There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank jackson's Knowledge Argument 0262122723, 0262621894, 2004042586

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THERE'S SOMETHING ABOUT MARY Essays on Phenomenal Corosoousness and FranK Jackson's K.oo.vtedge Argument tOffED BY PETER lUDlOW, VUIIN NAClASAW.... AND DANIEL SlOUAR FOREWORD BV FUJiI( JIoCI(SON

There's Something About Mary Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank jackson's Knowledge Argument

edited by Peter ludlow, Yujln Nagasawa, and Daniel Stollar

A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

© 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. For information, please email [email protected] or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 5 Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA02142. This book was set in Stone serif and Stone sans on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data There's something about Mary: essays on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument I edited by Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoijar. p. cm. "A Bradford Book." Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-12272-3 (hc: alk. paper)- ISBN 0-262-62189-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Consdousness. 2. Jackson, Frank, 1943- . 3. Knowledge, Theory of. r. Ludlow, Peter, 1957- . II. Nagasawa, Yujin, 1975- . III. Stoljar, Daniel, 1967- . BF311.T455 2004 126-dc22 2004042586

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments Sources

ix

xi

Contributors Foreword:

xiii

Looking Back on the Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson Introduction

1

Daniel Stoljar and Yujin Nagasawa Part I

Black-and-White Mary

Epiphenomenal Qualia

37

39

Frank Jackson 2

What Mary Didn't Know

51

Frank Jackson Part II 3

Does She Learn Anything?

"Epiphenomenal" Qualia?

57

59

Daniel C. Dennett 4

Dennett on the Knowledge Argument

Howard Robinson Part III 5

The Ability Hypothesis

What Experience Teaches

David Lewis

75 77

69

xv

\..ontents

6 Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument Philip Pettit

105

7 Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument 143 Michael Tye Part IV The Acquaintance Hypothesis

161

8 Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson (with Postscript: 1997) Paul M. Churchland

163

9 Acquaintance with Qualia 179 John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter 10 Phenomenal Knowledge Earl Conee Part V Old Facts, New Modes

197

217

11 Phenomenal States (Revised Version) Brian Loar

219

12 What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States Martine Nida-Rumelin 13 Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument David J. Chalmers Part VI

Did She Know Everything Physical?

269

299

14 Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia Terence Horgan 15 Two Conceptions of the Physical Daniel Stoljar

241

301

309

16 Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument 333 Benj Hellie 17 So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary Robert Van Gulick

365

Contents

Part VII 18

vII

Postscripts

Postscript

407

409

Frank Jackson 19 Postscript on Qualia

417

Frank Jackson

20 Mind and Illusion Frank Jackson

421

Supplemental Bibliography Index

457

443

Acknowledgments

Torin Alter, Benj Hellie, Frank Jackson, and Paul Raymont read a draft of the introduction and provided useful comments and suggestions. John Bigelow and Howard Robinson furnished important historical information. Martin Davies and Michael Smith gave us guidance about the overall direction of the work. David Chalmers did all three things, and in addition gave good advice about essay selection. We are grateful to all of them. We would also like to thank those authors and publishers who let us reprint the essays collected here and those authors who wrote new essays for the volume: David Chalmers, Benj Hellie, Philip Pettit, and Robert Van Gulick. We are grateful also to Judy Feldmann, Jessica Lawrence-Hurt, and Tom Stone of The MIT Press. Finally, further thanks to Frank Jackson for the foreword, and of course for his splendid creation, Mary.

Sources

Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-136. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. FrankJackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 291-295. Reprinted by pennission of the author and publisher. Daniel C. Dennett, "'Epiphenomenal' Qualia?" from his Consciousness Explained (New York: Little, Brown, 1991), 398-406. Reprinted by pennission of the author and publisher. Howard Robinson, "Dennett on the Knowledge Argument," Analysis 53 (1993): 174177. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches," from J. Copley-Coltheart, ed., Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988): 29-57. Reprinted by pennission of Stephanie R. Lewis and the publisher. Michael Tye, "Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument," from his Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), 3-20. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, "Acquaintance with Qualia," Theoria 61 (1990): 129-147. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. Paul M. Churchland, "Knowing Quali,t: II Reply to Jacksoll," from his A Neurocomputational Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Thl' MIT Press, I ')H'l) , 07-70. Reprinted by permission of the author and publishl'r. Paul M. Churchland, "Postscript: 1997," from 1'. M. Churchland and P. S. Churchland, On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997 (Camhridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998), 153-157. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. Earl Conee, "Phenomenal Knowledge," Australasian Juurnal uf Philosophy 72 (1994): 136-150. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher.

