The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626-1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavour 9622090834, 9789622090835

Citation preview

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavor 西班牙人的台灣體驗 (1626–1642): 一項文藝復興時代的志業及其巴洛克的結局

鮑 曉 鷗 José Eugenio Borao Mateo

The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange ᇝ຤ਝਝ჌ነ୺͚‫ݚ‬ਥ‫ټ‬ผ sponsored the publication of this book

Hong Kong University Press

14/F Hing Wai Centre 7 Tin Wan Praya Road Aberdeen Hong Kong

© José Eugenio Borao Mateo 2009 ISBN 978-962-209-083-5 All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Secure On-line Ordering http://www.hkupress.org British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

This digitally printed version 2010

Contents

List of Illustrations

vii

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

7

Chapter 2 The Arrival in Taiwan

31

Chapter 3 The Encounter

53

Chapter 4 The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

103

Chapter 5 Commerce in Northern Taiwan

135

Chapter 6 The Missionary Activity

171

Epilogue The Baroque Ending

201

vi

Contents

Annexes Annex 1: Annex 2: Annex 3: Annex 4: Annex 5: Annex 6: Annex 7: Annex 8: Annex 9: Annex 10: Annex 11: Annex 12: Annex 13: Annex 14: Annex 15: Annex 16: Annex 17: Annex 18: Annex 19: Annex 20: Annex 21: Annex 22:

207 The shipwreck in Taiwan of the galleon from Macao to Japan of 1582 The report of Bartolomé Martínez (1619) The small armada of May 1626 Record of the taking of Isla Hermosa (1626) The armada of August 1626 The armada of August 1627 The yacht “Domburch” reconnoitering Spanish posts in August 1629 The natives of Quelang The natives along the Tamsui River The initial acceptance of the missionary work by the natives (1632) Religious acts in Senar (ca. 1634) The death of the Dominican Fr. Francisco Váez (1636) Memorial describing of the forts in San Salvador in 1636 The battle of San Salvador (September 1641) How the captain of a socorro should behave (March 1642) The battle of San Salvador (August 1642) Interrogation by the Dutch of Teodoro, elder of Quimaurri (synopsis) (1644) Observations of the Franciscan Antonio Caballero about Yiguan (1649) Victorio Riccio met Koxinga in Anping (1662) The construction of the fortress of Quelang during the Spanish period The changes of the fortress during the Dutch occupation Trade and the Price Revolution in the Far East

Notes

249

Bibliography

273

Index

289

List of Illustrations

Figures 5.1: Inventory of a Spanish junk from Quelang to Manila 5.2: General commercial system in northern Taiwan

147 154

Maps General map of Southeast Asia 3.1: Native villages in the Taipei Basin 3.2: Native villages of Cavalan and archeological sites of Yilan 3.3: Schematic distribution of the Turoboan village 3.4: Natives villages in the East Coast, near Hualian 3.5: Location of the Basay villages in 1642 3.6: Archeological sites of the Shisanhang culture in Caquiuanuan 6.1: The Catholic missions around 1636 A1: The otilla of May 1626 for the conquest of Quelang A2: The eet of August 1626 against the Dutch A3: The eet of August–September 1627 against the Dutch A4: Movements of the Dutch troops in the battle of San Salvador (1642)

xiii 58 64 69 71 76 78 177 209 212 214 229

List of Tables

1.1: 1.2: 1.3: 1.4: 1.5: 1.6: 3.1: 3.2: 3.3: 3.4: 3.5: 4.1: 5.1: 5.2: 5.3: 5.4: 5.5: 5.6: 5.7: A1: A2:

The Dutch blockade of Olivier van Noort, December, 1600 10 Forces in the Battle of Playa Honda, 14–15 April 1617 14 Forces during the sixth Manila blockade, 1618–1619 15 Intitial composition of the Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense 17 Composition of the Reijersen Fleet, 1622 18 Dutch eets for the conquest of San Salvador city, August– 24 September, 1642 Population of Senar and Kipas 59 Population of the Tamsui-Pulauan branch 62 The six villages of Cavalan mentioned by the Basayan Teodoro in 1644 65 Natives of the Taipei Basin in 1646 82 General evolution of the number of natives in northern Taiwan 82 Spanish troops in Isla Hermosa (1629–1641) 123 Inventory of some important provisions sent on the relief voyage 142 List of eets and socorros in the Manila-Quelang route (1626–1642) 144–145 Income and payments of the Spanish coffer in San Salvador (1637–1638) 149 Esquivel’s records of the exchange value of some goods 152 Payments in the “Tayouan Account-Book” (November 1638– 156 October 1639) Tobacco shipped from Manila to San Salvador’s soldiers (1634–1642) 157 Number of Japanese ships that arrived at Manila 164 Composition of the Spanish armada assigned to conquer Quelang 1626 210 Supply of lime from August 1637 to September 1638 238

A3: Missionaries that came to Taiwan

244–247

Acknowledgments

I SPENT SEVERAL YEARS COLLECTING the pertinent documents that have been published in the two volumes Spaniards in Taiwan (2001, 2002). Without them this book would have been impossible. Quotations from this book can be seen profusely cited in the present one, under the initials SIT. I am indebted to many people in the making of this book, since a long process of research leads to a highly dependable situation on sources providers and advisors. It is impossible to make a reference to all of them, but I would like now to mention the help provided by Professors Florentino Rodao in chapter 1, Peter Borschberg in chapter 2, Peter Kang (੖਩ᄨ) in chapter 3, Zonlin Tan (ஹրʆ) in chapter 4, Kaim Ang (।ԙࠑ) in chapter 5, and Weijing Ku (̀৩ᕯ) in chapter 6. Also I would like to thank Professor Yi-chang Liu (ჳऩ‫ )ן‬who received me as visiting scholar in the Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences of the Academia Sinica (ɻ‫ޢ‬ ৑Ɂ‫م‬ɻʶ), where I spent three months completing chapter 3 of this book during a sabbatical semester. I am also grateful for the advice offered to me by scholar Paul Jenkuei Li (ңʧ‫)ސ‬, and for the enthusiastic researchers Yuchung Lee (ңิ ɻ), Pol Heyns, and Weichung Cheng (ሲၐɻ) in providing me materials and other miscellaneous help. Also I would like to thank the Amis writer Nakao Eki, who made the translation for the Chinese version and offered many insights in different chapters, especially in chapter 3, the one dealing with the natives; and to my former history students Tsonling Yang (ฦր፲) and Jacqueline Ou (ᅩඈ૪), who provided me materials and assistance, and helped me in the earlier stage of the Chinese translation. I should also give thanks especially to Ian Peng Leong Kwan (ᗐ‫و‬Ӫ), Jerome F. Keating, and Peter Herbert for their painstaking effort of editing the English text, and their suggestions offered to me in the process. Now that this study on the Spaniards in Quelang—dealing on one hand with deep oceans and extended kingdoms, but also with the small native towns of Quimaurri and Taparri of 600 inhabitants each—is ended, I would like to remember specially my maestro Professor Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, who many years ago told me: “It does not

xii

Acknowledgments

matter if you study the history of a whole country or a town of six hundred inhabitants, as long as the problem you are dealing with is universal.” Following his advice I tried to make clear that some cultural categories—like Renaissance and Baroque—can be registered not only beyond their conventional boundaries, but they can also be interpreted by unexpected actors or experienced by unconscious observers.

Fuzhou Zhangzhou Guangzhou Macao

Xiamen

Quelang Formosa

Tayouan

CochinChina

Babuyanes

Luzón

Cagayan Pampanga

Siam

Manila

Camboya Chiampa Chiampa

Cebú Mindanao Patani Joló

Caraga

Aceh Malaca Johor

Borneo

Ternate Tidore Moluccas

Sincapora

Sumatra Macassar Batavia Bantam Java

General map of Southeast Asia.

Introduction

THE ARRIVAL OF THE SPANIARDS in Isla Hermosa (or Formosa in Portuguese, currently Taiwan) from the Philippines can only be understood as another Spanish enterprise in the East in the context of the late Renaissance impetus, which originally started one century earlier with the aim of gaining access to the Spice Islands. This Renaissance action in the East can be observed through different perspectives not only in the Philippines but also in Taiwan, as we will explore in the succeeding chapters: belligerent national afrmation (chapter 1), intellectual interrogation (chapter 2), ethnological encounters (chapter 3), colonial construction (chapter 4), economic expansion (chapter 5), and Counter-reformist spirit (chapter 6).

RENAISSANCE

AS AN EXTRA-EUROPEAN DIMENSION

The Renaissance appeared as a cultural category for the rst time in the History of France (1855) by Jules Michelet. Michelet applied this category to the cultural changes in Europe in the fteenth and sixteenth centuries. Soon later Jacob Burckhardt gave a new vision in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860), where besides the “Revival of Antiquity” he also presented a world where daily life was worth being narrated, as well as other aspects of the human spirit like “the discovery of the world and man” or the “development of the individual.” Furthermore, when talking about the personality of a Renaissance man he emphasized cosmopolitism, individualism, and awakening of the personality; and when referring to the category of glory he mentioned the “morbid passion for fame.” He was referring basically to Italy and the republics of Venice and Florence, but his considerations had a more extensive application as the Renaissance expanded through Europe. He also presented the Renaissance as European imperialism, economic expansion, the decline of the church, and a romantic understanding in artists. But through the twentieth century new inputs have been added to this image, which focuses on the importance of trade, nance, science, and specially exchange with the East, presenting a more dynamic, interdependent, and complex picture. Another problem affecting the Renaissance is its duration. For how long was it present in European society? Some authors talk about an early Renaissance that ended in

2

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the Sacco di Roma (6 May 1527), when Spanish, Italian, and German mercenary soldiers sacked the city protesting about their delayed wages. Later the Mannerist Renaissance extended along the whole century, following the same patterns but amid a conictive and critical understanding. Besides, the Renaissance manifestations in Southern Europe, especially Spain, are not the same as the ones in the Baltic countries. And if we go beyond the European boundaries, the Renaissance still exists more as an existential attitude of imprecise chronology than as a world shaped by Greek architectonical forms and classical references. One of the most difcult challenges of the Spanish Renaissance expansion was to conciliate its impetus in the conicting triple search for God, Glory, and Gold. Was it possible to occupy new lands in the name of the king of Castile respecting the natural rights of the natives? The issue was brought to the universities for discussion, and the answer given by masters like Francisco de Vitoria was hardly echoed by the conquistadores when searching for El Dorado, the myth that contributed to the expansion of the Spanish frontier. This myth made its rst appearance in America in the mid sixteenth century, with an ulterior revival of searching for “lost paradises,” something that can be seen in literature. For example, in 1602 the book Miscelánea Austral was published in Lima, although it was written by Diego Dávalos fteen years earlier. There the idea of America as the ideal shelter to offer happiness to people was disclosed. Another similar Renaissance idea was portrayed in El Siglo de Oro, published in Madrid, in 1608, but also written twenty years earlier by Balbuena; here America was described as an Arcadia, a shelter from misfortunes. After experiencing that El Dorado was a moving and escaping idea, the myth crossed the Pacic several times, after every delusion. First, in the sixteenth century, looking for the islands of King Solomon; and second, in the rst third of the seventeenth century searching for the Rica de Plata and Rica de Oro Islands, preceding the moment the Spaniards reached Isla Hermosa.

MANILA

AS A COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC

The Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in 1521, but later they spent forty years in the Pacic Ocean making several tries to nd the route back to Mexico. In that process they not only had a territorial dispute with the Portuguese, but also a scientic one concerning the location of the Anti-meridian. At stake was Pope Alexander VI’s demarcation of the Moluccas and the Philippine islands. The dispute ended in the Treaty of Zaragoza (1529), which left the Spaniards a bare archipelago where the only rewarding thing was the conversion of the natives to the Catholic faith. Once they got established in 1565, they realized in the succeeding years that going to the Philippines was an uncertain destination, since less than one in every two persons who arrived in the Philippines would return. Amid several doubts Philip II decided to take this challenge of holding the archipelago and looking for other possibilities that the land could offer. At the beginning, the Philippine archipelago for the Spaniards was just Luzon Island and a few other islands around Cebú. The whole territory was bounded by Muslims in the south, the kingdom of Siam in the far west, feudal Japan in the far north along

Introduction

3

their way back to Mexico, and most importantly the great kingdom of China on the continent. In the last decades of the sixteenth century all these kingdoms were attracted by the silver of Manila that had crossed the Pacic Ocean, and by other opportunities offered to them by this city ruled by white people, who dressed quite differently. But, these foreign barbarians—as they might have been considered—still were worth some attention. Manila quickly became a multicultural society under the control of the Spanish elite, where the Chinese were the respectful settlers, who provided the most important services, not only as suppliers of silk for the cargo of the galleon, but also as artisans and farmers. Certainly, their abundant ne silk and porcelain jars were loaded once a year before the departure of the two or three galleons sailing for Mexico in early July. This was a dangerous trip of ve to six months, much longer than the secure trip from Acapulco to Manila that lasted only three months. Consequently the ow of silver from Mexico to the Philippines was more regular and stable than the Chinese silk going to Mexico. In other words, a common Spaniard in Manila could have been ruined by the loss of a ship returning to Mexico loaded with their unsold silk, while the administrators of the colony would safely survive given the more stable annual ux of silver to pay their salary and other needs of the colony. As a result, even though Manila was under the control of the governor general and the colonial administration, there was an elite class of citizens who commissioned the trade or enjoyed the administration of encomiendas, making this distant and isolated city resemble an Italian commercial republic, as sometimes the documents refer to it, by calling them the “citizens of this republic [of Manila].”

CONFLICT

AND EXCHANGE WITH THE

EAST

DURING THE

RENAISSANCE

In the succeeding years after the Spaniards got established in Manila (1571) they started to build relations with the neighboring countries. They soon got a very favorable impression of the Chinese since they opened their doors immediately after the Chinese coastal authorities received help from the Spaniards against the pirate Limahong who, although based in Taiwan, was moving near Manila. But, after Limahong’s escape, the desired direct access to China was closed. Also, some initial favorable expectations of friendship and political inuence in kingdoms like Siam evaporated since everything was affected by the inner power struggle within those realms. In any case, the unexpected fame of Manila’s silver became a magnet that converted the city into a commercial entrepôt. At the turn of the sixteenth century, this fame also brought her three crises with the Japanese (1597), the Dutch (1600), and the Chinese (1603). At the end of the sixteenth century, the Japanese were in a process of national unication under the authority of a military commander, the shogun Totoyomi Hideyoshi (ᔔϫ Ӟ΁, 1582–1598). But his impetus extended beyond the unication of Japan. He sent military expeditions against Korea and later, in 1597, even thought of conquering the Philippines. He had already heard about the Portuguese, the Spaniards, and even Mexico, especially since the fully laden galleon “San Felipe” shipwrecked in 1596 on the coast of Japan and awakened

4

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

his greed. The Spaniards prepared for a possible attack and they explored the coast of Isla Hermosa in 1597, considered as a possible fortress to defend against imperialistic Japan. The sudden death of Hideyoshi dissipated the threat and the Spanish interest in Isla Hermosa lost priority. The second crisis came with the arrival of a Dutch eet under the command of Olivier van Noort. It erupted when Phillip II excluded the Dutch from the Portuguese harbors and hence their participation in the spice trade. The Dutch, who had privately joined the Portuguese galleons, were now using their acquired knowledge to reach the Moluccas on their own. This crisis should be understood in the context of Noort’s arrival in Manila on a private basis in 1600 after crossing the Pacic Ocean. At this time, the powerful [Dutch] United East India Company (VOC) was not yet in existence, but the commercial success of Noort did in fact accelerate the creation, in 1602, of this commercial company. The third crisis was with the Chinese. The regular supply of silver from Acapulco attracted more and more Chinese to settle in the city, contributing to create and to spread the rumor that close to Cavite—the harbor near Manila where the galleons docked—was located a mountain of gold. By the very end of the sixteenth century even some mandarins were dispatched from China to nd out for certain if this was true. But, the Spaniards suspected that at the same time, they came to explore possibilities of controlling the Chinese colony, which they regarded as their own subjects, and later to control the Spanish colony herself. A series of misunderstandings and mistrusts ended in a Chinese rebellion and subsequent massacre of Chinese in 1603. On the other hand, the Spanish governors of Manila, as later happened to the Dutch, looked enviously at how the Portuguese in Macao managed to stay peacefully at the doors of China. At the end of the sixteenth century the Spaniards tried to establish a similar post near Macao, called El Pinar, probably in Lantau Island (ᙡ፾ࢌ); but this adventure lasted only a few weeks when it was stopped by a Portuguese eet. In fact, the only success the Spaniards can claim over the Portuguese was to take over some posts in the Moluccas Islands in 1606, since the Portuguese were unable to hold them after the pressure of the Dutch, whose presence started increasing from the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Dutch’s growing presence aimed to eliminate the Iberian competitors by force. The normal system was by pressuring with blockades of Macao and especially of Manila to cut the Chinese trade with the Philippines. The Spanish governor of Manila reacted in 1626 by occupying a post in Isla Hermosa to counterbalance the Dutch post established two years earlier in Tayouan (present Anping, near Tainan), and at the same time to see if it could be a second point of attraction for Chinese trade. But the move also had a religious signicance: rst, to help the missionaries nd better ways of sneaking into Japan, where persecution of Christianity was growing erce, especially since 1624; and, second, to nd a way to enter into China, avoiding the Portuguese control of Macao. All these above-mentioned parameters gave context to the Spanish Renaissance arrival on the island at the presidio of Quelang, a very small part of the vast Spanish Empire, and probably the farthest region where Spain’s armies would claim some

Introduction

5

sovereignty for sixteen years, and coincided with the worsening decadence of the Spanish Empire. On this island, as it happened in the Philippines, they also related very differently with countries like China and Japan, who were more educated and politically organized than the natives of Central and South America. On the contrary, they found themselves more acquainted with the diversity of Austronesian tribes, who populated the island.

THE

YEAR

1635

AS A TURNING POINT TOWARDS THE

BAROQUE

EXPERIENCE

During these years, Spaniards in the East showed interest in scientic problems, in which navigation and cartography were probably the most salient contributions of the Spaniards. The rst crossing of the Pacic, the location of new islands, and the description of winds were made by Spanish sailors like Urdaneta, who opened the Pacic to regular trafc. In the Philippines, the cartographer De los Ríos Coronel made contributions to navigation and made the rst detailed map of Taiwan in 1597, which was preserved for many years from the knowledge of their Dutch rivals. As the Spaniards had done in America, in the Philippines they studied the local botany and native languages, producing dictionaries and grammars. The rst translation of a Chinese book to a Western language was made in Manila in 15921 and other books featuring concepts of European cosmology were also translated.2 These episodes still continued in the sixteenth century, but we consider that the Renaissance experience of Europeans living in the East ended later than in their original centers of culture. The year 1635 can be articially used to dene a turning point towards the Baroque attitudes, coinciding with the arrival of the new governor general Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera in the Philippines. Since that year several events took shape portraying a new skeptical, pessimistic, and problematic understanding of the situation, a Baroque approach which we will be revealing in the following pages, particularly in the case of Isla Hermosa.

Chapter 1

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

THE EUROPEAN VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY started when the Portuguese explored the African coast at the end of the fteenth century. It was immediately followed by the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492 in the name of the queen of Castile, although the real aim of the expedition was to nd the western route to the spices region, the Moluccas Islands, known in Europe since the Roman times. These discoveries created a colonial competition between Portugal and Spain joined soon after by Holland and England and to a lesser degree other European countries. Now we are going to present briey the main European overseas empires as a way to understand the ultimate reasons for their arrival in Taiwan.

THE PORTUGUESE

OVERSEAS EMPIRE

We can trace the beginning of the Portuguese Empire to the fteenth century, when its naval power was built under the patronage of Prince Henry the Navigator who launched expedition after expedition to explore the Atlantic and the coast of Africa. The reign of Manuel I (1495–1521) saw the fruits of these expeditions after the Portuguese reached Brazil, occupying posts in East Africa and Madagascar, and gaining a foothold in India. They expanded this control to the sea routes up to Malacca (1511) and the Moluccas Islands, where the spices were located. After controlling the lucrative spice trade and during the rule of Juan III (1521–1557), they created the rst great European overseas empire in just a few years, reaching Japan in 1542 and settling in Macao in 1557. Juan III was succeeded by his grandson Sebastian (1557–1578), but Sebastian’s successor, Cardinal Henry (1578–1580) died without having appointed a Council of Regency to choose his successor. Philip II of Spain, who was half Portuguese, made good his claim to the throne by bribery and force, and was recognized as King Philip I of Portugal. In return he agreed to preserve Portuguese institutions, in other words, not to merge them with the Spanish ones. This created situations like, for example, a restriction in the communication between Manila and Macao.

8

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

THE SPANISH

OVERSEAS EMPIRE

This empire was basically located in America. Initially the Spaniards occupied the Antilles Islands, and in 1519 Hernán Cortés started to penetrate the Aztec Empire (modern Mexico), which after its conquest was called Nueva España (the New Spain). From there the Spaniards reached California and Florida in the north and Central America in the south. Later, the kingdom of the Incas (modern Peru) was conquered by Pizarro (1532–1535) and, subsequently, other South American territories met the same fate. In the Pacic Ocean, Magellan reached the Philippine region in 1521, and soon after his successor Elcano arrived in the Moluccas; but these discoveries only became effective forty-ve years later when Urdaneta discovered the route back to Mexico. Along the Atlantic Ocean, the economic exploitation was organized in the following way: from Europe to America they sent manufactured goods, like furniture, paper, etc. From America to Europe three kinds of products were sent: agricultural products (like corn, tobacco, potato, chocolate, coffee, tea, sunower, tomato, cotton, etc.), goods for industrial use (colorants such as indigo and campeche), and precious metals (particularly gold and silver). These metals had two destinations. The rst one was to Spain through the Atlantic Ocean; but, paradoxically, the silver ended up in the hands of Spain’s European enemies. It was used to pay the Spanish armies ghting in places like Holland and consequently it was spent in those lands. The silver later continued its movement to the East; the Portuguese and especially the Dutch used it in their trade with India and China, two countries with a huge demand for silver. The second destination of the metals was the Philippines. This Spanish colony was supported with a subsidy in silver called situado, which was used to buy Chinese silk to be placed in the Mexican and Peruvian markets.

THE DUTCH

OVERSEAS EMPIRE

By the end of the sixteenth century the Netherlands was the premier North Atlantic naval and commercial power. In 1594, when Philip II closed the port of Lisbon and all other Portuguese ports to the Dutch merchants for re-exporting, the Dutch decided to organize direct trips to Asia. In fact, they were familiar with the sea route to India and beyond, because several Dutchmen had already sailed on board Portuguese ships. Scores of Dutch ships sailed, between 1595 and 1602, to establish direct relations with the Spice Islands. The timing was very propitious for the Dutch because the Portuguese fortresses in the Estado da India (State of India, the Portuguese Empire in the Orient) were at permanent war with the Muslim sultans. Besides, these sultanates were controlling vital points in the spice trade and very willing to accept other merchant competitors. In 1596 the rst Dutch eet reached Bantam and was the rst to succeed in signing a treaty with the sultan of Java in 1597. In 1598, the Dutch already had factories in the Banda Islands, Achim (present Aceh), Johor and Patani (in the north of the Malayan

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

9

Peninsula). In 1601 Jacob van Neck left Patani for China to explore its market. Also they ventured the western route. Olivier van Noort reached Manila in 1600 and from there proceeded towards the west. Initially, private companies carried out this trade, avoiding ghts with the Portuguese. They were buying pepper, cloves, and nutmeg, in exchange for helmets, cuirasses, objects of glass, velvet, toys, etc. Finally the Portuguese viceroy of Goa decided to expel them. Conicts thus erupted. On the other hand, in 1600 the [English] East India Company (EIA) was founded in England, and English ships appeared in Asian waters. Consequently, the states general of the Netherlands became aware that the struggle to compete in Asia with the entrenched Portuguese and the emerging English would require a united effort. In 1602, they formed a single company, the VOC, nanced by a national subscription and governed by a board which directly reected the interest of the chief stockholders—the rich merchants of Amsterdam. It was given a twenty-one-year monopoly, freedom from import tariffs, and extensive political authority (to establish colonies, etc.) and military responsibilities (declaring war, seizing foreign ships, etc.) in the area of its operations. In the same year of its creation, a VOC eet sailed out on a mission to obtain a part of the pepper and spice trade from the Portuguese. They arrived at the coast of Johor, where they captured the cargo of the Portuguese ship “Santa Catalina” on 25 February 1603. Then, the VOC assigned one of its employees, the young jurist Hugo Grotius, to nd a legal justication for the case that could also be used in similar situations.1 In 1605, in the Spice Islands, the VOC conquered the Portuguese fortresses of Amboina and Tidore, forcing Manila to enter the area to help or substitute the Portuguese. But, after several skirmishes in 1609, the Dutch were practically in control of the spice area. The Iberians (Spaniards and the Portuguese) kept some parts of the Moluccas, Tidore, and a part of Ternate. The sultan of this island, who was in control of the production of cloves, became an ally of the Dutch. In other places, like Ceylon, the company initially failed against the Portuguese. However, in the coast of Coromandel, they established the factories of Masulipatan (1606) and Pulicat (1610), which became very important for their trade, because they supplied calicos, a product easily exchanged in Moluccas by pepper and spices. Certainly, the external history of the Iberian colonies in the Far East, during the rst half of the seventeenth century, can be dened by an increasing harassment by the Dutch economic, political, and ideological competitors. We can observe it through a myriad of sea battles and blockades, captives, deserters, shipwrecks, etc., from the Moluccas Islands in the south to Japan in the north. If we see this encroachment only with the information gathered from the Spaniards and the Portuguese, it is difcult to put some order and logic in all these military actions. But once we switch the view from these passive actors to the active ones, namely the Dutch, a more logical comprehension of the whole scenario emerges: a seasonal blockade of the Iberian harbors, especially Manila, to undermine their economic viability. We can say that there were ve phases in that process.

10

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

From the blockade of Olivier van Noort to the Moluccas War (1600–1606) In the rst phase of the Dutch-Spanish rivalry (1600–1609), the Dutch tried to conquer the main spice production area, the Moluccas, by removing the Portuguese from there. The Spanish governor of the Philippines, Pedro de Acuña, met that challenge by organizing a successful expedition to conquer the Moluccas (1606), replacing the Portuguese and confronting the Dutch. Nevertheless, the Dutch consolidated after gaining a solid foothold in 1619, in Batavia (present Jakarta), the center of the spice distribution area.

The “San Diego” episode (1600) Since 1596 the Dutch, after crossing the Indian Ocean, started to settle in the Moluccas region in competition with the Portuguese. In October 1600, Noort, coming from the Pacic Ocean, arrived in the straits of the Central Philippines to wait for the galleon “Santo Tomás” to seize its cargo. When he failed to see the galleon, he moved on to Manila. On his way he plundered a few native settlements in the Visayas Islands. In Manila he made a blockade and took some Chinese junks and other booty. Manila started its defense by arming one trade galleon and nishing the construction of one patache. Governor General Tello entrusted the defense to the senior member of the Audiencia (High Court), Antonio de Morga, because the main Spanish forces were in the South Philippines on a punitive expedition against the Moors. This was the composition of the two eets: Table 1.1 The Dutch blockade of Olivier van Noort, December, 1600 Spanish ships Ships “San Diego”

Tn

Commanders

300 Antonio de Morga

Dutch ships Ships

“Mauritius” “Hoop”: renamed

Tn Commanders

275

Noort

50

“Eendracht”

“San Bartolomé” 2 native vessels

50 Juan de Alcega

“San Jacinto” (Port.)

Esteban Rodríguez

(“Hendrik Frederik”: got separated

350

–

“Eendracht (Harmony)”: 50 until Brazil

Jean-Paul Desroches, Fr. Gabriel Casal, Franck Goddio, Treasures of the San Diego, Elf Foundation, 1997

On 14 December, Morga sailed out of Manila Bay and engaged the two Dutch ships in a six-hour battle (SIT, 31). As a result, Noort lost one of his ships, the “Eendracht,”

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

11

but he was able to escape to the other, the “Mauritius.” Morga also lost the agship “San Diego,” but he saved himself by swimming. The Spanish casualties were 109 Spaniards and 150 Filipinos. On the other hand, 13 Dutch were captured: among them, the British captain Wiseman. From then on, the Dutch started to attack Portuguese settlements in the Moluccas and Macao. They appeared there in 15992 and in 1601 they made a rst attempt to take the Portuguese colony. They tried again in 1603, 1604, and in the following year conquered the Portuguese settlement of Ambon. No wonder Acuña wrote in 1605: “I think that to drive the [Dutch] enemy from the Moluccas and from the islands of Banda, will be of great advantage to our affairs in Flanders, since the rebels of Holland and Zeeland harvest the products of these islands, and draw to them great wealth, by means of which they carry on war and become rich.”3

The rst Spanish counter-offensive (Pedro de Acuña, 1606) Consequently, Acuña prepared a eet of 1,672 Filipinos and 1,423 Spaniards against the Dutch. The governor stormed the Dutch fortication in Ternate and drove the Dutch from Tidore. Thus the three kings of this island (Batachina, Lalabua, and Cangaje) accepted the Spanish sovereignty. The sultan of Ternate was brought prisoner to Manila. The Dutch returned in May 1607 building a stronghold in the eastern coast of the small island of Ternate, from where they attacked the Spaniards and plotted with the native rulers against them.4 This victory had such an impact in Spain that the count of Lemos tasked Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, a court writer, with writing a historical account based on all the available ofcial documents that reached the Council of Indies to celebrate that victory.5 This move made the Dutch see clearly the importance of taking over Manila, a city that started to suffer regular blockades. But, on the other hand, they did not bother Macao any more until the famous invasion of 1622 (that we will talk about later) and the attempt of 1627.

Blockades of Manila (1609–1619) during the Twelve Years’ Truce The second phase of the Dutch-Spanish rivalry (1610–1619) almost coincides with the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) between Spain and Holland. The latter country beneted because it was allowed to return to the Iberian harbors; and in any case they did not respect the truce in the Far East. It was clear to the Dutch that their victory in Europe entailed the exclusion of the Iberians from the Moluccas region. Consequently, the Dutch started to show great interest in Manila, not because of Manila itself, but as a means to expel the Spaniards. They did not try to conquer Manila, but to suffocate the Spanish colony economically through seasonal blockades, trying to catch the galleons from Acapulco, and plundering the Chinese trade. The main Spanish answer was given by the military counter-attack of Governor Juan de Silva (1616) in the Dutch area, but without success.

12

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The beginning of the blockades The Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) between Spain and the Netherlands was a peace agreement that took effect in Europe, but was ignored in the East. The Dutch tried now to drive the Spaniards from the spice production region by (1) making assaults on the Spanish posts in the Moluccas; (2) cutting off the yearly aid from Manila; (3) inciting the natives, like the Moors of the south (i.e. Muslims in Mindanao), against the Spaniards; and (4) directing attacks on the Spaniards in the Philippines, especially by Manila blockades. The rst Dutch blockade in the Philippines happened in 1609 (SIT, 106). A eet under Captain François de Wittert’s command6 reached Iloilo and tried unsuccessfully to conquer the harbor. Wittert then went to Manila in April 1610 and started a blockade which lasted for six months.7 During the same time De Silva, newly arrived from Mexico with ve companies of infantry, prepared a eet to face the Dutch in Cavite. On 21 October, the Spaniards met the Dutch eet at the entrance of Manila Bay—the battle lasted six hours. The Dutch lost three of four ships, resulting in the death of Wittert, and the Spaniards captured abundant booty and prisoners. Later, in 1614, a Dutch eet—with two or three English ships—lay off Manila Bay for several weeks, paralyzing the trade. This can be considered the second blockade.

The second Spanish counter-offensive (Juan de Silva, 1616) In the face of the growing strength of the Dutch, the Portuguese and Spaniards decided to cooperate, but what was going to be an early model of an Iberian “union of arms” of the 1630’s ended in a asco. Implementation started on 21 November 1614, when De Silva sent emissaries to Goa to prepare the offensive. As a result, on 12 May 1615 a fully equipped Portuguese armada left Goa to go supposedly to Manila, from where both Iberian eets would set sail towards the Moluccas to meet the Dutch. But after passing by Malacca they decided to return to Manila, nding the city surrounded by a eet of the neighboring kingdom of Aceh. Both eets engaged in a battle in Malacca, and the Portuguese stopped the Aceh offensive, but their eet was greatly damaged. In December 1615 the Spanish armada in Manila—being ignorant of the difculties of the Portuguese—was ready but waiting in vain for the Portuguese arrival. Things got even worse for the Portuguese, because the rest of their eet had to face another unexpected offensive, now from the Dutch eet commanded by Van der Hagen. The Portuguese were able to stop the Dutch, but no Portuguese galleon was left after the offensive.8 Having no news from the Portuguese, De Silva left Manila in January 1616 with a powerful eet of sixteen large ships (with 300 bronze cannon), manned by 2,000 Spaniards, 2,500 Filipinos, and 500 Japanese,9 leaving the city totally disarmed in the case of a Dutch invasion. This eet left on 9 February and intended to inict a decisive blow on the Dutch throughout the whole East. This great armada—the biggest Spain had ever made in the Orient—reached the Singapore Straits at the end of February. They waited there for a month and warned the king of Johor to remain neutral in an impending Spanish-Dutch ght. But seeing that nothing had happened, two galleys, with De Silva

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

13

on board, went to Malacca to get more news, and they were very instrumental in the relief of beleaguered Malacca, which at the end of March was suffering the consequences of a new attack from the neighboring kingdom of Aceh. They abandoned the original plan after learning that the expected Portuguese reinforcements from Goa had been destroyed one month earlier by Van der Hagen and also because of the sudden death of De Silva at the end of April. The rest of the diminished eet, packed with sick soldiers, returned to Manila in a deplorable state without achieving anything. As William Lytte Schurz stated: “The debacle of this expedition is as important in the history of the East Indies as was the failure of the Invincible [Armada] in 1588, for it denitively settled the question as to who should dominate that region.”10

The third, fourth (Playa Honda battle), and fth blockades (1616–1618) The third blockade happened one month after the Spanish eet of De Silva left for the Moluccas, when the Dutchman Joris van Spielbergen came from Mexico to Manila, conrming in this way all the bad omens that the critics of the expedition of De Silva had foreseen.11 Spielbergen had been in Acapulco the previous year, unsuccessfully waiting for the galleons. He made his blockade (28 February–10 March 1616) and caused some harm,12 but being unaware of the poor state of the city defenses he rushed to the Moluccas, thinking that there he could help the Dutch, who supposedly were under De Silva’s attack.13 From then on the blockades started to be more systematic. The following year the Dutch reorganized a new eet with ten well-equipped galleons along with other smaller ones. This was the fourth blockade. The Dutch, now under the command of Jan Rodwik, went back to Manila looking for De Silva. They started the blockade in October 1616 and it continued until April 1617.14 By then, the destroyed Moluccas Spanish eet had returned with the news of De Silva’s death and the Audiencia, facing a new blockade, sent General Juan Ronquillo with seven galleons and other ships and a huge number of Filipino soldiers, who engaged in a erce battle against the Dutch in Playa Honda. Although General Juan Manuel de la Vega lost the galleon “San Marcos,” the Dutch suffered a complete defeat. Their agship, “Son van Holland” (Sun of Holland), was sunk, two more were burned, and others captured. Four ships withdrew to the Moluccas in bad condition, the rest of the eet, including the “Rood Leeuwe” (Red Lion) and the “Fresne,” went to Japan. These two galleons did not take part in the battle because they were plundering nine Chinese ships laden with valuable silks on their way to Manila. The galleons hastily unloaded their seized cargo because they were in a hurry to look for the yearly nao from Macao, which was expected to arrive soon; but a sudden furious storm devastated both of them when they were docking in the port of Cocci.15 A year later, in Manila, the Spaniards were able to gather more information on the rest of Rodwik’s unfortunate eet. Rodwik continued sailing the “Oude Son” (Old Sun). One of the contemporary chronicles, written in June 1618, considered that the “Oude Son” and the “Galiasse” started a new blockade from Ilocos to Manila in April that year, because “for almost two months two Dutch ships have been in the place and this has caused much apprehension in this city.”16

14

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 Table 1.2 Forces in the Battle of Playa Honda, 14–15 April 1617 Spanish ships

Dutch ships

Galleons

Commanders Artillery

“El Salvador”

General Juan Ronquillo

46

“Nieuwe Son”

Jacob Dircksz Lam 47

“San Marcos”

General Juan de la Vega

38

“Nieuwe Maen”

Martsz.’t Hooing 32

“San Felipe”

Captain Juan de Madrid

30

“Oude Son”

Jansz. Vianen

“Guadalupe”

Captain Juan Bta. Molina

24

“Oude Maen”

Meus Sandersz

“San Miguel”

Capt Rodrigo Guillestegui

31

“Der Veer”

Willem Jacobsz

“San Lorenzo” Captain Juan de Acebedo

32

“D’ Aeolus”

Job Corneliz

“Juan Bautista” Admiral Pedro de Heredia

30

“Roode Leeuw”

1 patache 3 galleys

Galleons

Commanders

Artillery

“Galiasse” 25

“Fresne”

Navas & Pastells, Catálogo ..., vol. VII, p. cccxcvi; Blair & Robertson, The Philippine Islands, vol. XVII, pp. 64 ff

The sixth blockade (12 October 1618–May 1619) In September 1618, with a view towards a new blockade, Governor Alonso Fajardo sent a ship to Macao to buy ammunition and, additionally, to engage in a little trade. Fearing that the Chinese sampans bound for Manila would surely run into the Dutch eet, he sent the Dominican Fr. Bartolomé Martínez as ambassador to warn the mandarins of Guangzhou (ᄤή) and Quanzhou (‫ݖ‬ή).17 Of course, the personal goal of Martínez was to see the possibility of establishing the Dominican order in Macao—something that he had already tried in 1612. The ship faced strong winds and was wrecked in Zambales, although no personnel damage was reported. On 12 October, ve Dutch ships appeared in Manila to rob the boats from China, as had happened in the previous years. In November, they allowed a Japanese ship with a license from their emperor to enter the city, for the Dutch did not want to harass them so that the Dutch factory in Japan could be kept safe. Following the blockade pattern they remained during winter and spring at the entrance of Manila. Meanwhile, Martínez was stationed in Lingayén, where he received orders to go to Cagayan to take a new ship and continue the trip to Macao. Martínez nally left

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

15

Cagayan in January 1619, but a big storm forced him to look twice for a shelter on the coast of Taiwan. He eventually reached Macao and returned to Manila, where he wrote an important document on the advisability of setting up a fort in Isla Hermosa to secure the Fujian-Manila trade and face the Dutch threat: It is said that the Dutch are trying to settle on this island at 24° … And if while awaiting his Majesty’s permission, the enemy should establish there rst, then the land will be lost and cut off from all trade. This will do the King no service, as [this question] could have been solved in time and without any cost. Once the [Dutch] have settled, it will be very difcult to drive them away because they will fortify themselves as required to destroy India and Manila. And because this is also important for Japan, the Japanese will surely help them. (SIT, 46)

At the beginning of May 1619, new Japanese ships arrived and were allowed to enter the bay. During this time Fajardo was preparing the defense and he was able to gather two big ships, two middle-sized, two pataches, and four galleys. Table 1.3 Forces during the sixth Manila blockade, 1618–1619 Spanish ships Ships

Dutch ships Notes

Ships

Notes

1 galleon

The one on board which Fajardo arrived

5 galleons

–

1 ship

Belonging to Japanese

9 ships

–

2 ships

Finished on time

caracoas

–

1 middle ship

Required to join the battle

1 patache

That was constructed

4 galleys Navas & Pastells, Catálogo ..., vol. VII, pp. xxix–xxx

When the Dutch learned that the Spaniards had a force ready to ght, they left the place and went for pillaging a native town in Ilocos before leaving the archipelago. But, some Dutch galleons were sunk; many ship parts, masts, etc., appeared a few days later on the seashore of that Ilocos town.18

The situation in the Moluccas We must not forget that the rst area of rivalry between the Dutch and the Spaniards was the Moluccas region. Since 1582, the Spaniards had tried to penetrate the Moluccas trade, but this only succeeded in 1605 when the Dutch drove the Portuguese out of Amboina and Tidore and the latter’s inuence in the spices region declined dramatically. The Portuguese now concentrated on their trade with India, China, and Japan, but always under the threat of the Dutch, who were in the Singapore Straits waiting for the

16

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Portuguese galleons going back to India after trading in China and Japan. This situation led the Spaniards to play a more active role in the spice area from 1606 on, after the successful campaign of Acuña. In 1617, the Spanish fortresses in Moluccas were located in Tidore, Jilolo, Tapongo, Payagi, and parts of Ternate; and their position was favored by the growing strife between the Dutch and the English.19 Although with some differences, every island had a similar complicated political environment20 and Ternate was a clear example of such. On this island the Spaniards had the main fortress of Rosario, which had six bastions, manned by two Spanish companies with 300 soldiers and a Pampango company with 150. Very near was the Dutch fortress of Malaio, with 200 soldiers, 150 Japanese, and some Chinese; they also had the fort of Takome near the Spanish Rosario along with a third fort Taloko on another part of this volcanic island. A similar situation held true on the next island of Tidore, where the sultan also had his own fortress. The interaction among natives and colonist was dened by alliances, treacheries, etc., complicating the situation in the area. First, the people from Ternate and Tidore remained loyal to Spain; but later on, they united with the Dutch to oppose the Spaniards. On the other hand, neither Spaniards nor the Dutch grew cloves or other spices, each in fear that they would be destroyed by the other. Nevertheless, the Dutch always took the biggest part of the trade of cloves, which were harvested only in Ternate, Tidore, and Moti. On other occasions, because the Dutch were increasing their control of the trade (especially after the foundation of Batavia in 1619), the natives became reluctant to sell cloves to them, and they sent the spices to the market of the nearby island of Macassar, where the European merchants also had commercial agents.21 The English arrived at Bantam in 1602 and met the Dutch, who had been present and in control of this town since 1596 after expelling the Portuguese merchants in 1601. In 1613, John Jourdain founded a factory at Macassar and soon later became president of the English settlement at Bantam and the leader in the growing struggle against the Dutch. They continued competing in the Banda Islands, until the VOC governor, Pietz Coen, attacked the English factory at Jacarta and destroyed it, building over it the colonial capital Batavia. In April 1620, when Coen had decided to strike the English in the Bandas, news of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of cooperation signed in Europe reached the archipelago.

Blockades of Manila (1620–1629) with Dutch eets based mainly in Japan In the third phase of the Dutch-Spanish rivalry (1620–1629) the Dutch felt ready to take over the entire Moluccas-Japan corridor, and they thought that the moment to set foot in Macao, or the Pescadores, or anywhere else like Taiwan, had arrived. If successful, this stronghold would open the door to a total control of the China coastal trade, but they did not forget that, being at war with Spain, they needed rst to get rid of the Spaniards in the Philippines. This time, the Spaniards tried to counter the Dutch by putting a fortress in the north of Taiwan (1626).

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

17

The Anglo-Dutch cooperation against Portuguese-Spanish trade (1620–1623) The Dominican Martínez had stated in his report that there was nothing to fear from the Dutch because at that moment they were engaged in war with the English (SIT, 46). However, precisely on 17 June 1619, the English and the Dutch governments signed the agreement known as the “Treaty of Defense” by which they united forces to ght against the Portuguese and Spanish monopoly in the Far East. The treaty allowed England to have one-third of the spice trade leaving two-thirds for the Dutch. The news of this agreement reached Bantam and Batavia in the spring of 1620 and forced the English and Dutch to put aside their old grievances and return conscated goods. Under this new treaty with the English, the “Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense” was created. All the commanders would form a council in charge of taking all the relevant decisions.22

Table 1.4 Initial composition of the Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense Dutch ships Galleons

“Haarlem” “Trouw”

English ships Commanders

Galleons

“Maan” “Palsgrave”

Commanders

“Bantan”

Admiral William Janszoon Vice Admiral Jacques Le Febvre Captain Douwe Annesz

“St. Michael”

Captain Leonard Jacobsz

“Bull”

Captain John Munden

“Hoop”

Chief Merchant Henry Vaecht

“Hope”

Captain Henry Carnaby

“Elizabeth”

Admiral Robert Adams Vice Admiral Charles Clefenger Captain Edmund Lewis

P. A. van Dyke, “The Anglo-Dutch eet of Defense, 1618–1622,” in About and Around Formosa, pp. 65–66

Just before the news of the Anglo-Dutch cooperation reached the East, the seventh Dutch blockade of Manila took place in 1620. The Dutch started their northern trip very late and, when going to Japan, they caught a sampan and a Portuguese frigate near Macao. Only three Dutch ships went to Manila to observe the situation and see if they had a chance to capture the galleon “San Nicolás,” which was coming from Acapulco with two ships. The Dutch ships waited in Espíritu Santo Cape and later engaged in battle with “San Nicolas.” The Dutch agship was damaged and later sunk, but the two others managed to reach Hirado on 26 July. If we compare the timing of this blockade with the previous ones, the main difference is that the Dutch spent the rainy monsoon season in Japan, enabling them to prolong the blockade for several weeks. Between January and June of 1621 the eighth blockade happened. This time the Spanish forces in Manila saw how the Dutch were accompanied for the rst time by English warships. A few Spanish ships were there while others were absent or destroyed

18

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

by previous storms or ghts. Fajardo was unable to do anything but to send a message to China to prevent the sangleys from coming to Manila,23 and to hold the walled city against a possible attack that never happened. At the end of June, the Dutch and the English went back to Japan. During this blockade, the Dutch and the English caught a Japanese ship, on board which were two missionaries, one Dominican and one Augustinian. The Dutch on their way to Japan feared the possible accusation that they had assaulted the Japanese ship. Therefore, upon arrival the attackers released the missionaries to the Japanese authorities to ingratiate themselves. According to the Spanish report of Jesuit Fr. Alonso Roman, the Dutch informed the Japanese that the only way to stop missionaries going to Japan was by destroying Macao and Manila, which they would be willing to do if they were provided with 3,000 to 4,000 Japanese warriors. The Japanese not only refused, but even ordered that these foreign ships were not to leave Japan with any Japanese on board.24 The ninth blockade of Manila occurred from December 1621 to May 1622. The Anglo-Dutch eet started this blockade at the end of 1621—earlier than in previous years. In April 1622, they captured the sampan of the Macanese Salvador Díaz, who later witnessed many of the Dutch developments while he was held a prisoner. In May the Dutch were again off Cavite25 and then moved towards Macao, where they blockaded the Portuguese colony from the middle of May to the middle of June. Something special happened at the same time. A big eet of eight commanded by Cornelis Reijersen, which had left Batavia on 10 April, arrived to help the operations with orders given by Coen to establish a fortied settlement in the Pescadores and, if convenient, to attack Macao. The English were disappointed because their equal partnership was destroyed; thus they split up with the Dutch and went to Japan. Eventually, the Dutch were defeated by the Portuguese; the remaining Dutch ships from the old Fleet of Defense along with some of Reijersen’s ships created a new eet, looking for places without European infrastructure. The Pescadores Islands were chosen for that (SIT, 63). Table 1.5 Composition of the Reijersen Fleet, 1622 Ships

Tn

Complement

Captain

Zierichzee

800

221

Cornelis Reijersen

Groeningen

700

192

Willian Bontekoe

Oudt Delft

700

196

Andriessen

Enchuizen

500

165

D. Pietersen

De Gallias

220

91

D. Floris

De Engelsche Beer

96

L. Nanning

St. Nicholas

40

J. Constant

Paliacatta

23

J. Jacobsen

Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, p. 76

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

19

The incident of Amboina (1623) and the Dutch arrival in Taiwan The Anglo-Dutch cooperation formally ended after the “Amboina Incident” (February 1623), in which ten English traders, ten Japanese, and a Portuguese were put to death by the Dutch authorities, who considered them as intruders in the Dutch monopoly.26 After that incident, the English ceased to be serious competitors in the great archipelago, which marked a new stage in the Dutch ascendancy in the Indies. A new step forward of the Dutch bid for supremacy was their landing in Taiwan. The Fujian magistrate told the Dutch to move from the Pescadores and suggested they go to Taiwan, where the merchant-pirate Li Dan had the base of his network. Li Dan was a key person in these negotiations, while Díaz was the interpreter for the Dutch. At the end of 1623, the Dutch explored Taiwan and started to occupy the Tayouan area, using it to harass the Fujian-Manila trade (SIT, 62–70).

New Dutch offensives (1624–1625) On 15 August 1624, the Spaniards thought that the Dutch would not come anymore that year (SIT, 57); but eventually they did and took a ship along with 30,000 pesos (SIT, 58).27 The following year the Dutch resumed the blockade again, when on 4 February 1625 Captain Pieter Muyser arrived off Cavite. His rst goal was to capture Chinese junks as he did on two occasions.28 His second goal was, if possible, to attack Manila with the expected reinforcements, which were, however, never met up.29 On 12 April, the Spaniards attacked Muyser’s eet somewhere between Cape Bolinao and Witter Island. Muyser lost his ship “Victoria,” but the Dutch defended themselves and were easily permitted to leave the place. The Spanish Maestre de Campo and the former governor Jerónimo de Silva were accused of cowardice and imprisoned because they did not exploit the victory. However, in his defense, De Silva was able to prove that his galleon was the only one that really engaged in the ght. It is possible that Muyser went to Tayouan and spent the monsoon season there, because De Witt, the governor of Zeelandia, wrote to Governor General de Carpentier on 29 October, mentioning that he did not receive any complaints from China about the two junks captured by Muyser and the imprisoned Chinese. Nonetheless, the Dutch stopped their naval operations in the Philippines for a while, but continued cruising the seas between the coast of China and Manila.30 At the beginning of 1626, the commercial situation was getting desperate in Manila, as we can see in this retrospective report of the Spanish governor to the king: Their object in fortifying it [the Zeelandia fort] now is that this place commands the passage of the ships from Chincheo (࿪ή) to this city [of Manila]. They have accomplished their end through the bribes which they have given to the mandarins, and the threats to rob them, as hitherto—namely, to secure the silks and carry them to Japan and Holland, as they are now doing, and take them away from this country, in this way ruining it, for

20

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

there is nothing of importance except this commerce. This clearly shows the harm done [to us]. Of the 50 ships that have come to these islands, nothing came [except] 40 piculs of silk while the enemy [in Tayouan] had received 900, without counting the weaves. And, if it were not for what has come from Macao, the ships [for Nueva España] would have nothing to carry. (SIT, 81)

The moment for the Spaniards to initiate a new offensive had arrived. Taiwan was now the scenario of operations. They tried to prepare in the most discrete way, but it was impossible. News of this move soon reached Japan and was brought back to Batavia by the Dutch ship “Zierichzee.” The whole preparation was known as early as at the beginning of February.31 How was the counter-offensive prepared in Manila?

The third Spanish counter-offensive (Fernando de Silva, 1626): Taiwan as the main scenario This new Spanish counter-offensive held Taiwan as its destination. We consider this counter-offensive by focusing on three moments (which we can read about in detail in the annexes 3, 5, and 6). In summary, we can say that the rst one happened between February and May 1626. The moment was propitious, because for the very rst time, during the regular months of blockade (December to July) in 1625, “the enemies didn’t show up,”32 as the bishop of Manila observed. Governor Fernando de Silva, expecting further attacks, developed a policy of defending the archipelago. The best defense was an attack, thus he organized a small Spanish eet of two galleys. The eet was under the command of Carreño, the commander of the Cagayano army which was moving around Ilocos from February to May. The eet eventually received the order from De Silva and established a post in northern Taiwan. This was the rst expedition of the entire counter-offensive. Besides the success of this timid counter-attack, other things also made it an auspicious time for the Spaniards, such as the arrival of the news from Macao—thanks to the information taken from the successful escape of Díaz in the April before—depicting the weak situation of the Dutch in Fort Zeelandia (Plate 5). As a consequence, the initial skepticism of Niño de Tavora, the newly arrived governor general, changed into an aggressive one in line with his predecessor.33 The second moment occurred in August 1626. Tavora prepared the second expedition to expel the Dutch in Taiwan and to help those Spaniards who had established in the north. However, part of the eet was destroyed by a storm and only a few ships managed to reach their destination (SIT, 89–90).34 Finally, in August 1627, Tavora prepared the third expedition to expel the Dutch from Tayouan.35 He personally commanded the eet, leaving Manila on 17 August, but soon later, a storm prevented the eet from continuing (SIT, 101).36 The end of 1627 marked a change in the initiatives—the Spaniards renounced de facto the attack on Tayouan and began to work on establishing direct trade relations with China.

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

21

Spanish and Dutch dealings with the Japanese: The Tayouan and the Alcarazo Incidents It is good to be reminded now of the role of the Japanese in this scenario. Both Dutch and Spaniards needed to be on good terms with them. The Dutch had important economic reasons since their main business was to conduct trade between China and Japan. On the other hand, in 1624 the Japanese had formally severed all their ties with Manila. The Spaniards tried to recover that relation, not only for economic reasons, but at least to give support to the persecuted missions in Japan, which the missionaries had never given up. But these aims resulted in a strong setback in both Dutch and Spanish camps for different but simultaneous reasons, in the so-called Tayouan Incident and Alcarazo Incident. Pieter Nuyts was a twenty-nine-year-old lawyer when he arrived in Batavia in the service of the VOC, in 1627. After one month he was appointed governor of the nascent Dutch colony in Formosa and one month later was sent as ambassador to the shogun. His lack of experience and his arrogance antagonized the Japanese so much that the shogun refused to receive him and he had to leave Japan after his failed mission. Therefore the Dutch trade with Japan suffered for his behavior. Nuyts returned to Tayouan where other problems, like the third Spanish armada and the lack of success opening trade with China, were awaiting him. In Tayouan he put pressure on the Chinese but especially among the Japanese vessels visiting Zeelandia who asked for taxes. These complained to him saying that before the Dutch had arrived they were there trading. Hamada Yahei, the leader of the Japanese community revolted (Tayouan Incident, 29 June–5 July 1628)37 and went to Japan with some Taiwan natives, pretending to be Formosan rulers, offering the control of the island to the shogun. After hearing this news from Hamada the shogunate declared an embargo on VOC merchants that lasted until 1632.38 After hearing this news the Spaniards in Manila became very happy because they saw that the opportunity to re-establish trade with Japan may have arrived. But the optimism only lasted a short time. General Alcarazo, one of the commanders of the failed armada to Taiwan in September 1627, passed by Siam in May 1628. He found there a red seal Japanese junk that—ignoring the Manila policy of appeasing the Japanese—he burned in revenge for a previous grievance.39 Consequently the tension between Manila and the Japanese authorities rose sharply. Nuyts tried now to take advantage of this uncomfortable situation between the Spaniards and the Japanese. He wrote a detailed report to the council of the VOC and explained the situation, emphasizing such a point: “We must do our utmost as to destroy the trade between China and Manila, for, as soon as this is done, we rmly believe your Excellencies will see the Spaniards leave the Moluccas and even Manila of their own accord.”40 Nuyts, still unaware of the Japanese revolt that was going to happen in his own palace, even ventured in 1629 with a small eet led by the ships “Domburch,” “Diemen,” “Slooten,” and the junk “Fortuyn,” to evaluate the strength of the Spaniards in Quelang. The “Domburch” drew nice maps of the Spanish fortresses in Tamsui and Quelang (see Plate 7), but in the end, no offensive was made. It is ironic that the recently arrived

22

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Spanish governor to Quelang was precisely the same Alcarazo, whose cannons in the fort of Santo Domingo in Tamsui repelled the ships sent by Nuyts.41 This was the only military confrontation, since during the next decade the hostilities between the Dutch and the Spaniards ceased in Taiwan and the trade between Fujian and Manila was restored. As in the Moluccas, both powers coexisted on the same land.

The 1630’s stalemate (1630–1639) The fourth phase in the Dutch-Spanish rivalry (1630–1639) was a very stable period without special conicts, although the Spanish monarch tried unsuccessfully to enforce a policy of uniting his forces with Portuguese armies to ght against the Dutch in all occasions possible.

The Spanish projects of Union of Arms The count-duke of Olivares, who acted as prime minister of Philip IV from 1621 to 1640, inspired the politics of the so-called Union of Arms. His political aim was to have all the territories under the same Crown contribute according to their capacity to the defense of the empire. This system took shape in 1625 with promising results. The Crown recovered Bahia (Brazil), which had been seized by the Dutch the year before. However, the duke’s idea failed on the whole and even caused in 1640 the secession of Portugal and Catalonia (which lasted until 1653). In the East, the attempt to implement this system aimed to unite the Portuguese forces of the East Indies with those of the Philippines to oppose the Dutch forces. This never happened, although several orders were issued. According to Benjamin Videira Pires, as early as 1609, when commerce between the Portuguese and the Spanish colonies was prohibited, it was ordered that the governments in Manila and Macao should help each other to face the Dutch and English menace. Pires also mentioned that Philip IV sent messages to promote the cooperation between the Spanish and the Portuguese armies against the Dutch in 1622, 1624, 1630, 1634, and 1639.42 On the other hand, we are able to trace along the rst half of this decade the moments when the king applied this policy particularly to the case of Isla Hermosa by sending messages to the governors of Macao and Manila to cooperate in expelling the Dutch under the Union of Arms scheme. We have registered them in the years 1627 (SIT, 108–109), 1628 (SIT, 116), 1629 (SIT, 136), 1630 (SIT, 143), 1632 (SIT, 159), 1633 (SIT, 212), and 1639 (SIT, 295). But the orders were never implemented.

The fourth Spanish symbolic “counter-offensive” (Corcuera, 1636–1637) During these years, the Manila initiatives were addressed against the Moors of Mindanao, not the Dutch. The king of Mindanao, Kudarat, had sent a huge predatory eet in 1633 to the Visayas (Central Philippines). Facing this problem, Governor Cerezo de Salamanca created a fortress in Zamboanga, from where Spanish ships could control

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

23

Moor movements. But in April 1636, Kudarat succeeded in dispatching a second eet ravaging the Central Philippines. The rst successful Spanish offensive took place on 21 December 1636, when the governor of the Zamboanga fort met the Moors in Punta Flechas (Cape Arrows), killing 300 enemies and rescuing 120 Christian natives and a Recollect friar. This encouraged the new Spanish governor, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, to organize a strong punitive expedition with four companies at the beginning of 1637 and to decide whether or not to discontinue the forts in Zamboanga and Isla Hermosa (SIT, 262–271). In March, they reached Lamitan and faced Kudarat forces. Corcuera returned victoriously to Manila at the end of May, after signing an agreement with Cachil Moncay, the nephew of Kudarat.43 Nevertheless, we can mention the last— but just as symbolic—counter-offensive against the Dutch, which took place just after the previous events. Pedro de Mendiola, the Ternate governor, sent two small galleys to ght against two passing Dutch ships; but the initial advantage of the galleys ended without consequence. This was a very relevant image of how the balance of power had changed denitively in favor of the Dutch.

From the falling of Malacca to the peace of Münster (1640–1648) The fth phase of what the Spaniards called “Dutch wars” (1640–1648) started at the same time as the independence of Portugal from Spain. The Dutch conquered Malacca from the Portuguese (1641) and Quelang from the Spaniards (1642), and resumed strong blockades of Manila. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Munster (one of those conguring the Westphalia Peace of 1648) between Spain and Holland ended the Dutch pressure, and the Spanish colony in the Philippines continued for two and a half centuries.

The Dutch conquest of San Salvador (1641–1642) War erupted again in 1640. The Dutch started furious offensives against the Iberian possessions throughout the Orient. Firstly, on 14 January 1641, after having been in Portuguese hands for 130 years, Malacca fell. Goa was cut off from Manila, which isolated the Portuguese from the Spanish territories—in fact, these two countries also became disunited in Europe by a Portuguese revolt for independence. The pressure did not stop; a new attempt was made in the following year. In August 1641, the Dutch attempted for the rst time to take the Spanish post in Quelang but failed (see annex 14). In 1642, between February and July, the Dutch navy cruised around the Cabo Espíritu Santo (Holy Spirit Cape) and Manila. Finally, in a second attempt made in August, the Dutch succeeded in taking the Spanish post in Quelang. How did it actually happen? On 10 August, Captain Hendrik Harouse arrived in Fort Zeelandia from the Pescadores with his soldiers. The council of Tayouan decided to send him on a military expedition to expel the Spaniards from Quelang. The main reason for this decision was that the southern monsoon was running to an end and it was impossible to predict when the promised reinforcements from Batavia would arrive. On 17 August, Harouse’s eet sailed to the north. It was a eet 690 strong: 369 soldiers, 222 sailors, 48 Chinese, 8 Javanese, 30 Quinamese (from an old kingdom in the middle of Vietnam), and 13 slaves.

24

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 Table 1.6 Dutch eets for the conquest of San Salvador city, August–September, 1642 Harouse advanced eet

Galleons and ships

Lamotius main eet

Captains

Galleons

Captains

“Wydenes”

Captain Hendrik Harouse

“Achtersloot”

–

“Kievith”

Captain Johan van Linga

“Lillo”

–

“Zantvoort”

Steersman Simon Corneliz

“Oudewaeter”

–

“Waterhond” “Waterhond” “Waeckenboey” “Goede Fortuyn” “Goede Hoope” Source: SIT, 379–382, 389

The battle started on August 19 and the Spaniards surrendered on 26 August. The chronology of the events was as follows: the long-awaited reinforcements nally arrived in Tayouan on 5 September 1642 under the command of General Johannes Lamotius who bore orders from Batavia to conquer Quelang. At that time, the results of Harouse’s campaign were not yet known. This was why the Dutch governor Traudenius and his council decided to dispatch Lamotius’s eet to Quelang to assist Harouse. However, in the short period between the signing of the instruction and the departure of Lamotius’s eet, the chief steersman Simon Cornelis unexpectedly showed up in Tayouan with a huge pilot boat, bearing the news that Quelang had been conquered.44 Nevertheless, Lamotius departed for Quelang on 9 September. He arrived there on the 13 September and took over command.

The last pressure against Manila and the nal peace Between 1642 and 1648, the Dutch continued to cut off the trade of the Chinese junks bound for Manila. They created great naval pressure in the Philippine waters. The rst encounter happened in 1644, but the main one was in 1646, which included several attempts. On 9 August of that year, instructions of the VOC command in Batavia were given to Marten Gerritsz de Fries, who was then in Capul Island (Central Philippines) waiting for the galleon from Acapulco.45 The instructions include: (1) to try to capture the Manila ship returning from Ternate; (2) to conquer the Spanish fort Costy and demolish it; (3) to cruise in the areas of Embocadero (archipelago gate), Espíritu Santo Cape, and Cagayan, in order to catch the Spanish silver ships coming from Acapulco; (4) to attempt closing Manila Bay to impede the returning galleon from going back to New Spain; and (5) to cut the Manila-Fujian trade. De Fries surrounded two Spanish galleons and another two ships in the Bay of Tingaw (near the Embocadero del Espíritu Santo), where the Spaniards were waiting

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

25

for the arrival of the silver galleon. The blockade lasted one month. The Dutch had to leave because they were losing too many men for lack of provisions. The Dutch retreated and the Spaniards pursued them. Finally, on 30 July 1646, a furious battle ensued, in which the Dutch lost the “Breskens,” the “Wisscher,” and other minor ships. The conditions were so bad and scurvy became so serious that a boat went ashore on Camarines Island. De Fries reached the village of Tagesuan and got a booty of “60 sixty head of cattle, which were used with satisfaction in restoring the eet condition.”46 In a different document De Fries mentioned that their failure was due to the diligence of the Spaniards, who set up res as warning signals all along the coastline, in case any Dutch ambush occurred.47 De Fries wrote in the following year (1647) that after his arrival to Tagima Island to await the Spanish ships from Ternate, a boat from Zamboanga, under the command of a Spanish lieutenant and with fteen Pampangos, came to await the Spanish eet. De Fries took the lieutenant prisoner and got relevant information that was forwarded to Batavia,48 when ending his mission. A new attempt was made in June 1647—Admiral Martin Gertzen attacked Cavite twice. During the second attack he met his death and his agship also sank. The rest of the armada went on to plunder the Bataan coast. The long series of Dutch aggressions ended as the news of the Treaty of Münster (1648) between Spain and the Netherlands (in the context of the Peace of Westphalia) reached the East. After this half century of Dutch pressure, what was the nal result of this colonial clash between these European powers? Schurz summarizes in this way: When the long series of Dutch aggressions ended in 1648, the Spaniards still held the Philippines and the Acapulco line was yet to continue for over a century and a half. But the trafc’s splendid possibilities of expansion had been checked. Of course, the restrictive policy of the Spanish government played its part in this result, but the cost of the Dutch attacks was irreparable. Not a galleon was taken by the enemy, though a few were driven ashore to be broken up by the waves, or scuttled to prevent their capture. However, to the comparatively slight loss of cargo that accompanied this sacrice of the ship themselves, there must be counted in the cost of the Dutch wars: the capture of many Chinese and Japanese vessels with cargo for the galleons; the drain of means from a small population; the diversion into defense against the Dutch of money and energies that should have gone into commerce; the complete cessation in some years of trafc, and so, the temporary disruption of the whole economic life of the colony; the entrance of vigorous competition into the Chinese elds, which the Spaniards had hitherto enjoyed largely to themselves; and the almost complete loss of all Spain’s possibilities in the coveted spice trade.49

Spaniards and Dutch in Taiwan: Rivals with a same fate During the time in which both colonial powers coincided in Taiwan, their rivalry did not reach the level of confrontation but one of mutual mistrust and permanent observation. This situation started in 1627, after the last Spanish Armada, and was broken in 1641

26

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

when the VOC felt condent enough to oust the Spaniards from Taiwan. Now we are going to see how these colonial powers were confronted with two similar challenges and to see how they faced them. By comparing the simultaneous Alcarazo and Tayouan Incidents we can understand the way they were still pushed by Renaissance optimism. On the other hand, by comparing the ways the Spaniards and Dutch experienced their defeats in 1642 and 1662 respectively we will explore how Baroque pessimism started impregnating their policies.

Considerations on the Alcarazo and the Tayouan Incidents The implications of the Alcarazo Incident—that we explained earlier—were handled in Manila like a state affair. On 19 January 1629, the governor summoned a council of theologians and lawyers to analyze the situation. The council concluded that the burning of the Japanese junk was unlawful, because of the lack of authority of Alcarazo for that action; therefore “he was obliged to compensate the Japanese for the damage he had infringed on them.” Nevertheless, seven months later the secretary of that council recognized that the only action that the council had taken up to the present was to free the Japanese, “and send them well provisioned to the governor of Nagasaki. [Additionally] the value of the conscated cargo will be compensated to their owners as long as Japan opens their ports to the Manila’s ships … [And the reason why still there is an] omission of the payment is to consider that the Spanish king has legitimate cause for a ‘just war’ against the Japanese.”50 But it is surprising that after reaching that conclusion, Tavora—instead of forcing Alcarazo to implement the compensation—sent Alcarazo to Isla Hermosa as the new governor of Quelang to contain the Japanese menace, by reinforcing the defences of Tamsui. After his arrival in northern Taiwan Alcarazo reported to Tavora saying that everything was already prepared for a Japanese invasion, something that he “would not fear at all, even if they dare to come with all their might, that it is said may reach 40,000 soldiers.”51 On the other hand, how did the Dutch react to the crisis created by the Tayouan Incident? As we have said earlier, the Dutch-Japanese dis-encounter started in 1627 during the arrogant Nuyts’s embassy to Japan, continued during the mentioned Tayouan Incident (1628), and reached its peak in 1630 when Nuyts maltreated the bogus Formosan embassy to Japan and the Japanese subjects who masterminded the whole affair. The situation grew so tense that the Japanese formally stopped the VOC ships in Japan52 and Nuyts was recalled to Batavia to be judged. At the same time, he was replaced by Putmants in Fort Zeelandia. This story was even recorded in Spanish records (SIT, 137). What happened to Nuyts in Batavia? We can answer that something similar to Alcarazo in Manila. He was found negligent (even guilty of promiscuity and illegal trade) and on 9 May 1630 was dismissed from his responsibilities and sent to prison, awaiting a formal judgement, although he was released from imprisonment after the arrival of his wife the following year. But in 1632 something happened that made his case different from the Alcarazo one. The High Government of the Indies decided to send Nuyts to Japan to account for his past actions at the Court of the Shogun. As Leonard Blussé pointed out,

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

27

“This extradition of a Company servant to a foreign despot was an unprecedented step in the annals of the Company.”53 This action pleased the Japanese very much, and not only was former trade resumed and expanded but also they released Nuyts after four years of imprisonment. Were these two government resolutions different? We think that in the nal analysis they were of the same nature, representing a still-alive Renaissance mentality common in both colonial powers of solving problems with audacity and self-condence, while the differences show clearly each country’s psyche. Alcarazo was declared guilty, but nothing was enforced against him; he was even sent on a bolder assignment to the Japanese frontier. The case of Nuyts seems the opposite but not if looked at from the VOC point of view. This apparent surrender was another real offensive, subtle enough to win the nal battle of getting back the commerce at the expense of Nuyts, who acted as a scapegoat. Spaniards, like Japanese, were bonded to the “king’s arms reputation,” or to the “primacy of honour,” while for the merchant nascent republic of Holland “strategy, opportunity and subtle diplomacy” was their main paradigm.

The Spanish and Dutch defeats Spain was defeated virtually by the Dutch in Taiwan since 1637 when the newly arrived governor general Corcuera decided on a progressive dismantling of the fortresses and a reduction of the soldiers. Nevertheless, the decisive battle happened ve years later. Corcuera had arrived in Philippines in 1635 after serving two years as the governor of Panama (1632–1634). The main concern of his policy was to control the Mindanao area disputed by Muslims. He was a brave man who even went to the military southern expedition of 1637 against the Moors. But the fact that he made these moves by diminishing the strength of Isla Hermosa reected not only a change towards a more conservative policy but also a mentality that had immediate consequences. The Dominicans stopped sending new missionaries to Taiwan, and they focused their activity on the island only as their main jumping board to China. No wonder, this time coincides with the nal decline of the Spanish strength in Europe. The end of the military career of Gonzalo Portillo, the last governor of Quelang, was a clear example of this decline and change of mentality. We know very well his life as a soldier reading the appointment of the general governor for his new post in Quelang (SIT, 309–313). After initiating his martial life ghting in Flanders, he moved to Mexico in 1611, where he enrolled as a simple soldier. Four years later, probably at the age of twenty-ve, he arrived in Terrenate and from then on, he participated in all the main battles of the Spaniards in the Philippines. Considered a trusted soldier, he was assigned to difcult missions and promoted for his bravery. Around 1625, he went to Manila and two years later he joined the third Spanish armada against the Dutch of Tayouan. He also accompanied Alcarazo during his expedition to Siam. His daring behavior led to his promotion as sergeant major of Terrenate—a full reward for this Renaissance soldier—when he was around forty years old. There, he continued ghting against the Moors, conquering their caracoas, and was even in charge of the Spanish fortress of

28

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the neighboring island of Tidore. Five years later, in 1633, he went back to Manila and took the post of captain of the Spanish infantry in the fort and garrison of the Chinese town of Tondo. Simultaneously he was appointed mayor and commander of the troops of Caraga (Mindanao), from where he went in 1637 accompanying Corcuera in his campaign against the Moors, particularly against the strong king Kudarat. So enduring in the battleeld, he was wounded by an arquebus on the left ear. Back in Tondo he fought in the general uprising of the Chinese in 1639 that ended in a massacre. After considering his career, Corcuera thought that he was the ideal man to replace the outgoing governor of Isla Hermosa or at least the only available one, despite his shortcomings, like his lack of administrative knowledge or his illiteracy, accusations that he received later when he ended in disgrace. When he became the governor of Quelang, Portillo was about fty years old. There he evaluated the defences and tried to rebuild some, even against the orders of Corcuera. He repelled the rst Dutch attack in 1641 with arrogant words that he was not afraid because he had met them before in Flanders. But the astonishing thing that happened to this professional soldier one year later is that he surrendered the fortress almost without a formal battle, risking the minimum. This behavior raises doubts whether he felt able to defend the fortress with the meager help sent to him by Corcuera (for which he blamed him constantly), or was he following a secret order of Corcuera of avoiding a formal battle to reach an honorable and fast unbloody conclusion. We think that his consistent career makes unthinkable the rst possibility, because he was clearly ordered “to occupy the fortress in my name [i.e., Corcuera] unto death; never to surrender or give it up to an enemy or to any person other than me” (SIT, 312). But the second situation is also difcult to believe, because that would mean dishonor and severe punishment. But Portillo deserves a third possibility to understand his behavior and his fate. Upon his arrival in Isla Hermosa, he might have experienced the contradictory policy of Corcuera and he could not defend a position that had been dismantled on purpose a few years earlier. Initially he might have been shocked, but later all the circumstances would lead him to a deep disillusionment and a new perspective of life, that the Spaniards call the Baroque desengaño, one that Don Quixote experienced after his defeat on the beach of Barcelona. In other words, he might have decided that faced by an eventual serious Dutch attack he would act ambiguously. He would not surrender the fortress, but he neither—for the rst time in his life—would send his soldiers to an unreasonable death. And he would take this responsibility alone, without expecting any human understanding, fearing how he would be legally treated, but at peace with his conscience. In his exile in Batavia he sent letters to the king imploring acquittal of his charges. Later, when his soldiers returned to Manila he moved to the friendly kingdom of Makassar, appealing again to the Spanish king and awaiting news of this. But the king ordered the Manila ofcers to capture him to be judged. We do not know what happened later because we lose track of him in 1645. On the other hand, observing the moments of the last governor of Fort Zeelandia Frederich Coyett (1656–1662) in his post, we can see he was a man of a similar fate. After he experienced a successful career he was left alone almost with his own resources

The Dutch-Spanish Rivalry

29

to face Koxinga’s invasion; or at least he felt so. Was he abandoned by Batavia or was it a problem of communication and bad luck? It is true that, despite the opposition between Verburgh (governor general at Batavia) and Coyett, the requested reinforcements, namely the eet of Admiral Jan van der Laan, reached Fort Zeelandia on time for its defense, although most of them set sail for a Macao blockade before the arrival of Koxinga. It is also true that upon the arrival of news in Batavia of Koxinga’s attack, new strong reinforcements were sent to Tayouan under Jacob Caeuw, who arrived to Zeelandia in the middle of the Chinese siege. The Dutch defenders received them with great joy, but in the nal analysis this eet did not accomplish very much, because they engaged in diversionary actions, and Caeuw went back to Batavia on the verge of the Dutch defeat. At the end, Batavia made Coyett the only one responsible for the loss of Taiwan. He did not escape like Portillo, and spent three years jailed in Batavia and was later conned for life on an island near Banda. When he was nally pardoned in 1674, thanks to the petition of his children and the intercession of the Prince of Orange, he wrote his magnicent Baroque account Neglected Formosa, presenting his version of the whole Formosa affair.54 He put the blame on Verburgh, for his “deep hatred against Coyett,” also on Van der Laan for his “insatiable avarice … in the Macao campaign,” and nally on Caeuw, for “his faithless cowardice in eeing from the siege with ships and the best men, thereby abandoning the besieged to their fate.” Neglected Formosa is a monument to the thesis that the honorable times had long gone, and honorable service would not be rewarded anymore. As Coyett said in his concluding remarks: “But although Governor Coyett and his Council, both before and during Koxinga’s siege, conducted themselves in everything like honorable men, it was all in vain, nor did it save them from being challenged in Batavia and imprisoned.”55

Chapter 2

The Arrival in Taiwan

IN 1571, SPAIN HAD ACCUMULATED almost seventy years of experience in colonial administration. The main discussions on the “right of conquest” and the “just war” were almost over in Spain, after the main contribution of the School of Salamanca, whose ideas gave way to the beginning of the Law of Nations. As a result, the Spanish monarchs produced a core of legislation that limited theoretically the authority of the Spanish governors (although sometimes they were beyond the king’s control). The occupation of the Philippine Islands by Governor Miguel López de Legazpi is oftentimes referred to as an example of colonization that tried to respect the principles of Francisco de Vitoria. In fact, Legazpi, the rst adelantado (expeditionary commander), had to stay in Cebú for ve years (1564–1569) waiting for the order of conquest of the whole archipelago and later proceeded through negotiations with the local chieftains. Before we enter into presenting this matter, let us recall briey how the concept of the Law of Nations was developed and how the question of Spain’s title to govern the Indies was discussed in the Renaissance academic and political circles of Spain.

THE

BEGINNING OF THE

LAW OF NATIONS (IUS

GENTIUM) IN

EUROPE

One of the rst rationales facing the issue on how to deal with foreign peoples was the one of the Roman Law. It was based on the concept that the Roman Empire was a superior civilization. Therefore, the emperor had the right and the duty, as the ruler of a more civilized nation, to extend to inferior ones the benets of his sovereignty. In this way, when the Roman Empire conquered a realm, it meant liberation from slavery to freedom. From this point of view, it can be said that the right of assimilation came from discovery and conquest. Later, the European Christian states produced a sort of Christianization of the Roman Law, in which the pope had the universal right to procure the spread of the Gospel in order to secure the eternal salvation of all men. Consequently, the nonChristian princes did not have full jurisdiction over their people. The most important right to conquer and govern other realms came by papal concession. In other words, primitive people would benet from being incorporated into Christian monarchies, not

32

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

only in temporal matters, but also in spiritual matters. Based on this theory, the Catholic kings, Ferdinand and Isabella, requested Pope Alexander VI for the right to undertake the conversion of the American natives to Christianity. In the 1493 bull Inter Caetera, the pope granted them the right to tutelage the spreading of the Gospel on the Western side of the globe. It was not clear however up to what extent they were authorized to use secular means. The questions that arose after the Spanish conquest in America were initially solved through medieval paradigms. For almost eight centuries (711–1492) the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula were ghting the Muslim kingdoms that had occupied this area, which was called Reconquista. This created a society accustomed to ghting, and this mentality was used in the conquest of America. But soon, the Spanish realized that the justication for the Reconquista in Spain could not be applied to the conquests in America. The Muslims were considered as unfaithful, anti-Christian intruders. On the other hand, the Amerindians could only be considered as pagans. This theoretical question became more real when the rst atrocities of the colonizers against the Indians were reported by some missionaries. The Spanish Crown started to consider if this historical process could be continued or not, and—if it were to be continued in America—what was the legal basis that might justify it. A complex debate on this topic arose in Spanish universities like Salamanca in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (but basically, from 1539 to 1551). During the sixteenth century some scholars and ofcers in Spain argued for the existence of a direct concession of the Indies to the Crown of Castile, either by God (providentialism) or by the emperor, but this idea was not intellectually important, although it existed in panegyrist circles. In other European countries, this providential doctrine was formulated, for example by James I of England, and can even be traced to Luther and Henry VIII. The idea of an imperial concession had many followers in Europe in the sixteenth century, like John Major and Almain. According to this doctrine it is not the pope but the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, called the caput orbis terrarum, who should distribute among the Christian princes the sovereignty over nonChristian peoples.

VITORIA, LAS CASAS,

AND THE NEW LEGISLATION

Other theories appeared around the sixteenth century, of which we will only introduce two; those of Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas that paved the way for the modern Law of Nations. The theory of Vitoria was based on the “freedom of acceptance,” expressed mainly in his Relecciones (1539). For Vitoria, (1) no pope or emperor can exercise temporal jurisdictions over other princes, Christian or indel. (2) The pope only had a regulating authority, by virtue of which a prince might be charged, to the exclusion of others, with the task of supporting missions. (3) If Spain had a primacy in dealing with other nations, it was because the pope, by virtue of his regulating authority, had conned the duty of evangelizing in the New World to the Spaniards alone, because: (a) they had the claim of prior discovery, (b) Spain was the nation best tted for the task,

The Arrival in Taiwan

33

and c) this would avoid strife among other Christian rulers. (4) This regulating authority might authorize some secular acts, like the provision of armed forces for the protection of missionaries, but it could not authorize a war of conquest. On the other hand, every nation (gens) possesses two rights, “peaceful commerce and intercourse with other nations” and “peaceful preaching of the Gospel,” and because the Amerindians were gentes, organized in independent states, they were bound by these two principles. Therefore, (5) the Indians would incur the penalty of conquest or just war (a) for refusal to hear the Gospel (but not merely for rejecting after hearing it) or (b) for refusal to admit strangers, and c) for unprovoked attacks on traders and missionaries. For Vitoria, neither the Roman nor the theocratic laws justied the sovereignty in the Indies, because the personal freedom of natives did not intervene in any case. Vitoria would consider the Spanish suzerainty lawful only (a) by just war or (b) when the natives freely recognized the sovereignty of Castile. Also he would consider conversion legitimate only if there was a free adherence to the Christian faith. But, whatever the justications were, Vitoria clearly would have preferred an empire based on peaceful trade to one formed by conquest. Regarding Las Casas, he had similar ideas as those of Vitoria, although he easily accepted that the Indies were “natural realms” of the king. For him, the main problem was created at the beginning when the leaders of the conquest deposed Indian rulers, made grants of land to their soldiers, and distributed local inhabitants to soldiers in encomienda.1 According to him, this encomienda system had usurped the royal authority and invaded the rights of the king. Besides, for Las Casas’s, the encomenderos (Las Casas himself was an encomendero before he became a Dominican) were not good tutors. Therefore, he thought that Indians should live in their own villages under the day-to-day government of their own chiefs; the royal ofcials should only administer justice, instruct the chiefs, and supervise them. These theories were followed by intense debates—scholarly and political—that had grave legal repercussions. In 1542, in response to Las Casas’s efforts, the Council of Indies promulgated the Nuevas Leyes (New Laws) prohibiting the enslavement of Indians. Later, in 1550, a formal debate was held in Valladolid, organized by Emperor Charles V, to evaluate the doctrine of Democrates Alter, a book defending the “authority of the settlers” complemented with a “benevolent aristocracy.” No formal conclusion was reached, and the book did not receive permission to be published. In 1573, the Spanish Crown disowned the ruthless methods by which the greater parts of its possessions in the Indies had been acquired. All these ideas were developed later by other jurists in Europe, like the Dutch Hugo Grotius (seventeenth century), who provided a justication for the Dutch expansion.

The beginning of the Spanish colony in the Philippines The sixty years between the arrival of Legazpi in Cebú (1564) and the expedition to Isla Hermosa (1626) generated all kinds of positive and negative experiences that all colonial powers might confront. Nevertheless, in tracing the seven years of Legazpi in

34

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the Philippines, we can know the birth of the colony and better understand the way in which it was shaped.

Cebú Legazpi arrived at the port of Cebú on 27 April 1564 and he asked the rajah Tupas for friendship through some emissaries. Tupas accepted but soon later, without any explanation, forced Legazpi’s men to leave the port. Legazpi considered that Tupas had accepted his friendship; therefore the subsequent refusal was an offense. Having justied himself with this thought, he employed the artillery of the ships and disembarked. Tupas and his people escaped to the mountains. On 8 May, Legazpi took possession of the island of Cebú in the name of the king of Spain. Afterwards, he made several calls to Tupas offering him peace and friendship. Some natives came back and nally Tupas himself appeared and had a formal meeting with Legazpi on 4 June. They made peace and signed a treaty of mutual alliance. The same happened with other chieftains, but some of them refused friendship with the Spaniards. Later, more people in the interior of the island joined the opponents since the Spaniards were in need of provisions. Legazpi called for a meeting and proposed to abandon the island, but one of the attendants convinced everybody that this move would be against the rights of the king. They decided to send a message to New Spain to explain the situation to the Audiencia and request orders from it or from the king. Meanwhile, they remained in Cebú waiting for an answer. Let us examine the main events surrounding Legazpi’s government, starting with his settlement in Cebú. First, the missionaries started their work and the daughter of Tupas was converted (as was Tupas on 21 March 1568). This good news was soon complemented when, on 15 October 1566, a galleon from Mexico arrived with soldiers and supplies but without any order of expansion. One year later, on 20 August 1567, two galleons commanded by Felipe and Juan de Salcedo, grandsons of Legazpi, arrived with new supplies but again without orders. Legazpi also faced another dilemma when, at the end of 1568, the Portuguese from the Moluccas blockaded the port of Cebú asking the Spaniards to leave the place. Legazpi, with Tupas’s support, was able to keep Cebú and the Portuguese ceased the blockade. Another problem came when he started to realize that Cebú could not provide enough food for the Spaniards. Legazpi decided to settle in the nearby island of Panay through a similar process of negotiation. He did so successfully and from there he explored southern Luzon. Finally at the end of 1569, Legazpi received a letter signed by Philip II appointing him as governor and general commander of Cebú and other communities he might or would establish in the future. The king also granted him faculties to govern those areas of the archipelago willing to recognize the Spanish rule. Things started to look more consolidated: in 1570, when three ships with fty couples arrived in Panay to settle there; and on 1 January 1571, when Legazpi founded the city of Santo Niño of Cebú, where the fty new families were located with the natives. The city was to be governed by a cabildo (city council) with two majors, one for each community, and the same laws of Castile would apply to it.

The Arrival in Taiwan

35

Manila The second episode after the consolidation of the posts in Cebú and Panay was the foundation of Manila. After hearing about the existence of an important town in the north, Legazpi sent Martín de Goiti with 120 soldiers and 600 natives seeking friendship. They reached Maynilad (Manila) on 24 May 1570. This was a Muslim settlement, governed by Rajah Sulayman, a nephew of the rajah of Brunei. The Spaniards asked permission to establish there in a friendly way, but the Muslims were suspicious and opened re against the Spanish ships from their small fort. Goiti considered that this aggression justied an attack. He conquered the place and stayed there for four days trying to win the friendship of the native Muslims. After failing in his attempt, he decided to return to Panay. Few months later, in April 1571, Legazpi left Panay with a eet of 210 soldiers and several hundred natives on their paraos (native boats, or praws). They stopped fteen days in Mindoro Island, where the natives welcomed them and offered their submission to the Spaniards in order to be freed from the sultanate of Brunei. There, Legazpi detained a Chinese slave trading junk. He bought the slaves, freed them, and sent them back home. This move won the sympathy of the natives as well as the Chinese who later went to Manila for trade. In May, the Spaniards arrived in Cavite, and the natives started to observe them. One of them, who had been in Panay, reported positively to the chiefs of three nearest towns, Rajah Sulayman of Manila and Rajahs Matandá and Lakandula of Tondo, who then started deliberations. First, those of Tondo put aside their suspicion, as Sulayman later did—he even donated a piece of land at the entrance of the Pasig River on 18 May. Soon after, other nearby towns went there seeking friendship, but some Pampangos of Macabebé refused and challenged the Spaniards to a battle. Sulayman sided with the Spanish soldiers, Lakandula took an ambiguous position, while Matandá was formally neutral. After his victory, Legazpi showed benevolence to the followers of Lakandula, recovering and fostering the mutual trust. On 24 June 1571, Legazpi formally founded the city of Manila, keeping the native name and appointing it as the capital of Nueva Castilla (later called Philippines). From then on, the inhabitants of Tondo and other villages witnessed how a Western city started to emerge. This was the very beginning of the colony. Although Legazpi died the following year, he still had time to see the results of the initial exploration and expansion, led by his captain Goiti and Lakandula in Pampanga by way of friendship, or in northern Luzon by his grandson Juan de Salcedo, who on different occasions made use of his weaponry. Legazpi, before dying, also established the encomienda system, and saw the baptism of Matandá and three sons of Lakandula. Following the indications of the king, the rule of Legazpi over his subjects—Spaniards and natives—was very humane and practical. For example, even if the local chiefs were converted to Christianity, they kept their civil and criminal authority over their subjects. So, the number of natives joining the Spanish administration and receiving Christian instruction grew. Nevertheless, not all the governors behaved like Legazpi, and the complete history of the colony is full of lights and shadows. Teodoro Agoncillo, a Filipino historian very critical of the Spanish presence in the Philippines, argued:

36

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Spain, by virtue of discovery and actual occupation, claimed the Philippines and made it a crown colony and therefore the Spanish king’s property … As a crown colony, the Philippines came under the control of the Council of Indies. Even so, the Spanish monarch appointed all the high ofcials of the colony and issued royal orders and decrees for its proper administration … [These laws] were collected and published under the title Recopilación de las Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (1681). This compilation testies to the humane character, at least theoretically, of the Spanish colonial system, which had no equal in the history of European colonialism up to the end of the nineteenth-century. The implementation of that system was, however, another matter … The Spanish governor … used his power not necessarily with wisdom but with malice aforethought in order to thwart the king’s good intentions regarding the natives. This explains why the Laws of the Indies, though humane, were generally dead letters in the Philippines.2

Vitoria’s principles as a reference in the conquest of the Philippines For the rst fteen years of the conquest, the encomienda system put in place by Legazpi continued its expansion, bringing along many abuses made by the encomenderos. This behavior of Christian colonizers displeased the Augustinian missionaries. They were imbued with the principles of Vitoria, on when a territory could pass to the suzerainty of another, and of Las Casas, to whom the emperor Charles V had bestowed the title of protector of the Indians. Therefore, they started questioning the legitimacy of the conquest of the Philippines, and, consequently, the legal presence of the Spanish government. They started demanding the restitution of the taxes collected by the encomenderos, creating a rift between the missionaries and the encomenderos, and even with the civil ofcers—echoes of which reached the Council of Indies. A rst step to deal with the problem was to establish an ecclesiastical structure, particularly the diocese of Manila. The Franciscans also held a special chapter in June 1580 in order to nd ways to improve the welfare of the natives. They agreed to urge the governor to promote the gathering of natives in single towns for their better governance, and to promote schools for the natives, teaching additional technical skills.

Bishop Salazar and the rst Synod of Manila (1582–1586) Domingo Salazar, the rst bishop of the Philippines, arrived in Manila in September 1581. The following year he called for an ecclesiastical council, the so-called Synod of Manila, “to deal with matters concerning the implementation of the Faith and the justication of the conquest made—and to be made—by Spain.”3 Following Vitoria’s ideas, they reached the conclusion that no valid claim could be made for the conquest of the Philippines, unless there was direct opposition of the natives to the preaching of the Gospel. And, if there was no opposition, there was no reason for a just war and subsequent domination. Therefore, the Spaniards had no right to collect tribute from the natives, unless they freely accepted Spanish suzerainty. But the problem was what to do

The Arrival in Taiwan

37

at that particular moment. For the time being, the problem eased after the king issued a decree, on 5 May 1583, for the creation of the Audiencia of Manila, to examine the abuses of the encomenderos and to punish them. The Audiencia became effective one year later after the arrival in Manila of the new governor general Santiago de Vera, and the new institution proved to be very effective in curtailing the abuses. The governor also brought a royal warrant in which the king encouraged Salazar to protect the natives. Nevertheless, after twenty years, the main problem about the legal ownership of the land was still not solved. The Synod started to realize that it was very difcult to nd a clear solution, and, on the other hand, the conquest had created a fait accompli difcult to reverse, and the only way was to nd a compromise by considering a possible “prescription” of the native rights. As Gutiérrez said, the Synod advised that the missionaries would do better by ceasing to talk about these problems, … to avoid division, scandal and to pacify the conscience of many conquistadores.4 In the following years, Salazar not only had softened his initial stand in a practical way, but also accepted the initiatives of Vera, a Renaissance conquistador, who even made fantastic plans for the conquest of China. In fact, Vera also had called earlier for an Extraordinary Council in 1585, to deal with the problems of the colony. The conclusions of the Synod and those of the Council were entrusted to the Jesuit Alonso Sánchez to be presented directly to the king. All the issues were discussed favorably in lengthy meetings of the Council of Indies, with the presence of the king, and the answer was issued two years later in the Instructions given to the new governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas (1589) upon his departure for his new post. These formed a very long document that (1) acknowledged the lack of original right to govern the natives but established a compromise saying that there were different kinds of natives, and over some of them—for example the converts—there was the right to govern. The Council also acknowledged that (2) the tributes collected unjustly should be returned. Philip II even contributed exemplarily with 12,000 pesos of his own to start this restitution. Many other things proposed by the Manila Council were accepted, such as (3) swift hearings of the complaints made by natives, (4) the creation of a hospital for natives, (5) the emancipation of slaves, whether they belonged to Spaniards or to other natives, (6) the granting to the natives of the same rights and duties as all the Spanish subjects, and (7) a series of privileges and exemptions to favor the natives. Finally, Salazar was appointed as the protector of natives. But, what had happened between the departure of Sánchez in 1586 with the request of the Synod and the arrival of Dasmariñas in 1590 with the answer to that consultation? Something important: the arrival of the rst group of fteen Dominicans in 1587 who were determined to implement to the end the ideas of Vitoria and Las Casas.

