Democracy for the Privileged: Crisis and Transition in Venezuela 9781685859572

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Democracy for the Privileged

To my Venezuelan students, from whom I learned much

Democracy for the Privileged Crisis and Transition in

Venezuela

Richard S. Hillman

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in (he United States of A m e r i c a in 1994 by L y n n e Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o 80301 and in the United K i n g d o m by L y n n e Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, C o v e n t G a r d e n , L o n d o n W C 2 E 8 L U © 1994 by L y n n e R i e n n e r Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data H i l l m a n , Richard S „ 1 9 4 3 D e m o c r a c y for the privileged : crisis and transition in V e n e z u e l a / Richard S. H i l l m a n . p. c m . Includes bibliographical r e f e r e n c e s and index. ISBN 1-55587-412-6 1. Political c u l t u r e — V e n e z u e l a . 2. D e m o c r a c y — V e n e z u e l a . 3. V e n e z u e l a — P o l i t i c s and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 7 4 - I. Title. J L 3 8 8 1 . H 5 5 1994 320.8'0987—dc20 93-42932 CIP

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A C a t a l o g u i n g in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and b o u n d in the United States of A m e r i c a

(S)

T h e p a p e r used in this publication m e e t s the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the A m e r i c a n National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of P a p e r f o r Printed Library Materials Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 .

Contents

List of Illustrations Foreword Andres Serbin Preface Acknowledgments

vii ix xiii xv

1

Political Paradoxes: An Approach

2

Past Influences: Anarchy Versus Order

29

3

Patterns and Institutions: Patron-Clientelism

51

4

Group Interests: A Hierarchy of Power

75

5

Ongoing Pressure: University Protests

95

6

Critical Times: A Social Explosion

115

7

Challenging the State: A Military Solution?

129

8

Future Directions: Legitimacy and Change

151

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book and Author

1

175 179 191 199

Illustrations

Maps Latin America Venezuela Regions of Venezuela

3 8 12

Figures 1.1 3.1 4.1 8.1

Foreign Debt and Petroleum Export Profits, 1980-1990 16 National Results: Presidential Votes, 1947-1988 63 Ratio of Income of Wealthiest 20% of Households to Income of Poorest 20% of Households 77 Changes in Gross Domestic Product, Inflation Rate, and Foreign Investment, 1989-1991 154

Tables 4.1 5.1 8.1 8.2 8.3

Annual Percentage Rates of Increase in Consumer Prices, 1960-1989 Foreign Debt, 1957-1983 Imports to Venezuela, 1990-1992 Exports from Venezuela, 1990-1992 Venezuelan Elections, 1993

vii

90 96 159 160 163

Foreword

In the last three decades Venezuela has been identified predominantly, by local as well as foreign researchers and analysts, as an atypical case in Latin America. The peculiar combination of abundant petroleum resources and a stable democracy gave rise to a proliferation of studies that accentuated, with variable emphases and approaches, these two characteristics as defining elements of the recent political evolution of the country. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, a series of events provides evidence that this frame of reference turns out to be insufficient to comprehend the fundamental nature of the Venezuelan case in the Latin American context. Together with the crisis set into motion by the external debt, the fall in petroleum prices, and the exhaustion of international monetary reserves, the Venezuelan political system established in 1958 has been showing numerous symptoms of growing deterioration and fracture. Particularly after the explosion of the caracazo (popular insurrection) in February 1989, an incremental process of political instability and social tension has developed, culminating in two frustrated military coup attempts in 1992. The linkage of this process with attempts to implement a new development strategy has given rise to numerous interpretations that associate the exhaustion of the established political model with the results of measures attempting to modernize the country's economy. In fact, both President Carlos Andrés Pérez and his government have been constrained by a difficult political situation. Thus, notwithstanding the positive indicators of economic performance between 1990 and 1993, any type of prediction or speculation about the future, especially on social and political levels, is extremely difficult. Multiple interpretations and analyses are being used to interpret this process and evaluate its possible consequences. Some of these analyses, as much among the Venezuelan as among the foreign political and social scientists, are based on traditional theoretical schemes and conceptions; other

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Andres Serbin

analysts attempt to focus on this process from an innovative perspective. This book, Democracy for the Privileged, by Richard Hillman, must be considered an example of the latter. It introduces an approach based on an analysis of Venezuelan political culture and establishes from a comparative perspective a number of similarities with contemporary situations of crisis and transition in other Latin American countries. From this point of view, Hillman's analysis draws from and enriches his previous contribution on in the the D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c and J a m a i c a in Distant Neighbors Caribbean, coauthored with Thomas D'Agostino. After an unmerited disuse, there has been a revival of the analytical approach to political culture as a framework for an explanation of the difficulties confronting the processes of democratization or of the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. Nevertheless, the contribution of this book goes far beyond that framework by including a much wider approach, of eclectic character, that incorporates other theoretical contributions, significantly enriching the interpretation of the Venezuelan situation. Hillman's accurate treatment of Venezuelan political culture and its historical roots brings together, in this sense, an adequate appreciation not only of the values and perceptions that have characterized the political life of the country, but also a balanced vision of the actors and processes that distinguish recent years. As in all interpretations of cultural dimensions, this approach requires an acute sensitivity and a clear disposition to avoid an ethnocentric vision. Hillman demonstrates such sensitivity with great competence in his analysis. Frequent and prolonged stays in the country in the last decade have allowed his immersion in daily Venezuelan life. His capacity to empathize and identify with the problems that Venezuelans confront day after day, by means of his direct interaction and, at the same time, unprejudiced and objective perspective have served him well. Each of these qualities, together with his unquestionable analytical talents, have made Hillman a perspicacious observer and analyst of the Venezuelan political dynamic. His analysis extends far beyond the traditional resources and written works used by most researchers. Moreover, Hillman's ability to understand the informal mechanisms that, through political culture, govern how the Venezuelan political system functions and the dynamics of the transition through which it is passing permits him to accede to a vision that, without losing objectivity, distance, and balance, achieves comprehension of the implicit processes informed by Venezuelan political attitudes and values. From this perspective, his work evidences not only a significant analytical capacity that vindicates the privileged theoretical focus, but also manifests a singular disposition to perceive the performance of many of the actors and development of a large part of the distinctive situation of the current moment in the context of an appropriate historical and conceptual framework.

Foreword

xi

The elements of this approach that thus configure a complete comprehension of the principal areas of investigation about the future of the Venezuelan political system open a series of questions. Emphasis on political culture and, basically on the historical legacy of Venezuela in particular and Latin America in general, could give rise to a series of deterministic conclusions. If a legacy of centralism and personalism from Spanish colonialism has engendered in Venezuela the actual corporatist, hierarchical, and caudillistic traits of the pactocracy, clientelism, and political patronage, would not the current transition beyond the rupture of the pacted consensus among the "privileged" bring with it the resurgence of the same patterns in whatever new system that emerges? This question, which is integral throughout Hillman's study, shifts focus to the emergence of new actors with new values and aspirations and the capacity of the system to reeducate itself in order to reform the existing rules of the political game. Is there a basis for transition in other ingredients of the Venezuelan political culture that have evolved over more than one and a half centuries of independent history? Such ingredients include a high degree of social mobility and the capacity to form new alliances and social groupings in the context of new consensual modes or new corporate pacts. The larger question is whether there are conditions for an optimistic scenario in which the system would be capable of generating the capacity for sufficient renovation to move through this period of transition toward the consolidation of democracy. The latter would require new values and attitudes in order to avoid an inexorable fall into authoritarianism, renewed centralization, and personalism in accordance with the inherited political culture. This situation raises questions about the inevitability of the consequences of this legacy in terms of the persistence of a rigidly structured political culture unreceptive to change. Also, a series of questions is opened about the exogenous factors that could effect this change. In the framework of the internationalization of the economy and globalization of communications, of the growing international and, particularly, regional interdependency, external pressures and d e m a n d s have significant weight in the process of reformulation and restructuring of political attitudes and values, from which Venezuela cannot escape. Economic opening and acceleration of the processes of subregional integration, beyond the hemispheric ups and downs and eventual reconstitution of protectionist mechanisms in the international system, create frequently irreversible new conditions for advances in e c o n o m i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g and r e d e f i n e d Latin A m e r i c a n d e v e l o p m e n t strategies. Consequently, in spite of the inescapable weight of the petroleum character of the Venezuelan economy, external pressures could generate a new pattern for the necessary demands for reform and modernization that would insert Venezuela into the competitive international system. At the same

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time, although indirectly and in the m e d i u m term, the political culture would not escape these emergent perceptions and values. Venezuelan responses to these questions have created a vision of the crisis strongly marked by traditions inherent in a political culture in which r u m o r s are f r e q u e n t l y reiterated, indiscriminate i n f o r m a t i o n is b r o u g h t forth by " c o n t a c t s " and personal sources that reinforce the " p r i v i l e g e d " character of the protagonists, and anxieties are generated by the uncertainty of change. These practices eventually can distort any objective assessment of the facts. However, Hillman's study addresses these questions by producing a body of systematic knowledge about this transition process that significantly enriches the limited existing literature on Latin A m e r i c a n political cultures and demonstrates without a doubt the principal elements of the Venezuelan political crisis. Hillman clearly recognizes that it is too early to ascertain the resolution of the conflict between the authoritarian impulses inherent in a political culture with roots in the past and the emerging pressures of a democratic culture in transition. Andres Serbin Caracas, April ¡993

Preface

Since the early 1960s, Venezuelan democracy has survived challenges from radical revolutionary and military authoritarian alternatives that have troub l e d o t h e r p a r t s of L a t i n A m e r i c a . M a n y o b s e r v e r s h a v e a t t r i b u t e d Venezuela's political success to its possession of vast deposits of petroleum. However, the boom-and-bust nature of oil economics set into motion serious s o c i o e c o n o m i c and political problems. Even as the V e n e z u e l a n economy grew in the early 1990s at the highest rate in Latin America, the g e n e r a l s t a n d a r d of li ving in the c o u n t r y fell to b e l o w 1970s l e v e l s . M a s s i v e discontent and violent protests a c c o m p a n i e d the g o v e r n m e n t ' s attempts to move from statist to neoliberal policies, raising questions about the capacity of Venezuelan democracy to endure these new challenges. This study responds to the need to examine the conditions that have s u p p o r t e d or i n h i b i t e d t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of d e m o c r a c y in V e n e z u e l a . V e n e z u e l a ' s relative stability and a f f l u e n c e have obscured w e a k n e s s e s inherent in its extensive background of authoritarianism and privilege, its deeply ingrained culture of protest and endemic violence, and the brevity of its democratic experiment. When an idiosyncratic power-sharing system appeared in 1958, traditional patterns were blended with modern institutions. The resulting hybrid is a centralized, elitist, patron-client system that has responded to mass aspirations ineffectively and invested oil income i n s u f f i c i e n t l y to s t r e n g t h e n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s or d i v e r s i f y the e c o n o m y . Consequently, the economic and social problems that have caused deeply rooted popular discontent are rapidly reaching critical proportions. In the last decade of the twentieth century, widespread skepticism about the legitimacy of the political system has been fostered by a climate of pressure and uncertainty exacerbated by university-inspired demonstrations, a popular insurrection, t w o a t t e m p t e d military coups, and s u b s e q u e n t a n t i r e g i m e protests leading to the removal of the president. This analysis, which includes my personal observation of these events,

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Preface

reveals the diminishing ability of a d e m o c r a c y for the privileged to m a i n tain political stability w h e n c o n f r o n t e d with heightened e x p e c t a t i o n s and increasing d e m a n d s for elected g o v e r n m e n t s to i m p r o v e a quality of life perceived to be deteriorating. U n d e r s t a n d i n g the critical transition o c c u r ring in V e n e z u e l a o f f e r s insight into a particular kind of a c c o m m o d a t i o n of historical legacies and democratization that produced relative stability f o r thirty-five years but has been faced with the need for f u r t h e r transformation in o r d e r to a v o i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n to a s i t u a t i o n i n f e r i o r to that p r e c e d i n g V e n e z u e l a ' s democratic experiment. Richard

S.

Hillman

Acknowledgments

I wish to express gratitude and appreciation for the support of several organizations that made it possible to complete this project. The Fulbright Scholars Program supported my teaching and research in Venezuela for two years (1987 and 1992). During each of those years the experience of total immersion in the daily life of Caracas, complemented by visits throughout the country, provided the basis for the extensive study projects that have culminated in this book. The School of International Studies in the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas and the Graduate Program in Political Science in the Faculty of Juridical and Political Science of the University of Zulia in Maracaibo provided the settings for many interviews (both formal and informal), interaction with students and faculty (both in and outside of the classroom), and much research. Although the courses I taught at these universities focused on U.S. government, Venezuelan students were adroit at introducing their national political experiences into virtually every discussion. A President's Research Grant provided by St. John Fisher College supported the completion of several chapters during the summer of 1993. Many students, colleagues, friends, acquaintances, and contacts assisted in the generation and clarification of ideas relevant to this study. The list is much too extensive for inclusion here, but a few individuals should be mentioned for special appreciation. Antonio Salazar, senior student at the UCV, acted as a research assistant from July until September 1992. Alvaro Benavides, executive vice president of the Bank of Venezuela, provided interesting insights and an invitation to address members of the academic and banking communities. Very productive contacts and discussions occurred at this meeting, which took place on July 10, 1992, at the Bank of Venezuela. Heraclio Atencio Bello, author, educator, government consultant, and attorney, graciously shared his book The Psycho-economic Crisis of the Venezuelan and many insights. Professor Oscar Abdalah of the

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Acknowledgments

Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB) offered interesting perspectives on changing Caracas and the current crisis. María de los Angeles González Smith, former associate professor of international studies at the UCV and friend, has been an excellent resource and critical reviewer. Professor Elsa Cardozo de Da Silva, coordinator of the graduate program in international studies at the UCV, also read portions of the manuscript, as did friend and former student Thomas D'Agostino, assistant professor of political science at Siena College. Their insightful comments are deeply appreciated, as are those of anonymous external reviewers. Businessman and friend Juan Carlos Aguilar's consistently stimulating, probing questions and optimism in the face of difficult political realities were inspirational. The gracious hospitality of AnaFrank Caufman, graduate student at the University of Madrid and former student at the UCV, was greatly appreciated. Finally, a special note of thanks is due to Professor Andres Serbin, director of the Venezuelan Institute of Social and Political Studies, for writing the foreword. The secretarial miracles performed by Lin Mocejunas will always be remembered. The maps and graphics included in this book are the excellent work of John Bogdal. Efficient support of U.S. Embassy officers in Caracas should also be acknowledged. The capable assistance of Lynne Rienner Publishers greatly facilitated the editorial and production process. Finally, this project would never have been realized without the patience, understanding, and love of my wife, Audrey, my son, Oliver, and my daughter, Shoshana. Of course, anyone who has contributed to the substance of this study is exonerated from responsibility for my interpretations. I hope that the book will contribute to enhanced understanding of politics in Venezuela and the process of democratization in Latin America. R.S.H.

1 Political Paradoxes: An Approach

A new world order had begun to take shape at the commencement of the last decade of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War caused East/West international relations to begin a process of realignment on a North/South nexus. Incipient regional economic blocs were being formed throughout the world in order to compete for inequitably distributed wealth. But, perhaps most significantly, the apparent collapse of authoritarian regimes seemed to pave the way for the emergence ana consolidation of new and developing democracies. These changes have required reformulation of approaches to governmental policymaking as well as to scholarship in political science. In the context of these new formulations, the trend toward democratization of former dictatorships has received a great deal of attention from politicians as well as from academics. Unfortunately, both groups have exhibited ideological enthusiasm that at times has obscured a complex set of problems and variables associated with political regime change. Thus, it has become fashionable to refer to the triumph of democratic systems, miraculously established in a very short term, before they have been able to take root in societies that have had scant experience with participatory politics. This situation is especially poignant in the Third World, where social conditions generated over centuries are often inimical to the basic conditions required for even a minimal degree of democratic governance. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the adoption of democratic forms in Eastern Europe are cited as examples of trends set into motion by fundamental human aspirations to exercise some influence over the fate of one's community. The cries of protest in Tiananmen Square in China are said to reflect these same values. However, it is in Latin America that the democratization of military regimes has been extolled most emphatically.

1

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The latter part of the twentieth century saw Agusto Pinochet's rule in Chile c o m e to an end. The Brazilian generals finally stepped aside, as they did in Argentina. The wars in Central America reached negotiated truces, and most Caribbean states continued to conduct their electoral rituals on schedule. In 1993, Venezuela conducted its eighth peaceful transfer of elected power since 1958, when the last dictator was expelled from the country. Indeed, most analysts hold the Venezuelan case in stark contrast to governments such as the Cuban, the Haitian, and the Peruvian, which have either f a c e d o v e r w h e l m i n g o b s t a c l e s or s t a u n c h l y r e s i s t e d the trend t o w a r d democratization in Latin America. Pundits of foreign policy and international affairs further postulate that democratization of all states in the Western Hemisphere would facilitate more equitable socioeconomic development and, hence, would lead to a level of h a r m o n i o u s cooperation capable of sustaining c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o m m e r c e , and s o l i d a r i t y . S u c h r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n , a l o n g the lines of a h e m i s p h e r i c f r e e - t r a d e zone, w o u l d b e c o m e h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e with the European and Asian counterparts. M e x i c o and Canada are generally c o n s i d e r e d the c e n t e r p i e c e s of such an a r r a n g e m e n t , but V e n e z u e l a is among the most important of the South American states that could participate. M a n y analyses of Venezuelan politics f o c u s on the c o u n t r y ' s great potential for the sustenance of its fledgling democracy of under forty years. The country possesses an important geopolitical position on the Caribbean coast of South America (see the map of Latin America); an electoral system with strong political parties; a youthful, relatively well-educated population; and natural resources such as petroleum. T h e s e favorable circumstances have led many analysts to conclude that although the Venezuelan model may have been tarnished by serious obstacles (such as the inability to s u f f i c i e n t l y d i v e r s i f y the e c o n o m y with oil wealth during the b o o m y e a r s ) , it n e v e r t h e l e s s p r e s e n t s neither any d a n g e r of a d e v o l u t i o n to authoritarianism nor the possibility of a golpe de estado (a coup or violent overthrow of the government). However, the international image of Venezuela as a prosperous, stable democracy, at the very least, had to be modified by the outbreak of massive p r o t e s t s , riots, l o o t i n g , and v i o l e n c e f o r a l m o s t a w e e k b e g i n n i n g on February 27, 1989. But, even then, these events were generally considered as challenges not to the system, but to the regime in power. The possibility of either a revolution or a military takeover was still seen as r e m o t e or nonexistent. Then two attempted coups within ten months of each other (February 4 and November 27, 1992) shocked those observers w h o believed Venezuela

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Democracy for the

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to be more stable than the rest of Latin A m e r i c a and the Third World. Logically, these observers were incredulous in the face of such unanticipated events, the significance of which has become the subject of great concern and unending debate in Venezuela. In fact, few analysts could have predicted these events in a country about which scholarship had focused mainly on the strengths of economic and political developments. Analyses tended to obscure the weaknesses i n h e r e n t in V e n e z u e l a ' s e x t e n s i v e b a c k g r o u n d of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , its deeply ingrained culture of protest and endemic violence, and a brief experi m e n t with d e m o c r a t i c structures. O n e f i n d s on closer e x a m i n a t i o n of Venezuelan political culture that after a long history of caudillo (military strong man) solutions to anarchy, despite the comparatively rapid and fairly abrupt transition to democracy, the 1960s and 1980s were rife with almost continuous civil unrest. Only in the oil-rich 1970s was there relative calm. The late 1980s were punctuated with intermittent protests and strikes generally initiated on the university campuses throughout the country. In a manner of speaking, the 1989 insurgency and the 1992 golpes were really the peaks of icebergs most clearly visible to those present in Venezuela during these troubled times. There are few Venezuelans who do not effusively proffer critical theories regarding the current situation in their country. Venezuela had reached a critical juncture by mid-1992. Daily editorials, television talk shows, and discussions in the streets called for the resignation of President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The p r e s i d e n t ' s e m b a r r a s s i n g inability to attend either the e n v i r o n m e n t a l s u m m i t m e e t i n g in R í o de Janeiro or the Iberoamerican leaders' s u m m i t in Madrid (due to fear of a n o t h e r g o l p e in his a b s e n c e ) c o u p l e d with w i d e s p r e a d s y m p a t h y for L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l H u g o C h á v e z ( t h e i m p r i s o n e d l e a d e r of the first a t t e m p t e d g o l p e ) h a v e p r o d u c e d a s t r o n g c o n s e n s u s that f u n d a m e n t a l change offers the only real solution to rampant corruption and an economic strategy deemed to be a failure. A popular telenovela titled "In These Streets" treats the themes of economic austerity and inequity, political uncertainty, and personal insecurity in Caracas. Its theme song (which hit the top of the Venezuelan recording charts) repeats a refrain that summarizes well the prevailing mood: " B e careful at the corners, d o n ' t be distracted when you walk . . . for in these streets there is no longer any c o m p a s s i o n . " P e o p l e of all social classes exhibit a high degree of frustration with the poor p e r f o r m a n c e of public services, monetary inflation, u n e m p l o y m e n t , civil disorder, widespread corruption, and a perceived lack of governmental responsiveness to societal needs and demands. T h e extent of frustration and disaffection is impressive. People from all walks of life berate the political parties as well as the politicians for having

Political

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5

lost their credibility. They see the regime as vindictive in its attack on the free press through bogus antimonopoly legislation. In the months following the first golpe attempt, both the cacerolazo (beating pots and pans) and the pitazo (whistling) were near-universal protests against the government that lasted several hours and could be heard in virtually every subdivision of Caracas and other cities late into the night. Although symbolic expressions, these manifestations, along with university protests, citizen marches, spontaneous eruptions, and, of course, the second attempted golpe, constitute a sufficient level of social discontent to raise serious questions about the status of Venezuelan democracy. Do these events mean that political legitimacy has eroded? To what extent has subversion played a role? Are the problems economic, political, or both? How can the situation in Venezuela be understood most effectively? What are the policy implications of such an understanding? There is a clear need to study Venezuelan politics from a perspective that incorporates democratic theory into an approach that would provide responses to these questions. The literature has provided excellent country studies, detailed investigations of the relationship of petroleum to politics, and penetrating analyses of the potential and strength of favorable conditions and developments in Venezuela. However, fundamental questions remain. Are the necessary structures for participatory institutions present in sufficient measure to provide for the ongoing functioning of democracy in Venezuela? What are the major obstacles? What is the significance of the attempted golpe and ongoing protests? What are the implications for other Latin American and Third World societies? How will Venezuela fit into the emerging new world order? Like all inquiries into the nature of political society, this book is based on certain assumptions, which should be made explicit at the outset. First, in order to respond realistically to questions about the way a political system operates in practice, it is essential to understand the attitudes, values, and beliefs that have developed over long periods of time and are transmitted through political culture. Second, political function is influenced by political form but may be determined as much by informal as by formal institutions, or by a combination thereof. Third, economic conditions influence but do not determine politics. Fourth, when these assumptions are applied to a systematic analysis of a particular political system they allow for comprehension of the way that system operates in comparative perspective. There are few, if any, absolutes in an approach that requires a high level of cultural sensitivity. In sum, a basic purpose of this book is to study Venezuelan politics with a view toward developing an understanding of the historical and contemporary forces that have created a precarious political situation in one of Latin America's most democratic and important states.

