The Republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920 [2] 0520041860, 9780520041868

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The Republic of

ARMENIA From Versailles to London içiÇ'ig20

The Republic of

ARMENIA

VOLUME

II

From Versailles to London, 1919-1920

RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY • LOS ANGELES • LONDON

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1982 by The Regents of the University of California Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hovannisian, Richard G. The Republic of Armenia. Includes bibliographies and index. CONTENTS: v. 1. The first year, 1918-1919.— v. 2. From Versailles to London, 1919-1920. 1. Armenia—History— 1917-1921. I. Title. DS195.5.H56 956.6*2 72-129613 ISBN 0-520-01805-2 (v. 1) ISBN 0-520-04186-0 (v. 2)

Contents

MAPS

vii

PREFACE

ix

ABBREVIATED TITLES

xi

1. THE REPUBLIC AFTER ONE YEAR

1

2. AN ITALIAN ODYSSEY

20

3. THE MIRAGE OF REPATRIATION

40

4 . A SUMMER OF INSURGENCY

62

5. THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL

IO 9

6. ARMENO-GEORGIAN RELATIONS

140

7. ARMENO-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS

l6 8

8. ZANGEZUR AND GOGHTAN

207

9. PARTISAN POLITICS

241

10. THE WORKINGS OF GOVERNMENT

280

11. THE LONG WAIT FOR AMERICA

316

12. THE SHAPING OF AN AMERICAN POLICY

366

13. THE ALLIED RETREAT TOWARD LONDON

404

14. THE RUSSIAN CRISIS AND TRANSCAUCASIA

458

15. DE FACTO RECOGNITION

482

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

53 1 573

INDEX

577

BIBLIOGRAPHY

V

Maps

1. THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS, JUNE, l g i g

3

2. REGION OF MUSLIM INSURGENCY: THE ARAXES RIVER VALLEY, SUMMER, 1 9 1 9

73

3. THE ARMENIAN-GEORGIAN DISPUTE

157

4 . AZERBAIJANI CLAIMS IN THE CAUCASUS, JUNE, 1 9 1 9

192

5. ARMENIAN CLAIMS IN THE CAUCASUS, JUNE, 1 9 1 9

193

6. ZANGEZUR AND GOGHTAN

2o8

7. ROUTES OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ARMENIA, AUGUST-OCTOBER, 1 9 1 9 8. CILICIA

339 413

Vll

Preface

A decade has passed since the first printing of The Republic of Armenia, Volume I. In the belief that I had gathered most of the existing source materials relating to the Republic, I had planned to complete Volume II within a few years. As it happened, however, I was surprised and some­ what overwhelmed by the discovery of thousands of additional documents in the archives of Great Britain and France and by the wealth of informa­ tion preserved in the contemporary newspapers, published in Erevan, Tiflis, and Constantinople, which came to hand. These sources have pro­ vided valuable detail and more penetrating insight into the domestic and international affairs of the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian repub­ lics. The importance and the sheer bulk of these materials contributed to the enlargement of the first draft of this volume to 8,000 typewritten pages. In the past five years I have reorganized and rewritten that un­ wieldy manuscript, condensing it into the present form. Volume II concentrates on the period from the signing of the Versailles peace treaty in June 1919 to the recognition of the Transcaucasian repub­ lics by the Allied Powers and the opening of the London conference on the Near East in early 1920. On the internal Caucasian theater, the volume covers the events from the declaration of United Armenia in May 1919 to the beginning of the second session of Parliament in February 1920. The changes that occurred during those few months were significant and, in some ways, impressive. Yet, while the Republic developed organically, the future of the Armenian people was again jeopardized, particularly by the retreat of the Allied and Associated Powers from their oft-repeated pronouncements regarding the complete separation of the Armenian provinces from the Turkish empire and the creation of a viable, united

X

P RE F AC E

Armenian state combining Russian (Eastern) Armenia and Turkish (West­ ern) Armenia. The system of transliteration is the same as in Volume I. In citations of newspapers, the page number follows the day of the month; for example, May 28:3, 1919, means May 28, 1919, page 3. The forms used in citing American, Armenian, British, and French archival materials are ex­ plained in the following list of abbreviated titles. Place names, with few exceptions, are given as they were generally known in the period of this study. A glossary of old and new place names is included before the index. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the support of the John Simon Guggen­ heim Foundation, which honored me as a Fellow for 1974-1975, during which time I wrote the first draft of this volume. I am also grateful for the assistance of the Committee on Research of the Academic Senate, UCLA, and for the courteous service extended by the staffs of the Univer­ sity of California, Harvard University, Yale University, and Hoover Insti­ tution libraries, the National Archive's and the Library of Congress in Washington, the Public Record Office and the British Museum in Lon­ don, and the Archives du Service Historique de l’Armée Française in Vincennes, France. Friends and colleagues in Erevan and the Armenian Committee for Cultural Relations have kindly supplied me with publica­ tions of the Academy of Sciences and the State University of the Armenian SSR. Raffi K. Hovannisian and Iris Papazian read the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. Noël L. Diaz transformed the sketch maps I com­ posed into the eight maps included in the text. Grace H. Stimson edited the volume with care and creativity. Vartiter Kotcholosian Hovannisian has been a participant in this study since its inception. I am profoundly in the debt of our children, who were frequently deprived of paternal presence and companionship for the sake of the second volume of The Republic of Armenia. R. G. H.

Abbreviated Titles

Adrbedjani pastatghtere

[Republic of Armenia. Ministry of Foreign Af­ fairs.] Gaghtni pastatghtere: Adrbedjani davadrakan gordsuneutiunits mi edj. Erevan, 1920.

Arm. Nat. Del. Archives

Archives of the Armenian National Delegation (now deposited in the State Historical Archives, Erevan, with microfilm copies in the Nubarian Library in Paris and at the headquarters of the Armenian General Benevolent Union in the United States).

Bofba v Azerbaidzhane

Borfba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhane, 1918—1920: Dokumenty i materialy. Publ. of In­ stitut Istorii Partii TsK KP Azerbaidzhana— Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Institut Istorii AN Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR. Baku, 1967.

Bor’ba v Gruzii

Borba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii: Dokumen­ ty i materialy (1917-1921 gg.). Comp. S. D. Be­ ridze, A. M. Iovidze, S. V. Maglakelidze, Sh. K. Chkhetiia. Publ. of Akademiia Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR—Gruzinskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie Gruzinskoi SSR. Tbilisi, 1958.

BRITAIN, ADM

GREAT

BRITA IN ,

ADMIRALTY

OFFICE,

PUBLIC

RECORD OFFICE (LONDON).

Adm l

Class 1: Admiralty and Secretarial Papers, 1660-1934. xi

xii BRITA IN , CAB

ABBREVI ATED TI TLES GREAT BRITA IN , CABINET OFFICE, PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

Cab 23

Class 23: Cabinet Minutes.

Cab 24

Class 24: Cabinet Memoranda.

Cab 25

Class 25: Supreme War Council (1 9 /7 -/9 1 9 ).

Cab 27

Class 27: Committees: General.

Cab 28

Class 28: Allied War Conferences.

Cab 29

Class 29: International Conferences.

Cab 45

Class 45: Historical Section. Official War Histories. Correspondence and Papers.

BRITA IN , FO

GREAT BRITA IN , FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES, PU B­ LIC RECORD OFFICE.

FO 371

Class 37a : Political. The class and volume num­ bers are followed by the document numbers, the file number, and the index number; for example, FO 371/3657, 3404/9846/512/58 represents Volume 3657, Documents 3404 and 9846, File 512 (Armenia, 1919—1920), Index 58 (Caucasus).

FO 406

Class 406: Confidential Print: Eastern Affairs, 1812-1946.

FO 418

Class 418: Russia and the Soviet Union, 1821— 1954• Class 424: Turkey, 1841—1951.

FO 424 FO 608

Class 608: Peace Conference, 1919-1920: Corre­ spondence. The volume number and file num­ bers (three figures) are followed by the document numbers; for example, FO 608/78, 342/1/2/7948/10174 represents Volume 78, File 342/1/2 (Middle East, Armenia, Internal Situa­ tion), Documents 7948 and 10174.

BRITA IN , WO

GREAT BRITA IN , WAR OFFICE ARCHIVES, PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

WO 32 WO 33 WO 95

Class 32: Registered Papers: General Series. Class 33 : Reports and Miscellaneous Papers (1855!939)Class 95: War Diaries, 1914—1922.

ABBREVIATED TITLES

WO 106

XIII

Class 106: Directorates of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1870-1925.

British Documents

Great Britain, Foreign Office. Documents on Brit­ ish Foreign Policy, 1919-1959. Ist ser. Ed. W. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. Vols. I—V. Lon­ don, 1947-1954.

FRANCE, ARCHIVES DU MAE

ARCHIVES DU M INISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRAN­ GERES ( q u a i d ’o r s a y ), PARIS.

FRANCE, ARCHIVES DE L’ARMEE

M INISTERE D’ETAT CHARGE DE LA DEFENSE NA­ TIO NA LE. ETA T- MAJOR DE L’ARMEE DE TERRE. ARCHIVES DU SERVICE H ISTO R IQ U E DE L’ARMEE FRANÇAISE (CHATEAU DE VINCENNES), VINCENNES.

16N

Classe 16N : Commandement du grand quartier gén­ éral. The carton, dossier, and document num­ bers are listed after the class number; for exam­ ple, 16N/3016, dossier 2, no. 17.

17N

Classe 17N: Missions militaires françaises (Mis­ sions to South Russia and the Caucasus, Cartons 581-590).

20N

Classe 20N : Front Oriental (including Corps expé­ ditionnaire d'Orient, Corps expéditionnaire des Dar­ danelles, Armée d’Orient, Commandement des armées alliées en Orient, Armée française d’Orient, Corps d’occupation de Constantinople, and Corps d’occu­ pation française de Constantinople).

Georgian Archives

Republic of Georgia. Archives of theDeleg to the Conference o f Peace and of the Govern­ ment in Exile (now deposited in Houghton Li­ brary, Harvard University).

Hayastani Komkusi patmutiun

Hayastani Komunistakan Kusaktsutian patmutian urvagdser. Ed. Ds. P. Aghayan et al. Publ. of Institut Istorii Partii TsK Kompartii Armenii— Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS. Erevan, 1967.

Hoktemberian meds revoliutsian

Hoktemberian sotsialistakan meds revoliutsian ev sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanake Hayastanum: Pastatghteri ev niuteri zhoghovadsu. Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian et al. Publ. of Institut Istorii, Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Armian­ skoi SSR. Erevan, i960.

XIV

ABBREVIATED T IT L E S

Hovannisian, Republic, I

Hovannisian, Road to Independence

Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Ar­ menia. Volume I. The First Year, 1918-1919. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971. Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967.

Istoriia Kompartii Azerbaidzhana

Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaidzhana. Publ. of Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Azer­ baidzhana—Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS. Vol. I. Baku, 1958.

Istoriia Kompartii Gruzii

Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Gruzii. Ed. V. G. Esaishvili. Publ. o f Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Gruzii—Filial Instituta MarksizmaLeninizma pri TsK KPSS. Part 1. Tbilisi, 1957.

Kompartiia Azerbaidzhana

Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaid­ zhana. Publ. of Institut Istorii Partii TsK KP Azerbaidzhana—Filial Instituta MarksizmaLeninizma pri TsK KPSS. Ed. M. S. Iskenderov et al. Baku, 1963.

Paris Peace Conference

United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference. Washington, D.C., 1942-1947. 13 vols.

Rep. of Arm. Archives

Archives of the Republic of Armenia Delega­ tion to the Paris Peace Conference (now inte­ grated into the Archives of Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun, Boston, Massa­ chusetts). The title of each individual file is giv­ en only the first time the file is cited in the notes.

us

U NITED STATES OF AMERICA. T H E NATIONAL AR­

ARCHIVES

CHIVES (W A SHING TO N , D .C .).

RG 59

Record Group 59: General Records of the Depart­ ment of State (Decimal File, 1910—1929). Figures representing class, country, and subject pre­ cede the document numbers; for example, 860J.01/60/173 represents Internal Affairs (8), Armenia (60J), Government (.oi). Documents 60 and 173.

RG 84

Record Group 84: The United States Foreign Ser­ vice Posts of the Department of State.

ABBREVIATED TITLE S

RG 256

Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia

XV

Record Group 256: Records of the American Com­ mission to Negotiate Peace. The citation form is the same as that used in RG 59. Velikaia Okiiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (sbomik dokumentov). Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian, A. M. Akopian, G. M. Dallakian. Publ. of Armianskii Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Arm. SSR—Arkhivnyi Otdel MVD Arm. SSR. Erevan, 1957.

1

The Republic after One Year

The first anniversary of the Republic of Armenia was observed on May 28, 1919, with public ceremonies designed to inspire confidence that the nation would, like the miraculous phoenix, emerge from the ashes. The appalling conditions that had caused “formless chaos” in 1918 had eased only slightly, yet enough to offer hope that a new dawn was breaking over Eastern (Russian) Armenia and that its rays would soon touch upon the desolate provinces of Western (Turkish) Armenia. The Act of United Armenia, promulgated during the celebrations of May 28, anticipated national restoration by declaring the two sectors of historic Armenia henceforth “everlastingly combined as an independent political entity.” The drama was enhanced by the seating of twelve Western Armenian deputies in the legislature of the Republic, formed in and still confined to Eastern Armenia. Although immediate unification was impossible, the government justified the act as a symbolic gesture and as a legal basis for making representations on behalf of integral Armenia and the Western Armenian refugees.1 Unfortunately, the Act of United Armenia soon led to misunderstand­ ings within the émigré communities and to the dissolution of the coalition cabinet in Erevan. The Armenian Populist (Zhoghovrdakan) party, belat­ edly objecting that the act had been drawn up without the prior consent of national leaders abroad, recalled its ministers from the cabinet just as the Republic’s first legislative body, the Khorhurd, was preparing to dis­ band and the electoral campaign for the Parliament (Khorhrdaran) of Armenia was getting under way. Before dispersing on June 5, the Khor1 See Hovannisian, Republic, I, chap. 14. 1

2

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

hurd appointed Alexandre Khatisian to head a provisional cabinet, vest­ ing it with both executive and legislative powers pending the convocation of the Parliament. To that cabinet fell the responsibility of assessing the country’s position in the summer of 1919. The International Scene The international status of the Republic of Armenia, after one year of nominal independence, remained obscure. The Allied and Associated Powers, while acknowledging Armenian sacrifices and loyalty during the war, cited technical difficulties in explaining their refusal to recognize Armenia as a formal ally and therefore as a state with the right to be seated at the Paris Peace Conference. The counterarguments of Boghos Nubar, Avetis Aharonian, and prominent Armenophile jurists had not been suffi­ ciently compelling to allay Allied apprehensions about predetermining the Turkish and Russian settlements'. Hence, in lieu of even de facto recognition, the victorious powers showered the Armenian supplicants with professions of goodwill and vague assurances of a secure national future. When the Allied heads of state left Paris after signing the Versailles treaty in June 1919, they had neither concluded peace with the Ottoman Empire, resolved the Armenian mandate question, disarmed the Turkish divisions in eastern Anatolia, nor arranged for the repatriation of Armeni­ an refugees. Meanwhile, in ter-Allied rivalries flared in the Near East. As the British consolidated their position in Mesopotamia and Persia, the French demanded the right to take control in Syria and Cilicia, the Italians sought compensation along the southwestern coast of Anatolia, the Greeks pressed inland from Smyrna, and the Americans advanced the open-door principle in the hope of securing equal opportunities in trade and com­ merce. Uncoordinated and unilateral maneuvers of the several Allies strengthened Turkish resistance. Concurrently, there surfaced among commercial, military, and colonial circles in the West a plea to deal moder­ ately with the Ottoman Empire in consideration of Muslim world opinion, the difficulties of imposing drastic terms, and the advantages of retaining the territorial integrity of Anatolia. In Transcaucasia, complex geographic and demographic factors made the small Armenian republic extremely susceptible to external coercion. Since most of the country’s lifeline from Batum passed through Georgian territory, Armenian efforts to gain a large part of the Akhalkalak-Borchalu region had to be circumspect. Despite surveillance by British mili-

50°

-------------------- 1----TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS A pproxim ate Boundaries June, 1919

L egen d B r it is h M ilit a r y G o v e r n o r sh ip

REPUBLIC OF A R M E N IA REPUBLIC OF ------------- A Z E R B A IJ A N

P r o v in c i a l bou n d ary C o u n ty ~ bou n d ary

REPUBLIC OF Q E 0 R G |A

XL DitI - udB- */t0

42

East of Greenwich

1.

THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS, JUNE, 1 9 1 9

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

4

tary authorities, Georgia demonstrated that it could seriously hamper the flow of relief supplies under the pretext of necessary railway repairs, the lack of rolling stock, and unstable domestic conditions. Nor could Khatisian’s cabinet ignore the precarious status of the half million Georgian Armenians, whose tribulations during and after the brief war in Decem­ ber 1918 were a cogent reminder of their vulnerability. The Azerbaijani republic, like Georgia, had fallen heir to a rich, populous commercial center, Baku, which had seemingly inexhaustible oil reserves. And if Georgia could pressure Armenia by manipulating rail traffic, Azerbaijan could easily suspend the shipment of crude oil, without which the Armeni­ an Railway Administration was unable to function. Historic racial and religious animosities, compounded by the immediate struggle for the districts of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Sharur-Nakhichevan, shaped the sad course of Armeno-Azerbaijani relations. Moreover, Armenia’s refusal to adhere to a regional defense pact against the Russian White Armies fur­ ther aggravated relations with both Azerbaijan and Georgia.2 Despite these serious problems, there was cause for optimism. In face of the postponement of the Turkish settlement, Armenian envoys labored diligently to prevent Allied sympathy from waning. The Supreme Council had never challenged the right of the future Armenian state to incorpo­ rate the eastern vilayets; Premier Clemenceau had intimated that France would forgo claims to Cilicia if the United States took the Armenian mandate; and, when Damad Ferid Pasha pled the Ottoman case in June 1919, the Allies responded with a stringent rebuke, ruling out continued Turkish dominion in either Arab or Armenian provinces of the empire. Armenophile societies the world over urged support for the Armenians, and international concern was demonstrated by the outpouring of public and private charity to sustain refugees scattered all the way from the Caucasus and the Anatolian coastal towns to campsites in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. Moreover, although some Allied officials and certain vested commercial interests began to mention the impracticability of a separate Armenian state, nearly all American and European representa­ tives in Transcaucasia called for rapid determination of Armenia’s perma­ nent boundaries and repatriation of the refugees. Overwhelmed by the staggering needs of the homeless masses, these officials openly criticized the delays at the peace conference. And, as the future of the Armenians rested heavily on the role of the United States in the Near East, it was noteworthy that President Wilson, with all his vacillation, stood committed to the regeneration of Armenia. Even his most bitter congressional foes 2 Ibid., chaps. 3, 6, 11.

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R O N E YEAR

5

were members of the highly vocal American Committee for the Inde­ pendence of Armenia.3 In Transcaucasian affairs, one positive development was the establish­ ment of formal diplomatic relations among the three new republics. The initial tendency of Georgia and Azerbaijan to discount Armenia as a significant political force had begun to change. Armenia had incorporated a part of Lori, and the Georgian hold on the rest of the district had been loosened through the formation of a neutral zone. In its chronic disputes with Azerbaijan, Armenia was outmatched in manpower and overall re­ sources, but the Armenian officer corps was the best trained in the Cauca­ sus and could rely on the martial tradition of the mountaineers in the contested districts. Although the Azerbaijani army held key positions in Karabagh, the Armenian militia of Zangezur had blocked all advances upon Goris (Gerusy), thus enabling Premier Khatisian to persuade the British authorities to reverse their initial ruling that Azerbaijan should exercise provisional jurisdiction in that district, too. Furthermore, despite ill-disguised threats hurled at Erevan for declining to join the regional defense pact against the Volunteer Army, Armenia alone was regarded with favor by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia. Armenian envoys and organizations functioned freely in the vast areas under General Denikin’s control, and Russian military and political spokesmen, while refusing to hear of the detachment of Georgia or Azer­ baijan, privately professed sympathy for the concept of a separate united Armenian state encompassing former provinces of the Russian and Otto­ man empires. The Domestic Scene So long as the Armenian republic remained confined to its existing territo­ ries, there was no prospect of rapid economic recovery. Large shipments of grain normally imported from South Russia were cut off because of unsettled conditions and the hostility between Georgia and the Volunteer Army. Local harvests had decreased by more than 40 percent during the war years, lands under cultivation had declined by a third, and industrial production and mining had nearly ceased. These losses were com­ pounded by the Turkish invasion and occupation in 1918, with more than 200 villages plundered, half the vineyards in the Araxes valley ruined, and about 200,000 large horned animals driven away, together with thousands of carts and agricultural implements. Eighty percent of the households 3 Ibid., chaps. 9-10.

6

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

were left without a single horse and nearly half had neither cow nor ox. During the spring of 1919 only a fourth of the farmland was sown, and agricultural income dipped to a sixth of its prewar level.45 The small republic was overburdened by almost 300,000 refugees, whose four years of abject misery had transformed them into starving, half-crazed mobs, agitated by unfulfilled promises of repatriation and increasingly resentful of their Eastern Armenian compatriots and of all officials, whether Armenian or Allied. The municipal administration of Erevan was driven to despair as the population of the capital tripled to 90,000 at a time when war damage and shortage of repair materials reduced the number of living quarters. In the Alexandropol district nearly 100,000 refugees lived in makeshift shelters or abandoned military barracks, with more people arriving daily from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan.6 In July the Ministry of Welfare had to instruct its agents abroad to suspend the transfer of refugees to Armenia until more accommodations were available, and families already en route were cautioned to proceed only if they could fend for themselves.6 But directives alone could not stem the inflow. Most of the newcomers were settled in the less congested Kars district, with the hope that they would soon be able to advance into the fertile valleys just beyond the border. American flour eased the famine and lowered the death rate in the summer months, but, as witnessed by an American relief officer, the amelioration was only relative: Thousands and thousands and thousands o f dirty, lousy, half-clad sick and diseased, cringing and suffering unfortunates of humanity; old gnarled grand­ mothers and grandfathers are here who seemingly never had the right to survive; then there are the young men who should be strong but their strength has gone in the struggle simply to live; but the thing that grips you is the women and little children who will haunt you with their mute appeal, and force you to think very tenderly of those who are near to you and for whom you will die a hundred deaths rather than have them ever reach this condition.7 4Ibid., pp. 130-133. See also H. G. Zatikian, “Hayastani giughatntesutian vijake 1918-1920 tvakannerin,” Banker Hayastani arkhivneri, 14th yr., no. 2 (1973), 209-220; A. Sargsian, “Hai giughatsiutian tntesakan vijake Dashnakneri tirapetutian orok, 1918-1920 tt.,” Banker Hay­ astani arkhivneri, 3d yr., no. 1 (1962), 234—253; H. Petrosian, “Tntesakan-kaghakakan iravijake Arevelian Hayastanum 1914-1917 tt.,” BanberErevaniHamalsarani, 7th yr., no. 2 (1973), 33-45; Papers of Tasker H. Bliss, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts, Box 253, File 876, Armenia, no. 16, Westermann to Bullitt, May 6, 1919. 5 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 20/20, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t.; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 21:3, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 22:5, 1919; US Archives, RG 59, 867.48/1244. See also H. G. Zatikian, “Hai gaghtakanutian u Hayastani bnakchutian tvi parzabanman shurdje (1918-1920 tt.),” Banber Erevani Hamalsarani, 7th yr., no. 1 (1973), 249-251. 6 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 1:3, 1919; Bor’ba, Aug. 30:2, 1919. 7 E. A. Yarrow, “Winter Conditions in the Caucasus,” Journal of International Relations, XI

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R O N E YEAR

7

Continuous waves of disease flowed from the crowded, infected hovels; and the poorly equipped hospitals, where freezing wind and sleet whipped through gaping holes and broken windows, often resembled morgues. Before the war there had been fewer than forty physicians and a combined hospital capacity of only 200 beds in the provinces of Erevan and Kars; ironically, more than twice as many Armenian physicians and medical facilities had existed in the city of Tiflis alone. During the winter of 1918—1919 approximately seventy physicians served in Armenia, but fifty-seven of them contracted typhus and seventeen died while caring for the diseased population.8 The ebb of the typhus epidemic gave little respite, for in the summer months malaria spread through the armed forces in the mosquito-infested Araxes river valley, and the supply of quinine was woefully inadequate to cope with the crisis. Financial solvency was out of the question under these conditions. The combined net income of all government departments in 1919 was 30 million rubles, whereas expenditures exceeded a billion rubles. More than 70 percent of the outlay was channeled through the ministries of Welfare, Provisions, and Military Affairs, agencies trying to sustain the population rather than rebuilding the country. The 23 million rubles allocated to the Ministry of Education, while not inconsequential, were less than 3 percent of total disbursements, and the average allowance for the cabinet, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 1 percent.9 In the absence of a central banking system and significant reserves of precious metals and exportable goods, by the beginning of summer the exchange rate of the state ruble had plunged to a fourth of that of the Russian imperial bank note. With monthly wages averaging about 100 rubles for those fortunate enough to be employed, most families were unable to get an adequate supply of staple foods even when they were available. The pood (36 pounds) value of wheat was 350 rubles; bread, 300-400; rice, 750; cheese, 575; lard and butter, 2,ooo.10 So high a level of inflation could only feed corruption. Extortionary practices of village (July 1920), 111. The number of deaths reported in Erevan from April through October 1919 was 5,789, including 2,585 in hospitals, 934 in orphanages, 2,023 in residences and streets, and 247 in and around the railway station. 8 Haradj, Jan. 23:4, 1920. Before the Russian revolutions in 1917 the provinces of Erevan and Kars together had 6 municipal hospitals with a total of 87 beds, 22 village hospitals with 133 beds, and 22 aid (feldsher ) stations serving a population of approximately 1,200,000. By the end of 1919 the numbers had grown to 37 hospitals with a combined bed capacity of 2,620 and 15 aid stations; there were approximately 150 physicians. 9 See Haradjy Jan. 3:4, 7:4, 1920. ™Nor Ashkhatavorf July 24:3, 1919. Georgian press regulations and censorship made it necessary for Ashkhatavor (“Laborer”) to appear under the altered title of Nor Ashkhatavor (“New Laborer”) from July to mid-September 1919.

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

8

commissars and militia chiefs, who paraded under the aegis of officialdom, brought discredit upon the government, but the swirl of events had not allowed for thorough administrative reforms. Many unscrupulous bureaucrats of the old regime clung to their posts, and newer appointees frequently proved no less venal. Untrained and inexperienced, they were grossly ignorant of local needs and customs. Yet, with the paucity of qualified personnel, the Ministry of Internal Affairs dared not risk still worse disorder by turning out the entire incumbent hierarchy. The deplorable behavior of many officials tried the patience even of those who understood the government’s quandary. The dominant Dashnakist party demanded revolutionary changes, warning that the public judged its leaders by the functionaries with whom it had immediate daily contact. The peasantry had traditionally regarded administrative offices as oppressive agencies that should be avoided and deceived. Hence they hid and hoarded vital supplies and attempted to evade taxes and other obligations of citizenship. Nor could they rely on the judicial boards to safeguard the fundamental rights of a republican society. The village customs, sometimes cruel and primitive, could not be changed until legal processes were adjusted to fit the circumstances. The following admoni­ tion was typical of the criticism leveled at respected comrades, who upon assuming high public office seemed to be afflicted with irresolution: The legislature of Armenia may propose and adopt such admirable democratic laws as to stir the envy of the parliaments of Europe; the government of Armenia may make very nice decisions and be committed to public service; the cabinet of Armenia may have—as indeed it does—very trustworthy, capable, and dedicated individuals; but all this is worthless, void of any positive significance, left dangling in air, unless there is the necessary mechanism to enforce the laws, enact the decisions, and give substance to the goal of public service. As long as our government fails to take stringent measures to renovate the commissar-militia structure, as long as it leaves unmuzzled the arbitrariness and assaults upon the bodies and spirits of the people of Armenia, as long as the various adventurers, extorters, and speculators sally forth from all sides under the guise of “commissars” and “militiamen,” the government, regardless of who may head it, will be unable to call up new recruits, combat desertion, safeguard the goods and properties of the population, uphold honor and dignity, eliminate racial discord, gather and distribute seed-grain, and thus inspire broad public support for the government and the administration of Armenia.11

Widespread evasion of military service was symptomatic of the country’s woes. The agrarian classes were exhausted by the five-year drain of man11 Ibid,., Sept. 9:2, 1919.

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R O N E YEAR

9

power and the constant suffering. The draft fell most heavily upon the poor, who could not secure exemption on the basis of essential occupa­ tions and who lacked the means to bribe local commissars. The Ministry of Military Affairs tried to broaden the base by instituting universal mili­ tary service, with three years of active and fifteen years of reserve duty for eighteen-year-old youths or twenty-year-old students. All men between sixteen and forty-three were required to carry identification papers show­ ing their military status so as to qualify for employment and state aid. The rapid succession of draft calls in 1919 indicated, however, that regulations alone could not solve the problem. In sheer desperation the cabinet finally authorized the restoration of the death penalty and the formation of extraordinary field tribunals for summary court-martial.12 Armenia’s communication and transportation systems were unsuited to the needs of an independent country. The rail trunk lines in the provinces of Erevan and Kars, constructed while the Caucasus was part of the Russian Empire, joined the Batum—Baku-Vladikavkaz railway to central Russia at Tiflis.13 This routing reduced freight capacity because of the steep mountainous terrain between Alexandropol and Tiflis and exposed Armenia to continued Georgian economic coercion. Plans were therefore made to lay a line between Kars and Batum in order to shorten the distance from the Black Sea to Erevan by 150 miles, free the country from economic dependence on Georgia, and garner lucrative duties in the transit trade between Persia and Europe. The inadequacy of the Republic’s roads was painfully demonstrated during Muslim risings in the summer months, evoking more internal criticism. Who was responsible, queried the press, for devising repatria­ tion schemes without even being able to protect the outskirts of Erevan? Why had the government failed to disarm Muslim centers when they were still reeling under the shock of the Ottoman defeat? Why had the villages of Zangibasar, a district that had breathed fire as long as the Ottoman army stood at its side, been allowed to keep a stranglehold on the main arteries to Sharur-Daralagiaz, Surmalu, and Alexandropol? “Our lands are splintered into little pieces, our army is scattered over broad expanses, 12 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 L; Ashkhatavor, June 18:2, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 31:3, Aug. 14:3, 1919; Hairenik, Sept. 9:2-3, Oct. 5:1, 1919. See also V. A. Mikayelian, Hayastani giughatsiutiune Sovetahan ishkhanutian hamar mghvads paihari zhamanakashrdjanum (1917—1920 tt.) (Erevan, i960), pp. 132—133. According to one document, often cited in Soviet studies, more than 17,000 arrests were made in 1919 for absence without leave. See, for example, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 298. 13 The construction of railways in the Armenian provinces is outlined by O. Balikian, “Zheleznodorozhnoe stroitel’stvo v dorevoliutsionnoi Armenii,” Banter Hayastani arkhivneri, 6th yr., no. 2 (1966), 199-206.

IO

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

our people are tired and dispirited, while our enemy is rich, healthy, armed, and determined. The attempt to occupy large tracts of territory without first securing the rear and the roads with sufficient force has brought us to this catastrophic situation. The continuation of the same indecisive and irresolute policies will cut us to the root.”14 Although Armenian journalists were adept at dramatizing the crisis, their solutions were more rhetorical than practical. The unending struggle for mere survival obscured many of the small, positive steps that had been taken. Conditions were, in fact, not so grim as they had been the year before. Capitalizing on British concern over the renewal of Pan-Turkic agitation, the Republic had managed to incorpo­ rate, at least nominally, the southern part of the Erevan guberniia and most of the Kars oblast, increasing its territory from less than 5,000 to more than 17,000 square miles. The annexed districts, with their fertile farmlands, salt and coal mines, and dense stands of timber, improved the country’s economic potential.15 Thfe expansion toward the prewar frontiers also made possible the repatriation of most Russian Armenian refugees who had fled from the Araxes valley and Kars. The government allocated 36 million rubles for this undertaking, 8 million for local improvements in the city of Kars, and smaller sums for the Kaghisman and Ardahan districts. By summer the municipal administrations in the province of Kars were operating bakeries, repairing streets and sewers, and providing loans to rehabilitate businesses.16 Although transportation and communication routes were never fully secure, most of the 1,600 versts (1,061 miles or 1,707 kilometers) of chaussée were open by midyear. With the thawing of the heavy snowdrifts, Gevorg Khatisian, brother of the premier and an eminent engineer, di­ rected the upgrading of the overland road between Kars and Batum, and crews made the chaussées suitable for automobile traffic between the capital and the district towns of Etchmiadzin (Vagharshapat), Igdir, NorBayazit, Karakilisa, and Karvansarai (Idjevan). Mechanics in Kars and Alexandropol put twenty trucks into running order and pieced together several automobiles for government use.17 The Armenian Railway Administration, starting with two locomotives, twenty freight cars, and 5 miles of track, expanded operations after the Turkish withdrawal, first 14 Ashkhatank as reprinted in Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 11:4, 1919. 15 Hovannisian, Republic, I, chaps. 7, 8. 16 Haradj, Jan. 11:4, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 17:3, 1920; S. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), p. 324. 17 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, File 660/3, H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavarutiun, 1919—1920 L: Teghekatu, no. 110, Aug. 14, 1919; S. Vratz­ ian, Kharkhapumner (Boston, 1924), pp. 120-121.

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R O N E YEAR

11

taking control of the 265 versts (176 miles) from Erevan to Sanahin in the Lori neutral zone and then the 124 versts from Alexandropol to Sarikamish and the 42-verst extension of narrow-gauge line to Karaurgan on the frontier. In May the network was further extended by including the 178 versts from Ulukhanlu to Nakhichevan and Julfa. Mechanics and engineers, many coming from other parts of Transcaucasia and from Russia, were employed in rail shops and garages in Alexandropol, where they repaired some of the damaged rolling stock abandoned by the Turkish armies. The inventory of the Railway Administration in the summer of 1919 listed two complete passenger trains, thirty wide-gauge and two narrow-gauge locomotives, and more than 500 freight cars and cisterns. Daily passenger service was scheduled between Alexandropol and Kars and between Erevan and Sanahin. The improvement in rail traffic was reflected in statistics showing that the volume of freight in the summer was ten times as large as in the first quarter of the year.18 The unfavorable balance of trade and the shortage of hard currency necessitated economic controls. The state monopoly on the export of spirits, carpets, cotton, and leather made possible the importation of a few shipments of petroleum, foodstuffs, and farm implements. The State Properties Administration resumed operation of the Kulp and Kaghisman salt mines, among the richest and largest deposits in the Caucasus. With the revival of rudimentary international trade, customhouses were opened at Uzuntala, Karaurgan, and other points near the Georgian, Turkish, and Azerbaijani frontiers to ensure the collections of duties and to prevent the smuggling of historic cultural treasures and other items placed under government regulation.19 During the spring and summer sowing periods, the agricultural ad­ ministration distributed 15,000 hand reapers, allowed 23 million rubles in cash credits, and handed out seed for a mere 5,000 dessiatines (13,500 acres) of grain and garden greens.20 A revived cooperative movement, however, was considered the key to agrarian rehabilitation and growth. Cooperative associations, which had become widespread after the March revolution in 1917, served as local agencies of production and distri­ bution, as intermediaries between the government and primary producers, and as mainstays of communal self-improvement and popular 18 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 22/22, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 19201. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, July 20:2, 1919\ Ashkhatavor, Nov. 2:4, 11:4, 1919; Vratzian, Kharkhapumnery pp. 119120; Teodik, Amenun taregirk, XV (Constantinople, 1920), 128. 19 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 5/5, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 19191., “Kratkii ekonomicheskii obzor Zakavkazskoi Armenii”; Vratzian, Kharkhapumner, p. 119. 20 Haradj, Jan. 10:4, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13.

12

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

democracy. Although the number of consumer cooperatives had grown to more than 200, with a total membership of 50,000 in early 1918, the Turkish invasion had shattered the fragile network. When the plundering armies withdrew at the end of that year, only 3 of the 57 cooperatives belonging to the regional Shirak Union in Alexandropol and less than half of the 100 associations in the Erevan and Etchmiadzin districts remained intact.21 Because of the emphasis given the cooperative movement, the reor­ ganized Shirak Union had 50 member groups by mid-1919; the Lori district, 42; Erevan, 36; Etchmiadzin, 34; Nor-Bayazit, 16; and Surmalu, 7. On July 1 the Erevan provincial cooperative conference amalgamated with units in Zangezur, Kars, Kazakh (Dilijan and Idjevan), and Lori to form the Union of Consumer Cooperatives of Armenia (Hayastani sparoghakan kooperativneri miutiun), known as Hai-Koop. The union’s ex­ ecutive was instructed to stress the working-class nature of the movement by excluding rich peasants (kulaks) and developing facets of the rural economy which benefited the toilers. Although association business was conducted in the national language, exceptions were allowed so as to bring all racial and religious elements into the union.22 As in other labor and agricultural boards, the leaders of the Hai-Koop were intellectuals. Eastern and Western Armenians, Marxists and antiMarxists joined in the movement. Economists such as Zaven Korkotian, Vahan Totomiants, and Davit Ananun set the tenor of the biweekly jour­ nal Hayastani Kooperatsiia (“The Cooperative of Armenia”) with statistical studies and feature articles on practical methods of production and mar­ keting, specific branches of cooperative endeavor in Armenia, and the international cooperative movement. The Hai-Koop employed a dozen specialists to plan lectures, serve as consultants, and extend the system to remote villages. By the end of 1919, it included more than 200 member associations representing 60,000 households.23 Several production cooperatives also resumed operations. The Erevan leather workshops manufactured 3,000 to 5,000 pairs of footwear each month, and seasonal totals for the food-processing sector rose to 40,000 kilograms of tomato paste, 25,000 of vegetable preserves, and 10,000 of nut and raisin-syrup 21 L’Union des Coopératives de l’Arménie, Les Coopératives en Arménie ([Paris, 1919]); M. Hakobian, “Haikakan kooperatsiayi patmutiunits,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 1st yr. (i960), 165- 177.

22 Les Coopératives en Arménie, p. 7; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 111/10,//.//. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t.f File 231/130, H. H. Patvirakutiun, Copies des Lettres, 1919 t. 23 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 2/2, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 19181., File 13/13; Haradj, Sept. 20:4, 21:3, 1919, Jan. 3:4, 1920. The union’s administration was divided among departments of commerce, industry, culture and information, and finance and distribution.

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R O N E YEAR

13

confections known as rojik and bastegh. Although the sugar shortage kept the fruit-conserve cooperatives closed, the grape crop was used for the production of 400,000 liters of wine and brandy, the prime export of the cooperative union.24 Meanwhile, the Hai-Koop’s representative in Europe, Dr. Mikayel M. Mandinian, participated in the International Cooperative Alliance, submitting information about the Armenian union and overstating its resources in the hope of gaining credits for the purchase of goods and machinery so essential for reconstruction.25 Most measures intended to draw the government and the citizenry together originated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In that effort, smaller administrative units were created by partitioning the Republic into ten new provinces.2627Municipal self-government, previously accorded only to Erevan, Nakhichevan, Ordubad, Kars, and Alexandropol, was extended to Ashtarak, Igdir, Kulp, Karakilisa, Jalal-oghli, Khamarlu, Etchmiadzin, and Dilijan by upgrading their status from township to city. Municipal administrations were granted credits for public works and for occasional cultural programs to lighten, if only momentarily, the prevailing atmosphere of oppressive austerity. Reacting to constant complaints about the militia, the ministry allocated funds for an eight-month training program at fourteen locations and pressed, with moderate success, for pay scales that might reduce the oriental form of bribery known as bakshish or papakh P The formation of an extraordinary court to deal with corrupt officials underscored the government’s pledge to hold its functionaries accountable for serious misdeeds. In August, in its first case, that court convicted a district commissar on charges of extortion and embezzlement and imposed a sentence of two years at hard labor.28 Parliamentary Elections and the New Cabinet Amid unsettled conditions the Parliament of Armenia was elected and organized in the summer of 1919. That the Armenian Revolutionary Federation would gain a clear-cut majority was a foregone conclusion. By 24 Les Coopératives en Arménie, p. 9. 26 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 111/10, File 231/130. The Armenian representatives claimed that there were 369 societies, including 184 consumer groups, 160 credit groups, and 25 production groups, with a combined membership of 300,000. Vratzian, Kharkhapumner, p. 115, states that in 1920 the number of societies was 280, with 111,957 members. 28 See Hovannisian, Republic, I, 449. 27 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, File 660/3, no- 85, Juty *6» 1919; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, p. 320. 28 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 28:3, 1919.

14

T H E REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

the turn of the century the Dashnaktsutiun had struck root throughout the Caucasus and, since the tsarist attempt to expropriate the holdings of the national church in 1903 and the “Armeno-Tatar” clashes in 19051907, had directed Armenian collective action. Having participated in the several Transcaucasian administrative bodies formed after the Russian revolutions in 1917, the Dashnaktsutiun had taken the helm of govern­ ment in the Republic of Armenia when the ill-fated Transcaucasian Fed­ erative Republic was dissolved in 1918. The disruption of the party network in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the loss of numerous leaders during the war years, and the participation of many others in the affairs of state had drained the Dashnaktsutiun, but its control in the Eastern Armenian provinces was still pervasive. Even had the electoral campaign been conducted under ideal condi­ tions, the opposition parties would have been dwarfed in the new legisla­ tive body. The Armenian affiliate of the Social Revolutionary party, except for emphasizing the need for integral bonds with Russia and inter­ racial harmony, offered little that was not already contained in the plat­ form of Dashnaktsutiun. The Marxist Social Democrat circles, divided among themselves and handicapped by the absence of a significant prole­ tariat in the Armenian provinces, chiefly attracted students and intellectu­ als. Like the socialist opposition, the constitutional democratic Armenian Populist party (Hai Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun) functioned under the anomaly of having more followers in Tiflis and Baku than in Erevan and of directing its affairs through a central body situated outside the Armeni­ an republic. But unlike the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Demo­ crats, the Populists had shared authority in the coalition cabinet, and the rank-and-file members identified increasingly with the concept of full national sovereignty. This party had the potential of becoming the catalyst for nonsocialist elements, particularly if a proposed merger with the more widespread Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) party and other Western Armenian nationalist-reformist associations was effected. The electoral boycott and the denunciation of “yellow bourgeois parliamentarianism” by the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were not unexpected,29 but the election-eve withdrawal of the Populist slate caused deep consternation. In Tiflis the Populist central committee, 29 See Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii-Armianskii Filial Instituta MarksizmaLeninizma pri TsK KPSS, Revoliutsion kochet ev trutsikner, 1902-/921 (Erevan, i960), pp. 508-511; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii-Sektsiia Istmoa, Spartak, 19/7-/920: Husher ev vaveragrer (Erevan, 1935), p. 90; H. N. Karapetian, HayastaniKomeritmiutiah dsnunde (Erevan, 1956), pp. 122-124.

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R O N E YEAR

15

reiterating Boghos Nubar’s objection that the Erevan government had exceeded its prerogatives in promulgating the Act of United Armenia, repudiated that document and scuttled the coalition cabinet. These actions aggravated intraparty friction, as many members in Armenia deplored the volte-face and chafed under the insensitivity of the cen­ tral committee. Almost none of the local leaders, for example, had been listed at the top of the party’s electoral slate, and under proportional representation only persons heading a minority ticket could anticipate possible election. Moreover, having become absorbed in the day-to-day struggle for national survival, many Populists in Erevan were prepared to accept Premier Khatisian’sjustification of the Act of United Armenia. Yet the central committee prevailed and instructed its Tiflis and Erevan journals to announce a boycott.30 Although the belated fiat did not significantly affect the final vote, it did cast ominous shadows over the campaign, which ironically had been sanctioned and regulated by the multiparty Khorhurd and the bipartisan coalition cabinet. The first national election took place as scheduled, June 21—23, 1919, with nearly 75 percent of the 365,000 eligible voters participating. The results must have gratified even the most zealous element of the Dashnaktsutiun, for the party received nearly 90 percent of the popular vote to 5 percent for the second-place Social Revolutionary party.31 The few opposition deputies, hopelessly outnumbered in the Parliament, never­ theless courageously decided to carry on. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, on the other hand, was not a monolithic organization but had served as a broad umbrella in the cause of national emancipation. Hence, while the Dashnakist deputies would stand unanimously on the principle of free, independent, and united Armenia, their divergent social and economic views could easily give rise to internal cleavages and expose the rivalry between the fundamentally conservative and traditionalist Turkish Armenian partisans and the more radical, internationalist Russian Armenian intellectuals. The wide spectrum within the Dashnakist parliamentary faction point­ ed up the importance of determining the chain of authority. During the caucuses in July it was ultimately established that party discipline would be imposed only in questions of national significance, that the faction would be responsive to the advice of the Dashnaktsutiun’s supreme Bu­ reau, and that cabinet members would be answerable to the Bureau 30 See the Populist newspaper Zhoghovurd for June 1919. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no* 127>Sept. 3, 1919; Erkir, Oct. 5—12, 1919. 31 Rep. of Arm Archives, File 660/3, no. 90, July 22, 1919; Hovannisian, Republic, I, 473.

i6

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

through parliamentary channels rather than directly. The general disposi­ tion of the faction was evidenced in its choice of a presidium consisting of Arshak Djamalian, Vahan Khoreni, and Simon Vratzian, who were well known in international socialist circles and who, as skilled journalists and orators, had frequently criticized the seeming paralysis of the coalition cabinet. It was also noteworthy that the faction included thirteen Western Armenians and three women, at a time when the suffragette movement in America and most of Europe had not yet reached fruition.32 The Khorhrdaran of Armenia convened on August 1, 1919, the air of excitement heightened by the arrival from Rostov-on-Don, Baku, and Tiflis of several deputies, who greeted and embraced their comrades for the first time in independent Armenia. The ceremonial session in the newly refurbished chamber was attended by Georgian, Azerbaijani, American, British, and French officials and by many other dignitaries, including Bishop Khoren Muratbekian, the primate of Erevan, who represented His Holiness Gevorg V (Sureniants). The appearance of Min­ ister of Military Affairs Kristapor Araratian and partisan hero Dro Kanayan occasioned lengthy ovations, and, as he had done in the first legislative body a year earlier, Avetik Sahakian set the tone of the proceedings. Without minimizing the severity of the crises facing the Republic, he inspired confidence that the sealed frontiers of Turkish Armenia would soon be shattered and that the Armenian nation would, with Allied help, become master of its historic homeland.33 During the second session on August 5, Hovakim Budaghian, chairman of the credentials committee, reported that the Dashnaktsutiun had won 73 of the 80 seats; the Social Revolutionary party, 4; the Muslim electorate, 2; and the Independent Peasants Union, 1.34 Nearly a third of the 32 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 12:3, 1919. 33 Ibid., Aug. 7:3, 1919; Hairenik, Sept. 21:1, 23:1, 1919. 34 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 105, Aug. 14, 1919. A third seat was apparently assigned later to the Muslim faction, reducing the Dashnakist membership to 72. The full membership of the Parliament, according to a roster published in Constantinople in 1920, is given below. It is possible that by that time several alternates from the Dashnakist slate had been advanced into Parliament to fill vacancies. Members of the Parliament: Dashnakist deputies: 1. Artashes Abeghian 2. Nikol Aghbalian 3. Avetis Aharonian 4. Sargis Araratian 5. Hovsep Arghutian 6. Nerses Avazian 7. Artashes Babalian 8. Khosrov Babayan 9. Varos Babayan 10. Gerasim Balayan 11. Berjouhi Barseghian 12. Hovakim Budaghian 13. Arshak Djamalian 14. Tigran Dsamhur 15. Arshak Ghazarian 16. Koriun Ghazazian 17. Abraham Giulkhandanian 18. Sirakan Grigorian 19. Martiros Harudunian 20. Arshak Hovhannisian 21. Artashes Hovsepian (Malkhas) 22. Hovhannes Kachaznuni 23. Ruben Kadjberuni 24. Drastamat Kanayan (Dro) 25. Smbat Khachatrian 26. Alexandre Khadsian 27. Gevorg Khadsian 28. Vahan Khoreni (Ter-Gevorgian) 29. Garnik Kialashian 30. Armenak Maksapedan 31. Sargis Manasian 32. Hmayak Manukian 33. Kata*

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R ONE YEAR

17

Dashnakist deputies had not yet arrived, and in fact the Khorhrdaran never did attain its full complement because some members were engaged in assignments abroad. The Parliament named Avetis Aharonian speakerpresident in order to give him greater prestige in dealing with the Allied Powers and Boghos Nubar’s National Delegation, and completed the presidium by selecting Sargis Araratian and Levon Shant (Seghbosian) as vice-presidents, Hakob Ter-Hakobian as secretary, and Aram Safrastian as junior secretary. Before that session recessed, Premier Khatisian reviewed the state of the nation since the adjournment of the Khorhurd in June and then submitted the resignation of his caretaker cabinet.35Two days later he was nominated by Arshak Djamalian, on behalf of the Dashnakist faction, to form the new cabinet. Social Revolutionaries Arsham Khondkarian and Davit Zubian and the lone independent, Artashes Melkonian, took the floor to express reservations about Khatisian. A forceful orator, Khondkarian criticized the questionable associations and the undemocratic past of the former mayor of Tiflis and showered abuse upon his interim cabinet for having restored the death penalty and having failed to uphold the rights of the Muslim minority. After Djamalian had delivered a stinging rebuttal, the Parliament, by a vote of 40 to 8, elected Khatisian as minister-president of the Republic of Armenia.36 Confirmation of the Council of Ministers took place during the next session, on August 10. As it was hoped that a coalition government of integral Armenia would result from negotiations with the National Dele­ gation’s representatives, then en route from Paris, four of the ministers were temporarily assigned two portfolios each: rine Manukian 34. Hovakim Melikian 35. Enovk Mirakian 36. Vahan Nalchadjian 37. Vahan Navasardian 38. Artashes Nazarian 39. Avetis Ohandjanian 40. Hamazasp Ohandjanian 41. Vahan Papazian 42. Garegin Pasdermadjian 43. Levon Petrosian 44. Aram Safrastian 45. Avetik Sahakian 46. Varvare Sahakian 47. Levon Sarafian 48. Eprem Sargsian 49. Haik Sargsian 50. Garo Sassuni 51. Arshak Sebouh (Nersesian) 52. Levon Shant (Seghbosian) 53. Garnik Shahinian 54. Arshak Shirinian 55. Levon Tadeosian 56. Iusuf Bek Temurian 57. Hovsep Ter-Davitian 58. Mikayel Ter-Gevorgian 59. Mihran Ter-Grigorian 60. Hakob TerHakobian 61. Gegham Ter-Harutiunian 62. Anushavan Ter-Mikayelian 63. Hovhannes TerMikayelian 64. Ruben Ter-Minasian 65. Hambardzum Terterian 66. Vardan Ter-Torosian 67. Sirakan Tigranian 68. Sahak Torosian 69. Mikayel Varandian 70. Gevorg Varshamian 71. Simon Vratzian 72. Haik Yaghjian 73. Zakar Yolian. Social Revolutionary deputies: 74. Arsham Khondkarian 75. Vahan Minakhorian 76. Le­ von Tumanian 77. Davit Zubian. Independent deputy: 78. Artashes Melkonian. Muslim deputies: 79. Mirbazir Mirzababev 80. Asat Bek Aghababbekov. 35 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a/3, no. 105, Aug. 8, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 8:2, 1919. 36 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 107, Aug. 10, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 10:2, 19:4, 1919.

i8

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

Alexandre Khatisian

m in i s t e r -p r e s i d e n t ; f o r e ig n

AFFAIRS

Abraham Giulkhandanian Sargis Araratian Avetik Sahakian

INTERNAL AFFAIRS; JU S T IC E p r o v is io n s ; f in a n c e

WELFARE AND LABOR; AGRICULTURAL ADM INISTRATION

Nikol Aghbalian

PUBLIC ENLIG HTENM EN T AND CULTURE

Kristapor Araratian

MILITARY AFFAIRS 37

Khatisian’s four Dashnakist colleagues were veteran cadre. All had held positions of authority in the party hierarchy, had been imprisoned or forced into exile during the years of so-called Stolypin reaction (1907— 1912), and had helped organize the Armenian volunteer movement dur­ ing the world war. Sargis Araratian and Abraham Giulkhandanian, to­ gether with party founder Rostom Zorian, had spearheaded the Armenian effort to stave off the Turkish offensive at Baku in 1918. Giulkhandanian, a native of Etchmiadzin and a graduate of the Yaroslav School of Law, had joined the Dashnaktsutiun as a youth and focused his organizational talents on the large Armenian work force in the petroleum industry around Baku. A member of the regional central committee from 1902 to 1908 and then of the party Bureau, he had campaigned against the right- and left-wing separatist movements in the party, led the defense council of Gandzak (Ganja, Elisavetpol) during the Armeno-Tatar clashes, and presided over the Armenian National Council at Baku. Still in his early forties in 1919, Giulkhandanian came to Erevan as a formidable activist.38 Araratian, born Shahnazarian and reared in the Armenian enclave at Nukhi in the Elisavetpol guberniia, had, like other Dashnakist intellectuals, served as teacher, editor, and field-worker. Regarded as an incisive thinker, he was often consulted by highly placed comrades. At the time of the Persian revolution in 1906 he was teaching at Tabriz, where he was closely associated with the Persian Armenian revolutionary leader Eprem Khan. He later earned a doctorate in chemistry at the University of Geneva, while collaborating with Mikayel Varandian in the management of Droshak (“Banner”), central organ of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. After his return to the Caucasus, Araratian was 37 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 108, Aug. 12, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 12:2-3, 1919-

38 For biographical information on Giulkhandanian, see Gabriel Lazian, Demker hai azatagrahan sharzhumen (Cairo, 1949), pp. 252-264; S. Vratzian, ed., Hushapatum H . H. Dashnaktsutian, 1890—1950, Publ. of the ARF Bureau (Boston, 1950), pp. 482-485; S. Vratzian, ed., Hairenik taregirk, V (Boston, 1947), 204-206; Heghapokhakan Alpom, ed. Avo [Tumayan], V, 4 (1964), 97-110.

T H E R E P U B L I C A F T E R ONE YEAR

19

first attached to one of the Armenian volunteer regiments as a propagandist and then participated in the defense of Baku in 1918. Now, at thirty-three years of age, he took on the tremendous problems of finance and provisions in the Republic of Armenia.39 Avetik Sahakian, affectionately called “Father Abraham” in party cir­ cles, was at fifty-four the dean of the cabinet. A native of Jalal-oghli and a graduate of the Petrovsk Agricultural Academy in Moscow, he had been employed in municipal and technical agencies in the Caucasus and had earned distinction for his work on control of the boll weevil. He had been a member of the Dashnaktsutiun Bureau and several national bodies before the 1917 revolutions, then served as provisions minister in the Transcaucasian Federation, and, after moving to Erevan with many com­ rades in the summer of 1918, became a mainstay in the Khorhurd during the first trying months of Armenian independence.40 Ten years Sahakian’s junior, Nikol Aghbalian was a gregarious intellectual and pedagogue whose restless disposition led him in many directions, including literary criticism, linguistics, and revolutionary journalism. Enthralled with the cultural vivacity of his people, Aghbalian, who had directed schools in Egypt, Persia, and various localities in Transcaucasia, took hold of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Culture with passionate enthusiasm.41 Minister of Military Affairs Kristapor Araratian was a relative latecomer to Armenian national affairs. As was not uncommon in the officer corps, he had been reared in a Russian milieu and had first served in the Cauca­ sus during the world war. Distinguishing himself at the battle of Sardarabad as commander of the 2d Artillery Brigade of the Armenian Corps, Colonel Araratian quickly advanced to the rank of major general. In March 1919 he was selected to replace Major General Hakhverdian as the nonpartisan military minister, a post he retained in the coalition, the interim, and now the regular cabinet of Alexandre Khatisian.42 That cabinet immediately turned its attention to four interrelated issues: British evacuation, Italian ambition, Armenian repatriation, and Muslim insurrection. 39 See Araratian’s memorandum regarding the events at Baku in FO 371/3658, 56685/512/ 58. 40 Gabriel Lazian, Heghapokhakan demher (mtavorakanner ev haitukner) (Cairo, 1945), pp. 275- 283.

41 S. Vratzian, Andzink nvirialk (Beirut, 1969), pp. 168-210; Vratzian, Hushapatum, pp. 489-492; Lazian, Demker hai azatagrakan sharzhumen, pp. 265-285; Heghapokhakan Alpom, I, 5 (i960), 129-138. ^Jacques Kayaloff, The Battle of Sardarabad (The Hague, 1973), p. 13.

2

A n Italian Odyssey

As a dispersed and decimated people in 1919, the Armenians had no choice but to base their case on the elusive principles of right and justice rather than on actual political and military strength. That disadvantage hindered the work of every representative abroad and made it virtually impossible for the Erevan government to give substance to the Act of United Armenia or even to safeguard its citizens. British intercession had been required to keep open the transportation lines from Batum and to incorporate the Kars and Nakhichevan districts. Indeed, for all the Transcaucasian republics, the single augmented British infantry division of English, Scottish, and fearsome Gurkha, Rajput, and Punjabi troops constituted the only visible external support against renewed Turkish encroachments from the south and Russian penetration from the north. Hence the announcement that these brigades were to be withdrawn spread consternation throughout the Caucasian isthmus. The British Decision Without having defined a long-range policy at the end of 1918, the British War Cabinet had authorized the military occupation of strategic sites along the Transcaucasian railway to enforce the evacuation of the Turkish and German armies, to reopen the Baku—Batum pipeline, and to produce a settling effect pending the conclusion of peace.1 The cabinet’s East­ ern Committee emphatically ruled out the establishment of a British 1 For the deliberations and decisions of the War Cabinet’s Eastern Committee, see Britain, Cab 27/24, 27/36-39. See also Cab 24/72, G.T. series; Cab 23/8, WC 495, 502, 505; Artin H. Arslanian, “The British Military Involvement in Transcaucasia, 1917-1919” (Ph.D. disserta­ tion, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974), chap. 3. 20

AN I T A L I A N ODYSSEY

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protectorate over the Caucasus, but it frequently drew attention to the region’s commercial and political importance as a natural center for international trade and as a bulwark against any hostile movement that might conspire to “turn the flank of the British position in Asia.”2 Although the engrossment of field commanders in local issues elicited strong criticism in London, particularly in the Foreign Office, such ventures might well have been justified on the strength of Lord Curzon’s own declarations in the Eastern Committee that the British expedition should help the “rather rudimentary states to make their way into existence” by providing “some kind of backbone and stability.”3 After the departure of the enemy armies, the 27th Division was kept in the Caucasus because of the postponement of the Eastern settlement and the Allied commitment to aid the loyal—that is, anti-Bolshevik—elements in Russia. The cabinet of David Lloyd George was nonetheless extremely sensitive to mounting unrest at home. The workers, faithful and quiescent during the war, staged mass demonstrations and threatened to strike, not only for better economic conditions but also for an end to intervention in Russia. Members of Parliament echoed the cries of their constituents for rapid demobilization, fiscal responsibility, and remedies to lingering domestic problems. By the beginning of 1919 the prime minister had already concluded that the shrinking armed forces had to be concentrated in regions where a long-term British presence was intended, a view sup­ ported immediately by the Treasury and the India Office and, after considerable vacillation, by the general staff under Sir Henry H. Wilson and the War Office, which had passed from Lord Alfred Milner’s openly interventionist direction to the slightly more guarded approach of Win­ ston S. Churchill. The opposition of the Foreign Office under George N. Curzon to a peremptory withdrawal was shared by the Admiralty Office on grounds that such action would jeopardize control of the Caspian Sea and the strategy of the White Army to seize the icebound Bolshevik fleet at Astrakhan. Moreover, General Denikin was likely to regard British evacuation as an opportune time to advance into Transcaucasia, thus driving non-Russian peoples into the arms of the Bolsheviks and causing a conflagration that would consume both the White Armies and the new 2 See, in particular, Cab 27/24, Eastern Committee minutes for December 1918 (Dec. 2, p. 6, for quotation). See also Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Vol. II: Britain and the Russian Civil War, November 1918—December 1920 (Princeton, 1968), pp. 66—81. 3 Cab 27/24, Eastern Committee, 40th Minutes, Dec. 2, 1918, p. 18. See also Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in East Asia, 1918—1923, (Albany, N.Y., 1976), pp. 116-119; Ullman, op. cit., pp. 81-86.

22

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nation-republics, whose separate existence the Foreign Office, at least, deemed in the best interests of the British Empire.4 When the question was reviewed by the Inter-Departmental Confer­ ence on Middle Eastern Affairs on March 6, Churchill pressed for the quickest possible disengagement, since he “really did not see what British interests were involved.” In the primary goal of crushing Bolshevism before it could leap the boundaries of Russia, the secretary of state for war regarded Transcaucasia as relatively insignificant. The future Russian government would undoubtedly reincorporate the region, so what hap­ pened in the interval was of no major concern, except that the longer the British troops stayed “the deeper our claws would stick in.” The confer­ ence, agreeing that the general objectives of the occupation had been achieved, asked the War Office to draft a plan for withdrawal in consulta­ tion with the India Office and the Admiralty.5 Yet that afternoon, when Churchill reported the decision to the cabinet, Lord Curzon was quick to stipulate that the retirement should be “slow and progressive” in order to mitigate the disarray and turmoil that would follow the removal of the Union Jack from the Caspian and the Caucasus.6 The news, previously reported from Paris, that the Italians might be authorized to replace the British in the Caucasus was received with dis­ belief. Domestic problems in Italy were certainly no less severe than in England, and Italian territorial pretensions were anchored along the Adriatic and the Mediterranean rather than the more distant Black and Caspian seas. An undersecretary of the India Office even suggested that the word “Italy” in the Paris dispatch had been a misprint, whereas Curzon termed the affair a “chimera,” predicting that once the Italians realized the enormity of the job, “any eagerness they had shown on general imperi­ alistic grounds would probably be greatly modified.” In Curzon’s opinion the British evacuation could not be effected before the end of the year.7 Officials in London had, however, misjudged Lloyd George’s earnest­ ness in inviting the Italians to take charge in the Caucasus and the determi4 See, for example, Britain, FO 371/3661,43647/1015/58; Cab 23/9, WC 521,531,536, 537; David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I (London, 1938), 248, 356; David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris: With Documents, XV ([New York, 1925]), 28; C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, II (London, [1927]), 163-164, 167-169. 5 FO 371/3661, 41025/1015/58; FO 608/83, 342/8/4/4453; Britain, IO, L/P&S/10807. 1° 1919 the Eastern Committee was superseded by the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCE). 6 Cab 23/9, WC 542(2), March 6, 1919. 7 FO Gen/216, IDCE, 6th and 7th Minutes, Feb. 13, 17, 1919. See also Busch, op. cit.t pp. 119-120; Marta Petricioli, “L’Occupazione italiana del Caucaso; ‘un ingrato servizio’ da rendere a Londra,” II Politico, XXXVI, 4 (1971), 730-738.

AN I T A L I A N ODYSSEY

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nation of Premier Vittorio Orlando and Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino to secure an immediate concession in order to stifle the criticism at home that Italian interests were being sacrificed at the peace conference. Replac­ ing the British in the Caucasus would open lucrative markets and ensure an ample supply of petroleum, coal, copper, and other vital minerals as well as strengthen the Italian position in negotiations for a final Near Eastern treaty. After several preliminary discussions, Lloyd George, with­ out conferring with the Foreign Office, offered Orlando the “mandate” on March 15. Although Orlando described the development as “una fortuna colossale,” both King Victor Emmanuel III and Colonial Minister Gaspare Colosimo were skeptical, pointing out the danger of being drawn into the Russian civil war, the ferment that such involvement would cause among Italian radicals, the possibility that the offer had been intended to distract Italy from more critical issues and to exclude it from Asia Minor, and, finally, the fact that the British never willingly relinquished any territory that was truly rich and valuable. Orlando, however, was insistent on the benefits of this “vera terra promesa,” explaining that Italy would gain immediate economic returns without assuming permanent obliga­ tions and that he had already specified that the Caucasus plan should not prejudice the ultimate arrangement in Asia Minor. Reassured by Sonnino, Orlando let Lloyd George know on March 22 that the offer was accepted.8 8 Petricioli, op. cit., pp. 739-774; FO 608/83, 342/8/3/5104. The understanding between Lloyd George and Orlando was described as 'ollows in a British memorandum written on March 22: M. Orlando said that he understood that the people of Georgia and Azerbaijan desired independence. The Prime Minister [Lloyd George] commented on this that, of course, the mandate would have to be of a loose character and given a great deal of local autonomy. M. Orlando then expressed apprehension lest General Denikin should penetrate into the Caucasus and assume control there. The Prime Minister replied that General Denikin had been headed off and would not receive any assistance in arms if he penetrated into this country. He pointed out that it involved at present a force of occupation of some 24,000 men, but that they had not had much trouble up to the present. In the course of the conversation it was pointed out that Russia depended on Baku and Batoum for its supplies of oil, which were very important industrially, and that for this reason the Bolshevists wished to get hold of Baku and Batoum. M. Orlando also said that he would have difficulty with his own Socialists in regard to accepting a mandate for the Caucasus. At the conclusion of this part of the Meeting, M. Orlando undertook to consider carefully whether Italy would accept a mandate in the Caucasus.. . . Note 1: On Saturday March 22 Count Aldrovandi [the Italian secretary] informed Sir Maurice Hankey [the British secretary] that he was authorised by M. Orlando to say for the information of Mr. Lloyd George that Italy would accept a mandate for the Caucasus without prejudice to their claims elsewhere. [See FO 608/83, 342/8/3/5104]. It is of interest that on March 19 Sonnino wired Carlo Sforza, the Italian high commissioner in Constantinople, asking him to facilitate passage to Paris for the Azerbaijani delegation, which had been detained in that city for weeks. See Hovannisian, Republic, I, 285, 288-289.

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During the next few days, Chief of Staff Armando Diaz and the military section of the Italian peace delegation discussed arrangements for the transfer with British Chief of Staff Wilson and Director of Military Intelli­ gence General William Thwaites. Wilson delighted in needling the Italians by painting a bleak picture of the Transcaucasian railways and pipeline and pointing out that effective control in the Caucasus would require naval dominance in the Caspian Sea. Yet he assented in principle that, because Italian shipping was in short supply, the relief expedition could be transported to Batum on the vessels that were to bring back the British force. It was also agreed that an Italian mission would go to Tiflis to arrange for the change of command and the billeting and provisioning of troops.9On April 4 Diaz appointed Colonel Melchiade Gabba10to head the mission, which was instructed to assess the opportunities for Italian financial, commercial, and industrial penetration of and immigration into the region and to compile data on its peoples, history, and politics. The investigation was to center on Batum, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, since it was assumed that General Denikin would be allowed to absorb the North Caucasus and that Russian Armenia would, if combined with the Western Armenian provinces, be assigned a separate mandatory power. The utmost secrecy was to prevail, with the local governments being told nothing of the British offer but only that Italy was deeply interested in the welfare of the Caucasian peoples and the defense of their independence against all aggressors. The mission was to have its report ready by the beginning of July. As a precautionary measure, Orlando instructed the Ministry of Interior to deny any rumors that Italy intended to deploy troops to Transcaucasia and to make certain that the press did not discuss the possibility of a future Italian mandate so as not to jeopardize the tentative move already initiated.11 Once the preliminaries were arranged, Sonnino cemented the Italian strategy with a reminder to the British delegation: “As is known, the question has formed the subject of conversations between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Orlando, as the result of which it was confirmed that the burden to be assumed by the Italian Government in substituting Italian troops for British troops in the above mentioned regions would imply no renunciation by Italy of a share in the military occupation of Asia Minor or any mandate to be held there.”12 9 Callwell, op. cit., p. 176; Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, XXXVII, 1 (1972), 99-100; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/11674. Lloyd George personally informed General Wilson of the impending transfer on March 23. 10 Colonel Gabba’s first name is given incorrectly as Melchiorre in Hovannisian, Republic, I, 306, based on a news item in Bulletin d’informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 9 (Feb. 15, 1920), 3-

11 Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 1, p. 744, pt. 2, pp. 100-103; Ft) 608/85, 347/1/6/7207. 12 FO 608/85, 347/1/6/7207. On March 23 Foreign Minister Sonnino informed the Italian

The Reaction Excluded from these proceedings, the British Foreign Office did not learn of the Lloyd George—Orlando agreement until after Gabba’s appoint­ ment, with verification from Paris arriving only on April 9.13The episode typified the personal diplomacy of the Allied chiefs of state and Lloyd George’s frequent circumvention of the regular channels of government. To a sharp complaint from Curzon, Louis Mallet replied that the experts of the British delegation rarely received official notice of what was transpiring in the Council of Four and had to rely on bits and pieces of information gleaned from private sources: “As regards the Caucasus, I was not in a position to inform you, as I only heard of it indirectly as a decision of the Supreme War Council unconnected with peace nego­ tiations.”14Although the internal evidence demonstrates the contrary, the

embassies in Paris, London, and Constantinople of the agreement. See Petricioli, op. cit.f pt. 1, p. 742. Orlando told Armenian representatives in April that he earnestly desired to assist the Armenians, possibly even with an armed force. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 4-5, April 6, 18, 1919. 13 FO 371/3661, 55729/1015/58. The Admiralty and the War Office, in contrast with the Foreign Office, were kept abreast of developments in Paris. On March 25 the Admiralty section of the Paris peace delegation informed the Admiralty Office in London that the Allied prime ministers had decided that the mandatory was to be assigned to Italy and that discus­ sions were being held between the chief of military intelligence (General Thwaites) and General Ugo Cavallero. Three days later the Admiralty alerted the Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean (Sir S. A. Gough-Calthorpe) and the Rear Admiral of the Black Sea (Sir Michael Culme-Seymour) of the decision. See FO 371/3661, 53460/1015/58. Then, in a communication to the Treasury Office on April 2, the Admiralty wrote that the prime ministers had “recently” decided that command of the Caspian Sea, too, was to be given the Italians. See FO 371/3667, 51538/11067/58. A copy of this message arrived in the Foreign Office on April 4, nearly two weeks after the Lloyd George-Orlando exchange. 14 FO 371/3667, 65997/11067/58; FO 608/83, 342/8/4/6087. There are indications that Curzon in fact already knew of the Lloyd George-Orlando agreement and may have feigned ignorance to strengthen his complaints regarding the manner in which Lloyd George and Balfour were conducting foreign relations in Paris. Despite Mallet’s belated letter of explana­ tion to Curzon, one of Mallet’s own minutes, dated March 24, 1919, reveals that he had sent Curzon a copy of the memorandum pertaining to the Lloyd George-Orlando exchange. See FO 608/83, 342/8/3/5104. That message is not included in the Foreign Office archives but may have been sent as private correspondence. The papers of Lloyd George also include a copy of a note to Curzon stating that the Council of Four had decided to substitute Italian for British troops in the Caucasus. See the Private Papers of David Lloyd George, Beaverbrook Library, F/12/2/20. Curzon’s own minutes show that he had learned of the decision from more than one source. Commenting on the establishment of a proposed demarcation line between Denikin and the Caucasian states, he wrote on April 4: “I got a telegram from Paris today saying that we were to evacuate the Caucasus immediately in favour of the Italians: If this be true, it does not seem to me to matter much what line of demarcation we dictate to Denikin, for the moment we have gone & the Italians appear, the latter will have no cause to wonder, with the Duke of Wellington, what is going on on the other side of the hill. Since Denikin’s head will appear over the top.” See FO 371/3661, 52104/1015/58. Yet, on April 7, George Kidston wrote in the

26

T H E R E P U B L I C OF A R M E N I A

British departments of government assumed thereafter that the Allied Supreme War Council had authorized the Italian substitution on April 9. Lloyd George, who never revealed the details of his discussions with Orlando, did not bother to rectify that impression.15 The senior British diplomatic and military personnel who were made privy to the impending transfer of command responded with dismay. Criticism came from the delegation at Paris, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty Office in London, and service posts in the East. The pointed comments, while emphasizing the particular concerns of the individual authors, focused on a few fundamental issues: the significance of the Caucasian isthmus for the defense of the empire; the value of continued dominance in the Caspian Sea; nullification of the labors of the preceding months by handing control over to the inept Italians; the foolhardiness of renouncing a land so rich in resources and so promising in opportu­ nities; the impact of the transfer on the fortunes of anti-Bolshevik Russia; the inevitable consequences of a White Army invasion of Transcaucasia, as well as the related revival of Pan-Turkic, Pan-Islamic, and Bolshevik agitation; and humanitarian obligations to the Armenian population pending effective measures by the peace conference.16 Foreign Office ledgers that the only intimation of the transfer of command to date was “a telephone message” from Paris to Curzon. FO 371/3661, 53346/1015/58. 16 See, for example, FO 371/3668, 8447/8449/124570/124999/11067/58; British Documents, III, 325-326. Most writers on this subject have accepted without question the assertion that the Supreme War Council confirmed the transfer of troops on April 9. Mallet’s letter of explanation to Curzon has probably contributed to that misconception. The first draft of his letter, however, stated that the decision had “apparently” been made by the Supreme War Council. Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary, had imparted this information to Mallet. FO 608/98, 375/1/13/8365. The existing records of the Supreme War Council do not indicate that it ever formally sanctioned the Anglo-Italian arrangement. Lloyd George did, however, apprise the Council of Four on April 2, 1919: “Mr. Lloyd George reported that he had arranged with the Italian representatives for the replacement of the British troops in the Caucasus by Italian troops.” See Cab 29/37, I.C. 170B, p. 38, Minute 14. The Supreme War Council had been organized at Versailles in 1917 to deal with high Allied policy matters. Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States were represented by two delegates each and by permanent military and naval advisers. After the war the Supreme War Council evolved into the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. Occasionally, sessions of the Supreme Council were likewise designated as sessions of the Supreme War Council. The military representatives and their staffs continued to meet as required to discharge obligations assigned them by the peace conference. On the formation and organization of the Supreme War Council, see Cab 21/91; Callwell, op. cit.f pp. 13-34 passim; H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, (London, 1920-1926), IV, 275-276, VI, 431-432, 526. For correspondence between the American military representative, General Tasker H. Bliss, and the other military representatives, see Bliss Papers, Box 68. The minutes of the meetings of the military representatives for 1919 are in Boxes 195-196, and in Cab 21/129-137. Situation reports and technical papers are in Cab 25, Supreme War Council, 19/7-19/9. 16 See, for example, FO 371/3659, 114390/512/58; FO 371/3662, 38936/1015/58; FO 371/ 3667, 61205/61247/73667/74840/75179/75550/79131/80816/84147/11067/58; FO 608/83, 342/8/4/4453; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/9839/10127.

AN I T A L I A N ODYSSEY

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Lord Curzon termed the Italian scheme “absolute madness” portending disorder, bloodshed, and anarchy, and he denounced the Parisian es­ capades that were encouraging “the most fantastic of all the aspirants” to stake claims from the Mediterranean to the Caucasus. He noted sarcasti­ cally that the prime minister and the War Office seemed bent on turning away from the Caucasus, Asia Minor, Constantinople, the Balkans, and central Europe, “leaving all the amiable people there to fight it out,” while the British established a firm base in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia and “from this reef of relative military security look on at the storm & shipwreck below.”17James Simpson of the Russian department summarized the Foreign Office objections in a lengthy memorandum that showed the Italian colonial record to be one of “persistent failure and most selfish exploitation.” He predicted that Italy would soon conspire with discontented elements in Turkey and serve as a covert channel for renewed German economic and political intrusion into the Orient. As Azerbaijan was already a hotbed of Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic collusion, the threat from that quarter to British interests in Persia and India required no elaboration. Moreover, the British withdrawal would subvert the principle of self-determination and be tantamount to “treachery to civilisation,” since the Caucasian peoples would be reabsorbed by Russia and thrust into the clutches of their former oppressors. The British public would certainly respond with the highest ideals and meet the challenge if the problem were put to them directly and honestly. The fiscal arguments, Simpson continued, had been overstated, for the Caucasus could easily bear the cost of maintaining a British division and even that force could be progressively reduced as a British-organized native militia expanded its functions. When the memorandum came across Curzon’s desk, the acting foreign secretary grimly recorded his accord with Simpson’s closing admonition that “the surrender of Transcaucasia at this time will be one of the biggest mistakes in British history, some of whose consequences can already be clearly seen.”18 It is curious that, aside from an announcement by Lloyd George on April 2, the question of the Italian expedition was not discussed in the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference until May 5, six weeks after Orlando had accepted Lloyd George’s proposal. Although relevant 17 FO 371/4215, 62789/50535/44. On April 18 Curzon circulated a memorandum saying that Italy had accepted a mandate in the Caucasus “with a rashness to which it is difficult to find a parallel” and urging that even at “this last moment” the Italians should be asked to desist “from an act of such deplorable levity.” FO 608/83, 342/8/4/7919. See also FO 406/41, no. 37; Earl of Ronaldshay [L. J. Zetland], The Life of Lord Curzon, III (London, [1928]), 265-266; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 19/9-/925 (London, [1937]), pp. 79-80; Ullmann, op. cit., pp. 227-228; Busch, op. cit., p. 88; FO 371/3667, 61247/11067/58. 18 FO 371/3662, 71722/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/10611; FO 406/42, no. 16.

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information had been leaked to the American delegation and Orlando himself had told Colonel Edward House that Italy should be awarded the Caucasian mandate in order to procure coal and petroleum,19 Woodrow Wilson claimed that his European colleagues had kept him in complete ignorance of their dealings. Lloyd George adroitly brushed aside such objections by reminding all present that neither the United States nor any other nation except Italy had shown a willingness to share in the tremendous postwar military burden. As Orlando was then boycotting the sessions because of the Adriatic deadlock, the British leader admitted that the Italians would cause utter havoc in the Caucasus.20 Yet, even after Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George had sanctioned the Greek occupation of Smyrna partly as a countermeasure to unauthorized Italian operations in Asia Minor, the prime minister continued to negotiate privately with the Italians, at one time even exchanging views on a suggestion that Italy take all Anatolia under mandate in return for waiving claims to Fiume.21 Only after failing in'that diversion did he denounce the depraved “Romans” to his American and French partners on May 19 and discover quite suddenly that Muslim world opinion had to be taken into account.22 Two days later the sprightly Welshman tried to exclude the Italians entirely from the Near East by urging Woodrow Wilson to accept a mandate for Cilicia, Armenia, and the “whole of the Caucasus region.” Both Lloyd George and Wilson delightedly indulged in fleeting fantasies before falling back into the roles that required the president to plead the 19 Papers of Edward M. House, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Drawer 29/31, March 26, 1919. 20 Paris Peace Conference, V, 465-468; Miller, op. cit., XIX, 557-559; Callwell, op. cit., pp. 187-188; Paul Mantoux, Les délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars—28 juin 1919 ), I (Paris, 1955), 486-487. American Near Eastern adviser William L. Westermann had written earlier: “Clever Orlando. If he can pull this off and save the Armenians with Italian troops who can gainsay Italian claims in Anatolia? It will greatly strengthen the fine Italian hand.“ Personal Diary of William Linn Westermann, Butler Memorial Library, Columbia University, entry for April 20, 1919. 21 Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, p. 115. See also David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Confer­ ence, II (New Haven, 1939), 568-569. As late as May 13 Lloyd George declared: “Gaul and Britain would have remained in such a rut if Rome had not come along and pulled them out. Asia Minor was now in exactly the same situation. The question now arose as to whether Italy should not be asked to take charge. The Italians . . . were an extremely gifted race. It was curious in this war, how they had developed some of the qualities for which the Romans had been famous.“ See Paris Peace Conference, V, 582; Mantoux, op. cit., II (Paris, 1955), 57-58. One of several solutions to the Eastern question proposed by British experts on May 1 included an Italian mandate over the whole of Anatolia. See Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, o ., [1974]). P- 127 n. 23. 22 Paris Peace Conference, V, 707-711 ; Mantoux, op. cit., II, 110—114. See also René AlbrechtCarrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1938), pp. 220-225.

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constitutional argument of Senate sanction as a prerequisite and the prime minister to bemoan the overextended financial and military liabilities of the empire.23 Although the Eastern department of the British Foreign Office soon gathered evidence that the Italians were ambivalent about the Caucasian venture and would probably use the issue simply to win political and economic concessions, the sailing of Colonel Gabba’s eighteen-man mis­ sion from Taranto on April 27, with officers of all the military branches, technicians and specialists, and even a prince of the house of Savoy, perplexed the analysts in London.24 Yet they had not misread the signs of Italian uneasiness. In addition to continued objections by the king and the colonial minister and the wariness of General Diaz and other senior officials, Count Carlo Sforza, the high commissioner at Constantinople, warned that the British were engaged in a shrewd maneuver to entice Italy into the Russian quagmire. By becoming embroiled with both Whites and Reds and providing the English a cover under which they could honorably extricate themselves from the Caucasus, Italy would be performing a “thankless task” for Great Britain. Moreover, though the Caucasian peoples might quarrel incessantly with one another, they were united in their aversion to colonial powers. Such arguments emboldened General Diaz to ask Orlando on May 6 not to make a final commitment, or even any further statement, regarding the expedition until Gabba. had submitted his findings. No longer so self-assured, Orlando soon agreed and set the scene for Italy’s tactic of evasion during the following weeks.2526 23 Paris Peace Conference, V, 756—766; Mantoux, op. cit.y II, 133—137. See also Hovannisian, Republic, I, 323-329; Helmreich, op. cit.y pp. 116-126; Westermann Diary, May 22, 1919; Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking (London, [1945]), pp. 272-284. On May 21 Curzon told Henry Morgenthau that Italy was despised by all and had no business in Asia Minor. See Papers of Henry Morgenthau, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts, Box 1, Diary, May 21, 1919. 24 FO 371/3662, 67445/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/9482. See also France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 1, no. 37. The mission sailed on the S.S. Membi in the company of Prince Aimone di Savoia Aosta. The personnel roster included Lieutenant Colonel Carlo Micheli (chief of staff); Major Carlo Coardi di Carpento (general staff); Major W. Gabutti, Captain V. Fracchia, and Captain G. Albani (arrangements); Captain Granafei, Lieutenant Colonel Barberis, and 2d Lieutenant Insom (naval services); Lieutenant Colonel Vittorio Novarese (mineralogy); Major Cesidio Del Proposto (industry); Major Lorenzo Valeri (consu­ lar service); Captain Alberto Merendi (forestry); Giuseppe Vita (finance); Lieutenant Melchiorre Marcora (commerce); Captain Edoardo Cook (medicine); and Lieutenant Massimo Paltaleoni (medical attaché). At about this time Major Giuseppe Gibello-Socco was named economic representative to the Armenian government. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 230/129, May 14, 1919. 26 Petricioli, op. cit.y pt. 2, pp. 103-106. Count Sforza served as high commissioner until the end of June, 1919, when he returned to Rome to assume the post of assistant foreign minister.

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As rumors of an Italian expedition circulated quickly, the British au­ thorities decided that something had to be said to the Caucasian govern­ ments. Hence, on May 10, just after Gabba’s mission had come ashore at Batum, General William M. Thomson formally announced the impending change of command and gave assurances that, as merely an Allied military adjustment, it would have no bearing on the ultimate status of the republics.26 Even though that news was reported around the world, the silence of the Italian government deepened suspicions in London. Eastern department chief George Kidston wrote resentfully of the Italians: “I even begin to doubt, when they accepted the mandate, they ever had any intention of going there themselves. In view of the exceedingly dubious policy which they are conducting elsewhere, is it not possible that they regard the Caucasian mandate as a valuable pawn of which they can make use with either the Turks or the Bolsheviks as circumstances dictate?”2627 In Paris, General Henry Wilson attempted without much success to force Baron Sonnino into either open action or retreat: “I told him I was coming out of the Caucasus on June 15, and that he had better adjust himself, and also make arrangements for taking over the Caspian Fleet. And I told him I was going to inform Denikin. This woke him up, but he still seems determined to go there.”28 In mid-May British army and navy commanders at Constantinople and in the Caucasus were instructed to begin the withdrawal on June 15, to evacuate all naval personnel from the Caspian while the 27th Division was still in control of the Baku—Batum railway, and, unless Italian replace­ ments had arrived by the appointed date, to hand over the Caspian flotilla to General Denikin.29 The disappointed field officers replied that the removal of the troops alone would take at least eight weeks and that the initiation of so decisive an operation while Denikin was beginning a broad sweep in the north would be untimely. Moreover, a serious quandary would be created: transfer of the fleet would undoubtedly lure the White Army into aggression against the Caucasian states, whereas withholding 26 WO 33/365, no. 4248; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, May 8, 10, 1919; A. Raevskii, Angliishaia interventsiia i Musavatskoe pravitel’stvo (Baku, 1927), p. 57; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 19/9 t.; Bor’ba, May 13:1, 1919; Bor’ba v Gruzii, p. 415. 27 FO 371/3662, 67445/1015/58. In another minute, Kidston noted: “Personally I believe that even if they have the sense not to go there themselves they will cling to whatever rights may be implied in the offer made to them 8c will use them for purposes of bargaining.” FO 371/3662, 31722/1015/58. 28 Callwell, op. cit.y p. 191. See also FO 608/85, 347/1/6/10761; British Documents, III, 335, 406. 29 FO 371/3667, 75203/79128/11067/58; WO 33/974» no- 445°-

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the vessels would be accurately interpreted as Allied distrust of Denikin and consequently undermine White Army prestige throughout Russia.30 From Constantinople, General George F. Milne of the Army of the Black Sea explained that the efforts of his staff to decrease Georgian-Volunteer friction and to safeguard supply routes to Armenia would be nullified by a rash withdrawal. British tact, discipline, and administrative ability had kept the “minor nations in check,” whereas the departure of the imperial forces would deliver the Caspian to the Bolsheviks, thus sealing the fate of Baku and releasing the flow of petroleum to Astrakhan and the whole of Red Russia. The withdrawal should at least be delayed until the White Army had captured Tsaritsyn and isolated Astrakhan.31 General Denikin, receiving the news with “deep surprise and regret and consternation,” also warned that the arrival of the Italians would prove disastrous to Anglo-Russian interests in the Caspian and the Caucasus.32 The apparent Italian irresolution prompted Lord Curzon to summon another interdepartmental conference on May 22, at which he castigated the Italians for jumping at the prospect of grabbing the Caucasus and then straddling the fence, neither accepting the responsibilities nor renouncing the adventure. The conference, criticizing British as well as Italian tactics, recommended that Lord Balfour demand a clear-cut statement of intent from the Italian delegation in Paris.33 Nevertheless, the suspense continued, as the Italians left the British inquiries unanswered. On May 29 General Diaz ordered the units designated for the expedition to concentrate at the ports of embarkation. Two days later General Pietro Badoglio reported that contingents from the XII Army Corps would be ready to sail at Taranto within twenty days and that the others, from the XXXV Corps in Macedonia, would join en route.34 Colonel Gabba was already homeward bound and a final decision was anticipated shortly. Advance information received in London indicated that Gabba would return a negative recommendation. General Thomson, who had en­ trusted the 27th Division to Major General George N. Cory on May 10 and had sailed for England after a brief interview with Colonel Gabba, told the War Office and the Foreign Office that the Italian mission had become 30 See, for example, FO 371/3667, 75204/75550/75772/79128/79131/80815/84147/11067/ 58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/11848. 31 FO 608/85, 347/1/6/12757; FO 371/3667, 80816/82890/11067/58. 32 FO 371/3667, 80816/11067/58. See also Cab 24/76, G.T. 7860; FO 371/3667, 84147/ 106304/11067/58; A. I. Denikin, Ocherkx russkoi smuty, IV (Berlin, 1925), 178. 33 FO 608/83, 342/8/4/11758; FO Gen/216, Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCE), 19th Minutes, May 22, 1919. 34 Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, p. 127.

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disillusioned as soon as it had reached the Caucasus and that, in any event, military, political, and humanitarian considerations demanded continued British supervision. As the last great empire with millions of Muslim inhabitants, Britain was obliged to support the justifiable aspirations of the Muslims of Turkey, Persia, Arabia, and Russia.35 This view, reflecting the opinion of many officers of the India Army, was reiterated by Lieutenant Colonel Claude B. Stokes, who had accompanied Gabba to Batum. He explained that the Caucasian governments, while ostensibly welcoming the Italians, would share in common the misgiving that Italy as a poor and undisciplined country would excel only in exploitation. Expressing dislike for the Georgian Menshevik leaders and the traits of their countrymen, warm admiration for the Tatars (Azerbaijanis), and praise for the fair play of the Armenian premier, despite his people’s shortcomings, Stokes complained that the plan to pull out of the Caucasus had “a decided dash of cynicism in it, for it cannot be honestly pretended that the advent of the Italians there will be either for their own good or that of the local inhabitants.” Cautioning that withdrawal would “recoil upon us sooner or later,” Stokes maintained that it would ultimately be less costly to take charge of the entire area from Mesopotamia and the Caucasus to India.36 Vice-Consul Patrick Stevens, a longtime Batum resident closely asso­ ciated with British business interests, repeated the economic argument that the tremendous natural wealth of the Caucasus would in itself guar­ antee full returns for all expenditures incurred in keeping imperial forces there. Otherwise the region would be ruined by the anarchistic-socialistic Italians, and British retreat would be misconstrued by Muslims every­ where as evidence of weakness. Furthermore, the abandonment “of a country that possesses unlimited fertile soils, varied climates, mineral resources, natural facilities for the development of great industries and vast commerce, at a moment when it most needs nursing by giving it sound advice, prudent handling, and judicious institutions and the introduction of other pressing reforms, is universally regarded as a mistake which undoubtedly will produce consequences to the peace and resources of the Trans-Caucasus.”37 Such admonitions failed to impress Lloyd George, who was, as his secretary, Sir Philip Kerr, explained to a member of the Foreign Office, deeply concerned about the public clamor to bring the boys home and felt the force of a mother’s refusal to sacrifice a son in settling some dispute among native races in the Caucasus. Kerr “took the 36 FO 371/3662, 82940/1015/58. 36 Ibid., 90450/1015/58; FO 406/42, no. 28; FO 85, 347/1/6/12174. 37 FO 371/3662, 83024/1015/58; FO 371/3667-3668, 73667/92815/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/10127/11955; FO 406/42, no. 19. See also British Documents, III, 336-338.

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line that we were doing as much, if not more, than as an Empire we could safely face, and that the disgusting thing in the situation today was the way in which the Americans with a population of a hundred millions, and ‘stinking with wealth,’ were withdrawing themselves from their share of the burden of civilisation in Europe and Asia. He returned again and again to the situation at home, and said that if we were not in a settled position there, it was hopeless to attempt to think of further commitments abroad.”38 The Italian Decision After directing investigations in Transcaucasia for a fortnight, Colonel Gabba delegated his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Carlo Micheli, to continue operations there and hastened back to Rome to report. His return set off a new round of diplomatic speculation: British Ambassador Rennel Rodd cabled from Rome on June 5 that he had learned Gabba’s recommendation was favorable and would entail the use of some 30,000 troops; Sir Louis Mallet wrote from Paris that the military sections of the Italian delegation were*showing every intention of proceeding with the expedition.39 Lord Curzon was momentarily stunned: “Gen. Thomson told me that the report of the commission could be adverse.”40 But Thomson had been wrong. Gabba’s report, stressing the potential political and economic windfall for Italy, noted that the opportunities were enhanced by the existing chaos in the Caucasus. Georgia, with an inept and corrupt government, was plagued by a near worthless currency, the lack of manufactured goods, interruption of trade and commerce, and disrepair of the communication-transportation systems. Azerbaijan seemed a little more stable, but in Baku millions of poods of petroleum were glutting storage facilities, exacerbating the already acute domestic crisis. And in Armenia the devastation wrought by the Turkish armies was beyond description. Moreover, long-standing racial and religious animosities and the immediate territorial disputes in the Caucasus were adding to the Bolshevik-Turkish menace. For these very reasons the new republics would welcome the Italians, who would provide the necessary external impetus to overcome petty squabbles and to engage in 38 FO 371/4380, 483/453/PID. 39 FO 371/3662, 84863/1015/58; FO 371/3668, 85797/11067/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/11832. A United States embassy report from Rome stated that Gabba had disembarked at Taranto on June 2. See RG 59, 763.72119/5273. See also Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 19 bis. 40 FO 371/3662, 84863/1015/58.

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constructive labors through a regional federation or confederation. Gabba and his colleagues, deeply impressed by the intensity of national sentiment, insisted that Italy work within the framework of titular independence, assisting the governments with technical and administrative supervision, financial institutions, and cadre for efficient national militias. Captain Granafei of the Italian navy stressed that the erstwhile Russian Armenian provinces formed an intrinsic unit of Transcaucasia and should be included in the proposed confederation even if the future united Armenia was assigned to a different mandatory power. The complete disengagement of Russian Armenia would raise insurmountable problems from a demographic and economic standpoint and would likely lead to renewed persecutions and massacres of Armenians. The mission also recommended that Italy should assume direct jurisdiction over Batum as the common port for all Caucasia and, instead of continuing the dualistic strategy of the British, should force Denikin to cease his harassment of thè local states. The compiled statistics on mineral and water resources, forest and fiber products, and facilities for communication, transportation, commerce, industry, and capital investment clearly revealed that Italy would secure combustible fuels, mineral ores, lumber, cotton, wool, leather, and handicrafted goods, as well as profitable markets for export. Furthermore, the land and the climate were ideal for large-scale Italian immigration. Military expen­ ditures could easily be retrieved even in an interim arrangement, whereas a long-term agreement would bring incalculable good to all parties concerned.41 Between June 4 and 6, in Paris, Gabba discussed these recommenda­ tions with the Italian delegation, General Diaz, and Minister of War Enrico Caviglia. Orlando and Sonnino, approving the enterprise, sent Caviglia and Gabba back to Rome to arrange for the dispatch, by June 20, of an expedition of 40,000 men, the number deemed necessary to maintain public order, facilitate economic penetration, safeguard the transporta­ tion system, garrison the province of Batum, patrol the disputed districts, and ensure an adequate reserve. Objections by King Victor Emmanuel and Colonial Minister Colosimo that the socialist parties would respond violently to a project considered hostile to Soviet Russia and that Italian troops in the Caucasus would be exposed to the “infezione bolscevica” were over-ridden. The fear of arousing the ire of even the anti-Bolshevik 41 Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, pp. 117-125. Reports were also submitted by Valeri and Del Proposto.

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Russians was eased by Admiral Kolchak’s agreement to accept Allied mediation in unresolved issues between the White Armies and the autono­ mous border provinces in return for continued Allied moral and material support. Baron Sonnino and his diplomatic corps also pointed out to Russian spokesmen in Paris that Italy, in occupying the Caucasus, would actually be assisting the White Armies by securing their broad southern flank.42 Although the Italians still had made no formal announcement, the British War Office wired General Milne that the transfer was now “practi­ cally certain” and that, for the sake of accommodation, the withdrawal would be delayed until July 15. In that period, General Denikin, it was hoped, would be able to capture Astrakhan with the support of the Royal Air Force based at Petrovsk.43 Yet, just when the matter seemed settled, the question of shipping became a new impediment. In preliminary Anglo-Italian discussions it had been understood that the Italian troops would be transported in British vessels, but by May the British were claiming that their naval tonnage was insufficient to handle their own demobilization, to transfer native battalions back to India, and to continue the troop rotations. General Thwaites nonetheless assured the Italians that efforts were still being made to secure the necessary vessels.44On June 11, however, when it was learned unofficially that the Italians would proceed with the venture, Sir Henry Wilson declared “that shipping for transport of Italian troops to Caucasus cannot possibly be supplied by British and that Italians must provide their own.”45 In taking this stand, the British were reacting in part to the unauthorized Italian occupation of points along the southern coastline of Asia Minor. As shipping to ferry troops to Adalia seemed ample, it was not unreasonable to suggest that tonnage sufficient to transfer two divisions to Batum could be found. Italian attempts to gain a reversal of the British decision were cut short when Lloyd George, on June 17, informed Sonnino that Great Britain absolutely could not spare the bottoms. Although irked by this setback, the Italian foreign minister nonetheless determined to carry through. As the regiments under orders began to concentrate around Taranto, Sonnino 42 Ibid., pp. 125-129. Italian representatives, confiding to Boghos Nubar that an Italian armed force would be dispatched to the Caucasus to help maintain order, requested detailed information on matters relating to communications and transportation. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 20, June 13, 1919. 43 WO 33/974, no. 4615; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, June 1, 1919; FO 371/ 3667-3668, 79128/79130/80816/103616/11067/58. 44 FO 608/85, 347/1/6/11674; FO 371/3668, 86034/87077/11067/58. 46 FO 371/3668, 90572/11067/58.

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instructed the Ministry of Transport to alter existing priorities to make the requisite vessels available.46 Italy would not be cheated of its prize. The End of the Odyssey The weeks of negotiation, preparation, and suspense came to naught with the fall of Vittorio Orlando’s cabinet on June 19 as the result of wide­ spread economic distress, political agitation, and resentment toward the other Allied Powers. The selection of Francesco Nitti to head the new cabinet was regarded as a mandate for new approaches to internal and international problems. Foreign Minister Tommaso Tittoni did indeed veer away from Sonnino’s forthright imperial policies and was more re­ sponsive to socialist sentiment regarding the Russian conflict, yet Italy was not prepared to forgo its share of the fruits of Allied victory. A day after taking office, Tittoni informed Ambassador Rodd that he would not unduly press the Adriatic question but hoped for a swift resolution of matters in Africa and Asia Minor to demonstrate to the Italian people the spirit of Allied fair play.47 Moreover, although Premier Nitti subsequently claimed that his first act was to cancel the Caucasian expedition, Tittoni continued to stress Italy’s need for raw materials and the possibility of assuming a mandate over at least an autonomous Georgian state: “If eventually [the] League of Nations called upon her to retire he would be quite ready to do so provided she were guaranteed permanent interest, in exploitation of such minerals, etc., as had been developed during her mandate.”46 At a meeting of the Italian Army Council on June 27, attended by Nitti, Tittoni, and several other cabinet members, the foreign minister an­ nounced the decision to concentrate on direct economic penetration rather than military occupation. Yet the chiefs of staff, having readied both men and equipment for immediate embarkation, behaved as if they had not heard the statement until Tittoni brusquely interjected that the discussion was superfluous since the project had been dropped. To no avail were Colonel Gabba’s remonstrances that the Caucasian peoples were anxiously awaiting the arrival of the expedition and that even purely economic exploitation required military support.49 46 Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, pp. 131-133. As late as June 23 the British command in the Caucasus received War Office messages advising that the Italians would be ready to embark on Tune 20. See WO 05/4058, entry for Tune 23, 1010. 47 FO 371/3668, 92379/11067/58. 48 See Francesco S. Nitti, Peaceless Europe (London, 1922), pp. 147-149; FO 371/3668, 92379/11067/58 . 49 Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, pp. 135—136.

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As before, the Italians used private and informal channels to make their decisions known. Implying that the undertaking had been postponed or suspended rather than abandoned, they played upon the shipping issue to remind the British that the accountability was not one-sided.50 After Tittoni had allowed Sonnino to sign the Treaty of Versailles on June 28 and then replaced him the next day as chief Italian delegate, he intimated to Balfour that the expedition would not sail at all. When the news was relayed to London on July 2, Curzon noted bitterly: “Exactly what I have always prophesized. But then what are we to do?”51 The War Office had already decided what to do. On. July 3 it informed General Milne that, since Italian replacements were unlikely and the Admiralty was advising Rome that unless naval units reached the Caspian by July 15 the flotilla would be turned over to General Denikin, a final delay of the British evacuation to August 15 was authorized to allow for the proper transfer of the fleet to the Russians and for an orderly and progressive retirement.52 For the rest of the month the minutes of Foreign Office personnel were marked by sarcasm and cynicism. When it was suggested that a straightfor­ ward statement be requested from the Italians through the British delega­ tion in Paris or through Ambassador Guglielmo Imperiali di Francavilla in London, Curzon scrawled, “There is no need to repeat the question about the Caucasus. Mr. Balfour put it and got a clear reply. All I need do is to congratulate Marquis Imperiali on this belated and solitary act of prudence.”53 Both the Admiralty Office and the War Office insisted, however, that all ambiguity be eliminated. Director of Military Intelligence General Thwaites queried: “Can we not get somebody to ask definitely whether they mean to go or not. An answer ’yes’ or ’no’ is all that is required and much ink and paper could be saved.”54 In reply to like comments and further objections from field commanders regarding the withdrawal, Lord Curzon wrote with chagrin: “I disapprove of the entire Caucasian policy of H.M.G. The decision to evacuate is a military decision and was concurred in by Mr. Balfour. Similarly I had no responsibility for the Italian suggestion and I cannot find a policy now to extricate ourselves from a situation produced by actions of which I never approved.”55 80 FO 371/3668, 98881/102471/103231/11067/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/14625/15932. See also WO 95/4958, entry for Aug. 11, 1919. 51 FO 371/3668, 97993/11067/58. See also British Documents, III, 419. 62 WO 32/7016, no. 79417; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 11,1919; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/13829/14625/15932; FO 371/3668, 103616/11067/58. 53 FO 371/3668, 110904/11067/58. 64 FO 608/85, 347/1/6/13829. 55 FO 371/3668, 106304/11067/58.

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On July 23 Curzon tactfully asked Ambassador Imperiali if the intima­ tion that Italy had abandoned the Caucasus project could be confirmed, and he was told with equally proper nuances that the interpretation seemed correct and confirmation would be requested from Rome.56 That verification was given shortly after Tittoni had concluded a secret protocol with Greek Premier Venizelos on July 28 relative to provisional spheres of operation in Asia Minor and the Aegean. On August 1, the date set for Italy’s first public announcement since the adventure began four months earlier, Imperiali informed the Foreign Office that the Italian government had found it necessary to abandon the Caucasian expedition. The military mission under Colonel Micheli would not, however, be withdrawn, and it might even be expanded in view of Italy’s economic interest in the region.57 At the same time, in Tiflis, Micheli released the text of a communiqué he had received from Rome: Please notify British commander and loGal governments that the arrival of Italian troops to relieve British will not take place. It is the wish of the Italian Government to establish friendly relations with local governments and to support commerce, industry and financial enterprises. Italian Government are ready to grant greatest facilities to local governments by sending technical work-men. If required Italian Mission will therefore stay on and you will be ready to take into consideration any offer and request which may be made to you.58

The message further instructed Micheli to expedite the transport of a commercial mission that the Georgian government wanted to send to Italy and expressed confidence that numerous economic pursuits could be developed to the mutual benefit of Italy and the Transcaucasian republics.59 K Ibid., 107336/11067/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/16245. See also British Documents, III, 452453 -

67 FO 371/3668, 127309/11067/58. See also British Documents, III, 45311; Petricioli, op. cit., pt. 2, p. 139. 58 FO 371/3662, 82940/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/17414. See also WO 33/974, no. 5000; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 13:2, 1919. 59 During a discussion of the Armenian problem by the peace conference on August 11, Foreign Minister Tittoni offered the following explanation: Italy at one time had thought of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper. Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral Koltchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the conditions demanded by the Georgians, Italy would have taken upon herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia. This, she could not do. In any case the area to be guarded was a large one; the Railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable length; some 40,000 men would

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Thus ended the Italian odyssey, which had spanned the spring and summer of 1919. The confusion, the contradictions, and disagreement among the Allies had been further aggravated by the episode, while the peoples of the Caucasus had to face the fact that the Italians would not come and the British would not stay. Under such circumstances the British could not withhold the Caspian flotilla from the Armed Forces of South Russia or compel Denikin to respect the demarcation line that had ex­ cluded the North Caucasus from his sphere of operation. The shift of that line southward to the frontiers of Georgia and Azerbaijan in August elicited saber-rattling demonstrations in Tiflis and Baku and more sober supplications for the British to remain a while longer. For Armenia, the ultimate decision of the British would be even more critical. External assistance was essential to relieve the country’s distress and to lay the basis for national renewal by repatriating Western Armenian refugees to their native provinces just beyond the frontier. While the statesmen were caught up in the Italian interlude, the issue of Armenian repatriation continued to embarrass the victorious Allied Powers. be required and, in addition shipping and supplies would have to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be available. The initial expense would be . . . 75 million lire and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore been given up. [See Paris Peace Conference, VII, 648-649].

3

The Mirage of Repatriation

News of the intended British withdrawal from Transcaucasia jolted the organizations engaged in relief and rehabilitation. Overland routes from the Black Sea to the Armenian refugee centers would be jeopardized and hopes for early repatriation dashed. The problems of relief and repatria­ tion were closely interrelated. Even the most outspoken advocates of purely philanthropic aid admitted that charity alone could at best merely sustain the homeless people on a day-to-day basis until a political settle­ ment cleared the way for reconstruction. Yet many Allied agencies were reluctant to demand anything more than humanitarian measures. This approach, embodied in the views of the British War Office and carefully planned by Herbert C. Hoover, Allied Director General of Relief, drove a wedge between relief and repatriative operations and perpetuated the emergency altruistic nature of Allied involvement with the exiled Armeni­ an population in 1919. The Problem For months after the Mudros Armistice, American relief workers and British control officers drew attention to the inability of Armenians to return to the eastern provinces and to the extreme hardships of those who remained in or ventured back to the districts in Asia Minor between Brusa and Sivas.1 Sir S. Arthur Gough-Calthorpe, the British high commis1 See, for example, Britain, FO 608/78, Files 342/1/5, 342/1/6, 342/1/9; FO 371/3657-3660, File 512/58 passim; US Archives, RG 256, 867B.00/26/32/46. See also FO 371/4172, File 1270/44; FO 371/4196, File 3349/44 passim. Aside from daily coverage in Armenian newspa­ pers, numerous feature and news articles on the subject appeared in English-language jour40

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sioner, and his assistant, Richard Webb, complained that the Ottoman authorities made no real effort to restore the goods and properties of the deported Christians and described the Armenian provinces as a “complete desert” where “the mixture of misery and disorder is unique even in the history of Turkey.”2 Hundreds of officials who had perpetrated the Ar­ menian massacres were still at their posts and, with rare exception, con­ tinued to incite Muslim inhabitants against the Christian survivors, most of them women and children. Their plight was frequently laid before the Allied high commissioners by the heads of the Armenian religious com­ munities, who begged that the remnants of the nation be spared further decimation. Calthorpe’s staff in particular rejected the Ottoman govern­ ment’s claim of helplessness and suggested that the restoration of the Armenians would proceed more rapidly if the Turks were forced to bear the costs of caring for the refugees.3 Upon learning that British troops were to be withdrawn from Transcaucasia, Calthorpe urged that some of them be transferred to Asia Minor to pacify the country and oversee the safe return of the dispersed Christians.4 The divergence between recommendations of this kind and the cabi­ net’s strategy of disengagement was quickly pointed out by the Eastern experts in the Foreign Office. George Kidston minuted one such dispatch: “The trouble is that all these schemes which are being pressed by our Representatives] abroad for repatriating refugees, restoring order & pro­ tecting imperilled Christians require an expenditure of men 8c money which we are not prepared to meet 8c are in direct conflict with the general policy of withdrawal from all Eastern countries which H.M.G. are undernais such as the London Times, Manchester Guardian, New York Times, and Christian Science Monitor. Typical of the many reports from relief-missionary personnel was that of Dr. Ernest C. Partridge, written from Sivas in June 1919: “Orders from Constantinople about the delivery of Armenian women from Turkish houses are being very laxly enforced and a great many women who are brought in here are not allowed any choice in the matter but are forced to say that they prefer to remain Moslems.” Warning of serious trouble, he continued: “The same bunch of men, with one or two exceptions, who have been running things for the past four years are in the saddle and are running things with a high hand. They have not been beaten in the war and they are independent and impudent. They are constantly stirred up by political reports and keep the Christian population in a tremor all the tim e.. . . What is the use of our gathering these orphans and saving people from starvation in order to have another massacre.” See FO 371/3659, 105792/512/58. 2 FO 608/82,342/6/2/6724; FO 371/4157, 521/521/44. See also FO 608/110, File 185/1/7; FO 371/4157, 18835/18850/25899/521/44. 3 FO 371/4157, 50520/64432/521/44; FO 608/111, File 385/1/12; FO 608/113, File 385/1/16. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 2/2, File 231/130, File 421/1, Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 19191.; FO 371/3657-3659, 31312/38733/41679/42786/107171/136038/512/58; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/59/129/141; RG 256, 867B.00/28/102/163/165. 4 FO 371/3667, 61966/11067/58. See also FO 608/83, 342/8/2/3283.

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stood to have adopted.”5And when Arthur Balfour forwarded from Paris an Armenian outline for gradual repatriation from Kars to Erzerum and from Erevan to Van, Kidston added, “But surely the submission of Boghos Nubar’s proposal by Mr. Balfour is in conflict with the Prime Minister’s policy of evacuating the Caucasus at the earliest possible moment.”6 The Foreign Office was not indifferent to Armenian suffering, as re­ vealed in hundreds of internal minutes. Departmental specialists noted their frustration with such observations as, “the luckless Armenians are sent from pillar to post.”7 Foreign Office sympathy for Armenian aspirations was overshadowed, however, by repeated warnings from the India Office and the War Office that ensnarement in the Anatolian maelstrom would have dire consequences. Refusing in May to sanction even the temporary deployment of British officers for repatriative purposes, Churchill’s ministry reiterated its position that “the pacification of Asia Minor and the repatriation of Armenians are tasks which, in the opinion of the Army Council, must bê left to the Mandatory Power in the area after peace has been concluded.”8 In the Caucasus, meanwhile, the Armenian government looked toward a time when repatriation would become more than an obsessive yearning. At the final session of the Khorhurd in June, Minister of Welfare Sahak Torosian presented a plan for worldwide repatriation, with the first phases entailing movement into the easternmost provinces of Anatolia from Persia, the Caucasus, the Black Sea coastal regions, and Russia. He recommended that a special department be created to organize responsi­ ble liaison committees in the Armenian communities abroad, conduct informational programs, gain the collaboration of wealthy compatriots, and set up, for each district to be reinhabited, administrative councils for agriculture, provisions, health, and reconstruction. The Western Armeni­ an refugees, Torosian cautioned, were pressing uncontrollably toward the borders, and action was essential to prevent regrettable repercussions. Everything was ready, and implementation could begin as soon as the Allies concurred.9 The newly seated Western Armenian deputies expressed dissatisfaction about the lack of a definite timetable. Armen Sassuni, Hmayak Manukian, and Armenak Maksapetian, demanding assurances that at least the border 5 FO 371/3657, 38707/512/58. 6 Ibid., 39367/512/58. 7 FO 371/3658, 64961/67894/512/58. 8 FO 371/3667, 70160/11067/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/9988. See also FO 371/3658, 44541/ 512/58; FO 608/79, 342/i/9/53° 29 Rep. of Arm. Archives, FUe 660/3, no. 110, Aug. 14, 1919; Hairenik, Sept. 6:1, 1919.

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districts of Alashkert, Basen, and Khnus would be resettled by the onset of winter, insisted that repatriation was inseparable from the goal of an independent united Armenia. Premier Khatisian attempted to calm the critics by explaining that preparations for the reoccupation of Kars, even with local British assistance and no insuperable obstacles, had taken three months and had drained the government. Resettlement of the Western Armenians would be far more difficult, since Turkish regiments were posted on the border and the Allied Powers had still not extended the needed support. Khatisian believed, nevertheless, that as a first step it would soon be possible to return 40,000 persons to the Alashkert valley. Then, after Simon Vratzian outlined the Dashnakist faction’s criticisms of the welfare ministry’s plan, the legislature resolved that repatriation must include political and military control in the Western Armenian provinces; that resources were sufficient to proceed into Bayazit, Basen, and Alash­ kert; that the government should facilitate the transfer into the Republic of endangered Armenians in Azerbaijan and refugees scattered through­ out the Caucasus and South Russia; that special agents should be dis­ patched to assist at refugee sites in Aleppo, Mosul, Bakuba, and Baghdad; and that a coordinating body for repatriation should be formed.10 In July the Department of Repatriation and Reconstruction was organized under the direction of Armenak Maksapetian, a native of Van. Pending final repatriation, the department rèsettled some of the refugees concentrated around Erevan in climatic zones and physical surroundings as similar as possible to those of their native districts.11 Arsen Kitur, another Western Armenian deputy, was sent to Baghdad to assist 20,000 refugees, mostly natives of the Van vilayet, and to urge the British authorities to repatriate them or at least transport them to Erevan to get them away from the alien, disease-ridden plains of Mesopotamia.12 The Ussher Plan Although the British War Office shunned all the repatriation schemes, it did ultimately yield to pressures to delay withdrawal from Transcaucasia. After inspecting conditions there in June, Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Pears, director of the British relief mission at Constantinople, wired the Allied Supreme Economic Council (SEC) that from a humanitarian point of view 10 Ibid. 11 Nor Ashkhatavor, July 31:3, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 22:1, 1919. 12 Hairenik, Sept. 19:2, Oct. 24:3, 1919. For British correspondence regarding Kitur’s mission, see FO 371/3659-3660,136350/141821/145209/152297/512/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/ 13804/17333.

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the evacuation would have a deplorable effect.13 When Herbert Hoover put the issue to the SEC, it urged the peace conference to ask Britain to postpone withdrawal until the end of August in order to ensure the delivery of relief supplies already consigned. On July 1 Sir William Goode, British representative on the SEC, announced that Lloyd George would comply with the appeal. Sir Maurice P. A. Hankey, secretary of the British delegation, also let it be known that Winston Churchill would reluctantly agree to a delay until August 15, by which time it was hoped Astrakhan would have fallen to the White Armies.14 With this turn of events, Armenophile agencies considered it all the more important that a repatriation plan be adopted before expiration of the British reprieve. In and around Novorossiisk alone more than 80,000 refugees were waiting to begin the homeward journey, and Batum was bursting with thousands of others who were unable to proceed even as far as Kars. With nearly every vessel bringing more destitute people to Batum, Military Governor W. J. N. Cooke-Collis had to halt disembarkations until adequate facilities for the care and repatriation of the refugees had been guaranteed.15In this crisis, the bold scheme of Clarence D. Ussher elicited much diplomatic correspondence during the spring and summer of 1919. An American medical missionary at Van since 1898, Dr. Ussher had witnessed the wartime Armenian tragedy and shared in the agony of the exiles.16Anguished by the misery being perpetuated by delays in the peace settlement, he devised a plan he hoped could be implemented within the existing political situation. With the consent of the Ottoman government, able-bodied male refugees would be returned to the eastern vilayets in time for the autumn sowing season. First to go would be farmers and technicians, furnished with seed and implements. Later the older orphans would be brought in to help with the harvest; not until sometime in 1920 would women and children follow. The operation would be administered by a three-man commission selected either by General Milne, if the British would assume the responsibility, or by the peace conference. The commissioners, stationed in the vilayet capitals of Van, Bitlis, and 13 FO 371/3662, 189177/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/13199. 14 FO 608/85, 347/^6/13238/13397. 15 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 5, 21, 22, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 1:3, 3i-3> 1919-

16 For an account of Ussher’s wartime experiences and the Armenian defense and evacua­ tion of Van, see Clarence D. Ussher, An American Physician in Turkey: A Narrative of Adventures in Peace and War (Boston and New York, 1917), pp. 213-314. See also Ussher’s papers and correspondence in the Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Houghton Library, Harvard University), New Series 2. For biographical information on Dr. and Mrs. Ussher, see New Series 6, Biographical Collection, 60/40.

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Erzerum, would, with the aid of mixed Muslim-Christian gendarmeries led by British or Allied officials, supervise subcommissions in each sanjak. The plan, Ussher insisted, was nonpolitical and, pending the decisions of the peace conference, the Christians would have only communal autonomy under Ottoman jurisdiction. Turkish officials and Kurdish chieftains could be prevailed upon to cooperate if they were promised a general amnesty for wartime excesses and if they were included in the local subcommissions. Moreover, Kurds and other Muslims who had fled westward during the war years would likewise be assisted in reclaiming their lands. Ussher argued that, if the large relief appropriations were shifted to this type of constructive labor, the tremendous refugee burden would soon be lightened and the threat of total pauperization averted. Armenian relief societies had sufficient funds for seed-grain, and other requisite expenditures could be met through advances from Allied nations to the account of the future government having jurisdiction over those provinces. Ussher was more optimistic than conditions warranted, but he counted on the Turkish desire to appear in a favorable light before the Supreme Council at Paris and on the willingness of the Armenians to subordinate the quest for immediate political control to the advantages of repatriation of thousands of refugees to the three eastern vilayets.17 Ussher’s associates on the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE) agreed that repatriation should be arranged irrespective of the final political settlement. In June, having seen at first hand the abject misery in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, James L. Barton, William W. Peet, and Walter G. Smith joined Ussher in presenting his plan to Ottoman officials in Constantinople. In interviews with Kurdish Senator Sheikh Abdul-Kadir and Interior Minister Ali Kemal Bey, Ussher stressed the positive worldwide reaction to acceptance of the program and tried to prove that the plan would neither compromise Turkish sovereignty nor mean the loss of territories to which the Armenians would return.18 But the Ottoman spokesmen were evasive, suggesting that Ussher take up the matter with Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, then en route to Paris to plead the Turkish case. Determined to continue his mission and, if possible, to gain the support of the peace conference, Ussher obtained letters of introduction from several Allied officials in the Ottoman capital. Rear Admiral Webb, the British assistant high commissioner, wrote his government, “One has to meet such people as Dr. Ussher to realise fully 17 RG 256, 867B.00/157; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/13450/14100. 18 RG256, 867B.48/29; RG 59, 860J.01/15; Walter George Smith, “Journal of a Journey to the Near East,” ed. Thomas A. Bryson, Armenian Review, XXIV (Autumn 1971), 76-77, entries for June 11-12, 1919.

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what the Turks have done and the Armenians have suffered.” Yet, despite the fact that he had often emphasized the need for swift repatriation, Webb cautioned that no move should be made until there were adequate provisions for enforcement, adding that, in his opinion, those very functions lay within the scope of the responsibilities assumed in Asia Minor by His Majesty’s Government.19 Ussher set out on June 15, accompanied by Walter George Smith, former president of the American Bar Association and a prominent Cath­ olic layman, who intended to defend the ACRNE against charges of gross incompetence advanced by Herbert Hoover and several officers of the American Relief Administration (ARA). Arriving in Paris a week later, the pair sought out Henry Morgenthau, then on assignment for the Interna­ tional Red Cross. As the American ambassador who had brought the massacres to public attention in 1915, a board member of the ACRNE, a political associate of Woodrow Wilson, and a close acquaintance of all five plenipotentiaries and many staff members of the United States delegation, Morgenthau could cut through the complex network of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Since coming to Paris in March he had been collaborating with Alexander Hemphill, Dr. John H. T. Main, Har­ old C. Jaquith, Charles R. Crane, and other representatives of relief, missionary, educational, and philanthropic organizations to win stronger humanitarian and political commitments to the Armenians.20 As soon as Ussher and Smith had joined the pro-Armenian lobby, Morgenthau arranged for interviews with American and British officials to whom the repatriation plan could be explained. In his résumé for the Ameri­ can commissioners on June 24, Near Eastern specialist William L. Westermann observed: “The project is based upon a sound knowledge of the present situation. It seems to obviate the grave danger incident upon military occupation by foreign troops. The number of officers required will not exceed 300.” Westermann recommended that Ussher be allowed to present his plan in person and that President Wilson be apprised of the general outlines before he sailed for home.21 That day and the next, the sponsors of the program met with commissioners Edward M. House, Robert F. Lansing, Tasker H. Bliss, and Henry White. Secretary of State Lansing, who normally followed a strictly legal approach to international 19 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/12677/16019. 20 Smith, op. cit.y pp. 77-78, June 15-16, 1919, and (Winter 1971), pp. 54, 56, June 22-23, 1919. See also Morgenthau Papers, Box 1, diary for June, 1919, and Box 5, Rickard to Morgenthau, June 19, 1919. After discussing the situation in the Caucasus with Hoover on June 3, Morgenthau wrote in his diary: “Hoover claims it is only district where he fell down—owing to his leaving it to others.” 21 RG 256, 867B.48/24. See also Smith, op. cit. (Winter 1971), pp. 56-58, June 24, 1919.

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affairs, was favorably impressed, even though he observed that many details still had to be worked out.22 Members of the British delegation listened sympathetically to Ussher and Smith but could make no commitment. Sir Louis Mallet and Eric Forbes Adam of the political department, while pointing to factors militat­ ing against the use of even a small number of British officers, admitted that the plan was reasonable and should come before the peace conference.23 Robert G. Vansittart, the most persistent advocate of Armenian rights among the technical staff, wrote in the delegation minutes: “The only solution is to get these people repatriated, and this sh[ould] be done before the British troops leave the Caucasus. There are obstacles of course, but it sh[ould] be clearly understood that the alternative is that there will be no Armenia because there will be no Armenians. If these people are not repatriated now it will be impossible to repatriate them before next year, and very few of the small remainder will survive another winter where they are.”24 Despite the excitement stirred in Paris by the Ussher plan, it failed to win the crucial support of Herbert Hoover. Aside from discerning politi­ cal implications in the project and distrusting private and missionarysponsored relief organizations, Hoover had heard the damaging protests and caveats of Acting Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American com­ missioner at Constantinople. Bristol denounced Ussher’s plan as a combi­ nation of the naïveté of missionaries and British manipulations to lure the United States into the bottomless Armenian pit. Repatriation against the will of the Muslim population would suggest that the Allies were sanction­ ing an operation not unlike the shocking Greek occupation of Smyrna. The Armenians were using the refugee issue for political rather than humanitarian ends, since repatriation would clearly enhance the probabil­ ity of a permanent award of the affected territories to so-called Armenia. The United States should recognize that the Anglo-Armenian plot would require a full-scale Allied military occupation of the region. On the other hand, repatriation initiated and administered by the Turkish authorities would yield much more satisfactory results.25 22 Smith, op. cit.y pp. 56-61, June 24-27, 1919. 23 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/14100. See also Smith, op. cit., p. 59, June 25, 1919. 24 FO 608/78, 342/1/1/13033. See also FO 608/79, 342/1/9/14100. 26 RG 59, 867B.00/155, 867B.48/23; Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Library of Congress, Divi­ sion of Manuscripts, Box 65, Armenia file, Bristol to Naval Advisor, June 25, 1919; Caucasus file, Bristol to Ammission, July 23,1919; Box 1, War Diary, Report for two weeks ending June 22, 1919; Box 31, Correspondence, Bristol to Admiral Knapp, May 20, June 25, 1919. See also Bristol to Smith, June 28, and to Admiral Benson, July 23, 1919; RG 59, 867.00/918; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/15073/15078; Bliss Papers, Box 253, File 876, Armenia, no. 12.

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Although circumstances precluded the Ussher program from being taken up by the Supreme Council, the flurry of related activities gave rise to belief that workable alternatives would be devised. That sentiment was not without foundation, for in July the issues of both relief and repatria­ tion were thrust upon the Heads of Delegations, successor to the Council of Four after the Treaty of Versailles was signed.26

The Morgenthau-Hoover Alternatives Distrustful of the Ottoman government in questions relating to protection and relief of the Armenians, Henry Morgenthau suggested that the Allies appoint a competent officer to stabilize conditions after the British with­ drawal. His candidate was Major General James G. Harbord, chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Force in France and a career officer with an outstanding administrative recocd in the Philippines and in Europe. After a preliminary discussion with Harbord, Morgenthau wrote him on June 25 that 750,000 Armenians were “practically marooned” in Trans­ caucasia. The ACRNE and the ARA were doing whatever possible to alleviate their hardship; President Wilson was alert to the problem; and Herbert Hoover was confident that the other Allied nations would confer on the selected American officer “such dictatorial powers as he may re­ quire to enable him to prevent the destruction of this vast number of people.” Should Congress fail to provide the necessary funding, the ACRNE would continue to allocate $1,500,000 each month. Certain that Armenian officials, too, would offer full support to the resident Allied commissioner, Morgenthau gave little heed to their amour propre: The Armenian Republic, which is a fully organized government, is steadily urging us to take hold of the matter and promise their hearty co-operation.. . . I believe that if we can secure a man of your calibre he would be, for all practical purposes, the dictator of this government, and that you would by this means place your own representatives either in direct charge of the various Armenian Govern­ ment Departments and Bureaus, or as co-ordinate heads, whichever, in your judgement, would accomplish the desired results. 26 Clemenceau was the only chief of state who continued to sit regularly on the reorganized council, serving, as before, as president of the peace conference. He was seconded by Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon. Great Britain was represented by Foreign Secretary A. J. Balfour until October and then by Sir Eyre Crowe; Italy, usually by Foreign Minister Tommaso Tittoni and sometimes by Silvio Crespi, Vittorio Scialoja, or Giacoma de Martino; Japan, by Baron Nobuaki Makino and Keishiro Matsui; and the United States, by Secretary of State Lansing until July 11, Henry White until July 28, and then Undersecretary of State Frank L. Polk until December 9.

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Harbord’s primary responsibility would be to protect and repatriate the Turkish Armenian refugees: “The burden of supporting these people, which now rests on the civilized world, can only be relieved by distributing these people with some relation to the possibilities of the land to furnish them a livelihood. Their homes have to a large extent been destroyed by their hostile neighbors and it practically means that new surroundings must be created for them; that they must be protected from their maraud­ ing neighbors and in this way helped to start life anew in their own country.” Still a firm advocate of an American mandate for Armenia, Morgenthau intimated that the organization built up by Harbord might well evolve into the administration of a mandatory regime.27 The next day Morgenthau proposed Harbord’s appointment to Presi­ dent Wilson, who replied that if he and Hoover could produce a working plan quickly it would be put to the Council of Four.28 Unhappy that the council’s belated attempts to reach a provisional Near Eastern settlement had been unsuccessful, the president hoped that some token of support might be shown the Armenians. But Hoover’s approach was far more calculating. His actions, when studied carefully, reveal that his seeming inconsistencies on the Armenian question were actually maneuvers, first, to bring all relief work under his supervision through an Allied commissioner for Armenia and, second, to separate from that post all political functions, including even repatriative measures. During the last week of June and the first week of July, he achieved those objectives a step at a time. By mid-1gig Hoover had little faith in the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, which he charged with “total lack of executive and business ability” and corruption that, if made public, would be “the great­ est scandal in American charitable history.” He complained that the Caucasus was the only region where his efforts had not produced impres­ sive results, because relief there had not been concentrated entirely in his hands. His own officials in the American Relief Administration had accused the ACRNE of allowing people to starve because of inefficiency rather than shortage of supplies: it transferred to Armenia less than half of the initial 7,000 tons earmarked for that country; it sold relief goods to the British military governor of Batum and to Georgian railway agents; it was tactless in excluding the Armenian government from distribution of the foodstuffs. Worst of all, graft and corruption riddled the organiza27 Papers of James G. Harbord, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts, Vol. I, pp. 57-58; Morgenthau Papers, Box 5, letter of June 25, 1919; RG 256, 184.021/28. See also Henry Morgenthau, All in a Life-Time (Garden City, N.Y., 1922), pp. 337-338. 28 Morgenthau, op. cit.f p. 338; Morgenthau Diary, June 26, 1919.

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tion from field soup kitchens up to district offices. While the situation had admittedly improved since Ernest Yarrow had replaced Dr. Main as direc­ tor of operations in Transcaucasia, the ARA officers recommended that all relief work in the region be separated from ACRNE headquarters in Constantinople. Another problem was that the ARA appropriation was scheduled to expire in the summer of 1919; new arrangements were necessary to prevent the primary responsibility for relief from reverting to the ACRNE.29 In Paris, Smith, Ussher, Morgenthau, and other ACRNE representa­ tives defended their organization by pointing to its lifesaving work when no other agency was helping the Armenians. They also argued that unfavorable reports had been grossly exaggerated and that early difficul­ ties in distribution and coordination had been overcome. Hoover was not convinced, but he considered Morgenthau’s proposal for an American commissioner temporarily representing the four major Allied Powers as being preferable to continued ACRNE dominance, though he disliked the plan’s political implications. In a discussion with Morgenthau, Smith, and American area specialists Westermann and William Buckler, Hoover questioned the repatriative functions of the resident commissioner and took issue with Westermann’s suggestion that the position be financed through a loan from Congress to the future government of Armenia, since such a measure might seem to commit the United States to accepting responsibility for that country. Westermann recorded in his diary: “Hoo­ ver is clear, hard and decisive. He hit the nail on the head, because this was exactly what I wanted to accomplish. My idea was that if we once got the U.S. in charge of Armenia we would have too much pride ever to let it go.”30 Only after Smith gave assurances that the ACRNE would bear the costs of the commissioner’s activities did Hoover consent to Harbord’s appointment, although, according to Morgenthau, he was not enthusiastic because “he fears the military and does not want to be over-ridden.”31 Smith, Westermann, and Morgenthau were disappointed in Hoover’s rigid capitalistic approach to American involvement in Armenia, which he saw as a poor deal with “nothing worthwhile there.” Westermann noted 29 Smith, op. cit.y pp. 54-56, Bryson’s notes 151, 154—156; Morgenthau Diary, June 3, 23, 1919; RG 256, 184.021/25/29, 867B.48/15/21; Papers of Henry White, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts, Box 43, Memorandum of White-Hoover discussion, June 5, 1919, and Hoover to White, July 7, enclosing report of Major Green, June 7, 1919. See also American Relief Administration, Bulletin, nos. 1-22 (1919); Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, I (New York, 1952), 386-387. 30 Westermann Diary, July 2, 1919, résumé of preceding week. See also Smith, op. cit., p. 60 n. 172. 31 Morgenthau Diary, June 27, 1919.

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with irritation that “unfortunately the whole thing is not a business matter, and the commercial standpoint is not applicable.”32 In the compromise letter that Hoover submitted to President Wilson on June 27, Morgenthau managed to incorporate the subject of repatriation: 1. We suggest that a single temporary resident Commissioner should be ap­ pointed to Armenia, who will have the full authority of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy in all their relations to the de facto Armenian Govern­ ment, as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia. His duties shall be so far as he may consider necessary to supervise and advise upon various governmental matters in the whole of Russian and Turkish Armenia, and to control relief and repatriation questions pending the determination of the political destiny of this area. 2. In case the various Governments should agree to this plan, immediate notifica­ tion should be made to the de facto Governments o f Turkey and of Armenia of his appointment and authority. Furthermore, he will be appointed to represent the American Relief Administration and the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and take entire charge of all their activities in Russian and Turkish Armenia.

Should General Harbord, who was regarded as an excellent choice, be unable to accept the position, Hoover asked Wilson to “leave it to us to select the man in conjunction with General Pershing.”33 At that point Hoover was apparently willing to submerge his reservations about Harbord and the question of repatriation in return for bringing the entire relief administration under his control. In its final session, immediately after the peace treaty with Germany was signed on June 28, the Council of Four accepted the Hoover-Morgenthau proposal, leaving the details to be worked out by the body that was to prepare the remaining peace treaties.34*Still unaware of that decision, Morgenthau, Harbord, and General Pershing, chief of the American Expeditionary Force, discussed the Armenian problem that same day. Harbord, though anticipating his prospective assignment, had four major reservations. Believing that a show of force would be needed to repatriate people who had been dispossessed by force, he listed, in his formal reply to Morgenthau’s June 25 letter, the following requirements: (1) a 32 Westermann Diary, June 27, 1919. 33 RG 256, 184.021/33; Paris Peace Conference, VI, 743-744; Morgenthau Papers, Box 6, Hoover to Wilson, June 27, 1919; Morgenthau, Life-Timef pp. 338-339. 34 RG 256, 180.03401/97, 181.94/1/23, 185.5136/37; Paris Peace Conference, VI, 741, 756. It was initially decided that the Council of Ten should “concert the necessary administrative steps to give effect to this decision,” but in fact the obligation fell to the Council of Heads of Delegations (Council of Five), principal body of the peace conference from July 1, 1919, to January 10, 1920.

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reasonable number of officers and civilian specialists for collaboration with Armenian ministries; (2) sufficient funding; (3) enough troops to protect the repatriated Armenians; and (4) definite assurances as to the authority of the resident commissioner. He foresaw no problem about staff and funding, but the last two requirements were crucial. No military man, he explained, would feel confident without troops of his own nation; the size of the force was a military matter and should not be determined by political expediency. The question of authority was the most critical: “Dictatorial powers in peace are very different from those Mr. Hoover, for example, had been able to exercise in war, but he could no doubt testify as to the difficulty of getting unanimity of action from four governments. I have witnessed much in two years in Europe to make me skeptical as to the stability of allied agreements.. . . No American undertaking to be the Allied Resident in the Trans-Caucasus can be sure of more power than is derived from the backing of his own government.” Harbord therefore concluded, “I should be proud to undertake such a duty as this under our own country alone, but under the conditions as I understand your letter to state them I think success impossible.”35 Harbord had put the issues clearly, yet he had indicated his receptivity to counterproposals and stronger guarantees. That his interest had been genuinely aroused was evident in further meetings with Morgenthau and in his instructions to a staff officer to prepare a list of noncareer military and civilian personnel willing to work in the Near East. Nevertheless, Hoover insisted that Harbord had declined the assignment and that he could therefore choose a candidate of his own. When Morgenthau tried to explain that Harbord’s reservations were based on his concern for the success of the project, Hoover let it be known that he was “not for pressing the matter with him.”36 On June 30 Hoover carefully introduced into the discussions the wis­ dom of separating the functions of relief and repatriation. Action to coordinate relief and to safeguard the Batum-Erevan railway was needed before the problem of repatriation could be tackled. Hoover recom­ mended Colonel William N. Haskell, ARA director in Rumania, as the ideal person to carry out this specific operation. Through Morgenthau he told the Armenophile agencies that a precipitous scheme for repatriation would condemn the Armenians to still greater suffering by dispersing them over broad expanses dominated by hostile Muslim bands, where it would be more difficult to get supplies to them. The refugees should 36 Harbord Papers, I, 59-60; RG 256, 184.021/28; Morgenthau Diary, June 28, 1919. Morgenthau termed Harbord’s letter a “masterpiece.” 36 Morgenthau Papers, Box 6, Lewis Strauss to Morgenthau, June 29, 1919

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remain in a limited accessible region until a final political settlement was reached. Meanwhile, the question of repatriation could be studied more methodically.37 In his memoranda to and appearances before the American commis­ sioners in Paris, Hoover emphasized the negative aspects of becoming involved with the Armenians except in a humanitarian way. On July 1 he warned Lansing, White, and Bliss that Armenia was the “poorhouse of Europe,” that the Armenians were inferior fighters and would be unable to defend themselves for several generations, and that from 50,000 to 100,000 foreign troops would be needed to repatriate them. If the United States was saddled with that desolate region, an annual drain of at least 100 million dollars could be anticipated. Since Great Britain was to inherit the immense wealth of Mesopotamia, Armenia should be forced upon her in a package deal, for undoubtedly “the British would rather bear the burden of Armenia than run the risk of losing Mesopotamia.”38 The following day Hoover added that in his opinion an investigation by Harbord would be tantamount to “an involuntary piece of propaganda, looking toward the acceptance by the United States of a mandate over that country.”39 Hoover’s next move was to advise that “a single competent official” responsible for coordinating relief efforts would be better than the proposed resident commissioner with a large staff. The ACRNE could turn over its Armenian funds to the new official, who would become a virtual dictator and develop an effective administration.40 At the same meeting the commissioners also considered a petition ad­ dressed to President Wilson by eight of America’s most distinguished citizens: former presidential candidate Charles Evans Hughes, former Secretary of State Elihu Root, Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and John Sharp Williams, former ambassadors James W. Gerard and Frederic Courtland Penfield, Governor Alfred E. Smith, and Professor Charles W. Eliot. The message had strong political overtones: We believe without regard to party or creed the American people are deeply interested in the welfare o f the Armenian people and expect to see the restoration of the Independence of Armenia. When the unspeakable Turks were perpetrating their diabolical crimes upon men, women and children of Armenia, American hearts were stirred with impotent horror but with the triumph of right over 37 Morgenthau Diary, June 30, July 2, 1919. 38 RG 256, 185.5136/39; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 261. As early as June 3 Hoover told Morgenthau that it would be “foolish” to take a mandate for the Armenians, the “least promising people—and land.” See Morgenthau Diary, June 3, 1919. 39 Paris Peace Conference, XI, 264; RG 256, 184.021/36, 867B.5018/4. 40 Ibid.

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primitive barbarity we had hoped that the Peace Conference would make it one of its first duties to take necessary steps to put a stop to the agony of Armenia and recognize her fidelity and service to our cause. We now believe that prevailing insecurity o f life and intense want in the major portion of Armenia make immedi­ ate action imperative and sacred duty. We therefore respectfully urge that as a first step in that direction and without waiting for the conclusion of Peace either the Allies or America or both should at once send to Caucasus Armenia requisite food, munitions and supplies for fifty thousand men and such other help as they may require to enable the Armenians to occupy the non-occupied parts of Armenia within the boundaries defined in the memorandum o f the delegation o f integral Armenia. We trust that it may be possible to secure prompt and full justice for Armenia.41

When the petition reached the Paris commissioners, Lansing and White asked Hoover to prepare an answer in consultation with Morgenthau and Buckler. Morgenthau’s diary entry of July 1 reads: “Hoover is determined to block Harbord and also to prevent our taking mandate. He tried to put into my mouth that I favored his views, but I declined to do so.”42 Hoover’s memorandum to the July 2 meeting of the commissioners suggested that any reply to the bipartisan petition should stipulate “that no action should be taken by the United States in Armenia without a complete and very thorough investigation of the geographical boundaries which would be given to this country because of the tremendous economic importance of these boundaries.”43 Instructed to confer again with Morgenthau and Buckler, Hoover met twice that afternoon with Morgenthau, reaffirming his opposition to an American mandate and to the appointment of a regular army officer as administrator in the Caucasus. He complained that Harbord “wanted impossible conditions and was too big.” Morgenthau described Hoover as being a “jealous power seeker” who preferred a lesser man such as Haskell to Harbord, a strong organizer and thus a potential rival, but he could not ignore the fact that Hoover held the ear of the commissioners. An experienced politician, Morgenthau therefore had to be content to make a few changes in Hoover’s memorandum.44 The final draft, dispatched to Hughes and his colleagues on July 3, outlined the measures already initiated to relieve Armenian suffering and the view of all military experts that the Armenians could not expel the Turks even if furnished with arms and munitions. Some 60,000 foreign 41 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 19/9, II (Washington, 1934), 824; RG 256,184.021/34/35/86, 867B.00/154; RG59, 860J.01/12; House Papers, 30/30. 42 Morgenthau Diary, July 1, 1919; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 264. 43 RG 256, 184.00101/101, 185.5136/40. 44 Morgenthau Diary, July 2, 1919. See also the draft reply prepared by Buckler in RG 256, 867B.48/43.

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troops would be needed to repatriate the Armenians and to police the region for years at a cost of no less than 300 million dollars. “This would have to be looked upon largely as a sheer effort to ease humanity. Who­ ever undertakes it will be exposed to constant political difficulties with the surrounding states on account of the mixed populations and the racial antagonisms that go back over centuries. In [any] event exhaustive investi­ gation should be undertaken by impartial experts on the ground as to the problems involved and measures to be taken before more than support of refugees is undertaken.” Morgenthau refused to subscribe to a para­ graph added by Hoover which repeated the argument that “whatever state is assigned the mandate for Mesopotamia should at the same time take up the burden of Armenia.”45 Meeting with Harbord and Pershing on July 3, Morgenthau learned that the American delegation had approved Hoover’s recommendation to have Haskell serve as Allied high commissioner in Armenia. Since the question of an American mandate would soon become urgent, Harbord suggested that he at least be sent to study the military situation in Armenia. Morgenthau presented the suggestion to Bliss and White that afternoon, and Hoover drafted a related recommendation to be dispatched to Presi­ dent Wilson.46 Triumphant in the selection of Haskell, Hoover no longer opposed a mission of inquiry headed by Harbord. At the same time he sought to mollify pro-Armenian elements in Paris by promising that, if the ACRNE paid Haskell’s salary and allowed the high commissioner to coordinate ACRNE operations in Transcaucasia, he would use funds he had on hand to purchase additional supplies for Armenia. Since it would be difficult to sustain long-range private charity, Morgenthau and Smith accepted the accomplished fact and wired Charles Vickrey and Cleveland H. Dodge at ACRNE headquarters in New York to secure the approval of the Executive Board.47 The success of Hoover’s strategy was reflected in the formal resolution adopted by the Allied Heads of Delegations on July 5: “Colonel W. N. Haskell, U.S.A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner 46 Foreign Relations, 19/9, II, 825-826; RG 256, 184.021/34/35 ends.; White Papers, Box 46, Armenia file, July 3, 1919; Morgenthau, Life-Time, pp. 340-341. In relaying the message to Hughes on July 12, the State Department added that Hoover and Morgenthau had conferred with Harbord and come to the conclusion that the responsibilities for relief and repatriation should be separated. See RG 59, 860J.01/13. 46 RG 256, 181.94/4, 184.021/34/35 ends.; Morgenthau Diary, July 3, 1919; Smith, op. cit., pp. 63-64, July 3, 1919; Morgenthau, Life-Time, pp. 342-343. 47 Morgenthau Papers, Box 5, Hempell and Morgenthau to Barton and Peet, June 23, and reply of June 25, 1919; Box 6, Morgenthau to Hoover, July 5, and to Vickrey, July 8, 1919; Morgenthau Diary, July 10, 1919. Hoover gives the impression in his memoirs that it was his idea that Harbord should conduct the investigation. See Hoover, op. cit., p. 455.

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in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coinci­ dentally appointed to take full charge of relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organizations operating there.”48 The questions of repatriation, support of the Armenian government, and jurisdiction in both Russian and Turkish Armenia had all been eliminated from the initial Hoover-Morgenthau compromise recommendations to President Wilson on June 27. Moreover, Harbord had been dropped in favor of Haskell, a loyal member of Hoover’s organization, and all relief operations in the Caucasus were to be channeled through the office of the high commissioner. The danger of potential political complications had thus been reduced significantly. That same day the American Commission to Negotiate Peace relayed to President Wilson the Hoover-Morgenthau recommendation to dissoci­ ate repatriation from relief. Explaining that Haskell’s appointment would strengthen relief efforts without necessitating the “expulsion of present trespassers and permanent pacification of territory,” the message con­ tinued: The broader question of repatriation, etc., requires an examination as to the measures and force necessary to successfully cope with the problems and will require Congressional action to provide sufficient funds and forces. We therefore recommend that a Mission should immediately be sent to Armenia headed by General Harbord who should choose his own assistants to investigate this question together with the general political and economic problems involved in setting up the new State of Armenia. Such investigation as a basis of determination o f policy is, in our minds, necessary before even the repatriation of refugees can be begun. We believe General Harbord could be persuaded to undertake such a Mission.49

With these related actions focusing attention upon the needs of the Armenian people, the concerted campaign in Paris eased for a time. Ussher returned to the Caucasus, Morgenthau set out on a new assign­ ment in Poland, and Smith, after his grueling inspection of refugee camps and his wearisome dealings with Herbert Hoover, began a holiday in the countryside. Having achieved his primary objective, Hoover showed little further interest in the proposed Harbord mission. Indeed, his description of Armenia as the poorhouse of Europe would be borne out in any impartial study. The intricate mosaic of events did not augur well for the Armenians. Colonel Haskell, who was notified of his appointment on July 48 RG 256, 181.94/6/8/9/1 oa ; Foreign Relations, 19/9, II, 827; Paris Peace Conference, VII, 28; FO 371/3671, 99787/98451/58. 49 RG 59, 860J.01/14; RG 256, 184.021/34/35 ends.; Foreign Relations, 19/9, II, 826-827.

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9, had neither the administrative capacity nor the strength of character to cope with the complexities in Transcaucasia.60 His tendency to impetuosity, haughtiness, and occasional panic would in the following months present a sharp contrast to Harbord’s firmness. But, as it happened, Harbord’s role developed into merely reporting on the responsibilities of forming a viable Armenian state under American mandate, rather than coordinating Armenian relief and repatriation and giving evenhanded, albeit not always pleasing, counsel to Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Turks alike. The Finishing Touches With Haskell’s appointment and Harbord’s projected mission, the peace conference could have tabled the issue of repatriation, but a feeling of uneasiness persisted. The British Foreign Office, which had not been consulted about the selection of a high commissioner, expressed amaze­ ment at the ambiguities in the appointive resolution, particularly about the jurisdictional bounds, and questioned Haskell’s qualifications. Still, since His Majesty’s Government had not taken an active role in Armenian matters, British military and diplomatic officials in the Near East were instructed to cooperate with Haskell in his relief and peacekeeping efforts.61Armenian tribulations did not, of course, lessen with the naming of a high commissioner. British advisers in Paris drew attention to the fact that Hoover’s program included no machinery for repatriation and that, if the British command in the Caucasus was to assist in returning refugees to their homes, action would have to be initiated quickly. Robert Vansittart wrote: “Repatriation is somewhat outside our sphere but unless it is properly taken in hand there will be no Armenians left and our policy in regard to Armenia will fall to the ground.” On another dispatch he noted that “the Armenians are everywhere dying at such a rate that there will soon be none left for the future Armenia” and that “we should emphasize 60 RG 256, 181.94/10. Haskell was born in Albany, New York, in 1878 and before the world war served in Mexico, Cuba, and the Philippines. During the war he served in France with the rank of captain before being named director of the American Relief Mission in Rumania. See also RG 59, 860J.01/16. 51 See especially FO 371/3671, File 98451/58; FO 608/82, File 342/1/14. Admiral Bristol, too, was displeased with the appointment but for other reasons. On July 23 he cabled the American delegation: “The very ready acquiescence of Allies in appointment of American commissioner to Russian Caucasus and adoption of scheme for repatriation Turkish Armenian refugees is great cause for careful thought regarding ulterior motives, therefore I urge and beseech that facts as they now exist on the spot be considered especially in order to prevent the United States being drawn in so deeply that we become involved beyond point of independent action.“ See Bristol Papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Stanav to Ammission, July 23, 1919.

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necessity for economising the remaining lives in all possible means.” Vansittart pointed out to William Buckler that even if Harbord departed immediately he could not report for several weeks, whereas Armenian survival depended on repatriation before the autumn sowing season. He suggested that Brigadier General W. M. Beach, chief of British intelligence in the Caucasus, be consulted about the feasibility of using British officers to attempt repatriation into the nearer border regions. Yet to his own delegation Vansittart admitted the delicacy of the proposal: “A weak spot in the plan is the gamble on our officers being able to carry on till the Americans come. If however America declined a mandate, they should never come; our officers and men would have to be withdrawn and the Armenians would be left defenceless in a hostile country so that their last state would be worse than the first. This is a risk that must be run. They will die anyhow if there is no immediate move.”62 On July 5 William Buckler, reminding the American commissioners that the assignments of Haskell and «Harbord did not cover all aspects of the Armenian crisis, echoed Vansittart’s suggestion about using British officers. The repatriation of at least a few thousand refugees before September would enable them to plant their crops and thus reduce starva­ tion the following year.53 Two days later Lansing took up the matter with the Heads of Delegations, suggesting that General Milne be consulted about means “to bring exiled Armenian agriculturalists back to the country, and to dispossess the Turkish usurpers of their land.” Balfour held out little hope of British involvement but did not oppose forwarding the request. “It was then agreed that the British Government should consult General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating immediately a certain number of Armenian refugees, and as to the possibility of ensuring their protection by British forces until Armenia received a mandatory. In the meantime their food would be supplied as at present by the American Relief Organisation.”64 While the political section of the British delegation kept the question alive, the military section cautioned that the existing armed forces in the Caucasus were barely sufficient to carry out the most essential duties. A military adviser wrote: “The Armenians as a race possess a great homing instinct, and if, as is feasible, a small number, such as 20,000, were repa­ triated now to this area, it is more than probable that large numbers of Turkish Armenians, of whom there are 300,000 now in the Caucasus, would consider repatriation on the general scale had begun and wander 62 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/13804/14100. 53 Paris Peace Conference, VII, 43-44, XI, 270; RG 256, 867B.5018/6, 181.94/7. 54 Paris Peace Conference, VII, 40-41; RG 256, 867B.48/27; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/14743.

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over the border on their own account, the movement would get out of control and thousands would perish during the coming winter.” Without a comprehensive program, the Armenians would undoubtedly again fall prey to the Kurds and Turks. Hence the proposal for partial repatriation was “too previous” and would be foredoomed even if General Milne were to advise in its favor. The memorandum was termed a “very reasonable appreciation of the situation” by Director of Military Intelligence Sir Wil­ liam Thwaites, particularly as Chief of Staff Wilson had stated emphatical­ ly that no British troops were available to aid in repatriation.56 The War Office, having made no secret of its opposition to the proposal, relayed the request of the peace conference to General Milne on July 12 and asked if repatriation of some refugees to the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum before the end of August was practical and if the Armenians had enough seed and supplies to justify the urgency. Milne replied nine days later that because of the Greek occupation of Smyrna the return of the Armenians could be accomplished only with the cooperation of the Turkish government or with the protection of a strong military force. No troops from his command were available for an operation of that nature. Before repatriation could be undertaken, Turkish armed forces would have to be made to withdraw from the eastern vilayets, an Allied-officered gendarmerie formed, a commission appointed to determine what lands belonged to the Armenians and what was to happen to the Turks who were to be evicted, and a workable system of relief developed. Halfhearted measures, Milne warned, would court disaster, as would any plans that involved British joint action with the other Allies: “It should be all or nothing.” Armenian appeals for repatriation, undoubtedly colored by political motives, were being supported by naive optimists like Dr. Ussher, “who has no idea of practical difficulties in carrying out the views he advocates and who frankly states he wishes the British and not his own people would undertake the task.”56 General Milne’s appraisal of the military difficulties was confirmed independently by Brigadier General G. Tom Bridges, who, after consult66 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/14768. General Thwaites had already advised on July 5 that “we cannot embark on an enterprise of this nature.” FO 608/79, 342/1/9/14410. Then on July 10, he wrote that Chief of Staff Wilson “wished me to say that there are no troops available to assist in repatriation either from the Caucasus or any where else and that he cannot find any British Officers for this purpose.” On that dispatch Vansittart admitted that repatriation “looks hopeless for this autumn.” He concluded woefully: “But as I have often pointed about, a great number of the remaining 650,000 Armenians will die if left where they are for another winter. And we are then committed to a policy of making Armenia without Armenians!” FO 608/79, 342/1/9/14768. 66 FO 608/79, 342/1/1/16689; FO 371/3662, 112726/1015/58; WO 33/974, no. 923. See also FO 371/3671, 101937/98451/58; FO 608/83, 342/8/3/16781.

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ing with British, Armenian, and French authorities in the Caucasus, re­ ported on July 26 that at least 15,000 troops would be needed to lead the refugees back to the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond. Colonel P. A. Chardigny of the French mission had shown that twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, three batteries of mountain artillery, one battery of field artillery, a squadron of airplanes, and a number of armored cars and tanks would be required. “All on the spot are agreed that to repatriate the 400,000 available Armenians into Turk­ ish Armenia before the country has been properly policed in this fashion, is to deliver them into the hands of the enemy and to invite massacre.”57 Its own position thus reinforced, the War Office on August 5 notified the Foreign Office of Milne’s reply and added the following advice: The Army Council regret that they are unable to do more towards the repatria­ tion of Armenians than is being done at present. At the same time in view of the moral responsibility which will unavoidably be attached to His Majesty’s Govern­ ment should further atrocities be perpetrated against the Armenians as soon as it is realized (a) That British troops will in fact be withdrawn and (b) That the recently appointed American Commissioner for Armenia will have no power with which to support this policy, they feel it their duty to point out that, in their opinion, the present Allied policy of forwarding Greek aspirations in Anatolia is increasing the danger that that situation will get still further out of control.58

In closing the question, the War Office had directed a sharp barb at the pronounced Grecophile policies of Lloyd George and Balfour. In this way, the issue of Armenian repatriation was allowed to recede in the chambers of the Allied Powers. Not willing to press the matter further, the Foreign Office tried to convince itself that everything possible had been done for the Armenians. A junior clerk wrote more frankly that the problems of relief and repatriation “have happily been taken out of our hands and put into those of Colonel Haskell.”59 Upon receipt in Paris of Milne’s assessment, Robert Vansittart added a postscript in which rationalization and despair were scarcely distinguishable: That is the situation. This reply is what I had expected, though I felt the enquiry sh[oul]d be made so as to make sure that no stone had been left unturned. The Armenians, left where they are, will die off this winter even if they aren’t killed off. 67 FO 371/3662,115218/1015/58; FO 608/84,347/1/2/18055. See also Bliss Papers, Box 256, File 895, Asia Minor, no. 5; Papers of Frank L. Polk, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale Univer­ sity, Drawer 78/56. 88 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/17922; FO 371/3662, 112726/1015/58 end. 69 FO 371/3662, 112726/1015/58.

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6l

The American delay makes any other policy impossible meanwhile. This w[oul]d be more serious if there were any other policy in reserve. But there isn’t. Our withdrawal means that we can’t take on such a job. We sh[oul]d need in Armenia six times the troops we are withdrawing from the Caucasus. It is beginning to look sadly as if the creation of Armenia will cease to be practicable within measurable time.60

All parties concerned realized that rehabilitation of the Armenian people would necessitate substantial economic and military commitments. What lay at the root of the problem was not the lack of logic in the numerous appeals from Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, but rather the Allied design to alter radically the political structure of the Near East without having to use force. Neither the appointment of a high commis­ sioner for Armenia nor the dispatch of missions of inquiry was an effective substitute for military protection. And, as it happened, the pedantics of international diplomacy gave way to the realities of daily events. Before Haskell or Harbord arrived in Armenia, the plans for repatriation had become academic, for widespread Muslim uprisings threatened the ex­ istence of even the Caucasian Armenian republic. However vital the ques­ tions of relief and repatriation, they were overshadowed by the crisis of immediate survival in the summer of 1919. 60 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/16689.

4

A Summer of Insurgency

Throughout the weeks of diplomatic exchanges concerning the abortive Italian expedition and Armenian repatriation, the British command was under orders to concentrate the 27th Division along the Baku—Batum railway in preparation for withdrawal. By mid-June the Gurkha and Raj­ put battalions which had helped install Armenian governors at Kars and Nakhichevan had been recalled, leaving only military representatives at Kars, Ardahan, Akhalkalak, Erevan, and Nakhichevan. Although the British did not start the evacuation from Azerbaijan and Georgia until August, they denied Premier Khatisian’s requests for the return of a few companies to provide temporary support for the new administrations at Kars and Nakhichevan.

The Issue The termination of the brief British military presence in Armenia in­ creased the vulnerability of the Erevan government. Although repatria­ tion of the Russian Armenian refugees continued, the shaky extension of Armenian jurisdiction into Kars and Nakhichevan created a troublesome military situation. The small army, worn out and lacking adequate sup­ plies and weapons, was stretched to a perimeter of more than 300 miles; the government had to rely on scattered garrisons to safeguard communi­ cation and transportation routes, aid repatriates, and uphold Armenian rule. Only 400 troops could be spared, for example, to protect Kaghisman, the strategic town that dominated the upper Araxes and the main KarsErevan road. As Khatisian and his cabinet realized, a coordinated Muslim insurrection could isolate almost every outpost in the recently annexed territories. 62

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63

Unlike the Armenians, the Muslims had stayed rooted in their villages during the Ottoman invasion of Transcaucasia and preserved a quasi feudal social structure under a landed military aristocracy. Kurdish chief­ tains Hasan Bey and Omar Agha held the hill country around Kaghisman, Ayy|ub Pasha led the proud warriors of Barduz, Jafar Bey ruled in western Olti, Shamil Bek Airumlinskii controlled the heights overlooking Kulp, and the Shahtaghtinskii and Khan Nakhichevanskii clans prevailed in Tatar (Turco-Azeri) districts of the lower Araxes valley. Ottoman ar­ mies, when forced to evacuate the region in the winter of 1918-1919, furnished the tribesmen with arms and ammunition and left some officers behind as instructors and artillerymen. Yet, even though most Muslim notables had been attracted to Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic ideologies, par­ ticularism and traditional clan vendettas persisted, and joint action against the Armenian regime was hindered by racial and sectarian differences between the predominantly Sunni Kurds and the Shi a Azeris. The Ar­ menian government attempted to gain Muslim allegiance through influ­ ential collaborators: Iso Bek counseled nonresistance in eastern Olti in return for local autonomy, and Colonel Kadimov brought southern Ardahan into submission. Other Muslim-populated districts seemed resigned to Armenian jurisdiction after the impressive British-coordinated military operations in April and May. But abandonment of the Armenians by the imperial contingents gave heart to Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts to reverse the recent setbacks in Kars and Sharur-Nakhichevan. The movement of Armenian soldiers and refugees toward the prewar frontiers alarmed the Muslim inhabitants and muhajirs (immigrants) in the eastern vilayets. Rumors of an impending Armenian invasion added to the apprehensions of both the civilian and military population. During the formative period of the Turkish Nationalist movement, General Kiazim Karabekir used a combination of propaganda and intimidation to calm the people and decrease desertions in the XV Army Corps. He sent emissaries to Barduz, Olti, Sharur, and Nakhichevan to encourage Muslims to resist and in midyear initiated an intensive telegraphic campaign to discredit Armenian rule in districts that had come under control of the Erevan government.1 Throughout 1919 the Republic of Azerbaijan proclaimed its rights to the entire province of Kars and much of Erevan. Although tacitly ac­ knowledging the obstacles to winning Kars, the Baku government proposed that, pending a settlement by the Paris Peace Conference, all 1 See Kâzim Karabekir, IstikU UH arbim iz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 66-100, 307-318, 359-360 passim.

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non-Allied military forces be excluded and that an administration reflect­ ing the will of the majority supplant that of the “bloodthirsty Armenian bandits.” No such concession could be made, however, regarding the southern half of the Erevan guberniia, a crucial link between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman Empire. Nasib Bek Usubbekov’s cabinet denounced the Armenian policy of sword and fire in the Turco-Azeri districts and accused the partisans of Van and Sassun of shedding the blood of innocent victims and leaving thousands of widows and orphans. Only when Azer­ baijan ruled in Karabagh, Zangezur, Ordubad, Julfa, Nakhichevan, Sharur, Surmalu, and Vedibasar could relations with Armenia be norm­ alized.2 Hoping, like the Turkish resistance leaders, to achieve their aims without open warfare, the Azerbaijani authorities filtered agents and funds into the disputed districts. That strategy had helped block Armenian rule in Nakhichevan until May 1919, when British intervention and the establishment of Gevorg Varshamian’s administration provoked the new crisis. Khan Tekinskii, the Azerbaijani minister plenipotentiary in Armenia, worked fervently on behalf of the Muslims of the Erevan guberniia. Al­ though failing to forestall the extension of Armenian authority to Nakhi­ chevan, he was soon encouraged by the withdrawal of the Rajput battalion, the last of the British troops. On June 4 he advised his government that the best way to avert a combined attack upon Azerbaijan by the Russian Volunteer and Armenian armies was to create a strong diversion in Sharur and Nakhichevan. A week later he reported that the 6,000 Muslim irregu­ lars could increase to 10,000 in a general mobilization. With their excellent cavalry and effective artillery, the partisans could, with sufficient moral and financial support, expel the Armenians and even strike at the Armeni­ an strongholds in Zangezur. In subsequent messages Khan Tekinskii, complaining that the Armenians had begun search and requisition oper­ ations in the occupied districts and that the Muslim forces were disbanding for lack of funds, urged the Azerbaijani government to initiate military maneuvers along the Armenian frontiers, provide money to sustain resis­ tance, and authorize him to induce Simko, the powerful Kurdish chieftain in the Maku khanate, to join in the struggle.3 2 For memoranda including the Azerbaijani territorial claims, see US Archives, RG 256, 184.01602/23,861.00K/93/106; [Republic of Azerbaijan], Revendications de la Délégation de Paix de la République de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase présentées à la Conférence de la Paix à Paris, 1919 ([Paris, 1919]). 3 [Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Gaghtni pastatghtere: Adrbedjani dayadrakangordsuneutiunits mi edj (Erevan, 1920), pp. 27—28,30-32, Tekinskii’s nos. 130,150, 184, 202,420; France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; RG 59, 861.00/6583; Britain, FO 371/3659, 134563/512/58 ends.

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The Muslim Council of Nakhichevan, meanwhile, protested to Allied authorities and the Paris Peace Conference against the introduction of “the despotic Armenian regime.” The cunning Armenians, donning “European attire,” were scheming to vilify the Muslims and even foment rebellion to lend credence to their accusations. Incapable of ruling them­ selves, they could not govern a people alien in race and religion. The Armenians, as well-read “students of Abdul-Hamid,” justified their op­ pression by evoking the bogey of Pan-Islamic agitation and tried to set one segment of the population against the other. The peaceful inhabitants of Nakhichevan therefore begged to be freed from Armenian mastery and placed for the time being under any Muslim government not inimical to the Allied Powers.45 Some Muslim leaders in Nakhichevan, aware of the political tactlessness of seeking union with Turkey and realizing the geographic obstacles to outright annexation by Azerbaijan, regarded provisional Persian jurisdic­ tion as the best alternative. When petitions to that end were relayed to Tabriz and Tehran, British commissioner Sir Percy Z. Cox advised Lon­ don that the trouble in the Araxes valley could have an unsettling effect on the comprehensive British plans for Persia.6 General Milne, who had received numerous protests from Muslim councils in the Erevan guberniia, from Kiazim Karabekir, and from Azerbaijani officials, instructed 27th Division commander General G. N. Cory to bring pressure “to bear on the Erivan Govt, to cease these provocative acts.”6 Yet upon investigation, both the military representative at Nakhichevan, Lieutenant (acting Captain) F. L. Schwind, and the Transcaucasian office of military intelligence reported that there had been no massacres. While the Armenian program to disarm the population had been suspended at the insistence of the British military representative, the Tatars continued to receive arms and supplies via Maku. And the Turks, intent for political reasons on showing the Armenians to be poor administrators, magnified incidents occurring on Armenian territory in inflammatory accounts, embellished by General Karabekir, to the Ottoman Ministry of War and British civil and military authorities.7 In a summary of various communiqués, the intelligence section of Milne’s Army of the Black Sea concluded that much of the mounting tension was caused by “the 4 FO 371/3670, 133265/72426/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/12/19766; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a/ 3, no. 83, July 13, 1919. 5 See, for example, RG 59, 763.72119/5429/5536/5590; FO 371/3670, 72426/72856/72426/ 58; FO 608/101, 375/3/6/1852/7235/10763. 6 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, June 27, July 13, 1919. 7 FO 371/3670, 120584/72426/58.

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circulation of exaggerated reports of Armenian misbehavior to which an element of truth is lent by Armenian tactlessness.”8 British, French, American, and Armenian sources showed independ­ ently that trouble was ready to erupt. British officers at Erevan supported the Armenian general staffs recommendation to occupy the village of Aralikh in Surmalu because it linked several Muslim-populated districts and permitted the infiltration of Turkish officers and agents from old Bayazit. Authorization was denied, however, by British headquarters in Tiflis on grounds that the status quo should prevail until the Paris Peace Conference had established the frontiers. Colonel John C. Plowden, who became the British military representative at Erevan in mid-June, verified that both men and arms were passing through Aralikh into the Araxes valley and renewed the earlier request, but General Cory again refused, observing that the Armenians already had their hands full.9 By this time Armenian travelers and patrols in the southern districts were no longer safe. On June 16 nine men of the Mush detachment were disarmed near Sadarak; the single wounded survivor later described the torture and mutilation of the others. In the following days Muslim partisans from Kotuz attacked the Assyrian village of Geul-Aisori and rustled the herds; near Nakhichevan the partisans of Nehram captured eight Armenians and put them all to death when the British military representative tried to intercede.10 Early in July the defiance of the village cluster of Baouk (Büyük) Vedi, scarcely 20 miles from Erevan, enflamed the entire Araxes valley.

The Rising Spread out among the orchards, vineyards, and streams of the Vedibasar district, Baouk-Vedi served as a rallying point for Muslim partisans. When the Armenians swept on to Nakhichevan in May, the village, east of the railway, was left unscathed. In June raiding parties from Baouk-Vedi struck in the direction of Davalu and on July 1 killed nine Armenian soldiers and twelve peasants. Because the village had become a symbol of resistance for other Muslim settlements, Colonel Plowden concurred with the Armenian military authorities that the attack had to be answered. With 8 FO 608/84, 342/12/1/5824; FO 371/3670, 120584/72426/58. See also WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 18, 1919. 9 WO95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, March 16, June 16, July passim, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/ 8a, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t., “Voennoe polozhenie Armenii do 20 sentiabria 1919 g.,” and Ocherk no. 1. See also RG 256, 184.021/7. *° Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, “Le mouvement tatare. . . , ” File 660/3, no. 90, July 22, 1919, File 8/8. See also Nor Ashkhalavor, Aug. 6:2, 7:2, 1919.

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400 men, Colonel Apresniank pitched camp before Baouk-Vedi on July 4 and demanded of the local commissar that the raiders be handed over, the weapons and goods of the murdered Armenians brought forth, and indemnity paid the families of the victims. Soon after the commissar returned to the village, the Muslim partisans opened machine-gun fire from concealed positions and decimated the Armenian unit. Preliminary casualty lists showed 5 officers and 30 enlisted men killed and 7 officers and more than 120 men seriously wounded.11 As usual, widely divergent explanations of the immediate cause of the conflict were circulated. Khan Tekinskii and the Azerbaijani government stated that the trouble had started when the Armenian besiegers had killed the village commissar and his assistant.12 British, French, and Armenian accounts maintained that Apresniank’s men had been ambushed while awaiting the return of the Muslim spokesmen and that both the commissar and his assistant were alive and well.13 Still, no one could deny that the Armenian column had been routed and compelled to abandon most of its heavy arms and field equipment. It was the largest and most humiliating loss of the year. For ten days after the calamity the Armenian army tried unsuccessfully to regain its honor by overwhelming Baouk-Vedi. The Muslim defenders, reinforced by volunteers from Karabaghlar, Kotuz, Dakhnaz, and other nearby hamlets and directed by Turkish officers Mehmed Chavush and Colonel Mehmed Effendi, turned back repeated charges up the hills facing the village.14 Responding cautiously to appeals by Plowden and 11 RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, Tumanian to Cory, July 12, and Tumanian communication, July 15, 1919; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 74 bis; S. Vratzian, Hayastam Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), pp. 268—269; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 20:1, 1919. Avetis Aharonian reported to the British delegation that 26 officers and 200 enlisted men had been killed at Baouk-Vedi. See FO 608/73, 342/1/6/18285. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/8a, Ocherk no. 1, and “Voennoe polozhenie Armenii do 20 sentiabria 1919 g.” The British 27th Division War Diary for July 4, written in Tiflis before news of that day’s battle at Baouk-Vedi had arrived, reads as follows: “The situation in Russian Armenia is becoming critical. Both sides are preparing for a fight. The Armenians on the one side, and the Tartars, assisted & organized by Turks on the other. BMR [British Military Representa­ tive] Erivan has interviewed a number of leading Tartars urging peace, but a general conflict seems imminent.” 12 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 74 bis, dossier 3, no. 480; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a/3, no. 87,July 18,1919, File 70/2,//. H.AdrbedjaniDivanagitakanNerkayatsutschutiun evAdrbedjani Karavarutiun, 19201., Azerbaijani minister of foreign affairs to Armeni­ an diplomatic representative, July 12, 1919. See also Bulletin d’informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 2 (Sept. 8, 1919), 2-4, and no. 3 (Oct. 13, 1919), 4-6. 13 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/8a; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 74 bis, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 20:1—2, Aug. 6:2, 7:2, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 10:2, Nov. 1:1, 1919. 14 RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1917-1919, File 711, Intelligence report, Aug. 1,1919; Archives de l’Armée, N16/3187, dossier 2, no. 57; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/8a, Svodkas.

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Khatisian, General Cory sent only two additional staff officers to Erevan and demanded an immediate cease-fire. Compliance by the Armenian command was indicative of its weakness. Plowden then urged Cory to insist that the Azerbaijani government recall some thirty officers who were collaborating with the Turkish instructors and discipline the deeply implicated Azerbaijani representative at Erevan.15 Throughout the crisis Khan Tekinskii kept his government informed about Armenian military movements and called for energetic counter­ measures. On July 14 he cabled that Armenian forces were converging upon Vedibasar and that even “the priests are appealing in their sermons for an attack against Baouk-Vedi as a holy crusade.” Stressing the psycho­ logical and moral importance of protecting the village, the envoy request­ ed the financial means to sustain the resistance and gave assurances that “major developments are anticipated in Sharur-Nakhichevan-Ordubad and in the Kars region.”16 A week later he added that the inhabitants of several Armenian villages in Sharur were already fleeing. He implored his government to order a military concentration along the borders to boost Muslim morale and increase Armenian confusion. The time was ripe for decisive action, as the Muslims were ready to rise from Vedibasar and Aralikh all the way to Nakhichevan.17 Usubbekov’s cabinet, facing the threat of the Volunteer Army on the northern frontier and not so eager as Khan Tekinskii to engage in direct military intervention, responded with limited covert assistance; 200,000 rounds of ammunition and 300,000 Russian imperial rubles were sent to Nakhichevan through the desolate northern reaches of Persia, and on July 20 an additional 4 million rubles were dispatched to Khan Tekinskii via Tiflis.18 General Kiazim Karabekir was fully aware of the vital significance of the Araxes valley. Like officials in the Azerbaijani war ministry, he sent emis­ saries to convince wavering notables that the Armenians would be left prostrate by the British evacuation of Transcaucasia. As Armeno-Tatar relations moved toward armed conflict, Karabekir recalled his most trust­ ed agent, Colonel Halil Bey, to Erzerum to detail strategy for neutralizing 16 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 19-21, 1919; WO 95/4891,81st Brigade War Diary, July 21-22, 1919. 16Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 31-32, Tekinskii’s no. 420; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 74 bis, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 17, 1919; FO 37i/3659» 134563/512/56 end. 17Adrbedjanipastatghtere, p. 36, Tekinskii’s no. 470; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis. 18 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 74 bis, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, HayastaniHanrapetutiun, 19201., Intelligence report no. 2, Aug. 8, 1919, by Tigran Dévoyants. This file includes many of Devoyants’s reports from Constantinople in the autumn and winter of 1919-1920.

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the Armenian military forces and establishing a regional Muslim govern­ ment. Accompanied by an artillery expert and several other officers whom Karabekir deceptively listed as deserters, Halil Bey slipped back over the border from old Bayazit on the night of July 17/18 and took command of the Muslim cavalry in Sharur.19 Reports of the British military representatives at Nakhichevan and Ere­ van conveyed the urgency of the situation. Both officers, blaming Turkish and Azerbaijani provocateurs for the disturbances, were alarmed because remote Armenian villages were under siege and newly repatriated resi­ dents were again being evicted. On July 18 Lieutenant Schwind cabled division headquarters at Tiflis that he was assuming control in Nakhi­ chevan because the Armenian administration was powerless. The crisis, he said, had been caused by external interference, the Armenian expedition against Baouk-Vedi (“a most necessary measure”), the distortion of facts in such matters as the Armenian attempt to register arms, and, perhaps most important, the mutual “congenital inability on the part of both sides to settle any point except by murder or massacre.”20 In authorizing Schwind to attempt arbitration, division headquarters stipulated that no action requiring British troops could be taken. Meanwhile, Colonel Plowden recommended that Schwind retire to Erevan and that Kalb Ali Khan Nakhichevanskii, “the ring leader of the Moslem military orga­ nisation in the Nakhichevan area should be removed at once on any pretext.”21 It was too late for either step, however, since the insurrection had already begun. The sporadic clashes in the countryside spread to Nakhichevan on July 20, when, according to a British source, a signal volley was fired by a Muslim in the bazaar, “upon which another Tartar drew his dagger and cut off the nearest Armenian’s ear.” Within minutes fighting enveloped the city. Meeting with Kalb Ali Khan and the Armenian governor that evening, Lieutenant Schwind arranged a three-day cease-fire to enable Colonel Plowden to conduct a personal investigation. But the truce did not hold, and toward dawn Armenian station guards were overwhelmed and a train that had just arrived with British army rations and American flour and condensed milk was looted. With full-scale interracial violence erupt­ ing, Schwind persuaded the Armenian commander, Major General Shel19 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 64-65, 78. Colonel Halil was reported to be in charge of thirty other Turkish officers participating in the Tatar operations against the Armenians. See WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 25, 1919. 20 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 18, 1919. See also RG 256, 867B.00/275/279. 21 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 20, 24, 1919. See also Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 34.

