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n a v i l l u S ' O y r r e G a a W Edward Herman
OTHER
BOOKS
BY EDWARD
S. HERMAN
Corporate Control, Corporate Power
d an ag op Pr d an ct Fa in m s i r o r r e T : k r o w t e N or rr Te nda al Re e Th
BY EDWARD
S. HERMAN
AND
FRANK
BRODHEAD
Demonstration Elections: ic bl pu Re n ca ni mi Do e th in s on ti ec El U.S.-Staged Vietnam, and El Salvador
n o i t c e n n o C n a i r a g l u B e th of The Rise and Fall
BY EDWARD
S. HERMAN
AND
NOAM
CHOMSKY
f o y m o n o c E l a c i t i l o P e h T : t n e s n o C g n i r u t c a f u n Ma the Mass Media m s i c s a F d l r o W d r i h T d n a n o i t c e n n o C n o t g n i h s a The W 3 : m s y l c a t a C e h t After f o n o t c u r t s n o c e R e h t d n a a n i h c o d n I Postwar
y g o l o e d I Imperial
THE
“TERRORISM’’
INDUSTRY
:
bs
e Experts and Institutions at Shape Our View of Terror
Edward S. Herman and
Gerry O'Sullivan
Providence
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}
| |
Copyright © 1989 by Edward S. Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States by Pantheon Books, a division of Random
House, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in
Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto.
Grateful acknowledgment is made to Anthony Sheil Associates Ltd. for permission to reprint “Sabra and Chatila” from The Gun and the Olive Branch (Revised Edition) by David Hirst, published by Faber & Faber Ltd., London. Copyright © 1984 by David Hirst. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Herman, Edward S.
The “terrorism” industry : the experts and institutions that shape our view of terror / Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-394-58080-X ISBN 0-679-72559-8 (pbk.) 1. Terrorism. 2. Terrorism—Prevention. 3. International relations. I. O’Sullivan, Gerry. II. Title. 1990 HV6431.H46 303.6'25—dc20 89-42655 Book Design by Anne Scatto
Manufactured in the United States of America First Edition
by , es ir qu ac m le ob pr e th of on ti The dominant defini e os th of y it il ib ed cr d an ht ig we e th repetition, and by n mo om “c of t an rr wa e th , it e ib cr bs su who propose and sense.” —STUART HALL
Contents
List of Tables
1x
Preface
x1
Part |. Terrorism in Fact and in Western Imagery I From Bandits to Terrorists 2. Western Primary Terrorism and the Demand for a Unified Opposition to “Terrorism” The Western Model and Semantics of Terrorism
Part Il. The Manufacture and Distribution of Terrorism
Images The Terrorism Industry: The Government Sector s, nk Ta k in Th , es ut it st In : or ct Se e at The Priv
and Lobbying Organizations
13
37
53 55 73 119
. The Security Industry
vil
s t n e t Con
_ _ _ — — — — — — — ———— 149
7. The Experts e h t f o t l e B n o i s s i m s n a r T as a i d e M 8. The Mass Terrorism Industry
19]
9. Conclusions
913
n o i t c A in m s i r o r r e t r e t n u o C Appendix A:
231
ce en ol Vi t is or rr Te y ar om Pr in s ie ud St Appendix B: Three l na io at rn te In f o g in st Li l Appendix C: A Partia
233
ps ou y Gr bb Lo , d es an ut it st In s, nk ” k Ta sm in ri Th ro er it nt “A
JES:
(with Principals and Experts) Appendix D: Some Excluded Experts on Terrorism
246
Notes
249
Index
297
Vili
List of Tables
30
2-1. Israeli Versus PLO Terrorist Killings 3-1. Killings by State and Nonstate Terrorists: Numbers and Orders of Magnitude
|
46
4—]. Witnesses in Twenty Government Hearings on Terrorism, 1980—1986
64
7-1. The Terrorism Experts
144
7-2. Linkages and Perspectives of the Terrorism Industry Experts
184
7-3. A Matrix of the Linkages of Thirty-two Terrorism Industry Experts
186
7-4. References by Terrorism Industry Experts to Western/Right-Wing and Non-Western/ Left-Wing Terrorism
8—1. Mass Media Sources Used in Covering “Terrorism”
8-2. New York Times’s Sources Used in a ” m s i r o r r e t r e t n u o C “ on es Four-Part Seri
189
194 196
— — — — — — ——
— — s e l b a T f o Lis t
d n a m s i r o r r e T e t a t s n o N d n , a s n o e i t t a a t i l i f f A l g_3, S a c i t i l o P r i e h T d n a s t s i r o r Ter a i d e M ass
M . S . U e h t 0 1 d e y a r t r as Po
1 8 9 1 n i s w e N V T S B C y b n e e S s a s t s i r o r r e T g_4, d n a s l a u d i v i d n I f
o s n o i t a i l i f f A l a c i t i l o P e g5. Th e h t n i t s i r o r r e T s a d e i f i Ident
Groups
a i d e M s s U.S. Ma
506 918
910
Preface
s im ct vi n ai rt ce ke ma at th s se es This book is about cultural proc
mo at th d an , ng di en tr ar he ns io at ul important, their trials and trib
to s im ct vi r he ot e us ca at th t bu , lf ha be bilize public opinion on their e Th s. er iz im ct vi to in ed ut sm an tr be remain unnoticed or even to s wa n io ss pa d an y th pa em se ou ar power of focused attention to e er wh 0, -8 79 19 of is is cr e ag st ho an Ir dramatically illustrated in the s wa an [r in ns ze ti ci S. U. e re th yft the seizure and detention of fi
. hs nt mo ny ma r fo s si ba y il da a on t en tm ea tr a di me ty ri io pr n ve gi
y it iv pt ca ng lo r ei th d an , ns ze ti ci an ic er Am , se ur co of These were,
r ei th of t ui rs pu in ns io at ti go ne d an s on si us sc di us uo in and the cont e ns te in e th t Bu . py co ws ne t en ll ce ex d an ic at am dr r fo release made
l ca ti li po ic st me do t an rt po im ed rv se so al es ag st ho e th focus on of n io at in rm te a ” a, ic er Am d ne ke wa ea “r a ht ug interests that so S. U. of p du il bu a d an e, nt déte s e s a c r e h t o n i , t s a r t By con r e g r a l e s e h t h t i w e d not coinci
. ry st du in ms ar e th d an military forces o d t a h t s n a c i r e m A f o of victimization e r a a i d e m e h t , s d n a m e d d interests an
X1
ee
8 0 0 0 ——
n i n e m o w h c r u h c n a c i r e m A r u o f f o r e d r u m e p a r e h T . e v i t n e less att press
n a c i r e m A s s e l h c u m t o g , e l p m a x e r o f , 0 8 9 1 n i r o d El Salva
, o k z s u l e i p o P y z r e J t s e i r p h s i l o P e h t f o r e d r u m e h t n a h t e g a r e cov
d n a , s a r u d n o H , a l a m e t a u G n i s t s e i r p n a c i r e m A f o g n i l l and the ki s e s a c e s e h T . n o i t n e t t a a i d e m e l b i g i l g e n d e v i e c e r s a h s e n i p p the Phili
a h t i w d e d i c n i o c s n a c i r e m A d e z i m i t c i v n i t s e r e t n i a i d e m d e t u m of
d e n i a t s u S . g n i l l i k e h t g n i o d s e m i g e r e h t r o f t r national policy of suppo
f o n o i t a z i m i t c i v f o n o i t a n i b m o c a e r i u q e r o t s m e e s t s e r e t n i a i med r o , v o r a h k a S , o k z s u l e i p o P s a h c u s , s n a c i r e m A n o n r o ( s n a c i r e Am
n o i t n e t t a f e o g a t n a v d d a e v i e c r e p e h t d n a ) r e t t a m t a Sharansky, for th . s e t a t S d e t i n U e h t n i s p u o r g l u f r e w o p y b y t i c i l b and pu d e n o i t n e m s st ie pr d n a n e m o w S. U. e th d n a s e g a t s o h The Iran
at th as m, is or rr te of s im ct vi n e e b e v a h to id sa be l al d ul above co
n r e t s e W y b d n a es ri na io ct di d r a d n a t s in d e n i f e d n e e b s ha word s wa s es pr e th y b t n e m t a e r t r ei th at th t en id ev is it t u B 2 s. ie it or th au e th at th is k o o b t n e s e r p e th of e m e h t r o j a m A t. en er ff di y l d e k r a m , ty li bi si vi at th d n a , ce oi ch l ca ti li po designation of terrorist is a highly ow ll fo t s e W e th in on t ti s i ac r o r r e t attention, indignation, and counter
as bi is th il ta de e r in o l p x e ll wi e . a W d n e ng g vi a a political and self-ser d e p to o l e v e d n e e e b v a h at l th e d o m s d c n i a t n a m e s e , and agenda th g n i h t e m o s r fo d e e n d n a of e us ’s st We serve Western ends, and the y of m r a e n th io to nt te at of al t de ea gr a ve .” gi sm e W ri ro called “ter experts and the supportive institutions that serve to expound, . a e d W m n s e i g r a o r n r r e e t e t z s i e d W e n a th g a p o e, r p d iz n al a ration also examine the mass media’s role in portraying terrorism in accord with Western needs. It is our view that the West’s experts and media have engaged in terrorism the of handling their in reversal” AMR LOCESS of “role
Fre abi teesbeanen ies, eee oak
movements whose Patt ee uve i, seeds nae enero see serious of victims main the are eros cena ESE Sh “ terrorists main the d identifie ave * i the world as Soil pve this If rror. counterte ssa Nf Foss reader the startling, : m e v o N n i t a h t t c a f e h t n o t F . st li t r o p e r n o g a t n e P a , 8 8 19 e o as s s e r g n o C l a n o i t a N n a c i r f A e M e th ca t s u o i r o t o n e r o m “ e h t of
FONTS SCCeh
epg a
zambiquan Civilians ea
en
Ai
ee
Sa
ushent- admits killgduovsr O00 . 1986 and 1988, is identified merely Xil
an “indigenous insurgent group” that engages in domestic terrorist violence.*> The report from which the 100,000 figure is drawn, however, claims that RENAMO’s role is purely destructive, and that
it lacks a program or any observable indigenous base.* There is also overwhelming evidence that RENAMO’s activities have been crucially dependent on South African aid, training, radio communication,
of nt rume inst y prox a been has it that and ort, supp ral gene and that government’s policy of destabilizing the African front-line a it e mak ld shou ence viol r othe and states.° RENAMO’s killings t oris terr s riou noto most d’s worl the as strong contender for ranking
orterr of sor spon state ier prem the ca Afri organization, and South AMO REN But a. Liby than gory cate ism, vastly more important in this m oris terr ern West by tion niza orga is rarely if ever listed as a terrorist ty bili onsi resp ary prim s bear h whic f, itsel experts, and South Africa Moand ola Ang in le peop ion mill for the death of an estimated rngove U.S. by ed tifi iden y larl regu is zambique alone in the 1980s,° of m victi a as a medi mass and rts, expe ment officials, establishment terrorism, not a terrorist state.’
al on ti Na , ce li Po al on ti Na e th at th ct fa e th er Readers may also pond
ed at ic pl im en be ve ha o wh , or ad lv Sa El of ce li Po Guard, and Treasury in s an li vi ci of er rd mu d an e, ur rt to , pe ra of s in thousands of case
e th r de un ng ni ai tr d an s nd fu S. U. g in iv ce re the 1980s, have been ss re ng Co by ed ss pa t, Ac ce an st si As sm ri ro er -T authority of the Anti
a by rt po re 86 19 A ”® m. is or rr te al on ti na er nt “i in 1983 to combat ps ou gr ed as -b ch ur ch S. U. o tw by or ad lv Sa El to research team sent
by s st re ar at th d te no ce li po an or ad lv Sa e th to investigate U.S. aid to the police are th wi es cl hi ve ed rk ma un in rs ce fi of ce commonly conducted by poli s or rr mi so al es cl hi ve ch su of darkened glass windows. The use l ca ti li po m ro [f ns io at ar cl de ny Ma . .. s. ic ct ta d ua sq h at de l traditiona s ee gr de g in ry va te ca di in s] on ti za ni ga or ts gh ri n ma hu d an prisoners d an n, io at oc ff su , ng di ol df in bl , gs in at be g in ud cl in e of physical abus ad he ce li po at l va ri ar d an st re ar of nt me mo rape between the re fo be ne do y ll ua us is n io at og rr te in of e as ph t rs fi quarters. This .? rs ce fi of ce li po as ee in ta de e th to es lv se em th the captors identify
p a s i D e h t f o s r e h t o M e h t f o e e t t i m m o C e h t d e t i The delegation vis
, a l u T a s e r e T a i r a M r e b m e m e e t t i m m o c h t i w e k o p s d n a peared, Xi
n, me ed fi ti en id un ur fo by n io ct du ab nt “who testified about her rece e ul se e e ed at pe re d an g, in at be n, io at og rr te in and her subsequent a y da e th Zo y Ma on ed st re was again ar was charged with being a terrorist an
re
was su
Fe
q
er. She
: y impris-
of se ca is th on n io at rm fo in r he rt fu r fo oned.”!° (See appendix A ne ni of e on s wa la Tu sa re Te a rf Ma .) on ti counterterrorism in ac 86 19 y Ma in ce li Po ry su ea Tr e th by ed st re s ar er rk human rights wo
eat Gu of nt me rn ve go e th , 86 19 e nc Si m. is or and charged with terr nt me rn ve go S. U. r a de s un nd t fu of en pi ci re e th en be so al s ha mala , my ar an al em at Gu ng li ru e th gh ou th al m, ra og m” pr is or “counterterr s an li vi d ci me ar un re mo ny ma ed ll ki s , ha ce li an po or ad like the Salv , of ng nh ga ei -M er ad , Ba es ad ig Br d Re O, PL e th d di an s th 80 19 e th in
a Abu Nidal, Qaddafi, and Carlos the Jackal combined. Although we will be focusing heavily on the “invisible” victims of terrorism and the biases of the Western terrorism experts and media, we do not approve or condone in any way the indiscriminate acts of violence that the Western experts on terrorism, government officials, and press attend to with great energy. Attacks on unarmed civilians in plane hijackings, bombs set off in public places, and the like are inexcusable, and attempts must be made to deter and control such actions
whatever their causes and whoever the perpetrators. Immediate practical measures of prevention and control are necessary, and punishment must be meted out in accord with the rule of law. We do not
believe that savage penalties will be useful or are morally justifiable for the crimes of hijacking and hostage-taking per se, although damage to
individuals and property that occurs in such actions is a different matter (and is treated severely in existing law). We also believe that a pol-
icy of refusal to negotiate with terrorists is foolishly unbending, poses
excessive danger to hostages, and is unsustainable. The powers who
claim to follow this policy do so erratically. d m te e ic is th on fl or in rr e te t th al of ea de e, at gr a o, ev th to li be We West has its roots in Western acts and policies. We do not deny e th necessity of protecting against terrorist acts a s they occur, but ee urgently importan acts if, in the lon
t to
understand 'he underlying causes of a
this ct that ae ao sepia is: to be reduced. We pte : anda enti, 1€ Vest inflicts far more terrorism than it eS
‘ obscured by its ability to define itself as view vict; oaeither while its vicums remain invisible or are branded terrorists. I XIV
Preface this is true, and if it is also true that a substantial part of antiWestern terrorism is a response to Western terrorism, then the
main solution to the terrorism problem for the West is clear: stop doing it. We would like to express our thanks to the following individuals for providing us with information or for critical reading of the
manuscript: Chip Berlet, Nicholas Bell, Nicholas Busch, Noam Chomsky, Bob Figlio, Howard Goldenthal, René Haquin, Roy Head, Mary Herman, Albert Mokhiber, Diana Johnstone, Wes McCune, Ben O’Brien, Robin Ramsay, Ellen Ray, Diana Reynolds, Bill Schaap,
Elmar Weitekamp, and Lou Wolf. We are also grateful to our editor at Pantheon, Jim Peck, for much cogent advice. The authors alone are responsible for any remaining errors.
XV
Terrorism in Fact and in Western Imagery
From Bandits to Terrorists
Introduction
n the half century before “terrorism” became a commonly used word, the United States struggled valiantly against a variety of “bandits,” “barbarians,” and “savages” in the Philippines and Central America
and the Caribbean
basin. In the Philippines,
President
William McKinley, having consulted God as well as Democratic and l cia mer com our ing lett that ing not r afte and ! ers, lead n ica ubl Rep rivals France and Germany obtain control of the Philippines would do to us for left g hin not was ere “th that nd fou ,” be “bad business
and ft upli and s, pino Fili the e cat edu to and all, m the take to but
best very the do ce gra ’s God by and m, the ize ian ist Chr and civilize
.”? died also st Chri m who for n -me low fel our as m, the by we could
t, Roo hu Eli War of ary ret Sec of ds wor We moved in, and in the d cte ndu “co e far war by ves nati t stan resi bly ica xpl ine the d due sub with marked humanity and magnanimity on the part of the United
States,” rte ex d an on si es gr ag of r wa s ou er rd mu In reality, we fought a
The “Terrorism Industy ———————__
i
war’ against a people BQ ECEUS ely referred to
n a i d n I “ n a , n o i minat with lete comp war a ; ages “sav and ” dits “ban as well a5 * ee as “niggers as eee mace killing
of prisoners, and eventually,
water torture, the
pee rebels. ae
ae
ae nbcirect attacks on the civilian base of the
niding mission ran into a severe obstacle, noted General Arthur McArthur in a report of October
ae “the almost complete community of action of the
The . ures meas h hars for need the ce Hen entire native population.”*
have may and s, sand thou of ds dre hun the civilian toll ran into Anti d lan Eng New the for ator stig inve The exceeded a million.® rn retu his g owin foll , 1904 in e wrot Imperialist League Philippines:
from the
y, tr un co e th of s ng di il bu ic bl pu e th d ye ro We have in fact dest s, ar ye x si of od ri pe e th ng ri du es ss lo op cr us inflicted continuo ed uc od pr y, tr un co e th of ns io ct se e rg la ed rn bu d an d ge va ra conditions leading to the death of most farm animals and to serious human and animal epidemics, brought foreign trade to an unprofitable condition by our tariff legislation, inaugurated tremendously expensive government for the benefit of foreign officeholders, established a partisan judiciary, crowded the prisons and deported or sent to the gallows the best and most patriotic leaders.® Nevertheless, the mainstream press of the United States found
this to be a benevolent enterprise, despite some unfortunate errors and regrettable excesses. Christianity and progress were being
ance to the barbarians, banditry was being quelled, and we would ae w; also benefit from the new partnership
(t ho se pe op le Fi li pi th no e wi th partnership
still alive).
Indwars ian of eociar nerastcationto Vietn againsamt inlesserthe breeds , from the 1960s and 1970s, As j
the government er centuries violen ce of acts demon strat ed any Mat against Filipino pence the in war of rules the of violat ions and a. prison e of handling Provoked by the ae infrequent, “contrary to policy,” and never the outsid e operat ing nts eeaa h ee Warfar e.’ piped hee the evidence of Serious
war crimes did get some publicity 17 ene dominant tone was 1 he Propa = t ic, and t e g o l o p a 8 nda response,
1902, of Pring administrat; On’s
MOtLy. of the press agreed, an
th
led by Senator
Henry
Cabot
ae
From Bandits to Terrorists a
Lodge, was effective in squelching criticism, even though based on massive deceit.®
During the brief period of disclosures and occasional recriminations in 1902, the most prominent editorial view was that the U.S. atrocities occurred not “because of, but in spite of, the government’s
general policy in the Philippines. . . . The penalty must fall not upon the policy, but upon the men.”” Many papers were more sympathetic to the pacification policy, and felt, as the St. Lowzs Globe-Democrat put it, that “it is strange, indeed, if American soldiers are to be called to
the field to fight savages without hurting them.”'” The New York Times also stressed the “hardships and dangers” faced by our “brave and loyal officers,” and castigated the “cruel, treacherous, murder-
ous” natives of Samar in the Philippines who had provoked unseemly behavior on the part of American troops." The racist element in the press and other opinions on the conquest of the Philippines was potent. This was a period of hardening race relations and numerous lynchings in the United States itself, and even opponents of U.S. imperialism often rested their case on the difficulties of bringing civilization to peoples “animated with the instincts, impulses and passions bred in the tropical sun” (Carl Schurz).!? The
imperialists, in turn, argued
that colored
peoples
should not be permitted to obstruct the natural expansion of whites, or that we were obligated to save them, with “intervention the plain duty of the United States on the simple ground of humanity.”! But as Shenton notes, “Through all arguments both imperialist and antiimperialist there moved an almost unquestioning acceptance of the innate superiority . . . of the Anglo-Saxon. . . .”!4 In the Caribbean and Central America as well, in the years between 1898 and 1940, the United States was regularly obliged to intervene to quell “banditry” and bring responsible government to
races regrettably unable to govern themselves. The word “bandit” was used loosely to designate anybody who stood in our way. Eco-
nomic historian M. M. Knight pointed out that in the Dominican Republic, “all resistance was ‘banditry’ to the Marines, even when it was Organized, using flags and uniforms.”!> The New York Times, however, found that “the goodwill and unselfish purposes of our own govern“moved was policy U.S. that and established,” clearly ment... [were]
almost exclusively by a desire to give the benefit of peace to people
_ _ — — — — — — — y r t s u d n I ” “Terrorism
ii
e r u t a n e h t n I “ , s e m u T e h t l O 4 . s n o i t u l o v e d e t a e p e r y b d e torment d o o g r o f ” a o e e p e b o t e a o l s e t a t S d e t i n U of things, the s r o v a e d n e r u O , O s 4 e E a e a c i N e t . o g n i m o D o t n a S n i t n e m n gover n i , y l e t a n u t r o f n U . d l r o w e h t n i s e v u o m t s e b e h t “ were based on o t s e i t i l i b i s n o p s e r r u o y b d e g i l b o n e e b e v a h s e n i r a m r u o s e such plac :
66
5
»16
a e f o k r o w s u o l i r e p e h t n i e g a g n e “
d n a s t i d n a b e v i s down elu
e h t “ d n a , s e i t u d r u o n e v i G 9 1 ” . e f a s y t r e p o r p d n a e f i l e k a m o t g n i y tr s i o n i d n a S “ t a h t g n i y a s t u o h t i w t s o m l a s e o g t i ” , nature of things pose” of e h T ° ? ” . r a w f o e t a t s e h t r o f e responsibl
“professed
pur
y r t n u o c r i e h t f o l i o s d e r c a s e h t g n i e e r f “ s a w o n i d n a S e k i l s t i band h c u s t a h g u a l o t y s a e s 1 t i “ e l i h w t u ” b , r e d a from the ruthless inv t h g i a r t s o g o t t u b “ n o i t p o o n s a t h n e m n r e v o g . S . U e h ” t , s e h s i r u o l f ? ? ” . a u g a r a c i N n i e c a e p e h t g n i p e e k r o f m a ahead with its progr y l n i a g d n e u t r e v n o c e v a h s “ e n i r a m r a u u o g a r a c Fortunately, in Ni d e m r o f s n a r ] t d n a [ . s . r . e i d l o e s v , i g t n c a i d n a t s p , u t blacks into smar
e c i l o p r o e f c r y o r f a n t a i l s i i m t r a p n o n a o l t n a i i r e t a e m v i t a e n d u cr t n e o t m “ n r e v o g e h w t o l d l l a u o ” h s s p o o r t f y o d o e b n i f s “ i ” h . T y t du , s i * h ? T ” . t i o r t e d v e o n r d u e y t n m i r a a r t maintain itself with the wellof course, was
Somoza’s
national guard, which,
with steady U.S.
° * . a 9 u 7 y g 9 l 1 a u l l r J i a t c r i e N o d t t r d h o n w g , la a support brou e n i p p n i o l i i h t e P p h i f t r o c s e e d t h a t h In retrospect it is easy to see t ” s e g a ” v s a l t s d a i “ n d r n a t n a s n a b l e “ e s c C a b i — e r r Ame and Caribbean t s i l a i a r i e g p o r m ) y l o i t l l o f s a g i p c n c a i o a g r d r o t n (a s was part of an ideol
y . s n s i i t 1 a I r l e c p r . o a n p o y d i h s n t e a e i a n l h n o T i i m s o s d d e n r a g g a
clear also that the lies and hypocrisy were not seriously contested in
a
s a v i n sri
, t t n i e m h s i l b a t s l e a n o i t a n e h t f o t r a p s A . s s the mainstream pre e e i s y a s w e e o was no question oe oe wesahad4daonae r u e o n n e 1 v r e t n i o t t h g l i a r r u t e e Se
yard. eee
t c f i i h t s n a m e s e h e t g n i n a y h e l t c t e t i w l has beenW
€rrorists,’ and we will show that the usage and treatment of t€rrorism and terrorj coriive th an t c e j b o e r o m o n is y a d o t s t s i r o the earlier handlin
y l e s o l c e l o r l a c i g o l o e d i n a s y a l p d n a s t i d n a b f o e a o t a h t g n i l b resem “bandit,” desigNates an eiiaist
of
i predecessor.
“Terrorist,”
like
: ? a t s o h w y d o b e m o , s t n e m h s i l b a t s e n r e t s e W i e in th; e way of h Ss : IZation e t a t s n r e t s e W t a h W 4 2 . s m i a n r e t s e W f o r o y r t i d n a b r e v e n is do ? r e t s e W t fi s n o i t c a r i e h t if terrorism, even
nee
From Bandits to Terrorists —————
definitions of these terms and are declared by Western political
entities like the International Court of Justice to be in violation of international law (1.e., banditry). The United States and other West-
ern states are still portrayed in a defensive posture, answering and remedying the provocations of the bandits-terrorists. The West remains the repository of civilized values and humane methods, which is being challenged by barbarians. In the years 1983-88, George Shultz and Ronald Reagan expounded the same or only
slightly altered self-righteous protestations as Elihu Root and William McKinley offered at the turn of the century and that Charles Evans Hughes and Calvin Coolidge provided in the 1920s. And the levels sta teoff ici al bot in h rea lit of y mis rep an res d ent ations of hypocrisy ear lie r. tha n no w les s no are me di a the an d ments
The Terrorism Industry as a Response to Market Demand
1s s ist ror ter of t tha d an s it nd ba of era the n ee tw One difference be ve ti or pp su d an s rt pe ex t lis cia spe od ri pe that during the latter ts an re sc mi the r to ni mo d an fy ti en id to d pe lo ve de ve ha institutions is Th . em th th wi al de ld ou sh st We ed iz im ct vi the and explain how cal iti pol d pe lo ve de ly gh hi a in r bo la of on isi div of s es oc pr reflects the ny Ma t. en hm is bl ta es ” ty ri cu se l na io at “n e rg la a th wi r de economic or I, FB the , om fr fs of in sp or of, ts par are s of the industry member
a use We . ots sho off e at iv pr ias qu ir the d an on ag CIA, and Pent uc od pr the e us ca be ” y, tr us nd “i an of l de mo ic rudimentary econom eldev l wel is ut tp ou al iv ct pe rs pe lna io at rm tion and sale of an info . ons uti tit ins d an s al du vi di in ble fia nti ide oped and located in a set of
ist in e es th e us ca be e at ri op pr ap The economic framework is also
al tu ec ll te in r fo d” an em “d a tutions and associated experts meet s ou og al an s, st re te in ul rf we po r he ot d an es at st by e ic rv se l ca gi lo eo id e th by py co g in is rt ve ad or my ar e th to the demand for tanks by e ic rv se al tu ec ll te in d an , em st sy et rk ma a is is Th producers of soap.