Arrival of the Dominicans and the revitalization of Vitoria’s ideas (1587–1597) Some of the Dominicans newly arrived in 1587 had received their theological training in Salamanca University, where Vitoria was teaching a few years earlier. Also they

38

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

were familiar with the spirit of Las Casas defending the rights of the Amerindians. Their arrival in Manila encouraged Salazar, himself a Dominican, to ght again for the justication of the conquest, for the ulterior right to govern the natives, and for the proper methods of evangelization. Among the new arrivals were Juan Cobo and Miguel de Benavides,5 who started working in the Chinese parian, and Diego de Soria, their superior. They were quite determined to implement the Vitoria principles, regardless of the consequences. When Dasmariñas came three years later (1590) with his instructions, which were quite favorable for the natives, the Dominicans were happy, but not entirely satised. Dasmariñas was so upset that he reported to the king saying that Soria, Cobo, and Salazar were preaching that the king, owned nothing in the islands, because they had been taken by unjust conquest. Salazar and Benavides sent reports to the king, and nally the eighty-year-old Salazar decided to bring the matter directly to the king. Salazar and Benavides left Manila in 1591 and reached Madrid in 1593. Salazar was heard very soon by the king, obtaining from him (1) the division of the Philippines into four dioceses. In the next meetings, he was also listened with attention, and, on 11 June 1594, Philip II issued a decree to the governor of the Philippines accepting that (2) the natives that were rulers before their conversion must keep their suzerainty after their conversion. However, Salazar received a great setback as well, when the Council of Indies decided that (3) tributes should be collected from all the pacied natives, whether or not they were Christians. This was too much for the already weakened health of Salazar, who died a few months later at the end of 1594. The discussions were continued by Benavides, who was appointed by the king as the bishop of the newly created dioceses of Nueva Segovia (North Luzon). Benavides was granted an audience by the king, for which he had prepared two reports on how the governance of the Philippines should be conducted. Benavides impressed the monarch so much that the latter forwarded them to the Council of Indies with the order to call for a meeting (inviting other religious authorities) to examine them and to reach a nal decision once and for all on related problems. Seven months later (October 1596) the council gathered again in order to reach a nal decision to be submitted to the king. This was nally done, before the return trip of Benavides to the Philippines. Then, on 8 February 1597 (a year before his death), Philip II signed a royal warrant ordering the new governor of the Philippines, Francisco de Tello, to gather all the authorities of the colony to nd ways in order to (4) restore the tributes that have been collected unjustly from pagan natives, over whom the king had no legal power and (5) to obtain, without coercion, ratication of the native’s submission to the Spanish monarch. In 1598, Benavides arrived in Manila with this unprecedented royal warrant and the governor started to give orders to accomplish it. Public meetings were held in Manila as well as in the town squares of different villages. The warrant was translated into local languages, and the natives, presided by their cabezas (native leaders), were asked if they freely wanted to submit to the king of Spain. The results were overwhelmingly favorable, although in some cases reservations or conditions were attached. For example, in Pangasinan, the natives agreed—as long as they received proper compensation for the

The Arrival in Taiwan

39

abuses committed by the alcaldes mayores (mayors of the cities) and the encomenderos and the unlawfully collected tributes were returned as well. Irrespective of whether the procedure was fully followed in all the corners of the Philippines, the fact is that from then on, it was difcult to sustain the previous statement of Agoncillo that Spain had claimed the Philippines (just only) by virtue of discovery and actual occupation.

The “El Pinar” episode At the end of the sixteenth century Portuguese and Spanish sources occasionally mention that there was a place located at the entrance of the Pearl River named El Pinhal or El Pinar, which was a small Chinese commercial port where Portuguese and Siamese stopped off probably for trade. In October 1598 Captain Juan Zamudio left Manila for Guangzhou, obtaining from the mandarins a license to establish him in that port, this action representing the rst Spanish attempt to challenge the Portuguese trade monopoly with China. Consequently the Portuguese in Macao tried to expel the Spaniards, but, as they were unsuccessful, blockaded the port instead. Shortly after, a formal order of expulsion from the viceroy of India arrived in Macao, and this time it was implemented, forcing the Spaniards out for good in 1599. Also it mentioned the adventure of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas who, on his way to Cambodia, got shipwrecked in China and spent a few months in El Pinar. Scholars like Albert Kammerer6 and Luís G. Gómes7 have discussed the location of this place, but Benjamin Videira Pires somehow settled the issue,8 locating the place on Lantau Island. In any case, the idea of occupying to El Pinar or some similar place near China was still present two decades later, as we can see in the report of the Dominican Fr. Bartolomé Martínez. This missionary made two trips to Macao, in 1612–1613 and 1619. The second trip turned out to be eventful, as the ship twice sought refuge on the shores of Isla Hermosa. In his report, he compared which place would be more suitable for a settlement near China, El Pinar or Isla Hermosa. After giving reasons about the convenience of freedom and independence for traders, he clearly concluded, “It is better for Manila to start here [Isla Hermosa] than in El Pinar or in some other part of the Chinese coastline, or even in Macao” (SIT, 40). He defended his point of view with such determination that, years later, he was the rst person landing in Quelang Bay (modern Jilong, in northern Taiwan) in the expedition of 1626.

The interest of establishing a Spanish post in Taiwan Since the occupation of Manila in 1571, the Spaniards expanded very quickly around the whole archipelago. In 1586, at a meeting of all the civil and ecclesiastical authorities to face the problems of the embryonic colony, the Spaniards proposed to King Phillip II, among many other things, to expand the reach of the archipelago to include Isla Hermosa. The rst chance to implement this plan seemed to appear in the years 1596–1597, when they thought it would be a good move to prevent the war that the Japanese shogun Hideyoshi (ᔔϫ Ӟ΁, 1582–1598) had declared on the Philippines. Another proposal of conquest came in 1619, after the trip of Martínez to Guangzhou. This Dominican

40

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

suggested establishing one garrison on Isla Hermosa in order to be closer to the Chinese to facilitate commercial dealings and to prevent the Dutch attacks on Chinese sampans during the blockade period. The Dutch pressure increased in 1624–1626, and the Chinese trade in Manila experienced a signicant decline. As a result, Fernando de Silva, acting governor of the Philippines, occupied a post in northern Taiwan, following, in fact, the original plans of Martínez. Let us see the whole process in detail.

The proposal to the king in the Junta of Manila (1586) Spain’s interest in conquering Isla Hermosa, or at least some strategic points of the island, turned up for the rst time in the memorial of the special council convoked by the bellicose Vera in 1586, which was sent to the Council of the Indies in 1586. The one in charge of bringing the document was the Jesuit Sánchez, who was also to carry the resolutions of the above-mentioned Synod of Manila for the bishop. Along the text of the Junta’s memorial, it can be read the following statement: Besides the said [Philippine] provinces, … between ourselves and those already converted, there are others that are quite distant either by location or by disposition but which cannot be called discoveries of ours because they are already known and being dealt with. They are getting worse everyday, and knowing this to be the case, it will be necessary for their good and our safety to pacify them. Later this will be very difcult or impossible to do. These provinces are Babuyanes, Isla Hermosa, Isla de Cavallos, Lequios, Isla de Ayuno, Jabas, Burney, … Mindanao, Siao, Maluco, and many others.

(SIT, 16) Probably the details of the text “escaped the King’s notice” when he signed three years later the “instructions for government” addressed to Gómez Dasmariñas, the new governor general of the Philippines, repeating almost verbatim many paragraphs of the memorial from Manila, as it happened with the cited text. Nevertheless, the mention of Isla Hermosa in a document signed by Philip II was important when thirty-seven years later (1626) this approval was recalled during the process of justifying the conquest.

Dasmariñas’ project during the Japanese threat of 1596–1597 The idea to send a military expedition to Isla Hermosa emerged for the rst time in 1597, when Hideyoshi menaced the southern seas, threatening Taiwan and the Philippines. As the Spaniards braced themselves for an attack, they churned out reports, like those of Luis Dasmariñas, and even the cartographer De los Ríos Coronel drew the rst detailed map of Taiwan in 1597 (see Plate 1). The apprehension died down with the death of Hideyoshi, leading the following year to the above-mentioned exploration of possibilities in El Pinar. But things changed when some Dutch showed up in the Philippine waters in 1599. The Dutch were an emerging naval power and Spain’s rival in Europe and therefore were capable of tipping the balance of power in the area (SIT, 18–38).

The Arrival in Taiwan

41

The suggestion of conquest in the report of Bartolomé Martínez (1619) The clash between the Dutch and the Spaniards in Taiwan was yet to come. However, by 1619, Martínez came up with a memorial regarding the advisability of establishing a port in Isla Hermosa. This was his rationale: (1) Martínez said that Pacan (Beigang) could be strategically comparable to Macao because it offered all the advantages of that city: good access to trade with China, low prices of goods, avoidance of taxes imposed by the mandarins, and none of the problems of living in Chinese territory. (2) The Spaniards would spare themselves the trouble of dealing with intermediaries to the mandarins and prot from the fame of Manila silver. Likewise, they would not be hampered by legal or defense concerns. (3) Taiwan could serve as a stopover point for the galleons on route to Acapulco, as well as a good watch post, just in case the Dutch found their way to China. The possession of such a port would avoid having a eet around to constantly guard the area. Once the enemy’s presence was felt, boats could be sent to warn China. (4) Martínez suggested that the conquest must be done as soon as possible, otherwise, either the Japanese would arrive earlier or the Chinese would cut down their trade with the Spaniards due to pressure from the Dutch or from Chinese pirates. The report was certainly read, disseminated, and analyzed—a copy of a follow-up document regarding the matter or perhaps an ofcial report based on this memorial fell into the hands of the Dutch. The Dutch translated that document into their tongue two years later (SIT, 48–53). Certainly, much of the data contained in this translation corresponds to the information found in the original Spanish document. Moreover, one may speculate that the Dutch managed to speed up their expansion into China— particularly the attack on Macao in 1622—when they had learned about the existence of such a document.

The immediate call for action after the increase of the Dutch threat (1624–1626) The arrival of the Dutch in Taiwan (rst to the Pescadores in 1622 and later to Tayouan at the end of 1623) created in Manila much uncertainty, making the Spaniards reconsider the possibility of going to Isla Hermosa. At this moment, political, commercial, and religious interests converged in a determination for action. Regarding commercial interest, we can say that the trade with China was necessary for the survival of the Philippines. The location of the Dutch in the Pescadores (1622–1624) and in Tayouan had caused a decline in the Spanish-China trade, as Pierre Chaunu analyzed observing the arrivals of the Chinese boats. On this pretext, the ofcers of the royal treasury of Philippines wrote a letter to the king (SIT, 57) as well as to the archbishop of Manila, Miguel García Serrano (SIT, 57), asking the latter for a remedy to the situation. We can summarize the religious interest was in the need of a safe stopover on their way to Japan and China. The Christians in Japan were being persecuted, and the Catholic Church already had several martyrs, both foreigners and Japanese. The Japanese ports were closed to missionaries. These missionaries were Jesuits going from Macao, and Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians from Manila. The

42

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Spanish Dominicans thought that Taiwan could be a good stopover to go not only to Japan but also to China, since the only way to enter China was Macao, which was under the control of the Portuguese. Besides, the Dominicans had a special interest in participating, and even promoting, the Isla Hermosa project for the following reasons: they had been established in Japan since 1602 and even had some martyrs there; they were dealing with the Chinese of the parian of Manila since 1588; they had tried unsuccessfully to enter China through Macao; the province of Nueva Segovia—the one comprising northern Luzon and even the Batanes Islands on the way to Taiwan—was assigned to them. As a result, Martínez, now the provincial of the Dominicans in the Philippines, saw the opportunity to implement his plans (of the report of 1619). According to the explanation of Bishop Diego de Aduarte (SIT, 84–85), concrete plans for the conquest started at the end of 1625 between Martínez and the governor of the Philippines. In January of 1626, some meetings were held between the provincial, the governor, the Audiencia, the archbishop of Manila, and some military men. Finally, a small eet of two galleys and twelve sampans left from the port of Cavite on 8 February 1626, reaching the northern part of Taiwan on 10 May 1626. (For details of the three armadas of conquest that were sent from Philippines to Taiwan see the annexes 3, 5, and 6).

The theoretical debate on the conquest In the Spanish colonial expansion, the sword and the cross were always together. The soldiers were supposedly to protect the missionaries, who usually acted as a moral power to counterbalance the excesses of the civil authority. For this reason, we can see how, even the conquest of a small position in Taiwan triggered a debate to justify the conquest. The political justication was given by the governor De Silva, who as the main ofcer in the colony was responsible for the move. He stressed the need to go to Isla Hermosa as a way to defend the colony from the Dutch, while the moral justication of the Dominican Domingo González (February 1626) tried to match the justication of the expedition not only with the theories of Vitoria (“right to preach” and “right to trade”) but also with others that Vitoria had opposed. Of particular mention were the practical reasons of Juan Cevicos opposing the move, explaining that no solution would be given to the problem, and that other new problems would be created.

Justication before the conquest We can start by considering the political justication of the governor De Silva (1624– 1626). He explained in a letter on 4 August 1625 to the king the importance of conquering Isla Hermosa for strategic reasons. He said that his predecessor Alonso Fajardo (1618– 1624) was already advised to do so (probably through Martínez’s 1619 report), and now he could not ignore the problem because the previous year the Dutch had fortied there and captured a Spanish vessel with 30,000 pesos. Once the occupation was done (May

The Arrival in Taiwan

43

1626), he wrote to the king again on 30 July, justifying once more his policy, saying that the trade had diverted to the Dutch port that year. The Dutch received 900 piculs of silk, twenty times more than the 40 piculs that had reached Manila (SIT, 81). The moral justication of the conquest was drafted by González (February 1626). On 7 February 1626, the day after the departure of the eet to conquer Isla Hermosa, González concluded a document justifying this move. We do not know how both things are related, but—considering that this document seems not of civil nature, but a private one—we can assume that the Dominicans felt the need to justify the action of occupying an alien island. González asked himself such a question: “Does this republic of Manila or, better said, His Majesty the King, have the right and the authority to colonize Isla Hermosa?” To this, he answered “yes.” The synopsis of his rationale (SIT, 58–61) was the following: According to the rst title of Vitoria, which is the right to preach, I must say yes, (1) because of the Bull Inter Coetera of Pope Alexander VI, in which “he entrusted the King and Queen of Spain with the task of sending preachers to all these kingdoms and provinces”; (2) because our experience is that these barbarian provinces have not guaranteed the safety of our preachers, consequently whoever will be sending preachers must also give them armed escort—not because the Gospel must be preached through violent means, but simply their safety has to be assured; however, these soldiers must never use their weapons unless they are gravely provoked; (3) since the safety of the soldiers who accompany the preachers cannot be assured unless they build a fort to defend themselves, then they can rightfully ask permission from the barbarians to do this, if this were possible;9 (4) since the pope and the learned men in Spain, such as Vitoria, approved this understanding, King Philip II then granted permission without further consultation; (5) since from Isla Hermosa the Dutch are cutting off our trade with China (which is vital for us), and then it is necessary to colonize Isla Hermosa for the survival of the Philippines. According to the second title of Vitoria, which is the right to trade based on the Ius Gentium (Law of Nations):10 (1) Our men, even if they are not preachers of the faith, can go and deal with the neighboring kingdoms and so establish trade relations with Isla Hermosa. No one can stop them from doing so as long as they do not give the natives a good reason to reject them. (2) In order to make this happen, they should set up a fortied place, where merchants and goods might be secured (from the surrounding natives, whose treachery we have long experienced — as well as from the Dutch — because if the Spaniards are not well protected, they will steal and kill them), as stated by master Vitoria. Finally, González asked himself if there was any difference in the case that the natives prevent the settlement of the Spaniards out of fear, justied or not. González said that, according to Vitoria, the Spaniards could still settle, if they really went with good intentions. Of course, they would rst send ambassadors to persuade the natives. Nevertheless, if they failed and the war came, it would be a “just war” for both sides, because the natives will be in an “error of judgment.”

44

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Reasons of Governor Tavora against the conquest (rose a posteriori) But not everyone was in favor of the conquest; for example, the new governor Niño de Tavora was skeptical after listening to this news. He arrived in Manila at the end of June 1626, and even showed some kind of dissatisfaction. De Silva had to explain and justify the action that had just happened to him—not only out of courtesy but also because it was customary for the incoming governor to make a formal judgment of the outgoing one as to the performance of his service. We neither have the details of the process of this particular judgment, nor its results, but we do know that Tavora, after demanding information from different persons, was reluctant: “The reasons to justify this move have been many. I, up to this moment, have not understood them all and I think only time will reveal everything” (SIT, 76). Nevertheless, his doubts were not on the nature of the move itself, but whether it was properly done according to the knowledge of maritime warfare. His main concern was how to protect this trade route from the Dutch, to which De Silva replied: “I can condently say that the [route] can be navigated nine months a year among islands and currents without a port on the eastern strip. And when the northern monsoons come, it is impossible for an [enemy] ship [to await us] in that area, due to the strong winds” (SIT, 82). De Silva, like other governors used to do in similar circumstances, collected all sort of letters of praise before his departure, which he could use later either to justify his actions in case of eventual accusations or for his personal promotion. Among these letters we can see the one from the archbishop of Manila dated 25 July, praising his government and the fact of “occupying the best port of Isla Hermosa, a task which was verily entrusted and ordered by His Majesty Philip II” (SIT, 79). Another praising letter was written by the ofcers of the Audiencia justifying the action of De Silva of stopping “the rebels from Holland … who are damaging and stealing from the ships that are coming to these islands to trade” (SIT, 83). Tavora had no alternative at that moment but to accept the consequences that the move of his predecessor might bring. In the letter of 20 July (SIT, 77) he manifested to the king the policy he would follow regarding this matter: (1) to keep the two galleys in good shape in order to facilitate the passage of the Chinese junks to Manila; (2) to involve civil merchants in the trade between Manila and Isla Hermosa so as to avoid expenses of the Crown; and (3) to provide ministers to procure the conversion of the natives to Christianity. Also, he presented to the king (1) a detailed map of the strategic location of Isla Hermosa, between China and Philippines. Besides, he was proud to give (2) the clear description of the fortress of the Dutch, which was made according to the report of Salvador Díaz, the Macanese who had just escaped from the Dutch fortress and safely arrived in Macao on 20 April 1626 (SIT, 62–70), and (3) a map with the situation of the Spanish settlement in the bay of Quelang (SIT, 74). Maybe because of the news, Tavora started to change his opinion and very soon became sympathetic to the endeavor of Isla Hermosa. He even organized two big eets of conquest to expel the Dutch from their post; the rst one left in September 1626 and the other in August 1627 (see annexes 5 and 6), but both were a failure due to bad weather conditions (see Map A2 and A3).

The Arrival in Taiwan

45

Reasons of Juan Cevicos against the conquest (1627 and 1628) The most serious objection came from the two discourses of Cevicos, written in 1627 and 1628. Cevicos had experienced the Japan-Manila route and the Dutch activity. As early as in 1609, when the galleon “San Francisco” was shipwrecked in Japan, he saw how well the Dutch fared in their rst voyage to Japan. Upon returning to Manila in 1610, Cevicos was captured by the Dutch and later released after a Spanish offensive was launched. The result of all these was his decision to become a priest. He worked in the cathedral of Manila until 1622 before he was sent to Madrid. From 1623 to 1630, he was based in this city, where he published his discourses. Cevicos’s discourse of 1627 (SIT, 106–111), which might have been also addressed to the Court, is more important because it openly protested the establishment of a port in Taiwan, a military move that had just become news in Madrid. The thesis of Cevicos’s long discourse was not moral, but practical: “The only reason for the Spaniards to fortify in Isla Hermosa is to drive out the Dutch from their fort and from that island.” Consequently, Cevicos (1) did not consider Isla Hermosa a strategic base for trade with China because, until then, the Dutch pirates were enjoying equal success at the entry point of Manila and at the exit points of the Chinese ports. He thought that (2) the Dutch were more interested in setting up a trading post that would make it easier for them to engage in commerce with Japan. A trading post offered intrinsic benets because the Dutch would be able to obtain the silver they needed to trade with China through it. They would be able to buy Chinese silk with the silver and then force the prices down, saying (to the Chinese) that the silver came from Manila. The consequence of this would be that (3) the Dutch would become more powerful and thus be a greater threat to Manila and Macao. Isla Hermosa might be turned into a springboard to launch an attack against Macao. Besides, (4) if Spain built a fort on Isla Hermosa, the situation would trigger new problems. For example, if the Spaniards tried to obstruct the trade between the Dutch and the Chinese, then both nations would become enemies of the Spaniards, “for each one is free to trade with whomsoever he wishes.” The situation would become worse if one tried to monopolize inuential zones by force. Cevicos also presented four other reasons in that discourse that seemed to comment against the report of Martínez, whom he may have met: (1) the island lacked natural resources; (2) if the Chinese ships were safer sailing to Manila, then the Dutch would wait for the boats at the exit of the ports of Taiwan; (3) Isla Hermosa was in no way a good stopover point for the galleons of Acapulco; (4) if Isla Hermosa was going to be an entry point for missionaries to China (clearly a reason of Martínez), this would only arouse suspicion among the Chinese, for they had not been informed about it, and the Dutch would act as they did in Japan, spreading calumnies that the missionaries paved the way for the conquistadors. Cevicos dealt in his second discourse of 1628 (SIT, 54–56) with different problems, but there he expressed the little danger that the Dutch represented in the Manila-Japan route, because they were expected to approach the Philippines from October to March, and lie in wait for the Chinese junks from April to May. They would then return to

46

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Batavia to avoid the period of furious gales starting in June. On the other hand, the ships bound to Japan from Manila would leave at the end of June or in July, the moment when the Dutch were not expected to be around.

Evaluation of the conquest of Taiwan according to the principles of Vitoria Can we say that the way in which the “conquest” happened was done according to the principles of Vitoria? To analyze this point we must check three different moments of the Spanish arrival in Taiwan by Vitoria’s principle of the Law of Nations, namely the preparation, the way the conquest was actually carried out, and the retrospective vision of the people involved in that endeavor. It would be difcult to reach a clear conclusion, because to evaluate the comparison between Vitoria’s principles and the actual process offers not only equivalences but also impairments. (In order to make clear our evaluation and not to interfere with the narrative, our comments are presented in the footnotes.)

The preparation Regarding the preparation we must consider the action of the civil and religious authorities. There is a sense of haste: the governor was new, the army was very small (only two galleys) and left Manila secretly, with only two hundred men and two cannon. In retrospect we can see that the religious authorities were very much in favor of the move, not only the archbishop, the Augustinian Miguel García Serrano, but also the Dominicans themselves. That is why they studied the licitness of the conquest and Fr. González, on 7 February 1626, the day after the eet departure, gave different favorable reasons (SIT, 58–61): The rst reason for going to Isla Hermosa, he said, was based on the papal bull of 1493 that “entrusted to the kings of Spain the task of sending preachers to all these kingdoms ruled by pagans … a matter in which the Pope had authority.”11 The second reason was based on the security that must be offered to the preachers and the soldiers. González said that they should ask permission from the natives to build a fort. If the answer was delayed, they could go ahead—it was more so for the proximity of the Dutch.12 A third reason was the Dutch presence in Taiwan, which would destroy the Philippines.13 A fourth reason was based on the Ius Gentium. All the ports should be common for all people and have the right to be protected. This right ceases when the common good of the natives is at stake.14

The actual conquest Regarding the actual conquest, we know that the Spaniards arrived in Quelang on 10 May, and the formalities of the conquest were nalized six days later on 16 May (SIT, 75–76), through a ceremony symbolizing “the possession of the port of Quelang and

The Arrival in Taiwan

47

the fort [to be constructed], representing all the things of that island”. They seemed satised, because they thought they had proceeded lawfully: First, “some missionaries and captains have negotiated with the natives offering them friendly dealings, but the natives refused to render obeisance to the King.” So, they took possession “in the best form and manner that can be lawfully allowed.”15 Secondly, they took possession “in the name of the King and considered the new land as a part of his royal patrimony.”16 But, it is relevant to recall the practical approach of the new governor general Tavora, who pointed out in July, just after his arrival, that “the reasons to justify this move have been many; I, up to this moment, have not understood them all and I think only time will reveal everything.” It seems that—for him and at that moment—the facts can be mainly justied if good results come; in fact, the rest of the letter shows that his main concern was trade. From these moments might come a new general map of Taiwan (see Plate 3), and a particular one of Quelang Bay (see Plate 4).

The conquest in retrospect Looking at the conquest in retrospect we can appreciate a sense of guilt in the civil authorities, not for the action itself but for the way it happened). The authorities acknowledged the occupation of native houses and the seizing of their victuals, especially rice. This was done because the natives ed their houses leaving everything behind, and this happened after the Spaniards made a show of might.17 The Dominicans also revealed that the houses of the natives were razed and burnt, although it is not clear if this happened in these rst days or in the next weeks or months. The Dominican Jacinto Esquivel also revealed that the Spanish authorities acknowledged the unlawfulness of this action and decided to compensate the natives with 4,000 pesos (real of 8). We know that six years later they had fullled a part of this payment: 400 or 600 pesos (SIT, 165). Esquivel doubted if the natives would receive more compensation for the damages they caused later.18 Finally, the Dominicans wanted to solve this question formally and asked again the trusted fellow theologian, González, if “the damages that the Spaniards inicted upon the Indians of Isla Hermosa, from the time they entered until this moment [were] justied or d[id] they owe them restitution?” González answered: The entry to Isla Hermosa was done amidst many debates about its justication. Fr. Bartolomé Martínez, a holy and learned man, very much respected by all, was in charge of everything. And thus in behalf of the Authorities, the Military Commander and the Captains, he concluded that on the whole it was justied even if individual soldiers committed some violations. He promised the natives compensation for the abuses and also for the land that the Spaniards seized. However, the Indians did not abide by this [arrangement] and instead perpetrated treason and theft, provoking [us] to wage war against them, and to withdraw the right to restitution. They are more indebted now and therefore deserving of more punishment, which is being delayed for the sake of peace. (SIT, 213)

48

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The actual relation with the natives The relation between the Spanish governor of Quelang and the natives was different from that in the Philippines. The Spaniards did not ask for tributes from the natives in northern Taiwan—although they had proclaimed sovereignty over the whole island in the record of the conquest of Isla Hermosa—because in practice they did not consider the natives as vassals, but as heathens to be converted, neighbors, and service suppliers. In that case, was the incident of 1636 (when natives of Tamsui killed several Spanish soldiers and a missionary in an ambush) a case of protest against Spanish tax collectors? The Dutch recorded the rumor that the incident was a kind of rebellion because these soldiers went there to demand tributes (SIT, 249). We think that this is a solipsistic view of the Dutch (who had been engaged a few months earlier in the suppressing of the rebellion of Mattaw), but not a real rebellion against tribute collection from the natives. At least, in Quelang, the native Teodoro made a clear statement in a formal interrogation by the Dutch saying that the Spaniards never collected tributes from them (SIT, 477). We think the missionaries explained it in a more realistic view, as they referred to a growing enmity and unrest (SIT, 244) that resulted in the killings when the natives saw the small party of soldiers who went from the garrison of Quelang to buy rice. But, in that case, the cause of the unrest is not explained clearly. In the collection of moral questions and answers that the Dominicans in Isla Hermosa asked González (SIT, 213–216) there is one made several years after the conquest that is worth bringing up here: “What form of just tribute may be imposed on the natives of Isla Hermosa, considering that they are not going to render obeisance to our King, unless through force” (SIT, 214). The question itself is important because it indirectly reveals that (1) the natives were not subjects to the Spaniards, and (2) they were not treated, accordingly, in other words, as they were a free nation. Also it makes clear that (3) if a situation of vassalage was going to be demanded from the natives, it would be achieved only by the use of force (a matter that is not recommended in that question). In other words, the person asking (maybe Esquivel) seems to stand for the maintenance of the status quo. Nevertheless, that person understood that (4) if a certain degree of “policy” (e.g. education, governance, etc.) would be offered it could not be done just gratuitously, and he foresaw that the governor might go ahead in asking for some tributes from the natives. The missionary was seeking advice on how to behave if that moment might arise. The nal words [“use of force”] of the question addressed the heart of the old topic of the Spanish conscience by pleading for a direct and clear answer, preventing González from answering something like “these were the old Spanish procedures in the Spanish America,” since in that case it would be even worse because “these very same doubts [might] apply to almost all of them [all these territories] at the onset.” So difcult was the question that González was only able to answer: “This is a very serious matter. We will nd out what is just only after hearing many other opinions” (SIT, 214).

The Arrival in Taiwan

49

The Dutch and their “justication” of the conquest of Formosa We can understand better the theoretical discussions of the Spaniards by comparison with the simultaneous arrival and occupation of the Dutch in Taiwan. Grotius, after getting much inspiration in Vitoria, developed a theory of occupation of foreign lands based on the treaties with the local rulers. These treaties offered a piece of land to conduct trade and set up a base for eet provisions. They considered offering help to the rulers when they were threatened, for example by the Portuguese. This would allow the Dutch to join a ght against these competitors and to seize their cargo. A consequential problem would then arise as to whom this cargo would belong, to the Dutch or to the local rulers they were ghting for? No clear solution was given, but this explains why the Dutch overseas empire, as well as the Portuguese, was made basically out of factories more than extended colonies. But the case of Taiwan was different. Formosa was the largest territory of the Dutch colonies. They had to solve, at least theoretically, the justication for landing in the early 1620’s, for controlling the neighboring villages in the late 1620’s, and for extending their political rule to the whole island, after the late 1630’s. In China the Dutch were unable to reach any agreement with local rulers, as the Portuguese did in Macao. To establish a factory in China without Chinese permission was dangerous both strategically and commercially, because in the nal analysis they depended on the Chinese silk and porcelain. A possible way was to occupy Macao, ousting the Portuguese competitors and replacing them. The justication behind this was based on the fact that Macao was under the same Crown of Spain, and they were formally at war with Spain. The failure in the attack of Macao in 1622 led the Dutch to end up in the Pescadores Islands, a territory at the Chinese frontier and far enough from China to establish a safe commercial niche. If China did not protest and force them to leave the place, they would consolidate that position. We have seen in the rst chapter that, after one year of stay, China protested and the Dutch had to leave. According to Dutch sources the Chinese suggested to them to move to Taiwan. For the Dutch that solution was at least practical, because they would not encounter again more Chinese magistrates’ opposition in a place without Chinese ofcers. They arrived in a big bay with emerging communities of Chinese and Japanese as well as natives living there. We do not have specic records of the arrival, but it seems that the lack of opposition facilitated their settlement there. The Dutch were aware that in the Philippines Spain was claiming the suzerainty of the islands and they tried to start doing the same with the villages neighboring Fort Zeelandia. An alliance was offered to the natives, by virtue of which the VOC would offer protection in exchange for the native acceptance of a kind of “Pax Hollandica.” The Dutch succeeded with the small and nearby towns like Sican, but others like Mattaw were unwilling to do so. To go forward, the Dutch had to consider them as rebels or hostile neighbors before using the arms and forcing them to submit. Another step to be taken to consolidate their suzerainty was to force the Japanese foreigners to pay some tribute for their trade. The Japanese, as we saw during the Tayouan Incident, opposed this policy but a few years later after the isolation policy of the sakoku—that

50

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

prevented Japanese sailors from leaving the county—the problem was solved. After more than a decade of VOC efforts trying to consolidate its power, “on 22 February 1636 headmen from twenty-two neighboring villages gathered in Sincan [the nearest of Fort Zeelandia] where … they agreed to enter into alliance with the company and to conclude peace with each other” (FE III, xii). At the end of the 1630’s the VOC could have claimed success, because they were (1) collecting tributes from the natives who were considered already vassals, and (2) leasing some land to Chinese farmers, who were considered free settlers. The natives probably understood this new Pax-Hollandica status basically as a way to accept a general authority in tribal disputes as well as in the difcult problem of dealing with the growing number of Chinese immigrants, etc. But the VOC, as other colonial powers, went through the next “semantic step” forward and understood “alliance” as “transferring of suzerainty.” This happened formally in June 1643 when the governor general at Batavia told the Tayouan Council, “the indigenous allies had to be made aware the fact that once they have entered into alliance with the Company and enjoyed protection, they also had to recognize the Company as their sovereign power” (FE III, xiii). Once this system was consolidated, it was a matter of making it extensible to the whole island, by gaining the transfer of suzerainty to each of the different villages. The process became standardized; some emissaries were sent to different villages to explain the new political situation in the island and therefore that it was a good measure to sign an alliance with the VOC to receive protection as well as intermediation in intervillage conicts. The natives were obliged only to pay some annual tribute. The whole process was completed or consolidated in the yearly meeting called “The Day of the Land” (landdag), and the rst one was held in 1641. At these meetings, the governor or his representatives made public the new appointments for the villages’ elders. In other words, the transferring of the authority was being made effective; very soon, four of such meetings were handled in the island (North, South, East, and West). The landdag meeting consisted also in a great meal and celebration, like a medieval courtesan ceremony or “Diet” presided by a king (the governor in this case), a ceremony that was labeled by Tonio Andrade as a “political spectacle.”19 Apparently, the process worked, but oftentimes the absentee elders in the landdag were many, while the number of those who promised to offer some tribute but failed to do so was even more. After thirty years of presence in Taiwan, the Dutch realized that collecting tributes from the natives would only lead to their alienation from the VOC, but how to nd a compromise between the interests of the VOC stockholders and the tough daily reality of administering a savage land? The problem was solved when, in 1647, orders came from Batavia saying that the tributes would not be requested anymore (FE III, 202).

Baroque compromises as the epilogue for the Renaissance discourses When men are engaged in adventures beyond their strength, sooner or later some of them are valiant enough to question the consequences and responsibilities of their actions. The search for a western route to the Spice Islands ended in the discovery and conquest of

The Arrival in Taiwan

51

America, a process that had unforeseen consequences. One hundred years before that, the Ming Court experienced similar vertigo when Zheng He (ሲ՗) started crossing the seas with condence, engaging the emperor in unforeseen diplomatic and commercial relations, stirring a debate between Confucians and eunuchs on the advisability of continuing these trips. Finally, the process was stopped abruptly, for still unclear reasons. On the other hand, in the rst decades of the sixteenth century, Europeans had gone so far with the Amerindians that they had embarked on a journey with no return, creating a situation difcult to reverse, and the only thing they could do was to re-conduct the situation in the best way possible. Among the Europeans, the Spaniards created their own model in facing the challenge. The Spaniards started following the Roman principle of discovery and actual occupation as right for dominance. Soon after, they asked the pope for a title granting them authority to preach the Gospel to indels. The boundary between the methods that could be used to implement this commission was ambiguous and was oftentimes cited to justify abuses, like the granting of encomiendas. The two topics of “authority” and the “right to preach the Gospel” were discussed at length within academic and political circles, inuencing the drafting of laws. But, when these laws came, half a century had already passed since the conquest and new realities had been shaped. When it was in a more mature state, the colonial system was transferred to the Philippines, where three kinds of agents were the main actors. First of all, the royal ofcers, who tried to enforce the laws amid many limitations, like the personal interests of the governors, the extension of the colony, etc. Secondly, the group of the colonizers included soldiers, veterans (some of whom were enjoying an encomienda but residing in Manila), and people making a living from their shares in the Acapulco galleon, etc. Finally, the clergy headed by the bishop and formed basically by missionaries. This group, while enduring expanding their mission, was also the most critical of the abuses of the encomenderos. It can be presumed that among the above-mentioned people, those with a more sensitive spirit lived in a state of permanent contradiction. Some of them had to reduce the scope of their mission to stay within the bounds of moral principles; others lowered their moral standards to reach their secular goals. Later, they might try to nd a solution to the problems they might have created. We have seen how De Silva was an example of the secular side. He was confronted with the growing initiative of the Dutch, cutting the trade between China and Manila and putting this city on the verge of extinction, as it was too dependent on this trade. De Silva had fought in Flanders against the Dutch; now he was again confronting the same foe on the other side of the world. How to face the challenge posed by those rebels against the same king and by those heretics that only few years before had shared the same religion? He looked for solutions and the ones proposed to him by the provincial of the Dominicans, Martínez, were convincing enough; therefore, regardless of whether he was persuaded or not at that moment, he decided on the conquest of Isla Hermosa. Martínez represents the spiritual side. He was determined to come to Isla Hermosa to set up a missionary bridge between the Philippines and Japan and China. His 1619 report looked much too worldly, because, most probably, it was his strategy to convince

52

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the previous governor Fajardo (1618–1624). Once the expedition was set up, De Silva and Martínez were sure about the lawfulness of this move against the Dutch, but how about the right to enter into a new land and to occupy it? De Silva probably did not care too much about the procedures. In fact, his commander Carreño, after waiting for a few days for an impossible answer from the natives whether they wanted or not to submit to the king of Spain, took possession of “the whole island as a patrimony of the King of Spain” (see annex 4). How did the missionaries regard the actual occupation? Was everything done according the principles of Vitoria, which González might have reminded them before his departure? In the reports they appear neither satised, because in fact some force was applied, nor disappointed, because after all no casualties were reported. If any problem was created, there would be time to think on it. Besides the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the English, and particularly the Dutch had to confront the issue of the justication underlying their colonization. What were the reasons applied by the Dutch in their colonial expansion in Asia? They declared—in the article 37 of the VOC’s charter—that “Spain and Portugal were enemies of the state, rendering their interest liable to attack and seizure as booty of war.” They confronted this problem for the rst time in 1603, one year after the foundation of the VOC, when the seizure of the fully loaded Portuguese galleon “Santa Catalina” took place in front of Johor, by Jacob van Heemskerk. The VOC, considering that the Portuguese were their main competitors and that the incident was likely to be repeated (as in 1605, the rich cargo of another Portuguese galleon “Santo Antonio” was seized by Admiral Van Warwijk at Patani), hurried to ask a young and smart jurist of the company, Grotius, to nd a legal justication for that. Grotius studied the matter for two years (1604–1606), producing a propagandistic treaty, De Iure Praede Comentaribus (Commentary on Law of Prize and Booty), of which only chapter 12, Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas), was published in 1609, on the verge of the negotiations between Spain and Holland that ended in the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621). In one sense, Grotius—based on many ideas of Vitoria—developed high concepts of freedom and peace, but at the same time he contributed to the expansion of the colonial Dutch rule in Asia. Regarding the other colonial powers, particularly Portugal and Spain, Grotius considered them as monopolists that should be banished, a matter that he developed in chapter XI of De Jure Praedae. There he defended that the act of a party [the Portuguese or Spanish] of preventing or actively impeding [other party: the Dutch] from exercising any one of the rights bestowed by nature is in itself a sufcient legal ground upon which to initiate and to wage a just war.20 Regarding the Southeast Asian rulers, Grotius recommended that the VOC should forge political and commercial alliances with them. Different from Vitoria and Las Casas (who addressed to the king and to the Council of Indies claiming with Renaissance vigor for the restoration of justice), Grotius was assigned by the VOC to write on the justication of the use of force. The VOC was very satised with his proposal, because “freedom of the seas” could sooner or later easily be understood as a “Dutch monopoly”; and “alliances with native rulers” as a “feudal suzerainty” as happened in Dutch Formosa. The illustration in the rst page of the book of Argensola (Amsterdam, 1706) was a good metaphor of Grotius ideas (see Plate 2).

Chapter 3

The Encounter

THE NATIVES OF TAIWAN whom the Spaniards and Dutch encountered belonged to the linguistic group called Austronesians. According to linguistic studies, the Austronesian family extends along the Pacic and Indian Ocean from Easter Island to Madagascar. The number of Austronesian-related languages is difcult to estimate; scholars’ estimates are from 500 to 1000. Academia Sinica researcher Paul Jen-kuei Li (ңʧ‫ )ސ‬considers that the Austronesians started in the north of present Myanmar around 7,000 B.C. and they spread in three directions, to the Ganges delta, along the Mekong River and along the Yangtze River. This latter group, around the year 5,000 B.C., might have reached the Chinese sea, and in 4,000 B.C. they would have entered Taiwan, coinciding with the early Neolithic period.1 Nevertheless, their great scale dispersion around the island would happen during the Iron Age period.

JAPANESE

STUDIES ON

AUSTRONESIANS

The studies of Japanese scholars at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century helped to start the modern classication of aboriginal groups, based on their linguistic differences, but also they studied other cultural elements like handicraft, family relations, tattooing, etc. Nowadays, Taiwan’s government recognizes the following indigenous groups: Amis, Truku, and Tao (on the Orchid Island) in the east; Atayal, Bunun, Cou, and Thao in the Central Mountains; Paiwan, Puyuma, and Rukai in the south, and Saisiat in the north. Kavalan, located in the northeast, joined the list in 2002; Sakizaya, previously a part of Amis, was recognized in 2007, followed by Seediq’s separation from Atayal in 2008. Other groups are still not yet ofcially recognized while many of their artifacts, clothing, etc., can be found in the museums of anthropology in Taiwan (National Taiwan University, Academia Sinica, Sung Ye, etc.).2 Regarding the early inhabitants in northern Taiwan, one of the first Japanese anthropologists, Ino Kanori (͠ॶ ཽर), mentioned for the first time the Ketagalan tribe in 1897, suggesting that they came from overseas 2,000 years ago, and they landed near the Shen’ao (૯ዌ, “Aodi” (ዌ֛)) harbor, near Sandiao Cape (ɍൌӯ). The first Japanese linguist to study the so-called Ketagalan language was Asai Erin

54

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

(૛ʂ య࠷) of the Taipei Imperial University, and since then the concept of Ketagalan and its boundaries has experienced several changes.3 Fifty years later, the modern Japanese scholar Tsuchida Shigeru (ɠ̈́ ಥ) attempted to dene the old linguistic boundaries on a map.4 Another modern scholar following the linguistic approach and working closely with Tsuchida is the above-mentioned linguist Paul Li, who considers that the Ketagalan language—or, at least, the northern Ketagalan—would be better called Basay language. Li proposes the idea that 400 years ago the Basay reached the Tamsui River, the Greater Taipei Area, and part of Keelung and Panchiao (‫׶‬ኽ), integrating the large Basay system, while in Yilan the Trobiawan Basay group was established. But, in our opinion, in recent years the name of Ketagalan, which is used to dene the inhabitants of northern Taiwan, has entered in a certain crisis, although there is no substitute for it. To our understanding, from reading the Spanish as well as Dutch sources of the seventeenth century two things are clear: (1) no Ketagalan tribe or Ketagalan language is mentioned at all, therefore it is risky to use this term to dene a tribe characterized by a common language spoken in northern Taiwan, or in the Taipei Basin. Ketagalan seems more like a “Japanese construction” that had been popularized at the end of the twentieth century. (2) On the other hand, the Spanish and Dutch sources only mention a maritime network of settlements with a common language, the Basays; on the contrary, the other villages are grouped around river basins and are dened geographically. We do not know if they belong to any special language group or have any particular cultural homogeneity.

ARCHEOLOGY

IN

TAIWAN

The archeological efforts to reach an accepted prehistoric classication in northern Taiwan also encountered problems. After different attempts, the proposal made by Sung Wen-hsun (宋文薰) in 1980 has become the standard.5 According to him, the earliest inhabitants of Taiwan belong to the late Paleolithic era, which in Taiwan is called the Changpin culture (長濱文化). Their remains were dated around 13,000 B.C. As with many Paleolithic groups, they relied on hunting, shing, and gathering for living. Around 4,000 B.C., the early Neolithic culture can be traced in the so-called Dabenkeng culture (大坌坑文化), where we can recognize the “cord-marked pottery,” and it can be related to the sites of the southern coastal area of China. A later Neolithic period can be dened from 2,000 B.C. to 200 A.D., in different cultures; among them the Bainan culture (卑 南文化) 6 in the southeast and the Yuanshan culture (圓山文化) in the north of Taiwan are the most important. All these Neolithic cultures grew crops and used tools related with this activity.7 Finally, the Iron Age started around 200 A.D. and it continued until the verge of the arrival of the Western sailors (1500). Several cultures must be related to this period, but in the north the Shisanhang culture (十三行文化) is considered as the main point of reference for all the new discoveries. This name comes from the archeological site discovered in 1959, near Pali (八里). In the residential area of this settlement, knive handles made of bronze from external traders were found;8 people not only used but also melted iron. Like other natives, they relied on shing and hunting for

The Encounter

55

living. Archeologists have also found a mass grave with some funerary trousseau, like agate, gold ornaments, etc., and some coins of the Tang and Soong dynasties, which reect some sort of intercourse with Chinese visitors during these periods. Finally, the historical data that was recorded during the Western presence in Taiwan (1624–1668) have provided a great variety of information (especially from the Dutch sources) about Taiwan’s plains aboriginals, or Pingputzu (平埔族), particularly those in the western coast such as the Siraya near Tayouan and the Basay and other inhabitants in the north and the east. This information begs the question as to how modern Taiwan aborigines can be linked to Neolithic cultures; rst, from prehistory to proto-history (seventeenth century), and, second, from proto-history to modern times. Lien Chaomei (連照美) sees some connections in the rst stage because in her excavation of the Peinan site she found several features that can be still recognized in the aborigines of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely head-hunting, tooth evulsion, betel nut mastication, and customs (like slotted earrings), leading her to believe in an “ethnic continuity.” Nevertheless, she shows her surprise when she must recognize that “prehistoric people tended to be taller than most present-day natives.”9 Regarding the study of the link in the second stage, between the natives mentioned in Western seventeenthcentury documents (and their archeological remains) with the Japanese or the modern ethnographic data, things are more complicated, because there are still few elements to relate, but expectations are higher. In fact the main success has been the possible location of old villages. Since the efforts of Nakamura Takashi (中村 孝志) in the 1930’s and 40’s that relate the lists of submissive native villages to modern towns, much other research of identication has been conducted trying to offer a general comprehension; rst there was one ofcial report conducted by Chang Yao-chi (張耀錡),10 and in recent times we have the vast research of Peter Kang (康培德). Furthermore, recent publications of a corpus of Spanish and especially Dutch sources have helped to revitalize these studies.

The groups of natives according to Spanish and Dutch sources The main body of references to nd the names of these tribes and their population through a deductive approach is the VOC documents,11 especially the list of villages from which taxes were collected between 1646 and 1655. Also, other Dutch materials, like the reports of the military expeditions or maps, particularly the one of junior merchant Simon Keerdekoe made in 1654 portraying the north of Taiwan, are useful to know the exact location of the villages. This map, although sketchy, placed many villages with some details that allow us to have a general image of the populated areas, and also reect the time of the Spaniards.12 Besides, Keerdekoe’s map has proved more reliable than expected when compared with the rst modern scaled Japanese map of northern Taiwan (made with triangulation methods in 1899) that reects with precision some old geographical features that cannot be recognized anymore.13 In this sense, it lls the gap of the geographical changes that have occurred between the seventeenth century and modern times. The most important thing, however, is that the original sites of the native villages are somehow still reected, and the Chinese maps of the eighteenth

56

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

century contribute to this assertion. Another different research system applied to identify the location of those villages is the inductive method of studying land contracts in the Qing archives. The studies of Nakamura were the rst attempt of a general mapping the villages mentioned in Dutch sources based on these Qing records. Many years later, the difcult issues of village location and grouping were followed by Wen Cheng-hua (溫振華), Chan Su-chuan (詹素娟) in 1999, and Kang in 2003. Nevertheless, the exact location of villages named in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be slightly different in some cases from their location in the seventeenth century, when mobility was easier; in fact, this kind of migration was already documented in the seventeenth century by the Dutch in the Basay case. The earlier general perception of the Spanish missionaries was more geographic than ethnic and it will not differ too much from the Dutch one. The Spaniards considered four homogeneous geographical areas (or provinces): (1) the Quelang area with the towns of Taparri, and Qimaurri, to which Caguinuauan (Santiago) also can be associated. The Great Tamsui Basin, divided into three parts: (2) the Tamsui River (from present-day Guandu Bridge (關渡大橋) to the mouth of the river) with towns such as Senar and Pantao, (3) the Quimazon River (along the Keelung River, modern Tianmu (天母), Shilin (士林), Tazhi (大直), and Neihu (內湖), called by the Dutch “the area of Quelang River”) with towns like Kimassow, that gave the name to the river (or vice versa); and (4) the Pulauan River (stretching along the Xindian (新店溪) River, in other words, modern Banqiao (板橋), Zhonghe (中和), and Yonghe (永和), called by the Dutch “the area of Pinerouan River”). Finally, the Spaniards mentioned (5) the farthest Cavalan area (in modern Yilan) and (6) the remote golden area (around modern Hualian), starting from Turoboan (in Liwu sikou (立霧溪口)—the mouth of the small river Liwu—at the Taroko Gorge (太魯閣峽谷) entrance) and stretching along the coast for more than 100 kilometers. Now we are going to see them.

Quelang Present-day Keelung is one of the cities of Taiwan with more history thanks to its deep and naturally protected harbor that offers a safe entrance to the island, especially from Japan (Plate 15). The at areas of the present Hoping Island (和平島, formerly Sheliao Island, 社寮島) and of the Dashawan (大沙灣) area of Keelung might still hide a great quantity of explanatory relics of Taiwan’s history awaiting exhumation, but until the present only one excavation has been conducted in each place. This excavation in Sheliao Island was started in 1947 by the Japanese archeologists, Kokubu Naoichi (國分 直一) and Kaneseki Takeo (金關 丈夫). They unearthed two sites, nowadays catalogued under the name of SLT: (A) a graveyard with stone tombs attached to it, and (B) a dwelling area with some pottery with geometric decoration, porcelains, axes, etc.14 These Japanese scholars related these remains to the linguistic Ketagalan culture, but nowadays we relate these archeological artifacts to the Shisanhang prehistoric culture. Do these artifacts belong to the proto-historical people of Quimaurri who shared Sheliao Island with the Spaniards? This question is impossible to answer at the present moment without more

The Encounter

57

precise chronological data. Furthermore, it is not only impossible because of imprecise dating, but also because the number of artifacts uncovered were few, and also because the Quimaurri people were located in a place near the present-day shipyards opposite to that of the excavation site. The answer is probably no, but it still gives us one idea of that culture. Regarding the village of Taparri in the Spanish period, it was located in the Dashawan area, where another earlier excavation was made in 1935. The archeologist Kawai Takatoshi (河井 隆敏) found some materials difcult to classify, but somehow related them to the Ketagalan culture (as mentioned earlier, this was the way the Japanese called the aborigines of northern Taiwan); among them he found four shell tombs.15 (We will explain further other aspects of these two villages of Quelang Bay, Quimaurri and Taparri, when talking about the city of San Salvador in chapter 4). Another village related to Quelang, not geographically but culturally, was Caquiuanuan [Santiago, St. Iago], which we will comment on with more detail later when describing the Basayan villages as a whole.

Tamsui River When the Spaniards and Fr. Bartolomé Martínez arrived in 1628 in Tamsui, they observed similar reactions in the natives as in Quelang two years before. The natives living on a hill half a league from the river ed into the inner area of (1) Senar (SIT, 221), to a place commonly identied as Linzishe (林子社), where there grows, among other things, a kind of tall long red root crop used to dye shing nets (SIT, 168). According to the information provided by Jacinto Esquivel, who four years later lived in Senar for a few months, the natives who ed had built eight or nine different small villages near Senar. He tried, in 1632, to bring them back closer to their former place, in a pleasant area located on top of a hill, surrounded by farmlands and fruit trees.16 The main reason to do so was to facilitate the possible preaching to them. As we will see in chapter 6, after Esquivel left the place that same year, Brother Jiménez established also in Senar, and he succeeded in bringing back the runaway natives near their original place (SIT, 225). He was helped by Captain Luis de Guzman, who, with the aid of his soldiers, built in a few days a house and a church, where a religious image from Senar was placed. The natives started to build their houses in the form of a town which they called (2) Rosario (SIT, 225). But, in January 1636, some of the natives under the leadership of Pila rebelled, killing the missionary Fr. Francisco Váez, and burned down the town and the church, escaping again to the inland (SIT, 239–241). Few months later, the new missionary Fr. Luis Muro tried to bring back the natives to Rosario, succeeding temporarily, but in one of his attempts—when he was accompanying a group of soldiers buying rice—he was ambushed and killed. As a result, not only the mission but also the fort were abandoned and probably the dwellings of the village Rosario vanished, while Senar continued as the main village. Thanks to Dutch sources we have the name of the headman of Senar in 1646, Tenayan, as well as the gures for the population for ten years. Senar probably comprised two different towns, as the map of Keerdekoe (1654) reect (see Plate 15):

58

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Kaggilach 小雞籠社 Toetona 大屯社

Taparri el Viejo

Kipas Senar Santo Domingo Taparri Rapan Pantao

Quipatao

北投 Touckenan Kirananna

天母 Kimassow

Cattaijo

士林

Pourempon Baritschoen villages

三重

Kimalitsigowan

Rieuweovas Rivrycq

Pulauan

汐止 Lichoco Kippanas

Kimotsi

台北

新莊

內湖

板橋

木柵

Sirong Cournangh

中和

樹林

Quinare

新店 Rybats

土城

Paytsie

Map 3.1 Native villages in the Taipei Basin. The possible old river-bed is indicated by the darker superimposition on the present river-bed. The darker villages along the coast are Basay villages.

The Encounter

59

Table 3.1 Population of Senar and Kipas

Senar

1646 Headman

1647 Headman

1648

131 Tenayan

294 Teman &

280

160 193

153

280

353

283

Kipas/Kabila/Kaggilach

108 Kakijlach

Total

239

294

p. 124

p. 198

Source: FE III

Kakilach

1650 1654 130

p. 235 p. 293 p. 501

the rst one was Senar itself, and the other one was (3) Kipas in the Dutch lists (or Kaggilach in the Keerdekoe’s map), together totaling around 300 natives. In 1647 a junior merchant Jacob Nolpe merged both villages, a decision that was praised by Governor Anthonisz Overtwater (FE III, 171). This might be the reason why Kipas does not appear in the census of 1647 and 1648. But later probably they were separated again, as we can see in the census of 1650 and 1654. This was the year when the map of Keerdekoe was drawn reecting two different units. As we will explain later Kipas might also be another Basay village.17 On the other side of the river, a dozen of villages stretched towards the south. Esquivel only mentioned the rst one, called (4) Pantao (Dutch: Parrigon), a rival village of Senar as usually happens with the cities separated by a river. This village must be located in present Pali.18 It was probably Esquivel himself who baptized some children of two headmen, who started asking for a resident priest in their village (SIT, 169). Esquivel also mentioned other villages beyond Pantao, but he said very little,19 only that the Spaniards “were neither friendly nor at enmity,” but most of them were enemies of the people in Pantao. Also, he reported that four Cagayanos who had deserted from fort Santo Domingo escaped to these villages with the purpose of reaching the Dutch fort, but one of them still remained living among the natives. Also he said that “one of the leaders of these places claims that he is the son of a Spaniard, one of those who disappeared long ago,”20 probably during the shipwreck of 1582. This event produced several documents (SIT, 1–15), and some descriptions of the area can be found, as well as the rst description of the natives as athletic warriors and deer hunters. Let us see one by the Jesuit Francisco Pirez: The mountain [probably present Guan Yin Mountain] had many trees and in some places vast areas of grass where many deer lived, and some of noteworthy size. A Portuguese named Balthasar Monteiro climbed many times and killed a good number of them. He once witnessed a hunting party of the barbarians that took place in an open space where the deer grazed. They surrounded them in a circle; every arrow that they shot bore a hook that would trap their prey among the grasses and tree branches. They are splendid runners. This place had no other people except two or three villages about three leagues away from each other, and which were at enmity with each other. (SIT, 15)

60

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Finally, of the other group of natives located on the west of the Tamsui River, those whom the Dutch later called the Baritschoen and Coloun villages, Esquivel only had a very vague idea. All he had to say about them was that: “The natives of the other side of the river Pulauan neither ask for us [i.e., the missionaries] nor repel us” (SIT, 182). Continuing up the Tamsui River we nd other villages, like (5) Taparri, clearly mentioned in Dutch sources, but probably—as we will explain in chapter 4—it started to grow there after the Dutch occupation (1642) with immigrated Taparrians from the Quelang Bay. The VOC tried to hire the Taparrians to cut trees into heavy beams, long boards, and planks for good remuneration, but they declined the offer on the real basis that this kind of heavy work was too exhausting for them (FE III, 197). Esquivel, in 1632, did not mention specically Taparri, so after staying in Senar he moved closer to describe the inner village of (6) Quipatao (in modern Beitou 北投), which had an external site on the riverbank, called Rapan by the Dutch. This village is well known for its sulfur production in high demand by the Chinese. Esquivel said: Quipatao consists of some eight or nine native villages … It is located near Senar and may be reached from there by land. However, the quickest and the best way is by water, going up from the fort [of Santo Domingo] through the river and entering the place through a canal … Quipatao is in the slope of a hill and a little far from the main river. There are sulfur deposits in large quantities, making the inhabitants richer than the rest. They own vast tracks of fertile plain. The whole area is spared from river oods. (SIT, 184)

In fact, there was another village, not mentioned in the Spanish sources, and only recorded by the Dutch from 1650, called (7) Touckenan (identied as 奇獨龜崙).21

Quimazon River (the origin of northern Taipei) The Spanish had few dealings with the natives of the Taipei Basin, but they were very clear in dening their dispersion along two different rivers. This natural division was also followed by the Dutch who distinguished between the Quimazon River and the Pinerouan [Pulauan, Pinnonouan] River (FE III, 477), although at other times they considered the Tamsui River and the Quimazon branch like a single region. The Spaniards were more familiar with the Quimazon branch because there was natural communication between the fort of Santo Domingo and San Salvador by land, although they preferred communication by sea. The rst time they made this land trip was in February of 1632 with Governor Juan de Alcarazo, in which they saw very auspicious images in the sky (SIT, 167). In the summer of that year, Esquivel went back to Quelang and experienced also this way but he traveled by canoe until Lichoco. For this reason he did not pay too much attention to the villages along the present-day Tianmu area, and he considered them as “tiny villages.” The Dutch sources were more specic. According to them, to the map of Keerdekoe, and to the identications made by contemporary researchers,22 after the entrance of the Quimazon River, there was Kirananna (奇里岸), a small village of no more than 50 souls. This village was followed

The Encounter

61

by the biggest one, Kimassow (麻少翁), with a big population of more than 400 souls that Esquivel omitted to report, even though its name was related to the one on the river. Kimassow was located in a slightly elevated area near the river. The geographic evolution of the meanders of the Quimazon River has now isolated this part, which before was well communicated with the other villages. Later was the village of Porompon (ɣ࣯‫)ݥ‬ with an average of 80 souls, and nally Kimotsi (թ‫؁‬Խ), near the junction of Tamsui and Keelung Rivers, with 100 souls. Esquivel, after talking with some of the natives along the river, came to know about the regular oods and their effects: The river passage towards the island until Lichoco is very calm and easy to sail, with lowlands on both sides. The same is true of the branch that goes to Pulauan but life along the banks is difcult because the river swells and overows at certain seasons, rising up to three or four brazas23 and ooding the houses and elds while people salvage their belongings in small boats. The natives living along either branch have shown me how high these oods could get by making knife marks of the wooden parts of their houses to indicate the level reached by the waters. These tides sweep in some pine trees and other fragrant wood, massive logs, and very strong and durable wood. They are milled in the Tamchui fort, where they are sawn and cut for building storage houses and for renovating the fort itself, which is made of wood and logs. This kind of river ood does not reach the villages of Quipatao because the inland abounds with soil. Neither does it affect the villages of Lichoco because the river springs from there, and is therefore a mere trickle. (SIT, 162)

Going upstream towards present Neihu, four other villages were located; rst Cattaio (塔塔悠) (reaching 200 souls) where—according to the Dutch—a rogue called Lamma was the headman in 1646;  later Lichoco (里族), with the similar population, and in 1644 the village was presided by the elder Ponap, and counted 80 strong (SIT, 478); Kimalitsigowan (麻里即吼), with a population between 150 and 200 souls, and Kippanas (峰仔峙), with an average of 100 souls. The river was navigable until Lichoco, and once Esquivel left the canoe, he was able to report on it: “Lichoco has two villages of up to 200 or 300 houses, a great portion of it are in the mountains” (SIT, 167). The rest of the way until Quelang had no villages and was very inconvenient. Esquivel described the route from Lichoco to Quelang in this way: The way from Lichoco to the island is rough due to some 36 piles of loose rocks scattered all over, making it impossible for a large boat to pass. Only small canoes can pass and be dragged along by the native rowers who have to disembark. This happens in summer, for in winter, there is enough water for the boats. Nevertheless, this way is perfect in comparison with the path that connects the forts through the beach. It is all rocky ground, with many rivers to cross and uphill climbs replete with obstacles and risks. (SIT, 167–168)

The Dominican missionary Victorio Riccio passed through there in March 1666 leading a Dutch embassy to meet messengers from Zheng Jing who after eighteen days on horseback had reached Lichoco. His description from Quelang to Lichoco was the following:

62

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The road he [i.e., Riccio] took was the roughest and the strangest that he had ever seen in the world. He sailed through a river that, at certain points, falls over precipices as it winds through mountain and crags. When he nally met with the Chinese ambassador, he had counted 38 falls, which is dangerous and fearful indeed, had he not been partly reassured by the expertise of the pilot who led the expedition using a hollow staff. It was also the season of rain. So much rain fell on them that he thought he would fall very ill. (SIT, 627)

On the other hand, the Dutch reported that embassy with many details, saying that in order to fetch the Zheng representative they had to send some Basay boats (i.e., those from Quimaurri) by sea and through the Quimazon River, to Lichoco. Then back to Quelang. Nevertheless, a few days later, they used the land road in their return voyage to Lichoco (SIT, 645–652).

Pulauan River (the origin of the old Taipei) The Spaniards had few dealings with the natives of the Taipei Basin, but in 1632 the relations were good, as Esquivel put it: “One can go to these villages in utmost security. Any soldier, Cagayano, or priest can condently come and go by himself. They would move from one fort to another, passing by the shore or the river banks through these villages to barter rice in the villages of Pantao and Pulauan” (SIT, 169). But, in fact, only the village of Pulauan was mentioned by the Spaniards. The Dutch were more precise and offered the following census: Table 3.2 Population of the Tamsui-Pulauan branch 1646

1647

1648

1650

1654

1655

Pinnonouan

223

231

230

263

245

235

Rieuweovas

119

125

140

136

135

116

Riwycq

146

152

146

145

135

107

25

36

38

30

Sirong

204

210

210

240

228

185

Rybats

181

187

181

148

89

91

39

54

Cournangh

Quimare Paytsie

140

133

211

Source: FE III p. 124 p. 188 p. 235 p. 293  ɻҦѣҁc2002 ୩ᙬࣂˤ̎ᜪ̌‫ޢ‬ӠɎ€, p. 23

p. 501 ɻҦѣҁ

The growth of this population tended to follow the pattern of slow population growth of the island, which in 1654 (or a little earlier) experienced a severe decrease, as we will comment later. To locate these villages is very important because they represent the beginning of the “old Taipei” in a broad sense. We think that this location is quite probable if we

The Encounter

63

assume continuity in the settlements since most of the new Chinese settlers would have located themselves alongside the existing native villages, growing together and forming a unity. In that case looking again to the Japanese map of 1899, we can see ve villages clearly dened in the Pulauan area that might have corresponded to the original native settlements. First, we have Rivrycq, in the southern part of modern Wan-Hua district, and Rieuweovas towards the north (to the west of the present government district ofce of Wan Hua). On the other side of the river was located Pinnonouan, in the area of modern Panchiao. When Japanese ethnologist Ino took some pictures of sinized aborigines near Taipei at the end of the nineteenth century, he went to that part of the river where these two towns communicate by canoe. One of the pictures shows a landscape where Dahan and Xindien rivers meet forming the Tamsui River, and in the horizon of the picture we can see Datun (大屯) and Chixing (七星) mountains. To help identify the contents of the picture he wrote on the right side the name of Wulauan, which is similar to pronunciation recorded by the Spaniards as Pulauan. The other pictures show a family in front of his house, with some other people, who were characterized by Ino as sinized aborigines. The 1899 Japanese map also gives us the possible location of two other native villages, Cournangh, in modern Zhonghe (中和), and Siron, in modern Yonghe (永和).25 About one of these villages, the Dutch mentioned that it was “one of the principal villages of the Pinerouan River” (FE III, 195). A second group can be dened around the Dahan (ɣ࿵) River with the villages of Quinare, Paytsie, and Rybats. From the last village came a report of an incestuous relationship between father and daughter resulting in pregnancy. When the news reached Tayouan, Keerdekoe, who was assigned to the north, got clear instructions to deal with this “intolerable matter among people subjected to our Christian rule, therefore need to be severely punished in a way that will serve as a deterrent to others” (FE III, 326). The location of this group was in the area of Tucheng (ɠ‫)ے‬, in the periphery of the main Pulauan area. 

Cavalan Cavalan was an area hardly visited by the Spaniards, although it was on the maritime route between Quelang and Manila. For this reason we have only a few direct reports of this region, which were basically about trying to dene who the natives of this region were. In 1635 Fr. Teodoro Quirós visited the place and administered some baptisms coinciding with a plague of smallpox. Few years later he dened the Cavalan people as “the bravest among the natives” (SIT, 303). The following year the free burgher Domingo Aguilar was sent there to buy rice (FE II, 323). But, in fact, Cavalan was regarded as a kind of strange place. Fr. Juan de los Ángeles said that some Cavalans (as well as others from Parusaron) were somehow blond or reddish (SIT, 568). For Esquivel, it was not a very attractive place for visiting, and he categorized the Cavalans as very treacherous people (SIT, 571). The same opinion was shared by Keerdekoe, who summarized his impression of Cavalan in this statement: “What else can be said about the Cavalan nation (except for the good ones) than that they are scoundrels?” (FE III, 389).

64

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 FDKC

FCC TCTP

TMY

HP? Quipatubucan CL 14 Kipatobbier TTW SKC Quimariptan 15 16 Quibanuran CLT KWL 17

礁溪

Taradingan Taptap Kimabasien 25 30 19

Quitalabiauan 29

ML

Quitubitubi 20

宜蘭

Caquimarratunoj 26

TLM

Baboloan 21 Sinachan 22 HTH Sinarogan 28

Jajinjurus 27 YLNH

40 Quimiabolas

Quitumejaj 32

41 Quiparaur HH

Quitatupaan

Kriouan River (Lang Yang River)

31 Wayaway 10 20

HSF

Quessajosojol 45 SH

羅東

70

LL ST

2 CLW

Kerrionan

40

60

Quiparru- SW 1 sinauan

Tarungan 9

30

50

46

Manauyen 8 Quitanaburauan 7 TNM

Banarauban 36 WH

12 Tarrachian

Quejena35 botorran Quimabolao 43

Map 3.2 Native villages of Cavalan (in circles) and archeological sites of Yilan (in rectangles).

The Encounter

65

The earlier but shortest list of Cavalan’s villages was made by Esquivel in 1632, listing twenty-ve of them; and the most succinct description of the geography of Cavalan was made by De los Ángeles, by saying: “Cabaran province has a bay eight to ten leagues wide, from tip to tip, and three rivers,” but he exaggerated when he said “this province has more than 70 villages, made up of 400 to 600 houses each” (SIT, 571). The Dutch were more precise and consistent in their taxation lists naming forty-ve villages in this extensive area of rice production. These lists can be complemented with other smaller listings, for example, the villages going to attend a landdag (i.e., annual ceremonial of native gathering intended by the VOC to consolidate its suzerainty).27 Kang, based on the similarity of the pronunciation and using eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Qing sources as a bridge, had continued the studies of Nakamura28 and Chan Su-chuan,29 reorganizing the lists of these Cavalan villages and relating them to modern towns.30 Based on this information, and after displaying these villages on a map and seeing their relation with the main rivers, we have attempted to group the villages, without implying that the six groups of villages we have formed dene social or political unities. Thus, the Lan Yang River acts as an axis of symmetry of the whole area dividing three groups of villages at the north and three at the south. In fact, this division has some basis, because when the Basayan informant Teodoro answered the interrogation of the Dutch in 1644 about the villages of Cavalan, its elders and its warriors, he only mentioned six villages, ve of them corresponding to the main village of each one of the groups we have considered (although, the fourth one, Quessajosojol, is missing), and the sixth one was the friendly and strategic Basay village of Quilatalabiauan. Notice also that the two pacied villages mentioned by the Basayan Teodoro (Dutch: Theodore/Theodooire/Teadoor) were precisely the two Cavalan villages with strong Basay connections:

Table 3.3 The six villages of Cavalan mentioned by the Basayan Teodoro in 1644 (They are probably the main ones, although number 4 is omitted)

Areas

Notes

Esquivel (1632)

1

Kibanorra

350

not pacied

Quibanuran

Kibannoran

2

Kekitsebsebbon

700

not pacied

Quitubitubi

Tobtobbe

3

Kinneporach

300

not pacied

Quiniporraj

Kigenobitorrangh

4

Teodoro (1644) Strong

–

–

5

Keketorachan

80

6

Kimmalauw

100

Basay

Kitalabiauw

60

pacied

Census (1650)

(Quessajosojol)

–

–

Tarrachian

not pacied

Quimabolao

Kimablauw

pacied

Quitalabiauan

Taloebayan

Source: SIT, 476–479 & FE III, 294–295

66

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Based on this division we are now going to take a step forward by comparing the scarce proto-historical information of the villages with the archeological data. Yilan County is relatively rich in archeological sites (coming either from hurried survey or from a formal excavation), and all of them are properly recorded in modern archeological charts.31 A rst observation of the charts shows that almost all of the sites belong to a period between the years 1400–1800 A.D., and are catalogued as belonging to the Shisanhang culture. This shows clearly that Yilan Plain was an area where settlers started their occupation at the verge of the proto-historical times, although the higher areas close to the mountains, and even former small low islands, have earlier settlements that can be traced to the end of the Neolithic period. A second observation is that a good number of these Shisanhang archeological sites are located in the same towns or areas where Chan and Kang located the villages listed 400 years ago. This correlation offers us an interesting bridge between the material culture and the protohistorical references of the area, but at the same time it generates a question: why do some archeological sites of the Shisanhang period seem difcult to relate with any of the villages listed in Spanish or Dutch sources? Different possibilities can be offered to explain this, for example, their period of existence was either earlier or posterior to the Western presence, or they were so small that they passed unnoticed by the Dutch surveyors. Here we offer a map (3.2) with the villages recorded by Westerners that can be associated with the modern archeological artifacts of the Shisanhang culture. Going from north to south, we find the first area with Quibanuran (Dutch: Kibanorra, Kimablauw) village, the most populated in the whole Lang Yang Plain. Chan and Kang identify this village with modern Qiwulan (淇武蘭) in the place called Jiaoxi (礁溪). We know that in 1646, eight houses, out of forty-six, paid a tribute to the VOC. Compared with other villages this was still a sign of friendship, but the Dutch were pessimistic about collecting it again in the following year (FE III, 118). The name of its chieftain in 1647 was Caroubotaij, and at that time the village had 711 souls. The survey of the following year raises this data to 840 souls; the same gure stands for 1650. In this district is located the archeological site KWL showing Shisanhang culture, from years 800 to 1800. This is probably the most important Shisanhang archeological site in the Yilan region that allows us to draw a clear relation between the archeological materials and the proto-historical information. For example, there were more than 300 smoking pipes discovered in the excavations that call to mind the policy of offering tobacco as a gift made by the Dutch when visiting the towns (a matter that we explain in chapter 5). Moving southwards we can consider a second area of villages, with Sinachan (Dutch: Sasinagan) as the most populated one, having 399 souls in 1647. Chan and Kang identify it with modern Xinzaihan (辛仔罕). It was surrounded by the villages of Taradingan, Taptap, Quitubitubi, Baboloan, and Sinarogan (Sinarochan).32 Sinachan village might have had some pre-eminence over the other ones, because: “[it] consisted of six different villages, but classied under one name” (FE III, 389). The name of the cabessa (headman) was Tarribe, and in 1651, the Dutch were very happy with him because he manifested affection and loyalty to the VOC when in 1 July 1651, carrying

The Encounter

67

his silver cane, he presented his cooperation to the VOC. However, two months later the whole story became confused, even to the point where the Dutch heard that the said Tarribe was then leading the Cavalans against them.33 The third area is located in the south of present Yilan city. Kimabolao (Dutch: Mabolauw) was the biggest village with 260 souls in 1650 (FE III, 394), but the others also had more than 200 souls. It is worth mentioning Jajinjurus (Dutch: Parerier), in the area of Pali (擺離). This village had 135 souls in 1647, with a headman called Bagoula (FE III, 189), and jumped to 210 in 1650 (FE III, 293). Most probably this place is related to the recently discovered archeological site YLNH, in Yi Lan University (formerly Yi Lan Nung Hsiao) where one gold necklace was unearthed in 2006 by Chiou Suijin (邱水金) in a graveyard. Crossing the Lang Yang River, and near the present city of Luodong, we can dene a fourth area made of few villages; among them Quessajosojol (Dutch: Sagol Sagol/Sochel Sochel) has the most proto-historical data. In 1644, the inhabitants did not welcome Captain Pieter Boon, and he reported saying that they “have turned down our offer [of alliance] in a mocking and despicable way … [adding that] if the Dutch wanted to meet with them they could come freely, as they were strong enough to withstand our force.” Boon decided to go there to destroy the village. This is the record of the punitive expedition that followed later: We arrived in Sochel Sochel and immediately set it are, most of their rear houses being lled with rice and paddy. Unfortunately when we marched along some narrow paths … the scoundrels shot and killed two of our men …, suddenly coming out of the thicket and attacking us before we saw them and then, immediately they ran off again. Next many of their warriors appeared in the eld close to their village in order to put up a strong ght, however when our musketeers charged them, at once they ed away and we have that many of them were killed in the charge. The next morning we burnt down and destroyed everything which had not been destroyed the preceding day. (FE II, 475)

Chan and Kang identify this village with present Saohu (掃笏), and in a place of this district is located the archeological site SH, with archeological data between the years 1400 to 1800, but the excavation did not report any special re, at least nothing different from those of other archeological sites. On the contrary, the village was rebuilt and it became the biggest of that area in 1647 with 458 souls. After Boon’s experience, they continued the very unfriendly relations with the Dutch, such that in that year it was still considered formally at war with the VOC (FE III, 189), and called “the most rancorous village” (FE III, 171). No wonder, when Teodoro and two Caquiuanuan headmen went in the name of the Dutch to warn the village to pay tribute: “the rebellious villagers spotted Teodoro and the interpreters, not only forbade them to enter, but even shot as many as ve volleys of arrows at them without hitting anyone, so that they were forced to keep out” (FE III, 182). Teodoro and those headmen of Caquiuanuan got so irritated that the following year they asked permission from the VOC to wage war against this

68

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

village and also against Quitatupaan (Dutch: Kittotepan/Kakitapan), that had behaved in a similar way (FE III, 240). According to Chan and Kang this village must be located in present Jiliban (奇立板) district, a place where nearby exists the archeological site catalogued as HSF. The fth area was formed by a few villages at the entrance of Kriouan River (Lang Yang River). Among them the most populous one was Quiparrusinauan (Dutch: Parissinawan), identied by Chan and Kang as modern Poluoxinzaiyuan (婆羅辛仔遠). This village was headed in 1644 by Boutay Madawis, and had more than 450 souls, that is why nearby there are three archeological sites of the Shisanhang culture, SW, ST, and LL. It is remarkable that the last site has the earlier strata of this culture, moving from the years 800 to 1400. This place was friendlier to the Basayan scouts and to the interpreter Teodoro. Probably he advised Boon to enter in Cavalan in his expedition of 1644 through that place. There the inhabitants gave a warm welcome offering “some houses that could serve as guardhouses as well as lodging for our men” (FE II, 474). This village was the most cooperative with the Dutch paying tributes, for example, in 1646, they “delivered 1320 pounds of rice, being the tribute of 44 houses, out of 130; besides a quantity of deerskins for one house” (FE III, 107), and even the headman promised to pay the remaining tribute on the rst occasion. Nevertheless, the following year, they only paid “555 pounds of rice and one skin” (FE III, 196), but in any case, compared with other villages, the Dutch were happy and a mutual good relation was established. People from the neighboring shing village of Kerrionan (Dutch: Little Moudanas) went there also to meet the Dutch. This village was identied by Chan and Kang as Jialiwan (加禮宛), which was also nearby the archeological site CLW. As we will argue later, we consider that this area has a strong Basay connection. No wonder, few days after the departure of Boon, these Cavalans were welcomed by the Dutch in Tamsui when they arrived in there “with six vessels loaded with a little rice and some trinkets to trade with and to sell to the Basayos” (FE III, 196). The sixth area was the farthest one and the news reaching the Dutch was scarce. The main village, as it was mentioned by Teodoro in his interrogation of 1644, must be Quimabolao (Dutch: Kimabolaw, identied as 奇武荖); the village had 100 men capable of bearing arms, and someone called Boetajomajauw was the elder (SIT, 479). The other villages were Manauyen (Dutch: Bragonlian, identied as 武淵); Quejenabotorran (Dutch: Kigenobutarang, identied as 南搭吝); Quitanabunaran (Dutch: Tenaboeran, identied as 打那美); and nally Banarauban (identied as 武罕), but this was missed in the Spanish sources. These last two villages can be related with the archeological sites of TNM and WH respectively. One of the rst times that Cavalan appeared mentioned in Dutch sources was in 1636 associated with a rumor saying that gold could also be found there (SIT, 246). The gold was one of the main motivations for the Dutch to reach the north of Taiwan and especially the east of the island where Turoboan, the “El Dorado” of Dutch Formosa, was located.

The Encounter

69

Parrougearon people

Tackilis River

Dadanghs Torrobouan Pabanangh

Turoboan (Dutch: Taraboan

Map 3.3 Schematic distribution of the Turoboan village. The shaded area called by the Spaniards Turoboan, Toroboan, (even Jorboan), was transcribed by the Dutch in different ways. When citing Basayans informers from Tamsui or Quelang the Dutch transcribed the name as Taraboan; when citing informers from the near village of Talleroma, they transcribed it as Tackilis, referring mainly to the river (the early Holo transliteration or 得其黎溪). The Dutch sources considered three different groups of people living in this area, and, according to their own perception there were those calling the place Torrobouan, others using the name of Pabanang, and nally those referring to the place as Dadanghs. Another group upwards the river was called Parrougearon, considered as very erce people. In modern days the mouth of the river is called Liuhsi (立霧or 立霧溪).

Turoboan and the gold-collecting area Turoboan was a fascinating village for the Spaniards and later for the Dutch, since it was located in an almost unreachable place where gold might have been found. The rst description of Turoboan is the one of Esquivel, in 1632, when he listed the goldcollecting villages, and claimed in a mythological fashion that there were “many rich

70

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

gold mines, where the Taparrians go to collect gold in huge quantities and sell them in Quelang to the sangleys who pay in stone money and cuentas. There is also a mountain that becomes so brilliant at sunrise that nobody can gaze at it. It is suspected to be a quartz or silver mine” (SIT, 163). Also he said in amazement that Alcarazo told him that he had seen gold of twenty-three carats from Turoboan (SIT, 165). But the fact is that at that time Alcarazo was no longer impressed anymore and even he prohibited private expeditions to that place. The only Spaniard that we know who went there was precisely Aguilar accompanied by some inhabitants of the Basay village Caquiuanuan, although, according to his interrogation by the Dutch years later “he had remained on the beach and had not gone into the village, as he had only traveled to Taraboan to track down some runaway slaves of the [Spanish] king, instead of searching for gold” (FE III, 75).34 Also, according to some rumors collected by the Dutch in 1641 (but without any simple reference in the Spanish sources): “On several occasions, Spanish priests might have traveled to that [golden] site, but none of them have ever returned because they had all been beaten to death by those mountain people” (FE II, 272). After the conquest of Quelang by the Dutch, the time for their exploration for gold sites had arrived. They organized several expeditions to the area, for they were systematic in collecting all the possible information from former visitors of Turoboan. The rst one was under Boon (spring of 1643), who before the departure interrogated Aguilar, as we have said (FE II, 319–324). Even in 1646, when the Dutch were considering stationing a Dutchman there, they called different interpreters like the Japanese Jacinto or the Quimaurrian Teodoro, who had been there “fteen times” (FE II, 489), to collect preliminary information from them. What and where was this “El Dorado”? According to Aguilar, two main areas can be differentiated, a “white sandy beach” between Manin and Turoboan (six miles equidistant from both places), and Turoboan itself. In both places, he said, one and a half picul can be taken yearly. Other details of Turoboan are very precise in Dutch sources (FE III, 74–76). There were two areas for collecting gold, upstream and in the delta of the river. The rst one was the most unknown because it was difcult to move around and it was populated by very erce people called the Parrougearon, who “look and move like monkeys.” They could collect gold of a coarse texture, but not in large quantities. They were very jealous of their mines and sometimes attacked the other natives collecting gold in the delta, near the beach. According to these sources, the natives collecting gold were living in a single town, called by Basayans and Cavalans, Turoboan (Dutch: Taraboan). It was occupied by three different groups, each one calling the place in their own way. First, there was the group that called the place Pabanangh that only gathered the gold “during three months of the year,” and they were on good terms with those Parrougearon, and were allowed to search for gold “higher up the river.”35 The second group was the Dadanghs, who “gather gold-dust at the beach near the river mouth after it has rained heavily for a few days, whenever they can and feel like it.” The nal group was the one who called themselves Torrobouan. The proximity between the terms Torrobouan and Taraboan makes us suspect that those inhabitants of Torrobouan had a close connection to the Basayans; in fact, the Basayan nature of the

The Encounter

71

Parrapoure

Turoboan

Rarangus Saquiraya

花蓮

Chicasuan

Tataruma

Patibur

Chiulien

Vatan

Tabaron

Sorigol

Chupre

Sapat

Dorkop Tacciraya

Pabanan

Map 3.4 Native villages in the East Coast, near Hualian 花蓮The southern villages of Sorigol, Sapat, Dorkop, and Tacciraya are not mentioned in the Spanish sources.

72

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

village was documented by the Dutch when in their census of 1650 they referred to this place under the name of Basey (FE III, 296).36 Going to the south of Turoboan is a long region stretching with towns where gold and silver were found. Esquivel listed some villages in 1632 (SIT, 163–164), all of them collecting gold (and, he said, even silver). The rst one was Rarangus, a village difcult to locate because it does not appear in Dutch sources.37 But we know that in 1628 the aid-ship from Manila stopped in that area, although the reason is not clear, either out of need or because they tried to explore the possible gold of this area. Esquivel relates that they met a very bad fate because they were massacred by the natives: The people of Rarangus with the help of the neighboring villages seized from us a sampan that bore aid and supplies from Manila. They stole everything and killed 10 Spaniards, sparing only one man who is still alive today, and four women who are also still alive. They were saved upon the petition of the women because of the ve women in the boat, one hanged herself, seeing the butchery of the Spaniards, and expecting to suffer the same fate. That Spaniard and the four women sent a native girl to our fort to tell us it was the sampan of Carabajal, and that the natives took from it two large bronze artillery pieces, 10 muskets, and two small woven caskets that might have contained money and, I know not, other things. The girl said that they lled a kind of pail with the blood of the victims, and then drank it; afterwards they ate their corpses and heads. When the Spaniards went there recently, they captured a Cavalan native who confessed all this to be true. They tried to take the [killers] as prisoners but they could not because they had ed to the mountains. (SIT, 163–164)

As we have read, Alcarazo sent an expedition to avenge the massacre and probably to know more about the area. As a result he realized that in that place gold was not produced in large quantities and very soon the interest of the Spaniards dwindled. He thought that gold was not going to be found any more in the Indies, and the period of “golden times” was over. But, the Dutch still believed in it. Other villages listed by Esquivel in this area from north to south were Saquiraya (Dutch: Sakiraya),39 Tataruma (Dutch: Talleroma), Chicasuan (Dutch: Sicosuan), Patibur (Dutch: Patsilar), Chiulien (Dutch: Sibilien), Tabaron (Dutch: Tavoran) but without mines, Parusarun, Raucay (Dutch: Rauai), Chupre (Supra), Saruman where only gold was available, and Pabanan. This last village might refer to Basanan (八桑安), nowadays called Baisanan (白桑安), where another necklace of gold was discovered in the archeological site PSN. On the other hand, in 1638, looking at the area from the south, the junior Dutch merchant stationed in Pimaba (modern Taidong), Amerten Wesselingh, reported another list of villages which collected gold (FE II, 206): rst Palan (which should be the previously mentioned Pabanan), later Linaw, Tacciraya, Ullebecan, Rabath (also Sapat), Daracop (also Dorcop). Certainly the Dutch since 1638 were so determined to reach Turoboan from the south that they gave credit to any favorable or even inauspicious rumor, as happened in 1639: “Rumor has it that ve white men had been there [north of Pimaba]. Two of them had shaven heads and wore long clothes, while the other three

The Encounter

73

were dressed in our fashion. Without the slightest doubt, these were Spaniards trying to lay their hands on the gold before we could. Time will reveal the accuracy of this information” (SIT, 295). We do not know if this rumor was different to the one mentioned in 1641, or was it the same one that still persisted two years later. Whatever the case, Turoboan, a village with strong Basay connections—as we will continue explaining later—still remained unreachable for the Dutch, but for only just a while.

The Basayans In clear contrast with the previous geographically homogeneous groups, like the Cavalans or those of Tamsui Basin, there is another, the Basay, which in fact we find dispersed along the northeast coast of the island, but with a clear sense of identity, as recognized by the Spaniards and the Dutch. Their cultural features were: (1) they have a common language; (2) their villages are located in isolated coastal settlements; (3) kinship is founded between Basayan villages; (4) they have created a trading network that links by sea not only themselves, but also the other tribes; (5) this network is not only used for trade but also for communication; and (6) headhunting was not practiced. Since we will see the economic aspects of this trading network in chapter 5, let us focus now on the other ones.

Language The Spanish missionaries are consistent in saying that there was a common language called Basay, known in the places they stayed, and that it extended towards the south. The rst reference comes from Esquivel (1632) when—after mentioning the towns in Cavalan and Hualian areas—he said: “All these villages are said to be big, and that they share a language called Baçay that is commonly spoken throughout the island. Although some villages have their own dialect, they nevertheless speak both baçay and their dialect” (SIT, 165). And in another moment he was more precise: “The native tongue is easy to learn. They speak a particular language in some partidos like Senar. But in Senar, as in all the other places with their own languages, everyone speaks a common and general language; that is what we missionaries learn to speak” (SIT, 180). De los Ángeles is quite consistent with Esquivel, when in 1649 he said: They have many languages: each province has its own; at times, even in villages of the same province, they don’t use the same language. One of them, called basaya, is somehow common in the area where the Spaniards had their garrison: it is somehow spoken up to the Torboan province—where there is gold—, because, as they say, they have the same language. It is also understood in the area of the river Tamchui, even if they have their own languages there. (SIT, 568–569)

In short, the idea conveyed by the missionaries is that, even if every general geographical unity (or partido) has its own language and sometimes more, a kind of lingua franca co-existed. It was spoken in Quelang, known in Tamsui, and its inuence

74

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

even reached to Turoboan. Was this the language of the “Indies of Tamchuy” studied by Esquivel?40 It seems that by using that name, Esquivel was referring to a language commonly spoken along the river; but, which one? It cannot be the language spoken in the Pulauan of Quimazon branches, because he was never stationed there. It should be the Basayan language. To justify this statement, let us consider the places he stayed at. He arrived in Quelang in the summer of 1631 and soon later passed to Taparri (both places were Basay-speaking areas) where he stayed until October. He was there without other Spaniards, therefore with no other option but to learn Basay. Logically he might have used the rst drafts of the Basay language written by his missionary fellow mates, particularly the Portuguese Váez who arrived in 1626, and compiled the rst list of words and prayers. From Taparri Esquivel moved to Tamsui and stayed there until February 1632. According to the History of Bishop Diego de Aduarte, he lived near the fort in a simple hermitage that he constructed and lived a life of prayer and mortication.41 But it is easy to understand that he continued learning Basayan when interacting with the Taparrians living near the fort, who probably were engaged in the sulfur business. This amounts to a total of around eight months studying Basayan. Then, he moved to Senar, where he spent a few months more, from spring to the beginning of summer. There, he might have used his Basayan knowledge to preach to the people of Senar and particularly the villagers of the close village of Kipas, most probably a Basayan village itself. At the same time he might have also employed his innate linguistic inclination42 in analyzing the differences between both languages. Once back at Quelang, it was probably the time he rewrote the notes of the language he had learnt, but unfortunately all these manuscripts are lost. 43 What about the language itself? The studies that we have on it are those based on the eld notes of Japanese linguist Asai. According to Li, in 1936, Asai, in searching for the Ketagalan language (as it was named forty years earlier by Ino) interviewed an aboriginal lady of more than seventy years old called Pan Shih-Yiau (潘氏腰), whose hometown was in Xinshe (新社), located in the modern coastal Gungliao Township (貢寮鄉). Asai was able to collect around 1,000 lexical items, a few sentences, and two short texts of her language (Ketagalan, according to Asai). He also found that another lady of around sixty-ve years old called Ipai (吳林氏伊排), in Shetou (社頭) near modern Shewei (社尾) in northern Yilan, was able to speak Trobiawan (a dialect of Ketagalan according to Asai) and provided Asai a dozen texts and a few traditional songs.44 In other words, we think that Asai in fact compiled the remaining data of the Basay language because Xinshe is located close to the old Basay village of Caquinuaran (Santiago), while Shetou was near Duoluomeiyan (哆囉美遠), the present Chinese name of the old Basay village of Quitalabiauan. Based on the notes of Asai taken from his two informants, Moriguchi Tsunekazu (森口 恒一) published the rst draft dictionary of the Basay language.45 Li—based on the eld notes of Asai, his own eld work,46 and the dictionary of Moriguchi—has discussed the pronouns, case markers, focus systems, and other grammatical aspects in his 1999 essay, offering a basic yet holistic glimpse into this extinct language. Additionally, we have gathered some observations from the Amis

The Encounter

75

writer Nakao Eki, who had pointed out to us how some linguistic structures are directly reected in names. For example, paying attention to the seventeenth-century place names recorded by Esquivel, Nakao recognizes that the place name Caquiuanuan shows a clear parallelism of word formation to that common in the modern Amis language—like the compound structure (ka-ci-X-an)—which may help us to understand the meaning of this Basay name. Based on that, she argues that the possible formation of the place name Caquiuanuan is that ca- and -an form a compound meaning “the place of X” and that qui- signies “having X/with X.” Thus the compound ca-qui-X-an modies the stem uanu and means “the place with (many/much) uanu.” Therefore the image conveyed by the place name Caquiuanuan will depend on the meaning of the stem uanu. Considering the fact that many modern Formosan villages are named after the features of their natural surroundings, Nakao supposes that the most possible candidate for uanu may be water (in Amis language “water” is nanom); if this is the case Caquiuanuan would mean “the place with much water.” This supposition is somehow supported by Li’s lexicon, in which he identies the Basay word for water as nanum.47 Besides, she argues, this structure is an “elaborated” version of another more common structure in the Amis language: ci-X-an. The most famous examples of this structure in place names are Ci-widi-an (the place with many leeches) and Ci-kasoy-an (the place with abundant rewood); both appeared in Esquivel’s 1632 record as Chiulien (Dutch: Sibilien) and Chicasuan (Dutch: Sicosuan), respectively. Besides these names, there are other Basayan place names also recorded by Esquivel carrying the qui-X-an compound or only the prex qui-, such as Qui-talabiau-an, Qui-parrusinau-an, and Qui-maurri, all supposedly indicating the mass of something present in those areas. Again, our understanding of those names hinges on the meanings of maurri, talabiau, and parrusinau.48

Villages Starting in the Tamchui area and following the west-east coastal direction we can establish the rst Basay village near the old fort of Santo Domingo, called Taparri. But, as we will explain in the next chapter, we think that this village started its development after 1642. Nevertheless, we presume the existence of a (1) Taparri settlement for different reasons, one is that the Basay language was understood in the Tamsui River as Esquivel and De los Ángeles mentioned, second is the regular distance among the Basay towns that make reasonable the establishment of a Basay spot in that strategic area, and nally that, when the Taparris of Quelang migrated denitively to Tamsui, they might have chosen a receptive friendly place. Once they got established in Tamsui, they had a population around 250 to 300 souls. Regarding the elders, in 1642, the elder of Taparri (of Tamsui) was Kilas sa Romana, the uncle of the wife of Aguilar. But since 1646, the elder was called Lucas Kilas, who kept the leadership during more than a decade, although Kilas sa Romana still held a kind of headmanship, as stated in 1646 and 1647.49 Following the seashore, and according to Esquivel, before reaching Quelang we can nd “two or three small villages of Taparris along the beach and the mountains” (SIT,

76

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Kaggilach Toetona Kipas preTaparri

Taparri el Viejo

Quimaurri Taparri

Caquiuanuan

Quitalabiauan

(Quiparrusinauan)

Turoboan

Map 3.5 Location of the Basay villages in 1642.

