The works of Aristotle [2, 1 ed.]

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II

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The text and annotations of this edition are reprinted from The Worlds of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, by arrangement with Oxford University Press.

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25396

GENERAL CONTENTS, VOLUME

II

BIOLOGICAL TREATISES History of Animals (Historia animalium), translated by D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, p. 7 On the Parts of Animals (De partibus animalium), translated by William Ogle, p. 161 On the Motion of Animals (De motu animalium), translated by A. S. L. Farquharson, p. 233 On the Gait of Animals (De incessu animalium), translated by A. S. L. Farquharson, p. 243 On the Generation of Animals (De generatione animalium), translated by Arthur Piatt, p. 255

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS by

W. D.

POLITICS

(Ethica Nicomachea), translated

Ross, p. 339

(Politica), translated

by Benjamin Jowett,

p.

445

THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION lica), translated

RHETORIC

ON

(Rhetorica), translated by

POETICS (De 681

(Atheniensium respubby Sir Frederic G. Kenyon, p. 553

W. Rhys

poetica), translated by

Roberts, p. 593

Ingram By water,

p.

BIOLOGICAL TREATISES

CONTENTS: HISTORY OF ANIMALS BOOK

I

BERLIN NOS.

CHAP. i.

Of

486** 5 simple and composite; of species and genera; and of differences in form,

parts,

character, 2.

Of

and

animals, and of their viscera; of maggots the stag's head; of the gall-bladder 16. Of the kidneys and bladder 5o6 b 17. Of the heart and liver of the stomach 5o6 b in ruminants, in the elephant, in birds, and ;

anatomy of serpents; of of serpents and of swallow-chicks

habits

fishes; of the

the organs of alimentation

and of 488 b 29

excretion 3.

4.

5.

Of the organs of the male and female; 489s 8 of the sense of touch Of the moisture in animals; of blood 489s 20 and vein Of animals viviparous, oviparous, and 489 s 34 vermiparous; of organs of locomotion, fins,

6.

Of

ceans, molluscs; as

Of

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

its

49 a 26

sutures

Of the face and forehead Of eyebrows and eyes Of eyes {continued) Of ears, nose, and tongue Of the neck and thorax Of the belly, navel and private parts Of the private parts (continued) Of the trunk and limbs Of the brain; of the lungs and wind-

49i b 9

49

b

49^

2

493° 12

494

b 19

and stomach

Of

the heart

and other

Of

the limbs

and

BOOK their

s 496 4

viscera II

movements:

b

497 4

of the huckle-bone; of wild cattle, elephants camels, and of the martichore; and of other

matters 2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

Of Of Of Of Of Of

b

the teeth of dogs the teeth of horses the teeth of man the teeth of the elephant

5oi 5 5oi b 14 5oi b 24 5oi b 30

the elephant's tongue

the mouth; and of the Egyptian hippopotamus

12.

13.

Yunx or wryneck Of fishes; and of the dolphin

504

14.

Of

15.

Of

9.

10.

11.

serpents and of sea-serpents; of the fish Echeneis

BOOK 1.

3.

25 28

4.

15

6.

5.

29 7.

and

the chief genera of viviparous

5o 5 b 25

5i 5 a 2 7

5i5 b 27 5i6 a 6 5i6 b 3i a 5i7 6 5i7b 2 5i7 b 21

feathers; and of the influence of 5i9 a 1 climate and season on the colour of feathers and of hair «3« Of the membranes of the bones and 5i9a 3o of the brain 14. Of the omentum or caul 5iob 7 «5- Of the bladder 5i 9b 13 16. Of flesh 5i9b 26 i7- Of fat and suet 52o a 6 18. Of the pupil of the eye 52o b 3 19. Of blood in health and disease 520b 10 20. Of marrow and of milk 52i b 4 b 21. Of milk; of the sheep and oxen of 5 22 7 Epirus; of rennet and cheese Of the seed of animals 523 a 13

16

b 13 b 5o5 5

514 s 23

Of

2.

502a 502 b 502 b a 503 b 503

i

hair

502 a 3 502 a 5

Of apes Of monkeys Of the crocodile Of the chameleon Of the characters of birds; and of the

8.

5ii b

of 5i2 b 11 the true system of veins or blood-vessels

Continued; of baldness and grey

14 s

492 1 a 492 13 a 493 5 s 16 493

veins, according to Syennesis

Of the true system of veins (cont'd) Of sinews Of fibre, and of the clot of blood Of the bones Of cartilage, or gristle Of horns, nails, and hooves Of hair and skin

isolated species, such

the parts of the body; of the skull

pipe; of the gullet 17.

3.

man

and 8.

and of

in

the eyes

III

Of the

serpents, cetaceans, testaceans, crusta-

3i

the organs of generation: in fishes, 509 a 27 birds, and serpents; and in viviparous animals

and Diogenes of Apollonia Of the same according to Polybus;

the genera of animals, such as birds 490b 7

24

Of

2.

and wings

fishes,

7.

feet,

BOOK 1.

in

8.

IV

s 523 30 animals; of the poulpe or octopus, and of other molluscs or cuttlefishes Of crustaceans 525 s 30 b Of crustaceans 527 1 Of testaceans 527b 34 Of sea-urchins 530 32 s Of tethya or ascidians; and of sea531 7 nettles or sea-anemones Of insects; and of certain anomalous 53i b 20 marine animals Of the senses: of the mole's eye; 532 b 29 of hearing, smell and taste in fishes, and in bloodless animals

Of

the several genera of bloodless

s1

6

1

CONTENTS 9.

Of

voice

and 10.

and sound:

in fishes, birds,

'faggot-bearer'; of the fig-wasp,

535* 27

certain other animals

Of sleep and waking; of the catching 536k 24

33.

of fish asleep; of dreaming 11.

Of

the nature of male

the eel;

and of the

Of

2.

Of

and ftm female; of

537b 22

34.

3.

4.

and

6.

hereditary pairing

539b 16 and copulation: in birds quadrupeds Of the same in oviparous quadrupeds 540 s 26 Of the same in serpents and other ani- 540 s 33

540b Of the same in fishes; and on the anomalous generation of the partridge Of pairing and copulation in molluscs 541b

Of the same in crustaceans Of the pairing of insects; of

9.

Of

and

541b the season 541b

Of the structure of the hen's egg, and 561* 3 of the development of the chick therein; of twin-eggs 562b Of the breeding habits of pigeons 3 Of the vulture; and of swallow-chicks 563 a 5 Of eagles and of their treatment of 563* 16

x

;

Z

and in fishes same in fishes the same in fishes the same in molluscs or cuttlefishes, and in testaceans Of the same in birds, both wild and

542

b 17

and partridges

a

Of Of

in insects, 10. 11. 12.

13.

Of Of Of

the

543 13 b 543 6 a 544 i

testaceans;

Of Of

and of the hermit crab growth of the sea-nettle and of sponges

17.

18. 19.

Of

the spontaneous

of the

ephemera of the hunter- 552b 26

20.

Of the breeding habits wasp or ichneumon

21.

Of the breeding habits of bees Of the varieties of bees; and of honey Of the breeding habits of wasps Of the breeding habits of the humble-

22. 23. 24.

548* 22

Of the breeding habits of crustaceans 549s 14 549b 30 Of the breeding habits of molluscs 550b 21 Of the breeding habits of insects; of creatures that live on snow and in fire; and

553* 16 553b 8 554b 21

555

s 11

26. 27.

28.

Of Of Of Of

s the breeding habits of ants 555 19 the breeding habits of the scorpion 555 s1 22 the breeding habits of spiders 555 s 26 555b 18 the breeding habits of grass-

hoppers 29. 30.

The same of locusts Of the breeding habits

of the cicada,

s1 556 8 s 556 14

or tettix

556b 21 insects spontaneously generated: of fleas and of lice; of the parasites of fishes 32. Of the clothes-moth; of the grub called 557b 1 31.

Of

and

sheat-fish,

and some

568 s

1

569 s1 10

certain fishes

the anomalous generation of eels 570 s 3 the spawning season in fishes; 570 a 25 of the pipe-fish; and of the tunny and mack-

Of Of

erel

Of the phenomena of pairing and conception in viviparous animals, as elephants, horses, kine, and swine 19. The same of sheep and goats 20. The same of dogs 21. The same, with further particulars,

571b 3 camels, b

573 17 a 574 16 a 575 13

of cattle 22.

The same of horses and of the substance called Hippomanes

D 575 2i

23-

The same of asses Of mules; and of the Syrophoenician

577a 18 577b I9

bee 25.

in

the generation of oviparous fishes 567s 17

the carp

other fishes of fresh-water Of the spontaneous generation of

star-

fish 16.

membranes

parturition

546b j^

and of the

564a 25 564b 14

fishes

b the signs of age and of maturity, 544 12 and of the pairing seasons: in man and quad-

of the purple

its

564a 6

566 a 2 continued; of the fish called Rhinobatus 566b 2 Of the dolphin and other cetaceans, and of the seal; and of their generation and

a 544 25

Of

Of the generation murex and other

embryo and

563b 14

the smooth dog-fishes Of the breeding of cartilaginous

rupeds 15.

the habits of pea-fowl the generation of cartilaginous

fishes; of the

domesticated 14.

young

Of the cuckoo; and of its laying in an alien nest Of the brooding of pigeons, crows,

g

^

of the bird called halcyon

the season of pairing: in birds,

558*25

and maturation; of wind-eggs; of the pairing-

their

8.

of pairing;

the generation of serpents,

habits of pigeons

in viviparous

or cuttlefishes 7.

Of

b 557 32

and the crocodile

BOOK VI 558b Of the pairing and nesting of birds 9 Of eggs, their colour, shape, structure, 559 s 15

538b 27

mals of long bodies 5.

the generation of the tortoise,

and of the viper

fishes called capon-fish

generation, spontaneous

and

Of

the lizard

BOOK V 1.

and of the de-

vice of caprification

24.

;

mules that pair and breed; of an old mule at Athens a Of the signs of age in quadrupeds 578 6

Of camels Of elephants Of wild swine Of deer Of bears Of lions

a

578 10 a 578 16 a 57 8 2 5 578b 6 a

579 17 a 579 3i

CONTENTS 32.

33.

34. 35.

36. 37.

the hyaena; and of ambiguity of sex

Of

its

fabled

•

579b 15

16.

17.

Of hares Of the fox Of the wolf, the weasel, the ichneu mon and the thos or civet Of the Syrian mules Of mice and of their prodigious

b 579 30

1.

Of

2. 3.

n

18.

and crustaceans Of season and weather, and of 6oi a 24 drought and moisture, in relation to birds and

58o b 1 58o b 10

19.

The same

58o a

other animals

4.

5.

7.

man

581a

9.

10.

11. 12.

the signs of conception; of effluxion and abortion

Of pregnancy; of twins and of multiple births Of lactation; and of the period of

582^ 33 a 5»3 14

fish

21. 22.

583

b 2 9

585*29

26. 27.

Of

24.

25.

the duration of fecundity; of indi- 585^ vidual differences in regard to procreation and child-bearing; of the inheritance of deformity; and of resemblance to parents

Of impregnation; and of development 586 s

Of the diseases of swine The same of dogs, and of and elephant The same of cattle The same of horses The same of the ass The same of the elephant

23.

Of

2.

28.

Of

womb

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

30.

Of the same as affecting their habits; 607*9 and of venomous creatures in certain countries Of the condition of fishes and 6o7b 1 other marine animals in respect of season

BOOK

9.

1.

VIII

and aquatic animals,

elephant

and

5.

eel-fishing

Of the diet and habits of birds The same of lizards and of serpents The same of wild quadrupeds Of drinking; and of the diet and fattening of swine Of the feeding and fattening of cattle; of the Pyrrhic or Epirote cattle

592* 27 594* 3 594* 25

2.

4.

6.

b 595 5

mals

9.

599 a 30

Of

the habits

and

and of one another

in shoals;

6io b

1

6iob 20

intelligence of

6n a 6 61 i a 15

The same of cattle and of horses The same of the stag and hind Of the habits of various animals;

6n b 32

or marten

8.

of fishes

swim

of the natural remedies that they employ; of the cunning of the hedgehog; and of the Ictis

and

The same

fishes that

sheep and goats

7.

Of the diet of the elephant; and of 596* 3 the length of life of elephants and of camels s Of the diet of sheep and of goats 596 12 b 10 Of the food of insects 596 b Of the migration of birds 596 20 Of the habitat and migration of fishes 597b 31 s Of the winter-sleep or hibernation 599 20 of insects

Of

fishes that are hostile to

a 595 6

b the feeding of horses, mules, 595 22 asses; and of the watering of domestic ani-

IX

the psychology of animals; of 6o8 a 10 the psychological differentiation of the sexes; of the sympathy and antipathy of various ani-

Of

mals one to another; and of the habits of the

3.

Of

6o5 b 21

of climate as affecting the forms of ani-

mals 29.

589* 10 and of various aspects of this distinction; of the dolphin; of the effect upon development of minute changes in the embryo; of the habits and diet of various marine animals; of eels terrestrial

enemies

604s 13 604 s 22 605* 16 605 s 23 6o5b 6

diversity of local habitation;

and

Of the psychology of animals; of the 588* 15 principle of continuity in the scale of organisms; and of the definition of plant and animal Of

603 s 30 604 s 4

insects; of the parasitic

maladies

1.

the camel

of the bee

15

586 s 31 Of the embryo 586 b 26 Of labour or parturition s Of delivery; and of the infant 587 8 Of milk; and of ailments of. the breast 587 b 19 588*2 Of infantile convulsions and other

BOOK

6o2 b 20

peculiar to certain

ing fish by poison and otherwise; of rain and drought, and heat and cold, in relation to shell-

9

woman

within the 8.

Of maladies

fishes; of lice in the sea; of devices for catch-

child-bearing 6.

60 b 8

of fishes; of parasites of

fishes

20.

the so-called catamenia

Of Of

and of

of quadrupeds;

the skin in serpents, insects,

VII

the signs of puberty in

and

6oo a 10 6oo a 27

of birds

the renewal of youth by sloughing or casting

580*6

fecundity; of the mice in Persia and in Egypt

BOOK

The same The same

10.

the nesting of the swallow; and 6i2 b 17 of the habits of pigeons and of partridges in regard to pairing, brooding, and rearing of the

Of

young The same continued Of woodpeckers Of the intelligence of

cranes;

6i3 b 6 6i4b 1 6i4b 18

and

of pelicans 11.

12.

the chalcis or cymindis; 13.

6i4b 3i

Of eagles and vultures; and of the wren and other birds Of swans and of the swan's song; of Of

the jay; of the

and of the mon-bird stork

filial

615 s 20

and of other

love of the

bee-eater;

and of

birds

6i5 b 19 the cinna-

i i

CONTENTS 14. 15. 16. 17.

Of Of Of Of

the halcyon the hoopoe

6i6 a 14

and its nest and other birds

the reed-warbler the crake; of the

sitta

36.

616*34 616^13

Of herons Of owsels;

6i6 b 32

Of Of

6i7a 28 617b 6

Of industrious insects; of the ant Of spiders and of the spider's web Of the whole economy of bees Of wasps Of the wasps called anthrenae Of humble-bees Of the temper and disposition of the

6i7a 11 of the white owsels of Cyllene; and of the laius or blue- thrush 20. Of thrushes 617 s 16 6i7 a 23 21. Of the blue-bird or wall-creeper 19.

22. 23.

24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

the oriole

the birds called pardalus and collyrion; and of crows and ravens

Of daws and choughs Of larks Of the woodcock Of the Egyptian ibis Of the little horned owls Of the cuckoo Of the bird called cypselus; and

of

48.

Of the bison on Mount Messapium Of elephants Of camels; and of the King of Scythia's mare Of the affectionate disposition

49

of the dolphin Of hens that assume the

46. 47.

31.

33.

34.

35.

Of ravens Of eagles Of a great bird in Scythia Of the phene or lammergeyer Of the petrel

62^31 629 s 28 629 b 5

plumage

630 s1 18 630 b 17 630 b 31 631 s 7

63 b 5

of the cock

the goat-sucker 32.

622b 20 622 b 28 623 b 3 627b 23

and other animals

lion

6i7 b 16 6i7b 20 6i7b 24 6i7b 27 6i7 b 3i 6i8 a 8 6i8 a 3i

620 a 16

the habits of the fishing-frog, of 620 b 9 the torpedo, and of other fishes; and of the sepia and the argonaut

hatch; and of the tree-creeper 18.

of hawking in Thrace; and of the wolves by Lake Moeotis

Of

6i6 b 2o

or nut-

Of hawks;

6i8 b 9 6i8 b i7 6i9b 13 6i9b 19 620s 13

50.

Of

the effects of castration or mutila-

49

b.

63 b 19

chewing the cud Of change of plumage, or meta632 b 14

tion

;

of rumination or

morphosis, in birds; of the hoopoe; of birds bathing in water or in dust

HISTORY OF ANIMALS BOOK

I

accident;

and

also in the

way

of multitude or

fewness, magnitude or parvitude, in short in [5] Of the parts of animals some are simple: to wit, all such as divide into parts uniform with themselves, as flesh into flesh; others are composite, such as divide into parts not

486 a

as, for instance,

uniform with themselves,

hand does not divide

into

the

hands nor the face

into faces.

And

of such as these,

some are called not members. Such are

parts merely, but limbs or

those parts that, while entire in themselves, have within themselves other diverse parts: as,

the

way

whole, the chest; for these are all in themselves entire parts, and there are other diverse parts belonging to them. All those parts that do not subdivide into parts uniform with themselves are composed

'the

as a

do so subdivide, for instance, composed of flesh, sinews, and bones. [75] Of animals, some resemble one another

of parts that

hand

is

of excess or defect. is soft,

Thus

some the some short one; some in

in others firm;

[10] have a long bill, others a have abundance of feathers, others have only a small quantity. It happens further that some have parts that others have not: for instance, some have spurs and others not, some have crests and others not; but as a general rule, [75] most parts and those that go to make up the bulk of the body are either identical with one another, or differ from one another in the

for instance, the head, foot, hand, the

[10]

arm

way

texture of the flesh

of contrast

and of

more' and 'the

less'

excess

may

and

defect.

For

be represented as

'excess' or 'defect'.

Once again, we may have to do with animals whose parts are neither identical in form nor yet identical save for differences in the way of excess or defect: but they are the same only in the way of analogy, as, for instance, bone is [20] only analogous to fish-bone, nail to hoof, hand

to claw,

and

what the

in all their parts, while others have parts wherein they differ. Sometimes the parts are identical in form or species, as, for instance, one man's nose or eye resembles another man's nose or eye, flesh flesh, and bone bone; and in like manner with a horse, and with all other animals which we reckon to be of one and the [20] same species: for as the whole is to the whole, so each to each are the parts severally.

another in the fashion above described. And they are so furthermore in the way of local disposition: for many animals have identical organs that differ in position; for instance, some 487 a have teats in the breast, others close to

In other cases the parts are identical, save only

the thighs.

for a difference in the as

is

the

way

of excess or defect,

the case in such animals as are of one

same genus. By 'genus'

mean,

I

stance, Bird or Fish, for each of these ject to difference in respect of its

there are

many

Within the

species of fishes

and

for inis

sub-

genus, and

and of birds. most of the

limits of genera,

parts as a rule exhibit differences

through con-

486 b

[5] trast of the property or accident, such as colour and shape, to which they are

some are more and some in a degree the subject of the same property or

subject: in that less

Note: The bold face numbers and letters are approximate indications of the pages and columns of the standard Berlin Greek text; the bracketed numbers, of the lines in the Greek text; they are here assigned as they are assigned in the Oxford translation.

feather

The

is

scale to feather; for

in a bird, the scale

parts,

then,

is

in a fish.

which animals

severally

possess are diverse from, or identical with, one

Of the substances that are composed of parts uniform (or homogeneous) with themselves, some are soft and moist, others are dry and solid. The soft and moist are such either absolutely or so long as they are in their natural conditions, as, for

instance, blood, serum, lard,

marrow, sperm, gall, milk in such as have it, flesh and the like; and also, in a different [5] wa Y> tne superfluities, as phlegm and the excretions of the belly and the bladder. The dry and solid are such as sinew, skin, vein, hair, bone, gristle, nail, horn (a term which as applied to the part involves an ambiguity, since the whole also by virtue of its form is desig[10] nated horn), and such parts as present an suet,

analogy to these.

Animals

differ

from one another

in their

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

8

modes habits,

of subsistence, in their actions, in their

and

we

differences

Concerning these speak in broad and

in their parts. shall first

general terms, and subsequently we shall treat of the same with close reference to each particular genus.

Differences are manifested in

modes

of sub-

488'

with a certain

sensibility: as a proof of which [10] it is alleged that the difficulty in detaching it from its moorings is increased if the

movement

to detach

it

be not covertly applied.

Other creatures adhere at one time ject and detach themselves from it times, as

is

to

an ob-

at other

the case with a species of the so-

some of these creatures

[75] sistence, in habits, in actions performed.

called sea-nettle; for

For instance, some animals live in water and others on land. And of those that live in water some do so in one way, and some in another: that is to say, some live and feed in the water, take in and emit water, and cannot live if de-

seek their food in the night-time loose and unattached.

prived of water, as

is

the case with the great

majority of fishes; others get their food and [20] spend their days in the water, but do not take in water but air, nor do they bring forth

Many

in the water.

of these creatures are fur-

the otter, the beaver, and some are furnished with wings, the diver and the grebe; some are destitute

nished with

feet, as

the crocodile; as

of feet, as the water-snake.

Some

creatures get

and cannot exist outthat do not take in ei-

their living in the water

[25] side it: but for all ther air or water, as, for instance, the sea-net-

and the oyster. And of creatures that live in some live in the sea, some in rivers, some in lakes, and some in marshes, as the frog and the newt. Of animals that live on dry land some take in air and emit it, which phenomena are termed 'inhalation' and 'exhalation'; as, for in[30] stance, man and all such land animals as are furnished with lungs. Others, again, do not inhale air, yet live and find their sustenance on dry land; as, for instance, the wasp, the bee, and all other insects. And by 'insects' I tle

the water

mean such on

creatures as have nicks or notches

their bodies, either

on

their bellies or

on

both backs and bellies. 487 b And of land animals many, as has been said, derive their subsistence from the water; but of creatures that live in and inhale water not a single one derives its subsistence from dry land. Some animals at first live in water, and by and by change their shape and live out of water, as is the case with river worms, for out of [5] these the gadfly develops.

Furthermore, some animals are stationary, and some are erratic. Stationary animals are found in water, but no such creature is found on dry land. In the water are many creatures that live in close adhesion to an external object, as is the case with several kinds of oyster. And, by the way, the sponge appears to be endowed

Many less, as is

creatures are unattached but motionthe case with oysters and the so-called

[75] holothuria.

Some can swim,

as, for in-

and crustaceans, such the crawfish. But some of these last move by

stance, fishes, molluscs, as

walking, as the crab, for

it is

the nature of the

move by walking. Of land animals some are furnished with wings, such as birds and bees, and these are so furnished in different ways one from an[20] other; others are furnished with feet. Of the animals that are furnished with feet some walk, some creep, and some wriggle. But no creature is able only to move by flying, as the fish is able only to swim, for the animal with leathern wings can walk; the bat has feet and the seal has imperfect feet. Some birds have feet of little power, and are [25] therefore called Apodes. This little bird is powerful on the wing; and, as a rule, birds that resemble it are weak-footed and strongwinged, such as the swallow and the drepanis or (?) Alpine swift; for all these birds resemble one another in their habits and in their plumage, and may easily be mistaken one for another. (The apus is to be seen at all seasons, [jo] but the drepanis only after rainy weather in summer; for this is the time when it is seen and captured, though, as a general rule, it is a creature,

though

it

lives in water, to

rare bird.)

Again, some animals move by walking on the ground as well as by

swimming

in water.

Furthermore, the following differences are manifest in their modes of living and in their actions. Some are gregarious, some are solitary, 488 a whether they be furnished with feet or

wings or be fitted for a life in the water; and some partake of both characters, the solitary and the gregarious. And of the gregarious, some are disposed to combine for social purits own self. among birds, such

poses, others to live each for

Gregarious creatures

are,

as the pigeon, the crane,

and the swan; and, by

the way, no bird furnished with crooked talons [5]

is

gregarious.

Of

creatures that live in wa-

BOOK

488 b

many

ter

I,

CHAPTERS

kinds of fishes are gregarious, such

as the so-called migrants, the tunny, the pela-

mys, and the bonito. Man, by the way, presents a mixture of the

and the solitary. Social creatures are such as have some one common object in view; and this property is two

not

characters, the gregarious

common

ous.

Such

to all creatures that are gregari-

social creatures are

man, the

bee,

[10] the wasp, the ant, and the crane. Again, of these social creatures some submit

no governance: and the several sorts whereas ants and nu-

to a ruler, others are subject to as, for

instance, the crane

of bee submit to a ruler, merous other creatures are every one

his

own

master.

And

and of solisome are attached to a fixed home and others are erratic or nomad. [75] Also, some are carnivorous, some graminivorous, some omnivorous: whilst some feed on a peculiar diet, as for instance the bees and the spiders, for the bee lives on honey and certain other sweets, and the spider lives by catching flies; and some creatures live on fish. Again, some creatures catch their food, others [20] treasure it up; whereas others do not so. again, both of gregarious

tary animals,

Some

creatures provide themselves with a

dwelling, others go without one: of the former kind are the mole, the mouse, the ant, the bee; of the latter kind are

many

insects

and quadru-

peds. Further, in respect to locality of dwelling-

some creatures dwell under ground, as and the snake; others live on the surof the ground, as the horse and the dog. [Some make to themselves holes, others

1-2

and some unmusical; but all animals without 488 b exception exercise their power of singing or chattering chiefly in connexion with the intercourse of the sexes.

Again, some creatures live in the fields, as some on the mountains, as the hoopoe; some frequent the abodes of men, as the cushat; the pigeon.

Some, again, are peculiarly

subjected to

ill

usage,

[10] and of the latter kind are such as merely have some means of guarding themselves

against attack.

Animals also differ from one another in regard to character in the following respects. Some are good-tempered, sluggish, and little prone to ferocity, as the ox; others are quicktempered, ferocious and unteachable, as the [75] wild boar; some are intelligent and timid,

and the hare; others are mean and and courageous and high-bred, as the lion; others are thorough-bred and wild and treacherous, as the stag

treacherous, as the snake; others are noble

by the way, an animal is higha noble stock, and an anithorough-bred if it does not deflect from

bred

face

mal its

if it is

come from

racial characteristics.

some are crafty and mischievous, some are spirited and affectionate

[20] Further,

so.]

are nocturnal, as the

owl and the

bat;

others live in the daylight.

Moreover, some creatures are tame and some are wild: some are at all times tame, as man and the mule; others are at all times savage, as the leopard

when

others or retaliate

as the wolf: for,

Some

their con-

[5] whole tribe of crows, for birds of this kind indulge but rarely in sexual intercourse. Of marine animals, again, some live in the open seas, some near the shore, some on rocks. Furthermore, some are combative under offence; others are provident for defence. Of the former kind are such as act as aggressors upon

the lizard

do not

and

geners; others are inclined to chastity, as the

place,

[25]

salacious, as the

partridge, the barn-door cock

and the wolf; and some creatures

can be rapidly tamed, as the elephant. Again, we may regard animals in another light. For, whenever a race of animals is found [jo] domesticated, the same is always to be found in a wild condition; as we find to be the case with horses, kine, swine, [men,] sheep,

and dogs. Further, some animals emit sound while

goats,

and some are endowed with voice: of these latter some have articulate speech, while others are inarticulate; some are given to continual chirping and twittering, some are prone to silence; some are musical,

as the fox;

and fawning, as the dog; others are easy-tempered and easily domesticated, as the elephant; others are cautious and watchful, as the goose; others are jealous

cock. But of

all

and

self-conceited, as the pea-

animals

man

alone

is

capable

of deliberation. [25] Many animals have memory, and are capable of instruction; but no other creature except

man

can recall the past at

With regard

to the several

will.

genera of ani-

mals, particulars as to their habits of life and modes of existence will be discussed more fully

by and by.

others are mute,

Common

to

all

animals

are

the

organs

whereby they take food and the organs whereto] into they take it; and these are either

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

10

identical with one another, or are diverse in the ways above specified: to wit, either identical in

form, or varying in respect of excess or one another analogically,

defect, or resembling

or differing in position.

Furthermore, the great majority of animals have other organs besides these in common, whereby they discharge the residuum of their food:

I

say, the great majority, for this state-

489 a ment does not apply

to all. And, by the way, the organ whereby food is taken in is called the mouth, and the organ whereinto it is taken, the belly; the remainder of the alimentary system has a great variety of names. Now the residuum of food is twofold in kind, wet and dry, and such creatures as have organs receptive of wet residuum are invariably found with organs receptive of dry residuum; but such as have organs receptive of dry residuum need not possess organs receptive of wet [5] residuum. In other words, an animal has a bowel or intestine if it have a bladder; but an animal may have a bowel and be without a bladder. And, by the way, I may here remark that the organ receptive of wet residuum is termed 'bladder', and the organ receptive of dry residuum 'intestine or bowel'.

Of animals

otherwise, a great

many

489 b

sues: further, every

animal has another part

in

which the moisture is contained. These parts are blood and vein, and in other animals there is something to correspond; but in these latter the parts are imperfect, being merely fibre and serum or lymph. Touch has its seat in a part uniform and homogeneous, as in the flesh or something of the kind, and generally, with animals supplied [25] with blood, in the parts charged with blood. In other animals it has its seat in parts analogous to the parts charged with blood; but in all cases

ture are

seated in parts that in their tex-

it is

homogeneous.

The active faculties, on the contrary, are seated in the parts that are heterogeneous: as, for instance, the business of preparing the food is

seated in the

motion

mouth, and the

office of loco-

in the feet, the wings, or in organs to

correspond.

some animals are supplied with man, the horse, and all such animals

[jo] Again,

blood, as

when full-grown, either destitute of or two-footed, or four-footed; other animals are bloodless, such as the bee and the

as are, feet,

wasp, and, of marine animals, the cuttle-fish, the crawfish, and all such animals as have more than four feet.

have,

besides the organs above-mentioned, an organ

sperm: and of animals ca[10] pable of generation one secretes into an-

for excretion of the

and the other into itself. The latter is termed 'female', and the former 'male'; but some animals have neither male nor female. Consequently, the organs connected with this function differ in form, for some animals have a womb and others an organ analogous thereother,

to.

[75] The above-mentioned organs, then, are the most indispensable parts of animals; and

Again, some animals are viviparous, others oviparous, others vermiparous or 'grub-bearing'. Some are viviparous, such as man, the 489 b horse, the seal, and all other animals that are hair-coated, and, of marine animals, the cetaceans, as the dolphin, and the so-called Selachia.

(Of these

some have

latter animals,

a tubular air-passage

and no

gills, as

the dol-

phin and the whale: the dolphin with the airpassage going through its back, the whale with [5] the air-passage in its forehead; others have uncovered gills, as the Selachia, the sharks and

with some of them all animals without exception, and with others animals for the most part, must needs be provided. One sense, and one alone, is common to all animals the sense of touch. Consequently, there is no special name for the organ in which it has its seat; for in some groups of animals the organ is identical, in others it is only analo-

er

gous.

the animal in

[20] Every animal is supplied with moisture, and, if the animal be deprived of the same by

their

kind; others engender in their interior a live

natural causes or artificial means, death en-

foetus, as

—

rays.)

What we term an egg

is

that

is

to be develops,

in respect to

its

and

primitive

completed

a certain

result of conception out of

which the animal

way

in such a

germ

it

that

comes from

part only of the egg, while the rest serves for 'grub' on the othfood as the germ develops.

A

hand

is

a thing out of

which

in

its

entirety

by differ[10] entiation and growth of the embryo.

Of

its

entirety develops,

viviparous animals, some hatch eggs in interior, as creatures of the shark

own

man and

the horse.

When

the result

BOOK

490b

I,

HAPTERS

of conception is perfected, with some animals a living creature is brought forth, with others an egg is brought to light, with others a grub.

Of the eggs, some have egg-shells and are of two different colours within, such as birds' e gg s otners are soft-skinned and of uniI 1 5] J

form colour,

as the

eggs of animals of the

shark kind. Of the grubs, some are from the first capable of movement, others are motionless. However, with regard to these phenome-

we

na

shall

speak precisely hereafter

when we

Furthermore, some animals have feet and some are destitute thereof. Of such as have [20] feet, some animals have two, as is the case with men and birds, and with men and birds only; some have four, as the lizard and the dog; some have more, as the centipede and the bee; but allsoever that have feet have an even number of them.

Of swimming

11

creatures that are destitute of

and the

hawk; some

are furnished with membranous wings, as the bee and the cockchafer; others are furnished with leathern wings, as the flying fox and the bat. All flying creatures possessed of blood have feathered wings or leathern wings; the bloodless creatures have membranous wings, as insects. The creatures that

[10] have feathered wings or leathern wings have either two feet or no feet at all: for there

are said to be certain flying serpents in Ethio-

some have winglets or fins, as fishes: and some have four fins, two above on the two below on the belly, as the giltback, [25] head and the basse; some have two only, to wit, such as are exceedingly long and smooth, as the eel and the conger; some have none at

Creatures that have

feathered wings are under the name of 'bird'; the other two genera, the leathern-winged and membrane-winged, are as yet without a gen-

classed as a genus

eric title.

Of creatures that can fly and are bloodless some are coleopterous or sheath-winged, for they have their wings in a sheath or shard, like [75] the cockchafer and the dungbeetle; oth-

and of these latter some are some tetrapterous tetrapterous,

feet,

ers are sheathless,

of these

dipterous and

—

as the muraena, but use the sea just as snakes use dry ground and by the way, snakes swim in water in just the same way. Of [50] the shark-kind some have no fins, such as those that are flat and long-tailed, as the ray

all,

as the eagle

pia that are destitute of feet.

to treat of Generation.

come

2-5

with feathered wings,

—

sting-ray, but these fishes swim actuby the undulatory motion of their flat bodies; the fishing frog, however, has fins, and so likewise have all such fishes as have not their flat surfaces thinned off to a sharp

:

such as are comparatively large or have their stings in the tail, dipterous, such as are comparatively small or have their stings in front. The coleoptera are, without exception, devoid [20] of stings; the diptera have the sting in front, as the

fly,

the horsefly, the gadfly, and

the gnat.

Bloodless animals as a general rule are inpoint of size to blooded animals;

ferior in

and the

though, by the way, there are found in the sea

ally

some few

edge.

Of

those

swimming

creatures that appear to

the case with the molluscs, these creatures swim by the aid of their feet and their fins as well, and they swim most rapidly backwards in the direction of the trunk, as is

have

feet, as is

the case with the cuttle-fish or sepia and the calamary; and, by the way, neither of these lat-

490*

ter

can walk as the poulpe or octopus

can.

The hard-skinned or crustaceous animals, swim by the instrumentality of their tail-parts; and they swim most rapidly like the crawfish,

tail

foremost, by the aid of the fins developed

member. The newt swims by means and tail; and its tail resembles that the sheatfish, to compare little with

upon

that

of

feet

its

[5] of great.

Of animals

that can

fly

some are furnished

bloodless creatures of

abnormal

as in the case of certain molluscs.

bloodless genera,

And

size,

of these

those are the largest that

[25] dwell in milder climates, and those that inhabit the sea are larger than those living on

dry land or in fresh water. All

creatures that are capable of motion

move with

four or more points of motion; the blooded animals with four only: as, for instance, man with two hands and two feet, birds with two wings and two feet, quadrupeds and fishes severally with four feet and [30] four fins. Creatures that have two winglets or fins, or that have none at all like serpents, move all the same with not less than four points of motion; for there are four bends in their bodies as they move, or two bends together with their fins. Bloodless and manyfooted animals, whether furnished with wings or feet, move with more than four points of motion; as, for instance, the dayfly moves with 490** four feet and four wings: and, I may observe in passing, this creature

is

exceptional

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

12

not only in regard to the duration of its existence, whence it receives its name, but also be-

of feet as

is

491'

the case with similar parts of sea-

urchins.

cause though a quadruped it has wings also. All animals move alike, four-footed and many-footed; in other words, they all move

In the genus that combines all viviparous quadrupeds are many species, but under no

[5] cross-corner-wise. And animals in general have two feet in advance; the crab alone has

were one by one, as we say man, lion, stag, horse, dog, and so on; though, by the way, there is a sort of genus that embraces all creatures that have bushy manes and bushy tails, 491 a such as the horse, the ass, the mule, the jennet, and the animals that are called Hemioni in Syria, from their externally resembling mules, though they are not strictly of the same species. And that they are not so is proved by the fact that they mate with and breed from one another. [5] For all these reasons, we must take animals species by species, and discuss their pe-

four.

Very extensive genera which other subdivisions ing:

of fall,

animals,

one, of birds; one, of fishes;

other, of cetaceans.

Now all

into

are the follow-

and an-

these creatures are

blooded.

There

another genus of the hard-shell is called oyster; another of the [10] soft-shell kind, not as yet designated by a single term, such as the spiny crawfish and the various kinds of crabs and lobsters; and another of molluscs, as the two kinds of calamary is

kind, which

and the

common

appellation.

as

culiarities severally.

These preceding statements, then, have been put forward thus in a general way, as a kind of foretaste of the

number

of subjects

and

the properties that

we have

to consider in or-

der that

wings

and by we

as well as feet.

the other animals the genera are not ex-

For in them one species does not comprehend many species; but in one case, as man. the species is simple, admitting of no differentiation, while other cases admit of differentensive.

but the forms lack particular designa-

we may

first

tinctive character

and of

get a clear notion of dis-

and common

properties.

shall discuss these matters

By

with

greater minuteness. [10] After this we shall pass on to the discussion of causes. For to do this when the investi-

gation of the details

is

complete

is

the proper

and natural method, and that whereby the subjects and the premisses of our argument will afterwards be rendered plain.

tions.

So, for instance, creatures that are quadru-

and unprovided with wings are blooded without exception, but some of them are viviparous, and some oviparous. Such as are viviparous are hair-coated, and such as are [20] pedal

oviparous are covered with a kind of tessellated hard substance; and the tessellated bits of this substance are, as it were, similar in regard to position to a scale.

An

named

—

such of them as have feet have a goodly num[75] ber of them; and of the insects some have

tiation,

are only

cuttle-fish; that of insects is different.

All these latter creatures are bloodless,

Of

They

it

blooded and capable of is naturally unprovided with feet, belongs to the serpent genus; and animals of this genus are coated with the tessellated horny substance. Serpents in general are oviparous; the adder, an excep[25] tional case, is viviparous: for not all viviparous animals are hair-coated, and some fish-

animal that

movement on dry

is

land, but

es also are viviparous.

All animals, however, that are hair-coated are viviparous. For, by the way, one

must

re-

gard as a kind of hair such prickly hairs as hedgehogs and porcupines carry; for these [30] spines perform the office of hair, and not

In the

first

place

we must

look to the constit-

[75] uent parts of animals. For it is in a way relative to these parts, first and foremost, that

animals in their entirety differ from one another: either in the fact that some have this or that, while they have not that or this; or by peculiarities of position or of arrangement; or by the differences that have been previously mentioned, depending upon diversity of form, or excess or defect in this or that particular, on analogy, or on contrasts of the accidental qualities.

To

begin with,

we must take

[20] tion the parts of

Man.

into considera-

For, just as each

is wont to reckon by that monetary standard with which it is most familiar, so must we do in other matters. And, of course, man is the animal with which we are all of us

nation

the most familiar. the parts are obvious

Now

enough to physiHowever, with the view of observing due order and sequence and of com-

cal

perception.

bining rational notions with physical percep-

BOOK

492"

we

CHAPTERS

I,

proceed to enumerate the parts: firstly, the organic, and afterwards the simple or non-composite. [25] tion,

shall

chief parts into which the body as a whole is subdivided, are the head, the neck, the trunk (extending from the neck to the privy parts), which is called the thorax, two arms and two legs. [jo] Of the parts of which the head is com-

The

posed the hair-covered portion is called the 'skull'. The front portion of it is termed 'bregma' or 'sinciput', developed after birth for it is the last of all the bones in the body to acquire solidity, the hinder part is termed the 'occiput', and the part intervening between the

—

—

sinciput

and the occiput

brain

lies

491 b

is

hollow.

The

rounded within a wrapper of

thin bone,

The

is

The

the 'crown'.

underneath the sinciput; the occiput skull consists entirely of in shape,

and contained

fleshless skin.

skull has sutures: one, of circular form,

in the case of

women;

men,

in the case of

as a

feneral rule, three meeting at a point. In5] stances have been known of a man's skull devoid of suture altogether. In the skull the

where the hair parts, is called the some cases the parting is double; that is to say, some men are doublecrowned, not in regard to the bony skull, but middle

line,

crown or

in

vertex. In

consequence of the double

fall

or set of the

hair.

8

The

part that

lies

under the skull

[10] the 'face': but in the case of for the

term

is

is

man

called

only,

not applied to a fish or to an ox.

In the face the part below the sinciput

and

be-

tween the eyes is termed the forehead. When have large foreheads, they are slow to move; when they have small ones, they are fickle; when they have broad ones, they are apt to be distraught; when they have foreheads rounded or bulging out, they are quick-tem-

men

pered.

Underneath the forehead are two eyebrows. [75] Straight eyebrows are a sign of softness of disposition; such as curve in

towards the nose,

of harshness; such as curve out towards the temples, of humour and dissimulation; such as are drawn in towards one another, of jealousy. Under the eyebrows come the eyes. These are naturally two in number. Each of them

5-10

13

has an upper and a lower eyelid, and the hairs on the edges of these are termed 'eyelashes'. [20] The central part of the eye includes the moist part whereby vision is effected, termed the 'pupil', and the part surrounding it called

the 'black'; the part outside this

A is

common

is

the 'white'.

upper and lower eyelid a pair of nicks or corners, one in the direcpart

tion of the nose,

of the temples.

to the

and the other

When

in the direction

these are long they are a

[25] sign of bad disposition; if the side toward the nostril be fleshy and comb-like, they are a sign of dishonesty.

All animals, as a general rule, are provided with eyes, excepting the ostracoderms and other imperfect creatures; at all events, all viviparous animals have eyes, with the exception of the mole. And yet one might assert that, though the mole has not eyes in the full sense, yet it has eyes in a kind of a way. For in point of absolute fact it cannot see, and has no eyes [_?o]visible externally; but when the outer skin is removed, it is found to have the place where

and the black parts and all the place that is usually devoted on the outside to eyes: showing that the parts are stunted in development, and the skin allowed to grow eyes are usually situated,

of the eyes rightly situated,

over.

10

492 a Of the eye the white is pretty much the same in all creatures; but what is called the black differs in various animals.

Some have the

rim black, some

some

distinctly blue,

some greenish; and

blue,

sign of an excellent disposition, ticularly well

greyish-

this last colour

and

is

the par-

is

adapted for sharpness of vision.

Man

is the only, or nearly the only, crea[5] ture, that has eyes of diverse colours. Animals,

as a rule,

have eyes of one colour only. Some

horses have blue eyes.

Of

eyes,

some

are large,

some

small,

some

medium-sized; of these, the medium-sized are the best. Moreover, eyes sometimes protrude, sometimes recede, sometimes are neither protruding nor receding. Of these, the receding eye is in all animals the most acute; but the last [10] kind are the sign of the best disposition. Again, eyes are sometimes inclined to wink under observation, sometimes to remain open and staring, and sometimes are disposed neither to wink nor stare. The last kind are the sign of the best nature, and of the others, the latter

mer

kind indicates impudence, and the

indecision.

for-

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

M

493

s

an omen and regarded

ii

Furthermore, there is a portion of the head, whereby an animal hears, a part incapable of breathing, the

'ear'.

Alcmaeon

ing', for

I

say 'incapable of breath-

is

mistaken when he says

that goats inspire through their ears.

Of

the

[75] ear one part is unnamed, the other part called the 'lobe'; and it is entirely composed

is

of gristle

and

The

flesh.

ear

is

constructed in-

and the innermost bone is like the ear itself, and into it at the end the sound makes its way, as into the bottom of a jar. This receptacle does not com-

ternally like the trumpet-shell,

municate by any passage with the brain, but [20] does so with the palate, and a vein extends from the brain towards it. The eyes also are connected with the brain, and each of them lies at the end of a little vein. Of animals possessed of ears man is the only one that cannot

move

this

hearing,

organ.

Of

some have

creatures possessed of

ears,

whilst others have

[25] none, but merely have the passages for ears visible, as, for example, feathered animals

or animals coated with horny tessellates.

Viviparous animals, with the exception of

and those others which

the seal, the dolphin,

after a similar fashion to these are cetaceans,

are all provided with ears; for, by the way, the shark-kind are also viviparous. Now, the seal has the passages visible whereby it hears; but [50] the dolphin can hear, but has no ears, nor yet any passages visible. But man alone is unable to move his ears, and all other animals can move them. And the ears lie, with man, in the same horizontal plane with the eyes, and not in a plane above them as is the case with some quadrupeds. Of ears, some are fine, some are

and some are

coarse, last

medium

of

texture; the

kind are best for hearing, but they serve

no way to indicate character. Some ears are some small, some medium-sized; again, some stand out far, some lie in close and tight, 492 b and some take up a medium position; of these such as are of medium size and of me-

as supernatural. Both inhalation and exhalation go right on from the nose towards the chest; and with the nostrils [10] alone and separately it is impossible to inhale or exhale, owing to the fact that the

and respiration take place from the and not by any porconnected with the head; and indeed it is

inspiration

chest along the windpipe, tion

possible for a creature to live without using this

process of nasal respiration.

Again, smelling takes place by means of the nose,

—smelling, or the And

of odour. tion,

and

is

sensible discrimination

the nostril admits of easy

mo-

not, like the ear, intrinsically im-

[75] movable.

A part of

composed of gristle, and part is the nostril consists of two it,

septum or

constitutes, a

an open passage; for

partition,

The nostril (or nose) of the long and strong, and the animal uses it like a hand; for by means of this organ it draws objects towards it, and takes hold of [20] them, and introduces its food into its mouth, whether liquid or dry food, and it is the only living creature that does so. Furthermore, there are two jaws; the front separate channels.

elephant

part

of

is

them

constitutes

and the

the chin,

hinder part the cheek. All animals move the lower jaw, with the exception of the rivercrocodile; this creature moves the upper jaw only.

[25]

Next

posed of

after the nose

and

flesh,

mouth lies inside the mouth are the

come two

facile

of

lips,

com-

motion.

The

the jaws and

lips.

roof or palate

and the phar-

Parts of

ynx.

The part that is sensible of taste is the tongue. The sensation has its seat at the tip of the tongue; if the object to be tasted be placed on the

flat

surface of the organ, the taste

sensibly experienced.

The tongue

ways wherein

is

is less

sensitive

flesh in general

in

in all other

large,

[jo]

dium

can appreciate taste. The tongue is sometimes broad, sometimes narrow, and sometimes of medium width; the last kind is the best and

position are indications of the best dis-

position, while the large

and outstanding ones

indicate a tendency to irrelevant talk or chat-

The

tering.

the ear,

part intercepted between the eye,

and the crown

termed the 'temple'. part of the countenance is

[5] Again, there is a that serves as a passage for the breath, the 'nose'.

For

a

man

and exhales by this its means: an outward rush of collected inhales

organ, and sneezing

which

last

is

breath,

and

is

is

the only

effected by

mode

of breath used as

that

is,

warmth and

the clearest in

cold, in

its

is

so:

can appreciate hardness, or

it

any part of

it,

just as

it

taste. Moresometimes loosely hung,

discrimination of

over, the tongue

is

and sometimes fastened: as in the who mumble and who lisp.

case of those

The tongue consists of flesh, soft and spongy, and the so-called 'epiglottis' is a part of this organ.

That part of the mouth that splits into two 493 a bits is called the 'tonsils'; that part that splits into many bits, the 'gums'. Both the ton-

BOOK

493 b

CHAPTERS

L

and the gums are composed of flesh. In the gums are teeth, composed of bone. sils

Inside the

mouth

another part, shaped like

is

a bunch of grapes, a pillar streaked with veins. If this pillar gets relaxed and inflamed it is called 'uvula' or 'bunch of grapes',

and

it

then

11-15

i5

than does the jaw or the eyelid. And the connexion between the latter and the glans is [30] called the frenum. The remaining part of the penis

composed of

is

gristle;

and

susceptible of enlargement;

and recedes

in the reverse directions to

derneath the penis are two 12

integument of these

[5] The neck is the part between the face and the trunk. Of this the front part is the larynx

[and the back part the gullet]. The front part, composed of gristle, through which respiration and speech is effected, is termed the 'windpipe'; the part that is fleshy is the oesophagus, the back of the neck

The

is

easily

'testicles',

a skin that

what is Unand the

cats.

is

termed

the 'scrotum'. Testicles are not identical with flesh, and are not altogether diverse from it. But by and by 493 b we shall treat in an exhaustive way regarding all such parts.

part to

the epomis, or 'shoul-

is

is

protrudes

observable in the identical organ in

has a tendency to bring about suffocation.

inside just in front of the chine.

it

it

The

privy part of the female

is

in character

der-point'.

opposite to that of the male. In other words,

[10] These then are the parts to be met with before you come to the thorax. To the trunk there is a front part and a back

the part under the pubes

and

not, like the

is hollow or receding, male organ, protruding. Fur-

the chest, with a pair of breasts.

is an 'urethra' outside the womb; (which organ serves as a passage for the [5] sperm of the male, and as an outlet for liquid

breasts

excretion to both sexes).

part.

Next

after the

neck in the front part

is

To each of the attached a teat or nipple, through which in the case of females the milk percolates; and the breast is of a spongy texture. is

Milk, by the way, is found at times in the [75] male; but with the male the flesh of the breast is tough, with the female it is soft and porous.

ther, there

The

part

common

neck and chest

to the

the 'throat'; the 'armpit'

common

is

arm, and shoulder; and the 'groin'

is

and abdomen. The part

to thigh

is

to side,

common

inside the

thigh and buttocks is the 'perineum', and the [10] part outside the thigh and buttocks is the 'hypoglutis'.

13

Next

after the thorax

'belly',

and

its

The

and

root the 'navel'.

root the bilateral part

is

comes the Underneath this

in front

the 'flank': the undi-

vided part below the navel, the 'abdomen', the extremity of which is the region of the 'pubes'; [20] and above the navel the 'hypochondrium'; the cavity

the flank

common is

to the

hypochondrium and

the gut-cavity.

pearance; of the fundament the part for resting on is termed the 'rump', and the part whereon the thigh pivots is termed the 'socket'

[25]

This

and the latter

is

a part peculiar to the female;

'penis'

organ

is

is

it is

and situated at the composed of two

which the extreme part is size, and is called the

does not alter in glans; and round about fleshy,

peculiar to the male.

external

extremity of the trunk; separate parts: of

The

part behind the chest

it is

a skin devoid of

any specific title, which integument if it be cut asunder never grows together again, any more

is

been

termed the

15

Parts of the back are a pair of blades', the 'back-bone', and,

'shoulder-

underneath on a

with the belly in the trunk, the 'loins'. to the upper and lower part of the

Common

trunk are the

'ribs',

eight on either side, for as

[75] to the so-called seven-ribbed Ligyans we have not received any trustworthy evidence.

Man, front

then, has an upper

and

Now the

(or acetabulum).

The 'womb'

now

'back'.

level

Serving as a brace girdle to the hinder parts is the pelvis, and hence it gets its name (6

and

fleshless;

w

i

passes across the

fleshy underneath,

its

when feet,

the animal

when

they

tn sandals.

quadrupeds are bony, sinewy, and in point of fact such is the

all

animals that are furnished with ^g exception of man. They are also unfurnished with buttocks; and this last point is plain in an especial degree in birds. It is the reverse with man; for there is scarcely case with

499b

£eet>

all

w

j t j1

any part of the body

in

which man is and the

as in the buttock, the thigh,

so fleshy calf; for

[5] the part of the leg called gastrocnemia or 'calf is fleshy.

Of blooded and some have the is

viviparous

foot cloven into

quadrupeds

many

the case with the hands and feet of

parts, as

man

(for

some animals, by the way, are many-toed, as the lion, the dog, and the pard); others have feet cloven in twain, and instead of nails have hooves, as the sheep, the goat, the deer, and the hippopotamus; others are uncloven of such for instance as the solid-hooved animals, the horse and the mule. Swine are either cloven-footed or uncloven-footed; for there are in Illyria and in Paeonia and elsewhere solidhooved swine. The cloven-footed animals have two clefts behind; in the solid-hooved this part is continuous and undivided. some are [75] Furthermore, of animals horned, and some are not so. The great majority of the horned animals are cloven-footed, as the ox, the stag, the goat; and a solid-hooved animal with a pair of horns has never yet been [70]

foot,

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

22

met with. But a few animals are known to be singled-horned and single-hooved, as the Indian ass; and one, to wit the oryx, is singlehorned and cloven-hooved. [20] Of all solid-hooved animals the Indian ass alone has an astragalus or huckle-bone; for the pig, as was said above, is either solidhooved or cloven-footed, and consequently has no well-formed huckle-bone. Of the clovenfooted many are provided with a huckle-bone. Of the many-fingered or many-toed, no single one has been observed to have a huckle-bone, none of the others any more than man. The lynx, however, has something like a hemias[25] tragal, and the lion something resembling the sculptor's 'labyrinth'. All the animals that have a huckle-bone have it in the hinder legs. They have also the bone placed straight up in the joint; the upper part, outside; the lower part, inside; the sides called Coa turned towards one another, the sides called Chia outside, and the keraiae or 'horns' on the top. [50] This, then,

is

bone in the case of

the position of the huckleall

animals provided with

the part.

500 b

it, and there two breasts and two teats, as is the case with man and the elephant, as previously stated. For the elephant has two breasts in the region of the axillae; and the female elephant has two breasts insignificant in size and [20] in no way proportionate to the bulk of the

front, either in the chest or near to

are in such cases

entire frame, in fact, so insignificant as to be in-

sideways view; the males also have females, exceedingly small. The she-bear has four breasts. Some animals have two breasts, but situated near the thighs, visible in a

like the

breasts,

and

likewise

teats,

two

number,

in

as

sheep; others have four teats, as the cow.

the

Some

[25] have breasts neither in the chest nor at the thighs, but in the belly, as the dog and pig;

and they have

a considerable

or dugs, but not

all

number of breasts Thus the she-

of equal size.

pard has four dugs in the belly, the lioness two, and others more. The she-camel, also, has two [50] dugs and four teats, like the cow. Of solid-hooved animals the males have no dugs, excepting in the case of males that take after the mother, which phenomenon is observable in horses.

Some animals

are, at

furnished with a mane and furnished also with a pair of horns bent in towards one an500* other, as is the bison (or aurochs), which is found in Paeonia and Maedica. But all animals that are horned are quadrupedal, except in cases where a creature is said metaphorically, or by a figure of speech, to have horns; just as the Egyptians describe the serpents found in the neighbourhood of Thebes, while in point [5] of fact the creatures

have merely protuber-

ances on the head sufficiently large to suggest

such an epithet. Of horned animals the deer alone has a horn, or antler, hard and solid throughout. The horns of other animals are hollow for a certain distance, and solid towards the extremity. The hollow part is derived from the skin, but the core round which this is wrapped the hard part is derived from the bones; as is the case with the horns of oxen. The deer is the [10] only animal that sheds its horns, and it does so annually, after reaching the age of two years, and again renews them. All other animals retain their horns permanently, unless the horns be damaged by accident. Again, with regard to the breasts and the generative organs, animals differ widely from [75] one another and from man. For instance, the breasts of some animals are situated in

—

Of male animals

one and the same time,

—

ternal, as

is

some are exman, the horse, and

the genitals of

the case with

most other creatures; some are

internal, as

with

500 b the dolphin. With those that have the organ externally placed, the organ in some cases is situated in front, as in the cases already mentioned, and of these some have the organ detached, both penis and testicles, as man; others have penis and testicles closely attached to the [5] belly, some more closely, some less; for this organ

is

not detached in the wild boar nor in

the horse.

The

penis of the elephant resembles that of

the horse;

mal

it is

compared with the

size of the ani-

disproportionately small; the testicles

are not visible, but are concealed inside in the and for this reason the

vicinity of the kidneys;

[10] male speedily gives over in the act of inThe genitals of the female are situ-

tercourse.

ated

where the udder is in sheep; when she is draws the organ back and exposes

in heat, she it

externally, to facilitate the act of intercourse

for the male;

and the organ opens out

to a con-

siderable extent.

With most animals

the genitals have the poabove assigned; but some animals distal charge their urine backwards, as the lynx, the lion, the camel, and the hare. Male animals differ from one another, as has been said, in this particular, but all female animals are retrosition

BOOK

501 b

II,

CHAPTERS

mingent: even the female elephant like other animals, though she has the privy part below the thighs.

male organ itself there is a great For in some cases the organ is composed of flesh and gristle, as in man; in such cases, the fleshy part does not become inflated, [20] In the

diversity.

but the gristly part

is

subject to enlargement.

In other cases, the organ

is

composed

of fibrous

with the camel and the deer; in other cases it is bony, as with the fox, the wolf, the marten, and the weasel; for this organ in the tissue, as

[25] weasel has a bone. When man has arrived at maturity, his up-

per part

is

smaller than the lower one, but with

other blooded animals the reverse holds good. By the 'upper' part we mean all extendall

ing from the head

down

excretion of residuum, [50]

all else.

to the parts used for

and by the

With animals

'lower' part

that have feet the

1-2

23

lion, the pard,

and the dog; and some have

do not interlock but have flat opposing crowns, as the horse and the ox; and by 'saw-toothed' we mean such animals as interlock the sharp-pointed teeth in one jaw beteeth that

tween the sharp-pointed ones in the other. No animal is there that possesses both tusks and horns, nor yet do either of these structures ex[20] ist in any animal possessed of 'saw-teeth'. The front teeth are usually sharp, and the back ones blunt. The seal is saw-toothed throughout, inasmuch as he is a sort of link with the class of fishes; for fishes are almost all sawtoothed.

No animal of these genera is provided with double rows of teeth. There is, however, an animal of the sort, if we are to believe Ctesias. [25] He assures us that the Indian wild beast called the

'martichoras' has a triple

row

of

upper and lower jaw; that it is a lion and equally hairy, and that its

teeth in both

hind legs are to be rated as the lower part in our comparison of magnitudes, and with animals devoid of feet, the tail, and the like. When animals arrive at maturity, their properties are as above stated; but they differ greatly from one another in their growth towards maturity. For instance, man, when young, has his upper part larger than the lower, but in 501 a course of growth he comes to reverse this condition; and it is owing to this circumstance that an exceptional instance, by the way he does not progress in early life as he does at maturity, but in infancy creeps on all fours; but some animals, in growth, retain the relative proportion of the parts, as the dog. Some animals at first have the upper part smaller and the lower part larger, and in course of growth [5] the upper part gets to be the larger, as is the case with the bushy-tailed animals such as

as big as

the horse; for in their case there

[5] With regard to dogs some doubts are entertained, as some contend that they shed no

—

—

is never, subsequently to birth, any increase in the part extending from the hoof to the haunch.

Again, in respect to the teeth, animals differ greatly both from one another and from man. All animals that are quadrupedal, blooded, [10] and viviparous, are furnished with teeth; but, to begin with, some are double-toothed (or fully furnished with teeth in both jaws), and some are not. For instance, horned quadrupeds are not double-toothed; for they have not got the front teeth in the upper jaw; and

feet

resemble those of the lion; that

man

in

[30]

and

its

face its

and

ears; that

its

it

colour vermilion; that

like that of the land-scorpion;

resembles

eyes are blue, that

its tail it

is

has a

tail, and has the faculty of shooting off arrow-wise the spines that are attached to the tail; that the sound of its voice is a something between the sound of a pan-pipe and that of a trumpet; that it can run as swiftly as 501 b a deer, and that it is savage and a man-

sting in the

eater.

Man sheds his teeth, and so do other animals, mule, and the ass. And man

as the horse, the

sheds his front teeth; but there is no instance its molars. The pig sheds none of its teeth at all.

of an animal that sheds

teeth whatever,

and others that they shed the

canines, but those alone; the fact being, that

they do shed their teeth like man, but that the circumstance escapes observation, owing to the

tusks, like the boar,

never shed them until equivahave grown within the gums to take the place of the shed ones. We shall be justified in supposing that the case is similar with wild [10] beasts in general; for they are said to shed their canines only. Dogs can be distinguished from one another, the young from the old, by their teeth; for the teeth in young dogs are white and sharp-pointed; in old dogs, black

ther,

and blunt.

some hornless animals,

ts]

also, are

toothed, as the camel.

not double-

Some animals have

and some have not. Fursome animals are saw-toothed, such as the

fact that they

lent teeth

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

In this particular, the horse differs entirely

from animals

in general: for, generally speak-

[75] ing, as animals grow older their teeth get blacker, but the horse's teeth grow whiter with age.

The

so-called 'canines'

come

in

between the

sharp teeth and the broad or blunt ones, partaking of the form of both kinds; for they are broad at the base and sharp at the tip. [20] Males have more teeth than females in the case of men, sheep, goats, and swine; in the case of other animals observations have not yet been made: but the more teeth they have the more long-lived are they, as a rule, while those are short-lived in proportion that have teeth fewer in number and thinly set.

502 b

man; and

mouths,

as

medium

capacity, as the pig

mouths of and his congeners. [The Egyptian hippopotamus has a mane like a horse, is cloven-footed like an ox, and is others have

[10] snub-nosed. It has a huckle-bone like cloven-footed animals, and tusks just visible; it has the tail of a pig, the neigh of a horse, and the ass. The hide is so thick that out of it. In its internal organs resembles the horse and the ass.]

dimensions of an spears are

[75]

it

made

8

Some animals

share

the properties of

man

and the quadrupeds, as the ape, the monkey, and the baboon. The monkey is a tailed ape. The baboon resembles the ape in form, only [20] that it is bigger and stronger, more like a dog in face, and is more savage in its habits, and its teeth are more dog-like and more powerful.

The

teeth to

last

come

in

man

are molars

[25] called 'wisdom-teeth', which come at the age of twenty years, in the case of both sexes.

Cases have been

known

in

women upwards

eighty years old where at the very close of the wisdom-teeth have

come up, causing

of

life

great

pain in their coming; and cases have been

known

of the like

This happens, of people

come up

when

phenomenon it

in

men

too.

does happen, in the case

where the wisdom-teeth have not

in early years.

Apes are hairy on the back in keeping with quadrupedal nature, and hairy on the belly in keeping with their human form for, as was said above, this characteristic is re[25] versed in man and the quadruped only

their

— —

that the hair is coarse, so that the ape is thickly coated both on the belly and on the back. Its face resembles that of man in many respects; it has similar nostrils and ears, and teeth like those of man, both front and molars. Further, whereas quadru-

in other words,

[50] teeth

peds in general are not furnished with lashes

on one of the two

The

elephant has four teeth on either side, by which it munches its food, grinding it like so much barley-meal, and, quite apart from these, it has its great teeth, or tusks, two in number. In the male these tusks are comparatively large and curved upwards; in the female, they are comparatively small and point 502 a in the opposite direction; that is, they look downwards towards the ground. The ele[50]

phant

is

furnished with teeth at birth, but the

tusks are not then visible.

The tongue small,

that

of the elephant

and situated

it is

far

is

exceedingly

back in the mouth, so

difficult to get a sight of

it.

them on

cant indeed. all

with the dog, the lion, and with all the saw-toothed animals; other animals have small

especially

And we must

bear in

mind

that

other quadrupeds have no under eyelash

at

all.

The ape has also in its chest two teats upon poorly developed breasts. It has also arms like man, only covered with hair, and it bends 502 b these legs like man, with the convexities of both limbs facing one another. In addition, it has hands and fingers and nails like man, only that all these parts are somewhat more beast-like in appearance. Its feet are exception[5] al in kind. That is, they are like large

hands, and the toes are like fingers, with the middle one the longest of all, and the under length,

case

set,

the under ones; in fact they are very insignifi-

part of the foot [5] Furthermore, animals differ from one another in the relative size of their mouths. In some animals the mouth opens wide, as is the

eyelids, this creature has

both, only very thinly

and

is

like a

hand except

for

its

stretches out towards the extremi-

palm of the hand; and this palm at end is unusually hard, and in a clum[70] sy obscure kind of way resembles a heel. The creature uses its feet either as hands or feet, and doubles them up as one doubles a ties like

the

the after

BOOK

503 b

II,

CHAPTERS

upper-arm and thigh are short .in proportion to the forearm and the shin. It has no fist. Its

projecting navel, but only a hardness in the

ordinary locality of the navel. Its upper part is [75] much larger than its lower part, as is the case with quadrupeds; in fact, the proportion

about as five to three. Owing to this circumstance and to the fact that its feet resemble hands and are com-

of the

former to the

posed in a

manner

latter

is

hand and of foot: of foot hand in all else have what is called a 'palm': of

in the heel extremity, of the

for

even the toes

—

for these reasons the animal is oftener found on all fours than upright. It has neither hips, inasmuch as it is a quadruped, nor yet a tail, inasmuch as it is a biped, except

[20]

to be

by the way that it has a tail as small as small can be, just a sort of indication of a tail. The genitals of the female resemble those of the fe-

male

in the

more man.

are

[25]

human

species; those of the

like those of a

The monkey,

dog than

as has

male

are those of a

been observed,

is

fur-

nished with a tail. In all such creatures the internal organs are found under dissection to correspond to those of man. So much then for the properties of the organs of such animals as bring forth their young into the

world

alive.

