The “Terrorism” Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror [1 (pbk) ed.] 0679725598, 9780679725596

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n a v i l l u S ' O y r r e G a a W Edward Herman

OTHER

BOOKS

BY EDWARD

S. HERMAN

Corporate Control, Corporate Power

d an ag op Pr d an ct Fa in m s i r o r r e T : k r o w t e N or rr Te nda al Re e Th

BY EDWARD

S. HERMAN

AND

FRANK

BRODHEAD

Demonstration Elections: ic bl pu Re n ca ni mi Do e th in s on ti ec El U.S.-Staged Vietnam, and El Salvador

n o i t c e n n o C n a i r a g l u B e th of The Rise and Fall

BY EDWARD

S. HERMAN

AND

NOAM

CHOMSKY

f o y m o n o c E l a c i t i l o P e h T : t n e s n o C g n i r u t c a f u n Ma the Mass Media m s i c s a F d l r o W d r i h T d n a n o i t c e n n o C n o t g n i h s a The W 3 : m s y l c a t a C e h t After f o n o t c u r t s n o c e R e h t d n a a n i h c o d n I Postwar

y g o l o e d I Imperial

THE

“TERRORISM’’

INDUSTRY

:

bs

e Experts and Institutions at Shape Our View of Terror

Edward S. Herman and

Gerry O'Sullivan

Providence

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}

| |

Copyright © 1989 by Edward S. Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States by Pantheon Books, a division of Random

House, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in

Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Anthony Sheil Associates Ltd. for permission to reprint “Sabra and Chatila” from The Gun and the Olive Branch (Revised Edition) by David Hirst, published by Faber & Faber Ltd., London. Copyright © 1984 by David Hirst. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Herman, Edward S.

The “terrorism” industry : the experts and institutions that shape our view of terror / Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-394-58080-X ISBN 0-679-72559-8 (pbk.) 1. Terrorism. 2. Terrorism—Prevention. 3. International relations. I. O’Sullivan, Gerry. II. Title. 1990 HV6431.H46 303.6'25—dc20 89-42655 Book Design by Anne Scatto

Manufactured in the United States of America First Edition

by , es ir qu ac m le ob pr e th of on ti The dominant defini e os th of y it il ib ed cr d an ht ig we e th repetition, and by n mo om “c of t an rr wa e th , it e ib cr bs su who propose and sense.” —STUART HALL

Contents

List of Tables

1x

Preface

x1

Part |. Terrorism in Fact and in Western Imagery I From Bandits to Terrorists 2. Western Primary Terrorism and the Demand for a Unified Opposition to “Terrorism” The Western Model and Semantics of Terrorism

Part Il. The Manufacture and Distribution of Terrorism

Images The Terrorism Industry: The Government Sector s, nk Ta k in Th , es ut it st In : or ct Se e at The Priv

and Lobbying Organizations

13

37

53 55 73 119

. The Security Industry

vil

s t n e t Con

_ _ _ — — — — — — — ———— 149

7. The Experts e h t f o t l e B n o i s s i m s n a r T as a i d e M 8. The Mass Terrorism Industry

19]

9. Conclusions

913

n o i t c A in m s i r o r r e t r e t n u o C Appendix A:

231

ce en ol Vi t is or rr Te y ar om Pr in s ie ud St Appendix B: Three l na io at rn te In f o g in st Li l Appendix C: A Partia

233

ps ou y Gr bb Lo , d es an ut it st In s, nk ” k Ta sm in ri Th ro er it nt “A

JES:

(with Principals and Experts) Appendix D: Some Excluded Experts on Terrorism

246

Notes

249

Index

297

Vili

List of Tables

30

2-1. Israeli Versus PLO Terrorist Killings 3-1. Killings by State and Nonstate Terrorists: Numbers and Orders of Magnitude

|

46

4—]. Witnesses in Twenty Government Hearings on Terrorism, 1980—1986

64

7-1. The Terrorism Experts

144

7-2. Linkages and Perspectives of the Terrorism Industry Experts

184

7-3. A Matrix of the Linkages of Thirty-two Terrorism Industry Experts

186

7-4. References by Terrorism Industry Experts to Western/Right-Wing and Non-Western/ Left-Wing Terrorism

8—1. Mass Media Sources Used in Covering “Terrorism”

8-2. New York Times’s Sources Used in a ” m s i r o r r e t r e t n u o C “ on es Four-Part Seri

189

194 196

— — — — — — ——

— — s e l b a T f o Lis t

d n a m s i r o r r e T e t a t s n o N d n , a s n o e i t t a a t i l i f f A l g_3, S a c i t i l o P r i e h T d n a s t s i r o r Ter a i d e M ass

M . S . U e h t 0 1 d e y a r t r as Po

1 8 9 1 n i s w e N V T S B C y b n e e S s a s t s i r o r r e T g_4, d n a s l a u d i v i d n I f

o s n o i t a i l i f f A l a c i t i l o P e g5. Th e h t n i t s i r o r r e T s a d e i f i Ident

Groups

a i d e M s s U.S. Ma

506 918

910

Preface

s im ct vi n ai rt ce ke ma at th s se es This book is about cultural proc

mo at th d an , ng di en tr ar he ns io at ul important, their trials and trib

to s im ct vi r he ot e us ca at th t bu , lf ha be bilize public opinion on their e Th s. er iz im ct vi to in ed ut sm an tr be remain unnoticed or even to s wa n io ss pa d an y th pa em se ou ar power of focused attention to e er wh 0, -8 79 19 of is is cr e ag st ho an Ir dramatically illustrated in the s wa an [r in ns ze ti ci S. U. e re th yft the seizure and detention of fi

. hs nt mo ny ma r fo s si ba y il da a on t en tm ea tr a di me ty ri io pr n ve gi

y it iv pt ca ng lo r ei th d an , ns ze ti ci an ic er Am , se ur co of These were,

r ei th of t ui rs pu in ns io at ti go ne d an s on si us sc di us uo in and the cont e ns te in e th t Bu . py co ws ne t en ll ce ex d an ic at am dr r fo release made

l ca ti li po ic st me do t an rt po im ed rv se so al es ag st ho e th focus on of n io at in rm te a ” a, ic er Am d ne ke wa ea “r a ht ug interests that so S. U. of p du il bu a d an e, nt déte s e s a c r e h t o n i , t s a r t By con r e g r a l e s e h t h t i w e d not coinci

. ry st du in ms ar e th d an military forces o d t a h t s n a c i r e m A f o of victimization e r a a i d e m e h t , s d n a m e d d interests an

X1

ee

8 0 0 0 ——

n i n e m o w h c r u h c n a c i r e m A r u o f f o r e d r u m e p a r e h T . e v i t n e less att press

n a c i r e m A s s e l h c u m t o g , e l p m a x e r o f , 0 8 9 1 n i r o d El Salva

, o k z s u l e i p o P y z r e J t s e i r p h s i l o P e h t f o r e d r u m e h t n a h t e g a r e cov

d n a , s a r u d n o H , a l a m e t a u G n i s t s e i r p n a c i r e m A f o g n i l l and the ki s e s a c e s e h T . n o i t n e t t a a i d e m e l b i g i l g e n d e v i e c e r s a h s e n i p p the Phili

a h t i w d e d i c n i o c s n a c i r e m A d e z i m i t c i v n i t s e r e t n i a i d e m d e t u m of

d e n i a t s u S . g n i l l i k e h t g n i o d s e m i g e r e h t r o f t r national policy of suppo

f o n o i t a z i m i t c i v f o n o i t a n i b m o c a e r i u q e r o t s m e e s t s e r e t n i a i med r o , v o r a h k a S , o k z s u l e i p o P s a h c u s , s n a c i r e m A n o n r o ( s n a c i r e Am

n o i t n e t t a f e o g a t n a v d d a e v i e c r e p e h t d n a ) r e t t a m t a Sharansky, for th . s e t a t S d e t i n U e h t n i s p u o r g l u f r e w o p y b y t i c i l b and pu d e n o i t n e m s st ie pr d n a n e m o w S. U. e th d n a s e g a t s o h The Iran

at th as m, is or rr te of s im ct vi n e e b e v a h to id sa be l al d ul above co

n r e t s e W y b d n a es ri na io ct di d r a d n a t s in d e n i f e d n e e b s ha word s wa s es pr e th y b t n e m t a e r t r ei th at th t en id ev is it t u B 2 s. ie it or th au e th at th is k o o b t n e s e r p e th of e m e h t r o j a m A t. en er ff di y l d e k r a m , ty li bi si vi at th d n a , ce oi ch l ca ti li po designation of terrorist is a highly ow ll fo t s e W e th in on t ti s i ac r o r r e t attention, indignation, and counter

as bi is th il ta de e r in o l p x e ll wi e . a W d n e ng g vi a a political and self-ser d e p to o l e v e d n e e e b v a h at l th e d o m s d c n i a t n a m e s e , and agenda th g n i h t e m o s r fo d e e n d n a of e us ’s st We serve Western ends, and the y of m r a e n th io to nt te at of al t de ea gr a ve .” gi sm e W ri ro called “ter experts and the supportive institutions that serve to expound, . a e d W m n s e i g r a o r n r r e e t e t z s i e d W e n a th g a p o e, r p d iz n al a ration also examine the mass media’s role in portraying terrorism in accord with Western needs. It is our view that the West’s experts and media have engaged in terrorism the of handling their in reversal” AMR LOCESS of “role

Fre abi teesbeanen ies, eee oak

movements whose Patt ee uve i, seeds nae enero see serious of victims main the are eros cena ESE Sh “ terrorists main the d identifie ave * i the world as Soil pve this If rror. counterte ssa Nf Foss reader the startling, : m e v o N n i t a h t t c a f e h t n o t F . st li t r o p e r n o g a t n e P a , 8 8 19 e o as s s e r g n o C l a n o i t a N n a c i r f A e M e th ca t s u o i r o t o n e r o m “ e h t of

FONTS SCCeh

epg a

zambiquan Civilians ea

en

Ai

ee

Sa

ushent- admits killgduovsr O00 . 1986 and 1988, is identified merely Xil

an “indigenous insurgent group” that engages in domestic terrorist violence.*> The report from which the 100,000 figure is drawn, however, claims that RENAMO’s role is purely destructive, and that

it lacks a program or any observable indigenous base.* There is also overwhelming evidence that RENAMO’s activities have been crucially dependent on South African aid, training, radio communication,

of nt rume inst y prox a been has it that and ort, supp ral gene and that government’s policy of destabilizing the African front-line a it e mak ld shou ence viol r othe and states.° RENAMO’s killings t oris terr s riou noto most d’s worl the as strong contender for ranking

orterr of sor spon state ier prem the ca Afri organization, and South AMO REN But a. Liby than gory cate ism, vastly more important in this m oris terr ern West by tion niza orga is rarely if ever listed as a terrorist ty bili onsi resp ary prim s bear h whic f, itsel experts, and South Africa Moand ola Ang in le peop ion mill for the death of an estimated rngove U.S. by ed tifi iden y larl regu is zambique alone in the 1980s,° of m victi a as a medi mass and rts, expe ment officials, establishment terrorism, not a terrorist state.’

al on ti Na , ce li Po al on ti Na e th at th ct fa e th er Readers may also pond

ed at ic pl im en be ve ha o wh , or ad lv Sa El of ce li Po Guard, and Treasury in s an li vi ci of er rd mu d an e, ur rt to , pe ra of s in thousands of case

e th r de un ng ni ai tr d an s nd fu S. U. g in iv ce re the 1980s, have been ss re ng Co by ed ss pa t, Ac ce an st si As sm ri ro er -T authority of the Anti

a by rt po re 86 19 A ”® m. is or rr te al on ti na er nt “i in 1983 to combat ps ou gr ed as -b ch ur ch S. U. o tw by or ad lv Sa El to research team sent

by s st re ar at th d te no ce li po an or ad lv Sa e th to investigate U.S. aid to the police are th wi es cl hi ve ed rk ma un in rs ce fi of ce commonly conducted by poli s or rr mi so al es cl hi ve ch su of darkened glass windows. The use l ca ti li po m ro [f ns io at ar cl de ny Ma . .. s. ic ct ta d ua sq h at de l traditiona s ee gr de g in ry va te ca di in s] on ti za ni ga or ts gh ri n ma hu d an prisoners d an n, io at oc ff su , ng di ol df in bl , gs in at be g in ud cl in e of physical abus ad he ce li po at l va ri ar d an st re ar of nt me mo rape between the re fo be ne do y ll ua us is n io at og rr te in of e as ph t rs fi quarters. This .? rs ce fi of ce li po as ee in ta de e th to es lv se em th the captors identify

p a s i D e h t f o s r e h t o M e h t f o e e t t i m m o C e h t d e t i The delegation vis

, a l u T a s e r e T a i r a M r e b m e m e e t t i m m o c h t i w e k o p s d n a peared, Xi

n, me ed fi ti en id un ur fo by n io ct du ab nt “who testified about her rece e ul se e e ed at pe re d an g, in at be n, io at og rr te in and her subsequent a y da e th Zo y Ma on ed st re was again ar was charged with being a terrorist an

re

was su

Fe

q

er. She

: y impris-

of se ca is th on n io at rm fo in r he rt fu r fo oned.”!° (See appendix A ne ni of e on s wa la Tu sa re Te a rf Ma .) on ti counterterrorism in ac 86 19 y Ma in ce li Po ry su ea Tr e th by ed st re s ar er rk human rights wo

eat Gu of nt me rn ve go e th , 86 19 e nc Si m. is or and charged with terr nt me rn ve go S. U. r a de s un nd t fu of en pi ci re e th en be so al s ha mala , my ar an al em at Gu ng li ru e th gh ou th al m, ra og m” pr is or “counterterr s an li vi d ci me ar un re mo ny ma ed ll ki s , ha ce li an po or ad like the Salv , of ng nh ga ei -M er ad , Ba es ad ig Br d Re O, PL e th d di an s th 80 19 e th in

a Abu Nidal, Qaddafi, and Carlos the Jackal combined. Although we will be focusing heavily on the “invisible” victims of terrorism and the biases of the Western terrorism experts and media, we do not approve or condone in any way the indiscriminate acts of violence that the Western experts on terrorism, government officials, and press attend to with great energy. Attacks on unarmed civilians in plane hijackings, bombs set off in public places, and the like are inexcusable, and attempts must be made to deter and control such actions

whatever their causes and whoever the perpetrators. Immediate practical measures of prevention and control are necessary, and punishment must be meted out in accord with the rule of law. We do not

believe that savage penalties will be useful or are morally justifiable for the crimes of hijacking and hostage-taking per se, although damage to

individuals and property that occurs in such actions is a different matter (and is treated severely in existing law). We also believe that a pol-

icy of refusal to negotiate with terrorists is foolishly unbending, poses

excessive danger to hostages, and is unsustainable. The powers who

claim to follow this policy do so erratically. d m te e ic is th on fl or in rr e te t th al of ea de e, at gr a o, ev th to li be We West has its roots in Western acts and policies. We do not deny e th necessity of protecting against terrorist acts a s they occur, but ee urgently importan acts if, in the lon

t to

understand 'he underlying causes of a

this ct that ae ao sepia is: to be reduced. We pte : anda enti, 1€ Vest inflicts far more terrorism than it eS

‘ obscured by its ability to define itself as view vict; oaeither while its vicums remain invisible or are branded terrorists. I XIV

Preface this is true, and if it is also true that a substantial part of antiWestern terrorism is a response to Western terrorism, then the

main solution to the terrorism problem for the West is clear: stop doing it. We would like to express our thanks to the following individuals for providing us with information or for critical reading of the

manuscript: Chip Berlet, Nicholas Bell, Nicholas Busch, Noam Chomsky, Bob Figlio, Howard Goldenthal, René Haquin, Roy Head, Mary Herman, Albert Mokhiber, Diana Johnstone, Wes McCune, Ben O’Brien, Robin Ramsay, Ellen Ray, Diana Reynolds, Bill Schaap,

Elmar Weitekamp, and Lou Wolf. We are also grateful to our editor at Pantheon, Jim Peck, for much cogent advice. The authors alone are responsible for any remaining errors.

XV

Terrorism in Fact and in Western Imagery

From Bandits to Terrorists

Introduction

n the half century before “terrorism” became a commonly used word, the United States struggled valiantly against a variety of “bandits,” “barbarians,” and “savages” in the Philippines and Central America

and the Caribbean

basin. In the Philippines,

President

William McKinley, having consulted God as well as Democratic and l cia mer com our ing lett that ing not r afte and ! ers, lead n ica ubl Rep rivals France and Germany obtain control of the Philippines would do to us for left g hin not was ere “th that nd fou ,” be “bad business

and ft upli and s, pino Fili the e cat edu to and all, m the take to but

best very the do ce gra ’s God by and m, the ize ian ist Chr and civilize

.”? died also st Chri m who for n -me low fel our as m, the by we could

t, Roo hu Eli War of ary ret Sec of ds wor We moved in, and in the d cte ndu “co e far war by ves nati t stan resi bly ica xpl ine the d due sub with marked humanity and magnanimity on the part of the United

States,” rte ex d an on si es gr ag of r wa s ou er rd mu In reality, we fought a

The “Terrorism Industy ———————__

i

war’ against a people BQ ECEUS ely referred to

n a i d n I “ n a , n o i minat with lete comp war a ; ages “sav and ” dits “ban as well a5 * ee as “niggers as eee mace killing

of prisoners, and eventually,

water torture, the

pee rebels. ae

ae

ae nbcirect attacks on the civilian base of the

niding mission ran into a severe obstacle, noted General Arthur McArthur in a report of October

ae “the almost complete community of action of the

The . ures meas h hars for need the ce Hen entire native population.”*

have may and s, sand thou of ds dre hun the civilian toll ran into Anti d lan Eng New the for ator stig inve The exceeded a million.® rn retu his g owin foll , 1904 in e wrot Imperialist League Philippines:

from the

y, tr un co e th of s ng di il bu ic bl pu e th d ye ro We have in fact dest s, ar ye x si of od ri pe e th ng ri du es ss lo op cr us inflicted continuo ed uc od pr y, tr un co e th of ns io ct se e rg la ed rn bu d an d ge va ra conditions leading to the death of most farm animals and to serious human and animal epidemics, brought foreign trade to an unprofitable condition by our tariff legislation, inaugurated tremendously expensive government for the benefit of foreign officeholders, established a partisan judiciary, crowded the prisons and deported or sent to the gallows the best and most patriotic leaders.® Nevertheless, the mainstream press of the United States found

this to be a benevolent enterprise, despite some unfortunate errors and regrettable excesses. Christianity and progress were being

ance to the barbarians, banditry was being quelled, and we would ae w; also benefit from the new partnership

(t ho se pe op le Fi li pi th no e wi th partnership

still alive).

Indwars ian of eociar nerastcationto Vietn againsamt inlesserthe breeds , from the 1960s and 1970s, As j

the government er centuries violen ce of acts demon strat ed any Mat against Filipino pence the in war of rules the of violat ions and a. prison e of handling Provoked by the ae infrequent, “contrary to policy,” and never the outsid e operat ing nts eeaa h ee Warfar e.’ piped hee the evidence of Serious

war crimes did get some publicity 17 ene dominant tone was 1 he Propa = t ic, and t e g o l o p a 8 nda response,

1902, of Pring administrat; On’s

MOtLy. of the press agreed, an

th

led by Senator

Henry

Cabot

ae

From Bandits to Terrorists a

Lodge, was effective in squelching criticism, even though based on massive deceit.®

During the brief period of disclosures and occasional recriminations in 1902, the most prominent editorial view was that the U.S. atrocities occurred not “because of, but in spite of, the government’s

general policy in the Philippines. . . . The penalty must fall not upon the policy, but upon the men.”” Many papers were more sympathetic to the pacification policy, and felt, as the St. Lowzs Globe-Democrat put it, that “it is strange, indeed, if American soldiers are to be called to

the field to fight savages without hurting them.”'” The New York Times also stressed the “hardships and dangers” faced by our “brave and loyal officers,” and castigated the “cruel, treacherous, murder-

ous” natives of Samar in the Philippines who had provoked unseemly behavior on the part of American troops." The racist element in the press and other opinions on the conquest of the Philippines was potent. This was a period of hardening race relations and numerous lynchings in the United States itself, and even opponents of U.S. imperialism often rested their case on the difficulties of bringing civilization to peoples “animated with the instincts, impulses and passions bred in the tropical sun” (Carl Schurz).!? The

imperialists, in turn, argued

that colored

peoples

should not be permitted to obstruct the natural expansion of whites, or that we were obligated to save them, with “intervention the plain duty of the United States on the simple ground of humanity.”! But as Shenton notes, “Through all arguments both imperialist and antiimperialist there moved an almost unquestioning acceptance of the innate superiority . . . of the Anglo-Saxon. . . .”!4 In the Caribbean and Central America as well, in the years between 1898 and 1940, the United States was regularly obliged to intervene to quell “banditry” and bring responsible government to

races regrettably unable to govern themselves. The word “bandit” was used loosely to designate anybody who stood in our way. Eco-

nomic historian M. M. Knight pointed out that in the Dominican Republic, “all resistance was ‘banditry’ to the Marines, even when it was Organized, using flags and uniforms.”!> The New York Times, however, found that “the goodwill and unselfish purposes of our own govern“moved was policy U.S. that and established,” clearly ment... [were]

almost exclusively by a desire to give the benefit of peace to people

_ _ — — — — — — — y r t s u d n I ” “Terrorism

ii

e r u t a n e h t n I “ , s e m u T e h t l O 4 . s n o i t u l o v e d e t a e p e r y b d e torment d o o g r o f ” a o e e p e b o t e a o l s e t a t S d e t i n U of things, the s r o v a e d n e r u O , O s 4 e E a e a c i N e t . o g n i m o D o t n a S n i t n e m n gover n i , y l e t a n u t r o f n U . d l r o w e h t n i s e v u o m t s e b e h t “ were based on o t s e i t i l i b i s n o p s e r r u o y b d e g i l b o n e e b e v a h s e n i r a m r u o s e such plac :

66

5

»16

a e f o k r o w s u o l i r e p e h t n i e g a g n e “

d n a s t i d n a b e v i s down elu

e h t “ d n a , s e i t u d r u o n e v i G 9 1 ” . e f a s y t r e p o r p d n a e f i l e k a m o t g n i y tr s i o n i d n a S “ t a h t g n i y a s t u o h t i w t s o m l a s e o g t i ” , nature of things pose” of e h T ° ? ” . r a w f o e t a t s e h t r o f e responsibl

“professed

pur

y r t n u o c r i e h t f o l i o s d e r c a s e h t g n i e e r f “ s a w o n i d n a S e k i l s t i band h c u s t a h g u a l o t y s a e s 1 t i “ e l i h w t u ” b , r e d a from the ruthless inv t h g i a r t s o g o t t u b “ n o i t p o o n s a t h n e m n r e v o g . S . U e h ” t , s e h s i r u o l f ? ? ” . a u g a r a c i N n i e c a e p e h t g n i p e e k r o f m a ahead with its progr y l n i a g d n e u t r e v n o c e v a h s “ e n i r a m r a u u o g a r a c Fortunately, in Ni d e m r o f s n a r ] t d n a [ . s . r . e i d l o e s v , i g t n c a i d n a t s p , u t blacks into smar

e c i l o p r o e f c r y o r f a n t a i l s i i m t r a p n o n a o l t n a i i r e t a e m v i t a e n d u cr t n e o t m “ n r e v o g e h w t o l d l l a u o ” h s s p o o r t f y o d o e b n i f s “ i ” h . T y t du , s i * h ? T ” . t i o r t e d v e o n r d u e y t n m i r a a r t maintain itself with the wellof course, was

Somoza’s

national guard, which,

with steady U.S.

° * . a 9 u 7 y g 9 l 1 a u l l r J i a t c r i e N o d t t r d h o n w g , la a support brou e n i p p n i o l i i h t e P p h i f t r o c s e e d t h a t h In retrospect it is easy to see t ” s e g a ” v s a l t s d a i “ n d r n a t n a s n a b l e “ e s c C a b i — e r r Ame and Caribbean t s i l a i a r i e g p o r m ) y l o i t l l o f s a g i p c n c a i o a g r d r o t n (a s was part of an ideol

y . s n s i i t 1 a I r l e c p r . o a n p o y d i h s n t e a e i a n l h n o T i i m s o s d d e n r a g g a

clear also that the lies and hypocrisy were not seriously contested in

a

s a v i n sri

, t t n i e m h s i l b a t s l e a n o i t a n e h t f o t r a p s A . s s the mainstream pre e e i s y a s w e e o was no question oe oe wesahad4daonae r u e o n n e 1 v r e t n i o t t h g l i a r r u t e e Se

yard. eee

t c f i i h t s n a m e s e h e t g n i n a y h e l t c t e t i w l has beenW

€rrorists,’ and we will show that the usage and treatment of t€rrorism and terrorj coriive th an t c e j b o e r o m o n is y a d o t s t s i r o the earlier handlin

y l e s o l c e l o r l a c i g o l o e d i n a s y a l p d n a s t i d n a b f o e a o t a h t g n i l b resem “bandit,” desigNates an eiiaist

of

i predecessor.

“Terrorist,”

like

: ? a t s o h w y d o b e m o , s t n e m h s i l b a t s e n r e t s e W i e in th; e way of h Ss : IZation e t a t s n r e t s e W t a h W 4 2 . s m i a n r e t s e W f o r o y r t i d n a b r e v e n is do ? r e t s e W t fi s n o i t c a r i e h t if terrorism, even

nee

From Bandits to Terrorists —————

definitions of these terms and are declared by Western political

entities like the International Court of Justice to be in violation of international law (1.e., banditry). The United States and other West-

ern states are still portrayed in a defensive posture, answering and remedying the provocations of the bandits-terrorists. The West remains the repository of civilized values and humane methods, which is being challenged by barbarians. In the years 1983-88, George Shultz and Ronald Reagan expounded the same or only

slightly altered self-righteous protestations as Elihu Root and William McKinley offered at the turn of the century and that Charles Evans Hughes and Calvin Coolidge provided in the 1920s. And the levels sta teoff ici al bot in h rea lit of y mis rep an res d ent ations of hypocrisy ear lie r. tha n no w les s no are me di a the an d ments

The Terrorism Industry as a Response to Market Demand

1s s ist ror ter of t tha d an s it nd ba of era the n ee tw One difference be ve ti or pp su d an s rt pe ex t lis cia spe od ri pe that during the latter ts an re sc mi the r to ni mo d an fy ti en id to d pe lo ve de ve ha institutions is Th . em th th wi al de ld ou sh st We ed iz im ct vi the and explain how cal iti pol d pe lo ve de ly gh hi a in r bo la of on isi div of s es oc pr reflects the ny Ma t. en hm is bl ta es ” ty ri cu se l na io at “n e rg la a th wi r de economic or I, FB the , om fr fs of in sp or of, ts par are s of the industry member

a use We . ots sho off e at iv pr ias qu ir the d an on ag CIA, and Pent uc od pr the e us ca be ” y, tr us nd “i an of l de mo ic rudimentary econom eldev l wel is ut tp ou al iv ct pe rs pe lna io at rm tion and sale of an info . ons uti tit ins d an s al du vi di in ble fia nti ide oped and located in a set of

ist in e es th e us ca be e at ri op pr ap The economic framework is also

al tu ec ll te in r fo d” an em “d a tutions and associated experts meet s ou og al an s, st re te in ul rf we po r he ot d an es at st by e ic rv se l ca gi lo eo id e th by py co g in is rt ve ad or my ar e th to the demand for tanks by e ic rv se al tu ec ll te in d an , em st sy et rk ma a is is Th producers of soap.

