Thucydides: History Book I [Bilingual ed.] 1908343966, 9781908343963, 9780908343956, 9780908343963

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ARIS AND PHILLIPS CLASSICAL TEXTS

THUCYDIDES

History 1

With an introduction, translation and notes by P. J. Rhodes

Aris ἃ Phillips is an imprint of Oxbow Books Published in the United Kingdom in 2014 by OXBOW

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and in the United States by OXBOW BOOKS 908 Darby Road, Havertown, PA 19083 © P. J. Rhodes 2014 Hardback Edition: ISBN 978-0-90834-395-6 Paperback Edition: ISBN 978-0-90834-396-3

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CONTENTS

Preface References Map of Greece and the Aegean Introduction 1. Thucydides and his History 2. The Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War 3. Summary of Book I

4. Abbreviations used in Critical Apparatus Bibliography Θουκυδίδου Ξυγγραφῆς A / Thucydides: History I Commentary Index

180 281

PREFACE This volume is a ‘prequel’ to my editions of Thucydides II (1988), lll (1994) and IV. 1-V. 24 (1998). Since then | have contributed an introduction and notes to the Oxford World's Classics translation of Thucydides by M. Hammond (2009), and I thank him for enjoyable and stimulating cooperation, and Oxford University Press for permission to adapt to the requirements of this volume some material first written for that. However, | have no plans to

continue editing Thucydides beyond V. 24. In common with other Aris & Phillips editions of classical texts, this edition supplies introduction and bibliography; Greek text and critical apparatus (using English for the apparatus) with facing translation; and a commentary which does not neglect the Greek text but is based on the translation. The Greek text and the (selective) apparatus are my own, and ]

thank Prof. J. S. Rusten for enabling me to edit my text in a computer file. In the commentary the emphasis is on the subject matter and on the way in which Thucydides has chosen to treat the subject matter. As in my previous volumes 1 have tried to remember that users may not previously have read any part of Thucydides, and, particularly in the Introduction, where appropriate | have repeated or adapted material from those volumes. I am grateful to Aris & Phillips and to their successors Oxbow Books for inviting me to edit Thucydides and for their help in the production of these editions. I thank also A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover (all now dead, and | never met Gomme), Prof. S. Hornblower and Dr V. Pothou

(both still alive and active), for their commentaries and other writings on Thucydides, my debt to which is much greater than is indicated by my citations of them. I thank Prof. A. J. Woodman for once more reading and helping me to improve my draft; and, as before, | owe it to him to make it clear that | have not always adopted his suggestions. The University of Durham has provided me with an academic home and has supported my work for half a century, and ] am very grateful for that. Technology has continued to advance, and | have tried to keep abreast of it, with the result that the appearance of the pages is different in each volume. University of Durham Epiphany Term 2014

P. J. R.

REFERENCES Greek authors and their works are in general abbreviated as in the fourth edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary, but | occasionally use a fuller form of reference; and notice: Ath. Pol. (with no indication of author)

[Aristotle], Athenaion Politeia

The following collections oftexts (and *translations) of inscriptions are cited: CEG

Hansen, P. A. Carmina Epigraphica Graeca, 2 volumes. Berlin: de

Gruyter, 1983—9. *Fornara Fornara, C. W. Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, i. Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War. Johns Hopkins U. P., 1977; "Cambridge U. P., 1983. IG Inscriptiones Graecae. Berlin: Reimer/de Gruyter, 1873-. Vol. i’, by a team of editors headed by Lewis, D. M., brings up to date the collection of Athenian inscriptions down to 404/3 (1981—98). *Lewis & Reinhold Lewis, N. and Reinhold, M. Roman Civilization: Selected Readings. 2 volumes. Columbia U. P., *1990. Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. M. 4 Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC. Oxford U. P., 1969; revised 1988. Smallwood, Docs ... Gaius Smallwood, E. M. Documents Illustrating the

M&L

Principates of Gaius, Claudius and Nero. Cambridge U. P., 1967.

The following collections of fragmentary texts are cited: FGrH

Vorsokr.

Jacoby, F., et al. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Berlin: Weidmann / Leiden: Brill, 1926—.

Diels, H., rev. Kranz, W. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin: Weidmann, ?1951-2.

Otherwise, details of modern books cited, apart from editions of Thucydides cited only for their emendations of the Greek text, and standard editions of other classical authors, will be found in the Bibliography, on pp. 37-44. ‘Gomme’, ‘Andrewes’ or ‘Dover’, without further specifictation, denotes the relevant author's work in the Historical Commentary on Thucydides, and ‘Hornblower’, without further specification, denotes his Commentary on Thucydides, commenting on the passage in question. Some frequently-cited books are cited with abbreviated titles (see Bibliography); in the following cases they are cited without indication of author/editor:

References Meritt, B. D., et al., The Athenian Tribute Lists. A.T.L. Talbert, R. J. A. (ed.), Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Barrington Atlas Roman World. C.A.H. Cambridge Ancient History. Hansen, M. H. and Nielsen, T. H. (eds), An Inventory of Archaic Inventory and Classical Poleis. [Except where otherwise stated, references are to poleis by serial number.]

O.C.D.*

Oxford Classical Dictionary. Oxford U. P., 32012.

Details of articles in periodicals are given when they are cited. The titles

of periodicals are given as follows; superior figures (e.g. CQ?) denote the second and subsequent series of periodicals. AA A. Ant. Hung. AJA AJP AR BCH CA Chiron CP

Archäologischer Anzeiger Acta Antiqua (Hungary) American Journal of Archaeology American Journal of Philology Archaeological Reports Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique Classical Antiquity Chiron

CQ

Classical Quarterly Classical Review Comptes-Rendus de l' Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres

CR CRAI

᾿Ελληνικά Eranos G&R GRBS Hermes Historia

Histos JHS JRS Klio MHR Mnemosyne PCPS Philologus Phoenix REG RM TAPA ZPE

Classical Philology

᾿Ελληνικά Eranos Greece and Rome Greek, Roman and Byzantine Stuidies Hermes Historia Histos Journal of Hellenic Studies Journal of Roman Studies Klio Mediterranean Historical Review Mnemosyne Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society ' Philologus Phoenix Revues des Études Grecques Rheinisches Museum Transactions of the American Philological Association Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

B

Land over 200 m

Map of Greece and the Aegean

INTRODUCTION 1. Thucydides and his History Thucydides Thucydides the Athenian historian tells us that he was the son of Olorus, and had mining interests in Thrace (IV. 104.4—105.1). Since the Miltiades who commanded the Athenians at Marathon in 490 married the daughter of a Thracian king called Olorus (Hdt. VI. 39.2), and the Thucydides who opposed Pericles in the 440s belonged to that family (e.g. Ath. Pol. 28.2), it is likely that Thucydides the historian belonged to that family too. The relationships shown in the following table are possible but not certain. OLORUS MILTIADES

= HEGESIPYLE

| CIMON

| d

| d

OLORUS

=

MELESIAS =

THUCYDIDES

HEGESIPYLE

THUCYDIDES the historian

Thucydides served as an Athenian general in 424/3, so if generals had to be at least thirty years old (which is likely but not certain) he was born not later than 454.' He failed to prevent Amphipolis from falling into the hands of the Spartans, but was in time to save Eïon for Athens (IV. 104.6-106). He was exiled for his failure, and did not return to Athens until an amnesty

was proclaimed at the end of the Peloponnesian War, in 404 (V. 26.5, cf, e.g., Xen. Hell. M. 2.20). It is assumed that he died within a few years of his return: a recent attempt to prolong his life by arguing that the Lichas who was archon in Thasos in 398/7 is the Lichas of Sparta whose death he records in VII. 84.5- is unlikely to be correct. !

C. W. Fornara, in Nomodeiktes ... M. Ostwald, 71-80, argues from V. 26.5 that he was

born before rather than after 460.

*

J. Pouilloux and F. Salviat, CRA/ (1983), 376—403. S. Flory, in Nomodeiktes

... M.

Ostwald, 113—23, suggests that Thucydides' work was not cut short by his death but (in the

2

Introduction

Although

he was an aristocrat, from the family which

had provided

the leading opponents of Pericles in the middle of the century, it is clear that Thucydides became an ardent admirer of Pericles, the aristocrat who presided over the Athenian democracy (see especially II. 65.5-13). His admiration seems to have been personal rather than ideological: comments on Sparta and Chios (I. 18.1, VIII. 24.4), and on the fickleness of the Athenian

assembly and on the régime under which Athens lived in 411/0 (II. 65.4, VIII. 97.2), suggest that he was no enthusiast for democracy. He strongly disliked Cleon, the ostentatiously populist politician who dominated Athens in the 420s (III. 36.6, IV. 21.3, 27-8, V. 16.1), and Hyperbolus, who tried to succeed to Cleon's position (VIII. 73.3): Cleon favoured energetic action against Sparta in the north-east, and the statement of an ancient biographer

that he was the prosecutor of Thucydides (Marcellin. Life of Thuc. 46) may well be true. His History The writing of historical narrative in prose was a product of the intellectual awakening which seems to have begun among the Greeks living on the west coast of Asia Minor and the offshore islands in the sixth and fifth centuries. The one predecessor of Thucydides whose work survives is Herodotus of Halicarnassus (c. 480s—420s), who wrote a history focused on the conflicts between Greeks and Persians at the beginning of the fifth century, in a discursive manner which gave him ample opportunity for

digressions on places, peoples and earlier history. He was an intelligent and energetic enquirer (though some scholars have raised doubts as to whether he visited all the places he claims to have visited and saw all the things he claims to have seen); he had an interest but not a totally credulous interest in legends of the gods and the remote past, and in his account of events he combined human motivation with a notion of divine justice. His manner was

that of a story-teller, and he had the reputation of being ‘most Homer-like' (Ομηρικώτατος). Thucydides does not mention him by name? but in I. 20. 3 criticises statements of his. Other early historians are known only from quotations and allusions by other writers, and many are little more than names to us. Three deserve to be mentioned here. Hecataeus of Miletus, at the beginning of the fifth 390s or later) was abandoned in despair; but the usual view is more probably right. * On Thucydides and Herodotus see especially Hornblower, Commentary, ii. 19-38, 122— 45.

Introduction

3

century, wrote an account of the Mediterranean world, which was used by Herodotus, and a book on families claiming a divine origin. Hellanicus of Lesbos compiled systematised accounts of myths, and works of local

history and chronology: Thucydides in J. 97.2 says that he was the one previous writer to deal with the period between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War, but his account was brief and not chronologically

precise (see commentary: the reader of I. 89-118.2 is apt to make the same criticism of that account). The eastern enlightenment quickly spread to the west: Antiochus of Syracuse in the fifth century wrote histories of Sicily and Italy, and his work may be the source of what Thucydides says in VI. 2—5 on Greek colonisation in Sicily, and of some other western material.

Thucydides states at the outset of his history that he started work on the history of the Peloponnesian War at the beginning of the war, expecting it to be a great war and more noteworthy than any of its predecessors: ‘This

was the greatest arousal for the Greeks and for a part of the barbarians, and one might say for most of mankind’ (I. 1.1—2: the whole of I. 1—23.3 is intended to justify this statement). This suggests an objective not unlike that of Herodotus, who had written 'so that the deeds of men should not be obliterated in the course of time, and that great and wonderful achievements both of the Greeks and of the barbarians should not be lost from memory'

(Hdt. I. praef.), and had claimed that the force with which the Persians invaded Greece in 480 was greater than any previous force either in the historical period or in the legendary (Hdt. VIII. 20). Though Thucydides' narrative manner is commonly thought of as matterof-fact, he can give extremely vivid accounts of exciting episodes (in book I, 48—53 on the battle of Sybota and its aftermath, and several other episodes), and seems particularly interested in siege-works (e.g. II. 75-8, III. 20-4, on the siege of Plataea). He is also very willing to use superlatives. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Greek states were more powerful than ever before (I. 1.3, 18.3-19, Archidamus in Il. 11.1); never before had there

been such depopulations of cities, exile and slaughter of people, earthquakes, eclipses, famine and diseases (1. 23.3); there had never been such a fatal disease as the plague at Athens (II. 47.3); the massacre at Mycalessus in 413 was 'a lamentable disaster, second to none in the war for the size of the

place' (VII. 30.3); and the disaster suffered by the great Athenian invasion of Sicily was the greatest ever (VII. 75.7, 87.5—6). In book I, the battle of

Sybota *was a larger naval battle of Greeks against Greeks than any before

it” (50.2).

4

Introduction

But it is not as a recorder of superlatives that Thucydides is commonly remembered. Most of his narrative is sober and serious in manner, and he has

impressed readers as a man determined to establish the truth. In I. 22 he gives

a statement on his method and purpose, which deserves particular attention. His claim is that his history is intended to be useful (84: cf. II. 48.3, on his account of the plague at Athens), and that although it is hard to get behind

the differing accounts of witnesses (cf. VII. 44.1—2, 71, but he does not often insert such cautionary remarks in his narrative) he has made a great effort to achieve accuracy (882-3). He is proud of his achievement, and very willing to criticise those who do not get the facts right (cf. I. 20, 97.2, VI. 54.1, 55): in ]. 23.6 he claims that Sparta's truest reason for going to war against Athens was

most concealed, but he will give a definitive account even of the ‘grievances and disputes’ on which others have focused; in II. 48.3 he says he will eschew

speculation on the plague and keep to the facts; in V. 68.2 he complains that it was hard to discover the size of the armies which — but he then proceeds to calculate the size of the For the most part he has relied on oral sources, might tell him who commanded the Athenians

fought at Mantinea in 418 Spartan army. as he had to do (documents in a battle and how many

soldiers were sent, but they would not give him an account of the course of the battle); and that, and the facts that his history immediately became a classic and no one else wrote an independent history of the Peloponnesian War, make it very hard for us to check his account. Normally he does not,

as Herodotus sometimes does, reveal the sources of his information, or give alternative versions before stating which he prefers (there are striking exceptions in I. 138.4, IV. 122 and VIII. 87, and in 11. 5.6 he reports two versions without stating a preference; in [. 126.6—7 he was perhaps silently countering an alternative version). We know he was aware that witnesses could be biased, and he tells us that his exile gave him the opportunity to speak to people on the anti-Athenian side (V. 26.5). We know that he made some use of documents: with the treaty quoted in V. 47 we can compare a version inscribed on stone (Tod 72 = /G i? 83), which differs from his version only in small verbal details; in book III there is a problem about Athens’ decisions over Mytilene, since there is a fragmentary document which does not entirely support Thucydides' account and which may indicate either that

his account is misleading or that the original decisions were subsequently modified (see my commentary on ITI. 50.2). Documents are directly quoted only in books IV-V and VIII, but this may be a fact about the writing of his

history rather than about the research done for his history.

Introduction

5

He explains events entirely in human terms, without any suggestion of intervention by the gods or fulfilment of divine plans (cf. pp. 13-15), and his account of what happened and of how and why it happened is almost always credible. (Many, however, have thought that the unexpectedness of the Spartans’ encounter with the enemy at Mantinea, mentioned in V. 66.1—2, does not make sense unless their view was blocked by a wood whose existence is not mentioned by Thucydides, or by any writer earlier than the traveller Pausanias, in the second century AD.) He reveals more of how he thought one should set about establishing the

truth in the passages where he deals with events earlier than the fifth century. In the opening chapters of book I he reviews the growth of power in Greece, to support his claim that the Peloponnesian War was greater than any previous war. The fact that there was no single name for the Greeks, or distinction between Greeks and barbarians, shows that the earliest Greeks were not a united people who engaged in joint actions (3). The customs which still prevail in the more primitive parts of Greece show what life used to be like in the parts which are no longer primitive (5—6). When corpses were removed from Delos, it was seen that many had been buried in the Carian manner, and this

shows that the Aegean islands were once occupied by Carians (8). Powerful states do not necessarily leave impressive physical remains: Athens would seem even more powerful than it actually is, but no one would take Sparta to be powerful; so the unimpressiveness of Mycenae does not disprove the tradition that it was once powerful (10.1—2). Poets are given to exaggeration, but their stories of the past, and even the details in their stories, can be used if they are approached in a rational spirit (10.3—5). In a digression in book VI on the ending of the Athenian tyranny (treated more briefly in I. 20.2) Thucydides confirms that Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus by citing an inscription in which Hippias is the first son to be listed, and the only one to be listed with sons of his own (55.1-2). He also quotes the couplet recording the younger Pisistratus' dedication of the altar of Apollo (54.7), and puzzles those who have seen the surviving inscription

(M&L 11 = /G i? 948, trans. Fornara 37) by describing its lettering as faint. Less happily, in telling the dubious story of the Spartan regent Pausanias he quotes not only the boastful couplet which the Spartans deleted from the Serpent Column (I. 132.23; for the list of names inscribed instead see M&L 27, trans. Fornara 59), but also letters allegedly, but hardly in fact, exchanged between Pausanias and the Persian King Xerxes in 478 (I. 128.6—129).

Various statements which Thucydides makes are supported by tekmeria,

6

Introduction

‘indications’, i.e. confirmatory pieces of evidence (see commentary on I. 1.1; this and similar terms are used frequently in the opening chapters of book

I). The fact that originally the city of Athens was on and to the south of the Acropolis is supported by the tekmerion that that is where the oldest temples are to be found (II. 15.3—4). To confirm that birds and animals were vulnerable

to the plague at Athens he adduces the tekmerion that birds of prey stayed away from the victims and dogs caught the disease from their owners (II. 50). In book III a Homeric hymn is cited as providing a tekmerion about the festival of Apollo on Delos (104: the cognate verb is used in $6). He is also prepared to argue from eikos, reasonable ‘likelihood’. There is no connection (one had perhaps been alleged by a dramatist) between Teres the Thracian, father of Sitalces, and Tereus of Greek legend, the husband of Procne: apart from other

arguments, it is likely that an Athenian king would be more interested in a son-in-law from Daulis than in one from distant Thrace (II. 29). If Hipparchus

had been the reigning tyrant at Athens, it is unlikely that Hippias would have been able to establish himself when Hipparchus was murdered (VI. 55.3: in this instance the word eikos is not used). Again there is an example in III. 104.6, where a traditional explanation is said to be a reasonable one. Thucydides is not infallible. Archaeologists do not now believe that the Aegean islands were once occupied by Carians. He ought not to have been taken in by the letters between Pausanias and Xerxes (there was no time for the exchange of letters while Pausanias was in Byzantium in 478, and the letters seem to improve on a rumour reported by Hdt. V. 32: see on 128.6). In VI. 54—9 he argues that until 514 the tyranny at Athens was not unpopular, and Harmodius and Aristogeiton murdered Hipparchus for purely personal reasons, yet he gives them some fellow-plotters and the hope that when they had struck the first blow the rest of the Athenians would want to reclaim their freedom. His belief that a rational enquirer can extract historical truth

from epic poetry is too simple-minded. Even in the contemporary history which was his main concern we occasionally have reason to think him mistaken on points of detail. An

inscription (M&L 61 Ξ /G i? 364, trans. Fornara 126) suggests that he is wrong about the commanders of th second Athenian expedition of 433 to Corcyra in I. 51.4. Later writers (Androt. FGrH 324 F 43 and Philoch. FGrH 328 F 136, trans. Fornara

148, Ath. Pol. 29.2) disagreed with VIII. 67.1 on

the composition of the committee which paved the way for the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411, and were probably right to do so. Under the influence of the sophists, the teachers of rhetoric and philosophy who were

Introduction

7

important in Greek intellectual life in the second half of the fifth century, he was very fond of contrasts such as that between surface appearance and underlying reality (/ogos, ‘word’, and ergon, ‘deed’: cf. 22.1, 23.3, 127.1-2 nn.), and we may suspect that sometimes the appearance which he rejects was not wholly false (as in VIII. 89.2—3, where Theramenes and Aristocrates were no doubt personally ambitious but may not have been totally insincere in the arguments which they used against the Four Hundred). Nevertheless, Thucydides' determination to establish the truth, and the range of evidence and arguments which he employed in his investigation of past history, are most impressive. The statement on method in |. 22, before proceeding to ‘the actions performed in the war’, begins with ‘the words uttered by individual speakers’. Thucydides’ history incorporates a considerable number of speeches (often presented as the most significant speeches out of a larger number delivered,

e.g. 67.5), and whereas elsewhere he ‘did not think it right to narrate ... in accordance with my own judgment’, the speeches ‘represent what I judged it most important for the individual speakers to say with regard to the current circumstances, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of

what was actually said”. Almost always he uses such words as τοιάδε, ‘such things’, before a speech and τοιαῦτα, ‘such things’, or τοσαῦτα, ‘so much’, after (e.g. I. 31.4, 36.4, II. 12.1); 1 do not believe that the exceptional ὧδε,

‘thus’, in II. 74.2 and τάδε, ‘these things’, in III. 29.2 (and in letters in I. 128.6, 129.2, but there he was perhaps quoting verbatim from his source) are intended to claim greater authenticity. Serious modern historians do not use direct speech except for verbatim quotations, and readers who recognise Thucydides’ attitude to historical truth as similar to their own are disturbed to find that in the speeches he confessedly allows himself an element of free

composition. Herodotus earlier had used direct speech, but he made no overt claim to authenticity, and in his case the speeches suit the story-telling manner and have not worried modern readers. Direct speech is used also in the other narrative

forms

of early Greek

literature, epic and drama,

but of course

they make no pretence to factual accuracy. With these precedents it 1s not surprising that Thucydides should have decided to include speeches in his narrative, but he has caused perplexity by professing two apparently conflicting aims, to follow his own judgment of what was appropriate and to adhere to the general sense of what was actually said. Clearly he was better informed in some cases than in others: he is likely to have heard

8

Introduction

speeches delivered in Athens before his exile, but he will have had difficulty in finding survivors who had heard and remembered Nicias' speeches in

Sicily in 415—413. Even in cases where he is likely to know what was said in the original speech, he tends to make a speech delivered in one place echo

or respond to a speech delivered in another place, as the original cannot have done (compare Pericles’ speech in Athens, I. 140—4, with the speeches delivered earlier in Sparta). The similarity of style between speeches makes

it clear that the language is on the whole Thucydides' own, though some striking original ‘I don't tells the

expressions may have been remembered and incorporated from the speeches (the speech of the Spartan Sthenelaidas in I. 86 begins, understand the many words of the Athenians’; Pericles in II. 62.3 Athenians to regard their land and houses as “ἃ pleasure-garden or

adornment of their wealth"). The kind of argument found in the speeches is appropriate to a generation taught by the sophists, and has parallels in

speeches in contemporary drama, but we may suspect that the amount of attention devoted to the nature of Athenian power in Thucydides' speeches reflects his own obsession with the subject rather than the amount of attention devoted to it in speeches actually delivered (cf. p. 16).

What room is left for authentic reporting? Most scholars would accept that men did make a speech on occasions when they are said to have done so (on the particular issue of speeches before a battle see my commentary on

IV. 9.4); and some resolve the problem of conflicting aims by supposing that the ‘general sense’ for which Thucydides claims authenticity is no more than the main point of the speech, e.g. that at Sparta in 432 king Archidamus was

opposed to an immediate declaration of war but the ephor Sthenelaidas was in favour. However, so small a degree of authenticity is hardly worth claiming, and it is better to think that Thucydides aimed at more than that, and that the general line of argument is the line which the speaker was known to have taken or could reasonably be expected to have taken -- though where Thucydides did not know he may have misjudged, and even where he did know his sense of what was appropriate may have led to his giving more or less prominence to particular arguments than the original speaker gave them. The best indication of what may have happened comes from Rome: an inscription records what the emperor Claudius said (or at any rate what he afterwards claimed to have said) in favour of admitting Gauls to the Senate, and we have a version of the speech by Tacitus, comprehensively rewritten, but still a version of Claudius' speech rather than a separate composition by Tacitus: *

E.g. de Ste Croix, O.PW. 7-16.

5

ILS 212 = Smallwood, Docs ... Gaius 369, Tac. Ann. XI. 24. Both texts translated Lewis

Introduction

9

To an unusual extent, parts of the content of Brasidas' speech at Acanthus in 424 are confirmed by passages in Thucydides' narrative (see my commentary on IV. 84.2). Thucydidean speakers contradict one another

on points of fact and interpretation (notice the disagreement between Cleon and Diodotus on the guilt of the lower class in the revolt of Mytilene, in III. 39.6 and 47.2—4; between Pagondas and Hippocrates on whether the

battle of Delium was fought in Athenian or in Boeotian territory, in IV. 92.1 and 95.2): it should never be assumed automatically that what a speaker says is true, or is believed by Thucydides to be true. Every historian, however strongly committed to factual accuracy, has to decide which facts to include, which facts to treat prominently and which to treat in passing, how one fact should be seen in relation to others. There can be no history without selection and interpretation. In the third of a series of brief and disjointed reports of Athenian activity in the west, which run from the later part of book III to the earlier part of book IV, with a sequel at the beginning of V, Thucydides states more explicitly than anywhere else that his narrative is selective (III. 90.1). He not only had to interpret, but his family background and his involvement in the war make it impossible that his interpretations should be unprejudiced. The tendency of recent scholarship has been not to set Thucydides on a pedestal as a totally accurate

and objective historian (as earlier generations did) but to emphasise his partiality? and to present him as an ‘artful reporter”, who though his manner is often matter-of-fact has used great artistry in selecting and presenting his

material so as to have the desired effect on his readers.' The use of Athens' might to crush Melos, the last island in the Aegean to hold out against her, is written up at length, with a dialogue between representatives of the two sides, at the end of book V (84-116), and

immediately afterwards books Vl and VII give us a lengthy account of Athens' great expedition to Sicily, which set out with extravagant ambitions

but ended in total disaster, while just before the section on Melos Sparta's equally cruel treatment of Hysiae in the Argolid 1s disposed of in a single and Reinhold 52-5. $ Perhaps the most extreme attack on his honesty is by E. Badian, in J. W. Allison (ed.), Conflict, Antithesis and the Ancient Historian, 49-91 with 165-81, revised in his From Plataea to Potidaea, 125—62 with 223-36.

7 δ΄

The phrase is borrowed from the title of a book by V. J. Hunter. This aspect of early Greek literature is stressed by H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis: he notes that the

author ‘relies on his reader to read with that degree of imaginative cooperation that makes direct statement unnecessary and the result more effective’ (p. 249, referring at that point to Plato).

10

sentence

Introduction

(V.

83.2).

Thus

Athens’

treatment

of Melos,

though

neither

important for the course of the war nor unparallelled in its cruelty, is used as

an opportunity to give the most cynical presentation of Athens’ imperialism before that imperialism overreaches itself in the attempt to conquer Sicily. In book I detailed accounts are given of Thucydides’ first two ‘grievances and disputes', concerning Corcyra and Potidaea (24—55, 56—66), but there are only passing references to the other two, concerning Aegina and Megara (67.2, 4, etc.: cf. on 23.6); and in the pentcontaetia the war of 440—439 against Samos is the only episode following the Thirty Years' Peace and is narrated in more detail than what has gone before (115.2-117: see on 115.2).

In the narrative of the Peloponnesian War particularly detailed accounts are given of some episodes, such as those of Plataea (II. 2-6, 61-8, III. 20—4, 52—68), Mytilene (III. 2—6, 8-18, 25, 27—50), Pylos (IV. 2-6, 8-23, 26-41) and Brasidas' campaign

in the north-east from 424 to 422 (IV. 78-88,

102-8, 109-16, 120—32, 133.4, 135, V. 2-3, 6-16); but there are disjointed and perfunctory accounts of other matters, such as Athens' large-scale naval campaigns of 431 and 430 (II. 23.2, 25—6, 30; 56), and Athens’ involvement

in the 420s in fighting in the west, eventually if not at first on a large scale and with ambitious hopes (a number of short sections between III. 86 and V. 4—5 — but this campaign ends in IV. 58-65 with a speech). Sometimes major sections of narrative are interrupted for some very brief reports, for instance on the death of Sitalces (IV. 101.5) and the Boeotian capture of Panactum

(V. 3.5). New approaches to literature have encouraged new approaches to some aspects of Thucydides’ literary skill: for instance, the investigation of narrative strategies known as ‘narratology’, applied particularly within classical literature by I. J. F. de Jong to Homer, has been applied profitably

to Thucydides by Hornblower and by T. Rood.° Thucydides’ history is unfinished (cf. pp. 16—19), and in a world lacking not only the computer and the compact disc, but even the modern form of book, comparison of one passage with another will have been much harder both for author and for readers than it is today. There have been many highly ingenious studies of Thucydides' artistry which have erred no less than those attributing total objectivity to him, by seeing an implausible degree

? [.J.F.deJong, Narrators and Focalizers, followed by A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey; Hornblower, in S. Hornblower (ed.), Greek Historiography, 131—66, and in his Commentary; T. Rood, Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation.

Introduction

1]

of intention behind every word in the text as it has come down to us.'? Not everything in Thucydides' writing in which we can find significance was put there so that we should find that significance; but it is certainly true that he often wrote one passage in full awareness of what he had written in another, and that he has not mechanically compiled a chronicle but has written a well considered history. The modern reader may complain of Thucydides' omissions. The problem is not so much that he omits explanations which we need but the first generation of his readers did not. Sometimes he does that, as when he fails to make clear what rights the Athenian generals had with regard to convening the assembly (e.g. II. 22.1); but he is presumably remembering that not all his readers will be contemporary Athenians when he gives his account of Athens’ public funeral of those who died in war (II. 34), or writes of ‘what is called the coastal territory, .. as far as Laurium, where the Athenians have their silver mines' (II. 55.1). He sometimes but not consistently gives geographical notes, especially on places on the edge of the Greek world (in book I, 24.1, 56.2, on Epidamnus and Potidaea), and he frequently indicates the mother cities of Greek colonies, especially in the north-east (in book I, 24.2 on Epidamnus, and also, 25.2 on Apollonia, 30.2 on Leucas, 56.2 on Potidaea, but in each of these cases the fact is relevant to the narrative); he

occasionally gives geographical notes on less distant places (e.g. 1V. 53.2 on Cythera, 76.3 on the probably not widely-known Siphae). On the other hand, he refers to a trophy in and to a suburb of Megara as if his readers know them (IV. 67.5, 69.2), and writes as if they know of a portico at Delium but do not know that it had collapsed (1V. 90.2). Nor should we complain too strongly that, by our standards, he takes too narrow a view of what should be included in a history of the Peloponnesian War, that although he devotes a great deal of attention to the morality of the Athenian empire (cf. pp. 8, 16) he devotes very little to its working, that he does not tell us how far the contenders depended on imports for basic materials or how much damage was done to Athenian agriculture by

the Peloponnesian invasions (and for Athens' use of Pylos and Cythera see p. 32): at that level, what he has not done is what no ancient writer would have thoughtof doing. Modern readers do often complain that, although Thucydides could note occasions when the Athenians were in financial difficulties (III. 19.1), could mention money-collecting expeditions without "^ Cf Rhodes, Histos 2 (1998), 64-71 1998.03 RhodesEpidamnusisaC ity647 .pdf)

(http://research.ncl.ac.uk/histos/documents/

Ἂ

12

Introduction

making their precise status clear (IV. 50.1), and could even mention the change in the Delian League from tribute to a tax on trade, in 413 (VII. 28.4), he does not mention the increase in tribute in 425, which we know of from

an inscription (16 i? 71; extracts M&L 69, trans. Fornara 136). Other kinds of omission are more irritating. In 433, when the Athenians received an appeal from Corcyra for support, and a counter-appeal from Corinth, the assembly devoted two days to considering these appeals; on the

first day they tended to favour Corinth, but on the second they changed their minds and made a limited alliance with Corcyra — but how many changed their minds, who spoke on which side, and what was Pericles' position (I. 44.1 n.)? In book II, not every Athenian approves of Pericles’ policy of refusing to meet the Peloponnesian invaders in battle, but no opponent is named: in 431 the men of the deme Acharnae collectively are dissatisfied (21.3, cf. 20.4); in 430 ‘the Athenians’ change their mind, attempt to negotiate with Sparta, depose Pericles from his generalship (which Thucydides does not actually state) and fine him, but later reelect him (59.1—2, 65.3—4). In cases like these it looks as if the artist has got the better of the reporter, and facts which Thucydides must have known are omitted to show Athens

moving towards war in 433, Pericles towering over the other Athenians in 43] and 430. Thucydides' perfunctory treatment of Athens' campaigns in the west, in books III-V, is parallelled by his failure in book II to make much of or to make sense of Athens' large-scale naval expeditions around the coasts of Greece in 431 and 430 (cf. above), which has caused great

perplexity. There is a particularly vexing omission in connection with the Persians. In IV. 50.2-3 Thucydides records an episode which ended with the Athenians' sending an embasssy to the Persian court, which turned back on learning of the death of Artaxerxes I, in 424/3; he does not mention, but we know from other evidence, that once Darius Il was established as the

new king the Athenians sent an embassy to him, and succeeded in making a treaty (see my commentary on $3). There are lesser omissions too, often concerned with the careers of individuals. The last chapter of book II records the return of Phormio from Naupactus to Athens in the spring of 428 (103.1); a little later, in III. 7.1, the

Athenians send his son to Naupactus 'since the Acarnanians had urged them to send a son or relative of Phormio as commander', but Thucydides does not explain why Phormio himself was no longer available (possibly he thought he had explained earlier). The Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 428, like the previous invasions, was commanded by the Spartan king Archidamus

Introduction

13

(IH. 1.1); that of 427 was commanded by Cleomenes, regent for Pausanias, the son of the exiled king Plistoanax of the other house (III. 26.2); the abortive invasion of 426 was commanded by king Agis, son of Archidamus (III. 89.1): the illness and death of Archidamus are mentioned nowhere, and

the recall from exile of Plistoanax, apparently in 427/6, is not mentioned

until V. 16 (for his exile see on 114.2). It is likely that Demosthenes was deposed from his generalship after his defeat in Aetolia in 426, but what Thucydides says of him in the remainder of book III does not make his status clear, and it is only in IV. 2.4 that we are told that he is a private citizen

(reelected for 425/4 but not yet in office: see my commentary). His Beliefs Already by the beginning ofthe fifth century many Greeks were unhappy with

the gods as depicted by Homer, beings who resembled but surpassed mortals in every respect including their misbehaviour, and some intellectuals, such as Xenophanes (Vorsokr. 21 B 11—12, 14-16, 23—6) and Heraclitus ( Vorsokr. 22 B 42, 128), were prepared to believe in a divine power but complained that human beings create gods in their own image. Protagoras in the middle of the century proclaimed that man is the measure of all things, and that it is impossible to know whether or not gods exist or what they are like (Vorsokr. 80 B 1, 4). Critias at the end of the century wrote a play in which one speaker says that originally there were no restraints on human nature; then laws were invented; but men took to breaking the laws when there was

no risk of detection, so gods were invented to put a stop to that (Vorsokr. 88 B 25). Herodotus was prepared to say that a channel was certainly the result of an earthquake, and can be called the work of Poseidon if one likes

to attribute earthquakes to him (Hdt. VII. 129.4); but he did not deny the existence of the anthropomorphic gods, and he certainly believed in a divine power which punished impiety, was jealous of great human prosperity and had long-term plans which were fulfilled in human affairs, and he believed in the messages conveyed to human beings through oracles.!! There is no indication that Thucydides had any religious beliefs. Such expressions as ‘enquired of the God ... he responded’ (I. 25.1) are the expressions conventionally used in such contexts, and do not imply that Thucydides was himself a believer. Events are explained in human

terms,

beyond which there is only the factor which he calls ryche (‘fortune’) or expresses by means of the impersonal verb xymbainei. In some cases these

!

SeeG.E. M. de Ste Croix, G&R? 24 (1977), 130-48.

Ι4

Introduction

refer to the totality of what happens to a community or individual (e.g. III. 90.1, IV. 14.3; in III. 89.5 the opposite of chance is implied when it is stated that a tidal wave would not xymbenai without an earthquake). In others they refer to ‘chance’ in the sense of what cannot be foreseen (e.g. I. 78.2, 84.3, or, on the weather, III. 49. 4): in I. 140.1 Pericles remarks on the habit of blaming tyche for what xymbainei contrary to reasonable expectation (logos); in II. 61.3 he classes the plague at Athens among ‘happenings which are sudden, unforeseen and contrary to all reasonable expectation’. Tyche and xymbainei are frequent in Thucydides' account of the episode at Pylos in 425, and it is often thought that this is a deliberate device to detract from the Athenians' success (see my commentary on IV. 3.1). They are also frequent in his accounts of Brasidas' exploits, but Thucydides clearly admired Brasidas and will hardly have wished to suggest that his achievements were due to chance (see my commentary on IV. 70.1). Religion is a phenomenon which plays a part in the life of some people but in Pericles' funeral speech festivals have only social value, not religious (II. 38.1), and when the plague strikes Athens the pious are not spared and religious belief does not prevent people from pursuing their immediate advantage

by unjust means

(II. 47.4,

53.4); similarly in civil wars oaths

were merely gambits to be used against an opponent, and ‘neither side paid attention to considerations of piety’ (eusebeia: II. 82.6, 8). Religion plays a prominent part in Thucydides' treatment of Brasidas (cf. IV. 116.2, V. 11. 1,

with my commentary), but as usual it is not mentioned in such a way as to suggest that Thucydides was himself a believer. Modern readers are puzzled by his treatment of Nicias in 413: when an eclipse persuades him to delay the Athenians' departure from Syracuse, he is described as ‘rather too much

inclined to divination and the like', but when he dies after a disastrous failure due to a considerable extent to his own errors he is said to be ‘of all the Greeks in my time the one who least deserved to reach this depth of misfortune, because his life was wholly conducted with a view to goodness

(arete)' (VII. 50.4, 86.5). Oracles, again, are facts to be taken into account when relevant (e.g. III. 92.5, 96.1 and, disparagingly, III. 104.1): occasionally the rationalist can find in them a sense other than their surface sense (II. 17.1—2); only with the suggestion that Cylon may have misinterpreted an oracle (I. 126.4—6) and with an oracle that the Peloponnesian War was to last thrice nine years does Thucydides seem inclined to go further (V. 26.3—4). Sometimes he suppresses a religious dimension: when the men who escaped from Plataea

Introduction

15

in 428 did so with their right foot bare, he suggests only a practical reason (III. 22.2); when the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 426 was abandoned because of earthquakes he does not say whether the fear was rationalist or

religious (Ill. 89.1). He does not give the reason for Athens' purification of Delos in the same year, which was perhaps to appease Apollo after the plague (III. 104.1); but he does, without comment, give a religious reason for the expulsion of the Delians in 422, and indicates that their restoration in 421 was due to feelings of guilt and to advice from the Delphic oracle (V. 1, 32.1). If men are given appointments because they bear significant names, that is something else which he suppresses (III. 92.2, 5, cf. III. 41). Natural phenomena are just natural phenomena, with no significance for human conduct (e.g. III. 116.1—2 on volcanic activity, cf. III. 88.3, stating that ‘the people there believe’ that Hephaestus is at work; IV. 52.1, on a solar eclipse, coinciding with the new moon, and an earthquake; VII. 79.3,

on autumn thunderstorms): III. 89.2-5 reaches a rational conclusion on an earthquake and tidal waves, though in III. 87, where earthquakes are mentioned after a recurrence of the plague at Athens, it is possible that the rationalist wavered; otherwise it is exceptional that in book I, at the end of his introduction on the greatness of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides is tempted to see significance in the earthquakes, eclipses, famines and diseases which accompanied it (23.3).'We have already noticed Thucydides' attitude to Pericles and Periclean democracy (p. 2). The nature of Athenian power is a prominent theme in his speeches, and I have suggested that this is because he was obsessed with the subject. Contemporary sophists were fond of the distinction between physis, unrestrained nature, and nomos, human

convention (cf. I. 76.3, and notice

III. 45.3, 7, from Diodotus’ speech in the debate on Mytilene: ‘It is physis for all of us, both individuals and communities, to make mistakes, and there is

no nomos which can prevent this ... In short, it cannot happen, and it is very simple-minded to suppose, that when human physis is powerfully driven to do something it can be deterred by the strength of nomoi or any other danger’). Some men argued that, although laws (nomoi) and moral rules were matters

of human convention, they were nevertheless desirable (e.g. Protagoras in Pl. Prt. 320 c-322 p, 326 c—E); others claimed that they were undesirable, as ?

Onthe Greeks’ interest in recording natural disasters see E. Gabba, JRS 71 (1981), 50-62

at 56. It is important to notice that Thucydides’ attitude to religious matters is not uniformly unbelieving: see S. I. Oost, CP 70 (1975), 186-96: N. Marinatos, JHS 101 (1981), 138—40; Dover, The Greeks and Their Legacy, 65-73; and 92.5, 96.1 nn.

16

Introduction

a device to prevent those who were strong by nature (physis) from acting as they wished (e.g. Antiphon the Sophist, Vorsokr. 87 B 44.12—34). It is clear that Thucydides, though he did not believe in divine sanctions for human behaviour, did believe that as far as the conduct of individuals is concerned

compliance with moral standards and obedience to law is better than rejection of moral standards and defiance of law (see especially II. 53, in the account of

the plague at Athens, III. 82—3, generalising from the civil war in Corcyra;" and compare II. 37.3, in Pericles' funeral speech).

However, the Athenian empire presented him with a dilemma: as a patriotic Athenian, he was proud of his city's achievement (his admiration of Pericles clearly extends to Pericles' empire: II. 65.5—7); yet the means by which the empire was acquired and retained might well be seen as acts of unrestrained pAysis, as rejection of moral standards and defiance of law on

the largest scale: the Athenians in 432 say, ‘We have not done anything at all surprising or alien to human ways ... men are worthy of praise if they follow human nature in ruling others but adhere to justice more than the power available to them would allow’ (I. 76.2-3). In his speeches Thucydides represents the Athenians as having no illusions about the nature of their empire: it is described as a tyranny not only by the Corinthians (I. 122.3),

and by Cleon, of whom he disapproves (III. 37.2), but also by Pericles, of whom he approves (II. 63.2); cf. also the unknown Euphemus in VI. 85.1. As he suggests that the Athenians naturally exercised their power in their

own interests, he suggests that their subjects naturally hated this (e.g. the Athenians in I. 75.4—76.1, Pericles in Il. 63.1, 64.5, the Mytilenaeans in III. 10.2-12). I believe that the element of reporting in his speeches is to be taken seriously (cf. pp. 7—9): in concentrating on this view of the empire

Thucydides may be exaggerating, but he is not fundamentally wrong.'^ And I suspect that he returns to the subject so often because he could not resolve the dilemma to his own satisfaction. The Composition of his History Thucydides' history is unfinished. Though he lived beyond the end of the war (cf. p. 1), the text which we have breaks off abruptly in the autumn of 411; and, since Xenophon's Hellenica and other histories which have not survived began at that far from obvious point (cf. pp. 22-3), we may safely assume that what we have is, if not all that Thucydides wrote, at any rate P ^

But III. 84 is probably an interpolation. For the contrary view see especially G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Historia 3 (1954—5), 1-41.

Introduction

17

all of his writing that was ever made public. Since he started work at the

beginning of the war (1. 1.1) and lived beyond the end, we may reasonably wonder about the timetable of his work. Did he write up the events of each year or half-year (cf. p. 19) shortly afterwards and then close that section, did he merely make notes during the course of the war, and wait until the war was over to begin composing his history, or did he do something between those two extremes? It has recently become fashionable to ignore these

problems and discuss Thucydides' text as if it is precisely the text which he intended his readers to have, but the problems still exist, even if it is hard

to make progress on them. The question is complicated by the fact that for some time the Peloponnesian War seemed to have been ended by the Peace of Nicias, in 421: although Athenians and Spartans fought against one another in the intervening years, it was possible to pretend that the peace was still in force until Athens joined Argos in a raid on Spartan territory, in 414 (VI. 105, cf.

VII. 18.3). V. 20 discusses the length ofthis first phase of the war in a manner appropriate to the ending of the war; but the chapter ends by referring to 'this first war', and therefore cannot have been written in its present form until

Thucydides realised that the Peace of Nicias had not ended the war. V. 24.2, with another reference to ‘the first war”, begins Thucydides' eleventh year; ch. 25 remarks that even immediately there was not a complete settlement, and the situation worsened until open war resumed; and then in ch. 26 we have Thucydides’ second preface, which echoes I. 1.1 and II. 1, says that he continued his history to the dismantling of the Athenian empire and the destruction of the long walls and Piraeus fortifications (which as far as his published text is concerned is not true), and justifies his decision to treat the whole twenty-seven-year period as a single war. In book I, references to events as long before ‘the end of this war’ (13.3, 18.1) may envisage either 42] or 404, but in 23.1, 3, on the magnitude ofthe war and the accompanying

disasters, Thucydides is probably thinking of the whole war from 431 to 404. In I. 97.2 there is a reference to Hellanicus' Arthis, which was completed in or after 407/6. In the narrative of the Archidamian War such references to ‘the’ or ‘this

war’ as IV. 40,1, 48.5, are best taken as references to the Archidamian War, written before Thucydides realised that that was the first part of a longer war. However, comments on the topography of Amphipolis in IV. 103.5 and !5

The fashion was begun, in reaction against the earlier obsession with the problems of

composition, by W. R. Connor, Thucydides.

18

Introduction

V. 11.1 refer to developments later than the time of the narrative (but V. 10.6 probably contrasts 422 with 424/3). Thucydides' remarks on Brasidas in IV. 81.2-3 imply a contrast between him and Sparta's commanders in the

Aegean in and after 412. What is said in II]. 93 about the history of Heraclea Trachinia after its foundation looks ahead at any rate as far as its capture by the Boeotians in 419, and possibly as far as its capture by the Athenians in 409/8; whereas it is possible that what is said about Athens' decisions

concerning Mytilene in III. 50 came to merit revision well before the end of the war but did not receive it. II. 65.10—12 refers to events after Pericles' death, including the support for Sparta of the Persian prince Cyrus in and after 407, and II. 100.2 mentions the reign of Archelaus in Macedon, which

lasted from 413 to 399; but II. 23.3 makes a statement about Oropus, in the present tense, which ceased to be true in 412/I. Therefore neither of the extreme solutions mentioned above is acceptable: throughout the history

there are both passages which were written well before the end of the war, and were not revised in the light of subsequent events, and passages which were not written until some time after the events in connection with which we read them, in some cases not until after the war had ended. Moreover,

there are internal discrepancies which

show

that the whole

work is not the product of a single spell of thinking. Most strikingly, II. 65.11 suggests that the Sicilian expedition of 415—413 was not at fault in its conception but failed owing to a lack of proper support from Athens;

but books VI-VII give the impression that the expedition was at fault in its conception yet even so short-term success might have been achieved but for the blunders of Nicias. At the level of detail, a note on Thyrea and the settlement of the Aeginetans there, in Il. 27.2, is repeated in IV. 56.2; and

V. 6.1 repeats the information on the mother cities of Stagirus and Galepsus which has already been given in IV. 88.2 and 107.3. V. 25-83 and book VIII are disjointed as the rest of the history is not, and it can plausibly be argued that these represent a relatively primitive stage in the process of composition, a first draft which Thucydides hoped to revise later. IV. 102-V. 13, V. 84-116 and books VI-VII contain polished accounts of events in the north-east, in Melos and Sicily respectively: they

are not obviously unfinished, but comparison with the rest of the narrative suggests that they need to have combined with them more information on

what was happening elsewhere at the same time, and that Thucydides may have intended to supply that information in due course. II. 1-IV. 101 appear

to be the most finished parts of books I[- VIII, neither unpolished nor limited

Introduction

19

to particular episodes, but we have noticed in book II one passage which came to need revision but did not receive it, and two passages which were

not written until the end of the war. Book I, on the greatness of the war and the causes of the war, is thought by some to betray an attempt to superimpose a later view of the causes on an earlier, but | believe that it does not do so,

but embodies a carefully worked-out design (cf. on 23.6).’° It is, however, possible that the section on Pausanias and Themistocles in chs. 128—38 is an early essay, incorporated because Thucydides had written it rather than written in order to be incorporated (cf. on 126.1). The number of passages which are demonstrably early or late is not large. It is likely that the account of the years 431—421 was worked up to almost

its present form in the years after the Peace of Nicias, when the war seemed to be at an end, and that the accounts of Melos and the Sicilian expedition were similarly worked up soon after the events in question. No section of the history was definitively finished: later events might cause Thucydides to go

back and revise a passage which already existed in a polished form, but he never reached the final stage of going through all that he had written to try to bring everything up to date and remove all inconsistencies. Another matter should be mentioned here. For most of his narrative of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides follows a strict chronological sequence,

year by year, with each year divided into a summer of about eight months and a winter of about four months (cf. II. I, V. 26.1), and he does sometimes interrupt a major section of narrative to insert a report of some other event, presumably in its chronological place (cf. p. 10). However, he sometimes

steps outside that framework to complete a story in one stretch of narrative (e.g. MI. 93, IV. 50.3, where he adds later material to that belonging to a particular half-year),

or to introduce

material

needed

as background

explanation later than the time when it occurred (e.g. III. 34.1, 70.1, and especially VIII. 45-54). In the account of the pentecontaetia in book | he makes no claim to follow a strict chronological sequence, and should not be supposed to have done so: unnecessary problems have arisen when scholars have neverthelss assumed that he has done that (see, e.g., on 103. 1). His Language

Detailed treatment of Thucydides' language, and of the history of the text, is outside the scope of this series, but a little must be said here about '^

[argue this in Hermes 115 (1987), 154-65.

20

Introduction

these subjects.'’ In narrative passages his manner is for the most part very straightforward; as in the accounts of Corcyra and Potidaea (1. 24—66) and Athens’ war against Samos (I. 115.2-117) it can be extremely vivid. In speeches his style is elaborate and idiosyncratic, making great and sometimes forced use of antithesis (forced contrasts, e.g. I. 33.3, 69.3), but (unlike his contemporary, the Sicilian orator Gorgias) usually preferring variation in detail to an exact balance between the contrasted elements (I. 70.3 begins with two precisely matching elements but adds a non-matching third, and I. 33.2 is not perfectly balanced; see I. 73.1 for a passage where balance would have been possible but has been avoided); and it is 8 compressed style, in which *he often tries to

say too much in too few words','* so that the meaning may be hard to fathom. He is fond of abstract concepts, which he expresses sometimes by means of

abstract nouns, sometimes by means of a neuter adjective or participle with the definite article, and he is fond of verbs compounded by one or more prefixes, often producing forms which have few or no parallels in surviving classical literature. He sometimes uses, though not as often as Herodotus, the arrangement of material (particularly suited to oral performance) known

as ring composition, by which items are presented not in a linear sequence but through rings, and sometimes lesser rings within a greater ring, and the

beginning and end of a ring are signalled by the use of similar wording: for instance, in I. 1 he opens a large ring which is closed by various expressions

spread over 20-1.'? Though not always perfectly lucid, Thucydides was a writer of great skill, at a time when writing in prose was still a young art in Greece. There is little contemporary prose for us to compare with his, but if more existed we should expect to find many features which were distinctively his own: when we look for parallels in surviving texts, we can often find them more easily in contemporary drama than in later prose. The Text No scribe at any date is likely to have copied a substantial portion of the text in front of him without making errors of his own, and perhaps also emending (whether correctly or incorrectly) what he took to be errors in the text in front of him, so no copy of Thucydides' text is likely to be identical 17 A list of distinctive features of Thucydides' style may be found in K. J. Dover's small editions of books VI and VII, pp. xiii-xviii/xiii-xvii. 5 Dover, opp. citt., xviii/xvi-xvii. Similar criticism was made by ancient writers, such as

Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 7 Some Thucydidean rings are set out in W. R. Connor, Thucydides, apps 1, 2, 6, 7, 9.

Introduction

21

either with any other copy or with the text which Thucydides himself wrote. It is not always easy for us to identify and correct our predecessors’ errors, and neither this nor any other modern edition is likely to have succeeded at every point in recovering what Thucydides himself wrote (though every edition aims to do that). Thucydides' text is known to have existed in the ancient world in a number of different versions: our mediaeval manuscripts transmit a version which divides the text into eight books, but there is no indication of a division made by Thucydides himself, and we know that other versions existed which

divided the text into a larger number of books. Several papyrus fragments, written between the third century BC and the sixth century AD, contain parts of the text. In this edition I cite IT",

II'5, IT? and II?, papyri which contain parts of book I and offer significant readings.

For book I there are seven mediaeval manuscripts of primary importance, C, G, M, E, F, A and B; they appear to be derived in the main from a single

lost ancestor, ©, but to account for the differences between the surviving manuscripts scholars have been led to postulate several lost manuscripts which are independent of © but have affected one or more descendants of Θ. On 2.2 and 2.61

cite H, a later manuscript which in book I derives its original

text from © but has had corrections made from a source independent of ©. Because the relationship between the manuscripts is complex, we cannot draw clear lines of descent, or identify a group of ‘the best manuscripts’, whose authority could be followed when we had alternative readings both of which were intrinsically acceptable. A recent discussion of the manuscripts and attempt at a stemma are given by Maurer. A further manuscript of Thucydides, of the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, has recently been discovered in the library of the Lavra monastery on Mount Athos; there is a preliminary report of this by E. K.

Litsas.?! We also have indirect evidence for the text of Thucydides. There are places where ancient authors and commentators (themselves transmitted to us by generations of copyists) quote or expound Thucydides, and sometimes their text is different from that of our surviving copies. For example, on 90.3

and

elsewhere

| cite scholiasts

(commentators)

on Thucydides;

on

2.2 and elsewhere | cite other ancient texts and their scholiasts. Lorenzo 7

Interpolation in Thucydides, 217—27 app. v (discussion), 234 (stemma).

?

E. K. Lilsas, ‘EAAnvixa 50 (2000), 217-30.

22

Introduction

Valla, who completed a Latin translation of Thucydides in 1452, had access to manuscripts independent of those which now survive,” and on 3.3 and elsewhere I cite his translation. I also cite the sixteenth-century printed edition of H. Stephanus. In this edition [ provide a critical apparatus at all points where my text differs from the Oxford Classical Text of H. Stuart Jones, and at some points

where I accept the Oxford Text but significant doubts have been raised. For a catalogue of the papyri and manuscripts cited see p. 36. After Thucydides Thucydides' history immediately became a classic: other historians deliberately began their work where his ended (cf. below), and as far as we know no one wrote a history ofthe Peloponnesian War which was essentially independent of his. (There does, however, seem to have been an independent history of Sicily in this period: a fragment from that enables us to supplement Thucydides’ account of the campaign of 427—424, at III. 90.2.) Some subsequent writers produced general Greek histories, covering a

shorter or longer period. Xenophon, an Athenian who spent much of his life as a dependant of Sparta, in his Hellenica continued the story from 411 to 362: he was not an energetic enquirer; on many points other sources

disagree with him and are sometimes to be preferred to him; he tended to deal with matters which could not be presented in a manner creditable to Sparta by omitting them altogether. He also wrote the Anabasis, on an

exciting episode in which he was involved, and an account of his hero, the Spartan king Agesilaus. Ephorus, of Cyme in Asia Minor, wrote a general history of the Greeks and their neighbours from the legendary period to the

middle of the fourth century, and although that has not survived the section on the fifth and fourth centuries was extensively used in the universal history of Diodorus Siculus (cf. p. 24): after 411 he is a valuable alternative to Xenophon; for the earlier part of the Peloponnesian War his account was based on that of Thucydides, with some deviations to the greater glory of Athens from another source or his own invention; for the pentecontaetia on the matters treated by Thucydides he tends to give further details (whether reliable or not) on episodes mentioned by Thucydides rather than episodes

omitted by Thucydides. Theopompus of Chios wrote Hellenica, covering the period 411—394, and Philippica, presenting a universal history in a series 7? On the importance of Valla's translation see F. Ferlauto, // testo di tucidide e la traduzione Latino di Lorenzo Valla, and the review by D. M. Lewis, CR? 30 (1980), 276—8.

Introduction

23

of digressions from Philip II of Macedon. All of these were more given than Thucydides to moralising; Ephorus and Theopompus were both believed to have been pupils of the Athenian orator Isocrates, and Theopompus wrote

speeches before he turned to history. Many of the later Greek historians succumbed to rhetorical influence, and were more interested in pleasing their readers and in moralising than in investigating what had happened and explaining why it had happened. Those who were still interested in investigation tended to work on a smaller scale, compiling local histories, records of eponymous priests or Olympic victors, and the like: the first to write in this way was Thucydides' older contemporary,

Hellanicus of Lesbos (cf. p. 3). In and after the time

of Alexander the Great some of the leading generals wrote accounts of the affairs in which they had been involved: writers such as Nearchus and Ptolemy on Alexander and Hieronymus on the late fourth and early third centuries were at any rate in a position to know much of the truth, and were less given to rhetorical embellishment than the later writers who used them as sources. The last great Greek historian was another man of affairs, Polybius, who in the second century was taken to Rome as a hostage, became an admirer of Rome, and wrote an account of the growth of Rome's empire from 264

to 146. Polybius like Thucydides professed a serious purpose and criticised those who did not come up to his standards. He believed that history should be useful, and often protested that it should keep to the truth, of speeches as well as actions: he criticises Phylarchus for writing history like tragedy, which aims to be plausible and does not mind being false (II. 56); he criticises Timaeus for composing rhetorical exercises and passing over the speeches that were actually made (XII. 25b, cf. i). The historian needs research in libraries and archives, exploration of the terrain and personal experience of affairs (XII. 25e): Polybius’ details of the Carthaginian forces at the beginning of the Second Punic War are not plausible invention but are derived from an inscription (II]. 33.17-18); other accounts of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps are both false and contradictory, but Polybius credits him with a reasonable plan, and has himself interrogated witnesses and explored the terrain (III. 47.6—48). Two concessions are made: to report miracles is childish credulity, but what will support the piety of the masses can be pardoned as long as it does not go too far (XVI. 12.3-11); and the historian may yield to patriotic bias as long as it does not lead him into actual falsehood (XVI. 14.6—10). Polybius, like Thucydides, was human and

24

Introduction

should not be placed on a pedestal, but he had a sense of the historian's responsibility which was like that of Thucydides and not far from that of a modern historian.

From the time of Polybius the Greek world was part of the Roman, and historians writing in Greek were concerned as much with Rome as with

Greece. Diodorus Siculus (cf. p. 22) wrote a universal history down to 54 BC: for the most part he followed one main source at a time for each region, rearranging the material in annalistic form (without taking much

care to assign events to the correct years: see on 29.1) and adding moralising passages of his own. Appian of Alexandria, in the second century AD, wrote regional histories of the wars through which Rome's empire grew; and Cassius Dio of Bithynia, in the third, rose to be twice consul and wrote a history of Rome. Meanwhile, c. AD 100, Plutarch, of Chaeronea in Boeotia,

wrote parallel Lives to display the characters of famous Greeks and famous Romans; and in the second century Arrian, like Dio a man from Bithynia who

had a political career under the Romans, wrote histories of Alexander the Great and his successors in which he went back to early and well-informed sources. Greek had become the language of educated men throughout the

eastern Mediterranean, and histories written in Greek include the Jewish War and Jewish Antiquities of Josephus (first century AD), who used nonJewish as well as Jewish sources, and ended his life as a Roman citizen

living in Rome. 2. The Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War The Origins of the War By the beginning of the fifth century BC Sparta and Athens were the largest and strongest of the many city states into which Greece was divided, and most of the other states in the Peloponnese, the southern part of the Greek mainland, were organised under Sparta's leadership in a league of allies, known to modern scholars as the Peloponnesian League. In the middle of the sixth century Persia had made itself the leading kingdom of the Near East, and its conquests had extended to Asia Minor, including the Greek cities on the Aegean coast. In the 490s those cities had risen against Persia in the lonian Revolt. They appealed for help to the mainland Greeks, and

Sparta declined to help but Athens, regarded as the mother city of those who belonged to the lonian strand of the Greek people (see I. 2.6), did send help (though only for one year), and help was sent also by the Euboean city of

Introduction

25

Eretria. The revolt was put down, and it gave the Persians the excuse (if they thought they needed one) for trying to extend their conquests to mainland Greece. An invasion in 490 was aimed specifically at Athens and Eretria, and Eretria was overcome but Athens, with help from neighbouring Plataea (promised help from Sparta did not arrive until after the battle), defeated the Persians at Marathon. That added to Persia's desire for revenge. [n the 480s the Athenians took advantage of surplus revenue from their silver mines to equip themselves with two hundred warships (see I. 14.3), a much larger navy than any other state possessed. When the Persians embarked on a major invasion of Greece, in 480, Sparta was accepted with little dispute as the leader of the loyalist cities, and Athens provided by far the largest contingent in the loyalists’ navy (more than half of the total, though not the ‘little under two thirds' of I. 74.1). Though successful at first, the Persians were defeated at sea in 480, at Salamis, and on land in 479, at Plataea.

The Persians were never in fact to invade Europe again, but in 479 that could not have been predicted, and it seemed important to strike back at the Persians, in order to obtain revenge and to liberate the Greeks of western Asia Minor,

who

were still under Persian

rule, and also to guard against

subsequent Persian attacks. Already in 479 Greek forces landed on Cape Mycale, on the mainland of Asia Minor opposite Samos, and defeated the Persians there; later that year, when the Spartans and some of the allies had returned home, the Athenians led others in capturing Sestos, on the European side of the Hellespont (I. 89.2). In 478 the war continued, still under Spartan leadership; but the Spartan commander Pausanias, who first campaigned in

Cyprus and then captured Byzantium, made himself unpopular (1. 94—5). The original anti-Persian alliance was not dissolved, but in the winter of 4787 a new alliance (with its headquarters on the island of Delos, where there was an important sanctuary of Apollo, so the alliance is known to us as the Delian League) was founded under the leadership of Athens to continue the war against Persia. Sparta and the other Peloponnesian states did not join

this league, but did not at first feel threatened by it (1. 89, 94—7; and for the sanctuary on Delos cf. IE. 104). The Delian League began as an alliance of free states with a common purpose, in whjch the executive power was vested in Athens, and those among the members who remembered the lonian Revolt against Persia in the 490s will have realised the need for an acknowledged leader, and may have been

more afraid that Athens would lose interest in the war against Persia than that it

would abuse its position and infringe their independence. However, though the

26

Introduction

Athenians probably did not set out with selfish intentions, even in the earliest

campaigns of the league they found themselves presented with, and accepted, opportunities to advance the particular interests of Athens. The alliance had been made for all time, but the allies’ enthusiasm for an unending war was not

so durable, and as the Athenians insisted on the obligations of reluctant allies they became increasingly domineering: in particular, more and more members chose or were required to contribute cash (phoros, ‘tribute’) rather than ships of their own to the league's forces, and in this way they were weakened while Athens was strengthened (I. 98-101).

After the defeat ofthe Persian invasion of Greece, the Athenian Themistocles had seen Sparta as a rival of Athens (cf. I. 90—3, and other stories in which Themistocles is credited with an anti-Spartan stance); but he was on the losing

side in Athenian politics, and the league's early campaigns were directed by Cimon, who favoured good relations with Sparta. After an earthquake c. 465/4, when they were confronted with a revolt of their subject peoples in Laconia and Messenia, the Spartans appealed for help to all who had been their allies against Persia in 480—478, including Athens, and Cimon took a substantial

Athenian army to the Peloponnese. But men associated with Themistocles (who had himself been driven into exile with the Persians: I. 135—8) gained

the upper hand in Cimon's absence, in 462/1, and achieved a major democratic reform. They had been opposed to the sending of help to Sparta, and the Spartans, distrusting the new régime, dismissed Cimon and his army. The Athenians then broke off their alliance with Sparta, and joined instead with

Sparta’s enemies on the Greek mainland (I. 101—2). Between 460 and 454 the Athenians continued the war against Persia, in Cyprus (which was partly Greek) and Egypt (where there had been Greek

settlers for two hundred years), and at the same time fought to build up a powerful position on the Greek mainland: members of the Delian League were called on to help them, in Greece as well as against the Persians. However, the Egyptian campaign ended in disaster, and Cimon was killed

in a further campaign in Cyprus, while Athens' expansion in Greece lost momentum

(I. 103-12). From inscriptions we learn that in the late 450s

and early 440s Athens had to face a good deal of disaffection from league members, some of whom had Persian support, and that in dealing with this it took several further steps along the road which led it from being leader

of an alliance to being ruler of an empire. With the Persians driven out of the Aegean and Cimon dead, there was no longer enthusiasm in Athens for

continuing war against Persia, and c. 450 the war which the league had been

Introduction

27

founded to fight came to an end (whether de facto or by a formal treaty). Nevertheless, the league was not disbanded.

In 447/6 subjects in Greece whom Athens had acquired in the early 450s rebelled, and a Peloponnesian army commanded by the Spartan king Plistoanax invaded Attica. He turned back without attacking Athens, but the Athenians came to terms. By the Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5 Athens gave up its possessions on the mainland but its domination of the Aegean through the Delian League was recognised: Greece was divided into a Spartan-led, land-based bloc and an Athenian-led, sea-based bloc (1. 113-115.1). But, if expansion on the mainland was forbidden, Athens was still interested in expanding wherever it could: in the years after 446/5 we hear of colonies founded at Thurii, in southern Italy, at Amphipolis, in Thrace (IV. 102-3), and on the shores of the Black Sea. The equilibrium which the Thirty Years' Peace sought to establish was unstable. Thucydides' narrative of the events leading directly to the outbreak of the war (I. 24-88, 118.3-126.1, 139—46) begins with a war between Corinth,

the most powerful member of the Peloponnesian League after Sparta, and Corcyra, an island state off the north-west coast of Greece which had remained outside both blocs: in 433 each appealed to Athens for support,

and in the hope of weakening Corinth but avoiding a direct breach of the Thirty Years! Peace Athens granted limited aid to Corcyra (I. 24—55). In 433/2 Athens put pressure on Potidaea, which was a member of the Delian League but had strong links with Corinth, and Potidaea revolted: there was a

battle in which once more Athenians fought against Corinthians, and Athens began a long and expensive siege of Potidaea, which finally capitulated in 430/29 (I. 56-66, II. 58, 70). Also trouble arose between Athens and Megara (on the isthmus between Athens and Corinth), on which Athens was imposing economic sanctions in response to a border dispute and the alleged harbouring of runaway slaves; and Aegina (near to Athens in the Saronic Gulf), forced into the Delian League in the 450s, complained that it was being denied the autonomy promised in a treaty. Among the members of the Peloponnesian League, Corinth took the lead in protesting against Athens' conduct and putting pressure on Sparta, and in 432 first Sparta and then the Peloponnesian League formally decided to go to war against Athens, and to try to break the Athenian empire (for this objective cf. II. 8.4—5). Thucydides insists three times that what persuaded the Spartans was their fear of Athens' power, rather than the validity of the particular complaints

against Athens (I. 23.4—6, 88, 118.2). Technically the Peloponnesians were

28

Introduction

the aggressors (cf. II. 2.3, 10-12, 18-20, and VII. 18.2), and except perhaps

in the case of Aegina, whose complaint Thucydides reports without comment (I. 67.2, cf. 139.1, 140.3), Athens seems to have been careful not to break the letter of the Thirty Years' Peace. Some modern scholars accept that Athens

was indeed in the right. However, it can be argued that the Athenians knew that there was bound to be war with Sparta unless they gave up their ambitions (which of course they could not do), that in the late 430s they took a line which was provocative while remaining technically correct, in order to bring about the inevitable war in circumstances favourable to themselves, and that Thucydides has written not an impartial but a patriotically Athenian account

of the causes of the war.”* For ‘the Athenians’ we may read ‘Pericles’. He was one, but not yet the leading one, of the democrats who triumphed over Cimon in 462/1; and, although he never became the universally accepted leader that Thucydides in II. 65.4—10 would have us believe, he became

increasingly influential, and for the most part the policies pursued by Athens from c. 460 to 429 were his policies. Strategy; The Archidamian War Sparta was fighting to break the Athenian empire and liberate the Greeks from actual or threatened rule by Athens, so it needed a positive victory; Athens

needed only to survive unscathed. Sparta was a land power and Athens was a sea power: we are given figures for Athens’ own forces in II. 13.6-8, and

although we have no comparable figures for Athens' allies or for the Spartan side it is a reasonable assumption that Athens had a 3:1 superiority in ships (and the more skilled sailors) but the Spartans had a 3:1 superiority in heavy infantry (and no other city's soldiers were a match for Sparta's). Sparta began the war with the traditional Greek strategy, of invading the enemy's territory with a large army in the hope that they would come outside their fortifications to fight and be beaten (in 431, II. 10—23). In 431—428 these invasions were led by the Spartan king Archidamus, and the first phase of the war is known as the Archidamian War. However, the long walls built in the middle of the century had made a single fortified area of Athens and the harbour town of the Piraeus, and as long as they controlled the sea and had the money to pay for their purchases (and financially the Athenians were 7

Eg. de Ste. Croix, O.P.

7

Cf. my article cited on p. 19 n. 16. Badian in his article cited on p. 9 n. 6 goes beyond

my view of a Thucydides writing with Athenian bias to argue for a Thucydides writing with deliberate dishonesty to justify Athens.

Introduction

29

far stronger than their opponents: cf. 11. 13.2—5) the Athenians could afford to neglect their farms in Attica. Pericles' strategy for Athens, which tried the patience of some men, was therefore to stay inside the fortifications and not give the Spartans the infantry battle they wanted. Beyond that, according to Thucydides, he merely thought that it should maintain its naval strength, keeping a firm grip on the empire it already had but not seeking to extend it

(esp. II. 13.2, 65.7). In fact, in the first two years of the war Athens sent out large-scale, expensive naval expeditions, and if it had continued to operate on that scale it would have exhausted its funds long before the Peace of Nicias brought the war to an apparent end in 421 — but Thucydides' narrative of these expeditions in book II is disjointed and perfunctory, implying that they were casual raiding expeditions of no great importance. Almost all commentators have agreed that these expeditions are hard to reconcile with the picture of Periclean strategy painted by Thucydides: my own view 15 that Thucydides reflects Pericles' public statements and that those were more cautious than

Pericles’ private hopes.”* In 428 Thucydides shows the Athenians’ awareness of their financial difficulties (III. 19). The Athenians certainly adhered to the policy of keeping a firm grip on the empire they already had. The cities of the island of Lesbos were among the few which had not been subjected to pressure by Athens and still contributed ships to the Delian League. In 428 the largest city, Mytilene, led most of the island in revolt against Athens. Sparta promised support, but it was unable to gain the cooperation of its allies in an additional invasion of Attica at harvest time, and a naval squadron sent to Lesbos wasted time on the voyage and made enemies rather than friends for Sparta. Mytilene was blockaded during the winter; and in spring 427, when the Spartans failed to arrive and the people were starving, capitulated to Athens. Athens’ original decision, to kill all the men and enslave all the women and children, was superseded by a less extreme but still severe punishment. (III. 2—6, 8-18, 25, 27-50). Melos, the one Aegean island which had managed to stay outside the Athenian empire, was attacked in 426 but not captured (III. 91.1—2). As a sequel to Athens' dealings with Lesbos, in winter 425/4 Chios, still a ship-

contributing member of the League, attracted suspicion by building a new city wall, was ordered to demolish it, and after obtaining assurances from

Athens duly did so (IV. 51). When Athens supported Corcyra against Corinth, it was already possible 23

See commentary on 25. | in my edition of bookII.

30

Introduction

to envisage ἃ war in which the western Greeks, in southern Italy and Sicily, would be involved (I. 36.2, 44.3). In 433/2 Athens renewed alliances with Leontini

in Sicily

and

Rhegium

in the south-west

of Italy; most

of the

Greeks in the west were of Peloponnesian origin, and from the beginning of the war it was expected that they would support the Spartans against Athens (cf. II. 7.2). In fact they remained uninvolved; but in 427 Athens responded to an appeal to send help to Leontini. Thucydides writes of the resulting campaigns in a number of separate, low-key sections (beginning in III. 86), but it is clear that eventually, if not from the beginning, the Athenians committed large forces to the war in the west and, in a departure from the declared policy of Pericles, were hoping to add Sicily to their empire. In

424 fear of Athens led the Sicilian Greeks to make an agreement that they would resolve their disputes on their own, without outside intervention: the Athenian commanders had to accept that, but they were punished (IV. 58—65),

and this was not to be the end of Athens' involvement in Sicily (see V. 4—5, and pp. 33-4, below). Thucydides treats as the first episode of the war an attack by Thebes on Plataea, in the spring of 431 (II. 2-6). Plataea was on the Boeotian side of

the mountain range separating Boeotia from Attica, but since the late sixth century had refused to join the Boeotian federation dominated by Thebes, and had been an ally of Athens. In 429 Sparta began a siege of Plataea (11. 71—8); in winter 428/7 half of the men in Plataea managed to escape and make their way to Athens (III. 20—4); in the summer of 427, with no

prospect of help from Athens, the remainder surrendered, and they were put to death and the city was destroyed (III. 52-68). This was clearly to the advantage of Thebes, and made for easier communications between Thebes and the Peloponnese, but the importance of the destruction of Plataea for the course of the Peloponnesian War does not justify the amount of attention

which Thucydides devotes to it. The area under Peloponnesian influence which was most vulnerable to an attack by a naval power was north-western Greece, where there were many Corinthian colonies but also some friends of Athens, and this area

saw a good deal of activity in the early years of the war (beginning in 429: II. 80-2). As a sequel to Athens’ support for Corcyra against Corinth in 433, Corinth sent its captives back to Corcyra to try to get control of the city and bring it over to the Peloponnesian side: the result was a bitter civil

war which began in 427, with the democrats supported by Athens and the oligarchs by Sparta. This dragged on to 425, and ended with Athens' friends

Introduction

31

victorious but badly weakened (III. 69-85, IV. 2-5, 46—8). Since 429 Athens

had had a naval squadron based on Naupactus, on the north side of the Gulf of Corinth. In 426 Demosthenes, one of the most adventurous Athenian commanders, attempted to march from there in a north-easterly direction, perhaps hoping ultimately to reach Boeotia (in a year in which other Athenian forces attacked Boeotia directly); but he was using hoplites, heavy infantry,

in rough country where they at a disadvantage, and was trapped and badly defeated by the Aetolians at Aegitium (III. 94—8 with 91.3—6). He learned from this mistake, and in the following winter helped the Acarnanians to trap and defeat opposing forces near the Gulf of Ambracia (III. 105—114. 1). However, the peoples of north-western Greece, like the Sicilian Greeks later, became afraid of Athens and made a treaty of neutrality (III. 114.2—4);

and in 424/3 the Athenians were unsuccessful in another multiple attack on Boeotia, in which Demosthenes was again to approach from the west and had help from those in the west who were still well disposed to Athens

(IV. 76—7, 89—101.2). The one part of the Athenian empire which could be reached from Greece by a land power was the coast of Macedon and Thrace: when the war began,

Potidaea was under siege and its neighbours were in revolt from Athens, and king Perdiccas of Macedon in the interests of his own security wavered between friendship and hostility towards Athens. In 426 Sparta founded a colony at Heraclea Trachinia, near Thermopylae, which could serve as a base or a staging-post for activity in the north-east (III. 92-3). Brasidas, the most enterprising of the Spartan commanders in the Archidamian War (first mentioned, and already singled out, II. 25.2), took a small force via Heraclea

to Thrace in 424. Support from Sparta was luke-warm, on account of the Athenians' success at Pylos in 425 (cf. below), but he was so successful in

detaching north-eastern cities from their allegiance to Athens that special terms had to be provided for several of them in the Peace of Nicias, and Athens' colony Amphipolis, which should have been returned to Athens, defied the treaty with Spartan acquiescence (IV. 78-88, 102-32, V. 2-3,

6—13, 18.5-6, 21). Sparta would have hurt Athens more than it did by its annual invasions if it had been able to establish a permanent fortress within Attica as a base

from which to attack the Athenians all the year round (epiteichismos). This possibility is mentioned both by the Corinthians and by Pericles in speeches in book | (122.1, 142.2-4), and in 421 Sparta threatened to build a fort in order to secure Athens’ acceptance of the Peace of Nicias (V. 17.1 n.), but it

32

Introduction

was only in 413, after the Athenians had committed the most flagrant breach of the Peace of Nicias, and had sent so large a proportion of their manpower to Sicily that the risk seemed worth taking, that the Spartans established a post at Decelea, in northern Attica (VII. 18, 27—8). Similarly, Athens could most effectively have acted against Sparta by establishing a stronghold in Spartan territory, to interfere with Spartan agriculture and incite disaffection among the Spartans' large subject population. There is no sign that the Athenians contemplated this when they sent their large naval expeditions round the Peloponnese in the first two years of the war; but in 425 Demosthenes was able to establish an Athenian base at Pylos, on the coast of Messenia, and in the fighting which followed the Athenians captured a number of Spartan citizen soldiers, who became an important bargaining counter (IV. 3—23, 26-41). In 424 a second Athenian base was added, on the island of Cythera, off the coast of Laconia (IV. 53-7). Thucydides reports that these caused great fear in Sparta, but does not indicate that the fear was justified by the use which the Athenians made of them (see IV. 41.23, 55, V. 14, 2-3).

Athens was better prepared than Sparta to endure a long war (II. 13, cf. I. 80.34, 121-2, 141.2-143). If the war was prolonged, Sparta's best hope of outlasting Athens was to gain access to the comparatively unlimited resources of Persia; and Athens needed, if not to obtain Persian support for

itself, at any rate to prevent Sparta from obtaining it (II. 7.1, cf. I. 82.1).

In 430 Peloponnesian envoys to Persia were betrayed to the Athenians in Thrace (II. 67); and in 425/4 a Persian envoy to Sparta was captured by the Athenians (IV. 50.1—2). Presumably some Athenian approach to Persia lies behind the mockery of one in Aristophanes, Acharnians, 61—125, of 425. The

Athenians sent back the Persian whom they captured with representatives of their own: these turned back on learning of the King's death (IV. 50.3); but, although Thucydides does not mention it, other evidence makes it certain that once the new King was securely established Athens did succeed in obtaining a treaty. In 430 Athens was struck by a plague, which persisted until 426/5, killed about a third of the population and weakened many others (II. 47—54, cf. 58.23, III. 87). The effect of this was so demoralising that in 430 the Athenians attempted to make peace with Sparta and deposed Pericles from the office of general; but Pericles revived their determination to fight, and

was reelected general, though eventually he was one of those killed by the plague (II. 59.1—2, 65.2-6). However, after the capture of their soldiers at

Pylos in 425, the Spartans in turn were willing to admit defeat and offered

introduction

33

to make peace (IV. 41.34, cf. before the final capture 15-22). A one-year truce was made in 423 (IV. 117—9), but failed to hold in the Thracian region; the death of the Spartan Brasidas and the Athenian Cleon in a battle outside Amphipolis in 422 removed the men most strongly opposed to a settlement, and in 42] the Peace of Nicias, attempting with a few exceptions to return to

the position of 431, seemed to mark the end of the war (V. 14—24). The End of the War At first sight the Peace of Nicias represented a victory for Athens, in that Sparta's attempt to break the power of Athens had failed. But the Peace quickly proved to be unsatisfactory, and it can be argued that Athens placed itself at a disadvantage by returning the prisoners captured at Pylos without obtaining full implementation of the Peace on the Peloponnesian side. Sparta's allies did not share its reason for wanting peace, and some of them

refused to accept the Peace of Nicias (V. 17.2, 22.1). Argos, Sparta's chief opponent within the Peloponnese, had been kept out of the Archidamian War by a thirty-year peace treaty, but that expired in 421 (V. 14.4 cf. 22.2); some of the Peloponnesians disenchanted with Sparta joined Argos in an alliance, and an attempt to enlarge that alliance caused great confusion. In 420 Athens, unhappy with Sparta's half-hearted implementation of the Peace of Nicias, made an alliance with Argos and some other Peloponnesian states still opposed to Sparta: this combination offered the chance of an encounter on land in which Athens might be victorious; but in fact in 418, after an encounter outside Argos which led to the opposing commanders' making a truce without fighting, the battle of Mantinea was a victory for Sparta and enabled it to reassert its supremacy in the Peloponnese (V. 52-83). In 416/5, without any mention by Thucydides of provocation, the Athenians finally besieged and captured the island of Melos (cf. p. 29): Thucydides gives this episode detailed treatment, as an instance of the Athenians' unsentimental pursuit of power, and as a trivial success for Athens to be contrasted with the major setback which was to follow (V. 84—116, cf. pp. 9-10).

Most of the Greek cities in the west had been colonised from the Peloponnese, and at the beginning of the war were reckoned among Sparta's allies; during the Archidamian War they sent no help to Sparta, and Athens' intervention in Sicily to support Leontini against Syracuse, from 427 to 424, had to be abandoned when the Sicilian Greeks agreed to reject all outside interference (cf. p. 30). In 415 Athens accepted another invitation

34

Introduction

to intervene in Sicily — to support Egesta against Selinus, which had the

support of Syracuse, and to reassert the independence of Leontini, which had by now been absorbed into Syracuse. In Athens the intervention was championed by the ambitious Alcibiades and opposed by the cautious Nicias. Large and ambitious forces were sent and great hopes were invested in them, and the hopes and the forces were made even larger in response to Nicias' attempt to prevent the expedtiion by arguing that the forces initially proposed were insufficient (VI. 6—32). Although Egesta was unable to provide the help it had offered, and Alcibiades, recalled to stand trial on religious charges in Athens, fled to exile in Sparta (VI. 33-93), in 414 the Athenians came close to capturing Syracuse, but support for Syracuse from

the Peloponnese, though not on a large scale, arrived just in time to prevent the Syracusans from surrendering to Athens, and in 413, although they had themselves received substantial reinforcements, the Athenians were

disastrously defeated. This was a great blow to their morale, and the drain on in by to

their resources seriously weakened them. (VI. 94-VIIT. 1). Meanwhile, 413 the Spartans established their raiding base at Decelea (cf. p. 32), and occupying that until the end of the war they kept the Athenians confined their urban fortifications all the year round (VII. 18-19, 27—8). Although in the late 420s the Athenians had made a treaty with the

Persians (cf. pp. 12, 32), about 414 they supported a rebel called Amorges against the Persian King. After this provocation, the Persians were prepared to support the Spartans against Athens; and although not all Spartans were

happy to pay Persia's price (the return of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian rule), and at some times some Athenians thought that Persia's support could be diverted to them, Persia's support did eventually enable Sparta to defeat Athens. After Athens' failure at Syracuse, its subjects in the Aegean were less afraid to challenge it. Fighting there began in 412. Matters were complicated by Alcibiades’ falling out with the Spartans, migrating to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes and suggesting to the Athenians that, if the democracy were replaced by an oligarchy and he were restored to Athens, he could divert Persian support from Sparta to Athens. That diversion was never realised, but Alcibiades' intrigues did prompt a change from democracy to oligarchy in 411 (though the democracy was restored in 410), and Alcibiades did join the Athenian fleet in 411 and his conviction was formally rescinded in 407 (but he went into exile again in' 406 after a subordinate of his had been defeated). Thuc. VIII deals with the war and the changes in Athens as far as the autumn of 411. Athens had a run of successes from 411 to 408, and

Introduction

35

there were times when it looked as if it might yet win the war; but in the end Sparta's victory at Aegospotami in 405 left it in control of the Hellespont and able to cut off Athens' vital imports, and left Athens unable to build, equip and man another fleet. Athens was blockaded during the winter of 405/4, and capitulated in the spring. It lost its empire (the Asiatic Greeks were claimed by Persia, but they and the other members passed at any rate for a few years into the hands of Sparta), its long walls and nearly all its navy, and became a subordinate ally of Sparta.