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kovnikian, and the Muslim council to allow Kalb Ali Khan to restore order with a mixed Armenian-Muslim militia. Once again, however, the truce collapsed and on July 22 the insurgents captured the police station and surrounded the Armenian garrison in the northern sector of Nakhi­ chevan, whereupon the Armenian artillery began shelling the lower areas. Schwind decided that all he could do was “sit tight and be neutral.” In the bitter fighting of the next two days, the Muslims, suffering heavy casual­ ties, were unable to dislodge Shelkovnikian’s 500-man garrison.22 To the north, meanwhile, the Armenians were in retreat. On July 22 the partisans, directed by Colonel Halil, attacked all the posts in Sharur. The two companies at Shahtaght managed to join Colonel Karakeshishian’s garrison at Bash-Norashen, but two days later the partisans sur­ rounded the town, seized the defile known as Volch’i Vorota (Wolves’ Gates) on the border of the Erevan uezd, and captured the 200-man garrison at Khanukhlar. On July 25 Karakeshishian’s column fought its way out of the encirclement and, taking along the Armenians of BashNorashen and Ulia-Norashen, moved up the Arpa river valley toward the highlands of Erevan and Daralagiaz. The refugees first concentrated at Chanakhchi and Zindjirlu and then, with the inhabitants of these and several other Christian villages, made their way over mountain passes to Nor-Bayazit.23 The Armenian armored train in Sharur did not fare so well. On July 26 the insurgents trapped it by cutting the rails near Norashen and weakening the bridge at Volch’i Vorota 12 miles to the north. As the train approached the defile the last car derailed, and the crew took to the safety of the hills. The unjustifiable abandonment of the train without even trying to cut loose the derailed car or to destroy the entire train to prevent its capture ultimately led to the court-martial and conviction of the officer in charge.24 The fall of Shahtaght and Bash-Norashen placed the Nakhichevan garrison in an untenable position. On the evening of July 25, General Shelkovnikian led his men and hundreds of Armenian inhabitants to Aznaburt (Znaberd) in the north and then, with the Christians of that town, toward the mountain stronghold of Martiros. Many Armenian peas­ ants in the Nakhichevan-Djagri river valley also fled into the mountains, but those who did not, together with those living west of the Nakhichevan22 FO 371/3865, 150075/150/34; FO 371/3670, 111634/72426/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/ 20387; RG 256, 867B.00/266. 23 Vratzian, op. cit., pp. 269—270; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8at 8a, Ocherk no. 1, File 66al 3, nos. 97-98, July 30-31, 1919; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17111. The 27th Division War Diary entry for July 25 noted that only 100,000 rounds of ammunition remained in Armenia. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, July 30:2, 31:2, Aug. 3:2, 1919. 24 Haradj, Feb. 1:2, 3:2, 4:2, 5:2, 1920.

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Julfa road and railway, had to be left to their fate. The Muslims vented their rage upon the Armenian patients and wounded soldiers in the American hospital at Nakhichevan, upon the hamlets of Yamkhana and Tumbul southwest of the city, and upon the villages of Yarimdja, Giultapa, Kiarimbek-diza, Kulibek-diza, Alagiaz-Mazra, Diduvar, and Nazarabad in the Nakhichevan-Djagri valley. For days thereafter corpses filled the shallows of nearby streams and the Araxes River. The Muslim cavalry pursued the Armenians up the Arpa and Nakhichevan rivers, forcing the mountaineers of Aghkhach, Ses, and Sultanbek to withdraw for a time, but the Armenian military line soon firmed up along a string of highland settlements from Khachik to Nors. Eventually 6,000 refugees from the Araxes valley reached Zangezur and Nor-Bayazit by way of mountain paths and streams.25 The Armenian border guards and refugees at Julfa, meanwhile, sought haven across the bridge in Persian Djolfa, whence they were transported to Tabriz. Lieutenant Schwind tried to withdraw along the same route, but his party, unable to secure safe-conduct passes, was turned back by Khan Nakhichevanskii. Finally, on July 28, the British staff and the American relief personnel, who had entrusted their hospital and orphanage to the Muslim council in the hope of safeguarding the children, were provided rail transportation to Julfa. After harrowing experiences there and the confiscation of two of their automobiles, they crossed the Araxes and arrived at Tabriz on the evening of July 2g.26 Armenian losses in July were staggering. Twenty-five officers of the 2d and 3d Infantry Regiments had been killed and twice as many wounded; no complete list of casualties among noncommissioned ranks was ever published. Heavy losses of military equipment and supplies were com­ pounded by the abandonment of the armored train and the entrapment of eight locomotives and more than 100 freight cars.27 Although the outnumbered Armenian troops had fought bravely and had managed, except for the two companies at Khanukhlar, to withdraw in order, the Muslim victory inspired daring raids far to the north. The partisans at28 28 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17582/18169; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File Sal Sa, Ocherk no. 1, File 660/3, nos. 97-99, July 30-Aug. 1,1919; RG 59,860J.01/21/28; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, Armenian government to Cory, July 28, 1919, and Doolittle to Ammission, July 30, 1919; RG 256, 867B.00/279; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 2, no. 74 bis, dossier 3, no. 10; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 31:2, Aug. 6:3, 1919. See also Bristol papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Bristol to Ammission, July 31, 1919. 28 The report of Schwind’s assistant, Lieutenant F. G. Johnson, is in FO 371/3865, 150075/ 150/34 and in FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20385 end. See also FO 371/3670, 111634/72426/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17550. 27 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 21:3, 1919.

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Aralikh, equipped with fieldpieces and machine guns and led by an officer who had come from Erzerum with Halil Bey, struck at the rear of the Armenian lines along the perimeter of Erevan county, while the defenders of Baouk-Vedi hurled back another assault upon their fortified positions on July 24 and 25. The seriousness of the situation was put clearly to the Armenians when Halil Bey returned twenty-nine gravely wounded soldiers to Armenian field headquarters at Khamarlu on July 25, with the warning that continued hostilities would seal the fate of the many prisoners still in his custody.28 Feeble Countermeasures The Armenian government reacted to the uprising with frantic directives and emergency decrees. On July 23 all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty-six and twenty-eight in the counties of Erevan, Etchmiadzin, and Surmalu were ordered to military duty, thus further reducing the work force at harvest time. Personnel losses also required the activating of nearly all reserve officers up to forty years of age in these counties and in Nor-Bayazit and Kars. On July 24 the Council of Ministers asked citizens to turn in their own weapons and ammunition because of depleted supplies in the state arsenals; 500 rubles in cash and foodstuffs would be paid for each Mosin or Lebel rifle and half a ruble for each bullet, and those who responded would be exempt from an extraordinary military tax. In a public rally two days later, Arshak Djamalian, Arsen Mikayelian, Vardges Aharonian, and partisan chiefs Hamazasp and Sebouh (Arshak Nersesian) urged the crowd to join in the struggle against the foreigndirected conspiracy to obliterate the Republic. The few hundred rifles and several thousand rounds of ammunition gathered at Erevan were insig­ nificant in view of the need. Moreover, a special committee formed to combat desertion and the harboring of fugitives had almost no means to enforce its regulations. Finally, on July 30, the entire country was put under a committee of public safety, composed of Premier Khatisian, Act­ ing Interior Minister Sargis Manasian, and Military Minister Kristapor Araratian.2829 Alexandre Khatisian tried in vain to secure British intervention. The 28 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a/3, no. 104, Aug. 7,1919 ; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 7:2,1919; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1917-1919, File 711, Intelligence report, Aug. 4, 1919. For a résumé of events in the Nakhichevan region in 1919, see RG 59, 867.00/1100. 29 Nor AshkhatavoryJuly 31:2, Aug. 1:4,3:2, 26:3,1919; Vratzian, op. cit., p. 2 7 1 ^ 0 3 3 /9 7 4 , no. 4997. See also Hairenik, Sept. 21:3, 1919.

43°

42
FO 371/3659-3660, 121849/ 144752/512/58; FO 371/3670, 121547/72426/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18167; WO 33/974, no. 5142.

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The Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Armenia was elated by this turn of events. Still unaware that his messages were being intercepted and deciphered, Khan Tekinskii advised his government on July 28 to propose to the British command a settlement whereby Azerbaijan would adminis­ ter the railway from Shahtaght to Julfa and be allowed to complete the Baku-Aliat-Julfa line for transit trade with Persia. Furthermore, Azerbai­ jan would oversee the establishment of a provisional regional administra­ tion with jurisdiction from Ordubad and Julfa to Baouk-Vedi and Davalu in the county of Erevan. Khan Tekinskii was disappointed that the Muslim partisans were still reluctant to extend operations to Erevan itself. He urged his superiors “to square accounts” in Zangezur within two weeks and to bring the Azerbaijani forces all the way to Khamarlu. Since the British, he was certain, would not assist the Armenians, the operation could be completed without a formal declaration of war. In his dispatch of August 3, the envoy concluded: “I beseech you, take advantage of the moment and waste no more time.”3^ Khan Tekinskii’s admonitions had become so provocative that both the French and American missions in Tiflis urged General Cory to demand his recall. Moreover, General Milne had learned that Khan Tekinskii was helping to recruit Turkish officers for action in Transcaucasia. When General D. I. Shuttleworth, in command of the British garrison at Baku, confronted Usubbekov with this information, the premier denied any knowledge of the alleged misbehavior but promised to summon Khan Tekinskii for questioning. Having performed yeoman service for the militant, pro-Turkish faction in the Azerbaijani government, Khan Tekin­ skii left Erevan on August 8. But instead of having to account for his extradiplomatic activities in Armenia, he was appointed assistant to Min­ ister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed Iusuf Jafarov.3839 On August 14 the columns of Azerbaidzhan, the Baku organ of the Musavat party, were filled with praises for the valor of the Muslims in the Araxes valley. The warriors of Baouk-Vedi, demonstrating that they would “never bow their heads before the Armenians,” had annihilated up to 4,000 of the enemy, including the hated Van detachment. A Muslim force of 1,500 men had reportedly driven the Armenians from Davalu and thus broken the stranglehold on Baouk-Vedi and restored the demar38 Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 38—40, Tekinskii’s nos. 558, 601,606; WO 33/974, nos. 5031, 5036A; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17706; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis. 39 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 4 ,6 ,9 , 1919; WO 33/974, no. 5043; RG 256, 184.01602/105; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 34. Khan Tekinskii’s final message from Erevan was apparently dispatched on August 4, 1919.

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cation line that prevailed before the Anglo-Armenian maneuvers in May.40 The Azerbaijani account, although exaggerated, was inaccurate only in details, for by the beginning of August the Armenian army and civil administration had been expelled from Julfa all the way to Davalu. On August 4 Muslim raiders even penetrated the environs of Khamarlu. In a counterattack launched on August 10, Dro overran the Vedibasar vil­ lages of Engidja, Shirazlu, Karalar, Djatkran, and Rehanlu and the hills above Baouk-Vedi. During the following week those heights changed hands several times, but the Armenian units were unable to break across the trenches into Baouk-Vedi. For the rest of the year the village cluster remained boldly defiant within sight of the Armenian army. Dro placed pickets along a front line extending from Kotuz to Mount Bozburun, Shirazlu, Kichik (Küchük) Vedi, and Khor-Virap on the Araxes River; despite frequent skirmishes and occasional daring raids, both sides held firm. The overall results gratified the Muslim insurgents and their sup­ porters in Turkey and Azerbaijan, whereas for the Armenians the night­ mare of July had brought the de facto southern frontier to within 20 miles of Erevan.41 Ferment at Kars While the Muslims in Sharur and Nakhichevan were displaying their prowess, those in the province of Kars were struggling against the consoli­ dation of Armenian rule. According to General Milne’s initial directives, the Armenian administration was to be established in Kaghisman and Kars and then gradually extended into Olti and Ardahan as far as the Barduz River, 25 miles northwest of Sarikamish, the Ardahan road, and the Kur River. The rest of the two counties was to be supervised by the British military governor of Batum.42 Although Stepan Korganian, governor-general of Kars, placed his officials at Merdenek and other towns in southern Ardahan without incident, the Armenians had difficulty in Olti. That highland district bordering the Erzerum vilayet had become a Muslim stronghold under Jafar Bey’s 3,000 partisans and 40 Reprinted in Ashkhatavor, Sept. 18:3, 1919. 41 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 109, Aug. 13, 1919, File 8/8, no. 47, Sept. 17, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 8:2, 13:2, 1919; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, Report of Aug. 21, 1919; Vratzian, op. cit., p. 271. 42 FO 371/3659, 98053/512/58; FO 608/82, 342/5/4/14655; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, May 6, 1919; WO 95/4894, 82d Brigade War Diary, June 8, 1919.

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the too Turkish officers whom Halid Bey, commander of the 3d Ottoman Caucasian Division, had left behind with cannon, machine guns, and small arms.43 During the summer of 1919 additional equipment was received from across the border where, as the result of the all-out Caucasian campaign the preceding year, the XV Army Corps still had more than 500 fieldpieces with 200,000 shells, 100,000 rifles, and millions of rounds of ammu­ nition. At Erzerum a small British control mission headed by Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Rawlinson was to supervise removal of the breechblocks and rifle bolts from weapons in excess of the limits imposed by the Mudros Armistice and to transport those parts and other matériel via the Trans­ caucasian railway to Batum, whence they were to be shipped to Alliedsupervised depots near Constantinople. Circumspect in his dealings with Allied officials, General Karabekir permitted the first trainload of weap­ ons to depart, but then, having secretly arranged for “partisan bands” to sever the rails near the frontier and having allowed Ayyub Pasha’s men to help themselves to arms and ammunition, he ordered the locomotive back to Erzerum with the excuse that the line was impassable.44 In June General W. H. Beach, chief of British military intelligence in Transcaucasia, went to Erzerum to advise Karabekir to cooperate and to caution him that he would be held responsible for the security of the roads in the region under his command. Having learned of the British decision to leave the Caucasus, Karabekir maneuvered to win time by professing a desire to fulfill his obligations while claiming that he had received no directives from Constantinople about the dismantling and exportation of arms. By midmonth, however, Rawlinson observed that the Turkish offi­ cers were no longer cooperating, even ostensibly.4546Armenian military intelligence also reported that Turkish emissaries, who were crossing in increasing numbers into the mountains of Olti and Barduz and the 43 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 359-360; Rep. of Arm. Archives File Sal 8a, Ocherk no. 1; Hairenik, Tune 29:2, 1919; WO 05/4870, 27th Division War Diary, Tune 2, 6, July 3, 1Q19; WO 95/4894, 820 Brigade War Diary, June 1, 1919; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18285. 44 A. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, 1918—1922 (London and New York, 1923), pp. 181—182; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 104/3,//. Patvirakutiun, 1919t.: Hashtutian Konferans, General Staff report, June 17, 1919. In May Karabekir informed Kemal that he had under his command 17,860 army regulars and large supplies of arms which he was determined not to relinquish to the English control officers. See Feridun Kandemir, MUß mücadele ba$langicmda Mustafa Kemâl, arkada$lan ve kar$isindakiler (Istanbul, [1964]), pp. 35-36; Cevat Dursunoglu, MUß mücadele Erzurum (Ankara, 1946), pp. 61, 71-74. See also Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 23-25; Re§it Pasin, “Erzurum Kongresi ve Üçüncü Ordu,” in Erzurum Kongresi ve Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk ([Istanbul], n.d.), p. 20; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, nö. 44. 46 Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 184, 190; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 42-43, 46; FO 371/3659, 102537/ 512/58; FO 608/82, 342/5/4/1508.

expanse between Sarikamish and Mount Ararat, were agitating the Muslim population with word that the British had deserted the Armenians.46 Frequent harassment by the mounted bands in Old prompted General Hovsepian to seek permission to pursue the raiders beyond the demarcadon line. Premier Khatisian, in raising the issue with General K. M. Davie on June 5, added the argument that, since Azerbaijan had repeatedly suspended petroleum shipments, it was essential that Armenia exploit the rich anthracite coal deposits around Peniak. Davie’s favorable recommen­ dation was endorsed by Cory and Cooke-Collis, who believed that the Armenians would “grab” the district anyway as soon as the British left. But Milne rejected the plan on the logic that, inasmuch as the Armenian army could not hold even the sector assigned it, no attempt should be made to expand operations into the rest of Old.4647 In early July, however, the British ban was lifted because the continuing raids revealed that regular Turkish officers and cartloads of ammunition were moving into Barduz and Olti from the Erzerum vilayet and raised apprehensions about the recrudescence of Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic agitation. Meeting with the Olti Muslim Council and Jafar Bey, the British military representative at Kars, Captain H. R. Prosser, and members of Korganian’s staff pledged that the district’s administrative character would be commensurate with its ethnoreligious composition. In reply Jafar Bey, voicing the principle of self-determination, demanded that the Armenians keep out pending a final ruling from Paris. At the end of July, after a new round of desultory fighting, Prosser again tried to intercede, but the Olti council only consented to reconsider and answer within ten days. Division headquarters, however, concluded that arbitration was futile and on August 5 instructed the British military representative to drop the question, it being clear that the Armenians “have already got as much as they can manage.”48 Armenian military operations in July were concentrated around Karaurgan, Karakurt, and Bashkeuy (Bashköy), the main infiltration routes from Erzerum to Sarikamish and Kaghisman. The penetration of the 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments into this district sent thousands of Muslims fleeing across the frontier and caused many settlements to petition nearby Turkish commanders for protection against the invaders. General Karabekir angrily reported stories of Armenian pillage, murder, and rape 46 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8 Svodka. 47 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, June 6, 8, 19, 1919. 48 Ibid., July 3, 6, 1919; WO 106/329, no. 163; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 3:2, 1919. See also Karabekir, op. cit., p. 307.

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to Colonel Rawlinson and broadcast them throughout Anatolia.49 Based on these dispatches, the Turkish press forecast what might be expected in lands falling under the control of the “helpless” and “civilized” Armenians. The Ottoman general staff distributed a booklet detailing the record of Armenian atrocities in Transcaucasia, and Sultan Mehmed VI confided to the British high commissioner that his position relative to the Nationalist officers in the interior had been undermined by fears of an Armenian attack on Erzerum.50Rawlinson, too, had seen enough refugees to complain that “Armenians are on the war path at Kaghizman and Olti 8c Sarikamish.”51 In receipt of similar accusations from the Muslims of Sharur-Nakhichevan, General Milne instructed Colonel Plowden to warn the Armenians to stop their provocations immediately lest Great Britain withdraw its support of Armenian aspirations.52 British intelligence nonetheless reaffirmed that the Turkish claims were exaggerated and designed to incite sentiment against any Allied decision awarding the eastern vilayets to Armenia.53 Assuring General Karabekir of his concern for the well-being of the Muslim population, Colonel Rawlinson set out in mid-July to inspect the border districts and to demand an accounting from the Armenian authorities.54 At Kars both General Hovsepian and Governor Korganian insisted that the turmoil was Turkish inspired, although admitting that several strategic Muslim villages near the frontier had been disarmed and that controls had been set up to prevent the unauthorized exportation of manufactured goods and agricultural supplies and implements. Rawlinson viewed this operation as “outright robbery” and the disarming of Muslims alone as gross injustice.55 In the hill country west of Kaghisman, Rawlinson was received by Hasan Bey, a “well informed and educated and very intelligent” chieftain of sixteen prosperous villages, who stated that should Armenian rule endure he would lead his people to the Kurdish lands around Diarbekir. Rawlin49 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 48, 71-74, 76-78, 79, 304-318. See also Turkey, Genelkurmay Ba§kanligi, Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi, III, 7 (March 1954), nos. 148-149, and 9 (Sept. 1954), nos. 193-201. 50 British Documents, IV, 668. The booklet was entitled Atrocités commises par les Arméniens sur les musulmans du Caucase durant le mois deJuillet 19/9. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 16/16, no. 31; FO 371/3659, 99204/512/58. Tayyip Gökbilgen, “Istanbul hükümeti gözüyle Erzurum Kongresi,” in Erzurum Kongresi ve Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk, pp. 56-57, 64-67. 51 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 13, 1919. Rawlinson’s unfavorable predispo­ sition toward the Armenians is evidenced in his memoirs (op. cit.y pp. 72-95, 196-197). 52 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/16808; WO 33/974, no. 4966; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, June 27, July 13, 1919. 53 FO 371/3659, 120012/512/58. See also FO 608/85, 347/1/6/18643. 54 Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 196-224; FO 371/4159, 137900/521/44. 55 FO 371/4159, 137900/521/44. See also FO 608/78, 342/1/6/16808 end.

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son then crossed the Araxes River into the orchards of Kaghisman, where he did not conceal his irritation with the “very fulsome and unwelcome attention” of Armenian officials and his scorn for the “ridiculously inade­ quate” garrison whose men were of “the worst, most useless type” and whose “only grain of wisdom” was not to challenge the Kurdish bands dominating the hills between the Araxes and the Ottoman frontier. The British officer was jolted, however, by the bearing of the leader of those bands, Omar Agha, “an ignorant, uneducated pig-headed swine as bob­ bery a Budmarah as you can find.” While the Kurds brandished daggers and uttered threats, Omar Agha vowed he would never bow to Armenian rule or leave his lands but would slit the throats of any who tried to force him to do so.66 Rawlinson extricated himself with relief from this “set of scoundrels” and drove into the Allah-Akber mountains near Sarikamish, where hun­ dreds of trained horsemen, each with a bandalier of 300 rounds of ammu­ nition, obeyed the command of Ayyub Pasha. The thirty-year-old chieftain, standing nearly seven feet tall, announced that his partisans would fight to the end and that the Muslim population would migrate rather than submit to Armenian rule. Many refugees from the lowlands had already sought haven with Ayyub Pasha, whose Turkish artillerymen were exchanging salvos with an Armenian outpost even as Colonel Raw­ linson was in camp. When Rawlinson’s automobile was fired on near Devik on his return to Sarikamish, he blamed it on the Armenians and lodged a formal protest with General Hovsepian, brushing aside the counterclaim that the Kurds had actually staged the attack to discredit the Armenian army. Rawlinson forwarded his complaint to General Milne with the warn­ ing that the Muslims were mobilizing and that the Armenian troops should be placed under Allied supervision.5657 General Karabekir, who was privy to most messages Rawlinson dispatched through Erzerum, was pleased that the investigation supported his contentions, but he feared that Allied supervision would jeopardize his own position and damage the Nationalist cause. He therefore informed his military colleagues in Anatolia that the British were fomenting Armenian-Muslim hostilities to gain an excuse to remain in Transcaucasia and reoccupy districts such as Kars and Nakhichevan.58 56 Ibid.; Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 200-214. In his published account, Rawlinson refers to Hasan Bey as Hussein Bey. 57 FO 371/4159, 137900/521/44 and Apps. A-C; Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 215-224; WO 33/974, nos. 4966, 4977. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 25/25, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun: Zinvorakan Nakhararutian Hramanagrer, 1920 t. See also Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis, for General Silikian’s complaint to the French representative, Captain Poidebard, regarding Rawlinson’s accusation. 58 Karabekir, op. cit., p. 275. See also Kandemir, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

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By the time Rawlinson returned to Erzerum on July 25, his staff had brought another trainload of munitions to Zevin (Zivin), where daily “rockslides” prevented further passage. The refusal of the local Turkish commander to clear the rails or help carry the cargo around the slides to a train brought up from the Armenian side prompted blustering threats from Rawlinson, but Karabekir explained by telephone that the Muslim inhabitants were so disturbed by schemes to extend Armenian rule as far west as Sivas that they would not tolerate the movement of military matéri­ el over any Armenian-controlled territory. All arms and equipment would consequently be safeguarded by the XV Corps until the peace treaty was signed. Frustrated at every turn, the British control officer wired in reply: “I take earliest opportunity of expressing my deep regret at the decision of the Turks to keep the essential parts at e r z e r o u m which I must immedi­ ately point out is a violation of the conditions imposed by the Allies under the terms of the Armistice which may therefore be terminated and war continued. Am telegraphing your decision to British Authorities.”59 On July 27 Karabekir informed Rawlinson that one of the first objec­ tives of the Erzerum congress then in session was to prevent the exporta­ tion of arms, and he gave his word that perfect order and security would be maintained in the territory under his command. In pleading for Turk­ ish cooperation, Rawlinson showed Karabekir his messages incriminating the Armenians and promised to do his utmost to retain Turkish sovereign­ ty over Erzerum. However, in view of Rawlinson’s unavailing appeals and the marked defiance of the Nationalist leaders, General Milne ordered the control mission to withdraw. On the eve of his departure Rawlinson was introduced to Mustafa Kemal, who stated that “any decision by Peace Conference to allow Armenian Government any territory beyond the old Turco-Russian frontier would be met by a revolutionary army.”60 Handed a copy of the manifesto of the Erzerum congress, Rawlinson left for home on August 7. He reported that many demobilized soldiers were still in eastern Anatolia because of lack of transportation, uncertain conditions in the western provinces, and a natural desire to resist Armeni­ an aggression: “The greatest inducement however has been the deserted state of the Eastern districts from which the pre-war population has abso­ lutely vanished or a more correct description would perhaps be ‘been exterminated’!” As barely 10 percent of the rural population remained, “the demobilized troops have found free houses and land at their disposal 59 FO 371/4159,137900/521/44, App. E; Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 225-226, 230-231; Karabe­ kir, op. cit. y pp. 87—89. 60 FO 371/4158, 126001/521/44; Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 226-227, 231-232; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 92-95, 105, 108. See also WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 30, 1919.

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everywhere and the effect has been to produce a population which consists of a unique proportion of trained soldiers who are not only instinctively anti-Armenian, but are at the same time moved by the strongest induce­ ment (i.e. their interest in retaining the properties they have squatted on) to resist any Armenian repatriation or any measure which might result in their losing the advantages they have gained.” The entire population, Rawlinson added, had been systematically armed, and the country abounded in concealed military caches. Some 35,000 rifles had been turned over to parties coming from the interior during the Turkish re­ treat from Batum to Trebizond alone, and twice that number had been distributed from Hasankale and Erzerum. As recently as July, 160 ma­ chine guns sent from Erzerum to Trebizond by the control commission had “entirely disappeared.” Rawlinson also did not take lightly Mustafa KemaPs threat of revolutionary resistance to Armenian expansion: “The conclusion I have formed is that such a revolution has great prospects of success, and that any endeavour to reduce the present territory and cede any portion of it to Armenia would call for a considerable Allied force and be a long and arduous undertaking. In addition to which the Armenians have already ‘bitten off more than they can chew and show no aptitude for Government and little desire for territorial acquisition.”61 The Sounds of August Rawlinson’s memorandum was intended to emphasize the folly of creating a large Armenian state. And although Rawlinson had misjudged Armeni­ an desires for further territorial acquisitions, the Armenians themselves had to admit that they were unable to digest even the modest bite they had taken. Their frustrations in July turned to desperation in August when the Italian expedition was canceled, the British continued preparations to evacuate Transcaucasia, the supply of arms and ammunition dipped to critical levels, previously quiescent Muslim settlements stirred with the news of events in Sharur-Nakhichevan and Kars, and the fighting spread to the Surmalu uezd, which linked Erevan with Kaghisman or, from the Muslim point of view, formed a direct avenue between Nakhichevan and Erzerum along the Araxes River. The only trans-Araxes county in the Erevan guberniia, the Surmalu uezd rose from the plain of Igdir to the towering peaks of Ararat and the Bartoghi (Takialtu) chain, which formed the frontier with the Bayazit 61 FO 371/4158, 126001/521/44. For a summary of Rawlinson’s discussion in the Foreign Office on August 29, see FO 371/3668, 122957/11067/58.

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sanjak of the Erzerum vilayet. Scores of Armenian and Muslim villages in the district had been devastated during the battles of 1918. Shortly after Turkish withdrawal at the end of that year, Colonel Tigran Baghdasarian’s 2d Volunteer Regiment of Western Armenians, mainly from Van and Sassun, led the first groups of refugees back to the Igdir plain. Then in the spring of 1919, leaving the 2d Battalion of G. Surmenian to protect the plain and the Orgov district, the ist Battalion under Vahan Pasdermadjian advanced the refugees to Molla-Kamar and Kulp (Goghb) and spread out over 40 versts (27 miles) from the slopes of Ararat to Abas-Geuljust inside the frontier. As the repatriates began to rebuild their homes in the picturesque vale of Molla-Kamar, the State Properties Ad­ ministration resumed the mining of the rich salt deposits at Kulp, halfway between Erevan and Kaghisman near the confluence of the Araxes and Arpachai rivers.62 The events at Baouk-Vedi and Aralikh in the east and Kaghisman in the west soon aroused the tribesmen of Shamil Bek Airumlinskii. In early August they attacked the single company of the ist Battalion at Abas-Geul and forced it to retreat to Molla-Kamar. For two weeks the cavalrymen of Sassun defended Molla-Kamar against Kurdish nighttime raids, but on August 14 the enemy penetrated the town and cut the telegraph wires to Igdir. The small detachment was nevertheless able to withdraw with all the inhabitants to Igdir. The loss of the town exposed the 120-man garrison at Kulp to encirclement, thus necessitating its recall. Fighting off the Kurds on August 15, the wagon convoy of soldiers and villagers crossed the Karakala bridge to safety in the county of Etchmiadzin. By that time the Kurds were raiding the plain itself, and hundreds of Armenian and Yezidi peasants streamed back into Igdir.63 The fall of Molla-Kamar and Kulp rendered the Armenian military position in the Kars oblast all the more tenuous. On August 17 Omar Agha led a thousand tribesmen against Colonel Shaghrutian’s garrison at Kagh­ isman. Shaghrutian urged the partisans to withdraw so as to avoid blood­ shed, but the Muslims demanded that the Armenians clear out instead. An Armenian counterattack at dawn on the eighteenth drove the Kurds 62 Hovhannes Sahakian, “Erku tari haikakan banakin medj,” in Edjer mer azatagrakan patmutenen (Paris, 1937), pp. 9-21. 63 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/ 8a, Ocherk no. 1; Sahakian, op. cit.y pp. 21-32; Tigran Baghdasarian, “Hayastani Hanrapetutian verdjaluisin,” in Edjer mer azatagrakan patmuteneny pp. 200-206; Sahakian op. cit.y pp. 21-32; WO 33/974, no. 5126; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 18, 1919; FO 371/3670, 121547/72426/58; FO 608/84, 342/12/1/ 5824; Archives de l'Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, nos. 48 bis, 70; Nor Ashkhatavory Aug; 20:3, 1919. Vratzian, op. cit.y p. 272, gives the wrong date for the fall of Kulp.

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from the outskirts of the town, but it was not until the arrival of a relief column from Kars two days later that they retreated to the hills.64 During the latter half of August Muslim irregulars maneuvered to isolate all outlying areas from Kars. The Armenian 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments were drawn into constant combat around Bashkeuy and Karakurt. Near Novo-Selim and Begli-Ahmed, the tribesmen, reinforced by a detachment of Turkish soldiers, tried to cut the railway and the main road between Sarikamish and Kars. After inspecting the war zone, Captain Fletcher of British intelligence reported that 6,000 Armenian peasants between the frontier and Sarikamish were abandoning their homes and harvest to the Turks and that Greek villagers trying to flee from the Novo-Selim area to Kars had been blocked. Fletcher confirmed that Turk­ ish regulars were operating at the rear of the Kurds and that Ayyub Pasha had allowed Turkish officers to take command in his sector.65 Other similarly disheartening communications caused the British mis­ sion at Kars to summon American relief officials, Governor Korganian, General Hovsepian, and fortress commandant General Daniel Bek Pirumian to an emergency conference. During that meeting the Armeni­ ans were advised to pull back their civilian population from Bashkeuy, Karakurt, Sarikamish, Kaghisman, Merdenek, and other threatened dis­ tricts and to concentrate their scattered military forces around Kars to defend the great fortress city. The Armenian spokesmen protested that civilian withdrawal would demoralize the troops and that the threat to Kars did not stem from the lack of manpower but rather of rifles and ammunition. General Pirumian decried the Allied tactic of awarding Kars to the Armenians and then immediately deserting them.66 Even the moral support of British military representatives at Erevan and Kars was to be taken away, for General Cory had just ordered Colonel Plowden and 64 FO 371/3659, 123719/512/58; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 12:4, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/Sa, Ocherk no. 1. 65 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 128,Sept. 4, 1919; Hairenik, O ct.2i:2, 1919; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 30, 1919. See also Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 138-139. 66 FO 371/4159, 145863/521/44, App. C; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 28, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/80. On August 28 General Cory wrote General Milne: “I am strongly of the opinion that it is premature to attempt the repatriation of refugees from Turkish Armenia until after peace has been made with Turkey. Owing to Turkish influence in the kars & o l t i provinces further efforts at repatriation there would also be a mistake. If this point of view is accepted it should be recognised that no further repatriation can be carried out until next spring and all refugees should remain where they are or collect towards food centers to be chosen and made known as such. By recognition of facts it will be possible for Americans to make a comprehensive plan for relief Sc repetition of the haphazard efforts of 1919 will be avoided.”

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Captain Prosser to close their missions and return to Tiflis on August 28.67 General Cory dared no longer risk the safety of his agents. Plowden had recently been the victim of Halil Bey’s taunts, Rawlinson had been recalled from Erzerum, and Prosser had failed in efforts to arrange a modus vivendi at Kars. Prosser, in his last report to division headquarters, de­ scribed the Armenians as so distressed that they tried to prevent his departure; it was only with much difficulty that he obtained transporta­ tion on the evening of August 30. His evaluation of the situation was grim. All available Armenian troops had been dispatched to Sarikamish and Kaghisman, and many wounded were being carried back from those fronts. Civilians had been forbidden to evacuate Kars, but some were fleeing by night. Prosser added: “The Armenians are undoubtedly de­ pressed at the withdrawal of the British to whom in spite of frequent assurances to the contrary they had looked to the last for assistance on behalf of the Allies. They talk about fighting to the death, etc., but I think that most of the fight in them went with our departure.” He ended with the following ominous prediction: “Taken all round the position of the Armenians in k a r s province is not a happy one at the present moment.. . . They are surrounded by a hostile population and with the advent of the Turk, k a r s as a portion of Armenia will most likely cease to exist.”68 Colonel Plowden, taking leave of a tearful Armenian premier, departed from Erevan on August 28 as instructed.69 His final appraisal reflected the views of most other British officers involved with the Armenians. Describing the tragic state of affairs, Plowden suggested that part of the trouble was the dominance of the Dashnaktsutiun’s Bureau, which prevailed over the moderates in government. The Dashnakists had led the bloody struggle for Armenian freedom and “as soldiers and patriots no praise is too high for them, but as politicians and administrators, they are grotesque and responsible for the hopeless condition of Armenian foreign and internal politics today.” The educated and wealthy bourgeois classes of Baku, Tiflis, Rostov-on-Don, and other regions of the former Russian Empire were scarcely represented because of financial disorder, incessant warfare, and political pressure tactics. The people, weary and hungry, would welcome anybody who could bring peace and return them to their fields. A major source of Armenia’s agony, wrote Plowden, was “the hope that 67 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 24, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 122, Aug. 28, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 31:3, 1919. 68 FO 371/4159, 145863/521/44, App. C. 69 Lieutenant Charles remained in Erevan for a few days longer until members of Colonel Haskell’s staff arrived. See WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 27, 30, 1919.

some at least of all the astounding promises that have been made her by the Allies, before, during and since the war will be fulfilled.” President Wilson’s “self-determination” had given the Armenians reason to believe that the Allies, especially the United States, would send the aid required to make their dreams become reality. Plowden felt that the Armenians were so desperate that they would have to sign a treaty with a nearby power, even if it meant the loss of their hard-won independence, or else disappear. Only Armenia, Plowden continued, had remained loyal to the Allied cause, suffering terribly, whereas Azerbaijan had embraced the Turks and Georgia had assumed a pro-German and anti-Allied stance in 1918. These irrefutable facts made it all the more difficult for the Armenians to com­ prehend why they were not even accorded equal treatment, since British regiments remained at Tiflis and Baku even as Erevan was being stran­ gled. It was common knowledge that the Turks were supplying the insur­ gents with officers and arms, yet the British refused to provide the Armenians with rifles and ammunition for self-defense. And the award of Karabagh to Azerbaijan was the hardest blow of all: “ k a r a b a g h means more to the Armenians than their religion even, being the cradle of their race, and their traditional last sanctuary when their country has been invaded. It is Armenian in every particular and the strongest part of Armenia, both financially, militarily and socially.” In contrast with Rawlinson’s denigration of the Armenian army, Colo­ nel Plowden’s description was glowing: “The morale of the troops is wonderful. Although practically completely without boots, no suitable clothing, no ammunition and no bayonets, they have fought against very considerably superior numbers, better fed, better clothed and with unlim­ ited S.A.A. [small arms ammunition] against troops trenched behind wall and trenches, with a bravery equal to the best European troops.” Given ammunition and equipment, “Armenia could hold off the Turks and Tartars until the winter makes fighting impossible.” The officers, he continued, “have behaved with great gallantry all through the operations, sacrificing themselves for their men in a manner up to the best traditions of any army.” Any country willing to supply Armenia with critically needed armaments, transport facilities, and medical supplies “would make a friend who in time may be a sufficiently powerful one.” But time was running short. A Turkish advance would be accompanied by orga­ nized massacres, and even without that disaster thousands of refugees would die during the coming winter if housing were not found for them. Plowden concluded that the Armenians should abandon their hopes for a large state and turn from the Dashnaktsutiun to the sound leadership

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offered by the cultured elements in Armenian intellectual and commercial centers in the former Russian Empire: “I consider that as a Nation they are much maligned. Given a good Government, the country will develop very quickly. The people are industrious and good farmers and very docile, and the soldiers are really fine material.”70

Protests and Appeals In seeking to attenuate the disappointment of Armenian officials, Colonel Plowden had explained that Great Britain, although never an enthusiastic proponent of self-determination, was the only world power to have made that principle applicable in many regions. Britain alone had sent troops to the Caucasus, an enormously expensive operation, and had assisted the local governments: “I compared this with the other Nations who had come into the war late; had forwarded their theories and ideals, but had taken no steps whatever to send troops to help the small nations, but had, on the contrary, demobilized their troops first of all and had declined fur­ ther responsibility.”71 Plowden’s jibe was aimed at the Americans, who deplored the British retreat yet were unwilling to send their own troops to the Caucasus. In hundreds of messages, American consular, relief, and intelligence officials stressed the crisis in Armenia: a Turco-Tatar campaign was un­ derway to annihilate Armenia and continue wartime massacres; it was questionable whether Armenian survivors could endure another winter; relief efforts without adequate military protection were futile; the Ar­ menian army was denied weapons to defend the Republic while enemy forces were being armed to the teeth; the indecision of the Allies and the peace conference had emboldened conspiratorial elements and prevented the industrious Armenians from concentrating on reconstruction; the abrupt British withdrawal from Kars and Nakhichevan could not be justi­ fied either politically or militarily; the Armenians had become pawns in the designs of imperial powers which coveted lands with quickly exploita­ ble economic wealth and which courted so-called Muslim opinion by show­ ing partiality to Azerbaijan and declining to enforce the armistice terms in Anatolia and Transcaucasia. As the Muslim revolt spread from Baouk-Vedi to Nakhichevan in July, Vice-Consul Hooker A. Doolittle wrote the State Department that he had incontrovertible evidence that Turkish officers and agents throughout 70 FO 371/4159, 145863/521/44, App. D. 77 Ibid.

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Armenia were plotting to subjugate the Christian population. Even more than food and seed-grain, Armenia needed a mandatory power, final determination of her boundaries, and immediate Allied intervention to spare this “friendly nation from complete extinction.” Asking that the British government be pressed to intercede, Doolittle criticized General Cory’s hands-off policy as verging on betrayal of Allied pledges to liberate the Armenian people. He stated that the consequences of British with­ drawal were beyond prediction and that Armenia, “the only steadfast ally,” could be saved with 10,000 foreign soldiers.72 Benjamin B. Moore of the American Military Mission to South Russia sent similar messages to Major Royall Tyler, chief of military intelligence in the American peace delegation. It would be unfortunate, Moore warned, if the work of Colonel Haskell as Allied commissioner for Ar­ menia was simply to gather information and offer advice. Action, not discussion, and an effective commander, not a commissioner, were re­ quired. Moore complained that Allied irresolution during his five months in Tiflis had simply aggravated the situation and that, “unless the Allies take a definite course of action, the restoration of order in the Caucasus will be all but impossible.” It was not without reason, he added, that the Armenians felt betrayed.73 Major Joseph C. Green, head of the American Relief Administration in the Caucasus, informed Herbert Hoover and other relief officials that the Armenian authorities had always acted in consultation with British mili­ tary representatives, yet they had been left with no arms to face the challenge on three fronts. With a third of the country already under rebel control, prolonged nonintervention would lead to a disaster “more terri­ ble than the massacres in 1915” and “the Armenian nation will be crushed, to the everlasting shame of the Allies.” He became even more emphatic in the last week of July. Noting that Clarence Ussher had returned from Paris still hopeful that a repatriation plan could be implemented, Green bluntly stated that unless Armenia received immediate military assistance “repatriation will cease to be an issue as few will survive starvation and massacre.” General Cory had revealed that he was under orders not to interfere and that he could not even protect the relief organizations in Armenia. Both British and French officials, Moore added, deplored the passive role of the Americans.74 72 RG 59, 861.00/4875, 860J.01/24; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, reports of July 17, 3°, 31, 1919; RG 256, 867B.00/173/181/192/193; Papers of Robert F. Lansing, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts, Vol. 45, pp. 7771-7774; White Papers, Box 46, Armenia file, Doolittle report, July 24, 1919; Bliss Papers, Box 253, File 876, Armenia, nos. 11, 13. 73 RG 256, 184.01602/85/97/105; Bliss Papers, Box 253, File 876, Armenia, no. 9. 74 RG 256, 867B.00/174/180/184/185/202/205, 867B.4016/45; RG 59, 860J.01/31; White Papers, Box 46, Armenia file, Major Green’s reports, July 28, Aug. 2, 1919; Paris Peace

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To demonstrate their unanimity on the Caucasus situation, Doolittle, Moore, Green, and Ernest Yarrow dispatched a joint appeal to Paris and Washington on July 23. Since their predictions of the past months had in fact materialized, they warned that the Armenian republic would soon succumb to starvation and foreign aggression. The Erevan government, impatient to begin reconstruction, had been required to devote all its energy to self-preservation. No definite program of rebuilding and repa­ triation could be adopted until Allied ambiguities had been resolved. To Muslim conspirators the British withdrawal had signaled abandonment of Armenia, so they had become increasingly arrogant and were disrupting relief work. Across the border, moreover, the Turks now openly defied the British authorities. The American representatives pleaded that either a European force or Allied military advisers and technical support be sent to aid the Armenian army.*75 While the Americans in Transcaucasia waited in vain for a satisfactory response from Washington, a loud dissenting voice was heard from Con­ stantinople. Acting Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, senior American repre­ sentative in the Ottoman capital, expressed vehement opposition to the formation of a united Armenian state and to American political involve­ ment with the Armenians in communications to naval colleagues, govern­ ment departments, the American peace delegation, and to businessmen, philanthropists, missionaries, and politicians of many hues. Bristol, scorn­ ful of all minorities, hoped to reeducate responsible Americans who had been taken in by the popular portrayal of the “terrible Turk” and the torments suffered by Oriental Christians. He protested to the naval advis­ er of the American delegation: “There is no doubt in my mind of an influence continually exerted to involve America with Armenia and divert our attention from the big question of the whole Near East.” The Armeni­ ans had brought many of their woes upon themselves, and the encourage­ ment of the British authorities and American missionary-relief interests had emboldened the unscrupulous Armenian leaders to employ aggres­ sive tactics. The United States should not let itself be maneuvered into Armenia. “England should be compelled to remain in Caucasus. She went to the Caucasus for selfish reasons and she is leaving now for selfish Conference, X, 532. See also Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York, [1958]), pp. 142-14375 RG 59, 860J.01/32; RG 256, 867B.00/175, 184.021/127; White Papers, Box 46, Armenia file, July 23, 1919. When a summary of wires from American representatives was relayed to the British delegation, Robert Vansittart noted on August 1: “I suppose our evacuation was inevitable; but I wonder if it was realised that there was a strong balance of probability that it meant doing in the remaining Armenians. If that had been explained could not troops have been found to hold on at least till America’s decision-was known?” FO 608/78, 342/1/6/16807.

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reasons.”76 Bristol denied being pro-Turkish: “I do not believe I am pro-anything except what I believe is absolutely right and I try to follow that road and not give a damn for anybody else that don’t agree with me. If I am considered pro-Turk because I believe there are 20 million of Moslems out here that should be helped to gain modern civilization as well as 2 millions or so Armenians, I would like this fact to be known and then I am willing to stand on that basis. The Turk has been a devilish brute and he has not changed his spots, but you cannot change his spots by making a martyr of him, whereas, you can do something for him by giving him proper assistance.”77 A master of manipulation, Bristol selected excerpts from reports which would sustain his contentions even in the face of strong counterevidence. In an exchange of letters with Benjamin B. Moore, for example, Bristol revealed his penchant for distortion. Moore, after visiting Constantinople in August, wrote to Bristol: “All information obtained confirms my state­ ment to you that the Tartar attacks had not been provoked by the Armeni­ an Government, since in its wildest mood it could not think of adopting so suicidal a policy. The only place where the Armenians appear to have carried on a deliberate anti-Tartar agitation is in the Karabagh-Zangezur district, where—for reasons well known to you—they can hardly be blamed for doing so.” The most formidable case that might be made against the Armenians, Moore continued, was that their civil administra­ tion had been ineffectual and that General Dro had been unwilling to yield to the insurgents.78 In reply Bristol ignored the thrust of Moore’s message and touched only on those passages that supported his opinion: “The points you gave me in your letter in regard to the Armenians carrying out an anti-Tartar agitation in the Karabagh District and the bad civil administration in Nakhichevan were some of the points that I had heard of before and desired to confirm.. . . Your point on Dro not making peace is another point along the same line.. . . To state it again in a nut-shell I believe that the Armenian Government is a mere detail as compared to the big question of the whole of the old Turkish Empire.”79 Bristol’s confidence in his own expertise was enhanced even more when, thanks to valuable naval and social contacts, he was appointed United States high 76 For this and other messages with similar content, see Bristol Papers, Box 65, Armenia file, Bristol to Ammission, Aug. 4, 5, 15, 19, 1919; Box 1, Report for two weeks ending June 22, 1919; Box 31, Bristol to Benson, July 23, 1919; Box 66, Caucasus file, Bristol to Ammis­ sion, Aug. 4, 21, 1919; RG 256, 867B.00/205; RG 59, 861.00/938. 77 Bristol Papers, Box 31, Correspondence, Bristol to Rear Admiral Newton A. McCully, Oct. 10, 1919. 70 Ibid., Moore to Bristol, Aug. 17, 1919. 79 Ibid., Bristol to Moore, Sept. 16, 1919.

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commissioner in Constantinople on August 12, 1919, a post that gave him control over both naval and diplomatic offices.80 Like the Americans in Transcaucasia, the small French military mission at Tiflis was critical of the British. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre-Auguste Chardigny accused the English of being so eager to create stable Georgian and Azerbaijani states as avenues to the East and profitable markets that they were pressuring Armenia to renounce claims to Borchalu, Akhalkalak, Karabagh, and Zangezur. They had reneged on their promise to prevent the return of Khosrov Bek Sultanov to Karabagh after the June massacre and had rebuked the Armenian government even as Turkish and Azerbaijani agents were preaching subversion throughout the coun­ try. Viewing the insurrection in Kars and Nakhichevan as part of a wider movement, Chardigny regretted that General Cory had ignored his advice to return two British battalions to Armenia. After the announcement on August 1 that the Italians would not replace the British, Chardigny warned that neither the Volunteer'Army nor the Caucasus Mountains could seal out Bolshevik ferment or safeguard trade routes to North Persia. The Armenians needed arms and ammunition to combat Bolshevik-Turkish collusion. At Erevan, meanwhile, Captain Antoine Poidebard, proving that Khan Tekinskii and other foreign agents were involved in the insurrection, reinforced Armenian protests. He praised the fairness of the Armenian administration at Kars in including all religious elements, yet he also accurately predicted that without at least one British regiment the troubles would spread from Sharur-Nakhichevan to Kaghisman and Olti.81 Armenian appeals etched a picture of calamity. The Republic was the first target of the revived Pan-Turkic movement. Not a single Allied soldier remained in the country. The Turks rejoiced in Allied indecision. The Armenian people were exhausted. Repatriates were again fleeing. Three thousand fanatic Shahsevans were crossing from northern Persia to join in the carnage. Armenian villages in the Ordubad district were surrounded. Roads were blocked. The ammunition would soon be gone. The nation was nearly paralyzed. Why, cried Premier Khatisian after the fall of Davalu and Kulp, was Armenia being abandoned despite such great sacrifices and solemn Allied pledges? Could not the victorious powers 80 Polk Papers, Drawer 78/186. For Admiral Bristol’s career and his pronounced views on Near Eastern questions, see Peter M. Buzanski, “Admiral Mark L. Bristol and TurkishAmerican Relations, 1919-1922” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960). 01 See Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3186, dossier 5, 16N/3187, dossiers 2 and 3 passim.

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spare even a few officers and the ammunition to give the Armenians a fighting chance?82 News and rumors from the several fronts overshadowed all other mat­ ters in the Armenian Parliament. In his dramatic oratorical style, Avetik Sahakian spoke of the iron chain closing in on Erevan and summoned the nation to bring forward its every last resource.83 In mid-August the Parliament declared a state of national emergency, sent emissaries to encourage the men at the front, and appealed for help to the legislatures of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, Greece, Rumania, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Persia, China, and Japan. The English version of the appeal reads: “The Allied Governments and Parliaments have declared over and again that the triumph of the Allied forces would lead to the liberation of the small peoples. The Great World Conflict had ended with the victory of the Entente Powers yet one of those small peoples—the most unfortunate—the Armenian people is abandoned to the caprices of fate and its secular butchers, causing once again its bloodshed in profusion.” The Armenians had celebrated the Allied victory in the belief that emancipation and restitution would soon follow: “But months have passed, alas, nine entire months, and no measures have been taken in that sense. During those long months the Armenian escapees from T urkey. . . perished by the hundreds and by the thousands from famine and disease,” afraid to reenter their homeland because “Turkish bayonets [were] always directed towards their chests.” Encouraged by the unexpected clemency of the Allies, Turkey had resumed its traditional policy of massacre and was determined to destroy the Armenian republic in Transcaucasia: “And all these ferocities have taken place while the representatives of the Allied Governments are among us and when thousands of their soldiers are but two or three hours distant.. . . Thus, even after the Allied triumph, there remains for the Armenian people no other means of safeguarding its physical existence than to take up in the worst possible condition an unequal combat against the secular enemy of the Armenians and of civilization.” Although the call to arms would heighten suffering, increase famine and epidemic, create new orphans, lead to more exoduses, and further deplete the nation, it was the only alternative to perishing at the hands of the Turks. The appeal 82 See, for example, Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t., File 421/1, bulletins for 1919; RG 256, 184.611, S-H Bulletins 748/865/889/1028/1059/1201, 185.005/5/8; FO 371/3659, 115082/512/58; FO 608/80, File 342/1/16; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/ 18643. 83 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 21:3, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130.

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concluded: “If it is reserved for the Armenian people to be exterminated at the moment when thousands of Allied soldiers are located at Constantinople, Trebizond, Batum, Tiflis, Baku, at a moment when they can easily stay the hand of the butchers of the Armenian people, then it remains only to forward to the conscience of humanity its agonizing cries and to go to its fate with the firm resolution to fall with honor.”84 Such messages of despair spurred Armenian representatives and Armenophile societies abroad to greater activity. They wrote hundreds of letters in August 1919 to heads of state, foreign ministers, and lesser officials asking for interviews so they could once again present the Ar­ menian case. European and American newspapers demanded measures to save the tormented Armenian nation, but they usually stopped short of insisting on the use of armed force. On August 13 the London Times called upon the United States to accept the mandate, suggesting that meanwhile—or in the event America refused the mandate—the British carry on in the Caucasus.85 Highly respected men of many nations spoke up for Armenia: among them were Anatole France, Paul Painlevé, Camille Mauclair, Albert Thomas, Henry Barby, Bertrand Bareilles, Denys Cochin, Emile Doumergue, Frédéric Macler, Antoine Meillet, and Gabrielle Revel in France; A. Krafft-Bonnard and Benjamin Vallotton in Switzerland; Nicolae Iorga in Rumania; Luigi Luzzatti, Pietro Romanelli, Filippo Meda, and Adriano Gimorri in Italy; Johannes Lepsius, Armin T. Wegner, and Joseph Marquart in Germany; James Bryce, Harold Buxton, Aneurin Williams, G. P. Gooch, and Emily Robinson in Great Britain; James W. Gerard, James Cardinal Gibbons, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Elihu Root, William H. Taft, and Herbert Adams Gibbons in the United States. Throughout Christendom, clergymen focused upon the new Armenian martyrdom with appropriate biblical references and exhortations. Since Great Britain was the only power with both men and arms in Transcaucasia, the world outcry was mainly directed at London. As ap­ peals flowed in to 10 Downing Street, Aneurin Williams, T. P. O’Connor, and other supporters of Armenia in the House of Commons pelted the cabinet with questions: Had there been fresh massacres of Armenians by Turks and Tatars in Asia Minor and the Caucasus? Had Allied representa­ tives reported that large-scale massacres of Christians would follow with­ drawal of occupation troops? Were Kurds, Tatars, Turks, and Georgians attacking, or preparing to attack, the Armenian republic of Erevan? If so, 84 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, “Appeal of the Armenian Parliament,” File 8/8, File 232/131, no. 598, File 660/3, no- 1>6» Aug. 21, 1919: Georgian Archives, Box 26, book 44; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 63 bis; FO 371/3659, 140360/512/58. 85 London Times, Aug. 13:11, 1919: FO 371/3659, 115734/512/58.

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would the Armenians, as England’s friends in the late war, be rendered any assistance, or would they be left to their fate? Would the government report to the Paris Peace Conference on “the universal feeling of horror” that would be aroused should the Armenians, who had already lost a million people through war and massacre, be once again handed over to the same people who were guilty of “those foul and wholesale mass­ acres?”86 Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cecil Harmsworth evaded a direct reply but gave assurances that both the government and the peace conference were considering the problem. When chided by Arthur Balfour on the handling of these questions, Harmsworth explained that “the House is disposed generally to respect the Foreign Office attitude of reserve in important matters, but in the case of Armenia a good deal of feeling has been displayed.”87 To the relief of Harmsworth and the cabinet, Parliament recessed for two months on August 19, but not before Lord Robert Cecil, a relative moderate in Armenian affairs, had criticized the War Office for sending tons of military equipment to the White Armies while denying the Armenians even a single shipment: “If there is competition between helping General Denikin and the Armenians I think the latter have a first claim. They have been bur friends, and if we desert them they will certainly be destroyed.. . . I hope we shall riot have to deplore in a few months’ time the final extinction of a race which, whatever its faults, is a race which has had heroic passages in its history, and which has held aloft the banner of Christianity in a land in which that banner has not often been raised.”88 The Foreign Office under Lord Curzon often sympathized with the critics, yet the policy of military disengagement made it difficult to answer the parliamentary inquiries. Still it was the Foreign Office that attempted to secure, despite the uncooperativeness of other departments, the mili­ tary advisers and arms that the Armenians insisted would save them from annihilation. The Quest for Arms As armies demobilized and nations began to shift to peacetime produc­ tion, the major Allied countries sought to sell their surplus war matériel, 86 Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, CXIX, cols. 1070-1071, 13041306, 1676-1678. See also FO 371/3659, 115800/115832/118610/512/58; FO 371/3668, 117223/117227/11067/58. 87 FO 371/3668, 119697/11067/58; FO 371/3659, 115734/512/58. 88 Pari Deb.t CXIX, col. 2035.

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ranging from heavy equipment and mobile barracks to mess kits and candles, to friendly states. The White Armies of Russia received thousands of tons of supplies; the smaller Allied countries and particularly the new states that had gained recognition also benefited, as the goods were sold at or below cost and largely on credit. Armenian representatives in Europe hoped to get provisions for refugees and troops, who were in dire need of underclothing, boots, and overcoats. Despite Allied reluctance to grant credit to countries still without established boundaries, the Armenians believed that their special circumstances warranted the waiving of tech­ nicalities. The Allies had, after all, provided arms and subsidies during the war for the Armenian stand that slowed the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus, and they had acknowledged a moral obligation to the surviving Armenians. After unsuccessful initial efforts, Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar were encouraged in June by the negotiations between Armenia’s military envoy, General Gabriel G. Korganian, and the United States Liquidation Commission, which was disposing of the surplus goods of the American Expeditionary Force. A draft contract was signed on June 24 by Avetis Aharonian for the Republic of Armenia and endorsed by an agent of the AEF for the delivery of uniforms, blankets, medications, office equip­ ment, and other noncombatant matériel valued at nearly 4 million dollars, payable in installments commencing in 1922. But disappointment quickly followed; in July Aharonian was informed that there was insufficient time to get the contract approved and that all remaining AEF stocks, including the goods earmarked for Armenia, were being transferred to the jurisdic­ tion of the French government.89 The French, however, had already shown that they would sell only for hard currency or for merchandise in exchange. In February the Armenian government had requested 10,000 Lebel rifles, a model for which the army then had a large supply of ammunition. After more than four months the French Ministry of War intimated it could make the weapons available from arsenals in Bulgaria and Macedonia, but only on a cash-and-carry basis, at a price of 1,350,000 francs. Aharonian’s request for credit was denied.90 No more successful were applications to the British Disposal Board, even though trucks, carts, tents, and other equipment were readily avail­ able in Egypt and Salonica. Initial inquiries by James Malcolm, London 99 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 230/129, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919: Copies des Lettres, 1918— 1919 t., File 7/7, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t., Korganov and Ohandjanian to American Liquidation Commission, File 144/33, ^ W. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Tntesakan Hartser. 90 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 7/7, June 27, 1919, File 231/130, no. 356, File 234/133, H. H. Patviraktäiun, 1919—1920 t., Korganian report no. 6, Nov. 5, 1919.

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agent for the Armenian National Delegation, evoked no favorable re­ sponse, but when a special Armenian economic mission headed by Hovhannes Kachaznuni arrived in Europe, hopes revived that the Treasury’s policy of dealing only with established political entities could be circum­ vented. In submitting his credentials on July 25, Kachaznuni again recited Armenian sacrifices and contributions which entitled the Republic to claim a share of the surplus goods. His petition initiated a round of exchanges among the British section of the Supreme Economic Council, the Army Disposal Board, and the Treasury Office, but on August 15 the Foreign Office was informed that the Treasury was not disposed “at the moment” to extend credit.91 Kachaznuni and Malcolm then sought the intercession of Curzon. By that time, however, the Foreign Office had come to regard the need for arms and ammunition as even more crucial than the need for goods. The question of military aid for the Armenians absorbed the attention of several British departments in 1919, with the peace delegation and the Foreign Office generally in favor and the War Office, in league with the India Office and the Treasury, adamantly opposed.92 When reports of renewed bloodshed reached Paris in July and August, Robert Vansittart minuted the dispatches with expressions reflecting the position of the delegation’s political section: “Unless our whole Armenian policy is to be a frost, the Armenians should get the bulk of whatever stores there are available when we leave.” “The Armenians will go under if they are not supplied with arms and ammunition.” “Our withdrawal means leaving the Armenians to their fate—unless they are armed, which should have been done long ago.”93 Sir Eyre Crowe, chief of the political section, added: “The sad fate of the Armenians is largely due to the failure of the Allies to adopt in time the only measure which could have averted it, which is the military occupation of Asiatic Turkey by the Allies themselves.”94 Meanwhile on August 8, Lord Balfour, as head of the delegation, asked the War Office and the Foreign Office to clarify the proposals to retain “moral control” in the Caucasus and to leave military supplies for the Armenians.95 Worried by the seeming reemergence of Pan-Islamic agitation, the For­ eign Office agreed that it was necessary to palliate the effects of the « FO 371/3671,109090/117356/117415/109090/58; FO 608/79,342/1V 15998/17635: RePof Arm. Archives, File 7/7. 92 See FO 608/78, File 342/1/6 passim. 93 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/16808/17111/17415/17550; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/13829. 94 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/16808. « FO 371/3659, 114087/512/58.

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evacuation of Transcaucasia. Yet the intensity of that sentiment differed among departmental clerks, section chiefs, and permanent ranking offi­ cers, the latter tending to be more reserved in recommending additional foreign commitments. As a student of history, however, Lord Curzon could never fully dissociate national interest from political morality. He often spoke of England’s obligation to the Armenians since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which at British insistence had forced the Russian armies to withdraw from Turkish Armenia and had made protection of the Armenians a collective European responsibility. In mid-August Curzon again appealed to Chief of Staff Wilson to delay the withdrawal from Transcaucasia and asked the War Office to help provide the Armenian army with the means for self-defense.96 The War Office, though also concerned about the British position in Asia, regarded as impractical the suggestions of the peace delegation and the foreign ministry. Churchill felt that the best way for Great Britain to counteract anti-British agitation wa? to demonstrate fair play by dealing moderately with the Ottoman Empire rather than by policing Trans­ caucasia and Anatolia or furthering Armenian territorial ambitions; it was understood, of course, that Turkish sovereignty in the Arab provinces would yield to Allied-sponsored Muslim governments. On August 26 the War Office summarized its position: “. . . the Army Council are strongly opposed to the issue of further armaments to the Armenians at this juncture, as they consider that such action would tend to aggravate the dangerous situation which already exists in Armenian Transcaucasia.”97 The Foreign Office termed the War Office attitude “wrong-headed” and “absurd,” especially since “the Tartars and Turks are not now threat­ ening any disputed district such as Karabagh, but the capital and the heart of the Armenian republic itself.”98And when the peace delegation learned on August 27 that the military authorities did not favor the idea of supplying the Armenians, Vansittart wrote disparagingly: It is all very well for W. O. officials “not to favour the idea.” They are not going to get their throats cut. The W. O. have war material “to burn.” . . . It is a plain fact that the Armenians are the only unarmed, or inadequately armed, people in the Caucasus. The French refused to sell them arms because they could not pay on the nail. As far as I can make out we mean to do nothing either. In my opinion the minimum we can do is to put them in a position to defend themselves before we go. I have been saying so for months, but still nothing is done . The matter has been handled in a manner that is not creditable. Everybody foreknows the result 96 Ibid., end. 97 FO 371/3659, 121298/512/58. 99 Ibid.

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of our departure, and yet nobody will take the one easy step that we can take to minimise that result. There has been enough hovering about this, and I hope F. O. and W. O. will both be told that H. M. G. [His Majesty’s Government] insist."

Without revealing the intensity of the interdepartmental friction, Vansittart and E. G. Forbes Adam intimated to the Armenian representatives at the peace conference that the cabinet was reviewing the Transcaucasian problem and that it might be prudent to have a military specialist available in London. On August 23 Aharonian named General Korganian for the London assignment and notified Lord Balfour of the mission’s objectives, explaining, “It is neither men nor cadre which we lack, but rather arms, munitions, equipment, and rations.” These supplies would not be used for aggressive purposes; as a guarantee, all such matériel could be placed under Allied supervision. The Azerbaijani military forces and the Muslim population had been well armed by the Ottomans. The Georgians had seized the arsenals of the former Russian Caucasus Army and had also obtained equipment from the Germans in 1918. Aharonian asked for military parity among the Transcaucasian states so that Armenia could defend its hard-won independence.99100 Arriving in London on August 29, General Korganian supplied statisti­ cal and technical details to Colonel Gribbon, Near Eastern analyst on the general staff. Gribbon was wary of the incessant cries about impending massacres (“The story is an old one”) and of most Armenian politicians (“Aharonian personally strikes me as being a mouthy sort of stump orator though he is undoubtedly capable”),101 but he held General Andranik in high esteem and was impressed by Korganian’s bearing and professional knowledge. Admitting that the issue was not the availability of arms but the political ramifications of showing favor to the Armenians, Gribbon nevertheless promised Korganian that the War Office would consider a formal request submitted to it. A memorandum dated September 2,1919, outlined the structure of the Armenian army and listed the matériel required to increase its effective strength to 30,000 men. This proposal, Korganian explained, was simply an emergency measure designed to secure the Russian Armenian provinces; a general reorganization of the armed forces should follow later.102 99 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18333. 100 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, no. 515. Another copy of these credentials is in file 7/7. See also FO 371/3659, 127730/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20367. 101 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/5936. 102 FO 371/3659, 12946/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20367; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian’s report no. 5, Oct. 29, 1919.

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In response to his request for an interview with Lord Curzon, Korganian was received by Near Eastern specialist George Kidston at the For­ eign Office on September 10. Kidston liked Korganian’s presentation and his assurance that “the Armenians would of course be willing to place all their forces under the control of British officers.” In his résumé of the interview, Kidston noted that, since the War Office had already rejected the arms proposal, the Foreign Office had to decide whether to urge reconsideration: “Personally, I think we should do so pointing out that if this offer to put the Armenian army under British direction would be accepted the risk to which the W. O. refer would obviously be much lessened if not altogether eliminated.” Proceeding cautiously, the Foreign Office broached the issue only through informal conversations with mem­ bers of the general staff.103 After nearly a month in London, Korganian still had received no official communication from any British government agency. He wrote Aharonian that everyone seemed bored and tired of listening to Armenian spokesmen. The atmosphere in the War Office was made even more chilly by an unpleasant episode involving Colonel Rawlinson. Taking Korganian to be a Russian officer, Rawlinson had spoken of his recent experiences at Erzerum, his keen admiration for Mustafa Kemal, and the likelihood that the Turkish army had already struck across the frontier because of the misbehavior “of the lords of Kars, Alexandropol, and Erivan and the rabble who are called Armenian soldiers.” Although Rawlinson was em­ barrassed and apologetic when Korganian protested, the Armenians re­ garded the British officer’s sentiments as an accurate gauge of the disposition in the War Office.104 Korganian was encouraged, however, when he learned on September 24 that the Army Council had become a little more flexible and was now asking the opinion of field commanders. On September 29 the Foreign Office, having already intimated that if Lord Curzon had his way the Armenians would be given both arms and surplus equipment, wrote that the matter was now under “earnest consideration.” The following day the Foreign Office formally asked the War Office to consent at least to the dispatch of some British officers and military supplies, excluding arms and ammunition. Optimistic because War Office officials had indicated privately that such a request would be received favorably, Assistant For­ eign Secretary John Tilley predicted on October 4 that, since the War Office supported Denikin wholeheartedly and the Armenians were on 103 FO 371/3659, 126440/126946/512/58. See also FO 371/3659, 131467/512/58. 104 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian’s report no. 5. See also Rawlinson, op. cit.y pp. 249-251; FO 371/3668, 122957/11067/58.

good terms with the Volunteer Army, Churchill’s people would probably come around to helping the Armenians.105 Tilley was mistaken. The Ministry of Munitions and the Treasury Office refused to sanction credits for surplus army issue, and the War Office failed to show any greater cordiality toward Korganian. On October 10 the Armenian envoy informed Churchill and Curzon that he was depart­ ing for Paris but would return whenever His Majesty’s Government so indicated. Reporting to the Armenian Ministry of Military Affairs, Kor­ ganian pointed to the intense interdepartmental rivalry in London: “The more the War Office seemed to turn against us, the more the Foreign Office moved in our direction.” George Kidston had not concealed the fact that the Foreign Office was incensed by the shortsighted conduct of the Imperial General Staff and the Department of Military Operations.106 On October 23, as the contest continued, the War Office announced that the Army Council had neither arms nor equipment available to meet the demand, adding that it was necessary to take into account “the jealousy which will be created in the neighbouring states” and “the danger of increasing the hostility of Mohammedans in Turkey both to the Armeni­ ans and towards the Entente Powers.”107 Typical Foreign Office commentaries followed: “The W. O. again reject the idea of assisting the Armenians, on grounds which seem to apply rather to the supply of arms and munitions rather than of boots and coats and tents. We have waited for over 3 weeks for this & it is a jejune performance when it arrives. We already knew that the W. O. would not supply arms & equipment for the Armenians, but what we wanted to know was whether they would furnish officers & advisers for the reorganisation of the Armenian army. On this point nothing is said.”108 That question was raised once more on November 3, but the War Office claimed that no reply could be given until it received detailed information on such matters as the number of officers needed, their status while serving in Armenia, and arrangements for pay.109 The British delegation in Paris, meanwhile, looked on helplessly. Hear­ ing that General Milne’s recommendation to provide the Armenians with 105 FO 371/3659, 131467/135151/512/58; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian’s report no. 5. 106 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian’s report nos. 5-6; FO 371/3660, 141128/ 512/58. 107 FO 371/3660, 145108/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20367. 108 Ibid. 109 FO 371/3660, 145108/151033/512/58. At the end of October, Korganian also conferred with members of the Italian delegation about the supply of arms, but this approach also proved fruitless. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 7/7.

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arms and equipment had been spurned in the War Office so as not to “aggravate the situation,” Vansittart noted with ridicule: “Perhaps in their eyes the situation will be improved (or whatever is the reverse of ‘aggra­ vated’) if the Armenians are ‘dealt with’ by their neighbours. But if they are, we shall be responsible, not because we did not stay, that we cannot have done—but because we did not leave them some munitions—that we could have done.”110 Writing Kidston on November 17, Eyre Crowe deprecated the pro-Turkish proclivities of the War Office: “There is surely more danger to the Armenians, who still exist in this part of the world, of being attacked and killed by Turks and Tartars rather than the latter being attacked and killed by Armenians. For the rest, we appear to be under some obligation to the Armenians in this matter, not only owing to the past public utterances of our statesmen but also because of our forced withdrawal from the Caucasus.” The War Office concern about Turkish animosity was irrelevant since the “Young Turk and Nationalist movement” was already hostile to the Allies and outraged by the peace conference’s rebuttal to the Turkish delegation in June. Crowe wanted the Foreign Office to urge reconsideration of support for the Armenians and hoped that the government would not be influenced by officials like Colonel Gribbon, who apparently wished to keep Turkey as large as possible even at the price of continued subservience of the former subject peoples.111 When the War Office did in fact reconsider the question early in 1920, however, it was no longer in the context of the Turco-Tatar threat to Armenia but rather of the southward thrust of the Red Armies of Russia.

Stabilization of the Front The minutes and correspondence of British officials in September oc­ casionally suggested that predictions of imminent massacres and Turkish military involvement in Armenia were exaggerated. In fact, even as the British missions withdrew from Kars and Erevan at the end of August, advising the Armenians to abandon Igdir and most of the province of Kars, the initiative on the field of battle shifted. Between August 28 and 30, the 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments thwarted an enemy attempt to encircle Sarikamish and then assumed the offensive. On the thirty-first the detachments south of Sarikamish recaptured Karakurt and advanced to the hills above Bashkeuy, while to the north the Devik detachment 110 FO 608/85, 347/1/6/18896. 111 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20367 (British Documents, IV, 892—895).

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drove into the strategic Verishan heights and into several villages, includ­ ing Verishan, Bashkeuy (near Old boundary), and Bekkeuy. Two days later Colonel Mirimanian’s 4th Regiment struck Ayyub Pasha’s forces near Kizilkilisa and captured Mount Gumridagh, driving the stunned Muslim partisans and refugees toward Barduz. Meanwhile, Kurdish tribesmen trying to isolate Merdenek and Kaghisman by blocking the roads to Kars were pushed back into the mountains. With most border posts again under Armenian control by early September, the Christian villagers gradually returned to their fields to salvage whatever was left of their crops.112 These local military successes were treated as momentous victories by the Armenians. The Parliament praised the officers and especially the troops who had so bravely faced tremendous hardships and superior enemy forces. At Kars thanksgiving services were conducted in the newly reconsecrated Church of the Holy Apostles, and a victory parade helped reassure the apprehensive inhabitants. On that occasion the 7th Infantry Regiment was organized under the command of Western Armenian parti­ san leader (khmbapet ) Sebouh, becoming the first military formation to use the national language at all levels.113 That the Armenians persevered was owing neither to the countless appeals on their behalf nor to the efforts of their envoys in Europe but rather to the indirect bonds between the Armenian general staff and the Armed Forces of South Russia. For General Denikin, the collapse of Armenia, the only pro-Russian state in the Caucasus, would lead to renewed Turkish activity in that area and would jeopardize his maneuvers in the North Caucasus and his relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Tiflis and Baku governments could not readily concentrate all available military strength against Denikin so long as they suspected a secret alliance between the Volunteer Army and Armenia. Not surprisingly, therefore, in August Russian representatives in Europe called for support of the Armenians, appealing to the “feeling of humanity of the British Govern­ ment, begging them to continue to defend the Armenians in the Caucasus against the menace of the Turco-Tartars.”114 Denikin himself asked the Allied Powers how they viewed the peril to Armenia and the concentration 112 For details of the military action in September, see Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a! 8a, reports of Colonel of the General Staff Alexandre K. Schneur. Nearly all reports and corre­ spondence of the ministry of military affairs were in Russian and remained so long after the other ministries had begun the transition to Armenian. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no- *28, Sept. 4, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 3:2, 4:2, 12:4, 1919; Vratzian, op. cit., P- 273113 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 9:2, 12:4, 1919. 114 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17550; FO 371/3659, 121318/512/58. See also British Documents, IV, 741.

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of large Turkish forces along the frontier.115 But even more important, early in September his staff diverted a shipment of 3 million rounds of ammunition to the Armenian army.116 That the crates were transported overland from Batum without incident might suggest that local British authorities closed their eyes to the operation. The Foreign Office, however, was mystified when Premier Khatisian admitted that the military ministry had received a million rounds of ammunition and that the priority needs were now winter clothing and technical equipment. British officials in Tiflis first intimated that the ammunition had come from the Italian military mission and then reported that the source had apparently been an American ship. The actual supplier was never clearly identified, and the Foreign Office, relieved in view of the War Office’s attitude toward the Armenians, chose not to pursue the matter.117 With ammunition replenished, the Armenian army continued oper­ ations to the north of Sarikamish in September, capturing the border posts through which Ayyub Pasha had previously received arms from Hasankale. Wounded in the skirmishes near Barduz, Ayyub withdrew toward Olti along with a host of Muslim refugees from districts taken by the Armenians. By October the influence of Turkish officers in Olti had weakened and the Kurdish beks began to think about seeking accommo­ dation with the Armenian government.118 The hardships of the indigenous Muslims were increased by sharp rivalry between Turkish and Azerbaijani agents. General Karabekir, for example, was furious that one such official, Ismail Bey, was trying to reorganize the defunct Southwest Caucasus Government under Azer­ baijani auspices, recruit Turkish officers for Azerbaijani service, put Azer115 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18167; FO 371/3659, 129425/512/58; WO 95/4958, Sept. 11, 1919, IP 1788. 116 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t.f Foreign Minister to Aharonian, Secret, Sept. 22, 1919, File 3/3, General Araratov to Korganov, Sept. 22, 1919. Araratian complained that Armenia’s military difficulties and needs had been explained to every Allied representative who had been in the Caucasus since the end of the war. Yet the Allies had done nothing. The Volunteer Army alone had helped by providing 3 million bullets, and a workshop was being assembled to adapt the ammunition for use in 3-line rifles. The army, according to Araratian, was made up of 25,000 men, of whom 15,000 could be put on the lines as combatants. He emphasized the importance of securing 15,000 to 20,000 3-line Lebel rifles and matching ammunition. 117 FO 37i/3659» 129090/134894/512/58. 118 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8a/8a, Svodka no. 1, File 421/1 no. 81, Oct. 3, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 24:3, 1919; Erkir, Oct. 12:1, 1919; FO 371/3659-3660, 134002/157883/ 512/58. For details of Khatisian’s subsequent goodwill visit in the province of Kars, see the November 1919 issues of Haradj and Ashkhatavor, bulletins in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, and Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), pp. 135- 137 *

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baijani currency in circulation, and even open an Azerbaijani information bureau at Erzerum. Believing that the Baku government intended to gain control of Olti and Ardahan by patronizing the Kurds, Karabekir sent additional officers into those regions with orders to suppress all agitation in the name of a so-called Kurdish republic.119 In the Surmalu uezd, the Armenian administration remained confined to the plain of Ararat, since the roads from Kulp to Kaghisman, Orgov to old Bayazit, and Aralikh to Maku were held by the Kurdo-Tatars. Frequent nighttime raids from Orgov and Dashburun peaked on Septem­ ber 21 with the plunder of Igdirmava and the penetration of Igdir itself. In swift flanking operations, however, Dro’s forces inflicted heavy casual­ ties upon the raiders, who scattered their booty as they fled up the slopes of Mount Ararat. In hot pursuit the Igdir detachment and Turkish Ar­ menian volunteer bands put the torch to Muslim settlements through which they passed, condemning the villagers to the misery of refugee existence along the Bayazit frontier. For the rest of the year, hostilities in the Surmalu sector were limited to skirmishes in the transitional zone between plain and mountain.120 The least satisfactory front, from the Armenian point of view, was to the south, where wire entanglements and trenches facing Baouk-Vedi and Davalu were situated 10 versts from field headquarters at Khamarlu and only 37 versts (25 miles) from Erevan. The Armenians there had to be entirely defensive, since the Muslim buttress extended all the way to Norashen and Nakhichevan. To the southeast the Daralagiaz detachment, based at Keshishkend, was able to protect the route of ascent from Nakhi­ chevan by retaking the strategic village of Sultanbek in August. Over that passageway several thousand refugees gained the safety of Daralagiaz and Nor-Bayazit; other small parties reached Khamarlu, Zangezur, and the Persian side of the Araxes. By autumn only a few thousand Armenians were left in the broad corridor from Davalu to Julfa.121 The Azerbaijani flag was hoisted throughout Sharur-Nakhichevan, with Samed Bey Jamalinskii acting as governor-general, Colonel Halil Bey as commander in chief, and Kalb Ali Khan Nakhichevanskii as chief of staff. Samed Bey had come from Baku with instructions to bring the region under Azerbaijan. In his first letter to General Kiazim Karabekir, 119 Karabekir, op. cit., p. 399. 120 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Schneur to Korganov, Qperativnaia svodka; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 20:3, 24:3, Nov. 2:2, 1919; Sahakian, op. cit., pp. 32—48; Baghdasarian, op. cit., pp. 206-209; Archives de l’Armée 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 33 bis; FO 371/3659, 133799/134002/ 512/58. 121 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 13:2, 26:2, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 18:3, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 25:4, 1919. See also FO 371/3660, 148767/512/58.

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dated September 3, 1919, Samed Bey outlined his duties in safeguarding half a million Muslims from Armenian oppression and expressed grati­ tude for the men and assistance sent from Erzerum. Halil Bey had over­ whelmed the enemy, thanks to Allah, yet the faithful of Zangibasar and Surmalu were in jeopardy and “it rests on your conscience to protect these Muslims from suppression.” In his cover letter, Halil Bey gave Karabekir additional information on the Armenian military positions, the brave decision of the Zangibasar district to expel all Armenian officials even though it lay within Armenian lines, and the difficulty of helping Surmalu, where twenty-four Muslim villages had been razed. The enemy was nonetheless disorganized and demoralized. Halil explained that he was upholding Azerbaijani jurisdiction from Julfa to Baouk-Vedi and was receiving funds from Samed Bey. Azerbaijan had taken no further steps to annex Zangezur, but Halil had given assurances of Turkish cooperation when that time came. Colonel Halil, noting that he was assuming com­ mand of all local forces, requested the dispatch of several junior staff officers and a physician, small favors granted by the XV Corps commander.122 In the war of words, Armenian sources graphically portrayed the suf­ fering of Christian survivors subject to slave labor in Sharur-Nakhichevan, whereas Azerbaijani versions emphasized the care accorded nonbelliger­ ent Armenians and the peaceful nature of Armeno-Muslim relations in the absence of the “brutal Erevan bandits.” An investigation undertaken by American relief officials Clarence D. Ussher and Carlton S. Ayer be­ tween September 17 and 26 sustained Armenian assertions but not with­ out disparaging the ability of Armenians to administer other peoples. At their first stop they found that of the 7,000 Armenians of the Khanukhlar district, the 2,400 who remained were concentrated in one of the eight settlements and prevented from returning to their own homes and fields. They were entirely destitute. Ten to twenty died each day from malnutri­ tion, malaria, and dysentery. Turkish soldiers had vented their passions upon these unfortunates, the licentiousness having become so rampant as to victimize even Muslim women until Halil Bey meted harsh punishment 122 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 328-330. See also FO 371/3670, 14013/145423/72426/58. In the autumn of 1919 Mustafa Kemal wrote that the Armenians in Erevan and Nakhichevan, believing that they had set up a real government, tried to seize certain positions but were beaten back by the Muslims. This weakness had given the impression that the Armenians could not endure as a separate government, a viewpoint that was spreading in Europe and America. Thus, Armenian claims to self-government had lost much of their appeal. See Mustafa Kemal, Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, Nutuk, Kemal Atatürk: Vesikalar, III (Istanbul, [i960]), 1018—1019. $ee also Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 80-92.

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to the worst offenders. The Armenians were so terrified that they were afraid to accept the relief funds Ussher had brought. Before leaving the village Ussher and Ayer were ordered back to Engidja by Halil Bey, who subjected the pair to harrowing treatment. “He was savage in his talk regarding the Peace Conference and the Allies, declaring himself an enemy of them all and he called President Wilson an ass.” The reception accorded by Kalb Ali Khan at Nakhichevan on September 19 was far more decent: “He was reasonable in his talk, but announced that no Armenian would be admitted to live in Azerbaidjan. He said it was not possible. Then he modified it, saying no Armenian government would be permitted to rule them.” Ussher observed that nearly all the Armenian villages in the region were either deserted or occupied by Muslims, who were expropriating the crops. The Armenians had been starved to such an extent that they were selling their properties for a few supplies, and when the paltry sums they received were exhausted “they will be but serfs to the Moslems.” The 800 people of Tazakend (Astabad), for example, had not resisted the Muslims and had disarmed but were now without food and were even being prevented from traveling to Nakhichevan. In Nakhichevan, Ussher and Ayer also met with Samed Bey, a graduate of the University of Petrograd and “an affable young man of 26 years,” who professed deep sympathy for Muslim and Armenian refugees alike. He was entrusted with 27,000 imperial rubles for the destitute of Khanukhlar, and the American relief officials personally distributed 20,000 rubles sent by the Armenian Ministry of Military Affairs for the prisoners of war, only 127 of whom still survived. After visiting Julfa, Ordubad, and Akulis, the Americans again conferred with the Muslim leaders on Sep­ tember 24. Samed Bey asked that all further relief be channeled through the local administration, especially as the inhabitants had come to believe that the Americans were trying to impose Armenian rule upon them. Halil Bey revealed that he had warned the Armenian government ten days earlier that, unless the aggression against Baouk-Vedi ceased, “he would show them some fight compared with which the occurrences in Nakhi­ chevan (45 villages destroyed and 10,000 massacred), would seem child’s play.” The rebellion, he claimed, had been spawned by the “unjust black­ mailing government of the Armenians in Nakhichevan.” By the time Ussher returned to Erevan on September 26, he had reached the following conclusions: The remnant of Armenians at Nakhichevan and Sharur are without clothing, fuel, seed, implements, cattle, money, doors, windows for their homes. The Tartars are well supplied with cattle formerly largely Armenian property.

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The roads into the hill country close in a few weeks. Unless provisions be transported before the snow falls, cold and famine will probably wipe out the majority o f the population. Either provision the people under American super­ vision or arrange for safe deportation [of Armenians] with foreign escort. The retention by the Armenian Government of Tartar prisoners and the slow murder of the Armenian prisoners of war are matters of great irritation. The Armenian prisoners are so poorly supplied with medicines and comforts that more than 300 have died. The Tartars are so eager for the return of their men that an exchange might be arranged which will lessen irritation. Most of the murders, rape and robberies are committed by Turkish soldiers imported by Khalil Bey. Turkish officers and soldiers unable to speak Russian are frequently seen. They should be removed from the country. Under present circumstances it is impossible for either Tartar or Armenian to justly govern the other race. Recent events have made antipathies too strong and neither race can trust the other. Both races desire American or British control with absolute power. A few individuals such as Khalil Bey and Kelb Ali Khan might regret the loss of personal power. They are feared but not loved by the people.123

But as in the case of Clarence Ussher’s scheme for repatriation to the eastern vilayets, the question of implementation remained unsolved. The summer of insurgency had been costly for the Armenian republic. Its authority was effectively excluded from much of the fertile Araxes valley; summer crops had been lost or heavily damaged; the army, with hundreds of casualties, had reached the end of its resources; newly re­ turned refugees had again been expelled; the entire population of Ar­ menia was strained and exhausted. In such circumstances the endurance of the Armenian soldiers was remarkable. A dismal lot wearing tattered clothes and carrying outdated weapons, they had not lost spirit and may well have preserved the Republic by holding the Kars front. Yet even as the peasants returned to the villages around Sarikamish, the Armenians had little cause to believe that their tribulations had ended. Their appeals for external assistance had been futile, and even the small British missions in the country were closed. Moreover, the 27th Division, from which so much had been expected at the end of 1918, was disbanding at Batum in fulfillment of the policy long advocated by Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Worldwide attention focused briefly on the British military with­ drawal from Transcaucasia. 123 RG 256, 184.021/285; FO 371/3666, 168733/1015/58. See also the eyewitness account of F. Treadwell Smith in RG 256, 867B.00/266/279, and FO 371/3672, 142160/133200/58.

5

The British Withdrawal

The British decision to proceed with the evacuation of Transcaucasia evoked renewed appeals from Allied officials and indigenous governing bodies throughout the Near East and South Russia, humanitarian and religious societies worldwide, industrial concerns and chambers of com­ merce, spokesmen for the Assyrian and Nestorian minorities, and nearly every Armenian community from Calcutta to Manchester and from Addis Ababa to Tulare, California.1 It seemed that only Russian Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists would rejoice, ascribing the British retreat to the surge of anticolonial revolutionary sentiment in Asia. The efforts of the peace conference to deal with the crisis produced negligible results; Nonetheless, after extensive international and personal diplomacy, the British government, having evacuated almost all its armed forces in the Caucasus, made a few temporary concessions. A Point of Unity Fear and suspicion of the Armed Forces of South Russia pressed Georgia and Azerbaijan into the petitioner’s role that had long been the lot of the Armenians. That role became more pronounced after August 4, when the British command recognized a new demarcation line extending Denikin’s jurisdiction to the frontiers of the two Transcaucasian states and tacitly acknowledging the suppression of the Mountaineer Republic of the North Caucasus and Daghestan.2 In advocating the southward shift of the line, 1 See, for example, Britain, FO 371/3659-3660, 136677/141065/150739/512/58; FO 371/ 3668, 115619/116466/117046/11067/58; Cab 24/87, G.T. 8006, 8052. 2 FO 371/3662, 100552/108889/1015/58; FO 371/3668, 115283/116229/116294/11067/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17550; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/17705/17896; WO 95/4958, South Russia, 109

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the War Office overrode the objections of General Milne and General Cory with the contention that “it would be futile and even worse to insist now on an arrangement which would be impossible to enforce when all our troops and representatives are withdrawn.”3Compounding the alarm in Tiflis and Baku was the fact that the British commodore of the Caspian flotilla (Norris) had already begun to close down the base on Chechen Island and transfer the armed vessels to Denikin’s staff at Petrovsk.4 Halfhearted assurances by Cory and General Shuttleworth that Denikin would not dare violate the demarcation line or engage the fleet for purposes other than the anti-Soviet campaign, since he depended on Allied support, were trusted no more than professions of goodwill by the Volunteer Army’s representatives in Transcaucasia.5 In this situation the cabinets of Noi Zhordania and Nasib Bek Usubbekov joined the parties seeking retention of the British division in Trans­ caucasia, offering to make generous economic concessions and to bear all incumbent expenditures. Foreign Minister Evgenii Gegechkori, in repeat­ ing Georgian claims to the province of Batum, suggested that the British might keep the port as a coaling station, naval base, and trade center.6 He and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mohammed Jafarov also instructed their Paris delegations to explain to the European public that the principle of nonintervention, entirely correct in relation to Russia proper, required modification in the Caucasus, where its rigid application would actually subvert the higher principle of self-determination.7 Such appeals stirred a bittersweet reaction in London in view of the radical pronouncements of Iraklii Tsereteli and other Menshevik veterans and the coolness with Caucasus and Turkestan, General Staff War Diary, Aug. 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 1919; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 5, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 2; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, p. 247. 3 WO 32/5694, Director of Military Operations (P. de B. Radcliffe) to Director of Military Intelligence (W. Thwaites), July 7, 1919. Nearly 3 million members of the British armed forces had been demobilized by July 1919. O f the remaining 1,200,000 men, 534,000 were in the Home Army, 420,000 in the Army of the Rhine, 105,000 in the Army of the Middle East, 76,000 in the Army of India, 41,000 in the Army of the Black Sea, 17,000 in Russia, and 7,000 in Italy. It was estimated that, with the withdrawal from the Caucasus, the Army of the Black Sea would be reduced to 10,000 men. See FO 608/85, 347/1/6/16955. 4 FO 371/3668, 114455/11067/58; WO 95/4955, 39th Brigade War Diary, Aug. 1, 1919; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, p. 245. 5 FO 371/3663, 138576/1015/58; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 3, 5, 1919; Bulletin Géorgien d’informations, no. 12 (Sept. 18, 1919), 3. 6 FO 371/3668, 113402/11067/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17550; FO 608/88, 356/2/7/17528/ 17962; FO 406/42, no. 48; WO 33/947, no. 5010; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 2, 1919. See also British Documents, III, 490-492. 7 FO 371/3668, 116989/119584/11067/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17550.

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which the Georgians and Azerbaijanis had received the British occu­ pational forces less than a year earlier.8 General Denikin, too, deplored the British evacuation, believing that it would quicken Bolshevik-Turkish conspiracy, add to the tribulations of Russian nationals in Georgia and Azerbaijan, disrupt the communication system in Transcaucasia, and necessitate the diversion of an army to that sector. It was intolerable that Azerbaijan should have sole access to the vast petroleum resources at Baku or that Georgia should control Batum, the western gateway to Transcaucasia. The British military mission attached to Denikin’s headquarters (Denmiss) labeled the Caucasus a hotbed of Bolshevik-German-Turkish collusion and urged that the petty govern­ ments there be warned that any hostile act toward the White Armies would result in a British naval blockade.9 In this dilemma the War Office annoyed all parties by insisting that Denikin concentrate fully against the Red Army and by spurning Georgian and Azerbaijani appeals to restore the previous demarcation line laid down by the British in June.10 There was some hope that a British political mission being sent to the Caucasus might ease the tension. The Wardrop Mission Shortly after the British withdrawal from Transcaucasia had been decided upon, the Foreign Office recommended that a political mission take over nonmilitary functions earlier assumed by army personnel. Curzon and Kidston, resenting the near monopoly of the War Office in the Caucasus, complained that the Foreign Office was left uninformed and “out in the cold” even in political affairs. The placing of political officers in the region would therefore partly compensate for the communication gap between these two vital ministries of state.11 Early in June, Curzon approved the nomination of John Oliver Wardrop, a specialist in Georgian studies and a former consul general at Moscow, and the War Office gave its assent on July 2, the day it was reported unofficially that the Italian expedition to 8 See, for example, the Georgian Menshevik declaration at the international labor confer­ ence at Lucerne: “ ‘Demokraticheskoe’ pravitel’stvo Gruzii i angliiskoe komandovanie,” comp. Semen Sef, Krasnyi arkhiv, XXI (1927), 170-173. 9 FO 371/3663, 123425/132316/134141/1015/58; Cab 24/87, G.T. 8051^09 5 /4 9 5 8 -4 9 5 9 , South Russia, British Military Mission, 1919-1920. 10 FO 371/3662-3663, 80442/85677/100552/110080/121653/129367/1015/58; British Docu­ ments, III, 3290; WO 33/974, no. 4657. See WO 32/5678 and 32/5694 for files on Denikin’s operations in the North Caucasus and British reactions in 1919. 11 FO 371/3662, 80442/1015/58; FO 371/3667, 19030/5890/58, 82890/11067/58.

the Caucasus had been abandoned.12 Wardrop was pleased by the Italian decision, which again gave Great Britain the opportunity to develop long-range associations with the new Caucasian republics. Though hopeful that a British force would be left to support his mission, he was certain of success whatever the decision because of “reasons personal to me and the fact that I have been in touch with the people of Georgia of all classes and parties for 32 years.”13 The Foreign Office appointed Wardrop chief British commissioner for Transcaucasia on July 22 despite attempts of the War Office to share jurisdiction and the appeals of Major General H. C. Holman (Denmiss) to have a single officer handle British affairs in South Russia and the Caucasus and to “deal with problems arising from Denikin’s struggle against the Bolsheviks and his aim of establishing a United Russia as one whole.”14 Wardrop was to maintain close contact with the still unrecognized Transcaucasian governments, to keep the Foreign Office informed, to encourage peaceful.relations between the Volunteer Army and the local republics, to promote British commercial interests, and to consult when appropriate with British military authorities. It was specified, however, that “in political matters, especially in the advice to be given to the Governments of the various states mentioned, you will be independent of the British military command.”15 Wardrop’s small staff included Vice-Consul T. E. Milligan Grundy, Vice-Consul John Alexis Waite, and Captain George F. Gracey, an intelligence officer familiar with Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish affairs.16 The Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian delegations in Paris were apprised of Wardrop’s appointment on July 25, with the clarification that it did not constitute British recognition of the republics.17 The mission’s departure was further delayed because the War Office insisted that Wardrop serve under General Milne so long as the 27th Division remained in Transcaucasia. When Churchill’s ministry finally relented in mid-August, the evacuation was already underway.18 Wardrop’s policy recommendations, submitted on August 5 at the suggestion of the government’s Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, showed that he supported Transcaucasian independence, distrusted 12 FO 371/3662, 95097/97179/1015/58; FO 608/88, 356/2/2/13302. 13 FO 371/3662, 97179/1015/58; FO 371/3668, 97993/11067/58. 14 FO 371/3662, 102622/107425/1015/58; FO 406/42, no. 38. 15 British Documents, III, 451—452; FO 608/88, 356/2/2/16146/18970 ends.; FO 406/41, no. 70. 16 FO 371/3662-3663, 97179/103146/123404/1015/58. 17 FO 371/3662, 108137/1015/58; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 15. 18 FO 371/3662, 107425/109457/117597/1015/58; WO 33/974, no. 5081.

General Denikin, and advocated British economic and cultural imperialism. The Volunteer Army should not be allowed to interfere or to recruit in Transcaucasia, but the republics should be told that Great Britain would recognize them only when they had given proof of their intent to live in harmony with Denikin, provided he upheld the goal of “a free and democratic government of regenerated Russia.” Great Britain had a golden opportunity to ingratiate itself with the little republics by persuading the Allies to recognize them, sponsoring their admission to the League of Nations, supplying textiles and machinery in return for mineral and agricultural products, sending advisers for economic development and administrative and financial reorganization, ensuring an equitable distribution of relief goods, establishing English boarding schools and helping advanced students to further their education in Great Britain, allowing trustworthy representatives of trade unions to visit England for exchanges with “the genuine British labour party,” and promoting broad-ranging cultural intercourse. Wardrop also recommended that the military evacuation should be effected slowly and that Great Britain should at least “continue to hold strongly the district of Batoum till its future is determined as we should wish it to be.” His optimistic memorandum concluded: “I venture to hope that Lord Curzon may find it possible to use influence to secure Treasury sanction for reasonable expenditure by the Mission on salaries, incidental expenses, enter­ tainment (very necessary in Oriental Countries) and such items.”19 Although the Foreign Office judged Wardrop’s recommendations pre­ cipitate, it had no major disagreement with his basic ideas. Lord Curzon had himself frequently advised that part of the British force be retained in Transcaucasia. During meetings of the War Cabinet on July 25 and 29 he had predicted that complete disengagement would ruin “all the good work that had been done in the smaller republics,” since Denikin would move in any direction he liked and pay no heed to demarcation lines in the absence of the British army. Curzon therefore called for a limited occupation for a specified time, perhaps a year longer. He deplored the variance in British policy north and south of the Caucasus Mountains and the interference of the military establishment in political matters. General Holman was with Denikin reporting directly to the War Office, General Milne was acting in both a military and a political capacity at Constantino­ ple, other ministries had their own representatives in South Russia and Transcaucasia, and now Oliver Wardrop was being sent out on a political assignment. The Americans, for their part, had “appointed Colonel Has19 F O 3 7 1 / 3 6 6 2 , 1 1 4 2 7 6 / 1 0 1 5 / 5 8 ; F O 6 0 8 / 8 8 , 3 5 6 / 2 / 2 / 1 8 0 0 6 .

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kell in Armenia, and . . . [he] was going to descend on the Caucasus and have his headquarters at Tiflis.”20 Anglo-American Exercises In the first leg of his “descent upon the Caucasus,” Colonel William N. Haskell, journeying from his former post at Bucharest to Constantinople, was greeted enthusiastically by the Armenian colonies in Ruschuk, Sofia, and other cities en route. Arriving on August 2, he conferred with Pa­ triarch Zaven Eghiayan and Armenian Roman Catholic and Protestant leaders about the survivors in Anatolia and the thousands of exiles who were still prevented from returning home. Haskell promised help to palliate their suffering, but, like Herbert Hoover, maintained that repa­ triation had to be postponed until the following spring.21 On August 5 Haskell asked the senior Allied commander in Constantinople, General Franchet d’Espérey, to protest the British withdrawal on grounds already stated so frequently: “To protect the relief measures now in progress, to prevent the annihilation of the Armenians and to prevent general anarchy throughout the Caucasus the presence of sufficient Allied troops are absolutely necessary.” Informed by the French officer that neither he nor Milne could act on the petition, Haskell forwarded the appeal to Hoover and the Paris Peace Conference, begging that the British be prevailed upon to remain.22 When the communiqué reached the Council of Heads of Delegations on August 11, Arthur Balfour noted that the evacuation had long been accepted as inevitable. The Italians had agreed to provide replacements but now seemed to have given up that intent. When Clemenceau inquired about possible American action, Frank Polk explained that, while the president planned to ask Congress to assume the Armenian mandate, the United States could not in the interim intervene militarily in a country with which it had not been at war. Clemenceau then tabled the discussion with a succinct description of the impasse: “France could do nothing; Italy could do nothing; Great Britain could do nothing, and, for the present, America could do nothing. It remained to be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.”23 20 Cab 23/11, WC 599(3), July 25, 1919, WC 601(4), July 29, 1919. 21 Hairenik, Sept. 18:1-2, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 15:2, 1919; RG 59, 860J.01/34. 22 RG 256, 181.9402/1; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/17764. 23 Peace Conference, VII, 647-649; Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela­ tions of the United States, 19/9, II (Washington, 1934), 829; British Documents, I, 389-390; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/19095.

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When informed by American officials in the Caucasus that 10,000 troops could save Armenia and that speed was essential, Polk advised his government to ask Congress for authorization to deploy the requisite force from the American army in Europe. If Congress refused to act, it would bear the responsibility instead of the administration.24Although the proposal was not accepted in Washington, Secretary of State Lansing, when replying to appeals from the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, informed James Gerard and Henry Cabot Lodge that everything possible was being done to alter the British decision. President Wilson, too, assured the ACIA of his deep concern for the Armenian people and his hope that Congress would agree to an American trusteeship over Armenia.25 On August 9 Balfour wrote Lloyd George and the War Cabinet that, although he did not dispute the need to evacuate Transcaucasia, “I do not like to look forward to the day when it will be said that while they had the fullest warning beforehand, the British precipitated a massacre of Ar­ menians by deliberately withdrawing their troops in the face of the advice of all local authorities as to the possible consequences.” The Americans should be given a fair chance to step in, and Washington should therefore be told that, if an American relief force was sent by the end of September, the British departure would be postponed for several more weeks. Bal­ four concluded: “As usual it is the Italians who have got us into the mess. Ever since April they have said they are going to the Caucasus, and now they say they cannot. But, if as a result, we can secure the Americans in their place, we shall have made a good exchange.”26 The reaction in the War Office, however, was not encouraging. Chief of Staff Wilson argued against any delay: it was impossible to keep white troops in the Caucasus; to leave only Indian units was not politic; the Caspian fleet had already been entrusted to Denikin; most of the equipment had been moved to Batum; and complex transport schedules had been arranged. The unfortunate results of the evacuation had been known by the Allied governments for months; the situation was not more urgent now, nor was the peril any greater.27 24 RG 59, 860J.01/25. A few days earlier Major Green wired from Tiflis that British with­ drawal would mean “the practical extermination of the Armenians”: “It is not a problem of repatriating the Armenians in Turkey but it is a problem of their safety in their own homes and in their present refugee camps. Nor is it a problem of ultimate Government or Mandate of Armenia. It is purely a question now of life and death to these people as to whether they are to be protected.” Polk Papers, 78/57, Hoover to Polk, July 30, 1919, end. 25 RG 256, 867B.00/197. 26 Cab 23/11, WC 615(5), Aug. 14, 1919; Cab 24/86, G.T. 7949. 27 C. E. Call well, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, II (London, [1927]), 208.

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With the Balfour memorandum and the War Office view before him, on August i t Lord Curzon received Ambassador John W. Davis. When Curzon put forward Balfour’s proposal, Davis, as instructed by Lansing, expressed only an informal opinion. Scarcely 100,000 American troops remained in Europe, most of them under orders to return home, and it would be difficult to put together a force sufficient to police the Caucasus. In any event, congressional assent would be required. Davis did not be­ lieve that humanitarian considerations alone would induce the American people to abandon the Monroe Doctrine. When they realized the heavy obligations of an Armenian mandate, it would be doubtful “whether phi­ lanthropy would survive in the contest with expediency.” Davis nonethe­ less agreed to forward Balfour’s suggestion to Washington.28 The next day Curzon again urged the War Cabinet to keep some British units in the Caucasus, but Churchill argued that no partial measures could avert the “general convulsion, anarchy, massacres and so on” and that furthermore it was not unreasonàble that Denikin should divert a force “to guard his southern flank to ensure a steady supply of oil from Baku.” He reminded his colleagues that the Caucasian states “gave us anything but a welcome; now, however, they are imploring us to stay.” There was no middle course between complete evacuation and full-strength occupa­ tion. When Lloyd George pronounced the Balfour proposal infeasible because an American decision was unlikely for another three months, the cabinet ordered Curzon to inform Balfour that the evacuation would go on as scheduled.29 Curzon’s letter to Balfour was self-righteous: “Personally, I am a little surprised that Paris has awakened so late in the day to the seriousness of the impending situation, because on many occasions during the past six months, I have taken the liberty (though quite ineffectually) of pointing it out to the Cabinet; having even, I believe, on several occasions rendered myself unpopular by the notes which I have written about the disorder, anarchy and bloodshed which were in my view certain to result from the Allied policy in Asia Minor.” He added that the United States had just issued a further appeal through Davis to hold at least Batum, since numer­ ous American relief workers were operating in the Caucasus. Curzon was unsure whether the State Department had a clear picture of the region’s geography; the retention of Batum alone would neither safeguard relief parties in the interior nor prevent massacres of Armenians in Karabagh and Nakhichevan. Still, Wardrop was being sent to Tiflis, and possibly 28 Foreign Relations, 19/9, II, 828-830; RG 256, 867B.00/185/220/221/234; FO 371/3659, 115267/512/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/7/18011; FO 406/41, no. 78; British Documents, 111,480-481. 29 Cab 23/11, WC 612(2), Aug. 12, 1919.

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diplomatic agents would be assigned to Baku and Batum in the hope that, with small military escorts, they might be able to avert some of the worst atrocities: “But this is the limit of my hopes, and the situation is not one from which I can otherwise extract any light to relieve the prevailing gloom.”30 Walter George Smith and the London Crusade Pressed by parliamentary questions, foreign inquiries, and editorial com­ mentaries, the British cabinet acquired another potential adversary when, on August 11, Walter George Smith joined the Armenophile activists in London. Encouraged by the British delegation in Paris and armed with letters of introduction from Lord Bryce and other prominent figures, Smith hoped to appeal more effectively to the British government than could American diplomatic representatives.31 He received the immediate support of Henry Wickham Steed, editor of the London Times. On the thirteenth the Times warned that, while the United States vacillated and the Allies floundered, the enemies of Armenia had coalesced. As the British withdrawal “at this grave moment and in these circumstances” would force the Armenians to choose “between extermination and an abandonm ent. . . of the cause to which they have been faithful through the war,” the United States should delay no longer in accepting the mandate or, failing that happy solution, Great Britain should carry on in the Caucasus.32 Smith’s statements to the European and American press were marked by dramatic urgency: “Forty-eight hours stands between now and the perpetration of massacres, that will bring a blush upon the face of humanity and Christianity”; “A wave of indignation will swell through the United States when it is known that the Armenians have been left to their fate and that American relief workers, men and women, share the common peril. No explanation will be accepted. The cordial relations between the two great English-speaking nations will be shattered.”33 With these dire predictions in mind, Smith and members of Parliament who formed the British-Armenia Committee planned a final campaign to delay the withdrawal. Aneurin Williams, chairman of the committee, told 30 British Documents, 111,482-484. 31 FO 371/3668, 114904/11067/58. 32 London Times, Aug. 13:11, 13, 1919; FO 371/3659, 115734/512/58. See also Walter George Smith, “Journal of a Journey to the Near East,” ed. Thomas A. Bryson, Armenian Review, XXIV (Winter 1971), 71-74» Aug. 7-10, 1919, XXV (Spring 1972), 62-65, Aug. 12-13, 1919. 33 Manchester Guardian, Aug. 18, 1919, in FO 371/3659, 117677/512/58. See also RG 59, 861.00/5002/5003/5016/5124.

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Lloyd George and Churchill that the Americans, disturbed by what seemed to be a crass British gamble to force the hand of their government, regarded the impending evacuation with genuine dismay. On August 15, the day the evacuation was to commence, the British-Armenia Committee implored the Foreign Office to ask the United States to assume financial responsibility for Indian battalions which could be kept in the Caucasus. That was the only compromise acceptable to Lloyd George.34 Of the many appeals received, the most unexpected came from the Second (Socialist) International, then meeting at Lucerne. Having de­ nounced all intervention in the Russian civil war and having fomented anticolonial agitation throughout Europe, the spokesmen for the toiling classes now made an exception. Understanding that such a reversal would undermine their anti-imperialist platform and invite the derision of politi­ cal enemies, the veteran socialists nonetheless yielded to the compelling arguments presented by Avetis Aharonian and Dashnaktsutiun’s delegate to the International, Mikayel Varändian, and adopted the resolution in­ troduced by Jean Longuet: The International conference, shocked at the renewed massacres o f the Armeni­ an population, asserts the necessity of putting an end to this outrage against humanity, and declares it to be the duty of the Governments represented at the Peace Conference in Paris to take all necessary measures effectively to abolish the present regime o f barbarity and violence in the Caucasus. The conference further requests of these Governments that, pending the establishment of a stable situation and the ensuring of liberty and security of all inhabitants of the Caucasus without distinction as to race or religion, the British Army of Occupation be not withdrawn and that it may remain until its withdrawal has been finally decided by the League of Nations.3536

British labor leader Arthur Henderson reinforced the resolution with a personal telegram to Lloyd George, and Albert Thomas and Pierre Renaudel subsequently explained in the French Chamber of Deputies that the socialists did not regard foreign intervention as being identical in all situations. The terrible sufferings of the Armenian people and the appeals 34 FO 371/3668, 120100/11067/58. See also Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, CXIX, cols. 1070-1071, 1304-1306, 1676-1678; Smith, op. cit. (Spring 1972), pp. 65-69, Aug. 14-15, 1919; FO 371/3668, 118761/11067/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/19095; Cab 24/87, G.T. 8052. 36 FO 371/3659, 117677/512/58 end. See also Erkir, Oct. 15:1, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1687/18, H. H. D.: ErkrordMidjazgainakan, 1919, no. 469, File 1688/19, H. H. £>.: Erkrord Midjazgainakan, 1920, no. 484; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 35, Aug. 1, 1919.

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of Varandian had convinced them that the British occupation must continue.36 In one of his infrequent appearances in the House of Commons, David Lloyd George defended the cabinet’s policies in a three-hour exposition on August 18. Although gratified that more than three and a half million men had been demobilized since the end of the war, he said Near Eastern problems could not be settled until the United States decided whether or not “to take her share of guaranteeing protection for peoples who, if they are not protected, will be subjected to torture, mis-government, and mas­ sacre.” Addressing himself to the most recent cause célèbre, the prime minister continued: We have been urged to withdraw troops, and it is said that the withdrawal of troops and demobilisation are the only methods to secure immediate reduction [of spending]. But the other day I was amazed to get a letter from the International Trade Congress.. . . It is the International Labour Conference, sitting at Lucerne, and it represented the socialists of all ranks. What was the request? Was it that we should demobilise? Was it that we should reduce our armaments? Was it that we should clear out from countries which were not our own, and leave these people to self-determination? Not at all. It was a resolution angrily complaining that British troops, were being withdrawn from the Caucasus.. . . We have a division and a half there and it is costing us millions. Speaking roughly, I should not be a bit surprised if (with shipping and everything else) it costs us about £30,000,000 a year. America appeals to us not to withdraw; the International Socialists appeal to us not to withdraw; and, if that is not sufficient, I am proud of this fact, that the inhabitants beg the British soldiers not to withdraw. There was no prouder appeal ever addressed to any land than the appeal which asks the British soldier to remain there to shield them. It is almost worth the money. But at the same time how can we demobilise?3637 36Journal officiel de la République française, Débats Parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, 51 st yr., Sept. 27,1919 (debates of Sept. 26, 2d sess.), p. 4612. See also FO 371/3667,124570/11067/58; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 18:2, 1919; Eastern Europe, no. 2 (Sept. 16, 1919), 63. On August 8 Aharonian had cabled several influential European labor leaders as follows: Withdrawal of English troops from Transcaucasia has had immediate effect to encourage Turks and Tartars to attack Armenian Republic. A strong force under Turkish Officers besieges Erivan and contemplates extermination of Armenians. Army of Armenian Repub­ lic fights desperately but unable to exist through want of ammunition and arms against overwhelming numbers. Nothing can prevent massacres and catastrophic events which have already taken place in Nakhichevan and Azerbeidjan if English do not interfere. English action in Transcaucasia is of humanitarian nature and cannot be identified with intervention in Russia and elsewhere. We implore in the name of the Armenian nation the Labour Party not to abandon them to their fate and take the necessary steps with your Party not to oppose remaining of English troops provisionally in Transcaucasia in order to prevent irreparable events until the fate of Armenia is decided upon. We await anxiously your kind answer. [Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1687/18.] 37 Pari. Deb., CXIX, cols. 2017—2018.

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During the lengthy debate that followed, Robert Cecil, T. P. O’Connor, and Aneurin Williams stressed the moral obligation to protect the Ar­ menians. Although agreeing that Great Britain could not shoulder the entire responsibility, they asked that the force in the Caucasus be kept there until it was known whether the United States would share the burden.38 In an emotional address, Williams used several of Smith’s favorite arguments: I say the fate of the Caucasus is inextricably linked up with the fate of Asia Minor. If it becomes known that we have retired from the Caucasus, then every element of fanaticism among our enemies will be encouraged and excited, and the whole country—both the Caucasus and Asiatic Turkey—I am convinced, and those who know the country are convinced, will be reduced to a state o f chaos and a state of butchery.. . . It is all very well for the Government to be economical—and we are all very glad of it—but it is a strange thing that their first great economy seems to arise at a point where it means the loss of such an enormous number of human lives.. . . We want time, and I implore the Government to allow time, in order that this matter may be settled without the massacre or suffering which we fear. I am quite sure of this: that if they do not allow time then when the results which are to be feared have come about, the great American and English peoples will be extremely angry against those who have rendered themselves responsible for such a result.39

It fell upon Andrew Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, to respond. Although every member of Parliament, he said, wanted to prevent further atrocities in Armenia, the government’s first responsibility was to its own people, not “to securing good order in countries like this, with which we have no connection at all.” He believed the danger was exaggerated, since the Turkish pashas who had perpe­ trated the wartime crimes in confidence that their side would win now knew “that they have a world which, if they go to certain extremes, will certainly punish them.” More significantly, the withdrawal would not be completed until late October and so the urgent need for more time would be met. Meanwhile, Bonar Law continued, any sign of help from America would be most welcome: “Indeed, I think I might say m ore.. . . It is, if I may be permitted to say so, an American problem rather than a British. They are in a better position to deal with it. They have interests as great as ours—I think, greater. I can assure the House that if the President of the United States were officially to say to the British Government, ‘We 38 Ibid., cols. 2031-2036, 2055-2066. 39 Ibid., cols. 2059-2062.

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wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements,’ we would certainly do our best to meet him.”40 The news that British troops would remain in the Caucasus until Octo­ ber, and perhaps even longer if the Americans cooperated, broke the tension. The Armenian lobby took credit for forcing the government into granting a reprieve and giving the United States time to make its decision. Walter George Smith, receiving wide commendation, wrote in his diary, “I believe myself the fight is won.” It was with a deep sense of accomplish­ ment that he finally departed for his Philadelphia home after six grueling months of official relief and unofficial diplomatic endeavors in the Cauca­ sus, Constantinople, Paris, and London.41 Although the cabinet had made a minor tactical retreat, the proviso about American cooperation was not met. On August 18 Curzon wrote of an interview with Ambassador John Davis: “Having barely recovered from a conversation lasting an hour and half with Mr. Walter Smith, an Ameri­ can gentleman officially interested in the American effort in Armenia, and deeply concerned at the risk of the Armenian people involved by our intended evacuation, I mentioned to Mr. Davis, in supplement to our recent conversation on the subject, two points which I thought ought to be borne in mind.” The first was whether the United States realized that “Armenia could not be kept alive by dollars only, but would have to be sustained by men,” and that if the Americans decided to assume the mandate they might have “to mobilise and send to the Black Sea the very considerable army that would be required for the purpose.” The second point revealed Curzon’s irritation with the meddling of Smith and other do-gooders. If American opinion had been so deeply aroused, why were representations received from private individuals rather than through diplomatic channels? Curzon thought it only logical that a formal appeal should come from responsible quarters and that the United States should indicate what American action might be taken if the British did in fact postpone the evacuation.42 The next day Curzon told Davis that Bonar Law, in his statement to the House of Commons, had meant to add that, if the United States did ask the British to stay pending a decision in Washington, it was only reasonable that the cost of maintaining the troops should be borne by the Americans.43 40 Ibid., cols. 2086-2087; FO 371/3667, 124570/10067/58; FO 371/3659, 119103/512/58. 41 Smith, op. cit. (Summer 1972), pp. 43-51, Aug. 18-19, 1919. 42 British Documents, III, 511-512. See also Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 39, Aug. 22, 1919. «Ibid., pp. 532-533; FO 371/3659, 119103/512/58; FO 608/84, 342/12/1/5785.

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The United States, however, could not be enticed into an unproductive partnership. Davis advised the Department of State to word its reply so as “to avoid charge of bad faith if mandate is finally declined,” and in turn he was instructed by Lansing on August 23 to submit a direct appeal to the British but to explain that it was made “on grounds of humanity,” as no funds had been appropriated for the purpose suggested by Bonar Law and Curzon.44 Three days later, even as Davis was apprising the Foreign Office of this communication, Lansing cabled further instructions that Curzon should be told that, since the United States had not signed the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, or any other international agreement that had perpetuated Turkish rule over Christians, America could not be held responsible and that renewed massacres would stir strong anti-British public sentiment. Should America accept the mandate, it would be for purely altruistic reasons, but as further decimation of the Armenians would make the creation of a viable Armenian state all the more difficult, American opinion in that event would turn sharply against assuming the burden. Davis, who well understood British resentment of the American stance, reluctantly agreed to call at the Foreign Office again.45 In private correspondence with Frank Polk, then heading the American delegation at Paris, Davis wrote: “Lansing answers just as I thought he would, that in the existing state of affairs any commitments on our part are absolutely impossible.. . . I really see nothing further that we can or ought to do in the premises.”46 Cynical Maneuvers As appeals to postpone the evacuation continued to come in—from the Lord Mayor’s Fund, the shah and the foreign minister of Persia, Sir Percy Cox, Rear Admiral Richard Webb, the Armenian bishop of Baku, the Russian Political Conference, and the combined Transcaucasian delega­ tions in Paris, among others—unexpected developments shifted the onus from Great Britain to France.47 Intrinsic to that complex process was a precipitate act by Woodrow Wilson and an unabashed display of cynicism by Georges Clemenceau. 44 RG 59, 860J.01/53; RG 256, 867B.00/239/251. See also Foreign Relations, 19/9, II, 832-

833-

46 RG 59, 860J.01753/64; RG 256, 867B.00/251; Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 836-837; FO 371/3668, 122311/11067/58 (British Documents, 111,531—532). 46 Polk Papers, 73/119, Davis to Polk, Aug. 25, 1919. 47 FO 371/3668, 118562/119686/119885/120808/123718/11067/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/ 18643/18654; RG 256, 861K.00/94; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 79/9, no. 546; Bulletin d’Informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 3 (Oct. 13, 1919), 7; Georgian Archives, Box 25, book 3, Box 26, book 31, Box 27, book 58.

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Because of reported Turkish interference in Armenia, the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia urged Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference to announce that continued Turkish aggression would result in the termination of Ottoman rule in all Asia Minor.48 A resolution of similar intent was introduced in the Senate on August 1, and the next day the president directed Secretary of State Lansing to suggest to the American delegation (Ammission) that the conference issue a warning to Turkey.49 Although Polk replied that declarations alone would hardly restrain the hostile forces in Armenia, the numerous appeals and the dramatic newspaper coverage of the Armenian ordeal prompted Wilson to have the following instructions sent to the Ammission on August 16: The President desires Turkish authorities to be warned that should they not take immediate and efficacious measures to prevent any massacres or other atrocities being perpetrated by Turks, Kurds or other Moslems against Armenians in the Caucasus or elsewhere, then all support concerning a secure sovereignty over the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire, under Article XII of his peace terms [Fourteen Points], will be withdrawn, and that such withdrawal might result in the absolute dissolution of the Turkish Empire and a complete alteration of the conditions of peace. Should Turks put forward the plea that they have no control over such occurrences, it should be pointed out that if they expect to exercise any sovereignty over any portion of the Empire they should demonstrate that they are not only willing but also able to prevent their conationals and coreligionists from the perpetration of atrocities. Therefore no excuse of inability to prevent atrocities against Armenians will be accepted from the Turks. Communicate to Turkish authorities at your discretion through such diplomatic channels as in your judge­ ment may be available, and in any case, repeat to Admiral Bristol for communica­ tion to Turkish authorities.50

As no formal diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte had been maintained since 1917, Bristol transmitted the message through the Swedish embassy but, displeased with the president’s action, told Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha informally that he fully understood the dif­ ficult position of the Turkish government. In his reply to Wilson on August 25, Damad Ferid explained that his cabinet was doing everything possible to maintain order and to guarantee the life, honor, and property of all inhabitants. Once the real situation in the Caucasus became known, no one could truthfully blame the Ottoman government for the “sad 48 RG 59, 860J.01/23. 49 Congressional Record, 66th Cong., ist sess., LVIII, pt. 4 (Washington, 1919), 3476; RG 59, 860J.01/44; RG 256, 867B.00/203. 50 R G 59,763.72119/6130 (Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 831—832). See also RG 256,867B.00/ 233 -

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events occurring in those foreign lands.” The grand vizier concluded by promising that when a just peace had been concluded, the Greek occupa­ tion of Smyrna had ended, and the right to maintain a larger army and gendarmerie had been recognized, the “effervescence existing during the last ten months will at once be replaced by order and tranquility everywhere.”51 Damad Ferid, proper and cautious in his reply, was no stranger to diplomatic intrigue. He played on the mutual suspicions of the Allied Powers by asking the French and British high commissioners how he should regard Wilson’s unilateral threat, particularly as the Ottoman Em­ pire had not been at war with the United States.52 The reaction was swift. Even though the British high commissioner had himself warned the Sublime Porte on August 2 about interference in Armenia, and a week later Admiral Webb was instructed by Curzon to urge “strongly upon the Turkish Government that massacres of Christians can only have effect of hardening opinion against Turkey,” the European Allies were incensed by the president’s action.53 Chief of Staff Wilson termed his “cousin’s” threat “a piece of impotent impudence.”54 On August 25 Clemenceau angrily complained in the Council of Heads of Delegations that Allied declarations about retaining Ottoman sovereignty in the Turkish part of the empire could not be nullified and “least of all could one High Commissioner dictate terms to Turkey, with whom his State had not been at war, without consultation with the Associated Powers.” After Polk explained that the president’s message simply expressed his own personal view and was not intended as a pronouncement of Allied policy, he concurred that no further pressure should be exerted by one power acting alone.55 At this point Clemenceau hinted at a shift in French strategy by stating that he did not know what could be done for the Armenians, since the other Allies would not intervene and “the French were not allowed by the British to play any role in that part of the country.” When Balfour asked if the French were hindered from sending a force to avert massacres in 51 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 835-836; RG 256, 867B.00/250. See also RG 256, 867B.00/ 240/247. 52British Documents, I, 524-525, IV, 736—738; FO 371/4158, 120189/521/44; FO 608/108, 385/1/1/18325/18531; RG 256, 867B.00/249; Paris Peace Conference, VII, 858—859. 53British Documents, IV, 727, 730—732; FO 371/3670, 115587/72426/58. 54 Call well, op. cit., p. 209. Robert Vansittart wrote on August 27: “An imbecility. I hope this may end the tendency to salve conscience by threatening the Porte for a situation which the threatener has contributed to put out of the Porte’s control. This tendency is not confined to U.S. as the ostrich is not confined to Africa.” FO 608/108, 385/1/1/18325. 66British Documents, I, 508—509, 524—525; Paris Peace Conference, VII, 839-840. See also E. J. Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference (New York and London, [ 1920]), pp. 180-181.

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Armenia only by British opposition, Clemenceau was unruffled: “What he had meant to convey was that nothing could be expected from the Ameri­ cans, who were hampered by their constitution, from the British, who were leaving the Caucasus, from the Italians, who would not go there, and from the French who were not allowed a free hand. The Turks, not being masters of their own house, were equally impotent. The Armenians were therefore no-one’s responsibility.” He himself could make no commit­ ment, but he would ask the advice of military experts.56 French intentions became clearer on August 29 during the discussion of a new appeal from Colonel Haskell, who, after his initial visit to Ar­ menia, cabled that conditions were “horrible beyond description.” An armed force was urgently needed to keep supply routes open and to restrain Muslim insurgents, who were becoming increasingly audacious as the British evacuated the region. “Arrival of even one regiment might decide fate of our Armenian allies who may be exterminated at any time unless troops are rushed.”57 When the message was read in the Coun­ cil of Heads of Delegations, Clemenceau circulated a memorandum suggesting that a small expedition be organized to protect the Armenians: The French Government recognizes the possibility of constituting an expedition­ ary force of some 12,000 men of all arms, to be taken for the most part from the army o f General Franchet d’Esperey, upon completion of the reconstitution of that army, that is, after September 10. The operation would be carried out by taking as point of debarkation the ports of Cilicia, where two French bases would be created (at Mersina and Alexandretta).

By this plan horses and matériel would be transported by railway from Haidar-Pasha to Cilicia, whence the expedition would of course be called upon to assist in transport and supply. In response to inquiries by Polk and Balfour as to whether the Black Sea might be a better route, Clemenceau and Philippe Berthelot, secretary of the French delegation, asserted that the roads to Armenia were in good repair and the two Cilician port cities were suitable points of departure.58 The surprising French offer, after months of indifference, was quickly analyzed by British and American delegates as a scheme to take control of Cilicia rather than to aid the Erevan republic. Yet they dared not press the issue for fear the French would then claim that they had been pre56 Paris Peace Conference, VII, 839-840; RG 256, 867B.00/233 end. 57 British Documents, I, 569, 574; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18471; FO 371/3668, 130719/11067/58 end.; RG 256, 181.9402/2, 184.611/901. 58 Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 10, 11; RG 256, 867B.00/195,184.611/901 \ British Documents, I, 569-574; FO 371/3668, 123850/124570/11067/58; Callwell, op. cit., 210-211.

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vented from saving the Armenians.59 In a message for the War Office, Balfour explained: All American and British Authorities on the spot agree that in the absence of external aid there will be an appalling massacre of Armenians. The only aid which the Americans are apparently in a position to give is to threaten the Turk with final destruction if he does not himself prevent the impending horrors.. . . All the British can do is to protest that neither the state of their army nor the state o f their Treasury permit them to retain a single battalion in the Caucasus though every Armenian throat should be cut in consequence of their leaving.

Hence the facts that the French offer did not stem from tenderness for the Armenians, that the best route to the troubled area was via Trebizond or Batum, and that the French delighted in complicating British military arrangements in Syria and Cilicia, were relatively unimportant: “It would be the worst possible policy to hamper the French plan by raising small difficulties, and formal objections'. I doubt their scheme succeeding, but do not let it be said that we have made it fail.”60 On September 2 the War Cabinet, deeming the French plan preposter­ ous, urged that the French send their troops to one of the Black Sea ports, where the British would turn over the stores that had accumulated there and in the Caucasus and would even delay evacuation until the French had become established.61 Curzon wrote Balfour that it had been pointed out “with unanswerable force that a French expedition to Alexandretta can have no effect whatever upon situation at Kars or Erivan, where the danger lies, that the force will never reach Erzerum, a distance of nearly 500 miles over a country without roads or resources and that coming from that direction it is much more likely to provoke hostility of Turks than it is to save existence of Armenians.” Balfour nonetheless insisted that, while the cabinet’s criticisms were valid logistically and militarily, there was no 59 FO 371/3659, 122448/512/58; FO 371/3668, 123928/11067/58; FO 608/78, 342/6/1/ 18579; RG 256, 867B.00/263; RG 59, 763.72119/6462. In the Foreign Office, Maurice Peter­ son wrote, “The French are sending these troops to overawe Feisal and not to rescue the Armenians of Erivan!” FO 371/3659, 123063/512/58. 80 British Documents, IV, 745-746; FO 371/3668, 123467/11067/58. After the meeting dur­ ing which Clemenceau presented the French memorandum, Frank Polk noted in his diary: “It is very evident that it was just a plan for the French to get hold of that territory. I did not commit myself in the meeting and asked Balfour if he was going to consent to any such arrangement and much to my surprise he said he did not see how we could refuse to let the French go in as long as they [British] were withdrawing and we would not go in. His attitude surprised me considerably.” See Polk Papers, 88/18, Diary, Aug. 30, 1919. See also entry for Sept. 1, 1919. 61 Cab 23/12, WC 621(1), Sept. 2, 1919; FO 371/3668, 124999/11067/58; Callwell, op. cit., p. 211.

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good political reason to reject the French offer, especially as “public opinion in America, Great Britain and France wants to save Armenia” and the first two nations were “confessedly powerless to do so.” Thus, until technical discussions between the military authorities of Britain and France exposed Clemenceau’s true motives, “I propose to maintain my attitude of general political approval.”62 In a brief note of September 8, Curzon struck at the core of the problem: “I think it is a pity to add third European invasion of Asia Minor to Greek and Italian invasion which everybody now regrets. French will get Cilicia anyhow and have no need of troops there now. They will certainly be used to coerce Syria later on.”63 Both Syria and Cilicia had been included within the French zones in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1915-1916, yet in 1919 General Allenby still commanded the armed forces in the region and Emir Faisal, with British encouragement, was attempting to transform it into an Arab kingdom. Deeply resentful of the British advantage, the French had decided to utilize the Armenian crisis to ensure their control of the Levant by placing an initial 12,000 men in Cilicia. That the French had reason to be disgruntled was conceded by some British statesmen. Balfour suggested that acceptance of a modified ver­ sion of the Sykes-Picot agreement, by awarding France a sphere “centring round Syria” and extending into Cilicia at least as far as Alexandretta and its hinterland, would relax Anglo-French rivalry.64 With the Eastern settlement still unformulated, Lloyd George, too, decided in September to seek a bilateral arrangement with Clemenceau and to shift the burden of Armenia to France. He would propose that the French occupy Cilicia and Syria west of the original Sykes-Picot line and allow Emir Faisal to garrison the inland cities. The memorandum revealed that Lloyd George had accepted Balfour’s advice not to quibble about the expedition’s route to Armenia: “The French Government, having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina for this purpose.”6682 82 British Documents, IV, 746-747, 748; FO 608/78, 342/6/1/18579 end. Andrew Bonar Law, Leader of the House of Commons, wrote Lloyd George: “If they [the French] . . . let us get away, though this is a rather cynical thing to say, I would not much care if they propose to help them [the Armenians] from Mars instead of Alexandretta.” Lloyd George Private Papers, F31/1/9, Sept. 5, 1919, in Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, O., [1974]), p. 145 n. 11. 63 FO 371/3668, 126931/11067/58. Also in British Documents, IV, 756. 64 British Documents, IV, 340-349. 66 Ibid., I, 700-701, IV, 379-380, 384-385; FO 371/4182, 130943/2117/44; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/19095; Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 216-217.

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Lloyd George himself traveled to Paris to present his proposals to Cle­ menceau and then on September 15 circulated his memorandum in the Council of Heads of Delegations. Clemenceau, however, was unwilling to exclude France from inland Syria. Holding out for a single comprehensive settlement of the Eastern problem, he said France for the present would bind itself only to replace British forces in the coastal regions and in Cilicia: As for the question of sending French troops to Armenia, this was a very serious and grave responsibility for France to take. He offered to send French troops to Armenia because the Armenians were threatened with massacre, in order to ren­ der a service to the Conference. This offer, however, could not constitute a provi­ sion of an agreement since France was not desirous of going to Armenia and it would involve an enormous burden. For the moment, he merely wished to put this question. “Does the sending of troops by France to Syria and Cilicia mean that he accepted the whole agreement?” If it, was so, he could not undertake to send troops.

Lloyd George yielded, concurring that sending troops to the two regions would not necessitate adherence to other points in his memorandum or prejudice the ultimate determination of mandates or boundaries.66 Having won the right to occupy Syria and Cilicia, the French govern­ ment dropped the ploy of an expedition to Armenia. No formal an­ nouncement was ever made, but all parties, accustomed to futility in Armenian matters, tacitly accepted the fact. There was nothing surprising in Polk’s conclusion that the commitment assumed by Clemenceau would not prevent massacres in Russian Armenia, or in Curzon’s prediction that the French would proceed as far as Mersina and Alexandretta and then “forget all about the Armenians.”67 On October 10 the British military representative in Paris, Major General Charles Sackville-West, wrote that Clemenceau’s maneuver “was just to annoy us.” Since the French did not have enough troops to garrison both Syria and Armenia and since the British were now preparing to leave Syria, he believed that the question of a military expedition to Armenia should be allowed to rest.68 In any event it would no longer have been possible for Britain to lend the French much support, for the 27th Division had already evacuated the Caucasus.

66 Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 205-208; Cab 23/12, WC 622 (3 and App. I), Sept. 18, 1919; British Documents, I, 690—693. 67 Polk Papers, 88/18, Diary, Aug. 29, Sept. 1, 1919; FO 371/3659, 131467/512/58. 68 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18473 end.

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The Evacuation Even when Clemenceau first offered to send a relief expedition to Ar­ menia, Colonel Plowden’s mission had already departed from Erevan, the 39th Brigade had cleared Azerbaijan, and the withdrawal from Georgia was in progress. General Cory’s 20,000-man force had been gradually reduced during the summer through imbalanced troop rotations and individual discharges. The Rajput battalion recalled from Nakhichevan in June embarked for Constantinople the next month, and the detachments of the 82d Brigade which had helped install the Armenian administration at Kars were concentrated at Gori pending their demobilization. To an inquiry from Army of the Black Sea headquarters whether further reduc­ tions could be made to simplify the final withdrawal, General Cory replied in mid-July that his men were “up to their eyes in essential guards and escorts” and his officers in “multifarious semi-political jobs.” He added that Exodus 5:18 best described his predicament (“Go therefore now, and work; for there shall no straw be given you, yet shall ye deliver the tale of bricks”).69 Late that month, with the withdrawal schedules completed and all units informed that the evacuation would commence in August, Cory was advised that the 27th Division would be disbanded, any remaining components to be joined to the 28th Division in the western coastal districts of Asia Minor.70 The evacuation began from Baku on August 15 and proceeded with impressive efficiency. On the eighteenth the 84th Punjabis halted at Evlakh to take aboard the detachment of Major Reginald Tyrer, who had closed the British mission at Shushi two days earlier and left the Armeni­ ans of Karabagh to make their peace with the Azerbaijani army. That evening General Cory bade farewell to the Azerbaijani government, ex­ pressing satisfaction with Usubbekov’s government, General Mehmandarov’s troops, and Jafarov’s advocacy of a peaceful foreign policy. On August 23 the last of the 4,000 men of the 39th Infantry Brigade en­ trained and the next afternoon Colonel (acting General) Shuttleworth’s headquarters were closed. By that time most of the brigade’s mules, har­ nesses, chargers, and saddlery had been handed over to the Azerbaijani army, along with sundry supplies and medications. Some weaponry and shells were left behind as well, although the breechblocks were removed from the powerful British guns overlooking the Caspian Sea.71On August 69 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, July 14, 1919. ™Ibid., July 25, 1919. 71 Details of the concentration and withdrawal of the constituent battalions of the 39th Infantry Brigade are included in the related war diaries. See WO 95/4955. See also Archives de l'Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 8 bis.

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24 Shuttleworth, after exchanging toasts with the Azerbaijani cabinet at a lavish banquet in the Hotel Metropol, was given a rousing send-off. Before leaving Azerbaijani territory the next day, he wired a parting message of peace to Premier Usubbekov from Akstafa: “May God grant you, as well as all your people, tranquility, good fortune and prosperity.”72 In his final assessment of the situation in eastern Transcaucasia, Shuttleworth reported that Azerbaijan’s bitterness over the new demarcation line with Denikin and the transfer of the Caspian flotilla to the White Army had been somewhat attenuated by General Cory’s support of Azerbaijani jurisdiction in Lenkoran and Karabagh, though it was feared that Denikin would attempt to stir up trouble between the Muslims and Armenians in Baku as an excuse to invade the country. At the time racial antagonisms were quiescent, but the atmosphere was electric; a few shots fired in any brawl could lead to a massacre: “Generally speaking, the Tartars are aggressive, the Russians and Armenians apprehensive.” Shuttleworth warned that if Denikin took hostile action the Azerbaijanis would look to the Turks for direction. Turkish intrigue already abounded, and “the Tartar successes in Nakhichevan and Kars have been used to fan PanIslamism.” But the government, if not threatened, could probably main­ tain order until the peace settlement and might even consider entering into a federative union with Russia.73 After the last troop convoy from Baku had passed through Tiflis on August 26, the remainder of the 81st and 82d Brigades began to clear Tiflis and its environs. Battalions of the Royal Scot, Royal Berkshire, Worcestershire, and Duke of Cumberland Light Infantry Regiments con­ centrated at Batum; signal corps personnel at Erevan and Alexandropol and the Punjabi detachments scattered along the Transcaucasian railway system were pulled in; the Ardahan mission under Lieutenant Oliver withdrew overland to Batum; the Akhalkalak mission under Major Letters joined an evacuation party at Borzhom; and Captain A. S. G. Douglas’s small staff returned to Tiflis from Alaverdi in the Borchalu-Lori neutral zone. On September 6 General Cory closed 27th Division headquarters in the Aramiants mansion, formerly the offices of the Russian Armenian National Council, and, after another round of feasting and exchanging toasts with the Georgian cabinet, departed for Batum. The last British echelon left Tiflis on the night of September 11 with General W. H. Beach, who had paid farewell visits at several state ministries and the missions of 72 Bor’ba, Aug. 26:1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 27:4, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 120, Aug. 26, 1919. See also WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 24, 1919. The 39th Brigade was disbanded at Batum on August 31. 73 FO 371/3663, 141575/1015/58.

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Allied and friendly countries.74 By that time the 39th, 81st, and 82d Brigades had been disbanded and some 16,000 men had embarked from Batum. The evacuation had progressed so smoothly as to surprise even military authorities and to alarm the British Foreign Office, particularly as Bonar Law had told the House of Commons that the withdrawal would not be completed until mid-October or later.75 The situation gave added urgency to the Foreign Office’s campaign to prolong the occupation of Batum. The Reprieve at Batum As the gateway to Transcaucasia, the terminus of the oil pipeline from Baku, and a key link in international commerce with the Caucasus, North Persia, and Transcaspia, Batum was of special importance not only to the Allied Powers but also to General Denikin, the Turkish Nationalists, and the three local republics. The province had a mixed population, with Russians and Armenians prevailing in the city but the hinterland inhab­ ited by native Muslim Ajarians, whose political loyalties were determined largely by religious affiliation even though some were becoming increas­ ingly conscious of their one-time Georgian association. The strong Geor­ gian claims to the region were challenged by Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Persia, and Armenia, the latter hoping to attain economic independence from Georgia by securing a corridor for a railway extension from Kars to the port of Batum. Many observers, particularly staunch supporters of the League of Nations, felt that Batum should be designated an international city to serve all the surrounding states and the worldwide business commu­ nity. Since the province was under direct British military jurisdiction, the decision to retire from the Caucasus raised the question of its future administration. In July and August both General Milne and General Cory recommended that British control over Batum be prolonged so as to prevent a disastrous scramble involving Georgians, Turks, Denikinists, and Bolsheviks. Such a policy, they argued, would steady all Trans­ caucasia, keep alive American relief efforts, and ensure for Great Britain a Black Sea port that would be “uncommonly useful” in the uncertain times ahead.76 General Denikin was already making inquiries about the disposition of Batum, and Consul Patrick Stevens warned that withdrawal 74 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug.-Sept. 1919; WO 106/329, no. 170; FO 371/3663, 139966/1015/58; FO 371/3668, 128427/129365/132834/11067/58; Bor’ba, Sept. 11:2, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 15, Box 22, book 45. 76 FO 371/3668, 128427/11067/58; FO 371/3663, 130308/1015/58. 76 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War diary, Aug. 10, 1919; WO 33/974,16596, July 27, 1919;

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would ultimately lead to Bolshevik subversion and the exclusion of all British interests. The Georgians themselves asked that the British hold the port, and similar requests came from the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Persian governments, from General Denikin, and from the British High Commission in Constantinople.*77 These considerations bolstered the position of the Foreign Office in contradistinction to the War Office, which believed there could be no halfway measures between effective occupation and total evacuation of Transcaucasia. But the public outcry about Armenian safety had become so thunderous by mid-August that Chief of Staff Wilson consented to consult General Milne about leaving political officers with military escorts at several points and retaining a few Indian units at Batum. In his message to Milne, however, Wilson omitted the latter point: “The decision of the Cabinet for complete evacuation of our military forces is final but I would like you to let me know whether in your opinion the coming disorders could be mitigated by our keeping-political officers at centres like Batum, Tiflis, and Baku, and whether such officers should have guards and if so what strength.” On August 20 Lord Curzon, outraged by Wilson’s omis­ sion, had the Department of Military Operations dispatch a new cipher that included the full intent of the query.78 In view of his earlier recommendations, Milne’s reply on August 21 was not unanticipated. Batum should continue under a British military gover­ nor with one white and one Indian battalion; a political officer at Baku would need half an Indian battalion as escort; the officer at Tiflis would require a larger force of one and a half Indian battalions “owing to the contentious character of this [Georgian] nationality and their constant disobedience of my orders to deal satisfactorily with Armenians.” As all the Transcaucasian states were imploring the British to stay, their cooper­ ation on terms highly advantageous to His Majesty’s Government was assured.79 The War Cabinet, nevertheless, was still plagued by ambivalence, partic­ ularly as the French were then talking about an expedition over Cilicia to Armenia. On September 2 the cabinet therefore delayed a decision on FO 371/3662, 112726/114781/1015/58 ends.; FO 371/3668, 106304/124999/11067/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/16808; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/17922; FO 608/84, 342/1/12/5824. 77 FO 371/3662-3663, 114781/126311/126879/127404/1015/58; FO 371/3668, 92815/ 115292/120808/11067/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/13842; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 21. 78 WO 33/974, no. 5104; FO 371/3668, 106304/119686/119885/120100/124570/128193/ 11067/58. 79 WO 33974, no. 5119; FO 371/3668,119815/121299/124999/11067/58. FO 608/85,347/1/ 6/18306.

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Batum by asking the War Office and the Foreign Office to study the potential dangers and the effectiveness of keeping a limited British force in the Caucasus.80 The differing conclusions reached by the two departments could easily have been predicted. The Foreign Office posited that a garrison at Batum would keep the Georgians and Volunteers apart, augment the influence of Chief Commissioner Wardrop, and safeguard “the most convenient access to the Armenian republic in the event of intervention by British or other Allied forces being determined upon.”81 The chief of staff, however, advised that small detachments at Tiflis, 200 miles from Batum, and at Baku, 460 miles away, could easily be isolated or immobilized and would come into contact and thus possible conflict with Russian Volunteers, Nationalist Turks, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Kurds. Of course, the British presence would lessen the threat to the Armenians from lawless Tatar and Kurdish elements, but they would soon learn that the British contingent was too weak to intervene or even move any distance from the railway. Hence, from a military point of view there was certainly no advantage; it remained for the War Cabinet to determine if political considerations warranted the risk.82 As Baku and Tiflis had already been evacuated, the Foreign Office concentrated its efforts in September on holding only Batum, thus nullifying Wilson’s arguments about the vulnerability of isolated detachments and the high cost of supplying scattered units. Wilson had admitted that there would be no immediate military danger to the Batum garrison, which was tied to the British naval lines.83 The issue was at last forced by General Milne, who wired on September 15 that within two days the only troops remaining in Batum would be those guarding animals and stores and that therefore a decision regarding the province was imperative.84*On September 18 the War Cabinet finally 80 Cab 23/12, WC 621(1), Sept. 2, 1919; FO 371/3668, 124999/11067/58. 81 FO 371/3663, 126879/1015/58; FO 406/42, no. 52. See also FO 608/78, 342/1/6/19095; British Documents, III, 537—538. 82 FO 371/3668, 133008/10067/58. 83 FO 371/3663, 126211/126879/1015/58. In a paper dated September 17, 1919, Wilson reinforced his arguments by pointing out that it would cost £2 million a year to keep a brigade in the Caucasus. The Foreign Office fought back by showing that this calculation was based on the assumption that small detachments would be spread between Batum and Baku, whereas if a garrison were kept only at Batum the cost would be £600,000 for a British force or £420,000 for an Indian force. The existing garrison, as of October 1, consisted of one British and two Indian battalions, together with a battery of field artillery and a machine-gun company. FO 371/3668, 133008/141461/11067/58. 84 FO 371/3663, 130308/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18167. See also FO 371/3668, 132271/ 11067/58.

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concluded that “the Secretary of State for War should immediately obtain from the British Commander in the Caucasus [i.e., Constantinople] his appreciation of the situation that might be expected to arise if British troops were immediately withdrawn from Batoum; and that in particular the British commander should be asked for opinion as to whether the Georgians would be able to occupy and garrison the town. In meantime, the British troops at present at Batoum should not be evacuated.”85 That same day the War Office wired General Milne: “Batoum will remain under British control pending final decision on policy and you should retain sufficient troops to maintain our authority and protect the province as suggested in your [report] of 21st August.”86 The reprieve, relayed through Constantinople, arrived in Batum on the night of September 21, just as the headquarters of the 27th Division was disbanding. With the receipt of this welcome news, Major General Cory and his staff sailed for Constantinople on September 24, leaving Brigadier General Cooke-Collis to continue as the military governor of the port and province of Batum, the last British beachhead in the Caucasus. A 2,000-man garrison composed of one white and two Punjabi battalions was all that remained of the more than 20,000 British troops who had occupied Transcaucasia.87 86 Cab 23/12, WC 622(5), Sept. 18, 1919; FO 371/3668, 132928/11067/58. Colonel Rawlinson claimed presumptively that his arguments had persuaded General Wilson to retain a force at Batum. See A. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1Ç22 (London and New York, 1923), pp. 249-250. 86 FO 371/3663, 131722/142941/1015/58; FO 371/3668, 132928/11067/58. 87 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Sept. 22, 24, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 2. General Milne inspected the Batum garrison on October 10 and in a public declaration informed the inhabitants that British military governorship would continue until the conclu­ sion of peace. The declaration included strict guidelines and demands for the maintenance of law and order in the city. See Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 39 bis; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 21:4, 1919; FO 371/3664, 151706/1015/58; Bor'ba v Gruzii, p. 487. The 80th Infantry Brigade’s War Diary for October 11, 1919, reads as follows: In the morning the C. in C. [Milne] at a conference at which all staff 8c administration were present explained the future policy of our occupation of Batoum town and province. That it had been decided, pending a final settlement of the whole Caucasian question by the Peace Conference, to maintain a British garrison at Batoum, 8c to administer the town and province as far as possible as a British protectorate. The policy was one of strict neutrality as regards relations with the Volunteer Army on the one hand, and the TransCaucasian States on the other. A local administration was to be formed and trained, which in the event of our evacuation would be able to assume control. That our stay here might be a question of months, or very possibly for a much longer period. As far as possible troops in the area were to live under peace conditions. See WO 95/4888. At the end of 1919 the strength of the Army of the Black Sea had fallen to less than 10,000 bayonets, distributed as follows: Batum, 1,874; Constantinople, 4,469; Anatolian railway, 2,272; Dardanelles, 657; Salonica, 562. See FO 608/272, File 38, no. 168780.

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The Reaction The embarkation of the 27th Division created an uneasy lull in Baku, Tiflis, and Erevan. The strongest sense of abandonment was felt by the people who had seen the British armed forces the least. The Armenian government had been afforded some recourse while General Cory was in Tiflis, but now even that little reassurance had been eliminated. It was ironic that the Armenians had not only been denied arms and ammunition by the British but were prevented by geographic factors from sharing in the animals and army issue left behind by the departing brigades. Ad­ dressing the Parliament of Armenia, Khatisian warned that the departure of the British had greatly encouraged the Turks, who were organizing subversive elements within the Republic. In this situation the government would regard as its foremost objective the defense of Armenian inde­ pendence and the physical survival of the citizenry.88The more outspoken Tiflis organ of the Dashnaktsutiun vented its frustration upon the British, who were accused of pulling out with the full knowledge that new massacres would ensue: “The Armenian Democracy, having already given so many victims, has every right to expect and demand of the Allies that at least for the time being it not be left alone again on the field of battle in the face of the merciless, sanguine enemy.”89 The Azerbaijani government in Baku, despite fears of the Volunteer Army, had for the first time become master of its capital and the sur­ rounding enormous petroleum reserves. Furthermore, the Armenians of Karabagh, driven to despair by the British departure, finally accepted provisional and qualified Azerbaijani jurisdiction on August 22.90 And with Azerbaijani agents active throughout Sharur-Nakhichevan, the prospect of uniting that region, together with Zangezur, to the world’s first Muslim republic seemed closer to realization. Only three days after Shuttleworth had crossed the frontier, Musavat party founder Rasulzade openly expressed that sentiment, writing on August 28 that Azerbaijan would soon stretch without interruption from Daghestan and the Samur River in the north to Julfa and the Araxes River in the south.91 The Georgian press also voiced confidence in the future of the nation. Menshevik newspapers noted their satisfaction that, while Anglo-Georgian relations had initially been strained because the Republic sought 88 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 131, Sept. 7, 1919. 89 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 6:1, 1919. 90 Hovannisian, Republic, I, 184-189. 91 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 1:4, 1919.

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German protection toward the end of the world war, the British had come to appreciate the character of the Georgian people and the government’s concern for all elements of the population. Occasional minor misunder­ standings were therefore unimportant in comparison with the positive English role in stabilizing the political situation in Transcaucasia and diminishing the threat from the north. The Menshevik organs, frequently radical in tone, asked the British to regard the common Transcaucasian regret at their departure as a vote of confidence for à job well done.92 Optimistic statements aside, the Georgian government was immediately beset by a series of jarring incidents. The first night after General Beach had left Tiflis, a passenger train to Batum was deliberately derailed, an occurrence often repeated in subsequent weeks. The bandits, both crimi­ nal and political, robbed the passengers and sabotaged the vital rail link between the capital and the coast. No less embarrassing was an attack upon General N. N. Baratov, Denikin’s chief of mission in Transcaucasia, whose automobile was hit by a bomb as it passed near the Italian mission in broad daylight on September 13. The explosion killed the two chauffeurs and Baratov’s aide-de-camp and mangled one of his legs so badly that it had to be amputated.93 When the rash of terrorism in Georgia was first reported to London, a Foreign Office clerk minuted: “The outrages seem to spring from one source but whether they are directed at Denikin or arranged by him it is impossible to say.” A strong suspicion pervaded British political circles that Denikin was employing the “old Russian system of provocation” in order to exonerate himself if he attacked Georgia in answer to the “treachery.”94*In this instance, however, the charge was insupportable, for the violence had been unleashed by the reorganized Georgian Bolshevik underground, and Denikin chose not to be “provoked” into retaliation against the Georgian Menshevik gov­ ernment.96 Nor had the last weeks of the occupation passed without mishap for the British. Nuri Pasha, commander of the Azerbaijani-Turkish army that captured Baku in September 1918 and half brother of Enver Pasha, 92 Bor'ba, Aug. 22:2, 1919. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 13:3-4, 1919. 93 FO 371/3671, File 129487/58; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary for Sept. 1919; WO 106/329, Report for seven days ending Sept. 27, 1919, no. 171(7); Haradj, Sept. 20:4, 1919; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 91, dossier 4, nos. 3, 5; Georgian Archives, Box 9, books 18, 19, Box 22, books 53, 54. 94 FO 371/3671, 129487/129487/58. 96 Bor'ba v Gruzii, pp. 475-479, 729; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Gruzii—Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Gruzii, ed. V. G. Esaishvili, pt. 1 (Tbilisi, 1957), 347-348. See also A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoismuty, V (Berlin, 1926), 246.

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1S 7

escaped from confinement in Batum, where he was in British custody awaiting trial for wartime crimes. Having gained the trust of his wardens, he was occasionally permitted to stroll along the seashore for exercise with a small escort. On August 8 the party was ambushed by a band of twenty guerrillas, two guards were killed, and Nuri was spirited away, presumably in a motor launch. The flight of the notorious Young Turk hero was scandalous, particularly as there were instructions to keep him under strict surveillance behind barbed wire. General Milne angrily ordered that mar­ tial law be imposed in Batum, the civilian population be disarmed, and a fine of 2 million rubles be levied upon the city for the murder of the soldiers, with half that sum offered as a reward for Nuri’s capture.96 But all efforts to apprehend Nuri were fruitless; once into the rugged hinterland of Batum, he passed through Ardahan and Olti to freedom in Efzerum. He later slipped back into Azerbaijan to play a key role in fostering Turkish-Bolshevik collaboration.97 When the Foreign Office learned of the escape, a staff member predicted with insight: “This is a pity. Nuri’s element is guerilla warfare 8c he will be a great asset to Mustafa Kemal either at Erzerum or in Azerbaijan.”98 The Arrival of Wardrop The uncertainties created by the British evacuation were dispelled some­ what, particularly for the Georgians, by the arrival of Chief Commissioner Oliver Wardrop. Greeted by many deputations at Batum on August 29, his mission traveled by train, in the former royal coaches, to Tiflis, where it was met by Acting Premier Gegechkori, the diplomatic corps, and nu­ merous dignitaries. Wardrop was delighted by his reception: he was the “prey of photographers,” the route to the magnificent mansion placed at his disposal was decorated with flags and oriental carpets, and public buildings were illuminated in his honor. A holiday spirit prevailed, since the Georgians were aware of his affection for them and considered his appointment as the beginning of a new era in Anglo-Georgian relations. The reception was so lavish and the welcome in the Georgian press so flattering that Wardrop wondered if the other republics might become jealous, but both the Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives expressed confidence that he would be strictly impartial. All three republics were 96 FO 371/3671, 115966/115966/58; WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 9, 12, 14, 1919; Bor’ba, Aug. 15:2, 1919; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 5. 97 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 46, 49 bis. See also Kâzim Karabekir, Istiklâl Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 118, 185-187. 98 FO 371/3671, 115966/115966/58.

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deeply saddened by the departure of the British officers and men, who threat from Denikin in the north and from the Kurds and other groups acting on Turkish instigation in the south. Wardrop was pleased that the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis had already requested facilities for “English scholastic, technical, and university training.” A staunch proponent of Transcaucasian independence, he initiated with his first dispatches a campaign to revise the notion perpetuated by the reports of General Milne and other military men that the Georgians were Bolsheviks at heart. Labeling such reports as “mischievous and misleading,” Wardrop pointed to the conservative nature of the social and agrarian reforms undertaken by Prime Minister Noi N. Zhordania." Wardrop was also impressed by Nasib Bek Usubbekov and Alexandre Khatisian. He described the Azerbaijani prime minister, after an initial meeting on September 6, as being “very pleasant, cultured, and Western in manner and appearance” and seemingly sincere in his desire for peace­ ful relations with all neighboring sfates and for a reasonable understand­ ing with Armenia over the Karabagh issue.99100Khatisian gratified Wardrop during their first interview on September 12 by reaffirming Armenia’s determination to remain permanently separated from Russia. He added, however, that the Allied failure to assist Armenia in its hour of need had lowered the prestige of the Paris Peace Conference. Haskell had come as the Allied high commissioner but despaired of doing anything without an armed force and was regarded by the Muslims as some sort of harmless American missionary. The recent arrival of a million rounds of small arms ammunition (from Denikin) would keep the Armenians fighting for a few more weeks, but the nation was exhausted and its resources were depleted. Khatisian asked for at least a strong Allied control mission at Erzerum to prevent Turkish aggression. Wardrop wrote the Foreign Office that if Britain adopted a supportive policy toward the three republics he could do much to create a healthy equilibrium in the Caucasus.101 Although Wardrop claimed to be impartial, the Armenian leaders sensed that he might rely heavily on Georgian sources of information and tend to favor the Georgians because of his long-time interest in them. Past 99 FO 371/3663, 125051/133615/1015/58; FO 608/84, 342/12/1/18923 end. See also British Documents, III, 535—536; FO 608/85, 347/1/8/10440; Bor'ba, Aug. 30:2, i q i q . 100 FO 371/3663, 127479/1015/58; FO 608/84, 342/12/1/18923 end. 101 FO 371/3659, 129090/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/19095. See also British Documents, III, 548-549. Inasmuch as Wardrop arrived in Tiflis at a time when Armenian representatives in London were trying to secure arms, the Foreign Office sought his opinion. He recom­ mended that a sympathetic reply be given to the Armenians regarding supplies and equip­ ment, but “I would prefer to leave supply of arms and ammunition to Americans.” FO 371/3659, 125946/512/58. See also British Documents, III, 556m

in Wardrop’s opinion would have gladly stayed on as a deterrent to the difficulties in communicating directly with British military authorities in Tiflis increased Armenian apprehension when it became clear that the British commissioner, too, would establish his headquarters in the Geor­ gian capital. The Armenians were therefore relieved when Captain George F. Gracey, a member of the Wardrop mission who had witnessed the Armenian agony during the world war, took up residence in Erevan in September. In his first report Gracey noted that the Armenians had welcomed him enthusiastically as “one who knew and appreciated all their struggles, who had been with them in their distress,” and who now symbol­ ized British sympathy for their aspirations for a secure national future.102 The worldwide pro-Armenian agitation slackened with the announce­ ment that a British garrison would remain at Batum, especially since the predicted massacres did not materialize. The Armenian retreat from Sharur-Nakhichevan on the one hand and the defense of the Kars region on the other seemed to have averted the worst of the consequences that had been feared in connection with the British withdrawal. Yet for the Repub­ lic of Armenia, Allied assistance had been reduced to an American acting as Allied high commissioner and a British political mission without armed support. It was more significant, perhaps, that the Italians had turned away from Transcaucasia, the French had exploited Armenian troubles to assert their right to occupy Syria and Cilicia, the British had refused to furnish arms, ammunition, or even noncombatant surplus goods, the Americans had sidestepped all except moral and humanitarian aid, the Paris Peace Conference lingered at an impasse, and the Nationalist move­ ment in Turkey took on a formidable character. While the Armenian leaders were not blind to these realities, they nonetheless were faced with serious regional problems that may have seemed petty and inconsequential when viewed from without. There was no way for the republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, so long as they espoused the goal of national independence, to avoid costly and enervating adjustments in their mutual relations. The lands and peoples of Transcaucasia had been held together much too long to allow for a neat and simple partition into three congenial sister states. 102 FO 371/3660, 144752/512/58.

6

Armeno-Georgian Relations

The virtual isolation of the Armenian republic in 1919 underscored the importance of establishing normal relations with Georgia and thus safe­ guarding the single, precarious lifeline from Batum to Erevan. The obsta­ cles were formidable, as the course of Armeno-Georgian affairs was predicated largely on a have and have-not basis. Georgia held most of the disputed territory and demonstrated Armenia’s vulnerability by frequent­ ly interrupting rail traffic and instituting reforms designed to eliminate the Armeno-Russian socioeconomic preponderance in Tiflis. In control of neither essential transportation routes nor a hostage Georgian minority, Armenian leaders capitalized insofar as possible on Georgia’s need for Allied support and its fear of the Russian White Armies. Hence, while the intensity of national sentiment and mutual distrust was reflected in jour­ nalistic feuding, particularly between Menshevik and Dashnakist newspa­ pers, the two governments set out on the rough and often backtracking road toward reconciliation. The Georgian Image The disdain with which many Allied officials treated the authorities in Tiflis, coinciding with the worldwide manifestations of sympathy for the Armenians, deepened Georgian resentment. Géorgian leaders ascribed to Denikinist and Dashnakist propaganda the damaging view that the cabinet was dominated by Germanophiles and Bolshevik-like extremists. Their suspicions of a working arrangement between the Dashnaktsutiun and reactionary White generals were reinforced by Armenia’s refusal to ad­ here to a regional defense pact or to join in protests against the Denikinist 1 4 0

suppression of the Mountaineer Republic.1 Even though Ashkhatavor, the influential Tiflis organ of the Dashnaktsutiun, called upon Georgian Armenians to defend the independence of the Georgian republic, the Georgian press questioned the sincerity of such declarations, pointing to evidence of an alliance between the Denikinist “black hundreds” and the Dashnakist “chefs.” Premier Zhordania complained that Armenians had been in the vanguard of the Volunteer Army when it tried to dislodge Georgian forces south of Sochi,2 and Menshevik newspapers observed sarcastically that the unfortunate Armenian people suffered from the absence of leaders, since those who claimed the title were unable to reach an accord even with the most favorably disposed neighboring gov­ ernment. But what else, queried Bor'ba, could be expected from officials who exalted the goal of friendship one day and slandered their neighbors before the Allies the next?3 The editorial had again touched on the delicate issue of Georgia’s image abroad. Rumors persisted that the Georgian wartime bond with Germany had been founded on more than a desperate self-saving calculation, that Noi Ramishvili, the strong man of the cabinet, had come to a secret understanding with Enver Pasha at the expense of the Armenians, that Georgian representatives were still in contact with notorious Young Turk agents in Constantinople, and that Georgian envoys had attended the opening ceremonies of the Erzerum congress summoned by the organiz­ ers of the Turkish resistance. Ramishvili angrily denied the stories, al­ though he confided to Premier Alexandre Khatisian that Azerbaijan had in fact sent agents to Erzerum and had received significant material assis­ tance from Turkish military authorities.4 Speaking to the Menshevik People’s Guard, Foreign Minister Gegechkori publicly denounced the rumor-mongering and expressed disappointment that the government of Armenia, in tolerating such defamation, was clinging to the dubious policies of the Paris Peace Conference rather than seeking Caucasian solutions to Caucasian problems.5 The Georgian press emphasized that view in commenting upon the Muslim uprisings in Armenia. While 1 See Hovannisian, Republic, I, 279-283; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 5, Box 24, books 8, 20. 2 “ ‘Demokraticheskoe’ pravitel’stvo Gruzii i angliiskoe komandovanie,” comp. Semen Sef, Krasnyi arkhiv, XXI (1927), 163. See also Britain, FO 371/3661, 34957/1015/58; Nor Ashkhata­ vor, Aug. 23:1—2, 1919; Gaioz Devdariani, ed., Dni gospodstva Men’shevikov v Gruzii (dokumenty i materialy) (Tiflis, 1931), pp. 52-55. 3 See especially Bor ha, April 3:2-3, May 18:1, Aug. 23:1, Sept. 12:1, 1919. 4 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t., Report for the period Sept. 6-14, 1919, File 660/3, no. 132, Nov. 9, 1919, File 16/16, Devoyants’s report nos. 17, 26, 32, Sept. 16, 29, Oct. 6, 1919; Borba, Sept. 9:1, 1919. 5 Bor’ba, Sept. 25:2, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 15:3, 1919-

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deploring both Turkish involvement and Allied passivity, the political editors noted that the Armenians had not been blameless. Dashnakist strategists had allowed partisan chiefs such as Dro, Hamazasp, and Andranik to terrorize the Muslim population in pursuance of an ill-fated “Parisian” orientation instead of a healthy “Caucasian” orientation.6 Still, Georgian leaders were deeply concerned about the prejudicial image being perpetuated by Allied officials. The British military establish­ ment had been cavalier in its attitude toward Zhordania’s cabinet, paying little heed to diplomatic protocol or military courtesy. The situation had improved somewhat under Major General Cory, but General Milne, com­ mander of the British Army of the Black Sea, remained hostile. He ac­ knowledged the existence of the Georgian government only by ordering compliance with various regulations and removal of Georgian garrisons from the Ardahan okrug and the disputed Black Sea district north of the Bzyb River. Reports relayed to London by Milne and his intelligence staff repeatedly called attention to the corruption, obstructionism, and anar­ chic extremism of the Georgian leaders.7 For the maligned Georgians, the arrival of Oliver Wardrop in August to represent and especially to report to His Majesty’s Government was a relief.8 Yet for months thereafter, British intelligence in Constantinople continued to document the furtive meetings between Georgian and Turkish agents. Dispatches from the small French military mission in the Caucasus were no less disparaging. Lieutenant Colonel Chardigny wrote the Ministry of War in Paris that Menshevik moderates, such as Zhordania and Gegech­ kori, had been eclipsed by the ultranationalist Germanophile Noi Ramishvili, who held the portfolios of Interior Affairs, War, and Public Enlight6 See especially the journals of the antisocialist, nationalist parties, such as Gruziia (“Georgia”), Obnovlenie (“Renewal”), Vozrozhdenie (“Renaissance”), and Sakartvelo (“Georgia”). See also Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 13:1, 14:1, 29:4, 31:3-4, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, nos. 86, 106, July 17, Aug. 9, 1919. 7 See, for example, FO 371/3662, 72735/75933/102003/102155/102669/102732/107417/ 1015/58; FO 608/84,347/1/2/2870; FO 608/88,352/2/2/4942/9998/11390/13027/18010, 356/2/ 3/6926/12482; WO 33/965, European War, Secret telegrams, no. 3599; WO 106/1396, Report on the Caucasus. For a published characteristic British description of the “extreme socialist” Georgians, see C. E. Bechhofer-[Roberts], In Denikins Russia and the Caucasus, 1919—1920 (London, [1921 ]), pp. 41-69. For Georgian materials on the disputed territory along the Black Sea, see Georgian Archives, Box 20, books 1, 2, 7-9, 17, Box 21, book 40, Box 22, book 50. 8 See, for example, FO 371/3663, 139962/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449 end.; “ ‘Demokraticheskoe’ pravitel’stvo Gruzii,” pp. 165-167. Sympathetic descriptions of the Georgians by Menshevik comrades include Karl Kautsky, Georgia: A Social-Democratic Peasant Republic, trans. H. J. Stenning (London, [1921]); Wladimir S. Woytinsky, La démocratie géor­ gienne (Paris, 1921). Bechhofer-Roberts {op. cit., pp. 48-49) sharply criticized Wardrop for his one-sided sympathy for the Georgians and claimed that the inhabitants of Batum and Armenia were “scandalized that a man of such pronounced views should be appointed to a position which calls for considerable intellectual disinterestness.”

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enment. He was terrorizing the country through the Committee of Public Safety and strengthening the Menshevik People’s Guard to the detriment of the regular army. There was, moreover, no doubt that Ramishvili had sent representatives to Erzerum to establish liaison with Mustafa Kemal. Chardigny’s replacement in the Caucasus, Commandant Emile de Nonancourt, added that both Georgian and Azerbaijani military agents had been in Erzerum to recruit Turkish officers for service with the Mountaineers in their rebellion against General Denikin.9 The appraisals of American diplomatic, intelligence, and relief officers were, however, the most damaging. After F. Willoughby Smith, a staunch advocate of an Armeno-Georgian Christian bloc in the Caucasus, retired in early 1919, the American consulate in Tiflis passed to career foreign service personnel who were highly critical of the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments and the assertedly anti-Armenian disposition of the British military authorities. Georgian leaders were described as hostile to the Allies and oppressive toward national minorities. Fanaticism was so ramp­ ant that Tjflis was often left without water and electricity because of the wholesale dismissal of Russian and Armenian municipal employees. Major Joseph C. Green, selected by Herbert Hoover to coordinate the distribu­ tion of American Relief Administration supplies to the Armenians, was even more derogatory. His reports, some of which were printed in Ameri­ can relief newsletters, portrayed the Georgians as lawless ruffians who robbed American officials in broad daylight or starved needy Armenians to extract territorial concessions from the Erevan government.10 The latter issue unleashed a thunderbolt from Paris and led to a new round of mutual recriminations. The Transit Problem Although the Georgians had often been accused of manipulating traffic to Armenia for political reasons, the arrival of ARA flour in May and June created an important test case. On June 27 Major Green, complaining to Hoover about the time consumed in making transport arrangements, reported that he had been blackmailed into releasing 700 tons of flour to the Georgians to facilitate passage of the relief supplies to Armenia and 9 France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3186, dossier 4, no. 79, 16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 8, 25 bis; WO 33/965, no. 3737. A favorable view of the Georgian leaders by a correspondent of Le Temps and La Gazette de Lausanne is presented in Paul Gentizon, La résurrection géorgienne (Paris, 1921). 10 US Archives, RG 256, 867B.48/20/21, 861K.00/49; American Relief Administration, Bulletin, no. 12 (June 6, 1919), 18-19, no. 13 (June 13), 22, no. 17 (July 4), 37, no. 18 (July 18), 18-28, no. 19 (July 25), 37, no. 22 (Aug. 15), 30-31.

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that the Georgians had then suspended traffic, demanding 15 percent of all shipments, until General Cory intervened with a stern warning.11 In his own explanation to General Milne, Cory blamed the five-day stoppage on “wanton obstruction on the part of Georgian government and officials, who, with their usual blatant disregard of any sense of decency, have hung these [railroad] trucks up at Tiflis and tried to coerce the American Mission into selling flour to them below market price.”12 Statistics compiled by Green’s staff showed approximately 200,000 des­ titute persons in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Batum district—80 percent of them Armenians—and a million who needed either complete or partial rations in Armenia. The British, Green reported, had been providing military escorts for relief convoys from Batum, but as the 27th Division was under orders to evacuate Transcaucasia further difficulties were fore­ seen: “The Georgian Government is attempting to push to the limit the advantages which the geographical situation of Georgia and the control of the majority of the rolling stock gives it.. . . It does not look with a friendly eye on the large shipments of flour passing through its territory to the Armenian territory and it is anxious to get some of our flour. I am attempting to settle this matter by ceding a certain amount of flour per month on terms which will be satisfactory to us and the Armenian Government.”13 In July, Green and Benjamin B. Moore of the American field mission in Tiflis cabled to Paris that the Georgians had suspended traffic for the third time in order to force Armenia to join the defense pact against the Volunteer Army. With some districts in Armenia again facing starvation, Green asked the peace conference to “give hell” to the Georgian delega­ tion and to warn the Tiflis government of the dire consequences of con­ tinued obstructionism.14 On July 16 Herbert Hoover submitted to the peace conference a memorandum reviewing relief efforts in Armenia and 11 RG 256, 181.94/4 end., 184.021/29. 12 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, June 26, 1919. For Cory’s earlier complaint to Zhordania regarding the interruption of rail traffic, see “ ‘Demokraticheskoe’ pravitel’stvo Gruzii,” pp. 157-159. See also Zhordania’s statement on the subject in Bor'ba, M ay25:i, 1919. Sir Louis Mallet and Professor J. Y. Simpson, members of the British delegation in Paris, warned the Georgian delegates on June 26 about the consequences of continued obstruction­ ism. In a memorandum on the interview Mallet wrote: “I also reproached them for the opposition which they had offered to the transmission of food to the Armenians, which had necessitated our sending armed guards with the food trains and had caused the deaths of hundreds of Armenians. They expressed their regret and reiterated their assurances of respect and attachment to Great Britain and their desire for the closest relations with the British Government in future.” FO 608/88, 356/2/7/14167. 13 RG 256, 867B.48/22: ARA Bulletin, no. 18 (July 18, 1919), 23-24, 26-27. 14 RG 256, 861G.00/82, 184.01602/85.

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raising the transportation issue: “I will not repeat the correspondence on the question between our officials and the Georgian Government. It is sufficient to say that their attitude has been entirely that of brigandage, against a population dying at their door.” Hoover also circulated the draft of a reprimand the peace conference could address to the Georgian authorities.15Two days later, after modifying several of Hoover’s harsher phrases, the Council of Heads of Delegations had Georges Clemenceau, as president of the conference, relay the following message to the Georgian government and its representatives in Paris: The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian Authori­ ties when food supplies were sent into Armenia in an endeavour on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death amongst these unfor­ tunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms, that such interference and that such action taken by the Georgian Authorities together with the continua­ tion of such action must entirely prejudice their case. The Council therefore expects that the Authorities in Georgia shall not only give privileges of transporta­ tion over the Railway routes at which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies at no more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the Authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement.16

By July 25, when the communiqué was received in Tiflis, American officials had cabled that relief traffic was again moving but that the Geor­ gians were restraining normal commercial intercourse so as to win ter­ ritorial concessions from Armenia before a less favorable settlement could be dictated by the Paris Peace Conference.17On July 28 Green added that the Georgians were unimpressed by warnings not backed by force, as they seemed to feel no urgency to reply.18The week-long silence, however, was not the result of indifference but of confusion and shock. The telegram was the first official communication the Allied and Associated Powers had addressed to the Republic of Georgia and, rather than de facto recognition or a promise of support, it had been a sharp rebuke. On July 31 Foreign Minister Gegechkori responded, expressing disappointment and bewilderment that Georgian benevolence toward the Armenian people had been rewarded with a slap from Paris. Using statistical tables, 15 Paris Peace Conference, VII, 231-232; RG 256, 867B.48/32, 867B.5018/7, 180.0501/27; ARA Bulletin, no. 19 (July 25, 1919), 36-37; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/15615. For a previous complaint by Hoover of Georgian “blackmail,” see FO 608/85, 347/1/6/13238. 16 Paris Peace Conference, VII, 210-211; RG 256, 180.03502/43, 184.611/582, 867B.48/34; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/15770/17104; WO 33/974, no. 4980; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 6. 17 RG 256, 867B.00/175. 16 Ibid., 867B.00/185.