, em th e uc od pr o wh e os th d an s, ea Id . es rc fo et rk ma to ve si on sp re is

s ce ur so re d an ed ne e th th wi e os th by ed iz id bs su d can be bought an al on ti Na n ca ri Af e th r he it Ne . nd ma de e iv ct fe to provide the ef

ee

y a a — — — — — — — — y t t s u d n I m s o r heete

Congress (ANC) nor the Mutual Support ee of Guatemala can fund data banks or theoretical analyses of the state terrorism that an posed has and oe their in s has killed scores of thousand

e. ee vor survi the to t threa ongoing

ee governments

ver, howe ts, effor ectua intel such te rwri unde do firms ess busin and

conin s need their to nent perti and they want data and analyses

e restiv and s rebel are e Thes es. enemi d eive perc their fronting large in ging enga nts rnme gove -wing underclasses, rather than right

scale torture and killings or Western-organized and Western-funded insurgents attacking disfavored states. The definitions, models of “terrorism,” and appropriately selective focus of attention follow , accordingly.?° The terrorism industry comprises government officials and bodies, governmental and quasi-private think tanks and analysts, and private security firms. The “private sector” of the industry 1s heavily interlocked with government intelligence, military, and foreign policy agencies, and is funded by and serves both governments and corporate establishments. The analysts supplied by the private sector of industry, along with those working in government, constitute the “experts” who establish and expound the terms and agenda demanded by the state. In accord with the state agenda, these experts invariably see the West as the victim of terrorism, and most of them also identify national liberation movements, seeking escape from colonial and neocolonial rule, either as terrorists or as a threat to the “democracies” by virtue of their being “manipulated” by the

Soviet Union and its proxies.2° The mass media contribute experts as well, but more important, serve as conduits for government and corporate-sponsored opinion. The terrorism industry is multinational, with close ties betwee?

government and private sponsors, institutes, and experts In and among the United States, Israel, and Great Britain, and also enco™

Ko re a So ut h Af ri ca , So ut h Fr an ce , Ge rm an We y, st Ca na da , pa ss in g Taiwan, and other members of the Free World. This multination4 spread expresses, first, a commonality

of state interest. AS Arie

Merari, a leading Israeli terrorologist, said in an interview 0D South African state radio, “The foundation of the strugg l a e g a i nst ter rors . ; ; inst the pEhPenoemmebnoodniedof in o un it y; th e u n i t of y e Western world ages terrorism itself, . , .”27 th Accordingly, Mera™ mn

From Bandits to Terrorists —__——_—__—_—_—_———__ the ANC and SWAPO

to be terrorist organizations, but not UNITA

or RENAMO. The multinational character of the industry also reflects an intent on the part of some states to influence opinion elsewhere (e.g., the Israeli effort to mobilize U.S. opinion against the Palestinian cause). It is manifested in the internationalization of institutes, conferences, publications, expert and media citations of

authorities, and standardized definitions and agendas. These processes have yielded a closed system of discourse on the subject of terrorism within the United States and in other Western ings hear in ate icip part who rs, make ionopin of set l smal A states. of or sect ate priv or t men ern gov the by d sore spon and conferences ng audi appl ews revi and les, artic s, book e writ the industry, and who echo an in as line ial offic the e erat reit , ghts insi keen one another’s this ies, orit auth ed edit accr a’s medi mass the as chamber. Established

ive rnat Alte m. oris terr of on ussi disc the zes poli mono p small grou ely ctiv effe are nts gme jud and ks, ewor fram das, definitions, agen excluded. The few experts outside the terrorism industry who have nant domi the g usin to en driv are a medi mass the to s acces al sion occa definitions and frames in order to be understood. This process of closure has allowed “terrorism” to be used as an instrument of news

management and ideological mobilization serving Western establishment interests, essentially without debate or audible dissent. The service of the terrorism industry has been very much needed in the West as a cover for its own activities and crimes. During the past forty years the Western states—including South Africa and Israel, as well as the great powers—have had to employ intimidation

on a very large scale to maintain access, control, and privileged positions in the Third World, in the face of the nationalist and popular upheavals of the “postcolonial” era. This has been a primary terrorism, in two senses: first, it has involved far more extensive

killing and other forms of coercion than the terrorism focused upon in the West (see tables 2-1 and 3-1 and the accompanying text below, and the case studies in appendix B). Second, it represents the efforts by the powerful to preserve undemocratic privileges and structures from threatening encroachment and control by popular Organizations

and

mass

movements.

From

this

perspective,

the

actions of the ANC constitute a derivative and provoked response senses two the in y primar is which ism, terror state n Africa South a to

y r t s u d n I “Terrorism

he

a c a d

t h g u o f e a e e a y e e r o f e b , y l r a l i m i S * * . d just note d e r o s n o p s . S . U e ? O a e ; 0 1 m s i r o r r e t y r a m i r p a t s n i aga e a t r o p p u s n i e c n e l o i v e a e s r e g u a d e y o l p m e h c i h w , e m i g e r a z Somo : . e g e l i v i r p c i t a r c o m e d n u y l l o h w f o a system

ed ur rt to nt me rn ve go ry ta li mi h is rk Tu e Asa further illustration, th

an l el qu to rt fo ef an 1n s, 80 19 e th in s rd Ku of s and killed thousand nt me rn ve go e Th . ce en ol vi ve si es pr re by nt me ve mo independence

en ev , od ri pe me sa e th in s rd Ku of s er mb nu er rg la of Iraq killed still using chemical weapons and nerve gas as instruments of massacre e ge fu re r, ve we ho y, an rm Ge st We d an en ed Sw and pacification. In

Kurds have been labeled, harassed, and put on trial as “terrorists.” The Turkish

however,

government,

is a member

of the NATO

alliance in good standing, and Iraq is a major oil producer and business partner of the West who served Western interests well in the-war with Iran. Both Turkey and Iraq, like South Africa, are

therefore exempt from designation as “terrorist states” in the West.°° Despite—and perhaps also because of—its primacy as a user of coercive measures, the West has gradually evolved a set of concepts and perspectives on terrorism that have been extraordinarily successful in rationalizing to Western publics its own larger-scale (wholesale) violence.?! In effect, terrorism has been redefined and selectively

addressed so as to encompass only the lesser (retail) violence of the liberation movements that are the main targets of Western intimiare who sts terrori minor other of dation, along with the acts

convenient foci of attention and indignation. Western acts and regimes of terror are either exempted from the terrorist label, played down, or treated as responses to the violence of others. The quelling

ee is e warfar cy urgen erins count by ee ee and their violence 1s deplore o tae alin e 2aan Propaganda Sisk : ee a peiliesererrnies ner Western violence oe peseitotcing feedback system: Pseat as the former js Pine tae i eee violence from the ME ae nize d as eithe r causa l or wort hy of atte? i ; and indignati

terror.

on,

the

4

;

‘

’

t s e r W he rt y fu if st ju to es rv se ce en ol vi s’ im vict

Clearly, such

sema ntic s and Intellectual appa propaganda ratus :

have been provi

:

require

el n

ed

a deve

and a cooperative mass media. The fo ism ded,as ter ror a of evo lut ion gra dua l noted, by the 2

;

1

10

~

my

1

From Bandits to Terrorists —_——____—_—_—— industry. The propaganda model spelled out in Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent describes the fact that powerful groups, such as the executive branch of the federal government and organized business, not only dominate as the sources of media news, they

also try to “co-opt the experts” and encourage and subsidize amenable intellectuals through consultancies and fellowships in well-endowed think tanks.°? The terrorism industry discussed here is an illustration

of that process and this book is an application of that model to a particular case. An important feature of the news-sourcing process described in Manufacturing Consent that can be observed clearly in the mass media’s handling of terrorism is the media’s naiveté and gullibility in treating materials provided by the government and co-opted experts. Although these sources have a material interest in the choice of facts and interpretations of the issues addressed, and have a distinct “line” that they wish to impose on the public’s perception of events, the as s frame ts’) exper ated affili (and nt’s rnme gove the take a medi suitable story pegs and their assertions of fact as objective news. An unbiased press would treat biased sources with extreme caution. It would

not allow them to define the issues, nor would

it depend

heavily, and often exclusively, on them and their affiliated private agencies for fact and opinion. Such uncritical acceptance of sources is the mark of de facto propaganda agencies. The mass media in the United States have treated George Shultz’s and Ronald Reagan’s pronouncements on terrorism much as they treated government pronouncements on U.S. goals in the Philippines and in our policing of the bandits in Central America in past years. The biases are as great as ever. This is therefore a study in ideology and ideological management as well as an industry study, because that industry is designed to develop, refine, and disseminate an

ideological line. In chapter 2, the case for the primacy of Western terrorism, the convergent Western interests on this issue, and the consequent demand for definitions and carefully selected evidence to serve these the be cri des we 3, r pte cha In ed. vey sur y efl bri is ds nee n ter Wes basic model and propaganda themes put forth by the Western

terrorism industry and show how the semantics and model of terrorism have been adjusted in the West by the government, experts,

1]

The

_ _ _ _ — — — y r t s Terrorism’ Indu

e P h g u o r h t 4 s r e t p a h c n I . s d e e n s it e t a d o m m o c c and press to a terrorism

industry is described—its

think tanks, experts, sacuetl

n o m a d n a n i h t i w s n o i t c e n n o c r e t n i l a r u t c u r t s d n a , es ti vi ti ac firms,

r e t p a h c n I , y l l a n o i t a n r e t n i d n a s e t a t S d e t i n U e h t n its various sectors i d e t i n U e h t f o a i d e m s s a m e h y t l e v i s n e h e r p m o c w o h w o h s 8, we

y, is t or n e rr m d te h n s a i l b a t s t e i e h m t s n a r d d t e n t a p o States have ad g n i h t e m o s h t i w g n i l a e d n i s e s a h p m e d n a , s e g a s u , s e m a r f s ’ y r indust

n o i t a l u t i p a c e n r o a i to t i d d a r n i e , t 9 p called “terrorism.” Finally, in cha ’s st We e h s t e f i o t r e p o n r a p i l l e w r O e h t y f o r of findings and summa m s i r o r r e t e h t w o e b h i r c s e ” d , e m w s i r o r treatment and use of “ter

cy li n po r e g t n s i e z W i l a n o i t a d r n o y e b industry serves in ways that go t en ns co er ne gi en to tes eli n er st We lp he at in the Third World, and th at home.

12

Western Primary Terrorism and the Demand for a Unified Opposition to “Terrorism

n the post-World War II era, the breakdown of the old colonial system and the emergence of national liberation movements created severe problems for the major Western powers, and eventually also for the colonial-settler enclaves of the West, most importantly, South Africa and Israel. The United States, Great Britain, and France

gradually evolved neocolonial systems that helped sustain control by

the judicious use of economic and military aid, trade privileges, and the cultivation of economic and political relationships. But the preservation of an open door and a favorable investment climate periodically required subversion and direct intervention, the former frequently taking the form of an alliance with and support of military and elite elements prepared to seize power and use the force necessary to subjugate restive populations. Such processes took place

in Indochina during the years 1946 through 1975; Iran, 1953-78; Guatemala, 1954 to the present; Brazil from 1964; the Dominican

Republic, 1963 and after: Indonesia, 1965-66 and thereafter; Chile 13

_ _ — — — — — — y r t s u d n I ” m s i r o r r e T “ e Th

$
? = ee oe responsibility of the prestigious and respecte Fs a

ae

Seer industry is to enhance the credibility $

warm ee to wien ce wes pyavotablerassacialions eee favorable See The a tae es aespentabiliey bs seth gained the same benefits by the se ngnawing Henitage sae : an gular participation of high Reas: a, alsIn its affairs. The CSIS acquired respectability

sae Schlesinge r, and € Corporate elit John Ce pe)a Ory elements of the

Anne Arm

nment officials Henry Kissing” m “o

. i f s r e b m e m d r a o b d n a , g n o r st al

as Louis Gerstner of on Brroth indust ers. I The

American Expres Jess crreedentiail. s of seals ss

Maustry who serv e as experts, like sade ’

70

The Government Sector

—————

and

LL

Moss

at Heritage, and Alexander, de Borch grave, Henze, Sterling, and Ledeen at CSIS, are thereby elevat ed These can then push Core right-wing positions on the “MacNeil/ L e h r e r N e w s S N th e as s u c h p a p e r s a n d s h o w s , n e w s hour, other T'V network

York Times as members of respectable establishment institutions. A Other members of the counterterrorism network have the responsibility of instructing Third World military personnel and police on the nature of communism and subversion and the need to stand

ready to displace weak elected governments with regimes of law and order (e.g., at the Pentagon’s School of the Americas in Panama).°*4 Others train them in the techniques of law and order, including the interrogation and control of unruly peasants and the tracking down and dispatch of subversives (Panama, Taiwan, Fort Benning, various police academies). The CIA also supplied training for the security obt ain ed kill ers Naz i num ero us usi ng 1950 s, the in Egy pt forces of Aloi s Stu rmb SS ann fuh rer inc lud ing net wor k, Geh len the through by est ima ted tro ubl e-s top hoo ter , Eic hma nn’s Brunner.®>> Brunner, res pon sib le per son all y bee n hav e to Cen ter Wie sen tha l Sim on the Law yer Berl in to exp lai ned had peo ple , 128 ,50 of 0 mur der for the as too, kill ed, be mus t orp han s Jew ish Kurt Schendel that French

they were “future terrorists.” to ed nd te ex en be s ha n io ct ru st in ch su At least since the 1960s, by d ne ai tr , or ad lv Sa El in N, DE OR e lik es rc fo ty ri cu se ry ta li mi ra pa

of e rc fo sk ta ’s nt de si re -p ce vi e Th ®” l. ne on rs pe n ia in nt ge Ar d an U.S. sm ri ro er rt te un co S. U. of ty li bi si on sp re ng ui in nt co a as 1986 records ty ri cu se an ili civ to ce an st si as d an g in in ra “t e id forces the need to prov

of ” es rc fo ty ri cu se ian vil “ci e Th * ”° s. nt forces of friendly governme

e th , as ur nd Ho a, al em at Gu , or ad lv Sa the friendly countries of El are le, Chi d an , zil Bra a, in nt ge Ar s me ti Philippines, and at various d ate ili aff e th d an ey Th . ds ua sq h at de as n ow more commonly kn

e th ed gn si as are ca ri Af h ut So d an a ic er Am military forces in Latin

m is or rr te e th in th wi es rol t en er ff di e Th ” s. st ri ro er “t g in task of kill ” s. on ti nc fu ed ut ib tr is “d of e cas ar Industry illustrate the famili

e o m s i r o r r e t r e t n u o c t n e m n r e v o g n r e t s e W e h t f o y t i r a d i l o The s n a t m o p w e i M n o m m o c a d n a s e g a k n i l n i y l n o t o n n w o h s s i k r wo m o u a m m o s f e n g i f n o a h d c e x y e n a i l p s i line On terrorism, it is also d

e n o s o a i t f i a , o r s e p l i o e h t h s d t n n e o a c i n t e a g l i e l r l y e l t d in frien : s r e w o p y l d n e i r f f o t r a p e h t n o s e i t i v i t c a a d n a g a p o r p d n a Political, 71

y t t s u d n I ’ m The Terroris

ee

n e e w t e b relation

the CIA

and

South

Africa’s

BOSs

, n r e t t a p l a r e n e g 4 s e t The a r t s u l l i , r e i l r a e d e t o ee e c n e g i l l e t n i n a e r o K h t u o S d n a n a w i a T ; . e a eG ae f ] C A e h T . e s o l c n e e = b e v a h g i t s e I N a e e e r h e t s ies, and relations between all e agenc h t f o s e i c n e g a e c n e g i l l e t n i e h t o t r e s i v d a d n a f o r o s n o p s d n a , A was also a N I D s e l i h C s a h c u s , a c i r e m A n i t a L n 1 s e t a t s y t i r u c e s l a n o i t o t na p u d e u n i t n o c e v a h s n o i t a l e r y l d n e i r f d n a s e g n a h c x e n ;nformatio i d r o o c e h t e t a t i l i c a f o t “ d r a h d e i r t s e t a t S d e t i n U e h the present. T e h t g n o m a d n a n i h t i w s e c r o f y t i r u c e s l a n r e t n i f o t n e m y o l p nated em n i d e n i a l p x e r e t r o P t r e b o R l a r e n e G s ” a , s e i r t n u Latin American co , r a o d n n o o C i t a r e p O s a t w r o f f e s i h t s f t o c u d 1968.59 One of the pro , d n y a a u g a r a , P l i z a r , B e l , i a h n C i t n e g r A r f o o cooperative endeav d a h s o t h n w e d i s s r i e d d r u m d r n o a t y i l n e o v m i t c e Uruguay to coll s i h d t n e i l l s i e k d r e e w r d . s n e u i g H r n t i n u r o o c b h g i e e n g n i u f taken re war

” . n o i t a t r s i e r p o o r d r l e t r Free Wo

in ge ga en to a re Ko h ut So d le ab en so al it ir This cooperative sp d an , rd wa on s 50 19 e th om fr s an ci ti li po S. U. of extensive bribery

Moon’s

nd re ve Re of cy en ag e th h ug thro

organizations, to own

e th in s on ti za ni ga or ng wi tgh ri us ro me nu newspapers and subsidize United States and throughout the Free World. Similarly, South ae oe oteto acquire and invest in newspapers and magazines

oe Se

ae

ee tna

n, ai it Br t ea Gr In ®! s. ce en di ee e ae , ae au

ci eee

ee

d an y it un mm co ss ne si bu e th to s 4

sponsored ad financed i SAG

e e e d an 76 19 (FARI) in

through books, other sees

te

eee ve information coed

Affairs Research

Institute

e ® Ofpicoen aa Se sa a urse, the conferences.

United St hasHi able to do the samenaathing even mol’ EE its alliedns and clien rcountries, mobilizing resources and : manipulating electio

Italy, for example.® (ae a very large scale in the Philippines 4° Brian Crozier’s Fory

Beene

Cin organized and subsidize

formed later into th - World Features (FWF), which was trans”

right-wing think Bae se tute for the Study of Conflict, a Brits SAME WAY tas ESIStand = Propaganda agency operating much flows easily within th

Institutions.

SS.

though on a smaller scale. Money

© Free World to Sustain right-wing ideologi@™

72

The Private Sector: Institutes, Think Tanks,

and Lobbying Organizations

o p m o c t n a t r o p m i e ar at th s nk ta k in th d n a es ut it st in e th of . M.. rt pa as y dl pi ra w e r g or ed at in ig or ry st du in m is or rr te nents of the s ha a m o l a S n h o J s. 70 19 e th in e iv ns fe of e at or rp of a major co da un fo of h” nt ri by la e iv at rv se on “c a of t n e m p o l e v e d e th described s ce ur so re e at or rp co ay rl pa to d e n g i s e d ns io ut it st in e at iv pr tions and r fo g in id ov pr s, ew vi d n u o s g in iz id bs su s, al tu ec ll te into co-opting in

lte in an ng hi is bl ta es d n a s, al tu ec ll te in ng wi tthe networking of righ e r O E P d an y e n o m of e rc fo r ee sh y b t lectual hegemony of the righ

by y il ar im pr d e d i v o r p s wa k r o w t e n is th of g n i d ganda.’ The fun

e h t , fe ai Sc on ll Me d ar ch Ri g in ud cl in s, al du vi di in important wealthy t family, n u H e th d an d, ar ck Pa d i v a D , n o m i S m ia ll Wi Coors family,

, on ds ar ch Ri hit Sm , in Ol g in ud cl in s, on ti da un fo ng and by right-wi nsive, most

fe of e th of rs ze ni ga or e h T r. uo Fl d an w, Pe Joseph i b o m n i d de ee cc su l, to is Kr ng vi Ir d n a n o m i S m ia ll Wi ‘Mportantly e r u p d an s, rm fi s, al du vi di ‘n y th al we of y ra ar de wi a s an n o u a z i n a g r o s 0 8 9 1 d i m e th y B . se ri rp te en g n i d n u f © overall 73

_ _ — — — — y r t s u d n I ’ m s i r o r r e T The ‘

—— ai

titution,

AmAmeerr;riiccean Enterprise Institute (AE]), the es :

the Hoover Institu sehateeie and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown Center an ee each had annual budgets in excess of

and the Heritage pou had become sufficiently affluent to be able e r e i v w e s l e l l c i i n i e e e $10 million, and Heritage ns B ee.

‘arene

sector have had a complementary

eee” Snes fright-wing institutes. We noted in chapter relationship in support of 11g) bythe pevernmentitouhe onet 4 the various forms of aid given by 8 ; — s n o i t u t i t s n l ‘ , a e i c c l n , n l a s el a e t a n w s s i i a f s s r o a f n i , l e n n o s r e p — s n sector institutio éeihcanenneee s ' t n t e u m b n fn, oe r — e t v r o e o g h p t l p l a u a r s n o d o m n a mati butions have been modest, and corporations and indivi uals have been obliged to provide most of the funding for the institutes and think tanks. Their role has been further enlarged in the ReaganBush era with the increased importance of undercover government operations designed to be free of publicity and legislative oversight, and therefore requiring sub rosa private support. In a brief statement

at a gathering at CSIS on June 10, 1986, President Ronald Reagan pointed out that “an institution whose work so directly affects the security of our nation” deserves support, so “permit me to commend those of you present today from the private sector. In supporung CSIS, you do yourselves and our nation a service.”2 The services rendered by the institutes and think tanks have run the gamut from actually facilitating terrorist operations and lobbying on behalf of terrorist organizations and individuals, to supporting and engaging in propaganda activities similar to those carried out by the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy, he t CIA, and agents of

the North-Secord network.3 The cooperative relationshi p between sectors is shown periodicall y

1C

the private and publ in cases where government financin$ through congressional Bes appr Opriations becomes rdifficult. The cons¢ vative labyrinth is then f call ed upon the fill the gap, 0 as in the ae the funding of e

.

th

Nicara

san contras. The private sector may :-

ani Manpower to help mobilize supportive constituencies. T is oa oe rman documents show that Jack Abramoff and ee ltizens Mee the Citizens ffor , Freedom were tn used by Oliver ost No! and brief ‘6 Central Americ; as eae ““merican visitors, i z e to organize telepho! t0 undertake 2 ee Speaking rallies, and sermons jn favor of the contras, 4”. tours,4 Ac AS another example, when the CIA 74

———

meer

vateRentat ne

SORE of Sea: Ss Forum World F eatures Was exposMeeld in SGre eX ] Britain in 1975 and had to be discontinued, Richard a e j a a e e p e r o p u s a eful ganda took over the funding of this when the U.S. executive branch was having trouble raisin ha to finance the organization of and publicity for the 1989 Sari s:

election, the Scaife, Olin, Grace, and Smith-Richardson foundati ons

came through with the necessary sums. For many covert state enterprises, private and government funds can be substituted for one another according to political and public relations convenience and exigencies. The relationship between the public and private sectors is also affected by the multinational character of the industry and the involvement of other governments in the collective enterprise. For example, the Unification Church of Reverend Moon, which is closely tied to the South Korean government, subsidizes institutes, media,

and terrorist governments and subnational groups that serve its right-wing political objectives. It was disclosed in South Korea in 1988 that the South Korean government, through its intelligence arm KCIA, had covertly funneled $2.2 million to the Heritage

Foundation in the early 1980s.° The CIA has long funded institutes and media in other countries, and the National

Democracy

does the same.© The Jonathan

Endowment

for

Institute, an Israeli

government-sponsored institute with U.S. branches, has organized

conferences in both the United States and Israel. A U.S.-based institute, JINSA, was organized and is run by individuals closely tied

to the Israeli lobby and can be regarded as a virtual agency of the Israeli government.’ And Heritage helps fund and engages in joint activities with institutes in Great Britain and Israel. Some of the institutes that are part of the terrorism industry

Operate in many spheres of intellectual activity and policy interest. This is related to size, and the Big Four—Heritage, CSIS, AEI, and Hoover—are all fairly diverse in activity. As terrorism became a Perceived area of policy interest, these “conglomerates” entered that

held, sponsored experts to deal with it, and provided support for their activities, Quite a few institutes specialize in terrorism more Tees single for vehicle the hantowly, and some are largely for inclusion in the industry are that the mae a e th in t er xp -e st li ia ec sp e on t as le at r fo ns io ase of operat

aa

75

,

— — — — — — — y r t s u d n I m s i “Terror

e i

t i t a h t , ) C S A ( l i c n u o C | y t i r u c e S n a e l c a i r e m A e h t f o e s a c e h t or, as in g n i k r o w t e n d n a n o u a c i n u m m o c f o s n a e m d : n a a l l e r b m u n a s e d i v pro , . y r t s u d n i e h t f o s r e b m e m r e h t o g n o am f o y n a m , d e h s i l b a t s e l l e w y l e v i t a l e r e r a s e t u t i t s n i r o j a While the m The number

. y r o t i s n a r t y l b a b o r p d n a w e n e r a s n o i t a r e the smaller op

in the range fewer than a by scholarly

s a w s 0 8 9 1 d i m e h t n i y r t s u d n i . S . U e h t n i s e t u t i t of ins t u b , ) x C i d n e p p a n g i n i t s i l e h t e e s ( y t f of forty to fi d e r u s a t e n m a s a t r d o e p r m e i d i s n o c e d b l u o n c e doz

m s i r o r . r s t e r T t e n p e x d e i s n r e o i r i e h t t f i o n g o c a e i n r d o or me reputati

y e h d s , t n e l a l i e r w s t a n u r o e d c h e t g o n r i industry institutes have eme . s e v l e s m g e h n t o s e m t d a u n t a are networked with the U.S. insti

U.S.-Based Institutes and Organizations We will concentrate here on two of the Big Four private-sector institutes and eight others that are of some importance or illustrate some significant feature of industry members. Only three of the eight—ASC, Rand, and the National Forum Foundation (NFF)— are of substantial size and importance. The others are not only small, frequently one-man operations, but their funding and activities are

harder to determine, and we will treat them more briefly. Of the eee eae a oon are of major importance 1n the diversified , ee

bnilea., rieee e that , but on teen? think tanksee ght-wing ae

has emphasized economic issues and policy. It was founded in 1943 O ; : by Louis Brown, ’ head of the oh e on n, io at or rp Co le il nv Ma s hn Jo the great producers ! e k r a m e e r f e h t t a h t s e i t i l a n r e t x e e v i t a g e n s e o h t i w l a e d o t fails

e f f o n o i t a r o t s e r e h t o t , e r o f e r e h t , d e t o v e t f a s e l p i c market prin er ne er the horrors of New Deal intervention. It does, howev and

a n e r a y c i l o p n g i e r o f e h t o t n I 8 2 d fellowships—an o t — h c a e r t u o d n a , s t c a t n o C e t r a p y l h E experts, most S 5

+

c

?

>

provides on

.

si)

DEES

48 provided a home base for several right-wing * Une is Stefan Pp e i r a e a e f b m o m i e t m g c , n y o n l o a s s e O board member of Lyndo ~

a

oO

€

n

76

’

Dee

The Private Sector ee

i)

and coauthor with L. Francis Bouchey of The Strategy of Terror. Martha

Crenshaw,

now

of Wellesley

College, who

ha

a S carefully

recently, Angelo Codevilla,

a former

: d n a s k r o w e m a r f r studies to approved terrorists, spent e confined h some

time at Hoover.

More

naval intelligence officer and right-wing activist implicated in the socalled Debategate scandal, has joined Hoover as an expert on

terrorism.'' Peter Duignan, for a number of years director of the South African program at Hoover and a member of Reagan’s foreign policy transition team, is also a member of the editorial advisory board of the South African Freedom Review, published in South Africa under the auspices of the extreme right-wing International Freedom Foundation.!* This journal is designed to put South Africa in a favorable light as a defender of Western values against the black agents of world communism. The Heritage Foundation The Heritage Foundation is important because of its size and influence, and also because it is a far-right enterprise that has nonetheless achieved respectability and power. It was organized in 1973 by Joseph Coors and New Right activist Paul Weyrich, with substantial funding help from Richard Mellon Scaife.15 Edwin Feulner, Jr., longtime head of Heritage, was report-

edly chosen by the Scaife group.'* Funded subsequently by a wide variety of corporations and foundations as well as wealthy individuals, the Heritage budget reached $14 million in 1987.