But this was not a final settlement of the balance of power in Greece: in 395 Athens was to join former allies of Sparta in a new war against Sparta, and in 378 it was to found a new league, of states wishing to defend their independence against Sparta, while in 371—369 Sparta was to suffer at the hands of Thebes defeats on land of a kind which Athens had not been able to inflict on it.

3. Summary of Book I 123.3 ]

INTRODUCTION Preface: Peloponnesian War greater than any previous war

2-19

‘Archaeology’: growth of Greek power, to justify that claim

20

Difficulty of getting history right

21

Previous wars not as great as Peloponnesian War

22 23.1-3

How Thucydides has written his history Greatness of Peloponnesian War

23.4-146

CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

23.46 24-55 56—66 67-88

Grievances and disputes, truest reason Corcyra (435-433) Potidaea (433—432) First meeting in Sparta (432)

89-118

Pentecontaetia: growth of Athenian power (from 479/8)

119-25 126-38

Congress of Peloponnesian League tn Sparta (432) Digression on past episodes raised in propaganda: Cylon, Pausanias,

139-46

Athenian response to Spartan pressure (432/1 )

Themstocles

36

Introduction

4. Abbreviations used in Critical Apparatus (cf. pp. 20-2) II^ IT% IIT? I>

— Oxyrhynchus Papyri x. 1245 (London): contains I. 139.4-141.3 Lund Papyri 2 (Lund): contains I. 49.6—50.2 Hamburg Papyri 163 (Hamburg): contains I. 2.2-3.1, 28.3-29.3 Oxyrhynchus Papyri xxxiv. 2073 (London): contains I. 110.2-4

C4 C2 C3 BC” C2/3

C

Cod. Laurentianus LXIX. 2 (Florence)

C10

G

Cod. Monacensis gr. 228 (Munich)

C13

M

Cod. Britannicus add. 11727 (London)

CI]

E

Cod. Palatinus gr. 252 (Heidelberg)

CI]

F

Cod. Monacensis gr. 430 (Munich)

A B

Cod. Parisinus suppl. gr. 255 (Paris) Cod. Vaticanus gr. 126 (Vatican)

H

Cod. Parisianus gr. 1734 (Paris)

MSS

consensus of CGMEFAB

others

consensus of CGMEFAB except as otherwise stated

rec

one or more of the manuscripts not listed above

Valla

L. Valla, Latin translation of Thucydides, in Cod. Vaticanus lat. 1801 (Vatican)?

Stephanus schol.

26 27

Cll

C11/12 Cll Cl4

1452

Η. Stephanus, Greek text, and Latin translation based on that of Valla scholiast (anonymous ancient commentator)

1564; 71588

For the date see E. G. Turner, JHS Ixxvi 1956, 96-8. Reproduction with Introduction published by M. H. Chambers, Valla’s Translation of

Thucydides in Vat. Lat. 1801.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Details of articles in periodicals are given where they are cited. Here | give details of all books which I cite, apart from editions of Thucydides cited only for their emendations of the Greek text and standard editions of other classical authors; and | include details of a limited selection of other

relevant books which are not specifically cited. When a book has different publishers in the UK and the USA, the American publisher is named second, in parentheses; | note in square brackets the abbrevations which I use for some frequently-cited books. Greek text The most recent major editions are: ed. Alberti, G. B. (book | in vol. 1, 1972). 3 volumes. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1972-2000. ed. Romilly, J. de, with Weil, R., and Bodin, L. (Coll. Budé: with French translation).

6 volumes (book I by de Romilly in vol. i, *1958). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1953-72; i? 1958. ed. Stuart Jones, H., with apparatus criticus revised by Powell, J. E. (Oxford Classical Texts). 2 volumes (book | in i). Oxford U. P, 1942; index revised

1963. Commentary Dover, K. J. Thucydides Book VI and Thucydides Book VII, with an Introduction and Commentary. Oxford U. P., 1965. Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A., and Dover, K. J. À Historical Commentary on Thucydides. 5 volumes (book 1 by Gomme, in vol. i, 1945). Oxford U. P., 194581; 1 corrected

1950. [N.B. this is cited by the commentator's name when the

reference is to a note on the passage under discussion, otherwise as H.C.T.] Hornblower,

S.

4 Commentary on Thucydides.

3 volumes (book

1 in vol. i, 1991,

rev. 1997). Oxford U. P., 1991-2008. [N.B. this is cited as Hornblower when the reference isto a note on the passage under discussion, otherwise as Hornblower, Commentary.| Marchant, E. C. Thucydides Book I. London: Macmillan (New York: St Martin's

P.), 1905; with new introduction and bibliography by T. Wiedemann, Bristol Classical P., 1982, rev. 1993.

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Pothou, V. Θουκυδίδου apyaioloyia kai πεντηκονταετία. Athens: Papazese, 2012. [N.B. this is cited as Pothou when the reference is to a note on the passage under discussion.]

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English translation by Crawley, R. London: Longmans, 1874; revised by Feetham, R. C. (Temple Classics) London: Dent, 1903; reissued (Everyman's Library) London: Dent (New York: Dutton), 1910; reissued London: Dent (Rutland, VT: Tuttle), 1993; reissued Wordsworth, 1997; revised in The Landmark Thucydides, ed. Strassler, R. B., with an Introduction by Hanson, V. D., New York: The Free Press, 1996. by Hammond, M., with Introduction and Notes by Rhodes, P. J. (Oxford World's Classics) Oxford U. P., 2009. by Hobbes, R. London: Seile, 1629; edited by Grene, D., U. of Michigan P., 1959; reissued U. of Chicago P., 1989. by Smith, C. F. (Loeb Classical Library: with Greek text). 4 volumes (book I in i). London: Heinemann (Harvard U. P.), 1919—23; revised 1928-35.

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OOYKYAIAOY ΞΥΓΓΡΑΦΗΣΑ

THUCYDIDES HISTORY I

ΘΟΥΚΥΔΊΔΟΥ

Ξυγγραφῆς Α (1) Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου

καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ἦσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῇ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὁρῶν ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, τὸ μὲν εὐθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούμενον. (2) κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων. (3) τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαίτερα σαφῶς μὲν

εὑρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἀδύνατα ἦν, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα. (2) φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλὰς καλουμένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη,

ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὖσαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες βιαζόμενοι ὑπό τινων αἰεὶ πλειόνων. (2) τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιμειγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοί τε τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὃν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, OÙ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ἴσχυον οὔτε τῇ ἄλλη παρασκευῇ. (3) μάλιστα δὲ τῆς

γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη αἰεὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν οἰκητόρων εἶχεν, ἥ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία καλουμένη καὶ Βοιωτία Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ πλὴν Ἀρκαδίας, τῆς τε

ἄλλης ὅσα ἦν κράτιστα. (4) διὰ γὰρ ἀρετὴν γῆς αἵ τε δυνάμεις τισὶ μείζους ἐγγιγνόμεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν ἐξ ὧν ἐφθείροντο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπὸ ἀλλοφύλων μᾶλλον ἐπεβουλεύοντο. (5) τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ

λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν ἄνθρωποι ᾧκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί. (6) καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι διὰ τὰς μετοικίας [ἐς] τὰ 2.2.

ἡγούμενοι before πανταχοῦ av IT". ἀπανίσταντο: ἀνίσταντο II?, correction in M, Dion. Hal. περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων (ii. 107 Usener ἃ Radermacher).

2.6.

παρασκευῇ: διανοίᾳ MM, variant noted in H, perhaps rightly, cf. Maurer, /nterpolation, 100-1. μετοικίας [ἐς] Hornblower: μετοικίας ἐς MSS, μετοικεσίας variant noted in H, adopted by Alberti, μετοικήσεις ἐς Ullrich.

THUCYDIDES History 1 (1) Thucydides the Athenian wrote up the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians, how they fought against each other, beginning immediately as the war got under way, and expecting it to be a great war and more noteworthy than its predecessors. He took as an indication of this that both sides went into it at the peak of every form of preparation, and he saw that the rest of the Greek world was aligning itself with the two sides, part of it immediately and part also considering it. (2) For this was the greatest arousal for the Greeks and for a part of the barbarians, and one might say for most of mankind. (3) What happened before it and what was more ancient still it was impossible to discover clearly because of the distance in time, but, on the basis of the

indications which I have found trustworthy when examining as far back as possible, ! consider that those affairs were not great either with regard to the Wars or in other respects. (2) For it is evident that what is now called Greece was not securely settled in antiquity, but previously there were migrations and each community would easily leave its territory under violent pressure from people who were at the time more numerous. (2) For there was no trade, and they did not mix fearlessly

with one another either by land or by sea, but each group made use of what it possessed sufficiently to live off it, and they did not have a surplus of wealth or grow plants on the land, since it was uncertain when some one else might

attack and (as they had no fortifications) carry things away. Everywhere they thought it sufficient to control what they needed for daily sustenance, and so removal was not a great hardship and for this reason they did not become strong either with cities or with provisions of other kinds. (3) It was particularly the best land which was always subject to changes of inhabitants, what are now

called Thessaly and Boeotia, and much of the Peloponnese apart from Arcadia, andthe areas which were best elsewhere. (4) Because ofthe quality of the land some groups' powers increased, but gave rise to dissensions through which they were destroyed, and at the same time they were more subject to plots by foreigners. (5) The land of Attica, at any rate, from the remotest times on account of its meagre soil was free from dissension and always inhabited by the same people. (6) Not the least example to support my argument that owing to migrations other places did not increase to the same extent is this: from the

48

Thucydides

ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι’ ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ πολέμωι ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίους οἱ δυνατώτατοι ὡς βέβαιον ὃν ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ πολῖται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἔτι ἐποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων ~

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History 1

49

rest of Greece the strongest of those driven out by war or dissension came to the Athenians as a secure refuge, and becoming citizens they immediately made the city still greater than in antiquity through the size of its population, in consequence of which later, when the land of Attica became insufficient,

they sent out colonies to lonia. (3) Also the following point is not the least demonstration for me of the weakness of things in antiquity. It is evident that before the Trojan War there was no achievement of Greece as a whole. (2) Indeed, I judge that the whole of Greece did not yet have this name, Hellas, but in the time before Hellen the son of Deucalion this appellation did not exist at all; but various peoples and in particular the Pelasgians gave the land a name derived from themselves.

But, as Hellen and his sons were

powerful

in Phthiotis, and

they were invited to the other cities to give help, eventually because of the contact between them the separate peoples came increasingly to be called Hellenes, but it was only after a long time that this name prevailed for all.

(3) Homer gives the best indication of this: for he lived a long time after the Trojan War, but he nowhere gives the name Hellenes to all of them, or to

any others than the men who came with Achilles from Phthiotis, who were indeed the first Hellenes, but in his poems he calls them Danaans, Argives and Achaeans. Nor indeed has he mentioned barbarians, because,

| judge,

the Hellenes had not yet been distinguished by a single name in opposition to them. (4) Those who came to be called Hellenes, separately by cities as they came to understand one another, and together later, achieved nothing

collectively before the Trojan War because of their weakness and lack of contact with one another. And it was after they had come to make more use of the sea that they went out jointly on that expedition. (4) Minos was the most ancient of those whom we know from oral tradition who acquired a navy, and gained control for the most part of what is now the Greek sea; and he ruled over the Cyclades islands and was the first settlement-founder of most of them, driving out the Carians and installing his own sons as leaders. As one would reckon likely, he cleared the sea of

piracy as far as he could, so that the revenues should come rather to himself.

(5) For in antiquity the Greeks and those of the barbarians who occupied coastal sites on the mainland, and the islands, when they took more and more to crossing the sea in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the leadership of men who were by no means the least powerful, for the sake of their own gain and sustenance for the weak. They fell on cities which were unfortified and settled as collections of villages, and raided them and gained most of their livelihood in this way. There was no disgrace attached to this

50

Thucydides

(2) δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἠπειρωτῶν τινὲς ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ

ὁμοίως ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελὲς εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων. (3) ἐλήζοντο δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἀλλήλους. καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται περί τε Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀζόλας καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ ἤπειρον. τό τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τούτοις τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς λῃστείας ἐμμεμένηκεν᾽ (6) πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει διὰ τὰς ἀφάρκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν δίαιταν μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι. (2) σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τῆς Ελλάδος ἔτι οὕτω νεμόμενα τῶν ποτὲ καὶ ἐς πάντας ὁμοίων διαιτημάτων. | (3) ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀνειμένηι τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν’ ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ Ἰώνων τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἐπὶ πολὺ αὕτη ἡ σκευὴ κατέσχεν. (4) μετρίᾳ δ᾽ αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαιτοι μάλιστα κατέστησαν. (5) ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἠλείψαντο᾽ τὸ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγῶνι διαζώματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἠγωνίζοντο, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐπειδὴ πέπαυται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν οἷς νῦν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀσιανοῖς, πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης ἅθλα τίθεται, καὶ διεζωμένοι τοῦτο δρῶσιν. (6) πολλὰ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξειε τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτώμενον. (7) τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα ὠικίσθησαν καὶ ἤδη πλωϊμωτέρων ὄντων, περιουσίας μᾶλλον ἔχουσαι χρημάτων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς τείχεσιν ἐκτίζοντο καὶ τοὺς ἰσθμοὺς ἀπελάμβανον ἐμπορίας τε ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προσοίκους ἕκαστοι ἰσχύος" αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ διὰ τὴν λῃστείαν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντίσχουσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ὠκίσθησαν, al τε £v ταῖς νήσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἠπείροις (ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὄντες οὐ

6.3.

διὰ τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον omitted schol. Ar. Clouds 989 and other indirect sources, deleted Herwerden, defended Maurer, /nterpolation, 66-17.

History |

51

activity, but rather it brought an element of glory. (2) This is demonstrated by some of the mainlanders even now, who take pride in doing this well, and

by the ancients among the poets, who everywhere alike record the questions put to those who sail in, asking if they are pirates, on the assumption that those whom they questioned would not deny the practice and those who were concerned to know would not reproach them. (3) They also engaged in

piracy against one another on the mainland, and until now much of Greece has had the ancient manner of life, in the region of the Ozolian Locrians, the Aetolians and the Acarnanians and the mainland there. The custom of carrying weapons has persisted among these mainlanders from their ancient practice of piracy. (6) For the whole of Greece used to carry weapons, because their settlements were unprotected and they did not have safe access to one another, and so they adopted the custom of living with arms like the barbarians. (2) The fact that in these parts of Greece men still live like that is a sign of customs which once extended to all alike. (3) The Athenians were the first to lay aside their weaponry and with a relaxed way of life turn to greater luxury. It is not long since the older men in the prosperous class gave up the delicate fashion of wearing linen tunics and

fastening the hair on their head in a bun with golden grasshoppers inserted. As a result of that the same fashion has prevailed to a great extent with the

older men among the lonians too, because of their kinship with the Athenians. (4) The Spartans were the first to wear modest clothing in the current fashion, and in general those of them with greater possessions particularly adopted a style of equality with the many. (5) And they were the first to go naked and to strip in public and anoint themselves with oil when they took exercise: in antiquity, even in the Olympic competition the athletes wore loincloths around their private parts when they competed, and it is not many years since this practice ceased. Even now among some of the barbarians, particularly those in Asia, there are contests for boxing and wrestling, and they take part wearing loincloths. (6) One could point to many other indications that the Greek way of life in antiquity was similar to the barbarian today. (7) Those of the cities which were settled most recently, when sailing had become more frequent, tended to have a surplus of wealth, and were established right on the shore-lines with walls, and cut off isthmuses, for the sake of trade and strength against each city's neighbours. The ancient ones because of the great prevalence of piracy were rather founded away from the sea, both on the islands and on the mainland (for the pirates used to plunder both one another and those who were not seafarers but lived on the coasts),

52

Thucydides

θαλάσσιοι κάτω okovv), καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε ἔτι ἀνῳκισμένοι εἰσίν. (8) καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον λῃσταὶ ἦσαν οἱ νησιῶται, Küpéc τε ὄντες καὶ Φοίνικες οὗτοι γὰρ δὴ τὰς πλείστας τῶν νήσων ᾧκησαν. μαρτύριον δέ“ Δήλου γὰρ καθαιρομένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τῶν θηκῶν ἀναιρεθεισῶν ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ Κᾶρες ἐφάνησαν, γνωσθέντες τῇ

τε σκευῇ τῶν ὅπλων ξυντεθαμμένῃ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ νῦν ἔτι θάπτουσιν. (2) καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ πλωϊμώτερα ἐγένετο παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους

(οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νήσων κακοῦργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατῴκιζε), (3) καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ᾧὥκουν, καί τινες καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιώτεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. (4) καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὄντες ὕστερον χρόνῳ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν. (9) Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὅρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστῆρας ἄγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι. (2) λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμῃ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι Πέλοπάτε πρῶτον πλήθει χρημάτων, ἃ ἦλθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔχων ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἀπόρους, δύναμιν περιποιησάμενον τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῆς χώρας ἔπηλυν ὄντα ὅμως σχεῖν, καὶ ὕστερον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις ἔτι μείζω ξυνενεχθῆναι, Εὐρυσθέως μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀποθανόντος, Ἀτρέως δὲ μητρὸς ἀδελφοῦ ὄντος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὐρυσθέως, ὅτ᾽ ἐστράτευε, Μυκήνας τε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον Ἀτρεῖ (τυγχάνειν δὲ αὐτὸν φεύγοντα τὸν πατέρα διὰ τὸν Χρυσίππου θάνατον), καὶ ὡς οὐκέτι ἀνεχώρησεν Εὐρυσθεύς, βουλομένων καὶ τῶν

Μυκηναίων φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν καὶ ἅμα δυνατὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τεθεραπευκότα τῶν Μυκηναίων τε καὶ ὅσων Εὐρυσθεὺς ἦρχε, τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀτρέα παραλαβεῖν, καὶ τῶν Περσειδῶν τοὺς Πελοπίδας μείζους καταστῆναι. (3) ἅ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβὼν καὶ ναυτικῷ [τε] ἅμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύσας, τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιήσασθαι. (4) φαίνεται γὰρ ναυσί τε πλείσταις αὐτὸς ἀφικόμενος καὶ Ἀρκάσι προσπαρασχών, ὡς Ὅμηρος τοῦτο δεδήλωκεν, εἴ τωι ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι. καὶ ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἅμα τῆι παραδόσει εἴρηκεν

9.3.

[τε] om. rec., deleted Krüger: δὲ Reiske.

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53

and these have remained inland settlements until now. (8) The islanders in particular were pirates, being Carians and Phoenicians — for it was they who inhabited most of the islands. Here is evidence: when Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war and the graves of those who had died on the island were dug up, more than half were seen to be Carians, identified by

the fashion of the arms buried with them and by the manner in which they still bury their dead. (2) When Minos established a navy, sailing between

them became easier (for he expelled the wrongdoers from the islands when he was settling most of them), (3) and the people living by the sea turned increasingly to the acquisition of wealth and lived more securely, and some built circuit walls as they were growing richer than they had been before. For in their desire for gain the weaker accepted enslavement by the stronger, and those who were more powerful and possessed of surpluses attached the lesser cities to themselves as subjects. (4) They were already living more in this manner when later they campaigned against Troy. (9) In my judgment it was because Agamemnon was foremost in power among his contemporaries, and not so much because he was leader of the suitors of Helen bound by the oaths of Tyndareus, that he mustered the

expedition. (2) Those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest account by tradition from their predecessors claim that Pelops first, with the surplus of wealth with which he came from Asia to people lacking resources,

built up his power and, foreigner though he was, became the man after whom the land was named. Later power accrued to his descendants even more, when Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the Heraclidae. Atreus was Eurystheus' mother's brother, and when Eurystheus set out on his campaign he had entrusted Mycenae and his kingdom to Atreus in accordance with the

family connection. (Atreus had fled from his father because of the killing of Chrysippus.) When Eurystheus failed to return, the Mycenaeans were willing to accept because of their fear ofthe Heraclidae, and Atreus appeared capable and had cultivated the masses. So he took over the kingdom of Mycenae and all that Eurystheus had ruled, and the Pelopidae became greater than the Perseidae. (3) | judge that, when Agamemnon had succeeded Atreus, and at the same time had gained greater naval strength than the others, he made the expedition by assembling the forces not so much through popularity as through fear. (4) It is evident that he arrived at Troy with the largest number of ships himself and in addition provided ships for the Arcadians, as Homer has shown, ifhe is a sufficient indicator for anybody. Also in the transmission of the sceptre Homer has stated that Agamemnon ‘was lord of many islands

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αὐτὸν πολλῇσι νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν" οὐκ ἂν οὖν νήσων ἔξω τῶν περιοικίδων (αὗται δὲ οὐκ ἂν πολλαὶ εἶεν) ἠπειρώτης ὧν ἐκράτει, εἰ μή τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν. εἰκάζειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στρατείᾳ οἷα ἦν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς.

(10) καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἢ εἴ τι τῶν τότε πόλισμα νῦν μὴ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀκριβεῖ ἄν τις σημείῳ χρώμενος ἀπιστοίη μὴ γενέσθαι τὸν στόλον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἵ τε ποιηταὶ εἰρήκασι καὶ ὁ λόγος κατέχει. (2) Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη, λειφθείη δὲ τά τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἂν οἶμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθόντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς ἔπειτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι (καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται, τῆς τε ξυμπάσης ἡγοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἔξω ξυμμάχων πολλῶν’ ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑποδεεστέρα), ᾿Αθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων διπλασίαν ἂν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φανερᾶς ὄψεως τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἔστιν. (3) οὔκουν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός, οὐδὲ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν πόλεων μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὰς δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην μεγίστην μὲν γενέσθαι τῶν πρὸ αὑτῆς, λειπομένην

δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ Ὁμήρου αὖ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρὴ κἀνταῦθα πιστεύειν, ἣν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσμῆσαι, ὅμως δὲ φαίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα. (4) πεποίηκε γὰρ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων νεῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτήτου πεντήκοντα, δηλῶν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας ἄλλων γοῦν μεγέθους πέρι ἐν νεῶν καταλόγωι οὐκ ἐμνήσθη. αὐτερέται δὲ ὅτι ἦσαν καὶ μάχιμοι πάντες, £v ταῖς Φιλοκτήτου ναυσὶ δεδήλωκεν" τοξότας γὰρ πάντας πεποίηκε τοὺς προσκώπους. περίνεως δὲ οὐκ εἰκὸς πολλοὺς ξυμπλεῖν ἔξω τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐν τέλει, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλοντας πέλαγος περαιώσεσθαι μετὰ σκευῶν πολεμικῶν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὰ πλοῖα κατάφαρκτα ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ λῃστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα. (5) πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐλαχίστας ναῦς τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῇ πεμπόμενοι. (11) αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηματία. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορίαι τόν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν

History 1

55

and all Argos’; and as a mainlander he would not have been able to rule over

islands except those in the immediate vicinity (which would not prove to be many) unless he had some naval force. One should also reckon from this expedition the likelihood of how things were before it. (10) And because Mycenae was small, or if any of the townships of that

time does not seem significant now, this would not be a reliable sign to justify disbelief that the force was as large as the poets have stated and the story maintains. (2) For if the city of Sparta were depopulated, and there remained the sanctuaries and the foundations of the buildings, | think that

after the passage of time there would be great disbelief among those living later that its power matched its reputation. Yet the Spartans occupy two of the five parts of the Peloponnese, and are leaders of the whole and of many allies outside. Nevertheless, because the city has not been built into a unity or equipped with expensive sanctuaries and buildings, but is inhabited as a

collection of villages in the ancient Greek manner, it would seem inferior to its reputation; but if the same thing happened to Athens one would estimate from the visible appearance of the city that its power was twice as great as it actually is. (3) It is not reasonable, then, to disbelieve, or to examine the

appearance of cities rather than their power. We should consider that the expedition was greater than those before it, but fell short of those undertaken now, if again it is right to have some belief in the poetry of Homer here: as a poet he would be likely to adorn and exaggerate, but even on his account the expedition seems somewhat inferior. (4) For in the twelve hundred ships he

has made those of the Boeotians of a hundred and twenty men and those of Philoctetes of fifty, showing, in my judgment, the largest and the smallest: at least, he has not recorded the size of the others in the catalogue of ships. That the men were all fighting men who rowed their own ships he has shown in the ships of Philoctetes: for he has made all the oarsmen archers. It is not

likely that there would have been many supernumeraries sailing with them, apart from the kings and those in the highest offices, particularly as they were going to cross the sea with equipment for war, and again their boats did not have decks but were equipped more like pirate vessels in the ancient manner. (5) If then one examines the mean on the basis of the largest and smallest ships, it is evident that the number of men who went was not large,

considering that they were sent jointly from the whole of Greece. (11) The reason was not so much shortage of people as lack of wealth. For because of the difficulty of sustenance they took a smaller army, which they expected to be able to live off the local resources while fighting, after

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πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν (δῆλον 6€ τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῶι στρατοπέδωι οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο), φαίνονται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καὶ λῃστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ. à καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ Τρῶες αὐτῶν

διεσπαρμένων τὰ δέκα ἔτη ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειπομένοις ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες. (2) περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἁθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάχῃ

κρατοῦντες [εἷλον], οἵ γε καὶ οὐχ ἁθρόοι, ἀλλὰ μέρει τῶι αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖχον, πολιορκίᾳ δ᾽ ἂν προσκαθεζόμενοι

ἐν ἐλάσσονί τε χρόνωι καὶ

ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἷλον. ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἀχρηματίαν τά τε πρὸ τούτων ἀσθενῆ ἦν καὶ αὐτά ye δὴ ταῦτα, ὀνομαστότατα τῶν πρὶν γενόμενα, δηλοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα τῆς φήμης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς λόγου κατεσχηκότος᾽ (12) ἐπεὶ καὶ μετὰ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατωικίζετο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασαν αὐξηθῆναι. (2) ἥ τε γὰρ ἀναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξ Ἰλίου χρονία γενομένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχμωσε,

καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐκπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον. (3) Βοιωτοί τε γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἑξηκοστῷ ἔτει μετὰ Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν μὲν Βοιωτίαν πρότερον δὲ

Καδμηΐδα γῆν καλουμένην ὦὥκισαν (ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασμὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταὐύτῇ, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν), Δωριῆς τε ὀγδοηκοστῷ ἔτει ξὺν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἔσχον. (4) μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε, καὶ "Iovac μὲν ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ὥκισαν, Ἰταλίας δὲ καὶ Σικελίας τὸ πλεῖστον Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς τε ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἔστιν ἃ χωρία. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὕστερον τῶν Τρωικῶν ἐκτίσθη. (13) δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων (πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι). ναυτικά τε ἐξηρτύετο ἡ Ἑλλάς, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ἀντείχοντο. (2) πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθωι πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ναυπηγηθῆναι. (3) φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμίοις

11.2.

κρατοῦντες [εἷλον] del. Krüger, cf. Maurer, /nterpolation, 119--20.

History 1

57

they had arrived and gained the upper hand in battle (that they did that is

clear: otherwise they would not have been able to build a fortification to protect their camp). It is evident that they did not use the whole of their force

there, but because of the difficulty of sustenance they turned to farming in the Chersonese and piracy. This is why, while they were dispersed, the Trojans Were more able to hold out in force for the ten years, since they were

a match for those left on the spot at any time. (2) If they had gone taking a surplus of sustenance, and had been able to carry on the war continuously, all together without brigandage and farming, they would easily have gained

the upper hand in battle and have taken Troy, given that when they were not all together they were able to hold out with the division present at any time; and if they had been able to take up position before Troy they would have taken it by siege in a shorter time and with less trouble. But owing to lack of wealth enterprises before this were weak; and this one, more famous

than those which occurred earlier, is shown by the facts to be inferior to its reputation and to the story which is now current about it through the poets; (12) since even after the Trojan War Greece continued in a state of upheaval and settlement, so that it did not have the peace to increase. (2) For the return of the Greeks from Troy took a long time and produced many revolutions; and to a great extent there was dissension in the cities, as a result of which men were driven out and founded new cities. (3) In the sixtieth year after the

capture of Troy those who are now Boeotians were expelled from Arne by the Thessalians and occupied the land which is now called Boeotia but was previously called Cadmeis (but there was an offshoot of them in this land earlier, from whom the Boeotians went on the eightieth year the Dorians together with of the Peloponnese. (4) With difficulty and secure peace and an end of expulsions, and

the the over sent

campaign to Troy); and in Heraclidae took possession a long time Greece gained out colonies: the Athenians

settled the Ionians and many of the islanders, and the Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest of Greece. All these were founded after the Trojan War. (13) As Greece became more powerful, and now engaged in the acquisition of wealth more than before, in most cases tyrannies were established in the cities as the revenues increased (previously there had been hereditary kingships with specified prerogatives); and Greece took to fitting out navies and they laid hold on the sea more. (2) It is said that the Corinthians were the first to put their hands to shipbuilding in an approximation to the current manner, and that triremes were built in Corinth first in Greece. (3)

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Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας: ἔτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὅτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίοις ἦλθεν. (4) ναυμαχία τε παλαιτάτη ὧν ἴσμεν γίγνεται Κορινθίων πρὸς Κερκυραίους" ἔτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ταύτῃ ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακόσιά ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου. (5) οἰκοῦντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ αἰεὶ δή ποτε ἐμπόριον εἶχον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, διὰ τῆς

ἐκείνων παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐπιμισγόντων, χρήμασί τε δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ποιηταῖς δεδήλωται ἀφνειὸν γὰρ ἐπωνόμασαν τὸ χωρίον. ἐπειδή τε οἱ Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον ἔπλῳζον, τὰς ναῦς κτησάμενοι τὸ ληιστικὸν καθήιρουν, καὶ ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα δυνατὴν ἔσχον χρημάτων προσόδῳ τὴν

πόλιν. (6) καὶ Ἴωσιν ὕστερον πολὺ γίγνεται ναυτικὸν ἐπὶ Κύρου Περσῶν πρώτου βασιλεύοντος καὶ Καμβύσου τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς θαλάσσης Κύρωι πολεμοῦντες ἐκράτησάν τινα χρόνον. καὶ Πολυκράτης Σάμου τυραννῶν ἐπὶ Καμβύσου ναυτικῷ ἰσχύων ἄλλας τε τῶν νήσων ὑπηκόους ἐποιήσατο καὶ Ρήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ. Φωκαῆς τε Μασσαλίαν οἰκίζοντες Καρχηδονίους ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες. (14) δυνατώτατα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ναυτικῶν ἦν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, πολλαῖς γενεαῖς ὕστερα γενόμενα τῶν Τρωϊκῶν, τριήρεσι μὲν ὀλίγαις χρώμενα, πεντηκοντόροις δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πλοίοις μακροῖς ἐξηρτυμένα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα. (2) ὀλίγον τε πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ τοῦ Δαρείου θανάτου, ὃς μετὰ Καμβύσην Περσῶν ἐβασίλευσε, τριήρεις περί τε Σικελίαν τοῖς τυράννοις ἐς πλῆθος ἐγένοντο καὶ Κερκυραίοις" ταῦτα γὰρ τελευταῖα πρὸ τῆς Ξέρξου στρατείας ναυτικὰ ἀξιόλογα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι κατέστη. (3) Αἰγινῆται γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ εἴτινες ἄλλοι, βραχέα ἐκέκτηντο, καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ πεντηκοντόρους;

ὀψέ τε ἀφ᾽ οὗ Ἀθηναίους Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπεισεν Αἰγινήταις πολεμοῦντας, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ βαρβάρου προσδοκίμου ὄντος, τὰς ναῦς ποιήσασθαι αἷσπερ καὶ

ἐναυμάχησαν: καὶ αὗται οὔπω εἶχον διὰ πάσης καταστρώματα. (15) τὰ μὲν οὖν ναυτικὰ τῶν “Ἑλλήνων τοιαῦτα ἦν, tá τε παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ὕστερον γενόμενα. ἰσχὺν δὲ περιεποιήσαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην οἱ προσσχόντες αὐτοῖς χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ᾽ ἐπιπλέοντες γὰρ τὰς νήσους κατεστρέφοντο, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσοι μὴ διαρκῆ εἶχον χώραν. (2) κατὰ γῆν δὲ πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις περιεγένετο, οὐδεὶς ξυνέστη᾽ πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ ἐγένοντο, πρὸς ὁμόρους τοὺς σφετέρους ἑκάστοις,

13.3. 15.2.

τέσσαρας: δικρότους R. T. Williams, JHS 78 (1958), 121-30. περιεγένετο Tournier cf. praecederet Valla: παρεγένετο MSS.

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59

It is evident that Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipbuilder, built four ships for the Samians: it was about three hundred years before the end of this war when Ameinocles went to Samos. (4) The most ancient naval battle that

we know of was fought by the Corinthians against the Corcyraeans: that was about two hundred and sixty years before the same point. (5) Since the Corinthians' city was established on the Isthmus, they have always provided a trading centre. In antiquity the Greeks made contact with one another by land more than by sea, and those inside the Peloponnese and those outside passed through the Corinthians' territory: thus they became powerful and wealthy, as has been shown by the ancient poets, for they gave the country

the epithet ‘affluent’. When the Greeks took to sailing more, the Corinthians acquired ships and cleared piracy away, and by providing a trading centre for both elements they made their city powerful as wealth flowed in. (6) Later the Ionians had a large navy in the time of Cyrus the first King of the Persians and his son Cambyses, and in fighting against Cyrus they won control of the sea in their region for some time. And Polycrates, tyrant of Samos in the time of Cambyses, gained naval power, made other islands subject to himself, and captured Rhenea and dedicated it to Delian Apollo. The Phocaeans when settling Massalia defeated the Carthaginians in a naval battle. (14) These were the most powerful of the navies. It is evident that

these existed many generations after the Trojan War, and used few triremes but were still equipped with penteconters and long boats like those of the Trojan War. (2) Shortly before the Persian Wars and the death of Darius, who was King of the Persians after Cambyses, triremes in larger numbers were used by the tyrants in the region of Sicily and the Corcyraeans: these were the last noteworthy navies built up in Greece before Xerxes' campaign. (3) For the Aeginetans and Athenians, and perhaps some others, acquired small navies, and they were mostly penteconters. It was only at a late stage that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, when they were at war with the

Aeginetans and at the same time the barbarian was expected, to have the ships built with which they fought the naval battle; and these did not yet have decks across the whole ship. (15) That is what the Greeks' navies were like, those in antiquity and those which came into existence later. Nevertheless, those who applied themselves

to this built up the greatest strength, through the influx of wealth and rule over others: for they, and particularly those who did not have sufficient land,

sailed against the islands and overcame them. (2) But there was no war on land from which a gain in power could be made. All the wars which did

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Thucydides

καὶ ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων καταστροφῆι οὐκ ἐξῆισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες. οὐ γὰρ ξυνειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις

ὑπήκοοι, οὐδ᾽ αὖ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης κοινὰς στρατείας ἐποιοῦντο, κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς ἕκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτονες ἐπολέμουν. (3) μάλιστα δὲ ἐς τὸν πάλαι ποτὲ γενόμενον πόλεμον Χαλκιδέων καὶ Ἐρετριῶν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἑκατέρων διέστη. (16) ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, καὶ Ἴωσι προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ μέγα τῶν πραγμάτων Κῦρος καὶ ἡ Περσικὴ βασιλεία Κροῖσον καθελοῦσα καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν ἐπεστράτευσε καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρω πόλεις ἐδούλωσε, Δαρεῖός τε ὕστερον τῷ Φοινίκων ναυτικῷ κρατῶν καὶ τὰς νήσους, (17) τύραννοί τε ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι, τὸ ép ἑαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοιἔς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν, 51 ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα τὰς πόλεις ὥκουν, ἐπράχθη δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον, εἰ μὴ εἴτι πρὸς περιοίκους τοὺς αὐτῶν ἑκάστοις᾽ οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. οὕτω πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μήτε κοινῇι φανερὸν μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀτολμοτέρα εἶναι. (18) ἐπειδὴ δὲ ot τε ᾿Αθηναίων τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννευθείσης οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν, ... (ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαίμων μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τῶν νῦν ἐνοικούντων αὐτὴν Δωριῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὧν ἴσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὅμως ἐκ παλαιτάτου καὶ ηὐνομήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος nv: ἔτη γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἀφ᾽ οὗ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῶνται, καὶ δὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν.) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον καὶ ἣ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη Μήδων πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐγένετο. (2) δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει pet’ αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁ βάρβαρος τῶι μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἦλθεν. καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπικρεμασθέντος οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι

ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

History 1

6]

take place were against those adjacent to each state, and the Greeks did not go out on external campaigns far from their own land to overcome others. For subjects had not been brought together under the sway of the greatest cities, and neither again did the Greeks undertake joint campaigns on an equal basis, but rather neighbours used to go to war against one another

individually. (3) It was particularly in connection with the war fought in antiquity between the Chalcidians and Eretrians that the rest of the Greeks were divided into an alliance with one side or the other. (16) Different communties had different factors preventing them from increasing. When the lonians were making great progress in their affairs Cyrus and the Persian Kingdom overthrew Croesus, campaigned against all that lies this side of the River Halys to the sea, and enslaved the cities on the mainland; and Darius afterwards with the power of the Phoenicians' navy enslaved the islands also. (17) The tyrants who ruled in the Greek cities looked only to their own interests with regard to their persons and the increase of their own households: as far as possible they mostly administered their cities with a view to safety, and nothing noteworthy was undertaken by them except to some extent against the communities surrounding each. Those in Sicily advanced their power to the greatest extent. Thus in every respect Greece was for a long time held back from any conspicuous joint achievement, but on the basis of separate cities was comparatively unadventurous.

(18) After the tyrants of Athens, and most and the last of those from the rest of Greece, where tyranny had earlier been widespread, with the exception of those in Sicily had been overthrown by the Spartans ... (For Sparta after the establishment of the Dorians who now live there endured the longest period of dissension which we know of, but nevertheless from remote antiquity has had good government and has always been free from tyranny. From about four hundred years or a little more to the end of this war the Spartans have always had the same form of government, and because of

that they have become powerful and have ordered things in the other cities.) Not many years after the overthrow of the tyrants from Greece the battle at Marathon was fought by the Persians against the Athenians. (2) [n the tenth year after that the barbarian came again with the great armada to Greece to enslave it. With a great danger hanging over them, the Spartans became

the leaders of the Greeks who joined in the war because of their superior power; and the Athenians in the face of the Persian onslaught decided to

abandon their city, and they removed themselves, embarked on their ships and became a naval people.

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κοινῆι TE ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον où πολλῶι διεκρίθησαν πρός τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους οἵτε ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ ξυμπολεμήσαντες. δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη: ἴσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσίν. (3) καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ξυνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινές που διασταῖεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. ὥστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰεὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὰ μὲν σπενδόμενοι, τὰ δὲ πολεμοῦντες ἢ ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχοις ἀφισταμένοις εὖ παρεσκευάσαντο τὰ πολέμια καὶ ἐμπειρότεροι ἐγένοντο μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς μελέτας ποιούμενοι. (19) καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἡγοῦντο, κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παραλαβόντες πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν. καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἤνθησαν.

(20) τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ηὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἑξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι. οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἢν ἐπιχώρια

σφίσιν 1, ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων δέχονται. (2) Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος Ἵππαρχον οἴονται ὑφ᾽ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἱππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ὧν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου υἱέων, Ἵππαρχος δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλὸς ἀδελφοὶ ἦσαν αὐτοῦ, ὑποτοπήσαντες δέ τι ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ παραχρῆμα Ἁρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ἐκ τῶν ξυνειδότων σφίσιν ‘Tania μεμηνῦσθαι τοῦ μὲν ἀπέσχοντο ὡς προειδότος, βουλόμενοι δὲ πρὶν ξυλληφθῆναι δράσαντές τι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, τῷ Ἱππάρχω περιτυχόντες περὶ τὸ Λεωκόρεϊιον καλούμενον τὴν Παναθηναϊκὴν πομπὴν διακοσμοῦντι ἀπέκτειναν. (3) πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας μὴ μιᾷ ψήφῳ προστίθεσθαι ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, καὶ τὸν Πιτανάτην λόχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὃς οὐδ᾽ ἐγένετο πώποτε. οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται. (21) ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὅμως τοιαῦτα ἄν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἃ διῆλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν

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The Greeks drove the barbarian away collectively, but not long afterwards

those who had defected from the King and those who had joined in the war were divided between the Athenians and Spartans. It was they who had become most conspicuous in power, the Spartans being strong on land and the Athenians with their ships. (3) For a short time their partnership persisted,

but then the Spartans and the Athenians separated and made war against each other together with their allies; and if a rift opened between any of the

other Greeks they now tended to gravitate to these. So throughout the time from the Persian War to the present war, sometimes in a state of truce, and sometimes making war either against each other or against their own allies when they defected, they became well prepared in military matters, and they grew in experience as they gained practice in the face of danger. (19) The Spartans were not leaders of allies subject to the payment of tribute, but were assiduous in ensuring that they were governed on an oligarchic basis

to Sparta's sole advantage; while the Athenians in time took away the cities' ships, except from Chios and Lesbos, and assessed them all to pay money.

The individual provisions for this war on each side were greater than when they had been flourishing most while the alliance between them was intact. (20) That is what I have discovered things to be like in antiquity, difficult as it is to trust each of the indications as one looks at them in turn; for people tend to accept hearsay about the past, and any local traditions there may be, indiscriminately from one another without verifying them. (2) The majority of the Athenians, for example, believe that Hipparchus was tyrant

when he was killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and do not know that Hippias was the ruler, as the eldest of Pisistratus' sons, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. Harmodius and Aristogeiton had a sudden suspicion on the day in question that Hippias had been given information by their associates: they left him alone as he was forewarned, but, wanting to risk taking some action before they were arrested, when they fell in with Hipparchus organising the Panathenaic procession by what is called the Leocoreum, they killed him. (3) There are many other things, even in the present and not forgotten in the course of time, about which the Greeks in

general do not think correctly: for instance, that the Spartan kings do not

cast one vote each but two; and that Sparta has a /ochos of Pitana, which has never existed at all. So lacking are most people in effort to search for the truth: they turn rather to what is ready to hand. (21) Nevertheless, from the indications | have mentioned, one would not

be mistaken if one considered that things were more or less as | have set out

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Thucydides

ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα,

ηὑρῆσθαι δὲ ἡγησάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι ἀποχρώντως. (2) καὶ ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος, καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν πολεμῶσι τὸν παρόντα αἰεὶ μέγιστον κρινόντων, παυσαμένων δὲ τὰ ἀρχαῖα μᾶλλον θαυμαζόντων, an αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων σκοποῦσι δηλώσει ὅμως μείζων γεγενημένος αὐτῶν.

(22) καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν. ὡς δ᾽ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. (2) τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών. (3) ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἑκάστοις οὐ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ μνήμης ἔχοι. (4) καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν atepréotepov φανεῖται: ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται. (23) τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν, καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως δυοῖν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πεζομαχίαιν ταχεῖαν τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν. τούτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μῆκός τε μέγα προύβη, παθήματά τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν

αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οἷα οὐχ ἕτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνω. (2) οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις τοσαίδε ληφθεῖσαι ἠρημώθησαν, αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιπολεμούντων (εἰσὶ δ᾽ ai καὶ οἰκήτορας μετέβαλον ἁλισκόμεναι), οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνος, ὁ μὲν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεμον, ὁ δὲ διὰ

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— not preferring to believe as the poets have sung about them, adorning and exaggerating, or as the prose-writers have composed, with a view to enticing listening rather than truth, though they are unexamined and through time much has become unbelievable and has won through to the realm of the fabulous -- and if one reckoned that from the clearest signs 1 have discovered sufficiently how things were in antiquity. (2) And, although people always judge the current war to be the greatest while they are engaged in it, but after it is over tend rather to admire the past, if one bases one's examination on the actual facts this war will nevertheless demonstrate that it has been greater than the others. (22) The words uttered by individual speakers, both before they went to war and once they were engaged in it, could not easily be recorded with accuracy either by me in cases where I heard the speech myself or by those making reports to me from the various places. The speeches here represent what in my judgment it would have been most important for the individual speakers to say with regard to the current circumstances, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. (2) The actions performed in the war I did not think it right to narrate on the basis of chance informants or in accordance with my own judgment, but on the basis

of my own presence in some cases and on the most precise investigation possible of what I could learn from others about each event. (3) The search proved burdensome, because those who were present at the various events did not give the same reports of the same occurrences, but followed each man's prejudice and memory. (4) The absence of a fabulous element in the history will perhaps make it seem less attractive to listen to; but if it is judged useful by those who want to study the clear truth of what has happened, the like of which in accordance with the human condition will at some time happen again, that will be sufficient. What I have put together is a possession for all time rather than a prize composition for a single hearing. (23) The greatest of the previous actions was the Persian War, and that nevertheless had a quick decision in two naval battles and two land battles. But the length of this war was greatly drawn out, and it happened that during it there were disasters for Greece such as had not happened in a comparable

stretch

of time.

(2) There

had

not been

so many

cities

captured and depopulated, in some cases by barbarians and in others the two sides fighting against one another (and some cities after they been taken suffered a change of inhabitants); nor so many people exiled slaughtered, either in the actual course of the war or through dissension.

by had and (3)

6ό

Thucydides

τὸ στασιάζειν. (3) τά τε πρότερον ἀκοῇ μὲν λεγόμενα, ἔργῳ δὲ σπανιώτερον βεβαιούμενα, οὐκ ἄπιστα κατέστη, σεισμῶν τε πέρι, oi ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἅμα μέρος γῆς καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐπέσχον, ἡλίου τε ἐκλείψεις, αἵ πυκνότεραι παρὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρὶν χρόνου μνημονευόμενα ξυνέβησαν, αὐχμοί τε ἔστι παρ᾽ οἷς μεγάλοι καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ λιμοί, καὶ ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα BAdyaoa καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα rj λοιμώδης vócoc; ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ξυνεπέθετο. (4) ἤρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς at αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὐβοίας ἅλωσιν. (5) διότι δ᾽ ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη. (6) τὴν

μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις

ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. αἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ᾽ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν. (24) ᾿πίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι ἐς τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον: προσοικοῦσι δ᾽ αὐτὴν Ταυλάντιοι βάρβαροι, Ἰλλυρικὸν ἔθνος. (2) ταύτην ἀπῴκισαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστὴς δ᾽ ἐγένετο Φαλίος ᾿Ερατοκλείδου Κορίνθιος γένος τῶν ἀφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους, κατὰ δὴ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον ἐκ τῆς μητροπόλεως κατακληθείς. ξυνῴκισαν δὲ καὶ Κορινθίων τινὲς καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου Δωρικοῦ γένους. (3) προελθόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν ᾿ἘἘπιδαμνίων δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. (4) στασιάσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά, ὡς λέγεται, ἀπὸ πολέμου τινὸς τῶν προσοίκων βαρβάρων ἐφθάρησαν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς πολλῆς ἐστερήθησαν. (5) τὰ δὲ

τελευταῖα πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν ἐξεδίωξε τοὺς δυνατούς, οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλήζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. (6) οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντες Emôduviot ἐπειδὴ ἐπιέζοντο πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πρέσβεις ὡς μητρόπολιν οὖσαν, δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλὰ τούς τε φεύγοντας ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι καὶ τὸν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλῦσαι. (7) ταῦτα δὲ ἱκέται καθεζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἐδέοντο. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν ἱκετείαν οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμψαν. (25) γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδεμίαν σφίσιν ἀπὸ Κερκύρας τιμωρίαν οὖσαν ἐν ἀπόρωι εἴχοντο θέσθαι τὸ παρόν, καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν Θεὸν ἐπήροντο εἰ παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς καὶ

History 1

67

What was previously reported by hearsay but more rarely confirmed in fact became not unbelievable: with regard to earthquakes, which attacked over

the greatest extent of territory and with the greatest violence; and eclipses of the sun, which occurred with greater frequency than was remembered from earlier time; great droughts in some places and famines resulting from them; and, what caused not the least harm and to some extent death, the disease of

the plague. All these things attacked together in conjunction with this war. (4) The Athenians and Peloponnesians began the war by breaking the thirty-year treaty which they had made after the capture of Euboea. (5) As to why they broke it, | have first set out the grievances and disputes, so that no one should ever need to ask from what origin so great a war broke out among the Greeks. (6) The truest reason, but most concealed in discussion, ] believe to be that the Athenians by becoming great and inspiring fear in the Spartans forced them to go to war. But the following were the publicly mentioned grievances on each side, as a result of which they broke the treaty and embarked on the war. (24) Epidamnus is a city on the right as one sails into the lonic Gulf; its neighbours are barbarian Taulantians, an lllyrian people. (2) This was colonised by the Corcyraeans, but the settlement-founder was Phalius son of Eratoclides, a Corinthian of the descendants of Heracles, duly invited from Corcyra's mother city in accordance with the ancient convention. The colony was joined by some Corinthians and men from the rest of the Dorian line. (3) As time passed Epidamnus' power became great and its population large. (4) But after many years of dissension among themselves, it is said, they were destroyed as a result of some war with the neighbouring barbarians and deprived of most of their power. (5) In the last episode before this war the common people there drove out the powerful men, who Joined with the barbarians to attack them, raiding those in the city by land and by sea. (6) The Epidamnians in the city, as they were worn down, sent envoys to Corcyra as their mother city, appealing that Corcyra should not overlook it as they were destroyed, but should reconcile the exiles with them and bring an end to the war with the barbarians. (7) They made this appeal going to sit as suppliants in the sanctuary of Hera; but the Corcyraeans did not accept their supplication but sent them away without success. (25) When the Epidamnians learned that there would be no retribution for them from Corcyra they despaired of how to deal with their circumstances; and they sent to Delphi and enquired of the God if they should hand over the city to the Corinthians as their founders and try to obtain some retribution from

68

Thucydides

τιμωρίαν τινὰ πειρῷντ᾽ ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνεῖλε παραδοῦναι καὶ ἡγεμόνας ποιεῖσθαι. (2) ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ ᾿Επιδάμνιοι ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον κατὰ τὸ μαντεῖον παρέδοσαν τὴν ἀποικίαν, τόν τε οἰκιστὴν ἀποδεικνύντες σφῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ὄντα καὶ τὸ χρηστήριον δηλοῦντες, ἐδέοντό τε μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαμῦναι. (3) Κορίνθιοι δὲ κατά τε τὸ δίκαιον ὑπεδέξαντο τὴν τιμωρίαν, νομίζοντες οὐχ ἧσσον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν ἢ Κερκυραίων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ μίσει τῶν Κερκυραίων, ὅτι αὐτῶν παρημέλουν ὄντες ἄποικοι. (4) οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα οὔτε Κορινθίωι ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμει ὄντες κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁμοῖα τοῖς Ἑλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς πόλεμον παρασκευῇ δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ προύχειν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν τῆς Κερκύρας κλέος ἐχόντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξηρτύοντο τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ ἤσαν e

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κελεύοντες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων καὶ ἑαυτῶν φρουρούς. (2) ἐπορεύθησαν δὲ πεζῇ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν, Κορινθίων ovoav ἀποικίαν, δέει τῶν Κερκυραίων μὴ κωλύωνται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν περαιούμενοι. (3) Κερκυραῖοι δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἤσθοντο τούς τε οἰκήτορας καὶ φρουροὺς ἥκοντας ἐς τὴν ᾿Επίδαμνον τήν te ἀποικίαν Κορινθίοις δεδομένην, ^

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στόλῳ τούς TE φεύγοντας ἐκέλευον Kat ἐπήρειαν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς (ῆλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν, ἣν προϊσχόμενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν) τούς τε φρουροὺς οὗς Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμψαν καὶ τοὺς οἰκήτορας ἀποπέμπειν. (4) οἱ δὲ Emôauviot οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑπήκουσαν, ἀλλὰ στρατεύουσιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων ὡς κατάξοντες, καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς προσλαβόντες. (5) προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν προεῖπον ᾿Επιδαμνίων τε

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History I

69

them. He responded that they should hand it over and make the Corinthians their leaders. (2) The Epidamnians went to Corinth and handed over the colony in accordance with the response, pointing out that their settlementfounder was from Corinth and disclosing the oracle, and they appealed to the Corinthians not to overlook it as they were destroyed but to come to their rescue. (3) The Corinthians undertook to provide retribution for them, both on grounds of justice, thinking that the colony belonged to them no less than to the Corcyraeans, and also out of hatred of the Corcyraeans, because although they were colonists of the Corinthians they neglected them. (4) For the Corcyraeans did not give them the customary honours in the common festivals, or allow a man of Corinth to initiate the proceedings, as their other colonies did. They were contemptuous of them; they had financial strength which at that time was on the same level as the richest of the Greeks, and

in military preparations they were stronger than the Corinthians, and far superior in their fleet, sometmes boasting ofthe earlier occupation of Corcyra by the Phaeacians, who had a reputation in naval matters. That encouraged them the more to build up their fleet, and they were by no means weak in this respect: for they had a hundred and twenty triremes when they began this conflict. (26) Having all these grounds for complaint, the Corinthians sent help to Epidamnus gladly, inviting whoever wished to go as a settler, and sending garrison troops from Ambracia, Leucas and Corinth itself. (2) They

went on foot as far as Apollonia, a colony of Corinth, out of fear that they might be prevented by the Corcyraeans from making the voyage by sea. (3) When the Corcyraeans learned that the settlers and garrison troops had arrived at Epidamnus and that the colony had been granted to the Corinthians, they were angry. They sailed with twenty-five ships immediately and another force later, and insultingly commanded them to take back the exiles (for the

Epidamnian exiles had gone to Corcyra, pointing to their tombs and their kinship and on that basis appealing to the Corcyraeans to reinstate them) and to dismiss the garrison troops and settlers whom the Corinthians had sent. (4) The Epidamnians did not submit in any respect; rather the Corcyraeans with forty ships campaigned against them with the exiles, whom they intended to reinstate, and enlisted the Illyrians as allies. (5) Taking up position outside the city, they announced that any of the Epidamnians who wished and the foreigners could depart unharmed; but those who did not would be treated as enemies. When they did not obey, the Corcyraeans began a siege of the city (for the site is an isthmus). (27) The Corinthians, when

messengers came

from Epidamnus to report that they were under siege, began to prepare an

70

Thucydides

εἰ δέ τις τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν μὴ ἐθέλει ξυμπλεῖν, μετέχειν δὲ βούλεται τῆς ἀποικίας, πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς καταθέντα Κορινθίας μένειν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πλέοντες πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ τἀργύριον καταβάλλοντες. (2) ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψαι, εἰ ἄρα κωλύοιντο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλεῖν: οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοῖς ὀκτὼ ναυσὶ ξυμπλεῖν, καὶ Παλῆς Κεφαλλήνων τέσσαρσιν. καὶ ᾿Επιδαυρίων ἐδεήθησαν, oi παρέσχον πέντε, Ἑρμιονῆς δὲ μίαν καὶ Τροιζήνιοι δύο, Λευκάδιοι δὲ δέκα καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται ὀκτώ. Θηβαίους δὲ χρήματα ἤτησαν καὶ Φλειασίους, Ἠλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενὰς καὶ χρήματα. αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων νῆες παρεσκευάζοντο τριάκοντα καὶ τρισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται. (28) ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπύθοντο οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευήν, ἐλθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Σικυωνίων πρέσβεων, ods παρέλαβον, ἐκέλευον Κορινθίους τοὺς ἐν ᾿Επιδάμνῳ φρουρούς τε καὶ οἰκήτορας ἀπάγειν, ὡς οὐ μετὸν αὐτοῖς Ἐπιδάμνου. (2) εἰ δέ τι ἀντιποιοῦνται, δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν αἷς ἂν ἀμφότεροι uot ὁποτέρων δ᾽ ἂν δικασθῇ εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν, τούτους κρατεῖν. ἤθελον δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντείῳ ἐπιτρέψαι. (3) πόλεμον δὲ οὐκ εἴων ποιεῖν᾽ εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθήσεσθαι ἔφασαν, ἐκείνων βιαζομένων, φίλους ποιεῖσθαι oÙc οὐ βούλονται ἑτέρους τῶν νῦν ὄντων μᾶλλον ὠφελίας ἕνεκα. (4) οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτοῖς, ἢν τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀπὸ Ἐπιδάμνου ἀπαγάγωσι, βουλεύσεσθαι πρότερον δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν τοὺς μὲν πολιορκεῖσθαι, αὐτοὺς δὲ δικάζεσθαι. (5) Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἀντέλεγον, ἢν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐν Ἐπιδάμνωι ἀπαγάγωσι, ποιήσειν ταῦτα᾽ ἑτοῖμοι δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὥστε ἀμφοτέρους μένειν κατὰ χώραν, σπονδὰς δὲ ποιήσασθαι ἕως ἂν ἡ δίκη γένηται. (29) Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις αὐτοῖς ἦσαν αἱ νῆες καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν, προπέμψαντες κήρυκα πρότερον πόλεμον προεροῦντα Κερκυραίοις, ἄραντες ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πέντε δισχιλίοις τε ὁπλίταις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ᾿Επίδαμνον Κερκυραίοις ἐναντία πολεμήσοντες" (2) ἐστρατήγει δὲ τῶν μὲν νεῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Πελλίχου καὶ Καλλικράτης ὁ Καλλίου καὶ Τιμάνωρ ὁ Τιμάνθους, τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ Ἀρχέτιμός τε ὁ Εὐρυτίμου καὶ Ἰσαρχίδας ὁ Ἰσάρχου. (3) ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐγένοντο ἐν Ἀκτίῳ

27.2. 29.1.

τρισχίλιοι: but δισχιλίοις 29.7. δισχιλίοις: θυϊτρισχίλιοι27.2: ναυσὶ καὶ ἑπτακισχιλίοις OnAitaic (XX) Hemmerdinger.

History 1

71

expedition. At the same time they proclaimed the foundation of a colony at Epidamnus, which any one who wished could join on equal and comparable terms to those there; if anybody was not willing to sail immediately but wished to participate in the colony, he could pay a deposit of fifty drachmae and remain in Corinth. There were many who sailed and many who paid a cash deposit. (2) They also appealed to the Megarians to escort them with ships, in case they were hindered in sailing by the Corcyraeans: and they prepared to sail with them with eight ships, and the Palians of Cephallenia with four. They appealed also to the Epidaurians, who provided five; the Hermionians, one, and the Troezenians, two; the Leucadians, ten, and the

Ambraciots, eight. They asked for money from the Thebans and Phliasians, and empty ships and money from the Eleans. Of their own forces the Corinthians prepared thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. (28) When the Corcyraeans learned of this preparation, they went to Corinth with envoys from Sparta and Sicyon, whom they took to accompany them, and urged the Corinthians to withdraw the garrison troops and settlers who were in Epidamnus, since Epidamnus was no concern of theirs. (2) If the Corinthians

did advance a

rival

claim

to it, they

were

willing to

submit to justice in the Peloponnese among cities agreed by both parties: whichever the colony was judged to belong to, that party should prevail. They were willing also to entrust the matter to the oracle at Delphi. (3) But they enjoined the Corinthians not to go to war: otherwise, they said, in that case under pressure from them they would be compelled against their

wishes to make friends other than their present ones, in their own interests. (4) The Corinthians replied to them that they would enter into discussion if the Corcyraeans withdrew their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus; but before that it would not be right for the Epidamnians to be subjected to a siege and themselves to judgment. (5) The Corcyraeans said in response that they would do this if the Corinthians too withdrew their men from Epidamnus; or they were prepared to let both parties remain in the territory and to make a truce until the judgment was delivered. (29) The Corinthians did not submit to any of this; but when their ships were manned and their allies were present they first sent ahead a herald to declare war against the Corcyraeans, and then put to sea with seventyfive ships and two thousand hoplites, and sailed to Epidamnus to make war against the Corcyraeans. (2) The generals of the ships were Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callicrates son of Callias and Timanor son of Timanthes, and of

the infantry Archetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. (3)

72

Thucydides

τῆς Ἀνακτορίας γῆς, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, οἱ Κερκυραῖοι κήρυκά τε προύπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἀκατίῳ ἀπεροῦντα μὴ πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἅμα ἐπλήρουν, ζεύξαντές τε τὰς παλαιὰς ὥστε πλωΐμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκευάσαντες. (4) ὡς δὲ ὁ κῆρύξ τε ἀπήγγειλεν οὐδὲν εἰρηναῖον παρὰ τῶν Κορινθίων καὶ αἱ νῆες

αὐτοῖς ἐπεπλήρωντο οὖσαι ὀγδοήκοντα (τεσσαράκοντα γὰρ ᾿Ἐπίδαμνον ἐπολιόρκουν), ἀνταναγαγόμενοι καὶ παραταξάμενοι ἐναυμάχησαν. (5) καὶ ἐνίκησαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι παρὰ πολὺ καὶ ναῦς πέντε καὶ δέκα διέφθειραν τῶν Κορινθίων. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτοῖς ξυνέβη καὶ τοὺς τὴν ᾿Επίδαμνον πολιορκοῦντας παραστήσασθαι ὁμολογίᾳ ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπήλυδας ἀποδόσθαι, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντας ἔχειν ἕως ἂν ἄλλο τι δόξῃ. (30) μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ τῆς Κερκύρας ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους oÙc ἔλαβον αἰχμαλώτους ἀπέκτειναν, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντες εἶχον. (2) ὕστερον δέ, ἐπειδὴ οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσημένοι ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τῆς θαλάσσης ἁπάσης ἐκράτουν τῆς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐς Λευκάδα τὴν Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν τῆς γῆς ἔτεμον καὶ Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίνειον ἐνέπρησαν, ὅτι ναῦς καὶ χρήματα παρέσχον Κορινθίοις. (3) τοῦ τε χρόνου τὸν πλεῖστον μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπεκράτουν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κορινθίων ξυμμάχους ἐπιπλέοντες ἔφθειρον, μέχρι οὗ Κορίνθιοι περιιόντι τῷ θέρει πέμψαντες ναῦς καὶ στρατιάν, ἐπεὶ σφῶν οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπόνουν, ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἐπὶ Ἀκτίῳ καὶ περὶ τὸ Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τε Λευκάδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅσαι

σφίσι φίλιαι ἦσαν. (4) ἀντεστρατοπεδεύοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ ναυσίτε καὶ πεζῷ. ἐπέπλεον δὲ οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο ἀντικαθεζόμενοι χειμῶνος ἤδη ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἑκάτεροι. (31) τὸν δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν ὕστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὀργῇ φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυπηγοῦντο καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο τὰ κράτιστα νεῶν στόλον, ἔκ τε αὐτῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀγείροντες καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐρέτας, μισθῷ πείθοντες. (2) πυνθανόμενοι δὲ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο, καί (ἦσαν γὰρ οὐδενὸς Ἑλλήνων ἔνσπονδοι οὐδὲ ἐσεγράψαντο ἑαυτοὺς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων) ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐλθοῦσιν ὡς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι καὶ ὠφελίαν τινὰ πειρᾶσθαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν εὑρίσκεσθαι. (3) οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πυθόμενοι ταῦτα ἦλθον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς 30.1. 30.3.

Κερκύρας others: Κερκυραίας CG. περιιόντι rec., Reiske: περιόντι Μ55.

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When they were at Actium in the land of Anactorium, where the sanctuary of Apollo is, at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, the Corcyraeans sent ahead to them a herald in a boat, forbidding them to sail against them; and at the same time they manned their ships, after bracing the old ones to make them seaworthy and repairing the others. (4) When the herald brought back no peaceful response from the Corinthians, and their ships had been manned, eighty in number (for forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus), the Corcyraeans put out against them, took up their formation and fought a naval battle. (5) The Corcyraeans were victorious by a wide margin, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthians' ships; and it happened that on the same day those besieging Epidamnus brought it to terms, that the foreigners should be sold into slavery and the Corinthians should be imprisoned and held until some further decision was taken about them. (30) After the naval battle the Corcyraeans set up a trophy at the headland of Leucimme on Corcyra, and they killed the other prisoners whom they had taken but imprisoned and held the Corinthians. (2) Afterwards, when the defeated Corinthians and their allies had departed for home in their ships, the Corcyraeans controlled the whole of the sea in that area; and they sailed

to Corinth's colony Leucas and ravaged Eleans' dockyard at Cyllene because they ships and money. (3) For most of the time control of the sea, and caused destruction

its land, and they set fire to the had provided the Corinthians with after the naval battle they retained by sailing against the Corinthians'

allies, until at the end of the summer the Corinthians sent ships and a force,

because of their allies' suffering, and camped at Actium and Cheimerium in the region of Thesprotis in order to protect Leucas and the other cities which were friendly to them. (4) The Corcyraeans set up a camp in opposition at Leucimme, with ships and infantry. Neither party moved against the other, but during this summer they occupied their opposed positions, and when winter had come they each returned home. (31) During the whole year after the naval battle and the following year the Corinthians, angry about their war with Corcyra, engaged in shipbuilding and preparing the strongest naval force they could, recruiting for pay oarsmen both from the Peloponnese itself and from the rest of Greece. (2) The Corcyraeans on learning of their preparations were afraid, and since they were not attached in a treaty to any of the Greeks, and had not enrolled

themselves under the treaty either with the Athenians or with the Spartans, they decided to go to the Athenians to become allies and try to obtain some help from them. (3) When the Corinthians had learned of this, they also went

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τὰς ᾿Αθήνας πρεσβευσόμενοι, ὅπως μὴ σφίσι πρὸς τῷ Κερκυραίων ναυτικῷ

καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν προσγενόμενον ἐμπόδιον γένηται θέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον ἡ βούλονται. (4) καταστάσης δὲ ἐκκλησίας ἐς ἀντιλογίαν ἦλθον, καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἔλεξαν τοιάδε. (32) “δικαιον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς μήτε εὐεργεσίας μεγάλης μήτε ξυμμαχίας προυφειλομένης ἥκοντας παρὰ τοὺς πέλας ἐπικουρίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν, δεησομένους ἀναδιδάξαι πρῶτον, μάλιστα μὲν ὡς καὶ ξύμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι γε οὐκ ἐπιζήμια, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς καὶ τὴν χάριν βέβαιον É&ovotv: εἰ δὲ τούτων μηδὲν σαφὲς καταστήσουσι, μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢν ἀτυχῶσιν. (2) Κερκυραῖοι δὲ μετὰ τῆς ξυμμαχίας τῆς αἰτήσεως καὶ ταῦτα πιστεύοντες ἐχυρὰ v μῖν παρέξεσθαι ἀπέστειλαν ἡμᾶς. (3) τετύχηκε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιτήδευμα πρός τε ὑμᾶς ἐς τὴν χρείαν ἡμῖν ἄλογον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀξύμφορον. (4) ξύμμαχοί τε γὰρ οὐδενός πω ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ ἑκούσιοι γενόμενοι νῦν ἄλλων τοῦτο δεησόμενοι ἥκομεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐς τὸν παρόντα πόλεμον Κορινθίων ἐρῆμοι δὶ αὐτὸ καθέσταμεν. καὶ περιέστηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη, τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ τῇ τοῦ πέλας᾽ γνώμῃ ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη. (5) τὴν

μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους: ἐπειδὴ δὲ μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὥρμηνται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι, καὶ ἅμα μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος εἰ ἐσόμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ ἄλλου παντὸς ἐπικουρίας δεῖσθαι, καὶ ξυγγνώμη εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἁμαρτίᾳ τῇ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἐναντία τολμῶμεν. (33) “γενήσεται δὲ ὑμῖν πειθομένοις καλὴ ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡμετέραςχρείας, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀδικουμένοις καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρους βλάπτουσι τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ποιήσεσθε, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξάμενοι ὡς ἂν μάλιστα pet αἰειμνήστου μαρτυρίου τὴν χάριν καταθήσεσθε᾽ ναυτικόν τε κεκτήμεθα πλὴν τοῦ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πλεῖστον. (2) καὶ σκέψασθε: τίς εὐπραξία σπανιωτέρα ἢ τίς τοῖς πολεμίοις λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἣν ὑμεῖς ἂν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημάτων καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ὑμῖν προσγενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδοῦσα ἑαυτήν, καὶ προσέτι φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετήν, οἷς δὲ ἐπαμυνεῖτε χάριν,

31.3.

τὸ αὐτῶν CG: τὸ Ἀττικὸν others, τὸ αὐττικὸν rec., cf. Maurer, /nterpolation 29, who thinks reading of CG too difficult.

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to Athens with an embassy to prevent the Athenians' fleet from being added to the Corcyraeans' and being an obstacle to their settling the war as they wanted. (4) An assembly was convened at which they spoke in opposition to each other; and the Corcyraeans spoke as follows. (32) ‘It is just, Athenians, that those who come without any previous great benefaction or alliance to depend on, and appeal for reinforcements from their neighbours, as we are doing now, should first demonstrate, preferably, that what they are appealing for will actually be advantageous, or, failing that, at least that it will not be injurious; and, next, that they will display reliable gratitude. If they cannot establish any of this clearly, they should not be angry if they are unsuccessful. (2) In sending us to ask for an alliance the Corcyraeans believed that they can offer you firm guarantees of this. (3) But this same practice of ours has turned out to be both unreasonable with regard to our request to you and disadvantageous with regard to our own interests in the present circumstances. (4) For, having never willingly become

allies of any one else before this occasion, we have come now to

appeal for this to others, and at the same time with regard to our present war against the Corinthians we find ourselves isolated because of it. What previously seemed to be our good sense, not to join in risks at the decision of our neighbours through an alliance with others, has been turned round and now revealed as folly and weakness. (5) In the naval battle which took

place we repelled the Corinthians on our own. But since they have mobilised against us with a greater force from the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we see that we are unable to survive through our own strength alone, and at the same time the danger for us 1s great if we do succumb to them, we are forced to appeal for reinforcements to you and to everybody else, and we must be pardoned if we dare the opposite of our previous uninvolvement, not through wickedness but through judging that we were previously mistaken. (33) ‘If we persuade you, a fine coincidence in many respects will result from our request: first, because you will be granting reinforcement to men who are suffering injustice and not harming others; next, because in accepting men who are facing the greatest dangers you would make a deposit of gratitude which we should most surely remember with undying testimony; and because we have acquired the largest fleet apart from your own. (2) And consider: what success can be rarer or more distressing to your enemies than that a power which you would have thought it worth much money and favour for you to gain should be present offering itself of its own accord without danger or expense, and moreover bringing you virtue in the eyes of most people,

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ὑμῖν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς loyüv: à ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἅμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὀλίγοι ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι οἷς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον οὐχ ἧσσον διδόντες ἢ ληψόμενοι παραγίγνονται. (3) τὸν δὲ πόλεμον δι᾽ ὅνπερ χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶμεν, εἴ τις ὑμῶν μὴ οἴεται ἔσεσθαι, γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβω τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησείοντας καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στῶμεν μηδὲ δυοῖν φθάσαι ἁμάρτωσιν, ἢ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἢ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βεβαιώσασθαι. (4)

ἡμέτερον δέ γ᾽ αὖ ἔργον προτερῆσαι, τῶν μὲν διδόντων, ὑμῶν δὲ δεξαμένων τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ προεπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντεπιβουλεύειν. (34) “ἣν δὲ λέγωσιν ὡς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς σφετέρους ἀποίκους ὑμᾶς δέχεσθαι, μαθόντων ὡς πᾶσα ἀποικία εὖ μὲν πάσχουσα τιμᾷ τὴν μητρόπολιν, ἀδικουμένη δὲ ἀλλοτριοῦται᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶ δοῦλοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοῖοι τοῖς λειπομένοις εἶναι ἐκπέμπονται. (2) ὡς δὲ ἠδίκουν σαφές ἐστιν προκληθέντες γὰρ περὶ ᾿Ἐπιδάμνου ἐς κρίσιν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ low ἐβουλήθησαν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μετελθεῖν. (3) καὶ ὑμῖν ἔστω τι τεκμήριον ἃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς δρῶσιν, ὥστε ἀπάτῃ τε μὴ παράγεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν δεομένοις τε ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος μὴ ὑπουργεῖν’ ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι

τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἂν διατελοίη. (35) λύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους; (2) εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἥτις μηδαμοῦ ξυμμαχεῖ, ἐξεῖναι παρ᾽ ὁποτέρους ἂν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν. (3) καὶ δεινὸν εἰ τοῖσδε μὲν ἀπό τε τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἔσται πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπηκόων, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς προκειμένης τε ξυμμαχίας εἴρξουσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ὠφελίας, εἶτα ἐν ἀδικήματι θήσονται πεισθέντων ὑμῶν ἃ δεόμεθα. (4) “πολὺ δὲ ἐν πλέονι αἰτίᾳ ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες ὑμᾶς ἕξομεν ἡμᾶς μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ οὐκ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας ἀπώσεσθε, τῶνδε δὲ οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ ἐχθρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπιόντων γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς δύναμιν προσλαβεῖν περιόψεσθε: ἣν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κἀκείνων κωλύειν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας μισθοφόρους ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν πέμπειν καθ᾽ ὅτι

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gratitude from those whom you will rescue and strength for yourselves? In all time all these things have happened simultaneously to few people, and

few who appeal for an alliance have offered safety and prestige to those on whom they call no less than they would receive it from them. (3) As for the war for which we should be useful, if any of you thinks it will not happen he is mistaken in his judgment, and does not realise that the Spartans will embark on war out of fear of you and that the Corinthians are influential with them and hostile to you: they are now trying to get us in their power first with a view to their attempt on you, so that we shall not stand together out of shared hostility to them, and they shall not fail to gain either ofthe advantages of damaging us or strengthening themselves. (4) It is for us, then, to anticipate them, by our offering and your accepting the alliance, and to plan against them in advance rather than in reaction to them. (34) ‘If they say that it would not be just for you to receive colonists of theirs, let them understand that every colony does honour its mother city when it is well treated, but when it is treated unjustly is alienated. For colonists are sent out not to be slaves but to be the equals of those who are left behind. (2) That the Corinthians were behaving unjustly is clear: for when summoned to arbitration over Epidamnus they preferred to pursue their complaints by war rather than by fair dealing. (3) And let what they are doing to us their kindred be an indication to you, to prevent you from being led astray by their deceit or induced by their direct appeal to assist them. For the man who experiences the least regret after indulging opponents is likely to continue in the greatest safety. (35) Nor will you break your treaty with the Spartans if you receive us, who are allies of neither party: (2) for it is stated in the treaty that any of the Greek cities which has no alliance anywhere shall be entitled to join whichever party it pleases. (3) And it will be a dreadful thing if it is possible for them to man their ships from those attached to them under the treaty, and moreover from the rest of Greece and not least from your own subjects, but we are excluded from the alliance

open to us and from obtaining help from anywhere at all, and then that they will count it an injustice if you are persuaded by our appeal.

(4) ‘Much more shall we hold you to blame if we do not persuade you: for you will be repelling us, who are in danger and are not hostile to you, and will not only fail to prevent men who are hostile and attacking you but will also be overlooking it as they take additional strength from your own empire. That would not be just; but either you must prevent them from obtaining mercenaries from your side or you must send help to us as far

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ἂν πεισθῆτε ὠφελίαν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς δεξαμένους βοηθεῖν. (5) πολλὰ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὑπείπομεν, τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἀποδείκνυμεν, καὶ μέγιστον ὅτι οἵ τε αὐτοὶ πολέμιοι ἡμῖν εἰσίν, ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις, καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι: καὶ ναυτικῆς καὶ οὐκ ἠπειρώτιδος τῆς ξυμμαχίας διδομένης οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀλλοτρίωσις, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δύνασθε, μηδένα ἄλλον ἐᾶν κεκτῆσθαι ναῦς, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅστις ἐχυρώτατος, τοῦτον φίλον ἔχειν. (36) “καὶ ὅτωι τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, φοβεῖται δὲ μὴ δι᾽ αὐτὰ πειθόμενος τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ, γνώτω τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ ἰσχὺν ἔχον τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβῆσον, τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου ἀσθενὲς ὃν πρὸς ἰσχύοντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἅμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βουλευόμενος, καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν, ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάζῃ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. (2) τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικὸν ἐᾶσαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν τό τε ἐνθένδε πρὸς τἀκεῖ παραπέμψαι, καὶ ἐς τάλλα ξυμφορώτατόν ἐστιν. (3) “βραχυτάτωῳ δ᾽ ἂν κεφαλαίῳ, τοῖς τε ξύμπασι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τῷδ᾽ ἂν μὴ προέσθαι ἡμᾶς μάθοιτε: τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς Ἕλλησι ναυτικά,

τὸ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων: τούτων δὲ εἰ περιόψεσθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψονται, Κερκυραίοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἅμα ναυμαχήσετε, δεξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἕξετε πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλείοσι ναυσὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι." (4) τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι εἶπον: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς τοιάδε. (37) “ἀναγκαῖον Κερκυραίων τῶνδε οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι σφᾶς τὸν λόγον ποιησαμένων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς τε ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐκ εἰκότως πολεμοῦνται, μνησθέντας πρῶτον καὶ ἡμᾶς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄλλον λόγον ἱέναι, ἵνα τὴν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν τε ἀξίωσιν ἀσφαλέστερον προειδῆτε καὶ τὴν τῶνδε χρείαν μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπώσησθε. (2) “φασὶ δὲ ξυμμαχίαν διὰ τὸ σῶφρον οὐδενός πω δέξασθαι: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἀρετῇ ἐπετήδευσαν, ξύμμαχόν τε οὐδένα βουλόμενοι

35.5.

εἰσίν rec., Richards: ἦσαν MSS, del. Herwerden. τοὺς μεταστάντας: τοὺς «ἡμᾶς μὴ δεχομένους» μεταστάντες Schwartz.

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as we can persuade you - or preferably accept us openly and come to our support. (5) As we suggested at the beginning, we can show that there will be many advantages in this; and particularly that the same people are enemies of ours, which is the clearest sign of our trustworthiness, and they are not weak but capable of harming those who defect from them. And to alienate us would not have the same effect when the alliance offered to you is naval, not land-based; but you ought most of all, if you can, not to allow anybody else to acquire ships, or failing that, to have whoever is strongest as a friend. (36) ‘And, if any of you thinks that what we are saying is advantageous, but is afraid that 1f he is persuaded by that he will be breaking the treaty, he should realise that your fearfulness by bringing strength will rather frighten your opponents, whereas if you are confident and do not receive us this will be weakness and will make you less formidable to strong enemies. You are now deliberating at the same time as much for Athens as for Corcyra, and

you are not taking the best forethought for Athens if, for the war which is coming and almost present, you concentrate on the immediate moment and hesitate to attach to you a place whose friendship or hostility will be of the greatest moment. (2) For it is well situated on the crossing to Italy and Sicily, so that it can prevent a fleet from going from there to the Peloponnesians and their sending one from here to Italy and Sicily; and it is most convenient in other respects. (3) “Το sum up briefly, overall and point by point, you must learn from this not to let us go: there are three fleets worthy of account among the Greeks, yours, ours and the Corinthians’; and if you overlook it while two of these are combined, and the Corinthians get ahead in annexing us, you will have to fight at sea against the Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians together; but if you receive us you will be able to contend against them with our ships in addition." (4) That is what the Corcyraeans said. After them the Corinthians spoke as follows. (37) ‘It is necessary for us, since these Corcyraeans have devoted their argument not only to your receiving them but also to claiming that we are acting unjustly and they are being subjected to war unfairly, to deal first with these points and then to proceed to the rest of our argument, so that you may first gain clear knowledge of our claim and then reject their request not unreasonably. (2) * They say that it was from good sense that they have never received an alliance with anybody; but they have behaved in this way for purposes of mischief and not virtue, since they did not want either to have an ally

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πρὸς τἀδικήματα οὔτε μάρτυρα ἔχειν οὔτε παρακαλοῦντες αἰσχύνεσθαι. (3) καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἅμα αὐτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς ὧν βλάπτουσί τινα μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας ἐκπλέοντας μάλιστα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκῃ καταίροντας δέχεσθαι. (4) καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἄσπονδον οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ξυναδικῶσιν

ἑτέροις προβέβληνται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως κατὰ μόνας ἀδικῶσι καὶ ὅπως ἐν ὧι μὲν ἂν κρατῶσι βιάζωνται, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν λάθωσι πλέον ἔχωσιν, ἢν δέ πού τι προσλάβωσιν ἀναισχυντῶσιν᾽ (5) καίτοι εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀγαθοί, ὅσῳ ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν τοῖς πέλας, τόσῳ δὲ φανερωτέραν ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν διδοῦσι καὶ δεχομένοις τὰ δίκαια δεικνύναι. (38) ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε ἐς ἡμᾶς τοιοίδε εἰσίν, ἄποικοι δ᾽ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθεῖεν. (2) ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶι ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. (3) αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα" (4) καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀρέσκοντές ἐσμεν, τοῖσδ᾽ ἂν μόνοις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαρέσκοιμεν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστρατεύομεν ἐκπρεπῶς μὴ καὶ διαφερόντως

τι ἀδικούμενοι. (5) καλὸν δ᾽ ἦν, εἰ καὶ

ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε μὲν εἶξαι τῇ

ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ, ἡμῖν δὲ αἰσχρὸν βιάσασθαι τὴν τούτων μετριότητα᾽ ὕβρει δὲ καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ πλούτου πολλὰ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἄλλα τε ἡμαρτήκασι καὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ἡμετέραν οὖσαν κακουμένην μὲν οὐ προσεποιοῦντο, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ ἑλόντες βίᾳ ἔχουσιν. (39) “καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκῃ πρότερον ἐθελῆσαι κρίνεσθαι, ἥν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐς ἴσον τά τε ἔργα ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα. (2) οὗτοι δὲ οὐ πρὶν πολιορκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡγήσαντο ἡμᾶς οὐ περιόψεσθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς δίκης παρέσχοντο. καὶ δεῦρο ἥκουσιν οὐ τἀκεῖ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς νῦν ἀξιοῦντες οὐ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ξυναδικεῖν καὶ διαφόρους ¢ ὄντας ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι σφᾶς: (3) ods χρῆν, ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσιέναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν à ἡμεῖς μὲν

37.2.

οὔτε (1) Dobree: οὐδὲ MSS.

