The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion: Transition Experience and Beyond 3030781879, 9783030781873

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The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion Transition Experience and Beyond

Jan Hornat

The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy

Series Editors Jean-Paul Gagnon, University of Canberra, Canberra, Australia Mark Chou, Australian Catholic University, Fitzroy, Australia

There are many types of democracies and many types of democrats. Though contemporary Western scholars and practitioners of democracy have tended to repeat a particular set of narratives and discourses, recent research shows us that there are in fact hundreds of different adjectives of democracy. What one theorist, political leader or nation invokes as democracy, others may label as something altogether different. Part of this has to do with the political nature of democracy. As a practice and concept, it is always contested. Yet instead of exploring these differences and ambiguities, many democrats today retreat to the well-worn definitions and practices made popular by Western powers in the twentieth-century. The aim of this book series is to engage and explore democracy’s many articulations. It seeks contributions which critically define, analyse and organise the many theories, concepts and practices that encompass democracy in all its forms. Both theoretical and empirical treatments of democracy, particularly when told from less conventional or more marginal perspectives, are especially encouraged.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14410

Jan Hornat

The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion Transition Experience and Beyond

Jan Hornat Charles University Prague, Czech Republic

The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy ISBN 978-3-030-78187-3 ISBN 978-3-030-78188-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To E.L.A.

Contents

1

Introduction A Visegrad Group Political Culture? Vestiges of Communism and Troubles with Liberalism

1 9 15

2

Democracy Promotion by the V4 States: Origins and Motives Democratic Identity Europeanization Return to the “West” and Status Geopolitics and Geostrategy Solidarity and Epistemic Communities

21 23 25 28 32 38

3

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The Democracy Assistance Infrastructure of the Visegrad States The Czech Republic: A Determined Promotor Hungary: A Reluctant Promotor Poland: Engaging in the Name of Solidarity Slovakia: Joining Democracy Promotion Efforts with a Time-Lag The Target States of Visegrad Countries’ Democracy Assistance

43 46 50 55 59 63

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viii

5

6

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CONTENTS

The Substance of Visegrad States’ Democracy Assistance Conceptualizing Democracy Transition Experience—“De-ideologizing” Democracy Assistance Educating and Mobilizing the Youth Training and Expertise Sharing Civil Society Support Rules-Based Market Economy External and Internal Factors Shaping the Substance of Visegrad States’ Democracy Assistance Downloading and Uploading the Rationale for Conducting Democracy Assistance Gender and the Empowerment of Women Windows of Opportunity, Domestic Discourses and Rhetoric

77 78 81 85 88 92 98 103 105 113 121

The International Visegrad Fund as a Democracy Promotion Instrument A Theoretical Perspective on the IVF The Structure and Procedures of the IVF Substance of the IVF’s Activities

135 136 139 141

Conclusion

149

Index

157

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 1.3

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 3.1

Visegrad Group’s Democracy Index (Source Author, The Economist’s Democracy Index 2006–2019) Freedom in the World (Source Author, Freedom in the World index 2006–2020) Checks on Goverment score in Visegrad Group (Source Author, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance—Checks on Government index 2006–2018) Strategies of democracy promotion (from least to most intrusive) (Source Author) Transformation promotion program annual budget (millions of CZK, nominal) (Source Data compiled by author from laws on state budget of the Czech Republic, years 2009–2020)

4 5

6 33

50

ix

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 8.1

Development and democracy assistance priority countries of V4 states Democracy assistance funding in selected countries (in thousands of EUR) Democracy assistance funding of Visegrad states (in millions of EUR) Selected TPP projects focused on supporting civil society Share of multilateral and bilateral development aid of Visegrad states (2018) Proportion of seats held by women in selected EU member state parliaments Objectives of the International Visegrad Fund Projects funded by the IVF in the EaP countries and the Western Balkans Typology of motives for democracy promotion by Visegrad states

66 71 71 94 104 115 143 144 150

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Introduction

Abstract Metrics used to observe the state of democracy indicate that the Visegrad states’ democratic consolidation is facing difficulties or, in fact, a backlash. The introductory chapter sets the discursive ground for the rest of the publication by probing the context of the alleged democratic backsliding. First, it looks at the normative framework of the Visegrad Group and questions the congruence and divergences of the member states’ political cultures. By discussing the vestiges of the communist era in the contemporary socio-political fabric in the four states it points to the differentiated troubles of accommodating the core tenets of liberalism in post-communist societies. It then extends this question to the realm of foreign politics of the Visegrad states, namely into the sphere of democracy assistance. Keywords Political culture · Post-Communism · Cognitive shortcuts · Visegrad · Democratic backsliding

Research for this publication was supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) project no. CZ.03.1.51/0.0/0.0/15_028/0006338, project title: Gender Equality in Czech Foreign Policy and Development Assistance. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_1

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Over 30 years since the revolutions and transitions that deconstructed institutionalized communist party rule and their totalitarian states, the Visegrad countries (V4) find themselves in an uncomfortable position of being considered as the political “black sheep” of the European Union.1 The labeling has much to do with a seeming democratic backsliding and the centralization of executive powers in the hands of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his FIDESZ party, Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš and his ANO movement and Poland’s Law and Justice party. The fourth member of the Visegrad grouping, Slovakia, seems to have already had its share of strongman-cum-mafia politics in the era of Vladimír Meˇciar, yet the targeted killing of journalist Ján Kuciak in 2018, who investigated tax fraud and tax evasion linked to Robert Fico’s governing party SMER, reminded the country that some vestiges of “Wild East” transition lawlessness are still present.2 The COVID-19 pandemic has further raised concerns that under the veil of securing public health governing politicians in the V4 may aptly utilize the situation to lock-in their power beyond the pandemic and elections.3 There is no doubt that some reports of the V4’s state of democracy have a patronizing, even disciplining tone (after all, the V4 states are among the youngest members of the EU and the “Western community”) and that alleged breaches of democratic and liberal principles are more closely observed than were they to occur in the democratically consolidated Western Europe. On a discursive and constitutive level, the V4 instrumentally plays the role of the “other” for the EU—a democratic backslider that potentially undermines key ideological and normative

1 Mischke, Judith, “Slovak PM: Visegrad Group ‘Not Black Sheep’ of EU”, Politico, 26 January 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/slovak-pm-visegrad-group-not-blacksheep-of-eu-robert-fico/. 2 See Sergeev, Viktor, The Wild East: Crime and Lawlessness in Post-communist Russia: Crime and Lawlessness in Post-communist Russia (London: Routledge, 1997). 3 See Novak, Benjamin, “Hungary Moves to End Rule by Decree, but Orban’s Powers May Stay”, The New York Times, 16 June 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 06/16/world/europe/hungary-coronavirus-orban.html; BBC, “Coronavirus: Is Pandemic Being Used for Power Grab in Europe?”, 17 April 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-52308002; Goslin, Tim, “Czechs Fear Autocratic Contagion of Coronavirus”, Balkan Insight, 15 April 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/15/czechsfear-autocratic-contagion-of-coronavirus/.

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tenets that undergird the entire European Union.4 The older member states are thereby implicitly reminded of the liberal democratic bounds that are not to be trespassed. In this sense, the Visegrad countries are easy targets. The consolidation and maturing of democracy is a lengthy process and as the German political scientist Ralf Dahrendorf argued as early as 1990: “while the formal process of constitutional reform during the transition may take at least six months, the economic restructuring six years, sixty years is barely enough” for the creation of “societal foundations which transform the constitution and the economy from a fair-weather into allweather institutions which can withstand storms generated from within and without.”5 So, according to this prediction, democracy may not yet be fully entrenched and coupled with liberalism within the V4 polity—all in a time when “the post-1989 liberal cycle is exhausted” and the three transitional objectives of the Visegrad states (democracy, market economy and Europe) are undergoing a crisis.6 Yet, political representatives in the V4 often position themselves as the vanguard of the European Union. Populism and the denial of the merits of liberalism are “a trans-European and even a trans-Atlantic phenomenon,” as Jacques Rupnik rightly points out, and Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have served as a legitimation of the V4’s own sovereignist and “illiberal” politics. Visegrad’s “response to those in the Western media who attribute their populist turns to a democratic ‘lag’ in the postcommunist space is that they are the avant-garde of the antiliberal movement, the cultural ‘counterrevolution’ on the march.”7 Closing his speech at the Bálványos Summer Open University in 2017, Orbán was

4 The Economist, “Big, Bad Visegrad”, 28 January 2016, https://www.economist.com/ europe/2016/01/28/big-bad-visegrad; Morillas, Pol, ed., Illiberal Democracies in the EU: The Visegrad Group and the Risk of Disintegration (Barcelona: CIDOB—Barcelona Center for International Affairs, 2016). 5 Dahrendorf, Ralf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 99–100. 6 Rupnik, Jacques, “Explaining Eastern Europe: The Crisis of Liberalism”, Journal of Democracy 29 (3), 2018: 36. 7 Ibid., 35–36.

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8.25

7.75

7.25

6.75

6.25 2006

2008

2010

2011

Czech Republic

2012

2013 Hungary

2014

2015 Poland

2016

2017

2018

2019

Slovakia

Fig. 1.1 Visegrad Group’s Democracy Index (Source Author, The Economist’s Democracy Index 2006–2019)

clear: “Twenty-seven years ago here in Central Europe we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the future of Europe.”8 But if the ideas to reframe democracy for the future EU came from Visegrad states, our conventional understandings of what liberal democracy is would interpret the current developments as an erosion or deformation of democratic governance. Traditional indexes used to “measure” the state of democracy in the world show an undeniable picture: although the trend is differentiated, it is nonetheless clear that democratic institutions and protections of individual freedoms have been weakened and contested in the region over the past ten years. The Economist’s Democracy Index serves as an indication of this trend as well as the Freedom in the World index of Freedom House. There is indeed a global decline in democratic governance as measured by The Economist and the developments in V4 partly correlate with it. But while the world average score dropped from its highest point in 2008, 2014 and 2015 (5.55) to 5.44 in 2019, the V4’s cumulative average score dropped from 7.6 in 2006 to 7.03 in 2019—V4’s democratic “backsliding” is thus faster than the rest of the world’s (see Fig. 1.1). A similar development can be observed in the Freedom in the World index (Fig. 1.2). 8 Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 22 July 2017, Tusnádfürd˝ o (B˘aile Tu¸snad, Romania), https://visegradpost.com/ en/2017/07/24/full-speech-of-v-orban-will-europe-belong-to-europeans/.

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100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Fig. 1.2 Freedom in the World (Source Author, Freedom in the World index 2006–2020)

Still, the declining numbers are mostly caused not so much by a direct limitation of individual civil and political freedoms in these countries, but rather the growing strength of the executive as it sheds checks on its power (e.g. by encroaching upon the judiciary or controlling media). Visegrad states are thus in line with what Nancy Bermeo labels “executive aggrandizement” as a source of democratic backsliding. She states that it “occurs when elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences. The disassembling of institutions that might challenge the executive is done through legal channels, often using newly elected constitutional assemblies or referenda.”9 This development is visible in the Checks on Government index score compiled by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). The only stable country within this indicator is Slovakia (Fig. 1.3). While the three indexes depicted above serve rather heuristic purposes than being authoritative judgments on the nature of democracy in the examined countries, their methods are based on conventional (and thus

9 Bermeo, Nancy, “On Democratic Backsliding”, Journal of Democracy 27 (1), 2016: 10–11.

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0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Czech Republic

2011

2012

Hungary

2013

2014

Poland

2015

2016

2017

2018

Slovakia

Fig. 1.3 Checks on Goverment score in Visegrad Group (Source Author, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance—Checks on Government index 2006–2018)

widely accepted) definitions of democratic governance and therefore should not be taken for granted. The developments point to the notoriously discussed return and rise of strongman/protector politics10 —i.e. strong central governments that protect their citizens against sources of danger from within and without; governments that require tradeoffs between citizens’ individual liberties and the provision of social, economic, physical and ontological security; governments where citizens outsource a part of their individual responsibilities to state institutions, which in turn are expected to meet a certain level of welfare for everyone. It is at this point when such governments reach the limits delineated by liberalism, which inherently hinders the accumulation of power by any actor at the expense of the individual (hence we too often hear from

10 Walker, Tony, “Why the World Should Be Worried About the Rise of Strongman Politics”, The Conversation, 23 July, 2018, https://theconversation.com/why-the-world-sho uld-be-worried-about-the-rise-of-strongman-politics-100165; Kagan, Robert, “The Strogment Strike Back”, Washington Post, 14 March, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/opinions/wp/2019/03/14/feature/the-strongmen-strike-back/.

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the region’s political leaders the necessity to decouple liberalism and democracy11 ). This book, however, is not about the perceived or real deformation of liberal democratic governance in the Visegrad countries, but about an interlinked phenomenon—the promotion of democracy carried out by these four states. Upon joining the European Union and institutionalizing their membership in the “Western” community, the post-communist Visegrad states were expected to become “democracy’s new champions” as they demonstrated “a particular interest in securing a greater place for democracy promotion on the agenda of the EU” despite the “skepticism about democracy promotion prevalent in the EU-15.”12 The experience that these states acquired during the transformation of their political and economic systems was to serve as the main added value of their efforts to assist the development of democratic institutions in third countries. The effort was to be carried out not only by V4 governments on a bilateral and multilateral level, but also by regional non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which were very active advocates of democracy assistance programs. In short, in the last two decades the Visegrad states have turned from democracy assistance recipients to donors. Even though—as we have seen—liberal democracy is perhaps not yet fully rooted as an “all-weather institution,” the V4 felt confident and willing to share its democratic transition experience with others. The question that the examination of the Visegrad states’ practices and approaches to democracy promotion helps us understand is one of incentive. There is a line of literature on the merits and demerits of promoting democracy by democratic governments, on the successes and failures of the practice and also on the origins of democracy promotion.13 A surge 11 Manifest of the Institute of Vaclav Klaus: Defending Democracy from Liberal Democracy, June 2018, https://www.klaus.cz/clanky/4283. 12 Kucharzcyk, Jacek and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance After EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008). 13 See Cox, Michael, John G. Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Carothers, Thomas, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Bridoux, Jeff and Milja Kurki, Democracy Promotion: A Critical Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Muravchik, Joshua, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1991); Magen, Amichai, Michael McFaul, and Thomas Risse, Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies (New

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in research on the issue of democracy promotion started mainly after the 2003 US invasion into Iraq and—judging by the swelling literature—the topic looks to be exhausted and analyzed from all possible perspectives. Nonetheless, one academic query that persisted without a conclusive answer is the question of the nexus between normativity and strategy. Is democracy promotion a sincere, altruistic attempt to bring civic freedoms and empowerment to disenfranchised and repressed people? Or is it simply a geostrategic calculus that opens the doors of a recipient state to the donor states as they work with alternative political movements, epistemic communities and organic intellectuals that may in the event of a politico-economic transition express loyalty to these donors through ideological alignment and strategic favors? Doubtless, the response to the question lies somewhere in between the two extremes and it perhaps reaches the limits of social science inquiry. However, the question in itself is important as a conclusive answer would necessarily carry political implications. Critics and authoritarian regimes facing democracy promotion activities on their territory see these actions of donors as purely geopolitical and geo-economic strategy. Promoting democracy is a veil for regime change and intends to open the country to the donor states’ political, economic and cultural interests, they claim.14 Advocates and donors themselves highlight the normative side of democracy promotion to justify it in the eyes of recipients and emphasize that the aim of such activities and rhetoric is to bring freedom and emancipation to individuals trapped in authoritarian states—and when freedom is achieved, it is up to the recipients to decide what they will do with it. Yet, donors do often highlight the strategic interests of democracy promotion in terms of creating a more stable neighborhood (hence world) or jointly fostering prosperity for recipients in donor countries by opening markets. Stating these interests explicitly is perhaps necessary in order to acquire the support of domestic coalitions (lawmakers, voters) to devote the funding and resources for democracy assistance. York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2009); Youngs, Richard, The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010) and William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 14 See Carothers, Thomas, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion”, Foreign Affairs 85 (2), 2006: 55–68 and Werner, Daniel, “Vladimir Putin’s History Lesson About Democracy Promotion”, EDP Wire, 16 August 2017, https://www.external-democracypromotion.eu/vladimir-putins-history-lesson-democracy-promotion/.

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A focused insight into the V4’s democracy promotion strategies and approaches presents a valid case to examine the interrelation of norms and strategy in democracy promotion. The four countries—switching from Marxism-Leninism—became liberal democratic norm entrepreneurs after their transformations at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, which makes it easier to track the genesis of their democracy promotion policies. At the same time, the case provides a possibility to filter the internal and external motives for implementing such policies. These motives will be described and categorized in the next chapter and hence applied to the individual V4 states’ democracy assistance practices. This publication thus subscribes to Burnell’s call to study the complex “grand strategy” of external actors, within which democracy promotion is one of many interacting components.15 While it is too early to tell, one of the sub-questions this book explores is whether and to what extent does a decline in democratic governance lead to a decline in democracy assistance funding and programs provided by the V4. Due to bureaucratic inertia there is certainly a time-lag in examining the effect of democratic backsliding on democracy promotion projects and funding. Therefore, this question will be studied mainly through the analysis of contemporary discourse in Visegrad states about the desirability of assisting democracy abroad. Before we turn to examining the theoretical motives of V4 states’ democracy promotion efforts, we will explore the political culture of the four states as it is tantamount to understanding the heterogenous approach of their societies toward liberalism and thereby liberal democracy.

A Visegrad Group Political Culture? Democracy is not only a technical form of governance based on rules that distribute political power, but a system that places a certain level of responsibility on individual citizens for its sustainability. In other words, democracy will work if the majority of the population internalizes its core tenets and values. The necessary congruence of the citizens’ sets of values and democratic structures have been observed already since the 1960s by Almond and Verba, who explored and laid grounds for the research 15 Burnell, Peter, “Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3 (2004): 100–116.

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of political culture.16 They understood political culture in terms of the behavior, attitudes and orientations of individuals in a society toward power. The particular political culture of a society (while, of course, somewhat fuzzy) is formed by its history, collective memory, authority patterns and the continual process of socio-economic activity. Thus “[e]very political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action”—that is, political culture.17 It would be myopic and overly generalizing to identify a unique political culture and political identity that encompasses all four Visegrad states. We can, however, find similar historical experiences and grievances, structural dependencies and socio-economic developments that have rendered the Visegrad states’ political cultures and identities similar over the last two centuries. George Schöpflin sees Central and Eastern European states as sharing aspects of Western Europe’s socio-political developments such as “feudalism, medieval Christian universalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the Enlightenment,” yet each of these “was shared slightly differently, less intensively, less fully, with the result that East European society’s participation in the European experience was only partial.” In practice, this led to the creation of a distinct political culture as “Eastern Europe constituted a transitional zone between the Western tradition of the division of power and the Eastern tradition of concentration of power.”18 The social classes of Eastern Europe had different compositions than in Western Europe. No sizeable bourgeoisie emerged during the period of industrialization to be the driver of democratization. Instead a large group of peasants was present and showed support for political parties which based their ideologies on agrarianism. More than in Western Europe, agrarianism in East-Central European conditions was “a doctrine founded on the principles of class solidarity and the organic unity of the peasantry” and mainly after World War I focused on redistributive land reform, whereby large estates would be parceled among the landless and small 16 Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980). 17 Almond, Gabriel A., “Comparative Political Systems”, The Journal of Politics 18 (3), 1956: 396. 18 Schöpflin, George, “The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe”, Daedalus 119 (1), 1990: 61.

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farmers.19 Czechoslovak agrarians conceived of “the countryside [as] one family” and “emphasized the dignity of the peasant farmer (owner) and his material independence, individual and social freedom, and intellectual and moral growth.”20 A stronger cleavage between the urban and rural areas emerged as suspicious peasants felt the “alien, parasitical ‘city’ siphoned off the fruits of [their] labor, in consequence of which the peasant remained poor and exploited.”21 All four states have in some form experienced the colonization of their cultures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, either under the Habsburg Empire or German and Russian (later Soviet) incursions. All experienced formal independence (except Slovakia) and nascent democratization during the interwar period only to see their emerging political freedoms implode due to internal pressures or external intervention. After World War II the Visegrad countries had to cope with social and national integration, the lack of which was perceived as one of the causes of the weakness and failure of their interwar polities as democracy can become incapacitated in societies deeply divided along ethno-religious lines.22 With the consolidation of borders came the attempts at ethno-nationalist homogenization of societies and resulted in the mutual exchanges of citizens and expulsions of Germans.23 Even though all four states experienced communist totalitarianism, its manifestations were differentiated—collectivization in Poland never reached the levels of Czechoslovakia nor did Budapest ever adhere to the principles of a centralized economy to the extent that Prague did. In short, while (and perhaps because) Czechoslovakia had the largest bourgeois class and the lowest share of population dependent on agricultural production for their existence when compared to Hungary and Poland

19 Hloušek, Vít and Lubomír Kopeˇcek, Origin, Ideology and Transformation of Political Parties: East-Central and Western Europe Compared (London: Routledge, 2010), 93. 20 Ibid., 88. 21 Schöpflin, The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, 78. 22 Chirot, Daniel, “Does Democracy Work in Deeply Divided Societies?” in Zoltan

Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds.), Is Democracy Exportable (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 23 See Szarka, László, “Significance of Czechoslovakian-Hungarian Population Exchange in the History of Intended Elimination of Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia”, Minorities Research 10, 2008: 51–65.

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in the aftermath of WWII, its communist system was most ideologically rigid.24 Another common trait of the political culture of Visegrad states is the personal nature of politics–notably the role played by “tight networks of informal influence, which sometimes resembled secret societies.”25 In this sense Schöpflin writes: Groups of individuals who had undergone some particularly intense shared personal experience, especially concentrated in time, would attribute unique significance to that experience and elevate it to a level of loyalty higher than all others. This loyalty would then cut across lines of political interest, and individuals on very different points of the political spectrum would participate in such networks.26

While Schöpflin talks about the Czechoslovak legionnaires or the Hungarian Etekölz Alliance from the interwar period, the same can be said of the new political elites (and intellectuals) that emerged out of the democratic revolutions of the late 1980s. The politico-economic networks around the leaders of the revolutions like Havel and Wał˛esa, but also Orbán and Meˇciar (who can hardly be considered as a leader of the revolution, but who nonetheless emerged as one afterward) were initially consensual in their state-building efforts and supported by the wider public, until cleavages and turf wars within these networks started to emerge and scathed their political and moral authority. The Visegrad grouping itself was formally constituted in February 1991 as a platform to help the (formerly three) states coordinate and exchange experience with their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Their shared goal was defined as “full involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of security and legislation” and maintained that “Coordination of the efforts—with respect for national peculiarities—increases the chances of attaining the desired goals

24 Havlik, Petr and Veronika Janyrova, “Czechoslovakia Was One of the Most Rigid and Conservative Countries in the Former Eastern Bloc”, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 10 December 2019, https://wiiw.ac.at/czechoslovakia-was-oneof-the-most-rigid-and-conservative-countries-in-the-former-eastern-bloc-n-414.html. 25 Schöpflin, The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, 73. 26 Ibid.

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and brings closer the realization of their objectives.” The Visegrad Declaration of 1991 also acknowledged that the convergence of their “basic objectives” included “full restitution of state independence, democracy and freedom” and the “elimination of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system.”27 The founding document of the Visegrad Group emphasized the countries’ commonality based on their regional proximity and historical contacts rather than on a shared political culture or identity: “The mutual spiritual, cultural and economic influences exerted over a long period of time, resulting from the fact of proximity, could support cooperation based on natural historical development.” Intensive cooperation would be facilitated “by the similar character of the significant changes occurring in these countries, their traditional, historically shaped system of mutual contacts, cultural and spiritual heritage and common roots of religious traditions.”28 The presence of Hungary in V4 does not permit the other three states to employ any (pan-)Slavic rhetoric to bind the states closer based on shared ethno-cultural background—which, as a consequence, helps maintain Visegrad as a pragmatic platform rather than being hijacked by identitarian politics. Nonetheless, the migration crisis of 2015 (among other crises of European integration) has facilitated the construction of a shared identity around the narrative of “protecting Europe” (i.e. the ideal of Europe that the four states sought to join after their revolutions) or, more precisely, “protecting the past achievements of the European integration process.”29 Indeed, the awareness of the function and existence of Visegrad among the countries’ populations has significantly increased during the period when the grouping was most visible on the EU level, with 82% of V4 respondents in a recent survey agreeing that the platform is important for their country and 73% agreeing that it should more often strive for a joint approach.30 27 Visegrad Declaration, 15 February 1991, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/ visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412. 28 Ibid. 29 Braun, Mats, “Postfunctionalism, Identity and the Visegrad Group”, Journal of Common Market Studies 58 (4), 2020: 925–940. 30 Janebová, Pavlína and Zsuzsanna Végh, Trends of Visegrad Foreign Policy (Prague: Association for International Affairs, 2019), http://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/10/AMO_Trendy_2019.pdf.

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Still, lumping the four states into a homogenous cluster of shared interests could be shortsighted and misleading. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have differentiated positions when compared to the nationalconservative stances of Poland and Hungary and often indicate the wish to be discursively decoupled from their counterparts, thus leading analysts to often speak of a Visegrad 2+2.31 In terms of measuring political culture, we do see differentiation not only between the Visegrad states, but also when we compare them to Western EU member states. Data collected from respondents of the World Values Survey (WVS), which is often used to categorize political cultures across the globe, suggest that the values of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states “differ from those prevailing in Western Europe.” Ronald Inglehart observes that Western European states traditionally rank higher on the level of “self-expression values,” which indicate a culture of tolerance, interpersonal trust and respect for individual freedoms that are most congruent with democratic governance.32 Visegrad states find themselves more oriented toward the so-called “survival” values, which “place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance.”33 When disaggregating Visegrad states, we see that throughout the years the WVS was conducted, it was the Czech Republic and Slovakia that were higher in self-expression values as Poland and Hungary leaned more toward the survival values. A “remarkably strong” linkage has been found between a country’s standing on the self-expression index and the stability of its democracy—societies that rank high in the self-expression values are stable democracies, those that rank low and tend toward “survival” values are authoritarian regimes.34 As Visegrad states find themselves leaning closer

31 DW , “This Is How the Visegrad Group Works”, Undated, https://www.dw.com/ en/this-is-how-the-visegrad-group-works/a-47402724. 32 Inglehart, Ronald, “East European Value Systems in Global Perspective” in HansDieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, and Jan Zielonka (eds.), Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 2006). 33 See World Values Survey, Inglehart-Wetzel Cultural Map, http://www.worldvaluess urvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings. 34 See Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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to survivalist values when compared to their Western EU counterparts, their inclination toward “executive aggrandizement,” as discussed above, becomes clearer. While we cannot speak of a political culture in the Visegrad group that would be incongruent with democratic governance, according to research related to the WVS it tends to be less supportive of democratic political life than Western EU states. This, nonetheless, does not imply hostility toward democratic governance. What is perhaps more difficult for CEE states to digest is the coupling of liberalism and democratic governance.

Vestiges of Communism and Troubles with Liberalism The communist period in CEE was a shared experience of the Visegrad states that altered the political culture of these states and slowed down its convergence with Western Europe, but the differences in political culture should not be attributed solely to this period. As we have explained above, other historical factors have shaped the sentiments and attitudes of CEE citizens toward socio-political hierarchy and the community in general. Still, however, the vestiges of communism and the mindsets and behavior it has imparted upon the populations is imminently observable. An umbrella term often employed to simplify our understanding of the collective psyche of CEE states is post-communism. The term does not signify a temporal definition of the state of countries that have democratized, nor does it refer to the mechanism of the political transition. Post-communism is used today rather as a depiction of a culture, a mindset, almost a clinical syndrome—a “post-communist mind.”35 Critics of the term may argue that the legacy is slippery and that it only serves as an excuse for shortcomings in the liberal democratic orders in CEE states or that it perpetuates a myth about communist politico-cultural heritage, but it nonetheless provides at least a partial explanation to why we speak of liberal democratic backsliding in the Visegrad states. Already in the 1990s observers of the region made pertinent prophecies believing that the post-communist mind will fall 35 Klicperova-Baker, Martina and Jaroslav Kostal, “Democratic Values in the Postcommunist Region: The Incidence of Traditionalists, Skeptics, Democrats, and Radicals” in Nadezhda Lebedeva, Radosveta Dimitrova, and John Berry (eds.), Changing Values and Identities in the Post-communist World (Cham: Springer, 2018).

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prey to illiberalism, neo-romanticism, anti-modern mythologizing and scapegoating.36 The “post-communist syndrome” is inter alia identified with suppressed individuality, “learned helplessness” and thus individual passivity, which leads to apathy and institutional lack of initiative, also an avoidance of responsibility, feelings of inferiority, conformity and an “us” versus “them” mentality.37 The mentioned traits of the post-communist political culture (whether introduced by communism or sustained by it from previous historical periods) have two major repercussions for the perception and practice of the liberal democratic political system in Visegrad states. First, they render the citizen more comfortable with a dirigiste state— a state that intervenes in individuals’ lives more profoundly and broadly, both practically and normatively. The populace is more tolerant of a paternalistic state that provides goods and services for the well-being of the citizens in exchange for limiting personal economic freedoms (hence the strong “survival” sentiments observed in the WVS). In other words, CEE citizens are more willing to outsource individual responsibility to the state, being aware of the necessary trade-off with their freedoms.38 The caretaker vision of the state combined with nostalgic fantasies of ethno-nationally homogenous and closed societies (recall the post-WWII social and national integration in Visegrad states) leads to an understanding of the state as a “titular” one. The titular state conception harbors an organic conception of the nation as a historic, cultural and religious community that must be protected by the state. The state is the “property of the ethnic community” and its purpose is to “further the interests of this titular ethnic majority.”39 It is this perspective of the state, prevalent in Visegrad polities’ mindsets, that is attuned, for example, to the idea of constructing a “Fortress Europe” in the face of increasing

36 Nodia, Ghia, “Chasing the Meaning of ‘Post-Communism’: A Transitional Phenomenon or Something to Stay?” Contemporary European History 9 (2), 2000: 269–283. 37 Klicperova-Baker and Kostal, Democratic Values in the Post-communist Region, 29. 38 Hornat, Jan, “Democratization Through Education? Theory and Practice of the

Czech Post-revolution Education System and Its Reforms”, Communist and Postcommunist Studies 52 (3), 2019: 271–281. 39 Dawson, James and Seán Hanley, “Foreground Liberalism, Background Nationalism: A Discursive-institutionalist Account of EU Leverage and ‘Democratic Backsliding’ in East Central Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies 57 (4): 2019, 717.

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migration to the continent. What the vision of a closed, titular state also reminds us of is that revolutions in 1989 were as much about democratic governance and individual freedoms as they were about nationalism and state sovereignty.40 The second repercussion of the post-communist mind for liberal democracy is a general misunderstanding—a semantic confusion—of what liberalism means and stands for and why it is coupled with democracy. In broad terms, liberalism is about emancipation. Emancipation of individuals from social hierarchies and the imposed will of majorities and central authorities (social liberalism). It also entails the emancipation of markets from possible constraints imposed by the state (economic liberalism). The meaning of liberalism is thus fuzzy and we should conceive of it as a continuum, just like we cannot speak of liberal democracy as appearing in a single form.41 For example, while some advocates for individuals’ autonomy see an emancipated market as a potential limitation on the individuals’ freedoms and imagine a role for the state as being the protector of the individual from the excesses of the market, those who advocate for emancipated markets, however, assume a limited state and see the state’s role as a protector of the market from the popular majority. From the standpoint of liberalism, it is thus possible to arrive at very different conclusions and justify the existence of both an interventionist state and also a limited state. In short, liberalism itself does not give a clear answer to queries about the role of the state in society and in the lives of individuals as it does not agree on the nature of freedom. In liberalism there is a constant internal tension between individual liberty and liberty of the markets. Moreover, liberalism speaks little of the emancipated individual’s relationship with the community. Still, when in current public discourse references to liberalism are being made, they point to the version of liberalism that advocates for the autonomy of the individual from any socio-economic constraints and majoritarian norms. Questions such as the level of individual solidarity (should it be enforced?), individual responsibility toward the society and community, the role of the state toward formulating “the good life” are presented with ambiguous answers by 40 Betts, Paul, “1989 at Thirty: A Recast Legacy”, Past and Present 244, 2019: 271–

305. 41 Ware, Alan, “Liberal Democracy: One Form or Many”, Political Studies 40, Special Issue, 1992: 130–145.

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liberalism (even though scholars may provide conclusive responses, these are difficult to mediate to the general public).42 Furthermore, the liberal democratic state has no means to impose or enforce itself upon the society in the way a totalitarian state can.43 The issue with the post-communist mind is that it is prone to cognitive shortcuts44 leading to mental analogies—even nostalgia—with the former regime and thus a cognitive bias against the current forms of liberalism. For instance, the liberal democratic state is not seen as neutral toward identifying “the good life” (e.g. constraining smoking in public places)— it is viewed even as moralizing and patronizing and in this sense is equated with the normalizing, disciplining communist state. The above-described strand of liberalism is seen as coming from Western Europe, notably “Brussels” and specifically the bureaucrats subservient to its ideology— Brussels is thus in a similar position to dictate like Moscow did during the communist period.45 Political correctness is seen as outright censorship46 ; non-governmental organizations are depicted as parasites and controlled

42 See Sandel, Michael J., Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996). 43 Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit : Studien Zur Staatstheorie Und Zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976). 44 Also known as heuristic availability, cognitive shortcuts describe mental shortcuts

that rely on immediate examples that come to a given person’s mind when evaluating a specific topic, concept, method or decision. The research into this form of thinking was pioneered by Herbert Simon and mainly Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s, who observed that individuals not only make decisions with imperfect information, they also simplify and skew the information at their disposal. Seeking to save effort and time, human beings reach judgments via cognitive shortcuts or subconscious heuristics, i.e. drawing upon the information that is most readily available. See also Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2011). 45 Lang, Václav, “Brusel není Moskva, zduraznil ˚ Zaorálek a nabádal k sounáležitosti s EU” [Brussels Is Not Moscow, Says Zaoralek and Encourage Cooperation with the EU], Novinky, 30 January 2014, https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/brusel-neni-moskvazduraznil-zaoralek-a-nabadal-k-sounalezitosti-s-eu-217257. 46 iDnes, “Socialismus se vrací, ne z Východu, ale ze Západu, ˇrekla Šichtaˇrová” [Socialism Is Making a Comeback, Not From the East, but from the West], 17 October 2019, https://www.idnes.cz/ekonomika/domaci/rozstrel-marketa-sichtarova-rozstrel-sandroidkou-v-posteli-politicka-korektnost-cenzura-umela-intel.A191017_140848_ekonom ika_svob.