The Encounter

77

166). The rst one must be (2) Kipas, attached to Senar, which the map of Keerdekoe mentioned as Kaggitach, probably because its leader was called Kakijlach. In fact, this name must have wider meaning because one of the other two Basayan villages located in the most northern part of Taiwan had a similar name. According to Kang these were (3) Toetona (大屯) and (4) Kaggilach (小雞籠).50 Later comes (5) Taparri el Viejo, a name which stands for the “ancient settlement of Kiparri.” We only know that in this place the natives robbed and killed some Spaniards whose junk got stranded on the coast in 1629 (SIT, 166, 173, 174). That place should be the one known in Qing sources as Quimpauli (金包里), in present Chinsan (金山). Following towards the east we reach Quelang Bay, one of the most important Basay centers, with the villages of (6) Quimaurri and during the Spanish times (7) Taparri. Later comes the already mentioned village of (8) Caquiuanuan (Santiago in Spanish sources and St. Iago, as transliterated by the Dutch), in present Fulong area. This was the rst place the Spaniards disembarked in Taiwan, in 1626 (SIT, 72). They found that a Japanese Christian had been living there for already forty years. Esquivel said that they were asking for a priest (SIT, 181), and certainly the Dominicans established a church there (SIT, 291) with a resident priest. In 1635, Quirós visited the place on his way to Cavalan. He claimed that only his presence in that village made the inhabitants feel secure against the Cavalans (SIT, 303). The last missionary assigned there was Pedro Chaves, who never took possession because when he was moving from China to there, in 1641, he was captured by the Dutch. In 1642 the people of Caquiuanuan looked for friendship with the new masters, the Dutch (FE II, 304); but the Dutch understood this initial friendly approach as a sign of native submission and they started demanding many things from them like selling provisions, etc. This created an eventual strong misunderstanding leading the natives to be passive and reluctant, an attitude interpreted by the Dutch as disobedience (FE II, 307–315). Certainly Caquiuanuan was a place to acquire rice, either brought from Cavalan, or grown locally. It is difcult to identify the actual place where the Caquiuanuan settlement was located during the Spanish and Dutch times, because it was an area populated since Neolithic times and up to the last period of Shisanhang culture, as attested by the seven different archeological sites found in the area. One way to understand this may be to consider Caquiuanuan as a group of small villages, especially those following the seashore,51 but those upstream on the river can also be included.52 Another way to locate it is from the description of the route given by General Johannes Lamotius after he made a trip from Quimaurri to Caquiuanuan with his soldiers in September 1642, thus putting it near the present train station at Fulong beach. He said that, rst they have to cross the river Kinarboes, later a place called Bawatang where the Chinese burned lime for the Spaniards, later a place called Bovo, another called Bangabangas, another called Batang, and nally “a long sandy beach before St. Iago” (SIT, 389–390). Different to the above-mentioned compact groups on the Yilan Plain, we have now the isolated coastal village of (9) Quitalabiauan (Dutch: Taloebayan) that Kang identies with modern Duoluomeiyuan (哆囉美遠). This is the place where Akai found one of the last Basay speakers. The information about this village in Dutch sources is

78

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

JL

YL

HSC1

SSH TJK CS

Caquiunauan

福隆 FL

Map 3.6 Archeological sites of the Shisanhang (十三行) culture around the area of Caquiuanuan (or Santiago). This area mainly corresponds to the present Fulong (福隆) beach

The Encounter

79

limited; nevertheless, we know that in 1650 it had 40 households and 193 souls (FE III, 294). This village must be a Basayan enclave (something that Kang had also observed), for different reasons. First, because when the Dutch arrived for the rst time to Cavalan, in 1644 during the Boon expedition, they disembarked in Catinunum harbor (modern Su Ao 南澳, a port which the Spaniards called San Lorenzo) and they marched towards the mouth of the river Kriouan (Lang Yang River), where they were greeted by the local people of Quiparrusinauan (Dutch: Parissinawan) and Terrachia (Dutch: Little Moudamas). Later, there appeared also those of Quitalabiauan (Dutch: Talebeauan) that had come from far away because scouts from Quimaurri went ahead to inform them; and, after meeting the Dutch, they were very pleased (FE II, 474). Second, it can be mentioned that in the same expedition Boon went to destroy the villages of Quessajosojol (Dutch: Sochel Sochel) and Quitatupaan (Dutch: Kakitapan), as we will see later. When reaching the last village, he decided to postpone its destruction because the day was already quite advanced and decided—probably advised by his Basayan scouts—to change course to Quitalabiauan, where “the villagers proved to be reasonably helpful and of good will” (FE II, 475). Third, when the Quimaurri chieftain Teodoro, an active collaborator with the Dutch, reported in 1644 the number of men of the native villages in the north capable or bearing arms, he counted four groups of towns (SIT, 478–479) — those of Quimazon River, those of Pulauan River, a group of only four from Cavalan (precisely, the most prominent ones), and the last group was made also of four distant villages: Kimauri, Caquiuanuan, Quitalabiauan, and Tarrachia, seemingly all of them Basayan villages. Finally, Quitalabiauan must be “the small Basayos island, situated in a fresh water river” (FE III, 390), mentioned in 1651, the year in which Teodoro proposed to the Dutch to build there a stronghold where “men should be stationed to go on patrol” to help the security of communications with Turoboan.54 For what we have said in the rst and third reasons, we can consider (10) the area of Quiparrusinauan and Terrachia, as a district with strong Basay connections. Something remarkable at the end of the Cavalan Bay was the magnicent harbor of Catinunum (San Lorenzo), which was often visited by Cavalans. De los Ángeles, who was there once, described it with great admiration: Big ships plying to windward through its mouth can enter the harbor, which is like a small bay dominated by a big, round hill to the right as you enter. Once inside, the ships approach land keeping right beyond said hill. Close to land, the water is still seven fathoms deep, so that the crew just needs a gangway to jump on to the land. Away from the open sea, the port is sheltered by mountains and protected from all winds. (SIT, 571)

Esquivel granted also to that harbor great strategic value, suggesting that the Spaniards set up a garrison, rst to control the Cavalan headhunting razzias to the people of Senar; and, second, to occupy it before the Dutch (SIT, 162–163). Certainly it was very strategic in the communications between Manila and Quelang. In 1639, the governor of Quelang Cristóbal Márquez regretted the loss of the junk of Captain Mateo Gómez because he did not know about the existence of that harbor (SIT, 307). Also, in 1641, San Salvador Governor Gonzalo Portillo reminded Manila authorities of the strategic value of port San Lorenzo as a strategic defense from the Dutch if they were

80

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

moving around, as actually happened later.55 In fact, on 16 September 1644 Boon docked there, when he started his above-mentioned expedition to Cavalan. As for the Basay, it was peculiar that they did not establish any known settlement in Catinunum. Maybe it was because the harbor was too crowded for the Basay concept of establishing an ideal isolated village, or because it did not have anything special inland, or, just, because the village of Quiparrusinauan—very friendly to the Basayos, if not Basay itself—was very near. Later came the village of (11) Turoboan, part of which was inhabited by Basayos, as we have explained earlier. Considering the regular distance among the cited villages (maybe they were located according to certain sailing journey units), it is once again peculiar to nd the existence of a double lap distance between Quiparrusinauan and Turoboan. Certainly, the nature of the seashore and its lack of any commercial value inland was the reason the trip to Turoboan was longer than the others.56

Communication role Because the Basayans were constantly moving, they were quite knowledgeable about what was going on around the island. In 1642, during the nal battle between the Dutch and Spaniards, they played an ambiguous role. In fact, some Basayan natives of Caquiuanuan moving earlier around Catinunum, on 22 February, had aided the Spaniards by preventing the capture of their aid-ship from Manila by an awaiting Dutch ship, but on the other hand, based on other information from Tamsui, some other Basays were on board the said Dutch ship helping in their exploration (SIT, 369). Once the Dutch got established in Quelang the Quimaurrians proved to be good interpreters thanks to their uency in Spanish. Certainly, the Quimaurri children had started learning Spanish from the Dominican missionaries. Besides, they moved so freely among the Spanish soldiers that Esquivel mentioned with some regret: “the children, through the daily visiting of the Spanish camp, have learned Spanish so well that there is no vulgar or coarse expression that does not escape their lips” (SIT, 182). In 1649, De los Ángeles mentioned that some natives managed to speak Spanish better than some natives in the Philippines (SIT, 568). The Dutch very soon noticed that the young natives of Quimaurri not only had Spanish names, but also were well versed in Spanish. Immediately they called on them as interpreters, communicating with them in Spanish. Alonso (Dutch: Tamory Alonce) was the rst Basayan hired. At the beginning of October 1642, just in the aftermath of the Dutch conquest of Quelang, Alonso accompanied a Dutch soldier to buy some provisions from some farming villages of the present Jilong River.57 Governor François Caron said of him in 1644 that he had mastered the Castilian language (FE II, 489), but very soon Alonso lost the trust of the company and was hanged. He was substituted by Teodoro, the elder of Quimaurri who became very efcient in providing services. Another good interpreter was Lucas Kilas, the above-mentioned elder of Taparri (in Tamsui) who also was praised in Tayouan for his services.58 Finally we can mention the native wife of Aguilar, who was very efcient in showing the Dutch the way to Turoboan.

The Encounter

81

An estimate of the population in northern Taiwan The information of the Spanish sources hardly mentions any clear gures of the native population. Regarding the Basayan villages, in 1632, only Esquivel said that Quimaurri had 600 natives in four or ve settlements (SIT, 162); later he said that Taparri was made also of four to ve previous settlements (SIT, 165). To know how populated these areas were we must rely on the number of family units gathered in Dutch sources for taxation purposes, at least this was the purpose of the gures until 1647, when taxes were abolished. These lists were known since Nakamura studies, and now most of them have been published in English in the third volume of The Formosan Encounter (FE III). Considering the difculties of Dutch surveyors in gathering this information we can say that they are quite systematic, even precise, and certainly they offer more than a general estimation. The Dutch said that the native population that they calculated in the censuses of 1646, 1647, 1648, 1650, 1654, and 1655 for the whole island was around 60,000 souls; but, considering that some places might have remained unknown to them, the gure—they said—can be roughly estimated at 100,000 (FE III, 141). Based on these gures we consider that the particular proportion of the population in northern Taiwan, including the populated Cavalan, was 20 percent of the whole island. In 1646, four years after the Spaniards had left the place, the registered population of the Taipei Basin, according to the survey made by a soldier accompanied by Lucas Kilas, offers the image of a deserted place, with only 2,952 souls, divided according to Table 3.4. The most signicant information drawn from the Dutch data is the decline in population that the island experienced between 1650 and 1654, when it decreased by 20 percent after years of stable growth. But, if the same can be said of the Taipei Basin—which after only nine years was reduced by one quarter, reaching 2,180 persons—the opposite happened in Cavalan, where the population experienced an 18.7 percent increase. (See Table 3.5). It is difcult to know the reasons behind this population decline, because the years of the Dutch presence in the north have not yet undergone a thorough study. Was it due to poverty or to natural disasters? The case of Tamsui is explained by the spread of an unidentied disease, which killed in a few weeks sixty-one persons in Taparri, thirtyseven in Quimaurri, but also “along the Quelang and Pinerouan rivers and other smaller streams” (FE III, 477). It seems that 1651 was the year of a change in the trend, and living conditions began to experience difculties in places like Quimaurri where the natives asked help from the Dutch, as they did with the Spaniards. Their petition was recorded by the new governor of North Holland (formerly San Salvador castle), Simon Keerdekoe. In a letter to the Dutch governor of Tayouan Nicolaes Verbuch dated 15 March 1651, Keerdekoe wrote: Teadoor and Loupo, the elders of Quimorij, informed us about the sobriety of some of the Christians living in their village. They also explained how the papists (i.e., the Spaniards) treated those Christians in the Spanish era: namely that the Church had supported all impoverished Christians. Clearly, those

82

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 Table 3.4 Natives of the Taipei Basin in 1646

Tamsui

Kimazon

Pulauan

Villages

Headmen

Houses

Widows

Souls

Senaer

Tenayan

37

5

131

Taparri

Chereman

84

6

278

Kipatou

Rapan

39

4

134

Quiranganan

Motton

8

Kimalsaou

Gommou

98

10

425

Paronpon

Mapalell

18

1

72

Kimaltsion

Kauyo

18

1

72

Total

543

28

Katayo

Laemo

13

5

54

Lichoco

Ponap

52

3

228

Kimalts

Taquay

51

2

178

Rabrabar

Limonang

36

5

138

Kipangas

Lacco

28

2

100

Rauarauas

Rimolts

30

6

119

Pinorowan

Pathiran

59

5

223

Roewerijs

Para

39

6

146

Sijoeron

Karijnach

55

6

204

Ribalts

Paeron

49

6

181

Kipas

Kakijlach

32

2

108

Pattsij

Taunas

35

9

133

1295

1114

Source: FE III, pp. 123–124

Table 3.5 General evolution of the number of natives in northern Taiwan 1646

1647

1648

1650

1654

1655

543

427

414

668

610

412

Quimazon

1295

1315

1322

1224

1003

950

Pulauan

1114

1109

1104

1218

1199

818 491

Tamsui

Quimaurij

408

500

541

506

360

375

360

8517

9670

11479

Source: FE III, pp. 124 187 236 中村孝志c2002，荷蘭時代台灣史研究 (下) , p. 23

292

St. Jago Cavalan

10559

505 中村孝志

The Encounter

83

Christians have come to miss this kind of support ever since the expulsion of the Spaniards. However, we fed their hope saying that they had fallen from one kind of Christianity [Catholics] into another [Protestants], and that the Company [the VOC] would not treat them any worse than the Spaniards.59

A letter from the merchant Iperen of Tamsui to Governor Cornelis Caesar, dated 16 July 1654 shows that three years later the situation had worsened and was particularly severe in Cavalan: “From Cavalangh two proas showed up to exchange rice, and the crew told us that those regions had also suffered huge rates in mortality. For in some villages a hundred persons had died” (FE III, 525). Finally, we should also take into account the very small size of the average family unit and its inuence on the overall population. For example, if we consider the data of 1646 in the Taipei Basin the average family size increased from 3.3 to 4.3, making the villages very vulnerable to epidemics. Another reason for this small family size can be the extended practice of infanticide out of poverty. Esquivel described the situation in this way: “Some are extremely greedy and constantly go about begging. I believe that this is due to the poverty and want in which they live. This is why mothers kill their infants by burying them alive or giving them away in exchange for stones, clothing material or carayo (i.e., needle), all this is due to their lack of clothing or food (SIT, 179). This, and other geographical factors, may explain the big difference in the average family size compared with other tribes like those of the Philippines.

Ethnological description of the natives Encounters only are “real” so as long they produced descriptions of “the other.” The rst comprehensive ethnological description of the natives of Taiwan can be found in the Account of the Eastern Barbarians (東番記), written by Chen Ti (陳第) in 1603.60 Surprisingly, he touches on the same topics as Dutch and Spaniards do when describing the western side of the island, the main purpose of which was to gather strategic knowledge to ght against the Japanese pirates. The same ethnological description was later developed, almost verbatim, by the Spanish or Dutch missionaries.

Tribal governance system At the beginning of his report, Chen mentioned the main geographical areas of Taiwan, and immediately he went on to discuss the way the natives organized themselves, manifesting the lack of governance and the importance of the “braves.” He said: There is no chief; one with many children is considered a hero by the populace, and they obey his orders. By nature they are brave and like to ght, and when there is nothing going on of this sort they practice running, by day and by night … They kill and wound each other … having cut the heads, they strip the esh from the skulls and hang them at their doors. Those who have many skeletons hanging at their doors are called the brave.61

84

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

This system existed also in the south of the island as Candidius had expressed earlier in 1629: “These villages have no general chief who rules over them, but each village is independent, nor has any village its own headman who governs it …”62 When later the Spaniards described the villages, they were also quick to point out the inexistence of a person representing authority, a headman or cabeza,63 but— following Chen’s pattern—they recognized a social organization giving preeminence to two groups, the elders and the bravest, like forming a kind of aristocracy. The elders, or bagui (as mentioned by Quirós using the native language), or principales (as Esquivel puts it, using Spanish), were, according to this missionary, “those who had more stones, ceramic jars, clothes and tambobos (storage room); [later comes] the bravest among them, the headhunters” (SIT, 181), those with special recognition after having participated in battles against the neighboring clans or villages. Beheading the enemy was seen as an accomplishment and the victor would paint his own neck and arms as a mark of prestige. These also can be seen in the north where we nd groups of elders who discussed with the Dutch particular matters.64 It can be recognized also in the way the Dominicans narrated the Senar elders’ decision of killing the missionary Váez: [Fr. Francisco] … formed them into a very good village where he taught doctrine … [And] wishing … to establish a church in another village called Pantao (whose natives were friends of the Spaniards but enemies of Senar) … he informed those of Pantao about his idea and desire, and they welcome it ... He returned to Senar with great joy, and he invited their chiefs … to help celebrate the dedication of the new church. The natives of Senar responded favorably at that moment, but when they discussed the matter among themselves that night, they did not think it was a good idea. They drank and thought worse about the matter and ended up deciding to kill Fr. Francisco. (SIT, 240)

Headhunting The natives of Taiwan were known for their headhunting activities; but, in fact, headhunting was a common activity in Southeast Asia, used to probe the manhood of the warriors, where the enemies’ heads were displayed to manifest one’s own pride and to acquire honor (see Plate 6). Esquivel gave an explanation of this practice based on the relations of friendship and enmity among the tribes: The natives of Quimaurri and Taparri have friendly dealings with all the other groups. But (1) those from Pantao are enemies of those from Senar. And (2) those from Senar are enemies of those from Pulauan, Pantao and Cabalan. (3) Those who live along the two branches of Tamchui River are enemies of the Cabalan … Before the Spaniards came, they were all cutting off each other’s heads and celebrate this with drunken feasts and masitanguitanguich. To honor the bravery of those who managed to cut heads, they would paint their necks, legs and arms. But later on, they realized how much trouble they caused their villages due to their treachery, and they no longer dare even

The Encounter

85

to kill their fellow-villagers, considering this to be bad luck … Only the Cabalan natives still practice head-hunting. At harvest time, they would hide along the path of the river and shoot arrows to kill and then cut the heads of the natives of Tamchui who pass by on small boats. They are so daring that they attack even the sampans, as they did last year, when they ambushed a sampan of sangleys that carried the servant of the Commander of Tamchui and two other Spaniards. They rained arrows on them, which overwhelmed and rendered useless the muskets that they carried. (SIT, 169–170)

The radical differences among the tribes, reected either in rivalry (temporal or permanent) or tribal hatred (a category emphasizing these differences), can help us to understand headhunting activity. Rivalry did not exclude cooperation against a common enemy, and did not even exclude marriages. Sometimes the rivalry was “natural” in places considered as “opposite areas” (the bands of a river or a bay, the lower and the higher part of a mountain, the old and the new parts of the same town, etc.). In this group we can include the people of Quimaurri and Taparri. Esquivel stated clearly that they “are of the same stock and all those from Quimaurri are Taparris. They have the same customs and traits. They are divided, but not to the extent of preventing inter-marriages or other forms of social relations” (SIT, 166). Other rival towns may be those of Senar and Pantao, as we have just mentioned. Even if they were rivals, they can occasionally join forces. Tribal hatred excludes any form of cooperation among natives and their relation is oftentimes bellicose and murderous. In this group we can include the relation between Cavalan and the ones of Senar. For this reason Esquivel recommended that “[the Spaniards may establish a fort near Cavalan] to prevent the natives from pillaging and killing the natives of the island who live near our port [of Tamsui], these are the natives of Senar and those living along the Tamsui river who get summarily beheaded when the harvest season comes” (SIT, 162–163).

Pillaging The natives were also jealous of their own coast and they were ready to pillage any foreign wretched ship arriving to their seashore, regardless who were on board, whether Spaniards, Chinese, or Japanese. Therefore other categories of the headhunting mentality were the pillaging of wretched alien sailors and the ambushes to Spaniards. We can identify three different pillaging of wretched ships and one ambush. In 1628, the natives of Rarangus (near Turoban) killed ten people of the wrecked sampan of Carvajal, a relief ship carrying cannon, money, and other items, which they stole (SIT, 163–164). Secondly, in 1632, the natives of Taparri el Viejo (Old Taparri) killed twenty or twentyve Spaniards of the junk of Cambodia that ran aground on its way to Manila (SIT, 166). Thirdly, another sampan going from Quelang to Manila wrecked in Cavalan also in 1632 (SIT, 174) and the natives killed eighty people, among them Spaniards, Chinese, and Japanese (SIT, 163). Since Rarangus was the rst pillaging that had happened and also it was located far from Quelang, the Spaniards postponed a possible punitive action. But the two pillaging

86

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

that occurred in 1632 were too much not only because they were close in time (and they could show a sign of weakness among the Spaniards), but also because they ended in real massacres. Consequently, the moment of action for the Spaniards had arrived. First they went to the nearest place, Taparri el Viejo, to carry a punitive expedition. They got a native, and after torturing him, they located the houses of the main perpetrators which were burned down (SIT, 173). Soon later they went to avenge both massacres of the eastern coast, accompanied by Cagayanos and probably some Basayans. First they reached southern Cavalan to avenge the recent one. They killed ten to twelve natives and burned down the houses of seven small villages. According to Esquivel the result was not very satisfactory, because: “Since the natives outnumbered them, the Spaniards could not do more, which made the natives even more arrogant, and scornful of the other natives who, out of fear of the Spaniards have made friends with them” (SIT, 163).65 Nevertheless they captured a Cavalan native to request information about the old case of the Rarangus massacre. With this information they moved southwards, and in the place they identied as Rarangus, the Spaniards “tried to take the killers as prisoners but they could not because they had ed to the mountains” (SIT, 164). Finally, we can mention the ambushes that already started at the very beginning. In a letter of 4 August 1628, the governor general reported to the king that the natives were not behaving as they did the rst time, and taking advantage of some negligence and the trust we have shown to them, they have killed up to 30 men” (SIT, 135). But no other ambushes were reported until those of 1636. The rst happened in January, when Váez was killed by the natives of Senar, and the second in April when 300 Senar warriors attacked twenty soldiers and forty laborers that went to call back a missionary, Muro, who was in Senar escorted only by four soldiers (SIT, 242–244, 249). This massacre led to the abandonment of the Spanish fortress in Tamsui, a matter that we will see in detail in chapter 6.

Matrilineal and patriarchal societies The rst document talking about the family system in Taiwan is probably the abovementioned Account of the Eastern Barbarians by Chen Ti. There, talking about how a man marries a woman, he describes the matrilineal system that he might have seen in the tribes of the West. Chen said: With regard to taking a wife, if a youth sees a marriageable girl, he sends someone to present her with a pair of agate beads. If the girl does not take them the matter is closed; if she does take them, then in the night he goes to her house. He does not call to the door, but plays on a kouchin (ɟೄ) to arouse her … The girl hears it and admits him to stay the night. Before daylight he straightaway departs, without seeing the girl’s parents. From this time on he must come in the dark and leave with the dawn while the stars are out, for years and months without any change. When a child is born, she for the rst time goes to the man’s home and [brings him back to her home] to be welcomed as the son-in-law … He then lives in her home and supports

The Encounter

87

her parents for the rest of their lives, while his own parents can no longer regard him as their son.66

But, when Esquivel talked about the same topic in northern Taiwan, he was not surprised—as Chen was—by some similar situations. On the contrary he described something more familiar to his culture, the patriarchal society. He saw how when a man was interested in taking a wife, he would acquire his spouse by paying her parents some cuentas (precious stones), acquired usually from the Chinese, although later, in the case of a Spanish soldier interested in marrying a native girl, her parents asked for silver coins (SIT, 177–178). The dismissal of the woman was accepted but it was not frequent for fear of the relatives of the wife. But, still these things could be solved through cuentas. For example, Aduarte mentioned: “As far as I know, they are not given to vices of the esh. If someone is found to have fallen into such a situation, the accused must pay one of these cuentas to the one who caught him, and everything is settled” (SIT, 179). Finally, we can mention that among the Basayans some sort of inter-village kinship was documented. The clearest example we have is not only the just mentioned comment of Esquivel—that even Quimaurrians and Taparrians might be divided, but “not to the extent of preventing inter-marriages or other forms of social relations” (SIT, 166)—but also the case of the family of the wife of Aguilar. This Spaniard told the Dutch that his wife, even if she originated from Caquiuanuan, belonged to the kinship of the headman of Taparri, Kilas sa Romana, who was her father’s brother (SIT, 388). No doubt this inter-village kinship facilitated communication among the villages.

Esquivel’s description of Senar Regarding the ethnological knowledge of the natives, the Spanish sources offer systematic information of those living in Tamsui and in Senar, in one of the reports of Esquivel;67 but we think that even if he reported mainly about the village of Senar, he tried to generalize his observations. In fact, we can say that most of the following general descriptions are similar to others from the Dutch witnesses, and those from the above-mentioned Account of the Eastern Barbarians by Chen. According to Esquivel the natives lived a (1) subsistence economy, therefore growing rice on the banks of the Tamsui River was their main agricultural activity. As Esquivel said: “the residents of Tamchui are farmers who live off their own elds and consequently remain in their towns” (SIT, 183), but, they produced only for themselves and hardly had big excesses of rice to be sold. Esquivel made the following observation: Here in Tamsui … the natives neither work with farm animals nor know how to use them. This would be very difcult for them. They watch over the elds day and night, from the time the rst grains of rice appear until the harvest to prevent pigs from ravaging the crop. And since planting requires so much effort, they only plant what they need to eat. No native sells rice in large quantities, but only in one or two small containers. Thus, in order to gather

88

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

enough for one cavan, one has to go through much trouble, only to end up gathering all sorts of grains. Wheat is not cultivated but the land is suited for it. And the King would have enough to supply his fort. Likewise, it would be good to send horses and mares from the Crown’s outpost in Manila and breed them here because the land in Tamsui is at and horses would be very useful. (SIT, 170–171)

They do not have any (2) religion, since “they do not have any kind of rites or sacrices, nor any sign of deference or reverence to anyone; neither do they have words to express these ideas in their language” (SIT, 179), but they have a lot of superstitions. For instance they would base their decisions in the bird songs, like that of the heron, on dreams, and even on bodily reactions like sneezing. The aberroa was looked upon as the good or bad spirit marking out one’s destiny. Esquivel said that death was not a matter of concern of reection for them because “no one believes that they will die, and when they see another person die, they think it is due to some particular bad luck,” and later he described their burial customs, some of which can be recognized in the archeological ndings. He described: The dead are buried beneath the houses in some nearby area. They put palm mats inside the tombs so that the body would not get wet and a kettle with rice beside the head for its food. They bury the dead in a knee-bent position in very small holes in the ground. On top of the burial place they leave the quiver, arrows, clay jars, stones, and other precious belongings of the deceased. (SIT, 180)

Besides the main superstition of interpreting the songs of birds to predict the future, Esquivel mentioned the activity of some (3) priestesses, or majuorbol (see Plate 10), who were “old women like sorceresses who speak with the devil. They say if one wishes to be cured, he has to give a certain sum for their services … With this, the bad spirit will be exorcised and the person will be cured” (SIT, 180). This activity resembles quite closely the institution of the inibs (witches, sorcerers) of southern Taiwan recorded by the Dutch.68 They supposed that a sick person had a bad aberroa in his body, and the only way to be cured was to expel it. The majuorbol come and after setting the price of their service and with the butchering of a pig, they usually require that there be drinking orgies while they do their job. Esquivel pointed out: They do not use herbs, neither medicines nor venom, which they are ignorant about. Rather, their cures consist in sucking the body of the sick, and to lie prostrate on the ground covered by a blanket, spitting on a plate of cooked rice while mumbling incantations in a “Greek-sounding” language which is nothing similar to what is spoken in this land. Afterwards they remove the stone chicubises (sic) from the sick person, making him kiss them. They put a big knife under his head, and order the sick not to eat anything for three days. When a sick person dies, one of the old women goes around the person’s house, beating the air with a machete or a truncheon. They say this drives away the bad spirits. (SIT, 180)

The Encounter

89

Regarding the way they hold a (4) banquet to celebrate special occasions, Chen gives us a glimpse of his experience in some part of the west coast by saying: “They gather about a great earthenware jar, and each one pours his portion by means of a bamboo tube. No food is prepared for these occasions. When the music starts up, they jump and dance, humming with their mouths something like a song.”69 The Dutch, talking about the village of Tarrisan, in the so-called Baritschoen villages (west of modern Tamsui and Dahan Rivers), qualied their banquets as “Bacchanalias, where they villainously attempted to kill the guests they invited” (FE III, 279, 346). Esquivel has a more complete description of the way the natives made their celebration of feasts, which comprise several days of drinking, dancing, and singing: The feasts would last for three full days, day and night, during which they do nothing else but masitanguitanguich—that is, to sing and dance, with jars of wine all around; they drink all the time. Some collapse and fall asleep, and then go on with the revelry as soon as they wake up. They eat sea food and raw venison. They are a lthy lot who eat deer entrails without rst cleaning these of excrement. They celebrate with drinking sprees when they harvest and when the rice grains appear, and after headhunting; and they have a chant just for this purpose. They also drink much when relatives come and when their old women, called majuorbol, recommend it … All the men, with arms linked around their necks, dance around an inner circle of dancing women. At the center are the said old women, performing the ritual slaughter of a pig. (SIT, 179–180)

Finally, we must say that the communal way of dealing with important matters was also applied when they had to solve some (5) personal quarrels, as it was also vividly described by Esquivel: None of the natives are given to quarreling or scandal. The worst they could do is to occasionally exchange heated words especially when they get drunk. It is only during such occasions that they tend to be vulgar, abusive and deant. One would stand alone and shout and stamp his foot on the ground for two to three hours, the so-called masimanamananur, wherein one gives his side of the problem, while the rest listen in judgment … After this, [as a response] comes the masimacamicauas, which is the other side of the story, wherein one sharply cries out and shouts to defend himself as he walks around slapping his buttocks; this lasts as long as the rst stage. From here arise violent verbal exchanges, spiced by the brandishing of truncheons or machetes; nevertheless, no blood has actually been spilt. (SIT, 182)

The Spanish and early Dutch relations with the Basay natives The Spanish encounter with the natives in the area of Quelang started with a clash, but relations subsequently improved. Some aspects of this relation can be summarized as follows: the Spanish soldiers were concentrated on the San Salvador fortress, a construction that acted as their symbol of power (army, eets) and wealth (silver, trade),

90

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

which offered the possibility of protection and had a capability of attracting natives to the overseas economy, etc. Besides, the Spaniards bartered native goods (sh, game, logs, salt, etc.) with silver and the natives were also introduced to the monetary economy. Also, in this area the missionaries devoted all their energy towards the natives. Finally the natives did not help the Spaniards in the nal Dutch attack, keeping a “wise” neutrality, expecting a new change of rulers. When the Spaniards left as prisoners for Batavia (on their way back to Manila) the native women who had married Spanish soldiers accompanied them in their exile. The Dutch sources are very much more detailed than the Spanish because they are written in a diary basis, allowing us to know in retrospective vision some things of the Spanish times. For example, through the interrogation to Teodoro we can know about the missionaries’ support of the natives in times of famine, or the absence of tax collecting. Dutch sources also offer very rich information of the interaction between the Dutch and those Basayans who had experienced the Spanish inuence, a relation that we are going to consider now.

The aftermath of the conquest (September to December 1642) We have mentioned that the Basays of Quelang wisely showed neutrality during the Dutch attack on the Spanish fortress. This shows their suspicious character towards foreign powers, leading them to manifest apparent submission in order to preserve their autonomy. This was the common trait of these relations. Certainly, on 4 September 1642, and under the presence of the Dutch commander Hendrik Harouse, they reached a peace agreement with the natives of Tamsui who actively sided with the Dutch during the attack. Later, they made a pact of reciprocal help with the Quimaurrians, emphasizing that they would have to surrender “dead or alive” all the Dutch servants or slaves that might desert. At that moment, Harouse was thinking of Pilet, one of his servants that had escaped. Two weeks later, with the arrival of Harouse’s superior Lamotius, the chieftains of nine villages of Tamsui area went to Quelang to offer their lands as a symbol of their alliance with the Dutch (at least, as the Dutch perceived it). The same happened with the villages of Quimaurri, Taparri, Caquiuanuan, Talebeouan, and so on. When Lamotius received these villages, his translator Alonso, a Basay from Caquiuanuan, appeared as his main native assistant. On 25 September, Lamotius proceeded to explore the land access to the gold mines of Turoboan, which was his main goal in this early stage of this northern expedition. He recruited the help of some Basayans for this endeavor, but after a few days marching he experienced difculties on the roads and a passive resistance from the Basay of Caquiuanuan. He called off the expedition, and on 1 October, he was back in Quelang thinking over what to do with the Basays. First, he sent Alonso to Tamsui to look for provisions, and, while he was there, Lamotius found out that Pilet (Harouse’s servant) was being kept hidden by the Quimaurris. It was the proof that those of Caquiuanuan and Quimaurri had broken their pact. He put eighteen elders of these two towns in jail with the idea of giving exemplary punishment; he later hanged three from Quimaurri-Taparri (among them their chief Sisinjan) and three from Caquiuanuan, including Alonso.

The Encounter

91

Lamotius, after declaring the VOC authority in Quelang, left for Tamsui on 11 October, leaving Harouse as the commander. Before departure, he appointed a new elder for Quimaurri-Taparri, a twenty-ve-year-old Quimaurrian called Teodoro. He had a Hispanized name, like Alonso, which revealed the Spanish exposure of this new generation of natives. According to his age, we must presume that Teodoro was raised under the shadow of the Spanish fort and the guidance of missionaries like Quirós. Lamotius’s two-month posterior stay in Tamsui (mid October to mid December) was very fruitful for the VOC interests, and particularly for Lamotius’s own records. At the beginning of November, he established the conditions for the relation between the VOC and the natives in a written document. More villages, including the reluctant Caquiuanuan, went there to pay homage to the VOC by surrendering their lands, and Tamsui headquarters gained preeminence over those in Quelang. Lamotius made a triumphal return to Tayouan, but not everybody shared his optimism. Lieutenant Pedel in Quelang, after an expeditionary trip, reported that the natives had surrendered their lands out of the fear created by Lamotius. The whole story soon reached Batavia, and also reached the Spanish captives there, like De los Ángeles, who reported it in this way: The general [Lamotius] returned to the island with the said six companies and hanged six natives of Isla Hermosa who were from Santiago, Quimaurri and Taparri, three villages who were friendly with us, because they had not given the Dutch food or guided them, which they promised to do but out of fear. The enemy did not realize that because the natives were our friends, it is their nature to act thusly. The Dutch also hanged a Tagalo boy who was the servant of the general because he ran away with the natives of that land; and the Dutchmen whom they found in our garrison, in the pay of his Majesty. This news that the natives have of the Dutch had so affected them that, if they had the chance, they would give the Dutch much trouble and reject their friendship. They now lament our absence, for under the shadow of the Dutch, the Spaniards are now almost like saints to them, and the natives ask nothing else except when you—[the Spaniards]—will return. (SIT, 416)

Teodoro: Chieftain of the Quimaurrians (December 1642–July 1643) For the second time, the inhabitants of Quimaurri tested the resistance of the Dutch with another provocation. First, they hid the Dutch deserter Pilet, and later a group of Cagayano slaves. We must recall that after the defeat of the Spaniards, the Dutch made three groups of captives. First, the Spaniards were to be sent to Batavia and from there they were given free passage either to Manila or to Spain. Second, the sixty-two mercenary Pampangos were to be kept with them in Batavia, and eventually—if they proved loyal to the VOC’s interest—would join the attacks on Manila. Finally, regarding the ninety-three mercenaries from Cagayan, they were also enslaved and most of them were put under the direct disposition of Lamotius, who brought them to Tamsui along with some Quimaurris and Teodoro himself. When Lamotius left Tamsui and headed towards the south, six Cagayano slaves escaped, reaching Quimaurri with the knowledge, consent, or connivance of Teodoro, who found a niche for them in his village.

92

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The Quimaurrians feared the danger and were restless. On 28 January 1643, they decided to leave the place ten days later. They justied this march in front of the Dutch garrison of Quelang by saying that the meager situation they were living in forced them to emigrate temporarily to Cavalan in search of rice (FE II, 417), but the Dutch—aware of the possibility that they were hiding the Cagayanos (FE II, 392)—interpreted that kind of escapade as a desertion. The episode had all the components of an exodus story. Teodoro placed his people in a forest between Quelang and Caquiuanuan, dense enough to hide them from the Dutch persecutors, who returned to Quelang empty-handed. After Teodoro had left Quelang, Aguilar, with the help of his wife, rendered some logistic services to Harouse, such as the preparation of the trips to Turoboan. Days later, Aguilar’s native wife, probably pushed by the Dutch, met Teodoro and other elders, and encouraged them to go back to Quelang to calm the Dutch. Some accepted, but as soon as they reached Quelang, they were arrested and the other Quimaurrians, in order to free them, had no choice but to surrender the Cagayanos to the Dutch; at rst only four of them, and later the other two, because they had already reached Cavalan. Harouse prepared a second expedition to Turoboan with the help of Aguilar and his wife to explore the gold mines and the access to Pimaba. But before that, he had to solve the problem of the Quimaurrians, because after ve months Teodoro still remained with his people in the forest. Harouse wrote to the new governor of Tayouan, Lemaire, saying that he was planning to capture the leaders of Quimaurri and Caquiuanuan very soon, but in fact, he was practicing a new attraction policy that proved to be successful when the Quimaurrians returned to Quelang out of their own free will and Teodoro surrendered himself to the Dutch. He begged for pardon and offered cooperation. After being interrogated and having accused other elders of Cavalan, he was released. Trust seemed restored in Quelang bay, but in July of the same year, the inhabitants of Caquiuanuan and Cavalan were still undecided whether to follow the same example of the Quimaurrians. Something quite strange is that Aguilar and his wife appeared very frequently in the Dutch sources until this moment, and that his wife was asked to be sent to Tayouan for interrogation. But, abruptly, both of them no longer appeared in the sources. Regarding Teodoro, we can see him in May 1644 newly conrmed in his authority, and rendering services to the Dutch when he was called for a long interrogation, when he was doing business with the Dutch by providing them coal, when he made a list of the native towns around, and when he was expected also in Tayouan for a formal visit.

Quimaurri cooperating in the pacication of Cavalan (September–October 1644) Although the inhabitants of Quimaurri were on good terms with the Dutch and those of Caquiuanuan had made a favorable approach, in Tayouan the Dutch were thinking of the need for tough action, especially with those in Cavalan. On 22 August 1644, the Formosa Council resolved to send an expedition like the one of Lamotius two years earlier. The plan was very ambitious, since on their return trip they would pass by Lamcam and the lands of the chieftain Quataong (FE II, 458–463). Captains Pieter Boon, who had

The Encounter

93

been in Quelang before, and Simon Cornelissen left Tayouan on 6 September, leading an expedition of 300 soldiers. On 10 September, they arrived in Quelang and started looking for interpreters in Tamsui and Quimaurri. On 13 September, Cornelissen headed for Cavalan as an advance force and Boon arrived three days later. They nally met in Catinunum (San Lorenzo), and from there, they sent emissaries to inform the Cavalans how to behave with the Dutch. As we have explained before, they proceeded to Terrachia (Dutch: Little Moudamas) and Quitalabiauan (Dutch: Talebeauan) where they were welcomed, thanks to the good work of the scouts of Quimaurri. They got a similar deal in Quiparrusinauan (Dutch: Parissinawan), where people from twelve towns went to hear them. Most of them agreed with the Dutch proposal of acknowledging their suzerainty, paying annual tribute, etc., although they asked for a delay in paying taxes because they were in the middle of the harvest season and ready to celebrate the marnas holidays. But the inhabitants of Quessajosojol (Dutch: Sochel Sochel) and Quitatupaan (Dutch: Kakitapan) scorned the Dutch proposal and those who had agreed with it. This was not ignored by the Dutch, who reached Sochel Sochel two days later and partially destroyed the town. The inhabitants ventured some resistance, which was answered with the total destruction of what was left. The same fate befell the smaller village of Kakitapan, and after that, the Dutch returned to their encampment in Quiparrusinauan. During the days the Dutch stayed there, they received new town leaders who came to pay homage to the VOC. The Dutch kept records of all these villages, and after the last visit, they claimed to have thirty towns submitted (FE II, 480–481), ready to pay some sort of tribute (at least this is the way they perceived it) and ready to make an annual formal visit to the Dutch in Quelang. Boon, considering that the goals of his expedition were accomplished, went back to Catinunun harbor and two days later reached Quelang on 1 October 1644. Once in Quelang, Boon evaluated the whole situation with the help of Teodoro, speaking presumably in Spanish. They talked again about Turoboan, because Boon was still very interested in going there and Teodoro knew the way very well. Boon also told Teodoro that those of Caquiuanuan had nice words but did not pay taxes and that they deserved punishment. But, he transmitted the idea to Teodoro that if they paid triple tribute they would be pardoned. On his way back to Tayouan, Boon followed the same route as Lamotius did two years earlier. First, he went to Tamsui by land, where he still received the obedience of some villagers. Later, he reached the land of the unfriendly chieftain Quataong (FE II, 497), but he continued towards the south reaching Tayouan after twenty-four days marching. Later, the Dutch received some satisfaction, rst upon the arrival of the news from Tamsui that some towns far from that place paid tributes and, second, when Teodoro managed to collect the rst tributes in Cavalan (FE II, 544). Nevertheless, these actions were still far from meaning real suzerainty. The Dutch tried for almost fteen years (until 1660) to subdue the natives of the entire island, for which they tried a practical formula, the landdag (or celebration of the Land Day), a kind of annual feudal meeting to stress the authority of the VOC, whose implementation obsessed the Dutch governors.

94

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The Spanish-(and Dutch)-Basayan Encounter An analysis of the types of political organization prevalent among the natives of Southeast Asia may throw light on the interaction of Spaniards with the natives of northern Taiwan, since the type of indigenous political structure affected the nature of such encounters. Shinzo Hayase in his analysis of the maritime Southeast Asian world regarding the aspect of “kingdom/nation-making” denes four types: (1) the kingdoms formed by Indianization, (2) the kingdoms formed by Islamization and the inuence of the “age of commerce,” (3) the colonial states formed by Christianization, and (4) the chiefdoms which did not form a kingdom.70

Southeast Asian kingdoms We think that Shinzo’s classification matches quite well in different areas of the Southeast Asia, for example the Philippines. In that archipelago we nd different groups of natives with common traits occupying extensive lands. The Spaniards referred these homogeneous groups unied by a common language as “nations,” like the Pampangos and the Cagayanos, who accompanied the Spanish armies, and we see them in Quelang ghting for the Spaniards as colligated armies, and under their own banner. The same can be said for the Tagalos, the Igorrotes, the Irrayas, the Visayas, the people from Pangasinan, etc. Maybe the larger population of these large and rice-growing territories made the creation of governments resembling monarchies more feasible; and that political structure may explain the facility the Spaniards encountered in raising mercenary troops. To some formal extent, there was an “encounter among equals.” The further south we go in the Philippine archipelago the bigger sense of state organization we find. The Muslim influence that started in the sixteenth century created sultanates in places like Mindanao, where the sultan had even a palace inside a wooden walled city and a group of courtiers handling state affairs. Qudarat, the sultan of Pulangi (in Mindanao) is the best example of this new organization system during the same years that the Spaniards were in Taiwan. In fact, the pressure Qudarat exerted against the Spaniards through destructive raids in Visayas moved Governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, among other measures, to dismantle the Spanish forces in Tamsui to concentrate sources in the pacication of Mindanao and the wars of Jolo.71 These southern sultanates sometimes exercised a kind of protectorate over friendly neighboring territories or formed alliances among them by a policy of marriage of princes. The clearer examples are precisely the sultans of Pulangi, Jolo, and Terrenate that have some kinship. The last one was a tiny volcanic island, whose spices even reached the West during Roman times. It was held in great respect by its neighbors, and they even kept their authority whilst at the same time allowing Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch to build forts in their territory. The same can be said of other sultanates as we move towards the west, particularly Johor in the Sincapora straits. That place was an important entrepôt in the middle of the large commercial networks that preceded the Portuguese arrival. Exposure to emerging Islam made them develop their networking style, giving a new

The Encounter

95

impetus to these sultanates, kingdoms of island-states. We can say that in these cases, the encounter with Western sailors created competition, but the pressure was limited to the commercial arena, and to the settlement of some factories, but there was no inland penetration. How about in Taiwan? According to Shinzo’s classication, we cannot clearly recognize in Taiwan “kingdoms formed by Indianization.” On the contrary, since the end of the sixteenth century the information refers to tribal societies. The report of the Macanese Salvador Díaz (the prisoner used as interpreter by the Dutch from 1622 to 1626, as we have mentioned in chapter 1), commenting on the natives around Tayouan said: “They have no king; the strongest one of each village is considered its leader” (SIT, 65) and that “they have no great leader who can unite them to war” (SIT, 67). We have already mentioned how Candidius also, when describing the same villages near Fort Zeelandia, pointed out their sense of independence, which might only reach some sense of organization in the face of an external menace: “These seven villages do not have a common leader to rule over them, but every village is a unit in itself. And every village in its turn does not have its own specic leader with absolute say or command over them, but they have a council consisting of 12 men” (FE I, 120–121). Nevertheless, after ten years the Dutch started discovering bigger political unities, like Longkiau, which was described in 1636 by Junius, the missionary who had just met her chief Lamlok. Junius later arranged a meeting between some delegates of Lamlok and the Dutch governor. The records of this encounter reected a respectable degree of court organization in Longkiau: These people are more civilized that those in their surrounding villages … they maintain their authority over their inferiors in a much better way. The [ruler] holds sovereign sway over sixteen villages, each of which has a chief appointed by him. He is attended by many servitors, who always surround him. They do not go about nude, but like other black nations, they wear garments, the women even covering their breasts. Fornication and adultery are regarded by them as something shameful, and each man may have but one wife. When the chief dies he is succeeded by his eldest son, who in his turn is respected as much as his predecessor.72

Another vague resemblance of a “kingdom formed by Indianization” can be found in the land ruled by “Tackamaba, alias Quataongh, the regent of over 15 villages, situated to the North” (FE II, 562), a case studied by Ang Kaim,73 but in any case we think that these cases still are far from the concept of an “indigenous kingdom.” Kang had suggested that the power of Quataongh realm was based in the external trade inuence coming from the sea.74 On the other hand, in Formosa—following Shinzo’s classication—it was impossible to nd “kingdoms formed by Islamization,” since Islam never reached the island. Different is the case of the “colonial state,” which was developed by the Dutch from 1635, and almost reached maturity on the verge of their withdrawal from the island; a topic that has been thoroughly studied, although not yet exhaustively. In relation to this Kang had also suggested a new model that could apply to the Pimaba villages. In this case the natives collaborated with the outsiders for the control of the

96

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

territory (in this case the Dutch area of inuence in the southeastern part of Taiwan), but once the outsiders left, the native supplanted them and took over that inuence.75

Formosan chiefdoms The case of “chiefdoms,” the fourth one in Shinzo’s classication, is the one that best matches most of Taiwan societies. “Chiefdom” sometimes means the preeminence of a headman, and sometimes means a senate of elders making the nal decisions. For example, the Spanish missionary Esquivel said that the villages he knew were led by the principales, to whom they called bagui (SIT, 179). But Esquivel, like Candidius, formally negated any authority. Esquivel clearly stated: “They neither had cabezas (leaders) nor a particular system of government” (SIT, 181). He added that only two groups of people existed, the rich and the bravest. The rst group had colored stones, symbolizing money, cloths, ceramic jars, and storerooms for corn. The bravest practiced headhunting and they showed their pride by painting their necks and arms. By saying so, Esquivel was referring particularly to the people of Senar, but we think that it can be extrapolated to the society that Spaniards and Dutch encountered in the northern places of Taiwan. Why didn’t any of these groups of villages like Cavalan develop into a sort of kingdom? One of the reasons might be the fact that the foreign trade conducted in Taiwan before the seventeenth century was very small and Taiwan was used only as an entrepôt for alien pirates. Foreign trade passing by near Taiwan only offered the natives the possibility of pillaging in the event the ship went aground.76 The group with greater possibilities to switch from “chiefdom” to “native kingdom” was probably the Basayans, who had more sense of organization, and who controlled a small commercial network in the northeast of the island exchanging Chinese products for local raw material, but this was not enough to evolve into a productive organization and to introduce monetary practices. Nevertheless, towards 1644, we can identify some clear changes. On one hand, the sense of vassalage intended to be fostered by the Dutch in all the natives under their command tried to give more preeminence to the gure of the chieftain over the elders. Particularly, in Quimaurri, they made it more explicit by choosing a young man, Teodoro, as their main leader. He was “conrmed in his position as a commander by presenting him with a cane as a symbol of his authority and a cloth of red damask, which he accepted with considerable gratitude, promising us that he will be obedient to the Company in everything” (FE II, 439). On the other hand, when Lamotius elected that young man as a chief of Quimaurri and Taparri alike, ignoring the elders of these villages, he was probably doing more than a change of leadership. He was electing a more educated man as the leader of the most dynamic group of northern Taiwan, a person with foreign exposure, with whom the Dutch would be able to communicate directly in Spanish, and he was the most reliable man for collecting taxes for the Dutch in the neighboring villages. And, certainly, Teodoro learned his job so well that a few years later he was able to engage with the Dutch in a long discussion about the right price of the coal that he was selling to them (FE II, 438).

The Encounter

97

The knowing of “the other” As we have mentioned in chapter 2, the rst encounter between the natives and Spaniards was violent when the Spaniards intruded in their territory of Quelang. The native response was violent at the beginning, but little by little they accepted the foreign presence, some of their costumes, lifestyle, and even values and organization. The same can be said of the native villages around Fort Zeelandia and Fort Provintia which had more interaction with the Dutch, compared with others who kept their distance. But after a few years of eventual clashes another image emerged: of the young natives entering the Christian realm. Candidius—after one year in contact with the people of Sinkan, and following the natural inclination of missionaries reporting exotic experiences—systematized his rst impressions of these natives in his discourse of 1628 (FE I, 112–137). The same can be said of Esquivel. His discourse “Situation of the conversion of the Isla Hermosa” (SIT, 179–189) was made in 1632 after a one-year stay in Quelang and Tamsui. Both are descriptive Renaissance discourses, of cultural superiority, written with the purpose of implementation of native conversion, and the transmission of cultural values, and methods of organization. Following the style of the arbitristas writers in Spain, they tried to analyze the problems of the colony and to look for solutions. Analyzing the respective discourses describing the natives written by Candidius in 1628 and Esquivel in 1632, we can nd that both of them reect the optimism of the newcomers on an island, called Hermosa, with a Renaissance appetite for global comprehension. They describe it as a “promised land” that will bear many fruits, and both of them ended with overall proposals. But, the brilliant future foreseen, for example, by Esquivel, to divide the north of Taiwan into missions to be granted to Franciscans, Augustinians, and Jesuits ended in nothing. The best part of the discourse of Esquivel is his penetrating psychological observations. In his discourse he narrates the encounter between the priest [himself] and the natives of Taparri, describing the changes in their attitude towards the missionary, going from the stage of fear, to suspicion, curiosity, affection, and nally the one of granting security: They are still extremely afraid and suspicious of us. Up to now they have a deep-seated fear of the Spaniards. When I rst came, they spread rumors that I carried shackles in a pouch to bind them and take them as prisoners to Manila. They directly accused me of this once, in the presence of another priest. They asked where my wife, children and possessions were. When I told them that priests neither get married nor own anything, they called me a big liar and a deceiver. The same thing happened—what’s more they thought me insane—when I tried to explain to them from the catechism that we will all raise from the dead. They argued that some of those whom we have baptized were now dead and buried beneath their houses. But we have slowly grown in affection for each other to the point that they would offer me a wife. But they are disappointed to see that we do not even allow women to enter the priest’s house. They had such affection for me in Taparri, where I was assigned for eight months, that when they would see me leave for another village where other Spaniards live, they would threaten to escape to the mountains if I did

98

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

not return to sleep there. They believe that without a priest, they can never be sure of what the Spaniards will do to them. (SIT, 181)

As with many foreigners of all times, the longer you stay in an alien place, the more you realize not only how difcult it is to report your experience but also how selfcentered you were in your rst observations. Not escaping this universal rule, Candidius and Esquivel provided the vision of the rst moments of the encounter from the Dutch and Spanish sides. But, as time passes by, we may presume that the complexity of the situation would penetrate their analysis, and that a Baroque perplexity would take root in their minds, leading to more conictive descriptions. But, unfortunately, we cannot properly trace these changes. In the case of Esquivel it was impossible since he died after three years in Taiwan. In the case of Candidius, it might have been possible since he stayed ten years (1627–1637), although with an absence of two (1631–1632). But, in his second stay he seemed silent since, as far as we know, no other discourses of the same category were produced by him. How do natives’ voices sound in these discourses? In principle they don’t. In the cases of the killings the natives inicted on the Dutch, all of them are explained by labeling the natives as treacherous and murderous savages, incapable of understanding the benets of civilization. The Dutch were convinced that in order to assimilate the natives the best way was to persuade by force. These reasons might explain the unequal encounter behind the landdag policies. Certainly in a process of assimilation it was difcult to record a discourse from the natives, either because it was not heard, or because it was erased. Nevertheless, it can still be retrieved in some cases, for example, when the Senar elders took the decision to kill a missionary, or as in other cases that we are now going to see.

From landdag to the suppression of taxes Between 1646 and 1648, we can identify two events where the Dutch made an important step forward in their Formosan encounter: the listening and understanding of “the other” and the elimination of taxes on the natives. We have selected a signicant event that happened in June 1646, when Jan Hendricksz Ootman and Daniël Sipter listened with admiration to the natives of Turoboan. They were caught by surprise after hearing from them a clear explanation justifying why they had decided not to allow the soldiers to settle down in their vicinity. Let us start by recalling that the rst successful visit to the gold-sites was at the end of January 1646, during the punitive expedition of senior merchant Cornelis Caesar (FE III, 1–41). After crossing the whole Hualian region (from south to north) his troops arrived in Turoboan, where they stayed from 23 to 26 January. They were allowed to explore the entrance of the Takilis River but they learned nothing by themselves about gold. Before leaving the place they offered some cangans, mirrors, tobacco, etc., to the eight elders of the village. Particularly, they honored the principal Patsien, to whom they presented a company cane, with the right of handing down to his son Tarrinouw after his death. The villagers offered the Dutch some pigs, millet cake,

The Encounter

99

etc., for their trip back (FE III, 33). Four months later the Dutch considered that another step forward in the exploration of the gold mining area should be made. Upon the new orders of Governor Caron, now senior merchant Gabriël Happart sent to Turoboan in June 1646 the two above-mentioned soldiers, accompanied by the interpreters Teodoro and Lucas Kilas. The mission was to live in Turoboan for a while, to establish friendly relations with the people and to nd out what commodities and merchandise the villagers would prefer to buy or to barter (FE III, 103). After three full days discussing the matter with the natives, Patsien, still the principal of the village, came with a frank and unambiguous answer to Ootman and Sipter: I, and my fellow-headmen, will not tolerate any Dutchmen living in our village for a longer time, because we have understood perfectly what you were after, to nd the gold-sites. This is the only thing that matters to you and, once these have been discovered, you will come to attack us, chase us away and ruin us. We are not going to pay any tribute to your Company. And if you force us to pay by using violence, we are ready to return it to you in an equal measure, and hold our ground, as you do with yours. When Mr. Caesar came a few months ago, we presented him some gold, but this was as exchange for the cangans and for the other gifts which Mr. Caesar offered to honor us. On the other hand, we will appreciate if you come here in a friendly way only to trade, but not for other reasons. (FE III, 103)77

The son of Patsien, following the example of his father gave also one explanation for having the company’s cane. He said that, after understanding at that moment that the purpose of endowing the cane had the implicit obligation of paying the company ten real of gold each year, he had decided to return the cane to Ootman, because he would rather leave his village than to pay tribute (FE III, 104). The amazing point here was not the refusal of the natives to the Dutch proposals (probably the Dutch had already experienced this before), nor the pacic and civilized way that the natives used in expressing their ideas (something that probably was also known to them), but the fact that the two soldiers related this event in a disturbed way. After feeling that “their minds had been read,” not only did they become speechless, but they granted the natives—maybe for a rst time—a moral authority and political understanding. The second event is the suppression of taxes on the natives in 1647. In fact the beginning of this policy can be traced back to 1636, when the governor Hans Putmans wrote to the governor general in Batavia on 7 October 1636. Putmans, after having declared that no subsidies were granted to the inhabitants, expressed that “collecting taxes from this poor people, as Your Excellency thinks we might, it is quite out of the question; for such a thing would only irritate and estrange them from us, as was the case of Kelang.” 78 During these years, in which the colonial territory was expanding, taxes were seen as a way of demonstrating authority, and also an income for the increasing needs of the administration. Besides, they were most welcome since the period was coinciding with the decline of the trade with Japan. All these circumstances led the governors to take advantage of all the possibilities, including sometimes tributes from villages which were declared enemies. The news of these excesses reached Batavia,

100 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

and it was in July 1647, when a letter from the governor general of Batavia reached the Formosa Council impelling Overtwater with several surprising orders. One was to protect the deer in order to prevent them from extinction. But the most shocking measure was the elimination of tributes, an order accompanied by the statement that it was unreasonable collecting tributes from enemies: From now on you will, until further notice, stop collecting the tribute all over Formosa, without any exception. We notice it is carried out not all according to our intentions; robbing these poor naked people from their food and clothes even before they themselves have any is denitively not the Company’s highest goal … We will be satised if they want to live in peace with us, and demonstrate our obedience to us, which we on our part will have to maintain with caution by occasionally presenting the elders with some gifts and by regaling them on the landdagen. (FE III, 200)

The same document went on to reprimand Overtwater for the situation that ended in the murder of three soldiers that went to Tataruma (Dutch: Talleroma) to claim some tribute, when this village was ofcially an enemy of the company: “If this is true, why did you put our men at risk by sending them over to claim a few deerskins or a little paddy? That is nothing compared with the loss of three lives … As for the said eastern side of Formosa, to the Company not only is it unprotable, but even harmful; therefore we will consider abandoning the area” (FE III, 200), an attitude that was anticipated by the Spanish Council of Indies as regards the Philippines. But, Phillip II decided to continue in the archipelago, whatever the expenses might be; also, the Gentlemen XVII sent now a letter conrming all these decisions, and reconrming their previous opinions: “The foundation of new colonies should be based on gentle government … just as all capable political administrators have observed” (FE III, 218). Regardless of the reasons behind the establishment of this Baroque compassionate policy towards the “good savage,” and their further implementation, these declarations bring us back conceptually to the Renaissance discussions in Spain about the Laws of the Indies that happened one century earlier, on which we have commented at the beginning of the previous chapter.

Teodoro Quirós and Teodoro of Quimaurri: The melancholy of the separation The Spaniards were defeated by the Dutch in 1642 and forced to leave Quelang in a few days. The soldiers that had married native women were allowed to leave accompanied by them, but any other Spanish relation with Taiwan was abruptly cut. One year later, Quirós, back in the Chinese parian of Binondo (Manila), was assigned by his superiors to write a memorial of his experiences of Isla Hermosa and particularly the reasons and the chronology of the defeat (SIT, 453–462). In the rst part he narrated the wonders of the island and the good decision of the Spaniards in going there. He even said that that conquest was “the easiest that the Spaniards have ever undertaken, and I have the evidence to convince the greatest skeptic” (SIT, 454). But the most important view that

The Encounter

101

he made referring to this northern part was that the Indians were good by nature, ready to learn and cooperate. He defended the natives from those accusations, labeling them as ferocious and treacherous, by saying that they tried to defend themselves from the pressure of the Spaniards. He even inverted the terms of the accusation, blaming the governors, who were seeking only for their advantage, instead of serving God and the king. He defended that the best governance combines strong authority and sincere care. And he put as example of these virtues Governor Alonso García Romero: How then that in a little more than a year [García Romero] commanded such a respect from the natives? How was he able to deal with them properly without being harmed by them? Why did they fear and love him and why they were almost ready to pay taxes to our Lord the King? Because he was a good Christian, he sought the salvation of those wretches and the increase of the Crown of his King … He showered the natives with attention, acting as a father to them and also, whenever necessary, as a judge. Thus they always remember him … During his time our Lord also opened doors to the conversion of the natives, which had not happened until then, and many were baptized … I moved about those villages alone, celebrating mass, and only accompanied by two native boys, without fearing any enemies as they were kept at bay by their fear of the Governor. (SIT, 456)

Maybe one of the two native boys who accompanied Quirós on his trip to Cavalan in 1635 was the much-mentioned Teodoro. Probably he was his main protégée not only because of this particular coincidence of names, but also because he was very much attached to the church service, as he was “responsible for the receipts and expenditures of the candles [in the church]” (SIT, 477). This close interaction between Spaniards and Quimaurrians created strong ties and needs. This is why, six years later, in 1648, the Quimaurrians—with a feeling of missing something—continued asking the Dutch for liturgical ceremonies and for the baptism of their children.79 We can recall also how even in 1651, during a period of famine, Teodoro—now as elder of Quimaurri— approached the Dutch asking for help and saying that in a similar situation the Spanish missionaries had helped them. Keerdekoe, reporting on this matter, concluded: “Clearly, those Christians have come to miss this kind of support ever since the expulsion of the Spaniards.”80 And nally he expressed to the Dutch governor of Tayouan Verbuch that he was feeding the hopes of the Quimaurrians consoling them that they had fallen from one kind of Christianity into another, and that the VOC would not treat them any worse than the Spaniards.

Plate 1 Map of Luzon, Isla Hermosa and a part of the coast of China (1597), by Hernando de los Ríos Coronel. (AGI, MP Filipinas 6).

Plate 2 Bartolomé Argensola, The Conquest of the Moluccas Islands (1609). This illustration belongs to a French edition made in Amsterdam in 1706 (on the centennial of the conquest), portraying the emergence of the Dutch Republic in the Far East, displacing the Portuguese and Spaniards. Courtesy of the Library of the University of Navarre (Spain).

Plate 3 Map of Isla Hermosa, a part of China and Luzon (1626), by Pedro de Vera. (AGI, MP Filipinas 141).

Plate 4 Detail of the map “Description of the Spanish Port in Isla Hermosa” (1626), by Pedro de Vera. (AGI, MP Filipinas 216).

Plate 5 A description of the Dutch port in Isla Hermosa (1626), by Pedro de Vera. (Museo Naval, Madrid. Collection Fernández Navarrete, Ms 27, f. 434).

Plate 6 The activity of headhunting was still easy to record at the end of the nineteenth century. From the Ino Collection, in the Tono Municipal Museum (Japan).

Plate 7 The Spanish fortress of Quelang. Detail of the map of the “Domburch” exploration (1629), by Gerbrantsz Black. (Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 4.VEL 141).

Plate 8 Drawing of the Spanish settlement in Tamsui by the “Domburch” exploration (1629), by Gerbrantsz Black. (Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 4.VEL 141).

Plate 9 Deer hunting by natives. Illustration called ‘Ein Formosa,” drawn by Casper Schmalkalden. From Die wundersamen Reisen des Casper Schmalkalden nach West-und Ostindiën 1642–1652.

Plate 10 Local priestess exercising sorcery. They were called majuorbol by the Spaniards and inibs by the Dutch. From the Ino Collection, in the Tono Municipal Museum (Japan).

Plate 11 Modern photograph of the old Santo Domingo fortress. (Photo by the author).

Plate 12 Ruins of the main bastion of San Salvador fortress, taken in 1936 by the Japanese. Picture kept in the Museum of the Department of Anthropology in National Taiwan University. (NTU-Anthr-SLT 3071).

Plate 13 Dutch map of fortress Noord Holland (formerly San Salvador), made in 1667. (Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 4.VEL 1128).

Plate 14 Map of Northern Taiwan (1667) by Cornelis Vischbee. (Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 4.VEL 30).

Plate 15 Map of Quelang. Map of Northern Taiwan (1654), by Johan Nessel, under the commission of Simon Keerdekoe. (Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 4.VEL 1127).

Plate 16 Eighteenth-century map portraying one of the galleon routes from Acapulco to Manila. (AGI, MP Filipinas 163).

Plate 17 An aborigine headdress adorned with a fake late-eighteenth-century Spanish coin. (Museum of the Department of Anthropology in National Taiwan University, 1450–1&2).

Plate 18 Gold leaf discovered in 2006 in the campus of Yilan University. It belongs to an aboriginal decorative item, probably a golden necklace (excavation catalogue number: YLNH-II P11A; burial tomb: M8). Courtesy of the Yilan Cultural Affairs Bureau.

Plate 19 Smoking pipe from the archeological site of Qiwulan (KWL) where more than 300 pipes were discovered. In the center there is the aboriginal decorative motif of a triangular face, common to the golden and wooden decorations. Courtesy of the Yilan Cultural Affairs Bureau.

Plate 20–21 Convent of Todos los Santos in Quelang according to a detail of the map of Keerdekoe (1654) and to another detail of the map of Cornelis Vischbee (1667).

Plate 22 Village of Quimaurri (Kemoraj) during the Dutch period, showing churches on both sides of the village. Probably one represents the Dominican church and the other the Franciscan during the Spanish times. Detail of the map of Keerdekoe (1654).

Chapter 4

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

FOLLOWING THE PATTERN set by the Roman Empire, Spain when starting the conquest of the New World proceeded to the establishment of a network of cities as administrative, military, and economic centers. Also, as in the Roman times, some cities were developed over pre-existing ones, like Mexico City; but most of them were created ex novo with a rectangular perimeter, containing a regular network of streets, and following strict regulations, especially since Philip II issued in 1573 his Plan de Ordenamiento Urbano para las Indias (Norms for Urban Design in the Indies). The rst cities were located in the Caribbean and Central America, like Santiago de los Caballeros (Dominican Republic 1508), San Juan (Puerto Rico, 1509), La Habana (Cuba, 1514), or Guatemala (1517); and Mexico (1521) in the north. Secondly, other cities were created in South America, like Cartagena de Indias (Colombia, 1533), Lima (1536), Arequipa (1540), Santiago (Chile, 1541), Mendoza (Argentina, 1548), or Potosí (Perú, 1560). Still in the second half of the sixteenth century new cities were created, like those around Río de la Plata; and in this context, the city of Manila was founded in 1571. Others followed in the Philippines, but at the end of the sixteenth century the Spanish urban expansion in the colonies can be considered a phenomenon already nished. For this reason the establishment of the “city” of San Salvador on Isla Hermosa was a kind of anachronism and in fact, never went beyond an “embryonic” state. To start describing this colonial enclave we can examine the administrative background of the Spanish ofcers arriving to that enclave that they called San Salvador.

THE SPANISH

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

During the rst years of the conquest in America the gobernación was the area ruled by the conquistador (the commander of every expedition). Soon after, the Crown created two main colonial governing bodies in Spain, in 1510 the Casa de Contratación (Chamber of Trade) in Seville, to control navigation and commerce, and in 1524 the Consejo de Indias (Council of Indies), to deal with all colonial matters, to make laws, and to administer justice in special cases. The Council of Indies started to control the Casa de Contratación, and the vice-kingdoms of Nueva España (Mexico) and Perú. The

104 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

viceroys were the appointed governors that took over the power of the conquistadores, and created a bureaucratized new government. For example, the Philippines started as gobernación depending from the vice-kingdom of New Spain (Mexico),1 and under the control of a governor general.2 The capital of the colony represented a court on a small scale, since the viceroy, or the governor general, ruled the area in an almost authoritarian way. In Manila, like in other colonial capitals, to advise the governor general and to counterbalance his power, there were two institutions: the Audiencia (High Court), which acted through the scrutiny of the oidores (judges); and in an indirect way the Church, who acted through the moral authority of the bishop. The Audiencia was divided into two sections, one for government and other for nancial matters. Each one had some oidores, who—as public servants—usually occupied their position longer. The nancial oidores were the contador (accountant), the veedor (overseer), the pagador (paymaster), and the tenedor (book keeper). But, in fact, the nominal president of the Audiencia was the governor general himself, and therefore usually came into conict with the judges or oidores. Besides the capital, other cities enjoyed the legal consideration of ciudad de españoles (Spanish city), governed by the cabildos (city councils). These were constituted as an assembly of regidores (councillors) presided by an alcalde mayor (mayor). In the “city” of San Salvador we can nd also some resemblance of this general colonial system. The natives were considered vassals of the king of Spain; consequently they had legal rights like any other subject. According to the circumstances, the way they lived was organized in different manners. First, we have the encomienda (entrusted land), an institution in which some natives were under the authority of a Spaniard, the encomendero. They worked for him and paid some taxes to him; in return the encomendero had the obligation—in the name of the king—to take care of them and provide them with the knowledge of the Christian faith. But, in fact, this system was oftentimes a source of abuses and was nally abolished, at least in theory, since in places like Philippines it lasted longer and even some natives became encomenderos.3 The other system was the reducción (new village made out of former dispersed houses), in which the natives outside the encomienda system kept their own chieftains. The reducciones organized by the Jesuits in Paraguay were very famous for their organization based on a communal system. In some places of South America the reducción evolved into the corregimiento system, where a special Crown ofcer, the corregidor of indies, was in charge. Finally, when the natives were more assimilated they formed the so-called pueblo de indios (town of natives). They were well developed in the Philippines, and the authority was a native called gobernadorcillo (governor representative), who was in charge of administering justice. These towns usually had a population of 2,000 persons. If they were smaller, for example of forty to fty families, they were called barangay (family village), and the chieftain was called cabeza (headman). All these regulations were based in the original Castilian Law modied with new elements, and the compilation of all these new norms were called Leyes de Indias (Laws of Indies), as we have mentioned in chapter 2. The king, through these laws, tried to

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

105

allow the Indians to keep their customs as long as they did not contradict the king’s interest. In the way the missionaries acted in Isla Hermosa, we can nd a vague similarity of these systems, especially the reducciones and perhaps the pueblos de indios.

THE

PARIAN, ALCAIZERÍA, OR

CHINESE

MARKET

In the Philippines a new kind of settlement also appeared that had no counterpart in the Spanish cities of America, the parian or Chinese market.4 Somehow, it was similar to the Spanish markets called alcaizería, where all kind of goods were sold. The parian in Manila was composed of provisional houses with a roof of straw, that easily burnt and it had to be relocated several times, but always near the riverside of the Pasig River. The rst one was established in 1581 by Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo inside the walled city, but it was burnt down on 30 January 1583. Soon later Governor Diego Ronquillo made a second one nearby. In 1588 it burnt down also, but it was reconstructed in the same place by Governor Santiago de Vera, who expanded it in 1590. This is the parian where the Dominicans Miguel Benavides and Juan Cobo started their rst contacts with the Chinese, and the place where they published in 1593 the three rst books of the Philippines, two of them in Chinese, the Shi Lu, and a Doctrine. It lasted in this location until November 1593, when Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas was assassinated by some press-ganged Chinese rowers on a military expedition to Ternate. The third parian was located in the exterior area of the walled city; and, in 1594, Luis Dasmariñas made a new one (the fourth) in the other part of the river, in the area called Binondo, which until today epitomizes the Chinese quarter. It burnt again in August 1595. Luis Dasmariñas reconstructed it soon after in the area called Arroceros (fth parian), near the walled city, reaching the gure of 8,000 Chinese residents, but two years later, in 1597 it burnt again. Reconstructed probably by Governor Tello de Guzmán, it lasted six years, because in the Chinese uprising of 1603, and the succeeding massacre of Chinese, it was destroyed.5 This time it was not reconstructed until 1605 by Pedro de Acuña, when the Chinese decided to return to Manila for trade. In 1628, when the Chinese population reached 28,000, it was burnt again, and Governor General Niño de Tavora had to reconstruct it. During the governorship of Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, it was destroyed again when a second uprising of the Chinese (1639–1640) took place with some cooperation of the pirate and merchant Nicolás Iquam (Zheng Jilong), which was followed by another massacre.6 Gonzalo Portillo at that time “captain of the Spanish infantry in the fort and garrison of San José de Tondo [Manila]” (SIT, 312) participated actively in the Chinese repression in 1639 just before being assigned to Isla Hermosa as governor. When the situation calmed down, Governor General Corcuera reconstructed the parian in 1640 in Tondo, but in 1642 there was another re. The Jose Luis Bello Art Museum of Puebla (Mexico) has an oil painting on the inside of a wooden chest representing the city of Manila around 1640, where the Chinese quarters can be easily recognized. As we will see later this urban structure of the parian was also developed in Isla Hermosa, but on a smaller scale.

106 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The natural conditions of the Spanish settlement in Quelang Bay Observing the map of Isla Hermosa drawn by De los Ríos Coronel in 1597, we know that from very early on, people in Manila were acquainted with the existence of a good natural harbor in northern Taiwan under the name of “Keylang.” Thus when the rst army of conquest reached Cavalan Bay in 1626, they continued carefully searching for this place until they found it (SIT, 72). What did the bay look like at that time?

Quelang Bay The Archivo General de Indias conserves a nice map made by Pedro de Vera shortly after the Spanish arrival (1626) outlining the entire bay and harbor area. If we compare that map with another made during the Dutch period by Cornelis Vichbee (1667), its seems that the Dutch one portrays the area more accurately, but a more careful observation shows that both are totally consistent, and the apparent discrepancies might be explained by the fact that there was a difference of forty years in their execution. Both maps tell us that the best place to dock in Quelang Bay was in front of the island near the entrance, opposite the mouth of the harbor, protected from the winds, and in the same place where the native town of Quimaurri was located. According to the rst reports this town comprised between 1,000 (SIT, 87) to 1,500 (SIT, 81) houses. But, in context, we consider that the gures are quite exaggerated (unless they included the neighboring Taparri). The island was separated from the mainland by a small channel, called by the Spaniards boca chica (small mouth), making it a perfect system of defense. On the opposite side of the channel was Taparri. Nevertheless, identifying the location of these two aboriginal towns presents some problems that we will analyze later. The other parts of the bay had some limitation, because they were shallow and muddy (especially at the furthest point, where the passenger dock is located today). Additionally, Dutch sources also conrm that the increase in the level of sediment in the bay was quite obvious. Consequently it became more difcult for big ships to anchor in the bay near Quelang Island through the years.7

The nal lap in the “Manila-Quelang” route The trip from Manila to San Salvador in normal circumstances took nearly a week. For example, the otilla of May 1626 that had set sail from Bangui (Northern Luzon) on 4 May arrived in southern Taiwan on 10 May, and reached Yilan on 14 May. These trips were always done along the eastern coast because it was the best way to avoid the Dutch. When they reached the place they called San Lorenzo (Catinunum by the natives, and nowadays Nan Ao, ‫ڲ‬ዌ), they knew that they were approaching Quelang. San Lorenzo occupied a strategic position, rst because it was a good natural harbor that could be used as a temporary shelter if they encountered rough seas (SIT, 162), and secondly, because it was a refuge if the Dutch were around patrolling the area, as happened in the last years of Spanish presence. After leaving San Lorenzo ships crossed the inlet of

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

107

Santa Catalina8 (Yilan Bay), which ended near the island of Malabrigo,9 meaning “bad shelter,” thus to prevent any sailor from going there in case of bad weather. Nowadays it is called Kueishan (龜山) Island. Continuing towards the north appeared the majestic Punta de Santa Catalina, or modern Sandiao (三貂) Cape. In this place sentinels were located to warn the incoming ships on the Dutch presence near Quelang. The signal was to light three res on top of the cape, advising the ships to return to the harbor of San Lorenzo (SIT, 334). After turning Punta Santa Catalina they could see from afar the town they called Santiago, the rst one they envisioned on 10 May 1626 (SIT, 72). They gave that name following a long tradition in the Spanish and Portuguese armies. We must say that Punta Santa Catalina later got the name of the village of Santiago (or St. Iago, at it appears in Dutch sources), and this is the name that passed from the Dutch, to the English and French cartographers who named the cape in different ways: Hock van St. Jacob,10 Point Iaques,11 Pointe Iago,12 etc. Later Santiago was transliterated by Chinese as Sandiao (三貂). The next salient point is present Bitou (鼻頭) Cape, that might correspond to the Punta de Monos (Monkeys Cape), as the Spaniards used to call it (SIT, 369). Finally, almost one league before Quelang, they passed near a small inlet called Babatangan (Dutch: Bawatang), where some Chinese worked for the Spaniards burning lime (SIT, 389). One of the most detailed accounts of the route by land from Quelang to Caquiuanuan was reported by the Dutch, in 1642 (SIT, 389–390).

Difculties in the communications While the area of Quelang seemed convenient as a natural harbor, strategically speaking it had its disadvantages. At times, it was difcult to approach the harbor because of strong counter-currents, and also it was difcult to leave the place for the same reason or for lack of wind. For example, when the two galleys of the eet of 1627 had Quelang within their sights, strong winds pushed them out to the sea. This was not a unique incident. A few months later, a mandarin from Fuzhou came to inspect the area to learn about the new neighbors. He was well received, but he became very embarrassed at his departure since his ship tried several times to leave port, but was only able to do so a few days later (SIT, 133). Similar descriptions of these conditions can be found later in Dutch sources; for example, in 1666, Nobel wanted to leave for Batavia, but the weather was so rough he had to wait until the next day. When returning to Quelang he was almost shipwrecked. This was avoided by dropping anchor, cutting the rope of the anchor, and returning to the bay to wait for another day. The same happened the following day, and nally he was able to leave only at night.13 Another problem was the dangerous Punta Diablos (Devil’s Cape), referring to modern Yeliou (野柳). The Chinese place’s name must come from the Spanish word diablo (devil), since its minnanhua pronunciation is similar to the Spanish one. This name was probably given because of the danger implied by the rocky penetration in the sea. It was near this area that Fr. Bartolomé Martínez died when his boat was approaching from Tamsui in 1629. The same can be said of the several shipwrecks which occurred in 1632.

108 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The “city” of San Salvador When the Spaniards arrived in Quelang Island they occupied the houses of the natives and took some belongings. Days or weeks later they left that place and promised compensation to the natives. The army moved to the corner of the small island to start placing an encampment in a deserted area (see Plate 14).14 In this way this colonial post in the defensive net of the Philippines started, and it was similar to its counterparts of Iloilo, Zamboanga, and Terrenate.

The name of San Salvador In Quelang, as it happened in many colonial islands or cities, we have another confusion of names, since those given by the Spaniards experienced some changes. The rst soldiers arriving in Quelang named the place clearly. In the record of the conquest of 16 May 1626 they mentioned the port of Santísima Trinidad and the fort of San Salvador (SIT, 75). This difference between “port” and “fort” was kept in succeeding documents; for example, when Governor General Fernando de Silva, the one that sent the rst expedition of conquest, reported to the king on 30 July 1626 (SIT, 82). Again, this distinction appeared in the letter of the ofcers of the Manila Court, who on 30 August 1627 talked about the port of Santísima Trinidad and the fort of San Salvador (SIT, 100). From then on, the Spaniards did not use the name of Santísima Trinidad anymore, but these two words reappeared fourteen years later—in the Dutch sources of 1641 and 1642—as “La Santísima” (SIT, 325) or “La Sanctissima Trinidado” (SIT, 379, 394, 397), not referring to the port, but to the fortress.15 In the Spanish sources we can register an important change in the naming in 1632, when Jacinto Esquivel talking about the port, ignored the original name of port Santísima Trinidad, and mentioned instead the port of San Salvador. Besides, he introduced another important element; he named for the rst time the whole area as “the city of San Salvador.” The word “city” does not appear anymore in Spanish documents, but it shows the perception of the missionaries who envisioned a more organic development of the area, seeing the island like a future city. The natives most probably had a similar impression, as the elder of Quimaurri, Quilas Lucas, told the Dutch in 1654 that the place “used to be well provided with streets and all kinds of shops and goods” (FE III, 565). On the other hand, the governor and the soldiers regarded the place more in military terms, thus when referring to the built area they used the words of the presidium and forces of San Salvador, being more consistent with the terms of the original foundation. In fact, the founding of Spanish colonial cities started somehow in the same way, creating a port and a fort at the same time, and later—if successful—developing the enclave into a city. This moment might have been when the confusion of names began, as it happened for example in Puerto Rico.16

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

109

The Quimaurri and Taparri locations In chapter 3 we located Quimaurri on the small Quelang Island and Taparri in the mainland, but later maps and Dutch sources present a different location, Quimaurri is located in the mainland, just in the former place of Taparri, the present Dashewan (ɣҳᜪ) area, with names like Quemorrie, Quemorach, Kemora, etc., and Taparri disappears from Quelang to appear depicted in Tamsui. This obliges us, rst, to present the reasons supporting our location, and, second, the reasons that might explain a change in 1642. Regarding Quimuarri, there are many references locating this village in Quelang Island: Herrera (1638) Palomino (1638) Aduarte (1640)

Portillo (1641)

Portillo (1642) Aduarte (1640)

“Quimaurri is [located] a cannon shot away from the fort.” (SIT, 286) “The town of Quimaurri [is located] a musket shot from this fort, on the other side of the mainland.” (SIT, 291) “[Brother Acevedo] went to Isla Hermosa with the rst fathers, … [at the very beginning] brought many of the natives down from the mountains to the place where they have ed from the Spaniards, in order to live with them along a small sea channel … and they formed a fairly-populated village called Camaurri.” (SIT, 226) “The enemy came, in fact, to seize la mira from me … [he] made a safe landing … and marched in … They arrived in a town called Quimaurri and lodged there for the night. In the morning, [the enemy] climbed a hill that commands a view of the said village and of the entire force because it is a high point ... They also went to el cubo and saw what they wanted. They sent me, from the retirada, the letter demanding the surrender of this fort and I replied with another, much to my satisfaction. When the enemy received my letter, they retreated and, along the way, burned down the town and the church of Quimaurri, [the place] where they stayed, and boarded their launches in the spot where they had disembarked.” (SIT, 328) “The Dominican house and convent is located in the village of Quimaurri.” (SIT, 372) “Once [that the church] of Taparri was nished … [Esquivel] tried to put another church … in a village closer to our Spanish fort, called Camaurri.” (SIT, 205)

Regarding Taparri the references are fewer: Aduarte (1640)

“Taparri is on the other side of one inlet that surrounds our fort.” (SIT, 226) Aduarte (1640) “Taparri … is less than a league away from our fort of San Salvador.” (SIT, 204) Los Ángeles (1645) “In the village of Taparri, [located] at the other side of the bay …” (SIT, 573)

110

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

How to explain the apparent contradiction with Dutch sources? We think that upon the arrival of the Dutch in 1642 there was a kind of “domino effect,” in which people of Quimaurri moved to the (supposedly recently deserted) Taparri town. The reasons for this migration are not clear, but we have a small clue on the initiative of the Quimaurrians moving to Taparri in the missive from Captain Hendrik Harrouse in Quelang to Governor Traudenius in Tayouan on 6 September 1642. Here we can see that the reason for moving was their fear of the attitude the Dutch would have towards them. The Dutch said: Yesterday the local inhabitants, Quimpauliers, returned with the ag we gave them as a sign of our mutual friendship, informing us that, men, women as well as children together with all their belongings, intended to move their village from the present site across the water where they used to live. However they also expressed their fear that we would fail to keep our promise to offer them protection and friendship. Something which time will tell …” (FE II, 301)

This paragraph had some problems of interpretation, especially in the sentence “[The Quimpauliers] … intended to move their village from the present site across the water where they used to live.” First of all, if Quimpauliers means Quimaurrians, the “present site” should be the “small island” and the place they were planning to move “across the channel” should be referring to the modern Dashewan, the old Taparri area, and the most suitable one. This presupposes that the Taparrians had deserted the place before, something possible, because in 1638 they went to the mountains and burnt the church (SIT, 291, 304). On the contrary, if Quimpauliers is a general name for Taparrians (in fact, Taparri el Viejo was called, at least since Qing times, “Qimpauli”), when they were thinking of moving they still were located in that “place across the channel,” in Dashewan, and they were planning to move to “their older place of residence” (i.e., Taparri el Viejo or any other place from there to Tamsui). Both cases support the dominoeffect hypothesis; in the rst case it justies the move of Quimaurri, in the second, the move of Taparri. A nal and important reason that echoes the Taparri migration to Tamsui was given by Simon Keerdekoe when explaining his map (1654) to Governor General Joan Maetsuycker; he said, “The Kimaury, the Tappary in Tamsui, as well as the people from St. Jago are a nation baptized during the time of the Spaniards” (FE III, 565).

The main fortress of San Salvador As we had mentioned, the Spaniards called this fortress San Salvador,17 but the Dutch— deceived by the initial name of the port of Quelang—called it Santísima Trinidad. The fortress construction started in 1626 and was nished more than ten years later. The earlier description of the garrison refers to 1629, and was given retrospectively by Sergeant Major Jara Quemada in 1644, presenting a very well provided fortress in terms of soldiers (more than ve hundred), and ammunition (SIT, 493). This process

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

111

of construction is explained in detail in annex 20. Now, we can say that the rst image (map of Black) was portrayed in the same year of 1629, and shows that the main bastion San Antonio el Grande was the only part nished. We do not have a map of the fortress during the Spanish times; but, considering the statement of General Johannes Lamotius that “the Dutch fortress started on the same place and shape of how it was when the Spaniards owned it”18 and an excellent map made by the Dutch in 1667, we can reconstruct a “synthetic image” similar to other contemporary Renaissance forts of four bastions (see Plates 12, 13). Later documents talk about vaults inside the bastions to make cellars for storage of gunpowder, barbicans, a well in the center, etc. The barracks inside the castle were the most changeable construction. The squared fortress of San Salvador, compared with its counterparts of Zamboanga, Iloilo (both in the Philippines), San Paulo (Macao), or Zeelandia in Tayouan, etc., was the biggest in East Asia. In 1636, some Spanish captives declared to the Dutch that “San Salvador lies at the entrance of a bay and is twice as wide as the fortress Zeelandia” (SIT, 246). This helps to understand the comments of Keerdekoe in 1654, who, when describing the geography of the island, said: “It must have been something [impressive] for Commander Harouse to witness the fortress Transidissimo with its bastions, as well as he church and the cloister” (SIT, 575). After the conquest, San Salvador was renamed as Noord Holland. The defensive system of San Salvador was completed with three small forts; two of them topping the nearby hills were connected by a path. These were San Millán, or la retirada; and San Antón, or la mira, which had a big cross on top (SIT, 367). The third one, San Luis or el cubo, was built besides the channel to watch the entrance to the island. For the year 1635, we have a detailed record of the number of cannon in each fortress and the specications of each one (see annex 13). This global vision of San Salvador was also suggested in some documents referring to the military complex with the word “forts,” especially since 1638 when all the cannon of the Tamsui fortress were transferred to Quelang.19

Other buildings or areas Among the civil houses outside the fortress, the most signicant one was the governor’s house. We have little information of this house during the Spanish times, but during the Dutch period it still existed. It was not used as residence anymore because of its deterioration. We know several details (length, distribution, etc.) about this house because in 1648–1651 the Dutch resumed discussions on what to do with it. In 1648, Anthony Plockhoy suggested to Governor Anthonisz Overtwater not to reconstruct it because “was not worth the cost and effort.”20 This opinion was taken by the new governor, Nicolaes Verburch, who instructed in 1650 to tear it down and use those materials to make another solid living place. But northern commander Keerdekoe, after visiting the house, was of the opinion that, because of the solid walls, they could still be used after some major repairs. He said:

112

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The house is 53 feet long. If we tear down the governor’s house back room, which is 18 feet long, 36 feet will still remain, and 21 feet wide; the wall is 2 1/2 feet thick with all dark bluestone … My opinion is to lower it 2 feet, and I believe that after reducing the height and length it would be a nice place to preserve goods. And there is more advantage in restoring it, since the house’s wall is so strong that needs no repair in 100 years, and now there are also rainy days, the masons couldn’t work, so keep the oor of blue stone laid in the meanwhile, and upon it to make a series of rib structures, in order to build an even oor on it, and separate the upper room in three parts, 2 foredecks for goods, and the third one for a surgeon.21

Finally renovations were done, and they were expecting to nish the house by the end of 1651. The other important building was the residence of the Dominicans, or convent of Todos los Santos (All Saints), that in 1627 was formally incorporated in the Dominican Province of the Holy Rosary (SIT, 86). Not only did it serve as a convent, but also as the main church of the area and the headquarters of the Misericordia Fraternity, a lay brotherhood to meet the nancial needs of the creation and maintenance of a hospital, and to help in the missionary endeavors. This building started as a very small church (SIT, 85), but, according to a report of Fr. Teodoro Quirós, around 1638 and 1639 grew more solid after a nancial solution was found. Then, he requested the Chinese masons to make a more denitive and secure building made of stone. Quirós transferred there some of the images and other remaining objects from the church of Taparri (now under the care of the Franciscans), since Quirós felt that Taparri was not a secure place as before after being burnt down.22 Governor Pedro Palomino opposed to that building in the town of Quimaurri, because it was a padrastro (higher tower) over the main fortress, and if the Dutch were to come to ght surely they would make use of it (SIT, 291). Quirós won the dispute by ignoring the governor’s orders, but Palomino was right since this was one of the buildings occupied by the Dutch in 1641 in their rst attempt of conquest (SIT, 332). The last governor Gonzalo Portillo tried again to convince the Dominicans to tear down the building since the house was already damaged. Initially the Dominicans accepted, but later they refused (SIT, 372). In that new case the Dominicans proved to be right because the convent served as temporary shelter for all the Spanish troops once they had to surrender the big fortress to the Dutch (SIT, 383, 415, 441). Since the building was very solid, somehow it still appears in the succeeding Dutch maps, specially the one of Keerdekoe of 1654. In an explanatory note of this map, in regard to the convent, he said, “near the church are two curious ponds paved with stone, which have odd-looking stairs that start from the bottom. In these ponds the clergy puried their bodies” (SIT, 575). In 1655, some stones of the fortress, and also of the church, still were laying scattered in Quelang. Another important place was the military hospital, which in the rst instance was built to serve the soldiers. This may explain Esquivel’s plans to build new ones in Quelang and Tamsui for the natives and for the Chinese, funded by the Misericordia Fraternity. The military hospital was relatively well endowed, as it had a surgeon and

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

113

regular medical provisions sent to it in the socorro (the regular ship with aid and supplies for the colony). We even have an inventory of medicines requested from Manila for the fort’s hospital pharmacy (SIT, 320–323) by the surgeon Antonio García de Campos, stating a good quality of pharmacy supplies (SIT, 338). Later, the Dutch went further in their plans to combat disease by making their settlement self-sustaining. For example, in 1648 in Quelang there were thirty-eight cows.23 They also studied the possibility of increasing their livestock in Tamsui.24 This was a common practice in the colonial armies, and most probably the Spaniards tried to do the same, but, if it happened, nothing was recorded. Finally, Esquivel reported on the beginning of a Spanish settlement, or, as he put it, on “a very small town of Spanish soldiers that have married native women and other ones that recently are coming after having escaped from their villages with the same intention” (SIT, 188). He was afraid that this might end in a rochela. What Esquivel meant for that is not totally clear, since this word is only used today in Venezuela to refer to din. Also in this country it means the habit of some animals frequenting a place, and also the place itself. Probably, Esquivel was using a metaphor to refer to a place of irregular and indecorous gathering. This might explain why in the Basay language the word for “prostitute” is “puta,”25 the same one that is in Spanish in its abbreviated form. In fact, the Dominicans suggested that orphan girls without dowry from the Santa Potenciana school of Manila, or other poor women, should come to Isla Hermosa. On the other hand, the practice of marriage between Spanish soldiers and native girls was also encouraged by the Dominicans and it was a practice that continued during Dutch period. This was the case of Joost Cornelissen van Langenaer (that we will see later). The Dutch were also interested in promoting Chinese marrying native women. In 1648, Plockhoy in Tamsuij asked for a clarication on this matter to Overtwater, in Tayouan, since he had a particular case to solve. Overtwater responded positively, adding that “in order to attract other cases, we should allow them also not to pay any capitation money.”26

The parian of Quelang Chinese were frequent visitors of Quelang before the arrival of the Spaniards, but the small parian of San Salvador—according to Bishop Diego de Aduarte—started taking shape just before 1630; and even it had a small church which was destroyed in 1631 by a typhoon, the same day that Esquivel arrived in Isla Hermosa (SIT, 204). One of the earlier descriptions of this “embryonic city,” recorded by the Dutch in that year, includes a rst reference to the initial parian: In between the fort and the hill, on which a chapel has been built, stand about thirty wooden houses inhabited by the governor and married men, mostly ofcers of the garrison, merchants, and some other persons. No more than ten Chinese houses are located there, all belonging to Chinese workers. (FE I, 197)

114

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

In 1632, when Esquivel referred for the rst time to the parian, he considered these houses as a quarter already formed (SIT, 185). Certainly, it is difcult to imagine more than those ten houses, since Fujian was very near and the sangleys tried to minimize their stay when arriving in Quelang just for business (SIT, 178). The Chinese living in Quelang also engaged in agriculture of subsistence. We know it because as soon as Lamotius arrived in Quelang in 1642, he ordered his Dutch soldiers to remain in the fort and respect the plantations of the Chinese.27 These Chinese quarters extending along Southeast Asia (Patani, Batavia, Manila, etc.) were well known by the Chinese authorities, who never gave up on a possible control of them. The arrival of three mandarins in Manila to visit the parian and to administer justice, before the massacre of 1603 occurred, is well documented.28 In the case of the parian of San Salvador something similar is documented. It happened towards the end of 1627, when a mandarin came for inspection in order to make an ofcial report on the rumors that have reached Fuzhou about the different trade behavior of the Dutch and Spaniards (SIT, 132). Also we know about the complaint that the mandarin in Fuzhou made to an Italian Dominican, Angelo Cocci, on his arrival in China, in 1632, about some smuggling of goods carried out near San Salvador by the sampans without license. He warned Cocci—who acted in his position as ambassador of the governor of Isla Hermosa—that if things continue in the same way “a mandarin will be assigned to collect those duties in [Quelang]” (SIT, 178). Very soon the political instability of China might have reduced the coastal magistrates’ interest for the parian. After 1634 the small church in the parian was re-established (SIT, 573), although there are no records of missionary action with the sangleys. In 1639, there is a reference showing that the life in the parian had some administrative ruling, since Governor Cristóbal Márquez made a formal notication in it, telling that the trade with China should be conducted in Quelang, not in Tamsui, notication that also was sent to China (SIT, 307). Márquez also commented in a letter that the sangleys went to see him to solve a dispute among Chinese merchants. He was not able to solve the problem due to his inability to understand it, but at least it shows the fact that the Chinese regarded him as an authority on the matter, thus indirectly showing a kind of legal relation. In fact, in these last years of Spanish presence, the next Chinaman who started to exercise major inuence among the Chinese in North Taiwan was Iquam, not only in Quelang, but more prominently in Tamsui, as he was emerging now as the main competitor with the Dutch in the trade with Japan.