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as witness to their injustice or to be ashamed when calling for support. (3) Their city with its self-sufficient situation makes them the judges of the harm they do to anybody more than if they dealt with them on agreed terms, because they have the least need to sail to their neighbours and the most opportunity to receive others who are forced to put in there. (4) And they have put forward this specious lack of treaty relationships not so that they need not join with others in acting unjustly but so that they may act unjustly on their own, in order that where they have the power they may proceed by violence, where they are undetected they may gain an advantage, and if they make any acquisition they may be without shame. (5) Yet if they were good men, as they claim, the more they were invulnerable to their neighbours,

the more openly they would be able to demonstrate their virtue by giving and receiving justice. (38) But they are not of that character, either towards

others or towards us: though colonists they have defected from us all the time, and they are now at war against us, saying that they were not sent out

in order to be treated badly. (2) We for our part say that we did not found their settlement in order to be insulted, but in order to be their leaders and to receive the appropriate respect. (3) At all events, our other colonies honour us, and we are held in particular affection by our colonists. (4) And it is clear that, if we are pleasing to most of them, then it would be perverse for

these alone to be displeased with us; and we should not be attacking them exceptionally unless we had been particularly subjected to injustice. (5) It would be honourable, even if we were mistaken, for them to give way to our anger, and shameful for us to use violence against their moderation. But in their insolence and abundance of wealth they have erred in many other ways against us, and they refused to take up the case of Epidamnus, which belongs to us, when it was ill treated, and when we went to support it they captured it by force and are holding on to it. (39) ‘And they say that they were first willing to submit to justice by

arbitration; but it is not those who have the upper hand and make the offer from a position of safety who should be regarded as making a good point but those who put their deeds as well as their words on a level footing before fighting it out. (2) These men did not make their specious offer of judgment

before they laid siege to the place, but only when they thought we should not overlook it. And they have come here not only after erring with regard to the episode there but are now claiming that you should become not their allies but their partners in injustice, and should receive them when they are in dispute with us. (3) It was when they were utterly safe that they ought to

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ἠδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδυνεύουσι, μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ὑμεῖς τῆς τε δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες τῆς ὠφελίας νῦν μεταδώσετε καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἄπο γενόμενοι τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἕξετε, πάλαι δὲ κοινώσαντας τὴν δύναμιν κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἔχειν. ἐγκλημάτων δὲ μόνων ἀμετόχως οὕτως τῶν μετὰ τὰς πράξεις τούτων μὴ κοινωνεῖν. (40) “ὡς μὲν οὖν αὐτοί τε μετὰ προσηκόντων ἐγκλημάτων ἐρχόμεθα καὶ οἵδε βίαιοι καὶ πλεονέκται εἰσὶ, δεδήλωται: ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως αὐτοὺς δέχοισθε μαθεῖν χρή. (2) εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἐξεῖναι παρ᾽ ὁποτέρους τις βούλεται τῶν ἀγράφων πόλεων ἐλθεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἑτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἡ ξυνθήκη ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μὴ ἄλλου ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερῶν ἀσφαλείας δεῖται καὶ ὅστις μὴ τοῖς δεξαμένοις, εἰ σωφρονοῦσι, πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης ποιήσει: ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς μὴ πειθόμενοι ἡμῖν πάθοιτε ἄν. (3) οὐ γὰρ τοῖσδε μόνον ἐπίκουροι ἂν γένοισθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀντὶ ἐνσπόνδων πολέμιοι: ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ ἴτε pet αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι μὴ ἄνευ ὑμῶν τούτους. (4) καίτοι δίκαιοί γ᾽ ἐστὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐκποδὼν στῆναι ἀμφοτέροις, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ τούτους μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἰέναι (Κορινθίοις μέν γε ἔνσπονδοί ἐστε, Κερκυραίοις δὲ οὐδὲ 51 ἀνοκωχῆς πώποτ᾽ ἐγένεσθε), καὶ τὸν νόμον μὴ καθιστάναι ὥστε τοὺς ἑτέρων ἀφισταμένους δέχεσθαι. (5) οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν. (6) εἰ γὰρ τοὺς κακόν τι δρῶντας δεχόμενοι τιμωρήσετε, φανεῖται καὶ ἃ τῶν ὑμετέρων οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἡμῖν πρόσεισι, καὶ τὸν νόμον ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν θήσετε.

(41) “δικαιώματα μὲν οὖν τάδε πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχομεν ἱκανὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους, παραίνεσιν δὲ καὶ ἀξίωσιν χάριτος τοιάνδε, ἣν οὐκ ἐχθροὶ

ὄντες ὥστε βλάπτειν οὐδ᾽ ad φίλοι ὥστ᾽ ἐπιχρῆσθαι, ἀντιδοθῆναι ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαμὲν χρῆναι. (2) νεῶν γὰρ μακρῶν σπανίσαντές ποτε πρὸς τὸν Αἰγινητῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐλάβετε; καὶ ἡ εὐεργεσία αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ ἐς Σαμίους, τὸ St ἡμᾶς Πελοποννησίους αὐτοῖς μὴ βοηθῆσαι, παρέσχεν ὑμῖν Αἰγινητῶν μὲν ἐπικράτησιν, Σαμίων δὲ 39.3.

ἄπο γενόμενοι CEG: ἀπογενόμενοι others ἐγκλημάτων δὲ ... μὴ κοινωνεῖν CG rec. cf. Valla: deleted Bekker, defended Maurer, Interpolation, 135-45,

40.1.

προσηκόντων ἐγκλημάτων ἐρχόμεθα others: προσηκόντων τῶν τοῦ δικαίου κεφαλαίων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐρχόμεθα CG rec. (but κεφαλαίων partly erased CG, translated ingressu Valla), defended as a corrupt version of the original text which in the other MSS was replaced by ἐγκλημάτων Maurer, /nterpolation, 141—5.

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have approached you, and not in a situation in which we have been treated unjustly and they are in danger, and in which you did not share in their power then but will give them a share in the benefit now, and while uninvolved in their errors will have an equal share in our grievance. They ought to have made their power joint long ago if they are to have a joint outcome, while you ought not to avoid our present complaints while sharing in what follows from their actions. (40) ‘That we have come with fitting complaints, and these Corcyraeans are violent and grasping, has been shown; but that it would not be just for you to receive them you must learn. (2) For if it has been stated in the treaty that any of the unenrolled cities may join whichever side it wishes, that agreement is not for those who go to harm others but for any one who appeals for security without abandoning another, and (as you will learn if you are sensible) who will not bring to those who receive him war instead of

peace. And that could happen to you if you did not take our advice. (3) For you would become not only reinforcers of them but also, instead of being in a treaty relationship, enemies of us; for we shall be compelled, if you go

with them, to defend ourselves against you as well as them. (4) Indeed, it

would be just for you, most of all, to remain uninvolved with both parties; or, failing that, on the contrary to go against them with us — for you are in a

treaty relationship with the Corinthians but have never even had a truce with the Corcyraeans - and not to institute the law that one may receive those defecting from the other side. (5) For when the Samians were defecting we did not cast our vote against you, when the other Peloponnesians were

divided and voting on whether to defend them, but we spoke openly against, arguing that a city should be entitled to discipline its own allies. (6) If you

receive those who are acting badly and provide retribution for them, some of your own cities will be seen no less coming over to us, and you will have

instituted the law against yourselves rather than against us. (41) ‘We therefore have these just claims against you, which by the laws of the Greeks are sufficient; and also this exhortation and right to your favour, which (since we are neither enemies who would harm you nor

conversely friends who have easy dealings with you) we declare should be repaid to us in the present circumstances. (2) For once when you were short of long ships for your war against the Aeginetans, before the Persian War, you acquired twenty ships from the Corinthians: this benefaction and that with regard to the Samians, the fact that through us the Peloponnesians were prevented from going to help them, enabled-you to overcome the Aeginetans

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κόλασιν, καὶ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις ἐγένετο οἷς μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι én’ ἐχθροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἰόντες τῶν ἁπάντων ἀπερίοπτοί εἰσι παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν’ (3) φίλον

τε γὰρ ἡγοῦνται tov ὑπουργοῦντα, ἢν καὶ πρότερον ἐχθρὸς À, πολέμιόν τε τὸν ἀντιστάντα, ἢν καὶ τύχῃ φίλος ὦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χεῖρον τίθενται φιλονικίας ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτίκα. (42) “ὧν ἐνθυμηθέντες καὶ νεώτερός τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρου αὐτὰ μαθὼν ἀξιούτω τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἡμᾶς ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ νομίσῃ δίκαια μὲν τάδε λέγεσθαι, ξύμφορα δέ, εἰ πολεμήσει, ἄλλα εἶναι. (2) τό τε γὰρ ξυμφέρον ἐν ᾧ ἄν τις ἐλάχιστα ἁμαρτάνῃ μάλιστα ἕπεται, καὶ τὸ μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου ᾧ φοβοῦντες ὑμᾶς Κερκυραῖοι κελεύουσιν ἀδικεῖν ἐν ἀφανεῖ ἔτι κεῖται, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπαρθέντας αὐτῷ φανερὰν ἔχθραν ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλουσαν πρὸς Κορινθίους κτήσασθαι, τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας σῶφρον ὑφελεῖν μᾶλλον (3) (ἡ γὰρ τελευταία χάρις καιρὸν ἔχουσα, κἂν ἐλάσσων ἧ, δύναται μεῖζον ἔγκλημα λῦσαι), (4) μηδ᾽ ὅτι ναυτικοῦ ξυμμαχίαν μεγάλην διδόασι, τούτῳ ἐφέλκεσθαι τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ τῷ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας διὰ κινδύνων τὸ πλέον ἔχειν. (43) ἡμεῖς δὲ περιπεπτωκότες οἷς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτοὶ προείπομεν, τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν, νῦν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξιοῦμεν κομίζεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ ὠφεληθέντας τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἡμᾶς βλάψαι. (2) τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἀνταπόδοτε, γνόντες τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐν ᾧ ὅ τε ὑπουργῶν φίλος μάλιστα καὶ ὁ ἀντιστὰς ἐχθρός. (3) καὶ Κερκυραίους τούσδε μήτε ξυμμάχους δέχεσθε βίᾳ ἡμῶν μήτε ἀμύνετε αὐτοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν. καὶ τάδε ποιοῦντες τὰ προσήκοντά τε δράσετε καὶ τὰ ἄριστα βουλεύσεσθε ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς." (44) τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες

ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν (εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθον ἐκέλευον σφίσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ξυμπλεῖν, ἐλύοντ᾽ ἂν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί), ἐπιμαχίαν δ᾽ ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἴῃ ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς

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and discipline the Samians; and this happened in crises of the kind in which men who are going against those hostile to them disregard everything else in comparison with victory. (3) They regard as a friend one who assists them, even if he was previously hostile, and as an enemy one who opposes them, even if he happened to be a friend, since they judge their connections less important than their immediate determination to win. (42) ‘You must take this to heart, and any younger men must learn from the older, and you must judge it right to defend us in the same way. And do not suppose that what we say is just, but what is advantageous, 1f

it comes to war, will be different. (2) For advantage follows most where people are least in error; and the impending war which the Corcyraeans are frightening you with when they urge you to act unjustly is still in the realm of uncertainty, and it is not proper that you should be excited by that and incur from the Corinthians a hostility which would be evident now

and not just impending. It would rather be sensible for you to dispel our previous suspicion on account of the Megarians, (3) for the most recent favour, conferred at a crucial time, even if it is comparatively slight can undo a comparatively weighty objection. (4) Nor because they are offering a great naval alliance should you be enticed by that: for not acting unjustly to your equals is a more reliable source of strength than being excited by

what is momentarily evidentto run risks and grasp for more. (43) We have fallen into the circumstances of which we ourselves spoke earlier in Sparta, the disciplining of one's own allies; and now we think it right that we should obtain the same from you, and that when you were helped by our vote you should not harm us by yours. (2) Give us an equal return, recognising that this is that critical situation which we mentioned, in which above all the one

who assists is a friend and the one who opposes is hostile. (3) Do not receive these Corcyraeans as allies in defiance of us, and do not defend them in their injustice. (4) If you act as we urge you, you will both be doing what is fitting and following the best policy for yourselves.’ (44) That is what the Corinthians said. The Athenians listened to both parties, and, holding two assemblies, in the first they were not less receptive of the Corinthians' speech, but on the next day they changed their mind — not to the extent of making a full alliance with the Corcyraeans, so as to recognise the same friends and enemies (for if the Corcyraeans ordered them to join in sailing against Corinth they would be in breach of their treaty with the Peloponnesians), but they made a defensive alliance, to go to the help of each other if anybody went against Corcyra or against Athens or

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τούτων ξυμμάχους. (2) ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν τοσοῦτον, ξυγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὖσιν, ἤν τι δέῃ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. (3) ἅμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κεῖσθαι. (45) τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους προσεδέξαντο, καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπελθόντων οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναῦς αὐτοῖς ἀπέστειλαν βοηθούς: (2) ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμόνιός te ὁ Κίμωνος καὶ Διότιμος ὁ Στρομβίχου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ ᾿Ἐπικλέους. (3) προεῖπον δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις ἢν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων οὕτω δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν. προεῖπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ λύειν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδάς. (46) αἱ μὲν δὴ νῆες ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύαστο, ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ναυσὶ πεντήκοντα

καὶ ἑκατόν. ἦσαν δὲ Ἠλείων μὲν δέκα, Μεγαρέων δὲ δώδεκα καὶ Λευκαδίων δέκα, Ἀμπρακιωτῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ Ἀνακτορίων μία, αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων ἐνενήκοντα. (2) στρατηγοὶ δὲ τούτων ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων, Κορινθίων δὲ Ξενοκλείδης ὁ Εὐθυκλέους πέμπτος αὐτός. (3) ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειξαν τῇ κατὰ Κέρκυραν ἠπείρῳ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος πλέοντες, ὁρμίζονται ἐς Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος γῆς. (4) ἔστι δὲ λιμήν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ ᾿Ελαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος ᾿Εφύρη. ἐξίησι δὲ tap αὐτὴν Ἀχερουσία λίμνη ἐς θάλασσαν: διὰ δὲ τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἀχέρων ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐσβάλλει ἐς αὐτήν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει.

ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ Θύαμις ποταμός, ὁρίζων τὴν Θεσπρωτίδα καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὧν ἐντὸς ἡ ἄκρα ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον. (5) οἱ μὲν οὖν Κορίνθιοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐνταῦθα ὁρμίζονταί τε καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο. (47) οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι, ὡς ἤσθοντο αὐτοὺς προσπλέοντας, πληρώσαντες δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν ναῦς, ὧν ἦρχε Μικιάδης καὶ Αἰσιμίδης καὶ Εὐρύβατος, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν μιᾷ τῶν νήσων ai καλοῦνται Σύβοτα᾽ καὶ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ δέκα παρῆσαν. (2) ἐπὶ δὲ

τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αὐτοῖς τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ ὁ πεζὸς ἦν καὶ Ζακυνθίων χίλιοι ὁπλῖται βεβοηθηκότες. (3) ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων παραβεβοηθηκότες᾽ οἱ γὰρ ταύτῃ ἠπειρῶται αἰεί ποτε αὐτοῖς φίλοι εἰσίν.

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its allies. (2) For they thought that the war with the Peloponnesians would indeed come about, and they did not want Corcyra, which had so great a fleet, to go over to the Corinthians beforehand. What they wanted most of all was that the two should wear down each other, so that if the need arose

the Corinthians would be weaker when they went to war against them and the others who had a fleet. (3) At the same time, the island seemed to them

to be well situated on the coastal voyage to Italy and Sicily. (45) It was with this kind of intention that the Athenians received the Corcyraeans; and not long after the Corinthians had left they sent ten ships to go and help them: (2) their generals were Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus and Proteas son of Epicles. (3) They were instructed not to fight a naval battle against the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra and were about to land there, or against any of the places belonging to them, but in those circumstances they were to prevent them as far as their strength allowed. They were given these instructions in order to avoid breaking the treaty. (46) These ships arrived at Corcyra; and the Corinthians, when they had made their preparations, began sailing against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. There were ten from Elis, twelve from Megara and ten from Leucas, twenty-seven from Ambracia and one from Anactorium, and ninety

from Corinth itself; (2) there were generals of these from the individual cities, and from Corinth Xenoclides son of Euthycles and four others. (3) When they had sailed from Leucas and touched the mainland opposite

Corcyra, they moored at Cheimerium in the land of Thesprotis. (4) There is a harbour, and above it, situated away from the sea, the city of Ephyre in

the district of Elaeatis in Thesprotis. Near this the Acherusian Lake flows out into the sea; the River Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis, issues into the Lake, which

derives its name

from

that. There

is also the River

Thyamis, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and Cestrine; and the headland of Cheimerium projects between these rivers. (5) The Corinthians, then, moored off the mainland there and made their camp. (47) When the Corcyraeans learned that they were sailing towards them, they manned a hundred and ten ships, commanded by Miciades, Aesimides and Eurybatus,

and they camped on one of the islands called Sybota; the ten Athenian ships were with them. (2) On the headland of Leucimme were their infantry, and a thousand hoplites from Zacynthus who had come to help. (3) On the mainland the Corinthians had many of the barbanans who had come there to help them; for the mainlanders in this region have always been friendly to them.

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Thucydides

(48) ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο τοῖς Κορινθίοις, λαβόντες τριῶν ἡμερῶν σιτία ἀνήγοντο ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ Χειμερίου νυκτός, (2) καὶ ἅμα ἕῳ πλέοντες καθορῶσι τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων ναῦς μετεώρους τε καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλεούσας. (3) ὡς δὲ κατεῖδον ἀλλήλους, ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας Κερκυραίων αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπεῖχον τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες τῶν νεῶν, ὧν ἦρχε «τῶν; τριῶν στρατηγῶν ἑκάστου εἷς.

(4) οὕτω μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἐτάξαντο, Κορινθίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας αἱ

Μεγαρίδες νῆες εἶχον καὶ αἱ Ἀμπρακιώτιδες, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἕκαστοι εὐώνυμον δὲ κέρας αὐτοὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ταῖς ἄριστα τῶν νεῶν πλεούσαις κατὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Κερκυραίων εἶχον. (49) ξυμμείξαντες δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα ἑκατέροις ἤρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολλοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστάς, τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἔτι παρεσκευασμένοι. (2) ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως,

πεζομαχίᾳ δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα. (3) ἐπειδὴ γὰρ προσβάλοιεν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἀπελύοντο ὑπό τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου τῶν νεῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν τι πιστεύοντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὁπλίταις ἐς τὴν νίκην, OÙ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο ἡσυχαζουσῶν τῶν νεῶν διέκπλοι δ᾽ οὐκ

ἦσαν, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ. (4) πανταχῇ μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχώδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία, £v T] αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες παραγιγνόμεναι τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἴπῃ πιέζοιντο, φόβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐναντίοις, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν A0nvaíov. (5) μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπόνει: οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶν αὐτοὺς τρεψάμενοι καὶ καταδιώξαντες σποράδας ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἐνέπρησάν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν. (6) ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσῶντό [te] καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπεκράτουν. ἡ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπὶ τῶι εὐωνύμωι, πολὺ ἐνίκων, τοῖς Κερκυραίοις τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ ἐλάσσονος πλήθους ἐκ τῆς διώξεως οὐ παρουσῶν. (7) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες τοὺς Κερκυραίους πιεζομένους μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπροφασίστως ἐπεκούρουν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι ὥστε μὴ ἐμβάλλειν mw ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγίγνετο λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐνέκειντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τότε δὴ ἔργου πᾶς εἴχετο ἤδη καὶ διεκέκριτο οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὥστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους

καὶ Ἀθηναίους. 48.3.

«τῶν» τριῶν Poppo.

49.6.

te MSS, II*: deleted Krüger.

|

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(48) When the Corinthians had made their preparations, they took three days’ provisions and put out from Cheimerium by night, ready for a naval battle; (2) and sailing at daybreak they saw the Corcyraeans' ships out at sea and sailing against them. (3) When they saw each other, they drew up in opposing formations. On the right wing of the Corcyraeans were the Athenian ships, and the rest of the line was occupied by the Corcyraeans,

with their ships in three divisions, each commanded by one of the three generals. (4) That is how the Corcyraeans were drawn up. On the Corinthian side the right wing was occupied by the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, and the centre by the other allies in their individual contingents; the left wing was occupied by the Corinthians themselves, with their best-sailing ships opposite the Athenians and the Corcyraean right. (49) When the signals had been given on each side, they engaged and began the naval battle. Each side had many hoplites on the decks, and many archers and javelin-throwers, being still equipped rather inexpertly in the ancient manner. (2) The naval battle was fierce, but the ferocity was not matched by skill, but it was generally like an infantry battle. (3) For when they collided with one another they could not separate easily, because of the number and crowding of the ships, and for victory they relied rather on the hoplites on the deck, who took up position and fought while the ships were immobile. There were no sailing-through manoeuvres, but they fought with spirit and strength rather than expertise. (4) Everywhere there was a great uproar, and it was a chaotic battle, in which the Athenian ships, supporting the Corcyraeans if they were under pressure anywhere, inspired fear in their opponents, but did not start fighting, because the generals were intimidated by

the Athenians'

instructions.

(5) The

Corinthians'

right

wing

was

in

particular difficulty; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pursued them in disorder to the mainland; and, sailing as far as their camp and disembarking, they burned the deserted tents and plundered the money. (6) Here, then, the Corinthians and their allies were defeated and the Corcyraeans gained the upper hand. But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they were easily victorious, when out of the Corcyraeans' smaller number the twenty ships were not back from the pursuit. (7) The Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeans under pressure, were now more willing

to reinforce them unhesitatingly. At first they held back from attacking any ship; but when there was an evident rout and the Corinthians were pushing on, then everybody took up the work and there was no discrimination any longer, but the point of necessity was reached in which the Corinthians and Athenians made assaults on one another.

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(50) τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὰ σκάφη μὲν οὐχ εἷλκον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἃς καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ζωγρεῖν, τούς τε αὑτῶν φίλους, οὐκ ἠσθημένοι ὅτι ἥσσηντο οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ, ἀγνοοῦντες ἔκτεινον. (2) πολλῶν γὰρ νεῶν οὐσῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεχουσῶν, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέμειξαν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥαιδίως τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐποιοῦντο ὁποῖοι ἐκράτουν ἢ ἐκρατοῦντο᾽ ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη Ἕλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὑτῆς γεγένηται. (3) ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεδίωξαν τοὺς Κερκυραίους οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐς τὴν γῆν, πρὸς τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἐτράποντο, καὶ τῶν πλείστων ἐκράτησαν ὥστε προσκομίσαι πρὸς

τὰ Σύβοτα, ot αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν βαρβάρων προσεβεβοηθήκει: ἔστι δὲ τὰ Σύβοτα τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος λιμὴν ἐρῆμος. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαντες αὖθις ἁθροισθέντες ἐπέπλεον τοῖς Κερκυραίοις. (4) οἱ δὲ ταῖς πλωΐμοις καὶ ὅσαι ἦσαν λοιπαὶ μετὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντεπέπλεον, δείσαντες μὴ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν πειρῶσιν ἀποβαίνειν. (5) ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὀψὲ καὶ ἐπεπαιάνιστο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο κατιδόντες εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων προσπλεούσας, ἃς ὕστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοὺς ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δείσαντες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μὴ νικηθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεραι δέκα νῆες ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὦσιν. (51) ταύτας οὖν προϊδόντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑποτοπήσαντες ἀπ᾿ Ἀθηνῶν εἶναι οὐχ ὅσας ἑώρων ἀλλὰ πλείους ὑπανεχώρουν. (2) τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις (ἐπέπλεον γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς) οὐχ ἑωρῶντο, καὶ ἐθαύμαζον τοὺς Κορινθίους πρύμναν κρουομένους, πρίν τινες ἰδόντες εἶπον ὅτι νῆες

ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέουσιν. τότε δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχώρουν᾽ ξυνεσκόταζε γὰρ ἤδη, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἀποτραπόμενοι τὴν διάλυσιν ἐποιήσαντο. (3) οὕτω μὲν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἐγένετο ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡ ναυμαχία ἐτελεύτα ἐς νύκτα. (4) τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις στρατοπεδευομένοις ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αἱ εἴκοσι νῆες αἱ

ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὗται, ὧν ἦρχε Γλαύκων τε ὁ Λεάγρου καὶ Ἀνδοκίδης ὁ Λεωγόρου, διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οὐ πολλῶι ὕστερον ἢ ὥφθησαν. (5) οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι (ἦν γὰρ νύξ) ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ πολέμιαι ὦσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔγνωσαν: καὶ ὡρμίσαντο. (52) τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναγαγόμεναι αἵ τε Ἀττικαὶ τριάκοντα νῆες καὶ τῶν

Κερκυραίων ὅσαι πλώιμοι ἦσαν ἐπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμένα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι εἰ ναυμαχήσουσιν. (2) οἱ δὲ

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(S0) After the rout, the Corinthians did not attach ropes to drag away

the hulls of the ships which they had disabled but turned to the men, sailing through and slaughtering rather than taking prisoners; and in ignorance they killed friends of their own, not realising that those on the right wing had been defeated. (2) For there were many ships on both sides, spread to a great extent over the sea, and after they had engaged with one another they could

not easily distinguish who were on the winning side and who on the losing: for in number of ships this was a larger naval battle of Greeks against Greeks than any before it. (3) When the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, and they won control of most and were able to convey them to Sybota, where the barbarians' land force had come to help them. (Sybota is a deserted harbour in Thesprotis.) After doing this they assembled again and sailed against the Corcyraeans. (4) They in turn, with their seaworthy ships and as many as they had left, together with the Athenians, set sail in response, afraid that the Corinthians might try to disembark on their land. (5) When it was already late, and the paean had been sung for sailing to attack, the Corinthians suddenly began to back water on seeing twenty Athenian ships sailing up. The Athenians had dispatched these to help after the ten, fearing (as indeed happened) that the Corcyraeans would be defeated and their own ten ships would be too few to defend them. (51) The Corinthians saw these first, and, suspecting that not only the ships they could see were coming from Athens but more, began to withdraw. (2) But the Corcyraeans could not see them, since they were approaching from a direction less clearly visible to them, and they were amazed at the

Corinthians' backing water until some did see them and announced that over there ships were approaching. Then the Corcyraeans withdrew also, for it was now growing dark and the Corinthians by turning away had ended the engagement. (3) In this way they parted from each other, and the naval battle ended at nightfall. (4) The Corcyraeans were camped at Leucimme; and these twenty ships from Athens, commanded by Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, made their way through the bodies and wrecks and sailed in to the camp not long after they were sighted. (5) The Corcyraeans, since it was night, were afraid that they might be enemy ships, but then they were recognised; and they moored. (52) The next day the thirty Athenian ships and those of the Corcyraeans which were seaworthy sailed against the harbour at Sybota, where the

Corinthians were moored, wanting to find out whether they would fight a

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τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἄραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ παραταξάμενοι μετεώρους ἡσύχαζον, ναυμαχίας οὐ διανοούμενοι ἄρχειν ἑκόντες ὁρῶντες προσγεγενημένας τε ναῦς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀκραιφνεῖς καὶ σφίσι πολλὰ τὰ ἄπορα ξυμβεβηκότα,

αἰχμαλώτων τε περὶ φυλακῆς ods ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν εἶχον, καὶ ἐπισκευὴν οὐκ οὖσαν τῶν νεῶν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμω᾽ (3) τοῦ δὲ οἴκαδε πλοῦ μᾶλλον διεσκόπουν ὅπῃ κομισθήσονται, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς, διότι ἐς χεῖρας ἦλθον, οὐκ ἐῶσι σφᾶς ἀποπλεῖν.

(53) ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἐς κελήτιον ἐσβιβάσαντας ἄνευ κηρυκείου προσπέμψαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ πεῖραν ποιήσασθαι. πέμψαντές τε ἔλεγον τοιάδε. (2) “ἀδικεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πολέμου ἄρχοντες καὶ σπονδὰς λύοντες ἡμῖν γὰρ πολεμίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους τιμωρουμένοις ἐμποδὼν

ἵστασθε ὅπλα ἀνταιρόμενοι. εἰ δ᾽ ὑμῖν γνώμη ἐστὶ κωλύειν τε ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἢ ἄλλοσε εἴ ποι βουλόμεθα πλεῖν καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς λύετε, ἡμᾶς τούσδε πρώτους λαβόντες χρήσασθε ὡς πολεμίοις." (3) οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτα

εἶπον: τῶν δὲ Κερκυραίων τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον ὅσον ἐπήκουσεν ἀνεβόησεν εὐθὺς λαβεῖν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοιάδε ἀπεκρίναντο. (4) “οὔτε ἄρχομεν πολέμου, ὦ ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, οὔτε τὰς σπονδὰς

λύομεν, Κερκυραίοις δὲ τοῖσδε ξυμμάχοις οὖσι βοηθοὶ ἤλθομεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοσέ ποι βούλεσθε πλεῖν, οὐ κωλύομεν᾽ εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλευσεῖσθε ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων, οὐ περιοψόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν." (54) τοιαῦτα τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἀποκριναμένων οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι τόν τε πλοῦν τὸν EX οἴκου παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Συβότοις᾽ οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τά τε ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς ἐξενεχθέντα ὑπό τε τοῦ ῥοῦ καὶ ἀνέμου, ὃς γενόμενος τῆς νυκτὸς διεσκέδασεν αὐτὰ πανταχῇ, καὶ τροπαῖον ἀντέστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσω Συβότοις ὡς νενικηκότες. (2) γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε ἑκάτεροι τὴν νίκην προσεποιήσαντο: Κορίνθιοι μὲν κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ μέχρι νυκτός, ὥστε καὶ ναυάγια πλεῖστα καὶ νεκροὺς προσκομίσασθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἔχοντες αἰχμαλώτους οὐκ ἐλάσσους χιλίων ναῦς τε καταδύσαντες περὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, ἔστησαν tponatov’ Κερκυραῖοι δὲ τριάκοντα ναῦς μάλιστα διαφθείραντες, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον, ἀνελόμενοι τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ναυάγια καὶ νεκρούς, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς τῇ τε προτεραίᾳ πρύμναν κρουόμενοι ὑπεχώρησαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἰδόντες τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἦλθον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐκ

54.2.

ἑβδομήκοντα suspected Gomme.

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naval battle. (2) The Corinthians put out their ships from the land and took up formation at sea but remained inactive, not intending to begin a battle of their own accord, when they saw that the fresh ships had come from Athens, and that many problems had arisen for themselves, both concerning the custody of the prisoners whom they had in the ships, and the fact that there was no opportunity to repair their ships in a deserted place. (3) They began to consider more how they might travel on their homeward voyage, fearing that the Athenians would regard the treaty as broken, because they had come to grips with each other, and would not allow them to sail away. (53) They therefore decided to embark some men on a boat without a herald's wand, and send them to the Athenians to make trial of them; and the message they were sent with was this. (2) * You are acting unjustly, men of Athens,

by starting a war and breaking the treaty; for you stand as an obstacle to our taking retribution from our enemies by raising arms against us. If it is your intention to prevent us from sailing to Corcyra or anywhere else we wish, and you are breaking off the treaty, take us here first and treat us as

enemies.' (3) That is what they said. As many in the Corcyraeans' force as could hear shouted out that they should be taken and killed immediately; but the Athenians replied as follows. (4) ‘We are not starting a war, men of the Peloponnese, or breaking off the treaty, but we have come here to help these Corcyraeans who are our allies. If you wish to sail anywhere else, we shall not prevent you; but, if you sail against Corcyra or against any of the places belonging to them, as far as possible we shall not overlook it.’ (54) When the Athenians had given this reply, the Corinthians began preparing for their homeward voyage, and set up a trophy at mainland Sybota. The Corcyraeans collected the wrecks and bodies which had been carried in their direction by the tide, and by a wind which had arisen during the night and had scattered them in all directions; and they set up a rival trophy at island Sybota to claim the victory. (2) The thinking with which each side claimed the victory was as follows. The Corinthians had prevailed in the naval battle until night, so as to be able to convey most of the wrecks and bodies; and they had no fewer than a thousand men as prisoners and had disabled about seventy ships: that was why they set up a trophy. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and when the Athenians had come they had collected the wrecks and bodies which had come in their direction; and because the previous day the Corinthians had backed water and withdrawn from them on seeing the Athenian ships, and when the Athenians had come the Corinthians had not sailed out against them from Sybota, for

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ἀντεπέπλεον ἐκ τῶν Συβότων, διὰ ἑκάτεροι νικᾶν ἠξίουν. oi δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀποπλέοντες στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, καὶ ἐκείνων) καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν

ταῦτα τροπαῖον ἔστησαν. (55) οὕτω μὲν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου Ἀνακτόριον, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ εἷλον ἀπάτῃ (ἦν δὲ κοινὸν Κερκυραίων αὐτῷ Κορινθίους οἰκήτορας ἀνεχώρησαν

én’ οἴκου, καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὀκτακοσίους μὲν oi ἦσαν δοῦλοι ἀπέδοντο, πεντήκοντα δὲ καὶ διακοσίους δήσαντες ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῇ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν᾽ ἐτύγχανον δὲ καὶ δυνάμει αὐτῶν οἱ πλείους πρῶτοι ὄντες τῆς πόλεως. (2) ἡ μὲν οὖν Κέρκυρα οὕτω περιγίγνεται τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Κορινθίων, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ αὐτῆς; αἰτία δὲ αὕτη πρώτη ἐγένετο τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτι σφίσιν ἐν σπονδαῖς μετὰ Κερκυραίων ἐναυμάχουν. (56) μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ εὐθὺς καὶ τάδε ξυνέβη γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις διάφορα ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. (2) τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων πρασσόντων ὅπως τιμωρήσονται αὐτούς, ὑποτοπήσαντες τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ποτειδεάτας, oi οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῶι ἰσθμῷ τῆς Παλλήνης, Κορινθίων ἀποίκους, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ξυμμάχους φόρου ὑποτελεῖς, ἐκέλευον τὸ ἐς Παλλήνην τεῖχος καθελεῖν καὶ ὁμήρους δοῦναι, τούς τε ἐπιδημιουργοὺς ἐκπέμπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ δέχεσθαι οὗς κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον, δείσαντες

μὴ ἀποστῶσιν ὑπό τε Περδίκκου πειθόμενοι καὶ Κορινθίων, τούς τε ἄλλους τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης ξυναποστήσωσι ξυμμάχους. (57) ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τοὺς Ποτειδεάτας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν: (2) ot te γὰρ Κορίνθιοι φανερῶς ἤδη διάφοροι ἦσαν, Περδίκκας

τε ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὦν. (3) ἐπολεμώθη δὲ ὅτι Φιλίππωι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Δέρδᾳ κοινῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιουμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο. (4) δεδιώς τε ἔπρασσεν ἔς τε τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμπων ὅπως πόλεμος γένηται αὐτοῖς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προσεποιεῖτο τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἕνεκα ἀποστάσεως: (5) προσέφερε δὲ λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδεῦσι καὶ Βοττιαίοις ξυναποστῆναι, νομίζων, εἰ ξύμμαχα ταῦτα ἔχοι ὅμορα ὄντα τὰ χωρία, pâov ἂν τὸν πόλεμον μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. (6) ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι προκαταλαμβάνειν τῶν πόλεων τὰς ἀποστάσεις (ἔτυχον γὰρ τριάκοντα ναῦς ἀποστέλλοντες καὶ χιλίους

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this reason they set up a trophy. (55) In this way each side claimed to be victorious. The Corinthians while sailing home captured by means of a trick Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was a jont foundation of the Corcyraeans and themselves. After installing Corinthian settlers in it they returned home. Of the Corcyraeans they sold the eight hundred who were slaves; and two hundred and fifty they imprisoned and kept in custody, and took great care of them, so that when they returned to Corcyra they might bring it over to them: it happened that most of them were leading men of the city in influence. (2) In this way Corcyra survived in its war with the Corinthians, and the Athenians' ships departed from there.

This was the first grievance causing the war for the Corinthians against the Athenians, that in a time of treaty they had joined the Corcyraeans in fighting a naval battle against them.

(56) [Immediately afterwards the following dispute leading to warfare occurred also between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. (2) When the Corinthians were planning to take retribution from them, the Athenians were suspicious of their hostility, and ordered the Potidaeans, who live on the

isthmus of Pallene, and were colonists of Corinth but tribute-paying allies of their own, to demolish their wall towards Pallene and give hostages, and to

dismiss and in future not receive the epidemiourgoi whom the Corinthians sent each year. They were afraid that the Potidaeans might be induced to defect by Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and might join in bringing about

the defection of the other Thraceward allies. (57) The Athenians made these precautionary preparations with regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the naval battle at Corcyra. (2) For the Corinthians were now openly in dispute with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, the Macedonian king, had become an enemy though he was previously an ally and friend. (3) He

became an enemy because the Athenians made an alliance with his own brother Philip and with Derdas, who were combined in opposition to him. (4) In his fear he began negotiations with Sparta, sending envoys to bring about a war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and he tried to win over the Corinthians to bring about a defection of Potidaea. (5) He also made approaches to the Thraceward Chalcidians and Bottiaeans to Join in

defection, thinking that if he had these neighbouring territories as allies he could more easily prosecute the war together with them. (6) The Athenians learned of this and wanted to anticipate the defection of the cities. They happened to be sending thirty ships and a thousand hoplites against his land,

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ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ, Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους μετ᾽ ἄλλων δυοῖν στρατηγοῦντος) ἐπιστέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχουσι τῶν νεῶν Ποτειδεατῶν

τε ὁμήρους λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελεῖν, τῶν τε πλησίον πόλεων φυλακὴν ἔχειν ὅπως μὴ ἀποστήσονται. (58) Ποτειδεᾶται δὲ πέμψαντες μὲν καὶ παρ᾽ Αθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἴ πως πείσειαν μὴ σφῶν πέρι νεωτερίζειν μηδέν, ἐλθόντες δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα μετὰ Κορινθίων, [ἔπρασσον] ὅπως ἑτοιμάσαιντο τιμωρίαν, ἢν δέῃ, ἐπειδὴ ἔκ τε ᾿Αθηνῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν ηὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ νῆες αἱ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὁμοίως ἔπλεον, καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἢν ἐπὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἴωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀφίστανται μετὰ Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων κοινῇ ξυνομόσαντες. (2) καὶ Περδίκκας πείθει Χαλκιδέας τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσηι πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας καὶ καταβαλόντας ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐς Ὄλυνθον μίαν τε πόλιν ταύτην ἰσχυρὰν ποιήσασθαι: τοῖς t ἐκλιποῦσι τούτοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς τῆς Μυγδονίας περὶ τὴν Βόλβην λίμνην

ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι ἕως ἂν ὁ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμος ἧ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνωικίζοντό τε καθαιροῦντες τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἐς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο. (59) αἱ δὲ τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης, καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τήν τε Ποτείδαιαν καὶ τάλλα ἀφεστηκότα. (2) νομίσαντες

δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀδύνατα εἶναι πρός τε Περδίκκαν πολεμεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει καὶ tà ξυναφεστῶτα χωρία τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν, ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξεπέμποντο, καὶ καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν Δέρδου ἀδελφῶν ἄνωθεν στρατιᾷ ἐσβεβληκότων. (60) καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀφεστηκυίας καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν περὶ Μακεδονίαν οὐσῶν, δεδιότες περὶ τῶι χωρίῳ καὶ οἰκεῖον

τὸν κίνδυνον ἡγούμενοι πέμπουσιν ἑαυτῶν τε ἐθελοντὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων μισθῷ πείσαντες ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς πάντας ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς τετρακοσίους. (2) ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ

Ἀδειμάντου, κατὰ φιλίαν τε αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελονταὶ ξυνέσποντο- ἦν γὰρ τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις αἰεί ποτε ἐπιτήδειος. (3) καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον ἐπὶ Θράκης ἢ Ποτείδαια ἀπέστη. (61) ἦλθε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εὐθὺς ἡ ἀγγελία τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστᾶσι, καὶ πέμπουσιν, ὡς ἤσθοντο καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀριστέως ἐπιπαριόντας, 57.6. 58.1. 61.1.

δυοῖν K. F. Hermann: δέκα MSS, marked as corrupt Jones, τεσσάρων Krüger. [ἔπρασσον] deleted Poppo. ἐπιπαριόντας Ullrich cf. accessisse Valla: ἐπιπαρόντας MSS.

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under Archestratus son of Lycomedes with two other generals; and they gave

orders to the commanders of the ships to take hostages from the Potidaeans and demolish their wall, and to keep watch on the nearby cities so that they

should not defect. (58) The Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians, to try to persuade them not to take any drastic action in respect of them. They also went to Sparta with the Corinthians, so that they could make ready retribution if it were needed, since after dealing with the Athenians for a long time they had obtained nothing satisfactory, but the ships destined for Macedonia were sailing just as much against themselves; and the Spartan authorities promised them that,

if the Athenians did go against Potidaea, they would invade Attica. So at this critical point they defected, forming a sworn pact with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. (2) And Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their cities by the sea, and to migrate inland to Olynthus and make

this a single strong city. To these men who were abandoning their cities he gave some of his own land in Mygdonia near Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as the war against the Athenians persisted. They demolished their cities and migrated inland, and began preparing for war. (59) The thirty Athenian ships arrived in the Thraceward region, and they found that Potidaea and the rest had defected. (2) The generals thought it would be impossible with their existing force to make war both on Perdiccas and on the places which had joined in defection; and they turned against Macedonia, against which they had originally been sent, and established

themselves and began to make war together with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded with a force from the interior.

(60) Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea defected and the Athenian ships in the region of Macedonia, were afraid for the place and considered its danger their own. They sent volunteers from their own people and men enlisted for pay from the rest of the Peloponnesians, in all one thousand six hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed. (2) Their general was Aristeus son of Adimantus, and most of the volunteer soldiers from Corinth

joined the expedition particularly out of friendship for him; for he had always been well disposed to the Potidaeans. They arrived Thraceward on the fortieth day after Potidaea had defected. (61) The news of the cities’ defection reached the Athenians immediately, and when they learned that the men with Aristeus had gone there also they

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δισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν ὁπλίτας καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς πρὸς τὰ ἀφεστῶτα, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν, (2) οἱ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον καταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς προτέρους χιλίους Θέρμην ἄρτι ἡρηκότας καὶ Πύδναν πολιορκοῦντας. (3) προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ καὶ

αὐτοὶ τὴν Πύδναν ἐπολιόρκησαν μέν, ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν À Ποτείδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθώς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, (4) καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βρέαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, τρισχιλίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων πολλοῖς, ἱππεῦσι δὲ ἑξακοσίοις Μακεδόνων τοῖς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Παυσανίου᾽ ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. (5) κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. (62) Ποτειδεᾶται δὲ καὶ οἱ μετὰ Ἀριστέως Πελοποννήσιοι προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ, καὶ ἀγορὰν

ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίηντο. (2) στρατηγὸν μὲν οὖν τοῦ πεζοῦ παντὸς οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἥρηντο Ἀριστέα, τῆς δὲ ἵππου Περδίκκαν

ἀπέστη γὰρ εὐθὺς

πάλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνεμάχει τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις, Ἰόλαον ἀνθ᾽ αὑτοῦ καταστήσας ἄρχοντα. (3) ἦν δὲ ἡ γνώμη τοῦ Ἀριστέως τὸ μὲν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ στρατόπεδον ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἐπιτηρεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἢν ἐπίωσι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἔξω ἰσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν παρὰ Περδίκκου διακοσίαν ἵππον ἐν Ὀλύνθωῳ μένειν, καὶ ὅταν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρῶσι, κατὰ νώτου βοηθοῦντας ἐν μέσῳ ποιεῖν αὑτῶν τοὺς πολεμίους. (4) Καλλίας δ᾽ αὖ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ ξυνάρχοντες τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἱππέας καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὀλίγους ἐπὶ Ὀλύνθου ἀποπέμπουσιν, ὅπως εἴργωσι τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀναστήσαντες τὸ στρατόπεδον

ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν. (5) καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τοὺς ἐναντίους παρασκευαζομένους ὡς ἐς μάχην, ἀντικαθίσταντο καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ξυνέμισγον. (6) καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστέως

κέρας καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον ἦσαν Κορινθίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λογάδες ἔτρεψαν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἐπεξῆλθον διώκοντες ἐπὶ πολύ᾽ τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον Ποτειδεατῶν καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἡσσᾶτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατέφυγεν. (63) ἐπαναχωρῶν δὲ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς διώξεως, ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἡσσημένον, ἠπόρησε μὲν ὁποτέρωσε διακινδυνεύσῃ χωρήσας, 61.4

Βρέαν Bergk: Βέροιαν MSS. ἐπὶ Ztpéyav Pluygers: ἐπιστρέψαντες MSS.

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sent two thousand hoplites and forty ships to the region which had defected, and Callias son of Calliades with four other generals. (2) These arrived first in Macedonia, and found the previous thousand besieging Pydna after recently capturing Therme. (3) They joined in the blockade and laid siege to Pydna; but afterwards they made an agreement and an alliance of convenience with Perdiccas, because they were under pressure from Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus. So they departed from Macedonia. (4) They arrived at Brea; next at Strepsa, first making an attempt on the place but failing to capture

it; and they proceeded by land towards Potidaea. They had three thousand hoplites of their own, apart from many of their allies, and the six hundred Macedonian cavalry with Philip and Pausanias. At the same time they had seventy ships sailing beside them. (5) Moving forward gradually, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus and camped there. (62) The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, and pitched camp on the isthmus towards Olynthus, with a market outside the city. (2) As general of the whole infantry force the allies chose Aristeus, and of the cavalry Perdiccas - for he had immediately defected from the Athenians again and was in alliance with the Potidaeans, appointing Iolaus to command in his place. (3) Aristeus' intention was to keep the force with him on the isthmus, to watch for the Athenians if they attacked, while the Chalcidians, the allies from outside the isthmus and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas should remain in Olynthus, and when the Athenians attacked his force they should go to help in the rear, and thus place the Athenians in the middle between their two forces. (4) But for their part Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues sent their Macedonian cavalry and a few of their allies against Olynthus, to preclude the men there from going to help; and they themselves struck camp and advanced against Potidaea. (5) When they were at the isthmus and saw their opponents preparing for battle, they too took up a position opposite, and not long afterwards they engaged. (6) Aristeus' own wing, and the picked men of both the Corinthians and the others who were with him, turned the body facing them and pressed on in pursuit for a great distance; but the remaining force of the Potidaeans and Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians and fled inside the wall. (63) When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw that the rest of his force was defeated, he was uncertain in which direction he should risk going,

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ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς Ὀλύνθου ἢ ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν. ἔδοξε δ᾽ οὖν ξυναγαγόντι τοὺς μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ὡς ἐς ἐλάχιστον χωρίον δρόμῳ βιάσασθαι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χηλὴν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς, ὀλίγους μέν τινας ἀποβαλών, τοὺς δὲ πλείους σώσας. (2) οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀλύνθου τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις βοηθοί (ἀπεῖχε δὲ ἑξήκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους καὶ ἔστι καταφανές), ὡς ἡ μάχη ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἤρθη, βραχὺ μέν τι προῆλθον ὡς βοηθήσοντες, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἱππῆς ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὡς κωλύσοντες: ἐπειδὴ δὲ διὰ τάχους ἡ νίκη τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα κατεσπάσθη, πάλιν ἐπανεχώρονυν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: ἱππῆς δ᾽ οὐδετέροις παρεγένοντο. (3) μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην τροπαῖον ἔστησαν οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις" ἀπέθανον δὲ Ποτειδεατῶν μὲν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ Καλλίας ὁ στρατηγός. (64) τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ τεῖχος εὐθὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποτειχίσαντες ἐφρούρουν. τὸ δ᾽ ἐςτὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον rjv: ov yap ἱκανοὶ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι ἔν τε τῷ ἰσθμῷ φρουρεῖν καὶ ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην διαβάντες τειχίζειν, δεδιότες μὴ σφίσιν οἱ Ποτειδεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι γενομένοις δίχα ἐπίθωνται. (2) καὶ πυνθανόμενοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν, χρόνῳ ὕστερον πέμπουσιν ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἑαυτῶν καὶ Φορμίωνα τὸν Acwniov στρατηγόν’ ὃς ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην καὶ ἐξ Αφύτιος ὁρμώμενος προσήγαγε τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ τὸν στρατὸν κατὰ βραχὺ προϊὼν καὶ κείρων ἅμα τὴν γῆν, ὡς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐπεξήιει ἐς μάχην, ἀπετείχισε τὸ ἐκ τῆς Παλλήνης τεῖχος. (3) καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κατὰ κράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐφορμούσαις. (65) Ἀριστεὺς δὲ ἀποτειχισθείσης αὐτῆς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν ἔχων σωτηρίας, ἢν μή τι ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἢ ἄλλο παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται, ξυνεβούλευε μὲν πλὴν πεντακοσίων ἄνεμον τηρήσασιτοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκπλεῦσαι,

ὅπως ἐπὶ πλέον ὁ σῖτος ἀντίσχῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελε τῶν μενόντων εἶναι" ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔπειθε, βουλόμενος τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις παρασκευάζειν καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἔξωθεν ἕξει ὡς ἄριστα, ἔκπλουν ποιεῖται λαθὼν τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. (2) καὶ παραμένων ἐν Χαλκιδεῦσι τά τε ἄλλα ξυνεπολέμει καὶ Σερμυλιῶν λοχήσας πρὸς τῇ πόλει πολλοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἔς τε τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔπρασσεν ὅπῃ ὠφελία τις γενήσεται. μετὰ δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας τὴν ἀποτείχισιν Φορμίων μὲν 64.1.

τεῖχος deleted Classen, defended Maurer, /nterpolation, 109-10.

64.2.

τεῖχος deleted Herwerden, defended Maurer, Interpolation, 109-10. (Some editors begin $3 at ὡς δὲ οὐδεὶς ...).

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to Olynthus or to Potidaea. He decided to collect the men with him into as small a space as possible, and go at a run to force his way into Potidaea. He made his way through the sea along the mole, with difficulty as he was attacked with missiles, and he lost a few men but saved most. (2) The force to go and help the Potidaeans from Olynthus (which is about sixty stades away and clearly visible), when the battle began and the signals had been raised, advanced a short distance to go and help, and the Macedonian cavalry

drew up opposite to prevent them. But when the victory went quickly to the Athenians and the signals had been pulled down, they withdrew inside the wall again and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians. The cavalry did not take part in the battle on either side. (3) After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave back their dead to the Potidaeans under a truce. There died of the Potidaeans and their allies a few under three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves a hundred and fifty and their general Callias. (64) The Athenians immediately walled off the city wall of Potidaea towards the isthmus and mounted guard. The side towards Pallene they left without a wali, since they did not think they were sufficient both to keep guard on the isthmus and to cross to Pallene and build a wall there, and were afraid that if they were divided the Potidaeans and their allies might attack them. (2) The Athenians in the city heard that Pallene was without a wall, and later they sent one thousand six hundred of their own hoplites and Phormio son of Asopius as general. He arrived at Pallene and, starting from Aphytis, brought his force to Potidaea, advancing slowly and at the same time ravaging the land; and, as no one went out to fight against him, he walled off the city wall towards Pallene. (3) In this way Potidaea was now placed forcibly under siege from both sides, and from the sea with ships moored off shore.

(65) When Potidaea was walled off and he had no hope of being saved unless there was some intervention from the Peloponnese or something else unexpected, Aristeus advised that with the exception of five hundred men the others should watch for a wind and sail out, so that the food should hold

out longer, and he was himself willing to be one of those who stayed. When he failed to persuade them, wanting to make the preparations needed in the circumstances and to do his best to obtain help from outside, he slipped past the Athenian guard and sailed out. (2) He stayed among the Chalcidians, fighting together with them in general, and in particular ambushing and killing many of the Sermylians near their city. He also negotiated with the Peloponnese to try to obtain some support. Phormio after he had walled off

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ἔχων τοὺς ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν ἐδήου καὶ

ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πολίσματα εἷλεν. (66) τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις αἰτίαι μὲν αὗται προσἐγεγένηντο ἐς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς μὲν Κορινθίοις ὅτι τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἑαυτῶν οὖσαν ἀποικίαν καὶ ἄνδρας Κορινθίων τε καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντας ἐπολιόρκουν, τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ὅτι ἑαυτῶν τε πόλιν ξυμμαχίδα καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῆ ἀπέστησαν, καὶ ἐλθόντες σφίσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐμάχοντο μετὰ Ποτειδεατῶν. οὐ μέντοι ὅ γε πόλεμός πω ξυνερρόγει, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἀνοκωχὴ jv: ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπραξαν. (67) πολιορκουμένης δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας οὐχ ἡσύχαζον, ἀνδρῶν τε σφίσιν ἐνόντων καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶι χωρίῳ δεδιότες᾽ παρεκάλουν te εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδάς τε λελυκότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. (2) Αἰγινῆταί τε φανερῶς μὲν οὐ πρεσβευόμενοι, δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κρύφα δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα pet αὐτῶν ἐνῆγον τὸν πόλεμον, λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς. (3) οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσπαρακαλέσαντες τῶν ξυμμάχων τε καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἄλλος ἔφη ἠδικῆσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες τὸν εἰωθότα λέγειν ἐκέλευον. (4) καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλήματα ἐποιοῦντο ὡς ἕκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς. (5) παρελθόντες δὲ τελευταῖοι Κορίνθιοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσαντες πρῶτον παροξῦναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεῖπον τοιάδε. (68) “τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους ἤν τι λέγωμεν καθίστησιν. καὶ an αὐτοῦ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχετε, ἀμαθίᾳ δὲ πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα χρῆσθε. (2) πολλάκις yàp προαγορευόντων ἡμῶν ἃ ἐμέλλομεν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων βλάπτεσθαι, οὐ περὶ ὧν ἐδιδάσκομεν ἑκάστοτε τὴν μάθησιν ἐποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπενοεῖτε ὡς ἕνεκα τῶν αὑτοῖς ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων λέγουσιν. καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὐ πρὶν πάσχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐσμέν, τοὺς ξυμμάχους τούσδε παρεκαλέσατε, ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι.

66. 67.3.

προσεγεγένηντο Ullrich cf. suberant Valla: προυγεγένηντο MSS. Κορινθίοις «ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους» Reiske. ἄλλος Reiske cf. aliusve Valla: ἄλλο MSS.

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Potidaea proceeded with his one thousand six hundred to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice, and captured some townships. (66) These were the further grievances of the Athenians and Peloponnesians against each other: that of the Corinthians, that the Athenians were besieging

Potidaea, which was a colony of theirs and had men Peloponnese inside it; that of the Athenians against the they had caused the defection of a city which was an ally paying, and had gone there and were fighting together

of Corinth and the Peloponnesians, that of theirs and tributewith the Potidaeans

openly. However, the war had not yet actually broken out, but there was still

a state of truce: for the Corinthians had taken this action privately. (67) With Potidaea under siege the Corinthians were not inactive, since they had men inside and were also afraid for the place. They immediately invited

the allies to Sparta,

and

went

and

denounced

the Athenians

for

having broken the treaty and behaving unjustly to the Peloponnese. (2) The Aeginetans did not send envoys openly, because they were afraid of the Athenians, but in secret they not least joined the Corinthians in pressing for the war, stating that they had not been left autonomous in accordance with the treaty. (3) The Spartans additionally invited any of the allies and anybody else who claimed to have been treated unjustly by the Athentans, and they convened their regular meeting and called on them to speak. (4) Many others came forward with individual complaints, and in particular the Megarians, who disclosed other not insignificant disputes, and in particular that they were being excluded from the harbours in the Athenian empire and the Athenian agora in contravention of the treaty. (5) The Corinthians came forward last, after allowing the others to provoke the Spartans first; and they made the following speech in addition. (68) ‘Your trust in your own constitution and in your dealings with one another, Spartans, makes you less trusting towards others if we have something to say. As a result of this you have good sense, but have more to learn with regard to external affairs. (2) For we have often told you before of the harm

which

we

were

expecting to suffer from

the Athenians;

but

you have not learned the lesson which we were teaching on the various occasions, but rather have been suspicious that the speakers were speaking on account of private disputes of their own. And because of that you did

not invite these allies before our suffering began, but only now that it is in progress. Among the allies it is particularly appropriate for us to speak, since we have the greatest complaints of being insulted by the Athenians and

neglected by you.

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(3) “καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀφανεῖς που ὄντες ἠδίκουν τὴν “Ἑλλάδα, διδασκαλίας ἂν ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι προσέδει: νῦν δὲ τί δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν, ὧν τοὺς μὲν δεδουλωμένους ὁρᾶτε, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτούς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ξυμμάχοις, καὶ ἐκ πολλοῦ προπαρεσκευασμένους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα πολεμήσονται; (4) οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες βίᾳ ἡμῶν εἶχον καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις. (69) καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη, ἐς τόδε τε αἰεὶ ἀποστεροῦντες οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων δεδουλωμένους ἐλευθερίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἤδη ξυμμάχους᾽ οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται. (2) μόλις δὲ νῦν γε ξυνήλθομεν καὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐπὶ φανεροῖς. χρῆν γὰρ οὐκ εἰ ἀδικούμεθα ἔτι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ Kad’ ὅτι ἀμυνούμεθα. οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται. (3) καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα οἵᾳ ὁδῷ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅτι Kat’ ὀλίγον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας. καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν οἰόμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν ἧσσον θαρσοῦσι, γνόντες δὲ εἰδότας περιορᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται. (4) ἡσυχάζετε γάρ, μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν διπλασιουμένην δὲ καταλύοντες. (5) καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἐκ περάτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα ἢ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀξίως προαπαντῆσαι, καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιορᾶτε, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπελθεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀμύνεσθαι βούλεσθε μᾶλλον ἐπιόντας, καὶ ἐς τύχας πρὸς πολλῷ δυνατωτέρους ἀγωνιζόμενοι καταστῆναι, ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὑτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἤδη τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν τιμωρίᾳ περιγεγενημένους, ἐπεὶ at ye ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες ἤδη τινάς που καὶ ἀπαρασκεύους διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι ἔφθειραν. (6) καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἔχθρᾳ

69.2.

γε Stephanus cf. tandem Valla: te MSS.

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(3) ‘If they were in any way invisible in their injustice towards Greece, we should need to teach you what you did not know. But now what need is there for us to speak at length? You can see that some of the Greeks have already been enslaved, while the Athenians are plotting against others, and not least our allies, and that they have already been prepared for a long time in case

it should come to war. Otherwise they would not have seduced Corcyra in defiance of us, and would not now be besieging Potidaea, of which the latter is the most opportune place to use with regard to the Thraceward region and the former would have provided the greatest fleet for the Peloponnesians. (69) ' And you are responsible for this, by allowing them first to strengthen their city after the Persian Wars and afterwards to erect the long walls; and you have continued to the present to deprive of freedom not only those who have been enslaved by the Athenians but also now your own allies. For it 1s not the one who enslaves but the one who could stop it but overlooks it who is more truly guilty of doing this, especially if he enjoys a reputation for virtue as a liberator of Greece. (2) We have scarcely been able to meet here now, and even now not on clear terms. For we ought to be examining no longer whether we are being treated unjustly but how we shall defend ourselves: those who have made plans and act have no hesitation in attacking those who have not yet decided. (3) We know in what way the Athenians proceed step by step against their neighbours. When they think they can escape detection because of your lack of perceptiveness they are less bold, but when they discover that you know but overlook it they press on strongly. (4) You alone of the Greeks, Spartans, pursue inactivity, defending yourselves against people not by your strength but by your hesitation, and you alone undo the growth of your enemies not when it is beginning but only when it is being doubled. (5) Yet you were said to be reliable, but your reputation got the better of the fact. We ourselves know that the Persians had come from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnese before they met worthwhile resistance from you; and now you are overlooking the Athenians, who are not far away as the Persians were but near; and rather than attack them you want to defend yourselves against their attack, entrusting yourselves to fortune in contention against enemies who have become much stronger. You know both that to the greater extent it was the barbarians who tripped over themselves; and that against the Athenians themselves we have on many occasions so far survived through their own mistakes rather than retribution on your part, since hope placed in you has already destroyed some who remained unprepared because they trusted you. (6) And let none of you think

106

Thucydides

τὸ πλέον ἢ αἰτίᾳ νομίσῃ τάδε λέγεσθαι᾽ αἰτία μὲν γὰρ φίλων ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν ἁμαρτανόντων, κατηγορία δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἀδικησάντων.

(70) “καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τινὲς καὶ ἄλλοι, ἄξιοι νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μεγάλων τῶν διαφερόντων καθεστώτων, περὶ ὧν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖτε, οὐδ᾽ ἐκλογίσασθαι πώποτε πρὸς οἵους ὑμῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὅσον ὑμῶν καὶ ὡς πᾶν διαφέροντας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται. (2) οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν’ ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργῳ

οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. (3) αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες" τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον " τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. (4) καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους: οἵονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. (5) κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. (6) ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. (7) καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν 5’ ἄρα του καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν

τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. (8) καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων 67 ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν

ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον᾽ (9) ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι. (71) “ταύτης μέντοιτοιαύτης ἀντικαθεστηκυίας πόλεως, ὠΛακεδαιμόνιοι, διαμέλλετε καὶ οἴεσθε τὴν ἡσυχίαν οὐ τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀρκεῖν ot ἂν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ, ἢν

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this is said out of enmity rather than reproach: for reproach 15 addressed to men who are friends but mistaken, but denunciation to enemies who have committed injustice. (70) ‘At the same time, we more than any others think we are entitled to

inflict criticism on our neighbours, especially when there are great differences involved, about which you seem to us at least to lack perception, and never

'to have reckoned the nature of the Athenians against whom your contest will be, and how much and how totally they differ from you. (2) They are innovative, sharp at forming new designs and at acting to accomplish what they decide: you are apt to preserve what you have, to decide nothing extra

and in action not even to go as far as you need. (3) Again, they are daring beyond their strength, risk-taking beyond their judgment and optimistic even in dire straits: your nature is to act short of your strength, not to trust your

judgment even in a secure position and to think you will never be freed from dire straits. (4) Moreover, they are unshrinking where you are hesitant, fond

of going away from home where you are most inclined to remain at home: they think that by going away they could acquire something, while you think that by advancing you might lose even what is at hand. (5) When they overcome their enemies they follow through to the greatest extent, and they fall back to the least extent when they are defeated. (6) Also they use their bodies for the city as if they were not their own, and their judgment as their own to take some action for the city. (7) When they design something and fail to follow up they think they are deprived of what is their own, and when they press forward and acquire something they think they have achieved little by comparison with what is to come. If they fail in any attempt, they redirect their hope to something else and thus fill the gap. They alone both have and hope for whatever they design, because they are so quick to undertake what they decide. (5) They work at all this through toil and danger, through the whole of time; and they least enjoy what is at hand because they are always making acquisitions: they do not regard a holiday as anything other than an occasion to do what is needed, and they see inactive leisure as a disaster no less than burdensome occupation. (9) So one would correctly sum them up by saying that their nature is neither to enjoy inactivity themselves nor to

allow other men to enjoy it. (71) ' Yet, while this is the kind of city which is set against you, Spartans, you continue delaying; and you consider that peace endures longest not for those men who with their forces act only in just causes yet make it clear by

their decisions that if they are treated unjustly they will not permit it, but your

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Thucydides

ἀδικῶνται, δῆλοι ὦσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τε τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμυνόμενοι μὴ βλάπτεσθαι τὸ ἴσον νέμετε. (2) μόλις δ᾽ ἂν πόλει ὁμοίᾳ παροικοῦντες ἐτυγχάνετε τούτου᾽ νῦν δ᾽, ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐδηλώσαμεν,

ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. (3) ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν’ καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. δι' ὅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας ἐπὶ πλέον ὑμῶν κεκαίνωται. (4) “μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦδε ὡρίσθω ὑμῶν ἡ βραδυτής. νῦν δὲ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ Ποτειδεάταις, ὥσπερ ὑπεδέξασθε, βοηθήσατε κατὰ τάχος ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνδρας τε φίλους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς τοῖς ἐχθίστοις προῆσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀθυμίᾳ πρὸς ἑτέραν τινὰ ξυμμαχίαν τρέψητε. (5) δρῷμεν δ᾽ ἂν ἄδικον οὐδὲν οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν τῶν ὁρκίων οὔτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τῶν αἰσθανομένων: λύουσι γὰρ σπονδὰς οὐχ οἱ St ἐρημίαν ἄλλοις προσιόντες, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὴ βοηθοῦντες οἷς ἂν ξυνομόσωσιν. (6) βουλομένων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμων εἶναι μενοῦμεν᾽ οὔτε γὰρ ὅσια ἂν ποιοῖμεν μεταβαλλόμενοι

οὔτε ξυνηθεστέρους ἂν ἄλλους εὕροιμεν. (7) πρὸς τάδε βουλεύεσθε εὖ καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειρᾶσθε μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν."

(72.) τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἔτυχε γὰρ πρεσβεία πρότερον ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι περὶ ἄλλων παροῦσα, καὶ ὡς ἤσθοντο τῶν λόγων ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παριτητέα ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους εἶναι,

τῶν μὲν ἐγκλημάτων πέρι μηδὲν ἀπολογησομένους ὧν αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν, δηλῶσαι δὲ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς οὐ ταχέως αὐτοῖς βουλευτέον εἴη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πλέονι σκεπτέον. καὶ ἅμα τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐβούλοντο σημῆναι ὅση εἴη δύναμιν, καὶ ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῖς τε πρεσβυτέροις ὧν ἤδεσαν καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἐξήγησιν ὧν ἄπειροι ἦσαν, νομίζοντες μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν λόγων πρὸς τὸ ἡσυχάζειν τραπέσθαι ἢ πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν. (2) προσελθόντες οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔφασαν βούλεσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι μὴ ἀποκωλύοι. οἱ δὲ ἐκέλευόν τε παριέναι, καὶ παρελθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔλεγον τοιάδε. (73) “ἡ μὲν πρέσβευσις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐς ἀντιλογίαν τοῖς ὑμετέροις ξυμμάχοις

ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἡ πόλις ἔπεμψεν. αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ καταβοὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν ἡμῶν παρήλθομεν οὐ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι τῶν πόλεων ἀντεροῦντες (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὔτε ἡμῶν οὔτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἂν γίγνοιντο),

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idea of fair dealing is not to distress others and in defending yourselves to avoid being harmed. (2) You could scarcely achieve this if you lived beside a city of similar nature; but as it is, and as we have just demonstrated, your

practices are old-fashioned by comparison with them. (3) As with skills, it is inevitable that what comes afterwards prevails. For a city which can remain inactive undisturbed institutions are best; but those who have to react

frequently need frequent new techniques. For this reason in Athens with its great experience there has been renewal more than with you. (4) ‘Let there, then, be a limit here to your sluggishness. Give help now to the others and to the Potidaeans, as you promised, by invading Attica speedily, so as not to abandon friendly and kindred men to their worst enemies and turn the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. (5) We should be doing nothing unjust, either by the gods who protect oaths or by men aware of the circumstances: for treaties are broken not by men who approach others because they are deserted but by men who do not go to help those with whom they swore the oaths. (6) But if you are willing to show enthusiasm we shall remain: for in that case we should not be acting righteously if we changed, and we could not find others who would be more congenial. (7) Deliberate well with regard to this, and try to be leaders of a Peloponnese which is no less than your fathers handed down to you.’ (72) That is what the Corinthians said. There happened to be Athenian envoys in Sparta beforehand, who had gone on other business, and when they learned about the speeches they decided that they ought to come forward before the Spartans, not to offer any defence against the complaints which the cities made, but to demonstrate on the whole matter that they ought not

to deliberate hastily but to consider at greater length. At the same time they wanted to indicate how great the power of their own city was, and to remind the older men of what they already knew and to expound to the younger what they had not experienced, thinking that in this way they would by their speech turn them towards remaining inactive rather than making war. (2) They therefore approached the Spartans and said that they too wished to speak to their gathering if there was no impediment. They told them to come

forward, and the Athenians did come forward and spoke as follows. (73) ‘The purpose of our embassy was not to reply to your allies but to deal with the business on which our city sent us. But on learning that there was no small outcry against us we have come forward, not to respond to the cities’ complaints (for neither we nor they were speaking before a jury which would pass judgment on us), but so that you should not be persuaded

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Thucydides

ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ ῥᾳδίως περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις πειθόμενοι χεῖρον βουλεύσησθε, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενοι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου τοῦ ἐς ἡμᾶς καθεστῶτος δηλῶσαι ὡς οὔτε ἀπεικότως ἔχομεν ἃ κεκτήμεθα, ἥ τε πόλις ἡμῶν ἀξία λόγου ἐστίν. (2) “καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, εἰ καὶ δι᾿ ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις, ἀνάγκη λέγειν᾽ καὶ γὰρ

ὅτε ἐδρῶμεν, ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίαι ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἧς τοῦ μὲν ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε, τοῦ δὲ λόγου μὴ παντός, εἴ τι ὠφελεῖ, στερισκώμεθα. (3) ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως

μᾶλλον ἕνεκαiἢ μαρτυρίου

καὶ δηλώσεως

πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν

πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται. (4) φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι

τῷ βαρβάρῳ:

καὶ ὅτε τὸ ὕστερον ἦλθεν, οὐχ

ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς πανδημεὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξυνναυμαχῆσαι, ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων ἂν ὄντων πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλοις ἐπιβοηθεῖν. (5) τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν νικηθεὶς γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας οὔσης τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν. (74) “τοιούτου μέντοι τούτου ξυμβάντος, καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, τρία τὰ ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην᾽ ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχοντα, ὃς αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ξένον τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐλθόντων: (2) προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην ἐδείξαμεν, οἵγε, ἐπειδὴ ἡμῖν κατὰ γῆν οὐδεὶς ἐβοήθει, τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη μέχρι ἡμῶν δουλευόντων ἠξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείραντες μηδ᾽ ὡς τὸ τῶν περιλοίτων ξυμμάχων κοινὸν προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκεδασθέντες ἀχρεῖοι αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς κινδυνεῦσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθῆναι

ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ προυτιμωρήσατε. (3) ὥστε φαμὲν οὐχ ἧσσον αὐτοὶ ὠφελῆσαι

73.2.

προβαλλομένοις: προβαλλόμενα Classen.

History |

ΠῚ

by our allies to fall easily into deliberating for the worse on great matters. And at the same time with regard to the whole argument which has been made against us we wanted to demonstrate that it is not unreasonable for us to possess what we have acquired, and that our city is worthy of note. (2) ‘There is no need for us to speak of matters far in the past, to which hearsay bears witness rather than the actual sight of those who will be listening. But the Persian Wars and the matters of which you have direct knowledge we must speak of, even if it is somewhat tiresome to bring this up always. For when we were acting as we did, we accepted the risks with a view to a benefit, and you obtained a share in its realisation, so we should not be deprived of all chance to mention it if there is any benefit in that. (3) We shall say this not so much in a plea for sympathy but as a testimony and demonstration of what kind of city your contest will be against if you do not deliberate well. (4) We claim both that at Marathon we alone in front faced the risks against the barbarian; and that, when the later force came, and we were not sufficiently able to defend ourselves on land, we embarked on our ships with our whole population and joined in the naval battle at Salamis. That prevented the barbarian from ravaging the Peloponnese by sailing against individual cities, which would have been unable to go and help one another against the large number of ships. (5) He himself provided the greatest indication of this: for when he had been defeated in respect of

the ships, with his power no longer the same as before he quickly withdrew with the greater part of his force. (74) ‘When that was the kind demonstrated

of thing

clearly that the Greeks'

that happened,

situation

depended

and

it was

on their ships,

we contributed the three greatest advantages towards it, the largest number of ships, the most intelligent man as general and the most unhesitating enthusiasm. We contributed towards the four hundred ships little under two thirds. We contributed Themistocles as commander: he was most responsible for the naval battle's being fought in the straits, which most clearly saved the situation, and because of this you honoured him most of all the foreign

men who have visited you. (2) And we demonstrated by far the most daring enthusiasm, in that, when

nobody was coming to help us on land and the

others in front of us were all submitting to slavery, we thought it right to abandon our city and destroy our own property, and not to abandon the body of the remaining allies or become

scattered and of no use to them, but to

embark on our ships and face the risks, and not to be angry that you had not first provided retribution for us. (3) So we claim that we conferred an

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Thucydides

ὑμᾶς ἢ τυχεῖν τούτου. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπό TE οἰκουμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ λοιπὸν νέμεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡμῶν τὸ

πλέον, ἐβοηθήσατε (ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε): ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπό τε τῆς οὐκ οὔσης ἔτι ὁρμώμενοι καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδι οὔσης κινδυνεύοντες ξυνεσώσαμεν ὑμᾶς τε τὸ μέρος καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. (4) εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῷ Μήδῳ δείσαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι, περὶ τῇ χώρᾳ, ἢ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὕστερον ἐσβῆναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὡς διεφθαρμένοι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ἔτι ὑμᾶς μὴ ἔχοντας ναῦς ἱκανὰς ναυμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν

ἂν αὐτῷ προυχώρησε τὰ πράγματα n ἐβούλετο. (75.) *àp' ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; (2) καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι" (3) ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. (4) καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν᾽ καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο. (5) πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

(76) “ὑμεῖς γοῦν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καταστησάμενοι ἐξηγεῖσθε᾽ καὶ εἰ τότε ὑπομείναντες

διὰ παντὸς ἀπήχθησθε ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, εὖ ἴσμεν μὴ ἂν ἧσσον ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ἂν ἢ ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς ἢ αὐτοὺς κινδυνεύειν. (2) οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ «τριῶν» τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι

76.1. 76.2.

ἀπήχθησθε others: ἀπήχθεσθε CG. «τριῶν» Herwerden.

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advantage on you no less than we received from you. For you came to help us from cities which were still inhabited, with a view to living in them in the future, since you were afraid for yourselves more than for us (when we

were still safe, you did not stand by us); but we set out from a city which no longer existed, and for which there was slender hope, and we faced the risks

and played our part in joining to save both you and ourselves. (4) If we had gone over to the Persians earlier out of fear for our land, as others did, or later had not dared to embark on our ships because we considered ourselves destroyed, then there would no longer have been any point in your fighting a naval battle, since you did not have sifficient ships, but the situation would

have developed at leisure for the Persians as they wanted. (75) ‘On account of our enthusiasm then and the intelligence of our purpose, Spartans, we surely do not deserve to be regarded with such excessive jealousy by the Greeks for the empire which we possess. (2) For we acquired it not by violence, but when you were not willing to persevere against the remaining power of the barbarians, and the allies approached us and themselves asked us to become their leaders. (3) And from the reality of the situation we were first compelled to advance it to its present position,

influenced particularly by fear, then honour and finally advantage. (4) And it no longer seemed

safe, when

most were

vexed with us, and some

had

defected and had been overcome, and you were no longer friendly to us in the same way as before but were suspicious and quarrelsome, to risk relaxing our grip: for the defections would have been towards you. (5) lt is unobjectionable for everybody to make a good disposition with regard to their interests when the risks are greatest. (76) ‘You at any rate, Spartans, as leaders of the cities in the Peloponnese have organised them with a view to your own advantage. And if you had persevered all the way then and had incurred vexation in your leadership, as we have done, we know well that you would have become no less distressing to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule forcibly or to be

at risk yourselves. (2) So we have not done anything at all surprising or alien to human ways if we accepted an empire that was offered to us and refuse to relax it, conquered by the three greatest considerations, honour,

fear and advantage. And we were not the first to begin such a practice, but it has always been an established fact that the lesser is constrained by the more powerful. At the same time, we think we deserve our empire; and we were so judged by you, until you took to calculating your interests and using your present argument about justice, which nobody when in a position to

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Thucydides

προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. (3) ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται. (4) ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. (77) “καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. (2) καὶ οὐδεὶς σκοπεῖ αὐτῶν τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοθί που ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι καὶ ἧσσον ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους μετρίοις οὖσι διότι τοῦτο οὐκ

ὀνειδίζεται: βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐξῇ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδὲν προσδέονται. (3) οἱ δὲ εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν, ἤν τι παρὰ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι

χρῆναι ἢ γνώμῃ ἢ δυνάμει τῇ διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλασσωθῶσιν, οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοιχάριν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς χαλεπώτερον φέρουσιν ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀποθέμενοι τὸν νόμον φανερῶς ἐπλεονεκτοῦμεν. ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἀντέλεγον ὡς οὐ χρεὼν τὸν ἥσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι ὑποχωρεῖν. (4) ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι. (5) ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τούτων

πάσχοντες ἠνείχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἀρχὴ χαλεπὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰκότως τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις. (6) ὑμεῖς γ᾽ ἂν οὖν εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἄρξαιτε, τάχα ἂν τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν διὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος εἰλήφατε μεταβάλοιτε, εἴπερ οἷα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ôt ὀλίγου ἡγησάμενοι ὑπεδείξατε, ὁμοῖα καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε. ἄμεικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε καὶ προσέτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται οὔθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.

(78) “βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως ὡς οὐ περὶ βραχέων, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοτρίαις γνώμαις καὶ ἐγκλήμασι πεισθέντες οἰκεῖον πόνον πρόσθησθε. τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον, ὅσος ἐστί, πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι προδιάγνωτε᾽ (2) μηκυνόμενος γὰρ φιλεῖ ἐς τύχας τὰ πολλὰ περιίστασθαι, ὧν ἴσον τε ἀπέχομεν καὶ ὁποτέρως ἔσται ἐν ἀδήλῳ κινδυνεύεται. (3) ἰόντες τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἔργων πρότερον ἔχονται, ἃ χρῆν ὕστερον

76.3. 77.1.

γένωνται CG, variant in ΑΒΕ: γεγένηνται others. ξυμβολαίαις: ξυμβολιμαίαις Cobet from Hesych. & 110 ξυμβολιμαίας δίκας, defended Maurer, /nterpolation, 71.

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115

gain something through strength has ever rated more highly and let it deter him from grasping more. (3) Men are worthy of praise if they follow human nature in ruling others but adhere to justice more than the power available to them would allow. (4) We think that, 1f others took over what we have, that would most demonstrate our moderation; but, unfairly, our reasonableness

has brought us ill repute rather than praise. (77) ‘On account of our both accepting disadvantage in treaty-based lawsuits with the allies and holding trials among ourselves under equitable laws we are judged to be addicted to litigation. (2) And, in the case of those who hold an empire elsewhere and are less moderate towards their subjects than we are, nobody examines why this is not a matter for reproach: for those who are able to use violence have no further need of litigation. (3) But those who have been accustomed to deal with us on an equal basis, if they are placed at however slight a disadvantage contrary to their belief that that ought not to happen, either by a judicial decision or by the exercise of power through our empire, are not grateful for not being deprived of more, but bear their loss with more difficulty than if from the beginning we had set the law aside and had been openly grasping. If we had behaved like that they would not have responded that the lesser ought not to give way to the powerful. (4) Men are more angry at being subjected to injustice, it seems, than to violence: for the first is judged to be grasping from a basis of equality, but the second to be compulsion on the part of the more powerful. (5) Indeed they suffered worse than this from the Persians and put up with it, but our empire is judged to be harsh — which is reasonable, for the current situation is always burdensome for subjects. (6) So, if you were to overthrow us and rule an empire, you would quickly exchange the good will which you have gained because of the fear of us, if indeed you will now follow policies similar to those of which you then gave a brief indication when you were leaders against the Persians. For your own institutions are incompatible with those of others, and moreover each one of you when going abroad follows neither these nor those observed by the rest of Greece. (78) ‘Deliberate slowly, then, since the issue is not slight, and do not

be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of others to take on trouble for yourselves. Recognise in advance how great is the incalculable element

in war, before you are caught up in it: (2) for as war is prolonged it is apt largely to revolve around chance; and and that is inaccessible as much to us

as to you, and the risk of which side it will favour is hidden. (3) When men go to war, they seize on deeds first, which they ought to perform afterwards,

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Thucydides

δρᾶν, κακοπαθοῦντες δὲ ἤδη τῶν λόγων ἅπτονται. (4) ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ A τοιαύτῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὄντες οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην. εἰ δὲ μή, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου

ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ à ἂν ὑφηγῆσθε.᾽" (79) τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων ἤκουσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ ἐγκλήματα τὰ ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἃ ἔλεξαν, μεταστησάμενοι πάντας ἐβουλεύοντο κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῶν παρόντων. (2) καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἤδη καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει παρελθὼν δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων, ἔλεξε τοιάδε. (80) “καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὁρῶ, ὥστε μήτε ἀπειρίᾳ ἐπιθυμῆσαί τινα τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, μήτε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς νομίσαντα.

(2) εὕροιτε δ᾽ ἂν τόνδε περὶ οὗ νῦν βουλεύεσθε οὐκ ἂν ἐλάχιστον γενόμενον, εἰ σωφρόνως τις αὐτὸν ἐκλογίζοιτο. (3) πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας παρόμοιος ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκή, καὶ διὰ ταχέων οἷόν τε ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐλθεῖν’ πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας οἵ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι θαλάσσης ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε

ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι; (4) πότερον ταῖς ναυσίν: ἀλλ᾽ ἥσσους ἐσμέν’ εἰ δὲ μελετήσομεν καὶ ἀντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος ἐνέσται. ἀλλὰ τοῖς χρήμασιν; ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πλέον ἔτι τούτου ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν. (81) τάχ᾽ ἄν τις θαρσοίη ὅτι τοῖς ὅπλοις αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει ὑπερφέρομεν, ὥστε τὴν γῆν δηιοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες. (2) τοῖς δὲ ἄλλη γῆ ἐστὶ πολλὴ ἧς ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἐκ

θαλάσσης ὧν δέονται ἐπάξονται. (3) εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, δεήσει καὶ τούτοις ναυσὶ βοηθεῖν τὸ πλέον οὖσι νησιώταις. (4) τίς oùv ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος; εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἢ ναυσὶ κρατήσομεν ἢ τὰς

78.4. 80.4,

εἰ δὲ μή others: ἢ CG. τούτον: τούτοις rec., τούτῳ Krüger.