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by state and foreign funding47 ; gender and LGBT equality is equated to social engineering and forced equalization during communism48 ; the universalism of liberalism is likened to communist internationalism—the list of such cognitive shortcuts and false analogies is long. The problem with cognitive shortcuts is that they last, are not necessarily tied to an individual’s experience with the regime and can be easily politically mobilized. In the public discourse, certain political leaders are employing these cognitive shortcuts to depict liberalism as an ideology that in its mechanism and usage of tools resembles (and even morphs into) communism. It is thus becoming a toxic term for the former, post-transition liberals, who see it as being stealthily hijacked by Neomarxism and are calling for the outright disaggregation of liberalism from democracy.49 The atomistic individualism advocated by liberalism is viewed as having no concern for the community and the well-being of the titular state. This makes it very easy for Orbán to call for an “illiberal” democracy that is based on right-wing collectivism: … we must break with liberal principles and methods of social organisation, and in general with the liberal understanding of society. In other words, the Hungarian nation is not simply a group of individuals but a community that must be organised, reinforced and in fact constructed. And so in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not

47 Nelson, Soraya Sarhaddi, “Hungary’s Leader Proposes ‘Stop Soros’ Laws Against NGOs That Help Migrants”, NPR, 23 February 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/ parallels/2018/02/23/588218227/hungarys-leader-pushes-for-stop-soros-laws-againstngos-that-help-migrants. 48 “Nebezpeˇcí Gender Ideologie LGBT” [The Threat of Gender Ideology and LGBT], Freedom and Direct Democracy Party Platform, Undated, https://spd.cz/nebezpeci-gen der-ideologie-lgbt/. 49 Hájek, Adam, “Ceskem ˇ obchází strašidlo neomarxismu, dˇesí Duku i Pohlreicha” [The Ghost of Neomarxism Is Creeping Around Czechia and Frightens Duka and Polhreich], iDnes, 10 October 2018, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/neomarxismus-duka-poh lreich-klaus.A181008_112306_zahranicni_aha.

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make this ideology the central element of state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.50

By the account above, the “democratic backsliding” in the Visegrad states is not a willing return of the populations into a non-democratic regime, but it manifests the troubles of accepting liberalism as a guiding substantive principle of democratic governance. It seems that the post-communist mind even after thirty years of living in liberal democracy is not congruent with liberalism. The institutions of liberal democracy have been built, but the culture remains to be fostered (and the current question is whether that culture will ever be shaped). A deformed understanding of liberalism is undermining support for liberal democracy, but what is more troubling is that antagonism toward liberalism may spill over and undermine support for democratic governance itself.

50 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp, 26 July 2014, Tusnádfürd˝ o (B˘aile Tu¸snad), Romania. https://www. kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktororban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.

CHAPTER 2

Democracy Promotion by the V4 States: Origins and Motives

Abstract Democracy promotion is a value-based foreign policy that nonetheless has geostrategic ramifications. This chapter explores the theoretical motivations for democratic states to integrate the agenda in their foreign policies and it also looks at the historical origins of the policy. It first discusses from a constructivist perspective how democracy promotion is related to the respective state’s democratic identity and how it strengthens this identity. The chapter further notes how the Visegrad states integrated their democracy assistance agendas in their foreign policies as part of their socialization within the European Union and how in general the policies contributed to heightening their status among “Western” states. Next, it touches on the issue of the geo-strategic and geo-economic implications of democracy promotion for donor countries and last, it looks at the role played by epistemic communities and former dissidents in laying the grounds for democracy promotion done by the Visegrad states. Keywords Europeanization · Democratic identity · Status · Solidarity · Epistemic communities

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_2

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The genesis of any public policy is in the research interest of academics, think-tank analysts and even journalists. Tracing where, when and how a policy originated enables the public to more thoroughly comprehend not only its alleged outcomes as declared by its advocates, but also the motives of actors that pushed the agenda forward. While researching the original impetus of, for example, domestic regulatory policies and tax reform may seem to unravel more consequential findings than conducting such research in the realm of foreign politics, studying why a given foreign policy (or foreign policy course) was adopted, helps the public to better appreciate (or denounce) its necessity and merits (and demerits). Just like a regulatory policy may emerge as a result of rent-seeking and lobbying from private sector entities, which saw it as a means to suppress (or even destroy) competitors,1 a foreign policy can also be hijacked by various interest groups that claim to represent “the national interest.”2 Promoting democracy is at first glance a value-based (or ethical3 ) foreign policy that is conducted out of sheer solidarity with people living in unfree societies. It is grounded in the paradigmatic view of human freedom as being a natural phenomenon—humans that are not free are considered to be living under constructed constraints that in an ideal world need to be abolished. Within this narrative it is thus hardly questioned that democracy is a “universal(ly aspired to) value” as “all human beings, when given a choice, opt for democracy as the best form of government”—such an assumption remains a core premise of the democracy promotion rationale.4 Although a caricature, this perspective about

1 For a discussion see Jakee, Keith and Leonie Allen, “Destructive Competition or Competition Destroyed? Regulatory Theory and the History of Irish Road Transportation Legislation,” European Journal of Law and Economics 5 (1), 1998: 13–50; Smith, Vincent H., “The US Federal Crop Insurance Program: A Case Study in Rent Seeking”, Agricultural Finance Review 80 (3), 2019: 339–358 or Gary S. Becker, “Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs”, Journal of Public Economics 28 (3), 1985: 329–347. 2 See Skidmore, David and Valerie Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Westview Press, 1993); Dietrich, John W., “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the China MFN Debates”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (2), 1999: 280–296. 3 Chandler, David, “Rhetoric without Responsibility: The Attraction of ‘Ethical’ Foreign Policy,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5 (3), 2003: 295–316. 4 Poppe, Annika Elena, “Harmony and Resilience: US Democracy Promotion’s Basic Premises”, Foreign Policy Analysis 15 (4), 2019: 534.

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what democracy promotion is, presents the intuitive understanding of the term by the general public.5 The rationale of promoting democracy in third countries is, however, much broader and the motives of donor states for framing and implementing democracy assistance tools and programs are complex and related to both foreign and domestic factors. In the following pages of this chapter, we will theoretically disaggregate these factors and in the subsequent chapters we shall empirically explore them in the cases of the Visegrad states’ approaches to democracy promotion.

Democratic Identity On a symbolic level, the revolutions of 1989 turned the Visegrad states into democracies overnight. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that democratization of their political systems was an inevitable development following the popular uprisings and roundtable negotiations. The citizens’ perception and identification of the self and the collective in the Visegrad states started to change dramatically, moving from an official, largely imposed communist identity, which was enforced by manipulating historical consciousness and collective memory,6 to a very unclear, yet to be defined democratic identity based on its own organic narratives. It was not only the institutions in which society, politics and the economy were embedded, but also the norms, ideas and ideals by which individuals interacted that were undergoing a transformation. International relations theory, namely the constructivist bent, assigns a role to ideas and norms in foreign policies of states: At bottom, constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness; the role it plays in international relations … Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and 5 Tures, John, “The Democracy-Promotion Gap in American Public Opinion”, Journal of American Studies 41 (3), 2007: 557–579. 6 Saueauk, Meelis, ed., Historical Memory Versus Communist Ideology, Proceedings of

the Conference. “The Shaping of Identity and Personality under Communist Rule: History in the Service of Totalitarian Regimes in Eastern Europe,” Tallinn, 9–10 June 2011, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/33306/507876. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

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that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place.”7

In other words, there was little doubt that the newly acquired democratic identity of the post-communist states would manifest itself also in their foreign policies. Identity—personal or collective—is “an inescapable dimension of being” and as such it is “not fixed in nature, given by God,” but socially constructed through speech acts, historical experiences and everyday socio-political actions.8 Importantly for foreign politics, the “constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.’”9 This relational formation of identity seeks to identify “Others” only to solidify and reproduce a certain form of identity—a “self”. From this theoretical perspective we can state that one of the motives for formulating democracy promotion policies is merely to strengthen domestic democratic identity. By stigmatizing non-democratic states and societies, democracies are creating ideational “Others” through which they provide another legitimization point for their domestic audiences. In practice, democracy promotion produces a morally superior identity of the democratic actor (as that actor stands for the natural rights of humans) juxtaposed to the inferior identity of the non- (or less) democratic actor.10 As “otherness” is also prone to social construction, democracy promotion defines the “very differences that transformation would ostensibly eliminate.”11 In this sense, democracy promotion is in part a symbolic domestic policy designed to help perpetuate the public’s acceptance of democratic governance—especially in the face of looming “legitimation

7 Ruggie, John G., Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation (New York: Routledge, 1998), 33. 8 Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9. 9 Ibid. 10 Rumelili, Bahar, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation,” Review of International Studies 30 (1), 2004: 31. 11 Doty, Roxanne, Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 136.

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problems” of politics and the political attractiveness of generating “moral authority.”12 For a democratizing state and its political elites drawing boundaries between itself and non-democratic states can thereby be an important component in terms of democracy-building at home. However, unlike the United States, whose “national identity is inextricably linked with the liberal-exceptionalism premise of the United States as an agent of democratic change, that is, a promoter of democracy”,13 the Visegrad states may feel uncomfortable in the position of exporting ideology (or even the technical aspects of democratic governance) abroad as they themselves were on the receiving end of ideological indoctrination by a foreign power during the communist period (nor were they impressed by the “Marriot brigades” of democracy promotors and Western consultants in the 1990s).14 In this sense, as we will see later, the terms “transition experience promotion” or “transformation assistance” were considered more neutral and non-ideological from the perspective of Visegrad donors and thereby euphemistically employed in their democracy promotion programs.

Europeanization The Visegrad states joined the European Union in 2004. The process of joining the EU required a massive transformation of the legal and institutional system of the countries and implementing the so-called acquis communautaire—over 80,000 pages of legislation. Prior to becoming members of the Union, the legislative assemblies of the V4 were fully occupied with passing legislation to transpose EU law into domestic law. Hungary’s June 1999 parliamentary session, for example, passed 152 of its 180 laws without debate as they were part of the acquis.15 The arduous process of regulatory and legal alignment with the EU is often labeled as Europeanization. 12 Chandler, Rhetoric without Responsibility, 310. 13 Monten, Jonathan, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and

Democracy Promotion in US Strategy”, International Security 29 (4), 2005: 112–156. 14 Pospieszna, Paulina, “When Recipients Become Donors: Polish Democracy Assistance in Belarus and Ukraine,” Problems of Post-Communism 57 (4), 2010: 7. 15 Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.

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The term, however, stretches beyond the mere technical convergence of institutions and is applied in a number of ways to describe a variety of phenomena.16 It alludes to the socialization of new member states with the rest of the EU—an expected change in behavior and a convergence of political, social and economic outlooks. The Union needs to foster and maintain a generally unified ideational congruence among its members in order to survive. A collective identity and “sense of community,” based on shared norms, narratives and ideas, has been described as a cohesive element for any political system.17 Though it is possible “to bind a group together before feelings of mutual identification have emerged,” a “we-feeling” is necessary for the durability of the community especially in moments when it is under stress.18 Accordingly, the European Commission is paying close attention to nurturing a European identity among citizens in member states, i.e. socializing citizens into adopting a European identity. In this sense, democratic values are emphasized as the principles that the EU is “determined to defend” and thus serve as a “proxy” for a European identity.19 Recent studies have found that socialization materializes on the level of the acceptance of democratic values as the adherence to “democratic values in a country grows as it accumulates more years of membership in the EU.”20 Since the notion of democratic values serves in the discourse of the EU as proxy for European values and identity, the EU seeks to strengthen this identity by identifying relational “others”—the non-democratic states. Europeanization thus often describes also the phenomenon of “exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory.”21 EU institutions are thereby markedly involved in democracy assistance around the world, amounting 16 Olsen, Johan P., “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market

Studies 40 (5), 2002: 921. 17 See Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965). 18 Ibid., 186. 19 Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973) https://www.

cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/ publishable_en.pdf. 20 Oshri, Odelia, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul R. Shenhav, “A Community of Values: Democratic Identity Formation in the European Union”, European Union Politics 17 (1), 2016: 118. 21 Olsen, The Many Faces of Europeanization, 924.

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to 2.8 billion USD committed in 2018 to the support of “government and civil society” in third countries.22 The Europeanization of Visegrad countries into the practice of diffusing European values and governance models abroad came, for example, with the attempts to formulate a “European Consensus on Democracy” (analogous to the “European Consensus on Development”23 )—“a cross-institutional umbrella policy document on what shape the European approach to democracy support should take.”24 The ensuing joint paper on “Democracy Building in EU External Relations” sought to build “a more coherent and overarching EU policy framework for supporting democratic reform processes in third countries.”25 In the broader realm of development support, the EU member states agree to the principle of “policy coherence for development,” which aims at minimizing contradictions and building synergies between different EU policies.26 The coherence of external development policies across member states includes the commitment to “mainstream” core EU values into external development policies. For instance, the European Consensus on Democracy states that “gender equality is at the core of the EU’s values and is enshrined in its legal and political framework” and mandates that “the EU and its Member States will promote women’s and girls’ rights, gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls and their

22 Commitments of EU Institutions in the OECD DAC Sector 151: I.5.a. Government and Civil Society. 23 The New European Consensus on Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’, Joint Statement by The Council and The Representatives of The Governments of The Member States Meeting Within the Council, The European Parliament and The European Commission, 7 June 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/ european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf. 24 Leissner, Maria, Ambassador for Democracy in Development Cooperation, 29 September 2008, Stockholm. See also Timothy Garton Ash, “We Need a Benign European Hydra to Advance the Cause of Democracy”, The Guardian, 17 April 2008, https:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/apr/17/eu.usa. 25 European Commission, Joint Paper on Democracy Building in EU External Relations, SEC(2009) 1095 Final, 27 July 2009, http://aei.pitt.edu/45425/1/sEC_(2009)_1095. pdf. 26 See European Commission, 2019 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development, SWD(2019) 20 Final, 28 January 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/ system/files/swd-2019-20-pcdreport_en.pdf.

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protection as a priority across all areas of action.”27 Similarly, democratic governance is to be mainstreamed to all policy sectors and EU external action.28 To capitalize on the transition experience of the new member states and strengthen their role as new donors, the European Commission sought to map the states’ experience and employ it in the external actions of the EU. In its 2009 conclusions on an operational framework for aid effectiveness, the Council stated that it “welcomes the ongoing initiative of the Commission to map the specific transition experience of several Member States, and looks forward to specific proposals.”29 The output of this activity was the European Transition Compendium, a 300-page list of good practices and expertise compiled from the new member states. The Council invited the EU member States and the Commission “to use where appropriate the transition experience in technical cooperation, as well as in broader development cooperation programmes, to support capacity building in partner countries.”30 In short, engaging in the task of supporting and promoting democracy abroad (as the provision of development aid) is an intrinsic component of EU membership and the EU has been actively nudging new member states to carry out such activities.

Return to the “West” and Status A widely accepted consensus about rejoining the “Western community” among the populations of the Visegrad states emerged after the revolutions. The geopolitical, economic and political visions of the future development of the four states were clearly geared toward formal membership in multilateral organizations that undergirded the security and welfare of

27 For full text see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ: C:2017:210:FULL&from=EN. 28 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations, 2974th External Relations Council Meeting, 17 November 2009, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ en/gena/111250.pdf. 29 Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on An Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, 2974th External Relations Council Meeting, 17 November 2009, http://register. consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15912.en09.pdf. 30 Ibid.

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the Western hemisphere. The expectations were symbolic, but also very pragmatic in the sense that joining the “West” would provide security, increase living standards and lock-in individual freedoms against possible future authoritarian impulses. While Poland and Hungary have been members of some Western multilateral structures—namely the IMF and the GATT—already before the end of communism, Czechoslovakia readily joined these in 1993. Joining NATO and the EU was presumably more consequential for the lives of citizens and thus given due regard in public discourse and political campaigns. Despite debates about possible neutrality for the postcommunist states as an alternative to joining the NATO alliance,31 67% of Poles expressed support for their country’s membership,32 as did 61% Hungarians,33 57% Czechs34 and 55% Slovaks.35 The referenda on EU membership resulted in over 75% of voters supporting accession in all Visegrad states. A return to the “West,” from which it was “kidnapped” by the Soviet Union,36 gave a clear political purpose to the societies and was to serve as a certificate of their (re)new(ed) identity. In order to return to the “West” and be a coherent and accepted part of it, however, the states needed to initially mimic and imitate its behavior in various policy spheres. An undeniable core-periphery asymmetry existed between the Visegrad states and their Western counterparts in the early years after NATO and EU accession (and arguably exists until

31 Štˇepánovský Jiˇrí, “Neutralita – spása Ceské ˇ republiky?”, Mezinárodní vztahy 31 (2), 1996: 83–94. 32 O´srodek Badania Opinii Publicznej, “Polska w NATO – Stopien Poparcia I Przewidywane Skutuki”, March 1999, http://tnsglobal.pl/archiv_files/038-99.pdf. 33 Hungary conducted a referendum on membership, which resulted in over 85% voters choosing to join the alliance. Perlez, Jane, “Hungarians Approve NATO Membership”, The New York Times, 17 November 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/ world/hungarians-approve-nato-membership.html. 34 Šandera, Jiˇrí, “Mˇení se postoje k NATO v dusledku ˚ boje proti terorismu?”, STEM , 19 December 2001, https://www.stem.cz/meni-se-postoje-k-nato-v-dusledku-boje-protiterorismu/. 35 Natoaktual.cz, “Slováci podporují cˇ lenství v NATO”, 17 December 2003, https:// www.natoaktual.cz/zpravy/slovaci-podporuji-clenstvi-v-nato.A031217_101217_na_zpravy _m00. 36 Kundera, Milan, “The Tragedy of Central Europe”, The New York Review of Books, 26 April 1984: 33–38.

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today) and as Krastev and Holmes argue, the strategy to overcome the asymmetrical relationship was to “Imitate the West!”: The process was called by different names—democratization, liberalization, enlargement, convergence, integration, Europeanization—but the goal pursued by postcommunist reformers was simple. They wished their countries to become ‘normal,’ which meant like the West.37

The process of imitation and mimicry even spilled over into more specific spheres of life, such as the practice of academic work.38 But as Lacan and Bhabha reminded us, “the effect of mimicry is camouflage”—it is not “a harmonization or repression of difference, but a form of resemblance that differs/defends presence by displaying it in part, metonymically.”39 Given that mimicking merely covers up the vestiges of the original (formal) culture that lies beneath the camouflage, that culture may one day come back to reassert itself. Imitation and mimicry in the Visegrad states are slowly uncovering their downsides and hence leading to the public’s constant questioning of the desirability of being part of the “West.” As Krastev and Holmes continue: The imitator’s life inescapably produces feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, dependency, lost identity, and involuntary insincerity. Indeed, the futile struggle to create a truly credible copy of an idealized model involves a never-ending torment of self-criticism if not self-contempt… It also entails the assumption that Central and Eastern Europe’s copycat nations accept the West’s right to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards. In this sense, imitation comes to feel like a loss of sovereignty.40

We can also examine the return to the “West” through imitation from the perspective of the states’ status and prestige. Status (closely linked with the notion of prestige) in the international community denotes a state’s

37 Krastev, Ivan, and Stephen Holmes, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and Its Discontents”, Journal of Democracy 29 (3), 2018: 118. 38 Kratochvíl, Petr, “Strukturální problémy cˇ eské sociální vˇedy: O hybridním charakteru oboru mezinárodních vztahu”, ˚ Mezinárodní vztahy 51 (1), 2016: 17–19. 39 Bhabha, Homi, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse”, October 28 (1984): 131. 40 Krastev and Holmes, “Explaining Eastern Europe”, 118.

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standing in that community and is related to the “higher order, collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes.”41 One of the “valued attributes” of the Western community after the end of the Cold War has been the adherence to the liberal democratic paradigms and Western states thus evaluate each other inter alia based on this principle. Status is thus not acquired only through a strong material base, but also through normative power. Its practical function for states is not only intersubjective (i.e. between states of the international community), but it also places the state “on the map” of global affairs. In other words, states with higher status (and thus authority) maintain more respect, visibility and prestige on the global level. Compared to established powers, small and weak states—a category where the Visegrad states fitted at least at the turn of the century— suffer from more urgent sense of insecurity and often (over)compensate this anxiety by making themselves useful for great powers and thereby enhancing their status in the eyes of the great power/hegemon.42 This perspective partly explains why Visegrad states’ development budgets and specifically budgets for democracy assistance swelled in relation to their engagement along with the United States in rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq (described below). The international status of a state thereby has direct repercussions for national identity and national pride. Indeed, according to public polls from the Czech Republic, NATO membership has increased the international prestige of the country in the eyes of its citizens.43 Thus, prestige and “international status-seeking cannot be separated from domestic legitimation games” and can be considered as a “sub-category of state identity politics.”44 Being anxious about their ranking within the global community, populations of (especially small) states are keen on augmenting the prestige and respect of their country as status may—as

41 Renshon, Jonathan, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 33. 42 Neumann, Iver B. and Benjamin de Carvalho, “Introduction: Small States and

Status”, in Neumann, Iver B. and Benjamin de Carvalho (eds.), Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 2. 43 STEM, “Po dvou letech v NATO: více prestiže pro CR, ˇ ale plnohodnotným cˇ lenem nejsme”, 4 May 2001, https://www.stem.cz/po-dvou-letech-v-nato-vice-prestize-pro-crale-plnohodnotnym-clenem-nejsme/. 44 Neumann and de Carvalho, Introduction: Small States and Status, 5.

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a form of social capital—be converted into influence and power (such as agenda-setting, access and material benefits).45 Being engaged in promoting democracy abroad may be viewed as an imitation task that brings the Visegrad states ever-closer to their Western counterparts and—in a virtuous circle—enhances their status and prestige among them. It is a voluntary bottom-up process, whereas formerly discussed Europeanization is a top-down process since states are “downloading” fundamentals of external action that the EU requires of its member states.

Geopolitics and Geostrategy From the perspective of (neo)realist IR theories, promoting democracy is an instrument of democratic states to ameliorate their chances at survival. Accepting the conclusions of liberalism’s democratic peace theory, which argues that democratic states never go to war with each other,46 a democratic state’s best strategy to ensure peace and thus freedom from military attack, is to support the creation of democratic structures in countries around the globe. Of course, there is a number of caveats to such a strategy and they are all connected to the level of intrusiveness democracy promotion entails.47 Several actions are available to states that seek to expand the global community of democracies and they can be set out on a very basic scale according to the level of intrusiveness into the recipients’ polity. For the purposes of this book, the tactics enumerated in Fig. 2.1 are all considered as “democracy promotion,” which we see as an umbrella term for the wide array of possible approaches to extending the community of democracies. The term “democracy assistance” denotes a tactic that is much more targeted and engaging and involves a certain level of material support (i.e. funding) for the recipient. This publication 45 Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon Lunde Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small States: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to US-Led Operations”, European Journal of International Security 3 (2), 2018: 256–277. 46 Doyle, Michael W., “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (3), 1983: 205–235. 47 By the term “intrusiveness” we mean the level that democracy promotion activities breach national sovereignty of receiving states. Of course, some democracy promotion activities in Fig. 2.1, such as technical assistance to governments, can be directly commissioned by the receiver and thereby present a voluntary infringement upon its sovereignty.

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Rhetorical comittments

Political gestures

Conditionality

Technical assistance to governments

Direct material support to civil society

Information dissemination

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Physical intervention

Fig. 2.1 Strategies of democracy promotion (from least to most intrusive) (Source Author)

thus uses the notion of “democracy assistance” in cases related to technical assistance and material support to governments, civil society and individuals in target countries. Of the numerous tactics that democratic states use to promote democracy abroad, the least intrusive category is rhetorical commitments in support of democratic opposition in authoritarian states or civil society movements. Consider former High Representative of the EU for External Action Catherine Ashton’s reaction to the Arab Spring: We have a moral duty as well as a practical need to help our neighbors secure democracy and prosperity. We are not ‘spectators.’ We have committed ourselves to engage, work and discuss with all the governments, parliaments and organizations with whom we share our commitment to democracy.48

An authoritarian regime can readily block such a pronouncement from being accessible to the wider domestic public and if no follow-up activities of the given democratic actor ensue, such rhetoric has little effect other than reaffirming the democratic identity of the sender. The second type of instrument is political gestures, which are carried out on the territory of the receiving state and are expressions of moral and political support for civil society and the political opposition, for example. Among such gestures we can include French President François 48 Ashton, Catherine, “Supporting the Arab Awakening”, New York Times, February 3, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/opinion/supporting-the-arab-awakening. html.

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Mitterrand’s unforeseen breakfast meeting with Czechoslovak dissidents, which included inter alia Václav Havel, in the premises of the French Embassy in Prague in the winter of 1988.49 Another example is the activity of then-newly inaugurated US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, who on his second at the US Embassy in Moscow in 2012 received a number of prominent Russian anti-government bloggers and civic leaders.50 The gestures add a certain amount of political legitimacy to the selected recipients and thereby irritate domestic regimes. A more intrusive instrument is conditionality. Democratic states can condition cooperation and trade with non-democratic states on their progress in reforming their political system. We can distinguish two basic types of conditionality—positive and negative. The former type is mostly employed by the EU and, for example, embedded in its “more for more” (incentive-based) approach to the countries of North Africa after the Arab Spring. If the states adopt liberalizing reforms that have been prenegotiated with the EU, the countries would receive more development aid and more access to the European market.51 In this sense, positive conditionality leaves the effect of the conditions on the receiving state as it can decide how far in the reform process it is willing to go in order to reach the offered benefits. Negative conditionality works in the opposite direction—a non-democratic state is sanctioned or embargoed, and these provisions are not lifted until progress is made toward democratization (as in the case of the US approach to Cuba or Myanmar).52 A democratic state can also offer technical assistance to a nascent democracy, which consists of consultations, exchanges of best practices

49 Vaughan, David, “December 1988: Mitterrand Meets Dissidents in Prague”, Radio Prague International, 14 July 2012, https://english.radio.cz/december-1988-mitterrandmeets-dissidents-prague-8552805. 50 Cullison, Alan, “Russia Slams New U.S. Ambassador”, Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020373530457716899 2039334260. 51 See Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood,” COM(2011) 303, 25 May 2011, https://eur-lex.eur opa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0303:FIN:en:PDF. 52 For a discussion of conditionality see Youngs, Richard, “The End of Democratic Conditionality: Good Riddance?” FRIDE Working Paper 102, September 2010, https:// www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130596/WP102_The_end_democratic_conditionality_ENG_set10. pdf.

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and recommendations for governance reform. Mostly employed during the accession phase of soon-to-be EU member states, using instruments such as TAIEX and Twinning, this form of democracy-building assistance is aimed at governmental structures of recipient countries and thus needs to be carried out with their support. The Visegrad states themselves were recipients of technical assistance also in the early 1990s as part of US democratization efforts.53 When governments are not open to cooperation on reforming their governance structures and liberalizing their political system, democratic donors target civil society as strategic partners in mobilizing the potential to advocate for reforms from the bottom-up. Organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED)—funded by the US federal government and the European Commission respectively but maintaining levels of autonomy—are at the forefront of providing grants to NGOs in recipient states for their day-to-day operations or for particular projects, building their capacities and strengthening their outreach. Such support can maintain a low profile and fund civil society groups engaged in rather non-political social issues (often labeled as a “developmental” approach) or it can specifically target opposition political parties, individual anti-government bloggers and journalists and politically engaged NGOs (labeled as a “political” approach).54 For the donor democracy, fostering partnerships with dissidents and opposition leaders in an authoritarian state can be decisive in establishing relations with the nascent political regime and providing access to its policymakers after a possible revolution—this is obviously a strategic and not a normative goal.55 Direct material support to civil society groups that are uncomfortable for

53 See Creed, Gerald W. and Janine R. Wedel, “Second Thoughts from the Second World: Interpreting Aid in Post-Communist Eastern Europe”, Human Organization 56 (3), 1997: 253–64 and Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989–1998 (London: Macmillan, 1998). 54 Carothers, Thomas, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” Journal of Democracy 20 (1), 2009: 5–19. 55 For a discussion see Hornat, Jan, “Closing the Closing Space: Sustaining Democracy Promotion in European Foreign Policy”, Global Affairs 2 (3), 273–285.

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the recipient country have in the past culminated in the banning of organizations such as the NED from operating in target states as these see it as unjustified meddling in their domestic affairs.56 A strategy that has the potential to reach a much wider audience in the target state is information dissemination. As authoritarian states have a tight grip on the control of information their publics receive, providing alternative (and in theory more objective and de-ideologized) information to citizens in these states can lead to their questioning of the legitimacy of their government and induce political mobilization. Traditional examples include the broadcasting of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe beyond the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, which had a massive impact on the access to non-censored information by citizens in Visegrad states and served even as facilitators in organizing protests in November 1989 in Czechoslovakia.57 The organized launching of balloons carrying various material about the outside world and criticizing the North Korean regime conducted by South Korean activists fits into this logic too (the North Korean regime retaliates with its own information-carrying balloons).58 The obviously most intrusive form of promoting democracy (and a very undemocratic one) is outright military intervention to impose regime change. While rather a pretext than a genuine cause, the 2003 US intervention in Iraq was justified on the basis of the necessity of democracy-building in the country. Though Iraq remains a country that has a long way to go before being considered by democratic states as a consolidated democracy, the case of United States post-WWII occupation of Japan was successful in terms of fomenting a democratic culture and institutions.

56 Garver, Rob, “Putin Is Cracking Down on Dissent and the First Victim Is the US-Based Democracy Group”, Business Insider, 29 July 2015, https://www.businessi nsider.com/putin-is-cracking-down-on-dissent-and-the-first-victim-is-the-us-based-democr acy-group-2015-7. 57 Tomek, Prokop, Ceskoslovenská ˇ redakce Radio Free Europe—Historie a vliv na cˇeskoslovenské dˇejiny (Prague: Academia, 2015). 58 The practice of sending information balloons was also used during the Cold War. See Georgiev, Georgi, “Cold War Atmosphere: Distorted Information and Facts in the Case of Free Europe Balloons”, Centaurus 61 (3), 2019: 153–177.

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The chances of a successful democratization increase as we move to the right-hand side of the continuum of “intrusiveness” of democracy promotion strategies (see Fig. 2.1). At the same time, though, the backlash from recipient governments and publics increases as their sovereignty is undoubtedly breached (i.e. when understanding sovereignty in the “classical”, Westphalian sense). Democratic states thus have to make strategic considerations in terms of what mix of instruments is most suitable from the perspective of their capacities and the material trade-offs they have to make when targeting a foreign state. As mentioned earlier, democracy promotion can be viewed as a strategy supporting the chances of survival. On the one hand it is an offensive strategy as it aims to remodel foreign governments into potential like-minded partners and transform their “otherness.” The EU’s Neighborhood Policy is sometimes depicted as a tactic to form a democratic “cordon-sanitaire” of well-behaved partners around the Union to protect it from authoritarian encroachments.59 It must be noted, however, survival is not only about physical existence and the containment of military threats but survival also concerns the mental, ontological existence of a polity. In an August 25, 1939 letter addressed to Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini emphasized that “rapprochement between Germany and Russia was necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.”60 The comment demonstrates that all political regimes foster feelings of discomfort when neighboring political “others.” Authoritarians are anxious about democrats and vice-versa and both sides have the toolbox of instruments mentioned above at their disposal to attempt to transform the other. While neither side may present a credible threat to the other’s physical security (security-as-survival), they do, however, pose threats to each other’s ontological security (security-as-being).

59 Jansson, Per, “Rhetoric and Legitimacy in the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Global Affairs 4 (2–3), 2018: 317–328. See also Gänzle, Stefan, “EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis”, Europe-Asia Studies 61 (10), 2009: 1715–1734. 60 Letter from Mussolini to Hitler, 25 August 1939, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_c entury/ns058.asp.

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Ontological security is defined as “security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is” and the continuity of this sense.61 It is thus “intimately connected with identity, and as such its pursuit requires differentiation and in that sense presupposes an Other.”62 States thereby do not only seek physical security (protecting territory and citizens’ lives), but also ontological security—the protection of its identity, values, norms and political culture in order to provide a sense of continuity of being to its citizens. “Other,” non-democratic political regimes are thus a threat to the ontology of democracies and need to be defended against on the front of ideological confrontation. The analysis above shows us that democracy promotion cannot be considered solely as a normative, value-based policy, but that it also has clear strategic and geopolitical repercussions that need to be taken into account.

Solidarity and Epistemic Communities A specific trait of the motives that lead Visegrad states to adopt democracy promotion measures is the notion of a certain reciprocal solidarity. The dissidents and political activists that opposed the communist regimes from the inside were supported by Western private and state foundations. The backing came in many forms, including existential support to the families of jailed dissidents (through, for example, the Charter 77 foundation) or the financing of the publishing of Polish Gazeta Wyborcza, the first independent daily in Eastern Europe.63 These dissidents and activists, who later became the new political elites taking the place of communist politicians, thus experienced first-hand how external support for their work enabled them to advocate for change from within the totalitarian systems. The role that the support played is not measurable and we cannot say that the regimes would not be toppled without the support of Western foundations to dissidents and groups. In order to provide a conclusive 61 Mitzen, Jennifer, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the

Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12 (3), 2006: 344. 62 Rumelili, Bahar, “Identity and Desecuritisation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological and Physical Security,” Journal of International Relations and Development 18 (1), 2015: 54. 63 National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report 1989, https://www.ned.org/ docs/annual/1989%20NED%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

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answer, we would have to observe the events of 1989 and preceding developments in isolation from activities financed or facilitated (such as the smuggling of books into the countries) by external actors—this, of course, would be an unobservable counterfactual. In fact, studies analyzing the effects of democracy assistance on the progress of democratization stray away from making positive or negative conclusions and assign only a “very modest” success to democracy promotion policies.64 The Cold War-era Western support to democratization efforts in the Visegrad states generated a sense of responsibility among the elites for the expansion of democratic governance further. A commitment to supporting democratic values wherever needed was considered as an act of reciprocity by the new, democratic political elites. Indeed, this sense of responsibility was indicated by President Barack Obama, when in 2011 he mentioned in Warsaw that he is “very much looking forward to hearing some of the observations that those who’ve fought long and hard for democracy may have as we face similarly transformative moments around the world,”65 or when Vice-President Joe Biden addressed Romania with the words “You’ve delivered on the promise of your revolution. You are now in a position to help others do the same.”66 The sense of responsibility coupled with the assumption that the transition experience of the Visegrad states is transferrable (at least its technical aspects and good and bad practices) into other states’ realities, created a strong impetus to engage in democracy promotion. As Tsveta Petrova maps, civil society groups in the CEE states were successful in lobbying their governments for the inclusion of activities to support democratic

64 See Finkel, Stephen E., Anibal Perez-Linan, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dinorah Azpuru, Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a CrossNational Quantitative Study (USAID and Vanderbilt University, 2006), 86; Burnell, Peter, “Does International Democracy Promotion Work?”, German Development Institute Discussion Paper, 17/2007, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3094/pdf/Bur nellPromotionWork.pdf; Burnell, Peter, ed., Evaluating Democracy Support: Methods and Experiences (Stockholm: IDEA, 2007). 65 Remarks by President Obama and President Komorowski in Discussion on Democracy in Warsaw, Poland, 28 May 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/05/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-komorowski-discussion-dem ocracy-wa. 66 Remarks by Vice President Biden on America Central Europe and a Partnership for the 21st Century, 22 October 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-off ice/remarks-vice-president-biden-america-central-europe-and-a-partnership-21st-century.