Deceptive Appearances T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s in Asia, A f r i c a , the M i d d l e East, and parts of Latin A m e r i c a e x h i b i t p r o f o u n d cultural d i f f e r e n c e s even to the casual observer. Tourists, g o v e r n m e n t officials, and businesspersons from the Western w o r l d w h o visit these areas readily p e r c e i v e exotic m o d e s of dress, cuisine, l a n g u a g e s , and o t h e r visibly d i v e r g e n t c u s t o m s and traditions. T h i s exotic i s m is not t h e c a s e in V e n e z u e l a , w h i c h superficially appears to m a n i f e s t a c u l t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n not very d i s t i n c t f r o m that of m a n y a r e a s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s or E u r o p e . N o r t h A m e r i c a n s , f o r e x a m p l e , initially feel at h o m e in a S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g c o u n t r y w h e r e E n g l i s h is fast b e c o m i n g the s e c o n d lingua f r a n c a , rock m u s i c p e r v a d e s the radio stations, a l m o s t everyo n e w e a r s b l u e j e a n s , and fast f o o d and h o m e - d e l i v e r y pizza h a v e b e c o m e fashionable. B e n e a t h the surface, h o w e v e r , are significant cultural d i f f e r e n c e s . T h e s e u n d e r l y i n g attitudes, beliefs, and v a l u e s — c o n t r a d i c t o r y and at times i n c o m p a t i b l e with o t h e r c u l t u r e s — a r e less v i s i b l e in V e n e z u e l a t h a n in o t h e r p a r t s of t h e T h i r d W o r l d . T h e l o w e r level of visibility of cultural d i v e r g e n c e s has left m a n y f o r e i g n o b s e r v e r s of V e n e z u e l a in a q u a n d a r y . T o u r i s t s and b u s i n e s s p e r s o n s b e c o m e impatient with V e n e z u e l a n s ' s e n s e of t i m e and p l a c e . A c a d e m i c s and p o l i c y m a k e r s f o c u s i n g on this i m p o r t a n t c o u n t r y are f a c e d with a m b i g u i t i e s , c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and w h a t a p p e a r to be e n i g m a t i c b e h a v i o r patterns. T h i s a s p e c t is b e c a u s e V e n e z u e l a is a p a r a d o x ical society. D e s p i t e t h e h i g h e s t p e r capita debt in Latin A m e r i c a , it is a rich c o u n try. Oil, iron, c o m m e r c e , industry, and a g r i c u l t u r e are s o u r c e s of w e a l t h . A l t h o u g h by Latin A m e r i c a n s t a n d a r d s the m i d d l e sector is large, t h e distrib u t i o n of w e a l t h is e x t r e m e l y i n e q u i t a b l e , w h i c h is p a i n f u l l y o b v i o u s . P o v e r t y and m i s e r y are a s s o c i a t e d with u r b a n s l u m s , yet the V e n e z u e l a n living s t a n d a r d r e m a i n s o n e of the h i g h e s t in the Third W o r l d . P e o p l e a r e g e n e r a l l y a f f e c t i o n a t e and a p p e a r to be h a p p y until they b e c o m e e n g a g e d in f r e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n s of political and e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s that t h e y p e r c e i v e to h a v e r e a c h e d a state of o n g o i n g crisis. T h e i r political d i s a f f e c t i o n and c y n i c i s m c a u s e d by d e e p - s e a t e d a n x i e t y , f r u s t r a tion, and a n g e r h a v e resulted in s e r i o u s d i s t u r b a n c e s . D e s p i t e c e n t r a l i s m in t h e d o m i n a n t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n d a t y p i c a l l y s t r o n g e x e c u t i v e s y s t e m o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , V e n e z u e l a is c o n s i d e r e d a d e m o c r a c y . F o r o v e r thirty y e a r s p o w e r h a s been p e a c e f u l l y t r a n s f e r r e d t h r o u g h o p e n elections. S u c h stability, h o w e v e r , has been s u b j e c t e d to m a s sive protests, v i o l e n c e , and a t t e m p t e d o v e r t h r o w s of the g o v e r n m e n t . A l t h o u g h V e n e z u e l a h a s b e g u n to r e c e i v e m o r e s c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n than it had in t h e past, w h e n it w a s relatively neglected, there is still i n s u f f i cient a t t e n t i o n to this important c a s e in w h i c h the potential f o r the c o n s o l i -

Political

Paradoxes

1

dation of democratic institutions has been conditioned by advantageous circumstances as well as serious obstacles. 1

A Perplexing Society T h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l airport at M a i q u e t i a , a t o w n a d j a c e n t to La G u a i r a (Caracas's port city), is modern and well situated, with easily accessible runways on the Caribbean coast of Venezuela (see the map of Venezuela). Upon arrival there, one is greeted by tropical warmth and humidity and impressed by the modernity and apparent civility of the place. In transit to ground transportation the many offers of "pirate" taxi drivers to undercut established rates for the forty-minute ride to Caracas commences a process of revelation that continues throughout o n e ' s stay in a country that, like other Latin American countries, consists of many puzzling inconsistencies. Legitimate taxis, charging the equivalent of approximately US$20, and carritos por puesto (minivans), charging less than half that amount, await outside the building. On leaving the airport one enters a complex and perplexing society that, as is the case in virtually all societies, defies facile description. The steep ascent to the capital city (containing around 20 percent of the nation's population ensconced in an elevated valley surrounded by mountains) offers an opportunity for the driver to expound on current problems and issues. T h e driver, in typical Venezuelan tradition, is loquacious on matters of political and economic concern. One hears that "the government is corrupt"; "the masses are starving"; "there is no real democracy here"; "we have oil and other natural resources but we remain poor"; "the students are r i o t i n g a g a i n " ; " t h i n g s were better u n d e r P é r e z J i m é n e z " ; 2 " C A P [President Carlos Andrés Pérez] must step down"; "Viva Chávez!" 3 These assertions contradict many glowing journalistic and academic accounts of Venezuela's economic development and successful transition to political democracy. T h e country has been perceived as one of the few bright spots in the Latin American political panorama. 4 One author suggested that "[a]gainst all odds, democracy has taken root and flourished" (Myers 1990:285). 5 These conclusions raise an important question: How can such widespread expressions of discontent (by people from all walks of life) be reconciled with the positive a c c o u n t s ? But this is not the only incongruity. Flights arriving in Venezuela during the evening hours allow for ascent on a highway free of the heavy traffic that during the day often clogs this singular route of access to the city. As one approaches the outskirts of Caracas, thousands of what Caraqueños call "blinking stars" appear in the hills. These lights are the product of illegally tapped electric power lines

Political

Paradoxes

9

running through the miles and miles of shanties surrounding one of the continent's most affluent metropolitan areas. 6 The city itself presents a panorama of skyscrapers in base relief against a backdrop of the Avila mountain range, which dwarfs the buildings and separates the metropolitan area from the coast. Along the major highway, which literally bisects the city by running through the valley on an east/ west axis, are billboards advertising a wide array of mainly North American products. At intersections cars run through red lights and in counterdirection on one-way streets in a common practice called comiendo la flecha (eating the arrow). On the one hand, Caracas is an advanced city with modern architecture and a clean, efficient subway system. On the other hand, the city has grown so rapidly that streets and buildings are still identified by the traditional proper names (rather than numbers) in distinctive subsections called "urbanizations." 7 The system is reminiscent of a past in which Caracas was considered a "town in which everyone knew each other." Thus, the contemporary capital with its still-growing population of between four and five million is the result of trends embedded in a turbulent history of political, economic, and social change.

A National Profile Centuries of miscegenation (mestizaje) of European, African, and Indian peoples has produced an ethnically blended nation. The resultant café con leche society, in which virtually every citizen identifies himself/herself as venezolano/a, reflects a pattern of creolization common in Caribbean countries (Hillman and D'Agostino 1992:15-16). The a u t h o r ' s research and studies in Brazil, J a m a i c a , and the Dominican Republic suggest that racial relations in modern Venezuela compare favorably. 8 Winthrop Wright (1990) amply documented the impact of colonial attitudes and their negative impact on racial harmony, but the level of discrimination and prejudice appears to be much lower in Venezuela than in other multiracial societies. The amalgamation of ethnic groups, the subjective nature of racial classification, and the absence of such classifications in any national census since 1926 require educated guesses as to the actual composition of the population. Estimates generally posit that between 65 and 90 percent of Venezuelans are mestizo, persons of mixed ancestry. 9 Beyond this vast majority, between 5 and 12 percent are black, between 2 and 6 percent are Indian, and between 10 and 25 percent are of European origin. Although the bulk of the European population is of Spanish descent, there are several immigrant groups represented. Italians, Portuguese, and

10

Democracy for the Privileged

Germans have made important contributions to Venezuelan society. Latin Americans, including Cubans and Chileans, have also settled in Venezuela. Finally, large numbers of Colombians are reputed to have entered the country illegally. Many have become marginalized and occupy the shanties in the hills around Caracas. They routinely are blamed, at times unjustly, for the rapidly rising rates of crime and delinquency. It is generally agreed that ethnic mixing has occurred on all social levels (Blutstein et al. 1977:50-55; I. Wiarda 1985:298; Hellinger 1991:6; Myers 1990:288). Therefore, ethnicity and class are not directly correlated. However, there are a few Spanish families who trace their ancestry to the colonial era. More significantly, there are also important examples of families from non-Hispanic origins who have entered the ranks of the political and economic elites. 10 A high degree of cultural Eurocentricity is exemplified linguistically. Spanish is V e n e z u e l a ' s national l a n g u a g e , and English, Italian, and Portuguese are widely used in the major cities. However, the national language is spoken with a large number of venezolanismos (words and expressions unheard of in other Spanish-speaking countries) and Indian dialects are spoken by around 200,000 Amerindians in the remote interior. Literacy has risen to approximately 86 percent. Even t h o u g h 96 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n is n o m i n a l l y R o m a n Catholic, the vast majority do not practice the religion. The Church has played a much less significant role in Venezuelan politics than in other Latin American countries. Concomitantly, of the remaining 4 percent, the Protestant and Jewish communities have been fairly visible. Like other Latin American and Caribbean societies, syncretic religion has been incorporated in subtle ways. For example, the Maria Lionza cult—one of the more popular syntheses of African, Indian, and Christian beliefs and practices—worships a goddess of nature who is similar to the Arawak Indian water deity, to West African mythical figures, and to the Virgin M a r y . " Widespread spiritualistic practices, such as the use of tobacco smoke, mediums, and artifacts, derive from various African, Indian, and European antecedents. Native curanderos ("witch doctors" or herbal healers) found in many Indian villages are consulted by many Venezuelans. 12 Although overall population density has remained low (53 per square mile) in a country that possesses an area approximately the size of Texas and Oklahoma (352,150 square miles), the rapidly growing population is extremely concentrated. The country is excessively urbanized with well over 80 percent living in the Caracas-Maracay-Valencia-Barquisimeto corridor and in Maracaibo. Officially estimated at 18,775,780 in 1988, the population, including marginalized squatters and undocumented immigrants, unofficially totals more than 20,000,000. The annual growth rate has been between 2.5 and 2.6 percent. Significantly, 70 percent of the pop-

Political

Paradoxes

ulation is under the age of thirty and 50 percent is under eighteen. T h e implications of these data for future generations of Venezuelans are enormous. If the provision of public services is currently problematical, it will be an even more challenging issue in the twenty-first century. G e o g r a p h y as well as d e m o g r a p h y have played significant roles in V e n e z u e l a n d e v e l o p m e n t . Strategically located (to the south of all the Caribbean island-states) on the north coast of South America, bounded on the east by Guyana and on the west by Colombia, the country is part of the g r e a t e r c i r c u m - C a r i b b e a n a r e a ( s e e t h e m a p s of L a t i n A m e r i c a and V e n e z u e l a ) . This geopolitical position is reinforced by the A m a z o n i a n r e g i o n , w h i c h isolates the country f r o m its southern n e i g h b o r , Brazil. However, Venezuela must be considered as more than a Caribbean state. Its mountains and rivers divide its territory into five regions, each with a distinctive climate, topography, vegetation, population, and resource base. The historical significance of each of these areas has varied accordingly. T h e areas include the Northern Mountains, the Maracaibo Basin and the Coastal Lowlands, the Guyana Highlands, the Orinoco Lowlands, and the Coastal Islands (see the map of the regions of Venezuela). Such variety is c o m m o n among Latin American states. T h e Northern Mountains form a chain linking the coastal range with the Sierra Nevada de Merida. Here two-thirds of the country's population live in only 12 percent of the land area. In this important political and economic center are the capital city of Caracas, the Maracay-Valencia corridor, and Lake Valencia. Historically, the farmlands, coffee and sugar plantations, and agricultural d e v e l o p m e n t s within the valleys of this region were d o m i n a t e d by an oligarchy that transferred its wealth to a modern industrial base. As the administrative hub of a centralized government, the Caracas metropolitan area has been the political heart of the country since its founding in 1567. Nevertheless, many political leaders have c o m e from the Andean states of Tachira, Merida, and Trujillo, which remain semi-isolated due to the high mountain p e a k s . ' 3 Small landholdings, rather than large plantations, characterize this subregion in which Hispanic culture has remained strong among the elites in a population with relatively large proportions of mestizos and Amerindians. The emergence of coffee as a commercial crop and the presence of an important university (the University of the A n d e s [ULA]), along with the disproportionate n u m b e r of political leaders that have come from Merida, have decreased this subarea's isolation. V e n e z u e l a ' s second largest city, Maracaibo, is located in a narrow, l o w l a n d strip lying b e t w e e n the coastal m o u n t a i n s and the c o a s t that stretches 1,750 miles (2816 km) along the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. In this area, called the Maracaibo Basin and Coastal Lowlands, are agricultural lands and cattle ranches, swamps, and beautiful beaches. It also

Political

Paradoxes

13

contains the largest deposits of petroleum in the country. In the 1920s, when the oil industry began to grow rapidly, Maracaibo and the surrounding state of Zulia were increasingly identified as distinct from the rest of the country. Maracuchos' sense of regional pride has created a rivalry with Caraqueños, who compete for control of the vast oil reserves. Composing only 10 percent of the national territory, this region contains some of the finest tourist areas, the city of Maracaibo with a population in excess of one million, and the University of Zulia (LUZ). African traditions, which date back to the era of the short-lived cacao boom and slavery, are most pronounced in C h o r o n i (on the coast separated by the m o u n t a i n s north of Maracay) and in Barlovento (on the coast between Caracas and Barcelona). Dancing to tambores (hollow log drums representing extant customs deriving from syncretic blends of African and European religions) is common in small coastal villages of this region. The Guyana Highlands, lying south of the Orinoco Basin, is the largest region with 45.1 percent of the country's area. However, it is sparsely populated and isolated. Large mineral deposits including iron ore near Ciudad Bolívar, electric power provided by the Guri Dam, and newly constructed roads and communications networks have aided in the modern attempt to industrialize and develop this area. H o w e v e r , the Gran S a b a n a and the Amazonian Territory to the south remain relatively untouched. Here tropical forests, interspersed with plateaus, exhibit unique varieties of flora and fauna. Angel Falls, the world's highest uninterrupted waterfall, has attracted tourists from all over the world to the remote outpost of Canaima. The G u y a n a Highlands may well be considered an internal frontier that may provide a key to Venezuela's future. The Orinoco Lowlands, stretching from the Guyana Highlands to the coastal mountains, comprise the llanos (grassland plains) with a climate that alternates between a wet season of heavy tropical rains and a dry season of dust and parched earth. It is in this region that the llaneros (racially m i x e d ranchers) created a culture of caudillismo (military leadership), which has played an important role in Venezuelan history. The recent discovery of petroleum deposits in this area has resulted in the provision of one-fourth the country's supply of crude oil production. The Coastal Islands include seventy-two cays, coral atolls, and islands in the Caribbean Sea. Margarita Island (site of some of the oldest Spanish settlements) has become an international tourist center, some islands have been designated as part of the national park system, and others are f r e q u e n t e d by a wide variety of V e n e z u e l a n s . M o r r o c o y National Park is a c c e s s i b l e by b o a t f r o m t h e n e a r b y r e s o r t t o w n s of T u c a c a s a n d Chichiriviche, but reaching Los Roques requires either a small airplane or a large yacht. The strategic location of some of these islands as well as their attractiveness to tourists may provide developmental potential in the future.

14

Democracy

Jar the

Privileged

Territorial disputes—with Colombia over the gulf waters to the north of Lake M a r a c a i b o and a historic claim to the Essequibo region within G u y a n a — h a v e been intermittent and heavily politicized. Although there h a v e been no s e r i o u s military actions, continued d i s c o v e r y of natural resources, economic development, and border-related issues (such as illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking) could increase the potential for these conflicts to escalate beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Despite the wide regional variations, Caracas has operated as the center of an urban network in which internal migrations have reinforced the consolidation of a unified nation based on linguistic and cultural identification (J. Lombardi 1982). However, the most profound influence on an economic and social transformation "more rapid and thorough than any other L a t i n A m e r i c a n n a t i o n ( p o s s i b l y e x c e p t i n g C u b a ) in t h i s c e n t u r y " (Hellinger 1991:9) was occasioned by the development of the petroleum industry.

