Thought and Knowledge: Essays 9781501738760

Citation preview

Thought and Knowledge

BY THE SAME

AUTHOR

Dreaming Knowledge and Certainty

Ludwig

Wittgenstein:

A

Memoir

Memory and Mind Problems of Mind: Descartes

to

Wittgenstein

Thought and

Knowledge

Essays by

NORMAN MALCOLM

Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright All

rights

©

1977 by Cornell University

reserved.

Except

for

brief

quotations

book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced permission

in

writing from

the

publisher.

in

in

a

review,

any form without

For information

Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca,

New

address

York 14850.

published 1977 by Cornell University Press. Published in the United Kingdom by Cornell University Press Ltd., f irst

2-4

Brook

Street,

London

WiY

iAA.

Book Number 0-8014-1074-6 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 76-25647 Printed in the United States of America by Vail-Ballou International Standard

Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information

appears on the last page of the book.

this

Press, Inc.

Elizabeth Anscombe

Rush Rhees Georg Henrik von Wright

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2016 with funding from

Kahle/ Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/thoughtknowledgeOOnorm

Contents

Preface 1.

2. 3.

9

Descartes’ Proof that His Essence

Is

Thinking

15

Thoughtless Brutes Descartes’ Proof that

40

He

Is

Essentially a

Non-Material Thing 4. 5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

Behaviorism

as a

58

Philosophy of Psychology

85

The Privacy of Experience

104

Wittgenstein on the Nature of

Mind

133

The Myth of Cognitive Processes and Structures

Moore and Wittgenstein on

the Sense of “I

The Groundlessness of Belief Index

know

159 ”

170 199 217

Preface

I

hese nine essays, written between 1964 and 1976, are

the

in

philosophy of mind, an area of thought freshly burgeoning with

puzzlement and argument. The resurgence of inquiry into the tionship of

mind and body has

naturally aroused

new

rela-

interest in

Descartes’ philosophy, and three of the essays are studies of Descartes. In the first

1

put forward

a

conjecture as to

have supposed himself to have demonstrated that ture

from

is

thinking,

which,

texts but

In the second

conjecture which

a

I

take

I

try to

1

do not claim

how

he might

his essential na-

to be verifiable

show, has considerable

up Descartes' notorious doctrine

plausibility.

that animals,

other than men, are automatons w ithout consciousness, and nect this doctrine

w

con-

currently favored views about the nature of

ith

thinking and thought. In the third

I

draw

attention to a valid de-

ductive argument, considered by Descartes to be I" is a

I

non-material thing, and

I

a

proof that “this

display here a confrontation be-

tween Descartes’ conceptions and those of Wittgenstein.

The

fourth essay

is

a

ticular reference to the

genstein.

The

fifth

deals

critique of logical behaviorism, with par-

Vienna

w

Circle,

ith the

B. F.

Skinner, and

W itt-

confusing notion of “the privacy

of experience” and attempts to expound some of Wittgenstein’s

thinking on this difficult topic.

The

sixth tries to provide an over-

view of Wittgenstein’s treatment of psychological concepts;

it

in-

W illiam

James and the Wurzburg psychologists on the nature of thought, and of Wolfgang Kohler’s explanation of cludes criticism of

judgments of “successive comparison.” The seventh

is

a

9

brief

10

Preface

thrust at currently influential cognitive psychology, with particular

reference to views of

Noam Chomsky

and Eric Lenneberg on

lan-

guage and thought. In the eighth essay

common

“defence of

terpretation of

Here

topic.

I

have given

I

draw

I

on

Wittgenstein’s final writing, lies

more comprehensive inmy previous essays on this

sense,” providing a

than

it

return once again to Moore’s renow ned

in

some of the insights contained On Certainty. The ninth essay also

heavily on this work, trying to relate

it

in

re-

to the topic of religious

belief.

am

I

grateful to the following editors, journals,

and publishers

for permission to republish eight of these essays:

Editor

to the

of The Philosophical Review for “Descartes’ Proof that His Essence Is

Thinking"

American

{Philosophical

Philosophical

{Proceedings

of the

slightly

1973:

Review

to

some observations (Philosophy

The

Forum

for

the

unrevised); to

“Thoughtless Association

Editor of Philosophy

the.

Brutes"

1972-

46,

,

Forum and

Publishers, for permission to use in

Is

Essentially a Non-Material

that appeared in an author/reviewer 14,

,

He

1965:

Philosophical

Gordon and Breach, Science “Descartes’ Proof that

74,

Association

American

revised);

,

1975); to

Thing”

symposium

William Marsh Rice University and

University of Chicago Press for “Behaviorism as a Philosophy

of Psychology" {Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for

Modern Psychology Press, Chicago,

,

ed.

T. W. Wann,

1964; copyright

University: revised); to

Avrum

©

copyright

,

Stroll

and Harper

New

N Row

for

“The

Essays in the Theory of

Row, New York, 1967; Avrum Stroll, Harper © 1967 by Avrum Stroll: unrevised); to Nicholas Rescher ed.

(Sc

and the American

Philosophical Quarterly

Nature of Mind” {American Series, ed.

for “Wittgenstein

Philosophical

Quarterly

Nicholas Rescher, Monograph No.

unrevised); to

Myth

University of Chicago

1964 by William Marsh Rice

Privacy of Experience” {Epistemology:

Knowledge

The

4,

,

on the

Monograph

Oxford, 1970:

Theodore Mischel and Academic Press

for

“The

of Cognitive Processes and Structures" {Cognitive Development

1

Preface

and Epistemology

,

1

New

Theodore Mischel, Academic Press,

ed.

York, 1971: unrevised); to Jaakko Ilintikka and the Philosophical

“Moore and Wittgenstein on

Society of Finland for

know

’

"

{Essays on Wittgenstein in

Honour of G.

Jaakko Ilintikka, Acta Philosophica Eennica, vised); to Stuart

University

Cornell

and

{Reason

Brown, the Royal Press

Religion

ed.

,

Philosophy Conference,

for

//.

28,

the Sense of

von Wright

Institute of Philosophy,

Brown,

1975, Cornell

ed.

1976: slightly re-

“The Groundlessness of

Stuart

,

‘I

Royal

and

Belief"

of

Institute

University Press, Ithaca,

forthcoming: revised).

I

he preparation of this book was accomplished

w

1976,

hile

I

w

as

I

express

the National

the spring of

on sabbatic leave from Cornell and w

fellowship conferred manities.

in

by the National Kndowment

my

hile

for

I

held a

the

Hu-

gratitude both to Cornell University and to

Endowment.

Norman Malcolm Ithaca

,

New

York

Thought and Knowledge

,

Proof that

Descartes'

1

His Essence

Thinking

Is

2

SUM RES COGITANS.

i.

not difficult to understand Des-

It is

cartes’ conviction that

by means of

sum he had proved

own

,

ficult to

his

existence with certainty.

understand how* he moves from the thesis

thinks, therefore his existence

ture

is

his “first principle,” cogito ergo

is

It is

more

dif-

he

that, since

certain, to the thesis that his na-

nothing but thinking and that he

is

entirely distinct from his

body His critic, Hobbes, regarded the transition from cogito ergo sum to sum res cogitans as obviously fallacious: it was like saying, “I am walking, hence am the walking.” Another contemporary, Arnauld, was unable to find in the Meditations anything like a sound 1

.

I

proof of the doctrine sum

res cogitans

3 .

Locke addressed himself

the Cartesian view that “actual thinking soul as actual extension it

is

is

from the body.”

save an arbitrary stipulation:

“it is

as inseparable 4

He saw

Adam

Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C.

The Philosophical Works cf Descartes bridge, 1931),

1

190.

,

ITie edition

and that of Haldane and Ross

as

from the

no support

for

but defining the soul to be

substance that always thinks,’ and the business

1.

to

is

done.”

5

‘a

Locke

Tannery (Paris, 1897-1913), VII, 78; ed. and trans. E. Haldane and G. Ross (Camof Adam and Tannery is hereafter cited as AT, and

HR.

I

P.

use the translations of the latter with oc-

casional changes. 2.

“Sum

3.

See

4.

John Locke,

ambulans, ergo sum ambulatio ”

AT

VII, 197-204;

ford, 1894), Bk. 5.

Ibid., Sec.

An

II,

HR

II,

i,

VII, 172;

HR

II, 61).

80-85.

Essay Concerning

Ch.

(AT

Human

Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (Ox-

Sec. 9.

19.

15

1

Thought and Knowledge

6

added

this tart

know

not what

comment: it

away without

pass

at all; since

they find

suspect that

good part of

a

I

their lives

6

thinking."

not true that the business was done by a mere stipulation.

It is

Descartes supported the doctrine sum is

many men

can serve for but to make

they have no souls

be of any authority,

“If such definition

one would expect of the supports of

to his system.

To many

with proofs. But

do not have the force

true that his explicit arguments

bility that

res cogitans

it

or plausi-

doctrine so central

a

students of Descartes, the cogito

both

is

compelling and profound, but the subsequent demonstrations in system, supposedly built on the

his

7 .

propose that Descartes’ doctrine that his essential nature

will

I

unconvincing

cogito, are

thinking

is

based on

a line of

is

thought, not explicitly stated but sug-

gested in various passages, which does have an impressive appear-

ance of cogency.

we

shall find

it

we

If

attribute this line of thought to Descartes

easily intelligible that the lucid philosopher should

have drawn the conclusion that he was “a substance the whole sence or nature of which for his

own

makes

that

is

to think."

sake; but also his

I

want

8 I

am

interested in Descartes

understand better what

to

dualism of mind and body

Discovering what 1 am.

Having made

cartes undertakes to find out what he

inquire what

I

am,

whom

I

examine himself attentively

I

“I

certain that he

know

know' to exist." 10

.

is.

“I

must be

9

that

He

I

He

is.

is is

is

it.

Des-

is,

exist,

and

says that he

careful to see that

not imprudently take some other object in place of myself." cartes

it

persuasive doctrine,

a

despite the unsatisfactory character of his explicit proofs of

2.

es-

11

I

w ill I do Des-

trying to pick out, from various candidates, that which he

searching for that which “pertains" to him or “cannot be

6.

Ibid.

7.

Speaking of Descartes and the

cogito,

Jaspers says: “Er kann von dieser Gewissheit

aus keinen weiteren Scbritt zu neuer Gewissheit tun der den gleicben Character zwingender ,

Evidenz

hdtte. ”

Karl Jaspers, Descartes und die Philosophie (2d ed.; Berlin, 1948), p.

AT VI, 33; HR o 152. 9. AT VII, 27; HR 10. AT VI, 32 {examinant avec attention ce que j'etais HR 101. AT VII, 25; HR 150; italics added.

8.

I,

1

1

I,

.

);

1

1.

I,

I,

18.

Descartes' Proof that

separated” from him

12

His Essence

Thinking

Is

l

In the language of the Principles, he

.

try-

is

ing to discern his “principal attribute” or “principal property.”

Or,

Descartes also puts

as

he

it,

7

13

trying to discover his “essence”

is

or “nature.”

Descartes does not explicitly define the terms “essence” or “nature.” lie does say that “nothing without exist

comprised

is

saying, contains only what

Does the essence of

thing.

14

in its essence.”

The

which

thing can

a

essence of

a thing,

he

is

necessary for the existence of the

is

thing contain everything that

a

still

neces-

is

sary for the existence of the thing? Descartes does not say. But one

would think

so, for

otherwise the essence of

a

thing would

contain something that was essential to that thing contradiction in terms.

like a

that

is

If

— which

a

thing

is

to

seems

the essence of a thing contains all

necessary for the existence of that thing, does

the essence of

fail

sufficient (as

follow that

it

well as necessary) for the exis-

tence of that thing? Apparently not. For

if it

w ere

so,

then the es-

sence of anything would imply the existence of that thing; but ac-

cording to Descartes,

this

HR

12.

AT VII,

13.

“Each substance has

26-27;

I,

is

He

a principal attribute”

(AT

VIII, 25;

“ that the 1 ” in “I

solely thinking,

(AT

and that

VIII, 24;

HR

I,

239). If

his existence requires

we

it

I,

240).

It

is

needs no other

he can prove that

his essence

“no world nor place,”

pear to follow that he “needs no other thing in order to exist,” Certainly

HR

think” stands for a

defined a substance as “a thing which so exists that

thing in order to exist”

15 .

5 *-

l

often said that Descartes uncritically assumed substance.

God

true only of the essence of

i.e.,

he

is

is

it

would ap-

a

substance.

should not attribute to Descartes an unreHective assumption on this

point. 14. 15.

AT VII, 219; HR AT VII, 68; HR

I,

II,

97.

182.

AT

VIII, 10;

HR,

I,

225. Gilson says that, for Des-

cartes, the essence of a thing constitutes the thing in itself

inseparable from the thing: E. Gilson, Discours de

la

;

the essence of a thing

Methode: Texte

et

is

Cornmentaire

There is a problem here. Descartes certainly would hold that you and have the same essence, namely, thinking. You can prove that your essence is thinking just as readily as can prove that my essence is thinking. But from the fact that thinking exists it does not follow that you exist, any more than it follows from the fact that exist. In this obvious sense, thinking is separable from you and also from me. The essence of a thing, therefore, is separable from the thing; or else (Paris, 1947), p. 305. I

I

I

thinking I

is

not our essence.

mention

this

problem only to leave

it.

Descartes does not discuss the question of

8 Thought and Knowledge

1

A

3.

criterion

my

for determining

essence.

It

helpful to think of

is

Descartes’ procedure in terms of an analogy with sense perception.

Me

has discovered an object, himself; and

make out what

order to

self attentively in

now

he

is

studying him-

his nature

Descartes

is.

states explicitly, of course, that this investigation of himself

sense perception: “I shall

analogy

in the

by

my

all

senses.”

16

What

is:

it

I

knowledge of and

a

more

familiar ac-

17

quaintanceship with myself.”

Although Descartes would deny that the essence of

thing

a

sufficient for the existence of the thing (except in the case of

he could hold that

there

if

something E, such that

0

and

if

if

is

an existing thing 0, and

is

something

necessarily he perceives himself and

he perceives x

sarily

,

then x

is

such that

x, if

if

E

is

the

Descartes

,

there

is

one perceives E, necessarily one perceives

essence of 0. With regard to the existing thing, himself if

is

God),

there

if

one perceives 0, necessarily one perceives E, then

could hold that

value

I

man studying an object in order to shall try little “considering my own nature,

to reach a better

little

away

not

the picture of a

is

make out what

call

is

he perceives x

he perceives himself neces-

his essence.

My

hypothesis will be

that Descartes did hold this view. This hypothesis will suggest a

route that could have taken

him from

the cogito to the doctrine

sum

res cogitans.

For

my

purpose

it

is

Some

verb “perceive.”

not necessary to fasten exclusively on the

other verbs of cognition, such as “be aware

We

of” or “apprehend,” can be substituted for “perceive.”

constantly remind ourselves of Descartes’ frame of thought.

proved with certainty that he himself

make

is

provided

for,

space.

He

selves,

and

AT

now

on

his

view, by

w ith

a difference in

He

has

going to

and study. In

passage Descartes says that in the cogito one’s

there can he numerically different selves

16.

He

himself or his existence the object of his attention

a striking

how

exists.

must

own

exis-

same essence. This cannot be bodies or by different locations in the

did not try to set forth any criteria for the identity and difference of it

is

problematic whether he could have done

VII, 34;

HR

I,

157.

17.

Ibid.

it.

Descartes' Proof that His Essence Is Thinking

something known per

tence

is

mind.

18

se:

one

sees

by

it

a

19

simple act of the

lie will hold himself (or his existence) before his mental

As he observes which will be what he

vision.

he will be aware of something

himself, is,

what he consists

what he can be

of,

defined to be.

My

suggestion

is

that Descartes

employed the following

princi-

ple as a criterion for determining his essential nature:

x

G.

my

is

essence

if it

the case that

is

if

am aware of myself, and (necessarily) am aware of x 19

(necessarily)

then

I

I

I

if

I

self, a

20

Descartes sometimes

cogito,

sometimes

a

know ledge

am aware

If I

4.

whether thinking true that

Is it

if

I

I

the

am aw are

of myself or aware that

I

AT

je suis,

ou j’existe,

syllogisme

(AT

IX,

19.

A

prevent that

VII, 140;

my

il

HR

II, 38.

1

21

a

and more frequently shall take the

I

my

ex-

Let us consider

of myself.

condition contained in principle G.

exist?

It

am aware

I

should be remembered that Des-

and penser

in a far

w ider sense than

French version: “Lorsque qnelqu'un

ne conclut pas son existence de sa pensee soi: il la

voit

comme par

par une simple

pense, done

dit: je

la force de quelqtie

inspection de I'esprit"

10).

must be placed on the scope of the variable x in result. If the value myself were substituted for x, the

restriction a silly

essence

stituted for

that arises

knowledge of him-

of thinking then necessarily

mats comme une chose connue de

,

it

that he exists.

am aware

first

cartes uses the verbs cogitare

18.

knowledge

exist,” as equivalent in principle G.

of thinking I

fulfills

of myself

“aware of myself," “aware of

liberty of treating the phrases

and “aware that

calls

of his existence,

knowledge, perception, or awareness

istence,"

of x then

.

In speaking of the perception, awareness, or

out of the

am aw are am aware

myself.

is

The term

“essence”

x should be something of w hich

said to consist of myself.

might mean, we can

I

is

not used that way.

formula, to

result

The

could be said to “consist”:

Without trying to specify further what

at least rake

this

this

I

would be value sub-

cannot be

requirement

the precaution of stipulating that x cannot take

myself as a value. 20.

(AT 21.

AT VII, IX,

28;

HR

I,

22).

See note 18 above.

1

52.

French version:

“cette connaissance

qne j'ai de moi-meme"

20

Thought and Knowledge

that in

which the English verb “think” any sensation

to oneself to feel

is

used

22

To

.

feel or to

example, to seem to

(for

to doubt, to deny, to imagine, to will, to be actively

thing,

would be “to think,”

we

have: “ Thought

way

that exists in us in such a 24

it.” if

As

a result

am aware

I

I

we

am

I

It

are aware of

that covers everything

is

it

true that, for Descartes,

thinking, and so

thinking; and

cogitare.

are immediately conscious of

two points

of these

am

we

that

of anything then

of thinking then

word

a

is

heat ), 23

aware of any-

broad use of

in Descartes’

should also be noted that Descartes holds that every thought

feel

seem

if

am

I

thinking

am aware am aware of

if I

I

thinking.

Does Descartes hold (or

aware that

that

exist)? If

I

am aware

I

whenever

I

think

he does, then he

am aware

I

committed

is

moment:

of myself at every

Some commentators

22.

that

French of the seventeenth century and tion to Descartes' Philosophical Writings

,

common

in

am

I

the everyday

medieval Latin. (See A. Koyre’s introduc-

in

Anscombe and

ed. E.

Note,

1954], p. xxxvii; cf. the Translators’

to holding

he holds that

for

claim that this wide usage was

of myself

p. xlvii).

Geach [Edinburgh,

P.

Whether or not

this

so,

is

1

can

see a purely philosophical basis for Descartes’ broad use of cogitare and penser. Descartes says:

these alone

“Of my thoughts some is

the

title ‘idea’

are, so to speak,

properly applied; examples are

of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or of

forms

as well.

For example

my

thought of

a

man

or

God. But other thoughts possess other approving, denying, though

in willing, fearing,

something

perceiv e {apprehendo)

images of the things, and to

my

as the object cf

thought

{tit

I

always

subjectum meae cogita-

by this action always add something else to the idea which have of that thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections, and other judgments” (AT VII, 37; IR 159; italics added). In logic and grammar subjectum means “that which is spoken of.” It seems fair to translate subjectum meae yet

tionis ),

1

1

1

cogitationis as

“the object of

my

1

,

thought.”

What Descartes holds

imagining, or willing, or sensing, or feeling,

etc., there

my

I

mind, an object of direct awareness.

there

is

If

is

awareness. before the

It

is

mind

What

is

common

to

all

of them

an object, thought or thinking. Thus ,

that Descartes should

have regarded

I

am

approve of something, for example,

natural to call that state of affairs in as

if

always an object before

an object of awareness, plus some further “attitude.”

other mental events.

that

is

is

The same

that there

is

holds for

an object of

which something it is

intelligible

all

is

directly

and plausible

forms of consciousness as species of thinking regardless of the contemporary popular and philosophical usage of penser and cogiall

,

tare.

23.

AT

VII, 29;

HR

1

,

153.

24.

AT

VII, 160;

HR

II,

52.

:

Proof that His Essence

Descartes

thinking at every moment. 25 Surely that Descartes 1

would have believed

have the actual thought

not obtain

whether there

moment that I

my

of

life

am aware

I

he evidence from

know'

it

I

doubt or

because

might be that

writings

his

I

Yet

exist.

doubt, that

if

did not think,

I

But

how

that

if

I

long?

is

27

As long

that

fact that

as

when he

one

I

exists

I

I

thinks,

it

think. I

am, and

I

And

is I

28

had existed.”

I

better,

should cease

at

as suggest-

sufficient to think. In exist, that

is

certain.

might possibly be the case that as long as he

says: “I saw

from the very

thought of doubting the truth of other things, 1

very

it

was; on the other hand, if all

the rest of what

if

I

had

I

should have no reason for think-

I

W hen

reason for thinking” he exists.

“But

it

IV he

ever imagined had really existed,

27.

could not know

I

certain that he exists. But the

is

had only ceased from thinking, even

I

In The Search

should likewise cease altogether

evidently and certainly followed that

ing that

it

am,

“I

think; for

In Discourse

difficult.

is

I

Here Descartes might be saying

thinks, and only

passage

because

to say

ceased entirely to think,

to exist.”

26.

existence, or

am, and know that

I

the Second Meditation Descartes says:

25.

that every

These remarks could be taken

know

ing the view that to

still,

my

not decisive.

is

ceased for an instant to think

I

the same time to be.”

is

life

Let us consider

sense.

of myself (or of

ruth Polyander says: “If

I

whether

he

my

of

exist).

I

After

it

common

from

any evidence that Descartes did hold

is

1

will think,

moment

that at every

2

But metaphysical philosophy does

1 exist.

inspiration

its

one

unlikely,

is

it

Thinking

Is

he

What

is

not thinking, he “has no

this suggests

is

that

whenever

thinking, he does have a “reason for thinking” he exists. But

one does not actually think

at

Letter to Gibieuf, 19 January 1642

AT AT how

X, 52 VII,

HR 27; HR 1 ;

I,

every

(AT

III,

moment

of

all

the reasons

478).

322.

I,

1

5

1

— 1

52.

I

follow Ilintikka in reading Quandiu autem? as

long?” and Nempe quandiu as “As long as” (Jaakko

I

lintikka,

“

Cogito Ergo ,

Sum

Inference or Performance?,” Philosophical Review, 71 [1962], 22). VI, 32-33; I, 101. For further evidence on the point 28.

AT

note 60 below.

HR

at

issue see

Thought and Knowledge

22

one has one

that

always thinking of

is

own

Descartes’

dence exist.

for his

reason for thinking one exists.

a

statements admittedly do not provide strong evi-

having held that whenever

believe

I

is

think

am aware

I

that

would be drawn

I

to

partly because the best support for his

principle “I think, ergo

I

exist”

principle “I think, ergo

I

am aware

later (Sections

I

plausible, however, that he

it is

accept this doctrine. This

is

the same time

at

that

exist.”

I

a

support for the

shall explain this

I

14-16) and shall assume for the present that Des-

would admit

cartes

remark need not imply

for believing various things; so this

that

whenever

I

am

thinking

I

am aware

that

I

exist.

Assuming

be

this to

namely,

principle G,

so,

thinking

I

am aware

if

fulfills

the

first

of thinking

I

condition of

am aware

of

am aware of thinking then am thinking, and (by our assumption) that if am thinking am aware of myself. It follows that if am aware of thinking am myself. For Descartes

would agree

that

if

1

I

I

I

I

I

aware of myself.

If I

5.

am aware

of myself I \

am aware

that the second condition of principle

ing to Descartes,

we

are

aware of myself would be fore,

if

I

am aware

Thinking

6.

principle

G

is

and

my is

and

To of

also

it

is

a particular I

example of thinking. There-

am aw are

Thinking

of thinking.

satisfies

my

the

two conditions of

essence.

The

appears to be rigorous.

recapitulate: Descartes’ first step in rebuilding the structure

human knowledge

le

reason-

achieved would be very natural for Des-

is

to prove that a particular thing exists,

namely, himself. Next he seeks to find out the nature of I

easy to see

holds for thinking. Accord-

therefore proved to be

ing by which this result cartes,

G

It is

aware of every thought we have. Being

of myself

essence.

of thinking.

this thing.

proceeds to deduce by highly intuitive principles and with

every appearance ot cogency that what constitutes the nature of this thing (himself)

only

if

he

is

is

thinking. For he

aware of thinking.

is

aware of himself

if

and

Proof that His Essence

Descartes

his

I

plicitly

method of proving the doctrine sum formulated by Descartes, and so my

necessarily a conjecture.

is

thought lay unclearly

But

mind,

in his

becomes

it

the passage in the Discourse where he

this

to

him

line

of

understand

easier to

announces

first

it

his discovery

mind and body:

of the separateness of

And

attribution of that

23

was not ex-

res cogitans

we assume

if

thinking

Is

then, examining attentively that which

was,

I

I

saw

that

1

could con-

had no body, and that there was no world nor place where might be; but yet that could not for all that conceive that was not. On the contrary, saw from the very fact that thought of doubting the truth

ceive that

I

I

I

1

I

1

of other things,

other hand

if

had only ceased from thinking, even

1

w as; on the the rest of what

very evidently and certainly followed that

it

if all

I

1

had ever imagined had really existed, should have no reason for thinking that had existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or I

1

nature of which

place, nor does

it

to say, the soul

and

The

by which

make

I

1

because

I

am,

is

am

my

a

be sure,

of

is

false that if

my

body.

It

I

is

not aware of his feeling): yet

29.

am aware

added.

Medita-

and that mean-

exist,

am

I

a

thinking

I

body cannot satisfy both conditions of

am aware

of I

my

body

am aware

(or

AT

if

lost all “

am aware which a man is

VII, 78;

is

HR

1

sensory power and

Ego sum

he

indeed of

of myself. But

of myself then necessarily

think to himself

30.

in

also

any other thing necessar-

that

body (suppose he has still

would

essence consists solely in the fact

aware of himself even

Ibid.; italics

1

not difficult to imagine cases in

he can

cartes can be

from body, and even if body were

29

certainly that

my

is

entirely distinct

attributing to Descartes

anything) then, according to Descartes, it

“me,” that

30

my if

no need of any

this

nature or essence, excepting that

evident that body or

To

is.

it

is

otherwise puzzling passage

know

thinking thing.”

principle G.

is

the latter;

be what

to

rightly conclude that

am

It is

than

intelligible the

pertains to

1

know

1

do not notice {animadvertam)

I

thing,

am what

thought that

tion VI: “Just

while

1

would not cease

line of

help to

that

,

even more easy to

is

not, the soul

ily

and that for its existence there depend on any material thing: so that

to think

is

,

ego existo."