, em th e uc od pr o wh e os th d an s, ea Id . es rc fo et rk ma to ve si on sp re is
s ce ur so re d an ed ne e th th wi e os th by ed iz id bs su d can be bought an al on ti Na n ca ri Af e th r he it Ne . nd ma de e iv ct fe to provide the ef
ee
y a a — — — — — — — — y t t s u d n I m s o r heete
Congress (ANC) nor the Mutual Support ee of Guatemala can fund data banks or theoretical analyses of the state terrorism that an posed has and oe their in s has killed scores of thousand
e. ee vor survi the to t threa ongoing
ee governments
ver, howe ts, effor ectua intel such te rwri unde do firms ess busin and
conin s need their to nent perti and they want data and analyses
e restiv and s rebel are e Thes es. enemi d eive perc their fronting large in ging enga nts rnme gove -wing underclasses, rather than right
scale torture and killings or Western-organized and Western-funded insurgents attacking disfavored states. The definitions, models of “terrorism,” and appropriately selective focus of attention follow , accordingly.?° The terrorism industry comprises government officials and bodies, governmental and quasi-private think tanks and analysts, and private security firms. The “private sector” of the industry 1s heavily interlocked with government intelligence, military, and foreign policy agencies, and is funded by and serves both governments and corporate establishments. The analysts supplied by the private sector of industry, along with those working in government, constitute the “experts” who establish and expound the terms and agenda demanded by the state. In accord with the state agenda, these experts invariably see the West as the victim of terrorism, and most of them also identify national liberation movements, seeking escape from colonial and neocolonial rule, either as terrorists or as a threat to the “democracies” by virtue of their being “manipulated” by the
Soviet Union and its proxies.2° The mass media contribute experts as well, but more important, serve as conduits for government and corporate-sponsored opinion. The terrorism industry is multinational, with close ties betwee?
government and private sponsors, institutes, and experts In and among the United States, Israel, and Great Britain, and also enco™
Ko re a So ut h Af ri ca , So ut h Fr an ce , Ge rm an We y, st Ca na da , pa ss in g Taiwan, and other members of the Free World. This multination4 spread expresses, first, a commonality
of state interest. AS Arie
Merari, a leading Israeli terrorologist, said in an interview 0D South African state radio, “The foundation of the strugg l a e g a i nst ter rors . ; ; inst the pEhPenoemmebnoodniedof in o un it y; th e u n i t of y e Western world ages terrorism itself, . , .”27 th Accordingly, Mera™ mn
From Bandits to Terrorists —__——_—__—_—_—_———__ the ANC and SWAPO
to be terrorist organizations, but not UNITA
or RENAMO. The multinational character of the industry also reflects an intent on the part of some states to influence opinion elsewhere (e.g., the Israeli effort to mobilize U.S. opinion against the Palestinian cause). It is manifested in the internationalization of institutes, conferences, publications, expert and media citations of
authorities, and standardized definitions and agendas. These processes have yielded a closed system of discourse on the subject of terrorism within the United States and in other Western ings hear in ate icip part who rs, make ionopin of set l smal A states. of or sect ate priv or t men ern gov the by d sore spon and conferences ng audi appl ews revi and les, artic s, book e writ the industry, and who echo an in as line ial offic the e erat reit , ghts insi keen one another’s this ies, orit auth ed edit accr a’s medi mass the as chamber. Established
ive rnat Alte m. oris terr of on ussi disc the zes poli mono p small grou ely ctiv effe are nts gme jud and ks, ewor fram das, definitions, agen excluded. The few experts outside the terrorism industry who have nant domi the g usin to en driv are a medi mass the to s acces al sion occa definitions and frames in order to be understood. This process of closure has allowed “terrorism” to be used as an instrument of news
management and ideological mobilization serving Western establishment interests, essentially without debate or audible dissent. The service of the terrorism industry has been very much needed in the West as a cover for its own activities and crimes. During the past forty years the Western states—including South Africa and Israel, as well as the great powers—have had to employ intimidation
on a very large scale to maintain access, control, and privileged positions in the Third World, in the face of the nationalist and popular upheavals of the “postcolonial” era. This has been a primary terrorism, in two senses: first, it has involved far more extensive
killing and other forms of coercion than the terrorism focused upon in the West (see tables 2-1 and 3-1 and the accompanying text below, and the case studies in appendix B). Second, it represents the efforts by the powerful to preserve undemocratic privileges and structures from threatening encroachment and control by popular Organizations
and
mass
movements.
From
this
perspective,
the
actions of the ANC constitute a derivative and provoked response senses two the in y primar is which ism, terror state n Africa South a to
y r t s u d n I “Terrorism
he
a c a d
t h g u o f e a e e a y e e r o f e b , y l r a l i m i S * * . d just note d e r o s n o p s . S . U e ? O a e ; 0 1 m s i r o r r e t y r a m i r p a t s n i aga e a t r o p p u s n i e c n e l o i v e a e s r e g u a d e y o l p m e h c i h w , e m i g e r a z Somo : . e g e l i v i r p c i t a r c o m e d n u y l l o h w f o a system
ed ur rt to nt me rn ve go ry ta li mi h is rk Tu e Asa further illustration, th
an l el qu to rt fo ef an 1n s, 80 19 e th in s rd Ku of s and killed thousand nt me rn ve go e Th . ce en ol vi ve si es pr re by nt me ve mo independence
en ev , od ri pe me sa e th in s rd Ku of s er mb nu er rg la of Iraq killed still using chemical weapons and nerve gas as instruments of massacre e ge fu re r, ve we ho y, an rm Ge st We d an en ed Sw and pacification. In
Kurds have been labeled, harassed, and put on trial as “terrorists.” The Turkish
however,
government,
is a member
of the NATO
alliance in good standing, and Iraq is a major oil producer and business partner of the West who served Western interests well in the-war with Iran. Both Turkey and Iraq, like South Africa, are
therefore exempt from designation as “terrorist states” in the West.°° Despite—and perhaps also because of—its primacy as a user of coercive measures, the West has gradually evolved a set of concepts and perspectives on terrorism that have been extraordinarily successful in rationalizing to Western publics its own larger-scale (wholesale) violence.?! In effect, terrorism has been redefined and selectively
addressed so as to encompass only the lesser (retail) violence of the liberation movements that are the main targets of Western intimiare who sts terrori minor other of dation, along with the acts
convenient foci of attention and indignation. Western acts and regimes of terror are either exempted from the terrorist label, played down, or treated as responses to the violence of others. The quelling
ee is e warfar cy urgen erins count by ee ee and their violence 1s deplore o tae alin e 2aan Propaganda Sisk : ee a peiliesererrnies ner Western violence oe peseitotcing feedback system: Pseat as the former js Pine tae i eee violence from the ME ae nize d as eithe r causa l or wort hy of atte? i ; and indignati
terror.
on,
the
4
;
‘
’
t s e r W he rt y fu if st ju to es rv se ce en ol vi s’ im vict
Clearly, such
sema ntic s and Intellectual appa propaganda ratus :
have been provi
:
require
el n
ed
a deve
and a cooperative mass media. The fo ism ded,as ter ror a of evo lut ion gra dua l noted, by the 2
;
1
10
~
my
1
From Bandits to Terrorists —_——____—_—_—— industry. The propaganda model spelled out in Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent describes the fact that powerful groups, such as the executive branch of the federal government and organized business, not only dominate as the sources of media news, they
also try to “co-opt the experts” and encourage and subsidize amenable intellectuals through consultancies and fellowships in well-endowed think tanks.°? The terrorism industry discussed here is an illustration
of that process and this book is an application of that model to a particular case. An important feature of the news-sourcing process described in Manufacturing Consent that can be observed clearly in the mass media’s handling of terrorism is the media’s naiveté and gullibility in treating materials provided by the government and co-opted experts. Although these sources have a material interest in the choice of facts and interpretations of the issues addressed, and have a distinct “line” that they wish to impose on the public’s perception of events, the as s frame ts’) exper ated affili (and nt’s rnme gove the take a medi suitable story pegs and their assertions of fact as objective news. An unbiased press would treat biased sources with extreme caution. It would
not allow them to define the issues, nor would
it depend
heavily, and often exclusively, on them and their affiliated private agencies for fact and opinion. Such uncritical acceptance of sources is the mark of de facto propaganda agencies. The mass media in the United States have treated George Shultz’s and Ronald Reagan’s pronouncements on terrorism much as they treated government pronouncements on U.S. goals in the Philippines and in our policing of the bandits in Central America in past years. The biases are as great as ever. This is therefore a study in ideology and ideological management as well as an industry study, because that industry is designed to develop, refine, and disseminate an
ideological line. In chapter 2, the case for the primacy of Western terrorism, the convergent Western interests on this issue, and the consequent demand for definitions and carefully selected evidence to serve these the be cri des we 3, r pte cha In ed. vey sur y efl bri is ds nee n ter Wes basic model and propaganda themes put forth by the Western
terrorism industry and show how the semantics and model of terrorism have been adjusted in the West by the government, experts,
1]
The
_ _ _ _ — — — y r t s Terrorism’ Indu
e P h g u o r h t 4 s r e t p a h c n I . s d e e n s it e t a d o m m o c c and press to a terrorism
industry is described—its
think tanks, experts, sacuetl
n o m a d n a n i h t i w s n o i t c e n n o c r e t n i l a r u t c u r t s d n a , es ti vi ti ac firms,
r e t p a h c n I , y l l a n o i t a n r e t n i d n a s e t a t S d e t i n U e h t n its various sectors i d e t i n U e h t f o a i d e m s s a m e h y t l e v i s n e h e r p m o c w o h w o h s 8, we
y, is t or n e rr m d te h n s a i l b a t s t e i e h m t s n a r d d t e n t a p o States have ad g n i h t e m o s h t i w g n i l a e d n i s e s a h p m e d n a , s e g a s u , s e m a r f s ’ y r indust
n o i t a l u t i p a c e n r o a i to t i d d a r n i e , t 9 p called “terrorism.” Finally, in cha ’s st We e h s t e f i o t r e p o n r a p i l l e w r O e h t y f o r of findings and summa m s i r o r r e t e h t w o e b h i r c s e ” d , e m w s i r o r treatment and use of “ter
cy li n po r e g t n s i e z W i l a n o i t a d r n o y e b industry serves in ways that go t en ns co er ne gi en to tes eli n er st We lp he at in the Third World, and th at home.
12
Western Primary Terrorism and the Demand for a Unified Opposition to “Terrorism
n the post-World War II era, the breakdown of the old colonial system and the emergence of national liberation movements created severe problems for the major Western powers, and eventually also for the colonial-settler enclaves of the West, most importantly, South Africa and Israel. The United States, Great Britain, and France
gradually evolved neocolonial systems that helped sustain control by
the judicious use of economic and military aid, trade privileges, and the cultivation of economic and political relationships. But the preservation of an open door and a favorable investment climate periodically required subversion and direct intervention, the former frequently taking the form of an alliance with and support of military and elite elements prepared to seize power and use the force necessary to subjugate restive populations. Such processes took place
in Indochina during the years 1946 through 1975; Iran, 1953-78; Guatemala, 1954 to the present; Brazil from 1964; the Dominican
Republic, 1963 and after: Indonesia, 1965-66 and thereafter; Chile 13
_ _ — — — — — — y r t s u d n I ” m s i r o r r e T “ e Th
$
? = ee oe responsibility of the prestigious and respecte Fs a
ae
Seer industry is to enhance the credibility $
warm ee to wien ce wes pyavotablerassacialions eee favorable See The a tae es aespentabiliey bs seth gained the same benefits by the se ngnawing Henitage sae : an gular participation of high Reas: a, alsIn its affairs. The CSIS acquired respectability
sae Schlesinge r, and € Corporate elit John Ce pe)a Ory elements of the
Anne Arm
nment officials Henry Kissing” m “o
. i f s r e b m e m d r a o b d n a , g n o r st al
as Louis Gerstner of on Brroth indust ers. I The
American Expres Jess crreedentiail. s of seals ss
Maustry who serv e as experts, like sade ’
70
The Government Sector
—————
and
LL
Moss
at Heritage, and Alexander, de Borch grave, Henze, Sterling, and Ledeen at CSIS, are thereby elevat ed These can then push Core right-wing positions on the “MacNeil/ L e h r e r N e w s S N th e as s u c h p a p e r s a n d s h o w s , n e w s hour, other T'V network
York Times as members of respectable establishment institutions. A Other members of the counterterrorism network have the responsibility of instructing Third World military personnel and police on the nature of communism and subversion and the need to stand
ready to displace weak elected governments with regimes of law and order (e.g., at the Pentagon’s School of the Americas in Panama).°*4 Others train them in the techniques of law and order, including the interrogation and control of unruly peasants and the tracking down and dispatch of subversives (Panama, Taiwan, Fort Benning, various police academies). The CIA also supplied training for the security obt ain ed kill ers Naz i num ero us usi ng 1950 s, the in Egy pt forces of Aloi s Stu rmb SS ann fuh rer inc lud ing net wor k, Geh len the through by est ima ted tro ubl e-s top hoo ter , Eic hma nn’s Brunner.®>> Brunner, res pon sib le per son all y bee n hav e to Cen ter Wie sen tha l Sim on the Law yer Berl in to exp lai ned had peo ple , 128 ,50 of 0 mur der for the as too, kill ed, be mus t orp han s Jew ish Kurt Schendel that French
they were “future terrorists.” to ed nd te ex en be s ha n io ct ru st in ch su At least since the 1960s, by d ne ai tr , or ad lv Sa El in N, DE OR e lik es rc fo ty ri cu se ry ta li mi ra pa
of e rc fo sk ta ’s nt de si re -p ce vi e Th ®” l. ne on rs pe n ia in nt ge Ar d an U.S. sm ri ro er rt te un co S. U. of ty li bi si on sp re ng ui in nt co a as 1986 records ty ri cu se an ili civ to ce an st si as d an g in in ra “t e id forces the need to prov
of ” es rc fo ty ri cu se ian vil “ci e Th * ”° s. nt forces of friendly governme
e th , as ur nd Ho a, al em at Gu , or ad lv Sa the friendly countries of El are le, Chi d an , zil Bra a, in nt ge Ar s me ti Philippines, and at various d ate ili aff e th d an ey Th . ds ua sq h at de as n ow more commonly kn
e th ed gn si as are ca ri Af h ut So d an a ic er Am military forces in Latin
m is or rr te e th in th wi es rol t en er ff di e Th ” s. st ri ro er “t g in task of kill ” s. on ti nc fu ed ut ib tr is “d of e cas ar Industry illustrate the famili
e o m s i r o r r e t r e t n u o c t n e m n r e v o g n r e t s e W e h t f o y t i r a d i l o The s n a t m o p w e i M n o m m o c a d n a s e g a k n i l n i y l n o t o n n w o h s s i k r wo m o u a m m o s f e n g i f n o a h d c e x y e n a i l p s i line On terrorism, it is also d
e n o s o a i t f i a , o r s e p l i o e h t h s d t n n e o a c i n t e a g l i e l r l y e l t d in frien : s r e w o p y l d n e i r f f o t r a p e h t n o s e i t i v i t c a a d n a g a p o r p d n a Political, 71
y t t s u d n I ’ m The Terroris
ee
n e e w t e b relation
the CIA
and
South
Africa’s
BOSs
, n r e t t a p l a r e n e g 4 s e t The a r t s u l l i , r e i l r a e d e t o ee e c n e g i l l e t n i n a e r o K h t u o S d n a n a w i a T ; . e a eG ae f ] C A e h T . e s o l c n e e = b e v a h g i t s e I N a e e e r h e t s ies, and relations between all e agenc h t f o s e i c n e g a e c n e g i l l e t n i e h t o t r e s i v d a d n a f o r o s n o p s d n a , A was also a N I D s e l i h C s a h c u s , a c i r e m A n i t a L n 1 s e t a t s y t i r u c e s l a n o i t o t na p u d e u n i t n o c e v a h s n o i t a l e r y l d n e i r f d n a s e g n a h c x e n ;nformatio i d r o o c e h t e t a t i l i c a f o t “ d r a h d e i r t s e t a t S d e t i n U e h the present. T e h t g n o m a d n a n i h t i w s e c r o f y t i r u c e s l a n r e t n i f o t n e m y o l p nated em n i d e n i a l p x e r e t r o P t r e b o R l a r e n e G s ” a , s e i r t n u Latin American co , r a o d n n o o C i t a r e p O s a t w r o f f e s i h t s f t o c u d 1968.59 One of the pro , d n y a a u g a r a , P l i z a r , B e l , i a h n C i t n e g r A r f o o cooperative endeav d a h s o t h n w e d i s s r i e d d r u m d r n o a t y i l n e o v m i t c e Uruguay to coll s i h d t n e i l l s i e k d r e e w r d . s n e u i g H r n t i n u r o o c b h g i e e n g n i u f taken re war
” . n o i t a t r s i e r p o o r d r l e t r Free Wo
in ge ga en to a re Ko h ut So d le ab en so al it ir This cooperative sp d an , rd wa on s 50 19 e th om fr s an ci ti li po S. U. of extensive bribery
Moon’s
nd re ve Re of cy en ag e th h ug thro
organizations, to own
e th in s on ti za ni ga or ng wi tgh ri us ro me nu newspapers and subsidize United States and throughout the Free World. Similarly, South ae oe oteto acquire and invest in newspapers and magazines
oe Se
ae
ee tna
n, ai it Br t ea Gr In ®! s. ce en di ee e ae , ae au
ci eee
ee
d an y it un mm co ss ne si bu e th to s 4
sponsored ad financed i SAG
e e e d an 76 19 (FARI) in
through books, other sees
te
eee ve information coed
Affairs Research
Institute
e ® Ofpicoen aa Se sa a urse, the conferences.
United St hasHi able to do the samenaathing even mol’ EE its alliedns and clien rcountries, mobilizing resources and : manipulating electio
Italy, for example.® (ae a very large scale in the Philippines 4° Brian Crozier’s Fory
Beene
Cin organized and subsidize
formed later into th - World Features (FWF), which was trans”
right-wing think Bae se tute for the Study of Conflict, a Brits SAME WAY tas ESIStand = Propaganda agency operating much flows easily within th
Institutions.
SS.
though on a smaller scale. Money
© Free World to Sustain right-wing ideologi@™
72
The Private Sector: Institutes, Think Tanks,
and Lobbying Organizations
o p m o c t n a t r o p m i e ar at th s nk ta k in th d n a es ut it st in e th of . M.. rt pa as y dl pi ra w e r g or ed at in ig or ry st du in m is or rr te nents of the s ha a m o l a S n h o J s. 70 19 e th in e iv ns fe of e at or rp of a major co da un fo of h” nt ri by la e iv at rv se on “c a of t n e m p o l e v e d e th described s ce ur so re e at or rp co ay rl pa to d e n g i s e d ns io ut it st in e at iv pr tions and r fo g in id ov pr s, ew vi d n u o s g in iz id bs su s, al tu ec ll te into co-opting in
lte in an ng hi is bl ta es d n a s, al tu ec ll te in ng wi tthe networking of righ e r O E P d an y e n o m of e rc fo r ee sh y b t lectual hegemony of the righ
by y il ar im pr d e d i v o r p s wa k r o w t e n is th of g n i d ganda.’ The fun
e h t , fe ai Sc on ll Me d ar ch Ri g in ud cl in s, al du vi di in important wealthy t family, n u H e th d an d, ar ck Pa d i v a D , n o m i S m ia ll Wi Coors family,
, on ds ar ch Ri hit Sm , in Ol g in ud cl in s, on ti da un fo ng and by right-wi nsive, most
fe of e th of rs ze ni ga or e h T r. uo Fl d an w, Pe Joseph i b o m n i d de ee cc su l, to is Kr ng vi Ir d n a n o m i S m ia ll Wi ‘Mportantly e r u p d an s, rm fi s, al du vi di ‘n y th al we of y ra ar de wi a s an n o u a z i n a g r o s 0 8 9 1 d i m e th y B . se ri rp te en g n i d n u f © overall 73
_ _ — — — — y r t s u d n I ’ m s i r o r r e T The ‘
—— ai
titution,
AmAmeerr;riiccean Enterprise Institute (AE]), the es :
the Hoover Institu sehateeie and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown Center an ee each had annual budgets in excess of
and the Heritage pou had become sufficiently affluent to be able e r e i v w e s l e l l c i i n i e e e $10 million, and Heritage ns B ee.
‘arene
sector have had a complementary
eee” Snes fright-wing institutes. We noted in chapter relationship in support of 11g) bythe pevernmentitouhe onet 4 the various forms of aid given by 8 ; — s n o i t u t i t s n l ‘ , a e i c c l n , n l a s el a e t a n w s s i i a f s s r o a f n i , l e n n o s r e p — s n sector institutio éeihcanenneee s ' t n t e u m b n fn, oe r — e t v r o e o g h p t l p l a u a r s n o d o m n a mati butions have been modest, and corporations and indivi uals have been obliged to provide most of the funding for the institutes and think tanks. Their role has been further enlarged in the ReaganBush era with the increased importance of undercover government operations designed to be free of publicity and legislative oversight, and therefore requiring sub rosa private support. In a brief statement
at a gathering at CSIS on June 10, 1986, President Ronald Reagan pointed out that “an institution whose work so directly affects the security of our nation” deserves support, so “permit me to commend those of you present today from the private sector. In supporung CSIS, you do yourselves and our nation a service.”2 The services rendered by the institutes and think tanks have run the gamut from actually facilitating terrorist operations and lobbying on behalf of terrorist organizations and individuals, to supporting and engaging in propaganda activities similar to those carried out by the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy, he t CIA, and agents of
the North-Secord network.3 The cooperative relationshi p between sectors is shown periodicall y
1C
the private and publ in cases where government financin$ through congressional Bes appr Opriations becomes rdifficult. The cons¢ vative labyrinth is then f call ed upon the fill the gap, 0 as in the ae the funding of e
.
th
Nicara
san contras. The private sector may :-
ani Manpower to help mobilize supportive constituencies. T is oa oe rman documents show that Jack Abramoff and ee ltizens Mee the Citizens ffor , Freedom were tn used by Oliver ost No! and brief ‘6 Central Americ; as eae ““merican visitors, i z e to organize telepho! t0 undertake 2 ee Speaking rallies, and sermons jn favor of the contras, 4”. tours,4 Ac AS another example, when the CIA 74
———
meer
vateRentat ne
SORE of Sea: Ss Forum World F eatures Was exposMeeld in SGre eX ] Britain in 1975 and had to be discontinued, Richard a e j a a e e p e r o p u s a eful ganda took over the funding of this when the U.S. executive branch was having trouble raisin ha to finance the organization of and publicity for the 1989 Sari s:
election, the Scaife, Olin, Grace, and Smith-Richardson foundati ons
came through with the necessary sums. For many covert state enterprises, private and government funds can be substituted for one another according to political and public relations convenience and exigencies. The relationship between the public and private sectors is also affected by the multinational character of the industry and the involvement of other governments in the collective enterprise. For example, the Unification Church of Reverend Moon, which is closely tied to the South Korean government, subsidizes institutes, media,
and terrorist governments and subnational groups that serve its right-wing political objectives. It was disclosed in South Korea in 1988 that the South Korean government, through its intelligence arm KCIA, had covertly funneled $2.2 million to the Heritage
Foundation in the early 1980s.° The CIA has long funded institutes and media in other countries, and the National
Democracy
does the same.© The Jonathan
Endowment
for
Institute, an Israeli
government-sponsored institute with U.S. branches, has organized
conferences in both the United States and Israel. A U.S.-based institute, JINSA, was organized and is run by individuals closely tied
to the Israeli lobby and can be regarded as a virtual agency of the Israeli government.’ And Heritage helps fund and engages in joint activities with institutes in Great Britain and Israel. Some of the institutes that are part of the terrorism industry
Operate in many spheres of intellectual activity and policy interest. This is related to size, and the Big Four—Heritage, CSIS, AEI, and Hoover—are all fairly diverse in activity. As terrorism became a Perceived area of policy interest, these “conglomerates” entered that
held, sponsored experts to deal with it, and provided support for their activities, Quite a few institutes specialize in terrorism more Tees single for vehicle the hantowly, and some are largely for inclusion in the industry are that the mae a e th in t er xp -e st li ia ec sp e on t as le at r fo ns io ase of operat
aa
75
,
— — — — — — — y r t s u d n I m s i “Terror
e i
t i t a h t , ) C S A ( l i c n u o C | y t i r u c e S n a e l c a i r e m A e h t f o e s a c e h t or, as in g n i k r o w t e n d n a n o u a c i n u m m o c f o s n a e m d : n a a l l e r b m u n a s e d i v pro , . y r t s u d n i e h t f o s r e b m e m r e h t o g n o am f o y n a m , d e h s i l b a t s e l l e w y l e v i t a l e r e r a s e t u t i t s n i r o j a While the m The number
. y r o t i s n a r t y l b a b o r p d n a w e n e r a s n o i t a r e the smaller op
in the range fewer than a by scholarly
s a w s 0 8 9 1 d i m e h t n i y r t s u d n i . S . U e h t n i s e t u t i t of ins t u b , ) x C i d n e p p a n g i n i t s i l e h t e e s ( y t f of forty to fi d e r u s a t e n m a s a t r d o e p r m e i d i s n o c e d b l u o n c e doz
m s i r o r . r s t e r T t e n p e x d e i s n r e o i r i e h t t f i o n g o c a e i n r d o or me reputati
y e h d s , t n e l a l i e r w s t a n u r o e d c h e t g o n r i industry institutes have eme . s e v l e s m g e h n t o s e m t d a u n t a are networked with the U.S. insti
U.S.-Based Institutes and Organizations We will concentrate here on two of the Big Four private-sector institutes and eight others that are of some importance or illustrate some significant feature of industry members. Only three of the eight—ASC, Rand, and the National Forum Foundation (NFF)— are of substantial size and importance. The others are not only small, frequently one-man operations, but their funding and activities are
harder to determine, and we will treat them more briefly. Of the eee eae a oon are of major importance 1n the diversified , ee
bnilea., rieee e that , but on teen? think tanksee ght-wing ae
has emphasized economic issues and policy. It was founded in 1943 O ; : by Louis Brown, ’ head of the oh e on n, io at or rp Co le il nv Ma s hn Jo the great producers ! e k r a m e e r f e h t t a h t s e i t i l a n r e t x e e v i t a g e n s e o h t i w l a e d o t fails
e f f o n o i t a r o t s e r e h t o t , e r o f e r e h t , d e t o v e t f a s e l p i c market prin er ne er the horrors of New Deal intervention. It does, howev and
a n e r a y c i l o p n g i e r o f e h t o t n I 8 2 d fellowships—an o t — h c a e r t u o d n a , s t c a t n o C e t r a p y l h E experts, most S 5
+
c
?
>
provides on
.
si)
DEES
48 provided a home base for several right-wing * Une is Stefan Pp e i r a e a e f b m o m i e t m g c , n y o n l o a s s e O board member of Lyndo ~
a
oO
€
n
76
’
Dee
The Private Sector ee
i)
and coauthor with L. Francis Bouchey of The Strategy of Terror. Martha
Crenshaw,
now
of Wellesley
College, who
ha
a S carefully
recently, Angelo Codevilla,
a former
: d n a s k r o w e m a r f r studies to approved terrorists, spent e confined h some
time at Hoover.
More
naval intelligence officer and right-wing activist implicated in the socalled Debategate scandal, has joined Hoover as an expert on
terrorism.'' Peter Duignan, for a number of years director of the South African program at Hoover and a member of Reagan’s foreign policy transition team, is also a member of the editorial advisory board of the South African Freedom Review, published in South Africa under the auspices of the extreme right-wing International Freedom Foundation.!* This journal is designed to put South Africa in a favorable light as a defender of Western values against the black agents of world communism. The Heritage Foundation The Heritage Foundation is important because of its size and influence, and also because it is a far-right enterprise that has nonetheless achieved respectability and power. It was organized in 1973 by Joseph Coors and New Right activist Paul Weyrich, with substantial funding help from Richard Mellon Scaife.15 Edwin Feulner, Jr., longtime head of Heritage, was report-
edly chosen by the Scaife group.'* Funded subsequently by a wide variety of corporations and foundations as well as wealthy individuals, the Heritage budget reached $14 million in 1987.