Heritage has served as an umbrella organization for a variety of institutions of the extreme right and for outright terrorist groups. It has had ties to the Christian right, the Moon system, Taiwan, and

South Korea,!® and the RENAMO lobby!® has been headquartered in the Heritage building. With its more respectable face, Heritage has supported right-wing intellectuals, and it has pioneered in developing a resource bank “to help bring this non-Washington expertise into the policy-making process.”'” It has strongly empha-

sized programs designed to influence policy through a continuous g exploitin by and es, conferenc and publicity, flow of position papers, ts relationships with decision makers. . , on ti ra st ni mi ad an ag Re e th th wi s on Heritage had close connecti , er rg be in We ar sp Ca e, es n Me wi s Ed al ci fi ra of -e an ag oa former Re “nneth Adelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and numerous others regu77

e h

— — — — — — y \ t s u d n I ” m s i r o r r “Te

d e i l p p u s e a e e r d n a s e c n e r e f n o c e g a t i r e H d e d n e larly att o e e i a f e s i n i m d a d n s a l a u t c e l l e t n i f o r e b m u n e g r a la e B e e B ; E W E N O s r e p a p n o i t i s o p s a l l e w s administration, a ership:

d a e L r o f e t a n a M e g a p d n a s u o h t e e r h t , e m u l o v y t n e w t The b u p d n a d e r a p e r p a n I S U m G A e v i t a v r e s n o C a n i t n e m Policy Manage t for the

n i r p e u l b n o i t i s n a r t l a i c i f f o e h t s a d e v r e s , e g a t i r e H y b hed

f o t a e r h t e h t f o e c n a t r o p m i e h t d e s s e r t s t I . 0 8 9 1 Reagan team in e s u o H f n o o i t u t u s n i e r e h t r o f d e l l a c d n a ” m s i r o r r e l t a n o “internati

” ” ” . n o i s r e v b u s “ d n a y t i r u c e s l panels on interna

y r a t i l i m e h t n i t h g i r e n i l d r a h e h t o t s k n i Heritage also has close l

e h t n o s e v r e s r e n l u e F n i w d E . e r e h w e s l e d n a x e l industrial comp a d n a g a p o r p d n a g n i y b b o l l u f r e w o p a , C S A e h t f o d r strategy boa e g a t i r e H e h t f o n a m r i a h c r e m r o f A . y r t s u d n i e s n e f e d organ of the d e t o n n a c i l b u p e R n r e h t u o S a , is n r u b k c a l B n e B , s e e t s u r t board of t r e b o . R s t h g i r l vi t ci s n i a g e a l g g u r g t n s i t t i m e r n u d n a g n o l s i h r o f

t f i o u d n o t c d s n i a l a n r u h o n s j r i o t b i r B n a i Moss, a right-wing Austral , l a n r e u g o a j t i r e H e h r t f e o d n , u n o o f i was a intelligence disinformat n w o n k l l , e n w o a s r a r e e P g o ; d R w n e a i v y e Polic R

anti-Semite, neo-

” ” e , c s n c e i i n c e was s g o u f e d o u t t e n s s i e c p n e a o r h f t p o o , r d i p n Naz a

e g a t i . r l e a H n r u o s j i h t d f r o l a a i o r b o t i d e e h r t e f o an early memb c i m o n o l c d E a n i l a c a o s n f S ’ r o n u o o s J g r d n a e i e t n P a i c o o y j r b p officials reci h s c a , w i g t h n n e w i i h o n t P r — u a T , n e i m h u C l d o e r t v e a i n d l . e s u e Fe Studi published by Pearson’s Council on American Affairs in 1967.”

eens oon

i t p

O o m c e b S 2 s n o l n a z l a c e p s e t ‘ e e s e h t bashing and s e e t s p i r a t l u m h c e o e e e It has not focused heavil fe LDBronismn, but its numerous right-wing ae. y on arete y r a m i r s p ’ d l r o w e h t o y t l e s o l c it d SY have tie ee

; contras he Afri gimes of terror and terrorists (Israel, , South / the rica, Sout the Custcmnlaniand Salace an states). Its experts and conferen Pe participants have regularly conve AL aut Pt é ¢ worl terrorism as a product of a es % simpleminded view 0° ible

for urge d have and viet conspiracy :

base and vehicle for writ; .

5

a

the years Heritage has provided

Ings

Crozier, and Samuel ae oe

:

terrorism by Robert Moss: B

78

yl

——

The Private Sector e_ _—

book The Soviet Strategy of Terror, Francis positioned himself SOmewhat to the right of Claire Sterling on the Soviet conspiracy to terrorize

the West. His citations, in order of Importance, are ert Rob M ie and , (15) s rce sou ed iat fil -af CIA er oth , (16) r (18), Brian Crozie

Rees’s Information Digest.*? Moss and Crozier have both beer on ie CIA’s payroll, so that CIA-based sourcing overwhelmed all others in Francis's book. Rees, the next leading source, was a member of the John Birch Society and a professional infiltrator and informer.

His Information Digest has long been recognized as a compendium of

fact, rumor, and planted disinformation very close in rigor and mode of compilation to traditional police Red Squad and FBI political files.24 Francis, however, informed the publication

Human Events that

Rees was an “authoritative” source on the subject of internal subversion.2> Francis follows Rees in calling for a close monitoring of subversion, generously defined.”° In an article published in Roger Pearson’s journal, Francis also finds that the ANC and “its convicted leader Nelson Mandela” are communist-controlled representatives of the forces of violence, in no way comparable to true freedom fighters like UNITA and the contras.?’ Through monographs, lectures, and policy briefs called “Backgrounders,” Heritage has been a strong proponent of counterinsurgency/national security doctrines, particularly with regard to Central America. The institute provided a set of foreign policy recommendations for Reagan’s second term that encouraged full support for paramilitary forces (death squads) in those countries where U.S. interests were “threatened.” Among the relevant follow-up publications are: Alvin Bernstein and Col. John D. Waghelstein, How to Win in El Salvador (1984); Virginia Polk, The New Guatemala Deserves U ‘S Support

(1985);

Timothy

Ashby,

Nicaragua’s

Terrorist

Connection

(1985); e Doctrin Reagan the Tests Angola III, (1986); William Pascoe Jonas Savimbi, The War Against Soviet Colonialism (1986); Jaime Pinto

and John Huber, The White House’s Confusing Signals on Mozambique Do ments Govern What s: Darknes of Heart (1985); and Adam Wolfson,

0 Blacks in the Rest of Africa (1985).

|

r sea of ation combin a for goemlage' writings are notable d ee ely extrem and fact, Bugible interest in authenticated a oun Backgr 1986 r Octobe an in ation, Henle As an illustr Pdate” (no, 27), Senior Policy Analyst James A. Phillips argue 79

— — — — — — — y ' t s u d n I ” m s i r o “Terr

e Th

k c a t t a o t n a l p d e l i o f a “ n i : a c t c e p s u s i s a v e p n e m e v 4 l n o o v k n c i a t t s a i r l a o t p r i o m t s u g that Tr u A n a , y l u J n i o g o T 1 y s s a b m e . S . U e h t ee of a e 2 o e e h t d n a , s u r p y C n i e s a b r i a h s i Brit d e d i v o r p s p i l l i h P . n a t s i k a P , i h c a r a K n i r

no eyjline ; h t t a d h e t u g r a , d s n n a o i t a g e l e n s UU a g e l l a e s e h t t r o p p u s o t s n o i t a dence or cit t s i r o r r e t g n i r o s n o p s d e d n a h d e r t h g u a c “ s a w i f a d d a Q e m next ti n a e k a t r e d n u d l u o h s y r a t i l i m . S . U e h t ” , s n a c i r e m A t s n i a g a s k c atta , e s i w e k i L . y r t s u d n i l i o s a y b i L e l p p i r c o t d e n g i s e d e k i r t s d n u o r g o t r i a Connec-

n i l m e r K e h T : m s i r o r r e T o c r a N “ , 9 8 . o N e r Heritage Lectu

l e h c a R y b 6 8 9 1 f o r e b m e c e D n i n o i t a d n u o f e h t t a d e r e v tion,” deli y l p m i s s m a r b A t t o i l l E e k i l s r e k e e s h t u r t t a h t e n i l e h t s e k Ehrenfeld, ta

e h t d n a n o i t a m r o f n i s i d t e i v o S f o n i d e h t r e v o d r a e h cannot be . s n o i t n e t n i t e i v o S t u o b a h t u r t e h e t v e i l e s b s o e t public’s unwillingn g d n n i a k c i f f a r t g u r d h t o b n o o t i t c e n n o n c i l m e r K Her evidence for a d e t c e y l l e s l u f e r a s c n y o b i t r d e e s z s a i l a r e n e g s f t o s i s terrorism con n a u g a r a c i N d n n a a b u C f s m o i a l c e h h t t i g w n , o s l l a a i c i n f f r o Weste t n a t r o p m i n a s s g 1 u r d a i t g v s n e i W e n h i t m r e d s n e t u t a a h i t r t a p x e y n o s m ’ i e t t s a e i n r t a t u a g p x a e r a c s i part of Red strategy. She quote a N

s m i a l o c , s h 4 s ’ w 8 g e 9 n e 1 f i t o r t a i e m h m o c n b at one of the Dento su

e d a g r u t r e h d t t a “ h m s n t l i d a a l h i u o c t g i f a of that two high Nicar produced a good economic benefit when we needed [it] . . . we g h n t i a r e d d e n f a f u e e h s h l t t p i o w e r e p u r d d o o o i f o v d f wante to pro

c i t n e h d t l u s a s e s i a e f h t t n i e c r . h s ” E of youth in the United State .. . evidence.”® n o i t a s m a r e o s f r n e i s v a s e f e o d c o e r o n n h t a e e t n i ext Hate ges influ

oe

a te roe ad

serve an the U.S hee 4 aa oe eee ae ae s a f m s F o e l p e i l D b u e R e serves in a autre - h ” o l t a m r o f n I s e t a t pacity to the United S

Agency n(aUtSiIoAn)a.l In hearingss held before the House on Inter ration Ope

Subcommittee

in 1986 e a e t t a h t t c a f e h t d e t n e m a l r e n l u e F » l l u f t o n d a h A I S U the y succeeded in informing the rest of the WO about th

ee. Py terrorists. Feulner had previously ee Wee policy formal a develop and implement £

a terrorism.

m i s a h e g a Herit O l u e F . t h g ri e e s a h r e n Defence

and

Str ategic

t i r B e h t o t y l r a l u c i t r a p , s e i l aces | e , p o r u E r fo e ut it st In s n’ ; air of Britiai ’ n tai er tion? d

i a n e s a , s e i d u t S

which

80

counte

form

Na

—————__> _

MllevPrimatesSerta

a

Security Advisor Richard Allen (a « ae 4 members ofits “Council of Maiiagesen Saas pone i c aS Heritage gave IEDSS $151, 273 in 1985 (their total ee was $185,611). IEDSS is well known for mite ae hie mation about the European peace movement a nd for Bienes a: CND campaigns in Parliament and the media, as well as for see information on international terrorism.2° Heritage has also tee

$140,000 to Brian Crozier’s International Freedom Fund Establishment.

Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) CSIS is the most important of the terrorism industry institutes. It is as affluent as Heritage, it places more emphasis on terrorism, and it has more—and more prestigious—experts in the field. Its head, David Abshire, succeeded in the late 1970s and early

1980s in bringing in Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski as counselors-in-residence. Abshire himself was made ambassador to NATO in the Reagan years, and was brought home to the United States to handle the media in the administration’s effort to contain the Iran-contra scandal. Anne Armstrong, head of the CSIS board, has been chair of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Ray Cline, former deputy director of the CIA, became a high official of the organization. A prestigious corporate board in the 1980s also helped CSIS increase its annual budget to more than

$14 million by 1986. CSIS’s wide appeal to the corporate community is evident in its funding base. In 1986, the organization received contributions from 126 domestic corporations, including 68 Fortune 500 companies, as It also obtained grants from 92

well as 27 foreign corporations.

foundations, most of them corporate-based and 25 identifiable by

). ation Found n Exxo on, dati Foun Alcoa Corporate names (e.g., 26 and s anie comp oil 8 are Among the domestic corporate givers gon Penta the to ons weap g lyin supp in ved “ompanies heavily invol

rate corpo The .>' iers) suppl ons weap r majo the all ally virtu uding (incl

cular parti 1 lex comp rial ndust ary-i milit the and “stablishment Clearly find CSIS a very worthy investment. Nit

Tees

ace

Serves this corporate constituency directly, pens Ae

1n s u h T s. ie ud st cy li po d n a y through general analyses 81

_ _ — — — — y t t s u d n I m s i r o r r e T ‘ e h T

a :

4

oe

diversified

company

with

a number

D

ae

Aveo CUnPOEMOE :aon with Saudi Arabia, and a CSIS one ih a? en el onll Frst multimillion-dollar co

l pol the on dy stu 00 ,0 helped fund a $125

a Saudi

ice Off t's men art Dep e at St the of or ect dir n the regime. David Long,

of au re Bu the in ia evs h ut So d an t Eas ar Ne the of Analysis for z, Boo of aw Sh hn Jo h wit ort rep IS CS the ed or th au co , Intelligence m, fir g tin sul con nt me ge na ma a l, ona ati ern Int Allen and Hamilton zed iti san a n tha re mo tle lit y lit rea in was dy stu ed or th au co the But er mb ce De in ng Lo by n tte wri ort rep version of a State Department

e som de ma d ha y ud st d fie ssi cla l stil d an 1980. The earlier internal and cal iti pol d an on ti up rr co the ut abo s strongly negative statement g zin ili tab des the d an ily fam ing rul the of t en em ag an military mism d ve mo re lly efu car e wer e es Th ty. ori min a Shi sed abu the of eat thr from the CSIS version, which portrayed Saudi Arabia as a paragon of stability. Steven Emerson provides an extensive comparison of the two texts, showing the careful excisions of negatives and other changes that make the final document a piece of disinformation.” Although 90 percent of the sanitized text was taken from the original Long report, CSIS released the refurbished document in February 1982 as part of its “Washington Papers” on international affairs, describing it as a “major new work.” The rewritten and “informally” declassified document was then used to lobby Congress in support of the sale of AWACS missiles to the Saudis, and the Avco Corporation, according to a company spokesperson, used it for “enhanced marketing efforts in Saudi Arabia.’23

ope ees Fen mae is mk en its investigations

,

cee ee

e a d

ces, panels, an

s Ne cu os reports e

hav

oS a frequently

ed ne da an ag op pr ng wi tgh ri d an nt me se tn ve Intheearly19;0s,. CSeeI

b

t n a t r o p m i n a d e y a l p : e c e d n e M e h t f zation o

i l i b a t s e d e h t n i e l ro

me in Chile. Its director of Latin America?

studies, James Th eberge, clai med to h Korean communist

guerrilla

learned how t o intimidate t

82

sHenunpongted a ean

ine desun

eee

PrivatenSecter eee

ee

circulated by a friendly ‘expert’ and 4 pa

news organization like eres

epOuigtn a reputable

Another CIA propaganda theme, that the Soviet Union planned

to establish a submarine base in Chile and otherwise th reatened the

Caribbean, was also disseminated through CSIS, in Theberge’s books Soviet Sea Power in the Caribbean and Russia in the Caribbean, and in The Stability of the Caribbean, edited by Robert Moss. Landis points

out: “Although these books were not published until late IS, ISU Mercurio published excerpts on February 28, 1973—early enough to have an impact on the elections, but too late to disprove the CIA fabrications.”°° CSIS organized a conference on the Red threat to Italy, which was held just before the Italian elections of 1976. The panel included William Colby and Ray Cline, both from the CIA; John Connally, a member of the Foreign Intelligence Oversight Board; Clare Booth Luce, former ambassador to Italy; and Claire Sterling. The composition of this group points up CSIS’s close ties to government, its “action” mission, and its lack of connection to anything resembling objective scholarship. To this group, the Italian scene presented a “national security” threat to the United States and called for forceful intervention.*© One day after the CSIS conference, an article coauthored by Sterling and Ledeen, entitled “Italy’s Russian Sugar Daddies,” appeared in the New Republic, claiming that the Soviets were secretly

funding the Italian export businesses. Daily American and Movimento Sociale

Communist party through a network of importThis essay, reprinted in the CIA-funded Rome in Il Borghese, the official organ of the neofascist Italiano (MSI), was distributed to reporters from

the United States at the request of the U.S. embassy.®’ It served to

divert attention from the fact that the United States itself was secretly funding centrist and right-wing parties in a massive interventionary

Operation38 More

recently,

and

illustrative

of the continued

unscholarly,

panel CSIS a 1984 in CSIS, of Propagandistic, and far-right bent

Was Organized on the alleged KGB-Bulgarian plot to kill the pope.

, e v a r g h c r o B de d u a n r A as ll we as e z n e H ul Pa al ci fi of A I C Ong-time a n, Kampelma Max i, Brzezinsk Zbigniew mb su en th e th ok to l ne pa e Th s. er me re we ne, and Marvin Kalb

ee Kupperman,

83

a

. o o y t s u d n m s i r o r The “Ter

t o n r o f t n e m n r e v o g . S . U e h t d e l i a s s a , n e v o r p s a e s a c . t d h g e i r t a h c s i i l d o u o f j d y a l n e u m e r t x e e m o s d e l d d e p d n a , h t u r t s a s w t ‘ s i h g T n i m ? i * ° a . l a c i d o e r m p tern

s e W e h t r e v o e c n e u l f n i t e i v t o i S o l f p o x e s o t m i d e n g i s e wing cla d , t n e t n o c l a u t c e l l e t n i o n f o e s i c r e x e a d n . a S g . U a p o e r h t a p y b d e g a r u o c n e n e e b d a h t a h t t l i u g t e i v o S n i f e i the bel e h t d n a , s r e h t o d n a , e z n e H , g n i l r e t S s t r e p x e m s i r o r r e , t t n e governm h c r o B e d d u a n r A t n i o

p p a d l u o w S I S C t a h t t c a f e h T . a i d mass me d n a r e p a d p e n w o n o o M e h t f o r o t i d , e t s i l a n r t u h o g j i r r a f — e v a r g r o t a r o b a l l o c d n , a s w e e N h t t h n g o i s n I d n s n a e o m t i g T n magazine Washi d e e n e w l l a s s u l ” l r e t a l o t h c c s n u j d n a a “ — s e e n R h e o t with Birchi J

” . p i h s r a l o h c t s p “ f e o c n s o ’ c S I to know about CS s It . es ns se o w t n i y c n e g a a d n a g a p o r p st vi ti ac an n CSIS has bee i n e S to d e r a e g y l e s o l c n e e b s a h , en se propaganda, as we have d e d u l c n i so al s a f h af st s it t . u B s d n ment and right-wing political dema g n i k a y m c i l o p d n a k r l o w ca ti li s po e in v i nee of front-line operat

e h t r fo r e k r o w n so ai li a i d e m d n a r o d a s s a b m a an aa = oe in cs ti li po n a i l a t I in t n a p i c i t r a p ve ti ac “ e e e c = n e R an Ir y rl e h t the ea in n e e w t e b o g as le ro a d e y a l p d an s e p s t gh ri rfa d ir n a fa af L C A W ntra ace - d: ine has had strong ties to cSoe

f o m s i r o r r e t e h t in s i n a p i e u r a P e g a r a e n i l C s the past es a S = e drive in 1980, in which o e c n e g i l l e t n I l a r of the Cent h s u B e h t r fo d e k r o w y c n e g A

ae cee

As We ng ni is ec rc (a n a p m o C t Ke e th of n io at ol vi r in , a a) ll vi de Co o el ng e c n e g i l l e t n i f o t vi da fi af : Hatch Act.*° (Ledee

aapeeus The

n and C line are discussed further as experts in

revolvin g door

betwee

, y s u b n e e b we sreganns izeatiohnas

e c r e t i a e t Walter

r a e r , n a e th a of n io at gn l si de o s s’ di A and ae aly

t. ap is ” s k o o p s tower for old

Ledee?

e v a h i d e S I S C r e h t o n a , k a w t t u L a i a i t a l e ‘ e s o l c y r e nships with Israel and MOSSAD RFASIWEesLal as had v ee U S gove :

e ee « y ul tr a is IS CS lals. © Bis r e b m e m ” al on ti na ti ul “m y ul rism industry, F The semipermanent te aqueur, Ku O.

rmment offici

SS

The Private Sector ae

divided into three categories: (1) e stablishment moderate; (2) lishme

nt far-right; and (3) critical and dis sident. In hig ¢ be cee P trum, of the four semipermanent and five transitor y expert

fit category (3), only two

category (1), and the seven extremist. The CSIS is not a or others noted above.

s at © SIS, none (Laqueur and possibly Kupperman) fit others fall into category (2)—right-wing “moderate” organization by this measure,

The Rand Corporation Founded by the U.S. Air Force as a think tank in 1948, the Rand Corporation now identifies itself as an “independent, nonprofit research and educational organization.” Even today, however, three of its five research divisions are sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, respectively; 84 percent of its revenues come from the

federal government; and 75 percent of its research funding is on national security.*’ Its “independence” is thus hardly complete, and Rand is responsive to its founder’s

needs.

In 1984, for example,

Rand was approached by the Pentagon with the idea of a study on

Latin America, using as the source of information former General

Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, an unemployed former leader of the Honduran death squads for whom the Pentagon was trying to make work. Alvarez Martinez was put on the Rand payroll.* Rand also conducted a study of Central American policy for the national security establishment in 1984, in which its authors reject a reliance on diplomacy as not providing enough “incentives” for

Nicaragua to behave itself. While urging the United States to “abide by the time-honored principle of nonintervention,” and to continue

its traditional support of “moderate forces” and “pluralist, democratic

institutions” in the area, the authors recommend the implementation of low-intensity warfare, stressing attacks on “soft” targets—i.e., U.S.

‘tate-sponsored terrorism—as the appropriate U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, a country with which the United States was not at war.* One of the authors of this report, Brian Jenkins, is Rand’s resident

‘OP expert on terrorism. In the field of terrorism, Rand has for some years maintained a

seit Subnatonal Contes romp, wh sponsor confer em

seminars, publishes articles and monograp A

and counterinsurgency, provides experts to those 85

A res

,

eee

i

y t t s u d n I ” m s i r The “Terro

q n a e g r a l y l e v i t a l e r a s 1 t I ” . e s a b a t a d m s i r o r r e t “ a s n i a t o and pial se for the terrorism field. The Rand data base op ! r a l o h c y op s “1 common , r e v e w o h , m s i terror

with those collected by other ingtja d n u f s t r u h , s e i c n e g a vernment

o g d n a , s m r i f y tutes, securit

, m s i r o r r € 2 e d o m n r e t s e W e h t s t r o p p u s d n a s t i f t mental bias tha y l t n e s e r p e d i s t u o d e g a w e c n e l o i v “ f o s t n e d i c n i t s i r o r r e t n o s It focuse

s o D r a w d y n c a a m o l l p a i n d o i t a n r e t n i s f e o r u d e c o r p accepted rules and

e r i p s n i o t d n o a m e ( e h n t o o i t t n e e t d t i a w d l r t o c w a r t t d designe to a

l i a y v a l c i l b u p “ n s o 1 i t a m r o f n i f i y l n d o e d u l c n i e fear.” Incidents ar d e o n t g i s e d t o n n e t f e o e c r n a e l o l able.”44 As governmenta acts of vi e r i p s y n o i l ” t n t , e o u r r b a i e n p f o s i n e t d o i d t n n i e a w t d t t l a c “attra wor n o e i l t , p c ) i e n l c o e n f i d s i o t n r e i a p e t s h R o a t p m p i n o c d a n e r a d a e ( f , e r o m r e e h l . t a t r r r m s o u a s e e o r t F e h l r r s e d t t o e f g u r t h f r l a w o a c p l x a e government violence very often does not yield “publicly available information” (e.g., the work of death squads and government torturers), and is claimed (often falsely) by the terrorist states to be

within the “presently accepted rules” of warfare. As the evidence of the victims is often not accessible and is countervailed by the claims of the victimizing states, government terror does not produce authenticated incidents. There are numerous other problems in determining and weighting terrorist incidents.4®

As noted, Rand’s top resident expert on terrorism is Brian Jenkins,

ak aan eae

=e =

author of International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict and numerous

will discuss his work in more dlPree PyEine aoe nee however, that despite his afore 2 ae ate ne organization, and his longee Sane iain borcess pon Oke 1s long-standing role as a counterinsurgency expert and advocate, Jenkins stand a s r e s S to the “left”

Cline, Ledeen, Alexander, and Sterli

lishment moderate.” N evertheless

has provided cases illustr

industr

ofa

ct

Sie ohsuees

h

a base for Paul He te nze as a resident e 6

ie

Me Hhingiion

“warehousing”

“scholar’: service that the

nee 10 s” set “as or s rt pe ex le tab sui for m or rf pe s e an porary institutional affiliation. Henze thus was able tO wor

86

The on the Bulgarian-KGB

Private Sector ee plot to kill the pope as a Rand scholar rath

than as a longtime CIA officer specializing in propaganda

*

The National Forum Foundation (NFF) The NFF came into existence in 1982 as the successor organization to the Coalition for

Decency, organized in 1977 by Jeremiah Denton, a former naval officer and prisoner of war in Vietnam. Denton, elected senator from Alabama in 1980, was quickly elevated to the chairmanship of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. NFF was designed initially to educate the public on the fallacies of the nuclear freeze movement, but it soon took on larger functions in the wake of Denton’s new recognition of the terrorist threat and his strong belief in the Soviet network theory of terrorism. y idl rap w gre F NF , on nt De s me Ja , son ’s ton Den r Run by Senato n, tio nda Fou rs Coo m lia Wil the om fr s ion but tri with the aid of con

nFou n Oli the t, Hun er nk Bu son Nel y, an mp Co W. R. Grace and ani org e Th . on ti da un Fo ily Fam ife Sca the and , dation, Parrot Oil

zation is housed in the Heritage Foundation building. With a budget of er mb nu a d re so on sp F NF the 4, 198 in n lio mil of over $1 conferences,

seminars,

and

press conferences

on

terrorism,

and

published a series of monographs and short studies on terrorism in its Policy Forum series. The first of the conferences was held in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on February 21, 1986, and featured Yonah Alexander of the State University of New York’s Institute for the Study of International Terrorism (ISIT). Among the other

participants were Louis O. Giuffrida, former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Oliver Revell of the FBI, Ambas-

sador L. Bruce Laingen, and Peter Goss of the British-based company Control Risks Ltd., a “risk analysis” and insurance company with ties

to the British intelligence community (see chapter 6.)*° Alexander, formerly of CSIS,

a member of the board of directors

n ow his h wit and l, nci Cou gy of Ray Cline’s U.S. Global Strate

put and F, NF at r” ola sch ed ish ngu sti “di a de ma was , IT) (IS institute on nt De es Jam and r de an ex Al . ism ror A charge of its program on ter pe

edited the conference proceedings, collected as Ge

r de an ex Al ed st ho F NF 6, 198 15, r be em pt Se feMilde to Terrorism. On a

a on ort rep to him ow all to An Press conference arranged ‘act-finding tour of the Middle East and to promote his then 87

_ _ — — — — — — y ' t s u d n I ” m s “Terrori

e h T

. er nf co s Es PT ie th At ? rs te gh Fi , Terrorists or F reedomhington’s ok bo t en ec National Press Club, a Buty dace Was most recent ence, necee uN ye by Michael Ledeen of CSIS and JINSA, ang d ar ch Ri as ch su s st li na ur jo e, er Th . st ge Di 's er ee Read eS f of ie a ch ce ne pe s, ) wi ! Le n e i h d C n a on st Po gt in sh Wa e th Ane d of th wi d le ga re re we s, the Associated Pres

“new information

on Libya’s

ti an c hi ap gr l ra ve se n w o h s d an m is or rr te g in role in promot ) 7 m. is or rr te ab Ar of e” nc de vi “e as s er st po American m, is or rr te th wi g in al de es cl ti ar l ra ve se d e c u d o r p s ha James Denton r te Pe t ys al an cy li po F F N th wi ed or th au co e ec pi ew vi Re In a National

ec sp n o t n e D ), 87 19 , 31 y ul (J I” SD g n i r e d r u M “ ed tl ti en Schweizer, e nc ra ea pp sa di a d an , es id ic su s, er rd ulated that a series of mu ts ec oj pr g on n i k r o ts w is nt ie sc d s an er ne gi en an pe involving Euro related to the Strategic Defense Initiative, or so-called Star Wars

s. et ed vi e So at th y tr b es ch t or ts is hi or y, rr it te al tu , ac in m, re ra we prog The evidence provided was not compelling. The authors do not distinguish between SDI and other high-tech and defense-related industries—one of the victims was a computer salesman—and they do not mention the total numbers working in these sectors which

would allow a calculation of probabilities. Only three of the alleged sixteen terrorist actions were linked to the SDI in terrorist commu-

niqués,*’ and the tie-in with the Soviet Union was entirely speculative. New Jersey Republican Congressman James Courter, a regular participant in Heritage and NFF functions, entered the SchweizelDenton article in the Congressional Record on July 22, 1987, prefacing

pase ie thestatement that “Murdering SDI” provided evidence oe mees headlines” but also allegedly proved the ™ t€ t is ft le e th n e e w t e b — t s a e l ry ve e th t —a ts es er nt rorist international and the val U.S.S.R -- which has made many officia efforts to kill SDI,"48 Facts ha

u® ro fe ci vo A . n o t n e D s e m a J s ' F F N e th ed er th po a f o r supporte r o s n o p s s ha , F F N e th th wi g on al , n o t n e D e B several “fact-f, al

“ott

:

t si vi tO r de or in a c i r e m A l ra nt Ce to Mterview contra eaek 1

:

column (April 23, 19

i

trl

“€

In the field. In a Wall Street Journal op _

Contra atrocities a Bi Denton dismissed Reed Brody's repo™ i ‘i essenu@ document,” Sandinista-sponsored , attributing all reports of oe , CO : 8anda many factured in ntra human rights violations to P O

Managua,19

88

On

July

24,

1988,

¢

pe

|

———

The Private Sector gist eae

published: a lett' er in the Ne; w York Review ¢of Books attack; Neier of Americas Watch for having identified ica gandists for the contras” in an article published on M Denton

demanded

an

apology,

Associated Press coverage

but

of a March

Neier

Aryeh

Sp bsOpa:

arch 17, 1988,

responded

by Citi

ng

1987 press conference at

which NFF officials, led by Pesan, stated that they would continue visiting congressional offices to emphasize the need for continu ed

financial support for Nicaraguan ‘freedom fighters.’ ”

In addition to its concern over Sandinista terrorism, the NFF has

been very greatly interested in South Africa, with special attention to the possible ill effects of any Western governmental sanctions and the violent tendencies of the ANC. An October 1987 issue of NFF’s Policy Forum provided an assemblage of quotations purportedly

showing the ANC’s link to the communist movement and its propensity toward revolutionary violence. This paralleled the Denton subcommittee’s hearings on the ANC, which had a similar emphasis. Neither NFF nor the subcommittee has ever put forth materials on or expressed concern over South African terrorist violence against its indigenous population or neighboring countries. Senator Jeremiah Denton’s hearings on terrorism were also devoted to tarring Denton’s political opponents with the terrorist brush. Among the groups attacked for providing “support” for Soviet and Cuban terrorist operations, Denton’s favorite was the National Lawyers Guild,®° and any group supporting the nuclear freeze was likely to be found, at minimum, an unwitting agent of the KGB.