Des-

not aware of anything

I,

190.

Thought and Knowledge

2 j.

result that

any corporeal thing

result that thinking

is

cannot give the

Since

his essence.

and since

his essence,

is

G

by principle

corporeal. 1 he criterion provided

a

does give the

it

substance can have

no more than one essence, Descartes is apparently entitled to hold that he is “entirely and absolutely distinct” from his body “and can without

exist

7

I do not

.

31

it.”

know

that body pertains to

he takes note of

nature, ergo

it

In

does not.

which Descartes published with the Medita-

th e Preface to the Reader, tions,

my

a criticism that

viously published Discourse on Method. that “it does not follow

from the

had been made of

The

he

criticism,

fact that the

his prestates,

human mind

is

reflect-

ing on itself does not perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that

nature or

its

essence consists only in

its

thing that thinks, in the sense that this

word

being

its

only excludes

all

a

other

things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature of the soul.” Descartes goes

was not

it

my

on

to remark:

“To

this objection

1

reply that

intention in that place [the Discourse] to exclude these

accordance with the order that looks to the truth of the matter

in

(as to

which

the order of

my

that so far as

my

was not then dealing), but only

I

perception

was aware,

I

essence, excepting that

(

percept ionem)\ thus

knew nothing

I

was

I

a

accordance with

in

my meaning was

clearly as belonging to

thing that thinks, or

a

thing that

has in itself the faculty of thinking. But I shall show hereafter

from

the fact that I

follows that there

is

know no

no other thing which really does belong

wrong account of

Descartes gives here a course.

If

my

other thing which pertains to

how

essence, it

to it."

32

his intentions in the Dis-

one examines the passage from the Discourse quoted

in the

preceding section, one sees that Descartes was not asserting merely that “so far as

I

was aware,

my

essence, except that

he

asserts, categorically

31.

Ibid.

32.

AT

I

I

was

knew nothing a

clearly as belonging to

thing that thinks.”

and without qualification,

VII, 7-8;

HR

I,

137-138;

italics

On “I

added.

the contrary

knew

that

I

Descartes'

was

a

that His Essence Is Thinking

I* roof

substance the whole essence or

25

nature of which

to

is

think.” 33

But Preface

my

for

show that Descartes does maintain

to

is

purpose the chief interest of the passage from the

from the

that

fact

that he knows of nothing other than thinking that pertains to his es-

sence,

it

follows that nothing else does pertain to

Arnauld acutely

may

that

y

is

know

not

clearly

sides.

essential to

is

x

and yet

,

a

that this triangle

w hether the square on I

Arnauld, “from the

its

base

may be

true

is

right-angled,

its

that

fact

essence.

one

is

34 I

low can

unaware is

it

follow

that anything else

35

one understands Descartes’ “argument from ignorance,

might want to

the Preface 36 and in the

viously fallacious.

From

ot her

is

that

is

If,

way

that

one

as

that Descartes himself states

Arnauld

restates

then

it,

it

it

is

in

ob-

the fact that one does not know of anything

essential to

x

,

it

does not follow that nothing

essential.

lunve\ er,

we

with principle G,

conceive of Descartes as reasoning in accordance previously described, then his proof

as

longer obviously fallacious. it

way

the

call it, in

asks

,

thinking being, that

a

nothing else really belongs to one’s essence?” If

I

equal to the squares on

is

belongs to one’s essence, except that one

also

that

lence the equality of the square on the base to those on

the sides does not belong to

else

it

is

By reasoning that is parallel to Descartes’, man would be entitled to argue as follows: “While

and distinctly perceive

yet doubt its

that y

,

essential to x.

says Arnauld, I

Descartes’ proof, in the Meditations

criticized

was solely thinking. Arnauld’s main point

that his nature

one

it.

no longer appears

understand

why

to

Descartes,

On

the contrary

it

seems

flawless.

no

And

We

be an argument from ignorance.

who

is

can

sought to introduce the rigor of

mathematics into metaphysics, and w ho believed that he had “very 37

exact demonstrations” 33. 35. 37.

AT VI, 33; HR AT VII, 199; HR AT Vlb- 13, HR

101.

I,

11

I,

,

81.

140.

of everything in the Meditations

AT VII, 201-202; HR II, 138. 36. AT VII, 8; HR

34.

I,

83.

,

was so

Thought and Knowledge

26

confident that he had discovered his essential nature. In replying to

Arnauld he says, “Although perhaps there have no knowledge

I

sufficient to

is

.

my

allow of

tain that

God

things of

which

.

.

yet since that which

existing with

am

as

it

me

could have created I

much in me of which I am aware of in myself

is

my

sole possession ,

without giving

not yet aware.”

38

me

am

I

cer-

those other

Descartes was sure that he

could exist with thinking as his sole possession, because his percep-

was seen by him

tion of thinking

condition of his perception of himself

ficient

8

and

/ have a clear

.

remarks

distinct idea cf

in several places that

mind

tion that

Meditation

is

39 .

The proof

and

occurring

thinking and unextended thing” (quatenus sum tantum

a

tans,

non extensa), 40 God’s omnipotence could

It is

distinct

is

make him

He

clear

If this is

merely

a

and distinct ideas has no value.

and contrary

to his

as

an unex-

It

would be unlike Des-

aims to be dogmatic on so crucial

himself as an unextended thing.

a clear

dogmatic assertion, then the proof

needs an objective proof that he has

first

exist apart

from body.

and distinct idea (conception, perception) of himself

cartes

res cogi-

necessary to ask w hat assures Descartes that he has

tended thing.

in this

distinct idea of himself “as

only

from

Descartes

body.

not proved until theS/x^ Medita-

that since he has a clear

from body, and therefore he

suf-

.

mind apart from

from body

distinct

is

it is

and

to be both a necessary

On

a clear

and

a point.

distinct idea of

our present interpretation,

premise of the argument from clear and distinct ideas

is

this

es-

by Descartes’ demonstrative proof that he is aw are of himself w hen and only when he is aw are of thinking. Aw areness tablished as true

of

body does not come

into

it.

This

would seem

proof as could be demanded that he has a of himself as solely

38.

AT

39.

E.g.,

HR

II,

40.

VII, 219;

AT

I

VII,

a

IK 1

and

VII, 78;

HR

I,

good

as

a

distinct perception

97; italics added.

HR

I,

140-141.

AT

VII, 175;

HR

II,

63.

32.

AT

be

thinking thing.

II,

3;

clear

to

190. Cf.

AT

VII, 169-170;

HR

II,

59.

AT

VII, 131;

,

His Essence

Descartes' Proof that

Why

9.

cited evidence

I

not

G

to determine his es-

from the Fourth Discourse and the Second Med-

But since Descartes declares that he has not proved the

itation.

mind from body

separateness of

until theiVjr/A Meditation

my

destroy that evidence and refute

this

is

Sixth Meditation. In support of the suggestion that

the

Descartes employed the criterion of principle sence,

27

mind from body

Descartes declares that the separateness of

proved until

Thinking

Is

No. What

suggestion?

delayed until the Sixth Meditation

is

does not

,

is

the resolution of

the radical doubt as to whether our clear and distinct perceptions

may

(ideas, conceptions)

whether there clear

not be mistaken. This

any correspondence

is

is

between

at all

a

doubt

and that

all

Descartes deduces,

at

He

that

V

the end of Meditation

and distinctly cannot

clearly

Him, and

things depend on

“what

41

Armed

perceive

I

with this

conclusion, Descartes can then assert, in Meditation VI, that that

fices

clearly

I

am

“it

suf-

able to apprehend one thing apart from another

and distinctly 42

from the other.”

in

order to be certain that the one

is

different

Since he has previously determined that he per-

ceives himself clearly

and distinctly

tended thing,” he deduces that his

God,

a

is

not a deceiver,

that

to be true.”

fail

is

and our

reality

and distinct perceptions. Having proved that there

as to

as

“only

in reality

he

a

is

thinking and unex-

a distinct

thing from

body. 43

Our ical

interpretation

is

not concerned with his radical, metaphys-

doubt, but only with his assertion that he has

a clear

and

dis-

tinct perception of himself as solely a thinking thing. Since this as-

sertion

is

warranted texts.

41. 44.

made both

drawing evidence

in

AT My

pour

Meditation II,

we

are

our interpretation from those

HR

HR

AT

VII, 78; interpretation disagrees with that of I lamelin,

VII, 70;

le

moment a

I,

,

42.

184.

“S'll dit qu'il est

se considerer

t'eme de Descartes (Paris, 191 1), p.

serts,

for

IV and

44

position in Meditation 11 torise

in Discourse

une

who

“I

(

Ibid.

43.

says of Descartes’

que comme une chose qui pense. ” O. Hamelin, Le Sys127.

We

have seen that is

in Discourse

IV Descartes

as-

to think (Section 7, above). In

do not now admit anything which is not necessarily am only tantum ) a thing which thinks” (Ad VII, 27; HR

Meditation II he says: I

190.

chose qui pense, cela signifie qu'il nest au-

without qualification, that his whole essence

speak accurately

I,

true: to I,

152).

Thought and Knowledge

28

The

io.

indivisibility of the

supplementary argument

which would be

man

of

“When

I

from the body,”

argument from

his

body

that

is

clear

is

my

of the Meditations Descartes declares that

sis

mind

ceive of the half of a

so that

we

we can do

as

does not follow that weight

have

lost

away from

who

lost his

not

is

some

is

my

“we

is

so.

assertion

46

is

am aware

In the Synop-

of the smallest of

is

not

a

all

bodies;

true that think-

It is

is

weight: yet

property of bodies.

parts of their bodies have

minds,

If

it

Descartes

found nothing taken

it

am

saying that I I

can be

not divisible into spatial parts. But

split in half.

again unqualified.

postponing of the

final

Descartes would reply that “I”

I

“I” refers only to a thinking

suspect that two things, mainly, have prevented

proved,

in

nature

tion II

how Descartes could have believed

this

AT

first,

the

that he

had

Meditation II and Discourse IV, that (leaving aside the metaphysical doubt) is

solely thinking.

The

result

is

the view that in the Discourse and Medita-

Descartes did not assert that he really

Descartes’

literally:

resolution of the radical, metaphysical doubt until Meditation

VI; second, a failure to perceive

45.

I

foot, or

are not able to con-

lamelin and other commentators from taking these assertions

make

if a

body,

mind.”

very weak.

would mean here “my body”: when

his

am

I

would be unconvincing. Has someone head been aware that he suffered no loss of mind?

their

Descartes

The

as

offering, as an empirical consideration, the claim that people

who

that

indivisible.

and although the

not divisible into spatial parts. But neither

is

were

His addi-

see that not only are their natures different but even in

This supplementary argument ing

45

respects contrary to one another.” 47

some

1

entire;

separated from

away from

that nothing has been taken

is

whole body, yet

to be united to the

an arm, or some other part,

ideas.

myself any parts, but

in

apprehend myself to be clearly one and

whole mind seems

he had not already

myself inasmuch

cannot distinguish

I

mind and body, “the mind or soul

and mind

to say,

is

if

and distinct

divisible

is

consider the mind, that

thinking thing,

a

he says, to prove that

sufficient,

argument

tional

only

by

it

for the separateness of

entirely different

is

proved

mind. In Meditation VI Descartes has a

own

is

nothing but

a

thing which thinks.

misinterpretation of the Discourse (see Section 7 above) also helps to

view attractive. VII, 86;

HR

I,

196.

46.

Ibid.

47.

AT

VII,

13;

HR

I,

141.

His Essence

Descartes' Proof that

and unextended thing,

am

I

does “I” ever refer solely to

a

proof that

am

I

only

a

thinking and unextended thing? Des-

pends on

not truly

is

argument

his previous

therefore he has to rely on

so:

is

Thus

thinking and unextended thing.

“supplementary” argument

2 ” is

doubt of the speaker’s ow n

has to imply that

exist” or “Possibly

“I

or denial.

makes

it

1

I

We im-

study of various types of “self-defeating” or “indefensible" statements,

intikka's

book, Knowledge ami Belief (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962).

"

Descartes' Proof that His Essence Is Thinking

possible for this test to have

be

sarily

satisfied for

every value of

satisfied for the value thinking has is

my

am aware

that

mine whether

contained

test

exist

I

I

is

since everything passes

it.

So

is

is

my

of*.

fact that

show

to

is

it

that thinking

is

eliminated.

’’

Let us try

We

I

am aware

to deter-

am aware

I

(a),

that

(b).

why

does

Awareness of anything whatever

This

it?

thinking,

is

is

in

I

We

thinking

aware But

that

I

I

of breathing? No.

Descartes’ broad use of the term (Section 4 ). So if am aware that exist, then I am thinking. noted the Cartesian doctrine that if

am

I

noted previously (Section 6 ) that my

that thinking passes test (b). But

easily explained.

test (b): “If

wanted

I

test (b). If

eliminated as a candidate by test

We know

Suppose

is

essence. Breathing will pass test

necessarily the case that

it

breathing

body

no tendency

in Descartes’ criterion

am aware

breathing

exist,

and so the

“x,

neces-

test will

essence.

he second

I

The

negative result.

a

35

am aware of thinking (ibid.). exist am aware of thinking. I

follows that

It

if

I

I

am

I

I

this analysis reveals that the fact that thinking passes test (b)

has no tendency to show that ditional, “If

1

am aware

is

it

the essence of myself. In the con-

of myself (aware that

I

exist)

then

am

I

aware of thinking,” we can substitute anything whatever into the antecedent, in place of the value myself, and always obtain sarily true proposition.

The

particular value myself

the truth of the conditional. “If

aw are of thinking” then

1

am aware

is

I

am aware

truth of the condition, “If

I

neces-

irrelevant to

of breathing then

I

am

am aw are of an old tire is necessarily true. And so on. The am aware of myself am aware of

necessarily true. “If

of thinking”

is

a

1

I

thinking,” does not depend on the value myself.

16

.

Reviewing Descartes'

ing that thinking

Thinking

is

my

I

my

am aware

I

Descartes’ criterion for determin-

essence has the look of being airtight.

two conditions hold: am aware of myself; (b) when

essence

aware of thinking myself

is

criterion.

if

these

of thinking.

(a) I

when

I

am aware

am ot

Thought and Knowledge

j6

Not only tions (a)

and

both necessarily true.

What more cogent proof

my

thinking?

(b) are

could there be that

We

furthermore, proposi-

this a plausible criterion but,

is

essential nature

is

are presented with the paradox that, although thinking ap-

parently does satisfy Descartes' criterion, nonetheless

my

tablished that tions

and

(a)

nature

is

(b) are true

thinking!

shows

Our

Condition

self-defeating: this

is

making the observation

The

of myself.

existence)

is

that

I

is

am aware

what prevents

is

has the

(a)

not

same

true because the awareness

“thinking,” and also because of Descartes’ doctrine

one cannot think without being aware of thinking.

This doctrine that one cannot think without being

thinking could “I

thinking”

(in

The

statement

Descartes’ broad sense of “thinking”)

that “l

am

exist.”

I

Thus we can

obtaining

entire

its

statements

“I

think.” T his

not aware that

1

am

,

am

a sec-

not think-

res cogi tans as

support from the self-defeating nature of the two

am not aware that exist” and “1 am not aware that may help in understanding why Descartes regarded I

For the

I

logical truth that underlies the

together with another of exactly the to

could show

thinking” has

regard the metaphysical thesis sum

th c cogito as being so fruitful. cogito

not

which we

in

we

ond-order, self-defeating character, derived from “1 ing.”

am

exist” has a second-order, self-

defeating character, derived from “I do not exist,”

am

“I

as self-defeat-

is

same way

In exactly the

not aware that

that the statement “I

aware of

be justified by the self-defeating nature of the

not aware of thinking.”

do not

ing as “I

showed

itself

am

statement

seem

am

derivative from the self-defeating character of

basis as does the cogito. Condition (b)

that

am not me from

of thinking but not aware

the statement “I do not exist,” and so condition

is

condi-

and think-

self-defeating character of the statement "I

aware of myself”

of anything

why

true solely because the statement “1

(a) is

aware of myself”

not es-

not because of any

is

my

necessary connection between myself (or ing.

analysis of

that this

is

it

same

character, could

Descartes to provide an immediate transition from the

cogito to the

We may

important theme that his nature

is

solely thinking.

conceive of Descartes’ criterion (principle G) as being

Descartes'

Proof that His Essence

obtained by substitution on the variables essence of y

the awareness of x

it

59

awareness ofy.”

I

truth, or even that

am

in

Thinking

Is

the formula “x

not claiming that this formula

degree of intuitive plausibility.

the

is

logically equivalent to the

is

very meaningful. Nevertheless

it is

jy

undertaking

If one’s

the essence of a certain thing (for example,

is

a triangle)

a logical

is

it

to

has

a

high

determine

and

if

the

in

process of studying this thing one hit upon something that satisfied

the mentioned formula (for example,

would be very compelling

a

three-sided plane figure)

to believe that the undertaking

it

had been

successfully completed.

My

criticism

is

method

of

correct it is

still

(a)

if

we assume

determination in

when

a fact that,

the conditions

that even

formula gives

for

x and

thus obtained are necessarily true,

(b)

a

other cases, and even though

and myself are substituted

thinking

and

all

that the

my

not established that thinking and myself (or

existence)

it

y, is

are es-

sentially connected.

A

statement of the form

myself”

is

that

true

it

is

“When

1

am aware

of x

necessarily true regardless of the value

when

the value

is

am aware of for x. The fact 1

thinking does not reveal

any neces-

sary relation between thinking and myself. Also a statement of the

form “When

of y am aw are of thinking” is necessarily true regardless of the value for y. The fact that it is true when the

value self

any

is

am aw are

myself does not reveal any necessary relation between

essential connection is

would be desirable

true.”

We

(a)

and

(b)

to

of

make

first

Descartes’ criterion a

sense, a conditional

the negation of the consequent

ent. Descartes’

satisfied.

explicit the sense in

can distinguish two senses in w hich

necessarily true. In the

is

are

Remembering

that

which the

“necessarily

conditional can be is

necessarily true

inconsistent with the anteced-

proof has not show n that the conditionals

are necessarily true in this sense.

59.

my-

between thinking and myself, although

every appearance of the criterion’s being

conditionals

if

I

and thinking. Neither condition of Descartes’ criterion shows

there It

I

But

this

x and y must take different

is

(a)

and

(b)

the sense required to

values. Cf. note 19 above.

Thought and Knowledge

38

A

prove that thinking and myself are essentially connected. tional

necessarily true, in the second sense,

is

condi-

self-defeating

if it is

deny the consequent. The conditionals (a) and (b) are necessarily true in this sense. The seeming cogency of the proof employing the to

criterion of principle

G may

two

derive from a confusing of these

senses of “necessarily true.”

worth noting that the conditional

It is

might be taken

“If

as a version of the cogito)

think,

I

necessarily true in both

is

good evidence that Descartes did

senses. Hintikka’s studies provide

not clearly distinguish these two aspects of the (Section 4)

I

asked whether

For the conditional “If

ble.

am

I

thinking

sense of having the actual thought /

in the

two ways think,

am aw are

I

exist.

exist”

I

that Descartes did not disentangle.

am aware

I

think,

I

those ways.

that

exist”

I

Previously

cogito.

was credible that Descartes should

it

have supposed that w henever

(which

exist”

I

is

that

think

I

credi-

is

it

exist,

I

necessarily true in

The

conditional “If

necessarily true in only one of

is

not implausible that Descartes should have

It is

I

made

the half-conscious assumption that this second conditional, being necessarily true, has the feature (possessed

I

every

Descartes wrote to Mersenne,

that

I

every mo-

exist at

am aware

I

thus be led to

that

exist at

I

mean merely

his

(pie

“1/ est

impossible que nous puis-

nous n'avons en

I

I

I

anything unless

that

an actual thought

1

,

,

it

is

a

ot

I

have the

It

would not have

myself. Yet

if

this

is

of myself (of

idea

necessary condition of

concept ot myself.

he say that

July 1641, that

1

am aware of me to think of have the

in

meme temps I'idee de notre Arne" (AT Descartes affirming here the view that whenever think of anything myself, i.e. aware that exist? What he says is that it is impossible for

Is

394).

soul?

true that

one) that the

I

sons jamais penser a aucune chose III,

is

am thinking, so it is true moment am thinking. 60

ment

60.

it

first

He would

consequent follows from the antecedent. believe (mistakenly) that since

by the

my

to

it

soul).

This could

doing any thinking that

mean

that

w henever

1

1

think

should 1

have

w hat Descartes meant, then w hy should

cannot think of anything unless at

temporal specification makes

my

the

same time

appear that he

actual thought, rather than about having a concept.

is

1

have the idea of

my

talking about having an

Descartes' Proof that His Essence Is Thinking

39

SUMMARY Descartes actually states three proofs of the thesis that a I

thinking and unextended thing.

can doubt that

my

body

body does not pertain Another proof

valid. I

have

a clear

to

is

One

is

am

only

the argument from doubt:

exists but not that

my

I

essential nature.

I

exist; therefore

This argument

is

my in-

the argument from clear and distinct ideas:

and distinct idea of myself

as a

thinking and unex-

tended thing and of body as an extended and unthinking thing; therefore

I

am

separate and distinct from body. T his argument

requires support for the premise that idea of myself as a thinking and is

1

have

a clear

unextended thing. The third proof

the argument from the indivisibility of myself: I

but

my body

essence. This

is

and distinct

divisible; therefore

my body

argument requires support

am

indivisible

does not pertain to

for the

premise that

I

my am

indivisible.

Descartes has another argument that

many words,

but

is

appears to provide cogitans,

and

a

his

new argument has an appearance of extreme it

is

in

so

and power of

this

res

rigor

actually invalid. Attributing this argu-

why

the transition from cogito ergo sum to sum

cogito itself.

down

needed support to the second and third

to Descartes helps to explain

solidity

set

complete demonstration of the doctrine sum

and cogency, although

ment

never

suggested by various passages. This argument

also to give the

arguments. T

is

argument

he thought he could make res cogitans: for

is

the seeming

mainly derived from the

2

Thoughtless Brutes

I

When

readers of Descartes

first

come upon

his

theme

that ani-

mals are automatons, lacking consciousness, they are astonished.

As Zeno Vendler

says in his recent book, Res Cogitans

torious doctrine of the automatism of brutes”

had no concern

He

one within ourselves, that

which has

1

Descartes himself

.

for the “counterintuitive” character of his thesis.

declares that the belief that animals “act

like the

“the no-

“perhaps the most

is

counterintuitive item” in Descartes' philosophy

,

feeling

and passions

ours,”

ample of prejudice. One cannot, he

says,

interior principle

by means of

to say,

is

like

by an

is

a soul

an outstanding expresent the reasons

against this belief “without exposing oneself to the ridicule of chil-

dren and feeble minds.”

The

2

doctrine of the automatism of animals was

controversy for

century and

a

a

topic of

a half after Descartes’ death.

much It

was

even claimed by some opponents of the doctrine that the Cartesians

were deliberately brutal

to animals.

La Fontaine

said of the philos-

ophers and logicians of Port-Royal: “They administered beatings to

dogs with perfect indifference, and made fun of those the creatures, as

if

they had

felt

pain.

They

Presidential Address delivered before the Sixty-ninth

the American Philosophical Association in Boston, 1.

Zeno Vendler,

2.

Descartes: Philosophical Letters

[hereafter

AT],

II

/)/.],

39.

40

See

p.

53

who

pitied

said that the animals

Annual Eastern Meeting of

December

28, 1972.

Res Cogitans (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), p. 152.

;

,

ed.

and

Oeuvres de Descartes, ed.

also/)/., 243;

AT

V,

276.

Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1970) C. Adam and P. Tannery [hereafter

trans.

— Thoughtless Brutes

were

noise of a

“my

point that

men when they

to

.

.

.

opinion

since

eat or

much

not so

absolves

it

kill

is

animals.”

them from the suspicion of crime 4

is

“hearts”

(

lenry More, Descartes says

I

no “thought

is

in

animals,” be-

does not reach into their hearts.”

5

This

W hy

does he speak

the animals?

inside

corda )

is

Was

as

if

the issue were one

metaphor? The reference to

a

it

certainly metaphorical.

minds cannot look into the animals

to

But the idea that our

determine whether or not

any thoughts are there does not seem to be just metaphor, since offered as an explanation {quia: because) of

animals do not think. In this same

“main reason”

for

why we

letter

More he

that only speech tetn).

as

7

Previously

“real

Descartes sets forth his

speech.” “Such speech,” he

expresses himself in the

shows thought hidden 1

is

cannot prove that

says, “is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a letter to

it

holding that animals are without thought

namely, that they do not use

another

is

remark, considering his view that thoughts are noncor-

poreal and nonspatial.

what

cruel to animals as indulgent

that in a letter to

human mind

a surprising

were only the

Descartes himself remarks on this

cannot be proved that there

it

cause “the

of

1

feeling.”

worth noting

It is

struck,

i

spring that had been touched, but that the whole

little

body was without

that

when

clocks, that the cries they emitted

q

quoted

a

passage

being an “interior” principle.

Descartes’ formal position

is

My

in

body.”

6

In

same w av, saying

body (in corpore latenwhich he spoke of the soul in a

impression

that soul (or

is

that,

although

mind) and thought are

completely nonspatial and so could not be inside or outside of anything, nevertheless he

mon

was actually much influenced by the com-

metaphysical picture of thought as occurring

inside a

person

of thought as being something inner. In maintaining that animals 3.

4. 5.

6.

num 7.

L. C.

DL DL DL

Rosen field, From Beast-Machine

245; 244; 245:

251;

to

think,

Descartes certainly

Man -Machine (New

York, 1941),

AT V, 278. AT V, 276-277 quia mens humana illorum corda non pervadit). AT V, 278 {Haec enim loquela unicum cogitationis in corpore la

p. 54.

(

est

cert urn).

DL

do not

AT

V,

345.

t ait is sig-

~f.2

Thought and Knowledge

meant

that they

do not have

that they

We know

ness?

cogitare ).

do not

8

Thus

(i

any kind of conscious-

feelings, sensations, or

from Meditation

II that to feel

($•

entire )

animals don’t think they don’t

if

mean

but did he also

reflect or meditate;

is

to think

In his Pas-

feel.

Descartes states that nothing ought to be attributed

sions of the Soul

and that these are of two kinds, actions Since passions are thoughts, and animals don’t have

to the soul except thoughts,

and passions

9 .

thoughts, therefore they don’t have passions, such as fear or anger.

On

the other hand, in one of the letters to More, Descartes says

deny “sensation”

that he does not

pends on castle

10

bodily organ.”

a

to animals, “in so far as

Marquess of New-

In a letter to the

he says that dogs, horses, and monkeys sometimes “express

passions” such as fear, hope and joy

he says that animals do not have (vray sentiment,

In order to

11 .