The fort Santo Domingo The founding of all these standard forts was quite similar. Even the walled city of Manila, Intramuros, started improving a pre-existing palisade made by the naturals that Miguel López de Legazpi converted in a wooden fort that was burnt in 1583. It was after the arrival of the engineer Díaz de Cevallos that Governor General Sande ordered the general planning of the city and fortications of Manila. The rst fort made of stone, called Nuestra Señora de Guía (Our Lady of the Guidance), was designed by the Jesuit

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

115

Antonio Sedeño and was nished around 1585.29 Later that fort became a part of one of the main bastions of the whole city, the San Diego bastion, with a similar size to the provisional squared wooden fort Santo Domingo in Tamsui.

The commanders The rst formal Spanish presence in Tamsui was in 1627 when the governor of Quelang sent Captain Antonio de Vera with twenty soldiers to buy rice and to explore possibilities of expansion. He stayed there for two months and established friendship with the natives near Tamsui (probably Senar). He was very well treated, but the selling of supplies was delayed and in fact never occurred. Later the Spaniards suspected that they were used by the headman of Senar against his traditional rival, the headman of Pantao, on the other side of the river. De Vera sent to San Salvador a request of more soldiers to force the negotiations of rice, but both headmen reacted by uniting forces and attacking the Spaniards, killing De Vera among others.30 At that time arrived to San Salvador Captain Lázaro de Torres with the ship “Rosario,” the only one that arrived to Isla Hermosa belonging to the armada of August 1627, and from there he was sent to Tamsui for a punitive expedition (SIT, 132). It is interesting to mention that the Renaissance mentality made them react to this incident by setting up the fortress of Tamsui, while a similar event in 1636, led them—under the Baroque pessimism—to dismantle it. The Spanish presence only lasted eight years (1628 to 1636), and among the formal commanders of the presidium we can mention Luis de Guzmán and Cristóbal de Carvajal. Guzmán, the longest-serving commander of Tamsui, was probably the rst. He was a well-respected second lieutenant in charge of the garrison and the two galleys (SIT, 493) that he used to repel the attack of the Dutch yacht “Domburch” in 1629 (SIT, 139–142). He was praised by everyone (SIT, 172), and helped Esquivel in setting up the mission of Senar in 1632 (SIT, 222, 225).31 Carvajal was probably the last commander and for a short period. He arrived in Isla Hermosa in 1627 as merchant with his own sampan, bringing aid to the fortress. For some reasons (ship problems, need of water, search for gold, etc.) he stopped in Rarangus (north of Hualian), where the sampan was robbed and some people killed and eaten by the natives (SIT, 162–163). After that he managed to reach San Salvador and remained there serving the king with the rank of secondlieutenant and also aid-de-camp without salary managing the company of Captain Pedro de Eguíluz, and it was probably with this company that he was commander of Tamsui (SIT, 318).32

The fort Fort Santo Domingo was considered as an extension of the main area of San Salvador. The name was suggested by Martínez who accompanied the troops the day of the occupation of the place, on 8 August 1628, on the feast day of St. Dominic (SIT, 221). The rst description of it is the map of the Dutch report of the “Domburch” expedition, in which a small fort of four walls can be recognized near the sea, in a corner of a big half-circled

116

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

area, containing the tents of the soldiers, and divided by a street (see Plate 8). The whole area is enclosed by the sea and a palisade. Nevertheless, the “Domburch” report describing the battle of 15 August 1629 said that “the fortication was on a mountain” (SIT, 139), and that “they have some batteries on land located in front of their fences” (SIT, 140). A second description of the fort was given by Governor Alonso García Romero, referring to the situation in 1635, when he left Isla Hermosa, saying that the fort was provided with enough artillery: eight cannon of different sizes. Regarding the building, Romero said something consistent with the drawing in the map made in the “Domburch”: “Its site and dimensions consist of three elevated wooden towers and a watch tower with a continuing wall that forms an irregular square, as the area is big and the three elevated towers do not form a triangle. I would have wanted to remedy this if I had held that post for a year more” (SIT, 260). The soldiers initially had an encampment outside the fortress, but after the “Domburch” episode and the improvement of the fort, the commander found a way to accommodate sixty soldiers inside (SIT, 249). When Esquivel arrived to the place in 1631, the missionary dwellings were the only ones in the palisade (SIT, 206). These lasted a few months, because in 1632 Esquivel went to reside in Senar, and only was coming to the presidium by sea on the liturgical feasts to celebrate mass for the soldiers. For the construction of these fences the soldiers used the wood coming from the river after every ood, as the natives did for their own houses. Esquivel said: “These tides sweep in some pine trees and other fragrant wood, massive logs, and very strong and durable wood. They are milled in the Tamsui fort, where they are sawn and cut for building storage houses and for renovating the fort itself, which is made of wood and logs” (SIT, 167). Since 1636 the fort became unoccupied until 1641 when the Dutch arrived preparing for the conquest of San Salvador in the following year. Once this happened, Tamsui became the center of Dutch activities in the north. In fact, Fr. Juan de los Ángeles managed to know in Macassar that the Dutch made repairs to reutilize the old Spanish fort: “[they] erected a fort of logs on the same spot where our fort was rst built, and left their artillery and 60 soldiers, as some of our laborers—who were brought to Tamsui to work—told us” (SIT, 416). Initially the fort kept its original and irregular square shape, and Batavia agreed on 15 June 1643 to build a provisional stone security to secure the sulfur trade. This new fort, was renamed Fort Anthonio, after the governor general of the VOC, Anthonio van Diemen; and one of the bastions was called bastion Maria,33 named after his wife Maria van Aelst. In June 1643 one idea started to take shape. Fort Anthonio was so provisional that a new rm defensive stone redoubt needed to be built at the rst suitable occasion, following the Dutch redoubt pattern in Asia. Very soon the design of a blockhouse was made, comprising two big squared vaults, one on top of the other, to be covered by a roof as high as the two vaults (see Plate 11).34 In 1644 the rst vault was nished, since in May 1645 Governor François Caron manifested his interest in starting the construction of the second one, and to make it possible he sent 300,000 bricks.35 But the death of Van Diemen on 19 April 1645 and the return of his wife to Holland created

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

117

the condition of removing their names from the fortress. In September of the same year Caron sent an instruction to upper-merchant Hendrick Steen, in Tamsui, telling him that “the Company’s fortress cannot bear the name Anthonio anymore and it should be changed to Fort Tamsuij. In the new books the name Anthonio cannot be associated with the image of Dutch fortress.”36 To get also other strong materials for Fort Tamsuij, in September 1645 the ship “Diemen” started making regular trips from Quelang to Tamsuij carrying stones of the old fortress. Probably, the roof was done according to the original plan, of the same size of the two vaults, but the blockhouse pattern proved to be not a very good idea in Taiwan, especially because of the impact of the typhoons and earthquakes on the roof. For this reason, in 1654 the upper-merchant of Tamsuij, Thomas van Iperen, wrote to Cornelis Caesar in Tayouan asking to substitute the present roof for another made out of stone: We have decided in a meeting of Councils to repair the roof of the redoubt Tamsuij and to support the roof according to your assignment. However it will not stand for very long and according to our opinion, with a hard wind or earthquake, which we have every year, the roof might collapse because the roof beams have completely rotted away. So we unanimously advise you to have the whole roof torn down. The roof top should be made with stone and lime, and the seams smeared with galligal [substance that prevents water from leaking through the roof].37

The parian of Tamsui In Tamsui another parian was in existence at least since the times of Esquivel, who had earlier reported “near the harbor of Tamsui the sangleys are setting up a small parian, that is bound to grow in time as more and more sangleys have said they will go there to sow the elds and plant sugarcane” (SIT, 185). Esquivel, in his interest for Japan, also envisioned another parian for Japanese—like the one in Dilao (Manila)—who could come for agricultural purposes. The Chinese parian of Tamsui grew especially after the Dutch conquered the north and placed the capital of the area, not in Quelang but in Tamsui. For example, in April 1648, Plockhoy reported that there were seventyeight Chinese in Tansuij, and three of them had recently married non-Christian women (FE III, 230). But this population uctuated since two years later only thirty-ve are mentioned. They appear under the leadership of Siotangh, “who dominated them with intolerable pressure.”38 In any case, the parian grew in a regular shape, as it is described in the map of Keerdekoe (1654). After the main Spanish settlement of San Salvador and its extension in Santo Domingo, the Spaniards were considering extending their inuence to other parts in the northern territories, especially to secure the arrival from Manila. Esquivel recommended the port of Catinunum (San Lorenzo) as the most suitable place (SIT, 162), but no special settlement in Catinunum was reported during the sixteen years of Spanish presence. This apparent lack of expansive action left us with some questions: Did they consider that a

118

The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

possible expansion was something beyond their main purpose—to secure the Chinese trade with the Philippines? Or was it due to a lack of power? Was it self-restraint following Francisco de Vitoria’s principles of international relations? Was it that, because Christianity was growing slowly, they did not nd a need to offer further protection to the missionaries? Why did they not explore the “gold-rich” areas of Turoboan, a place on the way from Manila to Quelang? The answer to that question must be explored in the transition to the Baroque spirit of the general culture in Spain, and its impregnation in the main actors of the scene that we are to present now.

Ofcers Following the Manila system, which reects well the Spanish colonial model, we can distinguish two levels of Spanish ofcial personnel, the governor and the royal ofcers, a distinction that applies in San Salvador, but on a small scale.

The governors The two higher civil positions in Manila of the governor general and the president of the Audiencia were held by the same person. The same happened in San Salvador where the local governor concentrated on the civil powers. The governor is sometimes referred to as alcalde (mayor) and castellano (garrison commander), pointing in this way his civil and military functions. Another time the title of alcalde is substituted for by cabo (head). These were the governors of San Salvador: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Antonio Carreño de Valdés Juan de Alcarazo Bartolomé Díaz Barrera Alonso García Romero Francisco Hernández Pedro Palomino Cristóbal Márquez Gonzalo Portillo

1626–1629 1629–1632 1632–1634 1634–1635 1635–1637 1637–1639 1639–1640 1640–1642

This list shows an average of two years’ stay for each governor. If we divided the governors during the Spanish presence in Taiwan according to the main events, we can make three differentiated periods. The rst one corresponds to the three years of (1) Antonio Carreño de Valdés (1626–1629). It was the period of consolidating the position. He arrived successfully, but soon he encountered many problems: the failure of the armadas of September 1626 and August 1627, the difcult adjustment of his soldiers to a new inhospitable land, and the scarcity of aid; therefore, he had to be harsh to control his soldiers. When exploring the Tamsui area for buying rice, his soldiers were caught in a skirmish with the natives, but the critical situation went under control thanks to the unexpected arrival of the “Rosario.”39 In the same year he established the fort of Santo

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

119

Domingo in Tamsui, but later there is no news about him until the spring of 1629, when he was recalled to Manila. The reason given by the then governor Tavora was that in his three years of service there, Carreño had not won the condence of his men, “not for lacking in uprightness and concern, but for being too strict and rigid” (SIT, 138). Regarding the establishing of contacts with China there were only three formal attempts; the rst one happened during Carreño’s governorship when the armada of 1627 tried unsuccessfully to reach Taiwan, during which two of its galleys stopped over in the Pescadores, where they were well received by the Chinese (SIT, 134). As a result, a few months later (towards the end of 1627), the above-mentioned mandarin visited the fortress in Quelang in order to know more about the intention of the Spanish settlement but he did not offer any commitment (SIT, 132–133). The second period corresponds to the next four governors and it is the only period with some achievements. The rst and most relevant governor of them was (2) Juan de Alcarazo (1629–1632). He had arrived in August 1629, a little earlier when the soldiers in Tamsui repelled the Dutch warship “Domburch,” which was reconnoitering the Spanish forces. Also during his time an important trade mission arrived bearing 200,000 pesos to engage in trade. He also carried out the two other attempts of establishing formal relations with China. The rst contact happened by chance when he set off for Isla Hermosa. One of his galleys lost its bearings and passed by China. There, the Spaniards received a warm welcome, and after the news reached San Salvador, Alcarazo sent a lieutenant to start contacts. But he came back with news of the political changes in China, particularly the death of the emperor and his powerful minister, the eunuch Wei Zhongxien (櫷⾈岊), that had frozen all maritime political activity. He tried again on 30 December 1630, when he sent a formal embassy to China led by Cocci. It was almost a failure because he was attacked by the crew of the sampan. Maybe the main achievement of Cocci as ambassador was to discover a factory of fake Spanish coins in Fuzhou. After these attempts, no formal talks were resumed and the China project was abandoned. On the other hand, the year 1632 was the worst for Alcarazo since several shipwrecks happened on their way to Manila. The next governor was (3) Bartolomé Díaz Barrera (1632–1634), who passed unnoticed in the documents; nevertheless he was the rst president of the Misericordia Fraternity (which we will comment on in the last chapter). When he left San Salvador, he retired to an encomienda in the Ilocos region (SIT, 255). The next governor (4) Alonso García Romero (1634–1635) was the last governor that devoted himself seriously to the expansion of the Spanish area of inuence. During his time the missionaries Quirós and García reached Cavalan, and he almost nalized the construction of the main fortress. It was also the moment when an important trade mission came in the socorro of López de Andoaín. Regarding the next governor, (5) Francisco Hernández (1635–1637), we only can highlight that an uprising of the natives in Tamsui during his time led to the removal of the fort of Santo Domingo. From then on, came a period of decadence motivated by the lack of interest in Isla Hermosa shown by the new governor general Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, who was more interested in the problems of the Southern Philippines. When (6) Pedro

120 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Palomino (1637–1639) took over the post as governor of Isla Hermosa, he implemented Corcuera’s policy of withdrawing the forces of the defensive system around the fortress of San Salvador. The next governor was (7) Cristóbal Márquez (1639–1640), who observed Corcuera’s policy of increasing control of the trade with China, but he only managed to aggravate the smuggling operations and to antagonize Iquam, who now was controlling China’s trade along the Taiwan Strait. The last governor was (8) Gonzalo Portillo (1640–1642) who after an initial victory against the Dutch in 1641, the following year faced defeat, signed the capitulation and was sent as prisoner to Fort Zeelandia and Batavia. In 1643, the Spaniards obtained permission to leave Batavia and return to Manila, but Portillo, fearing unjust reprisal from Corcuera, remained exiled in the kingdom of Macassar waiting for a better occasion.

Replacement of governors and judgments of residency We can trace a little the governor’s relations with civilians by examining the judgments of residence.40 When Márquez replaced Palomino in 1639 there appeared the rst information of civil conicts brought to a judgment of residency. The first one was a discussion among sangleys. A year earlier, some sangleys residing in San Salvador complained to Palomino that their ships were being robbed and their cargo seized by other Chinese who later went to Quelang to sell their goods. Palomino thought that they were cheating, and, surprisingly, punished the accusers and freed the supposed thieves. The accusers blamed Palomino, saying that he and some people had taken advantage in this case (maybe by accepting bribes). Márquez—acting as a judge—did not want, or was unable, to clarify their demands because, he said, “the sangleys are people that lie and exaggerate a lot” (SIT, 308). Second, there was another dispute between Palomino and the constable and his wife over money and the property of some clothes that were kept under the custody of Fr. Gaspar de Alenda. According to the constable and his wife, these things were theirs; but, according to Palomino, they belonged to a “Muslim woman from Cambodia” (SIT, 308). Márquez suggested to Palomino to solve the matter privately, because this was the only complaint, but he refused. Márquez then decided to keep everything in the royal coffer, and wait for the decision of the governor general Corcuera himself. We can see how the wife of the constable felt unjustly treated because she complained again, two years later, on the same matter upon the arrival of the new governor Portillo (SIT, 334).

The royal ofcers The next authority representing the Crown after the governor general was the Audiencia of Manila composed of six oidores (judges). In San Salvador, only the contador (accountant) and the tesorero (treasurer) had their counterpart. The rst one besides the ofce of contador held the one of veedor (overseer), and the second held also those of pagador (paymaster) and tenedor (book keeper). In other words, these positions were not handled by four or ve people, but usually only by two. In Taiwan the contador had

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

121

more prestige, since the tenedor was an appointed soldier. For this reason the natives used a similar word (cantadoor) to call in 1651 the Dutch senior merchant of Tamsui (SIT, 577; FE III, 375–376). In 1627, presuming that the army sent to Isla Hermosa would succeed in ousting the Dutch and in developing a colony, the ofcers of the royal treasury of the Audiencia appointed Diego de Rueda as ofcer to serve the roles of contador, veedor, pagador, and tenedor at Isla Hermosa, and gave him instructions on how to handle the nances of the fortress in Isla Hermosa and how his relations with the governor should be (SIT, 102–105). But, we know that nally Rueda refused to go to Isla Hermosa and was replaced by two persons, Aréchaga and Riveros, who were working directly under the same governor general. Aréchaga was going to serve as contador and veedor, while Riveros as pagador and tenedor. They were given new instructions on matters of personnel and money, on the handling of the inventory, and on how the inspections of merchant ships were to be conducted (SIT, 124). But these two persons nally did not go either to Isla Hermosa. In the absence of professional ofcers, Carreño looked for the most suitable soldiers to do the job on a provisional basis. He chose two second-lieutenants, Francisco de Vivero for the job of contador and veedor, and Juan Pérez de Rueda as pagador. Initially they did not get any extra payment, but were allowed to join the meetings of the select group of the Misericordia Fraternity in 1633. This was particularly interesting in the case of Juan Pérez de Rueda. He was a Mexican-born Spaniard who joined the rst expedition to Isla Hermosa in 1626 at the age of fteen. He arrived as a servant of one of the ofcers, and, because he was a clever young man, he spent most of his time at Isla Hermosa in the “ocio de pluma” (i.e., working as scribe), taking care of the royal storehouses. For Rueda the job became permanent, although with the arrival of a professional appointed contador, Jerónimo de Herrera, he took over only the position of tenedor, under the supervision of Herrera. In 1638, the contador, feeling pity on him, asked the governor general Corcuera for a salary be given to the tenedor Rueda, because his initial good dispositions had given way to grudges. Herrera said: “Such things and other [abuses] pierce my senior ofcer to the bone. This man, who is the custodian of the storehouses, feels it more because he receives no wages for his job” (SIT, 286). Finally, Rueda expected a salary in the socorro arriving with the new governor Cristóbal Márquez, but to his frustration little came. Márquez, upon his arrival to Isla Hermosa, reported to the governor general that Pérez de Rueda had fullled particular duties, for example he presented to the new governor the list of soldiers, but he refused to surrender the keys of the royal coffer, because he had not been paid his salary in full. Márquez was able to persuade him, paying him a year in advance (SIT, 308). Spanish bureaucratic paternalism always pays in the end, and Rueda, once back in Manila, was promoted as prosecutor of the royal treasury. The work of those people was reected in books, which do not seem to have been preserved. First we have the Transaction Book (SIT, 102), where all the income and expenses were registered. This book was kept in the governor’s house in a special box with two keys (one for the governor, the other for the ofcer). Then there was the Book

122 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

for Provisions and Royal Warrants (SIT, 102–103). Finally, there was the Copy of the Paymaster’s Payment Orders (SIT, 103, 282–284).

Soldiers In the seventeenth century a great number of soldiers enlisted as their last possibility of nding a way of living. Miguel de Cervantes, a soldier himself who had fought in Lepanto, expressed it clearly in Don Quixote, when one of the soldiers appears singing: “A la Guerra me lleva mi necesidad / si tuviera dinero, no iría en verdad” (“To war I go out of need. / If I had money, I will not go indeed”). This minimal philosophy of survival can apply to many of the soldiers in Isla Hermosa, not only Spaniards and Filipinos, but also those enrolled in the Dutch militia. Indeed, once they were enrolled they entered into a hierarchal and organized body that at least provided them daily food. Regarding the soldiers of Isla Hermosa, the initial question is to determine their number. We have a table with clear data on the composition of the armada of 1627 of 2,000 soldiers and sailors (SIT, 101), which—even if it did not reach Isla Hermosa—can provide us an idea of what was intended for the Spanish presidio right after its foundation. Among the 2,000 soldiers, there were 12 companies of infantry, amounting to 731 soldiers, implying an average of 60 persons per company, and meeting the minimum objective of having, at least, 25 infantrymen and 25 harquebusiers (SIT, 105). But they had provisions only for six months, implying that the main bulk of soldiers were expected to return after securing the conquest and the victory against the Dutch. For the soldiers, the system of their stay was called “closed presidium” in which their mobility depended totally on their superiors. Esquivel criticized the system saying, It will be of great advantage for the conservation of that land to establish an open fort that will allow people to come and go whenever they request it. In this way, if 30 men leave every year, 20 may return … This exchange shall not be limited to soldiers, but also to sailors and artillerymen who are much needed in the forts and for reconnaissance missions to explore the entire island and to punish natives who have killed many Spaniards and other foreigners who got shipwrecked in their coasts. (SIT, 194)

Spanish and Filipino soldiers Between 1627 and 1642, we have some population Spanish data, completed by Dutch sources that gathered their information from the Chinese merchants commuting from Quelang to Tayouan. The gures are not reliable in detail, since sometimes they uctuated too much over a very short period. We can conclude that the soldiers in Quelang, Spaniards, Pampangos, and Cagayanos amounted to an average of 250 to 300. The detailed Dutch accounts of the prisoners (including civilians) made in 1642 after the conquest presents a more exact composition of the population of San Salvador. Besides the number of 268 soldiers they offer, the data mention 42 women (most of them must

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

123

have been local women married with soldiers), 18 children, 32 slaves, 55 servants of soldiers and 2 priests with 29 servants, reaching a total population of 400 people. As for mercenary soldiers we can mention the Pampangos, the most loyal allies of the Spaniards, and the Cagayanos from northern Luzon. We can reconstruct the evolution of all these troops in the following table: Table 4.1 Spanish troops in Isla Hermosa (1629–1641)

Soldiers

1626

1629

1631

1633

Spaniards

100

320

100

Pampangos

200

70

30

Cagayanos

150

1637

1639

1640

1641

1642

100

60

88

55

86

113

20

100

41

22

32

62

50

79

96

87

93

SIT, 147 SIT, 493 SIT, 147 SIT, 211 SIT, 500 SIT, 314 SIT, 324 SIT, 336 SIT, 397

Source:

Esquivel was complaining about the different treatment given to Spanish and Pampango soldiers, and was requesting another system of “open presidium” also for them. He said: The soldiers from Pampanga who are now living there must receive the same treatment, as they make good companions. They should be rewarded for having been required to stay there for the longest time, having left their wives and children [in the Philippines]. May they freely come and go so that they may regain their possessions without being unjust to anyone. (SIT, 194)

Deserters The arrival of the relief ships from Manila was an important event in San Salvador, not only for the possible change of soldiers, but for the new aid that implied more food, cloth, and equipment. In the aid-ship of the spring of 1631 very little aid arrived, and probably this might have triggered the rst documented desertion by six Pampango soldiers. At the end of June 1631, this group took a small vessel in Tamsui and ed south (SIT, 147–148), either to the Philippines or to the Dutch camp. Whatever their real motives were, all six showed up at the Dutch factory in Tayouan on 30 June, where they gave themselves up and were interrogated about the reasons for their desertion. Two of these men, Domingo de Cavadta and Alonche de Toulacque (as spelled in the Dutch transcription), had lived close to Manila before going to Isla Hermosa. They declared that seven (sic) years earlier, they were recruited by the Spaniards to embark on a voyage. They formed a crew of Pampangos and black men who departed for Quelang on a eet composed of a frigate, two galleys, and nine junks (something that matches with the data of Carreño’s expedition). From the time they arrived in Quelang until they escaped, they were employed as construction workers for the Spanish fortications. They added that for the past two years, they received no pay for their labor, but rather beatings and ill treatment.

124 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

In 1632, a new group of seventeen deserters ready to take a sampan and ee to Luzon was discovered. Esquivel also writes of the real and desperate condition of those soldiers and explains the reasons for it. Many of them were recruited on false promises, since they were told that they were to be away for just two months. Others were forced to row in the galleys as punishment for their crimes. However, even after they had completed their term, they were retained as penal workers: They live in despair and anger because they are neither relieved from their posts nor sent back to their hometowns. Some of them were deceived into thinking that they would be there only for two months. Others came in galleys as to serve for their crimes but after their term is over, they are kept there as construction workers because they do not send others from Manila. In order to avoid these troubles at the least expense, what may be done is to employ 100 or 200 sangley laborers in both forts who can return to their lands, in the place of these native workers. (SIT, 171)

Palomino also recounts another desertion in 1638. Three Cagayanos ed to the “enemy zone,” which is probably the Tamsui area. However, Palomino adds that they have begun to negotiate with them so that they would return (SIT, 289), but the reasons for this desertion are not clear. On the other hand we have also references of soldiers sent back to the Philippines. In the above-mentioned report that Palomino submitted to Corcuera, he declared that that year had been kind to them as regards the deaths of soldiers. Only four had died: one Spanish soldier who was already ill, a Pampango that Palomino brought with him in his voyage to Isla Hermosa, and a boatswain and a Creole slave who were attacked by their native enemies on the road to Tamsui. Palomino further states in the same report that he was sending back to Manila “20 soldiers, some of whom are married, and the aide-de-camp Ginés de Rosas, who for this year and as always, has fullled his duties very well. I also send some men from Cagayan and four from Pampanga who are disabled” (SIT, 291–292). It is difcult to know if this was a general standard procedure for every relief ship that was dispatched to Taiwan or if the return of the soldiers was part of Corcuera’s master plan to progressively dismantle the said forces in Taiwan.

Other personnel Isla Hermosa was also an outpost for exiles, adventures, and free burghers. There was an attempt to exile to Isla Hermosa a priest in the time of Corcuera when this governor had a famous jurisdictional conict in 1635 with the archbishop of Manila. In this process Corcuera intended to remove a priest from his position in the cathedral and exile him to Isla Hermosa, but the archbishop opposed this decision arguing that it was an intromission in his responsibilities (this conict of interest will be examined in chapter 6). We know a real case of exile when Corcuera asked the veedor (overseer) of the fortress, Herrera, to send back as a prisoner someone called Bernardino de Ibarra, who “was in exile in Isla Hermosa” (SIT, 273).

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

125

Finally we can mention the free burghers, who were ignored in the Spanish sources, but they are echoed in the Dutch ones. For example, we know about the existence in 1642 of some merchants, since their eleven slaves, male and female, were listed by the Dutch (SIT, 397). Among these free Spaniards emerges strongly the colorful gure of Domingo Aguilar. He was born in Spain in 1604, arrived in Mexico when he was two years old, and he moved to Acapulco when he was sixteen years old to work as a boatswain. Back in Mexico he got involved in a criminal case, was captured and sent to Manila in 1623 to work in the galleys for ve years. During this period he was sent to Isla Hermosa in the rst expedition, and after recovering his freedom in 1628, he settled down in Quelang as a free man. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, he married a native woman related to one of the chieftains of Taparri, owned a sulfur mine, got a servant, and became a respected person by the natives and the Dutch; nevertheless, with the Spaniards he had a more distant relationship. On the other hand, he never achieved a fortune because he was afraid that possessing wealth would jeopardize his life and because his plans to collect gold from Turoboan were frustrated when the governor did not give him license to do so (SIT, 384–388). Among the Dutch the cases of free burghers were more common; we can mention now the case of Joost Cornelissen van Langenaer, who like Aguilar, also got established in Quelang years later. The Dutch reported in 1645: [He] was found in Kelangh, and since then has worked as a blacksmith for the Company ... He requests to be dispensed from the Company’s duties because he is married to an aboriginal woman and therefore cannot go back to the mother-country. He wants to be made a free man so he can settle with proper conduct, and earn his livelyhood in favour of the garrison and his own wellbeing.41

Langenaer was asking also to take over two Quinan (Vietnamese) slaves of the company, after paying for them,42 since slavery was something customary in the colonies.

Slaves and servants Since the beginning of the conquest of America there was legislation prohibiting slavery, and even Vitoria argued against Aristotle saying that there were no “slaves by nature.” But in practice the need for native labor to clean gold and to plant sugarcane made those laws useless, as the colonizers said: “we abide by the law, but we do not obey it.” This mentality led rst to many injustices against the American natives and to their substitution by black slaves, a situation that, in practice, nobody opposed. In fact, their trade was regulated and authorized by the Crown, who only allowed Genovese and Hollanders to carry on trade, although later Portuguese and Spaniards joined. The process developed after 1650, but before that black slaves were not rare in Asian colonies, even in San Salvador. Here, a small part of the population was comprised of slaves, although at the very beginning the proportion must have been big. The rst ones came with the

126 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

galleys of Carreño, in 1626, because when the governor general De Silva organized the conquest “every two of Manila’s citizens contributed with a slave to the galleys” (SIT, 334). Others came later for different reasons, like the case of a black slave belonging to a woman by the name of Dominga de Pineda, who in 1636 escaped from Manila to Isla Hermosa, but in 1638 was sent back to Manila to her owner (SIT, 292). Some of the slaves that came in 1626—if after some time of service in Isla Hermosa were still alive—were also requested by their owners. This was the case of one slave acting as cirujano (surgeon). In 1641, his master called him formally back to Manila, but the governor of San Salvador tried to retain him in Isla Hermosa, and offered to the governor general Corcuera some reasons for doing so, and even suggested the possibility for the Crown buying him: This slave is very much needed here because he has always been busy in the hospital. He is a surgeon, an old man who has been attending to all the patients, and curing them with care. We cannot manage without him because he takes care of requesting for what we need. I remit this request to Your Lordship so that he may not leave now. If his master would want to give him to the King for what he is worth, then he may be paid from the provisions here. Your Lordship will act in the best of interests. (SIT, 334)

The owner, General Fernando de Ayala, was an inuential citizen and he was able to bring him back. For this reason, the governor general had to send a substitute in the next aid-ship (1642), the cirujano Francisco Casta Vengala (probably, Francisco of Bengali race), who was caretaker of the Royal Hospital of Manila (SIT, 366). He was also a slave, not belonging to a particular master, but to the Crown. This slave belonged to the so-called group of esclavos del rey (slaves of the king). The status of these esclavos del rey must vary, but in the case of Isla Hermosa it looks like they were neglected, since they did not have a personal master to care directly for them. The best description of their situation was offered by Esquivel, when he requested more sayal (cloth) for them: “These wretches [negroes] come from a warm land and are freezing in this one. The same clothes they wear during the day they use to be warm at night, since they live in miserable straw huts that sometimes get all wet, and they usually end up warming themselves by smoking tobacco” (SIT, 196). Their number was clearly recorded since the governor had to report about them. In the last years of the Spanish presence they numbered six (SIT, 324, 397), a data that coincides with the list of San Salvador Spanish personnel made by the Dutch after the conquest. Nevertheless, besides these six slaves of the king, the Dutch accounted twelve male and female slaves of the governor, plus eleven male and female slaves of the merchants, and nally three “slaves or servants” of the king (SIT, 397). The Portuguese also had their slaves, and probably some of them escaped to China, ending in the service of Iquam, as the Franciscan Antonio Caballero knew it (see annex 18). “The above-mentioned mandarin Yquam (Iquam) always had in his service a good number of black Christians who came to him from Macao. They belong to his circle and are good harquebusiers. He trusts them the most as personal guards and also for other

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

127

military matters” (SIT, 574). The VOC had also its own slaves. For example, in 1645, Caron asked Steen, the commander in Tamsui, to send back to Tayouan the company’s black slaves that he had working in the redoubt. The main reason was that he now had in Tamsui more slaves than ever and the construction was going to be nished. Nevertheless, Steen was allowed to keep a few of them, as long as useful jobs could be found for them, but—as in the case of the esclavos del rey—Steen was “obliged to retain the Comp. slaven (slaves of the company), and he was not allowed to sell or give them away to any private person.”43 But in the case of the Dutch it seems possible to request buying one company’s slave as we can recall the case of the blacksmith Langenaer, who requested for it.44

The non-Spanish subjects: The natives and the Chinese Non-Spanish subjects may have had an undened status in San Salvador from the Spanish point of view. On the one hand, the natives had been there occupying their own territory; and, on the other, the Chinese were frequent visitors to Quelang harbor before the arrival of the Spaniards, and the subsequent Spanish presence was just another reason for them to come. The same can be said for the few Japanese. As for the legal and administrative relationship with the natives and the Chinese the Spaniards probably tried to achieve the Philippines system of organization, but not immediately.

Natives as suzerains The Spaniards did not consider the natives formally as vassals of the king of Spain, although this might have been their objective as happened in the Philippines. The missionaries, even the soldiers, interacted closely with them, but no ofcial relation between the governor and the elders is recorded. If some formal jurisdiction were to be achieved it would be related to tribute, but there is no record of natives paying tribute. In fact, in the 1930’s a private question was sent to the Dominican headquarters in Manila on that matter. The one formulating the question was a missionary of Isla Hermosa, but whether he was transmitting a personal concern or a request from the governor, we do not know. The question was: “What form of just tribute may be imposed on the natives of Isla Hermosa, considering that they are not going to render obeisance to our King, unless through force?” (SIT, 214). The one in charge of answering was Fr. Domingo González, who was provincial of the Dominicans and in charge of the Holy Ofce; he had even stayed in Isla Hermosa in 1634. He avoided giving a concrete answer, implying that the best was not to ask for any tribute and continue with the status quo. He said: “This is a very serious matter. We will nd out what is just only after hearing many other opinions” (SIT, 214). On the other hand we have clear evidence that tributes were never collected from the natives. As we can see in annex 17, in 1644 the Dutch interrogated Teodoro, the elder of Quimaurri, about payment of tributes in the form of money, rice, paddy, pelts, or anything else. The answer of Teodoro was quite explicit: “The [villages] did not pay tribute to the Spaniards and this was also never demanded

128 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

of them. They only paid for the candles that were used in the churches” (SIT, 476–479). But the lack of tributes does not exclude the fact that Spaniards might have regarded the natives as vassals, at least in the future. In fact, the practice of the Dutch was that they considered the natives as vassals, once they agreed to join the protection of the VOC, and after that they requested payment of tribute. Nevertheless, they decided in 1647 to cancel all the tributes without losing the condition of vassals.

Chinese as colonizers Another similar question was forwarded to González, probably at the same time, but now regarding the Chinese situation: “In the event that many more sangleys come to live there … may (the governor) impose similar tributes [to those in Manila] … with permission from the King or from his delegates here?” (SIT, 214). This time, González gave a positive answer based on the prot the Chinese may get. He said: If [Isla Hermosa] were to become as protable to the sangleys as this one [of Manila], due to the expansion of their trade with the Spaniards, then it will be right to sell them a permit to stay and to prot from there. I do not consider this as a tribute but as a sale or contract, stipulating “I allow you to stay on my land for this sum”. In my opinion, the Governor is entitled to do this even without orders from his Majesty. (SIT, 214)

Also in this opinion González was following the common pattern of leasing a land for business, as happened with the Chinese in Tayouan. In that case, both relations were not conceptually different from the Dutch land-leasing model analyzed by Pol Heyns.45

Renaissance militia and Baroque urban life As we have expressed several times, the Europeans moving around Eastern lands were imbued with Renaissance ideology and manners, as we can see from the historical sources. For example, in one place we encounter the conversion to the religious life of the rst Jesuit entering China, the Neapolitan Miguel Ruggieri, in relation with the famous battle of Lepanto; he reacted strongly against the harsh example of Spanish commander Don Juan de Austria—who had pardoned all the murderers who participated in that battle—by leaving his job as a judge and entering the Jesuit order (SIT, 12). On another occasion we see Juan Cevicos quoting Cicero (SIT, 56), or blaming the Dutch for unjustly re-enacting the Spanish Black Legend against Phillip II, as destructive propaganda against the Spaniards: “Neither have the Dutch failed to publish (as they did in Japan) that it is the custom of the king of Spain to conquer kingdoms under pretext of religion. That report, according to the religious of Japan has been one of the chief causes of so terrible a persecution against the Christians [in Japan]” (SIT, 111). And during the Baroque times, we see here and there how Spaniards and Dutch were aware of the news of Flanders, where they had their major battles. But if this ideology had had any

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

129

particular impact it is in the naming of places. Naming geographical elements, or cities, forts, bastions, or towers reveals the deep motivations of the explorers, conquerors, or merchants, in their search for fortune, although many other times, it can be also just a simple procedure without special connotations. But, to name and rename places has a clear ideological meaning, especially after military victories. It indicates who holds the authority and sometimes it sends a message to the population on how the authority is going to be exercised.

Naming places around the Pacic Ocean Certainly, as the Age of Discovery went on the sailors started to name the different places they were encountering. The simplest method to do this was to keep the local names, as frequently happened in the Portuguese maps referring to Africa, India, and East Asia. Other ways of naming islands—very much in tune with the Renaissance ideology—was based on classical mythology, as it happened with California (which initially they considered one island);46 or on biblical episodes, like in the case of Reyes Magos Island (probably Okinawa), or Solomon Islands. Spanish sailors gave names also based on particular events, like the islands of Pintados (because of the painted bodies of the natives), or Ladrones (meaning “thieves,” because the sailors were robbed once they landed). Another fashion was to name a place based on auspicious events like the name of the saint of the day of the discovery. This was common in Spanish territories—like Florida (from the Spanish “Pascua Florida”47), Isla de Pascua (Easter Island)—but not very much among the Portuguese, and totally rare among the Dutch. Spaniards and Dutch coincided in duplicating city or country names, like Nueva Granada (South America), Nueva Segovia (in the Philippines), Nueva España (Mexico), or New Amsterdam (later New York). Also, other names just like Zeelandia (the land towards the sea) re-enacted the northern area of the Low Lands in the fort of Tayouan. Others recovered old Roman names, like Batavia (the Latin name for the region of the delta of the Rhine River, or the Low Lands), to be given to the Dutch colonial capital in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Catholic Spain and Calvinist Holland differed in the use of saints’ names. Catholic countries emphasized the names of the saints after the Council of Trent, which reafrmed the value to the saints as intercessors; but most of the Reformed churches negated such intercession and consequently those names disappeared from their ofcial life, as it happened in Calvinist Holland. Both Renaissance views represented two different ways of dealing with the sacred, a difference that during the Baroque times reached its peak. The Spaniards in Isla Hermosa used the name of saints not only to name the main settlements: the port of Santísima Trinidad, the forts of San Salvador and Santo Domingo, but also the bastions, the defensive towers, and even the name of the cannon (SIT, 343). The Dutch used instead more geographical terms and patriotic ones, at a time in which they were founding their Republic. When the Dutch conquered the fortress San Salvador, they renamed the four bastions in their own fashion, San Antonio el Grande (the big [bastion] Saint Anthony) was renamed as Noord Holland (Northern Holland), San Antonio el Chico (the small [bastion] Saint Anthony), was renamed

130 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

as Zeeburg (bastion near the sea), San Sebastián bastion was renamed as Oosterpunt (western point) and later Bulermberg (or Bultenburgh); and, nally, San Juan (Saint John) bastion was renamed as Zuijderpunt (southern point). Nevertheless, the Spanish way of naming was more ofcial than real, since the normal soldiers used other more practical ways. For example, the tower topping Quelang island called ofcially as San Millán, had the popular name of la mira (the “watching point”), dening quite well its function; the fort San Antón, was called la retirada (the fort to cover the retreat from la mira to the main fortress), a name also quite descriptive of its function; nally, the San Luis tower was called el cubo because of its cubical shape. After the conquest, the Dutch proceeded in the same way of renaming the bastions, for example, San Millán was called Fort Victoria, implying maybe the fact that from that position they fought for their nal victory. Also, San Luis tower was renamed as Nobelenburg (and Eltenburg). But the most surprising is that in Tamsui, during a short time the newly built tower was called Anthonio, in honor of Anthonio van Diemen (the governor general of the VOC in Batavia), and the adjacent bastion, Burgh Maria, in honor to his wife. Alas! The protective honor traditionally granted to the saints or to the king (the Philippines was named after Phillip II) was now offered to a simple mortal, though a hard-working governor struggling for the glorication of Dutch oligarchy.

Renaissance forts Until recent times the Western fortresses in Asia were considered as archeologically displaced European rarities. But, since “the world has become at,” these buildings have attracted new interest, not only because they offer possibilities for tourism but also because we can understand better those people who came to Taiwan with a Renaissance impetus, and provided the knowledge of Taiwan proto-history. Besides, these people carried the modern techniques of military-building construction in Western Europe, adapted to the new powerful powder-red cannon. As Geoffrey Parker said, “all the evidence for radical military change comes from the lands of the Habsburgs or of their neighbors: from Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and France. That was the heartland of the military revolution.”48 In these buildings two traditions can be recognized, rst the idea of Vitruvius that architecture is an imitation of nature. Vitruvius was a military Roman engineer of the rst century, whose books were discovered fteen centuries later by Leon Battista Alberti. Based on this inuence, Alberti said in his treatise De re aedicatoria (1485) that a star-shaped conguration might be the best for defensive purposes. Later on, Leonardo da Vinci produced studies on war, ying machines, water and land devices as well as fortresses. Vitruvius also inspired him for his “Vitruvius man” (1492) as a synthetic image for the perfect proportion: the natural relation between a circle and a square, based on human proportions; a gure that can be even applied to military fortresses. Also, the new defensive fortications left forever the inaccessible places, and moved to the plain areas, where the bastions abandoned the circular shapes for the angled ones.49

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

131

Italian methods were spread all over Europe, and their architects were requested everywhere, like Alessandro Pasqualini, who went to Germany to start the construction of the Citadel of Jülich, in 1548. The Vitruvian ideas lasted for so long that even in the year 1700 the treatise of Fernández de Medrano on military architecture states that: “All parts in a fortress must be done according to some proportions … Because a fortress can be compared to the human body, in which if only a small part is sick the whole body will suffer.”50 Nevertheless, since the beginning of the seventeenth century it was very clear to the engineers writing treatises,51 like Cristóbal de Rojas, that the military architect, besides being familiar with Vitruvius and the six books of Euclid, should be a person with a great experience; or like Cristóbal Lechuga, who thought it very important to avoid the mistake of making a fortress more beautiful than useful for the defense.52 The second tradition in these Renaissance buildings was neo-Platonism, which understands reality as a subordination of worlds. In this way, the square represents the terrestrial world, while the circle the celestial one. Although these ideas can hardly refer to Taiwan, we can mention that one of the most astonishing forts in East Asia is the rst one built by the Spaniards in Manila, a round tower called Nuestra Señora de Guía (Our Lady of the Guidance). According to an early oor map of this circular tower, three inner circles appear inside of one squared fort of four bastions. These bastions are very similar to those in San Salvador because in both cases the bastion touching the sea was bigger than the other three. It seems that the square part of Nuestra Señora de Guía actually never was built, and the tower was torn down later, becoming part of the huge bastion San Diego of the whole Intramuros defensive system.53 The most important thing to consider now is the oor map itself, because—regardless whether it was constructed or not according to the original idea—that design reveals a clear example of neo-Platonist Renaissance architectural concepts in the Philippines where the celestial worlds (the circles) are inscribed in the terrestrial world (the square).54 This combination of a circle inscribed in a square was not alien to Spanish Renaissance, since it can be seen in the Palace of Charles V (Granada, 1527). The neo-Platonists believed that things in the universe were “emanations” from God, which were subordinated and consequently represented in concentric circles. The fact that the inner part of the tower is made of two concentric cisterns, lled up by rain water by an overowing system, emphasized graphically the idea of emanations, which for Pico de la Mirandola represented God, since for him many things of the universe are all symbols of God. Probably Sedeño, the Jesuit designer of the fortress La Guía, had a direct contact with these Renaissance ideas during his stay in Italy.55 This episode shows how Renaissance ideas impregnated the modern constructions in places very distant from Italy. In Europe the forts were made to protect a city, but in the colonial areas it was the other way around. First, the fort was constructed and later a city was developed under its shadow. In both cases the fort was called citadel, a model that can be seen around the whole of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The simplest style for these attached fortications was the squared one with four bastions. The treatise of Medrano denes the citadel as: “A fortress of four, ve, or more bastions, which is placed attached to a city; so, both names [city and citadel] keep the same relation as

132 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the one of the two areas [i.e. citadel refers to the small city and city refers to the big one].”56 In the sixteenth century the colonial visitors of the area around present Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Southern China, and Taiwan transferred this citadel model to their own settlements. Typical cases of these fortications are in the cities of Manila (Fort Santiago), Cavite (Fort Sant Felipe, 1595), Iloilo (1616), Batavia (1619), Sao Paulo de Monte (Macao, 1620), Pescadores (1622), Fort Zeelandia (Tainan, 1624), San Salvador (Quelang, 1626), and Zamboanga (Mindanao, 1635). This one was called Fuerza de San José, and was laid by another Jesuit, Melchor de Vera. These last two squared forts were twin fortresses constructed almost at the same time with a common destiny, the defense of the peripheral areas of the Philippines; Zamboanga was located in the southernmost part of the archipelago to face the threat of the sultanate of Magindanao,57 while San Salvador was in the north to protect the China-Manila trade against the Dutch. Though, on a different scale, this was a mirror image of Europe where “the Spanish Army of Flanders … deployed to defend the South Netherlands, were regularly kept in garrisons. In the year 1639, for example, the army maintained 208 separate garrisons, from the 1,000 men stationed in Dunkirk down to the 10 men who guarded the lonely fort on a dike near Ghent called ‘La Grand Misere.’ In all, defense accounted for 33,399 men, at a time when the total strength of the army, even on paper, was only 77,000.”58

Baroque cities While the Renaissance forts arrived in Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, in the seventeenth century the Baroque cities, either in the Iberian or Dutch models, were the novelty. The traditional Spanish urbanism evolved around the plaza mayor (main square), where the center of the urban life was concentrated, and crowds of people congregate for different reasons. This was a closed place, like the plazas of Madrid, Salamanca, etc., and this was the main difference with the plazas in the Spanish America, which were open areas, as happened in Manila, where the square is only limited on three sides by the cathedral, the governor’s palace and royal storehouses, reecting the fact that native cultures feel more comfortable in open spaces. Another particularity of the colonial plazas was its integrative function. While in Spain, the emblematic municipal, commercial, social, or spiritual buildings were scattered along the city, in colonial America the plaza mayor was the center of all of them, a place producing also a theatrical ostentation. In rural Philippines the church was the main building of these plazas, and there all the feasts were celebrated.59 San Salvador tried to offer probably a similar image, but it is difcult to reconstruct it. The convent of Todos los Santos—as we can see in the map of Vichbee (1667)—had a prominent location in a square made of huge gardens, with Renaissance proportions, where somehow we can recognize the aurea proportion60 in the rectangles, or the proportion 1:1 for the inner areas of the whole compound (as it happened in the Escorial). On the contrary, taking a look to the maps of Tayouan we can see a well-designed city near Fort Zeelandia, resembling the urban ideas of Simon Stevin (1548–1620). According to Ron van Oers, the inuence of this architect was omnipresent in the colonial

The “Embryonic” City of San Salvador

133

towns that create a kind of Dutch urban planning, although “town planning principles maybe were not strict regulations, but certainly as guidelines to direct the way in which the Dutch commanders and engineers had to plan and build in overseas territories.”61 Stevin was inuenced by early Italian Renaissance principles, based in the classical cardo and decumano principles of perpendicular streets, but the resulting style addressed two goals, the service and magnication of the new merchant and capitalist elite, and the exaltation of the new absolute value, the bourgeois style, similar to a new religion, and everything conducted with a full elimination of squandering and extravagance.62 No wonder we can recognize in the maps of Tayouan these equal houses with a scaled fronton, which go along orderly regular streets. But on Isla Hermosa, Baroque also means destruction or extinguishment of all these urban spaces. Certainly, the fort of San Salvador had been the last Renaissance impulse in the big military constructions of the Spaniards of Manila. They had the technique and the means, and they produced such a magnicent fort in the north of their area of inuence, worth 100,000 pesos (SIT, 495). Although the Spaniards left the place in 1642, somehow the defeat started earlier, in 1634, when the interim governor of the Philippines, Juan Cerezo de Salamanca, wrote to the king informing him about the situation in Isla Hermosa. He concluded saying: “I dare not say that the forts of Isla Hermosa must be abandoned, but I constantly afrm that it would have been good that they had never started” (SIT, 218). In 1636, the decision to leave the camp of Tamsui and transfer the cannon to San Salvador was taken; and in the following years, the orders arrived for the dismantlement of the peripheral defensive fortress of San Salvador, like la retirada, la mira, and el cubo. But the Spaniards were not the only ones abandoning the camp in Tamsui, some natives of Senar decided to move also to San Salvador, following the Spaniards, and to settle there among the Basayans (SIT, 289). When the last governor of Isla Hermosa Gonzalo Portillo arrived at San Salvador and saw the military conditions of his new post, he was disappointed with the same degree of delusion that inspired the famous sonnet of Spanish Baroque poet Quevedo:63 Miré los muros de la patria mía, si un tiempo fuertes ya desmoronados de la carrera de la edad cansados por quien caduca ya su valentía.

I saw the ramparts of my native land. One time so strong, now dropping decay, Their strength destroyed by this new age’s way That has worn out and rotted what was grand.

Salíme al campo: vi que el sol bebía los arroyos del hielo desatados, y del monte quejosos los ganados que con sombras hurtó su luz al día.

I went into the elds; there I could see. The sun drinks up the waters new thawed; And on the hills the moaning cattle pawed, Their miseries robbed the light of day for me.

Entré en mi casa: vi que amancillada de anciana habitación era despojos, mi báculo más corvo y menos fuerte.

I went into my house; I saw how spotted, Decaying things made that old home their prize; My withered walking-staff had come to bend.

134 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Vencida de la edad sentí mi espada, y no hallé cosa en que poner los ojos que no fuese recuerdo de la muerte.

I felt that age had won; my sword was rotted; And there was nothing on which to set my eyes That was not a reminder of the end.

Fortress San Salvador in Isla Hermosa and San José in Zamboanga can be a metaphor of the Spanish power in East Asia, since a few years after construction they were lost or abandoned. In the case of Zamboanga the fear of Koxinga’s invasion forced the withdrawal in 1662, as it happened with the succeeding abandonment of Ternate. This year is another mark for the Baroque European decay in Southeast Asia, since the Dutch experienced a similar fate, when they had to surrender the city of Tayouan, and its urban European life nally collapsed. We will nish by saying that this Baroque experience had also an echo in European culture. For example, when the Philippine governor general Diego Fajardo (1644–1653), while facing in Cavite the huge pressure of the latest Dutch blockades, was cheated by his wife, and according to the Spanish Baroque concept of honor he killed her and her lover. The event, well known in Manila, jumped to Spain and inspired the play of famous Spanish Baroque dramaturge Calderón de la Barca, El médico de su honra. Another example can be registered in one of the most famous Baroque novels, El Criticón, by the Aragonian Jesuit Baltasar Gracián. There the main character called Andrenio who explored strange lands might have received some inspiration from the manuscript of the long report written by another Jesuit, Artemio de las Cortes, who spent a year of captivity in China, in 1626. The same can be said of the Dutch experience in Taiwan, which generated a few novels in Holland in the following centuries.64

Chapter 5

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

DURING SOME DECADES OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY Taiwan experienced the economic effects of the European expansion that had started in the fteenth century. Portugal, Spain, Holland, and England, the main European actors in the East, shared some common economic principles under the name of mercantilism which lead these countries to rivalry, but no clear denition can be given of this economic doctrine. In fact, most of the concepts involved in this doctrine were not entirely original, and were even shared by local actors, particularly China, a country that ultimately absorbed most of the silver produced around the world.

MERCANTILISM The most common idea in dening mercantilism is the organization of the economy based on the belief that a nation is economically healthy when it possesses an increasing amount of precious metals, basically gold and silver. This concept of the importance of accumulation of money—called bullionism—started at the end of the fteenth century in Europe, and continued until the eighteenth century. The main justification of these aims was the needs of the monarch who had to pay for wars, for an increasing bureaucracy and diplomatic activity. At that time, the discovery of the rich mines of Potosí (1545), Zacatecas (1548), and Guanajuato (1558) gave to the Spanish Crown a political and military supremacy in Europe. For the rst time, the economy also became global and it was clear that the effects of a healthy trade in one part of the globe could have economic impact on other far-away parts. With this in mind, it makes sense that—as we have said in chapter 1—the governor of the Philippines Pedro Bravo de Acuña, justifying the need for action in the Moluccas, commented in 1605 on the importance of defeating the Dutch in the spice area as a way to deal with the affairs in Flanders, since “the rebels of Holland and Zeeland harvest the products of these islands, and draw to them great wealth, by means of which they carry on war and become rich.”1 Consequently—and before the Europeans discovered the risky side effect of precious metal imports, which is the price revolution—countries were aiming to be economically self-sufcient and achieve a favorable balance of trade in which exports included money spent on freight, insurance, or travel.

136 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Thus, a series of protectionist measures started to take shape, like to reward the foundation of new industries, encourage agriculture, and organize domestic and external taxation, using different kinds of tariffs to prevent imports of manufactured goods, as it happened with the limitations placed on the China silk in Mexican markets to protect Spanish textiles. Certainly, protectionism was the commercial policy of mercantilism. In order to implement these measures, control of foreign markets became very important, and the colonies were seen as captive markets for manufactured goods and as providers of raw material. To exercise this control, eets ensuring communication were necessary, and additionally they provided the necessary prestige for moments in which power was temporarily weakened, as we see in Fr. Melchor del Manzano’s letter to the king in 1627: “Moreover, these [Philippine] islands are sustained more by dint of opinion than by power because the neighboring kingdoms are great, like China, Japan ... and many others” (SIT, 112). Certainly sources in the years 1624–1627 bear many comments on the relation between silver, trade, power, and the prestige of countries. One example is the comment made in 1626 by the archbishop of Manila Miguel García Serrano on the justication of the conquest of northern Taiwan to counterbalance the mercantilist steps given by the Dutch: Time will tell … the signicance of [our move of going to Isla Hermosa, since] the Dutch not had carried out their threatened attempt to take the silk from China and quickly bring it to … Japan, as this meant a great fortune, selling it for silver bars that abound in that kingdom, bringing them enough wealth to carry on their commerce with China, and saving themselves of yearly trips to their own land. (SIT, 79)

But the importance of the mercantilist Dutch impact in Taiwan must be limited basically to twenty-ve years (1635–1660), when the Dutch expanded through the island by means of colonial bases. Also it might be possible to argue that the Chinese pirate-merchants moving around Taiwan in the rst half of the seventeenth century have been imbued by the same mercantilist spirit, especially the Zheng family which settled in Taiwan in 1662 and started to set up an administration that aimed at getting tributes from the Philippines. The mercantilist manifestations of the Spaniards in Taiwan were smaller since they had a tiny market to develop. Nevertheless, one of the reasons given by Governor General Fernando de Silva to justify the expedition of conquest was also clearly mercantilist, as we can see when he was complaining about “the damage made by the Dutch in 1624 when they captured a vessel bearing 30,000 pesos” (SIT, 58). In any case, the trade conducted by the Spaniards in Quelang was very limited in scope and far from the expectations of the promoters of the conquest, but it mirrors quite well the struggle of commercial interests in the China seas. To better understand the Spanish trade we have to contextualize it, rst, in the role that Taiwan played within the framework of the trade between Japan and China for almost half a century; and, second, we have to see it as one of the nal ramications of the long Acapulco-Manila

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

137

route that the Spaniards created across the Pacic Ocean in 1565 which lasted for 250 years.

Taiwan in the Chinese-Japanese commercial framework (1549–1683) This contextualizing framework of almost 150 years of Japan-China trade goes from 1549, the year Ming China and the Ashikaga Shogunate terminated their relations, to 1683, the moment the ban was totally lifted. Summarizing, we can say that during this long period, Taiwan had an important role as a commercial entrepôt in the area, becoming the place where Japanese and Chinese pirates—wokou (wakô, 倭寇) and haikou (海寇) respectively—met for their informal commercial exchange. Considering the general historical frame presented by Ts’ao Yung-ho,2 we can differentiate three periods of the trade in those years.

Lack of formal trade between Japan and China (1549–1567) The rst period started in 1549 when the Japanese shogunate nally decided to break the declining tributary system with China. This lack of formal relations led the traders of these two countries to nd informal ways of action, oftentimes bellicose. For example, in March, April, and August of 1553, the famous wokou Wang Zhi (王直) invaded the Chinese coast with hundreds of ships from Jiangsu (江蘇) to Zhejiang (浙江). The Chinese commanders Yu Dayou (俞大猷) and Qi Jiguang (戚繼光) resisted Wang, and later defeated him in Putuoshan (普陀山, 1553) and Taizhou (臺州, 1555). Some wokou sought refuge in Taiwan, which became a center of buccaneering activities.

The appearance of Western merchants (1568–1642) The second period is more relevant to us. We can differentiate a rst stage (1567–1622) coinciding with the consolidation of the international routes, thanks to the arrival of the Portuguese (Malacca, 1511; Hirado, 1543; Macao, ca. 1557), who in a few years practically monopolized trade between China and Japan. In fact, one of the reasons why Portuguese were accepted in Macao was that they could help the Chinese authorities in controlling wokou activities. In this context, the Ming Court partially lifted the ban on private trade in 1568 and Yuegang (月港) was the port designated to conduct these activities.3 As a result Taiwan grew in importance as a meeting place of the SinoJapanese smuggling trade. During this time, among the most famous Chinese haikou operating in the southern seas was Limahong (Lin A-feng 林阿鳳; also called Lin Feng 林鳳). In 1574, Limahong went to the Philippines with a eet of 200 ships and 10,000 men to conquer Manila. He almost succeeded; but after the Spanish reaction he had to retreat to Pangasinan area. This helped the recently arrived Spaniards to enter in good relations with the Chinese authorities since they cooperated in blockading Limahong. Nevertheless, the pirate escaped and there are no subsequent Spanish references to him.4 In the Chinese sources it is mentioned that he went to Guangdong, before he disappeared

138 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

from history.5 Other Japanese wokou was Tayfusu who in 1582 was acting in Cagayan (northern Luzon) with ten ships. Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa sent Captain Juan Pablo de Carrión to face him and other Japanese that had fortied at the entrance of Cagayan River. Finally, Carrión defeated those 600 Japanese.6 The second stage is dened by the ascendance of the Dutch, who little by little substituted the Portuguese. This period coincides with the Spanish presence in Quelang (1626–1642). The Dutch placed the island into the international trade routes, converting it into a strategic point of their intra-Asiatic commerce. This started when the Dutch gained more control of the Tayouan area after defeating the natives of Mattaw (麻豆) in 1636. In these years four haikou deserve attention. First, Li Dan7 (李旦), also known with different names: the Spaniards and the Portuguese called him respectively Rey de China (SIT, 46) and Rey Chino (SIT, 68), implying that he was acting as rey (king).8 But the Dutch with a more practical vision called him just Captain China (SIT, 90), and the English (according to the diary of Richard Cooks) called him Andrea Dittis. Cooks portrays the early life of Li Dan when he went as a young man to Manila to try his fortune. There he gained certain leadership among the Chinese, but around 1607–1608 he had a dispute with the Spanish authorities, who were asking for a sum of 40,000 tales that Li Dan had. As a result Li Dan was sent to the galleys. He managed to escape and he went to Hirado (平戶) where he became the leader of the Chinese community of that harbor,9 and used the bay of Tayouan as trans-shipment base of Chinese goods. In 1619, Fr. Bartolomé Martínez referred to his piratical activities conducted with eighty junks (SIT, 46). Li Dan also played an important role in the negotiations between the Dutch and the governor of Fujian, in 1623, convincing the Dutch to give up their fortress in Pescadores and move to Taiwan. The Dutch were helped by the captive Macanese Salvador Díaz who acted as interpreter (as we have mentioned in chapter 1). Li Dan died in 1625 (SIT, 66), and was substituted by Yan Siqi (顏思齊), also known as Pedro China, who was the second in command of Li Dan. And, nally, the two Zhengs (鄭) should be mentioned: Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝龍), also known as Nicolás Iquam (一官, 1604–1661), who was originally the lieutenant of Li Dan and later controlled the China Sea, and his son Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功), also known as Koxinga (國姓爺, 1624–1662), who succeeded him. During the second half of this period, haikou and wokou systems ended for different reasons in China and in Japan. On the part of China, Iquam surrendered in August 1628 to the new governor of Fujian, Xiong Wencan (熊文燦), who offered to invest him as an admiral of the Chinese coastal defense forces in return for abandoning his piratical activities. He accepted and defeated former ally pirates Quitsick (李魁奇), Tousailack (鍾斌), and Jan Lauw (劉香 or 劉香老), and gathered all their followers under his inuence. Between 1635–1640, Iquam cooperated with the Dutch in sending Chinese merchandise to Tayouan, which the Dutch reshipped to Japan, and in other actions, such as assisting the Dutch in expelling the Spaniards from northern Taiwan.10 Regarding Japan, the reason why the wokou system ended was that during the years

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

139

1603–1635, Japan enforced the so-called “red seal ship system” (shuyinsen 朱印船) to provide ofcial licenses to some boats that could be shown upon arrival in foreign harbors, helping their ofcers to identify the legal status of that ship. And, later, in 1633–1639, the shogunate enforced a policy of self-isolation called sakoku (鎖國), which among other things prohibited the Japanese from going abroad and closed their ports to foreigners. Nevertheless, there were two exceptions with Chinese and the Dutch traders. These ones were allowed for many years to reach Japanese waters, but their movements were limited only to the small articial island of Deshima (出島), in the bay of Nagasaki (長崎).

The Chinese competition (1642–1683) The beginning of the third period coincided with the moment the Dutch realized that Iquam was an important competitor who challenged their supremacy. He started trading directly with Japan, causing a drastic decline in the VOC trade. This forced the Dutch to divert more efforts to India,11 and, in the case of Taiwan, to rely on the island resources (deer hunting, leasing land to Chinese to plant sugar cane, etc.) until they were defeated by Koxinga. Once the Zheng family was established in Taiwan (1662– 1683), Koxinga saw Southeast Asia as an area of expansion and considered invading the Philippines. But these projects stopped abruptly few months after the conquest of Tayouan—renamed as Anping (安平)—after his unexpected death, caused probably by malaria. Occasionally, his sons tried to cooperate with Dutch traders after their second stay in Quelang (1664–1668) and English merchants who got established for a decade in Tayouan (1670–1680), but both groups achieved very little, leaving the scenario after only a few years of fruitless work. Two years after the conquest of Taiwan by the Qing navy general Shi Lang (施琅), Emperor Kangxi (康熙) lifted the ban on maritime commerce in 1683, and the traditional framework of East Asian trade revived, and, as Ts’ao summarized, “Taiwan became a small fringe area situated outside the main routes of East Asian trade once again.”12

Quelang as ramication of the Manila galleon route The way the Portuguese entered the intra-Asiatic trade in the 1540’s was very active, moving up and down in East Asia in pursuit of trade. In contrast, the Spaniards entered thirty years later, in the 1570’s, maintaining a passive attitude in Manila, waiting for the Chinese silk traders, who were attracted by the regular ow of Mexican silver, carried in the annual galleon from Acapulco, the so-called Manila galleon. With this name we refer to the galleon moving along the regular and longest maritime route, in time and distance, from Manila to Acapulco, which for 250 years (1565 to 1815) had a great impact on the history of the Philippine archipelago, using galleons mostly constructed in Cavite with Chinese and Malay workers, to venture the Chinese silk into the Mexican market.13

140 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The trip across the Pacic Ocean The trip was mainly organized by the merchants of Manila; consequently, every business operations cycle started in that city and ended ten or eleven months later in the same city, after the arrival of the prot. In theory, during the month of June the merchandise was loaded in Manila, before the galleon set sail for a difcult six-month trip. At the end of June or in the middle of July two or three galleons left Manila looking for the embocadero of San Bernardino (the “gate” located at the east of the archipelago). Later, following the edge of the Kuroshio stream, they reached the latitude of Japan, and turned east to cross the Pacic Ocean, arriving after ve or six months in North California and one month later in Acapulco. In this city, a very well established fair would be held upon arrival, around January or February of the following year. On the other hand, the galleons left Acapulco (see Plate 16) at the beginning of March on their westbound trip with the prots of the business, under the custody of the captain to be given to those who had commissioned their merchandise in the previous trip. The captain also carried the situado, or royal subsidy in silver, to pay the expenses of the Crown in the colony. For three months they had a pleasant trip toward the west, carrying few things. At the end of the second month the galleon reached the Marshall Islands, and two weeks later Guam Island (Marianas archipelago) or the Carolinas archipelago. In two weeks more, it was again in front of the San Bernardino embocadero. It was in this place that the Dutch eets were sometimes waiting for the arrival of the galleon. The fact that Taiwan was near the routes of the galleon made some Spaniards consider the possibility of setting a harbor there. Martínez suggested in 1619 this idea to face two possible problems in the westbound trip: the difculties of approaching the archipelago due either to bad weather or to the presence of the Dutch: If the vessels coming in from [New] Spain cannot dock in [the Philippines] due to the strong gales, then they can easily seek shelter in the port of this Island. From there, they can equip themselves and return to New Spain or unload cargo bound for Manila at the proper time. This is much safer than to pass through Japan, leaving them in the hands of our enemies. And if the Dutch happen to be on the lookout for Spanish vessels coming to these islands, a small fast-moving boat stationed at the entry point of Manila Bay can be sent to alert the incoming vessels so that they can change their course and go to Isla Hermosa instead; and, once the coast is clear, the same boat will inform them if they can resume their trip and bring their goods to Manila. (SIT, 45)

Regarding the eastbound trip, Fr. Teodoro Quirós presented in 1639 the quality of Quelang harbor as an alternative for the galleons in the case of arribada (opposite winds, forcing the ship to return to their departure point). He defended this possibility against other views suggesting that the harbor was not deep enough for the docking of the galleon, and he added that even, besides Quelang, there was near the gold mines of Toroboan another “port very safe and able refuge [present Nan Ao] for the Castilian ships, in the case of arribada. And they will nd themselves very near Manila and,

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

141

therefore, at home, thus avoiding the risk of venturing into Japanese waters” (SIT, 300). But, we think that the main reason why no Manila galleon docked in Taiwan waters was that Quelang was so near to the Philippines that it was not worth considering such stopover just at the very beginning of that long journey; besides it would mean an important deviation and consequently a great waste of time in that six-month voyage. This is why they usually left from central Luzon heading towards the Marianas Islands before turning to the north looking for the Kuroshio.14

Manila as entrepôt Many goods arrived in Manila, basically the products from Fujian and Guangdong, like porcelain and silk, which were the most abundant. Also, other products from India and Southeast Asia like ivory, cotton, spices, entered the galleon, even others coming from the whole of Asia, like Persian carpets, tapestries, tobacco, golden objects, tea, etc. And, of course, some products from Philippines such as wax, cotton, blankets, cinnamon from Mindanao, etc. These goods were paid in pesos of silver from Mexico or Peru. The loading of goods in the galleon was regulated by the pancada and the boletas system. Through the pancada system, the ofcers of the royal treasury communicated with the Chinese merchants about the quantity and quality of the goods required in order to x the buying price for that trip; and through the boletas system the Spanish merchants or individuals acquired the license for a particular space inside the galleon to load goods.15 Those with the right to acquire boletas were primarily government ofcers, big merchants, and clergy, and secondarily other Spaniards depending on the time they had spent in the Philippines. This system had been oftentimes criticized for this situation created a monopoly that limited the economic expansion of the archipelago.

The socorro of San Salvador as a small branch of the Manila galleon route The small trade carried out by the Spaniards in Taiwan was conducted basically under the scheme of the socorros or relief ships. The purposes of the socorros were multiple; rst to have regular communication between Manila and San Salvador for exchange of letters, transmission of new orders, replacement of governors, soldiers, etc. Second, to pay the military wages and other ofcial expenses, assigned in the situado. Third, to provide for the material needs of the presidio, like medicines, cloth, military supplies, paper, and even food and wine. To have one idea of the main products shipped in the socorro to San Salvador, we can see Table 5.1. The fourth purpose was to take care of a commissioned trade. In this case, Spanish merchants entrusted their money to the socorro shipmaster, who helped them in acquiring advantageously Chinese products in Isla Hermosa, which were later located to the cargo of the Manila galleon. But this only happened a few times in the rst years. Most likely, the daily life in San Salvador was very similar to other distant forts like Terrenate, Cebú, and Zamboanga, and the socorro played an important role in these cities. As it happened with the arrival of the galleons in Manila, the socorro was in San

142 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 Table 5.1 Inventory of some important provisions sent on the relief voyage

Pesos Canvas of rice Almonds in arrobas

1634

1635

1636

1637

1638

1639

1640 1641 1642

12000

12000

15000

8000

4000

6000

8000

7000 9000

600

600

1000

900

1862

1000

850

1016 1181

2

2

1 10

3

100

Sugar in arrobas

32

Swords and daggers

80

80

Muskets from Macao

20

20

Musket bullets Harquebus bullets Artillery bullets

2000

5000

9000

2000

5000 3650

150

Gunpowder in arrobas

100

Cotton socks

200

Hats with lining Cordovan clogs Cordovan shoes Ilocos blankets

4000

125

150

150

150

100

367

200

200

1000

1100

1500

2

101

155

650

150

30 200 1200 50

500

100

50

25

215

Source: SIT, 344–366

Salvador the most important event of the year, because the aid that the socorro brought included a fresh contingent of soldiers, the silver salaries, food, medicines, cloth, etc. The material goods, even if they were mainly for consumption by the garrison, might still have had a local economic impact. On the other hand the socorro brought news and changes. It may have been the moment of arrival of a new governor and the subsequent judgment of residency; for the soldiers it represented the possibility of going back to Manila and perhaps even to Mexico or Spain. And, from 1629, the chances of actually happening increased as the socorros started to come twice a year, in spring and in summer. In the end, the socorros had to withstand the pressure from the Dutch ships, which waited for them east of Taiwan, following the same strategy against the galleons expected from Acapulco. In such cases the socorros had special instructions as we can see in annex 15. Finally, to see the regularity of the socorro’s routine during the years of Spanish presence in Taiwan we can look to Table 5.2 reconstructing all the trips, and mentioning some particularities.

Trade between Spaniards and Chinese Some promoters of the adventure of Isla Hermosa said before the conquest that this post would help the trade with China, giving facilities to the Chinese to sell their goods

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

143

when the Dutch were blockading Manila. This was the case of the long memorial of Martínez in 1619 (SIT, 40–47), following the unrealistic ideas of the contemporary economic writers called arbitristas, who ourished in Spain and Portugal in the rst part of the seventeenth century, looking for arbitrios (solutions) for the social and economic problems of the country. His report of 1619 (written in an arbitrio fashion) envisioned a ourishing market in Isla Hermosa that would also benet Manila. But the later evolution of the actual trade does not correspond to that original optimistic view. On the contrary, it can be divided in the two usual stages of rise and decline that we are now to consider.

Establishing a promising market Conducting private trade was not a priority at the beginning. The rst move was made in the spring of 1627 through the socorro of Cristóbal de Carvajal (SIT, 163). We have mentioned him as the owner of a sampan, which on its way to San Salvador—carrying aid for the fortress—was stopped near Hualian (maybe looking for gold or information about it) and was attacked by the natives, and the ship was lost. After this failure, he entered into the service of the king as commander of Tamsui and as a mercenary ofcer (SIT, 317), being killed in 1641 during the rst attack of the Dutch (SIT, 333). Other news we have on the exploration of business possibilities are the attempts a few months later of twelve men (“adventurers without salary”) who unsuccessfully tried to come to Taiwan in the failed eet of August 1627 (SIT, 101). Nevertheless, this failed armada accomplished something else since the two galleys passed by the Pescadores, awakening the interest of the Chinese for their new neighbors, and promising good deals. After hearing these good expectations of trade, a council in Manila, summoned by Governor Niño de Tavora in 1628, decided to move forward with two measures: rst, to issue some instructions favoring a “free trading policy” to attract Chinese merchants to Isla Hermosa. In this way goods coming from China would not pay taxes upon arrival to Quelang or Tamsui (SIT, 125). Secondly, an important private trade mission carrying 200,000 pesos was sent to San Salvador. They stayed for one year before going back to Manila. They received some support from the Quelang governor Alcarazo who sent a notice to China to engage in business with these merchants. The result was good because the Manila governor said that the ship returned “with a great quantity of clothing and wheat” (SIT, 145). How to regulate business in peripheral areas far from Manila was probably an old problem of management in the colony, and the new situation created in Isla Hermosa raised again the issue that was faced by the Dominicans, making a moral question for their own understanding. The question was: “Can the commanders, like the ones in Isla Hermosa, Moluccas and Cagayan engage in trading without breaking the oath of loyalty or the orders from the King?” (SIT, 214). The issue behind was that these local governors were also in charge of administering justice, and therefore they were rightly banned from engaging in trade or business. This theoretical question was even extended to anyone with some authority administering justice, like military ofcers and even the governor

San Francisco

San Francisco junk

August

(Spring) Summer

Spring August (August)

(Spring) August

Spring August

Spring August

(Spring) August

Spring? August

Spring

August August

1627

1628

1629

1630

1631

1632

1633

1634

1635

ship San Francisco

ship (passing by Macao)

King’s sampan 2 ships

2 sampans with only rice 2 ships

ship with merchants “ship, galley, brigantine” (project)

Rosario

“Fleet-III: - 4 galleons, 3 ships” - ship Rosario - 2 galleys

“Fleet-I: - 2 galleys, 12 sampans” “Fleet-II: - 3 galleons, 2 galleys”

May August

1626

Name of the ship

Season

Year

Fco. Hernández

Alonso García

Alcarazo

Carreño

Incoming governor

August August

March

August

July–August

August

May

17-Aug 17-Aug 17-Aug

26-Feb

Manila

Departure from

Outward journey

April+1

May August

canceled

10-May August

Arrival in Quelang

12000

4000

March

April

dispersed

Quelang

captured

lost

25-Nov

31-Jul

21-Feb+1 wreck

Arrival in Manila

Return journey Money Departure in pesos from

Table 5.2 List of eets and socorros in the Manila-Quelang route (1626–1642)

Alcarazo

Carreño

Outgoing governor

Spring August

(Spring) August

(Spring) August

Spring

1637

1638

1639

1640

1642

June

King’s sampan

Source: J. E. Borao (2003), “Fleets, relief ships and trade”, pp. 320–321

June

Santo Domingo Lojiano

April

May May September September

20-May 20-May

August August

May

from Manila

Summer

Gonzalo Portillo

Cristóbal Márquez

Palomino

governor

Departure

San Nicolás de Tolentino

King’s sampan King’s sampan King’s sampan King’s sampan

King’s sampan King’s sampan

King’s sampan King’s sampan

Ntra. Sra. de la Concepción

King’s sampan San Nicolás de Tolentino

San Francisco

Name of the ship

Incoming

Outward journey

Spring

September

Spring

(August)

(Spring) August

1636

1641

Season

Year

Table 5.2 (continued)

Lost

12-Sep

19-May

Lost

Quelang

Arrival in

6000

3000

4000

6000 2000

1000 5000

4000

15000

in pesos

from Quelang

Money Departure

October

October

Manila

Arrival in

Return journey

Cristóbal Márquez

Fco. Hernández

governor

Outgoing

146 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

himself. The question probably reects a debate that might have happened at the end of the 1620’s since the scope of the issue referred to different ofcers. The answer was based not only on a principle, but also on circumstances. Thus in Isla Hermosa and the Moluccas it was possible because there was no other civil authority, while in the already stabilized city of Cagayan (North Luzon), it was the other way around, since the highest authority was the mayor, and his assignment as a military commander was something additional: In the case of the Moluccas, the cabo can decide for himself; in the case of Cagayan, it is mainly the responsibility of the alcalde mayor, while being a military ofcial is an additional responsibility; he takes an oath against making such deals and is obliged by the laws and therefore sins against these and against the oath if he breaks them. As for the one in Isla Hermosa, we have already seen that he may enter into these kinds of deals. (SIT, 214)

But the problem was not only of possible corrupt governors or ofcers, but also fraudulent merchants among themselves. Jacinto Esquivel recorded a case that might have happened in 1631 or 1632. He blamed the merchants “who always tried to defraud the king of his taxes and rights, [to the point of] not being willing to load even a piece of cloth unless the inspectors were out of the ship. This is what happened last time to the point of paralyzing the loading of the ship for more than 15 days” (SIT, 187). He added that the calculated pressure of the traders forced the governor to remove his inspector, nally allowing them to load the cargo and to dispatch the ship. We presume that things continued in a more or less prosperous way, because in 1635 another successful business operation occurred with the money commissioned to Juan López de Andoaín, the shipmaster of the relief ship of the spring of that year. He stayed for a few months, and even after his departure, several loaded sampans arrived missing the chance to sell their goods. We do not know what happened to these goods; maybe they went back to China or they organized an expedition to Manila. In fact, the Dutch sources mentioned the case of a Spanish junk going from San Salvador to Manila in 1636, which after having lost its mast was forced to turn itself over to the Dutch in Tayouan. It had twenty-eight Chinese aboard along with sixteen white men and mestizos, among them some soldiers, a woman with two children, commoners, and a Franciscan.16 The Dutch gathered from these people many details about the Spanish fortications, the small trade with China, and the hostility to conversion among some natives. They conscated the cargo of not great value and made an inventory. This inventory gives us an idea of the products of this trade between San Salvador and Manila. Besides silk, many other textile products were also carried (satin, hemp, socks, etc.), as Figure 5.1 indicates.

Decline of the market This junk was probably the last one of the rst period, because, after the arrival in the Philippines of the new governor general Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, the “free

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

147

496 pieces of hemp fabrics: 283 145 68 496

ditto at 3/4 R. ditto 1/3 R. ditto at 3/8 R. pieces of hemp fabrics, ne as well as coarse

R 212 1/4 f 551.17 R 72 1/2 f 188.10 R 25 1/2 f 76. 6 310 1/4

f 806.13

975 pieces of lanckijns (sic): 531 pieces ditto painted blue and white at 1/4 R. of 8, coarse 444 pieces 150 pieces coarse 194 pieces ditto white 94 pieces brown blue 6 ditto light blue 444 pieces lanckijns (sic) at 3/8 R. of 8 The lanckens (sic) total

132 3/4 f 345.3

166 1/2 f 432.18 299 1/4

465 pieces of cangans: 260 cangan pieces, coarse and ne ditto, at 3/4 R. of 8 95 f 104 pieces, coarse, at 5/8 R. of 8, not as good 65 f 42 blue cangan pieces at 3/4 R. of 8 31 1/2 f 59 pieces, brown blue, coarse at 1/2 R. of 8 29 1/2 f 465 cangans of different prices R 321

f 778.1

507 169 81.18 76.14 f

834

f

93

24 pieces Sijpous (sic) at 1 1/2 R. of 8

36

11 pieces of satin: 7 black pieces at 6 R. of 8 4 printed pieces at 5 R. of 8 11 pieces of satin amount to

R

42 20 62

2 pieces of colored damasten (sic) at 5 R. of 8

R

10

1835 pair of silk socks at 3/4 R. of 8

R 1376 1/4

f 3578.5

156 bundles of shoelace at 1/4 R.

R

39

f 101.8

11 pieces armosijntjes (sic) at 1 1/8 R. of 8

R.

15 1/8

f

157 catties of silk: 27 catties gesweenende (sic) silk at 2 R. a catty 125 catties bogij (sic) or yellow rough silk at ... per picul 5 catties white rough pole-silk at... per picul 157 catties silk amount to 35 piculs of Chinese nails at 4 R. per picul 2 turnover-swords, 1 at 16 R. and 1 at 18 R. 1 copper and gilded hat-ribbon and 30 buttons Total

54 171 1/4

f 109.4 f 52 f 161.4 f

26

39.6

f 140.8 f 445.5

10 1/4 f 26.13 R. 235 1/2

f 612.6

140

f

364

34

f

88.8

5

f

13

f 7496.15

In the fortress Zeelandia, 25 March 1636 (VOC 1120, (1637II), ff. 456–457) Figure 5.1 Inventory of a Spanish junk from Quelang that was on its way to Manila, but forced to turn itself to the Dutch after having lost its mast.

148 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

trading policy” changed abruptly in 1636 to another one in favor of “taxation.” Maybe it was more of a political move, trying to exercise a Spanish suzerainty in northern Taiwan, claiming the right to collect taxes from the Chinese trade, either in Quelang or in Tamsui. But this policy only could have been possible if the means to enforce it were available; and, at that moment, the Spanish power on Isla Hermosa had started to decline. A few years earlier (or just upon the arrival of Corcuera), the Dominicans were concerned of the possible implementation of the taxation policy, and they again requested Fr. Domingo González to issue an authoritative statement on the moral implications of the possible change of policy. The question was that if in the event that more sangleys come to live in Isla Hermosa—as it happened in Manila—might the governor general impose similar tributes, collected by his ofcers in Isla Hermosa, or not. The answer was afrmative: If that place Isla Hermosa were to become as protable to the sangleys as the Philippines, due to the expansion of their trade with the Spaniards, then it will be right to sell them a permit to stay and to prot from there. I do not consider this as a tribute but as a sale or contract, stipulating “I allow you to stay on my land for this sum.” In my opinion, the Governor is entitled to do this even without orders from his Majesty. (SIT, 214)

With or without the knowledge of these disquisitions of the Dominicans, the fact is that taxes to the Chinese merchants were levied in pesos from their selling of rice to the Spaniards. We have some details of these payments during thirteen months, from 28 August 1637 to 28 September 1638 (SIT, 281–284), as described in Table 5.3. Some merchants were more regular suppliers like Qui-quiet (Qui qua), Benua, and Lanco (Banco), who came twice to San Salvador. Also they moved back and forth between Tayouan and Quelang, because they also appeared in the list of Chinese traders arriving in Tayouan.17 Table 5.3 shows also the decline of the Chinese presence in San Salvador, because the Spaniards had to go to China to buy rice, as was the case of the Alonso Pacheco,18 who in 1638 went twice (May and June) to ll up the reserves in the Spanish fortress. Certainly, the main trade consisted only of purchases of rice on a regular basis. The Chinese were the main suppliers bringing back to China not only the silver but also some other local products, like sulfur, venison, bejuco, etc. Obviously, the table does not represent the gures of the real trade, but the one controlled by the Spaniards. In 1636 when they left Tamsui they lost the control of the business of that area (SIT, 307). Also trade on beaches near Quelang outside the control of Spaniards continued and even ourished, something reected by the fact that a few Chinese were caught and obliged to pay nes (SIT, 281). Another reason for escaping Spanish control was that the Spaniards failed in handling some commercial disputes that arose among Chinese merchants during the time of Governor Pedro Palomino (SIT, 308). Effects of this new situation were very well described by Quirós in 1639, who blamed the whole disaster on the governors:

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

149

Table 5.3 Income and payments of the Spanish coffer in San Salvador (1637–1638)

(i) Income received into the Spanish coffers from the following traders 1637

3 Sept 4 Sept

Buey Sac Qui-quiet

2 pesos & 6 reals 5 pesos & 2 reals

1638

9 April 4 July

nes to Chinese Qui qua

38 pesos & 6 reals 34 pesos & 7 reals for trade taxes

(ii) Payments made by the Spanish coffers to the following suppliers 1637

27 Aug Huasan 30 p (he sold 20 cavans of rice, 12 r/c) 27 Aug Tionchu 47 p & 4 r (48 cavans of rice, 10 r/c) 29 Aug Tionchu & Paolo 749 p & 5 r (278 cavans of rice, 11 r/c, 17 gantas of rice) 10 Sept Uchuan 1225 p & 6 r 14 Sept Tonchum 53 p 25 Nov Benua 70 p

1638

2 Jan 27 Feb 29 Apr 4 May 5 May 8 Jun 19 Jun 25 Jun

Benua 7 sangleys Lanco 5 limeworkers Alonso Pacheco Alonso Pacheco Banco Chensit

112 p & 7 r 144 p & 6 r 190 p 100 p 226 p (132 cavans) 538 p (93 + 153 cavans + 100 blankets) 125 p (100 cavans of rice) 160 p (52 + 103 cavans of rice + 200 blankets)

Source: SIT, 103–104, 281–284

It is said that the citizens of Manila have much money but do not make use of it. I say it is because there are bad governors who maltreat foreigners and weigh on them a thousand troubles, of which I am a witness. And so the sangleys have since avoided them. However, during the time of Sergeant Major Alonso García Romero, the natives and sangleys were well treated and the land was prosperous. Also, restricting free trade has stunted a potential business mine. When a sampan would come, they would conscate its entire cargo and hoard the goods for a long period in storerooms made especially for this purpose. Thus the governors and their cronies delay everything and anger the sangleys who end up giving in to their demands. As a consequence, the sangleys hardly visit us, denying the citizens of Manila the opportunity to trade with them. (SIT, 302)

On the other hand some Chinese merchants, if not most of them, must be related with the trading network of Iquam and might have served as his agents, when Iquam was still helping the Dutch before becoming their competitor around 1635. In fact, at the beginning of 1634 Iquam had appeared in some Dutch reports in a suspicious manner, like conspiring with the rebellious people of Mattaw (near Tayouan) against the Dutch. These reports even claimed that the former pirate Iquam was conceiving a plan of

150 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

capturing Quelang during an eclipse of the moon. In April the rumors of the menace of Iquam grew and the Sincandians, a group of Dutch allied natives, were going daily to explore the coast to see if they could discover Iquam’s whereabouts (FE I, 235–243). But, in any case, Iquam was clever enough to enforce his role as a middle man in the business between China and Japan, not only by increasing his naval power but also being present, at least indirectly, in the main events of the region, as a way to build his empire at the expense of the Dutch, and even the Spaniards. These ones were also aware of this fact, as the last Quelang governor Gonzalo Portillo reported to the Manila governor: On 19 July 1641, … we knew from the natives of Tamsui that the Dutch were planning to fortify there, with their own approval, … and the mandarin sangley, Icoa, was going to come with the Dutch by land to see … Also I learned that one sangley, married in Pangasinam, who was insurgent in the last war,19 was dispatched by Icoa to the Dutch fortress, and now he is there saying that with few Dutch and Chinese, it will be very easy to conquer the whole island and later Manila. (SIT, 331)

Trade between natives and Chinese The impression that Esquivel had of the Basay natives was that they were crafty people who engaged in trade and business to avoid farming work: These Taparris and the Quimaurris used to be the pirates on this island and are craftier than the other natives; they are not as simple and as good-natured as the rest […], those of Quimaurri who neither plant nor harvest; rather they live like gypsies or sangleys, going from one village to another, making for them houses, arrows, clothes, hatchets and pre-selling their cuentas and stones. After they have consumed the rice that they had gathered during that period, they would go back for another two months to engage in the same activity. (SIT, 183)

For this reason the Basay conducted their main amount of business with the Chinese, selling them sulfur, bonga,20 reeds, wine, wood for handicraft, and deerskin.

The sulfur trade The Chinese imported sulfur mainly from Lequios and Japan (SIT, 172) for their manufactures of reworks, gunpowder, etc., but also were attracted by the sulfur produced in northern Taiwan. Quirós claimed to have direct information about three sulfur mines (SIT, 300). We think that two of them might have been located around Quipatao (Peitou), with their commercial center in Tamsui. The Chinese bartered there sulfur “with chininas, printed clothing material and other trinkets (and even) a lowranking Mandarin came to load sampans with sulfur” (SIT, 168, 172). During the Dutch period business continued in the same place. A Dutch report of Hendrik Steen (1645) noted that two junks of Chinese mandarin Tjonthaij arrived to Tamsui to buy sulfur,

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

151

and they went back to China loaded with 100 picols of purged sulfur and 700 picols of unpurged sulfur. For this transaction Tjonthaij had to pay the following taxes: 140 real/8 in cash and 18 picols of purged sulfur. He also reported that three sangley cabessas (heads, leaders) from Tayouan—Sanqua (Saqua), Tiniso, and Janco—came from China and loaded 400 picols of unpurged sulfur.21 The other sulfur area was located near Taparri (probably Taparri el Viejo, in modern Chinshan), with the commercial center in Quelang. But, in 1632 Esquivel said that the natives did not extract sulfur from the mine of Taparri anymore, because it brought them bad luck (SIT, 168). Probably he got this information from the Spaniard Domingo Aguilar, who in 1642, told the Dutch that he had a sulfur mine (FE II, 325; SIT, 388). And the reason why Aguilar was enjoying this ownership was due to his good relations with the Taparris, since he was married to the daughter of the brother of Kilas la Romana, the chieftain of Taparri. Through the Dutch sources we know the trade continued. Just as the Dutch took over Quelang, a boat with eleven sangleys arrived. They came to collect sulfur that they had bought in Caquiuanuan (SIT, 393), an incident that shows how Caquiuanuan might have played a role as business center. Next year in 1643 the Dutch brought a big quantity of good-quality sulfur, and in 1645 Steen (Tamsui) reported to Governor François Caron (Fort Zeelandia) about the trade of sulfur, saying that the mandarin Lampcan and also the sangley Kimptingh loaded sulfur in exchange for cloths, Chinese beer, etc.22

The bonga, liana-reeds, and other trade Besides sulfur, most of the commercial interaction done between the native Basay and the Chinese was related to bonga, deers and deerskin. Esquivel had witnessed the process quite well. According to him, the bonga from Senar were used by the Chinese as a red colorant for the shing nets and to dye other clothes. The price in 1632 was 4–5 taels each picol, but the Chinese were trading them with stones, bells, brass bracelets, etc. The second item was the bejuco (liana) with which the Chinese used to produce chairs and handicrafts. Fr. Juan de los Ángeles gave a clear explanation of the usage of this liana or reeds: There is abundance of many kinds of reeds, from which ropes can be made for any purpose. The Chinese take to their country many sampan loads of reeds, from which they make a thousand interesting objects. From the inner core of the reeds they make reed paper, which is of the best quality, durable, and hardy. From the outside bark they make seats and back rests for very elaborate chairs, and a thousand other things. (SIT, 570)

The reeds were sold in 1632 at 2–3 taels each picol. Table 5.4 compares as a reference the exchange value of these last three items, as gathered by Esquivel in 1632. But we must consider that we cannot attempt to draw any particular conclusions from these gures, unless they are rst contrasted with a wider set of data:

152 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 Table 5.4 Esquivel’s records of the exchange value of some goods

(a) Sulfur In Quelang: In Fujian:

Notes: 5 piculs of sulfur = 2 mantles

(2 mantles = 3 reals)

10 piculs of sulfur = 5 mantles

(5 mantles = 1 peso)

1 picul of sulfur (a) = 16–18 taels

(in times of scarcity)

(b) = 5–8 taels

(in stable times)

(c) = difcult to sell (when there is a surplus) (b) Bonga In Senar:

bonga = some stones, bells, etc.