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Gegechkori showed that from February through July more than 3,500 freight cars had gone from Batum to Armenia. This record had been achieved, not by obstructionism, but by sacrifice, since at the time Georgia was unable to meet its own transportation needs and, in addition, had to make allowances for the requirements of the British military command.19 Gegechkori’s explanation had little effect, however, for Colonel Chardigny and Major Green, in relaying it to Paris, said the Georgian claims included “numerous inexactitudes,” showed ‘^manifest bad faith,” and were “not in accord with the facts.”20 When the exchange between Clemenceau and Gegechkori was released to the press in August, intense indignation was voiced by the dominant Menshevik party as well as by conservative, nonsocialist opposition groups. Georgia, they cried, had given Armenians haven for centuries and, de­ spite heavy economic strains, had permitted thousands more to enter during the world war. Georgia had made possible the very survival of Armenia in the midst of hostile elements. And now the Georgian people had received the Armenian token of appreciation. Whether or not direct Armenian channels had been used, the Dashnaktsutiun and its irresponsi­ ble scandal sheets had to bear the blame for the malicious reports sent to Paris. The Armenian government was obliged to proclaim that Clemenceau’s telegram had been a gross injustice. Without such an announce­ ment, any talk of Armeno-Georgian conferences to settle existing problems would be ludicrous.21 Armenian rebuttals matched Georgian editorials column for column. While the Erevan government categorically denied any implication in the episode, the Dashnakist Ashkhatavor reminded the rival organs that there had been good cause for Clemenceau’s warning. One might ascribe to misunderstanding or inefficiency the robbing at the frontier of refugees attempting to reach Armenia through Georgia or the paralysis of normal commerce because of conflicting regulations of Georgian military authori­ ties, the interior ministry, and the committee for provisions, but how could 19 Bor’ba, Aug. 6:1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 6:2, 1919. For an English translation of Gegechkori’s statement, see Polk Papers, 74/74, Office of Director General of Relief to Polk, Aug. 23, 1919, end. Other denials by the Georgian delegation in Paris are in Georgian Archives, Box 25, book 2; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/17175; RG 256, 184.611/706, 867B.48/41. 20 Copies of Major Green’s report of August 5, including a message from Colonel Chardigny and the letter of explanation by Gegechkori, are in the Polk Papers, 74/70, and in the White Papers, Box 44, Office of Director General of Relief, Aug. 23, 1919. 21 Ertoba, Aug. 6:1,1919. See also Borha, Aug. 6—13, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 8:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, nos. 106-107, Aug. 9-10, 1919; S. Vratziän, Kianki ughinerov, V (Beirut, 1966), 98-99.

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the calculated stoppage of relief supplies intended for a starving popula­ tion be justified? Was this the “benevolence” Georgia claimed for itself?22 For several weeks Armenian and Georgian information agencies released differing statistics about the number of locomotives and freight cars one country owed the other. The Georgians contended that delays in returning cars had caused occasional interruptions in service. Georgian figures included the rolling stock seized by Armenia during the brief war in 1918 and the trains requisitioned by the Turks and moved to Kars during their evacuation of the Caucasus. The Armenians countered that the British would attest to the prompt return of all relief trains and that the rolling stock that had changed hands during the Armeno-Georgian war could not be listed as the property of the Georgian Railway Adminis­ tration. The Georgians knew full well that during the Turkish invasion in 1918 the Armenian Army Corps had sent as many trains as possible toward Tiflis for safety. The Georgian contention that each republic should have title to whatever rolling stock was within its boundaries when the Transcaucasian Federation was dissolved in May 1918 was not accept­ able, for Armenia would thus be left with only a score of damaged locomo­ tives and 300 cars, whereas Azerbaijan would have nearly 400 locomotives and 4,000 cars and Georgia, 500 locomotives and more than 8,000 cars. An equitable redistribution of all the rolling stock was therefore imperative.23 The debate was indicative of the many complicated issues impeding normal Armeno-Georgian relations. The battle of words notwithstanding, Clemenceau’s reprimand had a decided effect on the flow of traffic from Batum. Although difficulties in transporting private and commercial goods to Armenia persisted, relief trains moved without significant interruption even after the departure of the British Punjabi railway escorts. On November 1 Avetis Aharonian wrote Premier Khatisian from Paris that the Temps had announced the conclusion of an Armeno-Georgian transit treaty, whereas the London Times reported continued interference with traffic. The Armenians in Europe, he added, had refrained from anti-Georgian propaganda, but if the English account proved true it would be high time to expose the Georgian game.24 As it happened, neither newspaper report was entirely accurate, yet negotiations for a transit treaty were actually underway. 22 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 9:1-3, 10:1, 14:1, 1919. 23 See esp. Bor’ba, Aug. 24:1, 1919: Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 9:1, 12:1, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 65/1, Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerhayatsutsich ev Vrastani Karavarutiun, 1918 t. 24 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, no. 801. See also File 421/1, no. 89, Nov. 6, 1919; ARA Bulletin, no. 20 (Aug. 1, 1919), 38.

The Armenians of Georgia The status of the nearly half a million Armenians in Georgia was an extremely complex and delicate issue. The Georgians resented the decades-long Armenian dominance in Tiflis, whereas the Armenians, losing their illustrious cultural, commercial, and political center, suddenly became a disadvantaged minority.25 For Menshevik leaders the process of nationalization was fraught with difficulties, yet they pressed steadily and sometimes harshly toward that goal. New regulations of the Ministry of Interior loosened the grip of the Armenian bourgeoisie on magnificent Golovinskii (Rustaveli) Boulevard and the chic Sololaki quarter of Tiflis, and administrative reforms led to the dismissal of most Armenian and Russian civil servants. In order to relieve congestion in the capital and at the same time to clear it of refugees and other undesirable elements, Minister of Interior Ramishvili issued further ordinances requiring all noncitizens who were not property owners or gainfully employed and all citizens whose heads of household were absent to leave the city. The latter category applied specifically to the dependents of men serving in Armenia or with the White Armies. Violators of the regulations were to receive severe punishment. In the Armenian view, the new rulers of Georgia were heeding the admonition of a nationalist deputy in the Tiflis city duma: “We must rid ourselves at any price of the Denikinists and the families of the Armenian ministers.”26 The multipartisan Armenian National Council, which coordinated the internal affairs of the Georgian Armenians, was repeatedly frustrated in dealings with the government. Above all, it insisted that the principle of cultural autonomy, adopted by most liberal and socialist parties when Russia controlled the Caucasus, be implemented immediately to ensure the rights of nationality groups. Although the Georgian cabinet and Con­ stituent Assembly paid frequent lip service to that concept, interference in the operations of Armenian institutions continued. Buildings owned by Armenian societies were requisitioned to house administrative agencies and foreign missions, even as financial magnate Melik-Azarian was denied permission to donate his mansion to serve as the Armenian legation in 25 The former Armenian economic preponderance in Tiflis was reflected in the Tiflis city duma, which in 1905-1906 included 53 Armenians, 14 Georgians, 10 Russians, 1 Muslim, 1 Pole, and 1 German. See Davit Ananun, Rusahayeri hasarakakan zargatsume, Vol. Ill: 19011918 (Venice, 1926), p. 437. 26 FO 371/3665, 159112/162831/1015/58; WO 95/4958, 27th Division War Diary, Dec. 1, 1919; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 804.4, Nov. 21, 1919, Doolittle to State Department; Georgian Archives, Box 23, book 66, Box 26, book 46; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 12:3, 14:1, 1919; Erkir, Dec. 11:1, 16:2, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 14:2, 1920. See also Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-/921) (Oxford and New York, [1951]), pp. 197-199.

Tiflis. The many cultural establishments formerly receiving municipal or state funds were now deprived of that revenue and threatened with dis­ ruption. When the Ministry of Education announced that budgetary con­ siderations would prevent the reopening of the schools of the Georgian-speaking Armenians and that their children would have to at­ tend Georgian schools, Armenian leaders, asserting that even the repres­ sive tsarist regime had not been so reactionary, claimed that a policy of coercive assimilation rather than fiscal problems lay behind the move.27 Enervated by difficulties since the partition of Transcaucasia and espe­ cially since the Armeno-Georgian war, the Armenian National Council sought to regain its strength through a general reorganization based on popular elections. In July the Georgian government finally granted ap­ proval but then, on the eve of the elections, reversed itself, explaining that the voting would interfere with the harvest being gathered in much of the country. The entire council, including representatives of the Armenian affiliate of the Georgian Social Democrat (Menshevik) party, protested this violation of the established rights of the Georgian Armenians but gained no satisfaction. Ashkhatavor, in ridiculing the unimaginative excuse of the Georgian authorities, contended that the real reason was the Men­ sheviks’ knowledge that the Dashnaktsutiun would sweep the election. Even the Georgian-speaking Armenians of Telav, who had previously been lulled by the Social Democrats, had repudiated the “turncoat and denationalized” Armenian candidates of the Georgian Menshevik party.28 In September, when it became clear that the Georgian government would not relent, the council was reorganized by its constituent parties, with Dashnakist Bagrat Topchian retaining the presidency.29 In December the council’s membership was reduced to thirty; ten places were assigned to the Dashnaktsutiun and five each to the liberal Populist party and to the Armenian affiliates or representatives of the Russian Social 27 Ashkhatavor, June 18:3, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 2:3, 1919. The Armenian case for national cultural autonomy is presented in Ashkhatavor, April 2:1, Sept. 21:2, Oct. 24:1, Nov. 7:1, 1919. See also Noi Zhordaniia, Moia Zhizn’ (Stanford, 1968), p. 97. 28 See Ashkhatavor!Nor Ashkhatavor and Kavkazskoe slovo, July—Aug. 1919. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, nos. 90, 95, July 22, 27-28, 1919. 29 Ashkhatavor, Sept. 20:3-4, 23:3, 1919\Bor’ba, Sept. 24:4, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 19:2, 1919. Arshaluis Mkhitarian, a Populist, was elected vice-president, and Lazo (Hakob Ghazarian), a veteran Hnchakist, was elected secretary of the National Council. The council was made up of 52 members, with 12 places awarded to the Dashnaktsutiun, 8 each to the Russian SD party, the Armenian affiliate of the Georgian SD party, the SR party, and the Populist party, 4 to the Armenian Proprietors and Commercial-Industrial Society, and 2 each to the Social Demo­ crat Hnchak party and the Russian Constitutional Democrat party. Coordination of the activities of the National Council was entrusted to an executive committee and to a council of elders, on which each faction was represented by one member.

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Revolutionary, Russian Social Democrat, and Georgian Social Democrat parties. In a move to establish rapport with the government, the vice-president of the council’s executive was to be selected from the affiliate of the Social Democratic party of Georgia.30 Ironically, just as Georgian officials were using the harvest season as an excuse for not holding the Armenian National Council elections, they announced that special elections for the Georgian Constituent Assembly would be held from August 10 to 12 in Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalak, and Borchalu, districts that had not participated in the March general elections because of widespread unrest and their disputed status. Although the Armenian foreign minister and the British military representative at Akh­ alkalak challenged the legality of such an election, the Dashnaktsutiun in Georgia decided not to declare a boycott, as it had done in March. In the campaign, the Mensheviks spared no means to solidify their control in the districts by winning an electoral victory. The disadvantaged Armenian party denounced the confiscation of its campaign leaflets and the threats of retribution against any village that dared vote the Dashnakist ticket. Whatever the truth of such charges, the Georgian election bureau an­ nounced that Menshevik slate Number 1 had received 12,000 votes in Akhalkalak as against 8,000 for Dashnakist slate Number 4 and that, although only half of the 44,000 enfranchised persons in Borchalu had participated, 12,000 of them had cast Menshevik ballots.31 The Georgian press termed the electoral results a mandate by the Armenian peasantry for permanent union with the democratic Republic of Georgia. Dashnakist tributes to the thousands of voters who had remained faithful despite beatings and intimidation and the accounts of fraud and manipulation by Georgian election officials did not detract from the jubilation of the Georgian Nationalist, National Democrat, and Social Democrat parties.32 In the areas where the special elections had been held, the impact of the Turkish invasion and Armeno-Georgian war of the preceding year was still much in evidence. For months the Menshevik People’s Guard made 30 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 14:3, 1919. 31 Bor’ba, Aug. 16:1, 19:2, 1gig; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 8:1, 9:1, 13:3, 17:3, 19:3,30:1-2, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 34, Box 22, book 59. 32 Bor’ba, Aug. 21:2, 29:1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 30:1-2, 4, 31:1, Sept. 6:3-4, 12:4, 1919. Three Dashnakist deputies, Zori Zorian, Tigran Avetisian, and Davit Davitkhanian, entered the Georgian Constituent Assembly as the result of the elections. See Hovannisian, Republic, I, 343 n. 5. In November, Davitkhanian was replaced by the first alternate on the Dashnakist slate, Garegin Ter-Stepanian. See Bor’ba, Sept. 20:1, 1919; Haradj, Sept. 21:4, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 20:3, 21:3-4, Nov. 12:3, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 123, Aug. 29, 1919.

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its presence felt in the Belyi-Kliuch district of the Tiflis uezd and settle­ ments in the adjacent Borchalu uezd into which the Armenian army had advanced. Armenian journals in Erevan and Tiflis described the pillage, plunder, and pauperization of the once prosperous villages of Shulaver, Bolnis-Khachen, Daghet-Khachen, Samshvildo, Varkhuna, Samtreti, Dumanisi, Vardisuban, and a score of others.33 On December 19 the Georgian cabinet and the People’s Guard gathered at Ekaterinenfeld to mark the first anniversary of the war, honor the memory of comrades who had fallen, and denounce anew the imperialistic policy of the Armenian government and its dominant party.34 Hundreds of Georgian Armenians arrested during that war remained in prison and were specifically excluded from the government’s amnesty decrees. The protests of the small Social Revolutionary, Social Federalist, and Dashnakist factions in the Constituent Assembly that the government’s amnesty policies were no different from those of tsarist reactionaries had no effect on the Menshevik-controlled legislature, which confirmed regulations excluding from pardon subversives or those who had betrayed the Republic during the Armenian invasion.35 The sufferings of the people of Akhalkalak dwarfed the tribulations of all other Armenians in Georgia. Thirty thousand had perished as the result of the Turkish occupation, and those who survived were starving. Some mothers attempted to save their daughters by offering them as wives to Georgian militiamen and soldiers. Russian, Jewish, and Georgian entre­ preneurs were reportedly buying young girls for 100 to 300 rubles and sending them to brothels; eight- to twelve-year-old orphan boys were being sold for a pittance at Bakuriani; hundreds of women and children were pressed into servitude in the adjacent Muslim districts. All roads leading away from Akhalkalak were strewn with the bodies of fleeing Armenians.36 In September the Akhalkalak Compatriotic Society in­ formed the Armenian government that, of the more than 80,000 Armenians in the county at the beginning of 1918, only 40,000 were left and that these were rapidly succumbing to famine, foreign marriages, concubinage, or to even worse fates. Although the Tiflis government regarded Akhalkalak as an integral part of the Republic of Georgia and even pretended to hold elections there, it did nothing to relieve the 33 See, for example, AshkhatavorINor Ashkhatavor, April 2:1, May 24:4, July 24:2, Aug. 7:2, 9:3* *3:3>3o:2» Sept. 5:1> 21:2» 3 1:1> ' W 34 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 21:2, 1919; FO 371/3673, 173801/168734/58 end. Mßor'ba, Jan. 29:3, 1920; Haradjt Feb. 14:1, 1920. See also Erkir, Dec. 16:2, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 5:1, 1919. 36 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 21:4, 22:2, 31:2, Sept. 3:2-3, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 25:4, Dec. 23:2, 24:1-2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 127, Sept. 3, 1919.

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agony.37 But public indignation was not directed only against Georgian officials. A special committee of the Armenian National Council of Georgia, which had been entrusted with several million rubles to purchase food and supplies for the destitute of Akhalkalak but which had left a record of ineptitude and meager results, came in for its share of abuse. Eventually the Georgian Ministry of Provisions allocated 3,500 poods of corn and Armenian relief agencies distributed 240,000 poods of flour, but it was American flour charged to the Armenian government which carried most of the Akhalkalaki survivors through the winter of 1919-1920.38 The Armeno-Georgian journalistic quarrels subsided in October, when a poorly coordinated Bolshevik insurrection flared in one district after another. Even though the central revolutionary committee was appre­ hended in Tiflis on the eve of the coup, which was set to coincide with the anniversary of the October revolution, the Menshevik government was embarrassed by its inability to prevent a rash of scattered uprisings lasting for several weeks.39 Entirely loyal during that crisis, the Armenian legal press condemned the “externally inspired subversion” and congratulated the government on its determination to safeguard the country’s in­ dependence. Hence the sense of outrage was all the greater when Minister of Interior Ramishvili remarked that in one or two districts the troublemakers included a few petty thieves, keepers of bathhouses, and proprietors of wine cellars who had previously been thought to be members of the party Dashnaktsutiun.40 Ashkhatavor responded angrily. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, it declared, had taken the position that the party controlling the present government of Georgia was the only one able to preserve the Republic and eventually to implement democratic principles. Why, then, did the Mensheviks descend to the bigoted and racist machinations of their own National Democrat rivals? “We are astounded at this indiscretion, especially as there have never been members of the Dashnaktsutiun in the areas mentioned by Ramishvili, and the Georgian government knows that very well.”41 37 Ashkhatavory Sept. 17:3, 1919. 38 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 2:3-4, Sept. 11:1—2, 1919 \ Ashkhatavory Oct. 21:1-2, Nov. 12:3, 1919; Erkirt Jan. 31:3, 1920. See also Georgian Archives, Box 8, book 12. 39 For contemporary accounts of the unrest, seeBorha, Nov. 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 54; FO 371/3664-3665, 152494/157882/157892/1015/58; FO 371/3673, File 168734/ 58 (including copies of and cuttings from several Tiflis newspapers). For descriptions of the rising in Soviet sources, see, for example, Bor’ba v Gruziiy pp. 483—512 passim; Istoriia Kompartii Gruziiy pp. 348—350; N. B. Makharadze, Pobeda sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii v Gruzii: Dokumenty i materialy (1917-1921 gg.) (Tbilisi, 1965), pp. 317-325; G. Zhvaniia, Velikii Oktiabr* i bor’ba BoVshevikov Zakavkaz’ia va Sovetskuiu vlast' (Tbilisi, 1967), pp. 215-221. 40 FO 371/3665, 159646/1015/58; Ashkhatavory Nov. 11:2, 1919. 41 Ashkhatavor, Nov. 14:1, 1919.

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The abortive Bolshevik coup shifted the brunt of press censorship from monarchist, ultraconservative, and moderately liberal organs to those of the internationalist socialist parties. Previously, the interior ministry had suspended the Ashkhatavor and Armenian-oriented Kavkazskoe slovo but allowed them to reappear as Nor Ashkhatavor (“New Laborer”) and Slovo (“Word”). Despite their mutual distrust, Georgian Mensheviks and Ar­ menian Dashnakists seemed to sense that the fate of their respective parties and national republics could not be dissociated. Now, however, the Mensheviks relentlessly suppressed socialist organs with pro-Russian lean­ ings. The Social Revolutionary Znamia revoliutsii (“Banner of Revolution”) was padlocked and its Armenian editors, Nikolai Tarkhanian and TerNersisian, were exiled. More significant was the closure of Sotsial-Demokrat and the expulsion of its Menshevik-internationalist editor, Arshak Zohrabian (Zurabov).42As the candidate of the Social Democratic organization in Tiflis, Zohrabian had been elected to the Russian state duma in 1907, but in 1918 he denounced the formation of a separate Georgian Social Democrat party and campaigned against his erstwhile comrades under the internationalist banner of the (non-Bolshevik) Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. His exile to Erevan by Ramishvili was a bold measure which incensed Zohrabian’s severest Dashnakist critics.43 At his death from typhus in the Armenian capital early in 1920, spokesmen for the Dashnaktsutiun, the Populist party, and the Russian Social Democrat, Social Revolutionary, and Communist parties joined in extolling Zohrabian’s qualities as either comrade or political foe and in deploring the treatment accorded him by his former Georgian colleagues. The entire Armenian National Council of Georgia met the train bearing Zohrabian’s body to Tiflis for burial in Khodjavank, which had become a veritable pantheon of the Armenian national movement. The huge procession to the cemetery in the Halvabar quarter signaled respect for an extraordinary intellect but also silent protest against those held responsible for his exile and death.44

42 Ibid., Nov. 14:3, 1919. 43 In response to the Armenian National Council’s protest that Zohrabian’s exile was moti­ vated by revenge, the Menshevik newspapers insisted that he had become a virtual Bolshevik and that Sotsial-Demokrat had been financed from Bolshevik sources. See Ertoba, no. 285, 1919, and Ashkhatavor, Dec. 21:2, 1919. In 1919 approximately twenty non-Menshevik news­ papers in Tiflis were closed and at least as many were forced to suspend publication tem­ porarily because of articles offensive to the Georgian authorities. Zhordaniia {op. cit., p. 101) discusses the freedom of the press within the limits of Georgian “democracy and inde­ pendence.” 44 Haradj, Jan. 6:1-2, 9:2, 1920; Borba, Jan. 6:4, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 9:3, 1920.

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The Disputed Territory By mid-1919 the Armenian and Georgian governments, though publicly asserting conflicting claims to the Borchalu and Akhalkalak uezds, were privately suggesting the possibility of adjustments. In July Minister of Military Affairs Araratian submitted to the Armenian foreign ministry a memorandum defining the northern boundary essential to the defense of the Republic. Because Alexandropol was a critical link between Erevan and Kars and the hub of communication and transportation routes, the frontier should be at least 60 versts (40 miles) from the city and some distance from the Alexandropol—Vorontsovka road. A compromise boundary justifiable on ethnographic, economic, and strategic grounds would extend from the north of Shulaver along the Borchalu mountains to Lake Toporavan (Parvana) and then south westward, incorporating the town of Akhalkalak, to Lake Khozapin and the Kur River at Ardahan (see map 3). That frontier, though giving Georgia parts of Borchalu and Akhalkalak, would be a solid defensive barrier and would bring more than 100,000 Armenians into the Republic.45 The Georgian government could hardly have seen a major concession in this plan, since most of the territory in question was already under Georgian jurisdiction or else within the Lori neutral zone. The limit of Georgian concessions, as delineated in a foreign ministry memorandum, would be to acknowledge Armenia’s annexation of southern Lori and possibly of Olti. Publicly, however, the Georgian delegation in Paris con­ tinued to assert claims to the entire Tiflis guberniia, hence all of Lori, and to the Olti and Ardahan okrugs of the Kars oblast, generally regarded as part of Russian Armenia. Georgian rule in these two okrugs would, it was explained, secure all inland routes from Batum to Akhaltsikh and Akhal­ kalak and also block any future Turkish attempts to seize the province of Batum. Although most of the population had become Turkish-speaking and Muslim, they were of Georgian stock and had lost their native dialects only in the nineteenth century. The districts could not be given to Turkey, for that would reward a defeated enemy, whereas Armenia should not have them, “as they have never formed a part of this country either ethnographically or politically.”46 The disposition of Ardahan and Olti addëd a new dimension to the 45 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, “Proekty granitsy Armenii s Gruziei: Borchalu, Akhal­ kalak, July 31, 1919.” 46 FO 371/4933, E 1577/1/58; FO 608/88, 356/2/2/4366/5214/5741; Georgian Archives, Box 24, book 22, Box 25, books 2, 5, 10, 26.

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territorial question, since until the Kars Muslim shura (council) was over­ thrown in April 1919 it had been impossible for either republic to take action in those counties. By General Milne’s arrangement, the Armenian administration was then authorized to expand from Kars into southern Ardahan and eastern Olti, and the rest of the region was placed under the direction of Batum Military Governor Cooke-Collis and his representative at Ardahan, Lieutenant Oliver. The Georgians nonetheless introduced small detachments into Potskhov and the town of Ardahan and initiated a political war of attrition with the British military authorities.47 In response to the repeated demands of General Milne and General Cory that the troops be withdrawn, Foreign Minister Gegechkori and Premier Zhordania explained that the garrisons were necessary pending the arrival of a British force adequate to maintain order. Zhordania complained that it was unfair to permit the Armenians to occupy much of Ardahan and Olti while denying the Georgians the right to patrol a small but strategic area adjacent to Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh. Nevertheless, in surprising contradiction to memoranda submitted by Chkheidze and Tsereteli in Paris, Zhordania said that Georgia would not lay permanent claim to Ardahan.48 Throughout the summer of 1919 Georgian officials resorted to evasion and deception, first assuring that arrangements for withdrawal had been made and then promising to investigate the British charge that the armed detachments were still in place.49 The tactic was based on the premise that, if they could hold out until the British evacuated, the Georgians would have a better chance to win part of the Kars province. And in fact General Milne ruled in mid-August that Georgia could keep small detachments at Ardahan and Potskhov if it pulled the troops in the Black Sea sector back to the Bzyb River and respected the demarcation line with Denikin’s armies.50 Again the Georgians tarried, fulfilling neither condition. When Lieutenant Oliver was recalled from Ardahan on September 2, the Kur River became the de facto dividing line between the Georgian and Armenian spheres of operation in the district. By that time Oliver Wardrop had arrived in Tiflis and, reversing the stand of the British military authorities, soon endorsed Georgia’s right to Batum and parts of the counties of Ardahan and Olti. 47 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, April-May, 1919. 48 “ ‘Demokraticheskoe’ pravitel’stvo Gruzii,” pp. 140, 155-157, 161-162; Borba, April 27:2, 4, 1919; Bor’ba v Gruzii, pp. 451-454; FO 608/82, 342/5/4/14655. 49 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, June-A ugust 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 21, books 28, 40. 60 WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 18, 26, 1919. See also FO 371/3663, 143737/ 143854/1015/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/12/21114 ends.

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The Call for Negotiation Despite their many differences, the Armenian and Georgian governments were bent toward some measure of accommodation by domestic crises and external threats. In notes exchanged in June and July, the Armenian foreign ministry called for the regulation of all nonterritorial questions, and the Georgian ministry asked to settle the boundary dispute without recourse to distant powers. At the end of July, as its army was being expelled from the long corridor between Davalu and Julfa, the Erevan government agreed to place all outstanding questions on the agenda. Premier Alexandre Khatisian explained to Antoine Poidebard, the French military representative, that while it was all well and good for the French and American missions to say, “Don’t cede your rights and have patience,” this advice was difficult to follow because of the lack of effective support and a settlement handed down by the Paris Peace Conference. Regardless of its weak bargaining position, Armenia would therefore begin bilateral negotiations with Georgia.51 That meeting was delayed, however, by Georgia’s proposal on August 6 to reconvene the general Transcaucasian conference, which had re­ cessed in June when Armenia had refused to adhere to the anti-Denikinist alliance. The suggestion was motivated by the impending withdrawal of the British forces, the Armeno-Muslim clashes from Karabagh to Kars, and the British announcement two days earlier that Denikin’s zone of operation would henceforth extend to the northern frontiers of Georgia and Azerbaijan.52 Extolling the ideal of Transcaucasian harmony, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers quickly accepted the invitation. Armenia’s plenipotentiaries, Stepan Mamikonian, the nonpartisan former president of the prestigious Armenian Committee of Moscow and a veteran negotiator, and Smbat Khachatrian, a Dashnakist advocate of Armeno-Georgian collaboration, arrived in Tiflis on August 15.53The Azerbaijani delegates, however, did not appear, initially because of Foreign Minister Jafarov’s insistence that the conference be shifted to Baku and then apparently because of a protracted cabinet crisis. 51 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, July 3114, 1919\ Hayastani Ashkhatavor (Erevan), Aug. 3:1, 1919. 52 Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 6, Box 26, book 31; FO 371/3663, 122739/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/18728 end.; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 7:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 65/1. 53 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no* 108, Aug. 12> 19 19'»Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 12:2, 1919; Bor’ba, Aug. 12:1, 16:2, 1919; Kavkazskoe slovo, Aug. 12, 1919; Bulletin Géorgien d'infor­ mations, no. 13 (Oct. 4, 1919), 2-3.

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While awaiting a decision from Azerbaijan, the Armenian and Georgian delegations met to determine the fate of the British-supervised neutral zone in Lori. The two-day conference began on August 29 with Mamikonian, Khachatrian, and Major General I. A. Kishmishian, Ar­ menia’s military attaché in Tiflis, on one side, and K. B. Sabakhtarashvili, assistant foreign minister, S. G. Mdivani, vice-president of the Constituent Assembly and former envoy to Armenia, and Major General A. K. Gedevanov, assistant minister of war, on the other. Brigadier General William H. Beach, chief of British intelligence in Transcaucasia, sat as an observer. It soon became apparent that the British proposal for provision­ al partition of the neutral zone was unacceptable to both sides without settling the issue of the entire frontier. The parties therefore agreed to retain the mixed administration under a British officer who would reside either within the zone at Alaverdi or at Tiflis. General Beach, who was optimistic that the British command would allow Captain Douglas or another officer to remain, witnessed the accord and signed its English translation.54 On September 1 the same representatives authorized Kishmishian and Gedevanov to organize a mixed military commission to verify the boundaries of the zone and to keep the size and the locations of the Armenian and Georgian detachments in conformity with spec­ ifications laid down in the protocols creating the neutral zone in January 1919.5556 The public reaction to this arrangement was largely favorable, although the Georgian conservative press criticized the Menshevik government for giving Armenia a chance to tighten its hold on the region. The organs of the dominant Georgian and Armenian parties congratulated the two gov­ ernments for their willingness to settle differences by peaceful means. Nor Ashkhatavor, speaking of the inseparable bonds between the two peoples, praised the moves toward mutual concession “despite the vociferous howls of the Georgian nationalist factions.” The Menshevik Bor’ba added a loud “Amen!” and expressed hope that, since even the chauvinistic Armenian

54 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, File 66a! 3, no. 135, Sept. 12, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 20, Box 22, books 52, 59, Box 24, books 13, 17, 29; Bor’ba, Sept. 12:3, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 12:2, 1919; La Géorgie Indépendante, Oct. 14, 1919; FO 371/3664, 144748/1015/58. General Beach had intended to chair the conference until General Milne’s headquarters in Constantinople advised him to act only as an observer. See WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary, Aug. 18, 26, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 45. 56 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 12:3, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 20, Box 23, book 60, Box 24, book 20. For the minutes and protocols of the British-chaired Armeno-Georgian conference ofjanuary 9—17, 1919, see Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 1, Box 21, books 14, 19, 20, 22, 24, Box 22, book 52.

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mouthpiece had come to realize the value of negotiation, the Dashnaktsutiun would repudiate its own aggressive policies.56 The mixed administration for the neutral zone consisted of Georgian commissar Alexandre Lordkipanidze and Armenian commissar Lieuten­ ant Colonel G. Vardapetian and subsequently Valad Valadian. As it proved impossible to prolong the supervisory role of Captain Douglas, the two sides accepted Colonel Haskell’s suggestion that Major Charles E. Livingston, a member of his own staff, reside at Alaverdi as the foreign liaison. An attempt by Haskell early in October to dissolve the neutral zone because of increasing unrest and of corruption in the gendarmerie result­ ing from arrears in pay was unsuccessful.57And the expedient of retaining the zone did not eliminate tension, as the Georgians soon charged that Armenian officials were behaving as if the district was an integral part of their country, and the Armenians claimed that Lordkipanidze was trying to get Muslim and Russian Molokan villages—but without success—to petition for incorporation into the Georgian republic.58 In a way the peasantry in the zone set an example for the two contending states. In December the multinational cooperative association of Lori met in Uzunlar (Odzun) to institute the progressive zemstvo system of rural self-government. That same month representatives of all ethnic and religious groups gathered at Alaverdi with the Armenian and Georgian commissars and Major Livingston to mark the beginning of the first judicial session based on liberal legal reforms.59 The September Conference The spirit of reconciliation found expression in many small ways. The Georgian government, for example, authorized the establishment of an Armenian consulate in Sukhum;60 the Armenian government welcomed the new Georgian envoy, Gerasim Makharadze, with unusual fanfare and assured him that the agreement on the neutral zone would be put before Parliament as an accomplished fact. On Makharadze’s first visit to the 66 See especially Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 3:2, 1919; Bor’ba, Sept. 13:1, 1919. See also Bor’ba, Sept. 4:1, 6:2; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 130, Sept. 6, 1919. 67 FO 371/4160, 146651/521/44, Weekly report no. 38, for week ending October 16, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 24, book 30. 68Bor’ba, Sept. 25:3, 1919\ Ashkhatavor, Nov. 15:3, 1919. 69Ashkhatavor, Nov. 18:2, Dec. 30:3, 1919. 60 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 104, Aug. 7, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 7:2, 14:3, 1919. Sakartvelo, organ of the Georgian National Democrat party, branded the appointment of an Armenian diplomatic representative in Abkhazia (Sukhum) as a new intrigue, maintain­ ing that such plenipotentiaries were usually assigned to independent countries and that Abkhazia was an integral part of Georgia.

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legislature on September 4, he was greeted by a demonstration of Armeno-Georgian amity in speeches celebrating the mutual resolve of two democratic peoples to defend their freedom and independence. Makharadze was accorded a standing ovation when he responded with equally eloquent language.61 Two days later Premier Khatisian, Assistant Foreign Minister Haik Yaghjian, and Member of Parliament Ruben Ter-Minasian departed for Tiflis to welcome Oliver Wardrop, consult with Allied and White Army missions, and resume the dialogue with Georgian cabinet members. Dur­ ing these interviews Noi Ramishvili played upon Armenia’s vulnerability and need to avoid isolation by combining with Georgia in a political bloc. The Georgian minister of war, internal affairs, and public instruction chose his words carefully in warning that Armenia’s refusal to join in the regional military alliance against Denikin had left Azerbaijan free to move against Armenia at will. Before Khatisian returned to Erevan on Septem­ ber 14, the Armenian and Georgian'representatives agreed to proceed with bilateral discussions, since the Azerbaijani delegates had still not arrived for the Transcaucasian conference.62 On September 17 Ramishvili, Mdivani, Sabakhtarashvili, Mamikonian, Khachatrian, and Kishmishian met for a formal exchange of views.63 In advancing the Armenian strategy, Stepan Mamikonian proposed discussion of nonterritorial issues as the first order of business. A participant in every previous Armeno-Georgian conference, he ably outlined Armenia’s case for unrestricted transit, the abolition of most custom duties, a share of the technical equipment, spare parts, and military matériel concentrated in the shops and warehouses of Tiflis, and rolling stock equivalent to the number of locomotives and cars used on the southern branch of the Transcaucasian railway in 1914. As Tiflis had been the Russian Armenian financial and banking center, the Erevan government also asked permission to engage temporarily in credit operations there. Moreover, Mamikonian wanted the status of the large Georgian Armenian minority to be clarified. A Georgian law on nationality adopted in May required residents to register as Georgian citizens or submit to all regulations pertaining to aliens. Mamikonian, noting that Georgian Armenians might wish to opt for Russian, 61 Borba, Sept. 9:2, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 7:3, 1919\ Ashkhatavor, Sept. 15:2, 16:2, 1919; FO 371/3659, 138574/512/58; FO 371/3664, 144748/1015/58. 62 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4, Report for period Sept. 6-14, 1919. 63 The stenographic minutes of the conference are in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 20, Box 24, books 13, 21, 29. A translation is in RG 256, 184.021/282. See also S. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), pp. 316-318.

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Armenian, or Georgian citizenship, urged a solution based on mutual consent rather than on unilateral legislative fiat. Ramishvili responded in conciliatory terms. His government, too, de­ sired a mutually satisfactory resolution of all outstanding questions. In view of Armenia’s economic distress and the fact that the Republic re­ mained landlocked because of delays in determining what Ottoman ter­ ritories it was to receive, Georgia would grant Armenia special transit privileges and the right to lease, but not keep, a certain number of locomo­ tives and freight cars. Repeating the standard argument that the Tiflis government would have to account to a future Russian government and to the Allies for goods and assets of Imperial Russia taken over by the Transcaucasian Federative Republic and then by the Republic of Georgia, Ramishvili conceded that because of Armenia’s pressing need the release of some essential materials might be feasible. He was also confident that the Georgian Constituent Assembly would adopt citizenship regulations agreeable to the Armenian government and make some arrangement about custom duties and financial operations in Tiflis. Ramishvili then introduced a condition that in all likelihood had been expected. The Georgian government, though quite willing to consider the Armenian proposals, also wanted the territorial question to be resolved so as to bring about close cultural and political relations between the two countries. Ramishvili declared that he would not repeat the various considerations on which Georgia based its claim to the entire Tiflis guberniia but would simply note that the provincial boundary had evolved through a long historical process and not through an arbitrary decision by Imperial Russia. In what he termed a generous concession for the sake of good relations, Georgia would consent to the temporary cession of southern Borchalu, the matter to be reexamined after Armenia had been given the opportunity to gather in its people on the lands (Turkish Armenia) even­ tually to be included within its borders. The provisional Armeno-Georgian boundary might therefore extend from the vicinity of Sanahin and Akori westward through the heart of the neutral zone to the southern limit of Akhalkalak, which in its entirety would remain within Georgia. Pursuing his government’s decision to give up most of Akhalkalak in return for the plain of Lori and the Alaverdi copper mines, Mamikonian presented statistics based on tax ledgers showing that 31,724 Armenians, 7,116 Russians, 4,930 Greeks, 3,931 Muslims, and virtually no Georgians were living in the neutral zone and that beyond the zone and into the Georgian capital itself the Armenians had a plurality. Armenia neverthe­ less would make “great concessions” by leaving the watershed of the Khram River and northern Borchalu to Georgia. Moreover, acknowledg-

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ing that in recent history the Armenian preponderance in Akhalkalak had been created by the exchange of populations between the Turkish and Russian empires after the war of 1828-1829, the Armenian government would cede the county, except for the southern lake district near Alexandropol, and relocate the population after establishment of a united Ar­ menian state. Playing secondary roles, Semen Mdivani urged the Armenians to approve the boundary outlined by Ramishvili, in view of the important economic concessions tendered, whereas Smbàt Khachatrian maintained that both Lori and Akhalkalak were Armenian in every aspect and were not essential to the territorial or economic integrity of Georgia. Yet he offered to ask his government to consider further modifications in Akhalkalak if the Georgian delegation would accept the natural moun­ tain boundary in Borchalu. As the discussion became heated, Ramishvili told the Armenians it would be futile for them to expect to gain more favorable terms from foreign powers. Moreover, since the'future united Armenia would pre­ sumably include a sizable portion of Turkish Armenia, it was unreason­ able to quibble over two small districts that were bound with Tiflis.64 Georgian economic concessions should be balanced by Armenian territorial concessions. Mamikonian, retorting that “it is not possible to cede land in exchange for wagons and locomotives,” said that Armenia had embarked on the road of compromise, not out of distress, but because the Armenian and Georgian peoples would have to walk side by side in the difficult times ahead. At that point of impasse, Ramishvili recessed the conference so that the delegations could receive additional instructions from their governments. The Armenian Council of Ministers ultimately resolved to relinquish even the southern sector of Akhalkalak, if necessary, to secure the Lori plain and the Alaverdi mines. In essence, therefore, the territorial dispute was narrowed to the question of whether Georgia would give up the entire neutral zone. In subsequent meetings both sides proposed minor varia­ tions, but the determination of each to hold on to Alaverdi prevented further progress in discussions.65 Meanwhile Armenia was denied the 64 A few days earlier Ramishvili had told Oliver Wardrop that Armenia should be awarded a belt of territory in eastern Anatolia extending as far as Trebizond, Hasankale, Baiburt, Gumushane, and eventually to Van. Wardrop reported that the Georgians were uneasy about their Armenian neighbors and would be happy to see them leave the country. In the Foreign Office, George Kidston wrote on the dispatch: “The Georgian aim is of course to edge off the Armenians to the south & let them expand as far as they like into Turkish territory, keeping them out of the Caucasus as much as possible.” See FO 371 /365g, 138104/512/58. See also FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449 encL showing that Ramishvili supported Armenian claims to Trebizond in order to strengthen the Georgian bid for Batum. 68 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, Report of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 5, 1919, File 67/3a, H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerhayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavarutiun, 1920 t..

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technical equipment, spare parts, and rolling stock, a share of the common assets of the former Transcaucasian republic, the military hardware of the former Armenian Army Corps stored in the Mantashev warehouses in Tiflis, and even its 5 million pounds sterling, frozen in Tiflis banks since the Armeno-Georgian war. Furthermore, until the status of Georgian Armenians was settled by treaty, the numerous Armenian professional and cultural societies could not transfer their funds, libraries, museums, and other movable properties to Erevan. Ramishvili’s moderation in discussions with the Armenian delegates did not deter him, as minister of interior, from continuing to expropriate Armenian-owned properties. Requisition of the Union Building, which housed the Shahkhatuni library, the Topchian Workers’ Club, and the reading rooms of the Dashnaktsutiun’s student organization for use by the Italian mission stirred political passions anew; the indignant occupants had to be evicted by armed militia.*66 Yet, in the paradox of Armeno-Georgian relations, provocative descriptions of these actions ran side by side with editorials stressing the common goals and struggles of the Transcaucasian dem­ ocracies.

The November Accords Although a territorial settlement would seemingly have to wait upon determination of how much of the eastern vilayets would be awarded to Armenia, both governments had softened their previously uncompromis­ ing positions, and on November 3 they concluded a treaty of arbitration and a transit agreement. The timing was significant, for the accords coin­ cided with the Bolshevik uprising and widespread peasant unrest in Georgia and the further deterioration of Armeno-Azerbaijani relations, thereby accentuating the mutual dependence of the two governments. Ramishvili, in particular, was reportedly so shaken by the insurrection in his country that he pushed the Georgian cabinet toward an accommoda­ tion with both Armenia and the Volunteer Army.67 Diplomatic representative in Tiflis (Tumanian) to Paris Delegation, Jan. 9, 1920. The Azer­ baijani plenipotentiary in Tiflis wrote the Georgian and Armenian governments on January 22, 1920, that since the regulation of disputed territory required the participation of all interested parties, the Azerbaijani government regarded the Armeno-Georgian discussions regarding the Borchalu district as being of no consequence. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. 66 Ashkhatavor, Nov. 15:3, 1919. For the Armenian view of Armenian-Georgian relations and the questions of national minorities and national cultural autonomy, see especially Arshak Djamalian, “Hai-vratsakan knjire>” Hairenik Amsagir, VI-VII (April 1928-April 1929). 67 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 48 bis.

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The arbitration treaty obligated Georgia and Armenia to settle all fu­ ture disputes peaceably: The Government of the Republic of Georgia, represented by Minister of Inter­ nal and Military Affairs Noi Vissarionovich RAMISHVILI and Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly of the Republic of Georgia Semen Gurgenovich MDIVANI on the one side, and the Government of the Republic o f Armenia, represented by Stepan Grigorevich MAM IKON IAN and Member of the Parlia­ ment of the Republic of Armenia Smbat Artemevich KHACHÄTRIAN on the other side, having examined the plenipotentiary credentials and having found them to be in the required form and proper order, have concluded the present treaty, wherein: 1. The contracting Governments (Republics of Armenia and Georgia) commit themselves to settle all existing disputes, as well as those that might arise between them, by mutual agreement, and, if that is not attained, through compulsory arbitration. 2. The exchange of the ratifications of this treaty shall take place within two weeks in the city of Tiflis. 3. The present treaty is signed in duplicate.68

The transit agreement, though dealing with only one of the nonter­ ritorial questions, was more substantive and immediate in its economic implications and revealed a partial shift in the Georgian strategy. Using the same introduction and two concluding articles as the arbitration treaty, it provided: 1. For goods transported on the Armenian railways from within the bounds of Armenia to Georgia or from Georgia to within the bounds of Armenia, as well as for those goods transported on the Georgian railways from within the bounds of Georgia to Armenia or from Armenia to within the bounds of Georgia, there is established free transit, i.e. transit without duties. 2. This treaty is being concluded for a term of three years, with each o f the contracting sides accorded the right to call for a review after one year from the date of ratification, in which event the treaty remains in effect for six months from the day of notification. If within that period no agreement is reached on the review then the treaty shall be allowed to lapse.69

In a related action, the Georgian government demonstrated its goodwill by authorizing transit between Batum and Armenia of 500 railroad trucks loaded with relief supplies.70 68 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, File 66/2, Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich ev Vrastani Karavarutiun, 1919 t.; FO 371/3660, 159650/512/58 end.; FO 371/3665, 157888/ 1015/58; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 48 bis; Georgian Archives, Box 21, book 24, Box 23, book 64. Ibid. to FO 371/3660, 150394/512/58 end.; FO 371/3664, 150598/1015/58.

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Bearing the treaties to Erevan, Mamikonian and Khachatrian were congratulated for their perseverance in negotiating from a relatively weak position. Premier and Acting Foreign Minister Khatisian submitted the documents to Parliament on November 11 with an optimistic appraisal of the Armeno-Georgian reconciliation. Deputies Simon Vratzian, Arshak Djamalian, Sahak Torosian, and Vahan Khoreni also lauded the new spirit of cooperation and expressed confidence that the remaining more com­ plex issues would soon be resolved. A gifted orator, Khoreni stressed the political and economic interdependence of the two neighboring peoples, who clearly could not survive without each other. The Armenian democ­ racy therefore supported the freedom of the Georgian democracy with the same fervor as it upheld its own right to independence. That same day, the treaties were ratified unanimously.71 Ratification by the Georgian Constituent Assembly followed on Novem­ ber 14. Foreign Minister Gegechkori hailed the treaties as a victory for the policy of mutual agreement and a defeat for the ruinous alternative of force of arms. Razhden Arsenidze, speaking for the dominant Social Democrat faction, pointed to peace and friendship among Transcaucasian peoples as the only possible avenue toward true independence. Words of commendation were also recited by Garegin Ter-Stepanian of the Dashnakist faction and by spokesmen of the Social Revolutionary and Social Federalist deputies. They joined the Menshevik majority in overriding the protests of the small National Democrat faction, which abstained from voting because its adherents insisted that questions of national honor, including defense of Georgia’s historic territories, could not be submitted to arbitration.72 The treaties were acclaimed by the liberal and socialist press in both countries. To blunt conservative criticism, the Menshevik Bor’ba noted that the transit treaty would give Georgia access to the markets of Persia and would yield a lucrative income in transportation fees. All Georgian political observers agreed, however, that the immediate benefits would favor Armenia and that the Erevan government should reciprocate with a conciliatory attitude on other issues.73Armenian newspapers around the world reported the treaties as a major foreign policy achievement. 71 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, nos. 192-193, Nov. 18-19, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 13:2, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 15:1, 1919- The Armenian acts of ratification are in the published collection of laws of the Parliament. See Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919 series, no. 10, Dec. 31, 1919, docs. 99, 100. See also FO 371/3666, 163548/168505/1015/58. 12 Hairenik, Feb. 1:3, 1920; Georgian Archives, Box 24, book 29. 73 For relevant excerpts from Georgian newspapers, see the information bulletins for November 1919 in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3. The strongest criticism came from the organs of the Georgian Nationalist and National Democrat parties, Klde (“Rock”), Sahartvelo

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Ashkhatavor, reflecting upon its relentless struggle against Georgian chauvinism and the protracted negotiations required to bring about two simple treaties, voiced the hope that this modest beginning would usher in a new era of Armeno-Georgian solidarity. The Armenian republic and people would stand with Georgia in its time of crisis and make no attempt to take advantage of the antigovernmental agitation that had disquieted much of the country.74 There was, perhaps, no better measure of the progress toward recon­ ciliation than the contrast between Prime Minister Noi Zhordania’s formal declaration at the end of 1918 and his assessment a year later. Addressing the Georgian legislature in December 1918, he had denounced the milita­ rists controlling the Armenian government, which had struck treacher­ ously into Lori attempting, like wolves, to devour everything.75 In reporting to the Social Democrat Labor Party of Georgia in December 1919, Zhordania explained that his cabinet now realized that internal stability and regional harmony, not dependence on solutions from abroad, pointed the way to national independence. The government had therefore sought to dispel the mutual distrust that had led to the regrettable war with Armenia, and had established treaty bonds with the neighboring republics as stepping-stones toward united political and economic action and perhaps eventual confederation.76 Armenian leaders, too, were ready to admit past errors. In the parliamentary session that ratified the arbitration treaty, Simon Vratzian spoke for the powerful Dashnakist faction, observing that the war with Georgia, “which we now recall with shame,” would never have occurred had the two governments then settled differences in the manner prescribed in the present agreement.77 Premier Khatisian spoke in a similar vein to a workers’ conference in December and, after outlining the progress made, received a thunderous vote of confidence.78 By the end of 1919 the two neighboring republics had translated their high-sounding oratory into a few pragmatic measures. Armenian expecta(“Georgia”), Obnovlenie (“Renewal”), and Iveriia (“Iberia”). Favorable reactions were forth­ coming, on the other hand, from the journals of the Georgian Social Federalist and Social Revolutionary parties, Sakhalkho-Sakme (“Popular Task”), and Shroma (“Labor”). 74 Ashkhatavor, Nov. 15:2, igig. See also ibid., Nov. 8:2, 14:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no- 190, Nov. 15, 1919. 78 Hovannisian, Republic, I, 109-110. 76 FO 371/3673, 170788/170788/58; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 23:3, 1919. 77 Hairenik, Jan. 13:2, 1920. 78 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 21:3, 1919.

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tions from the Allies and the Paris Peace Conference had begun to recede, whereas Georgian concerns about domestic and external threats led to a réévaluation of former strategies. Friction and rivalry continued into the new year, yet the improvement in relations gave promise that territorial and minority questions could also be resolved in a spirit of compromise. Unfortunately, there could be little such hope in the perplexing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

7

Armeno-Azerbaij ani Relations

Political conflicts superimposed on'deeply ingrained cultural-religious antipathies blighted Armeno-Azerbaijani relations in 1919. The broad­ ranging territorial disputes were in some ways a continuing manifestation of the warfare that predated the creation of the two republics. On oppos­ ing sides during the Turkish invasion of Transcaucasia, Armenians and Azerbaijanis had battled in every county from Surmalu to Baku. Their mutual attempts “to cleanse” the land of undesirable elements resulted in widespread devastation and thousands of destitute refugees. Yet the com­ plex demography of Transcaucasia made the formation of ethnically homogeneous countries a virtual impossibility. The Azerbaijani solution would confine an Armenian state to the northern half of the Erevan guberniia, thus precluding the existence of a viable republic; the Armeni­ an plan to limit Azerbaijan to the plains and steppes of eastern Trans­ caucasia would exclude from that state half a million Muslims in the Elisavetpol highlands and the Araxes river valley and would spell econom­ ic ruin for many Muslim herdsmen. The critical importance of the Karabagh—Zangezur—Nakhichevan corridor was accentuated in 1919 by political calculations. Fearful of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic movements to destroy the Armenian republic and thus eliminate the Armenian ques­ tion, the Erevan government insisted that Armenia’s survival could be assured only by keeping Turks and Azerbaijanis apart. Equally concerned about White Army intrigues, the Baku government was convinced that only by opening a direct route to Anatolia and encircling Erevan with Azerbaijani- or other Muslim-controlled territory could an ultimate Armeno-Denikinist combination against Azerbaijan be blocked. It was ironic that the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders shared many Russian cultural 168

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and political traditions and had served together on various municipal and regional boards. Premiers Khatisian and Usubbekov had more in common with each other than with many of their own countrymen, yet the issue of national sovereignty and political forces beyond the control of either leader drove a wide wedge between them. The Azerbaijani Scene The largest and most populous of the Transcaucasian states, Azerbaijan was also the most diverse. Aside from several Christian enclaves in eastern Transcaucasia, a score of nationalities inhabited Baku, the only major proletarian center in the Caucasus. Even though the independence of Azerbaijan had been declared in May 1918, it had taken the Azerbaijani and Turkish armies four more months to capture Baku and install the cabinet of Fathali Khan Khoiskii.1 Dominated by Nuri Pasha and the Ottoman divisions until the end of the world war, the Azerbaijani government had then acquiesced, though apprehensively, in the British military occupation. Yet its gloomiest anticipations did not materialize, as General Thomson resolved to preserve order through the local government. Hence, while the Azerbaijani army staff was obliged to withdraw to Ganja (Elisavetpol) until June 1919, and British officers assumed some administrative functions in Baku, Thomson acknowledged Khan Khoiskii’s government and even supported its bid for provisional jurisdiction over several disputed districts.2In April Nasib Bek Usubbekov replaced Khan Khoiskii as chief of state in a move intended to obscure the country’s initial dependence upon the discredited Turkish leaders and to reflect a more moderate stance toward Russia.3 The apparent willingness of the Allies not to hold the Azerbaijanis accountable for their wartime collaboration with the Turks caused bewilderment among the Armenians, who had believed that the arrival of the Allied armed forces would mark a sharp turn in their fortunes. The British confirmation of Khosrov Bek 1 See Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 189-190, 220-227. 2 See the War Diaries for Dec. 1918 and Jan. 1919 of the British 39th Infantry Brigade (WO 95/4955), Mesopotamian Expeditionary Army (WO 95/4967), and North Persia Force (WO 95/5045). See also Britain, FO 371/3667, File 5890/58; George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russiay 1 9 /7 -/9 2 / (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966), pp. 90-98; B. Baikov, “Vospominaniia o revoliutsii v Zakavkaz’i (1917-1920 g.g.)”Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii, IX (1923), 145-155; A. Raevskii, Angliiskaia interventsiia i Musavatskoe praviteVstvo (Baku, 1927), pp. 39-49; A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, IV (Berlin, 1925), 164-169; Adil Khan Ziatkhan, Aperçu sur Vhistoire, la littérature, et la politique de lAzerheidjan (Baku, 1919), pp. 64—83; Mehmet-Zade Mirza-Bala, Milti Azerbayqan hareketi: Miltî Az. “Müsavat” halk firkasi tarihi ([Berlin], 1938), pp. 154-166. 3 Hovannisian, Republic, I, 184 n. 77.

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Sultanov as governor-general of Karabagh and Zangezur rudely dispelled such illusions. The political cleavage in Azerbaijan was more pronounced than in Georgia and Armenia, where the Menshevik and Dashnakist parties held sway. Although the Federalist Musavat party had led Azerbaijan toward independence, it could not govern without coalition support in both the cabinet and the legislature. Composed of an odd combination of urban bourgeois intellectuals, bureaucrats, and landed khans and beks who con­ trolled much of the countryside and headed successive cabinets, the party subscribed to a platform of national democratic and liberal reforms. Their implementation was impeded, however, by the reluctance of one or an­ other wing to sanction changes that might weaken its own position. More­ over, while the administrative and military apparatus of the state was gradually being Turkified, there was much ambivalence on the question of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. The Ottoman authorities, it was admit­ ted, had played a major role in Azerbaijan’s emancipation, but resentment over the imperious behavior of Turkish officers lingered on. Most Musa­ vat leaders believed in friendly relations with Turkey, but they preferred national independence to Turkish dominion.4 The Baku government’s desire to win the confidence of the Allied Powers was exploited by the Pan-Islamic Azerbaijani Ittihadist organiza­ tion, which exerted much influence among lower-class urban workers and the semiliterate peasantry. The Ittihadists equated the Turkish struggle against partition of the Ottoman Empire with a struggle of all Islamic peoples against Western imperialism. Decrying the European orientation of the Musavatists, they served as intermediaries for collaboration among Bolshevik, Young Turk, and Turkish Nationalist agents in Azerbaijan. Although politically far to the right, the Ittihadists joined with the small Muslim socialist factions in denouncing the government’s irresolution, its failure to aid the Muslim Mountaineers of Daghestan, and its disinclina­ tion to establish economic and political bonds with Soviet Russia.5 Like Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan suffered from economic disor­ ganization and financial insolvency. The enormous petroleum industry was both blessing and bane. It had transformed Baku from village to metropolis in a few decades, and it gave the new republic strong leverage 4 For differing views and interpretations of the Musavat party, see Mirza-Bala, op. cit.; M. E. Rassoul-Zadé, L'Azerbaïdjan en lutte pour l'Indépendance (Paris, 1930), and Azerbayçan Cumhurieti (Istanbul, 1922); Mirza-Davud Guseinov, Tiurkskaia Demokraticheskaia Partiia Federalistov “Musavat” v proshlom i nastoiashchem ([Tiflis], 1927), and Partiia Musavat i ee kontrrevoliutsionnaia rabota (Baku, 1929). 5 See the party’s journal, Ittihad (Baku), 1919-1920.

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with foreign commercial interests, which could be expected to influence their respective governments to support Azerbaijan’s political aspirations so as to share in the economic wealth. Despite severe financial problems Azerbaijan could use its huge petroleum resources as collateral for foreign credits and manufactured goods. The very importance of Baku, however, jeopardized the Azerbaijani republic, since a revived Russia, whatever its ultimate political system, would not readily accept the loss of fields that had supplied more than 80 percent of its oil. And as a strategic pivot in the plans of Bolshevik, Turkish, and Pan-Islamic organizers, the city became a center of multilayered intrigue. An even more imminent threat was the domestic unrest caused by the stagnation in oil production, for the primary outlets to central Russia had been sealed by the civil war and the Allied embargo against the Soviet state. No more than 4,000 tons daily could be conveyed by pipeline to Batum, whereas normal production was four to five times that amount. By the last quarter of 1919 storage facilities were glutted with more than 3.5 million tons of oil, production had been drastically curtailed, and thousands of workers had been laid off. The economic turmoil spawned a political crisis and redoubled the agitation for resumption of trade with Soviet Russia.6 While the oil of Baku spread uselessly upon the waters of the Caspian Sea, Armenia lacked the fuel needed to warm hospitals and orphanages and to operate railways on a normal schedule. Although diplomatic envoy Tigran Bekzadian negotiated the purchase of up to eight million poods of petroleum to be exported duty free and the Armenian Council of Ministers approved the transaction in July, the sale was not effected.7 Khan Tekinskii, chief of the Azerbaijani mission in Erevan, was urging his government to use its economic advantage and suspend all petroleum shipments to Armenia until the territorial question had been settled. Foreign Minister Jafarov replied on July 24 that the sale would not be confirmed without significant modifications, warning Tekinskii not to let the Armenian government know about this strategy of procrastination.8 For the rest of 1919, therefore, Armenia had to rely on indirect purchases and on occasional allocations from British military authorities and American relief agencies. 6 Seeesp. FO 371/3667, File 2473/58; FO 371/3672, 148704/148704/58. A Soviet interpreta­ tion of the British economic operations in Baku is given by Raevskii, Angliiskaia interventsiia, pp. 65-91. The industrial-commercial enterprises in Azerbaijan in 1919 are listed in Bulletin d'informations de l'Azerbaïdjan, no. 2 (Sept. 8, 1919), 68. 7 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 82, July 12, 1919; Kavkazskoe slovo, July 12, 1919; Ashkhatavor, July 31:3, 1919; Hairenik, Aug. 30:1-2, 1919. 8 France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; Adrbedjanipastatghterey p. 37, Jafarov’s no. 54.

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Economic and political tensions in Azerbaijan mounted in August as the British military forces withdrew, the Caspian flotilla was transferred to General Denikin, and rumors of a White Army invasion multiplied. As­ sailed from both right and left for a policy of reliance on the Allied Powers and for vacillation in dealing with the Denikinist threat, Usubbekov’s cabinet resigned in mid-September. The crisis lasted for four months while politicians favoring a more aggressive foreign policy and a stronger Turkish orientation tried unsuccessfully to rally support for the candidacy of Khan Khoiskii, and Usubbekov sought to bring the Ittihadists and the Turkic socialist parties into a new cabinet under his leadership. The Ittihadist demand for the portfolio of the interior ministry, which con­ trolled the state security forces, prevented Usubbekov from organiz­ ing the cabinet until late December, when he finally struck upon an acceptable compromise Musavat candidate for the post and won over both the Ittihadists and the Turkic socialist bloc. Significantly, Khan Khoiskii returned to the cabinet as foreign minister.9 Between September and December, Usubbekov continued to serve as premier-president, and the government functioned more smoothly than might have been expected in a period of transition, partly because real power in Azerbaijan lay less with the Parliament than with the khans, beks, and Musavatist intellectuals. Through the Committee of Public Safety they could circumvent cumbersome legislative procedures, silence opposition by arresting key individuals, and even suspend civil liberties under cover 9 The outgoing foreign minister, Jafarov, was implicated in the acceptance of large bribes from foreign business concerns. The Azerbaijani cabinet crisis received considerable coverage in all Caucasian newspapers during the last quarter of 1919. Chief British Commissioner Oliver Wardrop reported to the Foreign Office that Usubbekov was prolonging the crisis in order to increase his personal power and to remove undesirable elements from the govern­ ment. Usubbekov finally submitted a new cabinet slate to Parliament in mid-December, but it was not until the end of the month, after several changes had been made, that confirmation was given. The Russian and Armenian factions either cast negative votes, abstained, or left the session. The new Azerbaijani cabinet was constituted as follows: Nasib Bek Usubbekov, MinisterPresident (Musavat); Fathali Khan Khoiskii, Foreign Affairs (Nonpartisan bloc supporting Musavat); Mahmed Hasan Hajinskii, Interior (Musavat); Khalil Bek Khas-Mamedov, Justice (Musavat); Rachiel Kaplanov, Finance (Musavat); Khudadad Rafibekov, Public Welfare and Health (Musavat); General Samed Bek Mehmandarov, Military Affairs (Nonpartisan); Khudadad Melik-Aslanov, Transportation (Nonpartisan); Hamid Shahtaghtinskii, Public En­ lightenment (Ittihad); A. D. Pepinov, Agriculture and Labor (Hummet—Menshevik faction); Djamo Hajinskii, Post-Telegraph (Muslim Social Revolutionary); Eybat Guli Mahmedbekov, State Controller (Ittihad). See Ashkhatavor, Dec. 25:3, 1919; Britain, Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 8, Jan. 14, 1920. The cabinet’s program, presented by Usubbekov, was given a vote of confidence by 59 deputies, whereas 8 Armenian deputies voted against the motion and the Russian deputies walked out in protest. See Near East News, Dec. 29:2, 1919. A copy of the newspaper, published by Haskell’s staff, is in FO 371/3673, 173801/168734/58.

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of the national emergency proclaimed in response to the White menace. These methods, however, did not differ measurably from those employed in Armenia and Georgia. The Azerbaijani Image In 1919 Europeans and Americans knew little about Azerbaijan, and the occasional newspaper accounts were singularly negative and denigrating. Commonly identified as Tartars or Tatars, the Azerbaijanis were por­ trayed as backward Muslim fanatics bent on implementing the Turkish scheme to annihilate the Armenians. Among Allied official circles, too, Azerbaijan figured in apprehensions about the revival of Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic agitation and of radical movements hostile to Western civiliza­ tion. Thus the Azerbaijani government faced the difficult challenge of surmounting its Ottoman birth, of broadcasting its republican and demo­ cratic principles, and of winning Allied trust even as it proceeded with the Turkification of all national institutions. A little progress was made by year’s end, but this was ascribable to factors other than the effectiveness of Azerbaijani propaganda. American consular, intelligence, and relief officials in Transcaucasia did more than any other foreigners to blacken the image of the Azerbai­ janis. In hundreds of dispatches, many of them released to the press, the Americans decried the Turco-Tatar plot to prevent the creation of a durable Armenian state by further decimating the Christian population. They produced evidence that Azerbaijani provocateurs, well supplied with money, were inciting Muslims in the provinces of Erevan and Kars and collaborating with Turkish emissaries from Anatolia. The Americans criticized the British for favoring the Azerbaijanis at a time when the future of “the faithful Armenian allies” hung in the balance.10 Not until Colonel Haskell arrived as the Allied high commissioner in August did any American official give serious heed to the Azerbaijani point of view. The French military mission echoed the American appraisals. Colonel Chardigny and Commandant Nonancourt denounced British toleration of “butchers” such as Khosrov Bek Sultanov and of untenable Azerbaijani pretensions to Karabagh and Zangezur as a tactic to win Muslim sympathy. Taking advantage of Allied indecision, Azerbaijan had determined to open a passageway over the Armenian highlands to Anatolia and wel­ comed the assistance of Turkish officers operating everywhere from Olti 10 See, for example, US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800; RG 256, 184.01602/28/60/97/105, 184.021/23/26, 185.5136/42, 867B.00/173/192/193, 867B.4016/4; RG 59, 860J.01/24/31, 867.00/893.

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to Baku. Captain Poidebard’s dispatches from Erevan became a chronicle of Turco-Tatar efforts to destroy the embryonic Armenian state before the Allied Powers were able to conclude an Eastern settlement.11 These reports had no great impact in Paris, however, as the French government under Clemenceau, lacking real interest in the Caucasus, accepted the logic of its eventual reabsorption into Russia. The Azerbaijani delegation, headed by noted intellectual Ali Mardan Topchibashev, had been held up at Constantinople for months before gaining permission to proceed to Paris, and even after arriving in France was treated with indifference. Yet from their luxurious headquarters in the Hotel Claridge on the Champs Elysées, the Azerbaijani representatives labored diligently to acquaint financial and commercial institutions with the excellent investment and trade opportunities in their country. In August the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations together formed the Comité France-Caucase, with Edmond Hippeau as chairman and Senator Anatole P. A. de Monzie as honorary president. The goal of the organization was to foster closer cultural, political, and economic relations between France and the new republican states in Transcaucasia.12 The Bulletin d'informations de l'Azerbaïdjan, which began publication in September, outlined the liberal-democratic, but not radical, program of the Baku government, stressed the unlimited economic potential in eastern Transcaucasia, and reported favorable comments of Western visitors to Azerbaijan.13 That some interest was stirred in French colonial and commercial circles was evidenced in the imperialistic L'Asiefrançaise, which began in late 1919 to focus a little attention on the political-economic outlook for Azerbaijan and Georgia.14Still, the French official attitude remained cool, and reports from the military mission at Tiflis continued to characterize the Azerbaijani leaders as untrustworthy. 11 See esp. Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3186, dossier 4, nos. 5 bis, 15 bis, 96 bis. 12 Georgian Archives, Box 23, book 67; Bulletin Géorgien d’informations, no. 14 (Oct. 21, 1919), 2, Bulletin d’informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 4 (Nov. 18,1919), 5; Erkir, Nov. 7:2,1919. See also Edmond Hippeau, Les républiques du Caucase: Géorgie—Azerbaïdjan (Paris, 1920). In October 1919 the Georgian and Azerbaijani delegations retained the services of former New York Congressman Walter M. Chandler to rally American opinion to their cause and to counteract the bad impressions made by Armenian propaganda. Chandler offered to do whatever possible “to neutralize and paralyze the unfriendly work of the Armenians” and concurred in the need for an organization along the lines of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. For correspondence between the two delegations and Chandler and for the attorney’s subsequent demands for additional fees and his threat of a legal suit, see Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 6, Box 26, book 31, Box 31, book 3. 13 Twelve issues were published between September 1, 1919, and April 1, 1920. The personnel roster of the Azerbaijani delegation is given in no. 3 (Oct. 13, 1919), 7, and FO 608/84, 342/12/1/18642. 14 See especially the feature article of Hippeau in the issue of Dec. 1919, pp. 297-303.

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The Italian approach was entirely pragmatic. Although the plan to send a military expedition had been abandoned, Colonel Gabba was assigned to Transcaucasia to advance Italian economic interests and secure fuel oil from Baku in exchange for manufactured goods, technical equipment, army supplies and uniforms, financial backing, and the services of engi­ neers, technicians, and a skilled labor force. From September until year’s end British, American, and French officials in Tiflis reported to their governments that the Italian mission had also offered a battery of guns, 26,000 rifles, and sundry munitions. In Rome the military and foreign ministries denied the accusation until Azerbaijani Premier Usubbekov and Military Minister Mehmandarov acknowledged that the offer had come from Colonel Gabba himself. The Italians, suggesting that Gabba had acted without authorization, promised an investigation and insisted that in any event government policy precluded arms shipments to any prov­ ince of the former Russian Empire. Although evidence of an arms deal continued to accumulate and it was reported in November that a shipment had actually arrived at Poti, a port not under Allied surveillance, any intended exchange of war matériel for petroleum was apparently ter­ minated because of the fear of exposure through continuing Allied inquiries.15 Nonetheless, the Italian mission did not abandon its economic diplomacy, which transcended the mutual relations of the Transcaucasian republics. Great Britain, the Allied Power most directly involved in Transcauca­ sian affairs, an empire with millions of Muslim subjects, and a longtime rival of Russia in Asia, figured strongly in Azerbaijani efforts to create a favorable disposition abroad. The British attitude toward Azerbaijan was clouded, however, by the political duality of buttressing the Russian White Armies while also attempting to minimize future Russian competition along the mountain tier from the Black Sea to India.16Sharply conflicting 15 FO 371/3663-3666, 134269/141088/142120/142742/147893/148159/148609/148960/ 149147/149242/150215/150457/ i 5° 98 l/ i 5 192l/ 153357/ *56 l° 2/ 156495/ 15749l / i 59642/ 162310/170310/170463/177985/1015/58; WO 95/4958, South Russia, Caucasus, and Turke­ stan, General Staff War Diary, Oct. 9,14,30, Nov. 1,2,5,1919; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 5, Dec. 3, 1919; RG 59, 860J.01/137/145/164/170, 867.00/10009/1049; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, telegram, Nov. 7, 1919 On reading the Italian denials, a clerk in the Foreign Office wrote in the minutes on November 29: “The Italians are liars, but I suppose there is nothing to be gained by telling them so at present.” FO 371/3665, 155979/1015/58. 16 While discussing the Caucasus during the meeting of the Eastern Committee on Decem­ ber 2, 1918, Earl Curzon explained: The really embarrassing factor of this problem is Azerbaijan, whether you will call it Turkish Azerbaijan, because it is inhabited by Turks or Tatars, or Russian Azerbaijan, because it belonged until recently to the Russian Empire. This includes Baku and Elizabethpol. These are the two principal cities. The difficulty about the Government of Azerbaijan

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assessments were sent to London by the British military and political authorities in the field. The military mission with General Denikin, for example, insisted that Azerbaijan was a hotbed of anti-British agitation and of Turco-Tatar machinations, a haven for the dangerous leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, and a focal point for Bolshevik subversion throughout the Near East and inner Asia. General Milne and the headquarters staff of the Army of the Black Sea, though somewhat less hostile, implicated Usubbekov’s government in the insurrection in Armenia and maintained that Baku was a primary center of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic conspiracy.*17 Many British officers of the India Army, on the other hand, had developed an affinity for Muslim peoples, evinced no particular sympathy for Asiatic Christians such as Georgians and Armenians, and distrusted the Russians. These sentiments influenced General Thomson and Colonel Shuttleworth when they commanded the 39th Infantry Brigade at Baku and Lieutenant Colonel Claude B. Stokes after the withdrawal of the British military force. Stokes, a former military attaché at Tehran and an officer with years of service in Asia, remained in Baku after his demobilization in the au­ tumn of 1919 and acted as an unofficial political observer until he was attached to the Wardrop mission in November. In him, the Azerbaijani government had a staunch ally. He believed that the Muslims were innate­ ly anti-Bolshevik and could be weaned away from dangerous Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic ideologies through the formation of stable national states supported by Great Britain. Premier Usubbekov, who looked to the Brit­ ish for direction, promised to use his influence to bend Turkish officials toward the same orientation if Great Britain would deal justly with the defeated Turkish empire.18 Similar arguments were advanced by Oliver Wardrop after his arrival as chief commissioner in August. Disquieted by what he perceived to be a Jewish—Bolshevik-German-Young Turk conspiracy against the British Empire and the entire civilized world, Wardrop wanted the Caucasian isthmus to be transformed into an armed at the moment is this, that it is violently pro-Turk, violently anti-Armenian, violently anti-Persian,—in fact, it is everything we do not want it to be. The Government is in the hands of the Tatar land-owners who hate the Armenians with a deadly hatred, hate the Bolsheviks equally well, and who, for racial and selfish reasons, incline towards the Turks. The aspirations of this small State of Azerbaijan are for recognition, which we have never yet given, and for the expansion to the South. [Cab 27/24, Eastern Committee, 40th minutes, p. 17.] 17 See chap. 4. 18 FO 371/3662,90450/1015/58; FO 371/4933, E1914/1/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/6/12174. The French mission complained that Stokes was “violently anti-Russian” and favored Azerbaijan over Armenia. His reports would not be impartial. Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3186, dossier 1, no. 48.

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buffer to safeguard the British position in Asia. After initial conferences with Usubbekov and Foreign Minister Jafarov, he reported that the Azerbaijani leaders, as educated, moderate men, were not interested in Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic fantasies and found Denikinists and Bolsheviks equally repugnant. Usubbekov’s sympathy for Turkey was of a “mild sort,” and in fact the Azerbaijanis considered themselves superior to the Turks and had no illusions about the fate of the Ottoman Empire.19 In November and December, Wardrop and Stokes blamed the growing Turkish influence in Azerbaijan on the absence of clear-cut Allied support and said that the Baku government, if given half a chance, would reject “an actively Turkish orientation.”20 Consequently, Wardrop and Stokes tended to be impatient with Armenian agitation in the disputed districts, convinced that the unrest would be exploited by the Turco-Bolshevik conspirators and would undermine Usubbekov’s attempt to withstand the strong anti-Allied currents. For the Armenians, however, it was ironic that the more Azerbaijan tipped toward Turkey the greater was the solicitude of the British representatives. The respectable image of the Musavatist leaders was refuted by the British departments of political and military intelligence and the High Commission in Constantinople, whose information showed that Musavat­ ist central committee chairman Mehmed Emin Rasulzade was deeply in­ volved with the Young Turks in Azerbaijan and had more than a casual knowledge of the underground contacts of Bolshevik, Ittihadist, and Turkish Nationalist emissaries in Baku. And, despite denials by Usub­ bekov and his ministers, Azerbaijani envoys were in communication with Mustafa Kemal, Turkish agents had infiltrated the political parties repre­ sented in the Azerbaijani cabinet, nearly 3,000 Turkish officers, instruc­ tors, and enlisted men were serving in the Azerbaijani army, and wartime criminals such as Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha were being treated as hon­ ored guests.21 There was in fact some validity in all these charges, as the Azerbaijani leaders felt constrained to operate on several levels simultaneously. Even as they sought Allied support, they flirted with Pan-Islamic and PanTurkic proponents, attempted to further their political objectives by coop­ erating with Turkish Nationalists, and turned aside when opposition 19 FO 371/3663, 127479/137208/1015/58; FO 608/84, 342/12/1/18923 end. 20 See File 168738/58 in FO 371/3673. See also FO 371/3664-3666, 148159/152788/155471/ 169242/1015/58; British Documents, III, 649, 661-662. 21 FO 371/3673, File 173677/58; FO 371/3660, 157883/512/58 end.; FO 371/5165, E1350/ 262/44; FO 371/4161, Reports 43 and 44 for weeks ending November 20 and 28, 1919. See also Armenian intelligence reports of Tigran Dévoyants in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, esp. nos. 8, 58, Aug. 23, Nov. 26, 1919.

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parties probed the possibility of accommodation with Bolshevism and Soviet Russia. It was a policy fraught with danger but aimed at survival. From the Armenian point of view, however, these manipulations demon­ strated that Azerbaijan had not broken its Turkish connections. The Azerbaijani attraction to Turkey, coupled with bitterness over the treat­ ment of national-religious minorities, led the Erevan and Baku govern­ ments toward a state of war. The Turco-Tatar Minority in Armenia The interracial warfare accompanying the Turkish invasion in 1918 had ravaged the Surmalu and Etchmiadzin uezds, expelled the Armenians from Sharur-Nakhichevan, and driven many Muslims from Daralagiaz and the southwestern side of Lake Sevan. Although most of the Armenian refugees from these districts had bee,n repatriated by mid-1919, they were again forced to flee during the Muslim insurrection in July and August. But nearly a third of the 350,000 Muslims of the Erevan guberniia had also become homeless, living in misery along the Ottoman frontier, in the abandoned Armenian villages of Sharur and Nakhichevan, and in the environs of the Armenian capital.22 The government’s announcement in the spring that all refugees could return to their native districts had been ineffectual, since little had been done to dispossess and relocate the Western Armenian squatters. An unwelcome burden in the less imperiled Muslim centers in Armenia, many Tatar refugees wanted to emigrate to Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani foreign ministry and press frequently protested the maltreatment of the Turkic population under Armenian domination. Aside from doing nothing to prevent atrocities committed by Western Armenian irregulars, the Erevan government was charged with disre­ garding the Muslim destitute, who were denied shelter, medical attention, and employment. Of the 15,000 needy in and around the capital city, fewer than 2,500 received even a daily bowl of soup. Furthermore, Ar­ menian welfare agencies knew full well that the disease-ridden Turkish Armenians settled in barracks in the Muslim quarter of Erevan would infect and thus decimate the native inhabitants.23 22 According to a contemporary American source, the population of Russian Armenia in mid-1919 was 1,429,882, including 775,111 native Armenians, 237,676 Armenian refugees, 312,611 Tatars (Azerbaijanis), 39,492 Kurds, 31,793 Yezidis, 27,200 Russians, 6,000 Turks, and 6,000 Greeks. See RG 256, 184.021/216. 23 Bulletin d’informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 4 (Nov. 18, 1919), 3—4. See also the Musavat and Azerbaijani Ittihad journals for the second half of 1919.

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Concentrated on the fertile plains of the river valley south and west of Erevan, the Turco-Tatars abhorred the prospect of permanent incorpora­ tion into the Armenian republic. Muslim deputies in the Armenian legisla­ ture exercised little influence outside Erevan, and Muslim functionaries of the Republic rarely interfered in the activities of villages at any distance from district centers such as Ulukhanlu. Yet the peasants were sick of fighting and resented the heavy levies imposed by Turkish officers and the rival mounted bands, forcible recruitment into partisan detachments, and the prohibition against carrying agricultural products to nearby Ar­ menian markets. After Armenian administration was extended to Kars and Nakhichevan in the spring of 1919, many local leaders despaired of further external assistance. Despite Turkish objections, they began to discuss the possibility of making peace with the Armenian government.24* Any such move was cut short, however, by the bold defiance at Baouk-Vedi in July and the triumphant Muslim rising in SharurNakhichevan. Although still behind Armenian military lines, the Muslim villages of Zangibasar renewed their resolve to combine with coreligionists in the Araxes valley and to become part of “southwestern Azerbaijan.” The proximity of Muslim settlements to the Erevan-Etchmiadzin rail­ way and the main road from Etchmiadzin to Igdir enabled them to sepa­ rate the Armenian forces into several isolated groups and to protect the broad Muslim arc from Nakhichevan through Surmalu and Kaghisman to the Erzerum vilayet. As unrest spread from Vedibasar to Zangibasar during the summer, trains were derailed and plundered and small detach­ ments of Armenian militiamen were ambushed in the Etchmiadzin dis­ trict. In tracking down the bands responsible for the trouble, the Etchmiadzin militia and the Western Armenian partisans looted the vil­ lages hugging the railway and drove the inhabitants toward the Araxes River. With or without participation by the regular armed forces and the authorization of the Armenian government, the “cleansing” process was in motion. As usual, the war of weapons was matched by a war of words. Foreign Minister Jafarov formally protested through Tigran Bekzadian, the Ar­ menian envoy to Azerbaijan, that the Erevan government must accept full responsibility for the Armenian reprisals against defenseless villagers. In Tiflis the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative appealed to General Cory to stop the Armenian pogrom, which was resulting in a daily stream of widows and orphans through Tiflis en route to Azerbaijan. The patience 24 See intelligence reports (svodkas) of Armenian general staff in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8.

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of the Baku government in restraining Muslims in the adjacent districts from going to the aid of their imperiled countrymen was not without limits.25 Bekzadian’s detailed refutation on July 12 contended that the citizens of Armenia were treated equally without regard to race or religion and that all loyal Muslim districts were administered by officials and militia­ men of that faith. The difficulties in Armenia sprang, not from discrimi­ nation or repression, but from provocation by well-financed foreign agents, examples of which Bekzadian drew to Jafarov’s attention.26 In his counterrefutation on August 1, Khan Tekinskii, the Azerbaijani envoy in Erevan, claimed that 300 Muslim villages had been destroyed since the beginning of 1918, that the only nondiscrimination shown by Armenians was in their slaughter of men, women, and children alike, that Muslim suffering was so intense that thousands were trying to move to Azerbaijan, and that those who had taken arms against the Armenian bandits were simply exercising their right to defend lives, property, and honor.27 In Paris, too, the Azerbaijani delegation launched a propaganda campaign to change the image of the Armenians as a helpless, victimized people and to point out what could be expected in areas placed under their domination. On August 20 Topchibashev warned the peace conference that the ethnic and territorial character of the Caucasus was being radically altered through a policy of terror and violence. Armenian aggression in the provinces of Erevan and Kars, coupled with Georgian imperialistic designs in Akhalkalak, Akhaltsikh, and Ardahan, was aimed at eliminating the Muslim population and suppressing the principle of self-determination. It had just been learned, for example, that the men of six villages had been massacred and their womenfolk distributed to the “Armenian warriors.” Azerbaijan could no longer tolerate such atrocities or acquiesce in the loss of a part of its land and people.28 Even as these charges were being made, the clashes in Etchmiadzin and Surmalu were increasing in number and intensity. They did not subside until the end of the month, after the Armenian victories at Kaghisman and around Sarikamish and stabilization of the southern front from Khamarlu 26 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69al la, H. H. Adrbedjani Divanagitakan Nerhayatsutschutiun ev Adrbedjani Karavarutiun, 1919 t.; Bulletin d'informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 2 (Sept. 8, 1919), 2- 4 * 26 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 690/ia. File 70/2; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 20/1-2, 1919. 27 Bulletin d'informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 3 (Oct. 13, 1919), 4-6; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 18 bis; Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 39-40, Tekinskii’s no. 601. See also FO 371/4952, E460/134/58 end. 28 FO 608/84, 342/12/1/1827; RG 256, 861K.00/93. See also Bulletin d'informations de l'Azer­ baïdjan, no. 3 (Oct. 13, 1919), 1-4.

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to Igdir. Meanwhile, the Muslim partisans of Zangibasar and Etchmiadzin, emboldened by the Armenian loss of Sharur-Nakhichevan, Kulp, and Molla-Kamar, tried to seize the roads and bridges spanning the Araxes River. Armenian militiamen and irregulars exacted retribution from the most vulnerable Muslim settlements and sacked the large villages of Djanfida and Kiarim-arkh. News of this operation elicited bitter recriminations from the small Social Revolutionary and Muslim factions in the Armenian Parliament. On August 24 Arsham Khondkarian used the tactic of parlia­ mentary questions to ask if the interior ministry knew that a number of Tatar villages had been pillaged and depopulated, that Armenian civilians had participated in the action, and that such outrages created a most detrimental atmosphere. He received no satisfactory reply.29 Khondkarian’s pointed questioning was frequently cited in Azerbaijani sources as proof of Armenian culpability. Incorporating this evidence in a formal protest on September 22, Foreign Minister Jafarov charged that the recent pogroms had devastated some fifty Muslim settlements. Public opinion in Azerbaijan was incensed, and the government, revolted by these atrocities, demanded strong measures to ensure the safety of Muslims.30The Armenian Dashnakist press retorted that Azerbaijani wails rose to a high pitch whenever the conspirators were trying to divert attention from their own acts of aggression. Was it not curious that Azerbaijani spokesmen, while bemoaning the fate of the “peaceful Muslims” in Armenia, were preaching subversion throughout Erevan and Kars and inviting Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Bey to send their irregular chete bands over the frontier into Karaurgan and Kars? And had they forgotten that repeated appeals for a pacific resolution of all disputes had been answered with an insurrection which had cost another 10,000 Armenian lives, had displaced thousands of newly repatriated people, and had been intended to destroy the Armenian democracy? The official Armenian reply to Jafarov in October claimed that a mixed Armeno-Muslim commission had gathered information from local Mus­ lim notables showing that responsibility for the disturbances rested upon alien agents, who asserted their authority over villages and partisan groups and then intimidated and punished all those who refused to join the rebellion. The action against Djanfida and Kiarim-arkh had been 29 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 9:2, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 15:3, 1919; Bor’ba, Sept. 20:3, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 31:1, 1919; FO 371/3660, 157887/512/58 end. See also Bristol Papers, Box 31, Rhea to Bristol, Dec. 1, 1919, end. 30 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 690/10, Jafarov’s no. 3253; FO 371/3660, 144753/512/58 end.; FO 371/4953, E460/134/58. See also Bulletin d'informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 5 (Dec. 15, 1919), 1-2.

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necessary because those villages harbored the murderers of Armenian peasants and militiamen and served as rebel centers. In that incident sixteen partisans had been killed after they opened fire on the Armenian militia and the villagers had been driven across the Araxes, but that was the extent of the so-called Armenian excesses. On September 9 the interi­ or ministry had instructed the Etchmiadzin authorities to release all per­ sons detained during the upheaval and to allow Muslim exiles to return to their villages. The government had also proclaimed a gênerai amnesty, and responsible Muslim leaders were appealing for an end to foreign intrigues.31 Nonetheless, the ability of the Zangibasar district to maintain a semiautonomous existence for the rest of the year was attributable more to its military preparedness than to any government program for local self-administration. The exchange of formal diplomatic correspondence had no bearing on the actual racial separation that proceeded swiftly in the Erevan guberniia. The Muslim Council of Kars, compfaining to Azerbaijani and Allied au­ thorities in October that 25,000 refugees, mainly women and children, were in dire condition, appealed for means to transport them to Azerbaijan.32 The Ministry of Public Welfare in Baku transferred funds, through Bekzadian, to Erevan to aid the Muslim needy, and the Azerbaijani Parliament allocated 69 million rubles to resettle some 40,000 victims of Armenian aggression.33 The ministry’s representatives in Armenia, Ali Khan Makinskii and Dr. Genizade, reported in December that about 13,000 Muslim refugees were at Erevan and another 50,000 were in outlying regions under Armenian control. In the northern part of the country, where the Muslim minority was small, interracial relations were generally cordial, and the status of the Muslims in Kars was acceptable. In the Muslim-administered districts south of Erevan, however, most of the 70,000 to 80,000 refugees lacked provisions, animals, and implements. An estimated 50,000 persons would be entirely dependent on relief during the coming winter. As Armenia did not object to the special Azerbaijani allocations to assist destitute Muslims, the welfare ministry’s relief agents recommended administration by local 31 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, and File 241/140, H. H. Patvirakutiun: Azgayin Patvirakutiun; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 23:1-2, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 19:1, 1919. 32 FO 371/3660, 144753/512/58 end.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no- 180, Nov. 4, 1919; See also Bulletin d'Informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 6 (Jan. 1, 1920), 5; Polk Papiers, 78/80, Bristol to Polk, Nov. 3, 1919, end. 33 Bulletin d'informations de l'Azerbaïdjan, no. 7 (Jan. 17, 1920), 4; Gotthard Jäschke, “Die Republik Aserbaidschan," Die Welt des Islams, XXIII, 1—2 (1941), 65. See also Ashkhatavor, Oct. 21:4, 28:2, 29:4, 1919; Bulletin d'informations de l'Azerbaïdjan, no. 2 (Sept. 8, 1919), 4; no. 5 (Dec. 15, 1919), 6; no. 6 (Jan. 1, 1920), 4, 5; no. 8 (Feb. 1, 1920), 6-7.

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committees under regional controllers in the counties of Erevan, Etchmiadzin, and Surmalu.34* The prolonged hardships of the Muslim minority revived talk of condi­ tional submission to the Armenian government. During the last quarter of 1919, Colonel Mehmed Bey, the Turkish commander at Zangibasar, urged the partisans to stand firm and assured them that additional assis­ tance would come from the 1ith Turkish Division at Bayazit. Yet, accord­ ing to Armenian intelligence sources, disaffection was increasing and frequent rivalry between Turkish and Azerbaijani officers and partisan chieftains spread confusion and resentment. Renegade bands plundered their coreligionists, and old sectarian feuds between Shi'a and Sunni resurfaced. On December 24 representatives from nearly all the villages of Zangibasar gathered to decide on a course of action. Many of them favored a plan of acquiescence if the local administration and militia remained entirely Muslim, no armed Armenians were allowed into the region, and the inhabitants were permitted to keep their weapons. Mehmed Bey, unable to dissuade the representatives, accepted an alter­ nate suggestion that prior to a final decision a three-man deputation should consult with Halil Bey at Nakhichevan as to how much tangible aid could be given should the resistance continue.36 As Colonel Halil was himself then appealing for additional support from General Karabekir and, through Governor-General Samed Bey, from Azerbaijan, he advised the deputation to address the military authorities in Baku. Meanwhile, an uneasy lull settled over Zangibasar. Though the Armenian-appointed Muslim commissar for the district did not venture far beyond Ulukhanlu, the most formidable Muslim center still within the actual boundaries of the Armenian republic seemed to be wavering. The Armenian Minority in Azerbaijan Besides the 300,000 Armenians inhabiting the contested mountainous sectors of the Elisavetpol guberniia, about 250,000 lived in regions well within Azerbaijan.36 Most of the latter group had suffered economic and physical dislocation during the Ottoman-Azerbaijani offensive in 1918 and, even after the Turks withdrew at the end of the year, were prey to 34 Bulletin d'informations de l'Azerbaïdjan, no. io (March 1, 1920), 7-8. See also FO 371/3673, 177610/168738/58; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 2:3, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 4:3, 1920. 36 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Svodka nos. 4, 6, 9, Nov. 5, 20, 1919, Jan. 9, 1920; File SaJSa, Svodka nos. 1-3, Oct. 1, 16, 20, 1919; FO 371/3660, 157883/159650/168733/512/58 ends. 36 For statistical tables based on official Russian publications for 1916, see RG 256, 184.01602/62.

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arbitrary petty officials and roving armed bands. Diplomatic representative Tigran Bekzadian and the Armenian national councils faced immense difficulties in reorganizing educational, religious, and commercial institutions and saving the rural population from virtual servitude. Whereas Khan Tekinskii in Erevan could aid and abet Muslim partisans with a good chance of success, Armenian leaders in Azerbaijan avoided resistance and acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Baku government. Even so, the prospect of reviving Armeniaii national life in Azerbaijan dimmed as territorial conflicts continued to poison Armeno-Azerbaijani relations and no settlement was forthcoming from Paris. Although the experiences of the Armenians of Baku, in the enclaves between Shemakha and Zakatal, and in the county of Elisavetpol were not entirely alike, all contributed to the pessimism weighing on the Christian minority in Azerbaijan. The influx of Russian and Armenian capitalists, technicians, and labor­ ers into the oil-rich Apsheron peninsula had created a Christian prepon­ derance in Baku by the turn of the century. The socioeconomic position of the more than 75,000 Armenians in greater Baku was far above that of any other Caucasian people.37 Outside this singular industrial center, however, extended a vast plain inhabited mostly by illiterate Azeri Turkish peasants and dominated by feudal beks and khans. In 1918 Armenians and Russians of all classes had collaborated with the Baku Soviet and the Centro-Caspian Dictatorship in efforts to withstand the TurcoAzerbaijani assaults. The fall of Baku on September 15 resulted in the massacre or material ruin of thousands of Armenians, particularly in the Armenikend quarter, but most of the Christian inhabitants were able to escape to Enzeli and other Caspian ports.38 37 Figures published by the Baku municipal administration in 1919 show that of the 238,168 inhabitants in the city in 1917, 77,123 were Russians, 67,190 Azerbaijanis, 52,184 Armenians, 12,427 Jews, and 11,904 Persians, with smaller numbers of Georgians, Poles, Germans, and Mountaineers. Ashkhatavor, Oct. 19:4, 1919. See also Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 148-149 n. 74; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 19/7-19/# (Princeton, 1972), pp. 5, 7, 13-14. Elected to the Baku City Duma in 1917 were 38 Armenians, 31 Muslims, 19 Russians, 12 Jews, 3 Poles, and 2 Georgians (Suny, op. cit., pp. 160-161). During the deliberations of the British Eastern Committee on December 2, 1918, Curzon described Baku as follows: “The city itself is a cosmopolitan dty; I have never seen one more so in the world; it is the centre of a good many of the scoundrels of mankind, and recent events have shown how hopelessly divided the population is. The idea that the Tatars, the Armeni­ ans, or the Bolsheviks, or any other party could permanendy hold Baku and control the vast resources there, is one that cannot be entertained for a moment.” Cab 27/24, Eastern Commit­ tee, 40th minutes, p. 16. 38 See Suny, op. cit.; B. Ishkhanian, Velikie uzhasy v gor. Baku: Anketnoe izsledovanie sentiabr'skikh sobytii 1918 g. (Tiflis, 1920); L. A. Khurshudian, Stepan Shahumian: Petakan ev partiahan gordsuneutiune 191J—1918 tvakannerin (Erevan, 1959).

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When the exiles began to return after Ottoman withdrawal from and British occupation of Baku in November 1918, the reconstituted Armeni­ an National Council yielded to General Thomson’s insistence that Ar­ menians participate in the Azerbaijani cabinet and legislature as a stabilizing measure pending a settlement by the Paris Peace Conference.39 But with Transcaucasia divided into national republics, the Armenian minority faced both subtle and overt discrimination. Most municipal employees were barred from their former jobs, and the commercial classes were subjected to complex economic regulations which fell most heavily upon minorities. Stagnation in the petroleum industry left many Armenian workers without employment. And the lingering effects of interracial strife could be seen in the plight of more than 8,000 refugee women and orphans in Baku. In the spring of 1919 the American relief committee represented by Theodore A. Elmer took charge of three orphanages with 900 children and employed some 2,500 women in weaving and handicrafts, but the number of Armenian indigents steadily increased with continuing repatriation from Enzeli and the arrival of more refugees from rural districts.40 The British military evacuation in August heightened the apprehension of the Baku Armenians. Their spokesmen complained of an Azerbaijani policy of willful provocation. Gendarmes had searched the Armenian cathedral for arms, and, although only medical supplies had been found, Azerbaijani newspapers had spread rumors that weapons were concealed in the courtyard of the church, further inflaming hostility toward lawabiding Armenian citizens. Travel between Baku and Tiflis had become extremely hazardous, as bands of irregulars frequently halted trains to rob, torment, and kill Armenian passengers. Not surprisingly, hundreds of people applied to the Baku Armenian Council every day for means to leave the country.41 Frequent protests by the multiparty national council brought no amelio­ ration. Indeed, upon the heels of the British withdrawal, the justice minis­ try intensified its investigation of the massacre of Muslims in Baku during the “March Days” of 1918 and incarcerated scores of Armenians through 39 The Armenian faction in the Azerbaijani legislature was composed of to members, including 5 Dashnakists, 4 Populists (National Democrats), and 1 Social Revolutionary. The 5 deputies from Baku initially were Poghos Chubar, A. Papian, Abraham Dastakian, Arshak Paronian, and Stepan Taghianosian. The deputies from Elisavetpol (Ganja) were Khoren Hamaspiur, I. Khodjayan, Arshak Malkhasian, A. Ter-Azarian, and Ter-Israelian. Dastakian and Hamaspiur served for a time in the cabinet. 40 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 6:4, 9:4, 1919. 41 For these and other reports relating to the difficulties of the Armenians in Baku, see Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 6ga/ia.

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administrative arrest, a procedure that did not require precise charges or a swift trial.42 The Dashnakist faction of the Azerbaijani Parliament, denouncing these acts as a deliberate attempt to prevent the healing of interracial relations, called upon the socialist parties in the legislature to express their views on the ministry’s policy. Although the socialist bloc replied in early September that it opposed the arrests and had appealed for an end to the persecution, the arbitrary procedures, which Azerbaijani officials termed security measures, continued for the rest of the year.43 As if to taunt the Armenians, the Azerbaijani government declared September 15 a national holiday to mark the anniversary of the liberation of Baku from “the yoke of a group of bandits and usurpers.” In newspa­ per editorials, public celebrations, and parliamentary sessions, Azerbaijani political leaders proclaimed September 15 as Azerbaijan’s “Day of Right,” reinforcing the May 28 declaration of independence by delivering the capital city and reuniting the nation. Armenian residents of Baku drew back behind closed shutters as festivê Muslim crowds celebrated the Azerbaijani-Turkish victory and a military parade retraced the line of march from the direction of Shemakha to the wharves where Russians and Ar­ menians had boarded ships to flee the area and hapless stragglers had become the first victims of Muslim vengeance. The Armenian minority was deeply troubled that Musavatist and Ittihadist orators recalled the brotherly assistance extended by the Ottoman armies and that the Turkic socialist parties, too, participated in the celebration.44 Of the Armenians in Azerbaijan, the 100,000 native inhabitants of Zakatal, Nukhi, Aresh, Geokchai, and Shemakha suffered the most. They had lived in the lower defiles of the Caucasus range for generations, their forefathers having migrated from Khoi and other Persian khanates in times of particularly intense religious intolerance. Their towns and vil­ lages, in the path of the Azerbaijani-Turkish advance in 1918, had been devastated and the people driven out, massacred, or subjugated. The misery of the survivors in 1919 evoked repeated protests from Armenian compatriotic unions and parliamentary deputies in Baku and from the Armenian press. According to these descriptions, often verified by American relief per­ sonnel, lawless bands were continuing to attack the few hundred Armeni42 The March Days are discussed in Suny, op. cit., pp. 214-233; Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 147—149; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (19/7-/921) (New York and Oxford, [1951]), pp. 69-76. 43 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 5:4, 6:1—2, 9:3, 1919. 44 Azerbaidzhan, Sept. 15:1, 1919; Bulletin d'Informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 4 (Nov. 18, i9!9)> 5“6-

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ans left in Zakatal. Shemakha was in shambles and the prelacy’s twentythree schools were closed. In the Geokchai district only 2,500 of the prewar Armenian population of 20,000 remained, and nearly all of these were herded together at a single location. Armenian villages had been leveled and their red tiles stolen to adorn homes in nearby Turkish settle­ ments. Although thirty-three wagonloads of the bones of massacred Ar­ menians had been carted away, evidence of the carnage still remained. The proud and educated peasants had become paupers.4546 As approximately half of the 55,000 Armenians in the Aresh and Nukhi districts still survived, they attracted the most attention. The commercial classes and peasantry had attained a level of prosperity and cultural vitality unusual in the rural regions of eastern Transcaucasia, but the struggle in the summer of 1918 had culminated in the destruction of forty-eight of the fifty-one Armenian villages, the annihilation of an estimated 25,000 people, and the abduction of several thousand women and girls. Months after the Turkish withdrawal from the Caucasus, however, the survivors of Aresh and Nukhi remained isolated and subject to the whims of petty Azerbaijani officials and reactionary landed beks. Unescorted persons attempting to flee to Evlakh, on the Transcaucasian railway, were killed or robbed by brigands.46 In a lengthy memorandum in July 1919, the Nukhi and Aresh com patriotic union detailed the excesses committed against the peasants, now concentrated in the three standing villages of Nidzh, Vardashen, and Jalut. The people were being driven into the fields of Muslim beks as servile laborers, with children separated from parents and spouses from each other. Most of the women who had been carried off still languished in captivity. Merchants and shopkeepers could not recover their goods and properties, for their petitions went unheeded.47 A deputy in Parliament, B. Balayan, appealed time and again for an end to the oppression, which the government tolerated and even encouraged by its inactivity. An inspection tour for the Baku branch of the Nukhi-Aresh union in the autumn convinced H. Khodjamirian that demoralization had reached alarming proportions. Young people were slipping from parental control. In a district once noted for educational achievement, with more than 4,000 students in the town of Nukhi alone, there remained scarcely 200 pupils with four or five teachers in makeshift quarters. Gangs of hooligans brought shame and dishonor upon the 45 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 6gafia; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 21:3, 1919. 46 AshkhatavorINor Ashkhatavor, July 24:3, Aug. 8:4, 27:4, Sept. 23:4, 24:4, 25:4, Oct. 19:3, 25:2, Dec. 14:3, 1919; Haradjy Jan. 14:4, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, Report of June 30, 1919. 47 Nor Ashkhatavory Aug. 15:4, 1919; Erkir, Sept. 11:1, 1919.

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Armenian people. Peasants and townspeople alike, cursing their forefathers for having settled in this wretched land, resolved to move to Armenia, whatever the difficulties they might encounter there.48 Armenian newspapers in Tiflis and Erevan decried the zulum (murder­ ous tyranny) that was decimating the Christian population and the futile efforts of Armenian spokesmen to be heard by Azerbaijani ministers. What did the Armenian government propose to do? Would it permit thousands to be sacrificed in the name of political expediency? Would it take any action or would it continue to rely on polite diplomatic correspon­ dence? Khatisian’s cabinet, however, beset by problems threatening to destroy the Republic, dared not go beyond diplomatic procedures, includ­ ing the intercession of Allied representatives. Through Bekzadian and American relief officials, the government provided funds to aid Armenian orphans and refugees in Azerbaijan, and in August the Parliament allo­ cated nearly 10 million rubles for resettlement of the Armenians of She­ makha, Geokchai, Nukhi, and Aresh.49Bekzadian, who had been negotiat­ ing for such a transfer since early spring, had been assured by Premier Usubbekov on July 6 that the Council of Ministers would soon act on a recommendation to expedite the departure of those who so wished.50 Armenians ascribed the continued postponement to the influence of beks and khans who did not want to lose their cheap labor force and to the desire of the Azerbaijani government to retain a hostage minority in the troubled interracial situation. Khan Tekinskii’s telegrams lent credence to this interpretation, for on July 21, the envoy urged his government to prevent Armenian emigration, adding that he would soon arrive in Baku to explain in full.51 The appointment of Khan Tekinskii, whose implica­ tion in the Muslim rebellion had made him persona non grata to the Armenian government and the Allied missions, as an assistant in the foreign ministry upon his return to Baku apparently increased the dif­ ficulties of Armenians trying to quit the country. Not until late autumn were several caravans of refugees able to make their way to Armenia; by the end of the year approximately 1,500 of them had been settled in the plains of Etchmiadzin and Igdir.52 In contrast with their compatriots in Baku and neighboring Karabagh, 48 Ashkhatavor, Oct. 19:3, Nov. 8:4, Dec. 16:3—4, 1919. 49 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 78, Sept. 25, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 9:3, 1919. 50 Nor Ashkhatavor, July 31:3, Aug. 7:1, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, nos. 81, 104, July 11, Aug. 7, 1919. 51 Archives de YArmée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, 18 bis. Adrbedjani pastatghtere, p. 39, no. 460, gives the date for this message as July 30, but from the numbering sequence of the original messages, the copy in the French military archives seems to bear the correct date. 52 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 26:4, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 6:3, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11.

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the 50,000 Armenians in the Elisavetpol (Ganja) uezd had not resisted the Turco-Azerbaijani forces in 1918 and had complied with Nuri Pasha’s ultimatum to disarm and submit to the Azerbaijani government, which had made Ganja its temporary capital. Although subject to requisitions and abuse, the 12,000 Armenians in Ganja and most of the villagers in the district had not been dislocated or massacred. At the end of the war, when the Azerbaijani Parliament was reorganized, the Gandzak (Ganja) Ar­ menian National Council selected two deputies to that body. But the lawlessness and persecution, rather than abating, increased in 1919. Hun­ dreds of Armenian petitions detailed the plight of the unarmed popula­ tion, particularly in rural areas where no road was safe for Christian travelers and where peasants could not even tend their fields without fear of assault.53 They were molested by both the Azerbaijani militia and rival bands of landless, disaffected Muslims, who raided the estates of khans and beks, refused to submit to taxation or military induction, and, mixing lust for violence with social revolutionary notions, spread terror in the agrarian strongholds of the ruling Musavat party.54Caught between these forces, several Armenian villages were pillaged, and more than a hundred peasants were killed while harvesting their crops.55 Parliamentary deputies Arshak Malkhasian and I. Khodjayan up­ braided the government for its failure to implement its proclamations assuring equality for all inhabitants of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Local officials were deaf to Armenian appeals, and life had become unbearable even in the city of Ganja. Azerbaijani troops garrisoned in the Armenian quarter taunted the men and dishonored the women; the president of the national council was mugged after protesting to the authorities; no Ar­ menian could hope for justice, since any who dared testify against a Muslim or contest the capricious acts of petty officials was endangering his very life. The police did not apprehend thugs and murderers or even conduct a routine investigation unless the victimized Armenian was a person of some prominence. Was this, the Armenian deputies concluded, the equal justice so frequently promised?56 63 See, for example, Ashkhatavor!Nor Ashkhatavort June 15:4, July 20:4, Aug. 6:4, 9:3, 10:4, 20:4, 21:4, 27:1, Sept 11:3-4, Oct. 19:3, Nov. 8:4, Dec. 23:3, 1919, Jan. 6:3-4, 1920. 54 For documents and discussions relating to peasant unrest in the Kazakh and Ganja districts in 1919, see, for example, Kompartiia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 313-316; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, esp. pp. 98, 101, 103-106, 126, 142, 170, 182-183, 211, 222, 230-231, 293, 305; A. A. Galustian, Iz istorii bor’by trudiashchikhsia Gandzhinskoi (ElizavetpoVskoi ) gubemii Azerbaidzhana za Sovetskuiu vlast' (19/7-1920 gg. ) (Baku, 1963). 66Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 20:4, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 15:3-4, 1920; FO 371/4753, E1569/ 134/58 end. 58Ashkhatavor, Nov. 8:4, 1919.

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In August the Gandzak Armenian National Council reminded Premier Usubbekov, in a lengthy petition, of its faithful collaboration with the government and its active discouragement of opposition. Yet its endeavors to persuade Armenians to have more confidence in the administration were being nullified by corrupt and irresponsible officeholders. The po­ lice had assumed the prerogatives of the judiciary, resorting to illegal search and seizure and to beatings, torture, and administrative punish­ ment. Economic boycotts, requisitions, hooliganism, arid physical abuse had become daily occurrences. The council implored Usubbekov to end the persecution that was steadily alienating the Armenians of Gandzak.57 During the long Azerbaijani political crisis, the Armenian parliamen­ tary factions used an overture by Usubbekov regarding Armenian partici­ pation in a new cabinet to call attention to the sad state of affairs. For the Dashnakist and Nationalist (Populist) factions, Arshak Malkhasian and Arshak Paronian made joining the coalition conditional on appointment of Armenian functionaries and police in Armenian-populated districts and of Armenian assistant chiefs of police in areas of mixed population such as Baku and Ganja; employment of qualified Armenian specialists in government offices; emancipation, restoration, and guaranteed personal safety of displaced and captive Armenian peasants; punishment of per­ sons guilty of crimes against Armenians and termination of the practice of promoting officials who had taken illegal actions against Armenians; cessation of anti-Armenian agitation in government newspapers; and af­ firmation of educational autonomy, including the appointment of Ar­ menians to positions in the Ministry of Public Enlightenment.58 Predictably, the Azerbaijani press retorted that Christians were already enjoying full legal equality, educational and cultural freedom, and economic opportunity, in contrast with Muslims in Armenia.59 In turn, Armenian political journalists denied the official Azerbaijani explanations that occasional problems in the countryside were isolated events and charged that the existing salakhana (slaughterhouse) was linked with the ruling circles of Azerbaijan. Premier Khatisian was urged to take up the cause of the Armenians in Azerbaijan, as the rights of national minorities

87 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 23:3—4, 1919. See also Ashkhatavor, Jan. 15:3-4, 1920; Georgian Archives, Box 24, book 25. Earlier petitions of a similar nature are in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130. 88 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a/3, no. 189, Nov. 14,1919; Kavkazskoe slovo, Nov. 8,1919; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 12:3, 1919; FO 371/3660, 159650/512/58 end. 89 See especially Azerbaidzhan, Nov. 12, 1919.

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were the very foundation of good relations among the neighboring republics of Transcaucasia.60 The Territorial Dimension Neither cordial nor even tolerable relations between Armenia and Azer­ baijan were possible so long as the complex boundary problem remained unsolved. In 1919 there was not one single stretch of frontier that both governments could accept as permanent. Azerbaijani pretensions ex­ tended through the southern counties of Tiflis into Batum and included all or part of every county, except Alexandropol, in the provinces of Erevan and Kars (see map 4). The bitterest dispute, however, grew out of Armenian claims to the eastern sector of the Elisavetpol guberniia— mountainous Kazakh, Elisavetpol, Shushi, Kariagin, and Jevanshir—and Azerbaijani determination not only to hold on to that region but also to incorporate Zangezur as well as the Araxes valley in the Erevan guberniia. The area in question included some 25,000 square kilometers of farmland and alpine pasture.61 For Azerbaijan, possession of these territories, aside from bringing several hundred thousand Muslims into the Republic, would open a direct overland route and railway connection with Anatolia and North Persia and make the country contiguous with the province of Persian Azarbayjan. And that might lead to an Azerbaijani-Persian confederation or, in the view of extreme Azerbaijani nationalists, to eventual annexation of Turkic-speaking Persian Azarbayjan with Tabriz at its center. At the mo­ ment, however, it was imperative to gain self-determination for the nearly 300,000 Muslims in the southern half of the Erevan guberniia and to discount Armenian preponderance in the Elisavetpol highlands by demonstrating that the region was bound historically, politically, and economically to eastern Transcaucasia. Success in Elisavetpol and Erevan, even if all pretensions in the provinces of Tiflis, Batum, and Kars had to be given up, would create an Azerbaijani republic stretching from the Caspian Sea to Mount Ararat and, according to prewar statistics, leave barely half a million Armenians within the Republic of Armenia. In presenting their case to the Paris Peace Conference and Allied repre­ sentatives in the Caucasus, the Armenians did not dwell upon the disputed Araxes valley, calculating not without reason that the victorious powers 60 Ashkhatavor, Aug. 27:1, Nov. 8:1-2, 1919, Jan. 16:1, 1920. 61 See Hovannisian, Republic, I, 78-92.

4-

AZERBAIJANI CLAIMS IN THE CAUCASUS, JUNE, 1Q1Q

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44

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T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

would recognize its geographic, economic, and strategic importance to Armenia and would not allow an area at the juncture of Persia and the former Russian and Ottoman empires to become a breeding ground of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic collusion. Instead, the main Armenian argu­ ments were directed toward the Elisavetpol highlands, an Armenian bas­ tion that had never fully submitted to foreign domination. Drawing boundaries that would incorporate a maximum number of Armenians (300,000) and a minimum number of Muslims (90,000), the Armenians claimed some 18,000 square kilometers (7,000 square miles), from Kazakh in the north to Zangezur in the south (see map 5). The bringing of this territory into Armenia would increase the Republic’s population, accord­ ing to prewar statistics, to 1,797,000, of whom 1,169,000 would be Ar­ menian. While a population exchange involving the Armenians of eastern Transcaucasia and the Muslims around Erevan was regarded as practica­ ble and desirable, the suggestion that the Armenians of Karabagh, too, should be subject to relocation was termed preposterous. At the eastern rim of the Armenian plateau, Karabagh was Armenian in every detail, and its cession “to the Pan-Turanian fanatics will open the door to endless invasions, endanger the peace of the Orient, and shake the political equi­ librium off its foundations.” Yet even if the Erevan government realized all its territorial pretensions, more than half a million Transcaucasian Armenians, or about a third, would be excluded from the Republic, as compared with 2 percent of the Georgians outside their country and 20 percent of the Shi'a Tatars (Azeris) outside Azerbaijan. If, on the other hand, Azerbaijan incorporated the entire Elisavetpol guberniia and its 350,000 Armenians, more than half of the Transcaucasian Armenian population would be outside the Erevan republic.62 Until mid-1919 both sides had cause for optimism. The Armenians retained control in Zangezur and extended their rule to Sharur-Nakhichevan; the Azerbaijanis held most of the disputed territory in the Elisa­ vetpol guberniia and penetrated farther into the central Karabagh highlands. The balance shifted in the summer, however, as the Armenian administration and repatriates were expelled from Sharur-Nakhichevan and parts of Erevan and Surmalu, remote Armenian settlements in the Bashkend district of mountainous Kazakh were raided, and the Armeni­ ans of Karabagh were brought closer to submission by Khosrov Bek Sul62 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131. See also La République Arménienne et ses Voisins: questions territoriales (Paris, 1919); Données statistiques des populations de la Transcaucasie (Paris, 1920). For a useful statistical study of the ethno-religious composition of the Caucasus, see the series by Artashes Abeghian, “Menk ev mer harevannere—Azgayin kaghakakanutian khndirner,” Hairenik Amsagir, VI-VII (Dec. 1927-Dec. 1928).

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tanov. The Karabagh assembly’s ultimate acquiescence in provisional Azerbaijani jurisdiction in August dealt a heavy blow to Armenian ter­ ritorial claims and strengthened the determination of the Baku govern­ ment to thrust a territorial bridge across Zangezur into “southwestern Azerbaijan.” Samed Bey Jamalinskii was assigned to organize an autono­ mous administration in Sharur-Nakhichevan pending the conquest of Zangezur and universal recognition of the Azerbaijani right of self-deter­ mination. It was then, in August 1919, that Colonel William N. Haskell arrived as the Allied high commissioner for Armenia. Immediately confronted with the complexities of Caucasian politics, he first tried to settle the SharurNakhichevan problem, but his actions took him far beyond the scope of relief matters and cast aspersions on his efficacy as an intermediary and his reliability as an impartial representative of the Allied and Associated Powers. Colonel Haskell in Erevan The Erevan government, in desperate straits because of the British evacuation and severe military setbacks, had high hopes for Colonel Has­ kell’s mission. Although the extent of his authority was still not clear to the Armenians or to Allied representatives in the Caucasus when he arrived at Batum on August 14, it was known that he had already wired the peace conference from Constantinople about Armenia’s need for Allied troops.63 Haskell and his party were welcomed by Armenian Consul General Eghiazarian and Ashot Mndoyants, president of the Batum Armenian National Council; both expressed thanks for the American humanitarian aid and confidence that quick action would save the Armenian republic. Haskell promised that the hour of salvation was near and noted that the very presence of the Armenian officials was gratifying evidence of progress toward the ideal of a free and independent nation.64 After an overnight journey to Tiflis, Haskell was greeted there by Benjamin B. Moore of the American field mission, Armenian representa­ tives Mikhail G. Tumanian and General Iosif A. Kishmishian, members of the Georgian government, and foreign diplomats.65 Haskell’s initial discussions with British and French officers revealed Armenia’s military weakness and its need of arms and ammunition for self-defense. Colonel Chardigny, however, also advised Haskell to urge Khatisian to yield to the 63 See above, p. 114. 64 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 21:4, 1919. 65 Bor’ba, Aug. 16:2, 17:3, 21:1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 16:1, 1919.

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fait accompli in Sharur-Nakhichevan until the Paris Peace Conference had determined the boundaries of the new Armenian state.66 Between August 20 and 23, while battles were raging in Surmalu and around Sarikamish, Haskell had his first glimpse of the bleak conditions in Armenia. He received a warm welcome from political and religious dignitaries and flower-bearing orphan children at Karakilisa, Alexandropol, and Erevan, which were bedecked with American and Armenian flags and oriental rugs. On August 21 Haskell was escorted from the Erevan railway station to the city by Khatisian and an honor guard of Sassun and Shahtaght mounted troops, acknowledging the cheers of the crowds turned out by Erevan commandant Arshavir Shahkhatuni. The festive atmosphere gave relief from the daily drudgery. The Allied high commissioner had arrived.67 In their first conference that afternoon, Haskell told Khatisian that he was charged to protect Armenians throughout the Caucasus and Anatolia and to regulate relief activities and that he had already appealed to Paris for military backing. Although the Turkish Armenian refugees could not be repatriated until the spring of 1920, the peace conference was commit­ ted to that objective. It now had to decide the exact boundaries of and the mandatory power for a united Armenia. General Harbord would soon arrive to study the military situation and calculate the number of foreign troops needed for defense. On existing problems Haskell recommended only defensive action pending the peace treaty, for the shifting of a little territory would have no effect on the final settlement. He believed that his mere presence would deter the elements that had been causing unrest, and he promised to warn the Azerbaijani government that continued provocation would have serious repercussions.68 On August 22 the presiding speaker of Parliament, Hovsep Arghutian, officially welcomed Commissioner Haskell to Armenia, regretting that he had to see the country at a time when it was devastated and filled with widows, orphans, and homeless, starving people. Surely the Allies recog­ nized their obligation to protect the Armenians, who had served them well for five full years against the enemy. Secure in their own military strength, however, the Allies had been in no hurry to settle accounts with the defeated foe, which, as a typical representative of oriental despotism, bowed only to the display of force. Emboldened by the laxity of the victors and the removal of even the few Allied troops in Armenia, the “dark 66 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 23 bis. 67 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 26:2, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 23:1, 1919; S. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), p. 274. 68 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4, File 660/3, no. 121, Aug. 27, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 26:3, 27:2, 1919; Vratzian, op. cit.y pp. 274-275.

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elements” were trying to destroy the young republic. The moment had come for the Allies to demonstrate that Armenia was not alone and that its enemies would not go unpunished. There was a time in history when the Armenians, “as one of the earliest peoples in the ancient world,” had enriched the culture of the West. Now the young Armenian democracy looked to the West, particularly the great American democracy, for assis­ tance, direction, and justice.69 Visibly moved by his reception and by the misery he had seen, Haskell told the assembled guests and members of Parliament that he well under­ stood Allied support was needed for the defense of Armenia. Although the Americans were usually slow to begin something, they moved swiftly once a decision had been taken. Hence it was unlikely that the question of the Armenian mandate would be resolved until the American attitude toward the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations had been clarified. Meanwhile, his job as Allied high commissioner was to preserve the physi­ cal existence of the Armenian people; to that end he had already acted to ensure the steady flow of supplies from Batum and to retain the British force or to bring other Allied troops to the Caucasus. If necessary, he would return to Paris to emphasize the obligation to safeguard the coura­ geous Armenian people. Since Azerbaijan had clearly violated the provi­ sional territorial boundaries recognized by the British military authorities, he would take appropriate action in Baku to end the incursions. This was not the time, however, for Armenia to expend its energy on political disputes with neighboring states. In the struggle to survive, the seizure of small pieces of territory would have little importance and, furthermore, would have no effect on the boundaries set by the Paris Peace Conference. The Armenian government should just prepare to distribute the assis­ tance that would be arriving and trust the Allies to solve other issues.70 The Expedient of a Neutral Zone Immediately after his return to Tiflis, Haskell wired the peace conference that conditions in Armenia were “beyond description” and that military reinforcements were indispensable, thus setting the scene for the Allied charade regarding the dispatch of a French relief force via Cilicia. On August 28 Haskell arrived in Baku, where he met with the Azerbaijani leaders so frequently vilified by the Armenians and by American consular 69 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 27:2, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 21:1-2, 1919. 70 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 75, Sept. 17, 1919; FO 608/84, 342/12/1/18925 end.; FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449 end.; FO 371/3659, 135256/512/58; Vratzian, op. cit.. pp. 275-276; Bor'ba, Aug. 28:3, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 2:1, 3:1, 1919.

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and intelligence officers. Contrary to expectations, he was welcomed by educated and dignified gentlemen, who emphasized their desire for peace and friendship with all neighbors. When Premier Usubbekov and Foreign Minister Jafarov confronted Haskell with his comments in the Armenian Parliament concerning Azerbaijani aggression, the embarrassed high commissioner claimed that his speech had been mistranslated.71 He had come, he said, as an advocate, not of the Armenian case, but of humanitarian assistance and peaceful coexistence pending a political settlement. He therefore suggested the creation of an Americansupervised neutral zone in the southern districts of the Erevan guberniia to bring an end to the hostilities, relieve the suffering of both Armenian and Muslim inhabitants, and reestablish the rail link for commerce and communication between Transcaucasia and Persia.72 The proposal came a week after Khosrov Bek Sultanov had forced the Armenians of Karabagh to acknowledge his authority, thus lowering the barriers to Zangezur. The formation of a large neutral zone south of Erevan would weaken Armenian claims to Sharur and Nakhichevan and block the Armenian route to Zangezur, paving the way for the ultimate westward expansion of Azerbaijan to the Araxes valley. On August 29 Usubbekov verbally accepted the proposal after successfully incorporat­ ing several changes, the full implications of which escaped Colonel Has­ kell. Drafted in twenty-one articles by Haskell on September 1, the agreement provided that the counties of Nakhichevan and Sharur-Daralagiaz would form a neutral zone under an American governor-general appointed by Haskell and administered locally by Muslim officials except in areas of Armenian predominance. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan would remove all troops and agents from the zone, proclaim a general amnesty, and defend the lives and property of the minorities within their countries. The Azerbaijani authorities would use their influence to quiet the Muslim population in the neutral zone and in the Erevan district, and the Armenian authorities would do the same among their people in the zone and in the Zangezur district. Azerbaijan would facilitate American relief operations in the districts of Shushi (Karabagh) and Goris (Zan­ gezur) and, when the American high commissioner deemed it advisable, would help to repatriate Armenian refugees living in Azerbaijan. Relief would be distributed in the neutral zone without distinction as to race or religion and would insofar as possible be extended to certain districts in Azerbaijan. The Muslim inhabitants of Baouk-Vedi would, under the 71 Bor’ba, Aug. 30:1, Sept. 12:4, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 30:2, Sept. 1:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no- 129>Sept. 3, 1919; Hairenih, Nov. 2:2, 1919. 72 Azerbaidzhan, Aug. 30—Sept. 5, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 1:2, 1919.

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direction of the American governor, be transferred with all their posses­ sions from the Erevan uezd to a suitable village in the neutral zone. The railway and telegraph lines between Erevan and the Persian frontier at Julfa would be repaired and would resume operations, as part of the Armenian Railway Administration, under the control of the American governor, with such Armenian or Muslim personnel as, in his judgment, would ensure efficiency and service to the entire population. Azerbaijan would be allowed to complete the railway from Baku to Julfa without interference and retain exclusive control of its operation. Freedom of worship and the right to education in the national languages would be granted to all inhabitants of the zone. The administrative expenses of the governor-generalship would be met through local revenues and, if they were insufficient, through funds of the Azerbaijani government.73 Believing that the Armenian cabinet would approve these terms and confirm them with relief, Haskell praised the peace-loving nature of the Azerbaijani leaders and wired Khatisian to have the Armenian army cease military operations on the southern front. Khatisian replied that his coun­ try had never been at war with Azerbaijan, but inasmuch as Usubbekov’s government, contrary to its previous claims, now implied that it could halt the hostilities, the Armenian army was being ordered not to advance beyond the existing lines of defense.74 On his arrival back in Tiflis, Haskell forwarded two copies of the draft document to Erevan with instructions that Khatisian sign and return one copy without delay. The Armenian cabinet quickly realized, however, that the American commissioner had been misled by his own naïveté and his inadequate knowledge of local geography and de facto boundaries. The inclusion of Daralagiaz in the neutral zone would take from Armenia a strategic highland district under firm civil and military control, close the only remaining route of communication between Erevan and Zangezur, and allow Azerbaijan to open a broad corridor to the Araxes valley. The articles requiring the Azerbaijani government to support American relief efforts in Shushi and Goris and to pacify the Muslims around Erevan while the Armenian government calmed the Armenians in Zangezur implied that Karabagh and Zangezur were as much a part of Azerbaijan as Erevan was of Armenia. Moreover, there could be no misinterpretation of Usub­ bekov’s addition of the articles giving Azerbaijan sole control over the construction and operation of a railway from Baku across southern Zan73 FO 371/3664, 148131/1015/58 end.; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20387 end.; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 263-265. 74 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 133, Sept. 10, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 4:3, 10:3, 1919.

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gezur to Julfa and the right, as the most concerned nation, to assume the responsibility for any fiscal deficit in the neutral zone.75 After consulting with the Bureau of Dashnaktsutiun, Khatisian an­ nounced in Parliament on September 5 that the government had honored Haskell’s appeal for a cease-fire and had accepted in principle the forma­ tion of an American governorship pending clarification of several ques­ tionable points in the draft terms. In contrast with the muteness of the disgruntled Dashnakist deputies, Social Revolutionary Arsham Khondkarian upbraided the government for its blind reliance on the Allies, who had rewarded the trust and sacrifices of the Armenian democracy with more heartache and misery. Allied representatives in the Caucasus had done nothing to defend the fundamental rights of the Armenian people; instead, those “lovers of neutral zones” were merely helping to strangle the young republic. A few days earlier Haskell had aroused Armenian hopes, particularly by promising that Azerbaijan would be called to ac­ count for its aggression, but then he'had gone to Baku and, playing into the hands of the khans and beks, had composed the scandalous draft document without even consulting the Armenian government. It was high time for the ruling party in Armenia to reassess its foreign policies and shun Western hypocrisy by turning to the Russian democracy.76 That same day the Parliament cut short the debate by a Dashnakist motion to suspend discussion until after cabinet and legislative representa­ tives had conferred with Haskell and the government had made its final decision. Despite this action, some Dashnakists let it be known that they agreed with much of Khondkarian’s criticism. The party newspapers, Hayastani ashkhatavor, Haradj, and Ashkhatavor, observed that Armenia’s enemies favored the creation of neutral zones in order to retain the stifling boundaries imposed upon the Republic by the Turks in 1918. All that Muslim beks and Turkish agents had to do now was to renew the agitation in Kars, to which Haskell would doubtless respond with another neutral zone. Even though the Allied Powers had won the war and were dictating the peace, they had allowed the richest lands of Russian Armenia to be taken from the Republic. The Armenian democracy had to realize that reliance on its own resources was the only sure way to survive.77 On September 6 Khatisian and Ruben Ter-Minasian, the latter repre­ senting Parliament and unofficially the Dashnakist Bureau, left for Tiflis to submit the government’s formal observations to Haskell. They raised 75 Ashkhatavor, Sept. 23:3, 1919, reprinting the critique of Hayastani ashkhatavor (Erevan). 76 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 10:3, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 20:1, 1920. 77 See, for example, Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 11:1, 1919; Hairenikf Nov. 23:3, 1919.

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three basic issues: the organization and extent of the zone, its relationship with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and its effect on the future of Zangezur. Although Sharur-Nakhichevan was an integral part of the Armenian republic, as the British military authorities had acknowl­ edged, the government would bow to circumstances and assent to an American governorship there. Their objections were also threefold. First, it was absurd to suggest the inclusion of Daralagiaz, which had remained Armenian even at the time of the Turkish military occupation of the Araxes valley. Second, if one government was to have a privileged position in the zone, it should be Armenia, because the region was vitally important to the Republic and because Azerbaijan, disregarding the dictates of the Paris Peace Conference, had instigated and financed the insurrection. Azerbaijan should not be permitted to circulate money in the zone, to have a special relationship with its administration, or to lay, without conditions, a railway across Zangezur to Nakhichevan. Third, Zangezur was and would remain Armenian, a fact accepted by General Cory but obscured in Haskell’s draft as amended by Usubbekov. In summary, Armenia would confirm the proposed agreement only if Daralagiaz was excluded from the zone, the American governor would appoint an administrative council based on proportional representation, the Baku-Julfa railway would be built by the countries controlling the regions through which it passed or under a special convention between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the wording was revised to make clear that the Erevan— Julfa line would be operated by the Armenian Railway Administration and that Azerbaijani assistance in relief had no political ramifications. Further­ more, the term “American governor-generalship” should replace “neutral zone.”78 Haskell, still not fully aware of the nuances in Caucasian political lan­ guage, deemed the Armenian observations reasonable. Taking advantage of Usubbekov’s presence in Tiflis for consultations about the Daghestan crisis, he tried to gain Azerbaijani acceptance of the changes. Usubbekov would not yield, however, on the question of Daralagiaz, the use of Azer­ baijani currency, and exclusive construction rights for the Baku-AliatJulfa railway; he also insisted that the American governor serve simply as an external controller and that actual administration be vested in a council drawn from the predominant nationality in the zone. Then, after another round of counterproposals, Nasib Bek conceded on the issue of Dar78 The Armenian observations, dated September 6 and addressed to Haskell from Khatisian, are in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4. See also FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20387 end.; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 10:2, 3, 1919.

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alagiaz, but only on condition that the Ordubad district, lying between Nakhichevan and Zangezur, also be excluded from the zone and adminis­ tered by Azerbaijan. With negotiations at an impasse, Usubbekov de­ parted for Baku. Haskell confided to Khatisian that he was beginning to despair of reaching any agreement without a supportive armed force.79 Returning to Erevan on September 14, Khatisian and Ter-Minasian reported that Haskell had finally seen the flaws in the original terms and now subscribed to the view that Zangezur was an inseparable part of the Armenian republic.80 That this favorable appraisal was not exaggerated was evidenced in a new nine-point protocol dictated by Haskell. The status quo would be maintained in Zangezur, Daralagiaz would not come within the neutral zone, the villagers of Baouk-Vedi could remain there but would have to disarm, construction of the Baku-Julfa railway would be contingent upon an Armeno-Azerbaijani agreement, and the zone’s administrative costs would be borne equally by the two governments or by the United States.81 The Baku authorities were astonished by the sudden shifts of the American officer who, they said, had previously affirmed in private that Sharur-Nakhichevan was essentially Azerbaijani. But Haskell, who was becoming accustomed to manipulative practices, refused to consider the petitions of the Azerbaijani-supported Daghestanis unless Usubbekov accepted his unrelated scheme for a neutral zone in the Araxes valley. The prime minister complained to British commissioner Wardrop on September 22 that, while his government was prepared to submit all disputes with Armenia to neutral arbitration, Haskell was playing with the fate of the Mountaineers by insisting on an unjust plan, twice modified under Armenian influence.82 Yielding to Haskell’s pressure, Foreign Minister Jafarov announced on September 29 that Azerbaijan would not oppose formation of a neutral zone in Sharur-Daralagiaz and Nakhichevan if several points were clarified.83 Jafarov then traveled to Tiflis to explain his position, but Haskell was unwilling to accept any more changes. Under duress, Jafarov then informed Haskell on October 6 that the Azerbaijani government, without renouncing its rights to Sharur-Nakhichevan, would not stand in the way of the American proposal and would, like the Armenian 79 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4. 80 Ibid. While in Tiflis, Khatisian and his colleagues also met with several Georgian and Armenian officials, Oliver Wardrop for the first time, General Nikolai N. Baratov, who had recently arrived as the envoy of General Denikin, and Colonel Gabba, who had returned to head the Italian mission in Transcaucasia. 81 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 315-316. 82 FO 371/3663, 137208/1015/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/12/19766 end. 83 Bor'ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 286—289.

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government, appoint a representative to accompany the governor-general to Nakhichevan. He nonetheless complained bitterly to Wardrop about Haskell’s behavior and inquired whether the American commissioner was really authorized to deal with Transcaucasian political affairs. Admitting his own misgivings, Wardrop advised a conciliatory policy and received Jafarov’s word that Azerbaijan, while not attempting to conceal its displeasure, would not sabotage the American plan.84 Elated by his apparent success, Haskell departed for Paris in mid-October to report to Hoover about relief requirements and to ask the peace conference to broaden his jurisdiction to include Georgia and Azerbaijan. The installation of the American governor at Nakhichevan was left to Colonel James C. Rhea, the mission’s chief of staff, who served as acting high commissioner in Haskell’s absence.85 Nonfulfillment The Muslims of the Araxes valley initially regarded any provisional ar­ rangement as preferable to restoration of Armenian control. On Septem­ ber 9 the representatives of “southwestern Azerbaijan” informed Haskell that American supervision would be acceptable so long as the principle of self-determination was upheld and until the Paris Peace Conference con­ firmed the region’s indissoluble unity with Azerbaijan. The Muslims had no quarrels with the Armenian villagers, who could return in safety, but they would take arms and die with honor rather than submit to extermina­ tion by Dashnakist bandits.86 By the end of the month, however, their position had shifted in response to Azerbaijan’s growing opposition to Haskell’s revision of the original plan. Completing an inspection tour of the region at that time, Clarence Ussher reported that he had been bullied by Colonel Halil Bey, who heaped insults upon the Americans, and that 84 FO 371/3663, 139171/1015/58; FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449 end.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66/2, Secret report of Armenian diplomatic representative in Georgia, Oct. 9, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 30:2, 1919. On learning of these proceedings, George Kidston, chief of the Eastern section of the Foreign Office, angrily noted that Haskell, who was supposed to represent all the Allied governments, was making “all sorts of arrangements” about which the Allies had no knowledge. FO 371/3663, 143527/1015/58. 85 Rhea had been in charge of organizing the Haskell mission in Paris, while Colonel Haskell proceeded directly from Rumania to the Caucasus in August. Rhea and his thirty co-workers, including two colonels, eight lieutenant colonels, and eight majors, were transported to Batum on the USS Martha Washington, the vessel assigned to the Harbord mission (see chap. 11). The personnel roster of the Haskell mission is given in RG 256, 181.94/2/4. The arrival of Rhea and his fellow officers in the Caucasus was reported in the Tiflis press on September 22 and » 19 19 86Azerbaidzhan, no. 276, as reprinted in Ashkhatavor, Sept. 21:4, 1919; Erkir, Oct. 2:3, 9:1, 1919. See also Ashkhatavor, Sept. 23:4, 25:1, 1919. 2

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T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

an American governor with a small armed force should be sent to Nakhichevan at once to protect the Armenian population from new massacres or death from malnutrition and disease.87 An American staff officer who subsequently tried to explain the functions of the governor-general to local Muslim leaders and secure their cooperation was told that Sharur-Daralagiaz, Nakhichevan, and Vedibasar were inseparable parts of Azerbaijan and were entitled to self-rule under Azerbaijani law. They would accept an American representative but not a governor, and they would welcome American relief for refugees of all faiths. It had to be understood, however, that “if anyone against the wish of our people tries to give our country to Armenians, we shall consider him an enemy; we shall meet him with arms in hand and our adversaries can enter our houses only over our dead bodies.”88 Despite such protestations, Colonel Rhea wrote the Nakhichevan Mus­ lim Council on October 16 that the Allies, through an American governor­ ship, were to supervise the admihistration in Sharur-Nakhichevan. Colonel Edmund L. Daley of the Corps of Engineers would be installed as governor on October 23 in the presence of Armenian and Azerbaijani officials. The Muslim council and all local military and civil officials were urged to attend the ceremonies.89 Rhea then traveled to Baku to hasten the appointment of an Azerbaijani delegate to accompany Daley as a sign of the government’s support. Receiving favorable verbal assurances, Rhea proceeded to Erevan with several American officers and M. G. Tumanian, the Armenian vice-consul in Tiflis who was to be a member of the mixed commission.90 The party’s arrival in Erevan on October 21 surprised the new Azer­ baijani envoy, Abdul-Rahman Akhverdov, who told Rhea he had received no word from his government about a neutral-zone agreement or an Azerbaijani representative on a mixed commission. Akhverdov immedi­ ately wired Baku that the American plan to place a governor in Nakhi­ chevan was confusing regional leaders who, like himself, did not know what arrangements had been accepted by the government.91 Fearing he would jeopardize the success of his mission by tarrying any longer, Rhea 07 FO 371/3660, 144752/512/58. 08 Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bryan to Bristol, Nov. 24, 1919, end.; Azerbaidzhan, Nov. 14, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 13:2, 1920. Azerbaijani sources refer to the American staff officer as “General Robinson,” but it probably was Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. Robinson. 89 FO 608/79, 342/1/12/2114 end.; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 313—314; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 103, Dec. 13, 1919; Azerbaidzhan, Oct. 23, 1919. 90Ashkhatavor, Oct. 24:4, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a! 3, no. 168, Oct. 21, 1919. File 4/4. 91Adrbedjani pastatghtere, p. 41, Jafarov’s no. 1135. See also RG 59, 867.00/1067; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no- *74>Oct. 28, 1919; Obnovlenie, Oct. 23, 1919.

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left Tumanian in Erevan and on October 24 continued on to Nakhichevan with only Daley and five other staff officers.92 Met by Samed Bey Jamalinskii and a display of Azerbaijani and Turkish flags, the Americans were escorted to the home of Kalb Ali Khan Nakhichevanskii, where Rhea read Haskell’s protocol on the organization of the neutral zone and asked that copies of the document be distributed to the public prior to the ceremonies the next day. Samed Bey and Kalb Ali Khan refused to comply but allowed Rhea to make the same request to the Muslim council. Its members, also spurning the American scheme, de­ clared that they would not submit to the plan even if the Baku govern­ ment, the only one they recognized, so instructed them. Halil Bey, the Turkish officer commanding the Muslim detachments, angrily claimed that he had been double-crossed by the British when they turned the region over to the Armenians; he would take no chances now with an American governorship. Until a settlement was reached he would keep good order, help to restore communication and transportation routes, and accept an American officer as a representative of the Allied Powers and the Paris Peace Conference. After three days of futile negotiations, Colonel Rhea returned to Erevan on October 29, leaving Daley in Nakhi­ chevan to coordinate relief activities and to exert whatever moral influ­ ence he could. Lieutenant Colonel James E. Shelley was dropped off at Davalu as a truce observer along the forward line of the Muslim forces.93 The miscarriage of the American plan brought satisfaction to the Mus­ lim notables and Turkish officers in Sharur-Nakhichevan and to the gov­ ernment of Azerbaijan. Foreign Minister Jafarov told Akhverdov that the local leaders had taken the correct position and that Samed Bey should now be instructed to establish cordial relations with Colonel Daley.94 But Rhea and Haskell, outraged and humiliated, accused the Azerbaijani government of reneging on pledges to accept the neutral zone and to send a representative to lend moral support to the American governor-general.95 Jafarov denied the charge, asserting that his government had announced only that it would assume a passive attitude in the matter.96 92 Ashkhatavor, Nov. 7:3, 1919; FO 371/3660, 157883/512/58 end.; RG 59, 867.00/1100. 93 RG 256, 181.9402/12; RG 59, 867.00/1100; Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bryan to Bristol, Nov. 24, 1919, end.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 181, Nov. 5, 1919; FO 3660, 148767/ 512/78; Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 41-42, Jafarov’s no. 93. 94 Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 43-44, Jafarov’s no. 105. 95 RG 59, 763.72119/8322; Bristol Papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Haskell to Logan for Hoover, Dec. 5, 1919. 96 Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 41-42, Jafarov’s no. 93. See also Ashkhatavor, Nov. 2:3, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 30:2, 1919. A Soviet interpretation of American intentions and actions in Nakhichevan is presented by G. E. Madatov, “Nakhjuvanda Sovet hâkimiyetinin gelebesi,” in

2o 6

T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

A clue to the Azerbaijani strategy was revealed in Usubbekov’s cipher message to Akhverdov on October 25, instructing him to tell Rhea that the basic conditions for Azerbaijan’s assent to a neutral zone had been the cessation of Armenian military operations in Zangezur and the withdrawal of Armenian regulars. Instead, those forces had actually been increased; therefore, Azerbaijan could not assist in organizing a neutral zone in Sharur and Nakhichevan.97 The explanation not only justified the Azerbaijani position but also brought Zangezur back into immediate contention. By the end of October the Turkish-oriented Azerbaijani nationalists led by Khosrov Bek Sultanov and Ali Agha Shikhlinskii had decided to press into Zangezur to expedite the direct annexation of Sharur-Nakhichevan. Yet, while military intervention seemed to be the only way to ensure a favorable solution to territorial disputes with Armenia, the rituals of diplomacy could not be ignored. Velikii Oktiabr’i bor'ba za Sovetskuiu vlasV v Azerbaidzhane, ed. I. A. Huseinov et al. (Baku, 1958), p p . 364- 370.

97 RG 59, 860J.01/180 end.; Bristol Papers, Box 31, Rhea to Bristol, Dec. 1, 1919, end.

8

Zangezur and Goghtan

The Zangezur highlands, towering above the arid steppes of eastern Transcaucasia and the river valley between Erevan and Julfa, form a veritable archeological museum. The primary mountain range extends in an arc from the Karabagh tableland to Persian Karadagh. Its 8,000- to 13,000-foot peaks divide Zangezur from Daralagiaz and Nakhichevan. Pitched toward the southeast, the massive formation is ribbed with sub­ ranges that have etched out distinct cantons: Sisian, Goris (Gerusy), Ghapan (Kafan), and Meghri (Genvaz) (see map 6). Hundreds of streams tumble down through remote, picturesque glens toward the Hakaru (Akera) and Araxes rivers as they merge and enter the Azerbaijani steppes. But in 1919 the Zangezur uezd was more than a region of exqui­ site natural beauty; it was an area of critical political and strategic impor­ tance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan and brought the two republics to the verge of open warfare. The Challenge Before the world war the population of Zangezur was about evenly di­ vided, the Christians prevailing in the central and southern sectors be­ tween Goris and Meghri and the Muslims, in the east on both sides of the Hakaru River and along the major feeder tributaries such as the Bazarchai and Okhchichai.1 In the interracial clashes in 1918 the Muslim partisans razed the few Christian settlements linking Zangezur and Karabagh, while Andranik and other Armenian militarists expelled the inhabitants of vul­ nerable Tatar (Azeri) and Kurdish villages in the central districts. The 1 See Stepan Lisitsian, Zangezuri Hayere (Erevan, 1969). Population tables and listings of current and former place-names are given in Kh. A. Avetisian, Zangezuri bnakchutiune ev bnakavairere 40 tarum (1920-1960) (Erevan, 1963), pp. 7-20, 84—91. 207

6

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ZANGEZUR AND GOGHTAN

ZANGEZUR AND GOGHTAN

20g

local Armenian administration eventually gained control in most of Zangezur, but the Muslims remained entrenched in the Barkushat range, which separated Goris and Tatev from Ghapan and Meghri, and in the mountains to the north of Goris, whence they threatened the routes leading toward Daralagiaz and Erevan.2 Armenia’s claims to the Zangezur uezd, exclusive of the southeastern sector, were bolstered in the spring of 1919 by the spread of its jurisdiction to Sharur-Nakhichevan and by the British ruling upholding the status quo in the disputed county until a final Allied decision. Under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Arsen Shahmazian, appointed general commission­ er by the Erevan government, and the multipartisan Zangezur regional council, Nikolai Hovsepian directed the civil administration, Sako (Hambardzum Sargsian) strengthened the militia detachments, and a military staff of regular army officers coordinated partisan operations and as­ signed field commanders to the several fronts.3 Disregarding Azerbaijani protests, the Armenians of Zangezur participated in the national parliamentary elections in June and were gratified by the inclusion of native sons Vahan Khoreni (Ter-Gevorgian) and Arshak Shirinian on the winning Dashnakist slate.4 During the spring and summer migrations of Muslim herdsmen, the opposing partisan forces had many occasions to test their mettle. The nomads, joined by mounted squads from the Hakaru valley and led by Azerbaijani and Turkish officers, pressed up into a dozen glens but were repeatedly blocked by Armenian mountaineers. Early in July, however, the Muslim tribesmen nearly encircled the Armenian forward positions by infiltrating over mountain trails. Near the Bazarchai River east of Tatev, they overran the village of Eritsatumb and seized several strategic heights, and in the Ghapan sector they set fire to the settlement of Karababa and, in an attempt to reach friendly Muslim villages in the Geghvadzor and Okhchichai vales, advanced upon Agarak and Eghvard. With a relief column brought in from the north by Lieutenant Colonel Smbat Torosian, the Armenians managed to take the offensive on the fourth day of the 2 Hovannisian, Republic, I, 86-88, 192-196. 3 S. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), p. 301. The regional commanders were Colonel Poghos Ter-Davitian and Lieutenant Colonel Smbat Torosian for the Sisian sector, Colonel Bughdan Melik-Hiuseinian for Goris (central Zangezur), H. Petrosian for Ghapan, and Shahsvarian and Anushian for Meghri. See Stemel, “Zangezuri herosamarte ev Arsen Shahmazian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XLI (Feb. 1963), 29. Numerous military reports, copies of diplomatic correspondence, and newspaper accounts relating to the events in Zangezur in 1919 are in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 9/9, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 79/9-/920 t. 4 Kavkazskoe slovo, July 22, 1919, reported that of 35,386 eligible voters in Zangezur, 27,832 cast ballots, with 26,984 for the Dashnaktsutiun and 627 for the Social Revolutionary party.

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battle and, by the next evening, to scatter the rival force, capture 10,000 rounds of ammunition and two damaged fieldpieces, and move out to a new perimeter of 15-20 versts (10-13 miles) from the recovered villages. Although this encounter was somewhat unusual in duration and intensity, it was but a single episode in the ongoing strife that ranged from the rustling of a few animals to large-scale forays with heavy arms support.5 By the end of summer the Armenians of Zangezur were facing isolation. The Armenian administration had been expelled from Sharur-Nakhichevan, the main supply routes from Evlakh and Karabagh were closed, and the sole remaining avenue to Erevan through Daralagiaz would soon be sealed by the blizzards that normally began to blow over the treacherous mountain passes in late autumn. Preparing for this eventuality, the regional council was reconstituted as a miniature cabinet in August, with Arshak Shirinian, assisted by Smbat Melik-Stepanian, assuming the functions of chief minister and director of internal affairs; Arsen Bakunts, communications; Asatur Avetisiart, assisted by Khachatur Danielian, health and welfare; Mikayel Zakarian, agriculture; Hakob Teruni, educa­ tion; and Eremia Bakunts, justice. The defense of Zangezur remained the responsibility of Shahmazian and the general staff.6 As food production in Zangezur was marginal, an attempt was made to lay aside sufficient provisions for the armed forces, but it was clear to all that the population would again be subjected to famine conditions long before the harsh winter had passed. Azerbaijani Preparations While the Zangezur Armenians were fortifying their positions, a propi­ tious sequence of events tempted Azerbaijani leaders to intervene. Even though the departure of the British in August raised apprehensions about the intentions of the White Army, the Azerbaijani government was jubi­ lant for a number of reasons. The Russian and Armenian inhabitants of 5 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 17/17, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t., Armenian Foreign Minister to Cory and to Plowden, nos. 2644-2645; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 24:3, Aug. 24:2, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 13:2, 1919; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, July 15, 1919, no. 2159; Stemel, op. cit., pp. 29-30. In mid-July the Armenian plenipotentiary in Baku informed his government that Azerbai­ jan was making preparations to seize Zangezur and that the plans included joint action with the khans controlling the territory across the Araxes River in northern Persia. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66/2, July 17, 1919, Bekzadian’s no. 510. 6 Vratzian, op. cit., pp. 301-302. The regional council also included Sahak Ter-Hairapetian, Gerasim Balayan, Eghishe Ishkhanian, and Melik-Esayan, the latter three, along with Avetisian and A. Bakunts, coming from Karabagh. Ter-Hairapetian and E. Bakunts are identified as Bolsheviks. See also Ashkhatavor, Aug. 29:3, 1919.

ZANGEZUR AND GOGHTAN

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the Lenkoran region finally laid down their arms and admitted Azer­ baijani officials;7 after months of defiance the Armenian Assembly of Mountainous Karabagh acquiesced in conditional recognition of Governor-General Khosrov Bek Sultanov; and Samed Bey Jamalinskii was organizing a semiautonomous administration in Nakhichevan preparatory to annexation by the Republic of Azerbaijan. With all primary roads under Muslim surveillance and the Armenian army pinned down in the provinces of Kars and Erevan, an Azerbaijani campaign to capture Zangezur and complete the overland corridor to the Araxes valley seemed opportune. Indeed, less than a week after the submission of the Karabagh Armenians, Musavat central committee chairman Rasulzade, extolling the liberation of Lenkoran and Karabagh and the resolve of the heroic people of Nakhichevan to unite with the Azerbaijani fatherland, declared that the moment had come to render Zangezur harmless and open the way to Julfa, thus bringing to fruition a large part of the Republic’s territorial aspirations.8 The compromise agreement regarding Karabagh stipulated that Azer­ baijani garrisons would be limited to Khankend and Shushi in peacetime strength and that any movement of armed forces would require the ap­ proval of two-thirds of the Armeno-Azerbaijani council.9 The agree­ ment was soon violated. Beginning in September, rifles, small arms ammunition, machine guns, howitzers, and mountain cannons were carted from the railway at Evlakh through Karabagh. In October the ist Infantry Division under General Ali Agha Shikhlinskii and the 2d Cavalry Regiment under General Edigarov were mobilized. Although the efforts of Sultan Bek Sultanov, brother of Khosrov Bek, to recruit 10,000 irregulars in the Jebrail district fell far short of that goal, as peasants were evading military service, by late October an expeditionary force of several thousand men was on combat alert in Jebrail and the Hakaru valley, the Haji-Samlu tribesmen were ready to descend upon Goris from the mountains in the north, and Halil Bey’s partisans in Sharur-Nakhichevan were riding up the defiles toward Sisian.10 The threat of a simultaneous 7 For materials on the Lenkoran-Mughan region’s nonrecognition of and struggle against the Azerbaijani government, see Bor*ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. m , 185-186, 194-195; P. B. Mosesov, “Sovetskaia vlast’ na Mugani (aprel’-iiul’ 1919 g.),” Izvestiia A. N. Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, no. 12 (1947), 50—58; Kompartiia Azerbaidzhana, pp. 316—319; Istonia Kompartii Azerbaidzhana, pp. 337-340; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 13:3, 16:4, 28:4, 30:2, 1919. See also the 39th Brigade and 27th Division War Diaries for July-August 1919 in WO 95/4879 and 95/4955. 8 Azerbaidzhan, Aug. 28, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 1:4, 1919. 9 These limitations were imposed by articles 15 and 16. See Hovannisian, Republic, I, 187. 10 For examples of the extensive diplomatic correspondence occasioned by news of these preparations, see RG 59, 860J.01/180 end., 867.00/1100; RG 256, 867B.00/295/307; France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 33 bis, 49 bis, 62 bis; Bristol Papers, Box 31,

212

T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

attack from Jebrail, Zabukh, Minkend, Sharur, and Ordubad hung over Colonel Shahmazian and the Armenians of Zangezur. The growing reliance of the Azerbaijani army on the service of Turkish officers was reported independently by British, French, and American observers. Colonel Rhea estimated that up to 2,000 Turkish regulars were in Sharur-Nakhichevan; supposedly deserters and mercenaries, they were in fact closely linked with the Ottoman 11th Division ju st beyond the frontier at old Bayazit.* 11 It was also learned that Nuri Pasha had slipped back into Transcaucasia and had been the guest of Khosrov Bek Sultanov at Khankend for two days in mid-October. The Turkish hero’s return disquieted Allied representatives, evoked Armenian remonstrances, and again aroused suspicion about Azerbaijani-Turkish relations.12 After his escape from British custody in August, Nuri had made his way from Batum to Olti and Erzerum, where he sought General Karabekir’s approval „for Turkish-sponsored autonomous administrations in Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to save the districts from absorption by Armenia or Georgia. Wary of Nuri’s motives and of permitting a potential rival in the region under his command, Karabekir, with the concurrence of Mustafa Kemal, advised Nuri that he could better serve the nation by strengthening pro-Turkish elements in Azerbaijan. Nuri then passed through Bayazit and Persian territory to eastern Transcaucasia, where his contact with leaders of the Azerbaijani Ittihadist party and the Bolshevik underground reinvigorated the adherents of Pan-Islamic ideologies.13 Other Turkish Ittihadist fugitives, too, soon appeared in Azerbaijan. Küchük Talaat, a former central committee member, and Halil Pasha, uncle of Enver and commander of the Caucasus front in 1918, were spirited away from prison in Constantinople by Nationalist sympathizers and directed to safety in the heart of Anatolia.14 At Sivas, Mustafa Kemal Rhea to Bristol, Nov. 14, 1 9 1 9 , ends.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File Sal Sa, Svodka nos. 1-4, Oct. 1 , 1 6 , 20, Nov. 9, 1 9 1 9 , File 66a/3. File 421/1, File 1649, H- HGharabagh. 11 Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bristol to Haskell, Dec. 3, 1919, end.; RG 256, 867B.00/275. See also FO 371/3666, 169271/1015/58; FO 371/3770, 140134/72426/58. 12 RG 59, 860J.01/180 end.; Britain, FO 371/3660, 159650/512/58 end.; Hairenik, Dec. 25:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8. 13 Kâzim Karabekir, ïstiklâl Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 185-187; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, Devoyants’s report no. 10, Aug. 24, 1919; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/ 3187, dossier 4, 49 bis; Bristol Papers, Box 31, Rhea to Bristol, Dec. 1, 1919, end. 14 Tevfik Biyiklioglu, Atatürk Anadolu’da (1919-1921), I (Ankara, 1959), 19, 65; Hüsameddin Ertürk, ïki devrin perde arhasi, comp. Samih Nafiz Tansu (Istanbul, 1964), pp. 202-204. The fact that Halil and Küchük escaped on the same day that Nuri escaped from Batum made Karabekir suspect a British plot involving the former Young Turk leaders. See Karabekir, op. cit., p. 118.

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told Halil that he could best demonstrate his patriotism by establishing liaison with the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus and securing Russian material and moral support for the Nationalist cause. Like Karabekir, Kemal wanted to keep the Ittihadist commanders out of Anatolia while using them to maintain unofficial contact with Soviet Russia. In Erzerum, Karabekir furnished Halil with an Azerbaijani army uniform and a small escort and urged him to organize the sabotage of key roads and bridges and ammunition depots in Armenia. Traveling incognito, under the name of Demir Ali, Halil traversed Nakhichevan with considerable difficulty at the end of September and joined Nuri as both a colleague and an adversary.15 Irrefutable evidence that Ittihadist notables were conspiring with underground groups in Baku and encouraging Khosrov Bek Sultanov in Karabagh to eliminate the Zangezur barrier alarmed the Armenians and further discredited the Azerbaijani cabinet in the eyes of most Allied officials. Wardrop and Stokes argued, however, that the best way to counteract Young Turk influence was to give firm support to Azerbaijani independence and to Prime Minister Usubbekov. The Ritual of Words As Azerbaijani regiments gathered along the frontiers of Zangezur, the Baku newspapers bemoaned the plight of Muslim refugees from that district. They estimated that since the onset of atrocities by Andranik “Pasha” and other Armenians more than a hundred settlements had been devastated and at least 40,000 people rendered homeless. Warning that herdsmen were in jeopardy and that nomads and flocks alike were being decimated by disease in the sweltering steppes, Khosrov Bek Sultanov begged his government to help him overcome “the Armenian bandits” blocking the routes to the summer grazing lands and to convert his titular position as governor-general of Karabagh and Zangezur into reality.16 Diplomatic representative Tigran Bekzadian wrote Alexandre Khatisian on September 22 that Azerbaijani leaders were planning to occupy central and southern Zangezur and the adjacent Goghtan (Ordubad) district so they could establish uninterrupted communication with Nakhi­ chevan, construct a railway from Baku and Aliat to Julfa, and annex disputed territories in the Araxes valley. Baku newspapers were preparing the populace for a state of war by headlining accounts of Armenian cruelty 15 Karabekir» op. cit., pp. 299-300. 16Bulletin dfInformations de l Azerbaïdjan, no. 1 (Sept. 1, 1919), 5; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3.

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T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

and disparaging Erevan’s call for the mediation of differences.17 On September 28 Khatisian, through the new Azerbaijani envoy, Abdul-Rahman Akhverdov, reiterated to Foreign Minister Jafarov Armenia’s desire for peace and warned that the reported Azerbaijani military buildup could lead to mutually regrettable consequences.18 Azerbaijan’s answer on October 2 was rigid: “Inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia that the uezd of Zangezur is in itself part of the territories of the Azerbeidjan Republic and therefore the question of the Armenian Government, expressed in the note men­ tioned, is an inadmittable intervention into the inner life of the Azerbeid­ jan Republic, the Government of which does not consider itself obliged to give an answer to the Government of Armenia about necessary mea­ sures into the administration of the Republic.”19Replying four days later, Khatisian accused the Azerbaijani authorities of reciting formal phrases instead of taking action to stabilize the volatile situation, forestall bloodshed, or encourage the litigation of disputes. The assertion that Zangezur was an inalienable part of Azerbaijan ignored reality; Azerbaijan would have to bear the responsibility for the consequences should it attempt to seize the county. Armenia was nonetheless still ready to discuss issues on which a “divergence of opinion” existed and to seek an understanding “worthy of the dignity” of sovereign states.20 In a letter to Jafarov the next day, October 7, Khatisian elaborated on the latter point. Progress in the Armeno-Georgian negotiations, he wrote, inspired hope that Armenia and Azerbaijan might similarly ease current frictions and eventually find solutions to the major problems affecting all three Transcaucasian republics. Armenia therefore proposed a bilateral conference at a site near the border—Kazakh in Azerbaijan or Dilijan or Karakilisa in Armenia—to consider provisional demarcation of the frontiers, the refugee question, a trade and transit agreement, and any other items the plenipotentiaries wished to place on the agenda.21 Azerbaijani reactions to Khatisian’s successive messages were markedly different. As to Zangezur, Jafarov replied tersely on October 24: “I have 17 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69at 1a, no. 932. See also File 8/8, Azerbaijan General Staff to Sultanov, Sept. 7, 1919, no. 4007; FO 371/3664, 148188/1015/58. 18 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, Khatisian to Akhverdov, no. 93/c.o.; FO 371/3660, 144752/5 1*/58-Seea,so FO 371/3663-3665,141097/141467/147984/157929/159307/159642/ 1015/58 ends.; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 33 bis. 19 FO 371/3663-3665, 143076/151582/154609/1015/58. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 9/9, “Posledniia sobytiia v Zangezure,” File 3/3, Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia, no. 912; La Géorgie Indépendante, Nov. 2:8, 1919. 20 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69a / 1a, Armenian Foreign Minister, no. 3996; FO 371/36643665, 151582/154609/1015/58 ends.; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20603 ends. 21 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 9/9, Khatisian’s no. 4108.

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received your October 6, No. 3996, and inform you that I have already given an answer on October 2 . . . through our diplomatic representative in Erevan.”22 But as no Transcaucasian foreign minister would spurn lip service to nonviolent principles, Jafarov wrote on October 26 that his government would accept the Armenian proposal for a bilateral conference provided it would aim for a permanent territorial settlement. Azerbaijani leaders, like the Georgian leaders, calculated that leaving the final determination of boundaries to the Paris Peace Conference would work in favor of Armenia. Baku, Jafarov added, was preferable to the sites suggested by Khatisian, and the Armenian plenipotentiaries should head for the Azerbaijani capital as soon as possible.23 Despite Armenia’s previous disqualification of Baku because of logistical and psychological disadvantages, Khatisian immediately informed Jafarov that Tigran Bekzadian, Martiros Harutiunian, and Vahan Papazian would arrive at Baku by November 20.24 As the formal correspondence passed slowly between Erevan and Baku, more trenchant notes sounded in the disputed highlands. With the Kariagin, Nukhi, and Zakatal infantry regiments and the 2d Cavalry Regiment poised in Karabagh and Jebrail, Khosrov Bek Sultanov circulated a leaflet, printed in Russian, Turkish, and Armenian, to the inhabitants of Zangezur. Denouncing the “dark forces” that had brought about the ruin of numerous villages and the dislocation of thousands of innocent people, Sultanov called upon the Zangezur Armenians to rid themselves of socalled patriots who were condemning the district to havoc and misery. The rumors that Azerbaijani jurisdiction would be accompanied by massacres and servitude had already proved baseless in Karabagh, where people now lived in tranquility and freedom from want. Like Karabagh, the Zangezur uezd was dependent on the Evlakh road for food and supplies and could not maintain an isolated existence indefinitely. Sultanov warned the Armenians to turn away from the provocateurs, who in the end would abandon them and flee to Erevan: “I appeal to you, people of Zangezur, workers and peasants, . . . demonstrate that you have no links with the anarchic and adventuristic elements. I guarantee your inviolability of person and property, and I have always honored my word. If you persist, however, in abetting the lawless elements, I have sufficient means to force 22 Ibid.y File 9/9, File 690/10, Jafarov’s no. 3985. 23 Bulletin d'Informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 6 (Jan. 1, 1920), 1; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69al 1a, Jafarov’s no. 4010; FO 371/3665, 159648/1015/58 end.; La Géorgie Indépendante, Nov. 9 1919 24 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69a! iat File 9/9; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, 62 bis. See also FO 371/3664, 150853/1015/58. >

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T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

you to recognize the authority of the Azerbaijani republic, but in that case the responsibility for the bloodshed will rest upon you.”25 At this point, in the latter half of October, the Azerbaijani cabinet retracted its acceptance of an American governorship for Sharur-Nakhichevan. Its original acquiescence had been conditional on the withdrawal of all Armenian regulars from Zangezur, whereas in fact military strength in the area was being steadily increased. Khatisian termed the allegation an “absolutely fallacious” excuse to void Colonel Haskell’s plan and to justify open aggression in Zangezur.26 The British representative in Erevan, Captain George F. Gracey, showed support for Khatisian by informing Wardrop that Armenia was doing its utmost to keep the peace but had been hoodwinked time and again. Near Lake Sevan, Azerbaijani agents were now trying to incite Muslims living in the vicinity of Bashkend to attack that large Armenian village of 800 homes and seize the surrounding lush pasturelands. Gracey added: “One readily sees by the self-confident smile and deportment of the Azerbaijani Representatives here that they look forward with no uncertainty to their ability to take these districts with force of arms. Not once have they mooted to me that troops were being moved or that the Armenians here are creating false impressions about them, and that it would likely lead to trouble.”27 In Goris, meanwhile, the Armenian administration and military staff met to assess their defense capabilities without appreciable aid from Ere­ van. While a full-scale encounter would exhaust their ammunition within a few days, Colonel Shahmazian maintained that an enemy offensive could be broken if the Armenians held out for a week. The regional government, vowing that Zangezur would never follow the humiliating example of Karabagh, ordered a general mobilization on October 26.28 Couriers from Karabagh, supplying details of Azerbaijani troop movements, reported that the invasion was scheduled for early November.29On October 29 General Shikhlinskii, so confident that he was no longer disguising his preparations, ordered an advance guard under Captain Ibrahimov to proceed from Avdallar to the Armenian positions 25 Azerbaidzhan, Nov. 6, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 8:2, 1919; Erkir, Nov. 26:1, 1919; FO 371/3664, 149329/1015/58; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 33 bis, 62 bis; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Svodha no. 4, Nov. 9, 1919. 26 Bristol Papers, Box 31, Rhea to Bristol, Dec. 1, 1919, end. See also Bor'ba, Sept. 26:1, 1919. 27 FO 371/3660, 159643/512/58. See also 151408/157889/159650/512/58; RG 59, 867.00/ 1067. A copy of Khatisian’s protest regarding Azerbaijani actions around Bashkend is in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69a! 1a, Armenian diplomatic representative in Georgia to Georgian Foreign Minister, no. 4734. 28 FO 608/79, 342/1/12/21114 end.; Hairenik, March 27:1-2, 1920. 29 Sarur [Asur], “Gharabaghi ktsume Adrbedjani,” Hairenik Amsagir, VII (June 1929), 144—145; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 9/9.

near Tegh and deliver an ultimatum to open the way to Goris and live in peace or else be ready to suffer the consequences.30 On November 3, Yapon (Hovhannes Paronian), commander of the Tegh detachment, telegraphed to Erevan that a major attack was imminent.31 Undeclared War and Belated Intercession Within hours the battle for Zangezur had begun. Preliminary skirmishes involving the Kurdo-Tatar partisans of Haji-Samlu were followed by a general Azerbaijani offensive at dawn on November 4. Under cover of a dense fog, the advancing regiments flanked the Armenian forward trenches and captured the first line of defense. By the next afternoon Bayandur, Khnadsakh, Korindzor, and Tegh had fallen, Khoznavar was in flames, and Azerbaijani artillery was bombarding the heights (Kecheldagh) overlooking Goris. At nightfall Azerbaijani crescent-shaped fires burned on these heights. Elsewhere, Muslim bands from Sharur-Nakhichevan invested Nors-Mazra and other villages near Sisian, and two Turk­ ish-officered platoons cut across the rugged Zangezur mountains from Ordubad into the Muslim stronghold of Okhchichai. Throughout Zan­ gezur the imperiled Muslim population took heart in anticipation of liber­ ation by the Azerbaijani army.32 Such hopes were cut short, however, by the counterattack Shahmazian mounted on November 6 after concentrating all available units on the Goris front. Artillerymen Simon Ter-Sahakian and Captain Ruben Narinian made direct hits on the Azerbaijani positions on Kechel-dagh, which was recaptured by Armenian companies commanded by Misha Ishkhanian. The Kurdish irregulars were the first to break ranks and scatter into the mountains around Minkend, while the Azerbaijani regu­ lars withdrew toward Tegh and the vale of Zabukh. Having gained the initiative, the Armenians charged the Azerbaijani lines, decimating Edigarov’s cavalry regiment in cross fire, reportedly inflicting several hundred casualties on the infantry, capturing 100,000 rounds of ammunition and six machine guns near Khoznavar, and putting two cannons and more than twenty machine guns out of commission. By November 9 the Azer­ baijani army was retreating in disarray toward Zabukh and the northern mountainous bypaths to Karabagh. Within a week after the invasion be30 FO 371/3660, 159643/159650/512/58 ends.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Jan. 3, 1920), 29. 31 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66/2. 32 Ibid., File 8/8, File 1649; Hairenik, March 27:1-2, 1920; Erkir, Dec. 13:3, 1919. See also FO 371/3665, 160010/1015/58.

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gan, the Armenians of Zangezur were celebrating an impressive victory. Colonel Shahmazian had become the hero of the hour.33 Information subsequently derived from Azerbaijani sources indicated that Minister of Military Affairs Samed Bek Mehmandarov had strongly opposed the Zangezur operation. When his view did not prevail, he in­ sisted that only the regular army be employed and that strict discipline be imposed to prevent pillage and massacre. Dismissing Mehmandarov’s injunction, Shikhlinskii and Sultanov counted heavily on auxiliary tribal support, but these bands looted abandoned Armenian villages and became so unmanageable that they even opened fire on Azerbaijani troops. Their flight in the face of the Armenian rush exposed the flanks of the infantry and contributed to the demoralization and costly retreat of regular army regiments.34 The rout of the Azerbaijani force near Goris was paralleled by failures on other fronts. Muslim partisan groups attempting to occupy the Sisian passes were intercepted by the Armenian Daralagiaz detachment and the militia of the Martiros district,3536while in the Ghapan sector the two Turkish platoons fell victim to mountaineers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Garegin Nzhdeh (Harutiunian). Assigned in August to bolster the Armenian defense of Goghtan, just west of the main Zangezur range in the Nakhichevan uezd, Nzhdeh took action in the Ghapan and Meghri (Genvaz) cantons of Zangezur as well. His mobile commando squads first prepared for an attack against the Muslim stronghold in the vale of the Okhchichai. At dawn on November 15 they rolled barrels packed with gunpowder and copper down into the Muslim trenches, the explosions scattering metal fragments and fire all around. The attackers, capitalizing on the element of surprise, swept through the Okhchichai and by nightfall had occupied the villages of Shabadin, Gedjevan (Kadjaran), Okhchi, Pirdoudan, and Aralikh-okhchi and had driven the defenders into the forest. For the Armenians, the operation relieved five isolated Christian settlements and reopened the pass to Goghtan; for Nzhdeh, it inspired a resolve to expel Muslim partisans and 33 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Svodkas; Stemel, op. cit., pp. 34-36; E. Ishkhanian, “Depkere Gharabaghum,” Hairenik Amsagir, XI (Oct. 1933), 126-127; “Gaspar Gaspariani odisakane,” trans. A. Amurian, Hairenik Amsagir, XLI (Jan. 1963), 40-42; Erkir, Dec. 11:1, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 3:2, 1920; Vratzian, op. cit., p. 303. During the Stalin era, Shahmazian was exiled to Siberia and never returned. 34 This information was given by Colonel Sokolov, who served as an Azerbaijani staff officer at Khankend in Karabagh. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, secret report; FO 371/3666, 167172/170793/1015/580. See also Mehmet-Zade Mirza-Bala, MUß Azerbayqan hareketi: MUß Az. “Müsavat” halk firkasi tarihi ([Berlin], 1938), p. 171. 36 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 660/3; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 28, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 3:2, 1920.

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villagers from the deep Barkushat-Geghvadzor valleys which cut across the heart of Zangezur.36 Because of the remoteness of the fields of battle, confusion and sus­ pense gripped the Transcaucasian capitals for several days. News of the Azerbaijani advance was received in Erevan and Tiflis, for example, only after Armenian forces had actually gained the initiative. At first the Azer­ baijani foreign ministry denied the presence of army regulars in Zan­ gezur. Akhverdov told Khatisian that according to his information the trouble grew out of local disputes between Kurds and Armenians and that the peaceful Muslim villages were simply guarding themselves against all anarchic groups. Khatisian, however, soon identified the attacking Azer­ baijani regiments and several of their Turkish officers and appealed both to Azerbaijan and to the Allied missions to effect an immediate withdrawal.3637 With the Zangezur crisis threatening to envelop all three Transcauca­ sian states, Allied representatives and the Georgian government at­ tempted to halt the hostilities. On November 4, while Georgian regiments were still trying to put down Bolshevik risings in several districts, Foreign Minister Gegechkori cautioned the neighboring states that resorting to arms “would undoubtedly have a ruinous influence on the common fate of the young republics, the existence of which has not received as yet international recognition, and would only add one link more to the chain of events, which the common enemies of the Transcaucasian Republics use in order to discredit them in the eyes of the civilised world.”38 The Erevan government quickly replied that it would entertain any suggestion, but it pointed out the duplicity of Azerbaijan in planning a bilateral conference even as orders were being issued for the invasion of Zangezur.39 36 Avo [Tumayan], ed., Nzhdeh (Beirut, 1968), pp. 79-86, 311-315; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1649; Stemel, “Garegin Nzhdehe Zangezurum,” Hairenik Amsagir, XLI (Jan. 1963), 17- 1937 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69a! 1a, Khatisian to Azerbaijani diplomatic representative, Nov. 12, 1919, no. 4794. Copies of Armenian appeals to Wardrop, Nonancourt, Poidebard, Gabba, Rhea, and other foreign officials in Erevan and Tiflis are in File 3/3. When news of the crisis reached the Foreign Office in London, George Kidston wrote: “We might suggest to the Peace Delegation that the Supreme Council should warn the Azerbaijan Delegates of the folly of flouting the Conference—but with the example of Fiume before them the warning may fall flat.” FO 371/3664, 150601/1015/58. The Foreign Office did forward Kidston’s suggestion to the British delegation in Paris, but Eyre Crowe replied that the Supreme Council had little knowledge of the region and that warnings alone seemed to be futile and “amuse nobody.” FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20763. 38 FO 371/3673, 168740/168734/58 ends.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66/2, Gegechkori's no. 8248, Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 52. 39 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 9/9, Armenian Foreign Ministry to Gegechkori, Nov. 12,

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Despite their reservations about each other, the British and American representatives in the Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop and James Rhea, were driven to collaborate by the urgent appeals and the prospect of another calamitous little war. On November 13 they sent to Baku and Erevan warnings that both countries would suffer at the Paris Peace Conference unless the bloodshed ceased at once.40The response from Erevan, though again criticizing Azerbaijan for its perfidy, stated that Armenia was still willing to meet at the conference table.41 On November 16 Wardrop reported to London that the Armenians, having apparently scored an early victory, were disposed to accept a truce before the contest turned against them. They were certainly not blameless, having provoked the Tatars with harsh treatment and agitated Azerbaijani public opinion by turning thousands of Muslims into refugees. The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, incited by Nuri Pasha and other notorious Turks, hoped to seize Zangezur by a coup de main, but Premier Usubbekov could hardly have been a party to this venture.42 In his capacity as acting Allied high commissioner, Colonel Rhea ad­ dressed a strongly worded summons to Khatisian and Usubbekov on November 16. Chiding both about the continued warfare and the negative worldwide impression being created, Rhea demanded that they meet with him on November 20. The message concluded, “I expect a reply from you so that I can inform the Peace Conference.” For the first time since the outbreak of the fighting, the promptness of Azerbaijan equaled that of Armenia in responding.43Since the setback in Zangezur was now common knowledge, Usubbekov accepted Rhea’s invitation and admitted the involvement of regular army units. He explained that because Armenia had fomented an insurrection the Azerbaijani government had to assist Governor-General Sultanov in dealing with the Bolshevik-inclined rebels, preventing further destruction, and repatriating refugees. In deference 1919. Copies of the same message, together with related communications to the Azerbaijani foreign minister and Allied representatives, are in File 66/2 and File 69a! 1a. See also Georgian Archives, Box 22, books 52, 61. 40 FO 371/3664, 152410/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20387 end. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 66/2. 41 Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 9/9, 66/2, 105/4, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t: Hushagrer. 42 FO 371/3665, 155114/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20387 end. See also FO 371/3665, 154757/1015/58. On November 11 Shahmazian reported that, although his men had won the battle in Zangezur, immediate reinforcements were needed to consolidate the victory, as the enemy, “having a government at its back,” would not readily accept the defeat as permanent. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69a/ 1a, Shahmazian’s no. 10. 43 FO 371/3665, 155083/1015/58; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 69aJ 1a; Bor'ba, Nov. 21, 1919. As late as November 17 Foreign Minister Jafarov denied the Azerbaijani action in Zangezur. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 690/10, telegram, Nov. 17, 1919.