"Black Gold" Waves of foreign immigration into Venezuela accompanied the expansion of the p e t r o l e u m industry b e g i n n i n g in the 1930s, increasing after the Second World War, and continuing during the boom of the 1970s. Their integration and the concomitant penetration of foreign (especially North American) business interests, ideas, and popular culture have challenged the national identity. Equally difficult challenges are posed by determining the most e f f e c t i v e ways to use the newly generated wealth for national d e v e l o p m e n t and what to do when that wealth is dissipated by market forces, administrative irresponsibility, and corruption. When it became known in the early 1920s that Venezuela is almost literally "floating on oil," the previously poor country soon became one of the richest in Latin America. Nevertheless, the possession of what Venezuelans call "black gold" has been a mixed blessing. Achievement of the highest per capita gross national product (GNP) (over US$4,000 in 1987) in South A m e r i c a must be weighed against the resultant underutilization of local l a b o r and e x t e r n a l d e p e n d e n c y . A t e n c i o B e l l o ( 1 9 8 8 ) , B l a n k ( 1 9 8 4 ) , Hellinger (1991), Karl (1991 a), Rey (1989), and Gil Yepes (1981) analyzed the myriad problems associated with generating wealth based on "ground rent" in an industry subject to the variations of international supply and demand. Scholars agree that the consequences of a historic opportunity to sembrar el petroleo (sow the oil income into a diversified economy) have also presented "dangers of severe economic and social distortion" (Hellinger 1991:10). Venezuelan intellectual Arturo Uslar Pietri warned very early

Political

Paradoxes

15

that petroleum wealth could have a destabilizing effect by enhancing the power of the state in such a way as to "constitute one of the most grave o b s t a c l e s f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a t r u l y d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e in Venezuela" (Uslar Pietri 1989:59). His conclusion that "paradoxically [oil] is at the same time problem and solution" (Uslar Pietri 1989:62) conforms to o n e of the themes of this book: T h e precarious status of Venezuelan democracy may be attributed to fundamental incongruities and contradictions in the political, economic, and social orders. Several scholars have explored these paradoxes as they relate to the e c o n o m i c s of p e t r o l e u m p r o d u c t i o n (for e x a m p l e , Karl 1991a). D a v i d Eugene Blank (1984) in Venezuela: Politics in a Petroleum Republic divided the history of oil production into two phases. The first period includes the entrance of the transnational companies ( 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 3 6 ) and the road to nationalization (1936-1976). During this initial phase there was recognition that the country's stability and economic development were inextricably interrelated to the foreign currency generated through exportation of oil. This recognition led to negotiation of concessions and the conviction that national control of this natural resource was indispensable for the promotion of d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e industry was exploited by subsidiaries of multinational corporations. When foreign ownership became increasingly illegitimate according to Venezuelan public opinion (Gil Yepes 1981:116), nationalization took place in 1976. B l a n k ' s second phase (1976-1983) dealt with the evaluation of the perf o r m a n c e of Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA). This evaluation is particularly difficult because of the ambiguity surrounding the role of the profit motive in public enterprise as well as the question of whether "the operation of a key public enterprise such as the P D V S A can proceed as an island of rationality in the sea of praetorianism, populism, and traditionalism that is the reality of Venezuela" (Blank 1984:151). Whether oil wealth has been used effectively to enhance development of the nation or, conversely, has added to foreign debt, exacerbated corruption, and contributed to cynicism about government emerges as one of the most pressing questions in modern Venezuela. However, it is indisputable that the gap between oil profits and the foreign debt has expanded since the early 1980s (see Figure 1.1). Clearly, international economic fluctuations, especially those during the world oil crisis of 1973 and the devaluation of 1983, have had serious impacts on Venezuela. Venezuelan oil diplomacy, including the country's role within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), its negotiations with light oil producers in order to decrease disadvantageous d e p e n d e n c e on heavy oil, and its tradition as a reliable supplier to the United States (most notably as an alternative source during the Arab oil e m b a r g o ) have mitigated the debilitating consequences of these impacts. Nevertheless, most scholars agree that to one degree or another Venezuelan

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Political

Paradoxes

17

political stability has been influenced by the responsiveness of the political system to volatile economic and social pressures in large part set in motion by the possession of "black gold" (for example, Tugwell 1977:237-254). However, this responsiveness does not mean that Venezuela's political crises are determined exclusively by economic variables. Without ignoring the impact of oil, alternative explanations for the crises can be found in social and political developments caused by ideological and cultural forces that have been continuous throughout boom-and-bust economic fluctuations.

Political Continuity and Change The Spanish colonial legacy has had profound effects on Venezuelan politics. Periods of anarchy, civil war, caudillismo, and military intervention may be attributed in large part to a continuous process of political evolution set in motion by the attitudes and values transferred to Nueva Granada by representatives of the Spanish Crown. The resultant political culture, along with a pattern of neglect, left the colony impoverished and unprepared for self-government. After independence in 1821, Simón Bolivar's vision of a unified Latin America disintegrated into civil war. The creation of the Republic of Venezuela in 1829 prompted a large number of constitutions attempting to unite a fractionated country. However, only a long and torturous succession of caudillos and dictators was able to provide ephemeral periods of stability during Venezuela's first century. Privileged classes emerged first as a result of agricultural wealth and later of discovery and exploitation of oil. The latter form of economic growth began a radical transformation of Venezuelan society that resulted in the production of a new crop of political leaders. Concomitantly, new political groupings evolved into organized parties. However, the lack of fundamental change in the power structure resulted in dissatisfaction, protests, and strikes against the state. After a brief interlude of democratic government from 1945 to 1948, with a new constitution that included human rights laws, provision for social legislation, and direct elections, Venezuela was once again dominated by the military. Another brutal dictatorship lasted until 1958. Then the groundwork for a party system was laid through a series of agreements between the leaders of the major political groups. The resultant party system is referred to as "partidocracia" (Rey 1989:255), "pacted democracy" (Hellinger 1991:94), and "pactocracy" (Cockcroft 1989:340). These terms are interchangeable and are used to describe a political arrangement that is commonly known as a "pacted system."

18

Democracy for the

Privileged

E c o n o m i c , party, and military leaders were able to negotiate agreements about political arrangements in the absence of overwhelming opposition. The conversion of the traditional rural elites' basis of wealth to urban financial and commercial interests facilitated this process. However, the pacted system is the result of elite bargains that p r e s u p p o s e traditional methods of mass cooptation. Therefore, as Terry Lynn Karl astutely pointed out, the issue of "who benefits" from these arrangements remains "singularly problematic" (Karl 1991b: 177). Seven presidents have been elected under the pactocracy's restricted policy agenda. Romulo Betancourt (Democratic Action [AD]) was elected in 1958, Raul Leoni (AD) in 1963, Rafael Caldera (Independent Electoral Political Organizing Committee [COPEI]) in 1968, Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) in 1973, Luis Herrera C a m p i n s (COPEI) in 1978, Jaime Lusinchi (AD) in 1983, and Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1988. State and municipal elections have undergone reforms that have initiated a process of decentralization, and the next presidential election was scheduled for December 1993. Thus, it appears that Venezuela's pacted system has provided a viable f r a m e w o r k for further transition and consolidation of stable democracy. However, in light of events such as the February 27, 1989, insurrection, the attempted golpes of February 4 and November 27, 1992, the cacerolazo, the pitazo, the continuous student protest movement, antiregime public opinion, and the trial of the president for corruption, the proposition that modern Venezuelan politics are truly democratic requires further analysis.

A Theoretical Approach This study focuses on two major questions: Is Venezuela experiencing a crisis that will end the democratic experiment? Or, conversely, is the country in the throes of a transition that will result in further consolidation of democracy in the future? A response to these questions requires a theoretical basis for comparison and the establishment of a working definition of democracy. 1 4 Although political theory contains few, if any, absolutes, generalizations can be m a d e about the relative degree to which certain p r a c t i c e s reflect accepted definitions. 1 5 It would appear evident that Venezuela has sustained institutions and practices that, at least to some extent, approximate the ideals of democratic governance. However, one author explicitly suggested that "[t]he substance of liberal democracy may lead to the conclusion that it is more of an ideal rather than a day-to-day functioning reality" (Herman 1988:5). Reference to comparative political theory helps to clarify this proposition. Application of comparative theory to Latin American d e v e l o p m e n t

Political

Paradoxes

19

e m p h a s i z e s the study of informal processes and institutions in order to avoid the pitfalls of ethnocentric bias and overly formalistic studies of constitutions, g o v e r n m e n t a l structures, and electoral s y s t e m s . 1 6 Previously assumed linkages between economic expansion and democratic political development have proved to be erroneous (Huntington 1968). This is particularly r e l e v a n t to the V e n e z u e l a n case, w h e r e rapid s o c i o e c o n o m i c developments have had destabilizing effects. 1 7 Similarly, assumptions about the "dysfunctional" nature of traditional institutions h a v e been criticized (H. W i a r d a 1985, Klarén and B o s s e r t 1986). In fact, dependency, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and corporate theories each reveal how traditional institutions have provided stability in Third World nations unable to replicate Western-style modernization because of the d i f f e r e n t environment, timing, and sequence of the problems facing their g o v e r n m e n t s . A l t h o u g h n o n e of the t h e o r i e s p r o v i d e s s u f f i c i e n t explanatory value in and of itself, an eclectic approach can synthesize their d i v e r s e f i n d i n g s in o r d e r to p r o v i d e i n s i g h t into t h e n a t u r e of L a t i n American political development. It is in this context that the functions performed by Venezuelan political structures are analyzed in this book. 1 8 This approach raises further questions regarding the presence of political parties, the short history of open elections, and the role of subgroups within Venezuelan society. 1 9 According to Edie (1991:47-48), "[t]he existence of political parties, frequent elections, and representative bodies does not guarantee representative government." Samuel C. Patterson (1992:101) also made this point: "Democratic transition is much more than a matter of e l e c t i o n s ; it c o n c e r n s how to m a k e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s — p a r l i a ments—work." Indeed, formal institutional structures cannot necessarily be considered the determining factor in the operation or modification of political systems. Power relationships and legitimate authority are derived from cultural patterns. 2 0 The perceptions of governmental performance within the context of those patterns determines political efficacy. Therefore, the real question is: On what basis does "democratic" government in Venezuela perform? There is wide consensus that democracy is a system of government in which its members participate, directly or indirectly, in the making of decisions that affect the whole community (Cohen 1973, Lijphart 1984). This concept is refined by including a requirement for policymaking institutions to be dependent on votes and other expressions of public preferences. 2 1 It is this requirement that responds most directly to the question of how governmental performance is perceived. A c c o r d i n g l y , Dahl ( 1 9 7 1 : 3 ) asserted that a r e a s o n a b l y r e s p o n s i v e democracy can exist only if at least eight institutional guarantees are present: "1. Freedom to form and join organizations; 2. Freedom of expression; 3. T h e right to vote; 4. Eligibility for public office; 5. T h e right of political

20

Democracy

for the

Privileged

leaders to compete for support and votes; 6. Alternative sources of information; 7. Free and fair elections; 8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference" (my emphasis). Karl ( 1 9 9 l b : 165) preferred to specify the dimensions of democracy: "1. contestation over policy and competition for office; 2. participation of the citizenry through partisan, associational, and other f o r m s of collective action; 3. accountability of rulers to the ruled through mechanisms of representation and the rule of law [my emphasis]; and 4. civilian control over the military." 2 2 Democracy presupposes a community in which citizen preferences are translated into public policies (Cohen 1973:40). However, virtually all theories of community are based on a reciprocal as well a consensual relationship b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and the body politic. In light of D a h l ' s requirements and Karl's dimensions, this fact implies a sufficiently educated electorate to form intelligent opinions and m a k e reasonable choices. Reciprocity also implies a sufficient level of civic consciousness to provide social cohesion. Individual acts have to be socially accountable, and policies must be based on the general welfare of the community, not on the preferences of powerful elites. Therefore, in transitional societies experiencing the emergence of new groups and alignments, the consensus model of pluralism is an appropriate measure of systemic performance (Lijphart 1984:3). However, the case of V e n e z u e l a presents an interesting d i l e m m a because the capacity of the political system to perform (in the sense implied above) may have been exceeded by inadequate development of civic consciousness combined with citizen preferences and expectations that were artificially enhanced during the oil boom years. Moreover, transition through pacts is "likely to produce corporatist or consociational" democracy that is based on an "improvisational institutional framework of governance that may become a semipermanent barrier to change" unless further modified (Karl 1991b: 181-182). If a basic function of the democratic state is to respond to p e o p l e ' s aspirations and preferences, then merely serving basic needs and f u n d a mental interests may be perceived as insufficient. This perception is exacerbated by mass expectations that lack a sense of reciprocal responsibility. D e m a n d s , i n f l a t e d or e x a g g e r a t e d b e y o n d t h e c a p a c i t y f o r a d e q u a t e response in an elite-dominated system could cause the government to lose its sense of legitimacy (the confidence and trust of its citizens). Therefore, the nature of the linkages between the state or governing apparatus and civil society must be clarified. This study's exploration of the role of interest articulation by university protest movements, for examp l e , i l l u m i n a t e s t h e n a t u r e of t h e s e l i n k a g e s in V e n e z u e l a n s o c i e t y . Similarly, the roles of the political parties, business and labor groups, religious organizations, and other groups as well as individual attitudes toward

Political

Paradoxes

21

civic responsibility must be understood. Finally, the relationship of subdivisions of the state (such as the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the military) require analysis. The lack of congruity between basic constitutional precepts and political reality and the ways in which formal institutions are circumscribed by personalistic (rather than legalistic) authority show how informal power structures have gained prominence in light of the shortcomings of the formal systems. Clarification of the linkages between the state and civil society and the nature of the informal power structures is facilitated by the application of corporatist theory in conjunction with democratic, modernization, dependency, and bureaucratic-authoritarian analyses. With origins in sixteenthcentury Iberia, corporatism is well suited for application in Latin America. It is a method of organizing society that seeks to structure represented interests hierarchically in a position subservient to the state (H. Wiarda 1985:61). New social groups are integrated into the existing political culture and system structure under elite tutelage and direction, thereby perpetuating the status quo through gradual accommodation and change as well as through the persistence of paternalistic, patron-client relationships. 2 3 This process of gradual accommodation and change has been seen as an insurmountable obstacle by those advocating the quick implantation of liberal democracy along the lines of the U.S. model. However, because political institutions are the result of lengthy internal historical developments, they cannot be externally imposed. Moreover, like all social institutions, government is legitimized by cultural values. B o t h r e f o r m e r s and revolutionaries, w h o see d e m o c r a t i c values as incompatible with Latin American political culture, have become disillusioned by this process. However, as Howard Wiarda (1981, 1985, 1986, 1991) pointed out, more careful analysis of political culture recognizes that two conflicting traditions have coexisted in Latin America: an authoritarian-corporatist-patrimonialist one and a liberal-democratic one. Whether or not these traditions can be "blended" constitutes one of the most important keys to understanding the way democratic institutions operate in Latin America.

Latin American Political Culture T h e study of political culture, currently enjoying a resurgence in the field of comparative politics, provides an important vehicle for understanding ideological predispositions toward the legitimation of political processes and institutions. The attitudes, values, and beliefs that underlie these predispositions are influenced by the thought and expression used to translate historical experiences. T h e process of democratization in Latin America,

22

Democracy for the

Privileged

for example, may be influenced conceptually by a Spanish language that has no precise translation for " c o m p r o m i s e " or " a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " and in which no distinction is m a d e b e t w e e n " p o l i c y " and " p o l i t i c s " (Millett 1993:1). The Venezuelan case amply illustrates the difficulties and promises of blending traditional Latin American ideas and values with modern ones. In Venezuela, as in the rest of Latin America, the influence of traditional Spanish Catholicism, political absolutism, and military ascendancy resulted in a society structured hierarchically by rank, but also structured vertically by m a j o r c o r p o r a t e g r o u p s (armed forces, church, oligarchy, bureaucracy, intelligentsia). Latin America is therefore "a society of place, of position, and external appearance" (Wiarda and Kline 1990:16). Accordingly, those within the system have interrelated obligations that produce a patron-client system of collective benefit. This form of patrimonialism directed by elite hegemony has produced a strong tendency toward centralist, authoritarian politics. Paradoxically, a concurrent cultural pattern of political rebelliousness and resistence to authority was also transmitted by the Spanish. Thus, a dominant culture of political centralization and authoritarianism competed (and in many ways continues to compete) with a subculture of decentralization and resistence to authority (Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane 1991:28). A f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , liberal, republican, and egalitarian ideas were often implanted in newly formulated constitutions and superimposed on persistent patterns of caudillistic authority and land tenure deeply rooted in the traditional culture. Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane ( 1 9 9 1 : 2 7 - 4 5 ) summarized Latin A m e r i c a n political c u l t u r e in historical p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e y showed how Spanish administrators left the colonies largely in the hands of military c o m m a n d e r s , criollo (a person of Spanish ancestry born in the Americas) politicians, and (in the absence of the central control of imperial government) caudillos who led warring factions against each other in anarchic societies searching for "a harmonious, non-competitive social bluep r i n t that c a n be i m p o s e d f r o m the t o p " ( E b e l , T a r a s , and C o c h r a n e 1991:35). This form of cultural hybridization has caused political and social conflict more amenable to the subculture of political rebellion than to the dominant authoritarian culture. H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h such c o n f l i c t o f t e n has resulted in political instability, it also provides a potential for innovative adaptations that would incorporate and consolidate democracy in societies where it cannot be imposed. H o w e v e r , astute observers of the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n process are well aware of the problems of praetorianism, economic collapse and disillusionment, "authoritarian nostalgia," and corruption that confront new d e m o c r a -

Political

23

Paradoxes

cies and make their futures precarious." 2 4 Moreover, elites have developed very little civic consciousness unless their interests are directly affected. "[T]he upper classes have looked to client groups to shelter them from the direct effects of lower-class mobilization. T h e client might be a political party, a personal dictator, a sympathetic state agency or ministry, the military, or, if all else fails, a 'hit s q u a d ' " (Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane 1991:39). Under these circumstances the government has acted as a buffer between the elite and the masses through a patron-client relationship that, in the perception of the masses, allows for their influence through connections and access to persons of power (modern caudillos), rather than through institutionalized political activities. An e m p i r i c a l study of V e n e z u e l a n political attitudes f o u n d strong a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e s y s t e m ( B a l o y r a 1977). Similarly, other scholars have been skeptical about the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. For example, Guillermo O'Donnell characterized Latin American democracy as "delegative" insofar as the president, by virtue of an electoral majority, b e c o m e s a "paternal f i g u r e " who, once elected, governs as he pleases without regard to electoral platform (Heine 1992:7). In this conception, institutions such as the Congress and the judiciary are mere inconveniences to the valiant macho, the saviour of the homeland, the caudillo. According to this view, such leadership in a "delegative d e m o c r a c y " has not been held accountable to the performance of its e c o n o m i c " p a c k a g e s " or structural a d j u s t m e n t s and, t h e r e f o r e , has had destabilizing effects. In the twentieth century political change in Latin America has become linked to popular perceptions of the quality of life provided by democratically elected g o v e r n m e n t s whose stability increasingly rests not on the r h e t o r i c and l a v i s h p r o m i s e s of c l i e n t e l i s m but on the ability to meet demands and deliver results in substantive terms (Hillman and D ' A g o s t i n o 1992:170). In the case of Venezuela this ability has become problematical in light of rising e x p e c t a t i o n s and c o n t i n u e d d o m i n a n c e by privileged groups. *

*

*

Venezuela is a paradoxical society in which the potential for the consolidation of democratic institutions has been conditioned by advantageous circumstances as well as serious obstacles. T h e consequences of a historic opportunity to "sow the oil" income and to diversify the economy have presented dangers of severe economic and social distortion. Significant cultural differences are less visible in Venezuela than in other parts of Latin America. Thus, while the country has been perceived as

24

Democracy for the Privileged

o n e o f the f e w bright spots in the Latin A m e r i c a n political panorama, serious e x p r e s s i o n s o f discontent have challenged the stability o f its d e m o c r a t ic system. V e n e z u e l a n p o l i t i c s has been c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a n a r c h y , 2 5 c i v i l war, caudillismo, revolution, and an idiosyncratic form o f d e m o c r a c y . In 1 9 5 8 leaders o f the m a j o r political parties agreed to share power, thus planting the roots o f a party-system " p a c t e d d e m o c r a c y . " B u t recent events have created skepticism that modern V e n e z u e l a n politics are truly d e m o c r a t i c . This

study raises the question

o f whether the

contemporary

V e n e z u e l a n crisis will end the d e m o c r a t i c experiment or result in further transition toward d e m o c r a t i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n in the future. A m e a n i n g f u l r e s p o n s e to this question requires understanding how political p r o c e s s e s and institutions are legitimized by underlying attitudes, values, and b e l i e f s . T h e transmission a c r o s s generations o f these ideological predispositions is influenced by the historical evolution o f the nation. T h e r e f o r e , in o r d e r to understand the b a c k g r o u n d and early d e v e l o p m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s in V e n e z u e l a , the s e c o n d c h a p t e r f o c u s e s on the p r o b l e m s inherent in imposing order in a basically anarchic society. T h e origins and strong influence o f c a u d i l l i s m o r e c e i v e s scrutiny in this chapter as d o e s the evolution o f a form o f d e m o c r a c y that has been grafted onto the traditional order. A n a l y s i s in Chapter 3 o f the hybridization o f traditional patterns such as caudillism and personalism and modern institutions based on c o n c e p t s o f participation and representation s h o w s that " p a c t e d " d e m o c r a c y o p e r a t e s on a modified base o f patron-client relations. T h e s e functional relationships can be seen in leadership patterns, formal institutions, the way parties operate, and election results. T h i s chapter also explores emergent patterns and e x p e c t a t i o n s that are conditioned by the nature and d y n a m i c s o f the pacted system, its potential to provide the basis for further consolidation, and the o b s t a c l e s it must confront. T h e fourth c h a p t e r c o n t i n u e s this exploration o f functional r e l a t i o n ships by focusing on informal institutions and m a j o r social groups in which an elitist and hierarchical power configuration is apparent. T h e fifth chapter d o c u m e n t s how the traditional c o m p o n e n t s

of

V e n e z u e l a ' s b l e n d e d p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m h a v e c o m e under sharp c r i t i c i s m . M u c h o f the c h a l l e n g e is spearheaded by demonstrations that originate on the c a m p u s o f the Central University o f V e n e z u e l a ( U C V ) . T h e year 1 9 8 7 provides a c a s e study o f how these protests created a c l i m a t e o f pressure and instability that led to m a j o r social upheaval two years later. T h i s political c l i m a t e produced a series o f interrelated actions that c o n stituted serious c h a l l e n g e s to the state. Chapter 6 analyzes the m a j o r s o c i a l upheaval that took place in 1 9 8 9 . Chapter 7 investigates the two attempted military coups o f 1 9 9 2 .

Political Paradoxes

25

C h a p t e r 8 r e f e r s to t h e f i n d i n g s of p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s in o r d e r t o d r a w c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e p a s t e v o l u t i o n , c u r r e n t s t a t u s , a n d f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n s of V e n e z u e l a n p o l i t i c s . It c o n c l u d e s w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s , o b s t a c l e s , a n d d a n g e r s c o n f r o n t i n g e l e c t o r a l d e m o c r a c y in V e n e z u e l a a n d in o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s .