In Fujian:

1 picul of bonga = 4–5 taels

(very cheap)

(c) Liana In Fujian:

1 picul of liana = 2–3 taels

Source: SIT, 168, 172

In fact, De los Ángeles mentioned in the same report other local products—including rice wine and a type of bush—which were much more appreciated by the Chinese: There are many varieties of rice. One of them, which is sticky when cooked, is very suitable for the making of a well-known wine. This is done without heating: they put the yeast and, when it is already fermenting, they transfer it to earthenware vessels, which they bury in the ground. After a year they get a strong, aromatic wine. Much of that wine is exported to China, since it is not produced there. There is also a bush, sort of an elder, worth mentioning. It is quite light; they extract the inner core by making use of wooden pegs. The core is as white as snow and as light as cork. They carve it in a thousand ower patterns and other designs, to be used for ower arrangements, which do not wither. The Chinese value it very much and import it to be used by their women for their headdresses. (SIT, 570)

The deerskin trade In the report of the shipwreck of 1582 made by the Jesuit Francisco Pirez, deer hunting was clearly observed near the mountain besides the beach where they were repairing their ship: The mountain had … in some places vast areas of grass where many deer lived, and some of noteworthy size. A Portuguese named Monteiro climbed many times and killed a good number of them. He once witnessed a hunting party of the barbarians that took place in an open space where the deer grazed. They surrounded them in a circle; every arrow that they shot bore a hook that would trap their prey among the grasses and tree branches. They are splendid runners. (SIT, 12) (see Plate 9)

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

153

Another description was the one of Diego de Aduarte in 1632, who adds the use of small dogs to drive the deer away (SIT, 180–181). The main consumers of corambre, or deerskin, were the Japanese because they produced leather items, garments, and furniture. The deerskins were sent by the Chinese to Japan, although sometimes ships from Japan came directly to Quelang, as it happened in 1632. Esquivel mentioned that that year “three sampans from Japan were loaded with them, and one Japanese told me that while silk is a very precious merchandise there, they earn more from skins” (SIT, 168, 177). But, the most important deerskin trade conducted from the Dutch was in Tayouan, where big quantities of deerskins were exported annually to Japan. Certainly, since 1635 the Dutch, after experiencing their decline of trade with Japan, started exploring other economic sources in the island and developed the deerskin trade especially in Tayouan and around the western coast of the island. But as early as 1638 they realized that the stock of deer was depleting, which called for some rationalization. In a resolution of the Tayouan Council of 18 October 1638, they tried to avoid deer extinction, but at the same time to continue supplying for the Japanese market. They issued some resolutions, among them: “Nobody will be allowed to hunt after the 30th of April so that the hinds can safely breed during the months of May and June” (FE II, 212). Quirós offered in 1643 a very succinct image of the Tayouan trade adding that 10,000 deerskins were exported to Japan by the Chinese under the Dutch (not including the Dutch exports) every year: The Chinese who live in the district of the Dutch garrison pay the Dutch 14,000 pesos every year—4,000 for the license to hunt deer and 10,000 for permission to sh and to bring their catch to the Chinese mainland, where sh is very scarce. I will also say that every year they get from the Island 10,000 deerskins, which are as valuable as gold is in Japan, as the English adjutant, who took Fr. Pedro [Chaves] prisoner when he was returning from China, told me. (SIT, 454)

According to the gures collected by Thomas O. Höllmann from different authors,23 the ve-year period of 1635–1639 was very high in deerskin exportation: 373,302 units. Later, 1640–1644, when Quirós wrote, it slowed down reaching only 230,119 units; but in the following ve-year periods it climbed again: 278,186 (1645–1649), 314,177 (1650–1654), and 425,444 (1655–1659). Nevertheless, it seems that not all deerskins sent to Japan came from Taiwan, and some might have passed by Tayouan after being bought originally in the Philippines. Dutch sources referred to one of these cases—referred by Chinese spying for the Dutch in September 1638—that ended in a failure (SIT, 293–294). A group of Chinese in Tayouan organized on the 20 May 1638 an expedition with a big junk to Taocan (some place in Luzon) to buy 25,000 to 30,000 deerskins, to be sent later to Tayouan before the departure of the ships to Japan. But for safety or other strategic reasons, the junk departure was from San Salvador. After leaving the port it encountered a heavy storm and after losing its mast ended up again in the vicinity of Quelang. The junk was fully loaded with other goods which it had to sell at a loss in Quelang, canceling their business in the Philippines.

154 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

In Fig. 5.2 we summarize these general ideas of the commercial system in northern Taiwan in the second period of the stay of the Spaniards, when the little silk market from China had completely declined. It shows, rst, how the Spaniards are silver suppliers and rice and services consumers; second, how all the silver in circulation in the nal analysis ends in Chinese hands; third, that the natives are the only raw material suppliers, and consumers of commodities. And nally that the Spaniards were not commodities consumers since they brought these materials from Manila, in the socorro.

Natives gold

silver

sulfur deerskin liana

mantles jars silver

Sangleys rice, services

rice, services silver

Spaniards Figure 5.2 General commercial system in northern Taiwan.

The tibucao trade of the Chinese There is still an unsolved commercial issue, the tibucao trade. Fr. Angelo Cocci, the rst Dominican to enter China, reported in 1631 that the Fuzhou ofcials complained to him about the rampant “practice of tibucao” in Taiwan (SIT, 178). We are not totally sure about the meaning of tibucao, but it seems that it was a kind of smuggling trade, with Taiwan as the entrepôt. The Chinese authorities pointed out that Taiwan was a place where one could acquire tibucao easily. Esquivel conrmed this as well. He mentioned how boats that belonged to sangleys from the Philippines transported the tibucao to Taiwan. They sold it there and later it was introduced into China without paying the due taxes. They would put in at some beach close to San Salvador, transact there, and then buy silk with the acquired money. At the same time, the traders from the Philippines would bring that silk to Manila and resell it. Esquivel recommended that if such business was inevitable, then at least some means had to be applied to control it. What was the tibucao? Was the above-mentioned deerskin from Toacan (in the case that this place can be identied with “Tibucao”)? Was tibucao referring to the famous Filipino tree called sibucao, whose seed was used as natural jewelry for making necklaces, becoming a very important commodity between Philippines and China in early modern times? Probably

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

155

it was. Was it a kind of new substance, for example tobacco (tabaco in Spanish), which underwent some prohibitions in Fujian in 1637? Probably no; but, what do we know about the contemporary introduction of tobacco in Taiwan?

The introduction of tobacco in China and Taiwan The trade between Spaniards and natives was minimal, and consisted of buying rice and a few other supplies. In this context of few exchanges, it is possible to think that the rst diffusion of tobacco in northern Taiwan was due to the Spaniards, although they did not engage in selling it. In any case, natives became consumers of tobacco as archeological ndings in Cavalan might suggest. How did the tobacco reach Taiwan from America?

The appearance of tobacco as an international commodity One of the ways that the Western presence impacted on the lives of the natives was in the consumption of tobacco, “(whose) rapid diffusion was one of the most remarkable facts in the history of commerce.”24 On the rst trip of Columbus, tobacco was discovered in Cuba; it was brought to Spain and in the sixteenth century was commonly used among different social groups. It is logical to think that this “companion of long nights of traveling” moved around the globe with the sailors. Probably the Portuguese were the rst ones smoking tobacco in the East by the middle of the sixteenth century. Soon later, the tobacco leaf might have been introduced in the Philippines directly from America by the missionaries in the last quarter of the sixteenth century,25 and from this archipelago tobacco started to be known in Japan and China. As stated by L. Carrington Goodrich, the rst reference to tobacco in Chinese literature happened around 1600.26 The Fujianese poet and writer of the Wanli period Yao Lu (ۢࣁ) declared: There is a plant called tanpaku (૗ʱഡ) 27 produced in Luzon. Another name is hsun (ᙾ). You take re and light one end and put the other end in your mouth. The smoke goes down your throat through the pipe. It can make one tipsy, but it can likewise keep one clear of malaria. People have brought it to Zhangchou to plant it, and now there is more there than in Luzon, and it is exported and sold in that country.28

Certainly the growth of this plant did not spread so fast in the Philippines, because in the book of Antonio de Morga, Sucesos en las Islas Filipinas (1606), when talking about drugs for entertainment, guests mentioned with great detail the bonga or buyos [betel-nuts], but did not say anything about tobacco. As a matter of fact, the rst tobacco factory in Spain started in 1620, in Seville, when its consumption was very much extended in the colonies. Tobacco had not only supporters but also met detractors who considered it poisonous, and prohibitions extended all over the world. Some of them included James I of England in 1604; Japan in 1607; in Turkey ca. 1611; the emperor of Japan in 1616, the Moghul emperor of India in 1617; the Czar Federovich in 1634. The Philippines was a natural

156 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

place for growing tobacco, and probably started to supply this plant to China during those years. Although we do not have clear evidence for that, it seems that in China several kinds of tobacco were planted, especially in Fujian, and years later prohibitions appeared in 1637, 1638, 1639 (in the Manchu area), 1640, and 1641 (again by the Manchu emperor). The decree of 1638 stated: “Those who hawk clandestinely Tobacco, and sell it to foreigners, shall, no matter the quantity sold, be decapitated, and their heads exposed on a pike.”29 These reiterative prohibitions only show that the production continued growing. Even Pope Urban VIII forbade the use of tobacco in 1642.

Tobacco reaching Taiwan The earliest time we have seen tobacco mentioned in Taiwan was by Candidius when he described in 1628 the way a young man should start visiting his wife at her home: “He must enter secretly … and lie down on the bed immediately without saying a word. If he wants to have some tobacco or something else, he is not allowed to ask for it, but he coughs a little. When his wife hears this, she comes to him and brings him what he needs and returns to the other people again” (FE I, 125). Other data about tobacco in Dutch Formosa before 1640 was shown by W. M. Campbell, when displaying the payments in the “Tayouan Account-Book.” He reects that at that time natives produced their own tobacco, which was to sell to the Dutch: Table 5.5 Payments in the “Tayouan Account-Book” (November 1638–October 1639)

Date

Spender in the name of the VOC

Tobacco & other items providers

16 November 1638

Jan Pitersen

Mattaw

6 January 1639

Jan Blankert

Tevorang

December 1638–January 1639

Jan

Mattaw

March 1639 January–March 1639

Sinkandians Hans Olhoff

11 April 1639

Lonkian

December–February 1639

Merkinius

February–April 1639

Jan

23 August 1639

Chinese smith

Mattaw

Source: Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, pp. 167–173

As for the Spaniards, Aduarte recommended, after his trip to Isla Hermosa in 1632, that among many other things needed in the Spanish garrison of Quelang, tobacco should be sent to the soldiers (SIT, 196). Indeed, this was a very much appreciated product, as we can see in 1640 in the reminder written by the governor of San Salvador to Manila (SIT,

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

157

319). Certainly tobacco was a regular commodity in the provisions sent regularly from Manila. These can be seen in the detailed relation of things carried by the socorro to Quelang, where we can see that tobacco was a regular, even growing, commodity: Table 5.6 Tobacco shipped from Manila to San Salvador’s soldiers (1634–1642)

Year Ship

Description of tobacco

1634 San Francisco Four bundles, nos. 1–4, each containing ve arrobas of tobacco, rolled up in oorcloth. 1635 San Francisco Bundles no. 12, 13, 14 and 15, containing ve arrobas of tobacco each, rolled up in oorcloth 1636 San Francisco Five bundles of tobacco, rolled up in oorcloth

Arrobas

Sticks Leaves

20 20

25 (?)

1637 sampan

Five arrobas of tobacco leaves

1639 sampan 1

7 wooden boxes, each containing 700 tobacco sticks Seven wooden boxes bound with liana, each one containing 700 tobacco cuttings.

9800

20 bundles of tobacco sticks, 300 in a bunch, rolled in two Candaba mats. 20 bundles of tobacco cuttings, 300 in each bundle.

12000

sampan 2

1640 sampan 1

sampan 2 1641 sampan

500 bundles of tobacco, 100 leaves in a bundle. Rolled in ve smaller bundles in 10 mats from Candaba.

1642 sampan 1

Nine arrobas and ve pounds of tobacco leaves Five boxes nos. 9–13, containing 21 arrobas and four pounds of tobacco. Two boxes, nos. 14 and 15, containing six arrobas and 18 pounds of clean tobacco leaves.

sampan 2

5

50000

36

Source: SIT, 346–366

Considering that in Castile the weight of an arroba was about 11.5 kg, we can suppose that the soldiers were well provided with tobacco and had enough to share with the natives who became attracted to that new fashion, although we do not have sufcient data as to how much they shared. Nevertheless recent archeologial ndings show a good local pipe production in native villages (see Plate 19).

158 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The Dutch tobacco diplomacy Certainly China very soon started producing tobacco, and even they were selling to the Dutch, who used it mainly as a way to make gifts to the Taiwan natives along with some other things, like clothing. This practice was especially used when they made long expeditions. In 1637 they provided Chinese tobacco and cangans to some chieftains of Heyankan with whom they had signed a peace accord (FE II, 156). In 1638, when Captain Johan van Linga went around Pimaba, different presents, including tobacco, were offered to the natives (FE II, 188, 190). In 1642, the Dutch stationed in Pimaba requested from the governor “more Chinese tobacco and silk of various colors, as presents for the regents of these villages” (FE II, 288). At the beginning of 1643, the natives were going to Tamsui with ginger, sugarcane, and potatoes to exchange for cash or tobacco (FE II, 343). In 1644, the Council of Formosa decided to tax the Chinese imports of candles, tobacco, arrack, oil, sh-oil, Formosan rattan, etc. coming to the island (FE II, 435). In 1645, when senior merchant Schillemans was assigned for a pacication in the southern villages and to get enough food for the supplies of Fort Zeelandia, he was provided with an additional “thirty cangans and fty envelopes lled with tobacco” (FE II, 528). When senior merchant Cornelis Caesar led an expedition to the gold area in East Taiwan, he brought along many gifts, including tobacco which he offered in a dozen towns (FE III, 21–40). That year this practice started to become more customary as cangans and tobacco continued to be used for exchange: in June by merchant Gabriël Happart (FE III, 97); in July by Jacob Nolpe (FE III, 103); and in another expedition in April 1647 (FE II, 167). Natives got so “addicted” that in 1650 a group of them attacked the dwellings of some Chinese laborers, getting everything available, like cloth, cangans, and tobacco (FE III, 313). Many other cases can be referred to; we just can nally note the observations of junior merchant Simon Keerdekoe on how to deal with the natives: “These people must be reeled in gently and gradually be brought to a better understanding of the Company and to this end a little of something like Chinese tobacco can contribute a great deal, as became clear to us in person during our presence here” (FE III, 375). Accordingly, when Arnoldus Montanus published his Atlas of China and neighboring territories, using information collected in the last years of Dutch presence in the island, he said about Taiwan: The Inhabitants also take Tobacco, although it grows not here, but is brought to them from China: Their Pipes are thin Reeds or Canes, with Stone Heads: That which the Hollanders often smok’d there, was brought from Japan; which though strong, is but like the Refuse other Tobacco.30

From the El Dorado Renaissance impetus to the Baroque reality The end of the sixteenth century and the rst half of the seventeenth century was the moment of the rst globalization, not only economic, but cultural alike because Renaissance and Baroque existential categories expanded as well. The Renaissance was not only the revival of the Greek and Roman classical worlds, but also the biblical one.

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

159

No wonder the echo of the fabulous harbors of Tarsis and Or31 relating the richness of Solomon reappeared after the discovery of the New World, and their meaning was present for more than two centuries motivating several Renaissance expeditions on search for gold.32 Spaniards looked for gold in the American continent, but also in the Pacic. Magellan not only looked for spices but he was also interested in gathering information about gold. When he arrived at Samar Island, he called it the island of the Good Signals, and Pedro Martir, who gathered great amounts of information about the expedition, wrote that some of the mates had heard comments about golden beaches while in the equatorial region. As Juan Gil commented, they were convinced that the gold mines of King Solomon were not far.33 This search for gold had different fashions and expeditions moved around the whole world accompanying the European expansion; but, in the end, after they experienced that the mineral was scarce, disillusionment and deception followed. This disillusionment was perceived in an escalated form, rst by the Spaniards in America (Aguirre) and the South Pacic Ocean (Mendaña), later by some Chinese in Manila, particularly Zhang Yi (ਜ਼⻙, also known as Tio Heng), once more by Spaniards in the North Pacic (Vizcaino), and nally by the Japanese (Hideyoshi, Ieyasu), and by the Dutch (Governor Traudenius and Governor Caron).34

The Amazon: The rst Spanish Dorado (1530–1561) El Dorado was the most prominent myth about the search of gold. It started around 1530 when some news about an Andean tribe called the Muiscas (in present Colombia) reached Quito, which said that these natives had some rituals practiced with gold. This news encouraged in 1635 some earlier conquistadores, like Belalcázar, to look for the location of a place that they started calling El Dorado, between present Colombia and Venezuela. The following year Jiménez de Quesada went also to search for the same golden land, but also without substantial result. The most famous expedition was organized by Francisco de Orellana and Gonzalo Pizarro. In 1541, they left Quito and crossed the Andean cordillera. Later they had a very difcult journey along the Amazon which divided the expedition. Pizarro went back to Quito and Orellana followed the whole river, giving to it the name “Amazon,” but also without success nding gold. Other explorers tried in similar vain to nd fortune, like Felipe de Utre (1541). Once the Muiscas were conquered the Spaniards found very little gold among them, and the myth moved on to neighboring nations. This portrays the essence of the El Dorado myth as an unreachable place that is always escaping its searchers, moving out to further lands. After Potosí’s discovery of Cerro Rico (in modern Perú) in 1545, the place started to produce large amounts of silver, and the following year, the exploitation of the silver mines of Zacatecas in Mexico also began. In this Renaissance atmosphere, the viceroy of Peru Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza organized in 1560 a new expedition in search of El Dorado, also as an excuse for bringing out from Quito many soldiers that had participated in the civil war among the conquistadores. All these expeditions looking for a chimera created many conicts among the adventurers, which was why this particular expedition became infamous. The leader was Pedro de Ursúa, who descended

160 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the Marañon River with 300 Spanish soldiers, 500 native Indians, and a few dozen blacks. Among the Spaniards was Lope de Aguirre, who killed Ursúa, and became the leader of the expedition. Following the Amazon they reached the Atlantic coast. Aguirre was a visionary who declared war on the Spanish Empire, and sent a letter to Philip II explaining his reasons. In 1561, he took control of Margarita Island where he killed several soldiers, until he himself was killed by some of his close followers. Those years were the same as when the routes across the Pacic were discovered. From times of old, it was thought that Tarsis and Or were located in the “Luzones, Lequios and Chinos,”35 but after nding no place like these in the Philippines and in the northern part of the Pacic, Spaniards in Perú turned to explore the southern part of the ocean. An attempt to discover the fabulous islands of King Solomon started in 1568 when the viceroy of Perú Lope García de Castro organized an expedition to the South Pacic. They reached an archipelago in the south of New Guinea, which they named the Solomon Islands because one of the crew members, and a relative of the viceroy, the young Álvaro Mendaña, described the islands as full of wealth. With his wife, Isabel Barreto, Mendaña spent the rest of his life organizing an ambitious colonial expedition to these islands, and also to establish a stopover in the spices trade. In 1573 he got a formal appointment from Philip II as governor of the islands, but he did not have the full support of the new viceroy, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, until 1595. Mendaña died on his way to the Solomon Islands, but his galleon “San Jerónimo” (the only one of the four that set sail) arrived thanks to the great pilot, Fernández Quirós. Nothing special was achieved and the expedition moved to the Philippines. By that time, the El Dorado myth was almost dead in America and in the South Pacic, but in 1595 it was revived by Walter Raleigh’s exploration along the Orinoco River where he discovered some gold, but nothing to match the legend. In the end he wrote the book The Discovery of the Large, Rich and Beautiful Empire of Guyana with a Relation to the Great and Golden City of Manoa, describing present-day Venezuela, trying to promote the discovery of El Dorado. Once again we recall Spanish writer Quevedo, who sentenced to death the Dorado mentality in America in his Baroque novel La vida del Buscón Don Pablos, written in 1603 (although published 1626). In the novel, the main character Pablos—a character always living on the fringe of survival—says at the end of the book: “I decided to immigrate to the Indies expecting that leaving my world and my land, my fortune would also improve. But, in fact, it proved to be worse; because no-one ameliorates his position if he only changes his place, but does not change his life and customs.” We can observe a similar pathos looking at the “Discourse on the Golden Age” delivered by Don Quixote (I, 11). In this discourse, Cervantes refers to the Golden Age as a primitive human stage in which the concept of private property did not exist; an ideal state of nature already gone, in opposition to the present age, which he referred to as the “Iron Age” in which everything is controlled by material interests and money.

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

161

Manila: The Chinese Dorado (1594–1603) In 1603, the same year El Buscón was written, some Chinese ended their short-lived Dorado myth after their encounter with the Spaniards in the Philippines. We have said that in 1568 the Chinese authorities partially lifted the ban on private overseas trade and resumed trade abroad, although with some limitations. Consequently, we can see, already in 1571, sangleys entering in contact with the Spaniards in the Philippines when Miguel López de Legazpi detained a haikou junk, which was trading slaves. As we have mentioned in chapter 2, he bought the slaves, freed them, and sent them back home. This move won the sympathy of the natives as well as the Chinese who later went to Manila for trade, establishing the rst parian. The good relations with Chinese authorities started in 1574, during the haikou Limahong incident, when the coastal Chinese authorities sought Spanish cooperation. Nevertheless as the Manila parian grew, the Chinese authorities looked with greater interest on the activities of their subjects in a foreign land, and on the land itself, starting to closely monitor the archipelago, something that made the Spaniards very suspicious. The Chinese’s monitoring of Manila started in October 1593, when Governor Gómez Dasmariñas prepared four galleys to attack the Moluccas and, due to some difculties, he forced 250 Chinese workers to go and man the agship. However, as soon as the agship moved a short distance off and the Chinese oarsmen were put to work, they decided to stage an uprising, preferring to die in the attempt than to continue rowing for the Spaniards. The rebellion took place on the night of 25 October, claiming the lives of the governor himself and a great part of the eighty-member Spanish crew. The Spaniards sent a formal complaint to China for this behavior, but a strange response came some months later when, in 1594, a small Chinese eet led by seven mandarins visited Manila with unclear intentions. As Argensola put it, A great number of ships from China appeared in Manila, without the customary goods, but rather loaded with men and weapons. On board were seven mandarins, counted among the senior Viceroys or Governors of their provinces ... and they went to visit Don Luis Pérez Dasmariñas with great pomp and an escort of men ... saying that they were on the lookout for Chinese who were going about those lands without license.36

Luis Pérez Dasmariñas welcomed them and gave each one a gold chain. But, in the end he concluded that they had come either to conquer or to sack Manila, but they might have changed their minds when they saw the unexpected presence of the Spanish armada. In retrospect, this incident has strong parallelisms with what happened ten years later. In 1603, there was another arrival of mandarins at Manila, an event which was very well documented in both Spanish and Chinese sources. On 23 May that year, three mandarins landed in Manila, displaying their insignia as judges. With great pomp made by the entourage of fty, they sought an audience with the governor and gave him a letter expounding the reason for the trip. They wished to verify the existence of a fabulous mountain in Cavite, believed to yield 100,000 taels of gold and 300,000 taels of silver

162 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

a year. They claimed that everyone could go and dig there and that the Chinese had already taken a great quantity of these metals back to China. The Chinese sources are more explicit. According to them, the three mandarins were Wang Shiho (˔ࣂ͑), who was the magistrate of the Hai Cheng (ࣵᅰ) district, and the leader of the expedition, but he was always at the back of the negotiations. The second mandarin was the eunuch Gao Tsai (ঢ়‹, called by the Spaniards Cochay) who had received specic orders from the emperor to investigate the matter, and nally Gan Yichen (ɳȹι, called by the Spaniards Chanchian), probably the military chief of Fujian, acting under Gao’s orders. He was the one leading the direct discussion with Spanish authorities. Accompanying these three dignitaries were two other persons, the main instigator of the trip Zhang Yi (ਜ਼⻙, called by the Spaniards Tio Heng) and the centurion Yang Yinglong (፫Ꮆ ᎘), who were the ones who informed the emperor in Beijing of the said mountain of gold. According to Chinese sources Zhang might have used the inuence of Yang to win an audience with the emperor and consequently he won his favor for the exploring expedition. The emperor actually allowed the said trip despite opposition from various people in his court who not only thought it was a ridiculous project, but which could also be a source of trouble. Gan added that he did not believe in the existence of such a mountain, and presumed it to be a lie. He told the governor that he had nothing to fear, since it was his duty to look into the matter. Afterwards, the governor had them housed in special lodgings inside the city. The fact that they aunted their insignia as judges and that the governor allowed them to do so incurred the ire of the members of the Audiencia. From 24 to 26 May, the mandarins begin to mete justice on their countrymen. Meanwhile, Domingo de Salazar, the prosecutor of the Audiencia, carried out his own investigation. Within this period, the governor allowed the mandarins to bring their entourage to the Chinese area of Tondo, where the Christian sangleys lived. On 27 May Judge Salazar presented a report in a public session of the Audiencia, requesting the governor to stop the operations of the mandarins so that his investigations might continue. The friction between the Audiencia and the governor worsened, but stopped when the governor nally published an edict prohibiting the mandarins from administering their justice and from aunting their insignia. On the eve of the mandarins’ departure, they went to Cavite to see the said mountain. With them was Second Lieutenant Cervantes, as well as the governor of the sangleys, Juan Bautista de Vera,37 who seems to have been around all the time. Faced there by the mountain without the gold, Zhang was no longer able to hide his deception and the true reason for his presence in Manila; and he could not stop the weight of the Spaniards bearing down on him with murderous eyes. However, the mandarins interceded for his pardon. The Spaniards grew even more suspicious. On the day of their departure, the governor received the mandarins and honored them with gifts. As he sent them off, they apologized for the mix-up they had caused and then sailed back to China. After the delusion of Zhang and Yang and after the loss of face of the two magistrates Gan and Wang, different “Baroque attitudes” of self-incrimination followed. First, Wang felt so vexed that he died soon after they arrived in Fujian. Gan reported

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

163

Zhang’s behavior to the emperor, demanding that he be punished for trying to deceive the imperial government and for bringing about its humiliation in a foreign land. The role of Gao, on the other hand, is more difcult to interpret. Some sources picture him as the superintendent of the said Beijing expedition, while others show him as Fujian’s quartermaster general for taxes, who makes a living off the Chinese maritime trade. The Ming Shi Lu (‫ྡྷע‬፣) even gives its version of the eunuch conspiring with Zhang, ending with a punishment to the villains of the story: (It was presented to the Emperor:) “The diabolical Fujianese Zhang Yi came up with an evil plan to propose the excavation of a gold mine in Luzon, but his real intention was to conspire with the eunuchs and provoke the barbarians. Yang Yinglong was his partner ...” The Emperor decreed: “Zhang Yi et al cheated the court ... They should be beheaded immediately and their head be shown to the coastal province [as a warning to people of his kind]...”38

The last Baroque deception for Chinese settlers was the massacre that ensued the following months. Here Chinese sources coincide with the Spanish ones by indicating that this entire trip had been the proximate cause of the Spanish suspicions of a rebellion, as actually happened and the massacre which ensued.39 But, the question is whether or not the three dispatched mandarins had been part of an advanced party of a planned invasion of Manila—either piratical or organized by corrupt ofcers. At that moment, the Spaniards could not know, but—as we have just said—the suspicions escalated out of control and led to the subsequent massacre.

Mexico: The Japanese Dorado (1596–1614) The Japanese also experienced their Dorado dream (or better to say their Argent Land dream) located on the other side of the Pacic rim, in Mexico. Hideyoshi was a kind of Renaissance prince, who not only started the unication of Japan but went out in conquest for Korea and even aimed for the occupation of the Philippines in 1597. One year earlier, in 1596, he had a direct experience of the foreign wealth passing along the Japanese coast when the galleon “San Felipe” fully loaded with the silk of China on her way to Acapulco wrecked near Nagasaki. The cargo was conscated, and, according to De los Ríos Coronel, “The Japanese became so greedy … that now their main intent is to go to Isla Hermosa, in order to get to these Philippine Islands” (SIT, 35). The death of Hideyoshi that same year stopped the Japanese expansion, but they started sending ships to Manila. In 1599, nine big ships and seven small ones without license arrived there. In 1600, two more ships arrived, but only because three others were lost during the voyage; while in 1601 and 1602 respectively, ve and two more other ships also came.40 This commerce coincided with a series of embassies where the new shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu (德川 家康, 1603–1616) was asking to participate directly in the trade with Mexico, a request that the governor of Manila could not grant. Nevertheless the trade continued according to the agreements set up in the embassies, as shown by the following gures:41

164 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642 Table 5.7 Number of Japanese ships that arrived at Manila

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

4

4

3

3

0

3

2

1

0

1

Source: Iwao, Early Japanese settlers in the Philippines, pp. 31–32

But, in contrast to these moves, Ieyasu started at the same time persecuting Christians; particularly extreme was the year 1605 in which 102 Christians were martyred. The relations were also jeopardized after in Manila some Japanese began to cause a rebellion, in 1606, 1607, and 1608, that ended with the expulsion of the Japanese. The last chance for Ieyasu to request a participation in the escaping Dorado of oceanic trade came unexpectedly in 1609, when the galleon “San Francisco,” with Manila Governor Vivero de Velasco on board in his way back to Nueva España, was shipwrecked on the coast of Japan, being forced to remain there almost for a year (September 1609 to August 1610). Vivero had no other chance but to listen with interest to the negotiations proposed personally by Ieyasu.42 The shogun asked Vivero to request, on his behalf, the viceroy of Mexico to send 50 miners to Japan to exploit the Japanese silver mines properly. In fact, the Dorado ambition of Tokugawa Ieyasu was very contagious and easily transmitted to Vivero, who got so enthusiastic with the proposal that he promised not 50, but 200, if necessary. In exchange he requested that the Spaniards going to work there to have 50 percent of the prot, while the other 50 percent will be divided in two equal parts, one for the Japanese government and the other for the Spanish king. As we will see later, nothing was done, and the “Baroque mentality” that followed in the Japanese bakufu in the 1630’s considered Western foreigners as contagious carriers of some kind of “social disease,” since their religion was seen as a problem for the nal unication of the country and their trade as the cause of the rise in prices.

The Pacic archipelagos: The new Spanish Dorado (1609–1632) Vivero arrived in Nueva España in November 1610, and was able to convince the viceroy Luis de Velasco of the importance of the mines of silver in Japan. Velasco was so impressed that he sent Fr. Alonso Muñoz, who had come with Vivero, to Spain to continue the negotiations directly with the king. Vivero wrote an extensive report of his stay in Japan, which, according to Demetrio Ramos, “was able to awake too many fantasies, and to substitute the golden illusion of America, waiting still for a full discovering, by the goals of the Far East.”43 In the meantime, the viceroy dispatched the famous pilot Sebastián Vizcaíno in March 1611 to return back the Japanese merchants that had come with Vivero, and to take advantage of the trip to discover the so-called Rica de Oro (Rich in Gold) and Rica de Plata (Rich in Silver) Islands, which were believed to be in some place in the Pacic Ocean, on the way to Japan. Besides, if the coast of these islands was appropriate they could be used as a stopover of the galleons.44 But the whole trip

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

165

of Vizcaíno was another Baroque deception that excluded Japan from the El Dorado dream. He arrived in Japan in June 1611, without nding the islands. There he visited some harbors, like Osaka, Miyako, etc., which he mapped, raising the suspicion of the Japanese. The negotiation for the exploitation of the mines failed, as well as the further attempts in 1612 to nd these mythical islands. He went astray on the coast of Japan, and he was able to nally return to Mexico in 1613 in the galleon “San Juan Bautista” constructed in Japan under the direction of William Adams. This galleon brought along the famous embassy of Hasekura and Luis Sotelo, whose visit was the last opportunity for trade. But, the galleon was not sent anymore by the shogun, but only by a local daimyo. In fact, this whole story epitomized the most Baroque adventure of these relations, as narrated by Shusaku Endo in his novel The Samurai. These problems with Japan led the Spaniards in Manila to think about setting up a port in Isla Hermosa, as it happened in 1619 with the Dominican Martínez. But gold was not mentioned in his report; he only referred to the security of the Manila-Acapulco route, but with a more rhetorical than practical rationale. The idea of searching for gold in this second period lost its novelty and became a more and more routine idea, although occasionally the novelty reappeared in the Philippines through some exploring missions like the one assigned to Carreño de Valdés, one year before he engaged in the conquest of Isla Hermosa. He was sent to the mountainous land of the Igorrots in northern Luzon to discover their gold mines, but with little success. Almost one year after the Spaniards arrived in Taiwan, a socorro was sent, the one of Carvajal, which stopped in 1627 near Hualian, most probably attracted by the rumors of the gold of Turoboan, but this move ended in disaster as most of the persons in the junk were massacred by the natives. The idea of exploring this place proved to be very dangerous and something that could only provide little gain. Then, the governor of San Salvador, Juan de Alcarazo, prohibited these gold expeditions. The Spanish Dorado ended here, coinciding probably with the last trip of the free burgher Aguilar to Turoboan, around 1632, the same year that Esquivel—fully aware of what was going on in San Salvador—tried to keep the myth alive by putting in one of his reports of that year the list of the still unsearched towns bearing gold and silver (SIT, 164): Turoboan: a village; it has many rich gold mines. Rarangus: a village with gold and silver mines. Patibur: a village with gold and silver mines. Chiulien: a village with gold and silver mines. Tataruma: a village with gold and silver mines. Saquiraya: a village with gold and silver mines. Parusarun: a village with gold and silver mines. Tabaron: a village with gold and silver mines. Rauay: a village with gold and silver mines. Chicasuan: a village with gold and silver mines. Chupre: a village with gold and silver mines. Saruman: a village with gold mines only. Pabanan: a village with gold and silver mines.

166 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The Dominican Teodoro Quirós was probably the only Spaniard in Isla Hermosa who in 1639 still considered that the mines of Turoboan were worth exploring (SIT, 300), although his words sounded more like rhetoric to convince the governor general Corcuera to send more soldiers and resources to the island. At that time the only ones left with the Dorado myth in Formosa were the Dutchmen.

Turoboan: The Dutch Dorado (1639–1646) As we have discussed in chapter 3, Turoboan was the Dutch Dorado. Since the end of the 1630’s, the Dutch established some soldiers in Pimaba (Taidong) to see if they could obtain some information of Turoboan from the south, but after the conquest of Tamsui and Quelang, they explored the northern route. In the earliest Dutch reports of the conquest of San Salvador we can see how they had the goal of nding a way to the famous eastern gold sites. In the instruction of Governor Traudenius to Captain Hendrik Harouse, and also in the rst letter and in the consecutive ones that Harouse sent to Traudenius, gold is mentioned. Later they proceed with very exhaustive inquiries about the location and communication of Turoboan, and especially when they interrogated the Spaniard Aguilar. The rst expedition to the gold mines area was conducted by Captain Pieter Boon from 21 March to 11 May 1643 (FE II, 363–364, 415–418), accompanied by the native wife of Aguilar, who acted as interpreter. After reaching Turoboan on 29 March and moving around the area, they left the place almost empty-handed, sending only some samples of gold to new Governor Lemaire along with his report. The upper merchant in Tamsui, Thomas Pedel, after knowing of the failure, was the next Dutchman to become interested. At the end of May, he “made extensive inquiries as to where the natives got the gold, or from whom they bought it” (FE II, 381) and just sent his reports to Tayouan, but he personally did nothing, since he was not able abandon his post in Tamsui. The new governor Caron ordered senior merchant Caesar to organize a new expedition in search for gold, which took place on 19 November 1645 to 15 January 1646 (FE III, 28–33). Caron, in his report of 31 January 1646 (FE II, 576–578), after repeating the general ideas of the location of the mines, said plainly that there was little gold to be found. He added that the natives of Turoboan felt very much pressured by the demands of gold, because they did not have enough; and, he said, “out of fear, … and in order to show us their obedience, they all together presented us the adornments of thin beaten gold which they were wearing around their necks.” (See Plate 18.) This was little and of a very poor alloy, because in order to increase their quantity, the inhabitants blend it with silver. Caron concluded in a very straightforward manner: “Then, no matter how strongly we insisted, nothing else was to be found anymore in the entire village.” The Dutch gave up; nevertheless they stationed in 1646 a few soldiers to see if still they could nd something. This negative information reached Batavia and Amsterdam, and nally the Gentlemen XVII sent a letter to the High Government in Batavia ordering the end of the search for gold, awakening them from their Dorado dream, and opening their eyes to the “Baroque reality,” reminding them that the real sources of wealth are in normal and constant trade:

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

167

We are not surprised at all that the gold-mine we have hoped to nd for such a long time has gone up in smoke … so that we are quite relieved now we can wake up from this dream, after the great expense we have incurred to support your efforts … The Company’s true silver and gold-mine is the China and Japan trade. (FE III, 209)

In other words, this text shows how the Dutch shifted from the bullionism, the early idea of the mercantilism aiming for the acquisition of precious metals, to other mercantilist aspects, like that of control of foreign markets.

Some nal considerations about the local impact of global economy All problems can be seen from different perspectives, and this also applies to the Spanish commercial presence in Taiwan. For example, we can take a macroeconomic approach to understand the commercial activity of the city of San Salvador, considering it as only a small spoke in the big wheel of the emerging global economy. After the discovery of the mines of Mexico and Potosí, there were regular shipments of gold and silver to Spain. According to the mercantilism and consequent protectionism doctrine, Spain controlled everything entering and leaving the country, especially the gold and silver; and the trade with America was a monopoly of the Crown. This monopoly intended to produce the establishment of an industry capable of supplying the increasing colonial demand but it was not perfect. On the contrary, this movement of money had an especial impact on the Spanish economy, because they experienced for the rst time that there was a close, and yet mysterious, relation between the arrival of precious metals and the increase of prices, the so-called Price Revolution.45 Besides, in Spain, this ination had bad economic consequences: salaries were inferior to those in other European countries; the accumulation of capital was more limited thus delaying the beginning of capitalism and contributing to the decline of the Spanish Empire. Regarding the Far East, this phenomenon was transferred to the whole of Europe and beyond, because other European countries continuously challenged Spain, and, as soon as the precious metals reached the Peninsula, they were used to pay the big expenses of the Spanish Crown. For Spain used the American silver to pay the Spanish armies ghting in places like Holland. Paradoxically these metals indirectly ended in the hands of Spain’s European enemies and were brought to the East (a phenomenon explained in annex 22). Finally, we must mention that although silver and silk were the two more characteristic elements of the expansion of the commercial revolution to Asia, many other products traveled over the world and many American goods entered almost for the rst time into China, such as sweet potato, corn, peanuts, quinine, pineapple, hemp, and tobacco, though initially they did not spread rapidly. From a microeconomic point of view, we can think that the Spanish presence in San Salvador might have accomplished the main economic objective of the conquest, namely to curtail the Dutch seasonal blockades to Manila, in order to reestablish the declining Chinese trade in Manila. It is difcult to know this process because we do

168 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

not have any record of Spanish ships cruising the China Sea or ghting in the open sea against obstructing Dutch eets. But the fact is that little by little Manila recovered the trade with China and became fully restored in the 1630’s. We might think that the presence of the Spanish garrison in the north of the island had enough effect to restrain Dutch ambitions. This deterrent was probably helped by the fact that at that moment the VOC successfully expanded its trade to Japan, and it was not practical for them to look for unnecessary troubles. This may also explain the peaceful period that dened the relations between Tayouan and Quelang in the 1630’s. As for the natives, we have mentioned in chapter 3 that the economy of the natives of Tamsui area was agricultural and what was grown was for self-consumption, while that of the natives in Quelang was based more on craftsmanship and they were itinerant, exchanging goods. It seems that they did not know (or did not need) the use of coins, as they bartered things through cuentas (small colorful stones), etc., but in these years the natives started to appreciate the use of silver because their main commercial partners (the Chinese) also appreciated it, as we have seen on different occasions (SIT, 168, 170, 172). The natives also received some silver from the Spaniards. Probably the rst big amount of pesos was when the Spanish started paying the 400 to 600 pesos that they gave as compensation for the damages inicted on them when the Spanish troops entered Quelang. The ux of silver continued as payment of their services, rice, etc. As a consequence, a “circuit of silver” started, and the old system was affected since many payments were requested in silver. For example, later the dowry of the native girls that were to get married with Spanish soldiers were requested by their parents also in silver (SIT, 177–178), and this silver disposal led the Chinese to request silver from the natives. This situation even generated some bogus business among the Chinese. Some sangleys had observed that the natives were not very good at distinguishing between real and fake pesos, and they tried to take advantage of it (see Plate 17). The real pesos were minted, while the fake ones were melted, so they tried to offer fake ones and to collect real ones (SIT, 170). Cocci, the rst Dominican who remained in Fuzhou, reported to the governor the existence of a factory of fake Spanish coins. They collected some samples and reported the case to Manila. The practice continued because in 1639 a Pampango was found with a fake real de a dos. Governor Cristóbal Márquez was not sure how to deal with the situation, so he sent the Pampango and the coin to Manila.46 As the natives became accustomed with the monetary economy, they were consequently seduced by the shine of the metal. Teodoro was probably the clearest example. After serving the VOC for four years collecting taxes, buying rice, and negotiating with different elders, he made a greedy impression of himself before the VOC ofcials. The governor of Zeelandia castle, instructing the junior merchant Nolpe—who was in the middle of a negotiation with Teodoro on mining coal for them—declared to his subordinate, in 4 June 1647: [Some time ago] Teodoro did not treat the laborers fairly. He wanted to pay his people so little for their work, and not even in cash, but in rags and bits and pieces, so that he himself could pocket most of the money. This has been

Commerce in Northern Taiwan

169

another reason why his people were sometimes unwilling to dig up the coal; yet after we had promised them their money, and it was actually given them, they were willing enough. I seriously doubt if there is some snag in it this time, the more so because on several occasions the said Teodoro has proven himself to be dishonest and intent on money. [And during the Captain Boon visit to Cavalan in 1644] Teodoro managed to extort plenty of money from the inhabitants, ... Therefore, we tend to believe that Teodoro is not held in high esteem in those districts. (FE III, 192)

Certainly, this text is another echo of the side effects of the exportation of the Price Revolution to Asia, and how mercantilism was taking root in persons like Teodoro.

Chapter 6

The Missionary Activity

IN THE SAME WAY THAT BUDDHISM entered in China along different waves, Christianity experienced a similar process, although with much more discrete results. The rst one was made by the Nestorians, who reached China from the West by land and made the rst Bible in Chinese. In the late Middle Ages with the improvement of maritime communications the Franciscans reached the Middle Kingdom, Montecorvino being the most representative gure, and nally the Portuguese Jesuits reached Japan and China during the Renaissance. It was during this time that Christianity accidentally visited Taiwan for the first time, in 1582. We can start by calling this Christian background in Asia.

NESTORIANISM

IN

CHINA

Christianity entered China in the form of Nestorianism sometime between the fth and the eighth centuries. Some authors consider that after the condemnation and banishment of the patriarch of Constantinople Nestorius, at the Council of Ephesus (431), his disciples spread the Nestorian heresy through Asia, thanks to the fact that the archbishop of Seleucia, Archæus, had already appointed a bishop for China in 411. But, it was not until the eighth century that there was the rst clear document of Nestorian Christianity, the Xi’anfu Inscription (大秦景教流行中國碑), that indicates the presence of Nestorianism a century earlier. The Xi’anfu Inscription is a stella erected in 781, commemorating the introduction and propagation of the “bright religion of Daqin” (referring to Christianity) in China. According to its text, somebody called “Olopen” (阿羅本) arrived at Changan (長安, present-day Xi’an) in 635, during the Tang dynasty. Then, the emperor Tang Taizong (唐太宗) sent his minister to receive him and conduct him to the palace. Olopen worked hard to translate the Scriptures, the emperor gave special orders for the propagation of this faith and in 638 issued a proclamation to build the Daqin Monastery (大秦寺). Nestorianism later faded out of China, but reappeared thanks to the Mongols. The Nestorians were successful in converting the Khitan and the Jurchen tribes and became widespread among the Uighur Turks and several Mongol tribes. During the Yuan

172 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

dynasty, the Nestorians had twenty-ve bishops throughout Asia and two archbishops, one of them in Khanbaliq (present-day Beijing) whose site was created in 1275 by the patriarch of Baghdad. Later, when William Rubruck and Marco Polo reached that city, they referred to that bishop as Ong Khan (King Khan) and related him to the legendary Prester John.

JOHN

OF

MONTECORVINO (1246–1328)

The new wave of expansion of Christianity was led by the Franciscans, and it happened after a climate of communications with the East was created during the Crusades. One of the pioneers’ trips outside of Christendom was the one of the Spanish Jew Benjamin of Tudela, who left the Kingdom of Navarre around 1159 (or 1167), reaching Palestine, Mesopotamia, and probably Persia. He moved around the areas with wellestablished Jewish communities. On his trip he made an effort to gather news from other communities from some countries that he did not visit, like Central Asia, India, Ceylon, and even China, where he mentioned the Jewish community of Kai Fong. It is not clear why he engaged in this trip, and the most common explanation is his interest in trading precious stones. He wrote the Book of Travels, that four centuries later was published in Hebrew in Constantinople, in 1543. In the thirteenth century, Christendom seemed interested in some kind of alliance with the Mongols against the Islam; this is something that explains the rst trips of the Franciscans. The rst one to mention this is Giovani di Pian Carpin, who was commissioned by Pope Innocent IV to visit the Tartars and to know their customs. He departed from Kiev in 1246. A few years later, during the Seventh Crusade, the king of France Louis IX also commissioned the Franciscan Rubruck to nd out the successor of Genghis Khan to send him messages from the pope and from himself. Rubruck departed from Constantinople in 1253. Soon afterwards the two trips of the Venetian Polo Family happened. The rst one started in 1255, when Nicholas and Mathew Polo left for Asia. Probably on their trip they crossed with Rubruck in different directions, although there is no data. They reached China in 1266, and later Khanbaliq (Beijing), the new Mongol capital built by Kublai (1260–1294). They went back to Italy with a letter from Kublai for the pope requesting scholars to teach in China. The second trip started in 1271, and this time joined by Marco Polo, the son of Nicholas. He stayed seventeen years in the service of Khan, moving around the whole country. Finally, when an embassy of the king of Persia asked Khubilai Khan for a princess, the Polos started their way back, reaching Venice in 1295. The adventures of Marco Polo were known very soon, but before he dictated his book in 1298–1299, while he was prisoner in Genoa, the famous trip of John of Montecorvino took place. In 1286, the ruler of Persia sent a request to the pope to send Catholic missionaries to the Court of the Chinese emperor, Kublai Khan, who was well disposed towards Christianity, probably because his mother was Nestorian. Montecorvino was commissioned for this endeavor. He started his journey in 1289, accompanied by

The Missionary Activity

173

the Dominican Nicholas of Pistoia and the merchant Peter of Lucalongo. From Persia he went by sea to India in 1291. There his companion Nicholas died. Traveling by sea from Meliapur, he reached China in 1294, only to nd that Kublai Khan had just died and Temür (1294–1307) had succeeded to the throne. Though the latter did not embrace Christianity, he threw no obstacles in the way of the zealous missionary, who, in spite of the opposition of the Nestorians, soon won the condence of the ruler. In 1299 Montecorvino built a church at Khanbaliq (Beijing) and in 1305 a second one, opposite to the Imperial Palace. At the same time he familiarized himself with the native language, preached in it, and translated into Chinese the New Testament and the Psalms. Also he had 6,000 converts, among them a Nestorian king. After he had worked alone for eleven years, a German associate, Arnold of Cologne, was sent to help him (1304). In 1307, Pope Clement V, pleased with the missionary’s success, sent seven Franciscans who were commissioned to consecrate Montecorvino as the archbishop of Khanbaliq and to become bishops of other dioceses, under Khanbaliq jurisdiction. Only three of these envoys arrived, Gerardus, Peregrinus, and Andrew of Perugia. They consecrated Montecorvino in 1308 and succeeded each other in the diocese of Zaiton (Quanzhou, 泉州). In 1312 three more Franciscans arrived from Rome but after the fall of the Mongols (1368), Christianity started to decline. No wonder then that for the Franciscans returning to China was their particular quest, something that they achieved again in 1633 from the Spanish post of Taiwan.1

THE

EVANGELIZATION OF THE

NEW WORLD

AND THE ROYAL PATRONAGE

As we have seen in chapter 2, the advantageous position of the Spaniards in the discovered territories of America was the reason presented by the “Catholic Kings,” Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, to gain the monopoly of the protection of the Catholic mission in America from the Pope Alexander VI, in the same way as their Portuguese neighbors did in Africa and India. Later, the Spanish and the Portuguese kings tried to control the Church in America. Following this purpose Ferdinand was able to get from the pope the right of administering the diezmos (tithe), and later, the establishment of the royal patronage (1508). By this patronage the monarchs had not only rights but also duties and responsibilities: the rights of presenting bishops and other ecclesiastical dignities (to be appointed by the pope) and of founding churches; and the duty of the economic sustenance of the colonial dioceses and clergy; nally the responsibility of the conversion on the natives. Charles I was able to introduce the Pase Regio (1528), a royal authorization needed for all the documents from Rome concerning the Church in America. In the following year, he ordered that all the requests from the bishops in America might be brought to the pope should be also channeled through the Crown. As a result, many “conicts of interest” arose between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, which even in Taiwan can be traced during the Spanish occupation. Certainly the Church, thanks to the royal patronage, had numerous missionaries and economic resources; but on the other hand, the colonial authorities had signicant powers in church affairs, and the local churches

174 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

were somehow isolated from Rome. This explains why that at the moment of the independence of the American colonies, most of the bishops were Spaniards, not criollos (Spanish descendants born in America).

THE JESUIT

MISSIONS IN JAPAN AND

CHINA

The Jesuits were a very active religious congregation founded in 1540 that started missionary work in America following the Spanish galleons and in Japan and China boarding the Portuguese naos. One of the rst Jesuits, the Spaniard Francis Xavier, reached Japan in 1549; and by the time he left for China he had already converted 2,000 Japanese. After the arrival of new Jesuits, the Christian population in Japan had grown, reaching 300,000 before the persecutions of 1614. But, at that time, other religious orders had also entered Japan. One of the main promoters of these Jesuit developments was the supervisor of the missions, Alexander Valignano, who made three visits to Japan; the rst one in 1579. Valignano also promoted the missions in China, after the arrival of Mateo Ricci in Macao, in 1582, through the policy of accommodation (or cultural compromise). Ricci began to study the Chinese language and culture, established cordial relations with Chinese scholars, and, in 1601, reached the imperial court in Peking, where he resided until his death in 1610. The new Jesuits included some French, German, or Belgian scientists who brought Western knowledge to China. Others, like Trigault, went to study the above-mentioned Nestorian monument in Sianfu in 1625, after it had been discovered. The news of this stele appeared in the History of China of the Portuguese Jesuit Alvaro Semedo (Madrid, 1642), which also informed Europe about the wars being fought between the Ming and the Manchus, as Martin Martini did later with more detail in his History of the Tartar War, published in 1654. The rst contact of Taiwan with Christianity was held in the context of these Jesuit missions, when the yearly nao from Macao to Japan was shipwrecked in northern Taiwan in 1582. The 300 persons on board had to stay in Taiwan from 16 July to 30 September, until they managed to go back to Macao in a smaller ship they constructed. Among them were four Jesuit priests and one brother. One of the priests was the Spaniard Pedro Gómez, who was on his way to Japan to serve as vice-provincial of the Jesuits. Another Spanish Jesuit was Alonso Sánchez. He was on board, because after being in Macao for an ofcial mission—to bring the news that the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies had united under the Crown of Philip II in 1580—he tried to go back to the Philippines, passing through Japan. The other Jesuits were Portuguese, fathers Alvaro Días and Christovão Moreira, and the brother Francisco Pirez. We know many details of the two-and-a-half months’ stay in Taiwan thanks to the reports written by Gómez (SIT, 2–9), Sánchez (SIT, 10–11), and Pirez (SIT, 12–15). These reports are important because they are the rst Western description of the island and its inhabitants, but as far as the propagation of the Christian faith among the natives is concerned they did nothing since this alien group and the natives mistrusted each other. Besides, the Portuguese sailors were working at preparing their way back to Macao, thus preventing the priests

The Missionary Activity

175

from doing any missionary work. In any case, the rst Christian ceremonies ever held in Taiwan were conducted at that time since the Jesuits celebrated mass in their camp, erected a big cross on the top of a mountain (maybe in Kuanyin Mountain, near Pali), and administered the sacraments (SIT, 7).

The mission of Taiwan as extension of those in the Philippines In order to avoid conict, the Spanish missionaries were located in different regional areas. For example, in Luzon, the Augustinians were along the coast of Ilocos (northwest) and Pampanga; the Dominicans in Cagayan (north) and Pangasinan (west); and the Franciscans, around Laguna Bay and in Bicol (Southern Luzon). The Jesuits were in the center of the archipelago, in the islands of Samar, Leyte, Bohol, and Negros, but also in some places near Manila. Other religious missionaries were the Recollects, in northern Mindanao. Although the religious orders were scattered along the diverse regions of the Philippines all of them were represented in Manila.

The Dominicans in Cagayan The Dominican presence in Cagayan started with the foundation of a church in Lal-loc in 1594. The next year, the diocese of Nueva Segovia was created and the Dominicans continued successfully extending their action through the Cagayan Valley, along with the encomenderos. The rst bishop was Miguel Benavides, a Dominican who had worked with the Chinese in the parian of Manila. But this progress in founding churches was parallel also to some uprisings. According to the missionaries, the reason behind them was the abusive way some encomenderos behaved; the riots were nally calmed through the mediation of the missionaries. For example, in Piat, some Spanish settlers abused the friendship of the natives; and a rst massacre (1600) was carried out by the Kalingas and Negritos. To better control the area, in 1603 Lal-loc was declared the Spanish City of Nueva Segovia, with Juan Clavijo as the rst Alcalde, and in 1604 the natives of Piat were pacied, thanks to the missionaries. But a second uprising (1605) by the Irrayas occurred in the village of Tuguegarao, by which some encomenderos were killed. Fr. Jacinto Pardo managed to get some peace, but the natives advised him to leave the place, as he did soon after. A third revolt (1608), now of the Gaddanes, killed the encomendero Luis Enriquez. A fourth one (1615) erupted in Abuatan (a barrio of Ilagan).2

Missionaries From their Cagayan base, the Dominicans moved northward to Babuyanes Islands, and later on established themselves in Taiwan in 1626, receiving the faculty of administering the sacraments in 1627, granted by the bishop of Manila (SIT, 95). How many of them arrived? By detailed reading of the scattered information provided by the Dominicans it is possible to reconstruct a table with all the missionaries that stayed on the island (see Table A3 in Annex). That table shows that the ow of missionaries entering Taiwan

176 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

intensied in the rst half of the 1630’s, when eight Franciscans arrived in 1633 with their sights set on entering China. But, by that time, the Dominicans already had surpassed them in China. The table likewise reects the fact that the missionaries did not directly go to Taiwan, but rst went to the Philippines to acclimatize themselves and to gather experience. For example, before reaching Taiwan Jacinto Esquivel stayed in the Philippines for four years; Frs. Teodoro Quirós and Angelo Cocci stayed ve years; Francisco Fernández Capillas, nine years; and Juan Bautista Morales, eleven years. Among the most relevant missionaries, we can mention, rst, Fr. Francisco Váez, who was one of the four Dominican missionaries who went there at the very beginning on board of the Carreño galleys. He was a Portuguese whose ten-year residence in Taiwan (1626–1636) was the longest. He died at the hands of the natives of Tamsui, as we will see. He was probably the rst to compile materials on the language of the natives. The most active one was Esquivel, profusely cited in this book. His two-year stay in Taiwan (1631–1633) was very important to understand missionary activity on the island and the native way of living as well. He arrived in San Salvador in the summer of 1631. From there, he went to Taparri, where he remained until October. Then he moved to Tamsui and stayed there for about ten months, rst near the Santo Domingo fort—from October 1631 to February 1632—and later moving around Senar dealing closely with the natives of the area, whom he describes in detail. At the end of that summer, he returned to Quelang, where he met up with Diego de Aduarte, the bishop of Nueva Segovia (northern Luzon) who was then visiting the island. It must have been on the instance of Governor Juan de Alcarazo and of Aduarte (both returned to Manila soon after) that Esquivel wrote two reports, the rst focusing more on civil concerns (SIT, 162–168) while the second one on ecclesiastical matters (SIT, 179–188). We know little of him afterwards because he no longer wrote any reports. He may have been busy nishing the manuscripts of his grammar, dictionary, and his catechism in the native tongue of Tamsui, before he joined the fateful voyage to Japan some time in the spring of 1633, where he was killed. We should also mention once more Quirós, a missionary that stood out, not only for his ten-year stay (the same as Váez), but also for his uninching spirit of perseverance in the mission. To him we owe the grammar book, The Art of Language in Formosa (Arte de la lengua de Formosa) and the dictionary Vocabulario en la misma lengua (Vocabulary in the Native Tongue). Most probably, these books were made by updating those of Esquivel, while, at the same time, he might have updated those of Váez. If any manuscript of these missionaries was published, it may have been lost a long time ago.

Territorial projects and realities of the mission After six years in San Salvador, the missionaries could still claim little success. In 1631, when the active missionary Esquivel arrived, only two missions were attended: Saint Joseph of Quimaurri and Saint John the Baptist of Taparri. Esquivel consolidated this one and created a new one near Tamsui, Our Lady of the Rosary, in a new reduction near

The Missionary Activity

177

All the Saints convent Saint Joseph Our Lady of the Rosary Senar

Saint Peter Parian

Taparri the old

Quimaurri

Tamsui Lichoco

Taparri Saint John the Baptist

Pantao

Convent of Saint Francis

Caquiuanuan Saint Dominic

Missions

Churches for the Spaniards

Convent

Map 6.1 The Catholic missions around 1636.

Senar. After this success, Esquivel became optimistic and—according to the “missionary division land” method, experimented in the Philippines—he made in 1632 a draft plan for the division of northern Taiwan into twelve ministries (SIT, 183–187), foreseeing that other religious orders might come, as it happened with the Franciscans in 1633. His plan was based on his own interest for the Tamsui area, thus he proposed that the Dominicans take ministries in (1) Tamsui and (2) Senar. He showed no interest at that moment in the natives of Quelang and only paid attention to the two ministries in San Salvador—(3) the Chinese parian and (4) a hospital. He also proposed to transfer the (5) curato—the ofcial chaplaincy to give religious service to the Spanish soldiers—to a different order because this work of the chaplain was giving a lot of trouble to the Dominican in charge; and he was determined to do so, regardless of the fact that this ofcial appointment had a salary attached to it. He concluded: We lay claim on the better ministries. It will be good to distribute what remains to the other Orders. The Recollects can take care of (6) Pantao, as well as the area beyond … occupied by natives of Pulauan, and the (7) Spaniards

178 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

of the fort of Tamchui which is in front of Pantao, with the (8) parish of the island … The Jesuits and the Augustinians can divide the territory of (9) Lichoco, which is ve leagues away from Taparri; they can also take care of (10) Taparri, (11) Quimaurri and (12) Santiago (i.e., Caquiuanuan because these areas are all close to each other. (SIT, 188)

This envisioned project of Esquivel placing missions along Tamsui River and its Kimazon branch might be a kind of mental projection of the successful Dominican missionary area of Cagayan Valley. But, only half of these twelve projected missions were achieved in the next four years, when the mission reached its highest moment divided in four areas. Let us see in detail these four missions. The city of San Salvador had the highest number of churches, comprising the rst area of mission. Here we should mention (1) the Dominican convent of Todos los Santos (Plates 20–21) (SIT, 210–211). We presume that this church was the only one properly built, while the others may have been a kind of provisional barracks. That is why after the Spaniards left Taiwan the building still remained for several years, as can be seen in Dutch maps. Most probably, in the latest years of Spanish presence all the religious services in Quelang were concentrated in this place, but the fact is that other chapels were also around. For example, the Spanish and Filipino soldiers had their own (2) church dedicated to St. Peter, which probably was inside the main fortress. As we have said, the Dominicans took care of this curato, until the secular priest Balcázar came. But, after one year of service he went back, and the church was transferred to the Franciscan Gaspar de Alenda (SIT, 208, 238). Esquivel also mentioned (3) a small church in the Chinese parian (SIT, 185, 204). Also the native town of Quimaurri had (4) a church dedicated to St. Joseph (SIT, 202). Due to the small size of the whole area around San Salvador, it is reasonable to think that the priests in charge usually resided in the convent of Todos los Santos. It is not clear when the mission of Taparri was established, but after the arrival of Esquivel in 1631 this second area of missions started to take shape, when he built (5) a church dedicated to St. John the Baptist. He said that this village was “a pueblo formed by four of ve added villages” (SIT, 165). If this was a newly created reducción, it contradicts the map of Pedro De Vera (1626), where Taparri appears already as a very well dened village. Probably, he wanted to emphasize that there was still room for the other dispersed Taparri villages to join in Quelang, as he added: “From Taparri to Tamchui there are two or three small villages of Taparris along the beach and the mountains. It would be wise to remove them from there and resettle them into a single village with the Taparris who live by the bay” (SIT, 166). He lived among these natives for eight months and enjoyed their high esteem. This mission was entrusted later to the Franciscans, and Alenda founded a convent devoted to Saint Francis. 3 This might explain the fact that in the map of Simon Keerdekoe—made in 1654—there is one church in each boundary of the small village (see Plate 22). But in fact, the religious services offered in this place seem to be fewer than in San Salvador, since most of the Franciscans were in China and the one based there was usually living in San Salvador, since he was

The Missionary Activity

179

also in charge of the curato. We know how this mission ended or languished, in 1638, when it was burnt by the natives.4 We do not know clearly the reasons, but according to Governor Pedro Palomino, it was due more to a poor missionary attention that ended in confrontation, than to a case of apostasy. Palomino said: This town was left with none because four of Your Lordship’s friars went to China. How will these natives exist, for without a priest, they are like a body without a soul? It has been days since the natives had ed to the mountain and, one night, burned down their village. A Franciscan who was here, Fr. Antonio, of Ciudad Rodrigo, used to visit that village but his visits would always end up with an argument. (SIT, 291)

There is little information about this Fr. Francisco. He was probably very soon substituted by Fr. Onofre Palleja in his mission duties, but Palomino was very concerned about the situation and for the bad example he had given, since “No one here, not even the friars themselves, can suffer him or bear his mean, dishonest ways, the worst of which is drinking” (SIT, 293). The third area of mission was near Senar, where Esquivel gathered some dispersed natives that escaped from the river when the Spaniards came, creating a reducción in 1632 which later was called (6) Rosario (SIT, 225), since the church was devoted to Our Lady of the Rosary. He disclosed his plans of consolidating the reducción with these words: “The natives of Senar comprise eight or nine villages and live near the fort. We are trying to unite them into one village where they used to live and where their houses stand. They abandoned the place out of fear when the Spaniards took over the place ... The place where we are trying to gather them is on a mountain, which is cool and pleasant to live in ...” (SIT, 166, 184). The Tamsui River seemed a very promising area thanks to the achievements of Esquivel and later Quirós, who baptized “320 persons in the year of the smallpox epidemic (probably 1635)” (SIT, 456). In 1632, Esquivel still presents the future of the missions in the Tamsui area in a very optimistic way: the natives of Pantao were asking for a priest; others in the Quimazon River said that they will request also a priest after they see how his presence in Senar is not harmful; and, nally, the elders of Lichoco were also asking for a priest after knowing how Esquivel had liberated some natives (that were unjustly taken as prisoners) from the Spaniards (SIT, 181–182). This optimistic view changed abruptly after the murder in 1636 of Váez and Fr. Luis Muro by the natives of Senar (an episode that we will explain later). Additionally, the Spanish garrison was withdrawn, and the mission was discontinued and consequently these promising communities of Tamsui were not mentioned any more. The fourth area of the missions was located in Caquiuanuan (Santiago), on the way to the populated areas of Cavalan. This mission probably started after the visit of the provincial Domingo González in 1634, and the cooperation of Governor García Romero. Quirós wrote that this governor “had the natives under control and that they esteem him very much” (SIT, 456), allowed Quirós to baptize 141 children in ve days in that year of the smallpox epidemic in Caquiuanuan (SIT, 456). The mission

180 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

was formally established by 1635, because in that year the provincial chapter of the Dominicans assigned Fr. Miguel Corona as minister of a (7) church dedicated to St. Dominic. Similarly, the Dominican chapter of 1637 referred to Fr. Francisco Díaz the same assignment, while the one of 1641 designates Fr. Pedro Chaves. Chaves, at that time residing in China, was unable to take over his post because the Dutch captured and imprisoned him when he was on his way to Isla Hermosa from China. The interest of the Dominicans for Cavalan also dates to the year of the smallpox epidemic, when Fr. Juan García went south to that province to administer some baptisms, as Quirós did soon after, baptizing 186 children during his eight-day stay there (SIT, 457).5 But, after hearing the news of the plans of Governor General Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera of discontinuing the Spanish presence in Taiwan, they stopped going further to the south.

The missions and the royal patronage The Crown took charge of the travel and sustenance of priests going to the Indies. In this sense, one can say that some missionaries had the status of royal ofcials receiving a salary. But the Dominicans in Taiwan declared that they received compensation only for their services as parish priests of the soldiers in the curato; so, they had to nd other means of nancing their endeavors. Paying attention to the administration of the curato we can see the conict of interest between the Church and the Crown, which scenario was more evident in Manila than in San Salvador. On the other hand, the so-called Misericordia proved to be a natural formula of cooperation, at least initially, between these two institutions.

Hospitals’ projects and the Misericordia The most prominent project of Esquivel, in cooperation with Alcarazo, was the creation of the Confraternity of the Holy Merci (or Hermandad de la Misericordia), one association of lay people for charitable works, formally constituted with the bishop’s approval.6 The government body was called Santa Mesa (Holy Table). It administered money and properties with which to cover the needs of the institution. It was very well developed in the Portuguese colonies, and some Portuguese residents of Manila contributed to create another one in this city. The project of the Misericordia of Isla Hermosa was inspired by this pattern but featured in different ways.7 The idea took shape in the spring of 1632, and the Mesa was provisionally established in the summer of that year with the support of Alcarazo, a few months before his denitive return to Manila. The governor agreed with Esquivel that the Mesa should start establishing one hospital in Quelang for Spanish soldiers and their wives, under the care of the Crown and nanced by estanco on some products such as bejuco o corambre (SIT, 175). That hospital should be followed later by another three, one in Quelang for servants and slaves; another, also in Quelang, for Chinese, Japanese, and natives, nanced by the Misericordia of Isla Hermosa (SIT, 185); and a third one in Tamsui, also for sangleys,

The Missionary Activity

181

Japanese, and natives, nanced by the sister hospital of the Dominicans in Manila (SIT, 185). The foundation of the rst hospital was the fruit of regular conversations between Alcarazo and Esquivel: They talked and decided that a Misericordia be established on that same Island. To this, Don Juan later donated 4,000 pesos, and Fr. Jacinto, 2,000 pesos worth of alms that some people in Manila gave him to distribute among the pious works that were to be established in that new conversion. The 6,000 pesos gave rise to the Misericordia. (SIT, 209)

Upon the return of Aduarte and Alcarazo to the Philippines, the statutes were presented by one of the members of the Mesa, Captain Juan Baquedano (SIT, 195), and nally approved in Manila in the autumn of 1632. Baquedano went back to Isla Hermosa in the spring’s socorro (SIT, 211), just to attend the rst formal meeting of the Mesa in April 1633. Regarding the goal of building a hospital, we can only say that during the sixteen years of Spanish presence in Taiwan we only can register the existence of a single hospital, and this one mainly for ofcial needs. We cannot be sure whether this hospital was the one intended by the Misericordia, or was just the continuation and development of a pre-existing one inside the fortress. In the last years of Spanish presence we have more details. For example, the ofcial certicates of His Majesty’s scal ofcer Simón de Toro stated that from 1634 to 1642, a “box of medicines” arrived in every shipment of aid that reached Quelang. The certicates give additional information; for example, in March of 1642 the vessel “San Nicolás Tolentino” brought Francisco Casta Vengala, surgeon and slave of His Majesty, who reported to Captain Andrés de Aguiar, caretaker of the Royal Hospital of the city of Manila. He brought surgical instruments, such as a pair of scissors, three razors, and one lancet. Esquivel had in mind another endeavor that the Mesa should carry out, a missionary school co-nanced by the Dominicans. In that meeting of April 1633, Esquivel pushed the Mesa for the creation of the school. They agreed on the idea and made a proposal signed by its members. The signatures show how this institution was supported by the most prominent Spaniards in San Salvador: the governor Bartolomé Díaz Barrera, as the elder brother and proveedor of the Santa Mesa; the father provisor Francisco Bravo, superior and vicar of the convent of Todos los Santos; the captains Luis de Guzmán, Juan Baquedano, Matías de Olaso, Miguel Sáez de Alcaraz; the royal accountant Francisco de Vivero; and the paymaster of the royal treasury Juan Pérez de Rueda. The school project of Esquivel was a kind of seminary school for Chinese and Japanese, probably inspired in the Jesuit School of Sao Paulo in Macao, or in the one in Manila, founded by the priest Juan Fernández León in 1594 to attend to the needs of orphans and the poor of the city, for whom he tried later to establish a seminary school.8 No doubt this project was intended to counterbalance the Japanese government pressure against Catholics and the isolation policy (or sakoku) that started precisely in this year of 1633. Esquivel in his petition explained the case in a clear way:

182 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

It will be to the greatest glory of the Lord … that the Chinese and Japanese children, as well as the Koreans and those from the Islands of Lequios (as both islands form part of the said empires), have a school of their own to educate them in the holy way and to instruct them about the mysteries of our holy faith through reading, writing, singing, and the teaching of moral theology. In this way, the more gifted among them may be later ordained as priests and the less keen serve as catechists or preachers in their kingdoms, most especially in times of persecution, since they are able to hide and mingle with their own, which our own priests cannot do. (SIT, 199–200)

The members of the Mesa agreed on the matter and they sent their resolution for supervision to Fray González, the prior of the Convent of Santo Domingo, in Manila; and later to the archbishop of Manila to be sanctioned. The bishop of Cebú, Pedro de Arce—at that time acting bishop of Manila—approved the proposal on 2 June 1633. But later we do not see in the documents any reference to this projected school. One of the reasons may be that its main promoter, Esquivel, had just engaged in his long-awaited missionary expedition to Japan—maybe with the additional idea of nding students for his project—and was killed upon his departure. On the other hand, the Misericordia appears several times in the documents of the later years but with a different function, a kind of nancial system for the missionary activities of the Dominicans. The rst reference is on 17 February 1637, when the soldier Duarte Rendon, acting as public notary issued a copy of the original permission for the school, stating that “the original is kept in the house of the Misericordia” (SIT, 203). This reference helps us know that the institution was still operating, and possessed an ofce, which was probably housed at the Convent of Todos los Santos, the only available building besides the fortress and the house of the governor. The Misericordia also experienced some changes. Firstly, the Dominicans had to support their increasing trips to China. Secondly, the governor was in increasing need of borrowing money, and the Misericordia—as happened in other places—was the only available nancial institution. So, the original gure of the governor as elder brother and/or proveedor was little by little blurred by the fact that the Misericordia was the one granting him loans. The clearest reference indicating this comes from the arrival of the last governor, Gonzalo Portillo. In his rst report to Corcuera, Portillo wrote that as soon as he arrived in Taiwan, “the priests of the order of St Dominic asked me to pay them the 2,000 pesos that Your Majesty owes the cash box of the Santa Mesa, since they have lent it” (SIT, 316). Likewise, he states in another report, “Of the 4,000 pesos that came, I paid 2,000 to the Santa Mesa. It will be necessary to ask again, even when I know that I will have a big argument with the priests about it” (SIT, 335). The nancial situation of the Misericordia, before the Spaniards left Taiwan, after being defeated by the Dutch, seems to have been one of solvency, at least according to the testimony of the scribe and key keeper of 1642, Juan Pérez de Rueda, who in 1644 declared that the Dutch seized all its belongings, namely “8,000 pesos in reals, 10 plates of ordinary silver, two large plates and merchandise worth 1,000 pesos” (SIT, 518). Certainly this data is consistent with the Spanish Fortress inventory that the Dutch made after their conquest (SIT, 394–397).

The Missionary Activity

183

Conict of interests on the occasion of the “curato” of Isla Hermosa The conict of interest between the religious and the secular authorities that usually erupted in Spanish colonies also happened in Taiwan although it never developed into any serious conict. On the contrary the documents show that missionaries encountered few problems with the governor. Esquivel—in very good personal relations with Alcarazo, both of them being from the nobility of the same region—explained it in this way: “We have not had problems with the authorities of the kind that question jurisdiction: for example: this or that other feast should not be celebrated so that the Indians or the black slaves could work; because the General is very good and agrees to whatever the Father says” (SIT, 187, 204–205). Initially the Dominicans took care of the “curato,” but after some time they realized that these religious services to Spanish soldiers and ofcers, and their families, started to give them more headaches than benets; therefore they wanted to transfer it to a secular priest. There were basically four reasons for the problems: the immoral behavior of some Spaniards, to have to remind soldiers about the Christian precepts, to settle irregular marital situations (some of them living in public concubinage), and to have to take part in arguments with merchants who contest the royal authority. In 1635, they formally requested the new governor of the Philippines to assign that kind of parish to a secular priest so that they could concentrate on missionary work. But, without looking for it they created a conict between the governor and the bishop of Manila. On October 8, 1635, Corcuera received a letter from the governor of Isla Hermosa, containing a brief request for a chaplain for the forts. That same day, Corcuera wrote directly to the provisor of the cathedral, Pedro Monroy, telling him to accept the task: In the service of His Majesty, it is tting that your Grace be the Senior Chaplain and Vicar of those forts, with a yearly salary of 300 pesos, plus Mass stipends, and the dues from the confraternity of soldiers that will be constituted anew. This extra income, plus the salary, will allow you to live decently, thus you will be spared the unavoidable inconvenience that will most likely happen should you turn down this position in His Majesty’s service. (SIT, 229)

Monroy declined for health reasons, and because his bishop needed him. But, the episode brought to light the struggle between the Crown and the Church to defend their own spheres of inuence. The archbishop of Manila, Fr. Hernando, wrote to Corcuera to justify his need to keep him as provisor. However, Corcuera went even further and took advantage of the occasion to remind the bishop of their respective “turfs.” I am aware that to approve ecclesiastics for the administration of the sacraments belongs to the prelates; but it belongs to the Governor, by right of Royal Patronage, to appoint them, just in the same way that His Majesty appointed your Grace as Bishop and Archbishop. His Holiness approved and conrmed it. Therefore I cannot abstain, although your Grace orders me so, from appointing parish priests and vicars, choosing from among these people, that your Grace must nominate, the one I deem most suitable … And when

184 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

I say that this [i.e., the appointment to ecclesiastical post by the privilege of Royal Patronage] is done in keeping with my service to the King, only His Majesty can ask me an account of it. (SIT, 231)

This conflict of interest expressed also the personal hostility between both authorities. In this case, the fact lying behind it was the intention of Corcuera to exile Monroy to Isla Hermosa as a revenge for a recent story.9 Corcuera even took advantage of this situation to discredit Monroy. He told the archbishop: “Your Grace’s need for him may be lled in by many [persons] who are more upright and better educated … In fact, Fr. Pedro de Monroy is superuous to your Grace for the peace and good governance of your Church” (SIT, 230–231). The conict dragged on for other reasons, among which included the governor’s ordering the archbishop’s exile to Corregidor Island in 1636. In the end, we do not know exactly if Monroy did go to Isla Hermosa. He most probably did not. The one who went as provisor, although the date is uncertain, was the cleric, Juan de Balcázar, who, according to Fr. Juan de los Ángeles “stayed there for a while and returned to Manila” (SIT, 573). We also know that this ofce continued existing and that it offered a corresponding salary. For example, the ledger of accounts of the royal treasury recorded that the chaplain of the camp received one hundred pesos on 31 December 1637, and twenty more on the 6 April 1638 (SIT, 283). Four years later, in November 1641, the name of Fr. Gaspar Alenda gured in the list of wage earners in Isla Hermosa. He was a Franciscan who arrived in 1633 and who received a monthly salary of fteen pesos, for his service as chaplain of the soldiers (SIT, 338).

Native opposition in Tamsui (1636) When Esquivel left for Japan in 1633, he had great hopes for the missions in the Tamsui River area that he had founded; it must have been hard for him to imagine the crisis they would encounter just three years later when two Dominicans were killed in different occasions—the experienced Váez, who had came to Isla Hermosa at the very beginning (1626), and Muro, who had been on the island for only one year (SIT, 457). According to the Dominican sources, especially the History of Aduarte (see annex 12), Váez was very condent in his dealing with the natives; he was even able to free from prison one of the troublemakers from Senar, Pila, who was later the one who took his life. Considering that the missionary situation in Senar was consolidated, he tried in January 1636 to do the same in the rival village of Pantao, located on the other side of the Tamsui River. He told the elders of Senar his plans and found no opposition, thus he planned to proceed. Nevertheless, in the evening of that day, the elders gathered to discuss the matter again and disapproved it. Váez knew somehow of this change of mind, but he went to Pantao as planned to proceed with the new foundation, and was killed on his way by the Senar natives. The case of Muro was different. Due to a great scarcity, in April of the same year the governor in San Salvador commissioned the captain in Tamsui to buy rice along the river. A group of soldiers went accompanied by Muro; but after some days they received

The Missionary Activity

185

news that six sampans from China had brought rice to San Salvador and there was no need to buy more rice. One group of Spaniards went to Santo Domingo to deliver half the grain they had bought, while four of them, including Muro, remained in the river where they were watching the other half. The captain of Santo Domingo was concerned about the security of this small group and sent some reinforcements (twenty soldiers and forty laborers), but on their way back to the fort, the whole group was ambushed by 300 native warriors, who killed some soldiers, laborers, and Muro. It is difcult to know the real reason for the natives to do so. Was it a total opposition to the presence of foreigners in their territory? Of course, an initial opposition is natural; and, if it were too dangerous to oppose the intruders, in the meantime they could accommodate to them or even take advantage of their presence. Therefore, were these killings the way the natives responded to concrete (cultural or material) grievances against the Spaniards? This might have been the case of Senar and the reason behind the killing of Váez. The elders of Senar may have seen in the missionary presence three assets: a protection against the Spaniards of Santo Domingo, a mediator in asking the help of the Spaniards when confronted with any problem, for example, the attack from the Cavalans or those of Pantao, and nally a sign of prestige, because not every village had a missionary. In that case, it makes sense to think that the people of Senar might have considered Váez as a traitor, for planning to extend the mission to Pantao. Probably, the same can be suspected in the case of the killing of Muro, who may have been considered a mediator for the soldiers that went to buy rice. According to a Dutch report, this action may be associated with the demand of a yearly contribution of “three gantas of rice and two chickens for every married couple” that the Spaniards asked from the natives (SIT, 249). But this reference seems a kind of solipsism, since Spanish sources do not mention at any moment that taxes were levied upon the natives.10 After this success, the natives later continued their offensive against the fortress, forcing the withdrawal of the garrison to Quelang. As a result, Corcuera became pessimistic in his approach to Isla Hermosa (SIT, 256) and ordered the new San Salvador governor, Francisco Hernández, to burn Santo Domingo fort and to punish the natives of Tamsui (SIT, 272). Peter Kang, commenting on those deaths, argued that early modern missionaries—not like their nineteenth-century counterparts—sometimes overestimated their religious progress and ignored their fragile position in the native context. It is why, when the missionaries moved to other villages for preaching purposes, they would be considered as traitors by their earlier converts.11

The results To measure the success or failure of a mission we must consider two aspects, the number of converts and the degree of acceptance of the new faith. In normal circumstances this can be known by using the registers of baptism, marriage, etc. But in our case, these were not kept, contrary to the case of the church in Tayouan that has preserved part of them.12

186 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

The number of native converts For the Spanish mission, gures such as the number of native converts are difcult to evaluate. We have only a general appreciation. People in favor of the mission would try to exaggerate the number of converts, while those against it would be very strict and selective in counting them. For example, in the junta (meeting) of January 1637 summoned by Corcuera to discuss the situation of Isla Hermosa, he regretted the lack of success—only 100 adult converts. He said, “The Dominicans offered the argument regarding the conversion of the natives to the Catholic faith and about the fruit that they could gather in Japan if trade were to be established there. All these reasons and many others that are greatly related to His Majesty’s service have been disproved in the said 11 years” (SIT, 263). On the other hand, García Romero who had been governor in Taiwan, claimed in the same junta that there were 800 converts (SIT, 269); and—as we have said earlier—the Dominican Quirós credited to himself the growth of Christians, during the time of García Romero: During his time [i.e., García Romero] our Lord also started the conversion of the natives, which did not happen until then; many were baptized. Myself alone, being the most wretched of all people there, in eight days baptized three hundred and twenty persons in the river Tamchui, when they got sick of smallpox that year; and around the feast of St. James, in just ve days, I baptized one hundred and forty one; and I moved about the villages alone, with only the company of two Indian boys, saying mass, without fear of the enemies, who were under control by the fear they had of the governor. (SIT, 456)

But, in fact, this way of baptizing seems to prove Corcuera right when he said that the Dominicans were baptizing “left and right.” The most optimistic gure was given by one ofcer that stayed the sixteen years of the Spanish presence, Juan Pérez de Rueda. When he was interrogated in 1644, he claimed that in 1642 the number of converts in the friendly towns of Quimaurri, Taparri, and Caquiuanuan was 1,000.

The degree of acceptance of the new faith Maybe, the degree of acceptance of the faith was one of the reasons for the disagreement between both gures in the junta of 1637. Corcuera was right in being skeptical because the conversions were done very recently. But looking at the year 1642, the comments of Juan Pérez de Rueda and of the second lieutenant Diego Tamargo were very positive in evaluating the success of the mission. Rueda indicated, There were many natives, men and women, of all ages, that have become Christians, and they were the hope of the mission. They were more than a thousand. Some native women loved the Spaniards and married them. The young men attended the church services very piously, and they learned the prayers, and how to write and to read. Some were able to read in Latin and were teaching the doctrine to the people of their own nation when the minister was busy … (SIT, 518)

The Missionary Activity

187

Tamargo also noted, Then the Dutch took over the land, and they saw many natives and youth receiving Baptism. The boys were willingly going to the church, and learning how to write and to read under the guidance of the priests of Saint Dominic … All the natives were crying and felt sorrow when the Spaniards lost their fortress, … they loved the missionaries, and the native women loved the Spaniards, and married them. And now [1644] they are in this city [Manila], because they came accompanying their husbands. (SIT, 515–516)

The acceptance of religious faith by the natives is the most difcult to evaluate. Sometimes the missionaries were not satised, and they regretted the low level of understanding of their converts, while other times—especially when they had to justify their work—they presented it with very promising results. In measurable terms, was 1,000 converts in sixteen years too many or too few? If we compare this with the Dutch results of 5,000 converts during forty years, it is possible to say that the gures were comparable, since they usually grow in exponential terms. Another way to see it is that both groups claimed the total conversion of the villagers near their headquarters. What happened with the Christian community of near 1,000 after 1642? The missionaries—amid some doubts (SIT, 457)—nally decided to abandon them, expecting that the solution would be temporary. In the meantime, they probably commissioned the Spanish free burgher Domingo Aguilar to look after the natives and to prepare an eventual coming back from Manila. But neither Aguilar nor his native wife are mentioned in Dutch sources after July 1643.

The missionaries tried to enter Japan during the sakoku13 The Christians in Japan still enjoyed a sense of freedom at the end of the sixteenth century, especially in the southern island of Sikoku (四國) because some daimyos (vassals, 大名) were Christians. Also they were respected by the rst important shogun, Hideyoshi (1582–1598), who enrolled big numbers of soldiers from this island in his military campaigns against Korea. But in 1587, Hideyoshi started acting in an erratic way. This year, he issued a decree to expel the missionaries, which in the end was not really enforced because the almost sixty Jesuits that had come from Macao to Japan behaved in a more discrete way. Hideyoshi moved a step forward in 1593, allowing the Franciscans from the Philippines to establish in Japan, causing a lot of friction among the two religious orders, because the pope—upon request of the Jesuits—had issued a decree allowing only Jesuit missionaries to go to Japan. This period ended in 1597 with the rst great persecution of Christians that took place in Nagasaki,14 and the fear of the invasion of the Philippines. But everything ceased after the death of Hideyoshi in the same year. During the ve years of civil war for the succession of Hideyoshi which brought Tokugawa Ieyasu (德川 家康, 1603–1616) to power, the Franciscans came back to Japan and the Dominicans entered as well. Ieyasu continued the unication of Japan,

188 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

started by his predecessor. The main interest of Ieyasu with the Philippines was to have participation in the Manila galleon trade, by establishing near Edo (Tokyo) a base for galleons. He even took advantage of the shipwreck of the galleon “San Francisco” (1609), with the outgoing Philippine governor on board, to negotiate a treaty. One of his nobles Date Masuname (伊達正宗) even sent a huge embassy of merchants to Mexico and Spain to open this business. At the beginning, Ieyasu was tolerant of Christianity and even new missionaries, the Augustinians, arrived in Japan from the Philippines. In 1614, Christianity reached its peak, having around 300,000 Christians administered by 140 Jesuits, 26 Franciscans, 9 Dominicans, and 4 Augustinians. But everything ended in 1614 when Ieyasu—a pious Buddhist—totally changed his mind and started a persecution against Christians, forcing many of them into exile to Macao or Manila. Ieyasu’s successor Tokugawa Hidetada (德川 秀忠, 1616–1632) increased the persecution. But, ironically, these were the years in which the Japanese colony in Manila reached a peak of 3,000 persons in 1624—the year Hidetada formally forbade the Spanish sailors to go to Japan. The martyrdoms, not only of missionaries, but also of Japanese Christians, continued in Japan, reaching hundreds. That is why when the authorities in Manila decided to set up a fort in Isla Hermosa, the Dominicans—also promoters of this idea—were very pleased since that move could facilitate their way to Japan. The moment arrived when the armada of 1627 set sail, on which those religious with interests in Japan were on board, namely the Dominicans, Augustinians, Jesuits of the Philippines; and, ironically, the Jesuits of Macao. Certainly, some Jesuits from Manila went to the island to set up a mission, and they accepted—as stated in one contemporary Jesuit report—“two Japanese priests disguised as servants, who were seeing whether they might enter Japan by way of Isla Hermosa. [Since] their Provincial has sent them for that purpose from Macao” (SIT, 131). But, after the failure of the armada because of the bad weather, they remained in Manila. Those who luckily succeeded were the Augustinian Lucas de Atienza (SIT, 115) and two Japanese Dominican priests who reached San Salvador in 1627, aboard the “Rosario,” the only ship that arrived from the big armada. Nevertheless, Atienza went back to Manila with that ship and died soon after on account of his great hardships. The rst of the two Japanese departing from Isla Hermosa back to Japan was Hioji Rokuzayemon Nishi, who had been exiled in Manila since 1614 and became a Dominican in that city. In 1629 he left Isla Hermosa and managed to reach Japan. His initial success might have encouraged the second Japanese Dominican, Kiusei Gorobioye Tomonaga, to try to sneak into Japan. He had also the same exile experience of Rokuzayemon. He arrived also in 1627, and left in 1632, reaching also his destination. The hopes of recovering the Japanese mission were reawakened in the Dominicans of Isla Hermosa, but these were short-lived. The new shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu (德川 家光, 1632–1651) was even more radical than his predecessor and laid down the sakoku policy (1633–1639), which, in addition to some economic dispositions, forbade Japanese to leave the country, isolated Japan, and tried to eradicate Christianity. With Gorobioye and Rokuzayemon back in their country, things looked timely for Esquivel, and he decided to try his luck, probably unaware

The Missionary Activity

189

of the new sakoku policy. But the year proved to be fatal. Esquivel was killed just upon departure and Gorobioye was captured and also killed. To make things worse, Rokuzayemon also received martyrdom the following year (1634). Another Japanese, Felipe del Espíritu Santo, stayed in Quelang from 1634 to 1636 most probably waiting for an opportunity, but he was recalled to Manila (SIT, 238). The Dominicans tried again, but now without passing by Isla Hermosa. In the summer of 1636, a group of six (four priests and two laymen) left from Manila without the consent of the governor (SIT, 275). Two were Japanese, the priest Vicente Shiwozuka de la Cruz and the laymen Lázaro of Kyoto, a leper. They reached Okinawa where they were taken prisoners, and were brought to Nagasaki where they suffered martyrdom in September 1637. One of the laymen was the Chinese-Tagalo mestizo Lorenzo Ruiz who in modern times became the rst Filipino saint.

The missionaries enter China The entrance of the Dominicans into China and the resumption of the Franciscan missions in that continent is another event in the history of the Catholic Church in Taiwan, since it was done via the two bases of Tamsui and Quelang that served as a missionary bridge to China. The rst one to enter China was an Italian Dominican from Florence, Angelo Cocci, who left Taiwan the last day of 1631 and arrived in China on 1 January 1632. He established a rst mission in Fu-an (福安) and stayed there until his death in 1633. Four months earlier, the Dominican Morales and the Franciscan Antonio Caballero also entered on the same boat. The arrival of the latter resumed the Franciscan presence in China that had ceased after the time of Montecorvino. During those years, other missionaries started going to Fujian from Taiwan. For example, the Franciscan Francisco Bermúdez and the Dominican Francisco Díaz went in 1634. In the spring of 1637, the Franciscan Alenda arrived in China. And soon later, Francisco Díaz—who had come back to Taiwan for a while—resumed his work in China with two new Dominicans, Pedro Chaves and Juan García. Some Franciscans also went: Francisco Escalona, Onofre Pelleja, and Domingo Urquicio. In fact, these three Franciscan missionaries attempted a trip to Japan in 1634, but when they neared Lequios, they were forced to return to Taiwan because of inclement weather. In any case, in 1637 ten mendicant missionaries in Fujian had arrived from Isla Hermosa. But this situation did not last for long. Díaz and Caballero went to Manila to discuss the matter of the Chinese Rites. They separated, to be sure that at least one of them would reach their destination. Caballero went rst to Quelang, and after leaving San Salvador was caught in 1636 by the Dutch off the coast near Fort Zeelandia15 (SIT, 247). Díaz reached Isla Hermosa safely, but the superior of the Dominicans in Isla Hermosa—unaware of the situation of Caballero—considered unnecessary that trip to Manila and he sent Díaz back to Fu-an. A few years later, in 1640, the Dominican Morales brought the issue of the Chinese Rites to Rome, coming back to China in 1649. On the other hand, in 1638 a persecution began in China that forced most of the missionaries to leave the country. This was a period of uncertainty that caused

190 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the priests to shuttle back and forth from Taiwan. During ten months between 1640 and 1641 there were no missionaries in China, because the only one remaining, Juan García, went back to Taiwan with health problems. At the beginning of this decade, things were getting difcult for the Spanish authorities in Taiwan due to continuous pressure from the Dutch. For example, we have mentioned the capture of Chaves by the Dutch when returning from China, but there were also some lucky events. Shortly before the Dutch took over San Salvador, one ship sailing from Quelang to China carried the Dominicans Francisco Díaz and Francisco Capillas (the newest recruit for China from the Cagayan mission). They reached the continent, reunited with Juan García, and continued the mission in China, now without the intermediate step of Taiwan. Certainly, the whole picture changed after their Philippines–Isla Hermosa lifeline was cut off. The missionary presence in Fujian was able to continue notwithstanding some misfortunes, like the deaths of Francisco Díaz in 1646 and Francisco Capillas on 15 January 1648. The latter case happened as a result of the disorder created in Fu-an by the arrival of the Tartars. In any case, those years of Spanish presence in Taiwan created a missionary foundation, solid enough to be supported from Manila. A new revival came when, in 1649, Morales arrived back from his trip to Rome, giving the Dominicans a new impetus in their evangelization.

