Agriculture in the Age of Fascism: Religious and Secular Iconographies (Rural History in Europe) 9782503552484, 250355248X

Citation preview

Rural History in Europe 13

The Series Rural History in Europe The countryside forms a complex and evolving universe. Clearly, it exhibits both inertia and ruptures, but it would be an illusion to contrast a contemporary rural world in rapid transformation with a traditional rural world of frozen landscapes, petrified societies, immobile economies and lethargic political contexts. Even if rural societies have been overthrown, rural landscapes have been profoundly transformed and the intervention of the State has considerably strengthened the regulation of production and trade, history must of necessity be considered as the main explanatory factor for our time. The rural world can also only be fully understood if it is viewed in a manner which transcends national boundaries and if the discrepancies which can best be observed by adopting a broad view are taken into account. The aim must be to create a dialogue between researchers which goes beyond national frontiers, crosses chronological barriers and breaks disciplinary boundaries. The main objective of the ‘Rural History in Europe’ collection is thus to provide keys to unlock the changes experienced by present-day European rural societies in the light of their historical experience. It will produce the necessary historical knowledge to make it possible for all to conceptualise the future of European country-dwellers as they face problems of the kind historians have always grappled with in examining societies of the past. How can the changes taking place in present-day Europe be understood without taking into account a past which is still very present, and which determines both structures and behaviour? The volumes will be published after a peer-review process for each paper, supported by the editorial board, the authors and the editors of each book. In order to ask the relevant questions about the future of the peasantries and rural spaces in transformation, the volumes of this collection will deal with the longue durée and will present either research in progress or a synthesis on a regional or national scale. The outcome of this procedure will be a series giving a detailed overview of historical developments in Europe as a whole.

Agriculture in the Age of Fascism Authoritarian Technocracy and Rural Modernization, 1922-1945

Edited by Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo and Miguel Cabo

H F

EDITORIAL BOARD Gerard Béaur, director Bas J.P. van Bavel Rosa Congost Anne-Lise Head-König Socrates Petmezas Vicente Pinilla Jürgen Schlumbohm

Cover: Girls making the Fascist salute in Cangas do Morrazo, Galicia (Spain), 1938. Research Project Nomes e Voces. File Quiñoy Pandelo. D/2014/0095/83 ISBN 978-2-503-55248-4 © 2014 Brepols Publisher n.v., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmited, in any form or buy any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

CONTENTS The series Rural History in Europe List of Contributors List of Figures and Tables

06



7

Acknowledgements

11

Foreword



13

1. Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

19

2. Backwardness, modernization, propaganda. Agrarian policies and rural representations in the Italian Fascist regime Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi



43

3. The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture, 1933-1950 Daniel Lanero Táboas



85

4. Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary Zsuzsanna Varga

113

5. The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany Gesine Gerhard

139

6. Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945 Ernst Langthaler

159

7. Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951 Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

189

8. Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo: a case study of the acceptance of Nazi agricultural ideology by the Japanese Empire Tatsushi Fujihara

219

9. Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism? 239 Édouard Lynch

5

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Ana Cabana

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain

Miguel Cabo

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain

Alba Díaz-Geada

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain

Tatsushi Fujihara

University of Tokyo Japan

Gesine Gerhard

University of the Pacific United States of America

Stefano Grando

Laboratorio di Studi Rurali, Università degli Studi di Pisa Italy

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain

Ernst Langthaler

Institute of Rural History, St. Pölten, and Universität Wien Austria

Édouard Lynch

Laboratoire d’Etudes Rurales, Université Lumière-Lyon 2 France

Juan Pan-Montojo

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Spain

Zsuzsanna Varga

Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest Hungary

Gianluca Volpi

Università degli Studi di Udine Italy

6

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. Postcard ‘Fighter of the fields’, 1932. (‘We gave life to the baneful immense fields, and they gave us harvests, comfort, strength and faith’) Figure 2.2. Front page of ‘La Domenica del Corriere’: Mussolini harvests in Agro Pontino Figure 2.3. National wheat exposition, 1927 Figure 2.4. Wheat Victory celebration, 1926 Figure 2.5. Wheat Contest advertisement, 1926 Figure 2.6. Mosaic by Ferruccio Ferrazzi in Sabaudia. (Facade of Chiesa dell’Annunziata) Figure 2.7. Wheat Contest advertisement, 1931. (‘Give us today our daily bread’) Figure 2.8. Rural houseswives’ section of Foggia attending Mussolini’s visit to the town, 1934 Figure 2.9. The rural houseswives’ newspaper Figure 2.10. Radio Rurale Figure 2.11. Collective listening of ‘L’ora dell’agricoltore’ through Radio Rurale in Calabria (early 1940s). Figure 3.1. Portugal. District Divisions Figure 6.1. Regional patterns of land and livestock use in Austria in 1930 Figure 6.2. Agricultural producer prices in Austria, 1929-38 Figure 6.3. Actual (left) and target state (right) of the average farming system in Ybbsitz according to the 1941 ‘communal construction’ plan Figure 6.4. Leaflet promoting the cultivation of oilseeds in the province of Niederdonau, 1940 Figure 6.5. Proportion of arable land devoted to rapeseed and turnip rape in Niederdonau, 1937-1944 Figure 6.6. The substitution of technical capital for land and labour in Austrian agriculture in the twentieth century Figure 8.1. Map of the agricultural immigration in Manchuria, 1941 Figure 8.2. Wada Den, ‘Ôhinata Mura’, 1939 Figure 8.3. New Aristocracy from Blood and Soil Figure 9.1. The Caravan of Agricultural Progress Figure 9.2. The Caravan of Agricultural Progress Figure 9.3. Motorization in Ukraine

7

LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Table 2.2. Table 2.3. Table 2.4. Table 2.5 Table 2.6. Table 2.7. Table 2.8. Table 3.1. Table 3.2. Table 3.3. Table 3.4. Table 3.5. Table 3.6. Table 3.7. Table 4.1. Table 4.2. Table 4.3. Table 4.4. Table 5.1. Table 5.2. Table 5.3. Table 5.4. Table 5.5. Table 5.6. Table 6.1. Table 6.2. Table 6.3. Table 6.4. Table 6.5. Table 6.6. 8

Active population per economic sector (% on total active population) Active population in agriculture Gross Internal Product for Agriculture (Billions of 1938 liras) Gross Capital Stock for Agriculture (Billions of 1938 liras) Fertilizers consumption (thousands of quintals) Tractor engines used in Italian agriculture Value of gross production per hectare in 1938 liras (average of the period) – proxy for technical improvement in farming activity Farming land according to use Portugal (1910-1950). Percentage of Active Population occupied in agriculture Portugal (1920-1950). Gross Agricultural Product as percentage of Gross Domestic Product Forms of land exploitation (Hectares) Forms of land exploitation. Continental Portugal: Family Farming Zone and Campos do Sul (1952-1954) Continental Portugal: Family Farming Zone and Campos do Sul. Percentage of managed and family farms (1952-1954) Portugal (1952-1973). Number of tractors and combine harvesters Portugal (1940-1960). Usage of fertilizers (annual average in thousands of tons) Population active in agriculture Percentage of GDP from agriculture Distribution of land ownership, 1935 Agricultural exports Number and area of new settlements during the period of National Socialism Investment in new agricultural machinery Amount of fertilizer used (in million Rm) Percentage of national income made up by farm income Foreign workers employed in German agriculture People employed in Agriculture as percentage of total workforce Varieties of modernity with regard to Nazism Weight of the agrarian sector as a percentage of the active population Contribution of agriculture and forestry to GNP Distribution of landed property, 1930 Use of tractors Use of mineral fertilizers (annual averages)

Table 7.1. Table 7.2. Table 7.3. Table 7.4. Table 7.5. Table 7.6. Table 7.7. Table 7.8. Table 7.9. Table 7.10. Table 8.1. Table 8.2. Table 8.3. Table 8.4. Table 9.1. Table 9.2. Table 9.3.

Population active in agriculture Percentage of GDP from agriculture Rural exodus (1910-1970) The development of the relative price of wheat to labour (1936-1953) Work horses in Spain Distribution of land ownership (1930 and 1956) Wheat production (thousands of metric tons) Technical modernization: other indicators (Combine harvesters and threshers) Tractors and combine harvesters of cereal Total consumption and consumption by hectare of fertilizer Books and Articles on Nazi Agriculture translated into Japanese Working population ratios of agriculture, forestry and fishery (%) Birth and death rates (‰) The component ratio of farm size (%) Indices of agricultural production Manufacturing of agricultural machinery Chemical fertilizer supplied to agriculture

9

Acknowledgements

This book has been the result of two meetings of the authors, first in the Rural History Conference, at the University of Sussex, Brighton (September, 2010), and some months later at a workshop in the University of Santiago de Compostela (February, 2011). The latter, under the title of ‘Fascism and Agriculture’, was organized by the editors and the HISTAGRA research group (http://histagra.usc.es). The support of Histagra (Rural World Agrarian and Political History) and the collaboration of the Department of Modern and American History (University of Santiago de Compostela) were extremely important for the workshop and for other aspects of the project. We must also mention the research projects behind us: the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación) sponsored the project under the title ‘Políticas agrarias en un contexto autoritario, de la autarquía a la revolución verde: consecuencias en el agroecosistema, la economía y la sociedad rural (1940-1980)’, headed by Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto (HAR2010-18668), as well as the one called ‘La nacionalización española en Galicia (HAR: 2010-21882)’, directed by Miguel Cabo. The Galician Government also financed Histagra (‘Grupo de referencia competitiva Historia agraria e política de mundo rural, séculos XIX e XX HISTAGRA’) under the leadership of Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto (GI-1657. Xunta de Galicia). The funds of the Galician government imply generous support by the European Union ERDF (European Regional Development Fund). We express our gratitude for all this support. We would like to thank as well the members of the Project ‘Nomes e voces’, especially Gustavo Hervella, secretary and manager, whose hard, continuous and good-tempered work of organizing of meetings and document editing, amongst other tasks, has proved to be very important for the outcome of this collective undertaking. Chus Martínez, webmaster of Histagra, has made too a relevant contribution to our work. We have to acknowledge the efforts of the translators, Daniel and Andrea Blanch, who have been in charge of the linguistic revision: a difficult job, given the diversity of the linguistic skills and backgrounds of the authors. Last but not least, we would like to show our gratitude to Manuel C. Martínez Barreiro, who prepared, homogenized and reviewed the texts, as a professional editor. Needless to say that despite all this help the editors and the authors are fully responsible for the contents of the book.

11

Foreword

This book has a short but intense history. It started as a session – ‘Fascism and rural modernization revisited’ – organised by the editors in the Rural History Conference, in Brighton, at the University of Sussex, in September, 2010. The ideas that were developed in the course of the presentations and the productive debate that followed encouraged us to expand the cases under consideration and clarify the terms of the discussion. Those two steps were the basis of a workshop held in Santiago de Compostela, under the title of ‘Fascism and Agriculture’ (February, 2011), organized by the research group HISTAGRA (USC) and coordinated by the editors, that enabled the integration in the comparative analysis of the Italian, German, French and Hungarian cases, absent in Brighton, and allowed a common approach with a general scheme designed before the meeting. Thus all participants were able to start out of certain homogenous assumptions to rebuild or write ex novo their texts and attempt to find answers to similar questions, giving shape to a cohesive set of chapters for a possible collective publication. Both sessions, as well as the book we present here, had the same aim: analyze, compare and discuss the agrarian policies or, with a broader scope, the rural policies of the fascist regimes in the interwar period. Attaining this aim is justified on two grounds: 1) Fascism, as a European phenomenon, has never been studied in comparative terms from the point of view of the design and execution of agrarian policies. The comparative approach has showed its potential in the field of ideological systems, leadership styles, party organisation, mass mobilization, role of the working class, etc., and should be applied to the agro-rural sphere, given the economic importance of agriculture and the strength of rural societies in the interwar world. 2) A historical analysis and a thorough discussion of the modernizing projects of fascism for agriculture appear to be right in time, now that modernization as a 20th century project seems to have come to an end. Revisiting agrarian policies becomes necessary in a moment, the beginning of the 21st century, that has brought under heavy and wide criticism – especially but not only from the perspective of its sustainability – the green revolution as an overarching technical and technocratic solution to the problems of rural societies and to the food necessities of the world population. We drew from our meetings some conclusions that need to be briefly explained in this presentation, even though we will give a larger report in the first chapter. Participants agreed, to start with, about the importance of a European and even a 13

Foreword

global look at fascism. We discovered through the comparative approach that fascism was tainted with the ‘spirit of the age’, of a time ruled by the ambition of a generalized agrarian modernization, which is both previous and subsequent to the alternative fascist projects of the interwar period. It was underlined that rural fascism cast a long shadow even beyond the European borders as the intellectual influence of Nazi projects in Japan reveals. Finally throughout the debates in the session and the workshop we were faced by the difficulties of coming to terms with the different consolidated versions, in national historiographies and historical approaches, of the definition of the various members of the family of authoritarian right wing regimes in the interwar period. We dedicated a good deal of time in Santiago to try and overcome the difficulties arising from the conceptualizing of this genus of political systems and movements, on the basis of the analysis of agrarian policies. In the following sections of these initial pages we sum up the diverse contributions in order to give the reader an idea of the practical and macroscopic view of the content of the book. We have adopted a chronological order, according to the date of conquest of power by fascists or authoritarian right-wing groups who adopted in different levels fascist symbols, political devices, institutions, specific policies or general concepts. Obviously Italy must come first not only in chronological terms: fascism was originally an Italian concept and the necessary point of departure of the very existence of both the noun and the adjective that can be applied to other political facts. Notwithstanding this unavoidable start, the adoption of a chronological order aims at freeing our book of what we understand as a dangerous premise: the existence of core regimes (Italy and Germany) and peripheral copies (the rest) and therefore of pure fascist options and authoritarian partly mimetic paths. S. Grando and G. Volpi deal in their chapter with the regime that coined the concept of fascism and defined itself as such. They emphasize the central position held by agrarian policies in its projects, due to the economic and social weight of agriculture in interwar Italy. Among the objectives of these policies they stress the struggle against poverty and unemployment – without hurting the interests of large landowners –, the achievement of food self-sufficiency and the search for consensus in the political communities. Grando and Volpi revise the bonifiche or land reclamation devised in order to meet the demand for land, the quest for self-sufficiency with its symbolic and material centre in the ‘battle for wheat’, its extension in the construction of a network for technical innovation and, finally, the creation of corporative system that was to become a model for other regimes. They dedicate a section to study the political representation of the rural world and the fascist propaganda that had the farmers as a target, two intertwined aspects of a political offensive to win over the support of the peasants and utilize them to convey a concrete view of fascism to the rest of the population. Another 14

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

section in this second chapter deals with the agrarian elements of the foreign policy: the economic competition with the neighbouring countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the imperial projects for Africa cannot be fully understood if rural policies are left out of the picture. Despite the limits and contradictions of the Italian regime in its structural policies regarding land distribution and its attempt to erase class conflicts through the corporations and the regulation of agrarian social relations, Grando and Volpi discover that the fascist regime had a clear success in certain policy areas where they acted as efficient ‘modernizers’: technological change, new means of communication and propaganda or wheat self-sufficiency. Fascist technocratic power imposed itself to uproot what fascists themselves defined as backwardness, a term that did not embrace though the questione meridionale. In relation to the Portuguese Estado Novo, Daniel Lanero lists the elements which were common to other fascist and parafascist dictatorships, in the sphere of the ideological representation of the rural world and the main lines of the agrarian policy. He includes in his outline food self-sufficiency, corporative structures that aimed at the disciplining of rural society, the preference for technical agrarian reforms, the power given to engineers in the design and application of agrarian policy, the existence of a ruralist tendency that fought over the political direction with those favourable to industrial development, the actual subordination of economic policies to industrial interests... This author gives a decisive role to two elements that contributed to set apart, at least partially, the Portuguese Estado Novo from other fascist regimes: Catholicism and reactionary ruralism as a leading discourse. He discusses if the regime created political programmes addressing the modernization of Portuguese agriculture and analyzes the content of its projects: which social groups or political elites were behind them, what kind of support and resistance they gave birth to and, lastly, which concrete results they attained. According to him the price policies, the building of the complex corporative organization and certain solutions given to the land distribution problems through the colonization, the hydraulic schemes and the land concentration, were the only outputs of the Estado Novo’s policies since other projects were blocked by the agrarian lobbies. Zsuzsanna Varga, in Challenges and responses: dilemmas of the agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary, analyzes the political and social origins of the agrarian modernization policies of fascism in the, due to the Treaty of Trianon, shrunk Hungary of the 1920s, and their development and application after 1932, with the arrival to power of Gyula Gömbös. This leader converted the pre-existing conservative positions into a anti-liberal and anti-bolshevik stance to define a ‘Christian idea of agriculture’. Agriculture became the national priority and a fundamental element of his government programme and an ambitious set of policies was applied to the 15

Foreword

sector: regulating and redeeming the debts of small landowners; promoting the small and middle-sized farms and protecting them according to the model of the German Law of Hereditary Entailment (1933); designing the peasant colonization and settlement of new agricultural villages, a plan that was limited by the opposition of those big landowners that supported the regime, until the expropriation of estates in Jewish hands opened an outlet to carry it out; land consolidation; and agronomic formation for small cultivators directed by model farms… From the beginning of the war, in 1941, onwards, Hungarian agriculture was subordinated to the cooperation with the German war effort and most of these modernization projects, that clashed with the interest of big landowners and were hindered by the political instability (six changes of government in twelve years), were partially abandoned. G. Gerhard in her chapter on The Modernization Dilemma: Agrarian Policies in Nazi Germany plunges into the debate on the modernizing character of fascism through the analysis of Nazi agrarian policies. She deals with the ways in which Nazi recipes offered solutions to the farmers to contain the negative effects of commodification and promote their participation in technical change. They organized the application of ‘scientific solutions’ to agriculture and favoured the protection of peasants. Thus they actually reached a wide support in the villages, where they managed to spread the idea of a National-socialist pro-peasant long term modernization. Gerhard brings imperialism and colonialism into consideration to review its impact on the protectionist policies regarding the farms and points out that militarism was an essential element in the organization of an agrarian bureaucratic system, aiming – almost in an obsessive way – at guaranteeing autarkic self-sufficiency. She concludes with a reflection on the dilemma posed by understanding as modernizing a set of policies that emphasized the defence of ‘traditional’ forms of agriculture and rural life, and suggests that such view can only be sustained if Nazi agrarian policies are seen in the framework of a longer term modernizing tendency. E. Langthaler in Varieties of Modernity: Fascism and Agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945 studies the agrarian policies of austrofascism, first, and the Nazi regime in Ostmark, then, and concludes that they must be understood as an alternative path of modernization, in relation to the liberal and socialist ways. He maintains that whereas between 1934 and 1938 the corporative state reinterpreted the projects of conservative modernization of the 19th century, after the Anschluss the German Reich imposed agro-industrialization on the countryside. He analyzes the latter through the development of commodification and through the study of the meticulous statistical control and the definition of farming styles, presided by a productivist rationality on the basis of concentration, intensification and specialization of exports. The objective of Nazism was the modernization of the agriculture of the 16

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

new German province of Austria, considered by technicians to lie behind the level of agrarian development in the rest of the Great Germany, so that it could better contribute to the food self-sufficiency of the Reich. Both technological and institutional changes were subordinate to this immediate aim; however the agrarian development of the 1930s and the 1940s was an irreversible step in the way towards agrarian productivism that would prevail after 1945. A. Cabana and A. Díaz, in Agrarian Fascism in Rural Spain, 1936-1951, deal with the character and sense of Franco’s agrarian policies. In the first place they put the regime in a European perspective and remind the readers of the uniqueness of its origins in a war and a far-reaching repression. They analyze in the second place the central role of ruralism in the Francoist discourse and explain the main elements of the agrarian policies. With autarky as the final end and government intervention as an instrument, the Nuevo Estado introduced a rationing system and production controls, designed a corporative structure for agrarian producers and displayed a policy of internal colonization and reforestation that followed very closely the modernizing logic of analogous regimes. After the fascist defeat in World War II, and once the commercial blockade decided by the UN was over, the Spanish government gave up autarkic policies and added to its policy-mix new elements such as land consolidation, which paved the way for the green revolution. The authors study these changes, follow common trends and influences and compare agrarian solutions in different periods and look for continuities and discontinuities of the high tide of fascism between 1936 and 1945, in the long history of the dictatorship, and the previous and subsequent stages. T. Fujihara, Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo: a case study of the acceptance of Nazi agricultural ideology by Japanese Empire, studies the experience of settlement of Japanese peasant families in Manchukuo, as a result of the Reclamation Farm Law of 1941, inspired in the Nazi Hereditary Farm Law. He examines the intellectual influence of Nazi theorists such as Darré and Backe in the Japanese imperial undertaking in Manchuria, defined by the author as a genuine experimental station for the Japanese and German pro-peasant model. A model, the one experienced in the conquered Manchukuo, which turned the working family farm into the axis of their programme for the development of prosperous and self sufficient agrarian economy. Self-sufficiency was once again the objective and technocratic and scientific organization the method for its implementation. Fujihara underlines the differences between European and Asian fascist agrarian models: whereas the former were more individualistic, the latter tended more to collectivism. However they shared the ambition to be modernizing alternatives to communism and capitalism, among other things because of their emphasis on the peasant household as the essential foundation of rural society, to be protected from market pressures. 17

Foreword

To end up national cases, E. Lynch, in Agricultural policy in Vichy France... devotes his chapter to the agrarian policies in France after the defeat in 1940. He opens it with a discussion of the literature on the fascist nature of the Vichy regime, the only example of a political system constructed under foreign occupation in the book. The short time-span of the Vichy experiment and the heterogeneity of its social, political and ideological supports are original elements, altogether with the relevant fact of the military occupation, to carry out the analysis of agrarian policies, which according to him stand out more for their continuities with the III Republic options than for their novelty. German demands and needs, labour scarcity or the priority of food supplies were in this case dominant factors of the agrarian options of the Vichy politicians. Under these parameters Lynch revises the policies of the collaborationist regime of Vichy, its discourse of ‘return to the land’ (retour à la terre) and protection of agriculture, the failed attempt to build a corporative system and the ambivalence of regulatory practices, and concludes that Vichy cannot be considered a case of agrarian fascism, despite common traits such as interventionism or corporatism. He does not find either modernizing policies but the opposite: a ruralist discourse that rejected urban modernity. Lynch concludes that the agrarian policy of the regime was rather in the field of counterrevolution than in the one of fascism: there were few reforms, traditional elites kept their influence and ultimately the defence of property prevailed over any modernizing project. All these national chapters, introduced as we have said by a historiographical and theoretical state of the art, share a further trait: they all include tables or an appendix with statistical information on agriculture and the rural world that helps the reader to understand some qualitative statements and construct a framework for the comparison. The data are sometimes heterogeneous but we consider that they help to give a more complete view of agriculture in authoritarian/totalitarian regimes in the Age of Fascism. Agrarian and rural policies are not an odd perspective to look at fascism and coeval authoritarian projects, since the leaders of these political experiments claimed that they were in power, among other things, in order to regenerate the nation, a concept they always linked to the countryside, the peasants and the soil. Hence fascism cannot be understood without its agrarian-rural compounds: the fact that many authors do not recognize the essential role of the rural world says more about our anachronistic and shallow comprehension of what mobilized right-wing modernizers in the interwar period, than about the nature and scope of those projects. We hope that this publication will be a first step towards a global, more diversified and comparative study of a political phenomenon, fascism, that despite its belonging to a time which looks remote to most of present day readers, might deserve a closer look and understanding in the future and must be subject to a permanent revision under the light of new shared experiences an representations. 18

1.

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

I.

The premises of our approach

This first chapter has been devised as a framework for the whole book and is supposed to act as both an introduction and a conclusion, insofar as a conclusion can be shaped at this stage. Since the entire book is comparative in its aim, this chapter establishes the general terms for the comparative analysis of agrarian policies and the broader rural policies of fascist regimes in the interwar period. Fascism has been the subject of an overwhelming amount of historical study, to which new titles are constantly being added, and continues to be a topic of lively debate. The authors are well acquainted with this extensive literature and many of the most relevant and recent contributions are quoted in each chapter. We cannot condense our common positions and our areas of dissent into a few lines; but we do want to stress one common feature of this book that derives from our comparative approach. Comparisons such as those we undertake in Agriculture in the Age of Fascism imply an understanding of ‘fascism’ as a concept that can be legitimately applied to different extreme-right movements and non-democratic regimes of the interwar period, as argued by Payne, Griffin or Paxton. These movements and regimes had a number of elements in common, which are understood as the ‘fascist minimum’. We therefore depart from the ‘exceptionalist’ thesis, which posits that each of those movements or regimes had unique characteristics that would render any comparative attempt useless. Such a thesis (as explained by Bracher, De Felice, and Burleigh, amongst others) entails the rejection of fascism as a generic notion and denies the usefulness of broad ideal types in history.1 In the interwar period and during World War II, there were in most Western countries ­– and in Japan – political movements that shared many symbolic, doctrinal, organizational, and strategic traits with Italian fascism. When these political movements assumed power through electoral mechanisms, successful coups d’état, or Italian or German military imposition, we talk of fascist regimes. However, there were also national states where fascists ruled in informal coalition with other right-wing groups and pre-existing authoritarian regimes that had adopted fascist elements before The literature on fascism is extremely vast. A useful overview can be found in Bosworth (2009).

1

19

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

or during World War II.2 In cases such as Austria before 1938, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Hungary before 1944, Romania or Vichy France, some authors talk of quasi-fascist, para-fascist and fascistized regimes, while others dispute the inclusion of these mixed regimes in the fascist family. We would agree with Kallis (2003) that the differences between both families of regimes – those created by fascist movements and those where fascists played a collateral or secondary role – tend to be exaggerated when the social and cultural cooperation of fascism with conservative forces is downplayed and revolutionary elements (such as the political use of violence) in supposedly conservative political systems are ignored. One potential way of breaking the impasse of the historiographic debates on fascism lies in sector analysis (youth, gender, etc.). This is what we will attempt to do from a rural perspective that is seldom included in general works on fascism. The best reader on this topic, compiled by Kallis (2003b), does not contain a single text on agriculture, agrarian policies, or the rural activities of fascism.3 However, our purpose is not to fill a secondary gap. We consider rurality and agriculture to be highly relevant, since many authors who deny the modernizing nature of fascisms tend to support their position by referring to the ruralist elements of fascist discourse, among other things. In doing so, they automatically – and fairly precariously – identify ‘modernization’ with the ‘urban world’ and ‘underdevelopment’ with the ‘rural world’.4 Agrarian policies affected very diverse parts of the population and economy. They were designed in political contexts of initial support for fascism in rural society, with the involvement of agrarian elites in the new political class, which had its own distinct traits in each country. The debate on the existence or inexistence of the political category of fascism is associated with the political coalitions that led to the success of authoritariantotalitarian regimes in interwar Europe (and Asia when we include the Japanese case) and with the social bases of those coalitions. This debate necessarily intersects with the debate concerning the very notion of the existence of a fascist agrarian regime. Saz (2012) refers to many of these non-fascist right wing movements as ‘reactionary nationalists’, a political culture that shared many traits with fascism but had specific features. Reactionary nationalist groups and organisations could be and were occasionally allies and more often competitors of fascism, at least before WW2. 2

Corni (1987) is the only currently available comparative study of the agrarian policies of Italy and Germany. Cobo (2012) deals with the broader topic of peasants and politics in some Western European countries (France, Italy, Germany and Spain) between 1870 and 1939 and, hence, tackles in depth the relationship between the peasantry and fascist movements and regimes. 3

Bavaj (2003) for example defends the essential modernity of Nazism (in its own terms), analyzing its policies in a variety of fields (industry, arts, social policies...), though curiously enough his book includes virtually no references to agriculture. When it does, it embraces the Corni and Gies theses of the eighties, stating that as far as agriculture was concerned, the National-Socialist regime had preserved continuities rather than trying to modernize the sector. In similar terms for Italy, see Ben-Ghiat (2001). 4

20

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

To address the question of the existence of fascist agrarian policies, we will deal with fascist regimes and not with fascist movements (before they seized power), even though sometimes our explanations will not establish clear-cut boundaries between the two. Also, in the case of ‘fascistized’ regimes such as those of the Iberian Peninsula, we will only analyze the period in which fascist elements had greater impact than conservative or authoritarian ones; a period that coincides with the years prior to 1945. We will also present an overview of the continuity of these policies in the ensuing years, in an effort to identify the modernizing elements in fascist policies and to test the hypothesis of their being a precedent to the modernizing policies of the Green Revolution. Some of these modernizing policies (land consolidation, technical diffusion, advisory services...) were already present as projects or practices prior to fascism.

II.

The seven components of the ‘common minimum’ in the rural policies of fascisms

The first common feature of the various fascisms is easy to detect: a strong ruralist emphasis at the discursive-ideological level. It implied an essentialist praise of peasantry and the rural world, which were assumed to contribute to national life and destiny far beyond their socio-economic weight. The countryside was conceived as carrying the cultural, demographic and social values that were indispensible for maintaining the vitality of the entire society and the ‘purity’ and essence of the nation, particularly in the racial sense (Bergmann, 1970; Conte, 1987; Veiga, 1987; Rosas, 1989). The origin of this discourse was obviously much older: it first appeared as a contemporary reaction to the political and cultural changes associated with the city in the eighteenth century, and then to the industrialization and urbanization that took place throughout the European continent and beyond in the nineteenth century. It also appeared as Jeffersonianism in the USA. The relevance of this highly significant feature in defining fascist discourse is nevertheless limited by three considerations. The first is the fact that ruralism was present in many ideosystems, from nineteenth-century nostalgia for the Ancien Régime to social Catholicism, anarchism, most nationalisms and the most conservative versions of liberalism. Ruralist overtones could even be detected in certain democratic radical versions of liberalism. The second consideration is that a fascist ‘rural turn’ became evident only after the failure of expansion strategies targeted at working-class and urban environments (in 1920 in Italy and in 1928 in Germany). This makes one wonder how much pragmatism and tactic was involved in the two main manifestations of fascism, rather than a defence of principles (Renton, 2001; Lyttelton, 2003). Finally, fascism praised rural values – which were identified with national values – and promised to foster agrarian production. However, its discourse was neither anti-industrial nor technophobic; if anything, it was anti-urban. Moreover, fascist movements leaned towards technolatry and shared a general admiration for the scientific achievements 21

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

and the ‘isms’ of the early twentieth century. Fascist elites mobilized scientists for their own aims and scientists in turn took advantage of the possibilities offered by fascism to further their purposes (Saraiva and Wise 2010). Science and technology were relevant to both parties, and to agriculture. Secondly, all fascist regimes gave the agrarian sector a primary role, but they did so to guarantee national self-sufficiency in the area of food, which in turn would ensure national independence from other powers or the feasibility of aggressive foreign policies, including military expansionism in certain cases. In Germany, this aspiration was strengthened by the memory of the Entente blockade and its erosion of the domestic front during the Great War (Offer, 1991). It was no random coincidence that strong propagandist campaigns were launched during this period, seeking to reduce dependence on imports in basic sectors. Examples include the paradigmatic Battaglia del grano in Italy, the German Erzeugungsschlacht, the Portuguese Campanha do Trigo, or Francoist autarky that lasted until the early 1950s. However, other actions such as protectionism, import quotas, or bans on imported livestock fodder were often included in agrarian policies as the means by which many countries addressed the Depression of the 1930s. The third characteristic shared by the regimes analyzed here is the prevalence of State intervention, with a view to protecting certain ‘higher values’ that could not be left at the mercy of supply and demand. Along these lines, a highly illustrative event took place during the first months of Hitler’s Chancellery. At that time Alfred Hugenberg (DNVP), head of the Ministry of Agriculture, put forward an aid scheme for ailing farms that did not include small or economically unviable ones. When Hugenberg left the Government, in June 1933, the main Blut und Boden ideologist, Walther Darré, launched a campaign against this scheme, vindicating that every German farmer should be helped regardless of the farm’s profitability. However, peasants were only the central figure of rural society insofar as their protection did not endanger autarky, weaken the counter-revolutionary coalition, or become an obstacle to technical change. Harwood (2010) argued this in reference to plant-breeding policies. The fourth commonality is a preference for reforms that did not question the framework of land ownership, such as internal settlements, water infrastructures, and land consolidation. This was reinforced through the co-opting of many professionals linked to the primary sector, who saw in the dictatorships an opportunity to implement their proposals and overcome what many considered to be obstacles inherent to parliamentary systems (Paxton, 1997; Aquarone, 1964; Oliveira, 1990; Brüggemeier, 2005; Herf, 1984; Heim, 2002; Misiani, 2011). This offered an image of efficiency and energy that fascist regimes claimed for themselves without qualms. The approach

22

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

gave technicians, who politically were not especially close to the regimes for which they worked, an alibi for their collaboration: they were carrying out ‘neutral’ and ‘apolitical’ tasks. This arrangement had the added virtue of exonerating them from complicity after the defeat of fascism. Engineers, veterinarians, agricultural chemists and other professionals encouraged the technocratic orientation of these regimes and took advantage of their powerful and uncontested political instruments to shape an authoritarian technocracy. Hence the critical technocratic and modernizing boost to farming, which we will highlight when dealing with the technical aspects of the agrarian shift. Finally, technocracy and interventionism nearly always led to the construction of organisms and agencies that extended State control in the field of technical change and came close to guaranteeing the subordination of the production and allocation of goods to its own political aims. The fifth common feature was the application of corporate designs that theoretically would harness the clashes of various socioeconomic interests and harmonize them under the paternalistic eye of the State. Corporatism preceded fascism, and the principal champions of corporatism in the years leading up to the Great War were to be found in the Catholic world, which presented corporatism as an alternative to liberal individualism and the socialist class struggle. Fascisms added two important features: corporatism was placed at the service of the State, and understood as the crystallization of the ‘national community’ (the Volksgemeinschaft of Nazism), which was above the differences present in the various sectors (landowners and nonlandowners, large and small-scale property owners, producers and processing industries, etc.). However, historiography has found that the practical reach of corporatism was modest, and that in case of conflict the ‘reconciliation of interests’ within the agrarian sector was always biased in favour of large properties (Corner, 1974; Cardoza, 1983; Giorgetti, 1974; Rosas, 1989; Cleary, 1989; Kluge, 1988). A sixth common trait that helped homogenize the agrarian policies of these regimes was the military element they shared on at least two levels. First of all, military considerations played a significant role in their design, which involved increased self-sufficiency aimed at reducing dependency on imports if a war broke out. Second, agrarian bureaucracy was patterned after military forms and models. Terms such as ‘battle’ or ‘campaign’, equated the patriotic effort of producers with the sacrifices of soldiers on the battlefield. They also helped convey an appearance of military discipline and hierarchy in the transmission and execution of agrarian policies, even though the historiographic reality was one of contradictions and internal struggles among State and party agencies. Military metaphors and institutional solutions were an unavoidable element in agrarian policies that ultimately relied on imperialism-colonialism for their final success, at least in ideological terms. This was obviously the case in Germany; 23

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

but agro-imperialism cannot be overlooked in the Italian or Portuguese projects, and in other countries where it proved illusory. Testing to what extent fascist agrarian horizons implied colonial expansion could be a productive research design. To finish the catalogue of common features, we can conclude from the prominent studies available on the national agrarian policies of fascisms that, in practice, agriculture was eventually subordinated to the needs of other economic sectors, particularly armament. This was consistent with bellicose fascist imperialism and its modernizing impulse. The exception would be the Salazar dictatorship, which remained coherent with its ruralist discourse. All this is proven by the clashes between the exaltation of ruralism and industrial needs. The first example can be found in the distribution of the active workforce. Rural exodus was not stopped in Germany or Italy, in spite of a number of restrictive measures. The exodus was often denounced but stemmed from a much older social dynamic that dictatorships ultimately did not oppose, as it would have hindered industrialization and rearmament. The same thing could be said of the spread of mechanization, which, according to its most passionate critics, ‘dehumanized’ and ‘industrialized’ agriculture, but was nonetheless necessary for maintaining production and stimulating domestic demand for industrial goods. No countries except Germany had completed the industrialization process, and agricultural exports served to finance the development of industry. An example of this was Italy’s Quota 90, which reflected the prevalence of industrial interests. To summarize, fascisms can be said to possess the following distinctive traits: ruralism, self-sufficiency as an aim, State intervention, faith in the great potential of science and technology applied to the agrarian sector, corporatism as the keystone of rural society, militarism, subordination of agriculture to the interests of other economic sectors in case of conflict, and a pervasive ruralist discourse. Every one of these characteristics can be found in regimes and historical periods prior and subsequent to fascism. What sets fascisms apart is the simultaneous combination of all these elements and their presence in a global ideological framework.

III.

Differential elements of fascist agrarian regimes

While we have established the common ground for principles and instruments in fascist agrarian policies – some arising from the utilization of common doctrinal approaches and models, some as a mere adaptation to similar political or economic challenges – we cannot ignore the broad differences that separated them. As a starting point, we can note the diversity in chronologies. Italian fascism ruled during the 1920s, the 1930s, and part of World War II with its exceptional 24

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

circumstances. In Germany, the experience encompassed the 1930s and World War II, while in France it was limited to the latter. In Spain and Portugal, the sequence was reversed and the dictatorial regime lasted three decades after 1945. A comparison of non-synchronic policies poses many problems, since the circumstances of international agriculture changed dramatically before and after 1929 and 1939, and again with the rupture provoked by the Axis collapse in 1945. Even if we try to overcome diachronic diversity by examining a limited time period, we encounter a vastly heterogeneous landscape. Structural and political conditions differed greatly in the 1930s, even among fascist and philo-fascist ministries of agriculture that used similar discourses and public policies to deal with relatively homogeneous problems. Common issues included decreases in domestic and external demand, agrarian prices, and revenues of agrarian households; urban unemployment that decelerated rural emigration; geostrategic and military plans with a clear preference for industrial growth but a parallel need to maintain agrarian output, etc. Chronology is not, however, the only relevant difference. First and foremost, it should be noted that the weight of agriculture varied from country to country, both in terms of national GDP and population employed in this sector. Germany (with 30.5 per cent of the population employed in agriculture in 1930) and France (with 34 per cent in 1931) could be defined as industrial societies at the outbreak of the economic crisis of 1929. Spain (with agriculture representing 48.2 per cent of the active population in 1930), Japan (49.5 per cent), Hungary (53.1 per cent in 1930), Italy (53.8 per cent in 1931) and Portugal (more than 60 per cent) were still agrarian countries, though their industrial sectors varied significantly. The role of agriculture in national economic development was a modern objective of governance for all fascist and authoritarian regimes, but with significant variations among them. Agricultural policy was of secondary importance in the German economy, at least before the war, while it was the key to overall economic policies in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Hungary. A second great area of diversity was that of rural structures. In France and Japan, small and mid-sized farms predominated in most regions and were cultivated by their owners. The situation in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Hungary, and Germany was much more heterogeneous. Large estates worked by seasonal wage labourers were present in several regions and prevalent in considerable areas of a given country (north-east Germany, southern Spain and Portugal, northern and southern Italy). A large and diverse peasantry worked its own fields and also leased lands, even in areas where large estates outweighed other types of farms. Rural structural policies and the social targets of technology (large and mid-sized farming estates) had to vary, even if the aim of a viable mid-sized farm tended to be widely shared and defended in most fascist and fascistized countries. 25

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

Thirdly, labourers, small peasants, farmers with mid-sized landholdings, and big farmers and landowners of large estates coexisted in all these rural societies, but their presence, class identities, and power varied greatly from area to area and even from village to village. Rural structures did not fit any strict typology of rural organizations before the fascists seized power. Socialist or anarchist unions tended to attract agricultural labourers, whereas independent, Catholic, democratic, or republican local unions were linked to small and mid-sized communities and these local unions were frequently federated in regional or national associations. However, the dimensions of class unions, the connection between class and peasant unions, and especially between the peasant unions and organizations controlled by largescale landowners, varied immensely among the countries considered here. The map of agrarian organizations in each country did not entail a specific rural political stance on fascist movements. The counter-revolutionary alliance embodied in fascist organizations was supported everywhere by certain sectors of rural society, but unless we cross these variables with others such as religion or political allegiance, we cannot say that there was a clear-cut pattern relating pre-fascist organizations or social structures and support for the fascist movement (as Michael Mann’s 2004 comparative approach has shown). Differences in rural support for fascism did not always match variations in prices or commercial policies. Even though materially rewarding its agrarian social bases could have been an initial objective of the economic policies of fascism, there were other mechanisms for seeking support and consensus in rural society that could compensate for the economic shortcomings of agrarian policies. Examples of this were the Nazi-era ‘modernization’ of the media in villages (see Trossbach and Zimmermann, 2006, or the chapter in this volume by Grando and Volpi in relation to Italy). The last observation leads us to a fourth level of differences. Fascism rejected democracy and all the democratic mechanisms of political participation, but needed and favoured the active involvement of the population in politics. The degree of political mobilization of rural society can be an indicator of the fulfilment of ‘the fascist model’. Mobilization was necessarily low in occupied countries like France and progressed little in Spain after the Civil War. Mobilization could involve the urbanization of local politics and the transformation of social relations, constituting a certain type of modernization. This in turn could be understood as either a break with prior tendencies or their acceleration towards change that did not imply a return to traditional local dynamics, if the corresponding traditions could be identified. Another level of differences relates to the techno-scientific possibilities of fascist countries. Techno-scientific resources such as institutions, personnel, or budgets varied greatly throughout the European fascist countries. While a ‘planned seed economy’ 26

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

could be imagined and developed in France (Bonneuil and Thomas, 2010) and connections between genetic research and the chemical industry could be successfully fostered by the Third Reich (Gausemeier, 2010), Spanish or Portuguese technoscientific elites – the Spanish agronomists that survived the deep purges – could not even dream of putting such ambitious programmes into place in any foreseeable future (Fernández-Prieto, 2007), though they did share the same ultimate objective. Finally, agrarian policies were dealt with differently when there were plans involving military campaigns and eventual territorial expansion (Italy, Germany and Japan) as opposed to countries with no such plans or marginal short-term local fascist political projects (Vichy, Franco’s Spain, and Salazar’s Portugal). Territorial aims made it imperative to organize the production of food and raw materials to facilitate geostrategic interests. Likewise, neocolonial ambitions such as the Ostraum, Manchuria, or the African empires might offer a potential or immediate outlet for rural conflicts that was absent when the projects had more to do with irredentism or expansion ‘on paper’. All in all, if we accept the proposal of Kallis (2003a) that fascisms diverged from each other ‘in the emphasis attached to specific components of the nationalist agenda’, and therefore in the features of the ‘long-term cognitive model of indigenous nationalism’, it can be said that agrarian options were also developed according to the place of agriculture and the rural world within local nationalist traditions. This position was conditioned by structural differences but not determined by them, since the readings of those structural elements and their integration within a more or less coherent discourse was the point of departure for fascist programmes. This was not a static role; it evolved along with the political, economic and military necessities of each regime.

IV.

The interplay between continuity and ruptures

While it may be a source of confusion to examine and compare diverse regimes in different periods with non-synchronous policies, it also benefits and clarifies this discussion of fascism with regard to its modernizing nature, its various historical expressions in Europe and Asia, and the time and timing of its development. Fascism spans a shorter period of time than the ideology of modernization, and is prior to what can be considered the high season of agricultural modernization, which is identified with the Green Revolution. Rural modernization began before the era of fascism and continued after it (see the text edited by Lains and Pinilla (2009) regarding agrarian production). What do we mean by modernization? In the tradition of Marx and Weber, moderniza27

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

tion would be considered a process of economic, social, and cultural change, which includes at least the following sub-processes: the disappearance of peasant communities, industrialization of agriculture (from the perspective of labour, capital, and technology), market integration of farms, the increasing role of the State as external planner of the rural world, and bureaucratization. Despite their many theoretical differences, Marx and Weber understood modernization as a unidirectional process built into human history. While we do not share such a vision or assume the positive value attached to it, the metanarrative of progress was accepted in diverse forms by liberals, socialists, anarchists, and fascists. In fact, fascisms built their own models of modernization in opposition to those of liberalism and socialism. The State was to promote technological change and turn it into the key instrument for overcoming social conflict in the rural world. It had to foster and control the market integration of farms and impose upon them a Weberian-type rational administration governed by a technical bureaucracy. In their understanding of modernity, fascisms integrated rural programmes and placed them under the control of a bureaucracy that possessed the technical and political knowledge to lead society. Fascisms presented themselves as the modern solution to the problems of rural societies, even resorting to the modern myth of revolution. They sustained that they could integrate the aristocracy or old agrarian elite with the peasantry, both of which were considered to be essential ingredients of the nation. They would also maintain and improve the economic position of the countryside, which implied a market-oriented agriculture that was understood as a corrected version of agrarian capitalism. Therefore they chose a policy mix that included the safeguard of private property, intense regulation of agrarian markets, and the promotion of technological change. Fascist and philo-fascist regimes were able to establish a new relationship with rural society by means of intense bureaucratic control. They displayed a modernizing authoritarianism that could be peasant-friendly when family property was well defined and farms had a dimension considered suitable for technological change. However, they were less open to collective demands, communitarian goods, or labourers’ hunger for land. In fact, fascist technical reforms or revolutions were portrayed as a safeguard against extensive land redistribution. The high expectations placed on the application of science to agriculture as a cure for productive and social ills created a privileged position for the technocracy in rural society. Technocrats were seen as the only agents capable of providing and managing viable technological solutions for agriculture. Thus, authoritarian technocracy can be identified as a key element of rural fascism. Fascism was favoured by the reaction to the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik threat, but was above all a nationalistic solution to decadence and defeat in the 28

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

Great War that ended the nineteenth-century world order. Fascism was a response to the crisis of liberalism and the socialist alternative that had gained momentum as the crisis progressed. In this volume, we are only interested in analyzing the implementation and validity of agrarian policies in the fascist or fascistized regimes that emerged in the interwar period, which ended with the total military defeat of fascism in 1945 and its subsequent exclusion, as a political project, from the international arena. Nonetheless, during the post-war period some authoritarian modernization policies developed under fascism were still implemented in the dictatorial context of fascist-rooted regimes such as Portugal and Spain, among others. These policies were then closely followed during the golden years of Stateled agrarian modernization, which was promoted by the industrial sectors that produced agrarian inputs and known as the Green Revolution, a model that began to develop in America in the early 1940s. The ideal and promotion of agrarian modernization have a long history, rooted in the eighteenth-century discourse on human progress and developed by the more systematic and comprehensive association with nineteenth-century industrialization. Agrarian modernization was present in the idea of ‘amelioration’ and agricultural improvement, as well as in the social figures of the imprenditori and ‘gentlemen farmers’. After the Great Exhibition of London in 1851, industrial projects became the material implementation of human progress. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the objective of attaining a significant degree of agricultural industrialization in a foreseeable and not-too-distant future and turning agriculture into a form of manufacturing was deeply rooted in, and consistent with, the promotion of a fully industrialized society and the changes that accompanied it prior to the twentieth century and World War I. Socialist models of agricultural modernization were clearly defined at the end of the nineteenth century (Kautsky, 1899 [1988] and Lenin 1899 [2007]). They shared with the liberal and liberal-conservative projects the idea that agricultural industrialization and rural urbanization marked the positive and unavoidable path towards agrarian modernization and progress. The age of modernization began with the universal triumph of this paradigm, identified with the systematic application of science to agriculture and with technological development intended to bring the various forms of agricultural production as close as possible to those of industrial production. The final success of the age of modernization took place after the Second World War and can be identified with the triumph and implementation of the Green Revolution (Fernández-Prieto and Picado, 2007). This short, recent, and paradigmatic framework for agricultural modernization was accepted by the two opposing blocks of the Cold War as the only possible future for agriculture. 29

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

Fascism had its place in the long-lived agrarian modernization ideology that began with the Enlightenment. Its model of authoritarian modernization involved certain core elements, but otherwise varied according to how particular fascisms seized or consolidated power. Regardless of its peasant-oriented rhetoric, fascism consistently presented itself as a path to modernization, almost always with scientific bases and technical-scientific support. In fact, a significant number of scientists, with their modernizing, technocratic force, used their science to help define a sizeable portion of the economic policies of fascism as a project and the European fascisms of Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.5 Looking back, many of the distinguishing features of fascist agrarian policies have clear precedents in social Catholicism, for example corporatism or ruralism, or in the turn-of-the-century agrarian crisis trend towards stronger State intervention (which was later enshrined during the Great War) and the conservative ruralist drift that opposed the social changes associated with industrialization. The most technocratic proposals of agricultural engineers, agronomists, veterinarians, forest engineers and other technicians were often likened to the image of an ‘agro-factory’, an authoritarian, top-down transformation of the countryside into an efficient agrarian production machine. From 1918 on, the State – whether communist, fascist, or liberal – became the great instrument for rural modernization. State intervention grew stronger after 1945, during the post-war reconstruction period and in the framework of the Green Revolution; and its presence continues today. It would be worthwhile and rewarding to explore interventions similar to those of fascism among politically opposite regimes, such as the New Deal in the USA, the policies of the Popular Front in France, or the Swedish ‘cattle pact’, to discover whether if they were merely simultaneous or if they influenced one another. ‘High modernist agriculture’ was present not only in Soviet collectivization or in ‘capitalist dreams’ applied at home or in post-war subordinate colonial agriculture; it also had an ample though relatively short-lived laboratory in fascist rural societies, as shown by Scott (1998). What legacy did the agrarian/rural policies of the various regimes leave their democratic successors? Are centralized technical direction, economic regulation and political rural planning, coupled with a discourse defending the traditional values of a nation’s countryside, leftover political responses to war necessities or a quasi-universal This was one of the primary conclusions of a recent academic meeting in the USA: Autarky. Workshop in Genetics and Political Economy of Fascism (UCLA Center for Society and Genetics, May 2008). The technocratic elements of regimes such as those of Portugal and Spain came directly from this science-backed modernization logic and coincided with it furing the entire lifespan of the regimes (Pan-Montojo, 2005 and 2008, Fernández-Prieto, 2007). 5

30

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

path of agricultural development in the capitalist system? Are they directly linked to the need to reconcile the State with farmers, using certain fascist elements, as Milward argues? Moreover – and this may border on provocation – is it possible to detect certain components of EU policies that were present in the far-right dictatorships of the past?6 Certain traits of fascist rural modernization were mixed into the modernizing logic of the Green Revolution after 1945. For instance, food supply as a fundamental standard for shaping agrarian policies – whether technological or price stabilizing – was a constant obsession in post-war Europe, especially after the 1947 food crisis. During the Cold War, this question affected international relations, and food aid policies were used as political weapons during the Green Revolution in particular. The difference, and not a trivial one, stemmed from the absence of war as an instrument for ensuring food. At another level, similarities relating to technocracy and its role in fascism also exist between fascist regimes and those that followed. Most of the agricultural agencies that had been created prior to 1945 survived the war and carried on with the same or disguised names; and the new agencies that did appear were modelled after the existing ones. Managing corn production, developing agrarian technology, fostering research, and rural planning were some of the functions of a growing number of bureaucratic entities, some of which had existed under liberalism. They experienced a clear leap forward during the fascist era, to the point that their numbers and spheres of intervention can be used as a benchmark for characterizing fascist rural regimes. Even greater expansion occurred during the Green Revolution. The response of rural society also merits attention: was it cooperation or resistance, consensus or reluctance? It is not a matter of dichotomies: one same group could include persons favourable and contrary to a certain political regime. The initial Nazi measures for increasing agrarian prices or stopping evictions were welcomed by the peasants, but interferences of the Reichsnährstand or the alleged urban bias in economic measures distanced many rural inhabitants from the National-Socialist State (Stephenson, 2009). Anti-clerical actions, requisitions of horses and labour shortages caused by military draft and rural migration had a cooling effect on political sympathies, though it did not necessarily imply rejection of the ideological basis of the regime or contempt for the Führer. The effects on local communities are another aspect to explore. Fascism may be considered an authoritarian model of agrarian modernization, but one that included very different versions, depending on how fascism seized power or consolidated its 6 We would however not be the first to suggest this. For example, Tooze (2008: 176) has recently argued that it was the Third Reich and, more specifically, the Reichnährstand that ‘initiated the hybrid system of private ownership and state management that continues to prevail in European agriculture to this day’.

31

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

position within the agricultural sphere. German fascism used and revived certain instruments of civil society (Harwood 2010, Gerhard 2008). Portuguese fascism, and Spanish fascism to a much greater extent, designed their modernizing policies with scant support in an authoritarian context where civil society had been destroyed and replaced with a corporative society that was hardly functional in practice (Lanero, 2010, and Cabana, 2009). This affected policies as well as their implementation: there was more active rural support in Germany and Italy than in Spain and Portugal. Francoism is an excellent example of the contradictory modernizing nature of fascism. The use of an adjective like modernizing is quite a paradox, given that the first Francoist modernizing policies gave way to a period of economic stagnation and technical decline, accompanied by a discourse that was Catholic and conservative, though filled with new fascist overtones. Some of the most successful Francoist policies were fascist in nature and autarkic above all in their implementation. This was the case with the reforestation of the Iberian Peninsula, beginning in the 1940s. It involved compulsory expropriation of thousands of hectares of communal land by the State, and a change in the use of the soil in order to increase its yield and promote selfsufficiency in wood and wood pulp, following the proposals of experts. This was the most technocratic, authoritarian proposal among those put forward by Spain’s forest engineers, and its success required the authoritarian power of the State (Rico, 1998). The same thing can be said of the hydraulic policy, which was partially designed during the Second Republic but executed autocratically throughout the Franco era, displacing thousands of families. Paradoxically, from the late 1950s on, these policies were followed by others based on the modernizing logic of the Green Revolution. Land consolidation policy, for example, was filled with modernizing technocratic content and executed according to the main principles of Francoist fascist authoritarianism. However, this policy was not in line with the self-sufficiency logic of the interwar period; rather, it adhered closely to modernization ideas derived from the Green Revolution and inspired by renewed relations with the United States in the mid-1950s.

V.

Conclusions and prospects for future research

In the genus of interwar fascist and philo-fascist regimes, we have identified certain common features with regard to agrarian and rural policies. The case studies that follow confirm the general characterization we have attempted to delineate, albeit each with its own nuances. If taken individually, these seven shared elements are not exclusive to those regimes; rather they are an outcome of long-term developments in general and the circumstances of the 1918-1945 period in particular. Growing public involvement in the agrarian sector, for example, can be traced to the late nineteenth century and was accelerated by the Great War in all countries involved in 32

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

the conflict (Koning, 1994). Taken individually, each of the traits mentioned can be found in regimes that had very little in common with fascism. Ruralist discourse or the transformation of the peasantry into the national class were central components of the Irish Free State, the Third Republic in France, or the development of Danish identity in the second half of the nineteenth century (Dooley, 2004; Mayaud, 1999; and Ostergard, 1992). Consensus on the legitimacy of public intervention in favour of certain social groups or for stabilizing prices, based on criteria that had very little to do with productivity or profitability, could be ascribed to the ‘primacy of politics’, which Tim Mason (1972) defined as a main feature of Nazism. However, without any distortion of the objective facts it is possible to find parallelisms with regimes that were ideologically far removed from fascism, such as the New Deal in the USA or the Office du blé of the French Popular Front. What definitively characterized a fascist approach to agrarian questions was the combination of the seven elements described here and their subordination to a peculiar ideosystem, even when including national differences in the classification. These differences were sometimes quite striking and arose from both nationalist traditions and structural conditions. As an overarching although not exclusive feature, the existence of a fascist way to modernity, built against liberal and communist modernizing projects, should be added to the list of common elements as a general self-presentation and self-perception, even in the conservative regimes of Portugal and Spain. Years after the defeat of fascism, these two governments still defined themselves in some kind of third way that was distant – but not equidistant – from liberal capitalism and communism. For this reason, apart from defining a fascist common minimum in the agrarian sphere, another crucial item in our discussion has been the recognition of fascism as a modern and modernizing programme in rural and agrarian contexts. Nowadays most historians agree that fascism was a modern ideology and that fascist regimes had a modernizing programme (Gentile, 2008; Griffin, 2003). However, there are still reservations regarding its rural policy, due to a misrepresentation of the countryside as the haven for archaism and tradition. We consider this to be a problem of perception stemming from the low visibility of rural transformations to the outside observer, whether historian or not. Anyone can see the inherent modernity of Italo Balbo’s transoceanic flights or Marinetti’s verses dedicated to the roar of race car engines; but a different kind of sensitivity is required to discover and value the relevance of statistics on fertilizer consumption, which Grando and Volpi have accomplished in their chapter. Another obstacle to detecting the ultimately modernizing character of the policies of these regimes in the rural world lies in ruralist rhetoric full of nostalgic and archaic concepts. Here, it is helpful to recall that fascist parties were catch-all parties, obliged to 33

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

court diverse social groups and therefore resorting to reassuring slogans. In the case of peasants, this implied emphasizing their highly valuable social role in relation to industrialists, merchants, and consumers, and casting them as the lead actors in the economic survival of the nation. Defending tradition and agriculture and depicting peasants as the backbone of the nation also ensured respectability and helped forge a counter-revolutionary alliance with conservative forces, which shared fascist phobias but feared their transforming potential. Ruralist rhetoric acquires another meaning when read through the analytical lenses of specific policies and outcomes. Policies such as those implemented by the Nazis or the philo-fascist conservative Hungarians, for example, offered peasants and farmers favourable formulae for containing the negative effects of the development of input and output markets. They even fostered rural participation in technological changes through active involvement in experiments and proposals. These policies offered alternative solutions that attenuated the negative consequences of previous modernization processes, along with some protection for the future and even a sense of participation in the modernizing process. In the process, they furthered the political aim of turning peasants and farmers into political supporters of fascism. Our text needs three explanatory points of reference. First, our emphasis on the modernizing character of fascism does not involve any attempt to rehabilitate it. If the late twentieth-century debates between post-modernism and modernism have had any outcome that can be shared by most social scientists, it is the recognition that ‘progress’, ‘modern’ and ‘modernization’ are heavily loaded and teleological concepts that only acquire a necessary and exclusively positive value in the context of the ‘modern’ metanarrative. While we do not coincide with modern discourse at this level, as observers of twentieth century societies in which intellectual and political elites judged historical processes from within such a discourse, we find it necessary to employ the concepts these elites employed. Second, we argue that the modernizing programme of fascist regimes differed from those of liberal-capitalism and socialism, especially the non-democratic socialist programme of communism that was so powerful in the interwar period. In fact, liberalism and Marxism coincided in their prognosis of the family farm as a doomed institution, and in their prediction of an urbanized rural society with industrialized agriculture in the hands of large farms; whereas fascism offered the peasantry a possibility of survival. Fascisms were prepared to seek formulae that would reconcile productive and technical modernization with the viability of small and mid-sized farms. Such a project had been defended and applied from diverse political angles in the Low Countries and Denmark, thanks to the introduction of cooperatives, and in republican France through direct State regulation of the agricultural sector (Jansma and Schroor, 1987; Bjorn, 1988; Cornu and Mayaud, 2007). Third, we are not defending the thesis of ‘reactionary modernism’, a concept coined by Herf (1984) in which modern techniques were selected 34

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

to serve reactionary ends, but rather a specific vision of modernity that included an autonomous horizon for the rural world. The intent was to combine both ‘traditional’ and radically new elements under the leadership of external institutions. From a wider perspective, agrarian fascist policies were not just a historical parenthesis, a series of dead-end programmes that started and ended with the regimes that conceived and applied them. A relatively long list of continuities has been pointed out and others will be brought to light in chapters ahead. All of them enable us to rethink the history of fascisms as it relates to a path for agrarian modernization. It can be described as a parabolic form on a timeline that began with the Enlightenment reforms and ended in the ambitious plans and achievements of the Green Revolution, many of which are being questioned today. We will conclude by touching on a topic that must be left to future research: to what extent was rural modernization the result of conscious and purposeful policies and to what extent was it a by-product of other more general plans or even specific plans intended for different social spheres? The mobilization and organization of women and youth under fascism eroded community relations, family hierarchy, and the position of local elites, but that was not its intended purpose. Mass media was intended to be used in Germany for indoctrinating and controlling rural areas.7 However, increased interaction of the rural population to the mass media, including new media such as cinema or radio, led to new and different consumption patterns that increased the attraction of urban life for many peasants. Equally important in some cases was the construction and consolidation of agricultural innovation systems and advisory services, through the establishment of new transmission channels that included itinerant lectures and demonstrations, experimental stations, and a network of centres to spread technology. These instruments were often already operative in pre-existing national research and development systems, but reached new heights within fascist agrarian policies. In the new political context, the policy of innovation was constantly used to foster the political support of the rural population and was given the role of solving structural social conflicts. Fascism thus turned innovation into the starting point for improving the future through science and technology. This book seeks to propagate a new perspective on agrarian policies in fascist and philo-fascist regimes. It also aims at encouraging research on a topic that has been This has been argued for the German case by Wagner (1986), Jucovy (1993), Münkel (2000), and Pyta (2007), among others. In a way it can be understood as an extension of the classic thesis of Dahrendorf (1965), which has now been overcome, by historiographic consensus. This thesis held that Nazism was by nature pre-modern, but through its totalitarian project paradoxically destroyed the traditional bases of German society and with them the elements that delayed its modernization (social hegemony of the aristocracy, local loyalties, endogamy of political subcultures...). 7

35

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

overlooked in the unending deluge of publications on fascism. One aspect that has not been addressed systematically in the chapters that follow is the sense and importance of the mechanisms of mutual influence and collaboration among regimes. The chapters dedicated to Hungary and Japan in Manchukuo emphasize the relevance of the adaptation of hereditary farms (Erbhöfe), an institution strongly connected to the American homestead. This was defended by reformists like Costa in Spain in the early twentieth century, sparking the interest of engineers and social-Catholic propagandists under the Spanish Second Republic as a means of stopping rural migration and stabilizing family farms. The Italian corporative agrarian system and its institutions were carefully observed in Spain, Portugal, or Vichy France, countries that eventually adapted these institutions to their own contexts. Beyond these transfers and influences, it is also important to analyze the concrete mechanisms fostering the exchange of ideas and the circulation of technicians and bureaucrats in the area of agriculture. This step would also further the debate on the exogenous and endogenous components that shaped agrarian policies and, by extension, the entire process of constructing fascist regimes. Apart from the connections or contributions of fascism to constructing the instruments of modernization for rural societies in the interwar period and after 1945, either under the umbrella of the Green Revolution or in the attempts at agricultural development in real socialism, the minimum commonalities of agrarian fascism are interesting in their own right. The comparative analysis of these policies and their effects suggest the existence of a fascist network – a concept borrowed from E. Langthaler’s comments during the seminar in Santiago de Compostela. The seminar included the cases contemplated in this book as well as references to other fascist or fascistised countries, which unfortunately we have not been able to include in our comparison, although their inclusion would certainly enrich and maybe qualify it. Thus, this work opens the door a little wider to transnational or post-national history, offering a new narrative for the future that has been freed from exceptionalist approaches to the past.