Denton’s “witness list” reads like a veritable who’s who of the terrorism industry: Michael Ledeen, Robert Moss, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Claire Sterling, among others, lent their voices to the subcommittee hearings, as did numerous members of the intelligence

institutional the is NFF the ways, many In and police communities. “mbodiment of the principles adhered to by Denton, and ae oe on the former senator’s ideological program since his dete

1€ 1984 elections.

_efeih mant o ration eit Ai JH

e e S e i l e a r s I h t i w d e i f i t n e d i y l e s o l c s Bone Pe Individual

e en Fa the for on vi za ni ga or ng yi bb lo l tua a Sanded as a vir Well as a terrorism institute. The two are closely nelulee ye 89

~ — — — — — — — — y r t s u d n I , m s i r o r r e “T

ie

th t di re sc di to ng yi tr of ts is ns co : aspect of lobbying for ee JINSA also illustrates the aut e w e an s ae or rr te as O PL d an Palestinians d n a s e t u t i t s n i e h t of n o i t a i l h f a f o y t i u g i b m a d n a acter r a h c l a n o s eee ‘1 the terrorism industry. JINSA vice-president Morris J. ee

o e r e Am er ic aIs ra the eh of he ad fo ‘s rmer

Com-

aff ili ate d Ot he rs or ga ni za ti on . lo bb yi ng pr oIs rael mittee, a major me mb er s bo ar d ad vi so ry or bo ar d an d with JINSA as founders Ke mp , Ja ck CS IS , of La qu eu r Wa lt er an d Le deen include Michael

Kir kJe an e Ka mp el ma n, Ma x an d Zu mw al t, El mo retired Admiral ad mi ni st ra Re ag an all th re e lat ter the patrick, and Eugene Rostow,

tion officials as well as Danger and Committee JINSA has produced Soviet support for the

Pre sen t the on Co mm it te the e of members for a Democratic Majority.”* g in il ta de s er tt le ws ne d an s ie ud st numerous arn te in r fo g in ck ba O L P ng gi le al d an PLO

. a d n a g a p o r p i el ra Is of ts in po l ra tional terrorism, cent

Until 1981,

, or ct re e di iv ut ec s ex e’ ut it st in e th by ed it ed s the JINSA newsletter wa an ic bl pu Re ey rs Je w e N r fo r fe af st er rm fo Dr. Stephen Bryen, a e th r fo rk wo to ne go d ha n ye Br , 79 19 In . Senator Clifford Case

A, NS g JI in nn ru s wa , he 80 . 19 y ty B ri ic jo Ma at cr mo De n a r io fo it Coal and in 1981 he joined the Pentagon to work with Richard When Bryen left JINSA for the Pentagon in 1981, Shoshana, took over as executive director. With Stephen the Pentagon and several well-connected JINSA directors sensitive, defense-related

positions, new

conduits

Perle. his wife, Bryen in serving in

for the disseml-

nation of propaganda opened up between JINSA and the White House, and JINSA took advantage of these opportunities.”

For example, on July 20, 1983, the White House Office of Media Relations and Planning released a report entitled “The PLO in Central America,” published in the White House Digest. The repo Sand inis ta’: the and Cas tro wit h F clos ely wor kin g aro , Me ' Pe al e He, £ ve its allies establish a Sov iet base of operations 1n Cent! ;

us ro th ts is or rr te of nt me oy pl de d an ng ni ai tr e th gh ou “r ca ni ediaue art ee the world. This poorly doc

out showing the encircled

y

pened

reponene™

a

names of some twenty-two “worldwide te™

orist

organizations” ]j j e c e — ™ : c e n t e d r p i t i a h e t g e o c r e a m a ’ r b s r y o w l s , cae i inked, th © center "6ofPihcisturfeoroefheYaadsser Arafat with the acronym “PLO : The ch art was design ed to show

90

alleged PLO backing

_ such for °

———

The Private Sector

ae

amen

cetee tes

organizations as the Black Panthers, the Ury

$s, guttas SUayan Lupa ma i ie BOS FP undergrou Sandinistas, and : El Salvador’s 3 ” n e m e v o m d n s ( the diagram carried the caption “Intelligence informationno iha:s e e linke the PLO with terrorist and guerrilla organizations around the world,”

b mo ve me nt s” “u nd er gr ou nd Sa lv ador’s me nt io to n it failed Ss” by name ! ;

(one assumes that it was intended to refer to the FMLN-FDR). While a “genuine” intelligence document would have been careful to identify the group, the diagram included in the White House Digest did not, perhaps because its source was not military intelligence but

rather the JINSA Newsletter (vol. 3, no. 21) for June 1983. According to the June Newsletter’s cover story, written by Shoshana

he (“T st Dige the in ort rep the to l tica iden e titl a g rin bea and Bryen g kin wor e wer as ist din San the and tro Cas PLO in Central America”),

ral Cent in acy ocr dem and er ord t ver sub to with the PLO in order SA JIN the and ort rep st Dige the If America and the Caribbean.

of k bul the that t den evi s ome bec document are read in tandem, it

m fro ale les who ed lift e wer ts” “fac and s tion cita s se’ Hou te Whi the e genc elli “int to d ute rib att m gra Bryen’s article. Likewise, the dia orepr ply sim was cle arti st Dige information” and accompanying the m fro se Hou te Whi the by n, tio rec cor or on iti add t hou wit duced, an agu car “Ni for ” ts’ nis ndi ‘Sa a agu car “Ni ., (e.g r tte sle new JINSA’s ‘Sandinistas’ ”).

g n i w t h g i r e th n e e w t e b p i h s n o i t a l e r e os cl e th s te ra st lu JINSA il

e th d n a y t i r o j a M c i t a r c o m e D a r fo e e t t i m m o C e th f o s t a r c o m e D in al ci fi of h g i h a e rl Pe h t i w s, ar ye n a g a e R y l r a e e th In y. bb lo i el ra Is as g in rv se k c i r t a p k r i K d n a , w o t s o R , n a m l e p m a K d n a n o g a t n e P the n a c i l b u p e R e th to in d e t a r g e t n i s a w y b b o l e th s, al administration offici

s k r o w t e n It . ll we as s e i d o b e v i t u c e x e y e k s it d n a administration

h g u o h t m, is or rr te on s l a i r e t a m s It . C S A d n a extensively with CSIS m o r f ed at ti en er ff di e b y l d r a h n ca , a d n a g a p o r p i el ra Is y ll essentia y l i s a e w o l f d n a , s t r e p x e d n a s e t u t i t s n i y r t s u d n i r e h t o y n a m f o e thos s r o r r e t n o n o i t a m r o f n i s a n i a g a t u o d n a e s u o H e t i h W e h Into t

n e e e t a t S , m s i r o r r e T l a n o i t a n r e t n I n i s e i d u t S Institute for

z

e e C t a 7 7 9 1 n i d e z i n a g r o , e t u t i t ‘This ins © be little more (4 -

) T I S I ( k r o Y New s r a e p p a , ) a t n o e n O ( k Niversity of New Yor

s i h r a e d n a x e l . A r e d n a x e l A h a n one-man Operation run by Yo s s u c s i d l l i w e w d n a , y r t s u d n i m s i r o r r e t e h t n i e r u g i f t n a t por 91

e t i

+ — — _ — — — — y r t s u d n I m s i r o r r e T “ r e e n pa

e a s s i l e l i s i l a e f r e t p a h c n i s w e i v d n a s writing

a é r e p o e c n e g i l l e t n i d n a , e c i l to military, po n w o s r e d n a x e l A t c e l f e r t h g i r i l e a r s I d n a European, r o f t i d e r c s m i a l c e t u t i t s n i e h t r o f r e y l f g n i s i t r e v d a n o d e h s i l b u p s k o o b e v i f y t n e w t , s e c n e r e f n and co

oe S., n A . s n o i t c e n n o c s r a n i m e S y t thir d n a , m s i r o r r e t

e v a h s e c n e r e f n o c s t i f o e m o S . t c e j b u s e h t n o s m l i f l a n o i t a three educ f o y t i s r e v i n U e h t , S I S C , F F N e h t h t i w y l e v i t a r o b a l l o c e n been do y a R d n a , y g o l o h t a P l a r o i v a h e B d n a l a i c o S r o f e t u t i t s n I s ’ o g Chica : m s i r o r r s e e T h s i l b u p o s l a T I . S l I i c n u y o g C e t a r t l S a b o l G . S Cline’s U. . l a n r u l o a J n o i t a n r An Inte as s” ct “a t s i r o r r e t f o s e i g o l o n o r h c h t r o f ts se y l r Terrorism regula

” t n e m s s e s s a k is “r d e s a b a i n i g r i V a , l a n o i t a n r e compiled by Risks Int

a n r e t n I s k s i R s s e n i s u B , y n a p m o c y t i r u c e s e t a v i r p a y b firm owned

, as bi r ei th s e s o p x e n o o s s e i g o l o n o r h c e s e h t f o n o i t a n i m tional. An exa

s s e n i s u b g n i c i v r e s n o i t a z i n a g r o n a f o g n i r e h t a g a t a d e h t in inherent of s m r o f r a l u c i t r a p in t s e r e t n i d e s u c o f y l w o r r a n s it to d e n u t t a d an g n i t r o p r u p l a n r u o j a r e t fo a i r p o r p p a n i y l e r i t n e t u , b m s i r o r r e t il reta n e e b s a r h e d n a x e . l e A v i t c e p s r e p d a o to look at terrorism from a br e u g o l o e d d e i t t i m m o c a is e h d n , a f l e in the risk analysis business hims . r a l o h c s n a a t r h s e t h i t d a n r a g a p o r p d n a l ci un Co gy te ra St al ob Gl S. U. e th d an IT IS , On January 19, 1988

l na io at rn te In ms il of cr Mi ty si er iv Un cosponsored a conference with

's on gt in sh Wa at y, an mp Co ll we Ho d an ll Be of (UMD), a subsidiary

t— uc od pr est lat s I’ UM w ie ev pr to r de or in , International Club ts ec oj pr h ic wh e, fil e Th e.” Fil ce ur so l Re na io at rn te In : An sm ri ro “Ter

ng ati rel re tu ra te li on hy ap gr io bl bi e” et by September 1991 a “compl ies rar lib to d re fe of g in be is , 90 19 to 60 19 om fr 40 terrorology 0” l too ch ar se re ve ti ni fi de e th me co be to e a e ee u oversees 7 Tea

Alexander’s selecti a : a ee

toward analysts and

a

foots ee solinane loam

who will aid in the we eee only excludes all ae su

ee

. eo

ma

a sea

cules

aie ot

for work on this Bole

ec

itis heavily wo®an

ik e B in ip pa so ni vi wi ad e pe n s t’ e ec oj enol pr e e included on thhee proj thos ong e lobbying groupss. Deanteon : of NFFboard are Jame

e! ov O° d an IS CS e of in Cl S. y Ra ; G l: ci un gy Co te ra Global St , ai a e th of ad , he ll be mp Ca n en Gl ; ” rd Institution; Edwa ™ r e p p u K nt he va ae of so al , er ll Te ward

oover;

92

Ro

aur CSIS;

UUM

CA)

ae Laqueur of CSIS and JINSA; Eugene Rostow of Ta

Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Reagan administration, National

Detense University, and JINSA; Robert L. Pfaltzgraaf, president of the far-right

Institute

for Foreign

Policy Analysis

(IFPA);

Paul

Wilkinson of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism: Jillian Becker of London’s Institute for the Study of Terrorism; Brian Jenkins of Rand; and retired General Aharon Yariv, former chief of Israeli intelligence and now director of Tel Aviv’s Jaffee

Center for Strategic Studies. “Terrorism: An International Resource File” will provide a nominally “objective” institutional outlet for data on terrorism that will not only stick closely to the basic Western definitions and model, but will also tilt sharply toward the right-wing end of establishment perspectives. United States Global Strategy Council

(USGSC)

The council was

nfou ch ear res al ion cat edu t mp xe -e ax “t a as 1 198 in ed at incorpor tly ren cur is ne Cli S. y Ra A CI the of or ect dir ty pu de er dation.” Form n, ma ib Le ris Mor ck, tri kpa Kir e an Je rs hai coc of aid the th (wi ir cha its J. William Middendorf, Donald Rumsfeld, and retired Lieutenant

General Robert L. Schweitzer). Cline also serves as codirector, with

Yonah Alexander, of their program on the topic “Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism.” Among those who have served on the council’s board of directors

and “strategy board” are Arnaud de Borchgrave and retired General E. David Woellner. Woellner became president of the Moon organization, CAUSA World Services, in January 1985 (to be succeeded in that post by Philip Sanchez, Nixon’s ambassador to Honduras and

Ford’s ambassador to Colombia). The Unification Church’s input into USGSC is impressive, and the organization is regarded by

investigative journalists Louis Wolf and Fred Clarkson as “yet another cis Fran L. ude incl s ber mem d boar ent Curr 4 n.”> atio oper SA CAU d iate afhl , Sulz ce ren Law ; IFPA the of aaf tzgr Pfal Bouchey;* Robert

ard Harv of s Pipe ard Rich w); belo (see n tio nda Fou Hale with the

red reti of set e larg a and n; atio ound F tage Heri the and ty Universi

military officers also affiliated with ASC (Moorer, Graham, Lemnitzer, Stilwell, Wedemeyer, etc.). The aims of the Global Strategy Council are to promote “global 93

— y r t s u d n I ” m s “Terrori

e i

l a n o i t a n e n i f e d p l e h o t t s y l a t a c a s a t c a o t “ d n a ” g n i n n a l t p h g i c r i d q g n r e e a t a n a o i r b t l d r a s h d t e i y r b i s e : g e strat y b d d s e n i l e h t g n o n l o a i t a ” y l g u e m t r o f stra y g e t a r t s s r o s n o s it sp m i a e s e h t h t i w d r o c c a n I 6 5 s r office h c r a e s e r as l l e w as , s m a r g o r p h c a e r t u o d an

n a e b b i r a C s It . s e u s s i l various internationa

and conferences on

n a c i r e m A n i t a L d n a

t s i l a i c e p a s c i r e m A n i t a L r e m r o , f e n i a t n o F . W r e g o R r is o t c e r i d s e i stud

e r e h w e s l e d e t a i l i f f a o s l a , l i c n u o C y t i r u c e S l a n o i t a for the Reagan N n a c i r e m A r e t n I r o l f i c n u o s C ’ y e h c u o B d n a m e t s y s n o o M e h t h t wi Security.°’ We

earlier the program

mentioned

on

low-intensity

t s . o r M e d n a x e l A d n a e n i l C d y e b t c e r conflict and terrorism codi revealing, perhaps, is the program on Geopolitics of Southern Africa, directed by Stephen A. Halper, a former operative in the Nixon White House and Ray Cline’s son-in-law, who was involved in the Debategate scandal, brought to light during House hearings in 1984.°° The featured political subdivision of the program is “African Insurgencies Supported by the Soviet Union.” The council links together individuals connected with the Unification Church

and other far-right operations

(ASC, CIAS, and

IFPA), to CSIS and the omnipresent Yonah Alexander. It has former officials Cline, Kirkpatrick, and Rumsfeld to lend respectability to its terrorism studies. With this political cast, that South African view-

Pome would be put in the frame of Soviet support and insurgent terrorism” is a foregone conclusion.

International Security Council (ISC)

The International Security

Council is the main U.S. agency of the Moon system in the field of ee

propaganda. In a brochure issued by ISC in October 1987 ,

ae oy eee ee pres

pp

ve

yung Christian

acknowledges the “generous and unwav-

AUSA

International and that of the Reverend

Moon, whose understanding of the threat to Judae™

civili zation ilizati

,

is unj

to ent ‘tm his is as ue, niq selfless commuitm freedom, security and peace” @ 9) The

Security

P

ede r p

(C

;

;

Cessor Organization to IS@MtheGanter for Internationa!

e d u l c n i d r a o b s t I . 9 7 9 1 n i a b r u h C y b d e z i n a g r o e a t “ s e a r o j a M pe tonesion Pale Keegan, Jr. (USAF, ret.), William Kintneh

! e i n a D l a r e n e G t n a n e t u e i ’ L c a , r ) . u t c e r c a m , o N w S e U d d ( r n a , u ) n . s , o . d r t 4 s h f e n e » r e o a o B a Y c N n i : A S U ( m a h Gra

94

ign

rivatensaer

Oe

eee

eee

Media and former counterinsurgenc Y Consult ant to South Vi etnam puppet president Ngo Dinh Diem a nd ot her terrorist gove r n m e n t s in the U.S. sphere of influence. Also on the board were Frank

Gervasi and Joan Peters. These reflect CIS-ISC and Churba’s |

time and fanatical devotion to Israel. Gervasi is a well] amine: an 5;

passionate apologist for Israeli policy; Peters is the author of From

Time Immemonal, a volume published in 1984 to demonstrate that

Palestinian Arabs were intruders into Palestine (so that, by an easy inference, they were not unreasonably denied political rights in that

area).°” The reorganized ISC board of 1986 continued to include Kintner and Churba, but it now contained seven Mexican conser-

vatives, four retired military officers (now including Gordon Sumner, Jr.), and several other right-wingers. The ISC advances its proclaimed goal of formulating “global strategic analysis” by sponsoring international conferences, through its quarterly journal, Global Affairs, and by taking out full-page ads in such organs as the New York Times. There it posts its various “declarations” on issues ranging from the security of Southeast Asia (NYT, May 4, 1986) to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit (NYT, Dec.

9, 1985). In both of these ads, the world is divided into the good and the evil, the problem being the naiveté of the leaders of the

good and their failure to grasp fully the sinister intentions of the enemy. In both, also, the Strategic Defense Initiative is lauded as a

marvel of creativity: “a wholly defensive system . . . indispensable to the restoration of a nuclear balance.” Among the publications of CIS and ISC are Frank Gervasi’s 1982 booklet, Media Coverage: The

War in Lebanon, and papers by S. B. Kelly, The Soviet Penetration of Iran, and Daniel O. Graham, Why Not Defend America? In 1963 Churba entered into a professional relationship with Meier Kahane in an operation they called Consultant Research Association, which infiltrated organizations and collected information

on behalf of the FBI and other government and private organiza ons. During the Vietnam War period, with seed money from ad S°vernment and certain labor groups, the two of them establishe ze li bi mo to ed the Fourth of July Movement, an organization that tri e ot wr o tw he T War. Vietnam the for campuses *Upport on college d ed an nd fu secretly Vietnam, in Stake Jewish 4 book in 1968, The

95

— — — — — — y t s u d n I ” m s i r o r r e “T

e i

e h t s a w h c i h w f o e m e h t e h t , t n e m n r e v o g . S . U e h t y b published mmitments

o c s t i p e e k s e t a t S d e t i n U e h t t a h t 1 | e a r s I r e o f c n a t r impo

a . m a n t e i V h t u o S e k i l s e c a l in p 60

a i b m u l o C t a s n o i t a l e r l a n o i t a n r e t n i n i e t a r o t c o d a g n i n i a t b o r e t f A

y t i s r e e f v r h o i i t : n A U l l i t y t l u c a f e h t d n e o k University, Churba wor e r h t o r o t f a e m c i n t e s g e i l l e t n t i s e a l E d d i e M m a a c 1972 and then be

, n o i t s c ’ e n l a e g g n a i e w R o l l d o . e F S z I i C n a g r o e 9 h 7 9 air force. In 1 ” r o s i y v c d r i a o l i o n p t e n s n e “ a i s m a a n g r a e v d o e e g r h e a t t b n r e u Ch . 2 8 9 n 1 n i i a g g n e , a i c t n n n g o e i m s re on disarma Churba’s devotion to Israel has never flagged. His writings and campaigns have constantly focused on Israel, its service to U.S. interests, its creative efforts in Lebanon.®! Churba has argued, time

and again, that the PLO is little more than a Soviet-front organization and that the mere presence of Arabs in Israel should be cause for worry. According to a piece distributed by CIS, “the Arab inhabitants of the West

are Jordanian

Bank

citizens and, therefore,

enemy

nationals vis-a-vis Israel under the rules of war.” Given Churba’s view of Palestinians as enemy agents, he is popular in Israeli “counterterrorism”

circles, and he has close ties to the

Israeli military and intelligence. A major conference on state terrorism and the international system was held by the ISC and CAUSA International in January 1986 in the hospitable environment of Tel Aviv, with speeches by Dr. Bo Hi Pak, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Charles Lichenstein, Gordon Sumner, Jr. (USA, ret.), and Yehuda

Blum, former Israeli ambassador to the UN.® Churba joined other luminaries of the extreme right in signing

Sn Ma 88 Comer Digest, wich denounced Ce sud ¢ajlineioeh

Ane administration for selling out South Africa

and others woes ie a siretiomed BENEMO paged ee

ymin

COED

ee PRESa whoehas e a flatteri onngy intr Clunoduc bation iswallonteChur ge’ba

preceding his interview with that “distingui

~

cidirector

stinguished founding Ml ne of CIS in the November 3 1989 ; John Birch Society’s week] Am: aes 28 the Review of the cana

displaying Churba’s ah extreme right, is his tae ‘€ssed extension of Soy; ;

p

viet

aga prop PrOpag

active measures’ agencies.”

inane feature.of chat aaa ee ae and his position or an view that the freeze movement °° nda

;

96

an

0

“

extension of the P

5 ro n h “ olitbu

|

The Private Sector e s

a.

Churba is connected to other eleme nts of th € far rig h t t h r ough his service as advisor to GeoMilitech Consultants Corporation, alo ng with John Singlaub of WACL and Edward Luttwak of CSIs GeoMilitech was founded in 1984 by Barbara § tudley, a friend o f Singlaub’s, apparently as an arms conduit for the s ecret government. The fi

rm supplied arms to the Salvadoran govern ment as well as the Nicaraguan contras, Singlaub using GeoMilitec to h procure $5.3 million in weapons, which were transferred to Ad olfo Calero in June

1985.°°

Despite this background of close connection to the Unification

Church and his extreme bias and fanaticism, Churba has appeared

on numerous television and radio programs as a terrorism expert,

including CNN News, the “MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour,” NBC News,

ABC's “Nightline,” and the “Larry King Show.” His line and organizational connections, though far-right, are within the bounds acceptable to the Western establishment.

The Nathan Hale Institute The Nathan Hale Institute was incorporated in 1977 to track and provide information on terrorist organizations and their supporters. Both the institute and an affiliated Hale Foundation are run out of the same office. The original trustees of the foundation were Lawrence Sulz, a CIA intelligence operations officer for twenty-three years; Daren Flitcroft, a former State Department attaché in the Philippines, and John R. Horton, a CIA

operations officer (1948-75) who later became the national intelligence officer for Latin America (1983-84).

Three individuals with ties to the far right have been officers of

the Hale Foundation. The president-director listed in the 1981 filing

for a Hale Foundation application to conduct business in the District of Columbia was John Carbaugh, an ally of Senator Jesse Helms

and, as we noted in the previous chapter, an attendee at the 1980 Buenos Aires meeting of CAL, the Latin American branch of WACL.

Sam Crutchfield, personal attorney to neo-Nazi Roger Pearson, and the man who helped Iran-contra defendant Robert Owen found the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance as a contra resupply front Operation, was secretary-treasurer of Hale. Victor ediay, listed as the foundation’s registered agent for the District of

lumbia according to their annual reports through 1988, once 97

‘om’

is

The |Terrorism

=

p aa Industry

Ne

service

ws

x

Capito]

as

known

Desa: ated viosss a former aide to Senator Strom Thurbent TuaRG He is with Kot

worked Information Services.

©» cas with the Aerospace

Technology

mond and spent ie sioe aye ne UL. Aue WORE: Fediay igence intell t e Sey Division, : - os ae Rlouan international gathering of right. ; ol ashingt " was the Wa 8 ) d French mercenaries seeking to begin a wing businessmen an the after Azores the 1 ‘ Settee secessionist revolt in the

oan Pp leit cam anaes es

lef

in

ents Wout worke Fediay rise enterp this In 1974. in Portugal st terrori t rightis a (OAS), zation Organi from the French Secret Army -held guese Portu the 1D coup a organization that sought to stage to and mainl the on right far the age encour to order in Azores . nment gover new the t agains action similar a attempt d on ym Ra by ed ct re di y tl en rr cu is e ut it The Nathan Hale Inst . on si vi di ce en ig ll te in s I’ FB e th of or ct re di t an st si as er rm fo Wannall,

This division was responsible for monitoring “subversives,” “front organizations,” and “activist types” (to use Wannall’s own language taken from his 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee).°° In spite of attempts by Congress to curb the domestic surveillance activities of the FBI, Wannall interpreted the bureau’s

powers as broad enough to escape any such strictures. In a 1976 memorandum, included in the Final Report of the Church committee,

Wannall observed that the “intelligence-gathering activities of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President to delegate

his constitutional authority,” including those statutes “pertaining to the national security.”®

vee

a professional anticommunist in the mold and manner

oe ee Poe founded the Nathan Hale Institute in order to ‘ ; . Oe G es ee: e es terrorist Operations and organizations. In 4 , published by the institute entitled Who Is Tracking the Terror ists? Wannall identified the ACLU es; Studi y Polic for tute Insti the , the National Law e U A yers Guild, 66 left-oriented media e Ms Communist party, USA, and th Pporting—directly or indirectly ; domestic terrorist orga serie lite”

as

.

S

e

.

.

} Wann all In Mosc ow. by vocabulary, “leftist,” pee BODS controlled

and coeval. Wannal) subversive,” and “terrorist” are coextens!v®

the links between ie ®P€ration provides an excellent example : ticularly on the d unterterrorism” and “counterdissidence, P@””

Among those

OMestic front who ar : © or have

98

been

; included

as

advisors

0 t

The

Private Sector

LL

,

Wannall’s operon are Ray Cline; Francis J. McNamara, a fo r m e r th of di re ct or st y af f o n e t i m e of fi ce r, i n t e l l igence military

H o ¢ u s e at i S I n t e r nal ecurity, national director for the VFEW xCommittiteteee On ’s anticommunist Pacey

as well as editor of Counterattack, a 1950s Herbert Romerstein, a longtime HUAG staffer

blacklisting SeINICG: and investigator | for the House

Internal

Security Committee’s

Republican minority;°* Donald F. B. Jameson, vice-president of Research Associates International, Ltd., a risk assessment firm in the Washington area, and a 1973 CIA “retiree”; Eugene Methvin of G r O a . ham, D a n i e G l e n e r L a i l e u r t e e t a i n n r a d e n Di d t Reader’s gest; a c u r a r n e d n t A l g y e n c y I n t e l D l e i t f g h e e o e nce nse former director f se rv es G r a h a m C o m m i S t t t r e a e t e . N g a y t i A o S n C t a h ’ l o e s f member

is C A U S A , C h u r c h ’ s U n ification on the board of directors for the h e l d h a s a n d W A o C f L , b r a n c h vice-chairman of the American

th e o f F r i e n d s A m e t r h i e fo c a r n positions on honorary committees Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations,

a haven for Nazi war criminals.°?

in ma e th , rt po re al nu an 86 19 ’s on ti da According to the Hale Foun S. U. ng ro st a r fo ss re ng Co y bb lo o “t objective of the foundation was e th om fr s ve ti ta en es pr re d, en is th To Intelligence Community.” l ra nt Ce e th t or pp su to te na Se e th foundation urged members of American

Counterterrorism

Act (S.1757), lobbied the Senate for

en es l pr re na io ss re ng co d ge ur d an s, ra nt increased support to the co on te ba de ic bl pu en op to ht ug so h ic wh , 76 42 R. H. at fe tatives to de U.S. support for covert operations in Angola. egl An s me Ja of s ep st ot fo e th in g in ow ll fo The Hale Foundation, o als , Q) AS r de un w lo be ee (s nd Fu ty ri cu Se d an ce ton’s Intelligen ts ui ws la ng ci fa rs ce fi of ce en ig ll te in r fo t or pp su l ga sought to provide le

to d te ec bj su s al du vi di in of ts gh ri al on ti tu ti ns co for violating the , ts le ok bo s he is bl pu so al on ti da un fo e Th . nt me surveillance or harass lec col ne ti es nd la “c a s in ta in ma d an s, ce en er nf hosts seminars and co

d e t i n U e th in g in at er op ts is or rr te d e t c e p s u s on t) is kl ac bl te va ri (p ae lates,

k n i h t a r e h t i e n s i C S A While the

) C S A ( l i c n u o C y t i r u c e S n a c i r e e m A a te g n i d i v o r p n i d e v l o v n i n e e b s a h t i , e t u t i t s n i y c i l o p e a ‘e a e t e h t f o s r e b m e m r e h t o y n a m r o f t r o p p u s e e A inde n i , e z i s s t i f o e s u a c e b t n a t r o p m i s i t i , e g a t i r e H e k i L : o i . an n o i t a t n e i r o y c i l o p d n a s n o i t c e n n o c g n i w t h reme rig 99

" " \ t s i A m s i r o r r e T “ The

ee

eh

. a < <
RFST depends heav ily on business a g e t,’ trus al party education

funding. In a fund-raising document entitle Scourge of Terrorism,” RFST

usiness and the

stresses that governments “do not

t, have the resources to assist private industry and business to preven

deter and counter terrorist attacks against their personnel, facilities and operations.” RFST is ready to step into that breach by providing “independent” research and educational work through its distin.

guished body of advisory experts from “industry, the armed services, the law and the police.” Generous support will help meet the “real challenge,” which is “to outthink and outwit the terrorist.”