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to Colonel Rhea, Sultanov was being instructed to suspend the operation, which as a matter of fact had already ceased.44 Azerbaijani newspapers and information bureaus minimized the scope of the armed encounters and claimed that the government, for the sake of improving relations with Armenia, had not pursued the rebels, even though the question of Zangezur was a purely internal matter.45Armenian agencies retorted that both General Cory and Colonel Haskell had confirmed the right of the Zangezur council to administer the region, that as Azerbaijani authority had never existed in the county there could not be a rebellion against it, and that labeling the local Armenians as Bolsheviks was beyond comprehension. The American liaison officers in Karabagh and Zangezur could testify that Azerbaijan had violated the provisional arrangements by attempting to take Goris by force of arms, a truth that even Usubbekov had not denied in his answer to Colonel Rhea.46 The Truce Azerbaijan’s military reverses and Armenia’s strategy to capitalize on the situation brought Usubbekov and Khatisian to Tiflis on November 19. Greeted with much fanfare by Georgian officials and members of the diplomatic corps, the two prime ministers paid separate courtesy calls, were hosted at dinner by Colonel Rhea, and then accompanied Gegech­ kori and Rhea to a performance of the Georgian opera Abesolom and Etheri,47 The similarity in bearing, dress, and looks of the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani leaders again made it difficult to realize that they represented peoples harboring deep grudges and engaged in mutual repressions. The formal meetings began in Rhea’s office on November 20 and lasted for four days. Although Usubbekov and Khatisian pledged their respec­ tive governments to nonviolent solutions and accepted Rhea as arbiter of the truce, their draft terms revealed significant differences. Usubbekov 44 RG 256, 861K.00/116/117; FO 371/3665, 156928/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20387 end.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 9/9, Usubbekov’s no. 7518; Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bryan to Bristol, Nov. 24, 1919, end.; Hairenik, Jan. 4:1, 1920. 46 See especially Azerbaidzhan, Nov. 20, 22, 1919, reiterating the view that the question of Zangezur was an issue pertaining to the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and was not to be a subject of international negotiation. See also the intensely anti-Armenian editorial position of the Georgian National Democrat newspaper, Obnovlenie, Oct.-Nov. 1919. 46 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 9/9, Khatisian’s no. 4946; RG 59, 860J.01/180 end.; Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bryan to Bristol, Nov. 24, 1919, end. 47 FO 371/3673, 168740/168734/58; La Géorgie Indépendante, Nov. 25:5, 1919.

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proposed that Azerbaijani regiments retire from Zangezur and the Ar­ menian government recall all troops, officers, instructors, and commis­ sars, level trenches and fortifications, and confiscate artillery, machine guns, and other arms of “a special military character” from the local population. Both governments would assist in the opening of roads and the return of refugees, and neither would forcibly subdue any other district that had not yet recognized its jurisdiction. All remaining issues would be referred to a general conference to be held in Baku.48 The Azerbaijani strategy did not escape Khatisian and his advisers. Inasmuch as the Azerbaijani army had already been ousted from Zan­ gezur, Usubbekov’s plan would impose unilateral restrictions upon the Armenians. Having established control in Lenkoran and Karabagh, Azer­ baijan would now accede to the status quo in Zangezur and then use this move as a concession in an effort to safeguard Vedibasar, Zangibasar, and other Muslim districts within Armenia. Khatisian therefore responded that there was no parallel between the status of Zangezur and that of the enclaves near Erevan. Everything possible was being done to resolve the latter problem, but it was essentially an internal matter unrelated to the present discussions. Furthermore, without guarantees of nonaggression, the people of Zangezur would not disarm. Because the bashi-bazouks of Sharur-Nakhichevan were a constant source of agitation in Zangezur, the truce should endorse Haskell’s program for an American-supervised ad­ ministration in the lower Araxes valley. Azerbaijan, moreover, should be required to honor the terms of the Karabagh compromise, which limited the size and location of military garrisons. The Armenian government agreed that roads to and within Zangezur should be reopened but main­ tained that the refugee question should be left to the forthcoming Armeno-Azerbaijani conference. Since the refugees from Zangezur had fled over a two-year period rather than just during the recent conflict, their repatriation could not be considered unless adequate arrangements were also made for Armenian refugees from Sharur-Nakhichevan and for the destitute victims in Nukhi and other despoiled areas. And while Ar­ menia had initially consented to send a delegation to Baku, it would now be better for psychological reasons to begin the conference in Tiflis and later transfer it, if need be, to Baku or Erevan. During Khatisian’s exposi­ tion, Usubbekov interjected comments of his own: circumstances in Zan­ gezur and Vedibasar were analogous; action on refugees was imperative since that problem lay at the core of the dispute; the projected neutral zone in Sharur-Nakhichevan had nothing to do with a truce in Zangezur; 48 FO 371/3666, 168733/1015/58 end.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 690/10, File 3/3.

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the conference should not be moved from Baku because the Azerbaijani cabinet had not yet completed its reorganization and appointees would be unable to leave the country for some time.49 Colonel Rhea, as arbiter, stressed the need to focus on the immediate crisis and postpone discussion of other issues. An acceptable compromise, omitting disarmament, refugees, immunity of semiautonomous enclaves, and the status of Karabagh and Sharur-Nakhichevan, was finally reached on November 23. The document, basically a declaration of intent, was signed by the two prime ministers with Rhea and Gegechkori as witnesses: This agreement, made and concluded at Tiflis this twenty-third day of Novem­ ber, Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, by and between Prime Minister Khatisian, representing the Government of Armenia, and Prime Minister Ussubekoff, repre­ senting the Government o f Azerbaidjan, witnesseth: 1. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not resort again to force of arms; 2. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan agree to take effective measures for repairing and re-opening, for peaceful traffic, the roads leading into Zangezur; 3. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan pledge themselves to settle all controversies, including boundaries, by means of peaceful agreements pending the decision of the conference convened in the following paragraph. In case this is not possible, then to select a neutral party as arbiter, whose decisions both Governments agree to abide by, said neutral party for the present being Colonel James C. Rhea, United States Army; 4. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan pledge themselves to immediately appoint an equal number of delegates to meet in conference in Baku on Wednesday, November 26th, and to adjourn to Tiflis on December 4th, where the meetings of the conference will continue, unless by common agreement, they are transferred elsewhere. This conference will discuss all questions which are the cause of dispute or friction between the two Governments and will have full authority to settle all such questions by agreement or arbitration; 5. That this agreement becomes effective on the date of signing and becomes permanent when ratified by the Parliaments of the two Governments, and the Prime Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaidjan hereby bind their respective Govern­ ments to faithfully support and carry out all the details o f the above agreement, in evidence of which they place their respective signatures to this agreement, in triplicate, in English and Russian, one copy of such being delivered to the represen­ tatives of the Allied High Commissioner, one of each to the Prime Minister of Armenia, and one of each to the Prime Minister o f Azerbaidjan.60 49 Ibid. See also RG 59, 860J.01/180 end. 60 Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 3/3, 8/8, 69a! 1a; Georgian Archives, Box 26, book 65, Box 24, books 29, 35; RG 256, 181.9402/3; FO 608/79,342/1/12/21114 end.; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 5, Dec. 3, 1919; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 67 bis. The agreements are paraphrased in Paris Peace Conference, IX, 606, and British Documents, II, 569 570 -

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An elaborate banquet at the Hotel d’Orient followed the ceremonies. Upon the proposal of toastmaster (tamada) David Ghambashidze,51 the glasses were first raised in honor of Usubbekov and Khatisian and then repeatedly refilled to salute Gegechkori, Ramishvili, Rhea, Wardrop, de Nonancourt, Gabba, and other dignitaries. Rhea drank to the “glory and prosperity” of Transcaucasia; Khatisian and Usubbekov voiced their trust that the young republics stood at the threshold of a new era of co­ operation. Drawing attention to the recent improvement in ArmenoGeorgian affairs and the enthusiastic welcome given the first through train from Tiflis to Erevan after the transit treaty of November 3, Khatisian declared that the Armenian government and the Dashnaktsutiun were fully resolved to establish close, lasting bonds with the Azerbaijani democracy. Usubbekov replied he had always believed that two peoples who had lived and suffered together for a thousand years could settle any existing political differences amicably.52 Oliver Wardrop happily reported to the Foreign Office that all the speakers had stressed the reliance of the Transcaucasian peoples on the Western powers, especially Great Britain and America, for sympathy, protection, and guidance. Though boasting of his own role in bringing the prime ministers together, the British chief commissioner explained that Rhea had acted as the direct intermediary because the American officer could use language sterner than Wardrop deemed prudent for himself. As a staunch advocate of the permanent separation of the Caucasus from Russia and of an enduring British presence in the region, Wardrop was delighted with the unequivocal pronouncements of Khatisian and Usub­ bekov regarding national independence and their solemn pledges to do everything in their power to abide by the truce.53 Colonel Rhea also enjoyed a glowing sense of accomplishment. In dis­ patches to the Department of State, the Paris Peace Conference, and the Near East Relief, he emphasized that this agreement was the first ever concluded between Armenians and Tartars (Azerbaijanis). Optimistic that relief could now be provided in previously inaccessible areas, he requested 61 Ghambashidze, a nonsocialist and the former secretary of the British Russian Chamber of Commerce, had been the unofficial Georgian diplomatic representative in London since March 1919. British correspondence regarding Ghambashidze is in FO 371/3661-3662, 41293/53708/58006/59790/68936/1015/58, and FO 608/88, File 356/2/3. One of his studies, intended to attract the interest and support of financial and industrial circles, is entitled Mineral Resources of Georgia and Caucasia (London, 1919). In 1918 and early 1919, before the arrival of the Georgian peace delegation in Paris, Ghambashidze, together with Konstantin Gvardjaladze and Zurab Avalov (Avalashvili), had represented Georgian interests in Great Britain and France. See Georgian Archives, Box 25, especially books 1, 3, 5, 6. 62 FO 371/3673, 168740/168734/58 end.; Erkir, Dec. 16:1, 1919. 53 FO 371/3665, 162833/1015/58 (British Documents, III, 662-663).

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additional supplies for some 10,000 destitute persons at Nukhi and almost 60,000 refugees around Shushi. Muslim refugees, too, were to be assisted, and it was important to earn the goodwill of the Azerbaijani authorities so as to facilitate relief work.54 Public announcements of the truce elicited a rare chord of unanimity and commendation. In Georgia, the press lauded the statesmanship of Gegechkori and his aides, and the Constituent Assembly congratulated the Armenian and Azerbaijani legislatures that a rapprochement between the two peoples was now within sight; this achievement would prepare the way for a durable peace and would form a unifying bond among all the democratic elements of Transcaucasia.55 Newspapers in Azerbaijan and Armenia portrayed the agreement as a symbol of hope, although the Musavat journals insisted that Azerbaijan had suspended its military operations only for the sake of improving relations, and the Dashnakist press observed that the truce included only half steps but would be honored by Armenia so long as Azerbaijan did not try to inflict the fate of Karabagh on Zangezur. After returning to Erevan, Khatisian told Parliament that his cabinet’s policy of peace had begun to bear results, first in the dual treaties with Georgia and now in the protocol signed by himself and the Azerbaijani chief of state. Both neighboring governments had come to realize that the stability of Armenia was essential for their own survival. It was not unreasonable, therefore, to look forward to a genuine working relationship among the three sister republics.56

The Aftermath These exchanges among the Transcaucasian heads of government had little effect on rival partisan groups in the disputed territories. During the latter half of November, Colonel Halil Bey’s mounted units resumed their raids along the perimeter of Daralagiaz at Arpa, Rind, Ainazur, Khachik, Ses, Sultanbek, Pashalu, and Nors-Mazra. Halil, notifying General Karabekir in Erzerum that he was committed to helping the Azerbaijani 54 Bristol Papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Rhea for Logan, Nov. 29, 1919. See also RG 59, 860J.01/180; RG 256, 181.9402/13. 56 FO 371/3773, 168739/168734/58 end. The Georgian government issued a long statement outlining the steps it had taken to resolve the Zangezur crisis since November 4. The English and French résumés of this document are in the Georgian Mail (Tiflis), Dec. 3:1, 1919, and La Géorgie Indépendantey Nov. 30:1-6, 1919 (copies in FO 371/3773, 168739/168740/168734/ 58). See alsoÆor’&a, Nov. 21, 1919. 56 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 17:3, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 105/4.

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army occupy Zangezur, asked that ammunition stored at Bayazit be turned over to officers he was sending there with transport vehicles. Karabekir granted the request, instructing 11th Division Commander Hilmi Bey to provide all necessary assistance.57 Neither this support nor the dispatch of additional Turkish “deserters” was sufficient, however, to prevent the Armenians from beating back the sporadic attacks on Daralagiaz and expelling Muslim combatants from their last positions in the mountains. At the same time the Dilijan detachment apprehended several Azerbaijani officers trying to organize bands of irregulars around Bashkend and returned them to Kazakh with a reprimand mocking the “childish antics” of the Azerbaijani military authorities.58 In central Zangezur, meanwhile, Armenian partisans gathered around the vale of Geghvadzor, which cut between the Barkushat and Meghri subranges and separated Ghapan from Tatev. Nzhdeh brought up the Ghapan and Genvaz units to the slopes of Mount Khustup and the mines, as the Darabas and Tatev companies in the north moved out from Maldash to strike from the opposite direction. The explosions of barrel bombs on December 1 signaled the opening of the campaign, but the Muslim defenders held the Darabas, Tatev, and Genvaz columns at bay for three days and nearly isolated the main Ghapan force. These reverses deepened Nzhdeh’s resentment of officials in Goris, who had limited his allocation of arms and ammunition with the excuse that a state of readiness also had to be maintained along the external fronts. He was further distressed when a mountain gun hand-carried from Goris and reassembled on the battlefield overturned on the first volley, smashing the sights and firing bolt. Nonetheless, before dawn on the fourth day of the operation, the partisans managed to slip behind the commanding Muslim positions and, after a barrage of barrel bombs, to capture Shahardjik at the head of Geghvadzor and to hoist the Armenian flag over the ruins of the Davit Bek fortress. By nightfall the next day the Ghapan and Genvaz detachments converged at Geghi in the heart of the vale, while Colonel Shahmazian’s wing descended from the north. On December 7 the last Muslim village, Adjibadj, was pillaged and put to flames. The “cleansing” process moved steadily forward under the Dashnakist band leaders, the terrified Muslim population scattering into the mountain recesses or fleeing toward Nakhi­ chevan and the Hakaru valley.59 The Armenian aggression provoked angry Azerbaijani denunciations. 57 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 413-414. See also Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 61. 58 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Report no. 2, for Sept. 20-Dec. 25, 1919, and Svodka no. 6, Nov. 20, 1919; FO 371/3666, 168733/1015/58 end.; Near East News, Dec. 6:2,812, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 17:3, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 22:2, 1920. 59 Avo, op. cit., pp. 84-88, 316-323; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8.

Khosrov Bek Sultanov urged his government to take up arms, since Ar­ menian regulars with machine guns and cannons had just overrun the Geghi district and devastated more than 400 hearths in nine villages. After Foreign Minister Jafarov had included this information in his protest to the Allied missions in Tiflis, Usubbekov wrote Haskell, Wardrop, and Gegechkori that Azerbaijan would have to intervene unless the heavy weapons were confiscated and all terms of the truce enforced.60 Returning to the Caucasus on December 3, William Haskell faced a plethora of complaints. He was particularly upset that the proposed American governorship in Sharur-Nakhichevan had not been imple­ mented. Even though he blamed Halil Bey and the Azerbaijanis, he also held Colonel Rhea responsible and seemed to resent his initiative in han­ dling the Zangezur crisis. In Constantinople, Admiral Bristol had com­ plained to Haskell that Rhea and other Americans in Tiflis could not distinguish between fact and propaganda, since they had swallowed the Armenian line about a Turkish-Azerbaijani master plan to unite over the Karabagh—Zangezur—Nakhichevan land bridge.61 But Bristol himself had been taken in by Karabekir’s precautionary transfer of troops beyond the border in the guise of deserters: “I do not believe that the forces that were to attack Zangezour from Nakhichevan were commanded by Regular Turkish officers; however, I have no doubt that there were Turkish deserters, officers and men, in this force.” The British were really to blame, for they had first backed one side and then the other, whereas the Caucasian races, like the Greeks, thought it quite proper to kill, rob, and oust all other peoples.62 Whether or not Bristol’s appraisal of Rhea in­ fluenced Haskell, the relationship between the Allied high commissioner and his chief of staff became so strained that Rhea resigned a week after Haskell’s return and severed his connections with the American relief agencies.63 In response to Azerbaijani protests regarding Zangezur, Haskell prom­ ised to send officers to investigate the allegation that Armenian regulars had been involved.64 Advising the Erevan government that the charge, if proven true, would be a “most heavy blow” to the future of Armenia, he demanded the recall of any military personnel or matériel being sent to 60 FO 371/3665-3666, 162554/164660/1015/58; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 18:3, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 23, books 65, 68. 61 See especially Bristol’s correspondence for November and December 1919, in Box 31 and in the files on Armenia and the Caucasus, Boxes 65-66. 62 Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bristol to Haskell, Dec. 3, 17, 1919. 63 RG 59, 867.00/1100; Bristol Papers, Box 1, Diary, Dec. 20, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 16:3, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 22:2, 1920. Lieutenant Colonel Edmund L. Daley replaced Rhea as Haskell’s chief of staff. 64 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 18:3, 1919.

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Zangezur and a full accounting.65 Khatisian repeatedly professed that his cabinet was committed to the conditions of the truce but admitted to protective measures in Daralagiaz against 2,000 assailants in November. He claimed, however, that no army regulars were stationed in Zangezur and that to his knowledge no fighting had taken place after the terms of the truce had reached the highland. Should an investigation prove otherwise, all implicated officials would be punished. Khatisian also pointed out that Azerbaijan’s modus operandi was to keep silent during its offensive operations and then to let out a howl of distress when its armies encountered effective resistance. The turmoil, he declared, would cease only after a provisional American governorship had been established in Sharur-Nakhichevan and the Azerbaijani strategists had abandoned the conspiracy to seize Zangezur.66 Captain Gracey again supported Armenian contentions in responding to Wardrop’s directive to scold the Erevan leaders for the violations. Military action after the truce had been prompted by Muslim attacks in Daralagiaz, and the use of heavy arms in Zangezur was not attributable to the regular army, for those weapons had been distributed to the parti­ sans by Andranik in 1918 with the sanction of the British liaison officer. In any event, no new incidents had been reported since the first week of December.67 Armenian political journalists, too, had their say. Even though an Ar­ menian delegation had departed for Baku, the hope of reconciliation was dim so long as the Azerbaijani leaders remained subservient to bloody “Red Sultanov” and Turkish lords such as Nuri and Halil. Trying to conceal the defeat by a handful of partisans in Zangezur, they were now circulating fantastic tales about a regular Armenian army attacking de­ fenseless Muslim villages. Only after the Azerbaijani politicians had cut the strings manipulated by the Turkish puppeteer pashas would a lasting settlement be possible.68 Apparently to placate Haskell and Wardrop, the Armenian government recalled Zangezur general commissioner Arsen Shahmazian in December, assigning his military responsibilities to General H. Kazarov (Ghazarian) 66 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, File 8/8, Haskell’s no. 342. 66 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 16:2, 1919. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, Armenian Foreign Ministry to Haskell, no. 5236; FO 371/3666, 169422/1015/58 end., Armenian foreign minister to Gracey, no. 5393, Dec. 12, 1919. 67 FO 371/3666, 165182/1015/58. See also FO 371/3660, 165450/512/58 end. 68 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 16:1, 1919. Captain Gracey, too, accused Khosrov Bek Sultanov of new intrigues. On December 12 he wrote: “I would again urge that steps should be taken tö have Sultanof removed from the region of Karabagh as he is a dangerous person. And our enemy.” See FO 371/3666, 169422/1015/58.

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and his civil duties to Sergei Melik-Yolchian. Kazarov was even instructed to determine whether there was any truth to the Azerbaijani allegations and if so to hold the transgressors accountable.69But even as Khatisian was informing the Allied representatives of these directives and once again denying that regular army units were in Zangezur, Dro, a revolutionary guerrilla fighter no less charismatic than Nzhdeh, rode up into the highland with an expeditionary force of 400 infantrymen, 300 sabers, 2 cannons, and 30 machine guns, not only to consolidate the Armenian hold there but also to prepare for the “emancipation” of Mountainous Karabagh and its incorporation into the Republic of Armenia.70 The Azerbaijani reversal in Zangezur was particularly disheartening to the Young Turk fugitives and their associates. In December, Khosrov Bek Sultanov wrote General Karabekir, under a cover letter by Halil Pasha, that the simultaneous advance into Zangezur from east and west had been suspended because of the menacing attitude of the White Army and the intercession of American representatives. Pressing their advantage, the Armenians had captured some twenty-five villages in the Geghi and Okhchichai valleys and had endangered the patriotic elements in Nakhi­ chevan. Sultanov and Halil asked Karabekir to help break the Zangezur barrier and relieve the national forces in Sharur-Nakhichevan by organiz­ ing diversions around Kars and Olti and providing at least 2,000 more Turkish enlisted men with officers, physicians, medical supplies, rifles, mountain guns, and ammunition. Although again releasing some matéri­ el, Karabekir judged conditions unsuitable for a major military diversion. He expressed deep resentment that Halil Pasha, as the Caucasus front commander in 1918, had spurned his requests at that time for enough troops to clear Nakhichevan and Zangezur of Armenians and other un­ friendly elements.71 The hardships of the Muslims of Sharur-Nakhichevan also aggravated the dissension among their leaders. Samed Bey Jamalinskii, the Azer­ baijani officer appointed to organize a semiautonomous administration, complained that Persian agents were trying to entice thousands of Muslim refugees across the Araxes River with offers of relief, assistance, and land. He called upon Usubbekov’s cabinet to send men and money to protect the district and aid the inhabitants, for, if a large number departed, the . Armenians would again occupy the Araxes valley and have easy access to Zangezur, thus imperiling all Azerbaijan. Jamalinskii accused Colonel Halil Bey of plotting against Azerbaijani officials and aspiring to become 69 FO 371/4953, E1569/134/58 end. See also FO 371/3660, 170799/512/58 end. 70 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1649. 71 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 413-414.

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a dictator. Plentiful funds and loyal troops were desperately needed to save the region from “this traitor Halil Bey and company.”72 For the Armenians the taste of military success, even on a small scale, was exhilarating. Praises sounded throughout the Armenian world for the valor of the small national army, which had given no heed to its own severe deprivations in defending the homeland. A committee representing civic, religious, cultural, and political societies was organized to honor the men under arms during a three-day period from December 19 to 21, desig­ nated as “Army Days.” Erevan commandant Arshavir Shahkhatuni, Social Democrat (“Specifist”) leader Davit Ananun, Anna Kalantarian of the Women’s Union, and Elisabeth Stamboltsian (Helen Biuzand) of the Young Ladies’ Circle directed the public campaign to collect money, tobacco, socks, and other gifts for the troops. Schoolchildren passed out lapel buttons to contributors, and socially prominent women served in restaurants and coffeehouses on days when net profits were earmarked for the fund.73 Inclement weather did not dampen public enthusiasm for the festivities on Army Days, which included rallies, concerts, lectures, student perfor­ mances, and nighttime illuminations. During a gala program in the parlia­ mentary chamber, Sirakan Tigranian reviewed the heroic role of the army in establishing and preserving the Republic, and Gerasim Balayan pointed to the contrast between the serf-recruits of the old regime and the new Armenian soldiers, who with the general public formed a single egalitari­ an class. The tribute to the army culminated in a military parade in front of City Hall, where from the reviewing stand Premier Khatisian con­ gratulated the gallant sons of the nation and thanked Parliament for sponsoring the celebration.74 Less elaborate programs were organized in many other towns and villages, and for weeks thereafter Armenian communities in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and even western Anatolia collected money to purchase gifts for compatriots defending the “Araratian republic.” The Armeno-Azerbaijani Conference The bilateral conference proposed by Khatisian on October 7, accepted by Jafarov on October 26, postponed by the Zangezur conflict, and re72 Adrbedjani pastatghtere, pp. 48-50, Jamalinskii’s nos. 100, 200, Akhverdov’s no. 89, Usubbekov’s no. 153. 73 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 14:3, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 24:4, 1920. 74 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 23:2, 24:2, 26:2, 1919; Erkir, Dec. 18:2, 1919; Hairenik, Feb. 28:4, March 5:1, 1920.

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scheduled for November 26 finally convened in Baku on December 14. The last delay was in part attributable to the recurrent hostilities and the advisability of waiting until the second congress of the Turkic Federalist Musavat party, December 2—11, 1919, had ended.78 That congress failed to reconcile the underlying differences between the progressive, urban intellectuals and the landed khans and beks, but Musavat founder Rasulzade managed to push through a resolution endorsing in principle a Caucasian confederation. He argued that confederation would not only mean economic and political advantages for all constituent republics but would also facilitate the creation of a large Azerbaijani Turkic state. The Azerbaijani delegation was instructed to broach the topic during the forthcoming conference with the Armenians.76 The first plenary session of that conference was presided over by For­ eign Minister Mohammed Iusuf Jafarov. Admitting that previous Trans­ caucasian conferences had been unable to resolve most of the complex regional problems, he was encouraged by the modest progress made in Transcaucasian interrelationships through recent bilateral treaties. The Khatisian-Usubbekov accord had inspired hope that the mutual desire for friendly relations would lead to productive deliberations. As head of the Azerbaijani delegation, Fathali Khan Khoiskii (who was to replace Jafarov as foreign minister a week later) added that only the closest association of the Caucasian peoples could save them from disruptive “international commotions” and domestic turmoil. “I have no doubt that to the freedomloving sons of the Caucasus the idea of independence is equally d ear.. . . We must guard our independence and this depends unconditionally on our ability to lay the foundation of a mutual understanding.” For Ar­ menia, Martiros Harutiunian, together with fellow delegates Tigran Bekzadian and Prince Argutinskii-Dolgorukii (Hovsep Arghutian), the latter then in Baku en route to Tehran as Armenia’s diplomatic representative, extended greetings to “the free nation of Azerbaijan” and declared that their people wanted only to live in peace and liberty. Political and geo­ graphic factors had condemned Armenia to inordinate suffering throughout history, but the Great Russian Revolution of 1917 presented the opportunity for peoples to determine their own destinies as cultural units. The Armenians, now demanding freedom and independence, real75 The congress was given extensive coverage in the central committee’s organ, Azerbaidzhan, Russian and Turkish editions, December 1919. 76 FO 371/3666, 169427/1015/58; Bor’ba, Dec. 19, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 21:3-4, 1919. The new central committee selected by the congress included Mehmed Emin Rasulzade, Nasib Bek Usubbekov, Hasan B. Aghaev (Aghazade), Mahmed Hasan Hajinskii, Shafi Bek Rustambekov, and Mehdi Bek Hajinskii. The committee was given the right to co-opt two additional members; one of them was to be Mustafa Vekilov Rafiev. See Ashkhatavor, Dec. 17:3, 1919.

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ized that only through harmonious relations with their neighbors could this goal be attained. The liberty of one republic in Transcaucasia was impossible without the freedom of all, and it was in this spirit that the Armenian delegation approached the labors of the conference.77 Despite these optimistic expressions, the conference did no more than formulate an incomplete agenda during its three private working sessions. At the first meeting on December 15, it became apparent that the positions of the two sides had not changed. The conference priorities, Harutiunian suggested, should be agreements on a temporary demarcation line, the refugee situation, and a trade and railway convention, as these accords would foster an atmosphere conducive to negotiation of more difficult problems. Unwilling to relinquish Azerbaijan’s economic and logistic ad­ vantages without gaining territorial concessions, Khan Khoiskii and his colleagues, Mahmed Hasan Hajinskii and V. R. Vekilov, pressed for a permanent boundary settlement, since the Khatisian-Usubbekov protocol had in essence already established a temporary demarcation line. More­ over, secondary issues would either disappear or become less critical if a regional confederation were formed. Bekzadian replied that, as neither side was prepared to accept the territorial views of the other, it would be more productive to concentrate on areas of possible understanding. Harutiunian added that the principle of confederation, which was in conformity with the platform of the party Dashnaktsutiun, could not hold a “firm place” on the agenda until after independence had been guaran­ teed to the Transcaucasian republics by international treaty. Further­ more, as Georgia would have to take part in any such deliberations, bilateral discussions on confederation would be premature.78 Although the Armenian government was willing to give lip service to the ideal of ultimate confederation, its true attitude was one of aloofness, since the Azerbaijani project would include the Muslim Mountaineer lands of Daghestan and the North Caucasus and especially since the Armenian state was expected to spread westward far beyond the historic and geographic bounds of Transcaucasia. Nonetheless, at the second working session on December 19, Harutiunian announced that his delega­ tion, despite its reservations, would not object to airing the principle of confederation and that the territorial controversy could also be listed on the agenda. The Armenian delegates then put the Azerbaijani spokesmen 11Bulletin d Informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 8 (Feb. 1, 1920), 3—4; Ashkhatavort Dec. 18:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 690/10; FO 371/3660, 170799/512/58 end.; FO 371/36653666, 162985/169426/1015/58. 78 Bulletin d'informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 9 (Feb. 15, 1920), 1-2; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 690/1 a.

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on the defensive by asking what proposals they would make regarding confederation and permanent frontiers. Hajinskii replied uneasily that no explicit statement could be made on either subject. He fell back on Harutiunian’s own argument that it might be better to refer the confederation issue to a general Transcaucasian gathering. As no further progress was made at the third private meeting on December 20, the two sides agreed on a procedure for the second plenary session. The Azerbaijani delegation would introduce the topic of confederation and the Armenian delegation, expressing interest in the concept, would suggest that the conference be interrupted for consultations and then resume in Tiflis with the participa­ tion of Georgia.79 The ritual was enacted on December 21. Harutiunian first reported that the conference agenda was to include a trade and railway convention, refugee affairs, the territorial dispute, and legal and political matters such as a consular treaty and the regulation of the status of citizens of one republic residing in the other. Khan Khoiskii then interjected that the complicated racial problems in the Caucasus could be reduced through a political-economic union or, more precisely, a confederation of inde­ pendent governments. Harutiunian, in his turn, reiterated the Armenian position, observing that the trade and transit treaties between his country and Georgia had markedly improved political relations even though the boundary feud had not yet been resolved. It would be advisable, he said, to recess at this point so that the delegations could consult with their respective governments and then to reconvene in Tiflis in parallel gather­ ings: a general Transcaucasian assembly to discuss confederation and bilateral meetings to deal with specific items. With that understanding the conference recessed.80 Harutiunian, in reporting to his government, blamed the impasse on Azerbaijan’s failure to make definite proposals on boundaries and confederation while at the same time rejecting the Ar­ menian idea of starting with less complex issues. Nonetheless, his delega­ tion had been treated with extreme courtesy and Usubbekov’s cabinet had followed the proceedings with genuine interest.81 The recess of the Armeno-Azerbaijani conference on December 21 actually marked its adjournment as the parallel tri- and bilateral confer­ ences scheduled for Tiflis did not materialize. Although representatives of the three governments would have other occasions to confer, those ™ Ibid. 80 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 227, Dec. 25, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 25:2, 1919; Bulletin d'informations de [’Azerbaïdjan, no. 9 (Feb. 15, 1920), 2—3; FO 371/3666, 166824/1015/

58. 81 Haradj, Jan. 9:2, 1920. See also Ashkhatavor, Dec. 23:3-4, 1919.

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meetings were to be largely in reaction to the disorders, bloodshed, and insurrections that loomed on the Caucasian horizons of 1920. The Doom of Akulis Even as the Baku conference called for an end to fighting and for peaceful litigation of disputes, the destruction of Lower and Upper Akulis (Agulis) in the Goghtan district had begun. With a population of no more than 20,000 and comprising the village clusters of Upper Aza, Bilav, Tevi, Vanand, and Akulis, Goghtan was shaped like a triangle, its base along the Araxes lowlands near Ordubad and its apex in the north at Mount Damurri-dagh, between Zangezur and Nakhichevan. The district had been re­ nowned since pre-Christian times as a cultural center. In particular, the walled town of Upper Akulis was noted for its richly furnished homes and handsome tapestries, for the stature and bearing of the indigenous dwell­ ers, and for the exquisite beauty and grace of the women, most of whom were highly literate and conversant in the arts. The people of Akulis had long maintained a productive symbiotic relationship with their Muslim neighbors, the merchant (khoja ) class playing a fundamental role in the commerce of Ordubad, Nakhichevan, and the trans-Araxes Persian khanates.82 During the Turkish invasion in 1918, most villages in Goghtan resisted and were pillaged; nine mountainous settlements managed to hold out until the end of the war. Extremely vulnerable because of its proximity to Ordubad, Akulis was spared through swift submission to the Turkish commandant. Thereafter, as in the past, the leaders of Akulis accommo­ dated themselves to whatever authority held sway in Ordubad and Nakhi­ chevan. When Armenia’s jurisdiction was extended to include Sharur-Nakhichevan in the spring of 1919, Akulis became the administra­ tive center of the Goghtan subregion under commissar Ashot MelikMusian and militia chief Movses Giulnazarian. But the Muslim rising in the summer months again isolated Goghtan. As Muslim partisans ad­ vanced upon the mountain strongholds, Akulis pledged fidelity to the newly appointed commissar (kaimakam) of Ordubad, Abbas Guli Bey Tairov, and was in return guaranteed absolute inviolability.83 On August 3, while defiant settlements near Akulis were being over­ powered and the large village of Tsghna (Chananab) wavered toward 82 For a series of feature articles on Goghtan, written by Hakob Ter-Hakobian (Irazek), see Haradjy Jan. 24:1, 28:4, 30:3, Feb. 4:1, 1920. 83 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 130, Sept. 6, 1919; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, File 800, Evangulov to American Consul, no. 2543, Aug. 20, 1919; FO 371/4953, E 1569/134/58 end.; Vratzian, op. cit., pp. 305—306.

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submission, Melik-Musian, Giulnazarian, and the Goghtan National Council addressed an appeal to the Armenian cabinet and legislature in Erevan and to Armenian representatives and national councils in Goris, Ghapan, and Genvaz. Nakhichevan had fallen, it was reported, and the Araxes was filled with mutilated bodies. After a brief resistance the inhab­ itants of several villages in Nakhichevan had withdrawn in good order and taken refuge in Goghtan, but this district, too, was now in extreme danger. Tanakert (Danagirt) was already invested, and Halil Bey left no doubt that he meant to eliminate Armenian Goghtan. The appeal concluded: “For the love of God, show us the way to salvation. With our own means we can maintain the present situation for ten or fifteen days at most. Death is no longer feared, for it is now the second year that we have reconciled ourselves to that fate. Goghtan will meet a heroic death, but let the entire world know that this time it is our own government at Erevan which has brought us to death’s door. Goghtan can be saved if at least 400 dedicated soldiers arrive immediately to help us.”84 With Muslim unrest spreading to Surmalu and Kars, all the Armenian government could do was to send Nzhdeh in August to coordinate the defense and to have Bash-Garni partisan chieftain Ghazar Kocharian (“Kechel Ghazar”) organize a small relief detachment, which set out from Erevan early in September and reached Goghtan a month later via the circuitous Daralagiaz-Zangezur route. By then the settlements of Tana­ kert, Kaghaki (Kialaki), Disar, and Handamedj (Andamich) had been devastated, and only the northern villages of Bist, Alahi, Paraka, Naservaz, Ramis (Urmis), and Tsghna remained free. Nzhdeh and MelikMusian were advised from Erevan that no additional assistance would be forthcoming and that the population should temporarily be withdrawn to Zangezur. Adamant in his belief that the loss of Goghtan would lay bare the mountain passes to Zangezur and irritated by officialdom’s lack of foresight, Nzhdeh did not impart the government’s instructions to the Goghtan council. Instead he planned to reinforce the district with com­ mando units from Ghapan and Genvaz as soon as action in the Okhchichai and Geghvadzor valleys had been completed.85 Throughout the autumn of 1919 the inhabitants of Akulis, unable to venture out of the town and enervated by a dwindling food supply, lived in constant apprehension. They were cheered briefly on September 23 by the visit of Clarence Ussher and Carlton Ayer as representatives of Colo­ nel Haskell. The Americans distributed funds provided by the Armenian government and American relief agencies and at the request of local 84 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 26:3, 1919: Vratzian, op. cit., pp. 306-307. 88 Avo, op. cit., pp. 311-313; Vratzian, op. cit., p. 307.

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leaders reserved a share for the Muslim needy in the vicinity. Ussher described Akulis as a garden paradise, with the terraced orchards and vineyards of the upper town and its tidy homes and refined people who would “bring credit to cultured society anywhere.” If Armenia’s officials could be recruited from exemplary citizens of this type, the nation’s suc­ cess would be assured. Ussher reported that the walled inner town was capable of a vigorous defense, but the residents had acknowledged the Muslim administration in Nakhichevan, since that city was the logical seat of provincial government and the only outlet during the lengthy winter season. Yet, although Abbas Guli Bey had praised the peace-loving popu­ lation and sent officers from Ordubad to ward off Muslim intruders, the Armenians were hostages and would undoubtedly fall victim to reprisal for any future Tatar difficulties elsewhere. Having studied the conditions in Khanukhlar, Nakhichevan, and Akulis, Ussher and Ayer urged Has­ kell, just before his departure for Paris, to hasten the organization of an American-supervised zone in Sharur-Nakhichevan to prévent famine and new massacres.86 As predicted, Akulis paid the price of retribution. In November, during and after the Azerbaijani advance into Zangezur, Muslim partisans from Ordubad and Nakhichevan tried to occupy the mountainous villages of Goghtan and reopen the passes to central Zangezur. Led by Turkish officers, two columns attacked the perimeters of Bist—Alahi-Naservaz and Ramis, but Giulnazarian and Kocharian held firm and forced the parti­ sans to fall back. Meanwhile, Nzhdeh’s squads inflamed the Okhchichai and Geghvadzor vales. After these actions, which gave the Armenian units greater maneuverability, Nzhdeh prepared to lift the siege of Goghtan, convinced that he could even capture Ordubad and thus screen the entire western flank of Zangezur. The civil and military authorities in Goris rejected the plan, however, arguing that it was first necessary to secure the Barkushat chain and the imperiled routes leading into the Hakaru valley. Nzhdeh was outraged, but he had to obey orders and postpone the Gogh­ tan expedition, thus, he later claimed, sealing the fate of Akulis.87 On December 17-18 a Muslim mob, including refugees from Zangezur, sacked Lower Akulis, drove off the flocks, killed all Armenians falling into their hands, and sent the remainder fleeing to the upper town. Respond­ ing to urgent telephone appeals, Ordubad commandant Edif Bey, a Turkish captain who had served in the same capacity during the Ottoman occupation in 1918, attempted to calm the Armenians during a personal “ RG 256, 184.021/285; FO 371/3666, 178733/1015/58; FO 37i/4953>E1569/134/58 end. 87 Avo, op. cit.y pp. 324-325; Vratzian, op. cit., p. 307; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8.

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inspection on December 19. He promised to call in disciplined Turkish regulars, if necessary, from beyond the border at Bayazit or, if the situa­ tion became worse, to escort the population across the Araxes River into Persian territory or to a protected site in the Goghtan mountains. Nevertheless, the portents of doom increased. Armed groups appeared on every side and many unfamiliar Muslims entered the town. When menacing bands approached the gates on December 24, the Armenians again asked Edif Bey and Abbas Guli Bey Tairov to intervene. That afternoon Tairov and the Shi a sheikh of Ordubad arrived to disperse the crowd, but they soon reported that the troublemakers were rebels from other areas. Because looting and arson had begun in the outskirts of town, they advised the Armenians to seek safety in the small Muslim quarter beyond the stream flowing through Akulis. At dawn, as the pillaging and fires threatened the central quarters, Tairov returned to Ordubad. Short­ ly before noon he sent word that the Armenians would be conducted to another village, but upon learning that the escorts were to be headed by Sattar, a notorious cutthroat who had escaped from prison, the townspeo­ ple implored Edif Bey to honor his word and personally lead them to safety. The commandant, pleading the weight of other duties, admon­ ished the Armenians to obey orders. When the terrified inhabitants refused to leave their houses and hiding places, it seemed that all bonds of restraint were snapped. The gendar­ merie joined the Muslim mob in a pogrom, forcing the victims into the street and then firing volley after volley into their midst. By evening several hundred townspeople had been killed and a score of the most comely girls distributed to the gendarmes and partisan commanders. Edif Bey selected for himself the sixteen-year-old daughter of the prominent Panian family and took her to his quarters in Ordubad. On December 25, 1919, Armenian Akulis ceased to exist.88 Although the plunder of Lower Akulis had been reported to Erevan via Goris by Ashot Melik-Musian, the first news of the tragedy at Upper Akulis was received in a cryptic message sent over the Indo-European telegraph by Archbishop Nerses Melik-Tankian of Tabriz on December 31: “Akulis no longer figures on the map.” Four days later he added: “All massacred. Am prevented from communicating details.”89 Those details were later supplied by several survivors, including a justice of the peace, Ivan Ter-Antonian, who had hidden under a cot in the police station while 88 FO 371/3666, 177928/1015/58; FO 371/4954. E1904/134/58 end.; FO 371/5165, E1551/ 262/44, App. A; Haradj, Feb. 3:1, 1920. 89 Vratzian, op. cit., p. 309. See also FO 371/3666, 166170/1015/58\ Haradj, Jan. 13:2, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 61.

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the Armenian girls were being tormented. He identified by name Turkish and Azerbaijani officers and local Muslim notables who had participated in the carnage and furnished evidence that the military authorities had actually planned and directed the attack.90 A Time for More Words Although death and destruction had become commonplace in Anatolia and Caucasia, the fate of Akulis, the symbolic showplace of Armenian rural enlightenment and creativity, was a particularly demoralizing blow. In their protests and denunciations, political journalists declared that the Akulis disaster demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that not even unconditional submission to the Turkish lords could guarantee mere physical survival. The people of Akulis, deciding upon peaceful accommo­ dation, had asked nearby Armenian partisans not to operate around the town and had surrendered their arms; they had been rewarded with massacre. Akulis had fallen victim to the “Asiatic diplomacy” of the Azer­ baijani khans and beks, who talked of brotherhood and confederation even as they were carrying out their murderous schemes.91 For nearly a month the Azerbaijani government professed to have no knowledge of the assault and announced that measures had been taken to prevent such excesses. After the massacre had been confirmed by numerous sources and the Armenian government relayed the details to Baku with the claim that up to 400 people had been killed in Lower Akulis and more than 1,000 in Upper Akulis, Foreign Minister Khan Khoiskii admitted that disorders might have taken place despite efforts of the local authorities. On January 21 he gave assurances that an inquiry would be conducted. Should the Armenian allegations prove to be correct, any official involved in the violence would be punished and everything possi­ ble would be done to retrieve the abducted girls. It was necessary to add, however, that the source of the troubles had been Armenian outrages in Zangezur. Refugees from that district had suffered so intensely from exposure and famine that they had apparently lost control and sought relief in Lower Akulis and had then spilled into the upper town, where they took shelter in abandoned Armenian homes.92 90 Haradj, Jan. 30:1, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 31:2, 1920; Hairenik, March 18:2, 24:1, 1920; FO 371/4954» E 1904/134/58 end. 91 Ashkhatavor, Jan. 15:1, 1920; Haradj, Jan. 3:1, 14:1, Feb. 7:1-2, 1920. 92 FO 371/4953, E1569/134/58 encl.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66/2; Near East News, Jan. 15:3, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 14:3, 18:4, 22:2, 1920; Haradj, Jan. 7:2, 16:2, 1920.

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As Khan Khoiskii glossed over the embarrassing aspects of the Akulis affair, he issued a new round of protests regarding continued Armenian aggression in Zangezur. Although Khatisian could claim that Nzhdeh’s march through Geghvadzor early in December had occurred before terms of the November 23 truce had been received in Zangezur, that rationaliza­ tion could not hold true for the campaign against Muslim villages around Shurnukh, southeast of Goris.93 With the name of Akulis as their battle cry, Nzhdeh’s partisans overran more than twenty settlements on January 19, while General Kazarov’s Goris detachment seized the primary routes to the Hakaru valley.94 In response to Khan Khoiskii’s accusation that regular army units had helped destroy nine villages on the first day of that offensive and that more than forty hamlets had been wiped out since the truce, the Armenian government in turn disclaimed knowledge of such incidents, asked for additional details, and then promised to make inquiries and punish any wrongdoers.95 These claims and counterclaims made Allied representatives and even many Armenians and Azerbaijanis skeptical of reports about the relations of the two republics. While Wardrop and Haskell again sent warnings to Baku and Erevan and privately complained to their own governments that the underlying cause of unrest in the Caucasus was the failure of the Paris Peace Conference to announce an Eastern settlement, Georgian Foreign Minister Gegechkori proposed to his Azerbaijani and Armenian counter­ parts that the three of them confer in Tiflis on ways to stop the chronic fighting before scheduling the pending Transcaucasian conference. Khan Khoiskii and Khatisian, accepting the invitation, soon arrived in the Geor­ gian capital, reiterating the demands of the “democratic elements” for Transcaucasian harmony and the hope that the present difficulties would gradually give way to regional stability and prosperity.96 On January 22, 1920, after preliminary discussions, the three foreign ministers pledged to settle disputes by mutual agreement or compulsory arbitration, committed each republic to recognize the independence of the others, and 93 Bor'ba, Jan. 28:2,1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11^0371/3666,167946/1015/58; Near East News, Jan. 24:2, 1920. 94 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1649; Avo, op. cit.y pp. 89-90, 324-325, 480-484. 95 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, Khatisian to Khan Khoiskii, Jan. 22, 1920, no. 301, Khatisian to Bekzadian, Jan. 27, 1920, no. 480; FO 371/3666, 173678/1015/58; FO 371/4953, E1561/134/58; Haradj, Jan. 30:4, 1920; Bulletin d'informations de l'Azerbaïdjan, no. 12 (April 1920), 3-4; Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 61. 96 FO 371/3666, 169473/175433/1015/58; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66/2, Gegechkori to Armenian foreign minister, Dec. 31, 1919, no. 9937. A copy of this message is also in File 6 9 0 /1 0 .

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agreed on periodic tripartite consultations to deal with matters of common interest and potentially eruptive situations.97 As the new year began, Armeno-Azerbaijani relations were marked by brutalities in the field and noble declarations in the halls of government. Rather than simple deception, however, the contrast was more the result of coexisting and often conflicting short-range and long-range goals. It was not out of character for Transcaucasian leaders to believe sincerely that the future of the separate republics rested largely on their ability to resolve national differences, even as they condoned, rationalized, or ig­ nored the rancor of the men under arms. Nor was it hypocrisy that would prompt one foreign minister to congratulate another on some event of national importance just before or after he had formally protested an alleged act of aggression. This was the way, perhaps, of emergent states whose crippling rivalries did not blind them to the fact that they were inescapably interdependent and bound to a common fate. 97 Bor’ba,

Jan. 23:1, 1920; Haradj, Jan. 29:1, 3, 1920; Near East News, Feb. 3:4, 1920. On the day the protocol was signed, Khan Khoiskii protested to Khatisian about reports of renewed repression in Armenia. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, no. 301. At this time the Caucasian Regional Committee of the Russian Communist Party released a leaflet alerting the working masses that Khatisian, Khan Khoiskii, and Gegechkori had united in the battle against Bolshevism. In an effort to save themselves, they were following the old imperial policies of Golitsyn and Vorontsov-Dashkov by inciting one national element against another to cause massacres and thereby deflect the attention of the masses from the revolutionary struggle. But the masses of the Orient were awakening and would soon let the death blow fall on the “Transcaucasian bourgeois lackeys of the Entente.” See Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian uruagdser, ed. Ds. P. Aghayan et al. (Erevan, 1967), pp. 529 - 531 -

9

Partisan Politics

The platforms of all Armenian political societies were rendered obsolete by the world war, the collapse of empires, and the formation of small national republics in Transcaucasia. The need for reappraisal extended alike to the Russian Armenian parties (Social Revolutionary, Social Demo­ crat, and Populist), the Turkish Armenian parties (Reformed Hnchak and Sahmanadir Ramkavar), and those including both elements (Hnchak and Dashnaktsutiun). Although each approached the challenge from a differ­ ent historical and ideological perspective, all were uncertain about Allied policy, the outcome of the Russian civil war, and their own viability in the ultimate realignment of world and national forces. All parties, except for the affiliates of the multinational Russian socialist groups, soon adopted the goal of an independent, united Armenia, yet the two composed entire­ ly of Western Armenians refused to acknowledge the “Araratian republic” as the nucleus of that state. And the Dashnaktsutiun itself, despite its mass membership and its control of the Erevan government, faced perplexing problems: the contradictions between nationalism and socialism, regional particularism among its followers, and a widening rift between intellectu­ als and partisan chiefs. Nonetheless, both Dashnakist and anti-Dashnakist leaders, placing great importance on showing a solid front, began negotia­ tions for creation of a united Armenian cabinet, legislature, and peace delegation. The Constitutional Democrats The Turkish and Russian imperial regimes had not produced a favorable climate for liberal, democratic parties; instead, they had given impetus to revolutionary movements. Only after restoration of the Ottoman constitu­ tion in 1908 had the Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) 241

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party evolved on a platform of free enterprise and nonviolent, legal meth­ ods to attain Armenian personal and collective rights within the empire. Ramkavar intellectuals criticized Hnchaks and Dashnakists for their demonstrative tactics and their harangues about class warfare when the entire nation was suffering under foreign oppression. Yet the Ramkavars, in absorbing the Armenakan party and one faction of the Reformed Hnchak party, also inherited a militant tradition and did not rule out defensive armed preparedness.1 The Eastern Armenian Zhoghovrdakan (Populist or Popular Democrat) party, on the other hand, was more purely bourgeois and antirevolutionary. Organized in 1917 by adherents of the Russian Constitutional Democrat party, the Populists gained much greater support from the commercial and professional classes of Tiflis, Elisavetpol, and Baku than in the Armenian agrarian provinces.2 Nevertheless, from November 1918 to June 1919 the Dashnaktsutiun willingly shared power with the Populist party in order to attract the financial and industrial resources of the bourgeoisie and to demonstrate that the government was committed to moderate, republican principles. The Populists’ withdrawal from the coalition cabinet and their boycott of the parliamentary elections to protest the Act of United Armenia spread confusion among the party rank and file. The former minister of provisions, Kristapor I. Vermishian, and several other party notables opposed the action and called for a clear statement of policy, especially as Populist ministers had themselves signed the act. Most party members in Armenia were resentful, moreover, that the central committee remained in Tiflis instead of transferring to Erevan. The central committee, in turn, complained through its organ, Zhoghovrdi dzain (“People’s Voice”), that too many profiteers and political climbers were joining the organization, making it more an anti-Dashnakist club than a party dedicated to serving the Armenian people.3 It was significant that the second Zhoghovrdakan congress, in Septem­ ber 1919, was held in Erevan. Headed by Samson Harutiunian, Arshaluis Mkhitarian, and Grigor Ter-Khachatrian, the seventy delegates sent greetings to Catholicos Gevorg V, the Armenian army, and the two dele­ gations in Paris. They displayed an emphatic Western orientation by expressing deep admiration for the Allied Powers in a resolution that also 1 Manuk G. Jizmejian, Patmutiun amerikahai kaghakakan kusaktsutiants, 1890-1925 (Fresno, 1930), PP- 117-121, 168-272 passim, 513-516; Artak Darbinian, Hai azatagrakan sharzhman oreren (Paris, 1947), pp. 111-131, 170-173, 181-204. 2 See Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 73-74, 87-88; D. Ananun, Rusahayeri hasarakahan zargatsume, Vol. Ill: 1901-1918 (Venice, 1926), pp. 605-607. 3 Erkir, Oct. 5:1, 9:4, 12:4, 1919; Slovo, Sept. 3, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 127, Sept. 3, 1919.

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berated the Dashnaktsutiun and its journals for giving Allied officials reason to question the reliability of the Armenians. The declaration sum­ moned all liberal, antisocialist elements to join in a campaign to oust the Dashnakists from office. Tacitly admitting the Populist error in boycotting the June elections, the congress announced that it would participate in every forthcoming regional and municipal contest in an effort to place more members and sympathizers in administrative positions.4 The need to gain wider support in the Armenian provinces, particularly because the monied classes of Tiflis and Baku faced mounting restrictions, influenced the party to shift from advocacy of cultural autonomy to en­ dorsement of national independence. The resolution on agrarian reform approved nominal nationalization and peasant proprietorship of all arable land, but it also stipulated that the current owners should receive full compensation, that the redistributed plots should be held in perpetuity with the right of inheritance, and that in the exploitation of mineral wealth the free enterprise system should prevail. This program, it was asserted, would create a self-sufficient, industrious middle-class peasantry and spur desperately needed capitalistic development. Recognizing the urgency of bringing together all groups sharing the Populist outlook, the congress instructed the central committee to form an antisocialist bloc, initially through a merger with the Western Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar party.5 The wartime holocaust had left the Sahmanadir Ramkavar party active solely in the dispersion. Winning the cooperation of many nonpartisans, the Ramkavars made a bid to overshadow the Dashnaktsutiun in Europe and America. Leaders such as Vahan Tekeyan and Arshak Chobanian worked closely with Boghos Nubar in shaping the policies of the Western Armenian National Delegation. In the Republic of Armenia, however, the party was represented only by a small number of refugees, mainly former Armenakans from Van. Having taken arms to defend Van in 1915, they scattered into Persia and Transcaucasia with the rest of the population when the liberating Russian army suddenly retreated. Subsequent at­ tempts to reorganize in the Russian Armenian provinces and Tiflis were interrupted in 1918 by the Turkish invasion, which drove thousands of refugees deeper into the Caucasus and into South Russia. Only in 1919, 4 For newspaper accounts of the Populist congress, see Zhoghovurd, Sept.-Oct. 1919; Bor'ba, Sept. 3:1, 11:3, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 3:3, 1919; Slovo, Sept. 12, 1919; Haradj, Sept. 23:1, 1919. See also Britain, FO 371/3659, 139968/512/58 end. 5 Zhoghovurd, Sept. 17, 1919; Erkir, Oct. 7:1, 1919. See also Ashkhatavor, Sept. 23:3, 1919. Avetis Terzipashian, a prominent Ramkavar from Van who had represented the refugee population in the Caucasus at the Western Armenian National Congress in Paris, returned to Erevan in time to participate in the Populist congress.

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as these people streamed into the Armenian republic, was it possible for the Ramkavar exiles to resume a semblance of party life. With funds brought from Rostov-Nakhichevan by Artak Darbinian, the Ramkavar council of (Caucasian) Armenia commenced publication in September of the Erevan semiweekly Hayastani dzain (“Voice of Armenia”).6 In the interim between the second general congress of the Sahmanadir Ramkavar party in 1913 and the third congress in 1920, regional confer­ ences had to deal with pressing issues. The weeklong conference of com­ mittees in the Armenian republic, December 21-27, 1919, had no authority to alter the party program and no direct communication with the central executive council, but the twenty participants worded their resolutions in keeping with the advice imparted by Avetis Terzipashian, who had returned from Paris, and by Vahan Tekeyan, who had recently been in Erevan.7After extending greetings to Premier Khatisian, Speaker of Parliament Sahakian, Commander in Chief Nazarbekian, Catholicos Gevorg, General Andranik, and Koghos Nubar Pasha, the conference took up four major items: refugee affairs, the current moment, coalition in government, and interparty relations.8 Relief operations had reached substantial proportions, reported N. Martirosiap, yet the refugees were being denied maximal assistance be­ cause of the deficiencies of the American supervisory personnel and cor­ ruption in the welfare ministry. The government’s claim that refugees enjoyed the full rights of citizenship was unfounded, for thousands were arbitrarily moved from one place to another, Western Armenian recruits were abused and sent to the front lines by the Russian-speaking cadres, and Western Armenians in the administration were held in subordinate positions. The conference therefore declared that the subjection of the refugees to compulsory military service was illegal and that their role in the armed forces should continue on a temporary, volunteer basis pend­ ing the actual creation of united Armenia. In a related resolution, adopted after Manvel Maloyan’s critique of the act of May 28, the delegates en­ dorsed the principle of an independent, united fatherland but maintained that, until Eastern Armenia was permanently separated from Russia and joined with Western Armenia, the formation of an integrated government would be “nominal, ineffectual, and dangerous.”9 The report on the “current moment” assailed Russian Armenian civic 6 Darbinian, op. cit., pp. 243—244, 372—383 passim; Arsen A. Keorkizian, Mer azgayin goyapaikare 1915-1922—1 (Beirut, 1967), pp. 383-385. 7 See below, pp. 269-277. 8 Darbinian, op. cit., p. 398; Keorkizian, op. cit., p. 400. 9 Darbinian, op. cit., pp. 392-394; Keorkizian, op. cit., pp. 394-396, 398-399.

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bodies, particularly those dominated by the Dashnaktsutiun, for having preempted the rights of the Turkish Armenians during the war and having been unwitting agents of Russian imperialism. Nshan Hakobian exclaimed that any group now refusing to put aside narrow social ideolo­ gies for the common goal of a free and united Armenia should be regarded as traitors. The more circumspect conference resolution reaffirmed confidence in Boghos Nubar and the National Delegation, urged the Erevan government to support that delegation, and called upon the Allied Powers to settle the Armenian question in a positive manner.10 Underlying the debates on inter party relations was a pervading distrust of the Russian Armenian parties, not excluding the ideologically allied Populists. Mikayel Papadjanian, the only Populist member of the Armeni­ an republic’s peace delegation, had already begun discussions with Ramkavar leaders in Paris about a possible merger, and in Tiflis Populist central committee members had spoken with prominent Ramkavar ref­ ugees, such as Avetis Terzipashian and Artak Darbinian, on the same subject. Despite these contacts and the resolution of the Populist congress in September favoring full national sovereignty, many Ramkavars private­ ly questioned the sincerity of the Populist commitment and the wisdom of associating the Turkish Armenian cause with a region formerly a part of the Russian Empire. Thus, when Populist spokesman Tigran Hakhumian told the Ramkavar regional conference that his party desired to move steadily toward merger, the delegates applauded warmly but by a vote of thirteen to five sustained Arsen Keorkizian’s argument that, pend­ ing the liberation of Turkish Armenia and the restoration of the Ramka­ var party to the homeland, there should be collaboration but not unification. On the other hand, the conference commended efforts abroad to achieve an immediate merger with Reformed Hnchak-Azatakan circles, which since the turn of the century had repudiated the internation­ al socialism of the old Hnchaks and dedicated themselves to the emancipa­ tion of the Turkish Armenians.11 Before adjourning, the Ramkavar representatives elected a new re­ gional executive council and approved a statement setting forth the his­ tory, ideology, and current strategy of the party. Intended primarily for circulation among the refugee population, the brochure maintained that since the struggle against the Turkish regime had been transformed into a crusade to build an independent state, the need for revolutionary action had ceased. The Ramkavar party believed that evolutionary social 10 Darbinian, op. cit., pp. 396-397. 11 Ibid., pp. 394-396; Keorkizian, op. cit., pp. 396-397.

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progress was natural and beneficial, whereas violent change produced harmful results. The Western experience had demonstrated that the free enterprise system had uplifted all classes through the extension of civil rights and through enormous strides in technology, public health, welfare, and education. In Armenian life, the absence of a popular, classless or­ ganization had borne heavily upon the people. It was now incumbent upon the survivors, whether industrialists, merchants, craftsmen, labor­ ers, peasants, intellectuals, priests, or students, to dismiss class-oriented dogmas and join in bringing about the harmonious political and physical regeneration of the nation. The Armenian people should draw together under the standard of the democratic, liberal, evolutionary, patriotic Sahmanadir Ramkavar party.12 The Socialists The internationalist adversaries of the nominally socialist Armenian Revo­ lutionary Federation included the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrat Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Specifists, and Hnchaks. In socioeco­ nomic ideology, the SR platform was similar to that of the Dashnaktsutiun, which at times had represented itself as the Armenian affiliate of the Russian Social Revolutionary party. Indeed, many Armenian SRs were former Dashnakists who had abandoned the party in 1907 because of its absorption in the Turkish Armenian question and its merely tangential involvement in the Russian opposition movement. Entering the ranks of the multinational SR organization, they decried the chauvinism and racial strife that were preventing Caucasian unity against the tsarist autocracy. These views, though appealing to some intellectuals, students, and work­ ers in Tiflis and Baku, scarcely made a ripple in the Armenian provinces.13 After the downfall of the Russian monarchy in 1917, SR fortunes in the Caucasus flourished briefly. The councils (soviets) of workers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ deputies took up the party slogans. With the votes of Russian soldiers in Armenia, an SR was elected mayor of Kars and SR factions appeared in several municipal assemblies. At the all-Transcaucasian level, SR leaders joined the Georgian Social Democrats in attempts to exclude the Dashnaktsutiun, as a nationalist party, from regional revolutionary 12 Darbinian, op. cit.> pp. 399-416, reprinting the brochure entitled Shrdjaberakan Hai Ramkavar Kusaktsutian Hayastani Kedr. Khorhrdi (Erevan, 1919). 13 See Vahan Minakhorian, “Andjatakannere,” Vem, I, no. 1 (1933), 100-111, no. 2 (1933), 90-107, and his “Inchpes steghdsvetsav Sotsialist-Heghapokhakan kusaktsutian haikakan hatvadse?” Hairenik Amsagir, XXVI (Dec. 1948), 52-59. See also A. Astvadsatrian, “Andjatakan sharzhumner H. H. Dashnaktsutian medj,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXI (July-Sept. 1953), 75-81, 54-61, 57-69.

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and soviet organs.14 But with the disintegration of the Russian armies and the formation of separate national republics, the strength of the Social Revolutionaries waned quickly. Denouncing the Transcaucasian and especially the Georgian Menshevik betrayal of international socialism, they were themselves ambivalent toward the Sovnarkom of Russia and split over the decision of their own Georgian members to follow the Menshevik example by establishing a Georgian SR party.16With the party reduced primarily to Russian and Armenian loyalists, the SR Caucasian regional council decided to use legal means to work for a single all-Russian federative democracy. Several Armenian comrades, headed by Arsham Khondkarian, transferred to Erevan to implement this policy and assist the small local committees. Unlike the Populists and Social Democrats, the SRs campaigned vigorously during the national parliamentary elections but achieved little success among the agrarian masses. By their own admission, they remained embarrassingly alien in the Armenian milieu.16 In August 1919 some forty SR delegates and party officials assembled in Tiflis for the first regional conference since the partition of Trans­ caucasia. As Denikin’s armies were then suppressing the North Caucasus Mountaineers and had launched an offensive toward Moscow, the confer­ ence condemned the counterrevolutionary forces and the Allied-supported scheme to smash the Sovnarkom in favor of a new centralized Great Russian regime. The delegates divided sharply, however, on ques­ tions of strategy. The majority, including all representatives from Ar­ menia, stopped short of acknowledging the Sovnarkom’s legitimacy and reaffirmed the use of legal operations in the separatist Caucasian repub­ lics. A vociferous minority, led by former Baku Soviet chairman Sako Sahakian, demanded outright recognition of the Moscow government and collaboration with underground elements striving to overthrow the na­ tionalist states and reunite Transcaucasia with Russia. The failure of the conference to reconcile these differences boded ill for the party.17 Arsham Khondkarian and his colleagues returned to Armenia with resolutions calling for renewed efforts to gain greater influence in cooper14 For descriptions and explanations of the rise and fall of SR influence in Transcaucasia, see Askanaz Mravian, “Sotsialist-Heghapokhakannere Andrkovkasum,” in Hodvadsner evjarer, 19/3-/929 (Erevan, 1961), pp. 117—142 passim; Minas Nikoghosian, Sovetnere Hayastanum (Erevan, 1968). 18 Lev Shengelaia led the Georgian SR party, which began publication of its own Georgianlanguage newspaper, Shroma, in September 1919. See also Bor’ba, May 23:1, 1919. 16 For the status and position adopted by the Social Revolutionary party in Armenia, see Arsham Khondkarian, “Opozitsian Hanrapetakan Hayastanum,” Vem, I, no. 1 (1933), 63-82; no. 2 (1933), 68-69, 76-79; II, no. 3 (1934), 45-48, 53-55. 17 Bor’ba, Aug. 30:3, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 24:3, 30:3, 1919; France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 8 bis.

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ative, professional, and peasant associations. Their chosen policy of legal opposition, however, put the SRs at a disadvantage in their contest with the Dashnaktsutiun; they became little more than an innocuous, perhaps even a useful, annoyance. Nor were they able to devise a simple, straight­ forward slogan on self-determination. The Erevan weekly Socialist Heghapokhakan (“Socialist Revolutionary”), for example, strongly supported the right of all peoples to sociopolitical and cultural development but maintained that the feasibility of self-determination in a specific setting depended on the situation. The paper’s negative views on both domestic and international affairs suggested that full self-government was still not possible in Armenia, yet at the same time SR spokesmen inveighed against Allied interference in Eastern matters, demanding that the Armenian people be allowed to decide their own political orientation. By the end of 1919 the injunction against meddling was also being directed at Soviet Russia, whose armies were fast approaching the Caucasus Mountains.18 Disagreements over tactics and interpretations of Marxism split Ar­ menian Social Democrats into five rival groups. Since the turn of the century, small Marxist circles had existed in Russian Armenia.19 Most Armenian SDs, however, resided in the commercial and industrial urban centers of the empire. Marxist agitation increased in Armenia toward the end of the world war, only to be abruptly silenced by the Russian military evacuation and the Turkish invasion. The internationalist SD organizations in Transcaucasia were further weakened by the partition of the region, the collapse of the Baku commune, and the final schism between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The few Armenian Mensheviks splintered among themselves: one group became the Armenian section of the Georgian SD party; the other, led by Arshak Zohrabian (Zurabov), upheld the internationalist standard of the Russian Social Democrat (Menshevik) party and castigated former Georgian comrades who were heading a secessionist national Menshevik party and a nationalist republic. Paying dearly for his principles, Zohrabian was expelled from Tiflis in November 1919; a few weeks later he succumbed to typhus in Erevan. Menshevism in Armenia evaporated with the death of its most eloquent and persuasive proponent. The Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia, pressing for reunification of the Rus18 Socialist Heghapokhakan, Feb.-May 1920; Mravian, op. cit., pp. 131-140. 19 For the history of early Marxist organizations in Armenia, see, for example, Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian urvagdser, ed. Ds. P. Aghayan et al. (Erevan, 1967), pp. 9—159; Khikar H. Barseghian, Marksizmi taradsume Hayastanum, 2 vols. (Erevan, 1967, 1975), and Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi kazmavorume (Erevan, 1965), pp. 11—166.

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sian Empire under Soviet rule, were subjected to sporadic persecution, frequently cut off from the central party organs in Moscow, and further hampered by the popular appeal of national independence. In early 1919 several prominent members in Baku concluded that their best option was to accommodate this sentiment by campaigning for Azerbaijani, Geor­ gian, and Armenian Soviet republics federated with Soviet Russia. The Caucasian Regional Committee (Kraikom) and most comrades in Georgia and Armenia, however, regarded the proposal as incompatible with the party’s denunciation of Transcaucasian separatism. Throughout the spring and summer Kraikom leaflets warned workers and peasants that so-called self-determination simply meant British, French, and American military occupation and ruthless exploitation by the foreign imperialistic bourgeoisie and their local underlings. The Right SR and Menshevik traitors to socialism on the one hand and the Musavat and Dashnakist chauvinists on the other were purposely fomenting interracial strife in order to perpetuate their reactionary regimes, but the Russian Commu­ nist Party would soon liberate the Caucasus and reunite it with Soviet Russia.20 The intraparty controversy was ultimately resolved in favor of the Baku position, as Lenin and the central committee agreed that advocacy of Soviet Caucasian republics or even of national Communist parties, joined at the regional level as affiliates of the Russian party, would facilitate revolutionary propaganda in the self-governing de facto border states. While resistance to the concept of autonomous Communist parties con­ tinued in some circles well into 1920, by the end of 1919 most Bolshevik organizations in the Caucasus had acclaimed the new slogan, “Long Live Soviet Georgia, Soviet Azerbaijan, Soviet Armenia.”21 In contrast with the widespread underground Bolshevik activity in Azerbaijan and Georgia, party labors in Armenia during the first year of national independence rested on a few individuals who themselves did not agree on questions of policy. Veterans like Arshavir Melikian argued that the devastation of the country precluded traditional revolutionary tactics 20 G. Zhvaniia, Velikii Oktiabr' i bor'ba BoVshevikov Zakavkazia za Sovetskuiu vlast’ (Tbilisi, 1967), PP- 200-207, 221—228; N. B. Makharadze, Pobeda sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii v Gruzii (Tbilisi, 1965), pp. 304—306, 355—357; Bor'ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 138-141, 202-205. 21Bor'ba v Azerbaidzhanet pp. 257-258; Institut Istorii, Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR— Armianskii Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Armianskoi SSR, Hoktemberian Sotsialistahan meds revoliutsian ev Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanake Hayastanum: (pastatghteri ev niuteri zhoghovadsu) (Erevan, i960), pp. 283-285; G. B. Gharibdjanian, V. /. Lenin ev Andrkovkase, III (Erevan, 1975), 256-258, 264—270; Barseghian, Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi kazmavorume, pp. 248-264; Tadeusz Swietochowski, “The Himmät Party: Socialism and the National Question in Russian Azerbaijan 1904-1920,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétiquef XI, 1-2 (Jan.-June, 1978), 128-130.

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and that for the time being the party should use legal means to educate the public in international socialism.22 Younger extremists rejected this strategy as an indirect acknowledgment of Armenia’s separation from Russia and even as toleration of the detested Dashnakists. The party’s condemnation of “bourgeois parliamentarianism” and its boycott of the national elections in mid-1919 showed that the radicals were in control.23 Yet harsh realities sometimes forced them into contradictions and allowed dissenters to rationalize temporary association with the Dashnakists, especially in the mountainous areas coveted by Azerbaijan. A gradual upswing in Bolshevik strength during the second half of 1919 grew out of nonresolution of the Armenian question, acute distress in the country, the influx of radicalized laborers from Baku and the North Caucasus and of Armenian Bolsheviks expelled from Georgia, and the efforts of a professional cadre sent by the Russian Communist Party and its Caucasus Regional Committee. During the summer, cells were formed in county capitals, more than a score of villages, auto and railway garages, and a few army units. Still, there was little coordination among the fewer than 500 old and new Communists in the country.24 To surmount this difficulty, Kraikom member Askanaz Mravian established liaison with several district committees and then summoned the first underground party conference of Armenia to meet at Erevan in late September. On the appointed day, however, only a dozen persons appeared, most of them residents of the capital city. At a consultative session held by this small 22 The tactical “errors” of Arshavir Melikian and his supporters have been the subject of intense disagreement and controversy in Soviet Armenian historiography. See, for example, A. Karinian, Hai azgayinakanneri ughin (Moscow, 1926); G. B. Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanaki hamar mghvads paikarum (Erevan, 1955), PP- 262—263; H. Danielian, Spartak Hayastanum (Moscow, 1931), pp. 89-91; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Institut Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Sektsiia Istmoa, Spartak, 19/7-/920: Husher ev vaveragrer (Erevan, 1935), p. 186; P. S. Kol’tsov et al., “Iz istorii kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Zakavkaz’ia,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, 6 (1962), 56-73. Veteran Bolsheviks Sargis Kasian and Bagrat Borian have emphasized in their writings that the overwhelmingly peasant population of Armenia had not yet developed a strong sense of class consciousness. For a survey of Armenian historiography in the 1920s, see Sh. R. Harutiunian, “Sovetahai patmagrutiune 1920-akan tvakannerin,” Teghekagir (March 1963), pp. 3-28. 23 Revoliutsion kodier, pp. 529-531; Danielian, op. cit., pp. 70-72; Spartak, 79/7-/920, pp. 79-81, 86-87, 90—91, 98—100, 174—177; Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 290—292; H. N. Karapetian, HayastaniKomeritmiutian dsnunde (Erevan, 1956), pp. 119-124. 24 According to Hayastani komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian urvagdsert p. 249, there were up to 400 members in the country in September 1919. See also Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 271-284, 299; Ds. P. Aghayan, Hoktemberian revoliutsian ev hai zhoghovrdi azatagrume (Erevan, 1957), pp. 216-218; A. M. Poghosian, Sotsial-tntesakan haraberutiunnere Karsi marzum, 1878—1920 (Erevan, 1961), pp. 324—330.

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group, Melikian reviewed Bolshevik activities since 1917 and again advocated the legal dissemination of Communist views in the legislature, municipal councils, and rural zemstvo assemblies. The majority, however, accepted the dictates of Kraikom representatives Mravian and Sargis Kasian on the need to intensify subversive agitation, especially among professional, trade, and peasant unions, to draw them away from the Dashnaktsutiun. The participants also selected six of their number, Mravian, Kasian, Melikian, Sargis Khanoyan, Danush Shahverdian, and Ghukas Ghukasian, to act as the Russian Communist Party’s Armenia Committee (Armenkom), to coordinate the network in the country, and to plan for the deferred conference, to be held early in 1920.25 In keeping with the strategy of secrecy, the Russian Communist Party remained underground in Armenia, although most Bolsheviks were known to the government, which not only granted them haven but also placed many on the state payroll as technicians, teachers, and ministry employees. The party’s Erevan all-city committee, for example, was chaired by welfare ministry official Stepan Alaverdian. Operations in Nor-Bayazit were directed by the assistant district superintendent of schools, Hovhannes Sarukhanian, whose immediate supervisor had him­ self been a Bolshevik activist in the North Caucasus.26 At Alexandropol, teacher and journalist Bagrat Gharibdjanian worked with labor leader Egor Sevian in doubling the membership to forty by mid-1919 and making the committee in that communications center the strongest and most militant in Armenia.27 Throughout the year Bolshevik intellectuals 25 A. Mravian, Erb ev inchpes e himnadrvel Hayastani Komunistakan (bolsh. ) Kusaktsutiune? (Erevan, 1928), pp. 12—13; M. V. Arzumanian, Askanaz Mravian (Erevan, 1955), pp. 74-78; Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 139-140; Hoktemberian Sotsialistakan meds revoliutsian, pp. 289-292; Barseghian, Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi hazmavorume, pp. 265-268, and Marksizmi taradsume Hayastanum, II, 478-481; Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 299-301; Spartak, 79/7-/920, pp. 87-88. Mravian later wrote that there was no viable party organization in Armenia before the summer of 1919, but this claim was refuted by Melikian. See Hayastani komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutiun, p. 279; Spartak, 79/7-/920, pp. 88-89. Several veteran Bolsheviks, such as Shavarsh Amirkhanian and Bagrat Borian, have main­ tained that the Communist party in Armenia existed only in the minds of intellectuals, as the peasants and workers did not want to hear about communism. When a delegate to a workers’ conference in Tiflis at the beginning of 1920 claimed there were 600 Bolsheviks in Armenia, the announcement caused amazement. Most Bolshevik leaders in Armenia remained wary of the peasants and believed that a period of peaceful educational and agitational activities was essential to give them a revolutionary disposition. See B. A. Borian, Armeniia, mezhdunarodnaia diplomatiia i SSSR, II (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929), 90-92, 95, 98-99. 26 V. N. Nerkararian, Hovhannes Sarukhanian (Erevan, 1955), pp. 33-44; Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 310-311. 27 S. H. Melkonian, Bagrat Gharibdjanian, 1890-1920 ([Erevan], 1954), pp. 125-135; Aghayan, op. cit., pp. 216-217, 221, 224-226; Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 105-106, 111-112; G. B.

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were permitted to give public lectures, engage in political debates, address rallies, and even criticize the government and the dominant party so long as they did not openly preach subversion. But in January 1920, when Mravian and Alaverdian, at a memorial service for Menshevik-internationalist Zohrabian, leveled a blistering attack on the Dashnaktsutiun and led a band of marchers shouting antigovernment and pro-Soviet slogans, a new era began in Dashnakist-Bolshevik relations and in the government’s attitude toward freedom of expression and assembly.28 Almost all Armenian Social Democrat “Specifists” were intellectuals who maintained that unique historic and political factors affecting the Armenians justified a separate Armenian approach to socialism and a distinct national Marxist party within the international movement.29After the formation of the Armenian republic, Specifist stalwarts such as Davit Ananun, Bashkhi Ishkhanian, and Stepan Zorian moved to Erevan and enthusiastically entered the executive councils of cooperative associations and professional unions. In January 1920 the Specifists founded the Social Democrat Labor Party of Armenia as a legal organization dedicated to the interests of the working classes.30 Taking exception to Marxist Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the new party hailed the restoration of national independence after centuries of foreign domination and proclaimed that it would participate in building the state while striving for scientific socialism. The Specifists ridiculed the Ramkavar premise that Western Armenia, because the emancipatory struggle had been centered there, should serve as the fulcrum of united Armenia. It made no difference, Davit Ananun declared, what part of the fatherland had been the primary field of battle; now only the Republic of Armenia existed and the future of Western Armenia depended on the survival and strengthening of this core. The Armenian bourgeoisie of Tiflis and Baku, who claimed that their reluctance to transfer their capital resources to Armenia stemmed from fears of radical socialist reforms, knew full well that their investments would be safe. They were simply waiting for others Gharibdjanian, Aleksandropoli bolshevikian kazmakerputiune, i 91j —1920 tvakannerin (Erevan, 1953), pp. 94—108; Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 268-275, 308, 310. 28 Mravian,Erbevinchpes, p. 14; Aghayan,op. cit., p. 225; Gharibdjanian,Hayastanikomunist­ akan kazmakerputiunnere, p. 307; Ruben [Ter-Minasian], Hai heghapokhakani me hishataknere, VII (Los Angeles, 1951), 345. For accounts of asylum afforded Bolsheviks in Armenia, see Ruben, op. cit., pp. 264—265; S. Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji ev trkakan sali midjev (Beirut, 1953), pp. 44-45. 29 See Anaïde Ter-Minassian, “Aux origines du Marxisme arménien: les Spécifîstes,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XIX, 1—2 (1978), 67—117. 30 Haradj, Feb. 1:2, 1920; Bor'ba, Feb. 9:4, 1920.

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to do the groundwork; then they would move in and reap the benefits. But all these hypocritical Zimzimovs (the crude bourgeois exploiter of Gabriel Sundukian’s social drama Pepo ) should beware, for only those who helped in the organization and consolidation of the new state would find room there. Because of such trenchant criticisms, the Specifists drew the barbs of Ramkavars, Populists, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks alike.31 The Social Democrat Hnchak party was the only Marxist group to include significant numbers of both Russian and Turkish Armenians. As the first national revolutionary society, it had reached the apex of popu­ larity on the eve of the general massacres in 1894—1896. In the wake of that calamity, questions of responsibility, ideological conflicts, and person­ ality clashes resulted in ruinous fragmentation and cleared the way for Dashnakist preponderance in the revolutionary movement.32 By 1919 many Russian Armenian Hnchaks had converted to Menshevism or 31Haradj, Jan. 14:2, 1920. Although the party’s manifesto was issued in January, formal organization and adoption of a platform were delayed until May 28-30, 1920, when a conference was held at Alexandropol. The conference, with delegates from Alexandropol, Karakilisa, and Erevan, decided that the Social Democrat Labor Party of Armenia, as the genuine representative of the Armenian proletariat, would lead the struggle for the destruc­ tion of capitalism and the transfer of all property to the people. It would also fight against discrimination and repression, whether based on race, religion, nationality, sex, or political belief. The party espoused the concept of a democratic, united, independent Armenian state which would guarantee the inviolability of person and residence, the freedom of press, speech, movement, assembly, strike, and use of native languages. The church should be separated from the state, and the schools, from the church. The party called for abolition of the standing army, indirect taxes, and the death penalty, for an eight-hour workday, for fair labor laws, for regulations to protect working women and children, and for the implementa­ tion of broad local autonomy. In its declaration on tactics, the party stressed that it would give full support to the creation of a united, independent state. Because of the nation’s critical circumstances, the Social Democrat Labor Party of Armenia (Specifist) had adopted the tactic of collaborating with the Dashnaktsutiun and other groups in defense of the state and of advocating a coalition government. While opposed to the dictatorial regime in Soviet Russia and to the antigovernmental stance of the Bolsheviks in Armenia, the party was willing to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in matters of Marxist doctrine and the attainment of socialism through democratic means. It could not, however, work with the bourgeois Populist party or any other group based on class privilege. In its own organic activities, the SD Labor Party would allow consider­ able local initiative and prerogative, with matters of general coordination and supervision entrusted to a five-member central committee with headquarters in the capital of the Armeni­ an republic. See Dsragir Hayastani Sotsial Demokratahan Banvorakan Kusaktsutian (Erevan, 1920); Hayastani Sots. Dem. Ban. Kusakts., Kusaktsutian taktihan (1920 t. mayisi konferansi voroshumnere) (Erevan, 1920). 32 For discussions of the Hnchak platform, tactics, and activities, see Arsen Kitur, ed., Patmutiun S. D. Hnchakian kusaktsutian, 1887-1963, publ. of the S. D. Hnchakian Party (Beirut, 1962-1963), 2 vols.; Louise Z. Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), pp. 104—131; Jizmejian, op. cit., pp. 52-96; Leo [Arakel Babakhanian], Tiurkahai heghapokhutiangaghaparabanutiune, I (Paris, 1934), 145-168; Mihran Seferian, Inchu ev inchpes himnvetsav S. D. Hnchakian kusaktsutiune (Beirut, 1952), and S. D. Hnchakian kusaktsutian propakant-karozchakan gordsuneutiune (Beirut, 1954).

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Bolshevism, and the weak party network in the Caucasus was held together by a small circle of old loyalists and a few refugee members from Van, through whose efforts the weekly newspaper Gordsavor (“Worker”) was revived for a time at Tiflis. The party managed to retain substantial support among Western Armenians in its traditional strongholds in Cilicia and the Balkans and, to a lesser degree, in the United States. As with the Specifists, the Hnchak attitude toward the Armenian republic was clear-cut. Without sparing the Dashnaktsutiun for its pseudosocialism, courtship of the bourgeoisie, and pretensions to leadership in national affairs, the Hnchak press castigated all parties that boycotted the parliamentary elections, Populist opportunism in first honeymooning with the Dashnaktsutiun and then embracing the reactionary elements around Boghos Nubar, and the hard-headed intellectuals who were unable to distinguish between state and government, that is, the permanency of one and the transitory nature of the other. If the government was controlled by an incompetent clique, the state should not be abandoned or undermined but rather aided by the providing of new leadership. No longer could there be Turkish or Russian Armenians, two separate delegations at Paris, or divisive arguments about the historic importance of any one region. There was only one nation and one struggle. The Armenian republic was the Piedmont that would give rise to a free, united, and independent people. The Hnchaks did obeisance to the distant goal of international socialism and demanded radical socioeconomic reforms once Armenia had been united within secure borders, but these gestures were overshadowed by their intense manifestations of specifism and nationalism.33 The Dashnaktsutiun Within a decade of its founding in 1890, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had become a worldwide national political organization. A decentralized structure facilitated operations in divergent political, social, and geographic settings, with communication and coordination normally maintained through two bureaus. The Eastern (Arevelian) Bureau, lo­ cated at Tiflis until 1918, had jurisdiction over regional committees in the Russian Empire, Persia, and, for several years, Meds Haik—the four eastern Ottoman vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van. The 33 See especially the articles and editorials by the controversial party leader, Stepan SabahGulian, in Eritasard Hayastan, Aug. 2—Oct. 8, 1919, and in other Hnchak organs published in Europe and the Near East in 1919-1920. See also the series by Hrair Vanian in Erkir, Sept.-Oct. 1919.

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Western (Arevmtian) Bureau at Geneva supervised activities in America, western Europe, the Balkans, and, through an arm at Constantinople, most of the Ottoman Empire. In 1913, amid international negotiations on the creation of an autonomous region in the six Turkish Armenian vila­ yets and Trebizond, the party’s Seventh Congress gave a new coordinating body, the Armenia (Hayastan) Bureau at Erzerum, responsibility for those provinces and at the same time transferred the Western Bureau to Con­ stantinople. A year later the Eighth Congress made the Western Bureau a division of the Armenia Bureau, thus shifting supervision of the political renaissance to the heart of the Armenian plateau.34 These actions were soon nullified, however, for Turkey’s entrance into the war did away with the reform program, and the massacres and depor­ tations removed the Armenian people from the territorial base that had nurtured the emancipatory movement. The Dashnakist network in the Ottoman Empire was shattered; hundreds of leaders and thousands of supporters perished and the survivors scattered into Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Caucasus. The revolutions and civil war in Russia and the related turmoil in Transcaucasia also battered the party committees in the broad expanse between Petrograd and Baku. The Eastern Bureau, uprooted from Tiflis, was thrust into a frantic effort to sustain the anoma­ lous Erevan republic, a burden that claimed another grim toll of party faithful. Only the Allied victory and the sudden possibility that the Ar­ menians might emerge from the ruins as a free people spared the Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun from complete demoralization. In 1919 the party, though badly crippled, still prevailed in the Russian Armenian provinces and planned to extend its hegemony over whatever united state the Paris Peace Conference might create. Yet, as the dominant political force, it also had to absorb the frustrations and accusations grow­ ing out of the wartime disaster and the protracted sufferings of the ref­ ugees. Within the ranks, too, there were loud rumblings of personal, sectional, and doctrinal discontent. Since the Dashnaktsutiun had become the party of government with the opportunity to legislate fundamental reforms, the former distinction between immediate nationalist and longrange socialist objectives became difficult to maintain. On March 1, in order to resolve these issues and to begin the process of reorganization, the Armenia and Eastern bureaus summoned the first postwar party congress to convene at Erevan on August 15.3536As the final territorial 34 For a study of the organizational structure of the Dashnaktsutiun, see Hratch Dasnabedian [Tasnapetian], H. H. Dashnaktsutian hazmakerpakan karuitsi holovuite (Beirut, 1974). 36 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1546/27, H. H. D. 9-rd Endhanur Zhoghov 19/9 t.; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 24:3, 1919; S. Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V (Beirut, 1966), 109-112.

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boundaries would presumably be drawn and the refugees repatriated by that time, the proposed agenda was directed toward making the Dashnaktsutiun’s program and structure appropriate to an independent state. In deference to the disabled Turkish Armenian bodies, the allocation of delegates was based on prewar membership rosters. Hence, while party conferences in the United States, the Balkans, Cilicia, and Constantinople elected representatives, the remnants of central committees of Turkish Armenia proper, acting with the expatriate Erkir coordinating committee at Erevan, named refugee comrades in the Armenian republic to serve as delegates for such erstwhile strongholds as Van, Mush, Khnus, Alashkert, and Erzerum.36 The hope that the peace settlement and repatriation would precede the congress vanished when the Allied chiefs of state left Paris without reach­ ing an agreement on the fate of the Ottoman Empire. In July even the survival of the small Caucasian Armenian republic came into question, as the Muslim uprising spread from Bàouk-Vedi to Nakhichevan and Kars. Several party officials and the regional conference of Georgia urged that the congress be postponed until the “counterrevolutionary dark elements” had been crushed and the permanent boundaries and the mandatory power for Armenia announced.3637 The central committee of Georgia, led by internationalists Bagrat Topchian, Tigran Avetisian, and Koriun Ghazazian and using the slogan “Workers of the World, Unite” on the masthead of Ashkhatavor, also seemed apprehensive that Western Armenian conservatives and Eastern Armenian moderates working together might dilute the socialist platform adopted by the Fourth Congress in 1907. The bureaus, however, not willing to accept a long delay, simply deferred the meeting for one month. Allied officials followed these developments with keen interest. The intelligence section of the Army of the Black Sea reported in July that the Dashnaktsutiun was under strong internal and external pressures to re­ nounce violent methods and maximalist ideologies. Of the three group­ ings within the party, the largest, which included nearly all Western Armenian members, favored evolutionary social reforms; the internation­ al socialists at the other extreme continued to revel in radical terminology; and the older intellectuals holding the middle ground, though inclined to discard revolutionary tactics, wavered because of concern that Turcophile sentiment in some ministries of Allied governments would prevent a satisfactory solution of the Armenian question. The intelligence section 36 Haradj, Sept. 20:1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 1:3, 1919. 37 For descriptions of the Georgian regional conference, see Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug 7:2, 8:1, 10:3, 12:3, 13:3, 15:3, 17:3, 19:3, 23:3, 1919.

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predicted that the forthcoming congress would opt for the evolutionary, nationalist position, particularly since the party had learned many lessons from the recent war and revolutions.38 Indeed, the theme of gradualism was played up by Haradj (“Forward”), the Bureau’s new organ, which on September 20 superseded Hayastani ashkhatavor (“Laborer of Armenia”), published by the Erevan central com­ mittee, and Ashkhatank (“Labor”), published by the Western Armenian bodies relocated within the Republic. Editor Simon Vratzian wrote that the turmoil and changes since the last congress in 1914 had produced diverse opinions on political, social, and organizational questions, but that the formation of an independent national government for the first time in more than five centuries overshadowed all differences. The Republic of Armenia was the foundation on which the Dashnaktsutiun would build its policies and actions. The stand of the socialist-oriented but realitybound Bureau members was then revealed: In the present circumstances, of course, there can be no talk of attaining social­ ism. Our party has shouldered the onerous burden of building and guiding the ship of state. Our view about the ideal form of government strikes against unattrac­ tive reality, precipitating a serious dilemma. That which others should have done, that which belongs to the representatives of the bourgeois classes in other lands, we ourselves are obliged to undertake.. . . Despite our inner emotions, we must accept the task of developing a state in which the system of private ownership prevails.

Yet the party would once again rise to the challenge, and the delegates assembling from far and near would find a common ground from which to campaign for the consolidation of independence and democracy in Armenia.39 The Ninth Congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation held its opening ceremonies in the parliamentary chamber on the evening of September 27, 1919. The stage was bedecked with the flags and coats of arms of party and state, photographs of the founding triumvirate—Kristapor, Rostom, Zavarian—and banners inscribed with the slogans, “Long Live United and Independent Armenia” and “Toward the Socialist Inter­ national.” The delegates were welcomed by Mayor Mkrtich Musinian, Erevan central committee member Haik Sargsian, and Prime Minister Alexandre Khatisian, who lauded the party’s role in establishing and defending the Republic and voiced confidence that the world would soon recognize Armenia’s right to independence and that peace would come to 38 FO 371/3659, 107879/512/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/8/15994 end.; Erkir, Sept. 14:1, 24:2, 1919 -

39 Haradjy Sept. 21:1, 1919.

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the Caucasus. Keynote speaker Nikol Aghbalian declared that loyalty to and participation in the Allied war effort with volunteer units had entitled Armenia to join the family of sovereign states. The Dashnaktsutiun, he added, had united the Armenian people across international boundaries and had become so pervasive a force that the fate of the nation was inseparable from that of the party. Cognizant of its momentous respon­ sibilities, the congress would certainly rise above narrow partisanship and act with the utmost circumspection.40 For the next several weeks the moderate socialist intellectuals who di­ rected the party’s central bodies attempted to strike and maintain a deli­ cate balance among the eighty voting and advisory delegates.41 The election of social progressive Vahan Khoreni, moderate Prince Hovsep Arghutian, and Western Armenian Movses Petrosian to the presidium of the congress was an early indication of this strategy. The conciliation of divergent proposals was seldom accomplished, however, without recourse to ambiguous phraseology, and all grievances could not be passed over in silence. The resentment of the ultranationalist wing, composed principally of Western Armenian warriors, was brought home in a thirty-three-point petition submitted to the presidium by nondelegate Smbat (Baroyan), who had been a staff officer under General Andranik. Each point bristled with insinuation. Who was responsible for abandoning the Armenians of Mush and Bitlis in 1915? For the collapse of the front in 1918? For Andranik’s disaffection from the party and the Erevan government? For the Armeno-Tatar conflagration in 1919? For the injustice to dedicated fedayee freedom fighters? For the toleration of vendettas and “Mauserism” within the party and corruption in the state administration? For antidemocratic conscription procedures? For discrimination against Western Armenian soldiers, officials, and refugees? For the delay in repatriation? For the confusion caused by the attitude of some party groups toward Boghos Nubar Pasha and the National Delegation? For the bungling that made the principle of united and independent Armenia the subject of partisan controversy? And how long would the party remain mute while Bureau members ignored the prescribed limits of their authority and dictated ruinous policies, while prominent Western Armenian comrades failed to account for funds entrusted to them and for irresponsible deeds, while party journals printed conflicting and contradictory editorials, and while absurd socialistic propaganda obscured and distorted the patriotic struggle for national freedom? Was reborn 40 Hairenik, Nov. 19:1, 23:2, 1919. 41 For the names and descriptions of many of the delegates to the party congress, see Haradj, Sept. 20:3, Nov. 6:2, 8:2-3, l 9 l 9 '>Nor AshÂhatavor/Ashkhatavor, Aug. 27:3, Sept. 25:3, 1919.

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Armenia to be the fatherland of one faction of the party or of the entire Armenian people? Unless the congress settled these and other questions and avoided the customary halfway measures that veiled truth and perpetuated tyranny, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation would fail in its holy mission.42 Although filled with personal injury and exaggera­ tion, the accusations nonetheless touched on very real issues. The reports prepared by the party bureaus prior to the receipt of Smbat’s petition seemed to have anticipated many of the charges. In presenting these reports and assessing the complex factors that had af­ fected the Armenian question since 1914, Simon Vratzian admitted that the breakdown in communications and the national peril had forced the weakened bureaus and other administrative boards to make occasional decisions not entirely within their jurisdiction. The ensuing lengthy de­ bate culminated in a compromise resolution accepting the reports but adding that, although the lack of coordination and consistency could be ascribed to the chaos of war and revolution, it was expected that hence­ forth there would be no circumstances that might justify an exception to collective decision and action. The imprecise wording was intended to admit error while relieving the bureaus of further accountability.43 Rationalizations also marked the debates on the volunteer movement. In retrospect it seemed that the formation of armed units on the Caucasus front in 1914 had removed any remaining Turkish hesitation to initiate deportations and massacres. The vindicators, on the other hand, main­ tained that the movement was the inevitable response to the fanatic Pan-Turanian and Armenophobe doctrines of the Ittihadists and a spon­ taneous manifestation of Armenian national aspirations, which the Dashnaktsutiun could not ignore. The majority took the latter position, resolving “to reject decisively all those opinions that Armenian misfor­ tunes had resulted directly from the volunteer movement and, on the contrary, to regard it as a historic episode in the self-defense of the Armenian people and as the clarion of their political freedom.”44 But the 42 See Dimum H. H. Dashnaktsutian IX Endhanur Zhoghovi nakhagahutian ev enkemerun; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1546/27. For a biographical sketch and outline of the military activities of Smbat, a native of Mush, see Heghapokhahan Alpom, ed. Avo [Tumayan], no. 9 (1959), 264-277. 43 Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V, 112-113. An edited version of the congress’s decisions and resolutions was published as Kaghvadsner H . H. D. 9-rdEndh. Zhoghovi voroshumnerits (Erevan, 1920), referred to hereafter as Kaghvadsner. Two handwritten variants, more complete, are in the party archives, File 1546/27. One of these was recorded by the delegates from Cilicia, Minas Veradsin and Tigran Dsamhur, and is referred to hereafter as Voroshumner, copy A; the other is referred to hereafter as Voroshumner, copy B. For action on the Bureau’s report, see Kaghvadsner, pp. 14-15; Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 8-9, copy B, pp. 12-14. 44 Kaghvadsner, p. 15.

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most persuasive justification—redemption of a united, independent state —still could not be offered. Whatever resolutions were adopted, the con­ troversy would smolder as long as the Western Armenians remained in exile. Deliberations on political and socioeconomic questions began during the second week of October. The commitment to national independence led to the unanimous decision to revise the previous minimal goals of cultural and regional autonomy: The Ninth General Meeting of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, sol­ emnly endorsing the declaration of independent and united Armenia and striving with all its might to bring about the territorial integrity and the development of the state as a democratic republic, resolves: (a) to regard as null and void the political planks pertaining to Russian Armenia and Turkish Armenia in the party’s minimal program; (b) to defer reconsideration of the entire program until the next general meet­ ing, which shall convene immediately after the question of a mandate for Armenia has been decided.46

The discussions on foreign policy were dominated by territorial maxi­ malism and a Western orientation. In reviewing the Republic’s relations with its neighbors and the Allied governments, Alexandre Khatisian de­ fended Avetis Aharonian’s adherence to the memorandum prepared by the National Delegation and submitted conjointly to the Paris Peace Con­ ference in February 1919. Even though the Republic’s delegation had been directed to claim only the six Turkish Armenian provinces and a Black Sea outlet, those instructions, Khatisian explained, were given at a time when the Erevan government was completely isolated and still un­ aware of Anglo-American willingness to include Cilicia and the interven­ ing territory in the reconstituted Armenian state. Any other action by Aharonian would have undermined the Armenian case, alienated all Western Armenian comrades, and diminished the prospect of an Ameri­ can mandate, since President Wilson and other influential Americans insisted that direct access from the Mediterranean through Cilicia was indispensable. During several days of heated debate, the radical “Tiflis six” and a few other Eastern Armenian delegates objected to the govern­ ment’s reliance on the Allies and its acquiescence in unrealistic and even imperialistic territorial pretensions. But the overriding majority, includ­ ing all twenty-seven Western Armenian representatives, staunchly sup­ ported Khatisian and ultimately transformed nine draft resolutions into a single nationalist manifesto: 46 Ibid.,

pp. 4 -5 ;

Voroshumner,

c o p y A , p p . 1 8 -1 9 .

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Having heard comrade Al. Khatisian’s report on the foreign policy o f Armenia and the related debates, the Ninth General Meeting o f the A.R.F. has come to the following decisions: A. The concern to secure and have foreign nations recognize the independence of united Armenia shall form the axis of Armenia’s foreign policy. B. In the matter of boundaries, foreign policy shall be conducted in accord with the memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference on 12 February 1919. C. The present friendly attitude toward the Allied nations shall be continued. D. In view of the prevailing political, economic, and cultural conditions, the general meeting finds it desirable that, through a special mandate of the Allied nations, Armenia be placed under a temporary protectorate [within the context of Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant]. E. The general meeting deems it preferable that the protector nation assume Armenia alone as a mandate. F. While taking a thoroughly sympathetic attitude toward the Russian people and Russia’s political restoration, our diplomacy must resist the attempts of the existing governments in Russia to spread Russian rule over former Russian Ar­ menia, thereby precluding the realization of an integral Armenia. G. With Persia the government shall preserve the same cordiality on which Armenia’s foreign policy has been founded to date and which is entirely in keeping with the pronounced friendship of the Armenian people toward the Persian people. H. With Georgia [the government shall] regulate boundary and other disputes through mutual agreement, having as a goal the steadfast collaboration of the two long-neighboring and culturally similar peoples. I. The government shall be directed to defend the interests o f Armenia and the Armenian workers in Azerbaijan, while also endeavoring to establish friendly neighborly relations.46

Although the critical state of Armeno-Azerbaijani affairs was only im­ plied in the final clause, a separate resolution on Karabagh and Zangezur clearly demanded that the government and the party take whatever action was necessary to guarantee the Republic’s permanent incorporation of “this inseparable sector of independent and united Armenia.” Antici­ pating the Allied imposition of a harsh treaty on the Ottoman Empire, the congress did not consider the possibility of diplomatic relations with the Turkish government; after Koriun Ghazazian’s exposition on the perils posed by the milli (Nationalist) movement, however, it did call upon the 46 Kaghvadsner, pp. 5-6; Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 5-7, copy B, pp. 10-12. Vratzian later wrote that the disposition of the congress was “maximalist” and not commensurate with the real political strength and potential of the Armenian people. The delegates were assertedly carried away by an “Armenian Parisian mentality” tending toward grandiose and imperialistic schemes when they endorsed the territorial demands that had initially been formulated by the National Delegation and subscribed to by Aharonian. See S. Vratzian, “Hayastani Hanrapetutiun,” Hairenik Amsagir, I (Nov., 1922), 51-52. For a rebuttal, particularly in regard to the “Armenian Parisian mentality” of the delegates, see Zarevand (Zaven Nalbandian), “Hayastani Hanrapetutiun,” Hairenik Amsagir, XII (March 1929), 64-69.

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Bureau to make a concerted effort to thwart the milli intrigues emanating from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.47 Abraham Giulkhandanian reported on the domestic issues of adminis­ tration, internal security, and public welfare. Despite delays in the peace settlement and repatriation, the government believed that the refugees would get home in time for the spring sowing; the interior ministry had therefore made detailed calculations on the agricultural capacity of the Western Armenian provinces and plans for provisioning, and protecting repatriates returning via Kars, Batum, Trebizond, and Cilicia. As mani­ fold ills still gripped Armenia, the Western Armenian delegates dwelt upon the plight of the refugees, the continuation of distrusted Russian administrative procedures, and the surprising laxity in dealing with Mus­ lim provocation. Eastern Armenian radicals, on the other hand, com­ plained of inadequate attention to social reform, internationalist principles, and minority rights. In contrast with foreign policy decisions, the resolution on internal affairs was sprinkled with revolutionary, internationalist terminology. It asserted that national independence was the only way to ensure physical security and political emancipation for the laboring masses, that the coun­ terrevolutionary plots of the Turco-Azerbaijani beks and aghas were in­ tended to eliminate the Armenian people, and that the Tatar working elements, because of cultural backwardness and undeveloped class con­ sciousness, had served as unwitting destructive instruments for those beks and aghas. To reverse this situation, Armenia had to propagate concepts of interracial harmony, class warfare, and enlightened internationalism among the peoples of the East. The Ninth Congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation advocated the following steps: to implement as quickly as possible the social reforms outlined in the party program; to root out every reactionary and antigovernmental movement, whatever its origin or source of support; to bring workers and peasants of all nationali­ ties into a common class struggle against the exploiting elite; to guarantee cultural rights and political equality to the minorities in Armenia; to prepare for the separation of church and state; and to impress upon government leaders that in Armenia’s critical revolutionary phase socio47 Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 6-8, copy B, pp. 17-18, 20. See also Ruben, op. cit., pp. 184-185. The congress also compiled a list of forty-one major perpetrators of the Armenian genocide, marking them for punishment, if not by the Allies or the new Turkish government, presum­ ably by the Armenians themselves. The meeting decided not to remove the section on the use of terrorism from the bylaws pending deliberation of the question by the next congress. See Voroshumner, copy A, p. 12.

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political reforms should not be obstructed by legal technicalities, particu­ larly those based on the imperial Russian codices.48 The resolution was predicated on the assumption that Muslim peasants in Armenia had been the victims of a feudal system and could be weaned away from the Turco-Azerbaijani aristocracy. It failed to consider the possibility that the “Tatar working elements” might cherish their “cultural backwardness and undeveloped class consciousness” and refuse to abandon the “reactionary and antigovernmental” camp. The demand for nationalization and democratization shaped the reso­ lutions pertaining to governmental organization. In discussing military affairs, for example, Dro Kanayan praised the selflessness of the troops in the face of harsh privations, inadequate training, and never-ending engagements, but he also warned that many officers had not given up the tyrannical behavior of tsarist commanders or accepted the principle of Armenian independence. His criticism evoked a unanimous call for action to inculcate the armed forces with the spirit of patriotic service and disci­ pline in a democratic republic, to retrain and reorganize the officer corps, to make Armenian the language of command at all levels, and to adopt a distinctive national military uniform and set of emblems. Although accepting conscription as a necessary evil pending the liberation of inte­ gral Armenia and the guaranteed inviolability of small countries by the League of Nations, the congress recommended that the term of service be reduced gradually to two years, with the objective of ultimately convert­ ing to a people’s militia and home guard.4950 The resolution on economic policy exemplified the congress’s frequent lip service to ideology while accommodating “unattractive reality.” Upholding the rights of peasants to the full fruit of their labor, the statement advocated an agrarian program based on expropriation and redistribution of private estates and the support of communal and cooper­ ative institutions to aid impoverished villagers. Then came the strategic retreat: The unrestricted flow of capital being an essential prerequisite to the creation of an economy, the Dashnakist government shall encourage the participation of both foreign and especially Armenian capital in the country’s reconstruction and the development of its industry, communications, and commerce. In the inevitable conflict between labor and capital, our government must but­ tress labor and the laborers by means of thoroughly democratic legislation.60 48 Kaghvadsner, pp. 7-9; Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 20-23. 49 Kaghvadsner, pp. 10-11; Voroshumner, copy B, pp. 4-6. 50 Kaghvadsner, pp. 12—13; Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 31—32.

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The third section of the congress agenda concerned revision of the party’s bylaws to provide increased coordination. Besides tighter member­ ship requirements, the delegates approved a clearly defined hierarchy, from village and city neighborhood committees through district, county, and regional conferences and administrative boards to the supreme party congress and Bureau. Henceforth a single bureau composed of seven members and three alternates and situated in the capital of Armenia would be vested with executive powers to enforce decisions made by regional conferences and the party congress. As before, the congress alone could alter the party’s program, bylaws, and policies, whereas the regional central committees retained autonomy in all other matters.51 To clear up the confusion resulting from the displacement of Western Armenian party groups, the congress decreed that one central committee could not function in the realm of another and that all subordinate bodies in each area would be under the jurisdiction of the central committee authorized in that region. The congress also ruled that Dashnakist journals would have complete editorial freedom in local and regional affairs but in matters of general policy could not deviate from the views expounded in the Bureau’s central organ.52 The measures designed to achieve internal unity were supplemented by safeguards against excessive concentration of power. The Bureau’s prerogatives were precisely set forth, and a permanent judicial tribunal, elected by and answerable solely to the general congress, was created with the stipulation that the judges hold no other party position. The tribunal was to serve as an appellate board for members whose expulsion for antidisciplinary or antiparty behavior had been decreed by a two-thirds vote of the body to which they belonged and as the court of first instance in cases involving comrades in government and party officials and com­ mittees, the Bureau included.53 Elected to the tribunal were Eastern Armenians Dr. Hovsep Ter-Davitian and Levon Tadeosian (“Papasha”) and Western Armenian Meruzhan Ozanian, all of whom had earned impeccable reputations in fulfilling past assignments and handling and auditing funds. While the congress was still in session, the presidium announced in the press that any accusations against individuals or groups should be submitted, with supportive documents and testimony, to the6123 61 For the details of these regulations, see H. H. Dashnaktsutiun, Kazmakerpahan kanonner, hastatvads 9-rd Endh. Zhoghovi koghmits (Erevan, 1919), cited hereafter as Kanonner. See also Dasnabedian, op. cit., pp. 106—113. 62 Kaghvadsner, pp. 16^-17, 22-23; Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 7, 16-17; Kanonner, pp. 25-26. See also Ruben, op. cit., pp. 150-160. 63 Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 29-31; Kanonner, pp. 28-29.

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tribunal by the end of the year.54That the tribunal took its charge seriously was evidenced thereafter in periodic publication of its findings.55 Among organizational matters, party-state relations aroused the most acrimonious debate. Arguing that direct control of the government was essential in leading the country through the perils facing it, Ruben TerMinasian demanded that Dashnakist ministers submit to the Bureau’s dictates. At the other extreme, Simon Vratzian emphasized the party’s past opposition to authoritarian regimes and its wholesome tradition of democratic decentralization. If Armenia was to avoid the Bolshevik mala­ dies of party-government synonymity and self-perpetuating elitism, the state machinery had to remain independent, with the Bureau’s influence being channeled through the Dashnakist caucus in the legislature.56 Finally a majority rallied to an intermediary position weighted in favor of the “democrats.” The caucus, in consultation with the Bureau, would select the Dashnakist candidate for prime minister (minister-president), who in turn would secure the faction’s approval of cabinet appointees before submitting their names to Parliament for confirmation. Assent of the faction would be sufficient for individual ministerial changes; resolution of full cabinet crises would require the Bureau’s concurrence. Comrades in the cabinet were to hold no party posts, and Bureau members entering government service were to withdraw from active participation in the supreme executive body during that tenure. The Dashnakist faction of Parliament would discharge its regular legislative duties without external interference, although accepting the Bureau’s right to enforce decisions of party congresses and conferences. Should Parliament cease to operate for any reason, the comrades in government would rule in collaboration with the Bureau. Ter-Minasian criticized the cumbersome features of the plan and protested that the parliamentary faction would gain enough power to neutralize the Bureau in affairs of state, but Vratzian, Khatisian, and other champions of the distinction between party and government were pleased by the prospect of cooperation rather than unilateral dictation.57 54Hairenik, Nov. 19:2, 1919. For biographical information on members of the tribunal, see Gabriel Lazian, Demker hai azatagrakan sharzhumen (Cairo, 1949), pp. 159-168, 201-211; S. Vratzian, Andzink nvirialk (Beirut, 1969), pp. 211-222; Vem, IV, no. 1 (1936), 37-47; Heghapokhakan Alpom, VIII, no. 10 (1971), 261-263; S. Tatul, “Bzhishk Ter-Davtian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXIV (Sept./Oct. 1946), 66-71. Hambardzum Terterian served on the tribunal as an alternate. 56 See, for example, Haradj, Jan 9:3, 15:3, 23:3, March 12:3, 17:3, June 25:3, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 14:3, 1920. 66 Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V, 113-114; Ruben, op. cit.f pp. 226-236. 57Kanonner, pp. 11-13; Dasnabedian, op. cit., pp. 110-111. In Kanonner, the resolution reads, “The Dashnakist members of the government cannot at the same time be a member

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Decisions on finances, a central party archive, a history of the Dashnaktsutiun and commemoration of its thirtieth anniversary, training of a professional cadre, and other organizational issues brought the congress to the final agenda item, election of the Bureau.58 The preponderance of philosophically socialist and functionally nationalist intellectuals on that body was assured through the choice of Arshak Djamalian, Simon Vratzian, Sargis Araratian, Abraham Giulkhandanian, and Hamazasp Ohandjanian, along with militant centralist Ruben Ter-Minasian and conservative Garegin Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo). Ironically, the selection caused a complication about which Ter-Minasian had warned, since four of the seven were serving either in the cabinet or as government representatives abroad. Ohandjanian, who in mid-1918 had gone to Germany on a futile diplomatic mission and later joined Aharonian’s delegation at Paris, and Pasdermadjian, who was en route to the United States as the envoy of the Armenian republic, were summoned back to Erevan, but the time of their return or even their willingness to serve on the Bureau was not known. And although it was hoped that ongoing negotiations for a coalition cabinet of integral Armenia would soon relieve Araratian and Giulkhandanian of their ministerial duties, in the interim the Bureau’s responsibilities would have to be shouldered by the three remaining members and the alternates, Gevorg Ghazarian, Vahan Navasardian, and Arsen Shahmazian.59 After more than five weeks of deliberations, the Ninth Congress of the Dashnaktsutiun adjourned on November 2,1919. Inability to take decisive action on problems linked to the unresolved Armenian question led to painful compromises, usually introduced by the phrase “under the exist­ ing conditions.” Still, this first and only party congress in an Armenian nation-state was an important milestone, marking formal abandonment of autonomy as a short-range objective in favor of a “free, independent, united Armenia.” Time alone would provide answers to crucial questions, but there was no assurance that time would be solicitous of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. of any party body,” whereas in Voroshumner, copy A, it reads, “A member of the Bureau cannot at the same time be a member of the government and, if entering the government, is suspended from the Bureau until he withdraws [from the government].” Vratzian subse­ quently criticized this interdiction. See pp. 52—53 of his article, cited in note 46 above. 68 Kaghvadsner, pp. 18-20; Voroshumner, copy A, pp. 24—27, copy B, pp. 14—18. Vratzian, Ter-Minasian, and Mikayel Varandian were appointed to organize the party archives and to prepare materials for a party history under the title, “Divan H. H. Dashnaktsutian.” On November 10 the Bureau made a public appeal for the gathering and forwarding of all records and pertinent documents relating to the history and activities of the Dashnaktsutiun around the world. 59 Ruben, op. cit., pp. 148—150; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V, 114.

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As the delegates dispersed, a Hnchakist correspondent surmised that the young radicals had been unable to seize the reins from the cautious semisocialist intellectuals, but they were confident that the party’s future belonged to them.60 The most outspoken organ of the radicals, however, was more cautious. Remarking on the impossibility of effectively addressing numerous topics while Armenia’s freedom remained un­ secured and on the resulting concentration on purely tactical questions, Ashkhatavor nonetheless commended the congress’s efforts to relieve the laboring classes and to ensure the nation’s collective political future.61 But as the weeks passed, the more customary expressions of impatience reappeared. Complaining of foot-dragging in implementing the social reforms advocated by the congress, caustic editorials accused party leaders and comrades in government of being more concerned with the attitude of this or that imperialist power, of Azerbaijani reactionaries, and of Armenian pashas who aspired to be the latter-day kings and nobles of the redeemed fatherland.62 The last satirical reference was to negotiations that had taken place ostensibly between the Armenian republic and the Western Armenian National Delegation but factually between the Dashnaktsutiun and the antisocialist parties. Negotiations for a United Government The political parties relying on the Paris Peace Conference for a favorable peace settlement knew that a harmonious working relationship was neces­ sary to demonstrate that Armenians, despite their catastrophic wartime losses, were capable of self-government. Although the presence of two Armenian delegations at Paris could be explained by the centuries-long division of the country, this dualism accentuated the sectionalism that would have to be overcome. Many Western Armenians were perplexed that the road to independence had surfaced in Russian Armenia, when Turkish Armenia had been the center of the emancipatory movement for nearly half a century. Boghos Nubar and his advisers feared that the territorial award in Turkish Armenia might be decreased with the excuse that a sizable region was already included in the Russian Armenian repub­ lic, and they were concerned lest the Dashnaktsutiun, through its control of the Erevan government, hold an insurmountable advantage in any 60 Eritasard Hayastan, Feb. 14, 1920. 61 Ashkhatavor, Nov. 7:1, 1919. 62 See esp. Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:1, 1920. See also Ashkhatavor, Jan. 14:3, 15:3,16:3, 1920, for descriptions of the 4th regional conference of the Dashnaktsutiun’s bodies in Georgia, in January 1920.

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united state. During the Western Armenian National Congress at Paris in early 1919, the non-Dashnakist delegates blocked a motion to acknowl­ edge the “Araratian republic” as the core of independent Armenia; in­ stead they accepted a compromise resolution instructing the National Delegation to strive for the creation of a single government and in the interim to work with the Republic’s representatives in all matters pertain­ ing to “integral Armenia.”63 In general, Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian did maintain a united front, although their personal and ideological differences did not escape the attention of Allied officials.64 As communications with the Caucasus improved and international news services dramatically portrayed the Armenian republic’s struggle for exist­ ence, large numbers of Western Armenians began to identify with the Erevan government. This development tended to detract from the pres­ tige of the National Delegation and to amplify Dashnakist criticism of Boghos Nubar. As the chief Armenian spokesman in Europe during the war, he had exhorted his compatriots to enlist in the French Légion d’Orient and, after the Russian armies disintegrated, to defend the Cauca­ sus front, giving assurances that the Allied nations would regard the Armenians as cobelligerents. Unlike the leaders of the Arabs and other subject peoples, however, he failed to obtain that pledge in writing, a blunder that assertedly denied Armenia a seat at the peace conference and prompt international recognition. Now Boghos Nubar Pasha let it be known that he would consent to a united government on condition that he become prime minister with the prerogative of residing abroad.65 In private correspondence Dashnakist leaders in Paris often com­ plained of Nubar’s narrow-mindedness, yet they also emphasized the urgent need for a single government and delegation. Aharonian wrote his 63 See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 14070/270, H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, 1919; US Archives, RG 256, 183.9 Armenia/16; Hairenik, Feb. 1:2, 1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (March 15, 1919), 325-326. For minutes and related records of the Armenian National Congress, see Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm rolls C-i and C-5. 64 See, for example, RG 867B.00/81/84/85/143/236; and FO 608/80, 342/1/13/10358. In the British Foreign Office, James Malcolm, the National Delegation’s London representative, sometimes discussed the discord between the two Armenian delegations and complained about the extremism of Aharonian and his colleagues. Nonetheless, the National Delegation and the Republic of Armenia Delegation conferred and acted regularly as the Delegation of Integral Armenia on issues relating to the Armenian question and the welfare of the Armeni­ an people. The meetings of the joint delegations were presided over by Boghos Nubar Pasha and, in his absence, by Avetis Aharonian. Occasional sharp exchanges took place between Arshak Chobanian, on the one hand, and Aharonian and Hamazasp Ohandjanian, on the other, but by and large the two sides worked harmoniously. For minutes of the ninety-six meetings of the Delegation of Integral Armenia for the period from April 6, 1919, to June 10, 1920, see Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm roll i -D. 66Hairenik, Jan 22:1—2, 25:1, Feb. 4:1,1920. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 23:3, 1919, and, for criticism of the critics, Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Aug. 2, 1919), 982-984.

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comrades in Erevan that unless such a government existed when Armenia was called upon to sign the peace treaty and other international conven­ tions, the mandatory power would be tempted to administer the country as a colonial possession.66 Garegin Pasdermadjian, one of two Dashnakists on the six-man National Delegation, was so insistent on a coalition and on rejection of socialist programs that he refused to return to Erevan and head the Dashnakist-dominated cabinet. Boghos Nubar was guilty of serious errors in dealing with the Allies and of imagining a Russian Armenian conspiracy to engulf Turkish Armenia, but he could not be ignored. Allowing him to serve as president of a reorganized peace delegation answerable to a coalition cabinet might therefore be the surest way to neutralize him.67 The controversy caused by the Act of United Armenia on the Republic’s first anniversary accentuated the need for an accord. Threatening to denounce the “coup d’état” before the Allied Powers, Nubar desisted only under pressure of his Ramkavar advisers and agreed to issue just a mild, judiciously-stated protest on receipt of Aharonian’s promise to ask the Erevan government to delay ratification. On July 18 Aharonian therefore wired Khatisian that the National Delegation denied the legality of the act and had devised its own plan for unity, which a special mission would carry to Erevan. In a private message, he explained that postponement of ratification was necessary to prevent “the stubborn old man from taking disastrous steps, as undoubtedly he would, since his concept of obligation is primitive and limited.” Aharonian hoped that the government would give Nubar nothing more than presidency of the peace delegation and would insist that the reorganized delegation include no more than one of Nubar’s current confidants, Vahan Tekeyan, Professor Abraham TerHakobian, and, the least desirable, Arshak Chobanian.68 Facing grave domestic and international problems, Khatisian replied that the Western Armenian special mission would be welcome and in August so structured his cabinet as to facilitate its eventual expansion into a coalition ministry.69 66Jizmejian, op. cit., pp. 395-397; Azg-Pahak, June 6, 1922. 67 S. Vratzian, Hin tghter nor patmutian hamar (Beirut, 1962), pp. 294-296, Vratzian to Pasdermadjian, May 18, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev H. Amerikayi Karavarutiune, 1919 t., Pasdermadjian letters, June 13, July 6, 1919. 68 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 14070/27a, File 231/130, no. 377, File 380/2, Pasdermadjian to American Central Committee, Sept. 18, 1919; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delega­ tion of Integral Armenia, nos. 23, 25, 29-32, June 17, 25, July 12-22, 1919; Jizmejian, op. cit., pp. 398-403; Darbinian, op. cit., pp. 417-421; Azg-Pahak, June 13, 1922. The animosity between Aharonian and Chobanian is discussed briefly in Aram Turabian, L'éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne ([Paris], 1929), p. 184. See also Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, passim. 69 FO 608/78, 342/1/1/18188 end.

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Aharonian and Nubar then issued a joint statement announcing that the National Delegation subscribed to the principle embodied in the act of May 28, rejecting only the section empowering the present government to speak in the name of integral Armenia. Confident that a mutually acceptable formula could be worked out, the National Delegation was sending a special mission to Erevan. “We therefore fervidly appeal to all elements of the Armenian people to leave the final solution of this delicate question to official, responsible bodies and to await its successful disposi­ tion in a calm mood.”70 The National Delegation’s emissaries were Vahan Tekeyan and Dr. Nshan Ter-Stepanian, both of whom were founders of the Armenian National Liberal Union (Hai Azgayin Azatakan Miutiun) at Paris, whose goal was to combine the Ramkavar, Populist, and Reformed HnchakAzatakan parties into a potent counterforce to the Dashnaktsutiun. Under the editorship of Arshak Chobanian, the affiliated newspaper Hayastan (“Armenia”) propounded the view that the adventurism of the revolution­ ary, socialist parties had kept most Armenians aloof from political affairs and that the constitutional democratic groups favoring the free-enterprise system now had the first real opportunity to draw all classes into the common endeavor of national reconstruction.71 As Tekeyan and Ter-Stepanian sailed from Taranto on September 13, every political party extended good wishes, yet Dashnakist and Hnchakist journalists also pointed out that the mission represented only one segment of the Western Armenian population.72The mission’s partisan nature became even more pronounced when the envoys reached Tiflis in early October, for on Nubar’s instructions they invited Populist central committee chairman Samson Harutiunian to join them.73 This maneuver annoyed many Dashnakists, not only because Harutiunian was an Eastern Armenian, but 70 KochnakHayastani, XIX (Aug. 23, 1919), 1096-1097; EritasardHayastan, Aug. 30:1, 1919; Hairenik, Aug. 13:1, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 24:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 140/39, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Gaghtni Grutiunner, Aug. 5, 1919; Arm. Nat. Del. Ar­ chives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 36, Aug. 6, 1919. 71 See London Times, July 12:11, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 22, 1919), 14011402; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 22:3, 1919, reprinting editorial from Zhoghovurdi dzain (Paris); Erkir, Sept. 10:2, Oct. 10:1, 1919. In the United States, the Sahmanadir Ramkavar organiza­ tion merged with two smaller groups in 1919 to form the Azgayin Ramkavar kusaktsutiun (National Democrat party). See Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (May 31, 1919), 685-686. Gabriel Effendi Noradoungian, a former Ottoman cabinet minister and a statesman of international standing, declined the National Delegation’s invitation to head the mission to Erevan. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 42, Sept. 5, 1919. 72 Sec Erkir and Hairenik, Sept. 1919. 73 Darbinian, op. cit., p. 424; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 168, Oct. 21, 1919; Slovo, Oct. 21, 1919.

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because he, more than any other individual, had precipitated the Populist withdrawal from the previous coalition and the boycott of the parliamentary elections. Having denounced the Dashnaktsutiun during the recent Populist congress, he now returned to Erevan on behalf of the Western Armenian National Delegation. The Dashnaktsutiun nonetheless acquiesced in this arrangement because it was clear that the negotiations between the National Delegation and the Republic of Armenia would in fact bring to the table opposing political parties rather than the two long-divided sectors of “integral Armenia.” On October 21 Vahan Tekeyan submitted to Prime Minister Khatisian the National Delegation’s proposals for a united cabinet, delegation, and legislature. The cabinet was to have an equal number of Western and Eastern Armenians, not counting a nonpartisan military minister, and an equal number of Dashnakists and Ramkavar-Populists. Decisions on fun­ damental issues such as war and peace, social reform, and national elec­ tions would require the concurrence of two-thirds of the ministers plus one (7 of 9 or 10 of 13). The premier, to be a Western Armenian nomi­ nated by the National Delegation, would remain in Paris as president of the peace delegation, and a vice-premier, to be selected by the legislature, would supervise domestic affairs in the Republic. Aside from Boghos Nubar, the peace delegation would include an equal number of Western and Eastern Armenians and of Dashnakists and non-Dashnakists. It would have broad prerogatives in dealings with the Allied Powers and would appoint all diplomatic representatives to those countries. The government could issue no instructions to the delegation without a two-thirds vote of the entire cabinet and would send no political missions to the West without the delegation’s prior consent. The existing legislature would disband after ratifying the agreement and transferring its authority to the coalition cabinet, which would then conduct new parliamentary elections in the Republic and in communities abroad. The reorganized legislature, to comprise an equal number of Eastern and Western Armenians, would convene when at least three-fourths of the deputies of each segment had assembled at Erevan, which was to serve as the provisional capital until the liberation of Turkish Armenia and the selection of a permanent capital in that region. Finally, the announcement of the accord should be so worded as to show that Western Armenia had established its government, to which the de facto Eastern Armenian or Araratian republic was being joined.74* 74 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 296/3, Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919 t.y Project, July 28, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 30:1-2, 1920.

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Khatisian passed the National Delegation’s plan through the Dashnakist faction of Parliament to the party’s Ninth Congress, then entering its fifth week of deliberations. When the terms were read to the congress on October 24, both Eastern and Western Armenian delegates objected to the Ramkavar-Populist bid to acquire broad veto powers, to obstruct social reforms, and to exclude the Erevan government from direct intercourse with the Allied countries. The moderates again prevailed, however, and the congress accepted Boghos Nubar as the president of a united peace delegation having a non-Dashnakist majority on condition that the delega­ tion submit to the government’s directives, that the Dashnaktsutiun hold a cabinet majority, and that the present Parliament be expanded—rather than supplanted—through additional elections in the Western Armenian communities and in districts such as Kars, which had not participated in the preceding election. There would be no objection, moreover, if most members of both the delegation and the cabinet were Western Armenians. In response to Samson Harutiunian’s co-option by the mission of the National Delegation, the congress named Western Armenian Shavarsh Misakian to join Simon Vratzian and Martiros Harutiunian as negotiators for the party and, by inference, for the Armenian republic.75 The bilateral conference opened on October 29. Premier Khatisian pledged that his cabinet would abide by whatever agreement was con­ cluded and co-chairmen Tekeyan and Vratzian expressed hope that the formation of a united government would hasten the realization of a united fatherland. Despite the sincerity and optimism of these sentiments, the conference adjourned three weeks later, after nine plenary and several informal sessions, without reaching an accord. Although differences had been narrowed, both sides arrived at a point where further compromise seemed tantamount to surrender. All the basic arguments had been ex­ pounded by the end of the fourth session, on October 31 ; thereafter the polemics were essentially a reassertion of the Ramkavar-Populist demand for safeguards against possible Dashnakist extremism and the Dashnakist call for democratic, majority rule.76 The only substantial disagreement about the delegation centered on Boghos Nubar’s desire to hold two posts. Vratzian stated that his side 76 See Banaktsutiunner Azgayin Patvirakutian ev Hayastani Hanrapetutian midjev, intro, by S. Vratzian (Boston, 1920), pp. 16-25, cited hereafter as Banaktsutiunner. 76 The minutes of the negotiations are in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 296/3 and File 8b/8b, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun ev Azgayin Patvirakutian Nerkayatsutsichneri Banaktsutiunnere, 1919 t. They were published under the title given in n. 75 and also as “Hai-haikakan banaktsutiun­ ner,” Vem, IV, no. 3, to VI, no. 1 (1936-1938), cited hereafter as “Haikakan banaktsutiunner.” The National Delegation’s plan is printed in Vem, IV, no. 3 (1936), 88-92, and in Banaktsutiun­ ner, pp. 18-25.

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would assent to a delegation with a Western Armenian, non-Dashnakist majority and Nubar as its president, but he insisted that the prime minister should be a different person, one responsible for the daily operations of government. Tekeyan, citing the example of Greek premier and delega­ tion chief Venizelos, replied that the prestige afforded Nubar in that dual capacity would strengthen the Armenian case. Ter-Stepanian, joining his colleague, said the selection of Nubar would also show that Turkish Ar­ menia was incorporating Russian Armenia and would dispel the impres­ sion in Allied circles that deep hostility existed between the two sections. The Dashnakists would not yield, however, arguing that the proposal was unjustifiable on political and logistical grounds. As delegation president, Nubar would have all the prestige and authority he needed; if it would please him, some other honorific title might be added.77 The Dashnakist conferees also maintained that the National Delega­ tion’s plan for a coalition cabinet disregarded political reality and demo­ cratic principles. To allow the Ramkavar-Populist bloc half the portfolios and veto powers based on fewer than one-third the ministers would violate the people’s will and undermine the government’s authority. The Dashnaktsutiun, towering above all other parties in popularity and repeatedly victorious in electoral contests, deserved at least a simple cabinet majority in the coalition. Tekeyan contended, on the other hand, that both a sectional and political balance should prevail until Armenia was unified and internationally recognized. The Dashnaktsutiun was presumptuous in claiming that it had sweeping support, since two parties had boycotted the parliamentary elections in Eastern Armenia and Dashnakist delegates had formed only a minority in the Western Armenian National Congress at Paris. Samson Harutiunian and Nshan Ter-Stepanian conceded that the Dashnaktsutiun had a large following, but they suggested that few of those who voted the party ticket had a sound knowledge of ideology and that the political disposition of the impressionable masses could change quickly. Furthermore, a moderate cabinet would help improve relations with neighboring states and win the confidence of the Allied Powers, whose aversion to socialism and revolution might otherwise hinder Ar­ menia’s development. To Vratzian, Misakian, and Martiros Harutiunian the issue of socialism was superfluous, for the party and government did not deny the essential role of capitalism and had guaranteed the protec­ tion of investments. In any event, the Allies realized that all social legisla­ tion introduced by the government had long ago been enacted in the West 77 Banaktsutiunner, pp. 32-33; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” IV, no. 4 (1936), 87, 92-94; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8b/ 8b.

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and that the popular authority of the Dashnaktsutiun was the strongest single deterrent to Bolshevism and renewed anarchy in Armenia. It was imperative that the party keep at least one more than half the portfolios.78 The Dashnakist representatives explained that the recently elected Par­ liament, engrossed in vital labors and soon to begin work on the annual budget, could not adjourn for the several months needed to implement the National Delegation’s plan for a new legislature. Pending supplemen­ tary elections to establish a sectional balance, the Parliament would refrain from motions of no-confidence in the government. Although acknowl­ edging that the Dashnaktsutiun had honored all its commitments during the six-month coalition with the Populist party and that its legislative faction had made no attempt to embarrass the cabinet, Samson Harutiunian said that all branches of government should be reconstituted so as to enhance the spirit of true unification. After much discussion, Tekeyan and Harutiunian, but not Ter-Stepanian, seemed willing to support a compromise whereby the Parliament would recess only until the addition­ al elections were held. By implication, the National Delegation would acquiesce in a Dashnakist legislative majority, since the party already held 72 (59 Eastern and 13 Western Armenians) of the 80 seats and would certainly win enough votes in the elections abroad to retain control. For the non-Dashnakists, therefore, it became all the more important that a cabinet minority have veto power.79 A day before the Ninth Congress of the Dashnaktsutiun adjourned, Simon Vratzian requested authorization to make further concessions for the sake of an agreement. But an intractable mood prevailed, especially after a scathing account of Nubar Pasha’s pretensions and diplomacy was presented by Professor Astvadsatur Khachaturian, a Western Armenian associate of Avetis Aharonian who had journeyed from Paris with TerStepanian and Tekeyan. Hence the final instructions of the congress read: “Declare to the general meeting’s representatives to stand squarely on the previously determined conditions in negotiating with the delegation of Boghos Nubar. In case those conditions are not accepted in toto, the negotiations must be brought to an end.”80 Upset by the restriction, Vratzian did not attend the fifth plenary session of the conference on November 2, leaving Martiros Harutiunian to uphold the party’s terms, foremost of which was a cabinet majority of 5 of 9 or 7 of 13 ministers. When Tekeyan objected that preliminary discussions with Aharonian in 78 Banaktsutiunner, pp. 33— 35,36-37; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” IV, no. 5 (1936), 87-98, V, no. 1 (1937), 73—76; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8b/8b. 79 Banaktsutiunner, pp. 31— 33, 36; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” IV, no. 4 (1936), 86-94; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8b/8b. 80 Kaghvadsner, pp. 21—22; Voroshumner, copy A, p. 28; Jizmejian, op. cit., p. 404.

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Paris had been based on an equal division of portfolios, Harutiunian made an indelicate innuendo about the mission’s narrow partisanship even though Dashnakists constituted a third of the National Delegation. Tekeyan and Ter-Stepanian replied angrily that the mission had been invited to Erevan to represent all Western Armenians, that it expressed the majority view of the National Delegation, and that the use of “Ramkavar” and “Populist” in the proposals simply meant nonsocialist and non-Dashnakist and should not be taken literally. Prime Minister Khatisian had given assurances that the question of credentials would not be raised, but since that pledge had been dishonored, the proceedings should not continue until the spokesmen facing the National Delegation’s mission had formally identified the source of their authority and what element of the Armenian people they represented.81 During a ten-day interruption, both sides prepared position papers. The Dashnakist statement, submitted on November 4, pointed out that the National Delegation’s proposals were marked by dualism. Aside from regional considerations, which would naturally concern a Western Ar­ menian delegation, the plan included strictly partisan features. It was acceptable and even preferable that Western Armenians predominate in all branches of government, but the precepts of democracy required that the cabinet have a Dashnakist majority and that the peace delegation answer to the government. However desirable the absorption of so-called Russian Armenia into Turkish Armenia, the fact was that the Armenian republic was now the foundation for a united, independent nation. In any event, a free Armenia was unimaginable without both sectors. The an­ nouncement of agreement should therefore simply proclaim a full and voluntary merger.82 Whatever duality might exist, Tekeyan replied on November 6, resulted from the illegalities of the May 28 act, which had spawned a monolithic cabinet and legislature. The National Delegation’s mission had come to Erevan to rectify both the sectional and political deficiencies of the act and found the Dashnaktsutiun unreasonable in questioning, after several days of negotiations, the composition of the mission. Granting even that Ramkavar-Populist tenets alone had been advanced, this should not have been surprising, since only the Dashnakist view was represented on the other side. Accordingly, the mission would not respond to the position paper of 81 Banaktsutiunner, p. 37; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” V, no. 1 (1937), 76-84; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8b/8b. The National Delegation’s proposals, drafted primarily by Arshak Chobanian, had been discussed in Paris by the joint delegations, which ultimately listed the many points on which there was agreement and the several outstanding issues on which consensus was not achieved. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 33-35, July 28-Aug. 1, 1919. 82 Banaktsutiunner, pp. 38—44; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” V, no. 2 (1937), 58-61.

2 7 6

T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

November 4 until the Erevan government decided whether it still recog­ nized the National Delegation and the special mission as properly consti­ tuted Western Armenian bodies and whether the three negotiators on the other side were empowered to act in its behalf. In cautious and conciliatory terms, Vratzian answered that there had been no intention to deny the mission’s jurisdiction but simply a suggestion that the participation of all elements in the National Delegation would have been desirable. He and his two colleagues had full authority to conduct negotiations, which he hoped would soon resume. Premier Khatisian himself met with the two sides on November 11 to urge them back to the table, warning of the grave consequences of a rupture.83 Somewhat mollified, Tekeyan, Ter-Stepanian, and S. Harutiunian sub­ mitted their own position paper on November 13. Stating that the Dashnakist counterproposals regarding sectional representation were “more than satisfactory,” they regretted that the same was not true of the partisan aspects. In addition to earlier concessions, based on a desire for unity rather than on conviction, they would now proffer the following final modifications. Nubar Pasha would withdraw his bid for the premiership if he was named foreign minister or “supreme representative” of the Armenian republic as well as president of the peace delegation. The National Delegation might also assent to a cabinet of 5 Dashnakists, 4 non-Dashnakists, and 1 nonpartisan (the military minister) if decisions on vital issues were taken with a minimum of seven affirmative votes. Parlia­ ment need not recess until the budget had been adopted; then, while additional elections were being conducted and the Western Armenian deputies were journeying to Erevan, it could hold an emergency session for ratification of international monetary and diplomatic conventions. No compromise was possible, however, on the stipulation that Turkish Ar­ menia be designated as senior partner in the declaration of union.84 When plenary sessions resumed, Vratzian argued that the seeming concessions were nullified by the voting requirement for cabinet action and by the provision to adjourn the legislature for an unspecified period. There could be no change regarding a nine-member cabinet, with 5 Dashnakists and 4 non-Dashnakists, but Boghos Nubar would be named foreign minister and Parliament would be recessed for as long as two months. The liberation of Turkish Armenia had always been the main objective of Dashnaktsutiun and, although it would be ridiculous to pre­ tend that a nonexistent Turkish Armenian state was absorbing the Cauca83 Banaktsutiunner, pp. 45-57; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” V, no. 2 (1937), 62-67. 84 “Haikakan banaktsutiunner/’ V, no. 2 (1937), 68-72.

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sian Armenian republic, the declaration of union could be so phrased as to stress the historic importance of Turkish Armenia. Tekeyan and TerStepanian remained adamant, however, and curiously enough were most exercised by the wording of the announcement. Breaking with Samson Harutiunian, they explained that the National Delegation ascribed the utmost significance to this issue, since the historic, moral, and legal foun­ dations of the Turkish Armenian case were far stronger than those of the Russian Armenian case. After two days of futile discussion, Tekeyan concluded that the conference had reached an impasse. There was noth­ ing else to do but to acknowledge this unfortunate outcome.85 The final session was held on November 16. Both sides knew that failure to reach agreement would cause dissension among the communities abroad, yet neither would give way. Vahan Tekeyan stated that the disap­ pointing reception of the National Delegation’s plan left the mission no alternative but to halt the negotiations and let the National Delegation decide what to do next. Simon Vratzian, also sullen, regretted that the counterproposals and concessions made by his side had not satisfied the National Delegation. The meeting was adjourned with mutual expressions of hope that the absence of a formal accord would not prevent close collaboration in the common struggle for a free, united, and independent Armenia.86 Rather than a united government, the negotiations simply brought greater distrust and confusion. Before leaving Erevan on November 24, Tekeyan and Ter-Stepanian released a public statement revealing their anger and frustration and promising that the National Delegation would continue to seek unification.87 On the other side, Vratzian wrote the Dashnakist central committee of America that the failure of the conference would evoke recriminations, and he urged his comrades “to participate in no way—or at least with extreme caution and reserve—in this campaign.” If the attacks became vicious, publication of the conference minutes without comment would be the most effective response. It was shameful, he continued, that the Armenians had been 85 Banaktsutiunner, pp. 58-62; “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” VI, no. 1 (1938), 96-101; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8b/ 8b. The National Delegation’s fear that the Turkish Armenian case would be jeopardized by linkage with the complex Russian problem through undue emphasis on the Russian Armenian republic at Erevan had previously been expressed by Tekeyan and Chobanian during a session of the joint delegations in Paris. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 31, July 17, 1919. 86 “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” VI, no. 1 (1938), 101-102; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8b! 8b. 87 Zhoghovurd, Nov. 27, 1919; FO 371/3660, 165450/512/58 end., FO 371/3666, 168733/ 1015/58 end.

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unable to show the world that they were united: “And in the final analysis, as the minutes will bear out, how minor are the issues that separate us at this moment.”88 Khatisian wrote Boghos Nubar on December 9 that the few remaining differences could and should have been reconciled; the problem was more a matter of trust than of principle. With no intent to cast blame, he pointed out that the minutes would show that the representatives of the Armenian republic had accepted the National Delegation’s plan as the basis for negotiations and then put forward modifications to make it more con­ sistent with existing conditions. If the National Delegation would study the transcripts, it would have to acknowledge the legitimacy of those modifica­ tions: a limited parliamentary recess; election of fifty-one additional West­ ern Armenian deputies; appointment of Boghos Nubar as both delegation president and foreign minister; organization of a coalition cabinet with a bare Dashnakist majority and selection of all ministers by mutual consent; and declaration of a voluntary uniôn of Eastern and Western Armenia. Khatisian urged Nubar to exert his influence to forestall an ugly public debate that would polarize the Armenian communities and give the false impression that Armenians held divergent national political aspirations.89 Fears about the exacerbation of intra-Armenian discord were not un­ founded. Shortly after Tekeyan and Ter-Stepanian had reported to Boghos Nubar, the Ramkavar press bitterly accused the Dashnaktsutiun of an insatiable lust for power and the Dashnakist spokesmen in Paris of duplicity, for even while publicly appealing for unity they had secretly been undermining the negotiations in Erevan. Dashnakist papers replied by publishing the conference minutes and castigating the small wealthy classes and the Ramkavar party for wanting at least half of everything, for disregarding the will of the people, and for perpetuating the notion that there could be a separate Turkish Armenian or Russian Armenian cause.90 Hnchakist journalists noted that the outcome was not unexpected because the negotiations had been left to “Dashnakist schoolmasters” and bourgeois conservatives obsessed with percentages and numbers. And why had Nubar’s delegation, which claimed to represent all Western Armenians, excluded Hnchaks and Reformed Hnchaks from the mission to Erevan while including the Eastern Armenian Populist party?91 Reformed Hnchak-Azatakan newspapers also criticized the National 88 Vratzian, Hin tghter, pp. 305—306. 89 “Haikakan banaktsutiunner,” VI, no. 1 (1938), 102-104. 90 Pahaky Jan.-Feb. 1920. For rebuttals by the Dashnaktsutiun, see Hairenik, Jan. 31:1-2, Feb. 5:2, 6:2, 7:2, 8:2, 10:2, 11:2, 20:1, 1920. 91 Erkir, Dec. 16:1, 1919\ Eritasard Hayastan, Feb. 14, 25, 1920.

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Delegation’s lack of circumspection and questioned whether a merger with the Ramkavar party could be consummated under the shadow of this affront.92 The clamor in the partisan press had no perceptible effect on the Allied Powers, whose approach to the Eastern problem was largely unrelated to Armenian internal affairs. Allied decisions, on the other hand, did influ­ ence the strategies of Armenian political bodies. Hence, after the Allies extended de facto recognition to the Armenian republic early in 1920, Boghos Nubar asked Populist leaders Samson Harutiunian and Arshaluis Mkhitarian in March to go to Erevan and conclude on behalf of the National Delegation an agreement based on the terms outlined in Premier Khatisian’s letter.93 As it happened, conditions in Armenia had changed so much that neither the government nor the Dashnakist party reacted to Nubar’s gesture with jubilation. By that time the long-awaited American decision on an Armenian mandate had become anticlimactic and the European Allies were rapidly retreating from earlier projections of a large nation-state encompassing all of Russian and Turkish Armenia and possibly even Cilicia. 92 Aravot (Constantinople), April 12, 1920; Hairenik, Nov. 30:2, 1919, May 26:1-2, 1920. 93 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 77-78, Jan. 28, 1920; Near East News, March 3:2, 1920; Darbinian, op. cit., pp. 426-428; Jizmejian, op. cit.y pp. 404-407; Haradj, Feb. 19:2, March 14:1,21:2, 1920; Hairenik, Feb. 27:1-2, 28:2, May 26:2, 1920; Vent, VI, no. 1 (1938), 105-109\ KochnakHayastani, XX (Feb. 28, 1920), 276-277.

10

The Workings of Government

Until the Allied Powers determined the boundaries of the new Armenian state and provided means to safeguard them, a comprehensive adminis­ trative system could not evolve. The Erevan government, in control of only a small part of the territory that presumably would fall within those boundaries, concentrated therefore on the immediate goal of sustaining the existing population. Yet the slow pace of the Paris Peace Conference made some modifications in the state machinery essential. By the end of the first parliamentary session in January 1920, it was possible to judge the effectiveness of this reorganization and to assess the workings of government. The Council of Ministers and the Parliament On August 10, 1919, Premier Alexandre Khatisian outlined his cabinet’s objectives in Parliament. Although every domestic problem was aggra­ vated by the Allied failure to deal with Turkish intrigue and impose a stringent treaty, the government, he said, would hold to its Western orien­ tation. Relief work would continue to have priority, but the Council of Ministers would also strive to get rid of tsarist bureaucratic practices, extend popular democracy through cooperative associations and local government agencies, begin land reforms by nationalizing large estates, decrease indirect taxes and introduce a graduated income tax, and attract foreign investments.1 1Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 10:2-3, 13: l > 14:1—2> 19:2» 20:1-2, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 25:1-2, 19 19280

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2 8 1

While Dashnakist deputies in Parliament applauded the program as being realistic, Social Revolutionary Arsham Khondkarian accused Khatisian of propounding a strange combination of bourgeois and socialist ideas and of neglecting such vital issues as separation of church and state, fundamental economic reforms, and relations with Russia. Furthermore, the premier had not defined the extent, form of government, or ethnic composition of so-called united Armenia. Dependence on the imperialist powers would bring colonial exploitation rather than national freedom. The Social Revolutionary faction could support the goal of united Ar­ menia within modest limits, but this goal was attainable only through federative bonds with the Russian democracy. In turn, Dashnakist Arshak Djamalian ridiculed the SRs and all other “faint-hearted intellectuals” who would compromise the ideal of full independence. The legislature then accepted Khatisian’s program with only two dissenting votes.2 At forty-five years of age, Alexandre Khatisian was by disposition and experience a man of government. Laying aside a medical degree early in his career, he had entered the public arena, becoming mayor of Tiflis and president of the Union of Caucasian Cities. After the Russian revolutions he served on the Armenian National Council, on the several peace mis­ sions, in the Transcaucasian federative government, as foreign minister in Kachaznuni’s coalition cabinet, and from April 1919 as acting premier of the Armenian republic.3 Although only Dashnakists, except for the military minister, entered his cabinet, Khatisian wanted his party to uphold the government without interfering in its day-to-day operations and believed that appointments to civil service should be based on talent and training. Hence every state ministry included nonpartisans, Populists, Social Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats, several of them division and bureau chiefs. Khatisian’s Dashnakist critics objected to dependence on cumbersome democratic procedures and the seeming reluctance to sweep away the tsarist class structure. Swift, revolutionary action, not sterile legalisms, held the key to Armenian survival. Moreover, the enlistment of so many comrades in governmental work hindered the rebuilding of the 2 Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 21:3, 22:3, 1919. 3 For a biographical sketch of Khatisian, see Gabriel Lazian, Demker hai azatagrakan sharzhumen (Cairo, 1949), pp. 304—313. See also Hushapatum H. H. Dashnaktsutian, 1890—1950, ed. S. Vratzian, publ. of the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun (Boston, 1950), pp. 537-540. Khati­ sian’s memoirs for the period he served as mayor of Tiflis have been published as “Kaghakapeti me hishataknere,” Hairenik Amsagir, X-XI (May 1932-March 1933). An eloquent speaker, Khatisian was noted for deflecting criticism by turning attention, with his captivating style, to deeply emotional issues affecting all political parties and the nation as a whole. See S. Torosian, “Hayastani Hanrapetutian orerun (Aleksandr Khatisiani shrdjane),” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXI (Aug. 1952), 44-50.

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party and threatened to taint it with the inevitable shortcomings of the existing handicapped administration.4 By and large, Khatisian’s views prevailed; under his direction the departments of government gained increasing independence from the party. Although the composition of the cabinet remained stable during the first session of Parliament, the ministries underwent significant reorganization. Armenian specialists coming from abroad were warmly welcomed, not only because the Republic needed well-trained officials but also because their arrival seemed to betoken the homeward turn of affluent and resourceful Armenians from Tiflis, Baku, Rostov-Nakhichevan, Moscow, Petrograd, Constantinople, and other cities of the dispersion. The Council of Ministers was answerable, as in the West, to the Parlia­ ment (Khorhrdaran). Elected in June and convened in August 1919, that body was strikingly different from its predecessor, the provisional legisla­ ture (Khorhurd), which had been organized by mutual agreement of the four constituent parties, with only eighteen of the forty-five seats appor­ tioned to the Dashnaktsutiun. The new Parliament included neither Populists nor Social Democrats, and all except eight of the eighty seats had gone to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. The huge Dashnakist majority was not, however, so overwhelming as might have been expected, for during the first sitting of Parliament, between August 1, 1919, and January 12, 1920, more than twenty deputies were still abroad and an equal number were absent at one time or another on assignments in various parts of the Republic and in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, on September 20 Parliament ruled that the voting privileges of a member would be suspended while he was serving in the cabinet, a provision subsequently extended to include deputies collaborating with the military ministry in the integration of volunteer detachments into the regular army.5 As the Dashnaktsutiun had become the ruling party with the opportu­ nity to implement reforms, internal philosophical differences, which had been overshadowed by the struggle for emancipation, soon emerged. While Dashnakist groupings in Parliament shifted on specific issues, a general pattern was discernible. The dozen Western Armenians tended toward social conservatism and ardent nationalism. Frequently speaking for them, Vahan Papazian (Korns), a former deputy in the Ottoman 4 For a discussion of the “dualism” created in the party and of the popular desire for strong authority in government, see Ruben [Ter-Minasian], Hai heghapokhakani me hishataknere, VII (Los Angeles, 1951), 226-236, 271-280, 340-343. See ibid., pp. 271-339, for Ter-Minasian’s evaluation of Khatisian’s cabinet and the individual ministries. 5 Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, Orenkneri havakadsu, publ. of the Parliament of Armenia, 1919 series, no. 2, doc. 28, no. 4, doc. 39, no. 5, doc. 55. See also Haradj, Sept. 2113, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 11:2, 1919.

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parliament, called for immediate de-Russification of the administrative apparatus and cautioned against deficit spending and radical socioeco­ nomic reforms. Garo Sassuni, drawing upon the party’s populist heritage, assailed the prevailing bureaucratic methods and insisted that the govern­ ment should be founded on the healthy instincts of the peasantry. The Western Armenian deputies collectively reflected the hurt of a proud people consigned to a refugee existence among compatriots who seemed indifferent to their tragic circumstances. At the other extreme, a few Eastern Armenian deputies such as Avetis Ohandjanian never fully disa­ vowed the SR formula of federation with Russia. A strong central position was taken by intellectuals who were dedicated to socialism yet imbued with intense nationalism. Nourished on Russian culture and steeped in the philosophy of internationalism, men like Vahan Khoreni, Arshak Djamalian, and Simon Vratzian nonetheless fervently embraced the goal of united and independent Armenia. There were also a few individuals who might be labeled antiparliamentary militants. Impatient in times of crisis with protracted legislative processes, Ruben Ter-Minasian’s follow­ ers would occasionally shout, “Burn your rotten statutes and lawbooks and establish the revolutionary order.” Although intraparty differences were not concealed in the parliamentary debates, the Dashnakist whips were able, time and again, to muster almost unanimous votes of confidence for Khatisian’s cabinet.6 The three Muslim deputies took an active role in the sessions only when foreign dignitaries were present or the racial issue was debated. Much more vocal as champions of racial and religious harmony, the four Social Revolutionaries—Arsham Khondkarian, Levon Tumanian, Davit Zubian, and Vahan Minakhorian—often asked whether the government had any knowledge of punitive expeditions against Muslim villages and whether it intended to defend the rights of all inhabitants of the Armenian republic. They decried Dashnakist chauvinism and called for a new, multi­ national federated Russian democracy, but even they could not entirely dispel an inner urge toward national sovereignty. When Sargis Araratian joined the cabinet on August 10, Parliament was 6 For subsequent criticisms of the Dashnaktsutiun and the Armenian government by former party members and state officials, see, for example, Hovhannes Kachaznuni, H. H. Dashnak­ tsutiune anelik chuni ailevs (Vienna, 1923); Gerasim and G. Torosian, Inchu hrazharetsank? (Paris, 1928); G. Chalkhushian, Inch er ev inch piti Uni mer ughin? ([Vienna], 1923). Replies by ARF loyalists include, for example, Vahan Navasardian, Inch cher ev inch piti chlini mer ughin (Cairo, 1923); S. Vratzian, Kharkhapumner (Boston, 1924); Arshak Djamalian, “H. Kadjaznunin ev H. H. Dashnaktsutiune,” Hairenik Amsagir, II (Jan.-July 1924); R. Darbinian (Chilingarian), Mer pataskhane H. Kadjaznunii (Boston, 1923). For other critical accounts of the party and government, see Levon Tiutiunjian, H. H. Dashnaktsutiune ibrev petahan gordson (1918— 1920) (Constantinople, 1921); Avetis Yapunjian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian kaghakakan, zinvorakan, tntesakan, enkerayin hatsutiune (Cairo, 1972).

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left without a speaker. The other vice-president, Levon Shant (Seghbosian), had not yet arrived from Europe, and Avetis Aharonian, who had been named president to enhance his prestige at Paris, was not expected home until after the signing of the Turkish peace treaty. Hovsep Arghutian, the eldest deputy not having cabinet duties, acted as speaker until Sirakan Tigranian was elected to fill the vacancy in mid-September.7After Avetik Sahakian relinquished his cabinet post in November, he, too, was made a vice-president and thereafter wielded the gave! alternately with Tigranian and Shant, who finally reached Erevan at the end of that month.8 While numerous issues were debated in the first session of Parliament, most of the bills were referred to one of twelve standing committees for further study: legislative, finance, provisions, local self-government, land, welfare and labor, repatriation and reconstruction, education, military, medical-sanitary, general assistance, and formal drafting. Of the 137 pieces of legislation adopted, most dealt with specific immediate needs such as allocations and credits or with the functions of the cabinet and legislature. The only acts bearing directly on foreign relations were the ratifications of the transit and arbitration treaties with Georgia. In sum, the debates between August and January covered all issues, but legislative action concentrated on organizational and fiscal matters.9 In mid-October Oliver Wardrop made his first visit to Armenia since 1910, this time as chief British commissioner in Transcaucasia. His lengthy report on the circular journey, Karakilisa—Erevan—Etchmiadzin— Nor-Bayazit—Lake Sevan—Dilijan—Karakilisa, describing the agony of the country and the character of its leaders, may serve as a preface to an evaluation of the several government ministries. Two days in Erevan left an indelible impression: The aspect of the city is pitiful. The streets are ill-kept, the wind carries clouds of infected dust. Everywhere there are wretched refugees in rags—hungry, diseased, demoralized.. . . During my short visit I saw in different places two men lying on the ground dying of hunger and exhaustion, and the appearance of some of the children was very painful to see; they are picking up refuse in the streets and eating it. The shops were bare of goods, and almost the only food for sale in fair quantities was fruit and melons. Among a population in this plight the common instincts of pity, cleanliness, and family affection are dimmed; people are selling 7 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919. no. 1, docs. 2, 4; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 20:3, 1919; Haradj, Sept. 21:3, 1919. 8H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 1, doc. 15, no. 5, doc. 52; Haradj, Nov. 6:3, 1919. 9 See Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919 series, nos. 1—10, 1920 series, nos. 1-2.

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their children for prostitution, robbery with violence had become frequent, and on both the nights when I was in Erivan I heard a lively and frequent interchange of rifle and revolver fire between the militia and bandits. Erivan at present is more depressing than any place I have ever seen.10

Wardrop found Catholicos Gevorg V “a strong personality of striking appearance,” but he was grieved by conditions at the Etchmiadzin monas­ tery: “The buildings are sadly in need of repair, the fine trees have all been cut down, and what was formerly the peaceful, well-kept abode of cul­ tured scholars is now, to a great extent, given up to miserable refugees. Yet, both here and in Erivan, I was told the situation was far better than it had been; at one time, when the Turks were within 5 miles of Erivan, there were on the plain between Etchmiadzin and Ararat 200,000 ref­ ugees, and as many as 900 died in one day.” It was consoling, however, that the Armenian leaders were dedicated and did not set themselves apart: “I may mention that the President [Khatisian] lives in a very modest way in a small apartment over an apothecary’s shop, though he has a handsome house in Erivan (now given up to refugee work), and the Ministers generally are very poorly housed. The heroic old General, Thomas Nazarbekoff, Commander-in-chief, seemed to have only one poor room for himself.” Having attended a session of Parliament, Wardrop wrote: “The deputies seemed to be serious, well-educated, and business-like; there were three women among them.”11 The British commissioner concluded with a searching appraisal of Ar­ menia and the Armenians: After the comparative comfort of Tiflis and the positive luxury of Baku it was painful to see the misery of Armenia. Not only have the people reached the limit of physical privation and suffering, but their moral character has been put under a strain which has in many cases passed the breaking point, and in all has produced lamentable results which must last for a long time. I cannot wonder that our American friends hesitate to take the mandate for such a country where for many years no return seems likely for the financial and other aid indispensable to make human life tolerable. Yet the Armenian people have a stubborn power of resis­ tance, an indomitable tendency to steady work (qualities in which they remind me of the Bulgarians), so that they will certainly “make good” if they have any kind of chance. They are not, perhaps, an easy people to get on with, especially at present; they are (according to some of themselves) generally devoid of anything like “charm,” rather one-sided in their views, indisposed to admit that they have any faults of character or conduct, excessively individualist (not to say “egoistic”), but they are 10 Copies of this report are in Britain, FO 371/3660, 154611/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/ 20063 end.; FO 608/79, 342/1/12/21114 end. "Ibid.

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very clever, hardworking, thrifty, frugal people who cannot fail to achieve physical well-being and prosperity when an opportunity is given them. In any case, they have been faithful allies, and have fought with a bravery and endurance which must for ever close the mouths of those who formerly slandered them, and said that it was their métier to be massacred unresisting, and which justifies their claim to a free political life for which they have a decided aptitude.12

Internal Affairs The Ministry of Internal Affairs, with jurisdiction over the civil adminis­ tration, militia, and transportation agencies, remained a cornerstone of the cabinet, even after several departments were shifted to other minis­ tries in the spring and summer of 1919. Abraham Giulkhandanian, though lacking specific training to head the ministry, was a seasoned organizer with an intimate knowledge of the country and had been chair­ man of the multiparty Baku Armenian National Council during the de­ fense of eastern Transcaucasia in ,1918. His assistant minister, Sargis Manasian, had collaborated with Aram Manukian in forming the Ar­ menian directorate at Erevan in 1917-1918 at a time when most other Dashnakist leaders were still in Tiflis building their strategy around the Transcaucasian Commissariat and Seim.13 Responsible for public order and security, the ministry bore the brunt of the widespread indignation over the arbitrary and extortionary acts of militia chiefs and village and district commissars, many of whom had used their local power base to keep themselves in office. Dashnakist newspa­ pers, no less than the Populist and Social Revolutionary press, demanded the ouster of these venal officials. Investigatory parliamentary commis­ sions confirmed that in several counties the small wealthy class still manipulated village commissars and militias, that peasants were often forced to sell their crops in advance to speculators for a few sacks of flour, and that the level of disaffection was critical. Hakob Ter-Hakobian, senior secretary of the legislature and head of the Nor-Bayazit commission, reported that the eighty-eight villages and 72,000 inhabitants in the semiarid district around Lake Sevan had suffered severely from Muslim raids and from the lack of appreciable assistance, as even the few shipments of sacked flour from Batum were seized by pilferers, who adulterated the contents with dirt and rocks before delivery. Eprem Sargsian noted that 12 Ibid. For a description of W ardrop’s arrival in Erevan from an Armenian viewpoint, see S. Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V (Beirut, 1966), 60-62. 13 See Hovannisian, Road to Independence, chaps. 8-9; A. Giulkhandanian, “Bakvi herosam arte”Hairenik Amsagir, XIX (July-Oct. 1941). Manasian was killed in May 1920 by Bolshevik insurgents. For a biographical sketch, see Lazian, op. cit.f pp. 218-220. See also the evaluation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs by Ruben, op. cit., pp. 311-318.

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morale was higher in nearby Daralagiaz because of the successful stand against the repeated Muslim attacks from Sharur and the incorruptibility of the county commissar at Keshishkend (Eghegnadzor). Economic de­ cline had been so drastic, however, that only 30,000 short-horned animals were left in this natural grazing land, and, unless flour and other necessi­ ties were received before the winter snows closed the road from Karanlugh in Nor-Bayazit over the Selim chain to Daralagiaz, more than 15,000 refugees and destitute native inhabitants would perish. Sahak Torosian of the Etchmiadzin commission drew a dismal picture of human and animal decimation and to environmental destruction. Whereas the army had done a fine job in the district and showed exemplary behavior, the militia was unreliable and the civil administration was directed by officials who had little knowledge of and even less interest in local condi­ tions. According to Armenak Maksapetian, however, the most scandalous situation existed at Dilijan. Although the fifty-four villages and 70,000 inhabitants of that district had been spared the Turkish devastations of 1918, they were now suffering under commissar Mesrop Bek Asratikian, who flouted the interior ministry’s directives and shielded bands of ruffi­ ans and rustlers, including one led by his brother.14 Mesrop Bek and other corrupt officials were removed from office and some particularly errant incumbents were tried and sentenced, but only total reorganization of the administrative hierarchy would solve the prob­ lem. Until then it was necessary to rely on corrective measures such as the establishment of academies and refresher courses for militiamen and civil servants, of higher pay scales to discourage extortion and bribery, and of a bureau of ethnic affairs to study the history, culture, and social customs of the national minorities and devise a program to encourage their partici­ pation in the life of the Republic.1516 The liberalization of municipal charters and the introduction of zem14 Haradj, Jan 3:3, 4:4, 6:3-4, 7:1-2, 9:3, Feb. 1:1, 7:2, 1920. For portrayals by Soviet Armenian authors of the tragic conditions in the country during the period of Dashnakist ascendancy, see, for example, Haikakan SSR, Gitutiunneri Akademia, Patmutian Institut, Hai zhoghovrdi patmutiun, ed. A. G. Hovhannisian et al., VII (Erevan, 1967), 49-62; Ds. P. Aghayan, Hoktemberian revoliutsian ev hai zhoghovrdi azatagrume (Erevan, 1957), pp. 193—202; V. G. Kzartmian, “Dashnakneri hakazhoghovrdakan kaghakakanutiune Hayastanum, 1918-1920 t t Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 2d yr., no. 1 (1961), 7-16; O. Balikian, V. Evoyan, and G. Sargsian, “Ashkhatavorneri paikare Dashnaktsakan tirapetutian dem,” Banber Hayastani ar­ khivneri, 7th yr., no. 2 (1967), 3-22, and “Hayastani bnakchutian sotsial-tntesakan vijake Sovetakan kargeri hastatman nakhoriakin (1918—1920 tt.),” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 1oth yr., no 2 (1970), 59-82. 16 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun gordsuneutian Hayastani karavarutian, 1919 t. hoktemberi l-its minchev mayis 5, 1920 t.,” pt. 1; H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 7, doc. 82; Haradj, Sept. 23:3, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 30:2, 1920.

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stvos were the most significant steps toward decentralization during Giulkhandanian’s tenure in office. The Dashnaktsutiun, a consistent advocate of regional autonomy, maintained that the transfer of authority to munici­ pal and rural boards would foster popular democracy, check the powers of commissars and police, and decrease bureaucracy at the national level. Municipal charters based on a small electorate of wealth and property had been granted the Caucasian cities under Russian rule, but the right of local initiative had been withheld from rural areas. In 1919, therefore, it was less difficult to broaden the electoral base and prerogatives of municipal bodies.16 Even though Armenia’s three major cities, Erevan, Alexandropol, and Kars, had been seriously damaged during the war, their city councils displayed extraordinary vitality. The municipality of Erevan, headed by Mkrtich Musinian, functioned through the departments of administra­ tion, city economy, labor, public works, enlightenment, provisions, and refugee affairs; it maintained three'schools, a reading room, a hospital, an orphanage, and several textile, soap, and leather plants; and it launched a beautification project under the supervision of Alexandre Tamanian, a distinguished architect and erstwhile president of the council of the Petrograd Academy of Arts. Mayor Hovhannes Melkonian of Alex­ andropol, the all-Armenian city at the hub of the country’s communica­ tion network, boasted seven municipal schools and four kindergartens, a large public library, and a cultural center in which nearly a hundred performances were given in 1919. Led by Hamazasp Norhatian, the Kars city council concentrated on clearing the rubble and reviving business activity after the Turkish withdrawal, installing water lines and electrical lighting, and operating bakeries for thousands of dependent repatriates and refugees.1617 The bylaws for a union of cities, drafted in October 1919 by a commis­ sion headed by Musinian, were adopted by the first congress of Armenian cities, which convened at Erevan on January 4, 1920. The weeklong meet­ ing passed resolutions outlining procedures for placing the militia under municipal supervision, increasing local production and distribution, in16 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie en vingt mois,’’ pt. 16, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . pt. 1; Haradj Jan. 15:2, 1920. 17 Ashkhatavor, Nov. 11:4, 1919, Jan. 14:3, 17:3, 1920; Haradj, Jan. 13:4, 23:2, 1920; Hairenik, Dec. 25:1, 1919, Jan. 17:3, 1920. Arshaluis Astvadsatrian, a native of Erevan who played an integral role in the civic and political life of the city, has provided valuable biograph­ ical information about prominent officials of the time. For his description of the mayor of Erevan, see “Mkrtich Musinian,’’ Heghapokhakan Alpom, ed. Avo [Tumayan], VII, no. 10 ( 1969), 259- 263.

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stituting adult education, improving sanitation, alleviating urban conges­ tion, and regulating expenditures. The problem lay not in identifying the needs but rather in finding the means to deal with them. The congress nonetheless was praised by the press for bringing government by the people one step closer.18 Rural self-administration through district and county zemstvo assem­ blies had long been an objective of liberal and revolutionary societies in the Caucasus. The Russian Provisional Government in 1917 and the Transcaucasian Seim in 1918 accepted the system in principle, but neither endured long enough to bring it into being. At the end of 1918 the Armenian legislature endorsed communal autonomy (hamainakan inknavarutiun), and in May 1919 the Council of Ministers issued regulations for the introduction of zemstvos in the counties of Erevan, Etchmiadzin, Surmalu, Alexandropol, Dilijan, Nor-Bayazit, and Daralagiaz. Actual or­ ganization of the assemblies took place while Giulkhandanian headed the interior ministry. Doing away with class restrictions that had been a fea­ ture of the Russian zemstvo statutes, the ministry granted unprecedented initiative powers to the basic levels of society. Zemstvo specialists were hired to explain the system to the public and to arrange for the election of district (uchastok; gavarak ) assemblies, which in turn would select county (uezd ; gavar ) assemblies.19 The first elections were held in January 1920 in the counties of Erevan, Etchmiadzin, and Alexandropol, with slates submitted by the Dashnakist, Populist, Social Revolutionary, and Social Democrat Labor parties and several peasant unions. As in other contests, however, most of the candidates were intellectuals or prominent party figures. Not surprisingly, the Dashnaktsutiun dominated all the assemblies, the Social Revolutionaries formed a small but vocal minority, and the bourgeois Populists and the proletariat-oriented Social Democrats gained only nominal representation.20 In the three electoral districts of Erevan (Akhta, Kanaker, Khamarlu), for example, the Dashnakist ticket received 18,493 votes, the SR, 2,459, and the Populist, 364. At Alexandropol, on the other hand, the election of a large bloc of peasant deputies critical of the government may have been the first substantive indication of disaffection from the Dashnaktsutiun and disillusion with its 18 For detailed reports on the work of the congress, see Haradj and Zhoghovurd, Jan. 3-31, 1920. See also Ashkhatavor, Jan. 8:2, 13:3, 17*3, 1920. 19 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun .. . ,” pt. 1; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 3:3-4, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 21:1, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 22:1, 3, 1920; Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, Karavarakan Iratu, publ. of Council of Ministers, no. 26 (Erevan, 1919). 20 For the party lists and related announcements, see Haradj, Jan. 13:1, 14:1, 15:1, 17:2, 25:1, 1920.

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cautious agrarian program. In any event, the district elections in January and the meeting of the first county assembly in February were regarded as impressive accomplishments in Khatisian’s administrative reform program.21 Because of their obvious bearing on state security, the Chief Railway Administration and the Post-Telegraph Agency were attached to the Min­ istry of Internal Affairs. By the beginning of 1920 several thousand work­ men had repaired 1,400 versts (928 miles) of telegraph, started new lines to link Erevan directly with Karakilisa and Kars and with Goris over the Keshishkend-Angelaut route, established the first intercity telephone sys­ tem with service between Erevan and Etchmiadzin (Vagharshapat), up­ graded the Nor-Bayazit—Keshishkend road for motor traffic, rerouted several hazardous stretches of railway, and repaired damaged stations between Alexandropol and Etchmiadzin.22The old Erevan station, several versts from the heart of the city, was linked by a spur line to a centrally located new depot. Starting in November, daily direct passenger service connected Erevan with Alexandropol, Sanahin, and Tiflis and Alexandropol with Kars and Sarikamish. Gevorg Beriants, formerly chief technician for the Transcaucasian railways, took the same position in Armenia, and additional mechanics and engineers arrived from abroad to work in auto and rail garages in Alexandropol and Kars. The professional union of railway employees, headed by Zarmair Nikoghosian, operated elementary and technical schools at Alexandropol and Karakilisa, offered courses to train station masters, railway agents, and conductors, and was able to exert considerable influence in the legislative and finance committees of Parliament.23 The railway and post-telegraph agencies grew so rapidly that in January 1920 Parliament sanctioned the formation of a separate ministry of com­ munications with divisions for railways, roads, railway militia, post-tele­ graph and telephone, and ground and water transport.24 With Arshak 21 Ibid., Jan. 28:3, 30:1—2, Feb. 3:2, 7:1, 27:2, March 2:2, 6:1, 1920. According to Near East News, Feb. 20:4, 1920, 12 of the 45 members of the Alexandropol zemstvo were nonDashnakists. See also FO 371/4950, E2428/36/58 end. 22 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d ’Arménie pts. 17-18, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 6, File 22/22; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 28:2, Nov. 11:4, 1919; Haradj, Nov. 5:3, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 31:2, Dec. 25:2, 1919; H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920 series, no. 2, doc. 15. 23 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 12:3, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 18:3, Nov. 13:3, 14:3, 1919 \ Haradj, Nov. 5:3, 1919, Jan. 4:3, 1920; Hairenik, Dec. 5:2, 1919. 24 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arm énie. . . , ” pt. 20; H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 2, docs. 14, 20; Haradj, Feb. 12, 1920. For documents relating to the unrest among communications workers, see Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 279-283, 286-292, 297. Shortly after the Ministry of Communications was organized, the post-tele-

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Djamalian entering the cabinet as the first minister of communications,2526 the newspapers reflected happily upon the salutary effect produced by the influx of specialists, proudly described the new “European-style” depot at Alexandropol, expressed hope that dependence on Azerbaijan for fuel might soon be relieved through exploitation of the coal fields around Olti, and applauded the appointment of a commission to study the country’s hydraulic resources with an eye toward eventual conversion to electrically operated railways.26 Judicial Affairs The Ministry of Judicial Affairs, like all other departments of govern­ ment, functioned in accordance with the Russian code of laws (Svod zakonov) as modified by the Provisional Government, the Transcaucasian Commissariat and Seim, and the Armenian legislature. Although the judicial reform of 1864 had consolidated and simplified Russian criminal and civil codes, progressive features such as trial by jury had never been extended to the Armenian provinces. The deep-rooted distrust of the courts among the Armenian masses also grew out of the inability to com­ prehend litigation in a foreign language, the terrifying preliminary inves­ tigations, which the police frequently turned into inquisitions to exact confessions, and the bleak prospect of gaining favorable decisions without influential intermediaries. There were no courts of cassation in the prov­ inces of Kars and Erevan, and appeal to the Palace of Justice (Sudebnaya palata) at Tiflis was beyond most people. In December 1918 the Armenian legislature adopted a plan for a na­ tional judicial system, with elected tribunals of conciliation to handle small claims and minor disputes, trial by jury in more important civil and crimi­ nal cases, and a legal hierarchy capped by circuit courts of the first instance (Shrdjanayin dataran), the Palace of Justice (Datastanakan palat) as the appellate court, and the Senate (Dserakuit) as the supreme court of cassation.27 Since only the Erevan Circuit Court existed in 1918, Samson graph and telephone division was made an autonomous section and transferred to Alexan­ dropol. See Ashkhatavor, Jan. 16:2, 1920. 25 For biographical sketches of Djamalian, a powerful socialist orator and party leader, see Lazian, op. cit., pp. 286-302; Hushapatum H. H. Dashnaktsutian, pp. 506-512. 26 See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . , ” pt. 6. See also Ashkhatavor, Sept. 21:3, 1919. 27 For the laws adopted by Armenia’s first legislative body, the Khorhurd, see the appendix entitled “Hayastani Khorhrdi hastatads orenknere, 1918-1919,” in S. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928). The legislation regarding the organization of the national judicial system is given on pp. 524-527. See also Haradj, Jan. 9:4, 1920; Vardges Aharonian, ‘Datarane Hayastani Hanrapetutian medj,” Hairenik Amsagir, XVII (May 1939), 126-130.