10

Oviparous and by the way, no

quadrupeds

blooded

—and,

blooded animal is oviparous unless it is quadrupedal or is devoid are furnished with a [50] of feet altogether head, a neck, a back, upper and under parts, the front legs and hind legs, and the part anterrestrial

—

alogous to the chest, all as in the case of viviparous quadrupeds, and with a tail, usually large, in exceptional cases small. And all these creatures are many-toed,

and the

several toes

are cloven apart. Furthermore, they all have

the ordinary organs of sensation, including a

503 a tongue, with the exception of the Egyptian crocodile.

This

latter

animal, by the way, resembles

certain fishes. For, as a general rule, fishes have its movements; though there are some fishes that present a smooth undifferentiated surface where the tongue should be, until you open their mouths wide and make a close inspection. Again, oviparous blooded quadrupeds are [5] unprovided with ears, but possess only the

a prickly tongue, not free in

3-11

25

passage for hearing; neither have they breasts, nor a copulatory organ, nor external testicles, but internal ones only; neither are they hairall cases covered with scaly Moreover, they are without exception

coated, but are in plates.

saw-toothed. River crocodiles have pigs' eyes, large teeth and tusks, and strong nails, and an impenetrate] ble skin composed of scaly plates. They

under water, but above the surwith remarkable acuteness. As a rule, they pass the day-time on land and the nighttime in the water; for the temperature of the water is at night-time more genial than that of see but poorly

face of

it

the open air. 11

The chameleon

resembles the lizard in [75] the general configuration of its body, but the

downwards and meet together under the belly as is the case with fishes, and the spine sticks up as with the fish. Its face resembles that of the baboon. Its tail is exceedingly long, terminates in a sharp point, and is for [20] the most part coiled up, like a strap of ribs stretch

leather. It stands higher off the

ground than

the lizard, but the flexure of the legs

same

is

the

Each of its feet is divided into two parts, which bear the same relation to one another that the thumb and the [25] rest of the hand bear to one another in man. Each of these parts is for a short distance divided after a fashion into toes; on the front feet the inside part is divided into three and the outside into two, on the hind feet the inside part into two and the outside into three; it has claws also on these parts resembling [jo] those of birds of prey. Its body is rough all

in both creatures.

over, like that of the crocodile. Its eyes are

and are very large and round, and are enveloped in a skin resembling that which covers the entire body; and in the middle a slight aperture is left for vision, through which the animal sees, for it never covers up this aperture with the cutaneous envelope. It keeps twisting its eyes round 503 b and shifting its line of vision in every direction, and thus contrives to get a sight of any object that it wants to see. The change in its situated in a hollow recess,

when it is inflated with air; it then black, not unlike the crocodile, or green [5] like the lizard but black-spotted like the pard. This change of colour takes place over

colour takes place is

the whole body alike, for the eyes

come ments

alike it

is

under

its

and the tail its move-

influence. In

very sluggish, like the tortoise.

It

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

26

tains this

[10] assumes a greenish hue in dying, and rehue after death. It resembles the liz-

two behind,

ard in the position of the oesophagus and the windpipe. It has no flesh anywhere except a

chaffinch,

few scraps of

flesh

on the head and on the

jaws and near to the root of the tail. It has blood only round about the heart, the eyes, the [75] region above the heart, and in all the veins extending from these parts; and in all these there is but little blood after all. The brain is situated a little above the eyes, but connected with them. When the outer skin is aside from off the eye, a something is [20] found surrounding the eye, that gleams through like a thin ring of copper. Membranes

drawn

extend wellnigh over its entire frame, numerous and strong, and surpassing in respect of

number and relative strength those found in any other animal. After being cut open along entire length it continues to breathe for a considerable time; a very slight motion goes on in the region of the heart, and, while contracits

[25] tion

especially manifested in the neigh-

is

bourhood of the

motion is more whole body. It has

ribs, a similar

or less discernible over the

visible. It hibernates, like the lizard.

no spleen

place of a heel;

This

analogous to the chest. The bird is remarkable among animals as having two feet, like man; only, by the way, it bends them backwards as quadrupeds bend their hind legs, as was noticed previously. It has neither hands nor front feet, but wings an exceptional structure as compared with other animals. Its is

1

—

504 a haunch-bone is long, like a thigh, and is attached to the body as far as the middle of the belly; so like to a thigh is it that when viewed separately it looks like a real one, while the real

thigh

the shin.

a separate structure betwixt

is

Of

all

it

and

birds those that have crooked

talons have the biggest thighs

and the strong-

with many have the toes separated more

est breasts. All birds are furnished

[5] claws,

and

all

or less asunder; that

is

to say, in the greater

part the toes are clearly distinct other, for even the

swimming

they are web-footed, have articulated

and

still

from one an-

birds,

although

their claws fully

distinctly differentiated

one another. Birds that

fly

high in

from

air are in all

[10] cases four-toed: that is, the greater part have three toes in front and one behind in 1

1,

498* 28.

latter bird

and

is

in front

and

wryneck.

is somewhat bigger than the mottled in appearance. It is

its toes,

and

re-

sembles the snake in the structure of its tongue; for the creature can protrude its tongue to the [75] extent of four finger-breadths, and then draw it back again. Moreover, it can twist its head backwards while keeping all the rest of its body still, like the serpent. It has big claws, somewhat resembling those of the woodpecker. Its note is a shrill chirp. Birds are furnished with a mouth, but with an exceptional one, for they have neither lips [20] nor teeth, but a beak. Neither have they ears nor a nose, but only passages for the sensations connected with these organs: that for the nostrils in the beak, and that for hearing in the head. Like all other animals they all have two eyes, and these are devoid of lashes. The heavy-bodied (or gallinaceous) birds close the [25] eye by means of the lower lid, and all birds blink by means of a skin extending over the eye from the inner corner; the owl and its congeners also close the eye by means of the

The same phenomenon

lid.

is

observa-

ble in the animals that are protected by

Birds also in some parts resemble the above[30] mentioned animals; that is to say, they have in all cases a head, a neck, a back, a belly,

and what

some few have two

as the

peculiar in the arrangement of

upper 12

504 b

scutes, as in the lizard

they

all

and

its

horny

congeners; for

without exception close the eye with

the lower

lid,

but they do not blink like birds.

[30] Further, birds have neither scutes nor hair, but feathers; and the feathers are invari-

They have no tail, but a rump with tail-feathers, short in such as are long-legged and web-footed, large in others. These latter kinds of birds fly with their feet tucked up close to the belly; but the smallrumped or short-tailed birds fly with their legs stretched out at full length. All are furnished with a tongue, but the organ is variable, being 504 b long in some birds and broad in others. Certain species of birds above all other animals, and next after man, possess the faculty of uttering articulate sounds; and this faculty is chiefly developed in broad-tongued birds. No oviparous creature has an epiglottis over the windpipe, but these animals so manage the [5] opening and shutting of the windpipe as not to allow any solid substance to get down ably furnished with quills.

into the lung.

Some

species of birds are furnished addi-

no bird with crooked found so provided. The birds with

tionally with spurs, but

talons

is

talons are

among

those that

that have spurs are

among

fly

well, but those

the heavy-bodied.

BOOK

505* [10] Again,

some birds have

eral rale the crest sticks up,

As a gencomposed

a crest.

and

CHAPTERS

II,

is

of feathers only; but the crest of the barn-door

cock

is

exceptional in kind, for, whereas

not just exactly easy to say

flesh, at

what

else

the

same time

not

[5] placed sideways, as dog-fish.

The

is

the case in

all

the

fishing-frog has gills placed sideways,

and covered not with all

it is.

27

the ray, while the lanky ones have the organ

it is

it is

11-13

but the selachian

a spiny operculum, as in fishes,

but with one of

skin.

13

Of water animals tutes a single

including

Morever, with

the genus of fishes consti-

group apart from the

many

rest,

and

diverse forms.

[75] In the first place, the fish has a head, a back, a belly, in the neighbourhood of which last

are placed the stomach

behind

it

has a

tail

and

shape, but not, by the way, in

No

viscera;

and

of continuous, undivided

fish has a neck, or

cases alike.

all

any limb, or

testicles at

within or without, or breasts. But, by the way, this absence of breasts may be predicated [20] of all non-viviparous animals; and in point of fact viviparous animals are not in all cases provided with the organ, excepting such as are directly viviparous without being first oviparous. Thus the dolphin is directly viviparous, and accordingly we find it furnished with two breasts, not situated high up, but in all,

the

neighbourhood of the

creature

genitals.

And

this

not provided, like quadrupeds, with visible teats, but has two vents, one on each is

[25] flank, from which the milk flows; and its young have to follow after it to get suckled, and this phenomenon has been actually witFishes, then, as has been observed, have

no

and no passage for the genitals visible But they have an exceptional organ

externally.

whereby, after taking the water in by the mouth, they discharge it again; and in [30] the fins, of which the greater part have four, and the lanky ones two, as, for instance, in the gills,

the eel,

and these two situated near

In like

manner

the grey mullet

—

to the gills. as, for in-

found in the lake at Siphae have only two fins; and the same is the case

stance, the mullet

—

furnished with

gills,

one duplicate, like the boar-fish; others have two on either side, one simple and the other duplicate, like the conger and the scarus; others have four on either side, simple, as the [75] elops, the synagris, the muraena, and the eel; others have four, all, with the exception of the hindmost one, in double rows, as the this

wrasse, the perch, the sheat-fish,

The

and the

carp.

on and the sword-fish has eight double So much for the number of gills as found

dog-fish have

all

their gills double, five

a side; gills.

in fishes.

[20] Again, fishes differ from other animals in as regards the gills. For they

more ways than

are not covered with hairs as are viviparous

land animals, nor, as is the case with certain oviparous quadrupeds, with tessellated scutes, nor, like birds, with feathers; but for the

nessed.

breasts

fishes

some cases are simple in others duplicate; and the last gill in the direction of the body is always simple. And, again, some [10] fishes have few gills, and others have a great number; but all alike have the same number on both sides. Those that have the least number have one gill on either side, and

the gills in

most

fart they are covered with scales. Some few 25] are rough-skinned, while the smooth-

skinned are very few indeed. Of the Selachia some are rough-skinned and some smoothskinned; and among the smooth-skinned fishes are included the conger, the eel, and the tunny. All fishes are saw-toothed excepting the scarus; and the teeth in all cases are sharp and set in

many

rows, and in some cases are placed on

the tongue.

The tongue

is

hard and spiny, and

with the fish called Ribbon-fish. Some of the lanky fishes have no fins at all, such as the muraena, nor gills articulated like those of

[50] so firmly attached that fishes in many instances seem to be devoid of the organ alto-

other

stretched, as

fish.

And gills,

of those fish that are provided with

some have coverings

for

this

organ,

505 a whereas all the selachians have the organ unprotected by a cover. And those fishes that have coverings or opercula for the gills have in all

cases their gills placed sideways; whereas,

among selachians, the broad ones have the gills down below on the belly, as the torpedo and

gether.

rupeds.

The mouth .

.

it is

in some cases is widewith some viviparous quad-

.

With regard fishes possess

to organs of sense, all save eyes,

none of them, neither the organs

nor their passages, neither ears nor nostrils; but all fishes are furnished with eyes, and the eyes devoid of lids, though the eyes are not hard; with regard to the organs connected with the other senses, hearing and smell, they

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

28

are devoid alike of the organs themselves

and

of passages indicative of them.

505 b Fishes without exception are supplied with blood. Some of them are oviparous, and some viviparous; scaly fish are invariably oviparous, but cartilaginous fishes are

all

vivipa-

506-

tion by reason of their not forming genera, but groups of which simply the specific name is

when we

predicable, as

All viviparous quadrupeds, then, are furnished with an oesophagus and a windpipe,

man;

rous, with the single exception of the fishing-

situated as in

frog.

plicable to oviparous

[5]

Of blooded animals

there

serpent genus. This genus

is

now remains the common to both

say 'the serpent', 'the

crocodile'.

same statement quadrupeds and to

the

only that the latter present 506 a shapes of these organs. all animals that take up air and out are furnished with a

ap-

is

birds,

diversities in the

As a general and breathe

rule, it

in

lung, a windpipe,

elements, for, while most species comprehended therein are land animals, a small minority,

and an oesophagus, with the windpipe and

to wit the aquatic species, pass their lives in fresh water. There are also sea-serpents, in

tion but admitting of diversity in properties,

shape to a great extent resembling their congeners of the land, with this exception that the

both these respects. Further, all blooded ani[5] mals have a heart and a diaphragm or midriff; but in small animals the existence of the

head in their case

is

somewhat

like the

head of

[10] the conger; and there are several kinds of sea-serpent, and the different kinds differ in colour; these animals are not found in very deep

water. Serpents, like fish, are devoid of feet. There are also sea-scolopendras, resembling in shape their land congeners, but less in

somewhat

regard to magnitude. These creatures

are found in the

neighbourhood of rocks;

as

[75] compared with their land congeners they are redder in colour, are furnished with feet in greater numbers and with legs of more delicate structure. to

them

found

Of

And

the

same remark

applies

as to the sea-serpents, that they are not

deep water. whose habitat

in very fishes

is

in the vicinity of

which some call the Echeneis, or 'ship-holder', and which is by some people used as a charm to bring luck in [20] affairs of law and love. The creature is rocks there

is

a tiny one,

Some people assert that it has but this is not the case: it appears, however, to be furnished with feet from the fact that its fins resemble those organs. unfit for eating. feet,

So much, then,

for the external

parts of

blooded animals, as regards their numbers, their properties,

and

their relative diversities.

oesophagus not admitting of diversity in

and with the lung admitting

[25] As for the properties of the internal organs, these we must first discuss in the case of

the animals that are supplied with blood. For the principal genera differ from the rest of animals, in that the former are supplied with

blood and the latter are not; and the former include man, viviparous and oviparous quadrupeds, birds, fishes, cetaceans, and all the oth[30] ers that come under no general designa-

of diversity in

latter organ is not so obvious owing to its delicacy and minute size. In regard to the heart there is an exceptional phenomenon observable in oxen. In other words, there is one species of ox where, though

not in

a

all cases,

bone

is

found inside the

heart.

[10] And, by the way, the horse's heart also has a bone inside it.

The genera

referred to above are not in

cases furnished fish

is

all

with a lung: for instance, the

devoid of the organ,

mal furnished with

gills.

as

is

also every ani-

All blooded animals

are furnished with a liver.

As

a general rule

blooded animals are furnished with a spleen; but with the great majority of non-viviparous but oviparous animals the spleen is so small as [75] all but to escape observation; and this is the case with almost all birds, as with the pigeon, the kite, the falcon, the owl: in point of fact, the aegocephalus is devoid of the organ altogether. With oviparous quadrupeds the case is much the same as with the viviparous; that is to say, they also have the spleen exceedingly minute, as the tortoise, the freshwater tortoise, [20] the toad, the lizard, the crocodile, the frog.

Some animals have 15

situa-

and

a gall-bladder close to

and others have not. Of viviparous quadrupeds the deer is without the organ, as the liver,

also the roe, the horse, the mule, the ass, the

and some kinds of pigs. Of deer those Achainae appear to have gall in their tail, but what is so called does resemble [25] gall in colour, though it is not so completely fluid, and the organ internally resemseal,

that are called

bles a spleen.

However, without any exception,

stags are

BOOK

507 a

II,

CHAPTERS

found to have maggots living inside the head, and the habitat of these creatures is in the hollow underneath the root of the tongue and in the neighbourhood of the vertebra to which the head is attached. These creatures are as large as the largest grubs; they

grow

all

to-

l3°] gether in a cluster, and they are usually about twenty in number.

Deer then,

as has

been observed, are without

a gall-bladder; their gut, however, that

even hounds refuse

to eat

it

is

so bitter

bling gall, in greater or less quantities.

Of

ani-

mals that take in sea-water and are furnished [5] with a lung, the dolphin is unprovided with a gall-bladder. Birds and fishes all have the organ, as also oviparous quadrupeds, all to

But of

fishes

some

have the organ close to the liver, as the dogfishes, the sheat-fish, the rhine or angel-fish, the smooth skate, the torpedo, and, of the lanky [10]

fishes,

the

the pipe-fish, and the

eel,

hammer-headed shark. The callionymus,

has the gall-bladder close to the liver, and in no other fish does the organ attain so great a relative size. Other fishes have the organ

also,

close to the gut, attached to the liver

I

I

by certain

extremely fine ducts. The bonito has the gallbladder stretched alongside the gut and equalling it in length, and often a double fold of it. [75] Others have the organ in the region of the gut; in

some

cases far off, in others near;

as the fishing-frog, the elops, the synagris, the

muraena, and the sword-fish. Often animals of the

same

show this diversity of posiinstance, some congers are found

species

tion; as, for

with the organ attached close to the liver, and others with it detached from and below it. The case is much the same with birds: that is, some [20] have the gall-bladder close to the stomach,

and others

close to the gut, as the pigeon,

and the sparnear at once to the liver and to the stomach as the aegocephalus; others have it near at once to the liver and the gut, as

the raven, the quail, the swallow,

row; some have

the falcon

it

and the

29

provided with these organs. Of the ovipara that are quadrupedal, the turtle alone is provided with these organs of a magnitude to correspond with the other organs of the animal. In the turtle the kidney resembles the same organ in the ox; that is to say, it looks [jo] like one single organ composed of a number of small ones. [The bison also resembles the ox in all its internal parts.] bird,

17

unless the ani-

mal is exceptionally fat. With the elephant 506 b also the liver is unfurnished with a gallbladder, but when the animal is cut in the region where the organ is found in animals furnished with it, there oozes out a fluid resem-

a greater or a lesser extent.

13-17

kite.

16

Again, all viviparous quadrupeds are furnished with kidneys and a bladder. Of the ovip[25] ara that are not quadrupedal there is no instance known of an animal, whether fish or

With

animals that

all

are

with

furnished

these parts, the parts are similarly situated,

and

with the exception of man, the heart is in the middle; in man, however, as has been ob-

507 a

served, the heart

is

placed a

little

to the

animals the pointed end of the heart turns frontwards; only in fish it

left-hand side. In

all

would

at first sight seem otherwise, for the pointed end is turned not towards the breast, but towards the head and the mouth. And (in [5] fish) the apex is attached to a tube just

where the right and left gills meet together. There are other ducts extending from the heart to each of the fish, lesser in

gills,

greater in the greater

the lesser; but in the large fishes

the duct at the pointed end of the heart

is

a

and exceedingly thick. [10] Fishes in some few cases have an oesophagus, as the conger and the eel; and in these tube, white-coloured

the organ

is

small.

In fishes that are furnished with an undivid-

ed

liver,

side;

the organ

where the

lies

liver

is

entirely on the right cloven from the root,

is on the right side: some fishes the two parts are detached [75] from one another, without any coales-

the larger half of the organ for in

cence at the root, as is the case with the dogfish. And there is also a species of hare in what is named the Fig district, near Lake Bolbe,

and elsewhere, which animal might be taken to have two livers owing to the length of the connecting ducts, similar to the structure in the lung of birds. The spleen in all cases, when normally placed, is on the left-hand side, and the kidneys [20] also lie in the same position in all creathat possess them. There have been

tures

known

instances of quadrupeds under dissecwhere the spleen was on the right hand and the liver on the left; but all such cases are tion,

regarded as supernatural. In all animals the wind-pipe extends to the [25] lung, and the manner how, we shall discuss hereafter; and the oesophagus, in all that

have the organ, extends through the midriff

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

jo

into the stomach. For, by the way, as has been observed, most fishes have no oesophagus, but the stomach is united directly with the mouth, so that in some cases when big fish are pursu-

ing

little

into the

ones, the stomach tumbles forward

mouth.

[30] All the afore-mentioned animals have a stomach, and one similarly situated, that is to

tioned; that

they have a gut connected therewith and closing at the outlet of the residuum and at what is termed the 'rectum'. However, animals present diversities in the structure of their stomachs. In the first place, of the viviparous quad-

is,

the stomach in

some animals

re-

sembles that of the pig; in others that of the dog, alike with the larger animals and the smaller ones. In all these animals diversities oc[25] cur in regard to the size, the shape, the thickness or the thinness of the stomach, and also in regard to the place where the oesophagus opens into it.

under the midriff; and

say, situated directly

508 a

There

is

also a difference in structure in the

gut of the two groups of animals above mentioned (those with unsymmetrical and those with symmetrical dentition) in size, in thick[50] ness,

The

and

in foldings.

intestines in those animals

whose jaws

rupeds, such of the horned animals as are not [35] equally furnished with teeth in both jaws

are unequally furnished with teeth are in

are furnished with four such chambers. These animals, by the way, are those that are said to

larger than those in the other category; for

the cud. In these animals the oesophagus extends from the mouth downwards along the

of the horned animals

chew

507 b lung, from the midriff to the big stomach (or paunch); and this stomach is rough inside and semi-partitioned. And connected with it near to the entry of the oesophagus is what from (or

its

appearance

is

honeycomb bag);

termed the 'reticulum'

for outside

it is

like the

stomach, but inside it resembles a netted cap; [5] and the reticulum is a great deal smaller than the stomach. Connected with this is the 'echinus' (or many-plies), rough inside and laminated, and of about the same size as the reticulum.

Next

the 'enystrum'

comes what is called abomasum), larger and

very few of

them

are small,

and no

single

one

very small. And some possess appendages (or caeca) to the gut, but no animal that has not incisors in both jaws has a straight gut. is

[35] The elephant has a gut constricted into chambers, so constructed that the animal appears to have four stomachs; in it the food is found, but there is no distinct and separate receptacle. Its viscera resemble those of the pig, 508 a only that the liver is four times the size of that of the ox,

and the other

proportion, while the spleen

viscera in like

comparatively

is

small.

Much

after this

(or

all

cases the larger, for the animals themselves are

the

same may be predicated of the and the gut in ovip-

properties of the stomach

[10] longer than the echinus, furnished inside with numerous folds or ridges, large and smooth. After all this comes the gut. Such is the stomach of those quadrupeds that are horned and have an unsymmetrical dentition; and these animals differ one from another in the shape and size of the parts, and in the fact of the oesophagus reaching the stomach [75] central wise in some cases and sideways in

arous quadrupeds, as in the land tortoise, the [5] turtle, the lizard, both crocodiles, and, in fact, in all animals of the like kind; that is to say, their stomach is one and simple, resembling in some cases that of the pig, and in other

Animals that are furnished equally with teeth in both jaws have one stomach; as man, the pig, the dog, the bear, the lion, the wolf. [The Thos, by the by, has all its internal

[10] only imagine these saurians to be increased in length and to be devoid of legs.

organs similar to the wolf's.] All these, then have a single stomach, and after that the gut; but the stomach in some is comparatively large, as in the pig and bear, [20] and the stomach of the pig has a few smooth folds or ridges; others have a much smaller stomach, not much bigger than the gut, as the lion, the dog, and man. In the other animals the shape of the stomach varies in the direction of one or other of those already men-

back and

others.

cases that of the dog.

The all

serpent genus

is

similar

and

in almost

respects furnished similarly to the saurians

among

That

oviparous land animals,

is

to say, the serpent

sellated scutes,

testicles,

is

if

one could

coated with

and resembles the saurian

belly; only,

by the way,

but, like fishes, has

two

tes-

in

its

has no ducts conit

verging into one, and an ovary long and bifurcate. The rest of its internal organs are identical with those of the saurians, except that, ow[75] ing to the narrowness and length of the animal, the viscera are correspondingly narrow

and elongated, so that they are apt to escape recognition from the similarities in shape. Thus, the windpipe of the creature is excep-

BOOK

509 a

CHAPTER

II,

and the oesophagus is longer and the windpipe commences so close to

17

3i

tionally long,

sometimes numerous, as in the goby, the ga-

still,

the perch, the scorpaena, the citharus, the red mullet, and the sparus; the cestreus or grey mullet has several of them on one side of the belly, and on the other side only one. Some fish

the

mouth

that the tongue appears to be un-

derneath it; and the windpipe seems to project [20] over the tongue, owing to the fact that the tongue draws back into a sheath and does not remain in its place as in other animals. The tongue, moreover, is thin and long and black, and can be protruded to a great distance. And both serpents and saurians have this altogether exceptional property in the tongue, that it is forked at the outer extremity, [25] and this property is the more marked in the serpent, for the tips of his tongue are as thin as hairs. The seal, also, by the way, has a split

tongue.

of the serpent is like a more spacious gut, resembling the stomach of the dog; then comes the gut, long, narrow, and

The stomach

single to the end.

The

heart

is

situated close to

and kidney-shaped; and for this reason the organ might in some cases appear not to have the pointed end turned towards the breast. Then comes the lung, single, and articulated with a membranous passage, very long, and quite detached from the heart. The liver is long and simple; the spleen is short and round: as is the case in both re[jo] the pharynx, small

[35] spects with the saurians. Its gall resembles that of the fish; the water-snakes have it beside

508 b the

liver,

and the other snakes have

it

usually beside the gut. These creatures are all saw-toothed. Their ribs are as numerous as the

days of the month; in other words, they are thirty in

Some

number. affirm that the

same phenomenon

is

[5] observable with serpents as with swallowchicks; in other words, they say that if you

prick out a serpent's eyes they will grow again. further, the tails of saurians and of ser-

And

pents,

if

With

they be cut off, will grow again. fishes the properties of the gut and

stomach are similar; that is, they have a stomach single and simple, but variable in shape [10] according to species. For in some cases the stomach is gut-shaped, as with the scarus, or parrot-fish; which fish, by the way, appears to be the only fish that chews the cud. And the whole length of the gut is simple, and if it have a reduplication or kink it loosens out again into a simple form.

An

property in fishes and in is the being furnished gut-appendages or caeca. Birds have exceptional

birds for the

with [75]

most part

them low down and few in number. Fishthem high up about the stomach, and

es have

leos,

appendages but only in small numbers, as the hepatus and the glaucus; and, [20] by the way, they are few also in the dorado. These fishes differ also from one another within the same species, for in the dorado one individual has many and another few. Some fishes are entirely without the part, as the mapossess these

selachians. As for all the rest, some of them have a few and some a great many. And in all cases where the gut-appendages are found in fish, they are found close up jority of the

[25] to the stomach. In regard to their internal parts birds differ

from other animals and from one another.

Some

birds, for instance, have a crop in front of the stomach, as the barn-door cock, the cushat, the pigeon, and the partridge; and the

crop consists of a large hollow skin, into which first enters and where it lies undi[jo] gested. Just where the crop leaves the oesophagus it is somewhat narrow; by and by it broadens out, but where it communicates with the stomach it narrows down again. The

the food

stomach (or gizzard) in most birds is fleshy and hard, and inside is a strong skin which [55] comes away from the fleshy part. Other birds have no crop, but instead of it an oesophagus wide and roomy, either all the way or in 509 a the part leading to the stomach, as with the daw, the raven, and the carrion-crow. The quail also has the oesophagus widened out at the lower extremity, and in the aegocephalus and the owl the organ is slightly broader at the bottom than at the top. The duck, the goose, the gull, the catarrhactes, and the great bustard have the oesophagus wide and roomy [5] from one end to the other, and the same applies to a great many other birds. In some is a portion of the stomach that resembles a crop, as in the kestrel. In the case of small birds like the swallow and the sparrow

birds there

neither the oesophagus nor the crop

is wide, but the stomach is long. Some few have neither a crop nor a dilated oesophagus, but the [10] latter is exceedingly long, as in longnecked birds, such as the porphyrio, and, by the way, in the case of all these birds the excrement is unusually moist. The quail is exceptional in regard to these organs, as compared with other birds; in other words, it has a crop, and at the same time its oesophagus is wide and

HISTORY OF ANIMALS

p

spacious in front of the stomach, and the crop [75]

is

some

at

distance, relatively to

from the oesophagus at that part. Further, in most birds, the gut

its

size,

as the barn-door cock, the partridge, the duck, is

thin,

and

simple when loosened out. The gut-appendages or caeca in birds, as has been observed, are few in number, and are not situated high up, as in fishes, but low down towards the ex-

the night-raven, [the localus,] the ascalaphus, the goose, the swan, the great bustard, and the

Some of the little birds also have these appendages; but the caeca in their case are exceedingly minute, as in the sparrow. owl.

BOOK

III

and

Now

that

properties,

we have

stated the magnitudes, the

and the

relative differences of the

other internal organs, it remains for us to treat of the organs that contribute to generation. [50] These organs in the female are in all cases internal; in the male they present numerous diversities. In the blooded animals some males are altogether devoid of testicles, and some have the organ but situated internally; and of those males that have the organ internally situated, some have it close to the loin in the neighbour-

its allies,

ers

it is

loosely suspended, as

is

As

in colour.

male

has

ject

case.

my

treatise

should

on Anatomy, and the sub-

more

be hereafter

will

fully

discussed

describe the specific character in each

1

The males

the case

to the differences observed in

fishes of diverse species, the reader

when we

cases attached to the belly, whilst in oth-

testicles, as

[20] the spine. These ducts in the rutting season get filled with the genital fluid, and, if the ducts be squeezed, the sperm oozes out white

ternally. In the case of these last, the penis

in

in others they are freely

been stated, and serpents also. They are furnished, however, with two ducts connected with the midriff and running on to either side of the backbone, coalescing into a single duct above the outlet of the residuum, and by 'above' the outlet I mean the region near to

consult

is

and that

[75] suspended, as in man. Fishes, then, are devoid of

hood of the kidney and others close to the belly. [35] Other males have the organ situated ex-

some 509 b

510"

tremity of the gut. Birds, then, have caeca [20] not all, but the greater part of them, such

of oviparous animals, whether

and, in the cases where the penis is attached to the belly, the attachment varies accordingly as the animal is em-

[25] biped or quadruped, are in all cases furnished with testicles close to the loin under-

prosthuretic or opisthuretic.

gan

No fish is furnished with testicles, nor any other creature that has gills, nor any serpent

hue; in all cases it is entirely enveloped with minute and delicate veins. From each of the two testicles extends a duct, and, as in the case of fishes, the two ducts coalesce into one above the outlet of the residuum. This constitutes the penis, which organ in the case of small

also

with the

testicles;

whatever: nor, in short, any animal devoid of [5] feet, save such only as are viviparous within themselves. Birds are furnished with testicles, but these are internally situated, close to the loin. The case is similar with oviparous quadrupeds, such as the lizard, the tortoise and the crocodile; and among the viviparous animals this peculiarity is found in the hedgehog. Others among those creatures that have the organ internally situated have it close to the belly, as is the case with the dolphin amongst [10] animals devoid of feet, and with the elephant among viviparous quadrupeds. In other cases these organs are externally conspicuous.

We

have already alluded to the diversities observed in the attachment of these organs to the belly and the adjacent region; in other words, we have stated that in some cases the testicles are tightly

fastened back, as in the pig

neath the midriff. is

With some animals the orsomewhat of a sallow

whitish, in others

[jo] ovipara

is

inconspicuous; but in the case and the

of the larger ovipara, as in the goose like, the

organ becomes quite

visible just after

copulation.

The ducts in the case of fishes and in biped and quadruped ovipara are attached to the loin under the stomach and the gut, in betwixt them and the great vein, from which ducts or blood-vessels extend, one to each of the two [35] testicles. And just as with fishes the male sperm is found in the seminal ducts, and the 510* ducts become plainly visible at the rutting season and in some instances become invisible after the season

with the l

v. 5.

is

testicles of birds;

passed, so also

is

it

before the breeding

BOOK

510b

II,

CHAPTER

17-

small in some birds and quite invisible in others, but during the season the organ in all cases is greatly enlarged. This season the organ

[5]

phenomenon

is

is

remarkably

illustrated in

and the partridge, so much so some people are actually of opinion that

the ring-dove that

BOOK testicles

back, in

BB;

CHAPTER

III,

33

marked W,\ the ducts turning which is the white fluid, are marked

are

the penis

ticles

1

A; the bladder E; and the

tes-

W.

[By the way, when the testicles are cut of? or removed, the ducts draw upwards by contrac-

these birds are devoid of the organ in the winter-time.

Of male animals

that have their testicles

-

r*A*

A

aldoiov.

some have them inside, as the dolphin; some have

placed frontwards, close to the belly,

them

exposed to view, close to the

outside,

[10] lower extremity of the belly. These animals resemble one another thus far in respect

but they differ from one another some of them have their testicles situated separately by themselves, while others, which have the organ situated externally, have them enveloped in what is termed the scrotum. Again, in all viviparous animals furnished with feet the following properties are observed to this organ;

in this fact, that

in the testicles

themselves.

From

E Kvans. ^^ opxets. AA tCiv Tr6pu)V bpxv T& v 0.^0 ttjs

KK K€pbv7)(nv). Now a judgement of the kind we have described. M. 9

.

knowledge is judgement about things and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves apprehension of

Scientific

that are universal

a rational ground).

principle

known

This being

from which what

is

so,

the

first

scientifically

follows cannot be an object of scientific

[^5] knowledge, of art, or of practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can

be demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom 1141 a deal with things that are variable. Nor are these

first

principles the objects of philo-

sophic wisdom, for

it is

a

mark

of the philoso-

pher to have demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, [5] and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e. practical wisdom, scientific

knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the

first

principles.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

390

1141 b

knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature. This is

Wisdom

(

i

sculptor

and

dom

we

ascribe to their

most

to Polyclitus as a

maker

of por-

and here we mean nothing by wis-

trait-statues,

that

in the arts

)

finished exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a

in

except excellence in art; but (2) we think are wise in general, not in

some people

particular field or in any other limited

some

respect, as

Homer

says in the Margites,

Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion.

—

we

the highest objects,

say;

for

it

would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge,

man

not the best thing in the world. healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same, any one would say that what is wise is the same but what is prac[25] tically wise is different; for it is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that one will entrust such since

is

Now if what

is

why we

some even of the lower animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have a power of forematters. This

is

sight with regard to their also that philosophic

say that

own

life. It is

wisdom and the

art of pol-

cannot be the same; for if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be [^0] called philosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms; there will not be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things), but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species. But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this

makes no

1141 b

their nature

difference; for

much more

even than man,

1

that

philosophic

Fr. 2, Allen.

wisdom

is

human goods

not

it is

divine, but useless; viz. be-

wisdom on

cerned with things

which

it is

above

is

that they seek.

hand

the other

human and

possible to deliberate; for

work

the

all

of the

con-

is

things about

man

we say

this

of practical

[10] wisdom, to deliberate well, but

no one deabout things invariable, nor about things which have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by action. The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only it [75] must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, [20] but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one should have both forms of liberates

—

or the latter in preference to the former. But

it,

wisdom

of practical as of philosophic

must be

a controlling kind.

Political

wisdom and

there

8

same

practical

mind, but

state of

wisdom

their essence

is

are the

not the

same. Of the wisdom concerned with the the practical

part

[25]

which

is

universal

wisdom which

is

legislative

city,

plays a controlling

wisdom, while that

related to this as particulars to their is

known by

the general

name

'politi-

has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said to cal

wisdom';

this

divine in

'take part in polities'; for these alone 'do things'

most

manual labourers 'do things'. wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it which is concerned with a man himself with the individual; and this is

e.g.,

conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are framed. From what has been said it is plain, then,

and

cause

evident

itics

there are other things

things that are remarkable, admir-

Practical

Him did the gods ma\e neither a digger nor yet a ploughman Nor wise in anything else.

Of

know

they

able, difficult,

1

[75]

[20]

why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic but not practical wis[5] dom, when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say that

scientific

as

Practical

—

[

-?o]

known

by the general

name

'practical wis-

BOOK

1142 b

VI,

dom'; of the other kinds one is called household management, another legislation, the

and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial. Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind 1142 a of knowledge, but it is very different from the other kinds; and the man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are thought to be busybodies; hence the third politics,

word

of Euripides,

But how could

1

I be wise,

who might

at ease,

Numbered among the army's multitude, [5] Have had an equal share? For those who aim too high and do much .

.

too

.

how one should order one's not clear and needs inquiry.

Further, is

What

has been said

is

7-9

intuitive reason

39i of the limiting premisses, for

is

which no reason can be given, while

wisdom

practical

concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the paris

—

ticular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well as in that of the major premiss there will be a limit. But this is rather percep[jo] tion than practical wisdom, though it is

another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar to each sense.

.

There

is

a difference

between inquiry and de-

liberation; for deliberation

Those who think thus seek their own good, and consider that one ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that such men have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one's own good cannot exist without household manage[10] ment, nor without a form of government. fairs

CHAPTERS

own

af-

particular kind of thing.

ture of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of scientific knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or some other

kind of thing. Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do not inquire about the things they

1142 b know about, but good deliberation kind of deliberation, and he

confirmed by the

fact

young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has [75] no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too, why a boy may become a mathe-

that while

inquiry into a

is

We must grasp the na-

inquires and calculates.

Nor

jecture; for this both involves is

something that

while

men

who is

it

a

s\ill in con-

no reasoning and

quick in

is

is

deliberates

its

deliberate a long time,

operation,

and they say

that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliber[5] ate slowly. Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation; it is a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excel-

lence in deliberation opinion of any sort. But since the man who deliberates badly makes a

who

matician, but not a philosopher or a physicist.

mistake, while he

because the objects of mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects come from experience, and because young men have no conviction about the

correctly, excellence in deliberation

but merely use the proper language, while the essence of mathematical objects is

such thing as error of knowledge), and correctness of opinion is truth; and at the same time everything that is an object of opinion is already determined. But again excellence in de-

It is

latter

plain

enough

to

them ?

[20] Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular;

we may

fail to

that weighs heavy

know

is

either that all water

bad, or that this particular

water weighs heavy.

That practical wisdom knowledge is evident; for

is

not

scientific

been concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature. [25] It is opposed, then, to intuitive reason; for

said,

it

is,

as has

2

1

Prologue to

2

ii4i b 14-22.

Philoctetes, Fr. 787, 782. 2,

Nauck.

deliberates well does so

is clearly a [10] kind of correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for there is no such thing

as correctness of

knowledge

(since there

is

that

it

no

The remaining

liberation involves reasoning. alternative, then,

is

is

correctness of

thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since, while even opinion is not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the man who is [75] deliberating, whether he does so well or searching for something and calculating. But excellence in deliberation is a certain cor-

ill, is

rectness of deliberation; hence

we must first in-

quire what deliberation is and what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of cor-

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

392

rectness, plainly excellence in deliberation

not any and every kind; for

man and

the bad

man,

if

he

as a result of his calculation

(

i

is

)

is

the incontinent

clever, will reach

what he

sets

before

himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil.

[20]

thought

Now

to be a

to

have deliberated well is for it is this kind of

good thing;

correctness of deliberation that deliberation, viz. that

is

excellence in

which tends

to attain

good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the middle term being false; so that this

what

is

[25] too

is

not yet excellence in deliberation

which one attains what one ought but not by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to attain it by long deliberation while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in the former case we have not yet this state in virtue of

got excellence in deliberation, which is Tightrightness in ness with regard to the expedient respect both of the end, the manner, and the

1143

its end is what ought to be done or not to [10] be done; but understanding only judges.

since

(Understanding

is

identical with goodness of

men

understanding,

understanding with Now understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'under-

men

of

good understanding.)

of

standing'

applicable to the exercise of the fac-

is

ulty of opinion for the purpose of

judging of

what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned and of [75] judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this has come the

—

use of the

name

'understanding' in virtue of

which men are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for call

we

often

such grasping understanding.

—

time. (4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified sense or

s

11

What is called judgement, in virtue of which [20] men are said to 'be sympathetic judges' and

to 'have judgement',

is

the right discrim-

shown by

with reference to a particular end. Excellence

ination of the equitable. This

in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then,

above all others a man of sympathetic judgement, and identify equity with sympathetic judgement about certain facts. And sympathetic judge-

which succeeds with reference to what and excel-

is

that

is

the end in the unqualified sense,

[30] lence in deliberation in a particular sense that which succeeds relatively to a particular

is

end. tical

If,

then,

wisdom

it is

to

characteristic of

men

of prac-

have deliberated well, excel-

fact that

ment is

is

we

judgement

point; for

and goodness of underwhich men are said to be men of understanding or of good understand1143 a ing, are neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men of underalso,

standing), nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For understanding is [5] neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about

may become

all

which judges what

the states

we have

is

true.

considered

converge, as might be expected, to the same when we speak of judgement and

understanding and practical wisdom and inwe credit the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For all these faculties deal with ultimates, i.e. with particulars; and being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being able [50] to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned; for the equities tuitive reason

standing, in virtue of

things which

that

is

Now

regard to what conduces to the end of which wisdom is the true apprehension.

Understanding,

the

is

judgement which discriminates what

[25]

10

is

man

equitable and does so correctly; and correct

lence in deliberation will be correctness with

practical

say the equitable

subjects of question-

ing and deliberation. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues commands,

are er

common

men.

to all

Now all

are included for not only

know

good

men

in relation to oth-

things which have to be done

among

particulars or ultimates;

must the man

of practical

wisdom

and judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive particular facts, but understanding

[55] reason is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason and not of

1144

BOOK

a

VI,

b

1143 argument, and the intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, i.e.

the minor premiss. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the

end, since the universals are reached from the [5] particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason.

This

is

why

these states are thought to be

—why,

while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive reason. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers natural

endowments

correspond to our time of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement; this implies that nature is the [10] cause. [Hence intuitive reason is both beginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and about these.] Therefore we ought to

CHAPTERS dom

9-12

393

no use to those who are good; [50] but again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as will be of

seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing. [55] These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have only stated the difficulties.

1144 a (1)

Now

first let

us say that in them-

must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them selves these states

produce anything. (2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of medicine produces health,

undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to

however, but as health produces health; so does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for,

demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.

[5] being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man

attend

We

to

the

have

stated, then,

what

practical

and

[75] philosophic wisdom are, and with what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is the virtue of a different part of the

the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. (Of the fourth part of the soul the nutritive there is no such vir-

soul.

might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind. For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not con[20] cerned with any coming into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for [25] knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if we are to Difficulties

man

should have practical

wisdom

knowing moral truths but becoming good, practical wis-

not for the sake of for the sake of

—

—

12

say that a

happy. (3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at

[10] tue; for there is nothing power to do or not to do.)

(4)

it is

in

its

With regard

able to

what

which

is

to our being none the more do because of our practical wisdom noble and just, let us begin a little fur-

ther back, starting with the following principle.

As we

say that

some people who do

acts are not necessarily just,

i.e.

those

just

who do

the acts ordained by the laws either unwilling-

ly] ly or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good man ought), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a [20] result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves. virtue makes the choice right,

Now

but the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

394

and

to these matters

must devote our attention

rive a clearer statement about them. There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is

[25] such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness

we

call

even

men

mere smartness; hence

is

of practical

wisdom

smart. Practical

is

wisdom

clever or

not the faculty, but

it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue, as has been said [ ?o] and is plain; for the syllogisms which deal with

Socrates in one respect

done are things which involve

ing-point, viz. 'since the end, is

of such

be (let

and such

a nature',

what

whatever

is

best,

it

may

argument be what we

for the sake of

it

i.e.

a start-

and this is not evident except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and please);

[^5] causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that is

it

impossible to be practically wise without

being good.

when

1144b

We

must therefore consider virtue

as practical

wisdom

same, but like

it

—so

is is

For

in the strict sense.

also

similarly related;

is

to cleverness

—not

the

natural virtue to virtue all

men

think that each

type of character belongs to its possessors in [5] some sense by nature; for from the very

moment

of birth

we

are just or fitted for self-

control or brave or have the other moral qualities;

but yet

which

is

we

good

seek something else as that

in the strict sense

—we seek

for

the presence of such qualities in another way.

For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without rea[10] son these are evidently hurtful.

seem

to see this

much,

that,

Only we

while one

led astray by them, as a strong

may

be

body which

sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in ac-

moves without

tion;

and

while

what

it was, Therein the part of us which forms opinions

his state,

still

like

will then be virtue in the strict sense. fore, as

two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom. This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why there are

[75]

1

11.

6-26.

they define virtue, after

naming

the state

and

which

accordance with the right

now

is

in

its

the right rule

ance with practical

seem somehow

is

objects

add

'that (state) rule';

which is in accordwisdom. All men, then, that

to divine that this

kind of

state

which is in accordance with wisdom. But we must go a little

virtue, viz. that

is

[25] practical

For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virfurther.

tue; and practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve

a rational principle.

that

once more; for virtue too

right track

in

of character

[jo] 13

was on the

s

another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wis[20] dom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right. This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men,

while

1

acts to be

1145

then, from what has been said, not possible to be good in the strict

It is clear, it is

sense without practical wisdom, nor practically

wise without moral virtue. But in this

may also refute

the dialectical

way we

argument where-

might be contended that the virtues exist from each other; the same man, might be said, is not best equipped by nature

by

it

in separation it

for all the virtues, so that he will have already

acquired one when he has not yet acquired an[55] other. This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of those in respect of which a man is called without quali1145 a fication good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues. And it is plain that, even if it were of no practical value, we should have needed it because it is the virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue; for the one deter[5] mines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end. But again it is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its [10] sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state.

BOOK

1146*

VI,

12-13— BOOK

CHAPTERS

BOOK

avoided there are three kinds nence, brutishness. these are evident

—

—

vice, inconti-

The contraries of two of one we call virtue, the oth-

it would be most oppose superhuman virtue, a heroic [20] and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good,

er continence; to brutishness fitting to

For he seemed not, he, man, but as one that

The

child of a mortal God's seed came}

Therefore

if,

of

as they say,

men become

vice or virtue, so neither has

when

—

kind of

state

from

they admire any one highly call him a man' so too the brutish type is rare-

—

[50] ly found among men; it is found chiefly among barbarians, but some brutish qualities are also produced by disease or deformity;

we

name

also call by this evil

go beyond vice.

Of

must

later

his rational principle to follow

on account of them. (3) The

temperate man all men call continent and dis[75] posed to endurance, while the continent man some maintain to be always temperate but others

do

not;

and some

call

the self-indulgent

man

incontinent and the incontinent man selfindulgent indiscriminately, while others distinguish them. (4) The man of practical wis-

dom, they sometimes

say,

cannot be inconti-

some who

those

clever are incontinent.

[20] with respect to anger, honour, and gain. These, then, are the things that are said.

—

vice.

man is Spartans, who

rarely that a godlike

to use the epithet of the

'godlike

man, knowing

passion, while the continent

that his appetites are bad, refuses

said to be incontinent even

higher than virtue, and that

found

(2) the incontinent man, knowing is bad, does it as a result of

what he does

Again (5) men are

is

it is

And

that

must evidently be

no

a different

them.

and

[25] brute has is

by the result of his calculaand ready to abandon

or incontinent

are practically wise

a god; his state

since

395

gods by

the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a

Now,

to abide

tions,

nent, while sometimes they say that

excess of virtue, of this kind

of a brute

1-2

VII and ready

1145 a [75] Let us now make a fresh beginning and point out that of moral states to be

CHAPTERS

VII,

and

men who

ordinary standards by reason of kind of disposition, however, we make some mention, 2 while we have all

this

[55] discussed vice before; we must now discuss incontinence and softness (or effeminacy), 3

Now we may

ask (1) how a man who judges can behave incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge,

rightly

some say

—

is

impossible; for

—

4

it

would be strange

thought if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For Socrates was [25] entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best people act so only by reason of ignorance. Now this view plainly so Socrates

—

contradicts the observed facts,

and we must

in-

and continence and endurance; for we must 1145 b treat each of the two neither as identical

quire about what happens to such a man; if he acts by reason of ignorance, what is the manner

with virtue or wickedness, nor as a different genus. We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing this, of [5] the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and

[30] of his ignorance? For that the man who behaves incontinently does not, before he gets into this state, thin\ he ought to act so, is evident. But there are some who concede certain of Socrates' contentions but not others; that nothing is stronger than knowledge they admit, but not that on one acts contrary to what has

leave the

common

opinions undisturbed,

we

have proved the case sufficiently. (1) both continence and endurance are thought to be included among things good and praiseworthy, and both incontinence and softness among things bad and blameworthy; and [10] the same man is thought to be continent shall

Now

1

Iliad,

xxiv. 258

ff.

2

Chapter

5.

3

ii-iv.

to him the better course, and therefore they say that the incontinent man has not knowledge when he is mastered by his pleas[35] ures, but opinion. But // it is opinion and

seemed

not knowledge, that resists but a

1146 a

tate,

to stand 4

if it is

not a strong conviction

men who hesi we sympathize with their failure weak

one, as in

by such convictions against strong ap-

Plato, Protagoras, 352.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

396 pctitcs;

but

we do

not sympathize with wick-

edness, nor with any of the other blameworthy states. Is it then practical wisdom whose resist-

ance

is

mastered? That

is

the strongest of

all

[5] states. But this is absurd; the same man will be at once practically wise and incontinent,

but no one would say that it is the part of a practically wise man to do willingly the basest acts. Besides, it has been shown before that the

man

wisdom is one who will act man concerned with the individual and who has the other virtues.

of practical

(for he facts)

is

a

(2) Further, if continence involves having strong and bad appetites, the temperate man [10] will not be continent nor the continent

man

temperate; for a temperate

man

will

1146 b

suaded to change his mind. But to the incontinent man may be applied the proverb 'when water chokes, what is one to wash it down [35] with?' If he had been persuaded of the

what he does, he would have de1146 b sisted when he was persuaded to change his mind; but now he acts in spite of his being persuaded of something quite different. (6) Further, if incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every kind of obrightness of

ject,

who is it

that

No

fied sense?

tinence, but

we

is

incontinent in the unquali-

one has say

all

the forms of incon-

some people

are incontinent

[5] without qualification.

have

neither excessive nor bad appetites. But the continent man must; for if the appetites are

Of some such kind

good, the state of character that restrains us from following them is bad, so that not all Cott75] tinence will be good; while if they are weak and not bad, there is nothing admirable in resisting them, and if they are weak and bad, there is nothing great in resisting these

others left in possession of the field; for the so-

le

some

are the difficulties that arise;

of these points

must be refuted and the

lution of the difficulty truth. (1)

is

the discovery of the

We must consider first, then, wheth-

knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly; then (2) with what sorts of object the incontinent and the er incontinent people act

man may

be said to be concerned

either.

continent

(3) Further, if continence makes a man ready to stand by any and every opinion, it is bad, i.e. if it makes him stand even by a false

whether with any and every pleasure and pain or with certain determinate kinds), and whether the continent man and the man of endurance are the same or different; and similarly with regard to the other matters germane

if incontinence makes a man apt abandon any and every opinion, there will be a good incontinence, of which Sophocles' [20] Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes will be an

opinion; and

to

instance; for he

is

to be praised for

not stand-

ing by what Odysseus persuaded him to do, because he is pained at telling a lie. (4) Further, the sophistic argument presents a difficulty; the syllogism arising from men's wish to expose paradoxical results arising from an opponent's view, in order that they may be admired when they succeed, is one that puts us [25] in a difficulty (for thought is bound fast it will not rest because the conclusion

when

does not satisfy it, and cannot advance because it cannot refute the argument). There is an ar-

gument from which

it follows that folly coupled with incontinence is virtue; for a man does the opposite of what he judges, owing to incontinence, but judges what is good to be

and something that he should not do, and do what is good and not what is evil. (5) Further, he who on conviction does and pursues and chooses what is pleasant would be thought to be better than one who does so as evil

[50] in consequence he will

a result not of calculation but of incontinence;

for

he

is

easier to cure since

he

may

be per-

[10]

(i.e.

to this inquiry.

vestigation

is

The

starting-point of our in-

(a) the question whether the con-

[75] tinent man and the incontinent are differentiated by their objects or by their attitude, i.e.

whether the incontinent man is incontinent simply by being concerned with such and such objects, or, instead, by his attitude, or, instead of that, by both these things; (b) the second

question is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every object or not. The man who is incontinent in the unqualified sense is neither concerned with any and every object, but with precisely those with which the self-indulgent man is concerned, nor [20] is he characterized by being simply related to these (for then his state would be the same as self-indulgence), but by being related to them in a certain way. For the one is led on in accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure; while the other does not think so, but yet pursues it. (1) As for the suggestion that it is true opinion and not knowledge against which we act incontinently, that makes no difference to the [25] argument; for

some people when

in a

BOOK

1147 b

VII,

state of opinion do not hesitate, but think they know exactly. If, then, the notion is that owing to their weak conviction those who have opinion are more likely to act against their judge-

ment than

those

who know, we answer

that

CHAPTERS begun

2-3

397

can string together its phrases, but do not yet know it; for it has to to learn a science

become part

of themselves,

and that takes time;

we must suppose that the use of language by men in an incontinent state means no so that

there need be no difference between knowl-

more than

edge and opinion in this respect; for some men are no less convinced of what they think than others of what they know; as is shown by the [50] case of Heraclitus. But (a), since we use the word 'know' in two senses (for both the man who has knowledge but is not using it and he who is using it are said to know), it will make a difference whether, when a man does what he should not, he has the knowledge but

[25] (d) Again, we may also view the cause as follows with reference to the facts of human

is

not exercising

latter

it,

or

is

exercising

it;

for the

seems strange, but not the former.

[35] (^) Further, since there are two kinds of premisses, there is nothing to prevent a 1147 a man's having both premisses and acting

against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premiss and not the particular; for

And

done.

it is

particular acts that have to be

one

is

two kinds

man

the opinion that

and such food is dry'; but whether 'this such and such', of this the incontinent

is

either has not or will,

is

not exercising the

then, be,

firstly,

an

enormous difference between these manners of knowing, so that to know in one way when we act incontinently would not seem anything strange, while to know in the other would be extraordinary. [10]

And

and that

pleasant',

is

am

knowledge. There

is

is

[5] the other of the object; e.g. 'dry food is a man', or for every man', and. 'I

food

The one opinion is universal, the other concerned with the particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of perception; when a single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with production it must immediately act (e.g. if 'everything sweet ought to be tasted', and 'this is sweet', in the [50] sense of being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same time actually act accordingly). When, then, the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that 'everything sweet

nature.

of uni-

good

'such

utterance by actors on the stage.

predicable of the agent,

there are also

versal term;

its

way

edge in another sense than those just named is something that happens to men; for within the case of having knowledge but not using it we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet not having it, as in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk. But now this is just the condition of men under the influence of pas[75] sions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness. plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk. The fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing; for even men under the influence of [20] these passions utter scientific proofs and It is

and those who have

happens

(now

'this is

sweet'

active),

and when appeus, the one opin-

to be present in

just

this

ion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads

[35] us towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts); so that it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of a rule and an opinion, and of 1147 b one not contrary in itself, but only in-

—for the appetite — the right

cidentally

opinion this

is

is

contrary, not the

rule. It also follows that

to

the reason

why

the lower animals are

[5] not incontinent, viz. because they

further (c) the possession of knowl-

verses of Empedocles,

tite

is

have no

universal judgement but only imagination and

memory of particulars. The explanation of how

the ignorance

is

and the incontinent man regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of the man drunk or asleep and is not peculiar to this condition; we must go to the students of dissolved

natural science for it. Now, the last premiss both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what determines our actions, [10] this a man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or has

it

in the sense in

which having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking, as a drunken man may Empedocles. And because not universal nor equally an

utter the verses of

the last term

is

object of scientific

knowledge with the uni-

versal term, the position that Socrates sought

[75] to establish actually seems to result; for not in the presence of what is thought to

it is

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

39 8

be knowledge proper that the affection of incontinence arises (nor is it this that is 'dragged about' as a result of the state of passion), but

knowledge. our answer to the question of action with and without knowledge, and how it is possible to behave incontinently with knowledge. in that of perceptual

This must

suffice as

1148 b

— not by choice but contrary

to his choice and [10] his judgement, is called incontinent, not with the qualification 'in respect of this or that',

anger, but just simply. This is confirmed by the fact that men are called 'soft' with regard to these pleasures, but not with regard to any of the others. And for this reason we group e.g. of

together the incontinent and the self-indulgent, the continent and the temperate man but not any of these other types because they are Cott-

—

—

We

[20] (2) is

any one

cation, or

must next

discuss

whether there

who is incontinent without qualifiall men who are incontinent are so

in a particular sense,

and

if

there

is,

with what

concerned. That both continent persons and persons of endurance, and incontinent and soft persons, are concerned sort of objects

he

is

with pleasures and pains,

Now some

is

evident.

of the things that produce pleasure

are necessary, while others are

worthy of

choice in themselves but admit of excess, the [25] bodily causes of pleasure being necessary

(by such I mean both those concerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse, i.e. the bodily matters with which we 1

self-indulgence and temperance as being concerned), while the others are not necessary but worthy of choice in themselves (e.g. victory, honour, wealth, and good and pleasant [50] things of this sort). This being so, (a)

defined

those latter,

who go

to excess

with reference to the

contrary to the right rule which

is

in

themselves, are not called incontinent simply,

but incontinent with the qualification 'in renot spect of money, gain, honour, or anger', simply incontinent, on the ground that they are different from incontinent people and are called incontinent by reason of a resemblance. (Com-

—

[35] P are tne case °f Anthropos (Man), who a contest at the Olympic games; in his case

won

1148 a the general definition of man differed from the definition peculiar to him, but yet it was different.) This is shown by the fact little

that incontinence either without qualification

some particular bodily pleasure blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice, while none of the people who are inconti-

or in respect of is

nent in these other respects is so blamed. But (b) of the people who are incontinent with respect to bodily enjoyments, with which [5] we say the temperate and the self-indulgent man are concerned, he who pursues the excesses of things pleasant and shuns those of things painful, of hunger and thirst and heat and cold and all the objects of touch and taste

—

75] cerned somehow with the same pleasures and pains; but though these are concerned with the same objects, they are not similarly related to them, but some of them make a deliberate choice while the others do not. le

This is why we should describe as self-indulgent rather the man who without appetite or with but a slight appetite pursues the excesses of pleasure and avoids moderate pains, than the man who does so because of his strong appe[20] tites; for what would the former do, if he had in addition a vigorous appetite, and a violent pain at the lack of the 'necessary' objects?

Now of appetites and

pleasures

some belong and

to the class of things generically noble

—

good for some pleasant things are by nature worthy of choice, while others are contrary to these, and others are intermediate, to adopt our [25]

previous distinction

victory,

honour.

whether of

And

—

e.g.

wealth, gain,

with reference to

all

ob-

intermediate kind men are not blamed for being affected by them, for desiring and loving them, but for do-

jects

this or of the

ing so in a certain way, i.e. for going to excess. (This is why all those who contrary to the rule either are mastered by or pursue one of the objects which are naturally noble and good, e.g. [jo] those who busy themselves more than they ought about honour or about children and parents, (are not wicked); for these too are good, and those who busy themselves about them are praised; but yet there is an excess even if like Niobe one were to fight even in them against the gods, or were to be as much devoted 1148 b to one's father as Satyrus nicknamed 'the filial', who was thought to be very silly on this point.) There is no wickedness, then, with regard to these objects, for the reason named, viz. because each of them is by nature a thing

—

worthy

of choice for

in respect of

them

[5] Similarly there

its

own

sake; yet excesses

bad and to be avoided. no incontinence with re-

are is

gard to them; for incontinence is not only to be avoided but is also a thing worthy of blame; but owing to a similarity in the state of feeling people apply the name incontinence, adding in

BOOK

VII,

we may

de-

1149 a each case what

it is

in respect of, as

bad doctor or a bad actor one

scribe as a

whom

we should not call bad, simply. As, then, in this case we do not apply the term without qualification because each of these conditions

is

not

[10] badness but only analogous to it, so it is clear that in the other case also that alone must

be taken to be incontinence and continence is concerned with the same objects as temperance and self-indulgence, but we apply the term to anger by virtue of a resemblance; and this is why we say with a qualification 'in-

which

continent in respect of anger' as

we

say 'incon-

tinent in respect of honour, or of gain'.

CHAPTERS

3-6

399

man who

has them to master or be mastered by them is not simple (continence or) incontinence but that which is so by analogy, as the man who is in this condition in respect of fits of anger is to be called incontinent in rea

spect of that feeling, but not incontinent simply. [5] For every excessive state whether of folly, of cowardice, of self-indulgence, or of bad temis either brutish or morbid; the man who by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, is cowardly with a brutish cowardice, while the man who feared a weasel did so in consequence of disease; and of foolish people those who by nature are thoughtless and live by their senses alone are brutish, like some [10] races of the distant barbarians, while those

per, is

[75] (1) Some things are pleasant by nature, of these (a) some are so without qualification, and (b) others are so with reference to

who

particular classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others are not pleasant by nature,

at times,

and not

Phalaris

may have

but (a) some of them become so by reason of injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits, and (c) others by reason of

flesh of a child or

and

originally

bad natures. This being

so, it is

pos-

are so as a result of disease (e.g. of epi-

lepsy)

or of

characteristics

madness are morbid. Of these it is possible to have some only to be

mastered by them.

an appetite for unnatural

[75] ual pleasure; but

it is

mastered, not merely to have the feelings. Thus, as the

on the human level which wickedness not simply but with

wickedness which

is

is

called wickedness simply, while that

discover similar states of character to those rec-

is

not

with regard to each of the

latter

ognized with regard to the former;

[20]

mean (A)

I

the brutish states, as in the case of

who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon or of the story told of Phalaris. These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease (or, in some cases, of Anadir ] ness, as with the man who sacrificed and the female

— —

ate his mother, or

with the slave

who

is

called

the qualification 'brutish' or 'morbid', in the

same way

it is

some incontinence is some morbid, while only that

plain that

[20] brutish and

which corresponds

to

human

self-indulgence

incontinence simply.

is

That incontinence and continence, then,

habit.

a

metaphor and not simply,

is

plain.

That incontinence

in respect of anger

less

what we

now

see. ( 1 ) Anger argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, is

will

proceed to

[25] seems to listen to

before looking to see

if it is

[^o] by reason of the

warmth and

1149 a

against, boils

too; for

is

disgraceful than that in respect of the appetites

Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state no one would call incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet to women because of the passive part they play in copulation; nor would one apply it to those who are in a morbid condition as a result of habit. To have these various types of habit is beyond the is

are

concerned only with the same objects as selfindulgence and temperance and that what is concerned with other objects is a type distinct from incontinence, and called incontinence by

ate the

and others are morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty; for these arise in some by na[30] ture and in others, as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from liver of his fellow),

limits of vice, as brutishness

sex-

also possible to be

kinds to

sible

e.g.

restrained a desire to eat the

its

nature, though

it

a friend; so

anger

hastiness of

hears, does not hear an or-

to take revenge.

For argument

or imagination informs us that

we have been

der,

and springs

insulted or slighted,

were that anything

and anger, reasoning as it like this must be fought

up straightway; while

appetite,

if

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

400

argument [^5] ject

or perception merely says that an ob-

is

pleasant, springs to the

enjoyment

1149 b of it. Therefore anger obeys the argument in a sense, but appetite does not. It is therefore more disgraceful; for the man who is incontinent in respect of anger is in a sense conquered by argument, while the other is conquered by appetite and not by argument. (2) Further, we pardon people more easily for following natural desires, since we pardon

[5]

them more

tites as

easily for following

such appe-

common to all men, and in so far as common; now anger and bad temper

are

they are are

more natural than

i.e.

for unnecessary objects.

the appetites for excess,

Take

for instance

man who

1150 a

among the latter themselves. For, as has been said at the beginning, 2 some are human and natural both in kind and in magniferences

and others

tude, others arc brutish,

are

due

to

[50] organic injuries and diseases. Only with the first of these are temperance and self-indul-

gence concerned; this is why we call the lower animals neither temperate nor self-indulgent except by a metaphor, and only if some one race of animals exceeds another as a whole in wantonness, destructiveness, and omnivorous greed; these have no power of choice or calculi] lation, but they are departures from the natural norm,

among men, madmen

as,

1150 a Now brutishness though more alarming;

is

are.

a less evil than vice,

for

it

is

not that the

defended himself on the charge of striking his father by saying 'yes, but he [10] struck his father, and he struck his, and' (pointing to his child) 'this boy will strike me when he is a man; it runs in the family'; or the man who when he was being dragged along by his son bade him stop at the doorway, since he himself had dragged his father only as far as

been perverted, as in man, they have no better part. Thus it is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living in respect of badness; for the badness of that which has no originative source of movement is always [5] less hurtful, and reason is an originative

that.

some sense worse;

(3) Further, those who are more given to plotting against others are more criminal.

thousand times as

the

better part has

Thus

source.

like

it is

comparing injustice in man. Each is in a bad man will do ten

the abstract with an unjust for

much

evil as a brute.

Now

man

a passionate

is

—

not given to plotting, nor

is

[75] anger itself it is open; but the nature of appetite is illustrated by what the poets call

daughter of Cyand by Homer's words about her 'em'guile-weaving

Aphrodite, prus',

broidered girdle':

And Whose

the whisper of wooing is there, subtlety stealeth the wits of the wise,

prudent

Therefore

soe'er.

if

this

how

1

form

of incontinence

is

more

criminal and disgraceful than that in respect of anger,

it is

both incontinence without qualifi-

cation

and

in a sense vice.

[20] (4) Further, no one commits wanton outrage with a feeling of pain, but every one who acts in

anger acts with pain, while the man outrage acts with pleasure. If,

who commits

then, those acts at which it is most just to be angry are more criminal than others, the inconti-

nence which

is

due

criminal; for there

is

is the more no wanton outrage in-

to appetite

volved in anger. Plainly, then, the incontinence concerned with appetite is more disgraceful than that con[25] cerned with anger, and continence and incontinence are concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures; but we must grasp the dif1

Iliad, xiv. 214, 217.

With regard

and pains and apand aversions arising through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and temperance were formerly narrowed down, 3 it is possible to be in such a state as to be defeated even by those of them which most people master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated; among these possi[10]

to the pleasures

petites

those relating to pleasures are incon-

bilities,

tinence and continence, those relating to pains [75] softness and endurance. is intermediate, even

people

towards the worse

Now,

The if

state of

they lean

most

more

states.

some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor the deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains, the man who pursues the exsince

cesses of things pleasant, or pursues to excess

necessary objects, and does so by choice, for [20] their own sake and not at all for the sake of any result distinct

gent; for such a repent,

who who 2

man

from them, is

is

and therefore incurable,

since a

cannot repent cannot be cured. is

deficient in his pursuit of

ii48 b 15-31.