In outlining the nature of the terrorist threat, the authors of this RFST document refer only to terrorism as defined in the Western model. This is entirely understandable given the business market to which the brochure is addressed and the strongly right-wing businessgovernment character of the advisory board. Its chairman is the noted academic expert on terrorism Paul Wilkinson, a terrorologist who never deviates from the Western party line, as we will describe

in more detail in chapter 7. Control Risks Ltd., another British-based security firm, has rather

extensive operations in the United States. The company evolved out of the corporate vestiges of the Al Insurance Agency, and was originally intended by its founder, Julian Radcliffe, to provide kidnap

and ransom insurance. Radcliffe was eventually joined by several associates with ties to British intelligence, police, the Special Al Service (SAS) Regiment, and the far right.52 Also going to work for Radcliffe were a handful of former researchers at Brian Crozet’

CIA-sponsored Institute for the Study of Conflict, including Peter

Janke, their resident specialist on South Africa. In London, we d, Control R is oi oe across the street from New Scotland Yar former metropolitan

ne ern Ireland, and Sir Robert

Arishltanletiesa Gea riee

:

airecto"

Its managing

major. Among the directors 0 132

f thell

The

Security Industry ——_—_ _

U.S. office are Peter Goss, former head of British militar y intelligence in Northern Ireland, and Karl D. Ackerman. a form er director of )

securityva. at the State Department. In 1984, Ackerman was busy peddling daily intelligence reports on potential terrorists prowling L.A. streets” to Los Angeles—based multinationals during the summer

Olympics, at $1,800 per package.*°

Control Risks gradually diversified its activities, becoming both a risk analysis and security consultancy firm. It hired Major General Richard Clutterbuck (also formerly with ISC) to be its counterter-

rorism specialist. Clutterbuck, a media staple in Great Britain and the author of several books

on terrorism,

including Living With

Terrorism (1975) and The Media and Political Violence (1981), is a

staunch proponent of the counterinsurgency doctrines developed by Frank Kitson. He argues in the latter study that “violence in industrial disputes, violence in political demonstrations, and terror-

ism” are all of a type. Following Kitson and the pattern established in his 1973 book, Protest and the Urban Guerilla, Clutterbuck effectively

conflates political dissent with political violence, and political violence with terrorism. That is, like many rightists, Clutterbuck seeks to criminalize dissent by labeling it terrorism. In 1986, Clutterbuck put his expertise to use as an associate of

Control Risks Ltd. by spying on British animal rights groups for the chemical industry. Several leading chemical and food manutfacturers had commissioned the Control Risks study in 1984 in response to heavy antivivisectionist lobbying. According to Kevin Toolis of the London Observer, Clutterbuck interviewed several leaders of the

animal rights movement, claiming that he was writing a book. He neglected to mention

that his “book” was, in actuality, a report

underwritten by the chemical industry and that he was a director of

Control Risks.°4

study One week earlier, the Observer had reported on another

undertaken by Control Risks, this one dealing with the anti-apartheid

business 1n South movement. A number of British companies doing

place, in order to be briefed Africa joined a “syndicate” at £1,500 per nt. According

moveme ©n potential violence from the anti-apartheid med that they fo a letter sent to prospective clients, Control Risks clai

-apartheid groups os anti of ities activ “the l detai in rt Would repo intentions,

groups and their Europe, their relationship with terrorist 133

____ “Terrorism” Industry —————

ie

terrorist Organy. or nt ita mil er th “o t tha s tie ili and assess the possib

netrating the ant. zations will exploit the South African issue by pe | ae Ae | apartheid movement.”

gepusiicss

The syndicate of companies doin

outh Africa Was

division of organized by Control Risks liniorsvalion Services, a Risks Infor. Control Risks Group. The chief researcher at Control mation Services is Peter Janke, who, as we Saw earlier, was a warm

working friend and servant of the South African government while at Crozier’s (and the CIA’s) ISC in the 1970s. A former Control Risks “security consultant,” David Walker, now

Ltd., an organization staffed almost entirely by

works for KMS

former SAS members and wryly referred to in England as “24 SAS,” or the 24th regiment. The acronym itself stands for “Keeni-Meeni Services,” a name derived from a piece of South Arabian slang meaning clandestine or “under-the-counter.” KMS even draws upon the SAS motto, Who Dares Wins, for its own professional slogan—

Who Pays Wins.°° This is a fitting motto for one of the world’s largest “private” recruiting networks for mercenaries. KMS achieved some notoriety when it was learned that Oliver North had used Walker as part of his private aid and resupply network for the contras. Walker was hired by Richard Secord to fly missions inside Nicaragua and to plan the sabotage of Soviet-made helicopters being shipped to Managua. John Nields, the chief counsel for the House

Iran-contra committee, described Walker as “a professional saboteur.”°’ For his services, the enterprise

paid Walker

$110,000.”

Overall, KMS may have recruited as many as fifty mercenaries t0

aid the contras.°® KMS has provided mercenary services elsewhere—to Ian Smith's

apartheid government in Rhodesia; to train Sri Lankan soldiers ®

counterinsurgency techniques; and to assassination operations

Lebanon. Its activities, and those of similar organizations,” are ce

carried out with the close cooperation of the British Foreig® 0 an

ee

Prieisionsiy

with Milica

et i ae

HS work Walker

aa at

ni tislawi

paper quotes a British

elias

ee

gets from t ae

ake

extended his services to ale AbiesGaciadienbakanieey:

€

als0

ei ee sons. : yarding nited States, with Walker men # recel”

and facilities in Washington, D.C., 4” 134

—_———

The Security Industry -_ _

ing diplomatic immunity and carrying State Department identif ae. ices rendered to Oliver North and the tion cards. The serv

terrorists fit into a consistent pattern of official Western directly and through firms like KMS for “counterterror.”

su ny

ce

Like its U.S. and British security firm counterparts, Israel’s Inter-

national Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) is a wide-ranging

operation with full “counterterrorism” capabilities. ISDS, based in Tel Aviv, is co-owned by Leo Gleser, a former colonel in the Israeli

Defense Forces (IDF) who participated in the 1976 raid on Entebbe.

ISDS has been very active in Central America, protecting business and government leaders as well as providing “counterterrorism” training to military and paramilitary personnel in Honduras and Guatemala.

In an April 30, 1985 letter of presentation to the Guatemalan military, Sammy Sapyr, then director of ISDS’s Guatemalan branch, described the company’s services in great detail. These included antiterrorism training and the formation of antiterrorism “squads,” electronic surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the sale of arms,

including helicopters and airplanes. Jon Lee Anderson points out that the document also offers a course in “selective terror” under the general rubric “the training of military personnel.” It should be noted, however, that in light of the role and performance of the Guatemalan army, all of ISDS’s services under the name of “coun-

terterrorism” facilitate serious state terrorism.

According to Gerard Latchinian, a multimillionaire currently serving a thirty-year prison term in Indiana for his role in the 1984 attempted overthrow of Honduras’s civilian government, ISDS employees were active in training the Honduran death squads, as well as members of the Nicaraguan contras, in techniques of terror. In fact, ISDS’s Gleser hired two ex-IDF members, Yehuda Leitner and Emile Sa’ada, to help train members of Gustavo Alvarez Martinez's Notorious Battalion 3-16, the general’s private death squad. Jose

admitted Valle Lopez, a former member of the battalion, has and hee Participating in a rash of kidnappings, torture sessions,

Murders, some of which took place in the presence of Mr. anfrom the LS;

embassy,

who

oversaw

several torture

panei

ie d

ted from Hon oe When Alvarez Martinez was eventually ous 'S Successor, General Walter Lopez Reyes, immediately severe

135

————_ — — ry st du In ” sm ri ro “Ter

he ties with ISDS.

Lopez Reyes told ue

Seana

that [SDs

in ‘ pete el

trained Alvarez Martinez s “special ane a

on rt, a front fo,

and hijacking techniques, and that this was,

Cre was coord}. oor me k too also who ras, cont the ng traini Reyes told Anderson, nation ‘between them and the CIA,” Lopez somethin

. The Israelis had “So. | didn’t renew their contract... or another.’® Despit ‘ way One . ads squ th dea s rez’ to de with Alva

that the “official” death s ear app it r, eve how , ract cont d ere sev the Martinez lives on.®” squad organized by Alvarez

In 1986, Yehuda Leitner, who had worked with Gleser and ISDs, were exposed Ged Honduras after his connections with the contras

in by Anne-Marie O’Connor in a Reuters dispatch. His colleague the affair, Emile Sa’ada, also admits to having contracted with the

Honduran government “to teach the Hondurans counterterrorism,”

but now claims to be nothing more than a melon farmer. The

company for which he works, Shemesh, currently employs some five thousand Honduran peasants as pickers and growers. But Shemesh also nominally owns ISDS, although as one U.S. military advisor told Anderson, “Israelis always go through front companies,” and in Central

America,

“Shemesh

has

always

been

their

front.” And

according to Carl Fehlandt, a former arms salesman in ISDS in Guatemala between 1982 and 1986, Shemesh/ISDS “is the offical Israeli arms outlet. The Israeli government owns ISDS and the man

who calls the shots is the Minister of Defense.”°° Another Israeli security firm, Tamuz

Control Systems, has long

been active in the Philippines. Based in Tel Aviv and founded by 2

group of Israeli generals still active in the reserves, Tamuz provided

security to Marcos and trained his police and security forces in

antiterrorism tactics. Like ISDS, Tamuz

seems to enjoy a “special

two Tamu? LAAONEMp with the Israeli government. In 1984, OPELALN ES who had previously worked in the police antiterroris™

unt ereah photocopying cafe pole aig mans court, however eden fe

a

bee ie PU QSBEC ISLS oe

e; as H. Handwerker

OS

and Y. Levy TP

orte the ith

generals 4? pany 1s headed by former s e i al r d d t er ri l r n r i is coordinated wi cou Wo to Th ansf of mate

nior defense offi,cials,67 se :

:

136

__————

The Security Industry —_——____ _

Counterterrorism Training Camps

A number of counterterrorism

training eee ute also sprung up over the last decade offering Whee hands-on seminars on detection, weaponry, and assassination.

schools operate as part of a network built largely around the activities

of Soldier of Fortune magazine and the private contra aid Suteeaise established by both Oliver North and John Singlaub. Such Scheer serve a dual function. While ostensibly training individuals in coun-

terterrorism techniques for self-defense, the camps also offer classes in counterinsurgency and assassination. These academies have attracted members of right-wing, racist, paramilitary organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and Posse Comitatus, as well as executives

interested in fending off terrorists.

Many of the civilian mercenaries

and trainers connected

with

these camps received counterterrorism and Ranger instruction at U.S. Army Special Forces bases at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort

Jeff Benning, Georgia, and Fort Lewis, Washington.® According to have Gerth, “Some of the units were created to fight terrorism but

acquired broadened mandates and training for missions against insurgencies in developing countries in Central America, Africa, and sia’.°°

In July 1983, Tom

Posey, a former marine corporal, Birchite,

and member of the Alabama National Guard, along with four other National Guardsmen, organized Civilian-Military Assistance

ary (CMA),”° as an instrument for sending mercenaries and milit

supplies to El Salvador. With extensive official support (both military

and diplomatic), CMA sent numerous shipments of weapons to El nez Salvador.?! According to Posey, General Gustavo Alvarez Marti

of Honduras

approached

his group in 1983 with a request for

the initial meetings training and advice.”* The U.S. embassy arranged

turned to helping between CMA and the Honduran.” CMA soon also sent

material aid but the contras, and not only provided Mercenaries to Honduras and Nicaragua to fight. Posey bragged to hundred rounds at the three fired had he that Times the Huntsville d-to-hand combat.

t in han icaraguans and hinted at engagemen killed pane a e wer men s ey’ Pos of two On September 1, 1984, was shot Leen im gua ara Nic r ove ing fly e helicopter they wer mercy

‘nvolvement, “claims © es’ ari cen mer the of s ial den ollowed

137

___ “Terrorism” Industry ———

iii

ne with extensiy do s wa n io at er : op re ti en is eae missions,” and so on. Th l] we as t ty Ac li ra ut Ne e th as the of on ti Vv iola official connivance, in aha

Boland amendment.

ers is SIONICS One of the largest and oldest of the training cent Counter. Inc. (Studies in Operational Negations of Insurgency and

ng Center, with Subversion), formerly Cobray International Traini

1979 by the headquarters in Powder Springs, Georgia. Founded in

late Lieutenant General Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, SIONICs is a frequent advertiser in such mercenary magazines as Soldier of

Fortune, Eagle, and Gung-Ho. WerBell was an OSS officer in China

during World War II and worked closely with both Ray Cline and

John

Singlaub

(Singlaub

was

visitor

and

occasional

camp). WerBell’s

training course at

involved classes in personal combat

(martial arts, knife

instructor at the SIONICS SIONICS

a frequent

fighting, and marksmanship) and “field and urban survival studies.”

The ten-day “primary course” was designed to teach a trainee how to avoid sabotage, kidnapping, and spying, and how to spot potential terrorists. Writing in Eagle magazine (June 1982), Sidney Filson described the course as “expensive and worth the price.” Students at SIONICS have included members of racist, paramilitary organtzations as well as groups like Lyndon LaRouche’s (now defunct) U.S. Labor party. In fact, in 1978 WerBell was employed by LaRouche'’s National Caucus of Labor Committees as “personal security advisor” to LaRouche himself.’° WerBell was active in international far-right politics up until his

death in December 1983. For example, he was involved in a 1982 coup attempt in Guatemala led by Mario Sandoval Alarcon’s National Liberation

Movement

(MLN).

According

to Jon

Lee

and Scott

Anderson, during preparations for the coup, WerBell remained 10

isolation in his suite at the Hotel Cortijo Reforma in Guatemala City; where a “retinue of Guatemalan colonels, businessmen, and a m¢™ ber of the U.S. military advisory group to Guatemala attached to

. ie mPnEDICAD Embassy regularly visited him, usually at night.”

sti

Oo ee

Ingram M-10 ae sa

WerBell owned seven other gor

Armament Corporation Guibien werBel!

ee davarene enouiy sddedHi dhe silencer) vented iicncaae Pavaball

and Parabel

t was ai lum Corp® q

ensed to sell weapons in Latin America 4” 138

a

[he Security Indtistry:

the firm planned for use by Watergate conspirator Frank St urgis to

obtain weapons

for Cuban

exiles

planning

to disrupt the 1979

Democratic convention in Miami.’7 In spite of the fact that WerBell’s Ingram M-10 and M-1]

uns

could be acquired legally only by special permission of U.S. seas

large numbers of them were inuse among European fascist eit siaee mig7oand 1977." The Spanish intelligence agency, DGS, purchased many such weapons under license from U.S. authorities in the 1970s. It was later learned that DGS was coordinating the activities of rightwing terrorists. ’°

Several other such camps have been established across the country, designed to train executives and security personnel in special “urban combat” techniques. Tuition rates are high; Executive Security

International (ESI) of Colorado commands over $5,500 for its basic

course in executive survival, and it counts among its faculty members Harvey McGeorge, a former Secret Service agent who has worked with terrorism expert Neil Livingstone. The Liddy Academy, the

training division of G. Gordon Liddy and Associates, Inc., offers a

seventeen-day program for close to $3,000. Not all of the antiterrorism training camps operate on a for-profit basis, however. The previously mentioned CMA has operated training camps for mercenaries for several years on a nonprofit basis. Humberto Alvarado, a former member of Alpha 66, operated a nonprofit camp in Bordentown, New Jersey, until local officials shut

the operation down.®! Camp Oliver North (and its sister operation, Camp Jeane Kirkpatrick) served to train predominantly CubanAmerican and Puerto Rican anticommunist forces for later “operations in Latin America, including planned invasions of Cuba and

Nicaragua.”8?

in duping several One self-styled “terrorism expentt succeeded

and conferences police departments into hosting training seminars

peace and an where participants were told that members of the

nuclear movements were, in actuality, highly trained stanney

James Davis, owner

of a California-based

“ompany known as DanCor,

private pole

au Ltd., had been on the payroll

'es0 state sheriff department's Red colds ae

eee 2

ialized Training ssia Spec e a s s ie e ater a »p© forn Cali the at or ruct inst an orked as 139

LL:

———__ — ry st du In ” sm ri ro er “T igen. founded cate

agency Institute (CSTI), an Reagan and his assistant, Eddwin presidency,

Reagan

appointe

ae

Louis

a oe

ef a

Giulirl

nagement y to direct the Federal Emergenc Ma

ead

A

Ronalh tO the

of EST,

gency. Shortly afte;

, Davis founded DanCor and began on gt in sh Wa to s ve a’ mo id fr uf Gi lice agencies across the po to ow m sh ad is ro or rr te ti an s ng hi peddli

country. for about seventy. A 1985 Davis workshop held in Boise, Idaho, ed a lecture by five police officers from the Pacific Northwest featur screening of The KGB an unidentified representative of ASC and a by the right-wing ComConnection, a film produced and distributed

chures e mittee for the Free World. Davis’s terrorism conferenc bro uclear listed sessions with titles like “Civil Disorder, Peace and Anti-N

Power Groups” and “Central American Groups.”

But Davis’s hard right line often provoked strong reactions from

local officials. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, one of Davis's training sessions for local police was canceled when an aide to the mayor realized that it was “essentially a program designed to provide police with an array of infiltration skills.” Judith Panora, of the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Commission, reviewed the course materials offered by Davis and concluded, “I thought it was too

right-wing. I felt it created in the mind of the police officers an inappropriate sense of paranoia.”*

Concluding Note The security industry serves business and government; it therefore

approaches “terrorism” from the standpoint of its employers a principals. Some segments, especially those providing security S&P vices and recruiting and training mercenaries, are often arms of the

government that carry out covert actions for which the governmen does not want to admit responsibility. Leaders of the security pusine® organize and

participate

regularly

in conferences

hearings; ap

seminars on terrorism, and are experts consulted Ny the media epi

and show how to cope with the terrorist threat. Because

their structural position and role, members of the security indus”? 140

ee

The Security Industry ——_ —__

at

terrorism strictly within the frame of the We stern mo Jook at leew a mate del. rial interest in inflat in g the thre at of terrorism And Be scans their own importa nce as supplier of counte rter-

4rorBeeservices Since the West engage Ss in and supports a primary

-orism under > the guisi e of respondiing ng to the violence of others, terror!

rity

industry naturally gravitates to the support of and r a ; in real terrorism, as exemplified by advising the GuaBR sand Honduran military on apprehending and interrogating BS cerrorists and aiding the Nicaraguan contras. In the West ss isallknown as counterterrorism.

141

DE

The Experts

iblink between the institutes/think tanks and the mass media 1s

provided by the large body of experts on terrorism, or “terrorologists,” who publish books, articles, and monographs through leading publishing houses, the mainstream press, and newsletters and jour-

nals issued by the various institutions that house them. They cov™

among their ranks right-wing journalists and policy analysts, forme military and intelligence officers, ultraconservative academics, COU”

terinsurgency

specialists,

FBI

informants,

and

CIA

contrac

employees. A significant number of these experts are affiliated with

ultra-right-wing organizations such as the WACL, CAUSA, the - _

SG

i nthacheai

ee

iste

va

attend one ache ee ce Sass

eee

Coalition

es

oe

for Peace Throus

eee eer

ees

ee Bee

and seminars, serve on

other’s journals (such as Terre”

142

oil

the © S and

The Experts ns

ai

Conflict Quarterly), review and write forewords for their books,

and

cite

one

another

copiously,

Throu

collez

h th; es raBUeS

;

supportive network, these experts establish fireteae ie z tally their very Similar assumptions and opinions as eh aa Sigh ca : : mon sense. They validate themselves by echoing one another in an information market which they dominate. There are other individuals knowl-

edgeable about the issues terrorologists address, but they start from

the wrong premises, are not funded by the institutes and think tanks of the terrorism industry, and are thus not properly accredited. Furthermore, their discordant views do not mesh well with the

commonsense ernment,

understanding of the issues established by the gov-

industry

members,

and

press,

and

they are

generally

excluded from serious discussions in public forums that reach large numbers of people. (A list of some of these unaccredited and excluded experts is given in appendix D.) In this chapter we will examine more closely some of the characteristics, links, and opinions of the preeminent terrorism experts. Our hypotheses are: (1) private-sector experts will tend to be affiliated with governments, or to have been so connected in the recent past;

(2) they will often be associated

with institutes and think tanks

organized to push established views, many with a strong right-wing

bias; (3) many of them will be linked directly or indirectly to the

international ultraright, exemplified by the Unification Church system and WACL; (4) many will be connected with private-sector security firms; and (5) the experts will rarely if ever depart from the official Western model and line on terrorism, and given the rightwing bias of the institutes, will, in fact, tend to expound the far-

right version of the line.

A Survey of the Experts

ori W ho Ultimately, we are most interested in those analysts of terrorism ; d are accredite

as experts by the mass

é wed to define allo

, media,

and w ho are thus

blic. pu the to ss acce n give are and es the issu

143

—__ — ry st du In m s i r The “Terro

——

———

fi

eT, Experts also include those who are cee

1¢ Participants th e e b Al ses nes wit as zed ili mob thie field and EXperts op 7-1 lists first (A) the 16 eading

Table aes sample of 136 s mas our m fro ons terrorism based on citati experts based on lists (B) o als It t.’ jec sub the on ms ite news pore experts, a er oth by k wor ir the tO number of references rorism.” There are 5

conferences.

political ter reported in Schmid’s volumes on t the two together provide ‘ndividuals common to lists A and B, so tha

Table 7-1 eee

SS

The Terrorism Experts EE

OEE

——

A. 16 Experts Based on Citations in

135-Item Media Sample

Robert Kupperman Walter Laqueur Michael Ledeen Neil Livingstone Ariel Merari Uri Ra-Anan Claire Sterling Paul Wilkinson

Fouad Ajami Yonah Alexander Joseph Churba Ray Cline William Colby Lawrence Eagleberger Paul Henze Brian Jenkins

B. 13 Experts According to Expert Citations in Schmid Yonah Alexander M. Cherif Bassiouni J. B. Bell

Brian Jenkins Robert Kupperman Walter Laqueur

Richard Clutterbuck

E. V. Mickalous

Margaret Crenshaw

E. V. Walter

Brian Crozier

Paul Wilkinson

Ted Gurr

. Supplementary List of 8 Major Terrorism Experts Arnaud de Borch grave

bo Alan Chalfont

Robert Moss

Richard Pipes

amuel T. Francis

Stefan Possony

Jeane Kirkpatrick

Maurice Tugwell re

i

144

The Experts ee

—_

94 separate cine: To this set of 24, we have added 8 supplementar names (C), based on our judgment of importance as fica ie

influence and outreach. Lord Alan Chalfont, a former British Shine minister and an active Journalist and publicist, was chair of the Jonathan Institute conference

of 1984 in Washington, chairs the

Institute for the Study of Terrorism in London, and links together diverse

governmental

and

right-wing

interests

in the terrorism

industry. Arnaud de Borchgrave runs a newspaper and magazine, writes fictional accounts of terrorism (which he and his coauthor Robert Moss discuss in interviews as though they were factual),? and

effectively exploits his numerous

connections to get his message

across. Samuel T. Francis is the leading Heritage Foundation authority on terrorism and has had substantial outreach through his

writings and participation in conferences, hearings, and interviews.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, following her stint as the Reagan UN ambassador,

has been a syndicated columnist, lecturer, and foreign policy expert associated with a number of institutes and think tanks. A cult figure of the right, she has had substantial outreach as a commentator on terrorism. Robert Moss, an Australian-born British journalist, has

been affiliated with a number of right-wing institutes, several of which

he helped

to organize,

and

has been

a prolific writer of

fictional and quasifictive accounts of the terrorist threat. The fictional accounts have been written in collaboration with de Borchgrave; the

quasifictive accounts have frequently been written under the direction or with the cooperation of various Western intelligence agencies.* Richard Pipes, the Harvard specialist in Soviet studies, is included

because of his multiple affiliations in the industry, his writings, and

his important role in the Jonathan Institute conference of 1979. Stefan Possony, the leading terrorism expert in residence at the

Hoover Institution, and also a longtime member of WACL and ASC,

has written extensively on terrorism, including a book written with

Communist Connection. L. Francis Bouchey, International Terrorism: The

army information officer, h tis Bri mer for a l, wel Tug e ric Mau Finally, , 1S ad of the Mackenzie Institute he d an da na Ca of nt ide res how a

adian terrorologist, with Can al nti lue inf t mos the as e her ed includ ee ada. wide-ranging activities in this field in Can exper, some of the major Let us turn now to an examination of

145

hoe lerronsm:

eee

Industty: ————--__

ter of their activities, as well to get a sense of the scope and charac r linkages and views ie ACetG

provide

basic information

on

thei

try y to arriv eratisome will we s ts ing oun acc se the ing low terrorism. Fol

positions on terrorism of and ns tio nec con the ut abo ons ati liz era gen all 32 experts.

Yonah Alexander

Alexander, a professor of International Studies

at the State University of New York, has run his Own institute since 1977, but he has also been affiliated with many other institutions

within the terrorism industry as visiting fellow (CSIS), as member

(the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies), and as a participant in numerous programs and studies. He was selected as director of terrorism research of the NFF in the mid-1980s, and

he has been codirector with Ray Cline of the program on terrorism and low-intensity warfare at the U.S. Global Strategy Council. Also in collaboration with Cline, Alexander has been in the risk analysis

business for private corporate clients.® In addition to the thirty conferences and seminars on terrorism sponsored by his own institute, Alexander has been a regular participant in conferences staged by others, including that put on by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv in 1979, the Brookings

seminar of 1982, the

Nuclear Terrorism conference of 1985, and others. He has testified

as an expert witness before the Denton committee. Alexander also edits the journal Terrorism.