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governance abroad. Represented by former dissidents and opposition actors, the governments were receptive to the ideas. Petrova confirms that “some of the same eastern EU civic activists who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their country subsequently also argued in favor of their state promoting democracy abroad as well. Where these democracy promotion entrepreneurs represented strong advocacy contingents…their states incorporated democracy promotion into their foreign policy.”67 The push for including democracy promotion as a tool of foreign policy by NGOs and civic activists was in the early phases after the revolutions an ideational issue pertaining to the effects of imitation, Europeanization and solidarity, mentioned above. It arguably turned toward a more pragmatic advocacy as the foreign funding supporting the NGOs working for the consolidation of democratic governance started to decline in the late 1990s and the organizations needed new sources of funding in order to sustain the “transition experience” they have accumulated. The Visegrad states in this sense developed active epistemic communities of experts and practitioners in the realm of democratization and economic transformation, which were engaged within the transnational networks of democracy-promoting actors.68 Researchers are, however, somewhat skeptical about the performance of the “transition narrative” in practice.69 The CEE states advocate their “transition experience” as first-hand know-how of the everyday realities of a democratic revolution, which is inherently more relevant than the “theoretical” knowledge of traditional democracy promotors. The narrative of a comparative advantage also serves well within the Western community of donors and is an effective discourse on the part of the regional NGOs to attract foreign funding for projects to be implemented outside the EU. According to some observers, the transition narrative amounts mostly to a self-legitimizing discourse as the relevant “transition experience” is

67 Petrova, Tsveta, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy Among

Postcommunist States (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 22. 68 Scott, James M., “Transnationalizing Democracy Promotion: The Role of Western Political Foundations and Think-Tanks,” Democratization 6 (3), 1999: 146–170. 69 Szent-Iványi, Balázs, “The EU’s Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition Experience from the New Member States”, Europe-Asia Studies 66 (7), 2014: 1102–1121.

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deemed to be very EU accession specific and not readily transferable to third countries and different cultural contexts.70 At the same time, thirty years after the revolutions, though the epistemic communities are on the one hand still reproducing themselves, given that the individuals that have experienced the transition first-hand are either slowly moving out of politics and NGOs or have passed away and are being replaced by young professionals who were already born into a democratic country, the claim that the post-communist states retain transition experience loses a part of its legitimacy. If some of the post-communist states have not yet institutionalized their democracy promotion activities, they are unlikely to face a similar push from the civil society as they did in the aftermath of the revolutions. As described above, the incentives to engage in activities promoting democracy in third countries are broad. Normative and material interests are both at play and the inducements to subscribe to the democracy promotion agenda come from internal and external contexts. Solidarity with countries still living under authoritarian and totalitarian systems motivated the new political elites and civic groups in Visegrad states to embrace democracy promotion, which in turn served to imitate the West and thus strengthen an emerging democratic identity in the postcommunist states. The practice of the democratic transition formed epistemic communities that could “sell” the comparative advantage of transformation experience to recipients and foreign donors, further increasing the status of the Visegrad states. During and after accession to the EU, the Visegrad states were further Europeanized in the development and democracy promotion sector through mechanisms of downloading and uploading. Democracy promotion became increasingly perceived as a geopolitical instrument to stabilize the Union’s neighborhood in the long run and create reliable partners. As the “transition experience” turns out to be transferrable only to a limited extent and as the practitioners of the democratic transition disengage from public and professional life, coupled with “democratic backsliding,” nostalgia and even “democratic fatigue” in the post-communist states, the prospects of their democracy promotion

70 See Horký, Ondˇrej, “The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European ‘Transition Experience’ to the South: Myth or Reality?” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 13 (1), 2012: 17–32; Szent-Iványi, Balázs and Zsuzsanna Végh, “Is Transition Experience Enough? The Donor-Side Effectiveness of Czech and Polish Democracy Aid to Georgia”, Democratization 25 (4), 2018: 614–632.

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activities look rather bleak.71 The next chapters will explore the development of the democracy promotion momentum of Visegrad countries and their current approaches to the agenda.

71 Rupnik, Jacques, “From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash”, Journal of Democracy 18 (4), 2007: 17–25.

CHAPTER 3

The Democracy Assistance Infrastructure of the Visegrad States

Abstract The institutions, programs and budgets—in other words, the infrastructure—involved in the democracy promotion agendas of the Visegrad states are quite differentiated. This chapter focuses on the architecture of the mechanisms that permit the operationalization of democracy assistance by each of the four Visegrad states. It attempts to track the evolution of the infrastructure and describe its standing within government structures. Given the fairly strong integration of the democracy assistance agenda into the official structures of Czech foreign politics, it identifies the country as being the most determined promotor of democracy among the Visegrad states, followed by Poland. In this sense, Hungary is depicted as being most reluctant to engage too explicitly in the agenda. Keywords Transition promotion program · Solidarity fund · International center for democratic transition · Centre for experience transfer from integration and reforms · Modernization theory · Development aid

In general terms, the promotion of democracy is epiphenomenal to Western development aid. Making a clear distinction between aid that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_3

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facilitates the advancement of democratic institutions and aid that doesn’t, would not make sense as most development support is inspired or in line with the now notorious modernization theory. First articulated by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1959 the theory deems that modernization, measured in terms of economic growth and increases in industrial potential of a country, fosters socioeconomic conditions that are favorable to democracy.1 Economic growth leads to an emergence of a more robust middle class, which no longer needs to focus on subsistence, but also on the development of the individual and his or her skills. As the individuals move up Maslow’s pyramid of human needs, there is a growing demand for education, political representation and engagement in public life.2 The one political system that most effectively permits the self-realization of individuals is democracy, thus the modernized individual strives to attain such political organization. More recent research shows that such a clean road to democracy through economic growth is rather theoretical than based on generalizable empirical observations.3 The resources from economic growth, for example, have to be distributed equitably in order to generate a broader middle class. To be distributed fairly, however, there need to exist transparent and accountable political institutions (including free and fair elections) that oversee and regulate the growth of wealth. Such a perspective turns modernization theory on its head, as it believes that, in fact, democracy is a prerequisite to sustainable economic growth rather than the other way around. This logic was embraced in the policy world by the World Bank Report on Sub-Saharan Africa released in 1989, which 1 Lipset, Seymour Martin, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review 53 (1), 1959: 69–105. 2 Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs is a theory in psychology proposed in

1943. It proposes a classification system of human needs ranging from “basic needs” (physiological needs such as food and water; safety and security needs), “psychological needs” (belongingness and love needs; esteem needs such as prestige and feeling of accomplishment) and “self-fulfillment needs” (self-actualization and fulfilling one’s full potential). Maslow, Abraham H., “A Theory of Human Motivation”, Psychological Review 50 (4), 1943: 370–396. 3 For a discussion see Wucherpfennig, Julian and Franziska Deutsch, “Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited”, Living Reviews in Democracy 1 (2019), 1–9, https://cis.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/cis-dam/ CIS_DAM_2015/WorkingPapers/Living_Reviews_Democracy/Wucherpfennig%20Deut sch.pdf.

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emphasized the necessity of focusing on the strengthening of the political dimension in recipient countries to increase the chances of effective socio-economic development.4 Nonetheless, the aim of foreign aid is primarily to advance the sustainable economic growth and thus create better living conditions for individuals within a target society and as per the modernization theory these activities lead to the creation of conditions that are in one way or another conducive to democracy. So, even when donors implement projects for the development of sustainable agriculture in a developing country or when donor financing is used to construct a road that will enable an increase in regional trade, they are indirectly increasing the likeliness of the emergence of democratic governance. Western donors often make a clear distinction between funding and projects devoted purely to “democracy assistance” and those designated for development support. Countries maintain separate budget lines for democracy assistance, build distinct tools and institutions to carry out the agenda and publicly distinguish between democracy assistance and development support. For example, recent US federal budgets have under section 7032 included a consolidated figure for the funding of “democracy programs” in foreign states—the budget for fiscal year 2020 counted with a minimum of $2.4 billion for democracy programs, the figure stood at $2.9 billion in 2014.5 In this section we thus aim to look at the institutional framework of bilateral democracy assistance of the Visegrad states—i.e. the tools, budgets and organizations that are specifically designed to assist democracy. From a comparative perspective, we will observe the variation across the states and attempt to answer the question why some states have explicitly created institutions that are employed to assist democratization abroad, while others prefer to conflate it within a broader framework of development support.

4 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth—A Long Term Perspective Study (1989), http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/498241468742 846138/pdf/multi0page.pdf. 5 Public Law 116–94—Dec. 20, 2019, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1865/text; Public Law 113– 76—Jan. 17, 2014, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/PLAW-113publ76/pdf/PLAW-113publ76.pdf.

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The Czech Republic: A Determined Promotor Of the four Visegrad states, the Czech Republic has institutionalized its democracy assistance agenda to the most significant degree. A catalyst for the creation of a separate democracy assistance budget and instruments was the Czech involvement in the politico-economic reconstruction of Iraq after the US-led intervention in 2003, which was politically supported by Prague in the (in)famous letter from the “new” Europe.6 Czech experts and consultants were dispatched into the USled Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Iraq in late 2003. Funding for particular projects related to the transformation of Iraq was allocated in March 2004 and amounted to 12 million CZK7 (approximately 320,000 EUR in constant prices)—the subsequent projects that were implemented included the training of Iraqi diplomats within the Czech Diplomatic Academy, stipends for exceptional Iraqi students, university courses focused on “information management” and the training of 200 Iraqi judges and lawyers.8 The budget was not committed only to the direct building of democracy as it was also used to finance projects in the health sector and to fund, for instance, equipment in a police station in Az Zubayr. The administration of the funding was to be carried out by a newly established unit within the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—the “Transition Promotion” Unit. The Czech Republic received praise from the United States for its reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) allegedly studied Eastern European transformation and in this respect “welcome[d] any sort of advice from the Czech side.”9 The pronounced interest on the part of the United States in Czech expertise coupled with strong lobbying efforts from 6 Grote, Inga, “Donald Rumsfeld’s Old and New Europe and the United States’ Strategy to Destabilize the European Union”, Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali 74 (3), 2007: 347–356. 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, “Transformaˇcní pomoc Iráku v roce 2004”, https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/lidska_prava/prioritni_ zeme_a_projekty_transformacni/irak/transformacni_spoluprace_iraku_2004.html. 8 Moravec, Filip, Jan Šnaidauf and Simona Hlaváˇcová, Hodnocení zapojení Ceské ˇ republiky do rekonstrukce a stabilizace Iráku (Prague: Association for International Affairs, 2007), https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/amocz-RP-02-2007.pdf. 9 “Czech Foreign Minister Visits Iraq”, Czech the News 12 (4), July/August 2003, https://www.mzv.cz/file/167003/ctn0307_08.htm.

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Czech NGOs (especially the largest one—People in Need10 ), the Czech government decided to extend the “transition” funding beyond Iraq and increased its budget to 14 million CZK. A separate, Transition Promotion Program (TPP) was thus created, and the original “Transition Promotion” unit was later merged with the Department of Human Rights into the Human Rights and Transition Policy Department (HRTP). In 2005, the first transformation promotion strategy was drafted and adopted by the government.11 The structure of Czech development policy underwent a major overhaul in 2007–2008, which gave birth to the Czech Development Agency (CzDA). Despite recommendations from the peer review process of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), which advised to include transition promotion under Czech development assistance, the Czech government decided to maintain the program as a distinct policy area within the administration of HRTP.12 The decision to leave the Transition Promotion Program as a separate policy area administered directly by the MFA, but complementary to Czech development and humanitarian aid, attests to the political importance the government of the time placed on having an explicit tool for assisting democracy abroad. In its foreign policy strategy document adopted in 2011 (Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic), the Czech Republic lists the issue of “promoting democracy” among its priorities and states that “In its policy of promoting human rights and democracy, [it] is an active and responsible member of the international community,” while highlighting the “specific experience gained in its own process of social

10 Bartovic, Vladimír, “Limited Resources, Global Ambitions: The Czech Republic’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt (eds.), Democracy’s New Champions, 34. 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Transition Policy Concept, https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/lidska_prava/transformacni_spoluprace_ 1/obecne_TRANS/koncepce_transformacni_spoluprace_1.html. 12 OECD DAC, Special Review of the Czech Republic, 2007, http://www.oecd.org/ development/peer-reviews/45367897.pdf; Foreign Development Cooperation Concept of the Czech Republic, 2010–2017, http://www.czechaid.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 09/Koncepce-zahranicni-rozvojove-spoluprace-na-obdobi-2010-2017.pdf.

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transition and nonviolent resistance.”13 The 2015 foreign policy strategy document reiterated these points, claiming that “A policy of promoting human rights and democracy is fundamental to the safeguarding of human dignity” and that “The promotion of democracy, human rights and transition represents one of its sectoral priorities.”14 In this sense it also embraced a broader definition of human rights, and thus democracy, stating that “Czech foreign policy is based on the principles of universality and the indivisibility of human rights, within the scope of which civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights are crucial for a dignified existence; the denial of such rights violates human dignity and may invite international instability.”15 The Czech Republic thus officially supports the development of and the access to all three generations of human rights.16 The Czech Republic also maintains a human rights and transition promotion strategy of which the latest version from the year 2015 identifies priorities and a general guiding framework. The concept paper sees that “Democracy, the rule of law and human rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of human dignity.” For that reason, “Promoting them and putting them into reality is an important priority goal of Czech foreign policy. As part of this goal, the Czech Republic promotes

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Conceptual Basis of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, 2011, https://www.mzv.cz/file/1413391/koncepce_zahran icni_politiky_2011_en.pdf. 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy, 2015, https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/policy_planning/ concept_of_the_czech_republic_s_foreign.html. 15 Ibid. 16 The three generations of human rights were identified by the French-Czech jurist Karel Vasak in 1977. Vasak claimed that “The first generation concerns ‘negative rights’, in the sense that their respect requires that the state do nothing to interfere with individual liberties, and correspond roughly to the civil and political rights. The second generation, on the other hand, requires positive action by the state to be implemented, as is the case with most social, economic and cultural rights. The international community is now embarking upon a third generation of human rights which may be called ‘rights of solidarity’”. Vasak, Karel, “A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” UNESCO Courier 30 (11), 1977: 29–32.

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transition to democracy worldwide and shares its specific experience of social transformation and democracy building.”17 The strategic documents demonstrate that democracy promotion, renamed as “transition” support or “transformation promotion,” is embedded in Czech foreign policy practice. In fact, the transition promotion strategy identifies an identitarian component of assisting democracy abroad as it is a policy that “reflects the humanistic principles of Czech political thought” and even labels it a “tradition” initially embodied by former President Václav Havel and Foreign Minister Jiˇrí Dienstbier.18 The policy is also deemed to enhance the country’s status since “Consistent work in this area raises the Czech Republic’s profile and contributes to its positive international image as a developed, responsible and solidarity-minded democratic country capable of learning from its own past.”19 The TPP as such works as a grant-making scheme. The HRTP Department opens annual calls for proposals in which, however, only NGOs based in the Czech Republic can participate. The NGOs design projects to be implemented in third countries with local partners. A fraction of the TPP budget is allocated by Czech embassies to fund small scale, often politically sensitive projects.20 Understandably, there is no public access to the types of small projects funded.21 According to the Czech law on international development assistance,22 transformation assistance is part of Czech development assistance, but has a separate budget line in the state budget.23 The budget has been

17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Human Rights and Transition Promotion Policy Concept of the Czech Republic, 2015, https://www.mzv.cz/public/ 98/7c/e8/2239165_1648851_Human_rights_and_transition_promotion_policy_con cept_of_the_Czech_Republic_.pdf. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Interview with Czech MFA official, summer 2019. 21 Czech Embassies Announce Calls for Proposals, see: https://www.mzv.cz/tbilisi/en/

the_eastern_partnership/transition_small_scale_project_proposals_1.html. 22 Law no. 151/2010 Col. “Zákon o zahraniˇcní rozvojové spolupráci a humanitární pomoci poskytované do zahraniˇcí a o zmˇenˇe souvisejících zákonu”, ˚ 21 April 2010, p. 1963. 23 See Law no. 336/2018 Col. “Zákon o státním rozpoˇctu Ceské ˇ republiky na rok 2019”, 19 December 2018, p. 6.

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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Fig. 3.1 Transformation promotion program annual budget (millions of CZK, nominal) (Source Data compiled by author from laws on state budget of the Czech Republic, years 2009–2020)

fairly steady over the last decade, fluctuating around 2–2.5 million EUR (Fig. 3.1). The TPP presents a bilateral instrument of democracy assistance, but the Czech Republic also provided contributions to the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund, which was inter alia used to support democratic governance. Created in 2000, the Trust Fund was initially employed to fund projects within the Czech Republic itself. Its mission was changed after the accession into the European Union, when it shifted its focus toward supporting good governance and economic transformation in the ex-Soviet republics and the Western Balkans. The Trust Fund existed until 2018 and its total funding amounted to over 10 million EUR over the course of fourteen years.24 It was replaced by the Czech-UNDP Partnership for Sustainable Development Goals, which focuses on four priority areas and among them is “good governance and rule of law.”25

Hungary: A Reluctant Promotor Hungary has been depicted by scholars as a “premature donor,” reestablishing its development aid programs with “no domestic support” and 24 UNDP, “Czech-UNDP Partnership for the SDGs”, https://www.eurasia.undp.org/ content/rbec/en/home/partnerships/aid-effectiveness-partnerships/czech-undp-partne rship.html. 25 Ibid.

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rather under external pressure by the OECD and the EU.26 The country re-created its international development policy and infrastructure in 2001–2003 before the EU accession but subsequent years saw little changes.27 Unlike the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary has a much less centralized and less transparent institutional framework for supporting democracy abroad. While Hungary was engaged in the case of Iraqi reconstruction assistance, which prompted the Czech MFA to institutionalize the TPP, Budapest was less involved in implementing projects directly related to the support of democratization and development of civil society in the country. The Hungarian PRT in Baghlan, for example, built infrastructure and educational facilities.28 The Hungarian government also provided the United States with premises in the Taszar Air Base to train Iraqi exiles (the so-called Free Iraqi Forces) to serve as liaisons between the American military and the Iraqi population.29 The National Security Strategy of Hungary adopted in the year 2004 describes the nexus between the country’s security and democracy. It considered the consolidation of democracy a part of the “Euro-Atlantic integration process” and sees the “implementation of democracy” as a core national security interest. In a brief mention of external democracy assistance, the document stated that “Hungary participates within the range of its possibilities in OSCE missions, in the protection of democracy.” In addition, it described the necessity to uphold and consolidate democratic governance in neighboring countries, where significant Hungarian minorities live:

26 Szent-Iványi, Balázs, “Hungary: Understanding the Mentality of a Premature Donor”

in Ondˇrej Horký-Hluchánˇ and Simon Lightfoot (eds.), Development Cooperation of the ‘New’ EU Member States: Beyond Europeanization (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 132. 27 Szent-Iványi, Balázs, “Hungarian International Development Cooperation: Context, Stakeholders and Performance”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 13 (1), 2012: 51. 28 Shah Ghani Zada, Ahmad “Hungarian PRT Implement Various Projects in Baghlan”, The Khaama Press News Agency, 21 December 2011, https://www.khaama.com/hungar ian-prt-implement-various-projects-in-baghlan-189/. 29 Yee, Sonya and Robin Wright, “Mobilization of Iraqi Exiles Falls Short”, Los Angeles Times, 29 March 2003, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-29-war-hun gary29-story.html.

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Hungary supports the concept, according to which Hungarians living in neighbouring countries must enjoy forms of self-government and autonomy […] the Republic of Hungary may contribute significantly to stability in the region and strengthen its relations with neighbouring countries. Hungary therefore has a particular interest in the enhancement of processes leading to the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law.30

The strategic document thus showed a more inward-looking focus on democratic consolidation, which however extends also to Hungarians living abroad. This creates space for externalizing the necessity to consolidate democracy at home also to neighboring countries, but as per the document’s note on cooperation with the OSCE, efforts to assist democracy abroad would be conducted preferably through multilateral organizations. Nonetheless, the Hungarian government did initiate some steps to systemize democracy assistance efforts in 2005 when it founded the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation (CDPF) and facilitated the establishment of its independent unit, the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT), and later in 2007 when the MFA set up the inter-departmental Democracy Workgroup. The ICDT was an independent non-profit organization, which originated with the idea of former US Ambassador to Hungary, Mark Palmer, who proposed “establishing an institute to collect and share the experiences of past democratic transitions.”31 His idea was followed up by meetings between the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister and the US Secretary of State in 2004 and in September 2005 the Hungarian President Laszlo Solyom announced its establishment at the World Summit of the United Nations. In the Centre’s own words, “Instead of promoting democracy in general, the ICDT sets more concrete and pragmatic goals.” It “strives to show how dozens of young democracies have made and are making the transition, so that those who set off on this difficult journey from dictatorship to democracy in the future may learn from the successes as well as from the failures.”32

30 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 2004, https://www.files. ethz.ch/isn/157029/Hungary_English-2004.pdf. 31 ICDT, Promoting Democratic Transition Worldwide in 2008. 32 Ibid.

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In its first three years of existence, the ICDT received about half of its funding from the Hungarian MFA and the rest from other donors, raising a little over 2.5 million EUR in total. The ICDT was part of the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, tasked inter alia to “actively contribute to the spread of democratic government structures without any geographic limitations” and “perform tasks related to the scientific study of democratic transition.”33 However, in 2017 the Centre announced that “it has been decided to eliminate the ICDT from the founding document of the Democracy Center Public Foundation, and thus put an end to the existence of this institution.”34 Some of the agenda related to the exchange of democratic transition experience was overtaken by the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT), also an independent unit of DCPF, which for example, hosted events designed to share V4 transitional experience with South Korea.35 The Democracy Workgroup at the MFA formally operating since 2008 was tasked with setting the strategic direction of Hungarian democracy assistance, deciding on particular democracy assistance projects and coordinating the agenda across numerous departments. The Workgroup was allegedly supposed to draft a distinct democracy assistance strategy—the strategy, however, never publicly materialized.36 In the same time as the Workgroup was initiated, Hungary issued its External Relations Strategy, which explicitly mentioned that “Hungary aims to reduce poverty, help democratic processes and develop civil society in the partner countries through her bilateral and multilateral international development and assistance programmes.” It also emphasized that “the progress of democratic institutions and of the market economy … are fundamental Hungarian interests” and that “With her EU and NATO partners, she participates

33 Deed of Foundation of the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, http://www. demkk.hu/en/public-foundation/deed-of-foundation. 34 ICDT Announcement Published on Its Facebook Page on 30 April 2017, https:// www.facebook.com/icdthungary/. 35 See Wagner, Péter, ed., Consolidating Democracy and Market: Conference Report on the Visegrad Four Countries’ Experiences in Transition (Budapest: Institute for Foreign Affairs, 2018), https://kki.hu/assets/upload/Korea_kiadvany_web.pdf. 36 Horváth, Áron, “Hungarian Minorities, the Balkans … and the Far East: Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt (eds.), Democracy’s New Champions.

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in stabilising the region, … in building democratic institutions.” Moreover, under the heading “responsible Hungary in the world” it stated that “Hungarian foreign policy strives consistently for a worldwide promotion of democratic values.”37 This emphasis on institutionalizing democracy assistance in Hungarian foreign policy was most pronounced during the tenure of the Foreign Minister Kinga Göncz of the Hungarian Socialist Party and daughter of Árpád Göncz, the first post-communist president of Hungary. The “Promotion of Democratic Transition Appropriation” saw a 100% increase from 200,000 EUR to 400,000 EUR in 2008. Recent budget proposals for the Hungarian MFA, however, no longer include an explicit democracy promotion appropriation.38 Therefore, given that Hungarian development aid is considered to be “one of the least transparent in the world,” data on current financing of democracy assistance activities is not publicly available.39 According to the numbers reported to OECD DAC, Hungary spent 0.18 million EUR on supporting good governance in 2014, 0.7 in 2015, 0.34 in 2016, 0.32 in 2017 and 1.85 in 2018 (though the massive increase between 2014 and 2018 seems somewhat inconsistent with other findings and should rather be attributed to an incompleteness in data reporting).40 The Foreign Ministers of the FIDESZ party succeeding Göncz have been less pronounced about “exporting” democracy (see discussion in Chapter 6). Still, the 2012 National Security Strategy mentioned that “fundamental security interests of Hungary include… the spreading of democracy,” reiterated the democracy-security nexus in Hungary’s neighborhood and expressed support for “strengthening the democratic

37 Hungary’s External Relations Strategy, https://web.archive.org/web/201805170 80401/http://www.mfa.gov.hu:80/NR/rdonlyres/3E8FA370-15B3-4919-AC14-41A 02CB54BA3/0/080319_kulkapcs_strat_en.pdf. 38 XVIII. Külgazdasági és Külügyminisztérium, Budget Proposal 2019, https://www. parlament.hu/irom41/00503/adatok/fejezetek/18.pdf. 39 Szent-Iványi, Balász and Simon Lightfoot, “Determinants of Civil Society Influence: The Case of International Development and Humanitarian NGOs in the Czech Republic and Hungary”, Comparative European Politics 14 (6), 2016: 761–780. 40 Data based on OECD DAC database.

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character of the transformation under way in the Middle East and North Africa.”41 Similarly, the International Development Cooperation Strategy and Strategic Concept for International Humanitarian Aid of Hungary 2014– 2020 declared among its main sectors of support “institutional development,” which includes “consolidating democratic structures and the rule of law, sharing the experience gained during transition and integration processes; good governance, institutional capacity building of central, local and sectoral administration, strengthening civil society.”42 Hungary’s International Development Cooperation Strategy for the period of 2020–2025 is, however, less explicit and assumes a more passive role for the country in supporting democracy through its development assistance.43 Democracy within Hungarian development policy is conceived as a tool to address “the root causes of migration” rather than an end in itself.44

Poland: Engaging in the Name of Solidarity The importance of the Solidarity Labor Union for Poland’s history can hardly be overstated. Solidarity is an emblem of national emancipation from the Soviet sphere of influence, a symbol of the power of the (“ordinary”) people and a metonymy of Polish democratization. The legacy of Solidarity transpires into the Polish identity and inspires even its development policies. In its appeal to the working people of Eastern Europe in 1981, the labor union—“contrary to the lies spread in [those] countries”—sought to internationalize the struggle for “improved living conditions for all working people” by expressing support for countries 41 Hungary’s National Security Strategy 2012, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Hon grie_-_2012_-_National_Security_Strategy.pdf. 42 International Development Cooperation Strategy and Strategic Concept for International Humanitarian Aid of Hungary 2014–2020, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/ 3/93/c0000/International%20Development%20Cooperation%20and%20Humanitarian% 20Aid%20Strategy%20of%20Hungary-v%C3%A9gleges.pdf. 43 A magyar Kormány Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttm˝ uködési Stratégiája a 2020 és 2025 közötti id˝ oszakra, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/7/8d/82000/NEFE2025% 20-%20Strat%C3%A9gia.pdf. 44 Hungary’s International Development Cooperation Strategy for the Period 2020–2025—Summary, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/7/3f/92000/NEFE2025_ summary_en.pdf.

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in Eastern Europe and hoping to “meet to exchange their union experiences” with the countries’ representatives.45 Following this spirit, Poland and its civil society after the transformation sought to share experience of the democratization know-how with less fortunate societies. Poland thus maintains almost a “messianic conviction that the skills [it] acquired should be further transferred. This is the mission of Polish civil society, which goes back to the Solidarity ethos.”46 Indeed, Polish civil society, whose leaders have been active in the Solidarity movement during communism, has significantly contributed to the shape of Poland’s external aid infrastructure.47 The personal and professional transnational ties of Solidarity’s leaders, who have themselves been recipients of foreign aid in the 1980s, has served a great deal in extending their pro-democracy network beyond Central and Eastern Europe. As Petrova documents, “Building on Solidarity’s international activism and the networks of their Western patrons and partners, these Polish activists have fostered, maintained, and further developed formal or informal relations with prodemocratic activists from other countries.”48 In this sense, Poland was quick to capitalize on its transition experience when in 1997 it established the “Polish Foundation for Market Transformation ‘Know How’” at the initiative and under the honorary patronage of the President of the Republic of Poland, Aleksander Kwa´sniewski. The Foundation was initially preoccupied with assisting market transformations in Eastern Europe and later moved to the development sphere but was suspended in 2005. A renewed interest in supporting democratic governance abroad reinvigorated the foundation in 2011 and later renamed it as the Solidarity Fund PL. As per the Fund’s statute, its objective “shall be carrying out tasks related to international development cooperation, including supporting democratic changes, development of civic society, rules of good governance, respect for human rights, development of local democracy, transferring experience ensuing from economic 45 Appeal of the 1st National Congress of Delegates of Solidarity to the Working People of Eastern Europe, 8 September 1981, http://polishfreedom.pl/en/document/poslaniei-krajowego-zjazdu-delegatow-nszz-solidarnosc-do-ludzi-pracy-europy-wschodniej. 46 Cited in Chimiak, Galia, “From Solidarno´sc´ to Global Solidarity: The Engagement of Polish Civil Society in Development Cooperation”, Studia Socjologiczne 222, 2016: 172. 47 See Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics and Chimiak, From Solidarno´sc´ to Global Solidarity. 48 Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics, 65.

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and system transformation.”49 The Fund receives most of its financing through the Polish development budget (a “state budget specific grant” at around 14 million PLN per year, i.e. 3.2 million EUR50 ). It is under the competence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and receives public funds “to conduct the tasks commissioned by MFA,” but it “can also use funds from other sources” while implementing Polish Development Cooperation projects. Since 2012 the Solidarity Fund implements its Democracy Programme, which is funded through the Polish development budget and its projects are aimed at “supporting democracy-oriented transformations in countries that have already embraced some democratic elements as well as in the countries that are undergoing systemic transition.”51 A unique tool of Polish democracy assistance is also the PolishAmerican Freedom Foundation (PAFF) founded as part of the PolishAmerican Enterprise Fund, which was financed through the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989. The US Congress passed the SEED Act as a broad initiative to assist the development of market economies in the democratizing countries of Eastern Europe. The Enterprise Funds were intended mainly as cheap capital to jumpstart the economies through private endeavor. The Polish Enterprise Fund was successful in generating a surplus, which the US Congress and the Polish Government agreed to devote to the Polish-American Freedom Foundation. Although not a governmental institution (but created through government initiatives), given its financial endowment the Foundation plays an important role in the dissemination of Polish transition experience—among its three core priorities is “Sharing the Polish Experiences in Transformation.” Within this priority, PAFF carries out the Region in Transition (RITA) program, which aims to support “democratic, social and economic transformation in the … countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.” Since its establishment, the program

49 Statute of Fundacja Solidarno´sci Mi˛edzynarodowej [The Solidarity Fund PL], http://

solidarityfund.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Statute_Solidarity-Fund-PL_ENG.pdf. 50 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Polish Development Cooperation— 2018 Annual Report, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/polish-development-coorperat ion---2018-annual-report. 51 Solidariry Fund PL, “Democracy Support Programmes”, https://solidarityfund.pl/ en/co-robimy/demokratyzacja/program-wsparcie-demokracji/.

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provided funding to over 1000 projects and disbursed 15 million USD in grants.52 Poland adopted its first Strategy for development cooperation in October 2003. In view of the upcoming EU membership, the Strategy organized the Polish development cooperation system, including PolishAid, and defined basic goals, rules and mechanisms for providing aid. Among the objectives of Polish foreign aid the document listed: promoting democracy, rule of law and principles of good governance and sharing experience of Poland’s political transformation.53 In August 2005, the Department of Development Cooperation was created at the MFA, which has since then been in charge of the national development aid system. The Department included a low-level unit for democracy assistance.54 Furthermore, an Interministerial Unit for Supporting Democratic Changes in Central and Eastern Europe was established within the Prime Minister’s Office during the Law and Order party rule between 2005 and 2007. The current system of development aid, of which Polish democracy support is an integral part, is guided by the 2012 Law on development cooperation.55 According to the text of the law, the Polish development cooperation is inter alia “aimed at creating conditions for sustainable development of the partner countries and their societies, in particular by promoting and consolidating democracy.”56 The law’s language is repeated in the Multiannual Development Cooperation Program framework for the years 2016–2020. The document defines thematic priorities for Polish Development Cooperation, which include “democracy and human rights—in particular, democratic election process; human rights and civic freedoms; strengthening the civic society organisations, civic

52 RITA, “About the Program”, https://programrita.org/en/about/. 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Strategy for Poland’s Development

Cooperation, 2003, https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/About,Polish,aid,202.html. 54 Ka´zmierskiewicz, Piotr, “Eastern Promises and Achievements: Poland’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt (eds.), Democracy’s New Champions, 89. 55 Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] of 2011, no. 234 item 1386. 56 Ibid.

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dialogue.”57 Most of the activities falling under the thematic priority of promoting democracy are carried out by the Solidarity Fund. In a reference to the operability of the Polish transition experience, the Program acknowledges that the “events taking place in the vicinity of the European Union show how important it is for the international community, including Poland, to engage in assuring stability and successful transformations in the countries that are the neighbours of the EU.”58

Slovakia: Joining Democracy Promotion Efforts with a Time-Lag The distinct nature of Slovakia’s internal political development after the 1989 revolution, which was characterized by gaining national independence and a period of democratic deconstruction under the Meˇciar government, has also led to a time-lag in the country’s development of a “Western” or Europeanized development cooperation infrastructure. Termed “a black hole in the middle of Europe” by then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Slovakia lost sight of EU and NATO accession during the Meˇciar years.59 The years between 1993 and 1998 are often portrayed as a “period of inertia” as the country created no new initiatives in the realm of its development cooperation.60 However, after the Atlanticist center-right coalition emerged as a replacement of Meˇciar’s government, Slovakia made a geopolitical U-turn and in terms of its development cooperation policies started to implement changes so as to meet criteria related to EU accession—still, Profant and Gažoviˇc, for example, see the country’s effort as becoming a “donor against its will.”61 In its strategic documents related to development, though, it has adhered to principles and goals related to the spread of 57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Multiannual Development Cooperation Program Framework for the Years 2016–2020, https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/ polish-aid. 58 Ibid. 59 Kacer, Rastislav and Marian Tupy, “Out of the Black Hole”, Wall Street Journal, 17 February 2005, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110859394591756971. 60 Gažoviˇc, Ondrej and Tomáš Profant, “Slovakia: A Donor Against Its Will?” in Ondˇrej Horký-Hluchánˇ and Simon Lightfoot (eds.), Development Cooperation of the ‘New’ EU Member States: Beyond Europeanization (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 64–65. 61 Ibid.