3

self-indul-

of necessity unlikely to

ni. 10.

man

The man

them

is

the

1151

BOOK

s

opposite of self-indulgent; the man 'who termediate is temperate. Similarly, there

VII,

is is

in-

the

man who

avoids bodily pains not because he is defeated by them but by choice. (Of those who [25] do not choose such acts, one kind of man is led to them as a result of the pleasure involved, another because he avoids the pain arising from the appetite, so that these types differ from one another. Now any one would think worse of a man with no appetite or with weak to do something disgraceful, under the influence of powerful appetite, and worse of him if he struck a blow not in anger than if he did it in anger; for what would he have done if he had been |jo] strongly affected? This is why the self-indulgent man is worse than the incontinent.) Of the states named, then, the latter is rather a kind of softness; the former is self-indulgence. While to the incontinent man is opposed the continent, to the soft is opposed the man of endurance; for endurance consists in resisting, while continence consists in conquering, and [55] resisting and conquering are different, as not being beaten is different from winning; this is why continence is also more worthy of

appetite

than

if

were he

he did

it

1150 b choice than endurance.

who

is

Now

man

the

defective in respect of resistance to the

things which most successfully

nacy too

is

is

soft

men

both

resist

and effeminate;

a kind of softness; such a

and

resist

for effemi-

man

his cloak to avoid the pain of lifting

trails

it,

and

without thinking himself wretched, though the man he imitates is a wretched man. [5] The case is similar with regard to continence and incontinence. For if a man is defeated by violent and excessive pleasures or pains, there is nothing wonderful in that; indeed we are ready to pardon him if he has resisted, as Theodectes' Philoctetes does when bitten by the [10] snake, or Carcinus' Cercyon in the Alope, plays the

and

invalid

as people

who try to restrain

burst out into a guffaw, as

their laughter

happened

to

Xeno-

phantus. But it is surprising if a man is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains which most men can hold out against, when this is not due to heredity or disease, like the softness that is hereditary with the kings of the Scyth[75] ians, or that which distinguishes the female sex from the male.

The

amusement,

thought to For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest from work; and the lover of amusement is one of the people who go to excess in this. lover of

be self-indulgent, but

is

too,

is

really soft.

CHAPTERS

6-8

401

Of incontinence one kind other weakness. For some

is

impetuosity, an-

men

after deliberat-

[20] ing fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation, others

because they have not deliberated are led by their emotion; since some men (just as people who first tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have first perceived and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and their calculative faculty, are not de[25] feated by their emotion, whether it be

keen and excitable peofrom the impetuous form of incontinence; for the former by reason of their quickness and the latter by reason of the violence of their passions do not await the argument, because they are apt to follow their

pleasant or painful.

It is

ple that suffer especially

imagination.

The

self-indulgent

man,

as

was

said,

1

is

not apt

he stands by his choice; but any [jo] incontinent man is likely to repent. This is why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulation of the problem, but the selfindulgent man is incurable and the incontinent man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former is a perma-

to repent; for

[55] nent, the latter an intermittent badness. generally incontinence and vice are differ-

And

ent in kind; vice

is

unconscious of

itself,

incon-

1151 a tinenceis not (of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarily beside themselves are better than those who have the rational principle but do not abide by it, since the latter are defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act without previous deliberation like the others); for the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e. on less than most people. [5] Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice (though perhaps it is so in a qualified sense); for incontinence is contrary to choice while vice is in accordance with choice; not but what they are similar in respect of the actions they lead to; as in the saying of Demodocus about the Milesians, 'the Milesians are not without sense, but they do the things that senseless people do', [10] so too incontinent people are not criminal, but they will do criminal acts. Now, since the incontinent man is apt to pursue, not on conviction, bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to the right rule, while the self-indulgent man is convinced be-

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

402 the sort of

man

to

pursue them,

cause he is Oil the contrary the former that is easily persuaded to change his mind, while the latter is it is

[75] not. For virtue and vice respectively present- and destroy the first principle, and in actions the final cause is the first principle, as the

hypotheses are in mathematics; neither in that case

is it

argument

that teaches the first princi-

—

nor is it so here virtue either natural or produced by habituation is what teaches right opinion about the first principle. Such a man as this, then, is temperate; his contrary is the ples,

self-indulgent.

[20] But there

away

man who

a sort of

is

right rule

—

a

is

carried

and contrary

as a result of passion

man whom

to the

passion masters so

that he does not act according to the right rule,

but does not master to the extent of making him ready to believe that he ought to pursue such pleasures without reserve; this is the incontinent man, who is better than the self-in[25] dulgent man, and not bad without qualification; for the best thing in him, the first principle, is preserved. And contrary to him is another kind of man, he who abides by his convictions

and

not carried away, at least as is evident from these con-

is

a result of passion. It

siderations that the latter

a

is

good

state

and the

former a bad one.

liberal

1152*

man and

man

the rash

like the confi-

many

dent man; but they are different in spects.

For

it is

one will not yield, since /o] nent man will be easy ie

is

to persuade; but

argument that the others refuse they do form appetites and many

to

for

re-

and appetite that the on occasion the Conn-

to passion

are led by their pleasures.

Now

it

to yield,

of

the people

them

who

are strong-headed are the opinionated, the ig-

norant, and the boorish

—

the opinionated being influenced by pleasure and pain; for they delight in the victory they gain if they are not [75] persuaded to change, and are pained if

become null and void as desometimes do; so that they are liker the incontinent than the continent man. But there are some who fail to abide by their

their decisions

crees

resolutions, not as a result of incontinence, e.g.

Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes; yet it was for the sake of pleasure that he did not

—

stand fast but a noble pleasure; for telling the [20] truth was noble to him, but he had been

persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. For not every one who does anything for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or bad or incontinent, but he who does it for a disgraceful pleasure.

Since there less

is

also a sort of

man who

takes

delight than he should in bodily things,

and does not abide by the rule, he who is intermediate between him and the incontinent man Is the man continent who abides by any and every rule and any and every choice, or the man who abides by the right choice, and is he

man; for the incontinent abide by the rule because he de-

the continent

[25]

is

man

fails to

and the right choice by which the one abides and the other does not? If any one chooses or

much in them, and this man because he delights in them too little; while the continent man abides by the rule and does not change on either account. Now if continence is good, both the contrary states must be bad, as they actually appear to be; but because the oth[jo] er extreme is seen in few people and seldom, as temperance is thought to be contrary only to self-indulgence, so is continence to in-

pursues this for the sake of that, per se he pur-

continence.

1151 b sues and chooses the latter, but incidentally the former. But when we speak without

it is

[jo] incontinent

who abandons

choice and any and every rule,

any and every or he who aban-

not false and the choice put it before in our 1 statement of the problem. Or is it incidentally any and every choice but per se the true rule

dons the rule that

is

that

how we

right; this

is

is

we mean what

qualification

is

per

fore in a sense the one abides by,

se.

There-

and the other

abandons, any and every opinion; but without qualification, the true opinion.

There are some [5] opinion,

those

who

who are

who

are hard to persuade in the first in-

and

are not easily persuaded to change;

stance

these have in

them something

nent man, as the prodigal 1

apt to abide by their

are called strong-headed, viz.

1146 s 16-31.

is

like the conti-

in a

way

like the

lights too

Since

many names are applied analogically, we have come to speak of

by analogy that

the 'continence' of the temperate the continent

man and

man;

the temperate

for both

man

are

such as to do nothing contrary to the rule for 1152 a the sake of the bodily pleasures, but the former has and the latter has not bad appetites, and the latter is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to the rule, while the former is such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it.

And man

the incontinent

and the self-indulgent

are also like another; they are different, the lat[5] but both pursue bodily pleasures

—

BOOK

1152 b ter,

so,

VII,

however, also thinking that he ought to do while the former does not think this.

CHAPTERS

8-12

tinence, endurance,

403

and

Nor

11

same man have

wisdom has been shown that practical

1

and be incontinent; for it a man is at the same time practically wise, and good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by but the incontinent man is unis, however, nothing to pre[10] vent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but

being able to able to act

act;

—there

are incontinent, viz. because cleverness practical

wisdom

scribed in our

differ in the

first

way we have

discussions,

2

and de-

and are near

together in respect of their reasoning, but difpurpose nor yet is the

—

fer in respect of their

incontinent is

man

contemplating

man who knows and a truth, but like the man who drunk. And he acts willingly like the

[75] is asleep or (for he acts in a sense with

what he does and

of the

knowledge both of end to which he does

not wicked, since his purpose is good; is half-wicked. And he is not a criminal; for he does not act of malice aforethought; of the two types of incontinent man the one

but

it),

and how

[35] these states are related to each other.

10

can the

softness are,

is

so that he

does not abide by the conclusions of his deliberation, while the excitable man does not deliberate at all. And thus the incontinent man is

which passes all the right deand has good laws, but makes no use of

1152 b The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the political philosopher; for

he

is

the architect of the end, with a view to

which we

call one thing bad and another good without qualification. Further, it is one of our necessary tasks to consider them; for not only did we lay it down that moral virtue and vice [5] are concerned with pains and pleasures, but most people say that happiness involves

pleasure; this

is

why

the blessed

man

is

called

by a name derived from a word meaning enjoyment. Now ( 1 ) some people think that no pleasure is a good, either in itself or incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the same; (2) [10] others think that some pleasures are good but that most are bad. (3) Again there is a third view, that even if all pleasures are good, yet the best thing in the world cannot be pleasure. (1) The reasons given for the view that pleasure is not a good at all are (a) that every pleasure

is

a perceptible process to a natural

and that no process is of the same kind as end, e.g. no process of building of the same

state, its

A

temperate man [75] kind as a house, {b) avoids pleasures, (c) man of practical wisdom pursues what is free from pain, not what

A

pleasant, (d)

The

pleasures are a hindrance

[20] like a city

is

crees

so the more one dethem, e.g. in sexual pleasure; for no one could think of anything while absorbed in this, (e) There is no art of pleasure; but every good is the product of some art. (/) Children and the brutes pursue pleasures. (2) The rea[20] sons for the view that not all pleasures are

them,

The

Anaxandrides' jesting remark, 3 willed it, that cares nought for laws;

as in

city

but the wicked man is like a city that uses its laws, but has wicked laws to use. [25] Now incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is in excess of the state characteristic of most men; for the continent man abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent man less than most men can. Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is easier to change a habit than to change one's nature; [50] even habit is hard to change just because it is

like nature, as

Evenus

says:

4

say that habit's but long practice, friend, And this becomes men's nature in the end.

/

We have now stated what continence, inconn-b 32.

2

iM4 a 23~b 4-

Kock.

4

Fr. 9, Diehl.

1

1144 s

3

Fr. 67,

to thought,

and the more

lights in

good are that (a) there are pleasures that are actually base and objects of reproach, and (b) there are harmful pleasures; for some pleasant things are unhealthy. (3) The reason for the view that the best thing in the world is not pleasure

is

that pleasure

is

not an end but a

process.

12 [25] These are pretty much the things that are said. That it does not follow from these grounds that pleasure is not a good, or even the chief good, is plain from the following considerations. (A) (a) First, since that which is good may be so in either of two senses (one thing good simply and another good for a particular person), natural constitutions and states

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

4°4

and therefore

of being,

also the

corresponding

movements and processes, will be correspondingly divisible. Of those which are thought to be bad some will be bad if taken without qualification

but not bad for a particular person,

[30] but worthy of his choice, and some will not be worthy of choice even for a particular person, but only at a particular time and for a short period, though not without qualification;

while others are not even pleasures, but seem to be so, viz. all those which involve pain and

whose end is curative, e.g. the processes that go on in sick persons. (I?) Further, one kind of good being activity and another being state, the processes that reour natural

store us to

state are

only inciden-

ts] tally pleasant; for that matter at work in the appetites for them is

much

of so

of our state

mained unimpaired;

the activity the activity

and nature there

for

as has re-

are

actually

pleasures that involve no pain or appetite (e.g.

1153 a those of contemplation), the nature such a case not being defective at others are incidental

is

all.

That

in

the

indicated by the fact

that men do not enjoy the same pleasant objects when their nature is in its settled state as they do when it is being replenished, but in the for-

mer case they enjoy the things that are pleasant without qualification, in the latter the contraries of these as well; for then they enjoy even and

[5] sharp

bitter things,

none of which

is

pleasant either by nature or without qualification.

The

states they

produce, therefore, are not

pleasures naturally or without qualification; for as pleasant things differ, so

1153 b

ing that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for money-making; both are bad in the respect mentioned, but they are

—

indeed, thinking [20] not bad for that reason sometimes injurious to health.

itself is

Neither practical wisdom nor any state of beis impeded by the pleasure arising from it; it is foreign pleasures that impede, for the pleasures arising from thinking and learning will make us think and learn all the more. (C) The fact that no pleasure is the product ing

of any art arises naturally

enough; there is no any other activity either, but only of the [25] corresponding faculty; though for that matter the arts of the perfumer and the cook are thought to be arts of pleasure. (D) The arguments based on the grounds that the temperate man avoids pleasure and that art of

man

the

of practical

and

1

the bodily pleasures (for

from them. Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some say the end is better than the process; for pleasures are not processes nor do they all are activities

and

ends; nor do they arise when we are becoming something, but when we are exercising some faculty; and not all pleasures have an end different from themselves, but only the pleasures of persons

who

of their nature.

are being led to the perfecting

This

say that pleasure

is

is

why

it is

not right to

perceptible process, but

it

should rather be called activity of the natural [75] state, and instead of 'perceptible' 'unimpeded'. It is thought by some people to be process just because they think it is in the strict sense good; for they think that activity is proc-

which it is not. (B) The view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like say-

ess,

it is

these that are of

nature) and the excesses of them, in respect of which the self-indulgent man is self-indulgent. This is why the temperate man avoids [35] these pleasures; for even he has pleasures this

of his

own.

do the pleasures

(c)

—they

the pain-

that children

*3

arising

[10] involve process

wisdom pursues

and the brutes pursue pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration. We have pointed out in what sense pleasures are good without qualification and in what sense some are not good; now both the [jo] brutes and children pursue pleasures of the latter kind (and the man of practical wisdom pursues tranquil freedom from that kind), viz. those which imply appetite and pain, i.e. less life,

1153 b But further (E) it is agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided; for some pain is without qualification bad, and other pain is bad because it is in some respect an impediment to us. Now the contrary of that which is to be avoided, qua something to be avoided and bad, good. Pleasure, then,

is

is

necessarily a good.

For the answer of Speusippus, that pleasure is [5] contrary both to pain and to good, as the greater is contrary both to the less and to the equal,

is

not successful; since he would not say

that pleasure

And

(F)

is

if

essentially just a species of evil.

certain pleasures are bad, that

does not prevent the chief good from being some pleasure, just as the chief good may be some form of knowledge though certain kinds of

it is even neceseach disposition has unimpeded

knowledge are bad. Perhaps

[10] sary,

if

activities, that, 1

1

whether the

i52 b 26-1 153*7.

activity (if

unim-

BOOK

1154 b

VII,

peded) of all our dispositions or that of some one of them is happiness, this should be the thing most worthy of our choice; and this activity is pleasure. Thus the chief good would be some pleasure, though most pleasures might perhaps be bad without qualification. And for

men

think that the happy life is weave pleasure into their and reasonably too; for no perfect when it is impeded, and hap-

this reason all

[75] pleasant and ideal of happiness

—

activity

piness

is

is

a perfect thing; this

is

why

the

happy

needs the goods of the body and external goods, i.e. those of fortune, viz. in order that he may not be impeded in these ways. Those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is [20] good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. Now because we need fortune as well as other things, some people think good fortune the same thing as happiness; but

man

it is

not that, for even good fortune itself when is an impediment, and perhaps should

in excess

then be no longer called good fortune; for its limit is fixed by reference to happiness. [25] And indeed the fact that all things, both brutes and men, pursue pleasure is an indication of its being somehow the chief good: wholly lost that many peoples 1 But since no one nature or state either is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue

No

voice

[50] the

is

.

same pleasure;

.

.

yet all pursue pleasure.

And perhaps they actually pursue

not the pleasure they think they pursue nor that which they would say they pursue, but the same pleasure; for all things have by nature something divine in them. But the bodily pleasures have appropriated the

name both because we

oftenest steer

our course for them and because all men share [3s] in them; thus because they alone are familiar, men think there are no others.

1154 a

It is

activity of

evident also that

our

faculties,

is

if

pleasure,

not a good,

i.e. it

the will

not be the case that the happy man lives a pleasant life; for to what end should he need pleasure, if it is not a good but the happy man may even live a painful life? For pain is neither an evil nor a good, if pleasure is not; why then should he avoid it? Therefore, too, the [5] life of the good man will not be pleasanter than that of any one else, if his activities are not more pleasant.

CHAPTERS much

those 1

who

say that

to the bodily pleasures,

some pleasures

Hesiod, Works and Days, 763.

are very

405

to be chosen, viz. the noble pleasures, but

not the bodily pleasures, i.e. those with which [10] the self-indulgent man is concerned, must consider why, then, the contrary pains are bad. For the contrary of bad is good. Are the necessary pleasures good in the sense in which even

which is not bad is good ? Or are they good up to a point? Is it that where you have states and processes of which there cannot be too much, there cannot be too much of the corresponding pleasure, and that where there can that

be too

much

of the one there can be too

Now

[75] of the other also? much of bodily goods,

much

there can be too

and the bad man is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of pursuing the necessary pleasures (for all men enjoy in some way or other both dainty foods and wines and sexual intercourse, but not all men do so as they ought). The contrary is the case with pain; for he does

not avoid the excess of

it,

he avoids

it

alto-

[20] gether; and this is peculiar to him, for the alternative to excess of pleasure is not pain,

man who

except to the

pursues this

excess.

Since

we

should

state

also the cause of error

—

not only the truth, but for this contributes to-

wards producing conviction,

when

since

a rea-

given of why the false view appears true, this tends to produce belief sonable explanation

is

—

therefore we must state [25] in the true view the bodily pleasures appear the more

why

worthy of choice, (a) Firstly, then, it is because they expel pain; owing to the excesses of pain that men experience, they pursue excessive and being a cure for

in general bodily pleasure as

[30] the pain. intense feeling are pursued

Now

curative agencies produce

—which the reason why they —because they show up against the is

contrary pain. (Indeed pleasure is thought not to be good for these two reasons, as has been 2

viz. that (a) some of them are activities belonging to a bad nature either congenital,

said,

—

as in the case of a brute, or

those of bad

men; while

due

to habit,

(/3) others are

to cure a defective nature,

and

it is

1154 b these

arise

i.e.

meant

better to be

in a healthy state than to be getting into

it,

but

during the process of being

made

perfect and are therefore only incidentalgood.) (b) Further, they are pursued because of their violence by those who cannot enjoy other pleasures. (At all events they go out ly

of their

(G) With regard

12-14

way

to

for themselves.

practice 2

is

manufacture

When

irreproachable;

ii52 b 26-33.

thirsts

somehow

these are harmless, the

when

they are hurt-

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

406 [5] ful,

it

bad.) For they have nothing else is painful

is

to enjoy, and, besides, a neutral state

many

to

people because of their nature. For the

animal nature

is

always

in travail, as the stu-

dents of natural science also testify, saying that sight and hearing are painful; but we have become used to this, as they maintain. Similarly, while, in youth, people are, owing to the growth that

is

going on,

in a situation like that of

[10] drunken men, and youth is pleasant, on the other hand people of excitable nature always need relief; for even their body is ever in

torment owing to

its

special composition,

and

they are always under the influence of violent desire; but pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it be strong; and for these reasons they become [75] self-indulgent and bad. But the pleasures that do not involve pains do not admit of excess;

and these are among the things pleasant

by nature and not incidentally. By things pleasant incidentally I mean those that act as cures (for because as a result people are cured, through some action of the part that remains healthy, for this reason the process

is

pleasant); by things naturally pleasant

thought I

mean

BOOK

those that stimulate the action of the healthy nature.

[20] There

no one thing that is always pleasour nature is not simple but there another element in us as well, inasmuch as

1155 a After what we have is

a virtue or

said, a discussion

would naturally follow, since it implies virtue, and is besides most

[5] necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those

dominating power most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, [10] the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble 'two going together' for with [75] actions friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only in possession of office

and

of

are thought to need friends

—

1

Iliad, x. 224.

1

—

is

ant, because is

we

are perishable creatures, so that

if the one unnatural to the other nature, and when the two elements are evenly balanced, what is done seems neither painful nor pleasant; for if the nature of [25] anything were simple, the same action would always be most pleasant to it. This is why God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure; for there is not only an activity of movement but an activity of immobility, and pleasure is found more in rest than in movement. But 'change in all things is sweet', as the 2 poet says, because of some vice; for as it is the vicious man that is changeable, so the nature [jo] that needs change is vicious; for it is not simple nor good.

element does something,

this

is

We

have now discussed continence and incontinence, and pleasure and pain, both what each is and in what sense some good and others bad; it remains

of to

them

are

speak of

friendship.

VIII

among men

of friendship

1155 b

but

among

birds

and among most

[20] animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence

we

praise lovers of their fellowmen.

We

may

how

near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim see

even in our travels

[25] at most of

all,

and expel faction

as their

worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.

But

we

it is

not only necessary but also noble; for

praise those

who

love their friends,

and

it

thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same peo[jo]

is

good men and are friends. few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence

ple that are

Not

come

a

3 the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feath-

[55] er flock together', and so on; others on the b contrary say 'two of a trade never agree'. 1 155 2

Euripides, Orestes, 234.

3

Odyssey, xvn. 218.

BOOK

1156 s

On

VII,

CHAPTER 14— BOOK

question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the rain, and stately this very

heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to 1 [5] earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what opposes that helps' and

'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced through strife'; 2 while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that

The

physical problems

like

aims

may

leave alone (for they

at like.

CHAPTERS

VIII,

previously.

them friends when they do not know mutual feelings? To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing [5] goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons. one

call

their

Now

these reasons differ

kind;

so, therefore,

from each other in do the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; for with respect to each

mutual and recognized love, and love each other wish well to each that respect in which they love one an-

there

is

those

who

other in

a

Now those who love each

[10] other.

up if we first For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is use[20] ful, so that it is the good and the useful cleared

of love.

;

that are lovable as ends.

Do men

love, then, the

good, or what is good for them ? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not [25]

what

is

good

for

him but what seems make no difference;

good. This however will

we

shall just

have

to say that this

is

'that

which

seems lovable'. Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes any[30] thing for

one

may have we ought

it, it is

it

that

it

may

keep, so that

oneself); but to a friend

we

wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not resay

to

when it is reciprocal beOr must we add 'when it is recmany people have goodwill to

ciprocated; goodwill

ing friendship. ognized'? For 1

Fr. 898. 7-10,

Nauck.

2

Fr. 8, Diels.

other for

do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love their utility

for the sake of pleasure;

may perhaps be come to know the object

friendship

of

407

whom

they have not seen but judge to be [35] good or useful; and one of these might 1156 a return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could those

we

do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling, [10] e.g. whether friendship can arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of [75] degree. We have discussed this matter

The kinds

1-3

acter that

it is

not for their char-

men

love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore

those

who

love for the sake of utility love for

the sake of

those

who

what

[75] the sake of

and not

is

good

for themselves,

and

love for the sake of pleasure do so for

what

is

pleasant to themselves,

is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or

in so far as the other

pleasure.

Such friendships, then, are

easily dis-

[20] solved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer

pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.

Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question. This kind of friendship seems to [25] exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people pursue not the pleasant but the

who are in their prime or young, between those who pursue utility. And such people do not live much with each other either; for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant; therefore they do not need such companionship unless they are useful to each other; for they are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other hopes [30] of something good to come. Among such useful) and, of those

friendships people also class the friendship of

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

4 o8 host

mh\ guest.

On

the other

hand the

friend-

ship of young people seems to aim at pleasure; lor they live under the guidance of emotion, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves

and what

is

immediately before them;

but with increasing age their pleasures become different. This is why they quickly become [35] friends and quickly cease to be so; their

not

know

1157 a

each other

they have 'eaten salt admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each [jo] other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise till

together'; nor can they

friendship changes with the object that is found and such pleasure alters quickly. 1156 b Young people are amorous too; for the

quickly, but friendship does not.

greater part of the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why

This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and in all other respects, and in it each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something like what, he gives; which is what ought to happen between [35] friends. Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance to this kind; for good

pleasant,

they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often within a single day. But these people do wish to spend their days and lives [5] together; for

it is

thus that they attain the

purpose of their friendship. Perfect friendship

who

are good,

and

is

the friendship of

men

alike in virtue; for these

wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason [10] of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they

—and goodness

is an enduring thing. good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too [75] they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the sake good or pleasure either of good or of pleasure

are

good

And

each

is

—

[20] in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling— and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind

1157 a people too are pleasant

to each other.

So too does friendship for the sake of utility; for the good are also useful to each other.

Among men

of these inferior sorts too, friend-

most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g. [5] pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as happens between readywitted people, not as happens between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover; and when the bloom of youth is passing the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attentions from the first); but many lovers on the other ships are

[10]

hand

them

to love each other's characters, these be-

are constant,

if

familiarity has led

ing alike. But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their amour are both less truly friends

and

less

constant.

Those who

friends for the sake of utility part

[75] advantage is at an end; for they lovers not of each other but of profit.

For the sake of pleasure or

are

when

utility,

the

were then,

pleasant,

men may be friends of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in

qualities.

each other unless some advantage come of the

of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification

and these are the most lovable Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men. But it is natural that such friendships [25] should be infrequent; for such men are such friendship requires time

rare. Further,

and

familiarity; as the proverb says,

men

can-

even bad

relation.

[20] The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slander; for it is not easy to trust any one's talk about a man who has

long been tested by oneself; and

good men that

trust

it

is

and the feeling

among that 'he

1158

BOOK

£

would never wrong me' and

all

VIII,

the other

things that are demanded in true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is nothing to prevent these evils arising.

[25] For to those

men

apply the

whose motive

is

name

of friends even

which sense

utility, in

states are said to be friendly (for the alliances

advantage), and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called friends. Therefore we too ought perhaps to of states

seem

to

aim

at

[jo] call such people friends, and say that there firstly and in are several kinds of friendship the proper sense that of good men qua good,

—

and by analogy the other kinds; for it is in virtue of something good and something akin to what is found in true friendship that they are friends, since even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends for the sake of [55] utility and of pleasure; for things that are only

incidentally

connected

are

coupled together. 1157 b Friendship being divided kinds, bad men will be friends for pleasure or of utility, being in this each other, but good men will be their

own

sake,

i.e.

409

nothing so characteristic friends. of friends as living together (since while it is [20] people who are in need that desire benefits, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together; for solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and is

do not enjoy the same things, are companions seem to do. [25]

The

which

truest friendship, then,

we have

good, as

as friends

is

who

that of the

frequently said;

1

for that

without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is good or pleasant to him; is

and the good man is lovable and desirable to the good man for both these reasons. Now it looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love

much

[jo]

towards

may

be

lifeless things,

felt just as

but mutual

and choice springs from a and men wish well to those

love involves choice state of character;

whom

they love, for their sake, not as a result

of feeling but as a result of a state of character.

And

respect like

friends for

pleasantness; for friendship

often

in loving a friend

for themselves; for the

into

these

the sake of

without

good-

qualifi-

cation; the others are friends incidentally

through a resemblance

3-6

For there

men love what is good good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each, [55] then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in

not

in virtue of their

ness. These, then, are friends

CHAPTERS

ity,

is

said to be equal-

and both of these are found most

in the

friendship of the good.

and

to these.

[5] As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of a state of character,

others in respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship; for those

who

live together

delight in each other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; [10] distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'. Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; [75] for there is little that is pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual

1158 a Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch as they are less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for

marks

these are thought to be the greatest

and most productive of it. why, while young men become friends [5] quickly, old men do not; it is because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight; and similarly sour people do not quickly make friends either. But such This

of friendship

is

men may

bear goodwill to each other; for they wish one another well and aid one another in

need; but they are hardly friends because they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest

marks

of friendship.

[10] One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect

type with them, just as one cannot be in love

with

many

people at once (for love is a sort of and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is

excess of feeling, 1

n5 6b 7>

2 3>33>

n57 a 3°>

b

4-

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

410

many people at the same time to same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his eyes. One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person [75] and become familiar with him, and that not easy for

please the

very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should is

many

people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time. Of these two kinds that which is for the

please one; for

sake of pleasure

when both

is

the

more like friendship, same things from

parties get the

each other and delight in each other or in the [20]

same

things, as in the friendships of the

young; for generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship based on utility is for the commercially minded. People who are supremely happy, too, have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant friends; for they wish to live with some one and, though they can endure for a short time what is painful, no one could put up with it continuously, nor even [25] with the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why they look out for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends should have. People in positions of authority seem to have friends

who

fall

ple are useful to

into distinct classes;

them and

some peo-

others are pleasant,

but the same people are rarely both; for they [50] seek neither those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with a view to noble objects, but in their desire for

pleasure they seek for ready-witted peo-

and

their other friends they choose as being clever at doing what they are told, and

ple,

these characteristics are rarely combined.

we have

said that the

good man

is at

the

may

be,

1

2 1

b i56 13-15, 1157* 1-3. 156 3 16-24, * I 57 a2 °-33-

they seem to be friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these characteristics belong to the friendship of virtue as well); while

it is because the friendproof against slander and permanent, while these quickly change (be-

ship of virtue sides differing

is

from the former

in

many

other

[10] respects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e. it is because of their unlikeness to the friendship of virtue.

But there is another kind of friendship, viz. which involves an inequality between the parties, e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and that

in general that of ruler to subject.

And

these

[75] friendships differ also from each other; for it is not the same that exists between parents

and children and between

rulers

and sub-

even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these is

jects,

nor

is

and so are the reasons for which they and the friendship are therefore [20] different also. Each party, then, neither gets the same from the other, nor ought to different,

love; the love

seek

it;

but

when

children render to parents

what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent. In all friendships

implying inequality

should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship. But equality does not seem to take the same

the aforesaid

same things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for 2 utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships and less permanent. 1

by

It is

same

friendships involve equality; for the friends get the

both to be and not to be friendships.

their likeness to the friendship of virtue that

the love also should be proportional,

1

that

[5] But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought

Now

time pleasant and useful; but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is surpassed also in [55] virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally exceeded in both respects. But people who surpass him in both respects are not so easy to find.

1158 b However

1158 b

[25]

[jo]

i.e.

the

better

form

in acts of justice

what which

and

in friendship;

equal in the priis in proportion to mary sense is that merit, while quantitative equality is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and proportion to merit secondary. This for in acts of justice

becomes

clear

if

there

is

is

a great interval in re-

spect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else

between the

parties; for then they are

[35] longer friends,

and do not even expect

no to

BOOK

1159 b

And

CHAPTERS

VIII,

most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the 1159 a case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest men. In be

so.

this

is

not possible to define exactly up friends can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a

such cases

to

it is

what point

great distance, as

God

friendship ceases. This

is,

is

the possibility of

in fact the origin of

[5] the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in that case their friends will

no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the [10] sort of being he is, whatever that may be;

6-9

411

over their children to be brought up, and so [30] long as they know their fate they love them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), but seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering; and they themselves love their children

even

if

these

owing

ignorance give them nothing of a mother's due. Now since friendship depends their

to

more on

loving,

and

it is

those

who

love their

friends that are praised, loving seems to be the

[35] characteristic virtue of friends, so that it only those in whom this is found in due

is

measure that are lasting

friends,

and only

their

friendship that endures.

1159 b

It is

in this

way more than any

other

that even unequals can be friends; they can be

equalized.

Now

friendship,

and

who

equality

and likeness are

especially the likeness of those

are like in virtue; for being steadfast in

[5] themselves they hold fast to each other,

goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; it is for himself most of all that each man

and neither ask nor give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for they do not remain even like to themselves), but be-

wishes what

come

therefore

mains

a

is

it

man

for

him

only so long as he rewish the greatest

that he will

for

is

good.

friends for a short time because they de-

[10] light in each other's wickedness. Friends who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as to ambition, to wish than to love; which is why

Most people seem, owing to be loved rather

most

men

love flattery; for the flatterer

is

a

friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be [75] such and to love more than he is loved;

and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is what most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that people choose honour, but incidentally. For most people enjoy being honoured by those in [20] positions of authority because of their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore they delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while those who desire honour from good men, and men who know, are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight in honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on

the strength of the

judgement

of those

who

speak about them. In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake; whence [25] it would seem to be better than being honoured, and friendship to be desirable in itself. But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the delight

mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand

long as they provide each other with enjoyments or advantages. Friendship for utility's sake seems to be that which most easily exists between contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned; for what a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives some[75] thing else in return. But under this head, too, might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love; if they are equally lovable their claim can perhaps be justified, but when they have nothing lovable about them it is ridiculous. Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only in[20] cidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our inquiry.

[25] Friendship and justice seem, as we have 1 said at the outset of our discussion, to be con1

II55 a 22-28.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

4 I2

cerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address

and fellowand so too those associated with them any other kind of community. And the exfriends their fellow-voyagers

as

soldiers, in

tent of their association

[50] friendship, as

it is

is

the extent of their

the extent to

which

jus-

between them. And the proverb 'what friends have is common property' expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community. Now brothers and comrades have exists

tice

all

things in

we have

mon

common, but

the others to

whom

referred have definite things in

—some more things, others fewer;

friendships, too,

com-

some are more and others

by

increases

injustice

who

it is a more comrade than a

e.g.

being

exhibited

are friends in a fuller sense; terrible thing to

all

seem

these

to fall

[50] of friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of

community. 10

less

1160 a and those of brothers to each other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship. There is a difference, therefore, also between the acts that are unjust towards each of these classes of associates, and towards those

and of companionship. But under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as a whole], offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose, and assigning honours to the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations [25] for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits, because it was at these seasons that people had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to be parts of the political community; and the particular kinds of offering sacrifice

for of

[55] truly friendships. And the claims of justice differ too; the duties of parents to children

the

1160 b

defraud a

There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of deviation-forms perversions, as it were, of them. The constitutions are mon-

—

archy, aristocracy,

and thirdly that which

is

based on a property qualification, which it seems appropriate to call timocratic, though most people are wont to call it polity. The best [35] °f these is monarchy, the worst timocracy.

The

monarchy

deviation from

1160 b ny;

for both are

but there

is

is

tyran-

forms of one-man rule, the greatest difference between

increase with the intensity of the friendship,

them; the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For a man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further; therefore he will

which implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an equal

[5] not look to his own interests but to those of his subjects; for a king who is not like that

extension.

would be

more

fellow-citizen,

terrible

and one seem to

[5] not to help a brother than a stranger, terrible to wound a father than any

more else.

And

Now

the

all

demands

of justice also

forms of community are

of the political

community;

like parts

men

for

journey

together with a view to some particular ad[10] vantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both to have come together originally

and

aim

to the

common

at,

what legiswhich is the other com-

to endure, for this

lators

and they

is

call just that

advantage.

Now

aim at advantage bit by bit, e.g. what is advantageous on a voyage

[75] munities sailors at

with a view to making money or something of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking of a city that they seek, and mem-

mere

a

titular king.

Now

tyranny

is

the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues his

own good. And it is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst deviation-form; but it

is

[10]

the contrary of the best that

Monarchy

tyranny

is

is

worst.

passes over into tyranny; for

the evil

form of one-man

rule

and

the bad king becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy passes over into oligarchy by the badness of

the rulers,

who

distribute contrary to equity

—

what belongs to the city all or most of the good things to themselves, and office always to the same people, paying most regard to [75] wealth; thus the rulers are few and are bad men instead of the most worthy. Timocracy passes over into democracy; for these are coterminous, since it is the ideal even of timoc-

bers of tribes and demes act similarly [Some communities seem to arise for the sake of [20] pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social

racy to be the rule of the majority, and

clubs; for these exist respectively for the sake

tions; for in

all

who

have the property qualification count as equal. [20] Democracy is the least bad of the deviaits

case the

form

of constitution

is

BOOK

1161 b

VIII,

CHAPTERS

but a slight deviation. These then are the changes to which constitutions are most sub.

ject;

these are the

for

smallest

and

easiest

transitions.

One may

find resemblances to the constitu-

tions and, as

it

were, patterns of them even in

households. For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the

and

[25] father cares for his children;

why Homer

this

is

1

Zeus 'father'; it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule. But among calls

the Persians the rule of the father is tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for it is the ad[jo] vantage of the master that is brought about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of government, but the Persian type is pervert-

modes

ed; for the

of rule appropriate to differ-

9-12

4i3

These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king [20] over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one party over the other, is

why

is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to merit; for that is true of the

man and found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too, with the jusfriendship as well. wife, again,

is

the

The

same

tice in these relations.

friendship of

that

The

the most part like in their feelings

a constitution the ideal

m

-

doing so he

is

not acting in accordance with and not ruling in virtue

their respective worth,

of his superiority. Sometimes, however,

1161 a en

wom-

because they are heiresses; so not in virtue of excellence but due

rule,

their rule

is

to wealth

and power,

sociation of brothers

as in oligarchies.

is

The

as-

like timocracy; for they

[5] are equal, except in so far as they differ in hence if they differ much in age, the

age;

friendship

is

Democracy

is

no longer found

of the fraternal type.

chiefly in masterless dwel-

is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and every one has licence to do as he pleases.

lings (for here every one

11

[10] Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves

The

friendship between a king and his depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for

justice.

subjects

his sheep

(whence Homer

called

children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.

his

e. g., Iliad,

i.

503.

2

is

and

their

the friendship ap-

propriate to timocratic government; for in such is for the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will correspond, [jo] But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice; e.g. be[35] tween craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave; the latter in each case is ben1161 b efited by that which uses it, but there is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. But neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For

there

is

nothing

[5] slave

is

common to the two parties;

a living tool

and the

the

tool a lifeless

Qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can; for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man. Therefore while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they

slave.

[10] exist

more

equal they have

fully; for

much

in

where the

citizens are

common.

Agamemnon

'shepherd of the peoples'). 2 Such too is the [75] friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of

1

friendship of broth-

like that of

is

man

the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in

is

comrades; for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for [25] ers

character. Like this, too,

with his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands everything [35] over to ner If tne man rmes

which justice

therefore that exists between persons so related

ent relations are diverse. The association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the rules in accordance

The

ancestors are honoured.

e. g., Iliad, 11.

243.

12

Every form of friendship, then, involves asso3 ciation, as has been said. One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship of kindred and that of comrades. Those of fellowcitizens,

fellow-tribesmen,

fellow-voyagers,

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

4M

like are more like mere friendships of [75] association; for they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might class the friendship of host and guest.

and the

friendship of kinsmen itself, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on parental friendship; for par-

The

ents love their children as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being

Now

something originating from them. parents

know

(1)

their offspring better than their

[20] children know that they are their children, and (2) the originator feels his offspring to be his own more than the offspring do their begetter; for the product belongs to the producer (e.g. a tooth or hair or anything else to

him whose it is), but the producer does not belong to the product, or belongs in a less degree. And (3) the length of time produces the same [25] result; parents love their children as soon as these are born,

but children love their parand they have

ents only after time has elapsed

acquired understanding or the power of discrimination by the senses. From these considerations

it

is

also plain

why mothers

more

love

than fathers do. Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love each other [30] as being born of the their identity

same parents;

for

with them makes them identical

with each other (which ple talk of 'the

same

is

the reason

blood', 'the

why

same

peo-

stock',

and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though in separate individuals.

Two

things that contribute greatly to friend-

common

upbringing and similarity of age; for 'two of an age take to each other', and people brought up together tend to be comship are a

[^5] rades; whence the friendship of brothers 1162 a is akin to that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together by derivation from brothers, viz. by being derived from the same parents. They come to be closer

together or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance of the original ancestor.

The [5]

friendship of children to parents, and of

men

to gods,

is

a relation to

them

as to

something good and superior;

for they have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth; and this kind of friendship possesses pleasant-

ness ers,

and utility also, more than that of stranginasmuch as their life is lived more in com-

1162 b

mon. The friendship

of brothers has the char-

[10] acteristics found in that of comrades (and especially when these are good), and in gener-

between people who are like each other, inasas they belong more to each other and start with a love for each other from their very birth, and inasmuch as those born of the same parents and brought up together and similarly educated are more akin in character; and the test of time has been applied most fully and al

much

convincingly in their case. [75] Between other kinsmen friendly relations are found in due proportion. Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for

man is naturally inclined to form couples even more than to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than and reproduction is more common to with the animals. With the other animals the union extends only to this point, but huthe

city,

man

[20] man beings live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different; so they help each other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the

common

stock. It

[25] is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship.

on

also

But

virtue,

if

this friendship

may

be based

the parties are good; for each

own virtue and they will delight in the And children seem to be a bond of union (which is the reason why childless people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is common holds them tohas

its

fact.

gether.

How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually to behave seems to [jo] be the same question as how it is just for them to behave; for a man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow. 13

There are three kinds of friendship,

as

we

said

1

[55] at the outset of our inquiry, and in respect of each some are friends on an equality

and others by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally good men become friends but 1162 b a better man can make friends with a worse, and similarly in friendships of pleasure or utility the friends

may

be equal or unequal This being so,

in the benefits they confer).

equals must effect the required equalization on a basis of equality in love and in all other re1

1

156*

7.

1163

BOOK

£

VIII,

CHAPTERS

spects, while unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority or inferiority. [5] Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the friendship of utility, and

this

is

friends

only to be expected. For those who are on the ground of virtue are anxious to

12-14

4*5

[35] happens because all or most men, while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous; now it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, but it is

the receiving of benefits that

1163 a Therefore

do well by each other (since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship), and between men

the equivalent of

who

will;

are emulating each other in this there can-

not be complaints or quarrels; no one is offended by a man who loves him and does well if he is a person of nice feeling [10] by him he takes his revenge by doing well by the other. And the man who excels the other in the serv-

—

he renders will not complain of his friend, what he aims at; for each man desires what is good. Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships of pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if they enjoy spending their time together; and even a man who complained of another for not afford[75] ing him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since it is in his power not to spend his days ices

since he gets

with him. But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use each other for their own interests they always want to get the better of the bargain, and think they have got less than they should, and blame their partners because they do not get all they 'want and deserve'; and and those who do well by others cannot help [20]

them

as

much

as those

whom they benefit

want.

Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do not the

dissolve the relation in the spirit of

same type of friendship

25] tracted it. on fixed terms; le

on the

more

basis of

The

in

legal type

which they Cottis that which is

purely commercial variety is immediate payment, while the

its

time but stipulates quid pro quo. In this variety the debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it contains an element of friendliness; and so some states do not allow suits [jo] arising out of such agreements, but think men who have bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept the consequences. The moral type is not on fixed terms; it makes a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend; but one expects to receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a man is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was when it was contracted he will complain. This liberal variety allows

for a definite

is

advantageous.

we can we should return what we have received (for

if

we must not make a man our friend against his we must recognize that we were mistak-

and took a benefit from a person not have taken it from since it was not from a friend, nor from one who did it and we must setjust for the sake of acting so

en

at the first

—

we should

—

[5] tie up just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one would agree to re-

pay

one could

if

(if

one could not, even the giv-

would not have expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible we must repay. But at the outset we must consider the man by whom we are being benefited and on what terms he is

er

acting, in order that

on these terms, or

we may

accept the benefit

else decline

it.

we ought to measure a service by its utility to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the benevolence of the giver. For those who have received say they have received from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and what they might have got from others minimizing the service; while the givers, on the contrary, say it was the biggest thing they had, [75] and what could not have been got from others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar need. Now if the friendship is one that aims at utility, surely the advantage to the receiver is the measure. For it is he that asks for the service, and the other man helps him on the assumption that he will receive the equivalent; so the assistance has been precisely as great as the advantage to the receiver, and [20] therefore he must return as much as he has received, or even more (for that would be nobler). In friendships based on virtue on the [10]

It

is

disputable whether

—

other hand, complaints do not arise, but the purpose of the doer is a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of virtue and character.

Differences arise also in friendships based on [25] superiority; for each expects to get more

out of them, but ship

is

dissolved.

when this happens the friendNot only does the better man

think he ought to get more, since more should be assigned to a good man, but the more useful similarly expects this; they say a useless man

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

416 should not get as

much

as they should, since

is

the use of being the

[^5] friend of a good man or a powerful one is to get nothing out of it?

man,

if

all

events

it

justified in his claim,

seems that each party

is

and that each should get

—

more out of the friendship than the other not more of the same thing, however, but the superior more honour and the inferior more gain; for honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence, while gain

is

the assistance re-

quired by inferiority. [5] It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements also; the man who contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honoured; for what belongs to the public is given to the man who benefits the public, and honour does belong to the public. It is not possible to get wealth from the common stock and at the same time honour. For no one puts up with the [10] smaller share in all things; therefore to the man who loses in wealth they assign hon-

our and to the

man who

is

willing to be paid.

and preserves the friendship,

the parties

act of public service

need; what, they say,

1163 b At

wealth, since the proportion to merit equalizes

it

and not a friendship if the proceeds of the friendship do [30] not answer to the worth of the benefits conferred. For they think that, as in a commercial partnership those who put more in get more out, so it should be in friendship. But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim; they think it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in becomes an

1164 a as

we

have said. 2 This then is also the way in which we should associate with unequals; the man who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must give honour in return, repaying what he can. For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not [75]

what

proportional to the merits of the

is

cannot always be done, e.g. in honours paid to the gods or to parents; for no one could ever return to them the equivalent of what he gets, but the man who serves them to the utmost of his power is thought to be a case; since that

good man. This

is

why

it

would not seem open

to a

man

[20] to disown his father (though a father may disown his son); being in debt, he should reis nothing by doing which a son have done the equivalent of what he has received, so that he is always in debt. But creditors can remit a debt; and a father can therefore do so too. At the same time it is thought that presumably no one would repudiate a son who was not far gone in wickedness; for apart

pay, but there will

from the natural friendship of father and son

human

nature not to reject a son's assisif he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding his father, or not be zealous about it; for most people wish to get benefits, but avoid doing them, as a thing unit

is

ts]

tance.

profitable.

BOOK

But the son,

—So much

for these questions.

IX

the sake of pleasure while the beloved loves the

and they do not both possess the qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the friendship it is dissolved when they do not get the things that [10] formed the motives of their love; for each did not love the other person himself but the qualities he had, and these were not enduring;

lover for the sake of utility,

In

all

friendships between dissimilars

we have

said,

1

it is,

as

proportion that equalizes the

and preserves the friendship; e.g. in the political form of friendship the shoemaker gets parties

[55] a return for his shoes in proportion to his

1164 a worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen do the same. Now here a common measure has been provided in the form of money, and therefore everything is referred to this and measured by this; but in the friendship of sometimes the lover complains that his excess of love is not met by love in return (though perhaps there is nothing lovable about [5] him), while often the beloved complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now performs nothing. Such incidents lovers

happen when the lover l C£ ii32 b 3i-33» 1163 15 n.

n5 8b

loves the beloved for

b a 27» II 59 35- 3>

n62 a

34

-b

that

is

why

the friendships also are transient.

But the love of characters, dures because

it is

as has

been

said, en-

3 self-dependent. Differences

arise when what they get is something different and not what they desire; for it is like getting nothing at all when we do not get what we [75] aim at; compare the story of the person

who made him

promises to a lyre-player, promising

the more, the better he sang, but in the

morning, when the other demanded the fulfilof his promises, said that he had given

ment 2

n62 a 34- b 4,

3

ii56 b 9-i2.

4,

cf.

1158b 27, ii59a 35- b

3.

1165

BOOK

s

CHAPTER 14— BOOK IX, CHAPTERS Now if this had been We see this happening

pleasure for pleasure.

VIII,

what each wanted, all would have been well; but if the one wanted enjoyment but the other gain, and the one has what he wants while the other has not, the terms of the association will [20] not have been properly fulfilled; for what

each in fact wants is what he attends to, and it is for the sake of that that he will give what he has. But who is to fix the worth of the service; he who makes the sacrifice or he who has got the advantage? At any rate the other seems to leave it to him. This is what they say Protagoras [25] used to do; whenever he taught anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of the knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. But in such matters some men approve of the saying 'let a man have his fixed reward'. 1

1-2

4i7

too with things put

up

for sale, and in some places there are laws providing that no actions shall arise out of voluntary contracts, on the assumption that one should settle with a person to whom one has [75] given credit, in the spirit in which one bargained with him. The law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms than that the person who gave credit should do so. For most things are not assessed at the same value by those who have them and those who want them; each class values highly what is its own and what it is offering; yet the return is made on the terms [20] fixed by the receiver. But no doubt the receiver should assess a thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he assessed it at before he had it.

Those who get the money first and then do none of the things they said they would, owing to the extravagance of their promises, naturally

find themselves the objects of complaint; for

what they agreed to. The sophists are perhaps compelled to do this because no one would give money for the things they do know. These people then, if they do not do what they have been paid for, are [jo] they

naturally

do not

made

fulfil

the objects of complaint.

But where there those

who

give

is

no contract of

up something

the other party cannot (as

we have

[55] complained of (for that

service,

for the sake of

is

said)

2

be

the nature of

1164 b the friendship of virtue), and the return to them must be made on the basis of their purpose (for it is purpose that is the characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue). And so too, it seems, should one make a return to those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured against money, and they can get no honour which will bal[5] ance their services, but still it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents, to give them what one can. If the gift was not of this sort, but was made with a view to a return, it is no doubt preferable that the return made should be one that seems fair to both parties, but if this cannot be achieved, it would seem not only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix [10] the reward, but also just; for if the other gets in return the equivalent of the advantage the beneficiary has received, or the price he would have paid for the pleasure, he will have got what is fair as from the other. 1

Hesiod, Wor^s and Days, 370, Rzach.

2

n62 b 6-i 3

.

A

further problem is set by such questions as, whether one should in all things give the preference to one's father and obey him, or whether when one is ill one should trust a doctor, and when one has to elect a general should elect a [25] man of military skill; and similarly whether one should render a service by preference to a friend or to a good man, and should

show friend,

gratitude to a benefactor or oblige a if one cannot do both.

All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision? For they admit of many variations of

magnitude

all

sorts in respect

of the service

[jo] necessity. But that

preference in plain enough;

all

and of its

we should

both of the nobility

and

not give the

things to the same person

and we must

for the

is

most part

return benefits rather than oblige friends, as

we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g. should a man who has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands

ransom

his

ransomer in return, whoever he

may

be (or pay him if he has not been 1165 a captured but demands payment), or should he ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself. As we have said, 3 then, generally the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations. For some[5] times it is not even fair to return the equivalent of what one has received, when the one man has done a service to one whom he knows [35]

3

n64 b 3i-i 165*2.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

418

makes a return to he believes to be bad. For that matter, one should sometimes not lend in return to one who has lent to oneself; for the one person lent to a good man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other has no hope of recovering from one who is believed to be bad. Therefore [10] if the facts really are so, the demand is not fair; and if they are not, but people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange in refusing. As we have often pointed

1165 b

to be good, while the other

one

out,

whom

and

then, discussions about feelings

1

much

tions have just as

ac-

definiteness as their

subject-matter.

That we should not make the same return

to

[75] every one, nor give a father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain enough; but since we

ought

to render different things to parents,

brothers, comrades,

and benefactors, we ought

render to each class what is appropriate and becoming. And this is what people seem in fact to do; to marriages they invite their kinsfolk; for these have a part in the family and to

therefore in the doings that affect the family; [20] and at funerals also they think that kins-

should meet, for the

folk, before all others,

same reason.

And

it

would be thought

that in

we should help our parents since we owe our own nour-

the matter of food

before

all

others,

ishment to them, and

it is

more honourable

to

help in this respect the authors of our being even before ourselves; and honour too one should give to one's parents as one does to the ods, but not any and every honour; for that 25] matter one should not give the same honour to one's father and one's mother, nor again

should one give them the honour due to a philosopher or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again to a mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropriate to their age,

by rising to receive them and find-

ing seats for them and so on; while to comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of [jo] speech and common use of all things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen and fellowcitizens and to every other class one should al-

ways try to assign what is appropriate, and to compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or usefulness.

The comparison

is

easier

when

the per-

and more laborious when they are different. Yet we must not [35] on that account shrink from the task, but sons belong to the

same

class,

decide the question as best 1

io94 b

1

1-27,

1098 s 26-29,

x

we

can.

I0 3 b 34 _I I0 4 a 5*

Another question that

arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Per-

1165 b haps we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these

For

was of these attriand when these have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. [5] But one might complain of another if, butes that

attributes.

we were

it

the friends;

when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character. For, as

we

said at the outset, 2

ferences arise between friends

most

dif-

when

they are not friends in the spirit in which they think they are. So when a man has deceived himself and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; [10] but when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person,

it is just that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with

something more valuable. But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him ? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is [75] good. What is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad; and we have said 3 that like is dear to like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is

this

not so in

all cases,

when

but only

one's

friends are incurable in their wickedness? If

they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this

and But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up. But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former [20]

more

as a friend

is

better

characteristic of friendship.

?

Surely he cannot.

When

the inter-

[25] val is great this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a child in intellect while the other [62 b 23-25.

3

ii56 b 19-21, ii59 b

1.

BOOK

1166 b

IX,

CHAPTERS

became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things ? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and with1 out this (as we saw) they cannot be friends;

2-4

419

on condition and the element that thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any other element in him. the good); he wishes for this only

of being whatever he

And

such a

is;

man

for he does so

wishes to live with himself; with pleasure, since the mem-

[jo] for they cannot live together. But we have 2 discussed these matters. Should he, then, behave no otherwise to-

ories of his past acts are delightful

wards him than he would

if he had never been he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than [35] strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.

subjects of contemplation.

his friend? Surely

rejoices,

seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for [5] his sake; which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come into conflict. And (3) others define him as one who

with and (4) has the same tastes as another, or (5) one who grieves and rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in mothers most of all. It is by some one of these characterlives

istics

that friendship too

is

defined.

Now

each of these is true of the good man's relation to himself (and of all other men in so far as they think themselves good; virtue 3 and the good man seem, as has been said, to be [10]

the measure of every class of things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what [75] seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for

the sake of the intellectual element in him, is thought to be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he

which

For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is [20] good, while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one

thinks.

else (for that matter, 1 1

* 1

i57b 22-24. 1

i3 a 22-33, c f-

2

even

now God

Ibid., 17-24, 1099s 13.

1

possesses

i58b 33-35.

his

the

And he grieves and more than any other, with himself; for same thing is always painful, and the same

thing always pleasant, and not one thing at one time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing to repent of.

Therefore, since each of these characteristics [jo] belongs to the good

and he

himself,

1166 a Friendly relations with one's neighbours, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes and does what is good, or

and

[25] hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant. His mind is well stored too with

is

man

in relation to

related to his friend as to

himself (for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of these attributes,

and those who have these friends.

Whether

between a

may

there

man and

to be not friendship a question we

attributes

or

is

himself

is

is

dismiss for the present; there

would seem

[55] to be friendship in so far as he is two or 1166 b more, to judge from the afore-men-

tioned attributes of friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love for oneself.

But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of men, poor creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in so far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are good, they share in these attri[5] butes ? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and impious has these attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong even to inferior people; for they are at variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things and rational desires for others. This is true, for instance,

of

incontinent

people;

for

they

choose, instead of the things they themselves

think good, things that are pleasant but hurt[10] ful; while others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people with whom to spend their days, and shun themselves; for they remember many a [75] grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they are by themselves, but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing lovable in them they have no feeling of love to themselves. Therefore also such men

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

420

with themselves; for and one element in grieves wickedness its of reason it by [20] when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad men are laden with repentance. [25] Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wickedness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be either friendly to oneself or a

do not

rejoice or grieve

their soul

is

rent by faction,

friend to another.

[50] Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but not identical with friendship; for one may

is

have goodwill both towards people whom one does not know, and without their knowing it, but not friendship. This has indeed been said 1 already. But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling implies intimacy while good[35] w iH ma Y ar i se of a sudden, as it does towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel 1167 a goodwill for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly

and love them only superficially. Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of

friendship, as the pleasure of the eye

is

the be-

ginning of love. For no one loves if he has not been delighted by the form of the beloved, [5] but he who delights in the form of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so when he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence; so too it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel goodwill for each other, but those who feel goodwill are not for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not do anything with them nor take trouble for them. And so one [10] might by an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship) not first

—

1167 b

the friendship based on utility nor that based

on pleasure;

for goodwill too does not arise

those terms.

The man who

on

has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but in doing so is only do[75] ing what is just; while he who wishes

some one

to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him. In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the [20] sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest.

Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not identity of opinion; for that might occur even with people who do not know each other; nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about [25] the heavenly bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly relation), but we do say is unanimous when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do what they

that a city

have resolved in common. It is about things to be done, therefore, that people are said to be unanimous, and, among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible for both or all parties to get what they want; e.g. a [50] city

is

unanimous when

all its citizens

think that the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be their ruler at a time when he himself was also willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes himself to have the thing in question, like the captains in 2 the Phoenissae, they are in a state of faction; for it is not unanimity when each of two parties thinks of the same thing, whatever that [55] may be, but only when they think of the same thing in the same hands, e.g. when both the common people and those of the better 1167 b class wish the best men to rule; for thus and thus alone do all get what they aim at. Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life. [5] Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous both in them-

—

2

Euripides, The Phoenician Maidens, 588

ff.

1168

BOOK

s

and with one another, being, so

selves

mind

of one

(for the wishes of such

IX,

CHAPTERS

to say,

men

are

constant and not at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for

advantageous, and common endeavour as well. But bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any more than they [10] can be friends, since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labour and public service they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to

what

is

just

and what

is

these are the objects of their

4-8

421

which they have treated well is their handiwork, and therefore they [5] love this more than the handiwork does its maker. The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and like; for that

tors

is

that

we

exist

by virtue of activity

(i.e.

by living

and acting), and that the handiwork

is

in a

producer in activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handisense, the

work manifests in activity. At the same time to the benefactor

himself criticizes his neighbour and stands in his way; for if people do not watch it carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting [75] compulsion on each other but unwilling

agent, but at most something advantageous,

themselves to do what

and

is

just.

that

is

[10] noble which depends on his action, so that he delights in the object of his action, whereas to the patient there

this

pleasant

is less is

is

nothing noble in the

pleasant and lovable.

What

is

the activity of the present, the hope

memory of the past; but most which depends on activity, and this is most lovable. Now for a

of the future, the

Benefactors are thought to love those they have benefited, more than those who have been well treated love those that have treated

and

this

doxical.

is

discussed as though

Most people think

it is

it

them

exist,

memory

while creditors actually take care of

the safety of their debtors, so

it is

thought that

benefactors wish the objects of their action to

then get their gratitude, while the beneficiaries take no interest in mak[25] ing this return. Epicharmus would perhaps declare that they say this because they 1 'look at things on their bad side', but it is quite like human nature; for most people are forgetful, and are more anxious to be well treated than to treat others well. But the cause would seem to be more deeply rooted in the nature of things; the case of those who have lent money is not even analogous. For they have no friend[50] ly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they may be kept safe with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have

exist since they will

done a

service to others feel friendship

for those they

have served even

of any use to

them and never

if

these are not

will be.

This

is

for they have an excessive love for their own poems, doting on them as if they were their children. This is what the position of benefaci

4 6,Kaibel.

of noble things

is pleasant, but that of not likely to be pleasant, or is so; though the reverse seems true of expec-

useful things less

is

tation.

Further, love

is

like activity,

[20] passivity; and loving ants are attributes of those

being loved like its concomit-

and

who

are the

more

active.

Again, all men love more what they have by labour; e.g. those who have made their money love it more than those who have inherited it; and to be well treated seems to involve no labour, while to treat others well is a labori-

won

ous task. These are the reasons, too, why mothfonder of their children than fathers; [25] bringing them into the world costs them more pains, and they know better that the chil-

ers are

dren are their own. This last point, seem to apply to benefactors.

too,

would

8

and love

what happens with craftsmen too; every man [35] loves his own handiwork better than he would be loved by it if it came alive; and this 1168 a happens perhaps most of all with poets;

!Fr.

[75] similarly has

man who

lat-

[20] mer of creditors; and therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their creditors did

not

that

for-

were para-

and the

is

made something his work remains (for the noble is lasting), but for the person acted on the utility passes away. And the

well,

because the

ter are in the position of debtors

pleasant

question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most, or some one else. People criticize those who love themselves most, and call them self-lovers, using this as an [30] epithet of disgrace, and a bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is and so men reproach him, for instance, with doing nothing while the good man acts of his own accord for honour's sake, and the more so the better

The

—

—

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

4 22

he

is,

and

fices his

acts for his friend's sake,

own

and

sacri-

interest.

[35] But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not surprising. For men say that one 1168 b ought to love best one's best friend, and man's best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a man's attitude towards himself, and so are all the other attributes by which [5] a friend

from

is

is

defined; for, as

we have

said,

1

it

this relation that all the characteristics

of friendship have extended to our neighbours.

All the proverbs, too, agree with this, e.g. 'a 2 and 'what friends have is common

single soul', property',

and 'friendship

is

and

equality',

home'; for all these marks will be found most in a man's relation to himself; he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best. It is therefore a rea[10] sonable question, which of the two views we should follow; for both are plausible. Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and determine how far and in what respects each view is right. Now if we grasp the sense in which each school uses 'charity begins at

may become

the phrase 'lover of self, the truth

[75] evident. Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign

hon-

to themselves the greater share of wealth,

ours,

and bodily

pleasures; for these are

what

most people desire, and busy themselves about as though they were the best of all things, which is the reason, too, why they become objects of competition. So those who are grasping with regard to these things gratify their appe[20]

tites

and

in general their feelings

and the

element of the soul; and most men are of this nature (which is the reason why the epithet has come to be used as it is it takes its irrational

—

and just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore the man who loves this and gratifies it is most of all a lover of self. Besides, a man is said to have or not to have self-control according as his reason has or has not the control,

assumption that

greatest, since virtue

he does

That

it is

way

those

are re-

who

give

is

the

man

on the and

himself;

is

the greatest of goods.

Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, following as [75] he does evil passions. For the wicked man, what he does clashes with what he ought to do, but what the good man ought to do he does; for reason in each of its possessors chooses

men who

so.

this

[^5] the things men have done on a rational 1169 a principle are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him. Whence it follows that he is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which is a matter of reproach, and as different from that as living according to a rational principle is from living as passion [5] dictates, and desiring what is noble from desiring what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble actions all men approve and praise; and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be [10] for the common weal, and every one would secure for himself the goods that are

what

are lovers of self in this

a

himself the things that are noblest and best, [30] and gratifies the most authoritative element in himself and in all things obeys this;

meaning from the prevailing type of self-love, which is a bad one); it is just, therefore, that proached for being

1169

is

best for

his reason. It

and

is

many

itself,

and the good man obeys good man too that

true of the

acts for the sake of his friends

his country,

and

if

necessary dies for them;

[20] for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are ob-

themselves the preference in regard to objects of this sort that most people usually call lovers [25] of self is plain; for if a man were always anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance

jects of competition,

with any other of the virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself the honourable course, no one will call such a man a lover of self or blame him. But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at all events he assigns to

[25] noble action to many trivial ones. those who die for others doubtless attain this

1

Chapter

4.

2

Euripides, Orestes, 1046.

gaining for himself nohe would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great and bility; since

Now

result; it is therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw away wealth too on condition that their friends will

BOOK

Il70 a

IX,

CHAPTERS

gain more; for while a man's friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to himself. The [jo] same too is true of honour and office; all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for himself. Rightly

he thought to be good, since he chooses But he may even give up actions to his friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act then

is

nobility before all else.

[55] himself. In all the actions, therefore, that are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is

men

1169 b noble. In said, a

man

sense in

should be a lover of

which most men are

also disputed

It is

been

this sense, then, as has

but in the

self;

so,

can contemplate our neighbours better tnan ourselves and their actions better [35] than our own, and if the actions of virtuous

will

1

[10] who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to do well by another than to be well

done by, and to confer benefits is characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to do well by friends than by strangers, the good man will need people to do well by. This is why the question is asked whether we need in prosperity or in adversity,

that not only does a

man

adversity need people to confer benefits

him, but also those

who

in

on

are prospering need

people to do well by. Surely it is strange, too, make the supremely happy man a solitary;

to

no one would choose the whole world on

for

condition of being alone, since

man

is

a politi-

and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the happy man lives with others; for he has the things that are [20] by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend his days with friends and good men than with strangers or any chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs friends. What then is it that the first school means,

cal creature

and

men

in

what

respect

is it

right?

[50] (1) happiness lies in living and being acand the good man's activity is virtuous

tive,

man

whether the happy

more

present at the start like a piece of property. If

and pleasant in itself, as we have said at the 3 outset, and (2) a thing's being one's own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and

provide by his own effort; whence the saying 'when fortune is kind, what need of friends?' But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends,

[75] friends

Is it

that

most

identify friends with useful people?