36

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

Bibliography Aquarone, Alberto (1964), ‘Aspirazioni tecnocratiche del primo fascismo’, Nord e Sud, 52 (1964), p. 109-128.

Bavaj, Riccardo (2003), Ambivalenz der Moderne, Munich, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag.

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth (2001), Fascist Modernities. Italy 1922-1945, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001.

Bergmann, Klaus (1970), Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft, Meisenheim, Verlag Anton Hain. Bjorn, Claus (1988), Det danske landbrugshistorie, Odense, Landbohistorisk Selskab of forfatterne.

Bonneuil, Christophe and Thomas, Frédéric (2010), ‘Purifying Landscapes: the Vichy regime and the genetic modernization of France’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 40, 4, p. 532-568. Bosworth, Richard J. B. (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, Oxford, Oxford U.P.

Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef and others (2005), How Green were the Nazis? Nature, Environment, and Nation in the Third Reich, Ohio, Ohio U.P.

Cabana, Ana (2009), Xente de orde. O consentimento cara ao franquismo en Galicia, Santiago, tresCtres. Cardoza, Anthony L. (1983), Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism. The Province of Bologna, 1901-1926, Princeton, Princeton U.P.

Cobo Romero, Francisco (2012), ¿Fascismo o democracia? Campesinado y política en la crisis del liberalismo europeo, 1870-1939, Granada, EUG.

Cleary, Mark C. (1989), Peasants, politicians and producers. The organisation of agriculture in France since 1918, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P. Conte, Domenico (1987), ‘Ceti rurali e salvezza della nazione: ideologia del “Bauerntum” nella Germania weimariana’, Studi Storici, 28, p. 347-384. Corner, Paul R. (1974), Il fascismo a Ferrara, 1915-1925, Oxford, Oxford U.P.

Corni, Gustavo (1987), ‘La politica agraria del fascismo: un confronto fra Italia e Germania’, Studi Storici, 28, p. 385-421. Cornu, Pierre and Mayaud, Jean-Luc (2007), Au nom de la terre. Agrarisme et agrariens en France et en Europe du 19e siècle à nos jours, Paris, La Boutique de l’Histoire.

D’Antone, Leandra (1991), ‘L’“intelligenza” dell’agricoltura. Istruzione superiore, profili intellettuali e identità professionali’, in Piero Bevilacqua (ed.) (1991), Storia 37

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

dell’agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea. Vol. III: Mercati e istituzioni, Venice, Marsilio Editori, p. 391-426.

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1965), Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, Munich, Piper.

Dooley, Terence (2004), ‘The Land for the People’: the Land Question in Independent Ireland, Dublin, University College Dublin Press.

Fernández-Prieto, Lourenzo (2007), El apagón tecnológico del franquismo. Estado e innovación en la agricultura española del siglo XX, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch.

Fernández-Prieto, Lourenzo and Picado, Wilson (2007), ‘Connections of the Green Revolution. State and technological change in Costa Rica, Mexico and Spain. 19401970’, Paper presented at the 4th Conference of the European Society for Environmental History, ESEH, Amsterdam. Gausemeier, Bernd (2010), ‘Genetics as a Modernization Program: Biological Research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes and the Political Economy of the Nazi State’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 40, 4, p. 429-456. Gentile, Emilio (2008), Modernità totalitaria. Il fascismo italiano, Roma, Laterza.

Gerhard, Gesine (2008), ‘Agricultural Sciences and the Building of a Greater German Empire’, in Norton Wise and Tiago Saraiva (eds.) (2008), Autarky. A workshop in Genetics and Political Economy of Fascism, Los Angeles, UCLA Center for Society and Genetics.

Giorgetti, Giorgio (1974), Contadini e proprietari nell’Italia moderna, Torino, Einaudi. Griffin, Roger (2003), The Nature of Fascism, London, Routledge.

Griffin, Roger (2007), Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler, Basingstoke, Palgrave.

Harwood, Jonathan (2010), ‘The fate of Peasant-friendly Plant-Breeding in Nazi Germany’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 40, 4, p. 569-603. Heim, Susanne (2002), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus, Göttingen, Wallstein-Verlag.

Herf, Jeffrey (1984), Reactionary modernism. Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.

Jansma, Klaas and Schroor, Meindert (1987), Tweehonderd jaar geschiedenis van de Nederlandse landbouw, Leeuwarden: Uitgeverij Inter-Combi van Seyen.

Jucovy, Jon (1993), The Bavarian Peasantry under National Socialist Rule, 19331945, Ann Arbor, City University of New York.

Kallis, Aristotle (2003), ‘“Fascism”, “Parafascism” and “Fascitization”. On the Similarities of three Conceptual Categories’, European History Quarterly, 33, p. 219-249. 38

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

Kallis, Aristotle (2003a), ‘To Expand or not to Expand? Territory, Generic Fascism and the Quest for the “Ideal Fatherland”’, Journal of Contemporary History, 38, 2, p. 237-260. Kallis, Aristotle (2003b), The Fascism reader, London, Routledge.

Kautsky, Karl (1988) [1899]), The agrarian question [Die Agrarfrage], London, Zwan Publications, 1988

Kluge, Ulrich (1988), Bauern, Agrarkrise und Volksernährung in der Europäischen Zwischenkriegszeit, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner. Koning, Niek (1994), The Failure of Agrarian Capitalism: Agrarian Politics in the UK, Germany, The Netherlands and the USA, 1846-1919, London, Routledge.

Lackó, Miklós (1995), ‘Fascismo e agrarismo. Aspetti dei movimenti fascisti nell’Europa centro-orientale’, in Angelo Del Bocca, Massimo Legani and Mario G. Rossi (eds.) (1995), Il regime fascista, Roma-Bari, Laterza, p. 93-106.

Lains, Pedro and Pinilla, Vicente (eds.) (2009), Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870, London, Routledge.

Lanero, Daniel (2010), Sindicalismo agrario franquista na provincia de Pontevedra, Santiago, tresCtres. Lenin, Vladimir Ilich (2007 [1899]), The development of capitalism in Russia [Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii], Abingdon and New York, Routledge.

Lyttleton, Adrian (2003), The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy 1919-1929, London, Routledge. Mann, Michael (2004), Fascists, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.

Mason, Timothy W. (1972), ‘The Primacy of Politics-Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany’, in Henry Ashby Turner (1972), Nazism and the Third Reich, New York, Quadrangle Books, p. 175-200.

Mayaud, Jean-Luc (1999), La petite exploitation rurale triomphante: France, XIXe siècle, Paris, Belin.

Millward, Alan S. (1993), ‘L’Europa in formazione’, in Storia d’Europa. Vol. I: L’Europa oggi, Einaudi, Torino, p. 161-219.

Misiani, Simone (2011), ‘Colonización interior y democracia: la reforma agraria italiana de 1950’, Historia agraria, 54, p. 105-140.

Münkel, Daniela (2000), ‘Der Rundfunk ghet auf die Dörfer. Der Einzug der Massenmedien auf dem Lande von der zwanziger bis zu den sechziger Jahren’, in Daniela Münkel (ed.) (2000), Der Lange Abschied vom Agrarland. Agrarpolitk, Landwirtschaft und ländliche Gesellschaft zwischen Weimar und Bonn, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, p. 177-198.

39

Fascism and modernity in the European countryside: a global view

Offer, Avner (1991), The First World War. An Agrarian Interpretation, Oxford, Clarendon.

Oliveira Baptista, Fernando (1990), ‘A política agrária do Estado Novo’, Cadernos de Ciências Sociais, 8-9, p. 91-98.

Østergård, Uffe (1992), ‘Peasants and Danes: The Danish National Identity and Political Culture’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 34, p. 3-27.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2005), Apostolado, profesión y tecnología: una historia de los ingenieros agrónomos en España, Torrelodones (Madrid), Asociación Nacional de Ingenieros Agrónomos.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2008), ‘El fin de un ciclo: las transformaciones de la propiedad y la explotación de la tierra en la posguerra’, in Enrique Fuentes Quintana (ed.), Economía y economistas en la guerra civil, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg-Real Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Morales, vol. II, p. 649-676.

Paxton, Robert O. (1997), La France de Vichy. 1940-1944, Paris, Éditions du Seuil.

Pyta, Wolfram (2007), ‘La tradition agrarienne et les visions planistes, du Troisième Reich au ‘Plan vert’ de la République fédérale allemande’, in Pierre Cornu and JeanLuc Mayaud (ed.) (2007), Au nom de la terre. Agrarisme et agrariens en France et en Europe du 19e siècle à nos jours, Paris, La Boutique de l’Histoire, p. 181-192. Renton, Dave (2001), ‘The Agrarian Roots of Fascism: German Exceptionalism Revisited’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 28, 4, p. 127-148.

Rico Boquete, Eduardo (1998), ‘The expansion of the forest and the defence of nature: the work of forest engineers in Spain 1900-1936’, in Charles Watkins (ed.) (1998), European Woods and Forests: Studies in Cultural History, Wallinford, CAB International, p. 181-190. Rosas, Fernando (1989), ‘A crise do liberalismo e as origens do “autoritarismo moderno” e do Estado Novo em Portugal’, Penélope, 2, p. 97-114. Rosas, Fernando (2000), Salazarismo e fomento económico, Lisbon, Notícias.

Saraiva, Tiago and Wise, M. Norton (2010), ‘Autarky/Autarchy: Genetics, Food Production and the Building of Fascism’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 40, 4, p. 419-428.

Saz, Ismael (2012), ‘¿Dónde está el otro? O sobre qué eran los que no eran fascistas’, in Joan Antón Mellón (ed.) (2012), El fascismo clásico (1919-1945) y sus epígonos, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, p. 155-190.

Scott, James C. (1998), Seeing like a State. How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Spoerer, Mark and Streb, Jochen (2006), ‘The Economic Impact of the Nazi Armament Policy on the Welfare of the German Consumers’, Paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, Finland, 21 to 25 40

Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto, Juan Pan-Montojo & Miguel Cabo

August 2006, Available at: .

Stephenson, Jill (2009), ‘Popular Opinion in Nazi Germany: Mobilization, Experience, Perceptions. The View from the Württemberg Countryside’, in Paul Corner (ed.) (2009), Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism, Oxford, Oxford U.P., p. 107-121. Tooze, Adam (2008), ‘The Economic History of the Nazi Regime’, in Jane Caplan (ed.) (2008), Nazi Germany, Oxford, Oxford U.P., p. 168-195. Trossbach, Werner and Zimmermann, Clemens (2006), Die Geschichte des Dorfes Stuttgart, UTB.

Veiga, Francisco (1987), ‘El vot agrari de la Guárdia de Ferro, Romania 1929-1937’, Estudis d’História Agrària, 4, p. 215-233.

Wagner, Kurt (1986), Leben auf dem Lande im Wandel der Industrialisierung: ‘Das Dorf war früher auch keine heile Welt’. Die Veränderung der dörflichen Lebensweise und der politischen Kultur vor dem Hintergrund der Industrialisierung am Beispiel des hessischen Dorfes Körle, Frankfurt am Main, Insel.

41

2.

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda. Agrarian policies and rural representations in the Italian fascist regime Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

I.

Introduction

The Italian Fascist regime lasted about two decades, from the 27-29 October march on Rome in 1922, when Mussolini was appointed Head of Government by King Vittorio Emanuele III, until the Grand Council of Fascism deposed Mussolini in 1943. While the start and end dates are clear, the real beginning of the regime is more difficult to pinpoint, as its classical authoritarian structures were gradually set in place throughout the 1920s. The Italian regime was the first to define itself as ‘fascist’, and it can broadly be considered the template upon which the other fascist or fascist-like regimes were modelled. Though a true common denominator in all these regimes can be difficult to detect, we can identify common features such as authoritarianism, the single-party State, nationalism, and corporatism. The fascist regime ruled the country at a time in which agriculture was central to the national economy, and most people still lived in rural villages or were spread throughout the countryside. Thus, agrarian policies and relations with the rural world in general must be considered a fundamental aspect of the regime. From the outset, it is important to acknowledge the rural roots of fascism and the strong links of Italian society with the meanings, values, and traditions associated with the countryside and rural ways of life. Clearly, then, an analysis of fascist agrarian policies can give interesting insights into the system of interests and culture that fascism sought to represent. These issues have been analyzed by numerous historians in the last many decades, following a period in which Italian historiography appeared to be more interested in the industrial policies of the regime. The actual corpus of studies explicitly dedicated to this issue is still limited. The works of Domenico Preti (1973), Gustavo Corni (1987), and the more recent contributions of Andrea di Michele (1995) and Mauro Stampacchia (2000) are worth mentioning. Some interesting insights are also present in studies dedicated to the ‘general’ history of fascism, in the work of Domenico Preti (1980), and particularly that of Renzo de Felice (1966, 1978, 1979), who opened the 43

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

door to widespread debate by challenging the traditional view of fascism as a period of stagnation. Other related topics include Italian economic history studies (Sereni, 1968; Ragionieri, 1975; Villari, 1979), and analyses of fascist trade-unionism (Cordova, 1974; Sapelli, 1978). Though not specifically dedicated to the history of the agrarian question during the two decades of fascist dictatorship, it is important to recall the work of Guido Crainz (1994) and Giacomina Nenci (1997). The first addresses the problem of farm labourers in northern Italy, the most representative area for agrarian riots from the rise of the socialist movements until new industrial development in the 1960s; the second is a brief but thorough historical-critical overview of Italian farmlands in contemporary history. A few studies on specific geographical regions or sectors should also be mentioned as their relevance extends beyond the scope of the works: for example Roveri (1972); Legnani, Preti and Rochat (1982); Brianta (1983); and Failla and Fumi (2006). Following a brief overview over the rural roots of fascism, the remainder of the chapter is structured into three parts. The first will provide a description of the most significant agrarian policies of the regime, along with a brief analysis of the international political environment and the context of Italian society at that time. The second section will address issues related to propaganda regarding the regime’s achievements and the use of ‘rural rhetoric’ in its efforts to gain legitimacy and strengthen its base. Finally, in the third section our focus will shift to the ‘foreign affairs’ of agrarian policies, as they relate to Eastern Europe and colonialism. The chapter will close with some concluding remarks.

II.

The rural roots of fascism: countryside and agrarian interests

A brief overview of the main social conflicts that characterized the rural areas of Italy in the first years of the fascist regime is useful for understanding the socioeconomic interests that fascism sought to represent. Here we recall the primordial significance that the fascist movement assigned to its rural roots. Mussolini himself and many of the gerarchi of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) ­– the hierarchy of high-ranking members in the National Fascist Party – came from rural areas, particularly in and around the Po valley, the main and most advanced agricultural area of the Italy. The presence of strong and politically engaged rural workers’ organizations in those areas created a setting of social conflict, with peasant and worker trade-unions on one side and landowners on the other, who were more concerned over rural worker salaries and recruitment conditions than land redistribution (Corni, 1987: 394). The socialist and communist Leghe (Leagues) of rural workers wielded significant power 44

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

before the Great War, and more after. However, they gradually began to clash with most other rural actors, including small landholders, independent farmers, mezzadri (sharecroppers), and large-scale landowners. In this context, the fascists were able to present themselves as an active barrier to the increasing power of workers’ organizations. Squadrismo challenged the activity of the socialist and communist leagues through massive use of violence.1 Strikebreaking, attacks against trade-unions, cultural centres, cooperatives, newspapers, and libraries, and even violence against individuals, were among the ‘tools’ used by the fascist squads in the Po valley and Tuscany. Within a few years, most of the large and small-scale landowners, along with many members of the rural and urban middle class, began to support the fascists and even finance their activities (Reichardt, 2009: 169-170), providing stable support for the new fascist regime when it came to power. Sharecroppers also backed and sometimes participated in the squadrismo, having gradually become more opposed to socialist and communist initiatives. The situation was very different in other parts of the country. In the south there was virtually no self-organization among rural workers, so both large-scale landowners and manufacturing-oriented policy makers had more margin to pursue their respective interests at the expense of the rural proletariat. It was not random coincidence that squadrismo was nearly absent in the south, with the exception of the Puglia squads, under the leadership of the ras Giuseppe Caradonna. In the manufacturing sector, workers were generally more organized than in most rural areas. But frequent disagreements among worker trade unions and unmet expectations regarding fundamental changes in economic power relations gave the fascists, many of whom came from revolutionary socialist trade-unionism, an opportunity to present themselves as the most trustworthy advocates of proletarian interests. With regard to relations among sectors, the prevailing economic conditions created a conflict between the interests of agriculture and manufacturing. Italy at that time was struggling with an increasing negative balance of payments for agro-food products in general, and for wheat in particular. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Italian food industry was unable to feed the entire, growing population. In the 1921-25 period, imported wheat was equivalent to nearly 50 per cent of domestic wheat production (Preti, 1973: 811). Squadrismo was a movement that characterized the first phase of fascism. Groups of fascists, organised into squads (hence squadrismo), carried out hundreds of violent actions from 1919 to 1924. Many of the leaders of squadrismo, called ras, would go on to have important roles within the regime. Though part of the fascist movement, the squads always had a certain degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the PNF and Mussolini himself.

1

45

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

This was taking place at a time of increasing protectionism in international markets, especially with regard to the USA, a major commercial partner with Italy; a trend that did little to meet the needs of the Italian economy. While low internal demand encouraged a push for free trade and open market policies (possibly with a weak currency) in order to find outlets for domestic production, basic industries also supported low tariffs but sought a strong currency because of their extensive reliance on imported raw materials. The regime chose the latter strategy and fixed the infamous ‘Quota 90’ exchange rate, which impacted rural groups. As far as the issue of protectionism was concerned, the fascist regime was not initially prone to fostering an approach based on greater free-trade. Commercial agreements had been signed with several countries in the early 1920s, when Alberto de Stefani, a marketoriented economist, was Minister of Finance. The replacement of de Stefani with Giuseppe Volpi in 1925 marked the shift to a more protectionist policy with stronger State intervention, which ten years later led to the launching of the autarky policy in a very different international context. A last important factor deserves to be mentioned. The demographic policy of the USA was also changing, and severe limits were imposed on further immigration from European countries. In prior decades, emigration to North and South America had played a significant role in controlling unemployment in Italy and its social consequences. The decline in emigration had traumatic consequences for the Italian economy (Preti, 1973: 815). A multi-faceted relationship arose between the regime and the various social groups, created by diverse factors and the complex and contradictory range of interests that characterized Italian agriculture. It included the interests expressed by landowners, sharecroppers, and rural workers and encompassed differences such as those of northern agrarian capitalists and southern owners of large landholdings or latifundia. Such complexity must be considered in the analysis of fascist rural policies and initiatives, as well as in the analysis of the rhetoric and propaganda that developed around these policies. It is important to note that even though it exhibited clear characteristics of a true dictatorship, the Italian fascist regime has been defined as ‘imperfect totalitarianism’ based on ‘authoritarian compromise’ (Legnani, 1995: 414-446). This is due to the fact that the regime had to negotiate economic decisions with centres of power that it had not entirely absorbed: the large industrial groups of the north and the large landholdings of the south. Without attempting to offer an exhaustive overview, in the following section we will focus on the main agrarian policy initiatives that directly or indirectly influenced the agricultural sector and rural areas.

46

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

III.

Domestic agrarian policies

III.1. The socio-economic context To better understand the extent of fascist agrarian policies and measures, it is useful to review some relevant features of the context in which they were promoted. 1. The Italian countryside was characterized by high levels of unemployment, and the manufacturing sector was not able to absorb the workforce. Industrial underdevelopment was prevalent throughout Italy, except in the northwest. Moreover, certain aspects of technological innovation tended to be labour-saving. From the regime’s point of view, this situation was not entirely negative. Given the links between the regime and the basic industries sector, it was useful to have what in Marxist jargon is referred to as a large ‘reserve army of labour’, that could meet sudden employment needs and keep manufacturing salaries low. This aspect of the relations between the primary and manufacturing sectors reveals a broader and frequently observed attitude in the fascist regime: the actual subordination of agrarian interests to industrial ones, despite the pro-rural rhetoric. 2. However, excessive unemployment in rural areas would have increased social conflict. In an effort to avoid urban concentration of social problems resulting from rural exodus, the regime imposed limits on internal migration from the countryside into the towns in the early 1930s; but this did not provide a definitive solution. 3. The agricultural sector was generally characterized by backwardness and low productivity, with limited use of fertilizers and low reliance on machinery and steam power. Furthermore, in most of the latifundia regions, extensive properties lacking any capitalist approach to production created an environment that was hardly favourable to innovation or improvement. 4. From a demographic point of view, it is well known that fascism intensely promoted population growth, even in the absence of any proper economic reasons. Agrarian policies aimed at offering greater opportunities for making a living in the countryside can be considered complementary to this demographic policy. 5. The regime considered the massive numbers of braccianti (seasonal agricultural workers) to be a hotbed of political instability, whereas a farmer rooted in his own small farm was perceived as a stable base of support. Peasants and farmers who were ‘tied to’ property and grounded in traditional, religious and familial values (Stampacchia, 2000: 133) could act as a counterbalance to the spread of salaried workers who were seen as a negative aspect of the modernization process, with its loss of identity, social disorder, and demographic decline (Lupo, 2000: 345-346). The programme to abolish migrant or seasonal rural work (by the sbracciantizzazione, described in III.4, p. 51-52) became a pillar of the regime’s rural policies and created a need for more farm land. 47

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

III.2. The bonifiche: land reclamation and land redistribution The need for farm land was one of the main factors that drove the regime towards the bonifiche or land reclamation campaigns. Even though these campaigns were not born of the regime (Giovanni Giolitti’s administrations had been already active in this field at the turn of the century), they were a pillar of fascist agrarian policies and one of the main elements upon which fascist propaganda was built. This is not the place for an extensive account of initiatives and achievements in the land reclamation campaign, but we shall provide some basic information. The bonifiche campaign started in the mid-1920s, with the creation of the Consorzi di bonifica (Reclamation Consortia), the agencies in charge of managing State intervention, and the first steps towards reclamation of the Agro Pontino wetlands to the south of Rome. This intervention lasted for almost twelve years and became the most prominent reclamation accomplishment, with thousands of rural workers and sharecroppers seeking to colonize these lands by moving from Veneto, Friuli, EmiliaRomagna, and to a lesser extent from central Italy.2 The results were significant and were achieved in a relatively short time by a massive workforce living in poor sanitary conditions and directly exposed to malaria (Stampacchia, 2000: 240-242). The period of strong State intervention from 1929 to 1934 was followed by a period of stasis. This was probably due to the requirements of the colonial wars, but also due to certain internal conflicts regarding the implications of the bonifiche in terms of land redistribution. A second wave of interventions took place in areas of Campania, Puglia, Sicilia, and Sardegna from the second half of the 1930s until 1942, towards the mid-point of World War II. When the interventions ceased, about one million hectares of land had been rescued out of the approximately 3.26 million hectares of non-productive or sub-productive land recorded in the 1911 census (Corni, 1987: 409-412), and about 150 new towns and villages had been built (Pennacchi, 2009). The bonifiche campaign also had implications in terms of land redistribution. The term integrale, was used with bonifiche to refer to intervention beyond the ‘simple’ reclamation of land and involved a redistribution process in favour of small-scale farmers. There had always been tension between large-scale landowners (who to a large extent controlled the Consortia during the first phase) and sharecroppers willing to profit from the opportunity to become landowners. Within the regime, this tension was also reflected in the clashes between socially oriented fascist trade-unionism and groups within the regime that supported landowners’ interests. Another example was 2 The communities established in Agro Pontino through this immigration process are still described as the veneto-pontina population, with distinct accents and linguistic usages.

48

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

the rising and falling fortune of policy makers involved in the campaign, such as Arrigo Serpieri, who was in favour of land redistribution but accepted the condition of farms needing to be economically viable. According to Corni, the outcomes of such conflicts varied depending on the area that was affected. In many places that were controlled by large-scale landowners, land reclamation was virtually brought to a standstill, and the regime focused its efforts on areas where a compromise had been found, or where it was still possible to redistribute land to the farmers (Corni, 1987: 409-412). In 1928, the Legge Mussolini took the control of the Consortia out of the hands of large-scale landowners who refused to engage in land improvement and gave it over to the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (National Veteran’s Work), a welfare society created during the First World War. Another critical point was the need to organize a common intervention plan for territories where ownership was part public and part private. Private owners were seldom willing or able to finance their part of land intervention (Stampacchia, 2000: 184-199). During the second wave of reclamations, redistribution was mainly a propaganda tool with no real content in most of the southern territories affected by the bonifiche.

III.3. The ‘Battle for Wheat’ and technological modernization The other main pillar of agrarian policy and propaganda within the regime was the Batagglia del grano or the ‘Battle for Wheat’, which focussed on increasing internal wheat production to the point of eradicating the need to import it. The initiative was launched in 1925, in the context of a series of policies inspired by autarky plans, which even included adjusting the Italian diet in order to achieve autonomy from international markets. The increase in wheat production was based on a series of objectives that included: ­—the use of additional farm land obtained through the bonifiche; —the redistribution of large unfarmed properties to farming households; —the re-orientation of production towards wheat, even in areas probably better suited to other types of production, which brought an end to local traditional agricultural production; —an increase in productivity per hectare and per worker through the introduction of new technologies. This last element was effectively pursued by many means, but only in some areas (Corni, 1987: 407). It would be misleading to identify those years as a period of real agricultural modernization for the entire country. In the north, chemical fertilizers, 49

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

tractors, and other machinery were successfully introduced in an area that had largely relied on animal energy. In spite of a slower pace after the crisis of the early 1930s, wheat productivity per hectare increased dramatically in leading areas of the country. Italy reached a production level of sixteen quintals of wheat per hectare, nearly doubling the American productivity figure of about nine quintals (Faita, 1995). In 1931, after six years of the campaign, national wheat production surpassed eighty million quintals, which was sufficient to meet internal demand almost entirely. The introduction of technological innovation was much weaker in the south, and most of the increase in production was achieved through an increase in land devoted to wheat cultivation. In general terms, the outcome of the wheat campaign was clearly negative for the south, whose rural economy was seriously damaged by the combination of very limited technological improvements on the one hand and a protectionist policy on the other. Wheat was the cornerstone of mass food production and consumption; as its price increased, the negative impact on the quality of nutrition in rural communities was dramatic. The same can be said for all the hill or mountain areas of the country, which were home to about nine million people (Preti, 1982: 45). Apparently, the only class that benefited from this campaign were the landowners and entrepreneurs of the productive northern plains. To summarize this section, we will highlight the links between the Battle for Wheat and certain elements of technological and scientific innovation. Support for technological innovation was partially aimed at strengthening the position of certain large national industrial producers such as FIAT, the leading national producer of tractor engines, along with Landini of Reggio Emilia. Italian producers were protected from foreign competitors by high tariff barriers. Another example of this was Montecatini, the prominent chemical company whose products were favoured by the regime. It illustrates the subordination of agriculture to the needs and interests of the industrial sector, a priority that would be blatantly reaffirmed with the establishment of the ‘Quota 90’ exchange rate. It is also important to note that the introduction of technology was often hindered by the fear of social conflict. For example, rural unemployment and the surplus of workers made it difficult for the regime to introduce technological innovations such as agricultural machinery in many areas of the Po valley, which would have increased unemployment among salaried workers and created social conflicts. As far as the elements of modernization are concerned, the search for new varieties of seed is worth mentioning. These were obtained thanks to the pioneering activity of

50

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

wheat hybridization carried out in the Stazione sperimentale3 of Rieti by Nazzareno Strampelli, who created high-yield and resistant varieties of wheat. This was more a culmination of the efforts of a valuable researcher who had been active since the beginning of the century than an outcome of fascist policy. Yet it deserves attention for two reasons: first, the availability of new varieties of wheat were very important in the Battle for Wheat; second, the regime gave active support to Strampelli, who became a member of the Partito Nazionale Fascista in 1925 (the first year of the wheat campaign) and was later made a member of the fascist parliament against his will. An important part of the Battle for Wheat was also carried out by the Cattedre ambulanti,4 or rural learning institutes, with experts who delivered a wide range of services to farmers, including the dissemination of advanced technological tools and the best knowledge available for increasing productivity, along with advice regarding the choices that farmers had to face in order to cope economically.

III.4. Rural work relations: seasonal workers and sharecroppers The ‘Battle for Wheat’ and land reclamations are intertwined with another rural campaign of the regime: the aforementioned decasualization of rural workers. The campaign was announced in 1930 and sought to reduce the number of braccianti: the farmless, casual or seasonal workers who had been deeply affected by the post-World War I crisis and were often socialist or communist in their leanings (Cordova, 2005: 11-12). The campaign also extended to other weak actors, such as impoverished sharecroppers and small-scale renters. The ideological implications of this policy have already been mentioned; and were aptly expressed by Arrigo Serpieri himself, who stated that anyone not in favour of binding peasants to the land was not a true fascist (Lupo, 2000: 346). The sbracciantizzazione policy was pursued through the assignation of farm land that became available from land reclamation and colonial expansion, and through the promotion of stable contracts with workers instead of daily agreements. The results were influenced by the resistance of the landowners as well as certain contra The Stazioni sperimentali were one of the various public institutions established in Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century in order to support the development of the primary sector. They were part of the innovation system for agriculture, with a focus on basic experimental research, in conjunction with the Cattedre ambulanti, who focused on technology transfer.

3

The Cattedre ambulanti di agricoltura were institutions seeking to disseminate agronomic knowledge to small-scale farmers and offer them other kinds of technical assistance through the action of highly competent experts. The Cattedre, locally based and largely autonomous, were established in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. They lasted until 1935, when they were abolished by the fascist regime, which established the Ispettorati provinciali dell’agricoltura under the direct control of the Ministry of Agriculture.

4

51

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

dictory aspects of the policy. For example, wheat farms required only a few workers, except at harvest, so seasonal employment could not be easily transformed into stable contracts. In the south, the conditions of casual workers worsened under fascism, including the cancellation of their right to occupy abandoned land and the abrogation of laws that limited the additional services they had to perform for their landowners. The regime exhibited a different attitude toward mezzadria (sharecropping), which was particularly common in the countryside of central and northern Italy. Since the early 1920s most sharecroppers had supported squadrismo, and sharecropping was regarded by the regime as a traditional mode of organization with deep roots in the history of the land. It was seen as being able to guarantee an element of stability to rural occupations and households. Furthermore, the sharing of risks and profits between landowners and sharecroppers was an example of economic relations that circumvented class conflict. It represented a form of rural corporatism consistent with the organic view of economic relations promoted through corporatist ideology (Lupo, 2000: 345). This favouring of mezzadria was linked to the de-casualisation policy, since it was a means of transforming rural workers into sharecroppers and land colonizers. Such was the context for one the most important acts to regulate work relations in the agricultural sector: the Carta della Mezzadria, which was published in 1933. The Carta established general rules for sharecropping that overpowered local traditions and specificities. Its general aim was to bind the farmer to the land, even though the flow of public expenditure for agriculture had decreased dramatically since 1931.5 Regardless of the effectiveness of the Carta, attempts to promote true modernization of the mezzadria were largely unsuccessful due to resistance from large-scale landowner lobbies, which were an important support base for the regime.

III.5. Institutional re-organization: the new role of the Consortia, fascistization of the trade unions, and corporatism The disposition towards stable contracts must not lead one to think that workers’ positions were strengthened under the regime. Quite the contrary (as was also evident in the manufacturing sector): in the context of strong State control and planning over the national economy, the manifold institutional frameworks for this political path included a new role for the Consortia and the fascistization of the trade unions. After workers’ organizations had been dismantled and embedded in 5 The Carta della Mezzadria was in place until 1964, when sharecropping was abolished. However its use in the regulation of sharecropping relations continued beyond that date.

52

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

the corporatist system, contracts were generally managed according to landowner interests. A brief review of the early years of the regime is needed in order to summarize the full story. The Agrarian Consortia, an interesting example of autonomous and pro-active cooperation among rural actors, had been involved in the agrarian policy of the regime since 1925. They actively supported policies such as land reclamation and the Battle for Wheat, and eventually became the entities responsible for managing the stocks of all strategic primary products, with the aim of rationalizing distribution, supporting autarky, and preparing for wars or other emergencies. In 1938, the Consortia was transformed from a fairly democratic structure into an entity directly managed by members of the regime. As far as trade-unionism was concerned, the fascist FISA – Italian Federation of Agricultural Trade Unions – was established in 1922 alongside Confagricoltura, the first organization representing agrarian economic, political, and trade-unionist interests, which had been created in 1920. Two years later, the two organizations were merged under the FISA leader Gino Cacciari, implying a further step towards the fascistization of trade-unionism (Bertini, 2004: 200). Re-organization was promoted in the years that followed and eventually all agricultural trade unions were grouped into the Confederazione Nazionale Fascista degli Agricoltori (CNFA) and again into the Confederazione Fascista degli Agricoltori (CFA) in 1934, which was fully embedded in the newly established corporatist system. The political organizations of rural workers and owners were thus ‘normalized’ under a scheme that was supposed to overcome any class conflict and confrontation of interests, in a united effort to support national interests. It is interesting to note that this path was largely managed by former revolutionary trade-unionists such as Luigi Razza and especially Edmondo Rossoni, who was Minister of Agriculture from 1935 until the fall of the regime. Furthermore, this process resulted in the 1927 publication of the Carta del Lavoro, the document that outlined the basic principles of fascist trade-unionism and economic policy.6 It also functioned as the basis for the Carta della Mezzadria. Through corporatism, the regime aimed at establishing a mode of governance that was free from class conflict, based on strong State regulation and an active, leading role for technicians in the process of rational re-organization (Legnani, 1982: 23). 6 It is interesting to note that the Carta del Lavoro was inspired by the Carta del Carnaro, the State constitution created by Italian poet Gabriele d’Annunzio after the conquest of Fiume, and written by revolutionary trade-unionist Alceste de Ambris (Lupo, 2000: 47-48).

53

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

In this, corporatism and fascist ruralism embraced a single objective: to promote an organic non-conflictive society that was far removed from the two extremes of the free market or communism, deeply rooted in the State (through corporatism) and in land (through ruralism). Corporations were internally structured according to the productive cycle rather than by professional category, which recreated a sort of institutional supply chain that addressed issues of supply chain organization and distribution rather than representing possible labour conflicts (Ragionieri, 1975: 2205-2212). Seven of the twenty-two corporations established by the regime,7 pertained to the agricultural sector: cereals, grapes and wine, oil, beets and sugar, livestock and fishing, wood, and textiles. They were divided into three cycles: agricultural, industrial, and commercial. Corporatism was a major institutional innovation, but was much less relevant in actual practice than in theoretical debate. Despite the efforts of Giuseppe Bottai, Minister of Corporations and one of the most valuable and culturally qualified leaders of the PNF, these institutions never became the cornerstones of national economic governance they were intended to be. Theoretical confusion (even in the context of the broad and relatively open debate promoted by Bottai), the lack of political will, and scarce resources accounted for this failure. Despite the overall failure of the corporatist project, relations between agricultural landowners and the regime worsened due to increasing State control over every aspect of economic life (types of production, production levels, distribution, price levels, associationism). A similar and simultaneous process occurred with salaried workers and peasants, resulting from poor living conditions, persistent unemployment, and the dismantling of autonomous workers’ organizations. The subordination of agriculture to industrial interests, as exemplified in the ‘Quota 90’, had the same effects on the entire range of agrarian actors.

III.6. The debate over Quota 90 By focusing the analysis only on policies explicitly affecting the agrarian sector, it would be easy to lose sight of the fact that in making basic decisions about economic policy, the fascist regime safeguarded manufacturing interests at the expense of the agricultural sector when necessary.

The corporations were officially established in 1934, although a Ministry of Corporations had already been created in 1926. Giuseppe Bottai was in charge of this Ministry from 1929 on. The institutional structure of the Corporatist State was not complete until 1939, when the Chamber of Deputies was replaced with the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations. 7

54

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

This was clearly evident in the decision pursued in 1926 by Giuseppe Volpi, the Minister of Finance, which is usually referred to as ‘Quota 90’, or the decision to revaluate the currency to an exchange rate of about 90:1 between Italian lira and British pound. Despite initial doubts about its viability, the policy was technically successful, with the exchange rate decreasing from around 1:153 in 1926 to about 1:88 only one year later. The decision was actually the result of a complex set of factors. The risks related to a continuous depreciation of the national currency were taken into consideration (the experience of Weimar Germany was very recent), as well as the fact that the USA had explicitly requested a stronger lira as a condition for the sizable loans that American banks were about to grant to Italy (Ragionieri, 1975: 2180). At the same time the Quota 90 campaign confirmed the regime preference for big manufacturing companies. These were able to purchase raw materials on foreign markets at lower prices, while many small Italian companies that relied heavily on exports were ruined. The decision was related to the general tendency to rationalize the productive sector, which was considered fundamental to maintaining a competitive manufacturing level, even at the expense of small companies and employment. Rural actors (both landowners and sharecroppers) were largely disappointed by the revaluation of the currency, which increased the economic stability of a middle class whose real wages were already guaranteed. Last but not least, autarky was encouraged, if not forced, by the dramatic revaluation of the currency.

IV.

Fascism, rurality, and propaganda

IV.1.

The symbolic representation of the rural context in propaganda

Fascist rural rhetoric was not only one of the most relevant ‘discourses’ promoted by the regime, it was also a pillar of the ideological construct that supported the regime, along with corporatism and militarism.8 This rhetoric had deep roots in the Italian society of that time. During the 1930s, migration had created a newly urbanized class that was responsive to the emergence of a certain ‘rural nostalgia’. The countryside was often regarded by the media as the cradle of traditional values, in contrast with the more modern and loose urban lifestyle. This attitude can be witnessed in various popular songs of that era. ‘If you want to enjoy life, come here to the countryside / [...] / Bright sheaves (fasci) of wheat, each sickle seems like lightning / [...] / Returning to your village which is much better than the town’.9 A more Novelist Antonio Pennacchi, from one of the rural families that colonized the Agro Pontino, frequently defined fascism as a ‘dictatorship of peasants’.

8

Se vuoi goder la vita, by Bixio and Cherubini. Translation by the author. The original is: ‘Se vuoi

9

55

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

culturally structured rural rhetoric was also typical of Catholic conservative culture, which considered ruralism to be the answer to the negative social consequences of industrialization and urbanization. Though less conservative and anti-industrial than popular or Catholic ruralism, fascist ruralism encountered a social context that was ready to accept its discourse. The regime worked to promote the image of a country that had to be more ‘rural’ than ‘urban’. This was clearly stated in a 1928 article entitled Sfollare le città (Reducing urban population), written by il Duce himself and published in the newspaper Popolo d’Italia. The importance of Mussolini’s rural background in this discourse cannot be overemphasized, since Mussolini’s life was always held up as an example for every true Italian fascist to follow. Many of Mussolini’s abundant statements, declarations, exhortations and threats, repeated in the media and engraved on the walls of buildings, had explicit ‘agrarian’ content such as ‘Le radici profonde non gelano mai’ (Deep roots never freeze); ‘Date tutto alla terra che è una banca che non fallisce mai’ (Give everything to the land, it is a bank that never goes bankrupt); ‘Io mi vanto soprattutto di essere un rurale’ (I am first of all proud to be a rural man). Mussolini’s exaltation of rural life was also loaded with an explicitly political content. In the speech he delivered at the 1928 national rural parade in Rome, he stated that fascism would never have buried the old regime without its disciplined and powerful rural infantry. From a more cultural perspective, rural rhetoric was also at the core of the socalled Strapaese debate, encouraged by a group of periodicals and intellectuals (Leo Longanesi, Curzio Malaparte, Mino Maccari) that were culturally close to fascism (Luti, 1966: 143-165). Strapaese, a term that could be translated as ‘hypervillage’, was a cultural movement that regarded rural communities, with their traditional patriarchal family-based organizations, as the cradle of honesty, order, and a quiet life; capofamiglia (rural householders) were perceived as hard working and trustworthy. In the literary debate of that time, the Strapaese supported traditional, national, and rural fascism, in opposition to the more modernist, trans-national, and urban idea of fascism expressed by the Stracittà (‘hypercity’) movement.

goder la vita vieni quaggiù in campagna / [...] / fasci lucenti di grano sembra ogni falce un baleno / [...] / Torna al tuo paesello ch’è assai più bello della città’.

56

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

IV.2.

The symbolic representation of land reclamation and the Battle for Wheat

Beyond this broad cultural landscape the link between fascist propaganda and rural rhetoric was also rooted in specific political acts and policies. In this sense, rural propaganda should be considered a structural component of fascist agrarian policies, rather than a cultural superstructure. Policies like land reclamation and the Battle for Wheat were certainly ‘used’ to increase the popularity of the regime. But prior to this they had already been designed and planned based on their rhetorical and propaganda potential, more than on the actual interests of the agrarian sector (which were generally sacrificed to manufacturing interests). In this sense the Battle for Wheat and rural rhetoric, land reclamation and cinema, sbracciantizzazione and propaganda, all become part of an organic system for structuring information (Bernangozzi, 1982). Let’s consider in greater detail the exploitation of the rhetorical potential of land reclamations and the Battle for Wheat. Beyond their economic implications, land reclamations were to a large extent used to promote the image of the regime, since they combined several basic features of fascist propaganda: modernization, conquests, ruralism. Through land reclamation new terrain was put to use, rural towns were founded, and urban and rural landscapes were designed according to the rationalist and monumental style of fascist architecture. Through the bonifiche, returning to the ‘rural’ did not imply moving backwards into the past, but rather forward into the future. Aware of the potential of these ideas, the regime actively promoted what has been defined as the ‘symbolic imaginary’ of the bonifiche, with particular emphasis on the Agro Pontino lowlands, which became ‘a permanent open-air exhibit of the regime’s achievements’ (Stampacchia, 2000: 209). Furthermore, thanks to the ‘heroic’ pioneers who were occupying the rescued land, it was possible for the regime to present the bonifiche as a ‘battle’, and the peasants as ‘soldiers’ fighting on inner fronts to enlarge the country. The peasant, who was already regarded as a ‘hard worker’ and ‘wise householder’, now became a ‘pioneer’ and ‘soldier’ of the new Italy (Figure 2.1). The fact that the Opera Nazionale Combattenti was put in charge of the management of rescued land had practical implications, but also reflects this view. The parallelism between internal and external conquests was clearly emphasized by il Duce in a 1932 speech to celebrate the founding of Littoria (now Latina, the largest town of Agro Pontino): ‘Here we have conquered new provinces, here we have conducted true military operations. This is the type of war we prefer!’ A similar range of meanings and values have been ascribed to the ‘Battle for Wheat’. The military title of the campaign speaks for itself: once again the ‘internal front’ of the new Italy was as important as the external in establishing the new power of the

57

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Figure 2.1. Postcard ‘Fighter of the fields’, 1932. (‘We gave life to the baneful immense fields, and they gave us harvests, comfort, strength and faith’)

Source: http://www.borghidilatina.it

Figure 2.2. Front page of ‘La Domenica del Corriere’: Mussolini harvests in Agro Pontino

Source: http://www.todocoleccion.net

58

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Nation, and il Duce was on the front lines of this battle (Figure 2.2). Along the same lines, a yearly contest for the ‘Wheat Victory’ had already been established. Every year ceremonies were held in which each province selected the best wheat growers, and the provincial champions took part in a final national contest, presided by Mussolini himself, with extensive media coverage of the event. The regime used the Battle for Wheat as the basis for a range of propaganda initiatives, in large part directed towards primary schools. Documentaries were produced and distributed by the Cattedre ambulanti in all rural villages, and in both urban and rural cinemas, seeking to reach as many communities as possible (de Cillis, 1934). These films followed a common narrative structure centred on the figure of Mussolini (Bernangozzi, 1982: 429-458), in which wheat symbolized the basic wealth of the country. It was the source of bread, produced by farmers from the ‘sweat of the brow, pride of work, poem of sacrifice’ (another famous Mussolini phrase). The easy parallel between the sheaves of wheat and the fasces symbolizing the regime (with their ancient Roman roots) was exploited extensively in the illustrations associated with the Battle for Wheat and national wheat contests (Figures 2.3-2.5). Figure 2.3. National wheat exposition, 1927

Source: http://www.borghidilatina.it

59

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Figure 2.4. Wheat Victory celebration, 1926

Source: http://www.borghidilatina.it

Figure 2.5. Wheat Contest advertisement, 1926

Source: http://www.borghidilatina.it

60

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Within this perspective, and the prayer-like definition of bread, further ‘religious’ meaning can be identified in the rhetoric of the regime. The religious and sacred meaning of the Battle for Wheat is seen in images where the battle for grain (picturing Mussolini himself at work) was used as a backdrop for the Annunciation (Figure 2.6) or represented in religious terms (Figure 2.7). Here we note that the regime had definitively abandoned its anticlerical roots after the signing of the Lateran Pacts in 1929.

IV.3.

Consensus-building in the countryside: the cases of Massaie Rurali and Radio Rurale

The consensus-building process in the countryside was generally based on the same forms of mobilization that the regime used throughout the country. Well-known examples of mass mobilization through the public education system10 and militarylike structures that enrolled students of all ages were particularly significant in rural areas. Similarly, the organization of leisure through the introduction of the ‘Sabato fascista’ (Fascist Saturday) became the symbol of the ‘permanent mobilization’ that the regime was promoting to create a new model for Italians, both in rural and urban areas. Countless monuments celebrating the Great War and phrases from il Duce engraved on the walls of buildings throughout the country also served as tools for consensus-building and on-going propaganda. For the sake of our analysis it is useful to focus on at least two examples of mobilization tools or policies designed explicitly for rural communities. First, the Sezione delle Massaie rurali, or Rural Housewives’ Organization, was founded in 1933 and boasted two and a half million members nine years later, making it the largest fascist organization for women. It was a primary mobilization tool (Figure 2.8), as it was at the centre of several different fascist themes: ruralism, traditional values and customs, the demographic policy, and autarky (since women could surmount the lack of imported goods through ingenious home management). Along with activities such as the promotion of small-scale agriculture and poultry farming, or advice for wise management of rural households, messages elevating rural life over urban life and promoting large families were also frequently channelled through this organization (Willson, 2002: 117-135). The mobilization of women did not entail a proper introduction of women into political processes or decision-making; these organizations remained confined to the ‘female’ sector of political life. The education system experienced a progressive fascistization process that reached its peak under two Ministers, Cesare De Vecchi and Giuseppe Bottai, in the mid-1930s. It is worth noting that the term used for the policy of school fascistization was ‘bonifica scolastica’, which was clearly borrowed from the more famous land reclamation campaign (Gori, 2009). 10

61

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Figure 2.6. Mosaic by Ferruccio Ferrazzi in Sabaudia (Facade of Chiesa dell’Annunziata)

Source: http://www.novecentoitaliano.it

Figure 2.7. Wheat Contest advertisement, 1931 (‘Give us today our daily bread’)

Source: http://www.borghidilatina.it

62

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Figure 2.8. Rural housewives’ section of Foggia attending Mussolini’s visit to the town, 1934

Source: http://www.manganofoggia.it

A second tool of mobilization and consensus-building reveals the focus of the regime on technological innovations. The fascist regime made widespread and often clever use of the new mass media (Cannistraro, 1975), including movies and Cinegiornali, cinema newsreels produced by the Istituto LUCE that frequently emphasized the ‘successes’ of the regime’s agrarian policies. In 1924, Italy heard its first public radio transmission, and within a few years radio broadcasting had become a very important part of the media, as it was popular among the middle class and gradually became more so among the lower classes. The regime quickly understood the importance of this tool and its propaganda potential. The national radio broadcasting company, EIAR, became one of the leading forms of governmental expression, along with the Cinegiornali, and newspapers like Il Popolo d’Italia. The Rural Housewives’ Organization also had its own newspaper (Figure 2.9). In order to make listening to the radio more attractive for young people and the lower classes, in 1933 the regime established the Ente Radio Rurale, a company that produced programs geared for students during the work week and for rural communities on Sundays. Radio Rurale, a radio set with standard characteristics and a fixed price, was produced in order to make these broadcasts more accessible. Interestingly, ‘rural radio’ was the label given to radio programming for the lower classes, rather than a more generic label such as ‘workers’ radio’, or ‘village radio’. Even the icon it used was ‘rural’: an ear of wheat beside two stylized fasces (Figure 2.10). 63

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Figure 2.9. The rural housewives’ newspaper

Source: http://www.provincia.campobasso.it/biblioteca/

Figure 2.10. Radio Rurale

Source: http://www.radiodantan.it

64

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Figure 2.11. Collective listening of ‘L’ora dell’agricoltore’ through Radio Rurale in Calabria (early 1940s)

Source: http://www.manganofoggia.it

Radio Rurale catalyzed collective listening, especially in rural areas and villages (Figure 2.11). Some programs became very popular, such as L’ora dell’agricoltore (The Farmer’s Hour), which was broadcast every Sunday. Communities in rural villages heard detailed descriptions of the ‘successes’ of the regime in the land reclamation campaign and Battle for Wheat. A last comment should be made before moving on to another aspect of fascist agrarian policy. The rural masses did not always passively absorb this entire range of propaganda strategies. Though clear opposition had not yet developed, examples of resistance were present and fascistization was often more of a superficial change in behaviour to cope with new political realities than a real transformation of rural communities. Open resistance was more explicit at the beginning of the regime (as in the opposition to the ‘normalization’ of the trade unions under the fascist umbrella), at the end of the 1930s especially, and throughout World War II.

V.

International relations and agrarian policy

V.1.

Relations with the authoritarian regimes in Danubian-Balkan Europe

Italian foreign policy during the interwar period (1920-39) pursued two main and concurrent aims: to rule over the Mediterranean and to create a sphere of influence in the Danube Valley and the Balkans, involving a gradual extension and increase 65

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

of Italian economic and political weight. Both objectives could only have been fully achieved if Italy had matched France in its mastery of the Mediterranean, thanks to the French colonial empire and the mandates over Syria and Lebanon that had been granted to France by the League of Nations. In the early interwar years, Italy tried to counterbalance the overwhelmingly powerful position of France and avoid the risk of Franco-British joint rule over Europe. In the late-1920s, Mussolini changed the direction of his foreign policy and began to move away from the Western powers. He tried to establish good relations with the British Empire as part of his determination to divide Britain and France and quickly accrue some real political gains. In the area between the Danube Basin and the Balkans, this revised policy drove Italy to isolate Yugoslavia in an attempt to establish alliances with all neighbouring states. Yugoslavia was considered the key opponent in the struggle for control of the Adriatic Sea and had to be neutralized. This had to be done in cooperation with Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania. Teodoro Sala (2008) stands out for having linked economic policy to fascist imperialism towards Eastern and Central Europe. Economic questions were not central to the prior studies by James H. Burgwyn (2006) and Jerzy W. Borejsza (1981). The excellent book by Davide Rodogno (2006) makes no reference to agrarian policy when addressing the neglected problem of the Italian ‘new order’ in the Balkans and the economic exploitation of occupied countries from 1941 to 1943. In spite of the lack of detailed studies on this subject, it is safe to assume that Italy’s attempts to establish political influence over the entire Danube Valley and the Balkans were preparatory steps towards economic exploitation. In the 1920s, expansion towards East-Central Europe had been capably controlled by individuals with excellent knowledge of the former Habsburg Monarchy and the economic and political realities of the successor States. This brain trust also had an intricate understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the Italian economy, especially its on-going lack of monopoly capital. Political alliances with conservative agrarian regimes in East-Central Europe and the Balkans, particularly Hungary and Romania, were the first step in their attempts to establish beneficial fair-trade agreements. Italy’s support for the cabinet of General Averescu led to the 1926 commercial treaty with Romania that allowed Italy to buy the entire stock of Romanian oil and vast quantities of raw materials very cheaply. However, fascist Italy was unsuccessful in promoting its own agrarian policy in the Danube Basin and the Balkans due to the fact that all these local economic systems were based on agriculture and needed markets in developed countries of the industrial West. The rapid acceleration of German financial competition even before 66

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

the Nazi rise to power made the Danubian and Balkan States the preferred trading partners of the Weimar Republic, and of the Third Reich after 1933. Italy turned to Hungary to find an ally against the Little Entente and to include a former enemy from the Great War in the Italian sphere of influence. The foreign policies of these two countries found common ground in their aim to revise the Peace Treaties of 1919-20. The rapprochement of Hungary and Italy occurred because demilitarized Weimar Germany was unable to force the Entente Powers to revise the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon. The preliminary sections of the Rome Agreement that was signed with Hungary in 1927 foreshadowed some important economic outcomes. Negotiations between Italian and Hungarian economic delegations started before the political negotiations but dragged on for years due to the ‘wine war’. Italy persistently flooded the Hungarian market with choice Italian wines without consideration for the legitimate Hungarian need to protect their own choice wines and avoid a decline in their exports. Italy did not want to import large amounts of Hungarian wine, and the same problem arose regarding Hungarian wheat production. Mussolini had launched the Battle for Wheat at home and was unwilling to buy the entire Hungarian wheat stock, even though Italy, Austria, and Hungary had signed the famous tripartite agreement in 1934 to prevent German influence in the Danube valley. Nazi Germany was ready to accept the entire Hungarian stock of crop exports. This policy rekindled a positive attitude towards Germany among Hungarians, supposedly establishing the prelude to a close alliance. Mussolini and other members of the fascist regime realized that the struggle for mastery of the Danube and the trade partnership with Hungary were about to be lost. Fascist policies in East-Central Europe and the Balkans presented a number of discrepancies. Though ideologically fascism found connections with reactionary regimes and populist mass-movements in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, divergent economic interests blocked Italy’s hopes of mutual integration of these economies. There were three basic causes: 1. Italy was not an industrial power like Germany, whose agrarian policies during the Third Reich went in the same direction as the Lebensraum project in East-Central Europe: that of colonization with agrarian aims, along the lines of the Mitteleuropa Plan that was attempted during World War I (1916-18). 2. The agricultural policies of fascist Italy generated competition rather than cooperation and integration between Italy and countries of East-Central Europe and the Balkans. 67

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

3. The divergent aims of the Italian economic policy prompted the fascist regime to promote the colonization and agricultural exploitation of Africa over that of EastCentral Europe.

V.2.

The mirage of Africa

Studies of fascist colonial policies have long been neglected. The works of Angelo Del Boca (1985, 1997) in the late twentieth century were the first significant research on this topic. For many years, the scant literature available on colonial history was mostly focused on military conquest and systems for ruling. Recently, some historians have begun to re-examine Italian colonialism in Africa, with regard to its strategies for colonization, the ‘awakening’ of the natives, and subsequent native attempts to regain their political freedom and national independence. The most prominent is the work of Nicola Labanca (2007). Within this context, Italian colonialism provides an opportunity to examine rural policy in a way that has never been pursued by scholars in the economic history of fascist Italy, which has mainly been focused on financial and industrial themes. Agriculture was considered mainly from the point of view of the rural myth and propaganda of the fascist dictatorship, aiming at promoting mass migration of farmers to the colonies. Colonial expansion had already found a place in the short history of the unified Italian nation by the time fascism came to power. The attempt to take control of Eastern Africa and subjugate the Ethiopian Empire met with failure in the military defeat near Adua in 1896. However, Italy had been able to take control of Eritrea and later Somaliland. In 1911, the myth of North Africa as the ‘fourth shore’ became popular, and was closely linked to the conquest of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, two provinces seized from the Ottoman Empire and renamed Libya in 1934. Colonial exploits were promoted primarily to give the rural population an opportunity to settle in new Italian colonies across the sea, rather than having to emigrate due to desperate economic conditions in the homeland. The settlement of small landholdings and extensive wheat farms in the colonies was aimed at increasing the number of small-scale landowners and production destined for local and national markets. Fascist authorities were resolved to move ahead with settlement plans, at the expense of the native peoples, in hopes that rural colonization in Africa would reduce domestic social and economic tensions between landless agrarian workers, small-scale farmers, and owners of large estates. Populist propaganda notwithstanding, Mussolini and his regime could not redistribute lands 68

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

without losing the strong support of the large estate owners in Southern Italy and the Po valley. Agrarian groups had strongly supported Mussolini and his movement from the beginning: fascism was perceived as the only way to stop post-World War I rural agitation and avoid the risk of social revolution. As with land reclamation, colonization allowed the regime to give Italian farmers land to till without offending large-scale landowners. Within this framework it is important for scholars to consider the topics of ideology and propaganda. Mussolini and the fascists saw the colonies in Africa as the most effective example of how modern ruralism should work. An Italian farmer in Africa was a living heir of the ancient Romans, and his noble aim was to work the land and increase agricultural production. From the beginning, Italian colonization and exploitation of the colonies was intertwined with the myth of superiority of white Europeans over Africans. In Italy, that sense of superiority was also enhanced by the myth of Roman civilization, which became a powerful element in fascist ‘cultural’ propaganda for encouraging mass migration towards the colonies. Italy’s colonization practices were quite different from those of France and Great Britain. Still, it would be incorrect to assume that the agrarian policy was merely due to the lack of raw materials such as gold, iron, coal, and oil in the colonies, as was the case in the homeland. There was no economic evaluation latent in the cultural attitudes of the early Italian Nationalists or the fascists later on. In contrast with the liberal State, the fascist regime encouraged systematic demographic colonization and backed it up with a renewed level of engagement and extensive resources. The Army was given the task of recovering control of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which had been almost completely lost during the Great War years (1915-18). Soon after, the Italian generals managed to crush the armed rebellion of local tribes using every means at their disposal. The most dramatic consequence of the military intervention was the large number of estates and villages that were expropriated from their Arab owners by the colonial government. The next step involved massive immigration of Italian peasants, mostly from north-eastern Italy (Veneto) or from the poorest overpopulated areas of the south. Immigrants were often employed in building modern rural villages in the area surrounding Tripoli and along the road from Tripoli to the Egyptian border, known as the ‘via Balbia’. The great effort to make Libya the perfect example of a modern colony was developed by Italo Balbo, a veteran fascist leader who was appointed Governor of Libya by Mussolini in 1935. Hellen Chapin Metz has highlighted how in October-November of 1938, the Governor’s project brought the first 20,000 settlers to Libya in a single convoy. The overall plan envisioned a colony of 500,000

69

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Italian settlers by the 1960s (Chapin Metz, 1987). A second wave of 11,000 settlers sailed from Venice, Naples, and Palermo in October of 1939. One thousand of these families came from the northern regions of Italy, four hundred from the mainland, and two hundred from Sicily (Del Boca, 1988: 232-291). Balbo promoted and organized exploration for strategic raw materials, especially petroleum, while constantly attending to agrarian colonization, the building of infrastructures, and the organization of public utilities. The new governor believed in cooperation between Italians and natives and sought a higher level of integration in order to decrease the deep resentment against the Italians and foster the welfare of the colony by encouraging a positive disposition among the Arab population. Just prior to the outbreak of World War II, 374,670 of the 900,000 hectares of tillable soil escheated by the government had been conceded to farmers (231,000 in Tripolitania and 143,580 in Cyrenaica); 3,960 of the 6,166 settler families lived in Tripolitania (23,918 persons) and 2,206 in Cyrenaica (15,014 persons); 5772 new farmhouses were built, 3675 of which were in Tripolitania and 2077 in Cyrenaica (Del Boca, 1997: 266). Italy’s declaration of war on 10 June 1940 put an end to the ambitious fascist overseas plans. Libya became the main battlefield in the North African campaign until the Axis defeat in 1943. After World War II, the new independent government of Libya forced the Italian colonists to leave their ‘Promised Land’. In Eastern Africa, colonization began in the 1890s with the settlement of Eritrea, which was intended as a first step in exerting Italian influence over the Ethiopians. It completely failed with the 1896 military defeat at Adua. In the 1920s and 1930s, colonization increased in Somaliland with the establishment of new peasant settlements. Meanwhile, in Eritrea Governor Jacopo Gasparini succeeded in making Asmara the key point for trade in raw materials and semi-elaborated products. The Ethiopian War of 1935-36 was the climax of the fascist colonial policy, and officially ended with the proclamation of the Italian Empire. The most immediate economic consequence of the war was a series of overseas investments and the chance to export colonial products to countries such as Austria and Hungary, thanks to the economic links that had been established in the Rome Agreement of 1934. The question to be posed is whether fascist policy in Ethiopia planned the massive immigration of Italian settlers. In the introduction to Dominioni’s latest work on the Italian Empire in Eastern Africa (Dominioni, 2008), Angelo Del Boca emphasized the peculiar nature of the Ethiopian campaign, which was expected to be a true fascist war.