Yet, in

still

another

letter,

“real feeling” or “real passion”

may passion 12 see how these apparent ).

moved, we need a

de-

it

contradictions are to be re-

understanding of what Descartes means by

a clear

“thought.” In an important and difficult passage in Meditation III

he says:

Some

of

my

thoughts are, as

name

were, images of things; the

it

belongs properly to those alone: as w hen

I

man,

think of a

of “idea"

or a chimaera,

God. But other thoughts have other forms bewhen fear, and when affirm, when deny, do

or heaven, or an angel, or sides: as

when

will,

I

I

1

indeed always apprehend something as the object of the thought

add something

I

I

1

my

thought, yet in

else to the idea of that thing;

and some of

these thoughts are called volitions or affections, and others judgments.

Descartes there

is,

saying,

is

is

why

“thought.” As he

Philosophical

[hereafter 9.

HR],

Passions

11.

DL

13.

HR

I,

is

I,

153:

17

(HR

159;

he

AT I,

calls

By an

idea. it

“idea” he

Descartes,

ed.

and

means

a repre-

first

form of

in this passage,

an idea

an “image.”

using the term “idea”

Works of

It

trans.

E.

10.

DL

54;

AT

the

is

1

laldane and

G.

VII, 28.

340;

AT

XI, 342).

AT IV, 574-575. AT VII, 37.

206-207; I,

believe, that in every instance of thinking

and foremost, an

first

sentation: this

8.

I

13

12.

DL

245; II,

AT

41.

V,

278.

Ross

Thoughtless Brutes

would appear

to

be what

is

usually meant by a “proposition” or

a

“propositional content,” since ideas, he says, can be affirmed or denied.

he idea of God, for example, might be expressed by the

I

sentence “

I

here

a

is

Supremely Perfect Being”

lized phrase “the existence of a

or

by the nomina-

Supremely Perfect Being.”

In either

what was expressed could be affirmed or denied. he second form of “thought” of which Descartes speaks

case, I

passage

not propositional content, but

is

toward propositional content

—for

some

is

“attitude” taken

example, an attitude of affirm-

ing, or

denying, or wanting, or fearing, or hoping.

firm or

deny

be

so, or

operation sense.

A

Supremely Perfect Being

that a

hope or is

fear that

proposition,

a

thought

in

is

it

i.e.

,

The

so.

an idea,

the second sense

is

One

exists, or

want

thought

i.e., a

what nowadays

involved in

is

could

af-

this to

kernel of every mental

called a “propositional attitude,” or a “mental frame.”

This conception of what

in this

the first

in is

variously

14

“mental operations”

all

has been popular with philosophers. Bertrand Russell subscribed to it

in

The Analysis cf Mind. According to him

a

propositional content

A

could be expressed by the phrase “an egg for breakfast.”

might take different attitudes toward

member C.

merely “entertain”

it,

it,

this content:

desire

it,

expect

person re-

it,

or feel aversion to

it

15 .

Lewis had the same conception. The propositional content

I.

expressed by the phrase of different

“Mary making

“moods of entertainment”:

pies it

passage from Meditation III

,

object

can be asserted, denied,

questioned, postulated, approved, and so on

The

now ” can be the 16 .

previously cited, reveals

how

Descartes conceived of what might be called “the mental side” of

an emotion such as thing (that

is,

I

fear.

“take in”

example, that there this propositional

is

a

“Mental frame”

15.

Russell, The Analysis of

16.

C.

pp. 48-55.

Lewis,

some

I

fear,” he says,

I

apprehend some-

particular propositional content

danger confronting me). Then

I

—for

apply to

content the mental frame or attitude of fearing.

14.

I.

“W hen

is

An

If

Vendler’s phrase: Res Cogitans, p. 167.

Mind (New York,

1921), p. 243.

Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, In.,

1946),

H I

Thought and Knowledge

met

a lion in

the jungle

forms of thought.

The

ositional content,

such

I

would have, according

first

would be

to Descartes,

a representation, i.e., a

two

prop-

might be expressed by the sentence “The

as

me.” The second form of thought might be the mental frame of fear. The union of these two forms of thought

may

lion

attack

might be expressed by the sentence

“I fear that

the lion

may

attack

me.

What

else

would be involved

in

my

perception and fear ot the

There would be something purely physical: the physical stimulation of my sensory organs; some physiological changes in heart, lion?

brain, nerves, glands; and

On

some avoidance behavior,

running.

e.g.,

Descartes’ view the connection between the sensory stimulation

and the behavior would be entirely mechanical, unless there was an intervention of the will

Kenny

says, “In

its

essentials the theory

processes involved in the perception of tion,

cess

by purely mechanical causation, which

is

that the physiological

a fearful object, set in a

members which accompany our

“Even

in us all

17

In one

the motions

passions are caused not by 18

the soul but simply by the machinery of the body.'' a lion in the jungle his reaction

mo-

further physiological pro-

issues in the behavior characteristic of fear.''

of his letters to More, Descartes says, of the

As Anthony

prevent the behavior.

to

might appear to be

If a

like

dog met

mine.

The

sensory stimulation, the physiological processes, and the resulting behavior could be quite similar. But for the dog there would be no propositional content and no propositional attitude.

be no “thought,”

in either sense

of the “mental” aspect of fear. the

dog responds purely

our

own human

as a

There would

of the w ord, and therefore nothing

When

confronted by

a fearful

object

machine. Descartes gives examples of

behavior that he regards as machine performances:

someone quickly thrusts his hand against our eyes as if to strike us, even though we know him to be our friend, that he only does it in fun, and that If

he

will take great care not to

hurt us,

we

have,

preventing ourselves from closing them, and 17. 18.

Anthony Kenny, Action Emotion DL 251; AT V, 345. ,

anil Will

this

all

the same, trouble in

shows

(New York,

that

it

1963), p. 8.

is

not by

Thoughtless Brutes the intervention of our soul that they close

machine

our body

of

is

so formed that the

our eyes excites another movement

becomes

but

.

movement of

why

clear

it

because the

is

hand towards

this

our brain which conducts the animal

in

muscles which cause the eyelids to close

spirits into the

It

.

.

jy

19 .

Descartes said, on the one hand, that animals

have feeling and passion but, on the other hand, that they do not

have “real” feeling and passion. The propositional representations

and attitudes that are produced

people by sensory stimulations

in

and physiological processes do not occur

Fo r the same

reason, the animals

sense.

Descartes wrote to

mode

of sensation.” 20 lie

every

human

More

in

the “lower” animals.

do not have

that “thought

sensation in the full is

included

meant the human mode

sensation includes thought, and

if

center of every sensation of ours there

is a

our

of sensation. If

thought

is

proposi-

content together with propositional attitude, then

tional

in

at

the

proposition. Animals do

not have propositional thoughts and therefore do not have sensations in the In

first

human mode.

reading Descartes

it

surprises

one

that he should include

emotion, feeling, and sensation under “thinking.” But

be

natural

a

employment of the word “thinking,” given

tion of the propositional nature of

human emotion,

this

his

would

concep-

feeling,

and

sensation.

the Reply to Objections VI

In

Descartes distinguishes between

three “grades” of sensation:

To

the

first

[grade] belongs the

immediate affection

of the

bodily organ by

external objects; and this can be nothing else than the motion of the particles

of the sensory organs and the change of figure and position due to

The second

that motion.

[grade] comprises the

immediate mental

results,

union with the corporeal organ affected; such are the perceptions of pain, of pleasurable stimulation, of thirst, of hunger, of

due

to the mind’s

colours, of sound, savour, odour, cold, heat, and the third [grade] contains

19.

Passions

ies that

20.

move

DL

I,

,

at

244;

13

(HR

all

I,

like.

.

.

V, 277

Finally the

those judgments which, on the occasion of

338;

AT

(in

mo-

XI, 338-339). “Animal spirits” are minute bod-

high speed.

AT

.

nostro sentiendi

modo

cogitatio includitur).

1

Thought and Knowledge

q.6

we have from our

tions occurring in the corporeal organ,

been accustomed to pass about things external to

The

grade of sensation

first

us.

earliest years

21

shared by animals and people.

is

It is

The second grade

the only sense in which animals have sensation.

involves perceptions (perceptiones ) of pain, heat, cold, sound, and so

On

on.

Descartes’ view this grade of sensation involves proposi-

content, and so

tional

Presumably the propositional

thinking.

is

content of a sensation of heat in the second grade would be ex-

me

pressed by the sentence “It seems to tion II

that

he presents such an occurrence as

feels heat as

an example of what

ing

and he declares that

entire)-,

cogitare ).

22

would be

of pain

seeming

to

him

“I feel

a sensation

pain.” In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes

nest que dans Ventendement ),

a

walking

my

,

is

“my

feeling or thinking that

third grade of sensation

mind, which alone see and

I

walk.”

I

called “thinking” because

is

that I

is

source of heat nearby; that

a

is

giving

me

pain; that

I

It

am

sensation

consciously seeming to see or

concerned

is

24 it

Descartes’ consists of

—for

“customary judgments” about the material world that there

my

Descartes says that

my

to walk”: this “refers only to

with

douleur

pain one must apprehend and affirm

In the Principles

ensu) of seeing or of

(la

and that animals don’t have pain. 23

appears that in order to have

(s

feel-

“nothing other than thinking”

it is

actually says that “pain exists only in the understanding”

a proposition.

that he

properly called sensation or

suppose that the propositional content of

I

(d

281.

as qualifying

and supplementing the remark

that

1

quoted from

Thought and Knowledge

74

This brings us back to Descartes.

9.

/

am

breathing does not entail / have a body

this held true

only for himself.

Me meant

tremely general. that

When

” p does not

form, “x has

“x has

To

logical possibility.

all

a

body.” This

values of p), a prop-

no body and x thinks that p" presents

state Descartes’ position in

a

even more gen-

who

he meant that every being whatever

eral terms:

ex-

form “x thinks

that the propositional

entail the propositional

form

he did not mean that

,

What he meant was something

implies that for all values of x (as well as for osition of the

he asserted that/ think

has thoughts,

feelings, emotions, intentions, sensations, could (logically speaking)

have existed without

a

body and yet have had those same thoughts,

When

sensations, and so on. certain that this

am)

entirely

is

without

(that

I

is

he said

to say,

by which

soul,

my

and absolutely distinct from

I

all

other

human minds,

HR

17.

When

1

190;

,

AT

read an

I

V

II,

exist

other think-

in

we now

have.

and

I,

an incorporeal state

throughout the entire time of our existence, yet having

16.

I

without bodies, but also that they

could have existed

thoughts, wishes, intentions

is

am what

have existed without ever having had bodies. You and

could

‘it

,

body, and can

he meant that not only himself and

it,”

ing, conscious beings can exist

all

my

in the Sixth Meditation

the

all

17

78.

earlier version of the present essay at the

Moral Science Club

Cambridge, some members of the audience objected that Descartes’ view may this: that having once existed in an embodied state and as a member of a linguistic community, and thus having learned a common language, he could in

have been only

later

come

to

be disembodied and yet continue to think to himself

the language that he had learned to apply

in

in

the terms of

conformity with the practice of that

community of speakers of w hich he had previously been a member. Of course it is true that Descartes held that “the extinction of the mind does not follow from the corruption

ot the

body”

(Synopsis

of the Meditations). Rut his device of “doubting”

of his former “opinions,” or of “imagining” In the Second Meditation false:

I

he

says: “1

them

to

be

suppose, then, that

persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of

ory represents to me. ure, extension,

I

consider that

mov ement and place

marks surely imply that

it

is

I

implies

false,

more than

all

the things that

all

that

possess no senses;

I

my

1

this.

see are

fallacious

mem-

imagine that body,

are but the fictions of

my

mind.” These

logically or metaphysically possible that

all

fig-

re-

he and his

thinking should have existed even though no corporeal world had ever existed. Fur-

thermore, Descartes states unequivocally that Ciod could have created him without a body.

In

responding to

A rnau Id’s

criticism of the reasoning of the Meditations

by

Descartes' Proof that

his

I

position of Descartes’

Consider,

bility.

tentions,

But

I

in

the

human

think, a conceptual impossi-

I

how

movements,

hen would the thoughts be expressible only

same way?

Now

I

a

to serve for

language?

in

would appear impossible

It

that disem-

common language. For what would

hen would each

of

it

ow n “mental lanlanguage would have to

them have

surely each private “mental’’

— for

have rules

how could there be

a

his

language without any rules?

hen, would each thinker obey the rules of his

in his

the thoughts, in-

here would not be the

figure, face, gestures,

which language?

75

to say that they did or didn’t use the terms of the language in

guage?

I

1

the problem of

all,

bodied beings should have

mean

is,

a Mon-Material Thing

Is

sensations could be expressed.

vehicle of the this.

of

first

He

own mind? But

own

language

just

Wittgenstein has pointed out that this makes

no sense, for it would imply that following a rule, and believing one w as following a rule, would come to the same which of course

—

they don’t.

18

Finally, the

problem cannot be skipped over by sup-

posing that the thoughts of the incorporeal beings might not be expressed

in

language

at all

but might

just

be “naked’

thoughts.

For the thinking of those incorporeal minds would presumably w hich Descartes intends cartes says:

to

prove that nothing corporeal belongs to

“Although perhaps there

is

much

in

me

of w hich

I

refer

his nature,

Des-

have no know ledge

w hich am aw are of in myself [namely, thinking] is sufficient to allow of my existing w ith it as my sole possession, / am certain that God could have created me without giving me those other things [e.g., a body] of w hich am not yet have departed from the Halaware (HR II, 97; AT \ II, 219; emphasis added. dane-Ross translation). In addition, the passage quote from the Notae in Programma, in footnote 2 1, makes it clear that in Descartes' view there is no dependence whatever between the concept of mind and the concept of body. For he says that he had “deduced and demonstrated that mind w as clearly perceived by us as an existence, or substance, even supposing we had no concept whatever of the body, or even denied that any material things had existence; and, accordingly, that the concept of mind .

.

.

yet since that

I

1

I

I

any concept of body" (emphasis added). The objection raised in Cambridge does show that there is an ambiguity in characterizing Descartes’ view as

does not involve

being

this: that

he

is

“essentially” a non-material thing. For this could be taken as

meaning merely that after having lived a corporeal human life he could continue to exist as a disembodied mind. In contrast, the strict and correct interpretation of his view is that he could have existed, w ith all his thoughts, ev en it he had never lived an embodied iH.

human

W ittgenstein,

life.

Investigations, para. 202.

Thought and Knowledge

y6

to various things

and

ascribe properties to

them. But referring and

ascribing are special activities, each having a special “logic.’' just

anything one does come under those headings.

ferring or ascribing

is

system

to invoke a

cepted practices. For example, pointing

agreed-on practices,

tions,

could that mean anything?

io.

Here

Section

would be appropriate

it

5)

rests

on

from shoulder

to

form of referring)

(a

How

is

could there be conven-

universe of incorporeal minds?

in a total

How

speak of re-

ot conventions, of ac-

the convention that the direction of pointing

outstretched finger, not the reverse.

To

Not

to

comment on my

strategy (in

of switching from first-person to third-person state-

ments. Descartes would object to this maneuver; and also he would discount, as irrelevant, the remarks

normal

Why

1

made

(in

Section

6)

about the

applying third-person psychological sentences.

criteria for

would he do

Because those attitudes would be conse-

this?

quences of the so-called “method of doubt" employed by him the Meditations.

In claiming that

that he had a body,

and

was

it

rational for

in claiming that

him

to

in

doubt

he could imagine that

“body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of

my mind"

Descartes implied that

{Second Meditation ),

that

guages at (his

tations.

an incorporeal world.

all

societies, or peoples,

He

implied

— that even

so

it

would have been

mind) should have engaged For

my

nor French, Latin, or any lan-

could have a full

logically possible that

in the speculations of the

Medi-

purposes, however, Descartes’ most important as-

sumption was that an incorporeal mind understanding of

and could correctly attribute tions

a

had there been no Europe, earth, or any inhabited place, nor

any nations, he

in

was

he should have existed as

logical (or metaphysical) possibility that

an incorporeal thinking being

it

all

in

an incorporeal world

of the psychological concepts,

to itself a

gamut of thoughts,

sensa-

and emotions.

Certainly there can be

we imagine

a

secondary use

a

play of imagination here, just as

conversation between of

language.

a table

and

a chair.

Yet the concepts employed

when

This in

is

a

such

He

a Non-Material Thing

77

imaginative play are rooted in patterns of behavior of living

human

Descartes' Proof that

beings.

was possible

It

Is

for Descartes to believe otherwise because of

the fact that a person does not, for the most part, ascribe feelings,

thoughts, sensations, to himslef on the ior.

basis of observing his

own

behav-

But Wittgenstein says something that goes to the heart of

this

matter:

We

do not say

dog

that possibly a

minutely acquainted with

soul?

its

talks to itself.

Is

that because

we

are so

W ell,

one might say this: If one sees the soul. But do also say in my own

—

one sees its case that am saying something to myself, because am behaving in suchand-such a way? do not say it from observation of my behavior. But it only makes sense because / do behave in this way 19 behavior of

thing,

a living

I

I

1

—

I

.

I

o w hat sort of behavior might

Well, suppose that what

W ittgenstein

said to myself

I

w

have been referring?

as “I refuse to grant his

would make sense to credit me with declaring this to myself only it had learned, for instance, the concept of refusing, a request.”

It

I

concept that ranges over

— for

my

great variety of circumstances and ac-

a

away with my hand something that was offered me. My declaring, w hether to myself or to others, that “refuse” such and such would not make sense if my previous employment of that word had never been linked w ith the right betions

example,

thrusting

I

havior.

1

Let us see w here

1.

we

are. In

centrated on his second premise.

amining

its

was

this

its

that a

first-

first-person mate.

if a I

“He

does not seem to be

this

then

is

true that

has a body.” Furthermore, 19.

employed the strategy of

Ibid., para. 357.

My

The

initial

ex-

justification for

noticed an odd sort of conflict betw een

sistency,

it

con-

third-person sentence lacks sense so

has no body” and

breathing.” T his conflict, although

so,

I

and third-person pair must have the same

the use of the sentences

is

I

third-person counterpart.

truth-value; consequently,

must

studying Descartes' proof

thinks he

is

can be loosely called an “incon-

a contradiction in

“He

it is

it

“He

any

strict sense.

thinks that p" does not entail

an ordinary use of language to

emphasis added to the

final

sentence.

If

“I le

attri-

Thought and Knowledge

y8

bute thoughts, desires, feelings, to beings conceived to be incor-

must be regarded

poreal, even though this

ment of concepts. Switching

to the third person helped,

remind us of how behavioral

to

criteria

third-person psychological sentences. stein’s insight that

It

also

brought

my

in

Wittgen-

my affirming that think or feel such from my applying behavioral criteria to

arise

myself, nevertheless

however,

govern the application of

although

and such does not

secondary employ-

as a

I

affirming this makes sense only because

largely satisfy those criteria. Descartes failed to see that the

ing of first-person psychological attributions

12.

think

question must be treated

this

we

What is the upshot in regard I am breathing does not entail /

have to agree that there

is

beings.

to Descartes’ contention that /

have a body?

two

at

mean-

dependent on the

is

human

existence and behavior of living, corporeal

seems to

It

At one

different levels.

no entailment.

me

tween the sentences

Someone might

“I

does not appear

It

am

more,

think

identical with

my

would one undertake think

I

am

breathing" and C 1

“I

have no body." j

by the device of asserting an

body” would be tendentious; and further-

me

to verify

to have

it?

All in

any

clear

there

all,

is

meaning.

no

breathing” and,

“1

have I

a

low

natural, un-

have no body” can be exhibited

self-contradictory. Considered in this light, “1 think

ing” does not entail

1

which the conjunction of the two sentences

controversial, sense in “I

am

between “I” and “my body.” But the assertion

does not seem to

it

1

any

establish a formal inconsistency be-

try to achieve this

identity of reference “I

would

that level

that there could be a substitution of terms, in accordance with

plausible definitions, that

do

I

“I

have

a

body,” anymore than

I

am it

as

breath-

entails “I

sunburn.”

bus there

deemed

to

is

a level at

which Descartes’ argument can be rightly

be both valid and sound.

the meaningfulness ot

“I exist,” as

we

If

we waive any doubts about

employed

in

the context of Des-

we must, that “1 have a body” cannot be deduced from “1 think am breathing,” and if we ignore a reservation to be made in Section 14, then we must cartes’ soliloquy,

and

if

admit, as

I

think I

He

Descartes' Proof that

a Non- Material Thing

Is

79

agree that Descartes hit upon a valid argument with true premises,

namely:

am am

1 think I

think I

I

herefore,

I

As

breathing entails /

breathing does not entail / have a body. / exist

does not entail

said before, this conclusion

is

had to be taken

having once had a

body.

a

have a body.

I

meaning

as

to: It is logically possible

have pointed out

I

meaning not

bodily existence,

must be taken

It

as

/

equivalent

As

that I should exist without a body. 17), this

exist.

just that

it

is

(see footnote

possible that,

could continue to exist without this: It

logically possible that I

is

should have existed without ever having had a body.

now we need

Hut

ferring?

cannot be

It

was born of

W ho

to ask:

the seventeenth century,

who

whom

this / to

Descartes

Descartes.

certain parents,

is

is

a

a historical

is

re-

who

person

France and Holland

lived in

served in

Descartes

in

made

military campaign,

mathematical discoveries, wrote various philosophical works, corre-

sponded with Father Mersenne, and so on, and so on. Anyone of

whom

no such

we

Therefore,

were true would not be

historical facts

cannot consider Descartes to have proved that

logically possible that Descartes should have existed

having had

Of

Descartes. it

is

without ever

body.

a

course any person whomsoever could pronounce the sen-

tences of Descartes' argument.

would

be referring?

I

who was

Not

I

who

the twentieth century,

have appendicitis by

a

Malcolm the Middle W

to Malcolm.

born of certain parents

in

whom

of

is

est

a

human

of the

being

USA

in

delivered newspapers, was caused to

horse,

became

none of those

Doctor of Philosophy,

a

wrote an infamous book entitled Dreaming

Anyone

whom

could, for example. But to

and so on, and so on.

,

historical facts

were true would not

be Malcolm. It

is

worth noting that Descartes, from

could not have been talking about Descartes.

w hich

led

ever been

up a

to th ecogito, included a

doubt

his

own

standpoint,

Ilis general

as to

doubt,

whether there had

material world, and therefore included a doubt as to

,

.

Thought and Knowledge

So

whether there had ever existed the

G.

M. Anscombe

E.

person

historical

calls attention to this in a

ing of Descartes’ argument to prove that

Descartes.

recent essay. Speak-

this I

is

not

body, she

a

says:

seems clear that the argument in Descartes deresults of applying the method of doubt. But by that method Descartes must have doubted the existence of the man Descartes: at any rate of that figure in the world of his time, that Frenchman, born of such-

Whatever pends on

and-such

else

a

is

said,

it

man — unless

stock and christened Rene; but also, even of the

a

man isn’t a sort of animal. If then, the non-identity of himself with his own body follows from his starting-points, so equally does the non-identity of himself with the man Descartes. “1 am not Descartes” was just as That w hich sound a conclusion for him to draw as “I am not a body.” .

is

named by

“I”

—that

,

in his

In regard to the valid

the present essay,

we

take

it

argument of Descartes’ that

think

I

it

it

a

(i.e.

is

we should

Descartes.

It

is

the topic of

argument

is

an interesting logical dis-

is

influenced by the

is

made manifest

argument

at

ing to accept, unwittingly, the superficial

proof of the metaphysical thesis that

20.

Ci.

21

E.

It

\1

grammar in

in

human

dramatic

It is

of his

tempt-

argument

1647 Descartes stated

he concept of mind does not involve any concept of

we .

as did

the level of

will not yield the

metaphysical consequence he thought he had achieved.

body.”

it,

unreasonable to expect that the complex ways

logical entailment. Descartes’

I

One

that the ref-

not misinterpret the import of

bodily form and behavior should be

as follows: “

as

totally unclear.

which our use of the mental concepts

as a

if

proof that Descartes, or

a

essentially a non-material thing.

is

Undoubtedly Descartes’ argument covery. But

is

having true premises,

as

,

peculiar and puzzling

erence of the word “I”

.

say the following: That even

does not serve as

any other human person, thing that makes

we must

argument

to be a sound

well as being valid)

book, w as not Descartes

.

20

read the second premise of Descartes’ argument in

Anscombe, “The

First

Person,”

Mind and Language

ed. S.

Gut-

tenplan, pp. 45-46. 21. he w hole sentence (from the Notae in Programma) contains an excellent I

formulation ot the argument from doubt:

“1

wrote that

we

could not doubt that our

He

Descartes' Proof that

way

the

Is a

Non- Material Thing

that this metaphysical thesis requires, then

ident that

t

he second premise

should be ev-

it

When we

unacceptable.

is

Si

interpret

it

the contention that our concepts of thinking and of thought

as

could have been understood and applied, even

been any

living, corporeal,

more absurd. mise

aken

We

does not matter.

implies something that

it

there had never

beings, then nothing could be

whether we

in this light,

false, or nonsensical,

since

it,

1

human

if

is

the second pre-

call

are entitled to reject

really unintelligible;

and

disposes of Descartes’ only valid argument to prove that he

is

this

es-

sentially a non-material thing.

13.

I

wish to register here an uneasiness about the expression,

“logical possibility.”

Can something be

conceptual impossibility? Apparently

meaning

that

p

entails q

possibility

a logical

we

so. If

if

it

is a

take “entailment” as

u (where the range of the variables p" and

“ ”

q is restricted to contingent propositions) if and only if the conjunction,/) and not-q is self-contradictory; and if, accordingly, we ,

say that

when

this

entail q;

and

we

if

conjunction

is

formulate this

not self-contradictory/) does not latter state of affairs in the termi-

nology of “logical possibility,” saying that that

we

p and

one and the same time,

yet should have no body.

whether shall take

have no body”

“I

up

Well, this

is

a

it

is

a

time; then

am

I

it

seems

logical possibility

is a

should think

There

a logical possibility

breathing and

problem, however,

as to

meaningful proposition, which

I

moment.)

in a is all

(

I

is

same

not-q should both be true at the

are forced to agree with Descartes that

that, at

it

right as far as

it

goes; but

it

doesn’t go very

far. It

certainly does not yield the metaphysical thesis that the mental

concepts, mind mind

in their actual use, are entirely

existed, because,

from the very

fact that

separated from consider-

we doubted,

it

followed that our

meantime we might doubt whether any material thing exdeduced and demonstrated that mind was clearly perceived by us as isted; whence an existence, or substance, even supposing we had no concept whatever of the body, existed, but that I

or even denied that any material things had existence; and, accordingly, that the

concept of mind does not involve any concept of body”

have deviated slightly from the

I

(UK

laldane-Koss translation).

1,

440;

A

I

\ III, 354.