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Harutiunian, the Populist minister of justice in the coalition cabinet (December 1918— June 1919), concentrated on the organization of appellate courts, each with administrative, civil, and criminal divisions. While Abraham Giulkhandanian held the portfolios of both internal and judicial affairs (August 1919— January 1920), more attention was focused on lower courts.28Commissions of the ministry and of Parliament exposed appalling conditions in the prisons, chronic violations of preliminary investigative procedures and of the right of habeas corpus, the reluctance of witnesses to testify, and continuing public distrust of the courts, which still used the Russian language and seemed no different from, and perhaps even less just than, tsarist tribunals.29 In August the ministry issued directives requiring investigations and trials to be conducted promptly, inspectors to reside within their bailiwicks, and court officers to visit prisons weekly to hear complaints of wrongdoing. The number of conciliation tribunals was increased and after November 15 all primary courts of the first instance, except in'Ardahan, had to accept testimony in the Armenian language. Support for the rights of the accused in government circles and in the press apparently had some effect. By the end of 1919, for example, 903 of the 1,240 civil cases pending before the Etchmiadzin district court had been resolved, 352 through arbitration. Even though only 264 of the 600 criminal cases had been completed, all but 31 o f the remaining defendants had been released to await trial.30 While the shift to Armenian for judicial proceedings met with gradual success in the lower courts, nationalization of the circuit and appellate courts presented a more serious challenge. Many eminent jurists had been trained in the Russian system but were scarcely able to converse, let alone conduct trials, in Armenian. In preparation for the transition, language classes were organized for officers of the court, only candidates proficient in Armenian were appointed as new vacancies occurred, and a commis­ sion of scholars was created to compile a handbook of Armenian technical and legal terminology by utilizing classical Armenian law codes, making translations from other languages, and, when necessary, coining new words.31 Parliament, acting on the recommendation of the Council of 28 R ep. o f A rm . A rch iv e s, F ile 10/10, “H a m a ro t tesu tiu n . . . pt. 8. 29 S ee, fo r e x a m p le , Ashkhatavor, O ct. 17:3, 1919. S ee also R u b en , op. c i t p p . 287-290. 30 Haradj, Jan. 9:4, 13:3, 1920. 31 Nor Ashkhatavor, S ep t. 4 : 3 - 4 , 1919; Hairenik, N o v . 25:1-2, 1919. C o m m issio n e d by th e A rm en ia n g o v e r n m e n t, th e T iflis A r m e n ia n L a w y ers’ A sso cia tio n u n d e r to o k th e p rep a ra tio n o f a R u ssia n -A rm en ia n le g a l d ictio n a ry . C o n trib u to rs in c lu d e d sp ecialists A. K u sik ian a n d H . C h m sh k ia n (civil law ), G. Iu zb a sh ia n a n d H . A m irk h a n ia n (crim in al law ), an d S. T e r-M in a sia n (com m ercial a n d ta r iff law). M em b ers o f th e ed ito ria l b o a rd w er e M an u k A b e g h ia n , H a r u tiu n C h m sh k ia n , T ig r a n H o v h a n n isia n , A . K u sik ian , S te p a n M alkh asian , a n d A. P ap ovian .

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Ministers, encouraged the independence of the courts by adopting the principle of permanent tenure of judges on good behavior and establishing a salary scale higher than that for other departments or even for cabinet members.32 As the court of first instance in cases involving claims or penalties of more than 4,000 rubles or a prescribed punishment of more than six months, the Erevan Circuit Court, presided over by G. Geghamian, heard 2,383 civil and criminal cases in 1919 and held special sessions at Kars, Alexandropol, and Nor-Bayazit. Its responsibilities were augmented in January 1920 when Parliament dissolved the extraordinary tribunals formed during the Muslim uprisings and transferred their duties to the circuit court.33 The Palace of Justice, under the presidency of Hovsep Amirkhanian, began to function in the latter part of the year, confirming or reversing the verdicts in 91 criminal and 38 civil cases; the Senate or supreme court was still not sufficiently organized to render formal judgments.34 During the months that Giulkhandanian held two cabinet portfolios, the Ministry of Justice was attacked by conservatives and extreme socialists alike. Anti-Dashnakist critics objected to having both judicial and internal affairs directed by the same person, even though the principle of separa­ tion of powers required the judicial branch to guard the public against abuse by agencies of the interior ministry. The legal system would be a sham, they declared, so long as Dashnakist band leaders dispensed their own “justice” and influential party members could wangle releases or pardons for guilty comrades.36 And militants within the Dashnaktsutiun protested that perpetuation of the tsarist legal system would make it impossible to win over either the Eastern or Western Armenian masses, who had long shunned the courts as symbols of oppression and discrimination. The primitive and often harsh methods of popular justice would continue until the government adopted revolutionary codes of law responsive to the needs of the people. The existing judicial establishment, moreover, was packed with political opponents, including Bolshevik sympathizers, who disdained national independence and clung to their icons of Russianism. But such admonitions did not persuade the legislative majority to disavow the principle that competence, not tests of party loyalty, should be the primary qualification for appointment. At the 32 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 7, doc. 75; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . . ,” pt. 4; Ashkhatavor, June 15:3, Oct. 17:3, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 27:1, 1919. 33 Haradj, Jan. 28:4, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . . , ” pt. 4; H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 1, doc. 1. 34 Haradj, Jan. 9:4, 1920. 36 See G. A. Djaghetian, Motik antsialits (Erevan, 1967), pp. 21-23.

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beginning of 1920, therefore, Dashnakists serving in the Erevan Circuit Court, Palace of Justice, and Senate were decisively outnumbered.36 As the possibility of a new coalition cabinet dimmed and as the stalemate at the Paris Peace Conference continued, Parliament expanded the exist­ ing cabinet by creating three additional ministries—communications, la­ bor, and rural economy—and Prime Minister Khatisian named Artashes Chilingarian (Ruben Darbinian) to relieve Giulkhandanian of the port­ folio of judicial affairs. Ajurist and experienced publicist who was a native of Akhalkalak, Chilingarian had been sent to Moscow in mid-1918 by the Baku Armenian National Council to solicit Soviet Russian assistance in the defense of eastern Transcaucasia. Prevented from leaving Moscow after the fall of the Baku Soviet, he subsisted by translating textbooks for the Commissariat for Nationalities and Armenian prose and poetry for Mak­ sim Gorkii’s universal literature project. Finally, through the intercession of Bolshevik Sahak Ter-Gabrielian, Chilingarian was allowed to depart in August 1919. His four harrowing months getting through the Red and White armies and traveling on to the Caucasus made him disillusioned with both sides. As Armenia’s minister of judicial affairs, he was to gravi­ tate toward the hard-line stance of party militants.37 Upon entering the cabinet Chilingarian attempted to accelerate the nationalization of the judicial system by designating July 1, 1920, as the deadline for the changeover to Armenian in the higher courts and ruling that failure to pass a language examination by that date would be grounds for dismissal. He completed arrangements for the establishment of circuit courts at Kars and Alexandropol and proposed that Parliament create a Western Armenian judicial bureau to help organize the legal system of United Armenia.38 The legislation, adopted on March 1, charged the new bureau with studying personal and inheritance laws and other customary practices of the Western Armenians so that the spirit of those traditions would be retained in any new legislation.39 Armenia’s first trial by jury took place on March 15,1920. The case was simple and the jury returned a quick verdict, but there was much ado about the event. The newspapers hailed the trial as a judicial milestone, and in the courtroom Chilingarian and Khatisian spoke of its significance 36 Ruben, op. cit., pp. 287-290; Aharonian, op. cit. (Aug. 1939), pp. 76-78, (Oct. 1939), pp. 117-118, 120-125. 37 See Chilingarian’s memoirs, published under the name he later used, Ruben Darbinian, “A Mission to Moscow,” Armenian Review, I-II (Spring 1948-Summer 1949). See also Haradj, Jan. 13:3, 24:3, Feb. 1:2, 1920; Hairenik, Dec. 18:2, 1919. 38 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 10; H. H. Orehkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 8, docs. 77, 78; Haradj, Feb. 3:2,4:2,6:2, 1920; Hairenik, May 21:2,1920. 39 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 3, docs. 28, 40; Haradj, March 5:2, 1920.

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in the evolution of a democratic republic. The actual legal proceedings were awkward and even amusing, as the prosecutor, public defender, and judges of the tribunal groped for the appropriate Armenian terms, but there was above all a sense of exhilaration, for after centuries of submis­ sion to the courts and discriminatory regulations of alien powers, the Armenians had succeeded in introducing the jury system in their national language.40

Provisions and Finance In accepting the portfolios of provisions and finance, Sargis Araratian took on the two ministries most disadvantaged by Armenia’s monetary weakness. Although state procurement and distribution of goods could have been assigned to the finance and welfare ministries, the existence of a separate Ministry of Provisions was justified by the country’s extraordi­ nary needs. With some 90 million rubles budgeted in 1919, the ministry managed the state warehouses, made small quantities of seed-grain avail­ able to farmers, compiled relief rosters and operated field kitchens, and imported several trainloads of food, fuel, and hardware. Armenian de­ pendence on foreign aid, however, was borne out by statistics showing that these purchases amounted to less than 2 percent of the commodities shipped in by American relief agencies.41 During the latter part of the year many government officials argued for phasing out the provisions ministry, because it overlapped other depart­ ments and because conditions had improved. Moreover, irregularities such as disappearance of vital medications and profiteering by employees were topped by a major scandal. In December Simon Vratzian told Parlia­ ment that goods valued at only 14 million rubles had been shipped to Armenia in return for 48 million rubles sent by the erstwhile Populist provisions ministers to a commission of Tiflis Armenian merchants headed by Iurii A. Tamashev to purchase seed-grain in the North Cauca­ sus. The commission’s books revealed a muddled accounting system and exorbitant dispersals for items such as entertainment, services of inter­ mediaries, and chauffeur-driven automobiles. Tamashev’s explanation 40 Haradj, March 17:3, 18:1, 1920; Aharonian, op. cit. (Aug. 1939), pp. 78-80. On January 10, Parliament voted to introduce the jury system in the circuit courts, in addition to the primary courts of first instance. See Haradj, Feb. 1:2, 1920. Aharonian states, apparently in error, that the sitting of the Erevan Circuit Court began on March 1, 1920. 41 Haradj, Jan. 3:4, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République Arménienne .. . pt. 10.

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that turmoil in the Caucasus and strained relations between the Volunteer Army and Georgia had caused the losses did not quiet deputies demand­ ing trial of the “bourgeois bandits” who had fattened themselves at the expense of hungry workers and peasants. A parliamentary investigation subsequently produced additional evidence of gross ineptitude and prob­ able embezzlement, but Tamashev and his colleagues never ventured from Tiflis to Erevan to defend themselves.42 The scandal hastened the end of the provisions ministry. A legislative committee recommended that the finance minister and state controller supervise the liquidation, that the job of procurement be assigned to the finance ministry, and that distribution be handled by municipal and zemstvo bodies or by boards appointed by the welfare ministry. Parlia­ ment unanimously favored liquidation, but Hambardzum Terterian and spokesmen for the welfare ministry cautioned against thrusting too much responsibility upon rural bodies still in the formative process. The majori­ ty, however, supported Garo Sassuni’s position that the proposed change was a wise step toward administrative decentralization. The Ministry of Provisions was abolished in January 1920, leaving Sargis Araratian with only the portfolio of finance.43 The Ministry of Finance was undermined, not by dishonesty or moral turpitude, but by disruption of the economy and an unstable monetary system. As most of the population paid no direct taxes in 1919, total revenues from all levies combined came to no more than 10 million rubles, in contrast with expenditures of several hundred million rubles.44 Moreover, the proliferation of currency unsecured by precious metals spurred a galloping inflation. By agreement of the Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian governments in mid-1918, bank notes issued by the Transcaucasian Federative Republic had been apportioned among the three states; mutual consent would be required for any future printings, which would maintain the existing distribution ratio. In August 1919, however, first Georgia and then Azerbaijan compounded the monetary chaos by issuing additional currency unilaterally, and in November the Armenian legislature responded by authorizing the finance ministry to print 400 million rubles.45 By early 1920 a pood of wheat, which had sold 42 Ashkhatavor, Dec. 23:2, 1919, Jan. 8:1, 2, 14:2, 17:2, 1920; Erkir, Jan. 13:3, 21:1, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 225, Dec. 23, 1919. 43 Haradj, Jan. 3:1,9:2, 15:1,29:3, 1920; H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919,00, 10, doc. 116. 44 Haradj, Jan. 3:4, 1920; Hairenik, March 2:2, 1920. 46 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 6, docs. 58, 59; Erkir, Dec. 19:1, 1919: Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Feb. 14, 1920), 214-215; Haradj, April 15:2, 1920. See also Mushegh H. Adonts, Hayastani zhoghovrdakan tntesutiune ev hai tntesagitakan mitke XX dari skzbin (Erevan, 1968), pp. 485-487.

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for 350 rubles five months earlier, cost 1,200 rubles, and the exchange rate jumped to 580 rubles for an American dollar and 2,000 for a British pound sterling. Pay increases lagged far behind spiraling prices, pushing the public toward a barter economy and seriously affecting wage earners.46 Unable to stem the inflation, the government did establish price con­ trols on bread and meat and facilitated the growth of credit cooperatives and banking institutions, which were sufficiently organized by October to begin international transactions.47 With the intent of eventually retiring the bank notes in circulation, the finance ministry commissioned Arshak Fetvadjian, who designed an attractive new currency for Armenia, to arrange for a billion rubles to be printed by a London firm.48 Among various short-term measures, a state monopoly on the sale of cotton proved the most profitable because of the brisk demand by foreign trading firms for raw materials. In spite of widespread grower resentment and concealment, which forced Parliament to decree in November that all undelivered cotton would be subject to seizure at two-thirds the official price, at the end of the year the finance ministry shipped several thousand tons to Batum, where its agent, Ervand Ter-Minasian, negotiated a barter price of 3 pounds sterling per pood in return for boots, hardware, and office equipment.49 As the tempo of trade increased, especially after the transit treaty with Georgia was signed, the finance ministry, assisted by the railway administration and the legislature, simplified tariff schedules by consolidating the 117 classes of merchandise into 24 and organized a bureau to furnish price and commodity information, stimulate business activity, and promote efficient rail and motored transport.50 There was still no end in sight to Armenia’s economic ills, but it was encouraging that during the first two months of 1920, 36,000 poods of goods were marketed abroad, a tenfold increase over the same period in 1919.51 Several steps to regulate fiscal operations were taken in the last quarter of 1919. The appointment of economic specialist Grigor Djaghetian as state controller in October conformed with the accepted practice of assign­ ing a person unassociated with the ruling party to that post. Two months 46 Haradj, Feb. 7:2, March 6:2, 10:2, 1920. 47 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 3, doc. 34, no. 9, doc. 95; Haradj, Sept. 23:3, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 16:3, 1919. 48 See FO 371/3672, File 14874/58. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, nos. 769-770; Haireniky Oct. 24:3, 1919. The currency was printed in 1920 by Waterlow and Sons, Limited. 49 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 6, doc. 76; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 4; Haradj, Feb. 29:2, March 2:2, 1920; Hairenik, Jan 31:4, 1920. 50 Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 5, doc. 51; Haradj, Jan. 23:4, 28:1, 1920. 61 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République Arménienne . . . ,” pt. 17; Ruben, op. City P-

296

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later the prerogatives of the controller were expanded to allow him to challenge any dispersal and freeze the funds until the cabinet and legisla­ ture had ruled on the matter.52 Parliament adopted the system of an annual state budget in November, detailing procedures and timetables for the presentation of proposals, adjustments through interministerial conference, confirmation by the cabinet, final action by the legislature, and publication. Although an annual budget could not be introduced before 1921, departmental requests for allocations in the interim would have to be countersigned by the prime minister and the finance minister, and members of the cabinet would submit their periodic budgetary proposals as a collective body.53 Since the Western orientation of the government was predicated on the expectation that American and European assistance would eventually be forthcoming if only Armenia could hold out, a sense of relief and excite­ ment briefly captured Erevan when it was learned that Hovhannes Kachaznuni and the Paris representative of an American firm, the Chicago International Corporation, had concluded a draft contract for a 50-million-dollar loan with interest payments to begin in three years.54 On November 4 Parliament authorized the finance ministry to float the loan at no more than 10 percent interest and 2 percent administrative fees for the sole purpose of procuring goods and services essential for national rehabilitation.55 The Council of Ministers buttressed Kachaznuni’s position on November 15 by naming him plenipotentiary and ex­ traordinary envoy for financial, commercial, and industrial affairs and by accepting as obligatory all contracts and conventions signed by him for Armenia.56 Newspapers explained that the loan would make possible the long-awaited reconstruction campaign, anchor the monetary system to a sound base, and meet the government’s expenses for at least two years. While foreign capitalists would realize a good profit, the economic benefits for Armenia would be substantial. Politically the loan would be advantageous, for Americans were known to take bold measures to protect their investments. Like so many other Armenian dreams, however, this one, too, proved illusionary. The Chicago firm, itself lacking 52 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 4, doc. 40, no. 10, doc. 117; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 1113, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 23:1-2, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 9:2, 1920. 53 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 5, doc. 55; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . .. ,” pt. 4; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 11:3, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 22:1, 1920. 64 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, no. 655. 66 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 5, doc. 49. See also FO 371/3660, 159650/512/58; FO 371/3672, 159649/159649/58. 56 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 381/3, H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev H. Amerikian Karavarutiune, 19/9, Council of Ministers to Kachaznuni, Nov. 18, 1919.

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a strong financial base, ultimately refused to risk so large a sum on a country having neither international guarantees nor a mandatory power. Public Assistance and Labor The Ministry of Welfare and Labor became the largest department in August 1919, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs yielded to it the Repatriation and Reconstruction Administration and the Chief Agricul­ tural and State Properties Administration. After Avetik Sahakian left the cabinet and resumed his duties as vice-president of Parliament on Novem­ ber 5, the ministry was directed by Artashes Babalian.67 A native of Shushi and a graduate of the University of Geneva’s school of medicine, Babalian had served as chief physician for the Armenian volunteer regiments during the war and then as a member of the Armenian National Council and the Transcaucasian Seim. In the welfare ministry he hastened the process of nationalization by ordering that all intra- and interministerial correspondence be conducted in Armenian beginning on New Year’s Day, 1920.58 By autumn a fair harvest and several large shipments of American flour had blunted the famine, but starvation and disease were still being re­ ported in every part of the country. Welfare ministry agents, district commissars, Dashnakist committees, and peasant and refugee associations all complained of the lack of adequate assistance. Even though the welfare ministry worked closely with American relief agencies, there was also discontent about the purported overbearing attitude of Colonel Haskell’s staff. The supervising officer at Etchmiadzin, for example, was accused of abusing refugee women and demanding control over the welfare minis­ try’s storehouse. Apparently to discourage speculation and make maximal use of existing supplies, he suspended the distribution of rations in favor of central soup kitchens. This action, welfare agents protested, was caus­ ing serious health and labor problems, for those in need of help had to queue up for hours each day just to get a cup of soup and a crust of bread.89 57 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 660/3, no. 181, Nov. 5, 1919. 58 Haradjy Jan. 22:3, 1920. For a biographical sketch of Babalian, see Heghapokhakan Alpom, III, no. 2 (i960), 34-43. 59 O. Balikian, V. Evoyan, and G. Sargsian, “Imperialistakan terutiunneri ekspansian Hayastanum,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 10th yr., no. 3 (1970), 94-97; A. Sargsian, “Hai giughatsiutian tntesakan vijake Dashnakneri drapetutian orok, 1918-1920 tt.,” Banber Haya­ stani arkhivneriy 3d yr., no. 1 (1962), 250. Robert Davis, an agent of the American Red Cross who had investigated conditions in Armenia in September and October 1919, reported that there was widespread hoarding and that the main obstacle to relief work was the “despicable selfishness of the upper-class Armenian.” See Polk Papers, 78/59.

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In their unending struggle to survive, the Armenian masses could not have been expected to philosophize about relative improvements since the terrible winter of 1918-1919, yet the welfare ministry was in fact distribut­ ing some 200,000 poods (35,000 tons) of food monthly as another winter season approached. In part, simple relief was being replaced by self-help, as employment opportunities increased in workshops operated by the ministry and by foreign relief organizations. Gradually the ministry was able to cut down relief rolls and, although somewhat haphazardly, to divide the population into three categories: the prosperous and inde­ pendently self-sufficient, who were to receive no public aid; wage earners and some peasants, who could buy provisions from government outlets; and the poor and destitute, who would continue to receive free supplies.60 Most of the welfare ministry’s assistance went to refugees, estimated at 360,000 in late 1919. Slightly more than two-thirds were Western Armeni­ ans; the rest were Eastern Armenians displaced from Muslim-controlled districts such as Sharur-Nakhichevan and from Azerbaijan. Of the Eastern Armenians who had retreated from Kars during the Turkish invasion, nearly 60,000 were repatriated to the province, together with as many Western Armenians. The flow of refugees from other parts of the Cauca­ sus increased during the final quarter of the year, averaging 6,000 a month.61 Although this influx intensified the congestion, the government did not block the movement, since it was more difficult to care for these people abroad and it was important to have them in a position to advance into the Western Armenian provinces as soon as Allied protection was forthcoming. After most refugees had been evacuated from Georgia, Babalian instructed his Tiflis representative, Davit Davitkhanian, to release the agents at Borchalu, Telav, and Lagodegh, to close the camp located near the main railway (300-verst station), and to announce that no more bread would be distributed in Tiflis or Batum and that persons still needing help should move into Armenia.62 Whereas most of the newcomers were transported directly to Kars and Sarikamish, the Turkish Armenian population already in the country remained concentrated in and around Erevan (50,000), Etchmiadzin (30,000), and Alexandropol (ioo,ooo).63 The Repatriation and Recon60 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun .. . pt. 9; Haradj, Jan. 4:3, 1920. See also Ruben, op. cit., pp. 305—311. 61 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . pt. 8; Haradj, Jan. 15:3, 1920. 62 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 3:4, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 25:2, 1919. 63 There are few precise statistical data on the number of refugees in the Armenian repub­ lic. The Figures released between 1918 and 1920 were based largely on the reports of local officials, relief officers, and spokesmen for the refugee population, as well as on the actual

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struction Administration, staffed largely by Western Armenians, re­ settled a few thousand in the deserted villages of Etchmiadzin and Surmalu and gave others jobs in the welfare ministry’s workshops, but these measures barely touched the surface of the problem. During the winter months the ministry participated in an American plan, supervised by Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. Robinson of Haskell’s staff, to relieve Alexandropol by placing more than 20,000 refugees in the Poligon barracks on the outskirts of the city. The project did facilitate relief operations, but it also exposed the people to contagion and to all the ills of camp life. The newspapers, calling conditions in the freezing barracks relief rolls. According to a report cited by H. Zatikian, “Hai gaghtakanutian u Hayastani bnakchutian tvi parzabanman shurdje (1918-1920 tt.),” Banber Erevani Hamalsarani, 7th yr., no. 1 (1973), 249, the 360,000 refugees were concentrated in the following regions: Erevan, 75,000; Etchmiadzin, 70,000; Ashtarak, 30,000; Bash-Abaran, 35,000; Nor-Bayazit, 38,000; Daralagiaz, 36,000; Bash-Garni, 25,000; Akhta-Elenovka, 22,000; Dilijan, 13,000; Karakilisa, 16,000. The refugees at Alexandropol are not accounted for in this report. In early 1920 the Ministry of Welfare reported that there were almost 600,000 refugees and native indigents receiving a half pound of bread or flour daily: District Erevan Kars Alexandropol Etchmiadzin Karakilisa Nor-Bayazit Dilijan Surmalu Daralagiaz Grand Total

Refugees 62,590 57,000 94*856 43.762 -26,443 6,610 7,192 6,300 6,032

Native Indigents 30,468 48,000 94,920 43.646 16,936 24.>37 5.977 2,600 3.94 > 270,625

Total 93.468 105,000 189,776 87,408 43.379 30.747 >3.>69 8,900 9.973 581,420

3 >0*785 See Haradj, April 6:2-3, 1920. Another welfare ministry report, issued in November 1919, classified the refugee population by place of origin, showing that there were approximately 285,000 Western Armenian and 39,000 Eastern Armenian refugees located in the following districts: District Erevan Kars Alexandropol Etchmiadzin Karakilisa Dilijan Nor-Bayazit Daralagiaz

Western Armenian 53,000 57,000 115,000 22,000 13,000 8,260 6,610 10,000

Eastern Armenian 14,000 — 2,000 30,000 — 300 2,000 —

The same report showed 143,087 persons receiving food or relief supplies in the Alexandropol district; 85,158 in Etchmiadzin; 42,824 in Kars; 31,711 in Nor-Bayazit; 30,000 in Erevan; 11,600 in Dilijan, 11,250 in Karakilisa; and 10,000 in Daralagiaz. See Near East News, Dec. 29:2, 1919.

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a stain on the national honor, reviled “the Armenian vampires” who preyed upon the wretched refugees. Expressions born of frustration were aimed abroad with no less intensity. The Dashnakist organ of Erevan, pointing to the high hopes nurtured by Allied assurances of restitution and repatriation, declared that such hopes had not been realistic “because the justice of the world’s great powers is most unjust.”64 Only half of the more than 40,000 orphans in Armenia could be accom­ modated in institutions in 1919. In May the government transferred 13.000 children from its 90 orphanages and 11 pediatric hospitals to the care of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE), which consolidated some of the smaller homes and gathered thousands of additional children into converted schools and military barracks. By the end of the year the Americans were looking after 21,000 children in 80 orphanages and 26 hospitals.65 These figures did not include 25 orphanages and several hospitals returned in July to the welfare ministry. Although provided shelter, the emaciated children suffered severely from the shortage of clothing and linens, heating fuel, and medications. Descriptions of their plight overshadowed even stories of the troubles of the refugees crammed into the Poligon barracks. Of the state orphanages, the 16 founded by the Moscow-Armenian Committee in the Ashtarak-Oshakan complex stood out as examples of efficiency and cleanliness under an experienced director. During the latter half of the year the ministry’s orphanage division, headed by Western Armenian Ruben Kadjberuni, nearly doubled the number of children under its care and opened additional homes for Yezidi boys and girls and for Armenian orphans fleeing from Nukhi, Aresh, and Sharur-Nakhichevan. As in the American orphanages, the scouting movement was introduced under the honorary presidency of Premier Khatisian and assumed major proportions after veteran youth director Vahan Cheraz arrived from Constantinople.66In December Parliament appropriated funds to support 15.000 children, of whom 11,000 were already situated at the following locations: Erevan, 1,375; Bash-Abaran, 1,600; Ashtarak and Oshakan, 881; Etchmiadzin, 357; Grkh-bulag, 1,017; Kars, 1,476; Jalal-oghli, 898; 64 Haradj, Jan. 7:1, 23:1-2, 25:2, 1920. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 422/2, Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 1920 t., no. 123, Feb. 19, 1920. 65 Near East News, Jan. 21:1, 1920. 66 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . . ,” pt. 7; John Elder, “Memories of the Armenian Republic,” Armenian Reviewt VI (Spring 1953), 21-25; T. Balasanian, “Mankatnere Hayastanum, 1917-1920 tt.,” Banter Erevani Hamalsarani, 2d yr., no. 2 (1968), 217-220; Hairenik, Oct. 7:1, Dec. 28:1-2, 1919; Haradj, Nov. 5:3, 1919, Jan. 15:3, 18:1-2, 1920; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V, 98.

1. M E M B E R S O F T H E A R M E N IA N C A B IN E T , O C T O B E R 1919 S e a t e d : A V E T IK S A H A K IA N , A L E X A N D R E K H A T IS IA N , G E N E R A L K R IS T A P O R A R A R A T IA N S t a n d i n g : N IK O L A G H B A L IA N , A B R A H A M G IU L K H A N D A N IA N , S A R G IS A R A R A T IA N

2. RUBEN TER-MINASIAN

3. ARTASHES CHILINGARIAN (RUBEN DARBINIAN;

A R M E N IA N R E V O L U T IO N A R Y F E D E R A T IO N , N I N T H G E N E R A L M E E T IN G , S E P T E M B E R -N O V E M B E R 1919 First row (reclining): 1. S IM O N V R A T Z IA N 2. G E V O R G G H A Z A R IA N 3. U N ID E N T IF IE D Second row: 1. V A R O S B A B A Y A N 2. D R O K A N A Y A N 3. S T U D E N T D E L E G A T E 4. S T U D E N T D E L E G A T E 5. V A H A N K H O R E N I 6. M IN A S V E R A D S IN 7. G R I G O R M E R J A N O V 8. R U B E N T E R -M IN A S IA N 9. U N ID E N T IF IE D 10. U N ID E N T IF IE D 11. H O V S E P T E R -D A V IT IA N Thirdrow: 1. K O R IU N G H A Z A Z IA N 2. A B R A H A M G IU L K H A N D A N IA N 3. U N ID E N T IF IE D 4. U N ID E N T IF IE D 5. V A H A G N K R M O Y A N 6. S H A H A N N A T A L I 7. K H O S R O V B A B A Y A N 8. Z A V E N K O R K O T IA N 9. U N ID E N T IF IE D 10. U N ID E N T IF IE D 11.1 H A M B A R D Z U M T E R T E R IA N 12. L E V O N T A D E O S IA N 13. U N ID E N T IF IE D Fourth row: 1. M IN A S M A K A R IA N 2. T IG R A N A V E T IS IA N 3. G A R O S A S S U N I 4. A R A M S A F R A S T IA N 5. M O V S E S P E T R O S IA N 6. A L E X A N D R E K H A T IS IA N 7. H O V S E P A R G H U T IA N 8. A S T V A D S A T U R K H A C H A T U R IA N 9. S IR A K A N T IG R A N IA N 10. A R S H A K G H A Z A R IA N 11. N IK O L A G H B A L IA N Fifth row: 1. A R S H A K H O V H A N N IS IA N 2. U N ID E N T IF IE D 3. L E V O N Z A R A F IA N 4. S A S S U N T S I M U S H E G H (A V E T IS IA N ) 5. M IS H A A R Z U M A N IA N 6. S H A V A R S H M IS A K IA N 7. U N ID E N T IF IE D 8. H M A Y A K M A N U K IA N 9. U N ID E N T IF IE D 10. H O V H A N N E S T E V E JIA N 11. H A IK S A R G S IA N 12. M A R T IR O S H A R U T IU N I A N 13. A R T A S H E S H O V S E P IA N (M A L K H A S ) Sixth row (set in): 1. S E R G E I M E L IK -Y O L C H IA N 2. G E R A S IM B A L A Y A N 3. U N ID E N T IF IE D 4. U N ID E N T IF IE D 5. U N ID E N T IF IE D 6. M E R U Z H A N O Z A N IA N 7. H A M A Z A S P N O R H A T IA N Seventh row: 1. A R S H A K M E H R A P IA N 2. A R S H A K D JA M A L IA N 3. U N ID E N T IF IE D 4. A R S E N M IK A Y E L IA N 5. U N ID E N T IF IE D 6. A R T A S H E S B A B A L IA N 7. T IG R A N D S A M H U R (J E M IL .) 8. U N ID E N T IF IE D

A M E R IC A N R E L IE F O R G A N IZ E R S Seated: A M B A S S A D O R H E N R Y M O R G E N T H A U , C L E V E L A N D H . D O D G E , JA M E S L. B A R T O N , S A M U E L T . D U T T O N Standing: A L E X A N D E R J . H E M P H IL L , H A R O L D A. H A T C H , S T A N L E Y W H IT E , W IL L IA M W . P E E T , E D W IN M . B U L K L E Y , C H A R L E S V . V IC K R E Y

9. ARMENIAN ORPHANS OUTSIDE NEAR EAST RELIEF ORPHANGES

12. TURKISH NATIONALIST LEADERS, SIVAS. SEPTEMBER 1919 (HARBORD MISSION) Seated: RUSTEM BEY, RAIF EFFENDI, MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA, RAUF BEY, HAJI FAIZI EFFENDI Standing: BEKIR SAMI BEY, SUREVA BEY. HUSEIN SAMI BEY, OMAR M lTMTAZ BEY, IHSAN BEY. MAZHAR MUFID BEY. KARA VASIF BEY

13. ANATOLIAN MUSLIM PEASANTS NEAR MAMAKHATUN (HARBORD MISSION)

14. GENERAL KIAZIM KARABEKIR AND GENERAL HARBORD AT ERZERUM (HARBORD MISSION)

15. GENERAL HARBORD, GENERAL VAN HORN MOSELY, AND LIEUTENANT HARUTIUN KHACHADOURIAN (rig AT ETCHMIADZIN (HARBORD MISSION)

16. ARMENIAN ORPHANS, ETCHMIADZIN (HARBORD MISSION)

17. B IS H O P M E S R O P (S M B A T IA N ), H A R B O R D , A N D K H A C H A D O O R IA N A T E T C H IM IA D Z IN (H A R B O R D M IS S IO N )

18. CATHOLICOS GEVORG V (SUREN IANTS) WITH ORPHANS

19. PRIME MINISTER KHATISIAN AND HARBORD. EREVAN (HARBORD MISSION)

20. ARMENIAN CIVIL AND MILITARY MISSIONS TO AMERICA. DECEMBER 1919 Seated: ARTASHES ENFIADJIAN, GENERAL HAKOB BAGRATUNI. HOVHANNES KACHAZNUNI. GENERAL ANDRANIK OZANIAN, ABRAHAM TER-HAKOBIAN Standing: ARTEM PIRALIAN. LIEUTENANT MIKAYEL TER-POGHOSIAN. CAPTAIN SUREN MELIKIAN. GAREGIN PASDERMADJIAN (ARMEN GARO). CAPTAIN HAIK BONAPAR I IAN

21. WALTER GEORGE SMITH

22. VAHAN GARDASHIAN

24. REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD WEBB

23. EARL CLRZON OF KEDLESTON

25. REAR ADMIRAL MARK L. BRISTOL

26. PATRIARCH ZAVEN (EGHIAYAN) OF CONSTANTINOPLE

27. CATHOLICOS SAHAK II (KHABAYAN) OF CILICIA

28. VAHAN TEKEYAN (sea te d , center) WITH ARMENIAN LEGIONNAIRES IN CYPRUS

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Dilijan, 453; Karakilisa, 293; Nor-Bayazit, 100; Gandzak (Ganja), 150; Georgia, 2,400 (the transfer of orphans from Tiflis to renovated barracks at Jalal-oghli then being in progress). Seeking to transform a generation of waifs into a generation of useful citizens, Parliament enthusiastically allocated funds for the vocational education of 2,500 orphans in 35 specialized shops and for the agricultural training of 150 adolescents on an experimental farm of 20 dessiatines (54 acres) with draft animals, implements, seed-grain, 100 dairy cattle, and 50 beehives.67 The labor section of the Ministry of Welfare and Labor was not promi­ nent during the tenures of Avetik Sahakian and Artashes Babalian. Under Russian rule the Armenian provinces had been kept as an agrarian marchland, with no more than 8,000 workers in railway shops, agriculturerelated enterprises such as distilleries, tanneries, and textile mills, and the copper mines of Zangezur and Lori. During the world war even this elementary industrial activity ground to a standstill. It was not until 1919 that a slight revival became perceptible, engendered in part by public works projects and by refugee entrepreneurs from Van and Mush who organized textile and leather works employing 2,000 families around Erevan and Etchmiadzin. At the end of the year the private business sector could count, exclusive of home ateliers, roughly 300 small factories and 400 distilleries with 5,000 workers.68 Although Khatisian’s labor plank rested on guarantees against exploita­ tion, little progress was made in alleviating the harsh conditions. Frenzied competition for jobs allowed employers to abuse workers and silence their complaints with threats of dismissal. In September, Sahakian and Sirakan Grigorian, director general of the defense of labor section, noting wide­ spread violations of fair-employment practices and sanitation standards, ordered all labor commissioners to enforce the eight-hour workday, the prohibition of child labor, dismissal procedures requiring a two-week notice and a hearing before a board of conciliation, and other laws de­ signed to protect workers. Owners and managers were to be warned that failure to comply with these regulations would draw prison terms of up 67 H. H . Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 8, docs. 85, 86; Haradj, April 6:3, 1920. 68 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie pt. 9. According to the Kavkazskii halendar9for 1917 (Tiflis, 1916), there were 4,738 factory and industrial workers in the province of Erevan. For a discussion of the decline of industrial production between 1914 and 1917, see H. Petrosian, “Tntesakan-kaghakakan iravijake Arevelian Hayastanum, 1914—1917 t t Banber Erevani Hamalsarani, 7th yr., no. 2 (1973), 34—38; Adonts, op. cit., pp. 449-451, 460-461. According to Near East News, Feb. 4:4, 1920, there were 4,600 factory workers in the provinces of Erevan and Kars together in 1914, whereas the number at the beginning of 1920 was 4,100.

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to six months.69There is no evidence, however, that sentences of that type were ever imposed. Significant labor unrest did not surface in the small factories and workshops, but it did affect the professional trade unions, which the Dashnaktsutiun supported in an effort to place comrades in positions of leadership. The formation of national professional unions of railway, auto-garage, post-telegraph, municipality, orphanage, cooperative, school, bank, bakery, printshop, leather, and textile employees culmi­ nated early in 1920 in the organization of the Union of Unions of Ar­ menia.70Although Dashnakist control of the unions was not pervasive and Bolshevik influences were soon manifested, particularly at Alexandropol, labor demands in 1919 were limited to economic improvements and were usually expressed in terms of patriotism and dedication to the long-suffering Armenian people and their young republic. At the threat of a railway strike in October, Parliament defended the union’s position and quickly voted an extraordinary appropriation for salary increments.71 The petitions of the post-telegraph union for a minimum monthly wage of 3,000 rubles, a six-hour day, and an independent post-telegraph administration met with a much slower response. When in December the union Anally set a strike date, the labor department persuaded it to delay action, as Parliament was then preparing a new wage scale for all state employees. A brief wildcat strike nonetheless erupted at Alexandropol, indicating that at least some workers had been radicalized beyond the control of the union leaders.72 The cabinet’s recommendation in December of a minimum wage of 1,400 rubles and revision of the fourteen-step pay scale for state em­ ployees stirred heated debates in Parliament. Avetis Ohandjanian, re­ porting that the finance committee considered the increase insufficient and the differentials between successive steps too large, suggested that the government submit a new proposal based on the needs of the workers. Ardent socialists in the Dashnakist faction quickly raised the banner of egalitarianism. Vahan Khoreni, a graduate of the historical-philological department of Leipzig University and an adherent of the view that the intellectual elite shaped the course of human social progress, found it 69 Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 23:3, 1919. 70 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun .. . ,” pt. 10; Haradj, Jan. 18:4, 30:4, 1920. 71 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 5, doc. 53, 1920, no. 1, doc. 4; Hairenik, Jan. 9:1, 1920; Haradjt Jan. 10:2, 1920. 72 H. S. Karapetian, Mayisian apstambutiune Hayastanum, 1920 (Erevan 1961), pp. 63-65; Hoktemberian meds revoliutsian, pp. 274-276.

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intolerable that a labor government should assign differing values to the tasks of workers. Moreover, the recommended pay scale, providing a raise of 180 percent at the lowest level as compared with 50 percent at the top levels, was deceptive, for it actually gave the upper ranks a monetary raise four times higher than it gave the bottom ranks. Arshak Djamalian admit­ ted that current difficulties necessitated some concessions to the bourgeois system. They should, however, be well reasoned and purposeful, and the government’s proposals were neither. As an advocate of social and fiscal cautiousness, Dashnakist Vahan Papazian ridiculed the previous speakers. Many workers were already earning more than cabinet members, and the proposed scale was both adequate and equitable. In imperial Russia, for example, the communications minister was paid nearly 200 times as much as his lowliest employee, whereas the present recommendation left only a fourfold differential between the lowest and highest ranks. On Decem­ ber 17 Parliament finally reached a compromise: the minimum monthly wage was raised to 2,000 rubles and the general scale rose from the previous 900—4,800 rubles to 2,000—8,150.73 The champions of labor urged that the scale for state employees be applied to all workers, but the matter was referred back to committee. Not until its second sitting did Parliament adopt such legislation. As the number of industrial workers approached the prewar level and the Bureau of Dashnaktsutiun became concerned about potential defec­ tions from the trade unions, the Council of Ministers proposed that a separate labor ministry be established. In opposing the measure as an extravagant proliferation of government, Western Armenian Dashnakists Sassuni, Maksapetian, Papazian, Hmayak Manukian, and Malkhas (Ar­ tashes Hovsepian) were linked in an unusual coalition with the four Social Revolutionary deputies, who maintained that strong labor laws and en­ forcement of existing codes, not another bureaucratic department, were needed. But Sirakan Grigorian of the defense of labor section protested that the interests of workers had been neglected and that in fact the labor department of the welfare ministry was treated like a stepchild. Artashes Babalian disputed the analogy, yet he cautioned that it was imperative to succor the labor movement. Replying to Haik Sargsian’s argument that it was senseless to have a separate ministry for 5,000 laborers, Djamalian asserted that Armenia already had many thousands of workers in a gen­ eral sense, and Arshak Shirinian said there were more than 3,000 miners in his native Zangezur alone. Arshak Hovhannisian queried whether Par­ liament should proclaim that it was not a legislature of labor and had little 73 H a r a d j,

D ec.

1 8 : 2 , 2 0 : 2 , 1 9 1 9 ; A sh kh atavor, D e c . 2 4 : 2 , 2 5 : 2 , 1 9 1 9 .

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T H E R E P U B L IC OF A R M E N IA

interest in the toiling masses. By the third day the hard-pressed opponents of the measure declared the proponents guilty of self-deception in refus­ ing to accept the reality that the costly venture was unjustified and that the government’s first responsibility was to aid refugees and peasants.74 Nevertheless, on January 8 Parliament liquidated the labor department of the welfare ministry and created the Ministry of Labor, complete with minister, assistant minister, secretariat, staff, and several divisions.75 Agriculture Inasmuch as peasants constituted more than 80 percent of the Armenian population, land reform and agrarian revival seemed far more urgent than labor legislation. Large estates were not common in this mountainous country, but a small class of prosperous peasant landlords {tanuter ; kulak ) controlled a substantial share of the cultivated terrain. The Dashnaktsutiun had always advocated communal ownership by tillers of the soil and periodic redistribution based on household size. In support of this plat­ form, the Armenian legislature technically nationalized the land, set max­ imum limits for individual proprietorship, and created committees to supervise the reallocation of excess parcels. Yet, except for the partition of a few estates around Etchmiadzin and Karakilisa, the reforms remained unimplemented in 1919. In some instances, fields seized by peasants were restored to their previous owners, and state lands were leased to Russian Molokan villages in return for food, farm implements, and animals. Many poor farmers were forced to sell their small plots to kulaks and specula­ tors, and complaints poured in from every district that Armenia was fast becoming a nation of landless peasants. The government tried to coun­ teract this threat by annulling all sales since December 1918 and establish­ ing boards of conciliation to compensate the buyers and return the properties to the defrauded peasants, but many of the latter had already left their villages or lacked the necessary documents for lodging claims. In October 1919 Avetik Sahakian, then head of the welfare ministry and its agricultural administration, told Parliament that famine, refugee congestion, and Turco-Tatar disturbances had prevented appreciable progress in the reform program. Still, land committees were now operat­ ing in every district, and a concerted effort would be made to give the 74 Haradj, Jan. 3:1, 16:3, 22:3, 23:2, 1920. 75 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 2, doc. 11; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 10. In creating the Ministry of Labor, the Parliament changed the name of the former Ministry of Welfare and Labor to Ministry of Welfare and Reconstruc­ tion. See H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 2, doc. 12; Haradj, Jan. 29:3, 1920.

T H E W O R K IN G S OF G O V E R N M E N T

S

07

communes additional holdings, including arable lands administered by the state properties division, before the spring sowing period.76 Despite its limitations, the Rural Economy (Agriculture) and State Prop­ erties Chief Administration was staffed with highly competent personnel, in part because the available educational opportunities in imperial Russia and the idealistic appeal of uplifting the peasantry had led many intellec­ tuals to become agronomists. When transferred to the welfare and labor ministry in August, the administration included divisions for agriculture, veterinary medicine, water resources, forestry, mountain resources (ac­ quired from the finance ministry), land distribution (acquired from the justice ministry), and state properties.77 Under Khachatur Eritsian the agricultural division prepared a horticulture curriculum for elementary schools, established a school of agriculture at Nor-Bayazit, appointed senior agronomists for each district, founded five agricultural field stations, and fostered the growth of viticulture, sericulture, and apiculture. During the latter part of 1919, the division also created reserve, laboratory, meteorological, statistical, and seed-distribution sections. The reserve section managed a large workshop making simple farm implements, imported three shiploads of heavy equipment from a Swedish firm, and supplied some communes with draft animals bought in Russian and Muslim villages near Kars. The meteorological section issued information on climatic and seasonal changes as related to improved crop yields, and the central agricultural laboratory established experimental farms at Erevan, Karakilisa, and Bidjazlu and employed zoologists, biologists, and bacteriologists to test methods of combating rodent infestation and plant disease.78 76 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . , ” pt. 3, File 13/13, “La Répub­ lique d’Arménie . . . ,” pt. 11; Hairenik, Jan. 9:1, 1920. For descriptions by Soviet Armenian authors of the miserable conditions of the peasants and their asserted hostility toward the Dashnakist-dominated government, see, for example, Hai zkoghovrdi patmutiun, VII, 53-57; V. A. Mikayelian, Hayastani giughatsiutiune Sovetdkan ishkhanutian hamar mhgvads paikari zhamanakashrdjanum (1917-1920 tt.) (Erevan, i960), pp. 62-109, and “Hoghayin hartse ev giughatsiutian drutiune Hayastanum 1917-1920 tt.,” Patma-banasirakan handes, 3d yr., no. 1 (i960), 110-124; H.G. Zatikian, “Hayastani giughatntesutian vijake 1918-1920 tvakannerin,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 14th yr., no. 2 (1973), 209-220; A. Sargsian, “Dashnaktsakanneri agrarayin kakhakakanutiune,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 6th yr., no. 2 (1965), 207—225. 77 For a description of the structure of and archival materials relating to the Ministry of Agriculture and State. Properties and its several divisions, see V. Evoyan, “Dashnaktsakan karavarutian giughatntesakan ev petakan guikeri ministrutian fondi tesutiun, 1918—1920,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 4th yr., no. 2 (1963), 201—218. See also Haradj, Sept. 20:1, 23:1, 19 1978 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 3; H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 8, doc. 88; Haradj, Jan. 31:2, 1920; Vratzian, Kharkhapumner, pp. 112, 115-116.

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Agrarian recovery depended most heavily on sowing all available land in the spring of 1920. The central statistical and seed-distribution sections of the agricultural division calculated that well over a million poods of seed-grain could be used, particularly as broad expanses of fallow land in Kars province were suited to the cultivation of wheat and barley. Parlia­ ment authorized the finance ministry to borrow money abroad, presum­ ably in Tiflis, to pay for imported seed-grain and allocated 227.5 million rubles for the purchase within Armenia of 250,000 poods of seed (wheat, 125,000; barley, 75,000; corn, 50,ooo).79The campaign was supervised by an interdepartmental committee formed in January and composed of the finance minister, who served as chairman, and representatives of the welfare ministry, rural economy administration, and legislature. The committee’s public appeals, emphasizing that American assistance could not continue indefinitely, exhorted peasants not to eat their seed-grain but to exchange it profitably for flour and hardware at one of ten regional storehouses. Although the hope of-getting substantial quantities of seed from the fertile plains of the North Caucasus again came to nothing and only 92,000 poods were imported, the internal exchange program was more successful, resulting in the collection of 279,000 poods.80 The total fell far short of the goal set by the seed-distribution section, but it was enough to make the spring planting the largest in several years. Meanwhile, the minister of finance urged cotton growers to increase production of that valuable export commodity and assured them that the state monopoly on marketing would be terminated, a pledge honored a month later by an act of Parliament.81 Other divisions of the Rural Economy and State Properties Administra­ tion also initiated a number of short- and long-range programs. The division of veterinary medicine assigned a field staff to each county, un­ dertook a successful animal inoculation campaign, opened five of the sixteen projected ambulatories at Etchmiadzin, Kars, Alexandropol, NorBayazit, and Erevan, and set up breeding farms in Kars and a model dairy at Petrovsk. Directed by mining engineer Stepan Turian, the division of mountain resources maintained a field laboratory and compiled geologi­ cal and mineralogical statistics and maps with a view toward future indus­ trial development. The state properties division regulated the use of 79 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 8, doc. 87, 1920, no. 2, doc. 23; Haradj, Sept. 2113, 1919, Jan. 4:3, 10:4, Feb. 3:2, 1920. 90 Haradj, Jan. 10:4, 23:4, Feb. 1:1,312,15:1, 17:2,18:1, 21:2, 24:3, March 27:1, 31:4, April 3:2, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 22:2, 1920. 81 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 5, doc. 45; Haradj, Feb. 29:2, March 5:2, 1920; Hairenik, May 20:2, 1920.

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nonarable government lands, managed the few salt and coal mines in operation, and built a fish hatchery near Lake Sevan, while the forestry division attempted to protect the national forests from illegal exploitation and collaborated with the labor ministry in the construction of sawmills near Sarikamish and Karakilisa and the extraction of wood alcohol.82 The division of water resources faced the tough assignment of clearing and restoring the network of war-damaged canals and arbitrating numer­ ous disputes over irrigation rights. Its most controversial and impressive endeavor, however, was the commissioning of a sixty-man team of experts led by hydraulic engineer Zavalashin to explore methods of harnessing the Zangu (Hrazdan), Arpa, Kazakh, Garni, and Abaran rivers for hydro­ electric energy and of bringing an additional 200,000 dessiatines (540,000 acres) of land under cultivation through the diversion of streams, creation of reservoirs, and draining of marshes, especially in the broad arid basin around Lake Sevan. The costly survey irked Avetis Ohandjanian and other members of the Armenian society of engineers, who had been slighted in favor of foreign specialists. Western Armenian spokesmen and several Dashnakist leaders like Ter-Minasian questioned the need for the project, as there was plenty of farmland in the plains and valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates; they distrusted any project that might lead to permanent refugee resettlement in Eastern Armenia and thus implicitly compromise the ideal of a united Armenia. The work nonetheless con­ tinued into 1920 and resulted in a collection of competent studies ànd detailed proposals, studies that might someday prove invaluable to a wellestablished Armenian government or to a mandatory power and foreign investors.83 On January 8,1920, the same day that Parliament approved the forma­ tion of the labor and communications ministries, debate was also con­ cluded on legislation to make the rural economy administration an independent ministry. Parliament’s support of the proposal was unani­ mous, but a jurisdictional question delayed the decision. Speaking for the legislative committee, Armenak Maksapetian recommended that the new ministry absorb the Repatriation and Reconstruction Administration be­ cause of their interrelated functions. Responding to Vahan Papazian’s 82 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . . ,” pts. 13-15, File 5/5; Vratziant Kianki ughinerov, V, 70; Ruben, op. cit., p. 301 \Erkir, Dec. 19:2, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 14:3, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 29:2, 1920. 83 Ruben, op. cit., pp. 299-300; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun pt. 3, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . . , ” pt. 12; Vratzian Kianki ughinerov, V, 71-72; Hairenik, Aug. 24:1, Sept. 1:3, 25:3, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 24:3, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 25:3, 1919. A series of informative articles on the water resources of the plain of Ararat appeared in the August 1919 issues of Nor Ashkhatavor.

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arguments in favor of keeping that administration under the welfare ministry, he said the latter should be phased out as soon as local agencies could handle essential public services and the care of orphans. Premier Khatisian expressed the view that by the autumn of 1920 the boundaries of Armenia would be determined, repatriation completed, and the organs of self-government sufficiently developed to provide public assistance, thus eliminating further need for the welfare ministry. Until that time, he advised, the ministry should retain the Repatriation and Reconstruction Administration. Parliament thereupon confirmed the government’s proposal to establish the Ministry of Rural Economy and State Properties and altered the name of the welfare ministry to Ministry of Welfare and Reconstruction.84 Simon Vratzian, a native of Rostov-Nakhichevan and a member of the Bureau of Dashnaktsutiun, later became minister of rural economy and minister of labor.85 *

Education and Culture In the autumn of 1919 Nikol Aghbalian, minister of public enlightenment and culture, planned to replace the old-style parochial schools with a system of compulsory five-year elementary education based on a progres­ sive curriculum of language, literature, history, geography, mathematics, music, and vocational training. The project called for 900 schools, but the obstacles to attaining that goal proved insurmountable. Many school buildings had been requisitioned as shelters for orphans and refugees, and the shortage of glass and hardware prevented essential repairs on scores of others damaged during the war. Attempts to persuade the Geor­ gian government to release a few thousand desks, tablets, and other school supplies kept in the former Russian state warehouses in Tiflis were unsuc­ cessful, and a campaign to recruit Armenian teachers in that city proved disappointing. Only 300 schools and 600 teachers were available when instruction began in September.86 Despite these and other difficulties, such as unscheduled recesses be­ cause of the lack of heating fuel and the outbreak of the deadly influenza then sweeping the world, Aghbalian’s optimism was unshaken. Enlisting the support of the cabinet and legislature, he raised the traditional beggar84 Haradjy Jan. 3:1, 1920; H . H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 2, doc. 13. 86 Haradj, April 6:1, 1920. Toros Toshian became the assistant minister of rural economy and Varos Babayan became the assistant minister of labor. Vratzian was to serve as the last prime minister of the Republic of Armenia. For a biographical article on Vratzian, see Richard G. Hovannisian, “Simon Vratzian and Armenian Nationalism,” Middle East Studies, V (Oct. 1969), 192-220. 86 Near East News, Dec. 6:2, 1919\Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 15:3, Sept. 13:1-2, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 17:4, 1919; Haireniky Nov. 22:2, 1919, Jan. 9:1, 1920.

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ly wages of teachers; persuaded the military ministry to exempt teachers over twenty-five from conscription; appointed district superintendents for Kars, Alexandropol, Dilijan, Nor-Bayazit, Etchmiadzin, and Erevan; facilitated the opening of the country’s first coeducational secondary school at Etchmiadzin; provided stipends and school supplies for children whose parents had fallen on the road to independence; and arranged with the welfare ministry to serve breakfast to 12,000 pupils in five povertystricken regions.87 Additional schools were established as more teachers arrived, including Armenian Bolshevik intellectuals driven out of Georgia or sent by the Caucasian Regional Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Believing that the needs of Armenia were so demanding that every qualified person should be utilized, Aghbalian dismissed the caveats against placing potentially subversive elements in the classroom and left the determination of actual disloyalty to the ministries of interior and justice.88 The opening of new gymnasia at Erevan, Alexandropol, Dilijan, and Karakilisa increased the number of secondary schools in early 1920 to 22, with 283 teachers and 5,162 students. Contemporary Armenian and American sources show with little variance that, in addition to 25 Muslim, 22 Russian, and 10 Greek schools, there were about 420 Armenian ele­ mentary schools, with 38,000 pupils and 1,000 teachers, of whom only half were graduates of secondary academies or pedagogical institutes. These figures do not take into account the erratic operation or closure of some schools because of local difficulties, lack of heating fuel, and requisition for other purposes, but they present a sharp contrast to the preceding year’s statistics showing 10 secondary and 135 elementary schools with a total enrollment of 14,000 and faculty of 500.89 Most adults in the Armenian provinces, unlike their compatriots in Tiflis, Constantinople, and other cosmopolitan cities, were unschooled or barely literate. In October 1919 Aghbalian proposed a campaign of public enlightenment through basic reading courses for beginners and popular universities for continuing education. While the cabinet and legislature studied the plan, he was encouraged by the initiative of several municipali­ ties that started their own programs.90 In accepting Aghbalian’s proposal 87 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 2, doc. 18, 1920, no. 1, docs. 7—9; Haradj, Jan. 3:1, 10:2, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 28:3, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 7:2, Dec. 27:1, 1919. 88 See Ruben, op. cit., pp. 283-287. 89 Near East News, March 8:2, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13, “La République d’Arménie . . . ,” pt. 3, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 5; Haradj, Feb. 3:2, 1920; Vratzian, Kharkhapumner, pp. 110-111. See also Ruben, op. cit., pp. 280-283; “The Public Scholastic Instruction in the Republic of Armenia,” Eastern Europe, I (Oct. 16,1919), 112-115. 90 Ashkhatavor, Oct. 29:2, Nov. 7:4, 11:4, 1919\Erkir, Oct. 29:1, Nov. 20:2, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 23: 2, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 23:2, 1920.

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on January 5, Parliament recognized the importance of decentralized supervision by authorizing any municipality, zemstvo, school board, professional union, or labor council to sponsor free, state-funded schools, which were to be open to all adults without regard to sex, nationality, or race. The six-month curriculum for illiterate and semiliterate persons required six class hours weekly in reading, writing, and arithmetic; the popular universities would offer evening lectures in Armenian literature and history, geography, social sciences, civics, and health.91 Few villages benefited from the legislation during the first half of 1920, but basic reading courses were organized at a dozen district towns and popular universities at Idjevan, Dilijan, Karakilisa, Alexandropol, and Erevan. The evening program in the capital city was particularly well attended, drawing upon scholars and guest lecturers such as Manuk Abeghian (language and literature), Hakob Manandian and Leo (history), Ervand Frankian (philosophy), Sirakan Tigranian (law), Simon Vratzian and Vahan Minakhorian (government' and politics), and Davit Ananun, Bashkhi Ishkhanian, Vahan Totomiants, and Arshak Djamalian (econom­ ics and sociology).92 Armenia was nearly void of cultural institutions, whereas Tiflis abounded with Armenian literary, dramatic, artistic, and scholarly societ­ ies. It would take years for Erevan to become even a modest cultural center, but the cabinet agreed with Aghbalian that, despite hunger and political uncertainties, a start should be made. Arrangements were begun in the summer and autumn of 1919 to transfer the valuable library of the Armenian Ethnographic Society from Tiflis to Erevan, where it was to serve as the basis for a socioethnographic research institute and museum. The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Culture created a division of antiquities in September to preserve historical monuments and prevent exportation of artifacts and manuscripts. Under the auspices of that divi­ sion, Toros Toromanian, an architect noted for his treatises on the medie­ val Armenian capital of Ani, resumed the excavation of Zvartnots, a seventh-century masterpiece of religious architecture.93 At the same time, Parliament reacted to demands to raise public performances above the level of such frivolous musical productions as Arshin Malalan by allocating funds for the organization of a national theater and school of drama by veteran director Ovi (Hovhannes) Sevumian, who soon embarked for 91 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 1, doc. 10; Haradj, Jan. 13:3, 1920. 92Erkir, Nov. 20:2, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 23:2, *1919; Haradj, March 2:1, 1920; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V. 95—96. 93 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 2, docs. 12, 13; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 21:3, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 12:2, 1919.

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Constantinople to recruit assistants and actors from that Armenian theat­ rical center.94 In October the founding of a national conservatory of music was entrusted to Grigor Mirzayan (Suny), and preparations were made for the Republic’s first art exhibit, featuring the works of thirty painters and sculptors, as the nucleus of a national gallery.95 Early in its second sitting, Parliament also authorized the establishment of the National Library of Armenia (Biblioteca Armeniae), and Nikol Aghbalian appealed to the colonies around the world to bring home whatever manuscripts and cul­ tural treasures had survived the foreign desecrations culminating in the holocaust of 1915.96 Above all, it was the founding of the State University of Armenia which most elated Aghbalian and his colleagues. In May 1919 the Council of Ministers had adopted a plan to establish the university at Erevan with the faculties of history and philology (Armenology), law, medicine, and physi­ cal sciences; allocations were later made for instruction in the first two of those departments in September. Iurii (Stepan) Ghambarian, former di­ rector of the Russian Free University of Paris and of the Tiflis Polytechnic Institute, was appointed rector, and Davit Zavriev, professor of chemistry at the same institute, was named vice-rector and placed in charge of preparatory activities in Tiflis.97 Hovering protectively over the project, Aghbalian allowed the Armenian Apostolic Church to reopen the Etchmiadzin theological seminary (Gevorgian jemaran), but gave notice that because of the limited national educational resources the university alone could develop the Armenological faculty.98 The critical housing shortage in Erevan, however, delayed the scheduled opening of the university. In November, when the Alexandropol municipal council granted Aghbalian’s request to use the school of commerce as a temporary campus until the next academic year, it was announced that instruction would begin after the Christmas holiday.99 The university was dedicated on January 31, 1920, in its borrowed headquarters. The colorful ceremony was attended by Premier Khatisian and most, of the cabinet, Commander in Chief Nazarbekian, members of 94 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 2, doc. 23; Haradj, Sept. 21:3, 1919; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V, 99-100. 95 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1919, no. 6, doc. 62; Vratzian, Kharkhapumner, pp. 112-113; Ashkhatavor, Oct. 28:3, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 28:2, 1919. 96 H. H. Orenkneri havakadsu, 1920, no. 6, doc. 53; Hairenik, Feb. 1:3, June 5:2, 1920. 97 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, “Hamarot tesutiun . . . ,” pt. 5; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 6:3, 26:2, 29:2, Sept. 9:2, 1919; Hairenik, Aug. 16:3, 30:1, Oct. 16:2, Nov. 1:4, 25:1, 1919; Bor’ba, May 25:2, 1919; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V, 96-97. 99 Ashkhatavor, Sept. 21:3, 1919; Hairenik, March 18:1-2, 1920. 99 Ashkhatavor, Oct. 28:3, 1919, Jan. 22:3, 1920; Erkir, Oct. 29:1, 1919.

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Parliament and of municipal councils, the diplomatic corps, and repre­ sentatives of Armenian cultural and professional societies throughout Transcaucasia. Professor Ghambarian welcomed the assembled crowd and Sirakan Tigranian read several of the congratulatory messages that came from far and near.100 On behalf of the Armenian Writers’ Union of Tiflis, poet laureate Hovhannes Tumanian wrote: Now, as the physical liberation of our people from oppression'becomes a reality, their minds and spirits, too, must be freed from the oppression of darkness and ignorance so that they may become communicants with the essence o f enlightened humanity and the universe. It is toward this end that we as a race have striven throughout the centuries. The Armenian university will achieve this monumental sacred mission. The life and fate of the Armenian writer is inextricably bound with the life and fate of the university of the Armenians. Long live free Mother Ar­ menia; long live the free university of free Armenia.101

Nikol Aghbalian delivered the keynote address: Although our country is in ruins and our people are in poverty, we are here founding an institution of higher learning. Whatever we possess today has been gained through the blood of generations. We are rebuilding our homeland and founding temples of education without worrying what our enemies, who have always leveled everything we have built, might be thinking about us. We have faith that this time the ship of the Armenian nation will weather the storm. Our enemies shall not succeed; the torch that we have lit on the highland o f Armenia shall not be extinguished but shall shine forth into Nearer Asia. The nightmare passes and the land of Armenia begins to brighten. For us, all the dangers have not ended; we must continue to grasp the sword in one hand, but the time has now come for us to hold the pen in the other.

As Armenian historians had lamented centuries earlier, the Turkish hordes, exclaimed Aghbalian, “have worn down our mountains and left only deserts in their place.” But Turkey, the scourge of Arabic, Byzantine, Armenian, Georgian, and other civilizations, was now facing its own day of reckoning. Armenia, liberated from both Turkish and Russian oppres­ sion, was at last to breathe once more the precious air of freedom. With the opening of the historico-philological branch of the state university, Armenia was taking a major step toward restoring the old, traditional bonds with the great civilizations of the West.102As Armenians rarely tired of rousing oratory, Avetik Sahakian and other favorites continued to 100 Haradj, Jan. 30:1-2, 31:1, Feb. 1:1—2, 3:1, 5:1, 6:1, 1920. 101 Ashkhatavor, Jan. 31:2, 1920. 102 Haradj, Feb. 5:1, 1920.

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enrapture the audience, which voiced approval of a resolution calling upon the Allied Powers to honor their pledges by bringing about immediate unification of Eastern and Western Armenia. After the ceremonies Mayor Melkonian hosted the dignitaries at a festive banquet, during which felicitations were extended by Oliver Wardrop, William Haskell, Antoine Poidebard, and the envoys of Persia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Volunteer Army. Then the guests proceeded to a grand ball in the auditorium of the school of commerce, now serving as the State University of Armenia.103 As classes began on February 1 with eight professors and 200 students,104members of the cabinet and legislature returned to Erevan for the second sitting of Parliament. Despite continuing difficulties, the government was encouraged by the progress made since confirmation of the cabinet in August 1919. Alexandre Khatisian hoped to advance from the emergency measures that had been necessary to sustain the population toward a program of national reconstruction. In preparation for this campaign, most ministries had been reorganized and an expanded cabinet had evolved: M IN ISTER -PR ESID EN T FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTERNAL AFFAIRS JU D IC IA L AFFAIRS COM M UNICATIONS FINANCE

Alexandre Khatisian Alexandre Khatisian Abraham Giulkhandanian Artashes Chilingarian Arshak Djamalian Sargis Araratian

RURAL ECONOMY AND STATE PROPERTIES

Simon Vratzian

WELFARE AND RECONSTRUCTION LABOR MILITARY AFFAIRS STATE CONTROLLER

Artashes Babalian Simon Vratzian Major General Kristapor Araratian Grigor Djaghetian

Yet, whatever the composition of the cabinet, restitution and repatriation could not be achieved without help from one or more of the victorious world powers. It was upon the United States of America that the highest hopes and expectations had been placed, but thus far they had been answered only with a flow of sympathy, flour, and fact-finding missions. 103 Ibid., Feb. 6:1, 1920. For colorful descriptions of the banquet and ball, see Torosian, op. cit., XXXI (July 1953), 102-103; Ruben Darbinian, “Hayastani Hanrapetutian orerun,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXVIII (June 1950), 30-35. 104 Near East News, March 8:3-4, 1920; Haradj, April 8:2, 1920.

11

The Long W ait for America

At the end of the world war, most Armenians believed that the United States would take the lead in guaranteeing their liberation and rehabilita­ tion. That belief was based on the long record of American public sympa­ thy, bipartisan support in Congress, and Woodrow Wilson’s strong conviction that the protection of Armenia was a “sacred trust of civiliza­ tion.” Yet, despite the backing of many prominent Americans, the presi­ dent was unable to make a firm commitment at the Paris Peace Conference. Both he and Secretary of State Lansing maintained that such action would be untimely before the Senate ratified the German peace treaty, which included the League of Nations Covenant. Armenians and Armenophile societies were advised not to press the mandate issue, so as not to give added fuel to the League’s irreconcilable opponents in Amer­ ica, who conjured up images of subservience to “supergovernment” and entrapment in the world’s worst “garbage heaps.”1 Wilson’s restraint prevented the mandate forces from conducting a public campaign at a time when pro-Armenian popular opinion was most intense. And although proponents of a mandate agreed that Armenia should be allowed to develop freely as a nation-state, they disagreed on whether the trusteeship should be for Armenia alone, for Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople in a federative union, or for the entire Ottoman Empire and perhaps even Transcaucasia collectively. During months of debate on the issue, the American peace delegation, at President Wilson’s behest, 1 See, for example, US Archives, RG 59, 763.72119/40190/4433/4479/5179; White Papers, Box 46, Armenia file, Polk to Ammission, May 26, 1919; Polk Papers, 89/124, Sevaisly to Wilson, March 3,1919 ;Pahak, J u n e 6 :3 ,13:1,1919. See also the minutes of the July 8 meeting of the United States Commissioners in Paris, RG 256, 184.00101/107. 3 1 6

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dispatched two missions to ascertain the views of the native populations and to recommend actions that would best ensure a lasting peace. Thus, as the first anniversary of the Mudros Armistice passed, the world was still awaiting a decision on what role, if any, the United States would play in the Near East. Divergent Mandate Plans An American mandate over the Ottoman Empire was the solution urged by a number of missionaries, diplomats, and businessmen with years of experience in the Near East. Perhaps the most articulate spokesman for this group was Caleb F. Gates, president of Robert College, who warned that the establishment of a separate Armenian state would be untenable on political and economic grounds. Talk of such a solution would provoke the Turks and imperil the survivors of previous massacres. It was neces­ sary to uplift all the racial and religious elements, none of which was yet ready for self-government. With the whole empire under American su­ pervision, the Armenians could be repatriated safely and, after resettling in sufficient numbers in the eastern vilayets, could be granted a degree of “home rule.”2 Gates actively encouraged the Turkish Wilsonian League, which sought to preserve the empire’s territorial unity by opting for American supervision, and claimed that the Turks had demonstrated their trust in America by allowing Robert College to remain open even after the rupture of Turco-American diplomatic relations in 1917. He advised the American delegation in Paris to center the “attention of the Peace Conference . . . upon giving the Turks a good government rather than upon delivering the Armenians and Greeks from the Turkish government.” It would be useless to organize an independent Arme­ nia next to a backward and embittered Turkish population in Anatolia.3 Gates was supported by Mary Mills Patrick, president of the Con­ stantinople College for Women, and by Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, who, as a proponent of aggressive American economic penetration in the 2Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis, [1971]), pp. 126-127, 169, 173-174; Caleb F. Gates, Not to Me Only (Princeton, 1940), pp. 252-253; Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle East (Beirut, 1963), pp. 188-189; RG 59, 860J.01/5; Bristol Papers, Box 1, Bristol to Senior Naval Advisor, April 29, 1919. See also Britain, FO 371/3658, 68100/512/58; FO 371/4157, 66819/521/44. 3 House Papers, Series II, 207/824, Wilsonian League to Wilson, Dec. 5, 1918, 207/826, Gates to Lybyer, March 2, 1919; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 173-174; Howard, op. cit., pp. 28, 52-53, 71-72. See also RG 256, 867B.00/110; Ahmed Emin Yalman, Turkey in My Time (Norman, Okla., 1956), pp. 73—74. For the program and activities of the Wilsonian League, see Mine Erol, Türkiye'de Amerikan mandasi meselesi, 1919-1920 (Giresun, 1972), pp. 35-47.

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Near East, and wary of supposed European plots to leave the United States “holding the bag” in Armenia, staunchly opposed partition and Armenian independence. In May 1919 Gates journeyed to Paris to present his views to the American delegation and then on to the United States to calm the “anti-Turkish hysteria” and explain that partition would be a “fatal mistake,” a message he preached for the rest of the year.45 Any suggestion to keep the Armenians bound to the Turkish empire, albeit under foreign supervision, was abhorrent to a people so deeply traumatized by the wartime holocaust and so uplifted by promises of emancipation. Gates’s plan, retorted Armenian newspapers, differed little from those of Turkish politicians trying to keep the empire intact. In Paris, Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian protested to Colonel House and Western Asian adviser William Westermann that Gates was spreading confusion among the friends of Armenia. In the United States, the Ameri­ can Committee for the Independence of Armenia, the Armenian Press Bureau, and the Armenian National Union cast aspersions on Gates’s motives. The State Department and the Peace Conference received hun­ dreds of telegrams and petitions, including one from thirty state gover­ nors, asking for immediate independence for integral Armenia.6The New York Times termed Gates’s recommendations immoral, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise expressed amazement that an American missionary and educator would use Robert College as an argument for preserving the Ottoman Empire: “I name Dr. Gates’ counsel extraordinary because it is violative of and repugnant to our sense of obligation to the Armenian people, who may explicably be moved to say of Dr. Gates and like-minded folks—the good Lord deliver us from our friends.” It would be better that Robert College shut its doors forever than to compromise with Turkish iniquities.6 Armenian Protestant leaders, proud of their American inspired educa­ tion and Westernization, were embarrassed by Gates’s declarations. Meet4 New York Times, June 3:12, 4:23, 1919; Howard, op. cit., pp. 71—72; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 181-183; New Armenia, XI (July 1919), 110; RG 256, 867B.00/110. Halidé Edib [Adivar], a Turkish feminist author who had close ties with both the Young Turks and the Turkish Nationalists, wrote: “The first sign of foresight and the greatest evidence of wisdom was publicly shown by Dr. Gates at this period.” See Edib’s The Turkish Ordeal (New York and London, [1928]), pp. 11, 15-16. 5 RG 256, 867B.00/110/112/118/119; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, File 421/1, no. 57, July 1, 1919; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 9, 13, April 27, May 8, igig,Pahak, June 13:2, 17:2, 1919: James B. Gidney, A Mandatefor Armenia (Kent,O., 1967), pp. 93-94;NewYorkTimes, J u n e 3:12, 5:12,8:111-2, 29:IV~7, 1919; Christian Science Monitor, June 6:4, 1919: Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (June 21, 1919), 803. 6 New York Times, July 13.III-2, 1919. See also Christian Science Monitor, June 5:7, 9:1, 10:9, 11:22, 1919.

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ing with him in the offices of Cleveland H. Dodge on June 5, a deputation of the Armenian Evangelical Union of America questioned how he, fully aware of Turkish atrocities, could suggest continued coexistence of the two races.7 Gates denied that he was defending the Turks or discounting the possibility of a future Armenian state, but he firmly believed that the exaggerated Armenian claims to half of Anatolia would culminate in renewed massacres. Only under an American protectorate for the whole empire could the Armenians hope to progress toward eventual self-rule in a modestly defined region.8 The distress of Armenian Protestants was compounded by the fact that the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions hedged on the issue of Armenian independence. When the Reverend Mihran T. Kalaydjian, on behalf of the Evangelical Union, appealed for support, asserting that the Turks “in their usual cleverness” were trying to escape punishment by advocating a unitary mandate—a plan backed by financial concerns having an interest in the Ottoman public debt and by a few misguided missionaries, the board responded with words of sympathy but insisted that political activity lay outside the scope of its endeavors. Of course, justice demanded that “the Armenians shall be delivered from the atrocities of Turkish tyranny and misrule” and that, whatever the ultimate peace terms, this “nation which has suffered for so many centuries shall develop its own latent resources in peace and happiness under ample protection and wise guidance.” Kalaydjian was confident that the board would be more responsive and decisive once its senior secretary, James L. Barton, had returned from the Near East. Both Barton and board treasurer William W. Peet, with a thorough understanding of the Armenian question, could refute the fallacious arguments of Gates and his adherents.9 Dr. Barton had spent many years among the Armenians, seven of them as president of Armenia (later Euphrates) College in Kharput.10 Having served as chairman of the Armenian and Syrian Relief during the war and later of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, he returned to Constantinople at the beginning of 1919 with the first shipments of ACRNE supplies. Although he accepted the wisdom of assisting all peoples of the Near East, Barton was so outraged by Turkish excesses that 7 The deputation included H. G. Telfeyan, D. Donjian, Dr. H. Dadurian, and Reverends G. M. Manavian, Kh. G. Benneyan, and M. T. Kalaydjian. 8 Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (June 14, June 21, July 5, 1919), 761-764, 781-784, 870-871. 9 Ibid. (Aug. 23, 1919), 1089-1090; Missionary Herald, CXV (Aug. 1919), 316-317. See also Leon Arpee, “Missionaries and Missionaries,” New Armenia, XI (Oct. 1919), 146-148. 10 See the Papers of James L. Barton in Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Houghton Library, Harvard University), new series IV. See also new series VI, Biographical Collection 6/5 and 6/6.

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he often called for the immediate separation of Armenia and full independence as soon as possible. With other missionaries and educators, he had helped to block an American declaration of war against Turkey in 1917. This action not only became a personal burden, but ironically played into the hands of postwar adversaries of American involvement in Armenia.11 Pangs of conscience made missionaries such as Barton all the more solicitous for the Armenians and ready to oppose the views of Gates and Bristol. Months before the end of the war Barton devised a plan to transform the Ottoman Empire into a federation of states under regional governors and a supreme American governor-general, but at the time of the Mudros Armistice he joined Peet and Dodge in urging Allied military occupation of Turkish Armenia and Cilicia and the formation of a united Armenian state extending from Erevan to the Mediterranean ports of Cilicia. Armenians from around the world would repatriate to this region, he argued, while most of the seminomadic Kurds would withdraw southward over the Taurus and the Turks, who had never been a majority in any of the eastern provinces, would move westward into the Anatolian heartlands.12Contrary to Gates, Barton contended: “This land belongs to the Armenians by right of occupancy for centuries and they now constitute the only people there morally and intellectually capable of self-government and with capacity to develop to the full the resources of the country.”13 He never relinquished that belief, although he later came back to a modified federal program because, he said, the Turks were so corrupt, backward, and unrepentant that they could not be left without the restraints and guidance of a mandatory power. The strategy of safeguarding Armenia by pacifying the surrounding territories was also espoused by many Americans who understood the complex racial, political, and economic composition of the Ottoman Em­ pire. Career diplomat Gabriel B. Ravndal, for example, called for an end to Turkish rule in the Constantinople-Straits zone and for a reconstituted Armenia stretching from Batum to Mersina, but he also pointed out the 11 Missionary Herald, CXIII (May-July 1917), 212, 263, 311-312, CXIV (Jan. 1918), 3-4; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 89-100; Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820— i960 (Athens, O., [1970]), pp. 153-155; Polk Papers, 81/193, Barton to Polk, Dec. 14, 1917; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Jan. 4, 1919), 18-20, 23-25. Postwar correspondence of Lodge, Root, and White criticizing those who had prevented a declaration of war on Turkey yet who now urgently appealed for intervention is in the Root Papers, Box 161. 12 RG 59, 867.48/1075. See also Grabill, op. cit.t pp. 101, 102-104, 109-111, 124-125; Daniel, op. cit.f p. 16; Morgenthau Papers, Diary, April 27, 1918. Peet’s letters and reports for the period 1913-1922 are in the American Board Papers, ABC 16.9.3, Western Turkey Mission, Vols. 48, 52. 13 New Armenia, X (Dec. 1918), 192. See alsd RG 59, 860J.01/9; RG 256, 867B.00/134/146; Missionary Herald, CXIV (Oct. 1918), 534-537, XV (June, Aug. 1919), 231-235, 33»~333-

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injustice of partitioning the rest of Anatolia, which should be kept as a Turkish state with ports on the Black and Mediterranean seas.14The views of Ravndal, Barton, and other veteran residents of the Near East were incorporated into Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s proposal for a joint American mandate over Constantinople, Anatolian Turkey, and Armenia. The triple mandate would allow for the separate development of each region and would obviate the major political and economic drawbacks to partition by setting up a common monetary and tariff structure and a coordinated system of administration, communication, and transportation. The United States, Morgenthau declared, had a unique opportunity to solve a problem that had plagued civilization for 500 years. The Turk had been the “habitual criminal” of history and the “constant offender” against the peace and dignity of the world. British attempts to rectify the system from within had been sheer folly, for, instead of reforming, the Turks had intensified their “pillage, massacre, and lust.” Unless the subject peoples were freed from “the most revolting tyranny that history has ever known” and unless Turkish peasants were given the chance to overcome ignorance and impoverishment, the immense sacrifices of the past war would have been in vain.15 Morgenthau’s sympathy for the Armenians was beyond question, yet he came under sharp criticism for failing to advocate the immediate separa­ tion of the new Armenia from the old Turkey. The New York Times editorialized on the negative aspects of delaying Armenian independence and of placing America in the strange role of helping the Turks, while Vahan Cardashian of the Armenian Press Bureau and James Gerard of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia expounded the advantages of an American mandate for Armenia alone and dis­ counted the merits of the joint mandate scheme.16 The Armenian revul14 RG 59, 867.00/827. See also RG 59, 763.72119/6238; FO 371/3658, 75852/512/58; How­ ard, op. cit., pp. 191-193. 15 Henry Morgenthau, All in a Life-Time (Garden City, N.Y., 1922), pp. 434-436; Morgen­ thau Papers, Diary, May 20-21, 1919; Root Papers, Box 161, White to Lodge, June 13, 1919; Papers of T. Woodrow Wilson, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Series IX-a, 56; RG 256, 186.513/26; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 174-175, 184. In June, Morgenthau confided to William L. Westermann that he feared the United States would reject responsibility for Constantinople and Anatolia, the only solution that would appeal to “big men” in America. Westermann noted in his diary: “So works the real estate mind in international politics. And thus passes the dream of the modern Satrapy of the Orient, with some ‘big man’ as Satrap.” Westermann Diary, June 9, 1919. See also the British reaction to the Morgenthau plan in FO 608/111, 385/1/11/11395. 16 New York Times, June 1:III—6, 6:12, July 6:IV-8, 1919; RG 256, 867B.00/89; RG 59, 763.72119/4601/4635; Armenian Press Bureau, Should America Accept the Mandatefor Armenia? ([New York], 1919).

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sion at Morgenthau’s plan was effectively expressed by W. D. P. Bliss, an American educator who had served many years in the Ottoman Empire. Was it reasonable, he asked, to have “ravisher and ravished, murderer and murdered, robber and robbed, all living together as brothers amicably in one house?” Was it not clear that the Turk was unable to live “with the Armenian,” only “on him.” The champion of Armenian liberation con­ tinued: “Is Armenia never to be free? Is she always to be subject to the Turk? Are Armenians always to be slaves, in the hope that gradually the Turks will become better masters and not rob, ravish and kill quite so badly?”17 The divergent opinions of distinguished Americans on the Near East caused tensions among them, and the delay of the peace treaty denied them the opportunity to join forces behind a single plan. Meanwhile, as the Senate began ratification hearings on the German treaty, the KingCrane and Harbord missions blazed a trail of adventure in the Near East. The King-Crane Commission On March 20, during a heated Anglo-French exchange in Paris on spheres of influence in the Near East, President Wilson suggested an inter-Allied mission of inquiry to help resolve the problem. Unable to reject the proposal without losing face, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando consented, and five days later accepted the guidelines drafted by the Americans, reaffirming that “it is the purpose of the Conference to sepa­ rate from the Turkish Empire certain areas comprising, for example, Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the east of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Mi­ nor, and to put the development of their people under the guidance of the Governments which are to act as Mandatories of the League of Na­ tions.” Several peoples formerly subjected to Turkish rule could now be recognized as independent nations under the supervision of mandatory powers, to be selected, when possible, with the approval of the inhabitants. The mission was requested, accordingly, to visit the affected regions to discover the preference of the residents and to acquaint itself “with the social, racial, and economic conditions, a knowledge of which might serve to guide the judgment of the Conference,” and to form an opinion as to the division of territory and the assignment of mandates “most likely to 17 New Armenia, XII (Jan. 1920), 1-3. See also Lawson P. Chambers, “Armenia and a Unitary Mandate,” New Armenia, XI (Dec. 1919), 180-182.

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promote the order, peace, and development of these peoples and countries.”18 Although Clemenceau and Lloyd George at first seemed willing to cooperate, their governments had no intention of relinquishing most of the rights gained by the Sykes-Picot protocols of 1915—1916. They feared that a mission of inquiry would stir up false hopes, cause unrest, and further complicate the Eastern settlement. Opposition in the Quai d’Orsay was matched in the British Foreign Office, where Lord Curzon labeled the plan “Wilsonian in every sense of the term.” It was a sad admission, he felt, that the conference had failed to face up to basic issues, even though further delay would invite renewed bloodshed.19 As the bickering continued, Arshak Chobanian and others expressed the anxiety of the Armenians: “While the grass grows, the steed starves.”20 American Near Eastern experts also deemed a new inquiry unnecessary, since there already existed ample data on which to base the Turkish treaty.21 Although the Council of Four allowed the matter to rest for several weeks, the American delegation eventually appointed Henry C. King, president of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, an industrialist friend of Wilson and a trustee of Robert College, as commissioners. At times the mission seemed doomed because Allied cooperation was not forthcoming, but finally, on May 21, Wilson announced that the American representa­ tives would set out by themselves if necessary. Crane did depart for Cpnstantinople four days later, to be followed by King and the rest of the small party, including technical adviser Professor Albert Lybyer, Arab specialist Captain William Yale, and George R. Montgomery, a specialist on the non-Arab regions.22 As French, British, and Italian representatives were never named, the anticipated inter-Allied mission became in fact an American commission. King and Crane began their work more than two 18 Paris Peace Conference, XII, 745-747; Howard, op. cit., pp. 31-34; Hovannisian, Republic, I, 3 18-320. In addition to Howard’s study, materials on the King-Crane mission are published in Grabill, op. cit., pp. 197—207; Gidney, op. cit., pp. 136-167; Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, O., [1974]), pp. 64-82,136-139; Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore, [1965]), pp. 140-147. 19 FO 371/4179, 4473/2117/44. For other data on the King-Crane commission, see File 2117/44 (FO 371/4179-4180), File 349/1/3 (FO 608/86). See also Westermann Diary, April 12, 13, 15, 20, 1919; Howard, op. cit., pp. 34-35, 43- 4520New Armenia, XI (May 1919), 78-79. 21 Evans, op. cit., pp. 143-144; Howard, op. cit., pp. 48, 49. 22 Paris Peace Conference, XII, 747—748; Howard, op. cit., pp. 36-82; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 175—179; Polk Papers, 78/80, Summary of Field Missions; Howard S. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924 (New York, 1969), pp. 266-267. See also Morgenthau Diary, May 22-23, 19 19-

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months after the Council of Four had first authorized the inquiry. The argument that the mission would garner little information not already known to technical experts seemed to be borne out by the memoranda its members developed while still in Paris: the Ottoman Empire should be dissolved; Turkish rule over Constantinople and the Straits should end; Armenia should be separated and given an outlet on the Mediterranean; selfish European exploitation and partition of the rest of Anatolia should be prevented; and a mandatory over Turkish Anatolia should be established. So that the empire could not revive, Asia Minor should not be kept as a unit, yet artificial economic barriers and wasteful duplication of transportation systems had to be avoided. The best solution would be American mandates over several subsidiary states. In so advising, the commission was endorsing the Morgenthau plan for a joint mandate, taking care to emphasize that “the rights of the Greeks and Armenians, the more industrious and enterprising groups, should be recognized.”23 These views did not change significantly after three months in the field. Starting in Constantinople, the King-Crane commission conferred with such interested Americans as Clarence D. Ussher, Walter George Smith, James L. Barton, and William W. Peet on the problems of Armenian relief and repatriation. At the American embassy, Rear Admiral Bristol and Consul Ravndal presented differing recommendations for a political setdemen t, while at the Constantinople College for Women, Mary M. Patrick arranged to have the commissioners meet Westernized Turkish women such as Halidé Edib Hanum.24 Leaving Constantinople on June 7, after King had visited briefly with Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, the party sailed for Jaffa (see map 7). In the next six weeks it conducted hundreds of interviews in Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon, finding, not sur­ prisingly, that most Arab Muslims opposed a Jewish national home in Palestine, favored a united Arab kingdom, distrusted the French, and preferred an American mandate to European supervision.2526 Before leaving Arab lands the Americans witnessed the plight of the Armenian refugees at Aleppo. Proceeding to Cilicia for a day, they were informed by American relief director William Nesbitt Chambers that approximately 25,000 Armenians had already returned to Adana alone 23 Howard, op. cit., pp. 79-80; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 198-199. 24 Howard, op. cit., pp. 87-88; Walter George Smith, “Journal of a Journey to the Near East,” ed. Thomas A. Bryson, Armenian Review, XXIV (Autumn 1971), 72-75. After meeting with Crane on June 3, before the commission had begun its formal inquiry, Smith noted: “I infer he will report some compromise plan for maintaining the integrity of the Empire as advocated by Dr. Gates and others. They fear the effects of dismemberment.” 26 The commission’s activities in the Arab provinces are discussed in Howard, op. cit., pp. 88-154.

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and that there now seemed to be some hope for better times, despite continuing Turkish hostility.26 The commission questioned members of the several ethnoreligious communities as to the desirability of a mandate. Turkish spokesmen, though ready to defer to the decisions of the central government, insisted that Cilicia was inseparable from Turkish Anatolia. The Armenian National Council, including representatives of the four political parties and three religious denominations, wanted Cilicia incorporated into the new Armenia under American mandate. Although French civil authorities had tried to have Armenian Catholics petition for a French mandate, the Catholics went along with the council’s unanimous demand for Armenian independence. The Armenians discredited Turkish population statistics, claiming that three-fourths of the 200,000 non-Christians in the region were tribesmen—Kurd, Circassian, Avshar, Ansari, Fallah, Kizilbash, and Turkoman—all of whom held deep grievances against the Turks. Nearly 150,000 Armenians had repatriated to Cilicia and their numbers were increasing daily. With sizable Greek, Assyrian, and Chaldean-Nestorian communities, Christians would soon constitute a majority. In a rare display of solidarity among Christian sects, Assyrian and Greek leaders echoed the Armenian arguments.2627 Back in Constantinople on July 23, the King-Crane commission decided not to pursue the investigation into Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Worried by the delay of the Turkish treaty, its members settled for information supplied by local American and British sources, giving rise to French accusations of Anglo-American collusion to undermine French interests in Syria while protecting British interests in Mesopotamia. In regard to Anatolia and Armenia, the commission’s decision could be justified on grounds that every conceivable point of view had advocates in cosmopoli­ tan Constantinople. Spending three weeks in the American embassy, the commission received a stream of Turkish, Armenian, Greek, Kurdish, Bulgarian, Assyro-Chaldean, and even Georgian deputations. The Turks appeared first, on July 31. Rival Turkish political societies proposed divergent solutions to the national crisis, but they shared the goal of preserving the territorial integ­ rity of the empire or at least of the non-Arab provinces, under foreign mandate if necessary. Their spokesmen attempted to lift the onus of 26 Ibid., pp. 140-141; Haireniky Aug. 30:4, 1919. 27 Turkish spokesmen claimed that the population of the Adana vilayet included more than 370,000 Muslims, only 60,000 Armenians, and small numbers of other Christians. The Armenians insisted that half of the 410,000 inhabitants were Christians. See also FO 608/81, 342/2/9/18864 end. A description of the geography and the ethnoreligious groups in Cilicia at this time is given by Pierre Redan, La Cilicie et le problème ottoman (Paris, 1921), pp. 1-64.

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Turkish excesses and to minimize territorial losses by appealing for help in reforming the government and ensuring harmony among all racial and religious elements. Invariably King’s response was that, since the peace conference had already decided to separate Armenia from Turkey, the discussion should center on rectification of recent wrongs, emancipation of captive Armenian women and children, and determination of suitable boundaries between Turkey and Armenia. Flustered by being forced to digress from their prepared statements, the Turkish representatives became imprecise and contradictory, but they did claim that the Armeni­ ans, although they may have suffered during the war, had for centuries lived in peace and prosperity in a tolerant empire. Except for deportation, Muslims had suffered no less at the hands of the Young Turks and had also borne the brunt of Armenian vengeance in areas occupied by the Russian armies. The Armenians had never formed a majority anywhere except possibly along the frontier, and to try to create an artificial Armeni­ an state would be like separating “the nail from the flesh.” The imposition of a minority Armenian regime over a Muslim majority would violate Wilsonian principles and lead to serious upheavals. Minor territorial concessions in the Van and Bitlis vilayets might be made to the Caucasian Armenian republic, but the best solution would be American supervision for the whole empire, with the human rights of all safeguarded by egalitarian reforms.28 When accounts of the testimony were published, Turkish newspapers criticized the ineptness of the politicians and again accused the Armenians of disloyalty and terrorism, of political and economic exploitation, and of complicity in an international plot to eliminate Turkey from the map. Soon recovering from their bungling in the interviews with King, several political associations publicly repudiated the possibility of even small ter­ ritorial concessions, and one announced desperately: “The Armenians are such a minority that the Armenian question should not even be an issue and our party has decided to declare that it does not think about the Armenian question.”29 Nevertheless, Turkish leaders welcomed the opportunity to submit additional information to the Americans. On August 13, Ahmed Emin and Ahmed Riza again appealed for a settlement based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Ahmed Emin, a moderate political journalist, admitted that enough territory must be ceded to the Caucasian Armenian republic to settle the refugees from the eastern vilayets; he also 28 Howard, op. cit.f pp. 163—169; Jahatamart (Constantinople) as reprinted in Hairenik, Aug. 29:1, 1919. See also Erol, op. cit.t pp. 61-67; Edib, op. cit., pp. 58-61. Edib states inaccurately that the American commission came “toward the end of September.” 29 Hairenik, Sept. 6:4, 17:1, 1919; Kâzim Karabekir, ïstiklâlHarbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 118-120, 136-137, 144-145, 148.

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proposed that the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople transfer to the new state and that Armenians remaining in Turkey could choose Turkish or Armenian citizenship. Ahmed Riza, a veteran politician, qualified these propositions by explaining that Turkish willingness to give up claims to Kars and Ardahan—ceded to the Russian Empire after the war of 1877-1878—should be recognized as a major concession to the Armenian republic. Most of the Muslims in the two districts would leave, making room for Armenians who had “migrated” to the Caucasus and other regions. If they could not all be accommodated, the frontier could be adjusted in favor of Armenia, provided the Ottoman parliament agreed. The two spokesmen concluded with another appeal for American intervention to prevent the military occupation, exploitation, and partition of the Ottoman Empire.30 The Armenian presentation began on August 1 with the testimony of the heads of the Apostolic, Catholic, and Protestant communities—Pa­ triarch Zaven Eghiayan, Archbishop Augustine Seyeghian, and Professor Zenope Bezdjian.31 On the assumption that Armenia was to be separated from the empire, all three stressed the need for a quick settlement to thwart Turkish intrigues on both sides of the former international frontier. Patriarch Zaven said that Armenians could soon attain numerical superiority in a united nation-state because the Turks had always been a minority in the historic Armenian provinces and Kurds and other Muslim groups had either been decimated by famine and epidemic or had fled before the Russian armies advancing toward the Euphrates River. To Crane’s standard query whether the Armenians would “drift” into an area set aside for them, the patriarch replied affirmatively, but Dr. Grigor Davitian, a lay leader of the Apostolic community, interjected that much would depend on the viability and security of the new state. During the cordial interview the Americans and Armenians concurred that Armenia 30 Howard, op. cit., pp. 174-177. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 23:4, 1919. 31 The patriarch had returned from exile in February 1919. Earlier, after restoration of the constitution regulating the affairs of the preponderant Apostolic community, the Armenian civil bodies had been reactivated under the direction of Dr. Grigor Davitian. Moreover, in an unusual show of unity, the religious and lay leaders of the three sects organized a mixed council to coordinate their care of orphans and refugees, recovery of women and children, and cooperation with the Allied high commissioners and their governments. Materials on the postwar organization and activities of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire are in the memoirs and papers of the following participants: Patriarch Zaven [Eghiayan], Patriarkakan hushers: Vaveragimer ev vhayutiunner ([Cairo], 1947), pp. 227-416; Jean Naslian, Les mémoires de Mgr. Jean Naslian, Evêque de Trébizonde sur les événements politico-religieux en ProcheOrient de 1914 à 1928 (Vienna, [1955]), 2 vols.; Hovhannes Amatuni, “Aprvads o r e r Hairenik Amsagir, XVIII—XIX (Oct. 1940-Aug. 1941); Matteos Eplighatian, “Meds eghernen heto,” Hairenik Amsagir. XXXIII (March-Aug. 1955); Vahram H. Torgomian, “Hushatetres,” Vem, IV. 2 (1 9 3 6 ^ 1 , 2 (1938). See also FO 371/3658, 47314/55119/512/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/ 11995, 342/1/10/7031 end.; FO 608/111, File 385/1/12.

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should be freed and granted the assistance of a mandatory power for at least several years.32 Ferdinand Tahtadjian, plenipotentiary of the Erevan government, was the next to be heard. Appealing for recognition of integral Armenia, he gave assurances that the Caucasian Armenians had no desire to return to Russian rule and that Russian leaders of various persuasions had agreed not to block national unification. Dashnakist, Hnchak, Reformed Hnchak, and Ramkavar representatives then presented the views of their parties. Arguing for a reconstituted state with ports on the Black and Mediter­ ranean seas, they likewise downplayed the differences between Eastern and Western Armenians, although the Ramkavars emphasized more than the others the need for American supervision. On August 6, survivors from the eastern vilayets described to the commission the hardships of their compatriots still living among a hostile Anatolian Turkic population and warned of dire consequences unless the United States protected the Christian elements. Five days later Dr. Davitian and Reverend Bezdjian completed Armenian testimony by submitting materials on Cilicia and future church-state relations and again urging swift, firm Allied action.33 In contrast with Admiral Bristol, who could not conceal his distaste for the British, Armenians, and Greeks as he propounded the “big point of view” to bring the “greatest good” to the “greatest number of people,” other prominent Americans maintained that the absolute freedom of Armenia should be guaranteed. Having traveled through much of Ana­ tolia and the Caucasus after the war, Barton and Peet told the commission on August 3 that to allow the Armenians to suffer Turkish tyranny again would be an unforgivable crime. Consul G. B. Ravndal agreed; he was convinced that Mustafa Kemal was conspiring with Enver Pasha and other Young Turk fugitives and that Allied military intervention was the only way to save the Armenians and to establish an Armenian state extend­ ing from the Caucasus to Cilicia.34 No witness advocated Armenian independence more fervently than Mary Louise Graffam, a long-time Oberlin missionary and teacher at Sivas. In 1915, refusing to desert her schoolgirls, she had accompanied them on the route of deportation as far as Malatia, where she had been forcibly turned back by the Turkish authorities. She had then remained at her post for the duration of the war, gaining the respect of local officials for her indomitable courage. Since the armistice she had been working ceaselessly to rehabilitate Armenian 32 Howard, op. cit., p. 182; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 19:2, 1919. 33 Howard, op. cit., pp. 182-184. See also the joint memorandum of the three Armenian religious chiefs, Aug. 18, 1919, in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130. 34 Howard, op. cit., p. 186. See also FO 608/78, 342/1/1/16279.

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women and children.36 As an eyewitness to Turkish brutalities, Graffam told the King-Crane commission on August 6 that to leave the Armenians with the Turks would be “beyond human imagination.”36 Her testimony was echoed a few days later by Dr. George E. White, president of Anatolia College at Marsovan, who said that under the Turkish government there was “no real security for the life of a man, the honor of a woman, the welfare of a child, the prosperity of a citizen or the rights of a father.” Armenia must have immediate independence under American sponsorship; delay could be fatal, for Mustafa Kemal was inciting the Turks to a campaign of “bloodshed, spoliation and warfare.” White, like all the American witnesses, maintained that Armenia’s liberation could not be effected without external supervision over the rest of Anatolia and the Constantinople-Straits zone, thus conforming with Morgenthau’s composite mandate plan.37 Mustafa Kemal was kept informed of the commission hearings through intermediaries such as Kara Vasif and Halidé Edib, both of whom argued that an American mandate over all of “old and new Turkey” would be the “least of all possible evils.” The Americans, they claimed, had begun to understand the difficulties of organizing a separate Armenia and were tending toward a general reform program. Even Bekir Sami Bey, one of Kemal’s closest associates, insisted that a provisional American mandate would be preferable to an independent Turkey limited to two or three provinces. Admiral Bristol, he intimated, had offered to send a Turkish delegation to the United States to appeal for administrative and economic assistance.38 Mustafa Kemal, demanding that nothing should be done that might compromise the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation, did not 36 See Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Biographical Collection, 24/33, Mary L. Graffam; Ethel D. Hubbard, Mary Louise Graffam of Sivas, Turkey (Boston, n.d.), reprinted from Lone Sentinels in the Near East; Missionary Herald, CXI (Oct., Dec. 1915)» 459“460> 565-568, CXI1 (Nov- !9 l6)» 5 l 7- 5 l 9 >CXIII (Feb.-April 1917), 74-77, 126-127, 177. 36 Howard, op. cit., pp. 183-184. On June 11 Walter G. Smith had written in his diary that Graffam had given a “vivid account” of the Armenian deportation. “She is for breaking up the Empire and making an independent Armenia at once. The Turks should have no political dominion, or the massacres will recur, she believes. We were greatly impressed by her tale.” Smith, op. cit., p. 76. See also Graffam’s report of July 16 in FO 371/3659, 123851/512/58. 37 Howard, op. cit., pp. 187-188. See also George E. White, Adventuring with Anatolia College (Grinnell, Iowa, [1940]). 38 Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 192J (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 80-87; Erol, op. cit.t pp. 41-44, 70-73, 86, 125-128; Ahmet CevatEmre, Ikineslintarihi: Mustafa Kemal neleryapti ([Istanbul], i960), pp. 245-249; Mahmut Gologlu, Sivas Kongresi ([Ankara, 1969]), pp. 89-92; Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London, [1964]), p. 188.

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reject the possibility of some type of accord. He let it be known that he would receive Louis E. Browne, an American correspondent who was traveling into Anatolia at the suggestion of commissioner Charles Crane.39 At the same time, however, Kemal denounced spokesmen in the capital who seemed resigned to territorial concessions to the Armenians: “It is not only practically impossible today to cede even an inch of this territory to the Armenians, but it would be dangerous, considering that the overwhelming majority of the population consists of Turks and Kurds, to settle Armenians there en masse, even if they cared to dwell there again in face of the violent irritation and thirst for revenge that prevails among that element.” The broadest possible concession would be to allow “non-offending Ottoman Armenians” to return to their homes.40 The King-Crane Recommendations * Having concluded its hearings, the American section of the inter-Allied commission returned to Paris and presented its findings to the American delegation on August 28, five months after the Council of Four had first approved the inquiry. The report was drafted by Henry King, who con­ centrated on moral and political issues, and by Albert Lybyer, who dealt with the territorial aspects. Their recommendations called for drastic modification of the Zionist program in Palestine and for a united Syrian kingdom, to include Palestine and the Lebanon, preferably under a short­ term American mandate but in no case under a French mandate. Cilicia was regarded as part of Asia Minor rather than of Syria. Dr. George Montgomery, who had been born to missionary parents in Marash, ar­ gued that the port of Alexandretta belonged historically and economically with the north and was the most suitable outlet for Aintab, Marash, Kharput, and even Bitlis, “all Armenian towns.” As for Mesopotamia, the commission was reconciled to a British mandate under guidelines estab­ lished by the League of Nations.41 The third section of the report, on the non—Arab-speaking provinces, was the most complex because of the many special problems affecting 39 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 224-226; Erol, op. cit., pp. 93-96; Kinross, op. cit., p. 188. See also RG 59, 763.72119/6696/6973; Polk Papers, 88/18, Diary, Oct. 14, 1919. A report in FO 608/115, 385/1/28/17448, describes Browne as “anti-British, pro-Turkish and bitterly antiArmenian in his sentiments,” and as an intermediary for the exchange of correspondence between Mustafa Kemal and the sultan. 40 Kemal, op. cit., pp. 88-89. See also ibid., pp. 265-266; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 101, 118-120, 136-137. 41 Paris Peace Conference, XII, 751-802; Howard, op. cit., pp. 195-198, 221-228.

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Constantinople and the Straits, Anatolia, and Armenia.42 The peace conference, for example, had not defined even approximately the boundaries of the new Armenian state, and Armenians no longer lived in large numbers in their historic lands. To bring stability in the Near East and peace in the world, the European powers should not partition and exploit the Ottoman Empire, and Anatolia should be kept inviolable as a Turkish homeland. Still, there had to be a “proper division” because of the “misgovernment and massacres of the Turkish rule” and Turkey’s inability to handle its strategic world position. The Turks had many attractive personal qualities, but “the Government of the Turkish Empire has been for the most part a wretched failure . . . characterized by incessant corruption, plunder and bribery.” Speaking of the treatment of Armenians and the unrepentant attitude of the Turks, the commission­ ers emphasized that “these crimes—black as anything in human history—cannot be simply forgotten and left out of account in seeking a righteous solution of the Turkish problem.” If the “rankest conceivable wrongs” were not to be passed over in silence, any settlement “must contain that small measure of justice which it is now possible to render in this case.”43 The reasons for a separate Armenia, then, may be said to be: because of the demonstrated unfitness of the Turks to rule over others, or even over themselves; because of the adoption of repeated massacres as a deliberate policy of State; because of almost complete lack of penitence for the massacres, or repudiation of the crime—they rather seek to excuse them; because practically nothing has been done by the Turks in the way of repatriation of Armenians or of reparations to them—a condition not naturally suggesting a repetition o f the experiment of Turkish rule; because, on the contrary, there is evidence of intense feeling still existing against the Armenians, and implicit threatening o f massacre; because there has been sufficient proof that the two races cannot live peaceably and decent­ ly together so that it is better for both that they have separate states; because of complete failure of the strong clauses o f the Treaty o f i878.[Berlin] to protect the Armenians; because the most elementary justice suggests that there must be at least some region in Turkey where Armenians can go and not have to live under Turkish rule; because nothing less than that could give to the Armenians any adequate guarantee of safety; because, consequently, nothing less will satisfy the conscience of the world upon this point; because in this day of opportunity for small nations under the League of Nations, the Armenians have surely earned the right, by their sufferings, their endurance, their loyalty to principles, their unbrok­ en spirit and ambition, and their demonstrated industry, ability and self-reliance, to look forward to a national life of their own; because such a separate state would probably make more certain decent treatment o f Armenians in other parts of 42 Paris Peace Conference, XII, 802—848. 43 Ibid., pp. 810-813.

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Turkey; and because there is no adequate substitute for such a state. In the interests of the Armenians, of the Turks, and of the peace of the world alike, the formation of a separate Armenian State is to be urged.44

King and Crane, not wishing to condone Armenian minority rule over a Muslim majority, described Armenian territorial pretensions as being rather “imperialistic” and based on a strained interpretation of facts. Except for a brief period in ancient history, the great expanse from Cilicia to the Caucasus had not all belonged to Armenia. Constituting no more than 25 percent of the population in this area before the massacres of 1894—1896, the Armenian element was now scarcely 10 percent. The new state should therefore be limited to the Russian Armenian provinces and approximately those parts of the Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van vilayets which the Russian armies had occupied in 1916-1917. In this cradle of Armenian civilization, with the anticipated influx from around the world and the probable emigration of many Muslims, the Armenians would again become a majority in about five years. A state of even these modest proportions would be economically viable and would have both geographic unity and defensible boundaries, thus decreasing the respon­ sibilities of the mandatory power and hastening the time when full selfgovernment would be possible. Although the Armenians coveted Sivas, Kharput, and other territory extending to Cilicia, these regions of mixed population should be left with Anatolia. If that area failed to become a successful entity, the question of enlarging Armenia could be reopened. “All this is argued with the best interest of the Armenians in mind, to give them a real and not an illusory opportunity. They are in genuine danger of grasping at too much and losing all.”45 Related recommendations included the formation of Constantinople and the Straits into an international state and the retention of Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia. Turkish rule should end in Constantinople, but unless Anatolia was safeguarded against partition and its inhabitants as­ sisted in rising out of poverty and ignorance, the Turks would feel unjustly treated and become a constant source of unrest. Italian and Greek ter­ ritorial claims to the coastal regions of Anatolia were untenable. Despite the aspirations of the Pontic Greeks, a separate enclave on the Black Sea was not possible because the eastern Pontus, with Trebizond, would serve as the outlet for Armenia, and Anatolia would need the other half for similar reasons. The Kurds possessed the strongest case for an autono44 Ibid., p. 814. 46 Ibid., pp. 819-828.

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mous zone, which would lie between Armenia and Mesopotamia, and if granted this tract should be assigned to the same mandatory power as Mesopotamia.46 For the non-Arab portions of the empire, therefore, the commission recommended the creation of separate Armenian, Anatolian, and Constantinopolitan states. All of them should be under one mandatory power so as to facilitate exchange of populations, repatriation, adjustment of the Ottoman public debt, and regional economic development. The American investigators thus formally endorsed the joint or composite plan and argued that the United States was the only nation having both the moral fiber and the material resources to assume the obligation. Financial and military requirements would not be excessive, and in any event it would be far better to spend millions to preserve the peace than billions to wage another war.4748 The King-Crane commission delivered the report to the White House on September 27, 1919. But its months of hard work had no apparent effect on the ultimate peace settlement, for the document was neither circulated nor printed for more than three years. The long delay was probably caused by the commission’s strong criticisms of French and Zionist aspirations at a time when an American role in Syria and Palestine was out of the question, by Secretary of State Lansing’s opposition to the assumption of political obligations in the Near East, and by President Wilson’s ill health.46 When the report reached the White House, Wilson had just collapsed from nervous exhaustion in Colorado and shordy thereafter suffered a stroke. Although receiving a résumé of the King-Crane recommendations before starting on his trip, the president apparently never read the full report.49 Even had he not been incapacitated, it is doubtful that Wilson would have submitted to Congress a program that included generous support for Turkish Anatolia. Nor would Armenia’s champions have calmly acquiesced in the exclusion of Cilicia and three of the eastern vilayets from the new country or its continued association with Turkey, albeit under a mandate. In any event, 46 Ibid., pp. 824-841; Howard, op. cit., pp. 232-234. 47 Paris Peace Conference, XII, 841-848; Howard, op. cit., pp. 235-237. 48 The disposition of the King-Crane report is discussed by Howard, op. cit., pp. 219-220, 258-262. A collection of Armenian press comments on the mission is in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130. 49 RG 59, 763.72119/6457/7161/7162; Polk Papers, 88/18, Diary, Aug. 28, 1919; Howard, op. cit., pp. 218-219. See also New York Times, Aug. 28:2, 1919, Dec. 6:3, 1922. The report of the mission was eventually published in Editor and Publisher, LV, no. 27 (1922), and New York Times, Dec. 3:!!—1, 4:12, 1922.

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while the future direction of American foreign policy was being debated in the United States, another mission set out to study conditions in Armenia and the Near East. The American Military Mission to Armenia The American Military Mission to Armenia, headed by Major General James G. Harbord, grew out of Henry Morgenthau’s proposal in June 1919 that Harbord take charge of the repatriation and rehabilitation of Turkish Armenian refugees. When the appointment failed to materialize, largely because of the opposition of Herbert Hoover, Colonel W. N. Haskell was named Allied high commissioner to coordinate relief activi­ ties, but not repatriation, in Armenia. Hoover then mollified Morgenthau by agreeing to recommend that Harbord conduct a field inquiry into the measures required for successful repatriation and into political and eco­ nomic problems attendant on the establishment of a new Armenian state.50 Afraid to put the Armenian question before Congress at that juncture, yet distressed by reports of continuing Armenian decimation, Wilson salved his conscience by approving the Harbord assignment on August 1.51Peace Commissioner Tasker H. Bliss told Harbord in Paris that the investigation would serve propaganda purposes, explaining “that the country should know to the fullest the horror of the situation there and that pending action by Congress the President was doing all he could by sending someone for moral effect and to get information.”52 Although Harbord was not appointed officially until August 11, he had been making preparations since early July. Hence, when first coming before the American peace commissioners, he was able to submit a tenta­ tive personnel roster, a draft of the orders he wished to receive, and an outline of the topics to be covered relative to the Armenian question and a possible American mandate.53 Nonetheless, in view of the stand of Congress and Secretary of State Lansing, Harbord’s instructions, issued on August 13, made no reference to a mandate: “It is desirable that you investigate and report on the political, military, geographic,60123 60 See chap. 3 above. 61 RG 256, 184.021/105, 867B.00/199; RG 59, 860J.01/20. 62 RG 256, 184.021/106/122, 867B.00/209. See also New York Times, Aug. 14:3, 15:10, 1919; New York Herald (Paris ed.), Aug. 14-15, cuttings in RG 256, 184.021/139/167. 63 Harbord Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 65-68; RG 256, 184.021/99/130/135/151, 867B.00/218. Studies relating to the Harbord mission include the M.A. thesis of John Philip Richardson, “The American Military Mission to Armenia” (George Washington University, 1964); Gidney, op. cit.t pp. 168-191 ; James G. Harbord, “Investigating Turkey and Trans-Caucasia,” World's Work, XL (May-July 1920), 35-47, 176-192, 271-280.

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administrative, economic and such other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region.”54*56 In notifying Avetis Aharonian of Harbord’s assignment, moreover, the American delegation cautioned that “the sending of this Mission and the various official acts that may be performed in connection therewith are not to be taken as implying official recognition by the United States of an Armenian Government or any of the other governments now existing in Transcaucasia.”65 The nearly sixty members of the American Military Mission to Armenia were carefully selected on the basis of training, experience, and expertise. Two brigadier generals, Frank R. McCoy, the mission’s chief of staff, and George Van Horn Mosely, a specialist in military supply and transportation, headed the list of officers, of whom the most junior was First Lieutenant Harutiun H. Khachadoorian, a native of Aintab, a University of Vermont graduate, and an intelligence officer attached to the American peace delegation.66 Three other ArmenianAmericans, all enlisted men, acted as interpreters.67 While preparations for the trip were being made, Harbord and his staff studied the files of the American peace delegation, intelligence summaries from the Caucasus and Constantinople, and various aspects of Armenian history, even paying a visit to the tomb of the last king of Armenia at the Cathedral of St. Denis.68 Among the many persons interviewed in Paris were Mary Mills Patrick, who presented the Turkish view of the Armenian problem. She submitted her own fourteen points in favor of an American mandate over the entire Turkish empire, suggesting that Rear Admiral 54 RG 256, 184.021/142; Harbord Papers, Vol. 1, p. 69. See also Atew York Herald, Aug. 14, 1919 (184.021/139); Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130. 65 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, File 380/2, Polk to Aharonian, Aug. 13, 1919; RG 256, 184.021/142 end., 867B.00/225. 56 Biographical sketches of the mission's officers and listings of all personnel are in RG 256, 184.021/42/43/44/48/60/99/101. See also New York Times, Aug. 15:2, 22:2, 1919; James H. Tashjian, ed., “The American Military Mission to Armenia,” Armenian Review, II (Summer 1949), 65-75. Lieutenant Khachadoorian (Khachaturian) had previously served in the Tiflis field party of Lieutenant Colonel F. F. Riggs’s mission to South Russia. See his report on the population of Asia Minor, Armenia, and the Caucasus in RG 256, 184.021/208. See also File 184.01602; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (March 27, April 3, 17, 1920), 413-415, 428-430, 497499. His own account of the Harbord mission, including many observations and details not given by Harbord, is in H. H. Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune depi Hayastan ” Hairenik Amsagir, XIX (Nov. 1940-May 1941). 67 The Armenian enlisted men were Sergeant-Major Aram Kojassar, Criminal Investigation Detachment; Sergeant Dick Ohanessian, 34th Service Company; and Private Dicran Serijanian, Headquarters Battalion, formerly attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. See RG 256, 184.021/99. 68 Khachaturian, op. cit. (Nov. 1940), pp. 127-130; RG 256, 184.021/85. Harbord’s thorough preparations impressed the British military advisers in Paris. See FO 371/3671, 119999/119397/58.

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Bristol be chosen as the American governor.59 Walter George Smith, Charles Vickrey, and other ACRNE officials, on the other hand, painted a dismal picture of renewed Armenian massacres and Pan-Turkic intrigues. Harbord was impressed by Boghos Nubar and his arguments for the incorporation of Cilicia into Armenia but was astounded that the most prominent Armenian spokesman had never been in his ancestral lands.60 On behalf of the Armenian republic, Avetis Aharonian gave assurances that the detailed information requested by the mission would be ready in Erevan and that the mere passage of the Americans through Anatolia and Transcaucasia would have a settling effect.61 General Mosely discussed the structure and needs of the Armenian army with Generals Hakob Bagratuni and Gabriel Korganian, who tried to show that the occupation of the Western Armenian provinces would require no more than 30,000 foreign troops and that they could be gradually withdrawn over a three-year period. Korganiart made a good impression on Mosely and Harbord and in turn was pleased by the knowledgeability of the Americans, particularly of transportation-communications expert William B. Poland.62 The mission was given broad publicity at home. There was widespread speculation that its findings would determine the fate of Armenia and that Harbord would be the governor if America was made the mandatory power. Pro-Armenian newspapers played up his personal qualifications and his administrative record in the Philippines and as chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe. Aharonian made no secret of his hope that the mission would lead to American acceptance of the mandate.63 The American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, in extending its best wishes to the mission through Gerard, Hughes, Root, Lodge, Williams, Smith, Penfield, Eliot, and Dodge, urged a speedy solution to the Armenian question and “consequently the full realization of the well deserved aspirations of a long suffering and worthy people.”64 It was the time factor that made many Armenians and their supporters 59 RG 59, 763.72119/6052; RG 256, 184.021/106/128; Bliss Papers, Box 243, File 809, Turkish Empire, no. 9. 60 RG 256, 184.021/106/113; Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), p. 36. 61 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, no. 488, Aug. 15, 1919; O. Balikian, V. Evoyan, and G. Sargsian, “Imperialistakan terutiunneri ekspansian Hayastanum ”Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 11th yr., no. 3 (1970), 92. 62 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian’s report no. 3, Aug. 14, 1919; Khach­ aturian, op. cit. (Nov. 1940), p. 130. 63 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, Aharonian to Polk, Aug. 15, 1919; RG 256, 184.021/ 174, 867B.00/235. 64 RG 256, 184.021/201; RG 59, 860J.01/60; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, File 421/1, no. 77, Sept. 24, 1919.

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uneasy. In a communiqué to the Allied high commissioners at Constan­ tinople on August 23, for example, the heads of the three Armenian religious communities questioned the value of new inquiries at a time when thousands of women and children were still captive in Muslim harems, refugees were prevented from returning home, and survivors in places such as Diarbekir, Marsovan, Caesarea, and nearby Brusa were openly threatened with annihilation. Each delay in the peace settlement heightened Turkish hopes of escaping punishment and avoiding restitu­ tion to the Armenians.65 Admiral Bristol’s reasons for distrusting the mission were quite different. Discounting any threat posed by the Turkish Nationalists, whose goals were “rather to be commended than condemned,” Bristol complained that the publicity given Haskell and Harbord showed inordinate concern for the Armenians and thus stirred unrest among Muslims. He urged Harbord to proceed “with no more advertisement or ostentation than is necessary for a dignified and proper investigation.”66 On August 25 the American Military Mission to Armenia finally sailed from Brest on a former Austrian transport, rechristened the S.S. Martha Washington.67 En route across the Mediterranean, just as King and Crane were submitting their report in Paris, Harbord completed his plans. The investigation was to cover the whole area between Thrace and the Caspian Sea but was to concentrate on Armenia, identified in this context as the region from the Cilician shores to the highlands east of Erevan. Arriving at the Dardanelles on September 2, the mission spent the next four days in Constantinople, exchanging courtesy calls, gathering data and conducting interviews, and seeking the cooperation of both the central government and Nationalist intermediaries in expediting travel through Anatolia. The mission was enlarged by adding Husein Bey, a professor at Robert College and an organizer of the Turkish Wilsonian League, American trade commissioner Eliot Grinnell Mears, and Major Haig Shekerjian, an American liaison officer with recent experience in the Caucasus.68 65 RG 184.021/187 end.; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130; FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449 end. 66 Bristol Papers, Box 65, Armenia file, Bristol to Ammission, Aug. 21, 1919; Box 1, Bristol report, Aug. 17, 1919; Box 31, Bristol to Harbord, Aug. 20, 1919. See also RG 256, 184.021/ 196. 67 Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), p. 36; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 377-378. Documents relating to the mission’s difficulty in securing a suitable naval vessel and the resulting delay in the departure date are in RG 256, 184.021/106/124/127/142/150/180/183, 867B.00/22; RG 59, 860J.01/63, 763.72119/6017/6145/6172. 68 RG 256, 184.021/100/139/140 ends., 860J.01/167/174; Harbord Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 7071 \Hairenik, Oct. 22:2, 1919. For interviews with Patriarch Zaven, Dr. Bezdjian, Archbishop

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An Anatolian Adventure On September 7 the military mission separated into a land party, headed by Harbord, and a sea party, which was to continue its studies on board and rendezvous at Batum and Tiflis a month later (see map 7). On the overland journey of more than a thousand miles, Harbord’s group, travel­ ing by railway, automobile, carriage, and even horseback, adhered closely to a predetermined timetable. En route by special train from HaidarPasha to Cilicia, the mission stopped briefly at Ismid, Sapanja, Geive, Afion-Karahisar, Akshehir, Konia, and other towns, where Armenian repatriates led by their priests welcomed the Americans with flowers and fruit and told of their tribulations and hopes.*69 In Konia, American relief director Mary Cushman reported that half a million deportees had passed through the city in 1915 and that she had several hundred Armenian orphans under her care. Harbord later recalled that he and his companions, after hearing many such stories, “literally dreamed Armenia and Massacres.”70 Passing through the Taurus tunnels near the historically strategic Cilician Gates on September 10, the mission descended to the rich plain around Adana, where American and Armenian relief agencies were try­ ing to accommodate thousands of repatriates to Cilicia, then under British military and French civil supervision. While inspecting American orphan­ ages and workshops, Harbord was struck by the large number of women and girls who tried to shield their faces to hide tattoos on their lips, cheeks, and foreheads—the glaring evidence of captivity among Muslim tribes­ men. With Turkish officials again claiming that Cilicia was a cradle of Turkish culture, ACRNE director Chambers recounted, as he had for the Augustine Seyeghian, Dr. Davitian, Ferdinand Tahtadjian, and Dr. Vahan Torgomian, presi­ dent of the Armenian Physicians’ Society, see Erkir, Sept. 10:1, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 24:2, 1919; Khachaturian, op. cit. (Dec. 1940), p. 64; Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), pp. 37—38; RG 256, 184.021/212. Khachaturian, op. cit. (Nov. 1940), p. 218, says that another Armenian, H. K. Kerobian, was attached to the mission in Constantinople as an interpreter. Major Shekerjian was serving on Admiral Bristol’s staff as a liaison with the other Allied high commissions. He had studied conditions in the Caucasus in June 1919 and had joined Green, Yarrow, Doolittle, and Moore in their united appeals regarding British withdrawal from the Caucasus and Muslim attacks in Armenia. Shekerjian became a career officer, attaining the rank of brigadier general in World War II. See James H. Tashjian, “Brig. Gen. Haig Shekerjian,” Armenian Review, V (Spring 1952), 70-76; Harutiun H. Khachaturian, “Hazarapet Haik Shekerjian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XIX (July 1941), 75-77. 69 RG 256, 184.021/242/243/247/250; Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), pp. 38-39; Khachatu­ rian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), pp. 65-66; New York Times, Sept. 9:19, 1919. At Ulakishla, Major Shekerjian left the main party and went directly to Sivas to scout the roads and prepare for the mission’s arrival there. See RG 256, 184.021/247/248. 70 Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), p. 36. See also Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), p. 66; Erkirt Sept. 14:3, 1919.

26°East of Greenwich 7-

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King-Crane commission, the horrors of the massacres, accused the Turk­ ish population of complicity in them, and gave reasons for including Cilicia in the new Armenian state. Similar statements were made by Archi­ mandrite Gevorg Arslanian, the Armenian prelate of Adana, Mihran Damadian (Tamatian), liaison representative of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, and executive members of the Armenian National Council. The Armenians were unanimous in appealing for an American protectorate. They complained that the French authorities had pressured them to request a French mandate and were enforcing disarmament only among Christian elements while failing to deal with Muslim bands that were murdering and mutilating Armenian farmers and travelers.71 After Harbord, McCoy, Khachadoorian, and Husein Bey spent a day in Tarsus and Mersina, the mission left Cilicia for Aleppo in northern Syria. As Aleppo had been the principal dispersal point of the deportees, the eyewitness descriptions by American Consul Jesse B. Jackson were filled with outrage.72 Supported by the testimony of Catholicos Sahak II (Khabayan) of Cilicia, Archbishop Mushegh Serobian, and members of the local Armenian council, Jackson estimated that of the million Armenians deported to the south, about 100,000 survived in outlying regions of Syria and Mesopotamia and that countless other women and children were still held by desert tribesmen. With years of experience in the Near East, Jackson believed that only the “wise dictatorship” of a mandatory power could overcome the difficulties caused by racial and religious heterogeneity and by the fanaticism of the population.73 The land party, leaving the Anatolian railway at its terminus near Mardin on September 13, traveled northward by Ford touring cars toward the Armenian plateau. Nearly every welcoming committee now included no­ tables under the sway of the Nationalists, and the commander of the 5th Turkish Regiment shadowed the Americans all the way to Sivas, clearing the road and alerting the local authorities of the mission’s approach. In remote towns and provincial capitals, a few American missionaries and relief workers were trying to recover Armenian women and children and feed the destitute. At Mardin, Agnes Fenenga reported that the massacres had been so thorough that not one Armenian was left, and Rachel B. 71 RG 256, 184.021/243/255/257/259/263; Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), pp. 40-41; Khach­ aturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), pp. 66-68; Hairenik, Oct. 23:3, 1919; Erkir, Sept. 17:1, 1919. 72 For Jackson’s reports relating to the deportations and massacres, see RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State: Aleppo; RG 59, File 867B.48. 73 RG 256, 184.021/243/267; Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), pp. 44-46; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), p. 68.

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North, one of five American women at Diarbekir, said that few of the 6.000 Armenians who had gathered there were native inhabitants. The Church of St. Kirakos had been converted into an orphanage. As the Armenians had virtually been extirpated and the Turks had never been a significant element in the province, Diarbekir had become overwhelm­ ingly Kurdish. As in other places, Harbord met with local notables, when­ ever possible in the presence of Armenian and other Christian representatives, to ask about the local racial-religious composition, to so­ licit opinions on the political settlement, and to emphasize American interest in the well-being of Armenian survivors.74 Harbord’s and Khachadoorian’s descriptions captured the exquisite beauty of the Arghana-Maden district and the breathtaking zigzag roads they followed in journeying northwestward to Mezere-Kharput (Kharpert) on September 17. Despite extensive damage in the Armenian quar­ ters, Kharput was the largest relief station on the Armenian plateau; more than 3,000 orphans were housed in what was left of Euphrates College and in twenty other shelters.75 Dr. Henry H. Riggs and his assistants, Levon Harputlian and Dr. Mikayel (Hakobian), reported that about 25,000 of the 175,000 Armenians in the province remained. Because of the lack of government support and a widespread state of anarchy, only a few thousand children had been freed from their abductors, whereas some 20.000 Islamized Armenians were terrorized and prevented from returning to the mother church. Notorious cutthroats appeared in the streets of Mezere without fear of punishment for their part in the massacres, and Muslim squatters refused to relinquish the goods and properties of Armenians. Unless the United States took charge in Anatolia, the outlook would remain bleak.76 The situation had improved a little just before the mission arrived, but, as expressed in the letter of an Armenian woman, this positive effect was as transitory as the stay of the mission: “In these days, one or another Allied official comes, does a peek-a-boo, and vanishes.”77 74 RG 256, 184.021/96; Harbord, op. cit. (May 1920), pp. 46-47, and (June 1920), pp. 176-178; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), pp. 70—71 ; Haire­ nik, Nov. 13:3, 1919. 76 KochnakHayastani, XIX (Oct. 25, 1919), 1387-1388; Hairenik, Nov. 21:2, 23:3, Dec. 18:3, l9 l9 76 RG 256, 184.021/258; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), pp. 72-73; Hairenik, Nov. 14:3, 16:3, 1919. Riggs maintained that proposals for the immedi­ ate formation of an independent Armenian state were impractical and were endangering the lives of the remaining Christian population. See FO 371/3660, 14267/512/58 end. 77 Hairenik, Dec. 3:2, 1919.

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At Malatia, in a fertile, fruit-laden plain southwest of Kharput, the mission learned that fewer than 1,000 of the 12,000 Armenian inhabitants remained. Two American relief workers reported that the authorities had recently been removing evidence of the massacres and had threatened reprisals against any Armenian who dared complain to Harbord. Indeed, an Armenian youth was apprehended as he approached a member of the mission. Driving northward from this now Kurdish-dominated district into historic Armenia Minor, the Americans crested the hills overlooking Sivas (Sebastia) on September 20 and entered the city through tree-lined streets. They were welcomed to Sivas not only by appointees of the sultan’s government but also by the founders of the Nationalist movement, chief among them Husein Rauf Bey, Bekir Sami Bey, Alfred Rustem Bey, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha.78 At the recent organizational meeting of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, held September 4-12, Kemal had displayed his manipulative abilities by thwarting a move of the “demo­ crats” to deny him the chairmanship. Undaunted by the fact that the Sivas congress, intended as a national convocation, drew less than twenty-five delegates from only a few provinces, Kemal used brilliant propaganda tactics to create an aura about the gathering and to turn it to his purposes. Denouncing the foreign occupation of Smyrna and Cilicia, the scheme to spread Armenian rule to the Kizil Irmak River, and the treachery of Damad Ferid’s cabinet in compromising the nation’s territorial integrity, Kemal coaxed the delegates into modifying the resolutions of the earlier regional Erzerum congress into a national program to preserve the unity of all lands left under Turkish control at the time of the Mudros Armistice, to fight against foreign occupation and attempts to form Greek and Ar­ menian states in Anatolia, and to deny minorities any special privileges. Although many of Kemal’s associates favored an American mandate as the only way of realizing these goals, a proposal for which Admiral Bristol had promised his support, Kemal demurred and instead accepted a compro­ mise welcoming the scientific, industrial, and economic assistance of any nonimperialist country that would respect the nation’s internal and exter­ nal independence.79 70 RG 256, 184.021/329; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), pp. 73-74; Harbord, op. cit. (June 1920), pp. 178-180. 79 For discussions of the Sivas congress and the question of an American mandate for Turkey, see Erol, op. cit./ pp. 84-93; Gologlu, op. cit., pp. 61-112, 219-260 (showing thirtyone delegates including eight members of the Representative Committee); Kinross, op. cit., pp. 185-189; Kemal, op. cit., pp. 57-133 passim; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 175-226 passim (including criticism of Kemal); Vehbi Cem A§tun, Sivas Kongresi (Istanbul, 1963). See also FO 371/4159, File 521/44 for Sept.-Oct. 1919; FO 608/112, 385/1/15/18356 ends.; RG 59,

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Employing the name of the Sivas congress and its nebulous Representa­ tive Committee, Kemal used patriotic appeals, deception, and coercion to bring about the severance of telegraphic communications between the interior provinces and the “gang of traitors” in the capital. Control of this vital utility gave him the means to coordinate the Nationalist movement and to neutralize or expel hostile officials. He also used the telegraph to lift the morale of the fatigued troops and population. In calling upon residents of the eastern vilayets to resist Armenian encroachments, for example, Kemal declared that the Allies had already given up the idea of forming a large Armenian state, since the Erevan government could not even hold its own against the Muslim forces of Nakhichevan and Azerbai­ jan. The world was learning that the Armenians were incapable of main­ taining a separate national existence; they would soon be abandoned.*80 Although Kemal was far from achieving his aim of personal dominance and internal solidarity, it was clear when the Harbord mission arrived in Sivas that he represented a new spirit of Turkish patriotism and defiance. In a lengthy conference with the three American generals on Septem­ ber 20, Kemal defined the Nationalist movement in Wilsonian terms. Rumors that it was Bolshevik- and Ittihadist-inspired he ascribed to the British imperialists, who wanted to add the Turks to the list of Muslim peoples in bondage. He was glad that the Americans, who recognized the goodness of the Turkish people, had prevented implementation of the secret Entente treaties of partition; they surely would insist upon an equitable settlement. Whether or not Kemal so intended, Harbord was given to understand that the Nationalists would accept an American man­ date. When Harbord expressed concern for Armenians, Kemal dis­ claimed any malice toward the Christian elements and condemned the wartime massacres, observing, however, that the outrages had been the work of “a small committee which had usurped the government.” The Greek outrages at Smyrna, on the other hand, were occurring under the cover of an Allied fleet, and the government of the “Erevan republic” was trying to exterminate the local Musli. 1 population in a “wave of sangui­ nary savagery.” Kemal accused the British of inciting Armenians and Turks to fight each other in order to have an excuse to occupy the entire region. The Nationalists would be cautious, however, and would not make the costly Ittihadist mistake of becoming embroiled in the Caucasus. Har763.72119/7533; RG 256, 184.021/77/253/288/342 ends.; Polk Papers, 78/190, McCully to Polk, with report of High Commission at Constantinople; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, intelligence reports. 80 TürkDevrim Tarihi Enstitüsü,Nutuk,KemâlAtatürk, Vol. Ill: Vesikalar (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 1018-1019.

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bord left the interview deeply impressed with Kemal’s authority, percep­ tion, and patriotism.81 In Sivas, for the first time since the beginning of the Anatolian adven­ ture, the Harbord mission was accommodated indoors as the guests of Dr. Ernest C. Partridge and his sister-in-law, Mary L. Graffam. The city was a major ACRNE station, staffed by seventeen Americans and their Ar­ menian assistants who operated shelters, workshops, and schools and cared for 1,500 orphans. Harbord learned that, of the nearly 200,000 Armenians in the province before the war, about 10,000 still survived in a servile status and that, even though the 25,000 Christians of Sivas had been deported, another 10,000 had come in from other places. He was especially moved by seeing 150 recently rescued “brides”: “Many of these are still no more than children, and the stories of the treatment received by these little girls of tender years would be beyond belief in any other part of the world.” Harbord had special commendation for Mary Graffam, whose experiences “have never bçen duplicated in the story of woman­ kind.”82 After sending three officers, including Major Shekerjian, to Tokat, Amasia, Marsovan, and Samson to investigate reports of renewed persecu­ tions of Armenians, Harbord led the main party eastward from Sivas on September 21.83 Signs of devastation and depopulation became more evident as the group pushed farther into the Armenian plateau. At Sushehir, two Armenians had the courage to state in the presence of Turkish officials that no Christians had escaped deportation or confinement in Muslim households and that few of the 500 repatriates had been able to reclaim their goods and properties. At Erzinjan, two Armenians and a Greek priest remained silent when the authorities reported that prewar and postwar numbers of Armenians were 16,000 and 500 as compared with 97,000 and 61,000 Turks.84 81 Harbord, op. cit. (June 1920), pp. 185-188; Bristol Papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Bristol to Ammission and to Secretary of State, Oct. 2, 1919; Kinross, op. cit., pp. 189-190. Kemal, op. cit., p. 150, mistakenly gives the date of the meeting with Harbord as September 22. Harbord wrote Bristol from Sivas to outline the mission’s findings halfway through the overland journey. See RG 256, 184.021/276; Polk Papers, 78/69, Harbord to Bristol, Sept. 21, 1919-

82 RG 184.021/96; Harbord, op. cit. (June 1920), pp. 189-190; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Dec. 1940), pp. 74-75; FO 608/113, 386/1/16/19040, jacket 496 end., July 16, 1919; Missionary Herald, CXVI (April 1920), 169-172. Mary Graffam died in Sivas in August 1921. 83 Lieutenant Colonel John Price Jackson and Major Lawrence Martin accompanied She­ kerjian (RG 256, 184.021/275). Their findings are reported in RG 256, 184.021/317. See also White, op. cit., pp. 91-105; Hairenik, Nov. 14:1, 1919; Erkir, Oct. 10:2, 1919. 84 Harbord, op. cit. (June 1920), pp. 191-192; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune’’ (Jan. 1941), pp. 130-131. See also FO 608/113, 386/1/16/19040, jacket 49b end.. Sept. 11, 1919.

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At Erzerum the Americans were welcomed by notables headed by gov­ ernor Rashid Pasha and XV Army Corps Commander Kiazim Karabekir. After a program of equestrian sports, wrestling, and sabre dances, Karabekir took the party on a tour of the strategically important city. Pointing to the rubble of two houses where he said the Armenians had burned a thousand Turks during the Russian occupation, Karabekir com­ plained bitterly that Armenian cruelty was unabated; recently 40,000 defenseless Muslims had been driven from their homes in districts just beyond the frontier. The Armenians, however, would learn a lesson if, prodded by the British and the Dashnakists, they tried to push beyond the prewar boundary. Karabekir and Rashid Pasha claimed that Armenians had never formed a significant element in the eastern vilayets; before the war they had numbered no more than 5,000 of the 45,000 people in Erzerum city and barely 10 percent in the province. The Erevan govern­ ment must drop its imperialistic policies and seek an accord with the patriotic forces of Turkey. When the Harbord mission left Erzerum, Karabekir wrote his military colleagues that he was now more certain than ever that the Americans would not intervene in Armeno-Turkish affairs.85

In the Caucasus At the frontier post of Khorasan on September 25, Harbord dispatched General McCoy, Colonel Edward Bowditch, and Private Dicran Serijanian on horseback to investigate reports of Turkish troop concentrations in the vicinity of Bayazit. The main party then advanced into the province of Kars and the Republic of Armenia. Making camp near the 7000-foot level, the Americans were received in Sarikamish the next morning with the symbolic offering of bread and salt and words of welcome by Minister of Military Affairs Araratian, Commandant Colonel Mirimanian, and other officers. The effect of forty years of Russian rule was seen in the improved roads, neat stone buildings, and reforested hillsides of this strategic for­ tress town.86 At Kars, Harbord’s next stop, the party was greeted with a twenty-one salute from the mightiest fortress in all Transcaucasia. Commandant Gen­ eral Harutiun Hovsepian (Ossipov), Governor-General Stepan Korganian, and Mayor Hamazasp Norhatian directed the guests through the 85 Harbord, op. cit. (June 1920), p. 192; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 131-132; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 302-305. Karabekir, pp. 305-318, includes the report he submitted to Harbord on Armenian atrocities in the Caucasus. 86 RG 256, 184.021/323, Harbord mission diary, Sept. 27-Oct. 8, 1919; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 133-134; Erkir, Oct. 15:2, 1919.

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throngs of orphans and pupils to an inspection of troops in the central square. Harbord was again gratified by the life-saving work of American humanitarians, who were sustaining much of the city’s population. Before departing, the mission was treated to a lavish Caucasian banquet, replete with song and dance, toasts and speeches, but Harbord, who had recently heard Karabekir’s protests and seen many Muslim refugees near Hasankale and Khorasan, suspected that the three-hour feast was meant to discourage a fuller investigation.87 Toward evening the Americans left Kars for the 50-mile drive to Kaghisman, on the Araxes River. Delayed by rain and mechanical prob­ lems, they straggled into the outpost at midnight and were billeted by Commandant Major Ruben Palian. On September 27, ignoring Palian’s advice, Harbord led the mission into an area along the river dominated by Kurdo-Tatars. Several of the party’s automobiles came under Muslim fire and most of their occupants were detained at Kulp by the partisans of Sheikh Shamil Bek. Convincing'their captors that they were not Ar­ menians in disguise and that dire consequences would follow if they were harmed, the Americans were released on September 29 and rejoined their worried leader, who had struck camp near an Armenian outpost.88 Now moving in the shadow of magnificent Mount Ararat, the party traveled through numerous half-ruined villages to Etchmiadzin, acknowl­ edging the salutes of Armenian detachments all along the way. At the Holy See of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the American visitors were guided by English-speaking Archbishop Mesrop Smbatian and awed by Catholicos Gevorg V, whose “majestic presence quite fulfills the ideals of a great prelate, the head of an ancient church, and the spiritual chief of a people who, through the almost inconceivable persecutions of centuries, have clung to their religion and their language and their national feeling.” The supreme patriarch spoke of the unique qualifications of the United States to assist Armenia. “His fine expressive face strengthened his words when he trusted himself to say something of the woes his people endured for so many generations.”89 That same afternoon the mission traversed the final 12 miles to Erevan. The welcoming party at the Zangu River included Commandant Arshavir 87 Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), p. 271 ; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), p. 134; Erkir, Oct. 15:2,1919. The information about Harbord’s suspicion is given by Khachadoorian, not by Harbord himself. 88 RG 256, 184.021/323; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 134- 13989 Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), p. 271. See also RG 256, 184.021/323; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), p. 139.

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Shahkhatuni, who had made meticulous preparations for the event, May­ or Mkrtich Musinian, and Prime Minister Alexandre Khatisian and his cabinet. After the official exchange of greetings, the motorcade pro­ ceeded through rows of orphans and schoolchildren, backed by thousands of cheering townspeople, to the central square and an inspection of the honor guard. Housed in the mansion reserved for Colonel Haskell on his occasional visits from Tiflis, General Harbord was serenaded and ap­ plauded long into the night.90 The exuberance of the Armenians did not leave the Americans unaffected: “There was a certain comfortable feeling of security at finding ourselves among Christian Armenians after so much contact with the Moslem faith in Turkey, and it was with great interest that I spent the forenoon of the last day of September in an interview with the Prime Minister on the Armenian situation, discussing the outlook for foreign assistance in the form of recognition and a mandatory of some disinterested nation, preferably America.”91 During the three-hour discussion Khatisian, described by Harbord as “a very polished gentleman” for whom “better acquaintance only gave our party higher respect,” argued for military support, with at least a fully equipped Armenian-American volunteer detachment, pending a man­ date decision. He was surprised by Harbord’s dismissing an immediate threat from Turkey simply because no troop concentrations had been observed and by the suggestion that the Armenians should establish diplo­ matic relations with the Turks. The Nationalists, according to Harbord, held no enmity toward the Erevan republic and, though resolved to pre­ vent supposedly “revolutionary and Bolshevist” Russian Armenians from moving into the eastern vilayets, they would accept nonoffending and properly documented Turkish Armenians. The prime minister cautioned Harbord against Turkish duplicity in using terms like “nonoffending” and “properly documented.” Harbord later wrote: “To the mind of Dr. Khatissian, there is no promise, no guarantee, no bargain, that will ever justify the return of the Armenian refugees to their former homes in Turkey, except the complete separation from the Ottoman Empire of the territory containing those homes.. . . To him it is unthinkable that his brethren shall ever again depend upon Turkish mercy or good faith.” The Armeni­ an leader was “an honest, intelligent man, confronted with problems as difficult as ever perplexed a statesman.” After the interview the Ameri­ cans attended a state luncheon, visited relief agencies, and ended the 90 Haradj, Sept. 30:1-2, 1919; Erkir, Oct. 15:2, 1919; Sachar, op. cit., pp. 354-355; Khach­ aturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 139-140. 91 Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), p. 273.

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day at a large reception hosted by the Bishop of Erevan, Khoren Muratbekian.92 The first day of October was spent in conferences with members of the Council of Ministers and with a special committee that had compiled answers to the detailed questionnaire sent ahead by the American mission. Comprising some forty consultants and government representatives, the committee submitted extensive data on both the Russian Armenian and Turkish Armenian provinces: climate, geography, and demography; eth­ nic and religious composition; flora and fauna; natural resources and production; existing and potential facilities for communication and trans­ portation; public and private finance and trade; health and sanitation; and scores of other topics of importance to a mandatory power and to foreign investors.93 The discussions, Harbord noted, “made a good impression on our party and while questioning the wisdom of some matters brought out in the meetings [such as an eight-hour workday], we were a unit in conceding the sincerity and good faith of the several members.”94 Although the Americans did not say what action they would recommend to President Wilson, Khatisian believed they were leaning toward a single mandatory for all Asia Minor and Transcaucasia, with separate national divisions. They had been especially interested in a railway link between Erevan and Cilicia and in Mediterranean outlets for Armenia so as to avoid difficulties should the Straits ever be closed again. These indications were encouraging, though Harbord’s advice to be patient a little longer was frustrating to a people at the end of its endurance.96 On their last evening in Erevan, the members of the mission were entertained at tea by a group of well-groomed, educated ladies, who stood out in startling contrast with the sexless-looking refugee women and si­ lently demonstrated that when emancipated from political and social op­ pression Armenian women could be no less informed and elegant than refined ladies in the West. That night Harbord was cheered by the arrival of General McCoy and his two companions, who had ridden from Khora92 Ibid., pp. 273-274. 93 Ibid., pp. 274-275; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 140-141; RG 256, 184.021/323; Haradj, Sept. 20:3, 1919; Ashkhatavor, Sept. 21:3, 1919; Hairenik, Jan. 8:5, 1920. See also RG 256, 184.021/291/363; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 394- 39594 Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), pp. 275-276. 96 Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), pp. 163164. Captain Antoine Poidebard, the French military representative in Erevan, reported to his government that Harbord personally favored a single mandate over all Anatolia and Transcaucasia for economic and military reasons. See France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, 33 bis.

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san to Bayazit and over the lower slopes of Mount Ararat without incident, and of General Van Horn Mosely and Captain Gustave Villaret, who had traveled to Sharur-Nakhichevan to have a “restraining effect” on Kalb Ali Khan Nakhichevanskii, Samed Bey Jamalinskii, and Colonel Halil Bey, a man with “a bad face” and “all the earmarks of a bad character.” At dawn on October 2, the American motorcade set out on the 200-mile journey to Tiflis by way of Lake Sevan and the forested district of Dilijan. Arriving in the Georgian capital late that night, Harbord felt as if he had come back to a prosperous European city. He was not surprised that Colonel Haskell, although Allied high commissioner for Armenia, had chosen Tiflis as his headquarters.96 Like many Allied and American officials, Harbord considered the Geor­ gian leaders to be Bolshevik-influenced and corrupt: “That a Georgian can cheer his own flag and at the same time point to the red one floating over it, shows how much their viewpoint differs from ours.”97 He held interviews with Acting Prime Minister Evgenii Gegechkori and his cabinet; met with Consul Leon Evangulov and the staff of the Armenian legation; and received memoranda from several Armenian societies and the Mailian Brothers, whose firm had sponsored many technical and scientific studies for the Armenian government. Again the Americans were dazzled by the grace of Armenian women at a tea in the Khnunts mansion.98 On October 3 Generals Harbord, McCoy, and Mosely left by train for Baku, enjoying the luxurious car formerly reserved for the tsar which boasted finely decorated staterooms and “a porcelain lined tub, and hot and cold water.” The small party was welcomed to the Azerbaijani capital the next morning with the blare of trumpets, folk music, and an honor guard alongside colorful rugs stretching from the train to the street. Driven to the Tagiev mansion for another Caucasian banquet where “Pari­ sian champagne flowed like water,” the generals were greeted by Prime Minister Nasib Bek Usubbekov, “a very plain, common-sense man of Tartar blood.” After meetings lasting several hours, the Americans were given a tour of the city and the oil-producing area and returned to the train in time for the overnight return journey to Tiflis. They were im­ pressed with the economic potential but not with the political oudook for 96 RG 256, 184.021/323; Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), p. 276; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 141-142. See also FO 608/78, 324/1/6/7461 end. When it was reported in London that an American officer had met with Muslim leaders in Nakhichevan, Foreign Office officials mistakenly presumed that it had been Colonel Haskell. 97 Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), pp. 277-278. 98 RG 256,184.021/284/304/364; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), p. 142. For materials submitted by the Mailian mission, see Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 5/5, File 23/23, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t.

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Azerbaijan: “The Azarbaijanese are the least qualified of the three TransCaucasian republics to govern themselves independently. They are im­ bued with pro-Turk and pan-Islam ideas and have exaggerated concep­ tions of their own political importance and possible leadership. . . . From the standpoint of its products, however, this country is more self-sustain­ ing and with its oil revenues more capable of going alone, than any other of the Trans-Caucasian governmental infants.”99 After a final day among the “light-hearted, plausible and pleasureloving Georgians,” Harbord cabled to Paris and Washington several points of immediate importance. The Turkish Nationalists, fearful of further territorial encroachments, hoped to save the Ottoman Empire through a unitary mandate. The depopulation of Anatolia was appalling; most young men had not returned from the war. By and large the Mudros Armistice was being honored, and, except for local problems, the Armeni­ ans did not seem to be in extraordinary danger for the time being. Heavy troop concentrations had not been observed near the frontier, though demobilized Turkish soldiers were active in places such as Sharur-Nakhichevan. Most inhabitants saw an impartial mandatory power as the only solution to a desperate situation caused by an “inextricable mingling of races, religions and interests.”100 The Return Voyage Before the S.S. Martha Washington weighed anchor at Batum on October 7, Colonel and Mrs. Haskell, the three-member American intelligence team headed by Benjamin B. Moore, and several hundred refugees were taken aboard for passage to Constantinople.101 Brief stops at Trebizond

99 Harbord, op. cit. (July 1920), pp. 278-279. See also RG 256, 184.021/323/346; Khach­ aturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (Jan. 1941), pp. 142-143. Khachadoorian was a member of the party that visited Baku. For a description of that visit from Azerbaijani sources, see Bulletin d'Informations de VAzerbaidjan, no. 6 (Jan. 1, 1920), 2-3. See also Bofba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 293-294, 299-300. 100 RG 5 9 ,860J.01/116/117; RG 256,184.02102/1/2, 184.021/307, 867B.00/283/284; Bristol Papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Harbord to Polk, and Stanav to Ammission, Oct. 6, 1919. See also FO 608/79, 342/1/9/19599 end.; British Documents, IV, 816—819. 101 Four members of the Harbord mission, including Sergeant Ohanessian, remained in the Caucasus to serve in the Near East Relief. Although Harbord had agreed to leave for Haskell’s use one of two limousines that had arrived belatedly at Batum for the mission, he yielded to Admiral Bristol’s urging to bring the automobiles to Constantinople for his own use. Bristol insisted that it would be a “shame” to let Haskell “gobble” them. See RG 256,184.021/303/323; Bristol Papers, Box 31, Harbord to Bristol, Oct. 7, 1919. It was with reluctance, moreover, that Harbord took aboard additional passengers, especially first-class women passengers such as Mrs. Haskell, for the return voyage to Constantinople. Mrs. Haskell, who had contracted typhus in the Caucasus, was hospitalized in Constantinople.

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and Samson gave Harbord time to cable messages of appreciation to the authorities in Transcaucasia and Anatolia. After receiving the report of the three officers who had inspected conditions in Marsovan and Amasia, he wrote Mustafa Kemal that the Armenians were everywhere apprehensive and, under new threats, were again leaving their homes. Kemal was reminded of “the keen interest America has in the safety and welfare of these people” and was urged to make public the fact that the Nationalists were not inimical to Christians, “as I understand from you is the case.”102 By that time important changes had occurred in Turkey. On Octo­ ber 1 Damad Ferid’s cabinet fell, after weeks of Nationalist agitation and the Allied refusal to let the government send a force against the rebels on grounds that a small detachment would be inadequate and a large one would either desert to Kemal or provoke a civil war. The new cabinet included several strong Nationalist sympathizers, particularly Minister of Defense Mersinli Jemal Pasha. The change in government was a momen­ tous victory for Mustafa Kemal, permitting him to strike even more fear­ lessly against ambivalent officials and to demand immediate national elections for a new parliament. And transferring to Angora at the end of 1919, he gained a central position from which to pivot in all directions.103 Admiral Bristol watched these developments with satisfaction. Al­ though reminded by the State Department in September to avoid express­ ing opinions on internal affairs or advising the Turks, he frequently disregarded these instructions.104 Considering Damad Ferid a British puppet, he warmly congratulated the Nationalists and extolled their patriotic goals, dismissing “the constant cry from our relief people, missionaries and the Armenian propagandists in America that the Turks are massing on the Russo-Turkish boundary for an attack on the Armenians and a general massacre.”105 He made the same points to the Harbord mission during its four days, October 11 to 15, in Con­ stantinople. In daily meetings Bristol reiterated his arguments for a mandate over the Turkish empire and against the creation of a separate Armenian state. His final effort was to host a reception so that 102 RG 256, 184.021/317/324, 184.02102/5, exhibit D. 103 Kinross, op. cit., pp. 191-196; Kemal, op. cit., pp. 151-167; Helmreich, op. cit., pp. 232-236. British documents relating to the fall of Damad Ferid’s cabinet and the formation of a new government are in FO 608/112, File 385/1/15; FO 406/41; FO 371/4159^4160, File 521/44 passim. See also British Documents, IV, 785-787, 802-810. The date for the change of cabinet is given as October 2 in several sources. 104 RG 59, 763.72119/6453, State Department to Bristol, Sept. 4, 1919. 106 Evans, op. cit., pp. 185-189; Bristol Papers, Box 65, Armenia file, Bristol to Naval Advisor, Aug. 15, 1919, Box 31, Bristol to Polk, Oct. 1, 1919, Bristol to Heck, Oct. 16, 1919; Polk Papers, 68/70, Bristol to Polk, Dec. 4, 1919.

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representatives of Turkish women’s organizations could mingle with the American officers. The high commissioner was delighted that Harbord had apparently been won over to some of his own views.106 In Constantinople, Harbord again received Patriarch Zaven Eghiayan, accompanied by Protestant spokesman Professor K. K. Krikorian (Grigorian). The patriarch resolutely urged the American representa­ tives, who had personally witnessed the difficulties of his people, to com­ mit themselves to Armenian emancipation and iildependence. A memorandum from the Armenian mixed council warned that the Nation­ alists had absorbed many of the followers and methods of the Committee of Union and Progress and were conspiring to keep Christians in the status of chattel (rayah ) under the very eyes of Allied officials. Some selfish foreign interest groups were again emerging as friends of the Turks, and the troubles that had long aggravated the Eastern question were manifest once more. American intercession at this critical juncture could save the Christian population and ensure the Armenians a secure collective exis­ tence. The children of the nation languished in exile; survivors feared new massacres. Unless the United States quickly accepted the Armenian man­ date, there would be no country to save or protect. Harbord, though responding with compassion and understanding, advised the Armenians to be patient a little longer. It was just not possible, he said, to establish a viable Armenian state without considering neighboring territories.107 Allied officials in Constantinople were courteous and cooperative but in private correspondence with their governments described the Ameri­ cans as naive and easily deceived by the Turks. For example, when Gen­ eral McCoy told the British High Commission that a semblance of order was being preserved in the interior and that Armenian survivors seemed to be safe for the present, staff member Thomas B. Hohler, a witness to Armenian tragedies in the Ottoman Empire since 1895, retorted, “I could not bring myself to trust Turks with Christians more than a fox with geese.” In reporting this exchange to the Foreign Office, High Commis­ sioner de Robeck wrote of the Americans: “Very few of them have any previous knowledge of the Committee of Union and Progress, or of the political history of the past ten years. In fact, they are ‘green’, easy for the 106 Bristol Papers, Box 1, War Diary, Oct. 11-15, 19 19» Box 3 1» Bristol to Polk, Nov. 10, 1919; Polk Papers, 78/69, Bristol to Polk, Oct. 15, 1919, 78/71, Bristol to Polk, Nov. 10, 1919. See also Richardson, op. cit., pp. 70-74. 107 RG 256, 184.02102/5, exhibit B; Erkir, Oct. 15:2, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 22, 1919), 1417-1418. At Constantinople, Major Shekerjian resumed his duties as the Ameri­ can High Commission’s liaison officer. Others who left the mission at Constantinople were Private Serijanian, Turkish interpreter Professor Husein Bey, E. G. Mears, W. W. Cumber­ land, and American newspaperman Walter S. Hiatt.

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Nationalists to spoon-feed, and ready to rise to such catchwords as inde­ pendence and self-determination.”108 The British regarded Admiral Bristol’s chief intelligence officer, Lieutenant Robert S. Dunn, as an eccentric Armenophobe who insisted that whatever responsibility the United States took in the Near East should be for the good of Turkey and the Turks and that it did not matter if the Nationalists drew upon the old Ittihadist party.109 Moreover, the anti-British propaganda disseminated by the United States Navy Radio Press at Constantinople and the open fraternization of Admiral and Mrs. Bristol with the Turks were scandalous. Ultimately the Foreign Office protested the situation and prominent Armenophiles launched a campaign to oust Admiral Bristol, but he outmaneuvered his accusers and successfully avoided that indignity.110 The return journey of the Harbord mission evoked much comment and speculation in the press. Turkish papers were optimistic that the mission would recommend territorial and political unity for the non—Arab-speak­ ing provinces. An American correspondent who had accompanied Har­ bord overland wrote that the mission’s career soldiers seemed disinclined to support a mandate because of national obligations nearer home, whereas the others argued that the United States was the power best qualified to resolve the Armenian problem and bring peace to the Near East. It was later reported that, despite these differences, no minority report would be filed and that most members considered an Armenian mandate alone as “entirely out of the question.” Printing these stories, the New York Times, which favored a mandate, wrote that, although the mis­ sion was supposed to demonstrate American concern for Armenia, the Turks might as well have been told that “we take no interest in Armenia at all.”111Most Armenian newspapers reacted cautiously to the rumors, but the socialist organs, particularly those of the Hnchak party, noted that 108 British Documents, IV, 819-826. General McCoy undertook a brief inspection tour of Smyrna, where he met with representatives of various groups, including the Armenian locum tenens, Archimandrite Hovhan Karapetian. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 91, Nov. 13, 1919. 109 Dunn had been a journalist and then a Buddhist monk in India before converting to Islam in Turkey and assuming the name Mehmed Ali Bey. Until the State Department dismissed him in 1922 he continued to file intelligence reports, subsequently described as being “the result more of barroom gossip than of serious intelligence gathering.” See Peter M. Buzanski, “Admiral Mark L. Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, i960), p. 41; RG 59, 867.00/1495. 110 See FO 608/111, File 385/1/11; FO 608/115, File 385/1/28; FO 406/41, nos. 141, 149. See also Polk Papers, 73/121, Davis to Polk, Nov. 1, Nov. 10, 1919, Polk to Davis, Nov. 5, 1919, 78/90, Van Engert to Davis, Nov. 4, 1919. 111 New York Times, Oct. 23:17, 24:12, 25:3, 1919. See also Hairenik, Oct. 24:3, 26:2, 29:3, 1919, Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 1, 1919), 1415-1416, 1421.

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economic gain was the moving force in American foreign policy. Seeking profitable world markets, the Americans had discovered Armenia’s extensive natural resources and ample potential for foreign investments, but they wanted to combine Asia Minor and Transcaucasia as a single territorial and economic unit in order to realize quicker profits. The United States would probably attempt to achieve economic dominance without incurring military or political obligations by hiding behind the Monroe Doctrine while also pushing for application of the open-door principle. The opinions of the Harbord mission were not accurately given by the press. The reported division between career officers and civilian members was an exaggeration, for the majority of both groups favored accepting a share of the burden in the Near East. Moreover, Harbord, instead of making outright recommendations, preferred to list relevant findings for consideration by the administration and Congress. Before doing so, he asked the mission’s senior members to submit their points of view. Only trade commissioner Eliot Mears clearly opposed a mandate because “a). Mexico will take our available capital and men, b). the Monroe Doc­ trine would become a sham, and c). European nations are now more imperialistic than ever before.” Captain (Professor) Stanley Hornbeck contrasted humanitarian reasons for American involvement with negative practical considerations such as the more pressing problems of the Far East and the inability of a democratic republic like the United States to guarantee a long-range foreign policy, which was much easier for coun­ tries with centralized governments and imperial ambitions.112 Most of the others felt an overriding obligation to answer the humanitarian call, as expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Jasper Y. Brinton: “This is the hour of crisis for Armenia. If she is to exist as a nation, preserving her institutions and developing her national existence, rather than to continue as a refugee and persecuted people, she must have the immediate support of a great power.” The assistance already being given to save Armenia from starvation would be like “pouring water into a sieve” unless the United States established control over the territory. Finance specialist William W. Cumberland added: “The Armenians are entitled to a better lot than has been theirs in the past. A sense of fair play demands that they be no longer subjected to promiscuous massacre, deportation, abduction and plunder. Though they may have some unattractive and some reprehensible qualities, they have at least been loyal allies, and the mere chance for existence is certainly not an exorbitant demand.” The 112 R G 2 5 6 , 1 8 4 . 0 2 1 / 1 3 9 / 3 2 9 e n d s .

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statements of William Poland and Colonels Edward Bowditch, Henry Beeuwkes, and John Price Jackson implied that world peace and Ameri­ ca’s unmatched qualifications to resolve the Eastern question warranted circumvention of the Monroe Doctrine and the bold plunge into the trouble-ridden region. Arguments against the mandate, Jackson said, represented the views of the “hard hearted business man, who has plenty of cold white corpuscles in his blood, and who reasons on the premises of dollars and cents,” whereas those in favor based their case on “demands of the heart.” The entire mission agreed that, for the Armenians’ own best interests, all Anatolia and possibly Transcaucasia should also be placed under supervision. Several members wanted to outline the new Armenian state immediately, but Harbord and others believed the question should be delayed because of the Armenian decimation and the hostility such a decision would certainly provoke. Only after Armenian regeneration and the natural unraveling of the races through voluntary immigration and emigration should permanent boundaries be drawn.113 The Harbord mission reached Marseilles on October 23 and two days later submitted its report in Paris to the American delegation, then headed by Undersecretary of State Frank L. Polk. He cabled Lansing a summary of Harbord’s findings and the warning about the consequences of further delays, adding: “General Harbord has presented a remarkable report on the Armenian situation. Strongly urge that you give him all the time you can when he arrives and if the President is well enough arrange an inter­ view as I feel sure you will be impressed.”114 Before the mission left for the United States, Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar tried unsuccessfully to learn from Harbord the substance of the report, but they were relieved to hear that the recommendation would not be against a mandate.11516Aboard the ever-creaking Martha Washington for a final time, the American Military Mission to Armenia arrived home on November 11, 113 Ibid., 184.021/329 ends. 114 Ibid., 184.02102/18/19, 867B.00/296; RG 59, 860J.01/24. See also Polk Papers, 77/121, Polk to Davis, Nov. 15, 1919, 88/18, Polk Diary, Oct. 31, 1919; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (May 1941), p. 139. American Peace Commissioner Henry White wrote Senator Lodge on November 1 that Harbord had presented “a most interesting report which will, I hope, be printed and serve as a means of enlightenment for years to come.” White continued: “I advise you to see him as soon as you can. He will give you much information of value as to the complications in those regions.. . . He makes it perfectly clear that it would be rank folly for us to take a mandate for Armenia alone, which I think I have explained to you in previous letters as my view, and, indeed, that of all the Commissioners.” Root Papers, Box 161, White to Lodge, Nov. 1, 1919. 116 Erkir, Nov. 19:2. 1919; RG 59, 860J.01/125/130. Herbert Hoover, America's First Crusade (New York, 1942), p. 50, states incorrectly that the Harbord mission returned on August 15 and reported in September.

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1919, and the next day delivered copies of its report to the War Department and the White House.116 The Harbord Report The report of the Harbord mission consisted of the main document and twelve appendices. The former, written by Harbord, reviewed the history of Armenia, emphasizing Armenian achievements despite great adversity. Harbord then assessed the record of broken promises and massacres since 1876, the prevailing conditions in Anatolia and Armenia, the feasibility of the mandate, and the obligations devolving upon the mandatory power.117 A sense of outrage was manifested in his description of the 1915 holocaust: “Mutilation, violation, torture, and death have left their haunting memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys, and the traveler in that region is seldom free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all the ages.” Women and children had been infected with venereal diseases; orphans and refugees were suffering all the woes “that flourish on the frontiers of starvation”; towns and villages were in ruins; brigandage was rampant. Conditions “shriek of misery, ruin, starvation, and all the melancholy aftermath, not only of honorable warfare, but of beastial brutality unrestrained by God or man.” Because of Allied intrigues, the events at Smyrna, and British evacuation of the Caucasus, unrest was increasing, and the Armenian, “unarmed at the time of the deportations and massacres, a brave soldier by thousands in the armies of Russia, France, and America during the war, is still unarmed in a land where every man but himself carries a rifle.”118 Although the Paris Peace Conference had decided to end Turkish sway in Armenia, ethnographic and economic problems complicated the libera116 RG 59, 860J.01/575/576; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 51, Oct. 28, 1919; Khachaturian, “Amerikian zinvorakan arakelutiune” (May 1941), p. 139. Harbord was not so closemouthed about the mission as several authors pre­ sume. As early as November 20 he spoke of his experiences at a New York banquet hosted in the Lawyers’ Club by James Gerard, chairman of the American Committee for the Inde­ pendence of Armenia, and attended by chiefs of the news services and many prominent citizens. See Hairenik, Nov. 29:4, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Dec. 6, 1919), 1464-1465; Erkir, Jan. 1:3, 1920. See also Morgenthau Papers, Box 6, Harbord to Morgenthau, Nov. 28, 1919; Lieutenant Khachadoorian’s discussion of the missibn in Hairenik, Dec. 10:1, 16:2, 1919, Jan. 1:1-2, 1920. 117 RG 256, 184.02102/5. The report, in a slightly altered form and without the many photographs accompanying the original text, has been published under the title, Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, Senate Document 266, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1920). The citations below refer to the published version. n* Ibid., pp. 4-11.

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tion. To overcome these difficulties and reduce external and internal rivalries, the entire region from Constantinople and its hinterland to Transcaucasia should be placed under a single mandatory power. The Turks preferred this solution to outright partition of their empire. Delays in the peace treaty and provocative actions by the European powers made it virtually impossible to award Turkish territory to a self-contained Ar­ menian state. Only under a single mandate could the ultimate boundaries be decided.119 Something could be said, moreover, for the Turkish point of view. Despite their estimable qualities, Armenians, like Jews, had never en­ deared themselves to other races, and they were not guiltless of bloodshed and violence. They needed the chance to prove their capacity for selfgovernment, but they could not be allowed to rule a Muslim majority toward whom they held resentment for past persecutions. There was understandably a widespread belief that the Turks would remain unre­ generate and that the Armenians should be granted full independence immediately and never again linked with Turkey. “To this the reply is that the Armenian should have no fear to submit his case to the League of Nations—the court of the world—and that he must in the meantime prove his capacity not only to govern himself but others and t hat . . . a plebiscite could be had and the mandatory at any time terminated by detachment of his territory from Anatolia. ”*20 Harbord concluded that a federal-type mandate was the most feasible. Only a power with a strong sense of altruism and a willingness to make available its most gifted sons for at least a generation should assume the obligation. “No nation could afford to fail, or to withdraw when once committed to this most serious and difficult problem growing out of the great war.” Harbord estimated that two army divisions, about 59,000 men, would suffice to supervise repatriation, pacification, and reconstruction while a native constabulary was being organized. Both the size and the cost of such a force could be cut in half by the end of the third year. The overall mandatory regime for the large area from Rumelia to the Caucasus would require a budget of about 750 million dollars for the first five years combined.121 Instead of making a clear-cut recommendation, Harbord listed in paral­ lel columns the arguments for and against an American mandate. It may be significant that argument 14 in favor of an American commitment was unmatched by a negative statement: 119Ibid., 120Ibid., 121Ibid.,

p. 11. pp. 17-18. pp 19-24.

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REASONS FOR

REASONS AGAINST

1. As one of the chief contributors to the formation o f the League of Nations, the United States is morally bound to accept the obligations and responsibili­ ties of a mandatory power.

i. The United States has prior and nearer foreign obligations, and ample responsibilities with domestic problems growing out of the war.

2. The insurance of world peace at the world’s crossways, the focus of war infection since the beginning of history.

2. This region has been a battle ground of militarism and imperialism for centuries. There is every likelihood that ambitious nations will still maneu­ ver for its control. It would weaken our position relative to Monroe doctrine and probably eventually involve us with a reconstituted Russia. The taking of a mandate in this region would bring the United States into the politics of the Old World contrary to our traditional policy of keeping free of affairs in the Eastern Hemisphere.

3. The Near East presents the great­ est humanitarian opportunity of the age—a duty for which the United States is better fitted than any other—as wit­ ness Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and our altruistic policy of developing peoples rather than material resources alone.

3. Humanitarianism should begin at home. There is a sufficient number of difficult situations which call for our ac­ tion within the well-recognized spheres of American influence.

4. America is practically the unani­ mous choice and fervent hope of all the peoples involved.

4. The United States has in no way contributed to and is not responsible for the conditions, political, social, or economic, that prevail in this region. It will be entirely consistent to decline the invitation.

5. America is already spending mil­ 5. American philanthropy and chari­ lions to save starving peoples in Turkey ty are world wide. Such policy would and Transcaucasia and could do this commit us to a policy of meddling or with much more efficiency if in control. draw upon our philanthropy to the Whoever becomes mandatory for these point of exhaustion. regions we shall be still expected to fi­ nance their relief, and will probably eventually furnish the capital for mate­ rial development.

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6. America is the only hope of the 6. Other powers, particularly Great Armenians. They consider but one oth­ Britain and Russia, have shown con­ er nation, Great Britain, which they tinued interest in the welfare of Ar­ fear would sacrifice their interests to menia. Great Britain is fitted by Moslem public opinion as long as she experience and government, has great controls hundreds of millions of that resources in money and trained person­ faith. Others fear Britain’s imperialistic nel, and though she might not be as policy and her staying where she hoists sympathetic to Armenian aspirations, her flag. her rule would guarantee security and For a mandatory America is not only justice. the first choice of all the peoples of the The United States is not capable of Near East, but of each of the great pow­ sustaining a continuity o f foreign ers, after itself. policy. One Congress can not bind an­ American power is adequate; its other. Even treaties can be nullified by record clean; its motives above suspi­ cutting off appropriations. Nonpar­ cion. tisanship is difficult to attain in our Government. 7. The mandatory would be self-sup­ 7. Our country would be put to great porting after an initial period of not to expense, involving probably an increase exceed five years. The building of rail­ of the Army and Navy. Large numbers roads would offer opportunities to our of Americans would serve in a country capital. There would be great trade ad­ of loathsome and dangerous diseases. It vantages not only in the mandatory re­ is questionable if railroads could for gion, but in the proximity to Russia, many years pay interest on investments in their very difficult construction. Roumania, etc. Capital for railways would not go there America would clean this hotbed of disease and filth as she has in Cuba and except on Government guaranty. The effort and money spent would Panama. get us more trade in nearer lands than we could hope for in Russia and Rou­ mania. Proximity and competition would in­ crease the possibility of our becoming involved in conflict with the policies and ambitions of states which now our friends would be made our rivals. 8. Intervention would be a liberal 8. Our spirit and energy can find education for our people in world poli­ scope in domestic enterprises, or in tics; give outlet to a vast amount of spirit lands south and west of ours. Interven­ and energy and would furnish a shining tion in the Near East would rob us of example. the strategic advantage enjoyed through the Atlantic which rolls be­ tween us and probable foes. Our repu­ tation for fair dealing might be impaired. Efficient supervision of a mandate at such distance would be dif-

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ficult or impossible. We do not need or wish further education in world poli­ tics. 9. It would definitely stop further 9. Peace and justice would be equally massacres of Armenians and other assured under any other of the great Christians, give justice to the Turks, powers. Kurds, Greeks, and other peoples. xo. It would increase the strength and prestige of the United States abroad and inspire interest at home in the regeneration of the Near East.

10. It would weaken and dissipate our strength which should be reserved for future responsibilities on the American continents and in the Far East. Our line o f communication to Constantinople would be at the mercy of other naval powers, and especially Great Britain, with Gibraltar and Malta, etc., on the route.

11. America has strong sentimental 11. These institutions have been re­ interests in the region; our missions and spected even by the Turks throughout colleges. tlie war and the massacres; and sympa­ thy and respect would be shown by any other mandatory. 12. If the United States does not take 12. The peace conference has defi­ responsibility in this region, it is likely nitely informed the Turkish Govern­ that international jealousies will result ment that it may expect to go under a in the continuance of the unspeakable mandate. It is not conceivable that the misrule of the Turk. League of Nations would permit fur­ ther uncontrolled rule by that thoroughly discredited government. 13. “And the Lord said unto Cain, 13. The first duty of America is to its Where is Abel thy brother? And he own people and its nearer neighbors. said: ‘I know not; am I my brother’s Our country would be involved in keeper?’ ” this adventure for at least a generation Better millions for a mandate than and in counting the cost Congress must billions for future wars. be prepared to advance some such sums, less such amounts as the Turkish and Transcaucasian revenues could af­ ford, for the first five years.. . . SUMMARY

Total Total Total Total Total

first year second year third year fourth year fifth year

G r a n d to ta l

$275,500,000 174.264.000 123.750.000 96.750.000 85.750.000 $ 7 5 6 ,0 1 4 ,0 0 0

14. Here is a man’sjob that the world says can be better done by America than by any other. America can afford the money; she has the men; no duty to her own people would suffer; her tradition­ al policy of isolation did not keep her from successful participation in the Great War. Shall it be said that our country lacks the courage to take up new and difficult duties?122

A final paragraph noted that without visiting the Near East it was impossible to realize in how much esteem, faith, and affection the United States was held by all peoples of the region, including “the wild, ragged Kurd, the plausible Georgian, the suspicious Azarbaijan, the able Armeni­ an, and the grave Turk.” Certainly the mandate would face extremely trying circumstances, but “if we refuse to assume it, for no matter what reasons satisfactory to ourselves, we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes.” So ended General Harbord’s report, which, although not entirely free of factual error and miscalculations, presented a reasoned assessment of an extremely complex problem.123 Of the twelve appendices, the only one published was General Mosely’s discussion of existing military conditions and the requirements for an effective mandate. The Turkish army was in poor shape, and thousands of armed deserters and demobilized men roved the country as bandits. On the other hand, the Turks had been soldiers for centuries and could be aroused to intense loyalty and courage by good commanders. Of the remaining 43,000 regulars, nearly a third were concentrated in General Karabekir’s XV Corps along the Caucasian frontier. Unlike Harbord, Mosely revealed strong distrust of the Nationalists. The Armenian army, he continued, with a combat strength of 13,500 bayonets was in critical need of equipment, munitions, and clothing. Nevertheless, it contrasted well with the Georgian army: “The Russian Armenians have been subject to military service in the Russian Army, in which they have furnished many leaders. They compare very favorably with the best Russian soldier in the prewar imperial arm y.. . . The Armenian is intelligent and patriot­ ic. When well led and equipped, he compares favorably with the best.”124* 122 Ibid., pp. 25-28. 123 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 124 See George Van Horn Mosely, Mandatory over Armenia: Report Made to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, United States Army, Chief of the American Military Mission, on the Military Problem of a Mandatory over Armenia, Senate Document 281, 66th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1920), pp. 9-13, 19-20, 38-39.