Heritage has served as an umbrella organization for a variety of institutions of the extreme right and for outright terrorist groups. It has had ties to the Christian right, the Moon system, Taiwan, and
South Korea,!® and the RENAMO lobby!® has been headquartered in the Heritage building. With its more respectable face, Heritage has supported right-wing intellectuals, and it has pioneered in developing a resource bank “to help bring this non-Washington expertise into the policy-making process.”'” It has strongly empha-
sized programs designed to influence policy through a continuous g exploitin by and es, conferenc and publicity, flow of position papers, ts relationships with decision makers. . , on ti ra st ni mi ad an ag Re e th th wi s on Heritage had close connecti , er rg be in We ar sp Ca e, es n Me wi s Ed al ci fi ra of -e an ag oa former Re “nneth Adelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and numerous others regu77
e h
— — — — — — y \ t s u d n I ” m s i r o r r “Te
d e i l p p u s e a e e r d n a s e c n e r e f n o c e g a t i r e H d e d n e larly att o e e i a f e s i n i m d a d n s a l a u t c e l l e t n i f o r e b m u n e g r a la e B e e B ; E W E N O s r e p a p n o i t i s o p s a l l e w s administration, a ership:
d a e L r o f e t a n a M e g a p d n a s u o h t e e r h t , e m u l o v y t n e w t The b u p d n a d e r a p e r p a n I S U m G A e v i t a v r e s n o C a n i t n e m Policy Manage t for the
n i r p e u l b n o i t i s n a r t l a i c i f f o e h t s a d e v r e s , e g a t i r e H y b hed
f o t a e r h t e h t f o e c n a t r o p m i e h t d e s s e r t s t I . 0 8 9 1 Reagan team in e s u o H f n o o i t u t u s n i e r e h t r o f d e l l a c d n a ” m s i r o r r e l t a n o “internati
” ” ” . n o i s r e v b u s “ d n a y t i r u c e s l panels on interna
y r a t i l i m e h t n i t h g i r e n i l d r a h e h t o t s k n i Heritage also has close l
e h t n o s e v r e s r e n l u e F n i w d E . e r e h w e s l e d n a x e l industrial comp a d n a g a p o r p d n a g n i y b b o l l u f r e w o p a , C S A e h t f o d r strategy boa e g a t i r e H e h t f o n a m r i a h c r e m r o f A . y r t s u d n i e s n e f e d organ of the d e t o n n a c i l b u p e R n r e h t u o S a , is n r u b k c a l B n e B , s e e t s u r t board of t r e b o . R s t h g i r l vi t ci s n i a g e a l g g u r g t n s i t t i m e r n u d n a g n o l s i h r o f
t f i o u d n o t c d s n i a l a n r u h o n s j r i o t b i r B n a i Moss, a right-wing Austral , l a n r e u g o a j t i r e H e h r t f e o d n , u n o o f i was a intelligence disinformat n w o n k l l , e n w o a s r a r e e P g o ; d R w n e a i v y e Polic R
anti-Semite, neo-
” ” e , c s n c e i i n c e was s g o u f e d o u t t e n s s i e c p n e a o r h f t p o o , r d i p n Naz a
e g a t i . r l e a H n r u o s j i h t d f r o l a a i o r b o t i d e e h r t e f o an early memb c i m o n o l c d E a n i l a c a o s n f S ’ r o n u o o s J g r d n a e i e t n P a i c o o y j r b p officials reci h s c a , w i g t h n n e w i i h o n t P r — u a T , n e i m h u C l d o e r t v e a i n d l . e s u e Fe Studi published by Pearson’s Council on American Affairs in 1967.”
eens oon
i t p
O o m c e b S 2 s n o l n a z l a c e p s e t ‘ e e s e h t bashing and s e e t s p i r a t l u m h c e o e e e It has not focused heavil fe LDBronismn, but its numerous right-wing ae. y on arete y r a m i r s p ’ d l r o w e h t o y t l e s o l c it d SY have tie ee
; contras he Afri gimes of terror and terrorists (Israel, , South / the rica, Sout the Custcmnlaniand Salace an states). Its experts and conferen Pe participants have regularly conve AL aut Pt é ¢ worl terrorism as a product of a es % simpleminded view 0° ible
for urge d have and viet conspiracy :
base and vehicle for writ; .
5
a
the years Heritage has provided
Ings
Crozier, and Samuel ae oe
:
terrorism by Robert Moss: B
78
yl
——
The Private Sector e_ _—
book The Soviet Strategy of Terror, Francis positioned himself SOmewhat to the right of Claire Sterling on the Soviet conspiracy to terrorize
the West. His citations, in order of Importance, are ert Rob M ie and , (15) s rce sou ed iat fil -af CIA er oth , (16) r (18), Brian Crozie
Rees’s Information Digest.*? Moss and Crozier have both beer on ie CIA’s payroll, so that CIA-based sourcing overwhelmed all others in Francis's book. Rees, the next leading source, was a member of the John Birch Society and a professional infiltrator and informer.
His Information Digest has long been recognized as a compendium of
fact, rumor, and planted disinformation very close in rigor and mode of compilation to traditional police Red Squad and FBI political files.24 Francis, however, informed the publication
Human Events that
Rees was an “authoritative” source on the subject of internal subversion.2> Francis follows Rees in calling for a close monitoring of subversion, generously defined.”° In an article published in Roger Pearson’s journal, Francis also finds that the ANC and “its convicted leader Nelson Mandela” are communist-controlled representatives of the forces of violence, in no way comparable to true freedom fighters like UNITA and the contras.?’ Through monographs, lectures, and policy briefs called “Backgrounders,” Heritage has been a strong proponent of counterinsurgency/national security doctrines, particularly with regard to Central America. The institute provided a set of foreign policy recommendations for Reagan’s second term that encouraged full support for paramilitary forces (death squads) in those countries where U.S. interests were “threatened.” Among the relevant follow-up publications are: Alvin Bernstein and Col. John D. Waghelstein, How to Win in El Salvador (1984); Virginia Polk, The New Guatemala Deserves U ‘S Support
(1985);
Timothy
Ashby,
Nicaragua’s
Terrorist
Connection
(1985); e Doctrin Reagan the Tests Angola III, (1986); William Pascoe Jonas Savimbi, The War Against Soviet Colonialism (1986); Jaime Pinto
and John Huber, The White House’s Confusing Signals on Mozambique Do ments Govern What s: Darknes of Heart (1985); and Adam Wolfson,
0 Blacks in the Rest of Africa (1985).
|
r sea of ation combin a for goemlage' writings are notable d ee ely extrem and fact, Bugible interest in authenticated a oun Backgr 1986 r Octobe an in ation, Henle As an illustr Pdate” (no, 27), Senior Policy Analyst James A. Phillips argue 79
— — — — — — — y ' t s u d n I ” m s i r o “Terr
e Th
k c a t t a o t n a l p d e l i o f a “ n i : a c t c e p s u s i s a v e p n e m e v 4 l n o o v k n c i a t t s a i r l a o t p r i o m t s u g that Tr u A n a , y l u J n i o g o T 1 y s s a b m e . S . U e h t ee of a e 2 o e e h t d n a , s u r p y C n i e s a b r i a h s i Brit d e d i v o r p s p i l l i h P . n a t s i k a P , i h c a r a K n i r
no eyjline ; h t t a d h e t u g r a , d s n n a o i t a g e l e n s UU a g e l l a e s e h t t r o p p u s o t s n o i t a dence or cit t s i r o r r e t g n i r o s n o p s d e d n a h d e r t h g u a c “ s a w i f a d d a Q e m next ti n a e k a t r e d n u d l u o h s y r a t i l i m . S . U e h t ” , s n a c i r e m A t s n i a g a s k c atta , e s i w e k i L . y r t s u d n i l i o s a y b i L e l p p i r c o t d e n g i s e d e k i r t s d n u o r g o t r i a Connec-
n i l m e r K e h T : m s i r o r r e T o c r a N “ , 9 8 . o N e r Heritage Lectu
l e h c a R y b 6 8 9 1 f o r e b m e c e D n i n o i t a d n u o f e h t t a d e r e v tion,” deli y l p m i s s m a r b A t t o i l l E e k i l s r e k e e s h t u r t t a h t e n i l e h t s e k Ehrenfeld, ta
e h t d n a n o i t a m r o f n i s i d t e i v o S f o n i d e h t r e v o d r a e h cannot be . s n o i t n e t n i t e i v o S t u o b a h t u r t e h e t v e i l e s b s o e t public’s unwillingn g d n n i a k c i f f a r t g u r d h t o b n o o t i t c e n n o n c i l m e r K Her evidence for a d e t c e y l l e s l u f e r a s c n y o b i t r d e e s z s a i l a r e n e g s f t o s i s terrorism con n a u g a r a c i N d n n a a b u C f s m o i a l c e h h t t i g w n , o s l l a a i c i n f f r o Weste t n a t r o p m i n a s s g 1 u r d a i t g v s n e i W e n h i t m r e d s n e t u t a a h i t r t a p x e y n o s m ’ i e t t s a e i n r t a t u a g p x a e r a c s i part of Red strategy. She quote a N
s m i a l o c , s h 4 s ’ w 8 g e 9 n e 1 f i t o r t a i e m h m o c n b at one of the Dento su
e d a g r u t r e h d t t a “ h m s n t l i d a a l h i u o c t g i f a of that two high Nicar produced a good economic benefit when we needed [it] . . . we g h n t i a r e d d e n f a f u e e h s h l t t p i o w e r e p u r d d o o o i f o v d f wante to pro
c i t n e h d t l u s a s e s i a e f h t t n i e c r . h s ” E of youth in the United State .. . evidence.”® n o i t a s m a r e o s f r n e i s v a s e f e o d c o e r o n n h t a e e t n i ext Hate ges influ
oe
a te roe ad
serve an the U.S hee 4 aa oe eee ae ae s a f m s F o e l p e i l D b u e R e serves in a autre - h ” o l t a m r o f n I s e t a t pacity to the United S
Agency n(aUtSiIoAn)a.l In hearingss held before the House on Inter ration Ope
Subcommittee
in 1986 e a e t t a h t t c a f e h t d e t n e m a l r e n l u e F » l l u f t o n d a h A I S U the y succeeded in informing the rest of the WO about th
ee. Py terrorists. Feulner had previously ee Wee policy formal a develop and implement £
a terrorism.
m i s a h e g a Herit O l u e F . t h g ri e e s a h r e n Defence
and
Str ategic
t i r B e h t o t y l r a l u c i t r a p , s e i l aces | e , p o r u E r fo e ut it st In s n’ ; air of Britiai ’ n tai er tion? d
i a n e s a , s e i d u t S
which
80
counte
form
Na
—————__> _
MllevPrimatesSerta
a
Security Advisor Richard Allen (a « ae 4 members ofits “Council of Maiiagesen Saas pone i c aS Heritage gave IEDSS $151, 273 in 1985 (their total ee was $185,611). IEDSS is well known for mite ae hie mation about the European peace movement a nd for Bienes a: CND campaigns in Parliament and the media, as well as for see information on international terrorism.2° Heritage has also tee
$140,000 to Brian Crozier’s International Freedom Fund Establishment.
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) CSIS is the most important of the terrorism industry institutes. It is as affluent as Heritage, it places more emphasis on terrorism, and it has more—and more prestigious—experts in the field. Its head, David Abshire, succeeded in the late 1970s and early
1980s in bringing in Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski as counselors-in-residence. Abshire himself was made ambassador to NATO in the Reagan years, and was brought home to the United States to handle the media in the administration’s effort to contain the Iran-contra scandal. Anne Armstrong, head of the CSIS board, has been chair of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Ray Cline, former deputy director of the CIA, became a high official of the organization. A prestigious corporate board in the 1980s also helped CSIS increase its annual budget to more than
$14 million by 1986. CSIS’s wide appeal to the corporate community is evident in its funding base. In 1986, the organization received contributions from 126 domestic corporations, including 68 Fortune 500 companies, as It also obtained grants from 92
well as 27 foreign corporations.
foundations, most of them corporate-based and 25 identifiable by
). ation Found n Exxo on, dati Foun Alcoa Corporate names (e.g., 26 and s anie comp oil 8 are Among the domestic corporate givers gon Penta the to ons weap g lyin supp in ved “ompanies heavily invol
rate corpo The .>' iers) suppl ons weap r majo the all ally virtu uding (incl
cular parti 1 lex comp rial ndust ary-i milit the and “stablishment Clearly find CSIS a very worthy investment. Nit
Tees
ace
Serves this corporate constituency directly, pens Ae
1n s u h T s. ie ud st cy li po d n a y through general analyses 81
_ _ — — — — y t t s u d n I m s i r o r r e T ‘ e h T
a :
4
oe
diversified
company
with
a number
D
ae
Aveo CUnPOEMOE :aon with Saudi Arabia, and a CSIS one ih a? en el onll Frst multimillion-dollar co
l pol the on dy stu 00 ,0 helped fund a $125
a Saudi
ice Off t's men art Dep e at St the of or ect dir n the regime. David Long,
of au re Bu the in ia evs h ut So d an t Eas ar Ne the of Analysis for z, Boo of aw Sh hn Jo h wit ort rep IS CS the ed or th au co , Intelligence m, fir g tin sul con nt me ge na ma a l, ona ati ern Int Allen and Hamilton zed iti san a n tha re mo tle lit y lit rea in was dy stu ed or th au co the But er mb ce De in ng Lo by n tte wri ort rep version of a State Department
e som de ma d ha y ud st d fie ssi cla l stil d an 1980. The earlier internal and cal iti pol d an on ti up rr co the ut abo s strongly negative statement g zin ili tab des the d an ily fam ing rul the of t en em ag an military mism d ve mo re lly efu car e wer e es Th ty. ori min a Shi sed abu the of eat thr from the CSIS version, which portrayed Saudi Arabia as a paragon of stability. Steven Emerson provides an extensive comparison of the two texts, showing the careful excisions of negatives and other changes that make the final document a piece of disinformation.” Although 90 percent of the sanitized text was taken from the original Long report, CSIS released the refurbished document in February 1982 as part of its “Washington Papers” on international affairs, describing it as a “major new work.” The rewritten and “informally” declassified document was then used to lobby Congress in support of the sale of AWACS missiles to the Saudis, and the Avco Corporation, according to a company spokesperson, used it for “enhanced marketing efforts in Saudi Arabia.’23
ope ees Fen mae is mk en its investigations
,
cee ee
e a d
ces, panels, an
s Ne cu os reports e
hav
oS a frequently
ed ne da an ag op pr ng wi tgh ri d an nt me se tn ve Intheearly19;0s,. CSeeI
b
t n a t r o p m i n a d e y a l p : e c e d n e M e h t f zation o
i l i b a t s e d e h t n i e l ro
me in Chile. Its director of Latin America?
studies, James Th eberge, clai med to h Korean communist
guerrilla
learned how t o intimidate t
82
sHenunpongted a ean
ine desun
eee
PrivatenSecter eee
ee
circulated by a friendly ‘expert’ and 4 pa
news organization like eres
epOuigtn a reputable
Another CIA propaganda theme, that the Soviet Union planned
to establish a submarine base in Chile and otherwise th reatened the
Caribbean, was also disseminated through CSIS, in Theberge’s books Soviet Sea Power in the Caribbean and Russia in the Caribbean, and in The Stability of the Caribbean, edited by Robert Moss. Landis points
out: “Although these books were not published until late IS, ISU Mercurio published excerpts on February 28, 1973—early enough to have an impact on the elections, but too late to disprove the CIA fabrications.”°° CSIS organized a conference on the Red threat to Italy, which was held just before the Italian elections of 1976. The panel included William Colby and Ray Cline, both from the CIA; John Connally, a member of the Foreign Intelligence Oversight Board; Clare Booth Luce, former ambassador to Italy; and Claire Sterling. The composition of this group points up CSIS’s close ties to government, its “action” mission, and its lack of connection to anything resembling objective scholarship. To this group, the Italian scene presented a “national security” threat to the United States and called for forceful intervention.*© One day after the CSIS conference, an article coauthored by Sterling and Ledeen, entitled “Italy’s Russian Sugar Daddies,” appeared in the New Republic, claiming that the Soviets were secretly
funding the Italian export businesses. Daily American and Movimento Sociale
Communist party through a network of importThis essay, reprinted in the CIA-funded Rome in Il Borghese, the official organ of the neofascist Italiano (MSI), was distributed to reporters from
the United States at the request of the U.S. embassy.®’ It served to
divert attention from the fact that the United States itself was secretly funding centrist and right-wing parties in a massive interventionary
Operation38 More
recently,
and
illustrative
of the continued
unscholarly,
panel CSIS a 1984 in CSIS, of Propagandistic, and far-right bent
Was Organized on the alleged KGB-Bulgarian plot to kill the pope.
, e v a r g h c r o B de d u a n r A as ll we as e z n e H ul Pa al ci fi of A I C Ong-time a n, Kampelma Max i, Brzezinsk Zbigniew mb su en th e th ok to l ne pa e Th s. er me re we ne, and Marvin Kalb
ee Kupperman,
83
a
. o o y t s u d n m s i r o r The “Ter
t o n r o f t n e m n r e v o g . S . U e h t d e l i a s s a , n e v o r p s a e s a c . t d h g e i r t a h c s i i l d o u o f j d y a l n e u m e r t x e e m o s d e l d d e p d n a , h t u r t s a s w t ‘ s i h g T n i m ? i * ° a . l a c i d o e r m p tern
s e W e h t r e v o e c n e u l f n i t e i v t o i S o l f p o x e s o t m i d e n g i s e wing cla d , t n e t n o c l a u t c e l l e t n i o n f o e s i c r e x e a d n . a S g . U a p o e r h t a p y b d e g a r u o c n e n e e b d a h t a h t t l i u g t e i v o S n i f e i the bel e h t d n a , s r e h t o d n a , e z n e H , g n i l r e t S s t r e p x e m s i r o r r e , t t n e governm h c r o B e d d u a n r A t n i o
p p a d l u o w S I S C t a h t t c a f e h T . a i d mass me d n a r e p a d p e n w o n o o M e h t f o r o t i d , e t s i l a n r t u h o g j i r r a f — e v a r g r o t a r o b a l l o c d n , a s w e e N h t t h n g o i s n I d n s n a e o m t i g T n magazine Washi d e e n e w l l a s s u l ” l r e t a l o t h c c s n u j d n a a “ — s e e n R h e o t with Birchi J
” . p i h s r a l o h c t s p “ f e o c n s o ’ c S I to know about CS s It . es ns se o w t n i y c n e g a a d n a g a p o r p st vi ti ac an n CSIS has bee i n e S to d e r a e g y l e s o l c n e e b s a h , en se propaganda, as we have d e d u l c n i so al s a f h af st s it t . u B s d n ment and right-wing political dema g n i k a y m c i l o p d n a k r l o w ca ti li s po e in v i nee of front-line operat
e h t r fo r e k r o w n so ai li a i d e m d n a r o d a s s a b m a an aa = oe in cs ti li po n a i l a t I in t n a p i c i t r a p ve ti ac “ e e e c = n e R an Ir y rl e h t the ea in n e e w t e b o g as le ro a d e y a l p d an s e p s t gh ri rfa d ir n a fa af L C A W ntra ace - d: ine has had strong ties to cSoe
f o m s i r o r r e t e h t in s i n a p i e u r a P e g a r a e n i l C s the past es a S = e drive in 1980, in which o e c n e g i l l e t n I l a r of the Cent h s u B e h t r fo d e k r o w y c n e g A
ae cee
As We ng ni is ec rc (a n a p m o C t Ke e th of n io at ol vi r in , a a) ll vi de Co o el ng e c n e g i l l e t n i f o t vi da fi af : Hatch Act.*° (Ledee
aapeeus The
n and C line are discussed further as experts in
revolvin g door
betwee
, y s u b n e e b we sreganns izeatiohnas
e c r e t i a e t Walter
r a e r , n a e th a of n io at gn l si de o s s’ di A and ae aly
t. ap is ” s k o o p s tower for old
Ledee?
e v a h i d e S I S C r e h t o n a , k a w t t u L a i a i t a l e ‘ e s o l c y r e nships with Israel and MOSSAD RFASIWEesLal as had v ee U S gove :
e ee « y ul tr a is IS CS lals. © Bis r e b m e m ” al on ti na ti ul “m y ul rism industry, F The semipermanent te aqueur, Ku O.
rmment offici
SS
The Private Sector ae
divided into three categories: (1) e stablishment moderate; (2) lishme
nt far-right; and (3) critical and dis sident. In hig ¢ be cee P trum, of the four semipermanent and five transitor y expert
fit category (3), only two
category (1), and the seven extremist. The CSIS is not a or others noted above.
s at © SIS, none (Laqueur and possibly Kupperman) fit others fall into category (2)—right-wing “moderate” organization by this measure,
The Rand Corporation Founded by the U.S. Air Force as a think tank in 1948, the Rand Corporation now identifies itself as an “independent, nonprofit research and educational organization.” Even today, however, three of its five research divisions are sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, respectively; 84 percent of its revenues come from the
federal government; and 75 percent of its research funding is on national security.*’ Its “independence” is thus hardly complete, and Rand is responsive to its founder’s
needs.
In 1984, for example,
Rand was approached by the Pentagon with the idea of a study on
Latin America, using as the source of information former General
Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, an unemployed former leader of the Honduran death squads for whom the Pentagon was trying to make work. Alvarez Martinez was put on the Rand payroll.* Rand also conducted a study of Central American policy for the national security establishment in 1984, in which its authors reject a reliance on diplomacy as not providing enough “incentives” for
Nicaragua to behave itself. While urging the United States to “abide by the time-honored principle of nonintervention,” and to continue
its traditional support of “moderate forces” and “pluralist, democratic
institutions” in the area, the authors recommend the implementation of low-intensity warfare, stressing attacks on “soft” targets—i.e., U.S.
‘tate-sponsored terrorism—as the appropriate U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, a country with which the United States was not at war.* One of the authors of this report, Brian Jenkins, is Rand’s resident
‘OP expert on terrorism. In the field of terrorism, Rand has for some years maintained a
seit Subnatonal Contes romp, wh sponsor confer em
seminars, publishes articles and monograp A
and counterinsurgency, provides experts to those 85
A res
,
eee
i
y t t s u d n I ” m s i r The “Terro
q n a e g r a l y l e v i t a l e r a s 1 t I ” . e s a b a t a d m s i r o r r e t “ a s n i a t o and pial se for the terrorism field. The Rand data base op ! r a l o h c y op s “1 common , r e v e w o h , m s i terror
with those collected by other ingtja d n u f s t r u h , s e i c n e g a vernment
o g d n a , s m r i f y tutes, securit
, m s i r o r r € 2 e d o m n r e t s e W e h t s t r o p p u s d n a s t i f t mental bias tha y l t n e s e r p e d i s t u o d e g a w e c n e l o i v “ f o s t n e d i c n i t s i r o r r e t n o s It focuse
s o D r a w d y n c a a m o l l p a i n d o i t a n r e t n i s f e o r u d e c o r p accepted rules and
e r i p s n i o t d n o a m e ( e h n t o o i t t n e e t d t i a w d l r t o c w a r t t d designe to a
l i a y v a l c i l b u p “ n s o 1 i t a m r o f n i f i y l n d o e d u l c n i e fear.” Incidents ar d e o n t g i s e d t o n n e t f e o e c r n a e l o l able.”44 As governmenta acts of vi e r i p s y n o i l ” t n t , e o u r r b a i e n p f o s i n e t d o i d t n n i e a w t d t t l a c “attra wor n o e i l t , p c ) i e n l c o e n f i d s i o t n r e i a p e t s h R o a t p m p i n o c d a n e r a d a e ( f , e r o m r e e h l . t a t r r r m s o u a s e e o r t F e h l r r s e d t t o e f g u r t h f r l a w o a c p l x a e government violence very often does not yield “publicly available information” (e.g., the work of death squads and government torturers), and is claimed (often falsely) by the terrorist states to be
within the “presently accepted rules” of warfare. As the evidence of the victims is often not accessible and is countervailed by the claims of the victimizing states, government terror does not produce authenticated incidents. There are numerous other problems in determining and weighting terrorist incidents.4®
As noted, Rand’s top resident expert on terrorism is Brian Jenkins,
ak aan eae
=e =
author of International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict and numerous
will discuss his work in more dlPree PyEine aoe nee however, that despite his afore 2 ae ate ne organization, and his longee Sane iain borcess pon Oke 1s long-standing role as a counterinsurgency expert and advocate, Jenkins stand a s r e s S to the “left”
Cline, Ledeen, Alexander, and Sterli
lishment moderate.” N evertheless
has provided cases illustr
industr
ofa
ct
Sie ohsuees
h
a base for Paul He te nze as a resident e 6
ie
Me Hhingiion
“warehousing”
“scholar’: service that the
nee 10 s” set “as or s rt pe ex le tab sui for m or rf pe s e an porary institutional affiliation. Henze thus was able tO wor
86
The on the Bulgarian-KGB
Private Sector ee plot to kill the pope as a Rand scholar rath
than as a longtime CIA officer specializing in propaganda
*
The National Forum Foundation (NFF) The NFF came into existence in 1982 as the successor organization to the Coalition for
Decency, organized in 1977 by Jeremiah Denton, a former naval officer and prisoner of war in Vietnam. Denton, elected senator from Alabama in 1980, was quickly elevated to the chairmanship of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. NFF was designed initially to educate the public on the fallacies of the nuclear freeze movement, but it soon took on larger functions in the wake of Denton’s new recognition of the terrorist threat and his strong belief in the Soviet network theory of terrorism. y idl rap w gre F NF , on nt De s me Ja , son ’s ton Den r Run by Senato n, tio nda Fou rs Coo m lia Wil the om fr s ion but tri with the aid of con
nFou n Oli the t, Hun er nk Bu son Nel y, an mp Co W. R. Grace and ani org e Th . on ti da un Fo ily Fam ife Sca the and , dation, Parrot Oil
zation is housed in the Heritage Foundation building. With a budget of er mb nu a d re so on sp F NF the 4, 198 in n lio mil of over $1 conferences,
seminars,
and
press conferences
on
terrorism,
and
published a series of monographs and short studies on terrorism in its Policy Forum series. The first of the conferences was held in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on February 21, 1986, and featured Yonah Alexander of the State University of New York’s Institute for the Study of International Terrorism (ISIT). Among the other
participants were Louis O. Giuffrida, former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Oliver Revell of the FBI, Ambas-
sador L. Bruce Laingen, and Peter Goss of the British-based company Control Risks Ltd., a “risk analysis” and insurance company with ties
to the British intelligence community (see chapter 6.)*° Alexander, formerly of CSIS,
a member of the board of directors
n ow his h wit and l, nci Cou gy of Ray Cline’s U.S. Global Strate
put and F, NF at r” ola sch ed ish ngu sti “di a de ma was , IT) (IS institute on nt De es Jam and r de an ex Al . ism ror A charge of its program on ter pe
edited the conference proceedings, collected as Ge
r de an ex Al ed st ho F NF 6, 198 15, r be em pt Se feMilde to Terrorism. On a
a on ort rep to him ow all to An Press conference arranged ‘act-finding tour of the Middle East and to promote his then 87
_ _ — — — — — — y ' t s u d n I ” m s “Terrori
e h T
. er nf co s Es PT ie th At ? rs te gh Fi , Terrorists or F reedomhington’s ok bo t en ec National Press Club, a Buty dace Was most recent ence, necee uN ye by Michael Ledeen of CSIS and JINSA, ang d ar ch Ri as ch su s st li na ur jo e, er Th . st ge Di 's er ee Read eS f of ie a ch ce ne pe s, ) wi ! Le n e i h d C n a on st Po gt in sh Wa e th Ane d of th wi d le ga re re we s, the Associated Pres
“new information
on Libya’s
ti an c hi ap gr l ra ve se n w o h s d an m is or rr te g in role in promot ) 7 m. is or rr te ab Ar of e” nc de vi “e as s er st po American m, is or rr te th wi g in al de es cl ti ar l ra ve se d e c u d o r p s ha James Denton r te Pe t ys al an cy li po F F N th wi ed or th au co e ec pi ew vi Re In a National
ec sp n o t n e D ), 87 19 , 31 y ul (J I” SD g n i r e d r u M “ ed tl ti en Schweizer, e nc ra ea pp sa di a d an , es id ic su s, er rd ulated that a series of mu ts ec oj pr g on n i k r o ts w is nt ie sc d s an er ne gi en an pe involving Euro related to the Strategic Defense Initiative, or so-called Star Wars
s. et ed vi e So at th y tr b es ch t or ts is hi or y, rr it te al tu , ac in m, re ra we prog The evidence provided was not compelling. The authors do not distinguish between SDI and other high-tech and defense-related industries—one of the victims was a computer salesman—and they do not mention the total numbers working in these sectors which
would allow a calculation of probabilities. Only three of the alleged sixteen terrorist actions were linked to the SDI in terrorist commu-
niqués,*’ and the tie-in with the Soviet Union was entirely speculative. New Jersey Republican Congressman James Courter, a regular participant in Heritage and NFF functions, entered the SchweizelDenton article in the Congressional Record on July 22, 1987, prefacing
pase ie thestatement that “Murdering SDI” provided evidence oe mees headlines” but also allegedly proved the ™ t€ t is ft le e th n e e w t e b — t s a e l ry ve e th t —a ts es er nt rorist international and the val U.S.S.R -- which has made many officia efforts to kill SDI,"48 Facts ha
u® ro fe ci vo A . n o t n e D s e m a J s ' F F N e th ed er th po a f o r supporte r o s n o p s s ha , F F N e th th wi g on al , n o t n e D e B several “fact-f, al
“ott
:
t si vi tO r de or in a c i r e m A l ra nt Ce to Mterview contra eaek 1
:
column (April 23, 19
i
trl
“€
In the field. In a Wall Street Journal op _
Contra atrocities a Bi Denton dismissed Reed Brody's repo™ i ‘i essenu@ document,” Sandinista-sponsored , attributing all reports of oe , CO : 8anda many factured in ntra human rights violations to P O
Managua,19
88
On
July
24,
1988,
¢
pe
|
———
The Private Sector gist eae
published: a lett' er in the Ne; w York Review ¢of Books attack; Neier of Americas Watch for having identified ica gandists for the contras” in an article published on M Denton
demanded
an
apology,
Associated Press coverage
but
of a March
Neier
Aryeh
Sp bsOpa:
arch 17, 1988,
responded
by Citi
ng
1987 press conference at
which NFF officials, led by Pesan, stated that they would continue visiting congressional offices to emphasize the need for continu ed
financial support for Nicaraguan ‘freedom fighters.’ ”
In addition to its concern over Sandinista terrorism, the NFF has
been very greatly interested in South Africa, with special attention to the possible ill effects of any Western governmental sanctions and the violent tendencies of the ANC. An October 1987 issue of NFF’s Policy Forum provided an assemblage of quotations purportedly
showing the ANC’s link to the communist movement and its propensity toward revolutionary violence. This paralleled the Denton subcommittee’s hearings on the ANC, which had a similar emphasis. Neither NFF nor the subcommittee has ever put forth materials on or expressed concern over South African terrorist violence against its indigenous population or neighboring countries. Senator Jeremiah Denton’s hearings on terrorism were also devoted to tarring Denton’s political opponents with the terrorist brush. Among the groups attacked for providing “support” for Soviet and Cuban terrorist operations, Denton’s favorite was the National Lawyers Guild,®° and any group supporting the nuclear freeze was likely to be found, at minimum, an unwitting agent of the KGB.