70

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Mussolini launched his offensive against the Ethiopian Empire in order to demonstrate to Western powers the prowess of the new Italian military machine, which had been revamped and influenced by fascist propaganda. According to a recent study of Italian wars between 1935 and 1943 (Rochat, 2005), this great military effort was intended to increase the prestige of Fascist Italy at home and abroad. As military operations officially came to an end with the fall of Addis Abeba on 5 May 1936, the new Italian authorities made an attempt to reorganize and manage their new colonial empire (Dominioni, 2008: 75-131). Italian colonialism in Ethiopia sought to reproduce the distinctive features of both French and British colonial organization: the new masters avoided any concession of political autonomy and imposed a strict ‘direct rule’ over the various peoples of the Empire, introducing apartheid as a means of separating the ruling white élite from the natives. Agricultural exploitation of the Empire involved the possibility of bringing in settlers from the mother country, as in Libya. Yet any mass movement of settlers from Italy to Ethiopia would require organization of ideas and plans based on preliminary studies of the new colony’s economic assets. Prior to 1936, none of this had been done; essays were published on related topics in 1937 and 1939, but none were put into practice.11 In early 1941, when the East African Empire was faced with the general offensive launched by British military forces, the prophets of agrarian colonization were still in the midst of a debate on the possibility of exploiting the temperate zone of the Ethiopian plateau in order to offer good tillable and fertile soil to white settlers, while leaving the agronomically less valuable parched lands to native shepherds, under Italian control (Rivera, 1941). The exploitation and colonization plans revealed the attitudes of high-ranking regime officials, including il Duce himself, in contrast with those of the technicians in the Ministry of Italian Africa. Ethiopia lost its appeal after the end of the Ethiopian War in 1936, when fascist foreign policy again shifted its focus towards Europe. The Italian administration’s plans for Ethiopia failed because of two critical issues that impeded colonization and rural exploitation of the new colony: the backwardness of local infrastructures and the on-going guerrilla warfare against the conquering forces, which lasted from the defeat of the Ethiopian armies until the fall of the Empire in 1941. The first problem forced the State into infrastructure investments for building roads and railways, in hopes of enabling the new masters to launch a large settlement campaign that would ensure a rational exploitation of the land. The 11 Specifically, see: Prospettive agricole dell’impero etiopico, Bardi, Roma 1937; and Prospettive di colonizzazione in AOI, Bardi, Roma 1939.

71

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

second issue endangered the settlement itself, as the lives and properties of Italian farmers were threatened by guerrilla forces. As with other Italian colonies, the Italian Empire conquest gave Italy another poor, pre-modern country that was agriculturally unfruitful and lacking in strategic raw materials. The expenses incurred in making the colonies productive put stress on the Italian economy, which was largely based on State intervention and autarchia. Profits never actually materialized and expenditures outweighed the effective gains from this venture. In the end, fascist rural policy in the colonies turned out to be over-ambitious and tardy. The post-World War I conquest and exploitation of Libya and Ethiopia occurred when the new historical phase of decolonization was already underway, and the ambitious fascist rural policy was permanently curbed by a lack of means in the strategic fields of finance, agriculture, and industry.

VI. Final remarks Two sets of pre-conditions must be identified in order to explain the agrarian policies of the Italian fascist regime: ­— the post-World War I economic situation involved economic backwardness, a deficit in the agro-food balance of payments, growing protectionism in the international system, and barriers to migration; —the groups that supported the fascist movement and regime were the large manufacturing companies and large-scale landowners, with their corresponding socio-economic interests. In this context, the regime aimed at achieving certain general objectives such as: — self-sufficiency in food provision, so as to improve the balance of payments and support the autarky policy; — settling casual rural workers and unemployed householders without dismantling the structure of land ownership or attacking the interests of large-scale landowners, while maintaining rural communities as a stronghold of support for the political regime; — promoting an overall reorganization of the geographical distribution of the population, in a context marked by national and international barriers to migration and a policy of demographic growth.

72

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

These objectives were pursued through a range of agrarian policies and other initiatives with ‘rural content’. They have been described here, and can be grouped into three main categories: — internal agrarian and rural policies (the Battle for Wheat, land reclamation campaigns, decasualisation of workers, technology transfer); — agrarian aspects of foreign policy and colonialism, including the organization of migration flows to the colonies; though the 1936-41 flow towards Ethiopia never materialized because of a lack of interest and time; — rural rhetoric to mobilize rural communities and support propaganda initiatives ‘for’ and ‘through’ these communities. Focusing on the first two groups, the potential outcomes of these policies were limited by certain weaknesses and critical factors: 1. Rural resistance that the regime was unable, or unwilling, to overcome. Though some tendencies towards a more socially advanced distribution of land were clearly present, they were hampered by the fascist need to maintain links with the powerful rural lobbies of large-scale landowners. These provided an important element of support to the regime, but were opposed to any redistribution of land. As a result, the official attitude towards the land ownership regimes was conservative (or, more precisely, reactionary), in spite of the official favourable stance on redistribution policies. Resistance also arose in other rural sectors, such as opposition to the introduction of tractors during the Battle for Wheat, due to high unemployment among rural workers. 2. Internal contradictions. The regime expressed contradictory views regarding rural territories and the agricultural sector, depending on which interests were most active in lobbying. The agrarian agenda changed over the years and lack of continuity hindered the achievement of policy objectives. The range of fascist rural policies reflected the technocratic views of Serpieri, the social expectations of fascist tradeunionism, and the conservative interests of landowners. 3. More generally, unrealistic ambitions and what has been incisively defined as the ‘incredible lack of correspondence between facts and words’ (Ragionieri, 1975: 2231) affected the regime’s rural policies and other areas of intervention. It has also been suggested that the rural policy suffered from short-sightedness, with initiatives aimed at mitigating current crises rather than creating the structural conditions for a more central role of agriculture within the national economy (Di Michele, 1995: 243-267). 4. As far as the ‘external front’ was concerned, we again find contradictory elements that influenced the concrete achievements of fascist policies. Though fascism found ideological connections with the rurally-based authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe, competitive agricultural interests created the conditions for weak 73

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

cooperation. More coherence was evident in the Italian expansion in Africa: which would give the regime the possibility of re-settling its rural masses in the new colonies and thereby mitigate clashes among the various agrarian classes in the Italian countryside. The policy priorities of the regime are another critical aspect to consider. Agrarian resistance was actually only as important as the subordination of agriculture to the interests of large-scale manufacturing, which was clearly evident in the ‘Quota 90’ policy aimed at supporting the import-based manufacturing sector (Preti, 1973: 817). When the interests of the agrarian sector conflicted with manufacturing interests, the regime protected the latter. In more general terms, the primary sector was often ‘used’ as a buffer sector to absorb employment fluctuations in manufacturing, as a source of cheap inputs, and as an outlet for machinery and chemicals. Beyond these limits and contradictions, some results were achieved in selfsufficiency in the wheat supply, recovering farm land, technological innovation, and access to land for rural households. Both technological and social elements of transformation led to what several authors have referred to as a ‘contradictory modernization’ (Tranfaglia, 1995: 127-138).12 From a technological perspective, modernization was expressed by strengthening the role of institutions such as the Cattedre ambulanti and the Stazioni sperimentali, and supporting research and technology transfer in order to strengthen land reclamation and campaigns related to the Battle for Wheat. Serpieri is noteworthy as an influential policy-maker of the regime and, above all, as a highly competent scientist who understood the backwardness of Italian agriculture. Social and cultural elements of ‘contradictory modernization’ can be found in the philosophy of establishing an agriculture that was ‘enrolled’ in a collective mobilization led by the State in pursuit of common goals. This enrolment implied the transformation of territories, changes in production patterns, and migratory movements that destroyed and re-created rural communities. The Battle for Wheat provides an example: through extensive use of the media and a widespread presence throughout the land, the regime broadcast its key words, slogans, and symbols into rural areas. The effect was to create a common language and, to a certain extent, a common identity for rural communities that had until then been completely isolated (Della Valentina, 1994: 432). The subordination of agrarian interests, as part of the enrolment of the sector into the economic goals of the whole, can be considered an ele12 The term modernization, with or without the adjective contradictory, is used in these comments as a neutral term, without any specific positive or negative judgment of value per se.

74

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

ment of modernization, at least in the contested sense that this term acquired during the twentieth century. Another relevant element of modernization can be found in the contents and tools of rural propaganda. The regime used the rhetoric of rurality and the symbolic meaning of food to strengthen its propaganda through and for rural people, while also using the more advanced mass media and public education system. The ‘rational’ image of the new farming communities and the emphasis on the widespread use of chemicals and tractors, along with hybridization, were in line with the general modernist rhetoric of the regime, which ranged from technology to culture and art, in contrast with Nazi Germany. It is important to underscore that almost all these elements apply mostly to northern Italy alone. In the north, increased production was based on technological and organizational change, whereas in the south it resulted from the increase in land dedicated to wheat cultivation. The mobilization campaigns were also much more effective in north-central Italy than in the deep south. In general terms, the questione meridionale (the on-going debate among social scientists and policy makers regarding the backwardness of the Mezzogiorno and strategies to overcome it) was abandoned during the regime and replaced with a single policy approach for the entire country. At the end of the regime, rural Mezzogiorno still suffered from severe backwardness, a condition that had been revealed in surveys and inquiries at the end of the prior century. Other long-term issues continued after fascism and were inherited by post-war Italy: ­— the need for land reform, which after years of propaganda were finally addressed in the 1950s governments led by the Christian Democrats, due to the pressure of Catholic and communist agricultural organizations (including a debate in which the aged Arrigo Serpieri participated); —a technological gap remained in many agricultural areas, general economic and social backwardness in rural areas and poor living conditions in rural communities throughout the country, especially in the south. The most enduring element of the regime has been the pervasive tendency towards public intervention in agriculture, with its plethora of public institutions, bodies, agencies, and expenditures. This feature of modernization, with its various positive and negative implications, survived the decades that followed fascism and even found its way into the context of a capitalist and industrialized country.

75

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Bibliography Bernangozzi, Giampaolo (1981-82), ‘Dall’informazione al consenso attraverso i cinegiornali Luce e gli altri media’, in Massimo Legnani, Domenico Preti and Giorgio Rochat (ed.) (1981-82), Le campagne emiliane in periodo fascista. Materiali e ricerche sulla battaglia del grano, Bologna, Istituto regionale per la storia delle resistenza e della guerra di liberazione in Emilia-Romagna, Annale 2, p. 429-458. Bertini, Fabio (2004), Le parti e le controparti. Le organizzazioni del lavoro dal Risorgimento alla Liberazione, Milan, Franco Angeli.

Bevilacqua, Piero (ed.) (1989-91), Storia dell’agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea, 3 vols, Venice, Marsilio.

Borejsza, Jerzy W. (1981), Il fascismo e l’Europa Orientale. Dalla propaganda all’aggressione, Bari, Laterza, 1981.

Brianta, Donata (1983), ‘Risicoltura e Fascismo negli anni della crisi: alle origini dell’Ente Nazionale Risi’, in Bertolini Braga and others (ed.) (1983), Agricoltura e forze sociali in Lombardia nella crisi degli anni Trenta, Milan, Franco Angeli. Burgwyn, James H. (2006), Empire on the Adriatic. Mussolini’s Conquest of Yugoslavia 1941-1943, Gorizia, Libreria Editrice Goriziana.

Cannistraro, Philip V. (1975), La fabbrica del consenso. Fascismo e mass media, Bari, Laterza.

Chapin Metz, Hellen (1987), Libya: A Country Study, Washington, Library of Congress.

Cohen, Jon S. (1976), ‘Rapporti agricoltura-industria e sviluppo agricolo’, in Pierluigi Ciocca and Gianni Toniolo (ed.) (1976), L’economia italiana del periodo fascista, Bologna, Il Mulino, p. 370-407. Cordova, Ferdinando (1990), Le origini dei sindacati fascisti, Milan, La Nuova Italia, RCS Libri.

Cordova, Ferdinando (2005), Verso lo Stato totalitario: sindacati, società e fascismo, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino.

Corni, Gustavo (1987), ‘La politica agraria del fascismo: Un confronto tra Italia e Germania’, Studi Storici, 28, p. 385-422. Crainz, Guido (1994), Padania, Rome, Donzelli.

De Cillis, Emanuele (1934), Conference held at the XVI International Congress of Agriculture, Budapest.

De Felice, Franco (1979), ‘Fascismo e mezzogiorno’, Annali dell’Istituto Alcide Cervi, I, p. 336-347. De Felice, Renzo (1966), Mussolini il fascista, Turin, Einaudi.

76

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

De Felice, Renzo (1978), Autobiografia del fascismo, Bergamo, Minerva Italica.

Del Boca, Angelo (1979), Gli italiani in Africa Orientale. Vol. 2: La conquista dell’Impero, Bari, Laterza. Del Boca, Angelo (1982), Gli italiani in Africa Orientale. Vol. 3: La caduta dell’Impero, Rome-Bari, La-terza. Del Boca, Angelo (1997), Gli italiani in Libia, Milan, Mondadori.

Del Boca, Angelo (1998), Gli Italiani in Libia. Dal Fascismo a Gheddafi, Bari, Laterza. Del Boca, Angelo; Legnani, Massimo and Rossi, Mario G. (eds.) (1995), Il regime fascista. Storia e storiografia, Bari, Laterza.

Della Valentina, Gianluigi (1994), ‘Meccanica agraria e modernizzazione dell’agricoltura italiana’, in Pier Paolo D’Attorre and Alberto De Bernardi (eds.) (1994), Studi sull’agricoltura italiana–Società rurale e modernizzazione, Milan, Annali Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, p. 403-438. Di Michele, Andrea (1995), ‘I diversi volti del ruralismo fascista’, in Italia contemporanea, p. 243-267. Dominioni, Matteo (2008), Lo sfascio dell’impero. Gli Italiani in Etiopia 1936-1941 Bari, Laterza.

Ercolani, Paolo (1969), Documentazione statistica di base, in Giorgio Fuá (ed.) (1969), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia, Milan, Franco Angeli, p. 380-460.

Failla, Osvaldo and Fumi, Giampiero (2006), Gli agronomi in Lombardia: dalle cattedre ambulanti ad oggi, Rome, Franco Angeli.

Faita, Pietro A. (1995), La politica agraria del fascismo: i rapporti fra le classi rurali, le scelte produttive, Chivasso, IRRSAE Piemonte Progetto Storia. Fuà, Giorgio (1969), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia, vol. III, Milan, Franco Angeli.

Gori, Elisa (2009), Indirizzi di politica linguistica e di politica scolastica ed educativa durante il fascismo (1923-1939), [accessed on May 2012]. ISTAT-National Institute of Statistics (1976), Sommario di Statistiche Storiche

dell’Italia, 1861-1975, Rome.

ISTAT-National Institute of Statistics (1986), Sommario di Statistiche Storiche

dell’Italia, 1926-1985, Rome.

Labanca, Nicola (2007), Oltremare. Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Legnani, Massimo (1995), ‘Sistema di potere fascista, blocco dominante, alleanze sociali’, in Angelo Del Boca, Massimo Legnani and Mario G. Rossi (eds.), Il regime fascista. Storia e storiografia, Bari, Laterza, p. 414-446. 77

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Legnani, Massimo; Preti, Domenico and Rochat, Giorgio (eds.) (1981-82), Le campagne emiliane in periodo fascista. Materiali e ricerche sulla battaglia del grano, Bologna, Istituto regionale per la storia delle resistenza e della guerra di liberazione in Emilia-Romagna, Annale 2.

Lupo, Salvatore (2000), Il fascismo. La politica in un regime totalitario, Rome, Donzelli.

Luti, Giorgio (1996), Cronache letterarie tra le due guerre, 1929-1940, Bari, Laterza. Mussolini, Benito (1928), ‘Sfollare le città’, Il Popolo d’Italia.

Nenci, Giacomina (1997), Le campagne italiane in età contemporanea. Un bilancio storio-grafico, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Orlando, Giuseppe (1969), ‘Progressi e difficoltà dell’agricoltura’, in Fuà, Giorgio (1969), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia, vol. III, Milan, Franco Angeli, p. 90-93.

Pennacchi, Antonio (2009), Fascio e martello. Viaggio per le città del Duce, Bari, Laterza. Preti, Domenico (1973), ‘La politica agraria del fascismo: Note introduttive’, Studi Storici, Anno XIV, 4, p. 802-1269.

Preti, Domenico (1980), Economia e istituzioni nello Stato fascista, Rome, Editori Riuniti.

Preti, Domenico (1982), Per una storia agraria e del malessere agrario nell’Italia fascista: la battaglia del grano, in Massimo Legnani, Domenico Preti and Giorgio Rochat (eds.) (1981-82), Le campagne emiliane in periodo fascista. Materiali e ricerche sulla battaglia del grano, Bologna, Istituto regionale per la storia delle resistenza e della guerra di liberazione in Emilia-Romagna, Annale 2, p. 27-78. Ragionieri, Ernesto (1975), ‘Dall’Unità a oggi: La storia politica e sociale’, in Storia d’Italia, vol. IV, 3, Turin, Einaudi, p. 1667-2483

Reichardt, Sven (2009), Camicie nere, camicie brune. Milizie fasciste in Italia e in Germania, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Rivera, Vincenzo (1941), ‘Punti fermi sulla colonizzazione agricola dell’Impero etiopico’, Rivista delle Colonie, XV/9-10, (1941-XIX), p. 2201-2206. Rochat, Giorgio (2005), Le guerre italiane 1935-1943, Turin, Einaudi, 2005.

Rodogno, Davide (2006), Fascism’s European Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Roveri, Alessandro (1972), Dal sindacalismo rivoluzionario al fascismo. Capitalismo agrario e socialismo nel Ferrarese (1870-1920), Florence, La Nuova Italia.

Sala, Teodoro (2008), Il fascismo italiano e gli slavi del sud, Trieste, Edizioni dell’Istituto Regionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione/IRSML.

78

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Sapelli, Giulio (1978), ‘Per la storia del sindacalismo fascista: tra controllo sociale e conflitto di classe’, in Studi storici, Anno XIX, 3, p. 627-656. Sbacchi, Alberto (1980), Il colonialismo italiano in Etiopia, Milan, Mursia.

Sereni, Emilio (1968), Il capitalismo nelle campagne (1860-1900), Turin, Einaudi.

Stampacchia, Mauro (2000), Ruralizzare l’Italia! Agricoltura e bonifiche tra Mussolini e Serpieri (1928-1943), Rome, Franco Angeli.

Tranfaglia, Nicola (1995), La modernizzazione contraddittoria negli anni della stabilizza-zione del regime (1926-1936) in Angelo Del Boca, Massimo Legnani and Mario G. Rossi (eds.) (1995), Il regime fascista. Storia e storiografia, Bari, Laterza, p. 127-139. Villari, Rosario (1976), ‘La crisi del blocco agrario’, in Valerio Castronovo (ed.) (1976), L’Italia contemporanea 1945-1975, Turin, Einaudi.

Willson, Perry R. (2002), Peasant women and politics in Fascist Italy: the Massaie rurali, London, Routledge.

79

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Appendix. Some basic statistic data on Italy

Table 2.1. Active population per economic sector (% on total active population)

agriculture manufacturing, trade, finance, various public totals % of active fishering transport insurance administrations population hunting commmunications on total

1921

56.2

28.6

6.0

4.2

5.0

100

47.6

1931

51.0

31.2

7.7

4.6

5.5

100

44.5

1936

48.2

31.8

8.7

5.4

5.9

100

43.8

Source: Preti (1973).

Table 2.2. Active population in agriculture 1921 (Total active population in agriculture: 10,200,000)

3,427,000



696,000

Independent farmers

33.6%

Tenants

6.8%



1,590,000

Sharecroppers

15.6%

4,465,000

Waged workers

43.8%



22,000

Others

0.2%

1931 (Total active population in agriculture: 8,082,000)

2,290,000

Independent farmers



1,000,000

Tenants

12.4%

37%



1,657,000

Sharecroppers

20.5%



2,408,000

Waged workers

29.8%



27,000

Others

0.3%

1936 (Total active population in agriculture: 8,755,000)

2,930,000

Independent farmers

33.5%



1,631,000

Tenants

18.6%



1,788,000

Sharecroppers

20.4%



2,379,000

Waged workers

27.2%



27,000

Others

0.3%

Source: Cohen (1976).

80

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

Table 2.3. Gross Internal Product for Agriculture (Billions of 1938 liras)

Agriculture

Total

Share



1920

35

102

34.31%



1930

36.8

126

29.21%



1940

39.7

163

24.36%



1950

38.8

173

22.43%

Source: Ercolani (1969).

Table 2.4. Gross Capital Stock for Agriculture (Billions of 1938 liras)

Agriculture Total economy Land Land Machinery Total improvements reclamations and tools Agriculture

Share

1920

21.4

2.19

1.8

25.5

486

5.25%

1930

21.7

3.15

2.5

27.3

619

4.41%

1940

29.7

6.45

3.31

39.4

806

4.89%

1950

33.1

8.76

6.16

48

782

6.14%

Source: Ercolani (1969).

Table 2.5. Fertilizers consumption (thousands of quintals)

Nitrates

Phosphates

Potash

Others

Total



1930-31

2203

11,013

275

16

13,507



1934-35

3780

11,335

721*

161

15,997



1938-39

7567

17,315

464

275

25,621

Source: ISTAT (1986).

81

Backwardness, modernization, propaganda

Table 2.6. Tractor engines used in Italian agriculture

North + Center Number Variation

South + Islands % Imported Number Variation

Per 1000 hectares

1928

16,156  

2,028  

82.8%

0.7

1932

24,605

52.3%

3,556

75.3%

79.8%

1.0

1936

31,238

27.0%

4,525

27.2%

74.9%

1.3

1940

36,969

18.3%

5,391

19.1%

69.4%

1.5

Sources: Cohen (1976), and ISTAT (1976). Elaboration by the Autor.

Table 2.7. Value of gross production per hectare in 1938 liras (average of the period) – proxy for technical improvement in farming activity Cereals

Potatoes and legumes

Green and industrial

Oil

Wine

Livestock

1909-11

1130

1041

n.a.

1274

4671

1064

1923-25

1322

1118

9058

1607

5653

1214

Source: Orlando (1969).

82

13,007

1941-50

Source: ISTAT (1976).

13,122

1931-40

Crops from arable land (1)

13,213



1921-30

 

2371

2107

1640

Wood plants (2)

5292

6112

6691

5660

5568

5562 1571

1591

1327 27,901

28,500

28,453 2355

2514

2559

Absolute values (1.000 hectares) Permanent Forests Others Total agric. Non fodder (4) (5) + forest productive crops (3) (6)

30,256

31,014

31,012

Italy

(1)

46.6

46.0

46.4

Table 2.8. Farming land according to use

8.5

7.4

5.6

(2)

19.0

21.5

23.5 20.3

19.5

19.6

Shares on (6) (3) (4)

5.6

5.6

4.7

(5)

100

100

100

Total

Stefano Grando & Gianluca Volpi

83

3.

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture, 1933-1950 Daniel Lanero Táboas

I.

Introduction

This article examines the agrarian policy implemented by the Portuguese Estado Novo, or New State, from its establishment in 1933 through the early post-World War II years. An interpretative synthesis is presented, based on the main contributions in this field by recent Portuguese agrarian historiography. The Estado Novo was a dictatorial political regime that ruled Portugal for forty years, from 1933 to 1974. It followed the Military Dictatorship, which in May of 1926 overthrew the liberal Republican regime that had been ruling since the fall of the monarchy in 1910 (Ramos, 1994; Marques, 1997). Due to the heterogeneity of the social and political forces that had converged to support the coup d’état against the Republic, it took until 1934 for the Military Dictatorship to resolve the political instability characterising the final years of the Republican regime (Farinha, 1998; Patriarca, 2000). In fact, the various forces supporting the coup favoured different and even opposite political projects. While the liberal republicans, conservatives and radicals interpreted the Military Dictatorship as a phase of transition towards the restoration of a regenerated liberal Republic, other anti-liberal and anti-democratic forces (conservative military figures, monarchists, integralists, and pro-fascists) sought to institutionalize the dictatorship in line with their conservative corporative, fascist, or monarchist tendencies (Rosas, 2004: 5566; 76-82; Costa Pinto, 1994). Once the democratic forces had been marginalized, from a succession of ephemeral military governments emerged the figure of Antonio Oliveira Salazar, backed by Catholics, pro-fascists, and integralists. Salazar was a professor of economics at the University of Coimbra who had been appointed Minister of Finance (1928), Minister of the Colonies (1930), and Prime Minister in July, 1932 (Lucena, 2000: 283-368; Costa Pinto, 2001: 1055-1076). He sidelined the most radical right-wing forces (the monarchists and integralists) and was backed by the conservative military republicans along with the União Nacional (National Union), a political organisation created in 1930 that would later become the single party of the regime (Braga da Cruz, 1988). 85

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

In March, 1933, the project for a political constitution was voted on and approved, marking the first step in the institutionalisation of the Estado Novo. An authoritarian regime was established under a personal dictatorship that formally maintained a certain liberal appearance with provisions such as legislative control of the executive power, as well as direct elections to the National Assembly and Presidency of the Republic (Lucena, 1976; Rosas, 1994a: 268-283). Ideologically, this regime was clearly conservative, Catholic, and corporative (Costa Pinto, 2005: 1-7). Much more debatable is whether the Estado Novo, or Salazarism, was in fact a fascist dictatorship (Braga da Cruz, 1982: 773-794; Lucena, 1994: 9-32). The political nature of this question would require a comparative analysis with the classical fascisms of Italy and Germany. However, during the period studied here (1930s and 1940s), the Portuguese regime demonstrated many political, economic, and cultural characteristics that easily identify it with the international family of fascist regimes that existed during the interwar period (Loff, 2008). More specifically, it fits what is currently called the fascistized or para-fascist group of dictatorships (Griffin, 1991: 120-128; Kallis, 2003: 219-249), or counter-revolutionary regimes disguised as revolutionary or pro-fascist (Griffin, 1991: 120-121).1 Aside from the Portuguese Estado Novo, the list of political regimes that various scholars have classified as para-fascist includes Greece under Metaxas, Francoism in Spain, and some of the Central European dictatorships of the 1920s and 1930s (Hungary, Romania, and Austria in the years prior to the Anchluss). From a formal perspective, the Estado Novo appears to have most similarities with the para-fascist, conservative dictatorship of Admiral Horthy, who ruled Hungary from 1920-1944 (Colloti, 1994: 155-158).2 Griffin defines them very graphically when stating that: ‘A para–fascist regime, however ritualistic its style of politics, well orchestrated its leader cult, palingenetic its rhetoric, ruthless its terror apparatus, fearsome its paramilitary league, dynamic its youth organization or monolithic its state party, will react to genuine fascism as a threat, and though it may be forced to seek a fascist movement’s cooperation to secure populist support or ward off common enemies (…), such a regime will take the first opportunity to neutralize it’ (Griffin, 1991, 121-122). 1

Hungary also maintained a liberal institutional appearance, including legislative elections and a parliament, but was restricted to the various currents within the power block. The composition of the power block itself (landed aristocracy, military forces, and the Catholic Church) was similar to that of the Estado Novo. While both dictatorships impeded the growth of the most clearly pro-fascist parties and movements, such as the Nacionalsindicalistas of Rolão Preto in Portugal and the Party of National Will of Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, they also exhibited moments of great proximity to fascist orthodoxy. The Hungarian dictatorship drew close to Italian fascism during the government of General Gömbos in the second half of the 1920s. The Estado Novo entered a process of fascistization that coincided chronologically with the Spanish Civil War and the early years of World War II. A significant difference between the two countries was the strong anti-Semitism present in Hungary as an important element in the counterrevolutionary offensive that ended the brief Soviet Republic of Bela Kun.

2

86

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Elements in common with the fascist and para-fascist dictatorships can also be detected in the ideological approach of the Estado Novo to the main rural and agrarian policies: achieving self-sufficiency in the food supply, the creation of corporative institutional structures for compulsory integration of rural society and the agrarian economy, a preference for technical agrarian reform, the concession of power to engineers for the management and implementation of agrarian policy, the real presence of a ruralist sector that disputed political hegemony with the forces favouring industrial development, resulting in the conflictive subordination of agriculture to industrial economic interests. Two political characteristics of the dictatorship help to identify the most basic features common to Portuguese agrarian fascism within the Estado Novo: Catholicism and the centrality of ruralism as an ideology. The Estado Novo built into its discourse an idealized view of the rural world as a harmonious society free from class conflict and preserving the essence and virtues of the race (Melo, 2001: 44-46). The Salazar dictatorship sought to project the traditional rural order of lords and peasants onto the entire Portuguese society. In contrast with the images offered by Nazism, this was no romantic or nostalgic dream of an idealized rural past but a reality that the regime sought to maintain at any cost (Rosas, 1994a: 47-53; Amaral, 1994b: 432) (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). This article describes the evolution of the Estado Novo policies for the rural world between 1933 and 1950. The question of interest is whether or not domestic policies were intended to generate political action programmes for modernising Portuguese agriculture.3 We will examine the content of these programmes, the social groups, or political elites that promoted them, the support and resistance they met with during implementation, and finally the specific results that were achieved. Before delving into these questions, it is helpful to include a brief description of the main agrarian regions of continental Portugal in the early 1930s, just prior to the establishment of the Estado Novo. A very simplified outline identifies two great agrarian regions separated by the Tagus River and the Central mountain range (Oliveira Baptista, 1993: 147-155). To the north of this line was the Family Farming Zone.4 It is defined by a disperse rural population, small and very fragmented agrarian operations (minifundios), with Along similar lines, though comparing the Estado Novo and Francoism, see Clar (2008). See also Freire and Lanero (2013). For the Portuguese case, see Lains (2003) and (2009). 3

It includes the districts to the north of the regions of Estremadura, Ribatejo and Beira Baixa, and specifically: Viana do Castelo, Braga, Porto, Aveiro, Coimbra, Leiria, Vila Real, Bragança, Viseu and Guarda (Figure 3.1). 4

87

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

mixed crop and cattle farming (maize, vegetable gardens, small vineyards, orchards, and cattle grazing pastures). The one exception in this zone was the area around the Douro River, which specialized in vineyards. The social structure mainly involved small nobility, who generally functioned as absentee owners that leased their large estates or parcelled out the land to a multitude of subsistence sharecroppers (Silva, 1994: 379-398). South of the Central mountain range and the Tagus River were the Campos do Sul, characterized by extensive wheat production, crop rotation, and sections of land left fallow every five to seven years.5 Any loss from fallow land was compensated by extensive sheep and pig farming along with cork and olive harvesting. In this area of large agrarian landholdings (latifundios), the rural population was composed mainly of agricultural labourers concentrated in villages. The social structure of this area was polarized, with a few landholders at the top and the great mass of agricultural workers at the base (Barros, 1980: 15-27; Oliveira Baptista, 1980: 341-372; Barros, 1986; Cutileiro, 2004: 23-80). Portugal also had a vast colonial empire overseas. The two largest Portuguese colonies in southern Africa were Angola and Mozambique. The political and ideological significance of the Portuguese African colonies for the Estado Novo has often been highlighted, but their economic contribution in the agrarian sphere must also be recognized. This involved the cultivation and production of cotton, rice, oils, coffee, sugar cane, and sisal in the plantations of Portuguese settlers, mainly using foreign capital and by means of concessions (Castelo, 2007). In addition, the monopoly of the colonial market had enabled wine production, a main subsector of the Portuguese agrarian economy, to survive difficulties in capturing foreign markets for its surplus of low-quality common wine during the agrarian crisis of the turn of the century. Although colonial agriculture had its own evolution during this period, it was closely linked to the mainland Portuguese economy (Clarence-Smith, 1985: 146-191).

II.

The Estado Novo in the 1930s: the age of agrarian fascism

The early years of the Estado Novo show clear continuity between the measures of the new regime regarding agrarian policy and the actions of the prior Military Dictatorship (1926-32). A coherent agrarian policy with national objectives only came into existence after Rafael Duque became Minister of Agriculture in 1934 (Amaral, 1994b: 432-434; Rosas, 2000: 190-192). Until then, the Estado Novo mainly pro In Oliveira Baptista (1993: 152-154) this refers to three districts of the Alentejo region that were dominated by latifundios: Portalegre, Beja and Évora. Following Rosas (2000:195), here they refer generally to the regions with large agricultural estates to the south of the Tagus River (Figure 3.1).

5

88

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Figure 3.1. Portugal. District Divisions

Elaboration by the Autor.

89

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

tected the economic interests of large rural lobbies and responded to their requests for aid in facing the difficulties that the international economic crisis posed for the various agrarian subsectors. The political solution adopted was to replace market mechanisms with State intervention in the agrarian economy, particularly at the level of commercialization. Remunerative prices were set for purchase of the main national agricultural commodities, accompanied by fixed sales prices for consumers. Competing foreign products were restricted as imports, exports, and internal commerce became centralised. The implementation of these measures in 1932 constituted the early stages of development of a corporative organisation in Portuguese agriculture. A complementary dimension of the protectionist economic programme in the early 1930s was that it maintained large-scale agricultural interests, namely the quest for self-sufficiency in the food supply. This, along with the social and political control of rural society and maintenance of low salaries for agricultural work defined the axes of Portuguese agrarian policy until the beginning of World War II, in spite of some attempts at reform that we shall later analyse. The concrete political measures implemented to achieve these objectives were accompanied by ongoing repression of the rural population under the fist of the dictatorship (Oliveira Baptista, 1996: 749-754; Flunser Pimentel, 2007; Madeira, Flunser Pimentel, Farinha, 2007). This combination of agrarian protectionism and food autarky was especially evident in the production of the two main Portuguese agricultural products, wheat and wine, though similar measures were applied nationally to other products such as oil, rice, and wool. Directly inspired by the Italian fascists’ Bataglia del Grano, the paradigmatic Campanha do Trigo (1929-33) was initially launched in Portugal by the Military Dictatorship that spanned from 1926 to 1932 (Machado et al., 1976; Machado et al., 1978; Martins, 1987: 337-354). The Estado Novo established a credit line for cultivating new land and promised to buy wheat at a fixed price. It sought to increase cultivated land surface and national wheat production, even though during the first third of the twentieth century wheat had become practically the only crop in the Alentejo-Campos do Sul region. The Campanha do Trigo, or wheat campaign, helped to avoid the negative effects of the 1929 crisis and received broad support during its early years from various segments of the Portuguese rural population. It especially favoured the latifundistas (large estate owners) of the south, but also the mid-size estate owners, who received a good income from cultivation of their lands. Even farmers barely above the condition of agricultural labourers received reasonable economic returns for the great risk of leasing or sharecropping lands ceded by large estate owners. However, the latter were hurt most by annual over-production beginning in 1931, which led the State to withdraw its credit line in 1933. High official purchase prices were maintained as the primary support measure for the agricultural sector until 1965 (Amaral, 1996a: 116-117). 90

Daniel Lanero Táboas

The crisis caused by the wheat surplus and the related decrease in sales prices led to reinforced State intervention in the grain sub-sector in an effort to stabilise the market. Free market operations were prohibited in 1933 and various institutions within the complex network of corporative government organisms were given the responsibility of regulating exchanges in this sector: the Federação Nacional dos Produtores de Trigo (National Federation of Wheat Producers); the Federação Nacional dos Industriais de Moagem (National Milling Federation), and the Instituto Nacional do Pão (National Bread Institute) (Lucena, 1991: 97-206; Amaral, 1996c: 98-183; Saraiva, 2010: 457-498). Protective policies for wine production were also a standard feature throughout the entire existence of the Estado Novo, even though they generally went against the economic rationale of internal and external markets. From the crisis of 1929 on, a series of political measures were taken to guarantee the profitability of vineyards and wine production: the storage capacity of State-dependent organisms was increased, internal consumption was promoted, massive surpluses of low-quality wine were placed on the colonial markets, and production subsidies were offered (Freire, 1996b: 1011-1014; 2010: 139-197). The main demand of the Portuguese wine lobby was for Estado Novo intervention to avoid large annual fluctuations in the sales price of wine. Again, the ‘solution’ was to place wine producers, wholesalers, and merchants within complex local and regional corporative frameworks beginning in 1932 (Freire, 2000: 175-198). The best example of this was the Junta Nacional do Vinho (National Wine Council) which throughout the dictatorship controlled production, financing and storage, especially of common wine. The measures taken during the 1930s established the main lines of the Estado Novo policies for the vineyards and wine industry, which were clearly more concerned with guaranteeing a purchaser for growers than enhancing the quality of the final product. Even after the 1930s, these measures coexisted with contradictory measures designed to alleviate the structural problems of Portuguese wine production, such as restrictions on planting new varieties of grapes, technical assistance for improving wine-making processes and support for cooperative wine production after 1950. Structural over-production and low quality wine defined the sector during the entire Estado Novo period. The great victims of the Estado Novo agrarian policy in the 1930s were the small farms of the northern Family Farming Zone. Their specialised production – pork, beef, dairy, potato, wood – was hit hard by the international economic crisis, and they received no commercial protective measures of the sort implemented for wheat, wine, and oils.

91

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

To ensure social and political control of the rural world and maintain low agricultural salaries, the Estado Novo combined repressive police measures with the creation ex novo of an organizational structure for rural membership: the organização corporativa da lavoura (corporative organization for agriculture). The regime had already outlawed strikes and the few class trade unions representing rural workers, which had had a certain presence in the conflictive Campos do Sul after 1910 (Pacheco Pereira, 1983: 106-116). Another initiative along these lines was State financing of a rural improvement programme to create jobs by improving small-scale local infrastructure, combat seasonal agricultural unemployment, and ensure the availability of a stable group of workers to large estate owners. Within the complex and confusing network of corporative entities were the Casas do Povo (People’s Houses), created in 1933. These organisms had a mixed membership of agricultural landowners and rural workers from a particular locality. The design of this institution reflected a common fascist perception of the rural world as a harmonious society bound together by religion and the benevolence of paternalist ‘lords’; which thus would have avoided any class conflict. One of their most relevant objectives was the ‘negotiation’ of collective labour contracts between the large agricultural estate owners, who directed the process, and the salaried workers. Thus, the Casas do Povo functioned as a labour pool, providing low-cost day labourers to the latifundistas of southern Portugal (Oliveira Baptista, 1993: 350-351; Freire, 2012: 273-302). Another corporativist agrarian structure worth examining is the Organismos de Coordenação Económica (Economic Coordination Organisms: OCE). These were autonomous entities within the State structure that had ambiguous and varying responsibilities ranging from the monopolistic regulation of production, transformation, and commercialization of certain agricultural products such as wheat, oils, and wine, to intervention in mainland and colonial commercial markets. Although they incorporated private interests, they were a clear example of State intervention. The Estado Novo channelled the demands of the various production, processing, and merchant lobbies linked to each agrarian subsector through the OCE, which arbitrated their disputes (Lucena, 1978: 817-862; 1979a: 117-167; 1979b: 287-355). The specific policies applied in the wheat, wine, and oil subsectors, such as the creation of a new rural institutional structure, the corporative agricultural organization, fell within the main objective of the Estado Novo for the agrarian economy and rural society: to ensure and strengthen dominance of large-scale traditional agrarian interests. As a social stratum, the latifundistas were vital and almost indispensible to the institutions and longevity of the regime. Their continual presence in the political decision-making centres of the Estado Novo provided them

92

Daniel Lanero Táboas

with a significant level of lobbying influence. This elite group of absentee landowners was fairly heterogeneous internally, due to their geographical origins (northern or southern regions) and the specific agrarian subsector upon which their economic power was based (grain, wine, oils, cattle). There were, however, a series of common features. They controlled local and regional matters at all levels (economically, socially, and politically). They held local and provincial political posts (as mayors, city clerks, civil governors) or delegated them to people of their choosing. They were the leading local and district representatives of the União Nacional, the single party of the regime. They chaired corporative agricultural entities such as the Grémios da Lavoura (agricultural guilds), Casas do Povo, Uniões (unions), and Federações (federations). They were involved in the branches of the Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa (Central Association of Portuguese Agriculture), the only organization representing employer’s agrarian interests that the Estado Novo had allowed to survive outside the new corporative structure. In reality, however, they were another tentacle of the Estado Novo in the peripheral territories and had been woven into the political regime itself. The most relevant figures of this rural elite occupied high political posts in Lisbon: as deputies in the National Assembly, directors of the Economic Coordination Organisms, secretaries of State and ministers of agriculture. From these platforms of economic and political power they exerted themselves fully in defence of an ultraconservative view of the Portuguese countryside and applied political pressure in the interests of the various sector lobbies. The most organized of the large pressure groups or agrarian lobbies that have been identified represented the latifundistas of the south (Rosas, 1994a: 41-47; Amaral, 1994a: 889-906; 1994b: 432-434). Aside from defending their overall interests, this lobby also became remarkably specialized in managing the agricultural subsectors of the Campos do Sul. Support for the Estado Novo from the senhores do pão, the large-scale wheat growers of the Alentejo, was partly the consequence of the fact that the national wheat protection tariffs were done away with during the First Republic (1910-26). This State policy had begun at the end of the nineteenth century (Reis, 1993: 33-85) and had resulted in a large increase in the wheat-producing surface in the region, to the extent that it almost became the only crop. In order to lower the price of bread during and after World War I, the Republican governments abandoned the protectionist grain policy and encouraged the importation of foreign wheat. As a result, the wheat growers of the Alentejo supported the military coup of May, 1926. The subsequent Campanha do Trigo was the moment of greatest understanding between the agrarian policy of the dictatorship and the interests of large-scale wheat producers. ­

93

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

The wine lobby also became highly influential; though internally it was more heterogeneous than the large agrarian interests of the south, due to the regional specificity of Portuguese viticulture. Here, there was a clear distinction between the interests of large-scale Port wine producers/merchants around the Douro River, who targeted the British market, and the common wine producer/wholesaler/merchant lobby of the central regions (West, Estremadura, Ribatejo, and Beira Alta), who were always concerned about overproduction and sought control of supply over both continental Portugal and the wine reserves of the colonial market. Their interests were protected by the creation of specific corporative structures for viticulture, beginning in 1933. Prominent members of the Portuguese viticulture lobby were placed at the head of the new OCE for this subsector. There was also a lobby for large-scale agriculture in northern Portugal, with a radical conservative ideology and heavily regional features (in contrast with the national flavour of southern agrarian discourse). Their main objective was to defend and preserve the archaic status quo of agricultural artisanship and family agriculture in the north (which guaranteed its dominance by means of self-reproduction). These were threatened by urbanisation, industrialisation, and the ‘excesses’ of the free market. The large-scale agrarian landowners were always absolutely opposed to agrarian modernization projects, which exacerbated the sector’s many difficulties both before and after World War II. The large-scale agrarian producers and their pressure groups remained highly influential in economic and political spheres until the final stages of the Estado Novo, even after large-scale structural changes in Portugal had ended traditional agriculture and the rural societal model inherent to it.

III.

The failed modernization project of Rafael Duque (1935-39)

The physiocratic intellectual current for reforming Portuguese agriculture had begun in the late eighteenth century and developed significantly during the following 150 years. Their proposals built upon a diagnosis of the Portuguese agrarian economy as decadent and backward vis-à-vis the more advanced European agricultural economies (Rosas, 2000: 154-187). A leading agrarian reform thinker of the early twentieth century was Oliveira Martins, who considered the true issue facing Portuguese agriculture to be an imbalance in the structure of land ownership. In the north, plots of land were excessively fragmented and even atomized, which made subsistence difficult for the over-abundant population. The south, especially the Alentejo, was dominated by large estate ownership and sparse population, so that large tracts of land were exploited rather inefficiently. Oliveira Martins proposed consolidating property 94

Daniel Lanero Táboas

in the north while dividing property in the south and re-locating excess population from north to south (Amaral, 1996b: 821-832). These ideas were increasingly fashionable during the decades prior to the establishment of the Estado Novo. They gave rise to numerous neo-physiocratic proposals by politicians and intellectuals, some of whom became politically prominent during the Estado Novo, including Rafael Duque and Antonio Salazar (Rosas, 2000: 154-187).6 A significant change in the direction of the Estado Novo agrarian policies occurred when Duque became Minister of Agriculture at the end of 1934, though changes were more evident in programmes and legislation than in concrete results. His proposal sought to reach beyond an overall agrarian policy, to bring about a ‘modernising return to the land’, which he understood as the sine qua non condition for the industrialisation of Portugal. Duque went on to become Minister of Economy in 1940, and by the end of World War II the agrarian reform programme coincided to some extent with the tenets of the industrial sector of the regime. The Duque agrarian reform project was ideologically and philosophically indebted to the earlier Portuguese physiocratic school inspired by Oliveira Martins and especially Ezequiel de Campos (Rosas, 2000: 154-166). Duque diagnosed a sort of Malthusian crisis in rural Portugal: the agricultural sector appeared to be incapable of absorbing the excess rural population and the productive capacity of the land was becoming exhausted. However, the crisis was more artificial than real, as it could be solved by intensifying production. Greater diversification and production would require a reform of the land ownership regime along with a large-scale programme for internal land settlement and hydraulic policies. Three main lines of action shaped the reformist and modernising project of Rafael Duque: correction of the structure of land ownership by dividing the southern latifundios and restructuring the northern minifundios, along with crop diversification and intensification combined with injection of industrial capital into agricultural processing in order to establish an embryonic agro-industrial sector in Portugal (Rosas, 2000: 195-204). In the latifundio regions, the correction of land ownership imbalances was summarised in a four word maxim: irrigate, settle, reorganize, modernize. The objective was to establish new family farms (casais agrícolas) that were economically viable by means of dividing and irrigating extensive arid properties (Oliveira Baptista, 1978: 311-362; Manique, 1987: 221-229). Peasants and salaried rural workers would be installed Rosas (1988: 192-193) used the term ‘neo-phisiocracy’ to categorize this intellectual current of agrarian reformism, a term already coined by Neto (1908: 334).. 6

95

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

there to become a new middle class of peasant owners who would pave the way for agricultural modernization and, ultimately, national economic modernization. Duque and other thinkers from the neo-physiocratic school considered that modification of the land ownership structure would only be possible in conjunction with internal land settlement and hydraulic agriculture. Although these land ownership transformation plans maintained a low profile in order to avoid offending the latifundistas, the reformist project became a legislative reality and developed an institutional infrastructure to oversee implementation. The Junta de Colonização Interna (Domestic Land Settlement Board) was created in 1936 and in 1937 the Hydraulic Agriculture Law was published, with its corresponding Hydraulic Agriculture Plan of 1938. The Reforestation Law was also enacted in 1938. Intensification and diversification of crops was a logical complement to the internal land settlement policy and the conversion of dry lands into irrigated surfaces. There were specific legislative measures to encourage fruit crops and other industrial processing crops such as hemp, flax, or sugar beet. However, the most successful productive diversification activity was the re-population of forest lands in the north. Here again, an industrialising logic was moving forward the agenda of launching a national cellulose industry; which did in fact occur in the 1950s. The third line of the Duque reformist project was to thoroughly transform rural artisan or cottage proto-industries, such as oil presses, mills, tanneries, and milkskimming, by injecting industrially-based capital. However, a budding Portuguese agro-industry was a direct attack on the interests of the latifundistas. They lost economic control over rural artisan industries, which were fundamental to the economic perpetuation and localisation of the salaried workers employed in these activities. The consolidation, reorganisation, and capitalisation that took place actually opened the doors for a rural exodus. The centrality of agriculture within the Portuguese economic modernization process was a theoretical foundation of the Duque reform programme. Industrialization could not occur without agrarian reform, which was entrusted to and driven by science and technique, such as the expansion of irrigation. Duque’s somewhat idealized interpretation suggested that beneficial effects of diversification and intensification would appear almost spontaneously, without extreme social or political tensions. As with the industrial modernization project a few years later, the State played a decisive role in designing, directing, and implementing the new agrarian policy. The Duque modernizing project gave the State responsibility for implementing large infrastructure projects for irrigation, forest re-population, guidance of internal 96

Daniel Lanero Táboas

land settlement, and new crop policies. If private initiative proved to be excessively passive, the State could even expropriate, divide, or consolidate parcels of land. It is important to highlight how the Duque agrarian reform project assumed that the social function of land ownership legitimised the corrective actions of the State in the land ownership regime. Duque’s ambitious project, as well as the work of the agronomic engineers of the Junta de Colonização Interna (among them Henrique de Barros, Eugénio de Castro Caldas, or Mário de Azevedo Gomes) met with rather poor and uneven results (Oliveira Baptista, 1993: 19-66).7 The two main causes were, first, the monolithic opposition of all the large agrarian lobbies to any agrarian reform project, a structural barrier that remained in place until the end of the Estado Novo in the mid1970s. Second, World War II brought a sudden change in the needs and priorities of economic policies and re-directed the budgetary spending of the Portuguese regime. Expensive internal settlement and irrigation projects were postponed or suspended. Apart from Duque’s modernising philosophy itself, perhaps the most significant change in the agrarian policy of the Estado Novo was the decrease in economic protection for large-scale agricultural production. This occurred between 1935 and the integration of the Ministry of Agriculture into the Ministry of Economy in 1940 (which Duque directed until 1944). It was most clearly seen in the 1936 demise of the Campanha do Trigo due to recurrent overproduction crises between 1932 and 1935. In the years immediately preceding World War II, the complementarity between economic protectionism and self-sufficiency in food production waned, to the point that the wartime economy of the Estado Novo significantly reinforced autarkic tendencies but turned a deaf ear to the interests of the southern estate owners, who began to seek alternative means of obtaining greater benefits from their products, which included recourse to the black market and contraband.

IV.

World War II and the new direction of Portuguese economic policy

Although Portugal did not participate as a belligerent, World War II significantly affected various sectors of its highly dependent peripheral economy, both positively and negatively (Rosas, 1996: 280-284). In the sphere of agrarian policy, the war led to Between 1937 and 1942 a total of 570 Has of uncultivated land was colonised, resulting in the creation of fifty-two casais agrícolas or family farms. In 1946 a new land settlement plan was launched for the following five years, which resulted in the establishment of eleven settlements, involving 22,000 Has and 471 casais agrícolas. All of these settlements except one were established north of the Tagus River. Private property was not expropriated for this purpose.

7

97

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

intensified autarky objectives, particularly in national food production. This goal was combined with efforts to guarantee staple goods for the population at stable prices, especially from the autumn of 1941, when the problem of food provision became drastic (Oliveira Baptista, 1996: 749-754). In November of 1941, the Estado Novo launched its own Produzir e Poupar (Production and Savings) campaign with the objective of increasing both production and productivity in the livestock sector and staple crops (grains, tubers, vegetables...). This new situation involved absolute reinforcement of State intervention at all levels of the agrarian economy. At the production level, there was compulsory declaration of harvest yields and forced sale to various corporative entities at fixed prices. Official prices had already been introduced for products such as wheat, rice, oil, and milk, even before the war. There was also controlled access to the very scarce and costprohibitive agrarian inputs, including petrol, copper sulphate, and mineral fertilizers. Through its corporative organization, the State also began to supervise merchandise transportation by creating a system of circulation guides, distribution to large-scale wholesalers, and control of the circuits from wholesalers to small merchants. The consequences of State intervention in the agrarian sector were similar to those of other contemporary historical experiences such as the wartime economy of the Third Reich and Francoist agrarian autarky in Spain: agrarian production fell and official sales prices to consumers became fictitious due to hoarding and speculation (Barciela, 1986; Christiansen, 2012; Corni, 1989; Farquaharson, 1986: 233-259). An extensive black market emerged and a rationing policy for staple goods was imposed – rather late – at the end of 1943. The chronic lack or delay in provision of products created food scarcity and famine that significantly affected the weakest economic sectors of both urban and rural populations (Rosas, 1995: 167-182). The food supply crisis lasted until Daniel Barbosa took over the Ministry of Economy in 1947-48. Barbosa stabilised the agrarian products market by applying a massive food importation policy and employing the foreign currency reserves that Portugal had accumulated during the conflict. World War II was a golden age for the corporative organisation of Portuguese agriculture. The OCE were entrusted with the management of intervention in the entire agrarian economy. However, in the Portuguese collective memory, the OCE are most associated with active involvement in the black market and a large, inefficient, bureaucratic structure during the wartime years. In contrast with other economic sectors, such as banking, foreign and colonial commerce, and the processing industries, much of the sacrifice required by a wartime economy fell to the Portuguese rural society and agriculture. In addition 98

Daniel Lanero Táboas

to the compulsory declaration and sale of harvest yields, there was a policy of maintaining low prices for agrarian products and protecting urban consumers, which hurt the entire agricultural sector. This social differentiation affected the owners of small farms and rural salaried workers most (Oliveira Baptista, 1996: 749-754). The southern latifundistas were not pleased with the agrarian policy of this period, which prevented them from taking advantage of wartime economic opportunities, at least through legitimate channels (Rosas, 1995: 176-182; Rosas, 1996: 280-284). Several different response strategies were launched by the large estate owners, including intentional decrease in production (with grave consequences for food autarky), secret channelling of production to the black market, contraband with Spain, or investment of capital in urban real estate. The wartime crisis in rural continental Portugal contrasted sharply with the situation of colonial agriculture. While the Portuguese colonies in Africa did suffer a period of economic depression from 1939-42 due to the war-induced shrinkage of global commerce, the situation reversed itself after 1942. Colonial agriculture attracted large amounts of mainland capital. The commercial exports and imports of Angola and Mozambique increased exponentially to supply demand from both continental Portugal and the allied nations, especially the USA and Great Britain. The tremendous increase in the value of colonial products on international markets stimulated colonial economic activities linked to exports, especially cotton, sugar, coffee, cocoa, tea, palm oil, tobacco, wood, hides, or rubber. With the renewed interest in colonial agriculture, new lands were wrested from the native population; cotton (Angola and Mozambique) and rice cultivation (Mozambique) became compulsory and the indigenous population was subjected to forced labour beginning in 1942. From another perspective, the wartime context had positive effects that went beyond agriculture. Food production established the bases for autochthonous industrial processing activities (Rosas, 1995: 233-274). After the war, the improved economic situation for the colonies created political tension between continental and colonial interests, as the colonies glimpsed the possibility of endogenous economic development. Their efforts to revise traditional economic relations with the Estado Novo, which favoured the mother country under the colonial pact, met with little success. Wartime circumstances had brought about greater economic integration and interdependence between Portugal and its African colonies, which lasted through the post-war years and had long-term political consequences for the Estado Novo (Aleixandre, 1996: 754-756; Clarence-Smith, 1985). In Portugal, the economic and social impact of the war weakened the position of the regime in the rural world during and after the wartime years. Northern areas of 99

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

small-scale family agricultural production were strangled by low agricultural salaries, difficulties in acquiring staple goods, forest plundering, and unauthorized use of agricultural lands by seekers of wolfram. This led to a series of uprisings among local and rural populations (Rosas, 2000: 227-235; Freire, 2004: 191-224). However, the price of some northern crops such as potatoes and rye significantly increased during the war. In the south, agricultural labourers in the Alentejo and Ribatejo rebelled against the State policy of decreased salaries and increased work hours, generating a significant labour strike movement. The dramatic poverty of the rural population was clearly expressed in the on-going protests from 1941 to 1949, in spite of the harsh repressive measures applied by the security and police forces of the dictatorship, the Guarda Nacional Republicana (National Republican Guard) and the Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado-Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado or International and State Defence Police (Pacheco Pereira, 1983: 128-129; Oliveira Baptista, 1996: 749-754; Rosas, 2000: 220-227; Freire, 1996a: 404-406; Flunser Pimentel, 2007: 132-158). World War II turned the economic policy of the regime in an industrialist direction. It provided contextual opportunities for developing endogenous Portuguese industries due to availability of internal markets, the disappearance of foreign competitors, and the need to substitute imports. The set of technicians and engineers headed by J. N. Ferreira Dias, Undersecretary of State for Industry, sought to design a complete programme of industrial reorganization that would modify the Portuguese economic development model (Ferreira Dias, 1998). The main lines of this industrialist project can be summarized in three complementary initiatives: national electrification; the creation of new metallurgical, cellulose, and chemical industries; and the reorganization/ consolidation of existing industries. These initiatives were legislatively addressed in Law 2002 on Electrification (1944) and, especially, Law 2005 on Industrial Development and Reorganization (1945). The industrialist political offensive of the early 1940s took up where neophysiocratic agrarian reform left off and become the vanguard of Portuguese economic modernization. These modernising programmes exhibit both differences and similarities. The theoretical and ideological foundations for the industrialist modernization project included an optimistic exaltation of scientific or technological progress and an appeal to the interventionist authority of a strong State (Herf, 1984: 153-88). The State was expected to cooperate by safeguarding internal and colonial markets for national industries, disciplining and organising the markets and economic agents, intervening to resolve uncertainties and incapacities of private initiatives, and even expropriating, consolidating, authorising, and financing industries (Brandão de Brito; 1988; 1989: 160-174; Rollo, 1996: 461-480; 1994: 450-455). 100

Daniel Lanero Táboas

This project was protectionist and nationalist in the economic sphere but also heavily based on a will to succeed. It was thought of as a scientific and technical crusade entrusted to an elite group of valiant, intrepid men in tune with the times: the industrialists, technicians, and statisticians. One of the most representative figures of this current, engineer J. D. Araujo Correia, proposed a ‘dictatorship of the technicians’ as the most desirable form for the modern State (Rosas, 1995: 424-426). The modernization project of the industrialists had its own view of the economic role of agriculture. In contrast with the Duque reformist programme, agriculture would clearly be subordinate to the hegemonic industrialist sector. Its mission was to provide Portuguese industries with a labour force, raw materials, and food while simultaneously consuming the industrial goods produced. In other words, they proposed what is now known as the classical modernization scheme. The industrialists differed from the neo-physiocrats in that the former did not share a vision of industry functioning in the rural sphere. Yet these groups were similar in that they both defended the absolute need for a profound reform of the structure of land ownership by consolidating in the north and parcelling estates in the south, with irrigation as the mechanism for increasing agricultural productivity. Industrialist thinkers defended this programme with the firm conviction that the subordination of agriculture to industry would benefit the Portuguese rural world. During the 1941-44 period it seemed that the State, whose political and economic role had been reinforced during the war, was going to give the J. N. Ferreira Dias industrialist project a green light. However, the acute social crisis and political uncertainty that the Estado Novo faced at the end of World War II led Salazar to take refuge in the traditional social supporters of the regime, the latifundistas, who began a ruralist counter-offensive in the same way they had opposed Duque’s reforms in the late 1930s. In the September, 1944 government re-structuring, both Duque and Ferreira Dias were removed from office. The latifundistas had significant representation in the National Assembly and their conservative ruralism was bent on diluting Law 2005 on Industrial Development and Reorganization during its parliamentary approval process in early 1945. The new Minister of Economy, Supico Pinto, ensured that it was never actually applied (Rosas, 1995: 435-437; Rosas: 2000: 110121). In spite of the defeat of the industrialist policies after the war, the industrial modernization project did alter the delicate political balance between very conservative ruralist interests and industry, introducing a modernising path that would be taken up in later decades.