I

Thought and Knowledge

82

and behavior of human beings.

ations of the bodily figure to

me

seems

It

that the expression “logical possibility" as used here, can be

dangerously confusing. There strictly in a

narrow sense,

is

no objection

to

it

when

it is

taken

expressing the absence of entailment.

as

But we are inevitably tempted

to give

meaning.

a deeper

it

would

I

myself prefer to limit the deeper meaning to the expression “conceptual possibility.” This

expression

is

to us that

we

no cure

is

misleading,

less

I

for anything; yet this latter

think, in the respect that

14.

In

my

examination of Descartes' argument

by the second premise,

have no body and

I

think

I

am

have contended that

1

tion.

want

I

breathing,” expresses this

to say

“I

which

is

brought into the

“I

conjunct of

first

that there

have no body.”

I

could neither see, touch, or

I

possi-

have no body.” In the discus-

Cambridge Mary Geach pointed out

absurdity in the statement tion in

a logical

conjunction involves a peculiar

something about the

Descartes’ conjunction, namely, sion at

have focused on

on the third-person counterpart of that conjunc-

reflection

But now'

I

that the conjunction, “I

sort of “inconsistency,” an inconsistency that

open by

combination of

a

self-contradictory.

is

the claim, implied

bility.

suggests

should study the actual use of concepts, rather than

confining our attention to the question of whether

two sentences

it

would be an

could be in feel

a

condi-

any part of

my

body, nor would have any kinaesthetic, muscular, or other bodily sensations.

Let us

But how could

I

call

this a

condition of “sensory deprivation.”

move from my awareness

sensory deprivation to the conclusion that tainly,

I

could not verify the

latter

conceptual reasons.

I

would be

sensory organs.

It

ap-

have no body” would be unverifiable

for

my

as-

very similar

(as

my

as-

There would be

a

serting or inferring that / have no body

kind of nonsense ,

which

is

Miss Geach remarked) to the kind of nonsense involved serting or inferring that 1

of

have no body? Cer-

in either case

my

assuming some normal functioning of “I

1

a state

by sense-perception, nor by

overhearing the testimony of others; for

pears that the statement

of being in

am

asleep.

This

is

a

in

in

further reason for

He

Descartes' Proof that

a Non-Material I'hing

Is

holding that Descartes’ conjunction does not express

Not only is there an inconsistency, between the two parts of the conjunction but,

possibility.

member as a

of the conjunction

statement in

As

15.

its

own

a final note,

I

be constructed, which

ment, yet leads to

a

conceptual sort,

a

in addition, the first

when

taken

right.

mention

will is

conceptual

a

conceptual absurdity,

a

is

of

S]

An argument

a curiosity.

can

of the same valid form as Descartes’ argu-

conclusion unacceptable to him. Consider the

following reasoning:

am am

/ I

breathing entails I

breathing does not entail /

Therefore,

Now

/ exist

understood

this

could

to

fail

as

am

does not entail

Descartes held that

I

exist.

am

1

meaning

am

thinking.

essentially a thinking being,

that at

be thinking. In

/

thinking.

my

no moment of

Hyperaspistes

a letter to

and he

existence

in

1641 he

said: I

human

had reason to assert that the

mother’s

womb,

is

1

gave?

essence of soul consists in the fact that consists in the fact that

deprived of

own

its

it

be, even in the

always thinking. What more certain or evident reason

could be wished for than the one

body

wherever

soul,

essence; so

it

had proved that the nature or

1

is

thinking, just as the essence of

extended.

Now

me

that a

it

is

it

seems to

nothing can ever be

man who

denies that

was thinking at times when he does not remember noticing it thinking, deserves no more attention than a man who denied that his body was extended while he did not notice that it had extension. 22 his soul

The

conclusion of the deductive argument

implies that thinking.

It

is

it

is

logically possible that

I

I

have

just

put together

should exist and not be

hard to see how Descartes could reject either of the

premises. Surely he ought to accept the

first

premise.

And how

could he object to the second premise, except by begging the question in favor of his thesis that

we have 22.

my

essential nature

is

to think?

Thus

the irony that the same form of valid deductive argument

Kenny,

Letters

,

hi;

AT

III,

423.

$4

Thought and Knowledge

that Descartes tially

a

employed

as a

proof of his thesis that he

is

essen-

non-material thing can be used to prove the profoundly

anti-Cartesian thesis that he thinking.

is

not a being

whose

essential nature

is

4

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

As

philosopher

a

have

I

a professional reluctance to

make

obser-

vations about an empirical science and especially so in the presence

some

of

of

its

distinguished practitioners.

am emboldened by

1

belief that the dispute over the place of behaviorism in

fundamentally

is

imply that

it

a

philosophical issue.

In

saying this

which we must content ourselves with opinions or

to

the contrary,

psychology

an issue w hich cannot be resolved and w

is

think that what

I

is

right

the

1

ith

do not respect

attitudes.

On

and wrong with the view-

point and assumptions of behaviorism can be clearly formulated.

A FAILURE TO DISAGREE Professor Rogers claims that behaviorism has had an unfortunate effect

from

on psychology. its

impoverishes psychology bv excluding

It

data the “private worlds” of people, the “flow of their 7

inner experience,” “the whole universe of inner meanings,” the

purposes, goals, values, and choices of people, and their “perceptions of self.”

dividual,”

1

I

le calls

all

and he says

that 2

to the strict behaviorist.” This essay was presented

of this “the phenomenal world of the in-

I

in a

“Not one aspect of le believes that

colloquium,

at

this

world

is

open

psychology needs to be

Rice University, to which Professors

Rogers and Skinner were contributors. 1.

C. R. Rogers,

“Toward

nology: Contrasting Bases for p.

a

Science of the Person,” Behaviorism and Phenome-

Modern Psychology

,

ed.

T. W.

Wann

(Chicago,

119. 2.

Ibid.

85

1964),

S6

Thought and Knowledge

enriched by “a science of the inner lawful relationships between these havior.”

A

study which concerns

must be added

am

willing to bet

(a

“external be-

with these “inner variables”

psychology

to empirical

attempt to find

phenomena and

itself

any deep understanding of human I

life” that will

science

if this

to obtain

is

life.

small sum) that Professor Skinner finds this

criticism puzzling, because he cannot see in

it

any

specific theoreti-

him and Rogers. Whether Skinner is puzzled not, I am. do not see that Skinner's behaviorism commits him denying or ignoring the existence of the “inner variables” w hich

cal issue that divides

or

I

to

Rogers thinks are so important. Let

me

explain.

5

Skinner

He

havior.

tion” of

an exponent of

is

the behavior

itself.

are, for the

most

may

times they

The

be “within the organism’s skin.”

The

pendent variables are

tion

be-

“func-

describable in physical terms, as

is

conditions of w hich behavior

dependent variable

is

a

is

is

a

is a

4

The

some-

physical

function are called “independent

said to be

is

is

function

part, external to the organism, although

independent variable.

chology

behavior

and the pieces of behavior are the “dependent

variables,”

A

3

that

w hich behavior

conditions of

ables.”

human

holds that every piece of

some condition

human

“functional analysis" of

a

relations

vari-

under the “control” of an

between independent and de-

The aim

scientific laws.

of behavioristic psy-

uncover these laws, thus making possible the predic-

to

and control of human behavior. “A synthesis of these laws

expressed

terms yields

in quantitative

a

comprehensive picture of

the organism as a behaving system.”

Skinner devotes considerable attention to w hat he tory fictions.”

Some

of his examples are being thirsty

being absent-minded or having confused couraged or having a sense or purpose

9 ,

and the

It.

4.

Ibid., p. 257.

7.

Ibid., p. 30.

10.

Ibid., p. 36.

and

5.

8.

of'

intent

F. Skinner, Science

3.

calls

ideas

achievement

8 ,

7 ,

being

,

“explana-

or hungry

interested or dis-

having an incentive or goal

behind an action or the meaning of

Human

Behavior

Ibid., p. 35.

Ibid., p. 72.

(New York, 6.

9.

1953), PP- 35» 36.

Ibid., p. 31.

Ibid., pp. 87-88.

10 it.

1

.

behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology All

these

of

examples

are

‘psychological” or “mental” concepts.

philosopher would want to

would consider

some philosophers

what

of

8y call

think that anything any

I

“psychological” concept Skinner

call a

to be an explanatory fiction. In saying that they are

explanatory fictions Skinner means that they are not explanatory. I

ake such an apparent explanation as[“I le

thirsty.” Skinner says: “If to be thirsty

have

a

tendency to drink,

he drinks because of invoked. signed to

If it

this state

in

mere redundancy.

purely inferential

—

remarks

is

about

not any such thing a

man

13

particular action.”

thing,” “T here

is

which control

explanatory

really has a

as, for

W hen

can-

doing

his behavior.

example, a

a

man

that there re-

“We

sense of achievement

“we

reinforce a

said to be “looking for

is

14

purpose

This would seem in

to

be

12

sometimes

are

fictions

some-

no current goal, incentive, purpose, or meaning

be taken into account.”

as-

reference, perhaps con-

a

sense of achievement,” he says,

a

is

man’s “pur-

stopped

has

ambiguous. Sometimes he seems to be saying

do not give

man

he

a

it

to

“discouraged,” you are not saving any-

is

cealed, to the independent variables

Skinner’s

speak of

—

is

that

no dimensions are

if

When you

1

’J

thing worth saying unless you are making

ally

means

it

an inner causal event

doing something or say that

something because he

slightly

If

which would make direct observation possible

not serve as an explanation.

pose”

is

means nothing more than

state of thirst,

a

is

this

drinking because he

is

to

a denial that the

doing what he does. But

I

do not

believe that Skinner wants to be in the absurd position of really

denying that people are sometimes encouraged or discouraged or that they have goals

and purposes, any more than he wants

that they get thirsty. Instead, he

are to be understood. says,

“usually

conceal

is

Such terms references

“Statements which use such words

trying to say as

to

how

to

deny

these terms

“meaning” and “intent,” he independent variables.”

10

as ‘incentive’ or ‘purpose’ are

usually reducible to statements about operant

conditioning.”

lfi

Skinner will agree that people have purposes, but holds that meanII.

Ibid., p. 33.

14.

Ibid., pp. 89-90.

12.

Ibid., e.g., pp. 36, 72. 15.

Ibid., p. 36.

13. 16.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 87.

.

Thought and Knowledge

88

ingful statements about purposes are reducible to statements about

functional relations between independent and dependent variables.

come back

Let us

to Rogers’ criticism of Skinner.

and choices of people,

goals, values,

—

ol those

all

them

phe-

to Rogers, behaviorism cannot deal with,

are examples of Skinner’s explanatory fictions. Skinner

ingly accept

purposes,

their “private worlds,” their

“perceptions of self,” their “inner experience”

nomena which, according

The

as significant

handled by functional analysis.

phenomena

would

insofar as they can be

you can define them

If

will-

in

terms of

functional relations between external or internal physical variables

and the observable behavior of people, then well and good. then

it is

What

not clear

I

w hat you

find puzzling

are talking about.

that Rogers himself

is

go halfway toward admitting

or at least to

study of the “inner variables” of w hich

subjective variables.

It is

it.

He

to

admit

this

allows that the

— he speaks “requires care-

recognized that variables of inner experi-

ence cannot be measured directly, but

it

fact that they are inner variables does not 17

seems

of observable behaviors which are indexes of these

ful definition

study.”

If not,

He

foresees the

is

also realized that the

preclude their scientific

development of “operational steps"

for

the “measurement of the behaviors which represent these inner variables.”

18

Skinner could retort that the observable behavior and

physical conditions, which are said

by Rogers

to “represent” the

inner variables, either do or do not define them. If they do, then the “inner” has

steam ahead.

become

If not,

“outer,” and functional analysis can go full

then the expressions which allegedly “repre-

sent” inner variables have not been given any meaning.

My

conclusion

is

that

Rogers has not shown some theoretical

flaw in behaviorism. Skinner could hold that Rogers’ “science of the person” ter,

would

tall,

insofar as

within the w ider domain of functional analysis of behavior.

would be one branch

or division ot behavioristic science

alternative or addition to

17.

has an intelligible subject mat-

it

Rogers, p. 130.

18.

it.

Ibid., p.

1

3

1

It

and not an

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

Hy

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF BEHAVIORISM Behaviorism,

Skinner

in

my

view,

when he

agreeing with this

is

essentially a philosophical doctrine.

is

philosophy of science concerned I! '

methods of psychology.” chology,

says that behaviorism

with

the

Behaviorism, as

“a

and

matter

subject a

is

philosophy of psy-

continuous with the philosophical doctrine o i physica-

is

which was expounded by Rudolf Carnap and other members

lism,

of the so-called \ ienna Circle.

views on

this topic in

I

will set forth

some of Carnap

s

order to bring out the close resemblance be-

tween Carnap’s physicalism and Skinner’s behaviorism. I

he basic

thesis of physicalism,

according to Carnap,

is

that

may be formulated in physical lanmaterial mode of speech,” the thesis is

“every sentence of psychology 20

guage.”

When

put

in “the

sentences of psychology describe physical occurrences,

that “all

namely, the physical behavior of humans and other animals.”

Carnap

says,

“Our

thesis thus states that a definition

structed for every psychological concept rectly or indirectly derives that concept

(i.e.

,

may

21

be con-

expression) w hich di-

from physical concepts.”

22

Psychological laws, too, are translatable into physical language (i.e.,

into language

rences),

which describes physical conditions and occur-

and therefore they are

The pure

subclass of physical laws. 23

philosophical principle behind this thesis

“The meaning

called Verification Principle:

method of

a

verification.”

As Carnap puts

of

a

is

the so-

statement

is

its

“A sentence says no Thus a statement that it,

more than what is testable about it.” 24 make about another person, e.g., that he is excited or angry, can mean nothing else than that he is behaving in such and such a way, that he will respond in such and such a way to certain stimuli, that 1

his central If

we

nervous system

is

in

such and such

a state,

and so on. 20

try to claim that over and above, or behind, these physical

19.

Skinner, “Behaviorism

20.

R. Carnap, “Psychology

at Fifty,”

in

Physical Language,” Erkenntnis

printed in Logical Positivism, ed. A. 21.

Ibid.

25.

Ibid., e.g., p.

22.

Ibid., p. 172.

Behaviorism and Phenomenology

167.

J.

Ayer (Glencoe, 23.

Ibid.

111 .,

,

3

,

p. 79.

(1932-33). re-

1959), p. 165. 24.

Ibid., p. 174.

Thought and Knowledge

(jo

facts there

is

an inner state of excitement or anger, which

en-

is

from the actual and/or potential behavior and the physiological state, and which might or might not be present with these physical facts, then we are claiming something that we do not tirely different

know how

Our

to verify.

assertion that this person 28

out to be “a metaphysical pseudo-sentence." that the person could

us that he

tell

erally truthful person

It

we should have evidence

an inner state of anger. Carnap’s reply

angry turns

might be objected

angry, and

felt

is

if

he was

a

gen-

for the existence of

that the person’s state-

is

ment does not inform us of anything unless we understand it, and we do not understand it unless we know what observable phenomena would verify

angry yesterday case

if

by the

at

.1 could not test

.

.

As Carnap puts it, noon’ has no meaning

fact that a

a

—

it

me — as would

for

will not

27

T he

fact that

we

be the

be rendered meaningful

sound having the structure of

from A’s own mouth." people as

it

was

“If the sentence ‘A

it.

this

sentence came

rely on the testimony of

source of information about them does not relieve us of

the necessity of giving a physical interpretation of the sentences

they utter, an interpretation which will able. In

make

those sentences test-

Carnap’s view the psychological concepts of ordinary lan-

guage are

a

source of confusion because their reference to physical

conditions and behavior

is

not sufficiently explicit.

tion of these concepts will consist in “physicalising"

The

clarifica-

them,

i.e.

,

in

providing explicit behavioristic definitions of them. But, as Carnap says, “psychology

cation of

its

is

concepts

a

physical science even prior to such a

—

a

physical science

whose assignment

clarifiit

is

to

describe systematically the (physical) behavior of living creatures, especially that of this

behavior

There differs

is

human

beings, and to develop laws under which

may be subsumed.”

one important respect

28

in

which Skinner’s behaviorism

from the physicalism of the Vienna

arises as to

The

question

whether the physicalizing of psychological concepts

to be in terms of the inner physiology of the

26.

Circle.

Ibid., p. 174.

27.

Ibid., p. 180.

28.

human organism

Ibid., p. 189.

is

or in

behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

terms of

outward behavior. Carnap discusses the example of

its

sentence w hich says that this

pi

person

a certain

excited.

is

holds that

le

I

a

sentence has the same “content” as another sentence which as-

serts that the person’s “central

and also that the person

making

is

“agitated

is

in a certain state

movements,”

the application of certain stimuli 29

make them on

.

I

lis

or

would

sample anal-

psychological sentence refers, therefore, both to inner

of a

ysis

nervous system”

physiology and to outward behavior. This mixed reference

is

more

former

some remarks made by Carl

explicit in

exponent

physicalism.

of

“Paul has a toothache,”

I

of this proposition, that

which are

it

some

would be

I

lempel, also

a

even

Discussing the psychological sentence

lempel asks “What is

what

to say,

is

the specific content

are the circumstances in

verified?” lie goes on to say that the following

of the test sentences

which describe these circumstances:

a)

“Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds.”

b)

“At the question, ‘What

the matter?’ Paul utters the words

is

have

'I

a

toothache.’ c)

“Closer examination reveals

a

decayed tooth w

ith

exposed pulp.”

d) “Paul's blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reactions,

show such and such changes.” e) “Such and such processes occur I

in Paul’s central

nervous system.”

lempel declares that the proposition about Paul's pain

an abbreviated expression of the fact that verified.” 30

about Paul

It is is

a

all

test

its

is

“simply

sentences are

evident that the alleged “content” of the sentence

very mixed bag, containing references to both the

outward behavior of weeping, gestures, and utterance, and such physiological phenomena cesses,

and events

Skinner

is

dissatisfied, rightly

29.

Ibid., p. 172.

30.

C. G.

I

in the central

lempel,

“The

sophical Analysis, ed. II. Feigl

31.

It

I>ogical

and W.

blood pressure, digestive pro-

as

nervous system I

31 .

think, with physiological analy-

Analysis of Psychology," Readings in PhiloSellars

(New York,

should be noted that both Carnap and

I

1949), p. 377.

lempel subsequently abandoned

the view that the “cognitive meaning” of an empirical statement or

some of

its

test sentences.

in Logical Positivism.

See

I

also to

lempel’s

“The

is

equivalent to

all

Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,’

Thought and Knowledge

92

For one thing, he says, not enough

ses of psychological concepts.

known about

them

neural states and events for

prediction and control of specific behavior

He

has a “methodological” objection.

32 .

is

to be useful in the

For another thing, he

believes that holding that the

events observed or inferred in an analysis of behavior are basically physiological

“does not solve the methodological problems with

which behaviorism

most seriously concerned

is

believe, that behaviorism as a

33

Skinner means,

.

philosophy of psychology

is

trying to

solve a problem that he calls “methodological” and that call

“philosophical.”

The problem

is,

he puts

as

34

about the subjective world of another.” know’

am

a

nary

That life

is

of thought that

a line

to say,

we know on

when someone

common knowledge w e not

is

a

Now

I

should

“how’ one knows

the fact

is

that

we

great deal about the “subjective worlds” of others. (Here

formulating

able.)

it,

angry

is

,

a

great ,

many

excited

have of the mental

,

occasions in ordior perplexed.

ify the “testable

Skinner’s view that

It is

if

what

behaviorism

content” of psychological concepts,

concentrate on the inner physiology of the rather on

lies

open

to observation,

This

states of others certainly

knowledge of physiological processes, about w hich w

largely ignorant.

I

hope Skinner finds accept-

I

tired

I

it

is

e are

to clar-

should not

human organism but

namely, physical circum-

stances and outward behavior.

["Skinner says:

“The

practice of looking inside the organism for an

explanation of behavior has tended to obscure the variables which are immediately available for a scientific analysis.

outside the organism, in

lie

environmental history.”

Carnap cal

“A

asserted:

processes in the

its

immediate environment and

32.

is

a

sentence about other minds refers to physi-

body

,

becomes untestable

Human

If

1

in

any other

principle,

the statement that

Skinner, “Behaviorism at Fifty,” p. 95. 35. Skinner Science and Human Behavior p. 31. y

34.

a

certain per-

Ibid., p. 83. 36.

and

should agree with

Behavior, pp. 28-29.

33.

,

On

of the person in question.

non sequitur.

Skinner Science and

in its

|

thus meaningless.” 36 Skinner could say, and this

variables

35

interpretation the sentence

him, that

These

Carnap, p.

191.

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

son

discouraged about

is

external

something

refers to his behavior

yy

and

also to

circumstances which “control” that behavior, then the

statement

is

testable;

and

is

it

more

far

readily testable than

Thus

ferred to processes in his body.

if it re-

Skinner’s brand of beha-

viorism explain psychological concepts in terms of outward behav

-

and circumstances rather than inner physiology.

ior

Despite Skinner’s justified dislike of physicalism’s predilection for physiology, the basic

a

his functional analysis

namely, to achieve

as that of physicalism,

concepts which

logical

aim of

will

make

is

a clarification

of psycho-

evident that psychology

it

same

the

truly

is

physical science. Like the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, he

attempting to reduce mental concepts to physical concepts,

though he has

may

form

a clearer idea of the

this

kind to concepts of another kind, and therefore

apy he It

engaged

as

I

w

ill

him

a

a

substantiate

by quoting from Skinner. Speaking of occupational

ther-

says:

of no advantage to say that such therapy helps the patient by

is

in

It

undertaking of reducing concepts of one

typically philosophical

this claim

al-

reduction must take.

be surprising to some to think of Skinner

is

giv

ing

“sense of achievement” or improves his “morale,” builds up his “in-

removes or prevents “discouragement.” Such terms as these merely add to the growing population of explanatory fictions. One who readily engages in a given activity is not show ing an interest, he is show ing terest,” or

We

the effect of reinforcement.

we

reinforce a particular action.

do not give a man a sense of achievement, To become discouraged is simply to fail to

respond because reinforcement has not been forthcoming. 3

Skinner remarks that

it

rule out “final causes.”

But

this principle

is

a

is

He

violated

'

“fundamental principle of science” to

goes on to say:

when

it

is

asserted that behav ior

is

under the

control of an “incentive” or “goal” which the organism has not yet achiev ed or a “purpose”

words

as

which

it

has not yet

fulfilled.

“incentive” or “purpose” are usually reducible to statements

about operant conditioning, and only

them w 37.

Statements which use such

ithin the

framework of

Skinner Science and ,

Human

a slight

change

a natural science.

Behavior, p. 72.

is

required to bring

Instead of saying that

a

Thought and Knowledge

y./

man behaves because of the consequences which are to follow his behavior, we simply say that he behaves because of the consequences which have followed similar behavior It

in the past.

38

Skinner

fairly evident that in these passages

is

is

trying to give

logical analyses, i.e., reductions, of various expressions that,

He

view, mislead us.

aged a

is,

trying to

what being interested

He

purpose.

tell

us what becoming discour-

and what

is,

it is

to

do something

for

pays particular attention to the notion of looking for

which describes an

something,

makes

is

on his

activity in terms of

this assertion: “In general, looking for

its

He

purpose.

something consists of

emitting responses which in the past have produced 'something’ as a

consequence.

something

am

“I

"

” 39

He

consists.

looking for

Here he

my

am

doing when

the past, lations”

I

glasses.”

tell

us of what looking for

“

He

have

'I

says that this sentence

my

lost

“equiv-

is

glasses,’ i shall stop

w hat

my glasses,’ or ‘W hen have done this in my glasses.’ ” He remarks that these “trans-

find

have found

I

trying to

offers several “translations” of the sentence

alent” to the following: I

is

I

seem “roundabout,” but

this

is

because “expressions

in-

volving goals and purposes” are “abbreviations.” 40

The remarks a

I

have quoted make quite evident Skinner's role

philosopher engaged

in translating

and reducing the misleading

mentalistic expressions of ordinary language.

have to

is

a

disguised meaning.

give

them whatever think

I

which they

it

is

These expressions

are “abbreviations.” Skinner's task

unpack these abbreviations by making

variables to

tic

They

explicit the behavioris-

refer in a “concealed”

intelligibility

I

and usefulness they have.

It

may

be conceived of

against another philosophy of psychology (which

trospectionism”), the basic assumption of which learns are.

from

Each

his

way and which

easy to see what makes behaviorism attractive as

P hi osophy of psychology.

own

as

1

is

as a

a

reaction

shall call “in-

that each of us

case w hat pain, anger, fear, purpose, and so on

of us first of

all

takes note of, and identifies, his

own

inner experiences and then surmises or infers that others have the

38.

Ibid., p. 87.

39.

Ibid., p. 89.

40.

Ibid., p. 90.

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

same inner experiences. line of thinking to

we do

I

believe that Wittgenstein has proved this

be disastrous. 41

sible),

it

is

a

form of solipsism. Worse than

Not only might

“anger”

also

is

it

wrong without

1

ing anything.

mined, either

own

identify in myself

I

think

is

it

a dif-

is

the same.

If

it

should not be identify-

I

Whether this were so or not could not be deterby myself or anyone else. Introspectionism assumes

that each of us

makes

makes no sense

wrong, then

I

identify in myself as “anger

were something different each time then

if it

pos-

not what others identify in themselves as “anger,” but

something each time, although

ferent

is

one’s ever being the

be the case that what

might be that w hat

it

this (if that

leads to the result that one’s identification of one’s

inner experience might be

as

leads to the conclusion that

It

not and cannot understand each other’s psychological lan-

guage, which

wiser.

95

it

correct identifications of his

to

determine that

does not have

a right

my

or

mental

identification

its

is

is a

assumption that each of us obtains

Hut

right or

wrong, and therefore

not an identification of anything. Introspectionism doctrine, because

states.

it

is

self-refuting his

mastery

of psychological concepts from introspection actually leads to the collapse of the notion of inner identification.

One hog”

does not have to accept the V erification Principle “whole

in

order to acknow ledge the strong point of behaviorism.

The

refutation of introspectionism, on purely philosophical grounds,

proves that our concepts of mental states and events cannot be

As we noted previously, lem cannot be avoided by the maneuver of holding that

divorced from

havior

is a

human

behavior.

this

prob-

verbal be-

common psychological conaware of this point. He says, “We cannot of showing how a private event can ever

sufficient foundation for our

cepts. Skinner

is

keenly

avoid the responsibility

come to be described by the individual or, in the same sense, be known to him.” 42 Skinner puts the point with equal sharpness in his

paper for the present colloquium.

He

talks

about

w hich some students applied various psychological terms 41.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.

42.

Skinner, Science and

Human

Behavior, p. 280.

a

case in

to the be-

Thought and Knowledge

96

havior of a pigeon.

They

for food, expected reinforcement,

and hoped

felt,

and so on. Skinner

willing to say

is

were reporting what they themselves “would have

that the students

expected,

example, that the pigeon hoped

said, for

43

under similar circumstances.”

for

But

he goes on to emphasize that they must have learned these terms

from

“verbal

a

“

community” which

had

access only

to the kinds of

What-

public infonnation available to the students in the demonstration.

ever the students infer a

knew about themselves which permitted them

comparable events

in the

had seen of the pigeon’s.” an

pigeon must have been learned from

community which saw no more

verbal

absolutely

telligibility

decisive

44 I

of their behavior than they

believe that Skinner has stated here

objection

of psychological

to

to

The

introspectionism.

in-

words must be based on something

other than the occurrence of those words.