Denton’s “witness list” reads like a veritable who’s who of the terrorism industry: Michael Ledeen, Robert Moss, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Claire Sterling, among others, lent their voices to the subcommittee hearings, as did numerous members of the intelligence
institutional the is NFF the ways, many In and police communities. “mbodiment of the principles adhered to by Denton, and ae oe on the former senator’s ideological program since his dete
1€ 1984 elections.
_efeih mant o ration eit Ai JH
e e S e i l e a r s I h t i w d e i f i t n e d i y l e s o l c s Bone Pe Individual
e en Fa the for on vi za ni ga or ng yi bb lo l tua a Sanded as a vir Well as a terrorism institute. The two are closely nelulee ye 89
~ — — — — — — — — y r t s u d n I , m s i r o r r e “T
ie
th t di re sc di to ng yi tr of ts is ns co : aspect of lobbying for ee JINSA also illustrates the aut e w e an s ae or rr te as O PL d an Palestinians d n a s e t u t i t s n i e h t of n o i t a i l h f a f o y t i u g i b m a d n a acter r a h c l a n o s eee ‘1 the terrorism industry. JINSA vice-president Morris J. ee
o e r e Am er ic aIs ra the eh of he ad fo ‘s rmer
Com-
aff ili ate d Ot he rs or ga ni za ti on . lo bb yi ng pr oIs rael mittee, a major me mb er s bo ar d ad vi so ry or bo ar d an d with JINSA as founders Ke mp , Ja ck CS IS , of La qu eu r Wa lt er an d Le deen include Michael
Kir kJe an e Ka mp el ma n, Ma x an d Zu mw al t, El mo retired Admiral ad mi ni st ra Re ag an all th re e lat ter the patrick, and Eugene Rostow,
tion officials as well as Danger and Committee JINSA has produced Soviet support for the
Pre sen t the on Co mm it te the e of members for a Democratic Majority.”* g in il ta de s er tt le ws ne d an s ie ud st numerous arn te in r fo g in ck ba O L P ng gi le al d an PLO
. a d n a g a p o r p i el ra Is of ts in po l ra tional terrorism, cent
Until 1981,
, or ct re e di iv ut ec s ex e’ ut it st in e th by ed it ed s the JINSA newsletter wa an ic bl pu Re ey rs Je w e N r fo r fe af st er rm fo Dr. Stephen Bryen, a e th r fo rk wo to ne go d ha n ye Br , 79 19 In . Senator Clifford Case
A, NS g JI in nn ru s wa , he 80 . 19 y ty B ri ic jo Ma at cr mo De n a r io fo it Coal and in 1981 he joined the Pentagon to work with Richard When Bryen left JINSA for the Pentagon in 1981, Shoshana, took over as executive director. With Stephen the Pentagon and several well-connected JINSA directors sensitive, defense-related
positions, new
conduits
Perle. his wife, Bryen in serving in
for the disseml-
nation of propaganda opened up between JINSA and the White House, and JINSA took advantage of these opportunities.”
For example, on July 20, 1983, the White House Office of Media Relations and Planning released a report entitled “The PLO in Central America,” published in the White House Digest. The repo Sand inis ta’: the and Cas tro wit h F clos ely wor kin g aro , Me ' Pe al e He, £ ve its allies establish a Sov iet base of operations 1n Cent! ;
us ro th ts is or rr te of nt me oy pl de d an ng ni ai tr e th gh ou “r ca ni ediaue art ee the world. This poorly doc
out showing the encircled
y
pened
reponene™
a
names of some twenty-two “worldwide te™
orist
organizations” ]j j e c e — ™ : c e n t e d r p i t i a h e t g e o c r e a m a ’ r b s r y o w l s , cae i inked, th © center "6ofPihcisturfeoroefheYaadsser Arafat with the acronym “PLO : The ch art was design ed to show
90
alleged PLO backing
_ such for °
———
The Private Sector
ae
amen
cetee tes
organizations as the Black Panthers, the Ury
$s, guttas SUayan Lupa ma i ie BOS FP undergrou Sandinistas, and : El Salvador’s 3 ” n e m e v o m d n s ( the diagram carried the caption “Intelligence informationno iha:s e e linke the PLO with terrorist and guerrilla organizations around the world,”
b mo ve me nt s” “u nd er gr ou nd Sa lv ador’s me nt io to n it failed Ss” by name ! ;
(one assumes that it was intended to refer to the FMLN-FDR). While a “genuine” intelligence document would have been careful to identify the group, the diagram included in the White House Digest did not, perhaps because its source was not military intelligence but
rather the JINSA Newsletter (vol. 3, no. 21) for June 1983. According to the June Newsletter’s cover story, written by Shoshana
he (“T st Dige the in ort rep the to l tica iden e titl a g rin bea and Bryen g kin wor e wer as ist din San the and tro Cas PLO in Central America”),
ral Cent in acy ocr dem and er ord t ver sub to with the PLO in order SA JIN the and ort rep st Dige the If America and the Caribbean.
of k bul the that t den evi s ome bec document are read in tandem, it
m fro ale les who ed lift e wer ts” “fac and s tion cita s se’ Hou te Whi the e genc elli “int to d ute rib att m gra Bryen’s article. Likewise, the dia orepr ply sim was cle arti st Dige information” and accompanying the m fro se Hou te Whi the by n, tio rec cor or on iti add t hou wit duced, an agu car “Ni for ” ts’ nis ndi ‘Sa a agu car “Ni ., (e.g r tte sle new JINSA’s ‘Sandinistas’ ”).
g n i w t h g i r e th n e e w t e b p i h s n o i t a l e r e os cl e th s te ra st lu JINSA il
e th d n a y t i r o j a M c i t a r c o m e D a r fo e e t t i m m o C e th f o s t a r c o m e D in al ci fi of h g i h a e rl Pe h t i w s, ar ye n a g a e R y l r a e e th In y. bb lo i el ra Is as g in rv se k c i r t a p k r i K d n a , w o t s o R , n a m l e p m a K d n a n o g a t n e P the n a c i l b u p e R e th to in d e t a r g e t n i s a w y b b o l e th s, al administration offici
s k r o w t e n It . ll we as s e i d o b e v i t u c e x e y e k s it d n a administration
h g u o h t m, is or rr te on s l a i r e t a m s It . C S A d n a extensively with CSIS m o r f ed at ti en er ff di e b y l d r a h n ca , a d n a g a p o r p i el ra Is y ll essentia y l i s a e w o l f d n a , s t r e p x e d n a s e t u t i t s n i y r t s u d n i r e h t o y n a m f o e thos s r o r r e t n o n o i t a m r o f n i s a n i a g a t u o d n a e s u o H e t i h W e h Into t
n e e e t a t S , m s i r o r r e T l a n o i t a n r e t n I n i s e i d u t S Institute for
z
e e C t a 7 7 9 1 n i d e z i n a g r o , e t u t i t ‘This ins © be little more (4 -
) T I S I ( k r o Y New s r a e p p a , ) a t n o e n O ( k Niversity of New Yor
s i h r a e d n a x e l . A r e d n a x e l A h a n one-man Operation run by Yo s s u c s i d l l i w e w d n a , y r t s u d n i m s i r o r r e t e h t n i e r u g i f t n a t por 91
e t i
+ — — _ — — — — y r t s u d n I m s i r o r r e T “ r e e n pa
e a s s i l e l i s i l a e f r e t p a h c n i s w e i v d n a s writing
a é r e p o e c n e g i l l e t n i d n a , e c i l to military, po n w o s r e d n a x e l A t c e l f e r t h g i r i l e a r s I d n a European, r o f t i d e r c s m i a l c e t u t i t s n i e h t r o f r e y l f g n i s i t r e v d a n o d e h s i l b u p s k o o b e v i f y t n e w t , s e c n e r e f n and co
oe S., n A . s n o i t c e n n o c s r a n i m e S y t thir d n a , m s i r o r r e t
e v a h s e c n e r e f n o c s t i f o e m o S . t c e j b u s e h t n o s m l i f l a n o i t a three educ f o y t i s r e v i n U e h t , S I S C , F F N e h t h t i w y l e v i t a r o b a l l o c e n been do y a R d n a , y g o l o h t a P l a r o i v a h e B d n a l a i c o S r o f e t u t i t s n I s ’ o g Chica : m s i r o r r s e e T h s i l b u p o s l a T I . S l I i c n u y o g C e t a r t l S a b o l G . S Cline’s U. . l a n r u l o a J n o i t a n r An Inte as s” ct “a t s i r o r r e t f o s e i g o l o n o r h c h t r o f ts se y l r Terrorism regula
” t n e m s s e s s a k is “r d e s a b a i n i g r i V a , l a n o i t a n r e compiled by Risks Int
a n r e t n I s k s i R s s e n i s u B , y n a p m o c y t i r u c e s e t a v i r p a y b firm owned
, as bi r ei th s e s o p x e n o o s s e i g o l o n o r h c e s e h t f o n o i t a n i m tional. An exa
s s e n i s u b g n i c i v r e s n o i t a z i n a g r o n a f o g n i r e h t a g a t a d e h t in inherent of s m r o f r a l u c i t r a p in t s e r e t n i d e s u c o f y l w o r r a n s it to d e n u t t a d an g n i t r o p r u p l a n r u o j a r e t fo a i r p o r p p a n i y l e r i t n e t u , b m s i r o r r e t il reta n e e b s a r h e d n a x e . l e A v i t c e p s r e p d a o to look at terrorism from a br e u g o l o e d d e i t t i m m o c a is e h d n , a f l e in the risk analysis business hims . r a l o h c s n a a t r h s e t h i t d a n r a g a p o r p d n a l ci un Co gy te ra St al ob Gl S. U. e th d an IT IS , On January 19, 1988
l na io at rn te In ms il of cr Mi ty si er iv Un cosponsored a conference with
's on gt in sh Wa at y, an mp Co ll we Ho d an ll Be of (UMD), a subsidiary
t— uc od pr est lat s I’ UM w ie ev pr to r de or in , International Club ts ec oj pr h ic wh e, fil e Th e.” Fil ce ur so l Re na io at rn te In : An sm ri ro “Ter
ng ati rel re tu ra te li on hy ap gr io bl bi e” et by September 1991 a “compl ies rar lib to d re fe of g in be is , 90 19 to 60 19 om fr 40 terrorology 0” l too ch ar se re ve ti ni fi de e th me co be to e a e ee u oversees 7 Tea
Alexander’s selecti a : a ee
toward analysts and
a
foots ee solinane loam
who will aid in the we eee only excludes all ae su
ee
. eo
ma
a sea
cules
aie ot
for work on this Bole
ec
itis heavily wo®an
ik e B in ip pa so ni vi wi ad e pe n s t’ e ec oj enol pr e e included on thhee proj thos ong e lobbying groupss. Deanteon : of NFFboard are Jame
e! ov O° d an IS CS e of in Cl S. y Ra ; G l: ci un gy Co te ra Global St , ai a e th of ad , he ll be mp Ca n en Gl ; ” rd Institution; Edwa ™ r e p p u K nt he va ae of so al , er ll Te ward
oover;
92
Ro
aur CSIS;
UUM
CA)
ae Laqueur of CSIS and JINSA; Eugene Rostow of Ta
Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Reagan administration, National
Detense University, and JINSA; Robert L. Pfaltzgraaf, president of the far-right
Institute
for Foreign
Policy Analysis
(IFPA);
Paul
Wilkinson of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism: Jillian Becker of London’s Institute for the Study of Terrorism; Brian Jenkins of Rand; and retired General Aharon Yariv, former chief of Israeli intelligence and now director of Tel Aviv’s Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies. “Terrorism: An International Resource File” will provide a nominally “objective” institutional outlet for data on terrorism that will not only stick closely to the basic Western definitions and model, but will also tilt sharply toward the right-wing end of establishment perspectives. United States Global Strategy Council
(USGSC)
The council was
nfou ch ear res al ion cat edu t mp xe -e ax “t a as 1 198 in ed at incorpor tly ren cur is ne Cli S. y Ra A CI the of or ect dir ty pu de er dation.” Form n, ma ib Le ris Mor ck, tri kpa Kir e an Je rs hai coc of aid the th (wi ir cha its J. William Middendorf, Donald Rumsfeld, and retired Lieutenant
General Robert L. Schweitzer). Cline also serves as codirector, with
Yonah Alexander, of their program on the topic “Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism.” Among those who have served on the council’s board of directors
and “strategy board” are Arnaud de Borchgrave and retired General E. David Woellner. Woellner became president of the Moon organization, CAUSA World Services, in January 1985 (to be succeeded in that post by Philip Sanchez, Nixon’s ambassador to Honduras and
Ford’s ambassador to Colombia). The Unification Church’s input into USGSC is impressive, and the organization is regarded by
investigative journalists Louis Wolf and Fred Clarkson as “yet another cis Fran L. ude incl s ber mem d boar ent Curr 4 n.”> atio oper SA CAU d iate afhl , Sulz ce ren Law ; IFPA the of aaf tzgr Pfal Bouchey;* Robert
ard Harv of s Pipe ard Rich w); belo (see n tio nda Fou Hale with the
red reti of set e larg a and n; atio ound F tage Heri the and ty Universi
military officers also affiliated with ASC (Moorer, Graham, Lemnitzer, Stilwell, Wedemeyer, etc.). The aims of the Global Strategy Council are to promote “global 93
— y r t s u d n I ” m s “Terrori
e i
l a n o i t a n e n i f e d p l e h o t t s y l a t a c a s a t c a o t “ d n a ” g n i n n a l t p h g i c r i d q g n r e e a t a n a o i r b t l d r a s h d t e i y r b i s e : g e strat y b d d s e n i l e h t g n o n l o a i t a ” y l g u e m t r o f stra y g e t a r t s s r o s n o s it sp m i a e s e h t h t i w d r o c c a n I 6 5 s r office h c r a e s e r as l l e w as , s m a r g o r p h c a e r t u o d an
n a e b b i r a C s It . s e u s s i l various internationa
and conferences on
n a c i r e m A n i t a L d n a
t s i l a i c e p a s c i r e m A n i t a L r e m r o , f e n i a t n o F . W r e g o R r is o t c e r i d s e i stud
e r e h w e s l e d e t a i l i f f a o s l a , l i c n u o C y t i r u c e S l a n o i t a for the Reagan N n a c i r e m A r e t n I r o l f i c n u o s C ’ y e h c u o B d n a m e t s y s n o o M e h t h t wi Security.°’ We
earlier the program
mentioned
on
low-intensity
t s . o r M e d n a x e l A d n a e n i l C d y e b t c e r conflict and terrorism codi revealing, perhaps, is the program on Geopolitics of Southern Africa, directed by Stephen A. Halper, a former operative in the Nixon White House and Ray Cline’s son-in-law, who was involved in the Debategate scandal, brought to light during House hearings in 1984.°° The featured political subdivision of the program is “African Insurgencies Supported by the Soviet Union.” The council links together individuals connected with the Unification Church
and other far-right operations
(ASC, CIAS, and
IFPA), to CSIS and the omnipresent Yonah Alexander. It has former officials Cline, Kirkpatrick, and Rumsfeld to lend respectability to its terrorism studies. With this political cast, that South African view-
Pome would be put in the frame of Soviet support and insurgent terrorism” is a foregone conclusion.
International Security Council (ISC)
The International Security
Council is the main U.S. agency of the Moon system in the field of ee
propaganda. In a brochure issued by ISC in October 1987 ,
ae oy eee ee pres
pp
ve
yung Christian
acknowledges the “generous and unwav-
AUSA
International and that of the Reverend
Moon, whose understanding of the threat to Judae™
civili zation ilizati
,
is unj
to ent ‘tm his is as ue, niq selfless commuitm freedom, security and peace” @ 9) The
Security
P
ede r p
(C
;
;
Cessor Organization to IS@MtheGanter for Internationa!
e d u l c n i d r a o b s t I . 9 7 9 1 n i a b r u h C y b d e z i n a g r o e a t “ s e a r o j a M pe tonesion Pale Keegan, Jr. (USAF, ret.), William Kintneh
! e i n a D l a r e n e G t n a n e t u e i ’ L c a , r ) . u t c e r c a m , o N w S e U d d ( r n a , u ) n . s , o . d r t 4 s h f e n e » r e o a o B a Y c N n i : A S U ( m a h Gra
94
ign
rivatensaer
Oe
eee
eee
Media and former counterinsurgenc Y Consult ant to South Vi etnam puppet president Ngo Dinh Diem a nd ot her terrorist gove r n m e n t s in the U.S. sphere of influence. Also on the board were Frank
Gervasi and Joan Peters. These reflect CIS-ISC and Churba’s |
time and fanatical devotion to Israel. Gervasi is a well] amine: an 5;
passionate apologist for Israeli policy; Peters is the author of From
Time Immemonal, a volume published in 1984 to demonstrate that
Palestinian Arabs were intruders into Palestine (so that, by an easy inference, they were not unreasonably denied political rights in that
area).°” The reorganized ISC board of 1986 continued to include Kintner and Churba, but it now contained seven Mexican conser-
vatives, four retired military officers (now including Gordon Sumner, Jr.), and several other right-wingers. The ISC advances its proclaimed goal of formulating “global strategic analysis” by sponsoring international conferences, through its quarterly journal, Global Affairs, and by taking out full-page ads in such organs as the New York Times. There it posts its various “declarations” on issues ranging from the security of Southeast Asia (NYT, May 4, 1986) to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit (NYT, Dec.
9, 1985). In both of these ads, the world is divided into the good and the evil, the problem being the naiveté of the leaders of the
good and their failure to grasp fully the sinister intentions of the enemy. In both, also, the Strategic Defense Initiative is lauded as a
marvel of creativity: “a wholly defensive system . . . indispensable to the restoration of a nuclear balance.” Among the publications of CIS and ISC are Frank Gervasi’s 1982 booklet, Media Coverage: The
War in Lebanon, and papers by S. B. Kelly, The Soviet Penetration of Iran, and Daniel O. Graham, Why Not Defend America? In 1963 Churba entered into a professional relationship with Meier Kahane in an operation they called Consultant Research Association, which infiltrated organizations and collected information
on behalf of the FBI and other government and private organiza ons. During the Vietnam War period, with seed money from ad S°vernment and certain labor groups, the two of them establishe ze li bi mo to ed the Fourth of July Movement, an organization that tri e ot wr o tw he T War. Vietnam the for campuses *Upport on college d ed an nd fu secretly Vietnam, in Stake Jewish 4 book in 1968, The
95
— — — — — — y t s u d n I ” m s i r o r r e “T
e i
e h t s a w h c i h w f o e m e h t e h t , t n e m n r e v o g . S . U e h t y b published mmitments
o c s t i p e e k s e t a t S d e t i n U e h t t a h t 1 | e a r s I r e o f c n a t r impo
a . m a n t e i V h t u o S e k i l s e c a l in p 60
a i b m u l o C t a s n o i t a l e r l a n o i t a n r e t n i n i e t a r o t c o d a g n i n i a t b o r e t f A
y t i s r e e f v r h o i i t : n A U l l i t y t l u c a f e h t d n e o k University, Churba wor e r h t o r o t f a e m c i n t e s g e i l l e t n t i s e a l E d d i e M m a a c 1972 and then be
, n o i t s c ’ e n l a e g g n a i e w R o l l d o . e F S z I i C n a g r o e 9 h 7 9 air force. In 1 ” r o s i y v c d r i a o l i o n p t e n s n e “ a i s m a a n g r a e v d o e e g r h e a t t b n r e u Ch . 2 8 9 n 1 n i i a g g n e , a i c t n n n g o e i m s re on disarma Churba’s devotion to Israel has never flagged. His writings and campaigns have constantly focused on Israel, its service to U.S. interests, its creative efforts in Lebanon.®! Churba has argued, time
and again, that the PLO is little more than a Soviet-front organization and that the mere presence of Arabs in Israel should be cause for worry. According to a piece distributed by CIS, “the Arab inhabitants of the West
are Jordanian
Bank
citizens and, therefore,
enemy
nationals vis-a-vis Israel under the rules of war.” Given Churba’s view of Palestinians as enemy agents, he is popular in Israeli “counterterrorism”
circles, and he has close ties to the
Israeli military and intelligence. A major conference on state terrorism and the international system was held by the ISC and CAUSA International in January 1986 in the hospitable environment of Tel Aviv, with speeches by Dr. Bo Hi Pak, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Charles Lichenstein, Gordon Sumner, Jr. (USA, ret.), and Yehuda
Blum, former Israeli ambassador to the UN.® Churba joined other luminaries of the extreme right in signing
Sn Ma 88 Comer Digest, wich denounced Ce sud ¢ajlineioeh
Ane administration for selling out South Africa
and others woes ie a siretiomed BENEMO paged ee
ymin
COED
ee PRESa whoehas e a flatteri onngy intr Clunoduc bation iswallonteChur ge’ba
preceding his interview with that “distingui
~
cidirector
stinguished founding Ml ne of CIS in the November 3 1989 ; John Birch Society’s week] Am: aes 28 the Review of the cana
displaying Churba’s ah extreme right, is his tae ‘€ssed extension of Soy; ;
p
viet
aga prop PrOpag
active measures’ agencies.”
inane feature.of chat aaa ee ae and his position or an view that the freeze movement °° nda
;
96
an
0
“
extension of the P
5 ro n h “ olitbu
|
The Private Sector e s
a.
Churba is connected to other eleme nts of th € far rig h t t h r ough his service as advisor to GeoMilitech Consultants Corporation, alo ng with John Singlaub of WACL and Edward Luttwak of CSIs GeoMilitech was founded in 1984 by Barbara § tudley, a friend o f Singlaub’s, apparently as an arms conduit for the s ecret government. The fi
rm supplied arms to the Salvadoran govern ment as well as the Nicaraguan contras, Singlaub using GeoMilitec to h procure $5.3 million in weapons, which were transferred to Ad olfo Calero in June
1985.°°
Despite this background of close connection to the Unification
Church and his extreme bias and fanaticism, Churba has appeared
on numerous television and radio programs as a terrorism expert,
including CNN News, the “MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour,” NBC News,
ABC's “Nightline,” and the “Larry King Show.” His line and organizational connections, though far-right, are within the bounds acceptable to the Western establishment.
The Nathan Hale Institute The Nathan Hale Institute was incorporated in 1977 to track and provide information on terrorist organizations and their supporters. Both the institute and an affiliated Hale Foundation are run out of the same office. The original trustees of the foundation were Lawrence Sulz, a CIA intelligence operations officer for twenty-three years; Daren Flitcroft, a former State Department attaché in the Philippines, and John R. Horton, a CIA
operations officer (1948-75) who later became the national intelligence officer for Latin America (1983-84).
Three individuals with ties to the far right have been officers of
the Hale Foundation. The president-director listed in the 1981 filing
for a Hale Foundation application to conduct business in the District of Columbia was John Carbaugh, an ally of Senator Jesse Helms
and, as we noted in the previous chapter, an attendee at the 1980 Buenos Aires meeting of CAL, the Latin American branch of WACL.
Sam Crutchfield, personal attorney to neo-Nazi Roger Pearson, and the man who helped Iran-contra defendant Robert Owen found the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance as a contra resupply front Operation, was secretary-treasurer of Hale. Victor ediay, listed as the foundation’s registered agent for the District of
lumbia according to their annual reports through 1988, once 97
‘om’
is
The |Terrorism
=
p aa Industry
Ne
service
ws
x
Capito]
as
known
Desa: ated viosss a former aide to Senator Strom Thurbent TuaRG He is with Kot
worked Information Services.
©» cas with the Aerospace
Technology
mond and spent ie sioe aye ne UL. Aue WORE: Fediay igence intell t e Sey Division, : - os ae Rlouan international gathering of right. ; ol ashingt " was the Wa 8 ) d French mercenaries seeking to begin a wing businessmen an the after Azores the 1 ‘ Settee secessionist revolt in the
oan Pp leit cam anaes es
lef
in
ents Wout worke Fediay rise enterp this In 1974. in Portugal st terrori t rightis a (OAS), zation Organi from the French Secret Army -held guese Portu the 1D coup a organization that sought to stage to and mainl the on right far the age encour to order in Azores . nment gover new the t agains action similar a attempt d on ym Ra by ed ct re di y tl en rr cu is e ut it The Nathan Hale Inst . on si vi di ce en ig ll te in s I’ FB e th of or ct re di t an st si as er rm fo Wannall,
This division was responsible for monitoring “subversives,” “front organizations,” and “activist types” (to use Wannall’s own language taken from his 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee).°° In spite of attempts by Congress to curb the domestic surveillance activities of the FBI, Wannall interpreted the bureau’s
powers as broad enough to escape any such strictures. In a 1976 memorandum, included in the Final Report of the Church committee,
Wannall observed that the “intelligence-gathering activities of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President to delegate
his constitutional authority,” including those statutes “pertaining to the national security.”®
vee
a professional anticommunist in the mold and manner
oe ee Poe founded the Nathan Hale Institute in order to ‘ ; . Oe G es ee: e es terrorist Operations and organizations. In 4 , published by the institute entitled Who Is Tracking the Terror ists? Wannall identified the ACLU es; Studi y Polic for tute Insti the , the National Law e U A yers Guild, 66 left-oriented media e Ms Communist party, USA, and th Pporting—directly or indirectly ; domestic terrorist orga serie lite”
as
.
S
e
.
.
} Wann all In Mosc ow. by vocabulary, “leftist,” pee BODS controlled
and coeval. Wannal) subversive,” and “terrorist” are coextens!v®
the links between ie ®P€ration provides an excellent example : ticularly on the d unterterrorism” and “counterdissidence, P@””
Among those
OMestic front who ar : © or have
98
been
; included
as
advisors
0 t
The
Private Sector
LL
,
Wannall’s operon are Ray Cline; Francis J. McNamara, a fo r m e r th of di re ct or st y af f o n e t i m e of fi ce r, i n t e l l igence military
H o ¢ u s e at i S I n t e r nal ecurity, national director for the VFEW xCommittiteteee On ’s anticommunist Pacey
as well as editor of Counterattack, a 1950s Herbert Romerstein, a longtime HUAG staffer
blacklisting SeINICG: and investigator | for the House
Internal
Security Committee’s
Republican minority;°* Donald F. B. Jameson, vice-president of Research Associates International, Ltd., a risk assessment firm in the Washington area, and a 1973 CIA “retiree”; Eugene Methvin of G r O a . ham, D a n i e G l e n e r L a i l e u r t e e t a i n n r a d e n Di d t Reader’s gest; a c u r a r n e d n t A l g y e n c y I n t e l D l e i t f g h e e o e nce nse former director f se rv es G r a h a m C o m m i S t t t r e a e t e . N g a y t i A o S n C t a h ’ l o e s f member
is C A U S A , C h u r c h ’ s U n ification on the board of directors for the h e l d h a s a n d W A o C f L , b r a n c h vice-chairman of the American
th e o f F r i e n d s A m e t r h i e fo c a r n positions on honorary committees Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations,
a haven for Nazi war criminals.°?
in ma e th , rt po re al nu an 86 19 ’s on ti da According to the Hale Foun S. U. ng ro st a r fo ss re ng Co y bb lo o “t objective of the foundation was e th om fr s ve ti ta en es pr re d, en is th To Intelligence Community.” l ra nt Ce e th t or pp su to te na Se e th foundation urged members of American
Counterterrorism
Act (S.1757), lobbied the Senate for
en es l pr re na io ss re ng co d ge ur d an s, ra nt increased support to the co on te ba de ic bl pu en op to ht ug so h ic wh , 76 42 R. H. at fe tatives to de U.S. support for covert operations in Angola. egl An s me Ja of s ep st ot fo e th in g in ow ll fo The Hale Foundation, o als , Q) AS r de un w lo be ee (s nd Fu ty ri cu Se d an ce ton’s Intelligen ts ui ws la ng ci fa rs ce fi of ce en ig ll te in r fo t or pp su l ga sought to provide le
to d te ec bj su s al du vi di in of ts gh ri al on ti tu ti ns co for violating the , ts le ok bo s he is bl pu so al on ti da un fo e Th . nt me surveillance or harass lec col ne ti es nd la “c a s in ta in ma d an s, ce en er nf hosts seminars and co
d e t i n U e th in g in at er op ts is or rr te d e t c e p s u s on t) is kl ac bl te va ri (p ae lates,
k n i h t a r e h t i e n s i C S A While the
) C S A ( l i c n u o C y t i r u c e S n a c i r e e m A a te g n i d i v o r p n i d e v l o v n i n e e b s a h t i , e t u t i t s n i y c i l o p e a ‘e a e t e h t f o s r e b m e m r e h t o y n a m r o f t r o p p u s e e A inde n i , e z i s s t i f o e s u a c e b t n a t r o p m i s i t i , e g a t i r e H e k i L : o i . an n o i t a t n e i r o y c i l o p d n a s n o i t c e n n o c g n i w t h reme rig 99
" " \ t s i A m s i r o r r e T “ The
ee
eh
. a < <
RFST depends heav ily on business a g e t,’ trus al party education
funding. In a fund-raising document entitle Scourge of Terrorism,” RFST
usiness and the
stresses that governments “do not
t, have the resources to assist private industry and business to preven
deter and counter terrorist attacks against their personnel, facilities and operations.” RFST is ready to step into that breach by providing “independent” research and educational work through its distin.
guished body of advisory experts from “industry, the armed services, the law and the police.” Generous support will help meet the “real challenge,” which is “to outthink and outwit the terrorist.”