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democratic governance. The first documents outlining the framework of Slovak development cooperation from 1999 have demonstrated the devotion to provide support to third countries also in the political realm by supporting “democratic institutions.”62 The self-proclaimed shift from recipient to donor took place in 2003 when Slovakia started providing foreign aid under the banner of SlovakAid. Mirroring the developments in the Czech Republic, Slovakia completed the institutional and legal framework for its development assistance and in compliance with a new act on Official Development Assistance, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC) as its budgetary organization. The Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund, created in 2002 by a memorandum between UNDP and the Slovak Government, was a facilitator in the process of the institutionalization of Slovak development cooperation. The Trust Fund—as in the case of the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund—still operates, currently with the aim of supporting “political and economic reforms in the region of Western Balkans and Eastern Europe (sharing Slovakia´s reform experience), and promotion of private sector involvement in development.”63 The Medium-term Strategy for Development Cooperation of the Slovak Republic for the years 2008–2013 sets the rationale for the country’s provision of development support. First, Slovakia feels a “co-responsibility” for global development—this co-responsibility is embedded in the values of peace, solidarity, basic freedoms, democracy and good governance. Second, Slovakia is interested in being an active actor in international politics and lastly, it feels a moral obligation to help and is also bound by commitments tied to its membership in the EU.64 The 2008–2013 Strategy copies the sectoral priorities of the 2003–2008 strategy, which include the support for the creation of democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society and peace. In this context,

62 The National Council of the Slovak Republic, Charter of the Official Development Assistance and Cooperation of the Slovak Republic, 2000, https://www.jstor.org/stable/ pdf/44963321.pdf. 63 UNDP Regional Hub for Europe and Central Asia, “Why Is Slovakia Helping”, https://publicfinance.undp.sk/en/oda/. 64 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Strednodobá stratégia oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky na roky 2009–2013, http://www.slovakaid.sk/ sites/default/files/strednodoba_strategia_oda_sr_2009_20013.pdf.

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Slovakia is “prepared and willing to share its transformation experience and know-how” in the above-mentioned spheres.65 The subsequent strategic document for years 2014–2018 defines the vision and basic goals of Slovak development cooperation, which are based on the strengthening of democracy and good governance abroad. It reiterates that the implementation of the vision and goals is facilitated by its transformation experience and the effective adoption of democratic principles; by the successful integration into international organizations and the recent experience with being a recipient of foreign aid. The Strategy also introduces 8 key program areas, which include the “program of sharing transformation experience”—a segment of foreign aid that is deemed as the “comparative advantage” of Slovakia. The program, nonetheless, is not concerned solely with the political transformation of target countries, but focuses on the economic and social transformation, which means that the goals of the program include the reform of the security sector, energy security, water management and food security.66 The transformation experience program area is to be implemented inter alia by CETIR (Centre for Experience Transfer from Integration and Reforms). CETIR was created in 2011 as a unit of SAIDC (as CETIR Point of contact) and is tasked with disseminating transition experience in order to support democratization and reform processes in target states.67 With a yearly budget not topping 100,000 EUR, CETIR is structured differently than the Czech Transition Promotion Program, for example, as it is mainly geared to provide technical expertise (thus resembling EU instruments such as TAIEX and Twinning).68 The program area can also be funded through the small grant scheme of SAIDC, which distributes

65 Ibid. 66 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Strednodobá stratégia rozvojovej spolupráce Slovenskej republiky na roky 2014–2018, https://www.mzv.sk/doc uments/10182/68590/Strednodoba+strategia+ODA+SR+2014-2018_SK_11_02_2014. pdf/7e146c6b-a621-42a5-b56c-76c58a6c8a5a. 67 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, “CETIR - Centre for Experience Transfer from Integration and Reforms”, 2014, https://issuu.com/slovakaid/docs/ cetir_letak_engl_web. 68 SlovakAid, “Slovensko Poskytuje Skúsenosti z Integrácie a Reforiem”, https://www. slovakaid.sk/en/node/907.

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funding through calls for proposals for small-scale projects amounting to a maximum of 10,000 EUR, with a yearly budget of 600,000 EUR.69 The Slovak act on Official Development Assistance of 2007 was replaced in 2016 by a new act, which unlike the language of the former law, defines no explicit priorities for Slovak ODA and thus does not mention the support for the strengthening of democracy abroad as goal of Slovak ODA—it essentially leaves the definition of development priorities and goals to the MFA.70 The latest medium-term development cooperation strategy of Slovakia (2019–2023) is closely tied to the SDGs, while repeating the transition narrative: “Slovakia implements development cooperation with partner countries with the aim to contribute to their sustainable development—mainly through lowering poverty and strengthening democracy and good governance. In this process, Slovakia draws on its experience with transition, building institutions of an independent state, developing a market economy, and fulfilling the principles of democracy, as well as on successful integration into international organizations and associations.”71

69 SlovakAid, ranty.

“Microgrants”,

https://www.slovakaid.sk/sk/ako-pomahame/mikrog

70 Law of 18 November 2015 on Development Cooperation (392/2015 Z. z. o rozvojovej spolupráci a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov), https://www.slovakaid.sk/ sites/default/files/novelizacia_zakona_392_2015.pdf. 71 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Medium-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation of The Slovak Republic For 2019–2023, https://www. slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/strednodoba_strategia_rozvojovej_spoluprace_eng_20192023_644_stran_final.pdf.

CHAPTER 4

The Target States of Visegrad Countries’ Democracy Assistance

Abstract Democracy assistance is targeted and with the limited capacities of the individual Visegrad states, the governments need to prioritize where to send aid and where to engage in terms of helping the formation of democratic governance. In this chapter, the geographical priorities of the four states in their democracy assistance agendas are observed. The chapter seeks to clarify the differentiated geographical focuses and also the historical evolution of prioritizing target states in the context of the geo-strategic goals of the Visegrad states. Statistics related to democracy assistance directed to selected countries are also presented. Keyword Recipient state · Development aid · Democracy assistance · COMECON · OECD DAC

The strategic rationale for the effort to promote democracy can be partly deduced from the target countries that donors choose as recipients of their programs and funding. The Visegrad states, of course, have limited resources to spend on development cooperation (both in terms of finance and people), so they have to prioritize and focus their aid both territorially and thematically. The states thus make strategic decisions concerning

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_4

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which societies are “worthwhile” to support in their possible democratization efforts. The choice, however, shows to be both strategic and political and not always economical (i.e. that assisting a selected country will bring the most effective returns in terms of democratization). As expressed laconically by a Slovak MFA official when speaking about the selection of partner countries for development: “we have chosen Serbia because of ourselves, Kenya because of the EU and Afghanistan because of NATO.”1 Indeed, we can categorize Visegrad states’ declared target countries along three major clusters. One category is composed of countries connected to the communist period when Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary provided foreign aid through COMECON and bilateral initiatives. Another category contains states that have been “assigned” by external actors in the name of burden-sharing or effective division of labor or made relevant to receive support based on external events. The last category consists of V4’s neighboring states or post-communist states to which they can relate their historical experience of transformation and socio-economic development. The described categorization was most visible in the initial phases of the countries’ development cooperation agenda—in the period around EU accession. The first category of priority recipient countries, which includes Vietnam, Mongolia, Angola, Ethiopia, Laos, Mozambique and China, can be considered as a legacy of the communist period, when the four Visegrad states (three respectively) provided certain forms of development and humanitarian assistance. During that era, the mentioned recipients were considered to be part of the ideological camp of the Eastern Bloc and supported through COMECON and on a bilateral basis.2 The priority countries to receive support were selected by the Soviet Union, but COMECON countries could also set their individual priorities if duly negotiated with Moscow. Most of the assistance to these countries was of a technical nature, for example, sending experts to overlook and manage the construction of various infrastructure projects. The aid also contained an ideological/political aspect in the form of 1 Paraphrased in Gažoviˇc and Profant, Slovakia: A Donor Against Its Will?, 69. 2 COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was an organization estab-

lished in January 1949 to facilitate and coordinate the economic development of the eastern European countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. Non-European states, namely Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia also became its members. The organization disbanded in 1991.

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scholarship for students from priority countries—for instance, Czechoslovakia set up the University of November 17,3 which served to school foreign students.4 The Visegrad states thus had some preexisting links in the form of people-to-people contacts and knowledge of the local socio-political infrastructure, which facilitated the provision of aid in the post-communist period. However, the aid to these countries after 1991 remained developmental and humanitarian rather than of a democracy assistance nature. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, most of these communistlegacy countries are no longer among the priority recipients of the Visegrad states in 2020. Table 4.1 also demonstrates that when compared to the other three states, Hungary has a very wide list of partner countries, which is often identified as a problem for coordination and thus the effectiveness of aid. The government acknowledges the issue, stating that “As a result, our assistance is fragmented, less effective and provides lower visibility for Hungary’s IDC policy.” Accordingly, the 2020–2025 development strategy calls for a “more comprehensive policy coordination” and a “more delimited geographical focus” but does not spell out the specific target countries. It does, however, aim to put more focus on countries of Sub-Saharan African than in the past.5 The second category of states is composed of countries that were targets of wider missions or operations carried out by the Visegrad states’ Western partners—these include Afghanistan, Iraq, but also Syria. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were in charge of their proper provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and took part in the reconstruction of Iraq, providing mainly training to local stakeholders and sending peacekeeping troops. Hungary was most reluctant to include its troops in the Iraqi mission, but was subtly pressured by the United States to do so—as then Hungarian Defense Minister Ferenc Juhasz warned,

3 The name of the University commemorated the Nazi security forces raid on Czechoslovak student leaders on the night of November 16–17, 1939. Many of the students were subsequently murdered or sent to concentration camps as a consequence of their protest against the closing of Czechoslovak Universities by the Nazi occupation administration. Hence November 17 is celebrated as International Students’ Day. 4 See Leichtová, Magdaléna and Linda Piknerová, Rozvojová spolupráce východního bloku v dobˇe studené války (Prague: Dokoˇrán, 2013). 5 Hungary’s International Development Cooperation Strategy for the Period 2020– 2025.

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Table 4.1 Development and democracy assistance priority countries of states

V4

Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Priority countries (as of 2020)

Bosnia and Herzegovina Cambodia Ethiopia Georgia Moldova Palestine Syria Ukraine Zambia Phasing out after 2020: Mongolia Kosovo Serbia

Belarus Ethiopia Georgia Kenya Lebanon Moldova Myanmar Palestine Senegal Tanzania Uganda Ukraine

Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Kenya Kosovo North Macedonia Serbia

Priority countries in 20066

Afghanistan Angola Bosnia and Herzegovina Iraq Moldova Mongolia Serbia Vietnam Yemen Zambia

Afghanistan Sub-Saharan Africa region Bosnia and Herzegovina Iraq Yemen Cambodia Kyrgyzstan Laos Kosovo Macedonia Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Palestinian Authority Serbia Ukraine Vietnam Afghanistan Bosnia and Herzegovina Cambodia China Ethiopia FYR Macedonia Iraq Kyrgyzstan Laos Moldova Mongolia Palestine Authority Serbia Ukraine Vietnam Yemen

Afghanistan Angola Belarus Georgia Iraq Moldova Palestine Authority Ukraine Vietnam

Afghanistan Albania Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina FYR Macedonia Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Mongolia Mozambique Serbia Sudan Tajikistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

Source Compiled by author based on strategic documents of the Visegrad states 6 Based on Szent-Iványi, Balász and András Tétényi, “Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries: A Path Dependent Approach”, Transition Studies Review 15 (3), 2008: 573–587.

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“officials in the U.S. government had the impression that Hungary had difficulty reaching decisions, while other nations in the region are able to act more quickly.”7 These target countries received mostly development aid, technical assistance but also some funding for civil society, education and related categories that could be labeled as democracy assistance. The third category presents states which are arguably most vital to the Visegrad group’s geopolitical and economic interests. These are countries of the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia) and Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine). The notion of a “stable neighborhood” appears in all the V4 national security and foreign policy strategies and thus the core focus on these states falls into this logic. It is these countries for which the transition experience narrative is most relevant—both in terms of democratization, but also in meeting EU and NATO accession criteria. Apart from receiving aid for the development of the agricultural sector (in Moldova, for instance8 ), the projects carried out by the V4 in these states focus on the reform of public administration and generally on assisting the countries in harmonizing internal rules and regulations with those of the EU. Due to the existence of the Transition Promotion Program, the Czech Republic currently maintains a different set of priority countries for the program than it does for its development cooperation. Among the TPP target countries are Armenia, Myanmar, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Cuba, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.9 Similarly, the Polish Solidarity Fund currently implements projects mostly in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (having implemented projects in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Tajikistan and Tunisia).10 This shows that the V4 states focus their democracy assistance funding

7 Voice of America, “Hungary Approves Troops for Iraq Reconstruction”, 3 June 2003, https://www.voanews.com/archive/hungary-approves-troops-iraq-reconstru ction-2003-06-03. 8 CzDA projects, for instance, have focused on the support and development of organic farming in Moldova. See http://www.czechaid.cz/en/projekty/development-of-organicagriculture-in-moldova/. 9 Human rights and transition promotion policy concept of the Czech Republic, September 2015, https://www.mzv.cz/public/98/7c/e8/2239165_1648851_Human_ rights_and_transition_promotion_policy_concept_of_the_Czech_Republic_.pdf. 10 Solidarity Fund PL, “Where We Work”, https://solidarityfund.pl/en/gdzie-pracuj emy/.

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mostly on the post-Soviet republics and potential EU member states and marginalize African and Asian countries. The preference for the post-Soviet republics and potential future EU member states in the Western Balkans is linked once more to the transition experience narrative, which is deemed to be best applicable in similar cultural contexts and/or in societies with similar historical developments. The fact that these societies are mostly Christian and ethnically or linguistically Slavic creates a notion of “psychological proximity” that facilitates the transfer of experience and knowledge by lowering transaction costs for communication.11 Nonetheless, reaching out to these countries and providing guidance, that in conclusion creates normative and structural incentives to join the camp of the “liberal West,” leads to geopolitical caveats. First, particular economic and strategic interests may be hurt if assistance is viewed as meddling in domestic affairs and second, the broader regional geopolitical dynamics may be destabilized. Take for instance Azerbaijan—while Armenia and Georgia are regular recipients of transition assistance from the V4 states, Azerbaijan is not. On the one hand, this is connected to the general geopolitical orientation of the three countries where the political elites in Georgia and Armenia have been showing more interest in cooperating with (even joining) NATO and the EU and thus remain more open to consulting and collaborating with CEE states. This is particularly important when Hungary, for instance, prefers to carry out assistance projects with the full consent of the local government.12 President Aliyev’s authoritarian politics in Azerbaijan thus leaves less entry points for the V4 states to engage local civil society or even the governmental institutions. On the other hand, the reasons for not focusing on Azerbaijan in providing transition experience (or ceasing the efforts lately), may rather lie in the domain of energy security as Visegrad states are increasingly looking into diversifying oil and gas supplies by tapping Azeri reserves and any discomforting political projects

11 Šimeˇcka, Michal, “From Democracy Assistance to Importing Transition Experience: The Case of Post-Soviet Local Government and Defence Reforms”, in Benedetta Berti, Kristina Mikulova and Nicu Popescu (eds.), Democratization in EU Foreign Policy: New Member States as Drivers of Democracy Promotion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 131. 12 Horváth, Hungarian Minorities, the Balkans…, 51.

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for the regime may hinder the negotiations.13 In a similar vein, Petrova claims that because Kazakhstan is an important energy partner for Poland, Warsaw has tended to ignore human-rights violations in the country and endorsed local elections as free and fair even though OSCE observers have denounced them.14 Related to the broader geopolitical dynamics in Eastern Europe, the Visegrad states are walking the tightrope in balancing their normative commitments and material interests in including their eastern neighbors within an EU sphere of cooperation, while not encroaching too rapidly and deeply on what Russia deems to be its own sphere of influence. Reconciling these two aspects is particularly difficult for Hungary, which aims to strengthen relations with Moscow (inter alia as a leverage to be used vis-à-vis Brussels). As Rácz pointed out already in 2011, “Russia, as the most important Eastern other, defines the Hungarian Eastern Policy by moderating it, as the intention not to alienate Russia limits Hungarian activities toward the East.”15 Given that the geopolitical relationship to Russia in all Visegrad states is ambiguous at best and rather dichotomous, similar balancing is discernible in Czech foreign policy, which is mostly due to the outlooks of Czech President Miloš Zeman, who advocates a policy of “numerous azimuths”—i.e. perceiving the Czech Republic as a bridge between the West (US and EU) and the East (China and Russia). For instance, when the biggest Czech NGO People in Need, which implements MFA development and transition projects in the Eastern neighborhood,

13 MTI-Hungary Today, “Hungary Could Import Gas from Azerbaijan from 2023”, 14 February 2020, https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-could-import-gas-fromazerbaijan-from-2023/; Hudema, Marek, “Mládek jedná o dodávkách plynu s Ázerbájdžánem. Každý zdroj navíc se hodí”, Hospodarske Noviny, 9 April 2015, https://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-63829930-mladek-jedna-o-dodavkach-plynu-s-azerba jdzanem-kazdy-zdroj-navic-se-hodi; Poland In, “I Hope Gas and Oil Will Flow from Azerbaijan to Poland: President Duda”, 1 June 2019, https://polandin.com/42899719/ i-hope-gas-and-oil-will-flow-from-azerbaijan-to-poland-president-duda. 14 Petrova, Tsveta, “How Poland Promotes Democracy”, Journal of Democracy 23 (2), 2012: 139. 15 Rácz, András, “A Limited Priority: Hungary and the Eastern Neighbourhood”, Perspectives 19 (2), 2011: 147.

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was banned from operating in eastern Ukraine and labeled “undesirable” by the Russian Ministry of Justice,16 the Czech President did not comment (leaving that to the Czech Foreign Minister), even though he has summoned the Russia ambassador to the Czech Republic in the past for different reasons.17 This episode falls into the narrative that the president has been advocating: implicitly attacking People in Need by delegitimizing NGOs in general as “leeches” sucking on the national budget.18 To form a more comprehensive picture of the V4 states’ territorial priorities in democracy assistance, we can focus on available statistics. A breakdown of financial data from OECD DAC database in Table 4.2 shows the geographic distribution of Visegrad states’ funding for activities in third countries in years 2018 and 2015 (in parentheses) that can be labeled as democracy assistance. A few caveats must be mentioned before making conclusions from the statistics reported by V4 states to OECD DAC. First, since the Visegrad states are fairly new members of DAC (Hungary joined in 2016, the other three states in 2013) the statistics are not available for a longer time period and thus it is more difficult to discern some generalizable claims from the data. Second, since the four states are donors with limited resources, one larger project in a target country can distort the overall picture (note Poland’s assistance to Myanmar in 2018 or Czech assistance to Turkey in the same year). Third, while OECD DAC has a methodology on how national aid agencies should report their numbers, the methodology on the classification of projects into OECD DAC categories may not be fully embraced by the relevant departments (rather individuals), who report the data to the Committee. Moreover, the reporting may be fragmented across more institutions. Due to these circumstances, we can observe 16 People in Need, “Statement on the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation’s Recent Inclusion of People in Need to its List of ‘Undesirable Organizations’”, 12 November 2019, https://www.clovekvtisni.cz/en/statement-on-the-ministry-of-justiceof-the-russian-federations-recent-inclusion-of-people-in-need-to-its-list-of-undesirable-org anizations-6171gp. 17 Czech Press Agency, “Kauza Clovˇ ˇ ek v tísni: Ministerstvo si pˇredvolalo ruského velvyslance”, Denik, 14 November 2019, https://www.denik.cz/z_domova/kauza-clovekv-tisni-ministerstvo-si-predvolalo-ruskeho-velvyslance-20191114.html. 18 Czech Press Agency, “‘Pijavice na státním rozpoˇctu.’ Co neziskovky vzkazují Zemanovi a Babišovi”, Tyden, 9 August 2018, https://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/ pijavice-na-statnim-rozpoctu-co-neziskovky-vzkazuji-zemanovi-a-babisovi_491847.html.

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Table 4.2 Democracy assistance funding in selected countries (in thousands of EUR)

Albania Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo Kenya Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia Turkey Ukraine Cuba Afghanistan Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Myanmar West Bank and Gaza

Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

0,037 (0,002) 0,365 (0,463) 0,951 (0,541)

0,118 (0,002) 0,009 (0) 0,180 (0,012)

0,015 (0,002) 10,990 (8,898) 0,015 (0,003)

0,108 (0,154) 0 (0,089) 0,103 (0,015)

0,381 (0,058) 0 (0,004) 1,023 (0,543) 0,004 (0,022) 0,044 (0,033)

0,106 0 (0) 0,020 0,233 0,056

0 (0) 0,252 (0) 0,365 (0,747) 0 (0,017) 0,006 (0,031)

0,212 (0,606) 5,341 (0,485) 1,203 (1,093) 0,298 (0,196) 0,230 (0) 0,508 (0,509) 0,350 (0,059) 0,019 (0,024) 0,292 (0) 0 (0,015)

0,151 (0,043) 0,002 (0) 0,547 (0,129) 0 (0) 0 (0,113) 0,052 (0,020) 0,052 (0,042) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)

0 (0) 0 (0) 0,226 (0,329) 0,298 (0,005) 0,002 (0,00519 ) 0 (0,047) 0 (0) 0,281 (0,249) 0,022 (0,021) 0 (0) 0,005 (0,039) 0 (0,041) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0,002)

(0,002) (0,023) (0,002) (0,010)

0,048 (0,038) 0 (0,003) 3,036 (3,966) 0 (0) 0,277 (0) 0,609 (0,458) 0,084 (0,074) 0,021 (0,033) 58,669 (0,175) 0,69 (0,115)

Source Author based on OECD DAC category 151: I. 5.a. Government and Civil Society-general, Total

Table 4.3 Democracy assistance funding of Visegrad states (in millions of EUR)

2016 2017 2018

Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

5.76 9.43 12.82

0.34 0.32 1.85

14.75 18.39 75.46

2.97 5.85 4.02

Source Author based on OECD DAC category 151: I. 5.a. Government and Civil Society-general, Total

significant fluctuation in the OECD DAC category (151: I. 5.a.) often considered as democracy assistance. With these limitations in mind, the data should serve rather heuristic purposes (Table 4.3).

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Nonetheless, some trends in the given numbers are visible. Relative to its size, Hungary is engaged the least of the four countries in the realm of governance and civil society support. Rather than focusing on the Eastern Partnership, Budapest targets the Western Balkans. On the other hand, Poland is most active in Ukraine and Belarus, its eastern neighbors with whom Warsaw shares historical and cultural affinity.20 Slovakia, for its part, being the smallest of the Visegrad states is the most focused donor, with a clear and compact set of priority countries where it also sends most of its aid connected to democracy assistance. According to the data, the Czech Republic is most willing to engage in countries where its assistance may be perceived as politically sensitive to domestic elites (Cuba, Kosovo, Turkey, Myanmar). Indeed, the approach is highlighted in the Czech foreign policy strategy, which “presupposes that human rights and democracy can be effectively supported in a situation where mutual respect and dialogue exist, but cannot be abandoned even in less favourable circumstances.”21 This tendency to carry out transition promotion activities in countries other than EU aspirant states and close neighbors by the Czech Republic is preordained by the legacy of the dissident-turned-president Václav Havel. Havel was an avowed defender of dissent and as such believed in the “common responsibility for what is happening in the world” and the necessity to “come to the aid of those in need.”22 In his view, the politically oppressed around the globe, whose personal fate mirrored his, were to be morally and practically supported by those elites that were free of state repression. Initiatives he helped set up, such as the annual Forum 2000 Conference, were intended to gather and foster a transnational network of prominent dissidents and democratic activists and provide them with a publicized platform to openly speak out. The main output of a 2007 Conference on Democracy and Security in Prague was the “Prague Charter”—initiated by Havel, it called “upon governments and 19 Categorized as “States Ex-Yugoslavia unspecified”. 20 The “affinity” is connected to the historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

(1569–1795), which encompassed the territory of contemporary Poland, Belarus, and larger parts of Ukraine and the Baltic states. 21 Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy, 2015. 22 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Transcript: RFE/RL Interview with Vaclav

Havel”, 27 March 2009, https://www.rferl.org/a/Interview_Vaclav_Havel_Global_Cri sis_NATO_Self_Determination/1563288.html.

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peoples throughout the free world to help those trying to build free societies elsewhere by… instructing diplomatic emissaries to non-democratic countries to actively and openly seek out meetings with political prisoners and dissidents; … Providing incentives, through diplomatic, political and economic means, to governments and groups willing to improve the human rights record in their countries and to embark on the road to liberal democracy [and] Promoting best human rights and governance practices that have been found effective and beneficial in other countries, in particular in new and recent democracies.”23 For instance, Havel was particularly engaged in the freedom of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese opposition leader under house arrest in the 1990s, and even nominated her for the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize she received. As Suu Kyi explained many years later: When I was under house arrest for many years in Burma, I knew that somewhere in the world, there was a man who was speaking out for me, and because of whom my freedom remained intact in spite of physical detention. He made me feel free because he was free, and he believed in the right of every human being to freedom.24

As the military junta in Myanmar initiated a controlled, top-down liberalization of the political regime and released Suu Kyi in 2010, an opportunity arose to engage Czech transition experience through, for example, the Burma Center Prague—a regular beneficiary of the Transition Promotion Program.25 Similar networks of dissidents (such as Oswaldo Payá26 ) help maintain the Czech focus on Cuba—as Havel’s former press officer and head of the Transition Promotion unit of the Czech MFA, Gabriela Dlouhá, explained: “After the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel was an icon. The people in opposition in Cuba asked him to be their advocate. They asked him to ask other 23 Democracy and Security International Conference, Prague, 5–6 June 2007, “Prague Charter”, http://www.democracyandsecurity.org/index.htm. 24 Richter, Jan, “Burma’s Suu Kyi Pays Homage to Václav Havel at Forum 2000”,

Radio Prague International, 16 September 2013, https://english.radio.cz/burmas-suukyi-pays-homage-vaclav-havel-forum-2000-8542950. 25 Burma Center Prague, “Mission Statement”, https://www.burma-center.org/mis sion-and-profile/. 26 Payá, Oswaldo and Václav Havel, “The Czech Past and the Cuban Future”, Journal of Democracy 15 (2), 2004: 160–169.

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countries to support them. And that is still our moral obligation.”27 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, however, this legacy of dissident support is becoming unsustainable in Czech foreign policy after Havel’s death. In Table 4.2 we can also witness that the recipients of democracy assistance are somewhat different from those listed as priority countries of the development programs of the V4. The democracy assistance recipients are either EU membership aspirants, close neighbors or states undergoing (or pressured by external actors to undergo) political liberalization. Assistance related to the development of democratic governance and civil society does not target priority countries in Africa or Asia (with the exception of Myanmar). However, there is flexibility in the choice of priority countries by the V4 and a readiness to react to immediate needs in societies that might need instantaneous support. The flexibility was observable during the Arab Spring uprisings, which presented an impetus for the EU and its member states to focus more closely on another region where stability was crucial and the means to reach the goal of stability could be democratic governance. Early into the protests, the Polish MFA announced the intention to send Lech Wał˛esa, former leader of Solidarity, to Tunisia and meet there with opposition figures, civil rights activists and former political prisoners—“because of his own experiences, he can contribute to building a democratic society in Tunisia.”28 Soon afterward, the Solidarity Fund was established, which became the main Polish instrument for democracy assistance in Tunisia. Former Slovak foreign affairs minister and a longtime civil society activist, Pavol Demeš, traveled to Libya with the same mission as Wał˛esa.29 As already mentioned above, the Slovak MFA hence founded the CETIR and issued calls for proposals oriented at Egypt and Tunisia.30 Similarly, the Czech Transition Promotion Program held 27 Spritzer, Dinah A., “Can Czech Efforts to Foster Democracy in Cuba Make a Difference?”, The Prague Post, September 16, 2004. 28 Deutsche Welle, “Poland/Tunisia: Revolutionary Adviser”, 9 May 2011, https://www. dw.com/en/poland-tunisia-revolutionary-adviser/a-6522294. 29 See Mikulova, Kristina and Benedetta Berti, Converts to Missionaries: Central and Eastern European Democracy Assistance in the Arab World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cee_ arab_democracy.pdf. 30 Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation, “Knowledge and Experience Sharing Activities”, https://nanopdf.com/download/slovakaid-knowledgeand-experience-sharing_pdf; Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation,

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special calls and earmarked a specific budget for projects to strengthen civil society and democratic governance in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.31 Hungary found itself in a particular position during the Arab Spring as it was holding the presidency of the Council of the EU, so its reactions to the developments were influenced by this official position, but it generally applied a similar strategy as the other V4 states in “sharing transition experience.” For instance, Hungary’s foreign minister János Martonyi participated in Tunisia in a conference entitled “The Tunisian revolution, the challenges of democratic transition and the role of the civil society” and ambassador István Gyarmati, Director of the International Centre for Democratic Transition “negotiated in Tunisia on projects promoting democratic transition and the transformation of the civil society.”32 To conclude, the Visegrad countries focus their democracy assistance primarily on countries that are either undergoing a process of political liberalization, and which thus present a safe window of opportunity to exercise their transition experience and transformation know-how, or on states that are aspiring to become members of the transatlantic community through the EU or NATO. While some CEE diplomats may have argued in 2005 that “shifts to democracy will decrease the influence of Russia in the countries of the former Soviet Union and may thus be considered as our security guarantors,”33 the claim was likely reconsidered after Russian interventions into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Leading up to these interventions, we could witness that as Russian influence in the two countries decreased—possibly due to incremental democratization in both states—Moscow employed physical power to regain that influence, leading in turn to a loss of stability.

Annual Report 2013, https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/engl_annual_report_ final_2013.pdf. 31 For a list of projects see: https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/human_ rights/transition_promotion_program/target_countries/projects_in_north_africa/index. html. 32 Ladányi, Éva and Erzsébet N. Rózsa, “Hungary and the Arab Spring”, Grotius, 5 August 2014, http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/TKYIUP/2014-08-05_ladanyi_n.rozsa_ hungary-and-the-arab-spring.pdf and ICDT, “Immersion Program for Tunisian Political Activists in Hungary”, September 2012, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/documents/pro jects/Project-brief_Immersion-Program-for-Tunisian-Political-Activists-in-Hungary.pdf. 33 Cited in Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States”, FRIDE Working Paper 55, 2008.

CHAPTER 5

The Substance of Visegrad States’ Democracy Assistance

Abstract The thematic focus of democracy assistance is a key issue for understanding the potential democratization of target states. The chapter first discusses the operational definitions of democracy used in official strategic documents of the four states and provides an overview of the specific narrative of the post-communist states’ democracy promotion— “transition experience.” Empirically, this chapter then tracks the focus of democracy assistance programs and projects of the Visegrad states carried out in target countries. It identifies thematic clusters of projects that can be found in varying degrees in all four states’ democracy assistance agendas. The first cluster focuses on the sphere of education and mobilization of the youth; the second on training and experience sharing; the third on civil society strengthening and the last on fomenting a rules-based market economy. Keyword Transition experience · Youth mobilization · Civil society · Market economy · Civil servants · Experience transfer

We have discussed that democracy promotion is an elusive term that may describe a wide array of policy choices. Democracy assistance is a narrowed down version of democracy promotion describing more © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_5

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targeted and technical aid toward building and developing democracy in a target country, even though the terms are often used interchangeably. Yet even the practice of democracy assistance differs across donors as all have different strategies as to how democratization and democracy actually happen. The very definition of democracy thus becomes a key variable in understanding how donors approach democracy assistance, which projects and programs they decide to fund and implement.1 Researchers thus often speak about the “substance” of democracy promotion, by which they understand the “substantive content that is being promoted … towards a third country or region through various activities and which … has the potential to advance the establishment of democracy within this country.”2 At the same time “the substance promoted … may be the same or may differ across countries and regions.”3 In order to probe the content of Visegrad states’ democracy assistance, we will first look at how the countries conceptualize democracy in their official documents (if at all) and then at what types of projects and programs they implement on the ground.

Conceptualizing Democracy The Czech Republic has a working definition of democracy for its Transition Promotion Program—in the Program’s policy concept document, democracy is viewed as an integral part of a triad along with the rule of law and human rights, which “are interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of human dignity.” The document adopts a wide definition of democracy, stating that “the core principle of the Czech Republic’s approach to human rights and democracy promotion” rests on the “indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.” In addition, the “transition promotion policy is committed to removing historical, social, cultural, religious and ideological obstacles to equality.” The explicit mention of the so-called three generations of human rights and equality signifies a rather normative view of democracy. Democracy 1 See Hornat, Jan, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance: Promoting Different Models of Democracy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). 2 Wetzel, Anne and Jan Orbie, “Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion”, European Foreign Affairs Review 16 (5), 2011: 565. 3 Ibid.

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in this sense is a public good that a priori leads to human emancipation in the classical liberal sense and is thus not a merely technical process (a method) of electing political leaders in the Schumpeterian minimalist definition of democracy.4 The Czech foreign policy concept further highlights a “social democratic” approach in its transition promotion agenda, stating that it “will pay particular attention to harnessing social dialogue for the more effective promotion of economic and social rights.”5 Rather than linking democracy with human dignity and equality, Hungary frames democracy within the nexus of security and stability. Its National Security Strategy “considers such universal and strongly interlinked values as peace, security, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, democracy … as its basic values.” These “values and their protection define [Hungary’s] security policy interests and objectives.”6 Furthermore a “lack of democracy in affected regions” is considered to “constitute a hotbed for violence within countries, for armed conflicts, and such cross-border threats as extremism, terrorism, or trafficking in arms, drugs or humans.” The strategy thus describes that the “spreading of democratic values [is] of paramount importance for the country’s security.” Democracy promotion is hereby a means to achieve (international) peace and thus strengthen security at home. The 2017–2021 Polish Foreign Policy Strategy identifies the need for democracy assistance for the purposes of “boosting resilience in the European neighbourhood against contemporary threats, especially internal destabilization.” Democracy is here understood as a requisite for a stable political and economic partnership with neighboring countries. Combining the Czech and Hungarian conceptualization of democracy, Poland claims its “raison d’état is inseparable from the universal values of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and the Christian values which underpin European integration.” Poland aims to “project 4 Schumpeter defined democracy in terms of a “political market economy”. For him, the “democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” Similarly, for Karl Popper, democracy is “no more than a framework within which the citizens act in a more or less organized and coherent way.” Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2003), 269; Popper, Karl, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 471–472. 5 Concept of the Czech Republic’s Foreign Policy, 2015. 6 Hungary’s National Security Strategy, 2012.