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117

and when they are suffering misfortune they then take up words. (4) We have never fallen into any mistake of that kind ourselves, and we do not see

that you have done. We say to you, while good policy is still available as ἃ free choice to both sides, do not break the treaty or transgress the oaths, but have the disputes resolved by arbitration in accordance with the agreement. If not, we call to witness the gods who protect oaths that we shall try to defend ourselves against you as the initiators of a war, wherever you lead the way.' (79) That is what the Athenians said. When the Spartans had listened to the complaints of the allies against the Athenians and to what the Athenians said, they dismissed them all and deliberated by themselves about the situation. (2) The opinions expressed by the majority tended in the same direction, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice and they ought to go to war quickly; but Archidamus their king, a man judged to be both intelligent and sensible, spoke as follows. (80) ‘Not only do I myself already have experience of many wars, Spartans, but there are those among you of the same age whom I see, so that none of us should desire war through inexperience of the reality, which

might happen to most men, or should think that it is good and safe. (2) And you would find that this war about which you are now deliberating would not be the least of wars, if one were to calculate it sensibly. (3) Against the Peloponnesians and our neighbours our might is comparable, and we can arrive at each place quickly. But against men who possess a distant land, and in addition are most experienced at sea and are best equipped in all other respects — wealth both private and public, ships, horses, hoplites and a body of men such as does not exist in any other single place in Greece — and furthermore have many tribute-paying allies, how are we to make war easily against these, and in what can we trust if we attack them without preparation? (4) [n our ships? But we are inferior; and if we practise and make preparations in response that will take time. Or in money? But we fall short far more here, and we neither have it in a communal treasury nor are able to provide it readily from our private resources. (81) One might perhaps be confident because we surpass them in our hoplites and the number of them, so that we can overrun their land and ravage it. (2) But they have a great deal

of other land which they rule, and they will be able to import what they need by sea. (3) Again, if we try to make their allies defect, we shall need also to go with our ships to help them, since for the most part they are islanders. (4) What kind of war, then, shall we have? If we cannot defeat them with

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προσόδους ἀφαιρήσομεν ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ ναυτικὸν τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα τὰ πλείω. (5) kav τούτῳ οὐδὲ καταλύεσθαι ἔτι καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ δόξομεν ἄρξαι μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς. (6) μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνῃ γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρώμεθα ὡς ταχὺ παυσθήσεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἢν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμωμεν. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν. οὕτως εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεῦσαι μήτε ὥσπερ ἀπείρους καταπλαγῆναι τῷ πολέμῳ. (82) “οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀναισθήτως αὐτοὺς κελεύω τούς τε ξυμμάχους ἡμῶν ἐᾶν βλάπτειν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφωρᾶν, ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπω κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι μήτε πόλεμον ἄγαν δηλοῦντας μήθ᾽ ὡς ἐπιτρέψομεν, κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, εἴ ποθέν τινα ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα (ἀνεπίφθονον δέ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἅμα ἐκποριζώμεθα. (2) καὶ ἢν μὲν ἐσακούωσί τι πρεσβευομένων ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἄριστα᾽ ἢν δὲ μή, διελθόντων ἐτῶν δύο καὶ τριῶν ἄμεινον ἤδη, ἢν δοκῇ, πεφαργμένοι ἴμεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς. (3) καὶ ἴσως ὁρῶντες ἡμῶν ἤδη τήν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῇ ὁμοῖα ὑποσημαίνοντας μᾶλλον ἂν EÏKOLEV, καὶ γῆν ἔτι ἄτμητον ἔχοντες καὶ περὶ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὔπω ἐφθαρμένων βουλευόμενοι. (4) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε, τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ééeipyaotar ἧς φείδεσθαι χρὴ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀπόνοιαν

καταστήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἀληπτοτέρους ἔχειν. (5) εἰ γὰρ ἀπαράσκευοι τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν ἐπειχθέντες τεμοῦμεν αὐτήν, ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ αἴσχιον καὶ ἀπορώτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πράξομεν. (6) ἐγκλήματα μὲν

γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν οἷόν τε καταλῦσαι᾽ πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαντας ἀραμένους ἕνεκα τῶν ἰδίων, ὃν οὐχ ὑπάρχει εἰδέναι καθ᾽ ὅτι χωρήσει, οὐ ῥάδιον εὐπρεπῶς θέσθαι. (83) “καὶ ἀνανδρία μηδενὶ πολλοὺς μιᾷ πόλει μὴ ταχὺ ἐπελθεῖν δοκείτω

εἶναι. (2) εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἐλάσσους χρήματα φέροντες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἔστιν

ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι᾿ ἣν τὰ ὅπλα

ὠφελεῖ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἠπειρώταις πρὸς θαλασσίους. (3) πορισώμεθα οὖν πρῶτον αὐτήν, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων λόγοις πρότερον ἐπαιρώμεθα, οἵπερ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων τὸ πλέον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα τῆς αἰτίας ἕξομεν,

οὗτοι καὶ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν προΐδωμεν.

82.2.

πεφαργμένοι Ch. Theodoridis, RM? 155 (2012), 413-4, cf. Thuc.'s usage elsewhere: πεφραγμένοι MSS.

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our ships or take away the revenues by means of which they sustain their fleet, we shall be harmed the more. (5) And in these circumstances it will not even be possible to make an honourable settlement, especially if we are judged to have begun the dispute. (6) And we should by no means be borne up by the hope that the war will quickly be finished if we ravage their land. I fear rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children: so likely is it that the Athenians in their spiritedness are neither enslaved to their land nor like inexperienced men terrified by war. (82) “1 am not indeed advising you to take no notice, allowing them to harm our allies and not catching them when they plot against us; but not to take up arms yet, but to send men to make accusations against them, neither

giving too clear an indication of war nor that we shall permit what they are doing. At the same time we should equip ourselves on our side, by winning over allies both Greek and barbarian, in the hope of gaining either naval or financial support from somewhere (for it is unobjectionable, when men are plotted against by the Athenians as we are, to bring in not only Greeks but also barbarians to achieve our safety); and at the same time make provision on our own account. (2) If they take some notice when we send envoys, that Will be best. If not, it will be better to let two or three years elapse, and then

after fortifying ourselves we can go against them if we judge it right. (3) Perhaps, when they see that we are now preparing and our words suggest a message matching our preparations, they will be more likely to give way, and with their land still undevastated they will be willing to deliberate about their existing benefits which are not yet destroyed. (4) You should think that you have their land as nothing other than a hostage, and the more so the better it is cultivated: you ought to spare it as far as possible, and not drive them to despair and make them harder to handle. (5) For if we are incited by the complaints of our allies to devastate it while we are unprepared, you must see that what we do will be more shameful and difficult for the Peloponnese. (6) For complaints of cities and of private individuals can be resolved; but if we all together embark on war for private reasons, when we cannot know how it will turn out, it will not be easy to make a respectable settlement.

(83) ‘Let no one judge it cowardice if many do not quickly attack a single city. (2) For they have as many allies, who pay money, and war is not a matter of arms as much as of expenditure, which enables the arms to bring

advantage, particularly for mainlanders against seafarers. (3) So let us first provide for the expenditure, and not be excited before that by the words of our allies: we shall bear most of the responsibility for the outcome either Way, 50 let us too take forethought for it at leisure.

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(84) “καὶ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὃ μέμφονται μάλιστα ἡμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε: σπεύδοντές τε γὰρ σχολαίτερον ἂν παύσαισθε διὰ τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι ἐγχειρεῖν. καὶ ἅμα ἐλευθέραν καὶ εὐδοξοτάτην πόλιν διὰ παντὸς νεμόμεθα. (2) καὶ δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι: μόνοι γὰρ δι᾽ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαις τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ἧσσον ἑτέρων εἴκομεν᾽ τῶν τε ξὺν ἐπαίνῳ ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῇ, καὶ ἤν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνῃ, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπείσθημεν. (3) πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία, εὔβουλοι δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν, καὶ μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγω καλῶς μεμφόμενοι dvo μοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξιέναι, νο μίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας ov λόγω διαιρετάς. (4)

αἰεὶ δὲ ὡς πρὸς εὖ βουλευομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔργῳ παρασκευαζόμεθα. καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνων ὡς ἁμαρτησομένων ἔχειν δεῖ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς προνοουμένων. πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται. (85) “ταύτας οὖν ἃς οἱ πατέρες τε ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν μελέτας καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ὠφελούμενοι ἔχομεν μὴ παρῶμεν, μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες ἐν βραχεῖ μορίῳ ἡμέρας περὶ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δόξης βουλεύσωμεν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν. ἔξεστι δ᾽ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἑτέρων διὰ ἰσχύν. (2) καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους πέμπετε μὲν περὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας, πέμπετε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοί φασιν ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων αὐτῶν

δίκας δοῦναι᾽ ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν διδόντα οὐ πρότερον νόμιμον ὡς ἐπ᾿ ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι. παρασκευάζεσθε δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἅμα. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ κράτιστα βουλεύσεσθε καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φοβερώτατα." (3) καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοιαῦτα εἶπεν: παρελθὼν δὲ Σθενε λαΐδας

τελευταῖος, εἷς τῶν ἐφόρων τότε ὦν, ἔλεξεν [ἐν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ὧδε. (86) “τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω: ἐπαινέσαντες γὰρ πολλὰ ἑαυτοὺς οὐδαμοῦ ἀντεῖπον ὡς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον᾽ καΐτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ᾽ ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν,

84.4. 85.3.

παρασκευαζόμεθα CG: παρασκευαζώμεθα others. ἐν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις others, τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις CG, deleted Krüger.

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(84) ‘And do not be ashamed of the sluggishness and hesitation for which they particularly blame us: for if you were to hurry you would finish more slowly, because you had made the attempt without preparation. And at the same time we have always lived in a city which is free and of the highest repute. (2) And this feature can well be seen as prudent good sense. For because of this we alone do not become insolent in success, and we give way

less than others in disasters. When people use praise to spur us on to dreadful things contrary to our own judgment we are not excited by pleasure, and if anybody goads us with denunciation we are no more persuaded by vexation to change our minds. (3) We are both warlike and well advised as a result of our good order: the former because respect is the greatest component of good sense, and good spirit of a sense of shame; and we are well advised because we are trained to be too unlearned to look down

on the laws and,

by hardship, to be too sensible to disobey them. We are not too intelligent in useless matters, finely blaming the enemy's preparations in our words but not following up comparably in our deeds. We think that the intentions of our neighbours are much like our own, and the chances which happen cannot be decided by words. (4) We always prepare in our deeds against enemies who are likely to deliberate well; and we should place our hopes not in mistakes which they may make but in our own safe forethought. We should think that one man does not differ much from another man, and that

the best is the one who is trained in the greatest rigours. (85) ‘These, then, are the practices which our fathers handed down to us,

and we have always kept them to our advantage. Let us not relinquish them, and let us not be incited to decide in a small fraction of a day about many lives, sums of money and cities, and our own reputation, but at leisure. This is possible for us more than for others because of our strength. (2) And to the Athenians send envoys about Potidaea, and send envoys about the injustices which our allies say they are suffering — particularly since the Athenians are ready to submit to arbitration: it is not an accepted practice to go against one who makes that offer in advance, as against one guilty of injustice. This will be the best decision for you and the most intimidating to our opponents. ’ That is what Archidamus said. Finally there came forward Sthenelaidas, who was at that time one of the ephors, and he spoke as follows. (86) ‘I don't understand the many words of the Athenians. They said much in praise of themselves but nowhere responded that they are not behaving unjustly to our allies and the Peloponnese. Yet, if they were good men against the Persians then but bad against us now, they deserve a double

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ὅτι ἀντ᾽ ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται. (2) ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, fjv σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν. οἱ δ᾽ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν. (3) ἄλλοις μὲν γὰρ χρήματά ἐστι πολλὰ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι, ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἀγαθοί, oÙc où παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει καὶ παντὶ σθένει. (4) καὶ ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύεσθαι ἀδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον πρέπει πολὺν χρόνον βουλεύεσθαι. (5) ψηφίζεσθε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἀξίως τῆς Σπάρτης τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ μήτε τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐᾶτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδῶμεν, ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας." (87) τοιαῦτα λέξας ἐπεψήφιζεν αὐτὸς ἔφορος ὧν ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. (2) ὁ δέ (κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῇ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ) οὐκ ἔφη διαγιγνώσκειν τὴν βοὴν ὁποτέρα μείζων, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι ἔλεξεν “ὅτῳ

μὲν ὑμῶν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, δοκοῦσι λελύσθαι αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀδικεῖν, ἀναστήτω ἐς ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον᾽", δείξας τι χωρίον αὐτοῖς, “ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ δοκοῦσιν, ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα.᾽ (3) ἀναστάντες δὲ διέστησαν, καὶ πολλῷ πλείους

ἐγένοντο οἷς ἐδόκουν αἱ σπονδαὶ λελύσθαι. (4) προσκαλέσαντές τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους εἶπον ὅτι σφίσι μὲν δοκοῖεν ἀδικεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, βούλεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐπαγαγεῖν, ὅπως κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ποιῶνται, ἢν δοκῇ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾿ οἴκου διαπραξάμενοι ταῦτα, καὶ οἱ ᾿Αθηναίων πρέσβεις ὕστερον ἐφ᾽ ἅπερ ἦλθον χρηματίσαντες. (6) ἡ δὲ διαγνώμη αὕτη τῆς ἐκκλησίας, τοῦ τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι, ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῶν τριακοντουτίδων σπονδῶν προκεχωρηκυιῶν ai ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὰ Εὐβοῖκά. (88) ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς

Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα. (89) οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ηὐξήθησαν. (2) ἐπειδὴ Μῆδοι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης νικηθέντες καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων καὶ οἱ καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς

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penalty for having become bad instead of good. (2) We were the same then as we are now, and if we are sensible we shall not overlook it while our allies are being treated unjustly or delay in providing retribution: there is no longer any delay to their suffering harm. (3) Others have plentiful money and ships and horses, but we have good allies, whom we must not betray to the Athenians, and we must not decide with arbitration and words when it IS not in word that they are being harmed, but we must provide retribution

quickly and with all our strength. (4) And let no one teach us that it is proper for us to deliberate when we are being treated unjustly: it is rather those who are intending to act unjustly for whom it is proper to deliberate for a long time. (5) Vote for war, then, Spartans, as is worthy of Sparta; do not allow

the Athenians to become greater; let us not betray our allies; but with the gods let us go against the unjust.’ (87) After saying that, in his capacity as ephor he put the motion to the Spartan assembly. (2) But (since they decide by shouting, not by voting) he said that he could not distinguish which shout was the greater; rather, wanting to impel them more to go to war through an open demonstration of their opinion, he said, ‘Whichever of you, Spartans, judges that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are guilty of injustice, go and stand in that place”, indicating a place to them, ‘but whichever of you does not judge thus, go to the other side'. (3) They stood up and divided, and there was a large majority which judged that the treaty had been broken. (4) They called in their allies and told them that they judged that the Athenians were guilty of injustice, but that they wanted to summon all the allies and call on them to vote, so that they could together deliberate and prosecute the war

if they judged that right. (5) The allies returned home after completing that business; and afterwards the Athenian envoys returned after transacting the business for which they had come. (6) This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the duration of the Thirty Years' Treaty which was made after the Euboean affair. (88) The Spartans voted that the treaty had been broken and they must go to war, not so much persuaded by the words of their allies as afraid that the Athenians would become more powerful, since they saw that most of Greece was already under their control. (89) For it was in the following kind of way that the Athenians came to the circumstances in which they grew in power. (2) When the Persians had withdrawn from Europe, defeated by the Greeks with both ships and infantry, and those of them who had fled on the

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Thucydides

Μυκάλην διεφθάρησαν, Λεωτυχίδης μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅσπερ ἡγεῖτο τῶν ἐν Μυκάλῃ Ἑλλήνων, ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἔχων τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ξυμμάχους, ot δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ᾿Ιωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως ὑπομείναντες

Σηστὸν ἐπολιόρκουν Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐπιχειμάσαντες εἷλον αὐτὴν ἐκλιπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπέπλευσαν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις. (3) Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπῆλθον, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν περιοῦσαν κατασκευήν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὰ τείχη τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχέα εἱστήκει καὶ οἰκίαι αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ ἐπεπτώκεσαν, ὀλίγαι δὲ περιῆσαν, ἐν αἷς αὐτοὶ ἐσκήνωσαν οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν Περσῶν. (90) Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἦλθον πρεσβείᾳ, τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὁρῶντες μήτ᾽ ἐκείνους μήτ᾽ ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην. (2) ἠξίουν τε αὐτοὺς μὴ τειχίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου μᾶλλον ὅσοις εἱστήκει ξυγκαθελεῖν μετὰ σφῶν τοὺς

περιβόλους, τὸ μὲν βουλόμενον καὶ ὕποπτον τῆς γνώμης οὐ δηλοῦντες ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὡς δὲ τοῦ βαρβάρου, εἰ αὖθις ἐπέλθοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοντος ἀπὸ ἐχυροῦ ποθέν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ τῶν Θηβῶν, ὁρμᾶσθαι: τήν τε Πελοπόννησον

πᾶσιν ἔφασαν

ἀναχώρησίν

τε καὶ ἀφορμὴν

ἱκανὴν

εἶναι. (3) οἱ δ᾽

Ἀθηναῖοι Θεμιστοκλέους γνώμῃ τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντας ἀποκρινάμενοι ὅτι πέμψουσιν ὡς αὐτοὺς πρέσβεις περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν εὐθὺς

ἀπήλλαξαν ἑαυτὸν δ᾽ ἐκέλευεν ἀποστέλλειν ὡς τάχιστα ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, ἄλλους δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ἑλομένους πρέσβεις μὴ εὐθὺς ἐκπέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισχεῖν μέχρι τοσούτου ἕως ἂν τὸ τεῖχος ἱκανὸν ἄρωσιν ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους τειχίζειν δὲ πάντας πανδημεὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου μήτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος ὅθεν τις ὠφελία ἔσται ἐς τὸ ἔργον,

ἀλλὰ καθαιροῦντας πάντα. (4) καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα διδάξας καὶ ὑπειπὼν τἄλλα ὅτι αὐτὸς τἀκεῖ πράξοι ᾧὥχετο. (5) καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐ προσήει πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ διῆγε καὶ προυφασίζετο. καὶ ὁπότε τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων

90.3.

καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας thought to be absent from scholiast's text so deleted Hude, but defended Gomme, Maurer, /nterpolation 69.

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ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides the king of the Spartans, who was leader of the Greeks at Mycale, retumed home with the allies from the Peloponnese; but the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had already defected from the King stayed on to besiege Sestos, which was held by the Persians, and after continuing through the

winter they took it when the barbarians abandoned it. After that they sailed back from the Hellespont in their individual city contingents. (3) The community of the Athenians, when the barbarians had left their territory, immediately conveyed back from where they had deposited them their children and wives and their surviving possessions, and they prepared

to rebuild the city and the walls. For little of the circuit remained standing, and most of the houses

had collapsed,

though

a few

survived,

in which

the powerful men among the Persians had lodged. (90) But the Spartans on learning what was intended went on an embassy. Not only did they themselves think it preferable that neither the Athenians nor anybody else should have a wall, but, more than that, their allies were spurring them on, out of fear of the size of the Athenians’ navy, which they did not have before,

and of the daring which they showed with regard to the Persian war. (2) The envoys claimed that they ought not to build the walls, but rather to join with them in demolishing what remained standing of the circuits of those outside the Peloponnese, in order (since they did not reveal their intention and their suspicious opinion to the Athenians) that if the barbarians came again they should not have any secure base to set out from, as they had done on that occasion from Thebes. They said the Peloponnese would be sufficient for them all to withdraw to and set out from. (3) The Athenians, when the

Spartans said that, replied on the proposal of Themistocles that they would send envoys to them about what they said, and immediately were rid of them. Themistocles told them to dispatch himself as quickly as possible to Sparta, and to appoint other envoys in addition to him, but not to send them immediately but to hold them back until they had raised the wall sufficiently to the minimum height needed to fight from. The whole body of all in the city was to work on the wall-building, themselves and the women

and children,

sparing no private or public building which might be advantageous for the work but demolishing them all. (4) He gave that instruction and hinted at the other things which he would do there, and departed.

(5) When he arrived in Sparta he did not approach the officials, but kept delaying and making excuses. And whenever any of those in authority asked him why he did not go before the community, he said that he was

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ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν, ἔφη τοὺς ξυμπρέσβεις ἀναμένειν, ἀσχολίας δέ τινος οὔσης αὐτοὺς ὑπολειφθῆναι, προσδέχεσθαι μέντοι ἐν τάχει ἥξειν καὶ θαυμάζειν ὡς οὕπω πάρεισιν. (91) οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ, ἄλλων δέ τινῶν ἀφικνουμένων καὶ σαφῶς κατηγορούντων ὅτι τειχίζεταί τε καὶ ἤδη ὕψος λαμβάνει, οὐκ εἶχον ὅπως χρὴ ἀπιστῆσαι. (2) γνοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖνος κελεύει αὐτοὺς μὴ λόγοις μᾶλλον παράγεσθαι ἢ πέμψαι σφῶν αὐτῶν ἄνδρας οἵτινες χρηστοὶ καὶ πιστῶς ἀναγγελοῦσι σκεψάμενοι. (3) ἀποστέλλουσιν οὖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κρύφα πέμπει κελεύων ὡς ἥκιστα ἐπιφανῶς κατασχεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀφεῖναι πρὶν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάλιν κομισθῶσιν (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ

ἧκον αὐτῷ οἱ ξυμπρέσβεις, Ἁβρώνιχός τε ὁ Λυσικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου, ἀγγέλλοντες ἔχειν ἱκανῶς τὸ τεῖχος) ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφᾶς, ὁπότε σαφῶς ἀκούσειαν, οὐκέτι ἀφῶσιν. (4) of te οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς πρέσβεις, ὥσπερ ἐπεστάλη, κατεῖχον, καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελθὼν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐνταῦθα δὴ φανερῶς εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ μὲν πόλις σφῶν τετείχισται ἤδη ὥστε ἱκανὴ εἶναι σῴζειν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, εἰ δέ τι βούλονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρεσβεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διαγιγνώσκοντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἰέναι τά τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά, (5) τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν ὅτε ἐδόκει ἐκλιπεῖν ἄμεινον εἶναι καὶ ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι, ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἔφασαν γνόντες τολμῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα αὖ pet ἐκείνων βουλεύεσθαι, οὐδενὸς ὕστεροι γνώμῃ φανῆναι. (6) δοκεῖν οὖν σφίσι καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τεῖχος ἔχειν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ

ἐς τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους ὠφελιμώτερον ἔσεσθαι: (7) οὐ γὰρ οἷόν t εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. ἢ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν ἢ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. (92) οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀκούσαντες ὀργὴν μὲν φανερὰν οὐκ ἐποιοῦντο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ κωλύμῃ, ἀλλὰ γνώμης παραινέσει δῆθεν τῷ κοινῷ ἐπρεσβεύσαντο, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προσφιλεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τότε διὰ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μῆδον προθυμίαν τὰ μάλιστ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐτύγχανον), τῆς μέντοι βουλήσεως ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδήλως ἤχθοντο. ot te πρέσβεις ἑκατέρων ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεπικλήτως.

91./,

ἄλλων δέ τινων Gomme: Shilleto.

τῶν δὲ ἄλλων

MSS,

διὰ φιλίαν, αὐτοπτῶν δὲ ἄλλων

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waiting for his fellow envoys, but they had been left behind because of some

preoccupation; however, he was expecting them to come quickly, and was surprised that they were not already present. (91) On hearing this they were

persuaded by Themistocles because of their friendship for him. But when others arrived with clear complaints that the wall-building was in progress and had already reached some height, they had no grounds for disbelieving them. (2) On hearing this he urged them not so much to be seduced by words as to send good men of their own to examine and give a trustworthy report. (3) So they sent them; and Themistocles sent a secret message to the Athenians urging them to hold the men back as inconspicuously as possible

and not to let them go until the Athenian envoys arrived back (for his fellow envoys had now

reached him,

Habronichus

son of Lysicles and Aristides

son of Lysimachus, reporting that the wall was in a sufficient state). For he

was afraid that when the Spartans heard a clear report they would not let the Athenians go. (4) So the Athenians held back the envoys as he had bidden them. And

Themistocles only then went forward to the Spartans and said plainly that their city had now built walls which would be sufficient to keep its inhabitants safe; and, if the Spartans or the allies wanted to send envoys to them on any matter, for the future they should go on the understanding that the Athenians

could determine what was in their own interest and in the common interest. (5) For when they had judged that it was better to leave the city and embark on the ships, the envoys said they had decided on this act of daring without

the others; and again in their deliberation with the others they had been second to none in judgment. (6) So now too they judged that it was better that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more advantageous both for their own citizens separately and for all the allies. (7) For it would not be possible for them to make a comparable or equal contribution to common deliberation except from a matching state of preparedness; he said either they should all participate in the alliance without walls or it must be accepted that the Athenians had acted correctly. (92) The Spartans on hearing this did not show their anger openly to the

Athenians, for their envoys had been sent to Athens not with the purpose of forbidding the, building but ostensibly of recommending a proposal to the community, and also it happened that they were very friendly to them at that time in particular because oftheir enthusiasm against the Persians. But because they had failed to gain what they wanted they were vexed but did not show it.

The envoys on each side returned home without making any objection.

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(93) τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχισαν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνω. (2) καὶ δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο᾽ οἱ

γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντοίων λίθων ὑπόκεινται καὶ οὐ ξυνειργασμένων ἔστιν ἧ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστόν ποτε προσέφερον, πολλαί τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι ἐγκατελέγησαν. μείζων γὰρ ὁ περίβολος πανταχῇ ἐξήχθη τῆς πόλεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ὁμοίως κινοῦντες ἠπείγοντο. (3) ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν

(ὑπῆρκτο δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἧς κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε) νομίζων τό τε χωρίον καλὸν εἶναι, λιμένας ἔχον τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν (4) (τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστί), καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν. (5) kal ζκοδόμησαν τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ τὸ πάχος τοῦ τείχους ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι περὶ τὸν

Πειραιᾶ’ δύο γὰρ ἅμαξαι ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις τοὺς λίθους ἐπῆγον. ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πηλὸς ἦν, ἀλλὰ ξυνῳκοδομημένοι μεγάλοι λίθοι καὶ ἐντομῇ ἐγγώνιοι, σιδήρῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ μολύβδῳ δεδεμένοι. τὸ δὲ

ὕψος ἥμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ διενοεῖτο. (6) ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακήν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι. (7) ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο, ἰδών, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς

κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν’ τόν τε Πειραιᾶ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως, καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρήνει, ἢν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι. (8) ᾿Αθηναῖοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτειχίσθησαν καὶ τάλλα κατεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν Μήδων ἀναχώρησιν. (94) Παυσανίας δὲ ὁ Κλεομβρότου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξεπέμφθη μετὰ εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ξυνέπλεον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλῆθος. (2) καὶ ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Κύπρον καὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέψαντο, καὶ ὕστερον ἐς Βυζάντιον Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐξεπολιόρκησαν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ. (95) ἤδη δὲ βιαίου ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἵ τε ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἤχθοντο καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Ἴωνες καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο- φοιτῶντές τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παυσανίᾳ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἤν που βιάζηται. (2) οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι 94.2—95.1. καὶ ἐξεπολιόρκησαν. ἐν τῇδε «δὲ» τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ ἤδη [δὲ] βιαίου Alberti («δὲ» Hude, [δὲ] omitted rec., deleted and full point after ἐξεπολιόρκησαν Stephanus).

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(93) In this way the Athenians built walls for their city in a short time. (2) And it is clear even now from the construction that it was done in haste. The foundations were laid with stones of all kinds, in some places not shaped to fit but put down just as each was brought, and many pillars from tombs and worked stones were laid down among them. For the circuit was extended to a greater extent all round the city, and because of this they disturbed everything alike as they pressed on. (3) Themistocles persuaded them also to build the remainder ofthe Piraeus

(which had been begun earlier in the year's archonship which he had held at Athens), thinking that 1t was a fine site, with three natural harbours, and

that the Athenians' becoming seafarers would be a great asset towards their gaining power: (4) for he was indeed the first who dared to say that they must take possession of the sea. And he at once began helping them to construct

their empire. (5) On his proposal they built the wall round the Piraeus of the thickness which can still be seen now: for two waggons brought the stones in opposite directions. [nside there was no rubble or earth, but large stones fitted together and cut square, fastened to one another on the outside with

iron and lead. The finished height was about half of what he had intended. (6) He wanted its size and thickness to stand up to enemies’ hostile plans, and thought that a few of the most unfit would suffice as a garrison, while

the others would embark on the ships. (7) For he particularly emphasised the ships, to my mind seeing that access for the King's forces was easier by sea than by land; and he thought the Piraeus was more advantageous than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians that if ever they were under pressure on land they should go down there and make a stand against all with their ships. (8) In this way the Athenians’ walls were built and other arrangements were made immediately after the Persians’ withdrawal. (94) Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Sparta as general of the Greeks with twenty ships from the Peloponnese; they were joined by the Athenians with thirty ships and a crowd of the other allies. (2) They campaigned against Cyprus and overran most of it; and afterwards against Byzantium, which was held by the Persians, and they took it by siege under

his leadership. (95) Since he was already violent, and the other Greeks were vexed, not least the Ionians and those who had recently been liberated from the King: they kept going to the Athenians and claiming that on grounds of kinship they ought to become their leaders and not permit Pausanias to do any violence. (2) The Athenians accepted the argument, and gave the matter

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Thucydides

ἐδέξαντό TE τοὺς λόγους καὶ προσεῖχον τὴν γνώμην ὡς OÙ περιοψόμενοι TOAÂG τε καταστησόμενοι ἧ φαίνοιτο ἄριστα αὐτοῖς. (3) ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετεπέμποντο Παυσανίαν ἀνακρινοῦντες ὧν πέρι ἐπυνθάνοντο: καὶ γὰρ ἀδικία πολλὴ κατηγορεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἀφικνουμένων, καὶ τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ἐφαίνετο μίμησις ἢ στρατηγία. (4) ξυνέβη τε αὐτῷ καλεῖσθαί τε ἅμα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τῷ ἐκείνου ἔχθει παρ᾽ Αθηναίους μετατάξασθαι πλὴν τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου στρατιωτῶν. (5) ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τῶν μὲν ἰδίᾳ πρός τινα ἀδικημάτων ηὐθύνθη, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα ἀπολύεται μὴ ἀδικεῖν κατηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμὸς καὶ ἐδόκει σαφέστατον εἶναι. (6) καὶ ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐκέτι ἐκπέμπουσιν ἄρχοντα, Δόρκιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς pet αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἔχοντας οὐ πολλήν᾽ οἷς οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. (7) οἱ δὲ αἰσθόμενοι ἀπῆλθον, καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίαι ἐνεῖδον, ἀπαλλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομίζοντες ἱκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῶι τότε παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους. (96) παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἃς ναῦς πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν

ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δηιοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν. (2) καὶ Ἑλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή, oi ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον’ οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἦν δ᾽ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα. ταμιεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίγνοντο. (97) ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ἃ ἐγένετο πρός τε τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἑκάστῳ. (2) ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπὲς τοῦτο ἦν τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά᾽ τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἥψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἵῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη.

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their attention, intending not to overlook this and in general to arrange things as seemed best to them. (3) But meanwhile the Spartans recalled Pausanias to put him on trial for the matters they had learned of: for he was accused of many acts of injustice by the Greeks who visited there, and his generalship seemed to be rather an imitation of tyranny. (4) It happened that he was summoned at the same time as the allies out of hostility to him realigned

themselves with the Athenians, apart from the forces from the Peloponnese. (5) After arriving in Sparta he was held to account for private acts of injustice

against individuals, but was acquitted of injustice on the greatest charges: for he was accused not least of medism, and that was judged to be extremely clear. (6) They did not again send him out as commander, but sent Dorcis and others with him and a small force; but the allies no longer conceded the leadership to them. (7) On discovering this they departed; and afterwards the Spartans no longer sent out others, fearing that those of their men who

went out might be corrupted, as they saw in the case of Pausanias. Also they rid themselves of the Persian war, thinking that the Athenians were competent to lead, and were at that time friendly to themselves. (96) The Athenians took over the leadership in this way, through the willingness of the allies and because of their hatred of Pausanias. They appointed which of the cities had to provide money against the barbarian and which ships: the pretext was to obtain recompense for what they had suffered by ravaging the King's land. (2) And this was when the office of Hellenotamiae

was

first established

for the Athenians,

to receive

the

tribute (for that was the name given to the contribution of money). The first assessment of tribute was four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was their treasury, and their meetings were held at the sanctuary. (97) The Athenians were the leaders of allies who at first were autonomous and deliberated in common meetings; and what they accomplished in war and in the handling of affairs between this war and the Persian War, both against the barbarians and against their own allies when they revolted and those of the Peloponnesians who came up against them on the various occasions, was as follows. (2) I have written about it and made this digression from my narrative

for this reason,

that all those before

me

omitted this topic and

composed accounts either of Greece before the Persian War or of the Persian War itself; Hellanicus touched on this in his work on Athens, but his account

is brief and not precise in its chronology. At the same time this provides an exposition of the way in which the Athenian empire was established.

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(98) πρῶτον μὲν 'Hióva τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολιορκίᾳ εἷλον καὶ ἠνδραπόδισαν, Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος. (2) ἔπειτα Σκῦρον τὴν ἐν τῷ Αἰγαίῳ νῆσον, ἣν @Kouv Δόλοπες, ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ ᾧκισαν αὐτοί. (3) πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους αὐτοῖς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων Εὐβοέων πόλεμος ἐγένετο, καὶ χρόνῳ ξυνέβησαν καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν. (4) Ναξίοις δὲ ἀποστᾶσι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκίᾳ παρεστήσαντο, πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχὶς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστῃ ξυνέβη. (99) αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι καὶ λιποστράτιον εἴ τῳ £yéveto: οἱ γὰρ ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. (2) ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ῥάδιόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους. ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι: (3) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ᾿ οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ᾿Αθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δέ, ὁπότε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο. (100) ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ £x Εὐρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Μήδους, καὶ ἐνίκων τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀμφότερα Ἀθηναῖοι Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ εἷλον τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς διακοσίας. (2) χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστῆναι, διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θράκῃ ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἃ ἐνέμοντο. καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἐπὶ Θάσον πλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναυμαχίᾳ ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν. (3) ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμόνα πέμψαντες μυρίους οἰκήτορας αὑτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ὡς οἰκιοῦντες τὰς τότε καλουμένας Ἐννέα Ὁδούς, νῦν δὲ Ἀμφίπολιν, τῶν μὲν Ἐννέα Ὁδῶν αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν, ἃς εἶχον Ἠδωνοί, προελθόντες δὲ τῆς Θράκης ἐς μεσόγειαν διεφθάρησαν

98.4-99.]. ὡς ἑκάστη (ἑκάστη ὡς ἑκάστῃ A rec.) ξυνέβη. αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι MSS: ὡς edd. (but ἑκάστη ὡς ἑκάστῃ defended Maurer, /nterpolation, 70); ξυνέβη Krüger, ξυνέβη αἰτία i δὲ ἄλλαι R. 1. Winton, Eranos 80 (1982), comparing VI. 76.3. 100.3. Ἦδωνοί G: Ἡδωνοί ABEFM, preferred Lewis, H:5wvoi C; cf. II. 99.4, IV. 107.3, 109.4, V. 6.4.

ἑκάστῃ deleted 171-2, 102.3,

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(98) First they took by siege Eton on the Strymon, which was held by the Persians, and reduced it to slavery, under the generalship of Cimon son of Miltiades. (2) Next Scyros, the island in the Aegean, which was inhabited by Dolopians, they reduced to slavery and settled themselves. (3) They fought a war against the Carystians, without the other Euboeans, and in time these

came to terms by agreement. (4) After this the Naxians defected and they went to war against them and brought them to terms by siege: this was the first allied city to be enslaved contrary to what had been established, but afterwards it happened individually to the others too. (99) There were other reasons for defection, but the greatest was failure to provide tribute and ships, and in some cases desertion from campaigns. For the Athenians enforced the obligations punctiliously, and in applying compulsion they were distressing to men who were not accustomed or willing to persevere. (2) Also in some other respects the Athenians' rule no

longer gave the same satisfaction as at first: they no longer participated in the campaigns on an equal basis, and it was easy for them to bring defectors into line. (3) The allies themselves were responsible for this: because of their reluctance to campaign most of them, to avoid having to be away from home, had themselves assessed to provide the monetary equivalent instead of ships; and the Athenian navy was increased from the expenditure which they contributed, while they themselves,

whenever they defected, went to

war lacking preparation and experience. (100) After this there occurred the infantry and naval battle at the River Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, of the Athenians and their allies against the Persians, and the Athenians were victorious on the same day on both elements, under the generalship of Cimon son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed Phoenician triremes to a total of two hundred. (2) Later it happened that the Thasians defected from them, owing to a dispute about the trading posts in Thrace opposite and about the mine which they administered. The Athenians sailed in their ships to Thasos, won a naval battle and disembarked on the island. (3) About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers from themselves and their allies to the Strymon, to settle in

what was then called Nine Ways and is now called Amphipolis. They won control of Nine Ways, which was held by Edonians, but on advancing into the interior of Thrace they were all destroyed at Drabescus in Edonian territory by the Thracians, who saw the foundation of the place as an act of war. (101)

The Thasians were defeated in battle and placed under siege, and appealed to

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ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἠδωνικῇ ὑπὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ξύμπαντες, οἷς πολέμιον ἦν τὸ χωρίον [αἱ Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ] κτιζόμενον. (101) Θάσιοι δὲ νικηθέντες μάχαις καὶ πολιορκούμενοι Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐπαμύνειν ἐκέλευον ἐσβαλόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. (2) οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ οἱ εἵλωτες αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν περιοίκων Θουριᾶταί τε καὶ Αἰθαιῆς ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν. (πλεῖστοι δὲ τῶν εἱλώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι: à καὶ Μεσσήνιοι ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες.) (3) πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν ᾿Ιθώμῃ πόλεμος καθειστήκει Λακεδαιμονίοις, Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὡμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν, τήν τε ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες. (102) Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ, ὡς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ ἐμηκύνετο ὁ πόλεμος, ἄλλους τε ἐπεκαλέσαντο ξυμμάχους καὶ ᾿Αθηναίους: οἱ δ᾽ ἦλθον Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ. (2) μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπεκαλέσαντο ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἐδόκουν δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκίας

μακρᾶς καθεστηκυίας τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο: βίᾳ γὰρ ἂν εἷλον τὸ χωρίον. (3) καὶ διαφορὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς στρατείας πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ᾿Αθηναίοις φανερὰ ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ χωρίον βίᾳ οὐχ ἡλίσκετο, δείσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ τολμηρὸν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποΐαν, καὶ ἀλλοφύλους ἅμα ἡγησάμενοι, μή τι, ἢν παραμείνωσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πεισθέντες νεωτερίσωσι, μόνους τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι. (4) oi 6 Ἀθηναῖοι ἔγνωσαν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίονι λόγῳ ἀποπεμπόμενοι, ἀλλά tivog ὑπόπτου γενομένου, καὶ δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦτο παθεῖν, εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργείοις τοῖς ἐκείνων πολεμίοις ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις οἱ αὐτοὶ ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία κατέστη. (103) οἱ δ᾽ ἐν Ἰθώμῃ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ξυνέβησαν

πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς: ἢν δέ τις ἁλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι

100.3. Ἠδωνικῇ Ο: Ἡδωνικῇ ABFM, preferred Lewis, Η:δωνικῇ CE. ξύμπαντες Poppo cf. omnes Valla: ξυμπάντων MSS. ai Ἐννέα Ὁδοὶ omitted Valla, deleted Cobet, cf. Maurer, /nterpolation, 89-90.

101.7. μάχαις others: μάχῃ CG, cf. prelio Valla. 103.7. δεκάτῳ: τετάρτῳ Krüger, ἕκτῳ Steup, πέμπτῳ at one time D. M. Lewis.

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the Spartans, urging them to go to their rescue by invading Attica. (2) They promised, keeping it secret from the Athenians, and intended to do so, but were prevented by the earthquake which had occurred, in which the helots and the perioikoi of Thuria and Aethaea defected to Ithome. (Most of the helots were descendants of the ancient Messenians who had been enslaved then, as a result of which they were all called Messenians.) (3) The Spartans therefore engaged in a war against those at Ithome. But the Thasians in the third year of their siege came to an agreement with the Athenians, by which they demolished their wall and handed over their ships, were assessed to repay immediately what was due and to pay tribute in the future, and gave up the mainland and the mine. (102) Since the Spartans' war against those at Ithome was prolonged, they called on other allies and the Athenians, who came with Cimon as general and a substantial body of men. (2) They called particularly on the Athenians because they judged them capable of assaulting walls, and as the siege became lengthy they found themselves lacking in that: otherwise they would have been able to take the place by force. (3) It as as a result of this campaign that an open dispute first arose between the Spartans and the Athenians. For the Spartans, when they had not been able to take the place

by force, became afraid of the daring and the revolutionary nature of the Athenians and, considering that they were of a different people, thought that if they stayed on they might be persuaded to revolutionary action by those at Ithome. They therefore sent them away alone ofthe allies, not revealing their suspicion but saying that they no longer needed them. (4) But the Athenians recognised that it was not for the better reason that they had been sent away but that some suspicion had arisen. Taking it badly, and not thinking it right that they should be treated in this way by the Spartans, immediately after their return they gave up the alliance which they had made with them against the Persians, and became allies of their enemies the Argives; and at the same time both parties entered into the same oaths and alliance with the Thessalians. (103) Those at Ithome in the tenth year, when they could no longer hold

out, came to terms with the Spartans, that they should leave the Peloponnese under treaty protection and never again set foot in it: anybody who was

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δοῦλον. (2) ἦν δέ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις Πυθικὸν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἱκέτην τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ᾿Ιθωμήτα ἀφιέναι. (3) ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι kat ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατῴκισαν, ἣν ἔτυχον ἡρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων. (103) προσεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὅρων πολέμῳ κατεῖχον" καὶ ἔσχον Ἀθηναῖοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγάς, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ὠκοδόμησαν Μεγαρεῦσι τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐς Νίσαιαν

καὶ ἐφρούρουν αὐτοί. καὶ Κορινθίοις μὲν οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τοῦδε τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἤρξατο πρῶτον ἐς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι. (104) Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως ἀπέστησεν Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλείω ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχων γενόμενος Ἀθηναίους ἐπηγάγετο. (2) οἱ δέ (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὑτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων) ἦλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον, καὶ ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νεῖλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες καὶ τῆς Μέμφιδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ὃ καλεῖται Λευκὸν Τεῖχος ἐπολέμουν ἐνῆσαν δὲ αὐτόθι Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων οἱ καταφυγόντες

καὶ Αἰγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ξυναποστάντες. (105) Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶν ἀποβᾶσιν ἐς Ἁλιᾶς πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι. καὶ ὕστερον ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐναυμάχησαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλείᾳ Πελοποννησίων ναυσί, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. (2) πολέμου δὲ καταστάντος πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπ᾽ Αἰγίνῃ μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγινητῶν, καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέροις παρῆσαν, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ναῦς ἑβδομήκοντα λαβόντες αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, Λεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγοῦντος. (3) ἔπειτα Πελοποννήσιοι ἀμύνειν βουλόμενοι Αἰγινήταις ἐς μὲν τὴν Αἴγιναν τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας πρότερον Κορινθίων καὶ ᾿Επιδαυρίων ἐπικούρους διεβίβασαν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας κατέλαβον καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν Κορίνθιοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες ἀδυνάτους ἔσεσθαι ᾿Αθηναίους βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν ἔν τε Αἰγίνῃ ἀπούσης στρατιᾶς πολλῆς καὶ £v Αἰγύπτῳ᾽ ἢν δὲ καὶ βοηθῶσιν, an’ Αἰγίνης ἀναστήσεσθαι αὐτούς. (4) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα

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caught there should become the slave of the man who took him. (2) There had also been some Pythian oracle to the Spartans before then, that they should let go the suppliant of Zeus of Ithome. (3) They departed with their children and wives, and the Athenians now that they were hostile to the Spartans received them and settled them at Naupactus, which they happened to have taken recently from the Ozolian Locrians who held it. (4) Also the Megarians went over to the Athenian alliance, defecting from the Spartans because the Corinthians Were gaining the upper hand over them in a war concerning the boundaries of their territory. The Athenians took possession of Megara and Pegae, and they built the long walls for the Megarians from the city to Nisaea and garrisoned them themselves. And it was not least as a result of this that the Corinthians first developed their deep hatred towards the Athenians. (104) Inaros the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and king of the Libyans adjoining Egypt, set out from Marea beyond the city of Pharus, caused most of Egypt to defect from King Artaxerxes, and became their commander and invited in the Athenians. (2) They happened to be on a campaign to Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies; and they left Cyprus and went there. They sailed upstream from the sea into the Nile,

winning control of the river and of two thirds of Memphis, and they made war against the third part, which is called White Wall. Inside were Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined in the defection. (105) Whenthe Athenians had disembarked from their ships at Halieis they

fought a battle against the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians were victorious. Later the Athenians fought a naval battle at Cecryphalea against the Peloponnesians' ships, and the Athenians were victorious. (2)

After this the Athenians engaged in war against the Aeginetans, and there was a great naval battle between the Athenians and Aeginetans, with their allies present on each side. The Athenians were victorious, took seventy of

their ships, disembarked on the land and began a siege, under the generalship of Leocrates son of Stroebus. (3) The Peloponnesians, wanting to defend the Aeginetans, had previously transported three hundred Corinthian and Epidaurian hoplites to Aegina in support, and then the Corinthians with their allies seized the heights of Geranea and descended into the Megarid, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to go to help the Megarians, with large forces absent in Aegina and Egypt; or if they did go to help they would have to uproot themselves from Aegina. (4) But the Athenians did not disturb the

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οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ oi νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος. (5) καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἰσορρόπου πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν an’ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργω. (6) καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον) ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαῖον ἔστησαν oi δὲ Κορίνθιοι κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων καὶ παρασκευασάμενοι, ἡμέραις ὕστερον δώδεκα μάλιστα ἐλθόντες ἀνθίστασαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς νικήσαντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκβοηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων τούς τε τὸ τροπαῖον ἱστάντας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν. (106) οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καί τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον προσβιασθὲν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐσέπεσεν ἔς του χωρίον ἰδιώτου, ᾧ ἔτυχεν ὄρυγμα μέγα περιεῖργον καὶ οὐκ

ἦν ἔξοδος. (2) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες κατὰ πρόσωπόν τε εἶργον τοῖς ὁπλίταις καὶ περιστήσαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψιλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς Ex’ οἴκου. (107) ἤρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ᾿Αθηναῖοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τό τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ. (2) καὶ Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ἐς Δωριᾶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μητρόπολιν, Βοιὸν καὶ Κυτίνιον καὶ Ἐρινεόν, καὶ ἑλόντων ἕν τῶν πολισμάτων τούτων,

οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Νικομήδους τοῦ Κλεομβρότου ὑπὲρ Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως νέου ὄντος ἔτι ἡγουμένου ἐβοήθησαν τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν ἑαυτῶν τε πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίοις, καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ὁμολογίᾳ ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποδοῦναι τὴνπόλιν ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. (3) καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτούς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλοιντο περαιοῦσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἔμελλον κωλύσειν. διὰ δὲ τῆς Γερανείας οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγὰς πορεύεσθαι. δύσοδός τε γὰρ ἡ Γερανεία καὶ ἐφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τότε ἠσθάνοντο αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας καὶ ταύτῃ κωλύσειν. (4) ἔδοξε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς περιμείνασι σκέψασθαι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατα διαπορεύσονται. τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δῆμόν τε καταπαύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα. (5) ἐβοήθησαν δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ καὶ Ἀργείων χίλιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων ὡς ἕκαστοι" ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι. (6) νομίσαντες δὲ ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ διέλθωσιν ἐπεστράτευσαν αὐτοῖς,

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force in Aegina, but the oldest and youngest of the men remaining arrived at Megara from the city under the generalship of Myronides. (5) After an evenl ybalanced battle against the Corinthians they separated from each other, and each side thought it had not fared worse in the action. (6) The Athenians (for in fact it was rather they who had won) set up a trophy after the Corinthians had departed. The Corinthians were accused of cowardice by the older men in the city, so they made preparations and about twelve days later they went and set up a rival trophy themselves to claim the victory. The Athenians went out to meet them from Megara, killed those who had set up the trophy, and attacked the others and won. (106) The Corinthians withdrew in defeat, and a significant part of them, under pressure and losing their way, rushed into a place belonging to a private individual, which happened to be enclosed by a great ditch and had no way out. (2) The Athenians on recognising this closed the front with their hoplites, stationed their light-armed around in a circle,

and stoned all those who had gone inside; and this was a great misfortune for the Corinthians. The main body of their force returned home. (107) At this period the Athenians began building their long walls to the sea, the one to Phalerum and the other to Piraeus. (2) When the Phocians went on a campaign into the Spartans' motherland of Doris, against Boeum, Cytinium and Erineum, and took one of those townships, the Spartans went to help the Dorians, under Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus as leader on

behalf of king Plistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still young, with one thousand five hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand of their allies; and they compelled the Phocians to make an agreement and return the city, and began to travel back. (3) In case they wanted to cross by sea, by way of

the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians sailed round with their ships, intending to prevent them; and it did not seem safe to them to travel by way of Geranea with the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae. For Geranea is hard to traverse and was always guarded by the Athenians, and on this occasion they learned that the Athenians were intending to prevent them by this way too. (4) They decided to remain in Boeotia and consider by what way they could most safely complete their march. They were also spurred on secretly by some men from Athens, who hoped to put an end to the democracy and the building of the long walls. (5) But the Athenians went out against them in full force, together with a

thousand A rgives and individual contingents from their other allies: altogether they numbered fourteen thousand. (6) They campaigned against the Spartans because they thought that they were at a loss to complete their journey, and

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καί τι καὶ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψίᾳ. (7) ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππῆς τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, oi μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. (108) γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἐν Τανάγρᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολύς. (2) καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα ἐλθόντες καὶ δενδροτομήσαντες πάλιν ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου διὰ Γερανείας καὶ ᾿Ισθμοῦ" Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δευτέρᾳ καὶ ἑξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Βοιωτοὺς Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος, (3) καὶ μάχῃ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Ταναγραίων τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους ἔλαβον. τά τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν. (4) ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. (5) καὶ Πελοπόννησον περιέπλευσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ τὸ νεώριον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐνέπρησαν καὶ Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων πόλιν εἷλον καὶ Σικυωνίους ἐν ἀποβάσει τῆς γῆς μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. (109) οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν. (2) τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαίμονα Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὅπως ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ax Αἰγύπτου ἀπαγάγοι Ἀθηναίους. (3) ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ προυχώρει καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλοῦτο, ὁ μὲν Μεγάβαζος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν χρημάτων πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀνεκομίσθη, Μεγάβυξον δὲ τὸν Ζωπύρου πέμπει ἄνδρα Πέρσην μετὰ στρατιᾶς πολλῆς" (4) ὃς ἀφικόμενος κατὰ γῆν τούς τε Αἰγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μάχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξήλασε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλῃσε καὶ

ἐπολιόρκει ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ & μῆνας, μέχρι οὗ ξηράνας τὴν διώρυχα καὶ παρατρέψας ἄλλῃ τὸ ὕδωρ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ ἐποίησε καὶ τῆς

γήσου τὰ πολλὰ ἤπειρον, καὶ διαβὰς εἷλε τὴν νῆσον πεζῇ. (110) οὕτω μὲν τὰ τῶν Ελλήνων πράγματα ἐφθάρη 86 ἔτη πολεμήσαντα᾽ καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι ἀπώλοντο. (2) Αἴγυπτος δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἐγένετο πλὴν Ἀμυρταίου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως τοῦτον δὲ διὰ μέγεθός τε τοῦ ἕλους οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, καὶ ἅμα μαχιμώτατοί εἰσι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οἱ ἕλειοι. (3) Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Λιβύων βασιλεύς, ὃς τὰ πάντα ἔπραξε περὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, 109.3. Μεγάβυξον Gomme: Μεγάβυζον MSS.

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also because of their suspicion of ἃ plot to overthrow the democracy. (7) The Athenians were joined by Thessalian cavalry in accordance with their alliance, but in the action these transferred their allegiance to the Spartans. (108) A battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia: the Spartans and their allies were victorious, and there was great slaughter on both sides. (2) The Spartans went into the Megarid, cut down trees, and returned home again by way of Geranea and the Isthmus. The Athenians on the sixty-second day after the battle went on a campaign into Boeotia under the generalship of Myronides, (3) and in a battle at Oenophyta they defeated the Boeotians, won control of Boeotia and Phocis, demolished the wall of Tanagra and took as hostages

the hundred richest men from Opuntian Locris. And they completed their own long walls. (4) After this the Aeginetans reached an agreement with the Athenians, to demolish their walls, hand over their ships and to be assessed for tribute for the future. (5) And the Athenians sailed round the Peloponnese under the generalship of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, set fire to the Spartans' dockyard, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and disembarked on the Sicyonians’ territory and won a battle against them. (109) The Athenians and their allies in Egypt stayed on there, and experienced many vicissitudes of war. (2) For at first the Athenians won control of Egypt, and the King sent to Sparta a Persian, Megabazus, with money to persuade the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and withdraw the Athenians from Egypt. (3) But, when the King was making no progress and his money was being spent in vain, Megabazus with the rest of his money was brought back to Asia, and he sent a Persian, Megabyxus son of Zopyrus, with a large force. (4) He arrived by land, won a battle against the Egyptians and their allies, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis. Finally he shut them into the island of Prosopitis and besieged them there for a year and six months, until by drying the channel and diverting the water elsewhere he left the ships on dry land and most of the island a mainland, and crossed with

his infantry and took the island. (110) In this way the Greeks' enterprise came to years of war; and few out of many journeyed through were saved, byt most perished. (2) Egypt came under from Amyrtaeus the king in the marshes: they could

destruction after six Libya to Cyrene and the King again, apart not take him because

of the size of the marsh, and at the same time the marsh-men are the most

warlike of the Egyptians. (3) Inaros the Libyan king, who had brought about everything in connection with Egypt; was captured by treachery and

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προδοσίᾳ ληφθεὶς ἀνεσταυρώθη. (4) ἐκ δὲ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ξυμμαχίδος πεντήκοντα τριήρεις διάδοχοι πλέουσαι ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔσχον κατὰ τὸ Μενδήσιον κέρας, οὐκ εἰδότες τῶν γεγονότων οὐδέν: καὶ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τε γῆς ἐπιπεσόντες πεζοὶ καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης Φοινίκων ναυτικὸν διέφθειραν τὰς πολλὰς τῶν νεῶν, αἱ δ᾽ ἐλάσσους διέφυγον πάλιν. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν. (111) ἐκ δὲ Θεσσαλίας Ὀρέστης ὁ ᾿Εχεκρατίδου υἱὸς τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως φεύγων ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτὸν Katdyew: καὶ παραλαβόντες Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας ὄντας ξυμμάχους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον. καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες

πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον), τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐχ εἷλον, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο προυχώρει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν πάλιν Ὀρέστην ἔχοντες ἄπρακτοι. (2) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον χίλιοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐν Πηγαῖς ἐπιβάντες (εἶχον δ᾽ αὐτοὶ τὰς Πηγάς) παρέπλευσαν ἐς Σικυῶνα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ ἀποβάντες Σικυωνίων τοὺς προσμείξαντας μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. (3) καὶ εὐθὺς παραλαβόντες Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ διαπλεύσαντες πέραν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἷλόν γε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν £x οἴκου. (112) ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν σπονδαὶ γίγνονται Πελοποννησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις. (2) καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὑτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος. (3) καὶ ἑξήκοντα μὲν νῆες ἐς Αἴγυπτον ar αὐτῶν ἔπλευσαν, Ἀμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν. (4) Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίου, καὶ πλεύσαντες ὑπὲρ Σαλαμῖνος τῆς ἐν Κύπρωι Φοίνιξι καὶ Κυπρίοις καὶ Κίλιξιν ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεζομάχησαν ἅμα, καὶ νικήσαντες ἀμφότερα ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ αἱ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου νῆες πάλιν [ai] ἐλθοῦσαι pet αὐτῶν. (5) Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς καὶ αὖθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν.

(113) καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχόντων Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὁπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων 110.4. Ἀθηνῶν IT^, schol. Townl. Hom. //. XVI. 280: Ἀθηναίων MSS. 112.4. [ai] omitted rec., deleted Classen.

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impaled. (4) But from Athens and the rest of the alliance fifty replacement triremes sailed to Egypt and put in to the Mendesian branch, not knowing

anything of what had happened. The infantry fell on them from the land and the Phoenician

fleet from the sea, and destroyed most of the ships, but a

minority made their escape back. So ended the affair of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt. (111) From Thessaly Orestes son of Echecratides, king ofthe Thessalians, came as an exile and persuaded the Athenians to reinstate him. Taking with them the Boeotians and Phocians as allies, the Athenians campaigned against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They won control of the land though only a short distance from their camp (for the Thessalian cavalry impeded them), but they were unable to take the city, and they made no progress with any of the other objects of their campaign, but returned again without success, taking Orestes with them. (2) Not long after this a thousand Athenians embarked on the ships at Pegae (which they held), sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the generalship of Pericles son of Xanthippus, disembarked and won a battle against the Sicyonians who engaged with them. (3) They immediately took the Achaeans

with them,

sailed across to the other side, and campaigned

against Oeniadae in Acarnania and began to besiege it; but they were unable to take it, and returned home.

(112) Later, after the lapse of three years, a five-year treaty was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. (2) And the Athenians held off

from their Greek war, but went on a campaign to Cyprus with two hundred of their own and their allies' ships under the generalship of Cimon. (3) Sixty ships from these sailed to Egypt, since Amyrtaeus the king in the marshes was sending for them, and the remainder began a siege of Citium. (4) When Cimon was killed and a famine developed they withdrew from Citium, but after sailing past Cyprian Salamis they fought a naval and an infantry battle at the same time against the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians. They were victorious in both, and then withdrew to home, and the ships from Egypt had returned and went with them. (5) After this the Spartans campaigned in what is called the Sacred War, won control of the sanctuary at Delphi and handed it over to the Delphians; and again later, after their withdrawal, the

Athenians campaigned, won control of Delphi and handed it over to the Phocians. (113) When some time had passed after this, since the Boeotians who had gone into exile were holding Orchomenus, Chaeronea and some other places in Boeotia, the Athenians with a thousand of their own hoplites

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ὡς ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμια ὄντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ ToApatov στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἑλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες. (2) πορευομένοις δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Κορωνείά ἐπιτίθενται οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Λοκροὶ pet

αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. (3) καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται" (4) καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο. (114) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον Εὔβοια ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν διαβεβηκότος ἤδη Περικλέους στρατιᾷ ᾿Αθηναίων ἠγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι μέλλουσιν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ φρουροὶ Ἀθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ Μεγαρέων, πλὴν ὅσοι ἐς Νίσαιαν ἀπέφυγον’ ἐπαγαγόμενοι δὲ Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀπέστησαν οἱ Μεγαρῆς. ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας. (2) καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Θριῶζε ἐσβαλόντες ἐδήωσαν Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγουμένου, καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθόντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. (3) καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὔβοιαν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο, Ἑστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον. (115) ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ an’ Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν" ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναῖοι Πελοποννησίων. (2) ἕκτωι δὲ ἔτει Σαμίοις καὶ Μιλησίοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο περὶ Πριήνης, καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ἐλασσούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες κατεβόων τῶν Σαμίων. ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται νεωτερίσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν. (3) πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ ὁμήρους ἔλαβον τῶν Σαμίων πεντή κοντα μὲν παῖδας, ἴσους δὲ ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λῆ μνον, καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπόντες ὁἀνεχώρησαν. (4) τῶν δὲ Σαμίων ἦσαν γάρ τινες οἵ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔφυγον ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον, ξυνθέμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις καὶ Πισσούθνῃ τῷ Ὑστάσπου ξυμμαχίαν,

ὃς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε, ἐπικούρους τε ξυλλέξαντες ἐς ἑπτακοσίους διέβησαν

113.4. κατελθόντες: κατῆλθόν τε Hude, lacuna after κατελθόντες Stahl.

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and individual contingents from their allies campaigned against these as enemy places, under the generalship of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea and reduced it to slavery, installed a garrison and began to withdraw. (2) But on their journey they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, and with them the Locrians, Euboean exiles and others of the same opinion; and they won a battle, destroyed some of the Athenians and took others alive. (3) The Athenians evacuated the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty in order to convey their men back; (4) and the Boeotian exiles returned, and ail the others became autonomous again. (114) Not long after this Euboea defected from the Athenians, and, when Pericles had already crossed to there with an Athenian force, news reached him that Megara had defected, the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and the Athenian garrison troops had been destroyed by the Megarians apart from those who had escaped to Nisaea. In making their defection the Megarians had invited to support them the Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians. Pericles quickly conveyed his force back from Euboea. (2) After this the Peloponnesians invaded and ravaged Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, under the command of Plistoanax son of Pausanias the

Spartan king, and without advancing any further they withdrew to home. (3) The Athenians again crossed to Euboea under the generalship of Pericles, and overcame the whole of it, making agreements with the rest but expelling the Hestiaeans and themselves occupying their land. (115) When they had returned from Euboea, not long afterwards they made a thirty-year treaty with the Spartans and their allies, giving back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaea (for the Athenians held these places in the Peloponnese). (2) In the sixth year war broke out between Samos and Miletus over Priene, and the Milesians, who were faring worse in the war, went to the Athenians and denounced the Samians. They were joined by private individuals from Samos itself, who wanted a constitutional revolution. (3) The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships, established a democracy, and took as hostages from the Samians fifty boys and the same number of men, whom they deposited in Lemnos; and they left a garrison and returned. (4) Among the Samians were some who did not endure this but fled to the, mainland. They arranged an alliance with the most powerful of the men in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, who at that time held Sardis. Assembling a supporting force of about seven hundred,

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ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐς τὴν Σάμον, (5) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, ἔπειτα τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐκκλέψαντες ἐκ Λήμνου τοὺς αὑτῶν ἀπέστησαν, καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας oi ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐξέδοσαν Πισσούθνῃ, ἐπί τε Μίλητον εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύειν. ξυναπέστησαν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυζάντιοι.

(116) Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ἤσθοντο, πλεύσαντες ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου ταῖς μὲν ἑκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο (ἔτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεῖν), τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρσι Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγίᾳ τῇ

νήσῳ Σαμίων ναυσὶν ἑβδομήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ εἴκοσι στρατιώτιδες (ἔτυχον δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ Μιλήτου πλέουσαι), καὶ ἐνίκων ᾿Αθηναῖοι. (2) ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν νῆες τεσσαράκοντα καὶ Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι, καὶ ἀποβάντες καὶ κρατοῦντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἅμα. (3) Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν ᾧχετο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας, ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν’ ὥχετο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναυσὶ Στησαγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας. (117) ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σάμιοι ἐξαπιναίως ἔκπλουν ποιησάμενοι ἀφάρκτῳ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιπεσόντες τάς τε προφυλακίδας ναῦς διέφθειραν καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες τὰς ἀνταναγομένας ἐνίκησαν, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν ἡμέρας περὶ τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα, καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο ἃ ἐβούλοντο. (2) ἐλθόντος δὲ Περικλέους πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλήσθησαν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν ὕστερον προσεβοήθησαν τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ

μετὰ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ἅγνωνος καὶ Φορμίωνος νῆες, εἴκοσι δὲ αἱ μετὰ Τληπολέμου καὶ Ἀντικλέους, ἐκ δὲ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου τριάκοντα. (3) καὶ ναυμαχίαν μέν τινα βραχεῖαν ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ, τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ὁμήρους δόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι. ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπήκοοι εἶναι. (118) μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη γίγνεται οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὰ προειρημένα, τά τε Κερκυραϊκὰ καὶ τὰ Ποτειδεατικὰ καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις 115.5. perhaps lacuna after τῶν πλείστων Classen & Steup. 116.7. τῶν νεῶν after ἑκκαίδεκα deleted Herwerden, omitted Valla. 117.2. Τληπολέμου: perhaps Τλημπολέμονυ, cf. Τλεμπ[όλεμος) /G i? 48.

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they crossed to Samos at night. (5) First they rose up against the democracy, and won control of most. Then they snatched their hostages from Lemnos, and defected, and the Athenian garrison troops and the commanders with

them they gave up to Pissuthnes; and campaign against Miletus. Byzantium (116) When the Athenians learned sixty ships. Sixteen of the ships they

they immediately started preparing to also joined them in defecting. of this, they sailed against Samos with did not use, for in fact some went to

Caria to find out about the Phoenician ships, and the others to Chios and

Lesbos to announce that they should come to help. But with forty-four ships and Pericles as one of the ten generals they fought a naval battle off the island of Tragia against seventy Samian ships, of which twenty were troop transports (all of them happened to be sailing back from Miletus), and the Athenians were victorious. (2) Later there came to help them forty ships from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos; and they disembarked, won an infantry battle, and began to besiege the city with three walls and at the same time from the sea. (3) Pericles took sixty ships from those engaged in the blockade and went quickly to Caunus and Caria, since news had come that Phoenician ships were sailing against them: for Stesagoras and others had gone with five ships from Samos to fetch the Phoenicians. (117) At this point the Samians sailed out suddenly, fell on the Athenian camp, which was unprotected, destroyed the guard ships in front of it, fought a naval battle and defeated those who

came out against them; and they won control of the sea off their coast for about fourteen days, and were able to convey in and out what they wanted. (2) But when Pericles arrived they were again shut in by his ships. Later there came from Athens to provide further help forty ships with Thucydides, Hagnon and Phormio and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. (J) The Samians engaged in a naval battle for a short time, but were unable to hold out; and in the ninth

month they succumbed to the siege and came to terms by agreement, that they should demolish their wall, give hostages, hand over their ships and be assessed to repay in instalments the money which the Athenians had spent. Also Byzantium came to terms, to be subject just as before. (118) It was after this, not many years later, that there took place the events mentioned above, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the matters

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τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη. (2) ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρός τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου. ἐν

οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἱέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἣν μὴ ἀναγκάνάνται, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι, πρὶν δὴ n δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο. τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο,

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχύς, ἢν δύνωνται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.

(3) αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις διέγνωστο λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀδικεῖν, πέμψαντες δὲ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπηρώτων τὸν Θεὸν εἰ πολεμοῦσιν ἄμεινον ἔσται᾽ ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος. (119) αὖθις δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐβούλοντο ἐπαγαγεῖν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐλθόντων τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας

καὶ ξυνόδου γενομένης οἵ τε ἄλλοι εἶπον ἃ ἐβούλοντο, κατηγοροῦντες οἱ πλείους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀξιοῦντες γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεηθέντες μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις πρότερον ἑκάστων ἰδίᾳ ὥστε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, δεδιότες περὶ τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ μὴ προδιαφθαρῇ, παρόντες δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ τελευταῖοι ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε. (120) “τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι αἰτιασαίμεθα ὡς οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐψηφισμένοι τὸν πόλεμόν εἰσι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς τοῦτο νῦν ξυνήγαγον. χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰ ἴδια ἐξ ἴσου νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμῶνται. (2) ἡμῶν δὲ ὅσοιμὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἐνηλλάγησαν οὐχὶ διδαχῆς δέονται ὥστε φυλάξασθαι αὐτούς τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατῳκημένους εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, τοῖς κάτω ἢν μὴ ἀμύνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν ἕξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὡραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὧν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἠπείρῳ δίδωσι, καὶ τῶν

νῦν λεγομένων μὴ κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι, προσδέχεσθαι δέ ποτε, εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόοιντο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν, καὶ περὶ

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which formed the reason for this war. (2) All these things which the Greeks did against one another and against the barbarian took place in about fifty years between the return of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. In this period the Athenians established their empire more firmly and themselves advanced to great heights of power, and the Spartans noticed this but did not try to prevent them except to a slight extent, but remained inactive for most of the time. Even before this they had not hurried to engage in wars unless they were compelled, and to some extent they were constrained by domestic wars, until at last the Athenians’ power was clearly being raised up and they were impinging on the Spartans' alliance. Then they considered that it was no longer tolerable, but they decided that they must make the attempt with all their effort, and demolish the Athenians' power if they could, by embarking on this war. (3) The Spartans themselves therefore had determined that the treaty had been broken and the Athenians were guilty of injustice, and they sent to Delphi and enquired of the God whether it would be better for them to make war; and he responded to them, it is said, that if they made war forcefully victory would be theirs, and he said that he would join in whether called on or not.

(119) They summoned their allies again and called on themto vote whether they should go to war. When the envoys had come from the alliance and a meeting was held, the others said what they wanted, most of them accusing

the Athenians and claiming that they should go to war. The Corinthians, who had previously canvassed them individually by cities to vote for war, and were afraid that Potidaea might be destroyed before they could save it, were present then, came forward last and spoke as follows. (120) ‘Allies, we could no longer accuse the Spartans of failing to vote for war themselves and to convene us for this purpose, as they have done now. For it is the duty of leaders to attend to their own concerns on an equal basis but to give priority in consideration to common concerns, just as they are given priority in honour by all in other contexts. (2) Those of us who have already had dealings with the Athenians do not need to be instructed to guard against them; but those who have been settled rather in the interior and away from

trade routes ought to know that, if they do not provide defence for those below, it will become more difficult for them to take back in return the goods which they should not be bad judges of what theirs; but should expect that at some danger could advance as far as them,

to send down their seasonal crops and the sea provides for the mainland; and is said now as if it were no concern of time, if they let slip things below, the and that they are deliberating now not

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αὑτῶν οὐχ ἧσσον νῦν βουλεύεσθαι. (3) δι᾿ ὅπερ καὶ μὴ ὀκνεῖν δεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης μεταλαμβάνειν. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μέν ἐστιν, εἰ

μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀδικουμένους ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνης πολεμεῖν, εὖ δὲ παρασχὸν ἐκ πολέμου πάλιν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ μήτε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχίᾳ ἐπαίρεσθαι μήτε τῷ ἡσύχῳ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι. (4) ὅ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀκνῶν τάχιστ᾽ ἂν ἀφαιρεθείη τῆς ῥαστώνης τὸ τερπνὸν 51 ὅπερ ὀκνεῖ, εἰ ἡσυχάζοι, ὅ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχίᾳ πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθύμηται θράσει ἀπίστῳ ἐπαιρόμενος. (5) πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γνωσθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλείω καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοὐναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁμοῖα τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ uet ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δέους δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν. (121) “ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν καὶ ἀδικούμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν καὶ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα, καὶ ὅταν ἀμυνώμεθα Ἀθηναίους, καταθησόμεθα αὐτὸν ἐν καιρῷ. (2) κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ

παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας, (3) ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων. δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ᾽ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Αθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία" ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήμασιν. (4) μιᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται εἰ δ᾽ ἀντίσχοιεν, μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλέονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν. τῇ γε εὐψυχίᾳ δήπου περιεσόμεθα. ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν φύσει ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ᾽ ὃ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιστήμῃ προύχουσι, καθαιρετὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μελέτῃ. (5) χρήματα δὲ

ὥστε ἔχειν ἐς αὐτά, οἴσομεν. ἢ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἅμα σῴζεσθαι οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τούτοις κακῶς πάσχειν. (122) ὑπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις,

μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὖσα τῶν προσόδων αἷς ἰσχύουσι, καὶ ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ

120.5. ὁμοῖα: ὁμοίᾳ Reiske.

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less about themselves. (3) For this reason they should not shrink from taking on war instead of peace. It is characteristic of sensible men to remain inactive if they are not treated unjustly, but of good men when they are treated unjustly to go from peace to war, and when there is a good opportunity to go back from war to agreeing terms, and neither to be borne up by good fortune in war nor to take pleasure in the inactivity of peace and submit to treated unjustly. (4) For the man who shrinks from war because of pleasure would very quickly be robbed of the delight in ease on account of which he shrinks, if he were to remain inactive, and the one who through good fortune is grasping in war has

not taken to heart that he is borne up by a boldness which is untrustworthy. (5) For many bad decisions happen to turn out right because the opposition has been worse in deliberation, and even more decisions judged to have been made well have turned shamefully to the opposite. For nobody's confidence in planning is matched by his following it up in action, but we form opinions in safety and then in fear fall short in the action. (121) ‘We are inciting war now because we are actually being treated unjustly, and have sufficient grounds for complaint, and when we have defended ouselves against the Athenians we shall settle it in due time. (2) For many reasons it is likely that we shall prevail: first, because of our superiority in numbers and in experience of warfare; next, because we all in the same way respond to instructions; (3) and a fleet, in which they are strong, we shall fit out from the resources available to each, and from the monies at Delphi and Olympia -- for by raising a loan we shall be able to entice by greater pay their

foreign sailors. For the Athenians' power is purchased rather than their own, and ours is less exposed to that weakness, since we are strong in our bodies

rather than in our money. (4) In all likelihood they will be conquered by a single victory in a naval battle; but, if they should hold out, we too shall have a longer time to practise with our fleet, and when we have brought our expertise to equality with theirs we shall indeed get the better of them through our good spirit. For the advantage which we have by nature they could not acquire from teaching, but their superiority in expertise we can overcome by practice. (5) To make money available for this, we shall contribute; or it would be terrible if their allies will not refuse to contribute to their own enslavement but we are not prepared to spend in order to take retribution from our enemies and save ourselves, and to prevent this money from being taken by them and itself

used to inflict harm on us. (122) There are also other ways of war available to us: defection of their allies, which would particularly serve to take away the revenues in which they are strong, the building of hostile forts in their land,

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χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὅσα οὐκ ἄν τις νῦν προΐδοι. ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς

χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ag’ αὑτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον: ἐν à 6 μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ᾽ ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταΐει.

(2) “ἐνθυμώμεθα δὲ καὶ ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν ἦσαν ἑκάστοις πρὸς ἀντιπάλους περὶ γῆς ὅρων αἱ διαφοραί, οἰστὸν ἂν "jv: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ξύμπαντάς τε ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι ἱκανοὶ καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἔτι δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἁθρόοι καὶ κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ ἕκαστον ἄστυ μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀμυνούμεθα αὐτούς, δίχα γε ὄντας ἡμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται. καὶ τὴν ἧσσαν, εἰ καὶ δεινόν τῳ ἀκοῦσαι, ἴστω οὐκ ἄλλο τι φέρουσαν ἢ ἄντικρυς δουλείαν" (3) ὃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐνδοιασθῆναι

αἰσχρὸν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ πόλεις τοσάσδε ὑπὸ μιᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν à ἢ δικαίως δοκοῖμεν ἂν πάσχειν ἢ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, oi τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαιοῦμεν αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐῶμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ μονάρχους ἀξιοῦμεν καταλύειν. (4) καὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν ἀπήλλακται, ἀξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψασαν καταφρόνησιν κεχωρήκατε, ἣ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοὺς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται. (123) “τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα τί δεῖ μακρότερον ἢ ἐς ὅσον τοῖς νῦν ξυμφέρει αἰτιᾶσθαι; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦσι βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν (πάτριον γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι), καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος, εἰ ἄρα πλούτῳ τε νῦν καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ ὀλίγον προφέρετε (οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐκτήθη τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι), ἀλλὰ θαρσοῦντας ἰέναι κατὰ πολλὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, τοῦ τε Θεοῦ χρήσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποσχομένου ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης ξυναγωνιουμένης, τὰ μὲν φόβῳ, τὰ δὲ ὠφελίᾳ. (2) σπονδάς τε οὐ λύσετε πρότεροι, ἅς γε καὶ ὁ θεὸς κελεύων πολεμεῖν νομίζει παραβεβάσθαι, ἠδικημέναις δὲ μᾶλλον βοηθήσετε: λύουσι γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀμυνόμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πρότεροι ἐπιόντες. (124) “ὥστε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινῇ τάδε παραινούντων, εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι

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and other things which one might not foresee now. For war proceeds least on stated terms, and from itself for the most part it contrives responses to what occurs: in this the man who engages in it dispassionately is more secure, while the one who is passionate about it is more likely to stumble. (2) ‘Let us take it to heart also that if each of us was involved in a dispute against people who were a match for us, over territorial boundaries, that would be bearable; but as it is the Athenians are capable against all of us

together, and much more powerful than any individual city. And so, if we do not defend ourselves against them united, every people and each city with a

single resolve, when we are separated they will overcome us without effort. And that defeat, terrible though it might be to hear, you must realise would bring nothing other than outright slavery. (3) Even to consider the possibility in talk, and that so many cities should suffer harm from one, is a disgrace

to the Peloponnese. In this case we should be judged either to deserve our suffering or else to be cowards in accepting it and being shown inferior to our fathers — since they liberated Greece but we cannot even confirm that achievement for ourselves, but we allow a tyrant city to be set up though we claim the right to overthrow sole rulers in a single city. (4) And we do not see how this policy can be free from the three greatest disasters, unintelligence or feebleness or neglect: for it cannot be that you have escaped these and have proceeded to what damages most people, condescension, which because it undoes many people has changed to the opposite name of senselessness. (123) ‘But why should we make accusations about the past at greater length than is advantageous for the present? With regard to what is to happen in the future, you must redouble your efforts in going to help the present (for it is a traditional characteristic of yours to gain virtue through effort), and must not set the custom aside, if you now have a slight increment in wealth and resources (for it would not be just for what was gained in circumstances of hardship to be lost in circumstances of surplus), but on many grounds you should enter confidently into the war: the God has given a response, he has himself promised to cooperate, and all the rest of Greece will join in the contest, part from fear and part for benefit. (2) You will not be the first to break the treaty, since the God in commanding us to make war considers

that it has already been contravened, but you will rather be going to support a treaty against which injustice has been committed. For it is not those who defend who break treaties but those who attack first. (124) 'So, when from every standpoint you are well placed to go to war,

and we are advising this in the common interest, if what is most secure

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καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, μὴ μέλλετε Ποτειδεάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὖσι Δωριεῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων πολιορκουμένοις (οὗ πρότερον ἦν τοὐναντίον), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται περιμένοντας τοὺς μὲν ἤδη βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽, εἰ γνωσθησόμεθα ξυνελθόντες μέν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες, μὴ πολὺ ὕστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν᾽ (2) ἀλλὰ

νομίσαντες ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖχθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἅμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ᾽ an αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες: ἐκ πολέμου μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη μᾶλλον βεβαιοῦται, ἀφ᾽ ἡσυχίας δὲ μὴ πολεμῆσαι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκίνδυνον. (3) καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι, παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν.᾽" τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ

Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. (125) οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἀφ᾽ ἁπάντων ἤκουσαν γνώμην ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἅπασιν ὅσοιπαρῆσαν ἑξῆς, καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πόλει᾽ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. (2 δεδογμένον δὲ αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς μὲν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀπαρασκεύοις οὖσιν, ἐκπορίζεσθαι δὲ ἐδόκει ἑκάστους ἃ πρόσφορα ἦν καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέλλησιν. ὅμως δὲ καθισταμένοις ὧν ἔδει ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη, ἔλασσον δέ, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄρασθαι φανερῶς. (126) ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσιν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς Θεοῦ" τὸ δὲ ἄγος ἦν τοιόνδε. (3) Κύλων ἦν Ἀθηναῖος ἀνὴρ Ὀλυμπιονίκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενής τε καὶ δυνατός, ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένους Μεγαρέως ἀνδρός, ὃς Kat’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννει Μεγάρων. (4) χρωμένῳ δὲ τῶι Κύλωνι ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῆι μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν. (5) ὁ δὲ παρά τε τοῦ Θεαγένους δύναμιν λαβὼν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναπείσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐπῆλθεν Ὀλύμπια τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, κατέλαβε τὴν

ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, νομίσας ἑορτήν τε τοῦ Διὸς μεγίστην εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῷ τι προσήκειν Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότι. (6) εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἢ ἄλλοθί Tov ἡ μεγίστη ἑορτὴ εἴρητο, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἔτι κατενόησε τό τε μαντεῖον οὐκ

125.2. ἑκάστους Nattmann cf. singulos Valla: ἑκάστοις MSS.

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is indeed that the same things should be advantageous for cities and for individuals, do not delay in providing retribution for the Potidaeans, who are Dorians being besieged by lonians (whereas previously the opposite used to happen), and in seeking freedom for the others. It is no longer possible to wait, when some are already being harmed and others will before long suffer the same fate if it becomes known that we have met but have not dared to defend. (2) You must consider that a point of necessity has been reached, allies, and at the same time that the proposal which we are making is the best. Vote for war, not fearing the immediate terror but longing for the more

lasting peace which will come from it. For peace which results from war is more secure, and avoiding war from inactivity is not similarly free from danger. (3) The city which has been established as a tyrant in Greece you must regard as established similarly against all, so that it is already ruling some and has designs on others; so we must attack it and bring it to terms, and then we shall ourselves live free from danger in the future and we shall liberate those of the Greeks who are now in a state of slavery.' That is what

the Corinthians said. (125) The Spartans, when they had heard the opinions of all, called in turn on all the allies who were present to vote, both greater and lesser cities; and the majority voted for war. (2) But, once they had resolved, it was impossible

for them to make the attempt immediately, because they were unprepared; but they resolved that each should provide what was appropriate and there should be no delay. Nevertheless, to furnish what was needed took not a year but slightly less, before they invaded Attica and embarked on the war openly. (126) During this time they sent envoys to the Athenians to make complaints, so that they should have the strongest reason for making war if

the Athenians paid no heed to them. (2) First the Spartans sent envoys commanding the Athenians to drive out the curse of the Goddess. The curse was as follows. (3) Cylon was an

Athenian, an Olympic victor, and one of the well-born and powerful men of antiquity; and he had married the daughter of Theagenes of Megara, who at that time was tyrant of Megara. (4) When Cylon consulted at Delphi the God responded that he should seize the Athenian acropolis at the greatest festival of Zeus. (5) He took a force from Theagenes, persuaded his friends,

and when the Olympia in the Peloponnese occurred he seized the acropolis

to make himself tyrant, considering that this was the greatest festival of Zeus and appropriate to him as an Olympic victor. (6) But whether the ‘greatest festival of Zeus' mentioned was in Attica or somewhere else did not yet

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ἐδήλου (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις Διάσια ἃ καλεῖται Διὸς ἑορτὴ Μειλιχίου μεγίστη ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ἐν n πανδημεὶ θύουσι πολλοὶ οὐχ ἱερεῖα, ἀλλὰ θύματα ἐπιχώρια), δοκῶν δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν ἐπεχείρησε τῷ ἔργῳ. (7) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθησάν τε πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐπολιόρκουν. (8) χρόνου δὲ ἐγγιγνομένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρίᾳ ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοί, ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς

ἐννέα ἄρχουσι τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορσι διαθεῖναι ἡ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσιν (τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες

ἔπρασσον). (9) οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κύλωνος πολιορκούμενοι φλαύρως εἶχον σίτου τε καὶ ὕδατος ἀπορίᾳ. (10) ὁ μὲν οὖν Κύλων καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἐκδιδράσκουσιν᾽ οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὡς ἐπιέζοντο καί τινες καὶ ἀπέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ, καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ἱκέται τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει. (11) ἀναστήσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ὡς ἑώρων ἀποθνήσκοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιήσουσιν, ἀπαγαγόντες ἀπέκτειναν: καθεζομένους δέ τινας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Σεμνῶν Θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ ἀπεχρήσαντο. καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι τῆς Θεοῦ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων.