xII

Sources

Brian Loar, "Phenomenal States (Revised Version)," excerpted from J. E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1990),81-108. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. (Revised version in N. Block, o. Flanagan, and G. GlizeJdere, eds., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997,597-608.) Martine Nida-Riimelin, "What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States," from T. Metzinger, ed., Conscious Experience (Exeter, U.K.: Imprint Academic, 1995), 219-241. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. Terence Horgan, "Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984): 147-152. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. Daniel Stoljar, "Two Conceptions of the Physical," excerpted from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001): 253-270. Reprinted by permission of the author and publisher. Frank Jackson, "Postscript," from P. Moser and]. Trout, eds., ContemportlTy MatniaIism (London: Routledge, 1995), 184-189. Reprinted by penniulon of the author and publisher. Frank Jackson, "Postscript on Qualia," from his Mind, Method, and Conditionals (London: Routledge, 1998), 76-79. Reprinted by permiSSion of the author and publisher. Frank Jackson, "Mind and Illusion," by permission of the author and the Royal Institute of Philosophy.

Contributors

John Bigelow is Professor of Philosophy at Monash University, Australia. David J. Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Consdousness Studies at University of Arizona. Paul M. Churchland is Professor of Philosophy at University of California, San Diego. Earl Conee is Professor of Philosophy at University of Rochester. Daniel C. Dennett is University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. Benj Hellie is Assistant Professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. Terence Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at University of Arizona. Frank Jackson is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, Australia. David Lewis was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. Brian Loar is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgl'rs University. Peter Ludlow is Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics at University of Michigan. Yujin Nagasawa is Research Fellow at the Australian Research Council Special Research Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Australian National University, Australia, and lzaak Walton Killam Memorial

xlv

Contributors

Postdoctoral Fellow in the Departmt'llt of Philosophy at University of Alberta, Canada. Martine Nida-Riimelin is Professor of Philosophy at University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Robert Pargetter is Professor of Philosophy at Monash University, Australia, and Principal of Haileybury College, Australia. Philip Pettit is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Howard Robinson is Professor of Philosophy at Central European University, Hungary. Daniel Stoljar is Senior Fellow in the Philosophy Program, the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, Australia. Michael Tye is Professor of Philosophy at University of Texas at Austin. Robert Van Gulick is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Syracuse University.

Foreword looking Back on the Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson

1. I think we should be realists about the theories we accept. To the extent

that we accept one or another theory, we should hold that its entities exist and its properties and relations are instantiated. This requires us to take ontologically seriously the pictures ow theories paint of what our world is Uke. To accept the kinetic theory of gases is to accept inter alia that gases are literally made up of the particles the theory is framed in terms of, and that these particles have the properties the theory uses in its explanations. It follows that it is always a good question to ask of the picture painted by one theory we accept how it relates to the picture painted by another theory we accept. A special case of this good question is the relation between the physical sciences and psychology. The physical sciences, by which I mean roughly physics, chemistry, and biology, tell us that human beings are very complex aggregations of molecules that make up the cells, neurons, blood, and so on that biology talks of, and that these molecules are in turn made up of the smaller particles that atomic and subatomic physics talks of. These aggregations interact with an environment that is itself a vast aggregation of the entities that the physical sciences talk of, set in a spacetime whose nature itself is the subject of the physical sciences, physics in particular. Where, if anywhere, in this picture do we find the entities and properties of psychology? Where are the pains, the sensings of red, the pangs of conscience, the hope that there will not be a war next year, and so on and so forth? The question is especially pressing in the case of the pangs, the pains and the sen sings of red. On the face of it, no amount of aggregating of elements with the kinds of properties the physical sciences talk of can make up the phenomenal, conscious side of our psychology. That side of things is, in

)lvl

Foreword

one way or another, an extra; a part of thl'