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them on an international scale, since they serve as the best guarantee of global peace, stability, and development.” Warsaw thus promotes “these values both out of respect for their axiological status, and as a means to strengthen its security and create an environment conducive to its development.” Interestingly, the strategy ambiguously notifies that “Poland will also oppose any attempts to interpret fundamental UN, OSCE, EU, and Council of Europe documents in a manner contrary to the intentions of their founders.” This is likely a cautionary expression by the contemporary Polish conservative government addressed both to partners (i.e. to liberal EU member states) and external actors (i.e. revisionist attempts by China and Russia to redefine the international human rights regime and international law7 ). Apart from seeing the promotion of democracy as a means to “strengthen the influence of [its] foreign policy,”8 Slovak strategic documents do not present such a comprehensive “definition” of democracy as in the Czech case. However, in connection to democracy Slovakia highlights the importance of assisting states in becoming members of international organizations and thereby fostering multilateralism. Democratic countries are considered the most reliable partners in sustaining effective multilateral forms of governance, which “is in the strategic interest of the Slovak Republic.” Moreover, this is necessary “[a]t a time of growing geopolitical rivalry, which more and more is demonstrated by competing models of governance, building of bilateral relations with democratic countries that share our values of freedom, the protection of human rights and the rule of law is of growing importance …” (emphasis in original). Likewise, Slovak development cooperation strategies have persistently claimed to focus “on successful integration [of priority countries] into international organizations and associations.”9

7 See Piccone, Ted, China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf. 8 Zahraniˇcná a európska politika Slovenskej republiky v roku 2020: Slovensko v nestabilnom svete, https://www.mzv.sk/documents/10182/4238286/200710-zahranicna-aeuropska-politika-SR-v-roku-2020. 9 Strednodobá stratégia oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky na roky 2009– 2013, http://slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/strednodoba_strategia_oda_sr_2009_20013. pdf.

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Transition Experience---“De-ideologizing” Democracy Assistance Though the strategic documents of the Visegrad states clearly acknowledge a commitment to the “promotion of democracy,” in practice, in their discourse and in bilateral negotiations with partners, the vehicle for achieving this goal is “transition assistance.” In other words, the use of democracy assistance as a term is addressed toward the domestic public, the EU and the US, while recipient countries are reassured of a less ideological and less political approach, which is merely technical and concerned with sharing best (and worst) practices from the historical experience of the Visegrad states’ transformations. The “transition know-how transfer” narrative has strongly “permeated official documents related to development aid” and there is hardly any voice within the V4 “questioning the narrative”.10 Being aware of the setbacks of a onesize-fits-all approach to democratization, the necessity of local ownership and having experienced the “Marriot brigades” in the 1990s, Visegrad states are adamant at furthering the narrative by offering voluntary peer consultations focused not “on teaching, but on sharing.” Visegrad donors allegedly tell recipients “what not to do, rather than posing as an ideal type.”11 Transition assistance, as a special brand of Visegrad states’ foreign policy, is much broader than the conventional democracy assistance agenda. It targets state institutions and civil society in spheres that are only very indirectly connected to the design and operations of the local political system. Under the heading of the Transfer of Transformation Program and CETIR Slovakia funded, for example, a project focused on the institutional capacity building in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the field of renewable energy resources; study tours of representatives of the Georgian Ministry of Interior at the Slovak Administration of State Material Reserves; a study visit of the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina focusing

10 Szent-Iványi, Balász and Simon Lightfoot, “Central European Transition Experience: A Depoliticisation of Democracy Aid?”, in Berti et al., Democratization in EU Foreign Policy, 53. 11 Cited in Mikulova, Kristina and Benedetta Berti, “Re-packaging the Transition KnowHow? Central and Eastern European Democracy Assistance in the Arab World”, in Berti et al., Democratization in EU Foreign Policy, 188.

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on the implementation of the directive on the reduction of emissions polluting the atmosphere from large incineration plants; and even sent cardiologists to Kenya.12 The Czech TPP funded, for example, a project supporting Serbian local authorities to combat domestic violence and the Polish Solidarity fund supported projects on the revitalization of cities in Moldova. This approach again points to a wider definition of democracy and of the processes that need to take place in order for a democracy to become consolidated. Transition experience seems to show that without functioning and fairly effective public institutions in various spheres of the society’s life, democracy has a lower chance of taking root. The perspective further validates Huntington’s decades-old supposition contesting modernization theory, claiming that as societies modernize, they become more complex and disordered and if the process of social modernization is not matched by a process of institutional modernization the result may be violence rather than economic and political development.13 This also challenges the view that the new CEE democracy promoters have uncritically adopted the American version of liberal democracy for their own export. As Huntington continues, “America was born with a government, with political institutions and practices imported from seventeenth-century England. Hence Americans never had to worry about creating a government. This gap in historical experience made them peculiarly blind to the problems of creating effective authority in modernizing countries.”14 Even in the realm of democracy assistance, the US approach is documented to focus much more on bottom-up civil society empowerment and government accountability than on a topdown building of democracy through the strengthening of governmental institutions that deliver services.15 Indeed, “When an American thinks

12 Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation, Annual Reports 2014 and 2018, https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/slovak_republic_oda_ann ual_report_2014_final_0.pdf and https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/annual_rep ort_2018_final.pdf. 13 Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 14 Ibid, 7. 15 See Kopstein, Jeffrey, “The Transatlantic Divide Over Democracy Promotion”,

The Washington Quarterly 29 (2), 2006: 85–98 and Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance.

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about the problem of government-building, he directs himself not to the creation of authority and the accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power. Asked to design a government, he comes up with … excellent devices for limiting government. The Lockean American is so fundamentally anti-government that he identifies government with restrictions on government.”16 The issue of transition assistance raises another question and that is to what extent is the motivation to use the transition experience narrative functional or normative. The functionalist perspective has two dimensions, one is related to the very definition of democratization discussed above. If Visegrad states believe that a nascent democracy needs to be first embedded in functioning institutions in order to reach a level of acceptance by the population to sustain itself, then the wide focus of transition assistance makes sense. After all, even the transformation in the post-communist states was somewhat guided by the technical requisites of EU membership, OECD and IMF recommendations and external consultants, which sought to lock-in the successes of democratization. The second dimension of the functionalist perspective is concerned with the acceptance of Visegrad states’ experience and guidance in the recipient countries. The perception that the donor V4 states are not advocating a certain ideological paradigm or specific political arrangements, but merely sharing their technical knowledge of governance reforms, may lead to increased trust and credibility in bilateral negotiations. This is important for the implementation of democracy aid projects as “there is certainly no lack of policy disagreements between democracy promoters and ‘recipients’. And, given the increasing scepticism and resistance against democracy in some parts of the world, negotiations are arguably crucial for enabling the continuity of democracy promotion in the face of broadly acknowledged limits of coercive democratization.”17 The de-ideologized and depoliticized version of democracy assistance promoted by the Visegrad states may also be considered to be motivated by normative presumptions. Technical knowledge transfer is clearly more respectful to the sovereignty of target states and is less likely to be accused of Western liberal democratic bias. Such a motivation is in line with the

16 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 7. 17 Poppe, Annika Elena, Julia Leininger and Jonas Wolff, “Introduction: Negotiating

the Promotion of Democracy”, Democratization 26 (5), 2019: 761.

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argument that “the practice of democracy promotion, even if it can never be democratic in a comprehensive sense, should be designed as to at least limit the gap between the principles of democracy that are to be promoted and the logic of external interference that is inherently in tension with these very principles.”18 Some authors, however, identify a problem—even a paradox—of transition assistance. Horký, for example, notes that “since the transfer of knowledge requires the consent of the partner country governments, it cannot produce major institutional and political shifts in favour of democracy and human rights.”19 Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot argue “that democracy aid based on transition experience interprets the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation in recipient countries as a series of technical reforms, neglecting the wider political and social context for these reforms.”20 Both arguments are valid, yet only for the technical aspect of transition assistance. As will be demonstrated below, the Visegrad states aim a significant portion of their assistance at “political” projects designed to support local civil society and even oppositional forces. As a general problem of democracy promotion activities, transition assistance projects and programs are mostly donor-driven as the bulk of funding is distributed to project implementers with a tax and legal base in the donor country. Though various microgrants schemes are made available by the Embassies of V4 states in target countries, the funding is limited, and very little public data is available or publishable due to political sensitivity. An analysis of the projects implemented by the Visegrad states in the years since transforming their international image into “donors” permits us to identify a number of project clusters that form the substance of the states’ transition assistance. The projects described below were funded either through the specialized instruments of transitionknowledge transfer (i.e. TPP, CETIR, Solidarity Fund or the ICDT) or through the official development agencies of the four states, since— as noted above—transition assistance does not limit itself to fostering 18 Ibid. 19 Horký, “The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European ‘Transition Experience’”,

21. 20 Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, “Central and Eastern European Transition Experience”, in Berti et al., Democratization in EU Foreign Policy, 49.

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democracy, but is merged also within ODA as a competitive advantage and added value that Visegrad states bring to the development table. Educating and Mobilizing the Youth For the purposes of promoting democratic ideals in a target state, the youth is generally an easily accessible target namely through various educational activities and exchanges. Working with the youth is also an investment into the future as their mobilization tends to create windows of opportunity for systemic changes and the emergence of “new political generations.”21 If possible to implement, educational activities designed to introduce local youth to democratic governance, civic engagement and human rights are projects that prepare upcoming generations of elites and induce them to embrace democratic principles of governance. A widely used tool is also the provision of scholarships to study in the donor country, which serves the purpose of attracting talent, but also as a possible means to instill aspects of democratic life in students. The TPP program has in its initial years devoted much funding to bringing students from transitioning countries to study in the Czech Republic. Mostly targeted at students from Eastern Europe, the TPP funded various summer and winter schools for “young leaders,” semesterstays in Czech universities focused on humanities and social sciences (e.g. an “Education for democracy” project), educational institutes (e.g. Educational Institute for democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Ukraine,22 Burma Center for Transitional Studies23 ) and even student

21 Roberts, Ken, “Youth Mobilisations and Political Generations: Young Activists in Political Change Movements During and Since the Twentieth Century”, Journal of Youth Studies 18 (8), 2015: 950–966. On the role of youth movements as a catalyst for change see also Cole, Juan, The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation Is Changing the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014); Konviˇcka, Libor and Jan Kavan, “Youth Movements and the Velvet Revolution”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27 (2), 1994: 160–176. 22 Centre for the Study of Democracy and Culture, “Educational Institute for Democracy and Civil Society in Ukraine”, https://old.cdk.cz/democratisation/educational-instit ute-for-democracy-and-civil-society-in-eastern-ukraine-second-year/. 23 Though these are not designed exclusively for young people. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, “Burma Center for Transitional Studies”, https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/human_rights/transition_prom otion_program/target_countries/burma_1/burma_center_for_transitional_studies.html.

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rallies (United Students of Belarus Rallye in 2008). In 2006, for example, over 60% of the 21 million CZK allocated to Belarus in the program was employed in educational projects for the youth. The scholarships are not always related to education in fields connected to political science, journalism and law—the TPP also provided funding to Iraqi students for the study of conservation and restauration of historical and cultural heritage and to Belarusian students to attend a summer school on vibrational spectroscopy. The Czech Republic has also been consistently supporting filmmakers in Myanmar by financing the Yangon Film School and various film screenings and joint film projects with Czech universities. In recent years, Czech funding toward the youth has shifted from providing scholarships to youth mobilization. Various projects in Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Iraq, Myanmar, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine have focused on engaging the youth with local administrations and councils, on increasing youth participation in public life and on supporting the youth’s appeal to the European Union.24 In a similar fashion, the Hungarian ICDT has held summer universities for “future leaders of the Western Balkans,” focused on “presenting Hungary’s experience on accessing the EU, its challenges, and the importance of regional cooperation in the path towards the European integration.”25 ICDT also co-participated in the “Moldovan Youth Civic Engagement Initiative,” of which the purpose was “to ensure wider civic engagement in the democratization in Moldova among the young generation.”26 The Centre also provided training workshops for young Moldovan politicians, where they learned “how to build, run, and use a political party in practice”. The project was motivated by the conviction that “introducing the experience of Hungarian political parties is an

24 Data collected from yearly project overviews of the TPP published by the Czech MFA. 25 The project, however, was supported by the International Visegrad Fund. ICDT, “Summer University for Future Leaders of the Western Balkans and the V4”, 2013, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/news/news-archive/2013/summer-university-for-fut ure-leaders-of-the-western-balkans-and-the-v4-held-in-budapest. 26 ICDT, “First Event of ‘Moldovan Youth Civic Engagement Initiative’ Held in Gagauzia”, 2013, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/news/news-archive/2014/first-event-ofmoldovan-youth-civic-engagement-initiative-held-in-gagauzia.

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effective means of preparing political party activists of Moldova for significant participation in the political life of their country.”27 Since 2013, the Hungarian Government funds the Stipendium Hungaricum Scholarship Programme that has allegedly supported 7000 students from across the world. Hungary has also been a regular contributor to the European Humanities University (EHU)—a private university founded in Minsk in 1992 but shut down by Belarusian authorities in 2004 and relocated to Vilnius.28 Poland, for its part, has been engaged in supporting a systemic reform of Ukrainian education, since “education reform is an important element of the democratic process.”29 Polish activities included advocating for the decentralization of the educational system, a comprehensive curriculum reform and recommendations on the system of monitoring the quality of education.30 In Georgia, PolishAid funded projects supporting civic engagement by strengthening social activities of students and school councils and particularly focused on improving access to quality preschool education. Through UNICEF, Poland has supported a project in 2017 on engaging adolescents and youth in decision-making for effective local governance in Belarus. A number of Polish-Ukrainian youth exchanges also take place, including business incubators for young talents in Ukraine and even the organization of Oxford debates for “young speakers.” In 2010–2012, Poland provided study trips for young Afghan political leaders to study the Polish political system.31 The Polish Government also sponsors the Stefan Banach scholarship program aimed at supporting the socio-economic development in Eastern Partnership countries and other 27 ICDT, “Training of Young Moldovan Politicians in Budapest”, 2009, http://archiv esicdt.demkk.hu/documents/projects/ProjectBrief_TrainingYoungMoldovanPoliticians. pdf. 28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Development Cooperation Annual Report 2012, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/c/38/d0000/2012NEFEbeszamolo_ helyes%20kotott%20segelyhitel.pdf. 29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Polish Development Cooperation— 2016 Annual Report, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/polish-development-coorperat ion---2016-annual-report. 30 Solidarity Fund PL, “Support to Decentralisation of Education in Ukraine”, https://solidarityfund.pl/en/gdzie-pracujemy/ukraina/wsparcie-decentralizacji-oswiatyna-ukrainie-przygotowanie-kadry-zarzadzajacej-oswiata-w-ukrainskich-polaczonych-hromad ach-kontynuacja-dzialan-z-lat-poprzednich/. 31 Poland’s Transformation Experience in Polish Aid Programme.

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specialized scholarships at the University of Warsaw (mostly intended for students from post-communist countries). Scholarships in general form a large part of bilateral Polish ODA, amounting to nearly 80 million PLN of the 124 million PLN allocated to Belarus in bilateral aid in 2017 and 184 million of the 230 million allocated to Ukraine.32 Although the smallest donor of the V4, Slovakia has also been active on the front of education and youth mobilization in target countries. In Moldova it has funded a project on the preparation of the schools and teachers for e-learning and other flexible forms of education. In Belarus it has supported international relations programs and European studies and in Tunisia, it has financed a project titled “Young citizens— actors of the transformation processes in Tunisia.”33 Projects in Ukraine supported local universities as “sources of civil society.”34 A number of educational projects have been implemented in Kenya, mainly geared toward increasing access to education and vocational training. SlovakAid also supported a project aimed at young Afghan professionals and university students to share transition experience in the sphere of security sector reform.35 Training and Expertise Sharing Building the human capacities of societies experiencing a socio-political transition to better cope with domestic issues linked to the transformation, but also to help these states integrate more seamlessly with existing international organizations, is considered as the core of transition assistance. Consequently, a significant number of projects conducted within the democracy assistance agenda of Visegrad states is targeted particularly at the political and public administrative elites of recipient countries. 32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Polish Development Cooperation— 2017 Annual Report, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/polish-development-coorperat ion---2017-annual-report. 33 SlovakAid, “Young Citizens—Actors of Transformation Processes in Tunisia”, 2013– 2015, https://www.slovakaid.sk/en/project/473-young-citizens-actors. 34 SlovakAid, “Universities—The Source of Consolidation of Civil Society in Neighbouring Ukraine”, 2010–2012, https://www.slovakaid.sk/en/project/395-universitiessource. 35 SlovakAid, “Reforma bezpeˇcnostného sektora ako súˇcasˇt univerzitného vzdelávania afganských mladých profesionálov – skúsenosti Slovenska”, 2012, https://www.slovakaid. sk/sites/default/files/projektovy_dokument_samrs_2012_03_08.pdf.

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At the same time, most projects focusing on training and transformation expertise sharing are aimed at recipient states in the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet republics. Funding for training activities of this sort within the Czech development scheme is disbursed both by the TPP and the Czech Development Agency (CzDA). For instance, CzDA has put most emphasis on projects involving an expertise-sharing component in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Georgia. In 2014–2016, CzDA funded a project to support the development of the capacities of the Sarajevo local government in the realm of acquiring funding from the EU’s pre-accession instruments (IPA) and other grant-making agencies.36 In the same time period, CzDA implemented a large project focused on assisting decentralization and reform of public administration in Georgia.37 Similarly, in Moldova, projects to strengthen capacities of public institutions, such as the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family38 and regional government in the southern part of the country, were part of the transformation experience transfer narrative.39 The TPP supported similar projects, but in a different mix of countries—namely Belarus, Ukraine and also Burma. Projects in these countries are of late focused on anticorruption measures, transparency in government, implementing rules for public tenders and the development of the rule of law in general. The Hungarian ICDT implemented projects targeted at governmental institutions in Western Balkans and the “GUAM” states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) on “Transferring the Experiences of the Visegrad Cooperation,” it also supported the development of

36 Czech Development Agency, “Support to Development in the Districts of SARAJEVO”, 2014–2016, http://www.czechaid.cz/en/projekty/support-to-development-inthe-districts-of-sarajevo/. 37 Czech Development Agency, “Support of Public Administration Reform in Georgia”, 2014–2017, http://www.czechaid.cz/projekty/podpora-reformy-verejne-spravy-v-gruzii/. 38 Now renamed as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Protection. Czech Development Agency, “Enhancing Capacities of Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family”, 2016–2018, http://www.czechaid.cz/en/projekty/enhancing-the-capacityof-ministry-of-labor-social-protection-and-family/. 39 Czech Development Agency, “Strengthening the capacity of public administration in Moldova—South Region”, 2014–2015, http://www.czechaid.cz/en/projekty/strengthe ning-the-capacity-of-public-administration-in-moldova-south-region/.

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the ombudsman institutions in Montenegro and Kosovo.40 In 2008– 2009 and in cooperation with the Hungarian National Elections Office, Hungary implemented a project to support the electoral system reform in Albania and later the ICDT implemented a project to facilitate the constitutional reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part of Hungary’s transition assistance—which also distinguishes it from the other three Visegrad states—is a focus on minority issues in recipient countries. Projects concerned with improving the minority community’s situation through better governance (particularly) in Kosovo, but also other countries, have been a steady focus especially in the initial years of the Center’s operation.41 Given a significant Hungarian minority in neighboring countries (especially Serbia and Ukraine), the issue of minority protection resonates domestically and thus the policies of assisting these states in better governance and Euro-Atlantic integration can be politically more easily justified in the name of increasing the well-being and protection of Hungarian enclaves in these states. Hungarian MFA initiatives that started prior to joining the EU, such as the Szeged Process (launched in 1999) or the Nyíregyháza Partnership with Ukraine (launched in 2003), have aimed to facilitate the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO and sought to advance public administration effectiveness, good governance and “cooperation especially along the border” (where the Hungarian minorities are most concentrated).42 More recently, projects related to supporting minority rights for Hungarians in Ukraine and Serbia, including Hungarian education in these countries, have been implemented by the Ministry of Human Capacities.43 Perhaps the most comprehensive initiative in the field of providing training and capacity building in recipient countries was adopted by 40 ICDT, “Strengthening Democratic Institutions in the Balkans: Ombudsman Service Reform in Kosovo and Montenegro”, 2006–2008, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/pro jects/all-projects/strengthening-democratic-institutions-in-the-balkans-ombudsman-ser vice-reform-in-kosovo-and-montenegro. 41 The project was funded by the Government of Luxembourg. ICDT, “Enhancing Minority Integration Through Improved Implementation of the Law on the Use of Languages in Kosovo”, 2009–2010, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/documents/projects/ Final-Report_EnhancingMinorityIntegrationinKosovo.pdf. 42 The Newsletter of the Carpathian Euroregion, “The EuroClip Public Foundation”, 1/2008, http://carpathianeuroregion.org/hirlevelek/20081en.pdf. 43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Development Cooperation Annual Report 2018, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/c/98/82000/Jelentes2018.pdf.

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Poland, when in 2011 (during the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU) it established the Eastern Partnership Academy of Public Administration (EPAPA). The Academy is run by the Polish MFA along with the National School of Public Administration (KSAP) and organizes training for civil service in all the EaP countries, for instance on the implementation of DCFTA/AA agreements, on cooperation in the WTO, and on fighting corruption.44 Over 60 civil servants are trained annually within the EPAPA. In addition, the concept of the EPAPA has gained support from within the Visegrad states and lately also from the EU Commission as the way forward for invigorating the Eastern Partnership in the future.45 In addition to the EPAPA, PolishAid has funded projects supporting the capacities of the public administration in programming and implementation of regional policy in Georgia and Moldova, on good governance and notably on the preservation of cultural heritage and monuments in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The Solidarity Fund, for example, has in 2018 and 2019 implemented projects on participatory budgeting in EaP countries and on social services reform in Ukraine. Most expertise-sharing projects funded by Slovakia bilaterally are implemented through CETIR, which organizes the exchanges of experts (such as in the case of the transfer of experience of Slovakia’s NATO accession to Montenegro) and study trips of elites and experts form recipient countries to Slovakia (e.g. assistance with civil service reform in Serbia). CETIR also helps to fund short-term study trips and training sessions for (mostly) EaP diplomats and MFA officials.46 Capacity-building initiatives are also implemented by the development agency SAMRS—examples include a project on strengthening the autonomy of local government and increasing transparency in Moldova and Ukraine, assistance with security sector reform in Georgia, EU/NATO accession experience sharing with Serbia (Partnership for Serbia) and the building of capacities in

44 Annual Reports of Polish Development Cooperation. 45 European Committee of Regions, “An Eastern Partnership Academy for Public

Administration is needed”, 13 May 2019, https://cor.europa.eu/cs/news/Pages/EasternPartnership-Academy-idea.aspx; The Visegrad Group Joint Statement on the Future of the Eastern Partnership, 9 April 2020, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-sta tements/the-visegrad-group-joint-200409. 46 Annual Reports of Slovak Development Cooperation.

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Montenegro for the approximation of EU law.47 As in the case of the other V4 states, the bulk of funding and projects devoted to training public administration personnel and civil servants is targeted at the Western Balkans and EaP states. A time-limited focus on the North African states brought forth projects focused, for example, on the capacity building of election monitors in Tunisia and on assistance with its security sector reform, but the attention this region received after the Arab Spring has dwindled since 2014 and is nearing zero in all the V4 states.48 Civil Society Support Assistance for groups and individuals that can shape public opinion and thus mobilize societies for a bottom-up democratization—i.e. what Samuel Huntington termed as “replacements,” revolutions from below49 —is undoubtedly an intrusive and political form of democracy assistance. Due to its very nature, such assistance is most often conducted without prior explicit consent of the local government (unlike, of course, training of public officials) and therefore may lead to complications in bilateral relations between a donor state and the state where such activities are funded. For donors, such support also has a strategic aspect. Judging by the Visegrad states’ histories, the civic leaders of the revolutions are most likely to become the new political elites in charge of the country’s politico-economic transformation. The political linkages built prior to the revolution may thus be capitalized in the form of friendly relations between the donor and former recipient state and provide priority access to the political and economic elites of the nascent democracy. In addition, there is always a clear convergence of interests between a donor and the recipient organization or individual—both sides claim to strive for political change—and thus the purposefulness of the funding is secured. However, 47 SlovakAid, “Budovanie kapacít Ciernej ˇ Hory na aproximáciu práva EÚ”, 2012–2013, https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/projektovy_dokument_samrs_2 012_04_06_0.pdf. 48 SlovakAid, “Zvyšovanie kapacít domácich volebných pozorovateˇlov v Tunisku”, 2011–2012, https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/projektovy_dokument_samrs_2 011_b_01_0.pdf and SlovakAid, “Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: The Way Ahead”, 2012–2013, https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/projektovy_dokument_samrs_2 012_06_04_0.pdf. 49 Huntington, Samuel, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

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the possibility of the souring of official bilateral relations between the donor and recipient states due to the meddling in domestic affairs via civil society support may be an obstacle the donor is not willing to overcome. As hinted earlier, the track record of the Czech Republic shows that it is most inclined to reach out to civil society groups and opposition forces in target states. The Czech adherence to a policy of supporting pro-democratic civil society and human rights activists in third countries is even more pronounced when considering that most of the aid for the purpose is being provided through the TPP (and implemented mostly by Czech NGOs in cooperation with local actors). While the status of the Polish Solidarity Fund or the Hungarian ICDT has been generally presented as autonomous from governments50 (thereby permitting the argument that their activities are delinked from the official policies of the state), the status of TPP is clearly linked to the Czech government as it is an integral part of the MFA, thus linking such aid to official state policy. The TPP has funded numerous projects that can be categorized as support for civil society and bottom democratization—for illustration, the Table 5.1 lists only a fragment of the projects implemented since the program’s creation. Hungary is more cautious in the sphere of supporting civil society groups in target countries and projects funded directly by public money through the MFA or development cooperation in general are seldom. The Hungarian MFA has, for example, funded a project on the development and strengthening of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was implemented by the Hungarian non-governmental organization DemNet in 2004. While DemNet is still active in the field of democracy assistance and supporting civil society abroad, it receives funding mostly through other sources, such as the EU and the Open Society Foundations. ICDT implemented in 2008 a project titled “Civil Society and State in the Process of Social Transformation” using funding from the Hungarian MFA.51 However, most of ICDT’s past projects focusing on civil society, such as the “Immersion Program for Tunisian Political Activists in Hungary” or “Strengthening Civil Society in Belarus by 50 These organizations are also communicated as “non-governmental institutions”, even though they were set-up at the initiative of their governments and funded in part by public finance. 51 ICDT, “Civil Society and State in the Process of Social Transformation”, 2008–2009, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/documents/projects/ProjectBrief_CivilSociety.pdf.

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Table 5.1 Selected TPP projects focused on supporting civil society Project

Target state

Year

Support of independent radio in Belarus The production of a brochure containing the Belarusian translation of UN CHR report on state of human rights in the country The printing of flyers informing about the Czech Radio broadcast in Spanish Funding for the Secretariat of the International Committee for Democracy in Cuba (ICDC) Debates with power—simulations aiming to find strong and weak spots of Belarusian opposition Aid to the politically persecuted and discussions on Czech transformation experience Support of NGO activity in Georgia Supporting election turnout of Iraqis living in the Czech Republic—transportation to Vienna Support for democratic opposition in Cuba Assistance to the Belarusian non-governmental sector Support of local initiatives, regional administrations and their cooperation Supporting civil society—fostering contacts among NGOs in Transnistria Increasing the influence of citizens on local decision-making Participation of citizens and media in decision-making Support for independent media in Burma Support for the campaign for free and fair elections in Belarus English courses and IT courses for Georgian NGO workers Purchase of technical equipment for civil society in Cuba

Belarus Belarus

2005 2005

Cuba

2005

Cuba

2005

Belarus

2006

Belarus

2006

Georgia Iraq

2006 2006

Cuba

2006

Belarus

2007

Iraq

2007

Moldova

2007

Serbia; Bosnia and Herzegovina

2007

Ukraine

2007

Burma Belarus

2008 2008

Georgia

2008

Cuba

2008

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Project

Target state

Year

Indian base for the transformation of Burma Increasing the effectiveness and influence of NGOs in the public sphere Development of civil society and its engagement in public life in Georgia Supporting NGOs in engaging in election campaigns in Moldova Support of civil society organizations involved in human rights protection in Burma Support for the House of Human Rights in Tbilisi Support for the development of Iraqi civil society Support of strategic planning and financial sustainability of Serbian NGOs Increasing civic engagement in Belarus Healthy civil society, successful state Strengthening the role of media in the Egyptian transformation process Transferring the transformation experience of Czech NGOs and media to support civic engagement and independent journalism in Georgia Building democratic bridges among local actors: youth, citizens and media Empowering civil society actors in Burma Partnership for the Belarusian non-governmental sector Support for the civic activities of churches in Cuba Supporting the civic engagement of the Crimean public Support to the civic participation in South Ossetia by sharing the Czech experience Civic Pole: Mapping and connecting civil society efforts in Egypt With new media towards the transformation in Moldova

Burma

2009

Belarus

2009

Georgia

2009

Moldova

2009

Burma

2010

Georgia

2010

Iraq

2010

Serbia

2010

Belarus Egypt Egypt

2011 2011 2011

Georgia

2011

Moldova

2011

Burma Belarus

2012 2012

Cuba

2012

Ukraine

2012

Georgia

2013

Egypt

2013

Moldova

2013

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Project

Target state

Year

Fostering of the Civic Activism in Ukraine Support civil society in Burma on the road towards parliamentary elections Strengthening civic activism through creative campaigns in Belarus A citizen activism project for Kosovo Development of environmental activism in Cuba Strengthening the security of citizens active in the public space in Crimea Support of media and transition reform in Ukraine Including the public into decision-making about the environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina Strengthening of regional organization of civil society in political dialogue about social integration in Georgia Strengthening the security of independent journalists and activists in Crimea and the Donbass and support for the dissemination of information from crisis regions Civic engagement 3.0 Strengthening the capacity of civic activists in fundraising, dissemination of independent information and advocacy on the European level Development and support of civil society Advancing Institutionalization of Cuban Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) Empowering Ukraine’s Civil Society in Monitoring Local Authorities and Enhancing Citizen Participation in Policy Making Using New Media for Civic Engagement and Transparent Elections Boosting the Sustainability of the Belarusian Independent Media Visions for civil society Including Belarusian society into the activities of civil society in Belarus

Ukraine Burma

2013 2014

Belarus

2014

Kosovo Cuba

2014 2015

Ukraine

2015

Ukraine

2015

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2016

Georgia

2016

Ukraine

2016

Moldova Ukraine

2016 2017

Belarus Cuba

2017 2018

Ukraine

2018

Moldova

2018

Belarus

2019

Ukraine Belarus

2019 2019

Source Author based on TPP call for proposals results

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Training and Education,” were fully funded by external donors (International Republican Institute and the Government of Canada respectively) and not the Hungarian MFA.52 Projects in support of civil society are rather implemented through multilateral channels such as IPA Twinning, UNDP Trust Funds or the Community of Democracies.53 Expectedly, Poland has been most active in supporting civil society groups, human rights activists and independent journalism in Belarus and Ukraine. Of the key components of Polish support for civil society is the access to independent information. This goal is embodied in the Polish support for Belsat TV, which launched in 2007. Belsat TV is a satellite channel of Telewizja Polska, born out of the initiative of Polish journalist Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy to create a television channel independent of Belarussian authorities. The initiative was widely supported by Polish political elites and the channel received nearly 21 million zloty (5.8 million USD) from the Polish MFA in 2008. Funding is currently provided also by other international donors and in 2017, amid the MFA’s threats to cut funding and transform the channel into a web portal,54 it granted over 28 million zloty (7.6 million USD) to Belsat.55 In a more recent effort, the Solidarity Fund has initiated a project titled Media Garage, which aims to support independent media in creating professional, high-quality content in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.56 PolishAid has also implemented projects supporting independent media in Georgia (Support for independent local and regional radio stations, 2016) and civil society in the Maghreb region (Impulse from Poland Our Way:

52 ICDT, “Immersion Program for Tunisian Political Activists in Hungary”, 2012, http://archivesicdt.demkk.hu/projects/all-projects/immersion-program-for-tunisian-politi cal-activists-in-hungary. 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Development Cooperation Annual Report 2014, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/6/25/41000/Korm%C3%A1nyjelent% C3%A9s_2014%20%C3%A9vi%20besz%C3%A1mol%C3%B3.pdf. 54 Belsat.eu, “Poland’s Foreign Ministry Plans to Reform Belsat TV into Web Portal”, 22 December 2016, https://naviny.belsat.eu/en/news/mzs-polshchy-my-ne-hocham-lik vidatsyi-belsatu/. 55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Polish Development Cooperation— 2017 Annual Report, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/polish-development-coorperat ion---2017-annual-report. 56 Górnicki, Jakub, “Garage Begins Tuning. Meet the Selected Media”, Medium, 10 July 2019, https://medium.com/outriders/garage-begins-tuning-meet-the-selectedmedia-3db5e5722428.

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support for the Development of Civil Society in the Maghreb countries, 2017). Slovak projects included efforts to raise confidence of Ukrainians in the electoral process (Citizens for fair Elections, 2004), strengthen and build capacities of civil society in Ukraine and Belarus and supporting public dialogue on reforms in Belarus (2007). In 2011 Slovakia set up the Slovak Balkan Public Policy Fund,57 implemented by the Pontis Foundation, which through “Slovak transition experience transfer … increases capacities and expertise of civil society organisations in the Western Balkans and their readiness to lead a dialogue with the government in the light of European integration.”58 More recently, in 2017–2019 SlovakAid funded a project in Albania and Georgia aimed at linking non-governmental organizations with local administrations and a project supporting active citizenship in Ukraine (Active citizen—effective state).59 Rules-Based Market Economy The existence of a free market where individuals are unrestricted from conducting their private economic endeavors is a general requisite of a functioning democratic system.60 In short, political and economic freedoms are inseparable when conceiving a liberal democratic system and thus there is no political freedom without economic freedom. Promoting only the political and social aspects of democracy would thereby be insufficient to foster a fully democratic system—the economic aspects also need to be promoted and transferred. Though some argue that the free market undermines democracy in a substantial manner61 (and indeed, the 57 Balkan Civil Society Development Network, “Slovak—Balkan Public Policy Fund, Pilot Phase Brought to Successful End”, 30 October 2012, http://www.balkancsd.net/slovakbalkan-public-policy-fund-pilot-phase-brought-to-successful-end/. 58 Hoxha, Blerta, “Towards Institutionalized Relations Between State and Non-state Actors in Albania”, The Slovak Balkan Public Policy Fund Policy Paper, September 2012, https://www.nadaciapontis.sk/data/files/Policy%20papers/Policy_PAPER_Blerta_ Hoxha.pdf. 59 SlovakAid, Annual Report 2019, https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/ samrs_vyrocna_sprava_2019_final_do_tlace_20.07.2020.pdf. 60 For a discussion see Beetham, David, “Four Theorems About the Market and Democracy”, European Journal of Political Research 23 (2), 1993: 187–201. 61 See Stiglitz, Joseph E., People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent (New York: W. W. Norton, 2019).