In outlining the nature of the terrorist threat, the authors of this RFST document refer only to terrorism as defined in the Western model. This is entirely understandable given the business market to which the brochure is addressed and the strongly right-wing businessgovernment character of the advisory board. Its chairman is the noted academic expert on terrorism Paul Wilkinson, a terrorologist who never deviates from the Western party line, as we will describe
in more detail in chapter 7. Control Risks Ltd., another British-based security firm, has rather
extensive operations in the United States. The company evolved out of the corporate vestiges of the Al Insurance Agency, and was originally intended by its founder, Julian Radcliffe, to provide kidnap
and ransom insurance. Radcliffe was eventually joined by several associates with ties to British intelligence, police, the Special Al Service (SAS) Regiment, and the far right.52 Also going to work for Radcliffe were a handful of former researchers at Brian Crozet’
CIA-sponsored Institute for the Study of Conflict, including Peter
Janke, their resident specialist on South Africa. In London, we d, Control R is oi oe across the street from New Scotland Yar former metropolitan
ne ern Ireland, and Sir Robert
Arishltanletiesa Gea riee
:
airecto"
Its managing
major. Among the directors 0 132
f thell
The
Security Industry ——_—_ _
U.S. office are Peter Goss, former head of British militar y intelligence in Northern Ireland, and Karl D. Ackerman. a form er director of )
securityva. at the State Department. In 1984, Ackerman was busy peddling daily intelligence reports on potential terrorists prowling L.A. streets” to Los Angeles—based multinationals during the summer
Olympics, at $1,800 per package.*°
Control Risks gradually diversified its activities, becoming both a risk analysis and security consultancy firm. It hired Major General Richard Clutterbuck (also formerly with ISC) to be its counterter-
rorism specialist. Clutterbuck, a media staple in Great Britain and the author of several books
on terrorism,
including Living With
Terrorism (1975) and The Media and Political Violence (1981), is a
staunch proponent of the counterinsurgency doctrines developed by Frank Kitson. He argues in the latter study that “violence in industrial disputes, violence in political demonstrations, and terror-
ism” are all of a type. Following Kitson and the pattern established in his 1973 book, Protest and the Urban Guerilla, Clutterbuck effectively
conflates political dissent with political violence, and political violence with terrorism. That is, like many rightists, Clutterbuck seeks to criminalize dissent by labeling it terrorism. In 1986, Clutterbuck put his expertise to use as an associate of
Control Risks Ltd. by spying on British animal rights groups for the chemical industry. Several leading chemical and food manutfacturers had commissioned the Control Risks study in 1984 in response to heavy antivivisectionist lobbying. According to Kevin Toolis of the London Observer, Clutterbuck interviewed several leaders of the
animal rights movement, claiming that he was writing a book. He neglected to mention
that his “book” was, in actuality, a report
underwritten by the chemical industry and that he was a director of
Control Risks.°4
study One week earlier, the Observer had reported on another
undertaken by Control Risks, this one dealing with the anti-apartheid
business 1n South movement. A number of British companies doing
place, in order to be briefed Africa joined a “syndicate” at £1,500 per nt. According
moveme ©n potential violence from the anti-apartheid med that they fo a letter sent to prospective clients, Control Risks clai
-apartheid groups os anti of ities activ “the l detai in rt Would repo intentions,
groups and their Europe, their relationship with terrorist 133
____ “Terrorism” Industry —————
ie
terrorist Organy. or nt ita mil er th “o t tha s tie ili and assess the possib
netrating the ant. zations will exploit the South African issue by pe | ae Ae | apartheid movement.”
gepusiicss
The syndicate of companies doin
outh Africa Was
division of organized by Control Risks liniorsvalion Services, a Risks Infor. Control Risks Group. The chief researcher at Control mation Services is Peter Janke, who, as we Saw earlier, was a warm
working friend and servant of the South African government while at Crozier’s (and the CIA’s) ISC in the 1970s. A former Control Risks “security consultant,” David Walker, now
Ltd., an organization staffed almost entirely by
works for KMS
former SAS members and wryly referred to in England as “24 SAS,” or the 24th regiment. The acronym itself stands for “Keeni-Meeni Services,” a name derived from a piece of South Arabian slang meaning clandestine or “under-the-counter.” KMS even draws upon the SAS motto, Who Dares Wins, for its own professional slogan—
Who Pays Wins.°° This is a fitting motto for one of the world’s largest “private” recruiting networks for mercenaries. KMS achieved some notoriety when it was learned that Oliver North had used Walker as part of his private aid and resupply network for the contras. Walker was hired by Richard Secord to fly missions inside Nicaragua and to plan the sabotage of Soviet-made helicopters being shipped to Managua. John Nields, the chief counsel for the House
Iran-contra committee, described Walker as “a professional saboteur.”°’ For his services, the enterprise
paid Walker
$110,000.”
Overall, KMS may have recruited as many as fifty mercenaries t0
aid the contras.°® KMS has provided mercenary services elsewhere—to Ian Smith's
apartheid government in Rhodesia; to train Sri Lankan soldiers ®
counterinsurgency techniques; and to assassination operations
Lebanon. Its activities, and those of similar organizations,” are ce
carried out with the close cooperation of the British Foreig® 0 an
ee
Prieisionsiy
with Milica
et i ae
HS work Walker
aa at
ni tislawi
paper quotes a British
elias
ee
gets from t ae
ake
extended his services to ale AbiesGaciadienbakanieey:
€
als0
ei ee sons. : yarding nited States, with Walker men # recel”
and facilities in Washington, D.C., 4” 134
—_———
The Security Industry -_ _
ing diplomatic immunity and carrying State Department identif ae. ices rendered to Oliver North and the tion cards. The serv
terrorists fit into a consistent pattern of official Western directly and through firms like KMS for “counterterror.”
su ny
ce
Like its U.S. and British security firm counterparts, Israel’s Inter-
national Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) is a wide-ranging
operation with full “counterterrorism” capabilities. ISDS, based in Tel Aviv, is co-owned by Leo Gleser, a former colonel in the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) who participated in the 1976 raid on Entebbe.
ISDS has been very active in Central America, protecting business and government leaders as well as providing “counterterrorism” training to military and paramilitary personnel in Honduras and Guatemala.
In an April 30, 1985 letter of presentation to the Guatemalan military, Sammy Sapyr, then director of ISDS’s Guatemalan branch, described the company’s services in great detail. These included antiterrorism training and the formation of antiterrorism “squads,” electronic surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the sale of arms,
including helicopters and airplanes. Jon Lee Anderson points out that the document also offers a course in “selective terror” under the general rubric “the training of military personnel.” It should be noted, however, that in light of the role and performance of the Guatemalan army, all of ISDS’s services under the name of “coun-
terterrorism” facilitate serious state terrorism.
According to Gerard Latchinian, a multimillionaire currently serving a thirty-year prison term in Indiana for his role in the 1984 attempted overthrow of Honduras’s civilian government, ISDS employees were active in training the Honduran death squads, as well as members of the Nicaraguan contras, in techniques of terror. In fact, ISDS’s Gleser hired two ex-IDF members, Yehuda Leitner and Emile Sa’ada, to help train members of Gustavo Alvarez Martinez's Notorious Battalion 3-16, the general’s private death squad. Jose
admitted Valle Lopez, a former member of the battalion, has and hee Participating in a rash of kidnappings, torture sessions,
Murders, some of which took place in the presence of Mr. anfrom the LS;
embassy,
who
oversaw
several torture
panei
ie d
ted from Hon oe When Alvarez Martinez was eventually ous 'S Successor, General Walter Lopez Reyes, immediately severe
135
————_ — — ry st du In ” sm ri ro “Ter
he ties with ISDS.
Lopez Reyes told ue
Seana
that [SDs
in ‘ pete el
trained Alvarez Martinez s “special ane a
on rt, a front fo,
and hijacking techniques, and that this was,
Cre was coord}. oor me k too also who ras, cont the ng traini Reyes told Anderson, nation ‘between them and the CIA,” Lopez somethin
. The Israelis had “So. | didn’t renew their contract... or another.’® Despit ‘ way One . ads squ th dea s rez’ to de with Alva
that the “official” death s ear app it r, eve how , ract cont d ere sev the Martinez lives on.®” squad organized by Alvarez
In 1986, Yehuda Leitner, who had worked with Gleser and ISDs, were exposed Ged Honduras after his connections with the contras
in by Anne-Marie O’Connor in a Reuters dispatch. His colleague the affair, Emile Sa’ada, also admits to having contracted with the
Honduran government “to teach the Hondurans counterterrorism,”
but now claims to be nothing more than a melon farmer. The
company for which he works, Shemesh, currently employs some five thousand Honduran peasants as pickers and growers. But Shemesh also nominally owns ISDS, although as one U.S. military advisor told Anderson, “Israelis always go through front companies,” and in Central
America,
“Shemesh
has
always
been
their
front.” And
according to Carl Fehlandt, a former arms salesman in ISDS in Guatemala between 1982 and 1986, Shemesh/ISDS “is the offical Israeli arms outlet. The Israeli government owns ISDS and the man
who calls the shots is the Minister of Defense.”°° Another Israeli security firm, Tamuz
Control Systems, has long
been active in the Philippines. Based in Tel Aviv and founded by 2
group of Israeli generals still active in the reserves, Tamuz provided
security to Marcos and trained his police and security forces in
antiterrorism tactics. Like ISDS, Tamuz
seems to enjoy a “special
two Tamu? LAAONEMp with the Israeli government. In 1984, OPELALN ES who had previously worked in the police antiterroris™
unt ereah photocopying cafe pole aig mans court, however eden fe
a
bee ie PU QSBEC ISLS oe
e; as H. Handwerker
OS
and Y. Levy TP
orte the ith
generals 4? pany 1s headed by former s e i al r d d t er ri l r n r i is coordinated wi cou Wo to Th ansf of mate
nior defense offi,cials,67 se :
:
136
__————
The Security Industry —_——____ _
Counterterrorism Training Camps
A number of counterterrorism
training eee ute also sprung up over the last decade offering Whee hands-on seminars on detection, weaponry, and assassination.
schools operate as part of a network built largely around the activities
of Soldier of Fortune magazine and the private contra aid Suteeaise established by both Oliver North and John Singlaub. Such Scheer serve a dual function. While ostensibly training individuals in coun-
terterrorism techniques for self-defense, the camps also offer classes in counterinsurgency and assassination. These academies have attracted members of right-wing, racist, paramilitary organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and Posse Comitatus, as well as executives
interested in fending off terrorists.
Many of the civilian mercenaries
and trainers connected
with
these camps received counterterrorism and Ranger instruction at U.S. Army Special Forces bases at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort
Jeff Benning, Georgia, and Fort Lewis, Washington.® According to have Gerth, “Some of the units were created to fight terrorism but
acquired broadened mandates and training for missions against insurgencies in developing countries in Central America, Africa, and sia’.°°
In July 1983, Tom
Posey, a former marine corporal, Birchite,
and member of the Alabama National Guard, along with four other National Guardsmen, organized Civilian-Military Assistance
ary (CMA),”° as an instrument for sending mercenaries and milit
supplies to El Salvador. With extensive official support (both military
and diplomatic), CMA sent numerous shipments of weapons to El nez Salvador.?! According to Posey, General Gustavo Alvarez Marti
of Honduras
approached
his group in 1983 with a request for
the initial meetings training and advice.”* The U.S. embassy arranged
turned to helping between CMA and the Honduran.” CMA soon also sent
material aid but the contras, and not only provided Mercenaries to Honduras and Nicaragua to fight. Posey bragged to hundred rounds at the three fired had he that Times the Huntsville d-to-hand combat.
t in han icaraguans and hinted at engagemen killed pane a e wer men s ey’ Pos of two On September 1, 1984, was shot Leen im gua ara Nic r ove ing fly e helicopter they wer mercy
‘nvolvement, “claims © es’ ari cen mer the of s ial den ollowed
137
___ “Terrorism” Industry ———
iii
ne with extensiy do s wa n io at er : op re ti en is eae missions,” and so on. Th l] we as t ty Ac li ra ut Ne e th as the of on ti Vv iola official connivance, in aha
Boland amendment.
ers is SIONICS One of the largest and oldest of the training cent Counter. Inc. (Studies in Operational Negations of Insurgency and
ng Center, with Subversion), formerly Cobray International Traini
1979 by the headquarters in Powder Springs, Georgia. Founded in
late Lieutenant General Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, SIONICs is a frequent advertiser in such mercenary magazines as Soldier of
Fortune, Eagle, and Gung-Ho. WerBell was an OSS officer in China
during World War II and worked closely with both Ray Cline and
John
Singlaub
(Singlaub
was
visitor
and
occasional
camp). WerBell’s
training course at
involved classes in personal combat
(martial arts, knife
instructor at the SIONICS SIONICS
a frequent
fighting, and marksmanship) and “field and urban survival studies.”
The ten-day “primary course” was designed to teach a trainee how to avoid sabotage, kidnapping, and spying, and how to spot potential terrorists. Writing in Eagle magazine (June 1982), Sidney Filson described the course as “expensive and worth the price.” Students at SIONICS have included members of racist, paramilitary organtzations as well as groups like Lyndon LaRouche’s (now defunct) U.S. Labor party. In fact, in 1978 WerBell was employed by LaRouche'’s National Caucus of Labor Committees as “personal security advisor” to LaRouche himself.’° WerBell was active in international far-right politics up until his
death in December 1983. For example, he was involved in a 1982 coup attempt in Guatemala led by Mario Sandoval Alarcon’s National Liberation
Movement
(MLN).
According
to Jon
Lee
and Scott
Anderson, during preparations for the coup, WerBell remained 10
isolation in his suite at the Hotel Cortijo Reforma in Guatemala City; where a “retinue of Guatemalan colonels, businessmen, and a m¢™ ber of the U.S. military advisory group to Guatemala attached to
. ie mPnEDICAD Embassy regularly visited him, usually at night.”
sti
Oo ee
Ingram M-10 ae sa
WerBell owned seven other gor
Armament Corporation Guibien werBel!
ee davarene enouiy sddedHi dhe silencer) vented iicncaae Pavaball
and Parabel
t was ai lum Corp® q
ensed to sell weapons in Latin America 4” 138
a
[he Security Indtistry:
the firm planned for use by Watergate conspirator Frank St urgis to
obtain weapons
for Cuban
exiles
planning
to disrupt the 1979
Democratic convention in Miami.’7 In spite of the fact that WerBell’s Ingram M-10 and M-1]
uns
could be acquired legally only by special permission of U.S. seas
large numbers of them were inuse among European fascist eit siaee mig7oand 1977." The Spanish intelligence agency, DGS, purchased many such weapons under license from U.S. authorities in the 1970s. It was later learned that DGS was coordinating the activities of rightwing terrorists. ’°
Several other such camps have been established across the country, designed to train executives and security personnel in special “urban combat” techniques. Tuition rates are high; Executive Security
International (ESI) of Colorado commands over $5,500 for its basic
course in executive survival, and it counts among its faculty members Harvey McGeorge, a former Secret Service agent who has worked with terrorism expert Neil Livingstone. The Liddy Academy, the
training division of G. Gordon Liddy and Associates, Inc., offers a
seventeen-day program for close to $3,000. Not all of the antiterrorism training camps operate on a for-profit basis, however. The previously mentioned CMA has operated training camps for mercenaries for several years on a nonprofit basis. Humberto Alvarado, a former member of Alpha 66, operated a nonprofit camp in Bordentown, New Jersey, until local officials shut
the operation down.®! Camp Oliver North (and its sister operation, Camp Jeane Kirkpatrick) served to train predominantly CubanAmerican and Puerto Rican anticommunist forces for later “operations in Latin America, including planned invasions of Cuba and
Nicaragua.”8?
in duping several One self-styled “terrorism expentt succeeded
and conferences police departments into hosting training seminars
peace and an where participants were told that members of the
nuclear movements were, in actuality, highly trained stanney
James Davis, owner
of a California-based
“ompany known as DanCor,
private pole
au Ltd., had been on the payroll
'es0 state sheriff department's Red colds ae
eee 2
ialized Training ssia Spec e a s s ie e ater a »p© forn Cali the at or ruct inst an orked as 139
LL:
———__ — ry st du In ” sm ri ro er “T igen. founded cate
agency Institute (CSTI), an Reagan and his assistant, Eddwin presidency,
Reagan
appointe
ae
Louis
a oe
ef a
Giulirl
nagement y to direct the Federal Emergenc Ma
ead
A
Ronalh tO the
of EST,
gency. Shortly afte;
, Davis founded DanCor and began on gt in sh Wa to s ve a’ mo id fr uf Gi lice agencies across the po to ow m sh ad is ro or rr te ti an s ng hi peddli
country. for about seventy. A 1985 Davis workshop held in Boise, Idaho, ed a lecture by five police officers from the Pacific Northwest featur screening of The KGB an unidentified representative of ASC and a by the right-wing ComConnection, a film produced and distributed
chures e mittee for the Free World. Davis’s terrorism conferenc bro uclear listed sessions with titles like “Civil Disorder, Peace and Anti-N
Power Groups” and “Central American Groups.”
But Davis’s hard right line often provoked strong reactions from
local officials. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, one of Davis's training sessions for local police was canceled when an aide to the mayor realized that it was “essentially a program designed to provide police with an array of infiltration skills.” Judith Panora, of the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Commission, reviewed the course materials offered by Davis and concluded, “I thought it was too
right-wing. I felt it created in the mind of the police officers an inappropriate sense of paranoia.”*
Concluding Note The security industry serves business and government; it therefore
approaches “terrorism” from the standpoint of its employers a principals. Some segments, especially those providing security S&P vices and recruiting and training mercenaries, are often arms of the
government that carry out covert actions for which the governmen does not want to admit responsibility. Leaders of the security pusine® organize and
participate
regularly
in conferences
hearings; ap
seminars on terrorism, and are experts consulted Ny the media epi
and show how to cope with the terrorist threat. Because
their structural position and role, members of the security indus”? 140
ee
The Security Industry ——_ —__
at
terrorism strictly within the frame of the We stern mo Jook at leew a mate del. rial interest in inflat in g the thre at of terrorism And Be scans their own importa nce as supplier of counte rter-
4rorBeeservices Since the West engage Ss in and supports a primary
-orism under > the guisi e of respondiing ng to the violence of others, terror!
rity
industry naturally gravitates to the support of and r a ; in real terrorism, as exemplified by advising the GuaBR sand Honduran military on apprehending and interrogating BS cerrorists and aiding the Nicaraguan contras. In the West ss isallknown as counterterrorism.
141
DE
The Experts
iblink between the institutes/think tanks and the mass media 1s
provided by the large body of experts on terrorism, or “terrorologists,” who publish books, articles, and monographs through leading publishing houses, the mainstream press, and newsletters and jour-
nals issued by the various institutions that house them. They cov™
among their ranks right-wing journalists and policy analysts, forme military and intelligence officers, ultraconservative academics, COU”
terinsurgency
specialists,
FBI
informants,
and
CIA
contrac
employees. A significant number of these experts are affiliated with
ultra-right-wing organizations such as the WACL, CAUSA, the - _
SG
i nthacheai
ee
iste
va
attend one ache ee ce Sass
eee
Coalition
es
oe
for Peace Throus
eee eer
ees
ee Bee
and seminars, serve on
other’s journals (such as Terre”
142
oil
the © S and
The Experts ns
ai
Conflict Quarterly), review and write forewords for their books,
and
cite
one
another
copiously,
Throu
collez
h th; es raBUeS
;
supportive network, these experts establish fireteae ie z tally their very Similar assumptions and opinions as eh aa Sigh ca : : mon sense. They validate themselves by echoing one another in an information market which they dominate. There are other individuals knowl-
edgeable about the issues terrorologists address, but they start from
the wrong premises, are not funded by the institutes and think tanks of the terrorism industry, and are thus not properly accredited. Furthermore, their discordant views do not mesh well with the
commonsense ernment,
understanding of the issues established by the gov-
industry
members,
and
press,
and
they are
generally
excluded from serious discussions in public forums that reach large numbers of people. (A list of some of these unaccredited and excluded experts is given in appendix D.) In this chapter we will examine more closely some of the characteristics, links, and opinions of the preeminent terrorism experts. Our hypotheses are: (1) private-sector experts will tend to be affiliated with governments, or to have been so connected in the recent past;
(2) they will often be associated
with institutes and think tanks
organized to push established views, many with a strong right-wing
bias; (3) many of them will be linked directly or indirectly to the
international ultraright, exemplified by the Unification Church system and WACL; (4) many will be connected with private-sector security firms; and (5) the experts will rarely if ever depart from the official Western model and line on terrorism, and given the rightwing bias of the institutes, will, in fact, tend to expound the far-
right version of the line.
A Survey of the Experts
ori W ho Ultimately, we are most interested in those analysts of terrorism ; d are accredite
as experts by the mass
é wed to define allo
, media,
and w ho are thus
blic. pu the to ss acce n give are and es the issu
143
—__ — ry st du In m s i r The “Terro
——
———
fi
eT, Experts also include those who are cee
1¢ Participants th e e b Al ses nes wit as zed ili mob thie field and EXperts op 7-1 lists first (A) the 16 eading
Table aes sample of 136 s mas our m fro ons terrorism based on citati experts based on lists (B) o als It t.’ jec sub the on ms ite news pore experts, a er oth by k wor ir the tO number of references rorism.” There are 5
conferences.
political ter reported in Schmid’s volumes on t the two together provide ‘ndividuals common to lists A and B, so tha
Table 7-1 eee
SS
The Terrorism Experts EE
OEE
——
A. 16 Experts Based on Citations in
135-Item Media Sample
Robert Kupperman Walter Laqueur Michael Ledeen Neil Livingstone Ariel Merari Uri Ra-Anan Claire Sterling Paul Wilkinson
Fouad Ajami Yonah Alexander Joseph Churba Ray Cline William Colby Lawrence Eagleberger Paul Henze Brian Jenkins
B. 13 Experts According to Expert Citations in Schmid Yonah Alexander M. Cherif Bassiouni J. B. Bell
Brian Jenkins Robert Kupperman Walter Laqueur
Richard Clutterbuck
E. V. Mickalous
Margaret Crenshaw
E. V. Walter
Brian Crozier
Paul Wilkinson
Ted Gurr
. Supplementary List of 8 Major Terrorism Experts Arnaud de Borch grave
bo Alan Chalfont
Robert Moss
Richard Pipes
amuel T. Francis
Stefan Possony
Jeane Kirkpatrick
Maurice Tugwell re
i
144
The Experts ee
—_
94 separate cine: To this set of 24, we have added 8 supplementar names (C), based on our judgment of importance as fica ie
influence and outreach. Lord Alan Chalfont, a former British Shine minister and an active Journalist and publicist, was chair of the Jonathan Institute conference
of 1984 in Washington, chairs the
Institute for the Study of Terrorism in London, and links together diverse
governmental
and
right-wing
interests
in the terrorism
industry. Arnaud de Borchgrave runs a newspaper and magazine, writes fictional accounts of terrorism (which he and his coauthor Robert Moss discuss in interviews as though they were factual),? and
effectively exploits his numerous
connections to get his message
across. Samuel T. Francis is the leading Heritage Foundation authority on terrorism and has had substantial outreach through his
writings and participation in conferences, hearings, and interviews.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, following her stint as the Reagan UN ambassador,
has been a syndicated columnist, lecturer, and foreign policy expert associated with a number of institutes and think tanks. A cult figure of the right, she has had substantial outreach as a commentator on terrorism. Robert Moss, an Australian-born British journalist, has
been affiliated with a number of right-wing institutes, several of which
he helped
to organize,
and
has been
a prolific writer of
fictional and quasifictive accounts of the terrorist threat. The fictional accounts have been written in collaboration with de Borchgrave; the
quasifictive accounts have frequently been written under the direction or with the cooperation of various Western intelligence agencies.* Richard Pipes, the Harvard specialist in Soviet studies, is included
because of his multiple affiliations in the industry, his writings, and
his important role in the Jonathan Institute conference of 1979. Stefan Possony, the leading terrorism expert in residence at the
Hoover Institution, and also a longtime member of WACL and ASC,
has written extensively on terrorism, including a book written with
Communist Connection. L. Francis Bouchey, International Terrorism: The
army information officer, h tis Bri mer for a l, wel Tug e ric Mau Finally, , 1S ad of the Mackenzie Institute he d an da na Ca of nt ide res how a
adian terrorologist, with Can al nti lue inf t mos the as e her ed includ ee ada. wide-ranging activities in this field in Can exper, some of the major Let us turn now to an examination of
145
hoe lerronsm:
eee
Industty: ————--__
ter of their activities, as well to get a sense of the scope and charac r linkages and views ie ACetG
provide
basic information
on
thei
try y to arriv eratisome will we s ts ing oun acc se the ing low terrorism. Fol
positions on terrorism of and ns tio nec con the ut abo ons ati liz era gen all 32 experts.
Yonah Alexander
Alexander, a professor of International Studies
at the State University of New York, has run his Own institute since 1977, but he has also been affiliated with many other institutions
within the terrorism industry as visiting fellow (CSIS), as member
(the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies), and as a participant in numerous programs and studies. He was selected as director of terrorism research of the NFF in the mid-1980s, and
he has been codirector with Ray Cline of the program on terrorism and low-intensity warfare at the U.S. Global Strategy Council. Also in collaboration with Cline, Alexander has been in the risk analysis
business for private corporate clients.® In addition to the thirty conferences and seminars on terrorism sponsored by his own institute, Alexander has been a regular participant in conferences staged by others, including that put on by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv in 1979, the Brookings
seminar of 1982, the
Nuclear Terrorism conference of 1985, and others. He has testified
as an expert witness before the Denton committee. Alexander also edits the journal Terrorism.