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3 6 2

General Mosely estimated that two reinforced divisions of 69,000 men combined would be needed for a joint or composite mandate, but he foresaw no difficulty in recruiting a volunteer army and in eventually retrieving expenses from the mandated region. Disproving stories that the mission’s career soldiers opposed the mandate, Mosely stressed that American humanitarian aid could not liberate the Armenians from five centuries of misrule unless peace was enforced and good government nurtured. To protect Armenia, “decimated as it is by massacres, further reduced in manpower by the recent war,, its people scattered to the four winds by war and carefully planned deportations, and its character under­ mined by the worst influences of its near neighbors,” the United States was the only power that could approach the challenge with “clean hands.”125 Mosely concluded with the following exhortation: If the American people could witness what we have witnessed, if they could talk with the peoples who are placing all thfir hopes on America and realize all that word now means to thousands who are only asking to have such conditions estab­ lished as to permit them to live in peace, I do not believe they would hesitate for a moment to accept the task, gigantic though it is. No nation has ever been offered such an opportunity. No nation is so ideally equipped to accomplish it as America.126

The eleven other appendices, more than a thousand pages long, formed a massive compilation of data and appraisals about the Turkish empire, Armenia, and the Caucasus. These reports covered the following topics: Political Factors and Problems Stanley K. Hornbeck Government Jasper Y. Brinton Public and Private Finance William W. Cumberland Commerce and Industry Eliot G. Mears Public Health and Sanitation Henry Beeuwkes Peoples John P. Jackson Climate, Natural Resources, Animal Husbandry, and Agriculture Edward Bowditch, Jr. Geography, Mining, and Boundaries Lawrence Martin The Press Harold W. Clark Transport and Communications William B. Poland Bibliography James G. Harbord

Hornbeck’s contribution was based on the premise that “the problem of creating and maintaining an Armenian homeland is subordinate to that 126Ibid., pp. 5-7, 25-27. lw Ibid., pp. 31—32.

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of safeguarding the Armenian people and ensuring them justice and equality of opportunity.” The Armenians, paradoxically, were both the most solid and the most troublesome element in the Near East. Industri­ ous, progressive, frugal, robust, and difficult to assimilate, they were disliked by others and severely persecuted. “Their history shows them a race of phenomenal persistence and capacity to endure; their record in the war proves them hard fighters; and their propaganda shows them optimistically and passionately nationalistic.” Listing the disadvantages of an American mandate, Hornbeck nonetheless argued that, if the obliga­ tion were accepted, distinct Armenian and Turkish Anatolian regions should be defined from the outset.127 Cumberland showed that, since the financial systems in Turkey and the Caucasus were unrelated, no particular advantage would accrue to a com­ posite mandate; Mears maintained that American commercial and trade interests would be advanced by the combination of the two regions into a political and economic unit under a “single friendly mandate.” The two specialists submitted many pages of statistical information that would assist a mandatory power. Both held that, while American control would bring no particular profit, a mandate was financially and commercially feasible and the decision therefore should be based on political considerations.128 Colonels Beeuwkes, Jackson, Bowditch, and Brinton each called atten­ tion to the recuperative and regenerative capacities of the Armenian people and the absolute need for an outside power to deliver them from eventual extinction or dispersion. All members of the mission believed that the formation of a united Armenian state without also providing supervision over the rest of Asia Minor and Transcaucasia would be unworkable. The best solution lay in either a unitary or a federated mandatory regime.129 This conclusion was reinforced by Brinton’s assessment of the new Transcaucasian republics: On the whole, the survey of governmental institutions in Transcaucasia gives the impression of much good work and much wasted effort; of many excellent public servants and an army o f incompetent and lazy ones; o f dishonesty in public office and o f a gross exaggeration of political life at the expense of more productive occupations; and finally of a total misdirection of “national spirit” and an almost tragic duplication of effort on the part of the three groups o f leaders, many of 127 RG 256, 184.02102/6. 128Ibid., 184.02102/8. 129 The appendices to the Harbord report are filed in RG 256 as follows: Hornbeck, 184.02102/6; Brinton, /7; Cumberland, /8; Mears, /g; Beeuwkes, /10; Jackson, /11; Bowditch, /12; Martin, /13; Clark, /14; Van Horn Mosely, /15; Poland, /16; Harbord bibliography, /17.

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whom are patriotic and more of whom are probably corrupt, who are trying to impose upon a district which above all needs strong central control, an elaborate and suicidal system of isolated statehood.130

Aside from showing that Armenia could become economically viable on the basis of geography and mineral resources, Major (Professor) Martin proposed a new definition of the country’s boundaries taking economic, topographic, and ethnographic factors into consideratipn. The southern frontier, he suggested, should extend from Zangezur and Nakhichevan to Van and along the Taurus Mountains to Alexandretta, excluding Diarbekir and the districts south of Bitlis, Mush, and Malatia. On the west, the boundary should run along the Anti-Taurus range to the southeast of Sivas, thus, contrary to Armenian aspirations, leaving out Caesarea and the city of Sivas, and then strike the Black Sea at about the Yasun Burun peninsula, near Ordu. The old Russo-Turkish frontier should form the northeastern boundary as far as the province of Kars and then turn eastward to the mountains around Lake Sevan, leaving Akhalkalak and the Lori neutral zone to Armenia and Karabagh to Azerbaijan. If Armenia was deprived of a mandatory power and consequently had to be made smaller, then the western boundary might extend from Mush to a point between Kerasund and Tireboli on the Black Sea, excluding even Erzinjan. Martin was gratified that the King-Crane commission and the Harbord mission seemed to concur that “Armenia should be independent, if not at present, then later.”131 Both the King-Crane and the Harbord reports, while mentioning prac­ tical reasons against American entanglement in the Near East, pleaded humanitarian arguments and implied that world peace was a powerful stimulus for involvement. The recommendations did not satisfy Armeni­ an aspirations for immediate unification and independence, but they did point the way to emancipation, repatriation, reconstruction, and eventual self-rule. Ironically, Woodrow Wilson did not use the reports to advance the Armenian cause, and the recommendations of the Harbord mission were actually turned against the mandate by its opponents. Because Wil­ son was ill, Harbord could not present the findings directly to him, and so the report was simply filed away in the White House.132 Requests by 130Ibid., 184.02102/7. 131 Ibid., 184.02102/13. 132 Harbord did receive a swift response from Secretary of War Baker: “I do not know when I have read any paper which so filled me with admiration for the accuracy of its observation or the sympathy with which a great mission was carried out.” See Harbord Papers, Vol. 1, Baker to Harbord, Nov. 24, 1919.

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Secretary of State Lansing and members of Congress to have the document released were ignored for several months, thus increasing speculation that the mandate recommendation was negative. When at last the report was forwarded to the Senate in April 1920, arguments for the mandate were obscured by skillful oratory and distortions on the part of the president’s critics.133 How much of the responsibility for this denouement should be placed on Wilson’s incapacitation is a matter of conjecture, but there was no doubt when General Harbord returned to the United States in November 1919 that Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations, and the mandate for Armenia were all faltering. 133 For Senate inquiries and requests relating to the release of the Harbord report, see RG 59, 867.00/1007 end.; Congressional Record, 66th Cong., ist sess., LVIII, pt. 9 (Washington, 1919), p. 8718 ; New York Times, March 4:3, 7:2, 1920. See also Advocate of Peace ThroughJustice, LXXXII (June 1920), 211-215.

12

The Shaping of an American Policy

While the King-Crane and Harbord missions were conducting their inves­ tigations, there were developments in the United States which affected the American response to the Armenian question: the controversy over ratifi­ cation of the Versailles treaty, proposals to assist the Armenian republic politically and militarily, the growing breach among Armenophiles on the mandate issue, and the implementation of additional relief measures. During the latter half of 1919 the likelihood of long-range American commitments in the Near East dropped sharply. The country had reached a crossroads from which it could either follow Woodrow Wilson into an untried, idealistic world organization or turn toward a “splendid isola­ tion.” As it happened, the president’s rigidity and his opponents’ vindic­ tiveness boded ill for Armenia. The Ratification Campaign Although physically and mentally exhausted when he sailed for home in June 1919, President Wilson was satisfied with the German peace treaty he had just signed at Versailles and particularly with its inclusion of the League of Nations Covenant. The final drafts of the Covenant had been altered to meet the Senate’s most stringent objections, and Wilson believed that ratification would follow within a few weeks. In submitting the treaty to the Senate on July 10, he emphasized the aspirations of small nations, such as those in the Turkish empire, which had been held together “only by pitiless inhuman force” and which now cried for release. Since the League of Nations would be indispensable in the effort to raise these peoples from darkness to eventual independence, the United States 3 6 6

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should not hesitate to approve the Covenant: “We cannot turn back. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.”1 Such rhetoric further offended many members of Congress who had resented Wilson’s strongheaded diplomacy in Paris. His failure to consult legislators had been impolitic, especially since the Republican party had gained control of both houses in 1918 and the foreign relations commit­ tees were dominated by staunch conservatives. Still, a combination of administration Democrats and moderate Republicans might have ratified the treaty had the vote been taken quickly. Ratification was considered essential for the normalization of international relations and commerce, and many prominent Republicans, headed by former President Taft, had rallied in defense of the League of Nations. Under these circumstances, the attitude of Senate majority leader Henry Cabot Lodge was crucial. Although he had earlier advocated a world organization, Lodge had gradually backed away from the League as it became increasingly identified with Wilson—that “utterly treacher­ ous” and “very sinister figure.”2 Demanding the “Americanization” of the League, he gave free rein in the Senate to its irreconcilable opponents, whose bombastic oratory was typified by the biblical exhortations of William Borah. Yet Lodge was also a self-proclaimed Armenophile, serving on the executive of the American Committee for the Inde­ pendence of Armenia. In May 1919 he reintroduced a Senate resolution calling upon the Paris Peace Conference to combine Russian Armenia, Turkish Armenia, and Cilicia into an independent Armenian state.3 A month later he joined Justice Charles Evans Hughes and other influential Americans in petitioning Wilson, the Allied chiefs of state, and the peace conference to give the Armenians food, clothing, and enough arms and equipment to enable them to defend themselves and regain their historic territories.4 Up to the spring of 1919 Lodge believed that the American 1 Congressional Record, 66th Cong., istsess., LVIII, pt. 3 (Washington, 1919), pp. 2336-2339 (quotations in text, pp. 2337 and 2339). See also The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, II (New York, 1924), 698-712. 2 Root Papers, Box 161, Lodge to Root, Sept. 29, 1919. See also Lodge to Root, March 14, 1919. The Wilson-Lodge rivalry in the context of the Armenian question is treated by Thomas A. Bryson, “Woodrow Wilson, the Senate, Public Opinion and the Armenian Mandate, 1919” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1965), pp. 50-54. 3 See Senate Resolution 38, Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 1, p. 156; Journal of the Senate, 66th Cong., ist sess. (Washington, 1919), p. 26. For the resolution introduced in 1918, see Senate Resolution 378, Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d sess., LVII, pt. 1 (Washington, 1918), p. 237. 4 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/12; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (July 5, 1919), 874-875. See also RG 59, 860J.01/22/23.

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public might be persuaded to accept the responsibility of a mandate for Armenia.5 But by the time Wilson returned with the Versailles treaty, Lodge had become unalterably opposed to a mandate. Intent upon humbling the president and radically revising the Cov­ enant, Lodge resorted to delaying tactics, permitting anti-European senti­ ment to grow and his filibustering colleagues to exploit every imaginable disadvantage of joining the League of Nations. Attacking with wit and sarcasm, prose and poetry, the irreconcilables voiced .blatantly racist ca­ veats against subversion by the pope and inferior non—Anglo-Saxon peo­ ples. They warned against secret diplomacy, weakening of the Monroe Doctrine, the selfish manipulations of European powers, and the naïveté of the American president. To obtain oil, raw materials, and markets, England and France would quickly ratify the treaty and reward them­ selves with the former German colonies in Africa and the richest areas of the Near East, leaving the United States the wasteland of Armenia, stag­ gering fiscal and military burdens* and even, ironically, the duty of playing nursemaid to the Turks, with whom the Americans had not been at war. What business did the United States have in the “cesspool of Europe,” with its “lying, corruption, diplomacy of sedition, intrigue, jealousies, Turkish secret workings and trickings to regain control, Russian Bolshevism, and religious warfare?”6 Although administration supporters were usually cautious in order not to jeopardize the chances of ratification, several senators, such as John Sharp Williams, matched the oratory of the irreconcilables. They re­ minded Lodge of his earlier stand on a world league and argued that the Covenant, instead of compromising national sovereignty, specifically ac­ knowledged the Monroe Doctrine. The attachment of reservations would be an open invitation to every other signatory state to do likewise and thus impair the peace settlement and the League of Nations. In despair by 5 Root Papers, Box 161, White to Lodge, Feb. 10, April 12, May 26, 1919, Lodge to White, June 23, 1919. See also White’s letters and reports to Root in Box 137. General Corres­ pondence. 6 See Congressional Record, LVII passim. See also Bryson, op. cit.y pp. 61—65, 75—90; Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East (Minneapolis, [1971]), pp. 195—196, 214—219. The most outspoken critics of the League of Nations and the European powers and of involvement in foreign places not offering immediate political and economic advantages to the United States included William E. Borah (Idaho), Frank B. Brandegee (Connecticut), Albert B. Fall (New Mexico), Asie J. Gronna (North Dakota), Warren G. Harding (Ohio), Hiram W. Johnson (California), Philander C. Knox (Pennsylvania), Irvine L. Lenroot (Wis­ consin), George H. Moses (New Hampshire), Harry S. New (Indiana), Miles Poindexter (Washington), James A. Reed (Missouri), and Lawrence Y. Sherman (Illinois). See Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington, Ky., [1970]; New York, 1973).

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midsummer, minority leader Gilbert M. Hitchcock offered a compromise that would allow the Senate to define its interpretation of certain treaty terms in a separate resolution without changing the actual wording of the treaty. The proposal was rejected by Lodge and his backers. Woodrow Wilson now faced the most difficult crisis of his political career, as personal animosities seemed to have triumphed over reason. Taking the path toward martyrdom, he ignored the advice of physicians and staff in resolving to stump the country to arouse popular idealistic fervor and thus coerce the Senate.7 Leaving Washington on September 3, he made emotional appeals across the breadth of the land, drawing larger and more enthusiastic audiences as the tour progressed. The Versailles treaty, he frequently exclaimed, offered redemption to weaker nations and was American “in spirit and essence.” At Kansas City he spoke of Armenia’s tribulations: “And at this moment, my fellow citizens, it is an open question whether the Armenian people will not, while we sit here and debate, be absolutely destroyed. When I think of words piled on words, of debate following debate, while these unspeakable things that can not be handled until the debate is over are happening in this pitiful part of the world, I wonder that men do not wake up to the moral responsibility of what they are doing.”8 Though extremely fatigued by the time he reached the West Coast, 7 In a message to Frank Polk on September 2, Secretary of State Lansing complained about Wilson’s decision “to carry the war into Africa.” He continued: There is an increasing sentiment against our taking a mandate over any portion of the Turkish Empire. The more people think about it, the less they like it. I find many Demo­ crats on the hill opposed to the idea. Armenia finds more supporters than any other section but even the demands of humanity are beginning to weaken before the growing dislike of the character of the Armenians. I believe that the Chinese excite more sympathy than the Armenians. The President is of course strong for taking a mandate but he is going to have a difficult time, I think, to obtain Congressional consent. [See the Polk Papers, 78/14.] When Wilson began his national circuit, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was conducting hearings on the Versailles treaty. Damaging testimony was given on September 12 by William C. Bullitt, a liberal who in May had quit the American peace delegation in disgust. (For a discussion of Bullitt’s mission to Soviet Russia in early 1919, see Hovannisian, Republic, I, 390-393.) In a betrayal of confidence, Bullitt testified that Lansing had told him privately that the League of Nations, as provided for in the treaty, was “entirely useless.” The secretary of state, Bullitt continued, had also confided that he was “absolutely opposed to the United States taking a mandate in either Armenia or Constantinople.” See 66th Cong., ist sess., Senate Document 106, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on the Treaty of Peace with Germany . . . (Washington, 1919), pp. 1273, 1276-1277. See also the New York Times, Sept. 13:1, 2, 14:16, 15:3, 16:6, 17:3, 18:2, 23:19, 1919; Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, ed. Walter Johnson, II (Boston, 1952), 395“ 399i Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston and New York, [1921]), pp. 268-277. 8 Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 5, p. 5009. See also Wilson, op. cit., p. 783.

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Wilson was uplifted by tumultuous receptions and manifestations of sup­ port by many moderate Republicans. On the swing back from California, he again spoke of Armenia at Reno and on September 23 declared in the Mormon Tabernacle at Salt Lake City: “Armenia is to be redeem ed.. . . At last this great people, struggling, struggling through night after night of terror, knowing not what day would see their land stained with blood, are now given a promise of safety, a promise of justice, a possibility that may come out into a time when they can enjoy their own rights as free people.”9 All the publicity given the president roused his opponents to even harsher attacks. A “truth squad” trailed Wilson to refute his arguments, while filibusterers in the Senate likened the League of Nations to an internationalist den suiting “the Kaiser, the socialists, the communists, the anarchists, the Bolshevists,” undermining the Monroe Doctrine, fostering hyphenated Americanism among immigrant groups, and serving as a vehicle of European imperialism.'They warned that the president of the United States would send thousands of soldiers to Armenia without con­ cern for their mothers, wives, and children. Warren G. Harding declared on September 11 : Does any thinking man stop to measure the colossal and endless involvement before which the sublimest unselfishness and most confident altruism must falter? Contemplate for a moment only the mandate for Armenia. It is very appealing to portray the woes, the outrages, the massacres, the awakening hopes of Armenia, and visualize the doubts and distresses and sacrificed lives while ‘the Senate waits.’. .. But the big, warning truth is little proclaimed. Our Armies—sons of this Republic, the youths from American homes—are wanted there.. . . Answer the call, and we station this American Army at the gateway between Orient and Occident, to become involved in every conflict in the Old World, and our splendid isolation becomes a memory and our boasted peace a mockery.10

Harding’s admonition that “safety, as well as charity begins at home” was repeated by other senators before Albert B. Fall made the absurd claim that participation in the League of Nations would require American troops “to guard the Turkish harems.”11 9 Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 7, pp. 6412, 6416; Wilson, op. cit., p. 1079. Senator John Sharp Williams introduced the president’s speeches into the Congressional Record. See Vol. LVIII, pt. 5, pp. 4997-5010; pt. 6, pp. 5585“ 5595>5937- 5951»6175-6183, 6234-6255; pt. 7, pp. 6403-6427. The speeches were later published as Senate Document 120, Addresses of President Wilson: Addresses Delivered by President Wilson on His Western Tour, September 4 to September 25, 19/9 . . . (Washington, 1919). See also Wilson, op. cit., pp. 727-1130. 10 Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 5, p. 5222. 11 Ibid-, pt. 6, p. 6137. See also pp. 5496, 5700-5723» Pl- 7» PP- 705 1- 7° 52, 7425-7426.

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Such tirades reflected growing concern in the Senate about Wilson’s popular appeal. Yet the administration’s plan to force ratification with only a separate resolution of interpretation came crashing down with the physical breakdown of the president. Refusing to slow the pace of his campaign, Wilson collapsed at Pueblo, Colorado, on September 26.12 Rushed back to the White House, he suffered a stroke on October 2. With Edith Bolling Galt Wilson shielding him thereafter, the president did not meet with his cabinet for six months and lost touch with many critical aspects of the political scene. The battle for ratification had lost its boldest champion. For several weeks after Wilson’s partial incapacitation, proponents and opponents of ratification played out their roles. Senator Lodge ultimately consolidated many proposed amendments into fourteen reservations, but Wilson, more rigid than ever in his sickbed, disappointed moderates of both parties by advising “friends and supporters of the treaty” to vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification. Only the irreconcilables emerged victorious on November 19, for they first joined the reservationists in adopting the Lodge resolution and then combined with administra­ tion loyalists in voting against the diluted treaty. Although more than two-thirds of the senators favored ratification in some form, the treaty was rejected.13 The bitterness of many moderates was expressed by William Howard Taft, who charged that both Wilson and Lodge “exalt their personal prestige and the saving of their ugly faces above the welfare of the country and the world.”14 The Senate’s action dealt a harsh blow to the cause of an Armenian mandate. Wilson had deferred the issue pending the Senate’s acceptance of the League Covenant, but neither the duration of the debate nor the final outcome had been anticipated. Meanwhile, supporters of the man­ date were not free to launch a national propaganda campaign, and condi­ tions were steadily deteriorating in the Near East. The administration’s reluctance, moreover, to release the King-Crane and Harbord reports only fed negative speculation, allowing opponents to claim that from 100,000 to 250,000 American boys would be needed to defend Armenia. As the likelihood of a quick decision on the mandate vanished, Armenians and their sympathizers concentrated on bolstering the Armenian republic 12 Grabill, op. cit., pp. 221-222 (Wilson, “stooped to his knees trying to carry the Covenant; face twitching, head racked with aches, sleepless“). 13 Congressional Record, LVIII, pts. 7-9 passim. See also David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilsonfs Cabinet, 19/5-/920, II (Garden City, N.Y., 1926), 40-46; Bryson, op. cit., pp. 109117; 66th Cong., ist sess., Senate Document 85, Treaty of Peace with Germany Showing the Amendments Reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, 1919). 14 Grabill, op. cit., p. 224.

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in ways that would not necessarily require long-range American commit­ ments. The Quest for Aid While the ratification debates dragged on through the summer of 1919, American consular, intelligence, and relief officers in the Caucasus re­ peatedly appealed for intervention to deliver Armenia from the hardships caused by Muslim uprisings and the British military withdrawal. In re­ sponse, Senator William King on August 1 introduced a resolution calling upon the Allied and Associated Powers to honor their pledges to liberate and rehabilitate the Armenian people, to force the Turks to evacuate the Armenian vilayets, and to give the Armenians arms and matériel with which to organize an efficient government and take control of the “na­ tional territories.”15 That same day President Wilson, under strong pressure to do something for the Armenians, agreed to send the Harbord mission to the Near East and soon thereafter issued his stern warning to the Turkish government about renewed aggression. The State Department tried meanwhile to persuade the British to retain a force in the Caucasus. Apprised of these measures, the American delegation in Paris, then headed by Undersecretary of State Frank L. Polk, advised that neither threatening notes nor the supply of arms could resolve the Armenian crisis. Rather, congressional authorization should be sought to dispatch 10,000 troops to keep open the relief routes to Erevan. If Congress refused, then the administration could no longer be held responsible for the fate of the Armenians.16 Colonel Haskell, the interAllied high commissioner to Armenia, cabled that a single reinforced infantry brigade could make the difference between survival and annihila­ tion.17 His appeal was supported from Constantinople by Consul G. B. Ravndal and by James Barton and William Peet, who wrote that they had personally witnessed Turco-Tatar preparations for new depredations: “We agree with Colonel Haskell that the Armenians should be furnished with five million rounds of ammunition for their Russian rifles which the British should deliver at Erivan before evacuation. Armenians should also be supplied with thirty thousand units clothing and equipment which should be followed by blankets, overcoats etc.” Pleading that an American 16 See Senate Resolution 147 in Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 4, pp. 3476, 3483-3484, and Journal of the Senate, 66th Cong., ist sess., p. 154. See also RG 59, 860J.01/29. 16 RG 59, 860J.01/24/25/33; RG 256, 867B.00/193/271; RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 1919, pt. 4, Class 800, July 31, 1919, Doolittle to Ammission; Lansing Papers, Vol. 45, pp. 7771—777517 RG 59, 860J.01/96; RG 256, 181.9402/2, 184.02102/3, 184.611, Bulletin 901.

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brigade be dispatched from France immediately, the two veteran mission­ aries cautioned: “Twenty thousand Armenian orphans, three hundred thousand refugees and seventy American relief works would be imperilled in case of an outbreak and the work of three years and the expenditure of more than ten million dollars American Philanthropy will be sacri­ ficed.”18 At home, the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia coordinated bipartisan efforts through executive members John Sharp Williams, a personal friend of Wilson, and Henry Cabot Lodge, who dominated the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee. Responding to ACIA chairman James Gerard’s inquiry about the suggested use of a small American armed force, former Republican presidential candidate Hughes expressed reservations but added: “Am perfectly willing that you as chairman if you think you have sufficient facts should urge sending of our troops which are now in Europe unless President knows adequate objection. I am anxious that we should give all help possible in the present emergency, but as to specific measures President must be the judge and must take the responsibility.” Lodge concurred: “I agree with Mr. Hughes that responsibility for action lies with the President. He can order the troops to Armenia if he sees fit.”19 Elder statesman Elihu Root was more forceful: “I consider imperative duty of Allies to send without any delay whatever sufficient troops to insure organization and equipment of Armenian forces adequate to protect the country and its inhabitants and that America should immediately do its part in furnishing troops.”20 Yet Wilson did not exploit this opening, understanding full well that any such move might antagonize Congress even more and further jeopardize the Versailles treaty. Hughes and Lodge had both bluntly stated that the president would have to bear the “responsibility.” Afraid to act unilaterally, Wilson insisted that specific congressional authority was required and thereby lost the opportunity to send a limited force and prove that cries about 250,000 men being needed to protect Armenia were gross exaggerations. On August 4 he wrote Secretary of State Lansing: “I fear that it would be most unwise to put before Congress just at this stage of its discussion of the Covenant either a proposal to promise to assume 18 RG 59, 860J.01/62. See also 860J.01/102; RG 256, 867B.00/277; Britain, FO 371/3659, 134122/512/58 end.; Bristol Papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Aug. 23, 1919. 19 RG 59, 860J.01/70, Gerard to Lansing, Aug. 14, 1919. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130; Bryson, op. cit., pp. 91-92; Lansing Papers, Vol. 47, p. 8174. 20 RG 59, 860J.01/91. See also Ralph Elliott Cook, “The United States and the Armenian Question, 1894-1924” (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1957), pp. 200-202.

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the Mandate for Armenia or a proposal to send American troops there to replace the British and assume the temporary protection of the population.”21 A few days later he told Cleveland Dodge that, despite his personal desire, “the present temper of the Congress” made it “manifestly impossible” to intervene.22 Considering Lodge to be a shameless hypocrite in Armenian affairs, Wilson dared not take the initiative. In this impasse, the New York Times observed: “The shade of p o n t i u s p i l a t e must be getting a good deal of entertainment out of the efforts of various countries to put off the responsibility for the Armenian blood which quite possibly may be shed by the Turks in the next few months.”23 And the liberal New Republic warned: “If we fail at this juncture to vindicate Armenia’s right to freedom we shall never again persuade the world that our moral sentiments are anything but empty rhetoric playing over a gulf of selfishness and sloth.” To tolerate the return of Turkish rule in Armenia would constitute the “blackest disgrace” in the history of the civilized world.24 As the last of the British battalions in the Caucasus gathered at Batum, the ACIA persuaded Lodge not to oppose the introduction of legislation authorizing steps to maintain peace in Armenia pending a permanent settlement. Sponsored by Senator Williams and introduced by minority leader Hitchcock on September 9, the joint resolution read: Whereas the withdrawal of the British troops from the Caucasus and Armenia will leave the Armenian people helpless against the attacks of the Kurds and the Turks, and whereas the American people are deeply and sincerely sympathetic with the aspirations of the Armenian people for liberty and peace and progress: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in the opinion of the Senate, Armenia (including the six vilayets of Turkish Armenia and Cilicia),. Russian Armenia, and the northern part of the Province of [Persian] Azerbaijan and Trebizond, should be inde­ pendent, and that it is the hope of the Senate that the peace conference will make arrangements for helping Armenia to establish an independent republic. Section 2. That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use such military and naval forces of the United States as in his opinion may seem expedient for the maintenance of peace and tranquility in Armenia until the 21 RG 59, 860J.01/26VÏ. 22 Grabill, op. cit., p. 210. Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820—1960 (Athens, O., [1970]), p. 164. On September 30, in a letter to ACIA chairman James Gerard, Lansing reaffirmed the view that the president had no power to act without the consent of Congress. See RG 59, 860J .01/105a. 23 New York Times, Aug. 28:10, 1919. 24James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia (Kent, O., 1967), p. 199, citing the New Republic, XX (Sept. 10, 1919), 163—164. See also Hairenik, Sept. 20:1, 1919.

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settlement o f the affairs of that country has been completed by treaty between the nations. Section 3. That the President is hereby authorized to suspend the foreign enlist­ ment act to the extent necessary to enable Armenians in the United States to raise money and arm and equip themselves as an armed force to go to the aid of their countrymen in Asia Minor. Section 4. There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated the sum o f $---------- to enable the President to execute the foregoing resolution.2526

When informed by Lodge that a foreign relations subcommittee would consider the resolution, Gerard assured the State Department that Lodge, Hughes, and Root were sympathetic to the intent of the legislation, and Vahan Cardashian, director of the Armenian Press Bureau, wrote Avetis Aharonian that Lodge’s stance was encouraging, since he and the Republi­ can party held more power than the president in the determination of American foreign policy.26 But Lodge resorted to Bismarckian tactics by assigning two hard line reservationists, Harding and Harry S. New, to the three-member subcommittee, along with Williams. As recently as September 11, subcommittee chairman Harding had cautioned his Senate colleagues that even a small-scale, temporary commitment in Armenia would make extrication virtually impossible. His attitude had not changed when hearings on the Williams resolution opened at the end of the month. 25 Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 5, p. 5067; RG 256, 867B.00/268. See also British Docu­ ments, IV, 797-798; FO 371/3660, 144328/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20063 ends.; New York Times, Oct. 18:1, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 8:2, Nov. 5:2, 1919. The paragraph on suspending the foreign enlistment act was incorporated later at the request of James Gerard, as it was hoped that an Armenian division could be recruited and supplied in the United States. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2; RG 59, 86oJ.oi/88/88a/ 91. Previously, on August 22, Gerard inquired whether the State Department had any objec­ tion to registering Armenian Americans who had military experience and wished to volunteer for service in Armenia. The department gave a noncommittal reply, as it had to an earlier appeal of the Armenian National Union of America, submitted by chairman Mihran Sevasly on April 24, for permission to enlist a volunteer corps of 10,000 men. See RG 59,860J.01/6/88; New York Timesf April 25:5, 26:14, May 1:16, 1919; New Armenia, XI (May 1919), 79-80. At the time the Williams resolution was introduced, the French authorities had intimated that they might send 12,000 troops to Armenia by way of Cilicia. Even though American officials having a knowledge of the problem warned that the French maneuver was not actually intended to relieve the Armenian republic, President Wilson telegraphed from Cali­ fornia on September 17 that, while he favored the Williams resolution, he was “willing to defer to see if French will send a sufficient number.“ RG 59, 860J.01/82. Three days later Assistant Secretary of State Phillips informed Wilson that Senator Williams believed the resolution would have a better chance of passage if the paragraph relating to an American armed force was omitted. Wilson demurred, however, on grounds “that it is of immediate humane neces­ sity to take energetic action, and that the very existence of the Armenian people depends upon it.” RG 59, 860J.01/82/92. 26 Lansing Papers, Vol. 46, pp. 8073-8074; RG 59, 860J.01/70; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2.

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By September Colonel Haskell was desperately claiming that even a single regiment could ease the crisis. Frank Polk suggested that 2,000 marines might be used to protect American personnel and the transporta­ tion routes without requiring a decision on the mandate question.27 In response to Polk’s request for information, General Harbord wrote from the field that there was so much devastation and depopulation in Anatolia that a Turkish attack seemed unlikely and that, since the British had now decided to retain a garrison at Batum, it could guard the railway.28 Haskell, on the contrary, insisted that marine detachments placed in several neutral zones and at strategic junctures would have a salutary effect and could be justified, if for no other reason, by the obligation to protect hundreds of relief workers.29 Inasmuch as all these exchanges were relayed through the American High Commission at Constantinople, Admiral Bristol was able to interject his own views and even, by paraphrasing, to alter the contents of some dispatches. After reading Polk’s wires to Harbord and Haskell, Bristol wrote the Paris delegation, the State Department, the Navy Department, and prominent political figures to disparage the suggested employment of a small armed force. The British, he said, were conniving to alienate Muslim world opinion from the United States by encouraging the Ameri­ cans to intervene in Armenia. But as the European powers had been at war with Turkey and had contributed to the present conditions, they should be made to enforce the armistice.30 If the United States sent a single soldier, at least 150,000 others should be prepared to follow: “The responsibility for taking this step is so great that no sentimentalism or even the starvation of thousands of Armenians should make us lose sight of all that this involves.”31 Although Haskell and several other American officials attempted to expose Bristol’s distortions, his repeated warnings began to influence the Paris delegation and the State Department. Moreover, his views were in some ways compatible with those of Harding and New, except that the two senators professed sympathy for the 27 RG 256, 181.9402/30, 184.021/281. 28 Ibid., 184.021/281 end., 184.02102/4. 29 RG 59, 763.72119/7432; RG 256, 181.9402/7. See also FO 608/79, 342/1/9/19876; British Documents, IV, 843-844. 30 RG 59, 867.00/938/940/941. 763.72119/7650, 860J.01/73; Bristol Papers, Box 66, Cauca­ sus file, Bristol to Secretary of State, Sept. 4, 1919, and Bristol to Ammission for Secretary of State, Nov. 5, 1919, Box 77, British-in-Turkey file, Bristol to Ammission and Secretary of State, Sept. 29, 1919. Bristol complained that the letter of Barton and Peet urging the dispatch of American troops had been sent “without my authority or knowledge.” 31 RG 59, 867.00/940/944; RG 256, 184.02102/- end. See also Bristol papers, Box 66, Caucasus file, Bristol to Ammission and Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 1919, Box 31, Bristol to Polk, Oct. 1, 1919 (copy in Polk Papers, 78/69).

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Armenians. The hope of Armenophiles that the foreign relations subcommittee would recommend quick passage of the Williams resolution was perhaps already doomed when Lodge wrote Root on September 29 that there was almost no possibility that Congress would sanction the use of American troops.32 Nevertheless, as the Harbord mission was crossing the old Russo-Turkish frontier into the Republic of Armenia and as the stricken American president was being rushed back to Washington, hearings on the resolution commenced.

Hearings on the Maintenance of Peace in Armenia Thirteen witnesses testified on the Williams resolution between Septem­ ber 27 and October 10, with three representatives of the Armenian Na­ tional Union of America appearing the first day.33 Because all three had emigrated from the Ottoman Empire years earlier, they were vague about Near Eastern geography and demography and ignorant of conditions in the Caucasus and in the Armenian republic. Easily baited by Harding into expressing opinions about Allied policies, the British withdrawal, and the League of Nations, they performed miserably. Senator Williams openly supplied them with suitable replies in his effort to point out that de facto recognition of the Erevan government would lift morale, that Armenians could defend themselves if given arms and equipment, that Armenian veterans in America and Europe would enlist in a volunteer corps for service in Armenia, and that the use of an American marine detachment to keep open the Batum—Erevan railway would have a favorable political effect in Anatolia and the Caucasus. Mihran Sevasly, chairman of the National Union, was the most disori­ ented, becoming easy prey for Harding. When, for example, Williams tried to show that adoption of the resolution, even without reference to 32 Root Papers, Box 161, Lodge to Root, Sept. 29,1919. On September 25 Root himself had replied cautiously to a request from Gerard that he communicate with Wilson regarding the critical situation in Armenia: “I do not feel like telegraphing any more to the President. It seems to me that he has been made fully aware of the conditions in Armenia. My impression is that any remedy requires a very radical and complete change of policy and an abandonment of the idea that a disturbed and savage world can be controlled by mere words. I have little hope that that change will occur at present, and I see no way to avert the hideous conse­ quences.” Root Papers, Box 161, Root to Gerard, Sept. 25, 1919. See also Hairenik, Oct. 8:2, i 9 »933 See Maintenance of Peace in Armenia: Hearings before a Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session, on S. J. R. 106, A Joint Resolution for the Maintenance of Peace in Armenia (Washington, 1919), cited hereafter as Peace in Armenia Hearings. See also Bryson, op. cit., pp. 101—108.

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an American force, would deter the Turks and other hostile elements, the following exchange occurred: MR. s e v a s l y :

SENATOR HARDING : MR. s e v a s l y : SENATOR HARDING : MR. s e v a s l y :

Among English-speaking men it is said it would act like magic on the whole of the East, upon the whole of the eastern world. Once they know out there that the eagle is soaring around Ararat there will be no trouble what­ ever. . . . The moral effect will be great; but a few soldiers would . . . Would add to the moral effect? Yes: I mean it would be the outer sign that this thing; that this paper, is not printed matter alone, but that it has . . . Punch to it? Yes: punch to it. I do not know that I am putting my case properly.

Senator Williams did not think so and took hold of the situation by posing a series of questions that Sevasly CQuld answer with “Yes, sir,” or “No, sir.” Thus Williams established that there was a Caucasian Armenian republic, that its avenue of supply from Batum was threatened, that it was not in the proximity of Cilicia, the Mediterranean region to which the French had offered to send a relief force, and that many Armenian-Americans would hasten to its defense if the foreign enlistment act were suspended. Sevasly’s poor performance was typified by his concluding remark: “I think if you passed the resolution it would be a very good thing to pass.”34 The testimony of Moses H. Gulesian, a prominent Boston financier and civic figure, was smoother, in part because Harding seemed to tire of interrupting.3536Gulesian told the subcommittee: “If you can not give anything else, give us this [resolution], and give us the benefit of the moral

34 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 3-12. See Sevasly’s earlier memorandum supporting an American mandate for Armenia in Christian Science Monitor, July 23:16, 1919, and New York Times, July 20:8, 1919. See also Teghekagir Hai Azgayin Miutian Amerikayi, 191J—1921 ([Boston, 1921]). The Armenian National Union of America had been formed in the spring of 1917 through mutual agreement among the four major political parties (Hnchak, Reformed Hnchak, Sahmanadir Ramkavar, and Dashnaktsutiun), the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Armenian Evangelical Union, and the Armenian General Benevolent Union. The stated purposes of the National Union were to further the “Armenian cause” and to recruit volun­ teers for the Légion d’Orient and other military units abroad. The chairman, Sevasly, was a Reformed Hnchakist. See Manuk G. Jizmejian, Patmutiun amerikahai kaghakakan kusaktsutiants, 1890-1925 (Fresno, Calif., 1930), pp. 341-351. At the time of the hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 106, the Social Democrat Hnchak party and the Dashnaktsutiun were no longer active in the National Union. 36 The success story of the Armenian immigrant, who spearheaded the drive to save the U.S.S. Constitution (Old Ironsides) from the scrap heap, is recounted by Irene H. Burnham, Not by Accident: The Story of Moses S. Gulesiaris Career (Boston, [1938]).

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effect. If you do not, there will be nothing of us left.” Because of Armenia’s agricultural wealth and economic potential, the United States would gain more than spiritual satisfaction by assisting the Republic. Thousands of Armenian-American businessmen, craftsmen, and university graduates would willingly return to help rebuild their homeland. When Senator Williams praised the admirable record of Armenian immigrants in America, Gulesian revealed an intense yearning for acceptance: “We make a business of becoming American citizens, and many of us have married American girls, particularly around in Massachusetts, most of them what we say ‘Yankees,’ and they make the best wives I ever met.”36 Vartan Malcolm, a Boston attorney, was the third National Union wit­ ness. He unwittingly contradicted several points made by Sevasly and Gulesian before submitting a memorandum, extracted from his book on Armenian-Americans,3637 showing that Armenians led other immigrants from the Near East and eastern Europe in literacy upon arrival, in number of children attending school, in skilled labor and the professions, in family income, and in naturalization. But Harding then drew Malcolm into a discussion of British policy and a mandate for Armenia, with Senator New blocking Williams’s attempt to intercede. Before concluding his statement, Malcolm asked that several warships and at least 10,000 troops be dispatched to Batum. There would be almost no danger of a military confrontation, since even American relief workers were regarded with awe by both Armenians and Muslims and the “native Turks” would welcome the presence of an American force.38 Armenian correspondents in attendance described with disbelief the “courageous feats” of the National Union’s representatives. Hnchak and Dashnakist papers in particular berated the trio for perpetuating the image of helpless Armenians and demanded that henceforth representa­ tion be entrusted to the duly appointed plenipotentiaries of the Armenian government, who would certainly know the distance between two strategic geographic sites and have enough wit to deal with politically loaded ques­ tions. Criticism was heard even from the political parties that still belonged to the National Union. Sevasly, in fact, tried to rectify his blunder by presenting an additional memorandum with relevant geographic and statistical information and an earnest appeal: “I beg the committee most 36 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 12-17. The Armenian National Union subsequently disas­ sociated itself from Gulesian because, invited to the hearings by Senator Harding, he had not represented the union’s views. See Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Oct. 18, 1919), 1375. See also a stronger indictment of Gulesian in the Reformed Hnchak journal Pahak, Nov. 7:1, 1919. 37 Vartan Malcolm, The Armenians in America (Boston, 1919). 38 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 17-32.

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urgently to disregard for the present such questions as the mandate and the future political status of Armenia, and to advise that the helping hand of this great Republic should be extended to the Armenians at this critical phase of their existence by dispatching at once a few battalions of Ameri­ can troops to the Trans-Caucasus to protect the inhabitants until the Armenian question is settled and Armenia’s independence is safe­ guarded.”39 On September 30, Assistant Secretary of State William C. Phillips testi­ fied for the Williams resolution. He produced information from Ameri­ can diplomatic and relief personnel showing that Pan-Turkism was still a potent movement and that a small foreign force could protect transporta­ tion routes to Armenia and lessen the impact of the expected winter famine. Phillips claimed that the State Department’s immediate interest was only humanitarian and that the resilient Armenian people, if given agricultural supplies and equipment and the means for self-defense, could soon look after themselves, repatriate their refugees, and enforce the decisions of the peace conference.40 George B. Hyde, a Red Cross officer recently returned from Aintab, gave similar testimony and told the subcommittee that approximately 200,000 Armenian women and children were still held in Turkish harems in Cilicia, Mesopotamia, and Syria.41 On October 2 Captain Abraham Tulin, a member of Hoover’s staff, described Armenia’s needs and praised the Erevan government and the army for their “wonderful” accomplishments in difficult circumstances. The soldiers had no bread for days at a time, and few of them had shoes, but “they were sticking.” Unfortunately, heroism alone was not enough, for “people who have not anything to eat and who have not had anything to eat in a long time and have not any munitions, and so forth, can not be very effective soldiers, with the best will in the world.” Tulin pleaded for American assistance. On one occasion he interrupted Harding, who was indulging in an Anglophobe diatribe, to say that the Americans “could not have saved a single Armenian life had it not been for the hearty and loyal and generous cooperation of the British in that region.” Senator New, who personified the antiforeign sentiment of many Americans, attempted to impugn the objectivity of the Jewish officer: 39 Ibid., p. 33. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Cardashian to Manuk Hambardzumian (Boston), Oct. 6, 1919. 40 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 34-40. See also FO 371/3660, 144328/512/58 end.; Hairenik, Oct. 3:3, 5:2, 1919. 41 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 40-44. For articles about and by Hyde, see Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Oct. 4, 1919), 1277-1278; New Armenia, XII (Aug. 1920), 113-114.

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sen a to r n e w

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c a p t a in t u l i n new

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t u l in new

t u l in new

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t u l in new

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t u l in

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Are you a native-born American? I am not. What is your original nationality? I was born in Russia. Y o u are Russian, then? Yes, sir. From what part of Russia? I was born in the province of Grodno. I was brought over here as a baby. I merely asked because your name and all indicated a foreign origin. I am not an Armenian. N o .42

Last to testify on October 2 was “General” Torcom, a native of Caesarea, a product of Bulgarian, French, and Swiss military academies, and an adventurer who had unilaterally issued a declaration of Armenian inde­ pendence in Erzerum and left a trail of bad debts from Tiflis to Archangel and London.43 He pointed out that many of the 40,000 single Armenian-Americans between the ages of 20 and 45 would volunteer for service, thereby creating a combined Armenian army of 80,000. With that force, “we can occupy all the Armenian lands, and we will be free allies, a free little nation, and we will owe that to the United States of America, and you will not hear anything more of the massacres.” Torcom’s pretentiousness and his pathetic final appeal undoubtedly strengthened the opposition of Harding and New to involvement in Armenia: “I am here, but I do not know your language, and the condition is that I have all the documents and I will bring you what is necessary. I hope you will give me the permission to work with you for Armenia. I must have a little office and two or three collaborators.”44 Had the subcommittee adjourned that day, as had been intended, even the most ardent Armenophile might have wondered how Armenians hoped to attain their political goals when they could not present a simple, well-organized, logical case to three senators. As it happened, they were 42 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 45-54. For an earlier report by Tulin regarding relief problems in the Caucasus, see RG 256, 867B.48/15. 43 For an English translation of Torcom’s “declaration of Armenian independence,’’ see Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 60-62. For examples of the extensive diplomatic correspon­ dence relating to his postwar activities and difficulties in Europe, see FO 371/3661, File 806/58; FO 371/3668, File 16214/58; FO 371/3670, 16164/17164/58; FO 371/3671, 111676/ 111676/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/1/17440 end., 342/1/6/1975; FO 608/94, File 363/1/13; RG 59, 763.72119/3170/4820/5235. See also FO 371/3659-3660, 111677/145164/512/58. According to Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Sept. 13, 1919), 1201, Torcom arrived in the United States on September 3. 44 Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 54-62.

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to have one more opportunity. Because Hovhannes Kachaznuni was sail­ ing from France at the head of a special economic and political mission, the ACIA, through Senator Williams, succeeded in reopening the hear­ ings for a single day to accommodate the former prime minister. At the same time, three prominent Americans with recent experience in the Caucasus were invited to testify: Walter George Smith, John H. T. Main, and Harold C. Jaquith. On October 10 they argued for saving the remain­ ing Armenians. Smith exclaimed: “No question has ever been before you gentlemen, or ever will be before you, which is so momentous as this question. I say it with all the sincerity of my being, and I wish I could say it to all the people of the United States.” His praise for the Armenian government and armed forces was echoed by Dr. Main: “They were doing an energetic piece of work; they were constantly on the job; they were constantly trying to help the Armenian refugees who were within their borders, having fled from the T urks.. . . I want to say with all possible emphasis that the Erivan government. . . was doing the best piece of work that was being done in Asia Minor when I was there.” Without external support, however, the Armenian republic would not have “a ghost of a chance.” Dismissing the obligations of Great Britain, Main continued: “Armenia appeals to us, and has done it from the first.”Jaquith, a youthful official in the Near East Relief, reviewed American humanitarian efforts and thought it inexcusable that Armenia, a nation of diligent, thrifty workers, had been denied recognition and loans, in contrast with many other countries which would probably never repay a penny: “It is sure that as soon as the Armenians are able to get back into their fields and establish their businesses, it will be less than two years before they will be selfsupporting; and within approximately that same short period they will be carrying on trade with those on the outside, and they will begin to accumu­ late a surplus both of goods and of money.”45 The three American witnesses presented the Armenian case far more effectively than had the Armenian spokesmen, eliciting from Harding a self-righteous apology: “Now, I want to tell you, I am a lot in sympathy with this whole situation. I do not want to give you a wrong impression.”46 It was at the end of Jaquith’s testimony that the envoys of the Armenian republic were introduced to the subcommittee.47 46 Ibid. f pp. 63-109. The subcommittee tried without success to get a copy of the Harbord report. See RG 256, 867B.00/285, 184.02102/3. 46 Peace in Armenia Hearings, p. 98. 47 The hearing given the representatives of the Armenian republic was arranged by Ge­ rard’s office with the collaboration of Senator J. S. Williams. A résumé of the correspondence is in Hairenik, Nov. 5:2, 1919. See also RG 59, 763.72119/7203.

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The Armenian Civil and Military Missions The Armenian civil mission disembarked at New York on October 9 to a tumultuous welcome by thousands of joyful compatriots. After ceremo­ nies at the pier, the guests were driven in a motorcade down Fifth Avenue to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, above which waved the Armenian red, blue, and orange flag. Kachaznuni was accompanied by his secretary, Suren Melikian, economic advisers Artashes Enfiadjian and Artem Piralian, and Armenia’s minister plenipotentiary to the United States, Garegin Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo). The mission’s primary purpose was to gain American economic and political assistance, but it was also to rally the divided Armenian-American community, whose manpower and technical skills were vital for the development of an independent state.48 Enfiadjian and Piralian, as Populist-Ramkavar partisans, strengthened the call for unity by emphasizing the dedication of the Erevan government and pointing out that, despite the Dashnakist majority in the Council of Ministers, the ministries were staffed largely by non-Dashnakists. And Professor Abraham Ter-Hakobian (Der-Hagopian), arriving in the United States on October 12 to represent Boghos Nubar and the National Delegation, publicly praised the broad-mindedness of national leaders such as Kachaznuni and Khatisian. Caught up in a brief wave of euphoria, all Armenian political parties pledged fidelity to the Republic’s tricolor and to the envoys of “the liberated sector of integral Armenia.” It was a rare, exhilarating moment in the history of the Armenian-American community.4950 Addressing the Harding subcommittee on the afternoon of October 10, Kachaznuni, Pasdermadjian, and Vahan Cardashian, who represented James Gerard, were markedly different from the previous Armenian witnesses.60 Without denying the desirability of a mandate or minimizing the distress in Armenia, they emphasized the nation’s historic cultural and political contributions, its right to self-determination, and its capability of self-defense if provided arms and ammunition and foreign advisory personnel. Such assistance, Kachaznuni said, would be an investment rather than a dole: “We have two guaranties. One is that Armenia is a very 48 Hairenik, Oct. 3:1, 7:1, 11:1, 15:1, 1919\ Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Oct. 11, 1919), 13011302, and (Oct. 18, 1919), 1353* Pasdermadjian, a Dashnakist member and vice-president of the Armenian National Delegation, departed for America on short notice, irritating the non-Dashnakist majority, which had been planning to send Professor Ter-Hakobian. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 46, Sept. 30, 1919. 49 EritasardHayastan, Oct. 11:1,29:1, 1919\Pahak, Oct. 17:1, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Oct. 19, 1919), 1335-1337, and (Oct. 25, 1919), 1367-1369; Hairenik, Oct. 29:1, Nov. 20:2, Dec. 24:1, 1919. See also S. Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, V (Beirut, 1966), 316-318. 50 Artashes Enfiadjian and Captain Suren Melikian were also present at the hearing.

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rich country in natural resources; the second is that the Armenian is an industrious and thrifty person, and he always pays his debts.” Pasdermadjian stressed the Armenian role in the Allied war effort and testified that an American battleship at Batum and a marine detachment at Erevan would be most welcome, since “our neighbors, the Orientals, are very impressionable.” Cardashian asserted that the Turks, realizing that the eastern vilayets—now a virtual wasteland—were lost to them, would concentrate on the preservation of areas west of the Anti-Taurus range. If the Armenians were supplied with food until the next harvest and with the means to organize and equip an army, they would be able to occupy in stages the territories to be awarded them by the peace conference.51The subcommittee was undeniably impressed by the powerful testimony, with Harding intimating privately that it might be feasible to recommend the granting of political recognition, military matériel, and a financial loan to the Erevan government.52 After the hearing Senator Williams escorted the Armenian dignitaries to the White House, where they were greeted by the president’s secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, who conveyed Wilson’s abiding sympathy for the Armenian cause and his regret that his health did not permit a personal interview. The party was also received by Vice-President Thomas R. Mar­ shall, Senate majority and minority leaders Lodge and Hitchcock, Senator King, and Secretary of State Lansing, all of whom offered words of encouragement.53 Within forty-eight hours of their arrival in the United 51Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 109-124; Erkir, Nov. 25:1, 191 q, Hairenik, Oct. 21:1, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, Kachaznuni to Khatisian, Oct. 12, 1919, pp. 13-19. The memorandum presented by Cardashian on behalf of Gerard is in Peace in Armenia Hearings, pp. 114-116; FO 608/79, 342/1/7/20779; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 94, Nov. 25, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 1:1, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 8, 1919), 1460-1461. 52 RG 59, 860J.01/119/323. See also Hairenik, Oct. 12:1, 1919. Senator Lodge wrote Elihu Root on November 3 (Root Papers, Box 161): We took up the Armenian question in which I feel, as you may suppose, a deep and sympathetic interest and referred it to a sub-committee consisting of Harding, New, and John Sharp Williams. They have heard the Armenians. They have gone into the subject very thoroughly and are preparing a report for the full committee, but it has not come along yet. You know with such a matter as the treaty up how difficult it is to get action on other questions. They will recommend the recognition of Armenian independence and I am inclined to think they will also recommend a relaxation of the foreign enlistment act so as to permit the Armenians to enlist their own people in this country and supply them with arms and munitions of war. This seems about as far as we can go at present. 63 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, Kachaznuni to Khatisian, Oct. 12, 1919, pp. 20-25, File 380/2, Cardashian to Aharonian, Oct. 14, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Oct. 18, 1919), 1351; Lansing Papers, Vol. 47, p. 8250; RG 59, 860J.01/106; New York Times, Oct. 13:6, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 15:1, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 10:2, 1920. After the subcommittee hearings had ended, the Department of State continued to make available reports regarding conditions in Armenia. On December 22 Harding was informed that Colonel Haskell urged the dispatch of 5,000 troops since, owing to the long delay in the

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States, the Armenian envoys had been admitted to the uppermost echelons of government, inspiring optimism and a gratifying sense of achievement. It was to take a little longer for them to realize that American cordiality could not be used as a reliable gauge of the probability of political and military support. Meanwhile, another Armenian mission appeared on the scene. Having experienced the futility of “knocking on official and unofficial doors” in Europe, the Armenian republic’s Paris delegation decided to send General Hakob (Iakov) Bagratuni to lobby for passage of the Wil­ liams resolution and to complement the civil mission. Bagratuni’s creden­ tials, signed by Aharonian on October 25, 1919, authorized him to solicit American military aid, assemble an Armenian-American expeditionary force if permitted, and recruit American instructors and technicians for the reorganization of the Armenian army. With much the same concerns that had led to Abraham Ter-Hakobian’s journey to America, Boghos Nubar Pasha wanted to have General Andranik, a Western Armenian, join the military mission. It was agreed that Bagratuni should head the mixed mission and that his secretary, Lieutenant Mikayel Ter-Poghosian, should serve as its secretary.54 Bagratuni, only thirty-eight years old, was a highly decorated officer who had distinguished himself in the Russian army as a corps commander and as commandant of the Petrograd garrison. After the Bolshevik revo­ lution he had made his way to Baku, there participating in the defense of the city and suffering the loss of a leg. In mid-1919 he went to Paris on behalf of the Karabagh Armenians, joining the delegation’s military sec­ tion under General Gabriel Korganian.55 More than fifteen years Bagratuni’s senior, Andranik was undoubtedly the most popular living Armenian hero, having battled the Turks as a partisan and an army regular for three decades. In 1918 he broke with the Dashnaktsutiun, denouncing those who had made peace with the Ottoman Empire, and ultimately left the Caucasus rather than acknowledge the Erevan government. After several months abroad, however, a mellower Andranik not only accepted the reality of the Caucasian Armenian republic but*64 conclusion of a Turkish peace treaty and the growing belief that nothing would be done, the situation was deteriorating, as demonstrated in the Azerbaijani refusal to honor the agree­ ment regarding a neutral zone in Sharur-Nakhichevan. See RG 59, 763.72119/8322. 64 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 379/1, File 232/131, nos. 692, 709, 778; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 44, 46, 47, 50, 51, Sept. 23, 30, Oct. 4, 17, 28, 1919. See also Jizmejian, op. cit. , pp. 416-417; Erkir, Oct. 14:1, 1919. 66 For biographical sketches of Bagratuni and other members of the mission, see Hairenik, Dec. 4:1-2, 1919; New Armenia, XI (Dec. 1919), 184-186; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 29, 1919), 1436-1439.

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urged his compatriots to lay aside political differences in the crusade to liberate the rest of the homeland.56 The military mission was met in New York on November 22 with the same enthusiasm and the same fanfare that had greeted Kachaznuni six weeks earlier: happy crowds, a beaming reception committee, bouquets held out by trembling schoolgirls, fluttering flags, honor escorts in cars and on horseback, a procession down Fifth Avenue. At the Holland House, Armenian scouts and uniformed veterans lined the way to the grand ballroom, where Bagratuni exhorted the youngsters to stand tall as the sons of Haik, the epic progenitor of the nation, and to emulate An­ dranik, Armenia’s soaring eagle.66768The emotional occasion was a boon to thousands of Armenian-Americans who had waited in anguish for years to hear news of their native townspeople and loved ones. Former presidential candidates Charles E. Hughes (Republican) and Alton B. Parker (Democrat) promised Bagratuni and Andranik that they would personally appeal to Woodrow Wilson for assistance to Armenia. The Episcopal church honored the combined civil and military missions in colorful ceremonies at the Cathedral of Saint John the Divine in New York City early in December. In one Armenian community after another, large audiences witnessed the gathering together of Armenian ministers, generals and diplomats, Dashnakists and anti-Dashnakists, Eastern and Western Armenians, and Apostolic and Protestant clergymen on a com­ mon platform in the name of a common cause.58At a mass rally at the New York Hippodrome on December 7, Hovhannes Kachaznuni extended to 5,000 expatriates greetings from “the hallowed peaks of ancient Masis 66 See Hovannisian, Road to Independence, p. 194, and Republic, I, 87-88, 190-191 ; Hairenik, Nov. 2:1,2, 18:3, 1919. Andranik’s military diary for the period March 1917-April 1919 has been published as General Andranik: Haihakan Arandzin Harvadsogh Zoramase, transcribed by Eghishe Kadjuni (Boston, 1921). For Andranik’s reception in France and Great Britain, see Cab 24/87, G.T. 8080: FO 371/3657-3659. 38163/43514/43515/46407/47105/50344/51911/ 54541/79482/83775/95969/512/58; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 52, June 12, 1919; Pahak, Nov. 7:1, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (July 12, 1919), 934, and (Nov. 15, 1919), 1371—x373»Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 20-21, June 2, 9, 1919. The Armenian military mission sailed from France aboard La Savoy on November 13. See Rep. of Arm. File 232/131, Aharonian to Kachaznuni and Pasdermadjian, no. 873; Pahak, Nov. 23:1, 1919. 67 Pahak, Nov. 23-28, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 25-29, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 29, 1919), 1444-1445; New Armenia, XI (Dec. 1919), 184-186; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, Pasdermadjian report, Nov. 27, 1919; New York Times, Nov. 23:10, 1919. 68 Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 29, 1919), 1445-1446; Hairenik, Dec. 5:2-3, 9:2, 1919; New York Times, Nov. 27:10, 1919. The activities of the military mission were given wide coverage in the American organs of the four political parties: Azg (Sahmanadir Ramkavar), Pahak (Reformed Hnchak), Eritasard Hayastan (Hnchak), and Hairenik (Dashnaktsutiun). Armenian Protestant views were expressed in the weekly Kochnak Hayastani.

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[Ararat], the blossoming slopes of Aragads, the towering mountains and deep valleys of Ardsakh and Siunik, the verdant shores of Mother Araxes, the pristine waters of Sevan, the awe-inspiring ruins of Ani and Dvin, the Mother Cathedral of Etchmiadzin, the magnificent monasteries of Haghpat, Tatev, Gandzasar.” There was no longer tsar, shah, or sultan: “That hallowed land today is ours, compatriots—yours and mine. Over the territory of Armenia there already flies an Armenian flag—do you hear, an Armenian flag!” Despite their suffering the Armenians did not want pity. They sought only temporary assistance to defend their embryonic state and expand it into Van, Mush, Karin (Erzerum), and other historic national territories. “We ask this without being ashamed,” because “our role in the world war gives us the right to place this question before the Great Powers, before the civilized, progressive peoples, without being afraid, confident in our resources and capacities.” Whatever the response of outsiders, there was no doubt that the Armenian-American community would do its share to rebuild the nation after centuries of woeful oppression. One after another, Ter-Hakobian, Pasdermadjian, Bagratuni, and Andranik brought the delirious audience to tearful standing ovations with praise for the brave little army of the Armenian republic, the promise of territorial unification, and the slogan of “one nation—one struggle.” The crowd roared its approval when James Gerard denounced the joint mandate plan and demanded support for a united, independent Armenia.59 The same excitement prevailed a week later in Boston where, after requiem services in Trinity Episcopal Church, nearly 8,000 people marched from the Commons to Mechanics Hall to honor the civil and military missions. This largest gathering in the history of the Armenian-American community accepted resolutions, read by Harvard Professor Albert Bushnell Hart and addressed to President Wilson, Senator Lodge, and the Foreign Relations Committee, urging recognition of the Armenian government and enactment of the supportive measures proposed by Senator Williams. Among the officials receiving the Armenian dignitaries the next day were Mayor Andrew J. Peters, Harvard President Abbot Lawrence Lowell, and Governor A. Calvin Coolidge. The Armenian press and daily newspapers of Boston made much of these events, stressing humanity’s obligation to Armenia.60 The numerous manifestations of sympathy notwithstanding, a firm 59 New York Times, Dec. 8:17,1919\ Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Dec. 13, 1919), 1502—1508, and (Dec. 20, 1919), 1529-1530; Hairenik, Dec. 9:3, 13:1, 14:1, 16:1, 17:1, 1919\ Eritasard Hayastan, Dec. 24:2-3, 1919; RG 59, 860J.01/174; New Armenia, XII (Jan. 1920), 16. See Azg, Pahak, and Hairenik, Dec. 16-23, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Dec. 27, 1919), 1572; Haradj, Feb. 13-17, 1920; New York Times, Dec. 15:3, 1919.

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American commitment was not forthcoming. In Washington, where Pasdermadjian had opened an unofficial Armenian legation in the Congress Hall Hotel, General Bagratuni was received by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker at the end of December. He presented a detailed memorandum on the structure, strength, needs, and potential of the Armenian army, claiming that with adequate arms and equipment the Armenians could themselves undertake the occupation of their territories beyond the old Russo-Turkish frontier. And Bagratuni argued that to train an ArmenianAmerican volunteer corps and to lend Armenia instructors and technical advisers would not seriously burden the United States. Baker was sympa­ thetic, but he cautioned that any action would require approval by the Department of State, the extension of treasury credits, and congressional sanction. He did promise to submit the question to Lansing.61 A résumé of the conversation was indeed sent to the State Department before Bagratuni called on Lansing on January 3, 1920, to express gratitude for American humanitarian assistance and to reiterate the points made at the War Department. Always polite and proper, Lansing still held to the legalistic position that the United States could not give military aid to a government that had not been formally recognized.62 Earlier, on October 11, Kachaznuni had put the case for recognition to Lansing who, despite his concern about complicating American-Russian relations, advised the Armenian mission to submit a formal memorandum on the subject. Dr. Pasdermadjian presented that document to the State Department before the end of the month, yet Lansing continued to dis­ courage any action that might imply American approval of the dismem­ berment of the former Russian Empire. In the matter of armaments, he said the Armenians could not be likened to the Poles, who had been permitted to recruit and outfit a volunteer legion in the United States, because that assistance had been required by wartime exigencies and was authorized only after the United States had recognized a Polish government.63 As long as Lansing remained in office, he withheld recognition from Armenia and was not overruled by the president. Never given a clear-cut answer to their petitions, the Armenians had to continue knocking “on official and unofficial doors.” 61 RG 59, 860J.24/1. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, Cardashian to Pasdermadjian, Dec. 26, 1919, Pasdermadjian report, Dec. 29, 1919. Jizmejian, op. cit., pp. 417-419, describes a subsequent interview between Baker and Andranik. 62 RG 59, 860J.24/-/2 end., 860J.01/176. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Gerard to Baker, Oct. 29, 1919, Baker to Gerard, Nov. 7, 1919. 63 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Cardashian to Hambardzumian, Oct. 16, 1919, File 381/3, Lansing to Pasdermadjian, Oct. 29, 1919, File 1407a/ 27a. Circular, Dec. 27, 1919; RG 59, 860J.01/400/419; Hairenik, Oct. 15:3, 1919.

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Armenian disappointment with the administration soon broadened to include Congress. After the hearings on the Williams resolution were closed, Senator Harding informed ACIA chairman Gerard that the sub­ committee would hasten its report to the full Foreign Relations Commit­ tee. Although it was not likely that American troops would be employed, the committee, recognizing the chief executive’s duty to protect American lives and property abroad, might recommend suspension of the foreign enlistment act and the allocation of arms and equipment.64Senator Lodge indicated that the Foreign Relations Committee would probably urge recognition of the Armenian republic and possibly endorse relaxation of the enlistment act.65 He had Kachaznuni’s memorandum on the recognition of Armenia printed as a Senate document and continued to introduce into the Congressional Record various public petitions asking protection for the Armenians.66 Yet neither Harding nor Lodge did anything to expedite consideration of the Williams resolution. The subcommittee’s report was in fact not forwarded until March 1920 and was not placed on the Senate calendar until May 11, seven months after the hearings had ended. The resolution that came to the Senate floor bore little resemblance to the original Williams version. There was no mention of using military and naval forces to maintain peace in Armenia, of providing arms and matéri­ el, of suspending the foreign enlistment act, or of appropriating funds. Rather, the resolution offered by Harding, noting that the hearings had established the truth of the reported massacres and other atrocities and that the American people were deeply concerned about the well being of the Armenians, merely extended best wishes to the Armenian republic and expressed the hope that “the full realization of nationalistic aspira­ tions may soon be attained by the Armenian people.” Only one section of the resolution recommended a substantive measure: “That in order to afford necessary protection for the lives and property of citizens of the United States at the port of Batum and along the line of the railroad leading to Baku, the President is hereby requested, if not incompatible 64 RG 59, 860J.01/323. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Gerard to Harding, Oct. 28, 1919, Cardashian to Pasdermadjian, Nov. 6, 1919. 65 Root Papers, Box 161, Lodge to Root, Nov. 3, 1919. Lodge assured Gerard that he favored recognition of and immediate assistance to the Armenian republic. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4; Hairenik, Nov. 29:4, 1919. 66 The memorandum, published as Senate Document no. 151, 66th Cong., ist sess., is entitled The Republic of Armenia: A Memorandum on the Recognition of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, Submitted by the Special Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United States. Presented by Mr. Lodge, November 10, 1919. See also the Journal of the Senate, 66th Cong., ist sess., pp. 244-245, 250, 271, 273.

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with the public interest, to cause a United States warship and a force of marines to be dispatched to such port with instructions to such marines to disembark and to protect American lives and property.” Harding told the Senate that the real object of this section was to guarantee the mainte­ nance of the communication line to Erevan, and that, if the president saw fit to have the marines go ashore, they would add “materially to the morale” of the Armenian army. Assured that the resolution was “entirely advisory” and that the initiative and responsibility still lay with the presi­ dent, the few senators who happened to be on the floor on May 13, 1920, accepted the report without objection.67 Everyone knew that the diluted resolution included no measure that President Wilson could not have taken without consultation at any time in 1919. The Armenians were being let down on all sides. James Gerard pro­ tested that they had been misled, but Lodge rationalized his silence in the Senate by claiming that he had worked hard to get the Foreign Relations Committee to accept the dispatch of even a single warship to Batum. As it happened, President Wilson made no attempt to implement the resolu­ tion. There were, after all, American naval vessels already in the Black Sea which could, if necessary, evacuate American relief personnel. The Wil­ liams resolution and associated efforts to assist Armenia all came to nought.68 The Americans’ failure to match their sympathetic expressions with political commitments placed a strain on Armenian party unity inspired by the arrival of the civil and military missions. By early 1920 disagree­ ments that had previously led the Hnchak and Dashnakist parties to bolt the Armenian National Union of America resurfaced. Members of the two missions were themselves affected. Ter-Hakobian no longer accompanied the civil mission on visits to various communities, and Andranik, angered by the failure to achieve tangible results, let it be known that he would attend no more public functions that did not include fund-raising for the Armenian armed forces in the Caucasus, Cilicia, and elsewhere. His jus­ tification was that, aside from being a member of Bagratuni’s mission, he represented Boghos Nubar’s National Delegation, which had empowered him to solicit funds. Supported by the Ramkavar and Reformed Hnchak parties, he also prescribed a distribution formula by which the Erevan 67 Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2d sess., LIX, pt. 7 (Washington, 1920), pp. 6844, 6978-6979, 7542-7543. See also Bryson, op. cit., pp. 161-163. 68 An Armenian editor used an old saying to ercpress the disappointment of his people: “The mountain gave birth to a mouse.” See Hairenik, May 14:2, 1920. See also Edward H. Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal (New York, 1924), pp. 337-338.

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government would appoint only one person to a mixed committee that would determine how the Republic’s share of the contributions would be used. Kachaznuni, Bagratuni, and Pasdermadjian tried unsuccessfully to have the conditions altered. Nonresolution of the issue led the Hnchak and Dashnakist parties to inform Andranik that, while they would not oppose his “liberty drive,” they would after its termination begin their own collection for the national army. Although the two sides ultimately gath­ ered about half a million dollars each and many people contributed to both campaigns, duality and disunity were again afflicting the most impor­ tant Armenian community of the dispersion.69

Dissension among Armenophiles While the Armenians extolled unity and exhibited disunity, pro-Armeni­ an elements in the United States were dividing on the mandate issue. One group, drawn largely from the missionary-educational-relief establish­ ments, agreed on the need for an American mandate. James L. Barton, its strongest proponent, persuaded the National Council of Congregation­ al Churches and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mis­ sions to adopt resolutions advocating American protection for the Armenians.70 Granting the administrative advantages of a common mandate over Turks and Armenians, Barton nonetheless insisted that the Armenians should be free of their “cruel task master.” “No one could visit Armenia and see the condition of the crucified people and not come away with the conviction that never again should Armenia be under Turkish rule.” It would be selfish, cowardly, and unreasonable to expose the region to another “unbridled orgy of massacre, lust, and loot.”71 Influential missionary-educators such as Caleb F. Gates continued to argue, however, that a single mandate for the entire Turkish empire was the best way to assist the constituent peoples. They chided their religious brethren who supported the Williams resolution, claiming that it fostered a spirit of 69Jizmejian, op. cit., pp. 419-424; Artak Darbinian, H a i azatagrakan sharzhman oreren (Paris, 1947), PP- 457~45®î Rep. ° f Arm. Archives, File 14070/270, Circular, Dec. 27, 1919; Kochnak H ayastani , XX (Jan. 1920), 34-36,45-48,91,116,147-148. For details regarding the financial campaigns and the partisan journalistic feuds, see the American organs of the four major Armenian political parties, December 1919-April 1920. 70 Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 8, p. 7867; M issionary H erald, CXV (Nov. 1919), 429-430, 432. 71 M issionary H erald, CXV (Nov. 1919), 433-434\ Kochnak H ayastani, XIX (Nov. 22, 1919), 1404-1405; N ew Arm enia, XI (Dec. 1919), 178-179. See also Crabill, op. cit., pp. 235-236; N ew York Times, Nov. 2:5, Dec. 8:17, 1919.

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revenge and could lead to even greater Armenian misfortunes. An independent Armenia was impossible in the foreseeable future.72 The Morgenthau plan for a triple mandate over Constantinople, Anatolia, and Armenia seemed to provide an acceptable compromise. After returning to the United States in the autumn of 1919, Morgenthau pressed his case for a thirty-year joint mandate as a solution that would prevent the resurgence of Turkish tyranny and would ensure the Armenians a separate national existence. Yet his plan aroused strong opposition, not only among isolationists, who exploited the argument that a mandate would obligate America to defend the “unspeakable Turk,” but also among Armenians and Armenophiles who supported the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia.73 For a time in early 1919, the ACIA did advocate a mandate for Armenia while continuing to urge political recognition and military, financial, and 72 Grabill, op. cit., pp. 190, 234—236, 239; Caleb F. Gates, Not to Me Only (Princeton, 1940), pp. 261-263; Hairenik, Dec. 31:2, 1919. After his return to the United States, Gates was urged by Admiral Bristol to continue to champion “the big point of view.” Replying to a letter from Gates, Bristol wrote in December that the formation of an Armenian state would be a gross disservice to everybody, including the Armenians. “The fight that some of our people have been making for Armenia and the inaccurate and in many cases false propaganda carried out in America for the Armenians has always seemed to be an impelling force towards the re-establishment of Turkish ru le .. . . I can see no more reason for establishing an Armenia in Turkey than I can for establishing an Italy in the Italian district of New York.” The lengthy letter ended with Bristol’s familiar caveat: “It is my firm belief that we should drop all petty questions, such as the formation of an Armenia, the running of the Turks out of Europe, the maintaining of the Sultan on account of the Mohammedan religion, the rights of the Christian races in Turkey (in my opinion there are mighty few Christians according to our lights), the rights of the Greeks on account of their ancient qualifications, the spheres of influence of France and Great Britain, and to take up the big idea of what to do with the old Ottoman Empire, and what to do for about twenty-five millions of people living in that old Empire.” Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bristol to Gates, Dec. 13, 1919. 73 Henry Morgenthau, All in a Life-Time (Garden City, N.Y., 1922), pp. 423-437; New York Times, Oct. 18:1, 20:4, Nov. 9 :III-i, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, Pasdermadjian report, Nov. 27, 1919; Hairenik, Oct. 22:3, 26:1, Nov. 21:3, 1919. On Morgenthau’s return to the United States, Frank Polk wrote Ambassador John Davis in London: “Henry Morgenthau has left Paris and the French Press now have more room for advertisements. He literally brisded with interviews.” See Polk Papers, 73/120, Oct. 9, 1919. The British minister in Washington wrote Lord Curzon on October 23 that Morgenthau thought that after the Senate had ratified the Versailles treaty he could, with the help of General Harbord, “create a wave of idealism in favour of Mandate for Constantinople and Armenia.” See British Documents, IV, 843. Admiral Bristol, characterizing Morgenthau’s plan as “oriental bargaining,” took issue with the underlying assumption that, given the guidance of a mandatory power, the Armenians were prepared for self-government. “All these races, including the Greeks and Armenians, are priest-ridden and are swayed by their priests for both good and evil—I must admit, very little good.” Neither Greeks nor Armenians, he thought, were fit to govern themselves or anyone else. Bristol Papers, Box 31, Bristol to Buckler, Dec. 19, 1919.

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humanitarian aid for the Erevan government.74 But as the champions of joint mandate schemes became more vocal and as the ACIA’s leading Republican members cooled on the mandate solution, the organization changed its strategy. James Gerard, using Vahan Cardashian as his writer, labeled the joint mandate plan “immoral and impracticable” and suggested to Senator Lodge that the United States offer Armenia direct administrative assistance.75 Lodge responded confidently: “We need not discuss the merits of a mandate. It is out of the question. Congress would never assent to taking a mandate for Armenia, Anatolia and Con­ stantinople. It cannot be done. The only way to help Armenia is by direct help. Of course, the President ought to recognize their government, and when recognized, then we could do something in the Senate if he would recommend anything for us to do.”76 Senator Williams, although favoring a mandate, accepted Gerard’s argument that Lodge would never agree to it. He therefore consented to recommend to the State Department a policy of direct aid.77 On November 26 Justice Hughes told the Armenian civil and military missions that the Morgenthau plan would increase the risk of perpetuating the Turkish empire. Hughes was concerned that the pro-mandate propaganda of some well-known figures was obscuring the real goal of guaranteeing the territorial and administrative integrity of the Armenian republic.78 The noted jurist Henry W. Jessup joined Hughes, saying that de facto recognition and economic and military support would give Armenia “might plus right.” The joint mandate proposed by “apparently well-meaning but singularly ill-advised” individuals was unworkable: “Is our memory so short that we can contemplate making any covenant of assistance directly or through the League with the heirs, executors, administrators or assassins of Abdul the Damned? . . . A mandate for Turkey and Armenia together would be a travesty on common sense.”79 The New York Times agreed: “There is 74 NewYorkTimes, May 23:20, 25:IV-6, June 1:III-6,July 6 :IV -8 ,1919 \ Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (May 31, 1919), 701; RG 59, 763.72119/5870; RG 256, 867B.00/89; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4. 75 RG 59, 860J.01/109; RG 256, 184.021/34, 867B.00/154; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Gerard to Lodge, Sept. 11, 1919, Cardashian to Pasdermadjian, Nov. 6, 1919. The Armenian National Union of America, under Sevasly’s chairmanship, continued to advocate a mandate, albeit more cautiously than before. 76 RG 59, 860J.01/189 end. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Lodge to Gerard, Dec. 9, 1919. 77 RG 59, 123H.391/69. See also RG 59, 860J.01/129/1326/ 132c/134; Cook, op. cit., p. 200. 70 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 381/3, mémoire, Nov. 26, 1919; Hairenik, Dec. 5:2-3, 1919. 79 Henry Jessup, “American Aid to Armenia without a Mandate,” in The Joint Mandate Scheme: A Turkish Empire under American Protection ([New York, 1919]), pp. 19-22; Hairenik, Jan. 4:1, 1920.

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much to be said in favor of an American mandate for Armenia. Something can be said, though not very much, in favor of an American mandate for Constantinople.. . . It is hard to see what can be said in favor of an American mandate for the residuary Turkish state in Anatolia; or, worst of all, for an American mandate over the whole Turkish Empire.”80 Disagreement among Armenophiles exacerbated Armenian intracom­ munity tensions, though all Armenians opposed a joint mandate. The Armenian National Union and the Armenian Evangelicàl Union had close bonds with the missionaries and continued to advocate a mandate for Armenia alone.81The Hnchak and Dashnakist parties, on the other hand, espoused the ACIA’s position that a mandate was not essential and criticized the dualism of demanding national independence while seeking a protectorate. They deplored relief posters and films that exploited the image of starving Armenians in order to raise funds. However well intended, this practice not only ruffled Armenian self-dignity but, by depicting a helpless and hopelesS people, played into the hands of elements opposed to political involvement in Armenia. Among the first Armenians to back away from the mandate was Vahan Cardashian, director of the Press Bureau of the Armenian National Union. In the summer of 1919 he justified the ACIA’s shift by alluding to the attitude of Lodge, Hughes, and Root and to the dangers of the joint mandate plan. At that point, however, deeming it impolitic for Armenians to renounce the mandate, he told Gerard that the ACIA should initiate the campaign for direct assistance.82 After bringing the Press Bureau under ACIA auspices in September, Cardashian consistently based Armenia’s right to independence on contributions to the Allied cause and to the past and future progress of the Near East.83 In November he notified Pasdermadjian that, should Wilson request authority for the mandate, the Senate would refuse and the Armenian cause would be forgotten. If, on the other hand, the president recognized the Erevan government and Congress sanctioned military, technical, and financial aid, Armenia would gain all the benefits of a mandate as well as those of 80 New York Times, Nov. 4:14, 1919. 81 See, for example, the memorandum of the Armenian National Union in Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Aug. 2, 1919), 1000-1001, and New York Times, July 20:9, 1919, and the sharp criticism of Vahan Cardashian and the tactics accepted by James Gerard in the newspapers Azg and Pahakt June-A ugust 1919. 82 See esp. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4. See also A Report of the Activities of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, 1918—1922 ([New York, 1922]). 83 See, for example, RG 860J.01/119/134/138/156/162/169/188/189; Hairenik, Sept. 10:2—3, 11:2, Oct. 2:2, 8:1-2, 1919. Under ACIA auspices, the Press Bureau was directed, as before, by Cardashian, while Ashot Tiriakian continued to serve as president of its board. See also Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Oct. 4, 1919), 1279-1282; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 39, 42, 43, Aug. 22, Sept. 5, 9, 1919.

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a sovereign state holding membership in the League of Nations. The fate of Armenia would thereby be separated from that of the Versailles treaty.84 Although spokesmen for the Erevan government had to accept Cardashian’s logic, they did not readily discard the idea of a mandate. As late as October the Ninth Congress of the Dashnaktsutiun endorsed the prin­ ciple of a mandate for Armenia alone, and Premier Khatisian attempted to win the approval of General Harbord.85 Moreover, even as the Dashnakist newspapers attacked the Morgenthau plan and questioned the need for any kind of mandate, the central committee of America privately admitted its misgivings when it advised field-workers in December that, owing to the disposition of the Senate, Pasdermadjian had reluctantly agreed to Gerard’s repudiation of the mandate solution in favor of bilateral treaty relations. That was now the only hope for a free and independent Armenia.86 The ACIA made this strategy official on December 18 with a public telegram to President Wilson. Signed by James W. Gerard, Charles Evans Hughes, Alton B. Parker, Elihu Root, Frederic Courtland Penfield, Nich­ olas Murry Butler, Jacob Gould Schurmann, John Grier Hibben, Philip N. Rhinelander, and Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and endorsed by Henry Cabot Lodge, the message denounced the joint mandate as a measure that would promote Pan-Turkish intrigues: “We are now being asked to enable the Turks to achieve under our protection that which they failed to attain through the war.” Further discussion of a mandate in any form would simply delay adoption of a straightforward policy toward Armenia: Representative American opinion has already expressed itself with convincing emphasis in favor of the creation of an Armenian state that will unite Ararat and Cilicia and which alone can become an effective barrier against the Pan-Turanian ambition of the Turks of Anatolia. We believe the American people will gladly sanction America’s extending necessary aid to Armenia; to that end, formulate a definite continuing policy and, as a preliminary step in that direction, recognize at once the Armenian Republic. This recognition will enable the Armenian govern­ ment to borrow the necessary funds to meet the most pressing needs of its starving people and will also be a practical step toward the creation of a united Armenia.87

84 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Cardashian to Pasdermadjian, Nov. 11, 1919. 86 H. H. Dashnaktsutiun, Kaghvadsner H. H. D. g-rd Endh. Zhoghovi voroshumnerits (Erevan, 1920), pp. 5-6. 86 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1407a/ 27a, Dec. 27,1919, Circular, Dec. 27,1919. In contrast with the Dashnakist journals, the Hnchak press categorically repudiated the mandate plan. See especially editorials by Sabah-Gulian in Eritasard Hayastan, Sept.-Dee. 1919. 87 New York Times, Dec. 22:6, 1919: Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 382/4, Gerard to Wilson and to Lansing, Dec. 18, 1919; Activities of the ACIA, pp. 14, 145—146.

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In conjunction with this and similar petitions sponsored by the ACIA, the Armenian Press Bureau issued The Joint Mandate Scheme, a booklet con­ taining articles by several noted Armenophiles and Armenians and a summary of the public wartime pledges of the Allies. All the contributors emphasized Armenia’s right to independence and labeled the joint man­ date proposal an aid and comfort to Pan-Turkic and Bolshevik con­ spirators.88 By the beginning of 1920 the ACIA program, which was supported by many Republican leaders who had taken a stand against a mandate, seemed to be the only plan that had a chance of acceptance. Yet Morgenthau and other mandate proponents challenged the practicality of any settlement that would leave the Armenians without some form of foreign protection. James Barton was so jolted by the drive to bury the mandate that he risked antagonizing Armenian nationalists by warning that mili­ tary aid without American guidance and supervision might subject the Armenians to still more tragedy.89 These differences among Ar­ menophiles contributed to the formation of a new organization in 1920, the Armenia-America Society, under the presidency of Walter George Smith. Supported by distinguished missionaries and relief officers, Armenian Protestants, and the Armenian National Union, the society favored a mandate for Armenia and did not explicitly reject a joint mandate. Although the two organizations had some mutual members— including Cleveland H. Dodge, Senator Williams, and even James 88 See n. 79 above. Contributors to the brochure included James W. Gerard, Henry W. Jessup, Lawson P. Chambers, W. D. P. Bliss, General Hakob Bagratuni, and Vahan Cardashian. See also RG 59, 860J.01/174; Polk Papers, 81/186. 89 RG 59, 860J.01/173. See also Hairenik, Sept. 9:3, 1919; New York Times, Nov. 2:5, 8:17, 1919. Barton had not changed his position on the separation of Armenia from Turkey. Writing Morgenthau on December 24 (on stationery of the Near East Relief), he stated that many “solid citizens” in America were concerned about the revival of pro-Turkish sentiment in Europe and the seeming retreat of the European powers on the Armenian question. Barton added that he and his associates held the following views: 1. That no part of Armenia shall be left under the control or rule of the Turk. 2. That in future settlements of that country ample provision be made for an ultimate self-governing Armenia, the same to include Cilicia, Turkish Armenia and Russian Ar­ menia. 3. That there is a general growing expectation that the United States will ultimately be willing to share in protecting Armenia and aiding her to future independence. 4. That there is a manifest sentiment everywhere in America against perpetuating the government of the Turk. Morgenthau replied that, after having conferred with Gates, he considered it improper to try to tell the European powers how to deal with Turkey, in view of the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Versailles treaty. It seemed wiser, for the time being at least, to concentrate oh relief activities. See Morgenthau Papers, Box 6, Barton to Morgenthau, Dec. 24, 1919, Morgenthau to Barton, Dec. 26, 1919.

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Gerard—and were not open rivals, they did represent differing approaches to the Armenian question. On another level, the ACIA and the Armenian parties most loyal to it regarded the Caucasian Armenian republic as the fulcrum of the Armenian cause, whereas the Armenia-America Society tended to view Armenia in broader terms and to attract elements still undecided about the Erevan government.90 Despite all the publicity and numerous bipartisan declarations of sym­ pathy for the Armenians, the Wilson administration failed to act on the ACIA recommendations. Convinced that a mandate was the best option, and fearful of piecemeal arrangements in the former Ottoman and Rus­ sian empires, the president continued to deny the Armenian republic even the moral benefit of de facto recognition. With this impasse prevailing at the end of 1919, there seemed good reason for the bitter observation of an Armenian newspaper: “Why fool ourselves with false hopes? All our big and little allies have abandoned us to our fate. America remains only distant America, lulling us today with hopes, unfortunately only with hopes. When will those be fulfilled, when will this powerful republic hasten to aid us, that is unknown.”91 The Hand of Charity Only in the continuance of humanitarian assistance did the United States react affirmatively to the Armenian quest for support. So long as political recognition was withheld, Hovhannes Kachaznuni’s efforts to obtain pri­ vate loans and government credits would be seriously hampered. In con­ trast with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other newly “liberated” states, for example, Armenia was deprived of a share of the 823,202 metric tons of surplus goods distributed by the United States Liquidation Commission. Pending recognition by the international com­ munity, Armenia perforce had to accept benevolence. When Colonel Haskell became Allied high commissioner to Armenia, he took charge of both government-sponsored and private relief oper90 See Thomas A. Bryson, “The Armenia-America Society: A Factor in American-Turkish Relations, 1919-1924,” Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, CXXXII, 2 (1971), 86—105; Missionary Herald, CXVI (Oct. 1920), 441; Grabill, op. cit., pp. 241-242, 248-249; Jizmejian, op. cit., pp. 372, 500-503; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Sept. 4, 1920), 11 1154, Teghekagir H ai AzgayinMiiitianAmerikayi, pp. 31-32. See also Hairenik, May 13:1, 1920. The national committee of the Armenia-America Society included such promi­ nent figures as George Montgomery, Stanley White, Hamilton Holt, Charles S. MacFarland, William N. Runyon, General Leonard Wood, and William Cardinal O’Connell. Ernest W. Riggs, former president of Euphrates College, served as executive secretary. 91 Hairenik, Nov. 29:2, 1919.

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ations. His administrative costs were borne by the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, which by a special act of Congress was granted a national charter in August as the Near East Relief (NER). According to the charter, the NER was “to provide relief and to assist in the repatriation, rehabilitation, and reestablishment of suffering and dependent people of the Near East and adjacent areas, to provide for the care of orphans and widows and to promote the social, economic, and industrial welfare of those who have been rendered destitute, or dependent directly or in­ directly, by the vicissitudes of war, the cruelties of men, and other causes beyond their control.”92 Shortly after setting up headquarters in Tiflis, Haskell wrote the NER that he was reorganizing operations through six regional offices at Tiflis, Batum, Kars, Erevan, Alexandropol, and Karakilisa. The final shipments financed by the American Relief 92 Senator William King, otherwise a strong supporter of the Armenian cause, criticized the proposed granting of a national charter to the NER on grounds that such action would infringe on states’ rights and set a bad precedent. Denouncing Turkish brutalities and praising the altruism and benevolence of organizations such as the Near East Relief, King insisted that they could conduct their good work under a charter granted by any state or the District of Columbia. In the House of Representatives, Louis C. Cramton of Michigan was the sharpest critic, questioning whether so powerful a corporation of “enormous wealth” might not be exploited for “sinister purposes.” It will be noticed that there is no Armenian on this list of directors. And could it be possible that some organizations might be formed of distinguished men, philanthropists though they may be, but who are also incidentally corporation lawyers and great corpora­ tion leaders, captains of industry, seeking commercial advantages in the Far East or in the Near East, and giving out in connection with the Federal incorporation an idea to the people of that section of the world that they represent in some way the Government of the United States, who in the bestowal of their relief might acquire for themselves a standing and a prestige that would result in some way to their pecuniary advantage or the advantage of their corporation, the securing of concessions? For the articles of incorporation of the NER and the debates on the proposed federal charter, see Congressional Record, LVII, pt. 1, p. 57, pt. 3, pp. 2518, 2545-2548, 2665, 3007-3014, 3151-3154, pt. 4, pp. 3431, 3464, 3680. See also Journal of the Senate, 66th Cong., ist sess., pp. 12, 128, 160; New York Times, Aug. 15:3, 1919. The incorporating trustees of the Near East Relief were James L. Barton, Cleveland H. Dodge, Henry Morgenthau, Edwin M. Bulkley, Alexander J. Hemphill, Charles R. Crane, William Howard Taft, Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, Abram I. Elkus, Charles W. Eliot, Harry Pratt Judson, Charles E. Beury, Arthur J. Brown, John B. Calvert, William I. Chamberlain, Robert J. Cuddihy, Cleveland E. Dodge, William T. Ellis, James Cardinal Gibbons, David H. Greer, Harold A. Hatch, William I. Haven, Myron T. Herrick, Hamilton Holt, Frank W. Jackson, Arthur Curtiss James, Frederick Lynch, Vance C. McCormick, Charles S. MacFarland, Henry B. F. MacFarland, William B. Millar, John R. Mott, Frank Mason North, George A. Plimpton, Philip Rhinelander, William Jay Schieffelin, George T. Scott, Albert Shaw, William Sloane, Edward Lincoln Smith, Robert Eliot Speer, James M. Speers, Oscar S. Straus, Charles V. Vickrey, Harry A. Wheeler, Stanley White, Ray Lyman Wilbur, Talcott Williams, and Stephen S. Wise. The charter provided that vacancies be filled by the remaining trustees. Elected as officers and directors of NER were Barton (president), Vickrey (secretary), C. H. Dodge (treasurer), Bulkley, Elkus, Hempill, Morgenthau, Millar, Edgar Rickard, and Scott.

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Administration had been delivered in August and would last only until the beginning of December; after that, 7,000 tons of wheat flour would be needed monthly until the fall harvest of 1920. Haskell complained that the delay in the peace settlement and consequently in the repatriation of refugees had serious repercussions on efforts to succor 800,000 destitute and 250,000 homeless persons. He estimated that a cash outlay of half a million dollars a month would be required for administrative costs, staff salaries, and railway supervision.93 At the NER’s first conference in New York in mid-October, the Armeni­ an problem was the main agenda item. In his keynote address, former Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels recalled that it had been impossible to help the Armenians during the war, but there were no longer insuperable obstacles to answering the Armenian “cry for existence.” With outside assistance, the Armenian people could soon fend for themselves as a free nation. The conference realized, however, that the momentum of public relief drives could not go on indefinitely and that government cooperation was vital.94On behalf of the NER executive committee, Charles V. Vickrey addressed the State Department about this issue and included the gist of Haskell’s assessment. During the preceding winter, negligence had contributed to the death of thousands of people, and it was estimated that scarcely 25 percent of the population would survive the approaching winter without relief. The executive committee asked that the United States Grain Corporation (USGC), a federal agency, allocate wheat in return for promissory notes from the Armenian republic, the Armenian National Delegation, or any other suitable body.95 Hundreds of similar appeals from religious, civic, and fraternal groups and private citizens poured into the White House, the State Department, Congress, and the NER. Garegin Pasdermadjian and James Gerard petitioned for food and clothing, seed-grain, farm equipment, and rolling stock “to sustain a generation whose misfortune it has been to be born on the threshold of great world upheaval and the greatest national decimation in history.”96 William Haskell meanwhile returned to Paris to report on conditions in 93 RG 59, 860J.48/8; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, Vickrey to Pasdermadjian, Nov. 24, 1919, end.; New York Times, Oct. 5:11-5, 1919. 94 Congressional Record, LVIII, pt. 7, p. 7107; Journal of the Senate, 66th Cong., ist sess., p. 250; New York Times, Oct. i2 :I I- i, 17:18, 1919\Hairenikf Oct. 19:3, 1919, KochnakHayastani, XIX (Oct. 25, 1919), 1386-1387, and (Nov. 1, 1919), 1403-1404. 96 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, Vickrey to Pasdermadjian, Nov. 24, 1919, end.; RG 860J.48/8; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 19/9, II (Washington, 1934), 821-823. See also RG 59, 860J.48/1. 96 RG 59, 860J.48/4/10; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 380/2, Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, Nov. 13, 1919, Gerard to Lansing, Nov. 1, 10, 1919.

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Armenia and to ask that his jurisdictional sphere be extended to include Georgia and Azerbaijan. On November 14 he told the peace conference that Armenia was still isolated and vulnerable to pressure by the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments, which controlled transportation routes, rail repair shops, and the fuel supply.97 Haskell’s request for broader authority was granted despite the reservations of the British, who had already sent Oliver Wardrop to Tiflis as chief commissioner for the Caucasus and were skeptical about the American officer’s capabilities.98 While in Paris, Haskell also conferred with representatives of the NER and other interested groups. He advised Aharonian and Boghos Nubar to encourage the Allies to furnish the Armenian army warm clothing and equipment, without which the troops would have to abandon their field positions during the winter. And unless the relief supplies, which had dwindled to a month’s reserve, were replenished soon, “the result will inevitably be famine and the extermination of 700,000 more Ar­ menians.”99 Receiving a new round of appeals, the British Foreign Office, at Curzon’s behest, “passed the buck” to the Supreme Economic Council (SEC), scheduled to meet in Rome on November 22: “Lord Curzon would point out that the destitute condition of these unfortunate people is to a large extent the consequence of the regrettable though unavoidable delay in a conclusion of peace with Turkey which prevents the re-establishment of settled conditions throughout Anatolia, which on humanitarian grounds, cannot be exaggerated, and the responsibility for which must to some extent be borne by the Allies themselves.”100 But as usual with Allied 97 Paris Peace Conference, IX, 167—168; RG 256, 181.9402/11/250/ 27/28; British Documents, II, 321-322; Polk Papers, 88/18, Diary, Nov. 4, 1919, 78/57, Memorandum, Nov. 3, 1919. 98 Paris Peace Conference, IX, 179-180; British Documents, II, 328-329. For British comments on Haskell and the Foreign Office’s reluctance to agree that his jurisdiction be extended to include Georgia and Azerbaijan, see FO 371/3671, File 98451/58 (esp. documents 145657/ 152114/152447/154210/154413/159415); FO 608/80, 342/1/14/14538/20581 ends. On November 28 George Kidston wrote Sir Eyre Crowe in Paris: “The proposal that Haskell should be given control in the name of the Allies of the relations between the republics has filled us with dismay here. I have seen several men just returned from the Caucasus and they one and all agree that Haskell is the last person who should be entrusted with such a delicate and difficult task. He is accused of not knowing his own mind for two minutes together, of being blustering and peremptory, of depending entirely on interpreters and of being utterly unsuited to deal with Orientals.” See British Documents, IV, 908. The acting chief of the French Military Mission in the Caucasus, Commandant de Nonancourt, likewise complained to his government on October 12 that Haskell was “very au­ thoritarian and vain.” See France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 30 bis. 99 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, Aharonian to Kachaznuni and Pasdermadjian, Nov. 5, 1919, File 381/3, Kachaznuni to Pasdermadjian; FO 371/3660, 150394/512/58 end.; Hairenik, Nov. 29:5, 1919. 100 FO 371/3660, 150394/512/58 end.; Paris Peace Conference, X, 658-659. See also FO 371/3660, 150642/512/58.

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bodies, the SEC, at the suggestion of the British delegate, passed the buck on: “The Supreme Economic Council . . . desires to place on record its sympathy with the Armenians and to express its regret that it has no resources from which the relief of Armenian necessitudes could be effected. The Supreme Economic Council is of the opinion that the relief of Armenian distress is . . . a matter of concern not alone to the Powers represented on the Supreme Economic Council, but to all the civilised peoples of the world.”101 Woodrow Wilson, who had consistently shunned political action on the Armenian question, intervened to sustain the relief program. On Novem­ ber 14, as the Senate moved toward a vote on the Versailles treaty, he informed Julius H. Barnes, president of the United States Grain Corpora­ tion, that the USGC could sell Armenia 35,000 tons of wheat and flour “on credit or otherwise.”102 A bumper crop had filled the silos with more than half a million tons of surplus winter wheat, which might spoil if kept until summer. When Congress, in March 1920, authorized the marketing of up to 5 million barrels for relief of distressed populations in Europe and “countries contiguous thereof,” the bills of sale for the flour already shipped to Armenia were transferred to that general account.103 The decision to supply the flour was relayed to the Armenian envoys, the NER, and the ACIA by the White House and the State Department, and on November 21 Kachaznuni, Pasdermadjian, and Enfladjian con­ ferred with Barnes on related legal procedures.104 The State Department asked Haskell to verify Kachaznuni’s credentials, but even before receipt of the confirmation three shipments of grain totaling 18,000 metric tons and valued at $2,174,000 had left Baltimore and New York.105106In January 101 RG 256, 180.0501/31 ; Paris Peace Conference, X, 623-624; British Documents, II, 492-493, 499102 RG 59, 860J.48/5/56; RG 256, 867B.5018/9. For published copies of related correspon­ dence, including President Wilson’s letter to Gerard on November 17, see Hairenik, Nov. 29:5, 1919-

103 See House Resolution 12954, Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 4, pp. 3992, 4314, pt. 5, pp. 4353“ 43^7»4396, 4672-4673, 4802, 4842, 4881, 5061. See also Frank M. Surface and Ray­ mond L. Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period (Stanford, 1931), pp. U 3 - I l 5-

104 RG 59, 867.00/1007 end., 860J.48/11; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, Kachaznuni to Khatisian, Nov. 19, 1919, File 381/3, Pasdermadjian to President Wilson, Nov. 21, 1919. 106 RG 59, 860J.4016/21/59, 860^48/12/130/15; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, Ar­ menian government to Colonel C. Telford, Jan. 17, 1920, File 380/2, Pasdermadjian report, Nov. 27, 1919, Cardashian toAharonian, Nov. 28, 1919, File 381/3, Credentials of Hovhannes Kachaznuni, Nov. 18, 1919. The steamer West Raritan sailed from Baltimore on November 26 with 7,270 tons of flour for Armenia, followed by the Delisle and the West Pocasset from New York on November 29 and December 10, with 11,138 metric tons combined. See Surface and Bland, op. cit., pp. 410-411.

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1920 Kachaznuni and his secretary, Suren Melikian, signed the contract calling for semiannual payments at 5 percent interest beginning in June of that year. Since treasury credits covered only the price of the flour and local handling charges, the NER accepted responsibility for freight and insurance costs. As it turned out, the NER paid $1,000,000 (including a $500,000 grant from the American Red Cross) for delivery to Batum of the first five cargoes, and the British Treasury, releasing unspent funds from a previous relief allocation, provided $560,000 in credit for the final three shipments, the last of which left New York in June.106 Of the flour the USGC distributed under authority of the congressional act of March 1920, Armenia eventually received 40,633.5 metric tons (475,043 barrels) valued at $4,813,744 from a total of 481,945 tons (5,420,896 barrels) valued at $57,782,000, or about 8 percent of the full allocation.106107 The eight shiploads of flour, combined with nearly 9,000 tons of foodstuff, clothing, and medications paid for by the NER and the Commonwealth Fund of New York and unloaded in 1920 at Batum, Poti, Constantinople, Derindje, and Piraeus, increased postwar American contributions charged to Armenia to more than 135,000 metric tons valued at 28 million dollars, of which 16 million was assigned on credit (ARA; USGC) and 12 million was outright benevolence (ACRNE; NER; Red Cross). In the war-related relief program, this was only a drop (0.6 percent), but it was sufficient to nourish the parched root of Armenian existence.108 At the end of 1919 the plight of Armenia and the Armenians was known to millions of Americans, and a host of Armenophiles were demanding intervention to bring Allied war aims to fruition. Yet a final decision had still not been taken on what role, if any, the United States would play in Armenia. The interminable debates on the League of Nations and a deepening revulsion to entanglement in European rivalries complicated the problem, and the president, for all his goodwill, continued to evade both the mandate question and political or military commitments. The European powers, meanwhile, justified their reluctance to act in Armeni­ an matters by arguing that a settlement could not be made until the United 106 RG 59, 86oJ.48/i6/i71/8; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III (Washington, 1936), 785-787; Surface and Bland, op. cit., pp. 151, 408-409, 410-411. 107 Surface and Bland, op. cit., pp. 151, 334-335, 338; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 148/47. See also James L. Barton, Story of Near East Relief (79/5-/950 ) (New York, 1930), pp. 124-127. 108 Surface and Bland, op. cit., pp. 9, 11, 151-152, 274-275, 334-335, 394~398>4 ° ° - 4 ° 1■ 408-413.

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403

States had announced its position. Throughout these months the senti­ ment of disdain for the weak revived, clearly manifesting itself among the world’s financial, industrial, and military circles. The Armenians needed no interpreters to comprehend the Wall Street Journal's observation that nations born out of war and starvation had to prove their right to existence by demonstrating that they had “the virility to survive.”109 109 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10:1, 1920; Bryson, “Woodrow Wilson/’ pp. 226-227.

13

The A llied Retreat Toward London

During the long Senate debate on the Versailles treaty, the Paris Peace Conference finished drafting the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian treaties. Each defeated country had to give up certain territories whose final disposition was left to the Allied Powers. Only in the case of the Ottoman Empire was this procedure not adopted, because the Allies were unable to agree on the new Turkish boundaries or on how to reconcile their own conflicting interests. Thus a year after the Supreme Council had announced that Armenia was to be separated from the Ottoman Empire, that decision remained unimplemented. In the meantime the Allied ar­ mies demobilized, wartime concerns gave way to social and industrial unrest, the United States drew apart, and the Turkish resistance move­ ment thrust itself into the political arena. Under these circumstances the Allies sought to discharge their moral obligations to the Armenians without making military commitments by winning general acceptance of a relatively small Armenian state incor­ porating the Erevan republic and only the eastern border districts of the Ottoman Empire. In discarding plans for an Armenia from sea to sea, Allied leaders would attempt to guarantee the safety of Christians left within Turkey and to establish a special administrative regime in Cilicia. This line of reasoning sounded the Allied retreat toward the London conference of 1920. Deferment of the Treaty American indecision contributed in large measure to the delay of the Eastern settlement, for the fate of Armenia, Cilicia, and Constantinople 404

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could not be resolved until America’s position was known. On June 27, 1919, the Supreme Council agreed to suspend further consideration of the peace treaty with Turkey “until such time as the Government of the United States of America could state whether they were able to accept a mandate for a portion of the territory of the former Turkish Empire.”1 President Wilson nevertheless gave assurances that his country would be a party to the treaty, a commitment reaffirmed by the State Department in July.2 As Senate opposition to the Covenant of the League of Nations hardened, however, the American delegation had to inform the peace conference, now the Council of Heads of Delegations (Council of Five), that there might be a “very considerable” delay in reaching a decision on a mandate.3 Still, Woodrow Wilson continued to show keen interest in the Near East. Anticipating the Constantinople mandate, he held up the Bulgarian treaty by opposing the award of most of Thrace to Greece so as not to deprive the projected Constantinopolitan state of an adequate hinterland.45 The appointment of an American as Allied high com­ missioner to Armenia, the dispatch of the Harbord mission, and the unilateral warning to the Turkish government about renewed per­ secutions all grew out of the president’s concern for the Armenian people and his desire to afford them American protection. European politicians, critics have said, should have begun to negotiate the Turkish treaty in the summer of 1919, when an American mandate for Armenia became increasingly unlikely. The Allies were loath to act, however, so long as there was a chance the United States would enter the League of Nations and share in international obligations. Although later admitting that the president’s “tactical rigidity” and “physical debility” left little ground for optimism, Lloyd George explained: “We knew only too well that without Wilson’s powerful advocacy there was no hope of per­ suading the United States to undertake the onerous responsibility of a mandate for the Straits and for Armenia. But we could not rush to assume the President’s practical demise.. . . American politicians were ready 1Paris Peace Conference, VI, 729; British Documents, IV, 652. 2 US Archives, RG 59, 763.72119/5658; White Papers, Box 44, Phillips to Ammission, July 21, 1919. See also Paris Peace Conference, XI, 265, 283-284, 297, 306, 310-311,338-339,609, 618. 3 Paris Peace Conference, VII, 193; British Documents, I, 131-132. 4 See, for example, RG 59, 763.72119/5721/5740/6060/6199/6298; Paris Peace Conference, VII, 234-235, 243-244,441-442, 671-672, VIII, 35-37, 50-51, XI, 342-344» 36°» 365” 366» 386, 408-409, 425-426, 460, 469, 575-576, 634; British Documents, I, 361-364, 399, 402, 589”59L 594“ 595»603-604, IV, 748—751; Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Parti­ tion of Turkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore, [1965]), pp. 198-203; Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, o ., [1974])» PP-

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enough to censure and calumniate their President, but they would not have tolerated any ignoring of Presidential authority by foreign powers.”5 The Allied intent to dissolve the multinational Ottoman Empire, as they had the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, was rooted in the SykesPicot and other secret wartime pacts. After Soviet exposure of these agree­ ments, the Allies had to concede that the terms would not necessarily be binding, but in fact most of the territories marked for French and British dominion were already under military occupation. It was therefore desir­ able that the United States take the Armenian mandate and in so doing fill in the expanse formerly reserved for Russia, cover the northern flanks of Syria and Mesopotamia, set up a barrier against Turkish agitation and Turco-Bolshevik collusion in the Orient, and, incidentally, honor Allied pledges to the Armenians. So neat an arrangement could not be aban­ doned lightly by the Europeans, and if postponement of the treaty might pressure the American government to live up to its moralistic proclama­ tions, the risk had to be taken. The delay aggravated inter-Allied rivalries and, in a vicious circle, was further prolonged by the discord. With each power having enormous gains at stake, their mutual suspicions were intensified by the presence in Constantinople of numerous Allied administrative and military control officers, many of whom compiled secret reports about the dealings of the others. The Italians in particular were regarded as intriguers, trying to curry favor with all Turkish parties, including the deposed Committee of Union and Progress, so that whatever faction ultimately prevailed Italy would secure economic concessions. Although the advance of the Greek and Italian armies in Asia Minor disturbed inter-Allied relations, the most serious controversies usually pitted France against Great Britain. With the heaviest financial and cultural investments in the Ottoman Empire, the French resented British command not only over Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, but also over Greater Syria and Cilicia, regions assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot agreement. The British were disinclined to relinquish the two areas until the French would be willing to grant addi­ tional concessions and partially gratify Arab national aspirations in Syria. The conservative press in France accused the British of bad faith and insatiable imperialism; the French high commissioner at Beirut, C. M. François Georges-Picot, and the commander in chief at Constantinople, General Louis F. M. F. Franchet d’Espérey, repeatedly warned of “les menées anglaises.” Because of the bitter jurisdictional disputes between Franchet d’Espérey and General George F. Milne, both French and Brit-6 6 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, II (New Haven, 1939), 817—818.

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ish military authorities had fewer complaints to make about inadequate forces for overseas duty.6 When, for example, Franchet d’Espérey announced in the summer of 1919 that the Allied garrisons in Constantinople would be strengthened with French battalions, Winston Churchill declared that “the British Government have maintained, are maintaining, and are prepared to maintain in this sphere whatever troops are necessary.” Large reserves of men stationed in Palestine and Egypt could be called upon whenever needed.7 This statement ironically came just when the War Office was insisting that not a single regiment was available for duty in Armenia or the Caucasus. Under these adverse circumstahces Premier Clemenceau refused to rush into negotiation of the Turkish treaty. The “Old Tiger” even delayed the work of the mandate commission to insist that the British honor their commitments and that a comprehensive settlement prevail over piecemeal arrangements.8 Complicating the problem was the realization that the Turkish treaty would present the last opportunity to fulfill wartime promises and to provide compensation for concessions on still unresolved issues, such as the Italian-Yugoslav boundary dispute. Meanwhile the Turks, “almost by instinct,” exploited every rift among the European powers.

Voices in the Wind The months of waiting distressed all Armenians and many Allied officials. In Paris, Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar issued numerous memo­ randa, appeals, and protests; in Constantinople the Armenian patriarch collaborated with the heads of the Armenian Catholic and Protestant communities and of the Greek Orthodox Church to draw attention to the plight of survivors, repatriates, and forced converts in such districts as Ismid, Eskishehir, Balikesir, Afion-Karahisar, Kastamuni, Angora, Yozgat, Eghin, Boghazlaian, Caesarea, Talas, Chorum, Amasia, Tokat, Mar6 See France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/141, dossiers 1-2; Britain, FO 608/108, File 385/1/1 ; FO 371/4232, File 106312/44; FO 406/41, no. 83. See also British Documents, IV, 719-720, 728-729, 775-777, 783, 784, 835; Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 516-517; Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain ’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany, N.Y., 1976), pp. 62-64. 7British Documents, IV, 768. 8 Evans, op.cit., pp. 210-215; White Papers, Box 44, Lansing to Ammission, Aug. 29, 1919; Root Papers, Box 161, White to Lodge, Sept. 10, 1919; Polk Papers, 78/53, Polk memoran­ dum, Sept. 12, 1919; RG 59, 763.72119/6024/6114/6371; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 638, 647-648.

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sovan, Ordu, Sivas, and Kharput. Many of these people could not retrieve their homes and properties or cultivate their fields, and all faced threats of new massacres. The Ottoman government was encouraging Muslim exiles from Europe and Kurdish tribesmen from the trans-Taurus to relocate in the Armenian provinces and thereby thwart the formation of a united Armenian state.9 On August 23 the Armenian religious leaders formally complained to the Allied high commissioners and Paris Peace Conference about the tribulations of their people: “Not enough that their property held by the Moslems was not returned to them; not enough that everywhere they were rubbing elbows with the murderers of their brothers, sisters, wives and children, but fate reserved to them the inexpressible pain of beholding their enemies calmly taking possession of all the orphans, widows and girls ravished during the deportations and massacres.” The Sublime Porte was not restoring the holy relics and treasures of 200 desecrated monasteries and 2,000 churches or rectifying past wrongs. Time and again Armenian spokesmen pointed out that even repatriates in the presumably safer areas of Asia Minor were once more fleeing toward Constantinople, and that only a quick, forceful peace treaty could save the Armenians.10 The Allied high commissioners and their control and relief officers in the interior repeated these admonitions. Muslim squatters were showing increased resistance to relinquishing Armenian homes and properties, and thousands of demobilized but not disarmed Turkish soldiers were joining lawless bands that terrorized Christians. Hundreds of officials who had collaborated in the Armenian massacres remained at their posts, and the government was deaf to demands that they be removed or arrested. French inspectors reported that Christians everywhere feared new mas­ sacres. The Armenian quarters of the towns between Samson and Sivas were in shambles and the misery of the survivors was indescribable.11 Lieutenant Edgar Pech noted that Allied rivalries strengthened Turkish defiance. Yet French officers also expressed satisfaction that the more the Turks became alienated from the British the more they turned toward 9 See, for example, FO 371/3658-3659, 47515/60850/77798/77890/86068/86314/98469/ 98767/512/58; FO 371/4157-4158, 64432/105799/115446/521/44; FO 608/78, 342/1/1/11366/ 12758/13664; FO 608/79, 342/1/9/20886 ends.; FO 608/112, 385/1/15/15526; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 7, Dec. 31, 1919; RG 59, 860J.01/56/129/144, 763.72119/5483; RG 256, 867B.00/28/102/165; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 2/2, File 231/130, Memoranda of April 1, Aug. 18, 1919, File 421, no. 78, Sept. 25, 1919; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 18, May 27, 1919. 10 RG 59, 867B.00/264. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 2/2, File 231/130; FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449 end. 11 RG 256, 867B.00/178. See also FO 371/3659, 12442/512/58.

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France.12 High Commissioner Jules-Albert Defrance sought to raise French prestige and demonstrate his flexibility on the Armenian question. Indeed, by the end of 1919 he was calling for the territorial integrity of Anatolian Turkey, inclusive of Cilicia, with the proviso that France’s “special position” and the protection of its “Armenian protégés” be guaranteed.13 Of the Allied Powers, Britain maintained the most thorough intelli­ gence operations, enabling High Commissioner S. A. Gough-Calthorpe and Assistant High Commissioner Richard Webb to keep the Foreign Office well informed. Through the Greek and Armenian Section of the High Commission, Admiral Webb supported measures to recover Ar­ menian women and children and urged action to require the Ottoman government to abrogate the abandoned property law, which had been promulgated in 1915 to legitimize the seizure of Armenian goods and properties.14Control and relief officers operating in the coastal areas and as far inland as Yozgat filed many reports about the horrors of the deportations and massacres, the destruction of once-prosperous Ar­ menian businesses, the threats to and the economic boycott of the repatriates, and the growing truculence of Turkish officials. Brigands who had participated in the massacres had been pardoned and recruited as gendarmes. Murderers, rapists, and robbers were “all over the place,” and countless war criminals, including the boatman who had drowned hundreds of Armenian children in Trebizond harbor, were at large. Turkish gendarmes not only sympathized with the offenders but were themselves accomplices in the decimation of the Christian population.1516 In forwarding these reports to London, Webb begged for an immediate peace settlement. On June 28, the day the German treaty was signed, he wrote: “I venture to think that we are hopelessly prejudicing the future chances of recuperation for thousands of Christians, whose welfare we have so much at heart, and concerning which we have made so many protestations.. . . I hope and believe that the peace terms will be severe and drastic, but let us have them quickly. Every day makes the situation 12 Archives de l’Armée, 20N/141, dossier 2, 20N/170, dossier 2, 20N/202, dossier 1. 13 Ibid., 16N/3194, dossier 4, dossier 5, no. 38, 16N/3206, dossier 3, Report, Oct. 12, 1919. 14 FO 608/82, File 342/6/2; FO 608/83, File 342/8/7; FO 608/111, File 385/1/12; FO 371/ 3658, 47776/512/58; FO 371/4159, 144282/3349/44. The Greek and Armenian Section was directed by Brigadier General Wyndham Henry Deedes and Commander Clifford E. Heathcote-Smith. 16 FO 371/3658—3660, 52430/55143/68108/75891/80086/105792/140460/512/58; FO 371/ 4157,18835/18850/50520/521/44; FO 371/4195-4197, File 3349/44passim; FO 608/79,342/l/ 9/16917; FO 608/108, File 385/1/1/543; FO 608/113, File 385/1/16; British Documents, IV, 705-707.

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more difficult and dangerous, and every day adds to the degree of hate, now extremely intense, which exists in this country between Moslems and Christians.”16 Weeks later, on September 11, he reminded the Foreign Office that since the end of the war he had been urging a decision on the future Armenian state so that deportees could be advised whether to return to their original homes or to relocate immediately within the boundaries of Armenia. Unfortunately, “Armenia is still as vague an expression as ever, and thus no action has been possible in the way of centralising Armenians in the new country.” Even continuing the forcible recovery program seemed unwise in the face of mounting hostility and threats to the survivors. As to women whose families had been massacred or who had borne children to their Muslim captors, Webb concluded that, “from the point of view of humanity as distinct from that of religious feeling, our best course is to leave them as they are for the present, while remaining always attentive to the slightest call for assistance or relief.” Since resistance to the restoration ■of Armenian properties grew in direct proportion to the delay of the treaty, it was also necessary, for the sake of the Christians, not to press that issue further. A policy of restraint in arresting and punishing participants in the massacres was likewise required: “There are now undoubtedly thousands of Mussulmans in this country who deserve to be treated with the most extreme penalties of the law, but to my everlasting regret, it appears impracticable to do this; Turkey must therefore be punished as a nation, and it is only the greatest criminals, those who from the centre instigated, organised, and finally ordered the massacres and deportations, whom, as a matter of practical politics, it is possible and desirable to punish in their persons.”1617 In receipt of such reports, Lord Curzon noted on September 20: “All this is the inevitable consequence of the long lethargy of Paris and the futile waiting for President Wilson.”18 But the wait continued and in the meantime British foreign policy came under sharp attack from within the cabinet itself. The War Office’s concerns about demobilization, expenditures, and military priorities, and the India Office’s fears about an adverse worldwide Muslim reaction to severe peace terms drew Winston Churchill and Edwin Montagu into a common front against the hard-line Balfour-Curzon formula. Some staff members in the India Office even 16British Documents, IV, 654-656. 17 FO 371/4159, 135233/521/44; FO 406/41, no. 110. For other warnings about the adverse effects of the delay of the peace treaty, see British Documents, IV, 703, 704-705, 705—707, 733“ 734» 751“ 753>78o>788-791, 876; FO 406/41, nos. 136, 140, 154, 164. 18 FO 371/4159, 13147/521/44. See also Lord of Ronaldshay [L. J. Zetland], The Life of Lord Curzon, III (London, [1928]), 261-269.

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I I

advocated a Turkish alliance to safeguard the British Empire and promote British influence in Central Asia, whereas War Office officials recommended that the treaty with Turkey be so negotiated as to facilitate the early release of most imperial troops in the Levant.19 In August the cabinet agreed that 300,000 troops could not be kept in the Near East indefinitely and that alternatives to an American mandate for Armenia had to be developed.20 These concerns prodded Lloyd George toward making an arrangement with Clemenceau regarding Syria and Cilicia. Curzon won support for a quick resolution of differences from A. J. Balfour, who pointed out the disastrous effects of delay, the need for the Arabs to accept a long-range French role in Syria, and the merit of allowing France to prevail in Cilicia if the creation of a larger Armenian state proved impracticable because of the lack of a mandatory power.21 The French Occupation of Cilicia Clemenceau’s offer at the end of August to send a military relief expedi­ tion to Caucasian Armenia by way of Cilicia was correcdy analyzed in the British cabinet as a ploy to advance territorial pretensions based on the Sykes-Picot agreement. Yet, with the British army leaving the Caucasus and the government being subjected to strong criticism for abandoning the Armenians, it seemed foolhardy to reject any proposal that might shift the burden of responsibility to France. Lloyd George had often declared that Great Britain had no permanent interest in Cilicia or Syria, and the growing aloofness of the United States made a settlement in the Arab provinces all the more urgent. Lloyd George therefore drew up an elevenpoint program reaffirming Britain’s gains in the Near East but also ac­ knowledging France’s special position in Cilicia and coastal Syria and formalizing the French commitment to protect the Armenians.22 Lloyd George gave Clemenceau the document on September 13 and two days later placed it before the peace conference. A wily politician, Clemenceau maintained that pending a comprehensive settlement he could agree only to the substitution of French for British troops in Syria 19 Balfour Papers, BM Add. MSS 46964, pp. 161-162, 166-168, 171-172, Aug. 23, and Balfour to Churchill, Aug. 17, 1919. See also BM Add. MSS 49749, pp. 145-147, 171-174, Hamilton Grant to Balfour, July 7, Balfour to Grant, Aug. 18, 1919; FO 608/80, File 342/2/6; Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath (New York, 1929), pp. 392-394. 20 Cab 23/12, WC 618(1), 619(1), Aug. 19-20, 1919; Balfour Papers, BM Add. MSS 49154, pp. 154-158, Curzon to Balfour, Aug. 20, 1919. 21 British Documents, IV, 340-349; FO 406/41, no. 106. 22 FO 371/4182, 130943/2117/44A; British Documents, I, 700-701, IV, 384-385; Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 216-217.

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and Cilicia. He carried the day as Lloyd George conceded that the British would have to clear those territories in any case.23 With the transfer of command set for November 1, the French made no further pretense of dispatching an expedition via Cilicia to relieve the Armenian republic. But Anglo-French relations remained tense; the British insisted that Emir Faisal’s Arab legion should garrison the inland Syrian cities, and the French thought that London was encouraging Faisal’s truculence.24When it became apparent that the French army could not meet the November deadline, the British did not conceal their disdain and only grudgingly delayed their departure by a few days.25 Since the end of the war Palestine, Syria, and Cilicia had been occupied by Field Marshal Edmund Allenby’s inter-Allied army composed largely of Anglo-Indian battalions. Of the approximately 6,000 French troops in the Levant at the time of the Mudros Armistice, most were Armenians belonging to the Légion d’Orient, the volunteer corps that in September 1918 had fought valorously in the* capture of the Arara heights and the expulsion of Germano-Turkish forces from Palestine.26 After the war Allenby set up the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration for lands from which the Turkish armies had withdrawn and removed Ottoman civil officials from all but the North Zone, which encompassed Cili­ cia proper and its eastward extension along the Taurus Mountains (see map 8). Until February 1919 the Légion—renamed the Légion Arménienne—was the main Allied force in the Adana vilayet, even though it was too small to occupy more than a few cities and key 23 Cab 23/12, WC 622(3 and App. I), Sept. 18, 1919; FO 371/4182, 130943/2117/44A; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/19095 ends.; British Documents, I, 690-693; Polk Papers, 78/60, “The Signifi­ cance and Import of the Clemenceau-Lloyd George Agreement of September 1919”; White Papers, Box 44, Ammission to Secretary of State, Sept. 19, 1919; Paris Peace Conference, VIII, '205-208. 24 Evans, op. cit., pp. 219-223, 227-232; Lloyd George, op. cit., pp. 699-710; Cab 23/12, WC 622(App. II), Sept. 18, 1919. See British Documents, IV, chap. 2; FO 406/41, no. 104 ff., for materials on the Syrian question. For the French view, see Le Temps for 1919 and especially the periodical L ’Asie française, edited by Robert de Caix. 26 FO 371/4184, 143915/144453/144851/2117/44A. 26 For documents and materials relating to the formation and activities of the Légion d’Orient, see France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Guerre 1914-1918, dossiers 890-893; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3198-3199, 3205-3206; FO 371/4952, E361/ 134/58 end.; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 64, Dec. 19, 1919; Aram Karamanoukian, Les étrangers et le service militaire (Paris, 1978), pp. 115-125; Paul Du Véou, La passion de la Cilicie, 1919-1922 (Paris, 1937), pp. 16-18; Dickran Boyajian [Tigran Poyajian], Haikakan Legeone (Watertown, Mass., 1965), pp. 116-137; M. Avetian, Hai azatagrakan azgayin hisnamia (1870-1920) (Paris, 1954), pp. 474-481; Aram Turabian, L ’étemelle victime de la diplomatie européenne ([Paris], 1929), pp. 86-94; L’Asie fran­ çaise, 18th yr. (Oct. 1918-Jan. 1919), 135-137; R* de Gontaut-Biron, Comment la France s’est installée en Syrie (1918-1919) (Paris, [1922]), pp. 49-52.

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transportation junctions. Towns to the east, including Aintab, Marash, and Urfa, were garrisoned by British detachments, and when the Brit­ ish 19th Infantry Brigade arrived at Adana in February the Franco-Armenian contingents also came under the command of Brigadier General Walter S. Leslie and then of his successor, Brigadier General Arthur Mudge.27 Allenby assigned a group of French officers, headed by Colonel Edouard Brémond, to oversee the Turkish administration and enforce the armistice terms in the North Zone.28 Because it seemed likely until mid-1919 that Cilicia would be incorpo­ rated into the new Armenia and because the British had no territorial pretensions there, Allenby did not object to the landing of French re­ inforcements—the 412th Infantry Regiment arrived in the summer months—but he did his utmost to prevent a French military buildup at Beirut or elsewhere in Greater Syria.29 This situation prevailed until the Lloyd George-Clemenceau accord of September 15, after which Gen­ eralissimo Ferdinand Foch annoùnced that 32 battalions of infantry, 20 squadrons of cavalry, and 14 batteries of artillery would replace the British army in Syria and Cilicia.30 In October, General Henri J. E. Gouraud, a highly decorated veteran campaigner, was named to head the army and Count Robert de Caix, an economist and editor who was intensely critical of British foreign policy, was appointed his general secretary, much to the delight of French colonial and commercial circles. 27 Edouard Brémond, “La Cilicie en 1919-1920,” Revue des études arméniennes, I, 3 (1921), 306-310; Du Véou, op. city pp. 20, 24-36; Gontaut-Biron, op. cit.y pp. 52-57; Boyajian, op. eit., pp. 214-215, 221-225; Turabian, op. cit.y pp. 95-100; De Rémusat, “Cilicie, 1918-1922,” Revue des sciences politiquesy LIV (Jan./March 1931), 349-350; L'Asie françaisey 20th yr. (May 1920) , 155-158; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Feb. 22, March 8, 1919), 247, 309-310, 313; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 1; FO 371/3657, 1922/4501/4502/7169/13595/16747/ 33707/5! 2/58. For a Turkish point of view, see Galip Kemalî Söylemezoglu, Baçimiza gelenler: Yakin bir mazinin hâtiralan, Mondrosdan-Mudanyaya, 1918-1922 (Istanbul, 1939), pp. 58-61. For a French officer’s criticisms of the Armenian Legionnaires, see Gustave Gautherot, La France en Syrie et en Cilicie (Paris, 1920), pp. 122-190 passim. 28 Brémond had formerly served as assistant chief of staff of the XXXV Army Corps and as chief of the French Military Mission in the Hejaz. An officer with many years’ experience in North Africa, he was regarded as having intimate knowledge of the Islamic faith and traditions. In May 1919 Lieutenant Colonel Romieu was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Flye-Sainte-Marie as commander of the Armenian Legion. Colonel de Piépape was named commander of all French detachments in Cilicia, but that position was nominal until the summer months when several regular French battalions arrived in Cilicia. 29 FO 371/4181, 91243/114816/2117/44A; Du Véou, op. cit.y pp. 33-35. See also Kochnak Hayastaniy XIX (Aug. 16, 1919), 1062; British Documents, IV, 321-323, 327-328. The 412th Regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel C. Thibault. See his study, Historique du 412e régiment d'infanterie, Pt. II: Opérations en Asie Mineur (Paris, 1923). 30 Testis, “L’Oeuvre de la France en Syrie,” Revue des Deux Mondes, ser. 12, LXI (Feb. 15, 1921) , 810; Du Véou, op. dt., p. 39.

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In a move to consolidate French power, Gouraud was instructed to assume the duties both of General Hamelin, previously the senior French officer in the Levant, and of Georges-Picot, the Beirut-based high commissioner for Syria and Armenia. He was henceforth to serve as “Commandant en chef de l’armée du Levant et Haut-commissaire de la République française en Syrie et Cilicie.” The change in the title from “Syrie et Arménie” to “Syrie et Cilicie” reflected the clarification of French objectives in the Near East.31 Allenby’s staff prepared the timetable for British withdrawal, which was to begin in remote places such as Urfa and progress toward the sea. The lack of sufficient French replacements raised fears that the towns between Urfa and Marash would fall to the Turkish Nationalists and that Armeni­ an repatriates would again be victimized. The British Foreign Office therefore suggested that the French encourage the Armenians to draw back from outlying areas into the Adana vilayet. As the French intended to establish a zone of influence along the Taurus range to the border of the Mush sanjak, Clemenceau’s government gave assurances that the French army would safeguard the population. The promised reinforce­ ments did not arrive in time, however, and Colonel de Piépape, the French commander at Adana, had to detail small detachments to man the posi­ tions in the eastern territories. During the last week of October thousands of Armenians in Aintab and Marash welcomed these French-Armenian units as their deliverers. On November 4 the formal exchange of com­ mand took place and the eastern territories came under nominal French occupation, with only a thousand soldiers scattered from Killis, Aintab, and Marash to Jerablus, Arab-Bunar, Tell-Abad, Suruj, and Urfa.32 Unlike the departing British battalions, the French had neither airplanes nor armored cars, heavy artillery nor automatic weapons, wireless transmitters nor swift courier service. Even when a part of the 156th French Division disembarked at Mersina and Alexandretta during the following weeks, most of the heavy equipment was kept at Beirut for 31 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3; Testis, op. cit., pp. 807-808; Gontaut-Biron, op. cit., pp. 331-332; Du Véou, op. cit., p. 39; British Documents, IV, 449-450, 464-465; FO 608/81, 342/2/9/19129 end.; L'Asie française, 19th yr. (Aug./Nov. 1919), 237—238, and, for an announcement of Gouraud’s arrival in Beirut, Ibid., 19th yr. (Dec. 1919), 294, 311-312. 32 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3; L'Asie française, 20th yr. (Dec. 1920), 31-32; Brémond, op. cit., pp. 328-329; De Rémusat, op. cit., p. 352; Testis, op. cit., pp. 826-827; Du Véou, op. cit., pp. 45,47; Stanley E. Kerr, The Lions of Marash (Albany, N.Y., 1973), pp. 55—56; FO 371/4184, 150929/2117/44A; Hairenik, Dec. 28:2, 1919, Jan. 13:3, 1920. General Allenby expressed deep concern regarding the effects of the British withdrawal and recommended that his garrisons “stand fast’’ until the French were able to relieve them. See British Documents, IV, 478, 500-501.

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possible action against Emir Faisal. The appeals of the military commanders in Cilicia for airplanes and heavy arms brought no quick response from General Gouraud’s headquarters, a fact that did not escape the attention of the Turkish Nationalists.33 Cilicia was the only region in 1919 to which Armenians repatriated in large numbers. Because of the proximity of the Syrian places of exile and less thorough enforcement of the deportation decrees, the mortality rate among the Cilician Armenians had been lower than that in the central and eastern vilayets. Repatriation, starting haphazardly at the end of the war, became a large-scale movement during the spring and summer of 1919. By the beginning of 1920, 150,000 Armenians had reportedly returned to the vilayet of Adana and the adjoining sanjaks of Aintab and Marash. They came from Aleppo on foot and in carts, trucks, and trains, their old campsites being quickly occupied by women and children rescued from desert tribes and from places of massacre around Meskene, Rakka, and Deir-el-Zor. The refugees at Beirut' and in Egypt were transported by sea, and they were followed by thousands who were not natives of Cilicia but relocated there in the hope of soon being able to reach their homes in Anatolia and the Armenian plateau. The flow into Cilicia was so heavy that, for example, only 500 of 23,000 refugees around Damascus still remained there in September. By that time the survivors of Zeitun and Hadjin had also returned to their mountainous homes, even though little assistance could be expected from Marash and Sis if hostilities were renewed.34* When Colonel Brémond and his staff arrived in February 1919, the Armenians had expected energetic measures to restore their properties and to disarm the Muslim population. Yet General Allenby stipulated that the control officers were to work through Ottoman officials, who proved to be adept at polite avoidance and passive resistance. In April, Brémond did issue regulations about the restitution of Armenian goods, and in May he ordered a general disarmament, but evasion was more the rule than the exception. Armenian spokesmen such as Mihran Damadian, the liai­ son in Cilicia of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, repeatedly protested 33 Du Veou, op. cit., pp. 46-47; Brémond, op. cit.y pp. 330-331, 335. The 156th Division, which became involved in the Franco-Turkish armed confrontations in 1920-1921, was commanded by Brigadier General Julien C. M. S. Dufieux. He took command at Adana on December 2, 1919. 34 Du Véou, op. cit., pp. 22-24, 49-50; Brémond, op. cit.y pp. 311-312; Boyajian, op. cit.y pp. 207-211; Erkir, Sept. 24:1, 1919, Oct. 12:3, 1919; Misak Keleshian, Sis-Matian (Beirut, 1949), PP- 595-602; Gersam Aharonian, ed., Hushamatian Meds Eghemi, 19/5-/965 (Beirut, 1965), pp. 872-874. Armenian newspapers around the world closely followed and frequently reported on the repatriation to Cilicia.

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the French failure either to disarm the Muslims or else to arm the Christians.36 The Armenians nonetheless organized interparty and interdenomina­ tional national councils throughout Cilicia and quickly reasserted their dominance in commercial, cultural, and educational endeavors. In Adana, Armenian newspapers, a theatrical troupe, and adult vocational educa­ tional classes began to operate and several thousand children entered or returned to school for the first time in four years.36 Moreover, despite Armenian impatience with the French supervisors and Colonel Brémond’s own professions of impartiality, manifestations of FrancoArmenian amity were not lacking. In August the death of Major Louis Rolland, the Armenian Legion’s chief physician and a humanitarian who had ministered to thousands of repatriates, prompted a threeday period of Armenian official mourning, the closure of places of entertainment, and the naming of a street and refugee camp in his mem­ ory. At the funeral Monsignor Gevorg Arslanian, the prelate of Adana, and Mihran Damadian extolled the centuries-long bond between the two peoples and received no less eloquent responses from Colonels Brémond and de Piépape.37 The next month French officers participated in the tumultuous welcome accorded Catholicos Sahak Khabayan, spiritual leader of the Cilician Armenians, on his return from exile. And on the first anniversary of the battle of Arara, Brémond, de Piépape, and Lieutenant Colonel Flye-Sainte-Marie, who had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Louis Romieu as commander of the Armenian Legion, showered praise on the legionnaires and gave assurances that the Allies would not forget their obligations to the heroic Armenian nation.38 36 Ruben G. Sahakian, Turk-Fransiakan haraberutiunnere ev Kilikian, 1919-1921 tt. (Erevan, 1970), PP- 121-123. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421, and File 504, Azgayin Miutiun Kilikio ev Siurio, 1919-1924; and Armenian newspapers published in Adana in 1919: Hai dzain (Independent, then Ramkavar), Kilikia (Dashnaktsutiun), Tavros (S. D. Hnchak). 36 In addition to newspaper accounts published in Cilicia, Constantinople, and the United States, Sept.-Dee. 1919, see Aharonian, op. cit., pp. 897-899; Gontaut-Biron, op. cit., pp. 216-221; Brémond, op. cit., pp. 311-325; Du Véou, op. cit., pp 49-58. For the work of the medical mission sent to Cilicia under the auspices of the Armenian National Delegation, see Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (May 31, 1919), 703; Revue des études arméniennes, I, 3 (1921), 377382; Rep. of Arjn. Archives, File 421/1, no. 32, May 6,1919; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 50, Oct. 17, 1919. The mission, headed by Dr. Chazarosian of Paris, included twelve Armenian physicians and three nurses from Paris, Geneva, Lausanne, and London. 37 Erkir, Sept. 10:1, 1919; Pahak, Oct. 17:3, 1919; Du Véou, op. cit., p. 50; Boyajian, op. cit., pp. 211-212. 38 Erkir, Sept. 27:2,1919 \Hairenik, Sept. 27:1, Nov. 26:2,1919. The encyclical of Catholicos Sahak on his return from exile is reprinted in [Catholicos] Babgen [Kiuleserian], Patmutiun hatoghikosats Kilikio (1141-en minchev mer orere) (Antelias, Lebanon, 1939), pp. 963-971.

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However genuine these expressions may have been, the French and British governments both handled the refugee issue with cynicism. The British authorities intended to use the September agreement as an excuse to transfer all remaining refugees in the Arab provinces to Cilicia and thereby to be freed from the obligation to feed, shelter, and protect them.39 Although the Foreign Office and the War Office were frequently at odds, Lord Curzon conceded the logic of concentrating the refugees in Cilicia and George Kidston of the Eastern department noted: “Our Military Authorities are apparently busily dumping large numbers of Armenian refugees from Aleppo to Cilicia where they will of course be at the charge of the French. I am not at all sure that this is not a rough and ready justice and that the French do not thoroughly deserve any little legacy of this kind that we can leave them, but they are not likely to view it in this light.”40 Lord Edward Derby, British ambassador in Paris, was instructed to inform the French that some 6,000 Armenians at Aleppo and several hundred in Mesopotamia would be repatriated to Cilicia without delay. Derby replied that the French objected to the transfer of so many refugees because the result might be an artificial Armenian majority in Cilicia which could be used to justify the creation of a “Great Armenia.” On this dispatch, a clerk in the Foreign Office minuted: “The French clearly show their hands as regards the new Armenia.”41 General Allenby’s men, meanwhile, were “busily dumping” the refugees into Cilicia. In October and November daily caravans moved northward from Aleppo, many of them using trucks provided by the American Near East Relief, while French and British vessels transported the refugees from Port Said. Allenby sent tents, blankets, and relief supplies from Egypt to Adana, where Colonel Brémond opened additional camps to accommodate the newcomers. The last to arrive in late November were the orphans, who were blessed by Catholicos Sahak in emotional ceremo­ nies at Mersina and assigned to new homes at various locations, thereby raising the number of institutionalized orphans in Cilicia to more than io,ooo.42 At the end of 1919, 24,000 persons were receiving food rations 39 Interdepartmental correspondence relating to the sustenance of the refugees and to the complaints of the War Office and the Treasury about the continuation of this aid is in FO 371/4183—4184, 136683/142780/2117/44A; FO 371/3659-3660, 119566/123851/125100/ 148995/512/58. At the end of the world war there were approximately 6,000 Armenian refugees in camps around Port Said, whereas by August 1919 the number of Armenian refugees in Egypt had risen to 23,000. See FO 371/3658-3659, 55384/123851/512/58. Many inhabitants of the Port Said camps were survivors from the Musa Dagh region near Antioch. The drama of their defense in 1915 was caught by Franz Werfel, The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, published in many languages. 40 FO 371/4183, 136683/2117/44A. See also FO 371/3660, 148995/512/58. 41 FO 371/4184, 146048/2117/44A. töErkir, Oct. 14:1,2,29:1, Nov. 25:2, Dec. 12:1,2, 1919; Gontaut-Biron,op. cit., p p .97-99.

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in the Adana district alone and, according to Brémond, 47,000 Armenians in the Arab provinces still awaited repatriation.43 Although the Armenian influx aggravated problems of housing, sanitation, and employment, it was morally exhilarating and politically promising. If Cilicia could not be included in the projected independent Armenian state immediately, the region might at least be organized as an Armenian national home under French protection. The French authorities, too, were pleased that the transfer of commands at Adana, Aintab, and Beirut had been free of bloodshed or major incident. The issue of inland Syria remained unresolved, but Emir Faisal’s influence seemed to be waning, and the prospect of French control in Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo was improving. Three weeks after taking command of the Army of the Levant, General Gouraud conducted his first and only inspection tour of Cilicia. At every stop along the route from Mersina to Tarsus and Adana on December 10, he was cheered by thousands of Christians waving French and Armenian tricolors. Enthusiastic Francophile demonstrations took place in Mersina at the Armenian school and orphanage and in Adana at the offices of the Armenian National Council, where schoolchildren, orphans, and scouts led a parade of the artisan guilds, each under its own banner. On a tight two-day schedule, Gouraud received Catholicos Sahak, Damadian, and members of the national council and in return paid a visit to the refugee workshops set up in the Abgarian school and to Dr. Rolland’s grave. He returned to Beirut by way of Alexandretta, where at the Armenian church he was once again warmly greeted.44 Elated by his journey, Gouraud, in his reports to Paris, praised Colonel Brémond and expressed satisfaction that the transfer of commands had been completed smoothly in spite of the presence of Nationalist troops on the borders of Cilicia. Unbeknownst to the Armenians, however, Gouraud added that his administration, while doing everything possible to give the Armenians work and security, would not encourage their political aspirations: “Il ne faudrait pas que la Cilicie fût transformée en province arménienne.”4546He also suggested that the Armenian Legion, already cut to less than half strength, should be reorganized as the Légion d’Orient through the recruitment of two battalions comprising members of all the races inhabiting Anatolia. Such a step would diminish Turkish objections to an Armenian contingent in French uniform without directly affronting the Armenians and would 43 Brémond, op. cit.y p. 313; Du Véou, op. cit., pp. 50; Erkir, Dec. 7:2, 1919. 44 Erkir, Dec. 11:3, 17:1, 26:2, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 106, Dec. 18, 1919; Brémond, op. cit.y p. 335; Hairenik, Jan. 15:3, 1920. 46 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3, Report, Dec. 15, 1919.

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help to dissociate the future of Cilicia from that of the new state to be called Armenia.46

The Turkish Reaction and French Feelers Although Turks were a minority in Cilicia, as in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, they constituted a majority when counted with other Muslim peoples such as Kurds, Ansaris, Circassians, Kizilbash, and Turkomans. These groups all held grudges against the Turks, but they shared the fear that Cilicia might become an Armenian center. Many Muslims who had paid a fee for the right to occupy the homes and properties of Armenian deportees now faced dispossession themselves. While a sense of fatalism had settled over most Muslims at the time of the Mudros Armistice and Turkish military withdrawal from the Adana vilayet, the long delay in formulating the treaty raised hopes that Cilicia might be spared from Armenian annexation. The Muslims in Cilicia resented the Armenian inrush, the seizure of converted women and children whom they had harbored, the unveiling of womenfolk by Armenians in search of lost relatives, the presence of Armenian soldiers in French uniform, and the dictates of European control officers. But the Allied troops were so few that the occupation was nominal and could not extend far into the Taurus and Amanus Mountains, where the partisan chete bands found many convenient hideouts. Before evacuating Cilicia, the Turkish army had distributed some 25,000 rifles and stashed away large reserves of weapons and ammunitions for possible future use.4647 Moreover, as the Nationalist movement coalesced in 1919, thousands of Turkish prisoners of war were repatriated from Egypt and Mesopotamia, facilitating Mustafa Kemal’s recruitment of veteran officers and soldiers.48 46 Ibid., 20N/157, dossier 3, Report, Feb. 12, 1920. The French steadily decreased the size of the Armenian Legion through partial demobilization and highly selective replacement practices. For Armenian interpretations of the French attitude, see Boyajian, op. cit., pp. 213-247; Turabian, op. cit., pp. 97—98; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Aug. 30, 1919), 1128. 47 Brémond, op. cit., p. 306; Gontaut-Biron, op. cit., p. 215. See also Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London, [1964]), pp. 131,203; Söylemezoglu, op. cit., 179-180; Ahmet Hulki Saral and Tosun Saral, Vatan nasil kurtarildi ([Ankara], 1970), pp. 13—21; FO 608/108, 384/2/1/5748/9408. 48 The cost of maintaining the prisoners of war pending the conclusion of peace led the British War Office and the Treasury to recommend their gradual release. In August the Paris Peace Conference sanctioned the immediate repatriation of the 112,000 Turkish prisoners in Egypt, and by the end of the year nearly 75,000 had been repatriated. For related corre­ spondence and documents, see FO 608/114, File 385/1/22; FO 608/117, 385/3/3/19917. See also Paris Peace Conference, VII, 565.

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As early as the spring of that year the chete harassed isolated parties of Allied troops and Armenian peasants in the outlying regions of the Adana vilayet, the attacks becoming more frequent as the harvest season ap­ proached. When a detachment of the 412th French Regiment was am­ bushed between Dortyol and Alexandretta in September, a punitive mission dispersed the band, but it was soon learned that the chete could be scattered in disarray only to reappear unexpectedly at another vulnera­ ble site a few days later. In October Kurd Yusufs men overran several settlements near the village of Jihan and, eluding pursuers, circled south of Adana to Sheikh Murad, where they killed forty Armenian peasants and terrorized the inhabitants of Yenije and Kurd Tepe before riding back up into the Amanus. Although a punitive mission composed of French, Moroccan, Punjabi, and Armenian troops and a mixed MuslimChristian gendarmerie razed the camps of the offenders and wounded their chief, the Armenians were outraged when their dead were carted from Sheikh Murad to Adana. Still, their demand for weapons could not be granted by the Allied authorities, who admitted that the Muslims were fully armed and the Christians lacked means of self-defense. The loss of more than a hundred Armenian peasants, travelers, and gendarmes in the counties of Sis, Jebel-Bereket, and Adana and the district of Tarsus made October the bloodiest month since the end of the war.49 As French assumption of control in Cilicia coincided with the collapse of Damad Ferid’s cabinet and the rise of Mustafa Kemal’s prestige, both the new cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha in Constantinople and the Nationalist Representative Committee in Sivas mixed implicit threats with their pro­ tests against what they regarded as Allied violations of the Mudros Armis­ tice. Foreign Minister Reshid Pasha complained to High Commissioner Albert Defrance that the occupation, coming at a time when the Turkish people were waiting for peace and for the evacuation of foreign armies, would prolong the state of uncertainty, thus causing more serious unrest throughout the country.50 Mersinli Jemal Pasha, a Nationalist organizer who had become minister of war in Ali Riza’s cabinet, called on the French to halt their advance into Aintab, Marash, and Urfa, districts controlled by the Turkish army until the beginning of 1919, and to prevent cruelties by Armenians wearing French uniforms. He warned that continued 49 Du Véou, op. cit., pp. 65-66; Brémond, op. cit., pp. 314-315; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, nos. 88-89, Nov. 5, 8, 1919\Erkir, Oct. 29:1, Nov. 4:1,19:1, 2,1919, KochnakHayastani, XIX (Dec. 20, 1919), 1545-1546; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/41, dossier 2, Report, Nov. 16, 1919, 20N/158, dossier 2, nos. 8-9; RG 256, 867B.4016/11; FO 371/4159, 141436/521/44; FO 371/4184-4185, 147974/154417/2117/44A; FO 608/79, 342/l/9/2° 47450 British Documents, IV, 506-507 (FO 371/4185, 154432/2117/44A).

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Armenian excesses might provoke reprisals against Christians in other areas.61 At Kemal’s behest scores of protest telegrams were sent to Constantino­ ple by various national defense committees.62 On November 12 Kemal denounced the occupation as evidence that the Entente nations had not repudiated their annexationist designs and were implementing their plans even without awaiting the decisions of the peace conference: They are unwilling to take into consideration the glorious history of the Ottoman Empire, dating from seven centuries ago, or the circumstances and elements of its prompt and powerful development or its rebirth.. . . The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried out in the vilayet of Aiden, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view o f opening the way to a division o f Turkey, are identical with those perpetrated in the localities of Marash, Ourfa, and Aintab, dependencies of the vilayet of Adana, which the French have oc­ cupied, using the Armenians as their instruments. These acts are the last o f a series of flagrant injustices of a political nature.

Kemal wanted the Allied Powers to know that the Turkish nation was united in the decision to employ every moral and material means at its command to protect its honor and existence.63 Having seized the telegraph network in Anatolia, Kemal appealed to the people of Cilicia to resist the crushing of their rights. At the same time both the Nationalists and the sultan’s government tried to block the exodus of Armenians from Caesarea and other Anatolian towns in order to prevent an even larger Christian concentration in Cilicia and to use the survivors as hostages.64 While the Nationalists were not yet sufficiently consolidated to take on the large Greek army of occupation and chose not to annoy the Italians, who were actively seeking a rapprochement, the strategic political importance of Cilicia and the vulnerability of the small occupational forces destined the region to become the first open battle arena in the Turkish “War of Independence.” Kemal sent several officers “on leave” to organize the partisans there. Secret communication had already been established with 61 Archives de l’Armée, 20N/158, dossier 3, no. 10. 62 See, for example, FO 371/4185, 156735/2117/44A; FO 608/112, 385/1/14/17236 ends.; British Documentsy IV, 535-537; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3026, dossier 3, 20N/141, dossier 2, 20N/158, dossier 2, 20N/202, dossier 2. 63 British Documents, IV, 538. See also FO 406/41, no. 175; FO 371/4185, 165695/2117/44A; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/141, dossier 3, no. 35, Nov. 28, 1919. 64 Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 261-262,327-328; Ali Fuat Cebesoy>Miliïmücadeléhâtiralari (Istanbul, 1953), p. 288; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1, no. 103, Dec. 13, 1919; Brémond, op. eit., p. 337; Erkir, Oct. 9:2, Nov. 15:2, 19:1, 26:1, 1919; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Nov. 29, 1919), 1450, and (Dec. 20, 1919), 1547; FO 371/4161, 163686/521/44.

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the Muslim notables of Marash, and the road between Sis and Hadjin had been rendered virtually impassable for Armenians.56 Although the occupation of Cilicia drew the French and Nationalists toward armed confrontation, neither side ruled out a modus vivendi. Colonial circles in France continued to defame Great Britain as an un­ scrupulous rival that was not above enticing the French into Cilicia and then posing as a champion of Turkish self-determination in an effort to gain additional political and economic advantages. Sharing this sentiment, the French authorities at Constantinople condoned informal contact with Nationalists even as they officially branded Mustafa Kemal a military deserter and political adventurer. During the autumn of 1919 French intelligence agents reported that, although the Nationalist movement was still largely a bluff, its leaders had been entirely alienated from the British and were hoping to win French sympathy. The problem of Cilicia, how­ ever, was a major stumbling block. It would be a grave error to award the region to an independent Armenia. Rather, France should consolidate its position there and seek to reconcile Turks and Armenians. Similar views were held by High Commissioner Defrance, who warned that the British were exploiting every opportunity for their own benefit, that Greeks and Italians were stirring up trouble in Asia Minor, and that the only reason­ able solution for Cilicia was to keep it under the sultan’s nominal sover­ eignty with French supervision and adequate guarantees for the safety of the Armenians.56 Initial French contact with Turkish commanders in Anatolia was made through junior officers of the High Commission and through private citizens such as Berthe Georges-Gaulis, a publicist sympathetic to the Nationalist cause. In October she ventured into the interior with de France’s consent in the hope of interviewing Mustafa Kemal. Near Eskishehir she met with Corps Commander Ali Fuad Pasha, who vilified the British and explained that, while Turkey would never submit to joint Anglo-French rule in Anatolia, some arrangement with France alone was not out of the question. At Konia, Colonel Refet Bey claimed the British were intent upon dominating all routes to the Orient and had permitted the French to take Cilicia only tojustify the creation of a British-controlled Kurdistan farther east. He regretted that the Turks and the French, despite their warm sentiments for each other, seemed headed for conflict over Cilicia. Although Georges-Gaulis was not allowed to proceed to Kemal’s headquarters on her first attempt, she returned to Constantinople6 66 Kemal, op. cit., pp. 238-239, 286, 332-333; Kerr, op. cit., pp. 67-68; Erkir, Dec. 1919 passim. See also Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 255-261, 287—288; Kâzim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 388-389. 66 Archives de l’Armée, 20N/141, dossier 2, 16N/3206, dossier 3.

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impressed with the patriotism of the Nationalists and determined to revise the image of the “terrible Turk” in France. Ali Fuad and Refet in their turn imparted to Kemal their impressions of the enthusiastic French writer.57 The rendezvous that evoked the most speculation and foreign concern in 1919 was a mysterious two-day meeting between François Georges-Picot and Mustafa Kemal. Georges-Picot had been a negotiator of the main wartime pact on the partition of the Ottoman Empire and had served in Beirut after the armistice as high commissioner for Syria and Armenia (a euphemism for Cilicia and those parts of the Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir vilayets assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot agreement). Critical of his government’s failure to match the aggressive British tactics in the Near East, he eventually lost favor with Clemenceau but gained support among colonial, shipping, and commercial interests. In September, on one of his journeys between Paris and Beirut, Georges-Picot conferred with Ahmed Riza and less prominent Turkish politicians in Rome, the Allied capital most accessible to the Turks, thanks to the arrangements of Count Carlo Sforza in the foreign ministry. At that meeting Ahmed Riza argued the Turkish case for Cilicia by querying whether France considered “a few square kilometers” so important as to risk its favored position and force the Turks into the arms of Great Britain. Georges-Picot, however, justified his country’s “special position” in Cilicia and spoke of the moral obligation to protect those elements of the population which had placed their trust in France.58 In this and subsequent discussions with French officials, Ahmed Riza and his colleagues played upon the historic bonds between the two peoples, blamed the rupture of their traditional cordial relations on Talaat and Enver, and, while admitting that a frontier realignment in favor of the Caucasian Armenian republic might be necessary, insisted that Cilicia and Smyrna should remain integral parts of Turkey.59 After his return to Beirut, Georges-Picot established communication with Bekir Sami Bey, a Nationalist organizer who was an old acquaintance and the former governor of Beirut. Bekir Sami confided that Mustafa Kemal would welcome an opportunity to exchange views with GeorgesPicot in Sivas. Hence, on November 30, just a week after being relieved of his post by General Gouraud, Georges-Picot departed on his controver-678 67 Ibid., 20N/202, dossier 2, Report, Oct. 13, 1919; Berthe-Georges Gaulis, Le nationalisme turc (Paris, 1921), pp. 68-90, and La question turque (Paris, 1931), pp. 42-91. The author implies that the mission was undertaken in November rather than in October. 68 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3, Oct. 3, 1919. See also Söylemezoglu, op. cit.f PP- 135- 14159 See, for example, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, no. 27.

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sial mission through Cilicia and Anatolia. Although several French mili­ tary historians have suggested that the trip was not sanctioned by the government and actually conflicted with Gouraud’s wishes, it seems un­ likely that a mission of such importance and having such far-reaching ramifications would have been undertaken without approval from influ­ ential persons in Paris. Meeting Ali Fuad Pasha in Caesarea, Georges-Picot intimated that there would soon be a new French cabinet and that it would be more sympathetic to the Turks and the principle of Turkish sovereign­ ty in territories having a Turkish majority.60 When he reached Sivas, Georges-Picot was not received immediately by Kemal because his calling card still bore the title “Haut-commissaire de la République française en Syrie et Arménie.” To surmount this difficulty, Georges-Picot explained that “Arménie” had reference only to the Erevan government and was unrelated to a state of that name which might be contemplated for a part of Anatolia. Although both Kemal and he knew the truth to be otherwise, the démenti was sufficient to allow discussions to proceed. Along with Bekir Sami, Rauf, and Rustem beys, Kemal heard Georges-Picot’s opinion regarding a new French cabinet and a shift in policy. In such an eventuality, France would seek investment and business opportunities, a supervisory role in the reorganization of the Turkish police and gendarmerie, and adequate guarantees for the protection of minorities. Kemal interjected that the Erzerum congress had already de­ fined the Nationalist position toward minorities, and Rauf added that the Erevan government possessed enough territory to serve as a haven for all Armenians who wished to emigrate. Kemal held out no hope of agree­ ment so long as the French army remained in Cilicia. Turkey might accept the loss of Syria, Iraq, and the Jezire district, but Cilicia could never be torn from the Turkish heartland. Georges-Picot contended that a Frenchsupervised administration was operating efficiently in Cilicia and that his government’s obligations to the inhabitants could not be ignored. Yet he also intimated that France might find a formula to restore Cilicia to Ottoman suzerainty provided the French “special position” was acknowl­ edged and adequate guarantees were made—including the use of French supervisory personnel—for the institution of reforms. Kemal, in his turn, noted that foreign economic assistance had been approved by the Er­ zerum and Sivas congresses and that competent advice on administrative improvements might also be acceptable, but in no way could the territorial 60 Du Véou, op. dt.f pp. 66-67; Brémond, op, cit., p. 336; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/202, dossier 1, Report, Dec. 7, 1919; Cebesoy, op. dt., p. 269; Sahakian, op. dt., pp. 74-76; Michel Paillarès, Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés (Constantinople and Paris, 1922), pp. 108-109; FO 608/108, 385/1/1/18977. See also British Documents, IV, 560.

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and political integrity of the country be compromised. France would have to relinquish all pretensions to Cilicia and to uphold in Allied councils Turkey’s right to independence and indivisibility.61 The discussions, though reaching no agreement, revealed to Kemal a certain French flexibility regarding Cilicia and other vital issues. Once again Kemal had maintained a stiff front, making threats and exaggera­ tions without batting an eye. He startled his own companions by speaking of “National Armies” ready to march at his command. They would not move into Cilicia for the time being if the French took away their Armeni­ an troops, but should the National forces be provoked into action, the responsibility for the consequences would fall on France.62 Georges-Picot returned to Paris as an advocate of an accommodation that would give his country the status of a most favored nation. It remained for the Nationalists to recognize France’s special position in Cilicia and its obligations to the Armenian inhabitants.

New British Appraisals The fall of Damad Ferid’s cabinet in October made it clear that henceforth the Allies would have to reckon with the Turkish Nationalists. The high commissioners in Constantinople emphasized the importance of a realistic peace settlement yet also maintained that it was still not too late for the Allies to emerge honorably from the predicament. Vice Admiral John Michael de Robeck, who in August had succeeded Vice Admiral GoughCalthorpe as British high commissioner, wrote the Foreign Office: “The pretensions of the new rulers of Turkey might have seemed ludicrous nine, or even six, months ago. They are sufficiently reasonable to-day to justify in Turkish minds the hope that the Peace Conference will let Turkey off lightly rather than try conclusions with the national move­ ment. There can be little doubt that an army of occupation would now be needed to impose terms which would have been regarded as merciful in the hours of ruin and dejection following the Armistice.” The Christian population was extremely alarmed: “Seeing what they see to-day, they are filled with apprehension, not only for the near future, but for the long future after the peace. They begin to feel that the Peace Conference, 61 Gontaut-Biron, op. cit., pp. 337-340; De Rémusat, op. cit., p. 353; Helmreich, op. cit., pp. 183-184; Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 269-270; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 399-400; Sahakian, op. cit., pp. 78-81; Jean Pichon, Le partage du Proche-Orient (Paris, 1938), p. 203; Tevfik Biyiklioglu, Atatürk Anadolu*da (1 9 /9 -/9 2 /), I (Ankara, 1959), 65. 62 Kinross, op. cit., p. 203.

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impressed by the Nationalist movement and anxious to avoid further trouble with it, will, after all, decide to leave the main body of Turkey intact and independent. In that event, all that the Allies, and especially Great Britain, have done for the Christians in the last ten months will only expose them to the greater wrath of their rulers in the time to come.” The Nationalists, on the other hand, were encouraged by the seeming lack of British resolve: “To the north, they see British troops leaving Samsoun. To the north-east, they see us abandoning the Caucasus, and leaving behind between Ararat and the Caspian a fruitful field for Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish propaganda. To the south-east, they see us slowly draw­ ing in our horns in south-eastern Kurdistan. To the south, they see us preparing to disinterest ourselves in Cilicia and Syria.” A harsh treaty, de Robeck continued, would now necessitate the use of an Allied—basically British—armed force, and the longer the delay, the larger that force would have to be. It was imperative, therefore, that peace be concluded within the next few weeks. In the Foreign Office the report was minuted with the lament that “it looks more like years.”63 Many of de Robeck’s and Webb’s dispatches described the political, military, and financial chaos in Anatolia and the plight of the Christians, whose renewed flight toward the seacoasts and Constantinople heavily taxed relief efforts. Conditions in the refugee camps even near the capital were appalling, as men, women, ând children were crowded into muddy, rain-soaked tents or left out in the open.64 The relief agencies, de Robeck explained in November, had never contemplated a year’s delay in the treaty; the Armenian organizations had almost exhausted their resources and even the Americans had to reduce both staff and expenditures just as the need was increasing. The delay had so damaged the prestige of British officials in the interior that “the most flagrant cases of injustice to Christians have to be left unredressed.” The Christians had become hostages and were bewildered that the British were apparently abandoning them. It was useless to appeal to the Sublime Porte: “The Government cannot and will not move a finger to help the Christians and possesses no funds to carry out the necessary relief work, even if it desired to do so, but the reverse is now the case. Turks are again taking posses­ sion of property restored to their Christian owners through the instrumentality of our relief officers, and a recent report shows that there 63 FO 371/4159, 144283/521/44 {British Documents, IV, 805-809); FO 406/41, no. 126. The report was sent on behalf of de Robeck by Rear Admiral Webb and strongly reflects his own views. 64 For documents relating to refugee matters, see FO 371/4195-4197, File 3349/44. See also FO 371/4161, 154459/521/44; FO 406/41, nos. 165, 181, 193; Erkir, Nov. 7:1, 1919.

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is a general tendency on the part of the Moslem population, supported by the local authorities, to render it impossible for the Christians to earn a living, and by boycotting and terrorism to drive them from their homes, never to return.”65 In a sharp protest to Grand Vizier Ali Riza in December, de Robeck demanded an end to persecution of Christians in the interior: “I am informed that in spite of all this ill-treatment the Armenians are proving most long suffering and are doing their utmost to prevent the occurrence of any unfortunate incident.”66 Exasperated with the Turks, the high commissioner wrote to Curzon at the beginning of 1920: “From the amount of active opposition and ill-will which the Turkish Authorities have displayed in the matter of providing housing for Armenian orphans in Constantinople itself, where the presence of British Naval and Mili­ tary Forces might be expected to work for acquiescence, even though reluctant, it will be possible for Your Lordship accurately to gauge the measure of resistance—amounting in practice to an almost complete refusal to do anything on their behalf—which all endeavours to assist Ottoman Christians necessarily encounter in these places and where there is no effective military occupation to back our demands.”67 Similar information was relayed to the War Office by General Milne, commander of the British Army of the Black Sea. Turkish feeling regard­ ing an independent Armenia ran high, he wrote, and even Damad Ferid’s cabinet had used every possible means to prevent Armenian repatriation. Yet a peaceful settlement might still be possible, since nearly all reasonable Turks accepted the inevitability of a limited territorial concession on the frontier. Milne cautioned: “If the decisions of the Peace Conference are so drastic in the treatment of Turkey that the older men, who have the spirit of compromise, are unable to keep the wilder spirits in check, then it will turn out that the national movement has greatly prejudiced the military position of the Allies.”68 In full accord, the War Office advised the Foreign Office on October 23 that “there seems to be no prospect of the creation of a Greater Armenia stretching from Cilicia to the Caucasus and now that Cilicia appears likely to be placed under a French mandate it would be well to abandon the idea of a Greater Armenia for the present and to endeavour to induce the Armenians that the best prospects for 66 FO 608/79, 342/1/9/20886 end.; British Documents, IV, 874—875. See also FO 608/112, 385/1/15/18523/20100/21026; FO 371/4161, 170747/521/44. 66 FO 371/4161, 170747/521/44. 67 FO 371/4162, 177618/521/44. 68 British Documents, IV, 998—9990. See also Cab 24/93, C.P. 156.

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their future lie in the creation of two small states, one in Cilicia and one in the Caucasus.”69 So long as American acceptance of a mandate seemed possible, the Foreign Office, under Curzon’s direction, continued to favor a relatively large Armenian state. But expressions of despair appeared with greater frequency in the ministry’s minutes during the latter half of 1919. As early as June, George Kidston of the Eastern department wrote: “It is surely becoming evident that the future Armenia will have to be a comparatively small affair & yet we still keep up the solemn farce that it will include the whole of the Six Vilayets as well as Cilicia.”70 No such admission was forthcoming, however, from either Curzon or Sir Eyre Crowe, who after mid-August headed the British delegation in Paris. Critical of the War Office’s suggestion that Armenia be confined to the Caucasus and that its army not be supplied with military matériel, Crowe wrote Kidston in November that Churchill’s men revealed a preference for an expansive, independent Turkey that would continue to rule over Armenians, Greeks, and other subject peoples. “I trust that neither His Majesty’s Government nor the Peace Conference will be influenced in so large a question of policy by what the War Office thinks. Considerations of much wider importance than the purely military are at stake and ought to be the basis of their decisions, and I personally still hope that the Conference may find the means of imposing terms on Turkey according to the spirit and indeed the letter of the Supreme Council’s reply to the Turks last July IJune] in the matter of the subject races of Turkey.”71 Kidston answered that both the War Office and the India Office were narrow-minded, but he did agree with them insofar as “it would be folly to antagonize all Moslem opinion and so substantiate the wicked C.U.P. cum Bolshevik lie that the British Empire is out to destroy Islam.” And now there was no way of transforming the eastern vilayets into an Armeni­ an state without an Allied army of occupation, for the Armenians would be a minority in their own country: “We must cut our coat according to our cloth and, unless the Americans or some one else have conscience enough to come in at the last moment and help, I fear that it may be very difficult to impose on the Turks the terms of the Supreme Council’s reply to them of last June. I wish I thought otherwise.”72 Crowe responded 69 FO 70 FO 71 FO 72 FO 910.

371/3660, 145108/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20367. 371/3659, 86314/512/58. 608/78, 342/1/6/20367 (British Documents, IV, 892—895). 608/78, 342/1/6/20832; FO 371/3665, 157145/1015/58; British Documents, IV, 907—

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defensively, but he continued to maintain that the War Office and the India Office were so possessed by the “pan-Islamic bogey” that they were afraid to deal with the Turkish treaty on national lines or to remove the Greeks and Armenians from Turkish domination. “The idea of winning the Turks from Pan-Islamism by truckling to them is insane.” Although conceding that an Armenia from sea to sea might have become impossible, he still held that efficient Allied advisory personnel and officers rather than an army of occupation would be adequate to enforce the treaty in that part of Anatolia which was awarded to Armenia: I do not think that whatever the extent of the Armenian zone may be, it will be fair to take too much into account the proportion o f the present Armenian popula­ tion to the rest. The zone or state can only be at first Armenian in name . . . : time alone will show whether enough immigration by Armenians from the rest of Turkey and from abroad will take place to give the government a definitely Armenian complexion. But to consider and decide the Armenian question purely on the basis o f present numbers would surely amount to countenancing and encouraging the past Turkish method of dealing with the problem of their subject nationalities.

It was most important, Crowe concluded, to keep alive the will to impose a firm and lasting settlement based on the principle of nationality.73 The American Withdrawal During the late summer and autumn of 1919, the British government made several futile attempts to hasten the peace treaty. In a proposal intended to appeal to the Americans, Lord Curzon suggested that the negotiations be entrusted to a conference of ambassadors chaired either by Frank Polk or John Davis, the United States ambassador at the Court of St. James.74At about the same time Viscount Edward Grey of Fallodon, a distinguished public servant and former foreign secretary, departed for Washington as a special envoy to ease the strain in Anglo-American relations, aggravated by Anglophobe oratory in the Senate.75 But Grey’s mission proved disappointing. Because of the president’s illness, he was never received in the White House. Nor would Secretary of State Lan­ sing be of much assistance, since his own inquiries about American participation in the Turkish treaty either were left unanswered or elicited the explanation that the president was not up to considering matters of 73 FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20832 end.; British Documents, IV, 912—914. 74 Balfour Papers, BM Add. MSS 49734, p. 185. See also RG 59, 763.72119/7285. 76 For correspondence relating to the Grey mission, see British Documents, V, 980-1065.

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such importance.76Convinced that the United States would neither accept the Armenian mandate nor help enforce the Eastern settlement, Grey advised the Foreign Office on November 23: “I am without any further answer respecting negotiations with Turkey and I do not see any course open to other Governments except to proceed with negotiations.”77 Grey’s message was sent four days after the Senate rejected the Ver­ sailles treaty. The defeat prompted the administration to cancel plans for Ambassador Hugh C. Wallace to act as American plenipotentiary at the peace conference after Polk and the other American delegates returned home in December.78 Lansing advised Wilson to recall the delegation immediately, since the United States had no reason to sign either the Bulgarian or the Turkish treaty if it was not a member of the League of Nations.79 In a rare response from the White House, Wilson accepted Lansing’s recommendation, but he did authorize Polk to sign the Bulgarian treaty if it was ready before the delegation left Paris.80 Wilson and Lansing hoped that the drastic recall action would create a strong backlash against those who had blocked ratification of the German treaty. On November 27 Polk was instructed to withdraw the American rep­ resentatives and to note that Ambassador Wallace was not to replace him on the Supreme Council.81 The American plenipotentiaries in Paris were disturbed by this turn of events, despite their own frequent complaints about the selfish designs of the Allied Powers and the attitude that the Turkish settlement was the “last call for spoils.”82 Polk warned that complete American withdrawal would nullify many months’ work, disillusion the Allies, and undermine American world prestige.83 On November 29, still believing that the steadying influence of the United States was vital, he forwarded to Washington a memorandum based on the assumption that the next 76 See, for example, Lansing Papers, Vol. 49, pp. 8451-8452, Lansing to Polk, pp. 84658466, Assistant Secretary of State to Grey, Nov. 17, 1919; Polk Papers, 78/97, Phillips to Polk, Nov. 17, 1919. 77 British Documents, IV, 901-902. 78 The intention to complete the peace treaties through regular diplomatic channels and to have Wallace act on behalf of the United States is discussed in Paris Peace Conference, XI, 650-652, 655, 657—660, and Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, I (Washington, 1934), 17—21. 79 RG 59, 763.721 i9/8i25a/8i26‘/2a (Paris Peace Conference, XI, 669-671). 80 RG 59, 763.72119/8127'/* (Paris Peace Conference, XI, 672). 81 Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 21—23; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 672-673. 82 See, for example, RG 59, 763.72119/5934, 867.00/967/970; Polk Papers, 73/120-121, Polk to Davis, Oct. 19, Nov. 5, 15, 1919, 78/12—13, Polk to Lansing, July 31, Aug. 12, Oct. 27, 1919, 78/69, Polk to Bristol, Oct. 14, 1919, 78/97, Polk to Phillips, Oct. 20, 1919. 83 RG 59, 763.72119/8061/8074/81250/8133; Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 25; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 680, 684—685.

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session of Congress would adopt a compromise resolution of ratification and enable America to join the League of Nations and help keep the peace in the Near East. As an Armenian mandate now seemed unlikely, it was essential to provide an international guarantee for the Armenians and to reconcile them with the Kurds. The recommendation was not based on humanitarian considerations alone: The altruistic reasons for American intervention in Turkish affairs are well known. For those to whom altruism carries no conviction two arguments based on selfishness may suffice: first, the argument of National Safety; secondly, that of Protection of our National Interests. (1) In the interest of peace we ought not to permit a patchwork division of Turkey, based on the spoils system and callous to local sentiment, such as will certainly be made if America holds aloof. No Power except the United States can prevent the carrying into effect of those notorious “secret” agreements, which would lead certainly to war and probably to another world-war. We ought therefore to join in the Turkish Treaty, and refuse to permit such a settlement even if the refusal costs us money and trouble. (2) If the United States takes no part, or an apathetic part, in the settlement in the Near East, its material interests must suffer incalculably. Commercial opportu­ nities in Turkey, as well as in the Ottoman territories placed under mandates, will be lost to the United States if it keeps aloof. The only way to maintain in Turkey our traditional trade policy of the “open door” is to be on the spot and hold the door open.84

Neither Polk’s frantic efforts nor last-minute appeals by the European governments reversed the instructions to withdraw.85 The delegation did continue its work for a few more days, however, thereby enabling Polk to sign the Bulgarian treaty. Then, on December 8, Lansing cabled that the president had consented to allow Ambassador Wallace to sit on the Supreme Council but only as an observer,86 a point emphasized in Lansing’s directive to Wallace: “I desire, in this connection, that you take no action and express no opinion on any subjects discussed by that body but that you report the proceedings to the Department and await instructions on any point on which an expression of the views of this Government is desired.”87 As the Americans prepared to leave Paris, Henry White wrote Elihu Root: “I have under, rather than over, stated the dismay caused to the French Government by our departure, and it is 84 Bliss Papers, Box 243, File 809. 86 For examples, showing the attitude of the European governments, see British Documents, V, 1052—1053; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 673—674, 680—689, 691-692; Foreign Relations, 1919, I, 26; RG 59, 763.72119/8074/82 i6 l/>; Polk Papers, 73/121, Polk to Davis, Dec. 8, 1919. 86 RG 59, 763.72119/81790; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 694—697. See also Polk Papers, 89/125, White House to Ammission, Dec. 2, 1919. 87 RG 59, 763.72119/81790 (Paris Peace Conference, XI, 697-698). See also Paris Peace Conference, IX, 559; British Documents, II, 532.

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hardly less to the British also. They both feel, now, that we’re not likely to take part in the Turkish Treaty, which they dread negotiating with each other . . . without our cooperation as mediators, if not as prospective holders of mandates, which . . . is practically out of the question now.”88 In a private conversation with Polk, Lloyd George voiced his concern and said that he had to presume America would not take a mandate, the only viable solution to the Armenian problem. Still, he hoped the United States would join in the Turkish treaty, to be negotiated in London as soon as possible.89 When the American Commission to Negotiate Peace closed its offices on December 9, however, no clarification had arrived from Washington. Armenophile Oratory The action of the American Senate left the European governments little choice but to accept Lord Grey’s advice to proceed with the Turkish settlement. Curzon had been trying for months to hasten the negotiations, and a state visit of French President Raymond Poincaré and Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon from November 11 to 14 helped the cause. Pichon expressed his government’s belief that, in regard to the Eastern settlement, “there remained only two parties whose interests had seriously to be considered and reconciled.” Curzon agreed in principle, but com­ plained that if the delay continued much longer there might be no one to receive the treaty: “It was even conceivable that the defeated Turkey, who would then be one of the few parties on the scene with a serious force available, would declare war on the Allies, and dare them to enforce their terms . . . And the ignominious result might be that the weakest and most abject of our foes would end up by achieving the greatest triumph.” Recommending that the settlement be negotiated in London, Curzon believed the treaty could be in hand by mid-January. Poincaré and Pichon, though cool to the suggested location, hinted that Clemenceau and other officials might meet in London for preliminary consultations only.90 When the French leaders returned home, a Parisian paper reported, in perhaps an official news leak, that the two countries had agreed to work harmoniously: “Their policy remains directed toward freeing from Turk88 Root Papers, Box 137, White to Root, Dec. 5, 1919. 89 Paris Peace Conference, XI, 675-676. See also Cab 23/18, Cabinet Conclusions (19), 2(App. Ill), Nov. 5, 1919. 90 FO 371/4239, 151671/151671/44 (British Documents, IV, 878-881); FO 608/117, 385/3/3/ 20932; FO 406/41, no. 152; Polk Papers, 73/121, Davis to Polk, Nov. 11, 1919; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 19/9-/925 (London, [1937]), p. 111. For reports on Presi­ dent Poincaré’s official activities in England, see Journal officiel de la République française, 51st yr. (Nov. 12-15, 1919), 12731-12734, 12784-12786, 12829, 12878—12883.