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post-communist states experienced their share of “wild capitalism” that eroded trust in the nascent independent judiciary and political system in the 1990s), regulations limiting market excesses especially in the early phases of the economic transformation are a boon for ensuring a democracy’s sustainability. Visegrad states, based on their own experience, are not market fundamentalists and are not exporting unfettered capitalism, but assisting recipient states in adhering to and implementing rules of the regulated EU market. However, it can be argued that the Visegrad states’ transition assistance serves material interests of the donor countries when it focuses on building a rules-based economy in target states. Given the EaP states’ geographical proximity and frequency of people-topeople contacts, the approach helps Visegrad states secure access to local markets and creates a more predictable and safer business environment for their investments. The goals of increasing the effectiveness of government institutions, transparency, accountability and anti-corruption measures fall in line with this argument. The Czech Development Agency, for example, has helped Georgia develop a system of national phytosanitary control through a project implemented in 2017–2021. The system is a requisite for the implementation of the DCFTA between the EU and Georgia introduced in 2014. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, CzDA worked to gradually build a network of accredited and technically equipped laboratories in order for the country to implement new transposed EU technical directives regarding product safety (“Support of Application of Free Trade Movement Principles and Increase of Safety of Products introduced to the market in Bosnia and Herzegovina”). The Transition Promotion Program sponsored a number of projects implemented by Transparency International in the EaP countries, including the support to an anti-corruption legislation consulting center in Georgia, a “strong anti-corruption watchdog” and “implementing rules for public tenders” in Ukraine, support for independent organs active in criminal proceedings in corruption cases and anti-corruption standards in public tenders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “justice for corruption” in Serbia and the promotion of anti-corruption standards in the Belarusian state institutions. Other projects were focused on the amelioration of the “business environment for foreign investment”

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and creating “investment friendly municipalities” in Kosovo, support for “transparency and communication” in Georgia.62 Hungary’s bilateral assistance is less active on this front and prefers to support similar activities through multilateral channels. The ICDT, for example, has implemented projects on deepening the integration of Ukraine’s energy sector into the EU market, but such projects have been funded by external donors and not directly by the MFA. Poland is mostly concerned with corruption in Ukraine and the MFA has continuously supported anti-corruption reform in the country by organizing training workshops for civil servants. PolishAid also funded a project merging the empowerment of civil society with creating a level playing field in the nation’s economy (“The Fight against corruption and economic crime as a significant part of capacity building of public administration and civil society organizations”). Furthermore, Poland has been supporting initiatives to tackle corruption in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia through multilateral channels, such as the UNDP Trust Fund and NATO Trust Fund for Counteracting Corruption. Moreover, the Eastern Partnership Academy of Public Administration organizes trainings for the civil servants in all the EaP countries on the implementation of DCFTAs and Association agreements, cooperation with the WTO and fighting corruption. In 2016–2017 SlovakAid supported a project titled “Use of experience in supporting the transformation of the regional market environment,” implemented by the Slovak Chamber of Commerce in Belarus. The project aimed to “improve the development aspects of bilateral relations between Slovakia and Belarus, to use partnerships to foster and support the transformation of the regional market environment for small and medium enterprises and communities in Belarus” and “to transfer Slovakia’s experience from economic and social transformations, and to expand economic collaboration between Slovakia and Belarus.”63 Starting in 2014, SlovakAid funded an initiative to improve the entrepreneurial environment in Albania, implemented by Business Alliance of Slovakia in cooperation with Foreign Investors Association of Albania. The project generated four “in-depth sector analyses” focused on fighting shadow

62 Information based on TPP annual reports. 63 SlovakAid, Annual Report 2017 , https://www.slovakaid.sk/sites/default/files/pou

zivatelia/Sabina%20Slim%C3%A1kov%C3%A1/slovakaid_vs2017_eng_final.pdf.

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economy; fighting corruption; major structural reforms implemented in Slovakia and barriers to cross border trade between Albania and Slovakia.64 Further, it has supported projects related to: increasing transparency and introduction of anti-corruption measures in state companies and municipalities in Ukraine; fighting corruption in Serbia and applying experience with green public procurement in Slovakia to Ukraine.

64 Foreign Investors Association of Albania, “Improving Business Environment in Albania”, http://fiaalbania.al/projects/improving-business-environment-in-albania/.

CHAPTER 6

External and Internal Factors Shaping the Substance of Visegrad States’ Democracy Assistance

Abstract This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the external and internal factors contributing to the state, status and thematic focuses of democracy assistance in the four Visegrad states. It looks at how the Visegrad states on the one hand “download” various aspects of their democracy assistance policies from the EU level, but also how on the other hand they have attempted to “upload” certain facets of their own know-how in this realm onto the EU level. As a particular case in point the chapter explores the role of gender mainstreaming and female empowerment in the democracy assistance agendas of the four states. In order to understand the contemporary dynamics and discussions of the future of democracy assistance in the foreign policies of the Visegrad states, the chapter reviews the internal domestic debates in the countries related to the export of democracy. Keyword Policy downloading · Policy uploading · Europeanization · Gender mainstreaming · Rhetoric · Arab Spring

The substance and approach to democracy assistance by the Visegrad states is the outcome of various factors, both internal and external. Domestic debates, political composition of parliaments that pass annual © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_6

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Table 6.1 Share of multilateral and bilateral development aid of Visegrad states (2018)

Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia

Multilateral (%)

Bilateral (%)

ODA/GNI ratio

70

30

0.130

61 68 76

39 32 24

0.209 0.136 0.131

Source Author based on annual ODA reports of V4 states

budgets and the lobbying of NGOs are all internal factors that determine how (and if) the country will assist in building democratic governance elsewhere. Even though the ministries and state institutions responsible for the disbursement of such funding have a certain level of discretion in what activities and where to fund them, they are held accountable and may face budget cuts if the political representation is not content with their work in terms of effectiveness or concerned with the policy’s interference with a presumed national interest. External factors may include sudden crises and windows of opportunity for democratization, such as the Arab Spring uprising discussed earlier, but also the recommendations of multilateral organs such as the EU, UN and OECD DAC. For example, this book is preoccupied mostly with bilateral democracy assistance by the V4, yet most ODA provided by these countries is multilateral (see Table 6.1) and thus shaped and implemented by actors beyond their direct control. Observing the dynamics of internal and external factors on the broader agenda of official development assistance by CEE states, Horký and Lightfoot in 2012 concluded that “a soft acquis from the EU, weak governmental structures, low political will and low public understanding prevented the policy [of development cooperation] from acquiring strong roots” in these states.1 Democracy assistance, however, assumes a particular role in the foreign policies of the Visegrad states, quite different from that of development aid and Horký and Lightfoot’s conclusion—especially concerning the policy’s “rootedness”—may thereby not apply. By studying the recent developments and domestic debates in V4 states regarding democracy 1 Horký, Ondˇrej, and Simon Lightfoot, “From Aid Recipients to Aid Donors? Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 13 (1), 2012: 1.

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promotion, we can elaborate more broadly about the future of such policies and their continuous or changing nature. Moreover, the following chapter will explore how Visegrad states download and especially upload aspects of the democracy assistance agenda onto multilateral (mainly EU) fora.

Downloading and Uploading the Rationale for Conducting Democracy Assistance The analytical concept of downloading sees the EU and other international organization as the “source of change/independent variable” vis-à-vis member states’ policies, while uploading sees the member states as the “sources of change/dependent variables” in the respective organization’s policies.2 The former process empirically assumes a passive role of member states, which accept changes of structure and policy substance in a top-down manner. The latter points to instances where member states proactively attempt to shape the organization’s policies to either enhance their status, reaffirm their identity or to pragmatically achieve better results than when working alone to advance their national interest and to “avoid impressions of unilateral assertiveness.”3 In terms of downloading policy, procedural and structural prescriptions in development aid and the field of democracy assistance in particular, OECD and the European Union have obviously played a key role for the Visegrad states. Prior to becoming EU member states, the V4 had to commit to the provision of international development assistance and as member states they were expected to devote ODA equivalent to 0.33% of their Gross National Income (GNI).4 Yet, as is clear from Table 6.1, none of the Visegrad states have approached this benchmark even in the year

2 Balfour, Rosa and Caterina Carta, “Introduction”, in Rosa Balfour, Caterina Carta and Kristi Raik (eds.), The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries: Convergence or Divergence? (London: Routledge, 2015), 6. 3 Ginsberg, Roy H., “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap”, Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (3), 1999: 439. 4 EU Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 15–16 March 2002, http://aei.pitt.edu/43345/1/Barcelona_2002_1.pdf.

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2018.5 While the 0.33% ODA/GNI does not describe the distribution of the aid thematically or territorially, the EU has consistently expected its member states to include (or to “mainstream”6 ) democracy and human rights issues into the development agenda.7 In line with Article 21(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, the 2017 European Consensus on Development states that the “EU and its Member States: • will integrate the respect of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and gender equality into their political dialogue • will promote civil society space and enhance their support for building the capacity of CSOs • will continue to support inclusive, transparent and credible elections by providing timely support throughout the election cycle, as well as promoting democratic and accountable political parties and the active participation of citizens throughout the electoral process • will support and promote democratic governance that ensures the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of thought, religion or belief, freedom of assembly and association, including for marginalised persons, and that delivers on universal human rights, whether civil, political, economic, social or cultural • will promote shared solutions to security and development challenges, including by supporting the democratic governance of the security sector, its effectiveness in providing human security, and capacity building…”8

5 As per the new EU Consensus on development, the “EU is collectively committed to provide 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) as ODA within the timeframe of the 2030 Agenda.” 6 European Parliament, “EU Support for Democracy and Peace in the World”, Briefing Paper, 2019, https://what-europe-does-for-me.eu/data/pdf/focus/focus06_en.pdf. 7 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries”, COM(2001) 252 final, Brussels, 8 May 2001 and Communication from the Commission, “On the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements Between the Community and Third Countries”, COM(95) 216 final, Brussels, 23 May 1995, http://aei.pitt.edu/4097/1/4097.pdf. 8 The New European Consensus on Development, “Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future”, June 2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24004/european-consen sus-on-development-2-june-2017-clean_final.pdf.

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Serving as a policy declaration agreed to by the member states and EU institutions rather than a binding strategic prescription, the Consensus nonetheless touches upon aspects that compose the substance of member states’ approach to promoting democracy. For example, integrating human rights and democracy into the political dialogue with third countries (without territorial restrictions and thus “everywhere”) is a commitment that member states are going to struggle with when it comes to relations with economically or strategically important authoritarian states (e.g. China). EU membership has also prompted Visegrad states to lean into the window of opportunity and engage in the assistance to potential democratization in North Africa following the Arab Spring uprisings in early 2011. As an initial reaction to the uprisings in the EU’s southern neighborhood, the European Commission produced a joined communication titled “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,” where it claimed to “increase financial support if needs on the ground so require it” and encouraged “EU Member States to continue to respond in a similar fashion.” With respect to democratization, the paper stated that “This is an area where we should seek to maximize the assistance that Member States can offer at short notice to develop a platform for civil society, political parties, trade unions and associations.”9 The joint communication was followed by a revision of the European Neighborhood Policy in May 2011 (“A new response to a changing Neighbourhood”), which stated that the present “challenge requires that EU and Member States policies be much more closely aligned than in the past, in order to deliver the common message and the coherence that will make our actions effective.” It claimed to “step up efforts of co-ordination with EU Member States” and called on member states to align “bilateral efforts in support of its overall political objectives.”10 The EU later created the position of EU Special Representative (EUSR) for 9 Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8 March 2011, https://ec.europa.eu/research/ iscp/pdf/policy/com_2011_200_en.pdf. 10 Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, COM(2011) 303 final,

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the Southern Mediterranean, whose task was inter alia to assist the coordination of efforts among the EU institutions and member states.11 As documented in the preceding chapter, all the four Visegrad states were quick to engage and implement projects in MENA, but lost interest in the region by 2014. In this sense, researchers have been speaking about a rather “shallow” and “face-value” Europeanization of the entire EU 28 and the V4.12 For the structuring of the Visegrad states’ development potential and its infrastructure, OECD has perhaps been more consequential through its peer review reports—what Orbie and Lightfoot term (OECD) “DAC-ization.”13 Indeed in the case of the Czech Republic, after the MFA commissioned an OECD special review of the country’s development cooperation program in 2007, Horký-Hluchánˇ correctly notes that “almost all the recommendations [of the review] were put into practice – from the legal framework through the institutional processes to the establishment of an evaluation system.”14 However, the recommendation to “[integrate] the Transformation Co-operation Unit and other dispersed development entities and functions into the Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid Department” (DDCHA) was systematically overlooked even though—as per DAC—“Failing its reintegration into DDCHA the unit’s objectives and activities will remain isolated from MFA’s broader development co-operation goals, synergies across sectors and themes will not be exploited and MFA will fail to achieve internal policy coherence.”15 This decision further highlights the

Brussels, 25 May 2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= CELEX:52011DC0303&from=EN. 11 Bremberg, Niklas, “Making Sense of the EU’s Response to the Arab Uprisings: Foreign Policy Practice at Times of Crisis”, European Security 25 (4), 2016: 431. 12 Orbie, Jan and Maurizio Carbone, “The Europeanisation of Development Policy”, European Politics and Society 17 (1), 2016: 2. 13 Orbie, Jan and Simon Lightfoot, “Development: Shallow Europeanization”, in Amelia Hadfield, Ian Manners, Richard G. Whitman (eds.), Foreign Policies of EU Member States: Continuity and Europeanisation (London: Routledge, 2017). 14 Horký-Hluchán ˇ , Ondˇrej, “Czechia: The ‘Foreign Development Cooperation’ as a Policy Without Politics”, in Ondˇrej Horký-Hluchánˇ and Simon Lightfoot (eds.), Development Cooperation of the ‘New’ Member States: Beyond Europeanization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 29. 15 OECD, Special Review of the Czech Republic, 17.

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Czech insistence on keeping a democracy assistance component within the MFA and thus closely intertwined with Czech foreign policy. Hungary has not yet commissioned an OECD DAC special review, but in the Polish case (2010), the review was somewhat critical of the Polish over-emphasis on sharing transition experience at the expense of focusing on eradicating poverty. For example, the DAC review stated that “Poland’s bilateral ODA focuses on middle income countries and in sectors (governance, democracy and transition) where it has a comparative advantage but which do not address poverty or the MDGs directly,” in Eastern Europe “it uses its know-how gained from its own transition to tackle poverty indirectly by aiding the process of European integration and convergence with EU policies. There may be more that Poland could do to address poverty directly in Eastern Europe.”16 It further acknowledges that “In fact, this comparative advantage is a key rationale for the bilateral programme’s existence.” In Slovakia’s case (2011), the recommendations led toward increasing the capitalization of its transition experience: “The government should […] focus more on using the transformation experience of Slovakia for the benefit of partner countries. The country’s transformation experience, together with its knowledge of the eastern region of Europe and the Western Balkans, gives Slovakia a comparative advantage relative to other donors in these areas. Slovakia should therefore ensure that its comparative advantage as a donor more consistently informs its policy and selection of priorities and countries.”17 As in the Czech instance, Poland and Slovakia adopted a number of these recommendations—Slovakia, for instance, “narrowed the thematic focus of the aid programme including by focusing more on sharing its own experience of transformation processes” and set up CETIR.18 The capitalization of transition experience and the perception that the successfully democratized post-communist states understand more closely the intricacies of transformation, led the Visegrad states to attempt 16 OECD, DAC Special Review of Poland, 2010, 21, https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-

reviews/45362587.pdf. 17 OECD, DAC Special Review of the Slovak Republic, 2011, 13, https://www.oecd. org/dac/peer-reviews/49512222.pdf. 18 OECD, Moving Towards Accession to the DAC, Bratislava, 4 October 2012, 8, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/MOVING%20TOWARDS%20A CCESSION%20TO%20THE%20DAC.pdf.

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to upload the “transition” assistance agenda onto the EU level. While, as mentioned, the EU is rhetorically adamant at supporting democracy in its neighborhood, the Visegrad states have localized gaps in the policy that they have aimed to fill. The opportunities to highlight both the democratization agenda and shift the territorial focus toward the Eastern Neighborhood and the Western Balkans came mostly during their Council Presidencies. Among the main priorities of the Czech presidency in 2009 was the Eastern Neighborhood. Building on a joint proposal by Poland and Sweden from 2008, the Czech presidency fully embraced the idea of creating an “Eastern Partnership” (EaP) as a component of the ENP—a “mini-version of France’s ‘Mediterranean Union’.”19 The Czech presidency initiated the first meeting of the group in May 2009 and since then, the EaP serves as a forum to expand the politico-economic ties between the EU and the six target states (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova). Not only a discussion forum, but the EaP “also sought to provide new tools to assist with the pre-existing and longer-standing ENP objectives of nurturing democracy, the rule of law and the development of free market economies through an open-ended European integration process.”20 For these purposes, the inauguration of the EaP in 2009 also included the launching of a Civil Society Forum, an umbrella organization of NGOs from the Eastern Partnership region and the EU, currently working with over one thousand organizations “to promote European integration, facilitate reforms and democratic transformations.”21 The EaP became also one of the priorities of the Hungarian Council Presidency in the first half of 2011. Assuming the Presidency of the Council during the uprisings in the MENA region, Hungary engaged in the region and sent experts and practitioners to Tunisia and Egypt and “treated the facilitation of these processes as an important goal.” Hungary also claimed it would “pay attention to bringing the topic 19 Runner, Philippa, “Poland and Sweden to Pitch ‘Eastern Partnership’ Idea”, EU

Observer, 22 May 2008, https://euobserver.com/foreign/26194. 20 Copsey, Nathaniel and Karolina Pomorska, “The Influence of Newer Member States in the European Union: The Case of Poland and the Eastern Partnership”, Europe-Asia Studies 66 (3), 2014: 428. 21 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, “Our Structure”, https://eap-csf.eu/civilsociety-forum/.

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[of transition experience transfer] to the forefront of the union’s next financial framework and in the programming of its external relations instruments.”22 The flagship initiative of the Polish presidency, which followed the Hungarian one, was the establishment of a democracy-assisting institution, which would be modeled on the US National Endowment for Democracy—i.e. a grant-awarding institution funded by the EU, but maintaining an autonomous statute and thus flexible in its provision of funding to groups and individuals in third countries.23 Being the key actor behind the establishment of the Community of Democracies24 in 2000, Poland was also at the forefront of the creation of another democracy-promoting institution—the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). The European Commission in the EED’s founding document described the objective of the institution: “to foster and encourage ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ in transition countries and in societies struggling for democratisation, with initial, although not exclusive focus, on the European Neighbourhood.”25 During the Presidency, the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland in Brussels was also active in organizing public events focused on the role of the EU in democracy assistance.26 As another example of uploading, in 2011 the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and other CEE states issued a non-paper to support the inclusion and “more systematic approach towards using transition 22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Development Cooperation Annual Report 2010, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/a/38/d0000/Besz%C3%A1mol%C3%B32010 NEFE%20(JAV%C3%8DTOTT).pdf. 23 See Sus, Monika, “Polish Role in Shaping the EU Foreign and Security Policy During Its Council Presidency in 2011”, Yearbook of Polish European Studies 17, 2014: 191–208. 24 The Warsaw Declaration of the CoD states that its members “will collaborate on democracy-related issues in existing international and regional institutions, forming coalitions and caucuses to support resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic governance. This will help to create an external environment conducive to democratic development.” See https://community-democracies.org/app/ uploads/2017/02/2000-Warsaw-Declaration-1-1.pdf. 25 Council of the European Union, “Declaration on the Establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy”, Brussels, 20 December 2011, http://register.consilium.eur opa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2018764%202011%20INIT. 26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Report: Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, April 2012, https://www.eukn.eu/fileadmin/Files/Presidencies/ 2011_Poland/Report_Polish_presidency.pdf.

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experience” in the Union’s external relations. The paper called on the Commission to “complete the work on the European Transition Compendium” and “incorporate the notion of transition cooperation in relevant policy documents and discussions.”27 Though the Compendium (ETC) was finished in 2011, it fell short on its operationalization— lacking funding and incorporation into the legislative proposals of EU external instruments.28 The identified reasons why the EU has not internalized the CEE states’ transition experience—despite the EC’s claimed interest to “capitalize on the Member States’ experience (such as transition management) and help strengthen the role of these states as new donors”29 —are twofold. On the one hand, it has been documented that the “old” member states were simply not interested in the issue. On the other hand, they did not understand the initiative and mostly viewed the ETC as an “initiative promoting mainly the CEECs’ interests, but not EU interests.”30 It is telling that the website of the ETC is now defunct and thus the Compendium is virtually inaccessible to the public.31 In the sphere of democracy assistance, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between pure downloading and uploading of policy preferences between the EU and Visegrad states as both sides have shown a genuine interest in the agenda (with differentiation of proactivity across the V4) and consider it a major component of their domestic and international identity. A more fitting term to characterize the flows of ideas is crossloading, which points to a mutual constitution of norms and approaches, eventually leading to some level of convergence.

27 Non-Paper by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, “Harnessing the Transition Experience in EU’s External Relations—From Policy to Implementation”, 16 February 2011, https://www.mzv.cz/ file/591175/non_paper_on_the_transition_experience.pdf. 28 Non-Paper by Czech Government, “Incorporation of the Use of Transition Cooperation into the Legislative Proposals of EU External Instruments for the Period After 2012”, 10 November 2011. 29 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the member states meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ (2006/C 46/01), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AC% 3A2006%3A046%3A0001%3A0019%3AEN%3APDF. 30 Hellmeyer, Monika, “The European Transition Compendium: To Much Ado About Nothing?”, in Horký-Hluchánˇ and Lightfoot (eds.), Development Cooperation, 240. 31 The webpage of the ETC was: www.eutransition.eu.

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Gender and the Empowerment of Women The Visegrad states are in a unique position to advocate for the inclusion of female empowerment goals within democracy assistance programs, yet their transition experience narrative only rarely touches on the issue and has been rather neglected. For instance, the handbook on the Czech transformation experience commissioned by the Czech MFA and translated into six languages to be disseminated globally, holds 24 chapters but none of these touches the issue of gender equality or women empowerment in general.32 However, a chapter on “Gender equality/Women empowerment” has been included in the ETC—this shows that rather than uploading the issue, the Visegrad states download it, often quite reluctantly. The unique position of the Visegrad states in the field of women empowerment stems, of course, from their communist past. Whereas the communist regimes subscribed to the Marxist conception of gender equality (though Karl Marx’s original theory is viewed as gender-blind33 ), they envisaged a rather traditional role for the women in society. Often employed as a progressive tool juxtaposed to the conservative Western capitalist democracies, women’s suffrage and the legalization of abortion were key early tenets of the Soviet policy vis-à-vis women. It is thereby often argued that as the communist regimes formally granted gender equality at the outset, women did not need to organize and struggle for empowerment and were thus rendered more passive when compared to their counterparts in non-communist countries.34 The subsequent shortage of women activists and advocacy groups and the disinterest on the part of the new (mostly male) political elites during the transition period led to socio-economic changes in the nascent democracies that disproportionally affected women (such as the reforms of the welfare state and the layoffs of surplus workers in state companies). As a consequence, women in the CEECs generally felt less satisfied with

32 See Transformation: The Czech Experience (Prague: People in Need, 2006), https://

www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/lidska_prava/transformacni_spoluprace_1/transf ormace_ceska_zkusenost_1.html. 33 Brown, Heather, “Marx on Gender and the Family: A Summary”, Monthly Review 66 (2), 2014. 34 Einhorn, Barbara, “Where Have All the Women Gone? Women and Women’s Movement in East Central Europe”, Feminist Review 39, 1991.

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the transition than men—in Slovakia, for example, women were more likely to feel they had “lost” as a result of the transition (57.5% of women and 46.7% of men) and were less likely than men to see the actions of the Communist party prior to 1989 as very negative (22.4% of women compared to 34.1% of men).35 The often uncritical adoption of neoliberal reforms by the new political elites, some of whom saw the transition as an opportunity to decompose any residues of socialism, was also primarily an anti-Marxist effort.36 Since feminism was viewed as an agenda linked to the onerous ideology that the CEECs have sought to replace, the engagement of women groups in the transition process was often delegitimized and degraded. In East Germany, for example, women attempted to join roundtable discussions in December 1989 by founding the Independent Women’s Association (UFV). They were allegedly told that if the negotiations “allowed women in they might have to let in the pet breeding associations as well.” Though the UFV managed to receive seats at the table, it found it difficult to make itself heard.37 Visegrad states could thus capitalize also on this aspect of the transformation experience and provide lessons-learned and best (and worst)practices to recipient countries. As will be demonstrated below, however, the topic is treated only marginally in both democracy assistance programs and development cooperation in general and emphasis on gender is mostly downloaded from the EU and the UN. This reluctance toward the advocacy of women empowerment has much to do with the postcommunist cognitive shortcuts mentioned earlier. Gender equality in the Visegrad states faced a conservative backlash in the 1990s and arguably the transition period saw an increase in gender inequality despite the seeming political empowerment.38 As of 2019, women in the V4 still hold much lower levels of representation in national parliaments than

35 Wolchik, Sharon L., “Gender and the Politics of Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia”, in Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (eds.), Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 167. 36 Przeworski, Adam, “The Neoliberal Fallacy”, Journal of Democracy 3 (3), 1992: 45–59. 37 Waylen, Georgina, “Gender and Transitions: What Do We Know?”, Democratization 10 (1), 2003: 157–178. 38 Watson, Peggy, “Eastern Europe’s Silent Revolution: Gender”, Sociology 27 (3), 1993: 471–487.

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Table 6.2 Proportion of seats held by women in selected EU member state parliaments State

Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (2019) (%)

Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Germany France Spain Austria Denmark Italy

22.5 12.6 28.7 20 30.9 39.7 44 39.3 39.1 35.7

Source Author based on data from The World Bank

is the EU average (see Table 6.2) and feminist advocacy groups that point to persisting inequalities (not only in the sphere of political participation) are being—mostly successfully—delegitimized and caricatured as the harbingers of “neo-Marxism” that aims to rehabilitate the former communist regimes.39 It would thus be myopic to assume that democratization anywhere will serve as a “quick solution to the pervasive problem of gender inequality” and scholars warn that in this sense “the expectations of democracy are unrealistic and need to be more nuanced.”40 Indeed, some empirical research shows that democracy has little significance for gender equality or that the relationship between democracy and gender equality is sometimes even negative.41 Moreover, Ted Piccone finds that while strong democracies in general tend to have smaller gender gaps, less mature (or weaker) democracies have a tendency to include women in politics and cabinet 39 Dolejš, Jiˇrí, “Strašení neomarxismem”, Deník Referednum, 2 February 2017, https:// denikreferendum.cz/clanek/24570-straseni-neomarxismem. 40 Bjarnegård, Elin and Erik Melander, “Disentangling Gender, Peace and Democratization: The Negative Effects of Militarized Masculinity”, Journal of Gender Studies 20 (2), 2011: 140. 41 Paxton, Pamela, “Women in National Legislatures: A Cross-National Analysis”, Social Science Research 26 (4), 1997: 442–464; Yoon, Mi Yung, “Democratization and Women’s Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Democratization 8 (2), 2001: 169–190.

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positions more in terms of “tokenism,” as the states seek to gain more legitimacy and status vis-à-vis the international community.42 The Visegrad states have been states parties to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and have taken part in the path-breaking 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women, which created the Beijing Platform for Action introducing the concept of gender mainstreaming. Even though it was with the 1995 UN Conference on Women that the EU first articulated its policy commitment to gender equality in its development cooperation, the Visegrad states have started to mainstream gender into their development assistance much later. For example, until the restructuring of the infrastructure of Czech foreign aid in 2007, the country’s development policy was perceived by researchers as generally “gender-blind.”43 Further activities on the international level related to mainstreaming gender issues into development have induced Visegrad states to (at least) nominally include the topic in their strategic documents.44 Working toward achieving gender equality in third countries is a proclaimed goal in all the four states’ ODA strategies and guiding documents, but gender equality is mainly situated within the context of alleviating poverty and not political empowerment. The Czech and Hungarian strategies see gender equality as a cross-cutting issue in its projects and as part of the general promotion of human rights—but gender equality is not a thematic issue (though the 2010–2017 CzDA strategy included the so-called twin-track approach to gender). The Slovak strategy aims to support gender equality mainly through economic empowerment: “The

42 Piccone, Ted, “Democracy, Gender Equality, and Security”, Brookings Institution Policy Brief , September 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/democr acy-gender-equality-and-security/; Piccone, Ted, “Democracy, Gender Equality, and Women’s Physical Security”, Democracy and Security Dialogue Working Paper Series, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/fp_20170905_ democracy_gender_working_paper.pdf. 43 See Horký, Ondˇrej, Ceská ˇ rozvojová spolupráce: Diskurzy, praktiky, rozpory (Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství - SLON, 2010). 44 For example, the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution on Women and political

participation (A/RES/66/130) or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2015– 2030, wherein the international community has devoted itself to “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” (SDG 5) and “Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic, and public life.”

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cross-cutting theme of gender equality is being implemented throughout SlovakAid activities in the field of education, health care and development of market conditions,” while the Polish strategy focuses mostly on entrepreneurship among women and mentions gender equality only in terms of maintaining it “among people affected by the project.” The strategies speak little to the political empowerment of women and only the Czech policy concept for the TPP mentions explicitly that “In the area of equality of men and women, it will promote women’s economic empowerment and participation in public life as a matter of priority concern.”45 Recent EU documents have also been more explicit in linking gender equality with political empowerment of women and prodding member states to adopt similar language. In the Council conclusions on Gender in Development of May 26, 2015, the Council stressed “that women’s and girls’ rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls remains a policy priority for EU’s external action and development cooperation, and should be strengthened and coherent in all areas without exception.” The Council pointed to the importance of adopting a so-called three-pronged approach to gender issues in external relations, which combines “gender mainstreaming in all stages of EU development policies and programmes, as well as in joint programming processes, gender specific actions, and political and policy dialogue with all partner countries.”46 Furthermore, the Commission’s Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016–2019 reiterated that one of the five priorities regarding the equality of women and men is “promoting gender equality and women’s rights across the world.”47 In this sense, the 2017 European Consensus on Development stipulates that “Gender equality is at the core of the EU’s values and is enshrined in its legal and political framework” and mandates that “the EU and its Member States will promote women’s and girls’ rights, gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls and their protection as a priority across all areas of action.” Linking gender 45 Human rights and transition promotion policy concept of the Czech Republic. 46 For full text see: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9242-2015-

INIT/en/pdf. 47 European Commission, Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016–2019, SWD (2015) 278 final, Brussels 3 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/ antitrafficking/files/strategic_engagement_for_gender_equality_en.pdf.

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equality and democracy, the Consensus views gender equality as a “key to unlock the development of democratic societies” and as being “positively correlated with increased prosperity and stability and better outcomes in areas such as health and education.” As mentioned earlier, the Czech Transition Promotion Program concept paper implicitly endorses a twin-track approach to gender equality—though not explicitly a thematic priority,48 gender is a crosscutting theme. The program as such is said to be “committed to removing historical, social, cultural, religious and ideological obstacles to equality (such as those affecting the situation of women and various vulnerable groups).” In this sense it claims to pay “special attention … to women human rights defenders and the specific forms of persecution they may face” and encourages “the participation of women and excluded and disadvantaged groups in decision-making processes.” Moreover, in the “area of equality of men and women, it will promote women’s economic empowerment and participation in public life as a matter of priority concern.” The TPP has not held special calls for projects focused on women empowerment (the only special call in its history was the 2011 call on projects for North Africa) and the only way it practically reflects gender in the project cycle is by asking in the project proposal form “how the theme of the equality of men and women is taken into account in the project.”49 Overall, only a handful of projects focused exclusively on the nexus of women empowerment and democracy has been implemented in the years of the program’s existence.50 It must be said, however, that the projects funded by the TPP are mostly driven by implementors—i.e. Czech NGOs who submit projects to the MFA and these are subsequently assessed by a panel composed of three MFA officials and two external members. This also applies to the microprojects financed by the TPP and facilitated 48 The priorities number (4)—“promoting an equal and full political and public participation” and (6) “promoting equality and non-discrimination” implicitly include gender equality. 49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, “Vyhlášení výbˇerového dotaˇcního rˇízení Programu transformaˇcní spolupráce na rok 2020”, 9 September 2019, https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/lidska_prava/aktualne/vyhlaseni_ vyberoveho_dotacniho_rizeni_2020.html. 50 The only project in the available database that was focused exclusively on empowering women was implemented in Myanmar in 2015 and aimed to strengthen the role of women’s civic organizations.

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through Czech embassies in target states. This generally means that unless a project thematically focused on the political, social or economic empowerment of women is presented by an NGO to the MFA as a proposal, no gender-focused project will be funded in that given year. The Hungarian ICDT has implemented only two projects in its history focused particularly on strengthening women in the political system. Both of these projects (“Increasing Lebanese Women’s Participation in Public Life” and “Strengthening the Capacity of Belarusian Women’s Movements and Organizations”) aimed “to transfer first-hand experience gained in the building of women movements under authoritarian regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe” and share “some of the most relevant experiences accumulated in Central and Southeast Europe in the field of advancing women’s rights.”51 However, the latter project was funded not by the Hungarian MFA but by the Government of Sweden. In the broader development cooperation agenda, Hungary (particularly the defense ministry) has funded, for example, “gender specific scholarships” for Kenyan women to participate in the security sector reform or worked with the Kyrgyz Women’s Public Union Erayim to provide school uniforms and food aid, but such projects were limited in number. Rather, Budapest supports gender equality through multilateral channels such as contributions to UN Women. The Polish foreign aid projects are also mostly preoccupied with the economic empowerment of women than with their political empowerment. PolishAid has recently funded numerous projects targeted at women. To name some, these were focused on supporting alternative sources of income for women in Ethiopia, assisting vocational training for women in Jordan, empowering women refugees from Syria in Lebanon through training, access to work and establishing a food shop, improving the economic condition of women in Palestine through small-scale agricultural projects and expanding women-led businesses and microenterprises.52 Projects focused on the political empowerment of women have been few. The MFA has financed a project aimed at strengthening women in the Georgian regions of Zemo and Kvemo Nikozi. The project was focused on developing local civil society comprised of female 51 ICDT, “Increasing Lebanese Women’s Participation in Public Life”, 2007, http:// archivesicdt.demkk.hu/projects/all-projects/increasing-lebanese-womens-participation-inpublic-life. 52 See Polish Development Cooperation Annual Reports 2016–2018.