The funding sources of Alexander’s institute are not in the public
domain, but his continuous appearance in government-sponsored and government-related conferences, seminars, and hearings in both
Israel and the United States, and his views—which
never depart
from the right-wing version of the Western model—show 4 close
spiritual affinity with the official Israeliand Reagan-era U.S. doctrine, whatever the formal and financial connections. His tie with Israel's also shown by the fact that his book Terrorists or Freedom Fighters
coauthored with E. Tavin, was published in cooperation with the World Zionist Organization. His book written with Ray Cline Sie Sponsored Terrorism, was commissioned by the U.S. Army in 1984 oe
was eventually published as a report of the Denton committee '
146
a Nheobiganets teeti 1985. Another Alexander-Cline collabor ation, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, was distributed freel eykby the hSte saben epomie rm to public requests for info st Subject of terrorism.®
Alexander has been a fertile producer on the subject of terro rism, his curriculum vitae listing thirty-one books. Fifteen of these works,
however, were edited or coedited volumes, and all but two of the
remainder were coauthored. Still, Alexander has written a great deal on terrorism, which he is able to do rather easily, given his continual
recycling of a simple message. The quality of his work may be illustrated by examining his (and Ray Cline’s) State-Sponsored Terror-
ism.’ The main goal of state-sponsored terrorists, the authors claim, is to undermine “pluralist states with democratic governments.” This may be the goal of the Reagan-era U.S. sponsorship of the contra attacks on Nicaragua, but Alexander and Cline do not list this as a case in point. On the other hand, as South Africa and Guatemala are on their list of states being subverted by Soviet proxies, the implication is that these are pluralistic and democratic states. This point is not clarified by the authors. They explain that a merit of their statement of the goal of state-sponsored terrorists is that it reflects “the recent policy positions voiced by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.”® The gearing of their analysis of terrorism to the policy needs of their own state could not be more explicit. No cliché or fabrication on Soviet sponsorship is left untouched in this volume—the PLO is the Soviet “transmission belt” for the
export of terrorism (p. 10); the North Koreans “fought the first Soviet-sponsored proxy war of the century in the 1950s” (p. 57); the
Pope was shot in May 1981 by a Turkish terrorist “trained and armed by the Bulgarian secret intelligence services” (p. 13);° Cuba and Nicaragua “closely coordinate in the supply, staging, and training
of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla war effort in El Salvador” (p. 64);'° and Nicaragua “has been antackang ts neighbors since August 1979 in a revolution without borders” (p. 88), 11
-Cline view of national liberEqually significant is the Alexander
ation movements. A war of national liberation for them 1s: ot that can be applied rm “te a is and m” ter a and pag pro munist
147
to any
a
The “Terrorism” Industry —
(Pp. 56 low-intensity conflict the Soviet Union chooses to support”
and xiii). Nowhere do they admit the possibility of rebel autonomy
and the legitimacy of such movements, their uniform Stress is oy Soviet support, which delegitimizes these movements. hey use the spread by Moscoy analogy of an “nfection, a virulent disease’
against “successive open societies’ to characterize national liberation po movements. They have no hesitancy in calling the ANC and SWa an model,” “extremist “terrorist groups . . - based on the Cub
acks against South Africa” organizations,” who “launch terrorist att
(pp. 64-65).
In brief, this is an extreme right-wing propaganda tract that ties
all liberation movements to Moscow and apologizes for South African
as well as any other Western-state
primary terror.
The authors
engage in shameless lying. None of these considerations, however, have detracted from Alexander’s status as an expert for both the Western media or other experts who cite and collaborate with him as a serious scholar.
Ray Cline Alexander’s collaborator, Ray S. Cline, Is a central figure in the terrorism industry, an early proponent of the Soviet
network theory, and a leading member and spokesman of the far
right. For a long time he was a senior associate at CSIS, adjunct
professor of International
Relations
at Georgetown’s
School of
Foreign Service, and an instructor at the Defense Intelligence School.
He currently chairs the CAUSA-affiliated U.S. Global Strategy Cou” cil, and serves on the editorial board of the Moon-owned monthly magazine, The World and I, edited by Arnaud de Borchgrave. Cline
is afhliated with many other members of the terrorism industry: During World War II, Cline served as a naval intelligence officer
and worked for the OSS in Kunming, China, with John singlav?
Mitchell Livingstone WerBell III, Richard Helms, and Howard Hu
Cline later served as deputy CIA station chief a South Kore4 int id
early 1950s. From 1958 to 1962, he was the CIA’s station chief is Taiwan, and from 1962 to 1966 was the agency's depuly ae
for intelligence. He later became director of the State Depa?™ ‘i d Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1969-73), where he help 148
_—————
The Experts
coordinate the CIA’s destabilization and eventual overthrow of the
Allende government in Chile.!? In addition oe nee Ena lies to the U.S. government, Cline has been closely connected to repressive regimes and the international ultraright. We have noted his leadership of a i cobbepataa
organization. While stationed in Taiwan, Cline was probably mone in channeling counterpart funds from the U.S. embassy to provide the initial financing for the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League in 1954 and the preparatory meeting of WACL in 1958.'? Cline has attended and participated in several WACL meetings. With Chiang Ching-kuo,
the son
of Chiang
Kai-shek,
Cline formed
Taiwan’s
notorious Political Warfare Cadres Academy, which has trained officers from right-wing nations worldwide in counterinsurgency techniques.'* One of the best known graduates of the academy is Roberto D’Aubuisson. Cline has also worked with the far right in the Philippines. After relocating the offices of WACL to the Nippon Star Trading Company complex in Manila in late 1986, John Singlaub met with Cline, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and General Luis Villa-Real. Villa-Real, the president of WACL’s Philippine chapter, played a central role in the creation of right-wing death squads in that
country.!® Both Cline and Singlaub were identified by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer as aiding the forces behind the 1986 coup attempt against the Aquino government.’®
Cline’s ties to the U.S. far right are also noteworthy. He has served in various capacities on the boards of organizations tied to the so-
called China Lobby, such as the Committee for a Free China and
the Coalition for Asian Peace and Security. He was president of the
National Intelligence Studies Center, a conservative and intelligencelinked think tank, and he has been active in the right-wing Association
of Former Intelligence Officers. Cline has given interviews to the
John Birch Society’s Review of the News on two separate SESS
follow LaRouche's on (April 22, 1981, and March 27, 1985). Lyndon and Cline Cultivated a friendly relationship with Cline,
3 He is also to chat with them throughout the early 1980s.” Card of directors of the Nathan Hale Foundation and aie
=
the editorial board of Yonah Alexander's journal, ee ees: Cline has been heavily involved in the risk analyst 149
m ihe Terrorism Industry e
eee
h Alexande; i as a collaborator with Yona of the politica] envin e e dg le ow kn my l sel to g¢ ma; explains, “I am try 18 Fis clients include several
working sometimes
)
=
ment
in foreign countries. as Tits.
i
-
.
.
.
i Ms not to invest in mainla
‘Lh: a) advised Chin nd ady has ch he (whi s ie compan General Dynamic, , g udin incl s, firm nse defe of er mb and a nu
.” Cline has also major contributor to CSIS) and Hewlett-Packard created a number of “political risk scenarios” for companies doin
the South business with South Africa, scenarios that claim that be an engine African government s “sophisticated leadership could
for growth.”° In addition to his ties to Taiwan, the Philippines, anq
South Africa, Cline once helped a Chicago arms manufacturer sel]
arms to the military regime in Turkey.’ We
described
earlier the nature
of a work
which
Cline and
Alexander wrote together, which expounds a simpleminded rightwing version of the establishment model. When Cline previewed his thesis that the Soviet Union was masterminding worldwide terrorism at a 1980 meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers,
he was sharply attacked by three of his colleagues. Howard Bane,
who had only recently retired as the CIA’s
said, “We've It’s divisive. Retired CIA stuff, that’s
got to It’s not officer all. It’s
Moscow
station chief,
get Cline off this Moscow control of terrorists. true. There’s not one single bit of truth to it.” Harry Rositzke concurred: “It’s that far-right horseshit.” Finally, Conrad Hassel, the FBI's
director for antiterrorism instruction, and now head of the Wack-
enhut Corporation’s antiterrorism division, observed, “If you wan! to believe in the conspiracy theory of terrorism, well, you've g°% It
but there’s no evidence for it.”?? Cline has been an outspoken proponent of disinformation and
direct manipulation of the press by the CIA. In testimony before
the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Cline defended the a of such covert devices as black propaganda and the funding °
Jpumalists, arguing that “the First Amendment is only a0 ame? :
ernie tao ioe
wae
Despite his CIA background, extensive connections ae
character of his ae
ahdaienean
ae
ona
BCS
"vert gues! frequent a been has fee rie dsice ‘Nightimesben U-»the ng defendi and m terroris on g , 150
’
=
la7i
~
:
i
Fe
ment’s use of m?Nazi war criminals as missile scientists Ist: (“Nightline,” 18, 1984). ,
October
Brian Jenkins closely linked
As we saw in chapter 5, the Rand Corporation jis to the Pentagon by historic ties and an ongoing
dominant funding relationship. As Rand’s top authority on terrorism,
Brian Jenkins would hardly be able to contest the Western model of
terrorism, and he has never done so. In fact, for many years Jenkins
has been actively involved in formulating terrorist strategies for his own government. Having served in the Green Berets, Jenkins became a counterinsurgency specialist at Rand, writing and advising on the best ways to defeat America’s insurgent enemies in Guatemala, E]
Salvador, and elsewhere. A 1977 article coauthored by Jenkins is an apologia for U.S. intervention in Guatemala and Guatemalan state terrorism.** As an important advisor in the construction of a counterinsurgency program in El Salvador in the early 1980s, Jenkins recommended that traditional methods be supplemented by the use of propaganda to discredit insurgents as “terrorists.”2° In another coauthored report in 1984, Jenkins recommended that the U.S. engage in low-intensity warfare against Nicaragua through a proxy army, actions that fall within Jenkins’s own definition of statesponsored terrorism. In short, Jenkins’s role as government advisor on policies involving state violence and insurgencies puts him in a serious conflict-of-interest position as an expert on terrorism. Jenkins has written extensively on terrorism and has made numerous appearances at conferences and as a media expert of choice.
He also edits TVI Journal (the acronym stands for “Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency”), a journal that he acquired from members of the Soldier of Fortune network in 1985.?° It 1s interesting, given his an aS on Position at a government-sponsored agency and as ee U.S.-sponsored terrorist activities, that Jenkins is one of the
se “rates” among the terrorism experts. His moderation 1s a that he is one of the few among the establishment exper S ati I ac now Openly castigated Sterling’s Soviet network model.2” He also
ft, that guerrilla
;
. nces an d ¢ cannot “dges that terror is not a monopoly ofrealthegrieva NOvements may be legitimate responses to
151
Siem
lenrorisme) (ndusthy ©—$
4
.
‘
182
re
The
Experts
te bends liberally, in accord with the needs Ofihe police and state. ’ ‘ . 1 . Wilkinson s servic | sive state was carr e to a repres ied to a new level n his attempt to discredi Coli t n Wallace, formerly of MI5 (Bri tish
sta
intelligence) and the Army Information Department. Wallace had
exposed the workings of an MI5-backed
“dirty tricks” campaign
designed to discredit Labour MPs by linking their names, prior to elections, with the Irish Republican Army, as well as an MI5 campaign
to smear Harold Wilson in 1976. Wallace also went on record in exposing abuses of psychological operations undertaken against the Irish by British intelligence.'°” In response to Wallace’s charges, Wilkinson passed along a letter of
dubious origin to ITN Television, which accused Wallace of all manner of wrongdoing. Wilkinson’s accompanying letter (on University of Aberdeen stationery and dated July 21, 1987) to a representative of ITN began, “Herewith the interesting letter I received from one
of our researchers on the Colin Wallace affair. . . . It certainly raises major question marks about the extent to which one can rely on his version of events in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.”’*® The letter in question, a rather crude piece of disinformation,
wrongfully accused Wallace of attempting to have the husband of a woman he was allegedly having an affair with killed by the Ulster Defense Association, and attributed his claims regarding Wilson and
MI5 to “James Bond fantasies.” Subsequently, in a letter to Wallace
himself dated June 9, 1988, Wilkinson apologized for having caused him any undue “discomfort or embarrassment.” A letter of retraction
was simultaneously sent to various news agencies calling the allegations against Wallace (which he had, in essence, provided as fact)
‘totally untrue.”!39
The Linkages and Opinions of the Establishment Experts ;
In this section
we
shall try to draw
some
aes
oie
bout the cana
positions taken by connections of and ona Stitutional 3® *Pe ert rts. In table 7-2 the instituti l connection gs a expo i s 2 :ese
/, 1 through s row in is bas ed at eg gr ag an ives can be , Shown on nd Ppperspective vee e ae :~— inMport4 ns opinio ics of their _
Portant characterist
183
___ — — — — ry st du In ’ sm “Terrori
ie
is aoe information a R e bl ta e th of | mn lu Co 9, seen on rows 8 and
asale hae Column 9 for the 12 experts discussed a es were une experts A : an 16 the for n io at rm fo ‘n supplies this Set of oe ). Eleven of the of choice in our media sample (WEE WES of im ate s, rt pe ex t an port le mp sa our 1n e sed abov 16 were
discus
set of 32 leading experts er rg la a for a dat r ila sim es giv mn third colu columns, cludes all of those in the first two
on terrorism, which in
7—1 and the text. It can be le tab in r lie ear d fie nti ide , ers oth 15 lus
nions between these seen that the differences in connections and opi three sets are small.
The table offers striking confirmation of our major hypotheses.
First, we can see on rows 1-3 how closely the experts are linked to governments. Over two-thirds have had some U.S. or British government affiliation in the recent past, and between a fifth and a
Table 7-2 manner
—_————
rere
reer
Linkages and Perspectives of the Terrorism Industry Experts* MEDIA
BIG 12
16
%
BIG 32
No.
%
NOM
vo
NO.
9
75.0
11
68.8
20
(3)
(2520)
(4)
(25)
(eee
(Z1e9)
2. British govt. link
Sie
2510
]
6.3
6
(18.8)
a. Army/police
(3)
(25.0)
()en(653)
(6)
(18.8)
3. Net govt. affiliated
10
83.3
WW
75
22
68.8
4. Institute/think tank
10
= 83.3
11
68.8
23
eDeS
(5)
(31.3)
(13)
(40.6)
(2)
(1t285)
(4)
(12.5)
CHARACTERISTIC 1. U.S. govt. link a. (GIA
a. Big Fourt
(8)
(66.7)
c. Israel-lobby
(2)
(16.7)
5. Risk analysis/security
i
58.3
8
50.0
6. Journalist
9
16.7
l
6.3
7. Academic
4
33.3
5
31.3
b. Moon related
(3)
(2)e((167)
(18.8)
(5)
62.5
(15.6)
related
8. Focuses on left and
insurgent terror
12
9. Fit in classif. by model type a. Estab. moderate
b. Estab. right ies
c. Dissident d. Nonet
:
46.9
13
40.6
5
15.6
96.9
10 °
me out
15
He
aie
10 ad 2
66.7 a ii
* For aa discdis¢ ussion of the thITEE $2 sof t Heritage, Hoover, AE], oA csie Of SSPEIHE: ape Brant, + No model evident in pub lished writings
184
100
29
62.5 ow 12:5
.
¢;
20 .
a
3.1 15.6
Exports
the
quarter aes had : act dee
perrorism commonly
cot la). Conferences on
: ie major speakers both the
private-
sector experts and government officials, who Operate collegially and on the same Paemises and are hard to tel] apart. William Casey, head
of the CIA during much of the Reagan cra, was the featured speaker at the 1985 conference on terrorism at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, addressing the subject “The International Linkages:
What Do We Knowe” Casey fitted in smoothly; the experts had no problems with accommodating the activist head of an activist intel-
ligence agency into the scholarly proceedings. These linkages between
governments
suggest the strong likelihood
and the terrorism experts
that the experts will adhere
to a
government party line; or, put another way, they point to a certain lack of independence on the part of these experts. This should raise questions about their suitability as sole sources for a supposedly independent—not to say adversarial—press. It is a striking fact that
the media not only do not seem to have qualms about this lack of independence, they do not appear to be aware that this is a problem. The assumptions and truths of the state are so taken for granted
that a symbiotic relation between state and “independent” press is not seen to contaminate the press function. This even extends to an unquestioning
(and often undisclosed)
use of CIA, ex-CIA,
and
other intelligence functionaries in the disinformation-propaganda line (Colby, Cline, Crozier, Henze, Moss, Tugwell, etc.), who are
treated as presumably objective news sources and analysts. Only in other countries does government
domination
of information
and
Opinion used by the press compromise press integrity. A second theme of this analysis of experts is that, in order to mobilize bias, the government and corporate elite have nurtured
those with the proper views by providing them with financial support 4nd institutes in which to work. It can be seen on row 4 of table
‘a that over two-thirds of the experts have been affiliated with stitutes and think tanks. As we described in chapter 5, many of e supported by “S€ Organizations have been funded and otherwis
oun wecorporate : s, ion rat rpo —co ons uti tit ins t men ish abl pn a inant est heirs of the corp y lth wea the and t, men ern gov the , s ns s conspicuously true . support relationship 1 ding and s—H s fun ThiFou ofa “o© gBig eritage, Hoover, CSIS, and AFI —with ute r instit ig I 185
Table 7-3 A Matrix of the Linkages of Thirty-two Terrorism Industry Experts INSTITUTES
COUNTRIES aa
AND
THINK
TANKS
SECURITY
a
S
ses
=
S
:
~
Ss
wo Sos yea cos SON : ROG dN Ss me
RD
eters,
Ss
SS
eS
NR
=
% S
Be pe oh ee Feo SE Sees OP SBS & See) as 2G : AH Ss Spe eee ea Ss egies es ree RS
2
5
SS
Ss
iN
Sees
Alexander Bell Chalfont Churba Cline Clutterbuck Colby Crenshaw Crozier
98I
de Borchgrave
Eagleburger Francis Gurr Henze
Jenkins Kirkpatrick Kupperman
Laqueur Ledeen
Livingstone Merari Mickolaus Moss Pipes Possony Ra-Anan
Sterling Tugwell Wilkinson Others* \ Based
on
research
contract.
2 Based
on
free distribution
= = of published
work.
SITAR * Walter.
2 Ajami.
and
= Bassiouni
have
no
current
(known)
ae Tos connections to entrie
om
e
~
FIRMS
Se
¢
s
leesSee
~~
SoS SS OF
=
OO &
inti which a very sizable fraction of the expert s have been associated We can see on row 4a that 66.7 percent of the Big Twelve sample of experts, and a somewhat smaller Pro portion of the total sample
(column 3) have been affiliated with this leading foursome. It can also be seen on rows 4b and 4c that there are significant connec tions between the mainstream terrorism experts and Moon-supported
institutes and those affiliated with the Israelj lobby. On row 5 of table 7-2 we can also see that about half or more of
the mainstream experts have been affiliated with private firms in the risk analysis and security business. This linkage tends to compromise
them as experts on terrorism, partly because they sell their services to businesses
and governments
who have restricted views on the
nature of terrorism. They also have a vested interest in “threat inflation,” as their business is contingent on an adequate volume of terrorism against which to protect their clients. Security business also ties the participants more closely to the government security establishment in exchange of information and a revolving door relationship. Five of the establishment experts are journalists, and a larger number are academics. These relationships often overlap with ties to government and the institutes (see table 7~3). Arnaud de Borch-
grave, Brian Crozier, Robert Moss, and Claire Sterling are classed as journalists, but the first three have had important links to governments and institutes; Sterling has been funded by the Reader’s
Digest, which has had long-standing CIA connections,!*° and her links to Western intelligence agencies and the various terrorism institutes and experts have been collegial and mutually supportive. Roughly one-third of the experts have had an academic connection (row 7), but a great majority of these experts have also had links to governments, the institutes, and risk analysis firms. This is evident
among the most prestigious experts, who are also most heavily cited by the media, such as Laqueur and Wilkinson. The relatively sizable contingent of academics in column 3 results from the fact that the
Sample of 32 includes those listed by Schmid as heavily cited by
other experts, who refer to some of the more esoteric and ee
literature by E. V. Walter, M. Cherif Bassiount, Ted Sa
Martha Crenshaw. The first two have had only academic connections, and they have rarely been cited in the media. 187
The
“Terrorism” Industry ——__
Table 7-3 provides a more detailed (but sull incomplete)
Picture
a variety of gover of the connections of our 32 experts with ee tutes, and security firms, and we
government agencies, insti Showianmthenlast column whether
or not the expert made an
of the | appearanc e as a witness in one of the terrorism hearings
1980s. The table shows clearly the density of the connections of the experts to establishment institutions and, by this route, to one another. We can see that Ray Cline is checked under 13 differen; columns, recording links to at least seven institutes and think tanks, among other connections. Looking at a particular column, we can see, for example, that 7 of the 32 experts have had demonstrable affiliations with the CIA, and that 11 have had a link to CSIS. Returning to table 7—2, we can see that only | of the 32 experts
departs from the Western model of terrorism, namely M. Cherif
Bassiouni.'*! Similarly, looking at where the experts fit into our classification of terrorism models—dissident, establishment moderate, and establishment right wing—all the experts for whom it 1s possible to make a judgment, except Bassiouni, adhere to the two establishment versions of the Western
model. We may note, also,
the right-wing domination of the expert pattern. Roughly two-thirds of the classifiable experts expound the extremist version of the establishment model, in which the Soviet Union directs or coordinates
world terrorism, national liberation movements are generally tabbed as terrorist organizations or agents of world communism, and hardline policies of national and international response are espoused. In fact, at least 10 of our 32 experts fall into the category of zealots, espousing ideas that we believe rational individuals would recognize
as foolish and unsupported by any evidence.!42 The bias of the Western experts is shown more directly and
dramatically in table 7-4, which summarizes the topics covered 10 the major books of three of our terrorism experts—Laqueu!, Slee
ling, and Wilkinson—plus the popular and oft-cited book The Lee rorists: Thew Weapons, Leaders, and Tactics, by Christopher Dobson a?
Robert Payne, published by Facts on File. We have tallied the coverage
by counting the references in the indexes of these books to 4 dor Western and right-wing terrorists hant or Operations, on the one ne
and a dozen non-Western or leftwing terrorists, on the of
i ghtcan be seen by the most cursory inspection that Western and 116 188
eae «The Experts eeee
——_——ee— wing terror is off the exper
ts’
Neither Saad Haddad, the
‘
delle Chiaie, the world-class
age
|
.
Table 7-4 References by Terrorism Industry Experts to Western/Right-Wing and Non-Western/Left-Wing Terrorism* —_"
ii i
~
0
a
DOBSON-PAYNE
ee
LAQUEUR
WILKINSON
ee
STERLING
Western/Right-Wing Roberto d’Aubuisson Stefano delle Chiaie
——_ =
— es:
a or
Orlando Bosch—CORU Luis Posada Carriles
as =
a co
l pas
pat Prk
Botha—South Africa Operation Condor
== —
(2)+ as
(1)t es
a ea
Pinochet
=
pss.
ae
=
Videla
(2)t
=e
fe
om
Sharon-Begin-Yaron
(1)t
=
(2)t
Lads
Saad Haddad Contras-Reagan-North
— —
_
— (4)+
abs —
Tecos (Mexico)
—
=
=
a=
Totals
1 0
l
l
0
Arafat-Fatah-PLO
22
26
10
51
Carlos the Jackal
11
é
2
40
Abu Nidal
11
16
1
2
Marighela Baader-Meinhof
8 34
8 19
6 4
1] 36
Red Brigades
15
22
2
57
5
19
6
22
18
21
Non-Western/Left-Wing
Tupamaros
Castro-Cuba
Qaddafi-Libya Soviet Union
Weathermen Black Panthers
Totals ee
4
—
5 1
134
19
15
40
9
11
54
7
:
:
2
nN
13
175
ar by author. + oats On Citations from the indexes of the books listed below
*B
72
was
tps
; ; ‘ to cope with oF or as having terrorists.
Inc., 1982). (New or Lo, on File, ed. rev. Terrorists, fanny: The er, . * range and R. Payne, Brown, & Winston/Resdet Little, Wiese, ce ,Bek Rinehart (Boston: Holt, York: 6h Pads The Terrorism Sterling, of AE aqueur, The Age 7 Yor State, rev. ed. (New York: New Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal (©
iP
189
:
ee
wre gh tex Boe renner 3s victims
as terrorists In of ter hile individuals or groups are listed in index, they are not treated r
ie
ee
fae Nervnism: ©(NGUSthy BOvernment
does not call
atrention FO its ¢ lient’s Savageries O1 call them terrorism—and neither does the private sector of the terrorism industry. The U.S. tras media also virtually ignore this approved terror. Neither the Tula
case nor the murder of Guevara Monge was ever mentioned by the New York Times, Washington Post, CBS
News, or to our knowledge
any other U.S. mass media source. In the first half of 1988, the New
York Times had three times as many news articles on alleged rebel violence as On the rampant and vastly more important state terrorism in El Salvador. This effective blacking out of client-state violence is
critically important to the continuation of state policy: the American
public might have mistaken the Tula and Guevara Monge beatings, rape, mutilation, and murder, and the thousands of similar events, as cases of terrorism,
not acts of counterterrorism
appropriately
funded by the American taxpayer. As we described in chapters 2 and 3, the Western model of terrorism focuses on nonstate actors, as many Western client states would have to be condemned if the traditional meaning was allowed to prevail. In fact, a major purpose of the intensified Reagan-era
emphasis on “terrorism” was to deflect attention from Argentina, Chile, El] Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa and focus it on the
Red Brigades and PLO. We can see in table 8—3 that the U.S. mass
media followed the Reagan agenda closely, just as the experts did (table 7~4). In our
sample
of news
nonstate
reports,
terrorists
outnumbered state terrorists by 96 to 10. In the CBS News coverage of 1981, summarized in table 8—4, the ratio was 152 to 5, if we
exclude Libya, which was the premier “terrorist” of 1981, as CBS N ¢ws—along with the rest of the media—intently followed the career
of the mythical Libyan “hit squad” late in that year. In all but one case, the state terrorists identified by the e
media
in table g—3. In that single, Were non-Western states, as shown ames spokesmen who ap €Xceptional case, a hews article-ciies
*rael’s bombj Words
ng of an Iraqi reactor was an act of terrorism. .
le or broadcast In thi s artic le sing a NOL » | orn source iden ifti
sample ever cited : — rrorist
tifying a Western state . per and in murd mas F ™ . ern seceenaelauianks th; was a period that this of ~ mass ©. Notete that ‘ ;
Yate).
Mala, and of massive internal repression a
205
Terrorism Industry —
iia
haere 7 = by South Africa; these, however,
cac upP as not show aS Cases 6 f State
do
terrorism in the 135 sample articles and broadcasts. The CBS index Western cases 5 for 1981 shows 45 non-Western and three f State
or, the only instance jp terrorism, the latter includ ing El | Salvad Which 1S cit ed 4 Latin America terror state
as a State terrorist.
Table 8-3 State and Nonstate Terrorism and Terrorists and Their * Political Affiliations, as Portrayed in the U.S. Mass Media e
LL
EEEEEEEE—E—E——E
NIN
ee
State and Nonstate Actors as Terrorasts Nonstate State
96 10
Political Characteristics of State and Nonstate Terrorists State: 9 1+
Non-Western Western Nonstate:
Left-wing
60+
Right-wing
10
Unclear
28
States Identified as Sponsoring Terrorism Western: United States Non-Western: Libya Soviet Union
18 3] 30 95
Iran
Sa
Syria
16
Cuba North Korea South Yemen
UI
Iraq Nicaragua
ae Pe
10 5 9
SEE
eS
ge
9
reports (see note 7, p. 291). és, June 9, 1981, features Arab accusations t
19
34, two parahey of a news article in the Philadelphia Inquirer, April 1ie contras Z suse are reporters doesn’t constitute stat Pee Reagan press officer Speakes whether the U.S. support ©
§$In the last t
ROD:
© sponsorship of terrorism, which he vigorously denied.
206
——
Mass Media ee
ide
eee
We may also note the huge and biased imbalance in mass med}
identification of nonstate
terrorists
by political Orientation,
a a
closely paralleling the choices of the experts (table 7-4). In Pi g—3 the ratio of left-wing to right-wing nonstate terrorists is 60 to 10; on CBS News for 1981 (table 8-4) it is 71 to 11. The Cuban
terror network that emerged from U.S. sponsorship of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose, and many years of terrorist attacks on Cuba** was almost surely the greatest perpetrator of nonstate (retail) terrorist violence in the Western Hemisphere in the
1960s and 1970s.** But it shows up only marginally in our media sample and not at all in the CBS News index of terrorism in 1981.