(12) ἤλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους, ἤλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὕστερον μετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τούς τε ζῶντας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὀστᾶ ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον. κατῆλθον μέντοι ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἔτι ἐν τῇ πόλει. (127) τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν δῆθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ ῥᾷον «ἂν» σφίσι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. (2) οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἤλπιζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὡς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυμφορὰν τὸ μέρος ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος. (3) ὧν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἠναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἴα ὑπείκειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὥρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. (128) ἀντεκέλευον δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸ ἀπὸ Ταινάρου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν: οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀναστήσαντές ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἀπὸ Ταινάρου τῶν εἱλώτων ἱκέτας ἀπαγαγόντες 126.6. πολλοὶ Μ55, defended M. Η. Jameson, BCH 89 (1965), 165-6: πολλὰ Hermann.

«ἀγνὰ» θύματα Hemsterhuis from Poll. I. 26, but see Jameson. 127.1. «ἂν» rec. 128.7. τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος [ἀπὸ Ταινάρου] deleted Herwerden, defended Maurer, /nterpolation, 75—6: τοῦ Ταιναρίου schol. Ar. Ach. 510, perhaps to be read here Hornblower.

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occur to him, and the oracle did not disclose (for in fact the Athenians have a greatest festival of Zeus Meilichios,

called the Diasia, outside the city, at

which the whole population makes sacrifices, many men bringing not animal victims but offerings of a local kind); but, judging that he had determined

correctly, he attempted the deed. (7) The Athenians on learning of this went to the rescue against them in full force from the fields, and settled down to besiege them. (8) As time passed the Athenians were exhausted by the blockade, and most departed, entrusting the guard duty to the nine archons and giving them full power in all respects to settle the matter in whatever way they decided was best (at that time the nine archons conducted most of the political business). (9) Those being besieged with Cylon fell into a bad way through shortage of food and water. (/0) Cylon and his brother therefore ran away. But the rest, when they were under pressure and some were even dying from hunger, sat down as suppliants at the altar on the acropolis. (11) When those of the Athenians who had been entrusted with the guard duty saw them dying in the sanctuary, they raised them up on condition that they would do them no harm; but they took them away and killed them. They even dispatched some who sat down at the altars of the Awesome Goddesses on the way. As a result of this they were called accursed and sinners against the Goddess,

and the families descended

from

them.

(12) The Athenians

therefore drove out these accursed men; and they were also driven out later by Cleomenes the Spartan in conjunction with an Athenian faction, when they drove out the living and uprooted the bones of the dead and expelled them. However, they returned later, and their descendants are still in the city. (127) This curse the Spartans commanded the Athenians to drive out,

making a show of providing retribution for the gods first, but knowing that Pericles son of Xanthippus was connected with it on his mother's side and

thinking that if he were expelled their plans for Athens would progress more easily. (2) However, they did not expect that that would happen to him so much as that it would make him vulnerable to criticism in the city on the grounds that the war was due in part to his own disastrous position. (3) For he was the most powerful of the men of his time, and in leading the state he was totally opposed to the Spartans, and would not allow the Athenians to give way but impelled them towards the war. (128) The Athenians in response commanded the Spartans to drive out the curse from Taenarum. For the Spartans had once raised up from the

sanctuary of Poseidon of Taenarum suppliants from the helots, and taken

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διέφθειραν, δι᾿ ὃ δὴ καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς νομίζουσι τὸν μέγαν σεισμὸν γενέσθαι ἐν Σπάρτῃ. (2) ἐκέλευον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν αὐτούς: ἐγένετο δὲ τοιόνδε. (3) ἐπειδὴ Παυσανίας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ κριθεὶς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν, δημοσίᾳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξεπέμφθη, ἰδίᾳ δὲ αὐτὸς τριήρη

λαβὼν Ἑρμιονίδα ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἑλλήσποντον, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πράσσειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐφιέμενος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς. (4) εὐεργεσίαν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε πρῶτον ἐς βασιλέα κατέθετο καὶ τοῦ παντὸς πράγματος ἀρχὴν ἐποιήσατο᾽ (5) Βυζάντιον γὰρ ἑλὼν τῇ προτέρᾳ παρουσίᾳ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχώρησιν (εἶχον δὲ Μῆδοι αὐτὸ καὶ βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινες καὶ ξυγγενεῖς οἱ ἑάλωσαν ἐν αὐτῷ) τότε τούτους οὗς ἔλαβεν ἀποπέμπει βασιλεῖ κρύφα τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἀπέδρασαν αὐτόν. (6) ἔπρασσε δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ Γογγύλου τοῦ Ἐρετριῶς, ᾧπερ ἐπέτρεψε τό τε Βυζάντιον καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν τὸν Γόγγυλον φέροντα αὐτῷ᾽ ἐνεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς ὕστερον ἀνηυρέθη: (7) “Παυσανίας ὁ ἡγεμὼν τῆς Σπάρτης τούσδε τέ σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος ἀποπέμπει δορὶ ἑλών, καὶ γνώμην ποιοῦμαι,

εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, θυγατέρα τε τὴν σὴν γῆμαι καί σοι Σπάρτην τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. δυνατὸς δὲ δοκῶ εἶναι ταῦτα πρᾶξαι μετὰ σοῦ βουλευόμενος. εἰ οὖν τί σε τούτων ἀρέσκει, πέμπε ἄνδρα πιστὸν

ἐπὶ θάλασσαν δι᾽ οὗ τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα."

(129) τοσαῦτα μὲν ἡ γραφὴ ἐδήλου, Ξέρξης δὲ ἥσθη τε τῇ ἐπιστολῇ καὶ ἀποστέλλει Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Φαρνάκου ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καὶ κελεύει αὐτὸν τήν τε Δασκυλῖτιν σατραπείαν παραλαβεῖν Μεγαβάτην ἀπαλλάξαντα, ὃς πρότερον ἦρχε, καὶ παρὰ Παυσανίαν ἐς Βυζάντιον ἐπιστολὴν ἀντεπετίθει αὐτῶι ὡς τάχιστα διαπέμψαι καὶ τὴν σφραγῖδα ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ ἤν τι αὐτῷ Παυσανίας παραγγέλληι περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πράσσειν ὡς ἄριστα καὶ πιστότατα. (2) ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος τά τε ἄλλα ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ εἴρητο καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν διέπεμψεν᾽ ἀντενεγέγραπτο δὲ váóe- (3) “ὧδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης Παυσανίᾳ. καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὕς μοι πέραν θαλάσσης ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἔσωσας κείσεταί σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραπτος, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρέσκομαι. καί σε μήτε νὺξ μήθ᾽ ἡμέρα ἐπισχέτω

128.3. Εελληνικὸν: Μηδικὸν Gebhardt.

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them away and destroyed them, and they consider that it was because of this that the great earthquake occurred at Sparta. (2) They commanded them also to drive out the curse of the Goddess of the Bronze House. That came about as follows. (3) When Pausanias the Spartan was first summoned by the Spartiates from his command, and was put on trial by them but was acquitted of injustice, he was not sent out again publicly, but privately he took a trireme from Hermione on his own account, without the Spartans' authority. He arrived at the Hellespont, allegedly for the Greek war, but in fact to engage in affairs with the King, as he had attempted also on the first occasion, aiming to rule over Greece. (4) It was from this that he had first laid up a benefaction to his credit with the King and had made a beginning of the whole affair. (5) For when he had captured Byzantium, when he was there previously after his withdrawal from Cyprus, since the Persians had held it and there were

relatives and kin of the King captured in it, he then sent these men whom he captured to the King, keeping it secret from the other allies and alleging that they had run away from him. (6) He arranged this through Gongylus of Eretria, to whom he entrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent

Gongylus to take a letter to the King, and this is what was written in it, as was discovered later: *Pausanias the leader of Sparta, wanting to gratify you, sends back to you these men whom he captured by the spear. And 1 propose, if you too judge it right, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and the rest of Greece subordinate to you. | judge that I am able to accomplish this in consultation with you. If this pleases you at all, send a trustworthy man to the sea, through whom we can conduct our discussions in future.’ (129) That is what the written text disclosed. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him

to take over the satrapy of Dascylium and supplant Megabates, who had ruled it previously. And he charged him in return with a letter to Pausanias at Byzantium, telling him to transmit it to him as soon as possible and show

him the seal, and if Pausanias gave him any instructions about the King's affairs he was to deal with them in the best and most trustworthy manner possible. (2) On arriving he did the other things as he had been told and transmitted the letter. This was the reply which had been written: (3) ‘Thus speaks King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you saved for me from Byzantium beyond the sea your benefaction will lie written up in our house for all time, and 1 am pleased with the words which have come from you. Let neither night nor day hold you back and make you slacken in doing

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ὥστε ἀνεῖναι πράσσειν τι ὧν ἐμοὶ ὑπισχνῇ, μηδὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου δαπάνῃ κεκωλύσθω μηδὲ στρατιᾶς πλήθει, εἴ ποι δεῖ παραγίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ust Ἀρταβάζου ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ὅν σοι ἔπεμψα, πρᾶσσε θαρσῶν καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ σὰ ὅπῃ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἕξει ἀμφοτέροις. (130) ταῦτα λαβὼν ὁ Παυσανίας τὰ γράμματα, ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιᾶσιν ἡγεμονίαν, πολλῷ

τότε μᾶλλον ἦρτο καὶ οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο ἐν τῷ καθεστῶτι τρόπῳ βιοτεύειν, ἀλλὰ σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδυόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἐξήει καὶ διὰ τῆς Θράκης πορευόμενον αὐτὸν Μῆδοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζάν τε Περσικὴν παρετίθετο καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐδύνατο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργοις βραχέσι προυδήλου ἃ τῇ γνώμῃ μειζόνως ἐς ἔπειτα ἔμελλε πράξειν. (2) δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὑτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι᾽ 61 ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ ξυμμαχία μετέστη. (131) oi δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι τό τε πρῶτον δι᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα

ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτόν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ τῇ Ἑρμιονίδι vni τὸ δεύτερον ἐκπλεύσας οὐ κελευσάντων

αὐτῶν

τοιαῦτα ἐφαίνετο ποιῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου

βίᾳ ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς ἐς μὲν τὴν Σπάρτην οὐκ ἐπανεχώρει, ἐς δὲ Κολωνὰς τὰς Τρωιάδας ἱδρυθεὶς πράσσων τε ἐσηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ οὐκ ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ τὴν μονὴν ποιούμενος, οὕτω δὴ οὐκέτι ἐπέσχον, ἀλλὰ πέμψαντες κήρυκα οἱ ἔφοροι καὶ σκυτάλην εἶπον τοῦ κή ρυκος μὴ λείπεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, πόλεμον αὐτῷ Σπαρτιάτας προαγορεῦειν. (2) ὁ δὲ

βουλόμενος àὡς ἥκιστα ὕποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρή μασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην. καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἱρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων (ἔξεστι δὲ τοῖς ἐφόροις τὸν βασιλέα δρᾶσαι τοῦτο), ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὕστερον ἐξῆλθε καὶ καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν. (132) καὶ φανερὸν μὲν εἶχον οὐδὲν οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται σημεῖον, οὔτε οἱ ἐχθροὶ οὔτε ἡ πᾶσα πόλις, ὅτῳ ἂν πιστεύσαντες βεβαίως ἐτιμωροῦντο ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμὴν ἔχοντα (Πλείσταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου ὄντα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἔτι ἀνεψιὸς ὧν ἐπετρόπευεν), (2) ὑποψίας δὲ πολλὰς παρεῖχε τῇ τε παρανομίᾳ καὶ ζηλώσει τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ

ἴσος βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοῖς παροῦσι, τά τε ἄλλα αὐτοῦ ἀνεσκόπουν, εἴ τί που

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anything you promise me, and let neither the need for expenditure of gold and silver or for the mass of a military force prevent you, if that needs to be present anywhere; but with Artabazus the good man whom I have sent to you act confidently so that my affairs and yours shall turn out finest and best for both of us.’ (130) While Pausanias was even previously in high regard among the Greeks for his leadership at Plataea, after receiving this written message he was then elated much more and was no longer able to live his life in the established manner. He used to go out from Byzantium wearing Median clothing and to journey through Thrace escorted by Median and Egyptian spear-bearers, and had a Persian table laid for him. He could no longer

repress his plans, but with small deeds he disclosed in advance what in his mind he was intending to do on a larger scale in the future. (2) He made himself difficult of access,

and behaved

with such

a harsh temper to all

alike that nobody could approach him. It is for this reason not least that the alliance transferred itself to the Athenians. (131) When the Spartans learned of this affair on the first occasion they called him back precisely because of this. And when he had sailed out for the second time in the ship from Hermione, without any command from them, it was evident that he was behaving in the same way. When he

was forcibly expelled from Byzantium by siege by the Athenians, he did not return to Sparta but based himself at Colonae in the Troad, and it was reported to the Spartans that he was dealing with the barbarians and staying there for no good purpose. So they could no longer hold back; but the ephors sent a herald with a skyrale, telling him not to disobey the herald, or else the Spartiates would declare war against him. (2) He wanted to incur as little suspicion as possible, and trusted that he could overcome the criticism through bribery, and so he returned to Sparta for the second time. At first he

was thrown into the enclosure by the ephors (the ephors have the right to do this to the king); then later he contrived to be released, and offered to stand trial if anybody wanted to examine him. (132) The Spartiates, both his enemies and the whole city, had no conspicuous sign in which they could securely trust to take retribution from a man of the royal family and currently holding an honourable position (for as his cousin he was guardian of Plistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and still young). (2) But he aroused much suspicion by his lawlessness and his refusal, in imitation of the barbarians, to be the equal of those who were with him; and they examined other things about him, to see if in any way his

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ἐξεδεδιήτητο τῶν καθεστώτων νομίμων, καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸν τρίποδά ποτε τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, ὃν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων ἀκροθίνιον, ἠξίωσεν ἐπιγράψασθαι αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ τὸ ἐλεγεῖον τόδε: 3

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ὧπερ εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς, μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλεῦσαί τι ἀνήκεστον, πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, παιδικά ποτε Ov αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος ἐκείνῳ, μηνυτὴς γίγνεται, δείσας κατὰ ἐνθύμησίν τινα ὅτι οὐδείς πω τῶν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγγέλων πάλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ παρασημηνάμενος σφραγῖδα, ἵνα, ἣν ψευσθῆι τῆς δόξης ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνός tt μεταγράψαι αἰτήσῃ, μὴ ἐπιγνῷ, λύει τὰς ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς ὑπονοήσας τι τοιοῦτον προσεπεστάλθαι καὶ αὑτὸν ηὗρεν ἐγγεγραμμένον κτείνειν. (433) τότε δὴ οἱ ἔφοροι δείξαντος αὐτοῦ τὰ γράμματα μᾶλλον μὲν

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λέγοντος, ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ Ταίναρον ἱκέτου οἰχομένου καὶ σκηνησαμένου διπλῆν διαφράγματι καλύβην, ἐς ἣν τῶν [τε] ἐφόρων ἐντός τινας ἔκρυψε, καὶ Παυσανίου ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθόντος καὶ ἐρωτῶντος τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἱκετείας ἤσθοντο πάντα σαφῶς, αἰτιωμένου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ΄ 3 ^ \ 5 4.5 h se e , τά τε περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφέντα Kai TAAA’ ἀποφαίνοντος καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ὡς οὐδὲν πώποτε αὐτὸν £v ταῖς πρὸς βασιλέα διακονίαις παραβάλοιτο, προτιμηθείη δ᾽ ἐν ἴσῳ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν διακόνων ἀποθανεῖν, κἀκείνου αὐτά τε ταῦτα ξυνομολογοῦντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἐῶντος ὀργίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ #

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[σφραγῖδα] Hude from Poll. VIII. 27, cf. Maurer, /nterpolation,

70: παραποιησάμενος σφραγῖδα MSS. 133.7. [te] deleted Poppo.

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life had broken out of the established conventions, and the fact that on the tripod at Delphi, dedicated by the Greeks as firstfruits from the Persians, he had presumed to have inscribed on his own account this elegiac couplet: When as prince of the Greeks he had destroyed the army of the Persians Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Apollo. (3) This couplet the Spartans immediately erased from the tripod, and they inscribed by name the cities which had joined in overthrowing the barbarian

and had set up the dedication. However, this was judged even then to be an unjust act by Pausanias, and now that he was in this position it appeared much more to be an act in line with his current intention. (4) They learned also that he was engaged in some dealing with the helots, and this was the case: he was promising them liberation and citizenship if they would join him in an uprising and in achieving his whole objective. (5) But even so they did not think it right to trust in some helot informers and take drastic action against him, but followed their customary habit towards themselves, not to be quick to make any irremediable decision against a Spartiate without indisputable indications. Eventually, it is said, the man who was about to convey to Artabazus Pausanias' last letter to the King, a man of Argilus who had been a favourite of his and most trustworthy to him, became an informer, afraid because of some intuition that none of the messengers before him had ever come back. He made a counterfeit seal, so

that if he was mistaken in his judgment or Pausanias asked to change the text he should not be found out; and he opened the letter, in which he suspected that some additional message had been included, and found it written there

that he was to be killed. (133) When he had shown the ephors what was written they were more willing to believe; but they still wanted to hear for themselves Pausanias saying something. So by arrangement the man went to Taenarum as a suppliant, set up a hut divided in two by a partition, and concealed some of the ephors inside it. When Pausanias came to him and asked the reason

for his supplication, they learned everything clearly, as the man accused Pausanias of what was written about him and revealed everything point point, that he had never betrayed him in any of his ministry towards King, but was to receive the privilege of dying in the same way as most his ministers. Pausanias acknowledged these facts, and told him not to angry about the situation but gave him a pledge that he would raise him

by the of be up

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πίστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδόντος τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀξιοῦντος ὡς τάχιστα πορεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὰ πρασσόμενα διακωλύειν. (134) ἀκούσαντες δὲ ἀκριβῶς τότε μὲν ἀπῆλθον οἱ ἔφοροι, βεβαίως δὲ ἤδη εἰδότες ἐν τῇ πόλει τὴν ξύλληψιν ἐποιοῦντο. λέγεται δ᾽ αὐτὸν μέλλοντα ξυλληφθήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, ἑνὸς μὲν τῶν ἐφόρων τὸ πρόσωπον προσιόντος

ὡς εἶδε, γνῶναι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐχώρει, ἄλλου δὲ νεύματι ἀφανεῖ χρησαμένου καὶ δηλώσαντος εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Χαλκιοίκου χωρῆσαι δρόμῳ καὶ

προκαταφυγεῖν᾽ ἦν δ᾽ ἐγγὺς τὸ τέμενος. καὶ ἐς οἴκημα οὐ μέγα 8 ἦν τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐσελθών, ἵνα μὴ ὑπαίθριος ταλαιπωροίη, ἡσύχαζεν. (2) οἱ δὲ τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν ὑστέρησαν τῇ διώξει, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ τε οἰκήματος τὸν ὄροφον ἀφεῖλον καὶ τὰς θύρας ἔνδον ὄντα τηρήσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπολαβόντες ἔσω ἀπωικοδόμησαν, προσκαθεζόμενοί τε ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ. (3) καὶ μέλλοντος αὐτοῦ ἀποψύχειν ὥσπερ εἶχεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι, αἰσθόμενοι ἐξάγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἔτι ἔμπνουν ὄντα, καὶ ἐξαχθεὶς ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα. (4) καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέλλησαν μὲν ἐς τὸν Κεάδαν, οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους [εἰώθεσαν], ἐσβάλειν ἔπειτα ἔδοξε πλησίον που κατορύξαι. ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς τόν τε τάφον ὕστερον ἔχρησε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μετενεγκεῖν οὗπερ ἀπέθανε (καὶ νῦν κεῖται ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι, ὃ γραφῇ στῆλαι δηλοῦσι) καὶ ὡς ἄγος αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ πεπραγμένον δύο σώματα ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς τῇ Χαλκιοίκῳ ἀποδοῦναι. οἱ δὲ ποιησάμενοι χαλκοῦς ἀνδριάντας δύο ὡς ἀντὶ Παυσανίου ἀνέθεσαν. (135) οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄγος κρίναντος, ἀντεπέταξαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐλαύνειν αὐτό. (2) τοῦ δὲ μηδισμοῦ τοῦ Παυσανίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ξυνεπῃτιῶντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὡς ηὕρισκον ἐκ τῶν περὶ Παυσανίαν ἐλέγχων, ἠξίουν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτόν. (3) οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες (ἔτυχε γὰρ ὠστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἄργει, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον) πέμπουσι μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἑτοίμων ὄντων ξυνδιώκειν ἄνδρας οἷς εἴρητο ἄγειν ὅπου ἂν περιτύχωσιν. (136) ὁ δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς προαισθόμενος φεύγει ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἐς Κέρκυραν, ὧν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης. δεδιέναι δὲ φασκόντων Κερκυραίων ἔχειν αὐτὸν ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ᾿Αθηναίοις ἀπεχθέσθαι, διακομίζεται on αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον τὴν καταντικρύ. (2) καὶ διωκόμενος

134.4. Κεάδαν CF, schol., cf. 4necd. Bekk. i. 219.8-13: Καιάδαν ABEGM.

οὗπερ τοὺς κακουργοὺς εἰώθεσαν thought to be absent from scholiast's text so deleted Vollgraff, εἰώθεσαν only deleted Alberti, cf. Maurer, /nterpolation, 34-5, 68-9: variants on ἐμβάλ(λ)ειν (ἐσβάλλειν CG) with εἰώθε(υ)σαν or εἰώθασιν before or after MSS.

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from the sanctuary and insisted that he should journey as quickly as possible and not hinder the negotiations. (134) Having heard precisely, on this occasion the ephors went away, but now that they had secure knowledge they started arranging to arrest him in the city. It is said that, when he was about to be arrested on the street, he saw the facial expression of one of the ephors approaching him and understood the purpose for which he had come, and that another out of good will disclosed the purpose with an indistinct nod. So he went at a run to the sanctuary of the Goddess of the Bronze House, and escaped in time. (The precinct was nearby.) He went into a small building which formed part of the sanctuary, so as not to suffer hardship in the open air, and stayed there without moving. (2) At that point they were too late in pursuing him; but afterwards they removed the roof of the building and, seeing that he was inside, they trapped him there and walled offthe doors, and they settled down and through starvation took him by siege. (3) When in the condition he was in he was about to expire in the building, they noticed it and dragged him out of the sanctuary still breathing, and immediately after being dragged out he died. (4) They intended to throw him into the Ceadas, where they threw criminals, but afterwards they resolved to bury him somewhere near. The God at Delphi later responded that he should be transferred to where he died (and he now lies in the forecourt, as the text on ste/ai discloses), and that, since what they had done had brought a curse on them, two bodies in return for one should be given back to the Goddess of the Bronze House. They had two bronze statues made, and dedicated them in return for Pausanias. (135) Since the God had determined that this was a curse, the Athenians in

response bade the Spartans drive that out. (2) The Spartans sent envoys to the Athenians about the medism of Pausanias, accusing Themistocles of joint involvement in it, as they discovered from their examinations concerning Pausanias, and claimed that he should be subjected to the same punishment. They were persuaded. He happened to have been ostracised, and was living in Argos and visiting the rest of the Peloponnese, and, together with the Spartans, who were ready to join in the pursuit, they sent men who were told to fetch him from wherever they found him. (136) Themistocles learned of this in time and fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra, of which he was a benefactor. The Corcyraeans said that they were afraid to accept him and incur the hostility of the Spartans and Athenians, so he was conveyed across the sea by them to the mainland opposite. (2)

166

Thucydides

ὑπὸ τῶν προστεταγμένων κατὰ MOT À χωροίη, ἀναγκάζεται κατά τι ἄπορον παρὰ Ἄδμητον τὸν Μολοσσῶν βασιλέα ὄντα αὐτῷ οὐ φίλον καταλῦσαι. (3) καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔτυχεν ἐπιδημῶν, ὁ δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς ἱκέτης γενόμενος διδάσκεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸν παῖδα σφῶν λαβὼν καθέζεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑστίαν. (4) καὶ ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον τοῦ Ἀδμήτου δηλοῖ τε ὅς ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, εἴ τι ἄρα αὐτὸς ἀντεῖπεν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων δεομένῳ, φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι: καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πολλῷ ἀσθενεστέρος ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακῶς πάσχειν,

γενναῖον δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ ἅμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκείνῳ χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σῴζεσθαι ἐναντιωθῆναι, ἐκεῖνον δ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ἐκδοίη αὐτόν (εἰπὼν ὑφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ διώκεται), σωτηρίας ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποστερῆσαι. (137) ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ

υἱέος, ὥσπερ ὁ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἦν ἱκέτευμα τοῦτο. καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἐλθοῦσι καὶ πολλὰ εἰποῦσιν οὐκ ἐκδίδωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστέλλει βουλόμενον ὡς βασιλέα πορευθῆναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν πεζῇ ἐς Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου. (2) ἐν T] ὁλκάδος τυχὼν ἀναγομένης én’ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἐπιβὰς καταφέρεται χειμῶνι ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ὃ ἐπολιόρκει Νάξον. καί (ἦν γὰρ ἀγνὼς τοῖς ἐν τῇ vni) δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ δι᾽ ἃ φεύγει, καὶ εἰ μὴ

σώσει αὐτόν, ἔφη ἐρεῖν ὅτι χρήμασι πεισθεὶς αὐτὸν ayer τὴν δὲ ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι μηδένα ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τῆς νεὼς μέχρι πλοῦς γένηται πειθομένῳ δ᾽ αὐτῷ

χάριν ἀπομνήσεσθαι ἀξίαν. ὁ δὲ ναύκληρος ποιεῖ τε ταῦτα καὶ ἀποσαλεύσας ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ὕστερον ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἔφεσον. (3) καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκεῖνόν τε ἐθεράπευσε χρημάτων δόσει (ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐξ Ἄργους ἃ ὑπεξέκειτο) καὶ μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινὸς πορευθεὶς ἄνω ἐσπέμπει γράμματα πρὸς βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ βασιλεύοντα. (4) ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι “Θεμιστοκλῆς ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ὃς κακὰ μὲν πλεῖστα Ἑλλήνων εἴργασμαι τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον, ὅσον χρόνον τὸν σὸν πατέρα ἐπιόντα ἐμοὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἠμυνόμην, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι πλείω ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγίγνετο. καί μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται (γράψας τήν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν

136.4. ἀσθενεστέρος rec., se ... imbecilliorem Valla: ἀσθενεστέρου MSS. 137.2. Νάξον: Θάσον Plut. Them. 25.2 (UMA: but Νάξον S); Ἔφεσον: Κύμην Plut. Them. 26.1.

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Pursued by those instructed to do 50, in accordance with their enquiries as to where he was going, in somewhat difficult circumstances he was compelled to seek lodging with Admetus the king of the Molossi, who was no friend of his. (3) Admetus happened not to be at home, and Themistocles became a suppliant of his wife, and was instructed by her to take up their child and sit at the hearth. (4) Not long afterwards Admetus arrived, and Themistocles disclosed who he was and called on him, although he had opposed him when he had put a request to the Athenians, not to take retribution from him as an exile. For in the present circumstances he would be ill treated when he was much weaker than Admetus, but it was noble for retribution to be taken by those of similar standing on an equal basis. At the same time, Themistocles said that he had opposed Admetus over some request but not regarding the safety of his person, but if Admetus were to give him up (he explained by

whom and on what grounds he was being pursued) that would deprive him of the safety of his life. (137) Admetus after listening to him raised him up with his own son, as he had seated himself holding him (and this is the greatest form of supplication). And not long afterwards, when the Spartans and Athenians came and spoke at length, he did not give up Themistocles to them, but since he wanted

to journey to the King he sent him away on foot to the other sea, to Pydna the city of Alexander. (2) There he happened to find a merchant ship putting out for lonia and boarded it, and was carried by a storm to the Athenian force which was besieging Naxos. And, since he had not been recognised by those on the ship, in fearhe declared to the captain who he was and why he was fleeing, and said that 1f the captain would not save him he would say that he had been bribed to take him: his safety depended on nobody's disembarking from the ship until sailing bcame possible; but if the captain obeyed him he would owe him a worthy repayment of gratitude. The captain did this, stayed out at sea off the Athenian position, and later arrived at Ephesus. (3) Themistocles cared for him with a gift of money (later the money which he had deposited reached him from his friends in Athens and from Argos); and with one of the Persians from the coast he journeyed inland and sent a letter to Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had recently become King. (4) What he wrote disclosed that “1, Themistocles, have come to you. | did the most harm ofthe Greeks to your house during the time when your father was attacking me and | was forced to defend myself, but much more good when I was in a position of safety but he was in a position of danger and his return conveyance took place. A benefaction is owed to me (he had written from

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γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε 61 αὑτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν), καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι πάρειμι διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν σὴν φιλίαν. βούλομαι δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισχὼν αὐτός σοι περὶ ὧν ἥκω δηλῶσαι."

(138) βασιλεὺς δέ, ὡς λέγεται, ἐθαύμασέ τε αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ἐκέλευε ποιεῖν οὕτως. ὁ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν ἐπέσχε τῆς τε Περσίδος γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο κατενόησε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τῆς χώρας: (2) ἀφικόμενος δὲ μετὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν γίγνεται παρ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγας καὶ ὅσος οὐδείς πω Ἑλλήνων διά τε τὴν προύπάρχουσαν ἀξίωσιν καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἣν ὑπετίθει αὐτῷ δουλώσειν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πεῖραν διδοὺς ξυνετὸς φαίνεσθαι. (3) ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι: οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἐπιμαθών, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι᾽ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής: καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε, ὧν δ᾽ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο. τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. (4) νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκωι ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ

ἃ ὑπέσχετο. (5) μνημεῖον μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ ἐστὶ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ ἐν τῇ dyopa: ταύτης γὰρ ἦρχε τῆς χώρας, δόντος βασιλέως αὐτῷ Μαγνησίαν μὲν ἄρτον, ἣ προσέφερε πεντήκοντα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, Λάμψακον δὲ

οἶνον (ἐδόκει γὰρ πολυοινότατον τῶν τότε εἶναι), Μυοῦντα δὲ ὄψον. (6) τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Αθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Παυσανίαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν Kad’ ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν. (139) Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης πρεσβείας τοιαῦτα ἐπέταξάν τε καὶ ἀντεκελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν τῆς ἐλάσεως ὕστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρ᾽ Αθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι ἐκέλευον καὶ Αἴγιναν

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Salamis warning Xerxes of the withdrawal and telling him that because of himself the bridges would not be destroyed — for which he falsely claimed the credit); and now when I have the opportunity to do you great good I am here, pursued by the Greeks because of my friendship for you. I wish to hold back for a year and then in person disclose what I have come for.’ (138) The King, it is said, admired his plan and told him to do this. In the time during which he held back he did as much as he could to learn the Persian language and the customs of the land. (2) When he arrived after a year he gained great influence with him, as much

as none of the Greeks

ever before, because

of the reputation he already had, the hope which he held out for Greece, promising to enslave it to him, and particularly the evident intelligence of which he gave him the experience. (3) For Themistocles was a man who disclosed most securely his natural strength, and in that regard was more than others exceptionally worthy of

admiration. For with his in-born intelligence, not buttressing it with anything learned before or after, he was the strongest at understanding the immediate situation with a minimum

of deliberation, and the best at estimating over

the greatest extent what was likely to happen in the future. What he set his hand to he was able to expound, and what he lacked experience of he did not fail to judge sufficiently; he was best at foreseeing the better and the worse in what was still not evident. To sum up, in the power of his nature and the brevity of his practising he was the strongest at improvising what was needed. (4) His life came to an end through illness; but some say that he killed himself voluntarily by poison, thinking he was unable to fulfil what he had promised to the King. (5) There is a memorial of him in Magnesia in Asia, in the agora: for he ruled over this land, as the King gave him Magnesia for his bread (which brought him fifty talents a year), Lampsacus for his wine (this was judged to be the richest place in wine at that time) and Myus for his sauce. (6) His relatives say that his bones were conveyed home on his instructions and, without the Athenians’ knowledge, buried in Attica: for it was not permitted to bury him as he had gone into exile for treason. So ended the affairs of Pausanias the Spartan and Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished of the Greeks of their time. (139) The Spartans on their first embassy made these demands and received these counter-commands about driving out the accursed. In their later frequent visits to the Athenians they commanded them to depart from Potidaea and leave Aegina autonomous; and most of all and most clearly

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αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι, καὶ μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ᾧ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Αθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. (2) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε τάλλα ὑπήκουον οὔτε τὸ ψήφισμα καθήρουν, ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων. (3) τέλος δὲ ἀφικομένων τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, ‘Pauçiov τε καὶ Μελησίππου καὶ

Ἀγησάνδρου, καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὧν πρότερον εἰώθεσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι “Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἴη δ᾽ ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους apeîte”, ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνώμας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς προυτίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἅπαξ περὶ ἁπάντων βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι. (4) καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν

Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου,

ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρήνει τοιάδε.

(140) “τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις, καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰςγνώμας τρεπομένους. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια ξυμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαιῶ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἢν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Sr ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. (2) “Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρότερόν τε δῆλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἡμῖν καὶ

νῦν οὐχ ἥκιστα. εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πω ἤτησαν οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται, βούλονται δὲ πολέμωι μᾶλλον ἢ λόγοις τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτάσσοντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεισιν. (3) Ποτειδαίας τε γὰρ ἀπανίστασθαι κελεύουσι καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι καὶ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθαιρεῖν᾽ οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι οἵδε ἥκοντες καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας προαγορεύουσιν αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι. (4) ὑμῶν δὲ μηδεὶς νομίσῃ περὶ βραχέος ἂν πολεμεῖν, εἰ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα μὴ καθέλοιμεν,

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they demanded of them that there would not be war if they demolished the decree about the Megarians, in which it was stated that they were not to use the harbours in the Athenian empire or the Athenian agora. (2) But the Athenians neither submitted in the other matters nor demolished the decree,

complaining the undefined envoys came said none of

that the Megarians were encroaching to work the sacred land, and receiving their deserting slaves. (3) Finally the from Sparta, Rhamphias, Melesippus and Agesandrus, the things which they had been accustomed to say before

and last and but

specifically this: ‘The Spartans want there to be peace, and there would be if you left the Greeks autonomous.' Then the Athenians held an assembly and called for expressions of opinion among themselves, and they judged that after deliberating they should make a single reply on all the issues. (4) Many others came forward, expressing opinions on both sides, that they should go to war, and that the decree should not be an obstacle to peace but they should demolish it; and Pericles son of Xanthippus, a man who at that time was first

of the Athenians, most capable both of speech and of action, came forward and gave this advice. (140) ‘I always hold to the same opinion, Athenians, that we should not give way to the Peloponnesians, even though | know that men do not show the same anger when being convinced that they should go to war as when in action in the event, but adjust their opinions to the outcomes. And I see that | must now too give the same or a similar recommendation; and | call on those of you who are convinced to come to the defence of what we together judge to be just, if we experience any mishap, or else not to claim the credit for intelligence when we are successful. For the outcome of affairs proceeds

no less perversely than the intentions of man, and for that reason we are accustomed to blame fortune for whatever happens contrary to reason. (2) ‘The Spartans have been clearly plotting against us in the past, and are doing so not least now. For it has been stated that we should offer and accept a just settlement with each other about our disputes, and that each side should possess what we do possess; but they have never asked for a just settlement nor accepted when we have offered, and they want to resolve the complaints by war rather than by discussion, and have come here now with demands and no longer with accusations. (3) They command us to depart from Potidaea, leave Aegina autonomous and demolish the Megarians' decree; and this last deputation has come proclaiming also that we should leave the Greeks autonomous. (4) None of you ought to think that we should be going to war over a trivial matter if we refused to demolish the Megarians' decree, when

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ὅπερ μάλιστα προύχονται, εἰ καθαιρεθείη, μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον, μηδὲ ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ὑπολίπησθε ὡς διὰ μικρὸν ἐπολεμήσατε. (5) τὸ γὰρ βραχύ τι τοῦτο πᾶσαν ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν βεβαίωσιν καὶ πεῖραν τῆς γνώμης. οἷς εἰ ξυγχωρήσετε, καὶ ἄλλο τι μεῖζον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεσθε ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπακούσαντες᾽ ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσαιτε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν μᾶλλον προσφέρεσθαι. (141) αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν πρίν τι βλαβῆναι, ἢ εἰ πολεμήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἔμοιγε ἄμεινον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἐπὶ βραχείᾳ ὁμοίως προφάσει μὴ εἴξοντες μηδὲ ξὺν φόβῳ ἕξοντες ἃ κεκτήμεθα τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν ἥ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἐλαχίστη δικαίωσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸ δίκης τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη.

(2) “τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου

καὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις ὑπαρχόντων

ὡς οὐκ

ἀσθενέστερα ἕξομεν γνῶτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀκούοντες. (3) αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. ἔπειτα χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾿ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. (4) καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε ναῦς πληροῦν οὔτε πεζὰς στρατιὰς πολλάκις ἐκπέμπειν δύνανται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε ἅμα ἀπόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὑτῶν δαπανῶντες καὶ προσέτι καὶ θαλάσσης εἰργόμενοι: (5) αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ βίαιοι ἐσφοραὶ ἀνέχουσιν. σώμασί τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, τὸ μὲν πιστὸν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων κἂν περιγενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ où βέβαιον μὴ οὐ προαναλώσειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν παρὰ δόξαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, ὁ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς μηκύνηται. (6) μάχῃ μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ πρὸς ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντισχεῖν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μήτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἑνὶ χρώμενοι παραχρῆμά τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελῶσι πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ ἐξ ὧν φιλεῖ μηδὲν ἐπιτελὲς γίγνεσθαι. (7) καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς μάλιστα τιμωρήσασθαί τινα βούλονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἥκιστα τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι. χρόνιοί τε ξυνιόντες ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίωι σκοποῦσί τι τῶν κοινῶν, τῷ δὲ πλέονι τὰ οἰκεῖα πράσσουσι, καὶ ἕκαστος οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἴεται βλάψειν, μέλειν δέ τινι καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προϊδεῖν,

140.5. οἷς MSS, Π'": ὥστε Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. VI. 62.1, cf. Gomme. 141.4. πληροῦν Herwerden cf. implere Valla: πληροῦντες MSS.

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they particularly offer the prospect that if it were demolished there would be no war, nor would you leave any ground for accusation among yourselves that you had gone to war over a small matter. (5) For this alleged triviality involves the whole confirmation and testing of your resolution. If you yield to them, you will immediately be subjected to some other, greater demand, on the assumption that through fear you will submit to that also; but if you are firm in your refusal you will make it clear to them that they must deal with you rather on equal terms. (141) You must form the intention now either to submit before suffering any harm or if we do go to war (which I for my part judge to be better) to refuse to give way for great and trivial reasons alike, and not to hold in fear what we have acquired. For the same slavery results from any claim, whether greatest or least, which equals present as a demand to their neighbours rather than seeking a just settlement. (2) *As regards the war and the resources of each side, that we shall not be in the weaker position you must recognise as you hear me point by point.

(3) For the Peloponnesians are men who work their own land, and they do not have money either privately or in public. Next, they lack experience of lengthy and overseas wars because through poverty they wage brief wars against one another. (4) Because they are like this they are not able to man ships or frequently send out land forces, since they would be away from their private property and spending from their own resources, and moreover would be excluded from the sea; (5) and it is surpluses rather than forced payments which sustain wars. Those men who work their own land are more ready to make war with their bodies than with their money, since in their bodies they have something reliable which may survive from their dangers but for their money no certainty that they will not spend it all too soon, especially if as is likely the war is prolonged beyond their expectation. (6) For in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are able to hold out against all the Greeks, but they are unable to make war against an opposing force unlike their own, since they have no single forum for deliberation which would enable them to accomplish decisions promptly; and since they are all equal in voting power and are not of a single stock each of them pursues what concerns himself. As a result of this nothing tends to be accomplished. (7) And some are most desirous of taking retribution from somebody, but others of suffering the least destruction of their own interests. They take a long time to come together, and then in a brief period they consider some of their common business but in a longer period they transact their own business, and each one thinks that no harm will result from neglect on his own part but Ἂς

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ὥστε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἁπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσματι λανθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἁθρό φθειρόμενον. (142) “μέγιστον δέ, τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύσονται, ὅταν σχο αὐτὰ ποριζόμενοι διαμέλλωσιν: τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ OÙ μενετοί. ( καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐπιτείχισις οὐδὲ τὸ ναυτικὸν αὐτῶν ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι. (3) τ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλιν ἀντίπαλον κατασκευάσασθαι, ἦ π δὴ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ἐκείνοις ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων᾽ ( φρούριον δ᾽ εἰ ποιήσονται, τῆς μὲν γῆς βλάπτοιεν ἄν τι μέρος καταδρομί καὶ αὐτομολίαις, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανόν γε ἔσται ἐπιτειχίζειν τε κωλύειν ἡμ

πλεύσαντας ἐς τὴν ἐκείνων καί, ἧπερ ἰσχύομεν, ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀμύνεσθαι: ( πλέον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκεῖνοι

τοῦ kac ἤπειρον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά. (6) τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας yevéot ob ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται. (7) οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὖθ ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐξείργασθέ no: πῶς δὴ ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσι καὶ προσέτι οὐδὲ μελετῆσαι ἐασόμενοι διὰ τὸ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν πολλαῖς ναυσὶν a ἐφορμεῖσθαι, ἄξιον ἄν τι δρῷεν; (8) πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγας ἐφορμούσας x διακινδυνεύσειαν πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, πολλαῖς δὲ εἰργόμεν ἡσυχάσουσι καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται καὶ ÔL αὐτὸ x ὀκνηρότεροι. (9) τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, kal o ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἐκεί" πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι. (143) “εἴτε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισί μείζονι πειρῷντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μ ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων δεινὸν ἂν ἦν" v δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει, καί, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας x τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ ἅπασα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς. (2) k ἐπὶ τῷ κινδύνῳ οὐδεὶς ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν ξένων τήν τε αὑτοῦ φεύγειν καὶ με τῆς ἥσσονος ἅμα ἐλπίδος ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἕνεκα μεγάλου μισθοῦ δόσει ἐκείνοις ξυναγωνίζεσθαι. (3) “καὶ τὰ μὲν Πελοποννησίων ἔμοιγε τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια δον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα τούτων τε ὧνπερ ἐκείνοις ἐμεμψάμην ἀπηλλάχθαι x

142.3. πόλιν: πόλει Rauchenstein, «πρὸς» πόλιν Gomme.

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it is the responsibility of somebody else to take some forethought for him, so that as the same notion is held separately by all it escapes notice that the common interest is being destroyed collectively. (142) ‘The greatest point is that they will be prevented by shortage of money, since they continue delaying and provide it at leisure; and critical moments in war do not wait. (2) And neither their hostile fortification nor their fleet is worth fearing. (3) For the first is difficult even for a comparable city to prepare in peace-time, and far more so in enemy territory when we no less in return have a hostile fortification against them. (4) If they do set up a guard-post, they might harm a part of our land through raids and desertions, but it will not be enough to prevent us from sailing to their land and then building hostile forts and (where our strength lies) defending them with our ships. (5) For we have more experience of land operations from

our fleet than they have of naval operations from their mainland activity. (6) And it will not be easy for them to add expertise at sea. (7) For even you, who have practised this since immediately after the Persian Wars, have not yet exhausted it. How then can men who are farmers and not seafarers, and who in addition will not be allowed to practise because they will be always blockaded by many ships of ours, do anything worthwhile? (8) For even if

they might take a risk against a few ships blockading them, emboldening their ignorance with their numbers, nevertheless, when they are precluded by many they will remain inactive, and through not practising they will become less acute, and for that reason more hesitant. (9) Naval warfare 1s a

matter of skill, like anything else, and it is not feasible to practise it on the side when occasion offers, but rather nothing else should be combined on

the side with that. (143) ‘And if they were to disturb the monies at Olympia or Delphi and try to entice the foreigners among our sailors with higher pay, it would be dreadful if we could not be a match for them when we ourselves and the metics embarked

on the ships; and now

we do have that advantage, and,

what is most important, we have citizens as helmsmen and other officers who are more numerous and better than in all the rest of Greece. (2) And in view of the risk, none of the foreigners would accept exile from his own land to join the contest on their side, with a reduced hope of success, for the payment of a great wage for a few days. (3) “Το my mind at least the circumstances of the Peloponnesians are like that or similar; and our own circumstances are free from those faults which | have found in them and have other major features in which we are not on

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ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μεγάλα ἔχειν. (4) ἤν τε ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν πεζῇ

ἴωσιν, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πλευσούμεθα, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου τε μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν auayei, ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐστὶ γῆ πολλὴ καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ kat’ ἤπειρον᾽ (5) μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε Gé: εἰ γὰρ

ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου διανοηθέντας τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης καὶ πόλεως φυλακὴν ἔχειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι

μὴ διαμάχεσθαι (κρατήσαντές τε γὰρ αὖθις οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι μαχούμεθα καὶ ἢν σφαλῶμεν, τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅθεν ἰσχύομεν, προσαπόλλυται᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάσουσι μὴ ἱκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν), τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται. καὶ εἰ ᾧὥμην πείσειν ὑμᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἂν ἐξελθόντας ἐκέλευον αὐτὰ δῃῶσαι καὶ δεῖξαι Πελοποννησίοις ὅτι τούτων γε ἕνεκα οὐχ ὑπακούσεσθε. (144) “πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι" μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας. (2) ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις δηλωθήσεται: νῦν δὲ τούτοις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν, Μεγαρέας μὲν ὅτι ἐάσομεν ἀγορᾷ καὶ λιμέσι χρῆσθαι, ἢν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ξενηλασίας μὴ ποιῶσι μήτε ἡμῶν μήτε τῶν ἡμετέρων ξυμμάχων (οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς οὔτε τόδε), τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι μὴ σφίσι [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις ὡς βούλονται᾽ δίκας τε ὅτι ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα. ταῦτα γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πρέποντα ἅμα τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἀποκρίνασθαι. (3) εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολεμεῖν, ἢν δὲ ἑκούσιοι μᾶλλον δεχώμεθα, ἧσσον ἐγκεισομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἕξομεν, ἔκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ὅτι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτῃ μέγισται τιμαὶ περιγίγνονται. (4) οἱ γοῦν πατέρες ἡμῶν ὑποστάντες Μήδους καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοσῶνδε ὁρμώμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐκλιπόντες, γνώμῃ τε πλέονι ἢ τύχῃ καὶ τόλμῃ μείζονι ἢ δυνάμει τόν τε βάρβαρον ἀπεώσαντο

καὶ ἐς τάδε προήγαγον αὐτά. ὧν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούς τε ἐχθροὺς

144.2. τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις deleted scholiast, Cobet, defended Maurer, /nterpolation, 76—7.

History 1

177

a level with them. (4) If they come against our territory with infantry, we shall sail against theirs, and it will no longer be comparable for even a part of the Peloponnese to be laid waste and the whole of Attica: for they will not

be able to take other land in return without fighting, but we have abundant land in the islands and on the mainland; (5) for control of the sea is a great advantage. Consider. If we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable?

Now we must form our intentions as near to that as we can, to let go our land and houses but keep guard on the sea and the city. We must not through anger over them fight it out with the Peloponnesians, who are far more numerous: for if we are victorious we shall again have to fight against no smaller numbers, and if we are unsuccessful we shall lose control of our allies, from whom we derive our strength, since they will not remain inactive if we are not sufficient to campaign against them. We should make our laments not for houses and land but for people: for it is not the houses and lands which acquire men but men who acquire them. And if I thought | could persuade you I should have commanded you to go out yourselves and ravage them, and to show the Peloponnesians that at any rate you will not submit on account of these. (144) ‘I have many other grounds for hope that we shall prevail, if you

are willing not to add to the empire while we are engaged in the war, and not to take on in addition risks of your own choosing: for | am afraid more of our own mistakes than of our opponents' intentions. (2) But that will be made clear in another speech when the events are upon us. Now let us send these men away with the reply that we shall allow the Megarians to use our agora and harbours if the Spartans for their part refrain from expulsions of foreigners, both ourselves and our allies (for there is nothing in the treaty to prevent either the one or the other); that we shall leave the cities autonomous

if they were in fact autonomous when we made the treaty, and when the Spartans too give their own cities autonomy not on terms convenient to the Spartans but as each of them wish themselves; and that we are willing to grant a just settlement in accordance with the treaty, and shall not begin a war but shall defend ourselves against those who do. This reply will be just, and proper for our city. (3) But you must know that it is necessary to go to war; yet if we accept it more willingly our opponents will distress us less,

and from the greatest dangers there emerge the greatest honours, both for city and for individual. (4) Our fathers withstood the Persians, not starting

from as great a base as we have but still abandoning what they did have; and by resolution more than fortune and by daring more than strength they drove the barbarians away and advanced our affairs to their present state. We must

178

Thucydides

παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ toic ἐπιγιγνομένοις πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι."

(145) ὁ μὲν Περικλῆς τοιαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες ἄριστα

σφίσι παραινεῖν αὐτὸν ἐψηφίσαντο ἃ ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ᾽ ἕκαστά TE ὡς ἔφρασε καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν,

οὐδὲν κελευόμενοι ποιήσειν, δίκῃ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐπρεσβεύοντο. (146) αἰτίαι δὲ αὗται καὶ διαφοραὶ ἐγένοντο ἀμφοτέροις πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀρξάμεναι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ᾿Επιδάμνῳ καὶ Κερκύρᾳ. ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μέν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ oU 3

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History 1

179

not fall short of them, but defend ourselves against the enemy by all means and try to hand over our affairs in no less a state to those who come after.’ (145) That is what Pericles said. The Athenians thought that he had given them the best advice, voted for what he urged, and replied to the Spartans in

accordance with his proposal, on each point as he had set it out and overall, that they would do nothing at the command of the Spartans but in accordance with the treaty were ready to offer a just resolution of the complaints on equal and comparable terms. They for their part returned home, and no longer went on embassies afterwards. (146) These were the grievances and disputes on each side before the war, beginning immediately with the events in Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless in this period they had contact and visited each other, though not without suspicion: for the events were a breakdown of the treaty and a reason for the war.

COMMENTARY

1—23.3. Introduction

1. Preface: Peloponnesian War greater than any previous war 1.1.

Thucydides the Athenian wrote up the war: Cf. the beginning of Herodotus'

history (Hdt. I. preface): Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις ἥδε, ‘This is the exposition of the enquiry [historia, a word which Thucydides never uses] of Herodotus the Halicarnassian'. In describing himself as Athenian Thucydides is not

only echoing Herodotus but identifying himself to the Greek world as a whole: to Athenians he would be ᾿Αλιμούσιος, ‘the Halimusian [of the deme Halimus]'; in IV. 104.4, when writing of himself as general, as with other characters in the narrative he gives his patronymic. He uses the same verb, literally ‘put together in writing’, in formulae with which he ends a year of the war (e.g. II. 70.4). the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, how they fought against each other: A narrower subject than Herodotus' ‘great and wonderful deeds

performed by the Greeks and by the barbarians ... and in particular the reason for which they went to war against each other', and once he has reached the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides keeps narrowly to it (cf. Introduction, p. 11).

Mention of the Peloponnesians first indicates that Thucydides is not writing from a narrowly Athenian viewpoint, and reference to the Peloponnesians rather than the Spartans reflects the fact that Sparta's alliance was not tightly under Sparta's control as Athens' alliance was under Athens' control. beginning immediately as the war got under way: The history is unfinished, but Thucydides lived beyond the end of the war and sometimes refers to the end of the war. It is uncertain how much was written soon after the events and how much was written or revised later: there are a few passages, but only a few, which must have been written later or which ceased to be true later (cf. Introduction, pp. 16-19). expecting: This is a conspicuous occasion when ἐλπίζειν means *expect' but not *hope'. a great war and more noteworthy than its predecessors: Hdt. VII. 20.2 states that the Persian force which invaded Greece in 480 was ‘by far the greatest which we know of’; and ‘noteworthy’ echoes the ‘great and wonderful deeds’ of Herodotus’

preface. Despite his reputation for sober narrative, Thucydides was in fact very fond of superlatives (cf. already ‘greatest arousal, §2; and see Introduction, p. 3). The literal meaning of the Greek here-is ‘most noteworthy of its predecessors’, an

illogicality often found in Greek. took as an indication: In his history of earlier times Thucydides gives arguments to support his statements as normally he does not in his contemporary history (cf.

Commentary

18]

Introduction, pp. 5—6). ‘Indication’ (tekmerion: here the cognate verb is used) is one key word; others are ‘example’ (paradeigma: 2.6), ‘sign’ (semeion: e.g. 6.2) ‘show’ (deloun: e.g. 5.2) and ‘evidence’ (martyrion: e.g. 8.1): Homblower notes that these words are treated as equivalent, not distinguished as they were by the later rhetoricians (Thucydides, 100—6). Thucydides also uses ‘likely’ (eikos: e.g. 4) and the cognate verb (e.g. 9.4); and here he 15 stressing his credentials as a historian, and programmatically using one of these terms at the very beginning of his introduction (Homblower). For a passage on facts and evidence which supports them by one of his contemporaries see Antiph. VI. Chorus-Member 31. We now should judge that,

even if he did not always arrive at right answers, Thucydides looked for answers in appropriate ways. Here his reasons for expecting a great war are that Athens and

Sparta were both at a peak of preparedness, and that the rest of the Greek world joined one side or the other; and these themes, of power and military preparedness and of increasing common action by large numbers of Greeks, will be traced in the chapters which follow.

1.2.

the greatest arousal: This has regularly been taken to mean 'upheaval',

‘disturbance’; but J. S. Rusten argues that in Thucydides kinein regularly means *mobilise' men or other resources for war (in Kinesis ... D. Lateiner, forthcoming,

cf. JHS 133 [2013], 137). the Greeks ... a part of the barbarians ... most of mankind: Thucydides exaggerates: many even of the peoples known to fifth-century Greeks did not become

involved in the war; but some barbarians did, and in particular Sparta finally won the war with the help of Persia. 1.3. Whathappened before it and what was more ancient still; It is not clear where

Thucydides would draw the line to make this illogically-expressed distinction (for which cf. 15.1): perhaps what happened before the Persian Wars was ‘more ancient’, and that category in particular will have been affected by the ‘distance in time’.

impossible to discover clearly: Thucydides insists, particularly in ch. 20, that discovering the truth about the past is difficult but he has tried harder and

more successfully than others. Although he is more given to linear exposition than Herodotus, and less to ring composition, in which the text is formed from self-contained units in which similar words mark the beginning and the end (cf. Introduction, p. 20), he does sometimes use rings: here he opens a large ring which he closes in ch. 20 with ‘discovered ... antiquity ... indications’, and again in 21. |

with ‘indications ... clearest ... discovered ... antiquity’; and indeed ‘great war ... greatest’ in |. 1--2 is balanced by ‘this war ... greater’ in 21. 2. For this large ring and smaller rings within it see N. G. L. Hammond, CQ" 2 (1952), 127-41; W. R.

Connor, Thucydides, 30—1 n. 29, 251. 2-19. ‘Archaeology’: growth of Greek power, to justify that claim 2.1. what is now called Greece: Now, because as Thucydides will explain (3.2) there was at first no one name for the whole of Greece.

182

Commentary not securely settled in antiquity: Thucydides was not aware of the ‘dark age’

between the collapse of the Minoan and Mycenaean worlds in the twelfth-eleventh centuries and the growth of the archaic (eighth-sixth centuries) and classical (fifth— fourth centuries), and did not as Herodotus did distinguish between a legendary remote past and a more knowable recent past (Hdt. I. 1—5 contr. what follows), but

envisaged a development, fitful but without any major reversal, from the primitive to the advanced. 2.2. Trade... mix fearlessly: One of the themes of Thucydides’ ‘archaeology’ is the growth of wealth, for which trade was necessary: trade became possible when

friendly contact with neighbours was possible (but protection was stil] needed); in 4 and 8. 2 Minos began the suppression of piracy; in 7 there was a growing interest in trade, and to facilitate it settlements were placed on the coast rather than

in inland strongholds; in 8 cities built fortifications because they had possessions worth defending. either by land or by sea: Hornblower notes Athens' claim to control both elements (Archidamus in 81. 2, Pericles in 62.2), and regards this too as programmatic; but apart from suggesting that Corinth at first profited from trade by land along the Isthmus (13.5) Thucydides concentrates on the sea (cf. e.g. 3.4). surplus of wealth: Early Greece did not have coinage, and Thucydides' use of

the word χρήματα need not imply that he thought otherwise. This theme will recur in 7.1, 8.3, 9.2, 13.1. grow plants on the land: Thucydides is probably thinking not of nomads or

hunter-gatherers (Hornblower) but of people who cannot afford the risk of planting trees such as vines and olives, which do not yield until after several years (Gomme).

they had no fortifications: Cf. 5.1, 6.1; and contrast the later development of fortified cities in 7, 8.3. 2.3. whatare now called Thessaly and Boeotia: The name Thessaly, like Hellas (3.2-3), is not found in Homer; for Boeotia see 11.3. 2. 4. because of the quality of the land: Thessaly and Boeotia, and the more westerly parts of the Peloponnese, were indeed among the most fertile areas in Greece, while Arcadia, in the mountainous centre of the Peloponnese, was

notoriously infertile (cf. the oracle ap. Hdt. I. 66.2). Thucydides’ argument is that the best land was most fought over by those already occupying it and most worth invading by those outside it.

2.5. Theland of Attica ... its meagre soil: What Thucydides says about Attica is cited by Strabo 333 / VIII. 1.2. On the land cf. what is said in Pl. Critias 111 B 4-7. Although Attica's land was not the best in Greece, it was better than that in more mountainous regions; but Athens' reliance on imported grain in the classical period would encourage the view that its own land was poor. free from dissension: There were in fact traditions of early internal wars, e.g. that between Erectheus and the Eleusinians under Eumolpus mentoned in Il. 15.1.

always inhabited by the same people: So the classical Athenians liked to

Commentary

183

believe, and it came to be claimed that the Athenians were autochthonous, born from the soil: see especially N. Loraux trans. A. Sheridan, The Invention of Athens, 148-50; V. J. Rosivach, CQ? 37 (1987), 294—306, the latter arguing that these claims

were not made until the fifth century. The Arcadians also were said to be their land's original inhabitants / authochthonous (e.g. Hdt. VIII. 73. 1: cf. Rosivach, 305-6).

Hdt. I. 56-8 represents the Athenians as pre-Greek Pelasgians (cf. 3.2) who became hellenised, and VI. 137 has a story of a community of Pelasgians expelled from

Attica by the Athenians. There is a contrast with the Dorians, and the Spartans in particular, who were considered to have arrived in the Peloponnese comparatively recently. As for the facts, whatever changes in the population of Greece there may have been before the Mycenaean period of the later second millennium, it does seem to be true that Athens itself (but not the rest of Attica) was continuously occupied

from then through the dark age to the archaic period and beyond, and (whatever we are to make of the legends of a ‘Dorian invasion’, for which cf. 12.3) that in the

Peloponnese the speakers of Dorian dialects were comparatively late arrivals and the Arcadians were survivals from the earlier population. 2.6. Not the least example to support my argument that owing to migrations other places did not increase to the same extent is this: The meaning of this passage has been much discussed: see, in addition to Gomme and Homblower,

H. W. Stubbs, CQ? 22 (1972), 74—7; M. H. B. Marshall, CQ? 25 (1975), 26-40. 1 believe that τόδε looks forward to what is said about Athens in the remainder of this section, and Thucydides' point is that Athens was able to increase as other states

were not because it was free from the upheavals to which they were subject and could peaceably absorb refugees from elsewhere. If this is the meaning, éc must be

deleted so that τὰ ἄλλα can be the subject of αὐξηθῆναι (cf. Gomme); μετοικίας can bear the required sense (‘migrations’), so we do not need Ullrich's emendation to

μετοικήσεις (cf. Homblower), but H's variant μετοικεσίας might be right.. the strongest of those driven out by war or dissension came to the Athenians as a secure refuge: Many leading Athenian families claimed to be descended from

such refugees, e.g. that of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Hdt. V. 55, 57-61), the Pisistratids (Hdt. V. 65.3) and the Philaids (Hdt. VI. 35.1). later, when the land of Attica became insufficient, they sent out colonies to Ionia: Just as Attica was not worth fighting for, it was not capable of sustaining its enlarged population, and this is Thucydides' explanation of the lonian migration

to the Aegean and western Asia Minor which seems to have taken place from the tenth century onwards; the belief that Athens was the mother city of the lonians can be traced back to the early sixth century (Solon fr. 4a West ap. Ath. Pol. 5.2), and in the fifth century was important to Athens' image as leader of the Delian League (cf. on 89.2, 95.1). Thucydides does not distinguish as present-day historians do between the ‘migrations’ across the Aegean in the insecurity of the dark age and the

foundation of ‘colonies’ (apoikiai) to facilitate trade and to export people for whom there was not enough food at home from the eighth century onwards.

184

Commentary

3.1. before the Trojan War: Thucydides accepts the legends of the remote past as embodying serious history, though they need to be treated in a rational spirit (on

the Trojan War see 9-11) and with allowance for poets' tendency to exaggerate (10.3, 21.1). His point here is that the Trojan War is the first recorded action of a united Greek force against an external enemy. 3.2. thewhole of Greece did not yet have this name, Hellas: Though Thucydides has immediately above mentioned the lack of common achievements by ‘Hellas’ before the Trojan War. The modern world (outside Greece itself) has preferred

versions of the Latin name, Graecia: in Greece by the fourth century that was believed to be an earlier name of Hellas (Arist. Meteor. 1. 352 À 32—B 3, Marm. Par. FGrH 239 a 6); probably Graikoi was originally the name of a people in north-

western Greece. Hellen son of Deucalion: Deucalion was said to be a son of Prometheus, and

the Greek equivalent of the Jews' Noah, the survivor of a flood which eliminated nearly all of the human race. Hellen was the father of Dorus, Xuthus and Aeolus, the ancestors of the Dorian, Ionian and Aeolian strands of the Greek people (Hes. fr. 9 Merkelbach and West), Ion being in turn a son of Xuthus. Pelasgians: Cf. 2.5: they appear as allies of the Trojans in Hom. 7/ 1I. 840 cf.

XVII. 288, and in the classical period the label was given by the Greeks to various pre-Greek inhabitants of their world. Phthiotis: A region in the south ofThessaly. In the Homeric catalogue of ships Phthia and Hellas, and *Pelasgian' Argos, are included in Achilles’ kingdom (//. II. 681—94). 3.3. Homer gives the best indication of this: The first of several passages in the *archaeology' in which Thucydides cites Homer. The //iad does indeed regularly call the Greeks Danaans, Argives and Achaeans; Hellenes do not appear except

in the passage noted above, but //. II. 530 compares the lesser Ajax with other *Panhellenes and Achaeans'. Barbaroi (a collective term for foreigners, who do not

speak intelligible Greek but whose language sounds like bar-bar) do not appear in Homer, but in //. II. 867 the Trojans’ allies include Carians who are barbarophonoi, ‘barbarian-speaking’, in Od. I. 183 and elsewhere there are references to allothrooi anthropoi, ‘other-speaking men’ — and Strabo 661 / XIV. 2.28 protests that Homer could not have used that expression unless there was already a concept of barbaroi, and that there are references to ‘Hellas and the middle of Argos’ (= northern and southern Greece: e.g. Od. I. 344).

he lived a long time after the Trojan War: The Trojan War was believed to have taken place in the early twelfth century (cf. on 12.3). Hdt. II. 53.2 dated Homer and Hesiod not more than four hundred years before his own time, i.e. in the ninth century; modern opinion dates the writing of the //iad and Odyssey about the second half of the eighth century, and Hesiod in the late eighth or early seventh.

3.4.

after they had come to make more use of the sea: This is one of the main

themes of the ‘archaeology’.

Commentary 4.

185

Minos... acquired a navy: Minos was a legendary ruler of Crete, placed three

generations before the Trojan War; and he appears already as the first ruler of the sea in Hdt. 1. 171.2-3, III. 122.2 (but see next n.). Sir Arthur Evans gave the name Minoan to the (linguistically non-Greek) bronze-age civilisation of Crete, which was the first advanced civilisation inthe Greek world, and had some influence in Greece, the Aegean and western Asia Minor: for an attack on ‘the myth of the Minoan thalassocracy' see C. G. Starr, Historia 3 (1954—5), 282—91 ; for a collection of papers sympathetic to the view that there was a Minoan thalassocracy of some kind see R. Hägg and N. Marinatos (eds), The Minoan Thalassocracy: Myth and Reality. the earliest of those whom we know from oral tradition: Herodotus tends to limit *the first of those whom we know' to the period from about the middle of the

sixth century, within the memory ofthe oldest people whom he will have met (cf. B. Shimron, Eranos 71 [1973], 45-51), and in III. 122.2 he makes Polycrates of Samos (on whom see 13.6) 'the first whom we know' to have planned to rule the sea, apart from Minos and anybody earlier than him. For an exploration of the treatment of

Minos by Herodotus and Thucydides see E. Irwin in R. Osborne (ed.), Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution, 188-223.

the Greek sea ... the Cyclades islands: The Greek sea is the Aegean; the Cyclades are the islands of the southern Aegean which encircle Delos (cf. Strabo 485 / X. 5.1, Plin. H.N. IV. 65). settlement-founder: Oikistes is the word used of the men who presided over the colonial foundations of the eighth century and after, and Minos' activity in the Aegean is assimilated to that pattern. driving out the Carians: The Carians (cf. 8.1) were in the archaic period and

afterwards the inhabitants of the south-western corner of Asia Minor, not Greek but considerably hellenised and in their history associated with the Greeks of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. In Hdt. I. 171.2-5 the Carians lived in the islands and were subject to Minos, and later were driven to the mainland by the Dorians and lonians.

installing his own sons as leaders: Thucydides or his source applies to Minos the practice of the later tyrants (Hornblower). As one wouid reckon likely: That this is the meaning of ὡς εἰκός here and always in Thucydides was argued by H. D. Westlake, Hermes 86 (1958), 447-52 = his Essays, 153—60; and here at any rate that seems right, though Hornblower

prefers ‘probably’. he cleared the sea of piracy ... so that the revenues should come rather to himself: When there are no agreements between communities to guarantee peaceful

intercourse, visits to

a community by outsiders are likely to be for plunder: cf.

Homer, for whom visitors from overseas are asked whether they are pirates (5.2). In Thucydides' scheme, at first the world was unsafe and trade was impossible (2.1), but the removal of pirates (cf. 5.1) allowed the development of trade (7), and

Corinth completed that and became a trading power (13.5).

\

186

Commentary

S.1. by no means the least powerful: Because only a rich and powerful man would be able to acquire a ship and recruit a crew; and this makes the point that piracy was an activity of respectable men (cf. below), not simply of outlaws.

unfortified: Cf. 2.2. settled as collections of villages: In the developmental scheme of Aristotle’s Politics (1. 1252 & 15-31), households coalesced to form villages and villages coalesced to form cities. Synoikismos, the joining of smaller communities to form more substantial ones, sometimes just institutionally and sometimes physically, is

a familiar process throughout Greek history (and sometimes though less often is reversed): in 10.2 Sparta is represented as still not physically unified; in 58.2 we have the physical union of Olynthus and its neighbours to form a greater Olynthus; IT. 15.1—2 attributes to Theseus an institutional but not a physical union of Attica. There was no disgrace ... an element of glory: Thucydides envisages a world lacking the institutions which give an unfavourable aura to piracy and try to prevent

it. 5.2.

This is shown by some of the mainlanders even now: Cf. what is said of

north-western Greece in 83. One of Thucydides’ ways of reconstructing the past is to

argue that what is still done in more primitive places used to be done everywhere. would not reproach them: The Homeric form of enquiry does suggest a reproach: Hom. Od. III. 71—4 = IX. 252-5 = Hymn. Hom. Apollo 432-5.

5. 3. The Ozolian Locrians, the Aetolians and the Acarnanians: Encountered in order from east to west if one proceeds along the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth beyond Phocis and Delphi; the Ozolian Locrians are distinguished from the Opuntian Locrians, on the coast of the Gulf of Euboea east of Thermopylae (cf. 108.3). carrying weapons:

In normal day-to-day life. We may think of the 'frontier

mentality' and the on-going fondness for guns in the USA. 6.1. Their settlements were unprotected: They did not live either in walled cities (cf. above) or in fortified farmhouses. like the barbarians: This would apply to the ‘primitive’ barbarians to the north and west of Greece rather than to the ‘civilised’ barbarians to the south and east, whereas §§5-6 will show ‘civilised’ barbarians retaining a custom which the Greeks have abandoned. The Greeks do sometimes use ‘barbarian’ to mean ‘uncivilised’: 47.3 and II. 68.1 mention ‘barbarians’, in the sense of non-Greeks, in Epirus, north of Acarnania; but in II. 81.3—7 these barbarians are also undisciplined where the Greeks are disciplined.

6.3.

The Athenians were the first: Thucydides uses the fossilised expression ἐν

τοῖς πρῶτοι. We may wonder whether it is true that the Athenians were the first, and (since here he does not tell us) on what basis Thucydides claims to know. Our evidence indicates that, having been one of the more advanced places in the dark

age, Athens fell behind the Peloponnese and western Asia Minor in the eighth and seventh centuries; but in Thucydides' time it was exceptionally advanced and

Commentary prosperous, and he may rival Sparta was by then the delicate fashion standard under-garment,

187

not have realised that it had not been so always, while its self-consciously old-fashioned and austere. of wearing linen tunics: The chiton (‘tunic’) was the and the himation (‘cloak’) the standard over-garment. The

Ionian tunic was made of linen and the Dorian of wool; the lonian was long and elaborate, sometimes with sleeves, and the Dorian was short and simple. Hdt. V.

87.3, in connection with a story about Aegina, claims that at an early date Athenian women had changed from Dorian tunics which were fastened with pins or brooches to Ionian tunics which were not. fastening the hair on their head in a bun with golden grasshoppers inserted: This is referred to as an old men's fashion in Ar. Knights 1331, Clouds 984; in vase paintings it is used for gods and upper-class mortals, but not universally, and

not only for the old or for males. In Thucydides' time long hair was affected by upper-class young Athenians (Ar. Knights 580, Clouds 14, Wasps 1317); and also by the full citizens of Sparta, a practice which Herodotus links with an episode c. 546 (I. 82). Elaborate clothes and long hair are inappropriate for physical hard labour, which thanks to their helots (see on 101.2) the Spartan citizens did not have to engage in, and they may be adopted to flaunt the fact that one does not have

to engage in physical hard labour (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1. 1367 a 30-2), but of course fashion and convenience do not always coincide. among the lonians too, because of their

kinship

with

the Athenians:

Thucydides frequently takes seriously the kinship of those belonging to the same strand of the Greek people, though his history shows that arguments from kinship were frequently overridden by contrary arguments of other kinds (N.B. VII. 57). In fact it is more likely that the elaborate fashions spread from the lonians of Asia Minor to Athens; Hdt. V. 88.1, after the report of an Athenian change mentioned above, claims that the elaborate fashion was originally Carian and passed from

the Carians to the Ionians. This depiction of luxurious Ionians and austere Dorian Spartans fits the stereotypical contrast between Ionians and Dorians (e.g. 124.1). 6.4. TheSpartans were the first ... a style of equality with the many: The ‘Old Oligarch', probably writing in the mid 420s, complained that in Athens the citizens dressed no better than metics and slaves ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.10): we may think of

the progression of jeans from working men's trousers to universal fashion, and more generally of the increasing fondness for ‘dressing down’ in recent decades.

6.5.

They were the first to go naked: Thucydides is still referring to the Spartans.

PI. Resp. V. 452 c 6-Ὁ | has the custom begun in Crete and imported to there (as many Spartan institutions were thought to have been imported e.g. Hdt. I. 65.4); a scholium on this passage claims that the first naked Orsippus of Megara, competing in the fifteenth Olympiad, 720 (/G other attributions can be found. Vase paintings and sculpture show that

Sparta from from Crete: athlete was vii 52), and the practice

was well established in the sixth century, and we may guess that it is not later than the organisation of the major panhellenic festivals in the early sixth century (cf. M.

188

Commentary

McDonnell, JHS 111 [1991], 182-93; S. G. Miller, in Polis and Politics … M. H. Hansen, 277-96; E. David, in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds), Sparta: The Body Politic, 138-40). Thucydides has perhaps been influenced too much by his general view of how Greece developed. among some of the barbarians, particularly those in Asia: For horror at

nudity among the Lydians and other barbarians cf. Hdt. I. 10.3, in the story of Gyges and Candaules' wife; Plato (above) makes the same contrast between Greeks and barbarians. 6. 6. the Greek way of life in antiquity was similar to the barbarian today: As

the more primitive parts of Greece today show what the whole of Greece was like in the past (5.2-3), the barbarians today show what Greece was like in the past.

7. Those of conflating the tenth century right on

the cities which were settled more recently: Thucydides is probably island and Asiatic cities founded in the migrations which began in the and the colonies founded in and after the eighth century. the shore-lines with walls: In comparison with the earlier cities

which were inland (as Thucydides goes on to say) and unfortified (2.2, 5.1, 6.1): on the coasts for the sake of trade (which in Thucydides' developmental scheme was now increasing) and with walls for protection. Hornblower notes that colonies

sometimes began on offshore islands and moved from there to the mainland: e.g. Cyrene (Hdt. IV. 156-8), Pithecusae — Cumae in the Bay of Naples (Livy VIII.

22.6). For the significance of the walls of Athens after the Persian War of 480—479 see 89.3-93.1. cut off isthmuses:

Homblower

notes

that this is true of some

very

early

settlements, such as Lefkandi on Euboea and Miletus. A colonial example is Epidamnus (26.5), whose site became a disadvantage when Corcyra attacked it.

The ancient ones ... were rather founded away from the sea: The cities of Athens (cf. 93.3, 107.1), Megara (cf. 103.4), Corinth and Argos were all a short distance inland, and Sparta was a long way from the sea.

these have remained inland settlements until now: But to gain access to the sea they tended to develop harbour towns on the coast in their territory, and in the

fifth century the fashion began of building long walls to combine the city and the harbour town in a single fortified area. 8.1.

Carians and Phoenicians: On the Carians see 4 and the argument which

follows here. The Phoenicians, apart from the Greeks the other great seafaring people of the Mediterranean in the first millennium, never became established inhabitants of the Aegean, but there is archaeological evidence that they visited it in the dark age and archaic period, and may have founded colonies on a small scale. when Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war: By the removal of remains of the dead (cf. next n.). In 426/5 (III. 104): the vicinity ofthe sanctuary had been purified by Pisistratus in the sixth century, and in 426/5 the whole island was

purified and to prevent pollution in the future a ban was imposed on all births and

Commentary

189

deaths there. Hornblower wonders whether Thucydides was himself involved in this purification. It is not always clear whether Thucydides' references in the earlier books to ‘this war’ were written when he thought the Peloponnesian War had ended

in 421 or after he had come to think of the whole war from 431 to 404 as a single war (cf. Introduction, p. 17): 426/5 15 inside *this war' in either sense. the graves of those who had died on the island were dug up: Homicide was particularly polluting (cf. Adrastus in Hdt. I. 34—45), but all birth and death was

polluting to some extent, and so had to be kept away from sacred places as far as possible: see especially R. C. T. Parker, Miasma, 32-73 ch. ii. In ch. 134 the Spartan regent Pausanias 1s blockaded in a sanctuary, but in order to avoid pollution

is removed from it before he dies. identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them and by the manner in which they still bury their dead: In principlethis isa valid archaeological argument, but it is usually believed that Thucydides arrived at a mistaken conclusion, perhaps by regarding as distinctively Carian practices which the Carians in fact shared with contemporary Greeks. Thucydides was not the first to argue in this way: at the

beginning of the sixth century modes of burial were adduced in the rival claims of Athens and Megara to the island of Salamis (Plut. So/. 10.4—5).

8.2. Minos established a navy ... heexpelled the wrongdoers from the islands when he was settling most of them: This closes a ring, by repeating what was stated in 4 though not in the same words. 8.3. the acquisition of wealth ... circuit walls: On the growth of wealth contrast 2.2 and compare 13.1. As communities had more to defend they took to fortifying their settlements: contrast 2.2, 5.1, 6.1, and compare 7. the weaker accepted enslavement by the stronger: Doulos and its cognates are commonly used of political subjection, whereas andrapodon and its cognates are

limited to literal slavery (cf. 98). It is not clear from the past Thucydides is thinking of, but striking (cf. J. J. Price, Mnemosyne* 50 [1997], age seems to have had a few large kingdoms

what authentic or imagined episodes voluntary acceptance of ‘slavery’ is 667-8). In fact, Greece in the bronze rather than the many small states of

the archaic period and after. In Thucydides' own time Athens' control of the Delian League was the most conspicuous instance of a powerful state's attaching the lesser cities to itself as subjects; but then the lesser cities, far from accepting slavery, were believed by Thucydides, probably with some justification, to have resented it and to have been anxious to retain as much autonomy as they could (cf. on 67.2). 8.4. when later they campaigned against Troy: Which leads to the Trojan War,

to which Thucydides devotes chs 9-11. 9.1. Agamemnon: More than Herodotus (who argued that Helen could not have been in Troy because the Trojans would not have endured a ten-year war to keep her:

I]. 112-20), Thucydides accepts the traditional story, and details in it (particularly in the Homeric catalogue of ships), but proceeds to rationalise it in his own way. It remains uncertain how much truth, if any, lies behind the story of a war of the

190

Commentary

Greeks against Troy (in Asia Minor near the Aegean end of the Hellespont) which the chronographers dated to the early twelfth century (cf. on 12.3); but it is agreed that, even if there was such a war, the history of it cannot be recovered from the stories about it in Greek literature (for a good recent discussion see S. Sherratt,

BICS 53.2 [2010], 1-18). was foremost in power ... not so much because he was leader of the suitors:

Thucydides does not deny the traditional story, but claims (cf. $3) that it was really because of his power that Agamemnon was able to assemble and lead the expedition; similarly in 480the Spartans as the most powerful ofthe Greeks led the Greek resistance to Persia (18.2). The story was that Leda, who bore Helen to Zeus, was married to Tyndareus, and he was worried by the competition among Helen's suitors and so on

the suggestion of Odysseus made them all swear to support the winning suitor (cf. Paus. III. 20.9), which they had to do when Paris abducted Helen to Troy. 9.2. Those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest account: Thus eg. Marchant, Pothou; contrast ‘Those who have received the clearest

account of Peloponnesian affairs’ e.g. Gomme (implied) and Hornblower, and also M. Chambers, in Gestures ... A. L. Boegehold, 188-92, who notes that this was the interpretation of Valla and compares e.g. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. V. 18.1. If the translation preferred here is correct, whoever Thucydides is alluding to as a source it is not Hellanicus of Lesbos, though fragments (FGrH 4 FF 155, 157) indicate that he told the story (supporters of the alternative translation also think the allusion is not necessarily to Hellanicus). Pelops

a Chrysippus Γ Agamemnon

' Atreus Ι

Perseus

— Thyestes | Menelaus

=

Helen

" Nicippe

=

Sthenelus

Eurystheus

The story as accepted by Thucydides was that Pelops son of Tantalus came to Greece from Asia Minor; Eurystheus, son of Sthenelus (son of Perseus, who killed

the gorgon Medusa) and Nicippe (daughter of Pelops), was king of Mycenae, and when he went to fight against Demophon (son of Theseus) of Athens and the

Heraclidae whom Demophon was harbouring he entrusted Mycenae to Nicippe's brother Atreus (who was in exile after killing their half-brother Chrysippus); when he was killed in that war the kingdom was retained by Atreus, and it was inherited from Atreus by Agamemnon.

after whom the land was named: The Peloponnese. cultivated the masses: Thucydides is thinking of how power was obtained by tyrants (cf. 13.1) in more recent times. 9.3. greater naval strength: Sea power being one of Thucydides' main themes (cf. on 3.4).