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ish domination the non-Turkish regions and the effective protection of nationalities which, like the Armenians, are distributed over several Turk­ ish vilayets without its being possible to speak of an Armenian country so-called.”91 Armenian representatives read this passage as alarming evidence that another Allied retreat was imminent. They knew that French financial, commercial, and shipping interests, having suffered huge losses in Russia and fearing that the splintering of Turkey would add to them, opposed drastic partition of the Ottoman Empire.92 In London, Avetis Aharonian asked the Foreign Office to clarify the French news story, while in Paris Boghos Nubar and Hamazasp Ohandjanian of the Armenian republic’s delegation wrote the president of the peace conference: “We refuse to believe that these lines convey the thought of the Allied Governments. The Heads of the Allied and Associated Governments have declared on many reprises [occasions], during the course of the war, that one of the goals of the great battle was to free Armenia from the Turkish yoke.”93'On November 21 the Foreign Office assured Aharonian that the statement was not “inspired by His Majesty’s Government” and did not represent its view.94*The terseness of the demurrer and the appearance of more ambiguous comments in the French press left the Armenian spokesmen uneasy. On December 1 Nubar and Aharonian appealed to Lloyd George and then submitted another memorandum on Armenia’s right to freedom and independence.96 In a brief interview Lord Curzon bluntly told Nubar there was now little hope for an American mandate or for the inclusion of Cilicia in Armenia. He regretted that the Mudros Armistice had not authorized the immediate military occupation of the Armenian provinces but maintained that Armenia would still be made viable by unifying the Erevan republic and the three eastern vilayets of Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum.96 91 FO 371/3660, 153366/512/58. 92 For the French point ofview, see L*Asiefrançaise, i8thyr. (Feb./July 1919), 179-183, 20th yr. (Feb. 1920), 59-60, and (June 1920), 172-175. See also British Documents, IV, 309-310; Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 1273-1274; Sahakian, op. cit., pp. 58-61; James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia (Kent, O., 1967), pp. 98-99, 203. 93 FO 371/3660, 153366/159593/512/58; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 140/39, Aharonian’s account of interview with J. A. C. Tilley, Nov. 14, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 7:4, 1920; RG 256, 185.5136/62. 94 FO 371/3660,153366/512/58; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 59, Nov. 29, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 9:3, 1920. 96 FO 371/3660, 161397/162907/512/58; FO 371/4952, E553/134/58 end.; FO 608/78, 342/ 1/1/21181; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, Memorandum, Dec. 11, 1919. 96 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 59, Nov. 29, 1919; Avetis Aharonian, Sardarapatits minchev Sevr ev Lozan (Boston, 1943)» pp. 31—32.

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Around the world, meanwhile, Armenophiles continued to demand justice. A host of French academicians, scientists, artists, and statesmen denounced those who would betray the spirit of the French Revolution for selfish financial and economic motives and vilified Pierre Loti and the few other outspoken defenders of the Turks. Historians and orientalists glori­ fied Armenia’s past contributions to civilization and welcomed the oppor­ tunity to restore an ancient people to the family of nations. On the initiative of Antoine Meillet and Frédéric Macler, the Société des Etudes Arméniennes was organized, not only to advance Armenian studies, but also to propagate the Armenian cause. Scholarhip, humanitarianism, and political action became inseparable for Armenophile intellectuals: “Dans la période critique—et décisive—que traverse la nation arménienne, il importe de mettre en évidence une langue, une histoire, un art, une littérature, dont l’originalité atteste le droit qui’ils ont de vivre et de se développer. En contribuant à fonder une Société des Etudes Ar­ méniennes, on aidera à bien établir les titres de la nation arménienne.”97 In England, the ministries were badgered by pro-Armenian petitions and memorials, and Lloyd George’s cabinet was often embarrassed by the pointed inquiries made in Parliament. Aneurin Williams, T. P. O’Conner, G. P. Gooch, James Bryce, and other members of the British-Armenia Committee were not satisfied by the government’s explanation that open discussion of sensitive foreign policy matters would not be in the national interest. Although Lloyd George declared on November 8 that the Allies would honor their pledge to deliver the Armenians from Turkish misgovernment, his critics continued to pose parliamentary questions about the threat of new massacres, the plight of the survivors in Anatolia, and the measures being taken to save the remnants of “this Allied nation.”98 Similar queries came from the British-Armenian Chamber of Commerce, the Baptist Union of Britain and Ireland, the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches, and the governments of Belgium, Brazil, 97 Bulletin Arménien, no. 12 (Dec. 30, 1919), 6-7; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421/1. The prominent Armenophiles included Paul Deschanel, Paul Painlevé, Denys Cochin, Gustave Schlumberger, Auguste Gauvain, Camille Mauclair, Gaston Deschamps, Gabriel Mourey, L’abbé Delarue, Charles Guernier, Paul Desfeuilles, Ferdinand Buisson, Albert Thomas, Pierre Renaudel, Ludovic de Contenson, Paul Fleurot, Louis Ripault, and Emile Pignot. 98 See, for example, Parliamentrary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, CXX, cols. 669, 1163, 1312, CXXI, cols. 604-605, 751, 1133; FO 371/3660, 147502/149111/149639/149653/ 1532^5/ 155° 9°/5 12/5®- $ee Lloyd George’s Guildhall speech, London Timesy Nov. 10:9, 1919. His comments on the Turkish settlement began: “Then there is Turkey—always troublesome in peace and war—and more troublesome in peace than in war. I think I can venture to say that there is complete agreement among the Allies on the fundamental principles of a settlement with Turkey. First of all, we are all agreed that the Turkish misgovernment in lands populated by Greeks, by Arabs and by Armenians shall come to an end.”

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Canada, and Switzerland." The most annoying protests were those of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, which would accept no retreat from the goal of Armenia from sea to sea. The sentiment of the Foreign Office was aptly expressed in a minute scrawled on one such appeal: “The Americans, who refused the mandate for Armenia, now demand the creation and immediate recognition of an Armenia including Cilicia to satisfy American ‘feeling about Armenia.’ As I suppose we can’t invite them to come over and create it themselvës we had better tel[egraph] simple acknowledgement with thanks of Gerard’s cable.”99100 Not to be silenced, Gerard gave the British notice that both Republican and Democratic leaders were committed to a united, integral Armenia: “I must frankly say if any adverse decision is rendered by Britain and France we earnestly mean to fight it.”101 While officials in the Foreign Office and other departments might privately ridicule the Americans, the government could not ignore the frequent complaints in Parliament. In December, members of both houses strongly criticized the cabinet for its secrecy in foreign affairs and its failure to impose a treaty of peace in the Near East. The Archbishop of Canterbury reminded his peers in the House of Lords of the government’s promise that all Turkish rule would cease in Armenia because the Turkish authorities had not only participated in but actually perpetrated the Ar­ menian atrocities according to a “deliberate plan and scheme”; the crime was an “outrage on civilisation without historical parallel.” The fulfillment of Lloyd George’s pledge to remove Armenia from the “blasting tyranny of the Turks” and to guarantee the Armenian people a separate national existence was “a matter of vital importance to the honour of humanity and the good faith and well-being of the world.”102 Such fervent oratory brought Curzon himself to the House of Lords to review Britain’s record in the Near East. Despite the Turkish empire’s “long career of bloodshed, atrocity, and crime,” there was some cause for optimism. The massacres expected on the heels of British withdrawal from the Caucasus had not materialized, and Armenians in many areas were now armed: “I hope myself that the worst is over, and that there are here the germs of a State which will retain an independent existence in the future with clearly-defined boundaries, and able to live in peace and amity with its neighbours.” Curzon reaffirmed his government’s wartime pledges: “By those declarations we stand. They do not express the senti99 FO 371/3660, 150240/156411/160039/165226/166111/172802/174174/512/58. 100/tod., 164581/512/58; FO 371/3666, 164662/1015/58 end. 101 FO 371/3660, 167264/512/58. 102Pari. Deb., 5th ser., House of Lords, XXXVIII, cols. 279-288.

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ments, the aspirations, or the intentions of ourselves alone. They are shared by all our Allies.”103Lord Bryce used the occasion to restate the case for including the six eastern vilayets and Cilicia in Armenia and for liberating “all the regions which historically belong to the Armenian part of Western Asia.”104 Because of growing dissension in his coalition cabinet and his need to campaign personally for a military appropriations bill, Lloyd George also paid more attention to Parliament. On December 15 he told the Commons that Britain would proceed quickly with the Turkish settlement, and three days later he promised to fulfill the pledge to remove the Christian com­ munities from “the yoke of a Power that has periodically butchered and plundered them.”105 Former Assistant Foreign Secretary Robert Cecil, now a critic of the government, reminded Lloyd George: “We cannot have in any way the old device of Turkish government for Armenia with certain guarantees, or anything of that kind. That will not meet the present situation. We must get rid of Turkish government over other races once and for all. I trust that which up to very recently was the policy of the Government is still the policy of the Government.” Somewhat impatiently, Lloyd George blamed the Americans for the treaty’s delay and denied that the Allies could have detached the territories to be liberated from Turkish rule and then settled their final status at a later date. A direct relationship existed between the potential role of the United States in the Near East and the amount of territory to be separated from the Ottoman Empire. But the Allies had waited long enough for the American decision. “Therefore we consider now, without any disrespect to our colleagues at the Peace Conference, and without in the least wishing to deprive the United States of America from sharing the honour of the guardianship over these Christian communities, that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with Turkey.. . . As far as the Government is concerned, we shall enter into the Conference with a view to doing all in our power to enforce the pledges we gave to the House of Commons and to the country during the progress of the War.”106 Preliminary Consultations On December 11, two days after the Americans had left Paris, Clemenceau arrived in London for consultations on various issues, including the Rus­ sian and Near Eastern problems. He went immediately to 10 Downing 103 Ibid., cols. 10i Ibid., cols. m Pari. Deb., 106Ibid., cols.

288—294. 294-300. H.C., CXIII, cols. 27, 36, 676. 730-731.

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Street where he told Lloyd George that the new arrangement in Syria and Cilicia was satisfactory, that the Greek and Italian armed forces should leave Asia Minor, and that the sultan should be allowed to remain in Constantinople under joint Anglo-French supervision. Armenia was not discussed because, according to Lloyd George, Clemenceau “was not dis­ posed to worry about the wretched Armenians any further.”107 In the formal sessions, which began that afternoon and lasted through December 13, Clemenceau proposed that the mandate system not be applied to Asia Minor, which was to be left unpartitioned. The Italians could be compensated with economic concessions, and the Greeks, with the award of all Thrace, including Adrianople, and with local autonomy in the Smyrna district. The Straits should be internationalized, but the sultan could stay in Constantinople under Allied supervision. Clemenceau did not press the issue, however, when Lloyd George and Curzon argued for removing the Turkish government to Brusa (Bursa) or another Anatolian city, conceding the validity of combining the Straits and Con­ stantinople into an international zone. The prime objective was to elimi­ nate Anglo-French friction in the region. Thus it was decided that Curzon and Philippe J. L. Berthelot of the French foreign ministry should prepare alternative drafts of the Turkish treaty for consideration.108 As in his private talk with Lloyd George, Clemenceau tried to dodge the Armenian question. With the French occupying Cilicia and with GeorgesPicot extending feelers to Mustafa Kemal, the erstwhile champion of Armenia now complained that “the Armenians were a dangerous people to get mixed up with,” particularly as they required a great deal of money and gave very little satisfaction. They could have a republic or whatever else they wanted but should not expect France to make any expenditures for this purpose. When Curzon objected that adequate controls would be needed to prevent the Turks from again “sweeping through Armenia massacring the population,” Clemenceau replied that Turkey’s financial dependence on Europe would serve as an effective deterrent.109 107 Cab 23/35, Secret S-5, Dec. 11, 1919. 100British Documents, II, 727-734; Cab 23/18, Cab. Concl.(i9), 13(2 and App.), Dec. 12, 1919, 14(3 and App. I), Dec. 15, 1919. For a résumé of the discussions, see Helmreich, op. cit., pp. 179-205. The American and Italian ambassadors in London attended those sessions dealing with issues affecting their governments and the future of the peace conference. See Paris Peace Conference, IX, 841-858. See also UAsie française, 20th yr. (Jan. 1920), 6-10, 31. 109British Documents, II, 734. Boghos Nubar reported to his colleagues that Clemenceau was very angry with the Armenians for their reliance on other powers and reluctance to bring their claims into line with French designs in the Near East. Clemenceau had assertedly declared, “Nous en avons assez des Arméniens.” See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 64, Dec. 19, 1919.

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On December 12 Berthelot submitted to Curzon the French outline for peace. It stressed that in view of the American retrenchment Britain and France should reach agreement as soon as possible. Turkish militarism, like Prussian militarism, should be crushed, the Straits neutralized under an international administration, and the Armenian and Arab populations emancipated from Turkish domination. No mandates or particular spheres of influence should exist in Asia Minor and, although economic and cultural reasons could justify keeping the sultan in Constantinople, Premier Clemenceau in the spirit of compromise was willing to yield to the British position. There were convincing moral and historic grounds to evict the Turkish administration from Europe and to place the remaining Anatolian Turkish state of some 500,000 square kilometers under interna­ tional financial and judicial controls. To prevent the partition of Asia Minor, the Italians would be granted certain economic concessions, and the Greeks would receive territorial and political compensation in Europe. Although unable to relinquish the Taurus passes and forts, which were vital for the defense of Syria, France would make provisions for Turkish cultural autonomy in Cilicia and might even allow the sultan to retain nominal sovereignty there. Armenia, the memorandum continued, differed topographically and ethnographically from Asia Minor and should be separated from Turkey. In that mountainous plateau region the Indo-European race, represented mainly by Christian Armenians and Muslim Kurds, had persevered. After the Turkish attempts to annihilate the Armenians, it was the Allied con­ sensus that an independent Armenia should be reconstituted. Yet the Armenians, despite their antiquity, high civilization, and intelligence, lacked political cadres and, like the Jews, were broadly dispersed. To grant their wish for a state from sea to sea would disadvantage them, for they had been a minority in that great expanse even before the two decades of massacres beginning in 1895. Instead, the new country should be formed by combining Russian Armenia, including Borchalu, Mountainous Karabagh, and Zangezur, with part of Turkish Armenia—the basin of Lake Van, the plains of Bitlis and Mush, and the eastern sector but not the city of Erzerum. Rail connections with Batum, Constantinople, and Cilicia would give access to the sea. Even so modest an undertaking would not be easy, for half of the proposed state was still just a “theoretical concep­ tion.” Whereas more than two-thirds of the 1,500,000 Armenians in the Caucasus were now concentrated near Mount Ararat in the Armenian republic, the Turkish Armenian provinces had been depopulated and devastated. An Allied force of about 20,000 men would be needed to

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maintain order and assist in repatriating some 400,000 Armenians from Asia Minor, the Arab provinces, and abroad.110 Robert Vansittart and Eric Forbes Adam prepared the Foreign Office’s commentary on the memorandum. They took issue with the French proposals on a number of administrative, financial, and economic matters and showed some sympathy for Greek claims to Smyrna and the sur­ rounding Ionian coast. They were gratified that the French had accepted the British position on Constantinople and the Straits, and Britain in turn would probably accept French supervision in Cilicia. Admitting that an Armenia from sea to sea was no longer feasible, the pair rebutted the French arguments for a small Armenia with counterarguments that Berthelot’s population statistics were inaccurate and that the Muslim popula­ tion of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Kharput, and Diarbekir had likewise been decimated by invasions, famine, and epidemics. There were sound ethno­ graphic and strategic reasons to award at least the fortress city of Erzerum to Armenia. Agreeing that Trebizorrd should not be attached to the new country, Vansittart and Forbes Adam recommended that Batum be made an international port or a free state under the League of Nations, with freedom of transit guaranteed to Armenia. They, like Berthelot, believed that Georgia and Azerbaijan should not be allowed to annex the eastern rim of the Armenian plateau: “The Armenian population, which is to form the new State, is too small for us to disregard any possibility of including territory essentially inhabited by Armenians in its frontiers.”111 When the Anglo-French discussions resumed on December 22, Berthe­ lot and Curzon reached general agreement on the boundaries of the Constantinopolitan state, the demilitarization of the Straits and the south­ ern littoral of the Sea of Marmara, the gradual transfer of the Turkish government to Konia or Brusa, the disbanding of the Turkish regular armed forces, and a number of financial and commercial issues. Berthelot admitted to Curzon and Vansittart that France hoped to obtain Cilicia under a formula acknowledging the nominal suzerainty of the sultan, but this did not preclude offering a home and protection to all Armenians who settled there. He also defended the French bid for a sphere of influence extending to Diarbekir and the Arghana-Maden mines in the Taurus Mountains, a region whose largely Kurdish population should not be subject to Armenian rule. Berthelot suggested a federated state under the sultan’s quasi authority and Anglo-French supervision, but Curzon re­ jected the proposal on the grounds that the Kurds would first have to 110British Documents, IV, 942—956; FO 371/4239, 167432/151671/44. 1» Ibid.

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reach a modus vivendi with the Assyrians and Armenians and show what they could achieve when free of Turkish interference. Berthelot now made no serious objection to the award of the city of Erzerum to the Republic of Armenia and agreed that Batum should serve as the international port for all states in the region. As to military as­ sistance to Armenia, he submitted a report from Colonel Chardigny, former chief of the French mission at Tiflis, showing that 20,000 men in twelve detachments would be required to protect the Armenians during the formative period. Three of the detachments should be stationed in the Russian Armenian districts of Nakhichevan-Zangezur, Ararat—Igdir, and Kars, and the remainder, in the Turkish Armenian districts of Bayazit, Van, Bergrikala, Alashkert, Meliazgerd (Malazkert), Bitlis, Mush, Khnus, and Khorasan. Curzon thought that 5,000 to 10,000 European soldiers would be adequate, since “the Armenian troops were capable fighters and as fierce as the Turks.” Moreover, large sums would probably be received in support of efforts to establish the new state. In drafting the Turkish settlement the Allies would, of course, have to consider military problems, as it would be disastrous to dictate terms that could not be enforced.112 The conference, which also covered Arab matters, the Caucasus, and economic questions, adjourned on December 23. The British foreign secretary, who yearned for the end of Turkish rule in Europe, was pleased with the discussion as well as with Lloyd George’s announcement that Premier Nitti was prepared to come to London immediately after Christ­ mas to confer on the Eastern settlement and then proceed with the prime minister to Paris for a final agreement. It seemed at long last that the treaty was within grasp.113 The Kurdish Question The Allied retreat from the goal of a large Armenian state brought the Kurdish question into sharper focus. During the first months of the peace conference, scant attention was given Kurdish affairs. Although most Kurds seemed to share antipathy toward Arabs, resentment of Turks, and distrust of Armenians, they were divided into hundreds of rival clans and tribes and had developed only a primitive sense of national consciousness. In eastern Anatolia the Kurdish element predominated on both sides of the Taurus Mountains and in the strategic reaches where Persia and the Russian and Turkish empires met. Because of the Armenian tragedy, 112 British Documents, IV, 602-603, 938-969; Cab 24/95, C.P. 375; FO 371/4239, 166415/ 151671/44; Archives de TArmée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, 44 bis. 113 Cab 23/18, Cab. Concl.(i9), 18(5), Dec. 23, 1919.

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it was likely that the Kurds had become an absolute majority in the prov­ inces of Diarbekir, Van, Bitlis, and Kharput. The claims of Kurdish nota­ bles in Constantinople, Cairo, and Paris that their people had a right to a separate existence in a large area encompassing much of Iran, Mesopo­ tamia, Syria, and Anatolia as far as Cilicia and Erzerum were not taken seriously by the Allies. Kurdish national aspirations, whether real or fab­ ricated, were accorded no place in plans for Anatolia so long as an Ameri­ can mandate for Armenia seemed possible and so long as the British contemplated the control not only of the Sulemanie and Mosul areas of “southern Kurdistan” but also of the hill country to the north.114 The British, because of their occupation of Mesopotamia and concern about their Asiatic possessions, were the most involved with the Kurds, but they were unable to formulate a definite policy in 1919. Some officials favored either the creation of Kurdish dependencies on the periphery of Mesopotamia or else the establishment of a united autonomous Kurdistan, yet they failed to provide workable solutions. It was not until after the fall of Damad Ferid’s cabinet and the spread of Nationalist agitation on the one hand and the Allied revision of intent toward the Armenians on the other that the British Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs reached tentative conclusions: no direct military activity should be taken beyond southern Kurdistan; a British mandate for the whole coun­ try was impractical; the central and northern regions, although protected against Turkish aggression, should be left to their own devices. Since it was most unlikely that the frontier of Armenia would be contiguous with the British mandate in Mesopotamia, every effort should be made to prevent the territorial corridor between the two states from becoming a staging ground for Turkish Pan-Islamic intrigues in the Orient.115 The interclan rivalries among the Kurds seemed to substantiate the assertion of Colonel Arnold T. Wilson, chief political officer at Baghdad, that no Kurdish leader was competent to speak for more than a single valley or tribe.116 Although most educated Kurds had been Turkified to some degree or exiled to the cities and absorbed into the Ottoman bureaucracy, feudal notables such as the Bedrkhans in Constantinople were stirred by the prospect of a huge autonomous domain under British protection. They perceived the advantage of being treated, not as constituents of a defeated enemy nation, but as a subject people seeking emancipation from the Turks. These leaders worked cautiously, 114 Numerous documents on the Kurdish question in 1919 are in FO 371/4191-4193, File 3050/44, and in FO 608/95, File 365/1/1* See also British Documents, IV, chap. 2 passim. 116 FO 608/95, 365/1/1/20991; FO 608/273, File 75, no. 214; Busch, op. cit., pp. 181-192. 116 FO 371/5068, E3706/11/44 end.

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professing to Turkish colleagues their loyalty to the sultan-caliph even as they privately petitioned Allied representatives for autonomy or independence. The formation of an autonomous Kurdistan, they told Turkish officials, was the best way to minimize Ottoman territorial losses to the Armenians.117 As a self-appointed Kurdish spokesman, General Cherif (Sherif) Pasha persistently disputed Armenian claims. An old associate of Abdul-Hamid who had fallen from favor during the Young Turk regime, Cherif re­ mained in Europe during the war as an Allied sympathizer and in early 1919 organized the League of Ottoman Liberals in Geneva to shift the onus of blame from the Turkish people to the dictatorial Ittihadist clique. He called for a peace founded on Wilsonian principles and refuted argu­ ments intended to justify the creation of a greater Armenia.118 Unable to gain a hearing as an Ottoman liberal, Cherif soon appeared in Paris as a representative of Kurdish interests, evoking speculation that he was involved in a Turkish maneuver to raise a new racial question as a counterpoint to Armenian pretensions.119 His memoranda traced the history of the Kurds to legendary procreators, recounted the feats of national heroes, cited statistics showing the Kurds to be a majority in vast areas, and claimed in the name of Kurdistan a wide arc of territory from Cilicia to Isfahan, including nearly all of the Turkish Armenian provinces of Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Kharput and half of Erzerum. Depending on the circumstances and his audience, Cherif, like his compatriots in Constantinople, used the terms “freedom,” “autonomy,” and “inde­ pendence” interchangeably.120 As the Allies adjusted their strategies to the disengagement of the United States, British officials impressed upon Boghos Nubar the desira­ bility of an Armeno-Kurdish declaration of solidarity in opposition to 117 See, for example, FO 608/95, 365/1/1/748/8307/9991/12468/19829, File 365/1/3 passim, 365/1/5/15978; FO 371/3657—3658, 11446/68105/512/58; British Documents, IV, 695—696, 742-743; RG 59, 763.72119/4762. 118 FO 608/110, 385/1/8/1164/1269/5968; Wilson Papers, Series 5-D, Cherif to Wilson, Dec. 23* 1918, Feb. 3, 1919; White Papers, Box 46, Armenia file; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 9-10, April 27, 29, 1919. 119 RG 256, 867B.00/117; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 421, no. 35, May 9, 1919. The American vice-consul in Geneva reported that “the apparent abandonment by Cherif Pasha of his affiliation with the Turkish interests is only a thin disguise of his real activities in their behalf.” The Kurds, he said, had previously shown no desire for national recognition and were among the most contented people in the Ottoman Empire—for a good reason. Cherif merely intended to use the Kurdish question in Paris to create difficulties for the Armenians to the ultimate advantage of the Turks. See RG 256, 183.9/Turkey 3. 120 FO 608/95, 365/1/1/2854/7996/10564/10837/16585/18506/19466/20691; RG 256, 867B.00/230; Bliss Papers, Box 254, File 882, Kurdistan; Nor Ashkhatavor, July 24:2, 30:1, 1919, L ’Asie française, 18th yr. (Feb./July 1919), 192-193.

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renewed Turkish rule.121 The division of eastern Anatolia into Armenian and Kurdish spheres would facilitate a peace settlement and reduce the opportunities for Turkish intrigue. Considering the Armenian case to be in jeopardy, Nubar negotiated an accord with Cherif, leaving the boundary question for later resolution. Cherif, gratified by elevation of the Kurdish issue to equal status with the long-recognized Armenian question, introduced enough ambiguity into the text to cover any future change in strategy. Signed by Nubar and Cherif on November 20, 1919, and subscribed to by Hamazasp Ohandjanian on behalf of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, the document reads as follows: We, the undersigned, representing the Armenian and Kurdish nations, have the honor to inform the Conference of Peace that our two nations, both of them Aryan, have the same interests and pursue a common goal, namely their liberation and independence and, especially for the Armenians, their emancipation from the cruel domination of the Turkish governments, and, in general, for the Armenians as well as the Kurds, their deliverance from the yoke of the Committee o f Union and Progress, whose official and occult government has been as disastrous for the one as for the other. We are thus in complete harmony in jointly petitioning the Conference of Peace for the creation of a united, independent Armenia and an independent Kurdistan, according to the principle of nationalities, and for the assistance of a Great Power, designated, after having heard the desires of our respective nations, to lend our countries its technical and economic aid during the period of reconstruction. In matters concerning the allocation of contested territories, indicated in our respective memoranda to the Conference of Peace, and the exact delimitation of the frontiers of the two future states, we formally declare that we submit entirely to the decisions of the Conference of Peace, persuaded in advance that its ruling will be determined on the basis of right and justice. We confirm, moreover, our complete agreement to respect the legitimate rights of the minorities in the two states.122 121 The India Office in particular was concerned about the Kurdish question and the inclusion of a large Kurdish population in the proposed Armenian state. In August 1919 Assistant Secretary Sir Arthur Hirtzel wrote that “the Armenian question is the Kurdish question, and it is crying for the formulation of a definite policy.” As it was dear that the Kurds would not submit to Armenian dominion, there should be a separate Kurdistan in which the Armenian element might be granted disproportionate representation because of their losses by massacre and their educational advancement. “They would kick, of course, because it would postpone, perhaps sine die the greater Armenian State. But it would be up to them to show, in fair competition with the Kurds, that they were the superior race. If they showed it, no one could resist their claim to coalesce with Lesser Armenia into a single Armenian State. If they failed, they could not resist the Kurdish claim to a Kurdish state.” FO 608/95, 365/1/1/19025. See also Busch, op. cit., pp. 187—189: Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, no. 964, File 1408/28, H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, 1920. 122 FO 608/95, 365/1/1/20747. See also FO 371/4193, 157141/163719/3050/44A; British Documents, IV, 928; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos.

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The first reactions to news of the accord were favorable. Patriarch Zaven told a member of the British High Commission that the Kurds, although incited to plunder and massacre since the reign of AbdulHamid, would, if left to themselves, again live in peace and harmony with the Armenians.123 Newspapers editorialized on the natural bonds be­ tween the two peoples, and an Armenian-Kurdish society was organized to promote the reconciliation. Sayyid Abdul-Kadir and several of the Bedrkhan separatists in Constantinople also expressed satisfaction, par­ ticularly because the agreement was the first public Armenian acknowl­ edgment of Kurdish rights.124 And High Commissioner de Robeck wrote enthusiastically that if the accord proved solid it would be “of happiest augury.”125 Nevertheless, Cherif and Nubar were subjected to scathing criticism as soon as the verbatim text was released and the implications became clear. Admiral Webb and Foreign Office officials questioned the authority of Cherif Pasha, who was merely an individual of Kurdish descent and entirely out of touch with conditions in his homeland.126 He was also accused of duplicity because he had written the Kurdish Club in Con­ stantinople that his primary aim was to prevent the formation of a large Armenian state. A united, autonomous Kurdistan under Turkish sovereignty would certainly be preferable to the partition of Kurdish-inhabited lands. Through intermediaries Cherif let it be known in the Turkish press that he had been motivated by a strong sense of Ottoman loyalty. He had gone to Paris as a Kurdish delegate since he could not have defended Ottoman interests as a Turkish spokesman. By raising the Kurdish question, he had neutralized Armenian claims and had forced Boghos Nubar into a major concession. The Kurds were deserving of administrative autonomy, but they would willingly remain in a political union with Turkey. In Constantinople, meanwhile, the Kurdish Club was torn by dissension, as the old bureaucrats and Pan-Islamists, accusing the separatists of going too far, reaffirmed their loyalty to the sultan-caliph. Even Abdul-Kadir, an advocate of full autonomy, retreated 55-57, Nov. 14, 18, 2i, 1919. On the day of the agreement, Nubar wrote Cherif to affirm that the two sides were pledged to cease issuing statements offensive to each other, to submit territorial questions to the peace conference for arbitration, and to conduct themselves in a spirit of “reconciliation, amity, and loyalty.” See FO 371/4193, 163719/3050/44A end. 123 FO 371/4193, 165708/3050/44A; FO 406/41, no. 197. 124British Documents, IV, 925-927; FO 371/4193, 163719/3050/44A; Erkir, Dec. 31:1,1919, Jan. 2:1, 3:2, 8:1, 1920. 126British Documents, IV, 928m 126Ibid. See also Vansittart’s critical comment in FO 608/95, 365/1/1/20747.

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in the absence of strong British support. Disclaiming any hostility toward the Turks, he declared that a self-governing Kurdistan would opt to remain within the “one fold of Ottomanism.”127 Publication of the Cherif-Nubar accord rocked the Armenian commu­ nities. Garegin Pasdermadjian, the Armenian republic’s envoy in Wash­ ington, resigned from the Armenian National Delegation, charging Nubar with gross negligence and flagrant violation of his prerogatives. “The smell of the Sublime Porte” was in that “cursed paper,” which imperiled three-fourths of Turkish Armenia; it petitioned for deliverance only from Young Turk oppression rather than from any and all forms of Turkish rule. Obviously Cherif was scheming to keep most of Armenia bound to Turkey under the guise of so-called Kurdistan.128 The Dashnakist and Hnchakist press attacked Nubar for incompetence in dealing with the French regarding Cilicia and now in linking the Armenian provinces to Kurdistan. It was surprising that a member of the Armenian republic’s delegation had signed the agreement, and he would undoubtedly be called to account, but this action did not detract from the guilt of Nubar Pasha, the principal author. Cherif’s previous claims to four Armenian vilayets had elicited no response from the Allies, yet “with one stroke of the pen” Nubar had voided the Armenian case submitted to the peace conference in February. The fact that Britain had found it necessary to pressure Nubar into the agreement was in itself proof of the strength of the Armenian case against the demands of Cherif. “Even admitting that we could do nothing to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state and still more that such a state on our southern flank would be desirable, you had no right to hand over any of our territory to that diplomacy, which however cynical toward us is nonetheless reluctant to deal at will with the six vilayets known by the name of Armenia.” The scandalous situation was only the most recent example of Boghos Nubar Pasha’s ineptitude.129 In a public statement of justification, Nubar explained that he had on the advice of Allied officials initiated an agreement that had drawn the Kurds into an open demand for independence from Turkey. The success127 FO 371/5067—5068, Ei 776/2786/4396/5063/11/44; Hairenik, April 6:1,1920. See also FO 371/4161, 163857/521/44. 128 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 71, 75, Jan. 10, 20, 1920; Hairenik, Jan. 17:1, 1920. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1408/28, Pasder­ madjian to comrades, Jan. 21, 1920. 129 See esp. Hairenik and Eritasard Hayastan, Jan.-Feb. 1920. For rebuttals in defense of Boghos Nubar and in criticism of Pasdermadjian and other detractors, see, for example, KochnakHayastani, XX (Jan. 24, 31, Feb. 14, 2 i; March 6, 1920), 100-103, 143-144, 198—202, 230, 306-308.

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ful strategy protected Armenian interests and left the Kurdish issue in abeyance pending a solution by the peace conference.130 Recalled to Erevan shortly after publication of the accord, Ohandjanian spoke of two immediate positive results: a formal Kurdish declaration of separation from the Turks, who therefore could no longer pretend to speak on behalf of all the Muslims in Anatolia, and Kurdish recognition of Armenia’s right to exist as an independent state. Furthermore, the passage about emancipation from Young Turk oppression, which Cherif insisted on for personal reasons, did not imply that either the Kurds or the Armenians would submit to another form of Turkish government. Both sides demanded absolute independence, leaving it to the Supreme Council to regulate the permanent boundaries.131 The Delegation of Integral Armenia also appealed for an end to the divisive debates in the Armenian press, but the continued Allied delay in drawing Armenia’s frontiers kept the issue alive well into 1920.132 From the vantage point of the Allies, Armenian or Kurdish aspirations were subordinate to broader political, military, and economic factors. The British still wanted to exclude the French from the eastern Taurus region, yet they were themselves forced to disavow a supervisory role in northern Kurdistan. The India Office ultimately concluded that nominal Turkish authority would be better than anarchy on the frontier of Mesopotamia, but the Foreign Office continued to oppose the extension of a dangerous “Turkish tongue” between Armenia, Iraq, and Persia. Lord Curzon ex­ plained to High Commissioner de Robeck: “The policy at which we are aiming in the Peace Treaty, as far as it has gone, with regard to Kurdistan is neither a single protectorate for England or France, nor a divided protectorate, nor a group of States under European protection, but an autonomous Kurdistan, severed from Turkey, and not even under Turk­ ish suzerainty.” The feasibility of the plan still had to be tested, for “there is no good in offering a boon to people who do not want it or would be incapable of profitting by it.”133 As it happened, the Allies did not reach a final decision on the subject until the San Remo conference in April 1920. 130 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 77, appended note, Jan. 28, 1920; Hairenik, Feb. 26:1, 1920: Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Feb. 28, 1920), 276. 131 Hairenik, April 7:1, 1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (April 17, 1920), 510-511. 132 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 77, Jan. 28, 1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Feb. 28, 1920), 276. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1408/28, Aharonian to Pasdermadjian, Jan. 17, 1920, File 232/131, Aharonian to Khatisian, no. 964, Dec. 10, 1919. 133 FO 371/5067, E1776/11/44. See also FO 371/5068, E3706/11/44.

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The British Reversal By the end of 1919 Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian had been forced to make substantial compromises, including acceptance of French domin­ ion in Cilicia and acknowledgment of Kurdish rights to a national state, which might infringe on territory claimed by the Armenians. It was doubt­ ful, moreover, whether Armenia would be awarded the Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir vilayets, constituting half of Turkish Armenia. Realizing that the British would play a major role in shaping the peace treaty, Aharonian spent the last days of the year in London, reviewing Armenian claims and Allied pledges and underscoring a passage from the Supreme Council’s response to the Turkish delegation in June: “The experiment has been repeated too often and for too long a period for any doubt to exist of the incapacity of the Turks to govern foreign races.” The Armeni­ ans had frequently been promised liberation, but the French press now occasionally used the term “protection” instead. If this tendency reflected a shift in Allied strategy, Europe would again be opting for the policy of reform, which had been proven ineffective by the painful experiences of the past forty years. It was inconceivable that the Allies should emancipate Muslim Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia while leaving only Christian Ar­ menia under the Turkish yoke. An independent Armenia, Aharonian argued, would form a natural barrier to Pan-Turkic, Pan-Islamic, and Bolshevik intrigues. It would have a Christian majority from the outset or as soon as the deportees and exiles had repatriated and joined the two million Armenians in the Caucasus.134 Handing a memorandum to Assistant Foreign Secretary J. A. C. Tilley on New Year’s Day, Aharonian requested a meeting with Curzon to make the following points: if Cilicia became a French protectorate, it should have a common frontier with Armenia; transit privileges to a Mediter­ ranean port in Cilicia should be guaranteed; if deprived of a coastline in the south, Armenia should have an extensive Black Sea littoral; the new state should include the six Turkish Armenian vilayets; Allied military assistance was vital for the organization of the Armenian army; the moun­ tainous rampart of Karabagh was essential to defense of the Armenian republic. Tilley told Aharonian that these issues would require further Allied consultations, and Curzon, noting his familiarity with the argu­ ments, replied by letter that the peace conference would give them due consideration.135 Aharonian was also received by Philip Kerr, the prime 134 FO 371/3660, 167222/512/58; FO 371/4952, E553/134/58 end. 135 FO 371/3660, 168436/512/58. The international situation changed so drastically in 1919 because of the delay of an Eastern settlement, the shifts in Allied policies, the growth of the

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minister’s secretary, who said that, while the American withdrawal had virtually delivered Cilicia to France, Great Britain remained committed to the creation of a united Armenia. He promised to speak to Lloyd George about the Armenian appeal for military aid.136 In Winston Churchill’s office on January 8, Aharonian repeated many of his arguments, adding that the Allies seemed to forget that Armenians had shown that they were effective fighters when provided with arms and equipment. As the Bolshevik armies approached the Caucasus, it was in the interest of the Allies, especially Great Britain, to help reorganize the Armenian army and raise its troop strength to 40,000 men. Churchill, lamenting Allied abandonment of the Russian White Armies, agreed only to place the Armenian memoranda before the cabinet.137 Aharonian returned to Paris on January 9. He was cautiously optimistic, even though neither Cilicia nor the western part of Turkish Armenia would be included in the state to be defined by the peace conference. During an unusually cordial reception at the Quai d’Orsay, Philippe Ber­ thelot assured Aharonian and Nubar that the boundaries of Armenia and the French protectorate in the Taurus would be contiguous, that Turkish rule would end in Cilicia, and that the Allies had not deviated from the aim of establishing a united Armenia. He believed that the new state would include Erzerum and that a transit agreement would guarantee access to the Mediterranean.138 At the same time, it was rumored that Clemenceau had left London in mid-December with a firm conviction that the Allied Turkish Nationalist movement, and the American withdrawal that by the end of the year the Delegation of Integral Armenia was forced to consider significant revisions in the claims presented to the peace conference in February. While still adhering to those claims in prin­ ciple, the delegation agreed to lobby for two Armenian regions: an independent state encom­ passing the Russian Armenian republic and as much as Turkish Armenia as possible, and a French-sponsored autonomous district including Cilicia and parts of the Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir vilayets. While asking that all six Turkish Armenian vilayets be included in the independent state, Armenian spokesmen privately admitted that they could hope for no more than the vilayets of Van, Bidis, and Erzerum and possibly the sanjak of Kharput and the northern part of Diarbekir. In any event, the independent state and the French protectorate should be contiguous. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Ar­ menia, nos. 60-73, Dec*6, 1919-Jan. 14, 1920. The Armenians vacillated on whether to claim Trebizond as their primary outlet on the Black Sea or whether they should follow the advice of Gabriel Noradoungian to exclude Trebizond and its large non-Armenian population and instead to develop Rize or another small port in Lazistan to the east. See Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 76-82, Jan. 23-Feb. 18, 1920. 136 A. Aharonian, op. cit., pp. 34-35; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 1408/28, Aharonian report, Jan. 27, 1920. 137 A. Aharonian, op. cit., pp. 36-38. See also Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delega­ tion of Integral Armenia, no. 71, Jan. 10, 1920. 138 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 76, Jan. 23, 1920; A. Aharonian, op. cit., p. 39. See also FO 371/4952, E172/134/58.

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position wasjustified by the wartime treachery of the Turkish government and its conduct since the armistice. Unfortunately, postwar Turkish cabinets had failed to punish the Ittihadist criminals or to rectify the wrongs they had committed.139 These developments were encouraging, but it was reported, on the other hand, that the British cabinet was now becoming as conciliatory toward Turkey as France previously had been. Although the program of Curzon, Balfour, and Lloyd George to end Turkish rule at Constantinople and in the few remaining possessions in Europe had been reaffirmed during the Anglo-French discussions in December, a revolt in the British cabinet reversed that decision at the beginning of 1920. The intensity of the interdepartmental conflict was revealed in voluminous correspondence and memoranda and in sarcastic private commentaries. As traditional pro-Turkish sentiment began to reassert itself in conservative circles, the India Office and the War Office were drawn together against the Foreign Office by common concerns regarding the rapid pace of demobilization, the anticipated agitation in Ireland, Egypt, and India, the growth of the Turkish resistance move­ ment, and the unfavorable course of the Russian civil war. Alarmed over Britain’s enormous war debts and insistent on greater fiscal responsibility, the Treasury Office, too, was eager to minimize expenditures for imple­ menting the peace treaties. Under Sir Edwin S. Montagu, the India Office had persistently dis­ paraged plans to partition Asia Minor and expel the sultan from his secular and spiritual capital. Using Lloyd George’s wartime declaration that the Allies had no wish to deprive the Turks of Constantinople or their Anatolian homelands, Montagu repeatedly warned that the millions of Muslim subjects of the British Crown expected the pledge to be honored. Nor would he accept Lloyd George’s explanation that the declaration had been a peace proposal which the Turks, by their rejection, had forfeited. While admitting to the justice of an Armenian “enclave,” “zone,” “man­ date,” or even “state,” the India Office contended that a relatively lenient Turkish treaty would earn the friendship and gratitude of Muslims rather than making them “a rankling sore both within and without the Em­ pire.”140In commenting on a treaty outline prepared by the Foreign Office in August 1919, Montagu expressed dismay at the implication that all Ottoman subjects in the new Armenian state who did not elect to become Armenian citizens should dispose of their properties and depart within a stipulated period of time: “It seems to me to be a monstrous thing that 139 British Documents, IV, 1062-1063. 140 Balfour Papers, BM Add. MSS 49749, pp. 145-147, Grant to Balfour, July 7, 1919; Cab 24/95, C.P. 326. See also Busch, op. cit., pp. 97-102; Cab 23/35, Secret S-4, Dec. 10, 1919.

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who do not wish to change their nationality should be expelled from the country in which they and their fathers may have lived for generations.. . . They may surely be allowed to remain in the country and the suggestion that all Turkish subjects will have to crowd into what remains of Turkey is [to] my mind little short of scandalous.” Montagu also found it hypocritical to flaunt the principle of self-determination in assigning Arab mandates and, although a Jew himself, scorned what he regarded as a surrender to the Zionist program in Palestine.141 For the rest of the year Montagu continued to argue that, while nonTurkish areas should be separated from the Ottoman Empire and the Straits internationalized, the sultan-caliph should remain enthroned at Constantinople. That would strengthen British influence in the Near East and expedite Turkish military evacuation of Kurdistan and Armenia. French acquiescence in the Lloyd George—Curzon plan, Montagu main­ tained, was part of a clever scheme to turn Muslim world opinion against the British. The “disastrous and incredible” principles of peace accepted in the discussions between Curzon and Berthelot, he protested, disre­ garded the views of the India Office. His position paper concluded: “I do not believe that Great Britain will be found willing to indulge in a pro­ longed war in semi-tropical climates in order to enforce a peace which, reading it from end to end, I cannot see is of any advantage to us.”142 Replying on January 4, Curzon contended that the French still wanted to leave the sultan in Constantinople so as to gain favor with the Turks and manipulate the Nationalist movement to their advantage in every part of the Eastern world. This “insidious danger” had to be guarded against at all costs. The Foreign Office did not propose to deprive the Turks of sovereignty in Asia Minor but rather to prevent Greek, Italian, or other foreign encroachments by making certain that the Turk would not repeat “the outrageous misgovernment of which he has for centuries been guilty.” Curzon said that “by political upbringing and tradition” he would certainly be inclined to favor the Turks, yet he and Lord Hardinge, both of them former viceroys of India, supported by the vast majority of Eastern experts and military field officers, many of them “almost instinc­ tively pro-Turkish,” concurred that the continuation of Turkish dominion in any part of Europe would be a tragic mistake: “It is a commonplace that for well nigh four centuries the rule of the Turk has been a blight and a curse to the countries which he has misgoverned, and I know of no single Tu r k s

141 FO 6 0 8 /1 1 6 - 1 1 7 , 3 8 5 /3 /3 /1 4 4 4 5 / 1 9 9 3 4 (in c lu d in g c o u n te r a r g u m e n ts by E. G. F orb es A d am ). S e e also IO , L /P & S /1 0 /8 5 1 , p. 4 9 9 5 , M o n ta g u to C u rzo n , A u g . 28, 1919; B u sc h , op. dt -, p p . 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 . 142 C ab 2 9 /9 5 , C .P. 3 8 2 .

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good thing that the Turk has done to a single nation or community or interest in Europe. His presence at Constantinople has poisoned the at­ mosphere in Eastern Europe, everywhere spreading corruption, malad­ ministration, and ruin.. . . From there he has ordered the massacres of hundreds of thousands of his Christian subjects. Constantinople in his hands has been, and if left there will remain, a plague-spot of the Eastern world.”143 Fortunately for Montagu, by the end of 1919 Secretary of War Chur­ chill and Chief of Staff Wilson, unwilling to commit a large armed force to quell a Turkish guerrilla movement, had decided that the sultan should remain in Constantinople provided the Turks were prevented from ever again closing the Straits. On December 30 Wilson assured Montagu that he would personally try to dissuade Lloyd George from pursuing Curzon’s “reckless policy.”144 At an interdepartmental conference on January 5 Wilson warned that the collapse of Denikin’s armies had opened the Caucasus and North Persia to Bolshevik disturbances and that the unrest might spread to Afghanistan and India. While India’s defense perimeter could be established along several lines, the only possibility of holding the northernmost of these, running from Batum to Baku, was to secure the friendship of the Turks. With the sultan in Constantinople, two British divisions would provide adequate control; if he was removed to Anatolia, military supervision for the entire country would be required. Curzon, on the other hand, maintained that keeping the sultan in Constantinople would abet Pan-Islamic, Pan-Turanian, and Nationalist movements. If the British Empire ever had to face Bolshevik Russia in a military confrontation, it would be far better that the strategic city not be in Turkish hands.145 The controversy reached a climax at a cabinet meeting on January 6, when the majority of those present overturned the resolutions of the Anglo-French conferences and voted to leave the sultan in his capital on condition that no Turkish troops be stationed there and that an interna­ tional force garrison the Straits. Adequate measures would also have to be devised to safeguard foreign financial interests and “to secure the 143 British Documents, IV , 9 9 2 —1 0 00. C h u rch ill, op. cit., p. 3 9 5 , d esc rib es th e C u r zo n -M o n tagu rivalry as follow s: “In th e se co n tr o v e r sie s L ord C u rzo n , m o u n te d u p o n th e F o re ig n O ffic e , r o d e fu ll tilt a g a in st Mr. E d w in M o n ta g u , w h o se ch a rio t was d raw n by th e p u b lic o p in io n o f In d ia, th e sen sib ilities o f th e M o h a m m e d a n w o rld , th e p r o -T u r k ish p r o p e n sitie s o f th e C o n serv a tiv e Party, a n d th e v o lu m in o u s m e m o r a n d a o f th e In d ia O ffic e .” 144 C. E. C allw ell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, II (L o n d o n , [1 9 2 7 ]), 2 18. 145 C ab 2 3 /2 0 , C ab. C o n c l.(2 o ), i(A p p . I), J a n . 6 , 1920; C ab 2 3 /3 7 , n o . 18(2), J a n . 5, 1920; C h u rch ill, op. cit., p p . 3 9 5 - 3 9 6 .

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protection of Armenians and other subject races.” Infuriated by the re­ buff to himself and to the Foreign Office, which had sought to reconcile practical and moral considerations, Curzon recorded an emphatic dissent. Noting that the cabinet had disregarded the advice of the prime minister and two successive foreign secretaries, he rejected the view that the Turk­ ish government would be more docile if left in Europe.146 On January 8 Curzon accompanied Lloyd George to Paris for a meeting of the Supreme Council. Still angry, he had E. G. Forbes Adam summarize the Foreign Office’s position once again: the Turks would not interpret the cabinet’s reversal as an indication of friendship but would rightly regard it as evidence of weakness, thus compounding the difficulty of solving such matters as the formation of an independent Armenia. In forwarding the paper to London, Forbes Adam wrote: “I am afraid that there are signs to show that the French, the India Office and the War Office are between them going to have their way.. . . We are, however, still fighting hard!”147 After the British volte-face, Philippe Berthelot revised his memoran­ dum on the Eastern settlement. It had been agreed, he wrote on January it , that an independent Turkish state would exist wherever the Turks formed a majority, that Turkish militarism would be suppressed and the army and navy disbanded, that the Straits would be neutralized and inter­ nationalized, that the “interested Powers” would oversee reform of the Turkish administration, that the Arabs would not be returned to Turkish rule, and that “the Armenians will be entirely free from the Turkish domination and constituted as an independent State.” The new French plan included contingencies for either the sultan’s expulsion or his reten­ tion in Constantinople but stipulated that, if he did remain, only the city and its immediate hinterland would be left to the Turks. The restricted Ottoman Empire would extend along the Black Sea to the east of Trebizond (Lazistan being awarded to Georgia), thence southward to the east of Erzinjan and Kharput (leaving most of the Taurus region and Diarbekir to France), around the Adana vilayet to the Mediterranean, and along the Aegean coastline to the Sea of Marmara. The Turkish army would be replaced by a gendarmerie, and legal, financial, and administra­ tive reforms would be implemented under Allied supervision. The formation of independent Armenia would, according to the plan, be achieved by uniting the Russian Armenian republic, with approximate­ ly one and a half million Armenians, and the Turkish Armenian districts 146 C ab 2 3 /2 0 , C ab. C o n c l.(2 o ), i(A p p . IV ); N ic o lso n , op. cit., p p . 1 1 3 -1 1 4 ; R o n a ld sh a y , p p. 2 7 0 - 2 7 1 ; B u sc h , op. cit., p. 195; H e lm r e ic h , op. cit., p p . 2 1 5 - 2 1 9 . 147 British Documents, IV , 1 0 2 6 - 1 0 2 8 .

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of Erzerum, Mush, Bitlis, and Van, to which as many as half a million expatriates and refugees would be returned. “In this way there will by degrees be reconstituted in reasonable limits what was formerly the King­ dom of Great Armenia; . . . of all the States which are endeavouring to establish control on the Russian frontier, an independent Armenia is that which the Russians are most prepared to recognise.” The requisite Allied peace force of from 5,000 to 20,000 men could be raised through volun­ tary recruitment under the auspices of the League of Nations. Without Trebizond or Cilicia, Armenia would be deprived of a separate seaport and should therefore be guaranteed direct rail access to Batum, to be made into a free port and state like Danzig. Berthelot seemed to feel the need to repeat rationalizations for the Allied retreat: The great difficulty in establishing Armenia is that the Armenians practically nowhere constitute a majority; the great objection to attributing to them countries such as Cilicia, where there is a strong -national nucleus, situated more than 400 kilom. from Armenia, is that such an extension would certainly result in placing the Armenians in a definite minority in their State, and that when a genuine consultation of the inhabitants took place they would elect a majority of representa­ tives hostile to the Armenians.. . . Reality and logic are equally opposed to the dream of a Great Armenia stretching from Trebizond to Alexandretta.148

In a pragmatic mood, Lloyd George circumvented Foreign Secretary Curzon and asked Montagu to prepare, in consultation with military officials, the British observations on Berthelot’s revised memorandum. Montagu moderated the French plan still further, listing points in favor of retaining a regular standing Turkish army, forgoing reparations, and leaving European Turkey virtually intact. On the eastern frontier, the fortress city of Erzerum should not be detached from Turkey: “Erzerum would be more of a commitment than a source of strength to Armenia. It has always been for the Turks a main defence against their traditional enemy, Russia, and deprivation of it would be a perpetual incentive to the Turks to attack the Armenians for its recovery.” The boundary should run a few miles east of the city, thereby awarding the entire Araxes valley to Armenia. Montagu also suggested that, because of the time needed to organize an international armed force under the League of Nations, the Allies should consider arming, equipping, and if necessary financing the Armenians to enable them to establish their independence. It was particu­ larly important, moreover, that non-Armenians be represented in the 148

C ab 2 3 /3 5 , S ecret S -6 , J a n . 11, 1920;

70654/ 15167/44 .

British Documents,

IV , 1 0 1 6 -1 0 2 5 ; F O 3 7 1 /4 2 3 9 ,

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government and their religious, cultural, and political rights be safe­ guarded.^ After Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary to the British delegation, had persuaded the prime minister to place the issue before the several cabinet members then in Paris, Vansittart and Forbes Adam composed a counter­ draft for Curzon. It called for stronger Allied controls over the reform process and for the protection of minorities in Turkey, the punishment of war criminals, and the restitution of and payment of reparations to the victimized Christian population. If the sultan was left in Constantinople, Turkey in Europe should, as suggested by the French, be limited to the city and its immediate environs. No objection could be raised to the French intent to administer Cilicia and the eastern Taurus as far as the sanjak of Mush, which presumably would mark the southern frontier of Armenia. Such a zone would constitute a buffer between Turkey and the Arab lands and would benefit Armenia both morally and materially. The territory in question should, however, be held as a mandate, and the French adminis­ tration in Cilicia should offer the Armenians the largest measure of pro­ tection and in no sense leave them under Turkish jurisdiction. In deference to the opinion of the general staff that Erzerum would be a source of weakness for Armenia, Curzon’s aides assented to its inclusion in Turkey but only on condition that the fortifications be dismantled.150 Deeming the suggested stipulations too restrictive, the cabinet asked that Vansittart and Forbes Adam revise the draft in consultation with Montagu and his staff. The resultant compromise decreased the control mechanisms, omitted mention of the advantage to Armenia of a contigu­ ous French zone, and softened the insistence on French protection of Armenians in Cilicia. Moreover, under the section on Armenia, the word “should” was substituted for “will” in discussions of the Allied intent to establish an independent Armenia, to unify Russian Armenia and a part of Turkish Armenia, to arm and equip the Armenians, and to guarantee access to Batum.151 In many ways the compromise draft returned to the initial French position, a change attributable, not to skillful French diplomacy, but to the British cabinet’s own ambivalence. Toward London In December Curzon had expressed the opinion that the Turkish treaty could be ready within a few weeks, but in fact formal negotiations did not 149 FO 3 7 1 /4 2 3 9 , 1 7 2 0 2 9 /1 5 1 6 7 /4 4 ; British Documents, IV , 1 036—1042. 150 FO 3 7 1 /4 2 3 9 , 1 7 2 0 2 9 /1 5 1 6 7 /4 4 . 161 Ibid.; F O 6 0 8 /2 7 2 , F ile 25, n o . 106; British Documents, IV , 1 0 4 7 -1 0 6 0 .

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even begin until February 1920. In the interim, the powers were en­ grossed with the Russian problem, bickered about the site of the confer­ ence, and had to adjust to an unexpected cabinet crisis in France. While Lloyd George was in Paris between January 9 and 20, he sat with Clemen­ ceau and Nitti as the International Conference of Premiers to deal with the Hungarian treaty, the Adriatic question, and developments in Russia and the Caucasus.152 The protocols of ratification of the Versailles treaty were also deposited and the League of Nations came into being, although without American participation. By and large, Clemenceau’s government had followed an aggressive foreign policy since the autumn of 1919 and, while still resentful of the British, had made relative gains in postwar competition in the Near East. Clemenceau’s personal popularity was reaffirmed in national elections in November, even though many of his secularist comrades in the Chamber of Deputies were replaced by practicing Catholics. In a strange turn of events, Clemenceau permitted his friends to place his name in nomination for president of the Third Republic, yet he pretended to be a reluctant candidate and refused to campaign. This ill-chosèn strategy allowed Clemenceau’s detractors to conduct a vigorous campaign for Paul Deschanel, a veteran public figure and former speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. When it became apparent on January 16 that Clemenceau would not win, he withdrew his candidacy and, suffering from wounded pride, two days later resigned as prime minister. Alexan­ dre Millerand organized the new cabinet and became the president of the peace conference, thus making Lloyd George the only member of the original “Big Four” still sitting on the Supreme Council. Millerand, like Nitti, did not regard himself as legally or morally bound by the wartime declarations of his predecessor and could therefore approach the remain­ ing setdements with greater flexibility, particularly as he kept the portfolio of foreign affairs for himself. For two weeks after Millerand took his place at the peace conference on January 21, the French and British continued to quarrel about the site of Turkish treaty negotiations. Determined to shake off the “sinister” influ­ ences lurking in Paris, Lloyd George argued for London, since during the preceding year British ministers had spent several months in France at the expense of their duties at home, whereas French ministers had spent less than a week altogether in England. Equally determined to stay in France, Millerand and Berthelot agreed on London for brief general discussions but insisted the treaty be drafted and delivered to the Turkish delegation162 162 Paris

Peace Conference,

IX , 8 4 1 - 9 5 1 , 9 9 5 - 1 0 1 7 .

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in Paris.163 The matter came to a head on February 2, when Lloyd George threatened to conclude a separate peace but also offered a compromise whereby the groundwork on the treaty would be completed in London and the “formal and final stages” in Paris. Millerand quickly accepted the proposal and announced that he would be in London by February 12.154 Le Temps, undoubtedly with the approval of the French foreign ministry, reported that the London conference would have “simplement un caractère préparatoire” and last only three days.156 To the surprise of all parties and the dismay of the Armenians, however, the conference was in fact to last for two months. By February 1920 the Allies had traveled the long, circuitous route from Versailles to London. Drawn to that path were all except uncompromising idealists and intense nationalists who refused to come to terms with dis­ tasteful reality. While the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia and related organizations in other countries could still turn out thousands of people to roar approval of resolutions calling for the unifica­ tion of all historic Armenian lands, Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar had to acknowledge that Armenia’s western boundaries probably would not extend beyond the Erzerum—Mush—Bitlis-Van line. As events had developed, the British military evacuation of the Caucasus, the Allied failure to meet Kemal’s challenge immediately, the refusal to sanction forceful countermeasures by the sultan’s government, the French and Italian unilateral feelers to the Turks, and the American withdrawal from the peace conference all paved the road of retreat from Versailles to London. 163 British Documents, IV, 902-903, 918-919, 924, 1069-1070, 1071-1074; FO 371/4237, 175085/176086/177070/151671/44. 164 British Documents, IV, 1082—1085; Cab 23/20, Cab. Concl.(2o), 8(8), Feb. 4, 1920. 156 Le Temps, Feb. 10:1, 1920.

14

The Russian Crisis and Transcaucasia

Resolution of the Armenian question depended on the pacification not only of the Near East but also of Russia. Many veteran statesmen believed that the Turkish aspect was the most crucial and that the future Russian government would, in its own interest, give up the provinces of Erevan and Kars to make possible a united Armenian state. Nothing would be certain, however, until the outcome of the Russian civil war was known. The Allied Powers, though supportive of the White Armies, discouraged forcible measures to reincorporate the non-Slavic border regions. That stance was taken most consistently by the British, whose policies tended to be pro-Russian east of the Baltic and north of the Caucasus lines but anti-Russian to the west and south. Geography had played tricks on the Armenians in the past, and now their supposed Russophilia earned them not plaudits but criticism from some British officials. The issues were muddled and the contradictions numerous, but in Transcaucasia the label of being pro-Russian and pro-Denikin had definite drawbacks. The British Attitude Military intervention in Russia had begun in 1917 ostensibly to safeguard Allied equipment and deter German-Soviet cooperation. Other excuses had to be found at the end of the war, but the Allies never admitted to intrusion into the domestic affairs of Russia. French involvement ended in the spring of 1919 with the hasty evacuation of Odessa and the Crimea in the face of a Red offensive. At about the same time, the British decided to remove their troops from Murmansk and Archangel prior to the onset 458

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of winter. It was up to Secretary of State for War Churchill and other uncompromising anti-Bolshevik militants to devise a strategy for liquidat­ ing the Soviet regime before that deadline.1 An inconsistent liberal, David Lloyd George became increasingly em­ barrassed by the British military presence in Russia and distrustful of the White Army commanders. In a major policy statement in April 1919, he declared that Russia was in the throes of chaos and anarchy: “It isjust like a volcano; it is still in fierce eruption and the best you can do is to provide security for those who are dwelling on its remotest and most accessible slopes, and arrest the devastating flow of lava, so that it shall not scorch other lands.” History had shown that it was easy to invade but not at all easy to conquer Russia. As much as the British government abhorred Bolshevism, military intervention would be stupid; Russia had to be re­ deemed by its own sons. British expeditionary forces would be withdrawn and loyal friends in Russia given a fighting chance by sending them supplies and military matériel.2Both Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were worried, however, that assistance to the White Armies might be regarded as an endorsement of Great Russian nationalism. Favoring separation of the Baltic and Caucasian provinces, they feared that Admiral A. V. Kolchak, once having captured Moscow, would march against the de facto border states. This concern underlay much of the correspondence between the Supreme Council and Kolchak before the Allied decision in June 1919 to acknowledge and continue to aid the White leader, whose Siberian army was then approaching Kazan.3 Winston Churchill, on the other hand, was elated by the smashing offensive and planned to extend “a left hand” to Kolchak over North Russia to unite the anti-Bolshevik armies and encircle the Soviet heartlands. As it happened, this plan was frustrated by a Red Army counteroffensive, which pushed Kolchak back to Ufa in June and forced Churchill to proceed with preparations to 1 Cab 23/15, WC 541A, March 4, 1919; Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 19171921, Vol. II: Britain and the Russian Civil War (Princeton, 1968), pp. 134-135, 178-179; Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath (New York, 1929), p. 248; C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, II (London, [1927]), 185-186; David Footman, Civil War in Russia (London, [1961]), pp. 191-192; George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia (New York, 1933), p. 195. 2 Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, CXIV, cols. 2940-2945. See also British Documents, 11, 308—312. 3 For documents and accounts of the correspondence between Kolchak and the Allied Powers, see British Documents, III, 312-377 passim; FO 608/188, File 582/2/1; John M. Thomp­ son, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, 1966), pp. 268-308; Hovannisian, Republic, I, 376-377; Ullman, op. cit., pp. 162-170; Churchill, op. cit., pp. 182-186; Stewart, op. cit., pp. 275—277; Paris Peace Conference, VI, 73-75, 321—323, 356; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, 1919 (Washington, 1937), pp. 322-386 passim.

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evacuate British troops from the enclaves at Murmansk and Archangel.4 But, even as Kolchak’s fortunes waned, the Armed Forces of South Russia began a grand march toward Moscow. It was upon General A. I. Denikin that the anti-Soviet crusade now centered. In command of the largest and best-equipped White Army, Denikin managed during the summer of 1919 to subordinate the divergent moti­ vations of his constituent forces and to capitalize on unrest behind enemy lines. After General (Baron) P. N. Wrangel had taken Tsaritsyn and isolated the Soviet fleet at Astrakhan in early July, Denikin issued his celebrated order for a general offensive to liberate Moscow. Against the advice of veteran staff officers, the campaign was waged all along the front from the Volga through the Ukraine rather than in a limited corridor that could be quickly penetrated. At first, victory followed upon victory and before autumn one arm of the front came within 250 miles of the Soviet capital.5 In the Caucasus, meanwhile, the Volunteer Army overran Daghestan and installed a subservient administration at TemirKhan-Shura. Although the offensive in the south annoyed the British Foreign Office and even some War Office personnel, the accom­ plished fact was acknowledged on August 4 with the announcement of a new demarcation line that left the North Caucasus under Denikin’s jurisdiction.6 Strong differences of opinion about the Russian problem marked every British ministry, but by and large the War Office and the Foreign Office came down on opposite sides of the nationality question. It was true that Churchill was not insensitive to the demands of the non-Russian popula­ tions and even favored regional autonomy, but this strategy was aimed at uniting the anti-Bolshevik elements rather than advancing the principle of self-determination. In themselves, the claims and aspirations of the constituent nationalities of the former empire were not very significant.7 This sentiment was shared by the War Office’s chief of military operations, Sir Percy P. de B. Radcliffe, who wrote on July 7: “In my view it is most important to remember that our greatest interests lie with General 4 Ullman, op. cit., pp. 179—199; Churchill, op. cit., pp. 249-254; Footman, op. cit., pp. 196-202; Stewart, op. cit., pp. 195-208; British Documents, III, 455-457. 5 George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1 9 /7 -/9 2 / (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966), pp. 185—188; Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, [1977]), pp. 39-44; William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 191J-1921, II (New York, 1935), 242-250; Stewart, op. cit., pp. 174-177, 181185. 6 Many documents relating to the activities of the White Armies in the North Caucasus and Daghestan are in Britain, WO 32/5678, 32/5694, 33/974. See also FO 371/3661-3663, 100552/ 108889/121653/1015/58; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 2. 7 Ullman, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

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Denikin. Our promises must be kept with Georgia and the other embryo states so long as we are in the Caucasus, at any rate, and have any means of fulfilling them. Their fate, however, can have but little bearing on the peace of Europe, whereas the destruction of Bolshevism (and in this Denikin at present controls the most promising movement) is of paramount importance.”8Later, in defending Denikin’s stern attitude toward Georgia and Azerbaijan, Radcliffe went further, labeling the Caucasian republics as “worthless.”9 Chief of Staff Sir Henry H. Wilson had no more sympa­ thy than Radcliffe for the border nationalities, but his main concern was simply to extricate the British troops from Russia in order to have them ready for anticipated upheavals in Egypt, India, and Ireland.10 The most balanced appraisals came from the Department of Military Intelligence, headed by Major General William Thwaites, which, while noting the many shortcomings of the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments, maintained that Denikin was needlessly aggravating relations and brutally sup­ pressing the Mountaineers of the North Caucasus.11 British officers in Transcaucasia often took issue with those in South Russia in regard to relations between the local states and the Volunteer Army. During the months that the 27th Division and 39th Brigade held the Batum—Baku line, their commanders threatened and cajoled the local governments while criticizing Denikin for his acts of provocation. Even General Milne, who regarded the Georgian government as being litde better than Bolshevik, complained that Denikin’s transgressions were low­ ering British prestige and spurring Bolshevik-Turkish intrigues in Transcaucasia.12 A staff officer who had conferred with Denikin in September added that the Volunteers were absolutely determined to carry out their united Russia policy step by step: “As regards the Caucasus, there appears to be only one point of view, namely, that they were an integral part of Russia; for the present they could stay as they were but as soon as the time came, they had got to come back to Russia, peaceably if possible, but if not, force would be used. The ‘time’ appeared to be merely when General Denikin had sufficient troops available to deal with them should they prove obstinate.”13 8 WO 32/5694, no. 12. See also minutes of the Interdepartmental Conferences on Middle Eastern Affairs, IO, L/P&S/10/807 and FO 371, Files 1015, 11067 passim, 1919. 8 FO 371/3663, 139240/1015/58. 10 See, for example, Callwell, op. cit., pp. 182, 208, 218; FO 371/4215, 62789/50535/44. 11 FO 371/3661-3663, File 1015/58 passim; WO 32/5694. 12 See, for example, WO 95/4879, 27th Division War Diary; WO 95/4950, Army of the Black Sea War Diary; FO 608/88, File 356/2/2; FO 371/3659, 121292/512/58; FO 371/3661-3662, 50843/88872/1015/58. 13 British Documents, 111,584.

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At Denikin’s headquarters, on the other hand, the British military mis­ sion (Denmiss) staunchly defended the North Caucasus operations and provided Winston Churchill with ammunition for his verbal salvos in cabinet meetings. Under Lieutenant General Charles J. Briggs and then Major General Herbert C. Holman, Denmiss insisted that the Georgians and Azerbaijanis were aiding and abetting the “dark elements” in the North Caucasus, a breeding ground of German, Bolshevik, Pan-Turkic, and Pan-Islamic conspiracy and a hindrance to the regeneration of a healthy Russian state structure. Far from menacing the Tiflis and Baku regimes, Denikin had actually informed them that they would not be interfered with pending the decisions of a future All-Russian constituent assembly. It was true that he was aroused, and justly so, by the discrimina­ tory treatment of Russian nationals in the two Transcaucasian states and amazed at the contradictions in British policy, but the commander of the Volunteer Army was doing his utmost to comply with the wishes of His Majesty’s Government.14 In July Holman urged the appointment of a single political officer to coordinate British policy in South Russia and the Caucasus and to deal with problems arising from Denikin’s struggle against the Bolsheviks and his endeavor to reestablish a unified Russian state.15 The Foreign Office’s naming of Oliver Wardrop as chief commissioner for Transcaucasia was hardly what Holman and Denikin had in mind.16 Jealous of its prerogatives, the Foreign Office was angered by the at­ tempts of the War Office to manipulate foreign policy. The fact that Holman had tacitly encouraged Denikin to crush the North Caucasus federation and that the War Office tried to rationalize that transgression was only one of many contributing causes of the ongoing feud between the two ministries. It was foolhardy, the Foreign Office maintained, to think the White Armies could succeed without enlisting the support of the non-Russian nationalities; Kolchak and Denikin had been shortsighted in that regard. Without dismissing the possibility of a federated union of Russia and the border states, the Foreign Office staff emphasized the political and economic advantages of championing the non-Slavic groups. Careful not to make binding commitments, Curzon conveyed informal expressions of sympathy to those peoples, facilitated travel and communi14 See WO 95/4959, South Russia, British Military Mission, June 1919-March 1920; FO 371/4380, 505/453/P.I.D.; FO 371/3663, 123425/136702/140084/141667/142530/142946/ 1015/58. 16 FO 406/42, no. 38; FO 371/3662, 110590/1015/58. See also Cab 45/105, Pt. III. 16 For Wardrop’s reports and arguments contrary to those of Denmiss, see, for example, FO 371/3663-3664, 137986/141224/142581/145404/150961/1015/58.

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cations for their representatives, and repeatedly reminded Denikin that their future was to be setded by the peace conference. Both Curzon and Lloyd George wanted to roll back the previous Russian frontiers, even though that aim was tempered by the belief that Germany would again try to use Russia to undermine the British Empire. It therefore became neces­ sary to strike a delicate balance that would give the reconstituted Russia enough territory and resources to withstand German enticements and would make the small buffer states strong enough to block the eastward penetration of German influence.17 As in the War Office, unanimity of opinion was often lacking in the Foreign Office. The senior officials, Sir John Tilley and Lord Charles Hardinge of Penshurst, upheld the goals of the White Armies, although they admitted that victory could not be achieved without the cooperation of the national elements.18And A. J. Balfour, both as foreign secretary and as chief British delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, would not budge from his policy of caution. Rejecting the feasibility of separate nonRussian Slavic states such as the Ukraine, he ignored Curzon’s ap­ peals to coax the peace conference into adopting a clear, coordinated Russian policy.19 Even George Kidston, chief of the Foreign Office’s Eastern department expressed strong reservations about the Caucasian states. A staunch antisocialist, he argued that neither Georgia nor Ar­ menia would have much of a political future so long as Mensheviks and Dashnakists held power. On the broader issues, however, Kidston disapproved of the Volunteer Army’s maneuvers in the North Caucasus and the War Office’s meddling in foreign affairs. The anti-Caucasian defamation campaign of Denikin and his British supporters, Kidston wrote at the end of July, was shortsighted from every point of view: “If we betray the republics to Denikin we shall have their lasting hostility in one of the richest districts in the world.”20 As public opposition to continued intervention in Russia mounted in Britain and the trade unions threatened Churchill, the “Little Napoleon,” with a work stoppage to emphasize that stand, Lloyd George and his secretary for war assured Parliament that the government had not devi­ ated from the policies expounded in April. Churchill told the House of Commons that Britain’s friends in Russia were waging a struggle on behalf 17 Cab 24/86, G.T. 7947; FO 371/3960, 104687/91/38. See also FO 371/3661-3662, 41293/ 42714/58008/60017/70964/71947/82242/1015/58; FO 608/88, 356/2/3/13505. is FO 371/3663-3664, 131980/144710/1015/58. 19British Documents, III, 424-425, 494-495, 499-500, 519-526, 591-592, 647—648; Brinkley, op. cit.y p. 175. 20 FO 371/3662, 110080/1015/58. See also FO 371/3663-3664, 139240/147980/1015/58.

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of the entire civilized world. They had occupied enormous expanses of territory and had plenty of men and rifles. All they now needed were manufactured goods, clothing, and boots, products of Britain’s great cit­ ies. Satisfying this debt of honor should not be construed as intervention. Nor should it be forgotten that the border states had been able to with­ stand Bolshevik pressure and propaganda only because Denikin and Kol­ chak had drawn off two-thirds of the Red Army.21 Churchill stressed these arguments in cabinet meetings in late July and early August, but faced with the defection of several ministers he asked only that Denikin be granted material assistance for a few more months. As usual, Curzon pointed to the deficiencies of the White commanders and the peace conference, and Lloyd George grumbled about the dangers of a reunified Russian empire and the impropriety of categorizing Britain’s involvement in Russia as an anti-Bolshevik crusade. In the end it was decided to give no further aid to Kolchak but to send Denikin a “final packet” so he would have a sporting chance.22 To strengthen the arguments on his behalf, General Denikin let it be known that reunification of Russia did not preclude a federative system and self-rule for the border nationalities. This “concession” was welcomed by Churchill, who wrote in September that a federation of autonomous states would be less of a menace to Great Britain than a vast centralized empire. He then cautioned: “A policy of the partition or dismemberment of Russia, although it might be for the moment successful, cannot have permanent results and could only open an indefinite succession of wars, out of which in the end, under Bolshevik or reactionary standards, a united militarist Russia would arise. Every effort should therefore be made to guide affairs into the channel, which leads into a federated Russia, without prejudice either to local autonomy or the principle of general unity.”23 The vague suggestion of local autonomy did not capture the imagina­ tion of the non-Russian nationalities, and, as Denikin’s offensive toward Moscow progressed, their representatives in Paris jointly announced their antipathy both to Russian Bolshevism and to Russian reactionary chauvin­ ism. Appealing to the peace conference for recognition of the right to self-determination, they condemned the suppression of the North Cauca­ sus republic and warned that mechanical reunification of the Russian 21 Pari Deb., CXVIII, cols. 1991-1992. See also cols. 1985-2000 passim and CXVI, cols. 2445-2474; Churchill, op. cit., pp. 261-263. 22 Cab 23/11, WC 599(3), July 25, WC 601(4), July 29, WC 605(3), Aug. U WC 612(2), Aug. 12, WC 628(5), Oct. 7, 1919. See also Ullman, op. cit., pp. 208-210. 23 Churchill, op. cit., p. 262. See also British Documents, III, 474-476; Pari. Deb., CXVIII, col. 2305; Brinkley, op. cit., p. 176; Ullman, op. cit., pp. 251-253.

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Empire would deny the world peace, order, and liberty.24 The Armenian spokesmen, for reasons of their own, refrained from public adherence to these joint communiqués, but it was an Armenian who in September 1919 founded Eastern Europe (with French and English editions) to expose Great Russian oppression and to disseminate the culture and aspirations of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Galicians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Cossacks, Mountaineers, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians.25

Rebellion in the North Caucasus As Denikin’s armies pushed on toward Moscow, resentment crackled on the lofty peaks and in the hidden valleys of the Caucasus. In August, surmounting racial and sectarian antipathies, bands of Ingush, Ossetians, Chechens, Kabardins, Balkars, and Daghestanis revolted against the Rus­ sian and Cossack invaders, harassing local collaborators and breaking communication and transportation routes. The Mountaineers recaptured Temir-Khan-Shura for a few weeks and besieged Petrovsk and Derbent. Accepting assistance offered by Bolshevik and Turkish agents, the rebels also sought the help of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The two governments, unable to risk open intervention, responded with secret shipments of arms and money and the dispatch of small contingents of “volunteers” sup­ posedly acting on their own initiative.26 The rising infuriated Denikin and Holman. In reports to the War Office, Denmiss accused the Mountaineers of collusion with the Bol­ sheviks and insisted that the trouble was rooted in Baku and Tiflis; the two governments should be severely reprimanded, perhaps even with a naval blockade of the Georgian coast, for their treacherous acts.27 Colonel Rowlandson, a staff officer sent by Holman in September to pacify the rebels, only generated more unrest by affirming British support of Denikin’s program to crush Bolshevism and reunify Russia on the basis 24 FO 371/3661-3663, 97451/101985/103474/104443/137212/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/ 19095end.; F O 608/84, 342/12/1/18925; F O 608/88, 356/2/8/14304/15154; RG256, 184.611/ 1201 \ Eastern Europe, nos. 1,4, 6 (Sept. i,O ct. 16, Nov. 16, 1919), 22-24, 118-120,181-183; Georgian Archives, Box 8, book 2, Box 25, book 11, Box 26, books 31, 46, Box 27, book 58. 25 The editor of the journal, published in 1919-1920, was Leon Svadjian. 26 The North Caucasus rebellion was given coverage in newspapers published in Baku and Tiflis, Sept.-Dee. 1919. See also FO 371/3663, 126300/129085/134207/134614/135424/ 136398/139216/140059/1015/58; France, Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 3, no. 77; A. RaevskiiyAngliiskaia interventsiia i Musavatskoe praviteVstvo (Baku, 1927), pp. 99—119 passim; Eastern Europey no. 5 (Nov. 1, 1919), 150-153. 27 See, for example, Cab 45/105, Pt. II; FO 371/3663-3664, 132316/136702/137079/ 138153/140084/147574/149858/151350/1015/58; FO 371/4159, Weekly report no. 36, for week ending October 2, 1919; British Documents, III, 616-617.

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of local self-government. The insurrection, Rowlandson said, was not a true national movement but rather a Bolshevik effort to divert Denikin from his primary objective. His Majesty’s Government would tolerate no further hostility toward the Armed Forces of South Russia.28 This unauthorized ultimatum stirred up outrage throughout the Caucasus and all the way to the Foreign Office in Westminster. Georgian and Azerbaijani newspapers, questioning the British expressions of sym­ pathy, vehemently protested Allied duplicity. Rowlandson’s blunder un­ dermined Oliver Wardrop’s careful cultivation of the friendship and confidence of the local governments. Deeply chagrined, Wardrop insisted that Georgia and Azerbaijan were not implicated in the Mountaineer rising. As anti-Bolshevik nations, they were ready to negotiate with Deni­ kin despite his provocations and his avowed goal of “Russia, one and indivisible.” If Wardrop had his way, Denikin would be required to with­ draw from Daghestan, where a British governor-general would be in­ stalled, and any Jews—meaning for Wardrop Bolshevik provocateurs— found there would be handed over to the Volunteer Army “for appropri­ ate treatment.”29 In London the Rowlandson affair fueled the quarrels between the Foreign Office and the War Office. Churchill’s ministry waited until late November to admit that Rowlandson could have phrased his statement “more judiciously” and until mid-December to submit to the cabinet copies of the controversial speech and related correspondence. Even then Chur­ chill tried to minimize the transgression by explaining that field officers were disadvantaged by the absence of clear policy guidelines.30 Ready to challenge Churchill at every opportunity, Curzon nonetheless shared his distress over the ambiguities in state policy. In October, after reading reports and minutes about the Caucasus, Curzon complained of the lack of agreement among the Allies, among the ministries of His Majesty’s Government, and even within the Foreign Office itself. As far as he could tell, 1. 2. 3. 4.

We We We We

are are are are

pro-Denikin north of the Caucasus. anti-Denikin south of the Caucasus. pro-Georgian so far as she is respectable and orderly. anti-Georgian in so far as she is Bolshevik and violent.

28 FO 371/4161, 163857/521/44, App. F; FO 371/3664, 153778/1015/58. See also FO 371 / 3663— 3664,142530/143362/151018/1015/58; Eastern Europe, no. 8 (Dec. 16, 1919), 252—253. 29 FO 371/3663, 141223/147981/1015/58. See also British Documents, III, 576; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/7574. 30 Cab 23/18, Cabinet C onclusions^), 1(5), Nov. 4, 1919, 9(3), Nov. 26, 1919; FO 371/ 3664- 3666, 147980/147981/149241/149774/151791/153778/156059/166121/1015/58.

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5. We are pro-Armenian so far as we do not want to see them exterminated. 6. We are anti-Armenian in so far as we do not mean to assume the responsi­ bility either of supplying them with arms or of guaranteeing an Armenian State or of repatriating them to a larger Armenia. 7. Whether we are pro-Azerbaijan or anti-Azerbaijan I have not the least idea. 8. As to the Hill [Mountaineer] State, I suppose it is little more than various groups o f bandits who are smashed by Denikin when his troops are in the neighbourhood, and who smash him when they are elsewhere employed.31

Curzon wrote Churchill: “If Denikin and his myrmidons would leave the Caucasus alone, all would be well. But if he persists in trying for Batum, Baku etc., he inevitably comes up against people whom it is our policy to support. A revived Russia spreading over the entire Caucasus into N[orth] Persia is not a portent that I should welcome.”32 At the same time, however, the Foreign Office mildly chided Wardrop for giving the Transcaucasian governments hope of British intervention. He was instructed to persuade them to take no action that might jeopardize Denikin’s northern offensive: “We cannot afford to have Denikin’s whole plan of campaign upset by intrigues in his rear, nor can we, in order to defeat German schemes in the Caucasus, risk a wholesale defection to Germany of the greater anti-Bolshevik Russia which Denikin rep­ resents.”33 Meanwhile, the Mountaineer rebels, adopting the motto “Islam, Free­ dom, and Independence” and led by revered warriors such as Sheikh Uzun Hadji and Ali Hadji (Akushinskii), spread throughout Daghestan and Chechenia. In October a number of strategic towns and junctions changed hands several times before the Volunteers finally regained con­ trol. The fighting slowed but did not cease as snow covered the Caucasus and the sons of Shamil withdrew to mountain fastnesses, where during the winter they cautiously welcomed Turkish officers and Bolshevik agents bringing financial aid with which to continue the struggle.34*The British Foreign Office, concerned over these developments, hoped that a political commissioner being assigned to Denikin’s headquarters would resolve the differences between the Armed Forces of South Russia and the Caucasian states. The appointment of a political commissioner had been approved by the 31 FO 371/3663, 131980/1015/58. See also Cab 24/86, G.T. 7949. 32 FO 371/3663, 136702/1015/58. 33 British Documents, III, 577—578. See also ibid., pp. 574-575; FO 371/3663, 136702/ 138231/1015/58. 34 FO 371/3663-3664, 139216/140084/144748/147574/148133/157893/159654/165446/ 1015/58. See also Bor’ba, Ashkhatavor, and Azerbaidzhan for November 1919.

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cabinet in July, but it was not until October that Member of Parliament Sir Halford Mackinder was named and not until December that he de­ parted for his post. He was to impress upon Denikin that British aid would end in March 1920, making it essential for him to secure the support or at least nonhostility of the border nationalities. As to the Caucasus, His Majesty’s Government had to admit that the claims of the de facto states to a separate national existence were strong. It was up to the peace confer­ ence or the League of Nations to determine how to satisfy those claims. For the time being, Denikin should honor the demarcation line an­ nounced in August and should, through a policy of reconciliation, gain the collaboration of the Transcaucasian populations in his struggle against Bolshevism.36 Mackinder’s instructions indicated that British policy had veered sharply in support of the separatist ambitions of the Trans­ caucasian republics. Yet there was a prophetic quality in an earlier observation made by Foreign Office veteran J. A. C. Tilley: “I feel only a pious hope that the Caucasus will prove a real barrier between Russia and the East. And I feel certain that we will have to reckon with a big new Russia and that it would be well to start on friendly terms with her (though it be immoral). I fear that the erection of a ring of small states around Russia may not prove a very lasting affair. ‘Et puis, le matin, le loup les mangera.’ ”36 Armenia and the White Armies Although the Armenian government, like those of Georgia and Azerbai­ jan, was committed to a policy of complete separation from Russia, its approach to winning the consent of Russia was different. After all, from the Russian point of view, the Armenians alone had remained loyal during the world war and now stood as a bulwark against Turco-Bolshevik col­ laboration. Moreover, so long as the Georgians and Azerbaijanis suspected a secret Denikinist-Armenian accord, they could not risk direct action against the Volunteer Army or concentrate all their military forces along the North Caucasus frontier. The Armenians hoped to persuade the Russians that a friendly, united Armenian state incorporating the Russian Armenian provinces would not impair the political, territorial, or econom­ ic strength of Russia and would actually be advantageous. As it happened, spokesmen of all Russian factions professed sympathy but few were will­ ing to advocate Armenian independence publicly. 36 C ab23/18, Cab. Concl.(i9), i2(App. IV/3), Dec. 10,1919; C ab23/37, no. 13, Dec. 2,1919; FO 371/3664, 148412/1015/58; British Documents, III, 672-678, 681-682; Ullman, op. cit., pp. 217-218. 36 FO 371/3664, 144710/1015/58.

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Armenia had envoys at the headquarters of both Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin during the latter half of 1919. No significant material aid was expected from Kolchak, who had strong monarchist views, but his acknowledged position as supreme commander of the anti-Bolshevik ar­ mies made it seem that his moral support would help the Armenian case at Paris and facilitate the relief of Armenian refugees throughout Russia. A former diplomatic representative in the Ukraine, Grigor S. Dsamoev (Dsamoyan), was delegated to win Kolchak’s favor and assist Armenians in Siberia. He finally reached Omsk on September 10, after a journey lasting more than two months. Although given a cool reception by Kol­ chak’s foreign minister, Dsamoev found a sympathizer in the assistant minister, who laid before the admiral several memoranda describing the status and goals of the Armenian republic and the security and equality enjoyed by its Russian inhabitants.37 In an interview at the end of September, Kolchak issued a statement of friendship and authorized Dsamoev to represent the Armenians of Siberia and the Far East, to raise the Armenian flag over his headquarters, and to coordinate relief efforts among the refugees. Pending the receipt of Denikin’s advice, however, no action was taken on the request that Ar­ menian soldiers in the White Armies be released for service in Armenia. That question had not been settled when Kolchak was forced to retreat to Irkutsk in November. In that central Siberian city, Dsamoev issued Armenian passports and visas and helped the local Armenian council in publishing a bulletin entitled Vestnik Armenii (“Herald of Armenia”).38 In December he attended the Second Congress of Armenians of Siberia and the Far East, which met in Irkutsk and adopted measures relating to refugee relief, repatriation, and aid to the homeland. In the following months the small communities of Siberia and Manchuria, notably Harbin, contributed more than 4 million rubles for the Armenian army.39 After Kolchak’s betrayal and execution in 1920, Dsamoev was acknowledged as the plenipotentiary of the Armenian republic at Vladivostok by the Japanese-influenced regime known as the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo.40 37 See Dsamoev’s report, written from Tokyo in April 1920 and printed in Hairenik, June 2:1—2, 1920. See also Hairenik, Sept. 9:3, 1919; Ruben [Ter-Minasian], Hai heghapokhakani me hishataknere, VII (Los Angeles, 1952), 256-257. 38 Hairenik, June 2:1-2, 1920. 39 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 73/1, H. H. Divanagitakan Nerhayatsutsich Heravor Arevelkum, 79/9 1; Ashkhatavor, April 1:1-2, 1920; Hairenik, June 2:2, 4:1, 1920. For materials on the First Congress of Siberian Armenians, see FO 608/78, 342/1/1/14761; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug. 23:4, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 7:1, 1919; Haradj, Feb. 25:2, 1920. 40 For a discussion of the Maritime Zemstvo Government and its relationship with the Japanese military authorities, see Stewart, op. cit., pp. 324-325, 382-397. See also Hairenik, June 4:2, 1920.

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That the Erevan government should concentrate most of its diplomatic efforts in Russia on the Armed Forces of South Russia and the associated Cossack administrations of the Terek, Kuban, and Don was natural, in view of the proximity of Denikin’s armies and the actual assistance he could offer. The Armenians were troubled by what Denikin represented politically, but they were given private assurances by the Russians that their national aspirations would be treated differently from the preten­ sions of the Georgians and Azerbaijanis. An Armenian leader noted, “With the fear of Denikin in our hearts, we adapted to his not-so-clear work, particularly as we saw the possibility of immediate gains.”41 The gains, aside from small shipments of foodstuffs, included permis­ sion to organize and assist the thousands of Armenian refugees scattered throughout the North Caucasus, the Cossack territories, and the Ukraine and to utilize the resources of the old established colonies, which were showing a renewed sense of national consciousness. Armenian national councils linked with the Erevan government were allowed to function in these communities and to aid the refugees. In the Don, Grigor Chalkhushian was accepted as Armenian consul-general at Rostov-Nakhichevan, and consular officials operated in a number of other cities. At Ekaterinodar, Hovhannes (Ivan Iakovlevich) Saghatelian served as minister plenipotentiary to the Kuban administration and concurrently as an unof­ ficial liaison with Denikin’s headquarters. When Denikin sent Colonel Mikhail M. Zinkevich to Erevan as a military attaché in September 1919, Saghatelian openly assumed the role of Armenian minister to the Armed Forces of South Russia.42 Many small gestures were taken by the Armenians as evidence of Rus41 Ruben, op. cit., p. 258. 42 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 71, H. H. Nerkayatsutsich Haravayin Rusastani Zinial UzheriMot, 1919 t -1920/21 L; A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, IV (Berlin, 1925), 176-177; Ashkhatavor, Nov. 14:3, 1919; Hairenik, Nov. 18:2, 25:1, Dec. 18:1, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 10:3, 1920. The following list of Armenian consuls and diplomatic agents in South Russia has been compiled from various newspaper notices and articles: Grigor Chalkhushian (Don: Rostov), Hovhannes Saghatelian (Kuban: Ekaterinodar), Asribekian and P. Hovhannisian (Terek: Kislovodsk), Ashot Tonian (North Caucasus), Hakob Sarikian (Vladikavkaz), Arsen Kalantar (Stavropol), Khojamarziarian (Novorossiisk), D. Iuzbashian and G. Sargsian (Kharkov guberniia), Nikoghos Zakarian (Ekaterinoslav), Eghishe Melikian and Barkhudariants (Odessa), Aram Telfeyan (Sevastopol), Stepan G. Baghian—also identified as Bagirian, and Staff Cap­ tain Balian (Simferopol). When Denikin’s headquarters moved out of Ekaterinodar, Sagh­ atelian transferred to the new headquarters at Taganrog. An individual identified as Bakhchisaraitsev then served as the Armenian consul in Ekaterinodar. See Ashot Tonian, “Rusakan banaki hai spayi me hushere,” Hairenik Amsagir, LXII (July—Aug. 1964), 1—12, 56- 6 7 .

Armenians did not always escape the wrath of Volunteer detachments and Cossacks. See, for example, Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 20/20; Erkir, Sept. 16:1, 17:1, 1919.

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sian friendship. When, for example, the German and Austrian govern­ ments released Russian prisoners of war, Denikin permitted some Armenian soldiers in the same ranks to transfer to Transcaucasia and enlist in the Armenian army. Solicitations for the “Armenia Salvation Fund” were conducted freely in communities in the Ukraine and South Russia. The Don Cossack government at Novocherkask relieved Armeni­ ans from military requisitions on grounds that they were foreign nationals and, when military conscription began again in the autumn of 1919, granted Chalkhushian’s request that all refugees, together with perma­ nent residents who would volunteer for armed service in Armenia, be exempted. The Armenian section of the Russian Red Cross and the Ar­ menian national councils were allowed to outfit the volunteers and help with their travel arrangements.43 Perhaps the most significant supportive measure, however, was the secret shipment of ammunition to Armenia at a time when the country’s arsenals had been depleted by Muslim up­ risings and the Allied Powers showed no disposition to intervene.44 Al­ though Denikin’s benevolence was based on self-interest, Armenia was nonetheless regarded differently from Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Armenians in territories occupied by the White Armies generally fared better than Jews and other minorities. In Odessa, Denikin told an Armenian deputation in October that he would not forget Armenian loyalty to Russia and the refusal of the Erevan government, despite serious consequences, to join in the “treacherous” Azerbaijani-Georgian alliance against the Armed Forces of South Russia.45 General Nikolai N. Baratov, chief of Denikin’s military mission in the Caucasus, made similar professions to Alexandre Khatisian, an old acquaintance who was now president of the Council of Ministers of the Armenian republic.46 Expressions of Russian concern for the Armenians were also heard abroad. When the British were withdrawing from Transcaucasia, the Russian embassies in Paris and London urged the Allied governments and the peace conference to protect the Armenians, whose plight was owing in part to their rejection of the anti-Russian policies of their neighbors. Denikin himself warned the Allies of a Turkish military concentration on Armenia’s frontiers and of Azerbaijan’s plans to invade Zangezur in order 43 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 20/20, File 70/2; Erkir, Dec. 10, 1919; Hairenik, Jan 6:3, 11:2, 1920;Haradj, Jan. 15:3, 1920; HovsepTadeosian, “Taparum ner antsiali husheri medj (19091920) ” Hairenik Amsagir, XXV (July/Aug. 1947), 82-91. 44 See above, pp. 103—104. 45 FO 371/3660, 156708/512/58 end. See also RG 59, 867.00/5476; Foreign Relations, Russia, PP- 774- 77546 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 4/4, Report for Sept. 6-14, 1919.

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to establish direct contact with the Turks.47 In view of these supportive statements, it was not surprising that Avetis Aharonian should decline to join other successionist states in protest against the Volunteer Army’s violations of human and national rights. He even avoided interdelegation consultations with the excuse that the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, as a part of the Delegation of Integral Armenia, could not risk jeopardizing the cause of united Armenia or offending the Western Armenians.48 In October, Mikayel Papadjanian, the non-Dashnakist member of the Republic’s delegation, told Forbes Adam of the British delegation that the Erevan government believed Russia would accede to the creation of a united Armenia. For that reason, Armenia could not establish close bonds with Georgia and Azerbaijan, whose separation the Russians vehemently opposed, until after the Armenian question was settled.49 Leaders of the Russian Political Conference in Paris had repeatedly assured the Armenians of their goodwill. Ambassadors Vasilii A. Maklakov, Boris A. Bakhmetov, and Michael de Giers explained that, so as not to encourage other non-Russian nationalities, a “mild protest” might have to be filed when the peace conference actually declared Armenia united, but this act, they promised, would be pro forma and the Allies could be so advised.50 On July to Maklakov told Aharonian and former premier Kachaznuni that the Political Conference, intractable in its rejection of Georgian and Azerbaijani separatism, regarded the independence of Armenia as being just, inevitable, and acceptable: “Whatever you do for your unification, whatever steps you take, we will not be offended; we will be offended only if you join this or that group in protest against us.” Maklakov suggested that when unification became a reality, the Russian Armenians could soothe Russian sensitivities with an appropriate preamble such as, “Certain that the Russian Constituent Assembly, were it now in existence, would not oppose our just aspirations, we, the 47 FO 371/3659, 121318/129425/512/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/17550/18167 ends.; British Documents, IV, 673, 741. 48 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 72a, Hayastani Hanrapetutian Nerkayatsutschutiun Parizum ev Ukrayiniayi Parizi Nerkayatsutschutiune, 1919-1921 t.t.; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, nos. 45, 47, 55, Sept. 26, Oct. 4, Nov. 14, 1919. See also Aharonian’s explanation to Albert Thomas in Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, no. 350, July 7, 1919; Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 28, July 3, 1919; Georgian Archives, Box 25, book 11. 49 FO 608/85, 347/1/8/19449. See also FO 371/3663, 142427/1015/58. 60 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 140/39, File 373, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Rusakan Nakhkin Nerkayatsutsichner, 1919-1922 t.; Avetis Aharonian, Sardarapatits minchev Sevr ev Lozan (Bos­ ton, 1943), pp. 21-23. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 381/3, Pasdermadjian to Lansing, Nov. 3, 1919; FO 608/78, 342/1/1/13031.

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Caucasian Armenians, declare ourselves united with Turkish Armenia.”61 Despite the apparent sympathy and cordiality, however, the Russian diplomats in their “not-so-clear work” made no public statements about Armenia’s right to independence. The Armenian-Russian flirtations complicated relations among the Transcaucasian states and stirred suspicions in British official circles. When Denikin inquired in September what the Allies proposed to do about the reported Turkish military buildup against Armenia and the hostile attitude of Georgia and Azerbaijan, George Kidston minuted the dispatch: “There can be little doubt that some sort of understanding exists between Denikin & the Armenians 8c that this understanding is directed, politically at any rate, against the Georgians & Azerbaijanis.”5152During the Zangezur crisis in November, he added: “It looks uncommonly as if Denikin & Armenia were plotting a simultaneous attack on Azerbaijan from North & South.”53 Kidston’s suspicions were fed by A. E. R. MacDonell, a Foreign Office clerk who while serving in Baku had come to loathe the socialist parties, especially the Dashnaktsutiun. Despite evidence of Azerbaijani aggression, MacDonell pointed the finger of guilt at the Armenians.54*He was certain of Armenian-Denikinist collusion, observing sarcastically that “the Armenian Society Dashnachtsoon [sic], which controls most of the Armenian policy, although strongly socialistic and revolutionary, willingly accepts Denikin’s assistance and advice.” Peace would not come to the Caucasus so long as the Dashnaktsutiun remained in power.56 According to J. Oliver Wardrop, who was also concerned about Russian interference in the Caucasus, Azerbaijani leaders believed that a Deni­ kinist-Armenian alliance was intended to divide the Azerbaijani army and thereby facilitate a Russian advance on Baku.56 He was pleased when Prime Minister Khatisian emphatically denied the existence of a pro-Russian party in Armenia and expressed uneasiness about the designs of the Volunteer Army. And it was an open secret, Wardrop reported, that the Armenian National Delegation’s negotiators in Erevan wanted “to prevent too close a rapprochement between that Government and the Russian Volunteer Army.”57 During the Zangezur conflict, Wardrop 51 Aharonian, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 52 FO 371/3659, 131467/512/58. See also ibid., 129425/512/58. 53 FO 371/3664, 147984/1015/58. See also FO 371/3660, 150927/151704/512/58. 64 See, for example, FO 371/3659-3660, 134563/136642/138104/142427/151587/157887/ 512/58; FO 371/3661-3666, 34957/148131/150601/166418/1015/58. 56 FO 371/3664, 152848/1015/58. 56 Ibid., 147983/1015/58. 57 British Documents, II, 548-549, 600; FO 371/3660, 144933/512/58.

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added that Colonel Zinkevich had admitted he was urging Denikin to relieve Armenia by exerting pressure on the Azerbaijani frontiers: “I rather think that the Russians and the Russian element would like to see actual fighting so as to take Baku. But at the same time I am convinced that the Armenians are entirely opposed to any kind of struggle and are doing their utmost to keep the peace. But a struggle against the Azerbaijanis would draw them over eventually into the hands of Denikin’s party as they are the only people that they can look to for active assistance and cooperation. And I believe that Zinkevich is working hard here to attain that end.” The Russians, Wardrop concluded, were again inciting the Armenians and Azerbaijanis by following the age-old dictum of divide and rule.68 There was, in fact, no secret alliance between Armenia and any of the White Armies, but the popular belief to the contrary was strengthened by an order that Denikin issued at Taganrog on November 9 (November 22, new style), 1919: “In view of the hostile relations of the Azerbaijan govern­ ment to the Russian Army and in view of the breaking of faith with Armenia, I order all officers of Russian service in the Azerbaijani Army to leave their ranks.”69 In the Caucasus the order was first published by the Baku newspaper Azerbaidzhan on December 6, only a few days after the fragile truce in Zangezur had been arranged. The Musavat organ admonished the Armenians not to be deceived by the forces of reaction but instead to clasp the hands of the other Transcaucasian republics in a spirit of mutual concession and conciliation.58*60 The Pan-Islamic jour­ nal Ittihad was more vitriolic. Its denunciations were echoed in the publications of the small Georgian nationalist parties, while the Menshevik papers called upon the Erevan government to unmask the hypocritical Volunteer pretense of concern for Armenians and wipe away the kiss of Judas given “by the serpent raised in the cage of Veliko” (Great Russian chauvinism).61 Khatisian’s cabinet disclaimed collusion with any external power or previous knowledge of Denikin’s stern, albeit unimplemented, command, but its denials were less categorical than the Azerbaijani and Georgian newspapers demanded. In a private letter to Garegin Pasdermadjian, Khatisian acknowledged that Denikin’s friendship had proved beneficial 58 FO 371/3660, 159650/512/58 end.; FO 371/3664, 152788/154239/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/7640. 69 FO 371/3666, 170792/1015/58. See also FO 371/3665—3666, 161419/162006/167441/ 1015/58; Raevskii, op. cit., p. 116. 60Azerbaidzhan, Dec. 6, 1919; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3, File 10/10, no. 2623. 61 See esp. Ertoba as reprinted in Ashkhatavor, Dec. 16:3, 1919.

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during the Zangezur crisis. Now officers dispatched by the general staff were trying to persuade Denikin to recognize Armenia’s independence in order to strengthen the Volunteer Army’s southern flank and block Turk­ ish intervention should Azerbaijan provoke the Russians into an armed conflict. Failure to grant recognition could compel the Erevan govern­ ment to come to terms, however unfavorable to Armenia and Russia, with the surrounding states.62 The obligation of Dashnakist organs to defend the government’s Rus­ sian policy often strained their ideological conscience and sometimes failed to hold back strong denunciations of the Russian reactionary ele­ ments. At the height of Denikin’s Moscow offensive, Ashkhatavor of Tiflis observed that occupation of enormous expanses of territory in a civil war was not so significant as might be thought. Just as Bolshevik excesses had prepared the way for ascendancy of the Whites, and just as the pinnacle of Red victories had marked the beginning of the Soviet retreat, so too Denikin’s impressive advance might presage his collapse, since people’s rights were being trampled by camouflaged reactionaries brandishing the motto, “Russia, one and indivisible.” Neither monarchic nor Soviet rule, but only the triumph of popular democracy could ensure the regenera­ tion of Russia.63 Haradj, the Erevan organ of the Dashnaktsutiun’s Bureau, frequently took issue with Ashkhatavor but early in 1920 had to admit that many moderate socialists had misplaced their hopes. After every White Army victory numerous ultrachauvinistic Pureshkeviches had proclaimed a sinister vision of a restored ancient regime and a repressive absolute monarchy. The Volunteer Army had not the ghost of a chance unless it would “change its face completely” by accepting democratic reforms and the right of all peoples to determine their own political future.64 The boldness of the Armenian journal may have been influenced by Denikin’s state of affairs on the field of battle. Decline of the Volunteer Army In November 1919 Denikin’s offensive stalled near Orel, and the Red Army, reinforced by troops Trotsky hastily transferred from Siberia, drove a deep wedge between the Volunteer and Cossack divisions in the Ukraine and the Don. The failure of the White Armies to coordinate offensive operations, to maintain order on and behind a thousand-mile front, to enlist the collaboration of non-Russian nationalities, and to make 62 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, Khatisian to Pasdermadjian, Dec. 6, 1919. 63 Ashkhatavor, Oct. 28:1, 1919. 64 Haradj, Jan. 9:1, 1920.

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effective use of Allied financial and military aid brought the anti-Bolshevik structure crashing down. As the Volunteer Army fell back into the Ukraine and toward the Caucasus, Denikin seemed to vent his anger upon the non-Russian elements. The Kuban Rada was suppressed and the Cossack administrations were compelled to relinquish much of their free­ dom, while, farther south, Russian envoys were recalled from Georgia and Azerbaijan and all sides braced for the possibility of armed conflict.65 Denikin’s reverses redoubled fears that he might sweep into Trans­ caucasia. Wardrop reported that the Volunteers had made air strikes in Daghestan, imposed economic sanctions against Georgia, impounded a Georgian military vessel, and used British arms and equipment to intimi­ date the local governments. These actions, aside from endangering the large Russian population in Georgia, were contrary to the policies and interests of Great Britain.66 But Denikin and Holman accused the Georgians of refusing to abide by an arrangement that would permit the Tiflis government to operate without interference, pending a decision by a future All-Russian constituent assembly, if discrimination against Russians and the Russian Orthodox Church ceased, Russian military property in the country was made available to the Volunteer Army, and Georgian detachments along the Black Sea were pulled back to the Bzyb River.6768In Denikin’s defense, the War Office contended that he had the right to limit the export of goods “to a state that claims to be independent,” and the Department of Military Intelligence released information showing that he had no aggressive designs toward the Caucasian states and that his economic reforms had little to do with “the separatist provinces.”66 The crisis nonetheless detracted from the anti-Bolshevik campaign and threatened the security of Transcaucasia. On December 22 the Foreign Office, with War Office approval, instructed Wardrop and General Holman to seek a settlement by which the Georgians would desist from harassing Russians and would retire to the Bzyb, thus creating a neutral 65 Stewart, op. cit.y pp. 336—344; Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 275-281; Kenez, op. cit., pp. 132—139; John Ernest Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies (London, [1932]), pp. 121—123; RG 256,181.9402/13; Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 78; British Documents, II, 570; Eastern Europe, no. 8 (Dec. 16, 1919), 255, no. 9/10 (Jan. 16, 1920), 9-17. 66 FO 371/3663-3665, 143099/147191/150961/151895/154761/157697/1015/58; FO 371/ 3671, 168741/9845/58 ends. For correspondence on the seizure of the armed Georgian steamer and the naval defense of Georgia, see FO 371/3663—3666, 132502/133361/134568/ 135447/ 136 l 5 l / 14*696/151583/157716/159414/160774/162299/163856/163945/163990/ 1015/58; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 12, Box 23, books 64, 68, Box 26, books 31, 46, Box 32, book 2. 67 See esp. WO 95/4958, ends.; FO 371/3665, 157250/159112/1015/58. See also Georgian Archives, Box 22, book 43. 68 FO 371/3664-3665, 148707/156846/159834/160274/1015/58.

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zone under British control officers, and Denikin would release the impounded vessel and revoke any economic measures directed “spe­ cifically against Georgia and Transcaucasia.” The entire question would receive the immediate attention of political commissioner Sir Halford J. Mackinder who was en route to Denikin’s headquarters.69 At Novorossiisk, Mackinder conferred with Wardrop, Holman, and Denikin’s staff in January, 1920, before reporting to London on the military, moral, administrative, and economic causes for reverses suffered by the White Armies. Only swift, decisive action, he advised, could prevent Bolshevism from sweeping like “a prairie fire” into India and southeast Asia. Even Wardrop doubted that the Transcaucasians would stand firm if Bolshevik armies advanced to the foot of the Caucasus Mountains. The Caspian and the Caucasus could, of course, be made into a temporary barrier, but the only effective remedy was “to kill Bolshevism at the source.” To that end, a new anti-Bolshevik federation of states between Poland and the Caucasus, to be given Allied technical and naval assistance, would be required.70 Mackinder put this plan to Denikin on January 10, adding that it was now unrealistic to expect the border nationalities to be content with “some crumbs of autonomy.”71 Under pressure of political and military necessities, Denikin acceded to a number of concessions on January 14. With regard to the Baltic and Caucasian provinces, he wrote: 1 .1 recognize the de facto independence of the border states who are carrying on the struggle against the Bolsheviks. 2. The settlement of the future relations of the border states with Russia must be accomplished by means of an agreement between the All-Russian Government and the border Governments. 3. The mediation of the Allies can be accepted in this matter.72

The concessions were not insignificant, but they had been made from a position of weakness and came too late to save Denikin. Nevertheless, Oliver Wardrop was confident that a mutually beneficial working arrange­ ment could be entered into by Georgia and the Volunteer Army. The impounded Georgian vessel had already been released and there was talk of allowing the Volunteer Army to conduct an unofficial recruitment 69 FO 371/3666, 163512/1015/58 {British Documents , III, 735); FO 406/42, no. 80. See also WO 95/4958, War Diary, Dec. 21, 1919. 70 FO 371/3980, 176979/1089/38; Cab 23/20, Cab. Concl.(2o), 6(3 and App. II) Jan. 29, 1920. For Mackinder's report, with appendices, see British Documents , III, 768-796. 71 British Documents, III, 773-774, 790-792. 72 Ibid., pp. 792-793. Mackinder returned to London in late January and resigned on February 13 because Lloyd George and the cabinet showed no disposition to accept his recoirfmendations. See British Documents , III, 822.

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campaign in Georgia.73 From another perspective, however, the welcome news indicated how low Denikin’s fortunes had fallen. In Wardrop’s own dispatches in 1920, the previous bête-noire characterizations of the Volunteer Army were shifted to the Red Army as it approached the flanks of the Caucasus.74 Lloyd George’s New Strategy When the House of Commons reconvened in October after a two-month recess, the critics of intervention in Russia became more abusive. They deprecated the “waste” of 100 million pounds sterling and, even more, the blot placed on national honor by collaboration with Kolchak, Denikin, and others. The taunts occasionally made Churchill lose his composure. Lash­ ing out at his adversaries and giving optimistic, though unrealistic, ap­ praisals of the situation in Russia, he reminded self-righteous critics that the White Armies, not the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, or the Allied Powers, had saved the small peoples between the Baltic and Black seas from Bolshevik enslavement. The cause of civilization rode with General Denikin, a strong leader and a true patriot.75 Although acquitting himself reasonably well in Parliament because of the strong anti-Bolshevik disposition of the majority, Churchill was almost helpless against the maneuvers of David Lloyd George. At the Lord May­ or’s annual Guildhall banquet on November 8, the prime minister, with­ out forewarning his cabinet, told the gathering of British and foreign dignitaries that the situation in Russia should be reappraised. Great Brit­ ain was not unmindful of the “gallant men of Russia” who had carried on the struggle against the Germans while the Bolsheviks were betraying the Allies, but their unsuccessful effort to free their country provided ample proof that Bolshevism could not be eradicated by the sword: We cannot, of course, afford to continue so costly an intervention in an intermi­ nable civil war.. . . Russia is a quicksand. Victories are easily won in Russia, but you sink in victories, and great Armies and great Empires in the past have been overwhelmed in the sands o f barren victories.. . . But I am hopeful that when the winter gives time for all sections there to reflect and to reconsider the situation, 73 FO371/3661,166830/168503/169174/169424/1015/58; F0 37i/4932, E698/1/58. Colonel Petr V. Den, who represented General Denikin in the Caucasus, announced the de facto recognition of the Transcaucasian states in February, 1920. See Bor’ba, Feb. 14:4, 1920; Raevskii, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 74 FO 371/3673, File 168738/58, File 171821/58; British Documents, III, 746—747, 747—749. 73 Pari. Deb., CXX, cols. 791-794, 1627-1638. See also Churchill, op. cit., p. 269.

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an opportunity may offer itself for the great Powers of the world to promote peace and concord in that great country.76

The retreat having been clearly sounded, Lloyd George’s own coalition majority in Commons bristled with indignation, and the London Times led many other newspapers in denouncing the prime minister’s defeatism. Lloyd George countered that his position was consistent with the policies announced in Commons in April and that the prolonged isolation of Russia was proving detrimental to the rest of Europe. British workers knew that the “chariot of Bolshevism” was drawn by “plunder and terror,” but all reasonable obligations to the friendly elements in Russia had been met. It should also be pointed out that many eminent British statesmen had been apprehensive of a “gigantic, colossal, growing Russia” and that peoples such as the Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians were fighting for their freedom, predicating their cooperation against the Bolsheviks on a guarantee of independence: Take another point. There are three claims for intervention now made upon this country. One is intervention in Russia, the second is intervention in Armenia, and those who want intervention in Russia are opposed to intervention in Armenia and those who are opposed to intervention in Russia are in favour o f intervention in Armenia. Could any wise man recommend, whatever his courage might be, that Great Britain undertake the terrible responsibility of restoring order in a country which was in fact a continent?

The most effective weapon against Bolshevism, Lloyd George concluded, was the promotion of “sympathetic justice” in all countries and among all classes.77 In private discussions with Frank Polk and American Ambassador John Davis, Lloyd George again expressed concern about a reunified Russia; he favored separate states in the Caucasus and the Baltic and perhaps even in the Ukraine and Siberia, with none of them or Russia powerful enough to upset world peace. He would negotiate with the Soviet government if it would honor international obligations.78 Lloyd George made similar representations to Clemenceau in Decem­ ber. The two premiers agreed that intervention had been a mistake and that the waste of resources was regrettable. Clemenceau observed that the 76 London Times, Nov. 10:9, 1919. See also Ullman, op. cit., pp. 304-306; Hodgson, op. cit., pp. 191-195; Eastern Europey no. 7 (Dec. 1, 1919), 201-205. 77 Pari. Deb.y CXX, cols. 715-726. For the general debate on the Russian question, see ibid.y cols. 681-738. 70 Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919, pp. 126, 128-129; Ullman, op. cit.y pp. 310-311; Paris Peace Conference, XI, 675.

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Russians, “as orientals,” seemed to enjoy fighting and inflicting torture and that the anti-Bolsheviks had failed because of their many faults; he had never liked Denikin anyway. Now was the time to construct a “barbed wire entanglement” around Russia, but he opposed the formation of separate states in Russia because the Allies would thereby seem bent upon dismembering the old empire. Still, at Foreign Secretary Curzon’s insis­ tence, Clemenceau and Lloyd George agreed to give “the border commu­ nities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government. . . such assistance in defending their liber­ ties as may be found desirable in the circumstance of each case as it arises.”79 Apart from this concession to Curzon, the prime ministers decided that no further aid should be given the anti-Bolshevik Russian armies and that Poland should be made into a strong military buffer. Outwitted by Lloyd George, Winston Churchill vented his frustration in fierce denunciations of the betrayal of the loyal Russian elements. The Allied leaders, he charged, had blocked every proposal to adopt a coor­ dinated system of command and operations against the enemy. They had pretended not to be at war with Soviet Russia, thus allowing the Bolsheviks to marshal their resources and deal with their adversaries one at a time. If Moscow and Petrograd had not been captured, the primary responsibil­ ity lay with the Allies. It had been a cheap thing to mock Denikin, but the Allies should realize that his collapse would give the Bolsheviks control of the Caspian and permit collaboration between the Red Army and Turkish Nationalists. Where was the wisdom of fortifying Poland and guarantee­ ing the independence of every state that had been torn away from the Russian Empire while complaisantly allowing Denikin to be destroyed? “It is a delusion to suppose that all this year we have been fighting the battles of the anti-Bolshevik Russians. On the contrary, they have been fighting ours; and this truth will become painfully apparent from the moment they are exterminated and the Bolshevik armies are supreme over the whole vast territories of the Russian Empire.”80 However clairvoyant his words, Churchill could not escape the fact that the White Armies had failed in their primary objectives. It was a bitter obligation for him to instruct General Holman, on February 3, 1920, to inform Denikin that no further assistance, except for that already allocated, would be forthcoming. Nor could the British government encourage the formation of a new 79 British Documents, II, 729-730, 744-748, 764-765, 776-778, 782; Cab 23/18, Cab. Concl.(ig), i4(App. I), Dec. 15, 1919. See also Ullman, op. cit., pp. 312-314. 80 Churchill, op. cit., pp. 266—270. The published version of this memorandum is mistakenly dated September 15, 1919. See also London Times, Jan. 5:7, 1920.

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anti-Bolshevik combination of states, since it had neither men nor money available to back such a plan.81 In early 1920 Lloyd George moved to implement his new strategy. Meeting with the Allied heads of government in Paris, he proposed that, since Bolshevism could not be defeated by force of arms, the best way to deal with the Soviets was to “civilise” them. First, the blockade of Russia should be lifted so as to permit direct trade with the Russian people through their cooperative associations. By means of “sympathetic under­ standing” rather than armed intervention, the struggle against the worst features of Bolshevism could be continued and won from within. On January 16 Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Nitti sanctioned the exchange of goods between the “Russian people” and Allied and neutral countries in order to remedy the “unhappy situation” in much of Russia.82 Lloyd George’s Guildhall foreign policy address of November was thus given practical application. The Russian question had entered a new phase when the Allied prime ministers gathered for the London conference in February 1920. Deni­ kin’s reverses gave the peoples of the Caucasus reason for both celebration and anxiety. On the one hand, there was a definite relationship between the decline of Denikin and the Allied decision to recognize the Trans­ caucasian governments and, on the other, between the approach of the Red Army and rising external and domestic threats to the independent republics. 81 Churchill, op. cit., pp. 270-271. See also Cab 23/20, Cab. Concl.(2o), 7(1), Jan. 29, 1920; Pari. Deb., CXXV, cols. 40-45. 82 British Documents, II, 867—875, 894—896, 898-899, 911,912; Paris Peace Conference, IX, 847-852, 863-866, 868-871, 885-886, 886-887, 889-890, 924-925; Thompson, op. cit., pp. 346-363; Brinkley, op. cit., pp. 220-221, 228-229; Ullman, op. cit., pp. 317, 326-327, 329330 -

15

De Facto Recognition

The Allies withheld recognition from the Transcaucasian republics so long as the outcome of the Russian civil war remained in doubt, but Denikin’s retreat at the end of 191.9 necessitated a reappraisal. Earlier expressions of sympathy had not been lacking, and Allied officials in the Caucasus had repeatedly impressed upon their governments the strategic and economic importance of the region. The British, French, Italian, Turkish, and even German connections in the Caucasus all figured in the ultimate decision to recognize and arm the Republics of Georgia, Azerbai­ jan, and Armenia. The British Connection In the Caucasus, as in Russia as a whole, the British connection was the strongest. While the War Office never faltered in its allegiance to Denikin, the Foreign Office and several other departments began in the autumn of 1919 to emphasize the advantages of a Caucasian buffer between Russia and Persia, especially in view of the recent Anglo-Iranian treaty. George Kidston advised that provisional recognition of the three Transcaucasian governments would entail little risk and no financial or military obligation yet would encourage them to resist Bolshevik and Turkish machinations. He accepted Oliver Wardrop’s argument that Great Britain would earn the lasting gratitude of the republics and would gain political and econom­ ic benefits by securing recognition for them. Kidston also contended that, by excluding Russia from Transcaucasia, the British position in Asia would be strengthened and that, unless the British took the initiative, they would be squeezed out commercially by the Germans and Italians and politically by the Bolsheviks and Turks. Although recommending equal 482

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treatment for the three republics, Kidston acknowledged that the status of Armenia differed from that of Georgia and Azerbaijan inasmuch as international pledges had been made to the Armenian people. The Rus­ sians themselves would probably see the justice of an independent, united Armenia.1 Foreign Secretary Çurzon favored a voluntary federation of Russian successor states, but this plan was rejected both by the non-Bolshevik Russians and by the border nationalities. He then displayed increasing sympathy for the Transcaucasian governments but maintained that policy issues must be decided jointly with the other Allied Powers. By midOctober, however, deeming the Paris Peace Conference “moribund,” he had decided it would be wiser “to formulate and pursue our own Russian policy within the limits (financial, political and geographical) open to us and inform Paris when we have done it.”2 Still, as long as there was a chance for Denikin to succeed, Curzon refrained from open advocacy of recognition of the Caucasian states. On October 4, in response to Wardrop’s appeal for at least provisional recognition, the Foreign Secretary cabled that such a commitment would be tantamount to de jure recognition and thus prejudice the peace settlement. Moreover, the recognition of states whose frontiers had hot been determined even approximately might give further incentive for armed conflict over boundary disputes. The most serious complication, Curzon admitted, was Denikin’s attitude, since Georgia and Azerbaijan were suspected of working “hand-in-glove” with enemy elements. The Caucasian states, by demonstrating their ability to live in harmony and perhaps even to join in a federative union, would measurably advance their cause.3Curzon was nevertheless well aware that an anti-Bolshevik Caucasian barrier could not be put in place without political and military support from the outside. The Department of Overseas Trade, the Petroleum Executive, and the Treasury shared the War Office’s reservations regarding the border na­ tionalities, but they viewed the Caucasus in a different light because of its exploitable resources and markets and its link with Persia and Central Asia. Tapping the enormous reservoir of petroleum in the Apsheron peninsula would diminish British dependency on American oil and have a favorable economic effect locally. As it was, the trade embargo against Soviet Russia had cut back oil production in Baku, thus hurting thousands of employees and heightening social and political unrest. The Department of Overseas Trade and the Petroleum Executive contended that the exB rita in , FO 371/3662-3664, 110080/131980/139967/144528/144710/1015/58.

2British Documentsy 111,592. 3 Ibid., pp. 560-562; FO 371/3663, 131980/1015/58.

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port of petroleum under British auspices would stimulate the economy, help pacify the region, and bring the United Kingdom political and com­ mercial benefits.4 Brigadier General H. K. Newcombe, sent to the Caucasus in September to settle accounts remaining from the British military occupation, also emphasized the relationship between economics and politics. Some form of recognition, he reported, was necessary to inspire trust in traders and investors who would introduce foreign capital and goods. Since the Cauca­ sus was the only area that had not buckled under Bolshevik pressure, the governments there should be helped before, rather than after, a political or military crisis developed: “I cannot impress too strongly that de facto recognition should be given without delay in order that definite steps can be taken for the reorganization of the general financial and economic situation.”5 Oliver Wardrop, too, used economic arguments in efforts to obtain recognition of the Transcaucasian governments. They were prepared to make generous concessions to marketing, investment, and industrial in­ terests in return for political support. Georgian leaders, despite their Marxist philosophies, had adopted a cautious, evolutionary program and had taken a hardline stand against Bolshevism. Allied recognition would counteract Bolshevik propaganda, build public confidence in the local governments, induce peasants to pay taxes, strengthen the parliamentary system, and encourage the republics to establish closer political and eco­ nomic bonds with one another. If for no other reason, recognition could be justified by considerations of defense in Persia and India.6 While supportive of all the republics, Wardrop was most concerned about Georgia and the enhancement of its alliance with Azerbaijan. Reports about the two states were often telegraphed to London under the priority classifications of “urgent” or “very urgent,” whereas most reports about Armenia were sent by sea and overland in regular diplomatic pouches. Wardrop’s representative in Erevan, Captain George F. Gracey, was far more attentive to the problems of the Armenians, partly because he had witnessed their dislocation and suffering during the war. Assuming his post on September 24, 1919, Gracey submitted numerous reports on conditions in Armenia, together with copies of the government’s diplo­ matic correspondence, information received from military intelligence, technical and statistical data on Armenia’s resources, agriculture, econ4 FO 371/3667, 137202/157950/2473/58. See also FO 371/3770, File 47637/58; FO 371/ 3673, File 167087/58. 5 FO 371/3671, 149219/91659/58. 6 FO 371/3663, 126879/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20063 end.; FO 406/42, no. 67.

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omy, inhabitants, and geography, and appraisals of internal politics. He repeatedly urged assistance, especially for the men under arms, who had bravely withstood severe privations but might perish during the forthcom­ ing winter unless they were supplied with warm clothing and boots. He also relayed Armenian appeals for political recognition as evidence of Allied moral support and as a gesture that would facilitate the work of Armenian diplomatic and economic missions abroad.7 When Wardrop paid his first visit to Erevan in October, Premier Khatisian told him that the government’s efforts to organize public institutions and a regular army were seriously hampered by the absence of interna­ tional recognition. Armenia needed such support in order to attract out­ side monetary and technical assistance; the help of British specialists in finance and industry, aviation, and communications was particularly de­ sired. Wardrop was so impressed by the sacrifices and spirit of the Ar­ menians that he began to uphold their claims to independence almost as enthusiastically as he did those of the Georgians.8 Wardrop also pointed to the danger of revived German influence. The Germans, he said, had recruited Jews from all over Russia to prepare the Caucasus for economic penetration and had outfitted Georgian prisoners of war, who were being released, with German tools and had given them printed matter advertising German goods.9 The Germans, who clearly intended to challenge the British again, were a major element in an anti-British alliance of “the Hebrew Bolsheviks, the Mussulman Ittihadists, and the Christian Germans.”10 That unholy union was spreading rumors that the Allies were enemies of self-determination.11 7 For examples of Gracey’s reports in 1919, see FO 371/3660, 148286/157883/157889/ 159643/^165450/170799/175431/512/58; FO 371/3666, 168733/168737/169442/1015/58; FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20387 end. 8 FO 371/3660, 154611/512/58 end.; FO 371/3663, 144528/1015/58; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 3, Nov. 5, 1919; FO 608/79, 342/1/12/21114 end. 9 FO 37l/3663“ 3664, i 3 198o/l35° 3 l / l 38 l96 /l44755/ l o l 5/58; f o 4o6/42>no. 58. 10 FO 371/3773» 169425/168734/58. See also FO 371/3663-3664, i 32829/ i 44754/ i 44755/ 1015/58. 11 Wardrop’s strong anti-Semitic expressions in official correspondence embarrassed the Foreign Office, which chided him in October, after he had written to denounce the Bol­ sheviks, the “German Jewish intriguers,” and the “diabolic” international plot to bring about the “ruin and enslavement of Christendom.” Distorting passages from the Bible (Zechariah, 12:3, 6), he complained: “[Jerusalem] is become a burdensome stone for all people, a cup of reeling, a pan of fire amongst wood, a torch of fire among sheaves.” George Kidston noted on the dispatch: “Mr. W ardrop’s reference to the Jews, no matter what opinion one may hold as to its justification or otherwise, is very ill advised in an official telegram Sc will only confirm the W. O. view that he is a fanatic 8c a visionary.” Curzon added: “I agree. Mr. W ardrop’s excursions into the Old Testament must be stopped at once.” FO 371/3663, 141223/1015/58. The admonition notwithstanding, Wardrop continued to mention Jews in a derogatory man­ ner in his caveats against German and Bolshevik threats.

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Wardrop’s appraisal was supported by Vice Admiral de Robeck, the British high commissioner at Constantinople, who after visiting Tiflis in October reported that the region held “extraordinary possibilities” for commerce and tourism but was plagued by uncertainties as to the future. The Georgians, he asserted, regarded Bolshevism as a “purely Jewish movement” controlled from Germany by the “international Jews.”12 Commander Harry C. Luke, a staff officer, felt that the possibility of strong German influence in Russia pointed up the wisdom of making Transcaucasia a buffer for British spheres in Persia, Mesopotamia, and India: “In other words, the desire of the Transcaucasian people for independence of Russia coincides with what seem to be the true interests of British policy.”13 Advocates of recognition, becoming more outspoken as Denikin’s re­ verses increased, pressed the government toward a more favorable view of self-determination. In late 1919 the Foreign Office summarized its stand: “It must be conceded at once that Armenia is in a different position from Georgia and Azerbaijan in this respect, since all the Allied Powers during the war have committed themselves more or less directly to the creation of an independent Armenian State under a European or an American mandate. The only question to be decided in the case of Ar­ menia is the extent of Turkish territory which should be added to the Erivan republic to make up the new State.” As to Georgia and Azerbaijan, the claims of the former were “infinitely stronger,” yet the two states should be treated alike, since Georgia would never be secure if Russia was allowed to reabsorb Azerbaijan. Recognition of all three states should be contingent on their ability to resolve their disputes and collaborate, pos­ sibly in a federative union.14A memorandum from the director of military intelligence, on the other hand, showed that the War Office remained adamant. The proposal to form a Caucasian buffer and recognize the local republics, General Thwaites wrote in December, was ill advised from the military viewpoint and, if implemented, would destroy British influence in Russia, imperil rather than protect Transcaucasian routes, and give the Bolsheviks the advantage. Denikin’s armies, still the most effective barrier to the spread of Bolshevism, should remain the focal point of British efforts, receiving support “to the utmost of our present ability.”15 12 FO 371/3664, 153849/1015/58. 13Ibid., 152147/1015/58. 14 FO 406/42, no. 81 ; British Documents, III, 701-702. See also Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany, N.Y., 1976), pp. 256-257. 15 FO 371/3672, 162432/162432/58.

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The Turkish Connection In reporting on eastern Transcaucasia, Wardrop and Lieutenant Colonel Claude B. Stokes, his political officer in Baku, gave assurances that the Azerbaijani government sincerely desired independence and British friendship and opposed Bolshevik and Pan-Turkic movements. Yet Azer­ baijan was perplexed by the silence of the Allied Powers. Continued nonrecognition was strengthening the Pan-Islamic Ittihad party, which was cooperating with the Bolshevik underground in efforts to topple Usubbekov’s moderate cabinet and make common cause with Turkey. Even the moderates could be driven against their will into the arms of Turkey if the Allies did not grant recognition and compel the Volunteer Army to clear the North Caucasus.16 Wardrop and Stokes made excuses for the asylum afforded Young Turk fugitives by the Azerbaijanis and for occasional bold Pan-Turkic manifestations like those on the first anniversary of the Turco-Azerbaijani capture of Baku. Usubbekov, they said, would use all his power to neutralize Halil, Nuri, and other Young Turks once he was certain of Allied support.17 In contradiction, numerous British officials in the field reported that the mutual attraction between Azerbaijan and Turkey was not artificial and that the army staffs of the two countries were in frequent communica­ tion. Nearly 3,000 Turkish officers and enlisted men were serving in the Azerbaijani army, and many others had been allowed to move into Daghestan to cooperate with Nuri Pasha, the Mountaineers, and the Bol­ sheviks against the Volunteer Army. Not only were opposition leaders such as Dr. Karabey Karabekov of the Ittihad party in league with fugitive Turkish generals, but many Musavatists maintained close bonds with them. From Constantinople, British assistant high commissioner Richard Webb wrote in November that, whatever the claims of Wardrop and Stokes, there was irrefutable evidence that the Musavat party was in the Pan-Islamic camp. And Commissioner Sir Percy Z. Cox telegraphed from Tehran that the Persian prime minister had conferred with Azerbaijani envoys and had found them “distinctly pro-Turkish and pan-Islamic.” From a variety of sources came reports that the Azerbaijani government was full of Turkish agents and sympathizers and that General Ali Agha

16 See, for example, FO 371/3663-3666, 137208/152788/165205/165865/1015/58; British Documents, III, 576, 602-603. 17 FO 371/3673, File 171821/58. See also FO 37i/3663“ 3665> *3 1982/l48 l59/ l 5547l/ 156102/159016/1015/58; FO 608/79, 342/1/12/2114 end.

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Shikhlinskii was trying, with or without the knowledge of Usubbekov, to bring about a Turco-Azerbaijani military alliance.18 The fact that Usubbekov and his associates may have been sincere in advocating Azerbaijani independence and British friendship did not rule out the desirability of cordial relations with Turkey. Azerbaijan’s bitter conflict with Armenia for control of the Karabagh—Zangezur-Nakhichevan corridor was enough to underscore that point. The Azerbaijani leaders therefore explored the possibilities of an understanding with the sultan’s government in Constantinople and with Nationalist commanders in Anatolia, where, according to both Turkish and Allied sources, Azer­ baijani agents were active. General Karabekir complained that their re­ cruiting activities were increasing the rate of desertion in the already undermanned XV Army Corps. Nevertheless Karabekir, aware of Azer­ baijan’s importance as an avenue to Soviet Russia, served as an intermedi­ ary between Mustafa Kemal and Azerbaijani and Turkish agents in the east. In September he reported that'special Azerbaijani envoys were being sent to consult with the Nationalists and that the Azerbaijani Ittihad party was shielding the Bolsheviks in Baku in the hope of turning Russians against one another in the North Caucasus so as to diminish the Russian threat to Muslim lands.19 Dr. Fuad Sabit, one of Kemal’s agents in Azerbaijan, asked Bolshevik spokesmen what assistance might come from Soviet Russia even though Turkish customs and economic practices were incompatible with commu­ nism. He reported that the Bolsheviks had accepted these differences and welcomed Turkish collaboration, explaining that for the moment they could offer only financial aid because the roads from central Russia were still blocked. Sabit added that Azerbaijan might also lend financial sup­ port, but it could not do so openly, as Usubbekov still placed high hopes on the English.20 Such precautions were apparently inadequate, for at the end of the year British intelligence sources reported that Azerbaijani agents had conferred with Kemal about military collaboration and that other agents were trying to win the cooperation of the influential Kurdish 18 FO 371/4160-4162, 157495/164001/177921/521/44; FO 371/5165, E1509/262/44, App. D; FO 371/3673,171821/171821/58. See also US Archives, RG 256,867B.00/266/275; France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 2, nos. 8 3 -8 4 ,16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 46,49 bis; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, File 16/16, intelligence reports. 19 Kâzim Karabekir, îstiklâl Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 140, 321, 358. 20 Ibid,., p. 359. According to Mehmet-Zade Mirza-Bala, MilR Azerbayqan hareketi ([Berlin], 1938), pp. 179-180, the promised financial assistance was delayed because of the Azerbaijani cabinet crisis in 1919, but eventually, in February 1920, 19,000 Turkish liras and 1 million French francs were sent to Angora. See also FO 371/4162, 174172/521/44.

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Bedrkhans. And, in spite of Usubbekov’s denials, the number of Turkish officers in Azerbaijan continued to grow.21 Suspicions about the Turkish-Azerbaijani connection were deepened by the surreptitious activities of the Azerbaijani envoy in Constantinople, Mir Yusuf Bek Vezirov, a wealthy landowner known for his admiration of Enver Pasha and the Young Turks. In the summer of 1919 the British had denied him permission to proceed beyond Batum on grounds that politi­ cal missions should not be accredited to the Turkish government prior to the conclusion of peace. The Azerbaijani cabinet protested this affront as a breach of international law, and Wardrop asked that the ban be lifted in order to extricate Usubbekov from an embarrassing predicament. The British Foreign Office, however, concurred in the opinion of Assistant High Commissioner Webb: “As this Republic is not recognized by His Majesty’s Government I have always maintained [the] view that though they had right to send Delegates to Paris when approved by Supreme Council they had no right to send diplomatic Mission to this or any other capital.”22 Foreign Secretary Curzon was thus outraged to learn that Vezirov had not only made his way to Constantinople in October but had even been granted an unofficial interview by High Commissioner de Robeck. An investigation failed to reveal how the Azerbaijani envoy had evaded Brit­ ish control officers. It was then decided not to deport him because British intelligence, believing he was “thick in pan-Islamist and C.U.P. intrigue,” hoped to find incriminating documents in his quarters.23 An Armenian intelligence officer, Captain Tigran Dévoyants, informed Erevan in November that Vezirov had already recruited thirty officers and was consulting with Young Turks and Nationalists about the struggle for Zangezur.24*British intelligence, soon confirming this report, added that Vezirov had conferred with the Turkish foreign minister about a defensive alliance. In his meetings with Turkish notables, Vezirov had assertedly declared that the Muslims of the Caucasus were “heart and soul” with the “Turkish Pan-Islamic movement.” He assured Kara Vasif 21 FO 371/4160-4161, 157495/164001/521/44; FO 371/3666, 169271/1015/58. See also Ar­ chives de l’Armée, 20N/169, dossier 1, Report, March 26, 1920, 16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 46, 49 to22 FO 371/3673, 137211/140031/144757/137211/58; FO 608/84, 342 /l2/5/ l 953223 FO 371/3672, 159170/162805/166690/137211/58. A Georgian representative, Grigorii Rtskhiladze, had also taken up residence in Constantinople by. that time. For related corre­ spondence, see Georgian Archives, Box 21, books 35, 40, Box 26, books 42, 46. 24 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 16/16, Reports of Dévoyants, Oct. 25, Nov. 26, 1919. See also Tigran Dévoyants, “Kianki drvagnerits,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXIV (Jan./Feb. 1946), 105.

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and other Nationalist intermediaries that Azerbaijan would never forget that the Turkish army had liberated Baku and made possible the dawn of freedom in 1918.25 In conversations with members of the British High Commission, however, Vezirov denied these allegations and replied evasively to queries about the purpose of his mission. Rear Admiral Webb thought the purported assignment to recruit teachers and civil servants was a cover for military recruitment and for attempts to increase Turkish influence in the Caucasus. He was certain that Azerbaijani leaders were deeply involved in Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic intrigues.26 The subsequent revelation of a Turkish-Azerbaijani draft treaty rein­ forced this belief. Couched in Pan-Islamic terminology, the one-year, renewable mutual defense agreement was signed on November 29, 1919, by Chief of Staff Jevad Pasha and an Azerbaijani attaché identified as Kerimov. The agreement specified that the two countries were to assist each other if the territorial integrity of either was imperiled by a neighbor­ ing state, if an external power attempted to impose an unwanted political, economic, or financial regime on either, or if they were exposed to a common political or military menace. The Ottoman government would help to reorganize the Azerbaijani army and would supply it with instruc­ tors and any surplus matériel on hand after peace was concluded with the Allies. There is no indication that the draft agreement was ever enacted, but its authenticity was supported by circumstantial evidence, especially in the correspondence of the Ottoman war ministry. What was more, that same ministry instructed General Karabekir in January 1920 to inform the Azerbaijanis that their plan for cooperation between the two general staffs was accepted.27 The Armenians had consistently maintained that a Turco-Azerbaijani agreement, whether or not a formal alliance, was directed against the Erevan republic, and most British officials in the Near East believed the Turks would use Azerbaijan in seeking to avert imposition of a harsh peace treaty by the Allies. Wardrop, hoping to wean Azerbaijan from Turkey, urged recognition of and assistance to the republic and the for26 FO 371/4161,163857/521/44; FO 371/5165, E1509/262/44. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/167, dossiers 1—2, for press extracts relating to the Azerbaijani mission; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 8/8, Report no. 8, Dec. 11, 1919, File 16/16, Report no. 48, Nov. 3, 1919. 26 FO 371/3660, 177611/512/58; FO 371/3673, 173368/174505/171821/58 ends., 177610/ 168738/58; FO 371/5165, E1509/262/44. 27 FO 371/4951, E59/2069/2165/2178/59/58; FO 371/5165, E1350/262/44; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 422/2, H. H. Hai Teghekatu BiuroParizum, 19201., no. 142, March 25, 1920. See also London Times, Feb. 9:16, 10:11, 24:15, 26:3, March 20:15, 17, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 69a/1a; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/169, dossier 1, 20N/186, dossier 1; FO 371/4162, 177921/521/44.

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mation of an independent Caucasian barrier against Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic penetration from the south and Bolshevik engulfment from the north. Denikin’s military reverses strengthened these appeals, and on December 1 the Foreign Office telegraphed Wardrop: “You are autho­ rized to inform Azerbaijan Government so far as His Majesty’s Govern­ ment are concerned their case will receive friendly and sympathetic treatment.”28 On December 31 Wardrop was notified that an Azerbaijani political agent would be welcomed in London, provided he came unofficially and was deemed suitable by Wardrop.29 The French Connection Of the Allied Powers, France was the least supportive of the separatist aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities. Premier Clemenceau had little interest in the Caucasus, although he used Armenia’s difficulties to consolidate the French position in Syria and Cilicia under the guise of sending a relief expedition toward Erevan. While concerned about their economic investments, particularly in petroleum, banking, commerce, and mining, including copper concessions in Lori and Zangezur, the French played an essentially negative role of watching and criticizing the actions of the other Allies and the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments. Unwilling to take an active political stance, they nonetheless smarted under the predominance of the British. Senator Henry Bérenger, the French Commissioner General of Petroleum Products, advised Clemen­ ceau that British policy in Asia was founded more on the acquisition of petroleum than on territorial aggrandizement. As the Caucasus was an integral part of that program, the British were trying to exclude French and other foreign competition. But France, Bérenger insisted, had every right to demand a share of the concessions in the Caucasus, Persia, and Mesopotamia.30 Although negotiations with successive directors of the British Petroleum Executive, Walter H. Long and Sir Hamar Greenwood, produced some preliminary understandings, no formal agreement was concluded in 191g.31 The small French military mission in the Caucasus lamented Clemenceau’s indifference. Headed by Lieutenant Colonel Pierre-Auguste Char28 British Documents, III, 678; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 5, Dec. 3, 1919. 29 FO 371/3666, 165063/1015/58; FO 371/3672, 165063/165063/58. 30 British Documents, IV, 1111-1113. 31 See British Documents, IV, chap. 4; FO 371/3666, 164597/1015/58; Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, O., [1974]), pp. 207-213.

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digny and then by Commandant Emile de Nonancourt, the French officers felt helpless in face of the aggressive attitude of British military and political representatives. The British, they believed, opposed the rein­ corporation of the Caucasus into Russia and were therefore backing the Muslims to the detriment of the Armenians. Like American officials in Tiflis, the French rejected Azerbaijani claims to Karabagh and Zangezur and urged that the Russian and Armenian elements in the Caucasus be aided in resisting the Pan-Turanian menace.32 In Erevan, Captain Antoine Poidebard, engrossed in the Armenian struggle for survival, regarded the Armenian leaders as unsung heroes and shared their view that there was a coordinated Turco-Azerbaijani campaign to obliterate the small republic. With his colleagues at Baku, Tiflis, and Batum, Poidebard called for Allied reoccupation of the Baku-Tiflis line and a strong French policy that would uphold the impressive French cultural and commercial record in the Orient. Political officers should replace the military mission, with a consul general at Tiflis and consuls in the other major cities. French schools should be opened and bright youngsters should be encouraged to pursue advanced education and technical training in France. Unless France hastened to take advantage of the unlimited opportunities in the Caucasus, the doors would be closed by the British, Americans, Italians, and ever-alert Germans.33 During the latter half of 1919 the economic potential of the Caucasus and the aspirations of the de facto governments attracted more attention in French official circles. Parisian newspapers shifted from terse and generally uncomplimentary coverage of Georgia and Azerbaijan to pub­ lication of feature articles on their history, people, and significance for “le monde civilisé.” Societies such as the Comité France-Caucase were organized and quickly adopted resolutions calling for recognition of the Transcaucasian states and promotion of cultural, commercial, and eco­ nomic ties with them.34 The British, watching closely, attempted to persuade themselves that, the harder the French tried, the more distrust they aroused among Turkish and Caucasian political and military leaders. Still, the Foreign Office kept track of French agents, becoming particularly curious about the mission of Dr. Jean Loris-Melikov, a member of the Pasteur Institute and a personal acquaintance of Clemenceau. In September Loris-Melikov set out for Russia and the Caucasus to 32 Archives de l’Armée, 16N/3186-3187 passim, 20N/181, dossier 1. 33 Ibid., 16N/3187, dossier 4, nos. 45 bis, 77, 107 bis. 34 Bulletin d'Informations de ÏAzerbaïdjan, no. 2 (Sept. 8, 1919), 5, and no. 5 (Nov. 18, 1919), 5-

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restore French prestige, persuade Denikin to adopt liberal policies regard­ ing domestic affairs and relations with the Caucasian states, and impress upon the latter the importance of cooperating with the Armed Forces of South Russia.35 He carried letters of introduction from American Ambassador Hugh C. Wallace and, more important, from Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary.36 Foreign Secretary Curzon was left ignorant of these developments until High Commissioner de Robeck wired from Constantinople on September 26, asking how to deal with Loris-Melikov, who had an introduction from His Majesty’s Government and was preparing to depart for South Russia. The Foreign Office, annoyed by Lloyd George’s disregard for protocol, criticized the issuance of Kerr’s letter as “rash and indiscreet.”37 It took two weeks to reconstruct the circumstances that had led to the letter, and, by the time de Robeck was asked for further information about Loris-Melikov, the French-Armenian envoy had already sailed for Odessa. De Robeck replied, however, that the mission should not cause undue concern, since Loris-Melikov was obviously “a man of Parisian tastes and training with some of the attributes of a political busybody.” In Constantinople he had given the Armenian patriarch unsolicited advice and had tried to interest Turkish officials in employing French professors in the university: “Bearing as he does a well-known name of Armenian origin and Russian associations, he had doubtless heard the East a-calling and has had a journey, with vague objectives, dignified with the name of ‘mission.’ ”38 Despite this opinion, the Foreign Office’s file on Loris-Melikov con­ tinued to grow. It was learned that his efforts in South Russia had been unsuccessful because of the intractability of Denikin’s “entourage” and lingering resentment over the recent French evacuation of Odessa and the Crimea. Then traveling to the Caucasus, he had stopped at Petrovsk and Baku and arrived at Tiflis in December. There, he tried to enlist Wardrop’s support for a plan to reconcile Georgia and the Volunteer Army and to create an Armenian-Georgian union. Feeling that the proposal was aimed at supplanting the Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance with a Chris35 For Loris-Melikov’s own account of his missions, see Jean Loris-Mélicof, La révolution russe et les nouvelles républiques transcaucasiennes (Paris, 1920). 36 Albert Thomas, who had served as minister of munitions in Clemenceau’s cabinet, acted as Loris-Melikov’s primary intermediary, with the approval of Clemenceau. 37 FO 371/3672, i 34519/ l 34519/5838 Ibid. Loris-Melikov was the nephew of General Mikhail T. Loris-Melikov, commander of the Russian armies on the Caucasus front during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and subsequently the chief minister of Tsar Alexander II. See also V. H. Torgomian, “Hushatetres,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXI (Nov./Dec. 1942), 110; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 51, Oct. 28, 1919.

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tian coalition against Muslim Azerbaijan, Wardrop offered no encouragement.39 Proceeding to Erevan, Loris-Melikov again appealed for regional cooperation. He professed to understand Armenian distress at the slow pace of the peace conference, but the Allied Powers, he explained, were carefully weighing all contingencies in order to effect a just and lasting settlement. Armenian leaders had to be patient a little longer and in the meantime demonstrate that they could form a stable administration capable of satisfying the needs of the entire Arme­ nian people. All Armenians should be brought under one roof and the devastated lands and population rehabilitated within a new polit­ ical framework. Loris-Melikov reminded the Dashnakist-dominated Parliament that, although he had left the Caucasus at an early age and had been a French citizen most of his life, he had once been a close associate of Kristapor Mikayelian, a founder of the party. He then cautiously suggested that, with the emancipation of Armenia, the Dashnaktsutiun had achieved its primary objective and should now allow the interplay of political forces to ensure the nation’s healthy and harmonious development. Loris-Melikov concluded by expressing confidence that the traditional bonds between Armenia and France would be renewed and strengthened.40 While Loris-Melikov was still in the Caucasus, another mission paid a brief visit to Tiflis. Headed by Vice Admiral Ferdinand J. J. de Bon, commander of the French Mediterranean squadron, the mission was wel­ comed by representatives of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. During two days of courtesy calls and banquets, de Bon stressed France’s innate love of freedom and its traditional defense of the liberty of other peoples.41 Belatedly, the French were making a bid for greater influence in Transcaucasia. Hearing about de Bon’s activities and the visit of a French naval mission to Baku, the British Foreign Office asked Wardrop to report on all French political and military representatives in the region. Wardrop echoed de Robeck in replying that the local governments had not taken the French seriously. In his own discussions with de Bon, Wardrop had found the admiral reluctant to express any opinion about political matters, and even Commandant de Nonancourt had scoffed at Loris-Melikov’s pretentiousness.42 These reassurances aside, the British resorted to delaying tactics when 39 FO 371/3672, 164661/134619/58; Loris-Mélicof, op. cit., pp. 38-43, 163-167, 175—202. 40 Loris-Mélicof, op. cit., pp. 168-170, 203-207; Haradj, Jan. 3:2, 1920; FO 371/3672, 177986/134519/58. 41 Archives de TArmée, 20N/186, dossier 2, nos. 58—59, Dec. 17, 1919, 20N/182, dossier 1, Report, Jan. 2, 1920, 16N/3187, dossier 4, no. 105; FO 371/3673, 173801/168734/58 end.; Ashkhatavor, Dec. 17:3, 1919; Loris-Mélicof, op. cit., pp. 156-157, 159-160. 42 FO 371/3666, 172650/1015/58.

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de Bon proposed to improve communications by installing two small wireless stations on the grounds of a French firm in Batum. After three weeks of interdepartmental correspondence, London decided that, while no political objections could be raised, it might be possible to use “local technical objections” to justify a refusal. Otherwise, all that could be done was to point out to de Bon the temporary character of the British military presence at Batum.43 To the French, however, this attitude only re­ inforced reports from the field about the high-handed behavior of the British military governor and his regime at Batum. On December 17 Ambassador Jules Cambon strongly protested British interference in the workings of the Baku—Batum pipeline, the unilateral fixing of oil prices, the imposition of an export tax, supervision of the Batum branch of the Russian State Bank by the British Trade Corporation, and other discriminatory measures. Protests were also filed about offensive acts taken against French commercial firms and the French naval services at Batum.44 The sharply worded notes aroused anger in the War Office, but the Foreign Office, upon verification of some of the charges, tried to pacify the French by giving the background for British actions and by promising no further interference in the flow of oil from Baku. The French were reminded, however, that the British had occupied Batum in compliance with the Turkish armistice and that, while the responsibility of policing the Caucasus had rested upon the Allies collectively, the actual burden was being borne solely by His Majesty’s Government. In privatè, Foreign Office personnel freely expressed resentment that the French, while content to let the British assume the financial costs, were demanding an equal share of whatever economic benefits might accrue.45 The Italian Connection Despite the bickering among French, British, and American officials in the Caucasus, they were united in concerns over the threat of Bolshevism, Pan-Islam, and renewed German penetration. And all distrusted the Ital­ ians, regarding them as political opportunists and instruments of German cabals. The Italians, for example, boosted their quest for raw materials and markets by professing sympathy for the Transcaucasian governments even as they fraternized with Turkish Nationalists in Anatolia and secretly accorded asylum to Young Turk fugitives in Europe. Their limited capital 43 FO 371/3673, 168898/168898/58. 44 FO 371/3665, 163106/1015/58. See also FO 371/3666, 163856/164041/1015/58; FO371/ 3672, 166312/166312/58. 45 FO 371/3660, 164281/512/58; FO 371/3672, 166312/166312/58.

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resources for foreign investment and British unwillingness to join in an economic consortium pushed them toward cooperation with the Ger­ mans. Warnings about the German-Italian connection came from many quarters.46 Even Patrick Stevens, a wily Irishman who served as British consul at Batum and who vigorously opposed Georgian and Azerbaijani independence, urged his government to furnish rolling stock and other equipment needed by the Transcaucasian railway in order to forestall action by the Italians: “Improvements introduced by them, tojudge by the way things are shaping, would mean also German participation in them and the surrender, by us into undesirable hands, of all control over the transport of oil to Batoum.”47 Oliver Wardrop reported that the Italian mission was wooing the local governments with promises of political support and offers to provide advisers and to book free passage for students wishing to continue their education in Italy. Colonel Gabba was creating an aura of opulence by using imported limousines and making lavish expenditures on banquets, and other forms of entertainment. According to Wardrop, the Italians wanted coal, manganese, and timber concessions in the Poti, Borzhom, and Svanetia districts of Georgia, petroleum in Baku, and a contract to construct a railway along the Araxes River between Aliat in Azerbaijan and Julfa, the connecting point with the line into North Persia.48 De Robeck, after visiting Tiflis in October, added that the Caucasian governments knew the Italians were using “every possible means to promote German interests both in regard to trade and politically.” German financial concerns undoubtedly were operating behind an Italian facade in Turkey, Russia, and the Caucasus.49 In fact, members of Colonel Gabba’s military mission were working hard to secure an Italian foothold in Transcaucasia.50 Representatives in 46 See, for example, FO 608/98, File 261/1/3; FO 371/3664, 145723/1015/58; FO 371/3667, 144831/2473/58; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, Report, Sept. 16, 1919, 16N/202, dossiers 1-2 passim. See also Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London, [1964]), pp. 140-143. M447 British Documents, III, 679. 48 Ibid-, pp- 56 l >595“ 596; FO 37^ 3 ^ 3 ^ 143079/1015/58. 49 FO 371/3664, 145725/1015/58. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, Report, Sept. 16, 1919. 50 When it was learned in London that Gabba’s mission would remain in the Caucasus even though the Nitti-Tittoni ministry had repudiated Orlando’s plan to send a large military expedition there, George Kidston wrote: “It should be noticed that Italian policy is to accord at least quasi-recognition to Republics—a further argument, I venture to submit, for our assuming the role of champion of the Republics without delay.” FO 371/3662, 116968/1015/ 58. And when Ambassador Imperiali informed the Foreign Office that Italian merchants were complaining about the lack of public security in Batum, another official wrote: “This is pretty cool in the light of the role the Italians have played in the Caucasus story.” FO 371/ 3668 , 123550/ 11067/ 58 .

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each republic, investigating resources and potentials, offered technical assistance, heavy machinery, manufactured goods, and even military supplies in return for the opportunity to participate in the economic exploitation and development of the new states. They portrayed themselves as a tolerant people, respectful of the customs and religions of others, and as champions of the right of all nations to a free existence. Azerbaijani officials were told that Italy sympathized with the Muslim struggle for liberation. Whenever Italians had come into association with Muslims, as in Tripolitania, they had exerted a “civilizing” influence. They were unique in being able to promote law and order without interfering in popular traditions and beliefs.5152 Uneasiness about the Italian connection increased when Georgian and Azerbaijani missions departed for Rome in the autumn of 1919. Secrecy shrouded the Azerbaijani mission, presumably because it sought military equipment at a time when Italy was pledged to a common Allied policy on the sale and delivery of arms. The Georgian mission, on the other hand, openly announced its objectives. Headed by Konstantin Sabakhtarashvili, it reached Rome on October 17 and, enlisting the assistance of Italian socialist comrades, explained in the press that it had come to place orders and interest Italian firms in the economic development of Georgia. In his interviews, Sabakhtarashvili always spoke of Georgia’s struggle for independence and its right to Allied recognition. He praised Colonel Gabba’s efforts and expressed appreciation to the Italians for being the first to resume maritime service at Batum after the war.62 Introduced to Premier Nitti on November 2 by Leonida Bissolati, leader of the reformist socialists, Sabakhtarashvili outlined the mutual advantages of close Italo-Georgian political and economic bonds. Italy would not only obtain petroleum, coal, manganese, timber, tobacco, and other necessities but would also find a ready market for industrial products and an outlet for surplus technical personnel.53 Sabakhtarashvili bluntly told British Ambassador George Buchanan that his government would grant eco­ nomic concessions to any country that supported Georgia’s political goals.54 Concern deepened in London when it was learned that a new 51 Bulletin d'informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 4 (Nov. 18, 1919), 4-5. 52 FO 3663-3665, 142999/144754/146279/147421/147531/155322/1015/58; British Docu­ ments, III, 595; Georgian Archives, Box 20, book 6, Box 26, book 31, Box 32, book 1. See also the memoirs of a member of the Georgian mission, W. S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage (New York, [1961]), pp. 427-434, 435-436. Wardrop attempted to prevent several members of the mission, including Woytinsky, from leaving Georgia on grounds that they were unreliable Jews or Germanophiles. See FO 371/3663, 135034/1015/58. 53 FO 371/3664-3665, 149679/162836/1015/58. 54 FO 371/3664, 151920/1015/58.

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Italian mission, composed of prominent businessmen and military repre­ sentatives, was preparing to depart for the Caucasus. Neither Buchanan nor Curzon found it insignificant that the mission was to be headed by Senator Ettore Conti, a skillful organizer and financier who had pre­ viously served as assistant minister of arms and munitions.65 The cordial reception given Sabakhtarashvili raised suspicions that the Italians intended to seize the initiative from Great Britain by championing the Caucasian states at the peace conference. Yet Bissoläti let Ambassador Buchanan know on November 3 that both he and Nitti had limited them­ selves to expressions of goodwill, since decisions on recognition required joint Allied action.66 Four days later Assistant Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza added that he had sidestepped Sabakhtarashvili’s appeals by contending that the presence of an Italian mission in Tiflis and a Georgian mission in Rome was tantamount to de facto recognition and that anything more might imply de jure recognition, which the government was not yet prepared to grant.67 Nkti’s cabinet' however, had already decided to act, and on November 3 Ambassador Imperiali wrote the British Foreign Office: The Italian Government would like to learn the view of the British Government respecting the question of the recognition or the non-recognition o f the Republic of Georgia. Information on this point is of interest to the Italian Government since it is their firm intention to act in the Caucasian question in perfect agreement with their Allies and to ensure British support and collaboration for the economic activity which Italy proposes to develop in those regions. Therefore if the British Govern­ ment were disposed to recognise the Georgian Republic, the Italian delegate at the Peace Conference would not be averse to bringing before that body the question of the recognition of the young Transcaucasian republics, and thus conform to the insistent solicitations of the Georgian Delegation.68

As the Russian crisis was still unresolved, Lord Curzon replied on November 14 that recognition of Georgia was bound to recognition of the other Transcaucasian states, an issue in turn bound to the whole Russian problem and, in a lesser degree, to the Turkish peace settlement. Al66 FO 371/3665, 162501/1015/58; Near East News, Feb. 3:7—8, 1920. Arrival of the Conti mission in Transcaucasia was reported by local sources in February 1920. See FO 371/4950, E2774/36/58 ends. For the personnel roster of the mission, see FO 371/4951, E51/51/58. 56 British Documents, 111,625-626. ®7 Ibid., pp. 637-638. ®* FO 371/3664, 149045/1015/58. On reading this note, a junior clerk in the Foreign Office complained that the Italians had pressed the British into an uncomfortable position, but Kidston disagreed, noting that he had always favored the idea of bringing the cause of the Transcaucasian states before the peace conference and had often pointed out the danger of Italy’s “stealing the match on us in this respect.”

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though the entire matter was under consideration, “it is impossible at the present juncture for His Majesty’s Government to afford any indication of their policy beyond the expression of sympathy with Georgian aspira­ tions which, as the Italian Government are aware, has already been given.”59 Not until mid-December did the Allied leaders, meeting in London, agree that further assistance to the anti-Bolshevik Russian forces would be useless and that aid to the non-Russian border populations struggling for “freedom and self-government” might be considered on the merits of each particular case.60 This was the Allied position on the Transcaucasian republics at the end of 1919. Recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan The failure of the White Armies forced the Allies to decide at the begin­ ning of 1920 whether an attempt should be made to fortify the Caucasus as a buffer against Bolshevism. Oliver Wardrop warned that only recogni­ tion of and material and moral assistance to the local republics could prevent the Bolsheviks from overrunning Transcaucasia and then work­ ing “their will in Persia and Transcaspia and beyond.” The republics would put up a stiff fight if they were given arms, equipment, and techni­ cal advisers and if the British reinforced their Batum and North Persia garrisons, helped renovate the Transcaucasian railway system, and manned a part of the Caspian flotilla.61 The Turkish and Bolshevik “hordes” would try to unite over the Caucasus, but “Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have now Governments which I believe to be prepared to do their best to defend their frontiers against invasion, and if help be given without delay, there is reason to hope that defence would be successful.”62 From Baku, Colonel Stokes advised that immediate recognition and military aid would allow the British to gain the friendship or, if desired, even the control of Azerbaijan and to suppress Turkish and Bolshevik influences in eastern Transcaucasia.63 From Tehran, Commissioner Percy Cox wired that the security of Persia was closely linked with protection of the Batum-Baku line and of the Caspian Sea.64And from Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck and Commander Luke reported that Bolsheviks and 59 British Documents, III, 647; FO 406/41, no. 146. 60 British Documents, 11,782. FO 371/3666, 167875/167947/169546/170159/1015/58. 62 Ibid., 168506/1015/58 (British Documents, III, 747-748). See also FO 371/3673, 172197/ 172087/58; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 3, Nov. 5, 1919. 63 FO 371/3666, 169242/1015/58. 64 FO 371/3664, 148577/1015/58; Adm. 1, 8593/134 ends. See also British Documents, III, 752- 753-

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Young Turks were busy mobilizing Muslim opinion against Great Britain. In Luke’s opinion, the Bolsheviks were skillfully “contriving to turn the somewhat vague and unformed aims of the pan-Islamic movement, such as it is, into anti-British channels,” and they were making progress because of Denikin’s “injudicious policy” toward Daghestan and Azerbaijan. His Majesty’s Government should therefore declare publicly that it was “now as ever” the friend of the Muslims, recognize the Azerbaijani republic, and guide the peace conference toward fair treatment of the Turks.65 Significantly, it was at this juncture that the British cabinet overturned the Lloyd George—Balfour—Curzon strategy by voting to leave the sultan in Constantinople and not to expel the Turks “bag and baggage” from Europe. Denikin’s reverses prodded the Foreign Office into open advocacy of recognition. Even Assistant Secretary J. A. C. Tilley seemed to come around, writing on January 2 that the “recognition of Georgia & Azerbai­ jan will be a blow to Denikin but perhaps he has fallen so low that another blow does not much matter.”66 Permanent Undersecretary Charles Hardinge agreed: “It was, I think, largely owing to Denikin’s successes that we have hitherto hesitated to recognise the de facto independence of the Caucasian republics, since there was always the possibility of Denikin turning his attention to them & incorporating them in the Russia under his control. That contingency is for the time being removed, and it should be considered whether the moment has not arrived to afford some recognition to the republics and thus to give them at least some moral support against the Bolshevik danger. I do not see how Denikin could well complain of action on our part in this sense.”67 Having read these comments, Curzon informed his colleagues that he would propose recognition to the Allied premiers and foreign ministers, soon to gather in Paris. To a query about the inclusion of Armenia, his staff replied that Armenia should be dealt with in the Turkish treaty, explaining “that if a) the Armenian republic was recognised within its Caucasian limits, the Turks would jum p to the conclusion that no Turkish territory was to be added to the new State, and b) that if on the other hand it was specified at the time of recognition that Turkish territory was to be detached to form the new State, we would risk an outbreak of massacres etc. before we were ready to enforce the Turkish settlement as a whole.”68 66 British Documents, IV, 1001—1003. 66 FO 371/3666, 168836/1015/58. 67 Ibid., 167875/1015/58. 68 Ibid., 168836/1015/58.

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Meeting in Paris on January 10, the Council of Foreign Ministers quickly granted recognition to Georgia and Azerbaijan in a maneuver that had little to do with the principle of self-determination or the validity of their claims.69 Curzon told the council of the British position on Armenia and of the desire of Georgia and Azerbaijan to become “real states.” The French and Italian ministers said they would not oppose recognition if it did not prejudice the boundaries of the future Armenian state; the Japa­ nese delegate and the American observer, as usual, had to communicate with their respective foreign ministries before venturing an opinion. It was agreed, therefore, that “the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognise the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as ‘de facto’ Governments, subject to the reserve that the representatives of the United States and Japan would request instructions from their Gov­ ernments on the question.”70 Notification of the de facto recognition, with the reasons for Armenia’s exclusion, was received in Tiflis on January 12.71 Within an hour the Georgian capital was bedecked with flags and carpets; factories, offices, and shops were closed and traffic was stopped by joyous demonstrations. At the prime minister’s headquarters, Noi Zhordania and Foreign Min­ ister Evgenii Gegechkori made patriotic speeches, including words of appreciation for Great Britain. Oliver Wardrop was enthusiastically ap­ plauded at the public meetings, the opera, and a fireworks display. Georgia observed a national holiday on January 13, as the spontaneous celebrations of the previous day were succeeded by organized rallies and special sessions of the city council and the legislature. Prime Minister Khatisian, who had just arrived in Tiflis for a round of consultations, extended the congratulations of the Armenian government and in turn was the recipient of Georgian ovations, expressions of brotherhood, and encouragement that Armenia’s day of justice was certainly imminent. For the next fortnight congratulatory messages flowed in from around the 69 The Council of Foreign Ministers met three times between January 10 and s i, 1920. During that period Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Nitti sat at the International Conference of Premiers and acted as the Supreme Council. There was some overlap in attendance at the two bodies, and several sessions were also attended by American Ambassador Wallace and Japanese plenipotentiary Matsui. See British Documents, II, 784-971; Paris Peace Conference, IX, 859-1015. 70 FO 371/3666,169628/169629/1015/58; British Documents, II, 796-797; Paris Peace Confer­ ence, IX, 958-959. 71 FO 371/3666, 169629/1015/58; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 8, Jan. 14, 1920; Georgian Archives, Box 8, book 10; Bor’ba, Jan. 14:1, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 14:1, 1920.

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world. Perhaps nobody felt more triumphant than John Oliver Wardrop.72 In Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Nasib Bek Usubbekov proclaimed to his people on January 13 that their country had been received into the family of “advanced nations.” The official Azerbaijani celebration began at dawn the next day with religious services at the Taza-Per mosque, followed by a rally of Muslim workers at City Hall, where Musavat orators hailed the Muslim political renaissance and the achievements of the world’s first Muslim republic. At noon the cabinet and members of the diplomatic corps and foreign military missions joined the Parliament in a special session. Foreign Minister Fathali Khan Khoiskii reflected upon the strug­ gle of the past eighteen months for national independence and character­ ized recognition as a victory not only for the Azerbaijani people but for the entire “Turkish race.” Mehmed Emin Rasulzade, chairman of the Musavat central committee, also spoke of the time when the country’s existence had been imperiled by Russian reactionary forces and British military occupation, but hard work and dedication had earned Azerbaijan the right to independence. On behalf of the Armenian factions, Arshak Malkhasian expressed felicitations and the hope that a new era of har­ mony had begun among the races and governments of the Caucasus. Azerbaijani Ittihad leader Karabekov, on the other hand, pointed out that recognition had been forced upon the Allied Powers, that the Muslim struggle for liberation was continuing on many fronts, and that the natural bonds between Azerbaijan and Turkey should be fortified. In the after­ noon, a review of the troops was attended by Colonel Stokes and other foreign representatives along the Caspian seafront. The celebrations con­ tinued long into the night with banquets, toasts and speeches, and colorful entertainment.73 Allied recognition came at a crucial time for Georgia and Azerbaijan. Both governments had just received a Soviet proposal for joint action to strike a final blow against “the monarchist counterrevolutionaries” and remove the barrier between the Russian and Caucasian workers and peasants.74 Foreign Commissar G. V. Chicherin’s overture placed the 12British Documents, III, 755; FO 371/4949, E36/1573/36/58 ends. , La République Géorgienne, Jan. 25:1-8, 1920; Bor’ba, Jan. 14-25, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 15:2-3, 18:3, 1920. The Turkish Parliament also extended congratulations to Georgia and Azerbaijan on their recog­ nition by the Supreme Council. See Bor’ba, Feb. 18:4, 1920. 73 Bulletin d'Informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 9 (Feb. 15, 1920), 4-8; FO 371/5165, E1509/ 262/44. See also London Times, Jan. 16:2, 27:11, 1919. 74 Georgian Archives, Box 32, book 26; Bor’ba v Azerbaidzhane, p. 367; Bor’ba v Gruzii, p. 527. See also FO 371/3666,169209/1015/58; NearEastNews, Jan. 16:1,1920; Bor’ba, Jan. 14:1, 1920.

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Transcaucasian republics in a delicate situation, particularly as the Sovnarkom had not acknowledged their right to independence and the radicalized proletariat and Pan-Islamic elements used the occasion to increase their antigovernmental agitation and repeat their demands for integral bonds with Soviet Russia. The imperious tone of the Soviet proposal was denounced in Musavat and Menshevik newspapers, which cautioned against entrapment in the Russian civil strife. The Armenian press admonished the Georgians and Azerbaijanis not to be deceived, for as soon as the Red Army disposed of Denikin it would undoubtedly try to crush the Caucasus and embrace Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In replies to Moscow on January 12 and 14, Gegechkori and Khan Khoiskii said their respective governments, though having employed de­ fensive measures against the Whites, would not engage in acts of aggres­ sion or interfere in the affairs of Russia, just as they would not allow meddling in their own domestic affairs. The establishment of normal relations with Soviet Russia and all other states would be welcomed if predicated on mutual respect for one another’s sovereignty and in­ dependence.75 In response, Chicherin scolded the two governments for being evasive and accused them of having provided facilities to the White Army. It should not be forgotten that the “creatures around Denikin” were the avowed enemies of all small peoples or that Soviet Russia had been the first to recognize Finland and Poland and to seek a modus vivendi with the Baltic states. In their replies, Gegechkori and Khan Khoiskii held forth the shield of neutrality and protested Chicherin’s slanderous inferences and the Sovnarkom’s failure to clarify its posi­ tion toward the republics.76 The final communication in February was a third Soviet note, which expressed disappointment and impatience at the disparity between the words and actions of the two governments. Although claiming to be anti-Denikin, they had spurned a concrete Soviet proposal for joint military action and had raised irrelevant issues bearing on the long-range association between Russia and the Caucasus.77 The stance of Georgia and Azerbaijan seemed to vindicate the support­ ive tactics advocated by Oliver Wardrop. Still, both he and Stokes re75 Bulletin d'informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. io (March 1, 1920), 2 \ La République Géorgienne, Feb. 1:4-6, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 14:4, 17:4, 1920; FO 371/4931, E414/1/58; A. Raevskii, Angliiskaia interventsiia i Musavatskoe praviteVstvo (Baku, 1927), pp. 182-184; Georgian Ar­ chives, Box 32, book 26. 76 Bor’ba v Gruzii, pp. 534-535; Raevskii, op. cit., p. 185; Bor’ba, Feb. 7:3, 8:2, 10:2, 14:3, 15:1,1920\Haradj, Feb. 14:1,17:2,1920; F O 371/3666,175359/ l ° 15/58i F O 37l/4949“495°> E i575/1910/2774/4918/36/58 ends.; Georgian Archives, Box 32, book 26. 77 Bulletin d'informations de VAzerbaïdjan, no. 12 (April 1, 1920), 5-6; Raevskii, op. cit., p. 186; Near East News, March 2:1, 5:1, 11:4, 1920.

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mained deeply concerned over the situation in the North Caucasus, where hundreds of Turkish and Bolshevik agents were zealously at work. South­ ern Daghestan, they warned, was already under the sway of Nuri Pasha and would probably fall to the Bolsheviks should matters be allowed to drift. The Mountaineers would readily turn aside from the alien elements, however, if the Allies granted them political recognition and financial assistance and forced the Volunteer Army to withdraw.78 But from a variety of other sources, the Foreign Office received condemnatory appraisals of the Mountaineers and their Turco-Bolshevik connections. In London a change in policy was deemed unwarranted, and on January 29 Wardrop was informed that “His Majesty’s Government do not propose, at any rate at present, to act upon your suggestions that recognition, encouragement, financial support, etc. be extended to Daghestan.”79 The recognition of Azerbaijan also brought renewed demands for the arrest or expulsion of the Young Turk fugitives in the country.80Wardrop and Stokes, however, argued that' the Turkish pashas in question had afforded the Azerbaijanis their first chances of independence and that violation of the rules of hospitality would embarrass Usubbekov’s pro-Allied cabinet. Without doubt, all responsible Azerbaijani leaders had chosen the Allied side in preference to the Turkish orientation, for they now realized that the Turks merely wanted to exploit and dominate them. Even Halil and Nuri had sent word through Usubbekov that they would break with the Bolsheviks and do almost anything the British wanted if given assurances that the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire would not be partitioned.81 Wardrop believed that, provided the Turkish peace terms were not too severe, “we ought to have no difficulties with Mussulmans.”82 British intelligence reports showed, on the contrary, that Halil Pasha had been accorded a tumultuous reception on his return to Baku from Daghestan and that Turkish influence was increasing rather than declin­ ing in Azerbaijan. The British High Commission at Constantinople main­ tained that the Azerbaijanis were making “violent flirtations if not more” with the Turkish Nationalists and had no intention of turning out the 78 See, for example, FO 371/3665—3666, 155114/169547/170159/1015/58; FO 371/3673, 172328/172696/168738/58. 79 FO 371/3673, 174040/174040/58. 80 Ibid., 171821/173368/174505/171821/58. 81 For the position of Wardrop and Stokes, see FO 371/3665, 155979/156102/159016/1015/ 58; FO 371/3673, 168738/172696/168738/58, 172977/173646/175583/171821/58, 172197/ 172087/58. 82 FO 371/3666, 174548/1015/58.