Of

we

(3)

men who are their friends are pleasant to good 1170* men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant), the supremely

Euripides, Orestes, 667.

happy

man

—

be

if this

need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities. so,

will

men

think that the happy man Now if he were a sol[5] itary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier. Further,

ought to

With

live pleasantly.

others therefore his activity will be

continuous, and

it

is

more

in itself pleasant, as

it

ought to be for the man who is supremely happy; for a good man qua good delights in virtu[10] ous actions and is vexed at vicious ones, as a musical

man

enjoys beautiful tunes but

is

bad ones. A certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good, as Theognis has said before us. pained

If

we

at

look deeper into the nature of things,

a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which is good [75] by nature,

we have

said,

4

is

for the virtu-

ous man good and pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception in that of man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the corresponding activity,

which

is

the essential thing;

therefore

life

seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or 2

1098* i6b 31-1099* 7. i099 a 7-1 1, 1 1 13* 25-33. ,

1

4 23

he ought not.

need friends or not. It is said that those who are [5] supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a man cannot

on the assumption

8-9

such friends indeed the supremely happy man will have no need, since he already has the [25] things that are good; nor will he need those whom one makes one's friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure); and because he does not need such friends he is thought not to need friends. But that is surely not true. For we have said 2 at the outset that happiness is an activity; and activity plainly comes into being and is not

4

3

io99 a

14, 21.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

4 24

And

thinking.

life is

among

good and pleasant in themselves, since it is [20] determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good; and that which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems pleasant to all men); but we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain; indeterminate, as are

its attri-

[25] butes. The nature of pain will 1 plainer in what follows. But if life

become

for such a life

is

good and pleasant (which

it

itself is

seems to be, from

the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly those who are good and supremely happy;

men

for to such

existence

who

he

life is

most

and their and if and he who

desirable,

the most supremely happy)

is

sees perceives that

hears, that he hears,

he

sees,

and he who walks, that he

[50] walks, and in the case of all other activisimilarly there is something which per-

ties

we perceive, if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for ceives that

we

we

are active, so that

perceive that

we

perceive,

if

and

was defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is

existence

1170 b

one of the things that are pleasant (for by nature good, and to perceive what is

in itself life is

good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant

is

(for they are pleased at the consciousness of the [5] presence in them of what is in itself good); if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to

and

is another self): be true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of

his friend also (for his friend

—

this

if all

his friend.

Now

sirable because

his being was seen to be dehe perceived his own goodness,

and such perception

is

pleasant in

itself.

He

[10] needs, therefore, to be conscious of the ex-

and this will be reand sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place. istence of his friend as well,

alized in their living together

If,

then, being

is

in itself desirable for the su-

10

[20] Should we, then, as possible, or is

thought

happy 1

will therefore

x. 1-5.

to be

need virtuous friends.

many

friends it

have an excessive number of friends? To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thoroughly applicable; for to do services to many people in return is a [25] laborious task and life is not long enough for its performance. Therefore friends in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are superfluous, and hindrances to the noble life; so that we have no need of them. Of friends made with a view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough. But as regards good friends, should we have [50] as many as possible, or is there a limit to the number of one's friends, as there is to the size of a city?

You

cannot

make

a city of ten

men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not a single number, but anything that falls between certain fixed points. So for 1171 a friends too there is a fixed number perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together (for that, we found, 3 is thought to be very characteristic of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and divide oneself up among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends of one another, if they are all to spend their days to[5] gether; and it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number.

found difficult, too, to rejoice and to grieve an intimate way with many people, for it may likely happen that one has at once to be happy with one friend and to mourn with another. Presumably, then, it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are enough for the purpose of living to[10] gether; for it would seem actually impossible to be a great friend to many people. This is why one cannot love several people; love is It is

in

practice; for

is

as

one should guests nor a man

—

is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be

The man who

make

as in the case of hospitality

be 'neither a man of many with none' 2 will that apply to friendship as well; should a man neither be friendless nor

can only be

Now

—

to be suitable advice, that

[75] premely happy man (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend

deficient in this respect.

1171'

the things that are

ideally a sort of excess of friendship,

and

that

towards one person; therefore great friendship too can only be felt towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed in felt

we do

not find

are friends in the comradely 2 3

many people who way of friendship,

Hesiod, Worths and Days, 750, Rzach. H57 b i9, 1158*3. 10.

1172

BOOK

a

IX,

CHAPTERS

9-12

425

in their grief, and love them as and companions in sorrow. But in all things one obviously ought to imitate the bet-

and the famous t/5] ways between two people. Those who have many friends and mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one's friend, except in the way proper to fellow-citizens, and

pathisers

such people are also called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it is possible to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man; but one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on the character of our friends themselves, and we must be content if

in our prosperity implies both a pleasant pass-

friendships of this sor.t are al-

[20]

we

find even a few such. 11

need friends more in good fortune or bad? They are sought after in both; for while men in adversity need help, in prosperity they need people to live with and to in

wish

the objects of their beneficence; for they do well by others. Friendship, then, is

to

bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case; but it is [25] more noble in good fortune, and so we also seek for good men as our friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these and to live with these. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both in good fortune and

more necessary

also

in

in

bad, since grief

is

when

lightened

[50] friends sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether they share as it were our burden,

—without

—

happening their presence by its pleasantness, and the thought of their grieving with us, make our pain less. Whether it is for these reasons or for some other that or

our grief

is

that

lightened,

dismissed; at

all

is

events

is

On

the other hand, the presence of friends

ing of our time and the pleasant thought of their pleasure at our own good fortune. For [75] this cause it would seem that we ought to our friends readily to share our good

summon

fortunes (for the beneficent character is a noble one), but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give them as little a share as possible in our evils whence the saying 'enough is my misfortune'. should summon friends to us most of all when they are likely by suffering a few inconveniences to do us a great service. [20] Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those in adversity (for it is

what we

pleasant, especially

We

if

one

is

1171 b in adversity, and becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend tends to comfort us both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows our character and [5] the things that please or pain us); but to see him pained at our misfortunes is painful;

one shuns being a cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally insensible to pain, such a man cannot for every

stand the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners be[10] cause he is not himself given to mourning; but women and womanly men enjoy sym-

and and have nobler and

characteristic of a friend to render services,

especially to those

not

who

are in need

demanded them; such

action

is

when our should join readily (for they need friends for

pleasanter for both persons); but friends are prosperous in their activities

we

these too), but be tardy in

coming forward

to

be the objects of their kindness; for it is not [25] noble to be keen to receive benefits. Still, we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill-joys by repulsing

them; for that some-

times happens.

The able in

presence of friends, then, seems desirall circumstances. 12

may

be have described

a question that

appears to take place. But their presence seems to contain a mix[55] ture of various factors. The very seeing of one's friends

ter type of person.

1

Do we

make

friends

Does

it

not follow, then, that, as for lovers the

[3°] sight of the beloved is the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others

because on

it

and

origin, so for friends the

for

its

sirable thing is is

love depends

is

most for

living together?

a partnership,

and

he to his friend;

as a

now

man

being de-

For friendship

is

in his

its

most

to himself, so

own

case the

consciousness of his being is desirable, and so [35] therefore is the consciousness of his

and the activity of this con1172 a sciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose, sake friend's being,

they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the 1 Fr. adesp. 76, Nauck.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

426

[5] study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most

wish to

in life; for since they

live

with their

they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together. Thus the friendship of bad men turns out an friends,

[10] evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other),

1172 b

while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve whence the saying 'noble deeds from noble men'. So much, [75] then, for friendship; our next task must be to discuss pleasure.

—

1

—

BOOK X proceed to review the opinions that have been expressed about pleasure.

After

these matters

we ought perhaps

next to

thought to be most intimately connected with our human nature, [20] which is the reason why in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure

Eudoxus thought pleasure was the good be[10] cause he saw all things, both rational and

and pain;

things that which

discuss pleasure.

For

it is

thought, too, that to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character. For these things extend right it

is

with a weight and power of their own in respect both to virtue and to the happy [25] life, since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful; and such things, it will be thought, we should least of all omit to discuss, especially since they admit of much dispute. For some say pleasure is the good, while others, on the contrary, say it is thoroughly bad some no doubt being persuaded that the facts are so, and others thinking it has a better effect on our life to exhibit pleasure [jo] as a bad thing even if it is not; for most people (they think) incline towards it and are

through

life,

—

the slaves of their pleasures, for

they ought to lead

them

which reason

in the opposite direc-

reach the middle state. not correct. For arguments about matters concerned with feelings and ac[55] tions are less reliable than facts: and so when they clash with the facts of perception they are despised, and discredit the truth as tion, since thus they will

But surely

this

is

H72 b

well; if a man who runs down pleasure once seen to be aiming at it, his inclining towards it is thought to imply that it is all worthy of being aimed at; for most people are not good at drawing distinctions. True arguments seem, then, most useful, not only with is

view to knowledge, but with a view to harmonize with the facts they are believed, and so they stimulate those who understand them to live according to them. Enough of such questions; let us [5] a

life

also; for since they

—

irrational,

what

is

aiming

excellent,

at is

and

and because

it,

in

the object of choice that

which

is

all is

most the

object of choice the greatest good; thus the fact that all things

moved towards

object indicated that this

was

for

all

the

chief

good (for each thing, he argued,

own

good, as

it

finds

its

same

things the finds

its

own nourishment);

and that which is good for all things and at [75] which all aim was the good. His arguments were credited more because of the excellence of his character than for their

own

was thought to be remarkably selfcontrolled, and therefore it was thought that he was not saying what he did say as a friend of pleasure, but that the facts really were so. He believed that the same conclusion followed no less plainly from a study of the contrary of pleasure; pain was in itself an object of aversion to all things, and therefore its contrary [20] must be similarly an object of choice. And again that is most an object of choice which sake; he

we

choose not because or for the sake of something else, and pleasure is admittedly of this nature; for no one asks to what end he is pleased, thus implying that pleasure is in itself an object of choice. Further, he argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g. to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of [25] choice, and that it is only by itself that the good can be increased. This argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more a good than any other; for every good is more worthy of choice along

with another good than taken alone. And 2 so it is by an argument of this kind that Plato 1

Theognis, 35.

2

Philebus, 60.

BOOK

H73 b

IX,

CHAPTER 12— BOOK

proves the good not to be pleasure; he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wis-

dom

than without, and that if the mixture is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it. Now it is clear that nothing else, any more than pleasure, can be the good if it is made more desirable by the addition of [

jo]

is

better, pleasure

any of the things that are good

in themselves.

CHAPTERS

X,

1-3

427

based on the various pleasures, surely they are not stating the real cause, if in fact some pleasures are

unmixed and

others mixed. Again, admits of degrees without being [25] indeterminate, why should not pleasure? The same proportion is not found in all things, nor a single proportion always in the same thing, but it may be relaxed and yet persist up just as health

to a point,

and

it

may differ in degree. The case may therefore be of this kind.

What, then, is there that satisfies this criterion, which at the same time we can participate in? It

of pleasure also

something of this sort that we are looking for. [55] Those who object that that at which all things aim is not necessarily good are, we may surmise, talking nonsense. For we say that ll73 a that which every one thinks really is so; and the man who attacks this belief will hardly have anything more credible to maintain in-

movements and comings into being are imperfect, and try to exhibit pleasure as being a movement and a coming into being. But they do not seem to be right even in saying that it is a movement. For speed and slowness are thought to be proper to every movement, and if a movement, e.g. that of the heavens, has not

senseless creatures that desire the

speed or slowness in itself, it has it in relation something else; but of pleasure neither of these things is true. For while we may become pleased quickly as we may become angry quick1173 b ly, we cannot be pleased quickly, not even in relation to some one else, while we can walk, or grow, or the like, quickly. While, then, we can change quickly or slowly into a state of pleasure, we cannot quickly exhibit the activity of pleasure, i.e. be pleased. Again, how can it be a coming into being? It is not thought that any chance thing can come out of any chance thing, but that a thing is dissolved into [5] that out of which it comes into being; and pain would be the destruction of that of which pleasure is the coming into being. They say, too, 2 that pain is the lack of that which is according to nature, and pleasure is replenishment. But these experiences are bodily. If then pleasure is replenishment with that which is according to nature, that which feels pleasure will be that in which the replenish[10] ment takes place, i.e. the body; but that is not thought to be the case; therefore the replenishment is not pleasure, though one would be pleased when replenishment was taking place, just as one would be pained if one was being operated on. This opinion seems to be based on the pains and pleasures connected with nutrition; on the fact that when people have been short of food and have felt pain beforehand [75] they are pleased by the replenishment. But this does not happen with all pleasures; for the pleasures of learning and, among the sensuous pleasures, those of smell, and also

is

stead. If

it is

things in question, there might be something in what they say; but if intelligent creatures do so as well, what sense can there be in this view? But perhaps even in inferior creatures there is some natural good stronger than themselves which aims at their proper good. [5] Nor does the argument about the contrary of pleasure seem to be correct. They say that if pain is an evil it does not follow that pleasure is a good; for evil is opposed to evil and at the same time both are opposed to the neutral state

—which

is

correct

enough but does not apply For if both pleasure

to the things in question.

[10] and pain belonged to the class of evils they ought both to be objects of aversion, while if they belonged to the class of neutrals neither should be an object of aversion or they should

both be equally so; but in fact people evidently avoid the one as evil and choose the other as good; that then must be the nature of the opposition between them.

Nor again, if pleasure is not a quality, does it follow that it is not a good; for the activities of virtue are not qualities either, nor is happiness. [75]

They

say,

however, that the good

is

deter-

minate, while pleasure is indeterminate, because it admits of degrees. Now if it is from the feeling of pleasure that they judge thus, the same will be true of justice and the other virtues, in respect of

which we

plainly say that

people of a certain character are so more or less, and act more or less in accordance with these [20] virtues; for people may be more just or brave, and it is possible also to act justly or temperately

more

or

less.

But

if

their

judgement

is

1

Again, they assume that the good

is

perfect

[jo] while

to

many sounds and 1

2

sights,

Plato, Philebus, 53-54. Ibid., 31-32, 42.

and memories and

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

428 hopes, do not presuppose pain. will these be the

coming

Of what then

into being?

There has

not been lack of anything of which they could be the supplying anew. [20] In reply to those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures one may say that these are not pleasant; if things are pleasant to people of vicious constitution, we must not suppose that they are also pleasant to others than these, just as we do not reason so about the things

wholesome

or sweet or bitter to sick people, or ascribe whiteness to the things that seem white to those suffering from a disease of that are

—

that [25] the eye. Or one might answer thus the pleasures are desirable, but not from these sources, as wealth is desirable, but not as the reward of betrayal, and health, but not at the

anything and everything. Or perhaps pleasures differ in kind; for those derived from noble sources are different from those derived from base sources, and one cannot get the pleasure of the just man without [jo] being just, nor that of the musical man cost of eating

without being musical, and so on.

The fact, flatterer

too, that a friend

seems to make

it

is

different

from

plain that pleasure

a is

not a good or that pleasures are different in kind; for the one is thought to consort with us with a view to the good, the other with a view to our pleasure, and the one is reproached for his conduct while the other is praised on the

ground that he consorts with us for different 1174 a ends. And no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by doing some most disgraceful

deed, though he were never to feel any pain in consequence. And there are many things we [5] should be

no pleasure,

keen about even if they brought remembering, know-

e.g. seeing,

ing, possessing the virtues. If pleasures necesthese, that makes no odds; choose these even if no pleasure resulted. It seems to be clear, then, that neither is pleasure the good nor is all pleasure desirable, sarily

do accompany

we should

and that some pleasures are desirable in them[10] selves, differing in kind or in their sources from the others. So much for the things that are said about pleasure and pain.

which coming into being later form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason, too, it is not a movement. For evlack anything

will

complete

ery

movement

time and

will

pleasure

is,

what kind of thing it is, if we take up the question

or

become plainer

again from the beginning. Seeing seems to be [75] at any moment complete, for it does not

is

[20] plete

its

(e.g. that of building)

for the sake of

when

it

has

made what

takes

comaims at. the whole

an end, and

is

it

It is complete, therefore, only in time or at that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each oth-

For the fitting together of the stones is diffrom the fluting of the column, and these are both lifferent from the making of the temple; and the making of the temple is [25] complete (for it lacks nothing with a view to the end proposed), but the making of

er.

ferent

the base or of the triglyph

each

is

the

making

in kind, then,

and

is

incomplete; for

of only a part.

They

differ

not possible to find at any and every time a movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time. So, too, in the case of walking and all other movements. For if locomotion is a movement from [jo] here to there, it, too, has differences in kind flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only so, but in walking itself there are such differences; for the whence and whither are not the same in the whole racecourse and in a part of it, nor in one part and in another, nor 1174 b is it the same thing to traverse this line and that; for one traverses not only a line but one which is in a place, and this one is in a difhave discussed ferent place from that. movement with precision in another work, but it seems that it is not complete at any and every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and different in kind, since the [5] whence and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form is complete at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible it is

—

We

1

to be pleased; for that

moment From

What

1174b

is

which takes place

in a

a whole.

these considerations

it

is

clear,

too,

that these thinkers are not right in saying there

a movement or a coming into being of pleas[10] ure. For these cannot be ascribed to all

is

1

Physics, vi- viii.

BOOK

1175 b

X,

things, but only to those that are divisible

CHAPTERS

and

not wholes; there is no coming into being of seeing nor of a point nor of a unit, nor is any of these a movement or coming into being; therefore there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure either; for it is a whole. [75] Since every sense is active in relation to object, and a sense which is in good condi-

its

tion acts perfectly in relation to the tiful

of

its

be ideally of this nature; whether it is

may

most beau-

objects (for perfect activity seems to

we

organ in which be assumed to be immaterial),

active, or the

say that

it

resides,

it

follows

that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of

objects.

its

And

this activity will

[20] be the most complete and pleasant. For, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense,

3-5

429

when

they look hard at a thing, but afterwards our activity is not of this kind, but has grown relaxed; for which reason the pleasure also is dulled. their vision

[10] One might think that all men desire pleasure because they all aim at life; life is an

and each

activity,

mind

in reference to theoretical questions,

and

they desire.

It is

with good reason, then, that

they aim at pleasure too, since for every one it completes life, which is desirable. But whether

we

choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the present. For they seem to be bound up together and not to admit of separa-

will always be pleasure,

differ

agent and patient are both present.) Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding

active about those

[75] so on in each case; now pleasure completes the activities, and therefore life, which

fering in kind.

the requisite

is

most; e.g. the musician is active with his hearing in reference to tunes, the student with his

and in respect of thought and contemplation no less, the most complete is pleasantest, and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete; and the pleasure completes the activity. But the pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the combination of object and [25] sense, both good, just as health and the doctor are not in the same way the cause of a man's being healthy. (That pleasure is produced in respect to each sense is plain; for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant. It is also plain that it arises most of all when both the sense is at its best and it is active in reference to an object which corresponds; when both ob[50] ject and perceiver are of the best there since

man

things and with those faculties that he loves

[20] tion, since without activity pleasure does

not arise, and every activity the attendant pleasure.

For

this reason pleasures

is

completed by

seem, too, to differ in

kind. For things different in kind are, we think, completed by different things (we see this to be true both of natural objects and of things produced by

art, e.g. animals, trees, a [25] painting, a sculpture, a house, an implement); and, similarly, we think that activities

differing in kind are completed by things dif-

Now

the activities of thought

from those of the

among

senses,

themselves, in kind;

and both

differ

so, therefore,

do

the pleasures that complete them.

permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age.

This may be seen, too, from the fact that each of the pleasures is bound up with the ac-

So long, then, as both the

tensified

ble object

intelligible or sensi-

and the discriminating or contem-

plative faculty are as they should be, the pleas-

ure will be involved in the activity; for when 1175 a both the passive and the active factor are unchanged and are related to each other in the same way, the same result naturally follows.

How,

then,

pleased?

Is it

all

human

no one is continuously that we grow weary? Certainly is it

that

beings are incapable of continuous

[5] activity. Therefore pleasure also is not continuous; for it accompanies activity. Some

things delight us

when

they are new, but later for at first the mind is in a state of stimulation and intensely active about them, as people are with respect to

do

so less, for the

same reason;

[50] tivity

by

of things

is

it

completes. For an activity

is

in-

proper pleasure, since each class better judged of and brought to

its

who engage in the activity with pleasure; e.g. it is those who enjoy geometrical thinking that become geometers and precision by those

grasp the various propositions better, and, sim-

who are fond of music or of buildan d so on, make progress in their proper function by enjoying it; so the pleasures ilarly,

[35]

those

m g>

intensify the activities,

and what

intensifies a

proper to it, but things different in kind have properties different in kind. Il75 b This will be even more apparent from the fact that activities are hindered by pleasures arising from other sources. For people who are fond of playing the flute are incapable thing

is

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

430 of attending to

they overhear since they enjoy

arguments

if

some one playing the flute, [5] flute-playing more than the

activity

hand; so the pleasure connected with

in

flute-

playing destroys the activity concerned with argument. This happens, similarly, in all other cases, when one is active about two things at once; the more pleasant activity drives out the other,

and

if it is

much more

pleasant does so

the more, so that one even ceases

all

from the

why when we enjoy anything very much we do not throw ourselves into anything else, and do one thing only when we are not much pleased by another; e.g. in the theatre the people who eat sweets do so most when the actors are poor. Now since activities are made precise and more enduring [10] other. This

and

better

is

by their proper pleasure, and injured

[75] by alien pleasures, evidently the two kinds of pleasure are far apart. For alien pleasures do pretty much what proper pains do, since

destroyed by their proper pains; finds writing or doing sums unpleasant and painful, he does not write, or does not do sums, because the activity is painful. So [20] an activity suffers contrary effects from its proper pleasures and pains, i.e. from those that supervene on it in virtue of its own nature. activities are

e.g. if a

man

And alien pleasures have been stated to do much the same as pain; they destroy the activity,

only not to the same degree.

Now since activities differ in respect of goodly] ness and badness, and some are worthy to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, too, are the pleasures; for to each activity there is a proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and that proper to an unworthy activity bad; just as the appetites for noble objects are laudable, those [50] for base objects culpable. But the pleasures involved in activities are more proper to them than the desires; for the latter are separated both in time and in nature, while the former are close to the activities,

and

so

hard

1176*

Each animal pleasure, as

it

thought to have a proper has a proper function; viz. that is

which corresponds to its activity. If we survey [5] them species by species, too, this will be evident; horse, dog, and man have different pleasures, as Heraclitus says 'asses would pre1

sweepings to gold'; for food is pleasanter than gold to asses. So the pleasures of creatures different in kind differ in kind, and it is plausible to suppose that those of a single species do [10] not differ. But they vary to no small ex-

fer

men at least; the same things some people and pain others, and are painful and odious to some, and pleasant to and liked by others. This happens, too, in the case of sweet things; the same things do not seem sweet to a man in a fever and a healthy man- -nor hot to a weak man and one in good condition. The same happens in other cases. [75] But in all such matters that which appears to the good man is thought to be really so. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and virtue and the good man as such are the measure of each thing, those also will be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant which he enjoys. If the things he finds tiresome seem [20] pleasant to some one, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in tent, in the case of

delight

many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. Those which are admittedly disgraceful plainly should not be said to be pleasures, except to a perverted taste; but of those that are thought to be good what kind of pleasure or what pleasure should be said to be [25] that proper to man? Is it not plain from the corresponding activities? The pleasures follow these. Whether, then, the perfect and supremely happy man has one or more activities, the pleasures that perfect these will be said in the strict sense to be pleasures proper to man, and the rest will be so in a secondary and fractional way, as are the activities.

to distinguish

from them that

it admits of dispute whether not the same as the pleasure. (Still, pleasure does not seem to be thought or perception that would be strange; but because [35] they are not found apart they appear to some people the same.) As activities are different, then, so are the corresponding pleasures. 1176 a Now sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the pleasures,

the activity

is

—

therefore, are similarly superior,

and those of

thought superior to these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior to others.

Now

that we have spoken of the virtues, [50] the forms of friendship, and the varieties of pleasure,

what remains

is

to discuss in outline

the nature of happiness, since this state the

end

of

human more

cussion will be the

up what we have

is

nature to be. concise

said already.

if

we

We

what we

Our first

said,

2

dis-

sum

then,

not a disposition; for if it were it might belong to some one who was asleep that

it

is

throughout 1

his life, living the life of a plant,

Fr. 9, Diels.

2

1

o95 b 3 1 - 1 096*

2,

1

o98 b 3 1 - 1 099*

7.

1177

BOOK

s

X,

CHAPTERS

some one who was suffering the

or, again, to

[35] greatest misfortunes. If these implications 1176 b are unacceptable, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before,

1

and

if

some

activities are necessary,

and

5-7

43

of something else

Now

—except happiness, which

is

and work for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order that one an end.

may

to exert oneself

exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts

amusement

it,

seems

desirable for the sake of something else, while

right; for

others are so in themselves, evidently happiness desirable in them-

and we need relaxation because we cannot

must be placed among those

among

those desirable for the sake [5] of something else; for happiness does not those lack anything, but is self-sufficient. selves,

not

Now

activities

are

desirable

which nothing

is

in

sought beyond the

And of this nature virtuous to be; for to

themselves

its

own

activity.

actions are thought

do noble and good deeds

desirable for

from

is

a thing

sake.

Pleasant amusements also are thought to be of this nature; we choose them not for the sake [10] of other things; for we are injured rather

than benefited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our property. But most of the people who are deemed happy take refsuch pastimes, which is the reason why are ready-witted at them are highly esteemed at the courts of tyrants; they make

uge

in

those

who

themselves pleasant companions in the tyrants' [75] favourite pursuits, and that is the sort of these things are thought they want.

to be of the nature of happiness because people in despotic positions spend their leisure in

them, but perhaps such people prove nothing;

and reason, from which good activdo not depend on despotic position; nor, if these people, who have never tasted pure [20] and generous pleasure, take refuge in the

for virtue flow,

bodily pleasures, should these for that reason be thought more desirable; for boys, too, think the things that are valued are the best.

It is

among

themselves

to be expected, then, that, as

seem valuable to boys and to bad men and to good. Now, as we have often maintained, 2 those [25] things are both valuable and pleasant which are such to the good man; and to each man the activity in accordance with his own disposition is most desirable, and, therefore, to the good man that which is in accordance with different things

men,

so they should to

Happiness, therefore, does not lie in amusement; it would, indeed, be strange if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one's life in or[50] der to amuse oneself. For, in a word, everything that we choose we choose for the sake virtue.

2

Relaxation, then,

is

taken for the sake of ac-

it is

tivity.

11 77 a ous;

The happy

now

life is

thought to be virtu-

a virtuous life requires exertion,

and

does not consist in amusement. And we say that serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement,

and that the activity of the better of any two whether it be two elements of our being or two men is the more serious; but the things

—

—

[5] activity of the better is ipso facto superior and more of the nature of happiness. And any

chance person

—even

—can

enjoy the man; but no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness unless he assigns to him also a share in hu[10] man life. For happiness does not lie in such occupations, but, as we have said before, 3 in virtuous activities. a slave

bodily pleasures no less than the best

—

happiness is activity in accordance with virit is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and [75] divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is con4 templative we have already said. Now this would seem to be in agreement 5 both with what we said before and with the If

tue,

truth. For, firstly, this activity

io98a 5-7. 1099s J 3>

15-22.

is

the best (since

[20] not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects);

and secondly,

it is

the most continu-

we

can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything. And we think happiness has pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is adous, since

3

4 1

work continuously.

[35]

not an end; for

a sort of relaxation,

Now

man

ities

is

s a b 1 098 16, n76 35- 9. Cf. io95 b 14-1096*5,

1

141

s

i8- b 3, ii43b 33-1144* 6,

1145*6-11.

ni3a

22-33,

u66a

12,

1097* 25- b ai, 1099* 7-21, ii73 b 15-19, b 75 36- 1 1 76* 3.

5

1170* 14-16, 1176* 1

1

H74 b

20-23,

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

43 2

[25] mittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activevents the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvellous for their purity and ities; at all

and

their enduringness,

who know

those

it is

to be expected that

pass their time

will

who

pleasantly than those

inquire.

more

And

the

spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity. For while a philosopher, as well as a just man or one posself-sufficiency that

is

sessing any other virtue, needs the necessaries [50] of life, when they are sufficiently equipped

with things of that sort the just man needs peowhom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow11 77 b workers, but still he is the most selfple towards

sufficient.

And

to be loved for

from from

this activity alone its

own

apart from the contemplating, while we gain more or less

it

practical activities

apart from the action. to

depend on

may have

[5]

may

would seem

sake; for nothing arises

leisure; for leisure,

affairs,

seem

we

are busy that

and make war that

we we

Now

the activity of the pracexhibited in political or military

live in peace.

tical virtues is

And happiness is thought

but the actions concerned with these

to be unleisurely.

would seem

absolutely murder-

ous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also unleisurely,

and

—aims

—apart from the

political action

it-

power and honours, or at all events happiness, for him and his fellow [75] citizens a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being difself

at despotic

—

So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for ferent.

their

which

own is

sake, but the activity

of reason,

contemplative, seems both to be supe-

[20] rior in serious worth

and

to

aim

at

no end

beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy

man are evidently those connected with this activity, it

follows that this will be the complete

happiness of man,

if it

life

none of the

(for

attributes of

happiness is incomplete). But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so rior to

much

our composite nature

perior to that

which

is

as this

is its

is

supe-

activity su-

the exercise of the other

kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in com[50] parison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing 1178 a in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something else. And what we said [5] before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest. 1

Warlike actions are

completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; [10] any one

[25] term of

1178-

be allowed a complete

But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this befit [10] our human estate. Just and brave acts, and other virtuous acts, we do in relation to each other, observing our respective duties with regard to contracts and services and all manner of actions and with regard to passions; and all of these seem to be typically human. Some of them seem even to arise from the [75] body, and virtue of character to be in many ways bound up with the passions. Practical wisdom, too, is linked to virtue of character,

and

this to practical

ciples of practical

wisdom,

wisdom

since the prin-

are in accordance

with the moral virtues and Tightness in morals is in accordance with practical wisdom. Being connected with the passions also, the moral vir[20] tues must belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are hu-

man; so, therefore, are the life and the happiness which correspond to these. The excellence of the reason is a thing apart; we must be content to say this 1

n69b 33,

1

1

much

76 b 26.

about

it,

for to describe

it

1179

BOOK

1

X,

CHAPTERS

than our purpose requires. It would seem, however, also to need [25] external equipment but little, or less than moral virtue does. Grant that both need the necessaries, and do so equally, even if the statesman's work is the more concerned with the body and things of that sort; for there will be little difference there; but in what they need for the exercise of their activities there will be much difference. The liberal man will need money for the doing of his liberal deeds, and [30] the just man too will need it for the returning of services (for wishes are hard to discern, and even people who are not just pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need power if he is to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to his virtue, and the temperate man will need opportunity; for how else is either he or any of the others to be recprecisely

ognized?

a task greater

is

It is

[35] the deed

assumed 11 78 b that

is

for deeds

debated, too, whether the will or is

more essential

to involve both; its

many

to virtue,

it

is

which

surely clear

perfection involves both; but

things are needed, and more,

the greater and nobler the deeds are. But the

man who

is contemplating the truth needs no such thing, at least with a view to the exercise of his activity; indeed they are, one may say, [5] even hindrances, at all events to his contemplation; but in so far as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he chooses to do virtuous acts; he will therefore need such aids

to living a

human

life.

But that perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will appear from the following consideration as well. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of actions must we assign to [10] them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers and running risks because it is

noble to do so ?

Or

liberal acts ?

will they give? It will be strange

To whom if

they are

have money or anything of the kind. [75] And what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, every one really to

supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep [20] like Endymion. Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation ? Therefore the activity of

God, which surpasses

all

7-8

433

must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature others in blessedness,

of happiness.

This

is

indicated, too, by the fact that the

other animals have

no share

in happiness, be-

ing completely deprived of such activity. For [25] while the whole life of the gods is blessed,

and that of men too

some likeness none of the they in no way

in so far as

of such activity belongs to them,

other animals

is

happy, since

share in contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does,

and

whom

contemplation more fully be[30] longs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is in itself precious. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation. But, being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body [35] also must be healthy and must have food 1179 a and other attention. Still, we must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or great things, merely because he cannot be supremely happy without external goods; for self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess, and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for even with [5] moderate advantages one can act virtuously (this is manifest enough; for private persons are thought to do worthy acts no less than despots indeed even more); and it is enough that we should have so much as that; for the life of the man who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy. Solon, too, was perhaps sketching well the happy man when he 1 [10] described him as moderately furnished with externals but as having done (as Solon thought) the noblest acts, and lived temperately; for one can with but moderate possessions do what one ought. Anaxagoras also seems to have supposed the happy man not to be rich nor a despot, when he said that he would not be surprised if the happy man were to seem to most people a strange person; for [75] they judge by externals, since these are all they perceive. The opinions of the wise seem, then, to harmonize with our arguments. But while even such things carry some conviction, the truth in practical matters is discerned from the facts of life; for these are the [20] decisive factor. We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the those to

—

test of 1

the facts of

Herodotus,

1.

30.

life,

and

if it

harmonizes

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

434

we must accept it, but if it with the clashes with them we must suppose it to be facts

mere theory. Now he who exercises his reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as [25] they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that

which was best and most akin to them (i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the philosopher is mani[30] fest. He, therefore, is the clearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably be also the happiest; so that in this

way

too the

philosopher will more than any other be happy.

matters and the virtues, and also friendand pleasure, have been dealt with suffi-

1180*

Now

some think that we are made good [20] by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature's part evidently does not depend on causes

is

us,

but as a result of some divine

present in those

who

are truly fortu-

argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been culti[25] vated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed. For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways? nate; while

And

in general passion

seems to yield not

to

argument but to force. The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship [jo] to virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base. But it is difficult to get from youth up a right one has not been brought

If these

training for virtue

ship

up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most people, espe-

ciently in outline, are

we

programme has reached

to suppose that our

its

end ? Surely,

as the

[^5] saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the 1179 b various things, but rather to do them;

with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good. Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, [5] as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among our youth, and to

make

which is gently born, and a what is noble, ready to be pos-

a character

true lover of

[10] sessed by virtue, they are not able to enmany to nobility and goodness.

courage the

For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures and the means to them, [75] and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument would remould such people? It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character; and perhaps we must be content if, when all the influences by which we are thought to become good are present,

we

get

some

tincture of virtue.

cially

when

if

they are young. For this reason

[55] their nurture and occupations should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when

they have become customary. But it is surely 1180* not enough that when they are young they should get the right nurture and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up, practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense

of

what

is

noble.

This is why some think that legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue and urge them forward by the motive of the noble, on the assumption that those who have been well advanced by the formation of habits will attend to such influences; and that punishments and penalties should be imposed on those who disobey and are of inferior nature, while the incurably bad should be completely banished. A good man (they think), since he lives with his [10] mind fixed on what is noble, will submit to argument, while a bad man, whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by pain like a beast of burden. This is, too, why they say the pains inflicted should be those that are most opposed to the pleasures such men love. However that may be, if (as we have said) 1 the man who is to be good must be well trained [75] and habituated, and go on to spend his [5]

1

1

i79 b 31-1180*

5.

1181

BOOK

s

X,

CHAPTERS

time in worthy occupations and neither willingly nor unwillingly do bad actions, and if this can be brought about if men live in accordance with a sort of reason and right order, provided this has force, if this be so, the paternal command indeed has not the required force or [20] compulsive power (nor in general has the command of one man, unless he be a king or something similar), but the law has compulsive

—

power, while it is at the same time a rule proceeding from a sort of practical wisdom and reason. And while people hate men who oppose their impulses, even if they oppose them rightly, the law in its ordaining of what is good is not burdensome. [25] In the Spartan state alone, or almost alone, the legislator seems to have paid attention to questions of nurture and occupations; in most states such matters have been neglected, and each man lives as he pleases, Cyclops-fashion, 1 'to his own wife and children dealing law'. Now it is best that there should be a public and proper care for such matters; but if they are [30] neglected by the community it would seem right for each man to help his children and friends towards virtue, and that they should have the power, or at least the will, to

do

this.

It

would seem from what has been said that this better if he makes himself capa-

he can do

For public control is plainly and good control by good [55] laws; whether written or unwritten would seem to make no difference, nor whethble of legislating.

effected by laws,

1180b

er they are

laws providing for the edu-

cation of individuals or of groups

—any more

does in the case of music or gymnastics and other such pursuits. For as in cities laws and prevailing types of character have force, so

than

it

in households

do the injunctions and the habits

[5] of the father, and these have even more because of the tie of blood and the benefits he

confers; for the children start with a natural affection

and disposition

to obey. Further, pri-

vate education has an advantage over public,

medical treatment has; for while in general rest and abstinence from food are good

as private

[10] for a man in a fever, for a particular man they may not be; and a boxer presumably does not prescribe the same style of fighting to all

would seem, then, that the detail is worked out with more precision if the control is private; for each person is more likely to get what suits his case. his pupils. It

But the 1

details

Odyssey, ix. 114

can be best looked

ff.

after,

one

8-9

435

by one, by a doctor or gymnastic instructor or any one else who has the general knowledge of what is good for every one or for people of a [75] certain kind (for the sciences both are said to be, and are, concerned with what is universal); not but what some particular detail may perhaps be well looked after by an unscientific person, if he has studied accurately in the light of experience what happens in each case, just as some people seem to be their own best doctors, though they could give no help to [20] any one else. None the less, it will perhaps be agreed that if a man does wish to become master of an art or science he must go to the universal,

and come

sible; for, as

to

we have

know

said,

it

it is

as well as pos-

with

this that

the sciences are concerned.

And surely he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better by his care must try to

become capable

of legislating,

if

it

is

[25] through laws that we can become good. For to get any one whatever any one who is

—

—

put before us into the right condition is not for the first chance comer; if any one can do it, it is the man who knows, just as in medicine and all other matters which give scope for care and prudence. Must we not, then, next examine whence or how one can learn how to legislate ? Is it, as in all other cases, from statesmen? Certainly it [50] was thought to be a part of statesmanship. Or is a difference apparent between states-

manship and the other sciences and arts? In same people are found offering to teach the arts and practising them, e.g. doc-

the others the

[^5] tors or painters; but while the sophists

1181 a profess to teach politics, it is practised not by any of them but by the politicians, who would seem to do so by dint of a certain skill and experience rather than of thought; for they are not found either writing or speaking about such matters (though it were a nobler occupation perhaps than composing speeches for the law-courts and the assembly), nor again are [5] they found to have made statesmen of their own sons or any other of their friends. But it was to be expected that they should if they could; for there is nothing better than such a skill that they could have left to their cities, or could prefer to have for themselves, or, therefore, for those dearest to them. Still, experience seems to contribute not a little; else they could [10] not have become politicians by familiarity with politics; and so it seems that those who aim at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

43 6

But those of the sophists who profess the art seem to be very far from teaching it. For, to put the matter generally, they do not even know what kind of thing it is nor what kinds it is about; otherwise they would not have classed it as identical with rhetoric or even inferior to it, nor have thought it easy to [75] legislate by collecting the laws that are thought well of; they say it is possible to select the best laws, as though even the selection did

of things

not demand intelligence and as though right judgement were not the greatest thing, as in matters of music. For while people experienced in any department judge rightly the works [20] produced in it, and understand by what means or how they are achieved, and what harmonizes with what, the inexperienced must be content if they do not fail to see whether the

work has been

well or

ill

made

Now laws are as

—

as in the case

were the 'works' 1181 b of the political art; how then can one learn from them to be a legislator, or judge which are best? Even medical men do not seem to be made by a study of text-books. Yet people try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments, of painting.

it

but also how particular classes of people can be cured and should be treated distinguishing [5] the various habits of body; but while this seems useful to experienced people, to the inexperienced it is valueless. Surely, then, while

—

1181 b

collections of laws,

and of constitutions

also,

may

be serviceable to those who can study them and judge what is good or bad and what enactments suit what circumstances, those who [10] go through such collections without a practised faculty will not have right

judgement

be as a spontaneous gift of nature), though they may perhaps become more intelli(unless

it

gent in such matters. Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our [75] ability our philosophy of human nature. First, then, if anything has been said well in detail by earlier thinkers, let us try to review it; then in the light of the constitutions we have collected let us study what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve or destroy the particular kinds of constitution, that

some

and to what causes it is due and others ill administered.

are well

[20] When these have been studied we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a comprehensive view, which constitution is best, and how each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use, if it is to be at its best. Let us make a beginning of our discussion.

POLITICS

CONTENTS: POLITICS BOOK Definition

and

natural finance I

structure of the State

2.

11.

BERLIN NOS.

CHAP. 1.

The state is the highest form of com- 1252 s 1 munity and aims at the highest good. How it differs from other communities will appear if we examine the parts of which it is composed 1252 s 24 It consists of villages which consist of households. The household is founded upon the two relations of male and female, of master and slave; it exists to satisfy man's daily needs. The village, a wider community, satisfies a

wider range of needs. The

satisfying all

the needs of

state

aims

ther to child 13.

at

sons

capable of an inferior kind of virtue. Socrates was wrong in denying that there are several kinds of virtue. Still the slave must be trained in virtue. The education of the free be subsequently discussed

BOOK

8.

The

which

10.

is

possible

439

II

i26ob 28 by examining both the

ascertain the nature of the ideal

we should

start

and the

best that theorists

solved

Among

theorists, Plato in the

Republic

the most fundamental questions.

He

raises

desires to

and the family But the end which he has in view is 1261 s 10 wrong. He wishes to make all his citizens ababolish private property

2.

solutely alike; but the differentiation of functions

3.

4.

is

a law of nature.

There can be too

much unity in a state And the means by which he would i26i b promote unity are wrong. The abolition

16

of property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection 1262 s 25 Other objections can be raised; but this

5.

unnatural finance. It has been by the invention of coined money. It accumulates money by means of exchange. Natural and unnatural finance are often treated as though they were the same, but differ in their aims Also in their subject-matter; for 1258 s 18

made

will

have imagined. Otherwise we might waste our time over problems which others have already

is

1256k 40 But we do not need that form of finance which accumulates wealth for its own sake. This

To

man

Commonwealths. Plato, Phaleas, Hippodamus

best states of history

slave

the household 9.

1.

state

is a i253 b 23 animate, and useful for action rather than for production Slavery is natural; in every depart1254 s 18 ment of the natural universe we find the relation of ruler and subject. There are human beings who, without possessing reason, understand it. These are natural slaves But we find persons in slavery who 1255 s 3 are not natural slaves. Hence slavery itself is condemned by some; but they are wrong. The natural slave benefits by subjection to a master The art of ruling slaves differs from 1255k 16 that of ruling free men but calls for no detailed description; any one who is a natural master can acquire it for himself As to property and the modes of ac1256 s 1 quiring it. This subject concerns us in so far as property is an indispensable substratum to

piece of property

7.

1259k management persons 17 more attention than things; free perfor more than slaves. Slaves are only

In household call for

Ideal

1253 s 3^

subject should be

we must discuss and distin- 1259 s 3^ guish the relations of husband to wife, of fa-

men. Men form

Let us discuss the household, since the state is composed of households

and the

by statesmen

12. Lastly,

political association

4. First as to slavery.

6.

exist,

specially studied

Household economy. The Slave. Property. Children and Wives

5.

minerals, for money. Special trea-

on finance

tises

bare subsistence; but the ultimate object of the state is the good life. The naturalness of the state is proved by the faculty of speech in man. In the order of Nature the state precedes the household and the individual. It is founded on a natural impulse, that

3.

only concerned with the

and animals

Natural finance is necessary to the I258 b 9 householder; he must therefore know about live stock, agriculture, possibly about the exchange of the products of the earth, such as

wood and

states to secure a

towards

is

fruits of the earth

is

the fatal one

1262k 38 descend to details. The advantages to be expected from communism of property would be better secured if private property were used in a liberal spirit to relieve the wants of others. Private property makes men happier, and enables them to cultivate such virtues as generosity. The Republic makes unity the result of uniformity among the citizens, which is not the case. The good sense of mankind has always been against Plato, and

To

CONTENTS

440 experiment would show that

his idea

im-

is

practicable 6.

i264 b 26 Plato sketched another ideal state Laws; it was meant to be more practica-

in the

ble than the other. In the Laws he abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the lead-

ing ideas of the earlier treatise, except that he made the new state larger and too large. He forgot to discuss foreign relations, and to fix a limit of private property, and to restrict the increase of population, and to distinguish between ruler and subject. The form of govern-

7.

fices together. These are bad features. But the discontent of the people is soothed by schemes of emigration 12. Of lawgivers, Solon was the best; I273 b 27 conservative when possible, and a moderate

democrat. About Philolaus, Charondas, Phaleas, Draco, Pittacus, and Androdamas there is little to be said.

BOOK The 1.

He is more than a mere who

let

(3) reward discoveries of public utility.

juries qualify their verdicts,

those

His

who made

classes

and

his property

find a definition citizens.

parents

Some

To is

He

is

ordinarily one

who

which

define

him

it

is

sits

on

hard

to

applies to all so-called as the

son of citizen

futile

i275 b 22

say that his civic rights

must have been

who

But he

justly acquired.

is

a

has political power, however ac-

quired 3.

4.

system were badly are impossible

Similarly the state is defined by 1276 s 7 reference to the distribution of political power;

when the mode of distribution is changed a new state comes into existence The good citizen may not be a 1276 16 good man; the good citizen is one who does good service to his state, and this state may be 15

to

when

learns to rule by obeying orders. Therefore

Qualified

verdicts

jurymen may not confer together. The law about discoveries would encourage men

since

tamper with the Constitution. Now laws obsolete and absurd should be changed; but needless changes diminish the respect for law

The

best existent states

Carthage

—

Sparta, Crete,

— Gree\ lawgivers

5.

and

Spartans cannot manage 1269 s 29 their serf population. Their women are too influential and too luxurious. Their property system has concentrated all wealth in a few hands. Hence the citizen body has decreased. There are points to criticize in the Ephorate, the Senate, the Kingship, the common meals, the Admiralty. The Spartan and his state are only fit for war. Yet even in war Sparta is hampered by the want of a financial system The Cretan cities resemble Sparta i27i b 20 in their constitutions, but are more primitive. the

common

Cosmi

Cretan constitution

narrow and are saved from

is

a

choice

The 6.

The Carthaginian

I272 b 22

polity

is

highly

The aims

i278 b 6

of the state are two: to

man's social instinct, and to fit him for the good life. Political rule differs from that over slaves in aiming primarily at the good of 7.

those who are ruled Constitutions are bad or good 1279 s 22 according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. Of good Constitutions there are three: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity. Of bad there are also three: Tyranny, Oligarchy, Extreme Democracy. The bad are perversions

of the 8.

and not without reason. It may be compared with the Spartan; it is an oligarchy with some democratic features. It lays stress upon wealth; in Carthage all offices are bought and sold. Also, one man may hold several of-

Democracy

satisfy

The

destruc-

Classification of Constitutions;

and Oligarchy; Kingship

factious

oligarchy; the cities tion only by their inaccessibility

13

Extreme democracies, and some oligarchies, neglect this rule. But circumstances oblige them to do this. They have no

meals are better managed. But

are worse than the Ephors.

citizenship in such a state is a moral training Mechanics will not be citizens in 1277 33

the best state.

The

Their

11.

denizen; private rights

a citizen.

power; and in the assembly. But

juries

body i274 b 3i

bad in principle. In a constitutional state the good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. The good man is one who is fitted to rule. But the citizen in a constitutional state

devised.

10.

civic

possesses political

citizen

i267b 21 Hippodamus, who was not a practical politician, aimed at symmetry. In his state there were to be three classes, three kinds of

and the

to define a citizen?

do not make

landed property, three sorts of laws. He also proposed to (1) create a Court of Appeal, (2)

9.

we

are

1266 s 31 Phaleas of Chalcedon made equal of main feature the property of distribution his scheme. This would be difficult to effect, and would not meet the evils which Phaleas had in mind. Dissensions arise from deeper causes than inequality of wealth. His state would be weak against foreign foes. His reforms would anger the rich and not satisfy the poor

8.

How

ment which he proposed was bad

2.

III

Citizen, civic virtue,

praised,

good

i279 b n Democracies and Oligarchies are not made by the numerical proportion of the rulers to the ruled.

the poor; oligarchy 9.

Democracy is

is

the rule of

that of the rich

1280 s 7 Democrats take Equality for their motto; oligarchs believe that political rights should be unequal and proportionate to

CONTENTS wealth. But both sides miss the true object of the state, which is virtue. Those who do most to promote virtue deserve the greatest share of 10.

power the same

On

2.

principle, Justice

is

i28i a

n

(cf. Bk. Ill, c. 14 fol). Let us begin by dealing with the other four and their divisions, inquiring also when and why they may be de-

not the will of the majority or of the wealthier, but that course of action which the moral aim ii.

of the state requires But are the Many or the

Few

like-

I28i a 39

would be unreasonable to give the highest offices to the Many. But they have a faculty of criticism which fits them for deliberative and judicial power. The good critic need not be an expert; experts are ly to be the better rulers? It

12.

13.

types of Constitution

is

at variance

own view and wrong. So

is

with our

the view that the

service to the state

the character of the rich

i283 a 2i Hence there is something in the claims advanced by the wealthy, the free born, the noble, the highly gifted. But no one of these classes should be allowed to rule the rest. A state should consist of men who are equal,

The Forms of Monarchy Of Monarchy there are five kinds,

I284b 35

1285b might 34 appear the best polity to some; that is, if the king acts as the embodiment of law. For he will dispense from the law in the spirit of the law. But this power would be less abused if reserved for the Many. Monarchy arose to meet

The

16. It

last

Democracy the Many are

also the poor, in an are also the wealthy. In every state the distinction between rich and poor

Oligarchy the is

tends to

become hereditary;

subjects equals to the rule of

it

i287 a

an equal. The

1

in-

monarch may be misled by his passions, and no single man can attend to all the duties of government

1287b 36 case alone can be imagined which Absolute Kingship would be just Let us consider the origin and 1288 s 34 nature of- the best polity, now that we have

One in

agreed not to

call

Absolute Kingship the best

BOOK

IV (VI)

Variations of the main types of Constitutions 1288b 10 Political science should study (1) the ideal state, (2) those states which may be the best obtainable under special circum-

Few

the most fundamental of class-divisions.

and

Still

from differences in and the poor by whom

their variations arise

they are ruled 4.

Of Democracies there are four 1290 s 30 The worst, extreme Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to all, and the kinds.

will of the people overrides all 5.

law

Of

Oligarchies too there are four 1292 s 39 kinds; the worst is that in which offices are hereditary and the magistrates uncontrolled

6.

by law 1292b 22 These variations arise under circumstances which may be briefly described

7.

Of

y

8.

strict sense 1293 s 35 but one form, that in which the best men alone are citizens 1293b 21 Polity is a compromise between

Aristocracy in the

there

is

Democracy and Oligarchy, but

of these forms

dividual

1.

1289b 26

Democracy and Oligarchy should be taken as the main that

Oligarchy and Democracy are important types;

the needs of primitive society; it is now obsolete and on various grounds objectionable

18.

Democracy and OH-

The common view

deserve equal shares; who are these equals? Obviously those who are equally able to be of

(1) the Spartan, (2) the Barbarian, (3) the elective dictatorship, (4) the Heroic, (5) Absolute Kingship

17.

as to

garchy.

numerical proportion of rulers to ruled makes the difference between these two types; in a

ideal state, if a pre-eminent individual be found, he should be made a king

15.

sirable 3. First

sometimes bad judges. Moreover, the Many have a greater stake in the city than the Few. But the governing body, whether Few or Many, must be held in check by the laws i282 b 15 On what principle should political power be distributed? Granted that equals

or nearly so, in wealth, in birth, in moral and intellectual excellence. The principle which underlies Ostracism is plausible. But in the

14.

44

and even (3) those which are essentially bad. For the statesman must sometimes make the best of a bad Constitution Of our six main types of state, 1289 s 2 6 Kingship and Aristocracy have been discussed stances,

Democratic 9.

side.

Many

inclines to the

so-called Aristocracies

are really Polities There are different ways of effect1294 s 30 ing the compromise which makes a Polity. The Laconian Constitution is an example of a successful

compromise

of three kinds: (1) the 1295 s 1 barbarian despotism, and (2) the elective dictatorship have already been discussed; in both there is rule according to law over willing subjects. But in (3) the strict form of tyranny, there is the lawless rule of one man over unwilling subjects Of the Best State both in general and under special circumstances 11. For the average city-state the best 1295 s 2 5 constitution will be a mean between the rule of rich and poor; the middle-class will be supreme. No state will be well administered unless the middle-class holds sway. The middleclass is stronger in large than in small states. Hence in Greece it has rarely attained to power; especially as democracy and oligarchy were 10.

Tyranny

is

CONTENTS

44 2

aided by the influence of the leading states 1296b 12 12. No constitution can dispense with the support of the strongest class in the state.

Hence Democracy and Oligarchy are the only some states. But in

constitutions possible in

a tyrant. Oligarchies are

7.

Whatever form

may

How 14.

The

1297* 14 be noted which

of constitution be

help in preserving

to

class,

liable to

to three subjects in particular: (a)

Assembly which

is

The

Delib-

8.

different in each

16.

each case. i300 b 12 (c) The Courts of Law. Here he must consider the kinds of law-courts, their spheres of action, their methods of procedure

BOOK V Of Revolutions, 1.

(VIII)

their causes in general

states are founded on 1301 s 19 erroneous ideas of justice, which lead to discontent and revolution. Of revolutions some are made to introduce a new Constitution, others to modify the old, others to put the working of the Constitution in new hands. Both Democracy and Oligarchy contain inherent flaws which lead to revolution, but

Ordinary

Democracy 2.

and

We may

is

the

more

stable of the

two

The

latter

deserve a

more

1302b

detailed

Trifles

may

common

cause

is

In all magistrates we should re1309 s 32 quire loyalty, ability, and justice; we should not carry the principle of the constitution to extremes; we should educate the citizens in the spirit of a constitution 10. (d) The causes which destroy 1310 s 39 and the means which preserve a Monarchy must be considered separately. Let us first distinguish between Tyranny and Kingship. Tyr-

anny combines the

carried through by force or fraud Revolutions in particular States, and revolutions may be avoided

how

weak 11.

In Democracies revolutions

12.

6.

conspire, or appeal to the people, or set

up

is the best preserva1313 s 18 Kingship. Tyranny may rely on the traditional expedients of demoralizing and dividing its subjects, or it may imitate Kingship by showing moderation in expenditure, and courtesy and temperance in social relations, by the wise use of ministers, by holding the balance evenly between the rich and poor 1315b 12 But the Tyrannies of the past

1316 s 1 inadequate; e.g. he does not explain the results of a revolution against a tyranny, and could not do so on his theory: nor is he correct about the cause of revolution in an Oligarchy; nor does he distinguish between the different varieties of Oligarchy and Plato's discussion of revolutions in

the Republic

is

Democracy

BOOK

rebel against oppression; ambitious oligarchs

may

against sedition

Moderation

have been short-lived

1304tbi8

(a)

may arise from a persecution of the rich; or when a demagogue becomes a general, or when politicians compete for the favour of the mob (b) In Oligarchies the people may 1305 s 36

is

tive of

be

5.

Democracy and

exposed to the same defects as Aristocracy. But both these kinds of Monarchy are especially endangered by the insolence of their representatives and by the fear or contempt which they inspire in others. Tyranny is weak against both external and domestic foes; Kingship is strong against invasion,

One

may

of effecting a revolution:

vices of

Oligarchy. Kingship

the aggrandizement of a

it

manner

1307b 26

class-oppression

5

particular class; another is a feud between rich and poor when they are evenly balanced and there is no middle-class to mediate. As to the

best precautions against se-

9.

1303b 18

be the occasion but

are never the true cause of a sedition.

The

from time to time; to let no individual become too powerful; not to let magistracies be a source of gain; to beware of

account 4.

true of

tions

ative causes 3.

is

or class

types

frame of mind which fosters revolution, the objects for which it is started, and the provoc-

gradual dissolution; which

structive agencies; to alter property qualifica-

1302 s 16

distinguish between the

of talent. Aristoc-

and frauds upon the unprivileged; to maintain good feeling between rulers and ruled; to watch de-

(b) The Executive. Here he must 1299 s 3 know what offices are indispensable and which of them may be conveniently combined in the

person of one magistrate; also whether the same offices should be supreme in every state; also which of the twelve or more methods of making appointments should be adopted in

man

oligarchies. Also they are

dition are these: to avoid illegality

form of constitution 15.

become

Polities as well

legislator

erative

or an ambitious

racies tend to

it

proceed in framing a Constitution b must pay attention >97 35

to

un-

the injustice of the ruling class may lead to revolution, but less often in Polities. Aristocracies may also be ruined by an unprivileged

middle-class

adopted there are expedients

own members;

they employ a mercenary captain, who may become a tyrant 1306b 22 (c) In Aristocracies and Polities less

these cases the legislator should conciliate the

13.

seldom destroyed ex-

cept by the feuds of their

1.

VI (VII)

Concerning the proper organization of Democracies and Oligarchies 1316b 31 (A) Democracies differ inter se

CONTENTS (i) according to the character of the citizen body, (2) according to the mode in which the characteristic features of

2.

democracy are com-

bined. 2.

Liberty is the first principle of 1317 s 40 democracy. The results of liberty are that the numerical majority is supreme, and that each man lives as he likes. From these characteristics

we may

3.

easily infer the other features of

democracy 3.

it is not the numer1318 s 11 majority, but the wealthier men, who are supreme. Both these principles are unjust if

In oligarchies

ical

supreme authority is to be absolute and above the law. Both numbers and wealth should have their share of influence. But it is the

hard

justice,

A 4.

and harder

still

to

make men

act

upon

them. 4.

I3i8 b 6 Bk. IV, c. 4). The best is (1) an Agricultural Democracy, in which the magistrates are elected by, and responsible to, the citizen body, while each office has a property qualification proportionate to its importance. These democracies should encourage agriculture by legislation. The next best is (2) the Pastoral Democ-

Democracy has four

racy. racy.

Next comes Worst of all

cy with

5.

species

(cf.

is

manhood

ties;

harder

5.

6.

(B)

The modes

ganization 7.

8.

is

of

7.

the best

way

ar-

1321 s 5

8.

1.

we must know what

and

states

and

is

mean between

^3^7h 18

that of Asiatics

spirit

and and

should be harmoniously blended

some Greek races must distinguish the mem1328 s 21 bers of the state from those who are necessary as its servants, but no part of it. There must

men who

are able to provide food, to practhe arts, to bear arms, to carry on the work of exchange, to supervise the state religion, to exercise political and judicial functions tise

9.

But of these classes we should exi328 b 23 elude from the citizen body (1) the mechanics, (2) the traders, (3) the husbandmen. Warriors, rulers, priests

remain

as eligible for citi-

The same

persons should exercise these three professions, but at different periods of life. Ownership of land should be confined zenship.

10.

states

1323 s 14

most desirable life True happiness flows from the possession of wisdom and virtue, and not from the possession of external goods. But a virtuous life must be equipped with external goods as instruments. These for

character of the citizens

We be

VII (IV)

for individuals Before constructing the ideal state

The

high

state

BOOK Summum Bonum

should be in a

as they are in

ery state; others are peculiar to special types of

The

city

that of the northern races; intelligence

of preserving these

rangements; oligarchs must not make their subjects too powerful an element in the army. Admission to the governing body should be granted on easy conditions. Office should be made a burden, not a source of profit Both in oligarchies and democraI32i b 4 cies the right arrangement of offices is important. Some kinds of office are necessary in ev-

The

Communication with the sea is 1327 s 11 and military reasons:

should be a

i320 b 17 explanation. Careful or-

governments Much depends on the military

leisure.

but the moral effects of sea-trade are bad. If the state has a marine, the port town should be at some distance from the city

founding OH-

little

means and temperately, with an

desirable for economic

prevent the growth of a pauper

garchies call for

i326 b 26 the

central position

class 6.

more manageable it will be The territory must be large enough to supply the citizens with abundance of

to

we must

must begin by considering i325 b 33 the population and the territory. The former

of living liberally

(3) the Commercial Democis (4) the Extreme Democra-

suffrage 1319b 32 preserve than to found a Democracy. To preserve it we must prevent the poor from plundering the rich; we must not exhaust the public revenues by giving pay for the performance of public duIt

picture of the Ideal State

We

should be as small as we can make it without sacrificing independence and the capacity for a moral life. The smaller the population the

true principles of political

to find the

443

laws hold good of both states and individuals But does the highest virtue con1324 s 5 sist in contemplation or in action? The states of the past have lived for action in the shape of war and conquest. But war cannot be regarded as a reasonable object for a state A virtuous life implies activity, 1325 s 16 but activity may be speculative as well as practical. Those are wrong who regard the life of a practical politician as degrading. But again they are wrong who treat political power as the highest good

to them Such a distinction between a rul1329 s 40 ing and a subject class, based on a difference of occupation, is nothing new. It still exists in Egypt, and the custom of common meals in Crete and Italy proves that it formerly existed there. Most of the valuable rules of politics have been discovered over and over again in

the course of history. In dealing with the land

the

we must distinguish between pubdemesnes and private estates. Both kinds of land should be tilled by slaves or barbarians of

of the state

individuals.

lic

a servile disposition

11.

The

site of

the city should be

1330 s 34

CONTENTS

444

their moral education the very young should be committed to overseers; these should select the tales which they are told, their associates, the pictures, plays, and statues which they see. From five to seven years of age should be the period of preparation for intellectual training

chosen with regard (i) to public health, (2) to political convenience, (3) to strategic requirements. The ground-plan of the city should be regular enough for beauty, not so regular as to make defensive warfare difficult. Walls are a practical necessity 12.

It is well that the arrangement 1331 s 19 of the buildings in the city should be carefully

BOOK

thought out

The Educational System of the Ideal State, its aim, and early stages 33i b 24 13. The nature and character of the citizens must be determined with reference to the kind of happiness which we desire them

The 1.

s 11

the citizens

music

Now a man

The

term 3.

acquires vir-

to

I332 b 12 young and to rule when they are their ultimate and highest func-

obey when Rule is

same as the good man, our education must be so framed as to produce the good man. It should develop all man's powers and fit him for all the activities of life; but the highest powers and the highest activities must be the supreme care of education. An education which is purely milition. Since the

tary, like the

The

good

ruler

is

culture,

4.

the

Laconian, neglects

5.

would do

this principle s 11

virtues of peace (intellectual

1334

are the most and individuals; war is

temperance, justice)

necessary for states

6.

nothing but a means towards securing peace. But education must follow the natural order of human development, beginning with the body, dealing next with the appetites, and training the intellect

last

of

all

produce a healthy physique

He must

also prescribe a physical

training for infants

and young

1336 s 3

children. For

better by listening to professionals. But music is a moral discipline and a rational enjoyment By learning music children bei340 b 20 come better critics and are given a suitable oc-

cupation.

When

don music;

7.

1334b 28 the legislator must fix the age of marriage, regulate the physical condition of the parents, provide for the exposure of infants, and settle the duration of marriage

To

is valuable for this purpose. The same be said of drawing, and other subjects of education have the same kind of value Gymnastic is the first stage of edui338 b 8 cation; but we must not develop the valour and physique of our children at the expense of the mind, as they do in Sparta. Until puberty, and for three years after, bodily exercise should be light Music, if it were a mere amuseI339 a 11 ment, should not be taught to children; they

may

citizens should be educated

older.

It

studies

tue of this kind by the help of nature, habit,

17.

1337 all

cussed

in the absolute sense.

2.

in the Ethics

being understood not in the conditional, but

16.

and

and reason Habit and reason are the fruits 1332 s 39 of education, which must therefore be dis-

Happiness was defined

as the perfect exercise of virtue, the latter

15.

Gymnastic Education should be under state-control and the same for

should comprise those useful i337 a 33 which every one must master, but none which degrade the mind or body Reading, writing, and drawing i337 b 23 have always been taught on the score of their utility; gymnastic as producing valour. Music is taught as a recreation, but it serves a higher purpose. The noble employment of leisure is the highest aim which a man can pursue; and

to pursue.

14.

VIII (V)

Ideal Education continued: Us Music

of riper age they should aban-

is not for them; nor should they be taught difficult instruments The various musical harmonies i34i b 19 should be used for different purposes. Some

professional skill

inspire virtue, others valour, others enthusi-

asm. The ethical harmonies are those which children should learn. The others may be left to professionals.

The Dorian harmony is the The Phrygian is bad; but

best for education.

the Lydian

may

be beneficial to children

POLITICS BOOK

I

them. In the of those is a community of some community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highrest, ly] est of all, and which embraces all the

1252 a Every

state

kind, and every

aims er,

good

at

and

degree than any othgood.

in a greater

at the highest

Some

people think that the qualifications of and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For exam[10] pie, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; a statesman, king, householder,

number, a statesman or king, were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government [75] is personal, the ruler is a king; when, aclarger

over a

still

as

there

if

place there must be a union cannot exist without each other;

first

who

namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind [jo] them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord

and master, and

that

which can with

give effect to such foresight

is

body and by

its

a subject,

nature a slave; hence master and slave have the 1252 b same interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians [5]

no

distinction

is

made between women and

because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say, slaves,

cording to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But

all

this

is

a mistake; for

It

governments any one

is

meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; 1

differ in kind, as will be evident to

who

considers the matter according to the hitherto guided us.

method which has

As

as

in

of

which the

differ

state

see in

composed,

is

what

when he

in order that

First

[25]

thus considers things in their

growth and

anything

else, will

is

is

right

origin,

whether a

first

the poor man's slave.

The

family

[75] several families are united, and the assosomething more than the sup-

state or

obtain the clearest view of

ciation aims at

society to be formed most natural form of the be that of a colony from the

ply of daily needs, the is

the village.

And

village appears to 1

;

Oxford

is

the association established by nature for the

supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard', and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger'. But when

Note: The bold face numbers and letters are approximate indications of the pages and columns of the standard Berlin Greek text; the bracketed numbers, of the lines in the Greek text they are here assigned as they are assigned in the

and Hesiod

house and wife and an ox for the plough?

for the ox

sci-

can be attained about each one of

them.

He who

the family,

is

says,

the different kinds of rule

from one another, and whether any

entific result

were by nature one.

[10] arise

We must therefore look at the elements

we may

they thought that the barbarian and the

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to

[20] other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the

whole.

if

slave

2

translation.