Commentary

191

not so much through popularity as through fear: Conceptually, though not

verbally, this closes a ring opened in δ]. 9.4. the largest number of ships himself ... ships for the Arcadians: 1n the Homeric catalogue of ships, 100 from Mycenae (//. I1. 569-80) and 60 provided for

the Arcadians (603-14); the next largest contingent is 90 from Pylos (591—602). if he is a sufficient indicator for anybody: Cf. 10. 3; Thucydides may have

been thinking of Herodotus' greater scepticism. the transmission of the sceptre: Hom. //. II. 100—9, quoting 108. The sceptre was made by Hephaestus for Zeus and transmitted through the dynasty of Pelops to Agamemnon. Thucydides is interpreting literally a formulaic phrase used of Agamemnon's rule. reckon ... the likelihood: £ikazein (cf. the noun eikos in ch. 4), arational activity but more speculative than tekmairesthai (from tekmerion), ‘take as an indication’. 10.1.

because Mycenae was small ... of that time ... now: Thucydides' main

point, illustrated from Sparta, is that a physically unimpressive city is not necessarily weak (in Thucydides’ time the ‘cyclopean’ walls of Mycenae will still have been visible, and they were surely impressive if to the mind of a fifth-century Athenian crude, but other signs of Mycenae's power and wealth will not). He may also be thinking of Herodotus’ point (I. 5.4 cf. IX. 27.4) that cities which once were great are not now: Mycenae had been subordinate to Argos in the archaic period, and was destroyed by Argos in the 460s (Diod. Sic. ΧΙ. 65). 10.2. there would be great disbelief ... that its power matched its reputation: Xenophon begins his Spartan Constitution by remarking that it was one of the least

populous of states (cf. on 101.2) but the most powerful and famous in Greece (Xen. Lac. 1.1). two of the five parts of the Peloponnese:

Thus

Hornblower;

'two fifths'

Gomme, but Thucydides is not likely to have thought decimally. The scholiast took this to mean that Sparta occupied Laconia and Messenia but not Arcadia, the Argolid and Elis: Corinth and Sicyon could be subsumed under the Argolid, while Achaea is omitted, but it was separated by high mountains from the rest of the Peloponnese and not much involved with it. That may well be the right explanation, but Homblower suggests as another possibility that the three non-Spartan parts were Arcadia-and-Elis, Achaea and the Argolid. Sparta controlled a much larger area than any other Greek city, c. 2,400 sq. miles/6,200 km’; in mainland Greece Athens came next, with c. 1,000 sq. miles/2,600 km’.

leaders of the whole and of many allies outside: The alliance which scholars call the Peloponnesian League gave Sparta the leadership of most ofthe Peloponnese,

but not Argos or Achaea: for allies outside the Peloponnese in 431 II. 9.2 gives a list. After 404 a still greater claim could be made for Sparta, so Gomme is probably right

to infer that this passage was written earlier. a collection of villages in the ancient Greek manner: For which cf. 5.1. The ‘city’ of Sparta consisted of four immediately ‘adjacent villages, and Amyclae a

192

Commentary

short distance to the south, and the remains from the archaic and classical periods

are indeed meagre. Athens ... the visible appearance of the city: Athens had been exceptionally

active in erecting temples and other public buildings in the third quarter of the fifth century; and in Pericles’ funeral oration of 431/0 we find ‘we are lovers of beauty’ (II. 40.1), *an education to Greece' (41.1), *our power does not lack witnesses, but

we provide great signs of it, to earn the admiration both of our contemporaries and of posterity; we do not need the praise of a Homer' (41.4). But in his last speech Pericles acknowledges the possibility that Athens will not remain a great city for ever (II. 64. iii). 10.3. but fell short of those undertaken now: Cf. Hdt. VII. 20-1 on the extent to which the force with which Xerxes invaded Greece in 480 surpassed previous

forces. if again it is right to have some belief in the poetry of Homer: Cf. 9.4.

he would be likely to adorn and exaggerate: nevertheless willing to argue from his details.

Cf. 21.1. Thucydides

is

10.4. twelve hundred ships ... a hundred and twenty men ... fifty: [n fact Hom. Il. I. 484—760 lists 1,186 ships, so Thucydides himself exaggerates by rounding up. 120 men on the Boeotian ships, 509-10; 50 on Philoctetes' ships, 719—20.

showing, in my judgment, the largest and the smallest: Present-day readers may wonder why numbers are given for those two contingents only, but are not likely to favour Thucydides' answer. fighting men who rowed their own ships: In Thucydides' Athens soldiers and oarsmen were usually distinct, and when soldiers did row their own ships that was remarked on (e.g. III. 18.4).

supernumeraries: Non-oarsmen. Α trireme in Thucydides' time typically carried [70 oarsmen and thirty others, the others comprising ten marines, four archers, ten men for such duties as working the sails and six specialist officers: see Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 107-13.

did not have decks: The triremes known to Thucydides had a deck completely covering the body of the ship in which the oarsmen sat; in 14.3 he remarks that those of the Persian Wars ‘did not yet have decks across the whole ship’; earlier vase paintings show ships with platforms at bow and stern and perhaps a connecting gangway between the two (see Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 158—61). In the course of the archaic period a distinction had developed between ‘long’ warships and ‘round’ merchant ships, the latter with more carrying capacity; we do not know

what kind of ships would have been used in a Trojan war of the twelfth century. 10.5. If then one examines the mean: Thucydides does not give a calculation, but if we make the calculation we find that it does not support the conclusion which he wants to draw. The mean is a crew of 85; 1,200 x 85 = 102,000 (or 1,186 x 85 = 100,810). In Athens’ Sicilian expedition of 415, we cannot be sure of the total

manpower, because 40 of the 100 Athenian triremes (and perhaps some of the allied

Commentary

193

triremes) were troop transports, and we do not know how many non-hoplite oarsmen each of them will have had (VI. 43), but Hornblower reckons that the 40,000 of VII. 75. 5 ‘is roughly the total for the whole expedition, 415—413, combatants as well as non-combatants, and with no subtraction for casualties’ (ii. 1061—6). In the Greek

navy of 480, if we accept Herodotus’ total of 378 ships, 378 x 200 = 75,600 crew (Hdt. VIII. 48, 82.2). 11.1.

shortage of people ... lack of wealth: We cannot begin to estimate figures

for the bronze age; but in Greece generally there was a fall both in population and in the level of prosperity at the beginning of the dark age, and then a rise in population from the later dark age to a peak in the fourth century: see R. Sallares, The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World, 61—3. a smaller army which they expected to be able to live off the local resources: With no means of preserving foodstuffs, it was still normal in Thucydides' time for an army to take provisions for its journey and expect to live off the enemy's land after arrival: it appears from Ar. Ach. 197, Wasps 243, Peace 312, that contemporary

Athenian practice was to take three days’ rations. Cf. W. K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek Military Practices, 1 = G.S. W. 1. 32-4.

after they had arrived and gained the upper hand in battle: The first stage in attacking a city was to win a battle and gain control of the countryside, so that the defenders would retire within their city walls.

build a fortification to protect their camp: As a scholiast remarks, this will be not the wall of Hom. 7/. VII. 336—43, 433-41, built in the tenth year of the war, but

some other wall, presumably mentioned in a now-lost epic. Even after winning the initial battle, the attackers would want to be protected against a possible counterattack. turned to farming in the Chersonese: Presumably mentioned in a now-lost epic. For a historical example see Xen. Hell. Vl. 2.37 (Iphicrates' sailors in Corcyra in 373). and brigandage: E.g. Hom. //. I. 366-7. 11.2. would easily have gained the upper hand in battle and taken Troy ... would have taken it: The sentence is awkward, but not so much so as to require emendation; Thucydides assumes that what the Greeks achieved in ten years by attacking in shifts they would have been able to achieve more quickly and easily if they had all been able to attack together. take up position ... would have taken it by siege: Until! the development of siege machinery (an early stage in which appears in the Spartan siege of Plataea, II. 75-7), a poliorkia was usually a blockade (like that to which the Spartans subjected Plataea after they had failed to take it by force, II. 78), with the attackers trying to isolate the city from the outside world until it succumbed by betrayal or through

starvation. Owing to lack of wealth: Closes a ring opened in $1.

194

Commentary

12.1. even after the Trojan War: Thucydides is unaware of the collapse of the Minoan—Mycenaean world (cf. on 2.1), and continues to make use of the corpus of Greek legend. upheaval and settlement: Thucydides envisages a continuation of the processes

mentioned in ch. 2. 12.2. The return of the Greeks Odysseus' ten years.

from Troy took a long time: Notoriously,

and produced many revolutions: Notoriously, the murder of Agamemnon Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. men

were driven out and founded

by

new cities: Notoriously, the foundation of

Rome by fugitives from Troy (the story was already known to Hellanicus, F 84); a scholium lists other examples.

FGrH 4

12.3. Inthe sixtieth year after the capture of Troy ... and in the eightieth year: Thucydides uses Ilium here but Troy in 8.4 and 11.2. We do not know his date for

the capture of Troy. The date which eventually became canonical was equivalent to 1184 (Apollod. Chron. FGrH 244 F 61), but Homblower suggests that Thucydides had an earlier date; in the fourth century a date of 1335/4 = 1,000 years before Alexander's invasion of Asia was suggested (Duris FGrH 76 F 41 cf. Clitarchus 137 F 7, Timaeus 566 F 126: see D. Asheri, in D. Ambaglio er al., Saggi di letteratura

e storiografia antiche, 53-98, cf. D. C. Feeney, Caesar 5 Calendar, 142-3). Nor do we know how these figures were arrived at. Probably they are based on generations,

for which lengths varying between twenty-five years and forty years were used by different Greeks on different occasions, and these two figures probably result from two different systems of reckoning. The latter is given also by Apollod.

FGrH 244

F 61(a) ap. Diod. Sic. I. 5.1. those who are now Boeotians ... there was an offshoot: This seems to be an

attempt to reconcile the tradition of the Boeotians' migration from Thessaly with their inclusion in the catalogue of ships (Hom. 7/7. Il. 494—510; and Orchomenus

included separately, 511—6). Ephorus had the Boeotians enter Boeotia once, retire to Thessaly when driven out, and later (after the Trojan War) retum (FGrH 70 F 119 ap. Strabo 401 / IX. 2.3, cf. the series of expulsions and returns in Diod. Sic. XIX. 53); Paus. X. 8.4 states that they lived in Thessaly in earlier times, and Hdt. VII.

176.2 states that the Thessalians moved into Thessaly from Thesprotia (Epirus). Arne: Cierium, in south-western Thessaly.

the Dorians, together with the Heraclidae: The so-called Dorian invasion (cf. on 2.5), which was accepted as historical by the classical Greeks. There are

versions of the story in Diod. Sic. IV. 57-8, Apollod. Bibi. II. 8: Eurystheus (cf. 9.2) had enslaved

Heracles and afterwards persecuted his descendants; they after

various oracular consultations conquered the Peloponnese and divided it into three kingdoms based on Argos, Sparta and Messenia. Thucydides has no occasion to

state whether he believed in Heracles as a historical figure. 12.4. sent out colonies: Thucydides conflates what are now distinguished as the

Commentary

195

‘migrations’ of the dark age and the 'colonisations' begun in the eighth century: cf. on 2.6. the Athenians settled the lonians: Cf. 2.6. In fact, from c. 1000 Aeolian Greeks

from Boeotia and Thessaly crossed the northern Aegean to the northern part of

western Asia Minor and lonians crossed the central Aegean to the central part; from c. 900 Dorians crossed the southern Aegean to the southern part (cf. the mention of the three strands in Hdt. I. 6.2). We do not know how large a part Athens actually played in the Ionian migration. and the Peloponnesians most of Italy and Sicily: Thucydides gives an

account of the colonisation of Sicily in VI. 2-5. Many of the western colonies were Corinthian; in southern Italy Taras was Spartan and some others were Achaean; but some others, including the earliest, around the Bay of Naples, Zancle and Rhegium, on either side of the strait between Sicily and mainland Italy, and others in northeastern Sicily, were Euboean (Ionian).

some places in the rest of Greece:

Especially in north-western Greece on

the route to Italy and Sicily, and in the northern Aegean, Hellespont — Propontis — Bosporus and Black Sea.

13.1.

now engaged in the acquisition of wealth more than before: Cf. 8.3, and

contrast the earlier state described in 2.2.

tyrannies were established in the cities: A tyrannos was a usurper (or the descendant of a usurper), often a man on the fringes of the previously-ruling aristocracy, in contrast to the hereditary kings mentioned below: he might rule

harshly or mildly, through political institutions or autocratically; in the constitutional schemes of Plato and Aristotle, and regularly afterwards, a tyrant was a bad ruler,

but for the Athenian Pisistratus as a good tyrant cf. on 20.2. We know of tyrants in many cities in the seventh and sixth centuries, but not in all (for instance, not in Aegina or Thebes); and Sparta was proud of never having had a tyrant (18.1).

as the revenues increased: Gomme

linked this with the mention of naval

activity which follows, but Thucydides does not seem to be attributing that specifically to tyrants. Economic development does seem to have been involved

in the rise of tyrants: tyrants relied on whatever local causes of discontent there might be to gain support, and one was that it was easier in a trading society than in a self-sufficient agricultural society for some men and families to become richer and others to become poorer, and newly rich men who did not belong to the established aristocracy (i.e. the families which had emerged most successful from the dark age) were likely to want a share in the political power wielded by that aristocracy. previously there had been hereditary kingships with specified prerogatives: If there had been hereditary kings (which some have doubted: e.g. R. Drews, Basileus), they were not grand monarchs like the kings of the near east but simply the foremost of the aristocrats in their community, and their prerogatives will not have been ‘stated’ but will have been limited by tacit understanding and political realities; and by the beginning of the archaic period kingship had widely been

196

Commentary

replaced by the collective rule of the aristocrats through regular (usually annual) officials. Greece took to fitting out navies: Thucydides continues one of his main themes. 13.2. It is said: On this expression (/egontai, as here, legetai and other forms) in

Thucydides see H. D. Westlake, Mnemosyne* 30 (1977), 345-62; V. Gray, CQ? 61 (2011), 75-90. With regard to past events Westlake (356-62) suggests that, while to some extent it distances Thucydides from what he is reporting, it tends to imply that

the information came from a source worthy of respect, and that Herodotus' practice was similar. Gray (discussing this passage at 89) remarks that for Thucydides, and also for Herodotus and Xenophon, ‘it is said” tends to be a narrative device used at important points to reinforce the author's own voice with the perspectives of others. |

triremes were built in Corinth first in Greece: The first development in shipbuilding was a distinction between 'round' merchant ships and 'long' warships (cf. on 10.4); early warships might be triaconters, with thirty oars, or penteconters, with fifty; from the eighth century there is evidence for ships with two banks of oarsmen, and later the trireme was introduced, a ship which had three banks of oars and therefore gained additional oar-power without the additional length which would be a structural problem (cf. Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 25-46). It is

debated whether the trireme was invented by the Greeks or the Phoenicians or each independently, and how early; Hdt. II. 159.1 gives triremes to Necho of Egypt (610— 594); the earliest literary reference to a trireme is in Hipponax fr. 28 West (second half of sixth century); if there were some triremes earlier, they seem not to have become the standard Greek warship until the late sixth century (cf. 13.6-14.1). See H. T. Wallinga, Ships and Sea-Power before the Great Persian War; P. Krentz, The Battle of Marathon, 72-3, 204—5. 13.3. Ameinocles ... built four ships for the Samians: A. J. Woodman reminds

me that Ameinocles ('better-fame') is a good name for an inventor. Nothing is known of him; in the context, by ‘ships’ Thucydides presumably means triremes. (R. T. Williams supposed that there were no Greek triremes that early and Thucydides could not have thought otherwise, and suggested that τέσσαρας is a corruption of δικρότους, ships ‘of two levels’; Plin. H.N. VII. 207, trierem Thucydides Aminoclen

Corinthium, shows only that whatever text Pliny had it was not that proposed by Williams; I believe Thucydides could have thought triremes existed early even if in fact they did not.) about three hundred years before the end of this war: Depending on when

this passage was written, the end of 'this' war might be 421 or 404 (cf. Introduction, p. 17). More important than the difference between those two end points, we do not know the basis for Thucydides' three hundred years: it is often thought that, while taken at face value this and the two hundred and sixty years of $4 are implausibly early, if they are based on over-long generations (cf. on 12.3) they may be scaled

Commentary

197

down, to place more credibly the invention of the trireme under Cypselus (tyrant c. 657—627) and the naval battle under his son Periander (c. 627—586): e.g. Morrison,

Coates and Rankov, 36—40. Cf. the suggestion of W. G. Forrest,

CO? 19 (1969), 95-

106, that the Carians in Eusebius' thalassocracy list (cf. on $6) may be a corrpution

of Corinthians. 13.4. fought by the Corinthians against the Corcyraeans: Corcyra was a colony of Corinth, founded c. 733, and friendly with Corinth when they jointly founded Epidamnus, c. 625, but often hostile to Corinth (cf. 24—55, esp. 24. 2). The Bacchiads exiled when Cypselus seized power are said to have gone to Corcyra (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7), and there are stories of a quarrel between Corinth and

Corcyra when the Corcyraeans killed a son of Periander (Hdt. 111. 48-53, Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59). 13.5. by land more than by sea: This fits Thucydides' view that the Greeks used the sea little at first but more later, but it 15 often thought that commercial traffic across the Isthmus between the Saronic Gulf and the Gulf of Corinth was

always more important than traffic along the Isthmus between central Greece and the Peloponnese (e.g. Hornblower). On the dio/kos, the causeway across the Isthmus usually dated to the early sixth century and seen as primarily a means to transport cargoes between the two gulfs, see R. M. Cook, JHS 99 (1979), 152-3, J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, 136-9, B. R. MacDonald, JHS 106 (1986), 190-5; but D. K. Pettegrew, 4J4? 116 (2011), 549—74, argues that it could have been built

later and was primarily for the Corinthians’ own purposes rather than for cargoes travelling long distances.

‘affluent’: Hom. //. 11. 570. the Corinthians ... cleared piracy away: Cf. Minos (4). The end of the sentence shows that the subject has reverted from the Greeks to the Corinthians, but

Thucydides does not indicate the change where it occurs. 13.6. the Ionians ... Polycrates ... The Phocaeans: The Greeks were fond of lists in which A was the best at something for x years, then B for y years and so on; and behind Thucydides' text lies the idea of a succession of thalassocracies, states or peoples which dominated the sea for a time and then gave way to another. Such lists will have been gross simplifications of the truth, but for the period about which there was some genuine historical knowledge there could have been some truth behind them. À version of such a list, running from the Trojan War to the Aeginetans at the beginning of the fifth century, and perhaps based on points at which a thalassocrat's power could be judged to have ended, was preserved by Eusebius, and can be found most easily at Diod. Sic. VII. 11: see the article by Forrest cited on $4 and earlier discussions cited by him. the Ionians ... in the time of Cyrus ... and his son Cambyses: Croesus, the

last Lydian king, had not been able to conquer the islands off the coast of Asia Minor (Hdt. 1. 27); after Cyrus conquered Lydia c. 546 the islands are said to have submitted (Hdt. 1. 169. 2, cf. 160 for Chios; but in 143.1 they had not been afraid), but that

198

Commentary

may have been formal submission without any lasting effect, since Thucydides 15 to state in 16 that it was only Cambyses' successor Darius who conquered the islands.

Cyrus (c. 559—530) was not the first King of the Persians, but was the ruler under whom Persia rose from being a small kingdom east of the Persian Gulf to become the greatest power in the near east; Cambyses (530—522) was his successor. Polycrates ... gained naval power, made other islands subject to himself: Polycrates seems to have been tyrant of Samos c. 532-522, but is credited with various achievements which are hard to place in that decade, and it is possible that earlier Samian achievements have been misattributed to Polycrates (cf. L. Woodbury, Phoenix 39 [1985], 193—220, who cites earlier discussions; M. E. White, JHS 74 [1954], 36—43, suggested that some of the achievements belong to his father; D. G. J. Shipley, 4 History of Samos, 800-188 BC, 74-80, preferred to think that Polycrates was already in power before the Persian conquest). Hdt. III. 122.2 makes

Polycrates of Samos 'the first whom we know' to have planned to rule the sea (thalassokrateein: cf. on ch. 4), hoping to rule lonia and the islands, 125.2 describes him as the greatest of the Greek tyrants apart from those of the early fifth century in

Syracuse, and 39.3—4 credits him with a navy of a hundred penteconters and with the capture of many of the islands and many cities of the mainland; Thucydides states in III. 104.2 that he was strong with a navy for some time, ruled over other

islands and captured Rhenea (cf. below). Whoever was responsible for it, extensive Samian power in the south-eastern Aegean seems more likely before than after the Persian conquest.

captured Rhenea and dedicated it to Delian Apollo: Rhenea was the larger island immediately to the west of Delos: III. 104.2 repeats this, adding that Polycrates dedicated it to Apollo by attaching it to Delos with a chain. H. W. Parke,

CQ 40 (1946), 105-8, dated this late in Polycrates' reign. καὶ τὴν Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε (here and in III. 104.2) is rhythmically the end of a dactylic hexameter, and Hornblower cites the suggestion of F. Sieveking, Klio 42 (1964), 171, that Thucydides' source was a dedicatory epigram. The

Phocaeans

when

settling Massalia

defeated

the Carthaginians

in a

naval battle: The Phocaeans, Aeolians in north-western Asia Minor, are said by Hdt. I. 163.1 to have been the first Greeks to undertake long sea voyages; they founded Massalia (Marseille) c. 600 (Timaeus FGrH 566 F 71), and could well have had to fight against Carthage in order to do so. They did have to fight against the Carthaginians and Etruscans c. 540, when they had fled from their city after the

Persian conquest and had joined their colony of Alalia on Corsica, and with sixty ships they won a technical but costly victory (Hdt. I. 166). 14.1. used few triremes but were still equipped with penteconters and long boats: It is not clear how far we can rely on Herodotus' language. He gives Polycrates 100 penteconters at one stage (III. 39.3), but forty triremes to send to Cambyses in 525 (III. 44.2); ‘ships’ or ‘boats’ are used on both sides in the battle

of Alalia (I. 166); in 500 Naxos has *many long boats' and the Persians assemble

Commentary 200 triremes to battle of Lade, of the lonians' Athenians send

199

attack it (V. 30.4, 32), and the lonians have 353 triremes before the but the Persians have 'ships' and Herodotus subsequently writes ‘ships’ (VI. 8-17); Thasos has ‘long ships’ (VI. 46.2); in 498 the twenty 'ships' to the lonians but the Eretrians send five triremes (V.

97.3, 99.1); for their war against Aegina in the late 490s the Athenians have fifty ‘ships’ and acquire a further twenty ‘ships’ from Corinth (VI. 89: Morrison, Coates

and Rankov, 42 n. 14, call the Corinthian ships triremes, but Krentz, The Battle of Marathon, 73, calls them penteconters), and after Marathon Miltiades attacks Paros with seventy

‘ships’ (VI.

132); in 492 Mardonius has ‘ships’ (VI. 43-4), while in

490 Datis and Artaphernes have 600 triremes (VI. 95.2) but referred to as ‘ships’ (VI. 114—6). At any rate it is not always ‘ships’ are not triremes. 14.2. Shortly before the Persian Wars and the death of 522—486; the Persian Wars against Greece were fought

after Marathon they are true that for Herodotus Darius: Darius reigned in 490 and 480—479.

Thucydides uses 'Persians' sometimes, as in 13.6 and with reference to Cambyses below, but here and commonly, like other Greek writers, he uses ‘Medes’ (defeated and supplanted by the Persians in 550/49) to refer to the Persians: | translate as

‘Persians’ except where a contrast is or may be intended. the tyrants in the region of Sicily and the Corcyraeans: In 481/0 Herodotus credits Gelon of Syracuse with large forces including 200 triremes (VII. 158.4); the Corcyraeans send sixty 'ships' to join in the Greek resistance to Persia, but they do not travel far enough to join in (VII. 168). noteworthy: Cf. 1.1, 17. 14.3. the Aeginetans and Athenians ... mostly penteconters: The intermittent war between Athens and Aegina, between c. 505 and 483/2, is treated in Hdt. V. 79-89, VI. 48-50, 73, 85-93, VII. 144—5. On Athens’ ships cf. on $1. E. Irwin, in D. Fearn (ed.), Aegina: Contexts for Choral Lyric Poetry, 428—9, remarks on

Thucydides' dismissal of Aegina's earlier greatness. Themistocles persuaded the Athenians ... to have the ships built with which they fought the naval battle: Cf. Hdt. VII. 144, Ath. Pol. 22. 7 (the latter giving the date 483/2): Athens' silver mines had done well, and Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to spend the surplus on building ships (as Thasos had done: Hdt. VI.

46.2) rather than to distribute it among the citizens (as Siphnos had done: Hdt. HI. 57.2), as a result of which in 480 they had 200 triremes, twenty manned by Chalcis, while the next-largest contingent was forty from Corinth (Hdt. VIII. 1.1 * 14.1;

‘ships’, but distinguished from penteconters). ‘The naval battle’ was that at Salamis, on which cf. 18.2, 73—4, but it is possible that by then not still usable. The Persian preparations for the invasion of (Hdt. VII. 20.1), and the Greeks could have learned of that Themistocles would have realised already that they and have planned Athens' new navy for that purpose. On

A.PF. 241-20).

all of Athens' ships were 480 had begun by 483/2 them, but it is not clear would need a large navy Themistocles see Davies,

200

Commentary

these did not yet have decks across the whole ship: Cf. 10. 4. Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 159—60, accept this, perhaps too uncritically.

15.1.

particularly those who did not have sufficient land: It is not clear whom

Thucydides has in mind here. 15.2. All the wars which did take place were against those adjacent to each

state: As far as we know, this is generally true of southern Greece (Sparta succeeded in expanding westwards into Messenia in the eighth and seventh centuries, but its attempt to expand northwards into Arcadia in the mid sixth century was halted: Hdt. I. 65-8); and Pheidon of Argos was powerful enough to intervene at Olympia, perhaps in the second quarter of the seventh century (e.g. Hdt. VI. 127.3, Ephorus FGrH 70 F 115 ap. Strabo 358 / VIII. 3.33). Further north, at the beginning of the sixth century the First Sacred War gave control of Delphi to an amphictyony (league of neighbours)

dominated by Thessaly (e.g. Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 107—13: against extremes of scepticism see J. K. Davies in S. Homblower [ed.], Greek Historiography, 193-212), and in the course of the century Thessaly managed to overrun much of central Greece

(e.g. Hdt. VIII. 27-8, Polyb. XVI. 32.1—2, Paus. X. 1). subjects had not been brought together: Sparta subjected the whole of Laconia and Messenia (cf. previous note), but after its setback in Arcadia extended its power through alliances. 15.3. the war fought in antiquity between the Chalcidians and Eretrians: The

so-called Lelantine War, fought for control of the Lelantine plain between the two cities in Euboea, probably in the late eighth century (e.g. Hdt. V. 99.1, Arist. Pol. IV. 1289 p 36—9, Strabo 448 / X. 1.12, Plut. Amat. 760 E-761 8). This will not have been a unified war, but several local conflicts about the same time will have fitted

into a coherent pattern of friendships and enmities. See J. Boardman, in C. A4. H^? in.1. 760—3. 16.1.

When the Ionians were making great progress in their affairs: Cf. 13.6.

Cyrus and the Persian Kingdom ... enslaved the cities on the mainland: Cf. on 13.6. This is the main theme of Hdt. I. 26-176; 169.2 states that Ionia was now enslaved for the second time (having been enslaved for the first time by the

Lydians). all that lies this side of the River Halys to the sea: The Halys, flowing from the Anatolian plateau to the Black Sea, was the eastern frontier of the Lydian kingdom:

Croesus had crossed the Halys to make war on Cyrus (Hdt. I. 75). Darius afterwards with the power of the Phoenicians' navy enslaved the islands also: See on 13.6. The islands in question were those very close to mainland Asia Minor. The Persians acquired Samos early in Darius' reign (Hdt. III. 120-8, 139-49), Lesbos contributed to Darius’ Scythian expedition of c. 514 (Hdt. IV. 97),

and Chios had been acquired in time to take part in the Joman Revolt of the 490s (e.g. Hdt. VI. 2). The Persians relied on the Phoenicians to provide them with a navy

in the Mediterranean.

Commentary

201

17. The tyrants ... nothing noteworthy: For the tyrants cf. 13.1. Even if Thucydides' view of what was noteworthy was limited to warfare and the building-

up of territorial power, he should have allowed Polycrates of Samos (13.6) as an exception.

their persons and the increase of their own households: Under a tyrannical régime there will not always have been a clear distinction between what belonged to the tyrant and what belonged to the state, and hostile commentators could easily allege that the tyrant was interested in enriching and glorifying only himself and his family, whereas defenders could say (as the Athenian Alcibiades, seen by some as a potential tyrant, is represented as saying: VI. 16.1) that in benefiting himself he benefited the state too. the communities surrounding each: Perioikoi: as a technical term, used with reference to Sparta and some other states, this denotes neighbouring communities

which were formally not subjected but free, but were nevertheless subordinate to the principal polis; Sparta's perioikoi had autonomy in the affairs of their own communities, but in external affairs had to fight alongside the Spartans but had no

share in decision-making. in Sicily: Particularly Gelon, in Gela from 491/0 and in Syracuse 485/4—478/7,

and his son Hieron, 477/6—467/6, and Theron, in Acragas c. 489-472. 18.1. After the tyrants ... had been overthrown by the Spartans: Cf. the list, in which some items are more credible than others, in Plut. De Her. Mal. 859 c-». Sparta was involved in the overthrow of the Pisistratid tyranny in Athens (cf. on 20.2) and some others, largely as a concomitant of Sparta's growing in power at

a time when tyrannies were in general running out of steam. Sparta later claimed that it had been opposed in principle to tyranny: probably that was untrue (note that, after overthrowing Hippias in Athens in 511/0, Sparta proposed reinstating him c. 504: Hdt. V. 91-3), but probably Sparta's anti-tyrannical reputation was based particularly on the overthrow of Hippias. In the Peloponnesian War Athens was to

be represented as a tyrant (e.g. l. 122.3), from which Sparta claimed that it would liberate the Greeks (II. 8.4).

with the exception of those in Sicily: Sparta was not involved at all with them, and they continued beyond the Persian Wars. had been overthrown by the Spartans ... (For Sparta: Thucydides breaks off the sentence to embark on a long digression about Sparta, and then resumes it with words recalling its original beginning. after the establishment of the Dorians: Cf. 12.3. endured the longest period of dissension which we know of: Cf. Hdt. |. 65.2 (the Spartans were the most badly governed until they changed to good government). This makes a contrast with what follows, but we have no reason to believe that the

condition of early Sparta was particularly bad. from remote antiquity has had good government: Cf. Hdt. I. 65.2—66. the reforms attributed to Lycurgus: Herodotus usés eunomie in 1. 65.2, and

| on

Eunomia

202

Commentary

seems to have been the title of a poem in which Tyrtaeus celebrated the reform (frs. | 4 West). Not all the institutions of classical Sparta will have been created at the same time (cf. below), but Plut. Lyc. 6 quotes a document known as the great rhetra, embodying a deal between the aristocrats and the ordinary citizens, by which the

citizens were given basic political rights in return for their solidarity against the non-citizen population. See, for instance, W. G. Forrest, 4 History of Sparta, 950— 192 BC, 40—68 (but his nine units within the citizen body called obes, rather than

five corresponding to the five villages, are not generally accepted). from about four hundred years ... to the end of this war: We cannot tell whether Thucydides was reckoning from 421 or 404 (cf. Introduction, p. 17), but

a date in the ninth century is much too early for the kind of reform envisaged; no ancient text puts the reform later than the foundation of the Olympic games in 776, but the likeliest date is early in the seventh century, after Sparta's conquests in the First Messenian War towards the end of the eighth century. have always had the same form of government: So the Spartans of the classical period liked to maintain. There had not been any abrupt and major change since the reform attributed to Lycurgus, but almost certainly there had been smallerscale developments and modifications: for instance, the ephors (cf. on 85.2) were not instituted or at any rate did not become important until some time later than the

great rhetra (the first reliably attested ephor is Chilon, in 555/4: Diog. Laert. 1I. 68, cf. P. Ryl. 18.ii. 5-13). they have become powerful: This was due largely to the fact that the possession of land and of helots to farm it made it both possible and necessary for the Spartans

to devote themselves to full-time military life as the citizens of other states did not. and have ordered things in the other cities: Cf. 19; until after the Peloponnesian

War, the Spartans were usually content to encourage but not require congenial régimes among their allies. Not many years ... the battle of Marathon: The expulsion of Hippias from Athens, the last instance known to us in mainland Greece, was in 511/0; the battle of Marathon was fought in 490/89, when the Persians invaded Greece with the particular aim of punishing Athens and Eretria for their support of the Ionian Revolt in the 490s. 18.2. In the tenth year: 481/0, continuing to 479/8. the great armada: According to Herodotus, 1,207 ships, 2,641,610 soldiers and sailors and an equal number of camp-followers (VII. 184—6). the Spartans became the leaders of the Greeks who joined in the war: By

general consent; not all of the Greeks did join in the war. the Athenians ... decided to abandon their city: In 480, after the failure to halt

the Persian advance at Thermopylae and Artemisium, Athens could not be saved, and Themistocles was credited with securing the evacuation of Athens and with keeping the Athenian and the rest of the Greek fleet at Salamis to confront the

Persian fleet there (cf. 14.3).

Commentary

203

and became a naval people: Cf. Hdt. VII. 142.2: the war against Aegina which prompted Themistocles' shipbuilding programme ‘saved Greece by compelling the Athenians to become seafarers’. The new navy of 200 triremes, and the success of

that navy in the battle of Salamis, made Athens the leading naval power in Greece: those who defected from the King: The Greeks of Asia Minor. divided between the Athenians and Spartans: Sparta already had a large body of allies in the Peloponnesian League (cf. on 10.2), and from 478/7 Athens built up a body of allies in the Delian League (89-117); the Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5

(115.1) effectively recognised the division of the Greek world into the two power blocs (cf. on 35.2). It was they who had become conspicuous in power: Hornblower notes that,

whereas in 23.6 Sparta is afraid of Athenian power, here both are powerful. the Spartans being strong on land and the Athenians with their ships: This was to be crucial for the strategies adopted in the Peloponnesian War. 18.3. For a short time their partnership persisted: Although they went their separate ways after 478, Athens did not formally renounce the alliance of 481/0 unti! 462/1 (101.4). Thucydides uses homaichm- again only in III. 58.4, when the Plataeans use it in referring to the Greeks' partnership against the Persians (cf. Hdt.

VII. 145.2, VIII. 140.a. 4). sometimes in a state of truce, and sometimes making war: Cf. 89-117; and for war between Sparta and other Peloponnesian states Hdt. VI. 83, IX. 35.2, Diod. Sic. XI. 65. Before the Thirty Years' Peace (cf. on $2) there was a five-year

truce made in 45] (112. 1). J. J. Price, Mnemosyne* 50 (1997), 665-76, remarks that hitherto Thucydides saw the Greeks as strong when united behind a strong power, but now a further increase in strength resulted from a division between two strong powers, which ‘destroyed precisely what had made all previous “noteworthy accomplishments" possible”. 19. were assiduous in ensuring that the cities were governed on an oligarchic basis: Cf. 76.1. Thucydides could have added that the Athenians likewise encouraged democracy among their allies (but imposed democracy only in a few cases where provocation and opportunity offered: see R. Brock in J. Ma et al. [eds], Interpreting the Athenian Empire, 149-66). S. Bolmarcich, GRBS 45 (2005), 5-34, suggests that Sparta distinguished between independent allies and subject allies, and interfered in the internal affairs of the latter; but that distinction is insecure. took away the cities’ ships ... assessed them all to pay money: Cf. 96, 99: after the war with Samos in 440—439 (115.2-117) only Chios and the cities of Lesbos still

contributed ships and not money to the Delian League. greater than when they had been flourishing most: Thucydides means greater than their strength (perhaps even their combined strength: Croiset) at the time of the Persian Wars. He is probably referring to each side, as in my translation here and in 1.1 (Gomme, Pothou; contr. Hornblower); but, whereas after the Persian Wars Athens increased in citizen numbers, wealth and power, in Sparta the great

204

Commentary

earthquake of c. 465/4 (101—3) began a decline in citizen numbers which was never to be reversed. 20. Difficulty of getting history right 20.1.

Thatis what I have discovered ... indications: Here Thucydides closes for

the first time the large ring opened in 1.3; after digressing to insist that he has taken the trouble to get the facts right as others have not, he will close it again in 21.1. people tend to accept hearsay ... indiscriminately without verifying them: For most of early history oral tradition was all that was available, but Thucydides

emphasises that it should not be accepted uncritically: in a small (conceptual but not verbal) ring ‘without verification’ here is answered by ‘unexamined’ in 21.1, and in 22.2 he claims to have engaged in 'the most precise investigation possible of what [he] could learn from others’. Cf. the remark of Hdt. II. 45.1 that the Greeks say many things ἀνεπισκέπτως, ‘without enquiry’. 20.2. The majority of the Athenians, for example, believe: The view which Thucydides attacks was not held by Herodotus (V. 55, VI. 123); it is often and perhaps correctly thought that it was held by Hellanicus of Lesbos, mentioned in

97.2 (e.g. Hornblower); it was expressed later by [PI.] Hipparch. 228 8 4-229 p 7, cf. Pl. Symp. 182 c 5-7. What Thucydides says he is attacking is the view of the majority of the Athenians; and in his own time there will have been many Athenians who did not want to be grateful to the Alcmaeonid family and to Sparta for the expulsion of Hippias and who would therefore prefer to emphasise the killing of Hipparchus. Thucydides will give a more detailed account in VI. 54-9, with arguments to support his controversial views.

Hippias was the ruler, as the eldest of Pisistratus' sons: It is generally accepted that Hippias was the eldest son (e.g. Davies, 4.PF 446-8); but tyranny was not a formal office, and it is perhaps better to think of joint rule than of Hippias as ‘the’ ruler.

Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers: Pisistratus had three sons, Hippias, Hipparchus and Thessalus, by his first, Athenian, wife, and two others by an Argive wife: Davies, A.P. F., 445—50. Harmodius and Aristogeiton had a sudden suspicion on the day in question:

Thucydides here gives a condensed account, which does not fully make sense without some of the further details given in VI (which suggests that the account in VI was written at the same time or earlier, but does not conclusively prove that: Thucydides might simply not have realised that this account did not say enough).

Aristogeiton and Hipparchus both loved Harmodius, but Harmodius preferred Aristogeiton; Hippias and Hipparchus retaliated by insulting Aristogeiton's sister;

Aristogeiton and Harmodius therefore planned to kill perhaps Hippias, perhaps both, at the Great Panathenaea of 514; on seeing one of their collaborators talking to Hippias they thought he was betraying them, and immediately killed Hipparchus;

Hippias remained in power and ruled more harshly until he was expelled in 511/0.

Commentary

205

In his longer version Thucydides wants to maintain that the tyranny was benign and the motive of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was purely personal, but not all of his

details support that: for instance, in both versions he gives them collaborators who would not share their personal motive. The personal motive may be accepted, but that need not exclude a political motive. organising the Panathenaic procession by what is called the Leocoreum: The Panathenaic procession went from the Ceramicus through the agora to the acropolis. An enclosure east of the Stoa of the Basileus, in the north-west corner

of the agora, used to be identified as the Leocoreum, but there is no sign of cult activity there before the second half of the fifth century, and the identification has been abandoned (see J. M. Camp,

II, The Athenian Agora, 47-8, 78—9; no. 27,

‘crossroads enclosure’, in Camp, The Athenian Agora: Site Guide, 84—6). 20.3.

many

other things:

On

these two points Thucydides

does seem

to be

criticising Herodotus, though he does not name him either here or elsewhere. that the Spartan kings do not cast one vote each but two: Hdt. VI. 57.5 says that if the kings are absent from the gerousia (the council comprising the two kings

and twenty-eight men aged over sixty) those most closely related to them ‘have the kings' prerogatives, casting two votes and their own as a third', which despite Hornblower should mean what Thucydides takes it to mean. and that Sparta has a /ochos of Pitana, which has never existed at ail: A

lochos was a division in the Spartan army; Pitana was one of the villages of Sparta (corresponding to obes: cf. on 18.1); and the /ochos of Pitana plays a significant part in the events leading to the battle of Plataea in Hdt. IX. 53.2. Thuc. V. 68.3 describes an army with seven Jochoi; it is usually thought either that he was unaware of a

change in organisation between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War or that ‘lochos of Pitana’ was not the formal title of the /ochos mentioned by Herodotus. The Roman emperor Caracalla, in an archaising spirit, created a ‘/ochos of Pitana’ in his army (Hdn. ΙΝ. 8.3).

So lacking are most people in effort: Contrast 22.3: for Thucydides ‘the task proved burdensome'. 21. Previous wars not as great as Peloponnesian War 21.1. the poets ... adorning and exaggerating: Cf. 10.3. prose-writers: Logographoi are prose-writers in general,

and historians

in

particular. Thucydides no doubt has Homer and Herodotus especially in mind: cf. M. Wecowski in J. Pigon (ed.), The Children of Herodotus: Greek and Roman Historiography and Related Genres, 47-9.

enticing listening: Contrast 22.4: Thucydides’ history will seem ‘less attractive to listen to’. Although written texts did circulate, books were ‘published’ primarily

by being read to an audience: for Herodotus’ recitations in Athens cf. Diyllus 73 F 3 ap. Plut. De. Her Mal. version) / 445/4 (Jerome).

862 4-8; Euseb. Chron.

FGrH

under 446/5 (Armenian

206

Commentary the realm of the fabulous: Contrast Thucydides' renunciation of the fabulous,

22.4. 21.2. thiswar... has been greater than the others: As Thucydides had proclaimed in 1.1. He will proceed in 23.1—3 to demonstrate how great the Peloponnesian War

was, but before that 22 contains a digression prompted by what was said in 20 about the difficulty of discovering the truth. 22. How Thucydides has written his history

22.1. The words uttered: This chapter, fundamentally important and much debated, sets out the principles on which Thucydides has written his history; and, surprisingly to modern readers, it begins with speeches. Under the influence of the

sophists he was fond of such contrasts as that between /ogos, *word' or surface appearance, and ergon, *deed' or underlying reality (cf. Introduction, p. 7), and his treatment of /ogoi in $1 and erga in $2 is a particular application of that. For a general

discussion of Thucydides' claim and the balance in his practice between reporting what was said and supplying what ought to have been said see Introduction, pp. 79; and for a punctilious explication of the Greek of this section see E. Schutrumpf,

Philologus 155 (2011), 229—56. The notes which follow supplement the Introduction with comments on particular passages. I heard the speech myself ... those making reports to me: For speeches in Athens Thucydides is likely to have heard the originals before his exile in 424/3 and

cannot have heard the originals after; for speeches outside Athens it 1s possible that he heard the originals in some cases after his exile but there is no case in which it is likely. most important for the individual speakers to say: Thucydides allows

speakers to contradict one another on matters of fact and opinion: we can therefore never assume without further reason that he endorses the correctness of the facts or agrees with the opinions. with regard to the current circumstances: This translation follows the general

view that αἰεὶ here is to be interpreted as e.g. in τίνων αἰεὶ πλειόνων in 2.1; but J. L. Moles has argued for ‘the always present things’, i.e. the permanent great issues (in C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman [eds], Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World, 104—5 with n. 19). the general sense of what was actually said: De Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 7-11, took

ξυμπάσης γνώμης to mean only the main point, e.g. that Archidamus (80—5) did not want to go to war immediately but Sthenelaïdas (86) did; but so small ἃ claim seems hardly worth making, and I see Thucydides as claiming that, where he knows, he

has represented the general line of argument actually used. Cf. the speech by the Roman emperor Claudius on the admission of Gauls to the senate: we have the text which he himself had published (Smallwood, Docs... Gaius, 369, trans. Sherk, Hadrian, 55) and Tacitus’ version of the speech (Ann. XI. 24), and can see that Tacitus has thoroughly rewritten the original but has not replaced it with a totally

different speech.

Commentary

207

22.2. chance informants: On disagreements even between eye-witnesses see $3. my own judgment: Contrast the use of his own judgment as to what it was

appropriate for speakers to say, 81. on the basis of my own presence ... the most precise investigation possible:

Except in the *archaeology' Thucydides almost always does not reveal his sources, give alternative versions or express uncertainty, but expects readers to accept his findings as authoritative. On that practice, and on the reliability of his findings, see Introduction, pp. 4-7. 22.3. those who were present ... did not give the same reports: Whether or not Thucydides has always succeeded in establishing the truth, he is at any rate aware of the difficulty of obtaining the truth even from eye-witnesses. Cf. VII. 44.1 on the night battle, and 71.2—5 on the last naval battle, at Syracuse in 413. 22.4. ifitis judged useful: Cf. 11. 48.3, on the purpose of Thucydides' account of the plague at Athens. the clear truth: On the significance of to saphes see T. F. Scanlon, Historia 51

(2002), 131-48. the like of which in accordance with the human condition will at some time

happen again: Cf. Ill. 82.2 on the consistency of human nature. Thucydides is not suggesting that history repeats itself in any rigid sense; but, as long as human nature and human societies remain the same, the same kinds of things will happen

and the same kinds of issues will need to be confronted, and therefore a reliable and intelligent history of the past should help towards understanding and decision-

making in the present. 23. 1—3. Greatness of Peloponnesian War 23.1. The greatest of the previous actions was the Persian War: Thucydides returns to the main theme of the ‘archaeology’, that the Peloponnesian War was

greater than any previous war, and on the Persian Wars he adds to what he has said in 18.1-2. Hdt. VII. 20.2 describes the Persian force of 480 as ‘much the greatest of

those which we know’, and greater than those of the legendary period including the Greek expedition to Troy. two naval battles and two land battles: Thucydides is thinking of 480—470,

and of the battles fought in Greece (ie. not Mycale: cf. 89.2): Artemisium and Salamis at sea, and Thermopylae and Plataea on land (thus a scholium, Gomme).

the length of this war: This was probably written late and refers to 431—404 (thrice nine years, V. 26.1—4); cf. Introduction, p. 17.

disasters for Greece such as had not happened in a comparable stretch of time: By the end of his catalogue Thucydides has departed from the rationalism which we tend to associate with him (cf. Introduction, pp. 13-15): depopulations of cities, and exiles and slaughter ($2), were connected directly or indirectly with

the war; but, if natural phenomena such as earthquakes and eclipses (83) were unusually frequent, unless they are to be interpreted as divine portents that was

208

Commentary

purely coincidental. Darius, Xerxes and generations before contention between

This looks like an attempt to outdo Hdt. VI. 98.2: in the time of Artaxerxes there were more evils for Greece than in the twenty Darius, some at the hands of the Persians and some from the the Greek leaders. Cf. Tac. Hist. 1. 3, on Rome's year of the

Four Emperors and Flavian era, probably a deliberate echoing of Thucydides. 23.2. cities captured and depopulated: E.g. Colophon by the barbarians (III. 34.1), Plataea (III. 68) and Thyrea (IV. 57.3) by the Greeks on the two sides. a change of inhabitants: E.g. Aegina (II. 27.1), Potidaea (II. 70).

people exiled and slaughtered: E.g. the Plataeans in the course of the war (II. 6.4, III. 68.1—2), Megarians as a result of dissension (IV. 66.1). 23.3. previously reported by hearsay but more rarely confirmed in fact: Reported in oral tradition but not attested by witnesses. This is a variant on the contrast (cf. on 22.1) between /ogos and ergon. became not unbelievable: Champions of Thucydides' rationalism would say that he does not commit himself to the truth of these (Gomme comes close to this

position), but we might think that a strictly rational historian would not have mentioned these phenomena in this way at all, even to report that they became more credible. In Britain at the end of the First World War, ‘for proof of the Second Coming [of Christ]

Adventists pointed to natural phenomena, including the increase in storms, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions’ (M. Pugh, ‘We Danced All Night’, 9). earthquakes: £.¢., it is alleged, on Delos (1I. 8.3, reported with the note that

it was unqiue and was seen as ominous; Hdt. VI. 98.1 reports an earlier unique earthquake on Delos as ominous), widespread (III. 87.4), earthquakes and a tidal wave (III. 89, treated very rationally), in Athens with political consequences (V. 45.4). However, J. S. Rusten argues that Delos never suffered an earthquake, but that Herodotus and Thucydides both accepted a misinterpretation of an oracle based on Pindar's reference to Delos as having originally been a floating island but subsequently become unmoved (akinetos) (fr. 33. c-d Snell & Maehler): JHS 133 (2013), 135-45. eclipses of the sun: II. 28, IV. 52.1, noting that it happens at the new moon. Thucydides does not here mention eclipses ofthe moon: there is a notorious instance

at VII. 50.4, at the full moon, after which Nicias, ‘too much inclined to divination’, listens to the seers and refuses to withdraw from Syracuse for a month. great droughts and famines: Thucydides does not mention any instances.

the disease of the plague: Which afflicted Athens between 430 and 426 (II. 47.3—54, III. 87.1—3).

Commentary

209

23.4—146. Causes of the Peloponnesian War 23.4—6. Grievances and disputes, truest reason 23.4. The Athenians and Peloponnesians began the war: In |. | itis ‘the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians’. the thirty-year treaty which they had made after the capture of Euboea: Cf.

114. 1-115.1. 23.5. As to why they broke it: This has been endlessly discussed, and a large book has been devoted to it (and to much more besides): de Ste. Croix, O.PW D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the first of a series of four books on the war, covers the history of 478—432 with a review of previous scholarship. For a

more detailed exposition of my views see Hermes 115 (1987), 154—65. ‘They’, who broke the treaty, are both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, and the grievances were ‘on each side’ ($6). However, in contrast to that apparent even-handedness,

Thucydides' truest reason is that Athenian power forced the Spartans to go to war, technically it was the Peloponnesians who began the war against Athens (88, 125, II. 10—12), and it suits Thucydides the Athenian to make his account one of why the Peloponnesians made war on the Athenians. I have first set out the grievances and disputes: He does this in 24-88, 118.3—end.

In general aitia (‘grievance’) denotes ‘cause’ in the sense of accusation or blame, diaphora denotes ‘difference’ or dispute, prophasis (*reason': 86) denotes a motive

or pretext for action (Hdt. I. 29.1 uses it of a false pretext as opposed to a true motive, but it is not always used in that way) — and aition ('cause' in a more objective sense) is not used in this connection but is used e.g. at 11.1. See particularly L. Pearson, TAPA

83 (1952), 205-23, 103 (1972), 381—94 = his Selected Papers, 91-109, 120-33. The overlap in meaning between the two words is such that in 118.1 and 146 the aitiai and

diaphorai are described as the prophasis for the war; and the distinction between the two explanations lies less in the particular meanings of those words than in the two

claims which I stress in the first note on 23.6. so that no one should ever need to ask: The confident Thucydides expects his account to be accepted as definitive, but the question has continued to be asked.

23.6.

The truest reason, but most concealed in discussion: This is in fact an

underlying explanation in contrast to the grievances and disputes which directly led to the war, but what matters to Thucydides is that it is ‘truest’, is a better explanation than one based on those grievances, and that it was ‘most concealed in discussion’ whereas the grievances and disputes were ‘publicly mentioned’. But by whom and in

what contexts? I should say, in general by people other than Thucydides: Athenians tended to blame the war on Pericles' intransigence over Megara (cf. below and

on 67.4), and Corinthians perhaps blamed it on Aristeus' enthusiastic support for Potidaea (cf. 60), but here as in other matters Thucydides claims to know better than others. This reason is pervasive in book I (e.g. 33.3, cf. 42.2, 44.2), and it is hard to follow A. Andrewes, CQ" 9 (1959), 223-39, in distinguishing an earlier version of

book I which lacked it from a later which included it.

210

Commentary Thucydides has a ‘truest reason’ again in VI. 6.1, for Athens’ Sicilian expedition

of 415, where it is contrasted with what *for a good appearance' the Athenians wanted. the Athenians by becoming great and inspiring fear in the Spartans forced them to go to war: This explanation 15 justified by the account of the growth of

Athenian power in 89-117, and the view that this was Sparta's real reason for going to war is repeated in 88, 118.2. R. Sealey, CQ? 7 (1957), 9-10, CP 70 (1975), 90-3, has argued that what Thucydides means is that the Athenians deliberately drove the Spartans to war; but while that may in fact be true (cf. Introduction, pp. 27-8; see

also p. 225, and the stress on Pericles' refusal to give way to the Spartans in 127.3, 140.1, 144.3) I do not think it is what Thucydides means here.

the following were the publicly mentioned grievances: Although he believes his *reason' to be a better explanation, Thucydides still gives what he intends to be a definitive statement of these: detailed accounts of two, concerning Corcyra (24—55) and Potidaea (56—66), and much briefer references to two others, concerning Aegina (first 67.2) and Megara (first 67.4). But Aristophanes (Ar. Ach. 515—39, parodying the

beginning of Herodotus on woman-snatching; Peace 500—2, 603—18) and other writers emphasise Megara, and when in 431

the Athenians expelled the inhabitants of Aegina

they claimed that these ‘were particularly responsible for bringing the war on them’ (II. 27.1). The contrast between the detailed discussion of two and passing references to the other two calls for explanation. On Megara it may suit Thucydides the admirer of

Pericles to play down allegations that Pericles had disreputable personal motives; and over Corcyra and Potidaea Athens could claim to be in the right whereas over Aegina and Megara that may have been more difficult. Thucydides is polemical in preferring his truest reason to the grievances and disputes, and he may also be polemical in his

treatment of the grievances and disputes. 24—55. Corcyra 24.1. Epidamnus is a city: This statement, without a connecting particle, has been compared with ‘Ephyre is a city’ (ἔστι πόλις Ἐφύρη) in Hom. //. VI. 152 (e.g. Homblower, Thucydides, 116); but it is an unremarkable way to begin a new section, and while it might be a (conscious or unconscious) echo of Homer it need not be so: see Rhodes, istos 2 (1998), 64 (http://research.ncl.ac.uk/histos/documents/

1998.03RhodesEpidamnusisaCity6471.pdf). Thucydides is not consistent, but tends to give geographical information for places at the edge of the Greek world more often than for places at the heart of the Greek world (and in these notes I give

references to Inventory, by polis number except where otherwise stated, for places other than the best-known). Corcyra (Corfu) is an island off the coast of northwestern mainland Greece (/nventory 123), and Epidamnus (Dyrrachium; Durrés in

present-day Albania: Inventory 79) is about 125 miles/200 km north of that. There is a general treatment of this episode by J. Wilson, Athens and Corcyra, 25—64; J. V. Morrison, CA 18 (1999), 94—131, studies it as a section in which

Commentary

211

Thucydides' multiple perspectives and authorial reticence force readers to do what he himself has done and 'reckon likelihoods', thus training them to read the work as a whole. the Ionic Gulf: An alternative name for the Adriatic: it was thought by the

Greeks to be derived from the wanderings of the legendary Io (Aesch. P. V. 840-1) or an Illyrian called lonius (Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 128), but may in fact have been

derived from the early voyages of the lonians, themselves spelled not with omicron but with omega (W. M. Murray, O.C.D.* 742).

Taulantians: Cf. [Scylax] 26, Strabo 326 / VII. 7.8. 24.2. colonised by the Corcyraeans ... a Corinthian ... from Corinth's mother city: Corcyra was founded from Corinth, c. 733 at the same time as Syracuse in Sicily (Strabo 269 / VI. 2.4) or c. 706 (Jer. Chron. 91b Helm), Epidamnus from Corcyra with Corinthian support c. 627 (Jer. Chron. 97b Helm) - so Corinth and Corcyra were not at enmity then (but see 13.4 and 25.3). Phalius son of Eratoclides ... of thedescendants of Heracles: The involvement

of Corinth is relevant to Thucydides' account, but this detail 15 not: Thucydides reports several minor there when exiled (R. of Heracles' will be a prove that Thucydides 24.5. The common

details from Corinth, and it has been suggested that he lived S. Stroud, Chiron 24 [1994], 267—304). ‘Of the descendants conventional claim used by the family; its use here does not actively believed it (cf. ‘the God’ in 25.1). people there drove out the powerful men: Demos can

be used to refer either to a whole citizen body or, as here, to the lower-class or democratic element within it; dynatoi 1s one of a number of terms used to refer to

the upper-class or politically dominant element. The Corcyraeans' rejection of the appeal suggests that the ‘powerful men’ had stronger links with Corcyra, or links with more influential Corcyraeans, than the common people (cf. 26.3). The first date which we have is 435 for the campaign of 29-30: how much earlier this occurred we do not know.

24.6—7.

envoys ... suppliants: Presbeis are men sent on diplomatic missions,

hiketai are people who, often as here in a sanctuary to invoke divine protection,

throw themselves on the mercy of those whom they supplicate: on supplication see especially J. P. Gould, JHS 93 (1973), 74-103; F. S. Naiden, Ancient Supplication. In this case the Epidamnians presumably tried diplomacy first and turned to supplication when that failed.

25.1.

they sent to Delphi and enquired of the God ... he responded: There was

a nearer oracle at Dodona, inland from the coast facing Corcyra, but Delphi was particularly associated with colonisation (cf. R. C. T. Parker, in Crux ... G. E. M.

de Ste. Croix, 306, 310). ‘Enquired of the God ... he replied’ is again conventional language, used again in 118.3, and is not proof that Thucydides was a believer (cf. on 24.2, and Introduction, p. 13). hand over the city to the Corinthians as their founders: /.e. regard Corinth

rather than Corcyra as their mother city.

|

212

Commentary

25.3.

on grounds

of justice, thinking:

Thucydides

explains the Corinthians’

decision, without himself accepting or rejecting the judgment. As often, he is confident in ascribing motives — which need not mean that he had inside information (cf. Hornblower). out of hatred of the Corcyraeans,

because they neglected them:

For the

hostility cf. 13.4. There was no international law which prescribed it, but there was a general understanding in the Greek world that an apoikia (colony) was an independent polis, linked by kinship, religion and sentiment to its mother city but not technically subordinate to it. Corinth tried to maintain particularly strong ties with its colonies (cf. 25.4, 38.3), and resented the independence of Corcyra; at this

time Anactorium also was opposed to Corinth (55.1). 25.4. customary honours in the common festivals ... initiate the proceedings: This has normally been interpreted as referring to festivals common to Corinth and

Corcyra; but T. S. F. Jim, CQ? 63 (2013), 537-42, defends the scholiast's view that it refers to common Greek festivals such as that at Olympia. For initiating a sacrifice see W. Burkert trans. P. Bing, Homo Necans, 37. It is striking, but perhaps a true reflection of Corinth's attitude, that Thucydides emphasises this more than Corcyra's naval power (let alone the commercial rivalry invoked by Gomme). the Phaeacians: Fairy-tale Phaeacia, like Corcyra, was isolated (e.g. Hom.

Od. VI. 8); while nothing in Od. VI-VIII(-XIIT) suggests a location for it, the identification of it with Corcyra became standard, and there was a sanctuary of the Phaeacian king Alcinous there (III. 70.4). a hundred and twenty triremes: Cf. 36.3, where the Corcyraeans claim that they,

the Corinthians and the Athenians have the three largest navies of Greece. Apart from suppressing piracy in the Adriatic, it is not known what use they made of this large navy. 26.1.

Ambracia, Leucas: Corinthian colonies: a city in and an island off north-

western Greece, between the Gulf of Corinth and Corcyra (/nventory 113, 126). 26.2. Apollonia: Between Corcyra and Epidamnus (/nventory 77). It was recorded

as a joint colony of Corinth and Corcyra (Strabo 316 / VII. 5.8, [Scymn.] 439-40), but Hornblower suggests that this might be due to Corcyraean manipulation of the facts. In order to avoid sailing past Corcyra they made an arduous journey, presumably from Ambracia (Gomme), one not considered feasible for the larger body of 27. 26.5. for the site is an isthmus: Hence easily cut off by an attacker who controlled the sea. 27.1. proclaimed the foundation of a colony: A full refoundation, as opposed to the reinforcement of 26.1. For coins which may have been issued in this connection, with the Corinthian design but E instead of the Corinthian 9, see C. M. Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, 84 with pl. 248. on equal and comparable terms to those there: This is standard language for the phenomenon (cf. e.g. M&L 5.27-8): the new settlers were to have equal rights in all respects with those already there.

Commentary

213

if anybody was not willing to sail immediately ... he could pay a deposit: A nice touch, to which 1 know no parallel. 27.2. appealed to the Megarians to escort them: Megara, north of Corinth on

the isthmus, was allied to it through the Peloponnesian League (but had been on the Athenian side between c. 460 and 447/6: 103.4, 114 1.): it had harbours both on the Saronic Gulf (Nisaea) and on the Corinthian Gulf (Pegae).

the Palians of Cephallenia: Pale (/nventory 132) was one of four cities on the island of Cephallenia, opposite the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth. the Epidaurians ... the Eleans: Apart from Leucas and Ambracia (26.1), and Thebes (in Boeotia, aligned with Sparta since 446: 113.4), these places are all in the Peloponnese. empty ships: Without crews. three thousand hoplites: Two thousand in 29.1 (the discrepancy is noted

already in a scholium): it is easiest to believe that the text is corrupt in one place or the other. 28.1. Sparta and Sicyon: Sparta was head of the Peloponnesian League; Sicyon was a neighbour to the west and a friend of Corinth, and likely to be listened to by the Corinthians: A. Griffin, Sikyon, 63. and urged: The indirect speech in this chapter and elsewhere is presumably to be understood on the same terms as Thucydides' direct speeches (22.1 with commentary).

28.2.

willing to submit to justice: Cf. 34.2, 39. Offers to go to arbitration are

a means of claiming moral superiority, and can be made both by those who are confident that they are in the right and by those who suspect that no arbitrator

acceptable to both sides will be found: cf. Athens' willingness to go to arbitration in 432 (78.4 etc.). prevail: Thus Hornblower; not ‘possess it’ (Gomme).

to the oracle at Delphi: Despite Delphi’s support for the opponents of Corcyra in Epidamnus (26.1). 28.3. to make friends other than their present ones: Corcyra was in fact neutral, belonging neither to the Spartan nor to the Athenian bloc (31.2). In this attempt to stave off war it suits the Corcyraeans to suggest that as colonists of Corinth they are friends of the Peloponnesians and enemies of Athens, while in Athens they will suggest that Corinth is an enemy both of Athens and of Corcyra (e.g. 35.5). 29.1.

The Corinthians did not submit to any of this: Gomme rightly judges that

Corcyra, if sincere, was being more reasonable than Corinth; but see G. A. Sheets,

AJP 115 (1994); 64—70, who argues that Corinth had at any rate a reasonable case against Corcyra. when their ships were manned and their allies were present: Thucydides does not give dates, but 1f we reckon back from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 this must be in 435 (and cf. on 45.1-2). However, Diod. Sic. ΧΙ]. 30-3

214

Commentary

reports the events of 435—433 under 438/7-436/5; cf. on 57.6 for the Potidaean episode: this should warn us against taking too seriously his narrative dates for

earlier events where it is harder to check. sent ahead a herald to declare war: Cf. Sparta's herald at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (II. 12.1—4). While presbeis were sent to negotiate (cf. on 24.6—7), a keryx was sent to make a formal declaration.

two thousand hoplites: But see 27.2 with commentary. 29.2. the generals of the ships were: With his knowledge of Corinthian details (cf. on 24.2), Thucydides names the Corinthian commanders but not the Corcyraean. We know nothing about these men, but Aristeus is not the same as the Aristeus of

60.2. 29.3.

Actium: the southern headland at the mouth of the gulf, about 50 miles/80

km from the south end of Corcyra. Anactorium: A joint colony of Corcyra and Corinth (55.1: Inventory 114); the city was inside the Ambracian Gulf, a short distance from Actium.

bracing: Fitting hypozomata, internal cables which tied the bow to the stern: Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 169-71, 196-8, 220-1.

29.5. the foreigners: All the new settlers who were not Corinthians. After this Epidamnus drops out of the story. 30.1.

set up a trophy at the headland of Leucimme: A trophy (tropaion),

literally ἃ commemoration of their forcing the enemy to turn (trepein) and a monument displaying spoils taken by the victors from the defeated (see G.S.W. ii. 246-75). Leucimme was a headland at the southern end of the more northerly of the two, called Lefkimme now, Gomme on 47.2; Hammond, JHS 65 (1945), 26 = his Studies in Greek History (Oxford U.

flee, was Pritchett, Corcyra: N. G. L. P., 1973),

448; and widely accepted; the more southerly, now Asprokavo, Wilson, Athens and Corcyra, 39—40. Thucydides has not made it clear, but presumably the Corinthians had sailed north, and the battle was fought near Leucimme, not near Actium. 30.2. Leucas ... the Eleans’ dockyard at Cyllene: Cf. 27.2. Cyllene (/nventory 254), was on the north side of the most westerly part of Elis, near the modern Kyllene.

30.3. Cheimerium in the region of Thesprotis: On the mainland, a little to the south of the south end of Corcyra (cf. on 46. 3-4): well to the north of Leucas, but suitable for challenging ships which headed south from Corcyra. 31.1.

During the whole year after the battle and the following year: Eniautos

can denote any kind of year, not necessarily a year in an official calendar. Whether or not Thucydides is thinking in terms of the seasonal years which he uses from 431 onwards (Il. 1), what he means in our terms is that the Corinthians made preparations

in the remainder of 435 and 434, and the deputations went to Athens in 433. 31.2.

had not enrolled themselves under the treaty either with the Athenians

or with the Spartans: These blocs, including but not limited to the Delian League

Commentary

215

and the Peloponnesian League, had effectively been recognised by the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/5: cf. on 115.1. 31.4. spoke as follows: With speeches Thucydides almost always uses such words as τοιάδε, ‘such things’ (as here) rather than τάδε, ‘these things’; the only exception

Is τάδε before and τοσαῦτα, ‘this much’, after one short speech (III. 29.2, 31.1). I do not believe that this language was chosen to advertise the fact that his speeches are not verbatim reports, or that he claimed a greater degree of accuracy for the exception (cf. Hornblower,

here and on 85.3, III. 29.2). In this case, as with other speeches

delivered in Athens before his exile in 424/3, it is likely that Thucydides heard the original speeches; as Gomme remarks, it is possible that there were speeches by more than one envoy, which he has conflated. Two Corcyraeans commemorated at Athens by a funerary epigram in the Ceramicus (/G ii? 5224 = (ΕΟ 469: this date U Knigge, 44 1972, 591—602, accepted CEG), Thersandrus and Simylus, may have been envoys sent on this occasion who were murdered in Athens: 32.1.

‘Itis just ... benefaction ... advantageous ... gratitude: The Corcyraeans

begin with what is ‘just’, but they cannot claim that Athens is already under an obligation to them, so have to concentrate on showing that an alliance will be advantageous to Athens and they will acknowledge an obligation to Athens. The Corinthians think they can claim justice, and with more difficulty advantage (esp. 42), but begin with what is ‘necessary’. Cf. Hornblower. Consideration of what is advantageous is prominent in the ‘realities of power” in Thucydides' speeches. 32.3. unreasonable: It is inconsistent of the Corcyraeans to have avoided alliance with Athens in the past but to be seeking it now (84). 32.4. good sense: Sophrosyne is ‘safe-mindedness’, often an oligarchic term but

not here (Homblower; and see H. North, Sophrosyne). Here the Corcyraeans mean avoiding trouble by not committing themselves to allies who might drag them into

trouble. The Corinthians reply in 37.2-4. 32.5. uninvolvement: Apragmosyne, ‘inactivity’, can be represented either as good in contrast to polypragmosyne, 'meddlesomeness' (cf. the Corinthians on the Athenians, 70) or as bad opting out when one ought to be involved (cf. Pericles’

funeral speech, II. 40.2). The Corinthians deny this rather than reinterpret it. 33.1. first ... next: It would be just to help those who are wronged, and in view of the Corcyraeans' naval strength useful to incur their gratitude. 33.2. whatsuccess ... receive it from them: This section provides a good example of the not quite perfect or Gorgianic balance charcteristic of Thucydides. Cf. Introduction, p. 20. virtue: Here-arete denotes moral virtue rather than (as often) manly excellence.

33.3. the Spartans will embark on war out of fear of you: Cf. 36.1: the 'truest reason' of 23.6. This is weakly denied by the Corinthians in 42. 2, reaffirmed in Thucydides' narrative in 44.2; and I believe it is not due simply to Thucydidean hindsight but could have been said in 433 (cf. on 44.2).

216

Commentary hostile: Echthroi, rather than polemioi, ‘enemies’, since they are not yet at war.

damaging us or strengthening themselves: Damaging the Corcyraeans, if the Corinthians fight and defeat them, or strengthening themselves, if the Corcyraeans

give in to them. ‘The contrast is frigid’ (Gomme). 33.4.

Itisforus... by our offering and your accepting: It is for the Corcyraeans

and Athenians together, by the Corcyraeans' (τῶν μὲν) offering and the Athenians' accepting. plan against them in advance rather than in reaction to them: Proepibouleuein rather than antepibouleuein. On Thucydides' fondness for contrasting words from the same root cf. Hornblower, Thucydides, 94.

34.1.

If they say: They do say this in 40.4—5.

every colony does honour ... is alienated: For the Corinthians’ view cf. 25.34,

and their reply in 38.1—3. 34.2. When summoned to arbitration: Cf. the narrative in 28; but of course it is always possible to rig the result by calling for arbitration on terms favourable to oneself, as each party did in 28. The Corinthians reply in 39. 35.1. 35.2. 35.3.

Your treaty with the Spartans: The Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5 (115.1). For it is stated in the treaty: For the Corinthians’ view of this see 40. 1-2. And not least from your own subjects: Athens could not prevent that, but

it was not likely to happen until after 412, when Persia enabled Sparta to offer higher pay (cf. Xen. Hell. I. 5.2-7; in 121.3 the Corinthians suggest doing this with money from Delphi and Olympia, but there is no indication that it was attempted). Hornblower doubts, 1 think unnecessarily, whether the Corcyraeans could have spoken to the Athenians of their Aypekooi, ‘subjects’.

36.1.

advantageous

... break the treaty: ‘An elaborate way of inviting the

Athenians to put prudential 36.2. it is well situated triremes, which needed to (1933), 16-24, revised in

considerations before moral ones' (Hornblower). on the crossing to Italy and Sicily: Particularly for put in to land every night if possible: Gomme, JHS 53 his Essays in Greek History and Literature, 190—203.

Cf. Thucydides' explanation of the Athenian decision, 44.3. Sicily will eventually play an important part in the war: at the beginning the Spartans hoped for support from there (II. 7.2); Athens intervened there in 427—424 (passages between III. 86 and IV. 65), 422 (V. 4—5) and, ambitiously but disastrously, 415—413 (VI-VII); and

after that Sparta received a little help from there. That this argument could have been used in 433 is supported by Athens' renewal of earlier alliances with Rhegium

on the toe of Italy and Leontini in Sicily in 433/2 (M&L 63-4 = JG i? 53-4, trans. Fornara 124—5). 37.1.

*It is necessary for us, since these Corcyraeans ... : This is a favourite

topos for the beginning of a second speech: if our opponents had kept to the point, so should we; but, since they did not, we shall not.

Commentary

217

There is a discussion of the Corinthian speech by T. Rood, in Third International Symposium on Thucydides, 65-73, noting its selective use of the past (which omits the First Peloponnesian War, narrated in 103.4, 105-8, 111-115. 1) and inability to outbid the Corcyraeans' offer of present advantage; cf. C. W. Macleod, GRBS 18 (1971), 234 n. 18 = his Collected Essays, 110 n. 18. from good sense ... for purposes of mischief and not virtue: This answers the

Corcyraeans' claim in 32.2-4 to have avoided involvement with others out of good sense. 37.3. forced to put in there: Cf. 36.2 with commentary. 37.5. demonstrate ... by giving and receiving justice: The Greek has the alliteration διδοῦσι ... δεχομένοις ... δίκαια δεικνύναι, presumably used for emphasis. In this instance the complaint is unjustified, since the Corcyraeans have offered (and the Corinthians have refused) to go to arbitration. 38.1. though colonists they have defected from us: Replying to the Corcyraean view of the relationship in 34.1. 38.2. insulted: Hybris typically involves arrogance, and violence and insult towards others: see Arist. RA. Il. 1378 8 23-30, and N. R. E. Fisher, Hybris. to be their leaders: Probably many Corinthian colonies (Gomme and Hornblower

cite Syracuse) would reject a claim pitched as strongly as this. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ tà εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι can be scanned as a (rather strained) hexameter, but prose writers normally avoided verse rhythms, and this was probably not intended as such (cf. Hornblower’s commentary, and in his [ed.] Greek Historiography, 68—9; and see on 13.6, 129.3).

38.3.

ourother colonies honour us: But notice Anactorium, 55.1.

38.4. it is clear that: The argument is not cogent: Corinth might have given Corcyra cause for resentment which it had not given to the others. 38.5. honourable ... for them to give way ... and shameful for us to use violence: If Corcyra had given way, Corinth might have pursued its advantage rather than abstained from violence. refused to take up the case of Epidamnus, which belongs to us, when it was ill-treated: Epidamnus was a joint foundation of Corcyra and Corinth, and Corcyra did not spurn it but supported the exiled faction against the currently dominant faction. 39.1.

to submit to justice by arbitration: Replying to the Corcyraeans in 34.2;

cf. the narrative in 28. 39.2. did not ... before they laid siege to the place: After Corcyra's original offer, Corinth called on Corcyra to halt the siege and Corcyra in response called on Corinth to withdraw the new settlers. not their allies but their partners in injustice: Homblower compares Soph. Ant. 523, where Antigone says that it is her nature to share not hostility but love.

39.3.

when they were utterly safe: They did not then think they needed an alliance.

40.1.

violent and grasping: Two key notions of Thucydides: this is his first use

218

Commentary

of the adjective biaios, but cf. ‘under violent pressure” in 2.1, and of any form of the concept pleonexia (Hornblower). it would not be just: Replying to the Corcyraeans in 35.1-2.

40.2.

not for those who go to harm others: This will not have been stated in the

treaty. 40.3.

instead of being in a treaty relationship, enemies: Athens will try to avoid

this by making a defensive rather than a full alliance with Corcyra: 44.1. 40.4. in a treaty relationship with the Corinthians ... a truce with the Corcyraeans: This is not cogent: Athens is in a treaty relationship with Corinth because they were previously at war, but this does not oblige Athens to support Corinth rather than Corcyra; it has never had a truce or treaty with Corcyra because they have never been at war. 40.5. when the Samians were defecting: In 440—439 (115.2-117). The cases are not parallel, since Samos was recognised as a member of Athens' bloc in the Thirty Years' Peace but Corcyra was not included in the Peace. If Sparta was indeed willing to support

Samos then, it would have been a breach of the Peace and would have shown Sparta (or some Spartans) to be more aggressive than appears in Thucydides' narrative. we did not vote against you: Having mentioned this vote and its result here, Thucydides does not mention it in his account of the episode. Hornblower suggests

that this is a deliberate ‘narrative displacement', to put a crucial fact in a context where it is not striking; and E. Badian argued that he did this because he was torn between the Spartan aggressiveness behind the proposal and Athens' infringement

of Samos’ autonomy after the Thirty Years’ Peace (in J. W. Allison fed.], Conflict, Antithesis and the Ancient Historian, 62-3, 66—7, revised in his From Plataea to Potidaea, 138—9, 141—2) — but to suppose that he had an ulterior motive may be over-interpretation: see Rhodes, Histos 2 (1998), 69 (http://research.ncl.ac.uk/histos/ documents/1998.03RhodesEpidamnusisaCity647 l .pdf). 41.1. bythelaws of the Greeks: Apart from what was stated in individual treaties, the Greeks had no written international law; but there were generally-accepted

assumptions, to which the word nomos could be extended, about how states ought to behave in particular circumstances. See P. Low, /nterstate Relations in Classical Greece, esp. 77-128.

41.2. when you were short of long ships ... from the Corinthians: Cf. Hdt. VI. 89, 92: probably shortly before 490, Corinth ‘sold’ twenty ships to Athens for a token 5 drachmae each; Athens then won one battle against Aegina but lost a second (but

defeated Aegina eventually, c. 457: 108.4), so ‘overcame the Aeginetans', below, is an over-optimistic view of the consequence of this help. Hornblower notes that this agrees with Herodotus' narrative and thinks it 1s based on Herodotus, but it is so brief an account of a presumably well-known fact that I am not sure a particular

source should be identified. Gomme mentions earlier Corinthian services to Athens which could be cited but are not. with regard to the Samians: Cf. 40.5.

Commentary 41.3.

219

They regard as a friend ... and as an enemy ... : It was a widespread

view that on should help one's friends and harm one's enemies, as in one of the first definitions of justice discussed in PI. Resp. (I. 332 A-336 a): the Corinthians say that in a crisis, irrespective of previous alignments, anybody who helps is a friend and anybody who opposes is an enemy. 42.1. any younger men must learn from the older: A contrast between the young and the old is frequent in Greek, and could be exploited in various ways: in book I cf. 72.1, 80.1. just ... advantageous: In 32.1 the Corcyraeans admitted that Athens had no obligation to support them but set out to show that it would be advantageous; the Corinthians began by claiming that justice was on their side, and now turn to arguing that support for them would be advantageous. 42.2. the impending war ... uncertainty: A weak reply to the Corcyraeans'

claim in 33.3, 36.1. our previous suspicion on account of the Megarians: Many have seen here an allusion to Athens' dispute with Megara in the 430s (67. 4 erc.: e.g. Gomme,

Homblower); but, although proteron (‘previous’) does not make that impossible, more probably the reference is to Athens' taking Megara out of the Peloponnesian League between c. 460 and 446 (103.4—115.1) — though this does not prove that the dispute of the 430s had not yet begun (e.g. de Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 230; C. Tuplin, CQ?

29 [1979], 301-7). 43.1.

in Sparta ... to discipline one's own allies: Cf. 40.5.

43.2.

the one who assists ... and the one who opposes ... : Cf. 41.3.

hostile: But not yet an ‘enemy’ (cf. 33.3). 44.1. Thatis what the Corinthians said: To this reader the Corcyraeans seem to have the better of the argument. holding two assemblies: |t was perhaps a common practice for the Athenians to spread a major decision over two days, with debate on the first and the vote on the second: cf. the making of the Peace of Philocrates with Philip of Macedon in

346 (e.g. Aeschin. II Embassy 53, 60—1). There is no need to suppose, with de Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 72, that there were separate proposals and votes on the two days. in the first ... but on the next day ... : A frustrating passage. Thucydides surely knew more than he tells us: how many Athenians changed their minds? which Athenians? why? what was Pericles' position? Plut. Per. 29. | states that Pericles persuaded the demos, which may well be true, but we do not know his grounds for

believing it. While Pericles was alive, Thucydides names no Athenian in opposition to him; this contributes to an impression of Athens dominated by Pericles, moving firmly towards war under his leadership. a full alliance ... a defensive alliance: lt was likely that an alliance with Corcyra

would lead Athens into fighting against Corinth: in this way Athens tried to put itself in a position where the circumstances in which that might happen would be such

220

Commentary

that it could claim not to be breaking the Thirty Years’ Peace (cf. 45.3, 53.4). On grey areas in which it might or might not be considered that a treaty was broken see Rhodes, in P. de Souza and J. France (eds), War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History, 7—12. Thucydides again uses epimachia of a purely defensive alliance in contrast to xymmachia, a full alliance, in V. 48.2 (referred to in 27.2 as ξυμμαχίαν

ποιεῖσθαι ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων ἐπιμαχεῖν), and epimachia has that meaning again in Xen. Cyr. III. 2.23 and Arist. Pol. III. 1280 8 27, but perhaps not in [Dem.] XII. Epist. Phil. (6—)7; elsewhere symmachia is used of full and of defensive alliances alike. For another fine verbal distinction cf. 69.6. 44.2. Forthey thought that the war with the Peloponnesians would indeed come about: Cf. the Corcyraeans in 33.3, 36.1, the Corinthians in 42.2. I have argued that

Thucydides is right, and that war was inevitable unless Athens gave up the policies which were upsetting the balance of power between itself and Sparta, and that in the late 430s Athens was behaving correctly but provocatively to bring about the war in circumstances in which it could claim to be in the right and was better prepared than Sparta (Hermes 115 [1987], 154—65). For expectation of war cf. the financial decrees which I believe are correctly dated 434/3, repaying outstanding debts to the sacred

treasuries, winding up the acropolis building programme and diverting surplus revenue to the dockyards and walls (M&L 58 = /G i? 52, trans. Fornara 119), and the renewal

in 433/2 of alliances with Rhegium and Leontini (cited on 36.2). the two should wear down each other: If Athens wanted to achieve that, it could do so by staying out of this conflict: cf. the Corinthians in 40.4. However, P. A. Stadter, GRBS 24 (1983), 131—6, argues that Athens' defensive alliance and its

small force (below) were well calculated to result in a weakening of both Corcyra and Corinth. 44.3. on the coastal voyage to Italy and Sicily: Cf. the Corcyraeans in 36.2.

45.1-2. they sent ten ships ... Proteas son of Epicles: Cf. M&L 61 = /G r 364, trans. Fornara 126.1—12, the first part of a document recording payments from the treasury of Athena in the first prytany of 433/2 to the commanders of the two expeditions to Corcyra (for the second see 51.4 with commentary); for Athens’ use of the sacred treasuries to finance the war see II. 13.3-5, and among other inscriptions M&L 72 = /G i? 369, extracts trans. Fornara 134. In this instance Thucydides and the inscription agree on the three generals (but Thucydides gives patronymics, the inscription gives demotics). Proteas and Diotimus (on whose family see Davies, 4.P.F. 161—5) were men who held office on other occasions in the 430s. Lacedaemonius, who served as a hipparch c. 450—430 (/G i? 511), was a son of Pericles’ opponent Cimon (on whom see 98.1), given a name reflecting his father's

sympathies: perhaps like Thucydides (cf. Introduction, p. 2) he had broken from his family's political stance and supported Pericles; or, more probably, he opposed Pericles and after a finely-balanced debate Pericles' opponents were able to have one of their men appointed (cf. on Dracontides, 51.4); either of those explanations is more likely than that of Plut. Per. 29.1—2, that Pericles had Lacedaemonius sent with

Commentary

22]

a small force on this occasion in order to discredit him. It 1s typical of Thucydides' reticence (cf. on 44.1) that he makes no comment on this appointment. 45.3. They were instructed: The Athenians were taking seriously the limitations of their defensive alliance (cf. 44.1). 46.1. ahundred and fifty ships: Double the number of 435 (29.1). The Corinthians made a major effort; but N. J. McKenzie and P. A. Hannah, Mnemosyne* 66 (2013), 206-27, note that both here and in later naval episodes Thucydides' presentation of the Corinthians is consistently negative. On this campaign see Hammond, JHS 65 (1945), 30—7 = his Studies, 456—70; Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 62-9. There were ten from Elis ... and ninety from Corinth itself: By comparison with 27.2 Cephallenia and the cities of the north-eastern Peloponnese have dropped

out; Anactorium with one ship has been added. Anactorium was a joint colony of Corcyra and Corinth, and at the end of this campaign Corinth had to capture it (55.1), so this one ship was perhaps contributed by a pro-Corinthian faction (T. E. J.

Wiedemann, Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book I-Book II Ch. 65, 31). 46.2.

Xenoclides son of Euthycles and four others: Literally, pemptos autos,

‘himself fifth'. In contrast to the view of Gomme

and others, K. J. Dover has

demonstrated that such phrases merely single out the man on whom Thucydides wants to focus for whatever reason, and do not imply that this man ranked above his colleagues: JHS 80 (1960), 61-77 = his The Greeks and Their Legacy, 159-80. Xenoclides reappears, again sent to the north-west, in III. 114.4. 46.3. Cheimerium: Cf. 30.3. 46.4. Thereis a harbour: The detail given here is not necessary for the narrative.