101

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

V.

Conclusion

With the institutionalization of the Estado Novo and the post-war context, Portugal in the 1930s and 1940s presents most of the elements that generally characterise interwar agrarian fascism. The influence of the agrarian policies of other contemporary fascist regimes on the Estado Novo is difficult to follow but easily discernible in the Campanha do trigo (1929-1936) and the internal land settlement projects of the 1930s, which were directly inspired by Italian fascism (Saraiva, 2010: 457-498). During the second half of that decade a section of the political elite led by Minister of Agriculture Rafael Duque within the Estado Novo designed a global agrarian reform project that can unambiguously be classified as modernising. Within the scope of this study, the reform programme of the Portuguese neophysiocrats fulfils all the parameters considered characteristic of agrarian modernization processes. Science and technology led the way to intensification and diversification of agrarian production, primarily through hydraulic projects. They were the motor driving all subsequent changes, and can be summarised by irrigation, land colonisation, re-organization, and modernization. Unintentionally, the reform programme also profoundly altered the ancient, hierarchical order of lords and peasants in Portuguese rural society. The origin and direction of these changes was derived in part from an exogenous actor, a new type of State. Duque’s modernising project injected industrial capital into the rural world and established a new relationship with the market based on the diversification of supply to satisfy the demands of a growing urban population rather than the economic protection of traditional crops. The reformist project did not merely modernise the agricultural sector and the social structures of the rural world; it was in fact the indispensable condition for a new model of industrial development that would eventually overcome Portuguese economic backwardness. Though Duque’s reformist project was clearly modernising and shared some features of agrarian fascism, it was far from being a fascist agrarian modernising project. It did not originate in the 1930s, when the Estado Novo most approximated the political characteristics of any version of classical fascism. This agrarian reformist project had its roots in the nineteenth century or even as far back as the Enlightenment, and was already present in the monarchic regime and the First Republic. The unifying thread was the effort to modify the land ownership regime as a means of overcoming the factors blocking the Portuguese economy. What probably most drew agrarian neo-physiocratic reformism towards agrarian fascism was neither its nature nor its concept of progress, but the political context in which Duque and the agronomic engineers sought to implement their reform. The Estado Novo provided 102

Daniel Lanero Táboas

an optimal political context because of its authoritarian features, not its conservative social backing in the rural world. The neo-physiocratic and industrial modernization projects diverged on one central axis: whether economic development should be assigned primarily to agriculture or industry. Most significantly though, they coincided at two key points: trust or even faith in science and technology as paths towards progress and the future, and a concept of the State as the deus ex machina of the modernising project. These two aspects, in conjunction with the corollary monopoly of the agronomic engineering corps over the execution of agrarian policy, best illustrate the Duque project against a historical backdrop of agrarian fascism. As World War II progressed, the neo-physiocratic agrarian reform gave way to the industrialist approach as the main modernising force. Its secondary role continued over the next two decades, with a short-lived phase of agrarian reform in the 1950s. This partial revival of the agrarian reform principles was reflected in the mid-range economic planning policies (Planos de Fomento) carried out by the Estado Novo from the early 1950s to the fall of the regime in 1974. Specifically, they could be seen in the agrarian reports section of the II Plano de Fomento (1959-1964), which was elaborated by the reformist agronomic engineer Eugénio de Castro Caldas. This was in fact ‘A menagerie in which the old elements were mixed with what at that time was the modern theory of economic development and certain contributions from industrialism’ (Amaral, 1994b: 437-440; 1996b: 821-832). The management of Portuguese agricultural modernization was definitely in the hands of the industrialists. In the early 1960s this new generation of industrialists imposed a still newer version of agrarian modernization: the Green Revolution. The economic evolution of Portugal during the forty years of the Estado Novo reveals constant tension between the ‘ruralist bunker’, the agrarian lobby bent on resisting change, and the agents of economic modernization, whether neo-physiocratic agrarian reformists or industrialists. Although the economic approach of the dictatorship became more aligned with industrialism, the latifundistas maintained significant blocking capacity until the end of the regime, especially regarding initiatives that touched upon the status quo of land ownership. The Estado Novo never wanted to risk losing agrarian lobby support, one of its main political and social bases. The resistance of the large estate owners to agricultural modernization was not overcome politically, but by the evolution of the agrarian sector itself after 1950.

103

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

Bibliography Aleixandre, Valentim (1996), ‘Política Colonial’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 2, p. 754-756.

Amaral, Luciano do (1994a), ‘Portugal e o passado: política agraria, grupos de pressão e evolução da agricultura portuguesa durante o Estado Novo’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIX, 127, p. 889-906. Amaral, Luciano do (1994b), ‘Agricultura e política agrícola: o país que nós perdemos’, in Rosas, F. (coord.) (1994), Vol. 7. O Estado Novo, in José Mattoso (dir.) (1994), História de Portugal, Lisbon, Ed. Estampa, p. 431-450.

Amaral, Luciano do (1996a), ‘Campanha do Trigo’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 1, p. 116-117.

Amaral, Luciano do (1996b), ‘Reformismo Agrário’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 2, p. 821-832. Amaral, Luciano do (1996c), ‘Trigo’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 2, p. 982-983.

Barciela, Carlos (1986), ‘Los costes del Franquismo en el sector agrario: la ruptura del proceso de transformaciones’, in Ramón Garrabou and others (eds.) (1986), Historia Agraria de la España contemporánea. 3. El fin de la agricultura tradicional (1900-1960), Barcelona, Crítica, 1986, p. 383-354.

Barros, Afonso de (Coord.) (1980), A Agricultura latifundiária na Península Ibérica. Seminario realizado de 12 a 14 de dezembro de 1979, Oeiras, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Barros, Afonso de (1986), Do latifundismo à reforma agrária. O caso de uma freguesía do Baixo Alentejo, Lisbon, CEEA/Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência. Braga da Cruz, Manuel (1982), ‘Notas para uma caracterização política do salazarismo’, Análise Social, Vol. XVIII, 72-73-74, p. 773-794.

Braga da Cruz, Manuel (1988), O partido e o estado no salazarismo, Lisbon, Presença.

Brandão de Brito, José Maria (1988), ‘Os engenheiros e o pensamento económico do Estado Novo’, in José Luís Cardoso (org.) (1988), Contribuções para a História do Pensamento Económico em Portugal, Lisbon, Don Quixote, p. 209-234.

Brandão de Brito, José Maria (1989), A industrialização portuguesa no Pós-Guerra, 1948-1965. O Condicionamento Industrial, Lisbon, Dom Quixote.

104

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Castelo, Claudia (2007), Passagens para África: o povoamento de Angola e Moçambique com naturais da metrópole (1920-1974), Porto, Edições Afrontamento.

Christiansen, Thomas (2012), The reason why: the post civil-war agrarian crisis in Spain, Zaragoza, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.

Clar, Ernesto (2008), ‘Farm Policy under the Salazar and Franco Dictatorships in Portugal and Spain: Towards an Authoritarian Model of Intervention in Agriculture?’ in Nadine Vivier (ed.) (2008) The state and rural societies. Policy and education in Europe 1750-2000, Turnhout, Brepols, p. 177-194. Clarence-Smith, William Gervase (1985), The Third Portuguese Empire, 19251975. A Study in Economic Imperialism, Manchester, Manchester University Press. Colloti, Enzo (1994), Fascismo, fascismi, Milan, Sansoni Editore.

Corni, Gustavo (1989), La politica agraria del nacionalsocialismo, Milan, Franco Agneli.

Costa Pinto, António (1994), Os Camisas azuis: Ideología, elites e movimentos fascistas em Portugal 1914-1945, Lisbon, Ed. Estampa.

Costa Pinto, António (2001), ‘O império do professor: Salazar e a elite ministerial do Estado Novo numa perspectiva comparada (1933-1945)’, Análise Social, Vol. XXXV, 157, p. 1055-1076. Costa Pinto, António (2005), ‘The ‘Corporatist Revolution’ of the Portuguese New State: An introduction’, in Aldo Mazzacane, Alessandro Somma and Michael Stolleis (eds.) (2005), Il corporativismo nelle dittature Sudeuropee, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Kostermann, p. 1-7. Cutileiro, José (2004), Ricos e pobres no Alentejo, Lisbon, Livros Horizonte.

Farinha, Luis (1998), O Reviralho: revoltas republicanas contra a ditadura e o Estado Novo, 1926-1940, Lisbon, Estampa.

Farquaharson, John Edgar (1986), ‘The agrarian policy of National Socialist Germany’, in Robert G. Moeller (ed.) (1986), Peasants and lords in Modern Germany, Boston, Allen and Unwin, p. 233-259. Ferreira Dias Jr., José Nascimento (1998), Linha de rumo I e II e outros escritos económicos (1926-1962), ed. by J. M. Brandão de Brito, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal. Flunser Pimentel, Irene (2007), A história da PIDE, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores.

Freire, Dulce (1996a), ‘Greves rurais e agitação camponesa’, in Fernando Rosas and José María Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 1, p. 404-406.

Freire, Dulce (1996b), ‘Vinho’, in Fernando Rosas and José María Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 2, p. 1011-1014.

105

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

Freire, Dulce (2000), ‘Sector vinícola contra a organização corporativa’, Ler História, 42, p. 175-198.

Freire, Dulce (2004), ‘Os baldíos da discordia:as comunidades locais e o Estado’, in Dulce Freire, Inês Fonseca and Paula Godinho (coord.) (2004), Mundo Rural. Transformação e Resitência na Península Ibérica (Século XX), Lisbon, Colibrí, p. 191-224.

Freire, Dulce (2010), Produzir e Beber. A questão do vinho no Estado Novo (19291939), Lisbon, Âncora Editora.

Freire, Dulce (2012), ‘Estado Corporativo em acção: sociedade rural e construção da rede de casas do povo’, in Fernando Rosas and Álvaro Garrido (coord.) (2012), Corporativismo, Fascismos, Estado Novo, Coimbra, Almedina, p. 273-302.

Freire, Dulce and Lanero, Daniel (2013), ‘State and agricultural modernization in the Iberian dictatorships after Second World War’, in Peter Moser and Tony Varley (ed.) (2013), Integration through subordination. Agriculture and the rural population in European Industrial Societies, London, Brepols, p. 183-201. Griffin, Roger (1991), The nature of fascism, London and New York, Routledge.

Herf, Jeffrey (1984), Reactionary modernism. Technology, culture and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kallis, Aristotle (2003), ‘Fascism, Parafascism and Fascistization: On the Similarities of Three Conceptual Categories’, European History Quarterly, 33-2, p. 219-249.

Lains, Pedro (2003), Os Progressos do Atraso. Uma Nova História Económica de Portugal, Lisbon, ICS. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Lains, Pedro (2009), ‘Agriculture and economic development in Portugal, 18701973’, in Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla (eds.) (2009), Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe Since 1870, London and New York, Routledge, p. 333-352. Loff, Manuel (2008), ‘O nosso século é fascista!’: o mundo visto por Salazar e Franco (1939-1945), Lisbon, Campo das Letras.

Lucena, Manuel de (1976), A evolução do sistema corporativo português, Lisbon, Perspectivas e Realidades. Lucena, Manuel de (1978), ‘Sobre a evolução dos organismos de coordenação económica ligados à lavoura. 1’, Análise Social, Vol. XIV, 56, p. 817-862.

Lucena, Manuel de (1979a), ‘Sobre a evolução dos organismos de coordenação económica ligados à lavoura. 2’, Análise Social, Vol. XV, num. 57, p. 117-167. Lucena, Manuel de (1979b), ‘Sobre a evolução dos organismos de coordenação económica ligados à lavoura. 3’, Análise Social, Vol. XV, 58, p. 287-355.

Lucena, Manuel de (1991), ‘Salazar, a fórmula da agricultura portuguesa e a intervenção estatal no sector primário’, Análise Social, Vol. XXVI, 110, p. 97-206. 106

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Lucena, Manuel de (1994), ‘Notas para uma teoria dos regimes fascistas’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIX, 125-26, p. 9-32.

Lucena, Manuel de (2000), ‘Salazar’, in António Barreto and Maria Filomena Mónica (eds.) (2000), Dicionário de História de Portugal, Lisbon, Figueirinhas, 9, p. 283-268. Machado Pais, José and others (1976), ‘Elementos para a história do fascismo nos campos: A “Campanha do Trigo’’, Análise Social, Vol. XII, 46, p. 400-474.

Machado Pais, José and others (1978), ‘Elementos para a história do fascismo nos campos: A “Campanha do Trigo’’, Análise Social, Vol. XIV, 54, p. 321-389.

Madeira, João; Flunser Pimentel, Irene and Farinha, Luis (2007), Vítimas de Salazar: Estado Novo e Violência Política, Lisbon, Esfera dos Livros.

Manique, António Pedro (1987), ‘O “Casal de Família”. Reflexões em torno da sua origem e fundamentos político-ideológicos’, in António Costa Pinto (ed.) (1987), O Estado Novo. Das origens ao Fim da Autarcia, 1926-1959, Lisbon, Fragmentos, p. 221-229.

Marques, António Henrique de Oliveira (1997), Guia de história da Iª República portuguesa, Lisbon, Ed. Estampa.

Martins Casaca, José Paulo (1987), ‘Sete falsas hipóteses sobre a Campanha do Trigo’, in António Costa Pinto (ed.) (1987), O Estado Novo. Das origens ao Fim da Autarcia, 1926-1959, Lisbon, Fragmentos, p. 337-354.

Melo, Daniel (2001), Salazarismo e cultura popular (1933-1958), Lisbon, ICS. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Neto, António Lino (1908), A Questão Agrária, Porto, Empresa Litterária e Typográphica.

Oliveira Baptista, Fernando (1978), ‘Dos projectos de colonização interna ao capitalismo agrário (Anos 30-1974)’, Boletim da Faculdade de Direito de Coimbra, special number, p. 311-362.

Oliveira Baptista, Fernando (1980), ‘Economia do Latifúndio. O caso português’, in Afonso de Barros (coord.) (1980), A Agricultura latifundiária na Península Ibérica. Seminario realizado de 12 a 14 de dezembro de 1979, Oeiras, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, p. 341-372.

Oliveira Baptista, Fernando (1993), A política agrária do Estado Novo, Porto, Afrontamento.

Oliveira Baptista, Fernando (1996), ‘Política Agrária’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 2, p. 749-754. Pacheco Pereira, José (1983), Conflitos sociais nos campos do Sul de Portugal, Lisbon, Publicações Europa-América.

107

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

Patriarca, Fátima (2000), Sindicatos contra Salazar: a revolta de 18 de Janeiro de 1934, Lisbon, ICS. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Ramos, Rui (Coord.) (1994), ‘A Segunda Fundação (1910-1926)’, in José Mattoso (dir.) (1994), História de Portugal, Lisbon, Ed. Estampa, Vol. 6.

Rollo, Maria Fernanda (1994), ‘A industrializacão e os seus impasses’, in Fernando Rosas (coord.) (1994), O Estado Novo, in José Mattoso (dir.) (1994), História de Portugal, Lisbon, Estampa, Vol. 7, p. 450-455.

Rollo, Maria Fernanda (1996), ‘Indústria/Industrialização’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand,, 1, p. 461-480. Reis, Jaime (1993), O atraso económico portugués, 1850-1930, Lisbon, Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda. Rosas, Fernando (coord.) (1994a), ‘O Estado Novo’, in José Mattoso (dir.) (1994), História de Portugal, Lisbon, Ed. Estampa, Vol. 7.

Rosas, Fernando (1994b), O Estado Novo nos Anos Trinta, 1928-1938, Lisbon, Ed. Estampa. Rosas, Fernando (1995), Portugal entre a Paz e a Guerra, 1939-1945, Lisbon; Ed. Estampa.

Rosas, Fernando (1996), ‘Economía de Guerra’, in Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (dir.) (1996), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, Lisbon, Bertrand, 1, p. 280-284. Rosas, Fernando (2000), Salazarismo e fomento ecónomico, Lisbon, Notícias.

Rosas, Fernando (2004), Portugal siglo XX (1890-1976): pensamento a acção política, Lisbon, Notícias. Saraiva, Tiago (2010), ‘Fascist Labscapes. Geneticists, Wheat and the Landscapes of Fascism in Italy and Portugal’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, Vol. 40, 4, p. 457-498.

Silva, Manuel Carlos (1994), ‘Resistir y adaptarse. Constreñimientos y estrategias campesinas en el noroeste de Portugal’, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Amsterdam.

Soares, Fernando Brito (2005), ‘A agricultura’, in Pedro Lains and Álvaro Ferreira da Silva (eds.) (2005), História Económica de Portugal, Lisboa, ICS. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, Vol. 3, p. 157-183.

108

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Appendix. Some basic statistic data on Portugal

Table 3.1. Portugal (1910-1950). Percentage of Active Population occupied in agriculture

Year



1910 57



1920 —



1930 49



1940 53



1950 49

Active Agrarian Population (%)*

*Includes the population occupied in the fishing sector. Source: Soares (2005: 162).

Table 3.2. Portugal (1920-1950). Gross Agricultural Product as percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Year

% GAP/GDP



1920

29



1930

30



1940

29



1950

31

Source: Soares (2005:162).

Table 3.3. Forms of land exploitation (Hectares)

Year

1890

1914

1929



Farmer owned and cultivated

230,000

347,000

351,000

Leasing

210,000

266,000

280,000



Sharecropping

110,000

55,000

68,000



TOTAL

550,000

668,000

699,000

Source: Carqueja (1930: 29), cited in Rosas (1994a: 38).

109

The Portuguese Estado Novo: programmes and obstacles to the modernization of agriculture

Table 3.4. Forms of land exploitation. Continental Portugal: Family Farming Zone and Campos do Sul (1952-1954) Form of land explotation

Family Farming Zone (num. of farms)

%

Campos do Sul** (num. of farms)

%

%



Continental Portugal (num of farms)

357,128

60

25,770

55

525,335

62

112,605

19

12,413

27

165,249

19

and/or sharecropping

123,175

21

8299

TOTAL

592,908

100

46,482

Farmer owned and cultivated Leasing and/or sharecropping Farmer owned & cultivated & leasing 18 162,984 19 100

853,568 100

*Districts of Viana do Castelo; Braga; Porto; Aveiro; Coímbra; Leiría; Vila Real; Bragança; Viseu and Guarda. ** Districts of Portalegre, Beja and Évora. Source: Oliveira Baptista (1993: 414).

Table 3.5. Continental Portugal: Family Farming Zone and Campos do Sul. Percentage of managed and family farms (1952-1954) Form of land Family explotation Farming Zone (num. of farms)

%

Campos do Sul** (num. of farms)

%

Continental Portugal (num of farms)

%

Managed

098,977

16.7

11,704

25.2 151,137 17.7

Family

493,931

83.3

34,778

74.8 702,431 82.3

TOTAL 592,908 100 46,482 100 853,568 100 *Districts of Viana do Castelo; Braga; Porto; Aveiro; Coímbra; Leiría; Vila Real; Bragança; Viseu and Guarda. ** Districts of Portalegre, Beja and Évora. Source: Oliveira Baptista (1993: 413).

110

Daniel Lanero Táboas

Table 3.6. Portugal (1952-1973). Number of tractors and combine harvesters

Year

Num. of tractors

Num. of harvesters



1952

2961

39



1967

19,076

1312



1973

38,057

3384

Source: Oliveira Baptista (1993: 323).

Table 3.7. Portugal (1940-1960). Usage of fertilizers (annual average in thousands of tons) Agricultural Campaign

Nitrogen fertilizers

Phosphate fertilizers

Potassium

TOTAL

Index*

1940/41-1944/45

9.7

36.9

3.8

50.4

100

1945/46-1949/50

14.6

45.0

4.4

64.0

127

1950/51-1954/55

36.2

63.1

5.6

104.9

208

1955/56-1959/60

60.4

72.8

8.9

142.1

282

*Index 1940/41-1944/45 = 100 Source: Oliveira Baptista (1993: 408).

111

4.

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary Zsuzsanna Varga

I.

Introduction

The history of the interwar period has been relatively well explored in Hungarian historical research. However, this does not apply to the topic of modernizing agriculture in the fascist era. Agricultural development in the period between the two World Wars is usually described in Hungarian historiography as an era of crisis and stagnation (Gunst, 2004; Held, 1980; Romsics, 1999; Szuhay, 1998). During the socialist period, it would have been unthinkable in publications to mention the idea of modernization in connection to the 1930s. That term was reserved for the socialist programme that considerably affected Hungarian occupational structure in the second half of the twentieth century. The socialist modernizing project had transformed Hungary from a moderately developed agrarian-industrial country into an industrialized one (Valuch, 2004). Such ideological restrictions were lifted after the political transition in 1990, allowing new questions and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity to emerge (Eisenstadt, 2000). It is helpful to clarify at the outset what is meant by modernization. Here, a ‘minimum definition’ will be used that contains the following features: a material increase in land and/or labour productivity, a social strengthening of supra-local regulation of farming, and a symbolic shift of the farming ideal to the future. In line with the collective aim of revisiting the relationship of fascism and modernization in the countryside, this chapter includes the seven common components suggested by the editors (Fernández-Prieto, Pan-Montojo and Cabo) as a basis for comparing the rural policies of fascist regimes. The political system of Hungary from 1932 to 1944 is usually characterized in scholarly discourses as an authoritarian and conservative system that adopted fascist elements, or as a para-fascist regime (Kontler, 2002; Pittaway, 2009). The right wing forces rose to power in 1932, under the significant influence of the conservative elite that had governed in the 1920s. Their influence was present until the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944.

113

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

This chapter consists of three sections. The first provides a historical background and discussion of the challenges in the agrarian sector, deriving mainly from Hungary’s particular situation after World War I and the trauma of the Great Depression. The second deals with the reactions of different political and social actors to these challenges. There is a ‘blank spot’ in the relevant literature regarding the intent of the decision-makers and the reality of agricultural developments. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the governmental tendency towards increasingly right-wing leaning plans and the structural policies they began to apply. In the third part, I attempt to explore how direct Nazi influence and Hungarian subordination to German needs impacted the possibilities of Hungarian agrarian policy. The primary sources used in this study include the different party programmes, records of parliamentary debates, documents from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, legal regulations, contemporary press releases, internal surveys and studies by research institutes (mainly the Hungarian Economic Research Institute), and statistical releases of the Central Statistical Office.

II.

Challenges

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Hungary was part of the AustroHungarian Monarchy. World War I and a series of revolutions led to the dissolution of this dual State in 1918. The Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920 deprived Hungary of two-thirds of its former territory and nearly sixty per cent of its population, including thirty per cent of ethnic Hungarians (Romsics, 1999: 117-125). In the interwar period there was no political force entertaining hopes of success in Hungary that could afford to neglect the issue of the revision of this treaty (Zeidler, 2007: 65-102). In the 1918-19 atmosphere burdened by defeat in the Great War and two unsuccessful revolutions, a government was formed by experienced politicians and magnates who wanted to restore the pre-1914 relations of power. Hungary remained a monarchy, though presided over by a regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Two prime ministers played important roles between 1920 and 1931: Count Pál Peleki (192021) and Count István Bethlen (1921-1931). ‘Teleki and Bethlen therefore advocated a “conservative democracy”, guided by the aristocracy and the landed nobility, as the proper response of the region to the challenges of the democratic age’ (Kontler, 2002: 345-346). In 1922, Bethlen decreed a new electoral law that lowered the proportion of voters from about forty to twenty-eight per cent of the population, which placed Hungary on a level with South-eastern Europe or the most conservative countries of Western Europe, such as France or Belgium. Still worse, and without parallel in contemporary Europe, voting was made public except in the capital and seven other 114

Zsuzsanna Varga

urban centres, which meant that only one in five parliamentary deputies were elected by secret ballot (Romsics, 1999: 182-183). As a result of territorial losses, the Hungarian economy became dependent on exports and imports, and was extremely vulnerable to changes in the world economy. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had become a unified customs area in 1850; its tariffs protected Austrian and Czech industry as well as Hungarian agriculture. Prior to 1918, Hungarian agricultural products were sold to a protected market of 52 million people, where prices were significantly higher than on the world market. Most Hungarian agricultural exports remained within the borders of the Dual Monarchy, where Hungary had markets for ninety-three per cent of its cattle exports, 100 per cent of its pig exports, ninety-three per cent of its fat exports, and ninety-four per cent of its grain and flour exports (Szuhay, 1998: 178-179). The dissolution of the Monarchy brought an end to the customs union and transformed the advantageous situation enjoyed by Hungarian agriculture. Austria and Czechoslovakia became external markets, placing Hungarian agrarian exports at the mercy of world market prices. The situation was aggravated by shrinking traditional Austrian and Czech markets, as both countries made efforts to develop and protect their own domestic agriculture.1 Hardships increased for Hungarian agriculture and its extremely limited internal market. In Hungary (and agrarian countries in general), the agricultural population aimed at self-sufficiency; since this stratum represented slightly over half of the country’s population, the market turnover in foodstuffs was very limited. Moreover, most of the urban population still had a little land, which preserved the tradition of self-sufficiency (Gyáni, 2004: 285-294). Agricultural exports were therefore especially significant. Between seventy-five and eighty per cent of all Hungarian exports consisted of agricultural products, a situation that did not change until after 1929. Exports made it possible to import raw materials, semi-processed products, machines, and other industrial articles required for industrial development. Hungarian agriculture had to shoulder the additional burden associated with the high production costs of Hungarian industry, which had sheltered it from the pressure of foreign competition, with the help of high customs duties. The result was a large-scale increase in the prices of industrial products. The price gap between agricultural and industrial products widened, and the modest results of industrialization had to be financed by agriculture (Berend-Ránki, 1995: 149-163). Despite all the efforts and subsidies, industry failed to thrive. The economic stabilization process of the 1920s, based largely on reconstruction loans from the League of Na See the chapter by Langthaler in this volume and Tönsmeyer (2003).

1

115

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

tions and Western countries, did not solve the basic structural problems of the re-shaped Hungarian economy. As a consequence, Hungary remained a moderately developed agrarian-industrial country in the interwar period. This was reflected in the employment structure: fifty-three per cent of the Hungarian population engaged in agriculture in 1930 (Table 4.1), and this decreased slightly to fifty per cent by 1940. Meanwhile, the percentage of the population engaged in industry rose from thirty-two per cent in 1930 to thirty-five per cent in 1940. The contribution of agriculture to the national income was naturally much smaller than the proportion of agricultural population in relation to total population. Agriculture accounted for forty-one per cent of national income in 1920, thirty-two per cent in 1930, and thirty per cent in 1940 (Table 4.2). The most urgent social problems after World War I were related to agrarian society. Hungary had inherited an ill-proportioned land distribution from the nineteenth century, and countless farmers had become landless or nearly so (Kopsidis, 2009). Following World War I, efforts were made to change the unhealthy estate distribution with land reforms in Central and East European countries. The purpose was to put an end to the destitution of the agrarian population and the possibility of revolution (Crampton, 1997). The conservative regime that came to power after the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 also implemented a land reform that in 1920 affected a mere 8.5 per cent of the country’s arable land (approximately 650,00 hectares). This percentage was considerably lower than the ones affected by similar initiatives in neighbouring countries; twenty-seven per cent of arable land in Romania and sixteen per cent in Czechoslovakia were redistributed after World War I (Brassley, 2010: 145-164). Sadly, the Hungarian land reform did nothing to address the predominance of large estates. The new Hungary became Europe’s large estate country in the most extreme sense of the word (Table 4.3). Nearly half of the country’s arable land was owned by a few dozen aristocratic families, and the proportion of non-aristocratic large estates was also high. Only about twenty per cent of the total arable land belonged to small-scale farmers and estates (those with less than 5.8 hectares), which represented four-fifths of all agricultural holdings. This extremely ill-proportioned distribution of landed property explains why only about thirty per cent of the agrarian population was able to maintain a family from the production of their own land. About seventy per cent of the farmers had very little or no landed property and were compelled to do wage labour. Rural poverty increased, the relative labour surplus rose, and industry was unable to absorb the redundant agricultural workers (Gunst, 1998: 202-208). The world economic crisis severely aggravated the problems of the Hungarian economy. Worldwide overproduction first became apparent in agriculture, and the

116

Zsuzsanna Varga

earliest symptoms of the Great Depression affected agricultural production. Agricultural prices began to plummet as early as 1928 (Tracy, 1982). In Hungary, for example, the price of plant-based products dropped by fifty-four per cent between 1929 and 1933, while the price of livestock and animal-based products fell forty-eight per cent (Hajpál, 1973). The price gap between agricultural and industrial products continued to expand. As a result, agricultural income in 1932-33 fell remarkably to forty-four per cent of what it had been in 1928-29. The massive price drops and the protectionist policies of European countries delivered a severe blow to Hungary, which had a significant export surplus. The fifty-four per cent average price fall resulted in a sixty per cent loss of export-generated national income (Berend–Ránki, 1974: 242-264). As prices crashed after 1928, debt burdens soared. The annual 1.17 billion pengő debt burden in 1928-29 had increased to 2.18 billion by 1932-33. The interest and repayment burden amounted to twenty-five per cent of income in 1932-33, compared to nine per cent in 1929 (Szuhay, 1998:181-182). The deep and prolonged crisis in the agricultural sector became the most dramatic problem. This was partly due to the unrivalled amount of manpower, including farmers and wage-workers in the agricultural sector. The first segment of rural society to be impacted was the most vulnerable one: smallholders who had contracted debts to modernize or merely sustain their tiny plots were suddenly unable to repay them, and about 60,000 farmers were forced to sell the land they had acquired only a few years earlier. Half a million rural labourers lost their work, and about the same number were forced to accept starvation wages. Poverty in the countryside took on such colossal dimensions that it was no longer possible to ignore. Whether out of national interest, humanistic concern, or a sense of imminent social ‘danger’, it was clear that something had to be done.

III.

Responses

III.1. The new ruralist conception of a ‘Christian idea of agriculture’ The Great Depression affected social attitudes and the nature of the political system. The political change brought about by the Depression occurred simultaneously at both elite and popular levels. The first element was a governmental crisis resulting in the removal of Bethlen from office in 1931. Following a brief interregnum under Gyula Károlyi, Regent Miklós Horthy appointed Gyula Gömbös as Prime Minister, a paramilitary-turned-politician, admirer of Mussolini, and the most prominent advocate of radical right policies (Vonyó, 2001: 9-29). 117

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

Gömbös was a key figure for the right-wing military and civil servant middleclass – an elite group in Hungary. The political influence of these groups had been increasing due to the development of the institutions of a modernizing State. The right-wing attitudes of this group had been apparent as early as the 1920s, mostly due to the decline of the Monarchy, the subsequent revolutions, and the dismemberment of the country. In their view, the conservative liberalism of the dualist period was largely to blame for the military collapse and break-up of historic Hungary. They sought to overcome this not by democracy, but by an authoritarian government in which they would have a greater say. The main elements of their political views were nationalism, militarism, and the demand for a strong State. They also held to anti-liberalism, anti-Bolshevism, a sharp criticism of plutocracy, and anti-Semitism as means of protecting the Hungarian people. The roots of this discourse go back to the late nineteenth century. At that time, neoconservative criticism of Hungarian capitalism began to take shape in those elements of society – primarily the aristocracy, the gentry, and some of the clergy – that were interested in developing the agrarian sector and that had suffered economically withunder liberalism and capitalist development. Ideologically, they based their criticism on agrarian discourse, anti-Semitism, and a new interpretation of national interests that implied the rejection of free competition and economic liberalism. These groups demanded protection for feudal Christian nobilities with agricultural interests and the aristocraticy-bound peasantry from the growing influence of a foreign, mostly Jewish plutocracy. From the early 1900s on, this ideology had become increasingly radical among civil servants and intellectuals. A greater role for the State and the State apparatus was integral to the radicalization of this conservative ideology – in aspects involving agrarian demands (the economic sector) as well as anti-Semitism (the social sector) (Romsics, 1999: 53-69). The tough, no-nonsense policy of Gömbös and his circle were increasingly welcomed by the governing conservatives after other methods for handling the world economic crisis had failed. Agriculture became an essential focus for the new government not only because of the crisis; the ‘Christian idea of agriculture’ had been an integral part of Gömbös’ political views since the 1920s.2 Gömbös considered Hungary’s agrarian nature to be divinely appointed and believed that whoever possessed the land would control the entire economy. Whoever controlled the economy would, in turn, control political and cultural life, and society itself. This vision guided his endeavours to reorganize Hungarian economic life around agriculture. For a better understanding of the influence of the Italian example in the development of Gömbös’s ruralist views, see Grando and Volpi in this volume. 2

118

Zsuzsanna Varga

Since the 1920s, Gömbös along with the gentry, military officers, and civil servants had proclaimed that the borders established under the Treaty of Trianon would only be modified by force of arms. Therefore, an army would be required: a peasant army with the necessary moral and financial backing to make them independent and fit for the great task. It is not surprising, then, that preference for agricultural interests was an essential element of the governmental programme entitled ‘National Workplan’, issued in October 1932 (Gergely, Glatz and Pölöskei, 2003: 288-302). Not only did the programme address agricultural matters first, it also subordinated other sectors of the economy to agricultural development. The government programme stated that industrial development should not happen ‘at the expense of the development of other sectors of production’ (Gergely, Glatz and Pölöskei, 2003: 296). Considering the economic situation in Hungary at that time and the economic and political ideology of Gömbös and his fellow leaders, this ‘other sector’ could only have been agriculture. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that their policy of industrial development implied support for the industrial sector in ‘processing raw materials from Hungary and turning out agricultural products’. They gave special attention to developing industry in a way that would ‘satisfy the needs of the rural population and make use of their surplus manpower’. There was an effort to ensure that industrial products were sold at a ‘fair price’, which was aimed at eliminating or at least decreasing the distance between the prices of agricultural and industrial products. The National Workplan promised to fulfil a longstanding demand by agricultural producers to restrict the ‘excessively important role’ of commissions charged by businesses. Similar priorities drove financial policy, as illustrated in the statement: ‘We consider credit as a tool that serves national production’ (Gergely, Glatz and Pölöskei, 2003: 297). Credit for agricultural production was discussed in a separate section of the plan. Thus, the priorities of economic policy were adjusted to Hungarian agrarian conditions, redefining the approach that had been in place since the 1920s. The agrarian sector became privileged in other areas, too. In matters of justice, intended reforms of ‘economic, criminal, and credit-related laws would fully acknowledge the special psychological and economic features of the Hungarian nation’ (Gergely, Glatz and Pölöskei, 2003: 299). This was supported by the promise of effective legal protection of ‘production, adjusted to national interests’. In light of the tendencies already mentioned, these national features and interests must have referred to agriculture and the social groups it encompassed. As in the justice system, vocational education also experienced an ‘increased emphasis on agricultural aspects’ (Gergely, Glatz and Pölöskei, 2003: 300).

119

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

Putting agriculture first was more than a slogan, it was an active pursuit; and measures taken in the first year clearly bore this out. Laws regulating the debts of farmers were an important tool in the State crisis-management policy. The first decrees regarding the reduction of interest rates were issued in 1931. The most significant laws of the Gömbös government were passed in 1933 and 1935. At the request of the debtor, estates that were indebted above a certain critical level came under government protection, and were subsequently categorized as such in the land registry’. These properties were protected from auction if the owner had been paying the interest on the loan. The State spent a significant amount of money settling so-called ‘smallholder debts’. In the 1933-34 and 1934-35 fiscal years, a total of 32.5 million pengős were budgeted for this purpose, a figure that increased toto 75.6 million in the two fiscal years that followed.3 It is important to note, however, that most of the subsidies associated with this mechanism were given to large-scale landowners, since sixty-one per cent of the 1.1 million protected hectares pertained to estates larger than sixty hectares. The other area of State intervention in agriculture involved subsidizing product marketing, mainly because Hungary was a major exporter of agricultural products.4 Alongside the urgent and necessary measures, Gömbös intended to base long-term development on a presence in new foreign markets. His first official visit abroad was to Mussolini in Rome, and six months later he was the first European prime minister to visit the newly inaugurated Chancellor of Germany, Hitler (Vonyó, 2001: 9-30). One month later, representatives of Hungary and Germany signed a trade agreement that supplemented the 1931 agreement and opened the German market to Hungarian exports of wheat, rye, barley, and corn.5 In addition to the extensive exports to Germany, which accounted for fifty to sixty per cent of exports in the 1930s and close to seventy-four per cent in 1944, Italy imported twelve to twenty per cent of Hungarian agricultural production. Given the general squeeze on currency liquidity, most of these transactions were organized within bilateral settlement mechanisms in which deliveries of goods were balanced in each direction (Szuhay, 1998: 186-190). 3

Magyar Statisztikai Szemle, 16, no. 2, 1938, p. 169-175.

At the beginning of the interwar period, sixty per cent of Hungarian agricultural exports went to Austria and Czechoslovakia, while Germany and Italy also imported products from Hungary. Until 1930, these four countries had absorbed most Hungarian agricultural exports. However, the Great Depression changed this situation dramatically.

4

Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive, hereafter MOL] K 69 Dossier 696 [hereafter Dos.] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Economic Policy, Materials of the First Supplementary Agreement to the 1931 Hungarian-German Trade Treaty.

5

120

Zsuzsanna Varga

In 1934, some changes took place in State agricultural intervention policies. The implementation of German economic policies was an important factor in the rise of monopolistic organizations, as the German government preferred having these types of Hungarian organizations deal with similar German ones in arranging foreign exchange sales. Hungary signed a 1934 agreement increasing agricultural exports to Germany. Sales monopolies coincided with the interests of large estate owners and led to purchase price increases for certain crops and products. Since the large estate owners were granted a majority of the export quotas, they benefitted most from the high export prices (Berend and Ránki, 1974: 273-274).

III.2. Land Policy A very important element of the economic and social policies of the National Workplan was to increase the number of ‘Christian economic persons’ and ‘persons with low or medium income’, while improving their production conditions. This primarily affected the peasantry, which was considered to be the ‘life-producing branch’’ of Hungarian society.6 The plan was to establish new and viable small and mid-sized farms within the framework of a ‘healthy settlement policy’. The protection of these farms was sought by means of a new law. In 1936, the Gömbös government introduced a law regulating entailed estates7 and entailed smallholdings.8 The true novelty was the latter, which the Prime Minister intended to use to shelter peasant smallholdings from the threat of fragmentation. The plan states in section 78.§: ‘An entailed smallholding is real estate for the purpose of cultivation that is protected against fragmentation by law through the prohibition of sale and debiting, its exclusion from legal inheritance, and the provision that limits exclusive predetermined succession to family members.’9 To determine who was entitled to own such a smallholding, the plan relied on the German Law of Hereditary Entailment (Reichserbhofgeset) of 1933, which protected the farms of competent and ‘racially fit’ peasant owners (Corni and Gies, 1994: 103128). The plan states in section 80.§: ‘The economic subcommission of the public 6 The ‘Christian idea of agriculture’ developed by Gömbös presented clear similarities with the ‘Blood and Soil’ ideology, though there were also differences with regard to their political purposes. See the chapter by Gerhard in this volume.

According to a 1687 law, the passage of landed estates to a specified line of heirs was subject to royal approval in order to avoid division, loss, or bequeathing of estates. By 1848, 31 entailed estates had been created, and a further 64 by 1914. Though the practice had been common among the aristocratic owners of large estates, it became extremely frequent in the last third of the nineteenth century. Before World War I, several plans were drafted to make the approximately 1.3 million hectares of landed estates freely marketable, but entailment continued until 1945. 7

Law XI:1936. In Corpus Iuris (1936: 125-156).

8

Law XI:1936. In Corpus Iuris (1936: 142).

9

121

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

administration committee may issue a license to establish an entailed smallholding to independent Hungarian citizens of integrity and high respect who are employed in agriculture, who may dispose freely of their possessions and are expected to carry out exemplary agricultural activity.’10 The second step was supposed to be large-scale reform of land ownership. In the 1920s, Gömbös had pushed for radical land reform at any cost, even if it proved economically disadvantageous.11 Once in power, however, he found it necessary to make significant compromises in this matter due to the serious opposition and immense political power of the large-scale landowners. In the end, Gömbös was only able to pass a modest settlement law shortly before his death in 1936. The settlements act proposed the subdivision of some 240,000 hectares of land within a twenty-five year period.12 Grantees had to pay thirty per cent of the purchase price in advance. Such a small amount of land contemplated in the act is a clear indication that this legislation brought no significant changes to the uneven distribution of landed property. A much greater issue arose from the fact that the law allocated some two million pengős for this purpose, which allowed a yearly purchase of about 2300 hectares. Still, this settlement plan was more thoroughly prepared than the 1920 reform of landed property: a separate department was created in the Ministry of Agriculture to manage implementation, headed by the Minister himself.13 Having learned from the mistakes of the 1920 land reform, the government was careful to establish viable estates with a provision of livestock and machinery. Existing villages were expanded with new settlements and model communities were established. These new villages had been designed by engineers, and the State organized the construction of roads, canals, parish halls, schools, and other community buildings. Twelve to fifteen hectares of land had been offered to certain claimants, along with a house and the plot of land on which it stood. One- and two-room standard-design houses were built, along with coops or pens, sties, and stables for livestock. The cost of all this was initially covered by the State, but charged to the recipients.14 Between 1936 and 1943 some twenty villages were extended, created or rebuilt. 10

Law XI:1936. In Corpus Iuris (1936: 143).

During the entire interwar period there were intense discussions on the optimal size of agricultural estates. See more on this in Schlett (2009: 220-223), Tóth (1988). 11

12

Law XXVII: 1936. In Corpus Iuris (1936: 241-265).

MOL Földművelésügyi Minisztérium [Ministry of Agriculture, hereafter FM] K-178 (1936-37: 45904793).

13

According to the law, those participating in the settlement and those benefiting from it had to pay in advance thirty per cent of the purchase price of the land. Exceptions were made for poor or very large families, especially in the Transdanubia settlement. See Nagy (1994: 110-137). 14

122

Zsuzsanna Varga

In sum, between 1936 and 1939 some 51,200 hectares of land were claimed and put to use. A total of 31,300 hectares passed into the hands of farmer-owners, and the rest was offered as small lease holdings. In the course of the reform, approximately 21,300 families obtained control of property, 9100 of them as owners and 12,200 as leaseholders. Most of the recipients extended their existing estates with the allotted land. In the course of three years, some twenty-nine million pengős had been dedicated to these settlement policies.15 The costs were far higher than originally envisioned, while the results proved fairly moderate. These experiences, along with persistent resistance from large-scale landowners made the government look for alternative options. In order to modernize small-scale farming, the government sought to accelerate the process of land consolidation. This involved a redistribution of property by which a farmer’s various plots of land were consolidated into one plot of land, with the approval of all owners affected and under the guidance of a legal authority. The fragmented nature of landed property in Hungary is evident in the data of the Central Statistical Office. In the mid-1930s, some 14,800,000 plots of land belonging to 2,100,000 smallholders occupied nearly five million hectares, which translated into an average of 2.4 hectares per landowner, divided into seven plots.16 It is easy to imagine the extra time and money required to access and cultivate such remote parcels. According to a survey in 1934, some 965 villages (27.8 per cent of the total, involving about 928,000 hectares) were in need of partial consolidation, and a further 1861 villages (53.5 per cent, or about 1.2 million hectares) required complete restructuring for consolidation purposes. It affected sixty-one per cent of the total area dedicated to smallholding. Decree 34.700/1935, issued by the Ministry of Justice, regulated consolidation and redistribution of land .17 The primary aim of this new order was to make consolidations easier, quicker, more professional, and most of all, more economical. The process gathered new momentum as the consolidation process begun in earlier years became easier to complete and the increased role of the State enabled new villages to begin the consolidation process. Consolidation was launched in twenty-four villages in 1936, eighteen villages in 1937, fifteen villages in 1938, and twenty villages in 1939, a total of seventy-seven villages. According to data from the Consolidation Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, consolidations were completed in ninety-eight villages 15

MOL FM K-178. (1940: 6765-6775).

16

Magyar Statisztikai Szemle, 15, no. 4, 1937, p. 296-299.

17

34.700/1935. In Rendeletek Tára [The Collection of Decrees, hereafter: RT],] (1935: 764-786).

123

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

between 1935 and 1941, affecting a total of nearly 180,000 hectares.18 Though these years were the most effective ones of the interwar period, the pace was far from what was needed. Nevertheless, positive effects were quickly evident in the villages concerned, as consolidated estates were suitable for sowing and harvesting machinery. The willingness to build farmsteads also increased. Production grew d by an average of twenty per cent in most villages, while the price of land also increased, and the quality of farming improved notably. In the late 1930s, land policy issues again appeared on the parliamentary agenda. Prime Minister Béla Imrédy declared in a speech on 4 September 1938 in the town of Kaposvár that the execution of the 1936 land reform had been too slow. There had been not enough money destined for the purchase of land and a new solution was necessary. He stated that ‘The essence of the new plan was for one third of the entailed estates larger than 172 hectares and one fourth of the estates larger than 290 hectares to be claimed as small lease holdings through an organization designated by the government.’19 This would affect a total area of 400,000 hectares, and completion of the settlement project would occupy the next fifteen years. Large-scale landowners mounted strenuous opposition and the plan was received coldly even among government officials and the party in government. The bill reached parliament a year later, and by then its design had changed significantly. In the meantime, the Second Anti-Jewish Law (IV: 1939) had been declared, which stated in section 16.§ that: ‘Jews may, regardless of any existing restrictions, be obliged to forfeit all their agricultural estates to the State, to be taken over in the form of property or smallholding’.20 Following these events, the Minister of Agriculture introduced a bill ‘promoting small lease holdings and the establishment of small estates, housing plots, and other land-political issues’. In the preamble to the bill, the Minister of Agriculture overtly acknowledged that neither the 1920 reform of landed property, nor the 1936 development law had solved the problems of the landless population, and that this was the reason behind the new law. ‘With the present law I shall promote on a larger scale and at a faster pace the economic independence of those groups within the agricultural population who have been designated by the development law as qualifying to obtain landed property or building plots. My plan is to achieve this by increasing the number of smallholdings and through organized groups of 18

MOL FM K-184 (1941: 5699).

19

Függetlenség, 6 September 1938.

Section 20.§ of Law IV:1939 extended the validity of the law to landed property owned by monetary institutions and companies with a Jewish majority.

20

124

Zsuzsanna Varga

leaseholders, as well as leaseholder-cooperatives’.21 During this ten-year programme, around 863,000 hectares were earmarked for conversion to small leaseholds. It was eventually approved as Law IV: 1940 on 20 April 1940; a fairly radical programme that involved 290,000 hectares of landed property expropriated from the Jewish population. However, this settlement project coincided with World War II and was never carried into effect.

III.3. Specialized agricultural training Limited budget resources significantly narrowed the scope of possibilities associated with the attempts to implement land distribution and consolidation projects. The need for widespread professional expertise became increasingly important, and the duality of the ownership structure became very evident. The landed aristocrats had hired professionally trained and licensed agricultural engineers to manage their estates.22 In contrast, most smallholders had never received any kind of vocational training, and the weakest area of agricultural training was elementary education. During Gömbös’ government, the Ministry of Agriculture was given the task of drawing up a plan to increase smallholders’ level of expertise, on the premise that ‘these farmers are among the purest representatives of our race.’ They also emphasized that, ‘In order to make agricultural production more economical, occasional record harvests are of little relevance, what matters is an increase in the level of average production of the agricultural masses’.23 The starting point of the report on prevailing educational conditions by the Ministry of Agriculture was that the agricultural population completed no more than six years of primary school, and eventually forgot how to read or write, since ‘those who do not join mankind’s large intellectual community of readers will not long for it later’.24 There were only twenty-two agricultural schools throughout the entire territory of interwar Hungary. Nine of them were specialised agricultural schools, while thirteen were winter schools for agriculture, that operated from November to February. The winter schools proved more successful, since they took into account Az Országgyűlés Képviselőházának Naplója [Records of the House of Representatives of the Parliament] 9 September 1939.

21

The Agricultural Academy of Mosonmagyaróvár, established in early nineteenth century, was the most important centre of agrarian higher education and research in the interwar period. There were also other institutes in Debrecen and Keszthely, which were upgraded to the status of institutions of higher education. 22

MOL FM K 184 (1934-1936: 33,251).

23

MOL FM K 184 (1934-1936: 33.251).

24

125

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

that peasants were not willing to do without their sons in the middle of the summer work season. The specialized schools required two full years’ attendance. A first step towards a solution involved creating interest among the peasants and convincing them of the benefits of studying.25 To this end, the Ministry organized three-month-long economic courses in winter. During the first year there was such little demand for it that young farmers had to be talked into taking part. However, by the following year news of the courses had spread and many new locations were opened with much greater numbers of participants. The Ministry calculated how many agricultural schools would be needed if the target group was smallholders with estates of six to sixty hectares. Based on a two-year curriculum with thirty to forty students in each school and class, there would be demand for some 246 schools. Until this number of schools could be secured, the Ministry proposed that the number of winter courses be increased. The execution of this plan was assigned to the ‘economic inspectors’ working in the agricultural administration. Ministry officials had warned the public not to expect any quick improvement in crops due to the development of the school network. They pointed out that the young farmers who had completed the agricultural school courses had little say in the farming methods of their fathers back home. They would have to wait an average of ten to fifteen years before taking over their fathers’ farms. This explains their efforts at encouraging older farmers to participate: ‘It is in the interest of Hungarian agriculture to involve older farmers – who are active in the actual cultivation of the land – in education alongside young farmers.’26 The solution appeared in the establishment of an economic consultation network. The German experience was greatly appreciated in this area, as the economic consultant was generally also the winter school economics teacher. The consultant was aided in his duties by animal husbandry and cultivation inspectors, as well as officials from economic associations and cooperatives. Decision-makers in the Ministry of Agriculture were of the opinion that the economic inspectors best fit the profile of economic consultants. The final element of the action plan was the implementation of ‘model farms’ that allowed farmers to see the effects of certain innovations in their own environment. In order to achieve this, the organizers proposed the establishment of one or two such farms in each village. In this respect the Ministry had already used the annual national agricultural exhibitions and fairs to popularize professional education in agriculture. In 1935, they organized a large-scale exhibition on professional education that had each school present their work to visitors. See Fülöp, Gunst and Oroszi (1996) for more on the history of Hungarian agricultural exhibitions and fairs. 25

26

MOL FM K 184 (1934-36: 42,500).

126

Zsuzsanna Varga

These were the main points of the package of recommendations put forth by the Ministry of Agriculture. Though the government intended to offer legal backing for the execution of this plan, which was finished by 1940, the bill was delayed and only reached Parliament in December 1941, finally taking effect in 1942. Law XVI: 1942 stated the following: Section 1. § ‘It is necessary to facilitate the improvement of the productiveness of Hungarian land, to increase the quantity and quality of agricultural production, and, hence, of national income. The present act aims at achieving these goals through the extension of agricultural education and consultation, the provision of benefits, the assurance of the order of agricultural production as well as decrees needed to organize agricultural production and marketing of agricultural products.’27

A full chapter was dedicated to the dissemination of basic and higher-level agricultural knowledge and expertise. The Minister of Agriculture instructed the institutions involved to participate more fully in disseminating knowledge of cultivation and animal husbandry among farmers. The law regulated in great detail the conditions for establishing model farms. The implementation of new methods was not the only requirement: a further regulation stipulated that, ‘The owner of the model farm is obliged to employ an estate agent and may need to draw up a work plan.’28 Stateowned experimental farms under long-term lease were also regulated by law, and a regular production competition or exhibition was fostered in each county.

III.4. Integration into Germany’s ‘Grossraumwirtschaft’ As mentioned earlier, a driving ambition of Hungarian politics during the interwar years was the revision of the Trianon Treaty. The political leaders found support for this ambitious objective first in Italy and later in Germany. Even though Hungary did not enter the Second World War until the military attack on the Soviet Union on 26 June 1941, revisionist efforts had continued successfully until that time. 29 Hungarian agricultural producers enjoyed the advantages associated with preparations for World War II. It entailed expanded opportunities for exporting agricultural products in the 1930s, once Hungary had established strong connections with Germany’s ‘Grossraumwirtschaft’ or large-area economy (Corni and Gies, 1997). Prepa See: Law XVI: 1942. In Corpus Iuris (1942: 125).

27

See: Law XVI: 1942. In Corpus Iuris (1942:. 127).

28

The total area regained or returned to Hungary in the period between 1938 and 1941 made up for over half of the losses sustained in 1920. Hungary’s landmass expanded from 93,000 to 172,000 sq. km and its population grew from 9 to 14.6 million (Romsics, 1999: 198-204). 29

127

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

ration for war brought prosperity to the leather, textile, and food industries, increasing the demand for agricultural goods. However, the situation became rather unfavourable after 1940-41. A first issue was that most of the enlisted soldiers were peasants. This of course had a negative effect on production, which was based mainly on manpower and animals for pulling. Second, as the war progressed, Germany increased its demands on Hungary for agricultural products. The essential question for the Hungarian government was how to simultaneously meet increasing external demand from the Germans and cover the increasing internal loss of farm labour due to the recruitment of soldiers. Third, after the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan in 1938, the Hungarian government began to give more and more priority to industrial development. The government investment plan earmarked one billion pengős, spread over five years, for armament and the upgrading of military infrastructures for deployment. This implied a clear subordination of the rural sector to the needs of military industrialization (Lengyel, 1993: 3-38). Faced with growing German demands, the government first introduced measures concerning the supply that was already in stock and the distribution of agricultural products. The aim was to distribute Hungary’s scarce stores of agricultural products according to governmental objectives. To achieve this, the State left only a portion of agricultural products in the hands of the producers, and handled the rest itself. In 1940, the Government issued a decree on the Sequestering of Agricultural Products.30 Any supply beyond household and economic needs was sequestered by the State and purchased at an established official price. Producers as well as consumers were required to have their supply registered.31 Trade was restricted in order to secure the rationed goods.32 War economy measures deeply affected production and consumption. Compulsory production forced landowners to cultivate industrial crops. In 1942, every farm had to produce sugar-beet, tobacco, fibre flax, and hemp in an area at least as extensive as the average of the two prior years.33

It applied to the most important agricultural products: bread grains, leguminous crops, corn, potatoes, and dried and dehydrated vegetables. In 1941, the sequestering was also extended to sugar-beet, tobacco, industrial plants, and all corn crops. See: 3.750/1940. In RT (1940: 987-990). 30

4.810/1940. M.E. In RT (1940: 1773-1777).

31

2.980/1943. M.E. In RT (1943: 295-298). Later on, special centres were set up to record, control, and manage the distribution of agricultural goods and livestock, (such as the Centre for Corn Distribution, Centre for the Distribution of Livestock, etc.). (Szabó and Virágh, 1993: 127-134).

32

670/1942. M.E. In RT (1942: 126-129).

33

128

Zsuzsanna Varga

Restrictions in consumption became the norm from 1941 on.34 The military attack on the Soviet Union demanded immense efforts from Germany, which meant increased sacrifices from allies such as Hungary. In 1941, Hungary undertook to deliver half of its surplus wheat and rye, eighty per cent of its surplus maize, and its entire surplus of oilseeds to Germany.35 The only way to achieve this was by introducing flour and bread coupons, which began on 8 September 1941 in the capital and its surroundings.36 In December 1941, Ribbentrop sent for Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy, who later reported the conversation as follows: ‘He referred to the fact that they were stretched to the limit and admitted that they needed every resource possible in order to win this colossal struggle. He told me that the main issue was oil and corn. He asked us to do all we could, given that in the current battle they were the ones making the greatest sacrifice. Hence, every country with something to offer should give it to the German Reich.’37 The landmark year in several aspects was 1942, when the State began interfering with agricultural production in several ways. Until that time the government had taken the household and economic needs of agricultural producers as the starting point, and only made use of their excess production. However, surplus production had varied significantly due to changing weather conditions, motivation to work, and so on. All this came to a head in 1942, when a severe supply shortage occurred due to a crop failure. The government solution was to establish a new delivery system based on quotas. In November 1942, the Jurcsek-system was introduced, which sought to provide the government with a constant production quantity.38 Hungary made a substantial contribution to the cereal supply of Germany and Italy, and after 19 March 1944 the country even shouldered the burden of supplying the German occupation troops. Rations were further reduced, while Berlin paid less and less for these goods and made no secret of the fact that Hungarian exports were considered a ‘war contribution’.39 Thus, Germany’s total outstanding debt 34

4.630/1941. M.E In RT (1941: 1828).

MOL K 69 Dos. 696 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Economic Policy, Material of the Hungarian-German economic negotiations of 7-29 July 1941. 35

36

9.230/1941. M.E In RT, 1941. 3793.

MOL K 69 Dos. 696. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Economic Policy. German file, 10 December 1941. 37

In 1942-43 Béla Jurcsek was the Under-secretary of the National Office for Public Supply. He was appointed Minister of Public Supply in March of 1944. 38

MOL K 69 Dos. 697 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Economic Policy, Material of the Hungarian-German economic negotiations in 1942. 39

129

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

grew rapidly.40 Following German occupation in March 1944, the Hungarian economy collapsed, and in autumn of 1944 the country became a theatre of war. Retreating German troops appropriated the machinery and livestock of large estates and emptied their granaries. The remaining resources and the peasant food supply were requisitioned by the logistical branch of the Soviet army. In certain parts of the country, especially in the East, ploughing and sowing were even left undone.

IV.

Closing remarks

If we try to summarize the results of modernization during the interwar period, we encounter a very ambiguous modernization process in Hungary. Results in terms of land productivity were only modest and were limited to large estates. Market integration and State regulation were strengthened, yet mainly as a side-effect of crisismanagement in the earlier years and war preparations later on. Further evidence of the ambiguous nature of modernization was patent in the Agrarian Development Law of 1942, which revealed the distance between the actual room for manoeuvring at that time and the ‘horizon of expectations and reform plans’. The Law expressed clearly that after the war, the critical situation of small family farms would improve substantially thanks to the ongoing agrarian modernization program. In the twelve years covered by this chapter, Hungary was ruled by at least six different governments. Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös was in office for the longest period, four years (1932-36), and subsequent prime ministers lasted no more than two years. This is important to mention because the support for the decision-makers was largely conditioned by the fact that there was not enough time to fully carry out their ideas regarding the agricultural modernization of Hungary. Governmental programmes often did not get past the law formulation phase, with no time for implementation. These quick changes in government are enough to explain why modernization only moved forward in small steps. However, Gömbös’ approach was pivotal in this sphere, as he and his followers (mainly, Darányi and Imrédy) were both idealists and pragmatists. They recognized the existing conditions and adjusted their agricultural modernization ideas accordingly. Politically, they faced the fact that radical land reform was out of the question so long as the large-scale landowners remained in power. However, after the years of crisis management that ended in 1935, Gömbös was prepared to risk conflict with the dominant rural elite. The first sign of this was German indebtedness at the end of 1941 only amounted to 140 million marks, but grew in two years to 1 billion marks, and by the end of 1944 amounted to 1.5 billion marks. See Berend and Ránki (1974: 319-341). 40

130

Zsuzsanna Varga

his reform of the party in government following a corporative design. However, due to his illness and death in 1936, these plans were never realized (Romsics, 1999: 181-191). Economically, the shortage of capital seriously limited the range of options. As a compromise, agricultural officials came up with structural policies that carried the promise of a positive outcome even in a financially limited situation. Land consolidation was one of these possible solutions, given that its positive effects were quickly perceived and it was much cheaper than restructuring land ownership. Similarly, the amplified offer of economic courses in winter cost much less money than establishing a national network of agricultural elementary and secondary education schools. There were also State-led campaigns for vineand fruit cultivation, along with attempts by the regime to promote the use of high-quality seeds. However, the concrete achievements of these policies were not always relevant, or even comparable to initial aims. As part of their pragmatic approach, Gömbös and his adherents were not against industrial development. On the contrary, they continuously emphasized how useful it would be for industry to absorb surplus manpower from the agrarian sector. Here, they encountered the problem of capital shortage once again, which they attempted to solve by developing labour-intensive branches of production that could absorb excess manpower. In their case studies, several authors in this volume (Gerhard, Langthaler, Grando and Volpi, Cabana and Díaz) emphasize instances of post-World War II attempts to recover and even expand upon agricultural modernization initiatives that had been launched in the 1930s. If we look at countries belonging to the Soviet sphere after World War II, including Hungary, we find this to be strikingly absent. It is especially interesting because strong continuity is often present in the dimension of State intervention. The communist parties of the region, following advice from the Soviet Union, attempted to adopt the tools and institutional apparatus of a war economy. This was not surprising in the Cold War environment. Agricultural production in Hungary had been fully subordinated to the demands of industrial development by the late 1940s. This industrialization was carried out at a forced pace and accelerated the process of migration from the agricultural sector. However, it was not followed by a process of replacing missing manpower with adequate mechanization and technological change. The forceful implantation of the Soviet Union agrarian model in Hungary reaped tragic consequences within a few years. Hungary, having always been an exporter of agricultural products, now needed to import then. After a decade of failures, Hungary gradually departed from the Soviet model and began adopting

131

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

methods of agricultural development from Western countries. Modernization of Hungarian agriculture was achieved in the 1970s (Varga, 2004: 231-273).