445

first

the

Euripides, Iphegenia in Aulis, 1400. Worlds and Days, 405.

POLITICS

44 6 family,

composed

of the children

who are said to be same milk'. And this is the

children,

and grand-

'suckled with the

reason

why

Hel-

were originally governed by kings; [20] because the Hellenes were under royal

1253 b

power

ther), the

of speech

is

intended to

set

and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is

forth the expedient

man

that he alone has

lenic states

[75] a characteristic of

rule before they

any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a

ans

still

are.

came

together, as the barbari-

Every family

is

ruled by the eldest,

and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:

state.

Further, the state to the family

whole

1

Each one gives law

to

his children

and

to his

wives.

is

and

is

by nature clearly prior

to the individual, since the

of necessity prior to the part; for ex-

[20] ample, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an

we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say equivocal sense, as

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves ei[25] ther are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.

When

that they are the

state

several villages are united in a single

complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state

comes

existence, originating in the bare needs of

into life,

and continuing in existence for the sake of a [30] good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the 1253 a best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

same when they no longer

have their proper quality, but only that they [25] have the same name. The proof that the is

a creation of nature

dividual

is

and prior

that the individual,

when

to the in-

isolated,

not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A sois

men by nature, founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when cial instinct is

[30]

and

implanted in

yet he

who

all

first

is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst

perfected,

of

all;

since

armed

gerous, and he

injustice

is

the

more dan-

animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man

equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Whereto] fore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is

or above humanity; he

the

Hence

it is

of nature,

[5]

evident that the state is a creation is by nature a political

and that man

is

like the

Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,

—

whom Homer

2 denounces the natural outcast forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts. Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And [10] whereas mere voice is but an indication

bond

of

is

men

in states, for the administra-

tion of justice,

which

what

the principle of order in politi-

is just, is

is

the determination of

cal society.

is

of pleasure or pain,

and

is

therefore found in

other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the inti-

mation of them to one another, and no fur1

Odyssey, ix. 114.

2

Iliad, ix. 63.

Seeing then that the state

is

made up

holds, before speaking of the state

of house-

we must

speak of the management of the household. The parts of household management corre1253 b spond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible [5] elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband have thereand wife, father and children.

We

1254

BOOK

s

fore to consider

what each

—

CHAPTERS

I,

of these three rela-

and ought to be: I mean the relation and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And tions

is

[io] of master

there

is

another element of a household, the

so-

called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us. [75] Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political

and royal

rule, as

I

was saying

at the outset, are

[20] all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature,

2-5

447

the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however,

1254 a another distinction must be drawn: the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is [5] only the use. Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possesspoken of

as a part is spoken of; for the not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of

sion

is

[10] part

is

The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas a possession.

the slave

is

not only the slave of his master, but

wholly belongs

him. Hence

to

we

see

and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is there-

the nature and office of a slave; he

fore unjust.

other's

And

which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the manage-

ment

of a household.

various sorts;

Now

some are

as in the arts

instruments are of

living, others lifeless;

in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless,

in the look-out

man,

a living instrument; for in

the arts the servant

is

a

kind of instrument, is an instrument

life.

And

so, in

the arrange-

ment of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which all other instruments. For every instrument could accomplish its own

takes precedence of if

work, obeying or anticipating the will of oth[35] ers like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, >

1

of their

own

own

man

And

a possession

But

is

there any one thus intended by nature

and for whom such a condition expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature? to be a slave,

is

[20] There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact.

ruled

For that some should rule and others be is

a thing not only necessary,

1

but expedi-

from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

ent;

And

there are

many

kinds both of rulers

and subjects (and that rule [25]

is

is

the better

exercised over better subjects

—

which for ex-

ample, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made [30] up of parts, whether continuous or dissubject element

between the ruling and the comes to light. Such a duality

exists in living creatures,

manner, the shuttle would weave and Homer, Iliad, xvm. 376.

in like

be defined

crete, a distinction

accord entered the assembly of the

Gods; if,

may

an instrument of action, separable from the

possessor.

[jo] Thus, too, a possession for maintaining

is

by

[75] ture a slave; and he

as

[25] with necessaries.

is

but another's man, is by namay be said to be anwho, being a human being, is also

nature not his

a possession.

Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided

what

who

it

but not in them only;

originates in the constitution of the universe;

even in things which have no

life

there

is

a

POLITICS

44 8

we

ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But are

wandering trom the

subject.

We will

there-

1255

doubtless the

if

men

differed

mere forms of

fore restrict ourselves to the living creature,

[^5]

which, in the first place, consists of soul and [35] body: and of these two, the one is by na-

would acknowledge

and the other the

ture the ruler,

we must

then

subject.

But

look for the intentions of nature

which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall in things

see the true relation of the

1254 b bad

two; although

or corrupted natures the

body

in

from one another

their bodies as

statues of the

much

the

inferior

in

as the

Gods do from men, that

s

all

class

should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but 1255 a the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear,

some men are by nature free, and and that for these latter slavery both expedient and right.

then, that

others slaves, is

will

often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil

events

and unnatural condition. At

we may

firstly

all

observe in living crea-

and a constitutional body with a despoti-

tures both a despotical

rule; for the soul rules the

whereas the intellect rules the appewith a constitutional and royal rule. And clear that the rule of the soul over the

cal rule, tites it

is

[5] body,

ment over

and

mind and

of the

the passionate,

is

the rational ele-

natural and expe-

dient; whereas the equality of the

two

or the

always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for [10] tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and rule of the inferior

[75] the other sity,

extends to

is

is

ruled; this principle, of necesmankind. Where then there

all

such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the is

whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be [20] under the rule of a master. For he who case of those

can be, and therefore

is,

and he who enough to ap-

another's,

participates in rational principle

prehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very differ[25] ent; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to disslave

tinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless

[50] for such services, useful for political life war and peace. But the op-

in the arts both of

—

happens that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And

posite often

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or [5] slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing vio[10] lence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of

The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when furopinion.

nished with means, has actually the greatest

power power

of exercising force:

and

as

superior

only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems to imply is

[75] virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill, while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or plausibility against [20] the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they

think, simply to a principle of justice (for law

and custom are a

assume that custom of war the same moment

sort of justice),

slavery in accordance with the is

justified

they deny

by law, but this.

at

For what

if

the cause of the

[25] war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the high-

rank would be slaves and the children of if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but

est

slaves

1256

BOOK

s

I,

CHAPTERS

confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using [jo] this language, they really mean the nat-

whom we

ural slave of

must be admitted

that

spoke

some

at first;

1

for

it

are slaves every-

where, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own [35] country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The 2 Helen of Theodectes says: Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods?

What

does this

[40] freedom

mean but

and

that they distinguish

slavery, noble

and humble

birth, by the two principles of good and evil? 1255 b They think that as men and animals

men and animals, good man springs. But though she may intend beget

from good men a is what nature,

so

this it,

cannot always

ac-

complish.

We

some foundation opinion, and that all

see then that there

[5] for this difference of

is

is

of a certain char-

and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and a science for the slave. The science of the slave would be such as the man acter,

of Syracuse taught,

who made money

by

structing slaves in their ordinary duties.

in-

And

[25] such a knowledge may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts.

For some duties are of the more necessary, more honourable sort; as the

others of the

proverb

'slave before

says,

master be-

slave,

3

[50] fore master'. But all such branches of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a sci-

ence of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which the slave must know [

how

^5]

to execute.

which

position

Hence those who are in a them above toil have

places

stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or

with

politics.

mean

between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one

slave,

distinction

449

has science, but because he

are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a

marked

5-8

from the

art of

acquiring slaves,

I

master and the art of the of hunting or war. of the distinction between master

art of the

being

Enough

[40]

and

But the

of justly acquiring them, differs both

a

species

slave.

practising obedience, the others exercising the

which nature intended abuse of this authority is

authority and lordship

them

to have.

The

and are the same, and

1256 a Let us now inquire into property genand into the art of getting wealth, in

injurious to both; for the interests of part

erally,

[10] whole, of body and soul, the slave is a part of the master, a living but

accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown 4 to be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household or a part of it, or instrumental to

separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on [75] law and force the reverse is true.

it;

and

art of

if

the

last,

making

whether

shuttles

is

in the

[5] art of weaving, or in the

The

previous remarks are quite enough to that the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of

show

some affirm, the same with each For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is [20] a government of freemen and equals.

way

that the

instrumental to the

way

that the cast-

ing of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus the material of the weaver, bronze of

rule are not, as

wool

other.

it is easy to see that the [10] the statuary. art of household management is not identical

The master 1

Chapter 5

is

not called a master because he 2

Helena,

fr. 3,

Nauck.

is

Now

with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be no other than the art of household management. 3

4

Philemon, Pancratiastes, Chapter 4.

fr. 2,

Meineke.

POLITICS

450

however, a doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household management or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth [75] has to consider whence wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property and riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general, parts

There

of

is,

the

wealth-getting

or

art

many are many

arts?

distinct

Again, there are

sorts

therefore there

kinds of

of

food,

and

lives

both

[20] of animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their food have

made beasts,

ways

differences in their

some

of

life.

For of

are gregarious, others are solitary;

they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivo[25] rous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by nature in such a

manner

that they

may

obtain with

greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the

things are not naturally

pleasant

to

same of

all

them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or [30] herbivorous animals further differ among themselves. In the lives of great difference.

The

men

laziest

too there

is

a

are shepherds,

who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, [^5] cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in

which there

are fish, are

fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts.

The

greater

number

ob-

from the cultivated fruits of the [40] soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up of itself, and whose food is not ac1256 b quired by exchange and retail trade there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the tain a living

brigand, the fisherman, the hunter.

Some

1257*

will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous

animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is [75] called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for

their sake,

and that the other animals exist for man, the tame for use and food,

the sake of

the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of cloth[20] ing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in

must be that she has made animals for the sake of man. And so, in one

vain, the inference all

war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes point of view, the art of

we ought

to practise

against wild beasts, and against

men who,

hunting, an art which

[25] though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.

Of

the art of acquisition then there

kind which by nature

is

a part of the

is

one

manage-

ment

of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary

[jo] to

life,

and useful

for the

community of They are the amount of

the family or state, as can be stored.

the elements of true riches; for property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

No bound to riches has been But there is a boundary fixed,

fixed for

man. 1

just as there

is

in

[35] the other arts; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state.

And

so

we

see that there

is

a natural art

which is practised by managers households and by statesmen, and what is

of acquisition of

the reason of this.

gain

two employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life of a shepherd [5] may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both [10] when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much food as a comfortable maintenance out of

[40] There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called art of wealth-getting, and has in fact sug1257 a gested the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with

an

it is often identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is

the preceding,

given by nature, the other perience and art. 1

Bergk, Poet. Lyr., Solon,

13. 71.

is

gained by ex-

BOOK

1257 b

I,

CHAPTERS

[5] Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations: Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. [10] He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of ex[75] change extends to all of them, and it arises at first

from what

is

natural,

circumstance that some have too too

much. Hence we may

from the

little,

others

infer that retail trade

not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the

is

first

community, indeed, which

is

the family,

[20] this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family originally had

things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many all

and different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still

things,

[25] practised

among

barbarous nations

who

exchange with one another the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for corn, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, [30] but is needed for the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler.

When

the inhab-

one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came into use. For itants of

[35]

the various necessaries of

easily carried about,

life

are not

and hence men agreed

to

employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of

life,

for example,

and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, [40] but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to iron, silver,

mark 1257 b

the value.

When

the use of coin had once been

discovered, out of the barter of necessary ar-

ticles

8-9

45i

arose the other art of wealth-getting,

namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use [5] of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail trade are con[10] cerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be [75] wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold? Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the

mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; in their [20] true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be con-

cerned with coin; for coin

is

the unit of ex-

change and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth-getting. As in the art [25] of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is

no

limit to the pursuit of their several ends,

aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, and [30] the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of view, for they

all

riches

matter of

must have a fact,

we

limit; nevertheless, as a

find the opposite to be the

case; for all getters of

hoard of coin without

wealth increase their

limit.

The

source of the

POLITICS

452 confusion

the near connexion between the

is

[35] two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each

is

case,

but there

is

a

ting wealth

is

ting wealth

manage-

the object of household

men

origin of this disposition in intent

upon

living only,

is

that they

and not up-

well; and, as their desires are un-

means of them should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of limited, they also desire that the

gratifying

obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the en[5] joyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the second species of wealthgetting. For, as their

enjoyment

is

in excess,

they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to supply their pleasures

they try other

by the art of getting wealth, using in turn every faculty

is

wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither

this the

aim

of the general's or of the physi-

and the some men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute. cian's art; but the

one aims

at victory

other at health. Nevertheless,

Thus, then,

too,

it

we have

considered the art of

which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned [75] wealth-getting

is

a part of the

household and the

of a

There are two

art of

sorts of wealth-getting, as

I

have said 1 one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former nec[40] essary and honourable, while that which 1258 b consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to in[5] crease at interest. And this term interest, ;

which means the

birth of

money from money,

applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Where-

is

fore of

all

modes

of getting wealth this

is

the

most unnatural.

with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit. 10

management

medicine not; for surely the members of a household must have health just as they must have life or any other [30] necessary. The answer is that as from one point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another way the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; [35] for the business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always what remains over of that from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.

arts,

[10] in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to

make

what sort of wool is good and serviceable and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, would be difficult to see why the art of get-

are led to believe that get-

ment, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money with[40] out limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The

1258 a are on living

—

or bad

accumulation

Hence some persons

manager of a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who [25] has not to make but to use wool, and to know, the duty of the

same property, but with is the end in the one further end in the other.

a use of the

a difference:

1258 b

11

Enough has been said about the theory of we will now proceed to the [10] practical part. The discussion of such mat-

wealth-getting;

And we

have found the answer to our original Whether the art of getting wealth is the business of the manager of a household

engaged

and of the statesman or not

some.

question,

ters is

not unworthy of philosophy, but to be in

them

practically

The

is illiberal

and

irk-

[20] viz. that wealth is presupposed by them. as political science does not make men, but

first,

useful parts of wealth-getting are, the knowledge of live-stock, which are

For

most

profitable,

them from nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with earth or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stage begins

example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a

takes

their business?

1

—

and where, and how,

1256* 15-1258*18.

—

as, for

BOOK

1259b

A

man ought to [75] return. these pay better than others, best in particular places, for

I,

CHAPTERS

know which

of

and which pay some do better in

one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which

may

be either tillage or plant-

and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to [20] man. These are the divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds the provision ing,

—

of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure these again differing as they are safer for sale

—

[25] or more profitable), the second is usury, of this, one kind is the third, service for hire employed in the mechanical arts, the other in

—

and bodily labour. There

unskilled

is

still

a

third sort of wealth-getting intermediate be-

tween

and the

this

first

or natural

mode which

9-12

453

dom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy [10] was of no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many [75] were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was [20] saying, his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly.

when

It is an art often practhey are in want of money;

concerned with ex-

tised

by

change, viz. the industries that make their profit from the earth, and from things growing [30] from the earth which, although they bear

they

make

no

from the iron mines; afterwards, when from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and with-

is

partly natural, but

fruit,

is

also

are nevertheless profitable; for ex-

ample, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now. [35] Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body deteriorated, the

the greatest use of illiberal

in

is most which there is the body, and the most

most

servile in

which there

is

the least need of

excellence.

Works have been

written

upon

who

have treated of Tillage and Plantwhile others have treated of other branches; any one who cares for such matters

1259 a

may

ing,

refer to their writings. It

a

monopoly

There was

money

a

man

of provisions.

of Sicily,

who, having up all the

deposited with him, bought

iron

[25] the merchants

out much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but that he must not remain at Syracuse, for [30] he thought that the man had discovered a

way

to his

of

making money which was injurious interests. He made the same dis-

own

covery as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as

know these things; for a state is much in want of money and of such

well ought to often as

[55] devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.

these sub-

[40] jects by various persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian,

cities

would be well ways

12

Of household management we have there are three parts

—one

is

1

seen that

the rule of a mas-

over slaves, which has been discussed al2 ready, another of a father, and the third of a husband and father, we saw, rules husband.

ter

A

in amass-

[40] over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a

[5] ing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth.

royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For 1259 b although there may be exceptions to the

also to collect the scattered stories of the

in

which individuals have succeeded

There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputation for wis-

order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and

command 1

I2 53 b 3 -11

-

POLITICS

454

most constitutional the citizens rule and are ruled by

more immature. But

in

1260*

never

less

is.

Yet

how

strange

is

the supposition

one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemper[40] ate and unjust, how can he rule well? if 1260* the subject, how can he obey well? If he

[5] states turns, for the

that the

when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequal[10] ity is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both

be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that

idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless,

1

of love

and of the respect due

kind of royal power.

a

And

to age, exercising

therefore

Homer

both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among

Here the very constitution of the shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and themselves.

[5] soul has

the virtue of the ruler ferent

from that of the

we maintain subject;

to be dif-

—the one being

and the other of the obvious that the same

the virtue of the rational,

Now, it

has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men', because he is the king of them all.

principle applies generally,

For a king

the natural superior of his sub-

most

all

[75] jects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

man

rules over the slave after another

is

irrational part.

is

and therefore althings rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the free-

—

from that

which the male

in

manner

rules over the fe-

[10] male, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them,

Thus

it is

tends

more

household management atmen than to the acquisition of

clear that to

inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which [20]

we

wealth, and to the virtue of free-

call

men more than to the virtue of slaves. A quesmay indeed be raised, whether there is any

tion

all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities whether he can have the virtues of tem-

excellence at

—

perance,

courage,

justice,

and the

like;

or

[25] whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we

they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must neces[75] sarily be supposed to be with the moral all should partake of them, but

virtues also;

only in such

manner and degree

answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and [30] children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not? So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required [35] in both, why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can

tributes; as the poet says of

we

[30]

say that this

is

a question of degree, for the

difference between ruler

and subject

is

a differ-

ence of kind, which the difference of more and 1

Herodotus,

11.

172.

as

is

required

by each for the fulfilment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue [20] which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a wom2 an, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a all

we

woman

And

in obeying.

other virtues, as will be

more

this holds of

clearly seen if

look at them in detail, for those

who

say

[25] generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better

than such definitions

who,

classes

is

their

mode of speaking,

3

enumerate the virtues. All must be deemed to have their special at-

like Gorgias,

but this

Silence is a is

women,

woman's

glory, 4

not equally the glory of man.

2

Plato,

4

Sophocles, Ajax, 293.

Meno,

72-73.

3

Meno,

71, 72.

The

1261

BOOK

J

CHAPTERS

I,

12-13-

-BOOK

II,

CHAPTERS

1-2

455

imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like

should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

the virtue of the slave is relative to a determined 1 that a slave is use-

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one [10] another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape the evil,

child

is

manner master.

Now we

ful for the

wants of

life,

and therefore he

[55] obviously require only so

much

will

virtue as

will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self-control ? But is there not a great [40] difference in the two cases? For the slave

shares in his master's

life;

the artisan

less

is

connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. 1260b The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of [5] mastership which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we closely

2

will

the constitution, are supposed to

purpose

is

to consider

community

is

best of

what form of all

for those

po-

who

most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other

are

[j?o]

constitutions, both such as actually exist

in well-governed states,

and any

[55] take this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

We will begin with the natural beginning of Three

alternatives are conceivable:

The members

of a state must either have (1) things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and some not. That

all

they should have nothing in common is clearly [40] impossible, for the constitution is a com-

1261 a munity, and must at any rate have a common place one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city. But should a well-ordered state have

—

1

i254 b l6 "39;

b cf. i259 25 sq.

of the

if

the virtues of either of

tues of the state.

And

and half the

them

difference in the vir-

they must

grow up

make

a differ-

to be citizens,

free persons in a state are

women. 3

[20] Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time.

Regarding, then, our present inquiry as comwe will make a new beginning. And,

plete,

first, let

us examine the various theories of a

perfect state.

II

things, as far as

may be, in common,

or

some

only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and prop-

yl

erty in

common,

as Socrates proposes in

the Republic of Plato.

4

Which

is

present condition, or the proposed

better,

new

our

order

of society?

theoretical

forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only under-

the subject.

when we speak

make any

ence: for the children

all

litical

to be discussed

inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the vir[75] tue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to

BOOK Our

have

different forms of government. For,

[10] There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is- not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literal-

and how we are to internowhere precisely stated. I am speaking of the premiss from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the

ly, is

impracticable,

im]

pret

it is

unity of the state the better'. that a state

may

not obvious such a degree

Is it

at length attain

—

no longer a state? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it beof unity as to be

2 3 4

Plato, Laws, vi. 777. Plato, Laws, vi. 781. Republic, iv. 423; v. 457; 462.

POLITICS

45 6

a family, and from being a family, an [20] individual; for the family may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain

comes

greatest unity even

this

if

we

could, for

[25] constitute a state. It is not like a military The usefulness of the latter depends

alliance.

quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anyits

thing

is

more

useful than a less (in like

ner, a state differs tion has not

an Arcadian

which

the elements out of [jo]

formed

a nation,

when

man-

the na-

population organized in

its

lages, but lives

from

differ

in kind.

principle of compensation, as

vil-

sort of life); but

a unity

I

is

to be

Wherefore the have already

re-

1

marked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoe[55] makers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters.

And

since

it is

better that this should be so in

politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same persons in

power where this is possible, yet where this is 1261 b not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at the same time should share in the governgood thing or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the [5] same persons. In like manner when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatit

just that all

is

ment (whether

est

good of

to govern be a

cities is in

tion; but surely the

good

reality their destruc-

of things

which preserves them. Again,

must be

that

in another point

[10] of view, this extreme unification of the

good; for a family is more than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being

state

is

clearly not

self-sufficing

1

Ethics, v, ii32b 32.

a

community

is large enough to be selfthen self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable [75] than the greater.

the

sufficing. If

it

would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not

upon

when

1262

But, even supposing that

it were best for the have the greatest degree of uniunity is by no means proved to follow

community ty, this

to

from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time', which, according to Socrates, 2

is the sign of perfect [20] unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individu-

'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his own wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their wives and children in [25] common; they would say 'all' but not 'each'. In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in al says

the term

some other words, 'both', ambiguous, and even in abargument becomes a source of logi-

'all':

'odd', 'even',

[30] stract cal puzzles.

mine

like

it is

That all persons call the same thing which each does so may be

in the sense in

a fine thing, but

it is

impracticable; or

if

the

words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself [35] concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody clined to neglect the duty

other to

fulfil; as in

is

more

in-

which he expects an-

families

many

are often less useful than a few.

attendants

Each

citizen

have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally 1262 a the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike. Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of one who is prospering or the reverse, however small a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'my son', 'so and so's son', the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the citizens; and [5] even about this he will not be positive; for will

2

Plato, Republic, v. 462.

BOOK

1262 b it is

impossible to

know who chanced

a child, or whether,

if

II,

CHAPTERS

to have

one came into existence,

—

has survived. But which is better for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordiit

nary and more restricted sense? For usually [jo] the same person is called by one man his own son whom another calls his own brother or cousin or kinsman blood relation or connexion by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after

—

Plato's fashion!

Nor

is

there any

way

of pre-

venting brothers and children and fathers and [75] mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indi-

2-4

457

community

and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and chil1262 b dren in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel. In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of that which good [5] laws ought to have, and the intention of [40] This

Socrates in

making

of wives

these regulations about

women and children would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states

and the preservative of them against is there anything which

revolutions; neither

Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the [10] state

which he and

to be created

all the world declare by friendship. But the unity

which he commends would be like that of the 2 lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristoph-

who

[20] are common, nevertheless the children are born are assigned to their respective

grow together in the exand from being two to become one, in which case one or both would [75] certainly perish. Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be

on the ground of their likeness. And some women, like the females of other animals have a strong for example, mares and cows

watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son', or the son 'my father'. As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is im-

cations of their relationship to one another.

Ge-

ographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of Upper Libya, where the women

fathers

—

—

tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Honest.

anes says, desire to

cess of their affection,

perceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of

community, the idea of relationship which is [20] based upon these names will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about the father,

[25] Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard,

and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, [30] but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more will be assaults

likely to occur if the relationship

is

unknown,

and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made. Again,

how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lov1

from carnal intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities between father [55] and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them love of this sort is im-

ers

proper.

How strange, too, to forbid intercourse

no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference. for

1

Republic, in. 403.

or brothers about one another. ities

which

Of the two qual-

chiefly inspire regard

and

affection

—that a thing your own and that only one—neither can such a is

it is

exist in

your

state as

this.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen [25] or of artisans to that of guardians, and

from the rank of guardians into

a lower rank,

will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or

know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned 3 evils, such as assaults, [30] unlawful loves, homicides, will happen transferrers cannot but

more often amongst those who to the

lower

classes, or

who

are transferred

have a place

as-

signed to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of [55] consanguinity. Touching the community 2

Symposium, 191, 192.

3 a

25-40.

POLITICS

458 of wives

and children,

be our conclu-

let this

1263 b

showing

principle,

that

it is

not impracticable,

but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For,

sion.

Next

let

us consider

what should be our

ar-

rangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in

[40] common or not? This question may be discussed separately from the enactments about 1263 a women and children. Even supposing

although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his [55] friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs,

that the

were their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country.

uals,

It is clearly

women and children belong to individaccording to the custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown [5] this

the

ed

common stock; and some nations. Or (2), may be common, and may be cultivat-

consumption into the

for

soil

in

is

the practice of

common, but

the produce divided

individuals for their private use; this of

common

property which

is

is

among a form

said to exist

Or (3), the soil and the produce may be alike common. When the husbandmen are not the owners,

among

certain barbarians.

[10] the case will be different and easier to deal when they till the ground for them-

with; but

ownership will give a they do not share equally

selves the question of

world of trouble. If in enjoyments and toils, those who labour much and get little will necessarily complain of [75] those who labour little and receive or consume much. But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all hu-

man

relations in

their

having

common, but

common

property.

ships of fellow-travellers are an

especially in

The

partner-

example

to the

point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which [20] turns up. So with servants: we are most liable to take offence at those with whom we

as if they

better that property should be pri-

vate, but the use of

it

common; and

business of the legislator this

the special

to create in

is

benevolent disposition. Again,

how

men ini-

tio] measurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the love of self

implanted by nature although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in exis

a feeling

1263 b and not given

in vain,

cess, like the miser's love of

almost

men

all,

jects in a

love

And

measure.

money;

for all, or other such obfurther, there is the

money and

[5] greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions,

which can only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state. tion of

two

virtues, besides,

ed in such a

state: first,

is

The

exhibi-

visibly annihilat-

temperance towards

[10] women (for it is an honourable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance sake);

secondly, liberality in the matter of one, when men have all things in

No

property.

common,

will

liberality or

any longer

do any

consists in the use

set

an example of

liberal action; for liberality

which

is

made

of property.

[75] Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to

[25] systems. Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private;

and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one 1 is heard denouncing the evils now existing in [20] states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause the wickedness of

every one has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will

human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have

most frequently come into contact in daily life. These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both

for,

when

make more

progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends', [50] as the proverb says, 'will have all things

common.' Even now there

are traces of such a

it,

—

[25]

all

common, though there them when compared with

things in

not

many

vast

numbers who have

Again, 1

of

private property.

we ought to reckon,

Republic, v. 464, 465.

are

the

not only the evils

BOOK

1264 b from which the the advantages

II,

CHAPTERS

citizens will be saved,but also

which they

will lose.

The

life

im[50] practicable. The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects

which they are

only.

For there

to lead appears to be quite

is

a point at

which

may

a state

attain such a degree of unity as to be

no longer

a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist,

it

become an

will

The

single foot. plurality,

which

common meals, whereby the made property common. remember that we should not disregard

Let us the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although some times they are not put together; in other cases [5] men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the

distributing

tries

and

a state at all without

and dividing

associations for

common

tribes.

But

all

its

constituents into

meals, and into phra-

ends

this legislation

[10] only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedae-

monians

try to enforce already.

But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor

is it

community

will

what be the general form easy to decide,

who

in such a

of the state.

The

citizens

are not guardians are the majority, and

about them nothing has been determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in [75] common? Or is each individual to have his own? and are their wives and children to be individual or common? If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, in what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? [20] Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the

same

and the rest are the real citizens. But and quarrels, and all the evils

so the suits

will exist equally

legislator has

form

if

which Socrates

Crete respecting

legislator could not

artisans

unison, or rhythm

should be united and made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, [40] like those which prevail at Sparta and

1264 a

459

but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it not con[25] tain two states in one, each hostile to the other? He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and

inferior state, like

harmony passing into which has been reduced to a state, as I was saying, is a [55]

4-5

institutions as their

own,

1

affirms

to exist in other states,

among them. He

says indeed

good an education, the not need many laws, for example

[50] that, having so citizens will

laws about the city or about the markets 2 but then he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute.

3

But

in that case they are likely to be

much more unmanageable and

conceited than

[55] the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. And whether community of wives and

property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates

has nowhere determined, neither

to discover this,

importance [40] ans

is

the

if

1264 b Again,

common

life

if

easy

of the guardi-

makes the women

Socrates

retains

private

will see to the fields, but

the house?

is it

their character of small

is

to be maintained.

common, and

men

nor

And who

do so

will

property, the

who if

will see to

the agricul-

have both their property and their it is absurd to [5] argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a household. The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. tural class

wives in

And

if

common? Once more:

this

is

often a cause of disturbance

among the meaner sort, how much more [10] among high-spirited warriors? But that the persons

same

is

whom

he makes rulers must be the

evident; for the gold

which the God

mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in those who are 4 [75] meant to be artisans and husbandmen.' Again, he deprives the guardians even of hap1

3

Republic, v. 464, 465. Ibid., v. 464.

4

2

Ibid., iv. 425.

Cf. Ibid., in. 4 1

5.

POLITICS

460

1265 b

We

ought to But the whole

thing can hardly be expected. must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citi-

cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect hap[20] piness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are?

now mentioned, will require a terri[75] tory as large as Babylon, or some other huge site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and

and

piness,

make

says that the legislator

the whole state happy.

1

Surely not the artisans, or the common people. of which Socrates discourses has

The Republic

these difficulties,

all

[25]

and others quite

who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid imposattendants,

sibilities.

as

It is

said that the legislator

eye directed to two points,

great.

The same,

or nearly the same, objections ap-

ply to Plato's later work, the fore

zens, just

we had

tution

better

which

examine

Laws, and

there-

briefly the consti-

therein described. In the Re-

is

have such a military force against her neighbours,

Even

[25] at home.

few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state. The population is divided into two classes 2 one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of coun3 sellors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and [55] artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not. He cer4 tainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is [40] filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the 1265 a education of the guardians. In the Laws

admitted to be the

there

is

much

hardly anything but laws; not

said about the constitution. This,

is

which he had

intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community [5] of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live free

are to be

from

servile occupations,

common

meals in both.

and there

The

only

dif-

Laws, the common meals 5 are extended to women, and the warriors 6 number 5000, but in the Republic only iooo. 7 [10] The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everyference

is

that in the

Republic, iv. 419, 420. Ibid., in. 412.

5

Laws,

7

Republic, iv. 423.

vi. 780.

2 4

Ibid.,

11.

Ibid., v. 451.

6 Ibid., v.

737.

373.

have his

or states,

if

as will be serviceable

and not merely useful

the

of action

life

is

not

best, either for individuals

a city should be formidable to en-

still

emies, whether invading or retreating.

There

which

Should not the

another point:

is

amount

of property be defined in

from

some way

by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so much [jo] property as will enable him to live temdiffers

8

perately,

well'; this

which is

man may

is

this

only a

way

of saying 'to live

too general a conception. Further,

temperately and yet miserably. would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally; if the a

A

live

better definition

two

are parted, liberality will

combine with

luxury; temperance will be associated with

For

toil.

and temperance are the only eliqualities which have to do with the use

liberality

gible

[55] of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of is inseparable from property. an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens; the population is to remain unlim[40] ited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of mar1265 b riages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states. But greater care will

these

There

virtues is

be required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them,

and therefore no one 1

3

to

[20] country. But neighbouring countries also must not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must

public, Socrates has definitely settled in all a

[jo]

ought

—the people and the

is

in

want; but,

if

the

property were incapable of division as in the [5] Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few 8

Laws,

v. 737.

I266

BOOK

a

II,

CHAPTERS

5-7 3

Laws

461

or many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit

tution

should be fixed by calculating the chances of

the worst of

mortality in the children, and of sterility in [10] married persons. The neglect of this sub-

common, is a among the citi-

who combine many forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of more numerous [5] elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is

zens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ancient legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although originally all the

nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; 6 for although the appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected combines both

ject,

which

in existing states

is

never-failing cause of poverty

so

[75] lots

may have been of Laws the opposite

different sizes: but

in the

principle

tained.

What

our opinion

in

is

main-

the right ar-

is

1

rangement will have to be explained hereafter. There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from

the

is

which are

arate places,

4

and

it

difficult to live in

is

two

houses.

The whole system

of

government tends

to

be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity,

armed

soldiers.

and

is

Now,

composed

if

of the heavyhe intended to frame

which would suit the greatest [50] number of states, he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best

a constitution

constitution

[35] forms,

is

a combination of

and they

praise the

all

existing

Lacedaemoni-

an because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, de[40] clare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common 1266 a meals and in the habits of daily life. In

way

1

Cf. vii. i326 b 26-32, 1330*9-18, 1335k 19-26.

Laws,

v. 734, 735. 4 Ibid., v. 745.

3

Ibid., v. 744.

which the

or are

rich are

may do

8

com-

as they like,

the endeavour to have the greater

and

number

of

the magistrates appointed out of the richer

and the highest

officers selected

from

who have the greatest incomes, both these

are oligarchical features.

The

oligarchical prin-

ciple prevails also in the choice of the council,

9

[75] for all are compelled to choose, but the

compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says that there ought [20] to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be given to the

who have the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled, will not vote. These consid[25] erations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are them10 selves elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire. Such is the constitution which is better sort of people,

[50] described in the Laws.

Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and 5

in. 693, 701

;

iv.

6 Ibid., vi.

2

in

duties, while the rest

classes

be increased 3 fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? for he assigns [25] to each individual two homesteads in sep-

all,

But they are nearer the truth

7

those

may

all.

[10] pelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political

[20] related as the warp and the woof, which 2 are made out of different wools. He allows

man's whole property

either not constitutions at

elements, the

their subjects; he only says that they should be

that a

maintained that the best constimade up of democracy and tyranny, it is

7 8 10

710; vi. 756.

756, 763, 765. Ibid., vi. 764; and Politics, iv. 1294 s 37» 12 9% b 16. 9 Ibid., vi. Laws, vi. 763. 756. Ibid., vi. 753.

POLITICS

462 statesmen, which

all

come nearer

to established

No

or existing ones than either of Plato's. introduced such novelties as the

else has

[^5] munity of

women and

one

com-

children, or public

women:

other legislators begin with what is necessary. In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, tables for

that being the question

upon which

all

revolu-

This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have [40] equal possessions. He thought that in a 1266 b new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily tions turn.

when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them. 1 [5] Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be al2 lowed, forbidding, as I have already observed,

any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification. But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to

forget,

—that

the legislator

who

fixes the

amount of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That the equalization of [10]

[75] property exercises

was

an influence on

politi-

understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the cal society

clearly

sale of property:

among

the Locrians, for ex-

ample, there is a law that a man is not to sell [20] his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original tion of

it

made

Such a law exand the abroga-

lots.

isted in the island of Leucas,

the constitution too democratic,

no longer had the prescribed where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too or too small, and the possessor may be

for the rulers

qualification. Again,

[25] large

living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then,

the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this v. 744.

2

I26 5 b 2I.

1267

a

moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be [30] equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient

education

But Phaleas

is

provided by the laws.

will probably reply that this

what he means; and

cisely

pre-

is

that, in his opinion,

there ought to be in states, not only equal propbut equal education. Still he should tell us

erty,

what there

[55]

will be the character of his education; is

no use

all, if it is

having one and the same for of a sort that predisposes men

in

to avarice, or ambition, or both.

Moreover,

civil

troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honour,

[40] though in opposite ways. For the common 1267 a people quarrel about the inequality of

property, the higher class about the equality of honour; as the poet says,

The bad and good

ali\e in

honour share?

There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. [5] But want is not the sole incentive to crime;

men

also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire they wish to cure some

—

going beyond the necessities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the desire,

—

only reason they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with

and therefore they commit crimes. what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and oc-

pain,

Now

cupation; of the second, habits of temperance; [10] as to the third, if any desire pleasures

which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for

all

ent on others.

other pleasures

The

fact

is

we

are depend-

that the greatest

crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the [75] honour bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes. There is another objection to them.

They

are

designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighbouring nations, and to all who are outside of it. The govern[20] ment must be organized with a view to

chiefly

8

Iliad, ix. 319.

1268

BOOK

s

military strength;

and of

this

II,

CHAPTERS

he has said not a

7-8

463

the body of citizens. But

if

there

is

law that

a

word. And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that more pow[25] erful neighbours may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, that a more powerful neighbour must have no in[30] ducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be in-

artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced.

curred in the time. 'For', said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus

form of government.

words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege. [55] at once.' These

The

one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from equalization of property

quarrelling.

Not

is

that the gain in this direction

is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more [40] than an equal share of honours; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution. And the avarice of mankind is insati1267 b able; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the

[5] gratification of it. The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train

the nobler sort of natures not to desire more,

and

to prevent the

that

is

to say,

lower from getting more; they must be kept down, but not

[10] ill-treated. Besides, the equalization pro-

posed by Phaleas is imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also

and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his movables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must all be let alone. It would appear that Phain slaves,

[75] leas is legislating for a small city only, if, he supposes, all the artisans are to be public

as

slaves

and not

to

form

a supplementary part of

[20]

judge

From these observations any one may how far Phaleas was wrong or right in

his ideas.

8

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the Piraeus, a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, [25] which made some think him affected (for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but these were worn on a cheap but warm garment both in winter and summer);

—

he, besides

aspiring to be an adept in the

knowledge of nature, was the statesman

who made

first

person not a

inquiries about the best

[50] The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three parts,

one of

artisans,

third of

one of husbandmen, and a

armed defenders

of the state.

He

also

divided the land into three parts, one sacred,

—

one public, the third private: the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship [35] °f tne gods, the second was to support the warriors, the third was the property of the

husbandmen. He also divided laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are three subjects of lawsuits, injury,

and homicide.

He

—

insult,

likewise instituted a

single final court of appeal, to

which

all

causes

[40] seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed

1268 a of elders chosen for the purpose. He was further of opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was to dis[5] tinguish accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be guilty of perjury, whichever

way

they voted.

He also enacted that those who discovered

anything for the good of the state should be honoured; and he provided that the children of citizens who died in battle should be maintained at the public expense, as if such an en[10] actment had never been heard of before,

POLITICS

4 64

Athens and

in other he would have them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. These

yet

it

actually exists at

As

places.

to the magistrates,

are the most striking points in the constitution

Hippodamus. There is not much else. The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the husband[75] of

men, and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the [20] warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken from the class of those

two other ment,

classes

how

who carry arms. Yet, if the have no share in the govern-

can they be loyal citizens?

It

may

[25] be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes,

but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at all,

power to appoint magistrates? Furwhat use are farmers to the city? Artisans [jo] there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen, too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in or have ther,

Hippodamus they are supposed have land of their own, which they cultivate [55] for their private benefit. Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, the republic of to

make

which has no and no share in anything. [40] Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands, and those of the public as well, they will

a fourth class,

place in the state

I268 b

[5] Neither is the law to be commended which says that the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take [10] pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another. Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much

as

the

demands? He

suitor

asks,

say,

for

twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten

minae (or in general the suitor asks for more and the judge allows less), while another judge [75] allows five, another four minae. In this they will go on splitting up the damages,

way

and some

will grant the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken? Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form; and this is just, [20] for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet con-

demns him.

To honour which

is

those

who

useful to the state

discover is

anything

a proposal

which

has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. [25] This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent [jo] to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretence of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I

was

opinion, and

saying, there it

is

a difference of

may sometimes seem

desirable

they will have a difficulty in supplying the 1268 b quantity of produce which will main-

[55] to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been

two households: and why, in this case, should there be any division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.

and gymand every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. That improvement has oc-

tain

beneficial; medicine, for example,

nastic,

BOOK

1269b

II,

CHAPTERS

curred is shown by the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the [40] ancient Hellenes went about armed and bought their brides of each other. The remains 1269 a of ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; for example, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, and not merely what their fathers had. But the primaeval inhabitants, [5] whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary or even foolish people among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earthborn men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws have been written down, they ought not al-

ways

to

remain unaltered. As

in other sciences,

[10] so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but ac-

with particulars. Hence we sometimes and in certain cases laws be changed; but when we look at the mat-

tions are concerned infer that

may

from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required. For the habit of [75] lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the ter

citizen will not gain so

much by making

the

he will lose by the habit of disobedience. The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from [20] a change in an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws

change

as

enfeebles the

power

of the law.

Even

if

we

ad-

mit that the laws are to be changed, are they [25] all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons ? These are very im-

8-9

465

which the lawgiver has set before his citizens. That in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide for their [35] daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there sure

is

is

a difficulty in seeing

to be attained.

The

how

this lei-

Thessalian Penestae

have often risen against their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason [40] probably is that the neighbouring cities,

1269 b even when at war with one another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, since they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas all the neighbours of the Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, were their enemies. In Thessaly, [5] a g am the original revolt of the slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at war with the neighbouring Achaeans, Perrhaebians and Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think that [10] they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now it is clear that when these are the results the citizens of a state have not found >

out the secret of managing their subject population.

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness of the state. For, a husband and a wife being each [75] a part of every family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into men

women

and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; the legislator wanted to make the whole [20] state hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his intention in the case of the

portant questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suit-

men, but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury.

able occasion.

The consequence is

Lacedaemon and two

[50]

and indeed

have

to be considered: first,

in all governments,

Crete,

points

whether any pargood or bad, when compared with the perfect state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character

ticular

law

is

that in such a state wealth if

the citizens

under the dominion of their wives, after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, for all warlike races are prone to the love [30] either of men or of women. This was ex[25]

In the governments of

is

too highly valued, especially fall

POLITICS

4 66

among the Spartans in the days of many things were managed by women. But what difference does it make

i270 b

emplified

[30] country

their greatness;

and 30,000

their

tan citizens

women rule, or the rulers are ruled women? The result is the same. Even in

able to maintain 1500 cavalry

is

whole number of Sparbelow 1000. The result proves

hoplites, the fell

whether

the faulty nature of their laws respecting prop-

by

erty; for the city

sank under a single defeat;

men was

[35] regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian women has been

the

most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedaemonian women existed [40] from the earliest times, and was only 1270* what might be expected. For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, [5] already prepared by the discipline of a

[35] rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them: in-

which there

(in

soldier's life

ments of virtue), But,

when Lycurgus,

to bring the sisted,

are

many

ele-

to receive his enactments. as tradition says,

women under

wanted

his laws, they re-

and he gave up the attempt. These then what then happened, and this

are the causes of

defect in the constitution

We

tributed to them.

is

clearly to be at-

are not, however, con-

[10] sidering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, and the disorder of the

women,

as

I

have already

indecorum

gives an air of

said,

1

not only

to the constitution

itself,

but tends in a measure to

The mention

of avarice naturally sug-

considered in foster avarice.

[75]

gests a criticism

on the inequality of property.

While some

of the Spartan citizens have quite small properties, others have very large ones;

hence the land has passed into the hands of a few.

And

this

is

due

also to faulty laws; for,

[20] although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance,

he allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses and to the large dowries [25] which are customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the 1

i269 b

12, 23.

want

tradition

of

their ruin.

There

is

a

days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of giving the in the

that,

deed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Whether this

statement

is

true or not,

it

would

certainly

have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property. Again, the law which relates to the procreation of [40] children is adverse to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator, want-

1270 b

ing to have as many Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has four from all the burdens [5] of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children, the land being distributed as

it

is,

many

of

them must

necessarily fall

into poverty.

The Lacedaemonian

constitution

is

defec-

another point; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the tive in

whole people, and so the office is apt to fall [10] into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to [75] court them, so that, in this way as well, together with the royal office the whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented

when

they

have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance, has [20] been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This is the case at

where the kings desire its permanence because they have due honour in their own persons; the nobles because they are repreSparta,

BOOK

1271 b

sented in the council of elders (for the

II,

office

[25] of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people, because all are eligible to the Ephoralty. The election of Ephors out of the whole people

ought not to be carried which is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine them merely on their own judgement, but accord[3°] m S to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution they have is

perfectly right, but

on

in the present fashion,

—

a deal too

much

licence; whereas, in the case

of the other citizens, the excess of strictness intolerable

so

is

that they

CHAPTER

9

467

did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans [25] used to join enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.

Neither did the

mon

first

introducer of the com-

meals, called 'phiditia', regulate

them

The

entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is ex[jo] pected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense; thus the inwell.

tention of the legislator

run away from

mon

is

frustrated.

The com-

meals were meant to be a popular institubut the existing manner of regulating

the law into the secret indulgence of sensual

tion,

pleasures.

them

[35] Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said that the elders are

[35] P oor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot

good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of

contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.

important causes should hold

ten been censured,

office for life is a

[40] disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. And when men have been 1271 a educated in such a manner that even

the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well

known

to have taken bribes and to have been

And [5] guilty °f partiality in public affairs. therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied), 'All magistracies are accountable to the ors.'

Yes, but this prerogative

them, and

we maintain

is

Eph-

too great for

that the control should

be exercised in some other manner. Further, the [10] mode in which the Spartans elect their elders

is

childish;

and

it is

improper that the

person to be elected should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the

same intention which

ap-

is

the reverse of popular. For the very

The law about

the Spartan admirals has of-

and with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpet[40] ual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king. 1271 b The charge which Plato brings, in the

Laws, 2 against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only, the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was [5] preserved, but when they had attained em-

—

fell, for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods

pire they

for

which men contend

are to be acquired by

virtue rather than by vice, they err in suppos-

ing that these goods are to be preferred to the which gains them.

virtue

pears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has

[10] Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no money in the treasury,

reckoned upon

although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one

this quality in the election of

[75] the elders; for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice,

almost more than any other passions, are

the motives of crime.

Whether kings

are or are not an advantage 1

[20] to states, I will consider at another time ; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they

now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously

[75] another's contributions. the legislator has produced beneficial; for he has

in. 14-17.

is

result

which

the reverse of

his city poor,

and

his citizens greedy.

Enough

are 1

made

The

of 2

respecting the Spartan constitution,

which these Laws,

1.

are the principal defects.

625, 630.

POLITICS

4 68

1272 b

rights of citizenship. 10

[20] The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in some few points is quite as

good; but for the most part

The

more popular

a

less perfect in

older constitutions are generally

form.

less elab-

fruits of the earth lic

lands,

and

But

and

all

the

on the pubwhich is paid by

cattle raised

of the tribute

the Perioeci, one portion

and

in Crete they are of

character. There, of

is

assigned to the gods

to the service of the state,

and another

to

said to be,

[20] the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a com-

ure, a

mon

orate than the later,

and the Lacedaemonian

is

and probably is, in a very great meascopy of the Cretan. According to tradi[25] tion, Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing [jo] among the inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated; it extends right across the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes [35] are settled; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus. The Cretan institutions resemble the Lace[40] daemonian. The Helots are the husband-

men

of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and 1272 a both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the two [5] constitutions are similar; for the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan

Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes [10] share in the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi. The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per [75] head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, 1 forbids 1

1271*35.

him

to exercise the

stock.

The

legislator has

ways of securing moderation

many

ingenious

in eating,

which

he conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children, and the companionship of men with one another [25] whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the

Lacedaemonian there

can be no doubt.

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in [jo] Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi. [55] The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgement, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not dis-

contented at being excluded from it. For there [40] is no profit to be made out of the office as 1272 b out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.

The remedy by which

they correct the evil

an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed also to resign before their term of office has expired. [5] Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, of this institution

is

which is a very unsafe rule. Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when

BOOK

1273'

II,

CHAPTERS

submit to justice. This shows that the Cretan government, although possessing they will not

some of the [10]

state,

is

characteristics of a constitutional really a close oligarchy.

nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is

The

temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are will-

this but the

[75]

ing are also able to attack her. But, as I have al1 ready said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually re[20] volting. But when lately foreign invaders

found of

their

the

Enough

way

into the island, the

Cretan of the

constitution

was

weakness revealed.

government of Crete.

are also considered to have

an excellent form of government, which differs from that of any other state in several respects, [25] though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian nearly resemble one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthagin-

—

ian institutions are excellent.

The superiority of

[30] their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remains loyal to the constitution; the Carthaginians have never

had

any rebellion worth speaking of, and have nevunder the rule of a tyrant. Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lacedaemonian er been

are the following:

469

would be censured, apply equally to which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristoc[5] racy and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may

stitution all

the forms of government

determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who [10] likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistracies of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and [75] should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office) these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by [20] the magistrates, and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at

—

11

The Carthaginians

10-11

do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon. Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian con-

—The common

tables of the

clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia,

and

their

Lacedaemon, are

characteristic of aristocracy.

The Carthaginian

constitution deviates from and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates aristocracy

should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well, he has not the leisure. If,

—

then, election of magistrates for their

[25]

wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a

form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginithird

ans choose their magistrates, and particularly their kings and gen[50] the highest of them erals with an eye both to merit and to wealth.

[35] magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor [40] that an ordinary one, but if there is some

mitted an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace them-

distinguished family they are selected out of

selves in

—

—

it

and not appointed by seniority this is far better. Such officers have great power, and there1273 a fore, if they are persons of little worth, lft

4 isqq.

—

—

But we must acknowledge

that, in thus devi-

ating from aristocracy, the legislator has com-

any way; and to this his attention should be first directed. Even if you must have [35] regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals,

POLITICS

470

should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than vir-

and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anytue,

[40] thing honourable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where vir-

1273 b tue has not the

first

place, there aristoc-

racy cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor

and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore [5] they should rule who are able to rule best. even if the legislator does not care to pro-

And

tect the

good from poverty, he should

rate secure leisure for

them when

at

any

in office.

would seem also to be a bad principle that same person should hold many offices, which is a favourite practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by [10] one man. The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic prinIt

the

ciples that the offices of state

uted

among many

should be distrib-

persons. For, as

I

said,

1

this

arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner [75] performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all. The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy

by enriching one portion of

them to panacea and the

the people after another by sending their colonies.

[20]

This

is

their

means by which they give

stability to the

Accident favours them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods. [25] Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, state.

which are

justly celebrated.

1274 been already

telling has

told.

2

Of

those

who have

own or in forthey have administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for example, eign

cities,

whose

affairs

Lycurgus and Solon did both. Of the Lacedae[35] monian constitution I have already spoken. 3 As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical ele[40] ment, the elected magistracy, aristocrati1274 a cal and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of all the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have de[5] stroyed the non-democratic element.

the law courts ple

grew powerful,

who were now

at all in public

but have passed their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was worth

affairs,

1

I26l b

I.

When

to please the peo-

playing the tyrant the old

was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every [10] demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now constitution

see.

All this

is

true;

it

seems, however, to be

the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having

been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues,

whom

the better class opposed. Solon, himself,

[75] appears to have- given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to

account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary; for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from

and the men of wealth, that is to from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the [20] class called zeugitae, or from a third class

the notables say,

were labourers

treated of governments,

some have never taken any part

Others have been

[50] lawgivers, either in their

of so-called knights or cavalry.

12

1

The

fourth class

who had no share in any magis-

tracy.

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Ca1

Chapters

1-8.

3

Chapter

9.

11-12— BOOK

BOOK II, CHAPTERS

1275*

tana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in [25] Italy and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first people

who had any

and

special skill in legislation,

although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were that he,

III,

CHAPTER

1

471

nothing remarkable, except the false witnesses.

suits against

He is the first who instituted de-

nunciation for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our

modern

legislators.

(Characteristic of Phaleas of property; of Plato, the

is

the equalization

community

of

wom-

and property, the common meals women, and the law about drinking,

en, children,

[jo] disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsist-

[10] of that the sober shall be masters of the feast; also

ent with chronology.

the training of soldiers to acquire by practice

There was

also Philolaus, the Corinthian,

who

gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diodes, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived for [55] him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together

ants

ended

their days.

The

inhabit-

which

point out their tombs,

still

are in

view of one another, but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not. Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, full

[40] Diodes out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth might not be visible

from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is 1274 b the reason why they settled at Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children, which they call the 'Laws of Adoption'. These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the [5]

number

of the

equal skill with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the other.) [75] Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution which already existed, and there

is

no

peculiarity in

is

is

worth

acts of violence.

Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is nothing [25] remarkable in them. And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions

lots.

In the legislation of Charondas there

them which

mentioning, except the greatness and severity of the punishments. Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a drunken man do something wrong, he shall be more heavily [20] punished than if he were sober; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expediency, for drunken more often than sober people commit

exist, or

BOOK

which

have been devised by

either actually

theorists.

III

democracy will often not be a an oligarchy. Leaving out of consid[5] eration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen in any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he citizen in a

citizen in

He who

would inquire

and government must determine 'What is a state?' At presinto the essence

attributes of various kinds of first

of

all

ent this

is

a disputed question.

Some

say that

and

the state has done a certain act; others, no, not

lives in a certain place, for resident aliens

[55] the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned

he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and be[10] ing sued; for this right may be enjoyed

entirely with the state; a constitution or gov-

ernment being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; [40] these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by 1275 a asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term ? For here again there

may

be a difference of opinion.

He who

is

a

slaves share in the place;

nor

is

under the provisions of a treaty. Nay, resident many places do not possess even such rights completely, for they are obliged to have a patron, so that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have aliens in

POLITICS

472

1276-

[75] been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not

are decided by other magistrates.

and in the other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise ex[20] pression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But

modify our definition of the

of age,

the citizen

whom we

are seeking to define

citizen in the strictest sense, against

is

whom

a

no

such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice,

and

in offices.

Now

of offices

and the same persons [25] are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; for example, the others have no limit of time, office of dicast or ecclesiast. It may, indeed, be some

are discontinuous,

A

similar

principle prevails at Carthage; there certain

magistrates decide

all

causes.

We may,

indeed,

citizen so as to

states. In them it is the holder [75] of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all

include these

such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of

now

the citizen

begins to clear up.

He who has the power to take part

in the deadministration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; [20] and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

or judicial

liberative

—

argued that these are not magistrates

and

that their functions give

the government.

But surely

at all,

them no share it is

in

ridiculous to

say that those who have the supreme power do not govern. Let us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question; what we [50] want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call

'indefinite

it

office',

and we

will

But

is defined to be one of both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more ancestors. This is a short and prac[25] tical definition; but there are some who

in practice a citizen

whom

raise the further question: How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said is

made by

—'Mortars are what

the mortar-makers,

and the

citizens

assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who

of Larissa are those

are generally so called.

for, if

[35] But we must not forget that things of which the underlying principles differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, an-

they shared in the government, they were

when regarded in this relahardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those 1275 b which are faulty or perverted are necesother third, have, tion, nothing, or

sarily

posterior to those

which

are perfect.

(What we mean by perversion will after explained. ) The citizen then of 1

be herenecessity

[5] differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen

of a democracy; but not necessarily to other

For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they dis[10] tribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes states.

1

Cf. 1279* 19.

who

istrates; for it is their

made by the magtrade to make Larisare

[30] saeans'. Yet the question is really simple, according to the definition just given cit-

This is a better definition than the other. For the words, 'born of a father or mother who is a citizen', cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state. izens.

There

is

a greater difficulty in the case of

[35] those who have been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in

many metics, both strangers and The doubt in these cases is, not who

tribes

slaves. is,

but

1276a whether he who is ought to be a citizen; and there will still be a further doubt, whether he

who ought not

to be a citizen,

is

one in

fact,

what ought not to be is what is false. Now, there are some who hold office, and yet ought

for

not to hold office, whom we describe as ruling, but ruling unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of he who holds a judicial or rule or office, [5] legislative office fulfils our definition of a

—

citizen. It

about

is

evident, therefore, that the citizens

whom

called citizens.

the doubt has arisen

must be

BOOK

1277*

III,

CHAPTERS

1-4

473

longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a [5] comic chorus, although the members of

Whether they ought to be so tion which is bound up with

or not

a ques-

is

the previous in-

both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of ele-

1 quiry. For a parallel question is raised respecting the state, whether a certain act is or is not

ments

example, in the transia tyranny to a democ[io] racy. In such cases persons refuse to fulfil

the

an

act of the state; for

tion

from an oligarchy or

any other obligations, on the and not the state, contracted them; they argue that some constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the common good. But this would aptheir contracts or

ground that the

tyrant,

ply equally to democracies, for they too

may

be

founded on violence, and then the acts of the [75] democracy will be neither more nor less acts of the state in question than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up on what principle shall we ever into another:

—

say that the state

is

the same, or different?

It

would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants (for the soil and the population may be separated, and [20] some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in another). This, however, is not a very serious difficulty;

we need

mark

ambiguous.

word

that the

'state' is

only re-

[25] It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single what is the limit? Certainly not the wall city

—

as different

when

the

form

of their

com-

position alters; for example, a scale containing

same sounds

is

said to be different, accord-

[10] ingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the

sameness of the constitution, and it may be same name, whether the

called or not by the

inhabitants are the

same or

entirely different.

quite another question, whether a state

It is

ought or ought not to fulfil engagements when [75] the form of government changes.

There

is

a point nearly allied to the preceding:

man and

Whether

the virtue of a

citizen

the same or not. But, before entering

on

is

good

a

good

we must certainly first obsome general notion of the virtue of the

this discussion,

tain

[20] citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a of a community. Now, sailors have

member

different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual's [25] virtue applies exclusively to him, there is,

part of the inhabitants

same time, a common definition applicathem all. For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the [50] constitution; the virtue of the citizen must

[50] fact.

therefore

you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, is Babylon, and every city that has the compass of the city, for

of a nation rather than a city; Babylon, they say,

some became aware of the This difficulty may, however, with

had been taken

for three days before

advantage be deferred to another occasion; the statesman has to consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not.

Again,

shall

though the

we

say that while the race of

dying and being and fountains the same, always flowing away and

citizens are always

we

call rivers

although the water is coming again? Or shall tions of

men,

we

say that the genera-

like the rivers, are the

same, but

[40] that the state changes? For, since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of the

1276 b

government changes, and becomes then

it

may

different,

be supposed that the state

*C£. 1274^34.

ble to

which he

be relative to the constitution of is

a

member.

forms of government,

If,

then, there are

many

evident that there

is

not a single virtue of the good citizen which

is

it is

But we say that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man. [55] The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideraperfect virtue.

[55] inhabitants, as well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same, al-

born, as

at the

is

no

tion of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well,

[40] and must therefore have virtue, still, inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the 1277* virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen thus, and thus only, can

—

POLITICS

474

the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the

good

must be good. composed of unlikes,

state all the citizens

[5] Again, the

state, as

may

be compared to the living being: as the elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and first

slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar

elements, the state is composed; and, there/o] fore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excelin

lence of the leader of a chorus is the same as who stands by his side. I

that of the performer

have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same. But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the

ood

good

citizen

and the virtue

of the

man coincide? To this we answer that

the

75] good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a

wise man. And some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As Euripi-

subtle arts for

me, but what the

As though

there were a special education need-

assume further that the subject

is

a citizen as

well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen

and the virtue of the good

man

cannot be ab-

some

cases they

for the virtue of a ruler differs

from that

solutely the same, although in

of a citizen. It

was the

which made Jason when he was not a

sense of this difference

—

[5] inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practise them, there will

cease to be a distinction

between master and

slave.

not the rule of which we are speakis a rule of another kind, which exercised over freemen and equals by birth

This

is

ing; but there is

—a

constitutional rule,

which the

ruler

must

[10] learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of general of cavalry by being under the

Now

fr.

16,

Nauck.

under the orders and by having had the command of a regiment and of a company. It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander'.

The two ought

how

are not the same, but the

to be capable of both;

good

he should

citizen

know

govern like a freeman, and how to obey these are the virtues of a [75] like a freeman citizen. And, although the temperance and justo

—

from those of a subgood man will include both; the virtue of the good man who is free and

tice of a ruler are distinct ject,

the virtue of a

hungry

for

meaning

that he

one but will comprise distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and dif[20] fering as the temperance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage

tyrant',

approved virtue who is able to do if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of [30] praise. Since, then, it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different things and not the same, but that the citizen must know and share in them both, the infercitizen of

Aeolus,

—

say that 'he felt

could not endure to live in a private station. [25] But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a

1

[35] of them: the other would be degrading; and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labour of their 1277 b hands: under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations, the working classes had no share in the government a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of

of a general of infantry,

[20] ed by a ruler. If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we

both.

—

a general of infantry by being state

requires. 1

may;

ence is obvious. There is, indeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned with menial offices, the master need not know how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution

orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of

des says:

No

1277 b

also a subject, e.g. his justice, will not be

than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to pre[25] serve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic

it would seem that all other must equally belong to ruler and sub-

of the ruler:

virtues

BOOK III, CHAPTERS 4-6

1278 b ject.

The

virtue of the subject

is

certainly not

wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.

[50] From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of

the

good

citizen, or different,

same, and

how

and how

far the

virtue

who

remains one more question about Is he only a true citizen who has a [^5] share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this still

and obeying; for none of the lower

virtue of ruling

And

if

[20] labourer. In oligarchies the qualification is high, and therefore no labourer can

ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of them are rich. At Thebes

was a law that no man could hold who had not retired from business for ten years. But in many states the law goes to the [25] there

office

this

man

is

a

class are citi-

man

a citizen

is

when

number

the

cluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is con-

whose

fined to those

fathers

they are not foreigners. May we not reply, that 1278* as far as this objection goes there is no

kinds of citizens; and he

that

we cannot

are necessary to the existence of the state;

all

those to be citizens

mother

of citizens increases, first

both citizens.

who

his

the children of a male or a female slave are ex-

which part of the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident aliens, and

more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted

though

only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children; the law is relaxed [jo] when there is a dearth of population. But

zens, in

consider

of a mechanic or

length of admitting aliens; for in some democ-

far different.

the citizen:

citizen.

life

for office

racies a

There

475 living the

is

[35] Hence, as

highest sense

evident, there are different

is

who

and mothers are

is

a citizen in the

shares in the honours of the

Compare Homer's words 'like some dishonoured stranger'; 2 he who is excluded from the honours of the state is no better than an alien. But when this exclusion is concealed, state.

then the object

is

that the privileged class

may

for example, children are not citizens equally

deceive their fellow inhabitants.

with grown-up men, who are citizens absolutely] ly, but children, not being grown up, are only citizens on a certain assumption. Nay, in

[40] As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good

ancient times, and artisan

class

were

among some slaves or

therefore the majority of best

form of

state will

them

nations, the

and now. The

foreigners,

are so

not admit them to

citi-

zenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen, nor to every free man as such, [10] but only to those who are freed from necessary services.

The

1278 b citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the con[5] duct of public affairs.

necessary people are either

who minister to the wants of individuals, mechanics and labourers who are the serv-

slaves

Having determined

or

next to consider whether there

ants of the

community. These

ried a

further will explain their position;

little

reflections car1

and indeed what has been

said already is of itunderstood, explanation enough. [75] Since there are many forms of government there must be many varieties of citizens, self,

and that

of

who

are subjects; so

under some governments the mechanic

and the labourer

will be citizens, but not in

others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-

government of the best (if there be such in which honours are given according virtue and merit; for no man can practise

A

constitution

is

the arrangement of magis-

[10] tracies in a state, especially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere sover-

eign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms

government

of

an one),

other cases.

to

[75] First,

i275a 3 8sqq.

we have

only one form

government or many, and if many, what what are the dif-

called

1

is

they are, and how many, and ferences between them.

when

especially of citizens

these questions,

2 Iliad, ix.

let

also are different:

us consider

648; xvi. 59.

what

is

and so

in

the purpose

POLITICS

476

and how many forms

of a state,

of

government

there are by which human society is regulated. have already said, in the first part of this

We

treatise,

1

when

ment and

discussing household manage-

the rule of a master, that

man

is

by

[20] nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their

common

interests in proportion as they sever-

any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life ally attain to

[25] (in

which there

is

possibly

some noble

element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and maintain the political community. And we all see that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and hap[50] There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they have been

often defined already in discussions outside the school. The rule of a master, although the slave

by nature and the master by nature have in

ts]

just as he, while in office,

had looked after But nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always [75] in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting after theirs.

places.

The

conclusion

ments which have

is

evident: that govern-

a regard to the

terest are constituted in

principles of justice,

common

accordance with

in-

strict

and are therefore true

forms; but those which regard only the inter[20] est of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a

community

Having determined

of freemen.

we have

these points,

how many forms

to consider

next

government

of

and what they are; and in the first what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of them will at [25] once be apparent. The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments [50] which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For the members of there are,

piness.

ality the

l279 b

same

interests,

is

re-

nevertheless exer-

with a view to the interbut accidentally considers

cised primarily

est of the master,

the slave, since,

if

the slave perish, the rule of

the master perishes with him.

On

the other

hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but essen[40] tially for the good of the governed, as we 1279 a see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the art-

place

a state,

if

they are truly citizens, ought to parOf forms of govern-

ticipate in its advantages.

ment

in

which one

regards the

common

rules,

we

call that

which

kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not [^5]

many,

interests,

rule, aristocracy;

and

it is

so called,

no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise gymnastics, and the helmsman is always one of the

either because the rulers are the best

crew. The trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care. But,

tage, for the

zens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name, a constitution. And there is a [40] reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but as the num-

trainer

ber increases

ists

[5] of,

themselves. For there

is

when he is one of the persons taken care he accidentally participates in the advan-

helmsman is also a sailor, and the becomes one of those in training. And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citi[10] zens think that they ought to hold office by turns. Formerly, as is natural, every one would take his turn of service; and then again, somebody else would look after his interest, 1

Cf.i.i253«2.

men, or

because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But

when

the

citi-

—

1279 b

it

becomes more

difficult for

to attain perfection in every

them

kind of

though they may in military virtue, for found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens. Of the above-mentioned forms, the pervervirtue,

this is

BOOK III, CHAPTERS 6-9

1280* sions are as follows: [5]

—

of royalty, tyranny; of

oligarchy;

aristocracy,

of

constitutional

government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: [10] none of

them

the

common good

of

all.