The Catholic and the Calvinist missions in Taiwan On the history of the Church we can see different crisis: schisms inside Christianity, the confrontation with Islam, the persecution of heretics, etc. But a new phenomenon happened in the seventeenth century that most prominently can be registered in places like Taiwan: for the rst time missionaries of the Catholic and Reformed churches were competing in the same foreign area; something similar might have happened before in Beijing when Montecorvino competed with Nestorians. In Taiwan the geographical separation of Calvinists and Catholics helped to avoid conict. They just saw each other through different stereotypes; the Catholics called the Dutch “heretics,” and the Calvinists called the Spaniards “papists” (i.e., followers of the pope). Naturally, this simplication does not consider several particularities, like the fact that the second Dutch governor of Tayouan, Fredericx da Vitt (1625–1626), was a clandestine Catholic.16 For these reasons we are tempted to compare both missions in order to understand them better. First, we can see the degree of training of these two groups of missionaries. Certainly, both groups were committed to their own view of Christianity and presumably they were well-trained ministers and equipped with experience. For example, Robert Junius graduated from the newly established Seminary School in Leiden, and Candidius, who had left Europe in 1624, served in the Moluccas for three years before coming to Taiwan.17 The Dominicans chosen were among the most competent and learned ones. Some of them, like Quirós or Esquivel had taught philosophy and theology in the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, before embarking to Isla Hermosa.18 Regarding the number of missionaries that came, among the Protestants we can recount thirty pastors

The Missionary Activity

191

(excluding schoolteachers), but only few of them, like Candidus, Junius, or Kruyf, shone for their long stay and commitment. As for the Catholics, considering all the religious brothers and priests as well as secular clergy, almost fty clergymen passed by Taiwan in one way or another, but only a few of them stayed for a long period. The main problem they encountered was the scarcity of missionaries. They tried to solve it by creating schools for catechists or attracting soldiers as schoolteachers, or as missionaries like the Mexican soldier Nicolás Muñoz (SIT, 154), but this method sometimes proved to be a source of problems for the difculty of changing former lifestyles (SIT, 189). Another question was the missionary methods. It seems that the Catholic way of bringing natives to Christianity was based more on participation in the liturgy than in a full comprehension of the faith. They followed the Counter-reformist ideas of liturgy emphasizing solemnity in the administration of the sacraments and veneration of images in the processions (SIT, 223). They considered that the understanding of the supernatural would come in a second stage, since the old ways were difcult to eradicate. For example, at times they had to face the local majurbol, or inibs (as they were called in Dutch sources), a sort of inuential priestesses who looked on the missionary work suspiciously. Also, they printed images since they proved to be a good catechetical aid. To see a prominent example of these images we have to move to Fujian. There was Giulio Aleni, a Jesuit missionary resident in Fuzhou, who, with the help of a local artist, worked hard until he produced in 1637 an abridged version of the Life of Christ of Nadal, published in Antwerp thirty years earlier.19 The Chinese translation must have impressed so much the Franciscans of Isla Hermosa that they probably acquired some copies in their trips to Fujian, as one of them still remains treasured in their own archives in Madrid. On the contrary, the Protestants seem more devoted to transmit the life of Jesus by translating the Gospel to the native language. To evaluate the books of doctrine they have produced, we can start rst exploring the catalogue of books of their own libraries. The church’s library of Tayouan20 had many books of the Christian reformers such as Luther, Calvin, etc., and different Bibles, and specially commentaries on the Bible. But to translate some parts of the Bible was so high a goal that the most successful attempt was nished in 1661 by Daniel Gravius, a Protestant pastor who stayed four years (1647–1651) with the natives near Zeelandia castle and translated the Gospel of Matthew into the Sinkang (新港) language. This book was made with quality printing but very sober in images. Besides, it came too late. It was printed in Amsterdam at the same moment that Koxinga was expelling the Dutch from Taiwan. On the other hand, the library of the Convent of Todos los Santos in Quelang had many books of the Counter-reformist theologians like Luis de Granada, Antonio Molina, Luis de Soto, and many copies of the Tridentine Catechism of Pius V. All these materials must have been background references for their provisional catechisms. Certainly, the Dominicans produced some catechisms and book of prayers, like those attributed to Esquivel or Quirós, but nothing was left behind, so it is difcult to evaluate the quality and scope of these materials. The remaining ones are those written by pastor Junius who prepared a series of catechisms; the rst one contained 80 questions, followed by a revised version with 89 questions, which was in use at least until 1649. Also Junius made

192 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

another extensive catechism for native catechists with 353 questions.21 This shows how the usage of catechisms recommended by the Council of Trent, and even the creation of seminaries were not only a Catholic tool, but Protestant alike. Another problem missionaries faced was their relationship with civil authorities. In theory the missionaries had ofcial support from the Spanish Crown or from the VOC but that, in fact, implied a control of the missionary activities. In the Spanish case it was more difcult to exercise that control since the bishops were not subordinated to the royal ofcers, and in fact they had the possibility of addressing the king directly, although with some limitations. Also the fact that the Spanish missionaries depended from their religious orders gave them a higher degree of mobility, sometimes evading the orders of the governor forbidding trips to Japan or China. As a result, a conict of interests at times erupted. The Dominicans in Isla Hermosa might have had a deterrent inuence on the actions of the governors of San Salvador, but little is known. The same might be said of the Dutch missionary Candidius, who “criticized the governor of the Moluccas, Jacques le Fèbre, in such a way as to have himself thrown out of the territory.”22 But the common understanding is that Protestant pastors in Dutch Formosa did not have that counterbalancing role presumed in the Catholic missionaries. One explanation might be the lack of missionary tradition23 or the way they were hired. As Leonard Blussé pointed out, “they were hired by the VOC and made directly responsible to the administration of the company rather than to the classis in Holland that had selected them, [additionally] … Protestants ministers in Formosa actually provoked the colonial administration into extending its jurisdiction over heathen villages so that their missionary eld might be expanded.”24 Maybe, for this reason they regarded the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries with some degree of admiration. Junius, one of the most zealous Dutch missionaries, said: The Spaniards have been aware of this [i.e., the missionary methods] for fully a hundred years, as the system we propose of instructing natives was followed by them in Japan, and hence they can rejoice in having made so many thousands of converts. The natives they taught on this plan were well instructed, and suffered for Christ’s sake all manner of pain, torture and torment; and had their teachers only been more prudent in other matters, all Japan might have been Roman Catholic by this time. The Portuguese do the same as regards China. They select the most intelligent children, and take them to another country where, without much difculty, education can be carried on under their own immediate direction and control. On reaching manhood, those students are t for service in any part of China, recent letters referring to some who have penetrated even into the Court of that realm, where they are now occupied in converting the great and principal men. We cannot but praise such self-denying zeal, even though shown by our enemies.25

Catholic priests and Protestant pastors had other differences, the most salient being their lifestyle. Both groups were established in native villages with a distant protection of soldiers, the rst ones accompanied by some helpers, while the second ones stayed

The Missionary Activity

193

with their own families, carrying out their ministry like any other profession, with the additional goal of building their own wealth. As Ross commented, “In 1643 [Junius], went back home as a rich man (his fortune ofcially amounting 14,600 reals); a good part of his wealth must have come from his involvement, legally or illegally, in this project [i.e., deerskin trade].”26 The Spanish missionaries in Taiwan might have accepted the words of Junius just as a compliment. In a long letter to the king, the procurator general of the Dominicans Melchor del Manzano pointed out in 1627 the strategic challenge that Isla Hermosa posed to missionary interests: “The post is the master key that will open the doors of the kingdoms of China to the Gospel. From afternoon till morning, the missionaries can pass through the rivers of China aboard small boats. We left Spain, driven by this intense desire, and sailed 5000 leagues” (SIT, 112–113). If the Dominicans were to evaluate the impact of their work, in one sense they must conclude that they came with high expectations, worked hard, but arguably they left the place empty-handed. In a more positive view, they will say that before leaving Taiwan they had gained a foothold in China. And if they were to judge everything in a more idealistic and Baroque way, they would be proud of saying that most important was the faithfulness to their own commitment that they have endorsed with the martyrs they have left behind. When the Protestants left the place they were also fully disappointed. Pastor Joannes Kruyf in a letter dated on 13 October 1662 expressed this pessimistic and Baroque comment: One cannot without tears think of the unexpected destruction and ruin of so many families, and of nearly thirty ministers, partly in their lives, partly in their fortunes (among whom I have my share, having lost all I had gathered in fteen years’ time), the loss and dishonor of the Company with other unspeakable miseries … All of which we ought to look upon as the effects of God’s just indignation, on account of our manifold sins.27

Renaissance and Baroque missionaries While observing some of the prominent priests and missionaries of the sixteenth century moving in the Philippine and Japanese scenarios we note some different traits from those missionaries moving in the same territories after 1633. The rst ones were intellectually curious, acting with a lack of knowledge of the alien culture and of the territory, which might explain their naïve feeling of superiority. The rst salient one is Urdaneta, a young sailor that accompanied Magellan in 1521, and forty years later came back to the Philippines as an Augustinian friar to discover the route for the return trip from Manila to Acapulco. We can see later, in 1575, another Augustinian, Martín de Rada, entering into China as guest of the Chinese authorities, reporting later on that trip to the Crown, and providing maps and books. In 1582 was the already-mentioned episode of a shipwreck in Taiwan with 300 persons on board. One of the Jesuits, Gómez, boarded that ship to go to take over his position in Japan. After two months shipwrecked in Taiwan their only alternative was to return to Macao in a smaller ship, as they did. And after some years Gómez was not afraid to try again going to the mission of Japan, which

194 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

at that time was in a moment of expansion, reaching 150,000 converts and attracting other religious orders from the Philippines. The Jesuit Sánchez, another survivor of that shipwreck, reappeared in the Manila scenario in 1584 trying to convince the governor for the conquest of China, and two years later he went to Spain with this in mind. Not getting approval in Madrid he went in 1589 to Rome lobbying for the implementation of his plan, also without result.28 In 1592, we see the Dominican Juan Cobo translating a Chinese book into Spanish, and writing another one, the Shih Lu, explaining among other things Ptolemaic geography to the Chinese in Manila.29 We can also mention Aduarte accompanying the Spanish military expedition to Cambodia in 1596, then as a young Dominican. These missionaries took endurance for granted because a bright future was just waiting for them. They were supported by the Crown, but, at the same time, they were the pillars of the royal ofcers in special missions, like embassies. Certainly, in the Renaissance the missionaries were asked to shoulder the responsibility of ambassadors, but in the Baroque times—when they embarked clandestinely to China or Japan, breaking the prohibitions of the governor—their moves were seen with suspicion. Once in those foreign countries they endured not for the bright future waiting for them but for the sake of survival. In this new period, they did not see the Chinese events from a distance, but usually they were drawn into them. They do not observe China with the former admiration, now they confronted it with a sort of criticism. The translation of the Mingxin Baojian made by Cobo in 1592 was made with a sense of dialogue with the Chinese culture, trying to learn in order to preach to them in the most effective way possible. But the same book was again translated by another Dominican, Domingo Fernández Navarrete, towards 1665. Here, more than a “dialogue” we nd a “comparison” trying to show how Christian doctrine was equal if not superior to the ideas gathered in the Mingxin Baojian.30 Finally the Baroque times are expressed by the sensation of a fast growth of converts, for which more missionary sources were in need. On 18 December 1618 the Jesuit Francisco de Otazo sent a letter to the president of the Council of the Indies notifying that there were more than a million baptized souls in the East, located in Manila or within 300 leagues around this city: 600,000 in the Philippines, 300,000 in Japan, 160,000 in the Moluccas, and this gure was without considering those souls from Malacca and Macao, “all of them in a big danger of extinction” — for these he was requesting urgent support.31

Renaissance deaths and Baroque martyrdoms Cobo acted as rst ambassador of the Philippine governor to Japan, and he died in Taiwan, when returning from his diplomatic mission. The ship he was on board shipwrecked and the natives killed most of the survivors (SIT, 23). This was the difference between Renaissance and Baroque violent deaths of missionaries, the rst ones were out of violence or assassination, the Baroque ones were more out of martyrdom, meaning that the reason that motivated the death was not just to commit a crime, but to oppose a priest or a practicing believer.

The Missionary Activity

195

The rst Dominican missionary that died in Taiwan was Fr. Bartolomé Martínez, in 1629, as a result of a maritime accident when going from Tamsui to San Salvador (SIT, 174). Soon later Mateo Cobisa died of a natural death, but his life, according to Aduarte, was still typical of a Renaissance mystic, able to have visions of far away events and predict the immediate future, as it happened precisely with the death of Martínez, which he foresaw two days earlier.32 The third was Tomás Sierra, the companion of Cocci, in the rst expedition of the Dominicans to China. Cocci and Sierra were betrayed by the Chinese sailors bringing them to China, and only the former survived (SIT, 154). The same happened with Esquivel on his departure to Japan in 1633; his death—which occurred between 9 and 10 of August—was motivated by the hope of the Japanese sailors of getting some reward from the authorities of Nagasaki.33 This year somehow marks the turn towards martyrdom. Certainly in Japan the rst deaths occurred much earlier, in 1597 (as a result of the “San Felipe” galleon incident), and other martyrdoms followed with alternating periods of tolerance. But in those cases the martyrs were caught by surprise or by an ad hoc policy, or during temporary restrictions. We can say that the “Baroque martyrdoms” were caused more by the temerity of the missionaries in moments of consolidated persecution. In this sense Japan was the earliest place they started. One example of it can be the death of the Franciscan Luis Sotelo in 1624, whose life was dramatized in the novel of Shusaku Endo, The Samurai. Since the implementation of the sakoku policy in Japan in 1633 things got worse and the immediate deaths of foreign missionaries and even of Japanese priests were the norm. In these years San Salvador was the stopover for those Dominican Japanese priests ordained in Manila on their way to Japan. They, like Esquivel, were aware of the danger of losing their lives for the simple fact of entering Japan or returning to their own countries, but their Baroque spirituality, a mysticism rooted in the cross, impelled them to go forward. As we have mentioned earlier, the rst one that risked his life was Tomonaga who reached Isla Hermosa in 1627, and left for Japan in 1632. In 1633 he was discovered by Japanese authorities and sent to martyrdom. Another was Rokuzayemon who arrived with Tomonaga in San Salvador the same year of 1627, but left that city earlier, in 1629, remaining successfully hidden in Japan for ve years until his martyrdom in 1634. These deaths were followed soon later by the tragic deaths that occurred in Tamsui in 1636 of Váez and Muro, who should have also been regarded as martyrs. At least this was the way in which they were presented by Aduarte. This historian described the lives and deaths of his companions introducing two new Baroque elements: a life of penance and a mystical fragrant death. As Esquivel, their strength was based in their penance, achieved by the use of cilices, disciplines, prayer, and devotion to St. Dominic and Our Lady of the Rosary. And the sign that they had achieved sanctity was revealed for the lasting fragrance that their incorrupt bodies expelled after death, as Aduarte referred to the cases of Váez and Muro. In the rst case, the History of Aduarte narrates:

196 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

In the following [year], around June, it was decided to transfer his grave because the area had become very humid and untting. Those who were present discovered the body giving off a fragrance … The habit was partly decomposed … but the body was incorrupt and recognizable, and the esh of robust color, as though alive. All the lay men approached to revere the holy martyr … The same thing happened when he just died. He was not buried for three days, out of devotion and [his body] never gave off a bad odor … It was clear that this was an obvious miracle that the Lord, in such time, would preserve a holy body incorrupt and fragrant. (SIT, 241)

The case of Muro was similar, but not as impressive. He was accompanied by some soldiers when they died in an ambush. Only after twelve days the Spaniards dared to recover the cadavers. His corpse was not fragrant like the one of Váez, but at the same time “did not smell at all. And no one dared to approach the other corpses because of their inevitable stench … Even the indels there consider it an obvious miracle” (SIT, 244). These stories were consistent with other Baroque deaths or miraculous cures, like the fragrant air that invaded the room of a crippled man in Calanda (Spain), who recovered his leg, in 1640.34

The episode of the Congregation of Saint Paul Another episode that makes the year 1636 a turning point towards the Baroque missionary activity is related to the arrival in Manila and Taiwan of the Congregation of Saint Paul which had been established few years earlier by the Dominican Fr. Collado (SIT, 237–238). He was a Dominican who was rst assigned to Cagayan before he was sent to Japan in 1619 where he stayed for three years, during times of harsh persecution. Thanks to his knowledge of Japanese and his natural conditions he was able to elude his persecutors. Finally, he had to abandon the mission and travel to Madrid and Rome. In some aspects he is comparable to the Franciscan Sotelo, because his main interest in going to Rome was to take the necessary steps to fulll the idea that had obsessed him for a long time. As Pablo Fernández explained,35 this was to found an independent congregation within the Dominican Province of the Holy Rosary to handle more directly the evangelization of Japan, China, and Formosa. In Rome he tried to convince the master general of the Dominicans, but he failed. Then, he moved to Madrid where he was able to recruit people to organize a mission to the Philippines, but without revealing his real plans to the procurator of the Province. In 1632, he was in Rome and obtained from the new master general the approval of a congregation that he named after St. Paul. While in Rome he published a Japanese-Latin-Spanish Dictionary,36 under the sponsorship of the recently founded Propaganda Fide, the Vatican ofce for the promotion of missions. In 1634, Collado left Spain with the missionary group that he had recruited and to whom he outlined his plans during their voyage to Manila. This was the ninth expedition that the Dominicans sent from Spain. In this trip, he coincided with the newly designated governor general of the Philippines Corcuera whom he won over to his cause. When he arrived in the islands in 1635 he presented to the Dominican provincial the documents

The Missionary Activity

197

that authorized him to establish the new congregation. However, he met up with strong opposition, since it was considered to be detrimental to the province, and a division (though a short-lived one) aroused among the Dominicans. The provincial in the Philippines, in order to win time, said that—according to the royal patronage for the missions—the new situation had not been reviewed by the Royal Council of Castile; but, to keep Collado at peace, he agreed to maintain the status quo until a new verdict would come from the master general of the order. But those Dominicans opposing the idea of creating a special group of action for the missions of China and Japan were backed by the newly appointed archbishop of Manila, Hernando Guerrero, and the bishop of Nueva Segovia, Diego de Aduarte. Collado became impatient and turned to Corcuera for help. The governor supported him and placed at his disposal the better Dominican houses outside the Manila walls,37 namely, the houses of Binondo, Parian, San Gabriel, Cavite, Nueva Segovia, and the vicariate of Todos los Santos in Isla Hermosa. In 1636 the Isla Hermosa mission—still shocked by the killing of the two missionaries, Muro and Váez—received the news about the division of the religious province. This happened when De los Ángeles (the representative of Collado) arrived to take over the mission in the name of the new congregation. De los Ángeles arrived in San Salvador bearing his titles and the governor general’s orders to the governor of San Salvador. He—assisted by other missionaries assigned to the new congregation (like Fr. Miguel de Corena)—deposed the present vicar peacefully and both groups lived in harmony waiting for the coming of a new dispatch. But, in fact, nothing much happened because disciplinary problems had arisen in Manila and some of the members of the order, who Collado had recruited from Spain for the congregation, were transferred to the province. Corcuera handled this ecclesiastical dispute again, but siding now in favor of the province. He forcibly took the houses run by the congregation and restored these to the province. The plans of Collado failed and he was sent to Cagayan.38 Besides, the master general of the Dominicans responded also in favor of the interests of the province, thus unity was restored in the Philippines and in Isla Hermosa as well. The impact of this action in Isla Hermosa was a turning point for the mission. The previous Father Vicar, Lorenzo Arnedo, went back to Manila. The same with two of the appointees of the congregation, Corena, who was ill, and Fr. Felipe del Espíritu Santo, a new Japanese waiting in Quelang since 1634 for an opportunity to sneak into Japan. He was recalled to Manila, maybe to join the 1636 Dominican attempt of going to Japan directly from Manila that ended in a martyrdom, which included the rst Filipino saint Lorenzo Ruiz. But, in fact, Espíritu Santo did not appear among those who went to Japan. In any case, his return to Manila shows clearly the new attitude of the Dominicans of excluding Formosa as a stopover in sneaking into Japan. Additionally, from 1637 to 1642 only a few new missionaries—in comparison with the previous years—went to Isla Hermosa, just two brothers and two priests. One of them was Fr. Capillas, a former missionary in the Cagayan Valley, who turned out to be the rst martyr of China in 1648. In fact, the few remaining ones, like Francisco Díaz, De los Ángeles, or Quirós, took

198 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

care of the China mission and of the Basayan converts. Finally these ones witnessed the defeat by the Dutch and the consequent exile to Batavia.

Mateo Ricci and Victorio Riccio Another Renaissance approach to evangelization was the one of the famous Jesuit Mateo Ricci, in the period before he reached Beijing. He studied the Chinese language not only for preaching but also for acquiring the knowledge of Chinese classics. By implementing Valignano’s ideas of accommodation he was showing respect to a different culture. But also he displayed his Renaissance spirit by showing some skills as an alchemist or by amusing the Chinese with his Treatise on Mnemonic Arts, with which he not only revealed “memory palaces,” but also tried to entice young Confucians with a method that might help them in passing exams.39 On the other hand, we see him in Beijing in a more scientic and Renaissance fashion when, in 1602, he showed to the emperor the sophisticated clocks brought by his companion the Spaniard Diego Pantoja,40 or when he drew his (revised) maps of the world, locating China using scientic methods; or nally when making the translation of Euclidean geometry in 1607. Then he paved the Baroque path of science for his successors; a goal that gained momentum when a Swiss Jesuit, John Terrenz Schreck, predicted the lunar eclipse in 1629. This event is most brilliant if we consider that in 1632 the Spanish troops of Isla Hermosa gave us one example of how cosmological Renaissance ways of interpreting the sky episodes were important to nd the possible signicance of their own fate. This happened with the signals that the Alcarazo troops saw in heaven when walking from Tamsui to San Salvador; and Esquivel echoed in this way: “At that time, at eight in the evening, this group of over 80 persons saw in the starlit sky above them a marvelous light much bigger that the moon. It lasted for three quarters of an hour and lled them with gladness and encouragement” (SIT, 167). We can switch now to one missionary who epitomizes the Baroque fate, Victorio Riccio,41 a Dominican from the Italian province of Tuscany, and antithetical to his close relative Mateo Ricci. Mateo, amid many setbacks, had a lineal and progressive action in China but, somehow he was the master of his actions. Victorio had a circular, errant, and colorful life dictated by an inscrutable fate that he evoked in his nal retirement in Manila in his memoirs (SIT, 581–627). Victorio’s life and deeds match one of the Baroque clichés, the fact that “dramatic and conictive vision of social reality [generates] a boom of chronicles and works devoted to contemporary events.”42 He left Manila for Xiamen in 1655 where he stayed for seven years. Xiamen was the center of the Koxinga area of inuence, thus the missionary was aware of all the moves of the Ming leader, especially the failure of the campaign of Nanjing in 1659, and his departure for the conquest of Dutch Formosa, in 1662. Until that moment Victorio Riccio was just a passive spectator of events, devoted to his mission. But soon after he got drawn in the Chinese events, when he received the notication of Koxinga ordering him to go to Anping for a special mission. He arrived in April 1662. And there he saw that everything was in disarray. Unexpectedly he found himself appointed as ambassador of Koxinga to

The Missionary Activity

199

the Philippines in order to request tribute from the Spaniards; otherwise the archipelago would be conquered (see annex 19). He arrived in Manila in May but his letter had an unexpected result, the unrest of the Chinese community that ended with a massacre in the parian. Manila prepared defenses for the imminent attack of Koxinga without knowing that he had already died a few weeks earlier. And the Spanish governor, expecting some diplomatic solution, let Victorio Riccio board for his third trip, carrying a letter to Koxinga asking for peace and to honor a former commercial agreement that they had signed. Mysteriously Riccio was not able to reach Anping, but arrived in Quelang. Although he tried to bring later the letter to Anping, in fact he ended in Xiamen, seventy days after he had left Manila. His position there was not comfortable because at that moment he knew about the death of Koxinga and he had to face there his brother Zheng Xi (鄭襲). Besides, for Riccio it was not easy to defend the position of the Spanish governor in the Manila massacre, but he successfully did so. To his surprise, Zheng Xi sent him again to Manila to reach another commercial agreement, arriving in that city in April 1663. He went back in July to Xiamen with the new letter of the Spanish governor, but when he arrived in Xiamen he found the city surrounded by the Tartars (this place was one of the last conquered by the Qing dynasty forces). He moved to a nearby island, and he nally ended on a Dutch ship from where he observed the naval battle between the Zheng and the Manchu forces assisted by the Dutch. From there he moved to Quanzhou (泉州), where he arrived in January 1664. He tried to settle down in this old, commercial city, but it was difcult for him since he had served for ten years in the Zheng territory, and now—in this new place controlled by the Tartars—he was suspected of former collaboration. He moved to Fuzhou, back to Quanzhou, and back to Fuzhou, coinciding also with a general persecution in China. There he realized that he had to go back to Manila and to abandon his missionary work in China. His plan was to contact the Dutch in their factory at Nan-t’ai (南泰島), and to wait for a difcult chance to go to Manila from there. In fact, he created that occasion by convincing the Dutch that he would help them in starting trade with Manila (SIT, 628–653), something totally forbidden since the peace treaties of Munster (1648) between Holland and Spain. In January 1666, he boarded a ship to Manila for his sixth and last trip. They passed rst by Quelang, a post that the Dutch had recovered two years earlier and would keep for another two. His presence there was providential for the Dutch because he helped them as translator in a negotiation with some Zheng Jing envoys from Tayouan. Finally his ship left Quelang reaching Manila on 19 March 1666. He was received by the Spanish authorities, not as a hero but with suspicion; and he was sent to his superiors, requesting them to place him away from the city of Manila.

Taiwan falling apart from the missions We have said in the previous chapter how in 1683 the emperor Kang Hsi lifted the ban on maritime commerce, and consequently traditional trade routes were re-established, putting Taiwan again outside these routes. Something similar can be said about

200 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

Christianity in Taiwan. Since the Spaniards left the island and the Dutch reduced their presence in the China Sea, Christianity started vanishing in northern Taiwan and then in the whole island. The next appearances of missionaries were coincidental, like this visit of Victorio Riccio, who still reported the presence of some Catholic natives (SIT, 626, 642–643). Later, in 1673–1674 (still under the Zheng regime), four Dominicans stayed in southern Taiwan trying to open a mission, but after a few months without positive results they went back to the Philippines (SIT, 655–657). Now, things were difcult for Taiwan. The missionary action was concentrated in China, and even the Spanish and Portuguese Jesuits were substituted by French, Belgian, and German Jesuits reaching still the Middle Kingdom from Macao. It was the moment of a slow but steady growth of Christianity, even if that happened during the crisis of the so-called Rites Controversy. It has been said that the year of the death of Hsu Kuang-chi (1633)—a Catholic converted by Ricci, the protector of the Jesuits in Beijing and the minister of Rites—represents the end of one epoch and the beginning of another, characterized by the rivalry with the mendicant friars, the period of this Rites Controversy. It is worth mentioning that at the very beginning Taiwan had a key role in that controversy, since the earlier protagonists, like the Dominican Morales or the Franciscan Antonio Caballero, reached China from Tamsui or San Salvador harbors. In fact, in these places somehow started the famous long trip to Beijing of 1637 made by the Franciscans Alenda and Bermúdez. They were received by the Jesuit Adam Schall, but the relation among the two groups of priests degenerated in a big quarrel that for a long period was the topic of gossip circles in Manila. The documents created with this occasion probably are the rst ones of the endless dispute that “ooded” European archives. A new short Christian presence in Taiwan appeared at the very beginning of the eighteenth century by a Jesuit leading a Chinese team of cartographers. From 1709 to 1718 some Jesuits scholars were commissioned to draw the maps of all the provinces of the empire, and Father Mailla was in charge of the province of Fujian and nearby islands. Fernando Mateos, a modern Jesuit scholar residing in Taipei explains: “On the third of April in the year 1714 the team sailed from Amoy, escorted by fteen junks of war with 755 soldiers and 75 ofcers. Mailla described minutely the Jesuit expedition to Formosa in a long letter of 85 pages, published in the widely read Lettres édiantes et curieuses of the Jesuit Missionaries.”43 This was the last recorded Christian presence on the island, until the Dominicans resumed their mission in 1859, as the Protestants did two years later, creating the last Christian wave on Taiwan.

Epilogue

The Baroque Ending

THE EL DORADO MYTH, which characterized the Renaissance period, was considered only as a dream and recorded legend during the Baroque. It was transferred to a chronicle as a way to make it stand out from contemporary endeavors. This was the case with the novelized narrative El Carnero, published in 1638 by the Creole Juan Rodríguez Freyle, narrating the rst century of the life of the city of Bogotá. Chapter 2 describes the ceremony of the proclamation as a king of the native heir, being bathed with gold, and fully covered by this precious metal, in the middle of a lake. But Rodríguez Freyle is quite direct in saying that many captains went in search of El Dorado, and they never found it, and he himself doubted if it ever really existed.1 But Baroque feelings are not only the delusive feelings of El Dorado and the series of deceptions that we have talked about in the last part of each chapter of this book. Also, for a long time the Baroque (and the Renaissance as well) had been understood beyond its architectural molders and literary delusions. Yes, the Baroque has become something more; it is a spirit, a vital attitude, and a way of understanding life. Thus it is common to talk about a Baroque cosmopolitism, a Baroque sense of honor, and even a Baroque man,2 all of them as categories where contraposition is a part.

BAROQUE

COSMOPOLITISM:

REFORMATION

AND LAWS

Probably one of the main conceptual problems that Eastern civilizations may have experienced upon the arrival of Westerners was to differentiate the nationals of the different European countries, as it happened with the Japanese, although for some of them that might have been easier because they were in a process of unifying a feudal state. Easterners had to learn the differences between the Portuguese and Spaniards, and from 1580 on, to understand the fact that though they were two different nations, they shared the same king. More confusion was added when the Dutch appeared. In theory they belonged to the same Crown, but they were in open rebellion against their king, consequently the Spaniards and the Dutch were mutual enemies. Later they observed that the English cooperated with the Dutch, but after the Amboyna incident, their relation

202 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

ceased. The Japanese, after getting familiar with the Jesuits, started observing other kinds of priests, the Dominicans and Franciscans, and later others called Augustinians. All of them were missionaries from the same religion, but dressed in different habits. The Chinese and Japanese living closer to the Spaniards in their respective parians of Manila probably coped faster with these differences and started to easily understand their special nuances linked with the social status of people living in Manila, the commercial system around the galleon, and the fact that those colonies included a cosmopolitan aggregate of nationals. For Eastern societies, like China, cosmopolitism was not a new experience. But in their case it was more a multicultural kind of aggregation of people, with different laws and customs. The novelty brought along by Westerners in cities like Manila was that the new cosmopolitism was under the rule of a distinctive and written law. A law that—even while it was used to the benet of the rulers, who defended their privileges and created differences among the people—still was somehow a referential law for everybody, with a clear differentiation of rights and duties. Maybe they were surprised by institutions like the Audiencia (or High Court) in which the judges had an independent authority from the governor, even if he was ofcially the nominal president of such court. Besides, this system of counterbalancing powers was extended to other spheres, for example the bishop, whose moral authority may have had an impact on government decisions. In Manila, there were two kinds of cosmopolitism, one resulting from the “attractive power of silver,” which brought Chinese, Japanese, and other Southeast Asian nationals into a multicultural aggregation, and the other one from the dominant group. The peculiarity of these different people coming from across the Pacic speaking different languages was that they were under a political unity. Among the group of soldiers were Spaniards, Mexicans, even Flemish, and black slaves. If we consider those arriving in Taiwan, we should add Pampangos, Cagayanos, and Tagalos, with a clear national distinction manifested in the fact that they were marching under their own banners. Among the Dominicans, there were not only Spaniards, but also Portuguese, Italians, and Sardinians. On the other hand, the people that joined the armies were classied under a clear structure: sailors, artillerymen, infantrymen, adventures, and all of them integrated into a common stratied system, which applied to salary, benets, honors, rights, and duties. These strata reached even the slaves, some of private ownership, others of public dependence like the “slaves of the king.” Certainly such a complex society can only be organized through laws that should be actualized and reformed according to new circumstances, including the regulations of how an army of conquest may behave and deal with the booty, as it happened with the armada of 1627 going to Taiwan (SIT, 98). As a result, for example, the natives of the Philippines had some particular laws for their own protection within the general legal body called Leyes de Indias3 (The Law of the Colonies), and even the sangleys had a part on them.4

Epilogue: The Baroque Ending

BAROQUE

REFORMATION:

THE

203

ARBITRIST SPIRIT

The law is usually attached to a policy of reformation, and the man that championed this spirit of reformation in Spain during the times of Philip IV was his prime minister, the count-duke of Olivares (1622–1643). He was a hard-working man who carried out an ambitious policy of reformation, through the creation of Juntas (i.e., special committees). But his policies failed in the end after some military defeats, including those of Montjuich (June 1641), Lérida (October 1642), a conspiracy in Andalusia (summer of 1641), and his nal destierro (1643) rst in his own lands near Madrid and later after new accusations when he was transferred to the city of Toro (1643). To add more trouble, he went through a trial in the tribunal of the Inquisition (1644) the year before he died. During the governorship of Olivares everybody felt authorized to suggest reforms, and a new group of people, the arbitristas, ourished. This name comes from arbitrio, or “solution” given to particular problems of the kingdom. Consequently, the arbitristas (considered as the first economic thinkers) were those clergymen, military men, businessmen, or public servants, who during the second part of the sixteenth century and through the seventeenth century wrote several reports or treaties, in Spain and Portugal5 alike, to solve political or economic problems. The government itself had their own policymakers, and a case for the Philippines can be seen in the long report made by Grau y Monfalcón,6 the procurator in the Council of Indies for the archipelago. There we can see a lengthy report of the situation, with some recommendations. The same analytical spirit can be seen in the junta of 1637 for the dismantling of the fortress of Isla Hermosa, or even in the detailed proceedings of Governor General Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera’s judgment of residency. Nevertheless, the arbitristas were more thinkers than public servants. For example, even if some of them like Luis Ortiz were royal accountants, Tomás de Mecado was a theologian, and González de Cellórigo was a lawyer. Regarding the Spanish presence in Taiwan, we can see in some reports that they were full of the arbitrist spirit. First, those of Luis Pérez de Dasmariñas and his rationale on the conquest of Isla Hermosa, second the one of De los Ríos Coronel, with the same purpose, both written in 1597. Later, we have the one of Fr. Bartolomé Martínez on “The advisability of the conquest of Isla Hermosa,” in 1619. More sophisticated were the two reports presented by Juan Cevicos in the court of Madrid (1627 and 1628) opposing the Spanish presence in Taiwan as a way of counterbalancing the Dutch presence and as a route for the missions to Japan and China. The same can be said of the report of Bishop Diego de Aduarte after his visit to Isla Hermosa (based on the draft of Jacinto Esquivel of 1632), which probably was an arbitrio handed down to the royal ofcers in Manila. On the other hand, other later reports, like the ones of Fr. Juan De los Ángeles or Fr. Teodoro Quirós, cannot be considered arbitrios, since they were made in retrospect, and did not suggest ways of action.

204 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

BAROQUE

HONOR:

THE

RHETORIC OF

FOR THE

EMPIRE’S

CORCUERA

AS A METAPHOR

DECLINE

The history of the Spanish presence in Taiwan can be summarized as a Renaissance adventure that after ten years of searching for consolidation lost its mission, and ended in Baroque pessimism. The reasons for their arrival were as neatly squared as the fortress they built and left behind: trade, the counterbalance of Dutch power, and missionary access to China and Japan. But ten years later some people in Manila considered that everything was a very costly enterprise with little gain in return. These ideas that can be traced not only in the contemporary documents of the Spaniards in Taiwan, but especially through all the papers gathered for the trial of Corcuera, two years after the defeat. In the junta of January 1637 they agreed to leave Isla Hermosa (SIT, 484), and to dismantle the peripheral fortress of Tamsui, el cubo, la retirada, la mira, leaving only the main fortress with only forty Spanish soldiers, eighteen Pampangos, and a company of Cagayanos. But Corcuera, as well as the other ofcers, considered that for the meantime the fortress should still be able to face a Dutch attack. And, considering the valiant defense of the post led by Governor Gonzalo Portillo in the rst Dutch attack in 1641, he was right.7 At that time good luck was on the side of Portillo, who claimed victory after “blasting the agship with an 18- [pounder] from the fortress of San Salvador, … And because the current brought them to a shallow part, or because the north wind that night was so strong that their cables broke, the said agship crashed against the coast where friendly natives, saw its masts, sails and riggings [oating] on the water” (SIT, 501). The change of attitude of Portillo was used by Corcuera to accuse him as the only one responsible for the lost of Quelang in 1642, being dominated by fear and avoiding battle against the Dutch. Not only that, Portillo—defenseless and afraid to return to Manila from Macassar—was considered not only a coward but also of being illiterate, and of other personal shortcomings. He appeared like the villain of a Spanish Baroque drama. The defeat manifested also a very important aspect of the Spanish character and of the Spanish armies: the sense of honor and of shame after a defeat without having put up the proper resistance. Corcuera accused Portillo because he did not behave according to the oath he had made to defend the fort entrusted to him by His Majesty (SIT, 492). And worst of all was that “the enemy seized the forces with the artillery, provisions, supplies, banners and other items that were kept there, to the discredit of the arms of His Majesty, as was witnessed by two great empires like Japan and China and other neighboring kingdoms” (SIT, 495). Consequently, The armed forces of His Majesty got a bad reputation, because without ring even a single shot at the Dutch enemy, he surrendered the said fort to [the Dutch enemy], and His Majesty received [not only] severe damage as regards the reputation of His naval forces, but also the loss of the fort, the artillery, the supplies and the men, and the new Christianity that had begun to ourish [in the land] from the preaching of the holy Gospel. (SIT, 502)

Epilogue: The Baroque Ending

205

The trial of Corcuera that followed the end of his term as governor is another postRenaissance event. Never before was a governor treated with such rigor, and the whole trial was a Baroque example of conict, excessiveness, and tumult. Along the trial we see the overowing rhetoric of the empire, using strong sounding statements to accuse others, or to defend personal actions. For example, Corcuera, defending his decision to delay the dismantling of the fortresses, said: “For honorable soldiers, without His Majesty’s express command, are obliged not to leave the King’s armed forces undefended as these were built at his orders and expense” (SIT, 500). Secondly, mentioning the negligence of Cristóbal Márquez (the governor before Portillo) and defending his withdrawal from the post, Corcuera said: “As for disobedient soldiers, particularly ofcers and others of like responsibilities; the most lenient punishment is not to give them any order for His Majesty’s service (this I learned from good masters in the state of Flanders)” (SIT, 502). Corcuera, justifying his innocence from the unpredictable behavior of Portillo, by whom he had been appointed, said “[the defeat] was due to the cowardice and poor government of the chief [i.e. Portillo] who was in charge. And this [courage] could not be given to him by [the governor of] Manila. It is a gift that God alone can grant” (SIT, 501). Another great example of the justication coming from Spanish imperial military code was given by Corcuera, when he justied his innocence recalling the Battle of the Downs (or Nieuwport) of July 2, 1600, where the archduke Alberto was defeated by the Dutch general Maurice of Nassau near Dunkirk. He said that the responsibility of the defeat was charged on the lieutenants, not on the generals: That great retreat saw the loss of hundreds and more of His Majesty’s ags. Being thus so, the said banners were entrusted to the noted captains by His Majesty … In the loss of the said banners—to which the captains willingly entrusted to the soldiers—, justice was not asked from the said captains; neither were they blamed for the loss. Rather, they threw into prison the surviving second lieutenants who lost the banners; and those who did not have good excuses were beheaded. (SIT, 504)

It was ironic that in another Battle of the Downs, near the same place as the previous one, the Spanish eet commanded by Oquendo was defeated by the Dutch in its attempt to bring supplies to the Spanish forces in Flanders. This happened in 1639, on the verge of the Dutch attack of Quelang. That (second) Battle of the Downs was a strong blow to the Spanish sea power with important repercussions to their colonies. The next defeat, although only a small one in relative terms, but morally very important was precisely the mentioned battle of San Salvador, in 1642, on the other part of the globe, leading to the nal transfer of maritime leadership from Spain to Holland, not only as an image but also as a reality—the Spanish cannons of San Salvador were transferred to the Dutch fortresses of the Banda Islands (SIT, 490).

BAROQUE

MEN:

THE SAN SALVADOR

BATTLE

(1642)

If Renaissance painting discovered the sense of perspective, the Baroque emphasized the chiaroscuro, understood as a “synthesis of contraposition,” the light and the dark,

206 The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626–1642

the beauty and the ugliness, of life and of death. In chapter 1, we have referred to one of the most Baroque episodes of Spanish Hermosa, the defeat by the Dutch (see annexes 14 and 16). Then, the small island of Quelang became a Calderonian stage where the play El Gran Teatro del Mundo (“The World as a Big Stage,” written around 1635), made in 1641 the rehearsal of the nal act, and in 1642 the one and only denitive performance. There, while Captain Valentín de Aréchaga was ghting against the heretics, his commander Portillo abandoned him to his own luck. Aréchaga and his soldiers could not believe this neglect, as Portillo could not believe how he was abandoned by Corcuera. Life was a dream. The stable and serene Renaissance sense of balance had been transformed into a dynamic perception. Everyone discovered that the coin has two sides, and that the truth was too complex to be summarized in one formula. As the delusion was set up in everybody’s minds, they started to understand why things ended in this way. The nal act of the play was performed in front of a satised audience, all the Basayans (Quimaurrians and Taparrians) and other natives from Tamsui. They came to witness from the surrounding mountains the theatrical spectacle of the announced Spanish defeat, surrender, and capitulation. Portillo, one of the two stage directors, summarized later the nal act in this way: Seeing ourselves defeated, we acknowledged the surrender because we had no other option and because we could not ght back. And even if we [could], we would have easily lost. The few men left in the fort divided themselves into parties and went out military style with our ag, war drums and weapons. (SIT, 399)

In the nal moments of the play, the audience, pleased and scared as well with such a pathetic ending echoed by the martial noise of the drums, felt compelled to act like the choirs of the Greek tragedies. Then, they stood up and borrowed the verses, which in Calderon’s play admonish the king: Rey de este caduco imperio, cese, cese, tu ambición, que en el teatro del mundo ya tu papel se acabó.

King of this perishable empire, end, end your ambition, because in the stage of the world, your role is already gone.

Finally, Spanish and Dutch actors retreated from the scene by the back door. Some Dutch still remained for the rehearsal of a new play, but the others went together with the Spaniards to Tayouan and later to Batavia, commenting about their performance and sharing the information of the whole theater of operations, from the corners of Nagasaki to the southern ones of Malacca. In Batavia they said goodbye to each other. Some Spaniards went back to Manila, others to Spain passing by Hamburg. And some Dutch just went back to Holland. The Quimaurrians went to Quimaurri and the Taparrians to Taparri, but for them the play they had seen was not a distant performance. It made them realize that it was going to alter their lives: that they had to pay more attention to their surrounding neighbors, that isolation was something of the past, and nally, that their time had recently been sequenced by such radical events and practices that a new perception of history had entered into their lives.

Annexes

Annex 1: The shipwreck in Taiwan of the galleon from Macao to Japan of 1582 A section from the account of the Jesuit Alonso Sánchez wherein describes the sinking of the ship which was to bring him from Macao to Japan. This took place in Taiwan in July 1582 (SIT, 10–11). On board the ship there were almost 300 persons, among them three more Jesuits going to their mission in Japan. One of them, the Spaniard Pedro Gómez, wrote a much longer, more detailed report of the same shipwreck (SIT, 1–9). Alonso Sánchez resided in Manila, and from there he went to China on a few occasions. In fact, now he was trying to go back to Manila the long way round, passing through Japan.

“The distance between Macao and Japan is 300 leagues, sailing eastward along the coast of China; and between Japan and Luzon, there are more than 200 leagues, going southwest … Along the way, traveling through this gulf is an island called Hermosa, because of her tall and green mountains seen from the sea. The Portuguese have traveled to Japan between this island and the Chinese coast for about 40 years without ever exploring or landing on it. The junk or ship, which I boarded, belonged to a very rich and important Portuguese in Macao named Bartolomé Baez. It was very big and carried all of Macao’s wealth because the other boat ahead was small and carried little cargo. We sailed eight or 10 days from Macao towards Japan, beset by difculties. As people say when we returned, this gulf had such a generous share of storms and hurricanes that neither mast nor rudder was spared. In the end, God did not want us to reach Japan. We owe the shipwreck on the said island to the pilot’s negligence. It was a Sunday at midnight and there was a great wind. We managed to get off with some planks, while others swam until they got exhausted. In short, the great junk fell into pieces and all the goods were scattered on the shore and rotted there. Later, some natives, naked and armed with bows and quivers, fell on us and with great spirit and determination, without hesitating and without hurting anyone, divested us of everything that we had. They came everyday, and more often

208

Annexes

at night, killing some and wounding many with their arrows, to the point that we had to defend ourselves the best we could. We remained in this condition more than three months feeding on available rice until we nally nished building a small boat out of the pieces we retrieved from the large one. The departure itself was so difcult since we spent over a month planning how to bring the boat to the water without having it fall into pieces, and thus leaving us with no other alternative but to be the next meal for those barbaric people whom we knew to be cannibals. We boarded this new boat, over 290 of us, and left without ballast or supplies; only with ve or six jugs of water and a little rice because the shoal through which we passed was so shallow and the coast extremely rough that it was impossible to leave with more cargo. Finally, we left. God gave us such a wind that in seven or eight days we returned to Macao where we were received with much sorrow and sadness among old and young alike over the loss of goods because there was no one so poor as not to send his basket to Japan, for they had no other job or other means to sustain themselves.” Annex 2: The beginning of the report of the Dominican Bartolomé Martínez regarding the “Advantages of Conquering Isla Hermosa” (Manila, 1619)

“So that Manila can maintain and further expand its trade relations, without fear [of being attacked by] the Dutch or other pirates, it is advisable to build a fort on Isla Hermosa in a place called Pacan,1 where a port is already said to exist. This will be the source, not only of a wealth of goods and services rendered to the Lord, but also of hope for the Crown’s increase and the promotion of other worthwhile causes, as the following arguments shall expound. It is a most ideal spot for trade and commerce as it is surrounded by Cagayan, China and Japan. It is said that the island is located 18 leagues from China at its closest point. The climate is delightful, the land abundant with fruits, venison and wheat. Nutmeg sticks were found among the rewood that the inhabitants of Isla Hermosa brought to our sampan, a clear proof that they exist on this Island. There is also much sh. If trade with Conchinchina, Siam, Cambodia, and principally Japan will be established from here, it will be very advantageous and lucrative … Once established [in Isla Hermosa], that port will be able to support this city [of Manila] by means of reasonable customs or taxes imposed on the merchandise that will be sold there. Whatever is left [may be spent on] iron, our, blankets and other military supplies. Since trade will ourish and because it is a peaceful land that is open to commerce and which [generously] sustains [its inhabitants], more people will go there—perhaps more than what is required for its security—because many will surely wish to live there as a reward for their services.” (SIT, 40, 44–45) Annex 3: The small armada of May 1626

The naval eet of 1626 was not made up of ships that bore specic orders to launch an offensive against the natives of northern Taiwan, because they were not expected to put up any resistance. The eet left Cavite on 8 February and spent the winter in northern

Annexes

209

Quelang Santa Catalina Santiago 10 May ISLA HERMOSA

Fort Zeelandia

7 May

0

100

200

15 March Cape Bojeador

4 May

Bangui ILOCOS CAGAYAN NUEVA SEGOVIA Two galleys

PAMPANGA Twelve junks 8 February

Manila Cavite

Map A1 The otilla of May 1626 for the conquest of Quelang. It was a successful trip of only two galleys accompanied by a dozen of junks.

210

Annexes

Luzon, where it quelled some ‘native uprisings.’ After passing through the province of Nueva Segovia on 4 May, it reached southern Taiwan three days later and reached the north of the island on 10 May. In reality, this was a small eet; its most signicant vessels were two galleys, small yet swift, each armed with ve cannon and each with a capacity of thirty infantrymen. The rest of the infantry and other supplies were loaded into sampans and other smaller vessels. Aduarte’s account of the composition of this armada slightly differs from that of Alonso de Toulacque Domingo de Cavadta described years later after the arrest by Dutch captors. The table below shows the discrepancy: Table A1 Composition of the Spanish armada assigned to conquer Quelang 1626 (two versions)

Aduarte’s account

Toulacque and Cavadta’s account

2 galleys

2 galleys

12 junks

1 frigate and 9 junks

3 infantry captains with their companies 100 Spaniards, 200 black men and men from Pampanga

Aduarte, History (SIT, 84–86) & “Report of Toulacque and Cavadta” (SIT, 146–149)

The History of Aduarte offers a detailed description of the voyage, landing, and occupation of the island of Quelang (renamed San Salvador by the Spaniards, which is called Hoping Island at present-day). Aduarte’s account says: They spent three days sailing along the coast and on 10 May reached a cove that they called Santiago. The Provincial and the chief pilot, Pedro Martin de Garay, explored the coast in two boats and went up to the main port in the North. In ve hours they discovered a port that they called Santísima Trinidad. Having informing the eet about this, they approached … And on an island whose circumference measures a little more than a league, they set up a fort called San Salvador and one more bastion atop a hill 300 feet or more in height, making the spot impregnable. The rst port that they established, they named Santiago … The inhabitants of that place had ed, terried by the Spanish harquebuses. But they desired to avenge themselves of the offence, seeing that the soldiers had helped themselves of the rice that they had left behind and were living in the houses that they built. To appease them and to make restitution for what they had taken, the missionaries went amongst them and tried to learn their language. In a short time, they began to communicate with them. (SIT, 72–73)

In short, after this conictive rst encounter, the Spaniards tried to solve the problem of ‘language barrier’ and lack of ‘mutual trust,’ in order to achieve peaceful co-existence with the natives. These tasks were entrusted basically to the missionaries, who then started to learn the native language and tried to approach the natives with kindness and respect. Also, the missionaries baptized the two daughters of the Japanese with a big display of pomp, with the idea of showing the importance of religion (SIT, 86). They also used the mediation of a Japanese Christian, a long-time resident of Santiago who was married to a native woman (SIT, 86).

Annexes

211

Annex 4: Copy of the record of the taking of Isla Hermosa, the fortress of San Salvador, and the native towns by Sergeant Major Antonio Carreño de Valdés, deputy of Fernando de Silva, Governor of the Philippines (Isla Hermosa, 16 May 1626)

“On 16 May 1626 at the port of Santísima Trinidad and the fortress of San Salvador of Isla Hermosa, Captain and Sergeant Major Antonio Carreño de Valdés, as the chief and deputy of the Governor and Captain General of the Island, declared that by virtue of the order from Lord Fernando de Silva, Knight of St James and Governor and Captain of the Philippine Islands, he begins the fortication and, in the name of His Majesty, acquires and takes possession of the island, fort and the native towns. [He had done] that because after having tried to negotiate with some of the natives through his retinue of members of the religious orders and captains, offering them friendly dealings and after waiting for their answer for four days, the natives refused to render obeisance to His Majesty. On this day, Mass was celebrated, a cross rose up, and the royal standard set up with the required solemnity and honor. And so that this day may be forever recorded, he said that in the best form and manner that can be lawfully allowed, he took—and did take—possession of the said port and fort to represent all the other things in that island in the name of His Majesty, and as his royal patrimony. And to symbolize this possession, he took in his hands branches from different trees, soil, and other things. And with due respect, he shouted, ‘Long live the King, our lord, Philip IV. May he live long and have more kingdoms and estates,’ as he claimed this [land] in behalf of the royal name. There present were Reverend Father Bartolomé Martínez, provincial of the Order of our Father St Dominic, three other members of that order, and captains Juan Martínez de Liédana, lieutenant general of the galleys, Antonio de Vera, Juan de Chaves, Benito Flores, Diego de Novas, and the chief pilot Pedro Martín Garay, who were witnesses to everything that took place and to which I, the scribe, also give testimony that all this happened in my presence and in the presence of the said witnesses. Signed by the aformentioned sergeant major, Antonio Carreño de Valdés, Fr. Bartolomé Martínez, Fr. Domingo de la Borda, Fr. Francisco de Santo Domingo, Fr. Jerónimo Morera, Juan Martínez de Liédana, Antonio de Vera, Benito Delgado Florez, Juan de Chaves, Pedro Martin Garay, Diego Novas. All of them rendering their testimony to my person, Pedro Sotelo de Ulloa, notary of war.” (SIT, 75–76) Annex 5: The armada of August 1626 (the rst attempt to conquer Tayouan)

In a document probably written in 1627, Fr. Melchor Manzano wrote to the king saying: “Last year, Governor Juan Niño de Tavora sent aid from the entire city in the form of men and ammunition” (SIT, 113). It is peculiar that this document is the only preserved reference to a big armada sent on the initiative of the new governor Niño de Tavora, for he or Aduarte in his History could have easily mentioned this event. On the other hand, Dutch documents (SIT, 89–90) contain the description of a Spanish armada that could be the one referred to by Fr. Manzano. The account, dated 10 September 1627, was written in Nagasaki by two Dutchmen who, in turn, claimed to have obtained this information from two Spaniards in Cambodia. In other words, the

212

Annexes

Kelang ISLA HERMOSA

2

Fort Zeelandia

1

0

100

200

Ships that made the whole trip.

LUZON galleys

1

2

ships junks

Cavite

Map A2 The eet of August 1626 against the Dutch. It was a very unsuccessful trip because of the typhoons. Some ships made the whole trip, one got lost (1), the other was stranded in Lequios (2), some junks disappeared, others were able to reach back to Luzon.

Annexes

213

news about this armada came from an indirect source. In any case, this armada cannot be the same one sent for the conquest in May 1626 or the one sent later in August 1627, because the rst one was smaller, and compared with the second one, we nd many differences. Let us look at the information culled from the Dutch sources. The armada was composed of three galleons, six frigates, two galleys, and twelve Chinese junks. The vessels carried 500 Spaniards and over 1,000 Filipinos from the province of Pampanga. The commander was a certain Caraans (possibly Alcarazo) who had orders from the governor general to attack the Dutch fort in Zeelandia. He failed to execute the order because a storm struck and so badly scattered the eet that only one galleon, six frigates, one galley, and four or ve junks managed to reach Quelang in August 1626. One of the other two galleons disappeared, while the other reached the islands of Lequios, where most of the crew perished. The other galley and the rest of the junks were either lost or driven to different areas in the Philippines. The boats that reached Quelang carried construction material for the fort but many of the crew members died there. In February 1627, the death toll escalated to 250 Spaniards and many more men from Pampanga.2 General Caraans, too, was gravely ill because he had drunk water containing high levels of sulfur. The area was uninhabitable and one could easily fall sick. According to the informants, the rst ones who had visited the place from Manila3 did not send reports about the unhealthy condition of this bay—which was why such problems arose. In addition, the said armada should not have carried that quantity of aid and supplies. Since no new provisions came from Manila, one of the six frigates went to Cambodia to buy rice in February 1627. On board the frigate was an “Italian ambassador” named Juan Bautista, who was assigned to do the purchasing but was unable to obtain anything. If this information were credible, then we would think that the armada of May 1626 was an advance party, whose mission was to nd better ground and prepare it for the coming of a larger contingent in August. If the two armadas of 1626 ought to be considered as one, this might explain the absence of the written Spanish sources about the second armada. Another possibility is that the second armada was a totally different initiative of the new governor Niño de Tavora. Annex 6: The armada of August 1627 (the last Spanish effort)

How big was the eet of 1627? We can answer this question by comparing the three eets. The eet of May 1626 was quite small with two or three galleys of the biggest ships, although around ten small ships also joined. The eet of August 1626 was bigger, because it seems that her primary goal was to expel the Dutch; so their initial destination was Tayouan, and later to Quelang to send a big relief to the rst expedition. The eet was very big, comprising three galleons, eight ships, and a large number of smaller boats. The eet of August 1627 had the same goals as the previous one, but in a reverse order: before attacking the Dutch, they had to rst go to Quelang to deliver the relief and to help them in building the castle. This eet was intended to be bigger than the previous

214

Annexes

Kelang ISLA HERMOSA Fort Zeelandia

0

100

200

Galleys that reached Penghu

LUZON Don Felipe

Santiago

2 Aug. 1626

San Ildefonso Peña de Francia

Santa Teresa

12 March 1627

Rosario Atocha The only ship that (Concepción) San Agustín reached Quelang

26 July

6 Sept. 17 Aug.

Map A3 The eet of August–September 1627 against the Dutch.

Cavite

Annexes

215

one, but after the problem encountered by the galleon “Concepción” that prevented it from making the trip, it was almost the same, or even smaller. We have a detailed record (SIT, 100–101) of the soldiers (more than 1,000), sailors (almost 900), etc. We know other things about this armada. The governor Niño de Tavora told the king in a letter of 1628 that the galleys “were unable to pass through the eastern part of the island. So, they went westward, between the coast of China and Isla Hermosa” (SIT, 134). Also, Tavora was now determined to continue the idea of his predecessor, which was to establish a fort in Isla Hermosa, because on July 7 (three weeks before the departure of the rst ships) “they began to load big quantities of tiling onto the agship [the galleon ‘Concepción’].” This quantity must have been very big, because “it was burdened with such a great weight, that the ship showed that it was not to make the voyage; for it commenced to leak so badly that it could not be drained.” And nally it was left behind in the port (SIT, 129). If the armada had not encountered a big storm, what kind of resistance could it have met in Tayouan? It is difcult to say, but, according to the information provided by the galleys, they observed the same defensive structure as shown in the map made with the information from Salvador Díaz (SIT, 134). Also, according to some Portuguese who had captured a ship sailing from Zeelandia and made some of the Dutch prisoners, “[they] were very weak and determined not to ght, but to leave the fort at the arrival of the eet.” (SIT, 131) In this case, it seems clear that the army of 1627 was strong enough to defeat the Dutch in Tayouan. But on the other hand, considering that since 1616 the Dutch had already gained the initiative in the Far East, we can presume that, even if the Spaniards had stopped the establishment of this fort in 1627, the Dutch would have tried it again. Nevertheless, we cannot elaborate more on this matter, because we have insufcient facts to write an accurate history. At the same time, we can feel the growing weakness of the Spanish forces, especially in the failure to set up a Union of Arms in cooperation with the Portuguese. Annex 7: The yacht “Domburch” reconnoitering Spanish posts in August 1629

Reconnaissance of fort of Santo Domingo and fortress San Salvador in August of 1629, according to the diary of the yacht “Domburch” (SIT, 139–140). (See also Plate 7.) “13 August. In the morning we started to sail with a slightly cool wind blowing westsouthwest. In the afternoon, at a distance of about two miles from the above mentioned west corner, we reached a bay or river that the Chinese called Tamsui. Later in the afternoon we rowed upriver with the well-equipped sloops to check the depth and the situation of the place. Upriver, at a distance of about two half cartouw (sic) -shots, we saw one Spanish galley, one frigate, four Chinese junks and some other small vessels. Furthermore we saw several houses on land surrounded by a bamboo fence. With this information we came back on board, and the council decided that the yacht Domburch

216

Annexes

together with the junk Fortuijn and the sloops of the other yachts would go upriver in the morning to see what could be done against the enemy. To make the yacht lighter we got rid of most of the water and threw some ballast overboard. 14 August. In the morning we set sail to the above-mentioned river. The yachts ‘Diemen’ and ‘Slooten’ remained at the mouth of the river, while the yacht ‘Dombur[ch]’ together with the junk and the sloops sailed upriver. At rst the river is narrow because there are cliffs on the one side, and on the other side there is a great sandbar. There was a little cool breeze from the north, and we got by sailing up to 1 ½ goteling (sic)-shots at the enemy vessel. We remained there, since it was almost evening, and the farther we went, the shallower the waters became. At night we posted one guard sloop between the enemy and ourselves. August 15. In the morning before dawn we made one throw 400 to 500 [fathom] long, and not long afterwards, by daybreak, we were within reach of the galley’s artillery. The galley red a shot at us, and when we headed towards them, they rowed back until they reached a bight, close to shore where they had a fortication on a mountain. We pursued the galley with our yacht, so that they, from their batteries on land located in front of their fences, red four times at us. We were at the mercy of their artillery, and they hit the yacht several times, resulting in considerable damage. The sail-maker of the junk Slooten was dead, the chief-merchant Adrijaen van der Wel and the navigating ofcer of the junk, being on board with us, both lost a leg, and our carpenter’s knee was shattered. We from the yacht defended ourselves against the galley and battery on land. The junk and sloops were dispatched to try, by going along the upper shore, to get the vessel within shooting range and take it or set it a re. However this was not possible, so they came back on board. Because the wind and the current were against us, the water level being at its highest, and having no more than three or four feet of water under the keel, we were forced, in order not to get stranded and to avoid further mishap, to retreat with the loss of two anchors. But it was too late; the ebb tide got us stranded on a place were the water was only three feet deep, within reach of the enemy artillery. The enemy could still reach us with one piece of artillery from its battery, and pursued us over land behind the cliffs, with two pieces of artillery, which they planted between some bushes nearby the beach. They severely damaged the yacht, but, by grace of God, not one man was injured. By dusk, the yacht started to oat, and catching the land wind, we started to sail, reaching the mouth of the river where we joined the two other ships. 16 August. In the morning we started to sail, keeping our course northeast alongside the island in order to discover the enemy fortress. According to the Chinese, we were still at a distance of about six miles from the fortress. We could discern a vessel from afar, pursuing us, while keeping close to the shore. We presumed the vessel to be an ihelis (sic). At noon, we had the wind and current against us and anchored our ships approximately four miles from the fortress.”

Annexes

217

Annex 8: The natives of Quelang (a) Jacinto Esquivel, Record of affairs concerning Isla Hermosa (SIT, 165–166).

“Isla Hermosa, as seen from the city or port of San Salvador, has the following villages along the side that stretches towards the Dutch port: Taparri: a settlement, formed from four or ve villages. These Taparris and Quimaurris live near the Spaniards inside the bay. They are the pirates who were living in the islet where we have the city built, who suffered much harm at the beginning of the conquest. They were driven out of their land, their tambobos of rice and corn razed from the ground along with their houses of excellent timber, their furniture and other belongings. Initially, the intention was to restitute 4,000 pesos for the damages; so far, they had been paid only 400 or 600 pesos. Afterwards, on various occasions, they killed some Spaniards, Cagayanos and sangleys who were coming to do business in the port. Although they were punished by burning their houses and injuring some of the natives, it may be doubtful whether they really deserve the said restitution, considering the great damage they had caused us. This is the only way that the Spaniards may be freed of this obligation. One can inquire about those damages from those who were here since the beginning of the conquest. From Taparri to Tamchui there are two or three small villages of Taparrians along the beach and the mountains. It would be wise to remove them from there and resettle them into a single village with the Taparris who live by the bay. Or they can live with the other natives elsewhere. Even if they do not harm the Spaniards who go from one fort to another through the coast, it remains a matter of justice to remove them from there because they were the ones who killed 20, 30 or more Spaniards in that port. Furthermore, they prey on the sampans that come to the coast, as they did this year to the junk of Cambodia that ran aground there on its way to Manila. For that, their villages were burned, but were soon rebuilt. The natives of Quimaurri and Taparri are of the same stock and all those from Quimaurri are Taparrians. They have the same customs and traits. They are divided and try to outshine each other, but not to the extent of preventing inter-marriages or other forms of social relations. They live on shing, hunting, salt making and fashioning arrows, houses, clothes, and knives. They do not plant as the other natives do because they do not know how. Still, they serve as farmhands for the rest, the way the sangleys work for us, as they are always bustling about. They are friendly and mingle with the other villages with whom they barter manual work for rice and corn. These natives are craftier and more sardonic than the others who are simple and more open. And since they are land-tillers, they help out more in the villages and leave only to plant or to hunt deer in the nearby areas.” (b) Jacinto Esquivel, A situationer on the conversion of the Isla Hermosa (SIT, 179).

“Their ways are similar to those of the others—somewhat inept and slow but naturally candid and simple, like the natives of Pangasinan. Those of Taparri and Quimaurri are the keenest [and quickest] of all, but are not as good-natured. Some are extremely

218

Annexes

greedy and constantly go about begging. I believe that this is due to the poverty and want in which they live. This is why mothers kill their infants by burying them alive or giving them away in exchange for stones, clothing material, all this due to their lack of clothing or food. The natives show no form of charity or respect for each other, more so with those aficted with repulsive diseases, like leprosy. To avoid contamination, lepers are left to die unattended.” Annex 9: The natives along the Tamsui River Jacinto Esquivel, Record of affairs concerning Isla Hermosa (SIT, 166–170).

“The natives of Senar comprise eight or nine villages and live near the fort. We are trying to unite them into one village where they used to live and where their houses stand. They abandoned the place out of fear when the Spaniards took over. They cultivated other farmlands, and built houses and tambobos in the interior. The place where we are trying to gather them is on a mountain, which is cool and pleasant to live on, as they can shelter themselves in their thatched huts from the cold of winter and from the fury of the winds that usually topple down their houses and tambobos. On this mountain there are many fruit trees, like peach and orange. It is about half a league from the fort of the Spaniards and the road is good due to some atlands that used to be farmlands before the Spaniards came. From the fort [of Santo Domingo], going into the interior by river, the river branches in two at a distance of two or three leagues from the port. One branch is called Quimaçon, through which one can go to the island or fort of San Salvador … The other branch of the river goes towards Pulauan, where so far and at the moment, we discovered two or three big villages. Along this branch that stretches toward the island, a short distance from where the river branches, there is on one side a small estuary through which one can enter a cluster of eight or nine villages called Quipatao, where many natives live. It is the place that one frequents by land from Senar, skirting around some hills. However, the way by the river is shorter and easier, much more so when the tide rises and ebbs, making the boat skim across the waters. There are very tiny villages nestled along the same branch of the Quimazon up to Lichoco, about six leagues away from San Salvador. Lichoco has two villages of up to 200 or 300 houses, a great portion of which are in the mountains. The river passage towards the island until Lichoco is very calm and easy to sail, with lowlands on both sides. The same is true of the branch that goes to Pulauan but life along the banks is difcult because the river swells and overows at certain seasons, rising up to three or four brazas and ooding the houses and elds while people salvage their belongings in small boats. The natives living along either branch have shown me how high these oods could get by making knife marks of the wooden parts of their houses to indicate the level reached by the waters. These tides sweep in some pine trees and other fragrant wood, massive logs, and very strong and durable wood. They are milled in the Tamchui fort, where they are sawn and cut for building storage houses

Annexes

219

and for renovating the fort itself, which is made of wood and logs. This kind of river ood does not reach the villages of Quipatao because the inland abounds with soil. Neither does it affect the villages of Lichoco because the river springs from there, and is therefore a mere trickle. The way from Lichoco to the island is rough due to some 36 piles of loose rocks scattered all over, making it impossible for a large boat to pass. Only small canoes can pass and be dragged along by the native rowers who have to disembark. This happens only in summer, for in winter there is enough water for the boats. Nevertheless, this way is perfect in comparison with the path that connects the forts through the beach. It is all rocky ground, with many rivers to cross and uphill climbs replete with obstacles and risks. Sulfur is abundant along the Tamsui River, in the villages of Quipatao. There is another sulfur mine in Taparri, where the natives used to get huge quantities to sell to the sangleys before the arrival of the Spaniards. But now they have stopped working in the mines because they claim that it gives them bad luck. For sulfur, the sangleys would barter chininas, printed clothing material and other trinkets. And they receive much of it, up to ve piculs for two pieces of clothing material worth three reals here. Last year, the sangleys took around a thousand piculs for the powder they need for their reworks. However, the real value of one picul there is not known for certain. We were told by the sangleys that a low-ranking Mandarin loaded sampans with sulfur and sold it for 17 or 18 taels per picul. We do not know if it was due to a shortage of supply or, as others claimed, it was because he had not brought anything there for two years. They told us that sometimes one picul of sulfur is worth ve to eight taels. But now they say that due to an over-supply, they can not sell it, but it seems that they are not being honest about this. Here in Senar, there is a kind of root crop that grows big and long, and which is used to dye their nets and other things. One picul of this crop is said to be worth four or ve taels in China but here they are bartered very cheaply with stones bells, brass bracelets, and other things. Aside from these, almost all the natives of the land sell much liana and deerskins. They say that in China, liana sells for two or three taels a picul. It is used to make chairs and thousands of other interesting objects. I do not know the cost of the deerskin there, but it is surely a prized item. This year, three sampans from Japan were loaded with it, and a Japanese told me that while silk is very precious merchandise there, they earn more from skins. If one walks from the fort along the sea coast towards the Dutch fort, the rst villages to be found are those of Pantao. One of the leaders of these places claims that he is the son of a Spaniard, one of those who disappeared long ago. The natives of Pantao are our friends; they are baptized while still infants, and they ask for priests. The natives living along the two branches of the Tamsui River, those of Senar (and those of Taparri, Quimaurri and Caquiuanuan, also known as Santiago, and who live next to the Cabalan) are our friends. One can go to these villages in utmost security. Any soldier, cagayán, or priest can condently come and go alone. They would move from one fort to another, passing by the shore or the river banks through these villages to barter rice in

220

Annexes

the villages of Pulauan and Pantao. Beyond Pantao there are many other native villages along the shore with whom we are neither friendly nor at enmity; we simply have no contact with them. The natives who live near Pantao are the opposite of those in Pantao; they go around head-hunting. Among them is a Cagayano, one of those who deserted the Tamsui fort to join the Dutch. We know nothing of the rest. The Pantao natives do not dare bring him unless he is dead because he is living with their enemies. The natives of Quimaurri and Taparri have friendly dealings with all the other groups. But those from Pantao are enemies of those from Senar. And those from Senar are enemies of those from Pulauan, Pantao and Cabalan. Those who live along the two branches of Tamsui River are enemies of the Cabalan. Before the Spaniards came, they were all cutting off each other’s heads and celebrated this with drunken feasts and masitanguitanguich. To honor the bravery of those who managed to cut heads, they would paint their necks, legs and arms. But later on, they realized how much trouble they caused their villages due to their treachery, and they no longer dare even to kill their fellow-villagers, considering this to be bad luck. Only the Cabalan natives still practice head-hunting. At harvest time, they would hide along the path of the river and shoot arrows to kill and then cut the heads of the natives of Tamsui who pass by on small boats. They are so daring that they attack even the sampans, as they did last year, when they ambushed a sampan of sangleys that carried the servant of the Commander of Tamsui and two other Spaniards. They rained arrows on them, which overwhelmed and rendered useless the muskets that they carried.” Annex 10: The initial acceptance of the missionary work by the natives (1632) Jacinto Esquivel, A situationer of the conversion of Isla Hermosa (SIT, 181–182).

“They are still extremely afraid and suspicious of us. Up to now they have a deep-seated fear of the Spaniards. When I rst came, they spread rumors that I carried shackles in a pouch to bind them and take them as prisoners to Manila. They directly accused me of this once, in the presence of another priest. They asked where my wife, children and possessions were. When I told them that priests neither get married nor own anything, they called me a big liar and a deceiver. The same thing happened—what’s more they thought me insane—when I tried to explain to them from the catechism that we will all rise from the dead. They argued that some of those whom we have baptized were now dead and buried beneath their houses. But we have slowly grown in affection for each other to the point that they would offer me a wife. But they are disappointed to see that we do not even allow women to enter the priest’s house. They had such affection for me in Taparri, where I was assigned for eight months, that when they would see me leave for another village where other Spaniards live, they would threaten to escape to the mountains if I did not return to sleep there. They believe that without a priest, they can never be sure of what the Spaniards will do to them. Each day they get to understand better what a priest is. The natives of Caquiuanuan [or Santiago], where a Japanese Christian has been living for some 40 years, are asking for a priest. The natives of Pantas in Tamchui are likewise asking for a priest. The

Annexes

221

residents of Quimaurri already have constructed a church, although they, too, have no priest. The sangley parian already has a priest’s house and a church, but no attending minister. The natives of Taparri and Senar already have a church and a priest. We are now trying to unite seven or eight villages so that we can better administer them. The different villages of the Quimaurri and the Taparri have been consolidated into two towns. What remains is to unite these two into one even if this will be a difcult thing to do because they are somehow at odds with each other … They promise to welcome us if we will not harm them in any way. The natives of Tamchui River, those who live along the branch that goes into the island have advised us to try out this plan on Senar. From there, one of their leaders told me that he and his fellow villagers wish to resettle near our fort because they want to build a church and have a priest of their own. Another leader of Lichoco, upon witnessing in Taparri that I have asked the Spaniards to free some native prisoners and to return to them their corn stock, also say, “Is this a priest? Well, if the other leaders want one, then I, too, want a priest for my town.” The men and women of Taparri now are very quiet because many of them were whipped for their vile dealings with both Spaniards and the men from Cagayan. The natives on the other side of the river Pulauan neither ask for us nor repel us. And in the other branches, in Senar, Taparri and Quimaurri, and Pantas [Pantao], a great number of infants were baptized. If we wanted to, we can also do the same with the infants and the older children of the Quimaurri and Taparri. However, we have held back until many more people are adequately instructed and so that a baptism can take place with solemnity …” Annex 11: Religious acts in Senar (ca. 1634) Diego de Aduarte, Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario (Synopsis of Chapter XXXV, SIT, 223–225).

“Whenever the father [Francisco Váez] celebrated mass, the natives would watch from outside … More came in the afternoons to listen to them sing the Salve. They sang everyday, to their great delight, and to the point that the young boys would sometimes ask the Brother [Andrés Jiménez] to sing; and he would go with them to the nearby riverbank and sing his devotions while they listened to him in awe. Fr. Francisco thought that the absence of their holy image would make the Spaniards feel dejected, and he wanted to return it to them for the feast of the Purication, as it was transferred to Senar a few days before the said feast. This was done against the will of his companion who stayed behind by himself. [The transfer] saddened the natives and even more because they thought that the priests would go with her and leave them behind. The Brother wrote about this to the captain and after the procession inside his fort ended, he ordered that she be returned on that same day with some soldiers as escorts and the same father who had brought her. The natives welcomed her with feasting like that of the rst time, having prepared for her an altar in the camp; and they bore her on their shoulders from there to their humble church, amidst great rejoicing. Once the soldiers had left, the two remained there like before and carried on with their activities in full view of the natives so that they might win their affection ... They stayed there for two weeks.

222

Annexes

But because Lent was approaching, Fr. Francisco had to leave for Tamchui to hear the confessions of the Spaniards and to preach to them. Only Brother Jimenez remained. In his good spirit, he thought that it was about time to introduce the crucied Christ to the natives, for he had already learned to pray the Creed in the native tongue and asked the father to send him an image. He did not delay in sending this to him through a Christian native, one of the laborers in the fort who had been sent from Manila to serve in the camp. The bearer entered with the image exposed to the people and they wondered at it. Later, they went to the Brother to ask what kind of man that was. And he announced the mystery to them, using only the words of the Creed to see if they can understand something. Later he knelt and adored the image, and told them to do the same. And imitating him, they all adored [the image] one by one, and the children extended their lips to kiss it resolutely. [At that time] a chieftain fell ill unto death and he said that he fervently wanted to be Christian. He got well and said that he wanted to wait until the actual moment of death. At least, he understood that he had to be a Christian in order to have a good death; this is no small matter for a man who had never heard of such a thing in his whole life … There was an old man, apparently over 90 years old, in a wretched condition. As he was so old, at the brink of death and no more than a bundle of skin and bones, [the Brother] presented to him the things of the faith through an interpreter who accompanied him. [The man] was far from believing these and, refusing to listen, put his head between his legs and stuck his ngers into his ears. The Brother returned to Senar, but leaving word with [the man’s] daughter that he would return in two days, a Saturday, the day that the Christians honor a great Lady. He went back … and the moment he stood before the old man, who already had the stench of death about him, he embraced him and told him what was going to happen and that he was to ask him nothing but to convince him to become a Christian so that he would not go to hell. He was somewhat adamant, but less stubborn than the rst time … They spent half an hour [praying], after which the Brother told the interpreter to try talking to the old man again. A marvelous thing happened because he said that he greatly desired to become a Christian, and that he was rejecting all his superstitious beliefs and idolatry, and that he was very sorry for having offended God, that he believed in Him.” Annex 12: The death of the Dominican Fr. Francisco Váez (1636) Diego de Aduarte, Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario (Synopsis of Chapter XLVII, SIT, 239–242).

“It was Fr. Francisco Váez, apostle of that land, who was the rst to learn the language of the natives, initiating that the faith be preached among them.… he went through those villages and walked among them alone and condent—or so he thought—as if he were in his own land … He went with the rst expedition sent from that province to conquer Isla Hermosa. The Father Provincial, Fr. Bartolomé Martínez, who, in his zeal for the conversion of the great China, arranged for it and went with it, choosing Fr. Francisco

Annexes

223

as a companion and coadjutor for the conversion of those people, because he knew Fr. Francisco’s good spirit…. He went out of his way to show his love for the natives, always returning to them and adapting to their rude and humble state … On the day of Epiphany this year [1636], he left the house of All Saints, located in the principal fortress and city of Isla Hermosa and went to that of Tamchui with great rejoicing, as though it were a wedding, without being bothered about the great amount of water that rained down on him during the trip. The cause of the great joy and haste was his knowing that the natives had united into one village called Senar in order to be attended to and taught the Faith. He left [for Senar] and shortly formed them into a very good village where he taught doctrine and prepared them to be Christian, and [with the natives] showing their good dispositions to be so. Wishing to spread the name of our Lord God and his holy Faith, Fr. Francisco tried to establish a church in another village called Pantao, whose natives were friends of the Spaniards but enemies of Senar … Fr. Francisco informed those of Pantao about his idea and desire, and they welcomed it. They indicated the day that the Father was to go and start constructing the church. This was why he returned to Senar with great joy. And he invited the chiefs [of Senar] for that, so—as people who had known the Father and the church for a few days—they might accompany him in this act and to help celebrate the dedication of the new church. The natives [of Senar] responded favorably at that moment, but when they discussed the matter among themselves that night, they did not think it was a good idea. They drank and thought worse about the matter and ended up deciding to kill Fr. Francisco. A native friend heard of this and told Fr. Francisco about it. He thought this impossible because those natives had just set up a village and church and showed great affection for the Father. In addition, he himself had talked to them about the trip to Pantao the previous afternoon, and they all gladly assented. Besides, nothing had happened to cause them to change their minds. Thus, he did not believe what the native friend had told him. He arose early in the morning to prepare for the day. Seeing that the natives did not come, he went out to call them. At that time, they were prepared to ambush and kill him. When they saw him approach, they began to shoot arrows at him. At the lead was the chief of the uprising whom the Father had just freed from the prison where the Spaniards held him. And seeing him, the holy martyr, shocked by such great ingratitude said, ‘Why, Pila?’—which was his name—‘I come to teach you the law of God and you kill me?’ But [his words] fell on deaf ears, cruel barbarians as they are; and they continued to shoot at him … with arrows everywhere. The soldiers who retrieved his body afterwards conrmed that they numbered over 500. Seeing him dead, the natives cut off his head from the mouth, leaving his tongue and lower jawbone. And bringing the head and the right hand went to the mountains to celebrate, since it is a great feast for them to cut off heads. But, in this occasion they did not manage to do more. Since, as it was known from them that, as they began to dance with the head—as they would, and even eat it—after the dance, the earth began to shake so much that they thought it was going to swallow them.”

224

Annexes

Annex 13: Memorial describing the forts in San Salvador in 1636 A letter written in Manila by Alonso García Romero on 12 July 1636. García Romero, after nishing his appointment as governor of Isla Hermosa, reported to the Viceroy of New Spain about the situation of the island. He includes a memorial of the situation of the forces (SIT, 258–261).

“Most excellent lord: … I served [as Governor of Isla Hermosa] for two years and subjected the natives in the vicinity to our power, an accomplishment that my predecessors had not achieved in eight years. Over a thousand converted to Christianity; the other towns asked for priests because the scarcity has caused that they receive nothing more than the waters of Baptism. And the commerce, my lord, I established in a way that over 300 Vp worth of cloth and silk of all types were put to use in two years. A quantity of silks, satin, velvet and other goods went back to China due to the lack of money … I enclose a description of the armed forces of Isla Hermosa and the state in which I left them … The principal fortification forms a square that consists of four elevated walled fortresses: two are of solid stone; one is only of stone (and surrounded by) a moat; the other is of wood. All four stretches of wall are of solid stone and lack only the parapets. Within sight of this fort are another three. The farthest is la retirada, which, following a straight line should be 600 paces away. The other two are 500 paces away. All are completely of solid stone. La retirada is triangular in shape with passages on in each side. It is invulnerable. The others a ... enough to defend an inlet that protects the other fortress ... All assist the main fort with the following artillery supply: In the fortress of San Salvador, which is the principal fort: – four bronze cannons, each one an 18-pounder – two fourth-grade cannons of bronze, made like a culverin; each one a 12pounder – one cannon-type bronze artillery piece; an eight-pounder – one sacre of alloyed bronze; an eight-pounder – three bronze sacres …; each a ve-pounder – three falcons, one of cast iron; each one a four-pounder – two artillery pieces of cast iron; cannon-type; each one a four-pounder The San Millán [la mira] fort has the following artillery: – one fourth-grade cannon in bronze; a 12-pounder – two sacres of bronze; each one an eight-pounder – a bronze falcon; a four-pounder The – – –

artillery in la retirada (Fort San Antón): a medium-sized low-grade bronze culverin; a 12-pounder two bronze sacres; each one an eight-pounder a cast-iron blunderbuss; a 20-pounder

Annexes

225

The artillery in the turret of Fort San Luis [el cubo]: – a low-grade sacre in bronze; a seven-pounder – two bronze falcons; each one a four-pounder The artillery and the condition of the fort called Santo Domingo in Tamsui. By land, the distance from the main fortress is 15 leagues; 10 leagues when following a straight line. Its site and dimensions consist of three elevated wooden fortresses and a watchtower with a continuing wall that forms an irregular square, as the area is big and the three elevated forts do not form a triangle. I would have wanted to remedy this if I had held that post for a year more. It has the following artillery: - a third-grade bronze cannon, each one a 15-pounder - two bronze sacres, each one an eight-pounder - a bronze artillery piece, cannon-type; an eight-pounder - a second-grade ... of bronze; a ve-pounder - a cast-iron falcon; a three-pounder - two cast-iron blunderbusses; each one a 12-pounder The following comprise the gunpowder and ammunition in all the fortresses: – Over 200 quintales of gunpowder in porcelain and clay jars that best conserve them V200 – Over 300 artillery pieces V300 – 18-pound cannon balls V649 – 15-pound cannon balls V433 – 12-pound cannon balls V633 – Nine-pound cannon balls V132 – Eight-pound cannon balls V309 – Seven-pound cannon balls V163 – Five-pound cannon balls V414 – Four-pound cannon balls V804 – Three-pound cannon balls V663 – Two-pound cannon balls V236 – Diamond-tipped bullets in cartridge belts V290 These forts are defended by three companies of the Spanish infantry, each with 80 soldiers, or a total of 240: – 15 breast-plated pages who are standard bearers, play drums and fes – a sergeant major, who is one of the good and strong captains – two adjutants of the sergeant major – 8 posts for an accountant, paymaster and supplies keeper of the Royal house and other minor ofcers – 11 artillery men with their constable – 10 sailors and six cabin boys who go about in the brigantines

226

Annexes

– – – –

one company (40 men) of soldiers from Pampanga another company of 60 spirited natives from Cagayan 12 carpenters for the artillery wagons 95 Negroes from ... who serve as construction laborers.”

Annex 14. The battle of San Salvador in (September 1641) Letter of Gonzalo Portillo to the Governor of the Philippines, on 9 September 1641, informing him of the arrival of the Dutch naval eet in 1641 (SIT, 328–329).

“Given the great urgency of the matter, I provide the details of everything that happened to the Dutch naval eet that came here with a large galleon and two medium sized ones, and two well-armed launches, a covered trap and a sampan. They had anchored the launches around this port and tried to attack the island to burn the churches. God deigned that I thwart their entry with three soldiers. The enemy came, in fact, to seize [la] mira from me. I thank God for the report that I received the day before from a native who was in the Tamchui River. He is one of the friends who had remained there. Later, I made a timely decision with the Council of War and occupied the tower, which I fortied. In it were the adjutant Juan [Saraos], with all those whom I brought as reinforcements, and more men from the fort whom I assigned to him. The enemy made a safe landing around the white square and marched in, accompanied by over 500 natives of the land whom they had assembled into a league, with more than 200 sangleys. They arrived in a town called Quimaurri and lodged there for the night. In the morning, [the enemy] with their banners and drums climbed a hill that commands a view of the said village and of the entire force because it is a high point. From there, [the enemy] identied all that we had in the [fourth bastions], and all the artillery. They did not stop at this. They also went to [el] cubo and saw what they wanted. They sent me, in [la] retirada, the letter demanding the surrender of this fort and I replied with another, much to my satisfaction ... When the enemy received my letter, they retreated and, along the way, burned down the town and the church of Quimaurri, [the place] where they stayed, and boarded their launches in the spot where they had disembarked. The enemy had convoked the entire Tamchui River and all the villages under Dutch jurisdiction. From the fort, we saw a great number of natives swarming the hillocks and squares, forming an army, and another eet of ships, launches and sampans. In the Tamchui River, the enemy had 17 more sampans, which they acquired, counting on fear [of] their ally. Suddenly, in the afternoon, in the wake of turbulent weather, we saw the enemy retreat behind a point, which is at most two cannon shots from this fort ... I was certain that the 17 sampans lay in wait there. I beneted from the presence of members of the religious fathers, who held a procession and rogations. We brought out the Blessed Sacrament and an image of the Virgin. This happened on that same Saturday. That night, in a quarter of a second, the Dutch red two cannon shots at us and later, in the morning, from [la] mira of the said point, we saw four sailboats drop anchor. Today, Monday, the 9th of this month, in the morning, a native sherman came to tell

Annexes

227

me that some masts and spars and rods and sails of the Dutch were oating in front of [el] cubo. To appease myself, I promptly sent the brigantine. It brought [portions of the wreck] which, despite their actual weight, entailed much effort to bring in because the current pushed them toward the Punta del Diablo [Devil’s Point, Yeliou], as it is called here. Because of the risk, and with all the rigging, they had no place to secure the sail of the ratchet and the spar of the galleon, and that of the topgallant. The master skipper said that he left the main mast at the point, along with the ratchet, with the sail unfurled, and with all the rigging. It seems he had brought in what was left of the agship that our Lord and the Blessed Virgin saw at sea. For such miracles still happen here, and your Lordship must give thanks for these favors. I am doing it here, holding another procession and rogations in thanksgiving for this afternoon’s favorable outcome, the date of which appears herein.” Annex 15: How the captain of a socorro should behave (March 1642) The present document was issued in Manila in 12 March 1642, by Governor of the Philippines Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Captain Valentín de Aréchaga, who was leaving on the relief ship “San Nicolás” bound for Isla Hermosa. It displays the instructions that the captain of this last socorro must fulll and execute during the voyage, sojourn and return to the city of Manila (SIT, 377–378).

“As soon as possible, you shall leave the port of Cavite to embark on the said voyage, bringing all the reals, provisions and goods that this city has been ordered to send the said forces. There, you shall turn these over and try as much as you can to reach the province of Nueva Segovia, where you will receive the 2,000 pesos and the other items that were requested from there. And spending no more than the required time in that province, you shall continue your voyage to the said forts. Should contrary winds arise, or some accident prevent you from reaching your destination, you will proceed, bearing in mind that all necessary effort must be exerted to transport the reals and the goods, as this will avoid the expense of sending another frigate to transport them. You shall be expected there, as the Governor of the said fort has written that he shall post a sentinel in the point of Santa Catalina by May to await the relief ship. And if three warning shots are red from the land, it is a sign that the enemy is around. In this case, the patache can put in at the port of San Lorenzo and from there, you are to advise the fort about your next moves and decide the best measures to take. This is what you shall do to the letter. Having advised the said Sergeant Major Gonzalo Portillo about the most effective way of retrieving the artillery from the Dutch ship that sank in that area, and seeing that this can be done, in observance of the decision that has been made, you shall attempt to do it, arming yourselves with the necessary strategy and precautions … This service that you will render His Majesty in bringing him at least some of these artillery pieces shall be so appreciated that you will be rewarded. Thus, even if the winds somewhat delay the performance of this task, you will do it …

228

Annexes

Once the said enterprise is over, if you don’t experience any trouble from the enemies or from some unforeseen event, you shall return to this city as soon as possible, without spending extra days in that port in the fulllment of your assignments. From that island, you shall try to load the greatest amount of wheat possible, charged to His Majesty’s account, and make sure that this arrives in time to provide for the Royal Storehouses and the ships that are bound for Castile. If Sergeant Major Gonzalo Portillo has soldiers whom he wishes to allow returning to this city due to inrmity or some other reason, you shall bring them with you and leave the corresponding number of your own men in their stead. If you happen to run into the Dutch enemy during the voyage or on the return home, and are unable to go on, you shall send the relief ship into battle, unless this poses an obstacle to you. And if you are forced to ght and defend yourselves, then do what you ought. If the enemy turns out to be much stronger and capable of seizing the patache, then, as it has been stated, you shall ght to the death and press on with the journey and disengage yourselves from them with all your might. When night falls and you can do nothing more, send the ship crashing into the land so that it may shatter and therefore be of no use to the enemy, and so that the entire crew may escape with their lives. You are to carry out these orders and dispose of other events that may arise according to your good judgment, deciding on what most favors His Majesty’s service and your good name.” Annex 16: The battle of San Salvador in (August 1642)

The Dutch failed in their rst attempt to drive the Spaniards out of Taiwan in 1641. They returned in 1642 with greater strength to a spot that Manila had practically deprived of defense facilities and therefore offered little resistance during the few days of attack. We shall now make a day-to-day reconstruction of the events, based on the Spanish records. On 10 August 1642, Captain Harouse arrived in Fort Zeelandia from the Pescadores Islands. Thereupon the council held extensive discussions on the opportunity of the timing and the weather conditions. They decided to act without further delay by sending Harouse on a military expedition to expel the Spaniards from the island. On 17 August the eet sailed to the north. This eet was composed of four ships, a patache, a junk and a vessel with Latin sails (a tartana or a lipote), and bore a crew 690 strong—369 soldiers, 222 sailors, 48 Chinese, 8 Javanese, 30 Quinamese, and 13 slaves. In the morning of 19 August (Sunday), the naval eet showed up in the vicinity of the island on which San Salvador was located (modern Hoping Island). The Spaniards, on the other hand, put up a resistance of only eighteen men under the command of Captain Valentín de Aréchaga. Aréchaga, who had arrived in Isla Hermosa a few weeks earlier on the last relief ship, was assigned with his men to defend the fort la retirada which guarded the entry point of Hoping Island. The Dutch patache and one of the four ships attempted to drop anchor beside the island, in the shadow of la retirada and under the cover of a hill, but the currents drove them back to sea. In the meantime, from la

25 August

la retirada

Convent of Todos los Santos

la mira 21-24 August

26 August surrender

el cubo

afternoon

Fortress San Salvador

Map A4 Movements of the Dutch troops in the battle of San Salvador (1642). The shadow corresponds to the present coastline.