The funding sources of Alexander’s institute are not in the public

domain, but his continuous appearance in government-sponsored and government-related conferences, seminars, and hearings in both

Israel and the United States, and his views—which

never depart

from the right-wing version of the Western model—show 4 close

spiritual affinity with the official Israeliand Reagan-era U.S. doctrine, whatever the formal and financial connections. His tie with Israel's also shown by the fact that his book Terrorists or Freedom Fighters

coauthored with E. Tavin, was published in cooperation with the World Zionist Organization. His book written with Ray Cline Sie Sponsored Terrorism, was commissioned by the U.S. Army in 1984 oe

was eventually published as a report of the Denton committee '

146

a Nheobiganets teeti 1985. Another Alexander-Cline collabor ation, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, was distributed freel eykby the hSte saben epomie rm to public requests for info st Subject of terrorism.®

Alexander has been a fertile producer on the subject of terro rism, his curriculum vitae listing thirty-one books. Fifteen of these works,

however, were edited or coedited volumes, and all but two of the

remainder were coauthored. Still, Alexander has written a great deal on terrorism, which he is able to do rather easily, given his continual

recycling of a simple message. The quality of his work may be illustrated by examining his (and Ray Cline’s) State-Sponsored Terror-

ism.’ The main goal of state-sponsored terrorists, the authors claim, is to undermine “pluralist states with democratic governments.” This may be the goal of the Reagan-era U.S. sponsorship of the contra attacks on Nicaragua, but Alexander and Cline do not list this as a case in point. On the other hand, as South Africa and Guatemala are on their list of states being subverted by Soviet proxies, the implication is that these are pluralistic and democratic states. This point is not clarified by the authors. They explain that a merit of their statement of the goal of state-sponsored terrorists is that it reflects “the recent policy positions voiced by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.”® The gearing of their analysis of terrorism to the policy needs of their own state could not be more explicit. No cliché or fabrication on Soviet sponsorship is left untouched in this volume—the PLO is the Soviet “transmission belt” for the

export of terrorism (p. 10); the North Koreans “fought the first Soviet-sponsored proxy war of the century in the 1950s” (p. 57); the

Pope was shot in May 1981 by a Turkish terrorist “trained and armed by the Bulgarian secret intelligence services” (p. 13);° Cuba and Nicaragua “closely coordinate in the supply, staging, and training

of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla war effort in El Salvador” (p. 64);'° and Nicaragua “has been antackang ts neighbors since August 1979 in a revolution without borders” (p. 88), 11

-Cline view of national liberEqually significant is the Alexander

ation movements. A war of national liberation for them 1s: ot that can be applied rm “te a is and m” ter a and pag pro munist

147

to any

a

The “Terrorism” Industry —

(Pp. 56 low-intensity conflict the Soviet Union chooses to support”

and xiii). Nowhere do they admit the possibility of rebel autonomy

and the legitimacy of such movements, their uniform Stress is oy Soviet support, which delegitimizes these movements. hey use the spread by Moscoy analogy of an “nfection, a virulent disease’

against “successive open societies’ to characterize national liberation po movements. They have no hesitancy in calling the ANC and SWa an model,” “extremist “terrorist groups . . - based on the Cub

acks against South Africa” organizations,” who “launch terrorist att

(pp. 64-65).

In brief, this is an extreme right-wing propaganda tract that ties

all liberation movements to Moscow and apologizes for South African

as well as any other Western-state

primary terror.

The authors

engage in shameless lying. None of these considerations, however, have detracted from Alexander’s status as an expert for both the Western media or other experts who cite and collaborate with him as a serious scholar.

Ray Cline Alexander’s collaborator, Ray S. Cline, Is a central figure in the terrorism industry, an early proponent of the Soviet

network theory, and a leading member and spokesman of the far

right. For a long time he was a senior associate at CSIS, adjunct

professor of International

Relations

at Georgetown’s

School of

Foreign Service, and an instructor at the Defense Intelligence School.

He currently chairs the CAUSA-affiliated U.S. Global Strategy Cou” cil, and serves on the editorial board of the Moon-owned monthly magazine, The World and I, edited by Arnaud de Borchgrave. Cline

is afhliated with many other members of the terrorism industry: During World War II, Cline served as a naval intelligence officer

and worked for the OSS in Kunming, China, with John singlav?

Mitchell Livingstone WerBell III, Richard Helms, and Howard Hu

Cline later served as deputy CIA station chief a South Kore4 int id

early 1950s. From 1958 to 1962, he was the CIA’s station chief is Taiwan, and from 1962 to 1966 was the agency's depuly ae

for intelligence. He later became director of the State Depa?™ ‘i d Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1969-73), where he help 148

_—————

The Experts

coordinate the CIA’s destabilization and eventual overthrow of the

Allende government in Chile.!? In addition oe nee Ena lies to the U.S. government, Cline has been closely connected to repressive regimes and the international ultraright. We have noted his leadership of a i cobbepataa

organization. While stationed in Taiwan, Cline was probably mone in channeling counterpart funds from the U.S. embassy to provide the initial financing for the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League in 1954 and the preparatory meeting of WACL in 1958.'? Cline has attended and participated in several WACL meetings. With Chiang Ching-kuo,

the son

of Chiang

Kai-shek,

Cline formed

Taiwan’s

notorious Political Warfare Cadres Academy, which has trained officers from right-wing nations worldwide in counterinsurgency techniques.'* One of the best known graduates of the academy is Roberto D’Aubuisson. Cline has also worked with the far right in the Philippines. After relocating the offices of WACL to the Nippon Star Trading Company complex in Manila in late 1986, John Singlaub met with Cline, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and General Luis Villa-Real. Villa-Real, the president of WACL’s Philippine chapter, played a central role in the creation of right-wing death squads in that

country.!® Both Cline and Singlaub were identified by the Philippine

Daily Inquirer as aiding the forces behind the 1986 coup attempt against the Aquino government.’®

Cline’s ties to the U.S. far right are also noteworthy. He has served in various capacities on the boards of organizations tied to the so-

called China Lobby, such as the Committee for a Free China and

the Coalition for Asian Peace and Security. He was president of the

National Intelligence Studies Center, a conservative and intelligencelinked think tank, and he has been active in the right-wing Association

of Former Intelligence Officers. Cline has given interviews to the

John Birch Society’s Review of the News on two separate SESS

follow LaRouche's on (April 22, 1981, and March 27, 1985). Lyndon and Cline Cultivated a friendly relationship with Cline,

3 He is also to chat with them throughout the early 1980s.” Card of directors of the Nathan Hale Foundation and aie

=

the editorial board of Yonah Alexander's journal, ee ees: Cline has been heavily involved in the risk analyst 149

m ihe Terrorism Industry e

eee

h Alexande; i as a collaborator with Yona of the politica] envin e e dg le ow kn my l sel to g¢ ma; explains, “I am try 18 Fis clients include several

working sometimes

)

=

ment

in foreign countries. as Tits.

i

-

.

.

.

i Ms not to invest in mainla

‘Lh: a) advised Chin nd ady has ch he (whi s ie compan General Dynamic, , g udin incl s, firm nse defe of er mb and a nu

.” Cline has also major contributor to CSIS) and Hewlett-Packard created a number of “political risk scenarios” for companies doin

the South business with South Africa, scenarios that claim that be an engine African government s “sophisticated leadership could

for growth.”° In addition to his ties to Taiwan, the Philippines, anq

South Africa, Cline once helped a Chicago arms manufacturer sel]

arms to the military regime in Turkey.’ We

described

earlier the nature

of a work

which

Cline and

Alexander wrote together, which expounds a simpleminded rightwing version of the establishment model. When Cline previewed his thesis that the Soviet Union was masterminding worldwide terrorism at a 1980 meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers,

he was sharply attacked by three of his colleagues. Howard Bane,

who had only recently retired as the CIA’s

said, “We've It’s divisive. Retired CIA stuff, that’s

got to It’s not officer all. It’s

Moscow

station chief,

get Cline off this Moscow control of terrorists. true. There’s not one single bit of truth to it.” Harry Rositzke concurred: “It’s that far-right horseshit.” Finally, Conrad Hassel, the FBI's

director for antiterrorism instruction, and now head of the Wack-

enhut Corporation’s antiterrorism division, observed, “If you wan! to believe in the conspiracy theory of terrorism, well, you've g°% It

but there’s no evidence for it.”?? Cline has been an outspoken proponent of disinformation and

direct manipulation of the press by the CIA. In testimony before

the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Cline defended the a of such covert devices as black propaganda and the funding °

Jpumalists, arguing that “the First Amendment is only a0 ame? :

ernie tao ioe

wae

Despite his CIA background, extensive connections ae

character of his ae

ahdaienean

ae

ona

BCS

"vert gues! frequent a been has fee rie dsice ‘Nightimesben U-»the ng defendi and m terroris on g , 150

’

=

la7i

~

:

i

Fe

ment’s use of m?Nazi war criminals as missile scientists Ist: (“Nightline,” 18, 1984). ,

October

Brian Jenkins closely linked

As we saw in chapter 5, the Rand Corporation jis to the Pentagon by historic ties and an ongoing

dominant funding relationship. As Rand’s top authority on terrorism,

Brian Jenkins would hardly be able to contest the Western model of

terrorism, and he has never done so. In fact, for many years Jenkins

has been actively involved in formulating terrorist strategies for his own government. Having served in the Green Berets, Jenkins became a counterinsurgency specialist at Rand, writing and advising on the best ways to defeat America’s insurgent enemies in Guatemala, E]

Salvador, and elsewhere. A 1977 article coauthored by Jenkins is an apologia for U.S. intervention in Guatemala and Guatemalan state terrorism.** As an important advisor in the construction of a counterinsurgency program in El Salvador in the early 1980s, Jenkins recommended that traditional methods be supplemented by the use of propaganda to discredit insurgents as “terrorists.”2° In another coauthored report in 1984, Jenkins recommended that the U.S. engage in low-intensity warfare against Nicaragua through a proxy army, actions that fall within Jenkins’s own definition of statesponsored terrorism. In short, Jenkins’s role as government advisor on policies involving state violence and insurgencies puts him in a serious conflict-of-interest position as an expert on terrorism. Jenkins has written extensively on terrorism and has made numerous appearances at conferences and as a media expert of choice.

He also edits TVI Journal (the acronym stands for “Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency”), a journal that he acquired from members of the Soldier of Fortune network in 1985.?° It 1s interesting, given his an aS on Position at a government-sponsored agency and as ee U.S.-sponsored terrorist activities, that Jenkins is one of the

se “rates” among the terrorism experts. His moderation 1s a that he is one of the few among the establishment exper S ati I ac now Openly castigated Sterling’s Soviet network model.2” He also

ft, that guerrilla

;

. nces an d ¢ cannot “dges that terror is not a monopoly ofrealthegrieva NOvements may be legitimate responses to

151

Siem

lenrorisme) (ndusthy ©—$

4

.

‘

182

re

The

Experts

te bends liberally, in accord with the needs Ofihe police and state. ’ ‘ . 1 . Wilkinson s servic | sive state was carr e to a repres ied to a new level n his attempt to discredi Coli t n Wallace, formerly of MI5 (Bri tish

sta

intelligence) and the Army Information Department. Wallace had

exposed the workings of an MI5-backed

“dirty tricks” campaign

designed to discredit Labour MPs by linking their names, prior to elections, with the Irish Republican Army, as well as an MI5 campaign

to smear Harold Wilson in 1976. Wallace also went on record in exposing abuses of psychological operations undertaken against the Irish by British intelligence.'°” In response to Wallace’s charges, Wilkinson passed along a letter of

dubious origin to ITN Television, which accused Wallace of all manner of wrongdoing. Wilkinson’s accompanying letter (on University of Aberdeen stationery and dated July 21, 1987) to a representative of ITN began, “Herewith the interesting letter I received from one

of our researchers on the Colin Wallace affair. . . . It certainly raises major question marks about the extent to which one can rely on his version of events in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.”’*® The letter in question, a rather crude piece of disinformation,

wrongfully accused Wallace of attempting to have the husband of a woman he was allegedly having an affair with killed by the Ulster Defense Association, and attributed his claims regarding Wilson and

MI5 to “James Bond fantasies.” Subsequently, in a letter to Wallace

himself dated June 9, 1988, Wilkinson apologized for having caused him any undue “discomfort or embarrassment.” A letter of retraction

was simultaneously sent to various news agencies calling the allegations against Wallace (which he had, in essence, provided as fact)

‘totally untrue.”!39

The Linkages and Opinions of the Establishment Experts ;

In this section

we

shall try to draw

some

aes

oie

bout the cana

positions taken by connections of and ona Stitutional 3® *Pe ert rts. In table 7-2 the instituti l connection gs a expo i s 2 :ese

/, 1 through s row in is bas ed at eg gr ag an ives can be , Shown on nd Ppperspective vee e ae :~— inMport4 ns opinio ics of their _

Portant characterist

183

___ — — — — ry st du In ’ sm “Terrori

ie

is aoe information a R e bl ta e th of | mn lu Co 9, seen on rows 8 and

asale hae Column 9 for the 12 experts discussed a es were une experts A : an 16 the for n io at rm fo ‘n supplies this Set of oe ). Eleven of the of choice in our media sample (WEE WES of im ate s, rt pe ex t an port le mp sa our 1n e sed abov 16 were

discus

set of 32 leading experts er rg la a for a dat r ila sim es giv mn third colu columns, cludes all of those in the first two

on terrorism, which in

7—1 and the text. It can be le tab in r lie ear d fie nti ide , ers oth 15 lus

nions between these seen that the differences in connections and opi three sets are small.

The table offers striking confirmation of our major hypotheses.

First, we can see on rows 1-3 how closely the experts are linked to governments. Over two-thirds have had some U.S. or British government affiliation in the recent past, and between a fifth and a

Table 7-2 manner

—_————

rere

reer

Linkages and Perspectives of the Terrorism Industry Experts* MEDIA

BIG 12

16

%

BIG 32

No.

%

NOM

vo

NO.

9

75.0

11

68.8

20

(3)

(2520)

(4)

(25)

(eee

(Z1e9)

2. British govt. link

Sie

2510

]

6.3

6

(18.8)

a. Army/police

(3)

(25.0)

()en(653)

(6)

(18.8)

3. Net govt. affiliated

10

83.3

WW

75

22

68.8

4. Institute/think tank

10

= 83.3

11

68.8

23

eDeS

(5)

(31.3)

(13)

(40.6)

(2)

(1t285)

(4)

(12.5)

CHARACTERISTIC 1. U.S. govt. link a. (GIA

a. Big Fourt

(8)

(66.7)

c. Israel-lobby

(2)

(16.7)

5. Risk analysis/security

i

58.3

8

50.0

6. Journalist

9

16.7

l

6.3

7. Academic

4

33.3

5

31.3

b. Moon related

(3)

(2)e((167)

(18.8)

(5)

62.5

(15.6)

related

8. Focuses on left and

insurgent terror

12

9. Fit in classif. by model type a. Estab. moderate

b. Estab. right ies

c. Dissident d. Nonet

:

46.9

13

40.6

5

15.6

96.9

10 °

me out

15

He

aie

10 ad 2

66.7 a ii

* For aa discdis¢ ussion of the thITEE $2 sof t Heritage, Hoover, AE], oA csie Of SSPEIHE: ape Brant, + No model evident in pub lished writings

184

100

29

62.5 ow 12:5

.

¢;

20 .

a

3.1 15.6

Exports

the

quarter aes had : act dee

perrorism commonly

cot la). Conferences on

: ie major speakers both the

private-

sector experts and government officials, who Operate collegially and on the same Paemises and are hard to tel] apart. William Casey, head

of the CIA during much of the Reagan cra, was the featured speaker at the 1985 conference on terrorism at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, addressing the subject “The International Linkages:

What Do We Knowe” Casey fitted in smoothly; the experts had no problems with accommodating the activist head of an activist intel-

ligence agency into the scholarly proceedings. These linkages between

governments

suggest the strong likelihood

and the terrorism experts

that the experts will adhere

to a

government party line; or, put another way, they point to a certain lack of independence on the part of these experts. This should raise questions about their suitability as sole sources for a supposedly independent—not to say adversarial—press. It is a striking fact that

the media not only do not seem to have qualms about this lack of independence, they do not appear to be aware that this is a problem. The assumptions and truths of the state are so taken for granted

that a symbiotic relation between state and “independent” press is not seen to contaminate the press function. This even extends to an unquestioning

(and often undisclosed)

use of CIA, ex-CIA,

and

other intelligence functionaries in the disinformation-propaganda line (Colby, Cline, Crozier, Henze, Moss, Tugwell, etc.), who are

treated as presumably objective news sources and analysts. Only in other countries does government

domination

of information

and

Opinion used by the press compromise press integrity. A second theme of this analysis of experts is that, in order to mobilize bias, the government and corporate elite have nurtured

those with the proper views by providing them with financial support 4nd institutes in which to work. It can be seen on row 4 of table

‘a that over two-thirds of the experts have been affiliated with stitutes and think tanks. As we described in chapter 5, many of e supported by “S€ Organizations have been funded and otherwis

oun wecorporate : s, ion rat rpo —co ons uti tit ins t men ish abl pn a inant est heirs of the corp y lth wea the and t, men ern gov the , s ns s conspicuously true . support relationship 1 ding and s—H s fun ThiFou ofa “o© gBig eritage, Hoover, CSIS, and AFI —with ute r instit ig I 185

Table 7-3 A Matrix of the Linkages of Thirty-two Terrorism Industry Experts INSTITUTES

COUNTRIES aa

AND

THINK

TANKS

SECURITY

a

S

ses

=

S

:

~

Ss

wo Sos yea cos SON : ROG dN Ss me

RD

eters,

Ss

SS

eS

NR

=

% S

Be pe oh ee Feo SE Sees OP SBS & See) as 2G : AH Ss Spe eee ea Ss egies es ree RS

2

5

SS

Ss

iN

Sees

Alexander Bell Chalfont Churba Cline Clutterbuck Colby Crenshaw Crozier

98I

de Borchgrave

Eagleburger Francis Gurr Henze

Jenkins Kirkpatrick Kupperman

Laqueur Ledeen

Livingstone Merari Mickolaus Moss Pipes Possony Ra-Anan

Sterling Tugwell Wilkinson Others* \ Based

on

research

contract.

2 Based

on

free distribution

= = of published

work.

SITAR * Walter.

2 Ajami.

and

= Bassiouni

have

no

current

(known)

ae Tos connections to entrie

om

e

~

FIRMS

Se

¢

s

leesSee

~~

SoS SS OF

=

OO &

inti which a very sizable fraction of the expert s have been associated We can see on row 4a that 66.7 percent of the Big Twelve sample of experts, and a somewhat smaller Pro portion of the total sample

(column 3) have been affiliated with this leading foursome. It can also be seen on rows 4b and 4c that there are significant connec tions between the mainstream terrorism experts and Moon-supported

institutes and those affiliated with the Israelj lobby. On row 5 of table 7-2 we can also see that about half or more of

the mainstream experts have been affiliated with private firms in the risk analysis and security business. This linkage tends to compromise

them as experts on terrorism, partly because they sell their services to businesses

and governments

who have restricted views on the

nature of terrorism. They also have a vested interest in “threat inflation,” as their business is contingent on an adequate volume of terrorism against which to protect their clients. Security business also ties the participants more closely to the government security establishment in exchange of information and a revolving door relationship. Five of the establishment experts are journalists, and a larger number are academics. These relationships often overlap with ties to government and the institutes (see table 7~3). Arnaud de Borch-

grave, Brian Crozier, Robert Moss, and Claire Sterling are classed as journalists, but the first three have had important links to governments and institutes; Sterling has been funded by the Reader’s

Digest, which has had long-standing CIA connections,!*° and her links to Western intelligence agencies and the various terrorism institutes and experts have been collegial and mutually supportive. Roughly one-third of the experts have had an academic connection (row 7), but a great majority of these experts have also had links to governments, the institutes, and risk analysis firms. This is evident

among the most prestigious experts, who are also most heavily cited by the media, such as Laqueur and Wilkinson. The relatively sizable contingent of academics in column 3 results from the fact that the

Sample of 32 includes those listed by Schmid as heavily cited by

other experts, who refer to some of the more esoteric and ee

literature by E. V. Walter, M. Cherif Bassiount, Ted Sa

Martha Crenshaw. The first two have had only academic connections, and they have rarely been cited in the media. 187

The

“Terrorism” Industry ——__

Table 7-3 provides a more detailed (but sull incomplete)

Picture

a variety of gover of the connections of our 32 experts with ee tutes, and security firms, and we

government agencies, insti Showianmthenlast column whether

or not the expert made an

of the | appearanc e as a witness in one of the terrorism hearings

1980s. The table shows clearly the density of the connections of the experts to establishment institutions and, by this route, to one another. We can see that Ray Cline is checked under 13 differen; columns, recording links to at least seven institutes and think tanks, among other connections. Looking at a particular column, we can see, for example, that 7 of the 32 experts have had demonstrable affiliations with the CIA, and that 11 have had a link to CSIS. Returning to table 7—2, we can see that only | of the 32 experts

departs from the Western model of terrorism, namely M. Cherif

Bassiouni.'*! Similarly, looking at where the experts fit into our classification of terrorism models—dissident, establishment moderate, and establishment right wing—all the experts for whom it 1s possible to make a judgment, except Bassiouni, adhere to the two establishment versions of the Western

model. We may note, also,

the right-wing domination of the expert pattern. Roughly two-thirds of the classifiable experts expound the extremist version of the establishment model, in which the Soviet Union directs or coordinates

world terrorism, national liberation movements are generally tabbed as terrorist organizations or agents of world communism, and hardline policies of national and international response are espoused. In fact, at least 10 of our 32 experts fall into the category of zealots, espousing ideas that we believe rational individuals would recognize

as foolish and unsupported by any evidence.!42 The bias of the Western experts is shown more directly and

dramatically in table 7-4, which summarizes the topics covered 10 the major books of three of our terrorism experts—Laqueu!, Slee

ling, and Wilkinson—plus the popular and oft-cited book The Lee rorists: Thew Weapons, Leaders, and Tactics, by Christopher Dobson a?

Robert Payne, published by Facts on File. We have tallied the coverage

by counting the references in the indexes of these books to 4 dor Western and right-wing terrorists hant or Operations, on the one ne

and a dozen non-Western or leftwing terrorists, on the of

i ghtcan be seen by the most cursory inspection that Western and 116 188

eae «The Experts eeee

——_——ee— wing terror is off the exper

ts’

Neither Saad Haddad, the

‘

delle Chiaie, the world-class

age




|

.

Table 7-4 References by Terrorism Industry Experts to Western/Right-Wing and Non-Western/Left-Wing Terrorism* —_"

ii i

~

0

a

DOBSON-PAYNE

ee

LAQUEUR

WILKINSON

ee

STERLING

Western/Right-Wing Roberto d’Aubuisson Stefano delle Chiaie

——_ =

— es:

a or

Orlando Bosch—CORU Luis Posada Carriles

as =

a co

l pas

pat Prk

Botha—South Africa Operation Condor

== —

(2)+ as

(1)t es

a ea

Pinochet

=

pss.

ae

=

Videla

(2)t

=e

fe

om

Sharon-Begin-Yaron

(1)t

=

(2)t

Lads

Saad Haddad Contras-Reagan-North

— —

_

— (4)+

abs —

Tecos (Mexico)

—

=

=

a=

Totals

1 0

l

l

0

Arafat-Fatah-PLO

22

26

10

51

Carlos the Jackal

11

é

2

40

Abu Nidal

11

16

1

2

Marighela Baader-Meinhof

8 34

8 19

6 4

1] 36

Red Brigades

15

22

2

57

5

19

6

22

18

21

Non-Western/Left-Wing

Tupamaros

Castro-Cuba

Qaddafi-Libya Soviet Union

Weathermen Black Panthers

Totals ee

4

—

5 1

134

19

15

40

9

11

54

7

:

:

2

nN

13

175

ar by author. + oats On Citations from the indexes of the books listed below

*B

72

was

tps

; ; ‘ to cope with oF or as having terrorists.

Inc., 1982). (New or Lo, on File, ed. rev. Terrorists, fanny: The er, . * range and R. Payne, Brown, & Winston/Resdet Little, Wiese, ce ,Bek Rinehart (Boston: Holt, York: 6h Pads The Terrorism Sterling, of AE aqueur, The Age 7 Yor State, rev. ed. (New York: New Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal (©

iP

189

:

ee

wre gh tex Boe renner 3s victims

as terrorists In of ter hile individuals or groups are listed in index, they are not treated r

ie

ee

fae Nervnism: ©(NGUSthy BOvernment

does not call

atrention FO its ¢ lient’s Savageries O1 call them terrorism—and neither does the private sector of the terrorism industry. The U.S. tras media also virtually ignore this approved terror. Neither the Tula

case nor the murder of Guevara Monge was ever mentioned by the New York Times, Washington Post, CBS

News, or to our knowledge

any other U.S. mass media source. In the first half of 1988, the New

York Times had three times as many news articles on alleged rebel violence as On the rampant and vastly more important state terrorism in El Salvador. This effective blacking out of client-state violence is

critically important to the continuation of state policy: the American

public might have mistaken the Tula and Guevara Monge beatings, rape, mutilation, and murder, and the thousands of similar events, as cases of terrorism,

not acts of counterterrorism

appropriately

funded by the American taxpayer. As we described in chapters 2 and 3, the Western model of terrorism focuses on nonstate actors, as many Western client states would have to be condemned if the traditional meaning was allowed to prevail. In fact, a major purpose of the intensified Reagan-era

emphasis on “terrorism” was to deflect attention from Argentina, Chile, El] Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa and focus it on the

Red Brigades and PLO. We can see in table 8—3 that the U.S. mass

media followed the Reagan agenda closely, just as the experts did (table 7~4). In our

sample

of news

nonstate

reports,

terrorists

outnumbered state terrorists by 96 to 10. In the CBS News coverage of 1981, summarized in table 8—4, the ratio was 152 to 5, if we

exclude Libya, which was the premier “terrorist” of 1981, as CBS N ¢ws—along with the rest of the media—intently followed the career

of the mythical Libyan “hit squad” late in that year. In all but one case, the state terrorists identified by the e

media

in table g—3. In that single, Were non-Western states, as shown ames spokesmen who ap €Xceptional case, a hews article-ciies

*rael’s bombj Words

ng of an Iraqi reactor was an act of terrorism. .

le or broadcast In thi s artic le sing a NOL » | orn source iden ifti

sample ever cited : — rrorist

tifying a Western state . per and in murd mas F ™ . ern seceenaelauianks th; was a period that this of ~ mass ©. Notete that ‘ ;

Yate).

Mala, and of massive internal repression a

205

Terrorism Industry —

iia

haere 7 = by South Africa; these, however,

cac upP as not show aS Cases 6 f State

do

terrorism in the 135 sample articles and broadcasts. The CBS index Western cases 5 for 1981 shows 45 non-Western and three f State

or, the only instance jp terrorism, the latter includ ing El | Salvad Which 1S cit ed 4 Latin America terror state

as a State terrorist.

Table 8-3 State and Nonstate Terrorism and Terrorists and Their * Political Affiliations, as Portrayed in the U.S. Mass Media e

LL

EEEEEEEE—E—E——E

NIN

ee

State and Nonstate Actors as Terrorasts Nonstate State

96 10

Political Characteristics of State and Nonstate Terrorists State: 9 1+

Non-Western Western Nonstate:

Left-wing

60+

Right-wing

10

Unclear

28

States Identified as Sponsoring Terrorism Western: United States Non-Western: Libya Soviet Union

18 3] 30 95

Iran

Sa

Syria

16

Cuba North Korea South Yemen

UI

Iraq Nicaragua

ae Pe

10 5 9

SEE

eS

ge

9

reports (see note 7, p. 291). és, June 9, 1981, features Arab accusations t

19

34, two parahey of a news article in the Philadelphia Inquirer, April 1ie contras Z suse are reporters doesn’t constitute stat Pee Reagan press officer Speakes whether the U.S. support ©

§$In the last t

ROD:

© sponsorship of terrorism, which he vigorously denied.

206

——

Mass Media ee

ide

eee

We may also note the huge and biased imbalance in mass med}

identification of nonstate

terrorists

by political Orientation,

a a

closely paralleling the choices of the experts (table 7-4). In Pi g—3 the ratio of left-wing to right-wing nonstate terrorists is 60 to 10; on CBS News for 1981 (table 8-4) it is 71 to 11. The Cuban

terror network that emerged from U.S. sponsorship of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose, and many years of terrorist attacks on Cuba** was almost surely the greatest perpetrator of nonstate (retail) terrorist violence in the Western Hemisphere in the

1960s and 1970s.** But it shows up only marginally in our media sample and not at all in the CBS News index of terrorism in 1981.