This harbour is not Cheimerium but the Glykys Limen at the mouth of the Acheron, opposite the island of Paxos; for Ephyre see /nventory 96 (accepting a location for

Cheimerium which 1 do not; near it was a nekyomanteion mentioned by Hdt. V. 92. n. 2); the River Thyamis is almost 30 miles/50 km north-west of that. Cheimerium must be between the two, and the best candidate is Cape Varlam (near Elinia in

Barrington Atlas, 54), with two small bays to the north of it: Wilson, Athens and Corcyra, 37-9, after N. G. L. Hammond, JHS 65 (1945), 26-30 = his Studies, 447— 56 (accepted by Morrison, Coates and Rankov; preferable to the more southerly locations of Gomme and others). 47.1.

commanded

by

Miciades,

Aesimides

and

Eurybatus:

This

time

Thucydides indicates the Corcyraean commanders (contr. 27.1), but still not their patronymics.

the islands called Sybota: Between the south end of Corcyra and the mainland, slightly to the north-west of the location accepted above for Cheimerium. They occupied the islands because allies of Corinth were on the mainland. 47.2. Leucimme: Cf on 30.1. Zacynthus: The most southerly of the large islands off the west coast of Greece (Inventory 141); it was allied to Athens at the beginning of the war (II. 7.3, 9.4).

222

Commentary

48.1.

three days’ provisions: They intended if victorious not to return to their

base but to land on Corcyra. 48.4. the left wing was occupied by the Corinthians: And part of the centre, since Corinth supplied nearly two thirds of the whole force (46.1). their best-sailing ships: Those whose hulls were in the best condition (the preferred explanation of Morrison, Coates and Rankov). 49.1.

the signals: Assumed to be visual signals by Morrison, Coates and Rankov;

Gomme's trumpet signal is a mistaken inference from the paean in 50.5. Each side had many hoplites ... in the ancient manner: The older style of naval warfare involved grappling and boarding, after which the soldiers would fight on the decks; but the Athenians had developed skilled manoeuvres to make naval battles depend on sailors' skills (cf. below): Thucydides was interested in, and no doubt as an Athenian proud of, such developments.

49.3.

sailing-through manoeuvres: The diekplous is ‘sailing through and out’.

Better than Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 42-3, are J. F. Lazenby, G&R? 34 (1987),

169-77 (with I. Whitehead, op. cit. 178-85, on the periplous, ‘sailing round’), and A. J. Holladay, G&R? 35 (1988), 149-5] = his Athens in the Fifth Century and Other Studies in Greek History,

183—4. Individual attacking ships, from a formation

in line abreast, would sail through gaps in the enemy's line and then turn to attack the stern or side of an enemy ship or (doubted by Lazenby) shear off its oars. 49.4. intimidated by the Athenians’ instructions: Cf. 44.1, 45.3.

49.5.

as far as their camp: Presumably Cheimerium (Gomme), but this is far

more credible if the location which I accept (on 46.4) is right rather than the location

accepted by Gomme. 49.7.

When there was an evident rout: Since Corcyra itself was now in danger

the conditions for Athenian engagement were satisfied; but Athens' intervention did not prevent the defeat of the Corcyraeans. the point of necessity was reached in which the Corinthians and Athenians

made assaults on one another: An emphatic point: this is the first time since the Thirty Years' Peace when the Athenians and members of the Peloponnesian League fought directly against one another. 50.1. disabled: Cf. Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 127-8: it was very hard to sink a trireme.

sailing through and slaughtering rather than taking prisoners: This is very matter-of-fact ... 50.2. this was a larger naval battle ... than any before it: ... but it is followed by one of Thucydides’ superlatives (cf. Introduction, p. 3). More ships, though not Greek against Greek, had fought at Artemisium and Salamis in 480; for the difficulty of distinguishing between friendly and enemy ships cf. Herodotus’ account of the battle of Salamis, VIII. 87-8. 50.3. Sybota is a deserted harbour: Mainland Sybota was probably Mourzo, facing the islands.

Commentary

223

50.4.

as many as they had left: Ten, if we combine 25.4 with 47.1.

S0.S.

the paean: Paean was originally a healing god associated or identified

with Apollo. A military paean (always attributed by Thucydides to Dorians) was a confident prayer for victory or a thanksgiving after victory; scholia here and on IV. 43.3 have the first addressed to Ares or Enyalius and the second to Apollo. back water: This made them less vulnerable and more able to make a change of tactic than turning to withdraw (Gomme).

The Athenians had dispatched these: There must have been another decision by the assembly, which Thucydides omits. Hornblower sees this as a ‘narrative

displacement’ which minimises Athens’ aggressiveness, but it may indicate no more than that Thucydides did not want to interrupt this vivid narrative. fearing: Plut. Per. 23.3, after making the original ten ships an insult to Lacedaemonius (cf. on 45.1—2), makes this Pericles' reaction to criticism. 51.1. began to withdraw: This repeats what was stated in 50.5, closing a small (logical but not verbal) ring after the explanation of Athens” additional ships.

51.2. But recounted. 51.3.

the

Corcyraeans

could

not

see

them:

The

episode

is vividly

the naval battle ended at nightfall: Literary scholars have remarked that

this is a frequent morif in battle narratives (cf., e.g., S. P. Oakley, 4 Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X, iv. 564); but it may well be that the motif is frequent because the phenomenon was frequent. 51.4. commanded by Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras: The inscription which reports payment for the first squadron (cf. on 45.1—2) also reports payment for the second, about twenty-three days later: M&L 61 =/G i* 364, trans. Fornara 126.13-23. This time Thucydides’ text and the inscription disagree on the commanders: the inscription names Glaucon, Metagenes and Dracontides. Some have postulated corruption or have imagined a last-minute change as a result of which what each text reports is true, but it is easiest to believe that here Thucydides has made a mistake (Dracontides like Andocides had a father called Leogoras).

Glaucon was one of the leading Athenians of the 430s, serving as general in several years (cf. Davies, 4.PF 90—2); Metagenes is otherwise unknown; Dracontides is an opponent of Pericles in Plut. Per. 32.3 (cf. on Lacedaemonius, 45.1-2). Andocides the orator, born c. 440, would be too young; Thucydides may have been thinking

of the Andocides who was his grandfather, who was general in several years in the 440s (cf. Davies, A4. P.F. 27-32; each was the son of a Leogoras). 51.5. since it was night: ἦν yàp νύξ; Hornblower remarks that the monosyllabic parenthesis ‘effectively conveys a sense of jumpiness’. S2.1.

against the harbour at Sybota: This must be the mainland Sybota of 50.3,

despite Gomme’s doubts. 52.3.

fearing that the Athenians

would

regard

the treaty as broken:

The

Athenians’ alliance bound them only to defend Corcyra, but if they thought the

224

Commentary

battle had ended the Thirty Years” Peace they might judge that further action against the Corinthians would not worsen the situation. 53.1.

without a herald's wand: A herald sent between states at war would carry

a wand as a sign of his status: the Corinthians were not going to indicate that they considered the Peace to be ended. The scholium describes the wand as a length of

wood bearing two intertwined serpents. 53.2. You are doing wrong: They dare the Athenians to regard the Peace as ended. 53.4. Wearenotstarting a war: However, the Athenians insist on their defensive

alliance and claim that they are not in breach of the Peace. Probably the action taken at 49.7 should be seen as justified by the terms of the alliance and the commanders' instructions, and the Athenians could reasonably claim that if their conflict with the Corinthians was limited to that they were not in breach of the Peace (thus Gomme; contr. Hornblower). 54.1.

The Corcyraeans collected the wrecks and bodies: Normally the victors

were left in control of the battlefield and the defeated could not recover their bodies and paraphernalia without admitting defeat and obtaining the victors’ permission. The fact that they had been able to collect some wrecks and bodies helped the Corcyraeans to claim that they were victorious, and gave them some spoils for their

trophy. For another instance of contested victory and rival trophies see 105.6. 54.2. about seventy ships: Seventy out of 110 was severe, and Gomme suspicious; but if the Corinthians had lost thirty it is not implausible. 55.1.

was

Anactorium: Cf. 29.3, 46.1.

After installing Corinthian settlers in it they returned home: If this is right, some men from the Corinthian fleet were left as settlers. Anactorium supported Sparta at the beginning of the war, but in 425 was captured and resettled by the Acarnanians with Athenian help (IV. 49)

the eight hundred who were slaves: Oarsmen, amounting to more than three quarters of the total if the numbers of captives are representative. so that when they returned to Corcyra they might bring it over to them: Cf. III. 70.1, reporting their return under 427 as something which (probably) had

happened recently. Gomme notes that we are not told what Corcyra did with its Corinthian captives. 55.2.

Corcyra survived: Although Corcyra had the worse of the actual battle,

after the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements the Corinthians did not follow up their advantage, and the episode ended with Corcyra not subjected to Corinth and Its treatment of Epidamnus not reversed. This was the first grievance causing the war: Cf. 23.5—6. It is a grievance ofthe

Corinthians against the Athenians. Which side was technically in the right depends on whether the Athenians’ claim that their limited action did not break the Thirty Years’ Peace is to be accepted (it is accepted by Gomme, rejected by Hornblower; |

Commentary

225

should describe it as a grey area open to interpretation); but the Athenians had made their alliance in the realisation that it could lead to fighting agaiunst Corinth, and that decision was not one of a state anxious to avoid trouble. 56-66. Potidaea 56.2. When the Corinthians were planning to take retribution from them: Thucydides begins by suggesting that the Athenians' pressure on Potidaea resulted

from their hostility to Corinth after the Corcyraean episode, but it emerges from what follows that they were worried because of Perdiccas of Macedon also. If we accept the Delian League's tribute lists as inscribed (which record not the full tribute but the !/ given to Athena), Potidaea paid 6 talents down to 434, the figure for 433 is not preserved, but 15 talents in 432. However, in 434 Scione, inscribed immediately below Potidaea, seems to have paid 15 talents, which is out of line with its other payments, and the editors of 4.7L. suggested that in 434 the two figures were wrongly transposed and Potidaea's tribute had already been increased before

then (see /G i? 277. vi. 5—6, 279. ii. 70, and Meiggs, A.E. 528-9). the Potidaeans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene: It is not inevitable that this geographical description, using the present tense, was written before their expulsion in 430/29 (11.70: see Hornblower). Pallene is the westernmost of the three prongs

projecting southwards from Chalcidice (in Greek usage the name denoted the area to the north, not the prongs). As that name Chalcidice indicates, most Greek cities in the area were or claimed to be of Euboean origin; on the colonisation of Potidaea (Inventory 598) from Corinth Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59. | states that the settlement-

founder was a son of Periander, tyrant of Corinth c. 627—587. their wall towards Pallene: On the southern side of the city. epidemiourgoi: Demiourgos is a title given to officials in various

places;

Hornblower speculates on the significance of epi-. It is remarkable that until now Athens allowed Corinth to send officials to a tribute-paying member of the League. Perdiccas: Given more detail in 57.2. His father Alexander was king in 480— 479 (e.g. Hdt. Vll. 173.3) and for some years after (137.1). His own reign continued until between 414 and 410 (VII. 9; Diod. Sic. XIII. 49.1—2); from the Athenians' viewpoint he was for ever changing sides between them and the Spartans, but he kept his throne, and to him the Athenians may have seemed equally inconstant. Thraceward: This was the term regularly used by the Athenians for the north

coast of the Aegean, settled by Greeks. 57.2. previously an ally and friend: /G 1° 89, a fragmentary Athens and Macedon which mentions Perdiccas, Arrhabaeus and Perdiccas', and ends with a series of names headed by Perdiccas, his and his son Archelaus, and including [Der]das, has been variously the 430s and the 4105.

treaty between ‘the kings with brother A lcetes dated between

226

Commentary

57.3. with his own brother Philip and with Derdas: Philip and his son Amyntas appear as claimants to the throne in 429 and seem to have had possessions north of the Thermaic Gulf (II. 95.2—3, 100.3). Derdas, said by a scholiast to have been a cousin of Perdiccas and Philip, was probably the ruler of Elimia, in the mountainous country between Macedon and Thessaly (Xen. Hell. V. 2.38 mentions a Derdas as ruling there). Perdiccas himself controlled Lower Macedonia, the area around the Thermaic Gulf (cf. II. 99). 57.5. the Thraceward Chalcidians: In this context, cities near Olynthus, to the

north of the three prongs. Bottiaeans: They had previously lived west of Pella, but had been transported to the part of Chalcidice west of Olynthus (cf. 11. 99-101). 57.6. They happened to be sending ... Archestratus son of Lycomedes: The name is fairly common, but this Archestratus appears (with Lacedaemonius: cf. 45.2) among five men appointed to implement an honorific decree (/G i? 48 bis). This expedition will have been sent in spring 432; but Diod. Sic. XI. 34, 37.1

recounts the episode under 435/4 and 432/1

(cf. on 29.1).

with two other generals: The manuscripts' 'ten' is certainly wrong; Athenian

expeditions often had three commanders (cf. 45.2, 51.4 with commentary). 58.1.

the Spartan authorities promised them: Taken by Hornblower to refer

to the Spartan assembly: only the assembly could enter into such a commitment, but since there was no immediate action (Sparta did not invade Attica until 431: II.

18-23) the matter may not have gone beyond the ephors and gerousia. There had been earlier occasions when attacks on Attica were made or contemplated to distract Athens from another campaign (101.1—2, 109.2-3, 114.1—2, cf. 105.3).

58.2. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians ... to migrate inland to Olynthus: Olynthus (/nventory 588), about 7 miles/11 km east of north from Potidaea, was previously Bottiaean but captured by the Persian Artabazus and given to 'the Chalcidian people' in 480/79 (Hdt. VIII. 127); it seems not to have been a large city before 432. What happened was a physical and political synoikismos (cf. on 5.1) by which nearby coastal cities became part of an enlarged city of Olynthus; Thucydides' anoikizein 1s a particularly appropriate compound for moving inland.

There was probably not until the fourth century a larger Chalcidian league centred on that city, but it is clear from its coinage that the enlarged city called itself *the Chalcidians'. The city from this near-century in Mygdonia near is about 25 miles/40 mountain range.

59.2.

was destroyed by Philip of Macedon in 348, and the remains are archaeologically important. Lake Bolbe: The area to the south of the lake, which itself km north of Olynthus; it is separated from Olynthus by a

the brothers of Derdas: Derdas had perhaps died (Gomme).

from the interior: Literally, from above. 1f Derdas' region was Elimia (cf. on 57.3), the invasion will have come from the southern part of Upper Macedonia.

Commentary 60.1.

227

considered its danger their own: Cf. Hdt. VII. 21.2 on Athens’ reaction to

the Persian conquest of Miletus in 494. volunteers ... and men enlisted for pay: Not an official force of the Corinthian state, which would have been blatantly in breach of the Thirty Years' Peace (cf. 66 with commentary). In the Corcyraean episode the Athenians sought to avoid an open breach of the Peace (cf. 44.1 with commentary); in this episode, where on the Corinthians' own principles the Athenians were entitled to discipline their own allies (40.5), the Corinthians sought to avoid an open breach. 60.2. Aristeus son of Adimantus: Different from the Aristeus of 29.2. See H. D.

Westlake, CQ 41 (1947), 25-30 = his Essays, 74-83, suggesting that Thucydides’ detailed information is due to personal contact with him, and contrasting Thucydides' favourable treatment of him with Herodotus' unfavourable treatment of his father

(VIII. 5, 59, 61,94). on the fortieth day: Thucydides has not given any dating material to provide a context for this. In 11. 2 he dates the battle of 52-3 with reference to the attack on Plataea in spring 431, but most editors have agreed that the text there is corrupt;

probably the battle outside Potidaea was in the tenth month before the attack on Plataea (about mid June 432), and that attack was four months before the end of the Athenian year 432/1 (about 10 March 431). See my commentary on Il. 2.1 (where Gomme emends as | do but Hornblower keeps the manuscripts’ text). 61.1. Callias son of Calliades: Probably the Callias who proposed at any rate the first of the financial decrees which 1 date 434/3 (M&L 58 = JG i? 52, trans. Fornara

119), and the renewal in 433/2 of alliances with Rhegium and Leontini (M&L 63—4 Ξ: [G i? 53-4, trans. Fornara 124—5). 61.2. Pydna: On the west coast of the Thermaic Gulf (Inventory 544); after a revolt against Macedon in 410 was suppressed it was transferred to a site slightly

inland (Diod. Sic. ΧΙΠ. 49.1—2). Therme: At the head of the Thermaic Gulf, on or near the site of the later Thessalonica (/nventory 552). 61.3. the arrival of Aristeus: See Gomme, i. 213, 215, for speculation on his route. 61.4. Brea: in the manuscripts, Beroea, inland towards Elimia, but that would make no sense of their route (though it is accepted by Hornblower). Brea (/nventory 624) was colonised by the Athenians probably in the 430s (M&L 49 = JG i? 46, trans. Fornara 100), and is best located 8% miles/14 km north-west of Potidaea at Verghia, a name perhaps derived from Brea (4R 44 [1997/8], 79; S. Psoma, REG 122 [2009], 263-80, cf. Barrington Atlas, 50).

Strepsa: ἐπὶ Στρέψαν for ἐπιστρέψαντες has been generally accepted. Strepsa

(Inventory 615), should be on the Chalcidian side of Therme (Gomme, contr. Hornblower), and is best located at Vasilika, in the valley south-east of Therme (cf. Barrington Atlas, 50; [nventory).

Pausanias: Not previously mentioned: a scholiast makes him a son or brother of Derdas, and he was more probably a brother (cf. 59.2).

228

Commentary

61.5.

Gigonus: (/nventory 572) best located north-west of Brea and 19 miles/31

km from Potidaea near Nea Kallikratia (cf. 4.7.2. i. 478; Barrington Atlas, 50). 62.1.

a market outside the city: Outside Potidaea. For such markets see Pritchett,

G.S. W. 1. 45—6 (but read ‘to bring supplies from the city’). 62.2. appointing Iolaus to command in his place: Ze. to command the cavalry here (thus Hornblower), rather than to be his deputy at Pella (N. G. L. Hammond

[and G. T. Griffith], A History of Macedonia, ii. 123, and the implication of Gomme's comment): cf. ‘the ... cavalry from Perdiccas’, 62.3. 62.3. in the middle betwen the two forces: The Athenians would arrive from the west (cf. 61.4—5).

62.6.

Aristeus' own wing: Probably the left wing (Gomme).

63.1.

through the sea along the mole: The mole will have been built to protect

the harbour. 63.2. aboutsixty stades away: Cf. on 58.2. Distances given in ancient texts were

not always precisely measured, and different states had stades of different lengths and we do not always know which stade is intended. 60 stades = 11 km implies 1 stade Ξ 183 m, and R. A. Bauslaugh notes that most of Thucydides' distances imply a stade of between 150 and 200 m (JHS 99 [1979], 5—6, where in this instance he reckons 10.5 km and 1 stade = 175 m).

clearly visible: Gomme notes that that is correct, but the Athenians approaching from Gigonus would not have been visible from Olynthus, and the forces of Aristeus

will probably have occupied the higher ground which blocked that view. and the signals had been raised ... pulled down: Whatever the signals were, their purpose will have been to send messages from the forces outside Potidaea to those left in Olynthus (Gomme).

63.3. trophy: Cf. on 30.1. There died ... : Nearly 300 out of 1,600 Peloponnesian hoplites and unspecified Potidaeans, 150 out of 3,000 Athenians. This is in accordance with the tendency in hoplite battles for about 596 on the winning side and 14% on the losing side to

be killed (P. Krentz, GRBS 26 [1985], 13-20). For the epitaph of the Athenians see Agora xvii 16 = CEG 10 = JG? 1179. In this battle the young Alcibiades distinguished himself and his life was saved by Socrates (Pl. Symp. 219 ε--220 r, Chrm. 153 a-c).

64.1.

walled off the city wall: What is commonly referred to as a siege was

usually in the fifth century not an attack on a city's walls but a blockade (for a more

advanced siege, still involving a blockade, see that of Plataea in 429—427: II. 71-8, cf. III. 20—4): here the Athenians built their own wall north of the city’s northern wall, to prevent contact between Potidaea and Olynthus (cf. Gomme).

towards Pallene: The Potidaeans had refused to demolish their own wall there (cf. 57.2). 64.2. Phormio son of Asopius: Not included in Davies, A.P. F, but he was a

Commentary

229

general in several years from 440/39 to 429/8; for his probable death after that see my commentary on II. 103.1. Aphytis: On the east side of Pallene, about 8 miles/13 (Inventory 563).

km

from

Potidaea

65.1. with the exception of five hundred men: Cf. the 480 left to defend Plataea in 429 (II. 78.3). 65.2. the Sermylians: Sermylia (/nventorv 604) was a short distance inland, east of Olynthus.

to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice: Once the blockading walls had been set up, the Athenians did not need their full forces to man them (Gomme). For the continuation and end of the siege see I]. 58, 70: in winter 430/29 the Potidaeans

surrendered and were allowed to leave, and they were replaced by Athenian settlers. 66. These were the further grievances: This refers only to Potidaea, and προσεγεγένηντο is preferable to the manuscripts' προυγεγένηντο. for the Corinthians had taken this action privately: Since this explains why ‘the war had not yet broken out, but there was still a state of truce', 'privately' must

mean that this was not an official Corinthian campaign (Gomme: cf. 60), not that Corinth had acted independently of the Peloponnesian League (Hornblower). 67-88. First meeting in Sparta

67.1.

invited the allies to Sparta: Not a formal congress of the Peloponnesian

League, which only Sparta could summon

(cf. 87.4, 119), but a coordinated attempt

to put pressure on the Spartan assembly. In Thucydides' narrative it is presented as a major set piece, with speeches by the Corinthians (68-71), Athenians who ‘happened to be in Sparta' (73-8), king Archidamus (80.1—85.2) and the ephor Sthenelaidas (86), exploring the contrasted characters of Sparta and Athens, and the nature of Athenian power, which provides Thucydides’ ‘truest reason’ for the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians present (cf. on 72.1) may have heard the Corinthian speech,

they will have reported in Athens what they themselves said, and they will not have heard (cf. 79.1) the speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas but will no doubt

have been able to discover what lines they took and how the debate ended. The detailed presentation of the speeches will, as always, be Thucydides” own work;

and Pericles in his speech in 140—4 responds to points made by Archidamus here and points made by the Corinthians in 120-4 more closely than is likely to be true

of the speeches actually made. 67.2. The Aeginetans did not send envoys openly: Their complaint is publicly known in 139.1, 140.3: perhaps the meaning 1s that there was no Aeginetan speech on this occasion. Their complaint, and that of Megara (67.4), in contrast to the detailed accounts of Corcyra and Potidaea, are mentioned only in passing: see on 23.6. they had not been left autonomous in accordance with the treaty: They were

forced into the Delian League c. 457 (105.24, 108.4), and the reference might be

230

Commentary

either to ἃ treaty made then (Gomme) or to a special clause or a general clause in

the Thirty Years’ Peace (Hornblower), in which case we have to assume -- which is not impossible — that since 446 Athens had taken some action of which we are unaware. The fragmentary 70 i? 38 could belong either to the settlement of c. 457 or to a later modification of it. In summer 431 the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans as ‘not least responsible for the war' (as here the Aeginetans ‘not least joined the

Corinthians in pressing for the war?) and replaced them with Athenian settlers. They were given a refuge by Sparta at Thyrea, on the east coast of the Peloponnese, but that was attacked and destroyed by the Athenians in 424 (If. 27, IV. 56.2-57).

On ‘autonomy’ see M. Ostwald, Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History; P. Karavites, RIDA? 29 (1982), 145—62, both suggesting that the term was coined with reference to the kind of freedom which the member states tried to retain within the Delian League; M. H. Hansen, in M. H. Hansen and K. A. Raaflaub (edd.), Studies

in the Ancient Greek Polis, 21—43, makes too little allowance for the likelihood that different men in different contexts would use this loaded term in different ways. 67.3. and anybody else: Hornblower, accepting this reading, wonders how this wider invitation was issued, and suggests the Olympic festival of 432. However, on

the chronology which I accept (see on 87.6), this meeting occurred before the end of the Athenian year 433/2 and therefore probably before the festival (for which see

A. E. Samuel, Greek and Roman Chronology, 191—4). their regular meeting: Their assembly (cf. 87.1—3). 67.4. the Megarians ... that they were being excluded ... in contravention

of the treaty: Cf. 139.1-2, where the reason for the exclusion is given, 140.3-4, 144.2. Despite the reticence of Thucydides, this exclusion became notorious (see especially Ar. Ach. 515-39, Peace 500—2, 603-18; and Plut. Per. 29.4-31.1, who mentions a series of decrees), and the Athenians attacked Megara twice a year from 431 (II. 31) until 424 (IV. 66—74). The main purpose of the exclusion was to impose

economic sanctions on Megara, to prevent it from trading with Athens and the Delian League (cf. Ar. Ach. 719—835; contr. de Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 225-89, 381—6). Megara had been an ally of Athens between c. 460 and 446 (103.4, 114.1—115.1); while it could have been a response to Megara's supporting Corinth at Sybota (46.1), the decree was not necessarily recent in 432 (stressed by P. A. Brunt, AJP 72 [1951],

269-79 = his Studies in Greek History and Thought, 1-10), though 42.2 is probably not an allusion to it. Probably Athens' action was not a direct breach of the Thirty Years' Peace, because when the treaty was made nobody envisaged such action and thought to ban it, but reaction on this scale to what appear to be small grievances

was in effect an act of war. 67.5. The Corinthians came forward last ... made the following speech in addition: Thucydides often suggests that he has selected one or two significant speeches from among several (cf,. Introduction, p. 7).

68.1.

Your trust ... less trusting: The Corinthians accuse the Spartans of being

introverted, and therefore inept in their dealings with others.

Commentary

231

good sense: For sophrosyne cf. 32.4. lt was particularly associated with Spartans; the concept is used both by Archidamus in 84.2 and by Sthenelaidas in 86.2 — and the Athenian Cleon praises sophrosyne and amathia in his perverse remarks in ΠῚ.

37.3. 68.3.

what you did not know ... what need is there for us to speak at length?

For this motif cf. Pericles in IL. 36.4, Hermocrates of Syracuse in IV. 59.2. seduced Corcyra: It was Corcyra which took the initiative in approaching Athens (31.2).

most opportune ... the Thraceward region: Because as a Corinthian colony it could be regarded as available to the Peloponnesians. the greatest fleet: Cf. 36.3, 42.4, 44 2. 69.1. to strengthen their city: Cf. 89.3-93.1, where Sparta tried but failed to prevent the rebuilding of Athens' walls. to erect the long walls: Cf. 107.1, 108.3, between which defeat at Tanagra was

only a short-lived setback for Athens (though in 107.4 dissident Athenians wanted to stop the building of the long walls).

liberator of Greece: A frequent claim in Thucydides, from 18.1—2 via II. 8.4 to VIII. 46.3. 69.2. those who have not yet decided: Sparta's hesitancy is a major theme of the Corinthian complaint. 69.3. lack of perceptiveness: Answered by Archidamus in 82.1. less bold ... press on strongly: A rather forced contrast between a situation in which the Spartans do not know what the Athenians are doing and one in which they do know but fail to act (cf. Introduction, p. 20).

69.4.

pursue inactivity: Cf. on ‘uninvolvement’ in 32.5. Quietism is condemned

in Pericles' funeral speech (II. 40.2) and his last speech (II. 61.4—64.6). strength ... hesitation: Hornblower follows A. Parry in noting the metrical

contrast between the quick δυνάμει (U U —) and the slow μελλήσει (- - -). 69.5. to the Peloponnese: It was only after a Persian squadron had advanced as far as the Megarid (Hdt. IX. 14) that the Spartans sent the substantial forces which fought at Plataea in 479. tripped over themselves: Appropriate to the Corinthians' argument, but as in 18.2 the Greek resistance could be represented more positively. through their own mistakes: Cf. Pericles in 144.1; and, as in the Egyptian campaign of 104, 109-10, the Athenians did sometimes overreach themselves.

69.6. reproach... denunciation: For Thuydides’ fondness for fine verbal distinctions not always reflected in normal Greek usage cf. xymmachia and epimachia in 44.1. Marcellin. Vit. Thuc. 36 attributes such akribologia to Prodicus of Ceos.

70.2.

innovative ... preserve what you have: Cf. Thucydides’ own judgment

of the Athenians and the Spartans in VIII. 96.5. Cleon in III. 38.3—7 represents the Athenians as too easily enticed by the prospects of novelty. Neoterismos often has

232

Commentary

unfavourable undertones: here it is something which the Athenians would be proud of, and provides an opportunity for the Corinthians to criticise the Spartans; cf. 102.3, where it is again combined with daring. But if the Spartans had been willing to support Samos against Athens in 440—439 (cf. 40.5) they had recently not been as reluctant as the Corinthians suggest. sharp: Cf. VIII. 96.4—5. 70.3. they are daring ... risk-taking ... and optimistic even in dire straits: For *daring' cf. VIII. 96.5. [n the Greek text the first two elements are exactly matched, in the manner favoured by Gorgias, but the third is constructed differently (cf. Introduction, p. 20). your nature: Archidamus replies in 84.2. 70.4. fond of going away from home: In Xen. Hell. IV. 3.2 the uncharacteristic Spartan Dercylidas is philapodemos.

by advancing... lose even what is at hand: Cf. Nicias! warning to the Athenians in VI. 9.2. 70.5. they follow through ... fall back: Cf. IV. 14.3, ofa battle between Athenians

and Spartans at Pylos. But what 1s said here is metaphorical: the Greeks in general did not pursue defeated enemies to a great distance (cf. E. L. Wheeler in P. Sabin ef al. [eds], The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, 1. 212). In 49.56

at Sybota some Corcyraeans went as far as the enemy camp and left the rest of their force in difficulty; and similarly in 62.6 at Potidaea some of the defending force went on a lengthy pursuit while the remainder was defeated. 70.6. they use their bodies for the city: Cf. what Pericles says in his funeral speech, and 70.8. do not

II. 42.2—-43.3. their judgment ... action for the city: Cf. II. 40.23. toil and danger: Cf. II. 36.2, but in 39.3 the Athenians unlike the Spartans make a practice of toiling; also Pericles' last speech, II. 62-3. Hornblower

compares Eur. Supp. 188—9, 323-5, 576-7. 8 holiday: But in his funeral speech Pericles boasts of Athens' many festivals as ‘relaxations from toil" (II. 38.1).

inactive leisure: On the morif of leisure as undesirable except when a special case for it could be made see A. J. Woodman,

Velleius Paterculus, ii. 241.

71.1. you continue delaying: This will be justified by Archidamus (esp. 84.1); cf. the Athenians in 78 and Thucydides’ own comment in 118.2. 71.2-3. your practices are old-fashioned ... what comes afterwards prevails: Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Ancient Concept of Progress, 11, and note the emphasis in 13.2—5 on the Corinthians’ innovations in naval matters.

71.3.

undisturbed institutions are best: Cf. the remarks of Cleon in III. 37.3,

Alcibiades in VI. 18.7. renewal more than with you: Cf. the Spartans' claim that their institutions were

those of Lycurgus, dated in antiquity to 776 or earlier (see on 18.1); but now it is increasingly thought that, while some ‘Lycurgan’ institutions are to be dated to the

Commentary

233

early seventh century, it was not until the fifth century that the Spartans deliberately cultivated austerity and attributed that to Lycurgus (cf. P. A. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 133-5). 71.4. to the Potidaeans ... by invading Attica: Cf. 58.1. to some other alliance: Presumably, as remarked by a scholiast, with Argos, which had made a thirty years' peace with Sparta in 451 (V. 14.4) and was neutral in

the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/5. The Corinthians did turn to Argos in 421 after the Peace of Nicias (V. 27-31), but, after a plan to align Argos with Sparta broke down, in 420 they inclined to Sparta again (V. 48).

71.5. the gods who protect oaths: Cf. the Athenians in 78.4. treaties are not broken ... : Cf. the later Corinthian speech, 123.2. 71.7.

noless than your fathers handed down to you: Cf. Pericles in 144.4.

72.1.

Athenian

envoys

... on other business:

Thucydides

ostentatiously (cf.

73.1) refuses to tell us what that business was. The Athenians' presence gives him the opportunity to insert here the first of the speeches in which the Athenians comment unsentimentally and unashamedly on the nature of their empire. Some

have thought it impossible that Athenians were present and spoke on this occasion (e.g. E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides?, 105; J. de Romilly trans. P. Thody, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, 242—3), but if we accept the reliability

of Thucydides' account in general we should not doubt it here. A. E. Raubitschek thought the business was the justification of Athens' reaction to Megara mentioned in Plut. Per. 30.2-3 (in P. A. Stadter [ed.], The Speeches in Thucydides, 32—48 at 33 = his The School of Hellas, 279-91 at 280), but more probably that preceded the sanctions decree (de Ste. Croix, O.P W. 246-51). not to offer any defence ... indicate how great ... turn them towards remaining

inactive: This matches the speech which follows. Thucydides should have been able

to find out approximately what they said (cf. on 67.1). Modern readers may well find this speech provocative; but to argue that Sparta would find it difficult to defeat Athens was a kind of deterrence, and J. R. Grant has noted that what might seem tactless to us was characteristic of Greek diplomacy (CQ" 15 [1965], 261—6). Among discussions of this speech in general see Raubitschek, op. cit. remind the older men ... expound to the younger ... : Cf. 42.1. 73.1. not to respond ... but so that you should not ... And at the same time ... to demonstrate that it is not unreasonable ... and that ourcity ... : Thucydides

avoids the precise balance which could easily have been used and which would have been characteristic of Gorgias (cf. Introduction, p. 20). to fall easily into deliberating for the worse: The Athenians commend the caution for which the Corinthians have criticised the Spartans; cf. 78, and Archidamus' speech which follows. 73.2. tospeak of matters far in the past: Gomme suggests that Thucydides may

have been thinking of Hdt. IX. 27.2-4, where the Athenians at Plataea do that. Ἂς

234

Commentary

tiresome to bring this up always: Tiresome to the Athenians, if we retain the manuscripts' text. In the Melian dialogue the Athenians refuse to use the Persian War to justify their empire (V. 89). 73.4. at Marathon we alone: In fact with a contingent from Plataea (Hdt. VI. 108.1), but the Athenians soon took to making this claim (cf. already Hdt. VII. 10. B.1, IX. 27.5): see K. R. Walters, RM? 124 (1981), 204-11.

we embarked on our ships: Repeated in 74.2, 4. that prevented the barbarian ... against individual cities: Cf. the argument which Mnesiphilus put to Themistocles in Hdt. VIII. 57—60. 73.5. He himself: By now ‘the barbarian' is specifically Xerxes. 74.1. towards the four hundred ships little under two thirds: Cf. 14.3. There is no consistency in the figures given in different texts, but Hdt. VIII. 43-8 gives Athens 200 (of which twenty were supplied to Chalcis: VIII. 1.2) out ofatotal of 378 (but the individual items, if the manuscripts' text is not emended, amount to 366).

K. R. Walters, RM? 124 (1981), 199—203, argues that Thucydides was attributing a gross exaggeration to the Athenians, and that they claimed as Athens' contribution

‘approximately four hundred ships, a little under two thirds’. Themistocles: In 480 he commanded the Athenians at Tempe, Artemisium and Salamis, but there is no mention of him in 479. most responsible ... fought in the straits: Cf. the narrative of Hdt. VIII. 56—64,

78-83. For the straits of Salamis N.B. VIII. 60.B, knowledge of which Homblower suggests Thucydides is assuming. you honoured him most of all the foreign men: Cf. Hdt. VIII. 123-5, claiming also that when the Greek commanders proposed to award prizes each voted for himself first and for Themistocles second. 74.2. the others ... submitting to slavery: After the fall of Thermopylae and the withdrawal from Artemisium there was nowhere north of the isthmus of Corinth

where it was feasible to resist the Persians. not to abandon the body of the remaining allies: Cf. the Athenians' refusal to abandon the Greek cause in Hdt. VIII. 140—4, IX. 4—7 (both after Salamis).

you had not first provided retribution for us: Cf. the complaints in Hdt. VIII. 40, IX. 6, 7.6. 74.3.

from a city which no longer existed: Cf. the attack on Themistocles by

Adimantus of Corinth, Hdt. VIII. 61. 75.1. do not deserve: Sthenelaïdas replies in 86.1. theempire which we possess: The Athenians now turn to this from the Persian War. excessive: Thucydides prefers the older ἄγαν to λίαν, which was becoming more

popular (J. F. Lockwood, CR 52 [1938], 7-8).

75.2.

not by violence ... to become their leaders: Cf. 94.1—96.1.

75.3. particularly by fear: τὸ πρῶτον is probably not here chronological. At first the Greeks will have been genuinely afraid that after their defeats in 490 and

Commentary

235

480—479 the Persians would attack them again (cf. on 96.1); later the Athenians will have been afraid that their allies would turn against them if they were not firmly

controlled (cf. Pericles’ last speech, Il. 63). honour ... advantage: As Hornblower remarks, these go closely together. The advantage uppermost in the speakers' minds would be power: the Athenians realised

that their empire brought economic benefits, both for rich and for poor citizens, but they did not as modern scholars have tried to do work out a balance-sheet of the empire.

75.4.

most were vexed with us: For the unpopularity of Athenian rule cf. II. 8.5,

and I. 98.4—99, It is maintained both in Thucydides’ narrative and in various speeches that the member states of the Delian League hated their subjection. Against that it was argued that the League was hated only by upper-class oligarchs, by G. Grote (History of Greece, vi. 9-10, 182-4 [12-vol. edition] = v. 149-51, 319-21 [10-vol. edition]) and by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Historia 3 [1954—5], 1-41). For further references and a review of the debate see Rhodes, The Athenian Empire, 36-8. Thucydides over-simplifies, and democratic politicians who were in power with

Athenian support and might be out of power without Athenian support had reason to favour Athens, but dislike of Athenian power is likely to have been widespread if not universal. some had defected and had been overcome: E.g. Naxos, 98. 4; Thasos, 100.2101.3; the Euboean cities, 114; Samos, 115.2-117.3.

you were no longer friendly to us: Cf. 101-2. the defections would have been towards you: A result of the division of the Greek world into Athenian and Spartan blocs, recognised in the Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5 (cf. 18.2). 75.5. unobjectionable: The word is used again by Archidamus in 82.1.

76.1.

as leaders of the cities in the Peloponnese ... advantage: Cf. 19.

you would have become no less distressing: Cf. 77.6, and the behaviour of

Pausanias after 479 (94—5, 128-34). This was borne out by Sparta's conduct after 404, but it is by no means impossible that it should have been said, and have been written by Thucydides, before then. 76.2. wehave not done anything at all surprising or alien to human ways: The

accumulation of negatives in the Greek makes this emphatic. your present argument about justice: As Hornblower remarks, no Spartan has said anything yet. nobody when in a position ... deter him from grasping more: Cf. the Melians'

argument from expediency in the Melian dialogue, V. 90. 76.3. human nature: One of the favourite contrasts of the sophists was between nomos, as human convention, which happens to have been decided one way but could be decided another, and physis, nature, which cannot be other than it 1s (cf. Introduction, pp. 15-16).

236

Commentary

77.1.

accepting

disadvantage

in

treaty-based

lawsuits

...

trials

among

ourselves under equitable laws: The meaning of this is controversial. Gomme began his comment by suggesting that it is the natural meaning of the sentence that

both clauses refer to the same phenomenon, but, after a discussion of treaty-based lawsuits (dikai apo symbolon, suits between citizens of different cities concerning which the cities had made a treaty: see P. Gauthier, Symbola, esp. 174—83), he

concluded as I do that they must refer to different phenomena. However, Hornblower argues that they do refer to the same phenomena and Athens had transferred such cases to its own courts. I believe the first point is that Athens still submitted to treatybased lawsuits even when that was to its disadvantage, the second is that some local lawsuits had been transferred from local courts to Athenian courts, which for the

purposes of this argument were deemed to be impartial but might well favour proAthenian litigants (cf. Meiggs, 4.E. 228—33). On the transfer of local lawsuits see M&L 52 = IG ὃ 40, trans. Fornara 103.71—6, [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.16-18, Antiph. 5. Murder of Herodes 47, Chamaeleon ap. Ath. 1X. 407 8. addicted to litigation: Athens was notorious for this (cf. e.g. Ar. Wasps). It has been calculated that even in the fourth century, when private suits reached a court only on appeal, the courts sat on 175—225 days each year (M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, 186-8). 77.2. those who hold an empire elsewhere: There need be no specific instance intended (but note the mention of the Persians in 77.5); in an Athenian speech

Spartan control of the Peloponnese should not be excluded (cf. Gomme). 77.4.

Men are more angry ... violence: Unfair treatment is resented more in a

setting in which one hoped for fairness than in a setting in which one had no such hope. 77.6. if you were to overthrow us ... : Cf. 76.1. each one of you when going abroad ... : On Spartans abroad cf. III. 93.3, V. 52.1; and Brasidas, who in the Thraceward region insisted that he would not misbehave (IV. 85-7), spoke attractively but deceptively (88.1, 108.5), and had to

claim that he had bound the Spartan authorities by oaths (86.1). 78.1. Deliberate slowly: Cf. 73.1. others ... yourselves: Answered by Sthenelaidas in 86.2. theincalculable element: Forthe importance ofthiscf. 84.3, IV. 18.2-5, VII. 61.3. 78.2. chance: Cf. Archidamus in 84.3, Pericles in 140.1, II. 61.3; and see Introduction, pp. 13-14.

78.3.

deeds... words: Cf. on 22.1 and Introduction, p. 7.

78.4.

We have never fallen into any mistake of that kind: For the importance

of thought before action cf. Pericles’ funeral speech, II. 40.3. by arbitration in accordance with the agreement: This is the first of several passages which indicate that there must have been a clause in the Thirty Years' Peace providing for arbitration (cf. on 115.1).

the gods who protect oaths: Cf. 71.5.

Commentary

237

79.1. they dismissed them all: This is a meeting of the Spartan assembly (cf. on 67.1): the foreigners were admitted to speak, and probably to hear one another, but were not allowed to stay and listen to the Spartans' own debate. 79.2. Archidamus their king: In the Eurypontid line: Archidamus II reigned

from 476/5 or 469/8 (see Rhodes, 4 History of the Classical Greek World, 478—323 BC, 29-30) to 427/6 (see my commentary on III. 89.1).

both intelligent and sensible: For xynetos see Hornblower, following R. Syme, PBA 48 (1962), 55-6: it is one of Thucydides’ highest terms of praise (cf. on 138.3), though misdirected intelligence is criticised by Archidamus himself in 84.3 and by Cleon in III. 37.3-5. Archidamus is the only man whom Thucydides describes as sophron. Archidamus' speech here belongs to a literary tradition of unheeded warners: see e.g. V. Gray in E. J. Bakker et al. (eds), Brill s Companion to

Herodotus, 299—302; another Thucydidean instance is the Athenian Nicias in VI. 8-26. E. L. Hussey in Crux ... G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 118-38, discusses among other Thucy didean passages Archidamus' and Sthenelaidas' speeches, noting that neither can deny the other's main points and suggesting affinties with the philosophy of

Democritus. 80.1. I myself already have experience: Cf. on 79.2. those among you of the same age: For the contrast between old and young cf.

42.1. through inexperience of the reality: For enthusiasm for war among those who have not experienced it cf. II. 8.1; but in 81.6 Archidamus will suggest that inexperience might have the opposite effect. Except against Corcyra, we do not

know of any wars fought by the Peloponnesians since 446. 80.2. not the least of wars: Cf. 1.1, 23.1—3. 80.3. who possess a distant land: Not as distant as the Persians (69.5). most experienced at sea: Archidamus here lists points which he develops in 80.4—81.4. The Corinthians respond to this point in 121.3—4, and Pericles in 142.6—

9, wealth: Cf. 83.2-3, Sthenelaïdas in 86.3, the Corinthians in 121.3-5 and Pericles in 141.3, 142.1, 143.1; later Cleon in III. 39.8 and Diodotus in III. 46.3. On the novel importance of money for Athenian power see L. Kallet-Marx, in Ritual, Finance, Politics ... D. Lewis, 227-51. ships, horses: Cf. Sthenelaidas in 86.3. hoplites: In this respect the Peloponnesians were superior: cf. Archidamus himselfin 81.1, and the Corinthians in 121.2. 3 body of men ... any other single place in Greece: Populous though Athens was, it is unlikely that the total population of Attica exceeded the total population

(including perioikoi and helots) of the much larger Laconia and Messenia. tribute-paying allies: Cf. 83.2; the Corinthians respond in 122.1.

238

Commentary

81.1. other land ... import what they need by sea: Cf. Pericles in 143.5. if we are judged to have begun the dispute: That was the case: the Spartans

rejected Athens” offer of arbitartion (cf. 78.4), and in 431 did formally begin the war (II. 10-12); the fact that in 414 it was the Athenians who most blatantly broke the Peace of Nicias of 421 gave them greater confidence in the last phase of the war (VI.

105.1-2, VII. 18.2). 81.3. if we try to make their allies defect: The first attempt to do this, which did involve a naval expedition, was in connection with the revolt of Mytilene in 428—427 and was a disaster (III. 2-50).

81.6.

the hope that the war will be quickly finished if we ravage their land:

Sparta began the war in 431 by invading Attica and hoping that the Athenians would go out of the city to fight a battle; since the Athenians would probably have been defeated in such a battle Pericles refused to do that (II. 10-14, 18—23); but it was

generally expected that this strategy would bring Sparta victory within a few years (V. 14.3, VII. 28.3, cf. VI. 11.5). V. D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Ancient Greece, argued that, while the threat of damage to farmland might provoke the victims to risk a battle, the invaders would not be able to do serious long-term damage. The Comithians unrealistically hope for a quick victory at sea in 121.4; Pericles remarks on the Peloponnesians' inability to wage a long war in 141.6.

bequeath it to our children: The war ended with Athens' capitulation in 404; but we do not have to suppose that Thucydides could not have written this unti] a late stage in the war. 82.1.

by winning over allies both Greek and barbarian: Cf. II. 7, on attempts

at the beginning of the war to gain allies. it is unobjectionable ... but also barbarians: The barbarians most obviously relevant are the Persians. The Delian League had been founded to continue the war against the Persians (96.1), and although after the death of Cimon it had discontinued

active warfare (cf. on 112.4) the Persians were still regarded as the Greeks' enemy par excellence. To appeal to Persia for support against fellow Greeks required a

major change in attitude, but the Spartans did this (without success until 412), and the Athenians also made approaches since they needed at least to ensure that Persia would not help Sparta (cf. II. 67, IV. 50). naval ... support: The support of Corcyra's navy had been gained by Athens

(24—55). unobjectionable: Cf. the Athenians in 75.5.

82.2.

when we send envoys: Although they were not persuaded by Archidamus,

after deciding on war in late summer 432 the Spartans did send envoys before

beginning the war in spring 431 (125.1—126.2, 139.1—2, 145-6). 82.4.

spareitas far as possible: Alexander the Great is said to have told his troops

to spare the land of Asia, because it was to be the property of the Macedonians (Just. Epit. Xl. 6.1). 82.6. complaints of cities and of private individuals: The complaints Thucydides

Commentary

239

has mentioned are all complaints of cities: Gomme suggests Corinthian and Megarian traders, but perhaps the individuals have been added simply to strengthen the view that this would be a war undertaken ‘for private reasons”, a view which limits ‘allowing them to harm our allies’ in 82.1. 83.2.

as many: As many as Sparta had, and in fact significantly more.

84.1. do not be ashamed: On this chapter see Hussey, in Crux (cf. on 79.2), 123-5, noting its sophistic character and suggesting that both Archidamus here and Pericles in II. 37—43 are represented as being aware of their city's weaknesses.

sluggishness: Cf. the Corinthians in 71.4; Archidamus prefers to say ‘at leisure' (83.3, 85.1). 84.2.

prudent good sense: For sophrosyne cf. 32.4, and the Corinthians in 68.1

and the description of Archidamus in 79.2. Sthenelaidas replies in 86.2. insolent ... disasters: This replies to the Corinthians in 70.3. goad us with denunciation: Cf. the Corinthian speech, which in 69.6 claims to be using reproach and not denunciation.

84.3. our good order: Cf. Sparta's eunomia in 18. 1, and for kosmos at Sparta cf. Hdt. I. 65.4. respect ... a sense of shame: Here aidos and aischyne are equivalent, and the

point is that true courage, 'good spirit', is a product of good sense. we are trained to be too unlearned ... decided by words: On excessive intelligence with regard to the laws cf. Cleon in III. 37.3—5, and on chance cf. 78.2. For views of Spartan education and hardship see Xen. Lac. Pol. 2-3, Plut. Lyc. 16.10-18.9. J. Hesk in D. M. Carter (ed.), Why Athens? 125—6, explores this view of

Sparta as good at deciding because it is risk-averse and aware of the unpredictability of chance.

84.4.

mistakes whieh they may make: Cf. the Corinthians in 69.5.

85.1.

This is possible ... because of our strength: Delay will not allow the

Spartans to become weaker and the Athenians stronger (Gomme).

85.2. arbitration: Cf. 78.4. Sthenelaidas ... one of the ephors: There were five ephors, elected from all full Spartan citizens with no possibility of re-election (Arist. Pol. 2. 1270 n 6-10, 25—8, 1272 À 6-7). They were the chief civilian officials of Sparta, which had not

abolished its kings but had transferred many of their powers to the ephors. 86.1. 1 don't understand the many words of the Athenians: However well Thucydides may have been informed about what was actually said, this speech conforms

very well to the stereotype of terse Spartan utterance (cf. Plut. Lyc. 19-20). they deserve a double penalty: Cf. the Thebans on the Plataeans (111. 67.2), and

see A. R. Hands, CQ" 24 (1974), 312-7. 86.2. the same then as we are now: 140.1, II. 61.2, Cleon in III. 38.1.

For claims to consistency cf. Pericles in

240

Commentary

if we are sensible: Replying to Archidamus in 82.24. not overlook while our allies are being wronged: Replying to Archidamus'

*war for private reasons' in 82.6. delay ... delay ... : This effectively counters the whole of Archidamus' speech;

cf. the Corinthians in 69.2, 4. 86.3. plentiful money and ships and horses: Cf. Archidamus in 80.3. 86.4. it is proper for us to deliberate: Replying to the Athenians in 78 (cf. 72.1) and to Archidamus in 84.1-85.1. 87.1.

asephor he put the motion to the Spartan assembly: The ephors presided

in the gerousia and the assembly. 87.2. since they decide by shouting, not by voting: Described for the election

of members of the gerousia by Plut. Lyc. 26.3-5: men in a windowless hut had to decide which candidate received the loudest shout. he said that he could not distinguish which shout was the greater: This need

not mean that opinions were in fact evenly divided (cf. Gomme). 87.4. they wanted to summon all the allies: Cf. on 67.1. prosecute the war if they judged that right: It would be possible to judge the

Athenians in breach of the treaty without going to war, as in 419/8 the Athenians judged the Spartans to be in breach of the Peace of Nicias but did not consider the treaty to be at an end (V. 56.1—3). E. Badian argued that the formal decision now was only that Athens was in the wrong, and that Sparta decided on war only when

the negotiations of winter 432/1 failed (1n J. W. Allison [ed.], Conflict, Antithesis and the Ancient Historian, 71—9, revised in his From Plataea to Potidaea, 145-52), but it is unlikely that Sparta would have summoned the allies except to obtain a

decision for war. 87.6. in the fourteenth year of the Thirty Years’ Treaty: Thebes' attack on Plataea, in spring 431, was in the fifteenth year (II. 2.1). Counting with ordinals was inclusive: if Thucydides for events before 431 was thinking in terms of Athenian

years, which began after the summer solstice, this will put the attack on Plataea in 432/], and this Spartan assembly at the end of 433/2, after a treaty (cf. 115.1) in

446/5. 88. the treaty had been broken and they must go to war: This opens a ring which will be closed in 118.3: inside the ring Thucydides places his account of the

growth of Athenian power, to justify his view of the reasons for the war. not so much persuaded ... as afraid ... : This repeats Thucydides’ belief that

his ‘truest reason’ counted for more than the ‘grievances and disputes’ (23.5—6), which he has dealt with in 24—88. 89-118. 'Pentecontaetia ': growth of Athenian power 89.1. For it was in the following kind of way ... grew in power: Cf. on 88. V. Pothou, Θουκυδίδου ἀρχαιολογία Kai πεντηκονταετία, 27, 134, stresses the use of yap, ‘for’: this section has been written to make the point about the ‘truest reason’,

Commentary

24]

not to provide a general history of the period, which lasted not quite fifty years (cf. 118.2: the term pentekontaetia is used by a scholiast here), or even of the Delian League. There was no doubt League activity against the Persians which Thucydides does not mention. Our other main sources for the period are Diod. Sic. XI. 37.4—XII. 28.4 and Plut. Them., Arist., Cim. and Per: to a considerable extent on inter-state matters they give further details (whether soundly based or not) on episodes which Thucydides mentions, rather than episodes which he omits; | cite these sources below only where | wish to draw attention to something which they say.

89.2.

with both ships and infantry: Cf. 23.1.

Leotychides ... returned home with the allies from the Peloponnese: Leotychidas

IL, the Eurypontid king, grandfather and predecessor of Archidamus II; Hdt. 1X. 106, 114, reports that the whole Greek force went to the Hellespont, and Leotychidas and the Peloponnesians retumed home on finding that Xerxes' bridge of boats had already been destroyed (cf. also Diod. Sic. Xl. 37.4). Hornblower remarks that in 89-95 Thucydides' narrative is relaxed, as it is not in the chapters which follow, so this like 128-38 may be early work pressed into new service (cf. on 126.1). the allies from Ionia ... who had already defected from the King: Cf. Hdt. IX. 103-4 on the defection of the lonians from the King at and after the battle of Mycale; it is not a problem that IX. 106.4 mentions the reception only of islanders

into the Greek alliance. lonians in a strict sense are one strand of the Greek people, who had settled on part of the west coast of Asia Minor and the offshore islands (cf. 2.6), with Aeolians to their north and Dorians to their south; in a looser sense

‘lonians’ was often used of the Asiatic Greeks as a whole. stayed on to besiege Sestos ... the barbarians abandoned it: [n the Chersonese

(Inventory 672). This episode is important as the first campaign after the Persian War under Athenian leadership. Here Thucydides and Herodotus overlap: Hdt. IX. 114.2-121 gives a detailed account. Thucydides surely knew it, but Hornblower is perhaps wrong to suggest that he assumed his readers would know it. Cf. also Diod.

Sic. XI. 37.4—5. which was held

by

the

Persians:

Μήδων

ἐχόντων:

Thucydides

makes

considerable use of such genitive absolutes in this section.

89.3. The community of the Athenians: This use of koinon is Herodotean (and is used ofthe Athenian assembly in Hdt. IX. 117). Cf. 90.5. from where they had deposited

them: Troezen, Aegina and Salamis (Hdt.

VIII. 41.1). to rebuild the city and the walls: Thucydides believes that Athens had walls before 480 (cf. 93.2 and Hdt. IX. 13.2), though Pothou thinks the emphasis on

the city justifies-‘rebuild’: no remains have been found, and some scholars have doubted that there were walls earlier, but see E. Vanderpool, in φόρος ... B. D.

Meritt, 156—60. a few survived: Not a serious disagreement with Hdt. ΙΧ. 13.2, where in 479

Mardonius destroyed everything which until then had been left standing..

242

Commentary

90.1. But the Spartans: Hornblower after D. M. Lewis notes that in Hdt. IX. 7-11 the Athenians were kept waiting in Sparta while the Spartans built a wall across the Isthmus of Corinth. The building of city walls features in Thucydides’ sketch of the Greeks' development (7). neither the Athenians nor anybody else should have a wall: Sparta remained unwalled (Xen. Hell. VI. 5.28, cf. 10.2 here) until the hellenistic period. their allies were spurring them on: In Plut. Them. 19.2, Aegina; the Corinthians complain retrospectively in 69.1. 90.2. asthey had done on that occasion from Thebes: Cf. Hdt. IX. 13.3 erc. 90.3. Themistocles told them ... : This is one of a number of stories in which Themistocles is not merely clever (138.3) but cunning (cf. e.g. Hdt. VIII. 75, 108— 10), and one of a number in which after 479 his cleverness is directed against Sparta, perhaps anticipating the future rivalry of the two cities (cf. Plut. Them. 20.3-4,

Them. 20.1-2 with Cic. Of. III. 49). The details may well have been embroidered, but we need not doubt that Sparta tried to prevent the rebuilding and was foiled by Themistocles. themselves and the women and children: This adds to what might be understood from πανδημεὶ, and should not be deleted.

90.5.

the community: The assembly (cf. on 89.3).

91.1. because of their friendship for him: Cf. 74.1. 91.3. Habronichus son of Lysicles: Used as a messenger between Thermopylae and Artemisium in 480 (Hdt. VIII. 21); a candidate for ostracism in the 480s and 470s (S. Brenne, Ostrakismos und Prominenz in Athen, 153-4). Aristides son of Lysimachus: See Davies, 4.PF 48-53. In the main tradition he was Themistocles' opponent, aristocratic and upright where Themistocles was

democratic and devious. In fact, it seems, they and Pericles’ father Xanthippus were engaged in a three-cornered rivalry in the 480s, and in the 470s Aristides (Themistocles' confidant in the various stories) was on the same side as Themistocles in opposition to Cimon: see Rhodes, 4 Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion

Politeia, 280, 348-9. 91.4. the Athenians could determine what was in their own interest and in the common interest: ‘The first suggestion that Athens sees herself as an imperial power' (Hornblower). 91.5. embark on the ships: Cf. 73.4, 74.2, 4. 91.7. either they should all participate in the alliance without walls: In 90.2 the Spartans had suggested that the walls of other cities outside the Peloponnese should be demolished, but there is no sign that that was a serious proposal. 92. ostensibly: δῆθεν (rare in Attic prose outsdie Thucydides) casts doubt on the ostensible purpose. they were vexed but did not show it: The first intimation of opposition betwen Sparta and Athens.

Commentary

243

93.2. it is clear even now ... done in haste: As in the opening chapters (8.1, 10.1-2) Thucydides cites archaeological evidence. Cf. R. E. Wycherley, The Stones of Athens, 11—12, suspecting that Thucydides exaggerates; J. M. Camp, The Archaeology of Athens, 59-60, accepting the Thucydidean account. Hornblower

cites some instances of the use of ornamental stones. the circuit was extended to a greater extent: Implying that Thucydides knew

where the old wall had been. 93.3. the Piraeus: This replaced the open Phalerum bay (cf. Hdt. VI. 116) as Athens’ harbour area. Athens could not rely on the Piraeus until it had gained secure possession of Salamis, at the end of the sixth century; but its intermittent war with Aegina will have demonstrated the need for a more secure harbour than Phalerum (see Hdt. V. 81.3, and cf. on 14.3). the year's archonship which he held at Athens: 1n 493/2 (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. VI. 34.1). Some, over-impressed by ‘recently’ in Hdt. VII. 143.1, have wanted a different office, nearer to 480, but see D. M. Lewis and W. W. Dickie, Historia 22

(1973), 757-8 and 758-9. with three natural harbours: Cantharus, facing west, was in antiquity and is

now the main harbour; the others, facing south, are Zea (Pasalimani) and Munichia (Tourkolimano). 93.4. helping them to construct their empire: This is preferred to ‘the beginning

of the work’ by both Gomme and Hornblower, and it provides the justification for the inclusion of this in Thucydides' account. 93.5.

the wall round the Piraeus: Only part was of solid masonry (Wycherley,

The Stones of Athens, 15). The surviving remains are of the walls built in the 390s. two waggons: The meaning must be that the wall was wide enough for them to pass each other (Gomme).

about half of what he had intended: We do not know the basis for this. 93.6. enemies’ hostile plans: Some of the later manuscripts have, and Herwerden preferred, the more obvious ἐπιβολάς, ‘enemies’ assaults’.

a few of the most unfit ... embark on the ships: Cf. what had happened in 480 (Hdt. VIII. 40-1, 51-2). 93.7.

the Piraeus was more advantageous than the upper city: In the 450s the

two were linked by the long walls (107.1, 108.3). In his emphasis on the Piraeus and the navy Themistocles is represented as foreshadowing Pericles (e.g. 142-3). 94.1.

Pausanias son of Cleombrotus: As in 479, when he commanded at Plataea

(Hdt. IX. 10.1—2), regent for his cousin, the Agid king Plistarchus. He and the Eurypontid king Leotychidas (cf. 89.2) exchanged commands, with Leotychidas taking land forces into northem Greece, where he too fell into trouble (cf. on 102.4). Despite Leotychidas’ withdrawal in 479, the Spartans had not given up their

leadership of the Greek alliance against Persia.

244

Commentary [ LEONIDAS

1 CLEOMBROTUS [ Pausanias

PLISTARCHUS | PLISTOANAX

|

—] Nicomedes

l Cleomenes

94.2. Cyprus: Poised between the Greek world and the near-eastern world (cf. Hdt. V. 104, 108-16, VI. 6, VII. 90; and below, 100. 1, 104.2, 112.2-4). It was used by the Persians as a naval base when they were interested in the Aegean, and claimed for the Greek world by the Greeks at times of aggression against Persia. Byzantium: On the European side of the Bosporus (/nventory 674); it had been

abandoned by its inhabitants and captured by the Persians in 494/3 at the end of the Ionian Revolt (Hdt. VI. 33.2). Recovering Byzantium for the Greeks was a natural sequel to recovering Sestos (89.2).

under his leadership: Literally, ‘under this leadership’, as opposed to the subsequent leadership of the Athenians. 95.1. Since he was already violent ... : Thucydides retums to Pausanias in Byzantium in 128.3-130. the Ionians ... liberated from the King: Cf. 89. 2. Even at the foundation of the

Delian League not all the members were Ionian in the strict sense, but representing the League as an Ionian league helped the Athenians to justify their leadership.

kept going to the Athenians ... : Cf. 96.1. Thucydides attributes the initiative to the allies, as in the Athenian speech in 75.2; but Hdt. VIII. 3.2 writes of the Athenians' using the hybris of Pausanias as a pretext to take over the leadership (cf.

Ath. Pol. 23.4). It would not have happened without willingness on both sides. I discuss the problems of 95.1—97.1 in The Athenian Empire, 5-11. on grounds of kinship: Cf. 2.6. 95.5.

he

was

held

to

account:

Euthynein,

literally

‘straighten’,

was

used

particularly of the accounting procedures to which office-holders were subjected. he was accused not least of medism

... extremely clear: Here and in the

later digression on Pausanias, presumably because he trusted his Spartan sources, Thucydides is convinced of his guilt on charges which were never proved in court.

On 'medism' as the term for collaboration with the Persians see D. Graf, JHS 104 (1984), 15—30, and cf. on 14.2. The story of Pausanias is continued in 128.3-135.1,

with this charge substantiated in 128.3-130. 95.6. might be corrupted: Cf. the case of Leotychidas, cited on 94.1. 95.7.

thinking that the Athenians ... friendly to themselves: But Ath. Pol. 23.2,

unemended and given its natural sense, says that the Spartans were unwilling, and Diod. Sic. XI. 50 has a debate which ends unexpectedly with a decision not to challenge Athens. Probably Pausanias was not alone in his ambitions for Sparta but the decision was acceptable to most Spartans. In the years after 478 Sparta's

Commentary

245

position in the Peloponnese was insecure: cf. e.g. Hdt. IX. 35.2. Hornblower notes the clash between this and the vexation of 92. 96.1.

The Athenians took over the leadership in this way: It is important to

Thucydides that the beginnings of the Delian League were innocent; and it is at any rate true that the Athenians could not have predicted that Pausanias would

provide them with their opportunity. However, L. stresses that in their early campaigns the Athenians interests in the northern Aegean which they had sixth century; and for this perspective see also J.

Kallet, JHS 133 (2013), 43-60, were quick to advance economic already begun to develop in the K. Davies, in A. Slawisch (ed.),

Handels- und Finanzgebaren in der Agdis im 5. Jh. v Chr, 43-66. Whether the new alliance was independent of or in some way bound up with the anti-Persian alliance of 481 (which still existed: cf. 102.4) is probably a question which nobody would have thought of asking at the time. They appointed which of the cities ... and which ships: And how large each

member state's contribution was to be: cf. 96.2. the pretext ... ravaging the King's land: Probably meant to be contrasted with

what happened later rather than with an undisclosed intention now. But not all the members had suffered as Athens had; and it is hard to accept ravaging as the only objective, and to understand why it is the only objective mentioned here. Ath. Pol. 23.5 writes of a permanent offensive and defensive alliance; Thucydides elsewhere

writes of liberating Greeks still subject to Persia (III. 10.3, V1.76.3—4); and there must also have been a desire to guard against further Persian attacks. 96.2. Hellenotamiae: ‘Greek treasurers’; an Athenian office to perform part of the leading state's function. The doubts of A. G. Woodhead that these were provided by Athens from the beginning (JHS 79 [1959], 149-52) were unnecessary.

tribute: Phoros, used by Herodotus of money levied by the Lydians, the Persians and others (e.g. 1. 6.2, III. 89.2—3): before this no Greek state had collected tribute. For ‘contribution of money’, below, Thucydides uses the cognate phora, and he

afterwards repeats phoros, making the mention of it very emphatic. The first assessment of tribute was four hundred and sixty talents: This was the work of Aristides (V. 18.5, cf. Ath. Pol. 23.5, Plut. Arist. 24.1—4). The evidence for tribute collected later, when the League was larger than at its foundation and

few members contributed ships, makes this amount implausibly large. Perhaps the assessment lists were optimistic (cf. I1. 13.3 with my commentary, and C. W. Fornara, in Gestures ... A. L. Boegehold, 251—7), and the first was made not only for

the original members but also for those whom Athens hoped to recruit. Delos was their treasury: Hence the modern term Delian League. The sanctuary

of Apollo on the Aegean island of Delos, his traditional birthplace, was of particular importance to the lonians (cf. on 95.1). The treasury was later moved to Athens,

presumably immediately before the first of the ‘Athenian tribute lists’ (lists of the '/so of each member's tribute given to Athena), of 454/3 (/G i? 259: cf. on 110. 1).

and

their

meetings

were

held

at

the sanctuary:

Meetings

of allied

246

Commentary

representatives were perhaps discontinued when the treasury was moved:

in the

second half of the century Athens took decisions which ought to have been taken by such meetings if they had existed. 97.1.

atfirst were autonomous: Forthe word cf. 67.2. Probably nothing was stated

at the time, because it did not occur to anybody that there might be encroachments on the members' freedom. against the barbarians and their own allies ... and those of the Pelopon-

nesians ... : The three fields of activity through which the Athenians built up their power. For an attempt to detect an antithetical arrangement of the material, with regard to these three fields, in the narrative which follows see R. A. McNeal, Historia 19 (1970), 312-21. 97.2. I have written about it and made this digression from my narrative: Whereas the purpose indicated in 88-89. | istoexplainhow Athens became powerful and made Sparta afraid for its position. This ‘second introduction” to the section on the pentecontaetia marks a change in scale from the detailed account of how Athens

moved into a leading position to the much briefer account of how it behaved in that position: see Rood, Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation, 229-31. all those before me ... or of the Persian War itself: dealt with the Persian War and a good deal of earlier Greek Hellanicus: Of Lesbos, whose writings included the Athens: FGrH 323a). That included events of 407/6 (FF

In particular, Herodotus history. first Arfhis (history of 25—6), so this comment

will presumably have been written after that (cf. Introduction, p. 17). This is the only occasion when Thucydides names another historian, though he often seems to show knowledge of Herodotus (cf. Homblower, ii. 122—45) and at least in 20.3

directly disagrees with him. his account is brief and not precise in its chronology: V. 20.2 shows that

οὐκ ἀκριβῶς here means ‘not precise”, not *erroneous'. Thucydides' account of this period is itself open to those objections. I discuss the chronology in The Athenian

Empire, 12-21; but on the dates of inscriptions see my revised views in CQ? 58 (2008), 500—6. At the same time this provides an exposition of the way in which the Athenian empire was established: And so justifies Thucydides' ‘truest reason' for the Peloponnesian War (cf. on 88). Herodotus claimed to provide an exposition (apodexis) of his investigation (Hdt. I. preface). 98.1.

Fion ... which was held by the Persians: At the mouth of the Strymon,

on the Thracian coast (/nventory 630). Hdt. VII. 107 describes the resistance by its governor, Boges; Plut. Cim. 7.3 adds that it was settled as an Athenian colony (and Thuc. IV. 102.4 says that the Athenians possessed it as an emporion, a trading post); schol. Aeschin. II. Embassy 31 (67a Dilts) gives a date of 476/5; Aeschin. III. Ctesiphon 183—5 mentions inscribed herms celebrating the victory. Cimon son of Miltiades: The father of Lacedaemonius (45.2); on the family

Commentary

247

see Davies, A. PF 293-312. He commanded the Delian League forces in all the campaigns which we know down to that against Thasos (100.2—101.3). 98.2. Scyros: East of Euboea, and on the route between Athens and the Hellespont (Inventory 521); it is not mentioned by Herodotus except as once as a man's home (VII. 183.3), so presumably was not important in the Persian War. Plut. Cim. 8.3-7, Thes. 36.1—4, says that Cimon brought back what was said to be the skeleton of the legendary hero Theseus; Thes. gives a date of 476/5. Dolopians: Except in this passage they are located in the mountainous country west of Thessaly; the Dolopians of Scyros are described as pirates by Plutarch, who says that Thessalians who had suffered from them obtained a judgment against them from the Delphic amphictyony (for which see on 15.2). 98.3. the Carystians: At the southern end of Euboea, again on the route betwen Athens and the Hellespont (Inventory 373). Carystus was captured by the Persians

in 490 (Hdt. VI. 99.2) and submited to them in 480 (VIII. 112.2 cf. 121.1); Hdt. IX. 105 mentions a battle in this campaign. Presumably Carystus had refused to join the League. without the other Euboeans: This presumably means that the other cities had joined the League and Athens fought only against Carystus.

98.4.

theNaxians: Inhabitants of the largest island of the Cyclades, in the southern

Aegean (/nventory 507). Unless we may extrapolate from 99.1, we do not know why Naxos defected.

enslaved: Here douloun, used metaphorically, in contrast to andrapodizein used literally in 98.1-2 (cf. on 8.3); the treatment of Thasos (101.3) is the best indication

of what this is likely to have meant in practical terms. contrary to what had been established: παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς.

However,

probably it had not been thought necessary to state that the allies were to retain their independence, but this was taken for granted: cf. on 97.1. 99.1. desertion from campaigns: Presumably by whole contingents in the course of a campaign (Gomme). Thucydides inserts this comment after the first coercion of an existing member; Diod. Sic. Xl. 70.3—4 inserts a comment after the coercion of Thasos, where Athens' conduct was more blatantly self-interested. However innocent the League's beginning may have been (cf. on 96.1), deterioration began

soon. the Athenians enforced the obligations punctiliously: The Athenians were taking a permanent alliance to mean permanent warfare, to an extent which the members had presumably not expected. not accustomed or willing to persevere: Cf. Hdt. VI. 11-12, on the Ionians at

Lade in the Ionian Revolt in 495. 99.2. no longer participated ... on an equal basis: Cf. what the Mytilenaeans say in III. 10.4. The fact that more members chose to pay tribute (99.3) will have contributed to this. 99.3. to avoid having to be away from home: For a small state to provide

248

Commentary

one or two triremes and their crew for a long campaign every summer would be burdensome. 100.1. the River Eurymedon: Which reaches the sea on the south coast of Asia Minor, north-west of Cyprus. The Persians were presumably assembling forces which

were or might be intended for another attack on Greece (cf. Diod. Sic. XI. 60.5—6, Plut. Cim. 12.2), and this victory over them made a great impression, marked by epigrams (cf. Diod. Sic. XI. 62.3), the dedication of a bronze date palm (phoinix) at Delphi (Paus. X. 15.4) and a vase which depicts a Greek about to penetrate a Persian called Eurymedon (for a recent discussion see M. C. Miller in D. M. Pritchard [ed.], War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens, 304—38). It has been suggested

that what prompted the invitation to Cimon and his fellow generals to judge the tragic contest of 469/8 (Plut. Cim. 8.7—9) was not the recovery of Theseus’ skeleton, mentioned immediately before, but the victory at the Eurymedon, in which case that victory can be dated 469 (A. T.L. iii. 160); I should expect a significant interval between that and the episodes of Carystus and Naxos, when Athens was not secure in the Aegean.

Phoenician triremes: The mainstay of the Persians' Mediterranean fleet. 100.2. the Thasians: Thasos is an island in the northern Aegean, off the Thracian coast (/nventory 526). about the trading posts ... and about the mine ... : For these possessions cf. Hdt. VI. 46.2-3; Kallet (cited on 96.1) stresses that Athens had already impinged on these Thasian possessions when it took Eton for itself (98.1). Some member states off the coast of Asia Minor had interests on the mainland there, so it will have been

remarkable if the Athenians succeeded in justifying this campaign to the members. 100.3. Nine Ways: In a straight line less than 5 miles/8 km inland from Eion, at a point where the Strymon could be crossed. Schol. Aeschin. II. Embassy 31 (cf. on 98.1) mentions an earlier Athenian attempt to occupy the site, after the capture of Eion.

Amphipolis: Settled under this name in 437/6 (IV. 102, cf. schol. Aeschin. Il. Embassy 31). Edonians ... Edonian: Hedonians and Hedonian, given by some manuscripts

at all occurrences, was suggested by D. M. Lewis, ‘Towards a Historian's Text of Thucydides', 43, and accepted by Hornblower. they were all destroyed at Drabescus ... by the Thracians: This is preferable to the manuscripts’ ‘they were destroyed ... by all the Thracians’, though Gomme

defended that. Cf. IV. 102.2 (‘by Thracians’, without ‘all’), Hdt. IX. 75. In my commentary on IV. 102.2 I preferred the location at Drama, about 30 miles/50 km

north-east of Amphipolis (cf. Meiggs, A.E. 84 n. 2); but the alternative location near the confluence of the Angites and the Strymon, about 8 miles/13 km north

of Amphipolis, is gaining acceptance (cf. M. Hatzopoulos, REG 101 [1988], 447 no. 854, Barrington Atlas 51, Inventory, p. 856). This is probably the disaster at *Datus/um' of Hdt. IX. 75, Isoc. VIII. Peace 86. It was a major setback for the

Commentary

249

Athenians: Agora xvii 1 =/G i? 1144 is thought to be primarily a list of those killed at Drabescus, with a few men killed elsewhere added, and is the earliest such list surviving from Athens (cf. Paus. I. 29.4 but contrast §§7, 14). 101.1. appealed to the Spartans ... by invading Attica: Cf. appeals by the Persians (109.2-3) and the Potidaeans (58.1); none of these was successful, but

contr. 114.1-2. 101.2. They promised, keeping it secret ... and intended to do so: The Athenians were commanded by Cimon, and Sparta had not yet broken with Athens (cf. 102.1); and I share the suspicions of many (already E. M. Walker, C. A.H.! v. 72) that Sparta's promise and intention, if not the appeal, were a later invention, to

explain why Sparta had not prevented the growth of Athenian power. the earthquake which had occurred: This killed many Spartan citizens (cf. Diod. Sic. XI. 63.1-2, Plut. Cir. 16.4—6), and at least contributed to the decline in Sparta’s citizen numbers over the fifth and fourth centuries (cf. de Ste. Croix, O.P. W.

33 1-2, though he minimises its importance in this respect). the helots: Their first mention in Thucydides: the word probably means ‘captives’, and they were a servile class of native inhabitants, probably reduced to that status in the eighth and seventh centuries (cf. below, and IV. 20.2-4). See N. Luraghi and S. E. Alcock (eds), Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia. the perioikoi of Thuria and Aethaea: For the perioikoi cf. on 17. Thuria (Inventory 322) was, and Aethaea (/nventory 312) probably was, in the southern

part of the Stenyclarus valley in eastern Messenia. to Ithome: The mountain overlooking the Stenyclarus valley from the west. In the list of five Spartan conflicts in Hdt. IX. 35.2, whatever is alluded to by 'the conflict with the Messenians at the isthmus’, we should not emend ‘isthmus’ to 'Ithome'. Most of the helots ... all called Messenians; This was essentially a revolt of the Messenians against Sparta. Sparta expanded westwards from Laconia into Messenia in the late eighth and the seventh centuries, but because the Messenians needed to reconstruct their past after their liberation in 370/69 it is hard to sift fact

from later embroidery in the First and Second Messenian Wars. If we reject, as | believe we should, a Messenian war c. 490 unknown to Herodotus, Thucydides' war is the Third Messenian War. See N. Luraghi, The Ancient Messenians, arguing

against a war c. 490 at 173—82. There were probably more perioikoi in Laconia and more helots in Messenia, but there were men of both categories in both regions. who had been enslaved then: At the time of the conquest. Thucydides uses douloun, but here literally (contr. 98.4). 101.3. in the third year of their siege: In IV. 102.2—3, if we count from Aristagoras' going to Myrcinus in 496/5, the settlement of 100.3 falls in 465/4 and the foundation of Amphipolis in 437/6; schol. Aeschin. II. Embassy 31 (67a Dilts) supports 465/4 if we emend the archon Lysicrates (453/2) to Lysitheus; Diod. Sic. XII. 32.3 (one of

his chronological notes, which seem more reliable than his main narrative dates: in

250

Commentary

XI. 70.1 he reports the Thasian war under 464/3) supports 437/6. This war should be dated 465/4—463/2. to repay what was due immediately and to pay tribute in the future: Thasos'

annual tribute was 3 talents in the late 450s but 30 talents (equal only to that of Aegina) in the late 430s: perhaps it was increased after the other payments had

been completed (cf. Meiggs, A.FE. 86 with 550-1). For the terms in general cf. those imposed on Samos later 117.3). 102.1. other allies and the Athenians: Including Aegina (II. 27.2, IV. 56.2), Plataea (III. 54.5) and Mantinea (Xen. Hell. V. 2.3). They came by virtue of the anti-Persian alliance of 481 (cf. 102.4). with Cimon as general and a substantial body of men: According to Plut.

Cim. 16.8-10 a Spartan called Periclidas asked Athens for help: his son was called Athenaeus (IV. 119.2, 122.1), and he was probably Athenian proxenos (de Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 182 n. 52). Cimon, whose Spartan sympathies are shown by his son's name Lacedaemonius (45.2), was eager to help but Ephialtes was opposed: the democrats

were willing to oppose Sparta and to expand Athens' power on the mainland as had not previously been done. Ar. Lys. 1137—44 confirms the involvement of Periclidas and says that Cimon went with 4,000 hoplites.

102.2.

capable of assaulting walls: They had experience in the campaigns of the

Delian League, most recently at Thasos; Gomme's suggestion that the allusion is to assaulting palisaded camps, as in Hdt. IX. 70.1—2, 102.3, was unnecessary.

102.3.

of a different people: Ionians rather than Dorians.

might be persuaded to revolutionary action by those at Ithome: It is likely that it was in the absence of Cimon that the democrat Ephialtes persuaded the

Athenian assembly to accept his reform of the council ofthe Areopagus, and that the Spartans were afraid that with him in the ascendant Cimon and his hoplites would be given new instructions (cf. Plut. Cim. 15.2-4, 17.3, with Rhodes, Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, 311).

They therefore sent them away alone of the allies: Whereas the Athenians had claimed that *at Marathon we alone in front faced the risks against the barbarian' (73.4): see Rood, Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation, 245. not revealing their suspicion: Cf. their concealed vexation in 92. 102.4. allies of their enemies the Argives: See for 480—479 Hdt. VII. 148-52,

IX. 12, and subsequently IX. 35.2: Argos was never willing to acknowledge Spartan superiority, and in 480—479 was formally neutral and in fact sympathetic to the Persians. There are favourable references to Argos in Aesch. Eum. 762-74, cf. 287—

91, 667-73, of 458. the Thessalians: In 480 they were at first divided, and they inevitably went over to the Persians when the Greeks abandoned their plan to hold the pass of Tempe

(Hdt. VII. 172-4); Leotychidas was said to have taken bribes when after the war he went to punish the Thessalians for their medism (Hdt. VI. 72).

Commentary 103.1.

251

in the tenth year: There is not room for a ten-year war between Athens’

war against Thasos (100.2-101.3) and the beginning of the First Peloponnesian War (103.4, 105-8), so scholars who thought Thucydides must have reported each event in its chronological place have emended the text (e.g. Gomme). However, there are exceptions even in books I1-VIII; here it is better to accept that events have been

grouped for narrative convenience, and in this case that Thucydides has anticipated the end of a war which ran from c. 465/4 to c. 456/5 (cf. Introduction, p. 19). Diod. Sic. narrates a ten-year war under 469/8 (ΧΙ. 63—4) but in one of his chronological

notes reports its ending under 456/5 (XI. 84. 8); Philochorus FGrH 328 F 117 put the earthquake and war under 468/7, but Paus. IV. 24.5 put them under 464,3; Ath. Pol. 25.2 dates the reforms of Ephialtes in Athens 462/1. 103.2. Pythian: Delphic. 103.3. at Naupactus ... from the Ozolian Locrians who held it: Probably in the campaign of 108.5. Naupactus (/nventory 165) was on the north side of the Gulf of Corinth, a short distance east of the narrowest part; the Messenians settled there were loyal allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (II. 9.4, etc.). An inscription containing an agreement between these Messenians and the Naupactians who had been expelled by the Athenians is to be dated to the 420s (SEG li 642 with A. P. Matthaiou, τὰ ἐν τῆι στήληι γεγραμμένα, 45—55.). Ozolian Locris was on the north

side of the Gulf of Corinth, between Delphi and the narrowest part of the Gulf. 103.4.

the Megarians went over to the Athenian alliance: This for Thucydides

is the beginning of what scholars call the First Peloponnesian War, which lasted until the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/5 (115.1). On the background to it see D. M. Lewis, in Classical Contributions ... M. F. McGregor, 71-8 = his Selected Papers in Greek

and Near Eastern History, 9-21,

stressing Corinth's desire to expand and resulting

conflict with Athens. For friendship between Corinth and Athens in the 490s see Hdt. VI. 89; Hdt. VII. 94 probably reflects later hostility rather than hostility in

480. Megara was squeezed topographically between Athens and Corinth, and at various times had border disputes with each. On the chronology accepted above, Sparta will have been engaged in the Messenian war until c. 456/5, which will help to explain why at first it was not involved.

Pegae: Megara's harbour on the Gulf of Corinth. long walls ... to Nisaea: Nisaea was Megara's nearer harbour, on the Saronic

Gulf. These long walls, linking city to harbour town in a single fortified area, anticipate those of Athens (107.1, 108.3), but Athens' walls may already have been

intended when Megara's walls were built (a suggestion which I owe to Dr J. B. Salmon), though presumably not before the democrats gained the upper hand (cf. on 107.4). their deep hatred towards the Athenians:

Which surfaced in the affairs of

Corcyra and Potidaea, and in Corinth's then taking the lead in urging Sparta to war (24—88).