That

we have

a

common

understanding of them proves that their use has to be logically connected with other public behavior.

THE FALLACY OF BEHAVIORISM I

have been trying to give an account of the hard core of logical

which gives

truth contained in behaviorism,

losophy of psychology. But viorism.

The

now

want

1

it

toughness as

its

treatment of

The same

psychological sentences in the first-person present tense.

me

begin to explain this by con-

am now

sidering Carnap’s sample sentence, “I

excited.”

says that the “rational support” for this sentence tences as “1

hear

“I feel

my

my

phi-

to disagree with beha-

Achilles’ heel of this doctrine lies in

error occurs in physicalism. Let

a

hands trembling,”

“1

voice quavering,” and so on.

my

see 1

le

lies in

Carnap

such sen-

hands trembling,”

goes on to remark that

am now excited” has the “same content” as the “physical” sentence “My body is now in that condition which, both under my own observation and that of others, exhibits such and the sentence

“I

such characteristics of excitement." ing that 43.

when

a

person says,

Skinner, “Behaviorism

45. Carnap, p. 191.

at

“I

am

40

Carnap

is

obviously assum-

excited,” his saying

Fifty,” p. 91.

44.

Ibid.

it is

based,

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

on his observations of the state of

in part at least, I

he truth

that

is

would be

it

a rare

which

ease in

he was excited on the basis of noticing that bling or his voice quavering.

such

case to occur.

a

do not say

I

A man who

own body.

person said that

hands were trem-

his

that

a

his

97

is

it

impossible for

had narrowly escaped some

danger might notice afterwards, perhaps with surprise, that

hands w ere trembling, and he might conclude excited. In the

normal case, however,

he

le says that

is

excited.

I

he

man

a

and he

is,

that he

must be very

does not conclude that

but his utterance

is;

his

is

not

the result of self-observation. I

he point comes out very strikingly when we consider

son reports of bodily sensations, e.g.,

“I

would be completely mad

this

ing that

my

face

if

1

were to say

my

was flushed,

It

my

someone were to say, on he would be joking or else

The same

true

is

first-person perception sentence, such as “I see a black dog.”

a

On

was holding

I

he would not understand how the words are used. of

headache.”

If

that he has a headache, either

,

a

on the basis of notic-

eyes dull, that

head, and had just taken some aspirin. that basis

have

first-per-

the basis of observing that another person's eyes are follow ing

black dog, / can say,

“1 le

sees a black dog.” But

sense for him to say, on the basis of noticing that

following

The

a

black dog, that he sees

natural temptation to

a

a

would make no his ow n eyes w ere it

black dog.

which behaviorist philosophers have

succumbed is to assume that first-person psychological sentences have the same “content,” or the same verification, as the corresponding third-person sentences. It looks as if that must be how it is:

is

nevertheless, that excited,

is

not

how

by the trembling of

it

is.

I

his hands.

But

do not verify do not verify it

in this

headache.

do not

way that / am excited. In the normal case By observing you can verify that you have I

1

verify that / have a headache. field is a

cow

.

brown cow.

I

The

in

I

a

I

can verify that the animal

cannot verify,

In the case of another

brow n cow

I

person

I

man

can verify that another

in addition, that

I

see a

at all.

in the

brown

can verify both that there

the field and that he sees

is

a

it.

notion of verification does not apply to

a

w ide range

of

first-

Thought and Knowledge

9S

way

person psychological reports and utterances. Another the point

The

observations.

are based

and utterances are

to say that those reports

is

error of introspectionism

is

to

to put

not based on

suppose that they

on observations of inner mental events. The error of

behaviorism

suppose that they are based on observations of

to

is

outward events or of physical events inside the speaker’s

These two philosophies of psychology share namely, that

psychological statement

a first-person

assumption,

false

a

skin.

a

is

report of

something the speaker has, or thinks he has, observed.

The logical

mistake of assimilating first-person to third-person psychostatements

imaginary case

to an

the street and

we

He

refers

going

down

quite obvious in Skinner’s thinking.

is

in

which we ask

a

“1

receive the reply

man w hy am going

he

is

”

to mail a letter.

Skinner says:

We of

have not learned anything new about

its

possible causes.

The

his

behavior but only about some

subject himself, of course,

may be

in

an advan-

tageous position in describing these variables because he has had an ex-

tended contact with his ow n behavior for not therefore in

a

The

is

is

from similar statements made by others behavior upon fewer occasions. he is simply

his

.

terms of

a plausible prediction in

truth

years. But his statement

different class

who have observed making

many

when

that normally

doing something his statement

ment made by somebody

else

is

his

.

experience with himself

man

a

.

tells

you

purpose

his

in a different class

46 .

from

a state-

on the basis of observation of him.

you see someone rummaging about

in the

in

If

papers on his desk, and

remember that when he had done this on previous occasions the rummaging had come to an end when he grabbed hold of his spectacles,

now

you might reasonably conclude on these grounds

looking for his spectacles. But

reason as follows: I

have done

spectacles

46.

I

my ”!

If

would be weird

am rummaging

this in the past

caught hold of

my

“1 lere

it

my

Skinner, Science and

Human

my

activity has terminated

spectacles. Therefore,

you heard

about on

a

I

man make

Behavior, p. 88.

am

if

that he

is

were

to

he

desk.

w hen

When I

have

probably looking for

such

a

remark and be-

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

yy

was not joking, you would thereafter regard him

lieved that he

with suspicion, because of the craziness of the remark.

Skinner

home,” hour.”

“I I

puzzled by such utterances as

is

am

home,”

inclined to go

le says that

establish responses of this sort?”

when

the language

is

when

“Later

The

come

go

in half

an to

low can the verbal community

le thinks a possible

to

to

w hich appear

affairs

explanation

learned while the individual

publicly,” “private stimuli”

manifestations.”

1

I

was about

go home

shall

they “describe states of

be accessible only to the speaker.

that

“I

“I

is

is

“behaving

be associated with the “public

rest of this possible explanation

is

as follows:

may going home' may be

these private stimuli occur alone, the individual

respond to them.

1

was on the point of

regarded as the equivalent of characteristically precede or

‘1

observed events

my

accompany

in

myself which

going home.' What

these events are, such an explanation does not say.” 47 For Skinner “private stimuli” individual’s skin.

would mean, of course, physical events within the

The

fact that

Skinner regards

this

hypothesis as

a

possible explanation of the utterances, even though he does not

know what

the private stimuli

would

shows how unques-

be,

tioningly he assumes that such a remark as

“I

am on

the point of

going home” must be based on the observation of something.

Undoubtedly people sometimes decide

to

go home because of

wrong to suppose that the announcement “I am about to go home” is a prediction based on observation. Normally it would be outlandish to ask a man what the observational data are on the basis of which he is predicting that he is about to go home. The announcement “1 am about to go home” is normally an announcement of intention. Anphysical disturbances within their skins. But

nouncements of intention internal

are not based

it is

on the observation of

either

or external variables, despite Skinner’s assumption that

they must be.

Skinner would reply that surely the announcement or the intention

47

is

.

under the

Ibid., p. 262.

control of

some

variable.

Perhaps

so,

depending on

Thought and Knowledge

100

how ambiguously we

would have some reason

We

time.

word

use the

might express

was supper time “determined “controlling factor,” or

home,

for going

some

this in

“control. ” e.g.,

Normally that

supper

is

by saying that the fact it decision” to go home, or was the

his

some such

cases

We

thing.

usually expect there

will

be something which controls a man’s intention,

But

if

we mean

it

man

a

in this sense.

“control” in Skinner’s technical sense, according to

which y is under the control of x if and only if x and y are conif this is what nected by some functional relationship i.e. by a law

we mean,

then

I

we have no ground

will say that

that either intentions or

—

,

,

at all for

believing

announcements of intention are under the

“control” of anything.

CONCLUSION Behaviorism conceptual

tie

is

must be some

right in insisting that there

sort of

between the language of mental phenomena and

public circumstances and behavior. If there w ere not, psychological

terms could not be taught, because there would be no basis for judging that our pupils employed them correctly or incorrectly. a

small child says

“I

am hungry”

that he has not learned

what

while rejecting food,

to say. If he says

it

we

If

consider

while rejecting

food and going for drink, w e judge that he has confused the w ords “thirsty” and “hungry.”

When

on several occasions there

right sort of correlation of behavior

and circumstances with the

child’s utterance of a psychological term,

the

way towards mastering

its

the

is

w e conclude

that he

is

on

employment. By virtue of having

behavioral criteria tor the truth of

some third-person psychological

statements

in certain

(e.g., “lie

able to determine in rect

a

is

hungry”)

circumstances,

good many situations whether there

understanding of various psychological terms.

is a

In this

these terms are anchored in preverbal behavior; and unless so there I

here

we

it

are cor-

wav were

would be no shared psychological language. is

a

development, however,

chological terms

in the

employment

of psy-

which can seem astonishing, and certainly

great conceptual importance.

I

refer to the fact that the

is

of

employ-

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology

101

merit of psychological terms outstrips their foundation in preverbal

Someone who

behavior.

has satisfied us that he understands certain

psychological terms begins to use them in first-person statements in the absence of the primitive,

preverbal behavior that had previously

He

served as the basis for judging that he understood those terms. tells

that he feels

11s

something, when

demeanor.

I

or angry at someone, or worried about

ill,

we should

not have supposed so merely from his

he interesting point

will accejit his

We

testimony.

conclude that he

had been judging solely on the

we should

ble circumstances,

testimony as

his

a

new

many

that in a great

is

angry when,

is

basis of nonverbal behavior

not have thought

criterion of

w hat he

is

it.

We

feeling

we we

cases if

and

visi-

begin to use

and thinking,

over and above and even in conflict with the earlier nonverbal

cri-

teria.

Philosophers sometimes read Wittgenstein’s insistence on there

being

conceptual link between statements of sensation and the

a

primitive, natural, expressions of sensation in

implying that there

is a

is

obviously not true.

to act out,

A

W ittgenstein

good way

without words, “a

to see this

“I

feel

morning.” This truth about sensations

remarks:

he

is

dog’s a

“We

say

a

dog

afraid his master

more is

as

w

is

to

mean

this,

and

imagine trying

my

shoulder, but

relaxed than

1

did this

emotions. Wittgenstein

afraid his master will beat him; but not, ill

beat

him tomorrow.

cow ering can be an expression of the

dog cannot give expression

morrow.

48 ,

even more obviously true

beliefs, intentions, is

did not

slight soreness in

not enough to bother me,” or

about moods, thoughts,

behavior

natural, nonverbal, behavioral counterpart

of every statement of sensation. it

human

Why

not?” 49

A

fear of being beaten; but

to the fear that he will be beaten to-

This latter expression of fear

is

reserved for creatures that

have some mastery of language.

The

first-person psychological sentences

behavior up to

People

tell

a

point,

must be correlated with

but they quickly go beyond that point.

us things about themselves which take us by surprise,

48.

Wittgenstein, Investigations, e.g., paras. 244, 281, 283, 288.

49.

Ibid., para. 650.

1

Thought and Knowledge

02

we should

things which

not have guessed from our knowledge of

A

and behavior.

their circumstances

behaviorist philosopher will

we had known more about their history, environment, and behavior, we should have been able to infer this same information. do not believe there are any grounds for thinking so. The say that

if

I

testimony that people give us about their intentions, plans, hopes, worries, thoughts, and feelings

I

it

most important source

far the

we have about them. To

of information

check

by

is

a

we cannot we credit it.

great extent

against anything else and yet to a great extent

we have no

believe

reason to think

even

it is

a theoretical possibil-

by

self-testimony could be adequately supplanted

ity that this

in-

ferences from external and/or internal physical variables.

Within the whole body of language the category of first-person sentences

psychological

human

status of

has

made on

have pointed out:

I

The

importance.

beings as subjects and persons

these first-person utterances, teristics

peculiar

is

which possess the tw o

puzzling

bound up with striking charac-

they are not, for the most part,

first,

many

the basis of any observation; second, in

cases they

cannot be “tested" by checking them against physical events and circumstances other than the subject’s

know what

man

a

wants, what he

is

own

testimony.

If

w

e

want

thinking about, whether he

annoyed or pleased, or what he has decided, the man himself best source of information.

testimony has

a

own

with his

In the

ask him

,

and he

behavior for this

many

le does,

the criticism which

paper

I

said that Rogers had not, in his

I

a

telling criticism of

however, make some remarks which hint

believe to be cogent. For example, he says,

implication, that behaviorism “transforms everything

an object.”

testimony

50.

50 I

in a

own

years."

contribution to the colloquium, expounded 1

His

our

and not “because he has had an extended con-

beginning of

behaviorism.

tells us.

is

is

privileged status in respect to this sort of informa-

tion about himself, tact

We

to

have argued that behaviorism true light.

Rogers, p. 113.

It

fails

it

at

by

studies into

to perceive self-

mistakenly assumes that

when

a

man

toy

Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology tells

you what he wants, intends, or hopes, w

on observation and, therefore, he

w ere an

object of his

own

hat

he says

is

based

speaking about himself as

is

if

he

Behaviorism also assumes that

observation.

these first-person utterances, since they are supposedly observational in nature, could theoretically of another person,

although

this

vances." In short, behaviorism is

be replaced by the observations

might require “technological ad-

fails to

perceive that self-testimony

not replaceable, even in principle, by observations of functional

relations

between physical variables

51 .

In his brilliant review (Language, 35 I1959], 26-58, reprinted in V he Structure Kodor and J. J. Katz [Knglewood (dills, N.J., 1964]) of Skinner s of Language, ed. 51.

J.

Verbal Behavior, fails to

make

Noam Chomsky

shows conclusively,

in

my

a case for his belief that “functional analysis”

with verbal behavior.

is

opinion, that Skinner able to deal adequately

f

The Privacy of Experience

u

writings on the topic of

In

the privacy of experience”

themes can often be discerned, one of which

I

shall call “the pri-

vacy of observability,” the other “the privacy of ownership.”

means

first

that

I

can observe (or perceive, or be aware

something that no one

The second theme means

or know).

one

observe

else can

of, or

I

The

know)

be aw are

(or perceive, or

that

two

of,

have something that no

else can have.

The

theme

first

is

Analysis of Mind. Russell asks, selves

thing

by Bertrand

illustrated

“Can we observe anything about our-

which we cannot observe about other people, or

we

observe

can observe public, if

it

suitably placed?”

1

answer

le gives the

1

2

only observable by one observer.” can observe or perceive

my

w riters the emphasis

example,

Professor

A.

J.

and he says that

Russell

that only is

that at least

is

is,

“each

is

is

saving that only

one person can

/ is

observe.

on the privacy of ownership. For

Ayer,

has the theory that a self

periences:

every-

sensations and images: the emphasis

on the idea that there are objects In other

is

the sense that another could also

in

bodily sensations and mental images are “private”: that

Logic

book The

Russell's

in

his

Language

nothing but

,

a series

Truth

and

of sense-ex-

“it is

logically impossible for a sense-ex-

(New

York, 1921),

1.

Russell, The Analysis of Mind

2.

Ibid., p.

3.

Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London, 2d ed., 1946).

p.

117.

118.

:

7 he Privacy of Experience perience to belong to the sense-history of more than or, as

he also puts

it,

Foundations

experiences, and he repeats that

same experience should be

that the

rate selves."

Ayer was ownership. since,

1

on

1

I

book

In his

“it

a

impossible

is

part of the history of

two

sepa-

theme of the privacy of

stating, in those books, the

may have been

idea

is

my

only a conjecture) that

(this is

experiences make up what

am, therefore

I

cannot have the same experiences, because then there

would be only

Some

4

6

his theory,

you and

5

to a single self."

Empirical Knowledge he retains the theory that

oj

self is a series of

single self,"

a

sense-experiences, and the sense-contents

“all

which form part of them, are private I he

105

one of us, not two.

would not

writers

any difference between the privacy

see

ow nership. For example, Ayer 7 later book, Philosophical Essays says: “The w arrant for saying can have direct knowledge of my ow n experiences but not

of observability and the privacy of in a

,

that

I

anybody’s

else’s

own. The reason why another person

whether Ayer

I

cannot have them.

1

thinking here that there

is

directly

1

know

and the privacy of what

ship), or

whether

his view

is

this latter view.

aware of only aware

of:

I

that there

is

not clear

is

It

difference between

the privacy of observ-

,

the privacy of owner-

only one fact that

is

For they would say that w hat only

owned

my

is

that the following remarks

being

philosophers would incline

can have, and what only

is

a

is

(i.e.,

Many

to speak of the privacy of

privacy of what

(i.e.

have

1

expressed in two different ways.

toward

experiences are exclusively

cannot directly know the experiences of

simply that

is

the privacy of what ability)

my

that

just

is

1

w hat

to speak of the

can have only is

can be

I

observed and of the

same

by Professor W.

can be

I

7'.

thing.

It

is

likely

Stace reflect this

view 1

cannot experience anything except

but 4. 6. 7.

1

can never see yours.

Ibid., p.

125.

5.

I

can

Ibid., p.

my own

feel a

experience.

pain in

my

leg.

I

But

can see 1

my

can never

128.

Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (New York, 1940), Ayer, Philosophical Essays (New York, 1954), p. 194.

p.

139.

red, feel

Thought and Knowledge

io6

the pain in your leg.

can

1

anger infects me, so that as

feel

1

my

it,

feel

I

my

feel

it

anger, not yours.

emotions, but not yours. Even

in I

sympathy with you,

your

yet, in so far

is

it

if

can never be you, nor you me.

I

cannot

your eyes, nor you through mine. Even if you can telepathically transfer a mental state, say an image, from your mind to mine, become aware of it, it is then my image and not yours. Even if, yet, when can directly perceive your mind, without having to infer it as some think, from your body, still this perception of your mind will then be to me my see through

1

1

my

perception,

experience. 8

Stace seems to be saying that there

is

a class of things that

can perceive (or experience, or be aware of), and that only

can have

I

and that these two

,

a class

only

I

of things

classes coincide.

But some writers would think that there

an importance

is

dif-

ference between the privacy of observability and the privacy of

ow

nership. For example, consider the view stated in

by Don Locke. 9

He

makes

a distinction

privacy” and what he

ical

“logically private” ers.”

10

This

1

between what he

calls “log-

“mental privacy.” Something

is

cannot be “owned by or shared with oth-

if it

what

is

calls

recent paper

a

called “privacy of

ow nership.” Something

is

“mentally private,” according to Locke, “if only one person can perceive

11

it.”

This

is

my

“privacy of observability.”

noted that Locke regards feeling

wide but not extravagant sense

ceive’ in the is

of perceiving.”

a species

Locke holds

that these

In respect of the ership

is

to have this pain is

merely

for

you

a

I

w hich

two forms of privacy

it

is

are not equivalent.

that the privacy of own-

have. But the privacy of observability

contingent truth. At the present time

it

it

my

feeling your pain?

Stace, The Theory of Knowledge

y.

I).

10.

Ibid., p.

,

is

else

he thinks, impossible

possible for one person to feel another’s pain.

8.

Locke,

anyone

someday technological advance

Let us ask w hat the difference would be between pain and

use ‘per-

feeling a pain

logically impossible for

to feel a pain of mine; but

may make

in

“I

12

example of pain, he thinks

necessary truth:

a

pain as perception:.

a

should be

It

“The Privacy of 148.

11.

and

feeling

my

Locke ought to believe that there Existence (Oxford, 1932), p. 67.

Pain,” Analysis

Ibid.

my

12.

,

24 (1964).

Ibid.

is

The Privacy of Experience

some feel,

from among the pains

criterion for distinguishing,

might

I

And

those that would be mine from those that would be yours.

indeed Locke does believe there

13

the identity of bodily sensations;

means

such

is

“Identity of location,” he says,

location.

namely,

man in

a

feels

in

is

and

a criterion,

different head, than

my

The

criterion of mine

is

the present time

it

some

or toothache. But

not possible for

is

me

to feel

and

that the

is

mine, and the headache in your head

head

space,

the headache another feels,

is

yours with regard to headaches, according to Locke, in

is

Since the headache

different location in physical

a

it

by “identity of location” he

therefore they are different headaches.

headache

that

necessary condition for

a

is

identity of location in physical space.

that one

At

loy

yours.

is

your headache

make

future scientific development might

it

possible, says Locke, for our respective nervous systems to be so

connected that i.e.

,

I

should be able to

should be able to

I

feel

the toothache in your tooth,

feel

your toothache.

We

could “plug into” 14

another’s nervous system “in order to feel his pain.”

want

I

to ask

whether there

is

any difference between owning

bodily sensations and observing or perceiving them.

“owning sensations”

it,

to

is

mean having

“perceiving”

a

sensation will

about “observing” ring.

a

mean

a sensation.

just the

paying attention

ing” a sensation will

two questions:

first,

It

Let us assume that

same

of, or

to, a sensation.

mean some

or

whether there

all

is

ference between having it,

as feeling

conscious

1

3.

What

first

it,

of these things.

it

14.

Ibid.

will ask

1

any difference between hav-

or paying attention to

question,

odd

Let us assume that “observ-

seems

feeling

any

is

it,

dif-

or being

it.

clear that there

except verbal, between having an

Ibid., p. 149.

it.

of, or notic-

sensation and being aw are of

or noticing

Considering the tinction,

a

are

suspiciously

is

ing and feeling a bodily sensation; second, whether there

conscious of

how

sensation? T his expression, too, has an

But we do speak of being aw'are

ing, or

understand

I

sensations. But

“perceiving” and “observing” to be understood?

unnatural to speak of “perceiving”

As

is

no

dis-

bodily sensa-

Thought and Knowledge

10S tions.

he

The

still

asks,

questions “Does he

It

pain?”,

in

doesn’t matter to

ification that

he

To

show

is

identical with the verification that

we must observe some of his, some movement or utterance, that This same movement or utterance will also

verify that he has pain

response or reaction in pain.

is

“Do you have pain?”, us w hich set of words is

someone has pain

feels pain.

shows he

The doctor “Do you feel used. The ver-

those twinges?” are used interchangeably.

feel

“Are you

pain?”.

have those twinges?” and “Does

still

that h e feels pain.

We cannot

finding out that he feels

it;

find out that he has pain

without

and we cannot find out that he

without finding out that he has

feels

This identity of verification

it.

is

it

one

aspect of the complete identity in use of such expressions as “having

burning sensation” and “feeling

a

burning sensation.” In applying

those expressions to myself and to others, a

my

difference in

Turning

to the

second question, less

uously complaining of “

I

do not know how

to

make

a

it

should be observed that

a

per-

attention to a sensation he has: he can be

or less conscious of

advised

I

use of them.

son can pay more or

more

a

aware of

or

it

toothache, he

is

If

it.

someone

is

stren-

sometimes admonished or

much about it!”; much attention to it.”

following ways: “Don't think so

in the

ry to take you

mind

off

it”;

“Don’t pay so

Sometimes the advice is effective: he really does succeed to some extent in taking his mind off the pain. Does it follow that he feels less pain? This is an interesting and difficult question which w ill 1

not pursue.

But even less

he

if it is

feels,

it

true that the less attention

does not follow that

pain then he feels no pain.

We

it

he

a

is

can think

man pays

not conscious of any ot cases in

should be inclined to say that

a

man

conscious ot

it.

a

soundly sleeping man

the leg with

a

For example,

sharp object: the leg

is

gasps: but his state ot heavy sleep

aw akened

a

minute or two

later

felt a

which we

sensation without being

drawn back is

to pain the

is

jabbed

violently

in

and he

resumed, and when he

is

he has no recollection of pain. This

case makes us teel pushed toward saying both that the jab pained

him, and also that he was not

conscious

of pain.

The violent move-

mcnt and the gasp, together with the cause of pain, provide

he felt pain.

i.e.,

1

1

is

a criterion for

two

criteria,

tinction.

are

There

in

normal

tes-

saying that he was not

genuine difference

is a

and therefore

a criterion for

in

the nature of the

reasonable basis for making this dis-

a

lower animals) but also

cially

a

saying that the jab pained him,

can be employed not only

It

was

fact that here

continuing state of sleep, and his negative

timony on awaking, provide conscious of pain.

toy

Privacy of Experience

I'he

in

regard to

in

unconscious or semiconscious

regard to animals (espe-

human or

states,

when they

beings

heavily dis-

are

tracted.

What

bearing does this discussion have on the supposed distinc-

between the privacy of ownership and the privacy of observ-

tion

ability?

I

think

it

is

relevant only in the sense of

showing what phi-

When Russell, in 7 'he own bodily sensations,

losophers ha xenot meant by this distinction. Analysis of Mind

speaks of “observing” one’s

,

he only means feeling them.

15

He

is

not concerned, for example,

with the phenomenon of paying more or

less attention to a sensa-

nor with the difference between feeling

tion,

conscious of

When

it.

simply means,

sensation and being

a

Locke, too, speaks of “perceiving” pain he

Rut

as already noted, feeling pain.

we have

no difference betw een having and feeling

seen

bodily sen-

that there

is

sation.

the philosophical distinction between the “ownership”

If

and the “perception” of sensation

is

meant

be

to

a

a distinction be-

tween having an d feeling sensations, then it is a distinction without a difference. Thus the themes of the privacy of ow nership and the privacy of observability seem to be identical. For the remainder of this

paper

privacy do

I

will

assume

come

to the

that these

same

two verbally

different

themes

ot

thing.

ii

I

return

now

to Locke’s conception of the

supposed distinction

between the ownership and the perception of

would be a but since there is no

view

15.

this

distinction

pain.

On

his

own

between having and feeling pain;

real distinction here,

Russell, e.g., Analysis of Mind, p. 118.

he

is

wrong from the

— /

Thought and Knowledge

10

start.

A

more

problem

interesting

provoked by

is

ownership of pain

criterion of the

his claim that the

the criterion of

(i.e.,

contend that the ownership of

pain)

is

the location of pain.

pain

is

determined not by location, but by who

1

will

Wittgenstein remarks: “Pain-behavior can point to

but the suffering person

who

the one

is

who

a

expresses pain.

painful place

expresses pain.”

expresses pain, either by natural pain-behavior or

who nearby who the one

would

is

in pain. If

is

in pain,

know which

I

he one

by words,

you were informed that there

but you did not

H>

is

a

is

person

person, you

by finding out w hich one expresses pain

find out

who has

in

move-

ments, actions, or speech.

The

view that w hich person has pain

is

to

be settled by finding

where the pain is located puts the cart before the horse. Our discovery of where pain (other than our own) is located presupposes

we know w ho the subject of pain is. Know ing that this person in pain, we can be guided by his pain-behavior (his flinching,

that is

limping, caressing,

exclaiming) to the location of the

pointing,

painful area. His expressive behavior defines, for others, the location

of the pain.