132

Zsuzsanna Varga

Bibliography Berend, Iván T. (1998), Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, Berkeley, University of California Press.

Berend, Iván T. and Ránki, György (1974), Economic development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, New York and London, Columbia University Press.

Berend, Iván T. and Ránki, György (1995), ‘The economic problems of the Danube region after the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’, in Béla Király and Loszle Veszprémy (eds.) (1995), Trianon and East Central Europe. Antecedents and Repercussions, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 149-163.

Berend, Iván T. and Ránki, György (2002), ‘Die deutsche wirtschaftliche Expansion und das ungarische Wirtschaftsleben zur Zeit des zweiten Weltkrieges’, in Iván Berend and György Ránki (eds.) (2002), Studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth century. Regional crises and the Case of Hungary, Burlington, Ashgate, p. 313-359. Brassley, Paul (2010), ‘Land reform and reallocation in interwar Europe’, in Rosa Congost and Rui Santos (eds.) (2010), Contexts of property in Europe. The social Embeddedness of Property Rights in Land in Historical Perspective, Turnhout, Brepols, p. 145-164. Corni, Gustavo (1990), Hitler and the Peasants: agrarian policy of the Third Reich, Oxford, Berghan Publishers. Corni, Gustavo and Gies, Horst (1994), “Blut und Boden”: Rassenideologie und Agrarpolitik im Staat Hitlers, Idstein, Schulz-Kirchner Verlag.

Corni, Gustavo and Gies, Horst (1997), Brot, Butter, Kanonen. Die Ernährungswirtschaft in Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag.

Crampton, Richard J. (1997), Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After, London, Routledge. Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noel (2000), ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus, Winter, p. 1-29.

Fülöp, Éva; Gunst, Péter and Oroszi, Sándor (1996), Az országos mezőgazdasági kiállítások és vásárok története, 1881-1990 [A history of national agricultural exhibitions and fairs, 1881-1990], Budapest, Agroinform. Gergely, Jenő; Glatz, Ferenc and Pölöskei, Ferenc (eds.) (2003), Magyarországi pártprogramok, 1919-1944 [The programmes of the political parties in Hungary, 1919-1944], Budapest, Eötvös Kiadó. Gunst, Péter (1998), ‘Hungarian Agrarian Society during the Inter-War Period (1919-1945)’, in Peter Gunst (ed.) (1998), Hungarian Agrarian Society from the Emancipation of Serfs (1848) to the Reprivatization of Land (1998), New York, Columbia University Press, p. 199-253. 133

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

Gunst, Péter (2004), ‘Hungarian Agriculture between 1919 and 1945’, in Janos Estók (ed.) (2004), History of Hungarian Agriculture and Rural Life, 1848-2004, Budapest, Argumentum Publishing House, Museum of Hungarian Agriculture, p. 137-219.

Gyáni, Gábor (2004), ‘Social History of Hungary in the Horthy Era’, in Gábor Gyáni, György Kövér and Tibor Valuch (eds.) (2004), Social History Of Hungary From The Reform Era To The End Of The Twentieth Century, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 271-507.

Hajpál, Gyula (1973), Áralakulás a két világháború között [Price Development between the Two World Wars], Budapest, KSH.

Held, Joseph (1980), ‘The Interwar Years and Agrarian Change’, in Joseph Held (ed.) (1980), The Modernization of Agriculture: Rural Transformation in Hungary, 1848-1975, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 216-223. Herf, Jeffrey (1984), Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kaser, Michael Charles and Radice, Edward Albert (eds.) (1986), The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919-1975 II. Interwar policy, the War and reconstruction, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kontler, László (2002), A History of Hungary, New York, Palgrave Macmillen.

Kopsidis, Michael (2009), ‘Hungary’, in Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla (eds.) (2009), Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870, London and New York, Routledge.

Lengyel, György (1993), ‘Institutions, Elites, Ideologies: From the Controlled economy to War Economy’, in György Lengyel (ed.) (1993), Hungarian economy and society during World War Two, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 3-38. Nagy, József (1994), ‘A Gömbös-féle telepítési törvény és végrehajtása’ [Gömbös’s Settlement Act and its execution], Múltunk, 39, 1-2, p. 110-137.

Pittaway, Mark (2009), ‘Hungary’, in Richard J. B. Bosworth (ed.) (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, p. 380-397.

Romsics, Ignác (1999), Hungary in the Twentieth Century, Budapest, Corvina-Osiris.

Schlett, András (2009), ‘Megkésettség–nyitottság–kettős erőtér. Közgazdászok az agrárpolitika szolgálatában a két világháború közötti Magyarországon’ [Agricultural economists in service of agrarian policies in interwar Hungary.], Agrártörténeti Szemle, 50, 1-4, p. 217-230. Szuhay, Miklós (1998), ‘Evolution of Hungarian Agriculture during the Inter-War Years (1918-1945)’, in Peter Gunst (ed.) (1998), Hungarian Agrarian Society from the Emancipation of Serfs (1848) to the Re-privatization of Land (1998), New York, Columbia University Press, p. 177-198. 134

Zsuzsanna Varga

Tönsmeyer, Tatjiana (2003), Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939-1945: Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn, Paderborn, Schöningh.

Tóth, Tibor (1988), A magyar mezőgazdaság struktúrája az 1930-as években [The Structure of Hungarian agriculture in the 1930s], Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.

Tracy, Michael (1982), Agriculture in Western Europe: Challenge and response 1880-1980, London and New York, Granada.

Valuch, Tibor (2004), ‘Changes in the Structure and Lifestyle of the Hungarian Society in the Second Half of the XXth Century’, in Gábor Gyáni, György Kövér and Tibor Valuch (eds.) (2004), Social History Of Hungary From The Reform Era To The End Of The Twentieth Century, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 511-671.

Varga, Zsuzsanna (2004), ‘Agrarian Development from 1945 to the Present Day’, in Janos Estók (ed.) (2004), History of Hungarian Agriculture and Rural Life, 18482004, Budapest, Argumentum Publishing House-Museum of Hungarian Agriculture, p. 221-294. Vonyó, József (2001), Gömbös Gyula és a jobboldali radikalizmus [Gyula Gömbös and the Radical Right], Pécs, Pannónia Könyvek.

Zeidler, Miklós (2007), Ideas on territorial revision in Hungary, 1920-1945, New York, Columbia University Press.

135

Challenges and responses: dilemmas of agrarian modernization in interwar Hungary

Appendix. Agricultural indicators for Hungary

Table 4.1. Population active in agriculture

%



1920

55,7



1930

53



1940

50

Source: Hungarian agriculture, 1851-2000. CD-ROM. Budapest: KSH, 2000.

Table 4.2. Percentage of GDP from agriculture

%



1920 41



1930 32



1940 30

Source: Hungarian agriculture, 1851-2000. CD-ROM. Budapest: KSH, 2000.

Table 4.3. Distribution of land ownership, 1935

Size group (ha) Number

Estates %

Area (ha)

%



00.0-2.90

1,184,783

72.5

946,122

10.1



2.9-5.8

204,471

12.5

856,878

9.2



05.8-11.6

144,186

8.8 1,175,048

12.6



.11.6-2900

73,663

4.5 1,260,473

13.5



0.29-580

15,240

0.9

600,973

6.5



0..58-1160

5792

0.4

466,995

5.0



116-580

5202

0.3 1,232,384

13.2



over 580

1070

0.1 2,789,132

29.9

1,634,407

100.0 9,328,005

100.0



TOTAL

Source: Hungarian agriculture, 1851-2000. CD-ROM. Budapest: KSH, 2000.

136

Zsuzsanna Varga

Table 4.4. Agricultural exports Year Imports Exports Balance in millions of pengős

Agr. Exp. as a percentage of total exports



1925

864.6

848.0

-16.6

80.4



1926

941.0

876.7

-64.3

82.2



1927

1182.3

807.6

-374.7

79.0



1928

1211.4

826.0

-385.4

73.8



1929

1063.7

1038.5

-25.2

77.0



1930

823.4

911.7

+88.3

74.9



1931

539.4

570.4

+31.0

68.2



1932

328.5

334.5

+6.0

66.0



1933

312.6

391.3

+78.7

71.6



1934

344.9

404.2

+59.3

69.6



1935

402.3

451.5

+49.2

67.5



1936

436.5

504.4

+67.9

67.8



1937

483.6

588.0

+104.4

66.6



1938

410.6

522.4

+111.8

65.3

Sources: Gunst (2004: 141).

137

5.

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany



Gesine Gerhard

I.

Fascism and the question of modernization in the German countryside

The publication of David Schoenbaum’s provocative book in the 1960s describing the modernizing effect of Nazi rule on German society sparked a debate that continues today regarding the modern or anti-modern characteristics of the Nazi regime (Schoenbaum, 1966; Bavaj, 2003). Along similar lines, Ralf Dahrendorf argued that despite the anti-modern ideology of Nazism, the regime had involuntarily caused a social revolution that could not be reversed after 1945 (Dahrendorf, 1965). The role of Hitler as a ‘revolutionary against revolution’ was a topic of controversy throughout the 1970s. Joachim Fest saw Hitler as an ambivalent revolutionary and modernizer because of his uncompromising will to create an ‘organic’ and ‘folk community’ (Fest, 1974). To others the societal changes wrought by National Socialism constituted ‘pseudo-modernization’, because of their contradictory and inconsistent implementation (Matzerath and Volkmann, 1977). In the late 1980s, the intentions of the Nazi leaders came under closer scrutiny. Rainer Zitelmann challenged the common understanding of an ‘unintended social revolution’, and argued that the Nazi leaders were in fact revolutionaries with modernist visions (Zitelmann, 1987; Zitelmann and Prinz, 1991). According to this interpretation, Hitler pushed modernization in several areas and his economic, social, and territorial visions were shared by other Nazi leaders. Many historians rejected this depiction of Hitler as a leading revolutionary because it overlooked the racial and anti-democratic elements of the Nazi regime and painted a largely uncritical picture of modernization during the Third Reich. Today, few people would argue that the Nazi era could be characterized simply as either backward or modernizing, among other reasons because modernity or modernization as concepts contain their own ambiguities. Continuities and discontinuities co-exist, and questions of intent and reality have to be examined more thoroughly. Nazi agricultural policies provide a good sample of ambiguity in the concept of modernization. For a long time, Nazi agriculture was understood as the epitome of 139

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

an anti-modern vision, and especially agrarian ideology with its prominent theme of ‘blood and soil’. The Nazi ideology of blood and soil elevated peasants and their small family farms, considering them the core and indispensable foundation of the German State, people, and culture. In an unprecedented propaganda campaign, this message was broadcast throughout the country and reached every village in the Reich. The emphasis on the small-scale peasant farm in the ‘blood and soil’ creed suggests a backward looking, anti-industrial, and anti-urban agrarian programme. However, the actual agricultural developments of the Nazi era point in another direction. Agricultural modernization and all its components of rural exodus, decreasing numbers of people engaged in farm labour, mechanization and technological change, followed the trends launched by industrialization during the nineteenth century. Nazi agrarian policies were neither anti-industrial nor technophobic. On the contrary, they were part of a larger vision that included the achievement of food independence or autarky, increased agricultural productivity, and territorial expansion, all of which could only be implemented through structural changes and modernization. The Nazi vision of a new kind of ‘peasant Reich’ [Bauernreich] actually combined the traditional values and lifestyles of peasants with an ambitious and modern approach to agriculture. Agricultural modernization was thus embedded in a rural ideology that cushioned peasants from the worst effects of structural change. Rural discourse played a significant role in a variety of ways. It helped the Nazi party gain electoral support before 1933 and it stifled rural protest and discontent once the Nazis were in power. Peasants felt encouraged: they welcomed their special treatment and reciprocated with essentially unwavering political support for the Nazi system. Peasants could count on stable prices for agricultural products and guaranteed markets for their goods. They could continue their way of life and work with few changes and were sheltered from the kind of economic crisis that took place in the 1920s. After 1936, the economic necessities of a country preparing for war took precedence over the ideological emphasis on protecting small peasant farms, but even then the effects of structural change in the countryside were muffled. Foreign workers replaced German peasants, who were being recruited to the front. Germany’s ruthless exploitation of occupied countries secured relatively high levels of food during the war and peasants enjoyed a privileged status in society. Without halting or reversing structural changes, Nazi agricultural policies sheltered peasants from the full force of modernization: from the most painful foreign competition, market prices, and pressures to modernize. Farm production was strictly controlled and peasants resented State interference, but their support for the Nazi regime never faltered. The twelve years of the Third Reich were like an interlude in terms of modernization, offering a reprieve from the long-term trend of structural change taking place. The 140

Gesine Gerhard

‘long farewell from the countryside’ was neither stopped nor reversed. After the war it would continue full force, but in the meantime its tempo was slowed down and its harsh effects mitigated (Gerhard, 2000). If the question of agrarian modernization requires a complex answer, so do questions regarding the intentions the Nazi leaders. Here also we find contradictory forces at work, which were best personified by Richard Walther Darré, the Minister of Food and Agriculture and ‘father’ of the blood and soil ideology, along with his protégée-turned-rival, Herbert Backe (Bramwell, 1985; Lehmann, 1993). Darré brought Backe into the State Ministry of Food and Agriculture in October 1933, and the two men worked together on some major policies. Backe was known as a capable administrator, and in 1936 became the food commissioner in Göring’s Four Year Plan administration (Vierjahresplanbehörde). In this position, Backe gained ascendance over his boss, Reich Minister Darré. The polycentric power structure of the Nazis allowed for this kind of authority and was deaf to Darré’s repeated complaints (Gerhard, 2009). In historiography, Backe has been described as a technocrat, a cold policy maker, and an ardent Nazi in Hitler’s confidence who worked closely with Göring (Lehmann, 1993). While Darré has been portrayed as the harmless peasant romantic and protector of every farm regardless of its profitability, Backe represents the modernizer who stood for change (Gerhard, 2005). Darré’s career during the Third Reich is a prime example of the modernization dilemma. Darré had studied genetics and applied his findings in animal breeding to humans and questions of racial selection. He was a member of the right-wing völkisch movement and actively supported the idea of a superior ‘Nordic race’ that needed to be protected. In articles published in the late 1920s, Darré proposed measures to ‘breed’ a new rural nobility that would lead Germany into the future. He joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and was charged with the task of strengthening the rural component of the Nazi platform in an effort to expand Nazi appeal in the countryside. Darré accomplished this task successfully. With his Agrarpolitischer Apparat (agrarian apparatus), he reached every village and brought the countryside ‘in line’ (Gleichschaltung). Darré’s extreme racial views and breeding ideas caught the attention of Heinrich Himmler, who appointed Darré as the first head of the SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt or RuSHA (Race and Settlement Office) in January 1932. In 1933, Darré succeeded Alfred Hugenberg as Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, took the title of Reichsbauernführer (Reich Peasant Leader) and head of the Reichsnährstand (Reich Food Estate). Darré’s racist and anti-Semitic ideas would play a significant role in the euthanasia programme and the ‘racial struggle’ against Slavs in Eastern Europe. The war in the east was waged to provide living space (Lebensraum) for German settlers, as Hitler had envisioned in his book, Mein Kampf. 141

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

Despite the fact that Darré’s ideological contributions continued to influence Nazi politics, he began to lose credit in the late 1930s. Göring and Hitler now considered his ‘romantic’ picture of the need to save small-scale peasant farms as counterproductive in light of the ‘Battle for Grain’, the need to increase agricultural production, and preparations for war. Darré quarreled constantly with the Minister of Economy, Hjalmar Schacht, and with Robert Ley, head of the German Labour Front, on matters of food prices and representation of rural labourers. By 1938, Darré had also lost the support of his former confidant, Heinrich Himmler. Darré’s ex-protégé Herbert Backe, a food expert and promoter of agricultural science and modernization, was seen as more capable of overcoming economic shortfalls and leading Germany to a final victory. Backe assumed Darré’s responsibilities as Minister in 1942 and officially replaced him in 1944 (Gerhard, 2005; Gerhard 2009).

II.

Rural discourse

Agricultural policies in Nazi Germany resonate with the characteristics outlined in the introductory chapter of the book as common to all fascist or fascistized regimes. In 1930, the Nazi party turned its interest to the countryside to attract rural voters, and the ruralist component became one of the most important aspects of Nazi ideology. It would remain so despite its many contradictions and the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. Well-known aspects of ‘blood and soil’ ideology include extolling the peasantry, rural life, the special characteristics of rural folk, and their significance for the ‘racial purity’ of the German people (Corni and Gies, 1994: 17-23; Gerhard, 2005: 131-132). This ideology is associated most closely with Richard Walther Darré, who never tired of praising the peasants as the source of German economic and cultural vitality, or of emphasizing the connection between the soil and the unique character of the peasants. Darré’s mission was to ‘save’ the peasants, their lifestyle, and their worlds from the threat posed by industrialization and urbanization. He also understood the defence of agriculture as a prerequisite for restoring the ‘racial integrity’ of the German people. This struggle had enormous significance, since the Nazis believed that the ‘destiny of the German people depended on the destiny of the Bauernstand’ (Corni, 1990: 27). As mentioned, Heinrich Himmler was impressed by Darré’s racial views and breeding expertise. Both considered the SS to be the most appropriate ‘breeding ground’ and founded the SS Race and Settlement Office to experiment with these ideas. In the 1930s, Darré publicized his ideas actively and founded the monthly journal Deutsche Agrarpolitik (German Agrarian Politics), later known as Odal. In his 1934 book entitled Das Bauerntum als Lebensquelle der Nordischen Rasse (Peasantry as the Life Source of the Nordic Race), Darré explained how a long tradition of settlement 142

Gesine Gerhard

and inheritance patterns had shaped the German people. Germans had entered history as peasants and had always despised urban areas; in sharp contrast with nomadic peoples, especially the ‘desert-dwelling’ Jews, who lacked this ‘geo-cultural’ bond between race and place (Darré, 1934). The special connection between the German people (blood) and the land (soil) was regarded as the historical basis for Germany’s survival and the reason for its cultural dominance. Industrialization and urbanization were threatening peasant farming, and with it, the very core of the German people. The defence of small-scale peasant farms was thus understood as a prerequisite for the restoration of Germany’s ‘racial integrity’. Darré gave the idea of ‘blood and soil’ a new connotation. He wanted ‘blood’ to be understood as ‘race.’ Peasants were not only the ‘fresh blood’ that provided cities with people; they were also the ‘life source of the Nordic race’ (Darré, 1934). He envisioned the creation of a new ruling class that was rooted in the agrarian community. This committed social Darwinist proposed a system of racial selection to achieve the ‘breeding goal of the German people’ (Darré, 1942). He also suggested marriage restrictions for Jews and ‘less valuable’ non-Jews, strict State control of all marriages and fertility, as well as sterilization of those members of the community who were considered to be a threat to the ‘racial purity’ of the German people. The Nazis applied all of these measures in the following years, even though the idea of a new rural political elite was never fully adopted. While it is reasonable to think that few peasants had read Darré’s books or cared much about his ‘breeding goals’, they did welcome the importance he attributed to them as Landvolk and Nährstand for the German nation. Peasants flocked to and participated in carefully staged national celebrations of the harvest, such as the annual harvest celebration in Bückeberg by Hameln. Hundreds of thousands of people attended this grandiose spectacle that culminated with speeches by Hitler and Darré. The annual celebrations were more popular than the bombastic party rallies held in Nuremberg, but their purpose was just as propagandistic in promoting nationalism and militarism. They can be seen as an indicator of Darré’s political clout and popularity in the 1930s, as well as a demonstration of the significance of agriculture for the Nazi regime. The last festival was held in 1937; in 1938 it was cancelled on very short notice since the trains that had brought peasants to Hameln from all over Germany were needed to transport troops to the Czech border in the wake of the Sudeten crisis. After 1938, Darré felt increasingly marginalized among Nazi leaders. His agrarian cult received less publicity, but remained instrumental for the Nazis until the collapse of the regime.

143

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

III.

The primacy of food

As in other fascist regimes, the food sector took on a prominent and multi-faceted role within the Nazi Reich. First of all, food supplies were vital for keeping German morale high and maintaining favourable and supportive public opinion towards the Nazi regime. Secondly, agricultural production had to increase in order to accomplish the goal of food autarky. Last but not least, food served as a rationale for the war itself, since self-sufficiency could not be accomplished within the existing borders of the Reich. More living space and a reorganization of the European market were necessary conditions for the implementation of the Nazi vision. Germany’s experience during the First World War, when failed agrarian policies and the Allied blockade had caused major food shortages, served as a constant reminder of the primacy of the food sector. The Nazis believed that Germany had been defeated in that war due to the collapse of the home front. To avoid a similar breakdown, sufficient food for the German civilian population was a high priority, and food rations could only be reduced as a last resort. Both Darré and Backe clearly understood this premise and were careful not to repeat the mistakes of the agrarian policies of World War I. In a 1937 publication, Darré condemned the 1915 ‘murder of the pigs’ that had been mandated due to fodder shortages, and had disastrous effects on the German meat supply. He was also critical of any increases in food prices (Corni and Gies, 1997: 402-403). To boost domestic production, a massive propaganda campaign mobilized the countryside for the Erzeugungsschlacht or ‘battle for production’, modelled after Mussolini’s battaglia del grano, which had been launched in 1925 to increase grain production. Just as in Italy, where wheat production had increased by thirty per cent in six years, a massive propaganda campaign was set up alongside the ‘battle’. Thousands of meetings were held and pamphlets were distributed, using militaristic language to bolster support for the national cause. Between 1927 and 1936, domestic agricultural production rose by an impressive twenty-eight per cent, but self-sufficiency was achieved in only a few areas, such as bread, potatoes, sugar, and meat (Tooze, 2007: 192-193). Other products such as fats, eggs, and fodder for horses were still being imported in large quantities at the beginning of the war (Evans, 2006: 349). Since peasants carried the burden of producing ever more food under increasingly difficult circumstances ‘low prices for their products, production quotas, fewer farm hands, and a lack of investment’ the appeal to their moral obligation and national responsibility became more important than ever. The frequent propagandistic

144

Gesine Gerhard

publications and public recognition of peasants as producers of food have to be seen in this light as well. In a radio address in February 1940, Hermann Göring spoke emphatically to the peasants and reminded them of their importance to the cause: ‘On your shoulders, peasants and farmers, peasant women and farm labourers, rests a double responsibility. Use all your energy. Show what you can do. The road ahead is endlessly hard and difficult’ (quoted in Corni and Gies, 1997: 406). In return for their hard work and sacrifices, peasants were promised a new era after the war. Darré envisioned Germany as a ‘Peasant Reich’ [Bauernreich] where the agricultural sector would see large investments and undergo significant modernization. Backe shared Darré’s vision of a modern peasant State, but emphasized the enlargement of Germany’s Lebensraum as crucial for its implementation. In addition to providing food, peasants would also play an important role in the future Greater German Reich. Darré’s concept of the ‘re-armament of the village’ points to the contradictory concept of modernity. While the concept of blood and soil embraced the small-scale family farm, the modernization of agriculture was also considered important. Investment in agriculture actually rose from 1933 to 1938. Once the war started, other industries took priority and growth could not be sustained. Investment in farm machinery and production of chemical fertilizers diminished dramatically. The modernizing vision of agriculture pursued by the Nazi regime was temporarily put on hold (Corni and Gies, 1997: 423ff, 432). While food continued to be a primary concern during the war and actually determined genocidal policies, as we will show below, Darré’s rural vision collided with the realities of a country engaged in warfare. Other economic necessities took priority over agricultural plans, which were adjusted accordingly. Consumer prices had to be kept low to avert the risk of weakening German morale, so peasants had to accept low prices for their products. The iron and steel shortage meant that the manufacture of agricultural machinery took second stage to the production of military weapons. The continuous rural exodus and the military draft after 1939 reduced the agricultural labour force dramatically. Additionally, fertile agricultural land was reassigned as land for motorways, camps, or other military projects (Evans, 2006: 347).

IV.

Corporate design and State intervention

In September 1933, massive restructuring of the agricultural sector began with the creation of the Reichsnährstand, or RNS (Reich Food Estate). This huge organization encompassed all people working in food production, processing, and distribution 145

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

(Gies, 1981). The RNS involved six million people, or more than 40 per cent of the German workforce (Tooze, 2007: 188). To Darré, who had created the RNS along with Backe, the Reich Food Estate was the realization of the long-held dream of a united ‘green front’. The Reich Food Estate would help strengthen the economic situation of peasants and secure their place in the Reich by uniting their interests, replacing antagonism and individualism with cooperation and a sense of community. Fascist Italy had been the first to create this kind of corporate design in the 1920s, and its success had been closely monitored by the Nazis. The Reich Food Estate was set up hierarchically according to the Führer principle. Darré and Backe were at the top, in Berlin, and passed on instructions to the appointed district and local peasant leaders, down to the smallest village and the tiniest farm plot. Every single one of the 55,000 villages in Germany had an Ortsbauernführer, who reported to one of 500 Kreisbauernführer officials, who in turn reported to one of nineteen Landesbauernführer officials (Tooze, 2007: 187). This ensured complete control over the agricultural sector and food production. Imports, agricultural production, and prices were fixed and subjected to strict regulations. Infractors were punished and compliance was strictly enforced. The Reich Food Estate actually ended the free market for agricultural products. Prices were regulated, production was directed, and food was completely removed from the influence of the market. The arms of the RNS extended beyond the economic realm of farming to include lectures, education, and other social contributions to peasant life. Funding for the RNS came from a levy imposed upon every farm; which allowed for the hiring of 20,000 staff and an annual budget of more than one million Reichsmark. The power and influence of this massive organization was impressive. More than twenty-five per cent of the German GDP was controlled by the RNS, with product sales totalling more than thirty billion Reichsmark (Tooze, 2007: 187-188). Although the RNS functioned as an independent organization, it actually provided a major tool for the State to regulate every aspect of the agricultural economy. With the beginning of the Four Year Plan in 1936, State intervention increased even further. A series of regulations were imposed on the food market to control food supplies and prices. In January 1937, food rationing was introduced for butter, margarine, and fat. After 1938, the supervision of farm production was taken to another level. All farms had to fill out a Hofkarte that kept track of their harvest and husbandry. A certain amount of food was allocated for consumption; the rest had to be delivered to the State. Together, these measures ensured complete control of agriculture by the regime and subordinated the entire sector to the economic necessities of the war. Peasants struggled under increasing pressure to meet production quotas, working more and

146

Gesine Gerhard

receiving less for their products. Agrarian ideology collided especially with the real situation of peasant women, who as mothers and bearers of the racial heritage stood at the centre of the blood and soil ideology. In addition to their responsibilities as a mothers and family caretakers, women had to make up for the loss of male farm labour and work to meet increase production demands. Peasants all across Germany resented the tight control, low prices, and State interference in their affairs. They complained about the many new regulations that altered the traditional customs of inheritance and property management. However, their obvious discontent was offset and muffled by their otherwise special treatment and overall favourable situation. They were protected from foreign competition, they had relatively stable incomes, and their tax burden decreased. Prices for agricultural products actually rose faster than industrial prices (Tooze, 2007: 195-196). Many peasants also saw their debts diminish or disappear and no longer feared foreclosure on their properties. Despite the great influence and control exercised by the RNS, self-sufficiency in food could only really be accomplished in a few areas. The solution to the food question had to be found somewhere else. This realization led to a plan that would solve the agricultural dilemma and work towards the grandiose imperial schemes of the Nazis: a dramatic expansion of farmland by means of the acquisition of Lebensraum to the east. Germany’s modernizing potential and industrial leadership would enable her to pursue agrarian settlements in a large German Reich that would extend all the way to the Ural Mountains. Before turning our attention to the link between agricultural policy and war, we will examine how Nazi Germany dealt with the question of land ownership.

V.

The structure of land ownership

Another common feature of fascist rural policies identified by the editors of the book was the fact that existing structures of land ownership were not fundamentally altered by the regime. This statement holds true for Nazi Germany. The original Nazi Party Program of 1920 called for land reform and the ‘creation of a law for the confiscation of land, without compensation, and for communally beneficial purposes’. This approach, as well as Darré’s emphasis on the value for the nation of small-scale peasant farms caused alarm and suspicion among the large estate owners, especially in eastern areas of Germany (Evans, 2006: 420). Hitler ‘clarified’ in April 1928 that this specific point of the party programme referred to Jewish land speculators. The large estate owners in the east had nothing to fear and would not see their property taken away. Darré’s first major piece of legislation, the Reich Erbhof Gesetz (Reich Entailment Law or REG), of September 1933, seemed however to further downplay the importance of large farms as it excluded owners of farms larger than 125 hectares from becoming Erbhofbauern (Hereditary Farmstead Peasants), 147

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

the highest honorary title that could be bestowed on a German peasant. The law also excluded the smallest farms, whose owners were looked down upon and who, at best, might serve as settler-reserves for the new Reich. The Entailment Law aimed at securing the landholdings of German peasants and protecting peasants as Germany’s ‘blood source’. The new category of Erbhof (hereditary farm or entailed estate) applied to medium sized farms ranging from 7.5 to 125 hectares (Grundmann, 1979). These farms would be protected from debts and insulated from market forces. The Erbhof could not be subdivided and would be passed down through generations of ‘pure’ peasant families. The term Bauer became an honorary title that farm owners had to apply for. The Erbhofbauer had to be a male of ‘healthy stock’ who could prove his Aryan descent back to 1800. Jews, daughters, wives, and non-inheriting siblings could not become Erbhofbauern. The Erbhof had to stay within the family; it could not be sold, bought, or used as security on a loan. The Erbhof would in turn be protected from the threat of foreclosure. All existing debts on farms were taken over by the Rentenbank Kreditanstalt, a State sponsored mortgage bank that charged farms collectively for the repayment of debts (Tooze, 2007: 182-186). Overall, the Erbhof law did not have any far reaching effects on the pattern of land ownership in Germany. Inheritance customs in the south-western region of Germany had created a large number of small family farms that didn’t qualify as Erbhöfe, while landowners in the east especially had accumulated large amounts of property and oversaw estates far beyond the 125 hectare maximum extension of an entailed estate. The exclusive selection process and strict racial criteria further diminished the number, so that only 700,000 farms were actually registered as Erbhöfe. This involved twenty-two per cent of the farming population and thirty-seven per cent of all agricultural and forest land (Evans, 2006: 422). Despite Darré’s contentious statements that the large estate owners had destroyed the peasantry in the east, stolen land from the peasants, and turned them into landless labourers, his call to return the land or redistribute it was never actively pursued (Corni, 1990: 121). Darré’s law never touched the property of the Junkers, neither did it promote the modernization of mid-sized peasant farms. Since money could not be borrowed against the farms, peasants had no capital to invest in machinery or increasing the size of their land. Marginal peasant holdings were excluded from these regulations and unaffected by the changes. Despite the relatively small reach of the Erbhof law, peasants all over Germany resented it, as it disregarded traditional inheritance patterns, excluded wives and daughters, and left siblings both landless and penniless. Fathers were in no position to leave money in their wills for their disinherited chil-

148

Gesine Gerhard

dren and could not raise money for dowries by re-mortgaging their farms, which had been a common practice for generations (Evans, 2006: 425). Overall, the impact of the Reich Entailment Law and the Reich Food Estate on the social realities of village life was quite limited. Strong village communities rooted in customs and institutions provided a solidarity net that the totalitarian regime could not easily destroy. This also explains why the grumbling of peasants never turned into outright resistance. Laws or quotas could be circumvented to a certain degree, and peasants turned to local courts to fight the inheritance restrictions. More often than not, exceptions were granted. Furthermore, peasants were basically content with the fixed prices and production quotas, which secured their income and mitigated the risks and insecurities of the free market or weather. During the Third Reich life for peasants continued more or less as before. The elevated social status and celebration of their contribution to society made them feel valued. Peasants had enough to eat and earned enough to support themselves, and that was more than they had experienced during the insecure 1920s and the Depression years.

VI.

Food policies and war

This analysis has shown how securing the German food supply and increasing food autarky played a prominent role in Nazi plans for a greater German Reich. In fact, food considerations served as a rationale for the war itself. At the height of its power, Germany exploited the natural and economic resources of occupied territories in a myriad of ways. The eastern lands played a special role in the German design. Hitler had always counted on being able to take control of the Ukraine for its grain resources. He wanted the European ‘bread-basket’ to feed German people in the new Reich and decrease Germany’s dependency on imports. But matters didn’t stop there; food policies turned decisively genocidal in 1941-42 when the food situation at home became precarious. During the preparations for Barbarossa in the winter of 1940-41, Herbert Backe had been charged with overseeing the economic aspects of territorial expansion in the east. Securing the Ukraine and especially its grain resources was a key military priority, and Backe knew exactly what was required of him. Backe had written his doctoral dissertation in the 1920s on the subject of Russian agriculture. As a specialist on the Soviet grain market, Backe had always promoted reorganization of the German-dominated European grain market. Barbarossa provided the opportunity to implement this plan. To preserve precious food resources at home, Backe requested that the three million invading German soldiers feed themselves from the Soviet soil alone. As few resources as possible were to be redirected from 149

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

Germany to the soldiers on the Eastern Front. Since the Ukraine alone did not have enough grain supplies to feed the incoming German men and horses, more drastic measures were needed. Food had to be taken from other Soviet areas as well, and large segments of the Soviet population had to be entirely cut off from food supplies in order to secure enough food for the German army. Backe thus came up with the so-called ‘Hungerplan’ – a scheme that would seal off major Soviet cities and starve their populations to death. In order to extract a maximum of resources, Backe’s Hungerplan divided Soviet territory into so-called ‘surplus areas’ (the Ukraine, southern Russia and the Caucasus region) and ‘deficit areas’ (Belarus, northern and central Russia). Less fertile areas in the north, including big cities like Leningrad, were to be sealed off and left on their own until the population surrendered (Gerlach, 2001; Heim, 2003; Gerhard, 2009). A group of staff from the Ministerial bureaucracy and High Command of the German Armed Forces (Oberkommando Wehrmacht) worked closely with Backe to implement the plan. In preparatory meetings for Barbarossa in spring 1941, the consequences of this food strategy were openly discussed, and mass murder on a massive scale was predicted: ‘If we take what we need out of the country, there can be no doubt that many millions of people will die of starvation’ (quoted from Tooze, 2007: 479). No exact number was specified, but earlier Backe had estimated a surplus of twenty to thirty million people in the Soviet Union; which was two to three times the number of Jews slated for the ‘final solution’ throughout Europe. The racial war that began in June 1941 targeted Slavs and Jews on a massive scale. Food was to be used as the ultimate weapon of destruction (Gerhard, 2009). The mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war under Backe serves as another case in point to illustrate how agricultural and food policies became genocidal. The German army had taken more than 3.3 million prisoners by the end of 1941. Many of them were shot on the spot, while starvation claimed the vast majority of the 2.2 million Soviet prisoners who died otherwise. Soviet prisoners were exempt from the Geneva Convention standards for the treatment of prisoners of war, and the Soviet POWs faced horrible conditions in German camps. Their deaths represent a calculated genocide that was ‘justified’ by the critical food situation in Germany (Streit, 1978). When a bad harvest and the imminent food supply crisis threatened to further decrease German rations in 1942, the Poles were designated as the next to be sacrificed. Backe and Himmler gave orders to reduce food consumption in this territory in June 1942, thus expediting the genocide in the General Government (Aly and Heim, 1993; Gerlach 2001). The millions of Polish Jews still alive in the Ghettos would be the first victims of these drastic measures, and their speedy elimination would reduce

150

Gesine Gerhard

the pressure on the food supply. Göring summarily dismissed all human considerations: ‘even if you say that your people will starve, it makes no difference to me. Let them do so, as long as no German collapses from hunger’ (quoted from Tooze, 2007: 547). General Governor Frank had internalized Hitler’s mantra that the ‘consequences must be accepted, because before the German population in any way faces starvation, others must…pay’ (quoted from Tooze, 2007: 547). Nazi food policy in the occupied East was thus a genocidal policy. The question of foreign workers in Germany received special attention from agricultural planners. Because of their usefulness to the German war effort, especially people employed in armament and food production, these workers received slightly more food than their compatriots, but only enough to enable them to continue working. Backe, however, argued forcefully that Germany could not afford anymore ‘useless eaters’ and should therefore limit the number of foreign workers to the absolute minimum. Backe was under tremendous pressure, but what caused him stress in April 1942 was not the wellbeing of Soviet prisoners; it was the inevitable need to reduce food rations for Germans. Other Nazi leaders watched the issue of food rations and Backe’s actions with great anxiety. Backe had the full confidence of Himmler and Hitler, who confirmed that Backe always had the last word on food policy. Backe, Himmler, and Heydrich formed the team that implemented the Hungerplan as a genocidal policy both in occupied Poland and the Soviet Union.

VII.

Agricultural sciences

A final example of the contradictory nature of modernization during the Nazi Reich is the role played by the agricultural sciences. For a long time historians have considered science under the Nazis to be pseudo-science that was used to support the racial theories and political agenda of the regime. Thus, according to this view, Third Reich scientists could not be enabling progress or generating any modernizing effects. Recent studies have challenged this picture (see Heim, Sachse, and Walker, 2009). The Nazis relied heavily on scientists to achieve greater economic independence and self-sufficiency (Gerhard, 2011). In their laboratories, researchers cultivated plants and bred new species that would increase agricultural productivity. Rather than being curtailed, the agricultural sciences flourished under the Nazis. Funding increased greatly and new research institutes were opened. Scientists received generous support, especially for war-related projects and for advancing Germany’s agricultural autarky. This enabled many scientists to continue their research without interruption. The war provided fresh opportunities for research, since scientists now had access to sensitive data and could experiment with human ‘guinea pigs’ from concentration and prison camps. With the occupation of territories in the east, the possibilities for new areas 151

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

of research and discovery seemed limitless, especially in agriculture (Heim, 2003). Herbert Backe was an enthusiastic supporter of the sciences and served as a mediator between the State and prominent research institutes like the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. In the realm of agricultural sciences, the Nazi period continued the earlier trends that had placed German science at the forefront globally. The Nazis believed in science and technology as agents of agricultural change. They supported scientific discovery and offered new opportunities for researchers, who would build on them after 1945.

VIII. Conclusion While Nazi rural policies overlap in many ways with the ‘common features’ of fascist regimes recognized by the editors of this volume, a comment on the specific nature of Nazi agricultural policies is in order. As described above, the close link between agricultural considerations, food policies, and genocide is a specific German feature that spanned the entire Nazi period. While food played a strategic role in the war for other countries and might have been used as a weapon, in no other fascist State were food policies used to implement mass murder. The Stalin era in the Soviet Union comes to mind as another totalitarian regime in which food and starvation generated massive change and upheaval. This is not the place to discuss issues surrounding Stalin’s ‘manmade famine’, but one cannot avoid associating it with Backe’s Hungerplan. Another difference lies in the chronology of events. The Nazis’ ‘Thousand Year Reich’ lasted only twelve years, and while this was certainly long enough to wipe out much of the European Jewry, commit mass murder of Soviet and Polish citizens, inflict unimaginable harm on countless peoples, and bring another world war to Europe, it was a short interlude in the larger trends of agrarian modernization and structural change. We started this paper with the thesis that the Nazi period represented a pause, a reprieve from the forces of structural change affecting German peasants. The modernization trend was in no way reversed under Nazi rule, and after 1945 structural changes accelerated exponentially. During the 1950s, small farms were given up en masse as thousands of people moved to the cities and found jobs in industry. The high esteem for peasants persisted for many years, and a considerable number of Germans still considered the peasant lifestyle as a cultural asset to be preserved. However, and most importantly, small peasants provided a flexible labour reservoir that could be employed in the booming industry sector. In the 1950s, tractors replaced horses, machinery increased labour productivity, and a dramatic surge in agricultural production ensued. Furthermore, the loss of the large estates east of the Elbe River altered the structure of land ownership in West Germany without the need for a land reform. European regulations would further phase out inefficient marginal farms, while simultaneously ensuring the continuation and profitability of niche farming. State inter152

Gesine Gerhard

vention in the agricultural sector reached another level with the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), implemented in the 1960s. In global terms, the impact of Nazi agricultural policies on structural change was weaker than in fascist Italy, where the regime lasted longer and fascist leaders had more time to implement changes. When we use the framework of modernization to understand the rural policies of the Nazi regime, we are confronted with a dilemma. We encounter an overarching ideology that emphasized traditional farming, elevated the peasant as the racial and cultural essence of the nation, and promised to preserve the peasant world. At the same time, we see that powerful trends of agrarian modernization continued throughout the period; and we encounter a Nazi vision of food autarky, involving the reorganization of the European market, that was revolutionary in itself. Agrarian policies in Nazi Germany can only be understood in the context of modernization. The blood and soil policy drowned out structural changes and the war imposed other economic priorities, but there was no doubt in the minds of the Nazi leaders that the modern Bauernreich would emerge when the time was right.

153

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

Bibliography Aly, Götz and Heim, Susanne (2002), Architects of Annihilation. Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Backe, Herbert (1942), Um die Nahrungsfreiheit Europas. Weltwirtschaft oder Großraum; Leipzig, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 2nd. ed.

Bavaj, Riccardo and Hildebrand, Klaus (2003), Die Ambivalenz der Moderne im National-sozialismus. Eine Bilanz der Forschung, Munich, Oldenbourg.

Bergmann, Klaus (1970), Agrarromantik und Grosstadtfeindschaft, Meisenheim, Anton Hain. Bramwell, Anna (1985), Blood and Soil. Richard Walther Darré and Hitler’s ‘Green Party’, Abbotsbrook, Kensal Press.

Corni, Gustavo (1990), Hitler and the Peasants. Agrarian Policy of the Third Reich, 1930-1939, New York, Berg.

Corni, Gustavo (1997), Brot-Butter-Kanonen. Die Ernährungswirtschaft in Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.

Corni, Gustavo and Gies, Horst (1994), ‘Blut und Boden’: Rassenideologie und Agrarpolitik im Staat Hitlers, Idstein, Schulz-Kirchner Verlag.

Dahrendorf, Rudolf (1965), Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, München, R. Pieper. Darré, Richard Walther (1934), Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der nordischen Rasse, München, Lehmann, 4th ed.

Darré, Richard Walther (1942), ‘Das Zuchtziel des deutschen Volkes, 1931.’, in Um Blut und Boden. Reden und Aufsätze, München, Lehmann, 4th ed. Evans, Richard (2006), The Third Reich in Power, New York, Penguin Books. Fest, Joachim (1973), Hitler. Eine Biographie, Berlin, Propylaen.

Gerhard, Gesine (2000), ‘Das Ende der deutschen Bauernfrage-Ländliche Gesellschaft im Umbruch’, in Daniela Münkel (ed.) (2000), Der lange Abschied vom Agrarland. Agrarpolitik, Landwirtschaft und ländliche Gesellschaft zwischen Weimar und Bonn, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, p. 124-142.

Gerhard, Gesine (2005), ‘Breeding Pigs and People for the Third Reich: Richard Walther Darré’s Agrarian Ideology’, in Franz-Josef Brueggemeier, Mark Cioc and Thomas Zeller (eds.) (2005), How Green Were the Nazis? Nature, Environment, and Nation in the Third Reich, Athens, Ohio University Press, p. 129-146.

Gerhard, Gesine (2009), ‘Food and Genocide. Nazi Agrarian Food Policy in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union’, Contemporary European History, 18, 1, p. 45-65. 154

Gesine Gerhard

Gerhard, Gesine (2011), ‘Food as Weapon. Agricultural Sciences and the Building of a Greater German Empire‘, Food, Society, Culture, 14, 3, p. 335-351. Gerlach, Christian (2001), Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord. Deutsche Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Zürich, Pendo Verlag.

Gies, Horst (1981), ‘Die Rolle des Reichsnährstandes im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssytem’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.) (1981), Der ‘Führerstaat’: Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, p. 270-304.

Grundmann, Herbert (1979), Agrarpolitik im 3. Reich. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit des Reichserbhofgesetzes, Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe.

Heim, Susanne (2003), Kalorien, Kautschuk, Karrieren. Pflanzenzüchtung und landwirtschaftliche Forschung in Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten 1933-1945, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag.

Heim, Susanne (2009), The Kaiser Wilhelm Society under National Socialism, New York, Cambridge University Press.

Lehmann, Joachim (1993), ‘Herbert Backe. Technokrat und Agrarideologe’, in Ronald Smelzer, Enrico Syring and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.) (1993), Die Braune Elite II. 21 Weitere biographische Skizzen, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Schoenbaum, David (1966), Hitler’s Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-1939, New York and London, W.W. Norton and Company.

Streit, Christian (1978), Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. Tooze, Adam (2007), The Powers of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, New York, Viking.

Wunderlich, Frieda (1961), Farm Labor in Germany, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Zitelmann, Rainer (1987), Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, Hamburg and New York, Berg.

Zitelmann, Rainer and Prinz, Michael (1991), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

155

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

Appendix. Agricultural indicators for Germany

Table 5.1. Number and area of new settlements during the period of National Socialism

Year

Number of settlements

Total area (in 1,000 ha.)



1933

4914

60.3



1935

3905

68.3



1937

1894

37.6



1939

486

17.9



1941

381

9.6

Source: Wunderlich (1961: 179).

Table 5.2. Investment in new agricultural machinery Year

Investment (in million Rm)



1934-1935

254



1935-1936

356



1936-1937

412



1937-1938

463



1938-1939

593

Source: Wunderlich (1961: 194).

156

Gesine Gerhard

Table 5.3 Amount of fertilizer used (in million Reichsmark) Year

Amount of fertilizer used (in million Reichsmark)



1934-1935

634



1935-1936

739



1936-1937

712



1937-1938

741



1938-1939

810

Source: Wunderlich (1961: 194).

Table 5.4. Percentage of national income made up by farm income Year

Percentage of national income



1933

8.7



1937

8.3

Source: Schoenbaum (1966: 163).

Table 5.5. Foreign workers employed in German agriculture

Year

Numbers



1933-1934

44,645



1934-1935

51,992



1935-1936

53,653



1936-1937

64,976



1937-1938

121,638

Source: Wunderlich (1961: 343).

157

The modernization dilemma: agrarian policies in Nazi Germany

Table 5.6. People employed in Agriculture as percentage of total workforce

Year

%



1933

28.9



1937

26.0

Source: Schoenbaum (1966: 175).

158

6.

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945 Ernst Langthaler

I.

Introduction

With regard to agricultural development in twentieth-century Austria, the ‘Austrofascist’ era from 1934 to 1938 along with the subsequent Nazi era from 1938 to 1945 have long been conceived as an ‘interlude’ or even a ‘step backwards’ by post-war historiography. Most writers have assessed fascist agricultural policies as being essentially ‘anti-modern’: some emphasize the authoritarian and totalitarian regulation of agriculture by the ‘Austrofascist’ and Nazi dictatorships, which did away with the democratic institutions of the Austrian First Republic. Others put the spotlight on the over-reaching agrarian fundamentalism expressed in the ‘Austrofascist’ glorification of peasantry and the Nazi Blut und Boden (blood and soil) ideology, which aimed at the restoration of what was considered a preindustrial ‘peasant community’. Both lines of argument led to the conclusion that Austrian agricultural development from 1934 to 1945 stagnated or even declined due to more extensive uses of land and livestock, which has sometimes even been interpreted as an outcome of peasant resistance against Nazi rule (Tremel, 1969: 390 f.; Mooslechner and Stadler, 1988). Accordingly, the transition to ‘modern’ – i.e. capital-intensive – agriculture did not take off until the 1950s, after the Austrian Second Republic completed its ‘reconstruction era’. Before questioning the view espousing the ‘anti-modern’ nature of agricultural policies in Austria from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, the main features of the two political regimes of this period will be outlined. The Republic of Austria, founded in 1918 as one of the successor States of the Habsburg Monarchy, was caught in the economic and political crises of the late 1920s and early 1930s. After the dissolution of Parliament, the prohibition of the Communist and Nazi parties, and the defeat of the Social Democrats in the civil war of 1933-34, the Catholic-conservative government proclaimed an authoritarian Christian and German Ständestaat, or corporate State. The parliament was replaced by six councils whose members were appointed without democratic electoral procedures. All political parties were banned, except for the Vaterländische Front (Fatherland Front), a broadly unsuccessful attempt to impose on society a fascist mass movement similar to that of Italy and Germany.

159

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Although seven Berufsstände (Professional Estates) were envisioned to encompass both employers and employees, only those of agriculture and public service were actually founded (Tálos and Neugebauer, 2005; Peniston-Bird, 2009). There is an ongoing debate as to the ‘fascist’ character of this anti-liberal and anti-socialist dictatorship that lacked imperialist or racist radicalism; however, its intermediate position between the prototypes of Italian Fascism and National Socialism, as well as its proximity to other authoritarian regimes of the 1930s, suggests that Austria can be labelled as ‘parafascist’ (Griffin, 1993: 240) or ‘Austrofascist’ (Tálos, 2005: 417). The Austrian ‘Corporate State’ was initially supported by Italian Fascism, but came to an end in 1938 when National Socialism began to gain power: internally, through Nazi party demonstrations against the Austrian government, and externally through invasion by the German Army. After a referendum, Austria was entirely annexed to the German Reich and sub-divided into seven Reichsgaue (provinces) under general and party administration. In several respects the Austrian provinces of the German Reich provided a laboratory for regime policies, such as the persecution of Jewish citizens. After the military defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, Austria again became a democratic republic under Allied occupation, until it regained full sovereignty in 1955 (Tálos and others, 2000). Despite some ‘exceptionalist’ notions, there is broad consensus that National Socialism, with key features including imperialism, racism, and totalitarianism, conforms to a generic definition of fascism (Kallis, 2003; Bosworth, 2009). Therefore, while completely acknowledging their differences, I refer to the two political regimes in Austria between 1934 and 1945 as ‘fascist’. This chapter challenges the view that the agricultural policies of the ‘Austrofascist’ and Nazi regimes in Austria were essentially ‘anti-modern’. I in no way dispute the anti-democratic and agrarianist tendencies of the ‘Austrofascist’ and Nazi regimes; but what needs to be challenged is the conclusion that they were ‘anti-modern’ in nature. Much of the confusion about the ‘(anti-)modern’ character of fascism derives from the vagueness of the term ‘modernity’. Neither the social sciences in general nor history in particular have developed a coherent theory of modernization; what we have is a bundle of (non- or even anti-Marxian) assumptions about societal change, diffusely labelled as ‘modernization’. Similar to orthodox Marxian approaches, the classical view of ‘modernization’, focused on the one-way street towards democratization and industrialization, has been re-interpreted in the context of the criticism of modernity since the 1960s and the argumentation for post-modernity since the 1980s (Knöbl, 2003). Modernization has inherited a certain ambivalence that allows more than one pathway for societal transformation. Alongside the ‘normal’ (i.e. West European) route to liberal-democratic society, alternative modernizing pathways –including socialist and fascist ones (Moore, 1966)– become thinkable. Whereas the classical notion of ‘modernity’ excludes fascism by definition, greater 160

Ernst Langthaler

reflection has generated perspectives that more accurately assess the ‘(anti‑)modern’ character of fascist regimes in general and their agricultural policies in particular (Bavaj, 2003, 2005). Roger Griffin recently examined the relationship between fascism and modernity, and the contradictory nature of the latter. Griffin states that ‘What fascism does viscerally oppose is not modernity as such, but those elements within modernity that it considers to be fuelling national decay and the erosion of that sense of a higher purpose to existence that fascism associates with membership in an organic community’ (Griffin, 2006: 9, 2007). Therefore, the crucial problem is not if, but how society was modernized in a certain time and place, which overcomes the sharp antagonism between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity‘. Based on the debate regarding Nazism and modernity that has been active since the 1960s (Bavaj, 2003: 13-56), these varieties of modernity can be ordered along two dimensions: first, the position of decision-makers, which addresses whether the modernization of society was an intended or unintended function; and second, the range of modernization, which considers whether it affected society partially or totally. By applying this two-dimensional order we encounter four ideal-typical positions that have been exemplified in the positions taken by scholars over the last five decades (see Table 6.1). In the 1960s, David Schoenbaum (1966) was one of the first to emphasize the ‘modern’ nature of Nazism; however, the ‘social revolution’ that accompanied it was considered to have occurred in spite of the ‘antimodernist’ intentions of Nazi leaders. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hans Mommsen (1991), who wrote the afterword to the German edition of Schoenbaum’s book (Mommsen, 1980), conceded that there had been several modern developments in the Nazi era, but classified them either as unintended consequences of Nazi rule or as ‘pretended modernization’. In the late 1980s, Rainer Zitelmann (1989) caused a stir by claiming that Hitler and other Nazi leaders were ‘revolutionaries’ in the sense that they aimed at fundamentally transforming German society according to modernist visions. In the 1990s, Riccardo Bavaj (2003: 199-204) assessed the entire debate and argued that, though many Nazi leaders followed modernist visions, their efforts affected only parts of society. It is not my intention here to enter this debate by judging who is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’; however, the debate will be used as a heuristic framework for assessing agricultural development in Austria from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s.

161

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Table 6.1. Varieties of modernity with regard to Nazism

Position of decision-makers Total Range of modernization Partial

intentional modernization a ‘great leap forward’ (e.g Zitelmann) modernization in ‘small steps’ (e.g. Bavaj)

functional unintended modernization (e.g. Schoenbaum) unintended effects of policy (e.g. Mommsen)

If we relate this heuristic framework to agricultural development, we should take as a point of reference the ‘great transformation’ of Austrian agriculture in the twentieth century, i.e. the transition from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive or ‘productivist’ food regime (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Ilbery and Bowler, 1998). Food regimes are composed of the institutionalized interrelations between a particular mode of accumulation of resources and a particular mode of regulation by societal actors along the agro-food chain (McMichael, 2009). Accordingly, the focus of this chapter is twofold: to examine first the development of agricultural resource flows into, within, and out of the agrosystem; and second, to study the development of agricultural regulation at different levels, including farming styles, as ‘modes of ordering’ local and regional agrosystems (van der Ploeg, 2003; Vanclay and others, 2006). In plain terms, the labour-intensive agrosystem in Austria after the 1918 dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy’s regional division of labour presented three main features: first, there were relatively low capital inputs and low outputs with a high internal conversion of resources (e.g. nutrient cycles between fodder production and organic fertilisation); second, prior to State intervention in the 1930s, in reaction to the ‘Great Depression’, there was a high degree of self-regulation at the local and regional levels (e.g. via peasant cooperatives); third, the dominance of peasant farming styles implied ongoing relative autonomy for the family economy vis-à-vis subordination to the State and markets (Bruckmüller and others, 2002, 2003). By the 1980s a ‘productivist transition’ had occurred that involved, first, high inputs (mainly chemical and mechanical technology financed by public and private credits) and high outputs (mainly raw materials for the processing industries) with decreased internal conversion; second, the widening and deepening of interventionist agricultural policies based on the vision of the productive family farm as codified in the 1960 Agriculture Act; and, third, the emergence of entrepreneurial farming styles with a strong masculine bias, which went hand in hand with the ‘feminization’ of the domestic sphere (Bruckmüller and others, 2002, 2003). With regard to this secular trend, the main question this chapter seeks to address is: what impact did the two 162

Ernst Langthaler

fascist regimes have on the transition from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive food regime in Austria? In the following sections, this question will be answered with regard to resource flows to and from markets, State regulation, and routine styles of farming. For the sake of pragmatism and principle, the Nazi era will be emphasized using recent source-based case studies (Langthaler, 2000, 2009), while the Austrofascist era will be examined using the available literature. Most of the exploration that follows refers to the province of Lower Austria (Niederösterreich) or Niederdonau, the rural hinterland of the city of Vienna.

II.

Agricultural development in the Austrofascist era: 1934-38

Any consideration of agricultural development at the national or supra-national level must take into account the features of regional and local agrosystems, especially in a country as diverse as Austria. The 1930 agricultural census and map (Wutz, 1939) in Figure 6.1 shows the main Austrian landscapes (alpine, northern highlands, flat lands, or hill country), making it possible to compare farm size, land use, labour, and capital endowments. The alpine area was characterised by holdings larger than twenty hectares with an emphasis on forestry and grassland farming. There were a considerable number of large forest estates in addition to large peasant farms. Due to the importance of dairy cattle, permanent labourers were the dominant element in the non-family workforce. In the northern highlands, mid-sized and large peasant farms between ten and 100 hectares were present in above-average numbers. Forestry, arable farming, and intensive livestock breeding were the dominant land use activities, which also required a greater presence of permanent non-family labourers. The flat and hilly land in and around the Alps and the highlands can be sub-divided into two areas: the eastern part surrounding the consumer centre of the highly industrialised Vienna basin was characterized by the unequal distribution of land between large estates and small-holdings or small peasant farms. Despite the considerable presence of livestock, the emphasis on intensive arable farming and viticulture led to aboveaverage numbers of temporary non-family labourers in combination with machinery. In the western part of the flatlands and hill country, the combination of grassland and arable farming in mid-sized and large peasant farms was most prevalent, characterized by intensive livestock breeding with permanent workers. Austria’s agrosystemic diversity posed a serious challenge to any kind of agricultural policy, be it fascist or non-fascist.

163

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Figure 6.1. Regional patterns of land and livestock use in Austria in 1930

Source: Wutz (1939).

In addition to the agrosystemic conditions, agricultural development in the ‘Austrofascist’ era was influenced by how Austria had coped with the economic and political crisis of the early 1930s. Massive production increases overseas (in the USA, Canada, Argentina) drove grain prices down on the world market from the late 1920s onwards, along with the prices of most other agricultural products. Since Austria relied heavily on grain imports and domestic production was weighted toward dairy and meat products, the agricultural sector was hit by the price decline in a rather late but serious manner. Under the Catholic-conservative Minister Engelbert Dollfuß, the agrarian apparatus reacted to the agricultural crisis by proclaiming an agrarischer

164

Ernst Langthaler

Kurs (Agrarian Course) in 1931, which involved protection against foreign production as well as restrictions on domestic dairy, meat, and grain production. Regulations were aimed at boosting prices for agricultural producers at the expense of consumers dependent on food purchases. This producer-oriented strategy reflected the polarization between the ruling Christian Social Party and their coalition partners on the one hand, and the Social Democratic Party on the other. It culminated in the gradual installation of an authoritarian regime in 1933-34 under Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß, formerly Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (Kluge, 1988; Miller, 1989; Bruckmüller, 1995; Hanisch, 2005). In a famous speech in 1933, Dollfuß metaphorically equated the corporative order of the ‘New State’ with the paternalistic order of the traditional ‘peasant house’, where the farmholder and the servants spooned their soup out of one same large bowl (Senft, 2005: 114). The Agrarian Course took deep root in the social and discursive polarization of Austrian society in the shadow of Great Depression and emerging Austrofascism. The ‘Agriculture and Forestry Professional Estate’ was established in 1935 in accord with the Constitution of the ‘Corporate State’. The idea of a corporative organization of farmholders and their labourers had been discussed by Engelbert Dollfuß, among others, in the 1920s, but had not been implemented due to socialdemocratic resistance, a hindrance the authoritarian regime removed. The agrarian ‘Professional Estate’ was a self-governing corporation at the service of the State. Rather than establishing new organizations, it incorporated existing ones. In Lower Austria, the Bauernbund (Peasant League), which had been founded in 1906 as a subdivision of the Christian Social Party, ruled alone; while the Landwirtschaftskammer (Agricultural Chamber), founded in 1922, was the official farmers’ organization and expertise apparatus. The informal links between Catholic-conservative politics and professional representation were formally established in the 1920s (Langthaler, 2008: 695-698). In contrast with the ideology-driven re-organization of the agrarian apparatus, agricultural policy followed a rather pragmatic course after the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuß by Nazi rebels in 1934. The far-reaching demands of agrarian civil servants included attempts to close the gap between input and output prices, increased demand for dairy and meat products, reduced tax burdens and social charges, lower interest rates on credit, and preventing the forced auction of farms. They provoked harsh reactions from industrial pressure groups and went mostly unfulfilled during the government of Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg. Contrary to the corporatist ideal of mutual co-operation, competition between different factions of the farming community soon became obvious and began to de-legitimize the agrarian apparatus (Mattl, 1993). The market regulation that had been set up according to the Agrarian 165

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Course involved fixed delivery quotas that served the interests of larger farm enterprises rather than small and mid-sized peasant holdings. Furthermore, food prices in the 1930s favoured arable farming over livestock farming and forestry. The massive price divergence (Figure 6.2) shows that the agricultural crisis was an outcome of under-consumption rather than over-production: under the monetarist budget policy of the ‘Corporate State’, the purchasing power of the unemploymentplagued urban population remained weak and food consumption shifted from relatively expensive dairy products and meat to cheaper grains and potatoes. The agricultural policy of the ‘Austrofascist’ regime did not affect the diverse agrosystems equally. The social and regional differentiation of agricultural incomes led to increased indebtedness and a wave of forced farm auctions, especially smallscale farms or in mountainous regions. Counter-measures such as the Bergbauernhilfsfonds (Mountain Peasant Aid Fund) of 1934 were unable to solve the debt problem. The Agrarian Course was biased towards large-scale farm enterprises in favoured areas such as the technologically advanced wheat and sugar beet farmers of the Danube basin. This area also produced the most important supply of top-level agrarian civil servants (Kluge, 1988; Senft, 2002, 2005). Figure 6.2. Agricultural producer prices in Austria, 1929-38

Source: Wiener Institut für Wirtschafts- und Konjunkturforschung (1939: 207).