252

Commentary

104.1. Inaros the son of Psammetichus ... invited in the Athenians: Here and in his other transitions between Greece and Egypt Thucydides uses no temporal

expressions, and it is reasonable to assume that he has done some grouping of sets of events which both belong to the period c. 460-c. 454 (cf. on 110.1). For a chronological discussion which counters an attempt to date this epsiode somewhat earlier see Rhodes, 4. Ant. Hung. 49 (2009), 353-8. An early in this period records the casualties of one of in Cyprus, Egypt and Phoenicia, and Halieis, Aegina year”, not necessarily an Athenian official year (M&L

Athenian inscription from the ten tribes, Erechtheis, and Megara, ‘in the same 33 = 26 i? 1147, extracts

trans. Fornara 78; another tribe's list, /G i? 1147 bis, makes unnecessary Gomme's suggestion that Erechtheis suffered exceptional casualties). The name Psammetichus suggests that Inaros was or claimed to be related to the Saite dynasty which ruled Egypt before the Persian conquest of 525; Pharus and Marea

were in the north-west of the Nile delta, near the later Alexandria. Egypt could not be claimed for the Greeks as Cyprus could (cf. on 94.2), but for the past two hundred

years Greek mercenaries and traders had been active there, so Egypt was part of the Greeks' world and was another place where they could oppose the Persians. King Artaxerxes: Reigned 465—424/3. 104.2. 8 campaign in Cyprus: Cf. on 94.2, and the inscription of Erechtheis cited above; and note that the inscription mentions Phoenicia, not mentioned by

Thucydides. Memphis: A short distance south of the apex of the delta and the modern Cairo. Inscriptions give us a Samian dedication (M&L 34 = /G xii. vi 279, trans. Fornara 77) and the award of a prize by Inaros to a Samian commander (/G xit. vi 468). 105.1. Halieis: Near the southernmost part of the Argolid (/nventory 349). Epidaurians: Epidaurus was on the Argolid coast of the Saronic Gulf (/nventory

348), and was often opposed to Argos. Sicyon (cf. 108.5) also fought on the Corinthian side (SEG xxxi 369).

Cecryphalea: A small island in the Saronic Gulf, north-east of Epidaurus. 105.2. against the Aeginetans: Athens' on-going dispute with Aegina was suspended in 481 before the Persian invasion (Hdt. VIT. 145.1); according to Plut. Them. 19.2 Aegina opposed the rebuilding of Athens’ walls (89.3-92), Pericles is said to have described it as the eye-sore of the Piraeus (Arist. Rher. III. 1411 A 15-16, Plut. Per. 8.7).

Leocrates son of Stroebus: Probably the Leocrates who was a general at Plataea in 479 (Plut. Arist. 28.1). 105.3. the heights of Geranea: Between Megara and Corinth. This was another attempt to distract Athens from a campaign by causing trouble for it nearer to home.

105.4. ButtheAthenians did not disturb the force in Aegina: Hornblower wonders what is implied: that the Corinthians expected that they would? that a lesser city would? that there was a debate in Athens and some men did want to do this?

Commentary

253

the oldest and youngest: For these as a separate category cf. Il. 13.7. The youngest were those aged 18-19 (Ath. Pol. 42.1 with 53.4); the oldest perhaps 40— 59 rather than 50-59 (cf. my edition of book Il, pp. 271-6). Myronides: A famous general (cf. 1V. 95.3, Ar. Lys. 801—4, Eccl. 303—5); said

to have been an envoy to Sparta and a general at Plataea in 479 (Plut. Arist. 10.10, 20.1). 105.6. set up a trophy ... set up a rival trophy: For another instance of contested victory and rival trophies see 54.

106.1.

The Corinthians withdrew in defeat ... : A remarkably detailed and vivid

passage in an otherwise austere narrative: H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis, 270—4, suggests that Thucydides focuses on such episodes because they instantiate his view that the war was a great catastrophe (cf. 23.1-3). 107.1. began building their long walls: Cf. the long walls built for Megara (103.4): the effect was to enable Athens as a naval power to remain in contact

with the sea and to make little of enemy invasions of the countryside (cf. Pericles in 140.4—5). These walls enclosed a wide area (the northern wall, to the Piraeus, reached the sea on the north side of the main harbour); a third wall (for most of its length close to the northern wall but turning to reach the sea at the bay of Phalerum, east of Munichia) was added, perhaps in the 440s and on the proposal of Pericles (Pl. Grg. 455 x, cf. Andoc. IN. Peace 7, Aeschin. Il. Embassy 174). At the end of the Peloponnesian War Sparta insisted on the destruction of the Piraeus walls and the long walls (Xen. Hell. 11. 2.20, Diod. Sic. XIII. 107.4, Plut. Lys. 14.8). 107.2. the Phocians: The people of the region which included Delphi (cf. on

112.4). Doris: In the mountainous region north of Phocis and south-west of Thermopylae. For Boeum, Cytinium and Erineus see /nventory 390, 392, 381; a fourth city, Pindus (Inventory 389), was perhaps not part of Doris at this time. Cytinium seems to have been the most important of the cities of Doris; we do not know which city was

captured. In the tradition of the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese (cf. 12.3) the Dorians were believed to have come from Doris. Hornblower notes this episode as one of several indications of Spartan interest in northern Greece (cf. Leotychidas’ expedition to Thessaly, cited on 102.4, Nicomedes ... Plistoanax son of I give a genealogical table) must have Plistoanax was now king (he reigned brother Nicomedes was regent for him.

and III. 92-3, esp. 92.3). Pausanias: Plistarchus (cf. on 94.1, where died without leaving a son; Pausanias' son from c. 458 until 408/7), and Pausanias'

one thousand five hundred ... ten thousand ... : A large force for what began as a small episode. 107.3. the Crisaean Gulf: The Gulf of Corinth east of its narrowest part; Crisa/Cirrha was the harbour below Delphi (/nventory 183 cf. p. 405), and the Peloponnesians are likely to have gone through there on their outward journey.

254

Commentary

107.4.

secretly by some men from Athens ... the democracy ... the long walls:

This is the nearest Thucydides Ephialtes (cf. on 102.2), which pro-Spartan and anti-democratic of Ephialtes (Antiph. V. Murder

comes to mentioning the democratic reforms of had been followed by the ostracism of Cimon as (Plut. Cim. 17.3, Per. 9.5) but also by the murder of Herodes 68, Ath. Pol. 25.4, Diod. Sic. XI. 76).

The long walls were evidently associated with the democrats who now dominated Athens. 107.5. The Athenians ... in full force: They were still committed in Egypt and Aegina; probably still fully committed in Egypt (cf. on 110.1), but once the siege of

Aegina had been set up they did not need to keep large numbers there (Gomme). 8 thousand Argives: Cf. their casualty list from the Athenian Ceramicus, M&L 35 = CEG 135 =/G bP 1149, with Paus. I. 29.8. their other allies: Sparta's dedication at Olympia mentioned Argives, Athenians

and lonians: M&L 36 = CEG

351 with Paus. V. 10.4, trans. Fornara 80. For members

of the Delian League this is the earliest recorded instance of their fighting for Athens

in mainland Greece. 107.6.

a plot to overthrow the democracy:

Cf. above. Plut. Cim.

17.4—9, Per.

10.1—4, has a story that the ostracised Cimon wanted to rejoin the Athenians and fight with them but was rejected; his friends fought valiantly and were killed; Pericles then proposed the recall of Cimon from ostracism — but although there may have been a decree recalling Cimon it is unlikely that that and his return happened until he had been absent for the normal ten years (cf. on 112.1).

107.7. Thessalian cavalry ... transferred their allegiance to the Spartans: Cf. their conduct in 511/0 (Hdt. V. 84. 2). Some Thessalians remained pro-Athenian: cf. 111.1. SEG xvii 243 is a dedication by Thessalian cavalry from Tanagra; SEG xxxiv 550 Ξ (ΕΟ 637 is the gravestone of a man from Atrax who was killed there. 108.1. at Tanagra: In the south-east of Boeotia (/nventory 220), perhaps with ambitions to rival Thebes (cf. coins discussed by B. H. Fowler, Phoenix 11 [1957],

164—70). 108.2.

cut down trees: Cut down the Megarians' olives and vines (Classen).

on the sixty-second day after the battle: This detail is mentioned to show the Athenians' resilience (cf. the Corinthians in 70.5). The garbled account of Diod.

Sic. gives Sparta's intervention in Doris and the battle of Tanagra under 458/7 and Oenophyta and the sequel under 457/6 (XI. 79-80, 81-3), which could in fact be

right though his narrative dates are untrustworthy. Myronides: Cf. 105.4. 108.3. Oenophyta: Barrington Atlas 55 suggests a location east of Tanagra, but M. H. Hansen in /nventory p. 435 doubts that it was a settlement. won control of Boeotia and Phocis: [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 3.11 mentions Boeotia as

a place where Athenian support for upper-class men was unsuccessful; Arist. Pol. V. 1302 B 29-30 mentions the destruction of a badly-run democracy in Thebes after Oenophyta; but we lack the further information needed to make sense of this. It is

Commentary

255

normal to distinguish between Athens’ allies in mainland Greece and the members

of the Delian League, but D. M. Lewis suggested that Acraephia (/G 1? 259. iii. 20) and Orchomenus (260. ix. 9) might be restored in the first two tribute lists (C.4.H°

v. 116 n. 72). hostages ... from Opuntian Locris: The region north-west of Boeotia; again we lack background information. This is the (unqualified) Locris which is listed among Sparta's allies in 11. 9.3. they completed their own long walls: Cf. 107.1, 4. 108.4. the Aeginetans reached an agreement with the Athenians ... : Cf. the

settlement with Thasos (101.3); Aegina paid 30 talents tribute a year. For the issue of Aegina's autonomy see on 67. 2. 108.5. Tolmides son of Tolmaeus: Cf. Davies, 4. Ε 74. AccordingtoAristodemus FGrH 104 F 12.2 he was general with Myronides at Oenophyta. Schol. Aeschin. II. Embassy 75 (160 Dilts) dates this campaign 456/5, and credits Tolmides with taking Boea in the south-east of Laconia (/nventory 327) and the island of Cythera (Inventory 336). Diod. Sic. XI. 84 narrates it under the same year. set fire to the Spartans' dockyard: At Gytheum (/nventory 333). This is one of the plans attributed to Themistocles after the Persian War (Plut. Them. 20.1—2 with

Cic. Off. III. 49: see on 90.3). According to Diod. Sic. XI. 84.6 he also captured Methone, in the south-west of Messenia (Mothone in /nventory 319). Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians: On the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth, west of its narrowest part (/nventory 145). According to Diod. Sic. XI. 84.7 he also

captured the cities of Cephallenia, an island outside the Gulf of Corinth (/nventory 125, 132, 135, 136); and he captured Naupactus and installed the fugitive Messenians there, which is indeed the most likely occasion for what Thucydides mentions in 103.3. the Sicyonians' territory: Sicyon was near the south coast of the Gulf of Corinth, west of Corinth (/nventory 228).

109.1.

Egypt: Continued from 104.

many vicissitudes of war:

Homblower notes that Thucydides uses this kind

of expression particularly with reference to death, and that ‘ideas’ and ‘forms’ of a disease were mentioned by medical writers (cf. 11. 51.1).

109.2. Megabazus, with money to persuade the Peloponnesians ... : Another unsuccessful attempt, and the earliest certain instance of Persia's trying to use its money

to influence affairs in Greece. An Athenian

decree outlawing Arthmius

of Zelea for bringing Persian money to Greece is first mentioned by Dem. XIX. Embassy 271-2, IX. Phil. iii. 41—4, and is one of a number of putative fifth-century documents for which there is no evidence earlier than the fourth (for another, the alleged Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia, see on 112.4). I suspect that these documents were constructed in the fourth century to make more vivid what

was thought to be known about the past (cf. C. Habicht, Hermes 89 [1961], 1-35; for a more sympathetic treatment see Meiggs, 4.£. 508-12, thinking the most likely

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Commentary

occasion for the decree against Arthmius to be when Pausanias was at Colonae [131.1]). Megabyxus

son

of Zopyrus:

Corrected

by Gomme

from the manuscripts’

Megabyzus. Cf. Hdt. III. 160.2 (this episode, and the fact that he had a son, Zopyrus, who defected to the Athenians); VII. 82, 121.3 (in 480).

Prosopitis: In the west of the delta (cf. Hdt. II. 41.5). 110.1. after six years of war: C. 460/59—c. 455/4 (cf. on 104.1). The removal of the Delian League's treasury to Athens in 454 (cf. on 96.2), suggested by the Samians according to Plut. Arist. 25.3, may have been prompted by a fear that Delos

would not be safe after this major setback. If Thucydides is right it was a great setback, involving two hundred ships (104.2) and a further fifty (110.4) and their crews. Some scholars, reluctant to believe that

Thucydides should have made so little of that, have relied on Ctesias (FGrH 688 F 14.36-8 [32-5]), who had only forty ships sent to Egypt, or have suggested as a compromise that most of the two hundred did not stay: see in favour of Thucydides Meiggs, A. E. 104-8, 473—6; in favour of a reduction A. J. Holladay, JHS 109 (1989), 176-82 = his Athens in the Fifih Century and Other Studies in Greek History, 43-

53. Ctesias could be badly wrong in other matters, and the case for reduction does not seem to me to be sufficiently strong. few out of many: Cf. VII. 87.6, on the end of Athens' Sicilian campaign of 415-413, and III. 102.8. 110.2. Amyrtaeus the king in the marshes ... : Cf. 112.3, and Hdt. II. 140.2. His area was presumably somewhere in the delta. ἑλεῖν with ἕλεσι ... ἕλους ... ἕλειοι is probably not an intentional pun (Hornblower; contr. J. E. Powell, CR 51 [1937], 103). 110.3. Inaros ... impaled: But the sons of Inaros and Amyrtaeus were allowed to hold office under the Persians: (Hdt. III. 15.3).

110.4. the Mendesian branch: Towards the east of the Delta. So ended the affair ... Egypt: By giving the episode this concluding sentence Thucydides does emphasise its significance. 111.1.

Orestes

... king of the Thessalians:

B. Helly has argued that the title

basileus was applied to members of a few leading families in Thessaly but there was never a single ‘king of Thessaly’; Pharsalus was Orestes’ city (L' Etat thessalien,

101—30; on Orestes' family, 104—7). Cf. II. 22.3, where in 431 separate cities sent their separate contingents to support Athens. Pharsalus: At the south-east end of the western of Thessaly's two plains (Inventory 413). From this point Athens' expansion seems to have run out of steam.

111.2.

Pegae: Cf. 103.4, 107.3.

Sicyon: Cf. 108.4.

Pericles son of Xanthippus: His first appearance in Thucydides, mentioned in

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257

the same austere way as other commanders; he receives fuller introductions in 127

and 139.4. Other texts associate him with the democratic reform of Ephialtes (Plut. Cim. 15.2, Per. 9.5, 10.7, cf. Arist. Pol. II. 1274 a 7—9, Ath. Pol. 25.1-2 with 27.1). 111.3.

the Achaeans: West of Sicyon on the south coast of the Gulf of Corinth;

they presumably made an alliance with Athens. Oeniadae in Acarnania: Outside the Gulf of Corinth on the north side (/nventory 1 30); cf. II. 102.2—6 (a digression on Oeniadae prompted by the Athenians' decision

not to campaign against it in 429/8). 112.1. after the lapse of three years, a five-year treaty: If we assume that it had recently expired when the Spartans invaded Attica in 447/6 (114.1-2, cf. II. 21.1, and see on 88.6), the treaty will have been made in 451/0 (but Diod. Sic.

ΧΙ. 86.1 dates it 454/3, and some, with whom Gomme sympathised, thought three empty years would make more sense after the treaty than before). Diod. Sic. and Theopompus FGrH 115 F 88, Plut. Cim.

18.1, Per. 10.4, associate this treaty with

Cimon on his return from ostracism, and if the treaty belongs to 451/0 this will be after a full ten years' absence (cf. on 107.6). For and Sparta about the same time see on 71.4. 112.2. to Cyprus with two hundred ... ships It is probably no coincidence that Cimon's return to Cyprus. Cf. Pausanias’ campaign (94.2) and

a thirty-year treaty between Argos under the generalship of Cimon: was followed by another campaign Cimon’s earlier campaign (100.1);

but the attempt of J. Barns to find another campaign to Cyprus in the late 460's (Historia 2 [1953—4], 163—76) was misguided. However great the disaster in Egypt (cf. on 110.1), Athens and its allies were again now able to send a large fleet outside the Aegean. 112.3. Amyrtaeus the king in the marshes: Cf. 110.2. In 445/4 Psammetichus,

described as king of Libya or of the Egyptians, sent a gift of grain to Athens, presumably in the hope of attracting further support against the Persians (Philochorus FGrH 328 F 90, Plut. Per. 37.4). Citium:

On

the south coast of the island (a Phoenician

city: /nventory p.

1224). 112.4. Cyprian Salamis: Distinguished from the Salamis in the Saronic Gulf. It was on the east coast, south of the long projection to the north-east (/nventory

1020). withdrew to home: After these campaigns and the death of Cimon no more active campaigning against the Persians 1s reported. Among the putative fifth-century documents first attested in the fourth century (cf. on 109.2) is a Peace of Callias betwen Athens and Persia, under which Persia agreed to keep well away from the Aegean, which if authentic would belong here (for collections of testimonia see SdA 152, and in translation Fornara 95). The earliest mention is in Isoc. IV. Panegyric 117-20, of c. 380, and | believe that the treaty was invented after the King's Peace of 387/6, by which the Asiatic Greeks were returned to Persia, to illustrate the contrast between the glory of the past and the humiliation of the present. Most scholars

258

Commentary

accept this treaty as authentic (e.g. Meiggs, 4.Ε. 129-51, 487-95); A. J. Holladay (Historia 35 [1986], 503—6 = his Athens in the Fifth Century, 55-60) suggested

an informal deal. In 447/6 a major building programme on the Athenian acropolis began (/G κυ 436—51), opponents claimed that money collected from the allies for fighting against the Persians was being spent on gilding Athens, and Pericles replied that as long as Athens kept the allies safe from the barbarians it was not accountable to them (Plut. Per. 12.1—4). Whether there was a treaty, an understanding or simply a cessation of active

warfare, there was clearly a change in the objectives of the Delian League and the nature of Athenian control after the death of Cimon, and even with his limited purpose (cf. on 89.1) Thucydides ought to have mentioned this. For his silence on a treaty c. 423 see IV. 50 with my commentary.

112.5.

what is called the Sacred War: The Second Sacred War, after a First at

the beginning of the sixth century, and followed by the Third and Fourth in the

middle of the fourth century. The sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi was the concern of the citizens of the polis of Delphi; of the league of predominantly northern Greek

peoples known as the Amphictyony, responsible for Delphi and the sanctuary of Demeter at Anthela, near Thermopylae; and of the Phocians, in whose territory Delphi lay (cf. on 107.2). Phocis had become an ally of Athens c. 457 (cf. 108.3),

and may have been given some power over Delphi then, while a fragmentary treaty between Athens and the Amphictyony (/G i! 9) is probably to be dated to that occasion. Thucydides seems to imply that Athens' intervention followed soon after Sparta's, and Plut. Per. 21.2 has εὐθὺς, ‘immediately’, for Thucydides’ αὖθις,

‘again’; but Philochorus FGrH 328 F 34b puts Athens’ intervention ‘in the third year', which is not impossible. Since Sparta and Athens did not fight against each other, they could claim that they were not in breach of the five-year treaty. Delphi supported Sparta at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (118.3), as did Phocis (II. 9.2-3): it is likely but not necessary that Phocian power over Delphi ended after the Thirty Years' Peace. 113.1.

the Boeotians who had gone into exile: ... Tolmides son of Tolmaeus:

For Tolmides cf. 108.5. This will have been some time in 447—446. Orchomenus: In the north-west of Boeotia (/nventory 213). Chaeronea: In the north-west of Boeotia, west of Orchomenus

(/nventory

201). reduced it to slavery: Whatever was done did not last long; but the verb is andrapodizein, used literally in 98.1—2. 113.2. Coronea: In the west of Boeotia, south of Orchomenus (/nventory 210). Locrians: Cf. 108.3.

Euboean exiles: The Euboean cities had joined the Delian League at the beginning (cf. 98.3 with commentary). destroyed some of the Athenians: Including Tolmides, of whom a statue was later set up (Paus. I. 27.5). There is an epitaph for those who died, perhaps on this

Commentary

259

occasion (CEG 5 = IG i? 1163; but dated 424/3 by N. T. Arrington, ZPE 181 [2012], 61—75). 113.4. autonomous again: For the term see on 67.2; here it denotes the end of any

kind of link with Athens. 114.1. Euboea defected: Tolmides had led Athenian settlers there (Diod. Sic. XI. 88.3), a practice which Athens seems to have started about the middle of the

century. If the tribute list JG i? 265 is correctly dated 447/6, the Euboean cities did not defect until they had paid that year's tribute. the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica: Cf. on the five-year treaty,

112.1. 114.2. Pericles quickly conveyed distract Athens succeeded (contr. the the Peloponnesians invaded ... Attica, near the border with Megara. Plistoanax: Now exercising his adviser (cf. below).

his force back: On this occasion an attempt to other occasions cited on 58.1, 101.1). Eleusis and Thria: The westernmost part of rule (contr.

107.2), but with Cleandridas as

without advancing any further they withdrew to home: Both in Athens (Ar. Clouds 858-9 with schol. = Ephorus FGrH 70 F 193, Plut. Per. 23.1-2) and in

Sparta (II. 21.1, V. 16.3, Diod. Sic. XIII. 106.10, Plut. Per 22.253) it was believed that Pericles had bribed them to withdraw, and Plistoanax and Cleandridas were exiled. Bribery was often alleged when men had acted as it was thought they ought

not; it is likely that there was at any rate an understanding that Athens would agree to what became the Thirty Years' Peace. The epitaph survives from Athens of a

Megarian called Pythion who escorted three Athenian tribal regiments from Pegae back to Athens (M&L 51 = CEG 83 = IG i? 1353, trans. Fornara 101); cf. Diod. Sic.

XII. 5. 114.3. making agreements with the rest ... expelling the Hestiaeans ... : We have inscribed texts of the Athenian settlements with Chalcis (M&L 52 = /G r 40, trans. Fornara 103) and, more fragmentary, Eretria (JG i? 39, trans. Fornara 102) and Hestiaea (/G i? 41). Hestiaea, at the north end of Euboea (Inventory 372), was

singled out for special treatment as a punishment for killing the crew of an Athenian ship (Plut. Per. 23.4). 115.1. athirty-year treaty: In 446/5 (cf. on 87.6). For discussion of the terms see de Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 293-4; E. Badian, in J. W. Allison (ed.), Conflict, Antithesis and the Ancient Historian, 60-71, revised in his From Plataea to Potidaea, 137—45.

It is clear that members of the Spartan and Athenian blocs were listed and neutrals were free to join either (35.1, 40.2), and that there was provision for arbitration over disputes (78.4, etc.); Badian argues that states autonomous at the time were

to remain autonomous as long as they themselves adhered to the treaty, but that 1s less certain.

giving back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaea: In 425, when the Spartans

260

Commentary

were suing for peace because of the Athenian occupation of Pylos, the Athenians demanded the return of these (IV. 21.3). Athens' acquisition of Troezen, in the south-east of the Argolid (/nventory 357), has not been mentioned: it presumably

happened after the events of 105.1. Naupactus (103.2) was outside the Peloponnese, and technically was not in Athenian hands.

Superficially these terms mark a victory for Sparta, as Athens surrendered much of what it had gained since 460; but Athens seems to have concluded that, while it could not expand where Sparta claimed to dominate, it could continue to expand anywhere

else. Thucydides needs to explain why the treaty made in 446/5 lasted for only half that time, but the only other episode which he mentions in this section is Athens' war with Samos. He could appropriately have mentioned here, for instance, Athens' colonisation of Thurii in southern Italy, perhaps in 444/3 (Diod. Sic. XII. 9-11[-18], cf. Arist. Pol.

V. 1303 a 31-3, Strabo 263 / VI. 1.13) and of Amphipolis in 437/6 (IV. 102.3-4), the activities of Phormio in north-western Greece, perhaps in the early 430's (IL. 68.7—8),

and Pericles' expedition to the Black Sea (Plut. Per 20.1-2). 115.2.

In the sixth year: 4410: the record of expenditure from the treasury of

Athena, /G i? 363 * 454, is best restored as covering the two years 441/0 and 440/39 (G. Marginesu and A. A. Themos, in Αθηναίων ἐπίσκοπος ... H. B. Mattingly, forthcoming). Diod. Sic. XII. 27-8 narrates the whole episode under 441/0; schol.

Ar. Wasps 283 assigns it to 441/0 and 440/39; in terms of our years it probably belongs to 440 and 439.

war broke out between Samos and Miletus over Priene: Samos was an island just off the coast of Asia Minor, Miletus (now inland) on the coast to the south of it, Priene on the south flank of Mount Mycale, north of Miletus (/nventory 864, 854, 861). The coastal plain Batinetis, north of Mycale, was the subject of disputes between the three cities between the 590s and the 130s (see S. Carlsson, Hellenistic

Democracies, 136—47). Priene appears in the earliest tribute lists (e.g. /G i? 260. x. 8), but is absent from that of 440/39 (272); Miletus paid in that year (272. ii.

11); Samos was still a ship-providing ally. Meiggs suggested that on this occasion Samos was trying to coerce Priene and Miletus defended it (4.E. 428). According to Plut. Per. 24.1, 25.1, Samos refused a Milesian call to submit to arbitration. This is Thucydides' only episode in the pentecontaetia after the Thirty Years’ Peace, and it is narrated in detail: the Athenians evidently took the matter very seriously, perhaps in part because of the Persian involvement (115.4).

the Milesians ... went to the Athenians and denounced the Samians: At some point Athens unsuccessfully backed an oligarchy in Miletus; /G i? 21, trans. Fornara 92, is to be dated 426/5 (cf. Rhodes, CQ 58 [2008], 503); we do not know the date of Milet 1. vi pp. 100-4 Ξ M&L 43, trans. Fornara 66, in which some men are expelled from Miletus; but a decree of Miletus which I date 434/3 points

to a constitution echoing that of Athens ( Milet vi. iii 1218 with ZPE 157 [2006], 116). According to Plut. Per. 24.2-25.1 Pericles was influenced now by his consort Aspasia, who was Milesian.

Commentary

26]

private individuals ... who wanted a constitutional revolution: Cf. Ar. Wasps

281—5. What follows indicates that Samos' current constitution was oligarchic; for Athens’ not-thoroughgoing support for democracies in the Delian League cf. on

19. 115.3. The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships: Under the command of Pericles, according to Diod. Sic. XII. 27.1, Plut. Per. 25.2.

Lemnos: In the northern Aegean, a possession of Athens since the beginning of the fifth century (/nventory 502-3; see Hdt. VI,. 136—40). It is mentioned, but the context cannot be restored, in the inscribed treaty which ended the war (M&L 56 = IG i? 48, trans. Fornara 115. ὁ 4). 115.4. Pissuthnes ... who at that time held Sardis: He was satrap of the Persian province of Lydia; he supported rebels against Athens in the 420s also (III. 34 cf. 31.1), but later he and after him his son Amorges revolted against Persia (VIII. 5.5, 28.3, 54.3). If there was a Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia (cf. on 112.4), Pissuthnes by supporting the Samians was breaking it. For a Spartan proposal to

support the rebels, resisted by Corinth, which would have broken the Thirty Years' Peace, see 40.5. a supporting force: Almost certainly mercenaries, though Thucydides does not always use epikouroi with that meaning (e.g. 40.3): see B. M. Lavelle, AJP 110 (1989), 36—9. Thucydides does elsewhere write of misthophoroi (e.g. 35.4).

115.5.

and won control of most: πλείστων here is not easy to interpret either

as masculine or as neuter (Classen and Steup, who wondered whether a word has dropped out), though recent editors have not commented.

Byzantium also joined them in defecting: We know no more than Thucydides tells us here and in 117.3, except that Byzantium paid its tribute in 441/0 (/G i? 271. 1. 37). 116.1. to Caria to find out about the Phoenician ships: Expected because of Pissuthnes' support for the rebels; for Caria cf. on 4. Chios and Lesbos: The league members other than Samos which still contributed ships (cf. 19). Pericles as one of the ten generals: For this cf. on 46.2.

the island of Tragia: South of Samos, west of Miletus (cf. Inventory p. 733). troop transports: See Morrison, Coates and Rankov, 152, 154—5, 226-7. 116.2. began to besiege the city: Diod. Sic. XII. 28.3, Plut.. Per. 27.3-4, say that newly devised ‘rams’ and ‘tortoises’ were used in this siege, but Gomme was

sceptical. 116.3. Caunus:

On the coast north-east of Rhodes,

a member of the Delian

League (/nventory 898). Stesagoras: Evidently a Samian. 117.1. the Samians sailed out suddenly: Under the command of the philosopher Melissus (Plut. Per. 26.2-3).

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Commentary

117.2. Thucydides: Not the historian (who will not yet have been old enough: cf. Introduction, p. 1), or his grandfather the son of Melesias (who had recently been ostracised: e.g. Plut. Per 41.3, 16.3). He is possibly to be restored among the generals who swore to the treaty at the end of the war (M&L 56 = IG 1° 48, trans.

Fornara 115; revised by A. P. Matthaiou, forthcoming); none of the men mentioned here is included in the list of generals for 441/0 given by Androtion FGrH 324 F 38. Hagnon: See Davies, A. PF 227-8: he is attested in various offices between now and 413, and was an associate of Pericles (cf. Plut. Per. 32.4); his son Theramenes

played an ambiguous role between 411/0 and 404/3. Phormio: Cf. 64. 2. It is likely though not certain that he and Hagnon were from the same tribe, Pandionis (III), and should be restored as generals from that tribe in

the inscription mentioned above. Tlepolemus and Anticles: We should expect them to be generals (cf. Hornblower), but they were perhaps taxiarchs or trierarchs: Tlepolemus certainly, and

before him Anticles possibly, should be restored after the generals in the inscription mentioned above (cda 15: [7Ἀντικλ]ὲς : Τλεμπ[όλεμος]). The inscription's Tlem- is the normal form, and should perhaps be read here; Diod. XI. 71.1 has Tlepolemus as the archon of 464/3, who could be the same man. The name Anticles is common, but possible identifications are with the proposer of an amendment to the decree of 446/5 for Chalcis (M&L 52 = IG i? 40, trans. Fornara 103. 40 cf. 70-1) and / or of an honorific decree c. 427/6 (IG i? 65.7-8); the assistant secretary and later secretary to the epistatai for the building of the Parthenon (e.g. M&L 59.2 Ξ /G i? 449.370, trans. Fornara 120), with duties in Athens at the time, is less likely to be our Anticles.

117.3. in the ninth month: Probably from the beginning of the siege (116.2). Matthaiou suggests that the treaty belongs to the beginning of the council's year 439/8 but the end of the archon's year 440/39.

came to terms by fragments of the oaths suggests restoring in fr. and Samos’ surrender of

agreement: The inscription mentioned above includes sworn by the Samians and by the Athenians; Matthaiou ὁ the exile of the leading opponents of Athens to Lemnos its ships and repayment of Athens’ expenses. For the terms

specified by Thucydides cf. those imposed on Thasos earlier (101.3). Whether Athens

imposed a democracy now, as in 115.3, has been disputed, but we should expect it; if that is right, they tolerated a return to (at any rate comparative) oligarchy later (VIIL 21, with Andrewes, contr. Hornblower). Athens seems to have come nearer

on this occasion than on any other to being defeated by a rebellious Aegean ally. be assessed to repay in instalments the money which the Athenians had spent: The inscription listing payments from the treasury of Athena (cf. on 115.2) gives a total of 1,400 or more talents; contrast the 1,200 talents given by Nep. XIII. Timotheus 1.2 and obtainable by emendation in Isoc. XV. Antid. 111 and Diod. Sic. XII. 28.3. It appears that Samos never paid tribute: if its payment of reparations was

completed within a few years, payments such as that alluded to e.g. in M&L 68 =

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263

IG i? 68, trans. Fornara 133.21-4, must have been made under some other special arrangement.

Also Byzantium came to terms, to be subject just as before: Cf. 115.5. 118.1. It was after this ... the reason for the war: Cf. 24-88, where the narrative of events before the outbreak of the war is continued. Thucydides uses prophasis (‘reason’) here and in 146 for what are called αἰαὶ (‘grievances’) in 23.5--6. 118.2. about fifty years: Cf. on 89.1; this section has covered only 479-439.

did not try to prevent them ... for most of the time: But see 40.5 for the proposal to support Samos against Athens. The battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta were fought

because Athens wanted to prevent the Spartans from retuming home from Doris (107.2—108.3); in the Sacred War the Spartans and Athenians did not fight against each other (112.5); it was only in 446 that the Spartans invaded Attica (114.2). they had not hurried to engage in wars unless they were compelled: Cf. the Corinthians in 69-71, the Athenians in 78 and Archidamus in 84-85.1.

constrained by domestic wars: Cf. on 95.7 for the 470s—460s, and 101.1—103.3 for the Messenian war of the 460s—450s; we know of no wars in the Peloponnese

since then, but the silence may be misleading. the Athenians’ power ... they were impinging on the Spartans’ alliance: Here Thucydides reaffirms the ‘truest reason” of 23. 6, cf. 88. 118.3. the treaty had been broken: Cf. 87-8. they sent to Delphi and enquired of the God ... he responded: For the

expression cf. 25.1. itis said: H. D. Westlake, Mnemosyne’ 30 (1977), 349—50, thought this betrayed

Thucydides' uneasiness in religious matters; but the oracle was a fact, clearly widely reported, whether one believed in its inspiration or not. Gomme took these words to

indicate that *this is the Spartan war-party's version'. if they made war forcefully ... he would join in whether called on or not:

Cf. II. 54.4, where this is noted again, and for ξυλλήψεσθαι Ar. Knights 229; ‘if they made war forcefully’ covers the oracle in the event of an Athenian victory. For

Delphi after the Thirty Years' Peace see on 112.5. 119—25. Congress of Peloponnesian League in Sparta 119. They summoned their allies again: For the previous meeting see 67.3—88: then representations were invited before the Spartans made their own decision; now Sparta's decision is followed by a formal decision of the Peloponnesian League. The Corinthians ... came forward last: Cf. the previous meeting (67.5). Their

speech, and that of Archidamus in 80—5, are answered on various points by Pericles in 140—4. Pericles cannot have heard what was said on either occasion; Hornblower

remarks that the ideas were in the air at the time and the Athenians will have been able to obtain reports; but it remains likely that the correspondence between the Thucydidean speeches is greater than the correspondence between the speeches actually made.

264

Commentary

120.1. 120.2.

We could no longer accuse the Spartans: As they did in 68-71. Those of us who have already had dealings ... those who have been

settled rather in the interior ... : The Corinthians embark on a series of contrasts. Here the point is that Athens' supremacy does not threaten only cities lying near

the sea and directly involved in maritime trade (e.g. Megara: 67.4 etc.), but 'there is no state which does not need to import or export something’ ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.3). In 427 the Athenians embarked on a campaign in Sicily partly in order to prevent shipments of grain to the Peloponnese (III. 86.4); but we do not know which Peloponnesian states relied on imported grain to what extent. for those below ... to send down ... things below: Greeks regularly thought of inland as ‘up’ and of the coast as ‘down’: thus Xenophon wrote of the campaign of Cyrus and his mercenaries against his brother Artaxerxes in 401, and later Arrian wrote of the campaign of Alexander the Great into the interior of Asia, as an Anabasis (‘upward journey"). 120.3. sensible men: In 68.1 the Corinthians complained that the Spartans were sensible, but lacking in knowledge with regard to external affairs; here they urge activity rather than the passivity of excessive good sense on all the

Peloponnesians. 120.4. shrinks from war ... grasping in war ... : Justifying the making of war and, when good opportunity offers, the ending of war. These contrasts make sense here only

as an assurance that in urging war now the Corinthians are not reckless warmongers; but C. W. Macleod, PCPS? 25 (1979), 53 = his Collected Essays, 124, judged that Thucydides ‘uses their rhetorical sententiae to expose their own rashness”. boldness which is untrustworthy: The rash assumption that good fortune 15 bound to continue: cf. the Spartans when offering terms to Athens in 425 (IV. 18).

120.5.

the opposition has been worse in deliberating: Cf. what the Corinthians

said of the Persians in 480—479 (69.5). 121.1.

We are inciting war ... we shall settle it ... : Completing the argument

of 120.3—5. 121.2. our superiority in numbers: more pessimistic remark in 80.3).

Cf. Archidamus in 81.1 (undermining his

experience of warfare: But of a limited kind of warfare (cf. Archidamus in 80.3), and even that not recently (cf. on 80.1). we allin the same way respond to instructions: Crediting all the Peloponnesians with Spartan discipline. 121.3. afleet, in which they are strong, we shall fit out: But contrast Archidamus in 80.3, 81.3; Pericles in 142.6—9.

and from the monies at Delphi and Olympia: For Delphi's sympathy with the Peloponnesians see 118.3; Olympia was controlled by Elis, a member of the Peloponnesian League. Pericles replies in 143.1, and stresses the availability to Athens of its own sacred funds in II. 13.3—5. On the secular use and misuse of sacred property see R. C. T. Parker, Miasma, 170—5.

Commentary

265

entice by greater pay: As they finally did, with Persian money, in 412-411

(VIII. 29). the Athenians’ power is purchased: As the Peloponnesians' would be if they

too hired oarsmen; but the contrast intended is between the Peloponnesians’ citizen hoplites and the Athenians’ hired sailors. It is certain that the Athenians did hire non-Athenian sailors (cf. Pericles in 143.1), but the extent is not clear (see Meiggs,

A.E. 439-41). strong in our bodies rather than in our money: Cf. Pericles in 141.5. 121.4. they will be conquered by a single victory in a naval battle: How hard it

would be for the Peloponnesians to achieve that was shown in 429 (II. 83—92). Cf. Archidamus in 80.4. when we have brought our expertise to equality with theirs: In 429 the

Peloponnesians still failed to realise how wide the gap was (11. 85.2). 121.5. we shall contribute: Corinth may have been rich in monetary terms, but many Peloponnesian states will not have been. Pherein (‘contribute’) is the verb

cognate with phoros, the ‘tribute’ paid by Athens’ allies (cf. 96.2). 122.1.

defection of their allies: That would require naval power (Archidamus in

81.3). the building of hostile forts: To allow longer-term raiding of the territory than an invading force could manage, and to act as a magnet to attract traitors:

epiteichismos here, epiteichisis in Pericles’ reply (142.2-5). The first recorded instance is Athens’ fortification of the island of Atalante in 431

(II. 32); the best

known are the Athenians’ occupation of Pylos in Messenia in 425 (IV. 3-23, 26-41) and the Spartans' occupation of Decelea in Attica in 413 (VII. 19, 27-8, cf. VI. 91.6, 93.2, VII. 18.1). See H. D. Westlake, CQ^ 33 (1983), 12-24 - his Studies, 34—49. other things which one might not foresee now: These could benefit the Athenians also, the more if they lived up to their reputation as innovators (70.2, 102.3). war proceeds least on stated terms: For the personifcation cf. Macleod, cited on 120.4. dispassionately ... passionate: À contrast unrelated to the argument. 122.2. The Athenians are capable against all of us together: Cf. Archidamus, pessimistically, in 80.3—4. The Corinthians now revert from wild optimism to the magnitude of the threats. when we are separated: Cf. Mnesiphilus' warning of what would happen if the

Greeks did not together resist the Persians at Salamis (Hdt. VIII. 57). outright slavery: For subjection as slavery cf. 98.4; and for this use of ἄντικρυς

cf. VIII. 64.5, 92.11. 122.3.

a tyrant city: Cf. the Athenians Pericles in II. 63.2, Cleon in IIl. 37.2,

Euphemus in VI. 85.1; and see C. J. Tuplin, in Crux ... G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 348-75. 122.4. thethreegreatestdisasters: Cf the Athenians three driving forces (75.3, 76.2).

266

Commentary

condescension ... senselessness: Kataphronesis and aphrosyne: cf. Pericles' play on phronema and kataphronema in II. 63.3; also the Corcyraeans' good sense which turned into folly, in 32.4. 123.1. accusations about the past ... advantageous for the present: Cf. the Athenians’ dismissal of ‘matters far in the past’ (73.2). if you now bave a slight increment in wealth and resources: Cf. Thucydides’

own assessment in 19; but if the Peloponnesians too have grown more prosperous while the Athenians have grown prosperous and powerful that does not help the argument here. the God has promised to cooperate: Cf. 118.3. all the rest of Greece will join: Cf. Thucydides’ own comment in II. 8.4—5. 123.2. You will not be the first to break the treaty: Cf. the Spartans' judgment in 87-8, 118.3; but contrast their later view in VII. 18.2. it is not those who defend ... attack first: Cf. the Corinthians' earlier remark,

in 71.5. 124.1. Dorians ... the opposite used to happen): Cf. the association of softness with the Athenians and other Ionians in 6.3-4. Hornblower follows J. Alty in noting that this contrast is deployed more often by the Peloponnesians than by the Athenians. some are already ... suffer the same fate: Cf. their earlier remark, in 67.3. 124.2. the more lasting peace which will come from it: Cf. 120.3.

124.3.

The city which has been established as a tyrant: Cf. 122.3.

125.1.

all the allies who were present: If pressed, as it is by Gomme, this implies

that (despite the Corinthians' view that al! were threatened) some were not present. the majority voted for war: But not all. Each member state had one vote (141.6), and a majority decision was binding (V. 30.1). 125.2. it was impossible ... they were unprepared: It was not yet too late in the

summer to begin: cf. next note. For the argument of E. Badian that even now the formal decision was only that Athens was in the wrong, and that Sparta decided on war only when the subsequent negotiations failed, see on 87.4. Nevertheless ... not a year but slightly less: After ‘there should be no delay’, this should mean not that the preparations took as short a time as this, but that they took as long a time (Gomme). Probably the battle outside Potidaea was fought about

mid June (cf. on 60.2); this meeting can hardly have been held before August but is unlikely to have been later; the Theban attack on Plataea was c. 10 March, in the tenth month after the battle; the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was c. 30 May, on

the eightieth day after the attack on Plataea (cf. II. 2.1, 19.1, with my commentary [where ‘20 May' is a misprint], emending the text of 2.1 and agreeing in essence

with Gomme; but Homblower defends the manuscripts’ text of 2.1). The interval will therefore be somewhat under ten months.

Commentary

267

126-38. Digression on past episodes raised in propaganda: Cylon, Pausanias, Themistocles 126.1. they sent envoys to the Athenians to make complaints: Thucydides

mentions Sparta's demand that Athens should expel the accursed, to which he attaches an account of the affair of Cylon to explain how the curse arose (126.2127); Athens' counter-demand about two Spartan curses, to the second of which he attaches an account of the downfall of the regent Pausanias (128-135.1); and an account of the downfall of the Athenian Themistocles, which is irrelevant to

the diplomacy of this winter but is justified openly as 'the affair of Pausanias the Spartan and Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished of the Greeks of their time’ (135.2-138, quoting 138.6), and also, it seems likely, by Thucydides’ view of Themistocles as a precursor of Pericles (see on 138.3). Although we can

see the rationale for its inclusion here, this extended digression, written in a relaxed manner, looks like something originally composed as a separate essay but pressed into service. For doubts about the details in the stories of Pausanias and Themistocles see Rhodes, Historia 19 (1970), 387—400. 126.3. Cylon: There are other accounts in Hdt. V. 71, Plut. So/. 12.1-9 (Ath. Pol. 1. the first part of that text to survive, gives the end of what seems to have matched the version used by Plutarch) and schol. Ar. Knights 445 (three versions); for a detailed discussion see Rhodes, 4 Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, 79-84. Cylon's Olympic victory was in 640, and his coup is to be dated to one of the Olympic years ($5) 636, 632, 628 or 624, before the legislation of Draco in 621/0. For tyrants see on 13.1.

Theagenes of Megara: His connection with Cylon is the most important fact known about him. 126.6. Whether the ‘greatest festival of Zeus’ ... somewhere else: This looks like a Delphic attempt.to explain support for a failure; or it may be that Thucydides

is countering an alternative version in which Cylon did make his attempt at the Diasia (M. H. Jameson, BCH 89 [1965], 167-72; and on the festival 159—66). On Thucydides and alternative versions see Introduction, p. 4; and on Thucydides and

oracles see Introduction, pp. 14-15. for in fact the Athenians have a greatest festival of Zeus Meilichios: ‘Kindly’. The expression shows that Thucydides has non-Athenian readers in mind (Gomme). many men bringing not animal victims but offerings of a local kind: The manuscripts’ text is defended by Jameson, 165-6. 126.7. TheAthenians ... in full force from the fields: Aspiring tyrants looked for support from men who for any reason were discontented; this response shows that there was not enough discontent to give Cylon the support that he needed. Jameson suggested that in the alternative version the Athenians came not from the agroi but

from Agrae, south-east of the city, where they were celebrating the Diasia. 126.8. to the nine archons ... most of the political business): This is probably

268

Commentary

a deliberate contradiction of the assignment of responsibility by Herodotus to the prytanies (‘chiefs’) ton naukraron (the function of the naukrariai and their officers

in early Athens is controversial — probably naval — but it seems likely that the nine archons were indeed the principal officers of state). Herodotus and Thucydides both

avoid explaining the guilt of the Alcmaeonids: only Plut. Sol. 12.1—2 states that the (eponymous) archon was Megacles. Thucydides' great-uncle Cimon had an Alcmaeonid wife, Isodice (Davies, 4.PF 376—7 cf. 304—5). giving them full power: Autokrator was used in the classical period to indicate

that officials were given powers which in some way (which was not always spelled out) were enhanced. 126.10. Cylon and his brother therefore ran away: Not stated in any other text. sat down as suppliants at the altar: Presumably that of Athena Polias (Gomme): cf. ‘the Goddess’ ($11). On supplication, an act not of claiming a right

but of appealing for pity, cf. on 24.6—7. Supplications were not always accepted, but what is represented as wrong here is the breaking of a promise once made. 126.11.

saw them dying in the sanctuary:

If they died in the sanctuary they

would pollute it: cf. 128.1, 134.23. the Awesome Goddesses: The Erinyes / Eumenides. Their sanctuary was on the Areopagus.

126.12.

The Athenians therefore drove out these accursed men: Becoming

tyrant and breaking promises to suppliants could both be seen as wrong. Plutarch

writes of on-going trouble until Solon persuaded the accursed to stand trial, when they were convicted and expelled; but Solon's involvement is probably a later fiction. They had been reinstated by the 590s, when Alcmaeon commanded Athens’ forces in the First Sacred War for the control of Delphi.

they were also driven out later ... an Athenian faction: In 508/7, when king Cleomenes of Sparta was brought in to support Isagoras against the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes; this episode ended with their reinstatement (Hdt. V. 69—72, Ath. Pol.

20.1—3). uprooted the bones of the dead: See Homblower for a possible instance of this, at Anaphlystus, in the south-east of Attica. 127.1.

knowing that Pericles ... on his mother's side: Pericles was the son of

Xanthippus and the Alcmaeonid Agariste. 127.1-2. thinking... they did not expect... : Ina variant on the contrast between logos and ergon (cf. on 22.1) Thucydides claims to contrast the ostensible purpose

of the Spartans' demand with their real expectation. 127.3. For he was the most powerful ... : Pericles has been mentioned as the commander of expeditions in the bald style used in narrating the pentecontaetia (111.2, 114.1, 3, 116.1, 3); now he is given a fuller introduction, and he will be given another in 139. 4, before his first speech (‘at that time ... first of the Athenians’).

Some have challenged the representation of Pericles as dominant, which Thucydides takes to its greatest extent in the final judgment on him in II. 65.5--13 (e.g. Gomme

Commentary

269

on 104.2): Thucydides certainly credited him with more power than any individual

could have possessed in democratic Athens, but it is still reasonable to think of him as exceptionally influential and as frequently, though not on every occasion, obtaining the decisions which he wanted (cf. Rhodes, in L. J. Samons, lI [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles, 32).

he was totally opposed to the Spartans: Hornblower stresses the imperfect tenses: this remark does not apply to this occasion only.

128.1. the Spartans had once raised up ... suppliants from the helots: We know only that this must have happened before c. 465/4 (cf. 101.2—103.3), not necessarily shortly before.

the sanctuary of Poseidon of Taenarum: In Sparta, not the sanctuary at Taenarum (the southern tip of the promontory on the west side of the Laconian Gulf): E. Kourinou, Σπάρτη συμβολὴ στὴ μνημεία κή τοπογραφία τῆς, reviewed by G. Shipley, CR? 53 (2003), 131-2. Hornblower had already suggested reading τοῦ Tatvapíov here, and that may be right. 128.3. When Pausanias ... acquitted of injustice: For Pausanias' original command

in 478, which ended with his being recalled to Sparta, see 94.1—95.5.

Thucydides now sets out to narrate what happened after that, but with a substantial digression which adds further material on Pausanias' original command. Diod. Sic. ΧΙ. 44—6 has a version of what follows, with some further embroidery. by the Spartiates: Here and in 131.1, 132.1, Thucydides uses the term of an official body in Sparta, for which he elsewhere uses ‘Lacedaemonians’ (e.g. 95.3,

in narrating this episode): for H. D. Westlake, CQ? 27 (1977), 95-110 = his Studies, 1-18, this is one sign, together with much in the language that 15 charactristic of Herodotus rather than of Thucydides,

that here on Pausanias and Themistocles

Thucydides may be following a written source. privately he took a trireme from Hermione:

For 'privately' cf. on 131.1.

Hermione was on the south coast of the Argolid (/nventory 350): in 480—479 it

contributed to the Greek forces ships (Hdt. VIII. 43) and soldiers who served under Pausanias (Hdt. IX. 28.4, 31.4). the Greek war: Elsewhere Thucydides calls it the Persian war (e.g. 95.7; contrast the Greek war of 112.2), but in this context ‘Greek war’ as the war fought by the Greeks makes sense. as he had attempted also on the first occasion: In 478. This is not substantiated

in the earlier narrative, except in the remark that ‘he was accused not least of medism, and that was judged to be extremely clear' (95.5). 128.4. It was from this that he had first ... : From here to the beginning of 131 Thucydides backtracks to give an account of Pausanias' conduct in Byzantium in 478. laid up a benefaction to his credit: A concept of reciprocity familiar in Herodotus: see J. P. Gould, Herodotus, 42—5, 82-5. 128.6. Gongylus of Eretria: Whatever else may or may not be true, he was (like

270

Commentary

Themistocles: 138.5) a man rewarded by Xerxes with a gift of cities (Xen. Hell. III. 1.6 cf. An. VII. 8.8).

to take a letter to the King: It is unlikely that authentic texts of such letters would have survived and have reached Thucydides. It is unlikely also that on this occasion Pausanias stayed long enough in Byzantium to send a letter and receive a reply (though in his second period in Byzantium, when he was not cooperating with the Athenians, it is likely enough that he had dealings with the Persians); and the

offer to marry the King's daughter is suspect (cf. below). this is what was written in it: Here and in 129.2 Thucydides uses τάδε (but in 137.4 for Themistocles’ letter he uses a different construction, and for Nicias’ letter

to Athens in VII. 10 he uses τοιάδε, *such"), whereas in speeches he almost always uses τοιάδε and such words (cf. [ntroduction, p. 7). It is likely that for these three

letters he was quoting verbatim from his source. by the spear: A poetic expression (e.g. Hom. 7]. XVI. 57). to marry your daughter: Hdt. V. 32 reports sceptically a rumour that he did

marry a daughter of Megabates (129.1): one item does not necessarily exclude the other (Gomme, Homblower), but it is likely that we have here two versions of a single rumour.

129.1. Xerxes was pleased: This motif15 more characteristic of Herodotus than of Thucydides. Cf. Xerxes’ letter, $3 (using a different verb). Artabazus son of Pharnaces: Artabazus was a commander in 480—479, who

escaped after the battle of Plataea (Hdt. IX. 89); his father was an uncle of Darius, and an important man in the Persepolis Fortification Tablets (D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia, 1—12). thesatrapy of Dascylium ... Megabates: Ofthe two Persian satrapies in western Asia Minor one was based on Sardis (115.4); the other, Hellespontine Phrygia, was

based on Dascylium, about 20 miles/32 km east of south from Cyzicus. Megabates was a nephew of Darius, and commander of the unsuccessful attack on Naxos in 499 (Hdt. V. 32-35.1); after this the satrapy was held by members of Artabazus’ family until the 340s.

129.3.

beyond

the sea:

The

world

of the Persians

and their near-eastem

predecessors was bounded by the Upper and the Lower Sea, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and Europe and even western Asia Minor were ‘beyond the sea’ (cf. J. H. Haubold, MHR 27 [2012], 5-24). Although these letters are unlikely to be genuine, the composer of this letter has included some authentic Persian touches. your benefaction will lie written up in our house: Cf. M&L 12, trans. Fornara 35.15—17, a Greek text from Asia Minor inscribed in the second century AD but probably a translation of an authentic letter of Darius I.

Let neither night nor day hold you back: Cf. Hdt. V. 23.2 (a Persian speaking to Darius), VIII. 98.1 (on the Persian royal post); the iambic rhythm is presumably accidental (cf. on a hexameter in 38.2).

Commentary

271

130.1. had a Persian table laid for him: Contrast his scornful reaction to Mardonius' finery at Plataea, Hdt. IX. 82. 130.2. He made himself difficult of access: Cf. the story of Deïoces the Mede,

Hdt. I. 96-100, esp. 99; and for the hellenistic and Roman world A. Wallace-Hadrill, JRS 72 (1982), 33-5. 131.1.

When the Spartans learned of this affair on the first occasion ... And

when he had sailed out for the second time ... : Thucydides now closes a ring and returns to the point at which he began this story, in 128.3. When he was forcibly expelled ... by the Athenians: Probably not immediately

(though that is inferred by some from Ephorus FGrH 70 F 191. 6, Diod. Sic. XI. 60.2), and perhaps not until c. 470 (Just. Epit. 1X. 1.3). Colonae in the Troad: Probably the Colonae on the Aegean coast (/nventory 782) rather than the inland Colonae south-east of Lampsacus (/nventory 746). sent a herald with a skyrale: lt was later believed that a skyrale was a stick round which a strip of material was wound in a spiral, or by extension a message using that medium: if sender and recipient had matching sticks the recipient could

read the message (e.g. Plut. Lys. 19.7—12). However, texts of the classical period do not support this cryptographic interpretation: what Thucydides means is more probably a straightforwardly-written strip wound round a stick for convenience of transport and / or authentication (T. Kelly, in The Craft of the Ancient Historian ... C. G. Starr, 141-69; S. R. West, CQ" 38 [1988], 42-7). Although Pausanias went privately he was still regent; but if there is no implication that the recipient was in a

position to decode the message it is no longer a problem that in spite of his doubtful status he was sent a skytale-message.

131.2.

trusted

that

he could

overcome

the

suspicion

through

bribery:

Thucydides' account is consistently hostile to Pausanias.

the enclosure: Usèd of the Spartan prison by Hdt. IV. 146.2, 148.2. the ephors have the right to do this to the king: And therefore to a regent

acting as king. 132.1. conspicuous sign: Semeion, cf. ‘uncontroversial indications’ (tekmeria), §5, and see on 1.1. guardian of Plistarchus: Cf. on 94.1.

in imitation of the barbarians: Cf. 130. 132.2. the tripod at Delphi: Its dedication is mentioned by Hdt. IX. 81.1. The gold tripod was melted down in the Sacred War of the fourth century (cf. Paus. X. 13.9); the bronze 'serpent column', of three intertwined snakes, is now in the Hippodrome in Istanbul, and has on it the list of cities (83). this elegiac couplet: Composed by Simonides according to Paus. III. 8.2, which is considered possible by A. Petrovic, Kommentar zu den simonideischen Versinschriften, 272).

272

Commentary

132.3. the Spartansimmediately erased ... had set up the dedication: According to [Dem.] LIX. Neaera 96-8, cf. Plut. De Her. Mal. 873 c, this resulted from a prosecution of the Spartans before the Delphic Amphictyony by the Plataeans; a change to the monument will at least have required the approval of the Delphic

authorities. For the list see M&L 27, trans. Fornara 59: with four names added later it still omits four places mentioned by Herodotus; but the report of names listed at Olympia by Paus. V. 23.1—2 omits four names included on the serpent column.

even then: Editors accept Struve's καὶ τότ᾽, which with εὐθὺς τότε above will imply that the change was made immediately after the monument was set up: C. W. Fornara, Philologus

111 (1967), 291—4, defends the manuscripts' καὶ τοῦτ᾽, ‘this

also was judged”, arguing both that εὐθὺς τότε can mean, and that it can be true, that the change was made immediately after Pausanias' second return; but the emended text is defended by J. Trevett, CO? 40 (1990), 409-11. 132.4. engaged in some dealing with the helots: Thucydides does not justify his confidence in this; but since the helot revolt of 101.2—103.3 began soon afterwards the recently disgraced and dead Pausanias was a convenient scapegoat. 132.5. their customary habit: Gomme remarks that kings and other leading Spartans found themselves in trouble not infrequently.

it is said: Westlake (cf. on 13. 2; and CQ? 27 [1977], 103-4 = his Studies, 8-9) sees this here and in 134.1, 138.1, asa sign that Thucydides while distancing himself to some extent considered his source trustworthy.

a man of Argilus: On the Thracian coast, west of Eion and the mouth of the Strymon (/nventory 554). Thucydides accepted this story, but to a modern reader it is full of improbabilities. found it written there that he was to be killed: Letters saying, 'Please kill

bearer’, are a motif in Greek and other literatures: cf. e.g. Hom. //. VI. 168-70, and in the Old Testament II Samuel 11.14-15. 133.

went to Taenarum: For Taenarum cf. on 128.1; it is 47 miles/75 km from

Sparta in a straight line. ministry ... ministers: Diakonos and its cognates are among the words in this

section used by Herodotus (e.g. IV. 71.4) but not elsewhere by Thucydides. 134.1. the sanctuary of the Goddess of the Bronze House: On the Spartan acropolis (Paus. III. 17.1—3); slight remains have been found. 134.2. theysettled down and through starvation took him by siege: Thucydides uses the language which would be used of starving a besieged city into surrender. 134.3.

dragged him out of the sanctuary still breathing: So that he should not

pollute the sanctuary by dying inside it. 134.4. the Ceadas, where they threw criminals: Originally men were thrown there to die (cf. Paus. IV. 18.4—5); perhaps by the classical period bodies were thrown there after execution, or perhaps this would have been a form of revival of

the archaic practice (D. M. MacDowell, Spartan Law, 144—6). For the site, at Trypi,

Commentary

273

8 miles/12 km from Sparta on the road to Kalamata, see W. K. Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, v. 58-60. later: After the earthquake and the helot revolt (Gomme)? he now lies in the forecourt: Cf. Paus. III. 14.1. two bronze statues: Cf. Paus. IIl. 17.7 (who does not give an explanation

because he judges earlier accounts sufficient). 135.2. accusing Themistocles: Whatever may have been discovered or fabricated about Pausanias, there is no good reason to think that Themistocles was in any way involved with Pausanias, or that he was guilty of medism before his flight to the Persians. Ephorus, FGrH 70 F 189 ap. Plut. De Her Mal. 855 r, said that Pausanias invited Themistocles to join him but he declined. For later versions of the story which follows see Diod. Sic. XI. 54-9, Plut. Them. 23-32. He happened to have been ostracised: Cleisthenes in 508/7 had introduced this procedure by which each year the Athenians had the opportunity to send one man into a kind of honourable exile for ten years, and it came to be used as a way of resolving political rivalries (Ath. Pol. 22, with Rhodes, Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, ad loc.). After the Persian Wars the main rivalry was between Themistocles, now anti-Spartan, and the pro-Spartan Cimon (cf. on 91.3). Diodorus narrates the whole story under 471/0, but that cannot be relied on.

Themistocles' ostracism might be either before or after Aeschylus’ Persae of 473/2; I believe no chronological argument can be based on his route across the Aegean (137. 2); but it is likely that the King whom he met was Artaxerxes 1 (137.3-138.2), who succeeded Xerxes in August 465. and was living in Argos and visiting the rest of the Peloponnese: Argos and

other states in the north-eastern Peloponnese fought against Sparta in the 470s and 460s (e.g. Hdt. IX. 35). For an attractive but speculative reconstruction of Peloponnesian history and Themistocles’ involvement in it see W. G. Forrest, (ΟΣ 10 (1960), 221-41. 136.1.

fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra, of which he was a benefactor:

Evidently at this point he did not feel safe from Sparta in Argos (possibly there

had been a political change there: cf. Hdt. VI. 83.1). We know nothing about his benefaction to Corcyra (Plutarch and a scholiast offer what look like guesses); but his fleeing in this direction is one of a few signs that he was interested in the west (de Ste. Croix, O.P.W. 176, 378-9). 136.2. Admetus the king of the Molossi, who was no friend of his: The Molossi

occupied the mainland in the region of Corcyra. We know of Admetus and the previous enmity only what Thucydides tells us; Plut. Them. 24.5 gives his wife the name Phthia. 136.3. to take up their child: Cf. Ar. Ach. 329-30, alluding to Eur. Telephus; but

standard topoi such as this use of a child by a suppliant can occur in life as well as in literature.

274

Commentary

137.1. this is the greatest form of supplication: Cf. J. P. Gould, JHS 93 (1973), 99 with n. 129. N. G. L. Hammond, Epirus, 492—3, notes that it was a particularly

appropriate form of supplication to a descendant of Neoptolemus, who had killed Priam at the altar of his court. the other sea: The Aegean. Pydna the city of Alexander:

Cf. for Pydna 61.2-3, and for Alexander of

Macedon commentary on 56.2. 137.2. Naxos... Ephesus: Plut. Them. 25.2—26.1, claiming to follow Thucydides, takes him via the siege of Thasos (one MS, but supported by the destination) to Cyme, further north on the coast of Asia Minor. It has commonly been thought that

if we can decide which is the authentic route we shall have a date for Themistocles' crossing the Aegean (see 98.4 for Naxos, 100.2-101 for Thasos), but 1 fear the two may be rival embroideries on the fact that in crossing the Aegean Themistocles needed to avoid detection by the Athenians.

137.3.

Artaxerxesson of Xerxes, who had recently become King: In August 465.

Plut. Them. 27.1—2 reports that Thucydides and some others specified Artaxerxes but Ephorus (cf. Diod. Sic. XI. 56.5-8) and some others specified Xerxes, and himself

thinks that Artaxerxes fits the chronology better. The chronology is in fact otherwise uncertain (cf. on 135.2), but it is much more likely that Xerxes, the king whom Themistocles defeated at Salamis in 480, should have been wrongly substituted for Artaxerxes than Artaxerxes for Xerxes.

137.4.

What he wrote disclosed ... : As with Pausanias' correspondence (128.6-

129), it is hard to believe that an authentic text reached Thucydides, but he is

probably reproducing accurately the text which reached him, whatever the basis for that may have been.

he had written from Salamis ... claimed the credit: The message from Salamis about the Greeks' intended withdrawal (different versions in Hdt. VIII. 75, Aesch. Pers. 355—60) led to the Persians' defeat but represented Themistocles as a

Persian sympathiser. Afterwards according to Hdt. VIII. 108-10 the Greeks pursued the Persians from Salamis as far as Andros, Themistocles proposed continuing to the Hellespont but was outvoted, and (wanting to incur the Persians' gratitude in case he should later need it: 109.5) he then accepted the alternative policy and sent a message to Xerxes claiming to have prevented the policy which he had originally advocated. That he then envisaged a later need for Persian support and sent any

message with that in view is highly unlikely. 138.1. unusual: Aramaic 138.3.

to learn the Persian language and the customs of the land: This was cf. A. Momigliano, Alien Wisdom, 7-12. What he learned was perhaps (cf. Homblower). more than others exceptionally worthy of admiration: Thucydides

switches from story-telling to a laudatory character appraisal, which anticipates that of Pericles in II. 65.7—9, cf. Pericles' praise of himself in II. 60.5.

Commentary

275

his in-born intelligence: Cf. 74.1, and Archidamus in I. 79.2, Brasidas in IV. 81, Hermocrates in VI. 72.2, Phrynichus in VIII. 27.5. not buttressing it with anything learned before or after: Ze. not relying either on training or on his own experience: this emphasis on Themistocles' in-born ability is appropriate for a man active before the era of the sophists (whether or not Thucydides worked that out).

the best at estimating ... the future: For this skill cf. Eur. fr. 973 TGF with R. C. T. Parker, in Crux ... G. F. M. de Ste. Croix, 323-4. he was able to expound: Cf. Pericles, I. 139.4, 1I. 60.5—6, 65.8-9.

improvising what was needed: Cf. Pericles’ ability ‘to discern what is needed’, II. 60.5. 138.4.

Hislife came to an end through illness ... voluntarily by poison: One of

the few places in which Thucydides mentions an alternative version (cf. Introduction, p. 4). It was already alleged in the fifth century that Themistocles poisoned himself with bull's blood (which in fact is not poisonous): Ar. Knights 83-4, cf. Diod. Sic.

XI. 58.2-3 (said also of Midas of Phrygia: Strabo 61 / 1. 3.21), Plut. Them. 31.5—6. Plut. Them. 31.4—6, Cim. 18.6—7, puts his death at the age of sixty-five, and seems to link it with Cimon's campaign of c. 450 (112.2-4), but if he was at least thirty years old and archon in 493/2 (cf. on 93.3) his sixty-fifth birthday should have been

earlier than then. 138.5. There is a memorial of him in Magnesia in Asia: Plut. Them. 32.4 refers to a splendid tomb, presumably in fact a cenotaph. That has not survived, but there

are coins of his from Magnesia (see C. M. Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, 244 with pl. 906), and in the hellenistic period there was a festival to him at Lampsacus (/K Lampsakos 3.12-15).

Magnesia for his bread ... Lampsacus for his wine ... Myus for his sauce: Magnesia on the Maeander was inland from Ephesus, Lampsacus was on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont, Myus was inland from Miletus (/nventory 852, 748, 856). For gifts of this kind cf. Hdt. I. 192.3, II. 98.1; Diod. Sic. XI. 57.7 remarks that Magnesia had plentiful grain, Lampsacus extensive vineyards and Myus was famous for its fish (to which opson commonly referred); but what Thucydides says of the cities does not mean that each supplied him with the commodity stated but is simply metaphorical (J. L. Marr, CQ? 44 [1994], 536-9). 138.6. his bones were conveyed home ... buried in Attica ... exile for treason: According to Paus. I. 1.2, 37.1, the Athenians later allowed his relatives to bring back his bones and bury them at Piraeus, and his descendants were active at Athens. Possibly his remains were first brought back secretly and later given an honourable burial. As with the Alcmaeonids after the Cylonian affair (cf. 126.12), what was at issue was the burial in Attica of those guilty of sacrilege or treason; what Creon tried to forbid in Sophocles' Antigone was burial anywhere: cf. E. M. Harris, in E. M. Harris and L. Rubinstein (eds), The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece,

38-9 = his Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens, 67—8.

276

Commentary

So ended the affairs ... the most distinguished of the Greeks of their time: With this conclusion the justification for 126—38 in its context at the end of book | has disappeared from view. Hdt. IX. 64.1 describes Pausanias' victory at Plataea as ‘the finest of all those which we know’; it is striking that Thucydides sets this seal of approval on two men whose achievements were followed by downfall. 139—46. Athenian response to Spartan pressure

139.1.

The Spartans on their first embassy

... driving out the accursed:

Closing the ring opened in 126.2, 128.1—2.

Potidaea ... Aegina ... the Megarians: Three of the four ‘grievances and disputes' of 23.4—6; the affair of Corcyra had come to an end, with Corcyra's gaining

the upper hand in Epidamnus. 139.2. the Megarians were encroaching

... and receiving their deserting

slaves: This explanation was not given in 67.4. There is a long account in Plut. Per. 29.4-31.1, whose sequence is best explained by de Ste. Croix, O.P. W. 246-51, 386-

8. The again 328 F slaves

territorial dispute resurfaced in the mid fourth century, when boundaries were problematic (Dem. XIII. Syntaxis 32, Androtion FGrH 324 F 30, Philochorus 155, IG ii? 204 = R&O 58 = IG ii? 292). In Ar. Ach. 524—9 the harbouring of — not illegal or wrong, but unneighbourly (Gomme) — becomes in a parody of

the beginning of Herodotus a fanstasy involving abducted prostitutes and Pericles'

consort Aspasia. 139.3.

Rhamphias, Melesippus and Agesandrus: Rhamphias reappears in 422

as a commander sent to the north-east (V. 12.1—14.1), Melesippus as the herald sent finally to Athens in 431 (II. 12); Agesandrus may be the father of Agesandridas in

VIII. 91.2. ‘The Spartans ... if you left the Greeks autonomous’: The Spartans end not with Thucydides' 'grievances and disputes’ but with his ‘truest reason”. For autonomy and the members of the Delian League see on 19, 67.2, 97.1, 115.1. Then the Athenians held an assembly: This does not imply that previously Sparta's demands had not been brought before the assembly Hornblower after Badian considered that implication possible).

(Gomme;

but

139.4. Pericles... most capable both of speech and of action: Cf. his introduction in 127, where he is ‘the most powerful of the men of his time’. On the responses of this speech to Archidamus' speech in 80—5 and the Corinthians' speech in 120-4 see on 67.1, 119. 140.1.

I always hold to the same opinion: For this claim to consistency cf. II.

61.2, Cleon in III. 38.1. that we should not give way to the Peloponnesians: Cf. 127.3. what we together judge to be just ... not to claim the credit for intelligence:

Cf. what he says in II. 64.1, and Alcibiades in VI. 16.4. we are accustomned to blame fortune ... contrary to reason: Cf. what he says in II. 61.3, and ta daimonia in II. 64.2.

Commentary 140.2.

277

plotting against us in the past: The proposal to support Samos in 440—439

(40.5) is the one clear instance between the Thirty Years’ Peace and the ‘grievances and disputes’ of 433—432. offer and accept a just settlement: Cf. 78.4, 115.1. each side should possess what we do possess: The Thirty Years' Peace was not made on the basis of the status quo, but Athens had to give up some previous gains: this is presumably an allusion to the Athenian and Spartan blocs as recognised in the Peace (115.1 with commentary: cf. de Ste. Croix, O.P. W. 293; but Hornblower

prefers a limited rule that each side should retain disputed territory unless / until deprived of it under arbitration). demands: Epitassein (cf. 139.1). Athens’ decree on the sending of firstfruits to Eleusis contrasts epitattein of Athens' demand from the Delian League members with keleuein of its urging the other Greek states to send voluntarily (M&L 73 = /G i? 78, trans. Fornara 140.33).

140.4.

going to war over a trivial matter: Cf. Plut. Nic. 9.9, Ar. Ach. 528-9.

Pericles' response is that appeasement over a small matter will not work, but will

demonstrate weakness and thus make greater demands more likely. 141.2. we shall not be in the weaker position: Cf. Archidamus in 80.2-81; but the Corinthians are optimistic in 121.2. 141.3. men who work their own land: True of most Greeks, though the Spartan

citizens had helots to farm their land for them. Pericles intended that the Athenians should abandon their farmland and rely on imports (11. 13.2, 14—16, 62.3). do not have money either privately or in public: Cf. Archidamus in 80.3, the Corinthians in 121.5.

lack experience of lengthy and overseas wars: Cf. Archidamus in 80.3; but the Corinthians allege Peloponnesian experience in 121.2.

141.5.

surpluses: Pericles surveys Athens’ accumulated wealth in 11. 13.3-5. He

returns to finance in 142.1. forced payments: Eisphorai.

In Athens eisphorai were payments

collected

from the rich when the need arose: what was in some sense the first was in 428/7 (III. 19.1: see my commentary). bodies ... money: Cf. the Corinthians in 121.3. Athens' oligarchies of 411—410 were in theory based on the citizens able ‘to serve with their money and their bodies’ (VIII. 65.3, Ath. Pol. 29.5, cf. VIII. 97.1, Ath. Pol. 33.1, Xen. Hell. Il. 3.48). 141.6. single battle ... make war: Cf. Archidamus' fear of a lengthy war in 81.6; but the Corinthians hope for victory in a single naval battle in 121.4. they have no single forum: Sparta consulted its allies on going to war, but not

on the conduct of the war. equal in voting power: Cf. 125.1. not of a single stock: Most were Dorian, but not all (e.g. the Arcadians: see on 2.5). each of them pursues what concerns himself: Cf. the Corinthians’ warning in

120.1-2.

278

Commentary

141.7.

They take a long time to come together: Cf. the Corinthians in 68.2, a

complaint no longer made in 120.1. they consider some of their common

business ... they transact their own

business: This repeats the point made above, that rather than focusing on their common interest *each of them pursues what concerns himself". 142.2.

their hostile fortification: Epiteichisis: proposed by the Corinthians in

122.1 (epiteichismos). 142.3. For the first ... a hostile fortification against them: This has caused difficulties, but 15 satisfactorily elucidated by N. G. L. Hammond, CR 61 (1947),

39-41: it will be particularly difficult for the Peloponnesians to set up a hostile fort in Attica when the fortified area of Athens and the Piraeus will serve as a base from which the Athenians can attack Peloponnesians who try to set up a fort and raid Attica.

142.4. raids and desertions: Desertions particularly of slaves, as when the Spartans occupied Decelea in and after 413 (VII. 27.3—5). it will not be enough to prevent us ... defending them with our ships: The Athenians did in 431 and 430 sail to the Peloponnese while the Peloponnesians

were in Attica, but rather than establish forts they withdrew when challenged (II. 25, 30; 56; but outside the Peloponnese a fort at Atalante in 431, II. 32). 142.5. For we have more experience of land operations ... their mainland activity: This contrast provides the transition between the two points raised in $2, hostile fortification and a Pelponnesian fleet. 142.6. it will not be easy for them to add expertise at sea: Cf. Archidamus in 80.4; the Corinthians are optimistic in 121.4. 142.7. immediately from the Persian Wars: Cf. 14.3, 74.1. 143.1.

disturb the monies at Olympia

Corinthians in 121.3. the metics: Non-Athenians

or Delphi

registered as resident

... higher pay: Cf. the in Attica, who

could

be

required to fight for Athens (cf. II. 13.7, 31.2). we do have that advantage: Of non-Athenians employed as oarsmen (see on

121.3). other officers: Hyperesia, a word which innaval contexts has lost its etymological sense of subordination: see Dover on VI. 31.3; J. S. Morrison, JHS 104 (1984)

48--59. 143.2.

in view of the risk: That the Athenians will win and will punish men who

have defected. 143.4. we shall sail against theirs: Cf. on 142.34. take other land: to supply food.

143.5.

If we were islanders: For this supposition cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.14-16.

The long walls linking the city to the Piraeus (107.1, 108.3) provided a fortified area with access to the sea.

Commentary

279

let go our land and houses: Cf. on 141.3. keep guard on the sea and the city: Cf. the policy attributed to Pericles in II.

13.2. We must not ... fight it out with the Peloponnesians: Cf. Il. 13.2; but when they invaded in 431 some Athenians did want to do that, and the Athenians did use

cavalry to harass the invaders (1l. 19.2, 21-2; and in 428 IIT. 1.2). our allies ... our strength: Cf. Il. 13.2; also Archidamus in 80.3, 81.2-3, 83.2,

the Corinthians in 122.1. laments not for houses and land: Cf. what Pericles says in his last speech, in II. 62.3. for people: Cf. Nicias’ ‘Men are the city’ in VII. 77.7. 144.1. notto add to the empire ... risks of your own choosing: Cf. Thucydides’ final judgment on Pericles, II. 65.7. C. Schubert and D. Laspe, Historia 58 (2009), 373—94, point to some attempts to add to the empire even while Pericles was alive (Astacus in 431, Epidaurus in 430).

our own mistakes: Cf. the Corinthians in 69.5. 144.2.

another speech: In II. 13.2-9 Thucydides gives us a summary in indirect

speech, mostly devoted to reviewing Athens’ resources. the Megarians: Cf. 139.2, 140.3-4. expulsions of foreigners: Not previously mentioned, but cf. the allusions in Il.

39.1, and Ar. Birds 1013—6, PI. Prt. 342 c, Xen. Lac. 14.4. Evidently the practice was notorious, but we have no detailed information: D. M. MacDowell suggests occasional administrative acts by the ephors (Spartan Law, 115). leave the cities autonomous ... when we made the treaty: Cf. 139.3, 140.3. when the Spartans too give their own cities autonomy: For the cities of the perioikoi see on 17. willing to grant a just settlement: Cf. 78.4 etc. shall not begin a war: It was indeed the Spartans who formally began the war

in 431 (II. 18-23). 144.3.

it is necessary to go to war: Because appeasement would not work: cf.

140.4—5. 144.4.

Our fathers withstood the Persians: Cf. the Athenian speech at Sparta,

73.2—74, and Pericles in II. 36.1—3, 62.3. hand over our affairs in no less a state to those who come after: Cf. the Corinthians in 71.1. The oath of Athens’ eighteen-years-old epheboi in the fourth century included the clause, ‘I shall not hand on the fatherland lessened, but greater and better both as far as I am able and with all’ (R&O 88.9-11, Lyc. Leocr 77). 145. at the command of the Spartans: κελευόμενοι: as Gomme remarks, after ἃ ἐκέλευε (‘he urged’) above ἐπιτασσόμενοι (‘at the demand’: cf. on 140.2) would have been more appropriate.

280 146.

Commentary These were the grievances and disputes ... Corcyra: This closes a very

large ring opened in 23.5—6 (and interrupted by 88-118.2, which narrates the growth of Athens'power during the pentecontaetia to justify Thucydides' view of the 'truest reason"). they had contact and visited each other: Until the final Spartan embassy returned with the Athenians' final reply (145). a breakdown of the treaty: Cf. the Spartan resolutions that Athens was in breach of the Thirty Years' Peace, 88, 118.3. Athens judged the Peloponnesians to

be in breach of the treaty as a result of the Theban attack on Plataea in spring 431 (II. 7.1). a reason for the war: For this use of prophasis (‘reason’) cf. 118.1. In book II (as we have it, but the division into books is not by Thucydides: cf. Introduction, p.

21) Thucydides embarks on his narrative of the war, with first a Theban attack on Plataea (II. 2-6) and afterwards the Peloponnesians’ solemn declaration of war and invasion of Attica (II. 18-23).

INDEX

This index 15 not exhaustive: in particular, it omits men named only as the fathers of men involved in the narrative, and some persons, peoples and places mentioned only in a context in which there are other names for which readers are more likely to search. References are to pages, mostly in the Introduction and translation: references to the Commentary are sometimes added to guide readers to discussions of a subject or to references which could not be inferred from the translation. Admetus (of Molossis) 167 Aegina 10, 27,59, 83-5, 103, 137, 141, 169-71 Alcibiades (of Athens) 34 Amphipolis 133 Anactorium 95

clothing 51 composition of history 16-19 Corcyra 6, 12, 27, 30—1, 59, 67-95, 105, 165 Coronea 145 Cylon (of Athens) 155-7

Archidamus (king of Sparta) 8, 12-13, 28,

Cyprus 20, 129, 143,159

117-21 Argos 33, 135, 165 Aristeus (son ofAdimantus, of Corinth) 97-103 Aristeus (son of Pellichus, of Corinth) 71

Corinth 27, 30-1, 57-9,

Aristides (of Athens) 127 Athens passim, esp. 24-35, 47-51, 55, 59-63, 67, 73-95, 95-149, 155-7, 165-79 Boeotia 47, 55, 57, 139-45; see also Thebes

Brasidas (of Sparta) 9, 10, 14, 31, 33 Brea 99 Byzantium 129, 147, 159-61 Callias (of Athens) 99-101

Callias, alleged Peace of, between Athens and Persia 257-8 Carians 5-6, 49, 53

Decelea 32, 34 Delian League 24-35, 63, 67, 113-5, 117-9, 129-47; see also power Delos 53, 131 Delphi 67-9, 137, 143, 149, 155, 163 Demosthenes (of Athens) 3-2 Diodorus Siculus (historian) 22, 24,2 | 3-4, 226, 241, 244, 247, 249—51, 254, 257, 260, 273 Dorians 57, 61, 107, 155

Egypt 26, 137, 141-3 Eion 133 Ephorus (of Cyme, historian) 22-3 Epidamnus 67-73

epiteichismos 31—2, 34, 151, 175

Carystus [33

Euboea 133, 145

Cecryphalea 137 Chaeronea 143-5

Eurymedon, River 133 evidence 5-6, 180-1

Chios 63, 147 chronology 19, 194, 213-4, 226, 240, 249-52,

Halieis 137

256-7, 260, 266 Cimon (of Athens) 26, 133-5, 143, 254 Cleon (of Athens) 2, 9, 33

67-123, 137-9, 149-55

Hellanicus heralds 53, Herodotus 7, 180,

(of Lesbos, historian) 3, 23, 121 71-3, 93, 161 (of Halicarnassus, historian) 2-4, 204

282

Index

Hipparchus (of Athens) 6, 63 Hippias (of Athens) 5—6, 63 Homer (poet of //iad and Odyssey) 2, 6, 49,

55, 210 Hyperbolus (of Athens) 2 Ionians 51, 57, 59, 61, 129, 155 Lacedaemonius (of Athens) 87

Leotychides (king of Sparta) 125 Lesbos 63, 147; see also Mytilene Leucimme 73, 87 Megara 10,27,85,103,137-9,145,155,171,177 Melos 9-10, 29, 33 Messenia 135—7

Miletus 145-7 Mytilene 10, 29 natural phenomena 15, 67, 135 Naupactus 31, 137 navies 49-59, 69, 79, 83, 87, 111, 117-9, 129, 151, 173-7 Naxos 133, 167 Nicias (of Athens) 14, 34

Nicias, Peace of, between Athens and Sparta 17, 19, 31-3 nomos and physis 15-16, 83, 115

Oenophyta 141 Olynthus 97-103 oracles 14—15, 67-9, 137, 149, 155, 165 Pausanias (regent of Sparta) 5—6, 25, 139-31, 159-65 Perdiccas (king of Macedon) 31, 95-103 Pericles (of Athens) 2, 12, 14-15, 28-9, 1437, 157, 171-9 Persia 24—7, 59-65, 105, 111—3, 129-33, 137, 141-3, 159-61, 167-9 Phocis 139-4] Phormio (of Athens) 12, 101-3, 147 physis see nomos Piraeus 129

plague at Athens 4, 32, 67 Plataea 10, 30 Plistarchus (king of Sparta) 132 Plistoanax (king of Sparta) 27, 139, 145

Plutarch (of Chaeronea, writer) 24, 219, 221,

223, 241, 273-5 Polybius (of Megalopolis, historian) 23-4 Potidaea 10, 27, 31, 95—103,169—71 power, nature of Athenian 15-16, 103-17, 149-55 Priene 145 Pylos 10, 32-3 religion 5, 13-15; see also natural phenomena, oracles ring composition 20, 181, 189, 191, 193, 204, 223, 240, 271, 276, 280

Samos 10, 59, 83-5, 145-7 Scyros 125 Sestos 125 Sicily 30, 33—4, 79, 87 Sicyon 143 Sparta passim, esp. 24-35, 55, 61—3, 67, 97, 103-47 speeches 7-9, 65, 75-85, 103-23, 149—55, 171 Sthenelaidas (ephor of Sparta) 8, 121-3 Sybota 3, 87-95 Taenarum 157-65 Tanagra 141 Thasos 133-5

Thebes 30, 35 Themistocles (of Athens) 26, 59, 111, 125-9,

165-9 Thessaly 143 Thirty Years’ Peace, between Athens

and

Sparta 10, 27-8, 67, 85—7, 93, 123, 145, 149 Thucydides (of Athens, historian) 1-24 Tolmides (of Athens) 141, 145, 258

trade 47-53, 103, 171,177 trophies 73, 93-5, 101, 139 Trojan War 49, 53—9

tyche 13-14, 105, 115, 121, 151, 171, 177 tyranny 57, 61, 153-5 walls 49-51, 57,95, 101, 125-9, 135—41, 147 wealth 51—9, 117—9, 123, 151—3, 173-5 Xenophon (of Athens, writer) 16, 22