The knowledge

of

who

is

the knowledge of the location of pain.

ow nership of pain

thinks, that the pain. self

This would make

It

pain

is

logically prior to

cannot be true, as Locke

determined by the location of

mystery of how the location of pain

is

it-

determined.

The also

a

is

in

fact that the

ownership of pain

proved by the empirical

is

that

fact

The most

not fixed

by

its

location

is

sometimes people locate

phenomenon under this heading, know n for centuries, is the so-called “phantom limb.” A person who has had a limb amputated may, for some months pains outside their bodies.

after, feel pains in the place

to a place not

occupied by

feels the pain there.

holding that the believes he

16.

is,

We

man

is

a

familiar

where the limb used part of his

to be.

1

le points

body and declares

cannot get around

this

that he

phenomenon by

not really in pain but only (mistakenly)

or by holding that the pain

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

,

para. 302.

is

not w here he (mis-

1

I'he

takenly) believes

is

it

but

in

some other

Privacy of Experience place.

1

is

located in a place that

One may 1

pain really

not occupied by flesh, bone, or nerves.

empty space has the disadvantage

in

of the behavior that

can be directed toward

The man who

be missing.

will necessarily

lis

I

to ac-

doubtful about this view for the following reason.

feel

he locating of pain

much

is

we have

think

cept at face value his indication of the painful place.

/ /

feels

that

painful place

a

pain in

a

phantom

limb cannot caress, protect, or favor the painful place; the pain cannot be intensified

by probing

A

and so on.

that place;

substantial

commonly serving to identify the location of pain will be impossible. his may seem to prevent from being completely correct to say that the pain is where the man points, even amount

of the

behavior

it

I

though he

is

not making any sort of mistake.

Against this objection

it

needs to be pointed out that there

The

conflict of criteria in this case.

the

man

facts are not these: that

when

the leg

is

probed, and so on. Such facts

might give the result that there was no

would be

a conflict

right thing to say.

betw een his words, and the

phantom-limb

bal behavior.

In the actual

words and

nonverbal behavior of pointing are

that

his

no nonverbal behavior

is

etc.

Adequate

is

satisfied.

feel that

man

it

is

1

satisfied.

do not see any sound

17

may

This inclination

sumption that the location of pain (and

it,

in

agreement: and

The

facts are not

flinch

No

when

a

pain

is

it

is

his

countervailing crite-

basis for the inclination to

not entirely correct to say that the pain

indicates.

nonver-

criteria for the location of pain (both

statement and his pointing) are rion

disagreement.

in

rest of his

There

case, his declaration in

he has the leg but does not limp with

probed,

although

sincerely declares he feels pain in his leg, he does not

limp, does not flinch

there

no

is

arise partly

the location of

empty space can contain no cause of

pain).

I

is

where the

from the

as-

a cause of

the

w ill proceed

to this point immediately. It

is

interesting that there

phantom-limb case 17.

For thoughts on

and to Professor

Ann W

as

this

is

a

proving that problem

I

am

ilbur Mackenzie.

strong inclination to take the a

person’s pointing, limping,

indebted both to Professor David Sachs

/

Thought and Knowledge

12

favoring, protecting, and other pain-behavior, does not define tor us

the location of his pain. For example, Professor Kurt Baier says the following:

The

phantom limb clearly demonstrate pain” we cannot mean the place to which we have

that

facts of the

When

he learns of

was and

a

a disposition to point.

his misfortune, the legless soldier

that he has a pain in his foot, although he

by “the place of

withdraws

still is

his claim

inclined to point

where the foot would be it he still had one. It is clear why the soldier withdraws this claim. It is, because, as a matter of empirical fact, the history, the fate, the life of the pain no longer depend on what happens to his foot. The doctor can move about, cut, squeeze, burn the amputated foot without thereby in any w ay affecting the person’s pain. The pain is therefore no more “in" his foot than it is in the blanket occupying the spot where it would be if it were still his, or anywhere else. To claim that the pain is in the foot is therefore to imply that, to the

same

spot, namely, the spot

causally speaking, “the key to the pain”

lies

in the foot.

pain cannot be in the place to which the legless soldier

For whatever

which he

lies,

is

whether

that place,

in

his

whose

disposed to point.

amputated

or the blankets covering his body,

pain,” not the object

is

is

Therefore, the

foot,

not “the key to the

determines the fate of the pain.

fate

the bed in

1

lence w e

do not say that the pain is in it. The place to which we are disposed to point, w hen we have a pain, is merely the place where we believe, rightly or wrongly

havior” is.

is

Since

that the pain

,

tied to

our

belief

may

this belief

is.

The

disposition to manifest “directed pain be-

about where the pain

be erroneous, as the facts of the phantom limb

show, we cannot identify the place of a pain w are disposed to point when w e have a pain. 18 It is

left foot.

But

a part of his

believe, in

is

this

say that the pain

in his left foot

is trivial.

may feel it a bit awkward to when he knows that he has no

is

The important

fact

is

body); and Baier admits

is

that he will

here (pointing at a place not presently

in his foot

is

fate of the pain,” as Baier puts

8.

the place to w hich w e

this.

Kurt Baier, “The Place of

A

that he it,

still

occupied

Baier goes wrong,

supposing that the reason the soldier w

say that the pain

1

ith

true that the amputated soldier

say that the pain

by

not to w here the pain

is,

ill

I

be reluctant to

no longer believes that “the

depends on w hat happens

Pain g Philosophical Quarterly, 14(1964),

to his

p.

140.

The Privacy of Experience

what used

foot (or

he

to

his foot).

ij

/

Baier thinks that the notion of

the ocation of a pain involves the notion of the location of xhz cause 1

the pain,

of

“To

lie says,

claim that the pain

in

is

the foot

therefore to imply that, causally speaking, ‘the key to the pain'

the foot.” It

pain has the

same

which

is

in

lies in

19

number

true that in a huge

is

is

this

of cases the bodily cause of

a

location as the pain. But there are familiar cases

not so. T he “key" to

headache

a

sometimes

is

a

nerve in the neck; and the so-called “referred" pains of angina arc located in the shoulder rather than in the heart

where the bodily

damage is. Even if we ignore these empirical facts, we can see that it is wrong to think that locating pain is the same as locating the (or bodily cause of pain.

a)

A man may

hese are different concepts.

I

give us the location of his pain without having any beliefs

about the location that

bodily cause.

its

has a bodily cause.

it

The

of

Ie

(1

need not even assume

Ie

I

might think

it

was “psychosomatic.”)

notion of the location of the bodily cause of pain

more

sophisticated that

at all

is

a

good deal

The

the notion of the location of pain.

is

notion relies on past experience and experiment; the second

first

does not. 20 Ibid.,

19.

Baier’s

my

italics.

There

a

is

Thomas

view and the view of

similarity,

has pain in his toe, he

is

making

and the other part

feels pain,

is

a

When

the body.

in

complex

assertion,

the ordinary

is

in

the toe.

consider the sensation of pain by

itself,

say with propriety, that the toe

either the place or the subject of

be remembered that,

our thought, w ed.

ith

W. Hamilton

when we

the cause of

without any respect

speak of pain it,

which

in

really

to

its

it.

in the toe”

(Thomas

does not hold that

we cannot

in

my

toe. If this part

20.

One

toe, part

of

taken belief that

I

my

of w hat

have pain

in

my

could be misled by the

Sometimes we

“source”

I

commonly

assert

is

to

combined

in

it

Reid, Works,

call this

has

a

chap.

II,

when

that the (or a) cause of the pain

assertion turned out to be mistaken, then

order to discover the point of area.

we cannot

say, “with propriety,” that

sensations are located in our bodies. But he does hold, w ith Reid, that

have pain

that he

is

[F.dinburgh, 1858], Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay

18, pp. 319-320). Baier

says he

ought

But is

a sensa-

“When we

cause,

the toe, the sensation is

man

one part of which

that the cause of the pain

is

l>etween

also a dissimilarity,

Reid. According to Reid, pain, being

can exist only "in the mind,” not

tion,

and

1

is

would have

our

say

I

in a

I

my mis-

toe. fact that

maximum

sometimes we probe

tenderness,

i.e.,

a

painful area in

the “center' of the painful

center of pain the “source” of the pain. Since the word

causal meaning, this

way

of speaking might give

a

philoso-

/

Thought and Knowledge

ij

in

To summarize having

our progress thus

ownership)

not defined by the location of pain, but instead the

is

location of pain

defined by the directed pain-behavior (verbal and

is

who

nonverbal) of the person of,

and location

I

now

turn

idea that

same pain.

is

the

is

same

pain.

concepts of cause

same ” 21

is

pure

as his,

it

same

pain.

is

sense to

implying that there

They

think that there

same sion

pain.

counter to what

his goes

They

is

a sense in

On

many

is

say, that

it

is

I

cannot have the

I

cannot have the

may mean

me

it

“qualitative

may mean

“same pain,” they

in this latter sense of

impossible for you and

some sense

to have the

same

pain.

22

Ayer takes this view in his Philosophical Essays He allows two people may “share” the same fear. But, he adds, “To say .

the feeling

is

shared

is

to say that the

two

say that they are numerically identical.”

about

difficulty

that

it

simply

is

feelings

how we a

just

that

He

it

not to

is

admits there

is

some

are to count the feelings. But he declares

convention “that

and not one,

that

feelings are qualitatively

and that they have the same ostensible object:

similar

my

an ambiguity in the expres-

the one hand, this

It is

the

say that

not

is

similarity” or “exact similarity”; on the other hand,

“numerical identity.”

feel)

philosophers think.

w hich you and

will say that there

“same pain.”

the

also possible for us both to have the

is

Wittgenstein

makes

it

is

In the Investigations

illusion.

of the expressions “same pain,” such that you and

T

This

impossible that two people should have (or

there occurs this remark: “In so far as

pain

The

pain must not be confused.

of,

believe this idea

1

in pain. (3)

to the question of the “privacy” ot pain.

is

it

sensation and

a

has pain (the problem ot

Which person

are the same. (2)

it

Feeling

far: (i)

we

are to say that there are

because there are two persons.”

In The Problem of Knowledge,

Ayer

says, “It

pher the idea that what the probing determines

is

the bodily cause is

Wittgenstein, Investigations, para. 253.

22.

Ayer,

Philosophical Essays, p.

194.

23.

Ibid., p.

(i.e.,

merely “where

the most.” 21.

23

true that one does

is

“source”) of that pain. In reality what has been determined

two

195.

it

the

hurts

7 he Privacy of Experience quite

frequently

speak

of different

thoughts or feelings, but

meant by ” 24

And

similar in his

aches are private: are feeling the

would generally be held

it

not

causes,

book

Peter Strawson,

same

the

what

that

they

are ,

if

is

or

the

literally

he says, “Head-

does not make sense to say that several people

in

25

his Individuals

“states of consciousness” there

He

that

Concept of a Person

I'he

same headache.”

of ownership.”

sharing

that these thoughts or feelings are similar,

is

from

proceed same.

this

it

persons

i

says that

is

if

,

holds that with regard to

a “logically

we

nontransferable kind

consider “the requirements of

identifying reference in speech to particular states of consciousness, or private experiences,

we

see that such particulars cannot be thus

identifyingly referred to except as the states or experiences of

some

one might say, owe

their

identified person.

States, or experiences,

identity as particulars to the identity of the person

And

experiences they are.” “that

it

in fact

one

is

he declares that

whose

states or

follows from this

it

logically impossible that a particular state or experience

possessed by someone should have been possessed by some-

else.”

26

Let us consider the distinction between “exact similarity” and

We

“numerical identity” to which these philosophers allude. certainly think of cases in tinction, or

something

like

which we want to make use of it.

said that after dinner Petersen

the

cigar.”

and

lansen smoked the same cigar,

I

It

could

mean

that

We

it

cigar

the

in respect to size,

brand from the cigar Petersen smoked.

shape,

could express

ordinary speech, by saying that they smoked “the identical

We

say, for example, that “Six ladies at the ball

tivo cigars

What

these remarks tend to

were wear-

mean

is

that

were being smoked by Petersen and Hansen, and

that

ing the identical dress.”

neither cigar had any feature that distinguished Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (New Wok, 1956), 25. Ayer, The Concept of a Person (New York, 1963), p. 26. Straw son, Individuals (London, 1959), p. 97. 24.

w ere

cigars, for example. If

Hansen smoked was not distinguishable this, in

this dis-

With

remark could be ambiguous.

color, or

can

p.

it

226.

50.

from the other;

/ 1

Thought and Knowledge

6

and among the dresses guishable

the ball there were six that were indistin-

at

— “You could not

them

tell

apart.”

But one could mean something different by saying that the two

men smoked

same

the

(“the

identical”)

namely, that

cigar:

al-

together only one cigar was being

smoked by them: (they passed

back and forth

The

tity”

like a

supposed

is

peace pipe).

expression “numerical iden-

is

useful phrase. If

cigar.

I

suspect that this

you have

and

that

A

A

it

from being

ask “Numerically the same?”,

I

how many

and

cigars,

al-

B.

a distinction betw een exact similarity

is

a

and B are smoking the

be asking

to

smoked by

fact that there

me

told

me

you could understand together, are being

does not prevent

Still, this

cigar at the dinner table,

The

are to say that the

not actually used in ordinary speech but has been in-

vented by philosophers.

same

We

to take care of this case.

two men smoked “numerically the same” phrase

it

and

made in regard to cigars and dresses can be made in regard to anything w hatever.

numerical identity that can be does not imply that

You can say

two people have the same (“the identical”) style in but what if asked whether you meant that .Vs

that

playing tennis; style

it

I

exactly like B's style or that

is

A

and B have numerically the

You would not understand this formed me that A and B have exactly the same same

style?

cannot be

a further

question.

With the

this further question:

A

cigars

is

numerically

and dresses there can be

and B appeared

ferent times during the evening, but

in-

style of play: there

question as to whether A’s style

identical with B’s style.

You

was

in it

the

same dress

at dif-

numerically the same

dress? I

bus

a

question of the form

“jr

and

y are exactly alike, but

is

x

numerically the same as y?" makes sense with some values for x

andy, but not

for others.

“B's cigar” for “y,” that

it

we

might turn out

If

we

obtain that

A

a

substitute “A’s cigar” for sensible question.

We

“ ” x

understand

and B had altogether only one

or that they had two. In regard to

tennis style, this further question

some other is

and

cigar,

sorts of things, e.g.,

meaningless.

Let us consider whether this further question has any meaning

7 he Privacy of Experience

A

with respect to colors. Surface

117

and surface B have exactly the

same color, i.e. they are “identical” or “indistinguishable” in color. Can there be a further question as to whether the color of A is ,

What would

numerically identical with the color of B?

Given

that the color of

one area

tempted to think, there

is

not

one of the most

color can be

indistinguishable from the color

is

sense of “same color” such that the

a

color of one place cannot be the is

mean?

what more can be asked? Despite what we are

of another area,

It

it

many

truistic of

same

as the color

of another place.

truisms that the very same shade of

places at the

same

time. In such cases there are

numerically different colored areas colored the same shade. Let us turn to the psychological realm, considering

Two

first opinions.

summer in the summer at the sea-

people can be of the same opinion, e.g., that a

mountains would be more enjoyable than shore.

A

But once you know that

would you know what

it

meant

a

and B have the same opinion, whether

to further find out

A

s

opinion was numerically the same as or different from B's? You

would

not.

dresses,

from cigars and

In this respect opinions are different

and arc more

like styles

and

colors.

What about sudden thoughts? Surely anything

“mental event,”

if

sudden thought

at the

has not been turned

is.

Two

same time, off.

Is

a

My

What would be

a

now

a

thought that the stove further question as to

whether altogether they have two thoughts, exactly thought?

is

people might have the same

e.g., the

there

sudden thought

alike, or just one

the difference?

suddenly thinking that the stove has not been turned off

different occurrence, or event,

is

a

from your suddenly thinking the

same thing. But it does not follow that have something which you do not have. It cannot be said, for example, that had my having 1

I

the thought that p, whereas you did not. To say “I had my having the thought that p" is to speak gibberish. It is no better to say “I

had

my

thinking the thought that/), but you did not have

can be said

is

“I

had the sudden thought

that p":

it.”

What

but then you

could have had the same. Let us turn to bodily sensations. Here the temptation

is

great (in-

1

Thought and Knowledge

18

deed, overwhelming) to suppose that there

no different from that of

thoughts.

how

sense of “same sen-

If

my

the description of

I

backache

a different

description then

is it

used.

no sense of “different sensation" such that

sensation must be different, just as there color" such that the color of

two

It

your backache

There is no sensations. There

different.

is

other sense of “same" and “different" in regard to is

the

as

have the same backache. This

the expression “same backache"

answers to

same

the

is

is

and sudden

styles, colors, opinions,

description of yours, then you and is

a

which two people cannot have the same. But the case

sation" in really

is

my

is

sensation and your

no sense of “different

areas must be different.

worth noting that descriptions of sensations can be imper-

It is

A

sonal.

sensation might be described as “a throbbing pain in the

shoulder." Personal pronouns do not have to enter into verbal descriptions of sensations.

The

descriptions of sensations in a medical

book would not say were, Jyet they could be whose sensations they J J J 1

complete descriptions.

By

description of a sensation"

“a

meant.

In

w hether

it

it

describing

was

were

tion

my

is

must have

location was,

would

,

that

I

one

would

and so on. it

Many

things

on February 22nd,

not belong to a description of

different descriptions: for

mention

whether the intensity of

had

As

ordinarily

is

it.

sensation and B’s sensa-

A

says,

“The ache

in

is

shoulder,” and although B utters the same w ords, he refers to

by A. Thus

A

his it

in

is

a

numerically different from the shoulder referred to

is

and B give

so they describe

ing

sensation

an inclination to think that

shoulder that

1

its

true of a sensation (e.g.

in the afternoon)

There

bodily

dull or sharp or throbbing,

waxed and waned, what

that

them

different locations to their sensations;

and

differently.

wrong. Giving the location

ol one's sensation

the space of physics or astronomy, but in

tions that has one’s a

a

mean what

I

ow n body

as

its

a

is

not locat-

space of sensa-

frame of reference.

If

A

locates

sensation in his space of sensation (e.g., in his right shoulder),

and B locates

a

sensation in the corresponding place in B’s space of

;

The Privacy of Experience sensation (e.g., in his right shoulder), then B's sensation

same place as A’s sensation.

responding place

B

If

(e.g., his right foot),

place from A’s. This

in a different

located his sensation in

cor-

a

use the

expressions “same

A

and

says, “in

my

place,” “different place,” in regard to sensations. Therefore,

B

p

the

in

is

1

then B's sensation would be

how we

is

1

when each

are not giving different descriptions

shoulder.” Descriptions sations.

2 '

sensations provide the criteria of identity for sen-

of

Since your sensation can have the same description as

mine, you and

I

can have the same sensation. Contrary to Straw-

depend on the iden-

son's view, the identity of sensations does not

of the persons

tity

ture of I

a

who have them

sensation that / have

28

It

.

is

not a characterizing fea-

As Wittgenstein remarks,

it.

“In pain

distinguish intensity, location, etc., but no owner.” 29

being mine w ere

If

then

characterizing feature of

a

ought to be able to say,

I

can say,

have

“I

a

pain that

have

“I

30 .

The

first

have

I

remark ought

description of the sensation; but

Thus we make a son cannot have my

senseless

pain that

mine,”

is

to

If

So

it

provided, or is a

w e w ere

it

27.

It

do w ant said

is

the offing, then

mistake to think that

tion this can only that

in

mean

that

if

contribution to the

a

assert,

has yet to

“Another per-

to provide a description

you and

your sensation

I

is

that.

If

a

sensation

is

about the sensation: for one thing, what

is

not

would

no descrip-

have the same sensaexactly like mine, not

we understand

“indescribable.

it

it

not said anything.

might he objected that there arc indescribable sensations. sometimes, that

first

be

we have

numerically the same. In so far as

to say,

I

— which

be plainly false that another person cannot have is

just as

pain

of the sensation (e.g., “a throbbing pain in the shoulder”)

tion

have,

I

not.

is

it

a

move when we

sensation.”

sensation

throbbing.” But actually the

is

remark means no more than that be described

a

a

and

But

also that

And

the conindeed

still a lot it

is

can

Strawson,

29.

Wittgenstein, Philosophise he Bemerkungen (Frankfurt

30.

Cf. ibid., p. 91.

p. 97.

am Main,

l>e

“indescrib-

able.” 28.

we

1964), p. 94.

— Thought and Knowledge

120

cept “exactly alike but numerically different,” 31

to sensations

Nor

.

it

has no application

any other “contents of consciousness,” such

to

as images, feelings, or emotions.

image, feeling, or emotion

is

Given

same

the

further question as to whether yours

that the description of

mine, there cannot be

as is

your

One

from mine.

different

a

could express the point by saying that contents of consciousness

have only generic identity and not numerical identity.

hope

I

will not

it

be thought insulting

if

say that

I

all

of us are

by very crude imagery. We tend to think of a mind as an intangible volume of space, and of the contents of that mind as located inside that volume of space. Another mind is a different volume of space, and its contents are numerically different from influenced

the contents of any other ferent space.

mind because they

are located in a dif-

assume

believe our strong temptation to

I

one

that

person’s thoughts, feelings, and “experiences” cannot be “numerically” the

same

although that

is

31

I

.

am

cally the

doctor

tells

me

imagery

is a

your sensation and mine must be numeri-

that

bad mistake, philosophically speaking, because

not holding that there are no cases at

same?”

this

not the whole story.

The assumption cally different

from

as another’s springs in part

will

all in

it

which the question “Numeri-

have application to sensations. Suppose, for example, that

that each time Petersen

and

his wife

come

to see

a

him, “they com-

same sensation." might ask, “Numerically the same?” What might want to know is whether there is a sensation that only one of them has and of which both of them complain; or w hether there is a sensation both of them have and of which both of them complain. Mv question is a request for information as to whether one or both of them have the sensation to which the doctor refers; and this plain of the

is

1

an intelligible question.

ily

think of

tion.

The

cerned,

is

still

(I

other cases

1

owe this example to Professor John Cook.) One can easin w hich those words would express an intelligible ques-

philosophically interesting case, as far as the problem of privacy the one

w here

I

know

B has one of

(i.e.,

it

is

given) that

same description. It “Do they have numerically the same or numerically description and

telligible

that

—despite our metaphysical conviction

we know

two sensations tain

the

the answer. is

To

that

it

A is

has

a

in this

is

con-

sensation of a certain case that

my

different sensations?”

question is

unin-

must be intelligible and indeed

think that because there are two people there must be

exactly like thinking that because there are

shade there must be two colors.

two

areas colored a cer-

The Privacy of Experience

embodies the idea feelings,

hidden from me.

I

road to skepticism about other minds,

the

1

your mind (your thoughts,

that the contents of

sensations) are

12

hus

it

puts

and even to

us on solip-

sism.

Of

course

often impossible for

is

it

me

out another’s

to find

thoughts or feelings. This might be because the other person does not trust

me

or

is

afraid of

depth than

telligence, sensitivity, or

mind

contents of his

same” were

to

It

is

criteria for

interesting that

comes tions.

It

is

not because the

we

Our

it.

are

to sensations, then

we should

ordinary speech contains none.

drawn

in different directions

when

it

to stipulating criteria for the numerical identity of sensa-

This comes out plainly enough

Siamese twins

who

share

a

common

them complained of

that each of their

have.

between “the same” and “numerically the

be given an application

have to make up

I

in-

are “numerically different” from mine.

the distinction

If

me, or because he has greater

common

W ould

a

in

the imaginary case of the

limb, e.g., a hand. Suppose

pain in exactly the same spot

in

hand, each giving the same description of the pain

two pains in that hand? Now there is some inclination to count the number of pains by counting the number of spatial locations of pain. By this rule there w ould be one pain felt by two people. On the other hand, there is some inclination to count the number of pains by counting the number of perhe

felt.

there be one or

By this rule there would be two pains in the same spot in that hand. Which rule is the right one? Neither. Our ordinary concept of pain does not embody either rule. And if it came to sons in pain.

adopting one of these rules,

Siamese twins,

it

would be

in

order to solve the problem of the

as arbitrary to

choose the one

as the

other.

Despite the mountain of confusion on the subject, cussion has

shown

following features: criterion of

I

that our ordinary concept of pain (1)

hope

my

embodies the

having and feeling pain are the same;

which person has pain

and not where the pain

is

is

dis-

(2)

the

w hich person expresses pain,

located; (3) there

is

no sense of the

Thought and Knowledge

122

expression “same pain” such that

it is

impossible for two people to

have the same pain. 32 IV

wish to

I

illusion of the privacy of pain,

assume

you and

that

“pain.”

to the mistaken inclination to

,

The

persistent

something that needs to be explained.

is

Wittgenstein’s

In

“grammar” of the word, I

that gives rise to the

is

metaphors,

they

the following:

(a)

cannot; (b)

I

or of the “language-game,” with the word.

You can be You can find

This remark may not be

32.

of headache.

The

in doubt as to

whether

out

would be

I

w hether

am

am

I

in pain,

in pain,

but

can-

I

We

do speak of “instances” or “cases” instances or cases of headache, would

literally true.

of identity for

criteria

of the

features

are

think the facts that give rise to the illusion of privacy

but

1

provoked by certain features of our use of the word

is

it

i.e.

it

cannot have the same.

I

strength of this illusion believe

what

raise the question of

ow ners. If two people each had headache of description 0, then there would be two cases of headache 0, i.e., numerically different cases of the same headache. Your case of headache would, necessarily, be numerically difinclude the identity of the

ferent

from

my

case of headache.

economy of language sometimes leads us to use the expression “different headache” when what we mean is different case of the same headache and also to say “same headache” when what we mean is same case of the same headache. Whether or not we actually do this, we could do it. shall call this a “secondary” sense of the It

possible that

is

,

I

expressions “different headache” and “same headache.” case of the

same headache,”

the expression

W ithin

the phrase “different

“same headache” occurs

in its

primary

sense. In this primary sense, the criteria of identity for headaches include location, intensity, etc., but not the identity of the

am

confident that

not feel the

the secondary sense follow

want

s:

when Ayer

same headache”

of “same headache”

to object to

says “Headaches are private: several people can-

(The Concept of A Person, p. 50), he wants to Ik speaking

we construed of “same headache,” we should be

in the

primary sense.

“Several people cannot

even English.

feel

The same

If

his

remark

as

being about

entitled to translate

it

as

same case of headache.” But then we should a case of headache.” What does it mean? It isn’t

the

speaking of “feeling

holds for “feel an instance of headache.”

going to understand Ayer’s remark, in

In the secondary sense, the cri-

of identity do include the identity of the owners.

teria I

ow ners.

we should

interpret

it

as

Thus

if

we

are

using “same headache”

the primary sense of the expression. But then the remark that “several people can-

same headache,” although good English, is not true. In the primary sense of “same headache” several people can feel the same headache. not feel the

The Privacy of Experience

and

not;

(c)

You can be

mistaken as to whether

1

am

1*3

but

in pain,

I

cannot. I

he most surprising thing about

this set of facts

what

is

/

cannot

do. / cannot be in doubt, or find out, or be mistaken as to whether /

am

in pain.