8

But government, and

there are difficulties it

is

monarchy

wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth [5] and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively

claim power in the

Tyranny,

as

I

was

saying,

exercising the rule of a master

Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy, and what

and democratical. For all some kind, but their [10] conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, is

justice oligarchical

men

cling to justice of

however, for all, but only for equals. And inis thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge erro-

men

over the political society; oligarchy is when of property have the government in their

equality

hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. And here arises the first of our difficul-

neously.

and it relates to the distinction just drawn. [20] For democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in their hands because they are strongly] er? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good. Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and ties,

—

—

[50] the poor are the rulers there will still be a difficulty. For, if the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other governments also

mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states. [55] The argument seems to show that, wheth-

just

er in oligarchies or in democracies, the

num-

ber of the governing body, whether the greater

democracy, or the smaller numan oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between [40] them. For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth.

number,

ber, as in

as in a

state.

will therefore be necessary

more

in every particular.

rule by reason of their

about these forms of

at length the nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook [75] or omit anything, but to set forth the truth

to state a little

477

1280a Wherever men

The

reason

is

that they are passing

[75] judgement on themselves, and most people are bad judges in their own case. And

whereas

justice implies a relation to persons as well as to things, and a just distribution, as I

have already said in the Ethics, 1 implies the same ratio between the persons and between the things, they agree about the equality of the things, but dispute about the equality of the persons, chiefly for the reason which I have because they are bad judges [20] just given,

—

own

and secondly, because both the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute justice. For the one party, if they are unequal in one respect, for example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all; and the other party, if they are equal in one respect, for example free birth, consider themselves to be equal in [25] all. But they leave out the capital point. For if men met and associated out of regard to wealth only, their share in the state would be proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share of a hun[50] dred minae, whether of the principal or of the profits, as he who paid the remaining in their

affairs;

But a state exists for the sake of a and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for ninety-nine.

good

1

life,

v. 1131* 15.

POLITICS

47»

they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake

and

[35] of alliance

security

from

injustice,

nor yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of one state. True, they have agreements about imports, and engagements that they will do no wrong to one another, and written arti[40] cles of alliance. But there are no magis-

1280b trades common

to the contracting par-

who will enforce their engagements; different states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one state take care that the citizens

ties

of the other are such as they see that those

ought

who come under

to be, nor

the terms of the

do no wrong or wickedness at all, but only that they do no injustice to one another. [5] Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration virtue and vice in treaty

states.

Whence

it

may

be further inferred that

must be the care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name: for without this end the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and law is only a convention, 'a surety to one an[10] other of justice', as the sophist Lycophron says, and has no real power to make the citizens good and just. virtue

This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and Megara, to be brought to-

1281

s

was of the same [jo] character after as before their union. It is

tercourse with one another clear then that a state

having a

common

is

not a mere society,

place, established for the

prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which

cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregation of families in wellbeing, for the sake of a perfect and self-suffica state

[35] in S u fe- Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities

family connexions, brotherhoods, rifices,

common

amusements which draw men

But these are created by friendship, to live together

the good

is

friendship.

sac-

together.

for the will

The end

of the

and these are the means [40] towards it. And the state is the union of 1281* families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life. state

is

Our

life,

conclusion, then,

is

that political society

sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. Hence they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share exists for the

[5] in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are in-

them in political virtue; or than those exceed them in wealth but are surpassed

ferior to

who

by them in virtue.

From what seen that

all

has been said

it

will be clearly

the partisans of different forms of

gether so that their walls touched, still they would not be one city, not even if the citizens [75] had the right to intermarry, which is one

[10] government speak of a part of justice only.

of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men dwelt at a distance from one an-

There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state: Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alter-

other, but not so far off as to

course,

have no

inter-

and there were laws among them that

they should not

wrong each

other in their ex-

10

—

natives seems to involve disagreeable conse-

[20] changes, neither would this be a state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, an-

are

other a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thou-

is not this un[75] the property of the rich, just? No, by heaven (will be the reply), for

if they have nothing in but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state. Why is this ? [25] Surely not because they are at a distance from one another: for even supposing that such a community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their in-

justly willed it. But if not injustice, pray what is? Again, when in the first division all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her, nor is

sand:

nevertheless,

common

quences.

more

If

in

the poor, for example, because they

number, divide among themselves

the

supreme authority

this

is

justice destructive of a state;

—

and therefore

this

[20] law of confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men

BOOK

1282'

III,

CHAPTERS

by superior power, just as the multitude coerce the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And what if [25] they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people,

—

is

this just? If so, the other case will

likewise be just. But there can be no doubt that these things are

all

Then ought

wrong and

unjust.

number

the

of those

in

are dishonoured

Some one may

thereby increased.

bad

who

say that

any case for a man, subject as he

is

it is

is

to

[55] all the accidents of human passion, to have the supreme power, rather than the law. But

what

if

the law

garchical,

how

ficulties?

Not

be democratical or oliwill that help us out of our difat all; the same consequences itself

11

Most of these questions may be reserved for 1 another occasion. The principle that the multi[40] tude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each 1281 b individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and pru[5] dence, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure of

mind and

disposition.

Hence

man

the

many

music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand [10] the whole. There is a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any are better judges than a single

of

individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because in them the scattered elements are combined, al-

though, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. Whether 1

by heaven, in some cases

rather,

it is

impossi-

argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But ble of application; for the

may

our statement

be bodies of

is

men

about

nevertheless true.

whom

And

if so,

which has been already raised, 2 and also another which is akin to it viz. what power should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have [25] no personal merit are both solved. There is still a danger in allowing them to share the the difficulty

—

—

great offices of state, for their folly will lead

them

and their dishonesty into a danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor [50] men are excluded from office will necesinto

error,

crime. But there

sarily

cape

be

is

full of

is

enemies.

to assign to

judicial functions.

The

them some For

only

way

of es-

deliberative

this reason

and

Solon and

them the power and of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not allow them to hold office singly. When they meet together their perceptions are quite good enough, and [35] combined with the better class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be), but each individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect certain other legislators give

of electing to offices,

will follow.

their

479

[75] this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or

[20] there

good to rule and have su[jo] preme power? But in that case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonoured. For the offices of a state are posts of honour; and if one set of men always hold them, the rest must be deprived of them. Then will it be well that the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still more oligarchical, for the

9-11

Chapters 12-17, IV VI »

judgement.

the other hand, the popular

that he who can judge of the healing of a sick man would be one who could himself heal his

—

and make him whole that is, in other 1282 a words, the physician; and so in all professions and arts. As, then, the physician ought to be called to account by physicians, so ought disease,

men

in general to be called to account

by their But physicians are of three kinds: there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is the physician of the higher class, and thirdly peers.

the intelligent

man who has

studied the art: in

such a class; and we attribute [5] the power of judging to them quite as much as to professors of the art. Secondly, does not the same principle apply to elections? For a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge; those who know geometry, for example, will choose a geometrician rightall arts

ly, 2

-

On

form of government involves certain difficulty ] ties. In the first place, it might be objected

there

and those Chapter

10.

is

who know how

to steer, a pilot;

POLITICS

480 [

if there be some occupations and which private persons share in the abil-

10] and, even

arts in

choose, they certainly cannot choose betthan those who know. So that, according to this argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the calling of them to account, should be entrusted to the many. Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent met by [75] our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those who have speity to

ter

1

cial

knowledge

—

as a

body they are

as

good or

Moreover, there are some arts whose products are not judged of solely, or best, by better.

the artists themselves,

namely those

arts

better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.

now

to be sufficiently another akin to it. That inferior persons should have authority in greater matters than the good would appear to

This

difficulty

seems

is

be a strange thing, yet the election and calling to account of the magistrates is the greatest of 2 all. And these, as I was saying, are functions

which

in

some

ple, for the

states are assigned to the peo-

assembly

supreme

is

matters. Yet persons of any age,

the senate,

and

is

may

and the courts

consist of

their property collectively

many is

per-

greater

[40] than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great offices. But enough of this.

1282 b The discussion of the first question 3 shows nothing so clearly as that laws, when 1

I28l a 40-b 2I.

a

Chapter

10.

S

I28l b 32.

this

is

the political science of

all

which the good

is

words, the common interest. All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid 4 [20] down by us about Ethics. For they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation to persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But there still remains a question: equality or inequality of what? here is a difficulty which justice, in other

For very

likely

will say that offices of state

ought

calls for political speculation.

some persons

[25] rior excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other differ-

be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible. For the power does not reside in the dicast or senator, or ecclesiast, but in the court, [^5] and the senate, and the assembly, of which individual senators, or ecclesiasts, or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this reason the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few; for the people, and sons,

gree a good in the most authoritative of

to be unequally distributed according to supe-

and generals, a high qualification

required. This difficulty

12

[75] In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest de-

in all such

for the great officers of state, such as

treasurers

But what are good laws has not yet been clearly explained; the old difficulty remains. The goodness or badness, justice or in[10] justice, of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of states. This, however, is clear, that the laws must be adapted to the constitutions. But if so, true forms of government will of necessity have just laws, and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws. ticulars.

and having

[jo] but a small property qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, al-

though

good, should be supreme; and that the magistrate or magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to [5] speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all par-

whose

products are recognized even by those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowl[20] edge of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge

[25] answered, but there

1282 b

the rest of the commuwho differ in any one respect

him and

ence between

nity; for that those

have different rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason [jo] for his obtaining a greater share of political rights.

face,

arts

The

and may be and sciences.

error here

When

a

upon the surfrom the other

lies

illustrated

number

players are equal in their art, there

is

of flute-

no reason

why

those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for they will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for him

who

is

is still

the superior artist. If

obscure,

it

will be

what

made

I

am

saying

clearer as

we

[55] proceed. For if there were a superior fluteplayer who was far inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater

ood than the

art of flute-playing,

and may

ex-

40] eel flute-playing in a greater ratio than 4

Cf. Ethics, v.

3.

BOOK

1283 b

III,

CHAPTERS

he excels the others in his art, still he .ought to 1283* have the best flutes given to him, unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute

which they do not. Moreover, upon this principle any good may be compared with any other. For if a giv[5] en height may be measured against wealth and against freedom, height in general may be so measured. Thus if A excels in height more to excellence in flute-playing,

B

than

even more,

in virtue,

if

virtue in general ex-

goods will be commensurable; for if a certain amount is better than some other, it is clear that some other [10] will be equal. But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that there is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be slow, and others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and the others much; it is in gymnastic contests that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival claims of candidates [75] for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composicels

height

still

tion of a state.

born, or rich, fice; for

all

And therefore the noble, or freemay with good reason claim ofmust be freemen and can be no more composed

holders of offices

tax-payers: a state entirely of poor

men

than entirely of

slaves.

wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are equally so; for without the former qualities a state cannot ex[20] ist at all, without the latter, not well.

But

if

11-13

481

always valued in a man's ty] tr Y- Another reason

own home and counis, that those who are

sprung from better ancestors are likely to be men, for nobility is excellence of race. Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it implies all others. Again, [40] the many may urge their claim against the few; for, when taken collectively, and compared with the few, they are stronger and rich1283 b er and better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the other classes who make up a state, are all living together in the same city, will there, or will there not, be any doubt who shall rule? No doubt at all in determining who ought to rule in each of the above[5] mentioned forms of government. For states are characterized by differences in their governing bodies one of them has a government of the rich, another of the virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements co-exist. How are we to decide? Suppose the [10] virtuous to be very few in number: may better

—

—

we

consider their numbers in relation to their and ask whether they are enough to ad-

duties,

many as will make up may be urged against all political power. For those who

minister the state, or so a state? Objections

the aspirants to

[75] found their claims on wealth or family might be thought to have no basis of justice; on this principle, if any one person were richer than all the rest, it is clear that he ought to be ruler of them. In like

manner he who

is

very

distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority over all those who claim on the the existence of the state

If

sidered, then least,

it

would seem

is

alone to be con-

that all or

of these claims are just; but,

if

some

we

at

take

have already 1 [25] said, education and virtue have superior claims. As, however, those who are equal in one thing ought not to have an equal share in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to have an unequal share in all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on either into account a

good

life,

then, as

I

of these principles are perversions. All

men

have a claim in a certain sense, as I have already 2 [30] admitted, but all have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the common element of the state; also they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under the same title as the noble; for they are nearly akin. For the noble are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble, and good birth is l

Cf. i28i a 4.

2

i

2 8oa 9sqq.

[20]

ground that they are freeborn. In an arisgovernment of the best, a like diffi-

tocracy, or

culty occurs about virtue; for better than the other

if

members

one citizen be of the govern-

may be,

he too, upon should rule over them. And if the people are to be supreme because they are stronger than the few, then if [25] one man, or more than one, but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many. All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to ment, however good they the

same principle of

[30]

them

justice,

are strictly right.

To

those

who

claim to be masters of the government on the ground of their virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often better and richer than the few I do not say individually, but collectively. And an[35] other ingenious objection which is some-

—

POLITICS

482

1284 b

times put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the leg-

[50] had brought the field to a level. The herald did not know the meaning of the action,

make the justest laws with a view to the good of

but came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to

who

islator

ought

desires to

to legislate

many, when the which we have mentioned occurs.

the higher classes or of the

cut off the principal

[40] case

is

Now

what

just or right

is

in the sense of 'what

is

is

to be interpreted

equal';

and that which

is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens.

a citizen is one who shares in governing 1284* and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life

And

of virtue. If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, although not enough to make up the full complement of a state, whose vir-

tue

is

so pre-eminent that the virtues or the po-

[5] litical capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they can

be no longer regarded as part of a state; for justice will not be

reckoned only

equal of those

if

who

he

is

are so

him

in virtue and in political Such an one may truly be God among men. Hence we see that

far inferior to

[10]

done to the superior,

as the

capacity.

deemed

a

legislation

who

is

necessarily concerned only with

and in capacity; and that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law they are themselves a law. Any one would be ridiculous who attempted to make [75] laws for them: they would probably rethose

are equal in birth

—

tort

what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions

said to the hares,

when

in the council of the

began haranguing and claimAnd for this reason democratic states have instituted ostracism; equality [20] is above all things their aim, and therefore they ostracized and banished from the city for a time those who seemed to predominate too much through their wealth, or the number of their friends, or through any other political influence. Mythology tells us that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar beasts the latter

ing equality for

all.

men

in the state;

and

this

a policy not only expedient for tyrants or in

[35\ practice confined to them, but equally necessary in oligarchies and democracies. Osis a measure of the same kind, which by disabling and banishing the most prominent citizens. Great powers do the same to whole cities and nations, as the Athenians did [40] to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians; no sooner had they obtained a firm grasp of the empire, than they humbled their allies con1284b trary to treaty; and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babyloni-

tracism

acts

and other nations, when

ans,

their spirit has

been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness.

The problem

is a universal one, and equally forms of government, true as well as false; for, although perverted forms with a view to their own interests may adopt this pol-

concerns

[5]

do

i

all

which seek the common interest The same thing may be obthe arts and sciences; for the painter

cv those >

so likewise.

served in

have a foot which, not in proportion, nor [10] will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other part of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorus-master will allow any one who sings louder or better than all the will not allow the figure to

however

beautiful,

is

rest to sing in the choir.

practise

compulsion and

with their

cities,

if

their

Monarchs, still

live in

too,

may

harmony

own government

is

[75] for the interest of the state. Hence where there is an acknowledged superiority the argu-

ment

is based upon a would certainly be better that the legislator should from the first so order his state as to have no need of such a

in favour of ostracism

kind of

political justice. It

remedy. But thing

is

if

the need arises, the next best

that he should endeavour to correct

[20] the evil by this or

The

some

similar measure.

principle, however, has not been fairly ap-

plied in states; for, instead of looking to the

own

[25] reason; the ship Argo would not take him because she feared that he would have been

good of

much for the rest those who denounce

under perverted forms of government, and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear

Wherefore tyranny and blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus too

of the crew.

cannot be held altogether just in their censure. The story is that Periander, when the herald was sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he

their

constitution, they have used

ostracism for factious purposes.

It is

true that

not absolutely just. In the perwould be great doubts about the use of it, not when applied to excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but [25] that

it is

fect state there

BOOK

1285 b

when used

CHAPTERS

some one who is pre-emiwhat is to be done with him ?

against

nent in virtue,

Mankind

III,

—

an one is to be on the other hand, be a subject that would be as

will not say that such

[jo] expelled

and

exiled;

—

he ought not to if mankind should claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his offices among them. The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life.

M [35]

The preceding

transition, leads to the consideration of royal-

which we admit

ty,

to be

one of the true forms whether in order to or country should be

of government. Let us see

be well governed a state under the rule of a king or under some other

form of government; and whether monarchy, [40] although good for some, may not be bad for others. But first we must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many. It is 1285* easy to see that there are many, and that the manner of government is not the same in all of

Of

them.

royalties according to law, (

daemonian

1 )

the Lace-

thought to answer best to the true pattern; but there the royal power is not [5] absolute, except when the kings go on an expedition, and then they take the command. Matters of religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly office is in truth a kind of is

generalship, irresponsible

and perpetual. The life and death, ex-

king has not the power of

cept in a specified case, as for instance, in an-

had

cient times, he

it

when upon

a campaign,

483

tyrannies because the people are by

nature slaves; but there is no danger of their being overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore also their guards are such as a king [25] and not such as a tyrant would employ, that

is

to say, they are

composed

of citizens,

whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries. For kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary;

and the

one are guarded by their fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them. [50] These are two forms of monarchy, and

was

which existed in ancient Aesymnetia or dictatorship. This may be defined generally as an elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being hereditary. Sometimes the office was held for life, sometimes for a term of years, or until certain duties had been performed. For example, the there

discussion, by a natural

13-14

a third (3)

Hellas, called an

[55] Mytilenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself shows in one of his banquet odes 2 that

they chose Pittacus tyrant, for he reproaches his fellow-citizens for 'having made the low-

born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and ill1285 b fated city, with one voice shouting his praises'.

These forms of government have always had the character of tyrannies, because they pos-

power; but inasmuch as they are and acquiesced in by their subjects,

sess despotic

elective

they are kingly. (4) There

a fourth species of kingly rule

is

—that of the heroic times—which was hereditary

and

legal,

and was exercised over willing

[10] by right of force. This custom is described in Homer. For Agamemnon is patient

[5] subjects. For the first chiefs were benefactors of the people in arts or arms; they either

when he

gathered them into a community, or procured land for them; and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacri[io] fixes, except those which required a priest. They also decided causes either with or without an oath; and when they swore, the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times their power extended continuously to all things whatsoever, in city and country, as well as in foreign parts; but at a [75] later date they relinquished several of these privileges, and others the people took from them, until in some states nothing was left to them but the sacrifices; and where they

attacked in the assembly, but when to battle he has the power even of life and death. Does he not say? the

is

army goes out

I find a man skulking apart from the nothing shall save him from the dogs and vultures, for in my hands is death.' 1 This, then, is one form of royalty a generic] alship for life: and of such royalties some

'When

battle,

—

are hereditary

(2) There

and others

is

elective.

another sort of monarchy not

uncommon among the barbarians, which

near-

resembles tyranny. But this is both legal and hereditary. For barbarians, being more servile [20] in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic government. Such royalties have the nature of

ly

1

Iliad,

11.

391-393.

1

Fr. 37 a, Bergk.

POLITICS

484

retained

more

had only the war beyond the border.

of the reality they

right of leadership in

[20] These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but limited First the

king was a general and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary despotic government in accord[25] ance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship, hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from one another in the manner which I have deto certain functions; the

and

a judge,

scribed.

(5) There is a fifth form of kingly rule in [jo] which one has the disposal of all, just as each nation or each state has the disposal of

form corresponds to the household. For as household man-

1286 b

dispense with the general principle which exists in law, and that is a better ruler which

from passion than that in which it is Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man. Yes, it may [20] be replied, but then on the other hand an free

is

innate.

individual will be better able to deliberate in particular cases.

The best man, then, must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their authority. But [25] when the law cannot determine a point not well, should the one best man or decide? According to our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgement, de-

at all, or

should

all

and decide, and

liberate,

relate to individual cases.

their

judgements

the assembly, taken separately, ferior to the

control of a

up of many individuals. And which all the guests contribute

agement is

is

the kingly rule of a house, so kingly

the household

of a nation, or of

Of

these forms

management

many

of a city, or

nations.

we need

only consider two, the

certainly in-

is

wise man. But the

public matters; this

rule

all

Now any member of state

is

made

as a feast to is

better than

banquet furnished by a single man, so a mul[50] titude is a better judge of many things than any individual. Again, the many are more incorruptible than a

Lacedaemonian and the absolute royalty; for most of the others lie in a region between them, having less power than the last, and more than the first. Thus the inquiry is reduced to two points: first, it is advantageous to

the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then his [35\ judgement is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of

the state that there should be a perpetual gen-

persons would

[35]

eral,

and

if so,

The

first

question

be confined to one family, or open to the citizens in turn? 1286 a Secondly, is it well that a single man should have the supreme power in all things?

should the

falls

office

under the head of laws

rather than of constitutions; for perpetual gen-

might equally exist under any form of government, so that this matter may be dis[5] missed for the present. The other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have now to consider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will begin by inquiring whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. [10] The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by written rules is absurd. In Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he eralship

[75] takes the risk.

Hence

ernment acting according

it is

clear that a gov-

to written laws

is

plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot

all get into a passion and go same moment. Let us assume that they are the freemen, and that they never act in violation of the law, but fill up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is

wrong at

the

scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the

more

incorruptible, the one

good

ruler, or the

many who are all good? Will not the 1286 b many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one man is not divided against himself. To which we may [40]

answer that

we [5]

one

their character

the rule of

call

them good,

man

is

as

good

many men, who

aristocracy,

as his. If

are all of

and the rule of

royalty, then aristocracy will be better

whether the governsupported by force or not, provided only that a number of men equal in virtue can be found. for states than royalty,

ment

The

is

first

governments were kingships, prob-

ably for this reason, because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue were few.

BOOK

1287 b

III,

CHAPTERS

[10] Further, they were made kings because they were benefactors, and benefits can only

be bestowed by good men. But when many persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired to have

commonwealth, and

a

up

set

a constitution.

The

ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury; [75] riches became the path to honour, and so oligarchies naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies

and tyrannies

into democracies;

for love of gain in the ruling classes

ways tending

to

was

al-

diminish their number, and so

to strengthen the masses,

who

in the

end

set

[20] upon their masters and established democracies. Since cities have increased in size,

no other form of government appears to be any longer even easy to establish. Even supposing the principle to be main-

power is the best thing for about the family of the king? Are his children to succeed him? If they are no better than anybody else, that will be mistained that kingly states,

how

[25] chievous. But, says the lover of royalty, the king, though he might, will not hand on

power

his

to his children. That,

hardly to be expected, and

human

is

too

however, is to ask

much

There is also a difficulty about the force which he is to employ; should a king have guards about him by whose aid he of

nature.

may how

be able to coerce the refractory? if will he administer his kingdom? Even if he be the lawful sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, still he must have some force wherewith to maintain [50]

not,

the law. In the case of a limited

monarchy

[35] there is not much difficulty in answering this question; the king must have such force as will be

more than

a

match

for

one or more

individuals, but not so great as that of the people.

The

ancients observed this principle

they gave guards to any one

whom

when

they ap-

pointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, [40] somebody advised that they should give him only such a number. 16 a

1287 At this place in the discussion there impends the inquiry respecting the king who acts solely

now

according to his

The

to be considered.

own

will;

he has

so-called limited

monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have already remarked, is not a distinct form [5] of government, for under all governments, 1

1

I286a

2.

14-16

485

example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general holding office for life, and one person is often made supreme over the administration of a state. A magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus, and also at [10] Opus, but in the latter city has a more limited power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all the as, for

citizens, in a city

which

consists of equals,

is

thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued that those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal share, [75] in the offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing. Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every one be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession implies law. And the rule of the law, it is argued, is preferable to that of

On

[20] any individual.

even

if

must

be,

the

same

principle,

be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and ministers of the law. For magistrates there it

—

this is

all

are equal

is

men say man when may indeed

admitted; but then

that to give authority to any one

unjust.

Nay, there

be cases which the law seems unable to de[25] termine, but in such cases can a man?

Nay,

it

law trains officers and appoints them to

will be replied, the

for this express purpose,

determine matters which are left undecided by it, to the best of their judgement. Further, it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws which experience suggests. Therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; [50] for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire. We are told that a patient should call in a physician; he will not get better if he is doctored out of a book. But the par[55] allel of the arts is clearly not in point; for the physician does nothing contrary to rule from motives of friendship; he only cures a patient and takes a fee; whereas magistrates

do many things from [40] indeed,

if

a

spite

and

partiality.

And,

man suspected the physician of

being in league with his enemies to destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have recourse to the book. But certainly physicians,

1287 b when they

are sick, call in other physi-

POLITICS

4 86 cians,

and training-masters, when they are

training,

training-masters,

other

as

in

they

if

could not judge truly about their own case and might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is evident that in seeking for justice men seek or neutral, for the law

mean

[5] for the

is

the customary law.

Again,

it is

to superintend

by no means easy for one man many things; he will have to

and what [10] difference does it make whether these subordinates always existed or were appointed by him because he needed them? If, as I said before, the good man has a right to rule because he is better, still two good men are betappoint a

number

of subordinates,

1

ter

than one:

this

is

would

And

of

that I

Agamemnon,

had

ten such counsellors! 3

day there are magistrates, for example judges, who have authority to decide some matters which the law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law [75]

at this

would command and decide

in the best

must think that those who are equal to him[35] self and like himself ought to rule equally with himself. These are the principal controversies relating to monarchy.

But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? for there is by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a master, another to kingly rule, another to constitutional rule; but there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other perverted form of government; for these come into being contrary to nature. Now, to [40] judge at least it

is

from what has been

manifest that, where

1288 a equal,

said,

are alike

and

neither expedient nor just should be lord of all, whether is

it

man

that one

men

there are laws, or whether there are

no laws,

but he himself is in the place of law. Neither should a good man be lord over good men, nor a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, un-

the old saying,

two going together?

and the prayer

1

the

laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than

customary

Again,

mean.

1288

less in a particular case, at

which

ready hinted, and to which

I

have

al-

more

4

But first of all, I must determine what natures are suited for government by a king, and what for an aristocracy, and what [5] recur.

for a constitutional

A

man-

ner whatever it could. But some things can, and other things cannot, be comprehended

I

will once

people

who

government.

are by nature capable of pro-

ducing a race superior in the virtue needed for political

rule are fitted for kingly gov-

and

[20] under the law, and this is the origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the

ernment;

man should rule. For matters of detail about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor does any one deny that the decision of such matters must be left to man, but it is argued that there should be many [25] judges, and not one only. For every ruler who has been trained by the law judges well; and it would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, or act better with two hands or feet, than many with many; indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make to them-

[10] ders them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy: while the peo-

best

selves

many

eyes

and ears and hands and

feet.

[30] For they make colleagues of those who are the friends of themselves and their gov-

ernments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his government; if not his friends, they will not do what he wants; but friendship implies likeness and equality; and, therefore, if he thinks that his friends ought to rule, he 1

3

i283 b 2i, i284 b 32. Ibid.,

11.

372.

2

Iliad, x. 224.

a people submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue ren-

who

ple

dom

are

are those

suited for constitutional

among whom

free-

there naturally

warlike multitude able to rule and obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their desert. But exists a

to

[75]

when

happens

a

whole family, or some individual,

pre-eminent in virtue as to then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king of surpass

to be so

all

others,

the whole nation. For, as

I

5

said before, to give

them authority is not only agreeable to ground of right which the founders of all states, whether aristocratical, or oligarchical, [20]

that

or again democratical, are accustomed to put

forward (for these all recognize the claim of excellence, although not the same excellence), [25] but accords with the principle already 4 5

1284* 3, and 1288* 15. i283 b 2o, 1284* 3-17, b 25.

BOOK

1289" laid

1

down. For

surely

III,

CHAPTERS

would not be

it

16-18— BOOK

right to

or ostracize, or exile such a person, or require that he should take his turn in being governed. The whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-eminence is kill,

in the relation of a

whole

the only alternative

is

to a part.

But

if so,

that he should have the

supreme power, and that mankind should [jo] obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respecting royalty and its various forms, and this is the answer to the question, whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and to which, and how. 18

many

CHAPTER

IV,

persons, excelling

in virtue, ted, the

and both

one

all

487

I

the others together

and

rulers

subjects are

fit-

to rule, the others to be ruled, in

such a manner as to attain the most eligible We showed at the commencement of our 2 inquiry that the virtue of the good man is

life.

necessarily the

same

as the virtue of the citizen

same manner, and by the same means through [40] which a man becomes truly good, he will 1288 b frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a statesman of the perfect state. Clearly then in the

or king.

We

maintain that the true forms of govern[55] ment are three, and that the best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there is one man, or a whole family, or

Having arrived at these must proceed to speak of

conclusions,

and describe how

it

we

the perfect state,

[5]

comes into being and

is

established.

BOOK

IV

with (2) that which is best We should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and, when formed, how it [50] may be longest preserved; the supposed state being so far from having the best constitution that it is unprovided even with the conabstract, but also

relatively to circumstances.

[10] In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject. For example, the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of different modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is absolutely the best (1);

(for the absolutely best

must

suit that

which

is

by nature best and best furnished with the

means

of life),

and

also

what common form

of

[75] training is adapted to the great majority of men (4). And if a man does not desire the

gymwhich might be attained by him, still

best habit of body, or the greatest skill in nastics,

the trainer or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of either (3). The same principle equally holds in medi-

and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and in the arts generally. Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single science, which has to consider what government is best and of what sort it must be, to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and also what kind of government [25] is adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with ( 1 ) that which is best in the

co]

l

cine

Cf. i28 4b 28.

ditions necessary for the best; neither best

is it

under the circumstances, but of an

the

inferi-

or type.

He

ought, moreover, to

[35] of

know

government which

is

(4) the form

best suited to

states in general; for political writers,

although

they have excellent ideas, are often unpractical. should consider, not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible

We

and what is easily attainable by all. There are some who would have none but the most perfect; for this

many

natural advantages are

re-

[40] quired. Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the

which they are living, they example the 1289 a Lacedaemonian. Any change of government which has to be introduced should be one which men, starting from their existing constitutions, will be both willing and able to

constitution under extol

some one

in particular, for

adopt, since there

is

quite as

much

trouble in

the reformation of an old constitution as in the

establishment of a

new

one, just as to unlearn

[5] is as hard as to learn. 2 Chapters 4, 5.

And

therefore, in ad-

POLITICS

1289 b

must

dition to the qualifications of the statesman already mentioned, he should be able to find rem-

periority in the king, so tyranny,

edies for the defects of existing constitutions,

worst of governments,

been said before. This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of government there are. It is often supposed that there is only

oligarchy

1

as has

one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. [10] But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of and in how many ways they are com-

states,

bined.

man

The same

to

political insight will enable a

know which

laws are the

best,

and

which are suited to different constitutions; for and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the the laws are,

A

constitution is the organization [75] laws. of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of

each community. But laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. So that we must know the varieties,

and the number of

varieties, of

[20] each form of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all is certainly more than form both of democracy and of oli-

democracies, since there [25] one garchy.

2 2 In our original discussion about governments we divided them into three true forms: kingly rule, aristocracy, and constitutional govern-

ment, and three corresponding perversions tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Of kingly [30] rule and of aristocracy we have already spoken, 3 for the inquiry into the perfect state the same thing with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means. have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and 4 [35] when the latter should be established. In what follows we have to describe the so-called

thest

from

exist

by virtue of some great personal su-

removed from

is

aristocracy,

is

the

a well-constituted form;

little better,

is

which

necessarily the farfor

it

is

and democracy

a long is

way

the most

tolerable of the three.

A

5

who preceded me has already these distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down the principle that when all the constitutions are [5]

writer

made

good (the oligarchy and the rest being virtuous), democracy is the worst, but the best when all are bad. Whereas we maintain that they are [10] in any case defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted better than another, but only less bad. Not to pursue this question further at present, let us begin by determining ( 1 ) how many varieties of constitution there are (since of de-

mocracy and oligarchy there are several); (2) [75] what constitution is the most generally acceptable, and what is eligible in the next degree after the perfect state; and besides this what other there is which is aristocratical and wellconstituted, and at the same time adapted to states in general; (3) of the other forms of government to whom each is suited. For democracy may meet the needs of some better than oli[20] garchy, and conversely. In the next place (4) we have to consider in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to establish some one among these various forms, whether of democracy or of oligarchy; and lastly, (5) having briefly discussed these subjects to the best of

our power, we will endeavour to ascertain the modes of ruin and preservation both of constitutions generally and of each separately, and to [25] what causes they are to be attributed.

is

We

constitutional government,

which bears the

common name of all constitutions, and the other forms, tyranny, oligarchy,

and democracy.

obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, and which is the next in badness. That which is the perversion of the first and [40] most divine is necessarily the worst. And It is

1289 b

just as a royal rule, if not a

mere name,

2 3 m. Cf. i288 b 29. "i-714-18. 4 in. 1279* 32-37, i286b 3-5, 1284* 3- b 34; chapter 17.

1

The

reason

government

why

is

elements. In the are

made up

also

among

there are

many forms of many

that every state contains first

place

we

see that all states

and in the multitude [30] of citizens there must be some rich and some poor, and some in a middle condition; the rich are heavy-armed, and the poor not. Of the common people, some are husbandmen, and some traders, and some artisans. There are of families,

the notables differences of wealth

—

and property for example, in the number of [35] horses which they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength 5

Plato, Statesman, 302, 303.

BOOK IV, CHAPTERS

1290 b

1-4

489

which the greater number are in oligarchies, and indeed in ev-

lay in their cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars against their neighbours;

government

was the practice of the Eretrians and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the riv[40] er Maeander, and of other peoples in Asia.

ery government, the majority rules; nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which

Besides differences of wealth there are differences of rank and merit, and there are some

[55] lation of a city to be 1300, and that of these 1000 are rich, and do not allow the re-

12903 other elements which were mentioned by us when in treating of aristocracy we enumerated the essentials of a state. Of these elements, sometimes all, sometimes the lesser and [5] sometimes the greater number, have a share in the government. It is evident then that there must be many forms of government, dif-

maining 300 who are poor, but

as

fering in kind, since the parts of which they are composed differ from each other in kind.

For a constitution is an organization of offices, which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, [10] or according to some principle of equality which includes both. There must therefore be as many forms of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the superiorities and the differences of the parts of the state.

There are generally thought to be two prinmen say of the winds that there north and south, and that the rest are but two of them are only variations of these, so of gov[75] ernments there are said to be only two forms democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is considered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of a few, and the so-called constitutional government to be really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the west a variation of the north, and the east of the [20] south wind. Similarly of musical modes there are said to be two kinds, the Dorian and cipal forms: as

—

—

the Phrygian; the other arrangements of the

comprehended under one or other of About forms of government this is a very favourite notion. But in either case the better and more exact way is to distinguish, as I have done, the one or two which are true [25] forms, and to regard the others as perversions, whether of the most perfectly attempered mode or of the best form of government: we may compare the severer and more overpowering modes to the oligarchical forms, and the more relaxed and gentler ones to the demoscale are

these two.

It

sovereign, for

a

few are sovereign. Suppose the whole popu-

must not be assumed,

of saying, that democracy

is

as some are fond simply that form of

free,

and

in all

other respects their equals, a share of the government no one will say that this is a democracy. In like manner, if the poor were few and

—

the masters of the rich who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government, in which the rich majority have no share of office,

[40] an oligarchy. Therefore

we

should rather

1290b say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and oligarchy in which the rich; it is only an accident that the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise a government in which the offices

were given according

to stature, as

is

[5] said to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy; for the num-

ber of

tall

or good-looking

men

is

small.

And

and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom. Both of them contain many other elements, and therefore we must carry our analysis further, and say that the government is not a democracy in which [10] the freemen, being few in number, rule yet oligarchy

over the lonia,

many who

are not free, as at Apol-

on the Ionian Gulf, and

Thera; (for

at

in each of these states the nobles,

who were also

the earliest settlers, were held in chief honour, although they were but a few out of many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government because they exceed in num[75] ber; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed of large property before the Lydian War.

But the form of government

when

the free,

who

is

are also poor

democracy and the ma-

a

govern, and an oligarchy when the rich [20] and the noble govern, they being at the

jority,

same time few

in

number.

have said that there are many forms of government, and have explained to what causes the variety is due. Why there are more than those already mentioned, and what they are, and whence they arise, I will now proceed to I

from the principle already 1 admitted, which is that every state consists, not of one, but of many parts. If we were going [25] to speak of the different species of aniconsider, starting

cratic.

[jo]

in

1

1289k 27 sqq.

POLITICS

490

mals, we should first of all determine the organs which are indispensable to every animal, as for example some organs of sense and the instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides or-

gans of locomotion. Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of organs, but that I mean [30] there may be differences in them different kinds of mouths, and stomachs, and the possiperceptive and locomotive organs

—

—

ble combinations of these differences will nec-

many varieties of animals. (For animals cannot be the same which have different kinds of mouths or of ears.) And when all [55] the combinations are exhausted, there will be as many sorts of animals as there are essarily furnish

combinations of the necessary organs. The same, then, is true of the forms of government which have been described; states, as I have repeatedly said, are composed, not of one, but of [40] many elements. One element is the food1

and

1291 b

the special business of political

—these are more

sary, others contribute to

luxury or to the grace

The third class is that of traders, and by traders I mean those who are engaged in buyof

life.

[5] ing and selling, whether in commerce or in fourth class is that of the serfs or retail trade.

A

labourers.

The warriors make up the

and they are if

as necessary as

the country

is

fifth class,

any of the others,

not to be the slave of every

in-

how can a state which has any tide name be of a slavish nature? The state is

vader. For to the

independent and

self-sufficing,

but a slave

is

[10] the reverse of independent. Hence we see though ingeniously, has not

that this subject,

been

2

satisfactorily treated in the Republic. Soc-

rates says that a state

is

made up

of four sorts of

people who are absolutely necessary; these are a weaver, a husbandman, a shoemaker, and a builder; afterwards, finding that they are not [75] enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to look after the necessary animals;

then a merchant, and then a

retail trader. All

form the complement of the first state were established merely to

these together state, as if a

supply the necessaries of life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers and of husbandmen. But he [20] does not admit into the state a military class until the country has increased in size, 1

it.

1290* 2

1261* 22 sqq.; in. 1283* 14 sqq.; iv. i289 b 27i29o b 23 sqq.; cf. in. 1277* 5 sqq.

5,

Republic,

11.

369.

neighbour's

Whether

common

essential to the state

which minister

parts

sense,

than the

to the necessaries of life.

their several functions are the func-

tions of different citizens, or of the same,

[^o]

it

—

for

may often happen that the same persons

are both warriors terial to the

and husbandmen,

—

is

imma-

argument. The higher as well as

the lower elements are to be equally considered parts of the state,

The

are absolutely neces-

its

the class engaged in the administration of justice, and that engaged in deliberation, which is

some

of these arts

encroach on

[25] an animal than the body, so the higher parts of states, that is to say, the warrior class,

ment

—

to

whereupon they go to war. Yet even amongst his four original citizens, or whatever be the number of those whom he associates in the state, there must be some one who will dispense justice and determine what is just. And as the soul may be said to be more truly part of

producing class, who are called husbandmen; 1291 a a second, the class of mechanics who practise the arts without which a city cannot exist;

beginning

is

land,

also

and

if so,

the military ele-

any rate must be included. There are the wealthy who minister to the state with at

their property; these

eighth class

is

form the seventh class. and of

that of magistrates

[55] officers; for the state cannot exist without And therefore some must be able to take

rulers.

and to serve the state, either always or in There only remains the class of those who deliberate and who judge between disputants; we were just now distinguishing them. If presto] ence of all these elements, and their fair and equitable organization, is necessary to 1291 b states, then there must also be persons office

turn.

who

have the ability of statesmen. Different functions appear to be often combined in the same individual; for example, the warrior may also be a

husbandman, or an

artisan; or, again,

[5] the counsellor a judge. And all claim to possess political ability, and think that they are fill most offices. But the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time. For this reason the rich and the

quite competent to

poor are regarded in an especial sense as parts of a state. Again, because the rich are generally] ly few in number, while the poor are many, they appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they form the government. Hence arises the common opinion dethat there are two kinds of government

—

mocracy and oligarchy. 3 I have already explained that there are many forms of constitution, and to what causes the [75] variety is due. Let me now show that there are different forms both of democracy «

Cf.

m.

6.

BOOK IV, CHAPTERS 4-5

1292 b

and oligarchy, as will indeed be evident from what has preceded. For both in the common people and in the notables various classes are included; of the common people, one class are husbandmen, another artisans; another trad[20] ers, who are employed in buying and selling; another are the seafaring class, whether engaged in war or in trade, as ferrymen or as fishermen. (In many places any one of these forms quite a large population; for example, fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant seamen at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tene[25] dos.) To the classes already mentioned

classes

491

not as individuals, but collectively. Homer says 1 that 'it is not good to have a rule of many', but means whether he this corporate rule, or the

many

rule of

individuals,

is

uncertain.

into a despot; the flatterer

over the better citizens. The decrees of the de[20] mos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant;

and the demagogue terer

both sides; and there may be other classes as well. The notables again may be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, educa-

with democracies of the kind which

[30]

Of forms

which

of democracy

comes that on equality.

first

said to be based strictly

is

In such a democracy the law says that it is just for the poor to have no more advantage than the rich; and that neither should be masters, but both equal. For if liberty and equality, as is [^5] thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. And since the people are the majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive,

such a government must necessarily be a democracy. Here then is one sort of democracy.

There

is

another, in which the magistrates are

elected according to a certain property qualifi-

[40] cation, but a low one; he who has the required amount of property has a share in the government, but he who loses his property

1292 a which

Another kind is that in who are under no disthe government, but still

loses his rights. all

the citizens

qualification share in

the law

supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. A fifth [5] form of democracy, in other respects the same, is that in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and supersede the law by their decrees. This is a state of affairs brought about by the demagogues. For in democracies which are subject to the law the [10] best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in their hands, is

held in

this sort of

be added day-labourers, and those who, to their needy circumstances, have no leisure, or those who are not of free birth on

differences.

is

democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule honour;

may

and similar

all

law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway,

trol of

and grows

owing

tion,

At

[75] events this sort of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the con-

to the other.

is

to the one what the flatBoth have great power;

is

the flatterer with the tyrant, the scribing.

The demagogues make

demagogue

we

are de-

the decrees of

the people override the laws, by referring

all

[25] things to the popular assembly. And therefore they grow great, because the people

have

things in their hands, and they hold in hands the votes of the people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, those who have any complaint to bring against the magisall

their

trates say, 'let the people

are too

happy

be judges'; the people

and so undermined. open to the ob-

to accept the invitation;

the authority of every office

[30] Such a democracy

is

is

fairly

not a constitution at all; for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this should be considered a constitution. So that if democracy be a real form [35] of government, the sort of system in which all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not even a democracy in the true sense of the word, for decrees relate only to particujection that

it is

lars.

These then are the different kinds of democracy.

Of

oligarchies, too, there are different kinds:

where the property qualification for such that the poor, although they form the majority, have no share in the government, yet he who acquires a qualification may ob[40] one

office is

1292 b

tain

there

a qualification for office, but a high one,

is

a

share.

and the vacancies filled

of

all 1

Another

in the

sort

is

when

governing body are

is made out the qualified persons, a constitution of

by co-optation.

Iliad, n. 204.

If

the election

POLITICS

492 this

kind inclines to an aristocracy, if out of an oligarchy. Another

a privileged class, to

[5] sort of oligarchy is when the son succeeds the father. There is a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in which the magistrates are su-

preme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned form of democracy among [10] democracies; and in fact this sort of oligarchy receives the

name

of a dynasty (or rule

of powerful families). These are the different sorts of oligarchies

and democracies.

membered which

is

that in

should however be

It

many

re-

states the constitution

by law, although not

established

democratic, owing to the education and habits of the people may be administered democrat[75] ically, and conversely in other states the established constitution

may

incline to

democ-

may

be administered in an oligarThis most often happens after a revolution: for governments do not change at racy, but

chical spirit.

once; at

first

the

dominant party are content

[20] with encroaching a little upon their opponents. The laws which existed previously continue in force, but the authors of the revolution have the

From what

power

in their hands.

has been already said

ly infer that there are so

of democracies

and

evident that either

many

we may

of oligarchies. all

safe-

different kinds

the classes

For

it

is

whom we

1

mentioned must share in the government, or [25] some only and not others. When the class of husbandmen and of those who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the government is administered according to law. For the citizens being compelled to live by their labour have no leisure; and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend assemblies only

when

necessary.

They

all

obtain a share

government when they have acquired the qualification which is fixed by the law [jo] the absolute exclusion of any class would in the

be a step towards oligarchy; hence all who have acquired the property qualification are admitted to a share in the constitution. But leisure

cannot be provided for them unless there are revenues to support them. This is one sort of democracy, and these are the causes which give birth to it. Another kind is based on the distal tinction which naturally comes next in order; in this, every one to whose birth there is no objection is eligible, but actually shares 1

1291 15 17-30.

1293

s

government only if he can find leisure. in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the laws, because the state has no means of paying the citizens. A third kind is when all freemen have a right to share in the government, but do not actually share, for the [40] reason which has been already given; so that in this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind of democracy is that which comes 1293* latest in the history of states. In our own day, when cities have far outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased, all in the

Hence

the citizens have a place in the government, through the great preponderance of the multi[5] tude; and they all, including the poor who receive pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the administration.

Indeed,

when

ple have the

they are paid, the

most

leisure,

common

peo-

for they are not

hindered by the care of their property, which

who are thereby prevented from taking part in the assembly or in the courts, and so the state is governed by the poor, who are a majority, and not by the laws. [10] So many kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these necessary causes. Of oligarchies, one form is that in which the majority of the citizens have some property, but not very much; and this is the first form, which allows to any one who obtains the required amount the right of sharing in the gov[75] ernment. The sharers in the government being a numerous body, it follows that the law must govern, and not individuals. For in proportion as they are further removed from a monarchical form of government, and in respect of property have neither so much as to be able to live without attending to business, nor [20] so little as to need state support, they must admit the rule of law and not claim to rule themselves. But if the men of property in the state are fewer than in the former case, and own more property, there arises a second form of oligarchy. For the stronger they are, the more power they claim, and having this object in view, they themselves select those of the other classes who are to be admitted to the [25] government; but, not being as yet strong enough to rule without the law, they make the often fetters the rich,

law represent is

their wishes.

intensified by a further

numbers and arises a third

When

this

power

diminution of their

increase of their property, there

and further stage of oligarchy,

in

which the governing class keep the offices in their own hands, and the law ordains that the [jo] son shall succeed the father.

When,

again,

1294

BOOK

1

IV,

CHAPTERS

the rulers have great wealth

and numerous

family

despotism ap-

friends,

this

sort

of

proaches a monarchy; individuals rule and not the law. This is the fourth sort of oligarchy, and is analogous to the last sort of democracy.

5-8

493 8

I

of tyranny.

I

put them in this order, not be-

cause a polity or constitutional government is to be regarded as a perversion any more than the above-mentioned aristocracies.

[35] There are still two forms besides democracy and oligarchy; one of them is universally recognized and included among the four prin-

forms of government, which are said to be (1) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democcipal

and (4) the so-called aristocracy or government of the best. But there is also a fifth, which retains the generic name of polity or [40] constitutional government; this is not common, and therefore has not been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the dif1 1293 b ferent kinds of government; like Plato, in their books about the state, they recognize four only. The term 'aristocracy' is rightly applied to the form of government which is deracy,

scribed in the that

only can

first

part of our treatise;

be rightly called

2

for

aristocracy

government formed of the best men and not merely of men who are good when tried by any given standard. In the [5] perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government. But there are some states differing from oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or constitutional government; these are termed aristocracies, and in them magistrates are certainly chosen, both according to their wealth and ac[10] cording to their merit. Such a form of government differs from each of the two just now mentioned, and is termed an aristocracy. For indeed in states which do not make virtue the aim of the community, men of merit and

which

is

a

absolutely,

reputation for virtue

where

may

be found.

And

so

government has regard to wealth, vir[75] tue, and numbers, as at Carthage, that is aristocracy; and also where it has regard only to two out of the three, as at Lacedaemon, to virtue and numbers, and the two principles of democracy and virtue temper each other. There are these two forms of aristocracy in addition to the first and perfect state, and there is a third [20] form, viz. the constitutions which incline

a

more than

the so-called polity towards

oligarchy. 1

Republic, viii, ix.

2

in. 1279*34, i286b 3.

and

have yet to speak of the so-called polity

The

truth

[25] is, that they all fall short of the most perfect form of government, and so they are

reckoned

among

and the

perversions,

really

perverted forms are perversions of these, as 3 said in the original discussion. Last of all

I I

which I place last in the inquiring into the constituand this is the very reverse of a

will speak of tyranny, series

because

tions of states,

I

am

constitution.

[30]

Having explained why

this order,

I

I

have adopted

will proceed to consider constitu-

government; of which the nature will be now that oligarchy and democracy have been defined. For polity or constitutional government may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy; but the term is [35] usually applied to those forms of government which incline towards democracy, and the term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth. Moreover, the rich already possess the external advantages the want of which is a temptation to crime, and hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen. And inasmuch as aris[40] tocracy seeks to give predominance to tional

clearer

the best of the citizens, people say also of

oli-

garchies that they are

composed

1294 a and gentlemen.

Now it appears to be an

of

noblemen

impossible thing that the state which

is

gov-

erned not by the best citizens but by the worst should be well-governed, and equally impossible that the state which is ill-governed should be governed by the best. But we must remember that good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government. Hence there are two parts of good government; one is the [5] actual obedience of citizens to the laws, the other part is the goodness of the laws which they obey; they may obey bad laws as well as good. And there may be a further subdivision; they may obey either the best laws which are attainable to them, or the best absolutely. The distribution of offices according to merit [10]

is

a special characteristic of aristocracy,

an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy. In all of them there of course exists for the principle of

3 in. 7.

POLITICS

494 the right of the majority,

good

and whatever seems

to the majority of those

who

share in the

Now in most form called polity exists, for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of [75] government has authority.

states the

who commonly

the rich,

take the place of the

on which the government,

noble. But as there are three grounds

men

claim an equal share in freedom, wealth, and virtue (for the fourth or

good birth

[20]

is

the result of the

two

last,

being only ancient wealth and virtue), it is clear that the admixture of the two elements, that is to say, of the rich and poor, is to be called a polity or constitutional

government;

and the union of the three is to be called aristocracy or the government of the best, and more than any other form of government, except the true and ideal, has a right to this name.

Thus

[25]

forms of

far

I

have shown the existence of than monarchy, democ-

states other

and oligarchy, and what they are, and in aristocracies differ from one another, and polities from aristocracies that the two latter racy,

what

—

are not very unlike

is

1294 b

them. (3) There is a third mode, in which something is borrowed from the oligarchical and something from the democratical principle. For example, the appointment of magistrates by lot is thought to be democratical, and

when

oligarchical; democratical

no property qualification, [10] oligarchical when there is. In the aristocratical or constitutional state, one element will there

is

be taken from each

—from oligarchy the prin-

from democracy the disregard of qualification. Such are the various ciple of electing to offices,

modes of combination. There is a true union

of oligarchy and de75] mocracy when the same state may be termed either a democracy or an oligarchy; li

who

names evidently feel that complete. Such a fusion there is also in the mean; for both extremes appear in those

the fusion

use both

is

The Lacedaemonian

it.

[20] ample,

constitution, for ex-

often described as a democracy,

is

has many democratical features. In place the youth receive a democratical education. For the sons of the poor are brought because the

it

first

up with

obvious.

them

the election of

again

the sons of the rich,

in such a

manner

as to

who

make

it

are educated

possible for the

sons of the poor to be educated like them.

A

similar equality prevails in the following pe-

[50] Next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy and democracy the so-called polity or constitutional

how

government springs up, and

should be organized. The nature of it once understood from a comparison of oligarchy and democracy; we must ascertain their different characteristics, and taking a portion from each, put the two together, like it

will be at

the parts of an indenture.

[35]

modes

may

be effected. In the

in

Now there

which fusions first

are three

government mode we must of

and when the citizens manhood the same rule is

[25] riod of

grown up

life,

to

no

are ob-

between the rich and poor. In like manner they all have the same food at their public tables, and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man can afford. Again, the people elect to one of the two greatest offices of state, and in the other [jo] they share; for they elect the Senators and served; there

is

distinction

share in the Ephoralty. constitution

is

many

said to be

By

others the Spartan

an oligarchy, because

combine the laws made by both governments,

it

say concerning the administration of justice.

offices are filled

In oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as judges, and to the poor they give no pay; but in democracies they give

one of these oligarchical characteristics; that the power of inflicting death or banishment rests with a few persons is another; and there are others. In a well attempered polity there [55] should appear to be both elements and yet neither; also the government should rely on itself, and not on foreign aid, and on itself not through the good will of a majority they

[40] pay to the poor and do not fine the rich. (1) the union of these two modes is a

Now

common

or middle term between them,

1294b therefore

characteristic of a

and

is

constitu-

government, for it is a combination of is one mode of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a mean may be taken between the enactments of the two: thus democracies require no property qualification, or only a tional

both. This

small one, from

members

of the assembly,

[5] oligarchies a high one; here neither of these is the common term, but a mean between

has

oligarchical elements.

That

by election and none by

all

lot, is

—

might be equally well-disposed when there is a vicious form of government but through the

—

general willingness of

all classes

in the state to

maintain the constitution. [40]

Enough

of the

manner

in

which

a con-

government, and in which the called aristocracies ought to be framed. stitutional

so-

BOOK

1295 b

IV,

CHAPTERS

8-11

495

government, and therefore need no separate 10

1

royalty.

Among

Barbarians there are elected

monarchs who exercise a despotic power; despotic rulers were also elected in ancient Hellas, called Aesymnetes or dictators. These monarchies, when compared with one another, [75] exhibit certain differences. And they are, 3 as I said before, royal, in so far as the mon-

arch rules according to law over willing subjects; but they are tyrannical in so far as he is despotic and rules according to his own fancy. There is also a third kind of tyranny, which is the most typical form, and is the counterpart of the perfect monarchy. This tyranny that arbitrary

[20]

which its

just

power of an individual no one, and governs all

responsible to

whether equals or

alike,

to

is

is

own

betters,

with a view

advantage, not to that of

its

subjects,

and therefore against their will. No freeman, if he can escape from it, will endure such a government. The kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for the reasons which I have given. 11

We

have now to inquire what is the best [25] constitution for most states, and the best life

most men, neither assuming a standard of which is above ordinary persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favoured by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only, but having regard [jo] to the life in which the majority are able to share, and to the form of government which

And in

which upon [55] the same grounds. For if what was said 5 in the Ethics is true, that the happy life is the

discussion.

1295" Of the nature of tyranny I have still to speak, in order that it may have its place in our inquiry (since even tyranny is reckoned by us to be a form of government), although there is not much to be said about it. I have already in the former part of this treatise discussed [5] royalty or kingship according to the most usual meaning of the term, and considered whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and what kind of royalty should be established, and from what source, and how. When speaking of royalty we also spoke 2 of [10] two forms of tyranny, which are both according to law, and therefore easily pass into

we

fact the conclusion at

arrive respecting all these forms rests

life according to virtue lived without impediment, and that virtue is a mean, then the life is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the best. And the same

which

[40] of cities

1295 b

and

stitution

is

Now one

in all states there are three elements:

class is very rich,

mean.

third in a

It is

and the mean are

just

now

4

which we were lie beyond the

speaking, they either

number of states, or they approximate to the so-called constitutional possibilities of the greater

1

3

in. 14-17. in. i285 b 2.

2

in. 1285° i6- b 3. 4 i293 b 7-2i,cf. i293 b 36-1294° 25.

best,

and therefore

it

will

[5] moderation; for in that condition of life are most ready to follow rational prin-

men

ciple.

But he who greatly excels in beauty, on the other hand is very poor, or very weak, or very much

strength, birth, or wealth, or

who

disgraced, finds principle.

Of

it

these

difficult to

follow rational

two the one

sort

grow

into

[10] violent and great criminals, the others into rogues and petty rascals. And two sorts of

correspond to them, the one committed from violence, the other from roguery. Again, the middle class is least likely to shrink from rule, or to be over-ambitious for it; both of which are injuries to the state. Again, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, [75] strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins at home; for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in which they are brought up, they never learn, even at school, the habit of obedience. On the other offences

hand, the very poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded. So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically;

knows not how

[20] the other

tocracies, as they are called, of

another very poor, and a admitted that moderation

clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in

and must be ruled

aris-

in a figure the life of the

city.

virtue

can attain. As to those

vice are characteristic

of constitutions; for the con-

for

states in general

and

principles of virtue

like slaves.

to

command

Thus

arises a

not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this: for good fellow-

city,

ship springs from friendship; when men are at enmity with one another, they would rather [25] not even share the same path. But a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes. Wherefore the city which is composed of middle-class citizens is neces6

Ethics,

1.

1098s 16;

vii.

ii53 b 10; x. 1177*

12.

POLITICS

49 6

best constituted in respect of the elefabric of the state

sarily

ments of which we say the naturally consists.

which

[50] izens

And

this

is

the class of

most secure

is

cit-

in a state, for

they do not, like the poor, covet their neighbours' goods; nor do others covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich; and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves plotted against, they pass through life safely. 'Many Wisely then did Phocylides pray, 1

—

things are best in the mean; I desire to be of a middle condition in my city.' political [35] Thus it is manifest that the best is formed by citizens of the middle and that those states are likely to be welladministered, in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good for[40] tune of a state in which the citizens have 1296 a a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or

community class,

a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out either out of the most of either extreme,

—

rampant democracy, or out it

is

of an oligarchy; but

not so likely to arise out of the middle and those akin to them. I will ex-

1296 b

cratical or oligarchical.

The

gards political supremacy as the prize of

[55] they thought of their own advantage, of the public not at all. For these reasons the

middle form of government has rarely, if existed, and among a very few only. One alone of

all

who

is

free

from

faction;

large, there are least likely to be factions

class

is

and

dissensions.

For

a

similar reason large

states are less liable to faction

than small ones,

[10] because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all

the citizens into

this middle constitution to [40] states. But it has now become a habit among the citizens of states, not even to care 1296 b about equality; all men are seeking

for dominion, or,

if

conquered, are willing to

submit.

What

then

the best

is

two

who

classes

are either

it

form

the best,

we

legislators

is

that the best

have been of a middle condition; for

example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and [20] Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and almost all legislators. These considerations will help us to understand

^r.

why most governments 12,

Bergk.

2

v.

are either

1308 s 18-24.

demo-

evident;

and of

say that there are

kinds of democracy and many of oliit is not difficult to see which has the first and which the second or any other place in the order of excellence, now that we have determined which is the best. For that which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is furthest from it worse, if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to [10] given conditions: I say 'relatively to given

general

And

of government,

[5] garchy,

superiority of the middle class

to leave nothing in the

is

many

conditions', since a particular

dle.

and

man

induced to give

middemocracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a [75] middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. A proof of the rich or poor,

ever,

ever ruled in Hellas was

other constitutions, since

no other and where the middle

vic-

and the one party sets up a democracy and the other an oligarchy. Further, both the parties which had the supremacy in Hellas looked only to the interest of their own form of government, and established in states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies; tory,

when I [5] plain the reason of this hereafter, 2 speak of the revolutions of states. The mean clearly best, for

that the

ever side gets the better, instead of establish[30] ing a just or popular government, re-

and what makes

is

is

—

constitutions

condition of states

reason

middle class is seldom numerous in them, and [25] whichever party, whether the rich or the common people, transgresses the mean and predominates, draws the constitution its own way, and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy. There is another reason the poor and the rich quarrel with one another, and which-

government may

be preferable, but another form for

may

be better

some people. 12

We have now to consider what and what kind of

government

is

suitable to

what and what

may begin by assuming, as a principle common to all governments,

kind of men.

I

[75] that the portion of the state which desires the permanence of the constitution ought to be

stronger than that which desires the reverse.

Now

every city is composed of quality and By quality I mean freedom, wealth,

quantity.

education, good birth, and by quantity, superi[20] ority of numbers. Quality

may exist in one

BOOK

1297 b

IV,

CHAPTERS

of the classes which make up the state, and quantity in the other. For example, the meanlyborn may be more in number than the wellborn, or the poor than the rich, yet they may much exceed in quantity as they fall

not so

and therefore there must be a of quantity and quality. Where the number of the poor is more than short in quality;

comparison

[25]

is

11-13

inflicted

497

upon them. (2) As

to the magistra-

those who are qualified by property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may. [20] (3) In the law-courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, as in the laws cies,

is inflicted on the and a smaller one on the poor. In some

of Charondas, a larger fine rich,

[50] then arise; if the artisans and labouring class, the last; and so with the intermediate forms. But where the rich and the notables ex-

who have registered themallowed to attend the assembly and [25] to try causes; but if after registration they do not attend either in the assembly or at the courts, heavy fines are imposed upon them. The intention is that through fear of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the

ceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity, there oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms according to the kind of superiority possessed by the oligarchs. [35] The legislator should always include the middle class in his government; if he makes his

assembly. Concerning (4) the possession of arms, and (5) gymnastic exercises, they legis[_?o] late in a similar spirit. For the poor are not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having them; and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor for non-atten-

laws oligarchical, to the middle class let him look; if he makes them democratical, he should equally by his laws try to attach this class to the state. There only can the government ever be stable where the middle class exceeds one or

dance at the gymnasium, and consequently, having nothing to fear, they do not attend, whereas the rich are liable to a fine, and there-

[40] both of the others, and in that case there will be no fear that the rich will unite with the 1297 a poor against the rulers. For neither of

lators,

proportioned to the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in form with the sort of people who compose it in each case. If, for example, the husbandmen exceed in

number, the

first

form of democracy

will

them will ever be willing to serve the other, and if they look for some form of government more suitable to both, they will find none better than this, for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, because they mistrust [5] one another. The arbiter is always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an arbiter.

The more

litical

constitution.

form

perfect the admixture of the po-

elements, the

Many

aristocratical

more

lasting will be the

who desire to make a mistoo much power to the

even of those governments

take, not only in giving

but in attempting to overreach the people. There comes a time when out of a false good there arises a true evil, since the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the constitution than those of the people. rich,

[10]

13

The

devices by

which

oligarchies deceive the [75] people are five in number; they relate to (1) the assembly; (2) the magistracies; (3)

the courts of law; (4) the use of arms; (5) gymnastic exercises. (1) The assemblies are

thrown open

to all, but either the rich only are fined for non-attendance, or a much larger fine

states all citizens

selves are

fore they take care to attend.

[55] These are the devices of oligarchical legis-

and

in democracies they

have counter

They pay

the poor for attending the assemblies and the law-courts, and they inflict no devices.

penalty on the rich for non-attendance. It is obvious that he who would duly mix the two principles should combine the practice of both, and provide that the poor should be paid to at[40] tend, and the rich fined if they do not attend, for then all will take part; if there is no such combination, power will be in the

1297 b hands of one party only. The government should be confined to those who carry arms. As to the property qualification, no absolute rule can be laid down, but we must see what is the highest qualification sufficiently [5] comprehensive to secure that the number of those

who

have the rights of citizens ex-

number they have no share

ceeds the

of those excluded.

Even

if

in office, the poor, provided

only that they are not outraged or deprived of their property, will be quite enough. But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy thing, since a ruling class is not [10] always humane. And in time of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed; when fed, they are willing enough to fight. In some states the government is vested, not only in those who are actually serving, but also in those who have served; among the Malians,

POLITICS

49»

governing body consisted of

for example, the

1298 b

and audits

their accounts.

[75] the latter, while the magistrates were chosen from those actually on service. And the earliest government which existed among the

some of them

Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the knights (for

ers of

strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed, without discipline, [20] infantry are useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in their cavalry). But when cities increased and the

heavy-armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government; and this is the reason

why the states which we call

constitutional gov-

[25] ernments have been hitherto called democracies. Ancient constitutions, as might be

expected, were oligarchical and royal; their population being small they had no consider-

were weak in numbers and organization, and were therefore more contented to be governed. able middle class; the people

have explained why there are various forms government, and why there are more than is [jo] generally supposed; for democracy, as well as other constitutions, has more than one I

of

form: also what their differences

whence they

arise,

and what

is

and form of

are,

the best

government, speaking generally, and to whom the various forms of government are best suited; all this has now been explained.

be assigned either

points

which follow next

in order.