Notes 1. David W. Dent (1990:109-129) synthesized political science research on Venezuela over the past thirty years. He showed how recent interest transcends Venezuela's role as a petroleum producer by focusing on its potential as a model of democratic rule. Much of the scholarship is concerned with "the transformation of the Venezuelan polity from a bureaucratic-authoritarian to a pluralist reconciliation system" with a "professionalized military" (p. 110). He concluded that the literature has "neglected a variety of important subjects that need greater research attention" (p. 123). Among these subjects Dent included the area of political culture and values. 2. General Marcos Pérez Jiménez was dictator of Venezuela from 1948 to 1958. 3. This widely uttered aphorism refers to Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, jailed leader of the golpe attempt on February 4, 1992. Chapter 7 offers a detailed analysis of this event (known as the F4), which was fomented by the Bolivarian Movement (MB 200). 4. l e d a S i q u i e r a W i a r d a ( 1 9 8 5 ) s i g n a l e d the v i r t u a l u n a n i m i t y in this appraisal of those who have conducted extensive studies of Venezuela, citing statistics on life expectancy, illiteracy, and economic indicators. See also "Venezuela Going Strong: Carlos Andrés Pérez Leads His Nation Toward Prosperity," USA Today (October 8, 1991: IF). 5. David J. Myers also asserted that " [ u n a n t i c i p a t e d , this turn of events is now taken for granted, and therein lies a fundamental reason for the importance of Venezuelan politics. They provide multiple clues as to how and why rules of the political game favorable to liberty and justice take root and flourish in soil that historically has fostered dictatorship, privilege, and human rights a b u s e s " ( M y e r s 1990:285). 6. Estimations of the marginalized population of these barrios and ranchos range from 1.5 to 3 million. 7. A typical a p a r t m e n t would be located in, for e x a m p l e , " E d i f i c i o Los Eucaliptos on Avenida Andrés Bello in Los Palos Grandes—Ciudad." Many visitors as well as residents of the city have difficulty in finding particular addresses, which are always given with reference to landmarks. 8. Valid conclusions about prejudice and racial inequality may be derived as much from subjective experience as from objective or statistical data. Accordingly, the author's Jamaican wife provides insight into the nature of race relations in these countries. Her appreciation of the integrative basis for ethnic identification in Venezuela, as opposed to the segregative tendencies in Brazil, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, demonstrates sensitivity to practical realities that belie cultural myths. Personal anecdotes containing examples of discrimination are revealing. For example, being directed to a service entrance in Brazil due to o n e ' s color is

26

Democracy for the Privileged

q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n o n than b e i n g r e f e r r e d to as negriia, a V e n e z u e l a n term of e n d e a r m e n t . A f r e q u e n t c o m m e n t a r y in V e n e z u e l a r e f e r s to t h e v e n e z o l a n o ' s a b i l i t y to t r a c e h i s / h e r a n c e s t r y " b a c k to s o m e o n e w h o p l a y e d t h e tambores" ( A f r i c a n d r u m s ) . A f e w elite g r o u p s are an i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n to this " r u l e , " which o p e r a t e s as an e q u a l i z e r in V e n e z u e l a n society. 9. E l s e w h e r e in Latin A m e r i c a this s p e c i f i c a l l y m e a n s a m i x t u r e of Indian and E u r o p e a n . In V e n e z u e l a the t e r m g e n e r a l l y refers to a mixture of Indian, black, and E u r o p e a n , or any c o m b i n a t i o n t h e r e o f . 10. N a m e s that r e p r e s e n t this p h e n o m e n o n i n c l u d e : R a v a r d , B o u l t o n , Ball, M a r s h a l l , Burelli, P e t k o f f , V o l l m e r , Pietri, G r e a v e s , L a n d e r , and G u d e n . T h e powe r f u l C i s n e r o s f a m i l y is of C u b a n origin. 11. A m o n u m e n t of M a r i a L i o n z a , a s t a t u e s q u e n u d e w o m a n of A m a z o n i a n p r o p o r t i o n s astride a tapirlike a n i m a l , stands in the c e n t e r island of the m a i n highw a y in C a r a c a s . D e s p i t e its inaccessibility d u e to o m n i p r e s e n t traffic, the statue is virtually a l w a y s a d o r n e d with f r e s h f l o w e r s and wreaths. 12. I k n o w of m a n y c a s e s in w h i c h u n i v e r s i t y - e d u c a t e d V e n e z u e l a n s consulted c u r a n d e r o s . In o n e i n s t a n c e an e n g i n e e r s o u g h t a c u r e f o r " t e n n i s e l b o w " and in a n o t h e r the w i f e of a p r o m i n e n t b u s i n e s s m a n w a n t e d h a r m to befall her h u s b a n d ' s mistress. 13. T h e V e n e z u e l a n A n d e s rise to t h e P i c o B o l i v a r ( 1 6 , 4 0 0 feel [ 4 , 9 2 0 meters] a b o v e sea level) in M e r i d a . 14. D o g a n and Pelassy ( 1 9 9 0 : 8 ) p r o p o u n d e d that " c o m p a r i s o n is the e n g i n e of k n o w l e d g e . " In the c o n t e x t of this b o o k this s t a t e m e n t m e a n s e s t a b l i s h i n g s o m e criteria against w h i c h t h e e f f i c a c y of V e n e z u e l a n d e m o c r a c y can be m e a s u r e d . 15. For e x a m p l e , Lipset ( 1 9 5 9 : 7 3 ) a r g u e d that " d e m o c r a c y is not a quality of a social s y s t e m w h i c h either d o e s or d o e s not exist, but is rather a c o m p l e x of c h a r a c teristics w h i c h m a y b e r a n k e d in m a n y d i f f e r e n t w a y s . " 16. S e v e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t d e m o c r a c y in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s are d r a w n f r o m an a n a l y s i s of c o m p a r a t i v e political theory c o n t a i n e d in the i n t r o d u c t i o n to H i l l m a n and D ' A g o s t i n o (1992). 17. T e r r y L y n n Karl ( 1 9 9 1 b ) m a d e a c o m p e l l i n g c a s e for d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g types of d e m o c r a c y a n d m o d e s of d e m o c r a t i c transition. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , her c o n c l u s i o n that " [ t ] h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e , rather than rising and f a l l i n g in t a n d e m , m a y b e p a r a b o l i c " (p. 182) is c o n s o n a n t with o n e of the m a i n t h e s e s of this study. 18. A c c o r d i n g l y , this s t u d y s h o u l d i l l u m i n a t e " t h e w a y in w h i c h v a r i o u s spec i a l i z e d political a g e n c i e s h a v e historically c r y s t a l l i z e d — e x e c u t i v e p o w e r , legislatures, b u r e a u c r a t s , c o u r t s — a n d to i n d i c a t e w h i c h d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s c o u l d b e fulf i l l e d b y s i m i l a r s t r u c t u r e s in v a r i o u s h i s t o r i c , c u l t u r a l , or s y s t e m i c c o n t e x t s " ( D o g a n and P e l a s s y 1990:41). 19. R o b e r t H. Dix ( 1 9 9 2 : 4 9 0 ) p o i n t e d out that " [ d e m o c r a t i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n is not, of c o u r s e , d e p e n d e n t s o l e l y o n t h e e m e r g e n c e of a s t r o n g , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d party s y s t e m — f a r f r o m it. E c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e , political culture, patterns of historical d e v e l o p m e n t , social and e c o n o m i c inequalities, and d e p e n d e n c e are o n l y a f e w of the o t h e r potentially r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s (see, e.g., D a h l , 1971; D i a m o n d et al., 1989)." 20. T h e structural c h a n g e s that s h a p e particular r e g i m e transition in w a y s that a r e c o n d u c i v e o r o b s t r u c t i v e to d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a r e i n f l u e n c e d b y " c o n t i n g e n t c h o i c e s " best u n d e r s t o o d within t h e c o n t e x t of the " p a t h - d e p e n d e n t " a p p r o a c h p r o p o u n d e d by Karl ( 1 9 9 1 b ) . T h e c h o i c e s as well as the p a t h s are d e f i n e d w i t h i n political cultural p a r a m e t e r s .

Political

Paradoxes

27

21. According to Lipset (1959:71) democracy is defined as a political system that "supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decisionmaking among alternate contenders for political office." 22. Karl also suggested that "there may be no single precondition for the emergence of a democratic polity" ( 1 9 9 l b : 165) and "the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived as the outcomes of democracy" (1991b: 168). 23. The clientelistic relationship implies the dependence, reciprocity, and personalization linking of two persons or groups who control unequal resources. The social or cultural conditions favorable to clientelism occur in corporatist societies where vertical structuring is likely to take place "in a historical context that is neither m o d e r n nor t r a d i t i o n a l , but t y p i c a l l y m o d e r n i z i n g " ( D o g a n and P e l a s s y 1990:90). 24. Samuel Huntington (1991) appraised these risks and problems. 25. In this study, "anarchy" and "anarchic" refer to a state of political confusion and disorder, not to the complete absence of government or some rudimentary order. The early stages of state formation in Venezuela included a degree of order based on caudillos, the Church, hacendados, and so on.

2 Past Influences: Anarchy Versus Order

The ideological predispositions toward governing institutions and political behavior that constitute political culture are strongly influenced by the historical context within which a nation is created, the way in which independence is achieved, artistic and intellectual interpretations of these experie n c e s , a n d s p e c i f i c g e o g r a p h i c and e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s . F a i l u r e to appreciate these influences leaves the casual observer unable to explain contemporary political events. Dramatic occurrences in Venezuela, including university-inspired popular insurrections, protest voting, and military coups, can be understood in the context of the nation's distinctive variant of Latin American political culture. The following summary of selected aspects of V e n e z u e l a ' s historical evolution illuminates how militarism, inequitably distributed wealth, violence, and corruption have constrained the democratic impulse in a basically p a t r i m o n i a l i s t culture of privilege and authority. 1 N e i t h e r e x t e n s i v e experience with participatory institutions nor the formation of communitarian values of civic consciousness are very deeply ingrained in Venezuelan political culture. However, administrative centralization, elite dominance of policymaking, and the use of protest demonstrations as forms of interest articulation and as agents of change are logical consequences of historical precedents. Contemporary Venezuela is the product of a turbulent past that included Spanish colonialism, independence born of revolution, fractured dreams of national unity, rebellion, volatile economic fluctuations, and political instability. Spanish conquest and exploitation, motivated by ambition and greed, attempted to impose European institutions on indigenous and incoming populations. However, political institutions were imposed, rejected, or modified, in whole or in part, as the new nation entered into the ongoing process of self-definition. The incorporation of beliefs and values at vari-

29

30

Democracy for the

Privileged

a n c e with t h o s e o f t h e d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e w a s c o n f l i c t u a l , but l e d to t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a w h o l e d i f f e r e n t than t h e sum o f its parts. A t e n a c i o u s l e g a c y o f S p a n i s h i m p e r i a l i s m h a s b e e n in a c u l t u r e o f c o n f l i c t and a m a l g a m a t i o n ( o f i d e a s and p e o p l e ) , r e s u l t i n g in p e r i o d s o f a n a r c h y , c i v i l w a r , c a u d i l l i s m o ( p e r s o n a l i s t i c , a u t h o r i t a r i a n r u l e r s ) , and m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . M o r e r e c e n t l y , an i d i o s y n c r a t i c f o r m o f d e m o c r a c y h a s c o m b i n e d c o n f l i c t i n g e l e m e n t s o f V e n e z u e l a ' s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e in a w a y that p r e s e r v e s traditional p o w e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i l e a l l o w i n g , at least t h e o r e t i c a l l y , f o r i n c r e a s e d p l u r a l i s m and i n c r e m e n t a l c h a n g e . In r e a l i t y , c o n t e m p o r a r y V e n e z u e l a n p o l i t i c s c o n t i n u e s to r e f l e c t the persistent i n f l u e n c e s o f past struggles b e t w e e n anarchy and order. T h e d y n a m i c s o f t h e s e s t r u g g l e s , as they are m a n i f e s t e d in f u n c t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s , c a n be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m the t h e o r e t i c a l operation o f formal, legalistic institutions. T h e r e f o r e , despite the emerg e n c e o f d e m o c r a c y and the p o s s e s s i o n o f o i l , V e n e z u e l a s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d n e i t h e r an a n o m a l y in L a t i n A m e r i c a nor a c o m p l e t e l y t y p i c a l c a s e . T h i s interpretation is r e i n f o r c e d in the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f V e n e z u e l a n s o c i o p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s u b s e q u e n t to the E u r o p e a n arrival.

A Neglected Possession O n his third v o y a g e to t h e N e w W o r l d in 1 4 9 8 , C h r i s t o p h e r C o l u m b u s l a n d e d o n the c o n t i n e n t a l c o a s t o f S o u t h A m e r i c a in what w a s to b e c o m e V e n e z u e l a . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r the c o u n t r y w a s i d e n t i f i e d as " l i t t l e V e n i c e " b e c a u s e palafitos

( I n d i a n huts built on stilts o v e r L a k e M a r a c a i b o ) w e r e

r e m i n i s c e n t o f the I t a l i a n c i t y . E x p l o r e r s , initially attracted b y tales o f g r e a t w e a l t h in t h e l e g e n d a r y E l D o r a d o , f a i l e d to f i n d g o l d o r s i l v e r and r a p i d l y lost interest in the c o u n t r y . A s an u n i m p o r t a n t part o f N u e v a G r a n a d a , f l e e t i n g interest in r a p i d l y d e p l e t e d pearl b e d s around M a r g a r i t a I s l a n d did little to alter a pattern o f n e g l e c t that left t h e c o l o n y i m p o v e r i s h e d and u n p r e p a r e d f o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . T h e k i n g o f S p a i n e v e n l e a s e d the w e s t e r n part o f the c o l o n y t o a G e r m a n c o m m e r c i a l b a n k in partial r e p a y m e n t o f l o a n s i n c u r r e d in his b i d to b e c o m e R o m a n e m p e r o r . T h e l e a s e ran f r o m 1 5 2 8 until 1 5 5 6 , w h e n t h e S p a n i a r d s c o u l d n o l o n g e r t o l e r a t e G e r m a n l o o t i n g a n d a b u s e s in t h e i r search for gold. A s a m p l e o f t h e b l a c k , o i l y s u b s t a n c e used f o r c a u l k i n g and o t h e r d a i l y c h o r e s by the I n d i a n s w a s sent to S p a i n in 1 5 3 9 . T h e v a l u e o f oil w o u l d n o t b e r e a l i z e d , h o w e v e r , f o r a n o t h e r f o u r hundred y e a r s . V e n e z u e l a ' s p o t e n t i a l a s a trading c e n t e r w a s a l s o u n d e r v a l u e d by S p a i n . H o w e v e r , the c o u n t r y ' s s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n p r o v i d e d an e a s y t a r g e t f o r s m u g g l e r s a n d p r i v a t e e r s w h o s e i l l i c i t v e n t u r e s ran t h r o u g h o u t the c i r c u m - C a r i b b e a n .

Venezuelan

Past

Influences

31

cities were attacked and ports were plundered by buccaneers and pirates. In the eighteenth century, Venezuela became a fairly self-sufficient agricultural colony based on Amerindian and African slave labor for the production of cacao and tobacco. Diverse Amerindian tribes fiercely resisted the repartimiento and encomienda systems imposed on them by colonists. The repartimiento was a method of distributing the natives for forced labor; the encomienda was a legal device adopted in 1503 to "civilize" them by entrusting them to Spaniards for their "spiritual salvation." The brutality of the repartimiento was not reduced by the encomienda, which lasted a century longer in Venezuela than in other parts of Latin America. 2 Catholic missionaries, attempting to convert Indians, established settlements in the hinterland. Their defense of these communities caused conflicts with criollo landowners. 3 Hellinger (1991) and D. Levine (1981) explained the relative subordination of the Church in later Venezuelan politics op. the basis of these conflicts. Moreover, the Church was factionalized and not as powerful as in other parts of Latin America. 4 Increasingly autonomous local governments (cabildos) controlled by the criollos were challenged in the latter part of the eighteenth century when Spain attempted to re-exert its authority. By granting a commercial monopoly to the Guipuzcoana Company, the Crown hoped to eliminate the colony's trade with other European countries and reap greater profits for itself. This form of regulation at the expense of Venezuelan prosperity and autonomy planted the seeds of criollo dissatisfaction and rebellion. 5 Armed revolts commenced in 1749 and led to a declaration of independence in 1811. Venezuela became the first South American country to declare its independence and the first to adopt a constitution. 6 Nevertheless, as Miriam Kornblith (1991:62) argued, "[t]he innumerable uprisings and revolts that plagued Venezuela in the nineteenth century show a society that could hardly qualify as an integrated polity."

Liberation Without Change Although the liberal philosophies of the French and American revolutions may have helped to justify opposition to Spanish imperialism, "few creóles took seriously the idea of equality among citizens" (Hellinger 1991:18). In fact, llaneros and other groups alienated by elite insularity and rejection were recruited by Spanish forces. 7 Past isolation, caused by the pattern of neglect on the part of the Spanish Crown, had the effect of promoting a spirit of independence among the landowning elites. 8 Thus, Venezuelans were among the most important leaders of the Latin American movement for independence from Spain. Simón Bolívar, a Caraqueño landowner who

32

Democracy for the Privileged

became known as "the liberator," along with such national heroes as Andrés Bello, Francisco de Miranda, José Antonio Páez, and Antonio José de Sucre, contributed to the demise of Spanish colonialism in northern South America. 9 After Francisco de Miranda, who led initially successful attacks against Spanish forces, was defeated, Simón Bolívar launched attacks with the assistance of the llaneros (who shifted their support to the revolution under the leadership of José Antonio Páez). Bolívar led his forces across the Andes, winning battles at B o y a c á (liberating Colombia) and at Carabobo (liberating Venezuela) in 1821. After the War of Independence, the Bolivarian vision of a unified Latin America disintegrated into civil war. 10 Gran Colombia (the multination merger of Venezuela, Colombia, and Equador created in 1822) fell apart by 1830, leaving the independent Republic of Venezuela to go it alone. Virtually all scholars of Venezuelan history have concluded that national sovereignty achieved very little in terms of the imposition of a new order. "In general terms, the Venezuelan independence movement began with an elite rebellion, a species of elegant, intellectualized protest expected to produce modest changes in local conditions and to result in the substitution of caraqueño control for Spanish peninsular authority" (J. Lombardi 1982:121). Although this initial impulse failed, and subsequent efforts required the inclusion of systemic considerations, inadequate appreciation of local power interests ultimately led to an independent state unable to function effectively. In fact, successions of dictatorships and periods of anarchy characterized a country in which rebellion and revolt became the only effective channels of political contest. "By 1888, another 730 battles and 26 major insurrections would be fought on Venezuelan soil" (Hellinger 1991:19). Thus, the suffering caused by the large numbers of casualties of the wars for independence continued as Venezuela entered into the era termed the "caudillo years."