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activists and provided workshops on gender equality, women’s rights, leadership, personal development, social mobilization, advocacy, volunteering, communication, presentation, learning to write projects, media and budgeting and on health issues.53 As a reaction to the Arab Spring, the Solidarity Fund implemented a project focused on increasing participation of Tunisian women in public discourse and encouraging them “to communicate their opinions and self-expression using internet platforms.”54 The Solidarity Fund also funded a project in Tajikistan to increase the civic activity of women by establishing ten Women’s Clubs and training them in leadership skills.55 When women are the focus of SlovakAid projects, there is also a heavy emphasis on their economic empowerment rather than their political and civic engagement. Though in 2013 a project that focused on supporting “Egyptian Women in Parliament” by organizing workshops and seminars for women on how to run election campaigns, the bulk of projects targeting women centered around “women empowerment through small business development” (Georgia), “empowering women through an alternative employment” (Albania) and “economic independence” (Kenya). A 2015 project in Kosovo titled “I am an empowered woman” aimed to educate women and young girls “about market-oriented production of unique handicrafts.” Similarly, in Kenya, SlovakAid funded a project on the empowerment of women through practical skills, which would “enable easier integration of women in the labour market.”56 In this sense, the empowerment of women is perceived in all Visegrad states through the prism of modernization theory—economic empowerment is a prerequisite for political empowerment. However, such rationale uses very little of the “transition experience” and only pays lip service to the transition narrative that is being deployed even for the gender-related projects. The sustainability of economic empowerment is contingent upon the political and civic empowerment of women, but if this is not a component of the foreign aid of Visegrad states (and democracy assistance in

53 Solidarity Fund PL, “Wsparcie kobiet w rejonie Zemo i Kvemo Nikozi”, 16 March 2017, https://solidarityfund.pl/2017/03/16/wsparcie-kobiet-rejonie-zemo-kvemo/. 54 Solidarity Fund PL, “Kobiety w Akcji – Tunezyjski etap zakonczony!”, ´ 16 October 2012, https://solidarityfund.pl/2012/10/16/kobiety-w-akcji-tunezyjski-etapzakonczony/. 55 Solidarity Fund PL, “Podsumowanie projektu ‘Z duchem czasu’”, 4 December 2013, https://solidarityfund.pl/2013/12/04/podsumowanie-projektu-z-duchem-czasu/. 56 Data collected from SlovakAid Development Portal, www.slovakdev.sk.

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particular), then the economic empowerment projects may lose effect in the long run.

Windows of Opportunity, Domestic Discourses and Rhetoric In democratic societies, politics is mostly about constant and continuous justification and legitimization of political decisions. The reproduction and construction of consent and agreement with a certain policy among the population pertains also to a democratic state’s foreign affairs agenda. This argument is particularly relevant for normative, value-based policies where the general public has a hard time deciphering the strategic and material payoffs. Nonetheless, such value-based policies may on the other hand be deeply integrated into the foreign policy identity of states, internalized by the public and thus difficult to reform or eradicate. Given that “transition promotion” and democracy assistance programs of the Visegrad states are relatively low-key components of their respective foreign policies, the discussions about the relevance of the programs usually emerge and react to external impulses—i.e. when a “window of opportunity” to effectively assist democratization in a strategically important country appears. As discussed earlier, the Arab Spring was one of such impulses, but the more recent include Ukraine in 2014 and Belarus in 2020. For the Czech foreign policy of human rights and transformation promotion, a key impulse leading to the reflection about its merits came with the death of President Václav Havel in December 2011. Havel was and still is considered as one of the key advocates of a foreign policy based on the promotion of human rights and democracy and the Czech diplomacy regarded the agenda as its staple and a tool to make itself more visible on the global scene—even to “make itself useful” to the newly acquired Western partners.57 Havel’s personal experience grounded his foreign policy outlooks, stating “I remember vividly what the support of the democratic world meant for me when I was persecuted and imprisoned in [communist] Czechoslovakia …I feel obliged to repay this debt to

57 Neumann and Carvalho, Introduction: Small States and Status, 2.

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those who are in a similar situation now.”58 The liberation from communist rule meant the deepening of “a feeling of co-responsibility for the world,” which he understood as “the awareness that if freedom is threatened anywhere, it is threatened everywhere.” Upholding and protecting “the traditional values of Western civilization” (that he generally viewed as universal and underpinned by natural human rights) thus became “a commitment, a moral imperative.”59 Such politics, however, is not unique to Havel, but reinvigorates the tradition of the first Czechoslovak President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, who considered himself an idealist basing all political decisions on moral and ethical grounds.60 Thus, in the second half of the 1990s and building on Havel’s distinct reputation as a “worldwide human rights campaigner,” the Czech Republic began to “carve out for itself a prominent role in promoting human rights, viewing this as an area in which it could add value due to its experience as a former totalitarian country that had successfully managed the transition to democracy.”61 In his personal capacity, Havel was active in founding platforms for discussing democracy, such as Forum 2000, and organizations that aimed to “advocate for stronger presence of democracy support on the EU’s agenda,” such as the European Partnership for Democracy.62 Havel’s presidency was succeeded by the presidency of Václav Klaus, whose conservative and neoliberal perspectives on foreign policy saw “human rights-ism” as a dogma akin to communism and warned that it threatens “individual freedom.”63 Klaus’ approach to Czech foreign policy was manifested by a general disinterest in the outlines set by Havel—he diverted from multilateral cooperation, pivoted to Russia, 58 Spritzer, Can Czech Efforts to Foster Democracy in Cuba Make a Difference? 59 Havel, Václav, A Call for Sacrifice: The Co-responsibility of the West”, Foreign

Affairs, March/April 1994, 16–20. 60 Szporluk, Roman, “Masaryk’s Idea of Democracy”, The Slavonic and East European Review 41 (96), 1962: 31–49. 61 Baun, Michael J. and Dan Marek, “Czech Foreign Policy and EU Integration: European and Domestic Sources”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11 (1), 2010: 7. 62 Institute for Public Affairs, “Európska nadácia pre demokraciu slávnostne uvedená do života”, April 2008, http://www.ivo.sk/5307/sk/aktuality/europska-nadacia-pre-demokr aciu-slavnostne-uvedena-do-zivota. 63 Albert, Gwendolyn, “Is the Czech Republic Still Abstaining on Human Rights?”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 23 June 2009, https://cz.boell.org/en/2014/03/24/czech-rep ublic-still-abstaining-human-rights-democracy.

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and expressed disregard for the democracy and human rights agenda. Nonetheless, the emphasis on the agenda persisted, in part due to advocacy from NGOs, but also given to the support of the agenda among the MFA staff and the Czech engagement in US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This adherence of Czech foreign policy to promoting “human rights-Atlanticism” was seen by prominent Czech philosopher Václav Bˇelohradský as the coupling of American messianism and the Czech “moral kitsch”—i.e. the myth that the small country can morally influence the global hegemon through the persona of its president/dissident Havel. In this sense, Bˇelohradský comments that the “human rights-Atlanticism” is a tool that “narrows the revolutionary potential of ‘human rights’ … to the American effort to become the sole power in a unipolar world.”64 A substantive public debate about the merits and demerits of the Czech foreign policy’s preoccupation with human rights and democracy promotion took place in 2014 and was mostly initiated by political scientist Petr Drulák, who assumed the position of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. Drulák believed that the Czech uncritical emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion (what he also labeled as “human rights-Atlanticism”) was mostly driven by a humanism that was one-sidedly anticommunist and that by 2014, it was losing not only its external legitimacy, but also its internal one. He was critical of the veneration (even “fetishization”) of the Havelian approach to Czech foreign policy and mostly for its conjunction with neoconservatism, its universalism and its perspective of human rights which was narrowed down only to their first generation (i.e. political and civil rights). Drulák advocated not for an outright dismantling of the human rights and democracy promotion agenda, but for more nuance and reflection when implementing it. For instance, he called for an extended understanding of human rights, encompassing also the second and third generation thereof (e.g. social and environmental rights) and a more selective approach, which would demonstrate that the agenda is not a tool of power politics or a “stick of the rich over the poor.”65 64 Bˇelohradský, Václav, “Naše nynˇejší lidskoprávní katastrofa”, in Jiˇrí Pˇribán ˇ and Václav Bˇelohradský et al., Lidská práva: (ne)smysl cˇeské politiky? (Prague: SLON, 2015). 65 Drulák, Petr, “Lidská práva v zahraniˇcní politice aneb od snˇení k naivitˇe. A zpˇet?”, Deník Referendum, 13 January 2014, https://denikreferendum.cz/clanek/17205-lidskaprava-v-zahranicni-politice-aneb-od-sneni-k-naivite-a-zpet.

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The words of the First Deputy were published during the time when the MFA was preparing its new foreign policy concept and since Drulák was the key author of the new strategy, his positions were initially interpreted by journalists and NGO leaders as an attempt to cut the human rights and democracy agenda out of the goals of Czech diplomacy. The subsequent debate was hence framed as a struggle for the “soul” of Czech foreign policy.66 The internal debate culminated in an op-ed published in The Washington Post titled “Are Czechs Giving Up On Moral Responsibility?” and authored by president of the National Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman, after his visit of the annual Forum 2000 conference founded by Václav Havel.67 In the piece, Gershman was critical of Drulák and claimed that under his watch the MFA “is in the process of terminating the assistance that has been provided to dissidents in Cuba, Belarus and China through a government program called TRANS [i.e. the TPP].” Public pressure (mostly exerted by NGO leaders and journalists rather than the general public) and external scolding by the US led to a foreign policy concept that did not present a radical change in the outlooks of Czech foreign policy, but which acknowledged the necessity to extend the understanding of human rights beyond the political and civil sphere also to the social and cultural one. The Transformation Promotion Program was not defunded or sidelined, and the human rights agenda was generally carried out in a path-dependent manner. The Czech debate has demonstrated how deeply the issue of supporting democracy and human rights is conflated with Czech foreign policy identity. By NGO leaders the issue is perceived as an asset, a comparative advantage vis-à-vis their Western European counterparts and journalists see it as an undisputable moral dimension of foreign policy that at least partly compensates for the country’s material-based dealings with communist China and arms transfers to problematic regions. Individual Czech parliamentarians often publicly propose facile solutions to “save public money” by defunding the Transition Promotion 66 Šlechta, Ondˇrej, “Drulák nebo Havel?”, CDK, undated, https://www.cdk.cz/dru lak-nebo-havel. 67 Gershman, Carl, “Are Czechs Giving Up on Moral Responsibility?”, The Washington Post, 16 November 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/are-czechs-giv ing-up-on-a-sense-of-moral-responsibility/2014/11/16/dfa0d0fc-6c41-11e4-b053-65c ea7903f2e_story.html.

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Program, which unjustifiably “intervenes into the domestic affairs of other states,” but in the parliament itself such propositions have not gained much traction.68 Related to the summer 2020 protests in Belarus, Communist member of Parliament Zdenˇek Ondráˇcek criticized the MFA for helping to foment anti-Lukashenko demonstrations by “handing out Czech material” to activists, which he saw as a breach of Belarussian sovereignty and “subservience to foreign interests.”69 Despite Ondráˇcek’s remarks, the Czech MFA announced an extra 10 million Czech crowns in support of Belarusian civil society, stipends for students and humanitarian aid for injured protestors.70 As already demonstrated earlier, the human rights and democracy promotion agenda has a much more marginal role within the foreign policy identity of Hungary, and this is also reflected in its internal debates. We mentioned that the democracy assistance infrastructure in Hungary was developed mainly during the ministerial tenure of Kinga Göncz, who was committed to the agenda and presented Hungary’s potential added value in this sphere during international fora. For instance, at the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly, she stated that “Hungary’s…expertise in democracy building, good governance, promoting the rule of law and human rights…will serve as a good basis for our effective contribution to the work of this organization” and reiterated that her country “remains committed to help Afghanistan rebuild itself after many years of war and create a state that is safe, stable and democratic.”71 In a Ministerial Council of the OSCE, she noted that “Genuine democracy, the

68 Horký-Hluchán ˇ , Ondˇrej, “Škrty v rozvojové pomoci a mýty”, Lidové Noviny, 19 December 2018, https://www.iir.cz/article/skrty-v-rozvojove-pomoci-a-myty. 69 Štorkán, Martin, “Nechte to na mnˇe, opakuje Ondráˇcek. Prošetˇrí, kdo vyvezl,naše materiály’ k demonstrantum ˚ v Bˇelorusku”, iRozhlas, 12 August 2020, https://www. irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/tomas-petricek-belorusko-kscm-cssd-protesty-lukasenko-chicha nouska_2008120600_sto. 70 Brezovská, Katka, “Petˇríˇcek: Vzhledem k naší historii pˇred dˇením v Bˇelorusku nemužeme ˚ zavírat oˇci”, Radio Prague International, 25 August 2020, https://cesky. radio.cz/petricek-vzhledem-k-nasi-historii-pred-denim-v-belorusku-nemuzeme-zavirat-oci8690208. 71 Address H. E. Ms. Kinga Göncz, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 27, 2008, https://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/hungary_en. pdf.

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promotion and protection of human rights including the rights of national minorities … are also part and parcel of our broad concept of security.”72 However, since the European migration crisis Hungarian foreign policy vis-à-vis developing and transitioning countries has been shaped mostly by the migration potential of those states. Though Hungary engaged in some minor attempts to support civil society in MENA after the Arab Spring, its perspective changed dramatically after experiencing the European migrant crisis of 2015–2016. The allegedly traditionalist foreign policy aimed at preserving and protecting Hungarian “Christian democratic values” of the Orbán government came to understand democracy promotion as one of the causes of migration, which upends the ethnic and ideational integrity of the Western civilization.73 The US attempts to build democracy in the Middle East have destabilized target countries and created hundreds of thousands of refugees who sought a safe haven in the EU. After the election of Donald Trump, Hungarian minister of foreign affairs Peter Szijjártó during an annual hearing before the joint session of the Parliament’s Economic and Foreign Affairs committees noted that “Donald Trump’s victory is decidedly good news for both Hungary and the world; it is a good thing that exporting democracy will not be at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in future.”74 In a speech at the Russia– Hungary summit in October 2019, focused on Hungary’s willingness and readiness to support Christian communities around the world, Szijjártó further stated that “The ideology-based democracy export experiment has failed, the events of the Arab Spring have often opened the way to Islamist forces, the situation has become worse, and the region has become a cradle for extremist ideologies…The persecution of Christians commenced, crisis situations developed, and mass migration began in the 72 Statement by H. E. Ms. Kinga Göncz Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Helsinki, 4 December 2008, https://www. osce.org/files/f/documents/7/3/35354.pdf. 73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Christian Democratic Approach Regards Different Things as Valuable Than the Liberal Approach”, 18 September 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/the-christ ian-democratic-approach-regards-different-things-as-valuable-than-the-liberal-approach. 74 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “There Will Be No Change in the Orientation of Hungarian Foreign Policy”, 29 November 2016, https://www.kormany.hu/en/min istry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/there-will-be-no-change-in-the-orientation-of-hun garian-foreign-policy.

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direction of Europe.”75 Still, Hungary is selective in how it addresses the issue and pays attention to the context and audience. Representing the country at the 8th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in 2015, State Secretary István Mikola reiterated that “Hungary continues to remain ready to fully cooperate with the Member States of the Community of Democracies in the field of the promotion of democratic values.”76 Nonetheless, the one bilateral instrument that the Hungarian government set up to assist with democratic governance abroad—ICDT—was legally disbanded. Furthermore, Hungarian foreign aid has also been subsumed by migration narratives and the newly found focus on the protection of Christians. In 2019, the government established the Hungary Helps agency tasked with implementing the Hungary Helps Program set up in 2017. The program’s aim is to provide “quick and efficient aid to people suffering from persecution and humanitarian disasters, helping them remain in their place of origin thus eliminating some of the underlying processes that trigger migration flows.”77 In announcing the foundation of the agency, the State Secretary for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and the Hungary Helps Program commented that Hungary is “setting this programme as an example before the world’s public opinion and other governments and international organisations, because we would like them to follow our example and spend at least as much money on similar direct programmes to help people remain in place, as they spend on facilitating migration and integration programmes, for instance.”78 The program claims to “revise the traditional lines between development cooperation and humanitarian aid” and as per its Ambassador-at-large, Péter Heltai, its “focus is, rather than spending the same amount in Europe for immigration related initiatives, to spend it in the crisis area where the value of the same sum of 75 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Hungary Is Taking Responsibility for All of the World’s Christian Communities”, 29 October 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/hungary-is-taking-responsibility-for-all-of-theworld-s-christian-communities. 76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Hungary Is Committed to Protecting Plural

Democracy”, 27 July 2015, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-andtrade/news/hungary-is-committed-to-protecting-plural-democracy. 77 See http://hungaryhelps.gov.hu/en/. 78 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Hungary Helps Agency Established”, 16 April

2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungary-helps-agencyestablished.

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money is four to five times higher, enabling more efficient help.”79 From an overview of the program’s projects, it is clear that it mostly focuses on the restoration of educational, health and economic infrastructures, job-creation and sustainable agriculture in communities in Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, Nigeria and others.80 Allegedly, the program since its founding in early 2017 “has helped 70 thousand persecuted people to stay in their homelands or return to, after the cease of hostilities.”81 In this sense, the transition experience narrative or any other political components are effectively eliminated and the program focuses exclusively on ameliorating the material subsistence of target communities. The approach is not limited to the Hungarian case as even the Czech Republic, for example, in reaction to the migration crisis, has established a humanitarian/development program to “prevent large-scale migration flows” titled “Aid in Place,” which is implemented by the Ministry of Interior (as opposed to CzDA or the MFA).82 It is yet to be seen to what extent these new programs will siphon funding from the “traditional” development programs and democracy assistance, but if governments adopt significant cuts in public funding in order to tackle the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, public opinion in the Visegrad states will likely prefer the new programs over the former as their goals are more easily narrativized into the anti-migration rhetoric. Unlike in the Hungarian case, there have been no explicit signs of the doubting of democracy promotion activities by the Law and Justice Party governments in Poland. Similarly like the Czech Republic, the agenda plays an important identitarian role in Polish foreign policy and at the same time is connected to the legacy of a number of activist individuals and former dissidents-turned-politicians. Of course, former Solidarity leader and President Lech Wał˛esa is one of them—having 79 Heltai, Péter, “The Hungary Helps Initiative—A Hungarian Face of Solidarity”, Hungarian Review 9 (2), 2018, http://hungarianreview.com/article/20180321_the_hun gary_helps_initiative_a_hungarian_face_of_solidarity. 80 It also states that the program is not exclusive for local Christians, but that its projects are “mutually beneficial for all the members of the local community regardless of race, ethnicity, color, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or another status.” 81 Hungary Helps, “Our Activity”, http://hungaryhelps.gov.hu/en/. 82 Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, Aid in Place Report 2017 , https://

www.mvcr.cz/clanek/zpravodajstvi-vyrocni-zprava-programu-ministerstva-vnitra-pomocna-miste.aspx.

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received the Nobel Peace Prize “for his campaign for freedom of organization” in 1983—and has been active in promoting lessons learned from the Polish transformation. His foundation (Lech Wał˛esa Institute) aims among other goals to promote “the principles of democracy and Polish peaceful political transformation experience worldwide.”83 An important advocacy role has also been played by the former minister of foreign affairs, Radosław Sikorski, who was in office in 2007–2014. It was Sikorski, who in January 2011 tabled a proposal at the EU Foreign Affairs Council to form the European Endowment for Democracy and who instigated the creation of the Polish Solidarity Fund in the same year.84 In the Atlantic Council’s Geremek Lecture on Global Democracy Promotion, Sikorski stated from his position of the foreign minister that “Poland is ready to lead Europe as an active partner for the United States in exporting the technology of democracy wherever it is needed and welcomed.”85 When the EED came to life in 2013, Sikorski at its launching ceremony emphasized that founding the endowment was “a way of paying off our debts for the help [countries west of the Iron Curtain] gave us in the seventies and eighties.”86 During his tenure and coinciding with the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU, Poland organized an International Donors’ Conference on “Solidarity with Belarus,” along with the United States setup a Tunisia Joint Mentorship Initiative to send transition experts and democracy activists to the country and founded an NGO Lifeline Fund to sponsor embattled organizations around the world.87 At the “Solidarity with Belarus” conference, which followed a crackdown on the Belarusian opposition after the December 2010 presidential elections, Sikorski 83 Foundation “Lech Wał˛esa Institute”, “Our Mission”, https://www.ilw.org.pl/en/ about-foundation/our-mission. 84 Youngs, Richard and Kinga Brudzinska, “The European Endowment for Democracy: Will It Fly?”, FRIDE Policy Brief , May 2012, https://pism.pl/file/9a5b4c89-0e84-4f658253-7b983e4c71f9. 85 Sikorski, Radosław and John McCain, “Second Bronislaw Geremek Lecture”, 2 March 2011, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/transcript-secondbronislaw-geremek-lecture/. 86 Radio Poland, “Polish-led European Endowment for Democracy HQ Launched”, 28 May 2013, http://archiwum.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/136976. 87 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-Polish Efforts to Advance Democracy Worldwide”, 28 May 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/05/28/fact-sheet-us-polish-efforts-advance-democracy-worldwide.

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warned President Lukashenko: “Sooner or later you too will be running away from your own people, hoping to find a country with even lower democratic standards than your own that is willing to take you in. You may want to consider keeping a jet ready to leave Minsk at the drop of a hat.” He also assured the Belarusian people that “Europe is with you” and that “Poland has already decided to engage even more deeply in the development of Belarusian civil society in a number of areas.”88 Sikorski was thus a key figure that helped set the tone and infrastructure of Polish democracy assistance activities, but he also was one of the architects—along with his Swedish counterpart Carl Bildt—of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. As an advocate of building more sustainable and stronger ties with the EU’s eastern neighbors, Sikorski was at the forefront of the EU’s negotiations with the Ukrainian government during the 2014 Maidan events.89 Using this window of opportunity to strengthen pro-democratic forces and moods in Ukraine, Poland established the Polish-Canadian Democracy Support Program. Launched only three months after the Maidan protests, this joint initiative aimed to “engage Ukrainian citizens in creating efficient, trustworthy, and lawabiding democratic institutions, especially local self-governments and independent media.” Implemented in 2014–2017 and managed by Solidarity Fund PL, the program’s budget amounted to 6.3 million CAD (with Canada contributing 2/3 of the funds and Poland 1/3).90 The Law and Justice government maintains the focus on Eastern Partnership states outlined by Sikorski, but it is working toward dismissing officials who are viewed as too connected to the former minister. In the sphere of Polish democracy assistance, the Solidarity Fund has witnessed a sudden change of management and board in 2017, which was allegedly

88 Sikorski, Radosław, “Solidarity with Belarus”, Keynote Speech at International Donors’ Conference in Warsaw, Poland, 2 February 2011, https://www.journalofdem ocracy.org/articles/documents-on-democracy-april-2011/. 89 Easton, Adam, “Poland’s Crucial Role as Yanukovych’s Rule Crumbled”, BBC, 25 February 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26342882. 90 Solidarity Fund PL, “Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program”, https://solida rityfund.pl/en/co-robimy/demokratyzacja/program-polsko-kanadyjski-program-wsparciademokracji/.

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spurred by the Fund’s former president Krzysztof Stanowski’s ties to Sikorski and conducted in a legally dubious manner.91 The new composition of the board and management of the Solidarity Fund has been criticized as having little experience in transformation assistance and little knowledge of the Eastern Neighborhood countries, where most of the Fund’s activities are directed.92 In reaction to the 2020 protests in Belarus, Poland adopted a similar tone like the Czech Republic with Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki tweeting that “Poland still remembers the breakthrough of 1989 and always supports its neighbours” and appealing “for an extraordinary sitting of the European Council and a determined response of the EU to the developments in Belarus.”93 In a later statement, he noted that “The authorities have used force against their citizens, who are demanding change in the country. We must support the Belarusian people in their quest for freedom.”94 The Polish government hence announced plans to increase their support for Belarusian civil society, independent media and academic scholarships, initially costing around 13 million USD.95 With respect to Belarus events of 2020, Hungary has initially been the most reluctant Visegrad state to engage in any public condemnation of the developments or critique of the regime. Viktor Orbán maintains solid ties with Lukashenko, having paid a visit to Minsk in June 2020, where he called for an end and to the remaining EU sanctions and Lukashenko identified Hungary as Belarus’s closest partner in the EU, and a country

91 Dudkiewicz, Ignacy, “Stanowski: Nie chodzi o mnie. Chodzi o spraw˛e”, ngo.pl, 18

May 2017, https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/stanowski-nie-chodzi-o-mnie-chodzi-o-sprawe. 92 Grajewski, Łukasz, “Podejrzany konkurs na wsparcie białoruskich mediów. Jak wyda´c 5 milionów złotych w kilka miesi˛ecy”, Eastbook, 21 May 2017, https://www.eastbook. eu/2017/04/21/podejrzany-konkurs-na-wsparcie-bialoruskich-mediow-jak-wydac-5-mil ionow-zlotych-w-kilka-miesiecy/. 93 The First News, “Polish PM Says Poland Obliged to Support Belarusians”, 10 August 2020, https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/polish-pm-says-poland-obligedto-support-belarusians-14740. 94 Euractiv, “Poland Calls for Extraordinary EU Summit Following Tainted Belarus Election”, 10 August 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/pol and-calls-for-extraordinary-eu-summit-following-tainted-belarus-election/. 95 Pempel, Kacper and Joanna Plucinska, “Poland Offers New Support for Belarus Civil Society, Media”, Reuters, 14 August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bel arus-election-poland/poland-offers-new-support-for-belarus-civil-society-media-idUSKC N25A0X3.

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which “understands us more than any other.”96 Initially emphasizing that Hungary supports “dialogue” with Belarus, it has not announced any official plans to extend support to civil society.97 Nonetheless, it has refrained from the initial diplomatic language and declared it would “follow the Polish position”98 and later signed on to a V4 presidents’ statement supporting “the right of the people of Belarus to free, fair and democratic presidential elections.”99 The Slovak perspectives on the agenda of democracy assistance have been also shaped mostly by individuals with a background in dissent and academia and who entered politics in the post-communist or postMeˇciar period. In this sense, one of the key figures was Martin Bútora, who was one of the founders of the Public against Violence (Slovak counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum) movement in Czechoslovakia in November 1989, served as advisor to President Havel and later became Slovak Ambassador to the United States in 1999–2003. In 2008, Bútora became a member of the board of directors of the European Partnership for Democracy, claiming that “The new foundation marks a turning-point as leading figures from across Europe rally round Václav Havel’s vision that democracy and human rights must lie at the heart of the European foreign policy agenda. It will be a small, but important, step on the long road to improve the prospects for democracy in complicated areas and societies.”100 Iveta Radiˇcová, who was also among the founders of Public 96 Holroyd, Matthew, “Hungary Urges EU to Pursue Dialogue with Belarus Amid Violent Protests”, Euronews, 14 August 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/ 13/hungary-urges-eu-to-pursue-dialogue-with-belarus-amid-violent-protests. 97 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Despite Minsk’s Crackdown, Hungary Says EU Should Pursue ‘Dialogue’ with Belarus”, 13 August 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/des pite-minsk-crackdown-hungary-says-eu-should-pursue-dialogue-with-belarus/30781872. html. 98 Ciobanu, Claudia, Miroslava German Sirotnikova and Edit Inotai, “Central Europe Adopts United Stance Against Belarus Ahead of EU Meet”, Balkan Insight, 18 August 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/08/18/central-europe-adopts-united-sta nce-against-belarus-ahead-of-eu-meet/. 99 Statement on Belarus by the Presidents of the Visegrad Group countries, 19 August 2020, https://www.prezident.sk/en/article/spolocne-vyhlasenie-prezidentov-v4k-situacii-v-bielorusku/. 100 Institute for Public Affairs, “Martin Bútora Will Serve on Board of European Foundation for Democracy Through Partnership (EFDP)”, undated, http://www.ivo. sk/5288/en/news/martin-butora-will-serve-on-board-of-european-foundation-for-dem ocracy-through-partnership-(efdp).

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against Violence and served as its spokeswomen and who assumed the role of Slovakia’s prime minister in 2010–2012, affirmed in a lecture at Oxford University titled “Restoring Trust” that “Nothing is without struggle. But the promotion of democracy at all levels is worth the struggle and has a good case.”101 Like Bútora, Radiˇcová has been a frequent host of the annual Forum 2000 Conference founded by Havel. In summary, the foreign policy agenda of human rights and democracy promotion carried out by the Visegrad states has mostly been developed by active individuals and is contingent upon the maintenance of their legacies. Opinion polls within these countries indeed demonstrate that the general public prefers material support to poor, developing and transitioning countries over democracy assistance. In Slovakia, the question of promoting democracy is laden with the perspective that the country “should solve its own political problems first.”102 In Poland, respondents in a 2019 poll indicated that PolishAid should mostly focus on assisting the development of the health care and education systems in target countries (41 and 40%, respectively), while only 17% considered it wanting to support democratization processes.103 Democracy assistance policies and public opinion is usually mobilized during suddenly open windows of opportunity (e.g. Arab Spring in 2011, Ukraine in 2014 and Belarus in 2020) as new projects and additional funding are publicly announced and enacted in tandem with other Western donors. At the same time, the focus of democracy assistance is shaped in a dialectical fashion with international organizations, mainly the EU. The Visegrad states download certain aspects (e.g. the territorial and gender focus), but also attempt to upload their visions of how and where democracy assistance should be carried out onto EU policies.

101 Lecture by Mrs. Iveta Radiˇcová, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, at Saint Antony’s College, Oxford University on 11 November 2011, https://www.mzv.sk/pt/ web/londyn-en/news/-/asset_publisher/olsKsIdtEfpB/content/lecture-by-mrs-iveta-rad icova-prime-minister-of-the-slovak-republic-at-saint-antony-s-college-oxford-university-on11-11-2011/10182?_101_INSTANCE_olsKsIdtEfpB_redirect=%2Fpt%2Fweb%2Flondynen%2Fnews%3Fstrana%3D5. 102 Bátora, Jozef and Zuzana Hozlárová (eds.), Verejná Diplomacia: Nový Strategický Nástroj MZV SR? (Bratislava: Ústav európskych štúdií a medzinárodných vzˇtahov FSEV UK, 2010), https://www.mzv.sk/documents/10182/12130/Zbornik. pdf/f52da06b-c453-461f-8c0a-d4e4b19b33c9. 103 PolishAid, “Poles on Development Assistance—Findings of a 2019 Opinion Poll”, undated, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/poles-on-development-assistance--fin dings-of-a-2019-opinion-poll2.

CHAPTER 7

The International Visegrad Fund as a Democracy Promotion Instrument

Abstract The International Visegrad Fund is a unique instrument designed to strengthen cooperation among the scholars and civil society organizations of the four member states. Since its foundation, the Fund has reoriented itself also to supporting this cooperation with states of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans, thus effectively becoming a multilateral democracy assistance instrument of the Visegrad Group. From the perspective of the principal–agent problem, the chapter probes the relationship of the Fund to the four states and the level of autonomy it has in promoting democracy in target states. It then provides an empirical overview of the geographical and thematic focus of the Fund’s projects to demonstrate its impact in promoting democracy on behalf of the Visegrad states. Keyword International Visegrad Fund · Eastern Partnership · Western Balkans · Principal–agent problem · Democracy assistance

An analysis of the Visegrad countries’ democracy assistance efforts would not be complete were we to omit the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) established in 2000. The Fund was created on the basis of a 1999 joint

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_7

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statement of the V4 on the “Contents of Visegrad Cooperation”1 and its initial aims were to strengthen ties between the four states, promote and develop cultural cooperation, scientific exchanges and cross-border cooperation.2 As will be demonstrated below, the IVF, seated in Bratislava, has extended its original aims and focuses beyond inter-Visegrad cooperation to include also the Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership states with an outlook to facilitate their democratization and approximation to the EU.

A Theoretical Perspective on the IVF We can identify a number of impulses why states decide to set up international organizations (IOs). States delegate or outsource certain tasks to international organizations in order to increase the effectiveness of the implementation of their policy preferences. International organizations have expertise that perhaps their founding and member states do not have the capacity to harbor. An example of outsourcing based on expertise (or specialization) is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is inter alia responsible for on-site inspections of nuclear facilities and monitoring whether they operate purely to serve civil purposes. The IAEA’s expertise is built not just by virtue of the experts it employs, but also due to the historical experience it holds. However, expertise is not enough to induce states to create new institutions or delegate tasks to existing ones. The United States or France could arguably provide experts with similar experience and expertise by themselves to inspect nuclear facilities in Iran, yet they often prefer to delegate the task (through the UN Security Council) to the IAEA. This is because the international institution, where a number of states are stakeholders and members, provides a strong case for the organization’s impartiality. As a consequence, the activities of international organizations are neutralized or “laundered” from potential political preferences of member states.3

1 Contents of Visegrad Cooperation approved by the Prime Ministers’ Summit Bratislava on 14 May 1999, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/cooperation/contents-of-vis egrad-110412. 2 Agreement Concerning the Establishment of the International Visegrad Fund, Statute of the International Visegrad Fund, https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/uploads.man goweb.org/shared-prod/visegradfund.org/uploads/2018/12/IVF_statute.pdf. 3 Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1), 1998: 3–32.

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The perceived neutrality of IOs is increased if they maintain a certain level of discretion or autonomy of decision-making. States are principals who delegate tasks to agents—IOs. A higher level of discretion permits IOs to fully employ and capitalize on their expertise without disturbing interventions from member states, which may be guided by political preferences. Greater autonomy of an IO from its principal(s) thus sends a signal that its decision-making and activities are less likely to be motivated by (geo)politics. Less autonomy, however, permits the principal(s) to more closely monitor its agent and make sure that it is not straying from the path defined in their founding principles. When agents slack, they engage in independent action that is undesired by the principal— they can minimize their effort to conduct a task (shirking) or they can shift policy away from the principals’ preferred outcome (slippage).4 In this sense, an agent can follow (vested) self-interest over the principal’s interest. If principals are worried about agency slack, they adopt various mechanisms of control over the agent in the form of a contractual relationship, which may include various screening and selection procedures of management, budgetary sanctions or reporting duties (e.g. annual reports).5 A high level of an agent’s autonomy can be used by principals to further two arguments. On the one hand they can adopt a “handsoff” approach and claim that in a given instance the agent was acting at its discretion and thus its actions have little to do with the official governmental stance (such logic underpins the National Endowment for Democracy or the European Endowment for Democracy). On the other hand, it can help to legitimize activities of the IO in a given context as it is operating devoid of political intervention of the principal(s) and thus in the interest of the recipient state. At the same time, nonetheless, extended discretion provides more room for agency slack and may lead to decreasing trust and faith of principal(s) in the agent’s work. The more individual states see IOs as tools and facilitators of other states’ foreign policy preferences, the more hostile they will be toward what they perceive

4 Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, et al., “Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory”, in Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, et al. (eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3–38. 5 Ibid.