166

Ernst Langthaler

III. Agricultural development in the Nazi era: 1938-45 III.1. Market linkage Despite the romantic images of pre-industrial agriculture adorning the ‘blood and soil’ ideology (Lovin, 1967), the Nazi regime did not reject modern technology (Herf, 1984). The surprising fact is that the food regime established by the German Nazi government in 1933 actually fostered technological progress. Conventional historiography on agricultural development in Nazi Germany has generally focused on the preparations for the war of aggression (Farquharson, 1976; Corni, 1990; Corni and Gies, 1997). This view has proven itself to be too narrow. From a broader perspective, it becomes evident that leading decision-makers in the agrarian apparatus of the Third Reich aimed at fundamentally re-ordering the interwar food regime at a European level (Tooze, 2006: 166-199). After the disruptions of agricultural trade during World War I, order was restored to the pre-war global food regime under British hegemony, based on the delivery of agricultural products from white settler colonies overseas to European industrial states (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). From the 1920s onwards, Germany became heavily dependent on food imports, especially feed for livestock farming (Grant, 2009; Corni and Gies, 2007: 371-392). According to Herbert Backe, the top-level Nazi agrarian civil servant (who managed to wrest power away from his superior, Richard W. Darré, Minister of Food and Agriculture and Reich Peasant Leader), the British-ruled Weltwirtschaft (world economic order) would be replaced by a European Großraumwirtschaft (Greater Economic Area) under German hegemony after 1936 (Backe, 1942). The project of European economic re-ordering of the German Reich was intertwined with the project of diplomatic and military political re-ordering; the two amalgamated into the political-economic ‘megaproject’ of the Nazi food regime. Though this vision was not fully realized, it guided the thoughts and actions of decision-makers, scientific experts, and civil servants in the agrarian apparatus of the Third Reich (Becker, 1987; Heim, 2003; Oberkrome, 2009: 90-232). In the Greater Economic Area plan, the German Reich aimed at re-orienting its agro-food commodity chains from global markets towards bilateral trade relations, especially with confederate States in South-eastern Europe, and towards domestic production (Sundhausen, 1983; Corni and Gies, 1997: 371-392). From 1934 on, a State-led production campaign known as the Erzeugungsschlacht (Battle for Production), was announced annually (Lovin, 1974). Though it seems excessive to accept the claim that the Battle for Production was completely lost, as some have stated (Degler and Streb, 2008), the results were rather ambiguous. The degree of self-sufficiency, for example, rose only slightly from eighty per cent in 1933-34 to 167

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

eighty-three per cent in 1938-39 (Volkmann, 1979: 301). Since Hitler and many other Nazi leaders were fearful of food riots like those of World War I (Kutz, 1984; Corni and Gies, 1997: 399-409), the crisis surrounding the Battle for Production on the eve of World War II was not only an economic issue, it was also supremely political. It culminated in a paradigmatic shift in what the leading agrarian experts understood to be the focus of the State-led production campaign. In the 1930s the emphasis of Nazi agricultural policy had been on the improvement of land productivity due to the relative scarcity of agricultural land and the abundance of agricultural labour. During the war, agronomic discourse shifted to the improvement of labour productivity due to the relative scarcity of agricultural workers as a consequence of the rural exodus, military service, and the abundance of agricultural land from German territorial expansion in Eastern and South-eastern Europe (Sundhausen, 1983; Streb and Pyta, 2005). The paradigmatic shift from land to labour productivity called for mechanical rather than biological farm technology, and for tractors rather than mineral fertilizers (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). However, due to the priorities of warfare, the project of overall mechanization of German agriculture –the so-called ‘armament of the village’ (Aufrüstung des Dorfes)– was postponed until after the ‘final victory’ (Corni and Gies, 1997: 429). Despite bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials and labour-force, local pilot projects known as Gemeinschaftsaufbau (communal construction) were implemented in mountainous areas as ‘small steps’ to prepare for the ‘great leap’. The communal construction plan for Ybbsitz, an Alpine commune in the south-west of Niederdonau, reveals the potential impact of such activities on the local agrosystem. Figure 6.3 depicts the actual state of the average farming system in the commune of Ybbsitz in 1941, according to research carried out by the planners. Each square represents one type of resource: the lower left square stands for cultivated land, the upper left square for livestock, the upper right square for labour force, and the lower right square for machinery. The arrows illustrate the directions and size of money flows. The planned impact of communal construction action on the local agrosystem becomes clear when compared with the five-year ’target state’ envisioned by the plan. First, the amount of land and the labour force hardly increased, but the amount of livestock doubled –mostly due to the increase in dairy cows– and the amount of machinery quintupled. Second, though farm size mostly stagnated in absolute terms, there were significant changes in land use. Arable land increased at the expense of grassland, while pastures were converted into meadows, resulting in more intensive use of land. Third, farm inputs such as mineral fertilizers, seeds, and fossil fuels increased substantially; so did farm outputs such as dairy products and meat. Consequently, the circular flows of resources were redirected more and more towards factor and product markets. Fourth, according to the plan’s cal-

168

Ernst Langthaler

culations, unprofitable farms were expected to gradually make profits.1 Thus, the communal construction plan transformed the farm from being a target for assigning family labour into a source of monetary income. Figure 6.3. Actual (left) and target state (right) of the average farming system in Ybbsitz according to the 1941 ‘communal construction’ plan

Legend: o = cultivated area (hectares), n = livestock (livestock units, 1 LU = 500 kilograms of live weight), n = labour force (working units, 1 WU = 300 working days per year), n = machinery (value as new in Reichsmark), ´ = money flows, a = grain, b = root crops, c = forage crops, d = meadows, e = pastures, f = forests, 1 = horses, 2 = oxen, 3 = cows, 4 = young cattle, 5 = pigs, I = family labourers, II = non-family labourers, A = individual property, B = collective property.

Source: Calculations and design by the author based on data from the Österreichisches StaatsarchivArchiv der Republik, Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, Unterabteilung Bergland, box Gemeinschaftsaufbau Niederdonau, file Ybbsitz.

As in other places, the Ybbsitz communal construction plans were only partially realized due to war-induced bottlenecks; however, the plans indicate a re-ordering of agrosystemic resource flows according to the designs of the agronomic experts of the Nazi food regime. Overall, the intervention sought to transform agriculture in moun Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Archiv der Republik, Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, Unterabteilung Bergland, box Gemeinschaftsaufbau Niederdonau, file Ybbsitz.

1

169

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

tain areas towards high-input high-output farming that was closely intertwined with upstream and downstream industries. Though the integration of arable and livestock farming was not yet challenged (as was the case two decades later), the emphasis on mechanized dairy farming indicates a vision for a more intensified, specialized, and concentrated –in short, productivist– agrosystem. In this way, the communal construction plans of the 1940s anticipated the path agricultural development would take in the 1950s on the northern fringe of the Austrian Alps (Langthaler, 2003).

III.2. State regulation The re-ordering of agrosystemic resource flows attempted by the agrarian apparatus in Nazi Germany involved an unprecedented amount of State regulation both in quantity and quality. Due to the corporatist structure of the Nazi agrarian apparatus, the key actor in this game, along with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, was the Reichsnährstand (Reich Food Estate) a compulsory corporation that encompassed producers, processors, and traders of food products. Both organizations were led by one person, Richard W. Darré (Corni and Gies, 1997: 75-250). The Reich Food Estate was a hybrid, functioning as both an interest group representing peasants and a State agency aimed at regulating the agricultural sector as if it were a ‘national farm’. The means to this end was to establish ‘total’ agricultural statistics (Tooze, 2001: 177-214). Conventional agricultural data collection and evaluation techniques were insufficient to meet the challenge of ‘total’ statistics, and bookkeeping statistics included only a small sample of all farms. Even the agricultural census fell short of ‘total’ statistics due to its centralized and inflexible nature, though it included all farms. The unconventional solution to this problem was the Hofkarte (Farm File) a decentralised and flexible data collection and evaluation technique. The differences between the agricultural census and Farm File statistics were striking: recurrent actualization (e.g. 1933 and 1939) versus annual actualization from 1937 onwards; centralized data collection and evaluation by the Federal Agency of Statistics versus decentralized data collection and evaluation by the regional agencies of the Reich Food Estate; aggregate data for administrative units versus farm-level data; small versus comprehensive selection of farm features; fixed sets of queries versus flexible queries (e.g. determination of the commercial seeds required on the basis of farm size and type of land use); and, scientific knowledge for basic and applied research versus bureaucratic knowledge for agricultural regulation (Fensch, 1939). In short, Farm File statistics combined the advantages of bookkeeping statistics (qualitative farm data) with those of the agricultural census (quantitative farm data). The Farm File was collected in close co-operation with the local representatives of the Reich Food Estate and the farmers themselves. It documented the basic elements 170

Ernst Langthaler

and relations of the agrosystem at the farm level. One copy was stored at the regional agency of the Reich Food Estate; another copy was given to the farmers. In theory, it served as a tool for both State control and self-management by the farmers. However, in practice the quest for control was contested by means of data manipulation. The guiding metaphor was that of the farm as a ‘living organism’, which had been applied by German-speaking agronomists throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Uekötter, 2010: 170-181). The Farm File was considered to be a biography ‘or even an x-ray’ of this ‘living organism’. Accordingly, the paperwork included a full 150 features that were actualized annually and included household and farm members (including family members not working on the farm), land tenure and use, arable crops, livestock and livestock yields, machinery, farm buildings, etc. (Fensch, 1939). The applications of Farm File statistics encompassed manifold areas: calculation of farm inputs and outputs at local, regional, and national levels; the improvement of farm management through agricultural extension; or the ‘production’ of an agricultural space (Halfacree, 2006). Whereas agricultural census data were aggregated according to administrative units, Farm File statistics enabled aggregations of data according to economic units. Statisticians of the Reich Food Estate re-ordered the agricultural space by classifying the communes of the provinces of Vienna, Niederdonau, and Oberdonau into ‘production zones’. Territories with similar conditions of agricultural production were grouped into: the flat to hilly Pannonian land (that included the wine-growing areas) in the east; the Alpine and Sub-Alpine regions in the southwest; the highlands in the north-west; and the flat to hilly area south of the river Danube in the west (Landesbauernschaft Donauland, 1940, 1941). Though similar classifications had already been made in Austria before 1938, the re-ordering of agricultural space by the Reich Food Estate was much more sophisticated. Spatial re-ordering was considered a means of planning region-specific measures, and therefore raising the efficiency of agricultural policies. Such mapping was part of State-led agricultural regulation that lasted beyond the Nazi era. Generations of agricultural statisticians in post-war Austria were concerned –even obsessed– with the delineation of ‘production zones’ (Heller, 1997). A ‘productivist countryside’ that functioned to improve food production was created both virtually and effectively by the agronomic expert system (Halfacree, 2006). Though the Hofkarte of the Reich Food Estate disappeared with the breakdown of the Third Reich in 1945, it was replaced in 1946 by the Betriebskarte under the revamped Chamber of Agriculture. Strikingly, it resembled its predecessor in the features it included in the tables, and even the fonts of the headings. Both the content and the form of these two systems of statistical registration indicate unbroken continuity of Farm File statistics from Nazi Germany to post-war Austria. Two 171

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

articles, one from 1939 and the other from 1950, concerning the ‘Farm Record’ in the agricultural press underscore the continuity: both articles argued that there was no reason for farmholders to be wary of registering their farms (e.g. with regard to taxation), both claimed that incorrect information in the Farm Record would be contrary to the farmer’s interests, both emphasised the necessity of the Farm Record for efficient agricultural administration, both declared farm aid as the main purpose of the Farm Record, and both praised the insights in farm development that the Farm Record provided to the farmholder. The main difference lies in the political-economic context, which in the first case was the ‘Battle for Production’ as a supply-oriented approach and in the second case involved the ‘sales and price battle’ as a demandoriented approach.2 These articles show that State regulation was directed not only at material capital in the form of food products, but also at symbolic capital in the form of the farmholders’ trust. However, reading between the lines, both articles reveal real and significant distrust arising from the collection of farm statistics. The Farm File statistics that were launched in the Nazi era and continued after 1945 can be interpreted as a form of ‘panopticism’ (Foucault, 1995: 205, 2007). The agricultural apparatus used this instrument to observe all farms without being noticed by their holders; and farmholders could also examine their own farm management data. Thus, Farm File statistics institutionalized State control of the ‘national farm’ as well as self-management by farmers. However, Farm File statistics did not actually exercise total control over the ‘national farm’; like other power relations, they were embedded in a ‘social force field’ (Thompson, 1978) that both enabled and limited control over the farming community.

III.3. Farming styles On the eve of the Second World War, the Battle for Production was not as successful as the Nazi agrarian apparatus decision-makers had expected. The worst result by far was the domestic production of animal and vegetable fats, where the degree of selfsufficiency had only improved slightly, from fifty-two per cent in 1933-34 to fiftyseven per cent in 1938-39 (Volkmann, 1979: 301). Herbert Backe, the executive in charge of food issues during the expansionist 1936 Four Year Plan, and other agrarian experts, lamented the ‘fat gap’ (Fettlücke) in the German food economy (Corni and Gies, 1997: 309-318). Nazi food regime decision-makers re-arranged several links in the agro-food chain in an attempt to close the ‘fat gap’. On the consumption side, the dietary fat content of the German population was to be reduced by the ‘control of consumption’ (Verbrauchslenkung), and the development of synthetic surrogates See Wochenblatt der Landesbauernschaft Donauland 11/1939, 372; Der Österreichische Bauernbündler 18/1950, 5.

2

172

Ernst Langthaler

after the war began (Reith, 2007). In the distribution domain, the agrarian apparatus sought to raise fat imports from all over German-dominated Europe through bilateral trade treaties with federated countries and exploitation of the agricultural resources of dependent and occupied areas after the war began in 1939 (Corni and Gies, 1997: 499-554). On the production side, the State-led campaign for domestic fat production was not only imposed throughout the entire wartime period, but also enforced under the label of a ‘wartime Battle for Production’ or Kriegserzeugungsschlacht (Corni and Gies, 1997: 469-497; Abelshauser, 1998). Besides the domain of animal fats, which was an objective of the ‘communal construction’ action, the production of vegetable fats was to be increased by increasing the acreage devoted to oilseeds. While the Nazi food regime generally set political impositions such as the confiscation of all food surpluses on farms after the war began, in this case economic incentives prevailed. A comprehensive package containing financial, technical, and legal measures was offered in order to promote the expansion of oilseed growing, including high fixed prices, additional bonuses for delivery contracts with processing enterprises, extra rations of nitrogen fertilizer, guaranteed redelivery of protein-rich oilcake as animal feed, and special extension services (Hanau and Plate, 1975).3 A leaflet distributed in 1940 via the official farmers’ journal in the province of Niederdonau shows how the oilseed growing ‘socio-technical network’ addressed farmholders (van der Ploeg, 2003: 101-141) (Figure 6.4). The headline offers a purely economic line of argumentation: ‘Oilseed-growing is worthwhile! Grow more oilseeds –but only at suitable locations!’ In the centre of the chart a macro-economic perspective prevails, arguing that one hectare of rapeseed yields 650 kilograms of fat directly and another 100 kilograms indirectly via milk production by dairy cows fed with oilcake, yielding a total of 750 kilograms. On the margins of the chart, microeconomic arguments appeal to the – male – farmer’s self-interest: the re-delivery of oilcake as feeding stuff in the upper left corner, the yield increase of wheat as the subsequent crop in the lower left corner, high prices and bonuses in the upper right corner, and in the lower right corner the annual multi-cropping through cultivation of rapeseed and intertillage on one same field. The message behind this visual and textual arrangement of signs can be decoded as follows: growing more oilseeds serves to further not only the interests of the national food economy, but also those of the farmer, who obtains better rewards and higher profits through more intensive use of land and livestock.4

3

See Wochenblatt der Landesbauernschaft Donauland 19/1940, enclosed leaflet.

4

See Wochenblatt der Landesbauernschaft Donauland 19/1940, enclosed leaflet.

173

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Figure 6.4. Leaflet promoting the cultivation of oilseeds in the province of Niederdonau, 1940

Source: Wochenblatt der Landesbauernschaft Donauland 19/1940, enclosed leaflet.

Strikingly, the oilseed-growing discourse mediated by the agrarian press was not in line with mainstream Nazi agrarian ideology; in fact, it diverged considerably. The Nazi ‘blood and soil’ ideology idealized the figure of the peasant, driven by extraeconomic motives such as the provision of a ‘racially’ pure German family, community, and people. It also condemned the figure of the profit-oriented farmer (Lovin, 1967; Bramwell, 1985; Eidenbenz, 1993). However, in this leaflet the discourse of the State-led production campaign turns the ideological hierarchy of peasant over farmer upside down by appealing to the rational male farmer who decides to grow oilseeds due to precise cost-benefit calculations. Nazi agrarianism, conventionally used as evidence in defence of the ‘anti-modern’ character of Nazism, was in practice more flexible and, thus, more compatible with modernist notions of farming than has been claimed so far. The discourses of the Battle for Production in general, and oilseed-growing in particular, encouraged farmholders to adopt the subject-position of ‘rational entrepreneur’. To what extent did farmholders in Niederdonau respond to the State-led production campaign for oilseed growing? Since rapeseed and turnip rape accounted for nearly 174

Ernst Langthaler

one half of the acreage devoted to oilseeds, we will focus on these two crops. According to the official agricultural statistics, no significant response occurred until 1940; then from 1941 to 1944 the percentage of arable land devoted to rapeseed and turnip rape increased substantially. The proportions by province amounted to 0.5 (1941), 0.4 (1942), 0.8 (1943) and 0.6 per cent (1944) of arable land. At the district level, a wide range including both above and below average figures can be observed (Figure 6.5). In Niederdonau, the Battle for Production was successful in the area of oilseed-growing (though this was not the case in other spheres); the acreage devoted to rapeseed and turnip rape increased more than a hundredfold, from forty-three hectares in 1937 to 4453 hectares in 1944 (Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, 1948). Farm level studies in three target regions indicate that a group of well-equipped farmers in favourable locations actually responded to this appeal by considerably increasing the acreage devoted to oilseeds (Langthaler, 2010). According to these findings, part of the farming community did adopt the ‘rational’ style of farming (in the agronomic sense) promoted by the agrarian apparatus. A nucleus of farmholders thus became the vanguard of the ‘productivist’, (capital-)intensive, concentrated, and specialized food regime that eventually became hegemonic amongst most of the post-war farming community (Ilbery and Bowler, 1998).

Figure 6.5. Proportion of arable land devoted to rapeseed and turnip rape in Niederdonau, 1937-1944

Note: the South-Moravian districts of Neubistritz, Nikolsburg, and Znaim are not included. Source: Calculation and design by the author, based on Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, 1948.

175

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

IV.

Conclusion

It is not easy to determine the impact of the Austrian fascist regimes on the transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive food regimes from 1934 to 1945, especially in the case of ‘Austrofascism’. Given the agrarian romanticism present in the ‘Austrofascist’ discourse, one might wonder if any kind of modernization actually took place between 1934 and 1938. However, a certain type of modernization becomes clear through the lenses of market linkage, State regulation, and farming styles outlined in the introduction. First, under the Agrarian Course, both prosperous and indebted farms became increasingly linked to markets: the former to product markets, the latter to credit markets. However, due to the oversupply of labour and the lack of demand for non-agricultural uses of land, incentives for investment in labour- or land-saving technologies were modest. Second, market regulation from the early 1930s onwards broadened and deepened the degree of State intervention both in Austria and abroad. However, the aim of these regulations was to limit rather than boost agricultural production. Third, despite the revival of peasant paternalism due to the integration of unemployed relatives and non-family labourers in family farms, the entrepreneurial farming styles of agrosystems specialized in intensive arable farming found room to manoeuvre. These contradictory developments are evidence of a ‘conservative modernization’ that used modern means to pursue traditional goals of limited commercialization and democratization. In Austria, this path was adopted by State and provincial administrations, as well as most agricultural organizations, from the late nineteenth century onwards, and readopted after World War I. From this perspective, the ‘Austrofascist’ era marked the heyday of conservative agromodernization (Bruckmüller, 1979; Langthaler, 2005, 2008). With Austria’s annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938, agricultural development entered a new phase, shifting from ‘conservative’ to enforced and from functional to intentional modernization. Both the enforcement and intentionality of agromodernization were driven by the Nazi war economy. The agricultural area was expanded in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe while the rural workforce decreased due to army and arms industry recruiting, even in spite of a massive assignment of forced labourers. Thus, agricultural planners around Herbert Backe privileged labour productivity over land productivity in order to sustain the food provision of the German population (Streb and Pyta, 2005). The ‘communal construction’ actions, Farm File statistics, and the boom of oilseed-growing reveal that Nazi agricultural policies promoted the temporal and spatial re-ordering of market linkages, State regulation, and farming styles in Austria under German annexation. The Nazi agrarian apparatus aimed at the ‘total re-ordering’ of Austrian agriculture and this State-led ‘megaproject’ became the apotheosis of agricultural regulation. In 176

Ernst Langthaler

the temporal dimension, the present was subordinated to the future and involved an attempt to establish a sharp break with the past ‘system era’ (Systemzeit) or ‘Corporate State’ of 1934 to 1938 and its failure to solve agrarian problems. In the spatial dimension, regulation at the local and regional levels was increasingly subordinated to regulation at the political-economic system level. Governance by the ‘megaproject’ involved both top-down and bottom-up processes, fuelled by the actors’ trust in Stateled regulation of the agricultural sector. Individual styles of farming were subordinated to the overall re-ordering of the agrosystem, guided by agronomic experts according to the notion of a ‘national farm’. The emerging agricultural ‘megaproject’ aimed at intensified, specialized, and concentrated, or productivist farming, was framed by the ideology of the superiority of the German ‘race’. Though this vision was not fully realized before 1945, it at least partially affected the thoughts and actions of agricultural decision-makers, agronomists, teachers, extension staff, and ‘progressive’ farmholders after 1945. Finally, let us evaluate the emergence of the productivist ‘megaproject’ of the Nazi era in light of the varieties of modernity outlined in the introduction. Agromodernization in German-annexed Austria was a multi-faceted phenomenon; yet two points become particularly evident. First, most Nazi agricultural policy decisionmakers intended to modernize Austrian agriculture, which they considered to be backward compared to the rest of the German empire. However, their ‘megaproject’ was neither clear-cut nor uncontroversial; it was instead a sometimes contested amalgam of (seemingly) ‘modern’ and ‘anti-modern’ elements. This ‘alternative modernity’ aimed at a highly productive and community-bound rural society as a part of German industrial society, based on state-of-the-art farm technology and a critical mass of ‘racially pure’ peasants. Second, the various Nazi agro-modernization projects only affected the agrosystem partially. There were significant changes in the institutional matrix –agricultural planning principles at the macro-level, links between the agrarian apparatus and farmholders at the mid-level, farmholder selfimage at the micro-level, etc. In contrast, technical change encountered a massive gridlock due to war-induced bottlenecks in material and labour, but this was not caused by ‘anti-modernist’ reservations of decision makers. All in all, the Nazi era involved no great leap forward in agro-modernization, but it was an irreversible step along the path towards a productivist food regime in post-war Austria. For instance, a key feature of the ‘productivist transition’, the substitution of mineral fertilizers and machinery for land and labour, gained momentum between 1938 and 1945 (Figure 6.6). Agro-modernization in German-annexed Austria does not deserve to be labelled as an ‘agricultural revolution’ if compared to the ‘revolutionary’ developments in Great Britain during the war, or those of post-war Austria (Short and others, 2007; Langthaler, 2011, 2012, 2013; Martin and Langthaler, 2012). Yet it does appear as a 177

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

sort of twentieth-century agricultural development Sattelzeit (saddle time: period of deep changes that brings about a major transition as Koselleck, 1972: XV, referred to the time between 1750 and 1850). In agriculture, as in other fields of Austrian society, there was no such thing as a ‘zero hour’ in 1945. Figure 6.6. The substitution of technical capital for land and labour in Austrian agriculture in the twentieth century

Note: The shaded area indicates the Nazi era: 1938-45. Source: Langthaler (2009: 823).

178

Ernst Langthaler

Bibliography Abelshauser, Werner (1998), ‘Germany: Guns, Butter, and Economic Miracles’, in Mark Harrison (ed.) (1998), The Economics of World War II. Six Great Powers in International Comparison, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 122-176.

Backe, Herbert (1942), Um die Nahrungsfreiheit Europas. Weltwirtschaft oder Großraum, Leipzig, Goldmann.

Bavaj, Riccardo (2003), Die Ambivalenz der Moderne im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Bilanz der Forschung, Munich, Oldenbourg. Bavaj, Riccardo (2005), ‘Modernisierung, Modernität und Moderne. Ein wissenschaftlicher Diskurs und seine Bedeutung für die historische Einordnung des Dritten Reiches’, Historisches Jahrbuch, 125, p. 413-451.

Becker, Heinrich (1987), ‘Von der Nahrungssicherung zu Kolonialträumen: Die landwirt-schaftlichen Institute im Dritten Reich, in Heinrich Becker and others (eds.) (1987), Die Universität Göttingen unter dem Nationalsozialismus, Munich, K. G. Saur, p. 410-436.

Bosworth, Richard J.B. (ed.) (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Bramwell, Anna (1985), Blood and Soil. Walther Darré and Hitler’s Green Party, Abbotsbrook, Kensal Press.

Bruckmüller, Ernst (1979), ‘Die verzögerte Modernisierung. Mögliche Ursachen und Folgen des “österreichischen Weges” im Wandel des Agrarbereiches’, in Herbert Knittler (ed.) (1979), Wirtschafts-und sozialhistorische Beiträge. Festschrift für Alfred Hoffmann zum 75. Geburtstag, Vienna, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, p. 289307. Bruckmüller, Ernst (1995), ‘Interessenvertretung der Bauern’, in Emmerich Tálos and others (eds.) (1995), Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs. Erste Republik 1918-1933, Vienna, Manz, p. 353-370. Bruckmüller, Ernst and others (2002-03), Geschichte der österreichischen Landund Forstwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, 2 vols., Vienna, Ueberreuter.

Corni, Gustavo (1990), Hitler and the Peasants. Agrarian Policy of the Third Reich, New York, Berg Publishers.

Corni, Gustavo and Gies, Horst (1997), Brot, Butter, Kanonen. Die Ernährungswirtschaft in Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.

Degler, Stephanie and Streb, Jochen (2008), ‘Die verlorene Erzeugungsschlacht: Die national-sozialistische Landwirtschaft im Systemvergleich’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2, p. 161-181.

179

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Eidenbenz, Mathias (1993), ‘Blut und Boden’. Zu Funktion und Genese der Metaphern des Agrarismus und Biologismus in der nationalsozialistischen Bauernpropaganda R. W. Darrés, New York, Lang.

Farquharson, John E. (1976), The Plough and the Swastika. The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928-1945, London and Beverly Hills, Sage.

Fensch, Hans Ludwig (1939), ‘Die bäuerliche Betriebsforschung des Reichsnährstandes’, in Konrad Meyer (ed.) (1939), Gefüge und Ordnung der deutschen Landwirtschaft, Berlin, Reichsnährstandsverlag, p. 590-594. Foucault, Michel (1995), Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison, New York, Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel (2007), ‘Panopticism’, in Sean P. Hier and Joshua Greenberg (ed.) (2007), The Surveillance Studies Reader, Maidenhead, Open University Press, p. 6776.

Friedmann, Harriet and McMichael, Philip (1989), ‘Agriculture and the state system: the rise and decline of national agriculture, 1870 to present’, Sociologia Ruralis, 29, p. 93-117.

Grant, Oliver (2009), ‘Agriculture and economic development in Germany, 18701939’, in Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla (ed.) (2009), Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe Since 1870, London and New York, Routledge, p. 178-209. Griffin, Roger (1993), The Nature of Fascism, London and New York, Routledge.

Griffin, Roger (2006), ‘Defining Fascism’, in Cyprian P. Blamires and Paul Jackson (ed.) (2006), World Fascism. A Historical Encyclopedia, Santa Barbara, Denver and Oxford, ABC Clio, p. 1-11.

Griffin, Roger (2007), Modernism and Fascism. The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Halfacree, Keith (2006), ‘Rural space: constructing a three-fold architecture’, in Paul Cloke, Terry Marsden and Patrick H. Mooney (eds.) (2006), Handbook of Rural Studies, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Sage, p. 44-62.

Hanau, Arthur and Plate, Roderich (1975), Die landwirtschaftliche Markt- und Preispolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer.

Hanisch, Ernst (2005), ‘Das Dilemma der Politik. Die Agrarpolitik von Engelbert Dollfuß’, in Ernst Langthaler and Josef Redl (eds.) (2005), Reguliertes Land. Agrarpolitik in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz 1930-1960, Jahrbuch für Geschichte des ländlichen Raumes 2, Innsbruck, Vienna and Bozen, Studienverlag, p. 107-113. Hayami, Yujiro and Ruttan, Vernon W. (1985), Agricultural Development. An International Perspective, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, second ed.

180

Ernst Langthaler

Heim, Susanne (2003), Kalorien, Kautschuk, Karrieren. Pflanzenzüchtung und landwirtschaftliche Forschung in Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten 1933-1945, Göttingen, Wallstein.

Heller, Armin (1997), Neue Typen der Agrarstruktur Österreichs. Automatische Gemeinde-klassifikation mit Clusteranalyse und GIS, Innsbruck, Geographie Innsbruck.

Herf, Jeffrey (1984), Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ilbery, Brian W. and Bowler, Ian R. (1998), ‘From Agricultural Productivism to Post-Productivism’, in Brian W. Ilbery (ed.) (1998), The Geography of Rural Change, London, Longman, p. 57-84. Kallis, Aristotle (2003), The Fascism Reader, London and New York, Routledge.

Kluge, Ulrich (1988), Bauern, Agrarkrise und Volksernährung in der europäischen Zwischenkriegszeit. Studien zur Agrargesellschaft und -wirtschaft der Republik Österreich 1918 bis 1938, Stuttgart, Steiner.

Knöbl, Wolfgang (2003), ‘Theories That Won’t Pass Away: The Never-ending Story of Modernization Theory’, in Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin (eds.) (2003), Handbook of Historical Sociology, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Sage, p. 96-107. Koselleck, Reinhart (1972), ‘Einleitung’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.) (1972), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon der politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, Vol. 1, p. XIII-XXVII.

Kutz, Martin (1984), ‘Kriegserfahrung und Kriegsvorbereitung. Die agrarwirtschaftliche Vorbereitung des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Deutschland vor dem Hintergrund der Weltkrieg I-Erfahrung’, Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 32, p. 59-83, 135-164.

Landesbauernschaft Donauland (ed.) (1940), Die landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgebiete in der Landesbauernschaft Donauland, Vienna, Landesbauernschaft Donauland.

Landesbauernschaft Donauland (ed.) (1941), Das Gefüge der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgebiete im Donauland, Vienna, Landesbauernschaft Donauland. Langthaler, Ernst (2000), ‘Eigensinnige Kolonien. NS-Agrarsystem und bäuerliche Lebenswelten 1938-1945’, in Emmerich Tálos and others (eds.) (2000), NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938-1945. Ein Handbuch, Vienna, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, p. 348-375. Langthaler, Ernst (2003), ‘Agrarwende in den Bergen. Eine Region in den niederösterreichischen Voralpen (1880-2000), in Ernst Bruckmüller and others (eds.) (2003), Geschichte der österreichischen Land- und Forstwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna, Ueberreuter, Vol. 2, p. 563-650.

181

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Langthaler, Ernst (2005), ‘Der “österreichische Weg”- und darüber hinaus. Ernst Bruckmüllers Modell der Agrarmodernisierung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, in Ernst Langthaler and Josef Redl (eds.) (2005), Reguliertes Land. Agrarpolitik in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz 1930-1960, Jahrbuch für Geschichte des ländlichen Raumes 2, Innsbruck, Vienna and Bozen, Studienverlag, p. 244-260.

Langthaler, Ernst (2008), ‘Nahe und entfernte Verwandtschaft. Agrar-Korporativismus in Niederösterreich’, in Stefan Eminger and Ernst Langthaler (eds.) (2008), Niederösterreich im 20. Jahrhundert. Vol. 1: Politik, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, Böhlau, p. 687-710. Langthaler, Ernst (2009), Schlachtfelder. Ländliches Wirtschaften im Reichsgau Niederdonau 1938-1945, habilitation thesis, University of Vienna.

Langthaler, Ernst (2010), Hitler’s Oilseed-Growers. Farming Styles, Agrosystems and the Nazi Food Regime in Niederdonau, 1938-1945, paper presented at the international workshop Historicising Farming Styles, Melk, Austria, 21-23 October 2010,

Langthaler, Ernst (2012), ‘Balancing between Autonomy and Dependence. Family Farming and Agrarian Change in Lower Austria, 1945-1980’, in Bischof, G. and others (eds.) (2012), Austrian Lives, Contemporary Austrian Studies 21, New Orleans, University of New Orleans Press, p. 385-404. Langthaler, Ernst (2013), ‘English and Austrian Farming in the Second World War: Revolution or Something Else?’, in Peter Moser and Tony Varley (eds.) (2013), Integration through Subordination. Agriculture and the Rural Population in European Industrial Societies, Turnhout, Brepols, p. 151-182. Lovin, Clifford R. (1967), ‘Blut und Boden: The Ideological Basis of Nazi Agricultural Program’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 28, p. 279-288.

Lovin, Clifford R. (1974), ‘Die Erzeugungsschlacht 1934-1936’, Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 22, p. 209-220.

Martin, John and Langthaler, Ernst (2012), ‘Paths to Productivism: Agricultural Regulation in the Second World War and its Aftermath in Great Britain and GermanAnnexed Austria’, in Paul Brassley and others (eds.) (2012), War, Agriculture, and Food: Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s, London and New York, Routledge, p. 55-74.

Mattl, Siegfried (1993), ‘Krise und sozialer Protest. Die Widerstandshandlungen österreichi-scher Bauern gegen das behördliche Exekutionssystem in den Jahren 1931 bis 1933’, Zeitgeschichte, 20, p. 1-22. McMichael, Philip (2009), ‘A food regime genealogy’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36, p. 139-169.

Miller, James William (1989), Engelbert Dollfuß als Agrarfachmann. Eine Analyse bäuerlicher Führungsbegriffe und österreichischer Agrarpolitik 1918-1934, Böhlaus zeitgeschichtliche Bibliothek 10, Wien and Köln, Böhlau. 182

Ernst Langthaler

Mommsen, Hans (1980), ‘Nachwort’, in David Schoenbaum (ed.) (1980), Die braune Revolution. Eine Sozialgeschichte des Dritten Reiches, Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, p. 352-368.

Mommsen, Hans (1991), ‘Nationalsozialismus als vorgetäuschte Modernisierung’, in Hans Mommsen (ed.) (1991), Die deutsche Gesell-schaft und der Nationalsozialismus, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, p. 405-427.

Moore, Barrington (1966), Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press.

Mooslechner, Michael and Stadler, Robert (1998), ‘Landwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik’, in Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch and Wolfgang Neugebauer (eds.) (1998), NSHerrschaft in Österreich 1938-1945, Vienna, Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, p. 69-94.

Oberkrome, Willi (2009), Ordnung und Autarkie. Die Geschichte der deutschen Landbaufor-schung, Agrarökonomie und ländlichen Sozialwissenschaft im Spiegel von Forschungs-dienst und DFG (1920-1970), Stuttgart, Steiner. Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt (ed.) (1948), Ergebnisse der landwirtschaftlichen Statistik in den Jahren 1937-1944, Vienna, Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt. Peniston-Bird, Corinna (2009), ‘Austria’, in Richard J. B. Bosworth (ed.) (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 434-452.

Reith, Reinhold (2007), ‘“Hurrah die Butter ist alle!”‚ “Fettlücke” und “Eiweißlücke” im Dritten Reich’, in Michael Pammer, Herta Neiss and Michael John (eds.) (2007), Erfahrung der Moderne. Festschrift für Roman Sandgruber zum 60. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, Steiner, p. 403-426.

Sandgruber, Roman (2002), ‘Die Landwirtschaft in der Wirtschaft Menschen, Maschinen, Märkte’, in Ernst Bruckmüller and others (eds.) (2002), Geschichte der österreichischen Land- und Forstwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna, Ueberreuter, Vol. 1, p. 191-408. Schoenbaum, David (1966), Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939, Garden City and New York, Doubleday. Scott, James C. (1998), Seeing Like A State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Senft, Gerhard (2002), Im Vorfeld der Katastrophe. Die Wirtschaftspolitik des Ständestaates, Vienna, Braumüller.

Senft, Gerhard (2005), ‘Vom Markt zum Plan. Die Agrarpolitik des österreichischen “Ständestaates”’, in Ernest Langthaler and Josef Redl (eds.) (2005), Reguliertes Land. Agrarpolitik in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz 1930-1960, Jahrbuch für Geschichte des ländlichen Raumes 2, Innsbruck, Vienna and Bozen, Studienverlag, p. 114-123.

183

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Short, Brian; Watkins, Charles and Martin, John (eds.) (2007), The Front Line of Freedom. British Farming in the Second World War, Exeter, British Agricultural History Society.

Streb, Jochen and Pyta, Wolfram (2005), ‘Von der Bodenproduktivität zur Arbeitsproduk-tivität. Der agrarökonomische Paradigmenwechsel im Dritten Reich’, Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 53, p. 56-78.

Sundhausen, Holm (1983), Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens im nationalsozialistischen Großraum 1941-1945. Das Scheitern einer Ausbeutungsstrategie, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt.

Tálos, Emmerich (2005), ‘Das austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem’, in Emmerich Tálos and Wolfram Neugebauer (eds.) (2005), Austrofaschismus. ������������ Politik-Ökonomie-Kultur 1933-1938, Vienna, Lit, p. 394-420. Tálos, Emmerich and Neugebauer, Wolfram (eds.) (2005), Austrofaschismus. Politik-Ökonomie-Kultur 1933-1938, Vienna, Lit.

Tálos, Emmerich and others (2000), NS-Herrschaft in Österreich 1938-1945. Ein Handbuch, Vienna, Österreichischer Bundesverlag.

Thompson, Edward P. (1978), ‘Eighteenth Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?’, Social History, 3, p. 133-165.

Tooze, Adam (2001), Statistics and the German State, 1900-1945. The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Tooze, Adam (2006), The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London, Penguin Books. Tremel, Ferdinand (1969), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis 1955, Vienna, Deuticke.

Uekötter, Frank (2010), Die Wahrheit ist auf dem Feld. Eine Wissensgeschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, p. 170-181. Van der Ploeg, Jan Douwe (2003), The Virtual Farmer. Past, Present and Future of the Dutch Peasantry, Assen, Royal van Gorcum.

Vanclay, Frank and others (2006), ‘The Social and Intellectual Construction of Farming Styles: Testing Dutch Ideas in Australian Agriculture’, Sociologia Ruralis, 46, p. 61-82.

Volkmann, Hans Erich (1979), ‘Die NS-Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges’, in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.) (1979), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 1: Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, p. 177-368.

Wiener Institut für Wirtschafts- und Konjunkturforschung (1939), ‘Die Lage der Gebirgsbauern in der Ostmark’, Monatsberichte des Wiener Instituts für Wirtschaftsund Konjunkturforschung, 13, 7, p. 204-212. 184

Ernst Langthaler

Wutz, Anton (1939), Landwirtschaftsatlas der Ostmark, Berlin, Reichsnährstandsverlag.

Zitelmann, Rainer (1989), Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, Munich, Klett-Cotta, second ed.

185

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Appendix: Key statistics on Austrian agricultural development, 1920s-1960s

Table 6.2. Weight of the agrarian sector as a percentage of the active population Year

People employed in agriculture (in 1000)

People employed in agriculture (per cent)



1923

1438

39.9



1934

1259

37.1



1939

1358

39.0



1951

1093

32.6



1961

776

23.0

Source: Sandgruber (2002: 264).

Table 6.3. Contribution of agriculture and forestry to GNP Year

Value of total agricultural Contribution to GNP production (Schilling) (per cent)



1929

1546

12.8



1937

1407

14.3



1948

4716

14.5



1950

8574

16.4



1960

19,022

11.1

Source: Sandgruber (2002: 344).

186

Ernst Langthaler

Table 6.4. Distribution of landed property, 1930 Farm size

Farm units (number)



0.5–5 hectares

216,815

50.0



5–10 hectares

76,004

17.5



10–20 hectares

73,446

16.9



20–50 hectares

52,783

12.2



50–100 hectares

8290

1.9



more than 100 hectares



TOTAL

Tarm units (per cent)

6020

1.4

420,479

100

Source: Sandgruber (2002: 300 ff).

Table 6.5. Use of tractors year Total number Tractors per 1000 of tractors people employed in agriculture

1930

720

0.6



1939

1074

0.8



1953

30,992

28.4



1962

78,748

190.4

Source: Sandgruber (2002: 264, 343).

187

Varieties of modernity: fascism and agricultural development in Austria, 1934-1945

Table 6.6. Use of mineral fertilizers (annual averages) year Nitrogen Phosphorus Potassium Total Tons of mineral (1000 tons) (1000 tons) (1000 tons) (1000 tons) fertilizer per 100 hectares of agricultural land* 1930-37

5.9

12.8

7.5

26.2

0.6

1938-44

19.5

18.9

42.1

80.5

1.9

1945-49

13.8

16.9

12.8

43.5

1.1

1950-54

26.6

38.8

36.0

101.4

2.4

1955-59

37.9

68.9

69.2

176.0

4.3

1960-64

60.5

109.7

108.3

278.5

7.1

* Excluding forests and unproductive areas. Source: Sandgruber (2002: 201, 205).

188

7.

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951 Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

I.

Introduction

Two questions will guide our reflections on agrarian fascism in rural Spain: in what sense were the agrarian policies of the Franco regime fascist, and to what extent may we consider these policies and their implementation as modernizing? We base our study on the theoretical framework outlined in the introductory chapter of the book, which describes the common modernizing parameters upon which rural fascist policies were built: ruralist discourse, autarky as a goal, State intervention, faith in the potential of science applied to the agrarian sector, cooperativism, militarism, and the subordination of agriculture to industrial interests. The State sought to achieve these goals by promoting technological change, which helped avoid social conflict in rural areas while giving the State the organic vocation and bureaucratic force so characteristic of authoritarian technocratic control. We will begin by locating the regime in its European context and reviewing the debate regarding its nature. The importance of its origin will then be explored in greater depth by evaluating the economic and social effects of its context, including how the civil conflict and repressive practices affected political – but not necessarily institutionalised – actions in rural Spain. In the agrarian sphere, we will analyse the central role of ruralism in the legitimising discourse of the regime and discuss the main axes of its agrarian policy. Autarky was the goal of the Franco regime, and strong economic interventionism was the means to this end. The regime imposed a system of rationing and production control, designed a corporative structure to integrate all agrarian producers, and deployed specific policies, particularly in the areas of colonization and reforestation. After the defeat of fascism in World War II, the patterns changed and in the 1950s new objectives and forms were introduced. Autarky was abandoned, hope was placed in technical innovation for increasing agrarian productivity, and new Green Revolution policies were added.

189

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

In the following pages we will delve into all of these aspects: pointing out influencing factors, comparing policies and periods, identifying continuities and cleavages, travelling the distance from words to actions, and finally, revisiting our initial questions.

II.

Was Francoism fascism?

The causes of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), midwife to Francoism, were basically endogenous. However, the war itself and its results can only be explained within the European framework that gave rise to fascism (Moradiellos, 2001).1 In response to the post-World War I crisis in Europe, several European states adopted forms of dictatorship and transitioned from liberalism to mass society. Nurtured by this international context, the Spanish Civil War became a struggle between fascism and anti-fascism. In order to understand the nature of the Franco regime, it must be placed within the interpretive framework of the interwar period. Fascism came to Spain through a military uprising that at first failed to topple the Republican State, but ultimately succeeded through the civil war it provoked. The lengthy duration of the Franco dictatorship (1936-1975) makes the political system he established complicated to define. Internal and external challenges shaped its discourse, aesthetics, and policies. Nested in the on-going debate regarding the nature of fascism itself, one of the most intensely studied themes in Spanish historiography is the question of whether Francoism was actually fascist in nature (Rodrigo, 2009; Moradiellos, 2009; Saz, 2004). The question was launched in 1964 by Juan Jose Linz, who defined the Franco regime as authoritarian. Since then, two main currents have evolved in the debate, the first of which offers variations to the definition established by Linz and involves historians such as J. Tusell, J. P. Fusi and S. Payne. The second current is defended by historians such as P. Preston, J. Casanova and J. Fontana, who argue that Spain was actually fascist. The distinction revolves around whether emphasis is placed on the modernization processes begun in the 1960s (first methodological option), or on the bloody origins of the regime and its social function (second methodological option). A new approach was developed in the 1990s that has attained great relevance and a certain degree of consensus among historians. It categorizes Francoism as a fascistized dictatorship (Saz, 2001, 2004) and overcomes Endogenous causes were the serious social tensions and violent political polarization that had crystallized in a context of profound economic crisis. These gave rise to a reaction against the values and policies of the Second Republic, which represented a democratic path to change. The result of the civil conflict was the imposition of a corporative and interventionist State from 1939 on. It was ultimately controlled by representatives of the urban and rural middle classes who had suffered the most from Republican democratization, reform, and trade union vitality.

1

190

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

the conservative/fascist dichotomy, acknowledging that the regime was heavily influenced by fascism and evolved towards conservative authoritarianism as a result of the interplay between internal and external forces. Such an approach distances Spain from the ‘pure fascism’ paradigms of Germany and Italy and includes it in the group of ‘para-fascist’ dictatorships: a set of countries that during the interwar years developed or imitated fascist solutions (Portugal, Vichy France, Hungary, etc.). Within the parafascist dictatorships there are considerable differences in degree among countries, from those that adopted the most fascistized solutions to others that opted for very different approaches, albeit with some fascist collaboration or emulation (Rodríguez Barreira, 2011). Most studies of the Franco regime define it grosso modo as fascist during the Civil War (1936-9) and immediate post-war (1939-45) period. This short time span coincided with the perceptible fascistization of legislation (education policies, propaganda, etc.) and the launching of membership organizations and programmes such as the Frente de Juventudes (Youth Front) or Auxilio Social (Social Aid). World War II and early Axis victories favoured the process during this phase. Later, Axis defeat accelerated de-fascistization from 1942 on. The Falange (fascist single party) then began to lose influence to other ‘family members’, or the various political or institutional forces that shared power during the dictatorship. This somewhat conflictive ‘family’ included the military, the church, and right-wing political forces that had supported the anti-Republican uprising (traditionalists, monarchists, and cedistas). With the defeat in 1945 of the Axis powers, the fascist project for Spain failed. However, even that decisive political blow and others that followed did not alter the role of the Falange as a primary component of the Franco dictatorship until its end (Saz, 2008). In rural Spain, however, the ‘fascist’ phase lasted longer. Agrarian and economic historians agree that Francoist rural and agrarian policies fit fascist models from 1936 until 1951, when Rafael Cavestany was appointed Minister of Agriculture (Naredo, 1996; Clar, 2008; Pan-Montojo, 2011). Under Cavestany’s legislative programme, the 1940s Falangist model and the emblematic Francoist agrarian policies of interventionism and market regulation ended and a new rural discourse began, with North American agrarian policy as the reference point.

III.

The Spanish Civil War and post-war period, a framework for fascism

Before analysing the extent of fascist agrarian policies in Spain, it is important to point out certain key aspects of the context in which they arose. The period of rural fascism throughout Spain generally coincides with the military conflict and the years 191

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

immediately following it. This should be taken into account when evaluating the efficiency of ‘modernizing’ Francoist agrarian policies. The fact that Francoism arose out of the Civil War distinguishes it from other antidemocratic regimes in interwar Europe. Contrary to appearances and to the excuses that the regime gave for poor agricultural production (such as ‘persistent drought’), the Civil War did not actually leave the countryside devastated. The most notable change in the countryside was the reduction of the labour force due to the calling up of young men for military service (see Appendix, Table 7.4). Along with this, the requisition of goods (animals, gasoline, tools, equipment) that took place in the rearguard left many farms with insufficient means to continue production (see Appendix, Table 5). Much more acute than the effects of the Spanish Civil War on Spanish agriculture were the effects of World War II, which led to extreme scarcity of inputs, especially fertilizers, and the international isolation of the Franco regime until 1955 (Christiansen, 2001; Clar, 2008).2 However, during the 1940s industrial stagnation, demographic growth, and deterioration of living standards in cities actually created a process of ‘re-ruralization’ and ‘agrarianization’ (see Appendix, Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3). This period also involved the highest levels of repression in the rearguard (Prada, 2010; Preston, 2011; Mir and others, 2002), carried out by both sides early in the conflict. Soon after, the new Francoist State created a climate of terror by deploying extensive measures of repression against adversaries and non-sympathisers.3 Francoist repression summarily ended the extensive socialist, republican or anarchist class agrarian unionism that had been in place since the agrarian crisis of the turn of the century. This is particularly relevant to understanding the evolution of the agricultural sector in some parts of Spain, where technological development in agriculture was endogenous. It was largely an outcome of the enterprising role of technicians and trade unions that did not rely on large innovating landowners. It occurred wherever class rather than Catholic trade unionism was dominant; as was the case in northwest Spain. Repression of its leaders and members along with the prohibition or strict control of all activity left agrarian unionism powerless from the early 1940s Agrarian expansion had occurred in many parts of Spain before 1936 thanks to the use of fertilizers, machinery and other means inherent to the ‘First Green Revolution’ (Garrabou, 1994). 2

Even today, some of the figures are provisional. Paul Preston points out that during the Civil War at least 300,000 men lost their lives on the battle front, and almost  200,000 men and women were murdered far from the front, executed with little or no due process. After the final victory of the Rebels at the end of March, 1939, some 20,000 Republicans were executed throughout Spain. Julio Prada calculates that at least 150,000 Spaniards were murdered or executed by the insurgents from the first days of the rebellion until the last military tribunal sentences. Calculations for the repression exerted by those loyal to the Republic suggest 50,000 deaths (Prada, 2010). 3

192

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

on (Fernández-Prieto, 1993; Cabana and Cabo, 2006). The only exceptions were the Catholic agrarian unions: they suffered no reprisals but were forced to join the new corporative system of cooperatives. Disarticulation of the agrarian unions destroyed both the forums for introducing and disseminating technological innovations and the synergy that existed between local agricultural needs and the economic and reproductive rationale of the rural communities. Although repression was more intense in other sectors, agrarian technicians were also among its victims. Agricultural experts in Republican areas endured severe repression during the Civil War. Engineers were terrorized and assassinated by militants who took justice into their own hands. This was due more to their social standing (bourgeoisie, civil servants, Catholics, etc.) than their political views.  Researchers and technical experts who were considered unsympathetic to the new regime were also purged.  Professional reprisals such as prison sentences, economic sanctions, demotions, formal accusations, transfers, or forced exile were more common among this group than physical disappearances (death sentences, firing squads, etc.). Such repression deprived the Ministry of Agriculture, its administration, and its agronomic institutions of highly trained and experienced human capital in areas ranging from research, university teaching, publishing, and institutional management, to the daily exercise of the profession (Pan-Montojo, 2009; Cordero del Campillo, 2003; Bernárdez and Cabo, 1996; Fernández-Prieto, 2007). Apart from the lack of human resources, the various agronomic research and extension centres and the agrarian State bureaucracies found it tremendously difficult to carry on their work for lack of funds. Shoestring budgets brought an end to new and even well-established lines of investigation, as well as to training tools such as teaching projects, publications, and the purchase of international reference material. These last two led to isolation, combined with the impossibility of training or research trips (due to both economic limitations and the ideological control of the regime).  However, even in the midst of these limitations, the pursuit of the autarky ideal did foster the creation of some scientific structures. A number of technicians took advantage of the new regime to further their work and became active as scientists within the State structure. Some new lines of research were mandated with autarky as the objective, such as genetic improvements to rice (Camprubi, 2010: 524-525). However, scarce budgetary investments, repression, and ideological prejudices created an overall sense of clear regression in technological policies. The forms of repression on which the new regime had established itself included murders, prison sentences, economic sanctions, professional disqualification, police controls, deportation, and exile. Such activities generated a climate of insecurity,

193

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

distrust, and fear that also affected land ownership (Pan-Montojo, 2008; Narotzky and Smith, 2010). People were subjected to exile, flight, and relocation to avoid the effects of repression in the rearguard, exerted by both parties in the struggle; though only the ‘Reds’ were affected after the insurgent victory. Land left ‘without an owner’ or taken by violence passed de facto into the hands of the repressors or those close to the winners. Another aspect of the development of agrarian policies during the war and immediate post-war period was the intent to benefit rural segments of society that had supported the insurgency. As Francoism went about disarticulating rural communities through violence and terror, it also ‘seduced’ many of their members in order to ensure stability and the implementation of State agrarian policies. These policies were designed to gain the support of the latifundistas (owners of large tracts of land), as well as the small and medium land-holders through ‘counter-reformation’ (Barciela, 1986) (see Appendix, Table 7.6).4 To reward the latifundistas for their support, the Francoist authorities decided to return to their prior owners lands that had been ‘redistributed’ under the earlier Republican Agrarian Reform. The Servicio Nacional de Reforma Económica y Social de la Tierra (National Economic and Social Land Reform Service), later known as the Servicio de Recuperación Agrícola (Agricultural Recovery Service), was established in 1938 to undertake that task.5 The regime applied measures to favour its social supporters, both the traditional agrarian elites and the ‘new men’. Social advancement became possible in rural Spain, based on affinity towards the regime, political connections, and the ability to take advantage of the legislation or legislative loopholes (Arco, 2007). Some laws should be understood from this angle: with its legislation on leases, Francoism concluded the disarticulation of large, dispersed land-holdings (Pan-Montojo, 2008, 2010, 2012). There was clearly no attempt to get rid of the latifundios, but the families who owned them could change. This was a method used by the regime to reward loyalties.

The impact of agrarian legislation during the Second Republic, along with the emergence of a powerful socialist and anarchist trade unionism in the latifundios (large landholding areas), explains why both these strata of rural society shifted towards the right in the 1930s and supported the uprising. 4

Although official organisms were created to return the land to its former owners, a full-fledged occupation of the land had occurred as the Francoist troops advanced during the war. This de facto occupation was eventually given formal status. Peasants were driven off the land they cultivated, often allegedly due to lack of payment, and cattle and crops were confiscated.

5

194

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

IV.

Identifying rural fascism in Spain: Francoist agrarian discourse and politics

The flagship rural policies of early Francoism coincide with those implemented by other European fascist regimes. The ruralist discourse that clothed these policies exalted the peasant as the incarnation of all virtues with which Francoism identified itself. We shall begin with a comparative analysis of this discourse and then examine the various agrarian policies that emerged: production controls, the imposition of a corporative agrarian union apparatus, and the launching of a settlement and reforestation project.

IV.1.

A strong ruralist component 

In spite of the agrarian rhetoric of the regime, industry immediately became the priority of Francoism, while agriculture was effectively and consciously relegated to an intermediate plane, as occurred in fascist Italy and Germany (Velasco Murviedro, 1982: 237-273). However, ruralism in the images, discourse, and propaganda offered an idealization or mythification of the peasantry, who were identified with the essences of race, traditional values, and national identity. For the classic fascisms, this was an efficient mechanism for mobilizing the rural masses. In the Spanish version, it was used to retain the social support of the peasantry and increase agrarian production in years of scarcity and requisitioning (Renton, 2001: 127-148; Cabana, 2009: 230-248). Ruralism played a decisive role in the legitimization of the new regime during the first phase of Francoism. The use of rural discourse to generate adherence to a regime was perhaps most emblematically seen in the role of R. W. Darré, German Minister of Agriculture in the first years of the Nazi regime. His Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil) rhetoric included elements of agrarian romanticism as part of the effort to infiltrate agrarian societies in the 1930s, at the launching of the propagandist Nazi rural organization.  Darré recovered components of nineteenth-century reactionary tradition such as the bond between nature, race, and nation. Such rhetoric condemned liberalism and Marxism and criticized the loss of essential traditions associated with the peasantry. Agrarian utopias and mythical images were key to the conversion of much of the rural population and an effective publicity measure; though in practice many of their legal dispositions proved to be void of content. Another example of the use of ruralist-coloured discourse was the Vichy regime, which had the support of most of the peasantry. The rural population still felt the repercussions of the 1930s agrarian crisis and was reticent towards parliamentarianism. ‘La terre, elle, ne ment pas’ (the land, she doesn’t lie) became one of the catch-phrases of the official cooperativist doctrine of Pétain. 195

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

In Portugal, the official discourse of the Oliveira Salazar regime was also full of populist and paternalist appeals to farm workers. As in the German and Spanish cases, the peasantry was portrayed in the propaganda as the seed of the nation and a source of moral values (arrabalde do céu). Salazar knew how to take advantage of the deeprooted Catholicism of the camponeses (peasants) and managed to identify it with the values of the regime, which were contrary to the tendencies of secularizing ideologies. Salazar’s ruralist discourse cast a mystifying aura around the values of the peasant world: family, duty, nation, religion, community, tradition, and the glorification of rural work. The peasants were gratified to be acknowledged in Salazar’s rhetoric and reciprocated by offering their sanction to the regime (Silva, 1998: 30-31). The situation was similar in Spain. Franco authorities consistently used discursive resources that matched those of their European counterparts (Castillo, 1979; Cazorla, 1999). However, instead of articulating their own discourse, Francoism simply adopted and appropriated principles of the ‘sovereignty of the peasantry’  (Sevilla Guzmán, 1979). This was an ethical reference defining the peasant life as intrinsically good, guided by values essential to the nation and worthy of emulation (Izquierdo, 2010: 17). The regime evoked idyllic images of a bucolic and entirely agricultural countryside that could counteract the ‘evils’ springing from the industrial working class in Spain. Gómez Benito (1996) suggests that we consider the ‘social message’ rooted in the pre-war Catholic social tradition, which involved showing at least formal and theoretical interest in improving the quality of life in rural areas and applying innovative production mechanisms.  Francisco Cobo (2005) insists that these innovations and the promise of a fair distribution of land were intended to attract elite rural traditionalists and the agrarian bourgeoisie, who desired to eradicate all the left-wing novelties established during the Second Republic. In addition to these, the regime also sought to attract farm worker collectives, rural professionals (including local artisans and merchants), and even day labourers or sharecroppers who dreamed of becoming landowners. Francoist discourse assured them that this last point was included in settlement policies. Antonio Bernárdez (1999) confirms that ruralist discourse highlighted how technology would improve production and thus circumvent social conflict.  This was behind the insistence on educating labourers in Francoist schools and trade unions or constructing a framework for introducing innovations to the masses. Without a doubt, ruralist discourse and Francoist propaganda were more effective when expressed in entirely religious terms, or at least in a mystical tone that alluded to ‘community values’ and ‘the hand of Providence’.6 Paternalist tones were also used 6

For example, the obligation to supply a fixed quota of the harvest to the State was frequently explai-

196

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

when addressing the rural population. Value was given to the idea of a protective State that was concerned for its peasantry, with significant references to the fact that the Caudillo (Franco) and his regime recognized the merit and sacrifices of those who worked the land. To enrich this political attitude, the discourse presented the Spanish countryside as a backward, abandoned land that had been consistently neglected by prior governments, which had treated the peasantry as an object of manipulation for the private ends of trade union demagogues and politicians.

IV.2.