Personalistic Power Brokers By 1836 twenty-one different constitutions were adopted." None brought stability to a country in which only an urban landowning aristocracy lived well. Rule by strength of arms held alternately by warring regional caudillos gave rise to the dominance of successive dictators during Venezuela's first century. 12 The personal rule of these charismatic personalities through the use of military force and the centralization of authority was a natural consequence of Spanish political association in which hierarchical relationships were based on the desire for order. 13 Therefore, postindependence disorder in Venezuela allowed for the expression of caudillo leadership in

Past Influences

33

the a b s e n c e o f any alternative, culturally specific, unifying factor. Populist caudillos also appealed to the m a s s e s ' alienation from social and e c o n o m i c a s c e n d a n c y . I n i t i a l l y , this was the c a s e with the m e s t i z o g e n e r a l J o s é A n t o n i o Pâez, who b e c a m e president in 1 8 3 1 . F o r sixteen years P â e z controlled political life with initial support from the Uaneros. T h e s e c o w b o y s from the O r i n o c o plains sought to wrest c o n trol from the conservative oligarchy and privileged classes with w h o m P â e z later aligned himself. In attempting to recuperate from the devastation o f the independence wars, credit was reestablished and immigration encoura g e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the e c o n o m y ( e v e n w i t h i n c r e a s e d c o n s t r u c t i o n ) r e m a i n e d uncoordinated, with different regions f u n c t i o n i n g as " s e p a r a t e export e n c l a v e s — l e a t h e r products from the llanos, c a c a o f r o m the c o a s t , and c o f f e e from the central highlands o f the A n d e s " (Hellinger 1 9 9 1 : 2 1 ) . T h e oligarchy and c o m m e r c i a l groups attempted to maintain their positions vis-à-vis repression o f pardo

or llanero mobility. In short, workers could

not advance in a system dominated by elites and power brokers who ration a l i z e d t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y t h r o u g h B o l i v a r i a n r h e t o r i c and i n t e l l e c t u a l sophistry. Although P â e z had the support o f the conservatives, he was the real source o f power. His opposition consisted o f rival power brokers, m e m b e r s o f the oligarchy who feared the rising power o f business groups, and liberals who advocated social r e f o r m s . 1 4 A deteriorating e c o n o m y , increasing f a c t i o n a l i s m , and c o n f l i c t strained the limits o f P â e z ' s ability to provide unity. A f t e r s e v e r a l r e b e l l i o n s , P â e z was f o l l o w e d by a s e r i e s o f c o r r u p t c a u d i l l o s a t t e m p t i n g t o p r o v i d e s t a b i l i t y in t h e m i d s t o f a n a r c h y , internecine warfare, and c h a o s . L o n g after its o b s o l e s c e n c e , slavery was abolished in 1 8 5 4 by a president who feared the recruitment o f slaves into opposition f o r c e s . E c o n o m i c c r i s i s and general discontent p r o v o k e d the consolidation o f those groups opposed to the central government as " f e d e r a l i s t s . " T h e e n s u i n g F e d e r a l W a r ( 1 8 5 8 - 1 8 6 3 ) e x a c t e d a h e a v y toll in human s u f f e r i n g and death without providing solutions to the c o u n t r y ' s s o c i o e c o n o m i c and political p r o b l e m s . 1 5 A f t e r another protracted period o f violence, General A n t o n i o G u z m a n B l a n c o was able to dominate regional caudillos by asserting dictatorial control in 1 8 7 0 . Although nominally a liberal, Guzmân B l a n c o consolidated power in the central government and proclaimed h i m s e l f " t h e Illustrious A m e r i c a n " who would regenerate V e n e z u e l a . R e m a i n i n g in p o w e r until 1 8 8 7 , G u z m a n destroyed all opposition. T h e C a t h o l i c Church was weakened further by strong anticlericalism, political parties c o m p l e t e l y disappeared, and administrative corruption led toward bankruptcy o f the country. Nevertheless, during the period o f " G u z m a n i a " there were educational programs, legal reforms, and artistic and architectural developments designed

34

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Privileged

to " E u r o p e a n i z e " Venezuela. 1 6 His creation of a national army would have political consequences not understood until much later. By 1888 the system that kept G u z m á n in power appeared on the verge of collapse. A f t e r having spent increasing amounts of time in Europe, G u z m á n decided to remain in P a r i s and n e v e r return to V e n e z u e l a . 1 7 N e i t h e r t h e p r e t e n t i o n s nor the administrative programs of this caudillo were sufficient to initiate an e f f e c tive process of national development. C o n t i n u o u s f i g h t i n g a m o n g r i v a l g e n e r a l s e n s u e d u n t i l in 1 8 9 9 Cipriano Castro, the "Lion of the Andes," seized power with an army that included C o l o m b i a n mercenaries. Under his c o m m a n d the national army received e q u i p m e n t , training, and professional d e v e l o p m e n t . Thus, s o m e s y s t e m i c c e n t r a l i z a t i o n took p l a c e . H o w e v e r , C a s t r o c o n t r i b u t e d to the c o u n t r y ' s bankruptcy by refusing to honor its international financial obligations. 1 8 Falling c o f f e e prices, costly revolts financed by foreign investors and d o m e s t i c enemies, and the foreign blockade also contributed. R e m a i n i n g in power, Castro continued to face serious economic and diplomatic troubles until illness forced him to relinquish control of the government to his aide, Juan Vicente G ó m e z , in 1908. 1 9 G ó m e z , w h o ruled Venezuela for nearly thirty years until he died in 1935, is c o n s i d e r e d " w i t h o u t d o u b t o n e of the cruelest and most b l o o d thirsty tyrants Latin America has ever p r o d u c e d " (Kantor 1969:353). Ironically, during his oppressive reign of terror Venezuela emerged into the modern era through a more centralized governing system with a national army. " G ó m e z constructed the first central state able to prevail over regional i n t e r e s t s w i t h o u t h a v i n g to play o n e c a u d i l l o o f f a g a i n s t a n o t h e r " (Hellinger 1991:36).20 E c o n o m i c growth, stimulated by the exploitation of oil in the 1920s, radically transformed the country, which until then had been presided o v e r as patrimony of a caudillo w h o attempted to j u s t i f y his brutal d o m i n a n c e through pseudointellectualism. 2 1 Opening the country and granting concessions to foreign oil prospectors, G ó m e z and his family, the army, bureaucrats, and a small g r o u p of agrarian property o w n e r s b e c a m e very rich. Interest and part of the principal of the national debt was paid. H o w e v e r , the e m e r g e n c e of industrialists and an e x p a n d i n g , t h o u g h small, m i d d l e class signaled increasing discontent with the rampant nepotism, corruption, and repression of the G ó m e z dictatorship. Caudillo politics could no longer mitigate anarchic conflict in a c h a n g ing society. Moreover, the interrelationship between foreign and d o m e s t i c interests during the initial expansion of petroleum exploitation was a s y m metrical. Hence, V e n e z u e l a ' s e m e r g e n c e f r o m caudillistic anarchy to a status of peripheral dependency was accompanied by a sociopolitical transition that would have p r o f o u n d e f f e c t s on future development.

Past

Influences

35

Transitional Impulses Dictatorial repression generally invites opposition. The form of the opposition, however, varies considerably from one political context to another. For example, it might be urban- or rural-based revolutionary, domestic institutional, or externally linked. The protest might be met by further repression or incremental accommodation. In Venezuela, a series of attempted uprisings and invasions by exiles were ineffectual as they confronted G o m e z ' s extensive intelligence network and powerful army. However, in 1928 a series of antigovernment speeches and protests culminating in a student strike at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) provoked popular demonstrations against the government that reflected the need for fundamental changes in the existing order. Over two hundred people were arrested and many killed or wounded in these demonstrations. Several young army officers discontented with the government, in part because of blatant political favoritism that inhibited their advancement, joined the students. After their attempts to storm Miraflores Palace, Gómez closed the university, incarcerated many of the protesters, forced others to work on the roads, and sent some into exile. These events accelerated a social transformation that had been gaining momentum. A group of political leaders emerged who would exert important influences in the ensuing decades. Although unsuccessful at this juncture, Rómulo Betancourt, Raúl Leoni, Jóvito Villalba, and others began to organize political groupings that later became parties with political machines capable of bringing together diverse memberships. 22 After Gomez's death in 1935, violence, looting, and destruction of oil installations were clear expressions of antigomecismo and hostility toward the regime's foreign supporters. The 1936 strike in Maracaibo for recognition of unions and improved working conditions evoked support throughout the country. Steve Ellner (1993) in his penetrating analysis described the important long-term role played by the Venezuelan labor movement in the development of democracy. However, the immediate consequence of labor's use of the strike was the banning of leftist organizations. Opposition political organizers fled as the new regime, encouraged by the gomecistacontrolled Congress, improved relations with the oil companies. At this juncture Rómulo Betancourt 23 began to distance himself from the Communists, who had a strong following among oil and dock workers. Betancourt secretly entered the country to organize a wide network of grassroots support. His recruitment of campesino organizers under the Democratic Nationalist Party (PDN) became an important resource base for its successor, Democratic Action (AD). With increased public support, AD emerged as an active opposition party, first under General Eleazar López

36

Democracy

for ihe

Privileged

Contreras, who replaced Gomez with a more open government, 2 4 and then under General Isaias Medina Angarita, who was influenced by liberal reformism. 2 5 Despite the reforms and apparent changes in philosophy of government on the part of the postgomecista regimes, fundamental changes in the power structure did not occur. This lack resulted in further protests by increasingly alienated middle and working classes. After AD candidate Romulo Gallegos (one of Latin America's greatest writers) 26 lost the controlled election of 1940, the party regrouped and was poised for participation with a group of young army officers in a golpe against the Medina government in 1945. 2 7 The officers, dissatisfied with the political disarray left by previous regimes, countered conservative opposition, thus allowing for a governing junta of which AD's Betancourt became the president. 28 Thus, although it could be argued that "[t]he main reason for the insurrection was Medina's unwillingness to transfer power through an open electoral process" (Kornblith 1991:65), there were other, more fundamental reasons. The new constitution drafted under the AD trienio (the 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 8 period of AD rule) included human rights laws, provision for social legislation, and direct elections. During the trienio, AD (which at first opposed the law as insufficiently nationalistic) implemented the 50/50 petroleum law introduced by Medina in 1943 in which the government would tax the oil companies an amount equal to 5 0 percent of the industry's profits. Also, A D negotiated the first collective bargaining agreement in the petroleum sector. However, major land reforms were postponed and "social peace" became a primary objective of a regime attempting to modernize in a way that would be compatible with diverse interests. Moreover, not all groups shared A D ' s conciliatory approach, and some feared the implementation of reforms that they perceived as challenges to their relative position in the power structure. The intense participation and doctrinaire confrontation among groups that produced the trienio "failed to address a common normative framework in which they could accommodate their differences" (Kornblith 1991:69). Thus, tensions with COPEI, the Church, and the military, along with militant political activities on the part of each party, had a destabilizing effect on the regime. The legitimacy of the system was questioned from the beginning. After Romulo Gallegos, a less astute politician than Betancourt, was elected in 1948 with over twice as many votes as the other three candidates combined (and A D candidates also won a majority in both houses o f Congress), 2 9 the regime became involved in a controversy with the military that resulted in another golpe. 3 0 Thus, the same military leaders who supported the trienio (with Venezuela's first popularly elected president)

Past

Influences

37

ended this brief interlude of democratic government prior to the end of the year. Hellinger ( 1 9 9 1 : 6 6 ) attributed the lack of strong middle-class support for the regime to a business sector "more interested in commerce, speculation, and corruption than in modernization o f the e c o n o m y " and a lingering identification of A D with the radical left. 3 1 The privileged elites seemed to be blinded by "the deforming flood of uncontrolled wealth" (Uslar Pietri 1989:63) from the oil boom, even as it was making the country more, rather than less, economically dependent. Moreover, rampant consumerism and corruption appeared to be by-products of a rapidly changing national scene. Population expansion and urban growth outstripped the capacity o f the country's infrastructure or the government's ability to "sow the petroleum." Therefore, despite the emergence of political parties and economic expansion, certain tendencies consonant with Venezuelan traditional political culture continued to prevail.

Further Repression T h e next decade was dominated once again by the military with Marcos Pérez Jiménez in command. With A D underground, elections permitted in 1952 showed the Democratic Republican Union ( U R D ) candidate Jóvito Villalba ahead when voting was suspended and Pérez J i m é n e z declared himself president. 3 2 He remained in office perpetrating another brutal dictatorship until 1958. T h e Pérez J i m é n e z regime was comparable to that of Juan Vicente Gómez. Graft and corruption reigned, opposition was not permitted, the U C V was closed, and an expanding military (including a national security force with a network of secret police headed by the sadistic Pedro Estrada) kept an increasingly unpopular regime in power. A boom in oil production and rising foreign investments supported the profligate and lavish life-style of the dictator and his friends. Nevertheless, expensive public works projects such as superhighways and public housing were constructed, generating support among groups within the elite and lower classes. U.S. support of this "law and order," anticommunist regime disillusioned the growing underground opposition, which was becoming increasingly active. 3 3 Gradually, it b e c a m e evident not only to the clandestine political groups, but also to religious organizations, the growing middle class, and elements within the military that the nation would have to transcend its caudillo heritage. A regime based on corruption, incompetence, and repression was incompatible with the rapidly urbanizing society in which large numbers o f immigrants as well as Venezuelans sought economic opportuni-

38

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Privileged

ty. M o r e o v e r , t h e r e g i m e had t a k e n t h o u s a n d s o f p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s and e m p l o y e d t o r t u r e in an e r a o f h e i g h t e n e d a s p i r a t i o n s f o r d e m o c r a c y and s o c i a l j u s t i c e . T h e i n e f f i c i e n c y and c o r r u p t i o n led to a g r a v e e c o n o m i c c r i sis when V e n e z u e l a should have been prospering. T h u s , public opinion s h i f t e d t o w a r d c o m m i t m e n t to s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t as well as meaningful economic development (Blutstein

1 9 7 7 : 4 3 ) . Discontent was

s u f f i c i e n t by the late 1 9 5 0 s to c a u s e s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e P é r e z J i m é n e z regime. A s a result o f t h e s e s h i f t s , the ideas and s t r a t e g i e s o f e x i l e d and o p p o s i tion l e a d e r s s u c h as B e t a n c o u r t , C a l d e r a , and V i l l a l b a g a i n e d a s e n s e o f l e g i t i m a c y . T h e g r o u n d w o r k f o r t h e i r future c o l l a b o r a t i o n in V e n e z u e l a n p o l i t i c s w a s laid in a s e r i e s o f m e e t i n g s in N e w Y o r k , w h e r e future b u s i n e s s and p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s prepared f o r a m o v e m e n t o f m a s s r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t t h e r e g i m e . T h e parties and the m i l i t a r y e v e n t u a l l y f o l l o w e d this lead.

Pactocracy By

1 9 5 6 , as a r e a c t i o n to the r e p r e s s i o n u n d e r P é r e z J i m é n e z , t h e f o u r

m a j o r p o l i t i c a l parties ( A D , U R D , C O P E I , a n d C o m m u n i s t ) a g r e e d to stop f i g h t i n g e a c h o t h e r and c o o p e r a t e in o v e r t h r o w i n g the g o v e r n m e n t . W h e n the C h u r c h and F e d e c á m a r a s b e c a m e d i s i l l u s i o n e d with t h e c o r r u p t i o n and r e p r e s s i o n o f an i n c r e a s i n g l y d y s f u n c t i o n a l s t a t e b e s e t with a s e r i o u s e c o n o m i c c r i s i s (due to s o a r i n g i m p o r t s , c a p i t a ! f l i g h t , and f i s c a l m i s m a n a g e m e n t ) , t h e p a r t i e s f o r m e d an o p p o s i t i o n b l o c , t h e P a t r i o t i c F r o n t . T h i s a g r e e m e n t , a d i s t i n c t b r e a k with the past, f o r m e d the b a s i s f o r m i d d l e - c l a s s s u p p o r t , the P a c t o f P u n t o F i j o , a n d the g r o u n d w o r k f o r a " d e m o c r a t i c " party s y s t e m . A t the end o f 1 9 5 7 , a m a n i p u l a t e d p l e b i s c i t e ( d e s i g n e d to p e r p e t u a t e t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p ) that b y p a s s e d t h e 1 9 5 2 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s p r o v o k e d w e e k s o f student and w o r k e r p r o t e s t s and riots c u l m i n a t i n g in a g e n e r a l s t r i k e . P é r e z J i m é n e z h a s t e n e d h i s o w n d o w n f a l l by a t t e m p t i n g to p e r p e t r a t e this absurd e l e c t o r a l s h a m . T h e n , w h e n e l e m e n t s o f the a r m e d f o r c e s and the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y e n t e r e d t h e a n t i d i c t a t o r i a l s t r u g g l e in s u p p o r t o f the P a t r i o t i c F r o n t , v i o l e n c e b e c a m e r a m p a n t a n d P é r e z J i m é n e z w e n t into e x i l e . 3 4 A m i l i t a r y j u n t a headed b y A d m i r a l W o l f g a n g L a r r a z á b a l t o o k c o n t r o l o f an a n a r c h i c and v i o l e n t interlude f r a u g h t with u n c e r t a i n t y and f i s c a l c r i s i s . T h i s p r o v i s i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d an e m e r g e n c y p l a n , p r o m u l g a t e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r a s p e e d y d e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n , and p r e s i d e d o v e r an a g r e e m e n t in w h i c h p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c e l i t e s c a l l e d f o r an end to l a b o r hostilities.

Past

Influences

39

The Pact of Punto Fijo, named after Rafael Caldera's residence where negotiations took place, was signed in 1958 by leaders of AD, COPEI, and URD. These parties agreed to share power regardless of the outcome of the election scheduled by the provisional government for D e c e m b e r of that same year. By ruling the Communist Party outside the system and making assurances to the business community, the Church, and the military, the roots of the partidocracia (a party-system "pacted democracy") were planted. This "consociational experiment" called for the production of agreements based on a concurrent majority that would ensure the vital interests of the main political forces. 3 5 This experiment meant that the AD, labor, COPEI, socioeconomic elites, and the military each had veto power over governmental policies. Although this arrangement constrained policymaking, it also helped to legitimate the system. In contrast to the conflict and mutual distrust between groups who conceived their interests as antagonistic in the trienio, these pacts were based on consensual agreements between the relevant political and social actors attempting to satisfy their diverse interests (Kornblith 1991). However, an important question (explored in Chapter 3) can be raised about the extent to which g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , centralized within the consociational system, allows for any real opposition to elite interests. In fact, the underlying social forces that induced these groups to cooperate with each other may have as much to do with the preservation of self-interests, elite privileges, and power as with the creation of a truly democratic state. Hence, it has been through centralized political parties conforming strictly to the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" that elite interests have dominated operational a g r e e m e n t s . C o n c o m i t a n t l y , cogollos (small g r o u p s of key players) have used the party structure to distribute patronage to supporters. T h i s f o r m of c l i e n t e l i s m is, of c o u r s e , v e r y m u c h in k e e p i n g w i t h Venezuelan cultural traditions. Therefore, the way in which the consociational system functions suggests the need for réévaluation of the efficacy of "partidocracia," or " p a c t o c r a c y , " as an expression of democratic governance. Despite strong motivation to achieve democratic ideals based on "constitutionally legitimizing political a r r a n g e m e n t s , " there has been a " g a p between constitutional provisions and reality" (Kornblith 1991:62, 89).

More Violence At the end of 1958 under the provisional government of Admiral Wolfgang Larrazâbal, fair elections indeed resulted in a Betancourt victory. With

40

Democracy for the

Privileged

much of its support from outside the cities, A D won almost 50 percent of the overall vote, defeating C O P E I ' s Caldera and Larrazabal, who had U R D and PCV support. Venezuela was plagued by violence during the early 1960s. The radical left, disaffected by their exclusion from the system, attempted to foment revolution. Intellectuals started guerrilla focos insurreccionales that failed to capture the popular imagination—especially in rural areas where the A D had a strong following and land reform programs enjoyed political, if not s t r u c t u r a l , s u c c e s s . T h e r e w e r e also several failed r i g h t - w i n g military golpes and a series of violently repressed demonstrations at the U C V during this period. Military occupation of the U C V in 1966 eliminated a major guerrilla base in the university dormitories. 3 6 Leaders of the PCV and the M o v e m e n t for Independent Revolution (MIR) formed the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and the National Liberation Front (FLN). However, their organizations remained estranged from the large popular base required for success. Disillusioned leaders formed new parties when they realized the extent of their political impotence. 3 7 Clearly, "the conditions that produced both the defeat of the i n s u r g e n c y a n d a v o i d a n c e of m i l i t a r y r u l e w e r e q u i t e s p e c i f i c to Venezuela's own historical experience" (Hellinger 1991:118-119). The radical left and revolutionaries were defeated and generally discredited by the late 1960s. Since then, a dominant two-party system based on the spirit of Punto Fijo has been functioning. Nevertheless, the old beneficiaries of power, including the elites and high-ranking military officers, have continued to plot coups when they believe their special privileges are threatened. Another potential for violence is increasingly found in reactions to socioeconomic conditions affecting the middle sectors and other groups, such as university students, the radical left, and middle-level military o f f i cers. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l question of whether the spirit of P u n t o Fijo, or consociational politics, is sufficient to provide a sense of legitimacy f o r new and diverse social groups is considered in Chapter 3.