A long article in the New York Times of June 25, 1978, that purports
to be “a status report on important terrorist groups” in the United States, Latin America,
and elsewhere
never
mentions
Omega
7,
Alpha 66, or any other Cuban terrorist group, although it gives an entire paragraph to the Puerto Rican FALN. In this T7mes article, terrorism is only left-wing terrorism. Similarly, in Europe, the greatest death tolls from terrorist attacks in the 1980s were a product of right-wing terror in Bologna and elsewhere in Italy. These do not show up at all in our media sample, although it contains a number of accounts of terrorism in Europe. In the Western model, however, the West is being attacked by the Soviet Union
and its proxies,
pattern tends to be ignored.
so terror
that doesn’t fit into this
In the 1980s, the spate of highly
ineffective attacks on NATO military installations, and the murder of several targeted military-political establishment figures in 1984—
85, fit the Western model and received attention. An article in the Philadelphia Inquirer by Steve Twomey, “W. Europe Alarmed by Terrorists’ Alliance” (Feb. 2, 1985), follows this establishment formula without deviation. Twomey never mentions right-wing terror-
ism in Italy or elsewhere, although the train bombing by rightists in
of Italy on December 23, 1984, accounted for more deaths than all the establishment favorites for the years 1984-85. Nor does he acts of een hint at the possibility that some of the favored for the delectation oa might have been manufactured and staged
follow ¢ reporters like himself.2° Other articles in our sample womey pattern.?” rin;g g terrorsism also nso : o sp tes | on sta of tale s identificati The mass media’ 207
Table 8-4
ws in 1981* Terrorists as Seen By CBS-TV Ne ee NE as Terrorists State versus Nonstate Actors
48 (5) 152
State (State exclusive of Libya) Nonstate Political Classification of Terrorists State:
43
Libya
9
Soviet Union Western states and clients
3+
Nonstate:
7]
Left-wing
11
Right-wing
704
Unclear
Names of States or Groups
Engaged in or Sponsoring Terrorism
Western or right-wing: El] Salvador government
1+
U.S. government
ly
Israel
1+
Jewish Defense League
1
Agca and Gray Wolves
6§
Non-Western or left-wing: Libya
43
Red Brigades
18
IRA PLO
15 13
Weathermen
12
E] Salvadoran rebels
6
Soviet Union
Black guerrillas of South Africa Guatemalan rebels
Pro-Syrian group Armenian Puerto Rican rebels er rr oth
ere
GIy.)
hk
Cf No DO NO —
* Based on an analysis of the titles of all the 1981 entries in the CBS index under the heading “Terrorism.”
+ The accusation against the Salvadoran government was made by the archbishop of El Salyer
the claim that the United States is engaged in terrorism was made by Khomeini; the allegation ¢
Israel was a terrorist state cited in the CBS News index was by an Arab. though + The large number that were unclear was based in part on the ambigui ty of in dex titles, alno '€ ta very substant
, ijack get ial number were of hija d to have i gs an ckin right political identification, that seem s : OE ae litical § In 1981, before Sterling ia and the KGB, his; po! ar lg Bu ca to d a n Ag di tie er me st We d the an affiliations were identified as
right-wing,
208
== ile: Mass) M eija ee
=e
follows closely the Western propaganda line: the simple count | table 8-3 is 132 to 1 in favor of non-Western Sponsorship. For CBS
in 1981, the ratio is 45 to 3 (table 8—4). Although the United States
organized a system of national security states, and funded and
trained numerous other right-wing movements such as those that overthrew governments in Indonesia and the Philippines, with the clear intention of creating an anticommunist political force that
would serve U.S. interests, only one item in our larger sample hints at the possibility that the United
States might be a sponsor of
terrorism.”® This is exactly the way a censored press works; its own
government does not do things that fit a nasty phrase like “sponsoring terrorism,” even if their own definitions fit the facts of the case to
perfection. The point is unthinkable and the censored press excludes it. So does the free press. Also excluded as sponsors are our allies, as well as their terrorist
offshoots. South Africa does not once appear as a terrorist state in the 135-item sample or in the CBS News index for 1981, nor do South Africa’s proxies, Savimbi, UNITA, or RENAMO, appear on
the list of cited terrorist groups (table 8-5). The ANC and SWAPO are cited twice as terrorists, however, and the CBS index for 1981 lists two articles in which “black guerrillas of South Africa” are noted as involved in terrorist incidents. One news item in the CBS index
is entitled “Elimination of Terrorism [is] South African Concern,”
in which CBS News allows the apartheid government to spell out its views on “terrorism,” which it opposes. Similarly, Guatemala never shows up as terrorist state in either of our samples, although the
CBS index for 1981 lists a Guatemalan rebel incident as fitting their notion
of terrorism.
Israel’s
cross-border
attacks are only once
identified as terroristic (as we have noted, by Arab sources), and their terroristic surrogate in Lebanon, Haddad, is never cited as a terrorist.
The individual terrorists of choice in th e
ien U.S. mass media, show
©n table 8—5, are once again closely geared to the Western Pie
and propaganda line, paralleling the selectivity of the eae ee, Carlos t ae ie). Predictably they are Arafat, Abu Nidal, and
equal to us aa Right-wing terrorists with records of murder than Carlos and Abu N idal, like Stefano delle Chiate, ela ee,
4nd Luis Posada, fail to gain significant mass media attention. 209
alenorsm —Industry ———__
aie
g of a Cuban airliner and Posada were both involved in the bombin
Posada was revealed in 1976 in which seventy-three persons died. network workj, ply sup ra cont the in ant icip part in 1986 to be a
dor. Hic for the North-Reagan team at Jlopango airbase in El Salva ae
interest or excite the identification as a U.S. agent failed to media, which, following their leaders, get terribly agitated if Italy or
Imagine France fails to deal properly with an Arab terrorist.
the
media reaction if one of these countries, or better yet Bulgaria or
Table 8-5 The Political Affiliations of Individuals and Groups Identified as Terrorist in the U.S. Mass Media*
Western or Right-Wing Alpha 66
]
Omega 7
1
Aryan Nations
l
Nicaraguan contras
157
Non-Western or Left-Wing Arafat-PLO Abu Nidal
31 13
Red Brigades
13
Shiite-Lebanese
12
IRA
10
Japanese Red Army Carlos the Jackal
9 7
Agca
ot
Red Army faction
5
Baader-Meinhof gang Direct Action
5 7
ANC SWAPO
2 2
Other Armenian FALN (Puerto Rico)
2 2
Ro tai ha 6 else ale acetate * Derived from sampl
t See note § in eae 198 news reports (see note 7, p. 291). the man tri : as +a Agca, probable agentwhoae to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981, was regarded by the U.S.'S. P press x
sample.
F
.
"6 Bulgarians and KGB during most of the period covered in this
210
news
ee
The Mass Media
i
the Soviet Union, was found actually emp loying Carlos the Jackal in
wk one of its own terrorist ventures! An article in tne ape York Tomes on December 10, 1986, on page Be
91, was entitled
“Accused Terrorist Helping to Supply the Cont
This is a “soft” ute. Posada is only an “accused” terrorist, erie
he had been kept in Jail for ten years after being accused of oe
Cuban plane bombing in a country (Venezuela) closely aligned with the United States and ruled by an anticommunist elite. The article does not feature the fact that Posada is a wanted man in Venezuela, yet secretly working for the United States as a member of a hired surrogate team operating out of a client-state air base. It is “balanced,” mentioning briefly the seventy-three civilians killed in the airline bombing, but stressing Posada’s dedicated anticommunism, long fight against Castro, and devotion to his family. There was no Times editorial reflecting on U.S. protection and employment of an international terrorist, nor was there any follow-up, despite Posada’s connections with then Vice-President George Bush. The Washington Post gave the Posada story similar low-key treatment.” Stefano delle Chiaie, Italy’s premier terrorist, involved in the Bologna and other bombings, had moved around Latin America for some years, working for the Argentine junta, Pinochet, and Luis Garcia Meza during the period of the Argentine-military—drug-cartel takeover of Bolivia in 1980. His activities in support of state terrorism in Latin America, and even his apprehension in Venezuela in March 1987 and return to Italy, were of slight interest to the U.S. media.
The New York Times ran a four-inch Reuters report on the capture
of delle Chiaie, under the headline “Italian Extremist Held by Venezuelan Police.” The heading and lead paragraph portrayed
delle Chiaie as an “extremist,” not a “terrorist.” The story, although report, was also the subject of a March 30, 1987 Associated Press news. not picked up by the Washington Post or TV network
Concluding Note ment and ely on the governication of their identif The U.S. mass media rely almost eee Private sector of the terrorism industry for 7
The
Terrorism Industry ——————____
terrorists, model of terrorism, facts, and proposed Solutions. The
industry naturally excludes the terrorism of the West and its clients from the terrorism agenda, and in fact, makes primary terrorists like the governments of South Africa and El Salvador victims of terrorism engaging In counterterrorism. The press follows Closely in
the terrorism industry’s wake. Thus Abu Nidal, loosely affiliated with Libya and Syria, merits great attention as a terrorist; the leaders of
RENAMO, whose killings of unarmed civilians exceed those of Aby Nidal by a factor of many hundred but who are surrogates of g Western client and ally, South Africa, are rarely placed on official and expert lists of terrorists and are given slight attention and inspire
little indignation in the mass media. Even after the State Department
itself issued a report documenting RENAMO Killings on a staggering scale, mass media attention was fleeting and their indignation was restrained (in contrast with their reaction to the killing fields of distant Cambodia). Even traditional terrorists like Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles, who blow up civilian airliners and engage
in multiple assassinations, do not attract substantial media attention. As long as they only attack the citizens, facilities, and friends of enemy states, the terrorism industry and media display little interest in their activities. We have shown that this pattern is pervasive. We
have also made it clear that these choices have nothing to do with
the substance of terrorism—in fact, they commonly involve emphasis on a lesser terrorism and simultaneous aversion of the eyes from wholesale terror. The choices are simply tailored to the political and
propaganda needs of the West.
212
Conclusions
“Terrorists” as the West’s Enemies
n his book 1984, George Orwell described a political system in
which words could be used at state discretion to meet the needs of state policy. War could be made peace, victims could be made into evil aggressors, by definition and by the institutionalization of the preferred state usage. The West's use of “terrorist” and “terrorism”
over the past decade is a model illustration of the pattern described carried out by by Orwell in a hypothetical totalitarian state, but and the mass Western states in collaboration with private institutions
media in a process of voluntary structuring of bias. of the Wester alliance Because the leaders and establishments terrorism useful, of t por sup iet Sov and ism ror ter of eat thr the found 4 threat from ut abo ity lic pub for nd ma there was an effective de iet support of
for evidence of Sov Properly identified terrorists, and licit at the Something called terrorism. This demand was quite exp
Jonathan
Institute
conference
aig of 1979 and in the Reagan-H
and the PLO ya, Lib n, io Un iet Sov e Th Pronouncements of 1981. 213
nee “ ly St CU IN = a n r o T
eas wave
offictally
jammed
‘as’ the
major
villains,
and
state-sponsored
undertaken oe ee the West, 4 were propaganda campaigns of gov ernment-related institutes and experts terrorism industry
with books such as Th, responded with alacrity, flooding the market The Communist Conn Ae ection, Terrorisy, Soviet Strategy ofTerror, Terror ism: A Soviet Export, The Terror Network, and others. Ihe mass media of the West followed
seen
from
with a similarly intense
the Western
state/terrorism
focus on terrorism, as
industry collective’s perwa
spective.
This perspective makes the West solely a victim of terror, its own
victims and those of its client states, terrorists or supporters of
terrorism. This feat is accomplished by the state and its representa-
tives fixing the agenda, the institutional apparatus of the terrorism industry mobilizing its “experts” to propound the agreed-on line,
and the mass media transmitting the line via government officials and accredited experts, in a closed system. Spokespersons for the victims—for example, South African blacks or Mozambiquan civilians under assault by South Africa’s proxy RENAMO, members of the numerous country groups of Relatives of the Disappeared in Latin America, or Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, or Guatemalan peasants—are not admitted to the discussion of the nature and sources of terrorism.
In this closed system, with only the Western establishment view allowed, an Orwellian process follows. In its traditional usage, terrorism meant violence or the threat of violence employed by governments
or opponents
of government
to intimidate.
Because
Western governments or their clients so often intimidate, the Western establishment has defined terrorism so as to exclude governments,
which allows it to attend closely to the Baader-Meinhof gang and
Red Brigades and to play down the more severely intimidating actions of governments like those of Indonesia, Turkey, El Salvador, and Guatemala, Using this device, South Africa and Guatemala are exempted from the designation “terrorist,” despite long-term and
aio
ars intimidation by violence of vast numbers in their respective
countries; In the classic language of Alexander
said to be merely violating
Haig, they may be g in “terror
“human rights,” not engagin ism.” We would submit that this is a semantic device that fits an Orwellian model,
nion Because the West has ne U Soviet the like states eded terrorist 214
and Libya as centerpieces of the propaganda project, the Western
rerrorism industry has worked out a new concept—state-sponsored
‘nternational
terrorism—designed
to Capture
Soviet
and
Libyan
support for rebels who are terrorists, by making these backers
“sponsors: of terrorism across borders and thus of “international terrorism.” One problem with the new concept, however, is that
while the Soviet Union and Libya do aid rebels abroad, so do South Africa, Israel, and the United States. South Africa has engaged in a
large-scale program of aid and support to UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, and it has engaged in numerous other open and covert cross-border operations using its own armed forces and mercenaries. Israel has maintained a proxy army in South Lebanon under Saad Haddad and his successors for some years, and the United States has organized and supports a proxy army attacking Nicaragua and “freedom fighters” in many other countries. Even more important, the United States has for many years aided
and trained foreign police, intelligence agencies, and armies that
have terrorized civilian populations and engaged in cross-border Operations.! How has the West coped with this problem? Here we move into another phase of Orwellian processes. The Western governments,
terrorism industry experts, and mass media simply refuse to call their own state-sponsored international terror by its right name; they focus exclusively and indignantly on the approved terrorists. The politicization of this attention-selection process can attain comic
dimensions. In the Reagan years, the president, Secretary of State Shultz, and the experts would simply list the premier enemy states taken from the approved set—the Soviet Union, Libya, Vietnam, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Nicaragua—but never
of the moment,
South Africa, Turkey, Israel, Taiwan, Argentina, or Guatemala. The
Crudity with which enemy states were chosen and self and allies €xcluded was quite remarkable, given the facts and the West's own
definitions, In one episode, Reagan excluded the Soviet Union and off ng, Syria, the former because a summit meeting was in the
the
iations latter because it had performed a useful role in hostage negot
from being a terrorist state: ane therefore was momentarily excused
he inclusion of Nicaragua, a country being steadily panic” a
was not derided “stern state-sponsored international terrorism, 215
by
ihe
leronism: Industry ————__
t the experts and mag tha n ow sh e hav We s. ert exp and ss U.S. pre media followed this Orwellian system of definitions without substan.
tial deviation (chapters 7 and 8). The well-known British expert Pay]
Wilkinson, for example, simply refuses to apply his own definitions
of terrorist and sponsor of terrorism to the contras and the United States, and refers to Qaddafi's aid to Nicaragua with some indignation
as a further demonstration of Qaddafi’s misbehavior,® rather than as an instance of his helping a victim resist terrorism. For Wilkinson, there is no such thing as Western-based terrorism, by patriotic
assumption. The suppression of evidence of Western-based state terror was
paralleled by gullible and frenetic coverage of the approved terror. Just as the experts and media could never see much connection between Israel and the Christian Phalange introduced into Sabra-
Shatila by the Israeli armed forces, so also they didn’t require much evidence of Libya’s connection with Abu Nidal and bombing attacks in Western Europe or the Turkish fascist Agca and the important, the alleged Soviet and intensively publicized
Bulgarian-KGB connection with the shooting of the pope in 1981. Equally connection to terrorism was developed through analysts—Sterling, Franas,
Henze, de Borchgrave, Ledeen, Possony, Alexander, Cline, Crozier,
Moss—who were knowing or gullible instruments of contaminated intelligence sources of disinformation.* The laundered materials provided by these terrorologists, as well as those of the government itself, were swallowed by the mass media with little question. Big Brother couldn’t ask for more. The politicization of choice of terrorists within the West has been
equally great. The basic rule has been: if connected with leftists violence may be designated “terrorist”; if not, the word is not applied. The Brinks robbery of October 20, 1981, for example, carried out by members of the Weather
Underground,
received
spectacular
publicity, was quickly labeled a terrorist incident, and aroused the
and press to a frenzy of concern about a prospective surge : FBI left-wing terrorism. By contrast, a small controversy was create i
i fheI
mince nh ae
on attacks on abortion clinics in the peter
inc; these count 85,cbste or tonenmi st Wi medrt incide iey as terroriorist nts. FBI I direct airech\” or |willia which:® these attacks weren’t “true terroris™ 216
accor"
: g: tO Webster, involves acts of violence ag alnst a Zovernment tickly pointed out that the FBI’s own de It was q\ en te ; a boas finition of terrorism i .
'
lin
Aae
7
7
‘cluded intimidation of “the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals.” The FBI then
explained the contradiction on the ground that in dealing with a complex issue like terrorism there is always “a matter of judgment.”
This blatant refusal to adhere to its own definition was not a matter of “judgment,” it reflected long-standing political bias.’ During the Reagan years there was an efflorescence of violence by right-wing organizations, including the KKK, neo-Nazi groups,
organized anti-Semites,
the Cuban
exile terrorist network,
and
mercenary armies.® Although better armed, with greater numbers, and engaged in more clearly intimidating acts than the Brinks robbery group,° they received modest attention from the press and
FBI and were rarely designated terrorists. Beau Grosscup points out
that in 1980,
six blacks were killed by snipers in Buffalo, New York: Vernon
Jordan, president of the Urban League, was wounded by sniper fire; a nineteen-year-old black youth was found hung from a tree in Mobile, Alabama;
two black joggers were shot to death in Salt
Lake City; and in New York City two black men and one hispanic
male were knifed to death. Senseless shootings of blacks by police
in New York, Indianapolis, Miami, and elsewhere led black leaders
to charge in the early 1980s that there was a national racist conspiracy engineered by whites against the black population. This surge of violence coincided with the re-emergence of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi movements. Much of the violence was directed
at anti-Klan rallies and demonstrations. In 1979 five anu-Klan demonstrators were killed in Greensboro,
North Carolina, after
the police released information to Klansmen about the demon-
Stration’s parade route, then were conveniently absent while the
homes of shooting took place. Nazi and Klan members fired into mented NAACP leaders in Sylacauga, Alabama, killed undocu workers in Texas and Arizona, beat people with chains in Tupelo,
Mississippi, shot five women
in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and a
youth in Wrightsville, Georgia.'®
e
to thes ; Grosscup notes that federal officials pai d little attention at least e acts and charges until 1985, although they were fully awar number 1n a camps training neo-Nazi and Klan of 45 carly as 1980 217
ie
____ — — — — — ry st du In ” sm ri ro “Ter
ng violence Of the ti da mi ti in e th t tha t ou ts in of states. He also po
ased to be of interest to the anti-Castro Omega 7 terrorist group ce Florida
aining camps in government in che 1930s. Their terrorist tr ings and threats mb bo r ei th d, re no ig re e we er wh se el d , an ia Californ al attention, and the in rg ma n ve gi re we rk Yo w Ne d “1 Miami an convicteg
o worked for the wh , an bi Fa or ct He ist ror ter d se es nf co e 1981 that rorist Orlando Bosch, bragged in lat Cuban-exile ter
e FBI bothered me.”" Fabian “December 5, 1980, was the last time th
fighters.” and Bosch had become “freedom
Counterinsurgency and ‘‘Low-Intensity Warfare”: Western Terrorism as “Counterterrorism”
Because of the power of the West, Western interests, and the Western
media, the terrorism industry has been able to subtly transform
rebellion and national liberation movements into terrorism and terrorists and the West’s (and Western client states’) attempts to
contain and repress these struggles into “counterterrorism.” This 1s perhaps the most significant of all the Orwellisms that characterize
Western usage.
As we described in chapter 2, in the broad sweep of modern
history the movement of the peoples of former Western colonies toward independence and the dismantling of oligarchic traditional structures has been of fundamental importance. The West had a large stake in the old order and has struggled to preserve it through
regimes like those of Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines, and the army-dominated national security states of Latin America.
The African pattern is similar, with the West long supporung apartheid in Rhodesia, Portuguese colonial rule, then Savimbi, and the South African apartheid state. In our view, Indonesian, Guate-
alan andSouth.Aan sate vero are example of pmeveat aes
Hess and scale of intimidation and desig st
ange, maintain elite rule, and keep 1? : majorities struggling for independence and basic human needs aD political rights.
If, in the face of these central facts, the West has bee? able t 218
Cvitsinnsiee
$$
iebel the world’s rebels in Indo ch oneces sia,as the Phialippi oe Rath Aigica, Central America, andina, otherIndpla teet the West and is proxies as engaging in “counterterr or,” thats
ropaganda achievement of historic dimensions. It is also the cide Orwellian transformation: the victims are made the ees whereas the terrorists are the alleged victims driven toa counterterror response. This Orwellian inversion is given a patina of truthfulness and
plausibility in the West by the virtually exclusive focus on selected retail terror, much of it cruel and irrational. It is possible in this way to designate the murderous governments of El Salvador, Guatemala,
and South Africa victims of terrorists. All it requires is: dramatic attention to the preferred victims; the appropriate redefinitions; stress on aid from
the Soviet bloc to the rebels; the muting of
evidence of state oppression and the absence of political options for the disfavored victims; and aversion of the eyes from the terror
inflicted on those in rebellion. The terrorism industry experts and mass media do this well (see tables 7-4, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5, and the
associated text). Equally important, the Western definitions, model, and focus of
attention make it possible to engage in the most brutal forms of preventive counterinsurgency and “low-intensity warfare” under the guise of “counterterrorism.” In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American
religious leaders produced a number of searching documents point-
ing out that under the Western-sponsored military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and elsewhere economic policies of unprecedented ruthlessness were installed, which created “a revolution that
did not previously exist.”!2 People defending themselves against
these economic policies were then slaughtered by U.S.-sponsored
and U.S.-trained military regimes under counterinsurgency opera
tions. The doctrine of counterinsurgency made any threatening movements from below subversive and thus suitable subjects for in Guatemala, repression. After the reformist Arbenz government
and those in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Indonesia, as:
tay ital or US-suppored in rg etl
Hh Lo se gags ibaa
ee
‘ons were liquidated or decimated
°rganize in Guatemala
since
b
by
hema Attempts to
iy
1954 have been regularly 4
219
attacked,
pe Girone:
eee
INUUSETY
| : counter sive under subver as d crushe ally ic od ri pe d an , ed threaten en in Indonesia, E] Salvace be e v ha ey th as , ns io at er op
insurgency
and South Africa. In the Western
|
|
,
b)
fata model of terrorism, 1 the analyses of the
Uniteg terrorism industry experts, and for the mass media of then world, 1S counterterror. Ina non-Orwellia States, counterinsurgency
however, counterterrorism is the violence of the primary terrorists,
The Larger Service of ‘’Terrorism” Terrorism has served other purposes in the West beyond mobilizing populations in support of counterinsurgency operations in the provinces. It can create a generalized fearfulness and irrationality that give leaders greater freedom of action. The Reagan administration needed a terrorism threat tied to a foreign enemy to justify
its enormous
arms buildup of the early 1980s (and to distract
attention from its regressive economic and social policies). Thorstein Veblen pointed out in 1904 that militarization to combat a foreign
enemy is the natural and best hope of the American elite as “a corrective for ‘social unrest’ and similar disorders of civilized life” and as the route to “popular submission and squalor.”'* Opponents
of militarization and harsh measures against dissident minorities are paralyzed by terrorism propaganda, as it is very difficult to do something that demagogues can interpret as “helping terrorists.”
The allegation of “supporting terrorists” may also be used as a political tool for discrediting dissident political figures. A picture of
Jesse Jackson with Arafat was part of the establishment—mass media
attack on a leader whose program was unacceptable to the dominant
class. In Portugal, the dissident political leader Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho was arrested, tried, and given a fifteen-year prison term
for allegedly serving as the leader of a “terrorist organization,” the
tld byheplsandwy “epee arene na
ui P ~25, The evidence for this association was the testimony of a drug Piha oc i sess UE ecision, no serious effort was made @ panization to FP—25 or any acts undertaken by, ioe
220
Conclusions ——__
$$ org
nization; 7 instead
yment” envirol .
members
may
that
he was
may
have been
guilty of helping create ¢
encourged havepais
a “moral
FP—25 tsomieret
activists in Otelo’s organization
ance
(although
aot identifying themselves as such).'’ In short, Otelo was sentenced under a ruling that could fit anybody who expresses an Opinion that
might have influenced a terrorist act, and who is therefore guilty of “errorist association.” In other countries of Western Europe, fear of terrorists has been
stirred up by right-wing interests as a control mechanism and to achieve various political objectives. The Langemann
papers noted
that the Crozier-Pinay group methodology for moving Europe (and eventually the rest of the world) to the right was to press themes “such as communist, extremist subversion of government positions and trade unions, KGB manipulation of terrorism and damage to
internal security.”!* By stirring up fear and developing a crisis mentality, the creation of a terrorist threat justifies a larger role for the police and army and for surveillance and crackdowns on opposition groups and organizations. It helps move societies toward a national security state and strengthens links between the great powers and their besieged right-wing clients such as South Africa, Guatemala,
and Turkey. The Crozier-Pinay group principles had been applied previously
in West Germany in the early 1970s, when Helmut Schmidt’s Social Democrats and conservatives together used “terrorism” as the basis
for an explicit attack on the “excesses of democracy.” Antiterrorism laws were passed that reduced individual rights and expanded the
Scope and functions of the police and army. The police infiltrated dissident organizations on a large scale. The state even carried out
legal proceedings against lawyers A loyalty and clearance system People were investigated between rejected as disloyal or hostile to
who defended “terrorists” in court. was imposed in which 1.5 million 1972 and 1977, and 4,000 or more the state. Only a handful of those
rejected were of the extreme right, although extreme-right ad i
Hourished, This was a system of intimidation in the name of opposing
oe, but actually using an inflated terrorism threat as an excuse _ *ccomplishing larger and antidemocratic ends. As Grosscup Points out, “Under pressure to prove their loyalty to the state in
Para
a
aiiien lenonsm:, naustry ase
ni s order to get or keep a position 1 civil service, thousand of Citizens lves from the politic al, Cultura] sought refuge by dissociating themse eee and social reforms of the late 1960s.”"!”
:
)
The creation and manipulation of a terrorist threat in West ern
Europe has been aided by the presence and growth Of migrant worker populations and the large flow of immigrants fleeing from of political oppression and seeking economic betterment. Because
widespread
unemployment
in Western
Europe
in recent years,
chauvinist outcries against immigrants have been relatively effective. It has been easy to pin the label of terrorism on political refugees,
notably on the Kurds in Sweden and West Germany. The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq have been under savage attack by military regimes, with thousands killed and tortured and imprisoned under barbaric
conditions, in a system that is labeled “counterterrorism” in Turkey, but as in Argentina in 1976—83, with the state terrorism far worse than that of the “terrorists.”*° For several years after the military coup of 1980, Western European governments (but not the United States) distanced themselves from the Turkish military dictatorship.
But European attitudes and policies changed, partly as a result of the installation of a nominal civilian regime in 1983 and reduction in state terror (outside of the Kurdish area); partly a result of the conservative drift of European politics; and partly because of new business relationships with Turkey that a number of formerly critical states wished to pursue.
From 1984 Turkey was no longer an outcast, let alone a terrorist state, and enemies of Turkey declared by the Turkish authorities to be “terrorists” became terrorists in Sweden and West Germany. The pattern is familiar. Once again the victims of Western state terror, here seeking refuge in the democracies, were suspect because the
Western terrorist state said so and found a hospitable response in
the police and security establishments and powerful right-wing circles
of the Western press.2! With the murder of Olaf Palme in Sweden
in February 1986, the police quickly arrested Kurdish dissidents, nol
on the basis of evidence, but simply because of stoked-up prejudice
and ideological bias.22 West Germany has prepared for a major tri oftwenty-three Kurdish “terrorists” alleged to have participated in
a terrorist organization within the PKK” (Kurdish Workers Party) The charges are vague and some of
the key witnesses are said by
222
the defense to be linked to the Turkish secret police.23 This ceeding followed years of press denu nciations of the PKK oe
sympathizers as terrorists, based on extremely modest protest ei ‘ties and
a number of killings among Turks whos e sources are unclear.” (West Germany has never tried any Gray Wolv es, a pene terrorist movement, which has operated in West Germany for year s has terrorized Turkish immigrant workers, and provided a base ee
Mehmet Ali Agca’s attack on the pope in 1981.)
Counterterrorism as Bringing Counterinsurgency Home
Terrorism has been used to advance right-wing agendas, justifying “exceptional” legislation, encroachments on individual rights, increased internal surveillance, an enlarged role of military forces in civil disputes, and greater pressure on the media to cooperate in dealing with terrorists. As Jenny Hocking points out with reference to Great Britain:
the ultimate impact of “terrorism” has been to provide a ready legitimation for an increasingly severe domestic exercise of state power—the tightening of political and social controls, particularly
through the legislative delimiting of acceptable political behavior.