Of

course,

someone could

to understand the En-

fail

word “pain,” but that is of no interest. Wittgenstein remarks that if someone said, “Oh, know what the word ‘pain means; what don’t know is whether this, that have now, is pain,” we

glish

1

I

I

I

should be stein's a

is

a little

misleading, since

person to say,

a

lies in

to classify.

1

le

would be

It

a

remarks would be

lis

I

this

is

pain.”

might be

the borderland between

pain and an ache.

of his sensation.

hard

is

W ittgen-

can actually be informative for

it

know whether

don’t

“I

that his sensation

sensation

understand him. 33 This remark of

at a loss to

It

shows us

telling us that his

pain and a partial

a tickle,

say, or

characterization

contribution to the description of his

a

sensation.

To

appreciate Wittgenstein’s point,

two assumptions:

word

first,

make

us

the following

that the speaker understands the use of the

“pain”; second, that he

borderline.

let

is

not characterizing his sensation as

Given these assumptions,

“that expression of

does not belong to the language-game,” as Wittgenstein puts

doubt

Notice that “the expression of doubt” to which he refers speaker’s expression of doubt about his ferring to

someone

has pain”

is

more,

we saw

as

there

else,

not prima facie earlier,

is

own

no problem:

a logically

speaker

If a

case.

“I

don’t

know

34

it.

is

is

a

re-

he

if

troubling remark. Further-

there can even be cases in which

we

“The

jab

should be inclined to say something of the follow ing

sort:

pained him but he w as not conscious of the pain, or w as not aw are

know that he felt pain.” T which we should be inclined to

that he felt pain, or did not

his implies

that there can be cases in

say: “I le

not aware (does not initely settled that

But w hat

is

true

33. Investigations

,

know)

such is

a

that he has pain.”

remark

is

that a person

para. 288.

34.

I

think

it

is

is

not def-

excluded from language.

who

Ibid.

understands the language

/

Thought and Knowledge

2 ~f

cannot himself express doubt, or ignorance,

One

pain.

not permitted to say

is

(unless one

is

characterizing

expression of doubt

This

stein as pointing

and even

if

as to if

I

man

he has influenza, he

w hether he has

whether he has pain.

le

I

believe

“I

I

have pain”

A

genuine

intend to find out whether

interpret Wittgen-

I

allow ed to express a

is

doubt

not allowed to express

is

a

know

may be wrong,”

I

W hy

have pain.”

is

as to

doubt

not permitted to say “I don’t

have pain but

I

I

is

and

fact;

understands the word “influenza,”

influenza. But he

have pain,” or

it

sensation as borderline).

a

and important

out. If a

it

do not know’

“I

not allowed.

is

a striking

is

w hether he has

as to

or “I

this?

v It

leaves us discontented to be told that the first-person expres-

doubt does not belong

sion of

We

“pain.”

should

an explanation of why this

like

conjecture that the philosophers

vacy of pain are wanting

own

doubt about one’s

language-game w

to the

who

to explain

case

is

ith so.

is

the It

w ord is

my

espouse the thesis of the pri-

w hy

is

it

that the expression of

game with the say, is that when a

missing from the

word “pain.” The

reason for this, they

person

he has direct and immediate knowledge that he

in pain,

is

This

in pain.

is

why

and cannot find out: This explanation in

pain”

pain.”

just as

is

To

be sure,

natural to say “I

phatic

way

flourish).

than

a

soon

for as is

it

he

unsatisfactory.

we can

is

in

The

know

I

is

pain he knows

“1

have 1

a

don’t

have

the case

it

a

toothache

still

1

1

it

would be quite

(a sort

still

hurts?”: to

or exaggerating, and your reply assured just

“I

w here the dentist has

meant, “Don’t

of rhetorical injected

complain of pain,

w hich you reply,

him you were

talk

more “I

you were pretending

hurts.” Possibly he suspected that

perhaps your reply

it.

toothache.” This might be an em-

normal amount of novocaine, but you

still

is

know am know if am in

utterance

think of cases in w hich

and he asks, “Are you sure

know

as

queer as the utterance

there

to

he cannot be in doubt, cannot be mistaken,

of stating that

And

want

not.

Or

nonsense!”, in which

The Privacy of Experience case

was

it

a logical or

philosophical

12s

comment, and an appropriate

one!

hen the phrase

\\

a useful prefix.

It

“1

does

know ” a job.

is

prefixed to

One

job

it

sentence

a

can do

is

job

can do

it

is

to

mere prejudice

or

Or

this prefix

illegal.”

an authority

is

know his “How do you know?” “1 am a p.

(“I

can inform the auditor that the speaker

is

“1

to say

think everyone feels that the sentence

1

not mak-

whether p is true. (“I know the lady low do you know ?” “She is my wife.”)

in a privileged position

snores.”

is

is

unsupported rumor. Another

on the general subject matter of the statement

lawyer.”)

and

inform the auditor that the speaker

agreement to purchase

normally

inform the audi-

to

tor that the speaker has grounds for asserting that p,

ing his claim from

it is

know

“I

I

am

pain

in

is

some would hold that it is senseless. wish to argue that it is senseless. But do not mean that perceive, as it were, a clash of meanings in my mind w hen say the words. mean that in this case the prefix “1 know” cannot do any of its normal jobs. Thus there is a good and sufficient reason am in pain” from for excluding the combination of words “I know a

rather queer thing to say; and I

I

1

1

1

1

language. 35 For the prefix does no work.

None prefix

of the previously mentioned jobs can be done by this

when

it

is

serve the purpose of informing you that

have pain.”

“1

attached to the sentence

It

cannot

have grounds for saying

I

have pain. For what could the grounds be, other than that pain? There

is,

pain” and

have pain.” Thus

“I

however, no distinction

put forward the fact that

have

pain.

grounds

Nor

The

only

1

it

of

would be

feel pain, as

plausible

meaning between a

redundancy

my

“grounds,”

grounds

for

I

feel

“1 feel

me

for saying

therefore,

I

are

to 1

not

36 .

can

“To

my

use of the 1-know prefix inform you that

1

am

an au-

words makes no sense' excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language. Hut when one draws a boundary it may be for various kinds of reason" (ibid., para. 499). have a hole in my tooth are 36. Compare w ith this case: My grounds for saying that feel a hole in my tooth. There is no redundancy here. 35.

say, ‘This combination of

1

I

n6

Thought and Knowledge

on the question of whether

thority

proved to be an authority.

dependently of

W ar).

history of the Civil

who

person

for a

understands Engl ish to

same reason

person’s proving an authority on this

a

person cannot be said to be

a

husband

is

snores. Yet

ife

in a privileged

with regard to

w e can

easily under-

stand, in various ways, how' he might be wrong. This

do not understand

otherwise

lous." 38

He

it

is

knowledge

we

is

really

because

am

1

do take it

is

it

say that

lie

know

their

own

ridicuis

in

is

to

tell

not

but

us that

pain w e take

it

for

we have

names. Experience teaches

of the sleeper

this

who was

lie

right.

me

in

So

jabbed felt.

It

in

1

do take

it

for

know their do not make it

the bus

assumption.

1

the leg, our inclination

was not

a

was

to

case ot his believing

did not feel pain.

Ayer, The Concept of A Person p. 59. Ibid. have also heard it said that the reason ,

39.

I

pain,” one’s

making

was not conscious of pain he

(mistakenly) that 38.

someone

granted that the people

for

so-and-so and to be

justified in

In the case

37.

makes

39

it.”

li

he

if

granted that the people riding with

names.

"

know

“appear somewhat

silly for

it

of

the normal thing for an adult person to be able to say

is

name

that his

“1

inapplicable in these cases,

is

find

in pain,

dealings w ith in daily it

We

superfluous.

granted that he knows

us that

So the notion

goes on to say: “But the reason for this, surely,

he knows that he

Well,

with

in pain’’

sentence

“respectable"

that the claim to

rather

am

that prefixing “1

pain.

what we

is

has no application here.

in a privileged position really

Ayer admits

own

in the case of one’s

Gener-

in pain.

in a privileged position

is

the question of whether his w

an

he

believe mistakenly that

with regard to the question of w hether he

ally speaking, a

being

means

it

also meaningless.

is

F or the position

in-

can be determined that he does

it

But since we do not know what

has pain, 37 the notion of

question

and

his say-so,

authority can be

answers can be checked out,

is

1

An

mistakes, or hardly ever does so, in his subject (e.g., the

make

not

1

have pain.

I

is

that

name

it

is

so easy to tell

— perhaps even

whether one

easier.

is

we do

in pain:

it

is

not say, “I as

know

I’m in

easy as remembering

The Privacy of Experience the case of small children, and sometimes

in

case of grown-ups.

I

his

shows

goes wrong

it

Ayer has not given

that

a

explanation of the “ridiculous” appearance of the sentence

We

I’m in pain.”

he knows

do not “take

for granted” that

Experience could not

it.

justify this

l2 7

if a

man

correct

know

“I

is

the

in

in

pain

“assumption”: for

we

do not know what it would mean for a person who understands the words to be wrong when he says “I am in pain.” 40 This utterance should not be thought of servation of something

whose

ontological status

dependent of the utterance. The utterance

an ob-

as the report of is

in-

an expression of

itself

is

completely

sensation, just as flinchings, grimaces, and outcries are expressions of sensation.

the occurrence of this utterance

If

sensation then

an expression of

serves as a criterion of sensation, just as does natu-

it

pain-behavior

ral

is

41 .

But then,

to

produce

a case

of a man’s mistak-

The

enly believing he feels pain will not be possible.

proach to

would be

this

a conflict

pain”) and his other behavior

case

where

This would

Thus

would be neither

it

fall

know”

“I

his utterance (“I'm

wrong

to say

is

a

prefixed to

that does not turn anything it

“I

have pain”

42 .

the words should be in error

Ayer

that

gives the following “proof” that

one can

tell

lies

It

person

a

when he

prevents the prefix from fulfilling

40.

feels pain.

cannot do any of

it

The fundamental

not a genuine possibility that

is

he

a

consistent criterion of the latter.

the jobs that this prefix normally does in speech.

that

producing

conflict of criteria),

right nor

in

short of providing a case in which he was mistaken.

there cannot be

When

(a

between

nearest ap-

its

if

really

a

who

about one’s sensations. For “to

tell

we know

a lie is

is

understands

says he has pain.

are in pain

knob

reason for this

normal purpose.

we

is

I

it,

not just to

This

would namely,

make

a

make a statement that one knows to be false; and this implies should take this as a proof that denying what one knows to be true” (ibid., p. 60). telling a lie is not, in all cases, stating what one knows to be false. The word “lying,” like the word "game” is applied over a broad range of diverse cases. false

statement:

it

is

to

I

41. Cf. Ithaca,

42.

my

N.Y.,

Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood 1975), P- *4°-

Wittgenstein, Investigations, paras. 270, 271.

Cliffs,

N.J., 1963; republished

n8

Thought and Knowledge

apply here

a

43

pose are logically meaningless.”

when we

Yet,

we

we have

philosophize about sensation,

desire to assert “If

am

I

no pur-

Tractatus: “Signs that serve

remark from the

in pain

must know

I

W hy

it.”

is

a

this?

strong I

think

are trying to point out the unacceptability of the supposition

that a

man who

either definitely does have pain, or definitely does

who

not have pain, and

know

declare, “I don’t

I

if

I

must know

it,”

We

have pain.”

If that

this as a possibility.

have pain

understands the words, should truthfully

all

is

then

we mean when we

do not want

I

We

to this use of the sentence.

are not going to accept assert, “If

make any

to

I

objection

are expressing a logical or philo-

sophical observation that embodies a correct appreciation of the

concept of sensation. 44

be recalled that the proponent of the privacy of experience

It will

was going

w hy the expression of doubt

to explain

have pain”

is

am

I

in pain

only true thing he can mean

why

is

w hat

He

is

must know

I

is

is

we

But

it.”

that the expression of

his assertion

the expression of doubt

sation.

know

if

1

not in the language-game. His explanation consisted

in asserting, “If

out. If this

don’t

“I

comes

then he

to,

is

see that the

doubt

is

ruled

not explaining

excluded from the language of sen-

merely saying over again that

it

it

excluded.

The theme of the privacy of pain may also be thought to explain why it is that you can be in doubt, can be mistaken, and can find out, that

I

have pain, w hereas

cannot have, or

know ledge of of

my

feel,

my

my

/

cannot. This

You cannot have “direct” but only “indirect” know ledge by w ay

sensation.

sensation,

behavior and words. T his attempt

43.

Wittgenstein,

I

have.

1961),

explanation

,

I

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

McGuinness (New York,

at

As we saw you can (Do not protest, “But

isfactory as the previous one.

the very sensation

would be because you

,

trans.

1

).

F.

is

as unsat-

have, and feel, can't feel Pears and

your B.

F.

#5.47321.

true perception ot the

our meaning tends not to be so pure. Mixed in with this “grammar” of sensation, there will l>e the temptation to think

one has grounds, or

an authority, or has an unobstructed view of one’s sensation,

44.

and

In actual practice

ture.

so on.

I

is

suspect that the phrase "privileged access" usually indicates such a mix-

7 he Privacy feeling of it,” tor

pain;

what could that mean?) Also we saw 1

have pain” the

that in the

“I

I

rectly” that

1

I

have pain.

I

In addition, this attempt at explanation

embodies

sensations as hidden from you. But then

my

seems to

picture of

a

undermines

it

my For

itself.

w as going to explain is how it is that you can find out sensations are, w hereas / cannot. But the picture it carries say that you cannot find out my sensations.

what

part of

what

129

know” does not serve any purconsequently, cannot say that know “directly” that have and so you cannot say, in contrast, that you know “only indi”1

sentence pose:

know

of Experience

it

vi I

he philosophical theme of the privacy of sensation

failure if conceived as an explanation of the

But can there be no explanation

at all?

grammar

I

satisfies

our concept of

me,

is

a person,

doubt, which has no place place in

am

I

taken as to

could find In short,

I

and

the expression of a

I

is

that

I

could be

in

doubt or mis-

w hether / have pain, just as you can be; and also that out w hether / have pain, in the same w av that you can. am trying to imagine that should be in the same posiI

I

to see

So

I

what the

results

my

you would

listen to

mvJ

imagine that

will

listen to

observe

for

the language-game, were to have

in

trying to imagine

behavior and

pain.

the

sensation (or of thinking

in the respect that

positions should be abolished.

mvJ

how

of explanation, and

you are with regard to the question of whether

want

too, feel

it.

What

tion as

grammar of

the

were different

or intending)

I,

simply

is

complete

what the consequences w ould be

to see if

a

of sensation.

confess that

I

some discontent with the statement that this game is played. What conceive to be a kind one that

is

my own

1

words

have pain, he

is

that

you observe

order to find out

in

words,

it

I

I

my own

have pain.

shall

language-game, will ask

have pain.

asymmetry of our

the

too will observe

my

In the present

be.

if

Your position

words, to find out

behavior or hear

know whether

I

would be

/

me. So

be if 1

in

It

if

I

have

behavior I

cannot

doubt, just as

another wants to will

imagine

that,

Thought and Knowledge

ijo

the projected game,

in

hurt?”

my

If

1

reply, “Yes,

evidence being that

times question I

it

shall dispute

Suppose

my

does,” then

sincerity.

am

I

I

So

As

may

I

or

someone, noticing

should hurry to ion

but

may

my own

to help It is

say

shall

I

1

Imagine the possibility

it.

exclamations and gestures of pain,

should inform him that

I

at all, or at least

I

am

in

my

opin-

probably exaggerating;

me — yet

at

the

should continue to groan and writhe and implore him

I

me!

enough

clear

best they

that these

would

would be bewildering phenomena.

indicate a split personality

—two persons,

were, inhabiting one body. 45 At worst, they would lunacy.

sincerity.

not convince myself.

should urge him not to be concerned about

I

same time

At

aid,

do not have pain

I

and

my

have pain,

1

on the one hand,

a liar: then,

my

that

it

things are, others some-

shall question

I

have pain, but, on the other hand, deny that

know

shall

I myself said so!

with myself, and

believe

1

sometimes ask myself, “Does

shall

I

It

is

it

mean complete

evident, furthermore, that our concepts of sensation

would have no application way it would not be right opposite.

as

Nor even

to such a case. If to say

was

I

right to say that

I

I

behaved

in pain,

was

in this

nor right to say the

in doubt as to

This behavior would diverge too

weird

w hether

I

was

in pain.

Our

concepts of sensation and emotion, of belief and doubt, grow

far

from the normal.

out of certain regular patterns of behavior and circumstances that are frequently repeated in

human

life.

Our

and mastered, by reference to those patterns.

concepts are taught,

The

concepts can be

extended gradually to new patterns that resemble the old. But they

we have been

could not be extended to cover the phenomena imagining.

1

hose phenomena would not be coherent expressions of

anything. I

have been trying

to explain

w hy we do not have the concepts of

doubting, being mistaken, or finding out, w hether oneself has pain. It is

45.

an odd sort

of

“explanation, ” and one

Cf. Wittgenstein’s remark: “It

1

listened to the

say that someone else w as speaking out of

own words

is

mv

may be

reluctant to call

my mouth, also: “My relation

words of

mouth”; and

wholly different from other people’s” Investigations (

1

,

p.

192).

might to

my

!

The Privacy of Experience it

by that name. Whatever we

tion that

call it,

it

provides

kind of

a

often required in philosophy, namely, to

is

plexing fact less perplexing by pointing out the part

porting

comes

a familiar structure.

to the following:

doubting, making

if

we

a mistake,

ample, the words

“I

don’t

3*

clarifica-

make

a

per-

plays in sup-

it

In the present case, the clarification

try to imagine

what

it

would be

like if

and finding out, concerning one’s

were to occur (and

sensations,

*

do not mean merely

I

know

if

have

1

pain’’

own

that, for ex-

should be uttered,

but also that there should occur both the spontaneous behavior and deliberate actions by which doubt

is

expressed, and the inquiries,

observations, assurances, by which doubt

imagine such behavior,

we

see that

under the headings we use

in

it

is

removed)

—

if

we

try to

could not be accommodated

describing the attitudes and feelings

of people.

We

have

tried to

imagine what

it

would be

like if

the expression

grammar of sensation. Similar results will be obtained with the grammar of intention. Imagine someone learning from his own present movements and speech w hat his in-

of doubt did belong to the

tentions are! If he put forth a statement about his present intention,

based on such observations, would you have learned his intention?

he have an intention?

I)( >es

Or imagine

trying to carry on a conversation with

own words and gestures what he someone who watches his own bodily move-

continuously infers from means!

ments

A

Or

picture

to find out

his

what he wants

person expresses feelings,

word.

We

tentions.

(But only

I

look to le if

is

someone who

him

beliefs, intentions,

for information

about

his

by

action and

by

thoughts and in-

our primary source of information about himself. based on his observations of his

his disclosures are not

own words and movements.) His

behavior and utterances reveal to

us his experiences, wishes, and aims (insofar as they are revealed).

And

accordingly,

we respond with sympathy,

dignation, or encouragement. or

we

seek to frustrate him.

to people

and engage w

ith

We

concert our

These

them.

are

ways

or reproach, or in-

own

in

plans with his,

which we respond

Thought and Knowledge

ij2

some humanlike creature exhibited behavior of the sort we have imagined, his movements and utterances would not reveal to us any experiences, intentions, or sensations. And they would not provide a foundation for any human attitude toward him of symIf

—

pathy or annoyance, of reliance or distrust, of agreement or

To

agreement.

the extent that he exhibited behavior approximating

the behavior of being in doubt as to (or

w hether he himself

feels pain

wants or intends something), and the connected behavior of try-

ing to

remove the doubt by observing

his

own movements and

terances, he could not appear to us as a person! This is

dis-

essential to the

concept of

shows

ut-

that

it

person that the expression of doubt

a

should not occur.

Thus

the explanation of

from language

is

is

another

that

— the explanation

planation

the expression of doubt

is

person

cannot

not that experience

that the expression of

is

from working language a

is

no

have,

“private.”

doubt could not

The

into the structure of our concept of a person.

mantics, but

superficial point of

fit

metry

is

excluded

feel,

or

The

ex-

coherently

excluding of

grammar

matter of deep philosophical importance. For

it

or seit is

an

asymmetry between your position and mine, w ith rethe question of w hat I feel or think or intend. This asym-

aspect of the spect to

is

not that each person has something, or feels or

knows something, know'

why

a

necessary feature of the concept of

a

person.

6

Wittgenstein on the

Nature of Mind Suppose you have two old are writing to

one of them. Both

about

letter tells

lives

in

Buffalo and the other

om” and ends

in

Tom

to the other

W

I

one and not the other?

W ittgenstein

two people,

you meant, not meant A? the

2

B.

A

and B, and said

a

headache.

to the

to

him rather than letter

w

ith

in

the

a

You

your hand

“Come it

here.”

It

1

in the

w

the case that

as

A

you

piano being tuned and

at

say, “It will soon stop.”

be the difference between meaning the piano-tuning

and meaning the headache?

you point toward meant the

ith

What went on which made

same time you have

Tom

is

presses these question on us.

Another example: you hear

What would

it

What connects your

Consider another example: you motioned w direction of

not yet

lope to hear from you soon,”

your writing

hat does

consist in?

of them

begins with the greeting “Dear

letter

with “Best regards.

are writing.

One

Omaha. But you have

followed by your signature. Let us suppose

Omaha you

and your

of your own. Thus the

suitable for either of them.

is

addressed the envelope. Your 1

are ardent fishermen,

a recent fishing exploit

content of the letter

named Tom, and you

friends, both

a

flow er

1

Or, while w alking w

ith a

companion

and exclaim “Look!” Let us say that you

flower's color, and not

did that difference consist in?

its

shape or

4

i.

Wittgenstein, Zettel, para.

3.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 666.

4.

Ibid., paras. 33-35.

7.

size or species.

2.

Ibid., para. 22.

What

/

Thought and Knowledge

j-f

In these examples a person meant something. Closely related

the notion of intention. Consider an

example of the

is

conver-

latter: in

must you were interrupted. You were going to say, “So leave by ten o’clock.” In what form did your intention to say those words exist before you said them? 5 sation

We

1

we

feel that

should be able to answer these questions. Yet

much

that occur to us carry

none of the answers

are frustrated, since

we

We think, halfheartedly, that perhaps your writTom rather than to the other consisted in your hav-

conviction.

ing to the one

you wrote the

ing an image of the one but not of the other, as

let-

But should we really want to say that you would not have been

ter.

writing to the

Surely not. rection of

Tom

And

A

of

in the

Omaha example

and B, and said

—should we say

you had an image of him?

unless in

“Come

which you motioned here,” but

was

it

not

B

tion

on A? But your attention might not have been

that this consisted in

your

in the di-

A you

fixing

meant,

your atten-

fixed

on A. You

might have been thinking about B: you were watching the expression

on

his face,

hoping that he would not be offended by your

choosing to speak to

A

first.

example of the simultaneous

In the

headache and piano-tuning, would

it

be the case that you meant

w hen you said “It will soon stop,” if your attention was concentrated on it more than on the piano-tuning? Could the the headache

question arise for you as to whether your attention w as sufficiently

concentrated on the headache

We

find that

letter to the

we

one

in

order for you to have meant

are unable to specify

Tom A

We

that

said

“Come

at

consisted in doing that.

looking hard

at

We

SeeZf ttel,

6.

Investigations, para. 674.

paras.

Meaning the color

1-2

and paras. 38-50;

a

or what

cannot say

at

meaning

you

in

said

the time its

color

certainly did not consist

the color, nor in saying to yourself

5.

in;

to say a sentence existed before

the flower, such that your

being

its

here” w hich w as

cannot seem to give an account of w hat you did,

you were pointing in

was

should come and not B.

what form your intention it.

it

rather than to the other consisted

went on when you motioned and your meaning that

what

6

it?

Investigations, paras.

“What 631-693.

a

great

W color!’

I

Nature of Mind

ittgenstein on the

1

35

hose things could have occurred and yet you might not

have meant the color; and likewise you might have meant the color without their occurrence.

At

our thinking

this stage

meant the

color; yet

likely to take a peculiar turn.

is

we cannot

specify anything

we

We

did or any-

thing that occurred, which can be identified with meaning the color.

So we think: “Meaning the color

occurs

in

it

It

is.

You cannot

the mind.

is

a

say what

just

is is,

it

something that

but you know what

unique, indescribable mental occurrence.

It

is

some-

thing definite but impalpable.”

As

\\ ittgenstein

remarks, this inclination to think of the mental

meaning the color as being “impalpable” or “intangible” (ungreishar) is one of the greatest importance 7 It expresses our idea state of

.

phenomena

that mental states,

we

what they

Meaning Remembering what you are.

duced

And

a

mysterious. Mental acts and

significant.

the color just

is

ate for breakfast

rience.” Intending to say fectly concrete

somehow

tremendously

are

feel,

are

“So

I

we cannot

say

“a particular mental act.” is

must leave

but indescribable mental

But

“a certain mental expeat

state.

ten o’clock”

is

a

per-

William James pro-

splendid expression of this w ay of thinking:

has the reader never asked himself

w hat kind of a mental

tention of saying a thing before he has said it?

tion, distinct

from

all

It

is

fact

is

his in-

an entirely definite inten-

other intentions, an absolutely distinct state of con-

sciousness, therefore; and yet

how much

of

it

consists of definite sensorial

images, either of words or of things? Hardly anything! Linger, and the

words and things come into mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is there no more. But as the words that replace it arrive, it welcomes them successively and calls them right if they agree w ith it, it rejects them and calls them w rong if they do not. It has therefore a nature of its ow n of the most positive sort, and yet what can we say about it without using words that belong to the later mental facts that replace it? he intention toI

say-so-and-so 7.

is

the only

name

Ibid., para. 608; paras.

it

can receive

173-175. Also see

8 .

W ittgenstein,

Blue and Brown Books

(Oxford, 1958), pp. 158-162.

William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York, 1890), 253. The same viewpoint appears in the programs and conclusions of the \\ iirzburg psychologists. 8.

They wanted

to find out

what happens when one makes

a

judgment.

I

hey held

that

Thought and Knowledge

136

As James saw it, when we think and speak, intending this or that by our words, there is a continuous flow of feelings and experiences, a

which comprise the thinking and meaning.

word

in a certain sense,

We

are

when we

use

sciousness.