Transferring Power From 1958 to the present, A D and COPEI have operated as the largest and most important parties. The U R D membership has steadily decreased and several minor parties, including the Movement to Socialism (MAS), have emerged. Recently, the Radical Cause Party (Causa R) has had success in mayoral, state governor, and national levels. Significantly, R a f a e l Caldera's presidential victory in 1993 was as an independent candidate of seventeen minor "convergence" parties. Voting, a political right and compulsory duty for those over the age of

Past Influences

41

eighteen, has elected eight presidents to date. 3 8 Betancourt ( A D ) was elected in 1 9 5 8 , Raul Leoni ( A D ) in 1 9 6 3 , R a f a e l Caldera ( C O P E I ) in 1 9 6 8 , C a r l o s Andrés P é r e z ( A D ) in 1 9 7 3 , L u i s Herrera C a m p i n s ( C O P E I ) in 1978, J a i m e Lusinchi ( A D ) in 1983, Carlos Andrés Pérez again in 1 9 8 8 , and Rafael Caldera again in 1993 (that time as an Independent). 3 9 E a c h o f these administrations has had to confront increasing s o c i o e c o n o m i c problems while attempting to strengthen the legitimacy o f the political system. Betancourt, elected with close to 5 0 percent o f the vote, appeared genuinely interested in consolidating d e m o c r a c y . T o that end, he formed a c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t , i m p l e m e n t e d m o d e r a t e e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s , and fought against political unrest. The coalition in which A D , C O P E I , U R D , and independents held cabinet posts alienated the Communists, who were deliberately excluded, as well as leftist members o f the A D . Betancourt faced guerrilla attacks from the left and attempted military coups from the right as he fortified his centrist coalition. He was also the t a r g e t o f an a s s a s s i n a t i o n a t t e m p t l i n k e d to R a f a e l T r u j i l l o o f t h e D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c . D e s p i t e these o b s t a c l e s , and e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s d e r i v i n g f r o m a d e c l i n e in international oil p r i c e s , B e t a n c o u r t battled against administrative corruption and transferred resources from the oil to the manufacturing sector in an attempt to " s o w the petroleum." In 1 9 6 0 Venezuela b e c a m e a founding m e m b e r o f the Organization o f Petroleum Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) . T h e following year a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n was r a t i f i e d . H o w e v e r , m o s t s c h o l a r s a g r e e that the new r e g i m e ' s greatest accomplishment resides in its transfer o f power through e l e c t i o n s to its s u c c e s s o r r e g i m e ( A b e n t e B r u n 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 9 ;

Blutstein

1 9 7 7 : 4 5 ; J . Lombardi 1 9 8 2 : 2 4 0 ) . This conclusion is even more poignant given the fact that Raul L e o n i was not B e t a n c o u r t ' s preferred candidate (Martz 1 9 7 7 : 1 0 7 ) . Despite continued guerrilla warfare and threats against voters, Leoni won the 1963 presidential elections with a plurality o f 3 2 . 8 percent, was inaugurated peacefully in March 1964, and then attempted to hold together a c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t . C o m m a n d i n g o n l y 13 p e r c e n t o f the v o t e s in C a r a c a s , A D brought Arturo Uslar P i e t r i ' s business-sponsored National D e m o c r a t i c Front ( F N D ) , which won 4 2 percent o f the Caracas vote, into the government along with the U R D . T h e A D - C O P E I coalition was dissolved when C O P E I , encouraged by its showing in this election, began to consider its strategy for the next one. Thus, C O P E I put forth conditions to j o i n the coalition that were unacceptable to Leoni. B y 1 9 6 6 , after the L e o n i administration antagonized business interests by e n a c t i n g a tax r e f o r m , p a s s i n g labor l e g i s l a t i o n , and entering the L a t i n A m e r i c a n F r e e T r a d e Association ( L A F T A ) , the F N D defected from the coalition to j o i n C O P E I in the opposition. T h e 1968 candidacy o f A D president Luis Beltrân Prieto Figueroa was

42

Democracy for the

Privileged

blocked by Betancourt and other party centrists who considered his positions too antagonistic to business interests. When Prieto Figueroa split with the party to form the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), A D nominated Gonzalo Barrios as its presidential candidate for the 1968 contest. He was narrowly defeated by C O P E I ' s Rafael Caldera, who had the support of Pedro T i n o c o ' s probusiness movement. Thus, power was transferred peacef u l l y to the o p p o s i t i o n as a result of an e l e c t i o n f o r the first t i m e in Venezuelan history. Lacking a parliamentary majority, Caldera governed through issuebased coalitions. This style of governance resulted in "pacification prog r a m s " that granted amnesty to guerrilla leaders and p e r m i t t e d leftist groups to engage in the political process. Caldera also opened up foreign policy and signed the Lima Consensus in 1973 bringing Venezuela into the Andean C o m m o n Market (ANCOM). The controls on foreign capital and regulation of foreign ownership called for under this agreement "set the stage for the nationalization of the iron and petroleum industries" (Blutstein 1977:46). Thus, despite appointing Tinoco as minister of finance, Caldera lost the support of the business sectors, which reacted to the controls and regulations of A N C O M agreements as well as to new tax-reform proposals. Carlos Andrés Pérez's (AD) election with over 48 percent of the vote in 1973 marked the beginning of a dominant two-party system in which A D a n d C O P E I w o u l d win o v e r 80 p e r c e n t of e a c h s u b s e q u e n t e l e c t i o n . L o r e n z o F e r n a n d e z ( C O P E I ) r e c e i v e d 38 p e r c e n t of t h e v o t e s c a s t . Apparently, extremist politics were rejected in favor of moderate, or centrist, positions that reflected the mainstream aspirations of a Venezuelan body politic rapidly being transformed by a modernizing commercial and material culture. In conformance with a long history of clientelistic politics, people began looking to the parties to redistribute state patrimony. Pérez, nicknamed CAP, continued many of the policies commenced by C a l d e r a , e x p a n d e d support for A N C O M , and nationalized the iron and petroleum industries (in 1976). His populist platform calling for tax reform and redistribution m e a s u r e s was i m p l e m e n t e d by m i n i s t e r of p l a n n i n g Gumersindo Rodríguez (formerly a member of the MIR). C A P ' s attempts to reduce the nation's dependence on oil by investing in heavy industry, however, were attacked as inefficient and corrupt as V e n e z u e l a b e c a m e increasingly indebted to foreign lenders and inflation soared. On the one hand, while the c o u n t r y ' s economy grew, the masses of Venezuelans experienced little or no benefits beyond subsidized prices on basic consumer items when the price of oil was high. This subsidy, in itself, is an important benefit in a society characterized by inequitably distributed wealth. In order to sustain the stabilizing effects of state subsidies through periods of oil price fluctuation, h o w e v e r , there is a need f o r e c o n o m i c diversification and nationalization of capital. In this regard, C A P ' s attempts

Past

Influences

43

to initiate industrialization and import substitution policies might have produced salutory results had they been implemented more effectively. On the other hand, "Venezuela's populist and modernizing elites had sought not so much to protect the industrialization process from foreign capital as to associate with it" (Hellinger 1991:131). Thus, the rich grew richer as poverty and urban marginalization increased in a society experiencing what scholars have universally termed an oil boom. At a time when expectations were elevated considerably, the seeds for future instability were being sown. Capital was exported, consumption skyrocketed, foreign debt grew, and, notwithstanding the creation of several commissions to depoliticize public administration, scandals riddled the Pérez regime, paving the way for another COPEI victory. After his election in 1978, Luis Herrera Campíns, traditionally considered a COPEI liberal, designed a conservative fiscal program that included intentions to privatize state-owned enterprises. When the oil price increases of 1979 and 1980 gave way to an oil glut and decreased petroleum revenues in the early 1980s, these policies had to be reevaluated. Great complications arose as a result of these changes. Enormous quantities of capital were transferred abroad, resulting in a crisis of capital flight. 40 Herrera Campíns was confronted with the collapse of oil prices, the need to make payments on debts held in U.S. dollars, and deterioration of the country's trade and reserves. 41 Thus, on February 28, 1983, which came to be known as "Black Friday," the bolívar (B) was devalued through the implementation of a three-tiered system of exchange rates. One level applied to repayment of public debt and importation of essential goods at a rate of Bs 4.3 to one U.S. dollar, another level applied to regulated trade at six to one, and the third level to private transactions and debt at a free-floating rate. The latter has continued to rise ever since. 42 The middle and working classes and the poor were devastated by these measures. Unemployment and inflation rose dramatically. Nevertheless, those wealthy Venezuelans who had access to capital were able to speculate and in some cases illicitly converted bolivars to dollars at preferential rates. The rich continued to get richer as the middle and lower classes grew relatively poorer. Despite his ambitious plans, Herrera Campíns's popularity declined steadily as a result of failed economic and political programs and an "abrasive" style (Abente Brun 1988:142). It is not surprising, therefore, that Jaime Lusinchi (AD) won the 1983 presidential election with an unprecedented margin of 56 percent of the votes. People hoped that the new administration would solve mounting economic pressures that had begun to erode popular confidence not only in the Herrera Campíns regime, but in the political system itself. The economic situation was very problematic when Lusinchi took

44

Democracy for the Privileged

o f f i c e . O i l r e v e n u e s w e r e low and the f o r e i g n p u b l i c debt had r e a c h e d U S $ 3 3 billion (an amount that is c o m m o n l y believed to equal Venezuelan private i n v e s t m e n t s a b r o a d ) . 4 3 V e n e z u e l a n living standards c o n t i n u e d to d e c l i n e as inflation rose to between 3 5 and 4 0 percent by 1987. T h e proportion o f f a m i l i e s living in acute poverty rose from 2 2 . 5 percent in 1981 to 54 percent in 1 9 8 7 . L u s i n c h i attempted to b l o c k the flight o f capital, promote e c o n o m i c growth, and renegotiate the debt. Stricter regulations were put into effect, austerity p r o g r a m s i m p l e m e n t e d (at great political c o s t ) , and V e n e z u e l a b e c a m e the only Latin A m e r i c a n country in the late 1 9 8 0 s to continue payment o f principal on its foreign debt. H o w e v e r , this type o f debt management caused a level o f capital outflow that could not be sustained. Not only did it deplete currency reserves from U S $ 1 7 . 4 billion in 1 9 8 5 to U S $ 6 . 5 billion in 1 9 8 8 , but it also had a negative e f f e c t on redistributive programs vital to the m a i n t e n a n c e o f c l i e n t e l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n d o m i n a n t elites and the masses. T h e government was forced to temporarily suspend p a y m e n t on the debt in D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 8 . M o r e o v e r , V e n e z u e l a ' s b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s ran a d e f i c i t o f U S $ 3 . 9 billion in 1 9 8 6 and U S $ 4 . 4 billion in 1988. L u s i n c h i called for government, business, and labor to share the costs o f a u s t e r i t y a d j u s t m e n t s in order to avoid I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y Fund ( I M F ) involvement. He further devalued the bolivar, reduced interest rates, a l l o w e d g a s o l i n e p r i c e s to rise, and c o n t i n u e d p r i c e c o n t r o l s on g o o d s imported at preferential e x c h a n g e rates. He responded to labor opposition by instituting in 1 9 8 5 unemployment insurance, provided for in the social security law o f 1 9 7 0 but never enacted. M a n y o f these e c o n o m i c measures w e r e generally a c c e p t e d , but an undercurrent o f social protest was gaining force. D u r i n g the c o u r s e o f L u s i n c h i ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , u n i v e r s i t y - i n s p i r e d demonstrations against rising costs o f transportation and food, m i s c a r r i a g e s o f j u s t i c e , and corruption were evident (see C h a p t e r 5). A c o m m o n j o k e held that B l a n c a I b a ñ e z , L u s i n c h i ' s secretary and mistress at the t i m e , was really running the country. Abuses o f R E C A D I (the O f f i c e o f D i f f e r e n t i a l E x c h a n g e R a t e C o n t r o l s ) were generally thought to be rampant. 4 4 In short, a l t h o u g h L u s i n c h i tried to c r e a t e the i m p r e s s i o n o f h a v i n g a c h i e v e d a d e g r e e o f stability in his struggle with difficult c i r c u m s t a n c e s , increasing a w a r e n e s s o f s y s t e m i c difficulties had begun to surface. T o w a r d the end o f L u s i n c h i ' s term, fiscal manipulation produced an e p h e m e r a l , but fortuitous, e c o n o m i c advance that generated s u f f i c i e n t c o n f i d e n c e to carry an A D victory for C a r l o s Andrés Pérez. C A P , w h o b e c a m e the first s e c o n d - t e r m president, had already taken a visible role as international s p o k e s m a n f o r debt reduction months prior to his election in 1 9 8 9 .

Past

Influences

45

He pledged to seek renegotiation, promising to pay no more than U S $ 2 billion a year in annual debt service. 4 5 More importantly, voters identified C A P with the oil boom era when he first held office and expected him to restore the prosperity o f the mid1 9 7 0 s . C O P E I c a n d i d a t e E d u a r d o F e r n a n d e z , w e a k e n e d by R a f a e l Caldera's opposition within the party, offered a conservative option: privatization and neoliberalism. This option appeared to have been rejected in favor of traditional AD populism, leaving the body politic unprepared for subsequent policy reversals. In his inaugural address Pérez made oblique references to "sacrifice," "reconstruction of the economy," and "corrective measures." The measures, however, "will not be discussed in detail during this address" (Pérez 1989). As a consequence, no one expected Carlos Andrés Pérez to announce the implementation of an I M F austerity program and then go on to embrace the neoliberal alternative. On e n t e r i n g o f f i c e , C A P d i s c o v e r e d that L u s i n c h i had virtually exhausted the country's foreign exchange reserves, leaving the financial system severely damaged. He then formulated a strategy of currency devaluation, higher interest rates, import duties, charges for state-supplied services, suspension of price controls, and new taxes designed to satisfy I M F conditionality for new loans. Scholars disagree about the inevitability o f this approach. David J . Myers ( 1 9 9 0 : 2 9 6 ) maintained that "[t]he new government had no alternative but to accept an International Monetary Fund austerity program." Daniel C. Hellinger ( 1 9 9 1 : 1 9 4 ) asserted that the austerity measures were inescapable "only if one accepts that there is no way to shift the burden of sacrifice to the rich. . . ." Whether or not austerity programs were necessary from an economic perspective, there is general agreement on the political costs. Enrique O c h o a Antich ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 9 ) spoke o f the " f e e l i n g o f deceit, having been ambushed with treachery" by campaign rhetoric promising the opposite o f what was secretly planned. Carlos Capriles Ayala and Rafael del Naranco ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 2 3 ) concluded that the government has consistently failed to consider " t h e limitations o f the less favored c l a s s e s " to endure the consequences o f economic policies. Thus, the efficacy o f Venezuelan democracy was being called into question implicitly by a nation unversed in the theoretical long-term benefits of austerity and sacrifice but acutely aware o f the real short-term deprivations. Elected officials were perceived as responsive only to the interests of a small, privileged class and as unaccountable to the mass electorate (see Chapter 4). Mounting frustrations once again resulted in violence on February 2 7 , 1989. This time the violence took the form o f a massive, spontaneous, urban-based riot. This popular insurrection in general opposition to the government's programs started in Caracas and spread throughout the coun-

Democracy for the

46

Privileged

try ( s e e C h a p t e r 6 ) . It w a s at the t i m e c o n s i d e r e d to be the w o r s t v i o l e n c e s i n c e the o v e r t h r o w o f P é r e z J i m é n e z . T h e r e m a i n d e r o f C A P ' s t e r m o f o f f i c e w a s riddled with p r o b l e m s and s c a n d a l s . C h a r g e s o f c o r r u p t i o n b e c a m e daily r e a d i n g in the p r e s s . G r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n c u l m i n a t e d in f r e q u e n t c a l l s f o r C A P ' s r e s i g n a t i o n . F i n a l l y , in the m i d s t o f o n g o i n g student p r o t e s t s , f a c t i o n s within the m i l i t a r y l a u n c h e d t w o a t t e m p t s to o v e r t h r o w the r e g i m e by f o r c e ( s e e C h a p t e r 7 ) . T h e s e u n s u c c e s s f u l c o u p s w e r e f o l l o w e d by m a s s i v e p e a c e f u l d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e g o v e r n m e n t o n the part o f the c i v i l i a n

population.

N u m e r o u s o p i n i o n p o l l s c o n s i s t e n t l y f o u n d that l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e s o f the p o p u l a t i o n supported a m i l i t a r y solution in t h e a b s e n c e o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m that w o u l d , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , shorten the presidential t e r m . 4 6 P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the s a m e p o l l s f o u n d that the m a j o r i t y o f V e n e z u e l a n s f a v o r e d d e m o c r a c y . 4 7 T h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e m o c r a c y and d e f i n i t i o n o f d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s is t h e s u b j e c t o f f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s

(see

C h a p t e r s 3 and 8 ) . *

*

*

L i f e in V e n e z u e l a in early 1 9 9 3 w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by g r e a t u n c e r t a i n t y and i n c r e a s i n g d i s a f f e c t i o n . In the a f t e r m a t h o f t w o a t t e m p t e d c o u p s and c o n t i n u o u s c a l l s f o r the p r e s i d e n t ' s r e s i g n a t i o n , p e o p l e w o n d e r e d i f C A P w o u l d s e r v e o u t h i s t e r m o f o f f i c e until t h e D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 3

elections.

D e s p i t e the s u s p e n s i o n o f c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s f o l l o w i n g the s e c o n d a t t e m p t on N o v e m b e r 2 7 , 5 3 p e r c e n t o f t h o s e e l i g i b l e w e n t to the p o l l s on D e c e m b e r 6 to v o t e in 1 9 9 2 l o c a l e l e c t i o n s . T h i s turnout m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d a s u b s t a n t i a l s h o w i n g under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . In this p o s t g o l p e interim, A D candidates were soundly defeated. C O P E I and M A S umphed, winning eighteen o f the nineteen state gubernatorial

tri-

races.

S i g n i f i c a n t l y , C a r a c a s m a y o r C l a u d i o F e r m í n ( A D ) l o s t to A r i s t ó b u l i Istúriz o f the w o r k e r - o r i e n t e d C a u s a R . 4 8 M a n y o b s e r v e r s b e l i e v e t h e s e results c o n s t i t u t e a d e f i n i t i v e m e s s a g e o f no c o n f i d e n c e in t h e r e g i m e . M o r e o v e r , o n F e b r u a r y 4 , 1 9 9 3 , u n i v e r s i t y students c o m m e m o r a t e d the anniversary o f the B o l i v a r i a n

Movement's

a t t e m p t e d c o u p by a s e r i e s o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and v i o l e n t p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t the g o v e r n m e n t . H i g h s c h o o l s t u d e n t s r a m p a g e d in a w o r k i n g - c l a s s n e i g h b o r h o o d o f C a r a c a s . C l e a r l y , V e n e z u e l a c o n t i n u e s to s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e p e r e n n i a l c h a l l e n g e o f c r e a t i n g o r d e r in a p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n f u s e d w i t h t h e a n a r c h i c t e n d e n c i e s o f the past, but d e s p e r a t e f o r an e f f e c t i v e transition to a m o r e h a r m o n i o u s future. C o m p a r e d to its e a r l i e r h i s t o r y , r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y ( i n c l u d i n g p e a c e f u l t r a n s f e r s o f p o w e r ) f o r o v e r thirty y e a r s h a s c r e a t e d the potential f o r f u r t h e r political e vo lution. H o w e v e r , the continuing i n c i d e n c e o f i n s u r r e c t i o n s ,

Past

Influences

47

a t t e m p t e d g o l p e s , protests, and high l e v e l s o f a l i e n a t i o n f r o m the p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s u g g e s t the need f o r a c l o s e r l o o k at s o m e o f the patterns that h a v e i n f l u e n c e d the f u n c t i o n i n g o f V e n e z u e l a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s .

Notes 1. For other historical analyses, see: Atencio B e l l o ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Blank ( 1 9 8 4 ) , Blutsteìn, et al. (1977), Ewell ( 1 9 8 4 ) , Hellinger ( 1 9 9 1 ) , J. Lombardi ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Maza Zavala and Mata (1980), and Uslar Pietri ( 1 9 8 9 ) . It should be noted that Daniel H. L e v i n e ' s assessment of Venezuelan political culture ( 1 9 8 9 : 2 4 7 - 2 8 9 ) suggested, perhaps more optimistically than this analysis, that Venezuelan political culture evolved sufficiently to support substantial democracy. 2. That the cacique (chief) Guaicaipuro of the Teques tribe is memorialized by a statue for his fierce resistance to Diego de Losada, founder of Caracas ( 1 5 6 7 ) , but is not in the National Pantheon, where other "resisters o f Spanish tyranny are enshrined" (Hellinger 1 9 9 1 : 1 5 - 1 6 ) , suggests a legacy of Indian denigration. 3. The term criollo applies to Spaniards born in the colonies, who gradually began to perceive themselves as different from Spaniards born in the Iberian peninsula and, therefore, developed loyalty to their new territories. 4. The Catholic Church (along with the oligarchical class and the military) is considered one o f the traditional triumvirate o f political power in Latin America. However, despite a Venezuelan population o f 9 6 percent nominally Catholic, the Church has never exerted a strong influence on politics. Daniel Levine (in Martz 1 9 7 7 : 1 5 8 - 1 7 3 ) argued that the Church's meager heritage from colonial times has been enhanced in the democratic era, thus creating the potential to alter its generally accommodationist role. There is little evidence o f more than a symbolic political role in the pronouncements of various bishops from time to time. 5. Although the essays o f the Venezuelan intellectual Andrés B e l l o were concerned with the conflict between the scholastic tradition and rational empiricism, they belied resentment toward Spanish imperialism. 6. In this "First R e p u b l i c " the constitution protected criollo interests by retaining slavery and making property the basis for citizenship. The Church did not oppose this new order that made Catholicism the state religion, despite losing some land and witnessing the enslavement of Indians living on its missions. 7. Many slaves and pardos (a propertyless, racially mixed group including cowboys from the llanos, or plains) who sought freedom and land fought under Spanish governor José Tomás Boves. 8. The elites were white Caraqueños whose wealth and connections were traceable to the early settlers. They were often referred to as mantuanos due to the lace mantillas used by the women. For a discussion of ethnic classification during this era, see J. Lombardi ( 1 9 8 2 : 4 8 ) . 9. Some scholars attribute the motivation of Bolivar and the criollos to fear o f the pardos as much as to the struggle against Spain. S e e Cockcroft ( 1 9 8 9 : 3 2 9 ) . 10. Bolivar's ideas, contained in his letters and early constitutional writing, foresaw political conflict engendered by the incompatibility between enlightened political thought and the reality o f conditions in Latin America. 11. It should be noted here that historians disagree as to which are new and which are modifications o f existing constitutions. In that regard, Judith Ewell ( 1984) counted only four new constitutions—those o f 1811, 1819, 1821, and 1830.