... The military-based strategy for countering domestic unrest abroad is being brought home, via Northern Ireland, to quell the
unemployed, the never employed, the socially deprived, and the
politically active... . What has been presented as a political solution to the “problem of terrorism” has been transformed in practice
into a military solution to the intractable economic and social
problems of Western capitalist nations.”° We indicated earlier that important analysts and propagandists Moss, among Western terrorism experts, like Brian Crozier, Robert
Richard Clutterbuck, Samuel Francis, and Maurice Tugwell, have Shown a strong proclivity to identify any labor disputes, eal influence iw and upheavals from below as probable signs of Soviet
“PPropriately a matter
for police and army interest a
thers, like Brian Jenkins and Paul Wilkinson, along with 223
Glu
m orroriom: =INCUStty n
eee
sen
deeply
buck and Tugwell, have been deeply 1m
involved in counterins ,
Se
ae €ncy
. sis of low elys siclana tson’s nclas ap operations. We pointed out that Ki to ibera e emocracy, intensity warfare identifies the threat
which
as protest that calls for a military response, as any kind of action ing it doesn't oe Paul presses the establishment to do someth viding ‘certain Wilkinson also sees counterinsurgency warfare as pro
basic ground rules which should be followed by liberal democracies
taking a tough line against terrorism.””’ The transformation of these
counterinsurgency experts into terrorism experts 1s plausible if, as we believe, and as Jenny Hocking suggests, “terrorism” and “counterterrorism” are designed to serve a larger purpose for the Western establishment.
They have been bringing counterinsurgency
home
from the provinces under the guise of counterterrorism.
Manufacturing Terrorism There are several different forms of manufactured terrorism. One
is the inflation of the menace on the basis of modest and not very threatening but conceivably real actions (as with the Weather Underground and the West German Kurds). Another is the false transfer of the responsibility for a terrorist act to a convenient villain, as in the case of Agca’s shooting of the pope.*® This involves a new
level of dishonesty because the witnesses must be persuaded by state officials to fabricate evidence, and the Western
terrorism industry
and press must swallow and disseminate these false claims. In the
Otelo case, also, there is strong evidence that state agents eventually
served as witnesses in a process designed to tie a political opponent to a terrorist organization.
peacoat tence er
well, may not only io li : etal cae ae Eo et Saale ‘a Si picate terrorists from within terrorist Ores aia
ys May urge
them
to commit
terrorist
acts to justify
prosecution, They themselves may carry out terrorist acts—attributed to
others—for propaganda y ae : Purposes. We believe that these ac tions are of great and underestimated ; pe It for
agents of intelligence or | fee
is not difficu’ ki 84nizauionsimportance. to set off a It bomb or even tO 224
Conclusions
——
individuals, or to encourage or hire others to do these things; then to make a phone call claiming responsibility on behalf of a Red network or Palestinian organization. This is an easy way of creating
a desired moral environment, and there is substantial evidence that states have frequently engaged in such practices. The Israeli govern-
ment carried out a number of terrorist bombings of U.S. facilities in Cairo in 1955-56, Egyptians and damage
hoping that these would relations between
States.2° Philip Agee described
be attributed to
Egypt and the United
frequent CIA-sponsored
acts of
violence in Latin America, arranged so that blame would fall on
Cuba.*° The intelligence agencies of Italy in the 1960s and 1970s participated in a “strategy of tension” in which violent acts were carried out by the organized right and then blamed on the left.*! These acts were of major importance in the total spectrum of terrorism in Italy. And in the United States, the FBI has long engaged in agent provocateur actions, urging violence on penetrated dissident organizations and carrying out direct acts of violence, then
attributed to the individuals and organizations under attack.°* Terrorism is also manufactured in the private sector to incriminate union leaders, activists, and political enemies, sometimes in collusion with agents of the state. In March 1980, a former CIA agent and Wackenhut employee, William L. Richardson, working for the
Canadian security firm Centurion Investigations, Ltd., testified in court that he had made a bomb intended to be placed in the car of a UAW union official during a strike at Douglas Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., and that he and his associates had several times previously used this tactic to cause the arrest of workers.** In the recent case of the arrest of an animal rights activist, Fran Trutt, in Norwalk, Connecticut, on November 11, 1988, her organization had been
protesting for several years against the operations of U.S. Surgical
Corporation (which kills between 9,000 and 10,000 dogs a year in
laboratories and during “sales sessions” for surgeons)** and its owner,
Leon Hirsh. Hirsh hired the security firm Perceptions International,
whose agents infiltrated the animal rights group. Members claim that the infiltrators pressed vigorously for violent action, gave Trutt ty to buy a bomb, and accompanied her to USCC, where the ©mb was placed beside the firm’s building. All of these details had
“€n rehearsed with the police, who then arrested Trutt.*° (The 225
ahpe mororsm
ee
Inuustry mee
U.S. Surgical Corporation and Perceptions Internationa] deny th aims. cn of terrorist bombings in Western Euro Se pe during the
early and mid-1980s had the earmarks of being, at least jn part manufactured terrorism. The bombings were all too convenient fe
Western propaganda needs; many of them, especially those directeg against NATO installations, were symbolic and ineffectual. If we as, who benefited from this terrorism, the answer is clear. It may be that some of the members of the groups allegedly engaging in these acts thought differently and truly believed that their actions would
be useful in curbing the Western war machine, but there are other
possibilities. One is that they were penetrated by Western intelligence agencies and led by them into these actions. Another is that the acts were even more directly those of state agents. The outbreak of terrorism in Belgium in the early 1980s is instructive. Between 1982 and 1985 a group called the Killers of Brabant murdered twenty-eight people in a series of supermarket robberies that yielded meager returns but great publicity on the “terrorist threat.” Nobody has yet been convicted of these crimes, but journalists’ investigations and court inquiries have uncovered evidence that tie these acts to state officials in a variety of ways. Among the interesting facts was the discovery of one of the murder weapons in the possession of a private detective and former member of the gendarmes, Madani Bouhouche, who claimed to work for State security. Bouhouche was also associated with the neo-Nazi
paramilitary group Westland New Post (WNP). At least two acknowl edged members
of the state security apparatus helped train WNP
activists. The day after Bouhouche was arrested, his friend Jea”
Bultot, another right-wing militant and founder of the Practical Shooting Club, also deputy director of Saint-Gilles prison, fled to
Paraguay. A witness claimed to have seen Bultot near a supermarkel shortly before one of the attacks. Once in Paraguay, Bultot told Belgian Journalist René Haquin that the killings were a state security
destabilization operation with state participation “at every level.” 4
aah
(including eanite
ae a
former gendarme turned a
se
to have a fle ® ic police found om theagents), sth ;State security and addresses of gatas Tt
mns*stolen Sromnnihie gendarmerie, asserted on Belgia! 226
eS —————_——Coielision that state security had provided the arms used by the Killers of Brabant. On the same day, seven WNP militants, including six military professionals, went on trial for Stealing defense documents
and setting up a private militia, which they claimed they did on
orders from state security to prove the weaknesses of the sec urity system. They named their security service contacts.2 Another terrorist organization, the allegedly left-wing Cellules
Communistes Combattantes (CCC), also surfaced in Belgium in the early 1980s. The CCC organized twenty-seven attacks in eleven months on banks, other business installations, army and NATO
facilities, accidentally killing two firemen in one attack, but otherwise doing marginal damage and generating tremendous publicity. The leader of this enterprise, Pierre Carrette, who performed miracles
in fixing radio-controlled bombs in the middle of a NATO radiocommunications center, was finally arrested. His father is the state security agent Alphonse Carrette, his brother is a WNP member and army commando,
and Pierre Carrette carried out these attacks
despite being under surveillance by Belgian security since 1979.37 These actions, claims, and linkages do not prove state control of this outburst of terrorism, but the accumulated evidence is strong that at least some elements of the security services cooperated in a
Belgian “strategy of tension” analogous to that pursued by the
intelligence and military services in Italy.
The private security industry also played a role in terrorist events in Belgium. As we described earlier, at the time of the bombing of the Jewish Synagogue on the Rue de la Régence in Brussels in 1982, it was being guarded by Wackenhut.?® The director of the Belgian
branch of Wackenhut at that time was Jean-Francis Calmette, an “xtreme right-wing arms enthusiast, who was linked to WNP. The man actually on duty at the synagogue was Marcel Barbier, a former
Paratrooper, anti-Semite, also a WNP man, who was later convicted of murder. This bombing provided the basis for the setting up of a Special new “counterterrorism” service of the state. The supermar ket bombings led to a Wackenhut contract to protect the centrally located
shopping mall City 2.39 pa
Creat Britain, both an anarchist menace and an alleged Black
a ation Front have reared their heads in eel ©us circumstances. Anarchist groups name 227
ee
e [he “Terrorism Industry re
Hurricane, pamphlets entitled Written in F ie and Without ep,
and magazines called Flamethrower and Attack made publicity Splashes in the mid-1980s. Some or all of these may be independent, but suggestions of
connections to psyops operations are aroused by their
timing and fit to state demands, frequent absurdity, ery for Public; ly
b)
enthusiasm for petty illegalities, and (in the case of the slick Magazines Flamethrower and Attack) affluence.*® The same is true of the rise of an alleged Black Liberation Front in 1987, in which a number of violent actions, generally ineffectual, were claimed and denied by shadowy black leaders and anonymous parties cited in the press, Eventually, the journal Special Forces, edited by a former British army officer, claimed an IRA alliance with the “London-based Black Liberation Front”! Phil Edwards and Robin Ramsay point out how
fine a specter this provides—a Black IRA is “a logical step forward” in state propaganda, merging two premier devils. The attempts to tie the IRA to Moscow in the 1970s had been a dismal failure, and
the Gorbachev policies had dealt a further blow to this traditional modality. The Black Liberation Front “raises one of the unresolved questions in this area: having created the ‘terrorism industry, how far is the British state prepared to go to produce some ‘terrorism’?”*! We do not claim that all of these threats and acts of terrorism in Western Europe in the 1980s were carried out or induced by agents
of the state. We do believe, however, that many of them probably were, and that other acts of terrorism
attributed
to preferred
terrorists (e.g., the Kurds) were carried out by agents of Western
states (e.g., the Turkish government). It is extremely interesting and important that, despite the historic record on this subject, the Western experts and press systematically ignore this possibility. The lengthy
articles on the new wave of terrorism that struck Western Europe
in the early and mid-1980s, which we cited earlier,#? do not mention
Westland New Post, Wackenhut,
ce
|
43
ae
Britain,**
or the “strategy of tension” 10
the growth of the very active National Fr ont 10 ee or even
D the better-known and proven role of the stats Hie extreme right in Italy. Terrorism is left-wing retail violence, and t
possibility of manufac tured terrorism is never mentioned.
228
Conclusions The Terrorism Industry As we have seen (chapters 4-7), the West has produced an industry of institutes and experts who formulate and channel analysis and
‘nformation on terrorism In accordance with Western demands. We have also seen that this industry is closely linked to Western govern-
ments, intelligence agencies, and corporate/conservative foundations and funders. It functions as a closed system, in which government officials and the accredited and well-funded experts attend one another's conferences, cite one another as authorities, and reinforce
their mutual status as experts. We believe that the institutes are designed to give authoritative status to experts who will confirm and reinforce state propaganda, to occupy the informational space that might otherwise be used by dissident voices, and thus to ensure closure of fact and opinion. The
mass media, whose structural links to government and the corporate system are already potent, and who are therefore already inclined to accept a state line, are driven further toward closure by the fact that the experts, whose credentials are from affiliation with institu-
tions specializing in terrorism, are supplied them by the industry collective. These experts all follow the approved semantics and model and select and fit facts accordingly. The development, activities, and influence of the terrorism industry illustrate how the powerful dominate the Western mass media
and public perceptions of reality through processes that appear entirely natural. The government and corporate wealthy nourish the institutes and think tanks that service and sponsor suitable intellectuals and journalists who will convey the proper messages. These selected analysts are also pushed by major media enterprises, Whose principals strive to advance conservative propaganda themes
(Readey’s Digest, Time, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times), and
the numerous right-wing syndicated columnists who aie
m0 Pagandize these themes (Buckley, Will, Evans-Novak, Jeane Kirk-
peat ames Kilpatrick, Rusher, Price, etc.). The gta ee.
a — ecome common sense; alternative views fognot considered It IS
relevant
by the mass
229
aPP
it disdisclosed -< it . nor 1s media,
The “Terrorism Industry re
ee , to the public
that the experts are co-opted and reflect the views of
the covernment
seats with badly
Nass numerous
Ze
and
powerful
vested
records
tarnished
1 asa
as paid propagandists,
alots and fanatics, are advanced
;
and asked open-ended questions [
.
Thus literal CIA
and
as authentic experts
This results in p part frc om theeesfact
ckly established that the truth of the government-state position 1S qui experts is merely to as beyond question, so that the function of ects an truths. This refl clarify and elaborate on preestablished effective propaganda system.
ustry is of a high In fact, the achievement of the terrorism ind
order. In his book Black Athena, Martin Bernal shows how the classical
scholars and intellectuals of the West, from the late eighteenth into
the twentieth centuries, paralleling the subjugation of the black and other colonized races by Western imperialism, succeeded in expunging from Western portrayals of ancient Greece the notion expounded
by Herodotus (and traditional Greek scholarship) that classical Greece
had been profoundly influenced by Asian and African cultures.* In a great feat of ideologically based cleansing, the fount of Western
civilization was purified and shown to be free of such alien influences
and to be of purely Aryan origin. We believe that the conversion of the West into the victim of “terrorism” and its victims into the “terrorists” is, in light of the facts, an equal or greater achievement of Western scholarship and journalism.
230
Appendices
Appendix A: Counterterrorism in Action
The Case of Maria Teresa Tula viuda de Canales*
Maria Teresa Tula viuda de Canales joined the Committee of Mothers of the Disappeared (Co-Madres) in 1978 after her husband was arrested and imprisoned. He was released but later assassinated in 1980. Maria Teresa (also
known as Laura Pinto) continued to work with the Committee and to raise her five children. In 1984, the Committee of Mothers was honored with the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation Human Rights Award. Four members of the Committee were chosen to travel to the United States to receive the award, among them Tula.
All four were denied visas by the State Department and accused of being
terrorists, men 1n O n Tuesday May 6, 1986, Tula was abducted by four heavily armed blindfolded
Cvilian clothes on the street near the office of the Committee. She was
and taken to an unknown location where for two days she was hidenmagates a
and threats she sls “aten, and raped by three men. In spite of the torture ince ntly conv
» acknowledge that she was a member of the Committee. Appare *
:
Fs
5
Update: Counterterrorism in Action (Los i‘Rescate Human Rights Department, E/ Salvador
Beles, 1987), appendix 1.
231
ee
Ayyertix A ————__ «
by her denials, Nas laa
Jeft
her at a bus stop near a park
is still unidentified.
arly
oF
early hursday
morning, May 8. es nie 98 1986, she was again abducted by “heavil
Twenty days ey
rise time, the Treasury Police. Interrogation a eumed
men in civilian cts ator: 12 days and conducted
in a more
$0 te Abuse
were nearly ae ues Gles, the interrogators accused her of belo: aoe f killing four policemen, of burning by on oe manner. ¥ Oa
eC COSC fecal having been a guerrilla
ein Toei : She: was blindfold ed indfo eded, handcuff a
combatant 1n
beaten, allowed little sleep or food, and force to carry out physical EXETCises for long periods of ume. Torture and interrogation were alternated with offers
of protection, money and work in exchange for collaboration. She was asked to
give names and addresses of members of the Committee (Co-Madres) and of
the non-governmental Commission of Human Rights (CDHES). She refused to
cooperate. On June 8, she was forced to sign a confession which she was not
allowed to read. On June 9, after 12 days of interrogation, she was video-taped
receiving a medical examination (the doctor examined only her back), forced
to sign a statement acknowledging the exam, and taken to the women’s prison at Ilopango. She was released from prison on September 23, when President Duarte himself ordered it and called a press conference to declare the release an example of democracy in action. During the press conference, Tula publicly pointed out one of her police torturers who was present. Maria Teresa Tula gave birth to her sixth child on July 10 while still in prison, just one month after her police interrogation. She is 35 years old and
received a first grade education.
232
Appendix B: Three Studies in Primary Terrorist Violence
1. Sabra and Shatila*
It had been inherently likely that the Israeli invasion would bring some such ghastly climax as Sabra and Chatila; all the same, it came as something of a
surprise even to some of those who had anticipated it. The Palestinian and Syrian combatants had all left without a hitch. On 30 August Yasser Arafat had
bid his emotional farewell. The Israelis seemed to be satisfied; General Eitan told the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence that “all that remains 1n West Beirut is a few terrorists and a small office of the PLO.” A few days later the American, French and Italian contingents of the multi-national force set up than, under their {0 supervise the evacuation had also departed—even earlier last in, were first out, with a eae Americans, The have. need they mandate, for the photographers a sign reading “mission accomp creat
érine holding up
made on the “pacification” of West Beirut: the era been had art i mi
As al former allies of the Palestinians, had given some Rote te peat the guerillas ae and to the state authority which, however em Pie vf ‘ented. way, Earlier 23 August even before evacuat® in elec lecting g a new succeeded had the parliament the onLebanese St under
‘ddtele aa Roots of Violence m the Mi e Th : ch an Br e iv Ol the o ke s©ndoHirn:st, FaThbeer Gu&n Faanbedr, 1984), pp. 429-28. 233
East, 2nd
Isracli-supported Pha entmmander of the nco ncy, wider of Maronite Christian milita tive
ir ETS True, Basher y ell rbo¢
president,
se
ok
ie
stained hig
d ality which ha ence and brut tion and Ht te da ee milith Nasi i he violma mi ti in y, er ib by br ed rr on ti ec e Se lo democracy. There wea feared and of rit spi ue tr si e th n He c ele ce. His supreme offi forms rathe observed the
ght now feel able to wa | o , under q strong man wh mi at th r, ve ve w at order and stability for which alae th e ev hi least hopes, ho ac d l u o w n | eba:no e and conciliate, rship had secured wise B e d a e l O cs L P ri e ia th ed all tscare amese interm
m the fighting o h w s an li vi ci n ia stin r the safety of Pale fo b bi Ha eign Minister,” said ip r o il F Ph ‘ m o O L P e , th n on Fr m nd. Farouk Kaddou Israel would not at th ” ur no men were leaving behi ho f o d r o w d given its “ is that the United States ha re later to confirm that th
e Department officials wees from the Israelis. Habib at St d an ut ir Be st We r te nc en numerous oral assura of th ng re st e th on , so s wa e Minister, Shafiq Wazzan: im had written to the Lebanese Pr
ted States will provide appropriate The governments of Lebanon and the Uni -combatants left
stinian non guarantees for the safety .. . of law-abiding Pale departed. .. . The United y Beirut, including the families of those who have of assurances received from the States will provide its guarantees on the basis with which
se groups government of Israel and the leaders of certain Lebane it has been in contact.
t to evacuate. These commitments were critical to the PLO’s agreemen considered There were, of course, forebodings. The Lebanese Prime Minister gh. They that the mandate of the multi-nationals was not far-reaching enou that should have been authorized to stay longer in order to cope with the chaos was likely to ensue when local militiamen, stronger and more determined than ed the as yet feeble and uncertain Lebanese army, sought to fill the vacuum creat
by the withdrawal of the guerillas. His and others’ misgivings were reinforced
when the Israeli army, encamped on the outskirts of the city, made a 600-yard advance, on the pretext of demining roads, from the international airport to been of Sabra and Chatila, where the PLO headquarters had oy very edge dent
Presi oe preteen ven etWe Bee agreement took place directly after peace plan” and it was a way of expressing displeasure. en or the sraclis Lebanon, as ever, furnished the means by which apa ‘ erp tes ee jas any diplomatic initiative they did not like. ay oa ie n ope pees CUne ee peneBeirut headquarters of the Phala We . Of t0all have East tian Chris in e ret innumerable terrorist ex at was one this ed, endur had t Beiru : at the most fateful tea
y meeting» was President-elect Bashir hs me in the building, holding his weekl ee a few hours later,(OF1 mo» announced that “sheikh Vaal and when, Maron tians Chris ite een a the idol of the them), had indeed of panic and stupefaction swe ragged, dead and disfigured, from the rubbls who ha planted the boy nb there wswept the country, Though no one knew 2
:
i
te
ere
In fufurt rthe her c¢ ontemptuous ess d, % ut sr witho consudilt ecide
Sharon
d
‘
le
1,
f
ao
oral
ovat
yin al 4, rd for Habib and all his works Bes" : ut ir Be st We to invade ing their colleagues, e
ral
ye
ey. .
234
;
;
:
‘
«
id
had i ee oe of 7 this igs a huge rally on 17 Ju Ty]yi " peer «before the end year ae we oe, Shall eat have told signed a peace
n’? Bashir was to have been the man with whom the fie
a
aby etl
Lee three-thirty in the morning of Wednesday, 15 Sipiecal wou pie v 4eneral Amir Drori, commander of Israel’s northern a ener Eitan Phalangist leaders at the East Beirut headquarters of the militis RE ak a
had built with Israeli assistance. Together with Fadi Frem, the sonaeeanees
chief of the Phalangist-dominated Lebanese forces, and Elias Hobeika, the head
of their intelligence, they drew up a plan for Phalangist Participation in the seizure of West Beirut. It was decided that, to spare Israeli lives, the Phalangists would be exclusively entrusted with “searching and mopping up” the refugee camps.
;
;
At five o’clock that morning the Israelis began their entry. It was easy: the
multi-nationals had conveniently removed mines and barricades and resistance from the Moslem-leftists was little more than symbolic. In the entire operation the Israelis lost only seven killed and a hundred wounded.
At nine o'clock Begin, receiving Habib’s deputy Morris Draper, greeted him with these words: “Mister Ambassador, I have the honour to inform you that, since five o'clock this morning, our forces have been advancing and taking up
positions inside West Beirut. Our objective is to maintain order in the town. With the situation created by the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, there could be pogroms.”
What the Phalangists would do when they entered the camps was obvious to any reasonably observant Israeli who knew anything about them. And there
were Israelis who knew them very well indeed. They had been training them in Israel itself since 1976. The military correspondent of Yediot Aharonot called them “an organized mob, with uniforms, vehicles, training camps, who have been guilty of abominable
cruelties.” It was common
knowledge,
too, that the
Palestinians were the particular object of their hatred. For Bashir Gemayel, there was “one people too many: the Palestinian people.” In his dealings with the Israelis he left no doubt that, when he came to power, he would “eliminate the Palestinian problem’”—even if that meant resorting to “aberrant methods against the Palestinians in Lebanon.” His militiamen never concealed their murderous ambitions. When a group of Israeli parliamentarians visited Israelioccupied South Lebanon, one such militiaman told them: “One dead Palestinian ls a pollution, the death of all Palestinians, that is the solution.” Bamahan, the army newspaper, wrote on | September, two weeks before the massacre:
A senior Israeli officer heard the following from the lips of a Phalangist: ha question we are putting to ourselves is—how to begin, by raping or killing: .
have the Palestinians had a bit of nous, they would try to leave Beirut. You civilians or pate no idea of the slaughter that will befall the Palestinians,
ve “3 Who remain in the city, Their efforts to mingle with the population the fighters will pursue useless. The sword and the gun of the Christian
“verywhere and exterminate them once and for all.” ; Polit;-.
agent
In their
ails blood lust drove EE mere as well as tives al objec eteIngs ~ C ; : ; e gus of many con theiPos leaders Israeli : representatives hece.,. With Cess; } : er the exo ary to resort to violence in order to bring about
239
———
AppendixB Se
Palestinians from Lebanon. “We knew that they wanted to destroy tik said General Aharon Yariv, commander of the Beirut area, They p; € cam I,”
hopes on General Sharon’s scheme to overthrow
Lebanon's Palestinians on Jordan.
King Hussein aeons their S
“dump all
The Israeli army also knew, at the highest level, just what ven geful feat
had taken possession of the militiamen after the assassination of t heir ido], Ne after seeing
ie,
to the Phalangists’ entry into the camps, the Chief of Staff tolq A
cabinet meeting that Phalangist officers had “just one thing left t do, and that is revenge; and it will be terrible . . . it will be an eruption the lik €0 of which hag never been seen; I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for,” They knew also how likely it was that the commander of the operation would give his men a free rein. Elias Hobeika had once been sent to South Lebanon by Bashir Gemayel at the request of the Israelis in order to support the activities of Major Saad Haddad.
Hobeika
proved his mettle—killing several Lebanese
and Palestinian civilians—so much so in fact that the Israelis decided to send
him back where he came from, lest his “excesses” prove an embarrassment. After Sharon had decided to “cleanse the camps,” someone proposed that an Israeli liaison officer be seconded to the Phalangists. But a superior, aware of Hobeika’s past, vetoed the idea, arguing that the Israeli army should not get
itself mixed up in atrocities.
After passing through the Israeli roadblocks set up at its entrance the first unit of 150 Phalangists entered Chatila camp at sunset. Some carried knives and axes as well as firearms. The carnage began immediately. It was to continue without interruption for forty-eight hours. Night brought no respite: the Israelis lit up the camp with flares. Anything that moved in the narrow alleyways the Phalangists shot. They broke into houses and killed their occupants who were gathered for their evening meal, watching television or already in bed. Sometumes they tortured before they killed, gouging out eyes, skinning alive, disembowelling. Women and small girls were raped, sometimes half a dozen times, before, breasts severed, they were finished off with axes. Babies were torn limb from limb and their heads smashed against walls. Entering Akka hospital the men
assassinated the patients in their beds. They tied other victims to vehicles a am dragged them through the streets alive. They cut off hands to get at rings
bracelets. They killed Christians and Moslems, Lebanese as well as Palestinians.
They even killed nine Jewesses who, married to Palestinians, had been living 10 the camps since 1948. Bulldozers were brought in to bury their victims ae demolish houses which Israeli aircraft had not already destroyed; for, roones as well as terrorized, all the Palestinians would surely have to flee. ; athe
What was going on in the camps could hardly escape the attenuon © st
Israeli soldiers surrounding them. Their forward
command
post was 4 sae
200 yards from the main killing ground and from the roof of this seven
ic
building they had a direct line of sight into the heart of the camps: Itce ie one officer, “like the front row at the theatre.” Elias Hobeika spent eee night on the roof of the command post. At 8 p.m. Lieutenant Elul, 6 ngist Yaron's chefde bureau, overheard
a radio conversation
in which a Phale ifty
inside the camp asked Hobeika what he should do with a grouP sestio CESS ieee and children, “This is the last time you’re going to ask me < Hughter
me that,” Hobeika replied, “you know exactly what to do.” Raucous © 236
Aopentix@ —
$$
among the Phalangist personnel on proke ¢ut ood that the women and children were the roof and Li tenant Elul to be murdered a
underst Yaron. Later e informed the commander of the Phalangist forces General Reenessage tO varon to the effect that “up till now 300 civilians fa Chatila sent i nd terrorists 3 n killed.” This information | was immediately despatche e d to military ave be
iv. Feedquarters in Tel Av
As dawn broke on Friday, 17 September, Israeli officers and men atop the
command post could see the bodies piling up. Later they were to see bulldozers, at least one or two of them Israeli-supplied, shovelling them into the ground.
Soldiers from an armoured unit, stationed a mere hundred yards from the camp, recalled how clearly they had been able to see the killing. Their report went to the higher authorities who were receiving similar ones from other points around the camp. Lieutenant Avi Grabowski, second-in-command of a tank company, said that he had seen Phalangists killing civilians, and that one
of them told him that “pregnant women will give birth to terrorists.” Israeli soldiers were instructed to do nothing. “We don’t like it,” an officer told his men, “but I forbid any of you to intervene in what is happening in the camps.” The soldiers blocked the entrances to the camps, several times turning back refugees trying to get out, and on one occasion a tank pointed its cannon at a group of 500 who, white flags held aloft, tried to explain that the marauders were “assassinating everybody.” At about four o'clock on Friday afternoon General Eitan and the Chief of Northern Command,
General Drori, met with Phalangist commanders,
some
of them fresh from the camps. Eitan congratulated them on their operation and the Phalangists, explaining that the Americans had called on them to stop, asked the Israelis for “just a bit more time to clean the place up.” It was agreed that all Phalangists would have left the camps by Saturday morning and that, meanwhile, no extra forces would be sent in. However, even as Eitan left Beirut airport for Tel Aviv, a new Phalangist unit of some 200 men set off for Chatila,
mowed down a group of women and children as soon as they got there, massacred all the occupants in the first house they came across and demolished Mt with a bulldozer. All accounts agreed: this new operation was well planned and coolly executed. About the same time, General Sharon and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir Were again meeting American envoy Morris Draper, who asked that the Israeli told army hand over its positions to the Lebanese army immediately. Sharon
him that nothing could be done because of the Jewish New Year. Besides the
es Bi leva
of the army was “preventing a massacre of the Rismspuae
pa
estern part of the city.” Later that evening the onilttary