The regulation of agriculture

Moving on from discourse to practice, agriculture became a regulated sector during the first decade of Francoism, and autarky was the objective of economic policies in Spain throughout the 1940s. There was a firm decision by the authorities to close borders to imports and regulate domestic economic activity in hopes of achieving selfsufficiency. Neither autarky as an ideal nor State interventionism were entirely new concepts, as they had been present in the Spanish economy since the turn of the century. Autarky, conceived by Francoism as a policy for accelerating the industrialization of Spain within a fascist model, enlisted the experiences of industrial mobilization during World War II and then joined forces with the nationalist tendency of Spanish capitalism (Saz, 2008; Catalán, 1995). The novelty lay in their intensity: they were unrenouncable, permanent, and kept in place in spite of their ineffectiveness (Barciela and others, 2001). This explains the rapid increase of public agencies involved in intervention during the foundational years of the regime. A policy of price discipline was established and prices were adjusted to July 1936 levels. Wheat was the first product affected by production control, price fixing, and sales quotas. The Batalla del Trigo (Wheat Battle) was declared and Spanish wheat policy followed the Italian model, based on Mussolini’s Bataglia del Grano (also present in Portugal with Salazar’s Campanha do Trigo). The Servicio Nacional del Trigo (SNT, National Wheat Service), the emblem of the autarky policy, was created in 1937, before the Civil War had even ended. Initially, the objectives were to end the wheat crisis and gain the support of the wheat producers of Castile and the Upper Ebro River for the insurgents, thus stabilizing the market at remunerative prices for the producers. However, the pre-war problem of overproduction was replaced by a post-war problem of scarcity. So the SNT changed its institutional focus and dedicated itself to the challenge of guaranteeing access to cheap bread.

ned in terms of solidarity with the less fortunate in other places and the need to supply soldiers on the front, who were cast as members of the family and the community.

197

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Two years later, the Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes (CGAT, General Commissariat for Supply and Transportation) was created and officially established rationing. In 1940, the Fiscalia de Tasas (prosecutor’s office and court for dealing with the black market), was instituted to combat transactions outside the established norms, and in 1941 the Junta Superior de Precios (High Council for Prices) was established. All these agencies were part of the State structure for rationing, official price controls, supply, and transport of agrarian products. What began with wheat was applied to all other grains (barley, oat, rye) and legumes. It soon spread to other basic products (olive oil, etc.) and industrial crops such as cotton (see Appendix, Table 7.7). Carlos Barciela (1986) defends a thesis that was widely accepted in Spanish historiography until recently: mainly that faith in the chimera of self-sufficiency led authorities to ignore the environmental limitations of Spanish agriculture and the peasant response to market forces in a context of agricultural interventionism. Farmers reduced the amount of land dedicated to fixed-price crops and instead cultivated crops that were free from intervention. As a result, the production and productivity of basic crops did not return to pre-war Republic levels until the 1960s (Catalán, 1993; Carreras and Taffunell, 2009).  Diverging from this, Christiansen’s analysis (2001, 2005, 2012) of this intervention has shown that a policy of price discipline is the usual post-war response. The context of World War II helped to reinforce that policy in the Spanish case, suggesting that the decreased supply of agrarian products was related to the lack of draught animals and artificial fertilizers. The Franco regime resorted to price regulation and rationing systems in order to cope with food scarcity and price increases, as did other wartime European countries. This explanation holds that the regulatory policy was a formula by which the Francoist State sought to guarantee minimum rations of bread and other dietary staples at a low official price. It also kept wages low for industry, as there was a clear connection between low food prices and low labour wages. Whether due to barely remunerative price fixing for the intervened products or reductions in agricultural inputs from the scarcity caused by World War II, agrarian production fell so dramatically in the 1940s that it was incapable of meeting demand. This led to food rationing and the appearance of an extra-official parallel economy, the black market. During this period, illicit production and circulation of basic supplies doubled official production (Richards, 1998:135). Most of the population resorted to the black market for survival, though the prices of raw materials there were several times higher than the price fixed by the State. For some farmers, this was a substantial source of illicit income.7 Christiansen (2002) has shown how income gained on the While the official prices of wheat and other cereals were generally established below prices of the

7

198

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

black market and the decrease in real salaries for labour compensated many farmers for the official prices they received for their products. They were able to generate enough excess from their crops to sell on the market when prices were favourable. These farmers tended to have good political connections, which minimized the risk of fines and confiscation by the authorities. Seen from this perspective, State intervention cannot be considered as entirely negative for all producers. The policy generated the tremendous inequalities in the 1940s at the core of the re-distribution of rural wealth. The same farmers benefitted from the system if they took advantage of the inoperative control and distribution of production and the rigid Francoist labour legislation that condemned day labourers to poverty and migration (Cobo and Ortega, 2003; Ortega, 2007). Agricultural and market intervention by the Franco regime also generated a context favourable to the appearance of new landowners in the rural sphere. Farmers who enjoyed good relations with the authorities or who obtained privileged information on the black market amassed enough wealth to be able to buy lands from other farmers who had not been exposed to the opportunities provided by illegal commerce (Pan-Montojo, 2004; Narotzky and Smith, 2010).  

IV.3.

Corporative designs for peasant unions

Corporativism was another defining element of rural fascism in Spain, along with State intervention. The 1938 Fuero del Trabajo (Labour Charter) organized the labour market by forcing workers to join vertical trade unions. This basic piece of regulation regarding labour relations within the new regime shows clear fascist inspiration (see the Italian Carta del Lavoro or Labour Charter of 1927). Along with this, the 1940 Ley de Unidad Sindical (Law on Trade Union Unity) and the Ley de Bases de la Organización Sindical (Base Law for Trade Union Organization) institutionalized a single, hierarchical, and corporative trade union. The objective was to harmoniously integrate employers and salaried employees of the same productive branch. Thus, the agrarian sector was structured into Hermandades Sindicales de Labradores y Ganaderos (Brotherhoods of Farmers and Livestock Producers). Gómez Herráez (2008) points out that corporativism in Spain was present both as part of the Falangist programme and in Catholic and traditionalist thinking. It had antecedents in the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) and the Catholic agrarian union experience. During this phase of strong fascist inspiration in Europe, the Francoist agrarian union institution had connections with the DAF (German Labour Front) and Second Republic, black market prices skyrocketed. Until 1949, wheat steadily increased to as much as 1941 per cent over the average prices during the Republic (Pujol, 1985).

199

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

with Italian corporations. De-activation of any pre-existing rural association structure was standard procedure in the early phases of fascist or fascistized regimes throughout Europe. It was considered necessary for the subsequent construction of agrarian unions within the State structure. The various fascist regimes in Europe sought continuity by super-imposing themselves on the pre-existing agrarian social structure. In Spain, however, the existing structures were dismantled, and those that survived did so thanks to their support for the insurgents (Catholic trade unions, chambers of agriculture, and large-scale landowner associations). These struggled to maintain their autonomy in the face of the unitary agrarian corporativist model the State sought to impose. Some were destroyed and the rest refused to become unified, creating an impasse of almost a decade before the new national syndicalist system was established in the agricultural sphere; a process that contrasted sharply with its rapid implementation in other productive sectors (Cabana and Cabo, 2006; Pan-Montojo, 2011). The Hermandades had many functions to carry out: social (such as labour association of agrarian workers), economic (combating plagues, construction of small irrigation infrastructures, creation of experimentation teams, distribution of seed, fertilizer, and tools), assistance (through the activities of the rural cooperatives, Cooperativas del Campo, and the trade union insurance project Previsión Social), communal security through the Servicio de Policía Rural (rural police service), and advisory (collaboration with government plans through the elaboration of statistics and studies, overseeing transactions, control of weights and measures, verification of fertilizer and seed, etc.). In spite of their extensive nature, these institutions played a secondary role in applying Francoist agrarian policy. In reality their true objective was to de-mobilize and control the rural population (Ortíz Heras, 1992; Collarte, 2006; Gómez Herráez, 2008; Lanero, 2011). With the imposition of a new institutional framework and the elimination of prewar agrarian societies and unions, the regime ensured that the peasantry had no valid interlocutor for its opinions and demands. A disorganized, leaderless rural society was what Francoism sought in order to impose its ‘modernizing’ measures with minimal opposition. In fact, one of the main differences between Spain and other European or democratic countries was the inability of the agents involved to discuss any negative effects of modernization.

200

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

IV.4.

New (or not so new) agrarian policies

The corporative structure and interventionism in the agricultural sector were accompanied by agricultural policies such as reforestation and settlement. Even though the policies included the promise of agrarian reform, attempts were made to mitigate aspirations of land redistribution. Both projects featured confidence in technical reforms and State opposition to redistribution of property as a basis for rural modernization. However, there was a world of difference in what was achieved: real success in reforestation and almost nothing in settlement. Paradoxically, Francoist agrarian policies sometimes actually achieved objectives from the Republican era, so we are not dealing with entirely new measures. The policies applied between 1936 and 1951 were at times the culmination of on-going historical processes. Authoritarianism led to the implementation of some policies (reforestation or the hydrological policy) that had been planned and designed before Francoism but were so unpopular that only a dictatorial State could put them into practice. The internal settlement policy was present during the entire Franco era but was barely perceptible during the early Franco years. Settlement was developed in the agrarian programme of the Falange, but until 1951 scarcely existed beyond legislative dispositions. The settlement policy was based on respect for private property, autarky, irrigation, and implementation of Catholic social doctrine. Family was the basis for the socioeconomic organization of agriculture and the social function of property. The Falange assimilated features from its reference models: combining the State intervention, large transformative projects, integral reform, tutelage, and transformation over redistribution found in Mussolini’s bonifica integrale (integral land reclamation) with the ruralism, order, and hierarchy of Nazi Germany. It also found inspiration in policies applied during the internal settlement of the United States (financing, irrigation plans, economic objectives, etc.). Last but not least, it was influenced by the negative model of Republican agrarian reform with its collectivization, social aims, expropriations, etc. In the early part of the twentieth century, a new form of State economic intervention had gained momentum, which was especially concerned with the construction of infrastructures that were too large for private initiative. These included canals and other public works to transform dry lands into irrigated fields. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera,  the bases were established for a more active hydraulic policy. However, a decisive instrument for implementing an integral hydraulic and colonizing policy did not appear until the Agrarian Reform of 1932 (more technical and moderate than the reform we associate with this period). The Base Law for this agrarian reform guaranteed that the State would carry out the necessary public works. Landowners would simply develop rational agrarian economy plans and establish peasant families on the land as tenants or sharecroppers. 201

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Though created in 1939, the Francoist Instituto Nacional de Colonización (INC, National Colonization Institute) was not a new invention. It owed much of its structure to prior technical planning, and generally agreed with prior policies. The Francoist settlement policy was not conceived as a true agrarian reform; rather it sought to avoid a collision with the interests of the latifundistas by reconciling rural reorganization with the expropriations required for it (Monclús and Oyón, 1986). The research of Carlos Barciela (1986, 1990, 2001) describes the absolute failure of the INC. It could not solve the problem for which it was designed (the reformation and adaptation of agrarian structures), nor did it clearly mitigate problems such as unemployment in the agrarian sector. Pérez Rubio (1995: 364) points out that the settlement policy was ever-present in public political messages during the Franco era, and a ‘star policy’ in areas dominated by large landholdings. In fact, in its first ten years of existence the INC only really settled 1,759 families, despite the official number of more than 25,000. The lack of financial resources was responsible for the gap between the plans for the settlement programme and the reality of it, in terms of both the number of colonists settled and the number of hectares of new irrigation. The reforestation policy bore clear marks of Italian fascist influence in its legislative provisions, institutions, and State conduct. It emulated the entrepreneurial attitude of the Italian fascist State, which actively industrialized the wood and forestry products sector.  Following the extreme, global, and regulatory approach of the Italians, the Spanish State reorganized the Patrimonio Forestal del Estado (State Forest Bureau), the organism in charge of reforestation policies, giving it a strong interventionist character. The goal was clearly to achieve self-sufficiency in wood and wood derivatives (especially cellulose), which required the expropriation of more than two million hectares of communal lands from rural communities.  The forest engineers working at various levels of government or as professors at the Escuela de Montes (Forestry School) became the champions of the autarkic ideals of the State. For them it was the opportunity to put into practice the principles they had already adopted during the earlier Primo de Rivera dictatorship (Casals, 1996). They accepted the precepts of intensive forestry almost unanimously, with no significant changes to their nineteenth-century guiding principles. They also incorporated technical innovations such as intensive use of farm machinery, chemicals, etc. (Rico, 1999). The corps of forest engineers also benefitted from the strategic placement of the paper products industry within the economic policy of the autarkic regime. The success of reforestation policies brought an end to the historical mixed use of communal land for farming, pasture, and silviculture throughout Spain. As a result, forestry experts were deeply hated in rural communities.  202

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

V.

After rural fascism: cleavages and continuities in rural policies

The 1950s marked the beginning of a new period in Spanish agricultural history. Many of the policies designed and implemented in the 1940s were maintained, but the discourse and instruments changed. The autarky ideal was renounced as the regime abandoned national syndicalist principles for a more technocratic approach. Efforts to reform the agricultural sector began with the sole objective of increasing productivity and economic efficiency through technical improvements. A process of recovery began as price liberalization measures and structural transformation were implemented. The change was also perceptible in the discourse as ruralist rhetoric faded and technical improvement took the spotlight. Agriculture was treated as another economic sector and the objective of increasing production was attainable through technological innovation (Gómez Benito, 1996). The ‘countryside’ lost its idyllic aura and became the aseptic ‘agricultural sector’; the farmer was no longer a ‘peasant’ full of ethereal virtues, but an ‘agricultural entrepreneur’. Though the discourse did not state it, the goal of the regime was to promote the industrialization of the country. Technological development of agriculture would lead to greater production of raw materials for the agro-industries. It would also free up the labour force, provide cheap labour in other economic sectors, even increase agrarian income levels, and transform farmers into consumers of industrial manufacturing (Naredo, 1986, 2004). During this period, the main lines of action were land consolidation and the ongoing reforestation and settlement policies. The latter actually moved beyond publicity to become fully developed. The irrigation of new land became a priority and land units and cultivation methods were established according to the Green Revolution model, which introduced large-scale machinery and chemical fertilization. Along with settlement, the consolidation of landholdings became the main pillar of the Franco regime policy for changing the agrarian structure. This essentially technical approach was scrupulously respectful of private property. It sought to solve the problems caused by the extraordinary fragmentation of small property holdings and establish landholdings large enough for mechanized farming. This involved structural issues, such as the creation of new roads. Although consolidation of landholdings was present from the very beginning of the economic and social land reform programme, the regime did not develop a legal tool to implement it until 1949-1952.  Land consolidation was rare until the 1960s, and enjoyed greatest success in the 1970s. The Spanish path to the Green Revolution diverged from the agricultural modernization process of Western Europe, with its democratic political arenas, pluralist societies, growing welfare states, trade union agreements, etc. In Spain, the industrial-agrarian development model was coercively imposed. Unlike the agrarian 203

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

crisis of the late nineteenth century, it allowed no margin for the peasants to adapt to the new circumstances under the best possible conditions (Fernández-Prieto, 2007). Rather than diachronically comparing two agricultural models as distant in time as the nineteenth century and the Green Revolution, we can instead compare and contrast the Green Revolution synchronically in different agricultural settings. The modernizing paradigm proved its strength in the agriculture of Southern Europe as well as in countries with agricultural sectors that had historically been more market oriented (Cabana and others, 2012) and that were already considered paragons of modernity in the European welfare system. Whether dictatorship or democracy, the strength and force of modernization theory is striking: at its core was the need to transform all that was traditional and therefore ‘backward’ into modern (Scott, 1998). In the Spanish case, the difference was not so much in the imposed implementation of the model but in how the regime dealt with its effects. The 1960s were primarily years of continuity with the Francoist Green Revolution agrarian policy of the 1950s. However, they should be understood as a new phase because a different dynamic developed between the experts and the farmers. In spite of efforts to create proximity by involving agents in community work and selecting agents with only mid-level or occupational degrees, the ‘technical’ experts had retained a certain attitude of tutelage towards the farmers. From a situation of total distrust, the two groups moved towards each other in a new model where the experts came to see themselves as permanent consultants for the farmers. The derogatory view of farmers as a group incapable of accepting changes and innovations was overcome. This philosophical change was in large part due to the importation of the extensionist model from the United States. It was not an entirely new concept: nineteenth-century public agencies linked to ministries or departments of education in the United States and several European countries had also sent itinerant professors to extend education beyond the formal sphere and into rural areas (Sánchez de Puerta, 1997: 920). The primary objective of the Servicio de Extensión Agraria (SEA, Agrarian Extension Service) was to increase agricultural production and thus increase the standard of living in rural areas, based on the pragmatic modernization philosophy that more is better. The ‘four arms’ of the Extension service defined its fourfold emphasis in the 1960s: 1) youth, families, and homes, 2) cooperativism and community development, 3) on-site technology transfer and 4) management training (Sánchez de Puerta, 1997: 931). There were other, more social objectives, but education and technology transfer were most emphasized in practice (see Appendix, Tables 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10). Although the SEA objectives were clear, the results were less than clear. Was it technical or social improvement that they were actually achieving? (Sánchez 204

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

de Puerta, 1996: 432) Many SEA agents wondered if their work had truly helped improve peasant quality of life or if they had merely served as transmitters in shifting the agrarian population to the industrial sector (see Appendix, Table 7.3). It seems clear that a few were more than that; among their merits is the key role they played in democratizing the countryside through such vehicles as assembly protocol, group dynamics, direct election systems, and the introduction of classbased agrarian unionism. The SEA introduced a modernized agricultural model that involved specialization of producers and production. It is probable that they were largely successful in extending this model, although the results were eventually counterproductive in some cases. The SEA concepts depended on the community as a whole and on the idea that improving productivity would also increase well-being. Young peasants turned agrarian businessmen would guarantee the future of a rural context adapted to the times. It did not turn out this way: the countryside was de-populated of all qualified personnel, who saw the city and industry as their best option for the future. In conclusion, many agrarian policies designed in the 1940s were carried out during the next decades, but incorporated new elements, words, and methods. The autarkic goal of the fascist period gave way to new politics that directed efforts towards a market agrarian sector, following the North American model.

VI.

Conclusion

We have analysed the characteristics of the agrarian policies of early Francoism, its circumstances, its fascist features, and its points of continuity and cleavage with prior and subsequent policies. To evaluate the extent to which these policies were ‘modernizing’, we must address again the meaning of this adjective. For a political project to receive the label of modernizing, it must have as its objective the improvement of productivity through technical change. It is also accompanied by a loss of producer autonomy vis-à-vis the State and the market. Faith in technique as a means of progress goes hand in hand with a legitimizing discourse, under the banner of a new mercantilized agriculture for a new rural society of agricultural entrepreneurs. It is easy to answer this question for the agrarian policy of the late 1950s, since each and every one of these criteria was met. However, what took place in Spain in the 1940s needs to be re-examined through the modernizing lens. Fascism clearly exerted a strong attractive force. The Italian model in particular became a reference point for the rural policies planned and implemented during the first decade of Francoism. Even so, the degree of fascistization or the emulation of 205

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

fascism in the regime cannot conceal the evidence of experiences that were already present in the national tradition, such as corporativism. In the rural context, Francoism was in no way a return to the past. The intentions of the regime were not to re-establish rural social or pre-Republican economic relations. The agrarian ‘counter-reformation’ and the establishment of intervention mechanisms shifted the distribution of agrarian income to benefit social groups supportive of the regime, rather than the prior landowners. Likewise, corporativism established new social relations among rural communities and novel forms of relating politically to the State and the market. Farmers who had used collective strength to adapt to capitalism in the first third of the twentieth century now found their autonomy diminished by Francoist authoritarianism. The norms and forms of relation and production imposed by the regime allowed only for silent acceptance, under the constant threat of severe repression should conflict or resistance arise.8 The compulsory and corporative Falangist trade union apparatus was interested in disciplinary control, de-mobilization, and mitigation of conflict among the peasantry. The rural population was left with no valid interlocutor in the institutional sphere that was comparable to the pre-war class agrarian unions. This, in conjunction with the black market, encouraged the rise of a new power group in rural communities, along with its clientelistic network. Controlling positions in the Hermandades agrarian unions were granted according to affinity with the regime (ex-combatants, Falangists, etc.), which led to discretional management of resources (fertilizer, seeds, tool replacements, access to insurance, etc.), and this determined what sort of impact it had on the misery that prevailed in the 1940s. The agrarian policy of early Francoism sought to increase agrarian production and ensure supply through an interventionist and isolationist policy that ended in failure. The repression exerted by the regime created a grave loss of human capital and the collective resources that had channelled modernizing measures to rural Spain in the decades prior to the Civil War. Thus, the process of modernization based on technical reform was damaged by the war and post-war circumstances of the 1940s. This can be attributed to the priorities of a regime born of civil conflict that was in need of rural support, and the counter-productive economic policy it imposed. However, even during the ‘fascist’ period of agrarian policy there were traces of a first step towards the modernizing tendency that was later and more clearly associated with The cleansing of agrarian democratic unionism and the repression of agrarian union leaders and leftwing technicians did not end rural conflicts but did transform them. Destruction of an organized means of mobilization re-activated the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985), including historical forms of peasant rebellion such as fraud and boycotts (Ortega, 2011; Cabana, 2006; Cabana and Cabo, 2006). 8

206

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

the Green Revolution. Some measures already established during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and even the Republic (such as the hydrological policy) were maintained but not implemented due to lack of social support or investment. Settlement and reforestation were the clearest examples of the authoritarian modernization model imposed by the regime. These formal mechanisms were implemented in pursuit of autarky until 1951; after that they remained in place as lines of action for the Green Revolution agricultural model. We have mentioned the importance of ruralism in the legitimizing discourse of early Francoist agrarian policies. Although devotion to technical progress was present as a way of gaining support for the young regime, the idea of the ‘sovereignty of the peasantry’ carried much more weight. It was not until well into the 1950s, after Cavestany’s arrival in the Ministry of Agriculture, that the emphasis shifted to transforming rural Spain through the technological changes outlined in the Green Revolution. This new focus would transform agriculture into an economic sector that quietly took a back seat to industry, turning the ‘peasant guardians of the race’ into ‘modern agricultural entrepreneurs’ and producing ‘more agriculture with fewer farmers’ (Cavestany, 1955: 97).

207

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Bibliography Arco, Miguel Ángel del (2007), Hambre de siglos. Mundo rural y apoyos sociales del franquismo en la Andalucía oriental, Granada, Ed. Comares. Barciela, Carlos (ed.) (2003), Autarquía y mercado negro, Barcelona, Crítica.

Barciela, Carlos (1986), ‘Los costes del franquismo en el sector agrario: la ruptura del proceso de transformaciones’, in Ramón Garrabou and others (eds.) (1986), Historia agraria de la España Contemporánea 3. El fin de la agricultura tradicional (1900-1960), Barcelona, Crítica, p. 383-454. Barciela, Carlos (1990), ‘La colonización agraria en España, 1939-1951’, in María Teresa Pérez Picazo and Guy Lemeunier (eds.) (1990), Agua y modo de producción, Barcelona, Crítica, p. 98-120.

Barciela, Carlos and others (2001), La España de Franco (1939-1975). Economía, Madrid, Sintesis.

Bernárdez Sobreira, Antonio and Cabo Villaverde, Miguel (1996), ‘Ciencia y dictadura: la investigación agronómica en Galicia durante el primer franquismo (1936-1950)’, Noticiario de Historia Agraria, 12, p. 119-139. Cabana Iglesia, Ana (2006), Entre a resistencia e a adaptación: a sociedade rural galega no franquismo (1936-1960), Santiago de Compostela, USC. Cabana Iglesia, Ana (2009), Xente de orde. O consentimento cara ao franquismo en Galicia, Santa Comba, tresCtres.

Cabana Iglesia, Ana and Cabo Villaverde, Miguel (2006), ‘Cuando lo viejo muere y lo nuevo no acaba de nacer: la represión del asociacionismo agrario en Galicia (1936-1945)’, in Jesús de Juana and Julio Prada (eds.) (2006), Lo que han hecho en Galicia, Barcelona, Crítica, p. 165-185. Cabana Iglesia, Ana, Cabo Villaverde, Miguel Díaz-Geada, Alba; FernándezPrieto, Lourenzo and Lanero Táboas, Daniel (2012), Agricultural Extension Programmes in Postwar Europe. A Comparative Study of Two Extreme Cases: Spain and the Netherlands (1946-1973), Glasgow, ESSCH.

Camprubí, Lino (2010), ‘One Grain, One Nation: Rice Genetics and the Corporate State in Early Francoist Spain (1939-1952)’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 4, p. 499-531.

Carreras, Albert and Tafunell, Xavier (2003), Historia económica de la España contemporánea, Barcelona, Crítica.

Casals Costa, Vicente (1996), Los ingenieros de montes en la España contemporánea, 1848-1936, Barcelona, Ediciones del Serbal.

Castillo, Juan José (1979), Propietarios muy pobres, Madrid, Servicio de Publicaciones Agrarias. 208

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

Catalán, Jordi (1995), La economía española y la II Guerra Mundial, Barcelona, Ariel.

Cavestany, Rafael (1995), ‘Menos agricultores y mejor agricultura’, Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales, 13, p. 97-124.

Cazorla Sánchez, Antonio (1999), Desarrollo sin reformistas: Dictadura y campesinado en el nacimiento de una nueva sociedad en Almería, 1939-1975, Almería, Instituto de Estudios Almerienses. Christiansen, Thomas (2002), ‘Intervención del Estado y mercado negro en el sector oleícola durante el primer franquismo’, Historia Agraria, 27, p. 221-246.

Christiansen, Thomas (2005), ‘Crime and punishment in the Black Market in Spain, 1940-1953. An analysis of the Fiscalía de Tasas’, Ager, 4, p. 63-99.

Christiansen, Thomas (2012), The reason why. The post-civil war agrarian crisis in Spain, Zaragoza, PUZ.

Clar, Ernesto (2008), ‘Más allá de 1936: la crisis de la agricultura tradicional española en perspectiva, 1900-1975’, Ager, 7, p. 109-147. Cobo Romero, Francisco and Ortega López, María Teresa (2004), ‘Hambre, desempleo y emigración. Las consecuencias sociales de la política agraria autárquica en Andalucía Occidental (1939-1975)’, Hispania, 218, p. 1079-1112.

Collarte Pérez, Anxo (2006), Labregos no franquismo. Economía e sociedade rural na Galiza interior. As “hermandades sindicales” en Ourense (1943-1979), Ourense, Difusora das Letras. Cordero Del Campillo, Miguel (2003), La Medicina en el exilio republicano, Alcalá de Henares, Universidad de Alcalá de Henares.

Fernández-Prieto, Lourenzo (1993), ‘Represión franquista y desarticulación social en Galicia. La destrucción de la organización societaria campesina, 1936-1942’, Historia Social, 15, p. 49-70.

Fernández-Prieto, Lourenzo (2001), ‘Caminos del cambio tecnológico en las agriculturas españolas contemporáneas’, in Josep Pujol and others (eds.) (2001), El Pozo de todos los males: sobre el atraso en la agricultura española contemporánea, Barcelona, Crítica, p. 95-146. Fernández-Prieto, Lourenzo (2007), El apagón tecnológico del franquismo: estado e innovación en la agricultura española del siglo XX, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch.

Gómez Benito, Cristóbal (1996), Políticos, burócratas y expertos: un estudio de la política agraria y la sociología rural en España (1936-1959), Madrid, Siglo XXI.

Gómez Herráez, José María (2008), ‘Las Hermandades Sindicales de Labradores y Ganaderos (1942-1977). Del análisis franquista a la historiografía actual’, Historia Agraria, 44, p. 119-155.

209

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Izquierdo Martín, Jesús (2010), ‘De palabras y cosas en el cambio agrario: el desafío de la historia conceptual’, article presented at the I Seminario Anual de la SEHA.

Lanero Táboas, Daniel (2011), Historia dun ermo asociativo. Labregos, sindicatos verticais e políticas agrarias en Galicia baixo o franquismo, Santa Comba, tresCtres. Mateos, Abdón (1998), ‘Violencia, política, nacionalsindicalismo y contrarreforma agraria. Cantabria, 1937-1941’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, 1, p. 159-189.

Mir, Conxita and others (2002), La represión bajo el franquismo, Madrid, Marcial Pons.

Monclús, Francisco Javier and Oyón, Jose Luis (1986), ‘De la colonización interior a la colonización integral (1900-1936). Génesis y destino de una reforma agraria técnica’, in Ramón Garrabou and others (1986), Historia agraria de la España Contemporánea 3, El fin de la agricultura tradicional (1900-1936), Barcelona, Crítica, p. 347-380.

Moradiellos, Enrique (2001), El reñidero de Europa: las dimensiones internacionales de la Guerra Civil española, Barcelona, Península. Moradiellos, Enrique (2009), ‘Franco y el fascismo’, Temas a Debate, 172, p. 3841.

Naredo, José Manuel (1986), ‘La agricultura española en el desarrollo económico’, in Ramón Garrabou and others (eds.) (1986), Historia agraria de la España Contemporánea 3. El fin de la agricultura tradicional (1900-1960), Barcelona, Crítica, p. 456-498. Naredo, José Manuel (2004), La evolución de la agricultura en España (19401990), Granada, Universidad de Granada.

Narotzky, Susana and Smith, Gavin (2010), Luchas inmediatas. Gente, poder y espacio en la España rural, Valencia, Prensas Universidad de Valencia.

Ortega López, María Teresa (2007), ‘Las miserias del fascismo rural. Las relaciones laborales en la agricultura española, 1936-1948’, Historia Agraria, 43, p. 531-553.

Ortega López, María Teresa (2011), ‘Campesinos y jornaleros bajo el franquismo. Represión, disentimiento y conflictividad en el campo español, 1939-1975’, in María Teresa Ortega López and Francisco Cobo Romero (eds.) (2011), La España Rural, siglos XIX y XX. Aspectos políticos, sociales y culturales, Granada, Ed. Comares. Ortiz Heras, Manuel (1992), Las Hermandades de labradores en el franquismo: Albacete 1943-1977, Albacete, Instituto de Estudios Albacetenses.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2004), ‘Innovaciones e continuidades na política agraria do primero franquismo (1936-1951)’, in Dulce Freire, Inês Fonseca and Paula Godinho (coord.) (2004), Mundo rural. Transformaçao e resistência na Península Ibérica (século XX), Lisbon, Colibrí, p. 55-70.

210

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2005), Apostolado, profesión y tecnología. Una historia de los ingenieros agrónomos en España, Madrid, Ministerio de Agricultura.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2008), ‘El fin de un ciclo: las transformaciones de la propiedad y la explotación de la tierra en la posguerra’, in Francisco Comín (coord.) (2008), Economía y economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil II, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutemberg, p. 649-676.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2009), ‘La depuración de los ingenieros del Ministerio de Agricultura, 1936-1942’, in Josefina Cuesta Bustillo (coord.) (2009), La depuración de funcionarios bajo la dictadura franquista: (1936-1975), Madrid, Marcial Pons, p. 232-247.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2011), ‘Sindicalistas e ingenieros en los conflictos políticoagrarios del primer franquismo’, in Dulce Freire and Daniel Lanero (eds.) (2011), Agriculturas e innovación tecnológica en la Península Ibérica (1946-1975), Madrid, Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 243-268.

Pan-Montojo, Juan (2012), ‘Spanish Agriculture, 1931-1955. Crisis, Wars and New Policies in the Reshaping of Rural Society’, in Paul Brassley, Yves Segers and Leen Van Molle (eds.) (2012), War, Agriculture and Food. Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s, New York, Routledge.

Rico Boquete, Eduardo (ed.) (1999), Pensamento forestal no século XX, Santiago de Compostela, Xunta de Galicia.

Pérez Rubio, José Antonio (1995), Yunteros, braceros y colonos. La política agraria en Extremadura (1940-1975), Madrid, Ministerio de Agricultura.

Prada Rodríguez, Julio (2010), La España masacrada. La represión franquista de guerra y posguerra, Madrid, Ariel.

Preston, Paul (2011), El Holocausto español: odio y exterminio en la Guerra Civil y después, Barcelona, Debate. Pujol, Josep (1985), ‘Los precios de los cereales en Cataluña durante los años de la autarquía económica: el mercado oficial y el clandestino’, Agricultura y Sociedad, 35, p. 235-254. Renton, David (2001), ‘The agrarian roots of fascism: German exceptionalism revised’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 28, 4, p. 127-148. Richards, Michael (1998), A time of silence. Civil War and the culture of repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Rodrigo, Javier (2009), ‘La naturaleza del franquismo: un acercamiento desde la perspectiva comparada de los fascismos europeos’, in Carmelo Romero and Alberto Sabio (coord.) (2009), Universo de Micromundos. VI Congreso de Historia Local de Aragón, Zaragoza, Institución Fernando El Católico, 2009), p. 47-62.

211

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Rodríguez Barreira, Óscar (2011), ‘Las cabezas de la Hidra. Políticas locales en el Parafascismo: el primer fascismo, 1936-1950’, in The Acts of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Association for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies, Lisbon.

Sánchez de Puerta, Fernando (1996), Extensión agraria y desarrollo rural: sobre la evolución de las teorías y praxis extensionistas, Madrid, Ministerio de Agricultura.

Sánchez de Puerta, Fernando (1997), ‘Estado y agricultura: la extensión agraria’ in Cristóbal Gómez Benito and Juan Jesús González Rodríguez (eds.) (1997), Agricultura y sociedad en la España Contemporánea, Madrid, Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 913-945. Sanz Lafuente, Gloria (2004), ‘Naturaleza y nacionalsocialismo. Una aproximación a Blut und Boden y a Richard Walther Darré’, in Carlos Forcadell and others (eds.) (2004), Usos de la Historia y políticos de la memoria, Zaragoza, PUZ, p. 494-525.

Saz Campos, Ismael (2001), ‘Paradojas de la historia, paradojas de la historiografía. Las peripecias del fascismo español’, Hispania, LXI/I, 207, p. 143-176. Saz Campos, Ismael (2003), España contra España. Los nacionalismos franquistas, Madrid, Marcial Pons. Saz Campos, Ismael (2004), Fascismos y franquismo, Valencia, PUV.

Saz Campos, Ismael (2008), ‘La lucha por la libertad en España desde una perspectiva comparada (1962-1977)’, Novísima. II Congreso Internacional de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo, Logroño. Saz Campos, Ismael (2010), ‘Fascismo, fascistización y desarrollismo en la dictadura franquista’, in Mónica Burguera and others (eds.), Historias de España Contemporánea. Cambio social y giro cultural, Valencia, PUV, p.175-92.

Scott, James C. (1985), Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasants resistence New Haven, Yale University Press.

Scott, James C. (1998), Seeing like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Sevilla-Guzmán, Eduardo (1979), La evolución del campesinado en España, Barcelona, Península.

Silva, Manuel Carlos (1998), Resistir e adaptarse. Constrangimentos e estratégias camponesas no Noroeste de Portugal, Oporto, Ed. Afrontamento.

Simpson, James (1997), La agricultura española (1765-1965): la larga siesta, Madrid, Alianza.

Velasco Murviedro, Carlos (1982), ‘El pensamiento agrario y la apuesta industrializadora en la España de los 40’, Agricultura y Sociedad, 23, p. 237-273.

212

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

Appendix: Agricultural indicators for Spain (20th Century)

Table 7.1. Population active in agriculture

Year

%



1929-1933

46.0



1949-1951

47.6



1964-1966

27.6

Source: Simpson (1997: 60-61).

Table 7.2. Percentage of GDP from agriculture

Year

%



1929-1933

8.6



1949-1951

30.5



1964-1966

16.5

Source: Simpson (1997: 60-61).

Table 7.3. Rural exodus (1910-1970)

Number of male agricultural workers (% variation) 1910-30 1910-50 1950-70 1910-70



North

-27

+7

-40

-36



Mediterranean

-28

-13

-49

-56



Interior

-21

+2

-50

-49



Andalucia

-3

+20

-43

-31



Spain

-20

+4

-46

-44

Source: Simpson (1997: 331).

213

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Table 7.4. The development of the relative price of wheat to labour (1936-1953) Year

Index of official wheat price paid to farmers (1935 price=100)

Index of real wages Index of relative in the agrarian price of wheat sector to labour (1935 salary=100) (1935-36 price=100)



1940

87

82

106



1941

72

73

99



1942

67

72

92



1943

85

74

115



1944

94

73

129



1945

99

72

137



1946

79

63

125



1947

81

60

136



1948

102

56

182



1949

91

53

172



1950

81

56

144



1951

88

51

173



1952

118

52

226



1953

122

52

234

Source: Chistiansen (2012: 94).

Table 7.5. Work horses in Spain

Year

Horses

Mule

Total



1934

808,500

1,479,200

2,287,700



1948

108,161

417,820

525,981

Source: Clar (2008: 120).

214

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

Table 7.6. Distribution of land ownership (1930 and 1956)

Importance of different types of landholdings in Spain

Total surface

Small plots ≤10 ha

Midsize holdings ≥ 10 ha ≤ 100 ha

Large holdings ≥ 100 ha



North (1959)*

63.3

21.5

15.2



Centre (1930)

53.3

22.3

24.4



South (1930)

27.9

19.8

52



Spain (1959)

46.5

24.9

28.6

* The figures for the north zone are only available for 1959. Source: Barciela et al. (1986: 118).

Table 7.7. Wheat production (thousands of metric tons)

Year

Surface

Production



1931-35

4557

4364



1940-44

3176

3206



1945-49

3972

3177



1950-54

4214

3907



1955-59

4341

4452

Source: Barciela et al (1986: 386, 420).

215

Exploring modernization: agrarian fascism in rural Spain, 1936-1951

Table 7.8. Technical modernization: other indicators (Combine harvesters and threshers)

Regional distribution of machinery for harvesting, 1932

Cereal surface* (thousandsof ha.)

Num. combines

Num. threshers

Ha / combine

Ha / thresher

North

211

30

808

7049

262

Mediterranean

761

3153

624

241

1219

Andalucia

1331

5711

567

233

2347

Interior

5640

61,447

3000

92

1880

Spain

7943

70,341

4999

113

1589

*Excluding corn and rice. Source: Simpson (1997: 220).

Table 7.9. Tractors and combine harvesters of cereal Tractors Rototillers Motorised Pulled combines combines Year Num. Thousands Num. Thousands Num. Thousands Num. HP HP HP 1950

12,798

75

1955

27,671

858

503

3

210

10

732

1960

56,845

2004

2273

16

1937

88

3088

1965

147,884

5943

21,951

143

11,509

583

3839

1970

259,544

11,641

72,267

619

27,966

1833

3630

Source: Barciela et al. (1986: 453-454).

216

Ana Cabana & Alba Díaz-Geada

Table 7.10. Total consumption and consumption by hectare of fertilizer

Year

Fertilizable surface* Thousands of ha

Nitrogen consumption Total kg/ mt ha

Phosphorous consumption Total kg/ mt ha

Potassium consumption Total kg/ mt ha

1945

15,591

11,373

0.7

81,203

5.2

30,719

2.0

1951

16,247

74,881

4.6

161,944

10.0

43,835

2.7

1955

16,188

178,826

11.0

224,073

15.0

54,607

3.4

1960

16,225

242,824

14.9

287,145

17.7

69,308

4.3

*Cultivated surface minus fallow land, plus natural grasslands. Source: Barciela et al. (1986: 440).

217

8.

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo: a case study of the acceptance of Nazi agricultural ideology by the Japanese Empire Tatsushi Fujihara

I.

Introduction

Officially regarded as a ‘symbiotic’1 utopia for Asian peoples, Manchukuo (満洲 国) was actually a puppet state established in northeast China by the Japanese Empire on 1 March 1932.2 The Empire sought to develop mining and heavy industries such as coal, petroleum, and iron, which were extremely important resources in both Manchukuo and Japan (Yamamoto, 2003: 107-130). The production of steel and agricultural fertilizer was important for the Manchukuo-Japan relationship, as was the development of railways. The South Manchuria Railway Company, known to the Japanese as Mantetsu, supported the development of Manchukuo. The Japanese empire viewed agriculture in Manchukuo as a valuable resource (Yamamoto, 2003: 89-107). The government of Manchukuo and Mantetsu sought to increase production of soybean, raw cotton, wool, sorghum, wheat, rice, and maize. About 300,000 peasants and young men3 moved from Japan to Manchukuo in order to carry out this project.4 Mori Takemaro has described the three aims of the settlement (Mori, 2003: 182). The first was to establish Japanese peasants as a barrier against communism and the military strength of the Soviet Union, especially in the more sparsely populated areas of Manchukuo. Japanese emigrants to Manchuria were frequently referred to as ‘human pillboxes’. The second aim consisted in achieving autarky. ‘Japanese settlers were needed in Manchuria to provide Japan with feed for livestock and with improved stock breeds. […] More immediately, they were needed to guarantee selfsufficiency in food supplies for the rest of the Japanese population in Manchuria’. Moreover, they were seen as potential consumers in Japanese business circles. Japan One of the most famous ‘ideals’ of Manchukuo was ‘Gozokukyōwa 五族協和’, which means ‘five races forming one union.’ The ‘five races’ were the Japanese, Koreans, Han Chinese, Manchu, and Mongols.

1

For further details regarding the establishment of Manchukuo, see Yamamuro (2006). On the social and cultural history of Manchukuo, see Young (1998). 2

For a discussion of the Youth Brigade, see Shiratori (2008).

3

On re-settlement to Manchuria, see Young (1998: ch. 7, 8, 9), and Wilson (2003).

4

219

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

sought to build a new economic bloc with China and Manchukuo, fashioning it after the relationship between Britain and the sterling area. The third aim of the settlement policy was to alleviate the rural crisis in Japan after the Great Depression. Some Japanese scholars, along with officials working in the sphere of agricultural economy, insisted that the crisis could be overcome if peasants acquired and expanded the holdings that previous settlers had owned. As I will discuss later, this policy was supported by a kind of ‘re-invented’ agrarianism based on social engineering. In fact, ‘the emigration plans counted heavily on the marvels of social science’ (Young, 1998: 334-335). The Nōhonshugisha (農本主義者) or agrarianists, generally esteemed a villagebased farming economy over urbanization and industrialization.5 How, then, could agrarianism coexist with social engineering in Manchukuo, and why would it? In her book entitled Japan’s Total Empire, Louise Young highlighted the ‘modernity’ of the Japanese empire and Manchukuo. While it is true that they exhibited modernist features, the difference between modernity in Manchukuo and in other countries must be explained, as some Manchukuo policies aimed at overcoming Western ‘modernity’. Young’s book and other studies tend to describe Manchukuo only within the context of Japanese history (Mori, 2003; Wilson, 2003). We must here draw attention to the ally of the Japanese Empire, since agrarian thinking behind the settlement of Manchuria was especially influenced by Nazi Germany. During the 1930s and 1940s, Japan sought to assimilate National Socialist thinking and policies. Kaitakunōjōhō (開拓農場法), or the Settlement Farm Law (SFL), was enacted in Manchukuo on 13 November 1941 and served as the legal basis for settlement. It was modelled after the Reichserbhofgesetz (REG) or Reich Hereditary Farm Law, which had been announced at the Reichserntedankfest (National Harvest Festival) in Nazi Germany on 1 October 1933. Little attention has been given in the literature to the influence of this German law, or to the SFL itself. In this chapter, we will examine the history of Manchukuo from a national and international perspective. Through the lenses of intellectual history, we will consider how the SFL was influenced by German agrarianism, especially the REG, and how the drafters of the SFL tried to overcome ‘Western modernity’.

On the history of agrarianism in Japan, see Iwasaki (1997). Iwasaki examines in detail Japanese agrarian thought from the perspective of daily life. 5

220

Tatsushi Fujihara

II.

The policy of emigration to Manchukuo: the Branch Village System

The 1932 policy of ‘armed emigration’ (武装移民) to establish settlements began with the goal of maintaining the peace. Manchukuo was bordered on the north by the Soviet Union. It also faced violence from ‘bandits’ (匪賊): poor peasant villagers who resisted Japanese colonizers. In order to address this, the government tried to increase the Japanese presence in Manchukuo. Though resistance did not disappear completely, safety gradually improved in the region. Four years later, the Japanese government implemented a new emigration plan. On 25 August 1936, Prime Minister Hirota Kōki (広田弘毅), announced a plan for one million Japanese families (about five million people) to emigrate from Japan to Manchukuo over a period of twenty years (Figure 8.1). The fields had already been cultivated by Chinese and Korean farmers in Manchuria, but had then been bought at an extremely low price by either the Manchurian Colonization Company (満洲拓 殖公社) or a branch of the Manchukuo government. In short, the emigration policy aimed at ‘Japanizing Manchuria’ (Young, 1998: 391). Most of the peasants who lost their holdings were left in despair, and filled with anger. Tsukui Shin’ya, who participated in the purchasing of land for development in Beoqing County, Sanjiang Province, recorded at the time of a forcible purchase: ‘We trampled on the wishes of farmers who held fast to the land and, paying no attention to their entreaties full of lamentations and kneeling, we forced them to sell. We forced a dirt-cheap sales price upon them. Even though the land was to be resettled by the colonization group, I felt saddened that we would be leaving these people to a future of calamity, and that by our actions we had committed a crime’.6 The new immigration plan was constructed upon this tremendous sacrifice by local peasants and landlords in Manchuria. A new objective was also added: to eradicate poverty in Japanese villages. Poverty levels had increased after the Great Depression of October 1929. The Rural Economic Reform Movement (農山漁村 経済更生運動),7 launched by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in October of 1932, had been largely unsuccessful. This bureaucratic movement was intended to facilitate ‘self-help’; however, many poor peasants and villages were unable to muster the energy to reform their economies. Tsukui Shin’ya, ‘Aa “muga Shijun’”, Henkyō 9, November 1972, p. 223-234 (Yamamuro, 2006: 204). I have changed the translation slightly. 6

On this movement, see, for example, Mori (1999), Smith (2003).

7

221

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

Figure 8.1. Map of the agricultural immigration in Manchuria, 1941

Source: Manshū takushoku iinkai jimukyoku, Manshū nogyō imin gaiyō, 1938.

222

Tatsushi Fujihara

The Japanese government decided to improve the basic agricultural structure by moving families from overpopulated rural areas of Japan to Manchukuo. To back this policy, in 1937 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry estimated 1.6 ha (4 acres) to be the proper amount of land per farm household in Japan (except in Hokkaidō). However, the actual average size was 0.9 ha (or 2.3 acres, except in Hokkaidō, where relatively larger farms existed). The Ministry thus estimated an overpopulation of about thirty-one per cent (Kobayashi, 1977: 84). One of the solutions intended to address this problem was to establish the Bunson Imin (分村移民), or Branch Village System. The system was simple: half the people from a village left their homeland for Manchukuo, while the other half remained in the village to expand their holdings. From the perspective of the government, the head village and its branch would be as deeply connected as Japan and Manchukuo. Eventually, almost three hundred thousand people were relocated to this ‘utopia’, though the policy suffered several setbacks. The number of applicants dropped during the 1940s, as the war industry boomed and business improved. Motivation for relocating to Manchukuo was low, and in some villages applicants were chosen by the local government and forced to relocate. In this way, as many historians have pointed out, the policy simply ‘threw away’ the excess population into Manchukuo. Many similar problems arose from the fact that those responsible for designing rural policy lived in cities, disconnected from rural inhabitants. Finally, Manchukuo collapsed after the Soviet Union invaded on 9 August 1945. Many colonizers, including children, died attempting to escape to the homeland. Some children remained in Manchuria and were brought up by the Chinese (Ide, 1986).

III.

The Settlement Farm Law: blood and soil in Manchukuo

It is important to understand the thinking behind the emigration policy, in order to better grasp how the Japanese Empire managed to mobilize so many peasants throughout Japan between 1932 and 1945. It seems that the image of the Manchukuo ‘peasant utopia’, which was fully embodied in the SFL, played an important role in mobilizing Japanese peasants. Although there were few new incentives to emigrate from the homeland to Manchukuo after 1940, most colonizers offered little resistance. This was to some degree a manifestation of the ‘spirit of the age’, which related the ‘peasant utopia’ to ‘anti-capitalism’ and was reflected in the propaganda. The Great Depression had seriously diminished the price of agricultural produce, especially silkworm cocoons, reducing most peasants to poverty. Certain scholars and educators began using speeches, books, articles, and pamphlets to propagate

223

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

the idea that emigration to Manchuria was indispensable.8 Speeches insisting on the importance of the emigration policy in official meetings were especially effective throughout the country, from Tokyo to poor rural villages. Hashimoto Denzaemon (橋本傳左衛門), Nasu Shiroshi (那須皓), and Katō Kanji (加藤完治) played an important part in this propaganda. Nasu and Hashimoto were renowned, influential agro-economists and professors at the Imperial University of Tokyo and the Imperial University of Kyoto, respectively.9 Katō was an educator, friend to farmers, and defender of peasant ideology.10 He and his acolytes lectured to villagers and village leaders throughout Japan, earnestly advocating the need for emigration to Manchuria in order to establish new small-scale Japanese family farms. Other types of media were also effective as propaganda. For example, Wada Tsutō’s (和田傳) novel Ōhinata Village (大日向村)11 described the first attempt at the Branch Village System in Japan, in the Nagano Prefecture (Figure 8.2), which had been more seriously affected by the Great Depression than any other (Wada, 1939). Emigration began on 7 July 1936, coinciding to the very day with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The novel describing this symbolic case was later adapted for theatre and film. Artistic expressions such as this propagated the idea that there were no class distinctions between landowners and tenant farmers, and that poor peasants could become landowners in Manchukuo. Although many peasants neither read the novel nor saw the play or film, village leaders used many of Wada’s phrases and ideas to persuade peasants to go to Manchuria. By incorporating these ideas into law, the SFL sought to be just as idealistic and utopian as Manchukuo was supposed to be. Details are unclear regarding the groundwork for the SFL. On 12 December 1939, about two years before the SFL became official, The Basic Outline of the Manchurian Settlement Policy (満州開拓政策基本要綱) was passed in Cabinet meetings in both Japan and Manchukuo. It stressed ‘harmony’ between the Japanese and native peoples of Manchuria, especially the Han Chinese and Korean farmers, in subtle acknowledgement of their rage at the Settlement policy. The Summary stated that On the role of mass media in Manchukuo and the settlement policy, see Young (1998).

8

During his stay in Germany as a student, he studied under Friedrich Aereboe (1865-1942), a famous agricultural economist. 9

It is interesting to note that their ideal country was Denmark. They repeatedly expressed admiration for Denmark, a country that was enthusiastic about educating small-scale farmers and not controlled by the capitalism of large countries such as Great Britain. 10

Young describes Wada as ‘a prominent member of the anti-urban, anti-Marxist rural literature movement’ (Young, 1998: 389). It should also be added that his ambivalent attitude towards the landed class often appears in his works. He was not a pure propagandist, but a novelist who often described both conflicts and harmony between landowners and tenant farmers. 11

224

Tatsushi Fujihara

Figure 8.2. Wada Den, ‘Ôhinata Mura’, 1939

Source: Wada (1939).

225

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

settlement would form the ‘moral’ foundation for a new order in East Asia, and the SFL became the legal systematization of this ideal. The SFL drafting committee was established in March of 1941 and chaired by Matsumoto Tamotsu (松本侠), Vice Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of Manchuria. The committee was composed of twenty-seven authorities from various spheres of society in Japan and Manchukuo. Though the draft had been drawn up by the Settlement Head Office and the judiciary of Manchukuo, it was revised more than ten times. On 6 December 1941, the bill was passed in the Diet of Manchukuo, and five days later the SFL came into force (Ōhata, 1942: 3-4). Though this law had no preamble, Article 1 contained the fundamental principle: ‘The purpose of this law is to establish the basis for firm management of settlement farms by inherited holdings and hence create sound family farms as well as villages based on those farms.’ In this spirit, Articles 36 and 37 forbade the execution or sale of any estate inherited from a settlement farm. This was intended to limit ownership, the most important condition for capitalism, and protect the new farms from market mechanisms. Additionally, according to Article 2, settlement farmers belonged to the ‘Settlement Corps’ (開拓団), which would change its name to ‘Settlement Cooperative’ (開拓協同組合) when self-management became feasible. Thus, the law indicated a ‘third way’ that departed from both capitalism and communism. Fuke (2010) describes in detail how the anti-capitalist and anti-communist policies and ideology of Italian fascists and National Socialists were being enthusiastically introduced into Japan from the 1920s to the 1940s. Many agronomists and economists translated relevant articles and books (Table 8.1), especially after Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany on 25 November 1936.12 The REG, announced on 1 October 1933, became one of the most important features of National Socialism to be embraced by the Japanese Empire. The REG also prohibited the execution of purchase or sale of landholdings, and guaranteed a single heir for each farm property. Neither the REG nor the SFL regarded landholdings as saleable goods. Both considered landholdings as the basis for corn production according to the national (or imperialistic) self-sufficiency policy, but also as the basis for peasant, village, and national development. Moreover, both laws placed the working family farm at the core of the development of a new country, an ideology suggesting a version of peasantism. Richard Walther Darré, who advocated the Erbhof ideology in Nazi Germany, insisted that the German Bauer (peasant owner) was the Neuadel (new aristocracy). This theory was deeply influenced by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. In fact, the SS ideal cherished by Himmler was very 12

In this pact, Germany agreed to recognize Manchukuo.

226

Year of first Translator printed edition

Der Reichsnährstand (The Reich Food Estate) Agrarpolitik (Agricultural Policy) Der Weg der deutschen Bauern (The Way of the German Peasant) Der Reichsnährstand (3.ed in 1940) (The Reich Food Estate)

Shokurryokyoukai 食糧協会 Hashimoto Hajime 橋本元

Nagakawa Hideo 永川秀男 Sekaikeizaichosakai 世界経済調査会

1937 1933

1940 1937

Reichserbhofgesetz (Reich Hereditary Farm Law) 1933 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 農林省 Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft des Agrarkredits (Past, Present and Future of Agricultural Loans) 1934 Kumashiro Yukio 熊代幸雄 Gesetz zur Regelung der landwirtschaftlichen Schuldenverhältnisse (The Law on Agricultural Loan Consolidation) 1933 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 農林省 Reden auf dem 2. Reichsbauerntag in Goslar (Speech at the 2nd Reich Peasant Conference) 1934 Toyohuku Yasuji 豊福保次 Blut und Boden, in: Grundlagen, Aufbau und Wirtschaftsordnung des Nationalsozialistischen Staates (GAW) (Blood and Soil in the Foundation, Construction and Economic Order of the Nazi State) 1936-38 Baba Masatoshi 馬場正利 Der Reichsnährstand und seine Marktordnung, in: GAW (The Reich Food Estate and Market Control) 1939 Hukuda Kitou 福田喜東 Agrar und Siedlungspolitik, in: GAW (Agricultural and Emigration Policy) 1939 Kondo Yasuo 近藤康男 Reichserbhofgesetz (The Reich Hereditary Farm Law) 1933 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 農林省 Neuadel aus Blut und Boden (New Aristocracy from Blood and Soil) 1930 Kuroda Leiji 黒田禮二 Die deutsche Landwirtschaft (German Agriculture) 1939 Kunigo Shigeru/Shibukawa Sadaki 救仁郷茂／渋川貞樹 Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse [the first half] (Peasantry as the Life-Source of the German Race) 1929 Okada Souji 岡田宗司

Title

Table 8.1. Books and Articles on Nazi Agriculture translated into Japanese

1943, 9 1944,

1943, 2 1943, 4

1942, 4

1941, 7

1941, 1

1940, 2 1941

1939, 8

1939, 7

1939

1937

1935

1934,6

Translated year and month

Tatsushi Fujihara

227

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

similar to that of the Bauer.13 The Neuadel were to maintain ancestral holdings, and could not sell them. From Darré’s perspective, an agricultural manager who didn’t perform any physical labour was only a Landwirt (farmer); a Neuadel worked the land and thereby possessed it. The SFL was deeply rooted in Darré’s ideology, and Manchukuo became the laboratory for applying the combined ideologies of Japanese and German peasantism.

IV.

Darré in Japan: the acceptance of ‘Blood and Soil’

Darré’s main work, Neuadel aus Blut und Boden (New Aristocracy from Blood and Soil), was published in 1930 and appeared in Japanese in January of 1941 (Figure 8.3), some 10 months before the SFL was enacted. The translator, Okanoe Morimichi (岡上守道) was better known by his pseudonym Kuroda Leiji (黒田禮二), derived in homage to Kropotkin and Lenin. While studying at the Imperial University of Tokyo, Kuroda became a Marxist and was deeply involved in labour movements. After graduation, he travelled to Germany as a newspaper reporter with the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. During this time he contacted several Marxists in Germany, and the Comintern in Moscow,14 becoming the central figure among Japanese Marxists in Germany. However, Kuroda gradually became attracted to National Socialism as it gained power, and translated several Nazi writings into Japanese. One of them was Neuadel aus Blut und Boden. Past studies of fascism in Japan and Germany have hardly mentioned acceptance of Darré in Japanese thinking. The person who encouraged Kuroda to translate this book was Sakurazawa Yukikazu (桜澤如一), known in the West as ‘George Ohsawa’, founder of the macrobiotic diet. In 1929, Sakurazawa published a book on dietary cures in France,15 and was also known for insisting that healthy food and bodies would strengthen any nation. His key concept of Shindofuji (身土不二) means that the body (身) and soil (土) cannot be separated. Thus, a person can only develop a healthy body through healthy food produced from healthy soil. Because of his special interest in food and health from the perspective of the national economy and eugenics, Sakurazawa sympathized deeply with Darré’s ideas about blood and soil. Sakurazawa’s short essay, included in the

Historical records on the relationship between the SS and “Neuadel aus Blut und Boden” are found in Corni and Gies (1994: 80-81). 13

Further research is required in order to ascertain whom Okanoe contacted in Germany and Moscow.

14

He was on friendly terms with André Malraux.

15

228

Tatsushi Fujihara

Figure 8.3. New Aristocracy from Blood and Soil

Source: Richard Walther Darré, Chi to Tsushi (translated by Reiji Kuroda, Syunyōdō, 1941).

Japanese translation of Neuadel aus Blut und Boden, stated: ‘The National Socialists’ new theoretical weapon is Agricultural Minister Darré’s ‘Blood and Soil’, in conjunction with Shintoism (神ながらの道)’. He describes Darré’s ‘Blut und Boden’ as ‘German Shintoism’, which led to Darré being interviewed by Fujisawa Chikao (藤澤親 雄) on 21 July 1940. Fujisawa was a researcher of Shinto and journalist for the Kyōdo Tsushinsha (共同通信社). In the interview, Darré commented that the REG was established to hand down ancestral holdings, and that the National Socialist worldview was very similar to that of Shintoism. It seems Darré was also seeking to promote ancestor worship (Fujisawa, 1943: 78). Darré was well acquainted with Shintoism, and Sakurazawa even encountered his key idea of Shindofuji in Darré’s thinking. In another book he stated, ‘I respect Hitler for a different reason than others: he recognized himself as a leader in the health (life) of his people. I want to devote my life to such a great world leader, that is, to the happiness of humankind’ (Sakurazawa, 1941: 103-104). Such extreme acceptance of blood and soil was unusual; but it is safe to say that National Socialism was prevalent in Japan at that time. Many Japanese intellectuals tried to think about National Socialism in the context of Japanese culture, and the REG was one of the best examples. Although Sakurazawa did not exercise a direct 229

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

influence on the Settlement Policy, he played an important role in creating an intellectual environment favourable to the SFL in Japan.16 The rise of agrarian thought has frequently been regarded as pre-modern, and therefore evidence of the incomplete modernism of fascist countries. Havens, in his monograph on famous agrarian thinkers such as Katōat mon, Gondō Seikyō, and Tachibana Kōand Ta, stated that Japanese agrarianism was ‘too rustic an ideology for the industrializing age’ (Havens, 1974: 321). However, Young (1998) has pointed out that Japanese agrarianism arose and developed within modern society. Hence, rather than old-fashioned, agrarianism can be considered innovative to some extent. With Sakurazawa’s interest in Darré, a fairly ‘post-modern’ idea such as the macrobiotic diet flowed into Japanese agrarianism.

V.

The differences between the Settlement Farm Law and the Reichserbhofgesetz



The deep bond between farmer and land, exemplified in Shindofuji, was central to both the REG and the SFL, as both laws perceived farmland as an organic body. Alongside certain similarities, some differences were also evident between the SFL and the REG, which will now be examined. 1) Race. The REG excluded ‘Jews and coloured races’ from the law. In contrast, there was no clear mention of race in the SFL. However, Article 2 of the SFL stated that settlement farmers were to be ‘Japanese settlers’, which excluded Korean, Taiwanese, and other peoples from the SFL. Though racism was more subtle in the SFL than in the REG, it is clear that the SFL was also deeply rooted in racism. 2) Size. Article 2 of the REG stated that the size of an Erbhof’ (Hereditary Farm) could range from the amount of land needed to feed a family to a maximum of 125 ha. A later supplementary rule indicated a minimum size of about 7.5 ha. In contrast, the SFL only stated that the Ministry of Agriculture in Manchukuo would decide the size of a settlement farm. The SFL did not provide strict size requirements since each settlement condition was unique. However, the standard size was approximately 10 ha (Ōhata, 1942: 45). We shall return to this matter later. 3) Men and women. The order of heirs in the REG was as follows: 1. Sons and sons of sons. 2. The father. 3. Brothers and their sons. 4. Daughters and their sons. 16 I suppose that Sakurazawa’s Shindofuji concept gives us a clue to understanding the Nazi view of nature. See Brüggemeier, Cioc and Zeller (2005).