19 August

20 August

Annexes 229

230

Annexes

retirada, Aréchaga red at the ship “Waterhondt,” hitting it thrice and killing the second helmsman and several of the crew. On 20 August (Monday), the enemy eet moored behind Hoping Island, that is, opposite the main fortress and out of la retirada’s re line. The Dutch then positioned a ship to block the canal that separated the island from the mainland. The landing seemed imminent and the governor Gonzalo Portillo braced for it by sending a detachment of his own company to la mira, the lookout point that presided over the whole scenario. The detachment, under the command of the adjutant Antonio Villanueva and second lieutenant Andrés Zárate, was made up of some eighty men, more than half of whom were Spanish, Pampango, and Cagayano soldiers; the remainder consisted of the ofcers’ servants. They advanced bearing their war drums, pipes, and the Spanish and Pampango war banners. Portillo had ordered that they should remain there the whole afternoon and to withdraw by night so that the enemy might not see them. Villanueva, however, only stayed until 4:30 in the afternoon, leaving behind ten Spaniards, ve Pampango natives, another ve from Cagayan, and, as Fray Juan de los Ángeles later wrote, thirty or forty native archers. They stationed themselves in the so-called paso de la cuesta (passage of the slope), under the command of the adjutant Andrés Carrillo, who previously reproached Villanueva for having left too soon, disregarding Portillo’s orders. The remainder of the Dutch eet, composed of four war ships under Commander Lamotius, was expected to arrive in ten days. Nevertheless, Captain Harouse recognized their advantageous situation and decided to send an advance force of 300 men on seventeen huge launches. Carrillo and his twenty soldiers tried to abort the landing but gave up after almost two hours of ghting. Two of his men were already killed, while two were wounded; they had received no aid, not even a replenishment of their gunpowder supply, which arrived when it was already too late. Following their orders, they relocated to la retirada to reinforce Valentín de Aréchaga’s stand. Seeing that the coast was clear, the Dutch who managed to land quickly went up to la mira while their companions completed the landing. Carrillo was then called to the main fortress, where he complained to Portillo about the meager aid he had received. On 21 August (Tuesday), the Dutch started to batter la retirada with their muskets and low-caliber cannon. The Spaniards in la retirada red back in vain, since la mira was the highest spot in the area. The Dutch dug trenches around la mira, and Aréchaga, despite the relentless ring, managed to fortify la retirada’s parapets. The situation on 22 August (Wednesday) was no different even if the Dutch also tried to aim at other targets, like the main fortress below, even knocking down the tower San Sebastián of the main fortress. Nevertheless, their main objective was la retirada, where Aréchaga maintained his position of defense with three bronze cannon (a 7-, a 9-, and a 12-pounder), eighteen Spaniards, and thirty Filipino soldiers under his command. At that time, the Dutch eet’s remaining four war ships had not yet come, although three new relief ships had been put in. Similar scenarios arose on 23 August (Thursday). Aréchaga received no aid from Portillo, who probably feared attacks from other points. La retirada was at the point of falling into enemy hands. The badly hit parapets were reinforced with bundles of cloth

Annexes

231

that Portillo nally sent to the beleaguered fortress. Aréchaga himself gave the Dutch a tough time, as he claimed to have killed 200 Dutchmen. By that time, the Dutch had nished constructing some esplanades behind the topmost spot of the hill of la mira. The plan was to install here two high-caliber cannon. On 24 August (Friday), the Dutch brought to la mira two bronze cannon, both 16-pounders (although the Spaniards believed that these were the 18-pounders that the Dutch seized from the Portuguese during the conquest of Malacca the year before). They opened re on la retirada, sending a volley of 108 shots that felled the outer wall. It was probably on this day that Aréchaga received seven men to replace the seven wounded whom he had dispatched to the main fortress. This token reinforcement was apparently the last form of aid that he received from Portillo. That night, Fr. Teodoro Quirós visited la retirada and spent the night attending to the embattled soldiers. The nal assault took place on 25 August (Saturday), at noon. The shelling continued for the second consecutive day and lasted till two in the afternoon, when the Dutch ascertained the hapless state of la retirada. The Spaniards had two cannon down, their death toll went up to half-a-dozen, and the casualties were numerous. The nal assault culminated in a hand-to-hand combat. The Spaniards and a handful of Pampangos and Cagayanos who remained standing ed to the main fortress, where Aréchaga received a hero’s welcome. Now masters of la retirada, the Dutch this time aimed their artillery at the main fortress. The three-hour battering ended with a ceasere, whereby the Dutch demanded the surrender of the post. Portillo, after spending the whole night in deliberation with his ofcers and the missionary fathers, decided that it was impossible to continue defending the fort. The next day, 26 August (Sunday), they signed the conditions of the surrender and the Dutch forces took possession of the castle. The Spaniards were housed in the convents of the Dominicans and Franciscans before they were shipped off to Zeelandia and Batavia. They stayed there for a year and were treated kindly until they were nally sent back to the Philippines, while some returned to Spain aboard Dutch ships. In fact, soon after the conquest, the long-awaited reinforcements nally arrived in Zeelandia on 5 September 1642 under the command of General Johannes Lamotius who brought the orders of Batavia to conquer Quelang. At that time, Zeelandia was still unaware of Harouse’s victory, which was why Governor Traudenius and his council decided to dispatch Lamotius’ eet to Quelang to assist Harouse. However, in the brief period between the signing of the instruction and the departure of Lamotius’ eet, the news that Quelang had been conquered arrived in Zeelandia, along with the rst prisoners. Nevertheless, Lamotius departed for Quelang as planned on 9 September. He arrived on 13 September and took over the command. Annex 17: Interrogation by the Dutch of Teodoro, elder of Quimaurri (synopsis) (1644) VOC 1148, (1654II), ff. 303–309; DZ Vol. II, pp. 257–262; SIT, 476–479.

1. 1.

What is his name? Where was he born? How old is he? He says his name is Theodore. He was born in Kimauri. He is about 27 years old.

232

Annexes

5. 5. 8. 8.

10. 10. 11. 11. 13. 13.

14. 14. 15. 15.

16. 16. 17. 17. 47. 47. 48.

Were they treated well by the Spaniards from the beginning? In the beginning they [of Kimauri] had been afraid of them, but afterwards they were pacied by the priests. With what other villages had the Spaniards been at war? With Kipormowa, a place by the sea nearby Tarraboan. The Spaniards had lost a vessel there that was on its way to Manila. The passengers and crew, including the Chinese who piloted the vessel—a total of about 30 persons— were bludgeoned to death by the inhabitants. A party of 100 Spaniards and the same number of auxiliary troops from Kimauri and St Jago, a total of 200 men, attacked and burned their village and captured three heads. When exactly did the Spaniards lose some 40 men in their earlier ght with those from Tamsui? Four years after they had been in Quelang. How many years was it since the Spaniards had lost those 70 men in the latter ght? According to his best estimate, around 10 to 12 years ago. Did these villages pay the Spaniards any tribute in the form of money, rice, paddy, pelts or anything else? They did not pay tribute to the Spaniards and this was also never demanded by the latter. They only paid for the candles that were used in the churches. And he, the one who was interrogated, was responsible for the receipts and expenditures of the candles. The receipts were in money or paddy. The paddy would be in turn used to buy money. How many of the eight mentioned villages were Christian? Two, Kimauri and St Jago. Do the inhabitants of these two villages understand Spanish? All from Kimauri, as well the adults and children understand Spanish. However, the ones from St Jago only understand Spanish partially because their priest could speak the native language. Do the inhabitants of the eight villages communicate with each other? Do they speak one and the same language? The ones from Kimauri understand the languages of all the other eight villages. But those villages understand each other only partially. Do those from Tamsui speak the same language as those from Kimauri? Yes. Why did they not go there to trade? Because the inhabitants of Tarraboan prohibited them from doing so and they [traders from Kimauri] were not allowed to bring in Chinese or Spaniards. Why did the inhabitants from Tarraboan not want the Spaniards and Chinese to come? Had they offended or bothered them?

Annexes

233

48. Because they dreaded the Spaniards, although they had never been wronged by them. And the Chinese were afraid of the inhabitants. Nevertheless, from time to time, the ones from Tarroboan visited Quelang and the governor. 49. When did they [the Kimauri] rst start trading with the people of Tarroboan? Did they trade with them before the Spaniards came to Quelang? 49. Since ancient times, long before the Spaniards came, they [the Kimauri] have been trading gold with the ones from Tarroboan, who would in turn trade with the Chinese.

Annex 18: Observations of the Franciscan Antonio Caballero about Yiguan (1649) Synopsis of a letter (SIT, 574–575).

“The prince and lord of this city of Hanay [An Hai], of its ports and its borders, is that mandarin whom they call Yquam [Zheng Zhi-Long], who had been feared from the start because he wielded power over the sea. Because of this fear, the Tartar king summoned and dragged him to the court of Beijing, where he had him detained with promises of sending him back to his land and giving him absolute government over this province of Fujian, of Canton and another within its connes. In the meantime, the same persons he left to take his place govern this city and its ports. In this city of Hanay is a brave woman, who is his stepmother; in one of its ports, a brother of his; and a son [Zheng Cheng-Gong] in another, in Emuy [Xiamen] and in his lands. [This son] is now at sea with 100,000 men to wage war against the Tartar if he does not set his father free to return to their land. The above-mentioned mandarin had a daughter in Macao, married to a son of Manuel Bello, who is from that city. The mandarin asked her and the whole family and relatives to come to this city before going [he] to Beijing. I got to know and visit them in Macao. Since they are Christians, they said and indicated that they could not live here in peace if they had no church. They offered to make them one if the minister were one of those priests dressed in sackcloth, who go about barefoot, girded with a rope, and who do not take money; and that their lands do not want any other. Fr. Pedro Canevari of the Company [of Jesus] … also told this to Fr. Juan Bautista de Morales. The above-mentioned mandarin Yquam always had in his service a good number of black Christians who came to him from Macao. They belong to his circle and are good harquebusiers. He trusts them most as personal bodyguards and also for other military matters. We hardly landed when some of them came to see us; a few had recognized me from Macao. Then, they proposed that one of my companions or I stay here with them because they had no Father. One Father of the Company, called P. Canevari, used to come. He had his church and residence in a city far from here, about a four days’ walk. However, he could not attend to them. From last Lent till August, ve Christians had died without the sacraments. I refer to what has been earlier said: that the mandarin wants to have us and not others in his lands. A few days later, Manuel Bello and his son Antonio

234

Annexes

Rodriguez, the husband of the mandarin’s daughter, called on us and mentioned the same thing to me, requesting that some of us remain here for this Christian community.” Annex 19: Victorio Riccio met Koxinga in Anping (1662) Synopsis of the Chapter 16 of the History of the Dominicans in China of Victorio Riccio, talking about his dispatch with Koxinga in Anping安平€ (SIT, 598–600, 607).

“At that time, Cuesing (國姓爺) saw with his own eyes the lamentable razing of China’s maritime areas. Contemplating that this would oblige him to die or to surrender, he decided … to conquer Isla Hermosa, which the Dutch had occupied. He incited and recruited (the help of) a vile traitor named Huping (何斌),4 son of another of the same name, who guided the Dutch against the Spaniards in acquiring the fort they set up in Queilang on that same island. He converted Isla Hermosa into a granary for his armies and eets and from there he set forth in power against the Tartar. Cuesing organized a eet of 500 sampans and 40,000 men and left Quinmuen (金門) in April 1661. In two days, he arrived in good spirits at the port called Tayvan (大員), where the famous fortress stands, the one called the key to the Orient because it is one of the best in the world … 3. And so Cuesing assaulted the land and seized without difculty a small fort on the other side, called Chiacan (赤崁), separated by a branch of the sea a league away from the main fort. Then with impressive boldness, he traversed the waters and took over the city and had the fort surrounded. This lasted for 10 entire months wherein several skirmishes on land and battles at sea took place, with the Chinese always earning a multitude of victories. Twelve soldiers, outraged with the Dutch, ed from the fort and offered to turn it over soon to Cuesing by seizing rst the sentry box or turret, which was the fort’s prime and eminent spot, from where the most damage could be done. Later, since they wanted to the scale the walls of the fort with the great multitude of soldiers who would always come from China to help, they miserably surrendered on 12 February 1662. All the Dutch shipped out with all their personal properties, leaving in the fort what was agreed upon, which was all the belongings of the Company (sumptuous and plentiful goods) and went to Jakarta. They captured a Castilian and severely punished him, exiling him to a barren island as a slave of the company. We learned from their own lips that over 9,000 Chinese and 632 Dutch died during the war. 4. Haughty and proud over this victory, Cuesing thought of subjugating the entire Archipelago of St Lazarus [Philippines] that has countless islands … Considering that news of the fall of the impregnable fortress in Tayvan would make the Spaniards tremble and surrender to him—as did the Dutch—he did not want to send a eet or soldiers, but a diplomatic mission to demand that they render him pariah and tribute, and (to make it known) that he would take them under his protection. In addition, refusal would mean that he would have to destroy those islands with re and blood, leaving no stone that is not reduced to ashes….

Annexes

235

5. Who would have thought that Cuesing was to choose a priest, preacher and minister of God for such an iniquitous and unjust cause? But this was what happened … And so once he seized the said fortress, he summoned Fr. Riccio—who at that time was in Zumingcheu (廈門)—to Tayvan. Since the priest did not know the reason for this, he thought that he was being called to his death, for he had not informed Manila what he had publicly declared, which was to conquer those islands. The Christians wept much over his departure, but he could not do anything about it (for he was taken by force), and set out, placing himself in God’s hands. In three days, he arrived in Isla Hermosa, in the said port of Tayvan. There, Cuesing invited him twice, though he did not personally show up, which made the Father more suspicious because in such occasions, he would usually vent his tyrannical designs on his guests. 6. He remained on land for eight days, … At one moment, he got considerably alarmed because as he slept in the house of the captain of the Christians, the eunuchs were summoned at midnight, bringing all their weapons, to receive orders from Cuesing. The priest heard the commotion, not knowing what it meant; and while he pondered the matter, a eunuch knocked loudly at this door, saying: ‘Cuesing also sends for our Father.’ Hearing these words was like receiving a death sentence and so as soon as he jumped out of his humble bed, he knelt on the oor and lifted his eyes and heart to heaven, asking for help in that moment, sincerely entrusting his soul to the hands of Divine Mercy. He did not try to hide, since there was no place to do so. He only spent a moment waiting for the one coming to arrest him. But since they delayed in coming, he stood up and stepped out of the house (which was beside the fortress). He saw the patrol passing and recognized (one) who was a Christian and asked what the tumult was all about. He did not know what to tell him until another from the house came and said that Cuesing had ordered the soldiers to throw some women from the palace into the sea. And he explained that the other one who called for ‘our father’ was referring not to the Father [Riccio] but to the captain of those Christians whom they habitually called by that kind name. At this, the Father felt relieved, and thanked God profusely. 7. Finally, after eight days, Cuesing gave him the open letters (containing the above-mentioned sham and threats), bidding him never to return if his demands were not met. He gave him money for the trip and the father, unable to say anything, or to protest—for this would mean having his throat cut—departed in tears, knowing and preparing himself for the uproar that these news would cause in Manila … 8. After 17 days, on 10 May, (his boat) anchored at a river bar in Manila. [And regarding the death of Koxinga, Riccio said:] … He was tormented by deadly sunstroke. So violent it was that, brimming with rage and pain, he clawed at his face and bit his hands. In ve days, he was compelled to give up his soul to the power of the devils, dying with a ghastly visage and committing dreadful acts until his last breath. He beat and kicked all who attended to him, and ordered the execution of this and that person, even if this was not carried out because they knew that he was hopelessly dying …”5

236

Annexes

Annex 20: The construction of the fortress of Quelang during the Spanish period Jose Eugenio Borao 鮑曉鷗, 十七世紀的雞籠要塞：過去與現在 (“The 17th Century Fortress of Quelang: Past and Present”). In: Catalogue of the Exhibition of the Spanish Presence in Taiwan, Museum of History, Taipei, 2006, pp. 39–52.

“The rst news about the Quelang fortress comes from the Spanish Period and during the time of rst governor Antonio Carreño de Valdés (1626–1629). The Spaniards started to build the main fortress and a small one, called la mira, on top of the hill, as soon as they reached the island of Quelang in 1626, as it is stated in the map of Pedro de Vera (1626)—in both places it can be read: ‘Here fortications are made.’ We know that the planner of the construction was an engineer named Nicolás Bolen, whose surname already belies that he was at least of Flemish or Dutch descent. We know that Bolen arrived in Isla Hermosa at the very beginning with the assignment of making the design and supervision of the construction of the fortress. His job was quite specialized for we know that his salary in Manila as ‘artilleryman’ was 200 pesos a year—a soldier earned 48 pesos a year, while the governor of Quelang 516 pesos (SIT, 336–342). Besides, we know that his job was done with the satisfaction of his superiors, that’s why in a Royal Treasury Council meeting, held in Manila two years after the conquest, in 1628, the Governor General recognized his real qualication as an engineer, and upgraded his salary to 250 pesos a year (SIT, 126–127). We do not have more details of Bolen. Just as the second governor, Juan de Alcarazo (1629–1632), took ofce the Dutch yacht ‘Domburch’ arrived in Quelang on a spy mission to the north of the island (see annex 1 of chapter 1). Through the map made by Gerbrantsz Black aboard the ‘Domburch’ we can see clearly the main bastion of San Antonio el Grande drawn from the said ship, where we can count 3 cannons on each side of the bastion. Also, this map renders a clear picture of the situation of the Spanish garrison: a big house can be identied, probably the one of the Spanish Governor (or the church of Todos los Santos) accompanied by a group of thirty tents for the soldiers. Although the map describes only the features of the bastion, the report aboard the ‘Domburch’ describes also the whole project of the fortress in a clear way: The fort lies on a bay that the Chinese call Quelang. It is square and built of stone, consisting of eight points … On the biggest point facing the waterside are six to seven pieces of artillery that guard the entrance of the bay. We saw loopholes in the wall facing the sea. The distance between the fort and the opposite bight on Taiwan is about two musket shots and in between, from our yachts, we could discern two sandbanks. As far as we could see, the bay lying past the fortress measured more than a goteling (sic)-shot in width towards the above mentioned bight on Taiwan. Those coming from the open sea could not see their vessels lying in the bay because they lie behind the said mountains and cliffs. But our junk that passed through the entrance of the bay within re range of the fortress saw two galleys and two ships. Further off from the fortress towards the sea is a small but rather high

Annexes

237

mountain, with a redoubt or guardhouse on top [called by the Spaniards la mira]. (SIT, 141)

Alcarazo completed the construction of Bastion San Antonio el Grande, where 12 cannons were lining up, and la mira. Besides this, he constructed the fortress la retirada (also called San Antón) to defend the entrance of the harbor with six pieces of artillery, and nally he completed the defensive system by building the small tower, el cubo, in la boca chica (small mouth) at the entrance of the small island from the Formosa mainland. During the period of the third governor Bartolomé Díaz Barrera (1632–1634), and the fourth one Alonso García Romero (1634–1635) we don’t have any special news on the development of the fortress. We presume that he was busy completing the bastions of the castle, substituting wood with stone, and elevating the curtains of the castle. Back in Manila, García Romero wrote in 1636, a very detailed report (see the annex) of the situation of the castle, the number and quality of cannons, etc., at the time of his departure. Among many other things, he states clearly: The principal fortication forms a square that consists of four bastions. Two are of solid stone; only one has the base made of stone, near the moat; the other is made of wood. All four stretches of wall are of solid stone and lack only the parapets. (SIT, 259)

We can be sure that San Antonio el Grande was one of the two made by stone. The other must be San Antonio el Chico, because it is the rst facing the entrance of the harbor. The one, which only its base was made of stone, must be bastion San Sebastián, because, it is the only one left near the moat. In fact, we will see how San Sebastián bastion was still under construction in 1638. And the fourth one, made of wood, must be the southern one, which we identify with the so-called bastion San Juan. The four bastions were ‘well armed with cannons,’ as the Dutch stated in 1636 after interrogating some Spaniards who were rescued in the sea (SIT, 245). In 1636, in the middle of the governorship of Francisco Hernández (1635–1637), the fth governor, the killing of some Spanish soldiers in Tamsui and two missionaries occurred. This fact, together with the general situation in the whole Philippines, made Governor General Hurtado de Corcuera call a special meeting in Manila on 22 January 1637 with all the military commanders in the colonial capital. The main point discussed was the advisability of withdrawing the forts of Isla Hermosa and Zamboanga (a fortress recently made, in a similar shape to the one in Quelang), both of which were located at the furthest points away from Manila, towards the North and the South respectively. The council advice was on withdrawing, but Corcuera decided to do it only in the case of Zamboanga, for the case of Taiwan he would wait for an answer from the king. On the meantime, he only ordered the dismantling of some external defenses from the main fortress. Certainly, at the beginning of 1637 an order from Manila reached governor Hernández, telling him to withdraw from Tamsui all the troops, after burning the wooden

238

Annexes

fortress of Tamsui and punish the natives for the massacre inicted on the Spaniards. Also, the cannons of fort Santo Domingo should be transferred to the main fortress, San Salvador in Quelang. Probably, this indirectly accelerated the construction work in Quelang (SIT, 272). The orders included also the destruction of la mira, la retirada and el cubo. But, in fact Hernández did not agree about la mira because he considered it was the most important defensive post, and he was reluctant to do it. This was the reason he was replaced immediately. We also know that, before he was replaced, he received orders to improve the living conditions inside the castle, because the incoming governor was expected to arrive in August 1637. Also he was ordered to build inside the castle the customary allotment for the captain of the Pampango soldiers, also the house for a senior chaplain, and the barracks for a total of 125 men, with the additional storehouses needed for their provisions. The expected new governor was Pedro Palomino (1637–1639), who reached Quelang in August. He came not only with the orders of fullling the withdrawal from Tamsui (if not yet done), but also with the clear assignment of concentrating the entire defense in the main fortress, which should be totally completed. This implied additionally the destruction of the three surrounding fortresses: la mira, la retirada and el cubo. We know with some detail the construction work of the fortress because the Crown accountant, Jerónimo de Herrera, was dispatched by the Governor General to Quelang to check on the performance of governor Palomino. He made the statements from August 1637 to September 1638, which is the rst half period of Palomino governorship; he recorded all the expenses and income in the royal coffer, and this material handed down to us tell us, for example, the amount of lime supplied during these 14 months: Table A2 Supply of lime from August 1637 to September 1638

Date

Provider

1637, 25 November

Sangley Benua

1637, 23 December

Francisco Hernández

1638, 2 January

Sangley Benua

1638, 2 January 1638, 27 February

Cavans of lime Lime price per cavan 850

12 cavans = 1 peso

2,540

10 cavans = 1 peso

550

10 cavans = 1 peso

Sergeant Andrés Narváez

1,200

12 cavans = 1 peso

7 sangleys

1,237

12 cavans = 1 peso

1638, 4 May

5 limeworkers

1,300

13 cavans = 1 peso

1638, 3 July

Sergeant Andrés Narváez

180

20 cavans = 1 peso

Source: SIT, 282–284 (note: 1 cavan = 75 liters aprox.)

This table offers us more ideas on the construction work of the fortress. First of all we can see that sergeants Francisco Hernández and Andrés Narváez were involved in the production and supply of lime. Maybe this was an additional job that ofcers with the help of some soldiers may volunteer to do. But this activity must be open to anyone that can provide this material as states the entry of 27 February 1638, referring to a 5 unspecied lime workers. Regarding the variability of the price, 1 peso for 10 or

Annexes

239

12 (even 20) cavans, might be depending of the quality of the lime, because the same person (sangley Benua) got different prices on two occasions; and on the same day (January 2) two different suppliers got also different prices. On the other hand, we can see how the construction work relied on the Chinese work force. They provided lime, like sangley Benua on two occasions, or the group of 7 sangleys; but also they were in charge of the construction itself. In the same record we can read another entry saying that on 29 April 1638, Sangley Lanco, a mason, was paid 190 pesos for making 97 fathoms of the wall of bastion San Sebastián, being paid 2 pesos and 4 reals for every fathom. This reference to the work done in bastion San Sebastián seems to conrm our previous statement that this bastion was the one with a stone base, but lacking the corresponding stone walls. When the Crown accountant Jerónimo de Herrera was going to leave he made a detailed description of the construction work done (SIT, 285) pointing out that: 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

There is a bastion [probably San Sebastián] that was nished around March after some months of work and is now in good condition. On bastion San Juan [probably the southern one], Palomino had made a splendid vault, and it can be very useful to store gunpowder. Bastion San Antonio, which was too low and not at all fortied with quicklime, was improved. The house of stone, serving as a hospital inside the fort, had fallen and a very good hospital was built for the sick in a spot by the seashore, as a replacement. Also, in this other house lives the Governor. The construction work was carried out at very little cost to the Royal Treasury. For many of the men from Pampanga who came recently turned out to be very good ofcers because the one who works most gets promoted as a sergeant or bailiff. Also the expenses have been reduced because recently a limestone quarry was nished, yielding 8000 cavans of quicklime.

We think that the construction of the fortress was nished a few years before the nal engagement with the Dutch. In those last years of Spanish presence, the bulk of the work consisted in implementing the orders of demolition of fort Santo Domingo in Tamsui, la mira, el cubo and la retirada. Nevertheless, the last governor of Quelang, Gonzalo Portillo (1641–1642) rebuilt el cubo and la retirada, shortly before the nal battle, thinking that without these fortresses, the main one would be defenseless. Probably, it was during these last years that the Spaniards added a dry ditch — mentioned in Dutch sources — to isolate the fortress, because, if needed, that ditch could be lled with seawater (SIT, 670). We can presume that in the Dutch sieges of 1641 and 1642 the fortress was fully operative, but we don’t know exactly because the ght between Spaniards and Dutch at the end of August 1642 took place in the hills, without a real siege of the fortress. It seems that the Spanish governor Portillo, considering his numerical inferiority, had

240

Annexes

decided to surrender early, but before doing so put up a limited opposition with some newly arrived soldiers. In this way, while avoiding a massacre, he would not be accused of cowardice. The Dutch conquered la mira almost without resistance, while for ve days the remaining few Spaniards put a strong resistance from la retirada, until it was totally destroyed. Once the Dutch were in la retirada, they had the San Salvador castle totally at their mercy, although it had prepared provisions to resist a siege of eight months (SIT, 428). Nevertheless the Spanish governor Portillo made a timid attack shooting at la retirada from the bastions of San Sebastián and San Antonio el Chico. The Dutch answered with two cannon-shots, which were enough for Portillo to conrm his defenseless position. Next day he surrendered a totally undamaged fortress (SIT, 434). According to the inventory of 1641 the fortress had 33 cannons of different sizes, and 5 additional ones in el cubo (SIT, 343). The ones that had been placed in la retirada and in la mira before their dismantling were now either inside the main fortress or sent back to Manila. This gure matches with the one provided by the Dutch, who made an inventory of everything after they conquered Quelang island; the number of cannons reached the gure of 40 (SIT, 396–397). After which the fortress underwent a series of reconstructions and demolition, according to the strategic requirements of the Island’s new masters.” Annex 21: The changes of (fortress) La Santísima Trinidad (as it was called San Salvador by the Dutch) during the Dutch occupation as stated in the latest Dutch maps (a) The rst period (1642–1661) and the map of Keerdekoe (1654)

When the Dutch seized Santísima Trinidad in 1642, the VOC destroyed three bastions and the walls between the bastions, leaving only the bastion San Antonio el Grande intact to guard the entrance of Quelang Bay. The Dutch renamed this bastion Noord Holland. What remained of Santísima Trinidad was used to build fortications in Tamsui (VOC 1146, ff. 569–572). The Dutch lived in this situation for twenty years (1642–1662) because, as they acquired greater control over Taiwan, they no longer saw the need to maintain a fortress that would defend them against external attack. They enjoyed good relations with the English, and had successfully kept the Spaniards in Manila at bay. The Japanese had closed their doors to all foreigners and the Chinese had their own internal problems to solve on account of the Tartar invasion. This is why the map of Simon Keerdekoe (1654) clearly shows the then current state of the fortress as well as how it looked during the Spanish period. This situation lasted until 1661, on the verge of the Koxinga attack on Tayouan. It nally surrendered on February 1662, a defeat that dealt a painful blow to the VOC’s intra-Asiatic trading network. (b) The second period (1664–1668) and two defensive maps (1666 and 1667)

Between 1664 and 1668 the Dutch reoccupied Quelang with the idea of rebuilding a “New Taiwan Factory” to resume their former trade. During this period the old fortress experienced a series of transformations that have left behind a good collection of maps

Annexes

241

about its situation. On August 1664, the VOC eet arrived in Quelang nding no resistance. The state of the fortress was depicted in one sketch illustrating the Voyagie of Bort (1670), where the bastion Noord Holland was still standing. The reoccupation had begun. Commander Bort immediately set out to reconstruct the redoubt Victoria and rebuild Santísima Trinidad. First, he reinforced the bastion Noord Holland, later the bastion Oosterpunt (also called the Half Moon Bastion), the northern bastion (also called Zeeburg), and the bastion Zuijderpunt, (also called the Small Half Moon Bastion). In one year, the bastions were operative and in the eastern side of the fortress a stone bulwark was added and a raveline guarded by two pieces of artillery. It seemed that by the end of 1665, Santísima Trinidad had regained its old glory; the Dutch renamed the fortress Noord Holland (VOC 1253, ff. 1294v–2202). Its situation can be seen in the map of Cornelis Vichbee (1666). This map was made on the verge of a Koxinga forces attack which nally started on 11 May 1666. An estimated 6,000 Koxinga soldiers engaged the 300 VOC defenders. After a siege of nine days, Zheng’s army, having about 1,000 wounded or dead, withdrew to Tamsui (VOC 1258, ff. 1659–1662). The reconstructed fortress had passed its rst serious test. After the Koxinga attack, repairs were done. Oosterpunt had to be replaced with a new one (with a cellar) on the foundations of the former Spanish bastion San Sebastián. Stones from the old Dominican convent of Todos los Santos were used as building material. Construction began on 13 December 1666 and the bastion was nished on 15 January 1667. Inside the fortress, a new smithy and a shop that also functioned as a dormitory were added. The cellar under bastion Noord Holland was also expanded. Outside the fortress, a new hospital, a carpenter’s shed, and a pigsty were built. All this was very well reected in an anonymous map (1667), the rst one revealing the real scale of the fortress. But, unexpectedly, on October 1668, the VOC garrison abandoned Quelang after blowing up the defense works. The other buildings were also demolished, leaving nothing but a pile of rubble. Annex 22: Trade and the Price Revolution in the Far East From: José Eugenio Borao, “China. Delfeudalismo al estado moderno.” In: Historia Universal Planeta, 1993, vol. 3, chapter 12, pp. 435–437.

“Trading activity in the East Asian seas experienced a rapid increase from the end of the 16th century onwards. Within a short period, Chinese silk came to be popular in Kyoto and Lima, Chinese cotton was being sold in the Philippine and Mexican markets, and Chinese porcelain was the rage in Sakai and London. However, this phenomenon declined towards the mid-17th century. What had happened in those 50 years? First, one must not lose sight of the fact that by the end of the 16th century, both in China and in Japan, silver had become the widely circulated currency, especially for paying taxes and transacting business. However, the Chinese mines soon started to show signs of depletion as the buying power of silver kept on rising, starting from the Soong and Yuan period. From 1592 until the beginning of the 17th century, gold was being exchanged

242

Annexes

for silver in Canton at a rate of 1:7, in Japan at 1:10, and in Spain, 1:13. This means that the value of silver in China was double that of Spain. Thus China was, for Japanese and Europeans, a cheap market for gold and for rst class manufactured items. Among the centers of consumption in Japan—which used silver to pay for their most valued goods, even if gold, silver, and copper currency were in circulation—silver remained the main exchange currency for foreign trade. Although we do not have precise details on the production of the silver mines in Japan, a half-century windfall in production did occur. Between 1596 and 1623, total exports were pegged at about 400,000 kg, or some 35% of world production. The second consumer center was New Spain, which used American silver that also reached the Philippines mainly through the so-called situado (the ofcial wages received by those employed by the Crown). The third consumer center was Europe, which used the American silver to nance its transcontinental trade and to pay the Chinese goods coming through the Indian Ocean route. As a result China (and India) was, as in the times of Ancient Rome, a kind of silver ‘suction pump.’ The principal and general effect for all in the zone was the extent to which the European Price Revolution affected Asia. One may trace the development of this phenomenon in the Far East to Japanese and American silver. Since 1630, when the exchange rate of gold to silver was the same in Japan and in Europe, at 1:13, Japanese silver ceased to be a vehicle for the said revolution, leaving it to American silver alone. However, even if Japan stopped contributing to the spread of the Price Revolution in China, it did bring in the said price increase when it purchased Chinese silk. At that moment, its trade structure became similar to that of New Spain—that of an importer of silk and silver. Just like the samurai elite, the Creole nobility in the Americas played consumer roles buying ne silk that was four times cheaper than that produced in Seville and Valencia. When, in 1640, the exchange rate of silver to gold (1:13) reached China, the cycle ended and the original trade logic ceased to have initial appeal. In other words, American silver set world history in motion as the change in prices of Chinese silk conditioned the activities of Seville merchants, while silk from Valencia experienced the ups and downs of trade via the Manila Galleon. The fact that China was abundantly paid with Japanese and American silver had two contradicting effects. In the coastal and southern sides of the continent, the trade situation was peaceful and stable; a bourgeois class of merchants and money lenders was on the rise, as well as rudimentary banks and trade associations, etc. Likewise, the intensied circulation of money facilitated reforms in the tax system, allowing for the commutation of taxes in the land, labor services, and other extra charges, allowing everything to be paid with silver. The State treasury experienced a nancial situation that was not known until then. In the 16th century, the military system was strengthened, the borders pacied, and an overall sense of prosperity pervaded the empire. Just as in Japan and in Europe, the Price Revolution in China beneted merchants and manufacturers of commercial goods alike. This shook, however, the agrarian base of the Ming economy, adversely affecting the feudal lords who lived on a xed income. The negative side of the situation soon appeared: ination, the unbridled growth of the urban centers, speculation, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor brought about inevitable

Annexes

243

social tension. All of this is perfectly chronicled in the novel Jinpingmei (The Golden Lotus), which narrates the tale of Ximen Qing, a merchant from Qinghe who made a fortune out of trade and usury. While Japanese and American silver stimulated the Ming economy, its uctuating production in Peru, Mexico, and Japan, piracy, shipwrecks, and protectionist policies in Madrid or Edo caused China’s foreign trade to be extraordinarily erratic all through the rst half of the 17th century. The problem arose when, from 1634 to 1636, the authorities in Madrid and Acapulco decided to reduce the amount of silver sent to Manila. The impact was felt in China, where it started to be common to impose taxes on silver. Nevertheless, the continued ow of Japanese shipments acted as a momentary palliative. In 1639, events in Japan and the Philippines triggered a series of difculties in the Ming economy. In the summer of 1639, the Tokugawa ofcials denied the Portuguese of Macao permission to stay in Nagasaki, giving Dutch and Chinese seafarers monopoly over the silver shipments to China. Moreover, the tension between the Spaniards and the Chinese reached a boiling point in Manila, culminating violently and causing the death of 20,000 Chinese. Consequently, hardly any silver reached the New World from China in the succeeding years and people hoarded it in any way they could. Deation occurred as the demand for silver could not be met—a situation that was not exempt from problems. In the more advanced regions of Southeast China, the value of silver suddenly increased early on in the 1640s, while the prices in silver of farm and manufactured products dropped to unimaginable levels. The problem seemed to worsen in the summer of 1639, when the Emperor Chongzhen declared an increase in taxes to nance the pacication program of a long-drawn peasant rebellion that broke out in 1627. This rebellion soon led to the taking of Beijing by one of the rebel leaders Li Zicheng that, in turn, provoked the emperor to commit suicide in 1644. It was simply the sign of the times. In 1641, Li conquered Luoyang, killed Prince Fu, and gave the prince’s belongings—grain, gold, and silver—to the starving masses. This, along with a series of natural disasters that had befallen the area since the 1620s, is reected in eyewitness accounts that told of starving masses, hoards of beggars, infanticide, etc. Japan’s historiography reects a similar phenomenon of rising prices in the country during the rst half of the 17th century. The said increase peaked in the 1630s, especially in the prices of food. Rice prices rose 6.3 times from 1600 to 1637. The turning point of the Price Revolution in Japan was the relative drop in the value of silver that was spurred by the purchase of Chinese gold. However, when both metals reached equilibrium, exchange refocused to silk, considered a luxury item of widespread use during the Edo period, which then became the main catalyst in Japan’s Price Revolution. According to some authors, it was this revolution and not the spread of Christianity that led the bakufu of the Tokugawa to release the nationalist decree of the sakoku. This body of economic and political policies included, among others, the broadening and intensication of the Itowappu (the system of pancada, or price control on imported silk), the control on garments, the selection and exclusion of merchant vessels, and the prohibition of Christianity—factors that isolated Japan from the world until the outbreak of the Meiji revolution.”

Table A3 Missionaries that came to Taiwan

LIST OF THE MISSIONARIES

Place of

THAT CAME TO TAIWAN, OR PASSED BY

birth

Year of birth

Losillo (Logrño)

1585

ON THEIR WAY TO JAPAN OR CHINA* Bartolomé Martínez, O.P. Domingo de la Borda, O.P. Francisco Váez de Santo Domingo, O.P.

Portugal

Jerónimo Morer, O.P. Francisco Mola, O.P. Angelo Cocchi de San Antonio, O.P.

Florence

1597

Tomás Hioji Rokuzayemon Nishi de San Jacinto, O.P.

Hirado, Kyushu

1590

Jacobo Kiusei Gorobioye Tomonaga de Santa María, O.P.

Kyushu

1582

Juan de Elgüeta, O.P. Brother Francisco de Acebedo, O.P.

Some Jesuits tried to go in the failed September armada. Lucas de Atienza, O.S.A. (Only for a few days) Mateo de Cobissa, O.P. Hno. Antonio Domínguez de Santo Domingo, O.P.

Viana (Portugal)

Brother Andrés Jiménez del Rosario, O.P. Jacinto Esquivel del Rosario, O.P.

Vitoria

1593

Francisco Bravo, O.P. Tomás Serra de la Magdalena, O.P.

Sardinia Island

Domingo Aduarte, O.P.

Zaragoza

1569

Teodoro Quirós de la Madre de Dios, O.P.

Vivero (Lugo)

1599

Miguel Corena, O.P. Lucas García, O.P. Brother Antonio Estrada del Rosario, O.P.

Tenerife

Juan Bautista Morales, O.P

Ecija (Córdoba)

Pedro Chaves, O.P.

Portugal

Antonio María Caballero de Santa María, O.F.M.

Baltanás (Palencia)

Francisco Bermúdez Alameda de la Madre de Dios, O.F.M. Gaspar de Alenda, O.F.M. Francisco de Escalona de Jesús, O.F.M. Onofre Pelleja de Jesús, O.F.M. Domingo Urquicio de Jesús o Vizcaino, O.F.M Diego de Jesús, O.F.M. Antonio de Ciudad Rodrigo, O.F.M. Brother Juan de Marcos, O.F.M. * Names in bold highlight the most prominent missionaries. The names taken by the missionaries when they enter in their order are in italics.

1597 1602

Annexes

245

Year in Taiwan (unless otherwise indicated)† 1626 -27 -28 -29 -30 -31 -32

26

-33 -34 -35 -36 -37 -38 -39 -40 -41 -42

Ml

Ml

29

26

27

28

29

30

31

26

27 27

28

29

30

31

27

28

29

30

31

27

28

29

27

28

29

30

31

27

28

29

Jp

Jp

Jp

Jp

27

28

29

30

31

32

Jp

33

34 35

36

34 35

36

37

33

34 35

36

37

33

34 35

36

32

33

34 35

36

32

33

34 35

26 32

33

32

Ch

34 35

36

Jp

27 28

29

30

29

30

31

32

29

30

31

32

32

31

32

33

31

32

33

31

32 32 32

38

39

40

41

42

33

Ch Ch

Ch

Ch

Ch Mc Mc Rm Rm

33

34 35

36

37

Ch

Ch

Ch

41

33

Ch Ch

Ch

Ml

Ml

Ml

Ml

Mc Mc

33

34 Ch

Ch

Ch

33

34 35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

33

34 35

36

37

Ch

Ch

Ch

33

34 35

36

37

Ch

39

40

41

42

33

34 35

36

37

Ch

Ch

Ch

Ch

Ch

33 38 33

† The years in boxed squares mean some kind of inspection visit; years underlined mean that the missionary died that year. Ch: China; Mc: Macao; Ml: Manila; Rm: Rome

39

(Table A3 continued on p. 246)

246

Annexes

(Table A3 continued)

LIST OF THE MISSIONARIES

Place of

THAT CAME TO TAIWAN, OR PASSED BY

birth

Year of birth

ON THEIR WAY TO JAPAN OR CHINA* Domingo González, O.P. Francisco Díaz, O.P. Juan García, O.P.

1606

Brother Juan Sánchez, O.P. Luis Muro de San Miguel, O.P. Lorenzo Amedo, O.P.

(Albay) Philippine

Felipe del Espíritu Santo, O.P.

Japan

Juan de los Angeles, O.P. Juan de (B)alcázar (secular) Antonio de la Torre, O.P. Juan de Arjona, O.P. Brother Pedro Ruiz, O.P. Brother Basilio Cervantes del Rosario, O.P.

Alcazar de Consuegra

Amador Acuña (donado), O.P.

Macao

Francisco Fernández de Capillas, O.P.

Barquerin (Palencia) 1607

* Names in bold highlight the most prominent missionaries. The names taken by the missionaries when they enter in their order are in italics.

Annexes

247

Year in Taiwan (unless otherwise indicated)† 1626 -27 -28 -29 -30 -31 -32

-33 -34 -35 -36 -37 -38 -39 -40 -41 -42

34 34 Ch

Ch

37

Ch

Ch

Ch

41

42

34 35

36

37

Ch

Ch

Ch

Ch

Ch

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

36

37

38

41

42

41

42

41

42

34 35

36

34 35

36

34 35

36

34 35

36

† The years in boxed squares mean some kind of inspection visit; years underlined mean that the missionary died that year. Ch: China; Mc: Macao; Ml: Manila; Rm: Rome

Ch

39

38

39

40

39

40

39

40

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1.

2.

See José Eugenio Borao Mateo, “Observaciones sobre traductores y traducciones en la frontera cultural del Mar de la China (siglos XVI y XVII),¨ Proceedings of the V International Conference of the Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas Asiáticos (AIHA), Taipei, 8–9 January 2005, pp. 388–405. See José Antonio Cervera Jiménez, Ciencia misionera en Oriente. Los misioneros españoles como vía para los intercambios cientícos y culturales entre el Extremo Oriente y Europa en los siglos XVI y XVII, Cuadernos de Historia de la Ciencia, 12, Universidad de Zaragoza, 2001.

CHAPTER

1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

1

For the relevance of the “Santa Catalina” affair and the role of Grotius, see Peter Borschberg, “Hugo Grotius, East India Trade and the King of Johor,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 (2), September 1999, pp. 225–248; and “The seizure of the Sta. Catarina revisited: The Portuguese empire in Asia, VOC politics and the origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (c.1602–1616),” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 33 (1), 2002, pp. 31–62. In the same trip the famous English captain William Adams was on board. After reaching Japan, he settled there and became an advisor of the shogun. William Lytte Schurz, The Manila Galleon, reprint: Historical Conservation Society, Manila, 1989, p. 283. To know the preparation of this big eet see F. Navas del Valle and P. Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. 5, pp. clxxiii–cci; to see a detailed table of the armada, Ibid., pp. ccxliii–ccxlv; to see how the conquest took place, Ibid., pp. ccxvi–ccxxix; to see the initial organization and problems, Ibid., pp. cclxxxvi–cccxiv. Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, Conquista de las islas Malucas, Madrid, 1609 (Reprint: Polifemo, Madrid, 2001). The classical account of Argensola on the Moluccas campaign includes many other details on China, Java, Sumatra, etc., the voyages of Sir Francis Drake and the one of Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa to the exploration to the Strait of Magellan, etc. This was a strong eet of thirteen ships, which was dispatched by the VOC in Holland in 1607 under the command of Pieter Willemsz and François de Wittert. Its objectives

250

7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

Notes to pages 12–16

were to prey on the Portuguese possessions in Africa and the East Indies and to avenge the defeat in Moluccas in 1606. This eet could have been the same one that took Juan Cevicos prisoner when he was returning from Japan to the Philippines, after the shipwreck of galleon “San Francisco,” of which he was the captain and the maestre (SIT, 167). It is interesting to mention that this rst Dutch blockade of Manila was extended during the monsoon season (August– September), something subsequent blockades will avoid. See Peter Borschberg, “Security, VOC penetration and Luso-Spanish co-operation: The armada of Philippines Governor Juan de Silva in the Straits of Singapore, 1616,” Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Century), Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, Fundaçao Oriente, Lisboa, 2004, pp. 35–62. See the whole affair in Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. cccxxvi ff. To know the oidores opposition to this eet see Ibid., p. ccclxviii; to see the quality of the ships of the armada, Ibid., pp. ccclxi–ccclxvii. See also BRPI, vol. XVII, pp. 251–280. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, p. 280. We know many details of this armada thanks to the report “Relación que hizo al general Sebastián Vizcaino un amenco llamado Pedro de Lest … que huyó en Acapulco” (Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. ccclxix–ccclxxii). The expedition of Spielbergen had started in Holland on 23 June 1614. He went to America plundering the coast of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Acapulco, from where he crossed the Pacic Ocean and reached Manila. A vivid description can be found in Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. ccclxix–ccclxxv; regarding the harm caused by Spielbergen, Ibid., pp. ccclxxiv–ccclxxviii. In Ternate, another deserter, the Dutchman Arnauld de Capeau escaped to the city of El Rosario controlled by the Spaniards. The Spaniards interrogated him and learned of the former odyssey and the present whereabouts of the Spielbergen eet (Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. ccclxxix–ccclxxxiv). A description of the events can be read in the carta annua of the Jesuits written by Father Otazo (Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. ccclxxxiv–cccxci; also in BRPI, vol. XVII, pp. 64 ff. For some echoes of this blockade, see: Álvarez, Formosa ..., pp. 35–36; SIT, 54). For a detailed account of the battle see Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. cccxcviii–cdvi. BRPI, vol. XVII, p. 74. Bartolomé Martínez had arrived in 1611 in the Philippines. The next year he stayed in Macao exploring the possibility of founding a Dominican mission. Later he stayed assigned in Binondo, where he mastered Chinese before becoming the vicar of the parian of Manila. See José María González, Historia de las misiones dominicas en China, 1732–1700, pp. 41–44, and Pablo Fernández, Dominicos donde nace el Sol, Barcelona, 1958, p. 76. Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VII–I, p. xxxii. Navas & Pastells, Catálogo ..., vol. VII–I: a) letter of the Jesuit Manuel Ribeyro, who just arrived from Terrenate (pp. xviii–xx); b) letter from Lucas Vergara Gaviria, the governor of Moluccas (pp. xxii–xxiv), who reected the strong rivalry between Dutch and English; c) letter from the king of Tidore written to the governor of Philippines (pp. xxiv–xxv); d) report of Francisco Rubián de Zubieta, the scribe of the ship “Nuestra Señora de Salvación” (pp. xx–xxii), who was taken prisoner by the Dutch in 1616 and forced to accompany them for two years.

Notes to pages 16–19

20.

21.

22.

23. 24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

251

“Relaçao breve de ilha de Ternate, Tydore e mais ilhas Malucas, aonde temos fortalezas, e presidios, e das forças, naos e fortalezas, que o enemigo olandes tem por aquelas partes. Malacca, 1619,” Documentaçao Ultramarina Portuguesa, vol. 2, Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, Lisboa, 1962, pp. 49–55. As far as we know, there are not studies on the gures of spices trade. The report of Grau y Monfalcón, referring to the situation of 1635, said that the total annual crop of Moluccan cloves was 2,816,00 lbs., of which the Dutch secured 1,098,000 lbs. and the Portuguese and the Spanish 1,718,000 in total. But these gures do not take into account those sold in Macassar. See John Villiers, “Manila and Maluku: Trade and warfare in the eastern archipelago, 1580–1640,” Philippine Studies 30, p. 158. Ibid., p. xxxvi. For a complete description of the activities of the eet see P. A. van Dyke, “The Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense, 1618–1622,” in Leonard Blussé (ed.), About and Around Formosa, T’sao Yung-ho Foundation for Culture and Education, Taipei, 2003, pp. 68–81. Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VII, p. xxxviii. Ibid., pp. xlv–xlvi. In fact, this affair had more consequences. The two missionaries and the captain of the ship suffered martyrdom, the Christian persecution in Japan resumed, and the relations with the Manila authorities worsened. In fact, Japan severed formally its relations with Manila two years later. See these details in chapter 6. In fact, the excuse Governor Fajardo gave to his wife on 11 May to leave his house, with the motive to spy on her, was that he was going to check the situation of the Dutch in front of Cavite. This move was fatal for Mrs. Fajardo (Catalina Zambrano) and her lover Juan de Mesa, as the storytellers were repeating generation after generation in Manila. The Dutch at Amboina feared that the English would attack back and took the preventive measure of assaulting the neighboring British East Indian Company factory in 1623. This problem became a national event in England, but it was partially cooled down after compensation was paid to the relatives of the victims. After this massacre, the British turned their interest to India. Another simultaneous episode in 1624 was the Dutchman Jacques l’Hermite’s threat to the galleon commerce in South America. After the failure of his eet, he went to the Dutch posts in the East Indies. In one of them, 219 Chinese residents of Manila or other towns of Luzon were on board the junks on their return trip from the Chincheo River. Muyser followed the instructions originally given to Witerboon on 22 May 1625, caught these Chinese, and brought them back to Batavia. The States General of Holland and Prince Maurits sent a eet of eleven ships sailing east via America and Acapulco to meet Muyser’s six ships in Cavite—but they did not meet at all. The interim governor Fernando de Silva (1625–1626) wrote in a letter to the king on August 1625 that these eleven ships left Holland in 1624 and caught three more ships in Peru; all of them reached Terrenate with 800 men on board. See Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VII–1, p. lxiii. It is worth mentioning now the adventure of the Jesuit Artemio de las Cortes. He left Manila on 25 January 1625 in the direction of Macao. But strong winds brought the ship to China and the ship wrecked on 14 February near Zhangzhou. After one year of captivity in China he was sent to Macao, and from there he reached Manila on 20 May 1626. This long journey allowed him to write a very important report of the Chinese daily life in Southern Fujian. See Artemio de las Cortes, Viaje de China, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1991.

252

Notes to pages 20–26

31.

See Yang Jie-yen 楊杰彥, 《荷據時代台灣史》 (The history of Taiwan during the Dutch period), 聯經出版, 台北, 2000, p. 67. As stated by Bishop Serrano in a letter to the king. See BRPI, vol. XXII, p. 89. For the detailed account see annex 3. For the detailed account see annex 5. For the detailed account see annex 6. It was probably this pressure that diverted the Dutch action towards Macao—during that summer, four Dutch ships set up a blockade of the port in order to capture the annual nao bound for Japan. On 18 August, four galliots under the command of Captain Joao Soares Vivas confronted the Dutch ships. They destroyed the agship “Ouwerkerk” and dispersed the others. According to Boxer, the Portuguese asked Manila for help, and Governor Niño de Tavora sent the galleon “Peña de Francia” to Macao—it was one of those ships initially bound for Isla Hermosa—but as it arrived at Macao, the problem was already settled. C. R. Boxer, O Grande Navio de Amacau, Fundaçao Oriente & Centro de Estudios Marítimos de Macao, 1960, p. 98. See W. M. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, reprint: Taipei, Southern Materials Center, 1987, 1992, pp. 42–51. For more details see Ibid., pp. 38–51. Also in Leonard Blussé, “Bull in a China Shop. Pieter Nuyts in China and Japan (1627–1636),” Leonard Blussé (ed.), About and Around Formosa, T’sao Yung-ho Foundation for Culture and Education, Taipei, 2003, pp. 95–110. In 1624, Sergeant Major Fernando de Silva going from Macao to Manila passed by Siam. There he showed a very arrogant attitude that the natives helped by the Japanese chopped his head to him and to most of his companions. Only thirty of them were sent to prison and the king of Siam conscated the whole cargo. The Spaniards sent a diplomatic mission to clarify the incident in 1625 under the command of Andrés López de Azaldegui, but did not succeed in getting the conscated cargo. See Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, VII–1, p. xlix; Colin-Pastells, Labor Evangélica, pp. 240–241; and Charles Ralph Boxer, O Grande Navio de Amacau, Fundación Oriente and Centro de Estudios Marítimos de Macao, Macao, 1960, p. 99. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, p. 283. Yang, based on the records of Batavia (DB, vol. 1, p. 99), also stressed the same idea; see Yang Jie-yen 楊杰彥, 《 荷據時代台灣史》 (The history of Taiwan during the Dutch period), p. 68. See annex 7. Benjamin Videira Pires, A viagen de comércio Macau-Manila, Museu Marítimo, Macao, 1994, pp. 19–22. See Carlos Quirino, “First newsletter in the Philippines,” Journal of the Philippine National Historical Society, 1957, pp. 169–178. VOC 1140, (1646III), ff. 470–473; VOC 1140, (1643) ff. 309–312; VOC 1140, (1643III) ff. 328–330. VOC 1160, f. 454. VOC 1170, f. 475. VOC 1160, f. 466. VOC 1160, f. 455. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, p. 287. The reasons for this “just war” were four: (1) the Japanese have prohibited the trade to oppose Christian propaganda; (2) they have refused to listen to Spanish ambassadors from Manila, aiming to foster peace among both kingdoms; (3) there were previous

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Notes to pages 26–38

51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

grievances that have not produced yet a Japanese apology, like in the case of the pillaging of the galleon “San Felipe,” in 1597; and, nally (4), that the Japanese always have intended to conquer the Philippines since the arrival of the Spaniards. For the whole “Alcarazo Incident” see Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, VII–1, p. clxi. Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, VII–1, p. clxiv. In fact, there was not a total suppression but just an important reduction of arrivals of Dutch ships, see W. Z. Mulder, Hollanders in Hirado, pp. 281–288. Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, VII–1, p. 106. C. E. S., Verwaarloosde Formosa, 1675. English version in W. M. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch (London, 1903), SMC, Taipei, 1992, pp. 383–492. Ibid., p. 458.

CHAPTER

 1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

253

2

At the very beginning of the conquest of America the conquistadores applied the Spanish medieval methods of controlling the new lands taken from the Moors. First, they followed a system by which the soldiers that have participated in the conquest received as a reward a share of Indians to work in plantations or in mines, that is why the system was called repartimiento (in Spanish repartir means to distribute, to share out). Very soon the system proved to be inefcient because of the diminishment of the natives—not accustomed to a regular work—that the system brought along. Then, it was substituted by the so-called encomienda system, also from feudal origin (in Spanish encomendar means “to entrust”). The encomienda was the land entrusted temporally to the encomendero, who received tributes from the natives living there, and had the possibility of asking them to render other services, like to work a particular number of days for him. On the other hand, the encomenderos had obligations towards the Indians entrusted to him, for example to organize their life, to predispose them to organized work, and to provide them Christian teaching. The legislation regarding the encomiendas tried to be humanitarian, avoiding exploitation and abuses, but, far away from the administrative centers, the encomenderos oftentimes were more concerned of their rights than of their duties. The Crown, in order to eliminate this system, tried to impede the transmission of the encomienda in the New Laws (1542), but it was very difcult to nd an alternative. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the formula of concertaje (in Spanish concertar means “to come to terms”) was established in America. In this situation the work was offered in exchange of a salary. The consequence was the recession of the encomienda system and the emerging of the ranch, where the exploitation to the Indians was more limited. In any case, the word encomienda retained the connotation of “Spanish tyranny.” T. Agoncillo, A Short History of the Philippines, National Book Store, Manila, 1975, pp. 37–42. See Lucio Gutiérrez, Domingo de Salazar, O. P., UST, Manila, 2001, pp. 123–152. See also José Luis Porras, The Synod of Manila of 1582, Historical Conservation Society, Manila, 1990. Gutiérrez, Domingo de Salazar, pp. 137–142. It is interesting to mention that Juan Cobo, after two years of studying Chinese, translated the Ben Sim Po Can (‫ע‬ʶᗸᛆ) into Spanish (the rst Chinese work translated into a Western language) and Miguel de Benavides translated a catechism into Chinese that was printed in the parian. See Borao, “Observaciones sobre traductores y traducciones.”

254

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

Notes to pages 39–50

It is worth mentioning now what happened with the Spanish translation by Cobo of the Ben Sim Po Can. Salazar, before his departure from Manila, praised the translation in a letter to the king. Knowing that Phillip II was a real book collector, Salazar probably requested from Cobo this little treasure for Philip II, upon his arrival in the court of Madrid. But the fact was that the gift was nally given by Benavides in 1596, not directly to the king, but dedicated to his son, the future Philip III. Albert Kammerer, “La découverte de la Chine par les portugais au XVIème siècle et la cartographie des portulans,” T’ung Pao, Leiden, 1944, pp. 147ss, 224ss. Luís G. Gomes, “Efémero estabelecimento dos castellanos nas vizinhanças de Macau no Século XVI,” Boletim do Instituto Luis de Camões, Macao, 1970, pp. 325–339. One important source that favored the thesis of Videira was the History of Aduarte (1962, pp. 348–363), who was a direct witness of the Dasmariñas episode. He stated clearly that the place where Dasmariñas was shipwrecked was on an island called Lampacao. See Benjamin Videira Pires, “Copia de hu’a do Irmão Andre Pinto Pera os padres E Irmãos da Compañía de Jesu no Collegio de S. Paulo de goa E de Cochím. A 13 de Novembro de 1564,” Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau, November, 1964, pp. 740–749. He claried this idea saying: “But if it is difcult to do so or if it is too dangerous to be waiting for an answer, they can of course start building it. This is even clearer in our case, not only in view of the grave risk posed both by the barbarians and, more so, by the Dutch. Thus it is urgent that this should be done” (SIT, 59). Before giving his opinion, González summarized the main ideas of Vitoria’s Ius Gentium, saying: “Ports must be common to all but without harming the land where outsiders desire to settle, … [consequently], the relation between kingdoms must be smooth-sailing. The Lord has it that all things are not be found in one kingdom alone, thus encourages communication, friendship, and trade. These tendencies are so intimately rooted in human nature that no matter how barbaric these people surrounding us may be, all of them value the warm welcome; that, in turn, they extend to foreigners who come to these parts without the intention to do harm” (SIT, 60). This point matches with the principles of Vitoria, because the pope is not considered the secular lord of these territories. This point clearly coincides with the ones of Vitoria. This reason was presented as a kind of self-defense. It was Gonzalez’s own opinion, because Vitoria did not analyze in his treaty “On the Indis” the Dutch question. This refers clearly to Vitoria, but it is a little bit redundant with the second reason. We do not know exactly how the conversations with the natives developed. Was it a kind of “Requerimiento” formula (i.e., a way to force negotiations) or a real case of “free negotiations”? The difference matters because the latter is the only one matching the principles of Vitoria. This idea is not mentioned in the principles of Vitoria. This contradicts the principles of Vitoria, to whom the natives’ decision must be totally free and without coercion. This desire to compensate victims seems in accordance with Vitoria’s opinions as well as the idea of canceling this compensation because of the later belligerent behavior of the natives who—after some time—ought to have known the intentions of the Spaniards. Tonio Andrade, “Political spectacle and colonial rule: The Landdag on Dutch Taiwan, 1629–1648,” Itinerario, vol. 21–3, 1997, pp. 57–93.

Notes to pages 52–55

20.

255

See Martine Julia van Ittersum (ed.), Table of Contents for Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty of Hugo Grotius, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2006.

CHAPTER

3

  Paul Jen-kuei Li, “The dispersal of the Formosan Aborigines in Taiwan,¨ Language and Linguistics, vol. 2, No. 1 (January 2001), p. 274. This theory has been challenged recently by DNA genetic studies, like those of Dr. Marie Lin, who claims that “the genetic structure of present-day Taiwanese aborigines cannot be found anywhere in Mainland China.” See her paper “Taiwan Population Genetics, Past and Present,¨ in the International Conference on History and Culture of Taiwan, Taipei, 2006. On the other hand, according to Australian archeologist Peter Bellwood, Taiwan can be considered as the origin of the proto-Austronesian language, whose early dispersion started around 4,000–1,000 B.C. Austronesian languages are reaching nowadays 270 million people speakers: Peter Bellwood, “Formosan prehistory and Austronesian dispersion,” in David Blundell (ed.), Austronesian Taiwan, University of California, Berkeley, 2001, p. 337.  2. To understand the evolution of the process leading to the present classication, see Margaret M. Y. Sung, “The languages of the Taiwan aborigines,” in Kwang-chih Chang et al. (ed.), Anthropological Studies of the Taiwan Area: Accomplishments and Prospects, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 1989, pp. 37–58.  3. For a summary of the scholars’ perception of the geographical boundaries of Ketagalan tribes see 詹素娟 and 劉益昌，大臺北都會區原住民歷史專輯：凱達格蘭調查報 告，臺北：臺北市文獻委員會, 1999, p. 97.  4. Shigeru Tsuchida, §Kulong: Yet another Austronesian language in Taiwan?”, Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, No. 60, Academia Sinica, 1985.  5. Wen-hsun Sung, “Unity and diversity in prehistoric Taiwan: a cultural perspective,” in Kwang-chih Chang et al. (ed.), Anthropological Studies of the Taiwan Area: Accomplishments and Prospects, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 1989, pp. 99–110.  6. This archeological site is the most important one in Taiwan, with 1,500 stone cofns and 20,000 artifacts that can be visited in the National Museum of Prehistory (國立史 前博物館) in Taitung (台東).  7. Liu Yi-chang (劉益昌) advances the archeological sequence of these periods in the Taipei Basin; for him, the Taipei Basin entered the Paleolithic era around 30,000– 50,000 B.P. and lasted till 10,000 B.P. On the other hand, the Neolithic era began around 6,500 B.P. when the early Dabenkeng culture appeared. See Liu Yi-chang 劉益 昌，淡水河口的史前文化與族群 (Native settlements and prehistoric culture in the mouth of the Tamsui River), Shisanhang Museum, Taipei, 2002, p. 45.  8. According to Liu Yi-chang (Ibid., p. 118), Taiwan had skipped the bronze period; therefore the bronze found in the Shisanhang site should be from China.  9. Chao-Mei Lien, “The interrelationship of Taiwan’s prehistoric archeology and ethnology,” Kwang-chih Chang, et al. (ed.), Anthropological Studies of the Taiwan Area: Accomplishments and Prospects, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 1989, pp. 162–173. 10. 張耀錡，平埔社名對照表 (A comparative name-list of peo-po-fang’s villages through the historical ages), 台北：台灣省文獻委員會, 1951. 11. The most available collection for northern Taiwan is The Formosan Encounter, Vol. II: 1636–1645 (2000), Vol. III: 1646–1662 (2006), Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei. We are citing this book here as FE.

256

Notes to pages 55–59

12. One study of the Taipei Basin population: Ang Kaim 翁佳音，大臺北古地圖考釋 (Interpretation of the Great Taipei Area), 臺北：臺北縣立文化中心, 1998. 13. In our opinion this map was made by three or four teams of cartographers (or by a single team but working in detail only in four or ve particular areas). Later those independent works were assembled in a single map. The result is that there are some sections (like the Tamsui River, some parts of the Quelang Harbor and the present Taipei area) whose proportions are very well kept and their accuracy is higher than initially expected. 14. Three levels were excavated: (a) 0–25 cm, with some modern Chinese pottery and porcelain; (b) 25–60 cm, with stone cofns and Chinese pottery; (c) below 60 cm, with some iron items and green and white porcelains. Because the place was near a strategic military site, the archeologists were not able to start in site A until the end of the war, in May 1947. See 國分直一 and 金關丈夫，台灣考古誌，東京：法政大學出版局, 1979 (reprint 台北：武陵出版社, 1990), p. 88. 15. 河井隆敏，基隆大沙灣的貝塚發掘記，民俗臺灣, 4 (3), 1944, pp. 30–31. The archeological chart of northern Taiwan names this site as TSW, and dates it around 1400–1650 A.D. 16. “The natives of Senar comprise eight or nine villages and live near the fort [Santo Domingo]. We are trying to unite them into one village where they used to live and where their houses stand. They abandoned the place out of fear when the Spaniards took over the piece of land [to build their fort]. They moved to the interior to cultivate other farmlands, and to build houses and tambobos. The place where we are trying to gather them is on a mountain, which is cool and pleasant to live in, as they can shelter themselves in their thatched huts from the cold of winter and from the fury of the winds that usually topple down their houses and tambobos. In this mountain there are many fruit trees, like peach and orange. It is about half a league from the fort of the Spaniards and the road is good due to some atlands that used to be farmlands before the Spaniards came” (SIT, 166; also in SIT, 184). 17. About this Basayan identication, let us mention just now that Overtwater called this place “Kabila,” and Keerdekoe in his map calls the same village “Kaggilach.¨ It seems that in both cases the village is identied with the name of her headman (see Table 3.1: “Population of Senar and Kipas”). 18. For a discussion of the possible identification of the location of the village see: 康培德 (Peter Kang), 台灣原住民史政策篇（一）── 荷西明鄭時期 (The history of Formosan aborigines: Policy formulation 1), 南投：國史館台灣文 獻館, 2005, p. 293. 19. Nevertheless, the Dutch recorded them with some detail. In 1650 the villages in the other side of the Tamsui River (and their population) were Parrigon (122), Parricoutsie (530), Pocael (520), Dockudukol (401), Paipeitsie (221), Warre Warre (221), Darridauw (189), Parriwan (200), Routsoudt (115), Ballebal (420), Taggewaer (187), Hallabas (115), and Warrouwar (394). They were very populated, totaling 3,587 souls (FE III, 293). According to Peter Kang some can be identied like Parricoutsie: Nankan (南嵌) of today’s Tayouan County (桃園縣), or Pocael: Chuchien (竹塹), near today’s Hsinchu City (新竹市). See Peter Kang, Ibid., p. 178. 20. If this person was a descendant of a Spanish or Portuguese survivor of the shipwreck of 1582, he might have been born a few years after the wreck, then, in 1632, he would be around forty-ve years old. Nevertheless, none of those documents referring to the shipwreck mentions that anyone stayed behind; rather, it is implied that all the survivors went back to Macao.

Notes to pages 60–70

21. 22.

2 3. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

257

Ang Kaim,大臺北古地圖考釋, pp. 71–72. Amongthese scholars we can mention Peter Kang, who additionally considers that the villages along the Tamsui River have an inland area of inuence projected uphill the nearby mountains. See his research report《大屯山、七星山系聚落史調查研究計 畫》, Yangminshan National Park, 2002. One braza is 1.67 meters. To know the colorful life of this insane criminal Lamma seeFE III, pp. 113–114. Nevertheless,scholars analyzing Qing land contracts say that Siron was located partly on present Zhonghe (中和) and partly Yonghe (永和). The relation of Dutch place names with the names of Qing archives can be this: Pinnonouan (武朥灣), Rieuweovas (了阿), Rivrycq (雷裡), Cournangh (龜崙蘭), and Siron (秀朗). See: 詹素娟, 劉益昌, 大臺北都會區原住民歷史專輯：凱達格蘭調查 報告 (Historical collections on the Aborigines in the Great Taipei Area: Investigation report on the Ketagalan), 臺北：臺北市文獻委員會, 1999, p. 69. Ifwe observe the Dutch lists we notice that they are quite consistent in their spelling and number of inhabitants. Some small villages only appear once or twice in consecutive years; therefore we presume that they were so small that they passed unnoticed in the other surveys. Interesting to mention that the list offered by Esquivel, though smaller, can be correlated with the Dutch ones, especially if the villages have more than 200 inhabitants. Spanish and Dutch transliterations of native villages offer a close spelling, although few names are difcult to reconcile. 中村孝志，荷蘭時代台灣史研究（下冊） (Studies of Taiwan history of the Dutch period, II), ̎˵: ᆭ൰, 2002, pp. 1–55. 詹素娟，族群、歷史與地域：噶瑪蘭人的歷史變遷（從史前到1900α）(Ethnogroups, history and area — the history of Kavalan), 國立台灣師範大學歷史學系博士 論文, 1998. See Peter Kang 康培德，“荷蘭時代蘭陽平原的聚落與地區性互動，” 臺灣文 獻, 52, 2001, pp. 219–253. 劉益昌 (Liu Yi-chang), 台北縣北海岸地區考古遺址調查報告 (Archeological sites in the northern coastal area of the Taipei County: A survey report), 台北縣立文化中 心，1997; and 臺閩地區考古遺址（宜蘭縣、花蓮縣）(Yilan and Hualian Counties in the charter of the archeological sites of Taiwan and the Min regions of Fujian), 中央 研究院歷史語言研究所, 台北, 2004. Ifwe compare the name of these two neighboring villages, Sinarochan and Sinachan, we can see how close they are and how much they differ from the rest of the names in the Lang Yang Plain. Therefore a close relation might be suspected. Thiscooperation was seen as important, because weeks before an incident occurred, probably in the Basay village of Quitalabiauan, between his people and a Dutch party made of two soldiers (one of them was killed) and two Basayans elders. Once the incident was over, one of the Basayans, Teodoro, suggested to the Dutch winning the condence of Tarribe, in order to cooperate with him in the relation with Turoboan (FE III, 389–391). Itis strange that Domingo Aguilar only went there for such a purpose. The account continues saying that: “Those slaves, who had run off from Quelang, had been beaten to death by the Parrougearons” (FE III, 75). These erce people were living in the mountains and were very jealous of their gold. Accordingto the local amateur historian Wang Tiensung 王天送, in the 1930’s a great quantity of human bones (near eighty persons) were discovered in that area, which

258

36.

37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

Notes to pages 72–74

are commonly believed to belong to Spaniards who were passing by. The bones were transferred soon after to a common mausoleum near the primary school Chung Deh 崇德國小. With his materials we proceed to make a C14 time period estimation of the bones that revealed they were of the fteenth century. If this data is right we have to think more of a ght among natives themselves for the control of the area rather than a massacre of Spaniards. A modern DNA study of the remaining bones might offer new insights. Forthe identication of Basey with Turoboan see Peter Kang 康培德〈十七世紀上半 的馬賽人〉(The Basay people in the rst half of the 17th century), 《臺灣史研究》 10 (1), 2003, pp. 1–32. According to the way Esquivel listed the village, Rarangus should be next after Turoboan, and the closest place is the area of present Xincheng (新城). Another reason to locate Rarangus in Xincheng is the explanation of the history of the Ami clan Raranges (rock column). According to this history, this clan used to live at the foot of the Bainan North Mountain (卑南北山), southwest to the new train station of Bainan. At some moment they reached as far north as Xincheng Township in Hualien County (花蓮縣新城鄉). Later on they were under the threat of the Truku people and they left that place, and they went to Taitung, rst to Hengchun (恆春), and later to Guanshan (關山). See ஈ˃ܸ, 廖守臣，吳明義，台灣原住民史：阿美族史篇 (The history of Formosan Aborigines: Amis), 南投：台灣省文獻會, 2001, p. 11. Thisepisode is probably the same one known by the Dutch, which they wanted to verify by interrogating Domingo Aguilar (SIT, 477). Nevertheless there are two important differences in the two stories, one is that the episode is located around 1635 and the event happened in Kipormowa, a place impossible to identify, because it does not appear in the lists made by the Dutch. InJanuary 2007 a new ethnic group was recognized by the Taiwan government under the name of Sakizaya, and located in the Hualian area. Unfortunately,the three manuscripts of Esquivel on the grammar, the dictionary, and the catechism in the language of the Indies of Tamchui are lost. Thehagiography of Esquivel was made by Diego de Aduarte in his History, Zaragoza, Imprenta del Hospital Real de Nuestra Señora de Gracia, 1693, pp. 413–426. For Esquivel, Quelang was an intermediate stopover on his way to Japan, his nal destination. That is why, while preparing himself in Manila for that trip, he published in that city, in 1630, a Japanese dictionary, based on a previous one made by the Jesuits and with the help of a Japanese Dominican. The same happened, with the manuscripts of another missionary that was very knowledgeable in the Basay language, Teodoro Quirós, who—according Victorio Riccio—after learning the Tagalo language: “was the rst to acquire a systematic knowledge of that [Basay] language and, from it, formulated a grammar, vocabulary, doctrine, confession, and a voluminous catechism wherein, through the dialogue, he made known everything that is necessary, from the creation to the end of this world” (SIT, 624). PaulLi, “Some Problems in the Basay Language,” Symposium Series of the Institute of Linguistics (Preparatory Ofce), Academia Sinica, No. 1, May, 1999, p. 637. See“Asai’s Basay vocabulary,” in Tsuchida Shigeru (土田 滋), Yamada Yukihiro (山 田幸宏), Moriguchi Tsunekazu (森口恒一), Linguistic Materials of the Formosan Sinicized Populations I: Siraya and Basay, Research report, The University of Tokio, Department of Linguistics, March, 1991, pp. 195–257.

Notes to pages 74–80

46.

47.

48.

49.

50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

259

In1987, Paul Li was also able to interview in Keelung an eighty-three-year-old lady called Tseng Panrao (曾潘蟯), who originated also from Xinshe (新社) and referred to him sixty-seven words. When she was asked for the meaning of 山地人 (mountain people), she answered: Basay. Paul Li, “Some problems in the Basay language,” p. 164. According to the lexicon of Farrell, “water” is also pronounced in other Taiwan aboriginal languages as “za: núm,” “zanum,” “ranum.” Other possibilities of the meaning of the stem “uanu,” following Ferrell lexicon can be: cloud (“ranun”), mountain (“na:ún”), forest/jungle (“nauna´ún”). See R. Ferrell, Taiwan Aboriginal Groups. Problems in cultural and linguistic classication. Monograph 17, Institute of Ethnology, Academica Sinica, 1969. PaulLi concludes that, linguistically, among all the Austronesian languages in Taiwan, it is Basay that is closest to Kavalan (Cabaran as written by Esquivel), rather than Amis. That is to say, our knowledge of modern Kavalan language may be a tool in “decoding” some Basay place names. Ibid., pp. 166–168. The lexicon of Ferrell gives also the meaning of the Cavalan words: “tanan¨ (hole) and §burau¨ (sea-shell) that might explain the meaning of the village Quitanaburauan, as something like the place having/producing shells with holes. Wethink that these two names refer to different persons because—as it happened in Quimaurri—the Dutch appointed young headmen in the nearest villages in order to make them more suitable for the service of the VOC. PeterKang,《大屯山、七星山系聚落史調查研究計畫》published by the Yangminshan National Park, 2002. If this is the case, those villages might have a certain correspondence to some archeological sites like Renli 仁里 (JL), Yanliao 塩寮 (YL), Hesichang 1 核四場 I (HSC1), Jioushe 舊社 (CS), and basically Fulong 福隆 (FL). Inthat case this might correspond by the archeological sites of Shisanxin 十三姓 (SSH) and Tzirengong 慈仁宮 (TJK). Inthis place is located the archeological site TLM with archeological data between the years 1400 to 1800. Nevertheless,it is strange that in the census of 1654 this village appears as one of those that “so far have not received a cane from the Honourable Company or did not want to accept one, but rebelled against the Company rule,” something that seems to conict with the Basay way of doing (FE III, 502). The whole story inSIT, 335, 377, 410, 442. Canwe nd other Basayan villages outside Taiwan, or some place names that might explain their origin in the Philippines or their expansion from Taiwan? At the present stage it is difcult to say, but it is surprising that the principal island of the Batanes Archipelago (located between Luzon and Taiwan) was called “Basay.” Nowadays is called “Basco” because Governor of the Philippines José Basco y Vargas sent an expedition in 1782 to force the Ivatans to agree to become Spanish subjects. After the success of this mission, Governor Basco was named count of Batanes, the new province was named Concepción, and the capital town was named after him. See Vocabulario Ibatán-Español, o sea del dialecto hablado por los naturales de las Islas Batanes y Calayan (Filipinas). Acopiado y compuesto por varios PP. Dominicos españoles misioneros en aquellas islas. Con prólogo of Otto Scheerer, Universidad de Santo Tomás, Manila, 1933. Additionally, in the most northern part of the Philippines (in the Cagayan Province) we can also nd place names like Aparri (similar to Taparri) or Camalaniugan (similar to Cavalan or Camalan).

260

Notes to pages 80–96

57.

TheDutch sources refer to the villages Kipangas (Kipanas?), Kiliessouw (Lichoco?), and Madamadou (?) (FE II, 305). FE II, 439, 449–450. Regarding the interpreters, there was also a Japanese with the Spanish name of Jacinto (Jasinto Cousaymondonne in Dutch sources). In the year 1645, he was considered an old person (FE II, 556). Most probably he was the Japanese Christian who the Spaniards met upon their arrival, in 1626, that he was married to a Basay and had two daughters who were baptized by the missionaries (SIT, 86). VOC 1183, f. 770v. See Laurence G. Thompson, “The earliest Chinese Eyewitness accounts of the Formosan aborigines,” Monumenta Serica, 23, 1964, pp. 170–178. Thompson,Ibid., p. 172. Campbell,Formosa under the Dutch, p. 15. TheDutch sometimes use the term cabessa, borrowed from the homonymous Portuguese cabeça (meaning head), to signify a leadership, not only in natives villages, but also in Chinese settlements. This explanation seems to contradict the Dutch lists of native villages that are accompanied by the correspondent headman. We can nd different explanations for this; rst, the interest of the Dutch in appointing a particular person to make him responsible for the affairs of the village, and therefore to facilitate negotiations. Another explanation is that the name of the representative elder in a given moment, for example a landdag, is not always the same in the succeeding lists. Twelveyears later the elder of Quimaurri, Teodoro, commenting probably on the same affair, identied the place as Kipormowa. He related the story with a more bizarre approach; and, substituting the Cagayanos by the Basayans, he said: “A party of 100 Spaniards and the same number of auxiliary troops from Kimauri and St Jago, a total of 200 men, attacked and burned their villages and captured three heads” (SIT, 477). Thompson,Ibid., p. 174. A situationer on the conversion of the Isla Hermosa (SIT, 179–182). SeeLeonard Blussé, “The eclipse of the inibs: The Protestant mission in 17th century Taiwan and its persecution of native priestesses.” International Conference on the Formosan Indigenous Peoples, Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica, Taipei, 1999. Thompson,Ibid. p. 173. ShinzoHayase, Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia, Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2007, pp. 16–17. Qudarat,or Corralat as the Spaniards called him, was recently featured in a historical novel of Cui-Perales, Qudarat, Lord of the Pulang, Manila, 2001. Campbell,Formosa under the Dutch, 115. See Ang Kaim 翁佳音，〈被遺忘的臺灣原住民史：Quata（大肚番王）初考〉 The forgotten history of Taiwan aborigines: A preliminary study of Quata)《臺北文 物》c42卷4期c1992. Peter Kang 康培德，〈環境、空間與區域——地理學觀點下十七世紀中葉「大 肚王」統治的消長〉(Environment, space, and the ebb and ow of the 17th century Quataongh reign: A geographic perspective),《臺大文史哲學報》59 (2003), p. 106. See Peter Kang, “Inherited geography: Post-national history and the emerging dominance of Pimaba in East Taiwan,” Taiwan Historical Research, 12.2, 2005, pp. 1–33.

58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64.

65.

66. 67. 68.

69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

74.

75.

Notes to pages 96–107

261

76.

Onecase of that was in 1622 when the natives of Lamey Island pillaged a Dutch merchant ship. The revenge made by the Dutch eleven years later led to the depopulation of that small island. 77. Wehave changed in this sentence the “indirect style” used in the document by a more literary “direct style.” In fact, Governor François Caron, when making a report based on the same information (although in a more briey manner) at the end of that year, used the direct style (FE III, 142). 78. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, p. 149. As regards the reference to Quelang, Putmans is bringing the issue of the killing of some Spaniards and one missionary that happened a few months earlier when they were in Tamsui buying rice. This incident was understood in a solipsistic view by the Dutch who perceived it as a native revolt against taxation (SIT, 244, 249, 477). 79. Campbell,Formosa under the Dutch, p. 231. 80. VOC 1183, f. 770v. CHAPTER

1.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

4

During these years, those in charge of the vice-kingdom of Mexico were Rodrigo Pacheco (1624–1635); the marquis of Cadereytia (or Cadeireta), Lope Díaz de Armendáriz (1635–1640); Diego López Pacheco (1640–1642); and the Aragonian Juan Palafox y Mendoza (10 June–23 November 1642), who later was archbishop of Mexico (1643–1653). From this city he monitored East Asia events; and in 1670, eleven years after his death, his book The History of the Conquest of China by the Tartar was published in Paris. During the Spanish presence in Isla Hermosa, the governors general in the Philippines were Fernando de Silva (interim) (1624–1626), Juan Niño de Tavora (1626–1632), Lorenzo de Olasso (interim) (1632–1633), Juan Cerezo de Salamanca (interim) (1633– 1635), and Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (1635–1644). See Nicolas P. Cushner, John A. Larkin, “Royal land grants in the colonial Philippines (1571–1626): Implications for the formation of a social elite,” Philippine Studies, No. 26, 1978, pp. 102–111. See Alberto Santamaría, “The Chinese parian (el parian de los sangleyes),” in Alfonso Felix, Jr. (ed.), The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570–1770, vol. 1, Manila, 1966, pp. 67–118. See J. E. Borao, “The massacre of 1603: Chinese perception of the Spaniards in the Philippines,” Itinerario, vol. 23, No. 1, 1998, pp. 22–39. See Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los Sangleyes en la Islas Filipinas, y de las victorias que tuvo contra ellos el Gouernador Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, el año de 1640–1641, ed. Catalina de Barrio y Angul, Madrid, 1642, 4 s. The bottom of the bay, in the place where the passenger harbor is now located, was an extensive muddy area with two small islands at the entrance that probably made that place totally deserted. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century the Japanese started to remove these islands and excavate the area in order to create the present harbor in the city. They gave this name to that place because the rst time they reached the area was that saint’s day (SIT, 72, 162). VOC 1149, f. 772; also in FE II, pp. 359, 540, 563. Map of Jan Van Braam, eighteenth century.

262

Notes to pages 107–115

11. 12.

Map of the Jesuit Carlo Trigona: “Quantung, e Fokien Provincie della China.¨ Nicolas Bellin in “L’isle de Formose et Partie des Costes de la Chine,” eighteenth century. J. L. P. J. Vogels, Het Nieuwe Tayouan. De Verenigde Oostindische Companie op Kelang, 1664–1668, Doctoral Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, p. 71. The Japanese excavation of 1936 of the fortress did not nd any native dwellings. This place still can be excavated and could become a very important archeological site in northern Taiwan. The succeeding efforts we have made in the last years to push for this excavation have not found sufcient echo in the respective administrative authorities and academic circles. At present it is still possible to excavate the area, but we are afraid that a delay could be very harmful, since it is a very attractive area for private housing. In fact, in 1636 this had appeared in Dutch sources as Sanckodeeff (SIT, 245). When Colombus discovered the island in 1493 he gave the name of San Juan Bautista to the island. In 1508 the Spaniards started exploring the island and discovered a big bay which they named Puerto Rico (meaning: Rich Harbor), and one year later, after the conquest of the island, the city of Puerto Rico was formally founded. But, in 1521, when the city acquired the status of capital of the island, both names were exchanged: the island was called Puerto Rico and the city San Juan. In 1635, García Romero referred that some money was charged to some people “in the fort of San Salvador” (SIT, 255), and later when he listed the cannon, he referred to “the fortress of San Salvador which is the principal fort” (SIT, 259). We have also the case of Corcuera when he ordered in 1637 that “all the forces, artillery and ammunition should be gathered in the castle of San Salvador” (SIT, 276), or when he appointed Portillo as “the keeper of the fort of San Salvador” (SIT, 309). Aduarte in 1640 said “they set up a fort called San Salvador” (SIT, 72). The same usage in the trial of Corcuera (SIT, 430, 464). VOC 1040, f. 317. For example the memorial of cannon written by Governor Portillo reads as follows “List of the existing armaments in the garrison in these forces of San Salvador of Isla Hermosa” (SIT, 343). The same wording of “forces of San Salvador” was used, in 1644, by the lawyer of Corcuera in a trial against the ex-governor (SIT, 507). VOC 1170, f. 498 v. VOC 1176, f. 741. Nevertheless, it is possible that there were two different churches, as expressed in the map of Keerdekoe. In that case, the Franciscan church must be the one burnt by the natives. VOC 1170, f. 491v. Another report said that there were fty-ve in Quelang and thirteen in Tamsuij (VOC 1179, f. 495). VOC 1170, f. 506. See Tsunekazu Moriguchi, “Asa’s Basai vocabulary,” Linguistic Materials of the Formosan Sinized Populations. I: Siraya and Basai, Research Report of Department of Linguistics of the University of Tokyo, March 1991, p. 219. VOC 1170, f. 505. VOC 1140, f. 301v. Borao, “The massacre of 1603,” p. 25. See Lourdes Díaz Trechuelo, Arquitectura Española en Filipinas (1565–1800), Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos, Sevilla, 1959, pp. 41–42.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

Notes to pages 115–131

30.

31.

32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

263

Some optimistic accounts said that seven more died (SIT, 132) and the rest escaped to Quelang after killing the Senar headman in the ght. Others said that thirty Spaniards died in total (SIT, 135). He also stayed ghting until the last moment (SIT, 371). He was one of the few that from his exile in Batavia decided not to go back to Manila, but to Spain, but he died in Germany, on his way back (SIT, 468). Carvajal died during the rst attack of the Dutch in September 1641. He was sent to spy the approaching movements of the Dutch with two Cagayanos and four Basayans. The seven of them were captured by the natives colligated with the Dutch, who killed them (SIT, 333). VOC 1146, f. 530v. VOC 1149, f. 777v. VOC 1149, f. 791. VOC 1149, f. 740. VOC 1207, f. 596v. VOC 1176, f. 752. This ship arrived that summer bringing some help, and it was the only one from the armada of 1627 that reached Isla Hermosa. See annex 6. The judgment of residence was the investigation made by the incoming governor, upon his arrival, on the services and management of the governorship of the outgoing one. Any person could present any complaint against the governor before his departure. To better understand the proceedings of the judgment of residence we can see the instructions given by the governor general of the Philippines Corcuera to the incoming Quelang governor Portillo on how to proceed in the case of the judgment of his predecessor Cristóbal Márquez (SIT, 313, 316, 334). The main problem of this procedure was that the system can be indulgent and consequently corrupted, because the judge was equal in rank to the person to be judged, and the new judge will meet the same fate once his period ends. VOC 1149, f. 774v. Ibid. VOC 1148, f. 739. VOC 1149, f. 774v. See Pol Heyns 韓家寶，《荷蘭時代台灣的經濟、土地與稅務》(Dutch Formosa’s economy, land rights and taxation), p. 193. One of the theories for the origin of this name is related with the Spanish chivalry novel Las Sergas de Esplandian (Seville, 1515), where it said that one island called California existed near the Indies, and it was populated by black women like the Amazons, those mythical female warriors mentioned by Herodotus. It was discovered on Easter Sunday (in Spanish: “Pascua Florida”). Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 24. Alicia Cámara Muñoz, “Tratados de arquitectura militar en España. Siglos XVI y XVII,” Goya, No. 156, May–June 1980, p. 339. Sebastián Fernández de Medrano, El Architecto perfecto en el Arte Militar, Brussels, 1700, p. 8. In the rst decades of the seventeenth century there were several engineers dealing with the theory of fortication. Among them we can cite Cristóbal de Rojas, Teoría y práctica de forticación (1598); Diego González de Medina Barba, Examen de forticación

264

52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

64.

Notes to pages 131–137

(1599); Cristóbal Lechuga, Tratado de la Artillería y de forticación (1611); and Luis Coscón, Expugnación de plazas (1629). See Cámara, “Tratados de arquitectura militar ...,” p. 344. See Esperanza B. Gatbonton, Bastión San Diego, Intramuros Administration, Manila, 1985. The divine world is sometimes represented by a triangle, a gure that shaped the rst Spanish fort in the Philippines, fort San Pedro, in Cebú. Sedeño joined the Jesuits in Loreto and later stayed several years in Rome as rector or the Jesuit “German college” before going to America. He arrived in 1581 in the Philippines, where he founded the mission of the Jesuits. See N. P. Cushner, “Los jesuitas en Filipinas en el siglo decimosexto, según el menologio inédito del Padre Pedro Murillo Velarde,” Missionalia Hispánica, No. 34, 1967, pp. 332–333. Sebastián Fernández Medrano, El Architecto perfecto en el Arte Militar, p. 34. But after its abandonment by the Dutch it became a ruin hardly used by the Chinese and a total displaced structure during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Similarly the Spaniards abandoned Zamboanga in 1662 (and Terrenate in 1663) in fear of the Koxinga invasion. But the case of Zamboanga is different because the Spaniards went back in 1718, under Governor General Fernando Bustillos Bustamante, who assigned General Gregorio de Padilla y Escalante to rebuild the old fort. The new fortication received the name of Nuestra Señora del Pilar. Parker, The Military Revolution, p. 40. Certainly, these cities celebrated special days. For instance, in Manila in the year 1597, on the eve of the feast day of Santa Potenciana (the patroness of the city), the governor rallied and cheered up the city, in the evening reworks were offered and during the feast day itself there was a masquerade and much rejoicing (SIT, 25–26). Not to mention the bullghting festival—an activity revitalized in the Baroque times—that the city enjoyed in 1626. One rectangle will have the perfect aurea proportion if the ratio between the long and the short sides is 1.618. Ron van Oers, Dutch Town Planning Overseas during VOC and WIC Rule (1600– 1800), Walburg Pers, Delf, 2000, p. 10–11. Enrico Guidoni, Angela Marino, Historia del Urbanismo. Siglo XVII, Instituto de Estudios de Administración local, Madrid, 1982, pp. 202–203. Translated by John Maseeld. See Thomas Walsh (ed.), Hispanic Anthology: Poems Translated from the Spanish by English and North American Poets, Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1920. See J. E. Borao, “Acercamientos literarios occidentales a la presencia holandesa y española en el Taiwan y las Filipinas del siglo XVII,” Encuentros en Catay, No. 19, Fujen University, 2005, pp. 117–140.

CHAPTER

1. 2. 3. 4.

5

Schurz, The Manila Galleon, p. 283. Ts’ao Yung-ho, “Taiwan as an entrepôt in East Asia in the seventeenth century,” Itinerario, Vol. XXI (1997), No. 3, pp. 94–114. The Ming Court, after this move set up a new county jurisdiction in Yuegang called Haicheng (海澄). This county nally merged into Lunghai (龍海) city in 1993. See Cesar V. Callanta, The Limahong Invasion, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1989.

Notes to pages 138–148

5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14.

15.

16. 17.