48

Democracy fur the

Privileged

12. These personalistic authoritarians battled over control, first of the cacao trade and later over c o f f e e production. Conservative (Unitarians) and Liberal (Federalists) parties were mechanisms to further the ambitions of the caudillos. 13. The social or cultural conditions favorable to this form of clientelism occur in corporatist societies where vertical structuring takes place. Accordingly, caudillos, or military strongmen, provide unity in exchange for political allegiance. 14. The first organized political party in Venezuela was the Liberal Party. Hellinger (1991:23-24) pointed out that "liberal" and "conservative" meant little in terms of actual policies. Generally, the conservatives were supposed to support the interests of landowners and commercial elites, the Church, and the military; and liberals would support expansion of suffrage, land reform, and the separation of church and state. 15. Hellinger (1991:26) provided an interesting discussion of contemporary political mythology surrounding the Federal War and Ezequiel Zamora's role as a populist caudillo whose Federalists "offered no comprehensive program of economic and social reform." 16. G u z m á n B l a n c o ' s liberal immigration policies and attempts to copy French architecture reflected the not uncommon belief that European culture is superior to South American culture. But, he also incorporated the cult of Bolivar in modernizing programs, thus blending European and Venezuelan elements in a visible legacy of statues, plazas, and buildings throughout the country. 17. Varying sources attribute the end of Guzmán's rule either to his overthrow and exile or to his personal decision to abandon Venezuela. The important point here is that the country remained underdeveloped after his rule ended. 18. U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root characterized Castro as a "crazy brute." In 1902 when England, Germany, and Italy blockaded Venezuelan ports in an attempt to collect on their credit, U.S. intervention provided a resolution. 19. There is speculation that Gómez was born in Colombia. 20. Gómez did this through the creation and later abolition of a Federal Council on which the regional caudillos sat. 21. Caesarismo Democrático, which propounded such factors as race, climate, and Hispanic culture as explanations for the instability and nondemocratic nature of Venezuelan society, was written by a collaborator named Laureano Vallenílla Lanz. This work was used as a justification for authoritarianism. Moreover, like the caudillos before him as well as virtually all succeeding regimes, Gómez perpetuated the idea that his power was within the Bolivarian tradition. 22. Jóvito Villalba founded the Democratic Republican Union (URD), the previously dissolved Federation of Venezuelan Students (FEV) and the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) emerged, the Venezuelan Revolutionary Party (PRV) was reactivated, the Revolutionary Group of the Left (ARDI) formed in exile evolved into the Organization for Venezuela (ORVE), and Rómulo Betancourt and Raúl Leoni founded Democratic Action (AD), which broke with its early Marxist orientation to later become the most influential mainstream party in Venezuela. Led by Rafael Caldera, the Independent Electoral Political Organizing Committee (COPEI) evolved from a conservative alternative to the FEV in the 1930s to the only serious electoral competitor of AD after 1958. 23. For more detailed analyses of Rómulo Betancourt's rise to leadership and his political agenda, see Alexander (1982), Betancourt (1979), Hellinger (1991:5458), J. Lombardi (1982:239-240), and Martz (1966). 24. López Contreras's "February Program" is considered the first socioeconomic governmental program advanced in Venezuela. 25. AD, founded by Rómulo Betancourt as a national revolutionary party, has

Past

Influences

49

evolved into a typical social democratic party. It has been the largest and best organized party in Venezuela since its reorganization in 1941. 26. Gallegos published Doña Barbara in 1929. Scholars agree that Gallegos's work represents a "bridge" between caudillismo and modern reformism by treating themes that illustrate the struggle of civilization to overcome barbaric tendencies in modernizing cultures. It is therefore consistent with adeco (members of Acción Democrática) political ideals. 27. Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez was among the officers involved in the coup ousting Medina in 1945. He represented the Patriotic Military Union (UPM), a secret lodge of military officers trained in Peru who sought to overthrow the government. 28. AD distanced itself from the Communists in the late 1930s and was thereby more successful in attracting the support of moderates as well as nationalistic labor, but its staunchest support over time came from rural campesinos. COPEI, the Communists, and other critics charge that AD's involvement in a coup delegitimized its claim to championship of electoral democracy. Some scholars believe this "shadow of illegitimacy" contributed to the coup of 1948 that produced the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship (Hellinger 1991:60). 29. Kantor (1969:357) called this "Venezuela's first honest popular election of a president and Congress." 30. The UPM demanded that several cabinet positions be given to the military, that a coalition government be formed with COPEI, and that Betancourt be exiled. When Gallegos refused, the military seized power in a bloodless coup, AD was outlawed, and AD leaders (including Gallegos and Betancourt) were exiled. 31. Fedecámaras, the association formed in 1940 to represent business interests, showed little interest in cooperating with AD if that meant acceptance of collective bargaining. 32. Initial returns showed the URD and the Christian Democratic COPEI outvoting the government by 2 to 1. 33. It was shortly after the demise of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship that Vice President Richard Nixon was attacked by angry mobs during his visit to Caracas. 34. Pérez Jiménez was extradited from the United States to Venezuela, where he was convicted of various crimes and sent into exile in Spain. 35. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the consociational regime. For further discussion of this type of political arrangement, see Abente Brun (1988). 36. UCV dormitories have been used for classes, offices, and workshops, rather than as domiciles, since the military confiscated large numbers of arms caches and guerrilla propaganda in 1966. Today the UCV is a commuter university. 37. For example, the Movement to Socialism (MAS) was formed by Teodoro Petkoff and other former Communists; Causa R was formed by Alfredo Maneiro after leaving MAS. 38. See Chapter VI, Articles 110 and 111, Constitución de la República de Venezuela (1983:30). Members of the armed forces may not vote in national elections. 39. A president may not continue in office for a second term, but may be reelected after two successive terms out of office. 40. Between 1979 and 1982, capital flight amounted to 22 billion dollars; and by 1985 it rose to 30 billion (Abente Brun 1988:142). 41. For more comprehensive discussions of the economic situation during the Herrera Campíns administration, see Hellinger (1991:121-129) and Abente Brun (1988:141-143). 42. The free-floating rate started at 7.5:1 in 1983, hovered around 14:1 later

50

Democracy for the

Privileged

that year, and then began an ascent that reached 28:1 in 1987 and climbed from 6 2 . 8 : 1 to 7 9 . 5 : 1 in 1992. In March 1993 the bolivar was approaching 85:1 and many Venezuelans commented that they expected it to surpass 100:1 shortly. In fact, as o f January 5, 1994, the official exchange rate was B 1 0 6 . 3 5 : $ 1 . 0 0 . 4 3 . Many informants told the author that " i f all the Venezuelan money in Miami banks and real estate were returned, we could pay the foreign debt once and for all." 44. In 1992, several Lusinchi cabinet members living in Miami were extradited to Venezuela for trial in the R E C A D I scandals. Blanca Ibañez, also under indictment, was granted political asylum in Costa Rica. 45. In 1988 the total service of the foreign debt, including capital payments plus interest, was $ 4 . 8 billion—an amount equal to 5 6 . 6 percent of Venezuela's oil exports. 46. Arturo Uslar Pietri, Rafael Caldera, and others openly called for a national referendum. Congress delayed discussion of a resolution on this matter throughout 1992, postponed a decision, and finally rejected it as unconstitutional. 47. The polls referred to appeared in El Nacional and El Universal throughout 1992. Enrique A. Baloyra ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 9 5 - 2 1 8 ) found earlier that well over half o f the Venezuelan population believed coups are justified under certain circumstances. Only approximately one-third opposed military intervention. But "condemnation of the 1948 coup and wide agreement on the necessity of the 1958 coup" (pp. 1 9 8 199) raised the question of whether there is a general predisposition or a series of reactions to specific events. Baloyra found that in the 1980s Venezuelans supported democracy but were dissatisfied with the performance of the government (p. 211). He concluded that coups are generally approved in Venezuela as efficient instruments of change, not because they produce regimes (dictatorial) that are better than democracy (p. 214). 4 8 . Causa R (the Radical Cause Party) was founded by a small group o f former Communists led by Alfredo Maneiro (who was later exiled) due to the discontent o f steel workers. Andrés Velásquez became a well-known party militant during protests in the early 1970s (Ellner 1 9 9 3 : 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 ) .

3 Patterns and Institutions: Patron-Clientelism

The potential of a pacted system in Venezuela to provide the basis for further democratization has tended to obscure the problems inherent in a historical legacy of order imposed on chaos as well as the limitations of the system itself. This situation had led most scholars as well as observers to pre-1992 assessments that, notwithstanding their degree of sophistication, dismissed the possibility of military intervention in modern Venezuelan politics. 1 Although several analyses have recognized the obstacles to consolidation of Venezuela's political arrangement in which elites have entered into consensus-producing agreements with each other, they appear to have overestimated the stabilizing effects of elite hegemony and underestimated the destabilizing effects of the oil bonanza and the potential conversion of latent political power of the masses into active involvement. 2 Moreover, the connections between economics and politics, between petroleum wealth and democracy, have been overemphasized: "Generally, and quite uncritically, petroleum is credited with or blamed for most of Venezuela's successes or failures in the realm of politics" (Abente Brun 1988:133). Obviously, Venezuela's possession of a valuable resource such as "black gold" has inclined analysts toward the tendencies evident in the facile conclusion that Venezuela must be a unique case. In this context, it is not surprising that much of the literature on Venezuelan politics focuses on the impact of oil, the emergence of democratic institutions, and the low probability of military intervention. However, typical Latin American patron-client relationships permeate leadership patterns, the functioning of formal and informal institutions, and the operation of social and political groups. (Patrons and clients are described in greater detail in Chapter 4.) These relationships derive from the blending of traditional and modern institutions in the formation of a pactocracy besieged by the burgeoning

51

52

Democracy for the

Privileged

p r e s s u r e s of a n e w e r a in V e n e z u e l a n p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . 3 T h u s , although the pacted arrangement itself may be considered idiosyncratic, it nevertheless derives f r o m and operates on the basis of patterns that are prevalent in Latin American political culture. Paradoxically, the very institutions that have provided stability through difficult transitions in the past contribute to the conditions that provoke military factions to continue to attempt violent intervention into national politics. Therefore, although modified or transformed in accordance with changing socioeconomic forces, certain political patterns have persisted in Venezuela They constitute a vital component of a full explanation of contemporary events.

Explaining Paradoxes An astute student of Venezuelan historical evolution admonished that limited vision can cause modern analysts to "see surface discontinuities as radical disruptions of historical trends" (J. Lombardi 1982:4). He argued that to fully understand "post-petroleum Venezuela," it is necessary to appreciate historical legacies prior to the emergence of oil and their continuity and change over time. Lombardi (1982:265-268) saw unifying concepts in hispanidad and urbanism. However, he recognized that Venezuela's Hispanic cultural identity as well as its Caracas-based urban network may be vitiated through challenges produced by the emergent forces of wealth, technology, and "progress." 4 Disillusionment with the impacts of the "petroleum extravaganza" and a cultural imperialism that has caused Venezuela to become "cosmopolitan to a d e g r e e u n i m a g i n a b l e at the beginning of the c e n t u r y " ( L o m b a r d i 1982:264) is e c h o e d in Daniel C. H e l l i n g e r ' s p e r c e p t i v e description of V e n e z u e l a ' s "tarnished d e m o c r a c y . " Hellinger ( 1 9 9 1 : 7 7 - 8 0 ) recognized the material benefits of petroleum revenues but also signaled the negative ways in which oil wealth has damaged a historical sense of venezolanidad (national identity) and led to a stultification of cultural expression. Clearly, the capacity of national myths, self-perceptions, and aspirations to condition political behavior has been as important in Venezuelan political develo p m e n t as the i m p a c t of s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s and p r o g r a m s . In f a c t , it is arguable that political actions are, to a large extent, consequences of ideological predispositions. If an erosion of cultural integrity has been one of the results of an ephemeral affluence occasioned by the seduction of materialism, one of the costs of political stability in Venezuela has been what Daniel H. L e v i n e termed a form of "structural coercion" operating on all levels of the political system (Levine 1978:105). According to this interpretation the rules of

Patterns and

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53

the g a m e established at Punto Fijo empower elite consensus building as a basis for the institutionalization of conflict. 5 However, this kind of "prudent leadership" based on moderation and c o m p r o m i s e between competing elites depends on cooptation of the masses. In other words, a patrimonialist structure is required for institutional legitimacy and continuity. Such an arrangement in Venezuela has presupposed the defeat of radical alternatives as well as mass acquiescence. It has emerged as a result of strategic or pragmatic power decisions to trade a more pervasive, and less limited, form of democracy for stability. Levine perspicaciously warned of the price, or dangers, of the t r a d e - o f f — " p r o g r a m s s h e l v e d , alternatives e x c l u d e d , and c h a n g e p o s t p o n e d " ( L e v i n e 1978:105). T h e significant utility of the pacted system in providing a workable alternative to dictatorship is undeniable. Its historic basis in patron-client linkages has served to preserve an unprecedented degree of order within the context of Venezuelan history. Nevertheless, "group interests are not infinitely malleable" (D. Levine 1978:105), and the center cannot hold indefinitely. Although imperfect, and transitional in a way that was unanticipated, the political system that emerged in 1958 provided a basis for redefined legitimacy in light of changing times. Whether or not it will be responsive to continuing pressures remains to be seen. Donald L. Herman (1988:13) argued that in comparison to Colombia "the Punto Fijo agreement placed Venezuela closer to the pluralist, democratic tradition of liberal democracy." He conceived of the agreement as grounded in the constantly evolving blend of corporatism and patrimonialism with liberalism and representativism postulated by Howard J. Wiarda (1980). According to this analysis, elite accommodation patterns are characterized by tolerance and compromise in a country devoid of a unified oligarchy. Herman drew from Lijphart (1968, 1969) in terming this political configuration "consociational." C o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m is defined by four elements: (1) a coalition that includes the leaders of all significant societal groups; (2) each group retains a veto on policy issues vital to it; (3) representation in political and governmental office is proportionate to each g r o u p ' s strength; (4) each group has autonomy for its internal affairs (Herman 1988:2). This conception of limited democracy offers an alternative to economic determinism as an explanation for Venezuelan political evolution. 6 Accordingly, one assessment of the limits of consociationalism recognized that "petroleum resources have, to a great extent, shaped the levels of public spending and perhaps facilitated regime maintenance but have not e x p l a i n e d r e g i m e e m e r g e n c e or b r e a k d o w n ; nor have they d e t e r m i n e d political f o r m u l a s " (Abente Brun 1988:134). Abente B r u n ' s understanding of the Venezuelan "experiment" in Hegelian terms affirms the evolutionary

54

Democracy far the

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n a t u r e of politics. T h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s c h a l l e n g i n g elite control during the trienio are c o n s i d e r e d the thesis to which P é r e z J i m é n e z p r o v i d e d a centrist antithesis. H e n c e , p o s t - 1 9 5 8 coalition a g r e e m e n t s h a v e b e e n a synthesis of these a n t a g o n i s t i c forces. T h e a n a l o g y is instructive w h e n carried to the logical c o n c l u s i o n that old s y n t h e s e s b e c o m e n e w theses o v e r time. D i e g o A b e n t e B r u n p r o v i d e d specificity in c o n s i d e r i n g t h e application of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l politics in V e n e z u e l a . In doing so, he c o n c e p t u a l l y disting u i s h e d b e t w e e n the state and the r e g i m e . " W h i l e the state c o n s t i t u t e s an abstract c o n s t r u c t that e m b o d i e d class relations, r e g i m e is seen as a set of institutions and institutionalized p r o c e s s e s that link g o v e r n m e n t s t r u c t u r e s a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s and with civil s o c i e t y " ( A b e n t e B r u n 1988:148). T h u s , t h e r e g i m e c o n s i s t s of t h e d o m i n a n t s o c i o e c o n o m i c e l i t e s , s u b o r d i n a t e social g r o u p s , the " m i d d l e c l a s s e s " or petite b o u r g e o i s i e , the political parties (especially A D and C O P E I ) , until 1975 the f o r e i g n oil c o m p a n i e s , the a r m y , and the C h u r c h . T h e r e l e v a n c e of the distinction b e t w e e n state and r e g i m e b e c o m e s e v i d e n t in analysis of social g r o u p i n g s and their relative i n f l u e n c e on the g o v e r n m e n t and in r e s p o n s e to the q u e s t i o n of s y s t e m i c versus r e g i m e l e g i t i m a c y in the current crisis. It is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i z e that e a c h of these a n a l y s e s r e f e r s in o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r to t w o s e t s of p o l i t i c a l p a t t e r n s t h a t c o e x i s t in m o d e r n V e n e z u e l a . O n e set of patterns derives f r o m authoritarian traditions and the o t h e r f r o m d e m o c r a t i c principles. B e c a u s e these a n t a g o n i s t i c patterns h a v e s e e m e d to c o a l e s c e in a period of relative political stability c h a r a c t e r i z e d by d e m o c r a t i c institutions, it is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e that the r e s u r g e n c e of the a u t h o r i t a r i a n i m p u l s e (in the f o r m of a t t e m p t e d military i n t e r v e n t i o n ) w a s generally unanticipated. H o w e v e r , the virtually continuous political p r o t e s t s of t h e 1980s ( d i s c u s s e d in C h a p t e r 5), their c u l m i n a t i o n in t h e s p o n t a n e o u s r e v o l t of 1989 ( C h a p t e r 6), and t h e d r a m a t i c e v e n t s of t h e e a r l y 1 9 9 0 s , i n c l u d i n g t w o a t t e m p t e d m i l i t a r y c o u p s ( C h a p t e r 7), h a v e a m p l e p r e c e d e n t in a pattern of coups, strikes, protests, and military revolts that d a t e s b a c k to the i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t in t h e early 1800s. A brief s u m m a r y of this historical pattern is revealing.

Violent Transitions G i v e n the high i n c i d e n c e of c o u p s in Latin A m e r i c a , it is not f a c e t i o u s to s u g g e s t that this m e t h o d of g o v e r n m e n t a l transition m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d t h e r u l e rather than the e x c e p t i o n . 7 I n d e e d , the n u m b e r of t i m e s v i o l e n c e h a s p r o d u c e d political c h a n g e in V e n e z u e l a is s i g n i f i c a n t . T h e B o l i v a r i a n w a r s to o v e r t h r o w Spain and the royalist s y m p a t h i z e r s f r o m 1811 until 1830 w e r e not inconsistent m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of the m i l i t a r i s tic c u l t u r e inherited f r o m the S p a n i s h c o n q u e r o r s . T h e legacy c o n t i n u e d in

Patterns and

Institutions

55

the form of caudillistic struggles for power: Military generals, who fought for control of the government, were challenged by popular rebellions and barracks revolts. For e x a m p l e , General José A n t o n i o Páez had to s u p p r e s s military revolts against his government in 1831. He defeated an attempted coup (for constitutional reforms) in 1835. Ezequiel Z a m o r a led a popular uprising against the Soublette government in 1846. T w o years after Z a m o r a ' s failure another popular uprising provided General José Tadeo Monagas an excuse to dissolve the Congress. By 1858 a rebellion against M o n a g a s ' s abuse of power forced his resignation. The Federalist Wars followed from 1858 until 1863. Between 1865 and 1867 continuous disturbances undermined the crea t i o n of a s t a b l e g o v e r n m e n t . In 1 8 6 8 a c o a l i t i o n of L i b e r a l s a n d Conservatives overthrew the Federalists. The government lasted for two years until G u z m á n Blanco led a successful revolution. This dictatorship endured ten years of virtually continuous rebellion. T h e first rebellion against Antonio Guzmán Blanco, led by General Matías Salazar, failed in 1872. Between 1874 and 1875 two generals led large-scale uprisings, and by 1877 the government was immobilized by critics. Subsequently, intensified civil conflict culminated in the successful coup of 1879. Repressive policies in the late 1880s led to another attempted coup in 1890. The f o l l o w i n g year the Legalist Revolution produced a civil war, which was resolved in 1899 when General Cipriano Castro took over the government. There were attempted coups in the early years of the twentieth century. However, it was not until 1908 that General Juan Vicente G ó m e z deposed Castro. A string of failed coups against G ó m e z in 1914, 1918, and 1921 was followed by an oil workers' strike in 1925. The strike, ended brutally by government troops, led to student protests and a failed barracks revolt in 1928. Antigovernment rebels continued to fight against the Gómez dictatorship in s u b s e q u e n t years. In 1936 there was a widespread strike f o r democratic reforms, and nine years later the October Revolution overthrew the government. T h e trienio government was able to suppress an army revolt in 1946, but by 1948 a successful coup ended this democratic interlude. The next year oil w o r k e r s and students launched another general strike. In 1950 President D e l g a d o Chalbaud was assassinated. This event was followed by riots and a student strike in 1951. P é r e z J i m é n e z w a s finally o v e r t h r o w n by a military o f f i c e r s ' plot launched in 1957. Popular uprisings and a general strike contributed to the s u c c e s s f u l c o u p . A n o t h e r u p r i s i n g led by a g e n e r a l , an a s s a s s i n a t i o n attempt, and strikes and rebellions called for by radicals against the pactoc-

56

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r a c y w e r e all u n s u c c e s s f u l in 1 9 6 0 . M i l i t a r y r e b e l l i o n s in P u e r t o C a b e l l o and C a r ú p a n o w e r e s u p p r e s s e d by the g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 6 2 . T h e n e x t y e a r a r m e d r e b e l l i o n s by d i s s i d e n t s , v i o l e n t p r o t e s t s , and t e r r o r i s m f a i l e d to prev e n t national e l e c t i o n s . In 1 9 6 6 a state o f e m e r g e n c y w a s d e c l a r e d when t h e g o v e r n m e n t d i s c o v e r e d a n o t h e r plot f o r a v i o l e n t c o u p . T h e v i o l e n c e did not end with t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o n t a i n m e n t o f the left in the 1 9 6 0 s . I n c i d e n t s in the 1 9 7 0 s , i n c l u d i n g c l a s h e s b e t w e e n

government

t r o o p s a n d g u e r r i l l a s in 1 9 7 7 , c o n t i n u e d to t h r e a t e n p o l i t i c a l

stability.