Again,

signifying

all

aware of a

common

possible

and distinguish

part,

the intention

it

men, we

it.

is

V\

hen

we

intend

of con-

a definite state

James gave the following example:

noun, such are fully

as

man

in a universal sense, as

,

aware of

carefully from our intention

this intention

on our

when we mean

a cer-

group of men, or a solitary individual before us. ... It casts its influence over the whole of the sentence, both before and after the spot in which the word man is used. 9 tain

James thought that there were subtle differences in the way the word “man” feels, when you use it in different senses, and that these different feelings spread themselves throughout the sentences

which the word occurs:

in

“a strict experimental procedure

“We

all

of us have the permanent con-

A number

must be used.

of observers must be

make judgments under standard, controllable conditions, and a careful record made of what takes place in their consciousness. Thus we shall find out what a judgment is” (George Humphrey, Thinking [New York, 1951], p. 34). The results caused to

of experimentally controlled introspection were

initially a

shock to the

W urzburg

group. Judgments are “recognized as such” but “with nothing in consciousness to dicate

why

they are judgments!” (ibid., p

ment w as found; but there were found

35).

No

in-

“psychological criterion” of judg-

certain “facts of consciousness,

whose con-

tent either escapes further characterization altogether, or proves accessible to such

characterization only with difficulty” (ibid., p. 36). “Impalpable,” “unanalysable,”

awarenesses, tendencies, and meanings were noted.

of the awareness

A

member

“The impalpably given content

often elusive” (ibid., p. 48). of the group tackled the “fundamental” question stated in the follow is

-

“What happens when people think?” (ibid., p. 55); experience when we think?”; “What are our experiences w hen

ing equivalent formulations:

“What

we

is

our actual

think, considered purely as modifications of consciousness

and apart from

their

context?” (ibid., pp. 56, 57). The findings of introspection were as follows: “Our thinking consists essentially of a specific process which must be considered to consti-

“A thought is not the sum of a number of images. “The thought of something is an irreducible

tute a fresh mental category." a true,

unanalysable unity.”

.

.

.

It is

fact

of experience” (ibid., p 58). I

he Wurzburg investigators believed themselves

to

have discovered that when

you think or judge there occurs some “unique,” “unanalysable,” “impalpable” experience. 9.

James,

1 ,

256.

—

;

W

sciousness of whither our thought

what thoughts

other, a feeling of 10

arisen.”

But

there any truth

is

all

men, sometimes

It

is

'

feeling like

a

37

any

are next to arise, before they have in

James’ notion?

this or that

word

or other, sometimes using the

you

going.

is

Mind

If

you

which you say the word “man”

actual conversations in

meaning

Nature of

ittgenstein on the

on

reflect

—sometimes

man, sometimes some man exclamation (“Man!”)

as an

will not detect those subtly different feelings that are

supposed

go with the different intentions.

to

James was trying to do what all of us should like to do, namely, to say what went on in us when we uttered a word and meant it in a certain

But

sense.

succeed. So

we

We

intangible.

Wurzburg

the

(like

are inclined to say that

cannot get hold of

what went on

We

it!

should

say exactly what intending the letter for the

we cannot do

Omaha

I

We

it.

11

all

We

should

him

ptjint at

Tom

in one's

in

be able to

Omaha

at

him

just

is.

is

in

to say this.

mind? So we are inclined

Omaha

Wittgenstein observes that

like to

pointed

comparisons and characterizations, and

the letter for the l orn in

impalpable,

silently to oneself,

embarrassed

are

is

not

But

with having an image of the

like to say, “I

At the same time, we

how can one up

it

om, nor with saying “Omaha”

with any feeling.

mind.”

cannot identify

we do

psychologist)

nor

my For

to give

to say that intending

“a particular mental act.”

when we speak

in this

w

ay, part of the

word “mental” is to indicate that “we mustn't expect to understand how these things work.” 12 The word “mental” serves here to signify what is mysterious, inexplicable, occult.

force of the

Let us see

Perhaps

Omaha one

if

we

we cannot consists in;

Tom

we can

but

say what connects the letter

rather than the other.

Suppose

Ibid., pp. 255-256.

The

See also

p. 472:

11.

in a

Cf. Zettel, para. 12.

Tom

a

garage

“This added consciousness

is

an abso-

in

what would otherwise be mere noise or

and determining the sequel of perfectly definite way.” 12.

h the

connection w ould be different

vision into something understood

words and images,

v\ it

of

Omaha was

that the

lutely positive sort of feeling transforming

later

Tom

explain what intending the letter for the

in different cases.

10.

can do anything to dispel the mysteriousness.

Blue and Brown Books, p. 39.

my

thinking, the

,

Thought and Knowledge

ijX

mechanic and the one

announced

wife that

connected the

I

curred

to write to in that

Omaha

was written. But

during the writing of the

and

letter,

still

going to w

him.

rite to

another case)

Or

or that

lives in

Or

w

letter

ith

words do

Or

in

I

w

might have made

I

Or

it

(an-

Tom

as

one

Omaha. Or

letter

as

I

wrote;

my

,

Omaha. in a way

in

wrote. These facts would con-

I

and no more than would

less,

(still

Tom

to

is

Omaha Tom

thinking of the

as

of

could have got connected

letter

address on the envelope or

to the

I

My

in

my

saying aloud that

thoughts

that

is

writ-

may

I

my way my

connect

superior to the

13

could have been that none of the previously mentioned

it

phenomena occurred, but should have

though

same garage." In this om. My remark oc-

I

my mind

him, but not

it.

I

we had talked about Tom and had Omaha, and had declared that was

w ays the

with him no

letter

was writing

I

(another case) after completing the letter

these various

Omaha

ing the

this.

and then

orn;

also after the writing.

while writing, “This

said,

saw him

I

my

nect

I

could be that

it

knew

I

also

w rote on the envelope the address of the

Omaha." In w ith him.

l

I

the previous hour

in

remarked that he

I

with the

letter

before the letter

other case)

works

still

and

a dentist,

was going

1

wonder whether he

said, “I

way

my

to

Buffalo was

in

answered that

this fact

is

I

was true

it

that if

was writing

only conditional,

to the

still it

I

had been asked

Tom

in

Omaha.

connects the

letter

I

Al-

with

him. 14 I

have spoken of certain

Tom

of

Omaha.

Is

this

that

I

It

or that

I

wonder whether he

said

thinking of the

13.

me and

a

“This

letter is to

Omaha Tom

Cf. /ft tel, para.

9.

14.

as

I

still

w

criteria."

works

Tom rote,

is

a

with the question

good many other philoso-

might be called “the problem of

said “I

letter

connection an entailment? This

that has previously perplexed

phers.

“connecting” the

facts as

in

Omaha,”

does

Cf. Investigations

in that

it

From

same garage," or that

follow,

para. 684.

the fact

w

I

was

ith logical

Mind

Wittgenstein on the Nature of

necessity, that

I

meant the

him? The answer

letter for

1

3 it

no. Cer-

is,

tainly not.

We

w

with him

difference

is

that in

one the mouth

straight line, in the other a line that curves

Consequently the second face, or “gives”

it

a

is

upward

smiling face, but the

a

curved mouth

right to say that the

following

line

horizontal

is a

both ends.

at

not.

first is

“makes” the one

It

smiling aspect. “It makes the difference.” But

added,

in

With the mouth example,

The way

smiling face.

a

such line

a sneer,

a

just

other lines could be changed, or new

would no longer

that the face

smile.

unchanged the expression might become,

or

leer,

a

we sometimes

remarks how

is

smiling

a

no entailment. Certainly that mouth would not make

is

any face lines

The

we draw two schematic human

be helpful. Suppose

whose only

there

facts connect the letter

they do not provide an entailment?”

if

may

analogy faces,

“But how then can such

ant to ask:

or

for

look of ferocity. Wittgenstein

a

say that what gives a certain person’s

face a friendly look are his friendly eyes. But: “It does not follow

from the

fact that there

is

what we

call a

friendly and an unfriendly

expression of the eye that there must be

eye of

a

a

difference between the

friendly and the eye of an unfriendly face.”

tempted

to think that a certain feature

friendly,

if

not so. “It

some other is

cannot make

we

is

are

face look

a

feature could destroy that effect. But this

true that other traits in this face could take

friendly character of this eye, and yet in this face

which

We

15

the outstanding friendly feature.”

16

it

away

is

the

the eye

Furthermore, even

We

a

story around

it

w hich would

alter

could see the expression as gloating, or as

cessful attempt at a smile, ferently,

and so on.

We

our a

way

of seeing

it.

forced but unsuc-

will see the fact dif-

depending on the human context that we imagine

These comparisons

if

we

did not alter or add anything to the smiling schematic face,

could spin

is

are intended to suggest that

17 .

something

I

do,

say, or think, can have the character of being the “outstanding” fea15.

Blue and Brown Books, p. 145.

17.

Cf. Investigations, para. 539.

16.

Ibid., p. 146.

ijo

Thought and Knowledge

which

ture of a situation in

we

I

am

writing a letter

my

can rightly say that this feature makes

Tom

of

meant

to

Omaha, show that

ter in various

make

it

Nor

or that

ways then ,

the

letter a letter to the

Our

same words

thoughts

,

,

or actions would not

an entailment by conjoining some outstand-

my

will

There

my

letter for the

Omaha Tom. That

respond and judge. But the connection between

what

a criterion

it is

of

is

not “certified by logic.”

(I

“all”

sort.

say or do will be used by other people as

meaning

no

is

language does not contain closed rules of that I

also

him.

we produce

Something of

But they are

only in a certain context. Change the lat-

ing feature with all of the relevant circumstances. here.

sense that

in the

connects the letter with him.

this will he so

a letter to

can

it

—

a

criterion

how

is

they

a criterion

w

ill

and

come back

to this point later.)

Let us return to the example of your pointing toward

a flow er

and exclaiming “Look!” where what you meant, what you were pointing

at,

w

as

its

w hich you meant get the

answer

Suppose

pointing. that

is

given

is

color.

How

would

or

from

a

shape, or

to

imagine various surroundings for the

that

its size,

its

species?

you and your companion belong in

nature.

The

case in

The w ay

its

studying colors

act

to

of

group

to a

leader of the group has just

now

on “pure” colors, and

a lecture

this differ

the group

is

on

a

walk

through the woods for the purpose of observing examples of pure natural colors. spots.

You

Each member

point

panion w

rite in

sycamore

tree.”

The

feeling of

meant the

at a

is

to

keep

a

record of the examples he

flower and say “Look!”

your notebooks: “Saw mystery has vanished.

color. If the circumstances

a

You and your com-

pure yellow’ near

a large

In those circumstances

had been different

you

in certain

ways you would have meant something else. We are tempted to think that your meaning the color must have been something that went on in your mind. But it might be that what went on in your mind or thoughts had nothing to do with what you meant. You might have thought to yourself, “What a huge flower!”; but still (in our example) was its color you meant when you pointed, and not it

Mind

Wittgenstein on the Nature of

Or you might have been impressed by

its size.

the outline of

it

as described,

it

141

shape, follow ing

its

with your eyes. But given the other circumstances

would not have been the shape you meant

still

w hen you spoke and pointed. We begin to see that it was the pattern of circumstances that gave your act of pointing its specific meaning. W’e have an inclinayour meaning the color was an event

tion to think that

panied the pointing but was hidden underneath

that

We

it.

accom-

thought we

we have w hen, puzzled about how we are able to mean something, we say that it is a ‘mental' event or act. W ittgenstein says to us: “Do not make that had to go down and

in to find

move! You are going

the

in

That

it.

wrong

the idea

direction.”

we should be

Instead of looking inside ourselves us, at the context in

is

looking around

w hich our words and pointing are

located.

We

should be searching horizontally instead of vertically. This temptation to look in the

wrong

whenever we are

direction besets us

perplexed about the concepts of mind. Wittgenstein’s admonition applies to

of them.

all

le says, for

I

example, that you should not

some problem

think of the sudden understanding of

occurrence here

is

Why

18 .

not?

Not because

too nebulous to be

of speaking

is

you off the

track.

that

way out

for the

it

It

false.

The

confuses you

19

It

makes you want

“mental”

Your thinking avoiding that way

is false.

reason for

.

of your perplexity.

this

as a

leads

you

astray.

It

throws

to search in the

wrong

You become

fly

a

place

in a

fly-

bottle 20 .

As Wittgenstein remarks, he does engagement, event? 18.

No

for

example,

one can say.

Ibid., para.

154;

7.ettel,

is

not deny that

an “inner event.”

He

describes his

How

remembering an could he? What

own aim

in

this

way:

para. 446. In talking about our philosophical inclina-

tions Wittgenstein uses the expressions “mental occurrence” (seelischer Vorgang)

“inner occurrence” (imierer Vorgang ) interchangeably. is

“mental”

we

is

in fact

This

is

not because whatever

“inner” (whatever that might mean), but because that

We

and

is

how

have the idea that suddenly understanding the solution of a problem, or suddenly remembering an engagement, or meaning the color w hen you think of

it.

pointed, are occurrences “in the mind” or “inside” us. 19.

Ibid.

20.

Investigations

,

para. 309.

Thought and Knowledge

i+2

“The impression

we

fact that

deny

we wanted

that

word ‘remember.’

way

ramifications stands in the 21

Wittgenstein

is

We say

that this picture with

of our seeing the use of the

He

in

is

any concrete

of remembering the picnic

“The mental event

saying

as

does not hold that remembering

not an “inner” or “mental” event. Insofar as there

meaning

word

its

and the mode of expres-

rejecting a picture,

sion that conveys that picture. is

What we

that the picture of the inner event gives us the correct idea

is

is.”

from the

arises

turn against the picture of the 'inner event.’

of the use of the

it

deny something

to

same as saying “I have just remembered the picnic.” Thus, “To deny the mental event would mean to deny the remembering,” 22 which would be absurd.

has just taken place in me,”

The

it

comes

to the

picture of remembering, or meaning, or thinking, as being a

“mental event,” an “inner occurrence,” “something that happens the mind,” has a hypnotic effect.

observing the situations and

It

prevents

them

all

w e say

w hat cases the shape”

—

really irrelevant,

is

of someone,

(as if that

remembering,

ing,

etc.,

The

the significance they have.

such observation

philosopher from

a

which the

activities, the contexts, to

words “remember,” “mean,” “think,”

belong and which give

picture

because

“He meant

in

it

makes

seem

it

that

can only show us

the color” or

in

“He meant

could be disregarded). This picture of mean-

etc., as

“something

I

do

in

my

mind” turns

11s

away from the only study that could give us a clear view of our concepts. Thus it is not just a picture but a harmful influence. In our puzzlement about mind there is an even more basic picon us and seems

ture that forces itself

picture

meaning

that

is

must be

or anger)

(or intending,

to define our

remembering, thinking,

something inner or something

either

problem becomes one of determining w hich the other

is

self-evident,

we

But w hichever horn of sive objections.

Wittgenstein

2

1

.

I

bill. ,

Joy

says,

para. 305.

is

problem.

it

is.

That

outer. it

is

The joy,

The

one

or

think.

this

dilemma we choose, there

are deci-

often manifested in joyful behavior; but, as

“Joy

22.

is

not

joyful

Ibid., para. 306.

behavior.”

23.

7,ettel,

23

A young

para. 487.

Mind

Wittgenstein on the Nature of

woman’s joyous exclamations, movements, manifestations of joy

they occurred

it

in

symptoms

his difficulty

1

43

would not be

quite different circum-

stances. Instead they could belong to a bitter

could be

smiles,

1

parody of

joy; or they

of madness. 24

cannot be remedied by thinking up more complex

constructions out of behavior (e.g., stimulus-response functions) in

The

terms of which joy would be defined.

When you

psychological concepts.

your meaning

said “Look!”,

point holds for

all

of the

pointed toward the flower and

color did not consist in that behav-

its

Nor did it consist in the conditional fact that if the words “Do you mean the color?” had been addressed to you, you would have “ answered “Yes.” As Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Meaning’ does not ior.

stand for an activity which wholly or partly consists in the outward expressions of meaning.”

25

In general, meaning, joy, or

remem-

bering cannot be identified with any sequence of behavioral manifestations, nor with

any

disposition to

manifest such behavior given

certain conditions of stimulation.

These

reflections

may make

horn of

seize the other

away from behaviorism and the dilemma, w hich is the idea that meanus turn

remembering, anger, and joy are inner occurrences or

ing,

But nothing of

Anger

didate.

we

this sort, that

is

can

specify,

is

an adequate can-

by sensations

often characterized

states.

that

swelling of the chest or the flaming of the cheeks; but

go with the it

cannot be

Meaning your letter for the Tom your seeing him in your mind, even

identified with such sensations.

Omaha

did not consist in

Realizing this,

we

are inevitably pushed toward thinking that joy

an unspecifiable inner

state,

inner occurrence, and so on.

nomena 24.

“A

a

meaning

Thus our

is

coronation its

is

the picture of

pomp and

surroundings: the crow n

is

dignity.

an indescribable

a

respectable hat.

Zettel, para.

19.

And

so on

must consist

Cut one minute of

is

is

the cheapest of metals,

cheap to produce.

“(Investigations ,

para. 584).

in

this pro-

being placed on the head of the king

thought vulgar. There the fabric of the robe

parody of

25.

is

desire to identify the phe-

coronation robes. But in different surroundings gold

gleam is

that

of mind, together with our idea that they

ceeding out of his

if

happened.

this

is

of

A

in its

crown

Thought and Knowledge

144

something inner or something outer, carries us by

a natural pro-

gression to the thought that meaning, remembering, thinking, joy,

each of them, unspecifiable, indescribable, inner states or

etc., are,

You

events.

feel that

are;

them going on inside you; 26 yet you cannot say You know what they are, but you cannot tell any-

you can almost

what they

you know what meaning or remembering

are.

one.

Through these stages we are driven ena of mind are inner indescribable ,

that this idea gets a 27

behaviorism.

quences. For able,

But

,

much deeper

and

There

private.

it

and private

(the

same being true

phenomno doubt its

rival,

produces intolerable conse-

meaning the color were something

if

is

hold on us than does

can be seen that

it

to the idea that the

for

inner, indescrib-

meaning the

size or the

how could possibly know that you meant the color of the flower when you pointed and said “Look!”? If you said, on being questioned, “I meant the color,” how could know what you meant by those words? How could learn which inner event it is that

shape), then

I

I

I

is

supposed to be designated by the phrase “meaning the color”?

How

could

I

know whether you and

I

use that phrase to refer to

same kind of inner event? How indeed, could the belief that the same kind of thing takes place in you as in me even be intelligible to me? How can think that w hat goes on in us is the same (or the

,

I

is

not the same)? For

Am

the same.

I

I

am supposed it?

any way what

show

in

w hat

entitles us to

But what

my

frustration, or possibly 1

it

matter

if

is

it? Is

it

my

have picked out (which

assume

that

you and

I

I

If is

meaning, or 1

the hypothesis),

— that

conceiving that you have

picked out

my

cannot say or

have picked out anything?

at all in

it is

myself and then

in

concentration itself?

have conceived of anything

Would

on something

to concentrate

conceive that you have

not to be able to specify how

I

it?

different

inner things (sup-

we

agreed in our use

posing that means something), provided that of language? 26.

27.

Investigations

This

is

,

surely

para. 305.

why

inner than to behaviorism.

Wittgenstein devotes far

more

attention to the idea of the

Wittgenstein on the Nature of I

he conception

of the

phenomena

of

mind

scribable, private, leaves us floundering in

are

we

to turn?

I

a

Mind

145

being inner, inde-

as

quagmire. So where

he picture of intending, thinking, joy,

etc., as

consisting in either something inner or something outer, has

down.

have reached

impasse because, according to Wittgenstein, we made

this

We

damental error.

must

assumed

consist in sotnething.

must be

meaning,

that

And

it

seemed

joy,

a

fun-

remembering,

etc.,

to us that the

something

either inner or outer. Wittgenstein thinks, however, that

mistake to say that your meaning the color

a

is

We

does not give us any possible solutions.

It

us

let

1*

Having

thing.'

said that joy

consists in

it

some-

not “joyful behavior,” 29 he then

is

imagines someone declaring that the word “joy” designates something inner all.

which he

to

,

replies:

course he

meaning

is

its

designates nothing

word “joy”

not saying that the

is

‘Joy

at

30

Neither inner nor outer.”

Of

“No.

use in the language.

It

is

is

meaningless.

not used to stand for

Its

some

There is no grouping of gesmovements, utterances, such that w e can say: That is what

constellation of behavioral responses. tures,

joy

is.

We

could occur joy,

remarked before that any sequence of such behavior in a

context in w hich

but of something

else.

So joy

it

would not be

is

not something

turn in the other direction and try to identify inner

we make

a

a

hopeless move, since here

it

we do

manifestation of outer.

But

if

w

e

with something not

know what

we mean.

A

carpenter building a structure sometimes works merely me-

chanically.

But

measures, makes

at

other times he puts thought into his work: he

tests,

considers different possibilities, comes to

decision, rejects this piece of

wood, searches

for another of the

right length, discovers a mistake in the structure, hits tion,

expresses satisfaction, and so on.

thought into

his

work he

ance from when he

is

When

normally present

will

a

he

is

upon

a solu-

thus putting

a different

appear-

working merely mechanically. In the one

case there are the activities of measuring, testing, trying; the facial 28.

7,ettel,

29.

Ibid., para. 487.

para. 16: “Der Irrtum 30.

ist

zu

Ibid.

sageti,

Meinen

bestehe in etwas."

Thought and Knowledge

ij 6

movements,

expressions,

which

exclamations,

express

faction, hesitation, searching, finding, or deciding. Little,

we cannot

be present in the other case. But

this will

thinking which

is

dissatisif

any, of

say that the

present in the one case but not in the other

is

those activities, facial expressions, movements, and exclamations.

Nor

we

yet can

say that the thinking

is

stream that flows under-

a

neath those manifestations of thinking, 31 any more than

when you

that

standing of

it is

read a sentence and understand

we

can say

your under-

it,

something that flows along with the reading (which

what William James thought). I want to say more about the kind of mistake we make when we

is

assume

remembering,

that thinking (meaning, expecting, or

consists in something;

when,

as

one might say, we seek to

etc.)

identify

Let us consider remembering. Suppose that after driving your

it.

you put the keys

car

someone

else

the keys?” (1)

wants to drive the car and

Now

Then you

the house

later

“Where did you put

asks,

imagine the following cases:

Nothing occurs

guilty.

drawer. Several hours

in the kitchen

you

to you:

feel at a loss

think to yourself: “After

I

and

left

also, as

the car

I

it

were,

entered

by the kitchen door.” You have an image of the kitchen

and of your hand pulling open the drawer. You say:

“I left

them

in

the kitchen drawer.” (2)

You

say:

“Now

let

me

You

think.”

close

images come. Nothing occurs to you, and you

You

“Where could

say to yourself,

I

your eyes but no feel

embarrassed.

have put them?” Suddenly

you exclaim: “The kitchen drawer!” (3)

When

the question was addressed to you, you were speaking

to another person.

on

a

(4)

You

Without interrupting your remarks, which w ere

different topic,

When got

you pointed

the question

up from your

at

w as put

chair,

the kitchen drawer.

to you,

them

were turning over

a

31.

a letter.

walked into the kitchen, took the keys

out of the drawer, and handed in

you were w riting

your mind

Ibid., paras. 100, 101, 106, 107.

over.

But

phrase of the

all

the while you

letter.

Wittgenstein on the Nature of

he want the keys?”

them

you say In

all

hen you say aloud,

in the kitchen

drawer, but

am

I

seem

“I

straight off, “I put

of these cases

you put the keys.

We

them

we should

to

remember

put-

reflection or imagery,

in the kitchen

drawer.”

remembered where

say that you

many more examples,

in

exhibiting

other differences, could be provided.) In one case you tried to

still

remember;

another case not. In one case you were preoccupied

in

with other matters

as

you indicated the whereabouts of the keys;

another case not. Your actions were different

in these

one case there were relevant thoughts and imagery; In

does

ought to be struck by the variety exhibited

these examples. (And, of course,

47

not sure.”

any hesitation or doubt, or

VV ithout

(6)

I

l

“Why

In response to the question you say to yourself,

(5)

ting

Mind

one case you knew' the answer immediately;

in

in

in

examples. In another not.

another not.

And

the degree of your confidence differed in these examples.

We

will agree that

your remembering where you put the keys

did not consist in your having an image of the drawer, nor in your

pointing there,

at

nor in your feeling confident that you put them

it,

and so on. So what did the remembering consist

Wittgenstein remarks,

Here our

We

“No answer

comes.”

As

32

phil osophical thinking reaches a crucial intersection.

can take the familiar path (which

is

a

dead end) of assuming

that in addition to the

phenomena we described

was the remembering

itself (for

it

is

and since the remembering cannot be

phenomena,

in?

it

true that

in

each case, there

you remembered);

identified with

any of those

must be something intangible and hidden. Or, we

can shift our whole viewpoint and say: “No.

Our examples

of

remembering were not incompletely described. We gave an accurate account of w hat happened w hen you remembered. There was not

some

we go

further occurrence which was the

in this

new

direction

we

will

remembering

be overcoming the inclination

to think there must be a mental occurrence of tion to the words, gestures, or actions

32.

Investigations

,

para. 678,

itself.” If

remembering

in addi-

by which remembering

and also para. 175 \Zettel, para.

162.

is

Thought and Knowledge

ijS

expressed

We

33 .

membering”

be ready to acknowledge that the word “re-

shall

actually used

is

by us

to range over a diversity of

events and circumstances that are not united by an essential nature

we

of remembering. In understanding this

from the obsessive desire

selves

to penetrate the phenomena.

we

Wittgenstein remarks that although

“remember” use

We

34 .

have

(“think,” or “mean”)

W hy

get to see

irregular multitude of

do we form the

“remembering,”

,

it

unified

W hy

w hat we

is

w ord

not learn to describe

“We

expect

ragged.”

30

phenomena and

we a

W hat

its

tend to

smooth,

we

find

situations are

“remembering.”

called

says,

we do

picture of the use of the word.

a false

that an

word

learn the use of the

are not prepared for that task. Furthermore,

regular contour and is

be freeing our-

shall

false picture at all? Partly

because

the

same

used throughout. Yet, as Wittgenstein

is

ought not to be expected that

this

word “should have

employment; we should rather expect the opposite.”

we

should

expect the opposite? Because

we w ere

a 36

not taught

word by means of a precise definition, nor by any definition at all. We heard the word used in this case and that case. And then we ourselves went on to use it in other cases the same as everyone else does. We were not shown the “essential nature” of remembering, w hatever that might be. It is the same as with the words “tree” or “dog.” W hy should a greyhound and a Pekinese both be called “dogs”? They are so difto use the

—

ferent. Is

people

it

reasonable to call

who would

them both dogs?

think there w as too

much

We

can easily imagine

of a gap here. Could

we prove them wrong? Consider the diversity

word “remembering.” Remembering a word is different from remembering a face; and remembering a sensation is still different. Remembering 33.

“I

have been trying

‘must be’ what etc.,

in all this to

remove the temptation

,

to think that there

called a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believ ing,

independent of the process of expressing

and Brown Books 34.

is

in the applications of the

a

thought, a hope, a wish, etc.” (Blue

p. 41).

Zettel, para.

114.

35.

Ibid., para.

in.

36.

Ibid., para. 112.

W your uncle

different from

is

Remembering

how

to

fix

Even with

it.

remembering

the radiator

to fix

Nature of Mind

ittgenstein on the

is