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as agency slack. The Trump administration’s positions on multilateral governance and IOs in general is a testament to such approach.6 Apart from “laundering” policy decisions, specialized IOs are formed by states for the simply pragmatic reason of pooling resources. States alone have limited financial and human capacities and thus pooling their efforts in realms that require large investments of human and financial capital lowers transaction costs, boosts potential impact and increases returns.7 The World Bank is a clear example of an institution, whose existence is designed and contingent on the idea of pooling resources. In other cases, pooling may refer not only to the amassment of resources, but also to the “joint decision making among the principals.”8 The initial impulses to form the IVF allegedly emanated from the working thesis to “force [the four societies] to cooperate” and was inspired by the successful Czech–German Fund for the Future.9 This top-down directive turned into a grant scheme which initially supported projects only if a partnership of at least three institutions from three different V4 states was established. The IVF scheme led to increased (“forced”) cooperation among civil society, research and cultural organizations, more frequent people-to-people contacts and intensified the flow and sharing of information among these institutions and the related epistemic communities. The fund mainly pooled resources but created a mechanism for the joint decision-making about the redistribution of the resources. In the following section, we will examine the level of discretion the fund maintains and how important the neutralizing and laundering effect of the fund is to the four principals.

6 See Sharma, Shalendra D., “Trump and the End of an Era? The Liberal International Order in Perspective”, The International Spectator 55 (3), 2020: 82–97; Weiss, Thomas G., “The UN and Multilateralism Under Siege in the ‘Age of Trump’”, Global Summitry 4 (1), 2018: 1–17. 7 Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organization”. 8 Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks, “Delegation and Pooling in International Organi-

zations”, Review of International Organizations 10 (3), 2015: 305–328. 9 IVF, “Visegrad=15”, 2015, https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/uploads.man goweb.org/shared-prod/visegradfund.org/uploads/2018/01/ivf_Visegrad-Fund15.pdf.

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The Structure and Procedures of the IVF The main governing body of the IVF is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which determines the amounts of annual contributions by the four contracting parties, approves the annual and long-term plans and the Rules of Procedure of the Secretariat. The “working” governing body of the IVF is the Council of Ambassadors,10 which meets at least twice a year and prepares a draft budget, drafts the Rules of Procedure and lays down “binding guidelines for the activities of the Executive Director and rules governing the preparation, acceptance and implementation of projects submitted to the Fund.”11 The executive function belongs to the Secretariat, headed by the Executive Director. Each of the four states has the right to nominate their own candidate for the position of the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director—both positions are appointed by the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Executive Director chairs the evaluation committees that select projects to be funded by the IVF. The committees evaluate projects only as a recommendation to be passed to the Council of Ambassadors, which decides about the final selection.12 The IVF’s Executive Director participates in sessions of the Council of Ambassadors, but only in an advisory capacity. The fund permits contributions from third parties, but these have to be approved by the Council of Ministers. In recent years, the Fund’s activities have been supported, for example, by the governments of the United States, South Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and others. The Fund’s Statute permits the financial support of “projects originating in countries other than the Contracting Parties, provided that they shall have at least two (2) co-organizing partners from the Contracting Parties.” The contributions from the four member states were initially 1 million EUR to be paid in equal shares. The individual contributions have increased to 2

10 Composed of ambassadors of “the Contracting Parties accredited to the Head of the

State whose plenipotentiary currently holds the post of President of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.” 11 Statute of the International Visegrad Fund. 12 IVF, Grant Guidelines, 2020, https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/uploads.man

goweb.org/shared-prod/visegradfund.org/uploads/2020/09/Grant_Guidelines_2020. pdf.

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million USD, leaving the fund with a budget of 8 million EUR (excluding contributions from third parties).13 At the outset, the IVF offered grants only to partnerships composed and lead by organizations from at least three V4 states and mobility scholarships exclusively to citizens (academics, artists) from the four member states. However, the Fund soon started to expand its reach beyond the V4. In 2004 it introduced “in-coming” scholarships for postgraduate students from six14 non-Visegrad states. In 2008 it launched the Visegrad + program “to administer and finance projects contributing to democratization and transformation processes in selected countries and regions.”15 The program initially held irregular calls for project proposals and focused on Serbia, Belarus and Georgia. Finally, to support the Visegrad’s proposal of establishing the Eastern Partnership component of the ENP, the IVF launched in 2011 the Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership (V4EaP), accompanied by a Western Balkans focus. The Fund thereby started to offer both mobility scholarships and grants (Visegrad + Grants) to non-V4 states, granted that the project proposals from these organizations ensure the active involvement of at least 3 V4 states. The objectives of the funding provided by the IVF were thus extended to the EaP and the Western Balkans, thus becoming a truly “international” fund. The mechanisms of control the principals exert over their agent (IVF) are fairly robust and do not offer much discretion to the fund. Strategic and annual plans as well as the budget are adopted by the governing bodies, which are political, projects are selected by V4 ambassadors (who can thus decide not to fund a project in a target state that may be politically sensitive or potentially hurt the interests of one of the member states) and the executive staff of the Fund is nominated and selected by the principals. The IVF thus has less room to act based on its own preferences and

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, “Mezinárodní visegradský fond”, https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/cr_v_evrope/visegrad/mez inarodni_visegradsky_fond_1.html. 14 At the time the countries included Belarus, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro and Ukraine. 15 IVF, Annual Report 2010, https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/uploads.man goweb.org/shared-prod/visegradfund.org/uploads/2018/01/ivf_annual_report_2010. pdf.

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its activities are more closely tied to the interest of the Visegrad states— leaving also less space for the “laundering” and “neutralization” effect of the Fund.

Substance of the IVF’s Activities Since 2000, the IVF has distributed nearly 100 million EUR in project and mobility funding. A little over 80% of these resources were distributed to individuals and organizations within the Visegrad Group states and in line with the primary intent to bolster cultural, social, academic, but also business exchanges and cooperation between the four neighboring states. The IVF was also considered not only as an instrument for increasing cooperation, but also for strengthening democratic governance in the four states themselves by advancing the development of civil society and supporting various public lectures on topics related to human rights and democracy. The Fund further funded research projects focused on the transition experience of Visegrad states and their democracy assistance policies (e.g. “The Evaluation of the Visegrad Countries’ Democratic Assistance Programmes,” “Lectures in Democracy and Human Rights Promotion: V4,” “Transferring the Experience of V4 to the GUAM Countries”16 ). In a joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four states on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the IVF in June 2020, the ministers acknowledged that the common aim of the nearly 6000 projects financed by the Fund, “has always been to bring together people inside the V4 region but also within Europe as a common continent and making thus its own contribution to the process of the European integration in general.”17 For the purposes of probing the V4 states’ democracy assistance activities and identifying how the IVF contributes to the agenda, we will look more closely at the targets of the remaining 20% of funding distributed by the Fund. The general goal of IVF funding (Visegrad + Grants) in

16 IVF, Annual Report 2007 , https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/uploads.man goweb.org/shared-prod/visegradfund.org/uploads/2018/01/ivf_annual_report_2007. pdf. 17 Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), 9 June 2020, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/dec laration-of-the-200609.

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the EaP and the Western Balkans is to “contribute to the development of the target countries mainly via facilitating the dissemination of the V4 countries’ know-how and good practices with a focus on democratization, the development of civil society, political, economic and social transformation, EU approximation and EU integration, good governance and regional cooperation.”18 Though the Visegrad + Grants scheme maintains the same thematic objectives as those applying for the Standard Visegrad Grants (where only organizations from the V4 are eligible recipients), the areas of support that are most conducive to assisting the development of democratic governance, a rules-based business environment and approximation with the EU are preferred. Out of the 260 projects implemented through the Visegrad + Grant scheme (as of 2019), 173 belonged in the categories “education and capacity building,” “public policy and institutional partnership” and democratic values and the media.” The remaining 87 projects were categorized under the IVF’s thematic objectives of “environment,” “culture and common identity,” “regional development, entrepreneurship and tourism” and “scientific exchange and research cooperation.” Moreover, within the IVF’s objectives in the EaP and the Western Balkans, we can identify congruence with the substance of the bilateral democracy assistance activities of the Visegrad states described earlier (see Table 7.1). The bulk of the IVF’s focus is the consolidation of cooperation and people-to-people contacts within the Visegrad states, so the number of projects implemented in the EaP and the WB is limited when compared to V4. Yet, the quantity of projects funded in the Visegrad neighborhood has been rising slowly as more funding is available and the Fund’s existence is increasingly acknowledged in the region (Table 7.2). Of the EaP countries, the most attention is directed toward Ukraine, with almost 56% of all the projects implemented by EaP recipients. Second in line is Georgia with 23% followed by Armenia with 11%. Given the Polish focus on Belarus in bilateral democracy assistance it is surprising that only 8 projects (4% of total) have been implemented in Belarus. Belarus is followed by Moldova with 7 projects and Azerbaijan with 3 projects. This breakdown demonstrates that the countries that are more open to approximation with the EU and the democratization of

18 IVF, Grant Guidelines.

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Table 7.1 Objectives of the International Visegrad Fund Issue area

Specific IVF objective

Educating and mobilizing the youth

• Increased participation of citizens in the democratic system • Increased awareness and active involvement of civil society in policy-making processes with emphasis on youth • Increased capacity building of civil servants • Rule of law and good governance; building the necessary central and local administration system with the involvement of the civil society • Creating new approaches to existing regional public challenges • Providing a safer environment and capacity building for whistleblowers, fact-checkers, investigative journalists and other watchdogs • Increased awareness of transparency as a norm in society, professionalization of transparency of justice, fight against corruption • Improved media and information literacy for increased resilience toward biased reporting, disinformation and propaganda • Competitive economies and economic modernization as the basis for stable and sustainable development, social welfare and integration to international markets. The role of education, research and innovation in realizing these goals • Launching or strengthening political, economic and social cooperation between cross-border regions in the spirit of micro-regional cooperation and enhancing connectivity

Training and expertise sharing

Civil society support

Rules-based market economy

Source Author based on IVF objectives

their political systems are also more likely to receive funding through the IVF. Of course, Ukraine and Georgia have a much more open system for the functioning of civil society and thereby there are more project proposals being submitted from these countries. At the same time, it is less politically risky to fund projects in countries where the political

0 12

Projects20 Scholarships 3 6

2008

4 4

3 7

2009

2 14

2 16

2010

2 18

7 12

2 15

2011

10 12

3 13

2012

18 14

4 15

2013

21 3

11 4

2014

22 6

9 1

2015

10 7

3 11

2016

23 6

11 8

2017

16 6

19 Projects with the main applicant from an EaP country. 20 Projects with the main applicant from a Western Balkan country, including Croatia which joined the EU in 2014.

Source Author based on IVF annual reports

2007

Year

IVF funded projects in the Western Balkans

Projects19 Scholarships

Year

11 10

2018

23 19

13 4

2019

20 5

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Projects funded by the IVF in the EaP countries and the Western Balkans

IVF funded projects in the EaP countries

Table 7.2

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elites themselves strive for some level of democratization and civil society activity than in autocratic states, such as Belarus and Azerbaijan. None of the projects implemented in Belarus, Moldova or Azerbaijan fall into the IVF’s category of “democratic values and the media.” In Georgia, nearly 20% of implemented projects fall into this category, in Ukraine, the number stands at 11% and in Armenia at 25%. In the second category that can be identified as part of democracy assistance or the sharing of transition experience—“public policy and institutional partnerships”—only one such project was implemented in Belarus or Azerbaijan. The project was implemented by the Gomel Regional Agency for Economic Development and focused on the European experience of elaboration of the Euroregions development strategy. On the other hand, the “public policy and institutional partnerships” is the most common project category for Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, where 30% of all projects fall in the said objective. In Georgia, the IVF projects related to democracy building entail the “empowering” of civil society, of watchdogs and of journalists. They are also focused on the sharing of V4 experience—both in the field of democratization and EU approximation. In the realm of transition experience, the IVF supported, for example, the projects “Learn and Practice Democracy – Sharing European Experience in Interactive Teaching and Debates”; “Experience-sharing of V4 countries to promote media professionalism”; “Learning from Visegrad 4 experience to advocate for equal, inclusive and democratic local governance” and “Experience-sharing of V4 Countries to Strengthen Civic Engagement.” Even more attention has been devoted to the realm of EU approximation. In this sphere the fund supported projects such as “Issues and Challenges of EU Integration: Experiences of the Visegrad Countries,” “V4 for C3 EU Integration,” “Economic Policy of Visegrad Countries on the Way of European Integration,” “V4 Supporting Economic Integration of Georgia and Moldova with the EU” and others. The Fund has also financed projects specifically targeting the empowerment of women in Georgia—“Gender Policies and EU Integration – Experience of V4 for EaP Countries” and “V4 for Empowerment Georgian Women in Rural Areas.” The focus of projects in Ukraine is slightly different from those in Georgia. Especially since 2014 there is a heavier focus on supporting independent media and tackling disinformation and on human rights issues. Apart from EU integration-related projects (e.g. “V4-Ukraine

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think tanks networking for public discussion on EU integration and advocacy of reforms,” “V4 assistance in assessment of economic reforms by regions of Ukraine in terms of EU integration” and “Road to the EU of the Visegrad countries: lessons for Ukraine”), there is a focus on Euro-Atlantic integration processes and thus NATO-approximation (e.g. “A New Strategic Concept of NATO – The Role of V4 in Enhancing Ukraine’s Euro–Atlantic Integration,” “Euro-Atlantic and political transformation processes in the Visegrad Group countries and Ukraine”). Compared to the EaP countries, the Western Balkan states receive a smaller proportion of funds from the IVF (only nearly 4% of total IVF funding since 2000, compared to 13% for the EaP states). Nearly 50% of IVF projects in the Western Balkans are implemented by Serbian institutions, followed by Northern Macedonia with nearly 19%. The remaining states (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Croatia) have received only a small number of projects ranging from a total of 6 in Kosovo and Albania to 3 in Croatia. Though the number of projects implemented by Western Balkan applicants is too small to describe broader trends, it is clear that projects within the category of “public policy and institutional partnerships” are most common, constituting one-fourth of all implemented projects in the region. Most projects in this category were preoccupied with transferring Visegrad experience with EU integration and inducing civil society actors to be involved in related discussions. The IVF supported the “European Movements” in Serbia and Montenegro with the projects “European Integration of the Western Balkans – Can the V4 Countries Be a Role Model?,” “V4 Backing the Advocacy Strategy for the European Integration of the Western Balkans,” “Regional Convention on European Integration” and “Strengthening the EU Approximation Processes in the Western Balkans.” In Albania and Kosovo, the IVF financed a project focused on the “Sharing Experience of Visegrad Countries’ EU Economic Integration.” Projects pertaining to the “democratic values and media” objective of the IVF are only a few, mostly targeting Serbia with projects including “Political Parties and Engaged Public: Encouragement of Civil Engagement to Control Leadership of Political Parties,” “Regional Academy for Democracy – Justice and Security Cooperation” and “Increasing Legislative Transparency in the Western Balkans.” An analysis of the substance of the IVF projects in the Western Balkans shows that they are mostly aiming at mobilizing civil society actors in support of EU integration and

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EU approximation. There is also a larger share of purely cultural projects focusing on art than for the EaP region (18% in WB and only 8% in EaP). The IVF’s activity in the Western Balkans also contains an indirect form of involvement as it provides technical assistance to the Western Balkans Fund (WBF). Formed in 2015, the WBF is partly modeled on the IVF and supports closer cooperation among its contracting parties through the support of their respective civil society and aims to advance EU integration. IVF officials were engaged in consulting the creation of the WBF and the two funds maintain a memorandum of understanding that ensures the provision of technical assistance.21 The extension of such cooperation has had the support of the V4 ministers.22 In sum, the IVF constitutes another layer of democracy assistance provided by the Visegrad states. Along the easily controlled bilateral dimension and the “laundered” multilateral support provided through the international organizations like the UN or the EU, Visegrad states employ the IVF as a regional instrument that does not have much autonomy and opportunity for agency slack and forces the four states to adapt consensual positions on politically sensitive issues, such as supporting various pro-democratic projects, agendas and civil society members in non-EU states. In the 20 years of the fund’s existence, the four governments have not reached the point of disagreement on its function and direction that they would threaten to withdraw or suspend funding. In fact, even in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the governments have made sure their contributions were always to be paid fully.23

21 IVF, “Strengthening Cooperation with Western Balkans Fund”, 27 February 2020, https://www.visegradfund.org/news/strengthening-cooperation-western-balkans-fund/. 22 Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the V4 countries on the Western Balkans, 27 February 2020, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/officialstatements/joint-statement-of-the-200323. 23 Rácz, A Limited Priority, 157.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Abstract The final chapter returns to the main research question of the publication and provides a typology of the motives of states for integrating democracy assistance in the portfolio of their foreign policies. It identifies three ideal types of motives—the first is “ideational,” which results mainly in the strengthening and consolidation of democracy in the donor state itself; the second is “integrationist,” which mimics Western democracy promotion efforts in order to be accepted as a legitimate member of the liberal-democratic community and the last type of motive is “geostrategic,” which is preoccupied with fostering a community of like-mined liberal and market-oriented democratic states serving as a bulwark against adversaries and with fostering global stability and reaping the economic gains from expanding the global market. Keywords Democracy promotion · Geo-strategy · Development aid · Status · Mimicry

An empirical account of the Visegrad states’ adoption and operationalization of democracy promotion as a component of their foreign policies after the Cold War exposes three basic motivations—ideational, integrationist and geostrategic—why the states engage in the endeavor of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0_8

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Table 8.1 Typology of motives for democracy promotion by Visegrad states Cause

Motive

The need to foster and sustain → a democratic culture and identity domestically The desire to be accepted as → part of the community of democracies (the “West”) and the global “core” Seeking security and potential access into the political process of a foreign country

→

Result

Ideational

→

Integrationist

→

Geostrategic

→

Consolidation and strengthening of democratic identity at home Mimicry of democracy promotion policies and efforts to expand the community of liberal democracies into global “peripheries” Democratic peace and closer economic and political relations with target country

Source Author

assisting foreign societies in becoming democratic. These three rationales operate in parallel and all have different causes and—if successful—expect varying results for the donor country. Every donor country and its policymakers maintain a varying balance among the three ideal types of motives.1 Therefore, we can also observe variance in the approach to the agenda of democracy promotion across governing political parties and coalitions. In short, the underlying motivation of states to engage in democracy promotion is fluid and subject to the domestic political context. However, given the variance of motives and justifications for carrying out democracy assistance, democracy promotion has proved to be a fairly stable policy that perpetuates itself and withstands attacks from its domestic opponents. The typology of motives of the Visegrad states is summarized in Table 8.1. The ideational motive is intrinsic to the democratic political regime. Since liberal democracies lack the resources and means to coerce citizens into being democrats (unlike authoritarian regimes that indoctrinate and intimidate citizens to conform with the regime), they must naturally find other, subtler means to foster and consolidate the democratic identity of their populations.2 This rationale for democracy promotion acknowledges that identifying non-democratic “others” and shaming them rhetorically 1 By the term “motive” we mean the reason or the rationale for doing something—in our case democracy assistance. 2 See Hornat, Democratization Through Education.

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is a strong requisite for reaffirming the domestic democratic identity. A constituency particularly fond of its democratic character will expect its political leaders to stand up against authoritarians in a condescending manner and affirm the democratic state’s moral superiority. Though the ideational motive employs the laudable rhetoric of advancing freedom and protecting the oppressed in foreign countries (the co-democrats, the dissidents), it is equally designed to affirm the “democratic self” and maintain a symbolic hierarchy among the virtuous democracies on the one hand and the malign authoritarian regimes on the other. To paraphrase Hattori, what democracy assistance is, is more important than what it does.3 In this sense, the nearly mythical status of democratic leaders in Czech history, like Masaryk and Havel, impedes attempts to phase democracy promotion out of the country’s foreign policy. With an explicit reference to the legacy of the first Czechoslovak president and dissidents of the communist period contained in the foreign policy strategy, the Czech MFA is keen on maintaining a democracy assistance instrument directly “under its roof.” We can contrast this with the position of Hungary which, as Medve-Bálint points out, never demonstrated too much satisfaction with the domestic democratic transition in the first place, thus resulting in very low public interest in external democracy assistance.4 While the Hungarian government initiated the creation of a democracy assistance instrument—the ICDT—it kept it apart from official structures and recently deactivated it completely. Overall, the respective government’s approach to the democracy promotion agenda correlates with the public’s satisfaction and subsequent support for democracy in general. So, while studies and polls from the early 1990s demonstrated that of the Visegrad populations Czechoslovakians expressed sentiments most conducive to democracy, the Hungarian society’s positions were least conducive to democratic governance.5 3 Hattori, Tomohisa, “The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid”, Review of International Studies 29 (2), 2003: 234. 4 Medve-Bálint, Gergo, “Return to Europe. Reflections After 20 Years of Democratic Renewal. Research Report on Hungary,” Center for Policy Studies Working Paper, 2010, https://cps.ceu.edu/sites/cps.ceu.edu/files/cps-working-paper-return-toeurope-2010.pdf. 5 Waldron-Moore, Pamela, “Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition: Evaluating Support for Democratic Institutions, Satisfaction with Democratic Government, and Consolidation of Democratic Regimes,” Comparative Political Studies 32 (1), 1999: 32–62.

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The integrationist motive has been driven by an internal impulse in post-communist Visegrad states to rejoin the “West” and consolidate the countries’ position therein. A certain code of conduct is expected from fellow democracies in order to be accepted into the community and standing up for the cause of democratic expansion is one of its aspects. Therefore, while becoming subjects of Euro-Atlantic integration, the Visegrad states became “recruiters” themselves—assisting other post-communist states in their efforts to join NATO, the EU and other multilateral institutions. Conducting democracy assistance is thus a statusseeking endeavor that enhances the prestige of a country from the perspective of its core partners—namely the United States and the European Union. Small and semi-peripheral states can thus “make themselves useful” for core partners in assisting their activities abroad, which has a multiplier effect for their standing with the partners. In this sense, we can point to how the Visegrad states have been active in countries which are far beyond their traditional target recipients, such as Afghanistan and Iraq (an engagement which actually led to the V4’s institutionalization of democracy assistance in their respective foreign policies) and also in supporting the EU’s efforts in North Africa during the Arab Spring. It is clear to the Visegrad states that being limited by resources, the often miniscule democracy assistance projects they implement have little or no direct effect on the democratization of a target country. But it is the cumulative effect of all engaged democratic actors working in tandem that can induce change. There is also an external factor in operationalizing the integrationist motive. The V4’s membership in certain organizations, such as the OECD, assumes or in some instances requires a certain level of engagement with developing and non-democratic countries through bilateral and multilateral development aid and democracy assistance. Similarly, EU member states’ development cooperation becomes “Europeanized” as countries are expected to follow guidance on how to carry out their assistance to developing countries—for example by “mainstreaming” gender or democracy into every external activity. The final, geostrategic motive is supported by realpolitik thinking. Within this approach democracy assistance can be conceptualized as a gift, a “voluntary extension of resources from one individual or society to another.” The act of giving forms or reinforces a social relationship and at the same time creates a social (in contrast to a material) obligation

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to reciprocate.6 In international relations practice, scholars depict development aid as a gift, since donor countries do not expect (or enforce) reciprocity from recipients. Development aid suspends the obligation of recipients to reciprocate and thereby establishes a clear social hierarchy between recipient and donor—a “symbolic domination.”7 As described earlier, the Visegrad states considered the democracy assistance they received from Western counterparts as a gift, which they felt obliged to reciprocate and did so on two levels. First, they opened their economic and political systems to the Western states’ advices, consultations and investments, leading to their increased politico-economic influence. Second, they reciprocated by extending their solidarity toward other post-communist states to perpetuate the cycle of democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration. If leading to a successful democratization in a target country, democracy assistance brings the promise of providing similar access to the recipient country’s political and economic system and the ensuing material payoffs. Moreover, this investment into closer political and economic ties with the recipient of democracy assistance translates into the security realm as peaceful relations among democracies are expected. Within the geostrategic rationale, democracy assistance can be viewed also as a tool for the incremental weakening of powerful rivals. For instance, Polish geopolitical thinking operates with the historical concept of “Prometheism” formulated by Józef Piłsudski before the First World War. The concept presented the belief that Poland’s main geopolitical enemy was Russia and that in order to assure Polish security, the objective of Warsaw and its partners should be to work to “internally dissolve the Russian centre of power.”8 The destabilization or even dissolution of the Russian power center would be achieved by supporting any centrifugal forces within Russia and “all liberation movements and movements fighting for independence.”9 Historically, Prometheism was manifested in the Polish support for the independence of Finland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Turkestan, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This belt of newly 6 See Mauss, Marcel, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (New York: Norton, 1967). 7 Hattori, “The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid”, 233. 8 Ištok, Robert, Irina Kozárová and Anna Polaˇcková, “The Intermarium as a Polish

Geopolitical Concept in History and in the Present”, Geopolitics 2018: 9–10. 9 Ibid., 9–10.

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independent states surrounding the Russian state would clearly weaken the power position of Moscow and lower the chances of threatening Poland. More recently, by focusing mostly on supporting opposition groups and pro-democracy activities in post-Soviet states bordering Russia, Poland is—in line with the Prometheian concept—attempting to weaken Moscow’s position in its periphery in turn reassuring Polish security. The proposed typology of motives for V4 states’ engagement in assisting democracy abroad points to two broader conclusions, which would deserve further research. The first is the question of resilience. We have described that democracy assistance programs in the V4 states have been institutionalized through the initiatives of individual policymakers with a personal interest in the agenda (Havel, Sikorski, Göncz), but also through inducements from international organizations (OECD, EU) and partners (the United States). Though contested, these individual legacies have been maintained and despite the observed “illiberal” turn and democratic backsliding in Visegrad states, democracy assistance provided by these four countries seems to follow a certain level of pathdependency and remains a part of the foreign policy agenda (and has been even extended within the operations of the IVF). So, although the ideational motive may be less relevant today for the Hungarian government, the integrationist and the geostrategic ones are still applicable. If—in a hypothetical scenario—the Visegrad states decoupled from the transatlantic framework, the integrationist motive would lose its meaning, but the geostrategic would likely prevail. In other words, while democracy promotion is mostly depicted as falling into the category of value-based, ideational policies, it can very well have a pure realpolitik basis. The second conclusion, connected to the notion of the policy’s resilience, is the issue of communication. The justification and legitimization of democracy promotion policies that local political elites communicate to their domestic constituents can be based on an array of arguments. While arguments connected to the ideational motive will cater to constituencies that are fond of the liberal democratic system, the geostrategic arguments may be acceptable to domestic constituencies that perceive democracy promotion as unnecessary and expensive “dogooding” and meddling into the domestic affairs of sovereign states. If we consider the example of Hungary, we can witness that the protection of Christian values (and Christian communities) globally has been

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a frequently pronounced topic of its foreign policy and its development cooperation specifically during the Orbán governments. The clear message of this renewed interest in emphasizing Christian values in relation to the outside world is that Hungary aims to protect “Western civilization” against the expansion of the non-Western (non-Christian and Muslim) world.10 This narrative could also be taken over to justify the promotion of democracy—“Western democracy” as a bulwark against encroaching “others.” What we mean to say here is that democracy promotion is a fairly resilient policy both in practice and in preserving a level of legitimacy for its execution among the domestic constituency. Though it has been expected that populist and illiberal leaders like Donald Trump will represent the end of democracy promotion as such, we can now observe that the agenda survived.11 Indeed, the emerging narrative of the necessity to “save” and protect the “West” as a unique “civilizational bloc” against external threats to its ontological security may give democracy promotion a new lease on life, albeit for rather jingoistic purposes.

10 Igoe, Michael, “To Direct More Funding to Christians, USAID Looks to Hungary”, Devex, 25 November, 2019, https://www.devex.com/news/to-direct-morefunding-to-christians-usaid-looks-to-hungary-96055; “Orbán: Europe Can Only Be Saved by Returning to Christianity”, MTI-Hungary Today, 26 November 2019, https://hungar ytoday.hu/orban-christianity-europe-persecuted/. 11 Rogin, Josh, “The Trump Administration Wants to Dismantle Ronald Reagan’s ‘Infrastructure of Democracy’,” Washington Post, 4 March 2018, www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/global-opinions/the-trump-administration-wants-to-dismantleronald-rea gans-infrastructure-of-democracy/2018/03/04/8b94d7f6–1e54–11e8-ae5a16e60e46 05f3_story.html; Carothers, Thomas, “Prospects for U.S. Democracy Promotion Under Trump,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 January 2017, http://carnegiee ndowment.org/2017/01/05/prospects-for-u.s.-democracy-promotion-undertrump-pub66588.

Index

A acquis communautaire, 25 Afghanistan, 31, 64–66, 123, 125, 152 agrarianism, 10 Albania, 66, 71, 90, 98, 100, 101, 120, 146 Aliyev, Ilham, 68 Arab Spring, 33, 34, 74, 75, 92, 104, 107, 120, 121, 126, 133, 152 Armenia, 67, 68, 71, 110, 142, 145, 153 Ashton, Catherine, 33 Azerbaijan, 67–69, 71, 89, 110, 142, 145, 153

B Babiš, Andrej, 2 Belarus, 66, 67, 71, 72, 86–89, 91, 93–98, 100, 110, 121, 124, 125, 131–133, 140, 142, 145 Belsat TV, 97

Biden, Joe, 39 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 66, 67, 71, 81, 86, 89, 90, 93, 94, 96, 99, 146 Brexit, 3

C Centre for Experience Transfer from Integration and Reforms (CETIR), 61, 74, 81, 84, 91, 109 Charter 77, 38 China, 22, 64, 66, 69, 80, 107, 124 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 46 cognitive bias, 18 cognitive shortcuts, 18, 19, 114 Cold War, 31, 36, 39, 149 Community of democracies, 32, 97, 111, 127, 150 Congress, 57 constructivism, 23

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Hornat, The Visegrad Group and Democracy Promotion, The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78188-0

157

158

INDEX

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 64 COVID-19, 2 Czech Development Agency (CzDA), 47, 89, 99

Georgia, 66–68, 71, 75, 86, 87, 89, 91, 94–100, 110, 120, 140, 142, 143, 145, 153 Gershman, Carl, 124 Göncz, Kinga, 54, 125, 154

D dirigiste state, 16 Drulák, Petr, 123

H Havel, Václav, 12, 34, 49, 72–74, 121–124, 132, 133, 151, 154 Huntington, Samuel, 82, 83, 92

E Eastern Partnership (EaP), 72, 87, 91, 99, 100, 110, 130, 136, 140, 142, 146, 147 education, 44, 67, 86–88, 90, 117, 118, 133, 143 Egypt, 74, 95, 110 energy, 61, 68, 81, 100 Enterprise Funds, 57 European Consensus on Democracy, 27 European Consensus on Development, 27, 106, 117 European Endowment for Democracy (EED), 35, 111, 129, 137 Europeanization, 25–27, 30, 32, 40, 108 European Neighborhood Policy, 37 European Transition Compendium (ETC), 28, 112, 113

I International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT), 52, 53, 75, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 97, 100, 119, 127, 151 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 29, 83 Iraq, 8, 31, 36, 46, 47, 65, 66, 86, 94, 95, 123, 128, 152 J Japan, 36 K Kenya, 64, 66, 71, 82, 88, 120 Krastev, Ivan, 30 Kwa´sniewski, Aleksander, 56

F FIDESZ, 2, 54

L Lacan, Jacques, 30 Libya, 74, 75 lobbying, 22, 39, 46, 104

G GATT, 29 Gazeta Wyborcza, 38 gender mainstreaming, 116, 117

M market economy, 3, 53, 62, 143 Marxism, 113 Marx, Karl, 113

INDEX

Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 122, 151 McFaul, Michael, 7, 34 Meˇciar, Vladimír, 2, 12, 59 mimicry, 30 minorities, 51, 90, 126 Mitterrand, François, 33–34 modernization theory, 44, 45, 82, 120 Moldova, 66, 67, 71, 82, 86–89, 91, 94–97, 100, 110, 142, 145 Morawiecki, Mateusz, 131

N National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 35, 36, 38, 111, 124, 137 NATO, 29, 31, 53, 59, 64, 67, 68, 75, 90, 91, 100, 146, 152 North Korea, 36

O Obama, Barack, 39 Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), 46 ontological security, 6, 37, 38, 155 Orbán, Viktor. See 2 –4, 12, 19, 20, 155 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), 27, 47, 54, 70, 104, 109 OSCE, 51, 52, 69, 80, 125, 126

P pan-Slavism, 13 Payá, Oswaldo, 73 People In Need, 47, 69, 70

159

Polish-American Freedom Foundation (PAFF), 57 political culture, 9, 10, 12–16, 38 post-communism, 15 Prometheism, 153 provincial reconstruction team (PRT), 51, 65

R Radio Free Europe, 36, 72 rent-seeking, 22 roundtable negotiations, 23 Rupnik, Jacques, 3, 42

S Schumpeter, Josepf, 79 Sikorski, Radosław, 129, 130, 154 SMER, 2 solidarity, 10, 17, 22, 38, 40, 41, 49, 55, 56, 60, 128, 153 Solidarity Fund PL, 56, 67, 87, 120, 130 Solidarity (labor union), 55, 74 South Korea, 53, 139 status, 30–32, 41, 49, 80, 93, 105, 116, 151 students, 46, 65, 85–88, 125, 140 Sub-Saharan Africa, 44, 66 Suu Kyi, Aung San, 73 Szijjártó, Peter, 126

T TAIEX, 35, 61 Transition Promotion Program (TPP), 47, 49–51, 61, 67, 73, 74, 78, 82, 84–86, 89, 93, 99, 100, 117, 118, 125 Trump, Donald, 3, 126, 138, 155 Tunisia, 67, 74, 75, 88, 92, 110, 129 Twinning, 35, 61, 97

160

INDEX

U Ukraine, 66, 67, 70, 72, 75, 85–91, 94–101, 110, 121, 130, 133, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 153 V Voice of America, 36

W Wał˛esa, Lech, 12, 74, 128 World Values Survey (WVS), 14–16 World War I, 10, 153 World War II, 11