T h e r e f o r e , the e v e n t s o f the 1 9 8 0 s ( C h a p t e r s 5 and 6 ) and the

1990s

( C h a p t e r 7 ) are not unusual. T h e pattern o f v i o l e n c e outlined a b o v e r e v e a l s a c o n t i n u i n g l e g a c y in w h i c h p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e has b e e n t h e result o f c o u p s , s t r i k e s , p r o t e s t s , and m i l i t a r y r e v o l t s . P a r a l l e l a t t e m p t s to f o s t e r in V e n e z u e l a a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s f o r g o v e r n m e n t , as w e l l as t h e p o s t - 1 9 5 8 p e r i o d in w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e t r a n s f e r r e d p o w e r p e a c e f u l l y , must be u n d e r s t o o d in the c o n t e x t o f this l e g a c y . T h e f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s r e v e a l s the e x t e n t to

which

V e n e z u e l a n institutions are infused with s o c i o e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l patterns that b e l i e t h e i r f o r m a l d e s i g n .

Constitutional Patterns V e n e z u e l a is g o v e r n e d u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 9 6 1 — t h e

twenty-sixth

and l o n g e s t lived s i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s first d e c l a r e d in 1 8 1 1 . T h e l a r g e n u m b e r u n d e r s c o r e s a turbulent history in w h i c h c a u d i l l o s p r o m u l g a t e d d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n s as s y m b o l s o f their p e r s o n a l i s t i c rule. N e v e r t h e l e s s , as e m b o d i m e n t s o f societal aspirations and v e h i c l e s for the e x p r e s s i o n

of

a u t h o r i t a t i v e institutional r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e s e d o c u m e n t s e x h i b i t a r e l a t i v e degree o f legalistic consistency. T h e y allowed for executive supremacy, f o r m a l f e d e r a l i s m , and l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h e r o l e o f t h e C h u r c h . M o r e o v e r , " [ t ] h e i n s i s t e n c e on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y l e g i t i m i s i n g p o l i t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s . . . r e v e a l s h o w d e e p - r o o t e d t h e d e m o c r a t i c ideal is, d e s p i t e the p r o b l e m s o f its implementation" (Kornblith

1991:62-63).

H o w e v e r , the c o n s t i t u t i o n s vary g r e a t l y as s t a t e m e n t s o f s p e c i f i c g o v e r n m e n t a l o b j e c t i v e s as w e l l as in t h e i r g e n e r a l d e g r e e o f o b s e r v a n c e . In this r e g a r d , t h e c o m m e n t a r y o f S i m ó n B o l í v a r is r e v e a l i n g : " T h e m o r e I a d m i r e the e x c e l l e n c e o f t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n o f V e n e z u e l a , the m o r e I a m p e r s u a d e d o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f its a p p l i c a t i o n to o u r s t a t e . " 8 B o l i v a r c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d that d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s vary in their m e t h o d s o f l e g i t i m a t i n g a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l institutions. T h e r e f o r e , h e c o n c l u d e d that any s t a t e m e n t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s that imitated t h o s e o f a n o t h e r c o u n t r y ( t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , f o r e x a m p l e ) , " w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g the d i f f e r e n c e in e l e -

Patterns

and

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57

ments, people, and things . . . and the needs of our people" would be unproductive (Petzold Pernia 1987:23). Apparently, Bolivar was aware that efficacious constitutional principles reflect, rather than create, patterns of l e g i t i m a c y . 9 This reflection means that citizen confidence in the system is directly related to the extent to which actual p o w e r derives f r o m formal power. In political systems characterized by a divergence between formal and actual power, as in the formalistic systems of Latin America, constitutionalism has been used to attempt to justify particular regimes. Such has been the case in Venezuela. However, unlike previous documents designed to legitimate authoritarianism, the Constitution of 1961 is modeled on that of 1947, Venezuela's first truly modern constitution, and is similarly concerned with social welfare, popular government, national self-determination, and socioeconomic development (Blutstein 1977:176; Kornblith 1991:75). It seeks to "protect and exalt work; promote the general well-being and security of society; achieve equitable participation in the enjoyment of wealth, according to principles of social justice, and promote economic development in the service of man; maintain social and juridical equality, without discrimination derived f r o m race, sex, creed or social c o n d i t i o n " ( C o n s t i t u c i ó n de la República de Venezuela 1983:3). The Constitution contains a preamble, 252 articles, and 2 amendments. It declares Venezuela a federal republic with sovereignty residing in the people. Public powers are divided between a president, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. States are described as " a u t o n o m o u s and equal political entities" (Title 1, Chapter 3, Article 16) and individual and collective rights and responsibilities are elaborated in 74 articles. 1 0 In reality, there has been a divergence between these legal procedures a n d p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e in V e n e z u e l a . T h e p o p u l a r e x p r e s s i o n " l a Constitución sirve para todo" (the Constitution serves any purpose) reflects this reality. For example, the president has the power of appointment to national commissions that determine public policies, the power to appoint his cabinet, and the ability to assume additional p o w e r s under "laws of exception." Furthermore, the states are really dependent on a centralized national government. Presidential appointees as well as political aspirants approved by political party cogollos preempt legislative decisionmaking and represent privileged interests." This extraconstitutional process has resulted in governm e n t o f f i c i a l s m o r e r e s p o n s i v e to t h e i r p a r t i e s t h a n to t h e g e n e r a l electorate. It is c o m p o u n d e d on the presidential level by a " l a m e - d u c k " constitutional requirement. 1 2 Presidents w h o cannot succeed themselves (until they have been out of office for two terms) are less responsive to electoral pressures while in office.

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A u t o n o m o u s in f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , c h e c k e d or c o n s t r a i n e d b y C o n g r e s s o n l y in e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and e m p o w e r e d to d e c r e e a broad r a n g e o f s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s , the s t r o n g e x e c u t i v e c a n a l s o d e c l a r e a s t a t e o f e m e r g e n c y (Article 2 4 0 ) , restrict or suspend constitutional

guarantees

( A r t i c l e 2 4 1 ) , i m p l e m e n t s i n g u l a r m e a s u r e s o f restriction o f p e r s o n a l l i b e r ty w h e n p u b l i c o r d e r is t h r e a t e n e d ( A r t i c l e 2 4 4 ) , and put into e f f e c t e x t r a o r d i n a r y e c o n o m i c and f i n a n c i a l m e a s u r e s w h e n a u t h o r i z e d b y s p e c i a l law (Article 190). In d e f i n i n g a s t a t e o f e m e r g e n c y , J u a n C a r l o s R e y s u g g e s t e d that it m a y not n e c e s s a r i l y b e " a situation in f a c t " that puts p u b l i c o r d e r or d e m o c r a t i c institutions in d a n g e r . H e a r g u e d that it c o u l d be a " j u r i d i c a l situation that is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f a f o r m a l l y e x p r e s s e d d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e e x e c u t i v e . . . creating problems o f interpretation" (Rey 1989:133). T h e suspensions o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s f o l l o w i n g the riots in 1 9 8 9 and the a t t e m p t e d c o u p s in 1 9 9 2 e x e m p l i f y the use o f t h e s e interpretive p o w e r s . M u c h d e b a t e f o c u s e d on the w i s d o m o f t h e s e m e a s u r e s at the t i m e , u n d e r s c o r i n g the f a c i l i t y with w h i c h e x e c u t i v e p o w e r p r e d o m i n a t e s o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e institutions as well as t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . E v e n a f t e r a r e f o r m i m p l e m e n t e d in 1 9 8 8 a l l o w e d the t w e n t y state g o v e r n o r s to be e l e c t e d r a t h e r than a p p o i n t e d by the president ( s t a t e l e g i s l a tures w e r e a l r e a d y b e i n g e l e c t e d ) , t h e states c o n t i n u e to e x e r c i s e o n l y l i m i t ed p o w e r s . T h e i r f i n a n c i a l and p o l i t i c a l d e p e n d e n c e on the

central

g o v e r n m e n t is a reality that d i f f e r s c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . H o w e v e r , r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e s t a t e s ' ability to r a i s e r e v e n u e m a k e s t h e m r e l i a n t on the national g o v e r n m e n t and s u b j e c t to its p r i o r i t i e s . V e n e z u e l a , l i k e m o s t L a t i n A m e r i c a n states, has a " s t r o n g e x e c u t i v e " type of government. E x e c u t i v e power dominates public

administration

t h r o u g h a vast s y s t e m o f m i n i s t r i e s and a b u r e a u c r a c y c o n s i s t i n g o f s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s , a u t o n o m o u s i n s t i t u t e s , and q u a s i - p u b l i c

organizations.

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e regulations g o v e r n i n g the operation o f this n e t w o r k are adopted by the president and r e q u i r e neither c o n g r e s s i o n a l nor c o u r t a p p r o v a l . In f a c t , " t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f C o n g r e s s f o r V e n e z u e l a n d e m o c r a c y d o e s not l i e in any a u t o n o m o u s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c a p a b i l i t y but in its c o m m u n i c a t i v e and s y m b o l i c f u n c t i o n s " ( M y e r s 1 9 9 0 : 3 0 6 ) . T h e o r e t i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t f r o m t h e l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h e s , the c e n t r a l l y

orga-

nized j u d i c i a r y ( w i t h n o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n f o r state c o u r t s ) has n e v e r e x e r c i s e d its p o w e r o f j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . T h e r e f o r e , this c e n t r a l i z e d s y s t e m h a s f a c i l i t a t e d the a s s e r t i o n o f p e r s o n a l i s t i c authority by the p r e s i d e n t in a w a y that is c o m p a t i b l e with H i s p a n i c patterns o f g o v e r n a n c e . It is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i z e in the c o n t e x t o f t h e s e patterns a c y n i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f l e g a l authority that c a n b e traced to the c o l o n i a l tradition o f " o b e d e z c o p e r o n o c u m p l o " (I o b e y but I c a n n o t c o m p l y ) . ' 3 C o m b i n e d w i t h e x t r e m e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f p o w e r , s u c h c y n i c i s m has i m b u e d V e n e z u e l a ' s

Patterns and Institutions

59

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t with a l e v e l o f f o r m a l i s m that e x a g g e r a t e s g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l rather than its l i m i t a t i o n . H e n c e , t h e rule o f law has b e e n d e n i g r a t e d as a c o m m o n l y p e r c e i v e d g u a r a n t e e o f j u s t i c e . 1 4 T h i s w i d e s p r e a d l a c k o f c o n f i d e n c e in the j u d i c i a l s y s t e m e x a c e r b a t e s the c o n s o l i d a tion o f d e m o c r a c y . " E v e r y day it is m o r e f r e q u e n t to s e e o u r p o l i t i c a l instit u t i o n s i n t e r f e r e in d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s t h a n t h o s e a s s i g n e d b y

the

C o n s t i t u t i o n . S u c h a pattern o f institutional c o n d u c t is h i g h l y d e s t r u c t i v e o f f a i t h in the b e n e f i t s o f d e m o c r a c y , b e c a u s e it n o r m a l l y c r e a t e s a s e n s a t i o n o f i m p o t e n c e in the p r e s e n c e o f the t r a m p l i n g o f or d i s r e g a r d f o r the e x e r c i s e o f rights . . . " ( A t e n c i o B e l l o

1988:159).'5

V e n e z u e l a ' s legal tradition, d e r i v e d f r o m c o d e l a w , further r e a f f i r m s the authority o f the state by a s s i g n i n g interpretation o f statutes to a p p o i n t e d j u d g e s . T h i s m e t h o d o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a l s o r e i n f o r c e s e l i t e h e g e m o n y in t h e p o w e r structure. T h u s , p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s d e r i v i n g f r o m cultural attitudes, v a l u e s , and b e l i e f s b e l i e the lofty r h e t o r i c c o n t a i n e d in V e n e z u e l a ' s e l a b o rate C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 6

Leadership T h e f o r m a l i s t i c nature o f g o v e r n m e n t a l institutions and the l e g a c y

of

s o c i o e c o n o m i c patterns in V e n e z u e l a h a v e e l e v a t e d p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p to a p o s i t i o n o f p r o m i n e n c e . Until 1 9 5 8 , o r d e r had b e e n i m p o s e d f o r the m o s t part o n a n a r c h i c s t r u g g l e s b e t w e e n r e g i o n a l c a u d i l l o s by r e g i m e s s e e k i n g to unify the country through strong, centralized leadership on the national level. T h i s p r o c e s s o f national c o n s o l i d a t i o n c o m p r o m i s e d the l e g i t i m a c y o f the c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e i n f o r m a l p o l i t i c a l l i n k a g e s b e t w e e n

leaders

and s o c i e t y and m a s s m o b i l i z a t i o n patterns w e r e d e t e r m i n e d b y i n d i v i d u a l s with e n h a n c e d a b i l i t i e s to e x e r c i s e p o w e r , c o m m u n i c a t e with the m a s s e s , and c a p t u r e t h e national i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e s e c a p a c i t i e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t in a p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a high l e v e l o f institutional formalism. P e r s o n a l i s t i c r a t h e r than i d e o l o g i c a l a p p e a l s are c o n t i n g e n t on c h a r i s m a t i c q u a l i t i e s that a l l o w l e a d e r s to e m p l o y c l i e n t e l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s with their followers. V e n e z u e l a , like other Latin A m e r i c a n states, demonstrates " a c l e a r t e n d e n c y t o w a r d p a t r o n - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s in w h i c h p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s a r e l i n k e d t o t h e m a s s e s in a s y s t e m t h a t d i s t r i b u t e s

employment,

f a v o r s , and p r o t e c t i o n in e x c h a n g e f o r l a b o r , support, and l o y a l t y ( H i l l m a n and D ' A g o s t i n o 1 9 9 2 : 6 7 ) . T h e p o w e r o f e l i t e s has b e e n c o n s o l i d a t e d in this p o l i t i c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e use o f p o l i t i c a l p a t r o n a g e . Leaders like José Antonio Páez, Antonio Guzmán Blanco,

Juan

V i c e n t e G ó m e z , and M a r c o s P é r e z J i m é n e z e x h i b i t e d c a u d i l l o l e a d e r s h i p

60

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Privileged

traits. However, unlike purely charismatic or military leadership based on the personal characteristics of the ruler and/or coercion, many of the presidents elected since 1958 may be considered modern or civilian caudillos to the extent that they act as power brokers. Martz (1992) pointed out that although Rómulo Betancourt envisaged mass participation by the electorate on a continuing basis, the participatory and open character of Venezuelan party leadership had increasingly come into question as leaders exercised centralized elitist control on behalf of the existing national political order. Consequently, their cultivation of clientelistic relationships also has reinforced the existing social hierarchy. In the modern era this form of caudillistic leadership has been perpetuated within the context of limited institutional democracy. One author cynically concluded that this perpetuation reduces democracy in Venezuela to a " m y t h " with the "right to elect a dictator every five years" (Carlos A. Ball M. in B. Levine 1992:300). Others are similarly disillusioned with the quality of leaders w h o are " a d v e n t u r e r s infiltrated in politics" living in an "impoverished intellectual emptiness, converting the juridical structure of the country into a Kafkaesque uncoordination where riddles substitute for rules" (Atencio Bello 1988:161). However, to a large extent the disillusionment with leaders is a consequence of the caudillo tradition itself. The idea that a heroic "strongman on horseback" can create stability, establish order, and through personal rule preside over national prosperity is a legacy that continues to prevail in Latin America. Modern caudillistic leaders are patrons who act as power brokers for clients seeking material rewards. This form of clientelism has evolved from its original rural agricultural base, in which the patron was the landowner, to the urban industrial base, where employers, government agents, and, since 1958, political party leaders provide jobs and opportunities for loyal, dependent supporters. 1 7 Thus, the prevalent expectation has continued to be for personalistic rather than institutional solutions to socioeconomic and political problems. 1 8 Politicians, well aware of this expectation, articulate elaborate platforms full of the rhetoric of flamboyant promises for immediate solutions to complex problems. Moreover, people describe these leaders by attributing to them mythical dimensions. Venezuela has had its "Liberator," its "Illustrious A m e r i c a n , " "El B e n e m é r i t o " (the well-deserving), the "Democratic Caesar," its "Generation of ' 2 8 , " and many "Bolivarianos." As John Martz (in Herman 1988:155) pointed out, Carlos Andrés Pérez said in 1973 that he would "rescue democracy." In 1992 C A P referred to himself on m a n y o c c a s i o n s as "the last bastion of d e m o c r a c y . " C A P ' s grandiose rhetoric of the 1988 campaign convinced people that his election would restore the prosperity of the 1970s. At issue were neither ideologies nor structural reforms. The choice was between the persona of individuals

Patterns and

Institutions

61

promising to lead the country out of a crisis the dimensions of which were not widely understood. P e o p l e receiving clientelistic b e n e f i t s m a k e special a l l o w a n c e s for caudillos or personalistic leaders, who are held to be " a b o v e the l a w . " Thus, political leaders are immune to charges of corruption, coercion, or even manipulation and deception when people believe their needs and aspirations are being served. Leaders who are perceived as failing to deliver on their end of the clientelistic bargain lose such immunity and are subject to removal through coups, assassination, or criminal indictment. 1 9 Ironically, the individualized loyalty engendered by personalism has tended to perpetuate a traditional social structure in which mobility and development are severely constrained. Venezuelan leaders have ascended through a system of political parties that has evolved rapidly since the 1940s. A seriously fragmented multiparty system was replaced by a two-party dominant system in which "centrist parties gained the recognition of socioeconomic elites" (Mariz in Martz and Myers 1977:95). These Caracas-based political parties "penetrate all sectors of rural and urban life" (Myers 1990:299). National executive committees coordinate the activities of party organizations for students, labor, professionals, campesinos, and women. State and local party organizations, also divided into functional divisions, are linked to the national parties through their h e a d q u a r t e r s in C a r a c a s . T h e r e f o r e , the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between political parties and Venezuelan political leadership has become intimate and profound. 2 0

Parties and Elections The strength of the political parties and the institutionalization of a regular c o m p e t i t i v e e l e c t o r a l s y s t e m a p p e a r to " s t a n d in s h a r p c o n t r a s t to V e n e z u e l a ' s unstable and authoritarian p a s t " ( M c D o n a l d and Ruhl 1989:125). 21 Due to the modification of patterns of partisan affiliation during the dictatorships, "the Venezuelan political parties that emerged in the 1940s, rather than byproducts of nineteenth century intraelite cleavages, w e r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n of r a p i d l y m o d e r n i z i n g s o c i e t y " ( A b e n t e B r u n 1988:149). Thus, elites depended on the parties for political machinery to process the political demands of the masses. 2 2 However, as John D. Martz (in Herman 1988:170) pointed out, "the Venezuelan party system and its component members have more fully realized p r o c e d u r a l than s u b s t a n t i v e n o r m s . " E l e c t i o n s h a v e been held on schedule, and power has transferred peacefully since 1958, but parties have functioned more as coconspirators than as aggregators of diverse interests. 2 3

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Democracy for the

Privileged

In fact, as patronage resources declined in the post-oil boom years, the partidocracia (party-controlled democracy) has come under increasing criticism. 24 This criticism is a logical consequence of a consociational system that has blended the underlying forces of corporatism with the procedures of pluralism. A major objective of Venezuelan parties has become the incorporation of the masses through a form of patronage that vitiates the aggregative function of modern parties. Accordingly, "the political parties in Venezuela have contributed to the reinforcement of the hegemonic network of the dominant classes" (Antequera 1992:62) through clientelistic redistribution of petroleum revenue. Privileged interests are thereby served within the context of a mass-based system. 25 Only a few of the hundreds of political parties that have emerged since independence have contributed to the modern pattern of centrist party domination through cooperative pacts. The first and largest of the modern massbased parties, Democratic Action (AD), helped to establish the democratic (consociational) system under the leadership of Rómulo Betancourt. Initially, AD factionalization led to the creation of new parties and fragmentation of the system. Subsequent consolidation produced two strong, competitive parties: the social democratic AD and the Christian democratic COPEI (Independent Electoral Political Organizing Committee). Martz (1966, in Martz and Myers 1986, in Herman 1988) has shown that these p a r t i e s have b e c o m e the most i m p o r t a n t political o r g a n i z a t i o n s in Venezuela since the death of Gómez. This importance can be seen in the results of presidential elections (see Figure 3.1). The party system has been categorized in a variety of ways. For example, Hellinger (1991:117) described the party system as having maintained the form of a guanábana (a pear-shaped fruit)—"a system dominated by the two large parties, generally inclined toward an adeco majority, with COPEI as the only opposition party capable of winning the presidency." David J. Myers (1990:299) characterized the party configuration as a "dynamic two-and-a-sixth-plus" system. 26 He (1990:300) also described the system in terms of four ideological groupings: the social democrats, the Christian democrats, the militant left, and the personalistic right. David Eugene Blank (1984:6-12) classified the "partisan-based populist electoral subsystem" as one part of Venezuela's "tripartite political system." 2 7 Naturally, the origins and development of the parties have shaped the contemporary system. A new generation of political leaders and the organization of their parties originated in student activities at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV). Exiled as a result of an attempted coup in 1928 against the Gómez dictatorship, UCV activists organized the Revolutionary Group of the Left (ARDI). Upon returning to Venezuela after Gomez's death in 1935, they formed new political organizations, including the Republican National

63

oc Ui I s I I

a