230

Tatsushi Fujihara

Obviously, in the REG, women were in a lower order of inheritance than men. The SFL followed Japanese civil law, so that men, the eldest child, and legitimate children had priority over women, younger children, and illegitimate children. Both the REG and the SFL embraced the patriarchal ideology of their regimes. Judging from this, the framework and aim of the SFL and the REG seem to have differed by little more than the size of each farm. The drafters of the SFL tried to outdo both the REG and the peasantism of Darré. It is not entirely clear who suggested using the REG as a reference in the drafting of the SFL. However, one can safely say that the REG was very popular among legal and agricultural experts at the time. For example, by June of 1934, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had already translated and published the REG into Japanese (Table 8.3). There is no doubt that the REG was the model for the SFL and that the drafters of the SFL were heavily influenced by the REG, as we shall see in the following quotations. Ono Takeo (小野武夫), an agricultural historian at Hōsei University and one of the drafters of the law (Ono, 1943: 234), stated that: The REG merely sought to maintain the life of the independent farmer or the landholding of pure Germans. In contrast, the essence of the SFL lies not only in the organic development of family, land estate, and village, but also in eternal village construction based on the spirit of the law. Its character is also different from the hereditary laws of Western countries, which only sought to safeguard private property. However, the SFL does not adopt the Soviet perspective, exemplified in the Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz, that denied private property. We may say that [the SFL] is a re-establishment of the pure Japanese social system. The statement that settlement farms should be established around a Shinto shrine (神社) especially embodies the character of a Japanese village.

The last sentence is no exaggeration. Article 48 required either the Settlement Corps or the Settlement Cooperative to secure land for the Shinto shrine and village common. Ono’s somewhat fanatic assertion seems to have a reactionary tendency; he suggests that the SFL would overcome both the modernity of Western countries and the communism of the Soviet Union. For Ono, even the REG was still quite Western and individualistic. Kawashima Takeyoshi (川島武宜), who at thirty-two years of age was the youngest drafter of the SFL, also insisted on its legal uniqueness. At that time he was an assistant professor of law at the Imperial University of Tokyo. In his paper entitled Outline of the SFL (Kawashima, 1942a), Kawashima asserts that any land estate was state-owned under the SFL.

231

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

Ownership under the SFL is certainly a type of ownership, but it contains none of the essential character of modern ownership. Can we call it ‘State ownership’ offering ‘right of use’ to the farmer, or simply ‘ownership’? What is the difference between the two? The only difference to be found is in the construction of the law. (Kawashima, 1942a: 14).

His interpretation was quite different from that of Ono. In another paper entitled The Settlement Family Characterized as a Legal Person (Kawashima, 1942b), which he finished writing the same day as the attack on Pearl Harbour, Kawashima explained that the SFL regarded the family farm as a ‘legal person’. Here, the idea of family departed entirely from that of the REG and that of civil law. ‘The idea of a “settlement family as a legal person’ is the rational legal-technical solution that allows the family to exist as a community in modern transactional society”’ (Kawashima, 1942b: 92). To sum up, Kawashima understood the core idea of the SFL to be collectivism based on familism, served by a ‘hyper-modern’ and technical legal construction. From Kawashima’s perspective, the most important Nazi concept, Volksgemeinschaft (the people’s community), was more clearly embodied in the SFL than in the REG. The SFL was a more radical law than the REG. Although Kawashima’s interpretation differs from that of Ono, especially regarding the communitarian and modern character of the SFL, it must be noted that the two agreed on the superiority of the SFL over the REG. In my opinion, this reflects the difference between Germany and Japan. Germany had a much smaller rural population than Japan (Table 8.2). Both the birth rate and death rate were higher in Japan than in Germany (Table 8.3). Thus, the rate of natural increase (A-B) in Japan was more than twice that of Germany. Furthermore, the percentage of small farms under 2 hectares was 1.5 times higher in Japan than in Germany, though it is important to consider the difference in productivity between a rice paddy and a wheat or rye field (Table 8.4). Overpopulation and poverty in Japanese rural areas drove the emigration policy, which is why the Japanese Empire demanded a more radical, forceful, and collective reform of rural development in Japan than did the Western countries, including Nazi Germany. However, Japan had few territorial resources and could not reform the land system by itself. Therefore, Japan needed ‘cooperation’ from its colonies. Manchukuo, as a Japanese puppet state, was the most important target of the reform. This created some inconsistencies in the SFL settlement policy ideal. Kawashima felt that one of the most frustrating inconsistencies was the divergence between collectivism and familism. Collectivism was influenced by the numerous innovative scholars and bureaucrats who were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Familism was based on the imperial system and Shintoism, venerated by many nationalists. The gap between the two made it possible to develop the ‘hyper-modern’ idea of regarding a family farm as a legal person.

232

Tatsushi Fujihara

Table 8.2. Working population ratios of agriculture, forestry and fishery (%) Country

Proportion

Japan

Year

49.6

Great Britain

1931

28.8

1933

France

35.7

USA

22.0

Germany

1930

6.7

1931 1930

Source: Statistisches Reichsamt (1938: 39-40).

Table 8.3. Birth and death rates (‰) Country Japan

Great Britain France

Germany USA

Birth rate (A)

Death rate (B)

15.3

12.3

31.6

16.3

15.0 19.0

14.8

Year

1935

3.0

1936

7.2

1936

15.3

-0.3

10.9

6.0

11.8

15.9

(A)-(B)

1936

1935

Source: Statistisches Reichsamt (1938: 19-20).

Table 8.4. The component ratio of farm size (%) Country

Small size

Japan

89.5 (under 2 ha)

Germany

59.4 (under 2 ha)

Great Britain USA

Middle size

8.9 (2-5 ha)

Large size

1921

4 (more than 20 ha)

1925

19.3 (under 2 ha)

46.3 (2-20 ha)

34.4 (more than 20 ha)

10.8 (under 8 ha)

46.2 (8-40 ha)

43 (more than 40 ha)

36.3 (2-20 ha)

Year

1.6 (more than 5 ha)

1923 1920

Sources: Statistisches Reichsamt (1932: 50); Woytinsky (1927: 102-103).

233

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

It may be worth noting that the rapid progress of Japanese plant breeding technology (especially rice) based on modern genetics in the first half of the twentieth century benefited small-scale farmers (Fujihara, 2010). Notwithstanding the symbolism of japonica rice for Shintoism, the Emperor, peasantism, and the Japanese Empire, japonica shortages at that time made it necessary to increase rice production for Japan and its colonies. Colonial governments in Taiwan and Korea also expected the livelihood of rice farmers to become more stable through increased incomes resulting from new productive varieties. Consequently, rice breeding technology was quite useful and important for the Japanese government. The Mantetsu experimental agricultural station developed some high-quality varieties that were resistant to cold and more sensitive to chemical fertilizers. The speed and singularity of the rural reform process was one of the main reasons why the technology-driven peasantism of the Japanese Empire succeeded in mobilizing farmers in support of a fascist regime.

VI.

Conclusion

Though modelled after the REG, the SFL was designed to develop the agriculture of Manchukuo and relieve the poverty of Japanese villages after the Great Depression. Both laws prohibited the purchase and sale of landholdings and guaranteed a single heir for each farmstead. The assimilation of Darré’s ideology by some Japanese intellectuals was foundational to the SFL. In particular, Sakurazawa Yukikazu, founder of the macrobiotic diet, sympathized with Darré’s ‘Blood and Soil’ approach as it related to Shintoism (ancestor worship) as well as Shindofuji (healthy soil as indispensable for a healthy body). On several points, however, the SFL was more radical than the REG. Kawashima believed this to be the case because the SFL regarded a settlement family farm as a ‘legal person’ and tried to connect the conventional family community to market mechanisms. I consider the SFL’s comparatively radical approach to be in large measure due to Japan’s need for more rapid and radical social change than any European country of the time. However, such legal experimentation could only be implemented after tremendous sacrifice by local peasants and landlords in Manchuria. I will conclude with two points regarding 1) continuity and change in these regimes and 2) conflicts with practical needs. 1) If we consider how the continuity of peasantism was reflected in the SFL before, during, and after World War II, we may note that after the war Kawashima Takeyoshi became an active and renowned legal expert. In his books, The Family System as Ideology (Kawashima, 1957), The Legal Mind of the Japanese (Kawashima, 1967), and others, he insisted that familism was a hotbed of fascism, and the basis of imperial system. Before the war Kawashima had also criticized primogeniture 234

Tatsushi Fujihara

in civil law, and in 1947 he evaluated the civil regulation of descent and land inheritance. His supporters provided a great deal of data on the process of inheriting family farms around Japan for the 1965 edited volume of The Inheritance of Family Farms and Farmland. On these grounds, Kawashima insisted that the new civil law should introduce very little partitioning of farmland in Japan (Kawashima, 1965). Kawashima’s approach is similar to that of a Sonderweg (special way) historian in Germany. If so, did his attitude towards the idea of ‘family’ completely change after World War II? Not at all: we should recognize the continuity of Kawashima’s views before, during, and after the war. Both his idea of the family as a ‘legal person’ before the war and his evaluation of the democratization of the family system after the war indicate a kind of modernization of the old Japanese family system. In spite of his strong loathing for fascism, he unconsciously adopted the legacy of fascism’s rapid modernization. At that historic moment, Japan needed rapid and radical modernization to become a democratic country. However, it is debatable whether the method applied succeeded in fostering and promoting democracy in Japan. 2) In this respect, we may note that without labourers it was quite impossible to manage ten hectares, the standard government-established size for a settlement farm in Manchukuo. Thus, settlement farmers had to pay sizable labour wages to Korean and Chinese peasants, a situation that did not correspond to SFL ideals. Only after the settlement farmers were introduced to the new agricultural method of a horse with a plough and harrow in 1941 did things take a turn for the better. It was called the ‘Hokkaidō method (北海道農法)’ because it had already been used to some extent on that island. However, the four year period from the introduction of this method to the end of the war was too short for the new scheme to achieve notable results. The Japanese government also considered establishing a hereditary law in Japan similar to that of the REG, but no such law was ever legislated because most Japanese villages were already influenced by market mechanisms and had long regarded land as a saleable good. Generally speaking, it was easier to attempt a new and risky policy in the colonies than in the homeland, so in this sense Manchukuo was an experiment carried out by the Japanese Empire. Louise Young criticized ‘the idea that the excesses of the wartime empire were the product of an incomplete modernization’ and stated that ‘Manchukuo remained a product of modern times’ (Young, 1998: 435-436). While I support her statement, I also encounter a criticism of Western modernity in the Manchukuo policies. As far as the SFL was concerned, it seems reasonable to suggest that certain actions aimed at overcoming modernity in Manchukuo inadvertently added some features of a post-modern State.

235

Erbhofgesetz in Manchukuo

Bibliography Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef, Cioc, Mark and Zeller Thomas (eds.) (2005), How green were the Nazis?: nature, environment, and nation in the Third Reich, Athens, Ohio University Press.

Corni, Gustavo and Gies, Horst (1997), Brot, Butter, Kanonen. Die Ernährungswirtschaft in Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.

Darré, Richard Walther (1930), Neuadel aus Blut und Boden, München, J. F. Lehmann Verlag.

Fujihara, Tatsushi (2010), ‘Japanese Rice Varieties in Colonial Korea: from the View of Nagai Isaburo’, The Social Sciences, 40/30, p. 81-93. Fujisawa, Chikao (1943), Senjika no Nazis Doitsu, Tokyo, Arusu, 1943.

Fuke, Takahiro (2010), Senjiki nihon no shakai shisō: ‘Cho kokka’ heno frontier, Kyoto, Jimbun Shoin.

Havens, Thomas R. H. (1974), Farm and nation in modern Japan: agrarian nationalism, 1870-1940, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Ide, Magoroku (1986), Owarinaki tabi: ‘Chūgoku zanryūkoji’ no rekishi to genzai, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.

Iwasaki, Masaya (1997), Nōhonsisō no shakaishi: Seikatsu to Kokutai no Kōsaku, Kyoto, Kyotodaigaku Gakujutsu Shuppankai,.

Kawashima, Takeyoshi (1942a), ‘Manshū kaitaku nōjō hō gaisetsu’, Hōritsu Jihō, 40/1 (1942a), p. 2-16.

Kawashima, Takeyoshi (1942b), ‘Kaitaku nōka no hōin sei’, in Hōsō Zasshi, 9/1, p. 73-93.

Kawashima, Takeyoshi (1957), Ideology to shiteno Kazokuseido, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten. Kawashima, Takeyoshi (1965), Nōkasōzoku to nōchi, Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. Kawashima, Takeyoshi (1967), Nihonjin no Hōishiki, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.

Kobayashi, Kōji (1977), Manshū imin no mura: Shinshū Yasuoka mura no Shōwa shi, Tokyo, Chikumashobō.

Mori, Takemaro (1999), Senji nihon nōson shakai no kenkyū, Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai.

Mori, Takemaro (2003), ‘Colonies and countryside in wartime Japan’, in Ann Waswo and Nishida Yoshiaki (eds.) (2003), Farmers and village life in twentieth-century Japan, London, Routledge, p. 175-198.

236

Tatsushi Fujihara

Münkel, Daniela (1996), Nationalsozialistische Agrarpolitik und Bauernalltag, Frankfurt am Main and New York, Campus Verlag.

Ōhata, Shōkichi (1942), Kaitakunoujouhou no Kaisetsu, Tokyo, Asashi Shimbun sha. Ono, Takeo (1943), Minzoku Nōseigaku, Tokyo, Asakurashoten.

Sakurazawa, Yukikazu (1941), Kenkōsensen no dai’issen ni tachite, Kyoto, Musōgenrikō-kyūsho. Shin’ya, Tsukui (1972), ‘Aa “muga Shijun”’, Henkyō 9, November, p. 223-234

Shiratori, Michihiro (2008), Manmō kaitaku seishōnen giyūgunshi kenkyū, Sapporo, Daigaku Shuppankai. Smith, Kerry (2003), ‘Building the model village: rural revitalization and the Great Depression’, in Ann Waswo and Nishida Yoshiaki (eds.) (2003), Farmers and village life in twentieth-century Japan, London, Routledge, p. 126-155.

Statistisches Reichsamt (1932, 1938), Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, Berlin.

Yamamoto, Yuzo (2003), ‘Manshūkoku’ keizaishi kenkyū, Nagoya, Nagoya daigaku shuppan-kai.

Yamamuro, Shin’ichi (2006), Manchuria under Japanese Dominion, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.

Young, Louise (1998), Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press. Wada, Tsutō (1939), Ōhinatamura, Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun sha.

Waswo, Ann and Yoshiaki, Nishida (eds.) (2003), Farmers and village life in twentieth-century Japan, London, Routledge.

Wilson, Sandra (2003), ‘Securing prosperity and serving the nation: Japanese farmers and Manchuria, 1931-33’, in Ann Waswo and Nishida Yoshiaki (eds.) (2003), Farmers and village life in twentieth-century Japan, London, Routledge, p. 156-174. Woytinsky, Wladmir (1927), Die Welt in Zahlen, Berlin, Rudolf Mosse.

237

9.

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism? Édouard Lynch

I.

Introduction

The story of the Vichy regime is rife with conflict from its inception. Since the 1970s, with the decline of the resistancialist, Gaullist-communist myth and greater attention to collaboration, along with research on the fascist temptations and leanings of the Vichy regime, most of the political debate and partisan disputes have focused on issues of race and the regime’s responsibility in the ‘final solution’ (Rousso, 1987). Historians, especially those studying contemporary political history, were not exempt from these tensions and have been considered as suspect of having given insufficient emphasis to the French version of fascism. This was first evident in how the work of Zeev Sternhell was received in the 1980s. The polemic was renewed in the 1990s by political scientists who began to refer to France’s ‘allergy to fascism’. Also under suspicion were French historians specializing in twentieth-century political history, most of whom came from the Fondation des Sciences Politiques. In their view, though the Vichy regime clearly leaned towards counter-revolution, the ‘republican model’ had been strong enough to preserve France from fascist contagion, which had remained confined to a small, inconsequential group in the 1930s (Berstein, 1984). Although they do admit that neither the Republic nor Vichy resulted in a genuinely fascist regime, opponents of the allergy thesis insist that conditions similar to those observed throughout Europe were also present in France (Dobry, 1989, 2003). They argue that the Vichy regime did implement policies comparable to those of the authoritarian regimes of the Iberian peninsula and central Europe. The argument for the ‘particular circumstances’ deriving from the German occupation of French territory and any subsequent constraints related to German pressures and civil war plays in favour of both theories. To the proponents of the immunity theory, it explains why the Vichy regime, which was alien to the national political culture, leaned towards fascism. To the others, however, these circumstances were instrumental in precluding a system with foundations that were well extended throughout French society. In the 1980s, these opposing academic factions joined forces in France and abroad to bring about a thorough renewal of research on the Vichy regime, focusing on its 239

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

race policy as well as its cultural and economic collaborationism. More recently, research on the role of the State and the attitude of the public administration has also undergone deep transformation (Baruch, 1997). However, agriculture is mostly absent in this rich renaissance of historiographic production. With the exception of Isabelle Boussard’s thesis on the Peasant Corporation (1980), the role of rural society and agriculture has received little attention, while Michel Cépède’s very rich 1961 study of the economy sprang from the author’s commitment to the Liberation and his role in it. Structurally, the study of French rural society in the twentieth century was still in its infancy. Agriculture as a topic was probably not salient among historiographers of that period; any related research was dedicated exclusively to the agricultural aspects of the black market in relation to the supply of foodstuffs (Sanders, 2001; Grenard, 2008). Significantly, even recent works on trade unionism (Margairaz and Tartakowsky, 2008) and organization committees in occupied France (Joly, 2004) hardly touch upon the issue of agriculture. In the 1990s, a few studies of public opinion and especially of the development and organization of the Resistance helped lift the veil regarding the attitudes of the rural population. Beyond what is at stake ideologically in national disputes, the debate in this area should be considered within the more general context and definition of European fascism. In an attempt to respond not from a theoretical model but from a more restricted and targeted approach that focuses on the agricultural dimension, it is certainly worthwhile to question the pertinence of including France in a work dedicated to the relationship between fascism, modernity and agriculture. Our purpose is not to create a compendium on agriculture under the Vichy regime. Rather, we will use real examples to explore the hypothesis of French agrarian fascism from the perspective of its ideology and its agricultural and modernization agenda. In the absence of any active fascist party or dynamic within the French State, even after Laval returned to power in 1942, Vichy can undoubtedly be placed in close proximity to other authoritarian and conservative regimes. However, the regime was permanently confronted with the alternatives offered by an active fascist model and tension between archaism and modernity. Traditional State elites with markedly counter-revolutionary projects existed alongside individuals that favoured ‘modernity’. Though short, the German presence was not without influence and many common themes found in this book can be identified in the Vichy regime: the establishment of an agrarian discourse, dealing with social tensions, and the predominance of State­triggered reflections and realizations before and during the war. The issue of whether the regime was proto-fascist or revolutionary in nature is juxtaposed to the issue of modernity, which is at the heart of the tensions and

240

Édouard Lynch

contradictions characteristic of all fascist regimes. A comparison of ‘modernization’ policies implemented by liberal democracies is stimulating, particularly in relation to a second stage of the French agricultural evolution , which took place after World War II. In its own particular way, the Vichy agricultural policy reflects the founding tensions between ‘Vichy’s republican origins’ (Noiriel, 1997) and an impossible modernizing rupture.

II.

Constraints and their influence

II.1.

A short-lived regime

For the sake of comparative analysis, it is helpful to recall the peculiarities of the French State in the landscape of all that is proper to fascism (Burin, 1985). Despite the various tensions of the 1930s, the republican regime remained stable, resisting unprecedented social strain and the changes embodied in the advent of the Front Populaire (Popular Front). During that period, the various fascist-inspired movements and leagues proved to be a relatively limited threat. Even the most virulent, such as the Croix de Feu, morphed into the French Social Party in 1936 and did not fall into open opposition to the regime. While the rural masses were instrumental in sustaining fascist and Nazi parties in Italy and Germany, the trouble created by the disciples of Dorgères only marginally impacted the French rural world, where the authority and legitimacy of the republican State remained undisputed (Paxton, 1996). The shock of military defeat and the moral collapse related to the exodus are key to understanding why the Republic was abandoned by its representatives in Vichy. In 1940 they granted full constitutional powers to Marshal Pétain, a World War I hero who had been regarded as a republican officer during the 1930s. This marked the beginning of the French State, an authoritarian regime in which Marshal Pétain wielded both legislative and executive powers until the French territory was liberated in June 1944. The short, four-year experience was influenced by partial territorial and military occupation that became total after 11 November 1942. In spite of Marshal Pétain’s insistence that he was fully in command and carrying out a proactive policy of collaboration with Germany, the situation precluded the implementation of a genuinely independent policy. In addition to the German occupation, the government and society at large began to experience ever more serious fractures in 1942-43. However, unlike most countries where an authoritarian or totalitarian regime acceded to power, the Vichy regime had a limited period of time and uncertain circumstances in which to implement its ‘national revolution’When Pierre Laval returned to power in April 1942, collabora241

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

tion intensified and increasingly affected the French population. Implementation of the Compulsory Work Service in particular served to enlarge the ranks of resistance as the regime’s political basis continued to diminish in size..

II.2.

Heterogeneity

In contrast with Italy or Germany, the Vichy regime lacked ideological homogeneity: no structured party came to power around a group of men and a particular doctrine. Even though he maintained close ties with political circles, Marshal Pétain did not enjoy the support of any large organization or rely on a genuinely agrarian doctrine. On the traditionalist side, Charles Maurras’s Action Française never really got involved in the agrarian question beyond its support of traditional agrarianism and defence of corporatism as propounded by the conservative leaders of the Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes (the National Federation of Independent Unions). The refusal of Colonel de la Roque, the leader of the French Social Party, to acknowledge military defeat deprived the State of any powerful or well-structured organization. ‘Pre-fascist’ movements, such as Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français (French Popular Party) and Déat’s Rassemblement National Populaire (National Popular Rally), were kept away from any Vichy circles that had actual decision-making power. Most importantly, however, the leaders of such groups came from workers’ parties, thus maintaining virtually no forms of communication with the rural world.1 This heterogeneity sheds light on the choices made by those who would shape the regime’s new agrarian policy. Pierre Caziot was appointed Minister of Agriculture in August 1940. Far from being a fascist-like ideologue, he represented continuity with the republican regime, more than rupture. A graduate of the National Institute of Agriculture, Caziot was an engineer, a land owner, and an expert on rural estate issues whose involvement in political circles was only marginal. When he first became a cabinet member for Victor Boret, Clemenceau’s Minister of Agriculture, he promoted rural ‘restoration’ in an effort to stabilize and revitalize rural farms after World War I. Caziot represented a republican agrarianism in favour of ambitious agricultural policies, fostered by the State but respectful of land owners’ prerogatives (Barral, 1968). His approach provides a striking contrast with the other ‘great’ Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Le Roy Ladurie, a former leader of UNSA. Le Roy Ladurie incarnated both the dynamism and the contradictions of rural unionism in the interwar period (Le Roy Ladurie, 1997). He was both an ‘archetypal notable’ (Paxton, 1997) and embodied a somewhat fanciful ‘synarchy’ (Dard, 1998). 1 Such as the French Communist Party in Doriot’s case, and the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière in Déat’s.

242

Édouard Lynch

II.3.

Constraints

Though Vichy consistently claimed to have independent control of the entire territory, regime policies and agricultural policy in particular were to some degree hampered by the German presence. The Germans tapped into the country’s financial and natural resources extensively under a policy that amounted to plunder (Umbreit, 2000). When the Americans occupied North Africa, the Germans invaded the South, and the French regime was unable to draw on the resources of its empire. France was also affected by the German colonisation policy that annexed certain eastern zones to the Reich and handed vast rural properties over to German ‘colonists’, most of whom came from Central Europe. This involved more than properties abandoned by owners who had fled or been taken as prisoners. As early as November 1940, land seizures extended to properties not run ‘according to German methods’ (Cépède, 1961: 184). The Vichy authorities were hard pressed to implement any kind of agrarian reform under those circumstances. It became extremely difficult to enforce any economic or agricultural policy due to the scarcity of horses, petrol, and farm workers (some 600,000 of the more than 1 million prisoners of war were agriculturists). Indeed, under such conditions any autonomous policy was difficult to implement, whether organizing production or estate restructuring, regardless of all the propaganda to the contrary. When relations with the French Empire were disrupted and then completely severed, in particular with North Africa, the entire agricultural economy of the country suffered. Rural leaders were compelled to dedicate all of their efforts to promoting production with very limited means and relied on requisitions in an attempt to allocate food supplies towards urban areas. Another consequence of this constraint was observed in the evolution of the regime, in particular at the turning point of 1942. After Le Roy Ladurie left his post, the issue of supplies became the government’s main preoccupation, alongside German requests for an increase in food supplies. The Germans intended to turn France into a wheat supplier and reduce its industrial capacity to a bare minimum, which explains the lack of tension with conflicting industrial priorities. Yet some tensions did arise, triggered by Germany. From 1943 onwards, collaboration was intensified in the industrial sector, to the detriment of other sectors deemed ‘secondary’, such as agriculture or small industrial enterprises. This policy meant readily tapping into the rural world for workers, which further reduced agricultural production capacities. Policy implementation was in the hands of new collaborationist teams, who considered peasants to be an egoistic population obsessed by their own enrichment. Such an attitude led to a harsh requisition policy that was denounced by the leaders of agricultural corporations. Adolphe Pointier, the leader of the Agricultural Corporation, voiced the corporation’s critiques

243

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

to the government, claiming that the new price and workforce policies negatively impacted agricultural production. Before and after Vichy, agricultural representatives remained constant in their claim that the interests of agriculture were being sacrificed to those of industry: In the interest of the public, both the occupation authorities and the French government are fighting against the increase in the prices of foodstuffs, aiming at maintaining the purchasing power of industrial workers and protecting the value of the currency. Typically, a policy of price control is more favourable to industry than to agriculture, and this trend is amplified by the solicitude shown by occupation troops towards industry and the workers who contribute to supplying the military.2

This is at the heart of the debate on the nature of the Vichy regime, which did not intend to offer mere administrative management of the territory, as was the case in some other countries. It sought a genuine ‘national revolution’ that would bring about deep societal and economic transformation. Prerequisite to such a strategy was a policy of collaboration with Germany and the assumption that the Germans would soon win the war; which would pave the way for thorough political and economic reorganization of the entire continent.

III.

Elements of continuity and rupture: return to the land, corporatism, and State control

III.1. A limited agricultural policy The new government manifest its activism in relation to agrarian policy in three main directions: first, it sought to consolidate farms, a project in which Minister Caziot was particularly involved. Among other things, he promoted measures to restrict the division of land among successors according to the framework on inheritance laws, violating the principle of equality among successors found in the Civil Code. A second important initiative involved two pieces of legislation from July 1942 and September 1943 that created a specific status for farmers and stipulated better conditions for those who improved or transformed the land. However, the value of such benefits was kept relatively quiet, revealing how reticent the government was to weaken owner prerogatives. Such texts were promoted by the rural corporations but were nowhere near the standards set forth in the 1936 socialist proposals regarding the status of farmers, which were adopted after the war (Boussard, 2003). Although Archives Nationales, F 10 5108, Note to the president of the council on the policy on agricultural prices, 17 May 1944. 2

244

Édouard Lynch

such measures were a real step forward in providing a framework to govern farmerlandlord relations, in no way did they constitute a break with pre-war policies. Structurally, they provide a good illustration of the Vichy agricultural policy of trying to stabilize farming without altering it in any way. In the words of Gordon Wright: ‘The changes that were implemented were both fragmentary and superficial. They purported less to change France’s traditional agrarian system than to keep it safe from the attacks of time’ (Wright, 1964: 140). The law on the return to land, a seminal regulation enacted by the Vichy regime, was a complete failure. It constituted part of a dynamic driven by the need to attract labourers back to the land, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of so many agricultural workers having been made prisoners and the difficulties related to the scarcity of agricultural equipment. For instance, a law of 10 March 1941 made it compulsory for men from seventeen to twenty-one years of age to participate in a ‘rural social duty’ scheme. Similar regulations sought to curtail the labour drain from agriculture to other sectors. Efforts were made to promote the recruiting of agricultural workers through cooperative workforce bureaux (law of 16 December 1942). In addition to supplying tangible workforce needs, this initiative made it possible to celebrate the ‘return of urban youth to the land’ and to extoll the moral virtues attached to it. The same dynamics were embodied in a law enacted on 13 March 1941 that provided subsidies for farmers to return to the land. It was intended for heads of families currently working in the industrial sector who would commit to a minimum of five years of residence in a rural commune. The aim was clearly to invert the rural exodus trend that had been acknowledged since the end of the nineteenth century (Méline, 1905) and address the poor treatment of rural workers compared to city workers, who enjoyed many social and financial benefits. This mechanism was unsuccessful: one third of the 1,561 beneficiaries had to renounce the subsidy, another third remained in precarious conditions, and 500 were successful. Given the scarcity of foodstuffs and urban unemployment, the low rate of responses illustrates the profound discrepancy between propaganda on return to the land and a social reality that was thoroughly disconnected. Two longer-term measures enacted by the Vichy government deserve mention. The first was that of 9 March 1941, which made it possible to implement a ‘reorganization of agricultural estates’ on the initiative of either farmers or the State, based on a simple majority rather than the two-thirds majority required in the previous piece of legislation. Initiatives were also carried out to reclaim ‘under-exploited’ areas, such as Sologne (27 June 1941) or the lower Rhône valley (31 January 1941), granting the administration greater leeway to impose extensive modifications (Pearson, 2008). However, these laws experienced only a rudimentary level of implementation due to 245

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

the difficult circumstances and distance between the regime’s ideological goals and the practical implications of carrying them out (Giandou, 2000). Above all, these measures remained marginal because in the leaders’ minds land ownership was indisputable: the defence of private property prevailed over modernization. Though they were a token of genuine willingness to reform, and their enactment was facilitated by the fact that they were not required to undergo any formal parliamentary approval process, such laws were a mere segue to policies initiated earlier by the Republic.

III.2. The corporatist experience The enactment of the law of 2 December 1940 on the Peasant Corporation corresponded to a more solid ideological project that went beyond the mere management of a country mired in defeat and questions about its food supply. This new organization claimed to provide fresh bases for the economic and social system, denying the existence of internal conflicts in order to project a unitary and pacifying vision. Debates over the issue of corporatism had gained strength in the 1930s when they were perceived as a global response to the economic and political crisis, based on a twofold criticism of liberalism and State initiative (Chatriot, 2011). Despite national references mainly voiced by La Tour du Pin at the close of the nineteenth century, the progress of the corporatist ideal indisputably thrived on contemporary experiments in several European countries and the growing tendency toward abandonment of the liberal model. Louis Salleron, the main theoretician of agricultural corporatism, noted in a 1934 article describing the Italian model, with its predominant role of the State, that: ‘the Italian corporatism has clearly defined features. It is the economic arm of a totalitarian State’. He considered the corporatist dimension of the Portuguese Constitution of 19 March 1933 to be less clearly State driven because it enhanced intermediary entities such as the family (Salleron, 1934). The growing impact of market organization and the transposition to agriculture of significant social measures previously implemented by the Popular Front convinced professional organizations, principally the National Agricultural Union, of the pressing need to establish a corporatist structure. This was debated at the congress of Caen in 1937, where the main point of inflexion consisted of greater acknowledgment of the leadership role of the State, which included applying the rules defined by the corporation. This accelerated after Marshal Pétain took office in 1940, placing land and agriculture at the heart of the new political and social construct (Saleron and others, 1941). However, tensions persisted between the autonomy aspirations voiced by the leaders of UNSA, and the Caziot administration, which took care to maintain some margin for the State to manoeuvre (Boussard, 1980: 54).

246

Édouard Lynch

Setting up and managing the Peasant Corporation revealed the pivotal role of the State and the autonomy of the various commune and canton unions. The legislation was a compromise between the aspirations of professional organizations to define structures and the State’s interest in playing a greater role than that of a mere comptroller. The corporatist press presented this as a victory of its principles: The assembly of local trade unions will create a regional union. The regional leaders will be proposed by the local trade unions and appointed by the national corporatist council. The members of that council will in turn be appointed by the Minister. How will the local trade union members be designated? They will be elected by agriculturists federated in a commune and their appointment will be ratified by the regional union.3

At the local level, the process of nomination was consistent with union practices, especially since the war prisoners were absent, creating confusion in all existing structures (Atrux and Baptiste, 2011). The most severe tensions occurred at the level of departments and regions because the process of unification imposed by the Ministry of Agriculture was not universally accepted. Some appointments made by the Ministry of Agriculture increased conflicts, and new tensions arose with Pierre Laval’s accession to power. By 1942 the corporatist experiment was exhibiting its practical and theoretical limits. On the practical side, requisitions and administrative constraints quickly made it a very unpopular tool in the eyes of agricultural producers. In the theoretical sphere, greater intervention by the authorities revived tensions against the State, whose interests and use of intervention as a key lever in the food supply policy were deemed to be opposed to those of the profession. This touches upon a fundamental weakness of the Vichy regime and its ‘fascist’ nature: there was no State single-party that could convey a progressively elaborated doctrine relayed by cadres and adherents, who would carry out projects in close collaboration with the State. The French State lacked this trait and Marshal Pétain objected to such an organization, which generated risks of tension and rivalry with some of the more structured organizations. This was particularly the case with the Peasant Corporation, given that the State consistently objected to starting from zero. Adolphe Pointier complained about this situation in a letter to Paul Cathala, Minister of Agriculture and Supply: Dissolution of former groups – You have not responded on this point to the question raised during the National Council. It seems to me that you are reluctant to revisit the text as enacted [and] you are wrong. This is a trite author’s trick and makes a disastrous ‘La Charte de la paysannerie Française’, Syndicats paysans, 19 December 1941 (quoted by Bous1980: 48).

3

sard,

247

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

impression upon rural masses, in particular regional leaders. Why don’t you simply pass a law saying in a few words: with the creation of the corporation now complete, all agricultural organs in existence as of 1940 and created thereafter dealing with the defence and organization of agriculture are dissolved? Those willing to create a new one should file an application with the Minister of Agriculture after having obtained a licence from the Peasant Corporation, which has enjoyed exclusivity of representation of the profession since the law of 2 December. In this way the problem is solved and neither injustice nor jealousy may arise again.4

III.3. The Office of Wheat and the ambivalence of State intervention The difficulty that the French State faced in imposing a new agricultural policy was also evident in the way markets were organized, the wheat market in particular. The Office National Interprofessionel du Blé (National Interprofessional Office of Wheat) was created in August 1936 by the new majority government of the Popular Front. Its goal was to regulate the wheat market, which suffered from structural overproduction and an unprecedented price collapse. This socialist project was bitterly debated, and faced harsh opposition from traditionalist agricultural organizations. They resented both the State intervention it represented and the presence of industrial workers’ representatives in its council (Lynch, 2002). Its promoters insisted that wheat prices be determined by consensus, with the State acting as referee. In spite of such agitated beginnings, the Office found its place in the political and administrative landscape, with a management that adapted both to market changes and agricultural organizations, which had a right to participate in matters relating to prices. Far from being a State control mechanism, the Office appears rather to have been a first attempt at a kind of collective management between the profession and public authorities. Prior to 1940, its competencies were limited to issues related to pricing and import controls. With the onset of war and the ensuing economy of penury, the scope of the Wheat Office was enlarged and its operating mechanisms were thoroughly transformed. It became a primary government tool for forecasting and managing the production and distribution of wheat and cereal in general. The reform implemented by the new regime in November 1940 transformed it into the Office National Interprofessionel des Céréals (ONIC, or National Interprofessional Office of Cereals), an agency of the Ministry of Supply. However, its operating mechanisms reflected a new form of organization: the central council and the board were dissolved and replaced by a government-appointed management council. As in the case of the corporation, the AN, F 10 5108, Letter from Adolphe Ponthier to Pierre Cathala, 24 May 1944.

4

248

Édouard Lynch

new regime appeared as a ‘divine surprise’ to the representatives of the profession. In the original organization of the central council of the Office, 29 of its 52 members represented wheat producers and included consumer and ministry representatives. The management council installed on 17 November 1940 was comprised exclusively of members of the profession: six representatives from agriculture, two from trade, two from the flour milling business, and one representing bakers. These members and the Office President were appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. In the new team the main associations of producers enjoyed a strong presence, which included the appointment of Pierre Hallé as president. He was Secretary General of the powerful Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé and had played an active part in promoting the activities of Dorgères. In addition to extending the Office’s range of action to include all cereals used in the production of bread, the text of 17 November 1940 extended its power to the implementation of a food supply policy: ‘to ensure the assessment of available resources, meet demand, maintain the supply by producers and stocking agents, the use of wheat stocks and work in the windmills, the allocation of resources among regions, and a regular supply to the various users of wheat, flour, secondary cereals, and derived products’. More importantly, the Office became the engine for agricultural policy in a broader sense: ‘orienting the production of cereals according to quantitative and qualitative needs in the national market and in possible international transactions’.5 The extent of the mission and potential political outcomes related to the supply of foodstuffs explain why the Office workforce skyrocketed from 830 agents in 1939 to 4000 in 1944 (Cepède, 1961: 111). Since central council appointments by the Office President were no longer based on ‘consultation’ with the unions, the Office completely lost its inter-professional dimension and was absorbed into the Ministry of Supply. A series of events similar to those of the Peasant Corporation led to a crisis after 1942, when Pierre Hallé tendered his resignation and the producer representatives refused to attend working sessions. Hallé was immediately replaced by the director of the Wheat Office, who acted in an interim capacity, indicating the primacy of the concept of placing the State and the Administration at the helm of the Office. When various regional relays were implemented, the positions were all filled by technocrats, to the detriment of agricultural representatives, who had become more and more reluctant to get involved in the responsibilities of a regime that was declining in popularity. This was evident in the poor participation of producers at intermediary levels. Law of 17 Novembre 1940 on the organization of the Office National Interprofessionnel des Céréales, Journal Officiel, 19 Novembre 1940, p. 5714.

5

249

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

In the end, the role of the Office became ambivalent, as did the corporatist experiment. Despite the weight of circumstances resulting from occupation, the tensions between the ‘natural’ supporters of the regime embodied in the large conservative organizations, and the implementation of an authoritarian and centralised policy that sought to control the market, the authoritarian and technocratic approach prevailed, with experts acting as guardians of the public good. The Office continued its activity after the war ended, alleging a need to ensure supply (Kaplan, 2008). This seemed a natural move for the new Minister of Agriculture, Tanguy-Prigent, who had set out to revive and promote the ideals of the Popular Front. Though the process eventually acquired more democratic procedures, some temporary appointments to the new council were indeed a settling of scores from leftist rural currents that had been marginalised under the Vichy regime. However, the role of the Office as a tool for regulating market scarcity was maintained. To conclude, Vichy agricultural policy came nowhere near meeting the criteria of genuinely fascist agrarianism. In addition to the constraints related to its short existence and German occupation, the reforms that were implemented were more markedly in line with previous Republican policies and do not constitute a real rupture with the past. This is glaringly obvious in the failure of the Peasant Corporation and in the way traditional elites shied away from the policy.

IV.

Modernization suspended

IV.1.

Agrarian ideology: more tradition than modernity

Vichy agrarianism is worth studying in light of the six components of an agrarian variety of fascism. The primacy of references to the land and rural society were ideological pillars of the regime. They were present in the propaganda surrounding the ‘peasant marshal’ and in the very first discourses made by the Head of State, exalting ‘the land, who does not lie’. The Vichy version of agrarianism was by no means a rupture with the past; rather it was heir to an old and rich tradition that associated Catholic, traditionalist, counterrevolutionary, and republican forms of agrarianism. This had been well established since the inception of the Third Republic (Bleton and Ruget, 2007; Gaboriaux, 2010) and was strengthened at end of World War I (Lynch, 2007). All their constituencies had been hammering away at the primacy of the agricultural sector since the beginning of the Third Republic. An example is found in the words of Guébriant, leader of the Peasant Corporation:

250

Édouard Lynch

There are traditions that a people cannot possibly shed without running the risk of growing dangerously weak. France used to be essentially a rural nation and today feels the pain of having yielded for the past hundred years or so to excessive industrialization; under pressure of the liberal doctrines, it sacrificed agriculture to manufacturing, peasants to citydwellers. […] The national revolution, with Marshal Pétain at the helm, has understood this well and is undertaking to re-build the nation. It aims at restoring agriculture on a sound basis, giving it back the status it should never have lost in France among the other branches of the national economy, i.e., primacy.6

In addition to public statements, agrarianism was also embodied in the cultural policy of the regime, which emphasized the protection and renaissance of a civilization of peasants. This was expressed in the revival of traditional rural celebrations such as the fête de la saint jean or fêtes des vendanges, in which various youth movements promoted by the regime played a key role (Dalisson, 2008). This policy was accompanied by boosting regional folklore, languages, and architecture, all part of a rehabilitation movement initiated as far back as the Republic. Its culminating moment was the international exhibition in 1937; yet as a policy it focussed more on ‘renovation’ than ‘revolution’ (Faure, 1989). Although these elements can also be found in the Italian and German regimes, Vichy exhibited a marked difference in its relations to the city and industry. Contrary to fascism and Nazism, which were to a certain extent bolstered by urban and workers’ movements, the Vichy regime built much of its identity in opposition to the city, criticizing its decadence as well as its political and moral degeneration. The interwar episode of the Popular Front, the strikes of the summer of 1936, and the communist-socialist accession to power are at the centre of the construction of the ‘anti-France’. The regime exhibited its misgivings in its propaganda extolling the figure of the artisan and the traditions of the compagnons rather than the prodigies of the country’s heavy industry. The mainstays of the system, the more modernist components of Vichy such as Jacques Doriot’s PPF and Marcel Déat’s RNP, kept their distance from the regime and its national revolution, which they deemed to be counter-revolutionary and moderate. Prior to reaching power in 1943, they represented opposition between an industrialised capital peopled with factory workers, and a provincial Vichy sustained by the rural masses. In fact, growing criticism of the peasants, who were accused of being responsible for the urban food crisis and of fuelling the black market, first appeared among Parisian collaborationist organisms as early as 1942 (Lynch, 2011). Lastly, it should be noted that a constant association of rural France with eternal France was implicitly fostered by Germany, Guébriant, Budes de (1941), ‘La corporation paysanne’, L’Illustration, 26 July.

6

251

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

which intended to restrict the country’s role to that of food production. Regime advocates were happy to embrace this view of the country, as it was fully aligned with their policy of collaboration, which was initiated as early as autumn of 1940. They stated: ‘Europe cannot be made without French agriculture. Outside of Europe, French agriculture can neither live nor prosper. Europe is the vital space for French agriculture’ (Braibant, 1941: 7). Lastly, the racist dimension is central to understanding agrarianism. Darré established it as a key feature of National Socialism and it was present in Italian fascism, although to a lesser extent. In colonizing Africa, Italian peasants were supposed to manifest the vigour and strength of their race (Matard and Bonucci, 2006; 2008). Apart from commonplace references such as the fecundity and good health of rural families, Vichy discourse was always racially ambiguous. Racism based on ‘science’ and ‘biology’ played a minor role compared with Italy or Germany after 1938, but State-advocated anti-Semitism grew considerably through measures such as the banishment of Jews from public service employment or the Aryanization of Jewish property, which had a considerable impact on numerous economic sectors. Again, agriculture appears as marginal to insignificant, comparable to the way Lucien Romier introduced the Minister of Agriculture: ‘oftentimes it has been said that Pierre Caziot’s stature and face are that of a Gaul. In fact, he was born in that part of France between Berry and Burgundy, where you may encounter the genuine Gaul type’.7 However, the rural dimension was not totally absent from the anti-Semitic propaganda that complemented the vote of the first racial status in October 1940. Celebration of values associated with the land, work, and roots gave shape to antiSemitic propaganda, evoking the themes that had surfaced with the Popular Front during the crisis of the 1930s (Lynch, 2005). The figure of the Jew mostly appeared in propaganda in the context of the fight against the black market, where Jews were accused of sabotaging regime policies and causing famine in cities.

IV.2.

Images that serve tradition

From the above it appears that the Vichy regime kept its distance from modernization both for structural and temporal reasons. A study of the images used by the regime to promote its rural policy bears this out unequivocally. While ploughing scenes may convey the idea of necessary effort without immediately perceptible effects, they are strikingly archaic. The plough and beasts of burden were the only Vichy expressions of agricultural labour, whether in ‘official’ regime propaganda or in articles published for a wider audience in journals such as L’Illustration. 7

Caziot, Pierre (1941), Au service de la paysannerie, Paris, Sorlot, p. 8.

252

Édouard Lynch

In the absence of a systematic study of rural images produced by the Vichy regime, a partial though interesting reflection of work in the fields and life in the countryside can be found in the cinema newsreels of the time. In fact, they were largely subject to German control, and the production and diffusion of images in general illustrate the impasse of the drive for modernization. One newsreel reported on the exhibition of ‘The Caravan of Agricultural Progress’ in Orléans, revealing the vivid contrast between the image of progress that such an initiative was supposed to convey and the images actually seen on film. ‘The Caravan of Agricultural Progress is travelling across the country, encountering great public interest, showing with striking clarity the future of a new Europe that favours France’s agricultural prosperity [...] the exhibition in Orléans has received 100,000 visitors’. The first part of the report focused entirely on the event and did not dwell on the enigmas of modernity. Figure 9.1. The Caravan of Agricultural Progress

Source: Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, AFE85000936, ‘La caravane du progrès agricole’, France Actualités, 3 juillet 1942.

However, with its images and commentary, the second part of the report portrayed a resolutely traditional rural France. ‘Coincidentally, this takes place the very day of Saint Jean, the day that for centuries all peasants have dedicated to the celebration of the hay harvest. In all countries, clear days of sun have allowed the hay to be stacked away for winter. The earth rewards the efforts of our peasants’.8

Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, AFE85000936, ‘La caravane du progrès agricole’, 3 July 1942.

8

253

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

Figure 9.2. The Caravan of Agricultural Progress

Source: Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA), AFE85000936, ‘La caravane du progrès agricole’, France Actualités, 3 juillet 1942.

Strangely, modernity (in the form of machinery) was absent from the report. When it did appear on screen it was far removed from France. However, the French news did report on harvesting in the Eastern plains: ‘Thousands of tractors have been sent to the Ukraine, where huge expanses of land have already been cleared. The earth is craving to produce; it well deserves its nickname of Europe’s wheat barn’.9 So modernity did exist, but only where allowed by Germany. Figure 9.3. Motorization in Ukraine

Source: INA, AFE86001992, ‘Du matériel agricole pour les agriculteurs russes’, France Actualités,25 juin 1943. 9

INA, AFE86001992, ‘Du matériel agricole pour les agriculteurs russes’, 25 June 1943.

254

Édouard Lynch

In their own way, cinema newsreels bore witness to the impossibility of modernizing a rural France constrained by its ancillary position, whose only obsession was to make ends meet from 1942 onwards. Pierre Caziot and Le Roy Ladurie had no choice but to acknowledge that production difficulties were growing, and they were compelled to trust that the ‘patriotism’ of farm workers would inspire them to release the last grains concealed in their barns.

IV.3.

A modernization paradox

Setting aside ideological and temporal factors that exalted tradition and weighed against a modernization policy for French agriculture in the Vichy government, a certain willingness to modernize, whether in agricultural or industry, cannot be denied. When Parliament members representing the old regime were partially banned and marginalized, they left the field open to technocrats and civil servants who cared mostly about efficiency and rationalisation. This dimension has been studied carefully in relation to industry, but agriculture did not escape the phenomenon. During the Vichy regime, a process that had begun in the interwar period acquired fuller dimensions as specialized groups came to power and focussed on areas such as wheat, beetroot, or flax. They had close ties with the producers and represented a new generation of farmers with land, culture, and technical expertise acquired in agricultural schools, in particular at Angers and Grignon. Beyond political affinities, some groups increased their visibility and saw in the Vichy regime an ally for implementing some of the reforms they advocated, as was the case with the Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé et Autres Céréales (AGPB, or French Wheat Producers Association) (Pesche, 2003) or the Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture (Permanent Assembly of the Chambers of Agriculture) (Atrux, 2010). Examples include Pierre Hallé, Secretary General of AGPB and a member of Pierre Caziot’s cabinet in 1940, who later became president of ONIC. Another example was Jean Achard, President of the National Confederation of Beetroot Growers, who was Minister of Supplies in 1940-41. In addition to these high-profile positions, central supply committees were organized by product, which greatly aided the re-organization and regulation of the market. These survived the war and remained until scarcity was no longer prevalent. The war period accelerated the renewal of agricultural elites working side by side with ‘experts’ in the various professional organizations. The latter were more focused on organizational and modernization issues, but there are no precise studies that would enable us to quantify that phenomenon. The recent works of Christophe Bonneuil and Frédéric Thomas (2010) are a definitive step forward in this area. They studied State-led seed initiatives and have brought to light the fact that the structures of the Vichy regime provided favourable 255

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

conditions for new elites and experts. They were given freedom of action by the government and encouragement by the German authorities, who were anxious to ensure a regular food supply to the new Europe. This new position for experts and scientists was akin to the processes that came to light in the domain of demographic policies (Rosental, 2003), and was an important milestone in the transformation and justification of public policies. It proves the fallacy of making a special case for agriculture in the story of the Vichy regime; this sector of the economy underwent tensions and contradictions that were similar to those of other areas. It would be exaggerated to state that Vichy was the starting point of a genuine modernizing project, as we have seen that modernization was an entirely marginal feature. However, the Vichy years were undeniably a time of new or accelerated institutional and political mechanisms that were later at the heart of post-war transformations. In the short term, though, it had no modernizing impact on agriculture. Quantitative results of the indicators compiled by Cépède show that production plummeted, productivity declined, and mechanization decreased significantly. Table 9.1. Indices of agricultural production Year

Crop production index

Animal production index

General index

1938

100

100

100

1939

103

105

104

1940

82

82

82

1941

81

69

76

1942

79

64

73

1943

82

62

74

1944

80

58

71

1945

67

59

64

Source: Cépède (1961: 324).

One of the reasons for the decrease in production has to do with a decline in essential factors: engines and fertilizers. There were close to 35,000 tractors just before the war; that number fell to 31,000 in 1943 and to around 28,000 in 1945. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that only a fraction of the machines was adapted to coal in response to the fuel crisis. The decline applied to all agricultural machinery and was caused by a brutal drop in imports, which were essential in this area, and by a decrease in production due to the scarcity of raw materials and workers. 256

Édouard Lynch

Table 9.2. Manufacturing of agricultural machinery Type of machine 1938

Average annual 1941-1994

Index number, (base of 100 in 1938)

Plows

18,921

16,143

85

Brabant plows

19,710

11,251

57

Harrows

22,933

7420

32

Seed drills

15,033

6924

46

Reaper-binders

11,460

4483

39

Mowers

28,439

17,371

61

3613

1359

38

Combine harvesters

Source: Cépède (1961: 226).

Table 9.3. Chemical fertilizer supplied to agriculture Agricultural campaign

Pure nitrogen

Phosphoric acid

Pure potassium

Total

1938-1939

208,000

400,000

273,000

879,000

1939-1940

177,000

250,000

228,000

655,000

1940-1941

154,000

120,000

170,000

444,000

1941-1942

125,700

125,000

224,000

474,000

1942-1943

120,500

96,000

246,000

462,500

1943-1944

94,200

36,000

177,000

307,200

1944-1945

50,600

23,000

5000

78,600

Source: Cépède (1961: 234).

By the end of World War II, French agriculture was in a catastrophic condition. Unlike what has been observed in many other European countries, very active propaganda in France was accompanied by an absence of actual change. More than any other regime, Vichy illustrates both the necessity and difficulty of a comparative approach to complex classifications. In the end, since only weak reforms were undertaken, the regime’s agricultural policy leaned more towards counter-revolution than fascism. Additionally, the traditional elites retained some of their influence and were not replaced after being partially marginalised in 1943. From

257

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

1942 onwards, the issue of food supplies was dominant and as the collaborationists came to power, this enhanced the technocratic nature of their policies, focused quasiexclusively on repression. Unlike many countries hit by fascism or para-fascism, France was one of the rare cases in Europe where the agricultural question was not a defining factor. The leaders of the agricultural professions were integrated within the Republic, a stance expressed by their acceptance of the agricultural policy implemented by the Popular Front. The occupation period was clearly more a time of unfulfilled aspirations and pre-war longings for professional autonomy. Following a short eviction at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the elites rapidly regained their leadership role in the new structures of unionism. Together with a fully legitimate and interventionist State, they played a predominant role in an active policy of modernization that reacted against the Malthusian economic model, which had largely been discredited.

258

Édouard Lynch

Bibliography Atrux-Tallau, Mélanie (2010), ‘Histoire sociale d’un corps intermédiaire: l’Assemblée permanente des chambres d’agriculture (1924-1974)’, Doctoral dissertation for the University of Lyon, 2. Atrux-Tallau, Mélanie and Baptiste, Martin (2011), ‘Por una historia social de la Corporation paysanne (Francia, 1930-1970)’, Ayer, 83, 3, p. 27-52. Barral, Pierre (1967), Les agrariens français de Méline à Pisani, Paris, PFNSP.

Baruch, Marc Olivier (1997), Servir l’Etat français. L’administration en France de 1940 à 1944, Paris, Fayard.

Berstein, Serge (1984), ‘La France des années 30 allergique au fascisme. A propos d’un livre de Zeev Sternhell’, Vingtième siècle, 2. Berstein, Serge (1985), ‘L’affrontement simulé des années trente’, Vingtième siècle, 5.

Bleton-Ruget, Annie (1997), ‘Gambetta et la république des paysans’, in Pierre Cornu and Jean-Luc Mayaud (eds.) (1997), Au nom de la terre. Agrarisme et agrariens en France et en Europe du 19e à nos jours, Paris, Librairie de l’Histoire, p. 51-64.

Bonneuil, Christophe and Thomas, Frédéric (2010), ‘Purifying Landscapes: The Vichy Regime and the Genetic Modernization of France’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, Vol. 40, Number 4, p. 532-568. Boussard, Isabel (1980), Vichy et la corporation Paysanne, Paris, PFNSP.

Boussard, Isabel (2003), ‘L’évolution des contrats de location de terre en France. L’exemple du statut du fermage, 1936-1946’, in Gérard Béaur, Mathieu Arnoux and Anne Varet-Vitu (eds.) (2003), Exploiter la Terre. Les contrats agraires de l’Antiquité à nos jours, Rennes, Association d’Histoire des Sociétés Rurales, Bibliothèque d’Histoire Rurale, p. 173-193. Braibant, Marcel (1941), L’Europe, espace vital de l’agriculture Française, Paris, Conférence du groupe ‘collaboration’, p. 21.

Burrin, Philippe (1985), Le Fascisme satellite: Bergery, Déat, Doriot, et les hommes de gauche français dans le champ d’attraction des fascismes, Genève, HEI.

Cépède, Michel ([1961] 1985), Agriculture et alimentation en France durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Paris, Génin. Chatriot, Alain (2011), ‘Du syndicalisme agricole à la corporation paysanne’, in Olivier Dard (dir.) (2011), Le corporatisme dans l’aire francophone au XXe siècle, Berne, Peter Lang, p. 29-48.

Cleary, Mark C. (1989), Peasants, politicians and producers. The organisation of agriculture in France since 1918, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 209.

259

Agricultural policy in Vichy France: modernity or an ‘allergy’ to fascism?

Dalisson, Remy (2008), Les fêtes du Maréchal: propagande et imaginaire dans la France de Vichy, Paris, Taillandier. Dard, Olivier (1998), La synarchie. Le mythe du complot permanent, Paris, Perrin.

Dard, Olivier; Daumas, Jean-Claude and Marcot, François (eds.) (2000), L’Occupation, l’Etat français et les entreprises, Paris, ADHE.

Dobry, Michel (1989), ‘Février 1934 et la découverte de l’‘allergie’ de la société française à la revolution fasciste’, Revue française de Sociologie, 30, 3-4, p. 511-533. Dobry, Michel (ed.) (2003), Le mythe de l’allergie française au fascisme, Paris, Albin Michel. Faure, Christian (1989), Le projet culturel de Vichy, Lyon, PUL-CNRS.

Gaboriaux, Chloé (2010), La République en quête de citoyens. Les républicains français face au bonapartisme rural (1848-1880), Paris, Presse de Sciences Po.

Gervais, Michel; Jollivet, Marcel and Tavernier, Yves (1977), Histoire de la France Rurale. T. IV: La Fin de la France paysanne (depuis 1914), Paris, Seuil. Giandou, Alexandre (2000), ‘L’échec d’une colonisation agricole et ses conséquences: La Crau’, Ruralia, 06 [accessed on January 2013]

Joly, Hervé (ed.) (2004), Les comités d’organisationorganisation et l’économie dirigée du régime de Vichy, Caen, Centre de recherche d’histoire quantitative. Grenard, Fabrice (2008), La France du Marché noir, 1940-1949, Paris, Payot.

Kaplan, Steven L. (2008), Le pain maudit. Retour sur la France des années oubliées 1945-1958, Paris, Fayard. Le Roy Ladurie, Jacques (1997), Mémoires 1902-1945, Paris, Flammarion, Plon.

Margairaz, Michel and Tartakowsky, Danielle (ed.) (2008), Le syndicalisme dans la France occupée, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Lynch, Edouard (2002), Moissons Rouges, Le Parti socialiste et la société paysanne dans l’entre-deux-guerres, Lille, Septentrion.

Lynch, Edouard (2005), ‘Ruralisme, paysannerie et antisémitisme en France (18901940)’, in Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci (ed.) (2005), Antisémythes. L’image des juifs entre culture et politique (1848-1939), Paris, Nouveau Monde editions, p. 163-175. Lynch, Edouard (2007), ‘La première guerre mondiale: renouvellement et mutation de l’agrarisme français’, in Pierre Cornu and Jean-Luc Mayaud (eds.) (2007), Au nom de la terre. Agrarisme et agrariens en France et en Europe du 19e siècle à nos jours, Paris, Boutique de l’Histoire, p. 119-134.

Lynch, Edouard (2012), ’Food Stocks, the Black Market, and Town and Country Tensions in France during Two World Wars and Beyond‘, in Paul Brassley, Yves Segers and Leen Van Molle (eds.) (2012), War, Agriculture, and Food. Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s, London, Routledge, p. 229-244. 260

Édouard Lynch

Margairaz, Michel (1991), L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une conversion, 1932-1952, Paris, CHEFF. Matard-Bonucci, Marie-Anne (2007), L’Italie fasciste et la persecution des juifs, Paris, Perrin.

Matard-Bonucci, Marie-Anne (2008), ‘D’une persécution l’autre: racisme colonial et anti-sémitisme dans l’Italie faciste’, Revue d’Histoire Moderne et contemporaine, 55, 3, p. 116-137.

Méline, Jules (1905), Le retour à la terre et la surproduction industrielle, Paris, Hachette. Noiriel, Gérard (1999), Les origines républicaines de Vichy, Paris, Hachette.

Paxton, Robert O. (1972), Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, New York, Knopf. Paxton, Robert O. (1973), La France de Vichy, Paris, Le Seuil.

Paxton, Robert O. (1996), Le temps des chemises Vertes, Paris, Seuil.

Pearson, Chris (2008), Scarred Landscapes: War and Nature in Vichy France, Palgrave, Macmillan.

Rosental, Paul-André (2003), L’Intelligence démographique: sciences et politiques des populations en France (1930-1960), Paris, O. Jacob. Rousso, Henri (1987), Le syndrome de Vichy, Paris, Seuil.

Salleron, Louis (1934), ‘Qu’est-ce que la corporation’, Association agricole, 32-33. Salleron, Louis et al. (1943), La corporation paysanne, Paris, PUF.

Sanders, Paul (2001), Histoire du marché noir, 1940-1946, Paris, Perrin.

Sternhell, Zeev (1983), Ni droite ni gauche. L’idéologie fasciste en France, Paris, Le Seuil.

Umbreit, Hans (2000), ‘Les politiques économiques allemandes en France’, in Olivier Dard, Jean-Claude Daumas and François Marcot (eds.) (2000), L’Occupation, l’Etat français et les entreprises, Paris, ADHE, p. 25-35.

Wright, Gordon (1967), La Révolution rurale en France, Paris, Editions de l’Epi (Original edition: Rural révolution in France, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964).

261