265

For a collection of Chinese references on Limahong, see: Tang Kaijian 湯開建，〈劉 堯誨《督撫疏議》中保存的林鳳及其與西班牙關係史料〉 (The contents related to Lin Fong and his connection with Spain in Liu Yaohui’s “Du Fu Shi Yi”)c《明清 時期的中國與西班牙國際學術研討會論文匯編》c30 October–2 November 2007, pp. 29–38. See the letter of Juan Bautista Román to the viceroy of Mexico, in 25 June 1582 (AGI, Filipinas 29). Also see Pablo Pastells, Historia de las Islas Filipinas, vol. 2, Barcelona 1926, pp. ccxxii–ccxxiii; and Virgina Benitez and José Llavador, The Philippines under Spain, vol. 3, NTHCPP, Manila, 1991, pp. 381–382. These sources about this Japanese affair do not mention that particular name of Tayfusu, but it appears in secondary sources like Fernández, Dominicos donde nace el Sol, p. 34. Fernández quoted from the History of Aduarte (p. 134), but we have not found that name in that location. See Seiichi Iwao, “Li Tan, chief of the Chinese Residents at Hirado, Japan, in the last days of the Ming Dinasty,” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, The Tokio Bunko, Tokio, 1958. I want to thank Professor Ang Kaim who commented to me that in contemporary Chinese literature a similar expression exists for “pretending to be the king of China,” which is jian hao (僭號), referring to the attempt of gaining the title of king or emperor. One case can be a man called Li Xin that appears in Shenzong Shilu, vol. 583, 5th month of 47th year (1619) of Shenzong reign (神宗實錄，卷583， 47α5˂): “Li Xin the treacherous Fujianese from Zhangzhou, [who pretended to the throne and] who illegally proclaimed himself the reign title of Hongwulao (̤‫؁‬Ϣ the “great martial master”), the pirate Yuan Balao and others led their gang of more than a thousand followers, rampantly plundering, setting re, and destroying [many places].” Whether this Li Xin is Li Dan or not is a matter of discussion. Letter of Richard Cooks on 25 February 1616: in William Foster, Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East, vol. IV, London, 1900, p. 54. For a contemporary impression of Iquam by the Franciscan missionary Antonio Caballero, see annex 18. Mark Vink, George Winius, “South India and the China Seas: How the VOC shifted its weight from China & Japan to India around A.D. 1636,” in As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente, Actas do VI Seminario International de História Indo-Portuguesa, Macao, 1991. Ts’ao Yungho, “Taiwan as an entrepôt …,¨ p. 105. Some of these products remained in Nueva España. Some were transferred by mule to Veracruz, in the Atlantic, to be reshipped to Spain, and another small part was kept to be sent to Lima (Perú). See J. E. Borao, “The arrival of the Spanish galleons in Manila from the Pacic Ocean and their departure along the Kuroshio stream (16th–17th centuries),” Journal of Geographical Research, No. 47, November 2007, pp. 17–37. For the whole seventeenth century the value of the merchandise was xed at 250,000 pesos (which was doubled on the return voyage) to be carried in 4,000 registered boxes. The Franciscan was Antonio María Caballero with a special mission related to the Chinese Rites controversy, that we will comment on in the following chapter. See Pol Heyns, Economy, Lands Rights and Taxation in Dutch Formosa, Appleseed Publishing, Taipei, 2002, pp. 71–72.

266

Notes to pages 148–159

18.

Pacheco appears listed among the regular soldiers (with 2 pesos as salary) in 1641 (SIT, 336), making unclear his status of merchant or of commissioned soldier for commercial activities. Referring to the Chinese rebellion and subsequent massacre of Chinese in 1639. Esquivel mentions several times this substance “bonga.” The bonga is a Filipino word that means a mixture of the fruit of the “areca” (betel palm) with betel leaves; a mixture that is also called “buyo.” This substance, bonga or buyo, is used for two purposes, rst for chewing (as modern ping-lang) and other is for dying in red color. Other times, when Esquivel is trying to explain what bonga looks like, he says it is similar to the shape of the “turmas de la tierra” (SIT, 163), which is a kind of underground mushroom, very delicious and well known by the Spaniards at that time. VOC 1149, f. 767. VOC 1149, f. 769. See Thomas O. Höllmann, “Formosa and the trade in venison and deerskins,¨ in Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, C. 1400–1750. See also: Pol Heyns, “Deer hunting in Dutch Formosa,” Missionary Approaches and Linguistic in Mainland China and Taiwan, Leuven Chinese Studies 10, pp. 69–72. See John Crawford, “On the history and consumption of tobacco,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1853, p. 45. This is a suggestion offered in a note in the BRPI, vol. XVII, p. 334. But, the rst reference that we had found of Philippine tobacco production is in the General History of the Discalced Augustinian Fathers, of Pedro de San Francisco de Assis (Zaragoza, 1756). There, referring to the last attempt of the Dutch in conquering the archipelago (1649) by subverting the natives, it is narrated a native subversion in the island of Samar, where they profaned liturgical vestments and “they destined the ciboriums and sacred chalices to the dirty use of their wine, tobacco, and buyo [betel-nuts]” (BRPI, vol. XLI, p. 111). In the description of the Philippines in the book of Domingo Fernández Navarrete (Madrid, 1676), that portrays the archipelago around 1650, after saying the excellent temperatures of the land to grow wheat, cloves, cinnamon, pepper, and mulberry trees to feed silkworms, states: There is excellent tobacco” (BRPI, vol. XXXVIII, p. 52). In the report of Dampier in the Philippines (1697) we can see how tobacco and betel-nuts were common for entertaining guests even in Muslim Mindanao (BRPI, vol. XXXIX, pp. 57, 70). L. Carrington Goodrich, “Early prohibitions of Tobacco in China and Manchuria,¨ Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 58, No. 4, Dec. 1938, pp. 648–657. The original transcription of “tabaco,” the Spanish term for tobacco, in all the main Eastern languages is quite close, sometimes identical, to the Spanish one, see Carrington, Ibid., p. 657. Carrington, Ibid., p. 649. Ibid., p. 650. Here Carrington relates the decree to a Manchu emperor, but according to the Chinese sources, this very prohibitory edict was issued by Chongzhong, a Ming emperor, not the Manchu emperor Abahai suggested by Carrington, although Abahai did proclaim several similar edicts. Arnoldus Montanus (ed.), Atlas Chinensis, translated by John Ogilby, London, 1671, p. 24. Tarsis and Or were two Eastern regions mentioned in the book of Kings, in the Bible. They were famous for their richness, coming from farther islands whose beaches were

19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

Notes to pages 159–175

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

46.

made of gold. From these two vaguely located places King Solomon received every three years a cargo of gold and silver, but also sandalwood, precious stones, ivory, monkeys, and peacocks. See Juan Gil, Mitos y utopías del Descubrimiento: El Pacíco, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1989. Gil, Ibid., p. 20. See J. E. Borao. “La llegada de Españoles a Isla Hermosa en el contexto del mito orientalista,” Encuentros en Catay, No. 6, Fu-jen University, 1992, pp. 183–205. See Juan Gil, Mitos y utopías del Descubrimiento, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1989, p. 19. Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Malucas, p. 212. A Chinese who arrived in Manila during the times of the pirate Limahong, to whom he served. At that time, he was appointed governor of the sangleys and was “respected by the Spaniards and loved by the sangleys” (Ibid., p. 230). MSL, Chapter 404 (Vol. XII, p. 12090). See J. E. Borao, “The massacre of 1603: Chinese perception of the Spaniards in the Philippines.” Seiichi Iwao, Early Japanese Settlers in the Phillipines, reprinted in Contemporary Japan 9, p. 32. Ibid., p. 13. See Josef Franz Schütte, “Don Rodrigo de Vivero de Velasco y Sebastián Vizcaíno en Japón (1609–1610),” and Arcadio Schwade, “Las primeras relaciones entre Japón y México (1609–1616),” in La expansión Hispanoamericana en Asia, siglos XVI y XVII, México, FCE, pp. 96–122 and 123–133 respectively. See Demetrio Ramos, Historia General de España en América, vol. IX–I, Rialp, Madrid, 1985, p. 506. See Juan Gil, Mitos y utopías del Descubrimiento, pp. 142–147. This led Hamilton to his famous thesis relating prot ination with the birth of modern industrial capitalism. According to him, the inationary forces of the Price Revolution era produced a widening gap between prices and wages, providing in Europe industrial entrepreneurs with windfall prot that they reinvested on a larger scale. In fact the practice was perpetuated as we can see from fake coins of Spanish-Mexican dollars of the year 1800 threaded in the headband of a native from Central Taiwan, kept in the Museum of Anthropology at National Taiwan University.

CHAPTER

1.

2.

267

6

Other attempts at reaching Central Asia from Europe were made. Here, we can mention the two embassies that the Castilian king Henry III (1390–1406) sent to Tamerlan. The rst one was held by Hernán Sánchez de Palazuelos and the second by Ruy González de Clavijo. In both cases the aim was not missionary but political. Henry III was looking for an alliance with Tamerlan to ght against the Turks. As for Clavijo, when in 1404 he reached the court of Tamerlan in Samarkanda, the Mongol ruler was leaving for the conquest of China, which did not happen because he died the following year. Clavijo went back to Castile without success. See Celedonio A. Ancheta, “One hundred revolts against the Spaniards,” Philippine Historical Review, Vol. 5, Manila, 1972, pp. 165–179.

268

3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

Notes to pages 178–185

Félix de Huerta, Estudio Geográco, topográco, estadístico, histórico, religioso de la Santa y apostólica provincia de San Gregorio Magno de Religiosos Menores descalzos de N. P. S. S. Francisco en las Islas Filipinas, Imprenta de M. Sánchez, Binondo, 1865, p. 405. In fact, it is not clear if there were one or two churches (as portrayed in the map of Keerdekoe), and, in this second case, if the one burnt by the natives was the Franciscan one. In any case, Quirós decided to get the remains of the church (either the Dominican one, or the only existing one), and bring it to a new more solid church in Quelang Island (SIT, 304). We have mentioned that the year of the smallpox epidemic might refer to 1635. There are two main reasons. First, the large number of baptisms of Quirós in Tamchui happened in that fatal year. Therefore, the smallpox epidemic cannot have occurred in 1636, since early that year the Spaniards lost control of the area. The other reason is that Governor García Romero, who stayed in San Salvador basically in 1635, claimed that during his governorship 1,000 natives were converted. Obviously this is an exaggeration, but somehow it matches the report of baptisms cited by Quirós in that epidemic year: 320 in Tamsui, 141 in Caquiuanuan, 186 in Cavalan, plus those made by García, which altogether reach the gure of 700. For a general introduction to this topic see Ivo Carneiro de Sousa, “Da Fundação e da Originalidade das Misericórdias Portuguesas (1498–1500),” Oceanos, No. 35, 1998, pp. 24–39. See J. E. Borao, “Some notes about the Misericordia of Isla Hermosa.” Review of Culture, No. 14, Instituto Cultural do Governo da R.A.E. de Macau, 2005, pp. 101–111. Antonio M. Molina, Historia de Filipinas, vol. 1, Madrid, 1984, p. 93. According to Pablo Fernández the story should be traced to the “Spanish artilleryman Francisco de Nava, who had a slave girl with whom he maintained illicit relations. The archbishop learned of this and told him to sell her. A Spanish lady, the wife of the governor’s nephew Pedro de Corcuera, bought her. The soldier, unable to forget her, promised to marry her. But, unsuccessful in his suit, he treacherously killed her on 19 August 1635. For his wife’s sake, Pedro took interest in the case, so much so that the unfortunate Nava expired on the gallows on 6 September. Neither his right of sanctuary in the San Agustín convent nor the archbishop’s claim of jurisdiction over his person saved him. For this reason, the archbishop excommunicated the judge, who was then a general of the artillery, and later put the city under interdict. The litigation was complicated with the intervention of Pedro de Monroy, who was persona non grata to the governor, since he had a hand in the excommunication. See Pablo Fernández, History of the Church in the Philippines, Life Today Publications, Manila, 1988, pp. 126–127. For more details about this matter, see Ruperto Santos (ed.), Anales Ecclesiásticos de Philipinas, Vol. I, Manila, 1994. In 1644, the Dutch asked the chieftain of Quimaurri, Teodoro, if they had paid taxes to the Spaniards. The Dutch recorded: “They did not pay tribute to the Spaniards and this was also never demanded by the latter. They only paid for the candles that were used in the churches. And he, the one who was interrogated, was responsible for the receipts and expenditures of the candles” (SIT, 477). See Peter Kang 康培德，〈林仔人與西班牙人〉(Lin-Zai villagers and the Spaniards), La frontera entre dos imperios, National Museum of Taiwan History, Tainan, 2006, pp. 209–222.

Notes to pages 185–195

12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

269

See Pol Heyns 韓家寶，荷蘭時代臺灣告令集：婚姻與洗禮登錄簿 (Baptisms and marriages records in Dutch Formosa), T’sao Yung-ho Foundation, Taipei, 2005. See J. E. Borao, “La colonia de japoneses en Manila, en el marco de las relaciones de Filipinas y Japón en los siglos XVI y XVII,” Cuadernos CANELA, No. 17, Tokyo, 2005, pp. 25–53. This persecution can be traced back to the famous incident of the galleon “San Felipe” (1596). This galleon was going from Manila to Acapulco but suffered a misfortune in Japanese waters. Misunderstandings produced by this incident caused Hideyoshi to suspect the ultimate intention of the Spanish missionaries, which eventually led to the persecution (SIT, 24, 26, 35). After a year, Caballero was sent to the Moluccas and later to Batavia. Finally he arrived in Manila in 1637 after being rescued by some compatriots. Governor De Vitt confessed his religion to the Macanese prisoner Salvador Díaz, also a Catholic. Also told him that he had a sister who was a nun living in Spain, and that he went to Rome for a pilgrimage. He even showed to Díaz a bull with permission to hide his Catholic condition (SIT, 64). M. J. Roos, The Amalgamation of Church and State in a Formula for Colonial Rule. Clergymen in the Dutch Administration of Formosa, 1627–1651, Ph.D Dissertation, Leiden, 2000, (1.1.). The Esquivel’s family belonged to the Basc Nobility. He was a young teacher of philosophy in Valladolid and for four years (1627–1631) professor of theology in the University of Santo Tomas (Manila), where he studied Japanese with the Dominican Kiusei Gorobioye Tomonaga. In fact, the rst one using Nadal’s book in China was Mateo Ricci, who reproduced some of the prints. See Jonathan Spence, The Memory Palace of Mateo Ricci, Penguin Books, 1985. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, pp. 328–330. Ibid., pp. 336–379. Roos, The Amalgamation … (1.1.). The rst Dutch missionaries were those graduated from the Seminary School of Leiden at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and their rst destinations were in Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Leonard Blussé, “Retribution and remorse: The interaction between the administration and the Protestant mission in early colonial Formosa,” Gyan Prakash (ed.), After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements, Princeton University Press, p. 154. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, p. 146. Roos, The Amalgamation … (2.4.2.). Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, p. 328. See Manel Ollé, La empresa de China, Acantilado, Barcelona, 2002. See Juan Antonio Cervera, “Misioneros en Filipinas y su relación con la ciencia en China: Fray Cobo y su libro Shi Lu,” Llull, Revista de la Sociedad Española de las Ciencias y de las Técnicas, vol. 20, No. 39, 1997, pp. 491–506. See J. E. Borao, “Observaciones sobre traductores y traducciones,” 2005, pp. 388–404. See Navas & Pastells, Catálogo …, vol. VI, pp. cccxix–cccxxxi. Aduarte, Historia, vol. 2, chapter XXXIX, pp. 345–355. Mariano Velasco, Bio-bibliografía de los religiosos de la Provincia del Santo Rosario. Dominican Archives, II–64, Avila.

270

Notes to pages 196–204

34.

Vittorio Messori, El gran milagro, Planeta, Barcelona, 1998. We must add that in the same year of 1636 another Dominican, the Portuguese brother Antonio de Viana, died in Isla Hermosa of natural death (SIT, 238). Pablo Fernández, Dominicos donde nace el Sol, Barcelona, 1958, pp. 67–69. Diego Collado, Dictionarivm; sive Thesavri lingvae iaponicae compendivm, compositum, Rome, 1632. One original copy can be seen in the Research Library of National Taiwan University. See Ruperto Santos, Annales Ecclesiasticos de Philipinas (1574–1862), 2 vols., Archdioceses of Manila, 1994, p. 67. He was there until 1641 where he was recalled by the king to go back to Spain, but he got drawn in Cabicungan, on his way to Manila. BRPI, vol. XXV, p. 158. These palaces were “mnemonic constructions” very much in fashion in Europe at that moment. That technique Ricci himself traced back to the old Greek poet Simonides. See Jonathan Spence, The Memory Palace of Mateo Ricci, Penguin Books, 1985. Zhang Kai, Diego de Pantoja y China (1597–1618), Biblioteca de Pekín, 1987, p. 52. See J. E. Borao, “Consideraciones en torno a la imagen de Koxinga vertida por Victorio Ricci en Occidente,” Encuentros en Catay, No. 11, pp. 48–77. Rosario Villari, El hombre barroco, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1992, p. 14. Fernando Mateos, “First Jesuits arriving in Taiwan: the 16th to the 20th Centurias,” Proceedings of the International Symposium Christianity in Taiwan: Review of Historical Materials (臺灣基督教：史料與研究回顧國際學術研討會) by the Chinese University and Cosmic Light, Taipei, 1998.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

EPILOGUE

1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

6. 7.

Demetrio Ramos, “Mentalidades e ideas en la América de la época colonial,” p. 504. See Rosario Villarí (ed.), El hombre barroco, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1992. The “Compendio de Las Leyes de Indias” was edited in 1690, under the orders of King Charles II. There are four volumes (tomos), that include eight books (libros), containing in total 218 titles (títulos), leading to the different laws (leyes). For example, the titles of Book III have 410 laws. Every law has a short description, the year, the king and the place where it was issued, accompanied with an explanation. Regarding the laws for Philippine natives see Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, “Origen y desactivación de la protectoría de indios en la Presidencia-Gobernación de las Islas Filipinas,” Revista Española del Pacíco, No. 8, 1998, pp. 213–233. The laws in the Compendio regarding the sangleys are in the Title 18 of Book VI (located in Volume II). See also BRPI, vol. XXII, pp. 151–159. See Eduardo Fructuoso, “Population, economy and commerce: Macao and the Philippines on the road of Iberian arbitrism in the rst half of the 17th century,” MacaoPhilippines, historical relations, University of Macao & CEPESA, pp. 179–201. See Nicolas P. Cushner, “Manila-Acapulco trade and the Grau y Monfalcón memorial (1635–1637),” Historical Bulletin, Manila, June 1959, pp. 40–50. In fact, Portillo had been assigned to other difcult missions, like to build a barricaded stockade in Tondo in 1639 to accommodate the 7,000 sangleys who were left behind after a second Chinese massacre (SIT, 503).

Notes to pages 208–235

271

ANNEXES

  This place might refer to Beigang. A discussion of this matter, see 陳宗仁，“「北 港」與「Pacan」地名考釋：兼論十六、七世紀之際台灣西南海域貿易情釋的變 遷，”漢學研究，21, 2 (December 2003), pp. 249–278. 2. Another Spanish source seems to agree with this part of the account: “Our soldiers have excellently fortied themselves there. However, at the beginning, the land tested them, for many died and suffered great misery and hardships—eating even dogs and rats, also grubs and strange herbs because they soon consumed the provisions that they had brought with them and others had not arrived from Manila” (SIT, 88).  3. This might have been the previous expedition, the eet of Carreño (May 1626). 4. Professor Kaim Ang suggested to me that Huping must be He Bin (何斌), the Chinese interpreter that provided Koxinga a map with details of Fort Zelandia, and probably he was also the main instigator for the invasion of Formosa. For this reason the VOC considered him a traitor. Huping was also known as Pinqua (斌官). His father, Kimptingh (also mentioned by Riccio) was a famous merchant sending ships to northern Formosa and Vietnam, Manila and other Southeast Asia countries. Around 1650, ten years before the invasion of Koxinga, we can see both of them requesting a lease of land around Fort Zeelandia to the Dutch. See Pol Heyns 韓家寶，《荷蘭時代台灣的經濟、土地與稅 務》(Dutch Formosa’s Economy, Land Rights and Taxation), 播種者文化，台北， 2001. 5. For a medical discusson on the death of Koxinga see: 鄭仰峻，〈鄭成功死因考〉，《高 苑學報》，第十二卷2006/7），頁211–228.

Bibliography

Primary sources Aduarte, Diego de (1693). La Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario de Filipinas, Iapon y China, de la sagrada Orden de Predicadores. Escrita por el ilvstríssimo señor don Fray Diego Aduarte, natural de la imperial ciudad de Zaragoza, y obispo meritíssimo de Nueva Segovia. Añadida por el Muy R. P. Fray Domingo González, Comisario del Santo Ocio, y Regente del Colegio de Santo Thomás de Manila, Zaragoza, Imprenta del Hospital Real de Nuestra Señora de Gracia. Archivo Histórico Español (1928). Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España y de sus Indias, Madrid, Academia de Estudios Históricos y Sociales de Valladolid. Argensola, Bartolomé Leonardo de (1609). Conquista de las Islas Malucas, Alonso Martín (ed.), Madrid (Reprint: Miraguano, Polifemo, Madrid, 1992). Blair, E. H.; Robertson, J. A. The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, Cleveland, vols. 15–24, 1904; vls. 25–35, 1905. Blussé, L.; Everts, N. (2000–2006). The Formosan Encounter. Notes on Formosa’s Aboriginal Society: A Selection of Documents from Dutch Archival Sources, Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei, v. 2 (1636–1645), 2000; v. 3 (1646–1656), 2006. Blussé, L.; Everts, N.; French, E. (1999). The Formosan Encounter. Notes on Formosa´s Aboriginal Society: A Selection of Documents from Dutch Archival Sources, Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei, v. 1 (1623–1635), 1999. Blussé, L.; Everts, N.; Milde, W. E.; Ts’ao Yung-Ho 曹永和 (2000). De Dagregisters …, Institut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, Den Haag, v. 4 (1655–1662). Blussé, L.; Milde, W. E.; T’sao Yung-Ho 曹永和 (1995–1996). De Dagregisters …, v. 2 (1641–1648), 1995; v. 3 (1648–1655), 1996. Blussé, L.; Van Opstall, M. E.; T’sao Yung-Ho 曹永和 (1986). De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan, 1629–1662, ed. Martinus Mijhoff, ’s-Gravenhage, v. 1 (1629–1641).

274

Bibliography

Borao Mateo, José Eugenio (2001–2002). Spaniards in Taiwan (SIT), SMC Book Co., Taipei, v. 1 (1582–1641), 2001; v. 2 (1642–1682), 2002. Campbell, W. M. (1903). Formosa under the Dutch. Described from contemporary records with explanatory notes and bibliography of the island, London, Kegal Paul, Trench, Trubner (Reprint: Southern Materials Center, Taipei, 1987, 1992). Chang Hsiu-Jung; A. Farrinton; Fu-San Huang; Yung-Ho Ts’ao; Mi-Tsa Wu, Hsi-Fu Cheng; Kaim Ang (1996). The English Factory in Taiwan, 1670–1685, National Taiwan University. Heyns, Pol 韓家寶; Wei-Chung Cheng 鄭維中 (2005). Dutch Formosan Placardbook, Marriage, and Baptism Records, Ts’ao Yung-ho Foundation for Culture and Education, Taipei. Lee, Yu-chung 李毓中 (ed.) (2008).《臺灣與西班牙關係史料彙編》(Recopilación de las fuentes sobre las relaciones entre Taiwán y España) 第1冊，國史館灣文 獻館，台北. Morga, Antonio de (1606). Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Mexico. (The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam, Cambodia, Japan, and China, at the Close of the Sixteenth Century, The Hakluyt Society, 1868). Nakamura (1998). 中村孝志著，Mi-Tsa Wu 吳密察、Kaim Ang 翁佳音編，《荷蘭 時代臺灣史研究上卷：概說．產業》，稻鄉，̎˵. Navas del Valle, F.; Pastells, P. (1929–1936). Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla and Historia general de Filipinas, Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Barcelona, v. 5 (1602–1608), 1929; v. 6 (1608–1618), 1930; v. 7–I (1618–1635), 1932; v. 7–II (1635–1636), 1932; v. 8 (1636–1644), 1933; v. 9 (1644–1662), 1936. Rodríguez, Isacio (1966). Historia de la Provincia Agustiniana del Santísimo Nombre de Jesús de Filipinas, vols. XVIII y XIX, Valladolid, Ediciones Estudio Agustiniano. Santos, Ruperto (ed.) (1994). Anales Ecclesiasticos de Philipinas (1574–1862), 2 vols., Archdioceses of Manila, Manila. Thompson, E. Maunde (ed.) (1964). Diary of Richard Cocks: Cape-merchant in the English Factory in Japan, 1615–1622, New York, B. Franklin. Torres Lanzas, P.; Pastells, P. (1925–1928). Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla and Historia general de Filipinas, Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Barcelona, v. 1 (1493–1572), 1925; v. 2 (1573–1587), 1926; v. 3 (1587–1594), 1927; v. 4 (1595–1602), 1928.

Secondary sources Agoncillo, T.; Alfonso, O. (1961). History of the Filipino People, Quezon City, Malaya Books. Andaya, Leonard Y. (1992). “Los primeros contactos de los españoles con el mundo de las Molucas en las Islas de las Especias.” In: Revista Española del Pacíco: 2: 61–83.

Bibliography

275

–––– (1993). The Wold of Maluku. Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period, Hawaii University Press, Honolulu. Andrade, Tonio (2000). “The Favorlangers are acting up again: Sino-Dutch-Aboriginal relations under Dutch rule”c《平埔族群與臺灣歷史社會》，台北：中央研究 院臺灣史研究所籌備處、中央研究院民族學研究所. –––– (2004). “The Company’s Chinese pirates: How the Dutch East India Company tried to lead a coalition of pirates to war against China, 1621–1662.” In: Journal of World History: 15–4: 415–444. –––– (2006). “The rise and fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624–1662: Cooperative colonization and the statist model of European expansion.” In: Journal of World History: 17: 4. –––– (2008). How Taiwan Became Chinese, Columbia University Press, New York. Ang, Kaim 翁佳音 (1992).〈被遺忘的臺灣原住民史：Quata（大肚番王）初考〉 (The forgotten history of Taiwan aborigines: A preliminary study of Quata)《臺 北文物》c42卷4期，頁105–188. –––– (1997 a).〈十七世紀的福老海商〉(The seventeenth century Ho-lo sea merchants)《第七屆中國海洋發展史國際研討會》（中央研究院社科所）. –––– (1997 b).〈萬里鄉的地名特色與發展史〉(Wanli township: Characteristics of its place names and the history of its development)c薛化元、翁佳音（總纂）， 《萬里鄉志》， 萬里鄉公所，臺北. –––– (1997 c).〈西班牙道明會在北臺灣的宣教〉(The Spanish Dominican mission in North Formosa)《臺灣教會公報》2381期第十、十一版10˂19ˀ€. –––– (1998 a).《大臺北古地圖考釋》(Textual research on old maps of the Greater Taipei Area)c 臺北縣立文化中心， 臺北. –––– (1998 b).〈荷蘭時代石門鄉的若干舊地名〉(Some old place names of the Shimen township during the Dutch period)《北縣文化，55》. –––– (1998 c).〈論十三行遺址的主人：荷蘭時代的十三行番社〉(On the hosts of the Shisanhang Culture: The Shisanhang aboriginal villages during the Dutch period)《北縣文化56》. –––– (1998 d).〈十七世紀的臺灣基督教史〉(History of Christianity in seventeenth century Taiwan)《臺灣基督教：史料與研究回顧國際學術研討會》，中原大 學、宇宙光傳播中心、國科會、教育部、內政部，台北. –––– (1999).〈近世初期北部臺灣的貿易與原住民〉(The commercial trade and aborigines of Northern Taiwan in the early modern period)，黃富三、翁佳音 （主編），《臺灣商業傳統論文集》，中央研究院臺灣史研究所籌備處， 臺北，頁45–80. Aram, Bethany (2008). Leyenda negra y leyendas doradas en la conquista de América, Marcial Pons, Madrid. Arcilla, Jose (1972). “Slavery, ogging and other moral cases in the 17th Century Philippines.” In: Philippine Studies: 20 (3): 399–416. –––– (1973). An Introduction to Philippine History, Ateneo University Press, Quezon City.

276

Bibliography

Armitage, David (ed.) (1998). Theories of Empire, 1450–1800, Ashgate Variorum, Aldershot. Attman, Artur (1983). Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550–1800, Goteborg. –––– (1986). American Bullion in the European World Trade, 1600–1800, Goteborg. Bauzon, Leslie E. (1971). “Mexican nancial aid: el situado.” In: Philippine Historical Review: 4: 68–96. Bernal, Antonio-Miguel (1992). La nanciación de la carrera de Indias (1492–1824): dinero y crédito en el comercio colonial español con América, Fundación El Monte, Sevilla. Bethell, Leslie (1987). Colonial Spanish America, Cambridge University Press, New York. Beuchot, Mauricio (1992). La querella de la conquista. Una polémica del siglo XVI, Siglo XXI, México. Blumentritt, Fernando (1882). Filipinas: ataques de los holandeses en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, Imprenta de Fortanet, Madrid. Blundell, David (ed.) (2001). Austronesian Taiwan. Linguistics, History, Ethnology. Prehistory, Phoebe A. Hearst Museum of Anthropology & Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei. Blussé, Leonard 包樂史 (ed.) (1981). Companies and Trade, Essays on Overseas Trading during the Ancient Regime, Leiden University Press, Leiden. –––– (1984). “Dutch Protestant missionaries as protagonists of the territorial expansion of the VOC on Formosa.” In: Dick Kooiman, Otto van den Muizenberg, and Peter van der Veer (eds.), Conversion, Competition and Conict, Essays on the Role of Religion in Asia, Free University Press, Amsterdam, 155–184. –––– (1988). Strange company: Chinese settlers, Mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia, Foris Publications, Dordrecht-Providence. –––– (1990). “Minnan-jen or cosmopolitan? The rise of Cheng Chih-Lung alias Nicolas Iquan.” In: Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17 and 18 Centuries, Leiden, New York, Brill, 245–264. –––– (1995). “Retribution and remorse: The interaction between the administration and the Protestant mission in early colonial Formosa.” In: Gyan Prakash (ed.), After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements, Princeton University Press, 153–182. –––– (1996). “No boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the changing pattern of the China Sea trade, 1635–1690.” In: Modern Asian Studies: 30–1: 51–76. –––– (2000). “Divesting a myth: Seventeenth century Dutch-Portuguese rivalry in the Far East.” In: Anthony Disney and Emily Booth (eds.), Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 387–402. –––– (2006). “The eclipse of the ‘inibs’: The Dutch Protestant mission in 17th Century Taiwan and its persecution of native priestesses.” In: Chuen-rong Yeh (ed.), History, Culture and Ethnicity. Selected Papers from the International Conference on the

Bibliography

277

Formosan Indigenous Peoples (1999), Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei, 71–88. –––– (2008). Visible cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the coming of the Americans, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Mass. Blussé, L.; Roessingh, M. (1984). “A visit to the past: Soulang, A Formosan village anno 1623.” In: Archipel: 27: 63–80. Borao Mateo, José Eugenio 鮑曉鷗 (1992 a). “La llegada de Españoles a Isla Hermosa en el contexto del mito orientalista.” In: Encuentros en Catay: 6: 183–205. –––– (1992 b). “Spanish presence in Taiwan, 1626–1642.” In:《國立台灣大學歷史學 系學報》：17: 315–330. –––– (1993). “The aborigines of northern Taiwan according to 17th century Spanish sources.” In: Newsletter of Taiwan History Field Research, Academia Sinica (Taipei): 27: 98–120. –––– (1994). “Extremo Oriente en la época de la universalización. Siglo XVI.” In: Historia Universal Planeta, Vol. VII, chapter XI, Ed. Planeta, Barcelona, 412–441. –––– (1996). “Consideraciones en torno a la Imagen de Koxinga vertida por Victorio Riccio en Occidente.” In: Encuentros en Catay: 10: 48–77. –––– (1998 a). “The massacre of 1603: Chinese perception of the Spaniards in the Philippines.” In: Itinerario: 23: 22–39. –––– (1998 b).〈關於台灣的首份西方文獻〉(About the rst Western document of Taiwan)c《北縣文化》 58，11，頁42–47. –––– (2001). “The Catholic Dominican missionaries in Taiwan, 1626–1642.” In: Leuven Chinese Studies: 10: 101–132. –––– (2003). “Fleets, relief ships and trade. Communications between Manila and Jilong, 1626–1642.” In: About and Around Formosa, T’sao Yung-ho Foundation, Taipei, 307–336. –––– (2004). “The ‘justication’ of the Spanish intrusion in Taiwan.” In:《文史哲學 報》(Humanitas Taiwanica: NTU): 60: 338–372. –––– (2005 a). “Intelligence-gathering episodes in the “Manila-Macao-Taiwan triangle during the Dutch Wars.” In: Macao-Philippines, Historical Relations, University of Macao & CEPESA, 226–247. –––– (2005 b). “Acercamientos literarios occidentales a la presencia holandesa y española en el Taiwan y las Filipinas del siglo XVII.” In: Encuentros en Catay: 19, 117–140. –––– (2005 c). “La colonia japonesa en Manila, en el contexto de las relaciones entre Japón y Filipinas de los siglos XVI y XVII.” In: Cuadernos CANELA: 17: 25–53. –––– (2005 d). “Some notes about the Misericordia of Isla Hermosa.” In: Review of Culture (Instituto Cultural do Governo da RAE de Macau): 14: 101–111. –––– (2005 e). “Observaciones sobre traductores y traducciones en la frontera cultural del Mar de la China (siglos XVI y XVII).” In: Proceedings of the V International Conference of the Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas Asiáticos (AIHA), Taipei, 8–9 January 2005: 388–405.

278

Bibliography

–––– (2006). (Taiwan in the Spanish eyes: 16th and 17th centuries. The evolution of the Spanish image of Taiwan), 台灣歷史與文化國際會議—台灣之再現、詮釋與認同，文 化總會、台灣歷史學會、行政院原住民族委員會、2006年5月29d30ˀcvol. 2，頁205–238. –––– (2007). “The arrival of the Spanish galleons in Manila from the Pacic Ocean and their departure along the Kuroshio stream (16th and 17th centuries).” In:《地理研 究》(Journal of Geographical Research: NTNU): 47: 17–38. –––– (2008 a). “Familias españolas y holandesas en Taiwan (siglo XVII).” In: Joan Bestard (ed.), Familias, valores y representaciones, Universidad de Murcia. –––– (2008 b). “Filipinos in the Spanish Colonial Army during the Dutch Wars (1600– 1648).” In: Isaac Donoso Jiménez (ed.), More Hispanic Than We Admit. Insights in Philippine Cultural History, Vibal Foundation, Quezon City, 74–93. –––– (2008 c). “La piedad lial en algunos autores del Siglo de Oro y de la China Ming.” In: J. M. Usunáriz and R. García Bourrellier (eds.), Padres e hijos en España y el mundo hispánico (siglos XVI–XVIII), Visor, Madrid, 89–108. –––– (2008 d). “The 17th century fortress of Quelang: past, present and future.” In: Review of Culture, Instituto Cultural do Governo da RAE de Macau, 27: 55–73. Borschberg, Peter (1999). “Hugo Grotius, East India trade and the King of Johor.” In: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies: 30 (2): 225–248. –––– (2002 a). “The seizure of the Sta. Catarina revisited: The Portuguese empire in Asia, VOC politics and the origins of the Dutch-Johor alliance (c.1602–1616).” In: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies: 33–1: 31–62. –––– (2002 b). “The seizure of San Antonio at Patani (January 1605). VOC freebooting, the Estado da India and peninsular politics, 1602–1609.” In: The Journal of the Siam Society: 90 1–2: 59–72. –––– (2003 a). “A Luso-Dutch naval confrontation in the Johor River Delta (October 1603).” In: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Band 153, Helft 1: 157–175. –––– (2003 b). “Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch plans to construct a fort in the Straits of Singapore (c. 1584–1625).” In: Archipel: 65: 55–88. –––– (2004 a). “Luso-Johor-Dutch relations in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (c. 1600–1623).” In: Itinerario: 28–2: 15–43. –––– (2004 b). “Security, VOC penetration and Luso-Spanish co-operation: The armada of Philippines Governor Juan de Silva in the Straits of Singapore (1616).” In: Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16th to 18th Centuries), Harrassovitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, Fundaçao Oriente, Lisboa: 35–62. –––– (2005). “Hugo Grotius’ theory of trans-oceanic trade regulations: Revisiting Mare Liberum (1609).” In: IILJ Working Paper 2004/14, New York. Bourne, Edward (1968). Spain in America: 1450–1580, J. & J. Harper editions, New York. Boxer, Charles Ralph (1930). The Third Dutch War in the East (1672–1674), Society for Nautical Research, London.

Bibliography

279

–––– (1939). “Notes on Chinese abroad in the late Ming and early Manchu periods compiled from contemporary European sources (1500–1750).” In: T’ien Hsia Monthly: IX, 5: 447–466. –––– (1960). O Grande Navio de Amacau, reprinted and translated by Fundaçao Oriente and Museu e Centro de Estudios Marítimos de Macao, Macao, 1989. –––– (1968). Fidalgos in the Far East, Oxford University Press. –––– (1969 a). “Portuguese and Spanish projects for the conquest of Southeast Asia, 1580–1600.” Reprinted in: The Journal of Asian History: 3–2: 118–136. –––– (1969 b). The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415–1825, Hutchinson, London. –––– (1974). “Macao as a religious and commercial entrepôt in the 16th and 17th Centuries.” In: Acta Asiatica: 26: 64–90. –––– (1990). The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800, Penguin Books, UK. Boxer, C.; Vasconcelos, F. (1955). André Furtado de Mendoça. Agencia General de Ultramar, reprinted and translated by Fundaçao Oriente and Museu e Centro de Estudios Marítimos de Macau, Macao, 1989. Brown Scott, James (1934). The Spanish Origin of International Law, Clarendon Press, London. Bryan Souza, George (1986). The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754, Cambridge University Press. Cámara Muñoz, Alicia (1998). Forticación y ciudad en los reinos de Felipe II, Nera, Madrid. Chan, Manuel T. (1988). The Audiencia and the Legal System in the Philippines (1583–1900), Progressive Printing, Manila. Chan, Su-jüan 詹素娟 (1998 a).《族群、歷史與地域：噶瑪蘭人的歷史變遷（從史 前到1900年）》(Ethnic groups, history and territory: Changes of the Kavalans throughout history; prehistory–1900)，國立臺灣師範大學歷史學研究所博士 論文. –––– (1998 b).〈分類的迷思——淡水河系原住民的族群類緣問題〉(The myth of classication: Ethnic relations of the aboriginals of the Tamsui area)，收於周宗 賢主編之《淡水學學術研討會——過去、現在、未來論文集》， 國史館， 台北，頁1–25. –––– (1999).〈地域與社群：大臺北地區原住民族的多群性〉(Territories and social groups: The multi-cluster characteristic of the aborigines in the greater Taipei area)「臺灣原住民國際研討會」，5˂1ˀ—5˂3ˀ，中央研究院民族學研究 所、順益原住民博物館主辦. –––– (2001).〈地域社群的概念與檢驗——以金包里社為例〉(The concept of local communities: The example of Quimaurri)，曹永和先生八十壽慶論文集編輯委 員會（編），《曹永和先生八十壽慶論文集》，樂學，臺北，頁63–80. Chan, Su-jüan 詹素娟; Liu, Yi-chang 劉益昌 (1999).《大臺北都會區原住民歷史專 輯：凱達格蘭調查報告》(Special series on aborigines of the urban area of Taipei: A survey report on the Ketagalans). 臺北：臺北市文獻委員會. Chaudhuri, N. (1978). The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760, Cambridge University Press.

280

Bibliography

Chaunu, Pierre (1951). “Le Galion de Manille. Grandeur et decadence d’une route de la soie,” Annales : 6–4: 447–62. –––– (1974). Las Filipinas y el Pacíco de los Ibéricos siglos XVI–XVII–XVIII, Mexico D.F., Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior. Ch’en Kuo-tung 陳國棟 (1998). “Structure of the East Asian trade during the maritime ban against Koxinga’s successors in Taiwan, 1664–1683.” In: Asian Business and Taiwan: A Historical Perspective, Taipei, IX Pacic Science Inter-Congress. Cipolla, Carlo Maria (1999). La odisea de la plata española: conquis tadores, piratas y mercaderes, ed. Crítica, Barcelona. Clark, I.; Neumann, I. (eds.) (1996). Classical Theories of International Relations, Macmillan Press, New York. Constantino, Renato (1975). A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War, Monthly Review Press, New York. Corpuz, Onofre (1965). The Philippines, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. Cunha Leao, Francisco G. (ed.) (1998). Jesuitas na Asia: catalogo e guia, Instituto Cultural de Macau, Macao, Instituto Portugués do Patrimonio Arquitectónico, Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa. Cunningham, Charles Henry (1971). The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies, as Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila, New York, Gordian Press. Cushner, Nicolas P. (1959). “Manila-Acapulco trade and the Grau y Monfalcón memorial (1635–1637).” In: Historical Bulletin (Manila): 3–2: 40–50. Dehergne, J. (1941). “L’île Formose au XVIIe siècle. Essais éphémères d’expansion Européenne.” In: Monumenta Nipponica: 4–1: 270–277. Díaz Trechuelo, Lourdes (1959). Arquitectura española en Filipinas (1565–1800), Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla. Duverger, Christian (1993). La conversión de los indios de Nueva España. Con el texto de los Coloquios de los Doce de Bernardino de Sahún (1564), FCE, Mexico. Dyke, P. A. van (1997). “How and why the Dutch East India Company became competitive in intra-Asian trade in East Asia in the 1630s.” In: Itinerario: 21–3: 41–56. –––– (2003). “The Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense, 1618–1622.” In: Leonard Blussé (ed.), About and Around Formosa, T’sao Yung-ho Foundation for Culture and Education, Taipei, 68–81. Fernández, Pablo (1988). History of the Church in the Philippines, Life Today Publications, Manila. Flynn, D.; Giráldez, A. (1996 a). “China and the Spanish empire.” In: Revista de Historia Económica: 2: 309–338. –––– (1996 b). “Silk for silver: Manila-Macao trade in the 17th century.” In: Philippine Studies: 44: 52–68. The Formosan Encounter, Vol. II: 1636–1645 (2000), Vol. III: 1646–1662 (2006), Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Taipei. Cited as FE in this book. Fryke, C. Schweitzer (1997). Voyages to the East Indies 1680 to 1686 & 1676 to 1683, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, Madras.

Bibliography

281

García-Gallo, Alfonso (1992). “Las Casas y Vitoria ante la incorporación de las Indias a la Corona de España.” In: Homenaje a Ismael Sánchez-Bella, Pamplona, 283–290. Gayo y Aragón, Jesús (1993). The Theology of the Conquest, Historical Conservation Society, Manila. Gil, Juan (1989). Mitos y utopías del Descubrimiento, Alianza Editorial, Madrid. González, José María (1946). Biografía del primer obispo de China. Excmo. Sr. D. Fr. Gregorio Lo, o López, O. P., UST, Manila. –––– (1948). The Proto-martyr of China: Blessed Francisco Capillas, UST, Manila. –––– (1951). Galería de varones ilustres. Vidas y hechos de los 36 misioneros dominicos de China del siglo XVII, UST, Manila. –––– (1964–1967). Historia de la misiones dominicanas de China. 5 vols., Stvdivm, Madrid. Grotius, Hugo (1926). The Jurisprudence of Holland by Hugo Grotius (vol. 1: translation, commentary and notes by R. W. Lee), Clarendon Press, Oxford. Gutiérrez, Lucio (1979). “Labor evangelizadora y misional de Domingo de Salazar en Filipinas (1581–1591).” In: Philippiniana Sacra: 39: 219–282. –––– (1985 a). “The affair of China at the end of the sixteenth century: Armed conquest or peaceful evangelization?” In: Philippiniana Sacra: 60: 329–406. –––– (1985 b). “Domingo de Salazar’s memorial of 1582 on the status of the Philippine Islands: A manifesto for freedom and humanization.” In: Philippiniana Sacra: 62: 259–314. –––– (1992). Historia de la Iglesia en Filipinas, Mapfre, Madrid. –––– (2001). Domingo de Salazar, O. P. (1512–1594): First Bishop of the Philippines, UST Press, Manila. Hanke, Lewis (1965). The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America, Little, Brown, Boston. Haring, Clarence Henry (1947). The Spanish Empire in America, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York. Hayase, Shinzo (2007). Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations: Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Manila. Hera, Alberto de la (1996). “Vitoria y Solórzano ante el problema de los justos títulos.” In: Homenaje al Profesor Alfonso García-Gallo, Madrid: 3: 69–100. Heyns, Pol 韓家寶 (2001 a). “Deer hunting in Dutch Formosa.” In Missionary Approaches and Linguistic in Mainland China and Taiwan, Leuven Chinese Studies: 10: 59–100. –––– (2001 b).《荷蘭時代台灣的經濟、土地與稅務》(Dutch Formosa’s Economy, Land Rights and Taxation)，播種者文化，台北. Höllmann, Thomas O. (1991). “Formosa and the trade in venison and deer skins.” In: Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, C. 1400–1750, Stuttgart.

282

Bibliography

Huber, J. (1990). “Chinese settlers against the Dutch East India Company: The rebellion led by Kuo Huai-I on Taiwan in 1652.” In: Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 17 and 18 centuries, E. B. Vermeer (ed.), Leiden, E. J. Brill, 265–296. Hugh Moffett, Samuel (1991). A History of Christianity in Asia, Harper, San Francisco. Hyma, A. (1953). A History of the Dutch in the Far East, George Wahr Publishing, Ann Harbor. Israel, Jonathan I. (1986). The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606–1661, Oxford University Press. –––– (1989). The Dutch Primacy in the World Trade 1585–1740, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Iwao, Seiichi (1943). “Early Japanese settlers in the Philippines.” Reprinted in: Contemporary Japan: 9, n. 1–4. –––– (1958). “Li Tan, chief of the Chinese residents at Hirado, Japan, in the last days of the Ming Dynasty.” In: Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (the Oriental Library), No. 17: 27–83. Jacobs, Hubert (1981). “The ‘Discurso Político del Gobierno Maluco’ of Fr. Francisco Combés and its historical impact.” In: Philippine Studies: 29: 309–344. Kang, Peter 康培德 (1999 a).〈殖民主義、文化接觸與權力展示：荷蘭東印度 公司一六四零年代花蓮地區探金活動〉(Colonialism, cultural contacts and demonstration of power: The VOC gold-searching activities in the 1640’s)《臺 灣原住民國際研討會》，中央研究院民族學研究所，台北. –––– (1999 b).《殖民接觸與帝國邊陲─花蓮地區原住民十七至十九世紀的歷史變 遷》(Colonial contact and imperial frontier: Historical changes of the aborigines in Hualien, 17th–19th Centuries)，台北：稻鄉出版社. –––– (2001).〈荷蘭時代蘭陽平原的聚落與地區性互動〉(The communities in LangYang Plain and their local interactions during the Dutch Period)，《臺灣文獻》 52，頁219–253. –––– (2003).〈十七世紀上半的馬賽人〉(The Basay people in the rst half of the 17th century)，《臺灣史研究》101€，頁1–32. –––– (2005). “Inherited geography: Post-national history and the emerging dominance of Pinaba in East Taiwan.” 《臺灣史研究》12 (2): 1–33. –––– (2006).“‫׳‬ˠɁၤϹऒˑɁ”(Lin-Zai villagers and the Spaniards). In: La Frontera entre dos Imperios, National Museum of Taiwan History, Tainan, 209–222. Keesing, Felix M. (1962). The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon, Stanford University Press. Kerck, David (1996). “Inuences of the European Middle Ages in the Philippines.” In: Philippine Studies, 44: 447–465. Klor de Alva, J. Jorge (1992). “Imagen del Japón en los primeros misioneros.” In: Cuadernos Americanos (UNAM): 36: 31–45.

Bibliography

283

Kuepers, J. J. A. M. (1978). “The Dutch reformed church in Formosa 1627–1662: Mission in a colonial context.” In: Nouvelle Revue de Science Missionaire: 34–1: 48–67. Laarhoeven, R. (1989). The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17 Century: Triumph of Moro Diplomacy, New Day Publishers, Quezon City. Laarhoven, R.; Pino Wittermans, E. (1985). “From blockade to trade: Early Dutch relations with Manila, 1600–1750.” In: Philippine Studies: 35: 485–504. Lach, Donald F. (1968). Southeast Asia in the Eyes of Europe, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Lach, Donald F.; Kley, Edwin J. Van (1965). Asia in the Making of Europe, 3 vols., University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Larrainzar, Carlos (1977). Una introducción a Francisco Suárez, Eunsa, Pamplona. Leach, Katherine (1993). Sixteenth Century Europe (Documents and Debates), Macmillan. Lee, Yu-chung 李毓中 (1998). ＜明鄭與西班牙帝國：鄭氏家族與菲律賓關係初探＞ (The Zheng and the Spanish Empire: A preliminary study on the relationship between the Zheng Clan and the Philippines)，《漢學研究》，第16卷2期，頁29–59. –––– (2001).＜北向與南進：西班牙東亞殖民拓展政策下的菲律賓與台灣 (1565– 1642)Ö (North and southward approaches: Taiwan and the Philippines under Spanish policy of colonial expansion in East Asia, 1565–1642)，收入曹永和先 生八十壽慶論文集編輯委員會，《曹永和先生八十壽慶論文集》，樂學書 局，台北，頁31–61. –––– (2002).＜《印地亞法典》中的生理人：試論西班牙統治菲律賓初期有關華 人的法律規範＞ (The sangleys as in the Leyes de Indias: on the Chinese-related legal regulations in the Philippines under early Spanish domination)，《第八屆 中國海洋發展史論文集》，中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所，台北，頁 327–380. –––– (2005a).＜圖像與歷史：西班牙古地圖與古畫呈現菲律賓華人生活 (1571– 1800)Ö (Images and history: The life of the Chinese in the Philippines as represented in old Spanish maps and artworks)c《第九屆中國海洋發展史論文 集》，中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所，台北，頁437–477. –––– (2005 b).＜從大航海時代談起：西班牙人在淡水＞ (Starting from the era of great navigation: Spaniards in Tamsui)c《揭開紅毛城四百年歷史：淡水紅 毛城修復暨再利用國際學術研討會論文集》，臺灣縣立淡水古蹟博物館， 台北，頁7–20. Legarda, Benito (1955). “Two and a half centuries of the Galleon Trade.” In: Philippine Studies: III (4): 345–362. Li, Paul J. K. 李壬癸 (1995).〈臺灣北部平埔族的種類及其互動關係〉(Types and interactions of the plain aborigines in Northern Taiwan)，潘英海、詹素娟（主 編），《平埔研究論文集》，中央研究院臺灣史研究所籌備處，臺北，頁 21–40. –––– (1997 a).〈台灣平埔族的歷史與互動〉(A history and interaction of plain aborigines in Taiwan), Formosa Folkways, Taipei.

284

Bibliography

–––– (1997 b).“̎ᜪ‫̵ࢌڲ‬પ‫ؿ‬પະၤሰ੢”(The tribes and their migrations of Austronesians in Taiwan), Formosa Folkways, Taipei. –––– (1999). §Some problems in the Basay language.” In: Symposium Series of the Institute of Linguistics (Preparatory Ofce), Academia Sinica, No. 1, May. –––– (2001).〈巴賽語的地位〉(The linguistic placement of the Basay language)， 《語言暨語言學》22€c頁155–171. Lin, Weisheng 林偉盛 (1997).〈荷據時期臺灣的金銀貿易〉(Taiwan’s gold and silver trading during the Dutch occupation)《第七屆中國海洋發展史國際研討會》， 中央研究院社科所，台北. Lisón Tolosana, Carmelo (1990). “Antropología del extraño (El difícil encuentro hispanochino en los Siglos de Oro).” In: Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales: 6: 143–175. Liu, Yi-chang 劉益昌 (1995).〈臺灣北部沿海地區史前時代晚期文化之探討〉 (Discussions on cultures of Northern Taiwan coastal areas in the late prehistoric period)，潘英海、詹素娟（主編），《平埔研究論文集》，中央研究院臺灣 史研究所籌備處，台北，頁1–20. –––– (1997). 《臺北縣北海岸地區考古遺址調查報告》(Archeological sites in the northern coastal area of the Taipei County: A survey report), 臺北縣立文化中 心，台北. –––– (1998).〈再談臺灣北、東部地區的族群分布〉(Further discussion on the ethnic distribution of northern and eastern Taiwan)c劉益昌、潘英海（主編），《平 埔族群的區域研究論文集》。臺灣省文獻會，台中，頁1–28. –––– (2000).《臺北市考古遺址調查與研究》(Archeological sites in the Taipei City: A survey research)c臺北市政府民政局，台北. MacLachlan, Colin M. (1988). Spain’s Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change, University of California Press, Berkeley. Martínez-Shaw, Carlos (ed.) (2008). La ruta de España a China, El Viso, Madrid. Moriguchi, Tsunekazu (1991). “Asai’s Basai vocabulary.” In: Linguistic Materials of the Formosan Sinized Populations. I: Siraya and Basai. Research Report of the Department of Linguistics of Tokyo University, March, 1–257. Mulder, W. Z. (n/d). Hollanders in Hirado 1597–1641. Haarlem: Fibula-Van dishoeck. Murakami, N. (1899). Diary of Richard Cocks, Cape-merchant in the English Factory in Japan, 1614–1622, Tokio. Nakamura Takashi (1970). 中村孝志，〈十七世紀西班牙人在臺灣的佈教〉《臺灣 史研究所》，台北. Noone, Martín J. (1986). The Discovery and Conquest of the Philippines (1521–1581), Historical Conservation Society, Manila. Oers, Ron van (2000). Dutch Town Planning Overseas during VOC and WIC Rule (1600–1800), Walburg Pers, Delf. Ollé, Manel (2002). La empresa de China, Acantilado, Barcelona. Pagden, Anthony (1990). Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Bibliography

285

–––– (1994). The Uncertainties of Empire: Essays in Iberian and Ibero-American Intellectual History, Ashgate Pub. Co., Aldershot. Pagden, A.; Lawrance, J. (eds.) (1991). Political Writings of Francisco de Vitoria, Cambridge University Press, New York. Parker, Geoffrey (1988). The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, Cambridge University Press, New York. Parry, J. H. (1940). The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, New York. –––– (1966). The Spanish Seaborne Empire, Hutchinson, London. Phelan, John Leddy (1959). The Hispanization of the Philippines. Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565–1700, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. Porras, José Luis (1989). “El galeón de Manila.” In: Estudios sobre Filipinas y las Islas del Pacíco, Asociación Española de Estudios del Pacíco, Madrid, 31–39. –––– (1990). The Synod of Manila of 1582, Historical Conservation Society, Manila. Portillo, Álvaro del (1947). Descubrimientos en California, CSIC, Madrid. Provost-Smith, Patrick (2002). Macao, Manila, Mexico and Madrid: Jesuit Controversies over Strategies for the Christianization of China (1580–1600), UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, MI. Quiason, Seran (1966). English “Country Trade” with the Philippines, 1644–1765, University of the Philippines Press, Manila. Quirino, Carlos (1957). “First newsletter in the Philippines.” In: Journal of the Philippine National Historical Society, 169–176. Ramos, Demetrio (1985). “Mentalidades e ideas en la América de la época.” In: Historia General de España en América, vol. IX–I, Rialp, Madrid, 503–561. Reid, Anthony (1988, 1993). Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680 (2 vols.), Yale University Press, New Haven. Rodao, Florentino (1989). “Restos de la presencia Ibérica en las islas Molucas.” In: España y el Pacico, Madrid: 245–254. –––– (1991). “El comercio de las especias.” In: Historia 16: 177: 93–98. –––– (1997). Españoles en Siam (1540–1939). Una aportación al estudio de la presencia hispana en Asia, CSIC, Madrid. –––– (2004). “Siam y los contactos exteriores de Filipinas, 1565–1898.” In: Revista Española del Pacíco, Asociación Española de Estudios del Pacíco: 14: 111– 126. –––– (2007). “The Castilians discover Siam: changing visions and self-discovery.” In: The Journal of the Siam Society: 95: 1–23. Rodríguez, Eulogio Balan (1941). The Philippines and Mexico, National Library, Manila. Roos, M. J. (2000). The Amalgamation of Church and State in a Formula for Colonial Rule. Clergymen in the Dutch Administration of Formosa, 1627–1651. Master’s thesis [Doctoraal Scriptie Geschiedenis], Leiden University. Rubiés, Joan-Pau (2003). “The Spanish contribution to the ethnology of Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.” In: Renaissance Studies: 17–3: 418–448.

286

Bibliography

Sanz y Díaz, José (1971). Legazpi, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid. Schurz, William Lytte (1929). The Manila Galleon (Reprint: Historical Conservation Society, Manila, 1989). Scott, Willian Henry (1987). “Demythologizing the papal bull Inter Caetera.” In: Philippine Studies: 35: 348–356. –––– (1997). Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City. Smith, Alan K. (1991). Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism, and World Trade, 1400–1825, Westview Press, Boulder. Spate, O. H. K. (1979, 1983). The Pacic since Magellan, vol. I: “Monopolist and freebooters” (1979), vol. II: “The Spanish lake” (1983), Australia National University Press, Canberra. Suichi, Nara (2003). “Zeelandia, the factory in the Far Eastern trading network of the VOC.” In: About and Around Formosa, T’sao Yung-ho Foundation, Taipei, 161–174. Tan, Zon-lin 陳宗仁 (2003).〈「北港」與「Pacan」地名考釋：兼論十六、七世紀 之際台灣西南海域貿易情勢的變遷〉(A study on the place names “Beigang” and “Pacan” and the changes in Taiwan’s Southwest Sea trading at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries)，刊於《漢學研究》21:2c頁249–278. –––– (2005).《雞籠山與淡水洋》(The Quelang Mountain and the Tamsui Ocean)c 聯經出版公司，台北. TePaske, John Jay (1967). Three American Empires, Harper & Row, New York. Thompson, Laurence G. (1964). “The earliest Chinese eyewitness accounts of the Formosan aborigines,” Monumenta Serica: 23: 170–178. –––– (1968). “The junk passage across the Taiwan Strait: Two Early Chinese accounts.” In: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies: 28: 170–194. Tierney, Brien (1982). Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, Cambridge University Press. –––– (1997). The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, Scholar Peter Ed., Atlanta. Ts’ao, Yung-ho 曹永和 (1979).《臺灣早期歷史研究》 (Studies on early history of Taiwan)c聯經，台北. –––– (1998). “Taiwan as an entrepôt in East Asia in the seventeenth century,” Itinerario, vol. XXI, No. 3: 94–114. –––– (2001).《臺灣早期歷史研究續集》(Studies on early history of Taiwan: The sequel)，聯經，台北. Tsuchida, Shigeru ɠ̈́ ಥ (1985). “Kulong: yet another Austronesian language in Taiwan?” In: Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology (Academia Sinica): 60: 1–59. Tuck, Richard (1999). The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant, Oxford University Press. Van Veen, E. (1996). “How the Dutch ran a seventeenth-century colony: The occupation and loss of Formosa 1624–1662.” In: Itinerario: 20–1: 59–77.

Bibliography

287

Videira Pires, Benjamin (1994). A viagem de Comércio Macau-Manila nos Séculos XVI a XIX, Macao, Museu Marítimo de Macau. Villarroel, Fidel (2005). Miguel de Benavides, O. P. (1550–1605). Friar, Bishop and University Founder, Santo Tomas University Press, Manila. Villiers, John (1986). “Manila and Maluku: Trade and warfare in the eastern archipelago, 1580–1640.” In: Philippine Studies: 34: 146–161. Vink, Mark; Winius, George (1993). “South India and the China Seas: How the VOC shifted its weight from China & Japan to India around A.D. 1636.” In: As Relações entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente: Actas do VI Seminario International de História Indo-Portuguesa, Outubro 1991, Macao, Lisboa: 125–140. Vogels, J. L. P. J. (1988). Het Nieuwe Tayouan. De Verenigde Oostindische Companie op Kelang, 1664–1668, Doctoral Dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. Walton, Timothy R. (1994). The Spanish Treasure Fleets, Pineapple Press, Sarasota. Wen, Chen-hua 溫振華 (1998).〈再讀一六五四年北臺古地圖〉(Rereading the 1654 Old Map of Northern Taiwan)c《北縣文化》58. –––– (1999).“清代淡水地區平埔族分布與漢人移墾〉(The distribution of the plains aborigines and the Han Chinese immigrant squatters, Tamsui area during the Qing rule)c周宗賢（編），《淡水學學術研討會——過去、現在、未來論文集》， 國史館，臺北，頁27–47. Wen, Chen-hua 溫振華; Tai Bao-tsun 戴寶村 (1998).《淡水河流域變遷史》(History of changes of the Tamsui drainage area). 臺北縣立文化中心， 臺北. Wills Jr., J. E. (1974). Pepper, Guns and Parleys: the Dutch East India Company and China, 1622–1681, Harvard University Press. Yang, Jie-yen 楊杰彥 (2000).《荷據時代台灣史》(The history of Taiwan during the Dutch period)c聯經出版，台北. Zafra, Nicolás (1993). The Colonization of the Philippines and the Beginnings of the Spanish City of Manila, National Historical Institute, Manila. Zaide, Gregorio F. (1971). “Manila and Acapulco.” In: Philippine Historical Review: 4: 245–270. Zandvliet, Kees 冉福立 (1997).《十七世紀荷蘭人繪製的臺灣老地圖》(Old maps of Taiwan from the Dutch, in the 17th century)，漢聲雜誌社，台北. –––– (1998). Mapping for Money. Maps, Plans and Topographic Paintings and their Role in Dutch Overseas Expansion during the 16th and 17th Centuries, Batavian Lion International, Amsterdam.

Index

Names Acebedo, Juan de　14 Acevedo　109, 244 Adams, Robert　17 Adams, William　165, 249 Aduarte, Diego de　42, 74, 87, 109, 113, 153, 156, 176, 181, 184, 194–195, 197, 203, 210–211, 221–222, 244, 254, 258, 262, 265 Aguiar, Andrés de　181 Aguilar, Domingo　63, 70, 75, 80, 87, 92, 125, 151, 165–166, 187, 257–258 Alcarazo, Juan de　21–22, 26–27, 60, 70, 72, 118–119, 143–144, 165, 176, 180–181, 183, 198, 213, 236–237, 253 Alcega, Juan de　10 Alenda, Gaspar　120, 178, 184, 189, 200, 244 Alonso / Tamory Alonce　80, 90–91 Andrea Dittis　138 Andriessen　18 Ángeles, Juan de los　63, 65, 73, 75, 79–80, 91, 109, 116, 151–152, 184, 197, 203, 230, 246 Annesz, Douwe　17 Arce, Pedro de　182 Aréchaga, Valentín de　121, 206, 227–228, 230–231 Argensola, Bartolomé Leonardo de　11, 52, 161, 249, 267 Arnedo, Lorenzo　197

Atienza, Lucas de　188, 244 Ayala, Fernando de　126 Baez (Váez), Bartolomé　207 Bagoula　67 Balcázar, Juan de　168, 184 Baquedano, Juan　181 Barreto, Isabel　160 Batachina　11 Bello, Manuel　233 Benavides, Miguel　38, 105, 175, 253, 254 Benua　148–149, 238–239 Bermúdez, Francisco　189, 200, 244 Black, Gerbrantsz　111, 236 Boetajomajauw　68 Bolen, Nicolás　236 Bontekoe, Willian　18 Boon, Pieter　67–68, 70, 79–80, 92–93, 166, 169 Borda, Domingo de la　211, 244 Boutay Madawis　68 Braam, Jan van　261 Bravo, Francisco　181, 244 Bravo de Acuña, Pedro　11, 14, 135 Caballero, Antonio María　126, 189, 200, 233, 244, 265, 269 Cachil Moncay　23 Caesar, Cornelis　83, 98–99, 117, 158, 166 Caeuw, Jacob　29 Candidus, George　84, 95–98, 156, 190, 192

290

Index

Canevari, Pedro　233 Cangaje　11 Capeau, Arnauld de　250 Captain China　138 Carnaby, Henry　17 Caron, François　80, 99, 116–117, 127, 151, 159, 166, 261 Caroubotaij　66 Carpentier, Pieter de　19 Carreño Valdés, Antonio　20, 52, 105, 118–119, 121, 123, 126, 144, 165, 176, 211, 236, 271 Carrillo, Andrés　230 Carrión, Juan Pablo de　138 Carvajal, Cristóbal de　85, 115, 143, 165, 263 Cavadta, Domingo de　123, 210 Cerezo de Salamanca, Juan　22, 133, 261 Cevicos, Juan　42, 45, 128, 203, 250 Chaves, Juan de　211 Chaves, Pedro　77, 153, 180, 189–190, 244 Ciudad Rodrigo, Antonio de　179, 244 Clefenger, Charles　17 Cobisa, Mateo　195, 244, 269 Cobo, Juan　38, 105, 194, 253–254 Cocci, Angelo　114, 119, 154, 168, 176, 189, 195 Coen, Jan Pieterszoon　16, 18 Collado, Diego　196–197, 270 Constant, J.　18 Corcuera, Pedro　268 Corena, Miguel de　197, 244 Cornelis, Simon　24, 93 Cortes, Artemio de las　134, 251 Coyett, Frederich　28–29 Date Masuname　188 Días, Álvaro　174 Díaz, Francisco　180, 189–190, 197, 246 Díaz, Salvador　18–20, 44, 95, 138, 215, 269 Díaz Barrera, Bartolomé　118–119, 181, 237 Díaz de Cevallos　114 Diemen, Anthonio van　116, 130 Dircksz Lam, Jacob　14

Eguíluz, Pedro de　115 Enríquez, Luis　175 Escalona, Francisco　189, 244 Esquivel, Jacinto　47–48, 57, 59–63, 65, 69, 72–75, 77, 79–81, 83–89, 96–98, 108–109, 112–117, 122–124, 126, 130, 146, 150–154, 165, 176–184, 188–191, 195, 198, 203, 217–218, 220, 244, 257–259, 266, 269 Fajardo, Alonso　14–15, 18, 42, 52 Fajardo Chacón, Diego　134, 251 Felipe del Espíritu Santo　189, 197, 246 Fernández Capillas, Francisco　176, 190, 197, 246 Fernández de Medrano, Sebastián　131 Fernández León, Juan　181 Fernández Navarrete, Domingo　194, 266 Fernández Quirós,　160 Flores, Benito　211 Floris, D.　18 Francisco de “casta bengala”　 126, 181 García, Juan　180, 189–190, 246 García de Campos, Antonio　113 García Romero, Alonso　101, 116, 118– 119, 149, 179, 186, 224, 237, 262, 268 García Serrano, Miguel　41, 46, 136 Gerritsz de Fries, Marten　24 Gertzen, Martin　25 Goiti, Martín de　35 Gómez, Mateo　79 Gómez, Pedro　174, 207 González, Domingo　42–43, 46–48, 52, 127–128, 148, 179, 182, 246, 254 González de Cellórigo, Martín　203 Grau y Monfalcón, Juan　203, 251 Gravius, Daniel　191 Grotius, Hugo　9, 33, 49, 52, 249, 255 Guerrero, Hernando　197 Guillestegui, Rodrigo　14 Guzmán, Luis de　57, 115, 181 Hagen, Van der　12–13 Hamada, Yahei　21 Happart, Gabriël　99, 158

Index

291

Harouse, Hendrik　23–24, 90–92, 111, 166, 228, 230–231 Hasekura, Rokuemon Tsunenaga　165 Heemskerk, Jacob van　52 Heredia, Pedro de　14 Hernández, Francisco　118–119, 185, 237–238 Herrera, Jerónimo de　109, 121, 124, 238–239 Hioji, Rokuzayemon Nishi　188, 244 Hurtado de Corcuera, Sebastián　5, 22–23, 27–28, 94, 105, 119–121, 124, 126, 146, 148, 166, 180, 182–186, 196–197, 203–206, 227, 237, 261–263 Ibarra, Bernardino de　124 Ipai　74 Iperen　83, 117

Lanco / Banco　148–149, 239 Langenaer, Joost Cornelissen van　113, 125, 127 Las Casas, Bartolomé de　32–33, 36–38, 52 Lechuga, Cristóbal　131 Le Fèbvre, Jacques　17 Lemaire, Maximiliaan　92, 166 Lewis, Edmund　17 Li Dan　19, 138, 265 Limahong　3, 137, 161, 267 Linga, Johan van　24, 158 López Azaldegui, Andrés　252 López de Andoaín, Juan　119, 146 López de Legazpi, Miguel　31, 33–36, 114 Loupo　81 Lucas Kilas　75, 80–81, 99

Jacinto / Jasinto Cousaymondonne　70, 260 Jacobsen, J.　18 Jacobsz, Leonard　17 Janco　151 Jan Lauw　138 Janszoon, William　17 Jara Quemada, Pedro　110 Jiménez, Andrés　221, 244 Jourdain, John　16 Junius, Robert　95, 190–193

Madrid, Juan de　14 Maetsuycker, Joan　110 Mailla, Joseph Marie de　200 Major, John　32 Manzano, Melchor del　136, 193, 211 María van Aelst　116 Márquez, Cristóbal　79, 114, 118, 120–121, 145, 168, 205, 263 Martínez, Bartolomé　14, 17, 39–42, 45, 47, 51–52, 57, 107, 115, 138, 140, 143, 165, 195, 203, 208, 211, 222, 244, 250 Martínez de Liédana, Juan　211 Martín Garay, Pedro　210–211 Martini, Martin　174 Mártir, Pedro　159 Matandá　35 Mendaña, Álvaro　159–160 Mendiola, Pedro de　23 Mesa, Juan de　251 Molina, Juan Bta.　14 Moncay, Cachil　23 Monroy, Pedro　183–184 Montanus, Arnoldus　158 Monteiro, Balthasar　59, 152 Morales, Juan Bautista　176, 189–190, 200, 233, 244 Moreira, Christovão　174 Morera, Jerónimo　211 Morga, Antonio de　10–11, 155

Kakijlach　59, 77, 82 Keerdekoe, Simon　55, 57, 59–60, 63, 77, 81, 101, 110–112, 117, 158, 178, 240, 256, 262, 268 Kilas sa Romana　75, 87, 151 Kimptingh　151, 271 Kruyf, Joannes　191, 193 Laan, Jan van der　29 Lakandula　35 Lalabua　11 Lamlok　95 Lamma　61, 257 Lamotius, Johannes　24, 77, 90–93, 96, 111, 114, 230–231 Lampcan　151

292

Index

Munden, John　17 Muñoz, Alonso　164 Muñoz, Nicolás　191 Muro, Luis　57, 86, 179, 184–185, 195, 197, 246 Muysert, Pieter　19 Nanning, L.　18 Narváez, Andrés　238 Nava, Francisco de　268 Neck, Jacob van　9 Niño de Tavora, Juan　20 Nobel　107 Nolpe, Jacob　59, 158, 168 Noort, Olivier van　4, 9–10 Novas, Diego de　211 Nuyts, Pieter　21–22, 26–27, 252 Olaso, Matías de　181 Olasso, Lorenzo de　261 Olivares, Count-Duke of　22, 203 Ootman, Jan Hendricksz　98–99 Oquendo　205 Ortiz, Luis　203 Otazo, Francisco de　194 Overtwater, Anthonisz　59, 100, 111, 113, 256 Pacheco, Alonso　148–149 Pacheco, Rodrigo　261 Palafox y Mendoza, Juan de　261 Palomino, Pedro　109, 112, 118–120, 124, 145, 148, 179, 238–239 Pantoja, Diego　198 Pardo, Jacinto　175 Patsien　98–99 Pedel, Thomas　91, 166 Pedro China　138 Pelleja, Onofre　189, 244 Pérez Dasmariñas, Gómez　37–38, 40, 105, 161 Pérez Dasmariñas, Luis　39–40, 105, 161, 203, 254 Pérez de Rueda, Juan　121, 181–182, 186 Pietersen, D.　18 Pila　57, 184, 223 Pilet　90–91 Pineda, Dominga de　126

Pirez, Francisco　59, 152, 174 Pizarro, Francisco　8 Ponap　61, 82 Portillo, Gonzalo　27–29, 79, 105, 109, 112, 118, 120, 133, 145, 150, 182, 204–206, 226–228, 230–231, 239–240, 262–263, 270 Putmans, Hans　99, 261 Quataong　92–93, 95 Qudarat / Kudarat / Corralat 22–23, 28, 94, 260 Quesada, Jiménez de　159 Qui-quiet / Qui qua　148–149 Quirós, Teodoro　 63, 77, 84, 91, 100–101, 112, 119, 140, 148, 150, 153, 166, 176, 179–180, 186, 190–191, 197, 203, 231, 244, 258, 268 Quitsick　138 Rada, Martín de　193 Reijersen, Cornelis　18 Rendón, Duarte　182, Ribeyro, Manuel　250 Ricci, Mateo　174, 198, 200, 269–270 Riccio, Victorio　61–62, 198–200, 234–235, 258, 271 Ríos Coronel, Hernando de los　5, 40, 106, 163, 203 Riveros　121 Rodríguez, Esteban　10 Rodwik, Jan　13 Rojas, Cristóbal de　131, 263 Román, Alonso　18 Román, Juan Bautista　265 Ronquillo, Diego　105 Ronquillo, Gonzalo　105, 138 Ronquillo, Juan　13, 14 Rosas, Ginés de　124 Rubián de Zubieta, Francisco　250 Rueda, Diego de　121 Ruiz, Lorenzo　189, 197 Sáez de Alcaraz, Miguel　181 Salazar, Domingo de　36–38, 162, 254 Salcedo, Juan de　34–35 Sánchez, Alonso　37, 174, 194, 207 Sanqua / Saqua　151

Index

Santo Domingo, Francisco de　211 Saraos, Juan de　226 Sarmiento de Gamboa, Pedro　249 Schall, Adam　200 Schillemans　158 Sedeño, Antonio　115, 131, 264 Semedo, Álvaro　174 Sierra, Tomás　195 Silva, Jerónimo de　19 Silva, Juan de　11–13, 250 Silva, Fernando de　20, 40, 42, 44, 51–52, 108, 126, 136, 211, 251–252, 261 Siotangh　117 Sipter, Daniël　98–99 Sisinjan　90 Soares Vivas, Joao　252 Soria, Diego de　38 Sotelo, Luis　165, 195–196 Sotelo de Ulloa, Pedro　211 Soto, de Luis　191 Spielbergen, Joris van　13, 250 Steen, Hendrick　117, 127, 150–151 Stevin, Simon　132–133 Tamargo, Diego　186 Tarribe　66 Tarrinouw　98 Tayfusu　138, 265 Tello de Guzmán, Francisco de　10, 38, 105 Teman　59 Tenayan　57, 82 Teodoro　48, 65, 67–68, 70, 79–80, 90–93, 96, 99–101, 112, 127, 168–169, 231, 257, 260, 268 Tiniso　151 Tjonthaij　150–151 Tokugawa Hidetada　188 Tokugawa Iemitsu　188 Tomonaga, Kiusei Gorobioye　188, 195, 244, 269 Toro, Simón de　181 Torres, Lázaro de　115 Toulacque, Alonso de　123, 210 Tousailack　138 Toyotomi Hideyoshi　3–4, 39–40, 159, 163, 187, 269

293

Traudenius, Paulus　24, 110, 159, 166, 231 Trigault, Nicolas　174 Tupas　34 Urdaneta, Andrés de　5, 8, 193 Urquicio, Domingo　189, 244 Ursúa, Pedro de　159–160 Utre, Felipe de　159 Vaecht, Henry　17 Váez, Francisco　57, 74, 84, 86, 176, 179, 184–185, 195–197, 221–222, 244 Valignano, Alexander　174, 198 Vega, Juan Manuel de　13–14 Vera, Antonio de　115, 211 Vera, Juan Bautista de　162 Vera, Melchor de　132 Vera, Pedro de　106, 178, 236 Vera, Santiago de　37, 40, 105 Verburg (Verbuch), Nicolaes　29 Viana, Antonio de　270, 244 Vianen, Jansz　14 Vichbee, Cornelis　106, 132, 241 Villanueva, Antonio　230 Vitoria, Francisco de　2, 31–33, 36–38, 42–43, 46, 49, 52, 118, 125, 254 Vivero, Francisco de　121, 181 Vivero y Velasco, Rodrigo de　164 Vizcaíno, Sebastián　159, 164–165, 250 Warwijk, van　52 Wel, Adrijaen van der　216 Wesselingh, Maerten　72 Willemsz, Pieter　249 Wiseman　11 Witerboon　251 Witt, Fredericx de　19 Wittert, François de　12 Zambrano, Catalina　251 Zamudio, Juan　39 Zárate, Andrés　230 Zhang Yi / Tio Heng 159, 162–163 Zheng Chenggong / Koxinga　29, 134, 138–139, 191, 198–199, 233–235, 240–241, 264, 271 Zheng Jilong / Yiguan / Yquam　105, 114, 120, 126, 138–139, 149–150, 153, 233, 265

294

Index

Places / Others aberroa　88 Abuatan　175 Acapulco　3–4, 11, 13, 17, 24–25, 41, 45, 51, 125, 136, 139–140, 142, 163, 165, 175, 193, 243, 250–251, 269–270 Achim / Aceh　8, 12 Alcarazo Incident　21–22, 26–27, 253 Amboina　9, 15, 251 Amboina Incident　19 Anping　4, 139, 198–199, 234 arbitristas / arbitrios　97, 143, 203 Arroceros　105 Audiencia de Manila　10, 13, 34, 37, 42, 44, 104, 118, 120–121, 162, 202 Babatangan / Bawatang　107 Baboloan　66 Babuyanes Islands　40, 175 bagui　84 Ballebal　256 Banda Islands　8, 11, 16, 29, 205 Bangui　106 Bantam　8, 16–17 Baritschoen　60, 89 Basay / Basayans　54–57, 59, 62, 65, 68–70, 73–75, 77, 79–81, 86–87, 89–90, 94, 96, 113, 133, 150, 198, 206, 256–260, 263 bastions María　116, 130 Oosterpunt　130, 241 San Antonio el Chico　129, 237, 240 San Antonio el Grande　111, 129, 236–237, 240 San Diego　115, 131 San Juan　237, 239 San Sebastián　130, 230, 237, 239–241 Small Half Moon　241 Bataan　25 Batanes Archipelago　42, 259 Batavia　16–18, 23 bejuco　148, 151, 180 Bicol　175 Binondo　100, 105, 197, 250

Bohol　175 boletas　141 bonga / buyos　150–152, 155, 266 Burney　40 cabeza / cabessa　38, 66, 84, 96, 104, 151, 260 Cagayan / Cagayanos　14–15, 59, 62, 86, 91–92, 94, 122–124, 138, 143, 146, 175, 178, 190, 196–197, 202, 204, 208, 217, 219–221, 226, 230–231, 259–260, 263 calico　9 Camalaniugan　259 Camarines Island　25 Cambodia　39, 85, 120, 194, 208, 211, 213, 217 campeche　8 cangans　98–99, 147, 158 Cape Bojeador　209 Cape Bolinao　19 Cape Espíritu Santo　17, 23–24 Capul Island　24 Caquiuanuan / Santiago / Hock van St. Jacob　57, 67, 70, 75, 77–80, 87, 90–93, 107, 179, 219–220, 268 Caraga　28 carayo　83 Carolinas Islands 140 Catinunum / San Lorenzo　79–80, 93, 106, 117 Cattaio　61 Cavalan / Camalan　56, 63–65, 67–68, 70, 72–73, 77, 79–83, 85–86, 92–93, 96, 101, 106, 119, 155, 169, 179–180, 185, 259, 268 Cavite　4, 12, 18–19, 25, 35, 42, 132, 134, 139, 161–162, 197, 208, 212, 214, 227, 251 Cebú　2, 31, 33–35, 141, 182, 264 Chiacan　234 Chicasuan / Sicosuan　72, 75, 165 Chiulien / Sibilien　72, 75, 165 Chupre / Supra　72, 165 churches Our Lady of the Rosary (Tamchuy)　 176, 179, 195

Index

St. Dominic (Caquiuanuan)　180 St. John the Baptist (Taparri)　176, 178 St. Joseph (Quimaurri)　178 St. Peter (San Salvador)　178 Concepción Province　259 Conchinchina　208 contador　104, 120–121 convents San Agustín　268 San Francisco　168 Santo Domingo　182 Todos los Santos　112, 132, 178, 181–182, 191, 197, 236, 141 corambre　153, 180 Cordovan clogs　142 Cordovan shoes　142 Coromandel　9 Corregidor　104 Corregidor Island　184 Council of Indies　11, 33, 36–38, 40, 52, 100, 103 Cournangh　62–63, 257 cuentas / chicubises　70, 87, 150, 168 Dadanghs　69–70 Daracop / Dorcop　72 Deshima　139 Dilao　117 Dockudukol　256 Domburch (ship)　21, 115, 116, 119, 215–216, 236 Embocadero del Espíritu Santo　24 Embocadero de San Bernardino　140 encomiendas / encomenderos　33, 36–37, 39, 51, 104, 175, 253 esclavos del rey　126–127 estanco　180 Fleet of Defense, Anglo-Dutch　17–19, 251 fortresses　 Malaio (Ternate)　16 Rosario　16 San José (Zamboanga)　22–23, 108, 111, 132, 134, 237, 264 San Paulo (Macao)　111

295

San Salvador / Sanctissima Trinidado　 81, 89, 108–111, 120, 129, 131–134, 204–205, 210–211, 240, 262 Santiago　132 Takome　16 Taloko　16 Zeelandia　20, 23, 26, 28–29, 49–50, 95, 97, 120, 132, 151, 158, 189, 228, 271 forts Costy (Ternate)　24 el cubo / San Luis / Nobelenburg / Eltenburg　109, 111, 130, 133, 204, 225–227, 237–240 la mira / San Millán / Victoria 109, 111, 133, 204, 224, 226, 238–240 la retirada / San Antón　109, 111, 130, 133, 204, 224, 226, 228, 230–231, 237–240 Nuestra Señora de la Guía (Manila)　 114, 131 Provintia　97 San José (Tondo)　105 San Pedro (Cebú)　264 Santo Domingo　22, 59–60, 75, 114–115, 117, 119, 129, 173, 176, 185, 215, 218, 225, 238–239, 256 Gaddanes　175 galligal　117 Gentlemen XVII　100, 166 Goa　9, 12–13, 254 gobernadorcillo　134 Guangzhou　14, 39 Heyankan　158 Hirado　17, 137, 138, 244 Igorrotes　94 Ilocos　13, 15, 20, 119, 175 Ilocos blankets　142 Iloilo　12, 108, 111, 132 indigo　8 inibs　88, 191 Intramuros　114, 131 Irrayas　94, 175

296

Index

Isla de Pascua　129 Ius gentium　31, 43, 46, 254 Jajinjurus / Parerier　64, 67 Java / Jabas　 8, 23, 238, 249 Jilolo　16 Johor　8 Joló　94 judgments of residence　44, 120, 142, 203, 263 just war　26, 31, 33, 36, 43, 52, 252 Kerrionan　68 Ketagalan　26, 53–54, 56–57, 74, 255 Kibanorra　65–66 Kimabolao / Mabolauw　67 Kimalitsigowan　61 Kimassow　56, 61 Kimotsi　61 Kipas / Kabila / Kaggilach　59, 256 Kippanas　61 Kirananna　60 Kriouan River　68, 79 Ladrones (Islands)　129 Lal-loc　175 Lamcam　92 Lamitan　23 lancet　181 lanckijns　147 landdag　50, 65, 93, 98, 100, 260 Lantau Island　4, 39 Laws of the Indies　36, 100 Lequios　40, 150, 160, 182, 189, 213 Leyte　175 Lichoco　60–62, 82, 178–179, 218–219, 221, 260 Linaw　72 Lingayén　14 Longkiau　95 Macabebé　35 Macao / Macan　4, 7, 11, 13–18, 20, 22, 29, 39, 41–42, 44–45, 49, 111, 126, 132, 137, 142, 144, 174, 181, 187–188, 193–194, 200, 207–208, 233, 243, 246, 250–252, 254, 256 Macassar　16, 116, 120, 204, 251

Madagascar　7, 53 Magindanao　132 majuorbol　88–89 Malabrigo　107 Malacca　7, 12–13, 23, 137, 194, 206, 231 Manila　2–7, 9, 10–15, 19–21, 23–24, 26–28, 35–46, 51, 63, 72, 79–80, 85, 88, 90–91, 97, 100, 103–106, 108, 113–114, 117–121, 123–128, 131–134, 136–150, 154, 156–157, 159, 161–165, 167–168, 175–176, 180–184, 187–190, 193–200, 202–208, 213, 217, 220, 222, 224, 227–228, 232, 235–237, 240, 242–245, 247, 250–265, 267, 271 Marianas Islands　140–141 Marshall Islands　140 masimanamananur　89 masitanguitanguich　84, 89, 220 Mattaw　48–49, 138, 149, 156 Maynilad　35 Mekong　53 Mindanao　12, 22, 27–28, 40, 94, 132, 141, 175, 266 Mindoro　35 Miyako　165 Moluccas　9–13, 15–16, 21–22, 34, 135, 143, 146, 161, 190, 192, 194, 249–250, 269 Moti　16 Myanmar　53 Nagasaki　26, 139, 163, 187, 189, 195, 206, 211, 243 negroes 126, 226 Negros　175 Noord Holland　111, 129, 240–241 Nueva Castilla　35 Nueva España　8, 20, 103, 129, 164, 265 Nueva Granada　129 Nueva Segovia　38, 42, 129, 175–176, 197, 210, 227 oidores　104, 120, 250, 165 Okinawa　129, 189 Pabanan　71–72 Pabanangh　69–70 Pacan　41

Index

padrastro　112, pagador　104, 120–121 Palan　72 Pali　54, 59 Pampanga / Pampangos　16, 25, 35, 91, 94, 122–124, 168, 210, 213, 230–231, 238–239 Panay　34–35 pancada　141, 243 Pangasinan　38, 94, 137, 150, 175, 217 Pantao / Parrigon　56, 59, 62, 84–85, 115, 177, 179, 184–185, 219–221, 223, 256 paraos　35 parian　38, 42, 100, 105, 113–114, 117, 161, 175, 177–178, 197, 199, 202, 221, 250, 253 Parricoutsie　256 Parriwan　256 Parrougearon　69–70, 257 Parusarun / Parusaron　63, 72, 165 paso de la cuesta　230 Patani　8–9, 52, 114 Patibur / Patsilar　72, 165 Payagi　16 Paytsie　62–63 Pescadores Islands　16–19, 23, 41, 49, 119, 132, 138, 143, 228 Pimaba　72, 92, 95, 158, 166 Pinar, El / Pinhal, El　4, 39 Pintados　129 Playa Honda　13–14 Pocael　256 Porompon　61 Protector of the Indians　36 proveedor　181–182 provisor　181 pueblo de indios　104 Pulangi　94 Pulicat　9 Pulauan / Pinnonouan / Pinerouan　56, 60–63, 74, 79, 81–82, 84, 177, 218, 220–221 Punta (cape) de Monos　107 de Santa Catalina　107 Diablos　107, 227 Flechas　23

297

Quanzhou　14, 173, 199 Quelang　4, 21–24, 26–28, 39, 43–44, 47–48, 56–57, 60–63, 70, 73–75, 77, 79–81, 85, 89–94, 97, 100, 106–115, 117–120, 122–123, 125, 127, 130, 132, 136, 138–141, 143–145, 147–148, 150–153, 156–167, 166, 168, 176–178, 180–181, 185, 189–191, 197, 199, 204– 206, 210, 213, 217, 231–233, 236–241, 256–258, 261–263, 268, 278 Quessajosojol / Sagol Sagol / Sochel Sochel　65–67, 79, 93 Quibanuran / Kibanorra / Kimablauw　 65–66 Quimabolao / Kimabolao　65, 68 Quimare　62 Quimaurri / Camaurri / Kemora　56–57, 62, 70, 77, 79–81, 84–85, 87, 90–93, 96, 100, 101, 106, 108–110, 112, 127, 150, 176, 178, 186, 206, 217, 219–221, 226, 231, 259–260, 268 Quimazon River　56, 60–62, 74, 79, 82, 179, 218 Quinamese　23 quinine　167 Quinmuen / Quemoy　234 Quiparrusinauan / Parissinawan　68, 79–80, 93 Quipatao　60–61, 150, 218–219 Quitalabiauan / Taloebayan /Talebeauan 64–65, 74, 76, 79, 93, 257　 Quitatupaan / Kittotepan / Kakitapan　68, 79, 93 Quitubitubi　65–66 Rabath / Sapat　72 Rapan　60, 82 Rarangus　72, 85–86, 115, 165, 258 Rauay　165 real de a dos　168 reducción　104, 178–179 regidores　104 Reyes Magos Island　129 Rica de Oro　2, 164 Rica de Plata　2, 164 Rieuweovas　62–63, 257 Rivrycq　63, 257 rochela　113

298

Index

Rosario (ship)　115, 118, 144, 188 royal coffer　120, 238 Royal Patronage　173, 180, 183–184, 197 Rybats　62–63 sakoku　49, 139, 181, 187–189, 195, 243 Samar Island　159, 175, 266 Samarkanda　267 San Bernardino　140 San Felipe (galleon)　3, 163, 195, 253, 269 San Francisco (galleon)　45, 164, 188, 250 San Gabriel　197 sangleys　18, 70, 85, 114, 117, 120, 124, 128, 148–151, 154, 161–162, 168, 180, 202, 217, 219–221, 226, 238–239, 261, 267, 270 Santa Potenciana　113, 264 Santísima Trinidad, La　108, 110, 129, 210–211, 215, 238, 240–241 Saquiraya / Sakiraya　72, 165 Saruman　72, 165 sayal　126 Senar　56–60, 73–74, 77, 79, 84–87, 96, 98, 115–116, 133, 151–152, 176–177, 179, 184–185, 218–223, 256, 263 shogun / shogunate　3, 21, 26, 39, 137, 139, 163–165, 187–188, 249 shuyinsen　21, 139 Siam　2–3, 21, 27, 37, 208, 252 Siao　40 sijpous　143 Sikoku　187 Sinachan / Sasinagan　66, 257 Sinarogan / Sinarochan　66 Sincan / Sinkan　50, 150 Sincapora Strait　12, 94 Siron / Sirong　62–63, 257 situado　8, 140–142 socorro　113, 119, 121, 141–144, 154, 157, 165, 181, 227 Solomon Islands　126, 160 Synod of Manila　36–37, 40 Tabaron / Tavoran　165, 71, 72 Tacciraya　71–72 taels　151–152, 161, 219 Tagalo　91, 94, 189, 202, 258 Tagesuan　25

Taggewaer　256 Tagima Island　25 Takilis River　98 tambobos　84, 217–218, 256 Tamsui / Tamchui / Tammpsua 21–22, 26, 54, 60, 63, 69, 73–74, 80, 83–91, 93– 94, 107, 109–110, 112–113, 116–117, 119, 124, 130, 133, 148, 150–151, 158, 166, 167–178, 184, 189, 195, 215, 218–220, 225, 226, 232, 237–241, 255–257, 261–262 Taocan　153 Taparri / Taparrians　56–58, 60, 70, 74–75, 77, 80–82, 84–85, 87, 90–91, 96–97, 106, 109–110, 112, 125, 150–151, 176, 178, 186, 206, 217, 219–221, 259 Taparri el Viejo　58, 77, 85–86, 151 Tapongo　16 Taptap　66 Taradingan　66 Tataruma / Talleroma　69, 71–72, 100, 165 Tayouan　4, 19–20, 21, 23–24, 26–27, 29, 41, 49–50, 55, 63, 80, 81, 91–93, 95, 101, 110–111, 113, 122–123, 127–129, 132–134, 138–139, 146, 148, 149, 151, 153, 156, 166, 168, 190–191, 199, 206, 211, 213, 215, 240 Tayouan Council　50, 153 Tayouan Incident　21, 26, 49 tenedor　104, 120–121 Ternate / Terrenate　9, 11, 16, 23–25, 27, 94, 105, 108, 134, 141, 250–251, 264 Terrachia　79, 93 tesorero　120 Tevorang　156 tibucao / sibucao　154 Tidore Island　9, 11, 15–16, 28, 250 Toetona　58, 76–77 Tondo　28, 35, 105, 162, 270 Toro　203 Treaty of Defense　17 Treaty of Münster　23 Treaty of Zaragoza　2 Tuguegarao　 175 Turoboan / Taraboan / Torrobouan　56, 68– 74, 76, 79–80, 85, 90, 92–93, 98–99, 118, 125, 140, 165–166, 257, 258 Twelve Year's Truce　11–12, 52

Index

Ullebecan　72 Union of Arms　12, 22, 215 veedor　104, 120, 121, 124 Visayas Islands　10, 22, 94 VOC　4, 9, 16, 21, 24, 26–27, 49–50, 52, 60, 65–67, 83, 91, 93, 101, 116, 127–128, 130, 139, 156, 168, 192, 231, 240–241, 249 Warre Warre　256 Warrouwar　256 Witter Island　19 Wulauan　63 Xiamen / Zumingcheu / Emuy　198–199, 233 Zambales　14 Zamboanga　22–23, 25, 108, 111, 132, 134, 141, 237, 264 Zhangzhou / Chincheo　19, 251

299