We will con-

reference to particular constitutions. All constitutions

have

three

elements,

which the good lawgiver has

concerning

to regard

what

is

expedient for each constitution. When they are well-ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they differ from one another, constitu-

1298 a

There

(1) one element which deliberates about public affairs;

tions differ.

te]

is

secondly (2) that concerned with the magistracies the questions being, what they should be, over what they should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of electing to

—

them; and thirdly (3) that which has judicial power. The deliberative element has authority in matters of war and peace, in [5]

making

death,

exile,

alliances;

it

confiscation,

making and un-

passes laws, inflicts elects

magistrates

all

to

more

them only

That

to some.

all

things

[10] should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy; this is the sort of equality which the people desire. But there are various ways in all may share in the government; they

which

may

one body, but by

deliberate, not all in

turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the

There are other constitutions which the boards of magistrates meet and

Milesian.

in

de-

[75] liberate, but come into office by turns, and are elected out of the tribes and the very small-

every one has obcitizens, on the other hand, are assembled only for the purposes of legislation, and to consult about the constitution, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. [20] In another variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly, but meet only to elect est divisions of the state, until

The

tained office in his turn.

magistrates, to pass laws, to advise about

and peace, and

to

make

scrutinies.

war

Other mat-

ters are referred severally to special magistrates,

who

are elected by vote or by lot out of

all

the

[25] citizens. Or again, the citizens meet about election to offices and about scrutinies, and deliberate

concerning war or alliances while oth-

er matters are administered by the magistrates,

who,

as far as is possible, are elected by vote. I speaking of those magistracies in which

special

sider the subject not only in general but with

the citizens or

(for example, to one or

magistracies, or different causes to different magistracies), or some of them to all, and oth-

am [35] Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion we will proceed to speak of the

These powers must

all to all

knowledge

of democracy

is

required.

when

A

fourth form

the citizens meet to [jo] deliberate about everything, and the magis

all

decide nothing, but only make the preliminary inquiries; and that is the way in which the last and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is at present administered. All these modes are democratiistrates

cal.

On

the other hand, that

some should

delib-

[35] erate about all is oligarchical. This again is a mode which, like the democratical, has

many

forms.

When

the deliberative class being

who have

moderate qualrespect and obey the prohibitions of the law without altering it, and any one who has the required qualification shares in the government, then, just be-

elected out of those ification are

a

numerous and they

cause of this moderation, the oligarchy inclines [40] towards polity. But when only selected individuals and not the whole people share in the

1298 b deliberations

of

the

state,

then,

al-

BOOK

1299 a

IV,

CHAPTERS

though, as in the former case, they observe the law, the government is a pure oligarchy. Or, again, when those who have the power of deliberation are self-elected, and son succeeds father, and they and not the laws are supreme [5] tne government is of necessity oligarchical. Where, again, particular persons have author-

particular matters;

ity in

—

for example,

the whole people decide about peace

and hold late

vote

when

and war

scrutinies, but the magistrates regu-

everything

else,

and they are elected by is an aristocracy.

—there the government

And

some questions are decided by magisby vote, and others by magistrates

if

13-15

499

the constitution. Again, in oligarchies either

the people ought to accept the measures of the government, or not to pass anything contrary to them; or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the decision should rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what is done in constitutional governments should be the rule in ol[35] igarchies; the veto of the majority should

be final, their assent not final, but the proposal should be referred back to the magistrates.

Whereas

in constitutional governments they take the contrary course; the few have the neg-

[40] ative, not the affirmative power; the afrests with the

trates elected

1299 a firmation of everything

elected by lot, either absolutely or out of select

multitude.

candidates, or elected partly by vote, partly by

—

[10] lot these practices are partly characteristic of an aristocratical government, and part-

pure constitutional government. These are the various forms of the deliberative body; they correspond to the various forms of government. And the government of each state is administered according to one or other of the principles which have been laid down. Now it is for the interest of democracy, according to the most prevalent notion of it (I am speaking of that extreme form of democracy in which the people are supreme even over [75] the laws), with a view to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts of law. For in oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges are compelled to attend under pain of a fine, whereas in democracies the poor are paid to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be adopted by democracies in their public assemblies, for they

These, then, are our conclusions respecting is, the supreme element

the deliberative, that in states.

ly of a

[20] will advise better if they all deliberate together, the people with the notables and the

—

notables with the people. that those

who

vote or by lot in equal ferent classes;

ceed in

and that

number

It is also

a

good plan

deliberate should be elected by

those

numbers out of the if

dif-

the people greatly ex-

who have

political train-

[25] ing, pay should not be given to all, but only to as many as would balance the number of the notables, or that the

number

in excess

should be eliminated by lot. But in oligarchies either certain persons should be co-opted from the mass, or a class of officers should be appointed such as exist in some states, who are termed probuli and guardians of the law; and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively with matters on which these have previ[30] ously deliberated; for so the people will have a share in the deliberations of the state, but will not be able to disturb the principles of

Next we

will proceed to consider the distribu-

tion of offices; this, too, being a part of politics [5] concerning which many questions arise: shall their number be? Over what

—What

and what shall be their duSometimes they last for six months, sometimes for less; sometimes they are annual,

shall they preside,

ration?

whilst in other cases offices are held for

still

longer periods. Shall they be for life or for a long term of years; or, if for a short term only, shall the same persons hold them over and [10] over again, or once only? Also about the

—

appointment to them, from whom are they to be chosen, by whom, and how? We should first

be in a position to say what are the possible them, and then we may proceed to

varieties of

determine which are suited to different forms But what are to be included under the term 'offices' ? That is a question not quite so easily answered. For a political com[75] munity requires many officers; and not every one who is chosen by vote or by lot is to be regarded as a ruler. In the first place there are the priests, who must be distinguished from political officers; masters of choruses and heralds, even ambassadors, are elected by vote. [20] Some duties of superintendence again are political, extending either to all the citizens in a single sphere of action, like the office of the general who superintends them when they are of government.

in the field, or to a section of

the inspectorships of offices

them

are concerned with household

ment, like that of the corn measurers in

many

are also

only, like

women or of youth.

Other manage-

who exist

and are elected officers. There menial offices which the rich have exestates

POLITICS

500

[25] cuted by their slaves. Speaking generally, those are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain

measures and of judging and commanding, pecially the last; for to

command

is

es-

the especial

duty of a magistrate. But the question is not of any importance in practice; no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the word, [jo] although such problems have a specula-

and how many, are necessary to the existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce to its well-being.

What

are

kinds of

much more

fecting

all

ently under different constitutions racies, for

offices,

important considerations,

constitutions, but

more

af-

especially

For in great states it is possiand indeed necessary, that every office should have a special function; where the citizens are numerous, many may hold office. And so it happens that some offices a man holds a second time only after a long interval, and others he holds once only; and certainly every work 1299 b is better done which receives the sole, and not the divided attention of the worker. But in small states it is necessary to combine many offices in a few hands, since the small number of citizens does not admit of many [55] small states.

ble,

—

holding office: for who will there be to suc[5] ceed them? And yet small states at times require the same offices and laws as large ones; the difference is that the one want them often, the others only after long intervals. Hence there is no reason why the care of many offices should not be imposed on the same person, for they will not interfere with each other. When the population is small, offices should be like [10] the spits which also serve to hold a lamp.

We must first ascertain how many magistrates are necessary in every state,

and

also

how many

are not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless

and then there will be no difficulty in what offices can be combined in one. We [75] should also know over which matters several local tribunals are to have jurisdiction, and in which authority should be centralized: for useful,

seeing

example, should one person keep order in the market and another in some other place, or should the same person be responsible everywhere? Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom they deal: I mean to say, should one person see to good order in general, or one look after the boys, another after the women, and so on ? Fur[20] ther, under different constitutions, should the magistrates be the same or different? For

—

in aristoc-

example, they are chosen from the

[25] educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, in democracies from the free, or are there certain differences in the offices answering to

—

and

them

tive interest.

1300*

example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, should there be the same magistrates, although they are elected, not out of equal or similar classes of citizens, but differ-

and may the same be

as well,

some, but different

some office

offices to

suitable to

others? For in

it may be convenient that the same should have a more extensive, in other

states

narrower sphere. Special offices are pe[50] culiar to certain forms of government: for example that of probuli, which is not a democratic office, although a bule or council is. states a

There must be some body of men whose duty is

measures for the people in order not be diverted from their busi-

to prepare

that they

may

when

these are few in number, the state an oligarchy: or rather the probuli [35] must always be few, and are therefore an oligarchical element. But when both institutions exist in a state, the probuli are a check on ness;

inclines to

the council; for the counsellor is a democratic element, but the probuli are oligarchical. Even the power of the council disappears when de-

1300* mocracy has taken that extreme form in which the people themselves are always meeting and deliberating about everything. This is the case

when

the

members

of the assembly re-

abundant pay; for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and de-

ceive

ciding everything for themselves. tracy which controls the boys or the

A

magis-

women,

or

[5] any similar office, is suited to an aristocracy rather than to a democracy; for how can the

magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors ? Neither is it an oligarchical office; for the wives of the oligarchs are too fine to be controlled.

Enough of these matters. I will now inquire [10] into appointments to offices. The varieties depend on three terms, and the combinations of these give

points?

all

possible

secondly, from

modes

:

first,

whom? and

who

ap-

thirdly,

how? Each

of these three admits of three va[75] rieties: (A) All the citizens, or (B) only some, appoint. Either (1) the magistrates are all or (2) out of some who are distinguished either by a property qualification, or by birth, or merit, or for some special reason, as at Megara only those were eligible who had returned from exile and fought to-

chosen out of

gether against the democracy.

They may

be ap-

BOOK

1300 b

IV,

CHAPTERS

15-16

50-

pointed either (a) by vote or ( /3) may be coupled,' I mean [20] that (C) some officers may be elected by some, others by all, and (3) some again out of some, and others out of all, and (7) some by

nature of their powers. By powers I mean such powers as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence of the country; for there are [10] various kinds of power: the power of the general, for example, is not the same with that

vote and others by lot. Each variety of these terms admits of four modes.

which regulates contracts

by

Again,

lot.

these several varieties

For either (A by

vote, or

(A

1

1

a)

may

all

]3) all

from

appoint from all all by lot, or (A

all from some by vote, or (A 2 0) all from some by lot (and if from all, either by sections, [25] as, for example, by tribes, and wards, and phratries, until all the citizens have been gone

2 a)

may

be in gible indiscriminately); or again

through; or the citizens

cases

all

(A

eli-

7,

1

A

2 7) to some offices in the one way, to some in the other. Again, if it is only some that appoint, they may do so either (B 1 a) from all by vote, or (B 1 j3) from all by lot, or (B 2 a) from some by vote, or (B 2 /3) from some by lot, or to

some

offices in the

one way, to others in the

in the market.

16

Of

the three parts of government, the judicial remains to be considered, and this we shall di-

vide on the same principle. There are three points

on which the

varieties of law-courts de-

whom they are appointed, the matters with which they are concerned, and the manner of their appointment. I mean, ( 1 ) are the judges taken from all, The

[75] pend:

persons from

from some only? (2) how many kinds of law-courts are there? (3) are the judges chosen by vote or by lot?

or

me

First, let

determine

how many

They

kinds of

num-

(B 1 7) from all, to some offices by vote, to some by lot, and (B 2 7) from some, [50] to some offices by vote, to some by lot. Thus the modes that arise, apart from two

law-courts there are.

(C, 3) out of the three couplings, number twelve. Of these systems two are popular, that all should appoint from all (A 1 a) by vote or

with treason against the constitution; the fourth determines disputes respecting penal-

other,

i.e.

(A

[35]

1

j8)

by

lot,

— or

(A

7) by

1

both.

One

ber:

is

are eight in

the court of audits or scrutinies; a

[20] second takes cognizance of ordinary offences against the state; a third is concerned

whether raised by magistrates or by

ties,

vate persons; the fifth decides the

pri-

more impor-

all should not appoint at once, but should appoint from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both, or appoint to some offices

tant civil cases; the sixth tries cases of homi-

and to others from some ('by both' to some offices by lot, to others by vote), is characteristic of a polity. And (B 1 7) that some should appoint from all, to some of-

the guilt

That

from

all

meaning

fices

by vote, to others by

istic

of a polity, but

more

[40] former method. /3,

7

from

)

lot, is also

character-

oligarchical than the

And (A

3 a,

/?,

B

7,

3 a,

from both, to some offices others from some, is characteristic

to appoint

all,

to

of a polity with a leaning towards aristocracy. 1300 b That (B 2) some should appoint from

some

is

oligarchical,

—even (B 2

j8)

that

some

[25] cide, which are of various kinds, (a) premeditated, (b) involuntary, (c) cases in which is

confessed but the justice

is

disputed;

and there may be a fourth court (d) in which murderers who have fled from justice are tried after their return; such as the Court of Phreatto is said to be at Athens. But cases of this sort [50] rarely happen at all even in large cities. The different kinds of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different courts. (7) There are courts for strangers of these there are two subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of :

their disputes

—

with one another, (b) for the

them and the must be about sums of a

settlement of disputes between

And

should appoint from some by lot (and if this does not actually occur, it is none the less oligarchical in character), or (B 2 7) that some should appoint from some by both. (B 1 a) that some should appoint from all, and (A 2 a) that all should appoint from some, by vote, is

citizens.

aristocratic.

nor of the courts for homicide and for strangers: I would rather speak of political cases, which, when mismanaged, create divi-

lished, will

—

government: which are prophow they ought to be estabbe evident when we determine the

ferent forms of

er to which, or

all

these there

courts for small suits

(8)

drachma up to five drachmas, or a little more, which have to be determined, but they do not require

sion

many

judges.

Nothing more need be

[35] suits,

[5] These are the different modes of constituting magistrates, and these correspond to dif-

besides

—

and disturbances

Now

said of these small

if all

ferent cases

in constitutions.

the citizens judge, in

which

I

all

the dif-

have distinguished, they

may

be appointed by vote or by lot, or some[40] times by lot and sometimes by vote. Or when a single class of causes are tried, the judges who decide them may be appointed, some by 1301* vote, and some by lot. These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the whole people, and there will be likewise four

modes, they

they are elected from a part only; for be appointed from some by vote and

if

may

judge in

all

causes; or they

may

be appointed

lot and judge in all causes; or be elected in some cases by vote, and in some cases taken by lot, or some courts, even when judging the same causes, may be composed of members some appointed by vote and [5] some by lot. These modes, then, as was said, answer to those previously mentioned.

from some by they

1301 b

POLITICS

5 02

may

Once more,

the

modes

of appointment

may

be combined; I mean, that some may be chosen out of the whole people, others out of some,

some out

of both; for example, the same tribube composed of some who were elected out of all, and of others who were elected out

nal

may

of some, either by vote or by lot or by both. [10] In how many forms law-courts can be es-

now been considered. The first form, viz. that in which the judges are taken tablished has

from

and in which all causes democratical; the second, which is composed of a few only who try all causes, oligarchical; the third, in which some courts are all

the citizens,

are tried,

is

taken from

all classes,

and some from certain and constitu-

[75] classes only, aristocratical tional.

BOOK V government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed. Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states, how many, and of what nature they are; what modes of destruction apply to particular states, and out of what, and into what they mostly

The

[40] excel in virtue have the best right of

[20]

to rebel (for they alone can with reason be 1301 b deemed absolutely unequal),

all

but then

they are of

There

all

men

the least inclined to

which

do

so.

change; also what are the modes of preserva-

claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous

tion in states generally, or in a particular state,

ancestors.

and by what means each

state

may be

best pre-

served: these questions remain to be considered.

[25] In the first place we starting-point that in the

must assume

many forms

as

our

of gov-

ernment which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail in attaining them, as indeed I have already explained.

1

Democracy, for example,

of the notion that those

who

arises out

are equal in any

because men [30] are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion respect are equal in

that those

who

all respects;

are unequal in one respect are

in all respects unequal; being unequal, that

is,

in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one [55] form of inequality. All these forms of gov-

ernment have a kind of justice,

but, tried

by an

absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, l

III.

both parties, whenever their share in the I282 b 18-30.

is

also a superiority

Here

is

then, so to speak, are opened

[5] the very springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in

governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of them into constitutional

government or

aristocracy,

and

[10] conversely; the other not affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing the

form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the ad-

own

hands. Further,

a question of degree;

an oligarchy, for

ministration into their there

is

may become more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or

example, [75]

maintained. Or the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only, e.g. the establishment or overthrow of a particular office: as at Sparta it is said that [20] Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias, the ephoralty. less strictly

At Epidamnus, too, the change was partial. For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a

BOOK

1302 b

IV,

CHAPTER 16— BOOK

was appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the Heliaea when an election takes place, and the office of the [25] single archon was another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is for instance, a perpetual monno proportion archy among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion. Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and

council

—

[jo] proportional; by the

number

or equality in

first I

mean sameness

or size; by the second,

equality of ratios. For example, the excess of

two

numerically equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for [35] two is tne same part of four that one is of 1 two, namely, the half. As I was saying before, men agree that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. Hence three over

there are

two

is

principal forms of government,

[40] democracy and oligarchy; for good birth 1302 a and virtue are rare, but wealth and

numbers

we

find a

more common. In what city shall hundred persons of good birth and of

are

virtue? whereas the rich everywhere abound. a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is

That

not a good thing; the proof is the fact that such [5] forms of government never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, as they be-

CHAPTERS

V,

we must

revolutions arise, the beginnings

503

first

of all ascertain

and causes of them which

constitutions generally.

three in

1-3

affect

They may

be said to be have now to give an

number; and we

We

want to know (1) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feel[20] outline of each. what is the feeling? (2)

ing has been already mentioned; 2 viz. the de[25] sire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality

and

superiority,

when

conceiving themselves

to be superior they think that they have not

more but the same or less than their inferiors; which may and may not be just.

pretensions

Inferiors revolt in order that they

may be equal,

and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonour from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons [35] of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in the way described, and about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, and in another as more than seven. Two of them have [jo]

been already noticed; 3 but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honour not,

—

which

[40] as in the case

I

have

just supposed,

1302 b

gin badly, cannot fail to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be

in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. Other causes are insolence, fear, ex-

employed; numerical in some

cessive

cases,

and pro-

predominance, contempt,

some

dispropor-

portionate in others.

tionate increase in

to be safer and less than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oli[10] garchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oli-

of another sort are election intrigues, careless-

Still

democracy appears

liable to revolution

garchs.

No

among

the people themselves.

dissension worth mentioning arises

And we may

remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, [75] and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government. further

ness, neglect

about

part of the state; causes

trifles,

dissimilarity of ele-

ments.

What

[5]

share insolence and avarice have in how they work, is

creating revolutions, and plain enough.

When

the magistrates are inso-

and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their lent

[10] gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public. It is evident, again, what an influence

honour exerts and how

In considering la 26.

how

dissensions

and

political

oured 2

it is

a cause of

Men who are themselves dishonand who see others obtaining honours

revolution.

i3oi a 33sqq., b 35sqq.

3

1.

32.

POLITICS

5°4 rise

the

rebellion;

in

honour or dishonour and just when

when undeserved

is

awarded according

to merit.

[75]

is

unjust;

Again, superiority

when one or more power which is too much for

a cause of revolution

persons have a the state and the power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And therefore, in gos, they

much

some

places, as at

Athens and Ar-

have recourse to ostracism. But

better to provide

from the

first

how

that there

[20] should be no such pre-eminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence

and then finding a remedy. Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have committed wrong, and are afraid of

1303*

of the

month by Cleomenes

the Lacedaemoni-

an, were compelled to admit to citizenship

some of

and

their perioeci;

at

Athens, when,

after frequent defeats of their infantry at the

time of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers [10] had to be taken from the roll of citizens. Revolutions arise from this cause as well, in democracies as in other forms of government, but not to so great an extent. When the rich grow

numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of government also change sometimes even without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Heraea

—

[75] (where, instead of electing their magisthey took them by lot, because the elec-

punishment, or they are expecting to suffer

trates,

wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. Thus at Rhodes the notables conspired

tors

against the people through fear of the suits that [25] were brought against them. Contempt is

loyal persons are allowed to find

also a cause of insurrection

example, in oligarchies

and revolution;

for

—when those who have

no share

in the state are the majority, they rebecause they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state; at Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of Oenophyta, the bad administration of the [jo] democracy led to its ruin. At Megara the volt,

fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny of Gelo arose; at Rhodes, before

the insurrection. Political revolutions also spring

from a

dis-

[55] proportionate increase in any part of the For as a body is made up of many mem-

state.

bers,

and every member ought to grow in prosymmetry may be preserved; but

portion, that loses its

nature

if

the foot be four cubits long

and the rest of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of an[40] other animal: even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow

1303 a

imperceptibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states. And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain [5] in a battle with the Iapygians just after the

War,

government in consequence becoming a democracy; or as was the case atArgos, where the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces on the seventh day

Persian

the constitutional

were

own when distheir way into

in the habit of choosing their

partisans); or

the highest

owing

to carelessness,

Oreum, where, upon

offices, as at

the accession of Heracleodorus to

office,

the

oli-

garchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and democratical government. [20] Again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the change; I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter; at Ambracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. For the Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was at

much

the same as none

all.

[25] Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a com-

mon

not the growth of a a multitude brought together by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for example, the Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, becoming later the more nu[30] merous, expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the peospirit; for a state is

day, any

more than

ple of Antissa,

it

grows out of

who had

received the Chian ex-

[35] iles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zancleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their

own city. The citizens of Apollonia on the Eux-

BOOK

1304*

V,

CHAPTERS

ine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution; the Syracusahs, after

the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted 1303 b strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled

and came

to blows;

the people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled

by them.

Now,

in oligarchies the masses

make

revo-

lt] lution under the idea that they are unjustly 1 treated, because, as I said before, they are

and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share. Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. For example, the Chytians at Clazomenae did not agree with the people of the island; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the No[10] tians; at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those equals,

who

live in the city.

pediment of a

ditch,

For just as in war the imthough ever so small, may

break a regiment, so every cause of difference, [75] however slight, makes a breach in a city.

The

greatest opposition

is

confessedly that of

3-4

505

Hestiaea after the Persian War.

was the division

them for his was rejected in his suit, whereupon he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of whom he was proxenus) to other citizen, wanted to obtain sons; but he

A

heiress arose at Phocis

ference of place.

of

In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great interests are at stake. Even trifles are [20] most important when they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse; for

was once changed two young men, who were

the Syracusan constitution

by a love-quarrel of in the government. The story

is

them was away from home

of

that while one

his beloved

was

gained over by his companion, and he to revenge himself seduced the other's wife. They [25] then drew the members of the ruling class into their quarrel

and

so split all the peo-

We learn from this story that

ple into portions.

we

should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs

mistake

and mighty men. The

in the beginning

—'Well

lies

[jo] says

begun

is

—

as the proverb

half done'; so an

error at the beginning, though quite small, bears the

same

ratio to the errors in the other

parts. In general,

the whole city 1

1301*33.

is

when

the notables quarrel,

involved, as happened in

occasion

popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy classes. At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage 1304 a was the beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this case the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without taking her. Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure among his offerings while he was sacrificing, and then slew him pretending that he had been robbing the temple. At Mytilene, too, a dispute about heiresses was the [5] beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the war with the Athenians in which Paches took their city. A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left two daughters; Dexander, an-

and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this difvirtue

The

an inheritance; one of two [35] brothers refused to give an account of their father's property and the treasure which he had found: so the poorer of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted in his cause the of

[10]

interfere.

about an between Mnaseas the

similar quarrel

Mnason, and Euthycrates the father Onomarchus; this was the beginning of the Sacred War. A marriage-quarrel was also the cause of a change in the government of Epidamnus. A certain man betrothed his daughter [75] to a person whose father, having been

father of

made

a magistrate, fined the father of the girl,

and the

latter, stung by the insult, conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow

the state.

Governments also change into oligarchy or democracy or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase in power or re[20] nown. Thus at Athens the reputation into

gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to

command

of

the sea, strengthened the democracy. At Argos, [25] the notables, having distinguished themselves against the tle

Lacedaemonians

of Mantinea, attempted to put

in the bat-

down

the

democracy. At Syracuse, the people, having been the chief authors of the victory in the war

POLITICS

506

with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, the [30] people, uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the gov-

ernment

themselves.

to

And

generally,

it

should be remembered that those who have [55] secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their greatdraws others into rebellion, or they them-

ness

selves, in their pride of superiority, are unwill-

ing to remain on a level with others. Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e.g. the rich and the people, are equally

1304 b balanced, and

or no midwere manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections, always a minority. Such are the be[5] ginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable. dle class; for,

if

there

is little

either party

Revolutions are effected in two ways, by and by fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or [10] afterwards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection force

was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Laceagainst their will. This

daemonians, and, having cheated the people, still endeavoured to retain the government. [75]

(2) In other cases the people are perat first, and afterwards, by a repetition

suaded

and allegiance which effect congenerally spring from the above-

of the persuasion, their goodwill are retained. stitutions

The

revolutions

mentioned causes.

And now, we must

taking each constitution separately*

see

what follows from the

principles

already laid down. [20] Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues,

who

either in their private capacity lay infor-

mation against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites

1305'

even the

enemies), or coming forward in public stir up the people against them. The [25] truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, bitterest

and the notables combined. At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against [30] them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the same manner the [55] democracy at Megara was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging and defeating the people, established the oligarchy. The same thing happened with the 1305 a democracy of Cyme, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favour with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to

combine;

—

either they

make

a division of their

property, or diminish their incomes by the im[5] position of public services,

and sometimes

they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate.

Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally [10] demagogues. They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, the art of rhetoric has made such progthe orators lead the people, but their ig-

when ress,

norance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to [75] the contrary are few and slight. Tyrannies were more common formerly than now, for this reason also, that great power was placed in the hands of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt

[20] in the fields, busy at their work;

and

their

BOOK

1306*

V,

CHAPTERS

chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred

of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led

a faction against the

Theagenes

at

men

of the plain,

Megara slaughtered

1

and

the cattle of

[25] the wealthy, which he found by the river side, where they had put them to graze in land not their own. Dionysius, again, was

thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity to the notables

won

for

him

the confidence of

Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for [50] where there is a popular election of the

the people.

magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above the laws.

A

more

state of things

or less complete cure for this for the separate tribes,

is

and not

the whole people, to elect the magistrates. [55] These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.

There are two patent causes of revolutions

in

oligarchies: (1) First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good

enough

to be their

be himself a

member

Lygdamis

of

few shared

among them father

in the

1

i.

59.

of the oligarchy

and changed the

constitution.

(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in garchies one is the personal rivalry of the garchs,

gogue.

two

which leads them

Now,

to play the

the oligarchical

sorts: either

olioli-

dema-

demagogue is of upon the oli-

(a) he practises

garchs themselves (for, although the oligarchy number, they may be a dema[-25] gogue among them, as at Athens Charicles' party won power by courting the Thirty, that of Phrynichus by courting the Four Hundred); or (b) the oligarchs may play the dema-

are quite a small

gogue with the people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians of the citizens endeavoured to gain over the people because [30] they were elected by them; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be

members

where composed of persons outside

of a political club; or, again,

the government, the oligarchs flatter the peo-

themselves, because only

government; there existed

and son could not hold office together, if there were several brothers, only was admitted. The people took ad-

See Herodotus,

times was

as

the rule already mentioned, that

[75] and, the eldest

city of Erythrae, too, in old

[20] ruled, and ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence at the narrowness

the oligarchy,

and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in some places father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office together. [10] At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a considerable change. For the noa

The

the law-courts are

at

among

and conquered the oligarchs, who were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. the notables to be their leader, attacked

he

[5] Istros

tables fell out

507

if

champion, especially

Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But revolutions which com1305 b mence outside the governing class may be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at Massalia and [40]

4-6

vantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of

m

order to obtain a decision in their [35] pl e favour, and so they change the constitu-

own

happened at Heraclea in Pontus. Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them; for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to call tion; this

in the people.

cur

when

Changes

in the oligarchy also oc-

the oligarchs waste their private

[40] property by extravagant living; for then they want to innovate, and either try to make 1306 a themselves tyrants, or install some one else in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse,

and

as at

Amphipolis a

man

named Cleotimus introduced Chalcidian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them up against the rich. For a like reason in Aegina the person

who carried on the negotiation with

endeavoured to revolutionize the Sometimes a party among the oligarchs

[5] Chares state.

try directly to create a political

change; some-

times they rob the treasury, and then either the thieves or, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, those who resist them in their thieving quarrel with the rulers. But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed

POLITICS

508 [10] from within; of this

we may

see

an exam-

ple at Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern a large city, be-

1307* having a certain money qualification,

sons

often occur by accident.

The

qualification

may

tors

have been originally fixed according to the cir[10] cumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as valuable, and then everybody participates in every [75] office; this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in

elected for

oligarchies.

[20] Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are com-

racies

cause they have a good understanding among themselves. Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is created within the original one, that

body

is

is

to say,

when

the whole governing

small and yet they do not

[75] the highest

offices.

Thus

all

share in

at Elis the gov-

erning body was a small senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because the sena-

were only ninety in number, and were life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedaemonian elders.

pelled to hire mercenaries,

and the general who

them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make [25] themselves into a company of tyrants. is

in

command

Sometimes the

of

We

must remark generally, both of democand oligarchies, that they sometimes

change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class;

mean

I

to say,

from those forms

of de-

[20] mocracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely.

oligarchs, fearing this danger,

give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them. And

from mutual distrust, the two hand over the defence of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two fac-

In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when few only share in the honours of the state, a

a

shown 2

in time of peace,

cause which has been already

parties

an aristocracy is a sort of oli[25] garchy, and, like an oligarchy, is the government of a few, although few not for the same reason; hence the two are often confounded. And revolutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when the mass

tions,

who

often ends the master of both. This

[jo ] happened at Larissa when Simos the Aleuad had the government, and at Abydos in the

days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels

have already mentioned 1 [55] som e instances; another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage. A revolution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both rose out of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon about marriages

I

1306 b Eurytion, and at Thebes upon Archias; enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the agora. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some memfor their

bers of the ruling class taking offence at their [5] excessive despotism; for example, the oli-

garchy at Cnidus and

at Chios.

of the people are of the high-spirited kind,

have a notion that they are ers.

Thus

tected,

good

and

as their rul-

the so-called Parthe-

the sons of the Spartan

were sent away

to colonize

Tarentum.

Again, revolutions occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonoured by those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta; or, when a brave man is excluded from the honours of the state, like [55] Cinadon, who conspired against the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus; or, again,

some

are very poor

when

and others very rich, a state most often the result of war,

which is Lacedaemon in the days of the Messenian War; this is proved from the poem of Tyr1307 a taeus, entitled 'Good Order'; for he of society as at

who were ruined by have a redistribution of the land. Again, revolutions arise when an inspeaks of certain citizens

counsellor, judge, or other magistrate to per-

dividual

i7.

Lacedaemon

who were

as

peers, attempted a revolution, and, being de-

the

i303 b 37-i 3 o 4B

at

[30] niae,

Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of 1

to affect

oligarchies; for

2

war and wanted

who

i305 b 2sqq.

is

to

great,

and might be

greater,

BOOK

1307 b

V,

CHAPTERS

sanias,

Lacedaemon, Pauwho was general in the Persian War,

or like

Hanno

wants

to rule alone, as, at

Carthage.

at

[5] Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to

some deviation from

justice in the constitu-

tion itself; the cause of the downfall

is,

in the

former, the ill-mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the [10] three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and democracy and oligarchy.

virtue, but especially

For

combine these is the endeavour of congovernments; and most of the so-

to

stitutional

called aristocracies have a like aim, but differ

from

polities

[75] hence less

in

some

the of

mode

them

are

of combination;

more and some

permanent. Those which incline more to

and those democracy constitutional gov-

oligarchy are called aristocracies,

which

incline to

6-8

who were

popular with the soldiers of the guard for their military prowess, despising the magistrates and thinking that they would eas[10] ily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual

they are contented. But the rich,

these matters,

them power,

if

the consti-

are apt to be insolent

[20] and avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that diit changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a de-

rection

mocracy, an aristocracy an oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aristocracy may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being

wronged, force the constitution [25] posite form. In like

to take

an op-

manner constitutional

governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own. What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii, where the qualification for office, at first high, was therefore reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. The notables had previously acquired the whole of the [jo] land contrary to law; for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land. Again, since all aristocratical governments .

.

.

[55] incline to oligarchy, the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where

property tends to pass into few hands, the notables can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage connexion

and some young men

interval of five years,

ernments. And therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal tution gives

509

with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy, or in a wellbalanced aristocracy. [40] I have already remarked that in all states 1307 b revolutions are occasioned by trifles. In aristocracies, above all, they are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution, and so with greater ease the government change something else which is a little more impor[5] tant, until they have undermined the whole fabric of the state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should only be re-elected after an

commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charge of and who are called councillors, determined to resist, but they after[75] wards consented, thinking that, if only this one law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the constitution. But other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to oppose; and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists, who established

at first

a dynastic oligarchy. All constitutions are overthrown either from [20] within or from without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having

an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians the democracies. I have now explained what are the chief [25] causes of revolutions and dissensions in states.

8

We

have next to consider what means there

are of preserving constitutions in general,

and

in particular cases. In the first place

evi-

it

is

we know the causes which destroy constitutions, we also know the causes which dent that

if

preserve them; for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of preservation. all well-attempered governments there nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law, more

[50] In

is

especially in small matters; for transgression

creeps in unperceived

and

at last

ruins the

POLITICS

5 io

state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats up a fortune. The expense does not take place all at once, and therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as [35] in the fallacy which says that 'if each part is little, then the whole is little'. And this is true in one way, but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they

are

made up

of

1

spoken, invented only to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further, we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, but be[5] cause the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them. They should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honour, or the common people in a matter [10] of money; and they should treat one anothev and their fellow-citizens in a spirit of

The

mocracy seek

equality

which the friends

of de-

to establish for the multitude

not only just but likewise expedient equals. Hence,

if

bring distant dangers near, in order that the may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night-watch, never relax their atten[ -?o] tion. He should endeavour too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarcitizens

rels of

the notables,

and

to prevent those

have not hitherto taken part

in

catching the spirit of contention.

who

them from

No

ordinary

man can

littles.

In the first place, then, men should guard [40] against the beginning of change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the po1308 a litical devices of which I have already

equality.

1308 b

is

among

the governing class are nu-

[75] merous, many democratic institutions are useful; for example, the restriction of the ten-

discern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman. [35] As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional governments by the altera-

when this arises, not out of any variation in the qualification but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property [40] with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually, 1308 b and in larger cities every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times greater or many times less than when the ratings recognized by the constitution were fixed, there [5] should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater tion of the qualification,

Where this is not done a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; or in the opposite case constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy. or less.

[10] It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of govern-

ment not

to

allow the disproportionate

in-

who

crease of any citizen, but to give moderate hon-

are of equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous be-

our for a long time rather than great honour for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not [75] every one can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honours which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he should be sent [20] clean out of the country. And since innovations creep in through the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, wheth-

ure of

offices to six

months, that

all

those

a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, 2 as I have already remarked. The short tenure

come

and aristocracies hands of families; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm when [20] his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are of office prevents oligarchies

from

falling into the

either the principal

men

of the state,

who

in

democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them. [25] Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them

makes the government keep in hand the constitution. Wherefore the ruler who has a care of the constitution should invent terrors, and 1

Cf. iv. 1297* 13-38.

er oligarchy or

democracy or any other. And an increase of prosperity in

for a like reason

[25] any part of the state should be carefully

watched.

ways

The proper remedy for this evil is almanagement of affairs and of-

to give the

opposite elements; such oppo-i and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the

fices of state to sites

are the virtuous

BOOK

1309 b

V,

CHAPTERS

poor and the rich in one body, or to increase the middle class: thus an end will be put to the [jo] revolutions

which

arise

from inequality.

But above all every state should be so administered and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. In oligarchies special precautions should be used against this evil. For the people do not take any great offence at being kept out of the govern[55] ment indeed they are rather pleased

— —

than otherwise at having leisure for their pribut what irritates them is to vate business think that their rulers are stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for they lose both honour and profit. If office brought no frofit, then and then only could democracy and 40] aristocracy be combined; for both notables and people might have their wishes gratified. 1309 a All would be able to hold office, which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, which

And

this result

there

is

no

may

is

the

aim

of aristocracy.

be accomplished

possibility of

when

making money out of want to have

the offices; for the poor will not

them when there is nothing to be gained from they would rather be attending to [5] them their own concerns; and the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow rich, and the notables

—

will not be

governed by the lower

class.

In or-

[10] der to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer of the revenue should be made

assembly of the citizens, and duwith the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And honours should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incor[75] ruptible. In democracies the rich should be spared; not only should their property not be divided, but their incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be protected. It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing, from undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choat a general

plicates of the accounts deposited

ruses, torch-races,

and the

like.

In an oligarchy,

[20] on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should

go to them; if any of the wealthy classes insult them, the offender should be punished more severely than if he had wronged one of his own Provision should be made that estates and not by gift, and no per[25] son should have more than one inheritance; for in this way properties will be equal-

class.

pass by inheritance

ized, It is

8-9

5"

and more of the poor

also expedient

an oligarchy

rise to

competency.

both in a democracy and in who have less

to assign to those

share in the government (i.e. to the rich in a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy) an [50] equality or preference in

but the prinshould be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class.

The

cipal offices of state.

There are three

who of

have to

all,

all

latter

qualifications required in those

the highest

fill

offices,

— (1)

first

loyalty to the established constitution;

[35] (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government; for, if what is just

not the same in

is

of justice

must

doubt, however,

all

governments, the quality

also differ.

when

all

There may be a do not

these qualities

[40] meet in the same person, how the selec1309 b tion is to be made; suppose, for example, a good general is a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal and just, which should we choose? In

making

the election ought we not to consider two points? what qualities are common, and what are rare. Thus in the choice of a general,

we

should regard his

skill

rather than his vir-

[5] tue; for few have military skill, but many have virtue. In any office of trust or steward-

on the other hand, the opposite rule should be observed; for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which ship,

men

all

possess.

may, however, be asked what a man wants [10] with virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always It

may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public ? Speaking generally, we may say that what[75] ever legal enactments are held to be for attend to them,

the interest of various constitutions,

preserve them.

And

all

these

the great preserving prin-

ciple is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned, 1 to have a care that the loyal citizens should be stronger than the disloyal. Neither should we forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in perverted forms

—

1

iv.

i296b 15;

vi.

1320* 14;

cf. 11.

i27ob 21 sqq.;

iv.

of

government;

for

many

practices

which ap-

[20] pear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies.

Those

who own

think that all virtue is to be found in their party principles push matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion denose which varies from the stroys a state.

A

ideal of straightness to a

hook or snub may

still

be of good shape and agreeable to the eye; but [25] if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other;

and

the

a

want

equality of property

must

introduced, the state

is

of necessity take another form; for

1310 a when by laws

carried to excess one or

other element in the state stitution

is

ruined, the con-

ruined.

is

which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible.

Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and

is

:

—

[10] entertain the very opposite feeling; in the of their oath there should be an express

—

'I will do no wrong to the people.' But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence

declaration

day

form

of

is

equal; and that equality

the popular will;

is the supremacy of and that freedom means the

doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words 1 of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all

wrong; men should not think

it

slavery

[55] to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation. I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continu-

10

have

I

causes

still

of

to

its

speak of monarchy, and the destruction

What I have

[40]

and preservation.

said already respecting forms

1310 b of constitutional government applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms; it is [5] therefore most injurious to its subjects, being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. The appointment of a king the resource of the better classes against the

is

own

universally neglected.

The

ple to be their protector against the notables,

is

the adaptation of education

is

though sanctioned by every of the state, will be of no avail unless

best laws,

citizen

characteristic of

democracy, the government of the majority [jo] and freedom. Men think that what is just

government, and yet in our

this principle

[75]

For two principles are

state.

is elected by them out of because either he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a tyrant is chosen from the peo-

of constitutions to the

make a revolution. And in [25] democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the

—

and will devise all the harm against them which I can'; but they ought to exhibit and to

form

and hence they are both more inclined better able to

ance.

an error common both to oligarin the latter the demto democracies agogues, when the multitude are above the law, are always cutting the city in two by quar[5] rels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause; just as in oligarchies the oligarchs should profess to maintain the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For there are cities in which they swear 'I will be an enemy to the people,

There chies and

of self-discipline in states as well as in

delight, but those by

toil,

push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end [35] by having none at all. Wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. For neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. If

and education

Now, to have been educated in the [20] spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats

and

is

are trained by habit

individuals.

true of

this

human

young

in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically, or oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be

body. The same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if any one attempts to [jo] every part of the

[40]

m&>

POLITICS

5i2

[10] people, and he

own number,

their

and x

in order to prevent

Fr.

89i,Nauck.

them from being

in-

1311

BOOK V, CHAPTERS 9-10

1

5i3

shows that almost all tyrants [75] have been demagogues who gained the

[10] by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust

favour of the people by their accusation of the

the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispers[75] ing them. From democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and also because plots against them are contrived by men

jured. History

notables.

At any

was the manner

rate this

in

which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others again [20] grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times

who elected them gave the magiswhether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty, if he

who

want

the people

of this class,

trates,

[20] cape subjection. Hence Periander advised Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tall-

[25] desired, in creating a tyranny, since he

had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of state. Thus Pheidon at Argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants; Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices.

[jo]

Whereas Panaetius

lus

at Corinth,

CypseAthens,

at Leontini,

Peisistratus at

Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues. And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether 1

est ears of corn,

put out of the

And

either

meaning

way

to rule or to es-

that he

the citizens

must always

who

overtop the

have already intimated, 3 the beginnings of change are the same in monarch[25] ies as in forms of constitutional government; subjects attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another is conrest.

so, as I

fiscation of property.

The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. Monarchs [jo] have great wealth and honour, which are objects of desire to all

are

made sometimes

mankind. The attacks

against their lives, some-

on beneon these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this [35] honour have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state from being

times against the office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult (and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly [^5] act out of revenge, and not from ambi-

enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian,

Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishon-

of the individual or of his family, or

fits

conferred, or

[40] Macedonian, and Molossian kings. The 1311 a idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people

against insult

and oppression. Whereas a tybeen repeated, 2 has no regard

rant, as has often

any public

except as conducive to his private ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of [5] a king, honour. Wherefore also in their desires they differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, of what brings honour. And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries.

to

interest,

That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end is wealth; (for 1 1.

2sqq.

2

in.

i279 b 6sqq., iv.1295

19.

tion.

For example, the attempt made upon the

our offered

to the sister of

insult to himself.

He

Harmodius and

the

attacked the tyrant for

and Aristogeiton joined in the Harmodius. A conspiracy [40] was also formed against Periander, the 1311 b tyrant of Ambracia, because, when

his sister's sake,

attack for the sake of

drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the litby Derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, tle,

by the eunuch to revenge an inwife had been carried off by Evagoras's son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by sovereigns on [5]

was

slain

sult; for his

3

1310*40 sqq.

1312 b

POLITICS

5M

Such was the upon Archelaus; he had ways hated the connexion with him, and

and that the offence would be

the persons of their subjects.

at-

die of a meal,

tack of Crataeas

al-

forgiven.

so,

[40] Another motive is contempt, as in the case 1312 a of Sardanapalus, whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the story-tellers say truly; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one else. Dion attacked the

Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of Elymeia,

[w] when

pressed in a war against and the younger to son Amyntas, under the idea that would then be less likely to quarrel

when he was hard

Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus,

own

his

Amyntas

son

by Cleopatra

[75]

with his

made

this slight a pretext for

though even a

laus,

ficed, for the real

—Crataeas

attacking Arche-

less reason would have sufcause of the estrangement

was the disgust which he felt at his connexion with the king. And from a like motive Hellanocrates of Larissa conspired with him; for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did not promise of restoring him to his counhe thought that the connexion between them had originated, not in affection, but in [20] the wantonness of power. Pytho, too, and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton outrage which fulfil his

try,

he had committed in mutilating him

when

a

child.

Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers of state [25] and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthilidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been beaten and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In the conspiracy against [jo] Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack; he was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged; for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be cited of murders and [55] conspiracies

which have

arisen

from sim-

ilar causes. is another motive which, as we have has caused conspiracies as well in mon-

Fear said,

1

archies as in more popular forms of government. Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders, he having been under the impression that Xerxes would forget what he had said in the mid1

Cf. I302 b 2, 21, 1311*25.

[5] younger Dionysius because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt; for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt; the assailants are [10] ready to strike, and think nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and

believing that his

power was worn

out.

Thus

again, Seuthes the Thracian conspired against

Amadocus, whose general he was. [75] And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out of contempt and partly from the love of gain. Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power, and the [20] union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory. Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different

way

as well as in those al-

ready mentioned. There are

men who

will not

[25] risk their lives in the hope of gains and honours however great, but who nevertheless

regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honourable in the world; they wish [jo] to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his [35] life if he fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying 'that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed; such a death

would be welcome to him'. But this is a temper to which few can attain. [40] Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are destroyed from without by some 1312 b opposite and more powerful form of

1313

BOOK

s

V,

CHAPTERS

government. That such a government will have the will to attack them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle; and all men, if they can, do

what they will. Democracy is anon the principle of He-

tagonistic to tyranny, siod,

'Potter hates Potter', because they are

1

[5] nearly akin, for the

mocracy

is

extreme form of de-

tyranny; and royalty and aristoc-

racy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type.

10-11

5i5

tyranny; indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed sons.

Kingly rule

causes,

and

is

is little

among

several per-

affected by external

therefore lasting;

it is

generally

And there are two which the destruction may come about;

[40] destroyed

from within.

ways in 1313 a ( 1 ) when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too

much

Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well gov-

after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law. Royalties do not now come into existence; where such forms of government arise, they are rath-

erned.

er

Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, [10] when the reigning family are divided among themselves, as that of Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of

[5]

And

therefore the

Hiero, flattered the son of Gelo and led into excesses in order that he

might

him

rule in his

name. Whereupon the family got together a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the [75] tyranny; but those of the people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and

drove them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards perished himself. There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies hatred and contempt.

—

Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for, living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be [25] included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready the angry are more impetuous in to strike making an attack, for they do not follow ra-

monarchies or tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters; but in our own day men are more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the

tional principle.

way

And men

to their passions

are very apt to give

when

they are insulted.

[30] To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hais more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless. In a word, all the causes which I have men2 tal tioned as destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect

tred

1

2

Worths i302b

and Days,

25.

25-33, i304 b 2o-i3o6b 2i.

Hence mankind

will not,

kings often

fall

into contempt, and, although

possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their over-

throw is then readily effected; for there is an [75] end to the king when his subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like

The

[20]

—

office.

they can help, endure it, and any one who [10] obtains power by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruction is the fact that if

him

or not.

destruction of monarchies

tributed to these

and the

is

to be at-

like causes.

n And

they are preserved, to speak generally, by if we consider them separately, (1) royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more restricted the the opposite causes; or,

[20] functions of kings, the longer their powunimpaired; for then they are more

er will last

moderate and not so despotic in their ways: and they are less envied by their subjects. This is

why among the

the reason

so long

the kingly office has lasted

Molossians.

And

for a simi-

has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by Theopompus in various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a [50] certain sense not less, but greater. There is a story that when his wife once asked him [25] lar reason

it

POLITICS

5 i6

whether he was not ashamed to leave to his power which was less than he had inherited from his father, 'No indeed', he replied, 'for the power which I leave to them sons a royal

more

will be

lasting.'

As

to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. One of them is [55] the old traditional method in which most ty-

rants administer their government. arts

Periander of Corinth

is

Of such

said to have been

and many similar devices

the great master,

may

be gathered from the Persians in the administration of their government. There are firstly

the prescriptions mentioned some disfor the preservation of a tyranny,

tance back,

1

in so far as this

is

possible; viz. that the tyrant

[40] should lop off those who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not

1313 b allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like; he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings

and he must take every means from knowing one another begets mutual confiacquaintance (for [5] dence). Further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at his gates; then he will know what they are for discussion,

to prevent people

doing:

if

they are always kept under, they will

learn to be humble. In short, he should practhese

tise

and the

like Persian

and barbaric

A

[10] arts, which all have the same object. tyrant should also endeavour to know what

each of his subjects says or does, and should

employ

spies,

like the

'female detectives' at

Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers

whom

Hiero

[75] was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the fear of informers

prevents people from speaking their minds,

and if they do, they are more Another art of the tyrant is

among

the citizens; friends

easily

found out.

sow quarrels should be em-

to

broiled with friends, the people with the notables,

and the

rich with one another. Also he

should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizens, and the people, having to keep [20] hard at work, are prevented from conspiring.

The Pyramids

ample of

of

Egypt afford an

ex-

this policy; also the offerings of the

family of Cypselus, and the building of the

temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratiand the great Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works were alike intended to

dae, 1

1311* 15-22.

1314a

[25] occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes,

manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into the treasury their whole after the

who

property.

war

The

tyrant

is

also

in order that his subjects

fond of making may have some-

thing to do and be always in want of a leader. [30] And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power. Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the licence which is allowed to slaves in order that they may be-

that

[55] tray their masters; for slaves and women tyrants; and they are of

do not conspire against

course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time.

For the people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, [40] the flatterer is held in honour; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble 1314 a spirit, which is a work of flattery. Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes; 'nail [5] knocks out nail', as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or independence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by [10] him as an enemy to his power. Another

mark

of a tyrant

is

that he likes foreigners bet-

with them and inone are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him. ter

than citizens, and

vites

them

lives

to his table; for the

Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three [75] heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody: (2) the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to

BOOK

1315*

V,

CHAPTER

have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good; [20] they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other

men: (3) the

tyrant desires

that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and

they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, [25] if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas

among

may

be referred: (1) he sows distrust

his subjects; (2) he takes

away

their

power; (3) he humbles them. [30] This then is one of the two methods by

which tyrannies are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action.

The

nature of this latter

method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like [55] the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the char[40] acter of a king. In the first place he should 1314 b pretend a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents of

which the common people get exthey see their hard-won earnings snatched from them and lavished on courte[5] sans and strangers and artists. He should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a sort at cited

when

a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he lord of the city, he will ever be in

money. Such a policy

is

is

want

the of

much when he

at all events

more advantageous for the tyrant [10] goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians

of his treasure than the citizens, for the one

accompany him, but the others remain

be-

hind. In the second place, he should be seen

5i7

11

and to require public services [75] only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, and generally he

to collect taxes

ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, [20] and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the

least offense against

modesty towards the young of [25] are his subjects, and the

either sex

women

who

of his

family should observe a like self-control towards other women; the insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at [50]

dawn and

pass whole days in sensuality,

men

to see them, that they may admire their happy and blessed lot. In these

but want other

things a tyrant should

if

possible be moderate,

or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is

soon despised and attacked; not so he

who

is

[55] temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly every-

thing which has been said before 1 about

ty-

He

ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the Gods; rants.

[40] for

if

men

think that a ruler

is

religious

1315 a and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his

hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought foolish. [5] And he should honour men of merit, and make them think that they would not be held in more honour by the citizens if they had a free government. The honour he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to make one person great; but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look [10] sharply after one another. If after all some one has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit; for such dispositions 1

i

a B 3 i3 35-i3i 4 29.

POLITICS

5 i8

arc ever

most inclined

to strike.

to be deprived of his

is

power,

And let it

any one be dimin-

if

from him all at [75] once. The tyrant should abstain from all outrage; in particular from personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the young. ished gradually, not taken

1316*

whom

and of

of hatred,

power too

will be

our and the virtuous when their honour is af[20] fected. Therefore a tyrant ought either not to commit such acts at all; or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon others, and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed to arise from affection, and not from the insolence of power, and in general he should compensate the appearance of dishonour by the increase of honour. [25] Of those who attempt assassination they are the most dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who do not care to survive, if they effect their purpose. Therefore special precaution should be taken about any who think that either they or those for whom they care have been insulted; for when men are led away by passion to assault others they are re-

—

gardless of themselves.

[30]

'It is

As Heracleitus

difficult to fight

says,

against anger; for

man will buy revenge with his soul.' And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men and of rich, the tyrant should lead 1

a

both to imagine that they are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his [35] ru l e an

assailants.

[40]

But

enough of

these

details;

—what

should be the general policy of the tyrant is He ought to show himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of a 1315 b steward and a king. He should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian; he should be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life; he should win the notables by companionship, and the multitude by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity be [5] nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object obvious.

1

Fr. 85, Diels.

more

not afraid. His

is

lasting.

His

disposi-

[10] tion will be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; and he will not be wicked, but half wicked only. 12

He

should be especially careful of his behaviour to men who are lovers of honour; for as the lovers of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the lovers of hon-

he

Yet no forms of government are so short-lived and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon; this continued for a hundred as oligarchy

The

years.

reason was that they treated their

[75] subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws; and in various ways

gained the favour of the people by the care

which they took of them. ticular, was respected for

Cleisthenes, in parhis military ability.

may be believed, he crowned the who decided against him in the games;

report

If

judge

[20] and, as some say, the sitting statue in the of Sicyon is the likeness of this person.

Agora

(A

similar story

is

told of Peisistratus,

who

is

on one occasion to have allowed himself to be summoned and tried before the Areopsaid

agus.)

Next in duration to the tyranny of Orthagoras was that of the Cypselidae at Corinth, which lasted seventy-three years and six months: Cypselus reigned thirty years, Peri[25] ander forty and a half, and Psammetichus the son of Gorgus three. Their continuance was due to similar causes: Cypselus was a popular man, who during the whole time of his rule never had a body-guard; and Periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great soldier. Third in duration was the rule of the Peisis[50] tratidae at Athens, but it was interrupted; for Peisistratus was twice driven out, so that during three and thirty years he reigned only seventeen; and his sons reigned eighteen al-

—

together thirty-five years. that of Hiero

[35]

most

short, not

and Gelo

lasting.

Even

Of

other tyrannies,

at Syracuse this,

more than eighteen

was the

however, was

years in

all;

for

Gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in the eighth; Hiero reigned for ten years, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. In fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration. [40] I have now gone through almost all the causes by which constitutional governments 1316 a and monarchies are either destroyed or preserved.

In the Republic of Plato,

2

Socrates treats of

revolutions, but not well, for he mentions 2

Republic,

vm.

546.

no

BOOK

1316 b

V,

CHAPTERS

cause of change which peculiarly affects the first, or perfect state. He only says that the cause is that nothing is abiding, but all things [5] change in a certain cycle; and that the ori-

gin of the change consists in those numbers 'of which 4 and 3, married with 5, furnish two harmonies',

— (he means when the number of

this

figure becomes solid); he conceives that nature

produces bad men who will not submit to education; in which latter particular he may very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some men who cannot be educat[10] ed and made virtuous. But why is such a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and

at certain times

not rather common to all states, nay, to everything which comes into being at all? And is it by the agency of time, which, as he declares, makes all things change, that things which did [75] not begin together, change together? For example, if something has come into being the day before the completion of the cycle, will it change with things that came into being before? Further, why should the perfect state 1 change into the Spartan? For governments more often take an opposite form than one [20] akin to them. The same remark is applicable to the other changes; he says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again into a tyranny.

And

yet the contrary

happens quite

democracy is even more likely to an oligarchy than into a moninto change [25] archy. Further, he never says whether tyranny as often; for a

and if it is, what form it

11-12

5i9

Gela into the tyranny of Cleander; Rhegium into the tyranny of Anaxilaus;

tius; that at

that at

the

same thing has happened

And

in

many

other

absurd to suppose that the state [40] changes into oligarchy merely because the

states.

it is

1316 b ruling class are lovers and makers of money, 2 and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should have an equal share in the government with themselves.

many

Moreover, in [5]

against

oligarchies there are laws

making money

in trade.

But

at

Carthage, which is a democracy, there is no such prohibition; and yet to this day the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It is absurd too for him to say that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich, and the other of the 3 poor. Is not this just as much the case in the Spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do not possess equal property, or all [10] are not equally good men? Nobody need be any poorer than he was before, and yet the

may change

all the same into a deform the majority; and a democracy may change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and

oligarchy

mocracy,

if

the poor

the one are energetic, the other indifferent.

[75] Once more, although the causes of the change are very numerous, he mentions only one 4 which is, that the citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though he thought that all, or the majority of them, were originally rich. This is not true: though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their ,

best,

and then there would be

property they are ripe for revolution; but, [20] when anybody else, it is no great matter, and an oligarchy does not even then more often pass into a democracy than into any other form of government. Again, if men are deprived of the honours of state, and are wronged, and in-

But

in point of fact a

sulted,

or

is

what

is

is,

not, liable to revolutions,

the cause of them, or into

changes. And the reason is, that he could not very well have told: for there is no rule; according to him it should revert to the first and a complete cycle. tyranny often changes [50] into a tyranny, as that at Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Cleisthenes; into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon did at Chalcis; into democracy, as that of Gelo's family did at Syracuse; into aristocracy, as at Carthage, and the tyranny of Charilaus [35] at Lacedaemon. Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny, like most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily; for example, the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Panae1

Republic, viii. 544.

they make revolutions, and change forms of government, even although they have not wasted their substance because they might do what they liked of which extravagance he 5 declares excessive freedom to be the cause. [25] Finally, although there are many forms

—

of oligarchies

and democracies, Socrates speaks

of their revolutions as though there were only

one form of either of them. 2

Ibid., 550.

4

Ibid., 555.

5

Ibid., 557, 564.

3

Ibid.,

55 i.

POLITICS

5 20

BOOK

1317 b

VI

—differences of population; We

have

now

considered the varieties of the

deliberative or

supreme power

in states,

and

the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of

government. 1

We

have also

spoken of the destruction and preservation of [ss\ constitutions, 2 they arise.

how and from what

causes

Of democracy and all other forms of governthere are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of orment

ganization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about [40] them. Moreover, we ought to consider the

1317 a various combinations of these modes

ement may

for the popular el-

husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of labourers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy be[25]

consist of

come

better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be [50] mentioned: the various properties and characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel an

[^5] existing one. Founders of states try to

racies

bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked 5 when speaking of the destruction and

stitutional

preservation of states.

themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristoc-

have an oligarchical character, and congovernments incline to democracies. When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these: [5] when the deliberative part of the govern-

ment and

the election of officers

is

constituted

and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to offices aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition oligarchically,

of a state. 3 [10] I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each

[75] state, but also briefly proceed to consider these and other forms of government are

how

to be established.

which form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of de[20] mocracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two First of all let us speak of democracy,

will also bring to light the opposite

causes. 1

One

IV. 14-16.

4 iv.

4 has been already mentioned,

(1 ) 2

V.

3

IV. 12.

i29i b 17-28, i292 b 25sqq., i296 b 26-31.

We

will

the principles, characteristics,

now

set forth

and aims

of such

states.

[40] The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of! men, can only be enjoyed in such a state: 1317 b this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it fol[5] lows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, [10] then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes.

man, as a

This, they say, since,

man

is

the privilege of a free-

on the other hand, not

likes

is

the

mark

to live

of a slave. This

the second characteristic of democracy, [75] whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and is

so

it

contributes to the freedom based

equality. 6 v.

i309 b 18-1310* 36.

upon

BOOK

1318 b

VI,

CHAPTERS

Such being our foundation and such the from which we start, the characteristhe election tics of democracy are as follows: of officers by all out of all; and that all should [20] rule over each, and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property qualiprinciple

—

fication should be required for offices, or only

low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the tenure of a very

[25]

all offices,

be brief; that

or of as

all

men

many as possible, should should

sit

or that judges selected out of in

all

matters, or in

and most important,

judgement, should judge,

in

all

most and in the greatest

—such

accounts, the constitution,

as the scrutiny of

and

private con-

assembly should be supreme any rate over the most important, and the magistrates over none or only [50] over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to [35] themselves, as I said in the previous dis1 cussion. The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law-courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the

men

poor

—

cording to the democratical notion,

opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there

and to the them who are

magistrates, or at least to any of

compelled to have their meals together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, [40] wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, mean employment. Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but 1318* if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based [5] upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, that all

should count equally; for

no more share in the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all equality implies that the poor should have

should rule equally according to their numbers. And in this way men think that they [10] will secure equality state. 1

Cf. iv. i299b 38.

and freedom in

their

the just-

is

—

form of the constitution, this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs [20] that to which the wealthier class; in their er

justice

stated assemblies, to the council

the property qualifications of five

hundred rich men ? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred ? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still [75] retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts? Which, ac-

over

causes, or at

521

Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained ? Are we to assign to a thousand

tracts; that the all

1-3

who

is

some

inequality

and

injustice.

For

if

the will of the few, any one person

is

more wealth than all the rest of the upon the oligarchical but this frinciple, to have the sole power 25] would be tyranny; or if justice is the will 2 of the majority, as I was before saying, they has

rich put together, ought,

—

will unjustly confiscate the property of the

To find a

wealthy minority. ity in

principle of equal-

which they both agree we must inquire

into their respective ideas of justice.

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be [jo] deemed law. Granted: but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed, the poor and the rich, that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disap[35] proved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly

— —

—

[40] or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient.

1318 b

But, although

know what

is

it

may

just

they like, encroach, Cf. in.

difficult in

1

281*14.

is

theory to

practical dif-

inducing those to forbear

ficulty of

2

be

and equal, the

who

far greater, for the

can,

if

weak-

POLITICS

5"

and justice, none of these

1319 a and the persons

cr are always asking for equality

are their inferiors,

[5] but the stronger care for things.

rule justly, because others will call

Of

comes all. I

first in

am

order;

it is

1

also the oldest of

speaking of them according

them

to the nat-

For the an agricultural [10] population; there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessaries of life they are always at work, and ural classification of their inhabitants.

best material of

democracy

is

do not covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than [75] the cares of government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, for the

many

honour.

are

more

desirous of gain than of

A proof is that even the ancient tyran-

were patiendy endured by them, as they endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property; [20] for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover, they have the power of electing the magistrates and nies still

calling

them

to account;

their

ambition,

if

thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all share in they have any,

is

the appointment of

offices,

except through rep-

resentatives elected in turn out of the

whole

Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary in the afore-mentioned 2 type of democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but that [50] the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualificatented.

tion, or,

ification

if

there be

is

no

required,

offices for

then

which

those

a qual-

who

are

1319 a the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this

if

he did, the land should not be within a

Formerly in

olis.

ment

[55]

them and

The good and fied, for 1

IV.

are not jealous of the good).

the notables will then be satis-

they will not be governed by

I292 b 22- I293a

IO.

2

1.

6.

men who

sell

his original allot-

There is a similar law attributed to Oxylus, which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man's land on which he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to the evil of which I am speak[75] ing would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not of land.

much

them husbandreckoned in the census, not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have more than possess

men. For

land, are

all

of

their properties are

amount required. Next best to an agricultural, and

the

[20]

in

many

respects similar, are a pastoral people,

who

live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able

camp out. The people of whom other de[25] mocracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior; there is no room for to

moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or labourers. Besides, people of this class can readily

come

to the assembly, because they are continu-

[jo] ally

moving about in the city and in the husbandmen are scattered over

agora; whereas

territory also

to elect

cer-

from the town or the acropmany states there was a law

forbidding any one to

the citizens are sure to be governed well (for

enough

the best kind of democracy,

[10] tain distance

the country

sons; the people are willing

is

and why? because the people are drawn from a certain class. Some of the ancient laws of most states were, all of them, useful with a view to making the people husbandmen. They provided either that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land, or that, [5]

marked out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government the offices will always be held by the best per-

to ac-

should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do [40] just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in every man. But

—

yet, if they have [25] people, as at Mantinea; the power of deliberating, the many are con-

them

man

count. Every

the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the best is that which

the previous discussion,

elected will

the

want

from the

and do not meet, cr equally

feel

Where

the

of assembling together.

city,

happens there

is

to

extend to a distance

no

difficulty in

making

an excellent democracy or constitutional gov[35] ernment; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country peo-

BOOK

1320s

VI,

CHAPTERS

We

have thus explained how pie cannot come. the first and best form of democracy should be [40] constituted; it is clear that the other or in1319 b ferior sorts will deviate in a regular order,

and the population which

is

legitimate, but even of the illegit-

and of those who have only one parent [10] a citizen, whether father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the nobeyond this tables and of the middle class, imate,

—

When

in excess of this point, the

and the notaand impatient of the

constitution becomes disorderly,

[75] bles

grow

excited

democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. Measures like those which Cleisthenes passed when he

wanted to increase the power of the democracy at Athens, or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be es[20]

tablished; the private rites of families should

be restricted and converted into public ones; [25] in short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connexions. Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the licence permitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also that of women and children, and the allowing everybody to live as he [30] likes. Such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober

The mere

manner.

establishment of a democracy

is

not

the only or principal business of the legislator, 1

v. 2-7, 131 i a

22-1313* 16.

one, two, or three days; a far greater is

the preservation of

it.

The

legisla-

cratical

democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit of including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of

not to go.

last

difficulty

pretty

The

who are

may

such a

each stage be of a lower kind. last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this or other at

those

523

should therefore endeavour to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against [40] the destructive elements, and should 1320* make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly demo-

excluded will

[5] kinds of government have been 1 fully considered. In order to constitute

3-5

[35] or of those who wish to create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted,

tor

measure to be that amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. The demagogues of our own [5] day often get property confiscated in the law-courts in order to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury but be

which

sacred.

or

oligarchical

will give the greatest

Thus

offenders will be as

much

afraid,

punished all the same, and the [10] people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be infor they will be

flicted

on those who bring groundless accusa-

tions; for

it is

the practice to indict, not

mem-

bers of the popular party, but the notables, al-

[75] though the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

Now,

since in the last

democracy the

and worst form of numerous, and

citizens are very

can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no rev[20] enues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a propertytax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even although [25] they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after their man[30] ner to distribute the surplus; the poor are

POLITICS

5*4

always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the de[55] mocracy; measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be

accumulated and distributed

among

poor,

its

if

such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, 1320 b make a beginning in trade or husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be expossible,

in

cused from useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthagini[5] ans retain the affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some

them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and

1321'

The number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new cittion should have the rights of citizenship.

izen should be always taken out of the better class of the people. little,

The

principle,

narrowed

a

gives another form of oligarchy; until at

[30] length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme

democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with [75] sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very

mistake, so do the worst forms of governthe greatest care. The populous1321 a ness of democracies generally preserves

least

ment require them

number

is to democracy in the place on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz. good order.