A long article in the New York Times of June 25, 1978, that purports

to be “a status report on important terrorist groups” in the United States, Latin America,

and elsewhere

never

mentions

Omega

7,

Alpha 66, or any other Cuban terrorist group, although it gives an entire paragraph to the Puerto Rican FALN. In this T7mes article, terrorism is only left-wing terrorism. Similarly, in Europe, the greatest death tolls from terrorist attacks in the 1980s were a product of right-wing terror in Bologna and elsewhere in Italy. These do not show up at all in our media sample, although it contains a number of accounts of terrorism in Europe. In the Western model, however, the West is being attacked by the Soviet Union

and its proxies,

pattern tends to be ignored.

so terror

that doesn’t fit into this

In the 1980s, the spate of highly

ineffective attacks on NATO military installations, and the murder of several targeted military-political establishment figures in 1984—

85, fit the Western model and received attention. An article in the Philadelphia Inquirer by Steve Twomey, “W. Europe Alarmed by Terrorists’ Alliance” (Feb. 2, 1985), follows this establishment formula without deviation. Twomey never mentions right-wing terror-

ism in Italy or elsewhere, although the train bombing by rightists in

of Italy on December 23, 1984, accounted for more deaths than all the establishment favorites for the years 1984-85. Nor does he acts of een hint at the possibility that some of the favored for the delectation oa might have been manufactured and staged

follow ¢ reporters like himself.2° Other articles in our sample womey pattern.?” rin;g g terrorsism also nso : o sp tes | on sta of tale s identificati The mass media’ 207

Table 8-4

ws in 1981* Terrorists as Seen By CBS-TV Ne ee NE as Terrorists State versus Nonstate Actors

48 (5) 152

State (State exclusive of Libya) Nonstate Political Classification of Terrorists State:

43

Libya

9

Soviet Union Western states and clients

3+

Nonstate:

7]

Left-wing

11

Right-wing

704

Unclear

Names of States or Groups

Engaged in or Sponsoring Terrorism

Western or right-wing: El] Salvador government

1+

U.S. government

ly

Israel

1+

Jewish Defense League

1

Agca and Gray Wolves

6§

Non-Western or left-wing: Libya

43

Red Brigades

18

IRA PLO

15 13

Weathermen

12

E] Salvadoran rebels

6

Soviet Union

Black guerrillas of South Africa Guatemalan rebels

Pro-Syrian group Armenian Puerto Rican rebels er rr oth

ere

GIy.)

hk

Cf No DO NO —

* Based on an analysis of the titles of all the 1981 entries in the CBS index under the heading “Terrorism.”

+ The accusation against the Salvadoran government was made by the archbishop of El Salyer

the claim that the United States is engaged in terrorism was made by Khomeini; the allegation ¢

Israel was a terrorist state cited in the CBS News index was by an Arab. though + The large number that were unclear was based in part on the ambigui ty of in dex titles, alno '€ ta very substant

, ijack get ial number were of hija d to have i gs an ckin right political identification, that seem s : OE ae litical § In 1981, before Sterling ia and the KGB, his; po! ar lg Bu ca to d a n Ag di tie er me st We d the an affiliations were identified as

right-wing,

208

== ile: Mass) M eija ee

=e

follows closely the Western propaganda line: the simple count | table 8-3 is 132 to 1 in favor of non-Western Sponsorship. For CBS

in 1981, the ratio is 45 to 3 (table 8—4). Although the United States

organized a system of national security states, and funded and

trained numerous other right-wing movements such as those that overthrew governments in Indonesia and the Philippines, with the clear intention of creating an anticommunist political force that

would serve U.S. interests, only one item in our larger sample hints at the possibility that the United

States might be a sponsor of

terrorism.”® This is exactly the way a censored press works; its own

government does not do things that fit a nasty phrase like “sponsoring terrorism,” even if their own definitions fit the facts of the case to

perfection. The point is unthinkable and the censored press excludes it. So does the free press. Also excluded as sponsors are our allies, as well as their terrorist

offshoots. South Africa does not once appear as a terrorist state in the 135-item sample or in the CBS News index for 1981, nor do South Africa’s proxies, Savimbi, UNITA, or RENAMO, appear on

the list of cited terrorist groups (table 8-5). The ANC and SWAPO are cited twice as terrorists, however, and the CBS index for 1981 lists two articles in which “black guerrillas of South Africa” are noted as involved in terrorist incidents. One news item in the CBS index

is entitled “Elimination of Terrorism [is] South African Concern,”

in which CBS News allows the apartheid government to spell out its views on “terrorism,” which it opposes. Similarly, Guatemala never shows up as terrorist state in either of our samples, although the

CBS index for 1981 lists a Guatemalan rebel incident as fitting their notion

of terrorism.

Israel’s

cross-border

attacks are only once

identified as terroristic (as we have noted, by Arab sources), and their terroristic surrogate in Lebanon, Haddad, is never cited as a terrorist.

The individual terrorists of choice in th e

ien U.S. mass media, show

©n table 8—5, are once again closely geared to the Western Pie

and propaganda line, paralleling the selectivity of the eae ee, Carlos t ae ie). Predictably they are Arafat, Abu Nidal, and

equal to us aa Right-wing terrorists with records of murder than Carlos and Abu N idal, like Stefano delle Chiate, ela ee,

4nd Luis Posada, fail to gain significant mass media attention. 209

alenorsm —Industry ———__

aie

g of a Cuban airliner and Posada were both involved in the bombin

Posada was revealed in 1976 in which seventy-three persons died. network workj, ply sup ra cont the in ant icip part in 1986 to be a

dor. Hic for the North-Reagan team at Jlopango airbase in El Salva ae

interest or excite the identification as a U.S. agent failed to media, which, following their leaders, get terribly agitated if Italy or

Imagine France fails to deal properly with an Arab terrorist.

the

media reaction if one of these countries, or better yet Bulgaria or

Table 8-5 The Political Affiliations of Individuals and Groups Identified as Terrorist in the U.S. Mass Media*

Western or Right-Wing Alpha 66

]

Omega 7

1

Aryan Nations

l

Nicaraguan contras

157

Non-Western or Left-Wing Arafat-PLO Abu Nidal

31 13

Red Brigades

13

Shiite-Lebanese

12

IRA

10

Japanese Red Army Carlos the Jackal

9 7

Agca

ot

Red Army faction

5

Baader-Meinhof gang Direct Action

5 7

ANC SWAPO

2 2

Other Armenian FALN (Puerto Rico)

2 2

Ro tai ha 6 else ale acetate * Derived from sampl

t See note § in eae 198 news reports (see note 7, p. 291). the man tri : as +a Agca, probable agentwhoae to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981, was regarded by the U.S.'S. P press x

sample.

F

.

"6 Bulgarians and KGB during most of the period covered in this

210

news

ee

The Mass Media

i

the Soviet Union, was found actually emp loying Carlos the Jackal in

wk one of its own terrorist ventures! An article in tne ape York Tomes on December 10, 1986, on page Be

91, was entitled

“Accused Terrorist Helping to Supply the Cont

This is a “soft” ute. Posada is only an “accused” terrorist, erie

he had been kept in Jail for ten years after being accused of oe

Cuban plane bombing in a country (Venezuela) closely aligned with the United States and ruled by an anticommunist elite. The article does not feature the fact that Posada is a wanted man in Venezuela, yet secretly working for the United States as a member of a hired surrogate team operating out of a client-state air base. It is “balanced,” mentioning briefly the seventy-three civilians killed in the airline bombing, but stressing Posada’s dedicated anticommunism, long fight against Castro, and devotion to his family. There was no Times editorial reflecting on U.S. protection and employment of an international terrorist, nor was there any follow-up, despite Posada’s connections with then Vice-President George Bush. The Washington Post gave the Posada story similar low-key treatment.” Stefano delle Chiaie, Italy’s premier terrorist, involved in the Bologna and other bombings, had moved around Latin America for some years, working for the Argentine junta, Pinochet, and Luis Garcia Meza during the period of the Argentine-military—drug-cartel takeover of Bolivia in 1980. His activities in support of state terrorism in Latin America, and even his apprehension in Venezuela in March 1987 and return to Italy, were of slight interest to the U.S. media.

The New York Times ran a four-inch Reuters report on the capture

of delle Chiaie, under the headline “Italian Extremist Held by Venezuelan Police.” The heading and lead paragraph portrayed

delle Chiaie as an “extremist,” not a “terrorist.” The story, although report, was also the subject of a March 30, 1987 Associated Press news. not picked up by the Washington Post or TV network

Concluding Note ment and ely on the governication of their identif The U.S. mass media rely almost eee Private sector of the terrorism industry for 7

The

Terrorism Industry ——————____

terrorists, model of terrorism, facts, and proposed Solutions. The

industry naturally excludes the terrorism of the West and its clients from the terrorism agenda, and in fact, makes primary terrorists like the governments of South Africa and El Salvador victims of terrorism engaging In counterterrorism. The press follows Closely in

the terrorism industry’s wake. Thus Abu Nidal, loosely affiliated with Libya and Syria, merits great attention as a terrorist; the leaders of

RENAMO, whose killings of unarmed civilians exceed those of Aby Nidal by a factor of many hundred but who are surrogates of g Western client and ally, South Africa, are rarely placed on official and expert lists of terrorists and are given slight attention and inspire

little indignation in the mass media. Even after the State Department

itself issued a report documenting RENAMO Killings on a staggering scale, mass media attention was fleeting and their indignation was restrained (in contrast with their reaction to the killing fields of distant Cambodia). Even traditional terrorists like Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles, who blow up civilian airliners and engage

in multiple assassinations, do not attract substantial media attention. As long as they only attack the citizens, facilities, and friends of enemy states, the terrorism industry and media display little interest in their activities. We have shown that this pattern is pervasive. We

have also made it clear that these choices have nothing to do with

the substance of terrorism—in fact, they commonly involve emphasis on a lesser terrorism and simultaneous aversion of the eyes from wholesale terror. The choices are simply tailored to the political and

propaganda needs of the West.

212

Conclusions

“Terrorists” as the West’s Enemies

n his book 1984, George Orwell described a political system in

which words could be used at state discretion to meet the needs of state policy. War could be made peace, victims could be made into evil aggressors, by definition and by the institutionalization of the preferred state usage. The West's use of “terrorist” and “terrorism”

over the past decade is a model illustration of the pattern described carried out by by Orwell in a hypothetical totalitarian state, but and the mass Western states in collaboration with private institutions

media in a process of voluntary structuring of bias. of the Wester alliance Because the leaders and establishments terrorism useful, of t por sup iet Sov and ism ror ter of eat thr the found 4 threat from ut abo ity lic pub for nd ma there was an effective de iet support of

for evidence of Sov Properly identified terrorists, and licit at the Something called terrorism. This demand was quite exp

Jonathan

Institute

conference

aig of 1979 and in the Reagan-H

and the PLO ya, Lib n, io Un iet Sov e Th Pronouncements of 1981. 213

nee “ ly St CU IN = a n r o T

eas wave

offictally

jammed

‘as’ the

major

villains,

and

state-sponsored

undertaken oe ee the West, 4 were propaganda campaigns of gov ernment-related institutes and experts terrorism industry

with books such as Th, responded with alacrity, flooding the market The Communist Conn Ae ection, Terrorisy, Soviet Strategy ofTerror, Terror ism: A Soviet Export, The Terror Network, and others. Ihe mass media of the West followed

seen

from

with a similarly intense

the Western

state/terrorism

focus on terrorism, as

industry collective’s perwa

spective.

This perspective makes the West solely a victim of terror, its own

victims and those of its client states, terrorists or supporters of

terrorism. This feat is accomplished by the state and its representa-

tives fixing the agenda, the institutional apparatus of the terrorism industry mobilizing its “experts” to propound the agreed-on line,

and the mass media transmitting the line via government officials and accredited experts, in a closed system. Spokespersons for the victims—for example, South African blacks or Mozambiquan civilians under assault by South Africa’s proxy RENAMO, members of the numerous country groups of Relatives of the Disappeared in Latin America, or Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, or Guatemalan peasants—are not admitted to the discussion of the nature and sources of terrorism.

In this closed system, with only the Western establishment view allowed, an Orwellian process follows. In its traditional usage, terrorism meant violence or the threat of violence employed by governments

or opponents

of government

to intimidate.

Because

Western governments or their clients so often intimidate, the Western establishment has defined terrorism so as to exclude governments,

which allows it to attend closely to the Baader-Meinhof gang and

Red Brigades and to play down the more severely intimidating actions of governments like those of Indonesia, Turkey, El Salvador, and Guatemala, Using this device, South Africa and Guatemala are exempted from the designation “terrorist,” despite long-term and

aio

ars intimidation by violence of vast numbers in their respective

countries; In the classic language of Alexander

said to be merely violating

Haig, they may be g in “terror

“human rights,” not engagin ism.” We would submit that this is a semantic device that fits an Orwellian model,

nion Because the West has ne U Soviet the like states eded terrorist 214

and Libya as centerpieces of the propaganda project, the Western

rerrorism industry has worked out a new concept—state-sponsored

‘nternational

terrorism—designed

to Capture

Soviet

and

Libyan

support for rebels who are terrorists, by making these backers

“sponsors: of terrorism across borders and thus of “international terrorism.” One problem with the new concept, however, is that

while the Soviet Union and Libya do aid rebels abroad, so do South Africa, Israel, and the United States. South Africa has engaged in a

large-scale program of aid and support to UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, and it has engaged in numerous other open and covert cross-border operations using its own armed forces and mercenaries. Israel has maintained a proxy army in South Lebanon under Saad Haddad and his successors for some years, and the United States has organized and supports a proxy army attacking Nicaragua and “freedom fighters” in many other countries. Even more important, the United States has for many years aided

and trained foreign police, intelligence agencies, and armies that

have terrorized civilian populations and engaged in cross-border Operations.! How has the West coped with this problem? Here we move into another phase of Orwellian processes. The Western governments,

terrorism industry experts, and mass media simply refuse to call their own state-sponsored international terror by its right name; they focus exclusively and indignantly on the approved terrorists. The politicization of this attention-selection process can attain comic

dimensions. In the Reagan years, the president, Secretary of State Shultz, and the experts would simply list the premier enemy states taken from the approved set—the Soviet Union, Libya, Vietnam, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Nicaragua—but never

of the moment,

South Africa, Turkey, Israel, Taiwan, Argentina, or Guatemala. The

Crudity with which enemy states were chosen and self and allies €xcluded was quite remarkable, given the facts and the West's own

definitions, In one episode, Reagan excluded the Soviet Union and off ng, Syria, the former because a summit meeting was in the

the

iations latter because it had performed a useful role in hostage negot

from being a terrorist state: ane therefore was momentarily excused

he inclusion of Nicaragua, a country being steadily panic” a

was not derided “stern state-sponsored international terrorism, 215

by

ihe

leronism: Industry ————__

t the experts and mag tha n ow sh e hav We s. ert exp and ss U.S. pre media followed this Orwellian system of definitions without substan.

tial deviation (chapters 7 and 8). The well-known British expert Pay]

Wilkinson, for example, simply refuses to apply his own definitions

of terrorist and sponsor of terrorism to the contras and the United States, and refers to Qaddafi's aid to Nicaragua with some indignation

as a further demonstration of Qaddafi’s misbehavior,® rather than as an instance of his helping a victim resist terrorism. For Wilkinson, there is no such thing as Western-based terrorism, by patriotic

assumption. The suppression of evidence of Western-based state terror was

paralleled by gullible and frenetic coverage of the approved terror. Just as the experts and media could never see much connection between Israel and the Christian Phalange introduced into Sabra-

Shatila by the Israeli armed forces, so also they didn’t require much evidence of Libya’s connection with Abu Nidal and bombing attacks in Western Europe or the Turkish fascist Agca and the important, the alleged Soviet and intensively publicized

Bulgarian-KGB connection with the shooting of the pope in 1981. Equally connection to terrorism was developed through analysts—Sterling, Franas,

Henze, de Borchgrave, Ledeen, Possony, Alexander, Cline, Crozier,

Moss—who were knowing or gullible instruments of contaminated intelligence sources of disinformation.* The laundered materials provided by these terrorologists, as well as those of the government itself, were swallowed by the mass media with little question. Big Brother couldn’t ask for more. The politicization of choice of terrorists within the West has been

equally great. The basic rule has been: if connected with leftists violence may be designated “terrorist”; if not, the word is not applied. The Brinks robbery of October 20, 1981, for example, carried out by members of the Weather

Underground,

received

spectacular

publicity, was quickly labeled a terrorist incident, and aroused the

and press to a frenzy of concern about a prospective surge : FBI left-wing terrorism. By contrast, a small controversy was create i

i fheI

mince nh ae

on attacks on abortion clinics in the peter

inc; these count 85,cbste or tonenmi st Wi medrt incide iey as terroriorist nts. FBI I direct airech\” or |willia which:® these attacks weren’t “true terroris™ 216

accor"

: g: tO Webster, involves acts of violence ag alnst a Zovernment tickly pointed out that the FBI’s own de It was q\ en te ; a boas finition of terrorism i .

'

lin

Aae

7

7

‘cluded intimidation of “the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals.” The FBI then

explained the contradiction on the ground that in dealing with a complex issue like terrorism there is always “a matter of judgment.”

This blatant refusal to adhere to its own definition was not a matter of “judgment,” it reflected long-standing political bias.’ During the Reagan years there was an efflorescence of violence by right-wing organizations, including the KKK, neo-Nazi groups,

organized anti-Semites,

the Cuban

exile terrorist network,

and

mercenary armies.® Although better armed, with greater numbers, and engaged in more clearly intimidating acts than the Brinks robbery group,° they received modest attention from the press and

FBI and were rarely designated terrorists. Beau Grosscup points out

that in 1980,

six blacks were killed by snipers in Buffalo, New York: Vernon

Jordan, president of the Urban League, was wounded by sniper fire; a nineteen-year-old black youth was found hung from a tree in Mobile, Alabama;

two black joggers were shot to death in Salt

Lake City; and in New York City two black men and one hispanic

male were knifed to death. Senseless shootings of blacks by police

in New York, Indianapolis, Miami, and elsewhere led black leaders

to charge in the early 1980s that there was a national racist conspiracy engineered by whites against the black population. This surge of violence coincided with the re-emergence of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi movements. Much of the violence was directed

at anti-Klan rallies and demonstrations. In 1979 five anu-Klan demonstrators were killed in Greensboro,

North Carolina, after

the police released information to Klansmen about the demon-

Stration’s parade route, then were conveniently absent while the

homes of shooting took place. Nazi and Klan members fired into mented NAACP leaders in Sylacauga, Alabama, killed undocu workers in Texas and Arizona, beat people with chains in Tupelo,

Mississippi, shot five women

in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and a

youth in Wrightsville, Georgia.'®

e

to thes ; Grosscup notes that federal officials pai d little attention at least e acts and charges until 1985, although they were fully awar number 1n a camps training neo-Nazi and Klan of 45 carly as 1980 217

ie

____ — — — — — ry st du In ” sm ri ro “Ter

ng violence Of the ti da mi ti in e th t tha t ou ts in of states. He also po

ased to be of interest to the anti-Castro Omega 7 terrorist group ce Florida

aining camps in government in che 1930s. Their terrorist tr ings and threats mb bo r ei th d, re no ig re e we er wh se el d , an ia Californ al attention, and the in rg ma n ve gi re we rk Yo w Ne d “1 Miami an convicteg

o worked for the wh , an bi Fa or ct He ist ror ter d se es nf co e 1981 that rorist Orlando Bosch, bragged in lat Cuban-exile ter

e FBI bothered me.”" Fabian “December 5, 1980, was the last time th

fighters.” and Bosch had become “freedom

Counterinsurgency and ‘‘Low-Intensity Warfare”: Western Terrorism as “Counterterrorism”

Because of the power of the West, Western interests, and the Western

media, the terrorism industry has been able to subtly transform

rebellion and national liberation movements into terrorism and terrorists and the West’s (and Western client states’) attempts to

contain and repress these struggles into “counterterrorism.” This 1s perhaps the most significant of all the Orwellisms that characterize

Western usage.

As we described in chapter 2, in the broad sweep of modern

history the movement of the peoples of former Western colonies toward independence and the dismantling of oligarchic traditional structures has been of fundamental importance. The West had a large stake in the old order and has struggled to preserve it through

regimes like those of Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines, and the army-dominated national security states of Latin America.

The African pattern is similar, with the West long supporung apartheid in Rhodesia, Portuguese colonial rule, then Savimbi, and the South African apartheid state. In our view, Indonesian, Guate-

alan andSouth.Aan sate vero are example of pmeveat aes

Hess and scale of intimidation and desig st

ange, maintain elite rule, and keep 1? : majorities struggling for independence and basic human needs aD political rights.

If, in the face of these central facts, the West has bee? able t 218

Cvitsinnsiee

$$

iebel the world’s rebels in Indo ch oneces sia,as the Phialippi oe Rath Aigica, Central America, andina, otherIndpla teet the West and is proxies as engaging in “counterterr or,” thats

ropaganda achievement of historic dimensions. It is also the cide Orwellian transformation: the victims are made the ees whereas the terrorists are the alleged victims driven toa counterterror response. This Orwellian inversion is given a patina of truthfulness and

plausibility in the West by the virtually exclusive focus on selected retail terror, much of it cruel and irrational. It is possible in this way to designate the murderous governments of El Salvador, Guatemala,

and South Africa victims of terrorists. All it requires is: dramatic attention to the preferred victims; the appropriate redefinitions; stress on aid from

the Soviet bloc to the rebels; the muting of

evidence of state oppression and the absence of political options for the disfavored victims; and aversion of the eyes from the terror

inflicted on those in rebellion. The terrorism industry experts and mass media do this well (see tables 7-4, 8-3, 8-4, 8-5, and the

associated text). Equally important, the Western definitions, model, and focus of

attention make it possible to engage in the most brutal forms of preventive counterinsurgency and “low-intensity warfare” under the guise of “counterterrorism.” In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American

religious leaders produced a number of searching documents point-

ing out that under the Western-sponsored military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and elsewhere economic policies of unprecedented ruthlessness were installed, which created “a revolution that

did not previously exist.”!2 People defending themselves against

these economic policies were then slaughtered by U.S.-sponsored

and U.S.-trained military regimes under counterinsurgency opera

tions. The doctrine of counterinsurgency made any threatening movements from below subversive and thus suitable subjects for in Guatemala, repression. After the reformist Arbenz government

and those in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Indonesia, as:

tay ital or US-suppored in rg etl

Hh Lo se gags ibaa

ee

‘ons were liquidated or decimated

°rganize in Guatemala

since

b

by

hema Attempts to

iy

1954 have been regularly 4

219

attacked,

pe Girone:

eee

INUUSETY

| : counter sive under subver as d crushe ally ic od ri pe d an , ed threaten en in Indonesia, E] Salvace be e v ha ey th as , ns io at er op

insurgency

and South Africa. In the Western

|

|

,

b)

fata model of terrorism, 1 the analyses of the

Uniteg terrorism industry experts, and for the mass media of then world, 1S counterterror. Ina non-Orwellia States, counterinsurgency

however, counterterrorism is the violence of the primary terrorists,

The Larger Service of ‘’Terrorism” Terrorism has served other purposes in the West beyond mobilizing populations in support of counterinsurgency operations in the provinces. It can create a generalized fearfulness and irrationality that give leaders greater freedom of action. The Reagan administration needed a terrorism threat tied to a foreign enemy to justify

its enormous

arms buildup of the early 1980s (and to distract

attention from its regressive economic and social policies). Thorstein Veblen pointed out in 1904 that militarization to combat a foreign

enemy is the natural and best hope of the American elite as “a corrective for ‘social unrest’ and similar disorders of civilized life” and as the route to “popular submission and squalor.”'* Opponents

of militarization and harsh measures against dissident minorities are paralyzed by terrorism propaganda, as it is very difficult to do something that demagogues can interpret as “helping terrorists.”

The allegation of “supporting terrorists” may also be used as a political tool for discrediting dissident political figures. A picture of

Jesse Jackson with Arafat was part of the establishment—mass media

attack on a leader whose program was unacceptable to the dominant

class. In Portugal, the dissident political leader Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho was arrested, tried, and given a fifteen-year prison term

for allegedly serving as the leader of a “terrorist organization,” the

tld byheplsandwy “epee arene na

ui P ~25, The evidence for this association was the testimony of a drug Piha oc i sess UE ecision, no serious effort was made @ panization to FP—25 or any acts undertaken by, ioe

220

Conclusions ——__

$$ org

nization; 7 instead

yment” envirol .

members

may

that

he was

may

have been

guilty of helping create ¢

encourged havepais

a “moral

FP—25 tsomieret

activists in Otelo’s organization

ance

(although

aot identifying themselves as such).'’ In short, Otelo was sentenced under a ruling that could fit anybody who expresses an Opinion that

might have influenced a terrorist act, and who is therefore guilty of “errorist association.” In other countries of Western Europe, fear of terrorists has been

stirred up by right-wing interests as a control mechanism and to achieve various political objectives. The Langemann

papers noted

that the Crozier-Pinay group methodology for moving Europe (and eventually the rest of the world) to the right was to press themes “such as communist, extremist subversion of government positions and trade unions, KGB manipulation of terrorism and damage to

internal security.”!* By stirring up fear and developing a crisis mentality, the creation of a terrorist threat justifies a larger role for the police and army and for surveillance and crackdowns on opposition groups and organizations. It helps move societies toward a national security state and strengthens links between the great powers and their besieged right-wing clients such as South Africa, Guatemala,

and Turkey. The Crozier-Pinay group principles had been applied previously

in West Germany in the early 1970s, when Helmut Schmidt’s Social Democrats and conservatives together used “terrorism” as the basis

for an explicit attack on the “excesses of democracy.” Antiterrorism laws were passed that reduced individual rights and expanded the

Scope and functions of the police and army. The police infiltrated dissident organizations on a large scale. The state even carried out

legal proceedings against lawyers A loyalty and clearance system People were investigated between rejected as disloyal or hostile to

who defended “terrorists” in court. was imposed in which 1.5 million 1972 and 1977, and 4,000 or more the state. Only a handful of those

rejected were of the extreme right, although extreme-right ad i

Hourished, This was a system of intimidation in the name of opposing

oe, but actually using an inflated terrorism threat as an excuse _ *ccomplishing larger and antidemocratic ends. As Grosscup Points out, “Under pressure to prove their loyalty to the state in

Para

a

aiiien lenonsm:, naustry ase

ni s order to get or keep a position 1 civil service, thousand of Citizens lves from the politic al, Cultura] sought refuge by dissociating themse eee and social reforms of the late 1960s.”"!”

:

)

The creation and manipulation of a terrorist threat in West ern

Europe has been aided by the presence and growth Of migrant worker populations and the large flow of immigrants fleeing from of political oppression and seeking economic betterment. Because

widespread

unemployment

in Western

Europe

in recent years,

chauvinist outcries against immigrants have been relatively effective. It has been easy to pin the label of terrorism on political refugees,

notably on the Kurds in Sweden and West Germany. The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq have been under savage attack by military regimes, with thousands killed and tortured and imprisoned under barbaric

conditions, in a system that is labeled “counterterrorism” in Turkey, but as in Argentina in 1976—83, with the state terrorism far worse than that of the “terrorists.”*° For several years after the military coup of 1980, Western European governments (but not the United States) distanced themselves from the Turkish military dictatorship.

But European attitudes and policies changed, partly as a result of the installation of a nominal civilian regime in 1983 and reduction in state terror (outside of the Kurdish area); partly a result of the conservative drift of European politics; and partly because of new business relationships with Turkey that a number of formerly critical states wished to pursue.

From 1984 Turkey was no longer an outcast, let alone a terrorist state, and enemies of Turkey declared by the Turkish authorities to be “terrorists” became terrorists in Sweden and West Germany. The pattern is familiar. Once again the victims of Western state terror, here seeking refuge in the democracies, were suspect because the

Western terrorist state said so and found a hospitable response in

the police and security establishments and powerful right-wing circles

of the Western press.2! With the murder of Olaf Palme in Sweden

in February 1986, the police quickly arrested Kurdish dissidents, nol

on the basis of evidence, but simply because of stoked-up prejudice

and ideological bias.22 West Germany has prepared for a major tri oftwenty-three Kurdish “terrorists” alleged to have participated in

a terrorist organization within the PKK” (Kurdish Workers Party) The charges are vague and some of

the key witnesses are said by

222

the defense to be linked to the Turkish secret police.23 This ceeding followed years of press denu nciations of the PKK oe

sympathizers as terrorists, based on extremely modest protest ei ‘ties and

a number of killings among Turks whos e sources are unclear.” (West Germany has never tried any Gray Wolv es, a pene terrorist movement, which has operated in West Germany for year s has terrorized Turkish immigrant workers, and provided a base ee

Mehmet Ali Agca’s attack on the pope in 1981.)

Counterterrorism as Bringing Counterinsurgency Home

Terrorism has been used to advance right-wing agendas, justifying “exceptional” legislation, encroachments on individual rights, increased internal surveillance, an enlarged role of military forces in civil disputes, and greater pressure on the media to cooperate in dealing with terrorists. As Jenny Hocking points out with reference to Great Britain:

the ultimate impact of “terrorism” has been to provide a ready legitimation for an increasingly severe domestic exercise of state power—the tightening of political and social controls, particularly

through the legislative delimiting of acceptable political behavior.