(for

of justice based

of

sensible nobility to divide the poor

amongst

them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum [10] is also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their good will. Moreover, they divide

all

two

their offices into

them being

classes,

of

elected by vote, the others by lot;

the latter, that the people

may

participate in

them, and the former, that the administered.

better

some

A

like

state

result

may may

be be

gained by dividing the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by [75] vote, the other by lot. Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.

As

[5]

common tail

there are four chief divisions of the people, husbandmen, mechanics, re-

kinds

these considerations there will be

ficulty in seeing

what should be

tion of oligarchies.

We

no

dif-

the constitu-

have only to reason

military

of

forces,

—the

cavalry,

the

heavy infantry, the light-armed troops, the navy. When the country is adapted for cavalry, [10] then a strong oligarchy is likely to be esFor the security of the inhabitants

tablished.

depends upon a force of this sort, and only rich can afford to keep horses. The second

men

of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic; and nowadays, where they [75] are numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the

form

struggle.

From

—

traders, labourers; so also there are four

A remedy

for this state of things

may

be found in the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And this is

the

way

in

which the poor get the

better of

from opposites and compare each form of oli[20] garchy with the corresponding form of

[20] the rich in civil contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cav-

democracy.

alry

The

first

and

best attempered of oligarchies

and heavy

raises

infantry.

An

oligarchy which

such a force out of the lower classes

is

raises a

And

therefore,

there ought to be

since the ages of the citizens vary

and some

akin to a constitutional government. In this two standards of qualification; the one high, the other low the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable

—

[25] offices and the higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed qualifica-

power against

itself.

and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed [25] troops; and these, when they have been are older

1322

BOOK VI, CHAPTERS

s

taken out of the ranks of the youth, should be-

come light-armed warriors

in reality.

The

oli-

garchy should also yield a share in the govern-

ment

to the people, either, as

those

who

I

said before, to

have a property qualification, or, as Thebes, to those who have ab-

in the case of

stained for a certain

[jo]

from mean employments,

men

of merit

ness,

who are

number

of years

or, as at Massalia, to

selected for their worthi-

whether previously

citizens or not.

The

magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the governing body,

should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take

rulers

no offence

when

at the privileges of their they see that they pay a heavy fine

[55] for their dignity. It is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public

and then the people who participate in and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire an alteration in the government, and the [40] notables will have memorials of the mu-

edifice,

the entertainments,

nificence. This,

however,

modern

fashion of our

is

anything but the

oligarchs,

who

are as

covetous of gain as they are of honour; oligar1321 b chies like theirs may be well described as petty democracies. Enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should

be organized. 8

Next

in order follows the right distribution of

[5] offices, their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spo1

No

can exist not having the necesand no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In small states, 2 as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them, but in larger there must be [10] a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated. First among necessary offices is that which ken.

state

sary offices,

has the care of the market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. For in every state there must in[75] evitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's wants; this is the readiest

way

to

make

a state self-sufficing

the purpose for

one

state.

A

and

so fulfil

which men come together

second

office of a

into

similar kind un-

dertakes the supervision and embellishment of 1

iv. 15.

2

iv.

i299a 34- b

10.

5-8

525

[20] public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the

prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is commonly called the office of City-warden, and has various departments, which, in more pop[25] ulous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbours. There is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country: the magistrates who hold this office are called Wardens of the country, or Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is [50] a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts, and

—

[55] decisions of the courts,

ments, and also This office again

all

public indict-

preliminary proceedings. is sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the like. all

[40] Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, viz. that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according 1322 a to the registers; and also the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to exe[5] cute the law. Still the office is necessary;

for judicial decisions are useless

and

if

they take no

cannot exist without them, neither can it exist without the execution of them. It is an office which, being so unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different courts. In like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on the register [10] of public debtors. Some sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the incoming ones; effect;

and

if

society

as regards those

in office,

when one

due

to magistrates already

court has given judgement,

another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines imposed by

POLITICS

5 26

[75] them. For penalties are more likely to be when less odium attaches to the exac-

exacted

double odium is incurred have passed also execute the sentence, and if they are always the executioners, they will be the enemies of all. In many places, while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, 'the Eleven' at

them; but

tion of

when

the judges

a

who

[20] Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as nec-

good

essary as that of the executioners; but

they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; for [25] they themselves require a guard, and are

men do

all

guard others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates not

fit

to

acting in turn should take charge of it. These are the indispensable officers,

—

1323'

sides, in a

they are called 'probuli', because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy

more commonly

and

'councillors'.

These are the

chief political offices.

Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion; priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough [20]

in small places, but in larger ones there are a

many besides the priesthood; for example superintendents of public worship, guardians

great

[25] of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the

of the public sacrifices, except

law assigns

performance any which the

to the priests; such sacrifices derive

their dignity

They

next in order [50] should be ranked first: follow others, equally necessary, but of higher

democracy, over the assembly. For

[75] there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the state. In some places

from the public hearth

of the city.

are sometimes called archons, sometimes

and sometimes prytanes.

kings,

and other military funcwar but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. In some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbours, with the country; also with the courts of law, with [35] the records of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the

are content with one; these officers are called

public deliberations of the state. There are

rank, and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the offices to which are committed the guard of the city,

[35] tions.

Not only

in time of

generals or commanders. Again,

[50]

a state has

likewise magistracies characteristic of states

1322 b cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen that

which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as

each of these departments has separate

the offices of guardians of

who

if

officers,

are called admirals, or generals of cavalry

or of light-armed troops.

And

there are subor-

dinate officers called naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops

—

and of horse having ;

all these are included [5] others under them: in the department of war. Thus much of mili-

tary

command.

But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, and has no other functions. Such [10] officers are called by various names, Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers.

Besides

which

is

all

these offices there

supreme over them, and

is

another

to this

is

and direc1323 a tors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles.

of these

are

—

servants.

to

Once more: there are three offices according whose directions the highest magistrates are

chosen in certain of the

law are an

—guardians the —of

states

probuli, councillors,

these,

of the law,

guardians

aristocratical, the probuli

an

oligarchical, the council a democratical insti-

[10] tution.

ratification of measures, or at all events

offices.

pre-

Some

not democratic offices; for example, [5] the guardianships of women and children the poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as clearly

often entrusted both the introduction and the it

women, guardians

of the laws, guardians of children,

Enough

of the different kinds of

1324

BOOK

s

VI,

CHAPTER 8—BOOK

BOOK

VII,

CHAPTER

1

527

VII things useful are of such a nature that where there

He who

would duly inquire about the best [75] form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be uncertain; for, in the natural order of

may

things, those life

who

which

be expected to lead the best

are governed in the best

their circumstances admit.

manner

We

of

ought

first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals. Assuming that enough has been already said in discussions outside the school concerning the

therefore to ascertain,

[20]

best

we

life,

will

now

only repeat what

tained in them. Certainly

no one

is

the propriety of that partition of goods

[25] separates ternal goods,

them

con-

will dispute

which

into three classes, viz. ex-

goods of the body, and goods of

the soul, or deny that the happy

man must

have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence,

who

is

afraid of every insect

which

flutters past

[50] him, and will commit any crime, great, in order to gratify his lust of

drink,

who

will sacrifice his dearest friend for

the sake of half-a-farthing, false in

however meat or

mind

and madman. These

and

as a child or a

is

as feeble

propositions are almost universally acknowl-

edged

as

soon as they are uttered, but

men

dif-

[55] fer about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good. Some think that a very

moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove

is

too

harm, or

at

much

them they must either do no use, to their posevery good of the soul, the greater

any

of

rate be of

[10] sessors, also of greater use,

it is, is

if

the epithet useful

noble is appropriate to such subjects. No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between [75] the natures of which we say that these very states are states: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and as well as

goods of the body are eligible at all, and all [20] wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them.

Let us acknowledge then that each one has much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any exter[25] nal good, but in himself and by reason of

just so

own

his

nature.

And

difference between

herein of necessity

lies

the

good fortune and happi-

goods come of themselves, no one is just or temperate by or through chance. In like [50] manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that ness; for external

and chance

which

is

is

best

the author of them, but

and which

acts rightly;

and

right-

cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have [35] the same form and nature as the qualities ly

it

[40] that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but exter1323 b nal goods by the help of virtue, and that

which give the individual who

happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those

could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the argu-

who and

are most highly cultivated in their in their character,

and have only

ate share of external goods,

than

a

mind

moder-

among

those

[5] who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities; and

for

for individuals

when

and

states, is

their objections hereafter.

any other instrument, and

all

the

virtue has external goods

1324 a performance of good

have a

limit, like

preface:

ments affecting them; these are the business of another science. [40] Let us assume then that the best

are any

is

them

I

not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods

this

possesses

name of just, wise, or temperate. Thus much may suffice by way of

the

who

life

life,

enough

them

for the

actions. If there

controvert our assertion,

in this treatise pass

both

of virtue,

over,

we

will

and consider

POLITICS

528

1324 b

viduals. Others, again, are of opinion that arand tyrannical rule alone consists with

bitrary

There remains

[5]

to be discussed the ques-

Whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or different? Here again there can be no doubt no one detion,

—

nies that they are the same.

For those

who

hold

that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches

make

the hap-

[10] piness of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that

happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individcity the

ual for his virtue say that the

more virtuous a

Two

points here pre-

city

the happier

is,

it is.

sent themselves for consideration:

[75]

which

the

is

more

first (1), eligible life, that of a

who is a member of a alien who has no political

citizen

state,

or that of

an

ties;

and again

(2), which is the best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either on the sup-

position that political privileges are desirable for

or for a majority only? Since the good

all,

[20] of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political thought and speculation,

and we are engaged

in a political

two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our inquiry. discussion, while the first of these

Now ment

it is

evident that the form of govern-

which every man, whoever he and live happily. But even those

best in

is

can act best [25] who agree in thinking that the

is,

tue

is

life

of vir-

the most eligible raise a question, wheth-

er the life of business

and

politics is or

more

eligible

than one which

these

two

—the

is

not

wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. For [jo] the

lives

life

life

is

of the philosopher

of the statesman

—appear

and

to have

been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own

and

in other ages.

tion of

Which is the

no small moment;

better

is

a ques-

for the wise

man,

like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his

[55]

life

according to the best end. There are that while a despotic rule over

some who think others

is

the greatest injustice, to exercise a con-

them, even though not unto a man's individual well-being. Others take an opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man is the stitutional rule over

just, is a great

impediment

[40] practical and political, and that every virtue admits of being practised, quite as much by

1324b statesmen and

rulers as

by private

indi-

happiness; indeed, in some states the entire aim both of the laws and of the constitution is to give

men

despotic

[5]

And,

therefore, although in

laws

may

power over their neighbours. most cities the

be said generally to be in a chaotic they aim at anything, they aim at

state, still, if

the maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view

[10] to war.

And

in all nations

which are able power is held

to gratify their ambition military

example among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some in esteem, for

nations there are even laws tending to stimu-

warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where men obtain the honour of [75] wearing as many armlets as they have served campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was late the

we

are told that

handed round

at a certain feast.

Iberians, a warlike nation, the

Among

number

the

of ene-

whom a man has slain is indicated by the [20] number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous mies

practices

some

among

them

other nations of a like kind,

and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be al[25] ways considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no [50] parallel; a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet most men appear to think that the art of despotic government is statesmanship, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are [55] not ashamed of practising towards others; they demand just rule for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behaviour is irrational; unless the one party is, and the other is not, born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which of

established by law

BOOK

1325 b

VII,

CHAPTERS

[40] may be hunted for food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a city happy in isolation, 1325* which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is quite possible that a city thus

might be well-administered and have good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest all that sort of thing must be exof enemies, isolated

—

[5] eluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed

honourable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and

communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by [10] them. His enactments will not be always the same; and where there are neighbours he will have to see what sort of studies should be practised in relation to their several characters, or how the measures appropriate in relation to best

form of

[75] properly eration.

The end

which the government should aim may be

each are to be adopted.

made

at

a matter of future consid-

1

2-3

may

529

maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because the possessors [35] of it are able to perform the greatest num-

misses,

still

ber of noble actions. If

now

address those who, while they agree

life

of virtue

is

the most eligible, differ

about the manner of practising it. For some renounce political power, and think that the life [20] of the freeman is different from the life of the statesman and the best of all; but others

think the

life

of the statesman best.

The

argu-

of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To both we say: 'you are partly right and partly wrong.' The first

ment

class are right in affirming that the life of the

[25] freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in hav-

ing the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; commands about necessary things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as [50] there is between slavery by nature and

or in issuing

[40] ject, for the best is the most eligible and 'doing well' is the best. There might be some if we assume that robbers 1325 b and plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be; their hypothesis is false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be hon-

truth in such a view

ourable, unless he

is

men

is

as a

husband

as

that

is

noble.

l

i3S3

&

^^^

2

1-4-7-

superior to other

cover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals the honourable and the just consist in sharing alike, as is just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the un-

who are

contrary to nature, contrary to nature is therefore, there is any one sulike, is is

[10] good. If, perior in virtue

and in the power of performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue. If

we

are right in our view,

and happiness

is

[75] assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for every city collec-

and for individuals. Not that a life of acmust necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the [20] thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is most truly tively,

tion

said to act. Neither, again, states

which

are cut off

is it

necessary that

from others and choose

to live alone should be inactive; for activity, as

tions of a state act

much

much

to a wife, or a father to his

[5] children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates the law can never re-

And

But perhaps some one, accepting these pre-

able

nor the son of his father, nor friend of on one another in comparison with this higher ob-

sections; there are

of

is

his son,

freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of this treatise. 2 it is equally a mistake to place inactivity above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the realization

man who

friend; they should not bestow a thought

like to those

that the

the

up anything to his neighbour, ought rather to take away his power; and the father should make no account of

and nothing which Let us

so,

to rule, instead of giving

may take place by many ways in which the secupon one another. The same

[25] well as other things,

thing

is

equally true of every individual.

If

were otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energies, would be far enough from this

[50] perfection.

Hence

it

is

evident that the

POLITICS

53 o

same

life is

states

and

best for each individual,

mankind

for

and

for

collectively.

1326 b

[jo] and good law is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly: to introduce

order into the unlimited

power far by way of introduction. In what has preceded I have discussed other forms of gov[55] ernment; in what remains the first point to be considered is what should be the condi-

Thus

1

tions of the ideal or perfect state; for the perfect state

cannot exist without a due supply of the

means pose

of

we must

better prepared, so will the re-

sult of his art

be nobler), so the statesman or

must

also

have the materials suited

him.

[5] First among the materials required by the statesman is population: he will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country. Most persons think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small state. For [10] they judge of the size of the city by the number of the inhabitants; whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their power. city too, like an individual, has a work to do; and that city which is best adapted to the fulfilment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in

A

same

sense of the

word

great in

which

Hippocrates might be called greater, not as a man, but as a physician, than some one else who was taller. And even if we reckon greatness by numbers, we ought not to include everybody, for there must always be in cities a multitude [20] of slaves

we

but

members

and sojourners and

foreigners;

should include those only of the state,

part of

who

and who form an

The number

are

essen-

of the latter

is a proof of the greatness of a city; but a city which produces numerous artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded with a populous one. [25] Moreover, experience shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a reputation

tial

of a divine

is realized in number and magnitude, and the state which combines magnitude with good order must necessarily be the [^5] most beautiful. To the size of states there

universe. Beauty

is

a limit, as there

to other things, plants, ani-

is

small, but they either wholly lose their nature,

therefore

is

[75] the

work

presup-

And

portion as this

to

the

as holds together the

purely imaginary conditions, but

nothing impossible. There will be a certain number of citizens, a country in which to place [40] them, and the like. As the weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have the ma1326 a terial proper for his work (and in pro-

legislator

is

power

of such a

mals, implements; for none of these retain their natural power when they are too large or too

life.

many

—

it.

good government have a limit of populaWe may argue on grounds of reason, and the same result will follow. For law is order,

[40] or are spoiled. For example, a ship which only a span long will not be a ship at all, nor

is

a ship a quarter of a mile long; yet there may 1326 b be a ship of a certain size, either too

which will still be a ship, but bad for sailing. In like manner a state when composed of too few is not, as a state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of too many, though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries, as a na-

large or too small,

[5] tion

may

be,

it is

not a

state,

being almost

incapable of constitutional government. For who can be the general of such a vast multitude, or

who

the herald, unless he have the

voice of a Stentor?

A state, then, only begins to exist when attained a population sufficient for a

it

has

good

life

community: it may indeed, if it [10] somewhat exceed this number, be a greater state. But, as I was saying, there must be a in the political

limit.

What

should be the limit will be easily

ascertained by experience. For both governors

and governed have

duties to perform; the spe-

[75] cial functions of a governor are to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state are to judge

and

to distribute offices according

must know each other's where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the

to merit, then they

characters;

population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not [20] to be. Besides, in an over-populous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out ? Clearly then the best limit of the population of a state

is

the largest

the purposes of

life,

[25 J single view.

number which

suffices for

and can be taken

Enough concerning

in at a

the size

of a state.

for

tion.

Much

the

same principle

ritory of the state: every

will apply to the ter-

one would agree

praising the territory which

is

most

in

entirely

BOOK

1327 b

and that must be the

self-sufficing;

VII,

CHAPTERS

territory

which is all-producing, for to have all things [50] and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at once temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. Whether

we are right or wrong in laying down this limit we will inquire more precisely hereafter, [35] when we have occasion to consider what the right use of property and wealth: a matwhich is much disputed, because men are

is

ter

inclined to rush into one of

two extremes, some

into meanness, others into luxury.

3-7

531

import from abroad what

own

not found in their country, and that they should export what is

they have in excess; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.

Those who make themselves

a

market

for

[30] the world only do so for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of this kind it ought not to have such an emporium. Nowadays we often see in countries and cities dockyards and harbours very con-

veniently placed outside the city, but not too

and they are kept in dependence by and similar fortifications. Cities

far off;

[35]

walls

determine the general

thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of in-

character of the territory which is required (there are, however, some points on which mil-

and any harm which be easily guarded against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine who may hold communication with one another, and who may not. [40] There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate naval force is advantageous to a 1327 b city; the city should be formidable not only to its own citizens but to some of its neighbours, or, if necessary, able to assist them

It

[40]

is

not

difficult to

authorities

itary

should be heard);

difficult of access to the

should be

it

enemy, and

1327* easy of egress to the inhabitants. Further,

we

require that the land as well as the in-

whom we were just now speaking 1 in at a single view, for a countaken should be try which is easily seen can be easily protected. As to the position of the city, if we could have what we wish, it should be well situated in re[5] gard both to sea and land. This then is one principle, that it should be a convenient habitants of

centre for the protection of the the other

is,

that

it

re-

and also for the timber and any other products

ceiving the fruits of the

bringing in of

whole country:

should be suitable for soil,

tercourse with their ports; likely

is

to

by sea as well as by land. The proper number or

magnitude of

a

communication with the

eficial to a

well-ordered state or not

which has often been asked.

this naval force

is

relative to

her function is [5] to take a leading part in politics, her naval power should be commensurate with the scale of her enterprises. The population of the state need not be much increased, since there is no the character of the state; for

the marines sea

is

is a"

ben-

ques-

argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population

may

if

necessity that the sailors should be citizens:

[10] that are easily transported.

Whether

accrue

It is

[75] tion, will be adverse to good order; the increase arises from their using the sea and hav-

who

have the control and com-

[10] mand will be freemen, and belong also to the infantry; and wherever there is a dense

population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will always be sailors more than enough. Of this we see instances at the present day. The [75] city of Heraclea, for example, although small in comparison with many others, can man a considerable fleet. Such are our con-

ing a crowd of merchants coming and going, and is inimical to good government. Apart

clusions respecting the territory of the state,

from these considerations, it would be undoubtedly better, both with a view to safety and to the provision of necessaries, that the city [20] and territory should be connected with

and

the sea; the defenders of a country,

we

if

they are

maintain themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land and by sea; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use both. [25] Moreover, it is necessary that they should to

1

I326 b 22-24.

its

harbours, its

its

towns,

its

relations to the sea,

maritime power.

Having spoken

of the

number

of the citizens,

2

what should be a subject which can be

will proceed to speak of

their character.

This

is

[20] easily understood by any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of Hel-

and generally on the distribution of races Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and las,

in the habitable world.

2

i326B 9- b 24.

POLITICS

532 [25] therefore they retain comparative political organization,

free-

and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and there-

dom, but have no

and I

1328 b also the size

say 'nearly', for

and nature of their territory. we ought not to require the

[20] same minuteness in theory as in the facts given by perception.

fore they are always in a state of subjection

and

But the Hellenic race, which is between them, is likewise intermediin character, being high-spirited and

slavery.

situated

[50] ate

Hence it continues free, and is best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able also intelligent.

the

There are

to rule the world.

also similar dif-

ferences in the different tribes of Hellas; for

some

of

them

are of a one-sided nature,

and

are intelligent or courageous only, while in

[35] others there

is

And

both qualities.

most

legislator will

a

happy combination

clearly those

whom

easily lead to virtue

of

the

may

be expected to be both intelligent and courageous.

Some

1

say that the guardians should be

whom they know, fierce whom they do not know.

As

in other natural

compounds

what the other produces. Such, for ex[50] ample, is the relation in which workmen and tools stand to their work; the house and ceives

friendly towards those

the builder have nothing in

[40] towards those

art of the builder

Now,

passion is the quality of the soul which 1328 a begets friendship and enables us to love; notably the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than against those

who

are

unknown

to us,

when

think that we are despised by them; for which reason Archilochus, 2 complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these words, [5] For surely thou are plagued on account of

we

friends.

The power freedom are passion

for

Nor

is it

of

in all is

command and men based upon

commanding and

the love of this quality,

invincible.

right to say that the guardians should

whom they do not not to be out of temper with any one; and a lofty spirit is not fierce by [10] nature, but only when excited against evil-doers. And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men show most strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands: as indeed is reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be deprived of a benefit by those who be fierce towards those

know,

[75]

for

we ought

owe them

Cruel and again,

is

one.

Hence

the saying,

the strife of brethren?

They who love in excess also hate in excess} Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the citizens of our state, 1

3

2 Republic 11. 375. Fr. 67, Bergk. 4 Euripides, fr. 975, Nauck. Fr. adesp. 78, Nauck.

the conditions

whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in any other combination forming a unity not everything is a part, which is a necessary condition. The [25] members of an association have necessarily some one thing the same and common to all, in which they share equally or unequally; for example, food or land or any other thing. But where there are two things of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common except that the one reof a composite

is

common, but

the

for the sake of the house.

And so states require property, but propeven though living beings are included in it, is no part of a state; for a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now, whereas happiness is the highest good, being a [55]

erty,

and perfect practice of virtue, which some can attain, while others have little or none of it, the various qualities of men realization

[40] are clearly the reason why there are various kinds of states and many forms of govern-

ment; for different men seek after happiness 1328 b in different ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and forms of government. We

must

see also

how many

things are indispen-

sable to the existence of a state, for

what we

call

the parts of a state will be found among the indispensables. Let us then enumerate the functions of a state,

and we

shall easily elicit

what

we want: [5] First, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many instruments; thirdly,

must be arms, for the members of a community have need of them, and in their own there

hands, too, in order to maintain authority both [10] against disobedient subjects and against external assailants; fourthly, there certain

amount

needs,

and

rather

first,

must be

a

of revenue, both for internal

for the purposes of

there

must be

war;

fifthly,

or

a care of religion,

which is commonly called worship; sixthly, and most necessary of all, there must be a

BOOK

1329 b

VII,

CHAPTERS

7-10

533

To

different persons in so

power of deciding what is for the public interest, and what is just in men's dealings with

to different persons.

one another. [75] These are the services which every state may be said to need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is as we maintain impossible that the community can be absolutely self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfilment of these functions. There must be husbandmen to pro-

one requires wisdom and the other strength. But on the other hand, since it is an impossible thing that those who [10] are able to use or to resist force should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this point of view the persons are the same; for those who carry arms can always determine the fate of the constitution. It remains therefore that both functions should be entrusted by

[20] cure food, and artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is necessary and expedient.

however,

employments are suited

far as these

primes of

life,

to different

for the

same persons, not, same time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to young [75] men strength and to older men wisdom. Such a distribution of duties will be expedient and also just, and is founded upon a principle the ideal constitution to the at the

of conformity to merit. Besides, the ruling

we have

[50] stitution; as we were saying, all may be all, or not all by all, but only some by some; and hence arise the differences of

should be the owners of property, for they and the citizens of a state should [20] be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class which is not a producer of virtue have no share in the state. This follows from our first principle, for happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all. And clearly property should be in their hands, since [25] the husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarian Perioeci. Of the classes enumerated there remain only

constitutions, for in democracies

the priests,

Having determined

these points,

in

the next place to consider whether all ought to share in every sort of occupation. Shall every [25] man be at once husbandman, artisan, councillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons? or, thirdly, shall

ployments others

assigned

be

common

to

all?

to

some emand

individuals

The same

arrange-

ment, however, does not occur in every conshared by

all

share in

all,

in oligarchies the opposite practice prevails.

Now, form

since

we

are here speaking of the best i.e. that under which the

of government,

class

are citizens,

and the manner

which

in

their

be regulated is obvious. No husor mechanic should be appointed to

office is to

bandman

Gods should

for the

it;

receive

honour from

Now

[35] state will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said, cannot exist without

since the body of [50] the citizens only. the citizens is divided into two classes, the

which and possesses men who are and not merely relatively to

warriors and the councillors, and it is beseeming that the worship of the Gods should be

virtue), is

it

clearly follows that in the state

best governed

just absolutely,

duly performed, and also a their service for those

must not lead the life of mechanics or trades[40] men, for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husband1329 a men, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance

up

of political duties.

Again, there

is

in a state a class of warriors,

and another of councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of [5] a state. Now, should these two classes be

active

classes

life,

to

rest

provided in

who from age have given the old men of these two

the principle of the constitution, the citizens

should be assigned the duties of the

priesthood.

We

have shown what are the necessary con-

and what the parts of a husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers [55] ditions,

state:

of all

kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and councillors.

And

these are distinguished sev-

from one another, the distinction being some cases permanent, in others not.

erally in

distinguished, or are both functions to be as-

signed to the same persons? Here again there is no difficulty in seeing that both functions will in

one way belong

to the

same, in another,

10 [40]

no new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state ought to be

It is

1329 b

POLITICS

534

divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen. The system has continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a law of Sesostris in Egypt and of

Minos

[5]

mon

The

in Crete.

com-

institution of

tables also appears to be of ancient date,

being in Crete as old as the reign of Minos,

and

in Italy far older.

The Italian historians say

was a certain Italus king of Oeno[10] tria, from whom the Oenotrians were called Italians, and who gave the name of Italy to the promontory of Europe lying within the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one another only half a day's journey. They say that this Italus converted the Oeno[75] trians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their common meals; even in our day some who are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of that there

On

his.

the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia

[20] dwelt the Opici, gia

who

and the Ionian Gulf,

Siritis,

who

the Chones,

trian race.

nally

now,

as of old,

From

came the

in the district called

are likewise of Oeno-

this part of the

institution of

the separation into castes

reign of Sesostris

is

than that of Minos. [25]

are

Ausones; and on the side towards Iapy-

called

world

common

from Egypt,

origi-

tables;

for the

of far greater antiquity

It is

true indeed that these

and many other things have been

in-

vented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. And we may [50]

infer

same

rule holds.

that in

political

institutions

Egypt witnesses

the

to the an-

tiquity of all these things, for the Egyptians

appear to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular constitution existing from time immemorial. We should therefore make the best use of what has been [35] already discovered, and try to supply defects.

have already remarked that the land ought who possess arms and have a share in the government, and that the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them; and I have determined what should be the extent and nature of the territory. Let me proceed to discuss the distribution of the land, I

to belong to those

[40]

and the character of the agricultural class;

1330 a

do not think that property ought to be as some maintain, but only that by friendly consent there should be a common use of it; and that no citizen should be in for

I

1330 a common,

want As

of subsistence. to

common

meals, there

is

a

general

agreement that a well-ordered city should have them; and we will hereafter explain what are our own reasons for taking this view. They [5] ought, however, to be open to all the citizens. And yet it is not easy for the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private means, and to provide also for their house-

The expense of religious worship should likewise be a public charge. The land must hold.

[10] therefore be divided into two parts, one public and the other private, and each part should be subdivided, part of the public land

being appropriated to the service of the Gods, and the other part used to defray the cost of the common meals; while of the private land, [75] part should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that, each citizen having two lots, they may all of them have land in both places; there is justice and fairness in such a division, and it tends to inspire unanimity among the people in their border wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of them are too ready to come to blows with their [20] neighbours, while others are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of honour. Wherefore there

is

law

a

bids those

who

property

of

in

some

places

which

for-

dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbours, on the ground that their interests will pervert their judgement. For the reasons already mentioned, then, the land should be divided in the manner described. The very [25] best thing of all would be that the husbandmen should be slaves taken from among men who are not all of the same race and not spirited, for if they have no spirit they will be better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The next best thing would be [30] that they should be perioeci of foreign race, and of a like inferior nature; some of them should be the slaves of individuals, and employed on the private estates of men of property, the remainder should be the the

common

what

why

is

the land.

state I

and

will

employed

on

hereafter explain

the proper treatment of slaves, and

expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as the reward of their it

services.

is

BOOK

1331'

VII,

CHAPTERS

10-12

535

but only certain quarters and regions; thus security and beauty will be combined. lines,

ii

We

have already said that the city should be 1 e * anc* anc* to tne sea anc to tne [35] °P en to In respect of possible. far as whole country as the place itself our wish would be that its situ-

^

^

'

ation should be fortunate in four things. The health this is a necessity: cities which

—

first,

lie

east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, are the

towards the

[40]

next

healthiest;

which

healthfulness

in

are

those

from the north wind,

are sheltered

for

they have a milder winter. The site of the city 1330 b should likewise be convenient both for political administration

view to the

and

and

difficult

for war.

With

a

should afford easy egress to same time be inaccessible of capture to enemies. There

latter

the citizens,

and

it

at the

should be a natural abundance of springs and [5] fountains in the town, or, if there is a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be established for the collection of rain-water, such as will not fail

when

the inhabitants are cut off

from the country by war. Special care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly, on the use of pure [10] water; this latter point is by no means a

which

consideration. For the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure water, [75] and the supply is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be separated from that which is used for other purposes. As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of government varies: thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or a monarchy, [20] but a plain to a democracy; neither to an

secondary

As

to walls, those

who

say that cities

mak-

ing any pretension to military virtue should not have them, are quite out of date in their notions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on this fancy confuted by [35] facts. True, there is little courage shown in seeking for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character and not much superior in number; but the superiority of the besiegers

may be and often is too much both human valour and for that which

for ordinary

[40] is found only in a few; and if they are to be saved and to escape defeat and outrage, the

133 l a strongest wall will be the truest soldierly precaution,

and

more

especially

now

that missiles

have been brought to such perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish as to choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or as if an in[5] dividual were to leave his house unwalled, lest the inmates should become cowards. Nor must we forget that those who have their cities surrounded by walls may either take advantage of them or not, but cities which are unwalled have no choice. [10] If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful for warlike purposes, and adapted to resist modern inventions. For as the assailants of a [75] city do all they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should make use of any means of defence which have been already discovered, and should devise and invent others, for when men are well prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking them. siege engines

12

As

the walls are to be divided by guard-houses

but rather a number of strong places. The arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally

[20] and towers built at suitable intervals, and the body of citizens must be distributed at com-

more convenient,

we should establish some

aristocracy,

if

the streets are regularly

out after the modern fashion which Hippodamus introduced, but for security in war [25] the antiquated mode of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get out of

laid

a

town and

for assailants to find their

A

way

in, is

should therefore adopt both plans of building: it is possible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen plant their

preferable.

city

what are called 'clumps'. The whole [30] town should not be laid out in straight

vines in

11327*4-40.

mon

tables, the idea will naturally

in the guard-houses.

of the

occur that

common

tables

These might be arranged

has been suggested; while the principal common tables of the magistrates will occupy a suitable place, and there also will be the buildings appropriated to religious worship as

[25]

except in the case of those

rites

which the law

or the Pythian oracle has restricted to a special

The site should be a spot seen far and wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the neighbourhood. Below this [30] spot should be established an agora, such locality.

POLITICS

536

which the Thessalians call the 'freemen's agora'; from this all trade should be exeluded, and no mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed to enter, unless he be sum[^5] moned by the magistrates. It would be a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of the elder men were performed there. For in this noble practice different ages should be separated, and some of the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown-up men remain with the magistrates; for the presas that

to]

ence of the magistrates

is

the best

mode

modesty and ingenuous fear. There should also be a traders' agora, distinct and apart from the other, in a situation which is convenient for the reception of goods both by sea and land. But in speaking of the magistrates we must of inspiring true

133

b

1332

[30] Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to attain it; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but

they propose to themselves a bad end; and sometimes they fail in both. Take, for example, the art of medicine; physicians do not always [^5] understand the nature of health, and also the means which they use may not effect the desired end. In all arts and sciences both the end and the means should be equally within

our control. The happiness and well-being which all men [40] manifestly desire, some have the power of

from some accident or them is not

attaining, but to others,

defect of nature, the attainment of

granted; for a good

1332 a

life

requires a supply of ex-

ternal goods, in a less degree

good

are in a

possess the conditions of happiness,

likewise be provided in their proper place near

wrong from

whom

the temples.

The

magistrates

who

deal with

indictments, summonses, and the and those who have the care of the agora [10] and of the city respectively, ought to be established near an agora and some public place of meeting; the neighbourhood of the traders' agora will be a suitable spot; the upper

contracts, like,

agora we devote to the life of leisure, the other is intended for the necessities of trade. The same order should prevail in the coun-

they are in a lower

when men when

greater degree

state, in a

[5] not forget another section of the citizens, public tables should

viz. the priests, for

a

state.

Others again,

go

who

utterly

it. But form of government, that, namely, under which a city [5] will be best governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportu-

the

since our object

the pursuit of

first in

is

to discover the best

nity of obtaining happiness,

we must

it is

evident that

clearly ascertain the nature of happi-

ness.

We maintain, and have said in the Ethics,

1

if

the arguments there adduced are of any value, that happiness

is

the realization

and

and perfect

ex-

not conditional, but

[75] try, for there too the magistrates, called by some 'Inspectors of Forests' and by others

ercise of virtue,

'Wardens of the Country', must have guardhouses and common tables while they are on

al'

duty; temples should also be scattered through-

Take

out the country, dedicated, some to Gods, and

and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are good only because we cannot do without them it would be bet-

some to heroes. But it would be

a waste of time for us to

linger over details like these.

The

difficulty is

We

not in imagining but in carrying them out. [20] may talk about them as much as we like, but the execution of them will depend upon fortune.

Wherefore

let

us say

no more about

these matters for the present. 13

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek [25] to determine out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. There are two things in which all well-being consists: one

them is the choice of a right end and aim of and the other the discovery of the actions which are means towards it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. of

action,

this

[10] absolute. And I used the term 'conditionto express that which is indispensable, and

'absolute' to express that

which

is

good

in itself.

the case of just actions; just punishments

—

ter that neither individuals

nor

[75] need anything of the sort

which aim

at

states

—but

should actions

honour and advantage are abso-

lutely the best.

The

conditional action

is

only

the choice of a lesser evil; whereas these are the

foundation and creation of good. A good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, [20] and the other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under the opposite conditions (for this also has been determined in accordance with ethical arguments, that the good man is he for whom, because he is virtuous, the things that are absolutely good are good; it is also plain that his use of these goods must be [25] virtuous and in the absolute sense good). This makes men fancy that external goods are 1

Ethics,

1.

1098* 16; x.

1

ij6 h

4.

1333

BOOK

s

the cause of happiness, yet

we might

VII,

CHAPTERS

as well

say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument and not to

the skill of the performer. It follows then from what has been said that some things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must provide.

And therefore we can only say: May our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for [50] we acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matchance but the result of knowledge and A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens ^hare in the government; let us then inquire even [35] how a man becomes virtuous. For ter of

purpose.

12-14

537

vantage even in their bodies, and secondly in [20] their minds), so that the superiority of the governors was undisputed and patent to their subjects, it would clearly be better that once for all the one class should rule and the others serve. But since this is unattainable, and kings have no marked superiority over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be found among the [25] Indians, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded upon justice. For if the government be unjust every one in the country unites with the governed in the desire to have [30] a revolution, and that the members of the

it is an impossibility government can be so

could suppose the citizen body to be virthem being so, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each

numerous as to be stronger than all their enemies put together. Yet that governors should

the virtue of all is involved. There are three things which make men hab[40] good and virtuous; these are nature,

is

if

we

tuous, without each of

it,

rational principle. In the first place, every

one must be born a man and not some other animal; so, too, he must have, a certain character, both of body and soul. But some qualities 1332 b there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some gifts which by nature are made to be turned by habit to good or bad. Animals lead for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser particulars some are influenced by habit as [5] well.

Man man

has rational principle, in addi-

Wherefore nature, habit, must be in harmony with one another; for they do not always agree; men do many things against habit and nature, if rational principle persuades them that they ought. We have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by tion,

and

only.

rational principle

the hands of the legislator. All else is the work [10] of education; we learn some things by habit

and some by

instruction.

Since every political society is composed of and subjects, let us consider whether the

rulers

relations of

one to the other should interchange

[75] or be permanent. For the education of the citizens will necessarily vary with the answer

given to this question. Now, if some men excelled others in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general (having in the first place a great ad-

excel their subjects

to be effected,

is

and

undeniable. in

How

what way they

all this

will re-

spectively share in the government, the legisla-

te] tor has to consider. The subject has been already mentioned. 1 Nature herself has provided the distinction when she made a difference between old and young within the same species of whom she fitted the one to govern and the other to be governed. No one takes offence at being governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than this gover[40] nors, especially if he will enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the required age. conclude that from one point of view governors and governed are identical, and from another different. And therefore their ed1333 a ucation must be the same and also different. For he who would learn to command well must, as men say, first of all learn to obey. As I observed in the first part of this treatise, there is one rule which is for the sake of the rulers and another rule which is for the sake of [5] the ruled; the former is a despotic, the lat-

We

ter a free

government. Some commands

differ

not in the thing commanded, but in the intention with which they are imposed. Wherefore, many apparently menial offices are an honour to the free youth by whom they are performed; for actions do not differ as honourable or dis[10] honourable in themselves so much as in the end and intention of them. But since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, and that the same person must first be a subject and then a ruler, the legislator has to see that they become 1

1329*2-17.

POLITICS

538

1334-

Many modern writers have taken a similar commend the Lacedaemonian con-

good men, and by what means this may be ac[75] complished, and what is the end of the

view: they

perfect

stitution,

life.

Now

the soul of

man

is

divided into two

one of which has a rational principle in other, not having a rational principle in itself, is able to obey such a principle. And we call a man in any way good because he

parts, itself,

and the

has the virtues of these two parts. In which of [20] them the end is more likely to be found is

no matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature and of art the inferior

always

better or superior,

that

which has

exists for the sake of the

and the

better or superior

a rational principle.

is

This prin-

our ordinary way of speaking, is two kinds, for there is a pracinto divided [25]

ciple, too, in

and a speculative principle. This part, must evidently be similarly divided. And there must be a corresponding division of actical

then,

tions; the actions of the naturally better part

are to be preferred by those

power

who have it in

their

two out of the three or to all, always to every one the most eligible

to attain to

for that

is

which is the highest attainable by him. The [jo] whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and of actions some aim at what is necessary and useful, and some at what is honourable. And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference

given to one or other part of the soul and its ac[55] tions over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better and the end; he should also remember the [40] diversities of

human

lives

and

actions.

For men must be able to engage in business 1333 b and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and indeed what is useful, but what is honourable is better. On such principles children and persons of every age which requires education should [5] be trained.

Whereas even

the present day

who are

the Hellenes of reputed to be best governed, and the legislators who gave them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which prem70] ised to be more useful and profitable. ie

and

praise the legislator for

making

conquest and war his sole aim, a doctrine [75] which may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune; and on this ground Thibron and all those who have written about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised [20] their legislator, because the Lacedaemonians, by being trained to meet dangers, gained great power. But surely they are not a happy people now that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator right. How ridiculous is the result, if, while they are continuing in the observance of his laws and no one interferes with them, they have lost the better part [25] of life! These writers further err about the sort of government which the legislator should approve, for the government of freemen is nobler and implies more virtue than despotic government. Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he [50] trains his citizens to conquer

dominion over

great evil in this. citizen

who

and obtain

their neighbours, for there

On

is

a similar principle any

could, should obviously try to ob-

—

power in his own state, the crime which the Lacedaemonians accuse king Pausanias of attempting, although he had so great [55] honour already. No such principle and no tain the

law having

this object

is

either statesmanlike

same things are best states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to

or useful or right. For the

both for individuals and for

[40] be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake 1334 a of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and [5] other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they lose their temper in time of peace. And for this the legis[70] lator is to blame, he never having taught

them how

to lead the life of peace.

BOOK

1334 b

CHAPTERS

VII,

14-16

539 2

habit and rational principle are required, and, of these, the proper nature of the citizens has

*5

Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best constitution must also be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure; for peace, as has [75] been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues 1

which are practised in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business. For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be

[20] temperate

and brave, and able

to endure:

is no leiand those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader. Courage and endurance are required for business and philosophy for leisure, temperance especially [25] and justice for both, and more compels war for leisure, and peace of in times men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tend to make them insolent. Those then who seem to be the best-off and to

for truly, as the proverb says,

There

sure for slaves,'

be in the possession of every good, have special

—

for ex[50] need of justice and temperance, ample, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they above all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of abun-

dance. There

is

no

difficulty in seeing

why

time of

in

leisure,

—to

show

them

excellent quali-

and war, and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. [40] Wherefore we should not practise virtue after the manner of the Lacedaemonians. For ties in

action

they, while agreeing with other men in their 1334 b conception of the highest goods, differ

from the

rest of

mankind

in thinking that they

are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue.

And

since (they think)

them ment derived from

these goods

and

the enjoyment of

greater than the enjoy-

[5]

the virtues

.

.

.

and that

should be practised) for its own sake, is evident from what has been said; we must now consider how and by what means it is to be at-

(it

tained.

We have already determined that nature and 1

a a *333 35> i334

2.

3

But we have

still

to

consider whether the training of early life is to be that of rational principle or habit, for these

two must accord, and when in accord they will [10] then form the best of harmonies. The rational principle may be mistaken and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, and there

may be much is

a like evil influence of habit.

Thus

clear in the first place, that, as in all

other things, birth implies an antecedent be-

ginning, and that there are beginnings whose end is relative to a further end. Now, in men rational principle and mind are the end to-

wards which nature strives, so that the and moral discipline of the citizens ought

[75] birth to be

ond

ordered with a view to them. In the and body are two,

place, as the soul

see also that there are

rational

two

sec-

we

parts of the soul, the

and the irrational, and two correspond-

—

reason and appetite. And as [20] ing states the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational

is

prior to the rational.

The

proof is that anger and wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the [25] body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow: none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul.

the

[55] state that would be happy and good ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use

also been defined by us.

16

Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, his first at what age [50] care will be about marriage should his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry? In legislating on this subject he ought to consider the persons and the length of their life, that their procreative life may terminate [55] at the same period, and that they may not differ in their bodily powers, as will be the case if the man is still able to beget children while the woman is unable to bear them, or the woman able to bear while the man is unable to be-

—

from these causes arise quarrels and between married persons. Secondly, he must consider the time at which the children will succeed to their parents; there ought

get, for

differences

[40] not to be too great an interval of age, for then the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from their affection, or to be of any 2

x

33

2a

39 s for be^iov, in he&repov Kara p.a£6v. 9 The Nouns themselves (to whatever class [5] has lost a part; e.g. KpX,

they

may

5F and E are the same as 2, and need not be counted. There is no Noun, however, ending nines.

in a

[75]

mute or

in either of the

E and O. Only three

4

Timotheus,

6

Alexis,

*

Plato, Laws, 770. Empedocles, fr. 88, Diels.

8

fr.

fr.

22,

two short vowels,

(jueXi, ko/x/xi, ireirepi)

Wilamowitz.

228, Kock. 7

Iliad, •

1.

1 1.

Iliad, v. 393.

ON

694

and neuters, end

end

in

five in T.

I,

The

POETICS

intermediates, or

N,

in the variable vowels or in

P, 2.

1459*

properly and with a view to provoking laugh[75] ter. The proper use of them is a very different thing.

22

when

The

perfection of Diction

clear

and not mean. The

made up

of the ordinary

is

for

it

to be at

clearest indeed

words

once

is

that

for things, but

[20] it is mean, as is shown by the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand the Diction becomes distinguished and nonprosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms,

i.e.

strange words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that deviates from the ordinary

modes

of speech.

— But

a

whole statement

in

[25] such terms will be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle, if made up of metaphors, a

barbarism, if made up of strange words. The very nature indeed of a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with the real names for things, but can be with their metafhorical substitutes); e.g. 'I saw a man glue 1 30] brass on another with fire', and the like. The corresponding use of strange words recertain admixture, sults in a barbarism. accordingly, of unfamiliar terms is necessary. These, the strange word, the metaphor, the ornamental equivalent, &c, will save the language from seeming mean and prosaic, while

—A

the ordinary

1458 b

words

in

it

will secure the requi-

What

site clearness.

To

the

realize

difference one

how

should take an epic verse and see

howonce clear and

reads

words are introduced. The same should be done too with the strange word, the metaphor, and the rest; for one has only to put the ordinary words in their place to see the truth of what we are saying. The same iambic, for instance, is found in Aeschylus and Euripides, and as it stands in the former it is a poor line; whereas Euripides, by [20] the change of a single word, the substitution of a strange for what is by usage the ordinary word, has made it seem a fine one. Aeschylus having said in his Philoctetes: 4>aye5at,pa

y\

jjlov

crdp/caos

kadUi wo86s, 2

Euripides has merely altered the into 0oii>aTcu. 3 Or suppose pvp 8e

[25]

ju'

€wz>

6X1705 re

/cat det/afa

kadlet,

/cat

here

ovTidapds

4

by the substitution of the ordinary words, into to be altered,

pvp 8e

Or

p.'

k&p

jut/epos

T€

/cat

acrdePLKds /cat aetoifa.

the line

h'ufrpop

aeiKeXiop /caraflets 6\iyr}P rt rpaire^ap6

into

helps most,

ever, to render the Diction at

it

the normal

8Uf>pop fMOxOrjpop Karadels fjuKpap re rpd-

[50]

7re£"az>.

non-prosaic tailed,

viation

is

the use of the lengthened, cur-

and altered forms of words. Their defrom the ordinary words will, by mak-

ing the language unlike that in general use, it a non-prosaic appearance; and their hav-

give

ing

much

in

common

with the words in gen-

[5] eral use will give it the quality of clearness. It is not right, then, to condemn these

modes

of speech, and ridicule the poet for using them, as some have done; e.g. the elder Euclid, who said it was easy to make poetry if one were to be allowed to lengthen the words in the statement itself as much as one likes procedure he caricatured by reading 'Etlxclpvp [10] eldop Mapadccpade fia8L£oPTa, and ovk aP y' kpcLfiepos top kneipov kWefiopop as verses. too apparent use of these licences has certainly a ludicrous effect, but they are not alone in

—

A

that; the rule of

moderation applies to

constituents of the

poetic

all

Or

fr. 1,

Bergk.

into rjiopes Kpa^ovaip.

Add

use of these poetical forms, as also of com-

pounds and strange words. But the It is

greatest

master of metaphor. the one thing that cannot be learnt from

[5] thing by far

is

to be a

others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception

of the similarity in dissimilars.

Of

the kinds of

words we have enumerated

vocabulary; even a

Cleobulina,

6

Ariphrades used to ridicule the tragedians for introducing expressions unknown in the language of common life, Scoparup airo (for aird Suparup), aedep, kyo) 8k plp, 7 'AxiXXecos irepi (for irepl 'AxiXXews), and the 1459 a like. The mere fact of their not being in ordinary speech gives the Diction a non-prosaic character; but Ariphrades was unaware of that. It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper

the

with metaphors, strange words, and the rest, the effect will be the same, if one uses them im1

rjLSpes jSoococrtv

to this that

4 6

6

Nauck, T. G.

F., p. 81.

3

Ibid., p. 618.

6 Ibid., xx.259. Odyssey, ix. 515. Iliad, xvii. 265. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 986.

CHAPTERS

1459 b

may

be observed that compounds are most in place in the dithyramb, strange words in heroic, and metaphors in iambic poetry. Heroic

it

[10] poetry, indeed,

may

avail itself of

them

But in iambic verse, which models itself as far as possible on the spoken language, only those kinds of words are in place which are allowable also in an oration, i.e. the ordinary word, the metaphor, and the ornamental all.

equivalent. [75] Let this, then, suffice as an account of Tragedy, the art imitating by means of action on the stage.

21-24

695

though one, has a multiplicity of parts in it. 1459 b This last is what the authors of the Cypria and Little Iliad have done. And the result is that, whereas the Iliad or Odyssey supplies materials for only one, or at most two tragedies, the Cypria does that for several and [5] the Little Iliad for more than eight: for an Adjudgment of Arms, a Philoctetes, a Neoptolemus, a Eurypylus, a Ulysses as Beggar, a Laconian Women, a Fall of Ilium, and a Departure of the Fleet) as also a Sinon, and a Women of Troy. 24

23

As

for the poetry

imitates by

means

out action), points in

it

is

common

which merely

narrates, or

of versified language (with-

evident that

it

has several

with Tragedy.

The

construction of its stories should be like that in a drama; they should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and [20] end, so as to enable the work to produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature. Nor should one suppose that there is anything like them in our usual histories. A history has to deal not with one action, but with one period and all that happened in that to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have I.

clearly

been. Just as two events may take place at the [25] same time, e.g. the sea-fight off Salamis

and the

with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive events one may sometimes come after the other with no one end as their common issue. Nevertheless most of our epic poets, one may say, ignore the distinction, [jo] Herein, then, to repeat what we have said 1 before, we have a further proof of Homer's marvellous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, though it was a whole with a definite beginning and end through a feeling apparently that it was too long a story to be taken in in one view, or if not that, too complicated battle

—

[35]

from the

variety of incident in

it.

As

it is,

he has singled out one section of the whole; many of the other incidents, however, he brings in as episodes, using the Catalogue of the Ships, for instance,

and other episodes

relieve the uniformity of his narrative.

As

to

for

the other epic poets, they treat of one man, or one period; or else of an action which, al1

i

a 4 5i 2 3

flF.

Epic poetry must divide into the same species as Tragedy; it must be either simple or complex, a story of character or one of suffering. Its parts, too, with the exception [10] of Song and Spectacle, must be the same, Besides

II.

as

it

this,

requires Peripeties, Discoveries,

and scenes

suffering just like Tragedy. Lastly,

of

Thought and Diction

in

it

must be good

the in

way. All these elements appear in Homer first; and he has made due use of them. His two poems are each examples of construction, their

the Iliad simple

and

a story of suffering, the

Odyssey complex (there is Discovery throughout it) and a story of character. And they are more than this, since in Diction and Thought too they surpass all other poems. There is, however, a difference in the Epic as compared with Tragedy, (1) in its length, [75]

in its metre. (1) As to its length, 2 the limit already suggested will suffice: it

and (2)

must be

possible for the beginning

work

and end

taken in in one view [20] a condition which will be fulfilled if the poem be shorter than the old epics, and about as long as the series of tragedies offered for one hearing. For the extension of its length epic poetry has a special advantage, of which it makes large use. In a play one cannot represent an action with a number of parts going on si[25] multaneously; one is limited to the part on the stage and connected with the actors. of the

to be

Whereas in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simultaneous incidents; and these, if ger-

mane

to the subject, increase the

poem. This then

is

body of the

a gain to the Epic, tending

it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds. Uniformity of incident by the satiety it soon creates is apt to ruin tragedies on the stage.

to give

[30]

(2) 2

As

1451*

for 3.

its

metre, the heroic has been

as-

ON

69 6

POETICS

1460 b

signed it from experience; were any one to attempt a narrative poem in some one, or in sev-

to add on the B. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in our own

other metres, the incongruity of the thing would be apparent. The heroic in fact is the gravest and weightiest of metres which is [35] what makes it more tolerant than the rest of strange words and metaphors, that also being a point in which the narrative form of poetry goes beyond all others. The iambic and trochiac, on the other hand, are metres of movement, the one representing that of life and action, the other that of the dance. Still 1460s more unnatural would it appear, if one were to write an epic in a medley of metres, as Chaeremon did. 1 Hence it is that no one has ever written a long story in any but heroic 2 verse; nature herself, as we have said, teaches us to select the metre appropriate to such a

minds

eral, of the

—

story.

[5] Homer, admirable as he is in every other respect, is especially so in this, that he alone

among epic poets is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the poem. The poet should say very little in propria persona, as he is no imitator when doing that. Whereas the other poets are perpetually coming forward in person, and say but little, and that only here and there, as imitators, Homer after [10] a brief preface brings in forthwith a man, no one of a woman, or some other Character them characterless, but each with distinctive

—

characteristics.

The marvellous is certainly required in Tragedy. The Epic, however, affords more opening for the improbable, the chief factor in the marvellous, because in visibly before one.

[75] Hector

The

would be

it

the agents are not

scene of the pursuit of ridiculous

on the stage

—the Greeks halting instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking but in the

The

poem

head

his

the absurdity

to stop is

them; 3

overlooked.

marvellous, however, is a cause of pleasis shown by the fact that we all tell a

ure, as

story with additions, in the belief that

we

are

doing our hearers a pleasure. Homer more than any other has taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right [20] way. I mean the use of paralogism. Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B, is or happens, men's notion is that, if the B is, the A also is but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, B, that on the assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is

—

b 447 21.

1

Centaur,

3

Iliad, xxii. 205.

cf.

1

2 1

449* 24.

led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent. Here is an instance, 4 [25] from the Bath-story in the Odyssey. likely impossibility is always preferable to

A

an unconvincing possibility. The story should never be made up of improbable incidents; there should be nothing of the sort in it. If, however, such incidents are unavoidable, they should be outside the piece, like the hero's ig[30] norance in Oedipus of the circumstances of Laius' death; not within it, like the report of the Pythian games in Electra, 5 or the man's

having come

to

Mysia from Tegea without utthe way, in The Mysians. So

tering a

word on

that

ridiculous to say that one's Plot

it is

would

have been spoilt without them, since it is fundamentally wrong to make up such Plots. If the poet has taken such a Plot, however, and one sees that he might have put it in a more probable form, he is guilty of absurdity as well [35] as a fault of art. Even in the Odyssey the improbabilities in the setting-ashore of Ulysses. 6

1460 b would be hands of an ceals them,

clearly

inferior poet.

intolerable

As

it is,

in

the

the poet con-

his other excellences veiling their

absurdity. Elaborate Diction, however,

is

re-

quired only in places where there is no action, and no Character or Thought to be revealed. Where there is Character or Thought, on the other hand, an over-ornate Diction tends to [5] obscure them.

As regards Problems and their may see the number and nature

Solutions, one of the assump-

on which they proceed by viewing the matter in the following way. ( 1 ) The poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent things in one or other of [10] three aspects, either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be. (2) All this he does in language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of words, since the use of these is conceded in poetry. (3) It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other art. There is, how[75] ever, within the limits of poetry itself a possibility of two kinds of error, the one di tions

4

xix. 164-260. 116 ff.

6 xiii.

6

Sophocles, Electro, 660

ff.

CHAPTERS

1461'

other only accidentally connected with the art. If the poet meant to describe the thing correctly, and failed through lack of rectly, the

power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But if it was through his having meant to describe it in some incorrect way (e.g. to make

movement have both

the horse in

right legs

that the technical error (one

thrown forward)

[20] in a matter of, say, medicine or

some other whatever

special science), or impossibilities of

kind they

may be, have got into

his error in that case

his description,

not in the essentials of must be the

is

the poetic art. These, therefore,

premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms involved in the Problems.

As

I.

to the criticisms relating to the poet's

Any

art itself.

impossibilities there

may

his descriptions of things are faults.

be in

But from

another point of view they are justifiable, if they serve the end of poetry itself if (to as-

—

sume what we have

[25] they

said of that

end)

1

make the effect of either that very portion of the work or some other portion more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is an instance If, however, the poetic end might have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness in such mat-

in point.

ters,

the impossibility

is

not to be justified, since

the description should be, free

from

One may

error.

[jo] the error

is

if

it

can, entirely

ask, too,

whether

in a matter directly or only

connected with the poetic art; an artist not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than to produce an unrecognizable picture of one. II. If the poet's description be criticized as not true to fact, one may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as described an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they [35] were. If the description, however, be neither true nor of the thing as it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it is in accordance with opinion. The tales about Gods, for instance, may be as wrong as Xenophanes thinks, neither true nor the better thing to say; but they are certainly in accordance with opinion. 1461 a Of other statements in poetry one may perhaps say, not that they are better than the truth, but that the fact was so at the time; e.g. the description of the arms: 'their spears stood upright, butt-end upon the ground'; 2 for that accidentally since

it is

a lesser error in

—

was the usual way still 1

J

with the 45

2a

2 Iliad,

4>

M54

x. 152.

of fixing

Illyrians.

a 4»

H55

a

*7>

As

them

then, as

it is

M6^ "

697

whether something said or done

poem

in a

is

morally right or not, in dealing with that one [5] should consider not only the intrinsic quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who says or does it, the person to whom he says or does it, the time, the means, and the motive of the agent whether he does it to attain a greater good, or to avoid a greater evil. III. Other criticisms one must meet by considering the language of the poet: (1) by the [10] assumption of a strange word in a passage like ovprjas nev ttp&tov, 3 where by ovprjas Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And in saying of Dolon, 6s fr' rj tol etdos erjv kolkos* his meaning may perhaps be, /jlIv not that Dolon's body was deformed, but that his face was ugly, as eveL8r)s is the Cretan word for handsome-faced. So, too, faporepov 81 Kkpcue 5 may mean not 'mix the wine stronger', [75] as though for topers, but 'mix it quicker'.

—

(2) Other expressions in Homer may be explained as metaphorical; e.g. in aXXot pkv pa deoi re Kai avepes ev8ov (awapTes) iravvvx^oi^ as compared with what he tells us at the same time, fj tol or' es wediov t6 TpwiKOv adprjaeiev,

avplyyuv fre

(iuXco?

6/zaS6j>t>

7

word airavTts

the

metaphorically put for 'many', since 'all' 8 is a species of 'many'. So also his 0177 8' a/x/xopos [20] is metaphorical, the best known standing 'alone'. (3) change, as Hippias of Thasos suggested, in the mode of reading a word will solve the difficulty in 8L8ofj,ev 8k ot, 9 and in to 10 \ih> ov KaTairWeTdL 6/x/3pcf>. (4) Other difficulties may be solved by another punctuation; 'all', is

A

Empedocles, al\j/a 81 6v7jt' tyvovTO, tol 11 [25] irpiv fiadov a6a.va.Ta {copa re irpiv KeKprjTO. Or (5) by the assumption of an equivocal term, as in wapcoxiKev 8£ ir\eco *>{/£, 12 where

e.g. in

equivocal. Or (6) by an appeal to the custom of language. Wine-and-water we call 'wine'; and it is on the same principle that

7r\€co is

Homer speaks of a poto,

13

we

call

same principle

that

Ganymede

Gods do not drink wine. This also a it is

r.

50.

Cf. Ibid., x.

8 Ibid., xviii.

10

4

described as

though the

Cf.

On

latter,

7

1, 11. 1.

Iliad, x. 251.

14

Ibid.,

xx. 234.

6

Ibid., x.

ll

there

Ibid. ix. 202.

1

1-13.

;

Iliad,

v. 275.

Sophistical Refutations, i66 b

Iliad, xxiii. 327.

however,

whenever

how many ways

Ibid., x. 316.

489 = Odyssey,

12

work-

on the

imply some contradiction,

necessary to reflect

3 Ibid., 6

to

is

14

instance of metaphor. But

word seems

A

.

is

[50] the 'wine-server' of Zeus,

may be an

KaaaLTe -

Kv-qpis veoTevKTOv

new-wrought tin a 'brazier'; and it

a 'greave of

er in iron

9

for the question

24-25

1

11.

Fr. 35. 14-15, Diels.

13 Ibid.,

xxi. 592.

15.

ON

698

POETICS

may

be of understanding it in the passage in K^>V question; e.g. in Homer's rfj tax*™ 27XOS 1 one should consider the possible senses whether by taking it in of 'was stopped there' [55] this sense or in that one will best avoid the

X^

/!>'

1462-

der one or other of the above-mentioned heads, [25] which are twelve in number.

—

fault of which Glaucon speaks: 'They start 1461 b with some improbable presumption;

and having so decreed it themselves, proceed to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his statement conflicts notion of things.' This is how Homer's silence about Icarius has been treated. Starting with the notion of his having been a [5] Lacedaemonian, the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met him when he

with their

went

own

Lacedaemon. Whereas the

to

fact

may

have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses was of a Cephallenian family,

and that her father's name was Icadius, not Icarius. So that it is probably a mistake of the has given rise to the Problem. Speaking generally, one has to justify (1) the Impossible by reference to the require[10] ments of poetry, or to the better, or to opinion. For the purposes of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconcritics that

vincing possibility; and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the artist

ought to improve on his model. (2) The Improbable one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not improbable; for there is a probability of things happening also against [75] probability. (3) The contradictions found in the poet's language one should first test as

26

The

may

question

or the tragic

is

be raised whether the epic

form

the higher

of imitation.

It

may

be argued that, if the less vulgar is the higher, and the less vulgar is always that which addresses the better public, an art addressing any and every one is of a very vulgar order. It is a belief that their public cannot see the meaning, unless they add something them[50] selves, that causes the perpetual movements of the performers bad flute-players, for

—

if quoit-throwing is to be represented, and pulling at the conductor, if Scylla is the subject of the piece. Tragedy, then, is said to be an art of this order to be in

instance, rolling about,

—

what the

were in the eyes of their predecessors; for Mynniscus used to call Callippides 'the ape', because he thought [55] he so overacted his parts; and a similar 1462 a view was taken of Pindarus also. All Tragedy, however, is said to stand to the Epic as the newer to the older school of actors. The fact just

later actors

one, accordingly,

is said to address a cultivated audience, which does not need the accompaniment of gesture; the other, an uncultivated one.

[5]

If,

must

therefore,

Tragedy

clearly be lower

The answer to this is one may urge ( 1 )

place,

is

a vulgar art,

it

than the Epic. twofold. In the

first

that the censure does

not touch the art of the dramatic poet, but only it is quite possible to overdo the gesturing even in an epic recital, as did Sosistratus, and in a singing contest, as did

that of his interpreter; for

Mnasitheus of Opus. (2) That one should not

one does an opponent's confutation in a dialectical argument, so as to see whether he means

condemn all movement, unless one means to condemn even the dance, but only that of ig-

same thing, in the same relation, and in same sense, before admitting that he has contradicted either something he has said himself or what a man of sound sense assumes as true. But there is no possible apology for im-

noble people which is the point of the criticism passed on Callippides and in the present

the

the

—

[10] day on others, that their

women

are not

when they are not necessary and no use made of them, like the improbability in the 2 appearance of Aegeus in Medea and the base-

gentlewomen. (3) That Tragedy may produce its effect even without movement or action in just the same way as Epic poetry; for from the mere reading of a play its quality may be seen. So that, if it be superior in all other respects, this element of inferiority is no nec-

ness of Menelaus in Orestes.

essary part of

probability of Plot or depravity of character,

[20]

is

The

with always

objections, then, of critics start

faults of five kinds: the allegation

that something

is

either (1) impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory, or (5) against technical correctness. The anis

swers to these objections must be sought un1

Ibid.,

xx. 267.

8

L 663.

like

it.

In the second place, one must remember ( 1 that Tragedy has everything that the Epic has (even the epic metre being admissible), to[75] gether with a not inconsiderable addition music (a very real factor in

in the shape of the

the pleasure of the

(2)

That

its

drama) and

the Spectacle.

reality of presentation

is felt

in

CHAPTERS

1462 b

the play as read, as well as in the play as acted. (3) That the tragic imitation requires less

1462 b space for the attainment of its end; which is a great advantage, since the more concentrated effect is more pleasurable than one with a large admixture of time to dilute it consider the Oedipus of Sophocles, for instance, and the effect of expanding it into the

—

of lines of the Iliad. (4) That there is unity in the imitation of the epic poets, as proved by the fact that any one work of

number

25-26

way

699

and Odyssey have many such each one of them in itself of some mag-

as the Iliad

farts,

10] nitude; yet the structure of the

meric poems

is

as perfect as can be,

two Hoand the

them is as nearly as possible one acTragedy is superior in these respects, and also, besides these, in its poetic effect (since the two forms of poetry should action in

tion. If, then,

give us, not any or every pleasure, but the very

kind

we have mentioned),

less

special

it is

clear

is

that, as attaining the poetic effect better

than

[5] theirs supplies matter for several tragedies; the result being that, if they take what is really

a single story,

it

seems curt

when

briefly told,

and thin and waterish when on the

scale of

length usual with their verse. In saying that there is less unity in an epic, I mean an epic made up of a plurality of actions, in the same

[75] the Epic,

So these

much two

it

will be the higher

art.

—

Tragedy and Epic poetry for in general and their species; the

for

arts

form of

number and nature

of their constituent parts; the causes of success and failure in them; the

Objections of the

answer

to

critics,

and the Solutions

them.

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TRUTH AND PAIN TYRANNY

POETRY Z&Z&

RELATION

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR VIRTUE AND VICE WAR AND PEACE

WEALTH WILL

WISDOM WORLD *>

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