... The military-based strategy for countering domestic unrest abroad is being brought home, via Northern Ireland, to quell the

unemployed, the never employed, the socially deprived, and the

politically active... . What has been presented as a political solution to the “problem of terrorism” has been transformed in practice

into a military solution to the intractable economic and social

problems of Western capitalist nations.”° We indicated earlier that important analysts and propagandists Moss, among Western terrorism experts, like Brian Crozier, Robert

Richard Clutterbuck, Samuel Francis, and Maurice Tugwell, have Shown a strong proclivity to identify any labor disputes, eal influence iw and upheavals from below as probable signs of Soviet

“PPropriately a matter

for police and army interest a

thers, like Brian Jenkins and Paul Wilkinson, along with 223

Glu

m orroriom: =INCUStty n

eee

sen

deeply

buck and Tugwell, have been deeply 1m

involved in counterins ,

Se

ae €ncy

. sis of low elys siclana tson’s nclas ap operations. We pointed out that Ki to ibera e emocracy, intensity warfare identifies the threat

which

as protest that calls for a military response, as any kind of action ing it doesn't oe Paul presses the establishment to do someth viding ‘certain Wilkinson also sees counterinsurgency warfare as pro

basic ground rules which should be followed by liberal democracies

taking a tough line against terrorism.””’ The transformation of these

counterinsurgency experts into terrorism experts 1s plausible if, as we believe, and as Jenny Hocking suggests, “terrorism” and “counterterrorism” are designed to serve a larger purpose for the Western establishment.

They have been bringing counterinsurgency

home

from the provinces under the guise of counterterrorism.

Manufacturing Terrorism There are several different forms of manufactured terrorism. One

is the inflation of the menace on the basis of modest and not very threatening but conceivably real actions (as with the Weather Underground and the West German Kurds). Another is the false transfer of the responsibility for a terrorist act to a convenient villain, as in the case of Agca’s shooting of the pope.*® This involves a new

level of dishonesty because the witnesses must be persuaded by state officials to fabricate evidence, and the Western

terrorism industry

and press must swallow and disseminate these false claims. In the

Otelo case, also, there is strong evidence that state agents eventually

served as witnesses in a process designed to tie a political opponent to a terrorist organization.

peacoat tence er

well, may not only io li : etal cae ae Eo et Saale ‘a Si picate terrorists from within terrorist Ores aia

ys May urge

them

to commit

terrorist

acts to justify

prosecution, They themselves may carry out terrorist acts—attributed to

others—for propaganda y ae : Purposes. We believe that these ac tions are of great and underestimated ; pe It for

agents of intelligence or | fee

is not difficu’ ki 84nizauionsimportance. to set off a It bomb or even tO 224

Conclusions

——

individuals, or to encourage or hire others to do these things; then to make a phone call claiming responsibility on behalf of a Red network or Palestinian organization. This is an easy way of creating

a desired moral environment, and there is substantial evidence that states have frequently engaged in such practices. The Israeli govern-

ment carried out a number of terrorist bombings of U.S. facilities in Cairo in 1955-56, Egyptians and damage

hoping that these would relations between

States.2° Philip Agee described

be attributed to

Egypt and the United

frequent CIA-sponsored

acts of

violence in Latin America, arranged so that blame would fall on

Cuba.*° The intelligence agencies of Italy in the 1960s and 1970s participated in a “strategy of tension” in which violent acts were carried out by the organized right and then blamed on the left.*! These acts were of major importance in the total spectrum of terrorism in Italy. And in the United States, the FBI has long engaged in agent provocateur actions, urging violence on penetrated dissident organizations and carrying out direct acts of violence, then

attributed to the individuals and organizations under attack.°* Terrorism is also manufactured in the private sector to incriminate union leaders, activists, and political enemies, sometimes in collusion with agents of the state. In March 1980, a former CIA agent and Wackenhut employee, William L. Richardson, working for the

Canadian security firm Centurion Investigations, Ltd., testified in court that he had made a bomb intended to be placed in the car of a UAW union official during a strike at Douglas Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., and that he and his associates had several times previously used this tactic to cause the arrest of workers.** In the recent case of the arrest of an animal rights activist, Fran Trutt, in Norwalk, Connecticut, on November 11, 1988, her organization had been

protesting for several years against the operations of U.S. Surgical

Corporation (which kills between 9,000 and 10,000 dogs a year in

laboratories and during “sales sessions” for surgeons)** and its owner,

Leon Hirsh. Hirsh hired the security firm Perceptions International,

whose agents infiltrated the animal rights group. Members claim that the infiltrators pressed vigorously for violent action, gave Trutt ty to buy a bomb, and accompanied her to USCC, where the ©mb was placed beside the firm’s building. All of these details had

“€n rehearsed with the police, who then arrested Trutt.*° (The 225

ahpe mororsm

ee

Inuustry mee

U.S. Surgical Corporation and Perceptions Internationa] deny th aims. cn of terrorist bombings in Western Euro Se pe during the

early and mid-1980s had the earmarks of being, at least jn part manufactured terrorism. The bombings were all too convenient fe

Western propaganda needs; many of them, especially those directeg against NATO installations, were symbolic and ineffectual. If we as, who benefited from this terrorism, the answer is clear. It may be that some of the members of the groups allegedly engaging in these acts thought differently and truly believed that their actions would

be useful in curbing the Western war machine, but there are other

possibilities. One is that they were penetrated by Western intelligence agencies and led by them into these actions. Another is that the acts were even more directly those of state agents. The outbreak of terrorism in Belgium in the early 1980s is instructive. Between 1982 and 1985 a group called the Killers of Brabant murdered twenty-eight people in a series of supermarket robberies that yielded meager returns but great publicity on the “terrorist threat.” Nobody has yet been convicted of these crimes, but journalists’ investigations and court inquiries have uncovered evidence that tie these acts to state officials in a variety of ways. Among the interesting facts was the discovery of one of the murder weapons in the possession of a private detective and former member of the gendarmes, Madani Bouhouche, who claimed to work for State security. Bouhouche was also associated with the neo-Nazi

paramilitary group Westland New Post (WNP). At least two acknowl edged members

of the state security apparatus helped train WNP

activists. The day after Bouhouche was arrested, his friend Jea”

Bultot, another right-wing militant and founder of the Practical Shooting Club, also deputy director of Saint-Gilles prison, fled to

Paraguay. A witness claimed to have seen Bultot near a supermarkel shortly before one of the attacks. Once in Paraguay, Bultot told Belgian Journalist René Haquin that the killings were a state security

destabilization operation with state participation “at every level.” 4

aah

(including eanite

ae a

former gendarme turned a

se

to have a fle ® ic police found om theagents), sth ;State security and addresses of gatas Tt

mns*stolen Sromnnihie gendarmerie, asserted on Belgia! 226

eS —————_——Coielision that state security had provided the arms used by the Killers of Brabant. On the same day, seven WNP militants, including six military professionals, went on trial for Stealing defense documents

and setting up a private militia, which they claimed they did on

orders from state security to prove the weaknesses of the sec urity system. They named their security service contacts.2 Another terrorist organization, the allegedly left-wing Cellules

Communistes Combattantes (CCC), also surfaced in Belgium in the early 1980s. The CCC organized twenty-seven attacks in eleven months on banks, other business installations, army and NATO

facilities, accidentally killing two firemen in one attack, but otherwise doing marginal damage and generating tremendous publicity. The leader of this enterprise, Pierre Carrette, who performed miracles

in fixing radio-controlled bombs in the middle of a NATO radiocommunications center, was finally arrested. His father is the state security agent Alphonse Carrette, his brother is a WNP member and army commando,

and Pierre Carrette carried out these attacks

despite being under surveillance by Belgian security since 1979.37 These actions, claims, and linkages do not prove state control of this outburst of terrorism, but the accumulated evidence is strong that at least some elements of the security services cooperated in a

Belgian “strategy of tension” analogous to that pursued by the

intelligence and military services in Italy.

The private security industry also played a role in terrorist events in Belgium. As we described earlier, at the time of the bombing of the Jewish Synagogue on the Rue de la Régence in Brussels in 1982, it was being guarded by Wackenhut.?® The director of the Belgian

branch of Wackenhut at that time was Jean-Francis Calmette, an “xtreme right-wing arms enthusiast, who was linked to WNP. The man actually on duty at the synagogue was Marcel Barbier, a former

Paratrooper, anti-Semite, also a WNP man, who was later convicted of murder. This bombing provided the basis for the setting up of a Special new “counterterrorism” service of the state. The supermar ket bombings led to a Wackenhut contract to protect the centrally located

shopping mall City 2.39 pa

Creat Britain, both an anarchist menace and an alleged Black

a ation Front have reared their heads in eel ©us circumstances. Anarchist groups name 227

ee

e [he “Terrorism Industry re

Hurricane, pamphlets entitled Written in F ie and Without ep,

and magazines called Flamethrower and Attack made publicity Splashes in the mid-1980s. Some or all of these may be independent, but suggestions of

connections to psyops operations are aroused by their

timing and fit to state demands, frequent absurdity, ery for Public; ly

b)

enthusiasm for petty illegalities, and (in the case of the slick Magazines Flamethrower and Attack) affluence.*® The same is true of the rise of an alleged Black Liberation Front in 1987, in which a number of violent actions, generally ineffectual, were claimed and denied by shadowy black leaders and anonymous parties cited in the press, Eventually, the journal Special Forces, edited by a former British army officer, claimed an IRA alliance with the “London-based Black Liberation Front”! Phil Edwards and Robin Ramsay point out how

fine a specter this provides—a Black IRA is “a logical step forward” in state propaganda, merging two premier devils. The attempts to tie the IRA to Moscow in the 1970s had been a dismal failure, and

the Gorbachev policies had dealt a further blow to this traditional modality. The Black Liberation Front “raises one of the unresolved questions in this area: having created the ‘terrorism industry, how far is the British state prepared to go to produce some ‘terrorism’?”*! We do not claim that all of these threats and acts of terrorism in Western Europe in the 1980s were carried out or induced by agents

of the state. We do believe, however, that many of them probably were, and that other acts of terrorism

attributed

to preferred

terrorists (e.g., the Kurds) were carried out by agents of Western

states (e.g., the Turkish government). It is extremely interesting and important that, despite the historic record on this subject, the Western experts and press systematically ignore this possibility. The lengthy

articles on the new wave of terrorism that struck Western Europe

in the early and mid-1980s, which we cited earlier,#? do not mention

Westland New Post, Wackenhut,

ce

|

43

ae

Britain,**

or the “strategy of tension” 10

the growth of the very active National Fr ont 10 ee or even

D the better-known and proven role of the stats Hie extreme right in Italy. Terrorism is left-wing retail violence, and t

possibility of manufac tured terrorism is never mentioned.

228

Conclusions The Terrorism Industry As we have seen (chapters 4-7), the West has produced an industry of institutes and experts who formulate and channel analysis and

‘nformation on terrorism In accordance with Western demands. We have also seen that this industry is closely linked to Western govern-

ments, intelligence agencies, and corporate/conservative foundations and funders. It functions as a closed system, in which government officials and the accredited and well-funded experts attend one another's conferences, cite one another as authorities, and reinforce

their mutual status as experts. We believe that the institutes are designed to give authoritative status to experts who will confirm and reinforce state propaganda, to occupy the informational space that might otherwise be used by dissident voices, and thus to ensure closure of fact and opinion. The

mass media, whose structural links to government and the corporate system are already potent, and who are therefore already inclined to accept a state line, are driven further toward closure by the fact that the experts, whose credentials are from affiliation with institu-

tions specializing in terrorism, are supplied them by the industry collective. These experts all follow the approved semantics and model and select and fit facts accordingly. The development, activities, and influence of the terrorism industry illustrate how the powerful dominate the Western mass media

and public perceptions of reality through processes that appear entirely natural. The government and corporate wealthy nourish the institutes and think tanks that service and sponsor suitable intellectuals and journalists who will convey the proper messages. These selected analysts are also pushed by major media enterprises, Whose principals strive to advance conservative propaganda themes

(Readey’s Digest, Time, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times), and

the numerous right-wing syndicated columnists who aie

m0 Pagandize these themes (Buckley, Will, Evans-Novak, Jeane Kirk-

peat ames Kilpatrick, Rusher, Price, etc.). The gta ee.

a — ecome common sense; alternative views fognot considered It IS

relevant

by the mass

229

aPP

it disdisclosed -< it . nor 1s media,

The “Terrorism Industry re

ee , to the public

that the experts are co-opted and reflect the views of

the covernment

seats with badly

Nass numerous

Ze

and

powerful

vested

records

tarnished

1 asa

as paid propagandists,

alots and fanatics, are advanced

;

and asked open-ended questions [

.

Thus literal CIA

and

as authentic experts

This results in p part frc om theeesfact

ckly established that the truth of the government-state position 1S qui experts is merely to as beyond question, so that the function of ects an truths. This refl clarify and elaborate on preestablished effective propaganda system.

ustry is of a high In fact, the achievement of the terrorism ind

order. In his book Black Athena, Martin Bernal shows how the classical

scholars and intellectuals of the West, from the late eighteenth into

the twentieth centuries, paralleling the subjugation of the black and other colonized races by Western imperialism, succeeded in expunging from Western portrayals of ancient Greece the notion expounded

by Herodotus (and traditional Greek scholarship) that classical Greece

had been profoundly influenced by Asian and African cultures.* In a great feat of ideologically based cleansing, the fount of Western

civilization was purified and shown to be free of such alien influences

and to be of purely Aryan origin. We believe that the conversion of the West into the victim of “terrorism” and its victims into the “terrorists” is, in light of the facts, an equal or greater achievement of Western scholarship and journalism.

230

Appendices

Appendix A: Counterterrorism in Action

The Case of Maria Teresa Tula viuda de Canales*

Maria Teresa Tula viuda de Canales joined the Committee of Mothers of the Disappeared (Co-Madres) in 1978 after her husband was arrested and imprisoned. He was released but later assassinated in 1980. Maria Teresa (also

known as Laura Pinto) continued to work with the Committee and to raise her five children. In 1984, the Committee of Mothers was honored with the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation Human Rights Award. Four members of the Committee were chosen to travel to the United States to receive the award, among them Tula.

All four were denied visas by the State Department and accused of being

terrorists, men 1n O n Tuesday May 6, 1986, Tula was abducted by four heavily armed blindfolded

Cvilian clothes on the street near the office of the Committee. She was

and taken to an unknown location where for two days she was hidenmagates a

and threats she sls “aten, and raped by three men. In spite of the torture ince ntly conv

» acknowledge that she was a member of the Committee. Appare *

:

Fs

5

Update: Counterterrorism in Action (Los i‘Rescate Human Rights Department, E/ Salvador

Beles, 1987), appendix 1.

231

ee

Ayyertix A ————__ «

by her denials, Nas laa

Jeft

her at a bus stop near a park

is still unidentified.

arly

oF

early hursday

morning, May 8. es nie 98 1986, she was again abducted by “heavil

Twenty days ey

rise time, the Treasury Police. Interrogation a eumed

men in civilian cts ator: 12 days and conducted

in a more

$0 te Abuse

were nearly ae ues Gles, the interrogators accused her of belo: aoe f killing four policemen, of burning by on oe manner. ¥ Oa

eC COSC fecal having been a guerrilla

ein Toei : She: was blindfold ed indfo eded, handcuff a

combatant 1n

beaten, allowed little sleep or food, and force to carry out physical EXETCises for long periods of ume. Torture and interrogation were alternated with offers

of protection, money and work in exchange for collaboration. She was asked to

give names and addresses of members of the Committee (Co-Madres) and of

the non-governmental Commission of Human Rights (CDHES). She refused to

cooperate. On June 8, she was forced to sign a confession which she was not

allowed to read. On June 9, after 12 days of interrogation, she was video-taped

receiving a medical examination (the doctor examined only her back), forced

to sign a statement acknowledging the exam, and taken to the women’s prison at Ilopango. She was released from prison on September 23, when President Duarte himself ordered it and called a press conference to declare the release an example of democracy in action. During the press conference, Tula publicly pointed out one of her police torturers who was present. Maria Teresa Tula gave birth to her sixth child on July 10 while still in prison, just one month after her police interrogation. She is 35 years old and

received a first grade education.

232

Appendix B: Three Studies in Primary Terrorist Violence

1. Sabra and Shatila*

It had been inherently likely that the Israeli invasion would bring some such ghastly climax as Sabra and Chatila; all the same, it came as something of a

surprise even to some of those who had anticipated it. The Palestinian and Syrian combatants had all left without a hitch. On 30 August Yasser Arafat had

bid his emotional farewell. The Israelis seemed to be satisfied; General Eitan told the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence that “all that remains 1n West Beirut is a few terrorists and a small office of the PLO.” A few days later the American, French and Italian contingents of the multi-national force set up than, under their {0 supervise the evacuation had also departed—even earlier last in, were first out, with a eae Americans, The have. need they mandate, for the photographers a sign reading “mission accomp creat

érine holding up

made on the “pacification” of West Beirut: the era been had art i mi

As al former allies of the Palestinians, had given some Rote te peat the guerillas ae and to the state authority which, however em Pie vf ‘ented. way, Earlier 23 August even before evacuat® in elec lecting g a new succeeded had the parliament the onLebanese St under

‘ddtele aa Roots of Violence m the Mi e Th : ch an Br e iv Ol the o ke s©ndoHirn:st, FaThbeer Gu&n Faanbedr, 1984), pp. 429-28. 233

East, 2nd

Isracli-supported Pha entmmander of the nco ncy, wider of Maronite Christian milita tive

ir ETS True, Basher y ell rbo¢

president,

se

ok

ie

stained hig

d ality which ha ence and brut tion and Ht te da ee milith Nasi i he violma mi ti in y, er ib by br ed rr on ti ec e Se lo democracy. There wea feared and of rit spi ue tr si e th n He c ele ce. His supreme offi forms rathe observed the

ght now feel able to wa | o , under q strong man wh mi at th r, ve ve w at order and stability for which alae th e ev hi least hopes, ho ac d l u o w n | eba:no e and conciliate, rship had secured wise B e d a e l O cs L P ri e ia th ed all tscare amese interm

m the fighting o h w s an li vi ci n ia stin r the safety of Pale fo b bi Ha eign Minister,” said ip r o il F Ph ‘ m o O L P e , th n on Fr m nd. Farouk Kaddou Israel would not at th ” ur no men were leaving behi ho f o d r o w d given its “ is that the United States ha re later to confirm that th

e Department officials wees from the Israelis. Habib at St d an ut ir Be st We r te nc en numerous oral assura of th ng re st e th on , so s wa e Minister, Shafiq Wazzan: im had written to the Lebanese Pr

ted States will provide appropriate The governments of Lebanon and the Uni -combatants left

stinian non guarantees for the safety .. . of law-abiding Pale departed. .. . The United y Beirut, including the families of those who have of assurances received from the States will provide its guarantees on the basis with which

se groups government of Israel and the leaders of certain Lebane it has been in contact.

t to evacuate. These commitments were critical to the PLO’s agreemen considered There were, of course, forebodings. The Lebanese Prime Minister gh. They that the mandate of the multi-nationals was not far-reaching enou that should have been authorized to stay longer in order to cope with the chaos was likely to ensue when local militiamen, stronger and more determined than ed the as yet feeble and uncertain Lebanese army, sought to fill the vacuum creat

by the withdrawal of the guerillas. His and others’ misgivings were reinforced

when the Israeli army, encamped on the outskirts of the city, made a 600-yard advance, on the pretext of demining roads, from the international airport to been of Sabra and Chatila, where the PLO headquarters had oy very edge dent

Presi oe preteen ven etWe Bee agreement took place directly after peace plan” and it was a way of expressing displeasure. en or the sraclis Lebanon, as ever, furnished the means by which apa ‘ erp tes ee jas any diplomatic initiative they did not like. ay oa ie n ope pees CUne ee peneBeirut headquarters of the Phala We . Of t0all have East tian Chris in e ret innumerable terrorist ex at was one this ed, endur had t Beiru : at the most fateful tea

y meeting» was President-elect Bashir hs me in the building, holding his weekl ee a few hours later,(OF1 mo» announced that “sheikh Vaal and when, Maron tians Chris ite een a the idol of the them), had indeed of panic and stupefaction swe ragged, dead and disfigured, from the rubbls who ha planted the boy nb there wswept the country, Though no one knew 2

:

i

te

ere

In fufurt rthe her c¢ ontemptuous ess d, % ut sr witho consudilt ecide

Sharon

d

‘

le

1,

f

ao

oral

ovat

yin al 4, rd for Habib and all his works Bes" : ut ir Be st We to invade ing their colleagues, e

ral

ye

ey. .

234

;

;

:

‘

«

id

had i ee oe of 7 this igs a huge rally on 17 Ju Ty]yi " peer «before the end year ae we oe, Shall eat have told signed a peace

n’? Bashir was to have been the man with whom the fie

a

aby etl

Lee three-thirty in the morning of Wednesday, 15 Sipiecal wou pie v 4eneral Amir Drori, commander of Israel’s northern a ener Eitan Phalangist leaders at the East Beirut headquarters of the militis RE ak a

had built with Israeli assistance. Together with Fadi Frem, the sonaeeanees

chief of the Phalangist-dominated Lebanese forces, and Elias Hobeika, the head

of their intelligence, they drew up a plan for Phalangist Participation in the seizure of West Beirut. It was decided that, to spare Israeli lives, the Phalangists would be exclusively entrusted with “searching and mopping up” the refugee camps.

;

;

At five o’clock that morning the Israelis began their entry. It was easy: the

multi-nationals had conveniently removed mines and barricades and resistance from the Moslem-leftists was little more than symbolic. In the entire operation the Israelis lost only seven killed and a hundred wounded.

At nine o'clock Begin, receiving Habib’s deputy Morris Draper, greeted him with these words: “Mister Ambassador, I have the honour to inform you that, since five o'clock this morning, our forces have been advancing and taking up

positions inside West Beirut. Our objective is to maintain order in the town. With the situation created by the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, there could be pogroms.”

What the Phalangists would do when they entered the camps was obvious to any reasonably observant Israeli who knew anything about them. And there

were Israelis who knew them very well indeed. They had been training them in Israel itself since 1976. The military correspondent of Yediot Aharonot called them “an organized mob, with uniforms, vehicles, training camps, who have been guilty of abominable

cruelties.” It was common

knowledge,

too, that the

Palestinians were the particular object of their hatred. For Bashir Gemayel, there was “one people too many: the Palestinian people.” In his dealings with the Israelis he left no doubt that, when he came to power, he would “eliminate the Palestinian problem’”—even if that meant resorting to “aberrant methods against the Palestinians in Lebanon.” His militiamen never concealed their murderous ambitions. When a group of Israeli parliamentarians visited Israelioccupied South Lebanon, one such militiaman told them: “One dead Palestinian ls a pollution, the death of all Palestinians, that is the solution.” Bamahan, the army newspaper, wrote on | September, two weeks before the massacre:

A senior Israeli officer heard the following from the lips of a Phalangist: ha question we are putting to ourselves is—how to begin, by raping or killing: .

have the Palestinians had a bit of nous, they would try to leave Beirut. You civilians or pate no idea of the slaughter that will befall the Palestinians,

ve “3 Who remain in the city, Their efforts to mingle with the population the fighters will pursue useless. The sword and the gun of the Christian

“verywhere and exterminate them once and for all.” ; Polit;-.

agent

In their

ails blood lust drove EE mere as well as tives al objec eteIngs ~ C ; : ; e gus of many con theiPos leaders Israeli : representatives hece.,. With Cess; } : er the exo ary to resort to violence in order to bring about

239

———

AppendixB Se

Palestinians from Lebanon. “We knew that they wanted to destroy tik said General Aharon Yariv, commander of the Beirut area, They p; € cam I,”

hopes on General Sharon’s scheme to overthrow

Lebanon's Palestinians on Jordan.

King Hussein aeons their S

“dump all

The Israeli army also knew, at the highest level, just what ven geful feat

had taken possession of the militiamen after the assassination of t heir ido], Ne after seeing

ie,

to the Phalangists’ entry into the camps, the Chief of Staff tolq A

cabinet meeting that Phalangist officers had “just one thing left t do, and that is revenge; and it will be terrible . . . it will be an eruption the lik €0 of which hag never been seen; I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for,” They knew also how likely it was that the commander of the operation would give his men a free rein. Elias Hobeika had once been sent to South Lebanon by Bashir Gemayel at the request of the Israelis in order to support the activities of Major Saad Haddad.

Hobeika

proved his mettle—killing several Lebanese

and Palestinian civilians—so much so in fact that the Israelis decided to send

him back where he came from, lest his “excesses” prove an embarrassment. After Sharon had decided to “cleanse the camps,” someone proposed that an Israeli liaison officer be seconded to the Phalangists. But a superior, aware of Hobeika’s past, vetoed the idea, arguing that the Israeli army should not get

itself mixed up in atrocities.

After passing through the Israeli roadblocks set up at its entrance the first unit of 150 Phalangists entered Chatila camp at sunset. Some carried knives and axes as well as firearms. The carnage began immediately. It was to continue without interruption for forty-eight hours. Night brought no respite: the Israelis lit up the camp with flares. Anything that moved in the narrow alleyways the Phalangists shot. They broke into houses and killed their occupants who were gathered for their evening meal, watching television or already in bed. Sometumes they tortured before they killed, gouging out eyes, skinning alive, disembowelling. Women and small girls were raped, sometimes half a dozen times, before, breasts severed, they were finished off with axes. Babies were torn limb from limb and their heads smashed against walls. Entering Akka hospital the men

assassinated the patients in their beds. They tied other victims to vehicles a am dragged them through the streets alive. They cut off hands to get at rings

bracelets. They killed Christians and Moslems, Lebanese as well as Palestinians.

They even killed nine Jewesses who, married to Palestinians, had been living 10 the camps since 1948. Bulldozers were brought in to bury their victims ae demolish houses which Israeli aircraft had not already destroyed; for, roones as well as terrorized, all the Palestinians would surely have to flee. ; athe

What was going on in the camps could hardly escape the attenuon © st

Israeli soldiers surrounding them. Their forward

command

post was 4 sae

200 yards from the main killing ground and from the roof of this seven

ic

building they had a direct line of sight into the heart of the camps: Itce ie one officer, “like the front row at the theatre.” Elias Hobeika spent eee night on the roof of the command post. At 8 p.m. Lieutenant Elul, 6 ngist Yaron's chefde bureau, overheard

a radio conversation

in which a Phale ifty

inside the camp asked Hobeika what he should do with a grouP sestio CESS ieee and children, “This is the last time you’re going to ask me < Hughter

me that,” Hobeika replied, “you know exactly what to do.” Raucous © 236

Aopentix@ —

$$

among the Phalangist personnel on proke ¢ut ood that the women and children were the roof and Li tenant Elul to be murdered a

underst Yaron. Later e informed the commander of the Phalangist forces General Reenessage tO varon to the effect that “up till now 300 civilians fa Chatila sent i nd terrorists 3 n killed.” This information | was immediately despatche e d to military ave be

iv. Feedquarters in Tel Av

As dawn broke on Friday, 17 September, Israeli officers and men atop the

command post could see the bodies piling up. Later they were to see bulldozers, at least one or two of them Israeli-supplied, shovelling them into the ground.

Soldiers from an armoured unit, stationed a mere hundred yards from the camp, recalled how clearly they had been able to see the killing. Their report went to the higher authorities who were receiving similar ones from other points around the camp. Lieutenant Avi Grabowski, second-in-command of a tank company, said that he had seen Phalangists killing civilians, and that one

of them told him that “pregnant women will give birth to terrorists.” Israeli soldiers were instructed to do nothing. “We don’t like it,” an officer told his men, “but I forbid any of you to intervene in what is happening in the camps.” The soldiers blocked the entrances to the camps, several times turning back refugees trying to get out, and on one occasion a tank pointed its cannon at a group of 500 who, white flags held aloft, tried to explain that the marauders were “assassinating everybody.” At about four o'clock on Friday afternoon General Eitan and the Chief of Northern Command,

General Drori, met with Phalangist commanders,

some

of them fresh from the camps. Eitan congratulated them on their operation and the Phalangists, explaining that the Americans had called on them to stop, asked the Israelis for “just a bit more time to clean the place up.” It was agreed that all Phalangists would have left the camps by Saturday morning and that, meanwhile, no extra forces would be sent in. However, even as Eitan left Beirut airport for Tel Aviv, a new Phalangist unit of some 200 men set off for Chatila,

mowed down a group of women and children as soon as they got there, massacred all the occupants in the first house they came across and demolished Mt with a bulldozer. All accounts agreed: this new operation was well planned and coolly executed. About the same time, General Sharon and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir Were again meeting American envoy Morris Draper, who asked that the Israeli told army hand over its positions to the Lebanese army immediately. Sharon

him that nothing could be done because of the Jewish New Year. Besides the

es Bi leva

of the army was “preventing a massacre of the Rismspuae

pa

estern part of the city.” Later that evening the onilttary