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fugitives.83 Finally, at the end of January, the Foreign Office instructed Wardrop to advise Usubbekov that the prolonged asylum granted the Turkish pashas and the mounting evidence of collusion with the Turkish Nationalists could only prejudice British confidence in the Azerbaijani government. Usubbekov was to be urged to arrest or expel the Young Turk notables and to repudiate or deny secret liaisons with either the sultan’s government or the Nationalists. If Wardrop had serious objections, he could defer action until he had communicated with the Foreign Office.84 Both Wardrop and Stokes did, of course, object, contending that such stringent demands would undermine Usubbekov unless the Allies first demonstrated their support by supplying military equipment, uniforms, and other vital goods. As Stokes was soon expected home on leave, the Foreign Office agreed to hold its directive in abeyance pending personal consultations in London.85 A Decision on Military Assistance On January 10, the day the Paris Peace Conference recognized Georgia and Azerbaijan, Lloyd George told his fellow prime ministers that they must decide whether to arm the Transcaucasian states in view of the probability that the Bolsheviks and Turks would join forces. Generals Foch, Sackville-West, and Cavallero, the experts to whom the question was referred, reported that the spread of Bolshevism could be arrested along strategic routes such as the Caucasus. The undertaking would entail Allied control of the Caspian flotilla and the deployment of at least two infantry divisions to the Caucasus until local armies were strong enough to relieve them. A minimum of three months would be required to create the barrier; in the interim Denikin should continue to resist the Bolsheviks.86 Since the British would have to bear most of the burden, a special session of the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs was convened in London on January 12 to consider the recommendations of the military experts. In an unusual show of unity, representatives of the India Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office agreed that control of the Caspian Sea was essential not only for defense of the Caucasus but 83 FO 371/3673, 172088/168738/58, 173368/173677/171821/58, 172328/172087/58; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 9, Jan. 28,1920; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 2, Reports, Jan. 11, Feb. 1, 1920. 84 Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 10, Feb. 11, 1920; FO 371/3673, 173368/ 171821/58. 85 Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 10; FO 371/3673, 176444/171821/58. 86 British Documents, II, 725, 925-927; Pans Peace Conference, IX, 837-838, 902-904.

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also for the safety of Persia, Mesopotamia, and India.87 But with Lord Curzon still in Paris, the conference was dominated by the chief of staff, Field Marshal Henry Wilson, who skillfully argued against new military commitments. He explained that, in addition to the two divisions for the Caucasus, five others would be needed for the territories beyond; seven divisions simply were not available. The British line of defense had to be drawn far to the south, beginning in Palestine and extending through Mosul and Biijand to India. The garrison at Batum should therefore be withdrawn and the Eastern peace settlement designed so as not to leave “the Turk dissatisfied and hostile, the Kurd restless and unquiet, and the Afghan unfriendly.” Granted, the loss of the Caspian would be “a first class disaster” and would impel the Caucasian states to throw in their lot with the Bolsheviks, but this outcome was unavoidable. Those states, in themselves not very important, would not prove decisive in military action either in or against the Bolshevik camp. Still, as long as Denikin was in the field, they could be given such moral and material support “as would not entirely preclude the possibility of his recovering, and once again making headway against the enemy.”88 Mention of Denikin’s name stirred Winston Churchill, who insisted that if two British divisions were available they should be used to bolster the dwindling loyal forces in Russia. He criticized the Foreign Office for attempting to keep the British garrison at Batum and divert to the Cauca­ sus the remaining military supplies allocated to Denikin: “We had been trying to bridge a twelve-foot gap with a ten-foot plank, and when this was found to be inadequate a ten-foot six plank has been substituted as a great concession. The only chance of reinvigorating the Russian elements which were opposed to Bolshevism was to support one more of them so vigorous­ ly that the rest would take heart and renew the struggle.”89 With neither the skill nor the conviction of Curzon, Foreign Office representatives in attendance failed to respond effectively. They tacitly accepted the decision to inform Curzon that a line of defense passing through the Caucasus was impractical, that the Caspian could not be held, that Batum should be evacuated before a definite threat materialized there, that seven divisions, if available, would be better employed in direct action against Moscow, and that so long as Denikin continued the struggle the Transcaucasian 87 For the views of the Admiralty Office and the India Office on defense of the Caspian, see Adm 1, 8593/134; Cab 24/96, C.P. 401, 412, 438; FO 371/3666, 168553/168602/168887/ i 6953° / i o 15/ 58 . 88 FO 371/3980, 171482/1089/38; FO 608/275, File 165, no. 165, IDCE 34th minutes, Jan. 12, 1920. 89 Ibid.

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republics should be helped in order to dissuade them from collaborating with the Bolsheviks.90 After the conference Field Marshal Wilson wrote in his diary: Curzon, who with Lloyd George is in Paris, sent a ridiculous wire about Georgia and Azerbaijan and the necessity for supporting them, just as I was writing to say that I wanted to withdraw our brigade from Batoum. We had a meeting at the Foreign Office, and I gave a lecture on a map showing the impossibility of standing on the forward lines in defence of India.. . . It was quite true that Georgia and Azerbaijan would go Bolshevik in spite of the fact that those fools in Paris only yesterday agreed to acknowledge the “defacto governments” o f those countries.. . . All this was agreed to by the Committee and wired to Curzon, and our wire will give Curzon and the Frocks in Paris something to think about.91

As predicted, the message outraged Curzon. And Lloyd George, hoping to reconcile the opposing views, immediately summoned his service minis­ ters to Paris. The sudden departure of Secretary of War Churchill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Wilson, First Lord of the Admiralty Walter Hume Long, and First Sea Lord Admiral David Beatty just when the peace conference was deliberating the Russian problem created war jitters throughout Europe. Meanwhile, on January 15, Jules Cambon, Philip Kerr, and Marquis della Torretta explained to the Georgian and Azerbaijani delegations in Paris the significance of the Supreme Council’s extension of de facto recognition. Iraklii Tsereteli of Georgia and Ali Mardan Topchibashev of Azerbaijan responded with words of appreciation, a request for financial, military, and political support, the suggestion that Daghestan also be recognized to consolidate the Caucasian buffer, and an appeal that Geor­ gian and Azerbaijani efforts to separate permanently from Russia not be impeded. Tsereteli said his government, given arms and matériel, could place 50,000 troops in the field, and Topchibashev claimed Azerbaijan could deploy 100,000. When Cambon imparted the gist of this conversa­ tion to the Supreme Council the next day, Clemenceau remained skepti­ cal. Lloyd George, however, was optimistic that “these tribes would put up a most formidable resistance to the Bolsheviks as they had done in the past against Russian expansion to their lands.” Pleased that no Allied troops had been requested, he thought arms and ammunition should be allocated since the British and French had plenty to spare. Clemenceau observed 90 FO 371/3666, 169528/1015/58 (British Documents, III, 753-755)- See also Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917—1921, Vol. II: Britain and the Russian Civil War (Prince­ ton, 1968), pp. 323-324. 91 C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, II (London, [1927]), 221—222.

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sarcastically that the French stockpile had probably all been given to the Soviets “by way of Denikin’s armies.” No decision was reached during that session on whether to arm the Caucasian states.92 Between January 15 and 18, the British cabinet members in Paris tried several times to resolve the sharp division of opinion on the armaments issue. Admiral Beatty, though emphasizing again the importance of hold­ ing the Caspian Sea, was unwilling to send sailors there unless a British or Allied armed force also secured the Batum-Baku lifte, precisely what Curzon had advocated, but Lloyd George argued that supplying the local republics with arms and matériel should be sufficient. He dared not recommit British soldiers and sailors after having withdrawn from the Caucasus only four months earlier. Predictably, Winston Churchill labeled as “madness” the abandonment of Denikin in favor of the feeble and untried Georgian and Azerbaijani governments. Having turned away from the strongest anti-Bolshevik army still in action, the Allies were now to lavish their resources on “the little weak pawns that are left to us.” All such measures were foredoomed, and it was ridiculous to fling “a few handfuls” of British soldiers and sailors into positions from which they could not be extricated and where “their poor lives will only be another unavailing sacrifice in the prolonged indecisions of the Allies.” Churchill’s call for a new anti-Bolshevik crusade failed to muster the support of even Chief of Staff Wilson, and Curzon took the opportunity to point out once again that the Russian opponents of Bolshevism had been given a chance and had failed. Building a line of resistance in the Caucasus, he said, was not nearly so serious a problem as trying to reorganize Denikin’s demoral­ ized armies. Lloyd George, agreeing with the foreign secretary, instructed Wilson and Beatty to consult with the Georgian and Azerbaijani delega­ tions about financial and military aid to help them resist Bolshevism.93 During that consultation, on January 17, the Caucasian spokesmen proved adept at discussing political matters but not at giving detailed military information. If Armenia was granted recognition and brought into an all-Caucasus defensive alliance, they advised, it would be easier to attain a modus vivendi with Soviet Russia, the best possible solution in the absence of Allied military intervention.94* Reporting to the British 92 British Documents, II, 896—898; Paris Peace Conference, IX, 866—868. See also Z. Avalov, Nezavisimost* Gruzii v mezJidunarodnoipolitike, 1918—1921 g.g. (Paris, 1924), pp. 241-243; Geor­ gian Archives, Box 25, book 4. 93 Cab 23/35, Secret S-10, Jan. 16, S -n ,Ja n . 18,1920. See also Ullman, op. cit., pp. 330-336; Busch, op. cit., pp. 259-260. 94 FO 608/272, File 16, no. 192; Avalov, op. cit., pp. 244-245. Beatty and Wilson also met with General Gabriel Korganian, the Armenian military attaché in Paris. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian report no. 13, Jan. 21, 1920.

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ministers the next day, Henry Wilson presented a dismal view of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Together they had no more than 40,000 men under arms, a force incapable of defending the frontiers and of protecting a railway nearly 500 miles in length. They were unworthy of receiving the food and money they were requesting. Georgians had always been cowards, submitting to Arabs, Turks, Persians, and Russians and then appealing to each of these overlords against the others. Curzon’s historical counterarguments were lost on Wilson, while Lloyd George selected points from both sides to boost his own proposal to furnish moral and material assistance but no troops. He doubted that the Bolsheviks would try to push beyond Baku, since if they did, “they would be entering Armenia, a miserable country which no one was willing to accept responsibility for.” If the Allies armed the Caucasian states, the Bolsheviks might think it better to negotiate than attack. Curzon’s renewed plea for at least a British naval force in the Caspian was turned down by Admiral Beatty, who insisted on occupation of the Batum-Baku line as a prerequisite, and by Churchill and Wilson, who said implementation of the proposed measure would be like “using a piece of putty to stop an earthquake.”95 In his diary, Wilson noted that he had wittily pointed out that “I could not see why Lenin should not attack all the Border states, since Paris had filched them from Russia, and Lenin might—and I thought ought to—claim them as part of Russia, and therefore ought to take them.”96 The British ministers, having failed to resolve their differences, brought the problem before the Allied premiers, who were then sitting as the Supreme Council. At that session on January 19, the Georgian and Azer­ baijani delegations were given their first and only hearing by the peace conference. Tsereteli, declaring that the two countries would defend themselves against a Bolshevik attack, stated his position: “We do not wish war; we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognise our independence.” Tsereteli and Azerbaijani delegate Megaramov (Mahmed Muharamov) claimed that their armies, though now not large, could be rapidly augmented if adequate supplies were furnished. Megaramov dodged Curzon’s query about Turkish officers in the Azerbaijani army, allowing his compatriot Topchibashev to concentrate on the Azerbaijani aversion to Bolshevism, particularly after the “Bolshevik” horrors in Baku in 1918. Lloyd George then took over the questioning and, to Churchill’s chagrin, so conducted it as to encourage the Caucasian delegates to de96 Cab 23/35, Secret S -n , Jan. 18, 1920. 96 Callwell, op. c i t p. 224.

nounce Denikin’s regime in Daghestan and his hostile behavior toward Georgia and Azerbaijan.97 After the Caucasian spokesmen and the Allied military representatives had withdrawn, Lloyd George continued to press for military assistance without troop commitments. The risk in supplying arms was minimal, since the Bolsheviks had already captured so many rifles and so much heavy armament that the possible loss of more rifles would make little difference. And the Bolsheviks were less likely to attack if they realized that the Transcaucasian states were well armed. Clemenceau reluctantly agreed, but Nitti objected that Italy had prohibited the use of either arms or troops against any de facto government in Russia. Lord Curzon, who was aware of attempted clandestine Italian arms deals in the Caucasus, could not refrain from commenting on the Italian “precedents” for inter­ vention. Without denying the veiled allegation, Nitti maintained that he could do nothing officially, but unofficial cooperation might be possible if Italy did not have to send troops or weapons. When Lloyd George replied that it was unimportant whether Italian participation was official or unofficial, the Italian prime minister became bolder: “I may say even confidentially that I would supply arms and war matériel if Great Britain or France will take the responsibility of sending them.” Lloyd George was quick to agree, and the Allied premiers decided to dispatch arms, muni­ tions, and, if possible, food—but not an armed force—to Transcaucasia and delegated Marshal Foch and Field Marshal Wilson to plan for the shipments. The Japanese delegate and the American observer again fol­ lowed the practice of referring the matter to their governments.98 After the meeting Wilson noted in his diary: The Frocks then sent for the Georgian and Azerbaijanese representatives, who told the Frocks the same ridiculous cock-and-bull stories they had told me and Beatty, and, for Lloyd George’s benefit and Winston’s anger, they added that they feared and hated Denikin, who was a Tsarist. After these dagos had withdrawn, Foch laid out his plan for trying to get a combination of States from Finland to Odessa, which was my plan a year ago but which in my opinion is no longer practicable. We were then dismissed, and the Frocks decided to arm, equip, and feed the Georgians, Azerbaijanese, and Armeni­ ans, and Foch and I are to advise on the amount, etc.99

Clearly unenthusiastic, Wilson wrote Curzon on January 20 that because more details were needed from the field “in order not to complicate a very 97 British Documents, II, 914—921; Paris Peace Conference, IX, 890-897. See also Bulletin d’informations de l’Azerbaïdjan, no. 8 (Feb. 1, 1920), 1-3; Avalov, op. cit., pp. 245-246. 98 British Documents, II, 921-925, III, 766; Paris Peace Conference, IX, 897-902. 99 Call well, op. cit., p. 224.

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complicated armament question,” he was ordering that officers be sent to Transcaucasia to ascertain exactly what the local states needed to defend their independence. Wilson thus began the War Office’s long series of delaying tactics.100 The Recognition of Armenia The Allied postponement of recognition of Armenia was predicated on international commitments which required guarantees stronger than those given Georgia and Azerbaijan by simple de facto recognition. For the people awaiting the implementation of those pledges, however, the delay was agonizing. On January 17 Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, seeking “common justice,” complained to the British delegation and the peace conference that the prolonged Allied silence was encouraging ele­ ments hostile to the Armenian republic. It was not necessary, they main­ tained, to wait for the final Turkish settlement to recognize Armenia as an independent, united state.101 In Tiflis, meanwhile, Prime Minister Khatisian did not conceal from Wardrop and other Allied officials his government’s deep sense of disap­ pointment. Although he understood the reasons for the separate treat­ ment of Armenia, he appealed for a swift resolution of the problem. Armenian monied interests, at last showing some concern for national reconstruction, would do nothing until Armenia’s future was more cer­ tain. And the Armenian government, if given Allied military assistance, would cooperate with Georgia and Azerbaijan to counter Bolshevik ag­ gression. Khatisian again requested military advisers, 20,000 rifles, am­ munition for the 30,000 Russian-style rifles on hand, artillery, army mules, and other military equipment.102 Wardrop, elated by the prospect of collaboration among the Transcaucasian states, assured the prime minister that the Armenian people had nothing to fear. Their right to liberty had been publicly confirmed so often by the Allies “that de facto recognition of that right has only a slight importance and all that now remains is to find the formula in which that recognition will be stated.” While the matter could be left to the Allies in full confidence, “nothing 100 FO 371/3666, 173628/1015/58; WO 33/974, no. 5638. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 14/14, Grundy to Gracey, Jan. 25, 1920, File 10/10, Captain H. Court to Armenian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and to Minister of War. 101 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 118/17, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Hashtutian Konferans, Jan. 17, 1920; FO 608/272, File 16, nos. 109, 192; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 74, Jan. 17, 1920. 102 FO 371/3660, 171252/512/58. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 2, Note, Jan. 14, 1920.

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should be said that might give umbrage to anybody or seem to anticipate the decisions about to be taken by the Allies.”103 When on January 22 Khatisian departed for Erevan and Wardrop entrained for Baku to congratulate the Azerbaijani government, news had not yet reached the Caucasus that the peace conference had, in fact, already recognized the Republic of Armenia. The earlier recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan created practical difficulties. It seemed absurd not to recognize Armenia while planning to arm and include it in the Caucasus barrier against Bolshevism. Hence, on January 19 Curzon told the Supreme Council that the decision to defer the recognition of Armenia should now be reversed, since the existing republic had been a part of the old Russian Empire and was ready to help defend the Caucasus. As no objections were forthcoming, the conference agreed that “the Government of the Armenian State should be recognised as a de facto Government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudiced the question of the eventual frontiers of that State.”104 In this inauspicious manner did the Republic of Armenia at last receive its coveted recognition. News of the Supreme Council’s action was relayed to the Caucasus by the British Foreign Office on January 21 and received in Erevan two days later, while Khatisian was still on his way back from Tiflis. A crowd quickly formed at City Hall, where commandant Arshavir Shahkhatuni spoke in romantic terms about Armenia’s entry into the family of sovereign na­ tions. At the government offices, members of the cabinet exchanged tearful embraces and made plans for the celebrations. Captain Gracey, the first person to get the message in Erevan, shared the joy of the Council of Ministers: “For long years, I have witnessed with my own eyes the sufferings and privations and sacrifices of the Armenian Nation for Free­ dom. Today I am happy to communicate to you the glad news and con­ gratulate you.” From the balcony of the Parliament building, Avetik Sahakian saluted the assembled citizens and praised the army and the people for having made possible the historic day. Sahakian set the tone for all the subsequent oratory: “There is One, United, Integral Armenia. The politicians of Europe have now recognized a part of that state. We 103 FO 371/3660, 177929/512/58. See also Ashkhatavor, Jan. 17:2, 1920\ Near East News, Jan. 16:4, 1920. 104 British Documents, II, 922-923, 925; Paris Peace Conference, IX, 899, 901—902. See also FO 371/3660, 172323/512/58; London Times, Jan. 23:2, 1920. Aharonian was formally noti­ fied by the secretariat of the peace conference on January 27. The Japanese delegate an­ nounced on March 6 that his government adhered to the decision to extend recognition to Armenia. See RG 256, 867B.01/16; Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 118/17, 120/19, 233/132, 422/2.

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are elated about that fact, but we reserve the greatest joy for the day when the rights of All of United Armenia are recognized.”105106 When Khatisian arrived in Erevan on the afternoon of January 23, the official celebrations began with a hundred-and-one-gun salute sounding from across the Zangu (Hrazdan) River. Streets and shops had been hastily decorated; offices and businesses were closed; throngs of townsfolk and refugees came out to share in the excitement. January 24 was a festival of hope in Armenia. Legions of workers, scouts, and orphans gathered at City Hall to hear Mayor Mkrtich Musinian, Vardges Aharonian, and Garnik Shahinian before marching, to the strains of “Mer Hairenik,” to the Parliament, where Dashnakist Avetik Sahakian, Populist Konstantin Giulnazarian, and Ramkavar Artak Darbinian vowed that the Armenian people would not rest until Vaspurakan (Van), Alashkert, Erzerum, Mush, Sassun, Zeitun, and all other Western Armenian districts had been liberated. At Government House, the throng heard Minister of Interior Abraham Giulkhandanian liken Armenia to a giant with his heart in Erevan, his hands in Alexandropol, his head in Karabagh, and his feet in Diarbekir and the Black Sea. The giant had slept through the centuries, and some wondered if he was still alive: “But we know that his heart never ceased beating and his hands never stopped working. Today, the Allies have realized that fact, and we are confident that soon the titan will move his head, stretch his feet, and stand erect. And at that time we shall again gather to celebrate the recognition of United, Independent Armenia.” The huge crowd roared its approval and cheered as the Council of Minis­ ters, Major General M. P. Silikian, Colonel Charles Telford of the Ameri­ can relief organization, and Captain George F. Gracey came into view. In the afternoon a military parade was led by Generals Hakhverdian and Ghamazian, and in the evening there were fireworks, singing, and dancing.106 Thanksgiving services, the ringing of church bells, military parades and artillery salutes, rallies and illuminations also took place at Etchmiadzin, Kars, Alexandropol, Dilijan, Nor-Bayazit, and other towns. Catholicos Gevorg V presided over the ceremonies at Etchmiadzin and, like Khati­ sian, dispatched messages of appreciation to the Paris Peace Conference and the Allied governments. To Lord Curzon he wrote: “I hasten to send to His Britannic Majesty the King and to you and the Great British People the expressions of my own and my People’s gratitude. I trust that this is 105 FO 371/4953, E i569/134/58 end.; Haradj, Jan. 24:1, 25:3, 1920; Bor’ba, Jan. 24:1, 1920; British Documents, III, 768; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 9, Jan. 28, 1920. 106 Haradj, Jan. 28:1-2, 29:2, 1920; Ruben Darbinian, “Hayastani Hanrapetutian orerun,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXVIII (June 1950), 24-25.

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only a temporary measure and that we are very near the day when the larger and united and independent Armenia will be recognized dejure by the Great British People and the Supreme Council.”107 At Kars, Mayor Hamazasp Norhatian, Governor-General Stepan Korganian, Member of Parliament Artashes Abeghian, and Sardarabad hero Major General Daniel Bek Pirumian spoke of the brotherhood of all citizens of the Armenian republic and, in turn, received expressions of goodwill from Mashadi Samad of the Muslim National Council and froih spokesmen for the Greek and Russian councils. Similar sentiments were addressed to the Erevan government by administrative bodies, political parties, and civic associations throughout the Caucasus, as well as by representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers.108 Insisting that the national holiday would not be complete until united Armenia became a reality, the Armenian press nonetheless expressed appreciation to the Allies, praised the work of the Armenian missions abroad, and exalted the memory of the countless heroes and martyrs who had fallen on Armenia’s road to independence. Of the Dashnakist jour­ nals, only Ashkhatavor cut through the euphoria with cynical comment. The “belated favor” of the Allies had been influenced neither by Armeni­ an diplomatic efforts nor by the aspirations of the Armenian workers and peasants; it was simply one link in the cordon sanitaire the Allies were stringing around Soviet Russia. The way of giving the “favor” was insult­ ing to the Armenian people, for, after all their declarations about emanci­ pation, the Allies now limited their recognition to “the existing state,” as if it were possible to disregard the determination of the Armenians to be one nation, united and independent.109 While admitting the logic of such reasoning, most Armenian leaders still deemed recognition a significant stepping-stone on the way to realizing Armenia’s aspirations. In an extraordinary session of Parliament on Jan­ uary 25, Khatisian told the assembled deputies, the Council of Ministers, military commanders, members of the diplomatic corps, and invited digni­ taries that the act of recognition had brought the Armenian question to the threshold of a final solution. In the past, Armenian quests for relief 107 FO 371/3660, 176049/177977/512/58; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 31:1, 1920. See also FO 3660, 173375/ 17632 i/5 12/58; Haradj, Jan. 25:2, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 2, no. 501 ; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11, Khatisian to Supreme Council; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (April 10, 1920), 482-483. 108 Haradj, Jan. 28-Feb. 7, 1920. For descriptions of the celebrations and special religious services in Constantinople on the occasion of Armenia’s recognition, see Erkir, Jan. 29:1, Feb. 1:1, 2:1, 1920; Haradjt March 12:2, 1920; Hairenik, March 6:4-6, 1920. 109 Ashkhatavor, Jan. 25:1, 1920. See also Ashkhatavor, Jan. 31:2, 1920; Erkir, Jan. 22-29, 1920; FO 371/4952, E778/134/58 end.

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through reform programs and reliance on international diplomacy had been stymied by Turkish massacres, beginning at Sassun in 1894 and continuing through the Cilician tragedy in 1909 to the great holocaust in 1915. In the second phase, the popular movement had been led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Hnchakian party, and other groups which had made innumerable sacrifices in the struggle for free­ dom. Had any other people in history ever suffered such enormous losses and still retained the will to live and to rebuild? The Armenian people had survived a troubled history and were now on the verge of the third and final phase of the emancipatory movement, the formation of a united, independent state. It was through the sheer determination and heroism of the Armenian soldiers and peasants that the little republic, created on May 28, 1918, had persevered until at last winning international recogni­ tion. With Allied help, that republic would gain its rightful western frontiers.110 Other speakers were Avetik Sahakian and Levon Shant, vice-presidents of Parliament, Hovakim Budaghian of the Dashnakist faction, Garo Sassuni on behalf of the Western Armenian refugees, and Simon Vratzian for the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun. All brought the same message: appreciation to the Supreme Council and the peoples of Europe and America but emphasis on the incompleteness of recognition until united Armenia became a fact. If necessary, Shant declared, the nation would marshal its meager resources and resume the old battle in order to leave no doubt that “Turkish Armenia is ours.” Sassuni added that the Western Armenians were not discontent that fortune had first smiled on their compatriots living in the shadow of Mount Ararat. Western Armenians had mixed blood with Eastern Armenians on the battlefield and were now confident that the present artificial boundaries would soon be dissolved.111 Simon Vratzian, in the most partisan declaration, praised the Armenian Revolutionary Federation for its role in the struggle for the spiritual, cultural, and political revival of the nation. The revolutionaries had fol­ lowed Khrimian Hairik’s advice to develop self-reliance and internal or­ ganization before looking to international diplomacy for help. Neverthe­ less, until the world war, the Armenian question had focused on reforms and autonomy. Only with the Russian revolution had the concept of independence taken hold. Although generations had worked for the liber­ ation of Turkish Armenia, independence had first come to Russian Ar­ menia. Vratzian declared this historical quirk to be of no great impor110 Haradj, Jan. 29:3, 30:2—3, 1920; Hairenik, May 4:1, 1920. 111 Ibid.

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tance, for a viable, independent state was inconceivable without both Eastern and Western Armenia. The Allied Powers, by granting recogni­ tion to the Erevan government, had taken a major step toward the estab­ lishment of a united Armenia. It did not matter that their decision had been influenced by their own interests, since that was the way of interna­ tional diplomacy. The Armenian democracy could not be locked up within the existing narrow territorial boundaries; rather, Armenia would incor­ porate the historic homeland in the west, take its place among the free nations of the world, and bring its inhabitants, regardless of national origin, race, and religion, the benefits of a progressive, egalitarian soci­ ety.112 Speaking for the small Social Revolutionary faction, Vahan Minakhorian also paid lip service to the Russian revolution and the right of all peoples to enjoy freedom and unimpeded cultural development. Deviat­ ing from his party’s previous opposition to involvement in Turkish Ar­ menian affairs, he assailed the Allied decision to recognize only one part of Armenia and to treat Turkish Armenia as a separate entity. The Ar­ menian Social Revolutionaries, many of whom had withdrawn from the Dashnaktsutiun in 1907 in disagreement about Turkish Armenia, seemed to be turning full circle. In the name of the Muslim population of the Armenian republic, deputy Asat Bek Aghababbekov congratulated the Armenian people for having reentered the family of free nations after centuries of suffering and striving. At this momentous time all the peoples of Transcaucasia should repudiate narrow chauvinism and work together in harmony for peace and progress.113 Members of the diplomatic corps and foreign military missions toasted the Armenian government and people at a gala banquet on January 26. Pleasing sentimental expressions were made by the Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Persian envoys, the Allied representatives, and even the normally dispassionate American officers. Captain Gracey exclaimed that the pic­ ture of Mother Armenia, mourning over her ruined cities and her sons in exile, was changing, as the valiant Armenian nation began to emerge from the ashes and create a new society founded on brotherhood, peace, and freedom. Colonel M. M. Zinkevich, Denikin’s special envoy, declared that Russia would never regret relinquishing the Armenian provinces, since there could be no doubt about the everlasting friendship of the Armenian people. Russia, recalling the loyalty of the Armenians during the worst days of war and revolution, welcomed the prospect of a united u* Ibid.

113Ibid.

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Armenian state, inclusive of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, and other areas of the historic homeland. Alexandre Khatisian replied that the memory of strong cultural bonds between Russians and Armenians induced a sense of sadness that the Armenian nation would be going its own way. The prime minister, it was reported, bade farewell to Russia with “poetic prose.”114 The festivities occasioned by the act of recognition culminated in a public announcement: “Regarding this act as the first step in the final realization of the aspirations of the Armenian people, for whose fulfillment the nation has entered into heroic battle and sacrificed the precious lives of its children, the Government regrets not having the opportunity to respond individually to each congratulatory message. But it is filled with confidence that the laboring class and heroic army of Armenia will successfully put the Republic on firm footing and attain the goal of centuries, the establishment of Free, Independent Armenia.”115 Double Dampeners The worldwide celebration of Armenia’s recognition was dampened by two unrelated events: an American retraction and a British reprimand. American foreign policy, as shaped by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, opposed the drastic dismemberment of the Russian Empire and was in line with Ambassador Boris Bakhmetov’s arguments that the “reasonable aspirations” of the non-Russian nationalities could be satisfied within “a reunited democratic Russia.” The right of Finland and Poland to a separate national existence was acknowledged, but not the right of other regions such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Armenia, however, was in a special category because of long-standing American concern and the fact that the Russian Armenian provinces would presumably constitute the smaller part of the united state.116 The Supreme Council’s recognition of the Caucasian Armenian repub­ lic on January 19 put American policy to a test. When Ambassador Wallace informed the State Department of the decision, Undersecretary of State Polk replied: “This government concurs in the decision taken by the Council to recognize the government of the Armenian state as de facto on condition that this recognition in no way prejudices the question of the 114 Haradj, Feb. 1:3, 1920; Hairenik, March 27:1, 1920. 116 For a slightly different text of the message in Armenian, see Haradj, Feb. 1:1, 1920. 116 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III (Washington, 1936), 436-445, 451-453. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 381/3, 382/4, for Pasdermadjian’s reminders to the Department of the State that the Russian representatives at Paris had acknowledged Armenia’s right of separation.

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eventual frontiers. Secretary of State will so inform Armenian representa­ tive [Pasdermadjian] in Washington.” Pending “very serious further con­ sideration,” Polk added, the United States was not prepared to recognize either Georgia or Azerbaijan.117 On January 26 Wallace relayed this information to Alexandre Millerand, the new president of the peace conference, who in turn notified Aharonian the next day. The welcome news was immediately cabled to Erevan, where it was announced as a further achievement of “Armenian diplomacy.”118 While these exchanges were taking place, the Department of State did a turnabout. Apparently both Lansing, who had been away on a fishing trip, and Wilson disapproved of Polk’s instructions to Wallace and or­ dered that they be countermanded. But it was too late; Wallace had already informed the peace conference. Trying to save face insofar as possible, the State Department instructed Wallace to tell the Supreme Council that the American position had been misunderstood. All that had been intended was to express goodwill toward the Armenian people and to indicate that the United States had no objection to European recogni­ tion. A press release included for Wallace’s use asserted that the United States was considering the granting of recognition but had not yet reached a decision because it was unusual to recognize a state that lacked clearly defined boundaries. American adherence to the act of recognition had therefore been rescinded.119 The peace conference and the Armenian delegation in Paris were for­ mally notified of the reversal on January 28, which added to the wide­ spread dismay over the contrast between American words and actions.120 Protests and appeals were sent to the Department of State by Armenophile societies, among them the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, which challenged the excuse about boundaries. Had not the Wilson administration recognized Czechoslovakia in the midst of the war, when that state had no boundaries at all?121 Several leading American newspapers joined in the criticism, particularly as President Wilson had repeatedly voiced concern for the Armenians. But it was not until April 23, 1920, that the United States finally granted Armenia the measure of 117 RG 59, 860J.01/192, 763.72119/8740. 118 Ibid., 860J.01/191/195, 763.72119/8922; RG 256, 867B.01/15, 180.03301/2. See also FO 371/3666, 174865/1015/58. 119 RG 59, 86oJ.oi/i92o/1926. 120 Ibid., 860J.01/193. See also Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 774-778; Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914—1924 (Baltimore, [1965]), pp. 261-262. 121 RG 59, 860J .01/203/205.

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recognition which had been briefly extended and then retracted at the beginning of the year.122 The perplexing American reversal was still unknown in Erevan when the government was stung by a sharp rebuke from British Chief Commis­ sioner Oliver Wardrop. After conferring with Azerbaijani officials in Tif­ lis and Baku, Wardrop became alarmed by the problems facing Usubbekov’s government. It was feared, for example, that the retreating White Armies would vent their rage on Azerbaijan and that domestic pressures to establish political and commercial relations with Soviet Russia would become uncontrollable. The Azerbaijani Ittihad party, on the extreme right of the political spectrum, and the Bolsheviks, on the extreme left, had joined in opposing the Musavat leaders and were trying to turn Azerbaijan away from the West in favor of friendship and alliance with Soviet Russia and Turkey. Resolutions demanding such action were adopted by the Baku Workers’ Conference and by the Ittihad party con­ gress, each with several hundred delegates. Incompatible in their philoso­ phies, the two groups tacitly acknowledged the need for cooperation to overthrow the Musavat party.123 With radical labor and Pan-Islamic agitation undermining the govern­ ment, Prime Minister Usubbekov and Foreign Minister Khan Khoiskii told Wardrop they could not remain silent while opposition elements clamored for countermeasures against Dro’s Armenian “bandit gangs,” which were engaged in a reign of terror in Zangezur. Fearing that Azer­ baijan’s newly reorganized cabinet might fall victim to public indignation over Zangezur, Wardrop agreed to address a stern warning to Erevan. Through his assistant in Tiflis, T. E. Milligan Grundy, he notified Khati122 Foreign Relations, /920, III, 778; Wilson Papers, Series 5-B, Colby to Pasdermadjian, April 23,1920. Admiral Bristol was deeply distressed by Allied recognition of the Transcauca­ sian states. On February 10 he wrote the Department of State: It is increasingly apparent that recognition of three Trans-Caucasus republics may be as serious an error in combatting Reds as announcement of blockade against Soviets lifted appears to be. It is my opinion, backed by much evidence, that both measures were taken without understanding the mentality of all peoples concerned and it was at the worst possible moment in struggle against Reds. The recognition of Georgia and Azerbaïdjan has been interpreted by those countries as forced on the Peace Conference and the British by a desperate military and political situation and not as a means to stiffen and assist these small countries against a Red invasion. These countries see in this recognition a proof of Red victory and power. For it they thank the Bolsheviks, with whom they have always had much sympathy, and to whom their selfish political ambitions will now turn more and more. [See Foreign Relations, /920, III, 581-582.] 123 For contemporary accounts of the Baku Workers’ Conference and Ittihad congress, see Bor'ba, Feb. 1:1,3, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 31:2,1920; Haradj, Jan. 17:3, Feb. 4:2, 5:1,2, 14:1, 1920; Bor'ba v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 387-389.

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sian on January 24 that there was strong evidence that regular army units had participated in attacks on twenty-four Muslim settlements. Wardrop warned that, if troops and artillery were not removed from Zangezur immediately and the offenders disciplined, he would recommend that his government “withhold sympathy and all aid to Armenia whose attitude in persistently disregarding advice of Allies is intolerable.”124 On learning of this action, the French mission protested that Wardrop’s rebuke was based on one-sided information and on the assumption that Zangezur should belong to Azerbaijan. The British commissioner had conducted no investigation and had not even asked the Armenian govern­ ment for an explanation.125But Wardrop apparently felt that he could not risk the loss of time on investigations and diplomatic correspondence. He reported to the Foreign Office on January 28 that despite the agitation in Azerbaijan he had prevailed upon Usubbekov to show restraint. He had been encouraged, moreover, that the Azerbaijani ministers had attended a banquet given in his honor at the*Armenian legation in Baku and that expressions of goodwill had been heard from all sides. Wardrop would now travel to Erevan to pressure Khatisian into withdrawing the regular armed forces from Zangezur and punishing those responsible for violating the truce signed by Usubbekov and Khatisian in November.126 The irritation caused in Armenia by Wardrop’s strongly worded mes­ sage was not apparent in the warm reception accorded him on January 29. He was flattered that an honor guard had waited hours at the unheated Erevan station when his train was delayed by severe winter weather. By the time he reached the Armenian capital, Wardrop had regained his composure and, instead of scolding Khatisian, spent his first day visiting Catholicos Gevorg V and greeting thousands of Western Armenian refugees who presented petitions for the recognition of inte­ gral Armenia and for their immediate repatriation. Western Armenian intellectuals, Professor Astvadsatur Khachaturian, Vahé Ardsruni, and Nshan Hakobian, extolled the British Armenophile tradition represented by such dedicated statesmen as William Gladstone and James Bryce. Deep­ ly moved by the throng of shivering refugees in ragged clothing trying to sing Britain’s national anthem, Wardrop himself braved the biting frost for a few minutes to urge them to be patient a little longer. Through Levon Shant and Vahan Papazian, he also received petitions from 40,000 124 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 14/14, Grundy to Armenian Govt., Jan. 21, 1920; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 10, Feb. 11, 1920. See also FO 371/3666, 173678/1015/ 58. 125 Archives de l’Armée, 20N/157, dossier 1, no. 14, Feb. 11, 1920. 126 FO 371/3666, 174585/1015/58.

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refugees in the Etchmiadzin district, including the prelates of Van and Aghtamar, who expressed gratitude for the de facto recognition of the Araratian republic and prayed for recognition of united Armenia.127 It was not until he met with the Council of Ministers on January 30 that Wardrop reminded his hosts that the future of their country depended on the Allied Powers. Azerbaijan, he believed, wanted to establish har­ monious relations with Armenia and understood the menace posed both by Turkey and by Soviet Russia. Wardrop later reported to the Foreign Office that his words had been accepted as the advice of a friend and that he had been made privy to secret instructions being dispatched to Zangezur to prevent further incidents. Khatisian, Wardrop added, had due control over his fellow ministers, all of whom were university educated and “of good social standing,” and he was nudging them toward the right with “moderate national ideas” and was employing large numbers of “non- revolutionaries” in the government. He had no love for extremists, “who are apt to twit him on past connections with aristocratic, imperial circles and preference for fashionable society.”128 At Wardrop’s suggestion, the Armenian cabinet submitted a confiden­ tial memorandum outlining its desiderata. Described as reasonable and moderate by both Wardrop and the Foreign Office, the document called for a temporary demarcation line between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As Nakhichevan remained a center of Turkish conspiracy, Armenian super­ vision or else a British military governorship should be implemented there. Either way, the Julfa-Erevan railway would resume operation and thus benefit the entire Caucasus. Armenia would acquiesce in continued provisional Azerbaijani jurisdiction in Mountainous Karabagh if all rights and privileges guaranteed Armenians in the agreement of August 28, 1919, were honored and Zangezur remained under local Armenian ad­ ministration. Azerbaijan should not use economic pressures, such as deny­ ing Armenia petroleum, to exact political concessions, and Azerbaijani and Turkish agitators should be cleared out of vulnerable areas like Kars and Zangibasar. British officers should be assigned to study Armenian military needs and the condition of the army. Repatriation of the Western Armenian refugees was of paramount importance. The government had done all it could to help the refugees, and foreign humanitarian assistance had alleviated suffering, but the problem could not be solved until the exiles had returned home and gathered in their first harvest. Under Allied supervision, repatriation should begin in border districts such as Bayazit, FO 371/4952-4953, E782/1569/134/58; Haradj, Jan. 31:1, Feb. 1:2, 1920. 128 FO 371/4952, E782/134/58. See also Darbinian, op. cit., pp. 30-35. 127

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Diadin, and Alashkert and then extend to all the Western Armenian provinces. Finally, Batum’s future should be so determined as to satisfy Armenia’s political and economic needs and provide direct access to the sea through a Kars-Batum branch railway.129 After an overnight journey to Alexandropol with Khatisian for the dedication of the State University, Wardrop returned to Tiflis on Febru­ ary l. He was highly pleased with himself. The three Transcaucasian republics had been recognized and offered armed support. Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian leaders had professed mutual respect and a willingness to collaborate. And the Turks and Bolsheviks in Daghestan were quarreling. In summarizing his stay in Erevan, Wardrop telegraphed the Foreign Office: “I venture to hope that recognition has turned over a new leaf in the history of the three Republics.”130 His full report concluded with the following paragraph: My journeys to Azerbaijan and Armenia have I believe justified the time and labour expended and my estimate of the situation in Transcaucasia is more fa­ vourable than it was before those visits. It would be rash to take a completely optimistic view of the future: the nervousness of the Armenians on the one hand and that of the Turks (which reacts in Azerbaijan) on the other must be taken into account. The announcement of the Allied terms to Turkey (whatever they may be) will cause great excitement. But, on the whole, I think the crisis may pass without any very serious disturbance of the peace. Once the Turks know the worst they may possibly cease to be active in this region. Of the efforts of the Bolsheviks I have less fear than formerly; nationalism in Transcaucasia is the best antidote to that danger and the action o f the Allies has given a power stimulus to local patriotism.131

Wardrop’s ability to portray the recognition of the Transcaucasian gov­ ernments as a British accomplishment annoyed the other Allied repre­ sentatives. It was true that when Colonel and Mrs. Haskell arrived in Erevan on February 11 to offer congratulations they were greeted with enthusiasm and that the Armenian government also expressed apprecia­ tion to French Captain Antoine Poidebard, but there remained underly­ ing resentment that the British would reap both political and economic benefits through their active propaganda.132 Poidebard, who had traveled to Constantinople in December to plead the Armenian cause before the Allied commissioners and to urge suppression of the reemerging Pan-Turanian movement, was hurt that his efforts were overshadowed by 129 FO 371/4952, E782/134/58, App. 2; FO 371/3660, 178036/512/58; Rep. of Arm. Ar­ chives, File 17/17. 130 FO 371/3666, 176776/1015/58. 131 FO 371/4952, E782/134/58. 132 Haradj, Feb. 3:2, 1920; Hairenik, April 1:3, 1920.

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Wardrop’s grand gestures. He revealed his feelings in congratulating Khatisian: “France which had a primary role in the defeat of the enemy wishes the Republic of Armenia to know that she used all her authority in the Supreme Council to win recognition. In view of the great sympathy with which France regards Armenia, we regard with sorrow that others have tried to detract from her importance in the work of that recognition and that they are trying to make your Government believe that our work has been less energetic than that of others.”133 Poidebard reported to his government on February 11 that he was badly disadvantaged. It was enough to point out that Wardrop had received news of Armenia’s recognition more than a week before any other Allied mission and had exploited that advantage to the utmost.134 Wardrop’s political agility did not seem to perturb the Italians, who continued to seek economic concessions, markets, and an outlet for a surplus technical and labor force. In congratulating Armenia on recogni­ tion, Colonel Gabba announced that another Italian mission, comprising specialists in finance, commerce, administration, and military services, would soon arrive in Transcaucasia. And in Rome, when the former prime minister, Luigi Luzzatti, and nineteen other prominent politicians urged Nitti’s government to establish diplomatic relations with the Armenian republic, Assistant Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza replied that he had just told the visiting president of the Armenian Parliament and Paris delega­ tion, Avetis Aharonian, that Italy would welcome the exchange of diplo­ matic agents.136 On February 3, 1920, Aharonian appointed Mikayel Varandian (Hovhannisian), an intellectual long active in European socialist circles, as Armenia’s diplomatic representative in Rome.136 Recognition of the Transcaucasian republics was another setback for Denikin. Yet, with the White Armies in rapid retreat, he had no choice but to accept the accomplished fact. After first predicating his acknowledg­ ment of the “de facto self-governing regions” on the understanding that their relations with the All-Russian government would be worked out by a future constituent assembly, he had his representative in Tiflis announce 133 Archives de l'Armée, 20N/186, dossier 1, Jan. 28, 1920, 20N/157, dossier 2, no. 144; Haradj, Feb. 8, 1920; FO 371/4954, E1904/134/58 end. 134 Archives de l'Armée, 20N/186, dossier 1, no. 14, Feb. 11, 1920. 135 FO 371/3660, 177158/512/58; FO 371/4952, E274/134/58 end.; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 2, Report, Feb. 20, 1920; Bor’ba, Feb. 1:4, 18:4, 1920; Er&r, Feb. 2:3, 1920; Haradj, March 6:1, 10:1, 1920. 136 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 233/132, no. 1377, Feb. 17, 1920; Hairenik, Feb. 17:3, 1920; Haradj, Feb. 18:2, 1920. In making the appointment, Aharonian used the authorization granted him by the Council of Ministers on September 22, 1919. See Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, no. 3898. Varandian's appointment was confirmed by the Armenian government at the beginning of March. See Haradj, March 10:1, 1920.

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his recognition of the Transcaucasian governments on February 13.137 In Erevan, Colonel Zinkevich claimed that Russia had actually accepted Armenia’s independence as early as August (September, new style) 1919, when he had returned to Armenia as special envoy of the Armed Forces of South Russia.138 In further concessions, Denikin restored the autonomy of the Cossack administrations of the Don, Kuban, and Terek regions and named General Nikolai N. Baratov, an officer well versed in Caucasian affairs, to serve as his foreign minister. Allied military circles nurtured a hope that the White Armies and the Transcaucasian states might join forces against the Red Army, but Denikin’s star was fast falling. In March 1920 Ekaterinodar was abandoned, followed by the frenzied naval evacuation from Novorossiisk to the Crimea. In April, Anton Ivanovich Denikin relinquished his command to his rival, Baron Petr Nikolaevich Wrangel.139 Meanwhile, the Caucasian states had to deal with the approaching Red Army as best they could.140 Flickers of Hope The recognition of the Armenian republic was widely celebrated in the communities of the dispersion: in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Cilicia; in Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania; in England, France, and the United States. Even the small, remote commu­ nities in South America, India, and the Netherlands East Indies were touched by enthusiasm. The Armenians of Java began a subscription campaign to finance an agricultural school in Armenia, and those in India 137 Bor’ba, Feb. 14:4, 1920; La République Géorgienne, Feb. 29:8, 1919\ Near East News, Feb. 16:1, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/182, dossier 2, Report, March 1, 1920; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (7 9 /7 -/9 2 /) (New York and Oxford, [1951]), p. 249. 138 Haradj, Feb. 4:2, 21:3, 1920; Hairenik, April 9:2, 1920. 139 George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 7 9 /7 -/9 2 / (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966), pp. 230, 235-237; William H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 7 9 /7 -/9 2 /, II (New York, 1935), 285, 287-289; George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia (New York, 1933), pp. 344—347» 356-358; Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919—1920 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, [1977]), pp. 208, 227—234, 245-255; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, 578. At the time that Denikin made conciliatory gestures to the Cossacks, the Don was largely under Soviet control and the White Armies were retreating into the Kuban. 140 British policy toward the border states was summarized in a cabinet meeting in January 1920: The Border States surrounding Russia must themselves take the full responsibility for deciding as between peace and war. Not the slightest encouragement, however, should be given them to pursue the policy of war, because if we were to give that advice we should incur responsibilities which we could not discharge.. . . We should continue our policy of giving material support to enable the Border States to defend themselves if attacked by the Bolsheviks. [See Cab 23/20, Cabinet Conclu­ s io n s ^ ), 7(1), Jan. 29, 1920.]

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offered Erevan their expertise in shipping and international commerce. The reemergence of Armenia as a political entity stirred the national consciousness of German-, Hungarian-, and Polish-speaking Catholic Ar­ menians in central Europe who were descended from emigrants of the later Middle Ages. Although they had been largely assimilated into the life of their adopted countries, they now formed Armenian cultural societies and national councils and, with the encouragement of the Armenian Roman Catholic order of Mekhitarists, sent deputations to Erevan to investigate possible repatriation. Similar inquiries came from commu­ nities in Bessarabia, Transylvania, the Crimea, the North Caucasus, South Russia, Transcaspia, the Balkans, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Algeria.141 Ar­ menian newspapers hailed the beginning of the homeward trek and listed goods and technical equipment needed for rehabilitation of the fatherland. There could be no doubt that if united Armenia became a reality the conditions that had for centuries driven Armenians from their country would be reversed and the ingathering would reach large proportions. The repatriation of nearly a thousand soldiers early in 1920 was re­ garded as a precursor to the awaited general movement. The soldiers had been taken prisoner by the Germans while serving in the Russian army; after the war, through the efforts of the Armenian diplomatic mission in Berlin, they were placed in a separate camp at Minden in Westphalia. There, like all prisoners of war in Germany, they were supervised by an inter-Allied commission and received rations and clothing from the Brit­ ish and American Red Cross and the French government.142 Their repatriation was delayed for months because of unsettled conditions in Russia and Marshal Foch’s concern that they might add to the “effervescence” in the Caucasus, but finally, in August 1919, Armenian envoy Dr. James Greenfield was notified that the men would sail in a few days. They had to wait four more months, however, because of complications arising from the conclusion of peace with Germany, the lack of shipping, and priority given Russian and Cossack prisoners being repatriated to ports under Denikin’sjurisdiction. At last, most of the men 141 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, no. 743, Oct. 20,1919, File 233/132, no. 1139, Jan. 13, 1920, File 421/1, no. 103, Dec. 13, 1919; Haradj, Jan. 15:3, 1920; Hairenik, Oct. 2:2, Dec. 9:1, 1919. 142 For correspondence and discussions relating to the 200,000 Russian prisoners of war in Germany, see British Documents, I, 300-302, 862—864, 873-875, 883, 891—892, 912—913, 921-922, II, 426-428, 431-434, 650-652, 656-657, IV, 706-709; Paris Peace Conference, V, 4, vu, 208-210,230-231,486,488,498-501, vin, 507-508,519-523,537-538.548-549. 579-580, 589, 606, 678, IX, 371- 374. 379- 383. 710-711. 729- 731. 738- 744. XI, 129-130, 149, 154-

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sailed from Hamburg on December 13, taking with them medicine and clothing contributed by the small German-Armenian community. De­ tained at Gibraltar for several days, they disembarked at Batum shortly after the Supreme Council had recognized the Armenian republic.143 As the Erevan government won wider acceptance in Armenian commu­ nities abroad and turned its attention to their problems and potentials, the need for diplomatic representation was felt more strongly. Yet the cabinet moved cautiously, in consideration of the National Delegation’s position among those communities, their internal structure and rivalries, and the question of finances. In most areas the government relied temporarily on honorary consuls or consular agents, usually prominent local residents who received no salary. In territories of the former Russian Empire, regular diplomatic missions were established at Tiflis, Batum, Baku, Ekaterinodar, and Rostov-Nakhichevan, and consuls or consular agents operated at one time or another at Odessa, Sevastopol, Simferopol, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Kiev, Kislovodsk, Vladikavkaz, Sochi, Sukhum, Poti, Ashkhabad, and Kokand. Hundreds of Armenians in Petrograd, including the distinguished historian Nikolai Adontz, made their way to the West with the assistance of consular agent Vardan Chmishkian at Terrioki and Consul Mikhail Ter-Asaturov at Helsinki.144 In the Balkans, the Republic of Armenia was represented by Garo Balian at Sofia, H. Khndirian at Bucharest, Sava Giorgiewitz (Sahak Gevorgian) at Belgrade, and Dr. Galust Aslanian at Salonica.145 Consular agents were named for Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw, and in western Europe James Greenfield served in Berlin, Levon Nevruz in Geneva, and Tigran Chamkerten in Antwerp.146 In Africa, Haik Pataban acted as Armenian vice-consul at 143 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 231/130, nos. 370, 448, July—Aug. 1919, File 232/131, nos. 694, 696, 823, 855, Oct.-Nov. 1919, File 233/132, nos. 1030, 1127, 1490, Jan.-M arch 1920, File 234/133, Korganian reports nos. 6, 10, Nov. 5, Dec. 22, 1919; Haradj, Feb. 14:1, Dec. 9:1,1919, Feb. 21:6 ,1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Feb. 21,1920), 255. See also FO 371/3671, File 102583/58; Erkir, Jan. 21:2, 1920. For correspondence of the Armenian delegation attempting to secure the release of other Armenians who had been taken prisoner as soldiers in the Russian and Ottoman armies and who were interned in France, Sardinia, Algeria, Serbia, and at Camp Bellary near Madras, India, see Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, nos. 609,640,797,835,907, Sept.-Nov. 1919, File 233/132, nos. 1094,1399,1400.Jan.-Feb. 1920; FO 371/3672, File 164095/58. For documents relating to the repatriation of Georgian prison­ ers in Germany, see Georgian Archives, Box 21, books 33, 35, Box 26, book 51. 144 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 374, H. H. Patxnrakutiun ev Finlandakan Karavarutiun, 1920— 1922 t. 146 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 360/1 ,H. H. Sofiayi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921t.; File 364, H. H. Bukreshi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921—1929 t.; File 366, H. H. Belgradi Hiupatosutiun, 1920—1921 t.t.; File 231/130, no. 795, Oct. 29, 1919; File 233/132, nos. 1094, 1400, Jan. 6, Feb. 21, 1920. See also Haradj, March 2:2, 3, 1920. 144 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, no. 577, Sept. 9, 1919; File 233/132, nos. 1370, 1428, Feb. 16, 26,1920; File 140/39, no. 2753, Feb. 6, 1920; File 353, H. H. Berlini Nerkayatsu-

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Addis Ababa, and Matik Kevorkov (Gevorgian), as consul at Djibouti.*147 In the autumn of 1919 Arsen Kitur was sent to Baghdad to work with British and Arab authorities on the repatriation of refugees in Mesopo­ tamia.148 In Japan, Consul Diana Agabek Abcar turned her business office in Yokohama into a legation and her home into a haven for Armenian refugees awaiting passage to the United States.149Garegin Pasdermadjian assumed his duties in Washington, where a large legation building was purchased through a subscription drive in the Armenian-American com­ munity, and in South America, Dr. Etienne Brasil was accredited to the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.150Then, after the Supreme Council had recognized the Armenian republic, Hovhannes Khan Massehian, the former Persian minister to Sweden, was named Armenian envoy to His Majesty’s Government in London; Mikayel Varandian, to the Royal Government in Rome; and Tigran Chaiyan, to the Greek republi­ can government in Athens.151 The exchange of diplomatic missions with Persia was particularly en­ couraging because it was vitally important to have good political and commercial relations with that neighboring country. The Armenian min­ ister plenipotentiary, Prince Hovsep Arghutian, was greeted at Enzeli on December 25, 1919, by the provincial governor and local Armenians and then, after visiting the communities at Resht and Kazvin, was accorded a tumultuous welcome in Tehran on January 4, 1920. In frequent discus­ sions with Persian officials, Arghutian urged stronger control in the tschutiun, 1918—1919 t., and 353a, 1919-1920 t.; File 365, H. H. Viennayi Hiupatosutiun, 1920-1923 L; File 367, H. H. Zhenevi Hiupatosutiun, 1919—1921 t.t.; File 368/1, Beldjikakan Karavarutiun evBriuseli Hiupatosutiun, 1919—1920 t.t.; File 376, H. H. Patvirakutiun evLehastani Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919-1921 t.t.; File 378, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Evropakan Zanazan Petutiunneri Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919—1923 t.t. 147 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 233/132, nos. 1315, 1370, Feb. 9, 16, 1920; File 402, H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutschutiun Habeshstanum, 1919-1923 t.t. See also File 401, H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Egiptosi Medj, 1920-1922 t.t. 148 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 232/131, no. 827, Nov. 4, 1919; File 403,//. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Iragum, 1920 t. 149 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 403a, H. H. Nerkayatsutschutiun Japoniaum 1920-1922; RG 59, File 702.60J94. 150 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 230/131, nos. 669, 670,677, Sept. 29-30, 1919; File 233/132, nos. 1016, 1032, 1051, Dec. 20-24, 1919; File 400, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Haravayin Amerikayi Petutiunnere, 1919—192 j t.; RG 59, File 701.60J11; Haradj, March 12:3, 1920; Ashkhatavor, Jan. 15:2, 1920. For the records of the Armenian mission in Washington, see Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 379/1-387/9. 151 See Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 331/1-338/8 (London Mission), Files 344/1-347/4 (Rome Mission), Files 354/1-355/2 (Athens Mission). The delegation of the Armenian repub­ lic acted as the Armenian mission in Paris. See Files 319/1-322/4. Subsequently, Grigor Sinapian was named consul general in Paris, and a consular office was opened in Marseilles. See also Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 233/132, nos. 1366, 1377, Feb. 16-17, 1920; Near East News, March 13:3, 1920; Haradj, Jan. 10:3, 1920.

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northern provinces, especially in the Maku khanate, where Turkish offi­ cers and agents were active, and restoration of the railway link between Tabriz and Erevan. Arghutian published newsletters and bulletins to keep the large I rano-Armenian colony and the small Indo-Armenian commu­ nity abreast of developments in the Armenian republic. Aside from the legation in Tehran, a consulate was opened at Tabriz and consular agents were appointed at Isfahan/New Julfa, where spokesmen of the surround­ ing Armenian villages, whose forefathers had been forcibly resettled there by Shah Abass three centuries earlier, announced plans to return to the ancient homeland as soon as it was able to receive its expatriate sons.152 In Erevan, meanwhile, Persian Consul Asadullah Khan, calling to mind the centuries-long association of the Iranian and Armenian peoples, sought to improve communications and strengthen political and commercial relations between the two countries.153 Greeks and Armenians were drawn together by their recent tribulations in the Ottoman Empire and their fear of continued Turkish rule. In the Caucasus, the representative of Greece, Dr. Stavrodakis, expressed his pleasure that the Hellenic communities in and around Kars were reviving under Armenian auspices. But the future of the Pontus was a highly sensitive issue. Archbishop Chrysanthos, metropol of Trebizond, had gone to Paris to plead for an autonomous Pontic republic rather than the region’s incorporation into the new Armenian state. Accompanied by Stavrodakis, Chrysanthos also traveled to Erevan to suggest an ArmenianPontic federation. Welcomed in the Armenian capital with political and religious honors on New Year’s Day, 1920, he proposed that the federated states function under separate governments with distinct systems of trans­ portation, communication, and currency and with independence in both internal and external affairs. As the cause of Pontus had received little encouragement in Paris, Khatisian called for a more reasonable arrange­ ment allowing the region a local legislature and autonomy in internal affairs but providing for a unified army, common systems of post and telegraph, roads and communication, and finance, and the direction of foreign policy by the central government. Although no agreement was reached during two days of negotiation, Armenian leaders were optimistic that an eventual compromise would bring Trebizond and its hinterland 152 Ashkhatavor, Jan. 22:2, 1920; Haradj, Feb. 29:2, March 2:2, 1920; Near East News, Jan. 24:2, 1920; RG 59, 701.60J91. For materials on the Armenian embassy and consulates in Persia, see Rep. of Arm. Archives, Files 79/1-99/23. See also Samson, “Hayastani andranik despane Parskastanum,” Vem, II, nos. 3-6 (1934), 61—73, 96-103, 72-85, 73-85. 153 Near East News, Jan. 15:3, 1920; FO 371/5165, E 1501/262/44; Haradj, Jan. 11:3, 1920.

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into the Republic of Armenia, a solution supported by Prime Minister Venizelos.154 The de facto recognition of the Erevan government in January and the opening of the London conference in February 1920 marked the begin­ ning of a new phase in the history of the Armenian republic. Looking back, the road from Versailles to London had been filled with great expectations and greater disappointments. An American mandate had become increasingly elusive as the settlement was delayed month after month and as one commission after another set out to study conditions in the Near East. By the time the Allied leaders gathered in London, the Red Army was already approaching the North Caucasus, and the Turkish Nationalists had gained ascendancy in most of Anatolia. As the Allies had no will to face up to the Turkish challenge, it was not difficult to find justifications for leaving the sultan in Constantinople, rejecting Armenian territorial pretensions to Cilicia, and advocating, instead of a large Ar­ menia, a modest state with “reasonable” and “safe” boundaries. Even so, the Allied and Associated Powers remained committed to the formation of a free, united Armenia that would incorporate Russian Armenia and at least a part of Turkish Armenia. The London conference would pre­ sumably determine how to discharge that obligation. The existing Russian Armenian republic, meanwhile, had gradually grown in strength and stature. In a report to Avetis Aharonian on Febru­ ary 6, 1920, Prime Minister Khatisian noted that the amelioration in domestic conditions was profound. There was neither famine nor epidem­ ic during this second winter of the Republic, the administrative machinery and the army were better organized, and the first steps had been taken toward local and regional self-government. Relations with Georgia were much improved and, although there was constant friction with Azerbai­ jan, “Zangezur is firmly in our hands.” The British were an enigma, advising a resolute defense of Zangezur one day and condemning such efforts the next. As for the Americans, they were efficient in the job of relief but their political influence, despite Haskell’s self-image, was negli­ gible. Khatisian added that, while the Allies had their own reasons for recognizing the Armenian republic, the act had enhanced the prestige of the government and brought the attainment of national objectives closer.164 164 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 354/1, Khatisian to Archbishop Chrysanthos, Jan. 10, 1920; Al. Khatisiant Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), pp. 161-162; FO 37^ 4953» E784/134/58; Erkir, Jan 30:1, 1920; Hairenik, March 7:2, 1920. For the British peace delegation's file on the Pontus, see FO 608/82, File 342/8/1.

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It was now essential for the Supreme Council to bolster the armies of the Transcaucasian states, to draw Azerbaijan away from the Turks and Bol­ sheviks and extradite the Young Turk fugitive leaders, to pressure Azer­ baijan to relinquish claims to Karabagh and Zangezur and lift the embargo on the shipment of petroleum, and to repatriate the Western Armenian refugees before the spring sowing season. Khatisian privately conceded the loss of Cilicia by asking that Armenian diplomatic efforts be concen­ trated on the creation of a unified state encompassing erstwhile Russian Armenia, the six provinces of Turkish Armenia, and the Black Sea littoral around Trebizond. The prime minister was well aware that the Allies might conclude that even this revised goal was no longer feasible.155 Even as Alexandre Khatisian wrote to Aharonian, the Allied premiers and foreign ministers were assembling in London to work out the Turkish peace treaty and to solve, in one way or another, the complex Armenian question. The settlement of a problem that had been an issue in interna­ tional diplomacy for nearly half a century seemed imminent. But, alas, the Armenians were to learn that the road from London to San Remo and Sèvres was to be no less hazardous and circuitous than the eight-month passage from Versailles to London. And with the Red Army advancing around the flanks of the Caucasus Mountains and the Turkish National­ ists mobilizing along the frontier, they were to enjoy no respite in the struggle to regain national existence as the Republic of Armenia.156 156 Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, Khatisian to Aharonian, Feb. 6, 1920; Khatisian, op. cit., pp. 170-174.

Bibliography

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File 22/22. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. [Republic o f Armenia, 1920]. File 23/23. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. [Republic o f Armenia, 1920]. File 24/24. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. [Republic o f Armenia, 1920]. File 25/25. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun: Zinvorakan Nakhararutian Hramanagrer, 1920 t. [Republic of Armenia: Commands of the Military Ministry, 1920]. File 26/26. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun: “Haikoope” 1919 ev 1920 tvakanin [Republic o f Armenia: “The Armenia Cooperative” in 1919 and 1920]. File 27/27. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. (Tavrizi Shukayum Gtnvads Petakan Tghtere). [Republic of Armenia, 1920 (The State Papers Eound in the Tavriz Marketplace)]. File 28/28. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. [Republic of Armenia, 1920]. File 65/1. H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich ev Vrastani Karavarutiun, 1918 t. [R. o f A. Diplomatic Representative in Georgia and the Government of Georgia, 1918]. File 66/2. H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavaru­ tiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Georgia and the Government of Georgia, 1919]. File 660/3. H' H- Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavaru­ tiun, 1919-1920 t.: Teghekatu [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Georgia and the Government o f Georgia, 1919-1920: Bulletins]. File 67/30. H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavaru­ tiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Georgia and the Government of Georgia, 1920]. File 68/4. H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1921 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Georgia, 1921]. File 69/1. H. H. Adrbedjani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich ev Adrbedjani Karavaru­ tiun, 1918 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Azerbaijan and the Gov­ ernment o f Azerbaijan, 1918]. File 690/ ia. H. H. Adrbedjani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Adrbedjani Karavarutiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Azerbaijan and the Government of Azerbaijan, 1919]. File 70/2. H. H. Adrbedjani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Adrbedjani Karavarutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Azerbaijan and the Government of Azerbaijan, 1920]. File 71 . H. H. Nerkayatsutsich Haravayin Rusastani Zinial Uzheri Mot, 1919 L—1920I 2 i t . [R. of A. Representative with the Military Forces of South Russia, 19191920/21]. File 72. H. H. Nerkayatsutschutiun Ukrayiniayum, 1918—1928 t.t. [R. o f A. Mission in the Ukraine, 1918—1928]. File 72a. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun Nerkayatsutschutiun Parizum ev Ukrayiniayi Parizi Nerkayatsutschutiune, 1919—1921 t.t. [Republic of Armenia Mission in Paris and the Ukrainian Mission in Paris, 1919-1920]. File 73. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Heravor Arevelkum, 1919 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in the Far East, 1919]. File 74/1 . H . H . Patvirakutiun ev Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun Tajkastanum, 1914-1918 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and Diplomatic Mission in Turkey, 1914— 1918]. File 74at 1a. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Tajkastani Karavarutiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission and the Turkish Government, 1919].

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File 75/2. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Tajkastani Karavarutiun, 1 9 /9 -/9 2 0 t. [R. of À. Diplomatic Mission and the Turkish Government, 1919-1920]. File 750/20. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Tajkastanum ev Tajkastani Karavarutiun, 19211. [R. o f A. Diplomatic Representative in Turkey and the Turkish Government, 1921]. File 76/3. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Tajkastani Karavarutiun, 1921 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Mission in Turkey and the Turkish Government, 1921]. File 79/1. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1919 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1919]. File 80/2. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 81/3. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 82/4. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 83/5. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 84/6. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 85/7. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 86/8. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 87/9. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 88/10. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 89/11. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1920]. File 90/12. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1921 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1921]. File 91/13. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1921 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1921]. File 92/14. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1921 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1921]. File 93/15. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1922 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1922]. File 94/16. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1919—1922 t. [R. o f A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1919-1922]. File 95/17. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum, 1922 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia, 1922]. File 96/18. H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum: Hiupatosakan Bazhin, 1919-1922 t. [R. of A. Diplomatic Representative in Persia: Consular Section, 1919-1922]/ File 99/»/ 23. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Tavrizi Hiupatos (Mushegh Ter Zakariani Arkhive, 19201. [The Republic of Armenia’s Tabriz Consul (Mushegh Ter-Zakarian’s Archive, 1920)]. File 102/1. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1918 t. [R. o f A. Delegation, 1918].

534

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File 103/2. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1919]. File 104/3. H- H. Patvirakutiun, 19191.: HashtutianKonferans [R. of A. Delegation, 1919: Peace Conference]. File 1040/30. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [R. o f A. Delegation, 1919]. File 105/4. H- H- Patvirakutiun, 1919 t.: Hushagrer [R. o f A. Delegation, 1919: Memoranda]. File 106/5. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t.: Versaiii Dashnagire [R. of A. Delegation, 1919: The Versailles Treaty]. File 107/6. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t.: Hushagrer [R. o f A. Delegation, 1919: Memoranda]. File 108/7. H- H- Patvirakutiun, 19191.: Haikahan Djarderi Masin [R. o f A. Delega­ tion, 1919: About the Armenian Massacres]. File 109/8. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1919]. File 110/9. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1919]. File 111/10. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1919]. File 112/11. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919 t.: Hai Paterazmakan Geriner [R. of A. Delegation, 1919: Armenian Prisoners of War]. File 113/12. H. H. Patvirakutiun,1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation,1919]. File 114/13. H. H. Patvirakutiun,1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation,1920]. File 115/14. H. H. Patvirakutiun,1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 116/15. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 117/16. H. H. Patvirakutiun,1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation,1920]. File 118/17. H- H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Hashtutian Konferans [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: Peace Conference]. File 119/18. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Hashtutian Konferans [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: Peace Conference]. File 120/19. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Hashtutian Konferans [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: Peace Conference]. File 121/20. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Despanneri Khorhrdazhoghov [R. o f A. Delegation, 1920: Conference o f Ambassadors]. File 122/21. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Spayi Hamagumar [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: Spa Conference]. File 123/22 .H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920t.: San Remoi Hamagumar [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: San Remo Conference]. File 128/27. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Midjazgayin Postayin Paimanagrutiunner [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: International Postal Conventions]. File 129/28. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919-1920 t.t.: Projet de mandat pour l’Arménie [R. of A. Delegation, 1919-1920: Mandate Plan for Armenia]. File 130/29. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Azgeri Dashnaktsutiun [R. of A. Delega­ tion: League of Nations, 1920]. File 131/30. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Azgeri Dashnaktsutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delega­ tion: League of Nations, 1920]. File 132/31. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 133/32. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Sahmanneri Khndire. [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: The Question of Boundaries]. File 134/33. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 135/34. H- H- Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Hayasemer [R. o f A. Delegation, 1920: Armenophiles]. File 136/35. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Kilikia [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: Cilicia].

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File 137/36. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 138/37. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Tghtadramneri Gordse [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: The Matter of Paper Currency]. File 139/38. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Namakanisheri Tpagrutian Gordse [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: The Work of Printing Postage Stamps]. File 140/39. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 19201.: Gaghtni Grutiunner [R. o f A. Delegation, 1920: Secret Correspondence]. File 141/40. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Karmir Khach, 1919-1923 t. [R. of A. Delega­ tion and the Red Cross, 1919-1923]. File 142/41. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 143/42. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 144/43. HPatvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Tntesakan Hartser. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: Economic Questions]. File 145/44. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Tntesakan Hartser: Bambak, 1920-1923 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Economic Questions: Cotton, 1920-1923]. File 146/45. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 19201.: Affaires Tapis [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: The Question of Rugs]. File 147/46. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 148/47. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Tntesakan Hartser [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: Economic Questions]. File 149/48. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 150/49. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 151/50. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 152/51. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 153/52. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation,1920]. File 154/53. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Zanazan Grutiun [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: Miscellaneous Correspondence]. File 230/129. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (50 à 250), 1918-1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1918-1919]. File 231/130. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (25/ à 500), 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1919]. File 2310/1300. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation, 1920]. File 232/131. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (50/ à 1000), 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1919]. File 233/132. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, (1001 à 1300), 1919-1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1919-1920]. File 234/133. H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1919-19201. [R. of A. Delegation, 1919-1920 (Reports of Major General Korganov)]. File 235/134. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (1501 à 1900), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 236/135. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (1901 à 2300), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 237/136. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (2301 à 2690), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 239/138. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (2691 à 2999), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 241/140. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Azgayin Patvirakutiun [R. of A. Delegation: National Delegation]. File 272/171.//. H. Patvirakutiun: Ardzanagrutiunner, 19191. [R. of A. Delegation: Minutes, 1919].

536

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File 273/172. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Ardzanagrutiunner, 1919—1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Minutes, 1919-1920]. File 294/1. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1916 t. [National Delegation, 1916]. File 294a/1a. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1917 t. [National Delegation, 1917]. File 295/2. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1918 t. [National Delegation, 1918]. File 296/3. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [National Delegation, 1919]. File 297/4. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919—1920 t.: Kilikia Ugharkvads Bzhshhakan Arakelutiun [National Delegation, 1919—1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia, 1919-1920]. File 298/5. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919—1920 t.: Kilikia Ugharkvads Bzhshkakan Arakelutiun [National Delegation, 1919-1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia, 1919-1920]. File 299/6. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919-1920 t.: Bzhshhakan Arakelutiun depi Kilikia, 1919-1920 t. [National Delegation: Medical Mission to Cilicia, 19191920]. File 300/7. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919-19201.: Bzhshhakan Arakelutiun depi Kilikia [National Delegation, 1919-1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia, 1919-1920]. File 301/8. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [National Delegation, 1920]. File 302/9. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 19I0 t. [National Delegation, 1920]. File 305a. Amboghdjahan Hayastani Patvirakutiun Kilikiayum, 1919-1920 t. [Dele­ gation of Integral Armenia in Cilicia, 1919-1920]. File 306/1. H. H. Patvirakutiune ev Andrkovkasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1919]. File 307/2. H. H. Patvirakutiune ev Andrkovkasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1920]. File 318. Andrkovkasi Asorinere, 1919-1922 t.t. [The Assyrians of Transcaucasia, 1919-1922]. File 3180. Krteri Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1918—1919 t. [The Kurdish Mission, 1918— , 1919]File 319/1. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1919]. File 320/2. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1920]. File 321/3. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. o f A. Delegation and the French Government, 1920]. File 322/4. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1920]. File 331/1. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1917 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1917]. File 332/2. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 19181. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1918]. File 333/3. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1919]. File 334/4. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1920]. File 335/5. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 19191920 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1919-1920]. File 336/6. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1920].

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File 344/1. H. H. Hrotni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1918 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1918]. File 345/2. H. H. Hrotni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1919]. File 346/3. H. H. Hrotni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1920]. File 347/4. H. H. Hrotni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1921]. File 353. H. H. Berlini Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1918—1919 t. [R. of A. Berlin Mission, 1918- 1919]. File 353a. H. H. Berlini Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919-19201. [R. of A. Berlin Mission, 1919- 1920]. File 354/i . H. H. AtenkiNerkayatsutschutiun evHunakanKaravarutiune, 1919-1920 t. [R. of A. Athens Mission and the Greek Government, 1919-1920]. File 355/2. H. H. Atenki Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Hunakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Athens Mission and the Greek Government, 1921]. File 360/1. H. H. Sofiayi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921 t. [R. of A. Consulate General in Sofia, 1921]. File 364. H. H. Bukreshi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921—19291. [R. of A. Consulate General in Bucharest, 1921—1929]. File 365. H. H. Viennayi Hiupatosutiun, 1920-1923 t. [R. o f A. Vienna Consulate, 1920- 1923]. File 366. H. H. Belgradi Hiupatosutiun, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. o f A. Belgrade Consu­ late, 1920-1921]. File 367. H. H. Zhenevi Hiupatosutiun, 1919—1921 t.t. [R. o f A. Geneva Consulate, 1919-1921]. File 368/1. Beldjikakan Karavarutiun ev Briuseli Hiupatosutiun, 1919—1920 t.t. [The Belgian Government and the Brussels Consulate, 1919-1920]. File 369/2. Beldjikakan Karavarutiun ev Briuseli Hiupatosutiun, 1921—1922 t.t. [The Belgian Government and the Brussels Consulate, 1921—1922]. File 371. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Khorhrdayin Rusastan, 1920-1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and Soviet Russia, 1920-1921]. File 373. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Rusahan Nakhkin Nerkayatsutsichner, 1919-1922 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Former Representatives of Russia, 1919-1922]. File 374. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Finlandakan Karavarutiun, 1920-1922 t. [R. o f A. Delegation and the Finnish Government, 1920-1922]. File 375. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Latviayi Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919-1922 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Latvian Mission, 1919-1922]. File 376. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Lehastani Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919-1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Polish Mission, 1919-1921]. File 377. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Chekhoslovakiayi Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1921 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Czechoslovak Mission, 1921]. File 378. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Evropakan Zanazan Petutiunneri Nerkayatsutschu­ tiun, 1919-1923 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Missions of Various European States, 1919-1923]. File 379/1. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev H. Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1917— 1918. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the N. American Govern­ ment, 1917—1918]. File 380/2. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev H. Amerikayi Karavarutiune, 1919

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t. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the Government o f N. America, 19 19 ] File 381/3. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev H. Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the N. American Government, 19193 File 382/4. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev Amerikian Karavarutiune: Press Bureau, 1919 t. [Washington Representative and the American Government: Press Bureau, 1919]. File 383/5. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev AmerikayiKaravarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the Government of America, 1920]. File 384/6. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the American Government, 1920]. File 385/7. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Amerikian Karavarutiune: Ar­ menian Press Bureau, 1920 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the American Government: Armenian Press Bureau, 1920]. File 386/8. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the American Government, 1921]. File 395/17 .H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun: Hiupatosakan Grutiunner, 192019211. [R. of A. Washington Missidn: Consular Correspondence, 1920-1921]. File 400. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Haravayin Amerikayi Petutiunnere, 1919-192’] t. [R. of A. Delegation and the States of South America, 1919-1927]. File 401. H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Egiptosi Medj, 1920-1922 t.t. [R. of A. Temporary Representative in Egypt, 1920-1922]. File 402. H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutschutiun Habeshstanum, 1919-1923 t.t. [R. of A. Temporary Mission in Ethiopia, 1919-1923]. File 403. H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Iragum, 19201. [R. of A. Temporary Representative in Iraq, 1920]. File 403a. H. H. Nerkayatsutschutiun Japoniayum, 1920—1922 [R. of A. Mission in Japan, 1920-1922]. File 404/1. Azgeri Dashnaktsutiune, 1918-1920 [The League of Nations, 19181920] . File 404al 1a. Azgeri Dashnaktsutiune: Sevri Dashnagir, 1920 t. [The League of Nations: Treaty of Sèvres, 1920]. File 421/1. Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 19191. [Armenian Information Bureau in Paris, 1919]. File 422/2. Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 19201. [Armenian Information Bureau in Paris, 1920]. File 502. Azgayin Marminner: Azgayin Khorhurd, 1918. [National Bodies: National Council, 1918]. File 503. Kamavorakan Gnder, 1914—1918 t. [Volunteer Units, 1914-1918]. File 504. Azgayin Miutiun Kilikio ev Siurio, 1919—1924. [National Union o f Cilicia and Syria, 1919-1924]. File 506. Azgayin Miutiun Egiptosi, 1916-1921 1. [National Union o f Egypt, 1916-

1921] . File 508. Azgayin Miutiun Bulghario, 1918-1921 1. [National Union of Bulgaria, 1918-1921]. File 509. Haikakan Miutiun Rumania, 1918—1921 t. [Armenian Union o f Ru­ mania, 1918-1921].

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File 510. Hayots Azgayin Khorhurd Lehastanum, 1920—1931t. [Armenian National Council in Poland, 1920-1931]. File 515. Hayots Miatsial Enkerutiun Londoni, 1919 t. [The Armenian United Association of London, 1919]. File 516. Amerikayi Hayots Azgayin Miutiun, 1919 t. [Armenian National Union o f America, 1919]. File 526. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, 1919 t. Hunvar [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turkish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, January 1919]. File 527. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, 1919 t. Petrvar [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turkish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, February 1919]. File 528. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, 1919 t. Mart [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turkish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, March 1919]. File 529. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, 1919 t. April [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turkish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, April 1919]. (The files that follow are part of the original archives of Dashnaktsutiun.) File 1283/26. H. H. D. Arevmtian Evropayi Kedronakan Komite, 1919 [A. (Armeni­ an) R. (Revolutionary) F. (Federation) Central Committee of Western Europe, 19191File 14060/ 26a. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, 1918 [A. R. F. Central Committee of America, 1918]. File 14070/270. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, 1919 [A. R. F. Central Committee of America, 1919]. File 1408/28. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, 1920 [A. R. F. Central Committee of America, 1920]. File 1546/27. H. H. D. 9-rd Endhanur Zhoghov 1919 t. [A. R. F. 9th General Meeting, 1919]. File 1649. H. H. D.: Gharabagh [A. R. F.: Karabagh]. File 1687/18. H. H. D. Erkrord Midjazgainakan, 1919 [A. R. F.: Second Interna­ tional, 1919]. File 1688/19. H- H. D.: Erkrord Midjazgainakan, 1920 [A. R. F.: Second Interna­ tional, 1920]. Armenian National Delegation. Archives of the Armenian National Delegation. (Transferred in 1972 from Paris to the Armenian SSR State Historical Archives, Erevan, with microfilm copies deposited in the Nubarian Library in Paris and at the international headquarters of the Armenian General Benevolent Union in the United States). Microfilm Roll C-i (Pp. 1-2052: Delegation minutes, correspondence, and documents, refu­ gee affairs, National Congress, Phil-Armenian Congress, Lausanne confer­ ences, 1918-1924).

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

540

C-2 (Pp. 2°53-4°49: Delegation correspondence and memoranda, refugee affairs, League of Nations, Lausanne conferences, Cilicia, Armenian Na­ tional Home, 1922—1924). C-3 (Pp. 4050-6203: History of Armenian Question, statistical data, Armenian orphans and refugees, delegation correspondence, 1921—1924). C-4 (Pp. 6204—8277: Delegation correspondence, Paris Peace Conference, Allied policies, Armenian orphans and refugees, 1919-1924). C-5 (Pp. 8278-10047: Armenian National Congress, news agency releases, 1919-1923). C-6 (Pp. 10048—12019: News agency releases, 1922—1923). C-7 (Pp. 12020-14208: Armenian press bureaus, League of Nations and refugees, Cilicia, general correspondence, 1918—1925). C-8 (Pp. 14209-15727: Armenophile societies, 1918-1924). C-9 (Pp. 15728—17785: Near East Relief, Transcaucasian affairs, Armenian communities in Western Europe, 1920-1929). C-10 (Pp. 17786-18594 and new series pp. 1—1214: Armenian communities in Europe and Near East, conditions in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Cilicia, correspondence of Noradoungian, Tekeyan, Alpoyadjian, and others, 1919-1924). C"i 1 (Pp* 1215-3131 n.s.: Conditions in Cilicia and Syria, Armenian commu­ nities in Near East and United States, 1919-1922). C-12 (Pp. 3132—5166 n.s.: Catholicosate of Cilicia, Patriarchates of Constan­ tinople and Jerusalem, Mekhitarist Brotherhood, Republic of Armenia Delegation, general correspondence, 1919-1924). C-13 (Pp. 5167-6695 n.s.: Armenian Legion and Légion d’Orient, History of Armenian Question, Cilicia, National Home, correspondence of General Andranik, Patriarch Zaven, Gulbenkian, Melkonian, and others, 19191 9 2 5 )-

D-i (Pp. 1-2000: National Congress, general correspondence, memoranda, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 4 ).

D-2 (Pp. 2001-3881: Peace conference, delegation minutes, correspondence memoranda, 1920-1923). D-3 (Pp. 3882-5902: Delegation committees. Allied policies, Turkish Nation­ alist foreign relations, Cilicia and the Armenian Legion, 1920-1924). D-4 (Pp. 5903—8301 : Conditions in Cilicia, National Home, Delegation memo­ randa, correspondence of Damadian, Sevasly, Esayan, Chobanian, and others, 1920-1924). D-5 (Pp. 8302—10143: Peace conferences, conditions in Cilicia, refugees, dele­ gation correspondence, 1919-1923). D-6 (Pp. 10144-12019: Conditions in Transcaucasia, Paris Peace Conference, delegation secretariat, Armenophile societies, Soviet-Turkish relations, Soviet Armenia, League of Nations, general correspondence, 1919-1924). 1- D (Pp. 1—2050: Andonian’s history of Armenian Question and National Delegation, minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, minutes of National Delegation, Paris Peace Conference, Treaty o f Sèvres, Armenians in the world war, 1915—1924). 2- D (Pp. 2051-2320: Cilicia, National Home, refugee affairs, 1919-1923).

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

541

France Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Quai d’Orsay), Paris. Guerre 1914—1918: Turquie. Cartons 887—889. Arménie: août 1914—mai 1918. Cartons 890—893. Légion d’Orient: septembre 1916—avril 1918. Cartons 894—895. Arméniens du Caucase: octobre 1917—avril 1918. Ministère d’Etat Chargé de la Défense Nationale. Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre. Service Historique (Château de Vincennes), Vincennes. Classe 16N. Commandement du Grand Quartier Général. T. O. E. 3ème Bureau E. File 3016 (Légion d’Orient). Files 3051—3052 (Turkish-Caucasus front, 1917-1919). Files 3060-3061 (Caucasus, Cilicia, etc., 1917-1919). Files 3152-3154 (Comptes-rendus des Armées Alliées en Orient, 19171919)Files 3180-3187 (Caucasus: Turkish invasion of, massacres o f Armenians in, conditions of refugees in, British occupation of, Armenian republic in, 1917-1919). Files 3194-3206 (Intelligence reports, correspondence, and documents relating to Turkey, Asia Minor, Transcaucasia, Armenians, Allied poli­ cies, 1915-1920). Classe 17N. Missions Militaires Françaises. Files 581—585 (Mission in South Russia, including numerous reports on the Caucasus, Armenian refugees, Pan-Islamic movements). Files 589-590 (Mission in the Caucasus). Classe 20N. Front Oriental. Commandement des Armées Alliées en Orient {C.A.A. ). 2ème Bureau. Files 139-144. Bulletins de renseignements, comptes-rendus, correspondance: Empire Ottoman, Arménie. Caucase, etc. 1916-1919. Files 157—158. (Armenian survivors and conditions in Cilicia, Allied poli­ cies and rivalries, Soviet-Turkish relations, 1919-1921.) Files 166—170. Renseignements de la Marine, 1917—1921. File 171. Conférence des hauts-commissaires, 1919-1920. File 172. Correspondance et renseignements relatifs à l’Armée du Levant, 1916*9 21Files 173—175. Comptes rendus et renseignements britanniques; renseignements divers, 1916-1922. Files 186—187. Caucase: Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan et Arménie, 1919-1921. Corps d’Occupation de Constantinople (C.O.C. ), puis Corps d’Occupation Français de Constantinople (C.O.F.C. ). 2ème Bureau. Files 1081—1084. Bulletins de renseignementsjournaliers et hebdomadaires: ren­ seignements politiques, économiques et militaires, 1920-1923. File 1085. Rapports mensuels concernant la politique intérieure et extérieure. . . , 1920-1923. File 1086/1. Renseignements sur la Turquie, la Géorgie, l’Arménie . . . , 1920. 1921‘ File 1088. Armée française du Levant.. .à la chute d’Aïntab, 21 février, 1921. File 1095. Renseignements de la Marine . . . Turquie, Russie méridionale, Causase, Arménie, Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan, Syrie et Cilicie . . . , 1920-1923.

542

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

File 1115. Télégrammes . . . Evénements de CiUcie et résistance à l’occupation française; renseignements sur le Kurdistan et l’Arménie, 1919-1923. Republic of Georgia. Archives of the Delegation to the Conference of Peace and of the Government in Exile. (Now deposited in Houghton Library, Harvard Uni­ versity). Boxes 1—2. The Russian Revolution and the Situation in the Caucasus prior to the Bolshevik Invasion. Box 3. The Caucasus and Turkey in 1918-1919. Boxes 4—7. The Transcaucasian Federation and Independent Georgia. Boxes 8-9. Independent Georgia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Boxes 10-12. Independent Georgia: Ministry of Finance, Trade, and Industry. Boxes 13-15. Independent Georgia: Ministry of Agriculture. Boxes 16-18. Independent Georgia: People’s Guard. Box 19. Peace Conference in Trebizond; End of Transcaucasian Federation; Indepen­ dent Georgia and Its Relations with Turkey and Germany. Boxes 20-23. Georgia, English Military Command in Transcaucasia, Russian White Army. Box 24. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Boxes 25—30. Georgian Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris. Box 31. Georgian Diplomatic Representation in Paris. Box 32. Georgian Legation in Rome. Box 33. Georgian Legation in Berlin. Box 34. Georgian Legation in Constantinople. Box 35. Georgian Legation in Berne. Box 36. Interrelations among Georgia, Northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Poland, Bielorussia, Baltic, and Scandinavian Countries. Box 37. Georgia and Soviet Russia. Box 80. The Georgian and Foreign Press about Georgia.

Great Britain Admiralty Office Archives. Public Record Office (London). Class 1. Admiralty and Secretarial Papers, 1660-1934. Cabinet Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 21. Registered Files (1916-1939 ). 4. Supreme War Council, 1917. 101. Organisation of the War Cabinet, 1918 102. Functions of the War Cabinet, 1918. 129-137. Supreme War Council: Military, Naval, and Air Representatives, 1917-1919. 139. Future of Constantinople. 143. Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation, 1919. 153—154. Future of Syria, 1919. 158. Relations between France and Great Britain and Their Policy re Russian and Turkish Peace, 1919. 173. Trading Relations with Russia, 1920. 174. Smyrna, 1920.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

543

177. Bolshevik Influence on Moslems, 1920. 184. Turkey: Peace Negotiations, 1920. Class 23. Cabinet: Minutes (1916-1939). 1—12. War Cabinet Minutes, W.C. Series, 1916—1919. 13—16. War Cabinet: ‘A ’ Minutes, 1917—1919. 17. War Cabinet: ‘X ’ Minutes, 1918. 18-23. Cabinet Conclusions, 1919-1920. 37—38. Conclusions, 1919-1921. 40—44. Imperial War Cabinet: Minutes, 1917—1918. Class 24. Cabinet Memoranda (1913—1939). 1—5. ‘G’ War Series, 1915-1920. 6 - 88. ‘G.7 V Series, 1917—1919. . 92-117. ‘C.P.’ Series, 1919-1920. 143—145. War Cabinet: Eastern Reports, 1917—1919. 154-155. Cabinet: Foreign Countries Reports, 1919-1922. Class 25. Supreme War Council (1913—1919 ). 42. Turkey: Reports on Pan-Turanian Movement and on Turkey in Asia and Its Problems. 43. Turkey and South Russia: Reports on the Military and Strategical Situation. 72. Eastern and Central Asian Question. 104. Near East: Situation Report. 107. Near East: Situation Report. 118. The Ottoman Empire and Trans-Caucasia: Military Occupation. 120-126. Circulated Papers. 127. Miscellaneous Unnumbered Papers (including history of Supreme War Council). Class 27. Cabinet Committees: General Series (1913-1939). 1. British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 1915. 23. Middle East, 1918. 24. Eastern Committee: Minutes of Meetings, 1918—1919. 25—39. Eastern Committee: Memoranda, 1918. Class 28. Allied (War) Conferences (1913—1920). 1—8. Anglo-French and Allied Conferences: I. C. Series, 1915—1919. 9. Miscellaneous Papers, 1915—1920. Class 29. International Conferences (1916-1939). 1-6. ‘P ’ (Peace) Series, 1916—1920. 7— 22. War Cabinet: Paris ('W.C.P.’ Series), 1919—1920. 23-27. War Cabinet: Paris (‘AT Series), 1919. 28. Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation, 1919—1922. 29-35. Peace Conference (A.J.’ Series), 1920-1922. 37—40. Council of the Heads of Governments (Four), 1919. 41. Ministers of Foreign Affairs (C.M. Series), 1920. 42—52. Council of Ambassadors (C.A. Series), 1920. 69-78. Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers (H.D. Series), 1919-1920. 81—90. Allied and International Conference on the Terms of Peace and Related Subjects (I.C.P. Series), 1919-1920. Class 45. Cabinet Office Historical Section. Official War Histories: Correspondence and Papers.

544

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

105. Russia, South (including Transcaucasia), 1918-1919. 106-109. Transcaucasia and Turkey, 1917—1923. Foreign Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 96. Miscellanea, Series II. Turkish Atrocities in Armenia (vols. 205-212). Class 371. Political: General Correspondence. /9 /9 - /9 2 0 Geographic Classification 34: Persia. Geographic Classification 38: Russia. Geographic Classification 44: Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. File 519 (Future of Turkey). File 521 (Situation in Turkey and the Caucasus). File 1270 (Misdeeds of Turkish Officers and Breaches of Armistice). File 2117 (Syria and Cilicia). File 3050 (Kurds and Future of Kurdistan).

File 3349 (Relief Activities). File 50535 (Situation in Southeast Europe and Turkey in Asia). File 106312 (Spheres of Allied Command). File 151671 (Anglo-French Conference on the Turkish Settlement). Geographic Classification 58: The Caucasus. File 512 (Armenians and the Future of Armenia). File 806 (General Torcom). File 1015 (Caucasus: Georgia and Azerbaijan). File 1773 (Situation at Batum). File 2244 (North Caucasus Republic). File 2473 (Georgian Economic Mission). File 2893 (Armenian-Georgian Hostilities). File 5890 (Situation in the Caucasus). File 7882 (Caucasian Prisoners in Germany). File 11067 (Affairs in the Caspian and British Evacuation of Caucasus). File 14518 (Military Situation in the Caucasus). File 15439 (Situation at Enzeli). File 16214 (Armenian Military Mission). File 25355 (Administration of Kars). File 33623 (Petroleum Executive and the Caucasus). File 39980 (Concessions in the Caucasus). File 42186 (Lenkoran Republic). File 47637 (Petroleum, Baku). File 47761 (Trade Conditions). File 60982 (Caucasus Copper Company). File 67164 (Claims against General Torcom). File 72426 (Armenian Occupation of Nakhichevan). File 89370 (Mikayel Varandian’s Correspondence Regarding Karabagh). File 91659 (Financial Questions and Accounts Due in Azerbaijan). File 98451 (Resident Commissioner [Haskell] in Armenia). File 102582 (Repatriation of the Caucasian Prisoners in Germany). File 104606 (Claims against the Turkish Government). File 109090 (Armenian Economic Mission [Kachaznuni] in Europe). File 113944 (Situation in Grozny and North Caucasus Oil Fields).

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

545

File 115966 (Escape of Nuri Pasha). File 119397 (Harbord Mission). File 129487 (Bolshevik Outrages in Georgia). File 133200 (Assyrians in Transcaucasia and North Persia). File 134519 (Loris-Melikov Mission). File 137211 (Azerbaijani Political Mission [Vezirov] to Constantinople). File 148704 (Fuel Problems in Caucasia). File 149194 (Armenian Bank Notes). File 159649 (Alleged Armenian Purchase of Airplanes). File 162432 (Situation on the Caspian). File 164095 (Armenian Officers Interned at Madras). File 166439 (Film “Ravished Armenia” or “Auction of Souls”). File 167087 (Oil Stocks at Baku). File 168734 (Press Extracts). File 168738 (Situation in Azerbaijan). File 168898 (Proposed French Wireless Station at Batum). File 170408 (Colonel Stokes). File 170788 (Situation in Georgia). File 170842 (Ghambashidze as Georgian Representative). File 171821 (Turkish Activities in the Caucasus). File 172087 (Situation in Daghestan). File 176894 (Future of Batum). 1920 Geographic Classification 44: Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. File 3 (3/44) (Asiatic Provinces). File 11 (Kurds and the Future of Kurdistan). File 27 (Relief of Armenians). File 56 (Treaty with Turkey). File 262 (Intelligence Reports). File 272 (Movement of CUP [Young Turk] Leaders). File 345 (Bolshevik Propaganda and Activity). File 621 (Pontus). File 1214 (Cilicia). Geographic Classification 58: The Caucasus. File 1 (1/58) (Caucasus). File 5 (Military Needs of Azerbaijan). File 24 (Armenian Interests in Egypt). File 36 (Press Extracts). File 51 (Italian Mission in the Caucasus). File 59 (Alleged Military Convention between Turkey and Azerbaijan). File 69 (Captain Gracey). File 134 (Situation in Armenia). Class 406. Confidential Print: Eastern Affairs, 1812-1946. Class 608. Peace Conference, 1919-1920: Correspondence. Middle East, Political (Files 341—390). Armenia File 342/1/1. Constitution of Future State. File 342/1/2. Internal Situation. File 342/1/3. American Armenian Committee.

546

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

File 342/1/4. Claims in Bulgaria. File 342/1/5. Outrages on Armenians in Turkey. File 342/1/6. Occupation, Allied. File 342/1/7. Desiderata, American. File 342/1/8. Desiderata, Revolutionary. File 342/1/9. Relief Expedition. File 342/1/10. Roman Catholics. File 342/1/11. Railways and Roads. File 342/1/12. Political Relations. File 342/1/13. Boundaries. File 342/1/14. Resident Commissioner. File 342/1/15. Arrests in Russia. File 342/1/16. Young Turk Menace. Armenians File 342/5/1. Refugees in Egypt. File 342/5/2. Karabagh. File 342/5/3. Permits, French. File 342/5/4. Political Relations with, in Caucasus. Anatolia File 342/6/1. Future of. File 342/6/2. Administration. Armistice File 342/7/1. Turkish Breach of. File 342/7/2. Amnesty under. File 342/7/3. General File. Asia Minor File 342/8/1. Sovereign State, Euxine Pontus. File 342/8/4. Committee, Middle East Section. Azerbaijan File 342/12/1. Desiderata. File 342/12/2. Urmia. File 342/12/3. Representation of, at Peace Conference. File 342/12/4. Payments by H.M.G. File 342/12/5. Proposed Mission to Constantinople. Caucasia File 347/1/1. Outrages, Armenians on Turks. File 347/1/2. Reports. File 347/1/6. Desiderata. File 347/1/7. Military. File 347/1/8. Political Relations, Allies. Commissions File 349/1/1. International Commissions for Armenia and Constantinople. File 349/1/2. International Commission for Development of Armenia. File 349/1/3. Inter-Allied, to Middle East. File 349/1/4. Inter-Allied Relief. File 349/1/5. American-Persian Relief. Georgia File 356/2/1. Delegation to Peace Conference. File 356/2/2. Situation in.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

547

File 356/2/3. Recognition of. File 356/2/4. Arrests. File 356/2/5. Press. File 356/2/6. Political Relations with Allies. File 356/2/7. Desiderata. File 356/2/8. Political Relations: General Denikin. Government and Administration File 357/2/3. Constitution of New States. Indemnities File 362/2/1. Turkish, to Armenians and Syrians. Journeys File 363/1/12. Papadjanoff, Korganoff. File 363/1/13. General Torcom. Kurds File 365/1/1. Aspirations of. File 365/1/2. Sovereign State. File 365/1/3. Administration. File 365/1/4. Nisibin. File 365/1/5. Van. File 365/1/6. Reports. Outrages File 374/1/1. By Turks in Asia Minor. Peace Conference File 375/1/1. Representation of Armenia. File 375/1/2. Representation of Kurdistan. File 375/1/7. Representation of Persia. File 375/1/12. Turkish Representatives. File 375/1/13. Decisions Taken. Persia File 375/3/1. Desiderata at Peace Conference. File 375/3/3. Azerbaijan Republic. File 375/3/4. Delegation to Peace Conference. File 375/3/6. Accession of Nakhichevan, Ordubad, Sharur and Deralges [«c]. File 375/3/8. Political Relations, Allies. Reports File 378/3/1. Middle East. File 378/3/2. Turkey. Smyrna File 383/1/1. Future of. File 383/1/2. British Interest in. File 383/1/3. Administration. File 383/1/5. Greek Claims. File 383/1/6. Occupation, Military. Statistics File 384/2/3. Populations. File 384/2/4. Armenia, Populations. Turkey File 385/1/1. Occupation, Military. File 385/1/2. Treaty Boundary.

548

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

File 385/1/3. Capitulations. File 385/1/4. Individual Punishment for Outrages. File 385/1/5. Movements of Sabaheddin. File 385/1/6. Straits, Internationalization. File 385/1/7. Reparation and Restitution. File 385/1/8. International Status. File 385/1/11. Mandates. File 385/1/12. Repatriation. File 385/1/14. Desiderata. File 385/1/15. Cabinets. File 385/1/16. Administration, Asia Minor. File 385/1/17. Extradition of Enver and Talaat Pashas. File 385/1/18. Arrests. File 385/1/20. Political Relations, Anglo-French. File 385/1/21. Outrages. File 385/1/22. Prisons. File 385/1/23. Political Relations, Allies. File 385/1/24. Finance. File 385/1/25. Committee of Union and Progress. File 385/1/26. Trade and Commerce. File 385/1/27. Gendarmerie. File 385/1/28. Propaganda, Anti-British. File 385/1/29. Ghalib Kemali Bey. File 385/1/31. Russian Desiderata. File 385/1/32. Relations, Greek. File 385/1/35. Sale of State Property. Territory File 385/2/1. Boundaries, Mesopotamia. File 385/2/2. Spheres of Influence. File 385/2/3. Petition re Middle East. Treaties File 385/3/1. Conversations, Anglo-French. File 385/3/2. Treaty of Peace—Germany. File 385/3/3. Treaty of Peace—Turkey. File 385/3/4. Turkish Delegates. File 385/3/5. Turkish Notes and Allied Replies. File 385/3/6. Georgia and Azerbaijan. File 385/3/7. Turco-Arab. Russia-Political (Files 591-615). Georgia File 599/3/1. Future Status. File 599/3/2. Claims to Trebizond. Internal Situation File 602/1/3. Caucasia. File 602/1/6. Georgia. Navy File 607/1/3. British Caspian Flotilla. Peace Conference File 608/1/1. Representation at.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

File 608/1/3. Representation at—Georgia. File 608/1/9. Tartar Representation. Legal (Files 1781—1830). Arrest File 1782/1/2. Of Turks for Misdeeds during the War. Court-Martials File 1789/3/1. For Armenian Atrocities. Massacres File 1809/1/1. Turkish. Trials File 1825/1/1. Djavid Bey. File 1825/1/2. Djemal Pasha. Military (Files 2121—2145). Armenia File 2121/2/1. Plight of Armenians. Occupation File 2137/2/2. Turkish Territories. File 2137/2/3. Legal Aspects. Russia File 2139/2/2. Georgia. Repatriation File 2139/6/2. Georgian and Caucasian Prisoners. Turkey File 2142/1/1. Surrender and Trial of Turkish Officers. File 2142/1/2. Constantinople. File 2142/1/3. Preparations to Renew Hostilities. File 2142/1/4. Army, General File. Reference Eastern Mission (Turkey), 1920 (Files 1—493). Class 800. Private Collections: Ministers and Officials. Private Papers of Lord Balfour. Private Papers of Lord Robert Cecil. Private Papers of Sir Eyre A. Crowe. Private Papers of Earl Curzon. India Office Archives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Class L/P&S/10. Political and Secret Subject Files. War Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 32. Registered Papers: General Series, 1855-1925. Class 33. Reports and Miscellaneous Papers, 1855—1959. Class 95. War Diaries, 1914—1922. Class 106. Directorates of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1850-1925. Private Papers. The Papers of Lord Arthur J. Balfour (British Museum, London). The Papers of Lord James Bryce (Bodleian Library, Oxford). The Papers of Lord Robert Cecil (British Museum, London). The Papers of David Lloyd George (Beaverbrook Library, London).

549

55°

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

United, States of America American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Houghton Library, Harvard University), Cambridge, Massachusetts. ABC Files. 3. Foreign Department. Missionaries, Letter Books. 16.5. Miscellaneous Papers relating to the Near East Missions. 16.9.1. Turkey Mission. New Series, 1920-1929. 16.9.3. Western Turkey Mission. 16.9.5. Central Turkey Mission. 16.9.7. Eastern Turkey Mission. 16.9.8. Eastern Turkey Mission: Women’s Board. New Series 2 (1959-1965 acquisitions). The Papers of Isabella M. Blake. The Papers of Clarence D. Ussher. New Series 4 (1967). The Personal Papers of James L. Barton. New Series 6. Special Collections. Biographical Collection (Box and File) 6/5. Mr. 8c Mrs. James L. Barton. 6/6. J. L. Barton. 13/23. Lawson Powers Chambers. 13/25. William Nesbitt Chambers. 16/34. Mary Floyd Cushman. 19/43. Mr. 8c Mrs. Theodore Allen Elmer. 22/7. Agnes Fenenga. 23/37. Frank Gates. 45/24. W. W. Peet. 46/25. Mr. 8c Mrs. Ernest C. Partridge. 46/50. Mr. & Mrs. Ernest Wilson Riggs. Mr. & Mrs. Henry H. Riggs. 60/40. Dr. & Mrs. C. D. Ussher. 66/8. Ernest A. Yarrow. The National Archives (Washington, D.C.). Record Group 5. United States Grain Corporation. Record Group 38. Office of Naval Intelligence. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Political Relations between the United States and Turkey, 1910-1920 (Microfilm Publication 365: 8 rolls). File 711.67. United States Grain Corporation. Political Relations between Armenia and Other States. File 760J.00. Political Affairs. File 760J.60G. Armenia and Georgia. File 760J.61. Armenia and Russia. File 760J.67. Armenia and Turkey. File 760J.90C. Armenia and Azerbaijan. Political Relations between Russia and the Soviet Union and Other States, 19101929 (Microfilm Publication 340: 20 rolls). File 761.67. Russia and Turkey. File 761.90C. Russia and Azerbaijan.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

551

World, War I and Its Termination, 1914-1929 (Microfilm Publication 367: 518 rolls). File 763.72. European War. File 763.72119. Termination of the War. Political Relations between Turkey and Other States, 1910-1929 (Microfilm Pub­ lication 363: 29 rolls). File 767.68. Greece. File 767.68118. Termination of War and Lausanne Conference. File 767.90C. Azerbaijan. Internal Affairs of Armenia (Microfilm Publication T1192: 8 rolls). File 860J.00. Political Affairs. File 86oJ.oop8i. Political Affairs—Popular Comment. File 860J.01. Government. File 860.20. Military Affairs and the Army. File 860J.4016. Race Problems. File 860J.4016P81. Race Problems—Popular Comment. File 860J.404. Religion. File 860J.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 860J.50. Economic Affairs. File 860J.51. Financial Affairs. File 860J.63. Mines and Mining. Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1910-1929 (Microfilm Publica­ tion 316: 177 rolls). File 861.00. Political Affairs. File 861.01. Government. File 861.20. Military Affairs and the Army. File 861.4016. Race Problems and the Nationality Question. File 861.48. Calamities and Disasters. Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1910-1929 (Microfilm Publication 353: 88 rolls). File 867.00. Political Affairs. File 867.00B. Bolshevism. File 867.01. Government. File 867.03. Legislative Branch. File 867.04. Judicial Branch. File 867.20. Military Affairs and the Army. File 867.4016. Race Problems. File 867.404. Religion. File 867.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 867.52. Lands. File 867.911. Public Press. Internal Affairs of Greece, 1910—1929 (Microfilm Publication 443: 45 rolls). File 868.00. Political Affairs. File 868.01. Government. File 868.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 868.51. Refugee Settlement Commission. Internal Affairs of Asia, 1910-1929 (Microfilm Publication 722: 28 rolls). File 890C.00. Azerbaijan. File 890D.4016. Syria: Racial Disturbances. File 890D.48. Syria: Calamities and Disasters. File 890G.48. Mesopotamia: Calamities and Disasters.

552

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

Internal Affairs of Persia, 1919-1929 (Microfilm Publication 715: 37 rolls). File 891.00. Political Affairs. File 891.4016. Racial Problems. File 891.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 891.6363. Mines and Mining: Petroleum. Record Group 84. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. Record Group 256. Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Mi­ crofilm Publication 820: 563 rolls). File 103.97. American Relief Administration. File 123. Diplomatic and Consular Service Personnel. File 180.01. Principal Councils of Peace Conference. File 180.0201. Plenary Sessions, Minutes. File 180.03. Supreme Council. File 180.03101. Supreme Council, Minutes. File 180.032. Conference of Foreign Ministers. File 180.03201. Conference of Foreign Ministers, Minutes. File 180.033. Conference of Ambassadors. File 180.03301. Conference of Ambassadors, Minutes. File 180.034. Council of Four. * File 180.03401. Council of Four, Minutes. File 180.03402. Council of Four, Decisions. File 180.035. Heads of Delegations. File 180.03501. Heads of Delegations, Minutes. File 180.03502. Heads of Delegations, Resolutions. File 180.036. Conference of Powers with Special Interests. File 180.03601. Council of Powers with Special Interests, Minutes. File 180.037. Council of Ministers. File 180.03701. Council of Ministers, Minutes. File 180.038. International Council of Premiers. File 180.03801. International Council of Premiers, Minutes. File 180.040. Supreme War Council. File 180.0401. Supreme War Council, Minutes. File 180.05. Supreme Economic Council. File 180.0501. Supreme Economic Council, Minutes. File 181.94. Inter-Allied Mission (Haskell) to Armenia. File 181.9402. Inter-Allied Mission to Armenia, Reports. File 183.9 Armenia. Conference Delegations, Armenia. File 184.001. American Commissioners Plenipotentiary. File 184.00101. American Commissioners Plenipotentiary, Steering Committee. File 184.016. American Field Mission (Riggs) to South Russia (and Trans­ caucasia). File 184.01602. American Field Mission to South Russia, Reports. File 184.021. American Military Mission (Harbord) to Armenia. File 184.02102. American Military Mission to Armenia, Reports. File 184.1. American Delegation Personnel. File 184.611. S. H. Bulletins. File 184.612. E. S. H. Bulletins. File 185.005. Turkey, Armistice Negotiations. File 185.5. Turkey, Conditions of Peace. File 185.513. Turkey, Political Clauses.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File File

553

185.5136. Turkey, Political Clauses, Boundaries. 861.00. Russia, Political Affairs. 861.48. Russia, Social Matters. 861G.00. Georgia. 861G.00B. Georgia, Bolshevism. 861K.00. Caucasus—Azerbaijan. 861K.911. Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Press. 867.00. Turkey, Political Affairs. 867.00B. Turkey, Political Affairs, Bolshevism. 867.20. Turkey, Military Affairs and the Army. 867.4016. Turkey, Social Matters and Race Problems. 867B.00. Armenia, Political Affairs. 867B.001. Armenia, Chief Executive. 867B.01. Armenia, Government. 867B.20. Armenia, Military Affairs and the Army. 867B.4016. Armenia, Race Problems. 867B.48. Armenia, Calamities and Disasters. 867B.5018. Armenia, Food Conditions and Shortages. 867B.51. Armenia, Financial Conditions. 867B.77. Armenia, Railways. 891.00. Persia, Political Affairs. 891.48. Persia, Calamities and Disasters.

Public and Private Papers. The Papers of Tasker H. Bliss (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Mark L. Bristol (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Cleveland H. Dodge (Princeton University). The Papers ofJames G. Harbord (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Stanley K. Hombeck (Hoover Institution, Stanford University). The Papers of Edward M. House (Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University). The Papers of Charles E. Hughes (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (Library o f Congress, Division o f Manu­ scripts). The Papers of Frank L. Polk (Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University). The Papers of Elihu Root (Library of Congress, Division o f Manuscripts). The Diary of William L. Westermann (Butler Memorial Library, Columbia Uni­ versity). The Papers of Henry White (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of T. Woodrow Wilson (Library of Congress, Division of Manu­ scripts).

Official Publications Armenia [Republic of] Council of Ministers. Karavarahan Iratu [Government Bulletin]. Erevan, 19191920. Delegation to the Conference of Peace. The Armenian Question before the Peace Conference [Paris, 1919].

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--------- . L’Arménie transcaucasienne: Territoires, frontières, ethnographie, statistique. Paris, 1919. --------- . Données statistiques des populations de la Transcaucasie. Paris, 1920. --------- . La République Arménienne. Paris. 1920. --------- . La République Arménienne et ses voisins: Questions territoriales. Paris, 1919. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gaghtni pastatghtere: Adrbedjani davadrakan gordsuneutiunits mi edj [Secret Documents: A Page from the Conspiratorial Activity of Azerbaijan]. Erevan, 1920. Parliament. Hayastani Khorhrdi hastatads orenknere, 1918—1919 t. [The Laws Enacted by the Legislature of Armenia, 1918—1919]. Erevan, 1919. --------- . Orenkneri havahadsu [Collection of Laws]. Erevan, 1919-1920. Union of Cooperatives. Les Coopératives en Arménie. [Paris, 1919].

Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun] Kaghvadsner H. H. D. 9-rd Endh. Zhoghovi voroshumnerits [Excerpts from the Decisions of the Ninth General Meeting of the A. R. F.]. Erevan, 1920. Kazmakerpahan kanonner, hastatvads 9-rd Endh. Zhoghovi koghmits [Organizational Regulations, Confirmed by the Ninth Gen(eral) Meeting]. Erevan, 1919. The Bureau. Hushapatum H. H. Dashnaktsutian, 1890-1950 [Commemorative Volume o f the A. R. Federation, 1890-1950]. Ed. S. Vratzian. Boston, 1950.

Azerbaijan [Republic of] Le 28 Mai 1919. [Baku, 1919]. Délégation Azerbaidjanienne à la Conférence de la Paix. L’Azerbaïdjan en chiffres. [Paris, 1919]. --------- . Bulletin d’informations de l’Azerbaïdjan. Paris, 1919-1920. 12 issues. --------- . Carte de la République de l’Azerbaïdjan. [Paris, 1919]. --------- . Claims of the Peace Delegation of Caucasian Azerbaidjan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris. Paris, 1919. --------- . Composition anthropologique et ethnique de la population de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919. --------- . Economie and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919. --------- . La République de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919. --------- . Revendications de la Délégation de Paix de la République de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase présentées à la Conférence de la Paix à Paris, 1919. [Paris, 1919].

France Journal officiel de la Républiquefrançaise. Débats Parlementaires. Chambre des Députés. 5ist-52d yr., 1919-1920.

Georgia [Republic of] Délégation Géorgienne à la Conférence de la Paix. Bulletin Géorgien d’informa­ tions. Paris, 1919. --------- . Mémoire présenté à la Conférence de la Paix. Paris, 1919.

Great Britain Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919—1959. ist series. Ed. W. L. Woodward, Rohan Buder, J. P. T. Bury, et al. London, 1947—1978. 21 volumes to date.

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555

--------- . Historical Section. Peace Handbooks. Vol. IX, The Russian Empire: no. 54, Caucasia. London, 1920. --------- . ----------. Peace Handbooks. Vol. XI, Turkey in Asia: no. 62, Armenia and Kurdistan. London, 1920. Parliament. House of Commons. The Parliamentary Debates. 5th ser., 1918—1920. --------- . House of Lords. The Parliamentary Debates. 5th ser., 1918-1920.

Kurdistan Kurd Delegation to the Peace Conference. Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People. Paris, 1919.

Pontine Greeks National Delegation of the Euxine Pontus. Memorandum Submitted to the Peace Conference by the National Delegation of the Euxine Pontus: Paris, 1919. --------- . The Negotiations until Armenians. Paris, 1919. --------- . Le Pont-Euxin devant le Congrès de la Paix: Note additioneile au Mémoire de février 1919. Paris, 1919.

Turkey Genelkurmay Ba§kanligi. Atrocités commises par les Arméniens sur les musulmans du Caucase durant le mois de juillet 1919 [Istanbul, 1919]. --------- . Harb Tarihi Dairesi. Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi [Journal of War History Documents]. Ankara. Sept. 1952-. --------- . ----------. Türk îstiklâl Harbi [The War of Turkish Liberation]. Vols. I—II. Ankara, 1962-1963. Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü. Nutuk, Kemàl Atatürk. Vesikalar [Speech of Kemal Ataturk. Documents]. Istanbul, [i960]. 3 vols. Türk inkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü. Atatürk’ün s'ôylev ve demeqleri [Ataturk’s Speeches and Statements]. Ankara, 1959-1961. 3 vols. Les Turcs et les revindications arméniennes. Paris, 1919.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR. Institut Istorii. Hai zhoghovrdi patmutiun [His­ tory of the Armenian People]. Ed. A. G. Hovhannisian et al. -Vol. VIL Erevan, 19 6 7 --------- . Institut Istorii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Armianskoi SSR. Hoktemberian sotsialistakan meds revoliutsian ev Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanake Hayastanum: Pastatghteri ev niuteri zhoghovadsu [The Great October Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Order in Armenia: Collection o f Documents and Materials]. Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian et al. Erevan, 1970. Akademiia Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR. Institut Istorii. Istoriia Azerbaidzhana [History of Azerbaijan]. Ed. I. A. Guseinov et al. Baku, 1958-1963. 3 vols, in 4 pts. Akademiia Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, Armianskoi SSR, Gruzinsksoi SSR. Instituty Istorii. Pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Zakavkaz’e [Victory o f Soviet Order in Transcaucasia]. Tbilisi, 1971. Akademiia Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR—Gruzinskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Len­ inizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie Gruzinskoi SSR. Bor’ba za pobe-

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du Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii: Dokumenty i materialy (1 9 /7 -/9 2 / gg. ). [Struggle for the Victory of Soviet Order in Georgia: Documents and Materials (19171921)]. Comp. S. D. Beridze et al. Tbilisi, 1958. Armianskii Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Arm. SSR—Arkhivnyi otdel MVD Arm. SSR. Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia ipobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Sbomik dokumentov ) [The Great October Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Order in Armenia (Collection of Documents)]. Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian, A. M. Akopian, and G. M. Dallakian. Erevan, 1957. Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS. Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian urvagdser [Historical Outlines of the Communist Party of Armenia]. Ed. Ds. P. Aghayan et al. Erevan, 1967. --------- . Revoliutsion kodier ev trutsikner, /9 0 2 -/9 2 / [Revolutionary Appeals and Circulars, 1902-1921]. Erevan, i960. --------- . Sektsiia Istmoa. Spartak, 1917—1920: Husher ev vaveragrer [Spartak, 1917-1920: Memoirs and Documents]. Erevan, 1935. Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Azerbaidzhana—Filial Instituta MarksizmaLeninizma pri TsK KPSS. Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaidzhana [His­ tory of the Communist Party o f AzeYbaijan]. Vol. I. Baku, 1958. --------- . Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaidzhana [Sketches of the History of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan]. Ed. M. S. Iskenderov et al. Baku, 1963. --------- . Institut Istorii AN Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR. Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhane, 1918-1920: Dokumenty i materialy [Struggle for the Victory of Soviet Order in Azerbaijan, 1918-1920: Documents and Materials]. Baku, 1967. Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Gruzii—Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninisma pri TsK KPSS. Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Gruzii [Sketches of the History of the Communist Party of Georgia]. Ed. V. G. Esaishvili. Pt. 1. Tiflis, *9 5 7 -

United States of America American Relief Administration. Bulletin. 22 issues. 1919. Congress. Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. 66th Cong., 2d sess. Senate Document 266. Washington, D.C., 1920. --------- . Congressional Record. 65th and 66th Cong. Vols. LVI-LIX. Washington, D.C., 1918-1920. --------- .Journal of the Senate. 66th Cong., ist sess. Washington, D.C., 1919. --------- . Mandatory over Armenia: Report Made to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, United States Army, Chief of the American Military Mission, on the Military Problem of a Mandatory over Armenia, by Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Mosely. 66th Cong., 2d sess. Senate Document 281. Washington, D.C., 1920. --------- . Maintenance of Peace in Armenia: Hearings before a Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session, on S.J.R. 106, a Joint Resolutionfor the Maintenance of Peace in Armenia. Washington, D.C., 1919. --------- . The Republic of Armenia. A Memorandum on the Recognition of the Govern­ ment of the Republic of Armenia, Submitted by the Special Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United States. Presented by Mr. Lodge, November 10, 1919. 66th Cong., ist sess. Senate Document 151. Washington, D.C., 1919.

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--------- . Treaty of Peace with Germany: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and Submitted to the Senate on July 10, 1919, by the President of the United States. 66th Cong., ist sess. Senate Document 106. Wash­ ington, D.C., 1919. --------- . Treaty of Peace with Germany Showing the Amendments Reported by the Com­ mittee on Foreign Relations. 66th Cong., ist sess. Senate Document 85. Washing­ ton, D.C., 1919. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919. Washington, D.C., 1934. 2 vols. --------- . ----------. 1919: The Paris Peace Conference. Washington, D.C., 1942— 1 9 4 7 - *3 vols--------- . --------- . 1919: Russia. Washington, D.C., 1937. --------- . --------- . 1920. Washington, D.C., 1936. 3 vols.

Newspapers and Journals Ashkhatavor [“Laborer”] and Nor Ashkhatavor [“New Laborer”]. Tiflis, 1918-1920. L'Asie française. Paris, 1919-1920. Azerbaidzhan [“Azerbaijan”]. Russian ed., Baku, 1919-1920. Azg-Pahak [“Nation-Sentry”]. Boston, 1922. Bor'ba [“Struggle”]. Tiflis, 1918-1920. Bulletin Arménien. Paris, 1919. Christian Science Monitor. Boston, 1919-1920. Eastern Europe. Paris, 1919—1920. Eritasard Hayastan [“Young Armenia”]. Providence, 1919-1920. Erkir [“Homeland”]. Constantinople, 1919-1920. The Georgian Mail. Tiflis, 1919. La Géorgie Indépendante. Tiflis, 1919-1920. Gruziia [“Georgia”]. Tiflis, 1919. Hairenik [“Fatherland”]. Boston, 1919-1920. Haradj [“Forward”]. Erevan, 1919-1920. Kavkazskoe slovo [“Word of the Caucasus”] and Slovo [“Word”]. Tiflis, 1919-1920. Kochnah Hayastani [“The Clarion of Armenia”]. New York, 1919-1920. The Missionary Herald. Boston, 1915—1922. Near East News. Tiflis, 1919-1920. The New Armenia. New York, 1919-1920. New York Times. 1919-1920. Pahak [“Sentry”]. Boston, 1919-1920. Sotsialist Heghapokhakan [“Socialist Revolutionary”]. Erevan, 1920. Le Temps. Paris, 1919-1920. Times. London, 1919-1920. Wall Street Journal. New York, 1919. Zhoghovurd [“People”]. Erevan, 1919-1920.

Published Documents, Memoirs, and Studies Abeghian, Artashes. “Menk ev mer harevannere—Azgayin kaghakakanutian khndirner” [We and Our Neighbors—Problems of National Policy], Hairenik Amsagir, VI-VII (Dec. 1927-Dec. 1928).

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Adonts, Mushegh H. Hayastani zhoghovrdahan tntesutiune ev hai tntesagitakan mitke XX dari skzbin [The Popular Economy of Armenia and Armenian Economic Thought at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century]. Erevan, 1968. Agadzhanov, M. Ordzhonikidze v bor’be za osushchestvlenie natsional’noi politiki Kommunisticheskoi partii v Zakavkaz’e [Ordzhonikidze in the Struggle for the Realiza­ tion of the Nationality Policy of the Communist Party in Transcaucasia]. Tbilisi, i960. Aghayan, Dsatur P. Hoktemberian revoliutsian ev hai zhoghovrdi azatagrume [The October Revolution and the Liberation of the Armenian People]. Erevan, 1957. --------- . Velikii oktiabr’ i bor’ba trudiashchikhsia Armenii zapobedu Sovetskoi vlasti [Great October and the Struggle of the Workers of Armenia for the Victory o f the Soviet Order]. Erevan, 1962. Aharonian, Avetis. Sardarapatits minchev Sevr ev Lozan (haghakahan oragir) [From Sardarabad to Sèvres and Lausanne (Political Diary)]. Boston, 1943. Aharonian, Gersam, ed. Hushamatian Meds Eghemi, 1915—1965 [Memorial Volume of the Great Holocaust, 1915-1965]. Beirut, 1965. Aharonian, Vardges. “Datarane Hayastani Hanrapetutian medj” [The Court in the Republic of Armenia], Hairenik Amsagir, XVII (May-Oct. 1939). Albrecht-Carrié, René. Italy at the Paris Peace Conference. New York, 1938. Amatuni, Hovhannes. “Aprvads orer” [Bygone Days], Hairenik Amsagir, XVIIIXIX (Oct. 1940-Aug. 1941). American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. A Report of the Activities of the American Committeefor the Independence of Armenia, 1918—1922. [New York, 1922]. Ananun, Davit. Rusahayeri hasarakakan zargatsume [The Social Development of the Russian Armenians]. Vol. III. 1901-1918. Venice, 1926. Armenian National Union of America. The Case of Armenia. [New York, 1919]. --------- . Teghehagir Hai Azgayin Miutian Amerikayi, 1917-1921 [Report of the Ar­ menian National Union of America, 1917-1921]. Boston, 1922. Armenian Press Bureau. Should America Accept the Mandate for Armenia? [New York], 1919. Arslanian, Artin H. “The British Military Involvement in Transcaucasia, 19171919.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Los Angeles, 1974. Arzumanian, M. V. Askanaz Mravian. Erevan, 1955. Arzumanian, M. V., ed. Askanaz Mravian: Hodvadsner evjarer, 1915—1929 [Askanaz Mravian: Articles and Speeches, 1913-1929]. Erevan, 1961. A§kun, Vehbi Cem. Sivas Kongresi [The Sivas Congress]. Istanbul, 1963. Astvadsatrian, Arshaluis. “Andjatakan sharzhumner H. H. Dashnaktsutian medj” [Separatist Movements within the A. R. Federation], Hairenik Amsagir, XXXI (July-Sept. 1953), 75-81, 54-61, 57-69. --------- . “Andznakan husher Rubeni masin” [Personal Memories about Ruben], Hairenik Amsagir, XXXII (Aug. 1954), 43— 53--------- . “Hayastani hayatsume” [The Armenianization of Armenia], Hairenik Am­ sagir, XLI (July 1963), 33-52. --------- . “Im andznakan hushere Rubeni masin” [My Personal Memories about Ruben], Hairenik Amsagir, XLIV (July-Sept. 1966), 33-48, 16-24, 7 _1 3 --------- . “Mkrtich Musinian,” Heghapokhakan Alpom, VII, 10 (1969), 259-263. --------- . “Rubene,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXI (March—Nov. 1953); XLIII—XLIV (April 1965-June 1966).

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--------- . “Vahan Minakhorian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXII (Aug. 1954), 23-37; XXXVII (Nov. 1959), 80-97. Avalov [Avalashvili], Z. Nezavisimost’ Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike, 1918—1921 g.g. : Vospominaniia: Ocherki [The Independence of Georgia in International Politics, 1918—1921: Memoirs: Sketches]. Paris, 1924. Avetian, M. Hai azatagrakan azgayin hisnamia (1870-1920) hushamatian ev Zor. Andranik [Commemorative Volume of Fifty Years of the Armenian National Liberation Movement (1870-1920) and Gen. Andranik]. Paris, 1954. Avetisian, Kh. A. Zangezuri bnakchutiune ev bnakavairere 40 tarum (1920—1960 ) [The Population and Sites o f Habitation in Zangezur during 40 years (1920-1960)]. Erevan, 1963. Avo [Tumayan], ed. Heghapokhakan Alpom [Revolutionary Album]. Vols. 1-9. Aleppo and Beirut, 1956-1975. --------- . Nzhdeh. Beirut, 1968. Babayan, A. Edjer Hayastani ankakhutian patmutiunits [Pages from the History of Armenia’s Independence]. Cairo, 1959. Baghdasarian, Tigran. “Hayastani Hanrapetutian verdjaluisin” [At the Sunset of the Republic of Armenia]. In Edjer mer azatagrakan patmutenen [Pages from the History of Our Liberation Movement]. Paris, 1937. Pp. 193-280. Baikov, B. “Vospominaniia o revoliutsii v Zakavkaz’i (1917—1920 g.g.)” [Memoirs of the Revolution in Transcaucasia (1917-1920)], Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii [Ber­ lin], IX (1923), 91-194. Balasanian, T. A. “Mankatnere Hayastanum, 1917—1920 tt.” [The Orphanages in Armenia, 1917-1920], Banber Erevani Hamalsarani, 2d yr., no. 2 (1968), 217220. Balikian, O. “Zheleznodorozhnoe stroitel’stvo v dorevoliutsionnoi Armenii” [The Construction of Railways in Prerevolutionary Armenia], Banker Hayastani arkhivneri, 6th yr., no. 2 (1966), 199-206. Balikian, O., V. Evoyan, and G. Sargsian. “Ashkhatavorneri paikare Dashnaktsakan tirapetutian dem” [The Struggle of the Workers against the Dashnakist Regime]. Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 7th yr., no. 2 (1967), 3—22. --------- . “Hayastani bnakchutian sotsial-tntesakan vijake Sovetakan kargeri hastatman nakhoriakin (1918-1920 tt.)” [The Social-Economic Situation of the Popu­ lation of Armenia on the Eve of the Establishment of Soviet Order (1918-1920)], Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 10th yr., no. 2 (1970), 59-82. --------- . “Imperialistakan terutiunneri ekspansian Hayastanum” [The Expansion­ ism of the Imperialist Powers in Armenia], Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 1ith yr., no. 3 (1970), 79-104. Banaktsutiunner Azgayin Patvirakutian ev Hayastani Hanrapetutian midjev [Negotia­ tions Between the National Delegation and the Republic o f Armenia]. Intro, by S. Vratzian. Boston, 1920. Banian, Garnik. “Levon Shant (1869-1951 ),” Hairenik Amsagir, XXX (Jan. 1952), 23-32. Barseghian, Khikar H. Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi hazmavorume [The Forma­ tion of the Communist Party of Armenia]. Erevan, 1965. --------- . Marksizmi taradsume Hayastanum [The Spread of Marxism in Armenia]. Erevan, 1967, 1975. 2 vols. Barton, James L. Story of Near East Relief (1915—1930). New York, 1930.

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Bechhofer-[Roberts], C. E. In Denikin’s Russia and the Caucasus, 1919—1920. Lon­ don, [1921]. Beno [Nalchayan]. “Husher Abr. Giulkhandaniani masin” [Memories about Abr(aham) Giulkhandanian], Hairenik Amsagir, XXIV (Sept./Oct. 1946), 83-92. Bierstadt, Edward Hale. The Great Betrayal: A Survey of the Near East Problem. New York, 1924. Biyikhoglu, Tevfik. Atatürk Anadolu’da (1919—1921) [Ataturk in Anatolia (19191921)]. Vol. I. Ankara, 1959. Bonsai, Stephen. Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles. New York, 1946. Borian, B. A. Armenia, mezhdunarodnaia diplomatiia i SSSR [Armenia, International Diplomacy and the USSR]. Moscow and Leningrad, 1928-1929. 2 vols. Boyajian, Dickran [Tigran Poyajian], Haikakan Legeone [The Armenian Legion]. Watertown, Mass., 1965. Brémond, Edouard. “La Cilicie en 1919-1920,” Revue des études arméniennes, I, 3 (1920,303-376. Brinkley, George A. The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917—1921. Notre Dame, Ind., 1966. Bryson, Thomas A. “An American Mandate for Armenia: A Link in British Near Eastern Policy,” Armenian Review, XXI (Summer 1968), 22—41. --------- . “The Armenia-America Society: A Factor in American-Turkish Relations, 1010-1024,” Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, CXXXII, 2 (1971), 86-105. --------- . “Mark Lambert Bristol, U.S. Navy, Admiral-Diplomat: His Influence on the Armenian Mandate Question,” Armenian Review, XXI (Winter 1968). 3-22. --------- . “John Sharp Williams: An Advocate for the Armenian Mandate, 19191920,” Armenian Review, XXVI (Autumn 1973), 23-42. --------- . “Woodrow Wilson and the Armenian Mandate: A Reassessment,” Armeni­ an Review, XXI (Autumn 1968), 10—29. --------- . “Woodrow Wilson, the Senate, Public Opinion and the Armenian Man­ date, 1919.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Georgia, 1965. Burnham, Irene H. Not by Accident: The Story of Moses S. Gulesian’s Career. Boston, [ i 9 3 8]Busch, Briton Cooper. Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914—1921. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971. --------- . Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923. Albany, N.Y., 1976. Buzanski, Peter M. “Admiral Mark L. Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Berkeley, i960.

Callwell, C. E. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries. London, [1927]. 2 vols. Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. Milli mücadele hâtiralan [Memoirs of the National Struggle]. Istanbul, 1953. Chalkhushian, G. Inch er ev inch piti Uni mer ughin? [What Was and What Shall Be Our Path?]. [Vienna], 1923. Chamberlin, William Henry. The Russian Revolution, 1917—1921. New York, 1935. 2 vols.

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Chtchian, Sahak. “Husher Arshak Djamaliani masin” [Memories about Arshak Djamalian], Hairenik Amsagir, XIX (March-April 1941), 102-115, 135-142. Churchill, Winston S. The Aftermath. New York, 1929. Vol. V in the series The World Crisis. Cook, Ralph Elliott. “The United States and the Armenian Question, 1894-1924.” Ph.D. dissertation. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1957. Cumming, Henry H. Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East: The Decline of French Influence. London, 1938. Daniel, Robert L. American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820—1960. Athens, O., [ i 9 7 o]. --------- . “The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (Sept. 1959), 252-275. Danielian, H. Spartak Hayastanum. Moscow, 1931. Darbinian, Artak. Hai azatagrakan sharzhman oreren [From the Days of the Armeni­ an Emancipatory Movement]. Paris, 1947. Darbinian, Ruben [Artashes Chilingarian]. “Hayastani Hanrapetutian orerun [In the Days of the Armenian Republic],” Hairenik Amsagir, XXVIII (June-Aug. 1950), 24-36, 19-34, 17-33--------- . Mer pataskhane H. Kadjaznunii [Our Reply to H. Kachaznuni], Boston, !9 2 3 --------- . “A Mission to Moscow,” Armenian Review, I—II (Spring 1948-Summer 1 9 4 9 )Dasnabedian [Tasnapetian], Hratch. H. H. Dashnaktsutian kazmakerpakan haruitsi holovuite [The Evolution of the Organizational Structure o f the A. R. Federa­ tion)]. Beirut, 1974. “ ‘Demokraticheskoe’ pravitel’stvo Gruzii i angliiskoe komandovanie” [The “Demo­ cratic” Government of Georgia and the English Command], comp. Semen Sef, Krasnyi Arkhiv, XXI (1927), 122—173; XXV (1927), 96-110. Denikin, A. I. Ocherki russkoi smuty [Sketches of the Russian Turmoil]. Paris and Berlin, [1921-1926]. 5 vols. De Rémusat. “Cilicie, 1918-1922,” Revue des sciences politiques, LIV (Jan./March »9S1). 348-391Devdariani, Gaioz, ed. Dni gospodstva men’shevikov v Gruzii (dokumeniy i materialy ). [The Days of Menshevik Rule in Georgia (Documents and Materials)]. [Tiflis], 1931 -

Dévoyants, Tigran. “Kianki drvagnerits” [Events from My Life], Hairenik Amsagir, XXI-XXIV (Nov./Dec. 1943-JanVFeb. 1946). Dillon, E. J. The Inside Story of the Peace Conference. New York and London, [1920]. Djaghetian, G. A. Motik antsialits [From the Recent Past]. Erevan, 1967. Djamalian, Arshak. “H. Kadjaznunin ev H. H. Dashnaktsutiune” [H. Kachaznuni and the A. R. Federation], Hairenik Amsagir, II (Jan— July 1924). --------- . “Hai-vratsakan knjire” [The Armeno-Georgian Entanglement], Hairenik Amsagir, VI-VII (April 1928-April 1929). Dubner, A. Bakinskiiproletariat vgody revoliutsii (1917-1920). [The Baku Proletar­ iat in the Years of the Revolution (1917—1920)]. Baku, 1931. Dursunoglu, Cevat. MUR mücadelede Erzurum [Erzerum in the National Struggle]. Ankara, 1946. Du Véou, Paul. La passion de la Cilicie, 1919-1922. Paris, 1937.

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Glossary of Place Names

Nearly all place names in the text appear in the form most widely used prior to 1920, as listed in the column on the left. Sites that have since been renamed or given existing alternate forms are listed in the column on the right. Easily recognizable variants (e.g. Erzerum; Erzurum) are not in­ cluded. Former Name

Current Name

Adalia Ainazur Aintab Akhta Alashkert Alexandretta Alexandropol Angelaut Angora Antioch Arpa Avdallar

Antalya, Turkey Aghevnadzor, Armenia Gaziantep, Turkey Hrazdan, Armenia Ele§kirt, Turkey Iskenderun, Turkey Leninakan, Armenia Angeghakot, Armenia Ankara, Turkey Antakya, Turkey Areni, Armenia Lachin, Azerbaijan

Baouk-Vedi Bash-Abaran Bash-Garni Bayandur Bayazit Bazarchai Belyi-Kliuch

Vedi, Armenia Aparan, Armenia Garni, Armenia Vaghatur, Armenia Dogubayazit, Turkey Barkushat, Armenia Tetri-Tskaro, Georgia

573

574

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Former Name

Current Name

Bidjazlu Bolnis-Khachen Bozburun, Mount

Vostan, Armenia Bolnisi, Georgia Erakhi Mountains, Armenia

Caesarea Chanakhchi Constantinople

Kaiseri, Turkey Sovetashen, Armenia Istanbul, Turkey

Darabas Daralagiaz Davalu Dsegh

Darbas, Armenia Vayots dzor, Armenia Ararat, Armenia Tumanian, Armenia

Ekaterinodar Ekaterinoslav Elenovka Elisavetpol Eritsatumb

Liuksemburg (Luxemburg), Georgia Krasnodar, Russian S.F.S.R. Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine Sevan, Armenia Kirovabad, Azerbaijan Bardzravan, Armenia

Fiume

Rieka, Yugoslavia

Gandzak Ganja Gedjevan Gerusy Grkh-bulag

Kirovabad, Azerbaijan Kirovabad, Azerbaijan Kadjaran, Armenia Goris, Armenia Akunk, Armenia

Hadjn Hamamlu Handamedj

Saimbeyli, Turkey Spitak, Armenia Andamich, Azerbaijan

Jalal-oghli

Stepanavan, Armenia

Karabaghlar Karakilisa Karanlugh Kariagin

Chimankend, Armenia Kirovakan, Armenia Martuni, Armenia Fizuli, Azerbaijan

Ekaterinenfeld *

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

575

Former Name

Current Name

Karvansarai Keshishkend Khamarlu Khankend Kiarim-arkh Kulp

Idjevan, Armenia Eghegnadzor, Armenia Artashat, Armenia Stepanakert, Azerbaijan Sovetashen, Armenia Tuzluça, Turkey

Manes Marsovan Mezire

Ala verdi (new city), Armenia Merzifon, Turkey Elâzig, Turkey

Norashen Nor (Novo) Bayazit Nors-Mazra Novo-Selim

Ilichevsk, Azerbaijan Kamo, Armenia Nurs, Azerbaijan Selim, Turkey

Okhchi

Voghchi, Armenia

Pashalu Petrograd Petrovsk

Zaritap, Armenia Leningrad, Russian S.F.S.R. Makhachkala, Russian S.F.S.R.

Rehanlu Ruschuk

Aigavan, Armenia Ruse, Bulgaria

St. Petersburg Salonica Sardarabad Ses Shahali Shulaver Sis Sisavan Sisian Smyrna Sultanbek Sushehir

Leningrad, Russian S.F.S.R. Thessaloniki, Greece Hoktemberian, Armenia Sers, Armenia Vahagni, Armenia Shahumiani, Georgia Kozan, Turkey Sisian, Armenia Hatsavan, Armenia Izmir, Turkey Bardzruni, Armenia Su§ehri, Turkey

Tanagert

Danagirt, Azerbaijan

576

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Former Name

Current Name

T emir-Khan-Shura Tiflis

Buinaksk, Russian S.F.S.R. Tbilisi, Georgia

Trebizond Tsaritsyn Tsghna

Trapzon, Turkey Volgograd (Stalingrad), Russian S.F.S.R. Chananab, Azerbaijan

Ulukhanlu Uzunlar Uzuntala

Masis, Armenia Odzun, Armenia Aigehovit, Armenia

Vladikavkaz Vorontsovka

Ordzhonikidze, Russian S.F.S.R. Kalinino, Armenia *

Zeitun Zeiva

Süleymanli, Turkey Davit Bek, Armenia

Index

Abaran River, 309 Abas-Geul, Surmalu uezd, 73, 84 Abcar, Diana Agabek, 527 Abdul-Hamid II, Sultan, 65,393,443,445 Abdul-Kadir, Sheikh, 45, 445-446 Abeghian, Artashes, 16 n. 34, 514 Abeghian, Manuk, 292 n. 31, 312 Abkhazia, 159 n. 60 Act of United Armenia, 1, 15, 20, 242, 244, 269, 275 Adalia district, 35, 339 Adana, city and vilayet, 324-325, 338340, 412-422, 453 Addis Ababa, 109, 527 Adjibadj, Zangezur uezd, 208, 226 Adontz, Nikolai, 526 Adrianople, 339, 438 Adriatic region, 22, 28, 36, 456 Aegean region, 38, 453 Afghanistan, 452 Afion-Karahisar, Brusa vilayet, 338, 339, 407 Agarak, Zangezur uezd, 208, 209 Aghababbekov, Asat Bek, 17 n. 34 Aghaev (Aghazade), Hasan Bek, 231 n. 76 Aghbalian, Nikol: as minister of educa­ tion, 16 n. 34, 18, 258, 310-315 Aghkhach, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Aghtamar, prelate of, 521 Aharonian, Avetis, 16 n. 34, 17, 99, 274; as president of Republic delegation in Paris, 2, 61, 67 n. 11, 96, 147, 260, 266, 268, 269-270, 284, 318, 335, 336, 375, 385,400,407,434,448-449,457,512 n. 104, 529-530; and Second Internation­ al, 118, 119 n. 36; and Russian Political Conference, 472-473

Aharonian, Vardges, 72, 513 Ahmed Emin (Yalman), 326-327 Ahmed Riza, 326-327, 424 Aiden vilayet, 422 Ainazur, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 73, 208, 225 Aintab, city and sanjak, 330,413,414,415, 416, 419, 421, 422 Ajarians, 131 Akhalkalak, town and uezd, 62, 130; dis­ puted claims to, 2, 92, 152, 154, 157, 161, 180, 193, 364; elections in, 150; conditions in, 151 Akhaltsikh, town and uezd, 150,154,157,180 Akhta, Nor-Bayazit uezd, 73, 301 n. 63 Akhverdov (Hakhverdov), Abdul-Rahman: as Azerbaijani representative in Armenia, 204, 205, 206, 214, 219 Akori, Borchalu uezd, 157, 161 Akshehir, Konia vilayet, 338, 339 Akstafa, Kazakh uezd, 130, 339 Akulis (Agulis), Nakhichevan uezd, 107, 208; destruction of, 234-238 Alagiaz-Mazra, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Alahi, Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 235, 236 Alashkert, Erzerum vilayet, 43, 256, 339, 441, 513, 522 Alaverdi, Borchalu uezd, 130, 157, 158, 159, 162 Alaverdian, Stepan, 251, 252 Albani, Captain G., 29 n. 24 Aldrovandi, Count, 23 n. 8 Aleppo, city and vilayet, 339, 413; Ar­ menian refugees at, 43, 324, 340, 418 Alexandretta, 339,413; proposed expedi­ tion from, 125,127,128; future of, 330, 364, 454; French at, 415, 419, 421

577

57»

IN D E X

Alexandropol, city and uezd, 12, 73, 74, 130, 157, 192, 193, 253 n. 31, 293, 294, 308, 311, 398, 513; refugees at, 6, 300, 301-302; and transportation routes, 9, 11, 154, 290, 291; municipal govern­ ment of, 13, 288, 311, 312; Bolsheviks in, 251 ; state university at, 313-315,522 Algeria, 525 Aliat, Baku uezd, 76, 192, 201, 213, 496 Ali Fuad Pasha (Cebesoy), 423-425 Ali Hadji (Akushinskii), 467 Ali Kemal Bey, 45 Ali Riza Pasha: as grand vizier, 421, 428 Allah-Akber Mountains, 81 Allenby, Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman, 127, 412, 415, 416, 418 Allied and Associated Powers: and future of Near East and Transcaucasia, 2, 49, 51, 54» 103-104, 145, 195, 196-197, 245,322-324,404-457 passim, 482-530 passim; Supreme War Council of, 25-26 Amanus Mountains, 413, 420, 421 Amasia, Sivas vilayet, 339, 344, 351, 407 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 319, 391 American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Ammission), 46-47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 3 3 4 » 3 7 6 , 4 3 0 -4 3 3 American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE), 45, 46, 48, 49-50, 51» 5 3 »7 5 »3 0 2 »3 ! 9 >3 3 6»3 4 4 »3 9 8»4 °* American Committee for the Indepen­ dence of Armenia (ACIA), 5, 115, 123, 174 n. 12, 318, 321, 336, 367, 373, 374, 381, 392-397 passim, 401, 436, 518 American Expeditionary Force in Europe (AEF), 48, 51, 96, 115, 116, 336 American Military Mission to Armenia, 55 - 5 7 » 334 - 3 65 - See also Harbord, General James G. American Military Mission to South Russia, 89, 335 n. 56 American Red Cross, 402, 525 American Relief Administration (ARA), 46, 48, 49-50, 51, 75, 143, 398-399, 402 Amirkhanian, Hovsep, 293 Amirkhanian, Shavarsh, 251 n. 25 Ananun, Davit, 12, 230, 252-253, 312 Anatolia, 82,168,173,191, 212-213,395, 425, 452, 488; future of, 2, 4, 28, 60, 316, 317, 319, 3 21 - 3 3 3 »355» 363. 393» 3 9 4 »4 0 9 »422, 4 3 °> 4 3 9 »4 5 ° - 4 5 i ! survivors in and repatriation to, 4, 57-59,

114, 230, 337, 338, 340-342, 3 4 4 » 3 5 1 , 407-408, 422, 427-428. See also Otto­ man Empire Anatolia College (Marsovan), 329 Andamich, Nakhichevan uezd, 235 Andranik (Ozanian), General, 99, 142, 207,213,228,244,258,385-387,388 n. 61, 3 9 0 -3 9 1 Angelaut, Zangezur uezd, 208, 290 Anglo-Iranian treaty, 482 Angora, city and vilayet, 339, 351, 407 Ani, 312, 387 Ansaris, 325, 420 Antioch, Aleppo vilayet, 413, 418 n. 39 Anti-Taurus Mountains, 364, 384 Anushian: as Meghri commander, 209 n. 3

Apresniank, Colonel, 67 Apsheron peninsula, 184, 483 Arab-Bunar, Urfa sanjak, 413, 415 Arabia and Arabs: future of, 4, 32, 127, 322, 324, 435 n. 98, 439, 448, 451, 453 Aralikh, Surmalu uezd, 66,68, 73,84, 105 Aralikh-okhchi, Zangezur uezd, 218 Ararat, 105, 395, 441; Mount, 79, 83, 84, 105, 191, 285, 346, 349, 427, 439, 515 Araratian, Major General Kristapor: as minister of military affairs, 16, 18, 19, 72, 74, 104 n. 116, 154, 315, 345 Araratian, Sargis: as minister of provi­ sions and finance, 16 n. 34, 17, 18, 266, 283» 2 9 5 » 315 Araxes River, 3, 62, 71, 73, 77, 81,83, 84, 105, 135, 179, 181, 182, 192, 193, 207, 208, 210 n. 5, 229, 237, 346, 387, 496 Araxes river valley, 5,7,10,63,65,66,68, 71, 76, 168, 179, 191, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 211, 222, 454 Archangel, 458, 460 Ardahan, town and okrug, 3, 10, 62, 63, 7 3 » 7 7 » 105» 130» 137 » 142, 154 - 155 » 157, 180, 192, 193, 212, 292, 327 Ardsruni, Vahé, 520 Aresh uezd: Armenians of, 186, 187-188, 302 Argentina, 527 Arghana-Maden district, 339, 341, 440 Arghutian, Hovsep (Prince ArgutinskiiDolgorukii), 16 n. 34, 196-197, 231, 258, 284; as envoy to Persia, 527-528 Armed Forces of South Russia. See South Russia, Armed Forces of Armenakan party, 242, 243 Armen Garo. See Pasdermadjian, Garegin

IN D E X

Armenia-America Society, 396, 397 Armenia (Euphrates) College, 319 Armenian Apostolic Church, 285, 301, 346, 378 n. 34 Armenian army, 8-9, 62, 64, 66-72, 75, 76-77» 79-81, 83-86, 87, 88, 102-105, 209-210, 217-218, 263, 361, 380, 388, 4 4 9 » 4 7 !» 4 7 3 - 4 7 5 » 5 11 Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. See Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenian Azgayin Ramkavar party, 270 n. 71. See also Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar party Armenian Bolsheviks (Communists), 14, 153, 248-252, 293, 294, 31 x. S ee also Russian Communist Party Armenian-British relations. See Great Britain Armenian Committee of Moscow, 156, 302 Armenian Evangelical Union of America, 319, 378 n. 34, 394 Armenian-French relations. See France Armenian General Benevolent Union, 378

n. 34

Armenian-Georgian relations. See Georgia, Republic of Armenian government ministries, 4-12, 269-315 passim Armenian independent Peasants Union, 16 Armenian Khorhurd (legislature), 1-2, 15, 17, 19,42-43, 282, 291. See also Ar­ menian Parliament Armenian Legion, 412,417,419,420 n. 46 Armenian National Congress, 243 n. 5, 268, 273 Armenian National Council of Adana, 325, 340, 419 Armenian National Council of Baku, 18, 185, 286, 294 Armenian National Council of Gandzak, 189-190 Armenian National Council of Georgia, 148-149, 152, 153 Armenian National Delegation, 17, 97, 24 3 » 245» 258, 383» 3 9 °» 3 9 9 »446, 526; and negotiations for united govern­ ment, 267-279, 473. S ee also Nubar Pa­ sha, Boghos Armenian National Liberal Union, 270 Armenian National Union of America, 318,375 n. 25,377,378 n. 34,379,390, 393 n. 75, 394

579

Armenian Parliament (Khorhrdaran): elections to, 1, 2,13-19; composition of, 16-17 n. 34, 282; activities of, 93-95, 98, 135, 188, 230, 280-284, 297, 298, 302, 304-306, 309-310, 514-515; Has­ kell in, 196-197; and party-government relations, 264-265 Armenian Populist party (Hai Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun), 149, 190; and parliamentary elections, 1, 14-15, 282; second congress of, 241, 242-243, 271; and negotiations for united govern­ ment, 270-275, 279 Armenian Press Bureau (New York), 321, 3 7 5 » 3 9 4 . 396 Armenian Proprietors and Commercial Industrial Society, 149 n. 29 Armenian Reformed Hnchak (Verakazmial Hnchakian) party, 241, 245, 270, 278-279, 328, 378 n. 34, 390 Armenian refugees, 4, 6-7, 10, 40-61 p a ssim , 244, 285, 299-303, 324-325, 340-341, 344, 382, 407-410, 416, 418419, 422, 427-428, 439-440» 453-454» 469, 470, 520-521, 530 Armenian Republic Delegation, 2, 96-97, 99-100, 147, 260, 261, 268, 269-270, 336,3 5 5 »4 3 4 »4 4 4 »4 4 8 - 4 4 9 »472,508 n. 94, 511, 512 n. 104,518,527 m 151 .'See also Aharonian, Avetis Armenian Revolutionary Federation. See Dashnaktsutiun Armenian-Russian relations. S ee Denikin; Russia; Russia, Soviet; Volunteer Army Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Con­ stitutional Democrat) party, 14, 241, 242, 270 n. 71, 378 n. 34; Erevan con­ ference of, 244-245; and negotiations for united government, 270-279 p a ssim Armenian Social Democrat Hnchak party, 149 n. 29, 241, 242, 253-254, 267, 278, 328, 353 - 3 5 4 »378 n. 34, 379, 390, 391, 3 9 4 » 4 4 6 , 5 15 Armenian Social Democrat Labor party (“Specifist”), 252-253 Armenian Social Democrats (Men­ sheviks), 149 n. 29, 150, 153, 248. See also Georgian Mensheviks Armenian Social Revolutionaries, 149150, 241; and parliamentary elections, 14,15,16,17, 209 n. 4, 281,516. See also Georgian Social Revolutionaries; Rus­ sian Social Revolutionary party

5 So

IN D E X

Armenian-Turkish relations. S ee Otto­ man Empire; Turkish Nationalist movement Arpa, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 73, 208, 225 Arpachai (Akhurian) River, 73, 84 Arpa River, 70, 208, 309 Arsenidze, Razhden, 165 Arslanian, Gevorg, prelate of Adana, 340, 417

Asadullah Khan, 528 Ashkhabad, 526 A shkh atank (Erevan), 257 A sh k h a ta vo r (Tiflis), 7 n. 10, 141, 146, 149, 152, 166, 200, 256, 267, 475, 514. See also N o r A sh k h a ta vo r Ashtarak, Etchmiadzin u ezd, 13, 73, 301 n. 63, 302 Asia, 21, 33, 109, 175, 177, 482, 491 Asia Minor, 129; Italian interests in, 2, 23, 24» 28, 35, 36, 38, 406; future of, 27, 116, 123, 127, 324, 330, 348, 354, 363, 382, 438, 439, 450, 451; conditions in, 40,41,42,45,46,94, 375, 382,408,440 L A sie fra n ç a ise (Paris), 174 Aslanian, Dr. Galust, 526 Asnaburt (Znaberd), Nakhichevan u ezd, 7 0 , 73 Asratikian, Mesrop Bek, 287 Asribekian: in Terek, 470 n. 42 Association for Defense of Rights of Ana­ tolia and Rumelia, 342. S ee also Erzerum congress; Sivas congress Assyrians, 109, 325, 441 Astrakhan, 21, 31, 35, 44, 460 Austria-Hungary, 404, 406 Avalov (Avalashvili), Zurab, 224 n. 51 Avazian, Nerses, 16 n. 34 Avdallar, Zangezur uezd, 208, 216 Avetisian, Asatur, 210 Avetisian, Tigran, 150 n. 32 Avshars, 325 Ayer, Carlton S., 106-108, 235-236 Ayyub Pasha, 63, 78, 81, 85, 103, 104 Aza, Nakhichevan u ezd, 208, 234 Azarbayjan (Persian), 191 A zerb a id zh a n (Baku), 76, 474 Azerbaijan, Republic of, 111, 147, 300; and Armenia, 2-5, 43, 63-64, 67-68, 76-77, 104-106, 131, 160, 168-240 passim , 261; British withdrawal from, 5, 109-139 p assim ; and Volunteer Army, 5» 39» !56» 168, 465, 472, 474, 476, 483, 500; foreign views of, 27, 32, 87, 143,

173-177- 349-35°» 4 8 3 .4 8 4 .4 9 4 .5 1 9

n. 122; Paris delegation, 110, 112, 144, 174, 180, 219, 507-510; and Turkish Nationalists, 163, 170, 173, 177-178, 471-472,487-491,504,522; conditions in, 168-173; parliament of, 172 n. 9, 182, 185 n. 39, 186, 187, 189, 190, 502; Armenians in, 183-191; recognition of, 499-502, 518, 519 n. 122; and Soviet Russia, 479, 502-503 Azerbaijani Ittihad party, 170, 172, 186, 487, 488, 502, 519 Azerbaijani Musavat party. S ee Musavat party Azerbaijani Turkic socialist bloc, 172, 186 Babalian, Artashes, 16 n. 34, 315; as min­ ister of welfare and labor, 299, 303, 305 Babayan, Khosrov, 16 n. 34 Babayan, Varos, 16 n. 34, 310 n. 85 Badoglio, General Pietro, 31 Baghdad, 43, 442, 527 Baghdasarian, Colonel Tigran, 84 Baghian, Stepan, 470 n. 42 Bagratuni, General Hakob (Iakov), 336, 396 n. 88; in United States, 385-388, 390-391

Baiburt, Erzerum vila yet, 162 n. 64, 339 Baker, Newton Diehl, 364 n. 132, 388 Bakhmetov, Ambassador Boris A., 517 Baku, city and g u b e m iia , 16, 94, 117, 168170, 192, 193, 285, 467, 473, 474» 499» 508, 509; and transportation routes, 9, 30,38 n. 59, 76, 199, 201, 202,389,492; petroleum at, 23 n. 8, 33,111, 131, 170171, 483, 495-496; British withdrawal from, 31, 76, 129-130, 132, 185; Ar­ menians in, 86, 122, 183-186; Turkish officers and agents in, 174, 212-213, 504-505; foreign missions at, 175, 197199 » 3 4 9 » 4 9 2» 4 9 3 » 4 9 4 » 526; Armeni­ an-Azerbaijani conference at, 214-215, 222, 223, 228, 230-234; Bolsheviks in, 249,488, 519; workers* conference, 519 Baku Armenian National Council, 18, 185, 286, 294 Bakuba, Mesopotamia, 43 Bakunts, Arsen, 210 Bakunts, Eremia, 210 Bakuriani, Gori u ezd, 151, 157 Balayan, B. :in Azerbaijani parliament,187 Balayan, Gerasim, 16 n. 34, 210 n. 6, 230 Balfour, Arthur James: as head of British peace delegation, 25 n. 14,31,37,42,48

5 8 i

IN D E X

n. 26, 58, 60, 114, 115-116, 124-128, 411, 450, 463; as foreign secretary, 95, 450,463; and proposed French expedi­ tion to Armenia, 115, 124-128 Balian, Garo, 526 Balkans, 27, 230, 254, 255, 256, 525, 526 Balkars, 465 Baltic provinces, 458, 459, 477, 478, 479 Baouk-Vedi, Erevan u ezd, 66-67, 69, 72, 73» 75» 76 » 84 » 105» lo 6 » 107» *79» 19*»

198-199, 202 Baptist Union of Britain and Ireland, 435 Baratov, General Nikolai Nikolaevich: as Denikin’s envoy in Transcaucasia, 136, 202 n. 80, 471, 524 Barberis, Lieutenant Colonel, 29 n. 24 Barby, Henry, 94 Barduz, Olti okrug, 63, 73, 77, 78, 79, 103, 104 Bareilles, Bertrand, 94 Barkhudariants: at Odessa, 470 n. 42 Barkushat Mountains, 208, 209, 219, 226, 236 Barnes, Julius Howland, 401 Barseghian, Berjouhi, 16 n. 34 Bartoghi (Takialtu) Mountains, 73, 83 Barton, James Levi, 45, 398 n. 92; and future of Armenia, 319-320, 321, 328, 372- 373» 376 n - 30, 3 9 1» 396

Basen plain, Erzerum vila yet, 43 Bash-Abaran, Etchmiadzin u ezd, 301 n. 63, 302 Bash-Garni, Erevan u ezd, 235, 301 n. 63 Bashkend, Kazakh u ezd, 73, 194, 216, 226 Bashkeuy, Kars okrug, 73, 103 Bashkeuy (Bashköy), Kaghisman okrug, 73» 79» 85, 102 Bash-Norashen, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 7°» 73» 75» 192

Batum, city, port, and oblast, 24, 35, 73, 77» 83, 94» *26, 130, 136, 157, 192, 193, 297» 339» 374» 379» 384» 526; transpor­ tation and pipeline connections with, 2, 9, 10, 20, 30, 38 n. 59, 52, 78, 140, 146, 154, 164, 171, 197, 377, 389-39°» 439» 454» 455» 495» 496 » 497» 522; Russian claims to, 23 n. 8, 131, 132, 467; future of, 34,110, 113, 131, 134, 154, 155, 162 n. 64, 191, 320, 440, 441, 454, 455; ref­ ugees and relief supplies through, 44, 49, 144-146, 262, 300, 378, 398, 402; British garrison at, 116, 117, 131-134, 376, 499, 506, 507; escape of Nuri Pa­ sha from, 136-137, 212; foreign mis­

sions at, 338, 350, 492, 495, 496; defense perimeter at, 452,499,508,509 Batum Armenian National Council, 195 Bayandur, Zangezur u ezd , 208, 217 Bayazit, town and sa n ja k , 43, 66, 69, 73, 83, 105, 212, 226, 237, 339, 345, 349, 4 4 1» 521

Bazarchai River, 207, 208, 209 Beach, Brigadier General William Henry, 58, 78, 130, 136, 158 Beatty, Vice Admiral David, 507,508,510 Bedrkhans, 442, 445, 489 Beeuwkes, Colonel Henry: and Harbord mission, 355, 362-363 Begli-Ahmed, Kars okru g, 73, 85 Beirut, 414, 415, 416, 419, 424 Bekir Sami Bey: and Turkish Nationalist movement, 329, 342, 424, 425 Bekkeuy, Kars okru g, 73, 103 Bekzadian, Tigran: as Armenian repre­ sentative in Azerbaijan, 171, 179-180, 182, 184, 188, 213, 215, 231-232 Belgium, 435 Belgrade, 526 Belorussians, 465 Belyi-Kliuch, Tiflis u ezd, 151,157 Benneyan, Khachatur G., 319 n. 7 Bérenger, Senator Henry, 491 Bergrikala, Van vila yet, 441 Beriants, Gevorg, 290 Berlin: Armenian mission in, 525 Berlin, Treaty of, 98, 122, 331 Berthelot, Philippe Joseph Louis, 125; and Near Eastern settlement, 438, 440, 441, 449, 451, 453, 454 Bessarabia, 525 Beury, Charles E., 398 n. 92 Bezdjian, Dr. Zenope, 327, 328, 337 n. 68 Bidjazlu, Erevan u ezd , 307 Bilav, Nakhichevan u ezd, 208, 234 Birjand, 506 Bissolati, Leonida, 497, 498 Bist, Nakhichevan u ezd , 208, 235, 236 Bidis, city and vila yet, 254, 258, 339, 441; proposed repatriation to, 45, 59, 60, 454; future of, 326, 330, 332, 339, 364, 439-440, 449 n. 135, 454, 457, 517 Black Sea, 9, 22, 40, 42, 125, 131, 175, 260, 321, 328, 364, 390, 448, 453, 513 Bliss, General Tasker Howard, 26 n. 15, 46, 53» 334

Bliss, William Dwight Porter, 322, 396 n. 88

582

IN D E X

Boghazlaian, Angora vila ye t, 339, 407 Boghos Nubar. See Nubar Pasha Bolnis-Khachen, Borchalu u ezd , 151, 157 Bon, Vice Admiral Ferdinand Jean Jacques de, 494-495 Bonar Law, Andrew, 120, 121, 127 n. 62,

131

Borah, Senator William Edgar, 367, 368 n. 6 B o r ’ba (Tiflis), 92, 141, 158, 165 Borchalu u ezd , 3, 130, 150, 151, 154, 157, 161, 163 n. 65, 193, 300, 439 Borian, Bagrat, 250 n. 22, 251 n. 25 Borzhom, Gori u ezd, 496 Boston, 387 Bowditch, Lieutenant Colonel Edward, Jr.: and Harbord mission, 345, 355, 362-363 Bozburun, Mount, 73, 77 Brandegee, Senator Frank Bosworth, 368 n. 6 Brasil, Dr. Etienne, 527 Brazil, 435, 527 Brémond, Colonel Edouard: in Cilicia, 414-419 Bridges, Brigadier General George Tom Molesworth, 59-60 Briggs, Lieutenant General Charles James, 462 Brinton, Lieutenant Colonel Jasper Y.: and Harbord mission, 354, 362-363 Bristol, Acting Rear Admiral Mark Lam­ bert: view of Armenians, 47, 90-91, 227, 328, 376, 392 n. 72, 519 n. 122; appointment as high commissioner, 9192, 123; and other American missions, 57 n. 51, 324, 335-336, 337, 344 n. 81; and future of Ottoman Empire, 317318, 320, 328, 342, 350 n. 101, 351352; opposition to, 353 British-Armenia Committee, 117-118, 435

British-Armenian Chamber of Com­ merce, 435 British Army Disposal Board, 96, 97 British Empire, 21-22, 33, 176, 411, 429, 452, 463. See also Great Britain British Imperial armed forces: withdrawal from Caucasus, 20-39 pa ssim , 44, 62, 1 0 9 ^ 1 3 9 passim , 185, 374, 376; Army of Black Sea, 31, 62-63, 142, 175, 256257, 428 Brown, Arthur Judson, 398 n. 92 Browne, Louis Edgar, 330

Brusa (Bursa), city and

vila ye t,

40, 337,

339» 438» 440

Bryce, Viscount James, 94, 117, 435, 437, 520 Buchanan, Ambassador Sir George Wil­ liam, 497, 498 Bucharest, 114, 526 Buckler, William Hepburn, 50, 54, 58 Budaghian, Hovakim, 16, 515 Budapest, 526 Buisson, Ferdinand Edouard, 435 n. 97 Bulgaria, 96, 404, 431, 432, 524 Bulkley, Edwin M., 398 n. 92 B u lle tin

d 'in fo rm a tio n s

de

l'A zerb a ïd ja n

(Paris), 174 Bullitt, William Christian, 369 n. 7 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 395 Buxton, Harold, 94 Bzyb River, 3, 142, 155, 476 'Caesarea (Kaisaria), city and

vila ye t,

337,

339. 364. 407. 422. 425

Caix, Count Robert de Saint-Aymour de, 414 Calthorpe, Vice Admiral Somerset Arthur Gough-: as British high commissioner in Constantinople, 25 n. 13,40-41,409, 426 Calvert, John B., 398 n. 92 Cambon, Ambassador Jules Martin, 495, 507

Canada, 436 Canterbury, Archbishop of, 436 Cardashian, Vahan, 321, 375, 383, 384, 393» 394» 395

Carpento, Major Carlo Coardi di, 29 n. 24 Caspian flotilla, 30-31, 37, 115, 130, 172, 499» 505

Caspian Sea, 3, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30, 31, 129, 184, 191, 192, 193, 337, 427, 480, 502, 5 0 5 -5 0 9

Caucasus Mountains, 92, 113, 477, 530 Caucasus Regional Committee (Kraikom). See Russian Communist Party Cavallero, General Ugo, 25 n. 13, 505 Caviglia, Enrico, 34 Cecil, Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-, 95» !2o, 437 Central Asia, 411, 483 Chaiyan, Tigran, 527 Chaldeans, 325 Chalkushian, Grigor, 470, 471 Chamberlain, William Isaac, 398 n. 92 Chambers, Lawson Powers, 396 n. 88

IN D E X

Chambers, William Nesbitt, 324, 338 Chamkerten, Tigran, 526 Chanakhchi, Erevan uezd, 70, 73 Chandler, Walter Marion, 174 n. 12 Chardigny, Lieutenant Colonel PierreAuguste: as chief of French mission in Caucasus, 60, 92, 142-143, 146, 173, 195, 441, 4 9 1 -4 9 2 Charles, Lieutenant, 74, 86 n. 69 Chechenia and Chechens, 465, 467 Chechen Island, 110 Cheraz, Vahan, 302 Cherif (Sherif) Pasha, General: as Kurd­ ish spokesman, 443-447 Chicherin, Grigorii Vasilevich, 502-503 Chile, 527 Chilingarian, Artashes: as minister of ju­ dicial affairs, 294-295, 315 Chkheidze, Nikolai Semenovich, 155 Chmishkian, Vardan, 526 Chmshkian, Harutiun, 292 n. 31 Chobanian, Arshak, 243, 268 n. 64, 269, 270, 275 n. 81, 277 n. 85, 323 Chorum, Angora vilayet, 339, 407 Chrysanthos, Archbishop of Trebizond, 528 Chubar, Poghos, 185 n. 39 Churchill, Winston Spencer: and Russian civil war, 21, 449, 459-464» 466> 478, 506-509; and British withdrawal from Transcaucasia, 22, 44; and future of Near East, 98, 407, 410, 429, 452; and Armenians, 101, 118, 449 Cilicia: French interests in, 2, 124-128, 132, 139, 197, 375 n. 25, 378,406,411416, 438, 439, 448, 449, 455, 491; fu­ ture of, 2,4, 28, 260, 328,330,332,333, 3 3 8»3 4 °» 348, 3 6 7 »3 7 4 »39, 3 9 5 »4 ° 4 » 409, 427, 436, 437, 439, 440, 442, 443, 4 4 9 »4 5 5 »5 3 °i Armenians in, 256, 262, 324-325, 380, 416-419; and KingCrane commission, 324, 325, 328, 330, 332; Armenian claims to, 325, 328, 330, 3 3 2 , 3 3 6» 3 4 °» 3 6 7 »428, 434, 4 3 7 »4 4 6 , 454; Turkish resistance in, 342, 420426 Circassians, 325, 420 Clark, Major Harold W.: and Harbord mission, 362 Clemenceau, Prime Minister Georges: and Cilicia, 4, 411-412, 415, 424; at Paris Peace Conference, 28, 48 n. 26, 114, 124-125, 145, 146, 322, 323, 407,

583

479-480, 481, 501 n. 69; and proposed French expedition to Armenia, 114, 124-128; and Caucasus, 145, 146, 174, 491,507-508, 510; and consultations in London, 4 3 7 "4 3 9 » 4 4 9 “ 4 5 °î resigna­ tion of, 456; and Russian question, 479480, 481, 510 Cochin, Denys, 94, 435 n. 97 Colosimo, Gaspare, 23, 34 Comité France-Caucase, 174, 492 Committee of Union and Progress. See Ittihad ve Terakki party and Ittihadists Commonwealth Fund, 402 Communist Party of Russia. See Armeni­ an Bolsheviks; Russian Communist Party Congregational Churches, National Council of, 391 Constantinople (Istanbul), 141, 212, 339, 350, 402; Allied officials at, 30, 31, 40, 41, 43-44, 45 - 4 6» 5 °» 7 8 , 9 °» 9 1» 9 4 » 113, 114, 123-124, 129, 132, 134, 142, 177, 227, 319, 337, 35i~353» 406-410, 423, 426-428, 445, 447, 453, 455, 486, 489» 4 9 3 »4 9 9 - 5 0 0 »504 - 5 0 5 ; future of, 316, 320, 321-322, 324, 329, 331, 332, 3 3 3 »3 5 7 » 360, 392, 393, 394, 404-405» 4 3 9 »4 4 °» 4 5 0 - 4 5 2; Armenians in, 256, 327-328, 337, 407-408, 427, 428, 445, 524; retention of sultan at, 438, 439, 450, 451 - 4 5 2 , 4 5 3 »455 Contenson, Ludovic de, 435 n. 97 Conti, Senator Ettore, 498 Cook, Captain Edoardo, 29 n. 24 Cooke-Collis, Acting Brigadier General William James Norman: at Batum, 44, 4 9 » 7 9 » 134 » 155 Coolidge, Governor A. Calvin, 387 Cory, Major General George Norton: as 27th Division commander, 31; and Muslim uprisings in Armenia, 65, 68, 7 4 »76, 7 9 »85» 86, 89, 92, 179; and Brit­ ish withdrawal from Transcaucasia, 110, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135; and Zangezur dispute, 110, 201, 221; and Georgia, 142, 144, 155 Cossacks and Cossack territories, 465, 470, 471, 475, 476, 524 Cox, Sir Percy Zachariah: in Tehran, 65, 122, 487, 499 Crampton, Louis C., 398 n. 92 Crane, Charles Richard, 46,323,327,330, 398 n. 92

584

IN D E X

Crespi, Silvio, 48 n. 26 Crimea, 458, 493, 524, 525 Crowe, Sir Eyre, 97; as head of British peace delegation, 48 n. 26, 102, 219 n. 37, 400 n. 98, 429, 430 Cuddihy, Robert J., 398 n. 92 Culme-Seymour, Rear Admiral Sir Mi­ chael, 25 n. 13 Cumberland, William Wilson, 352 n. 107, 362-363 Curzon of Kedleston, Earl (George Na­ thaniel): and British withdrawal from Transcaucasia, 21-38 passim, 116-117, 121—122, 132—133; and Armenia and Armenians, 95, 98, 100, 101, 116-117, 121-122, 124, 126-127, 400, 418, 428, 429, 434, 436-437. 4 3 8>4 4 8 . 467. 5 °°> 512, 513; and future of Near East, 98, 124, 323, 392 n. 73,410-411,430, 433, 434, 4 3 6 - 4 3 7 . 4 3 9 - 4 4 1 . 4 4 7 . 4 5 0 . 4 5 1 . 4 5 3 . 4 5 4 > 455> and Wardrop mission, 111-114; and Transcaucasian states, 175 n. 16,184 n. 37,462-463,466-467, 483,485 n. 11,498-499,500-501,508510; and Russian question, 459, 463464,466-467, 480,483, 506, 507, 508510 Cushman, Mary Floyd, 338 Czechoslovakia, 397, 518 Dadurian, Dr. H., 319 n. 7 Daghestan oblast, 3, 192, 507; Volunteer Army occupation of, 170,201,202,460, 461, 476, 500, 510; rebellion in, 465466; Turks in, 487, 500, 504. See also Mountaineer Republic; Mountaineers; North Caucasus Daghet-Khachen, Tiflis uezd, 151, 157 Dakhnaz, Erevan uezd, 67, 73 Daley, Colonel Edmund L., 204—205, 227 n. 63 Damad Ferid Pasha: as grand vizier, 4,45, 123-124,324,342,421,428,442; fall of cabinet, 351, 426, 442 Damadian (Tamatian), Mihran: in Cilicia, 340, 416, 417, 419 Damascus, 416 Damurri-dagh, Mount, 208, 234 Danielian, Khachatur, 210 Daniels, Josephus, 399 Darabas, Zangezur uezd, 208, 226 Daralagiaz, 9, 70, 105, 178, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 209, 210, 218, 225-226, 228,

287, 300 n. 63. See also Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd Darbinian, Artak, 244, 245, 513 Darbinian, Ruben. See Chilingarian, Ar­ tashes Dardanelles, 337 Dashburun, Surmalu uezd, 105 Dashnaktsutiun (Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun), 190, 232, 328; news­ paper comments of, 7-n. 10, 135, 140, 141, 146, 149, 152, 153, 158, 166, 181, 200, 225, 256, 257, 267, 286, 288, 302, 379, 446, 475, 514, 516; and parlia­ ment, 13-14, 15, 17, 43, 209 n. 4, 281283, 288, 494, 514-515; Bureau of, 15, 86, 200, 254-255, 257, 258, 259, 264, 265, 266, 305, 310, 515; and govern­ ment, 18, 265,293,304-306; appraisals of, 86-87, 159. 256-257,463,473.494; in Georgia, 149, 150, 151, 152-153; Ninth General Meeting of, 241, 255267, 272, 274, 395; and other parties, 242-253 passim, 378 n. 34, 385, 390, 3 9 1 . 394 Dastakian, Abraham, 185 n. 39 Davalu, Erevan uezd, 66, 73, 76, 77, 105, 156, 205 Davis, Brigadier General Keith Maitland, 79

Davis, Robert, 299 n. 59 Davit Bek fortress, Zangezur uezd, 226 Davitian, Dr. Grigor, 327-328, 338 n. 68 Davitkhanian, Davit, 150 n. 32 Deedes, Brigadier General Wyndham Henry, 409 n. 14 Defrance, Jules Albert: as French high commissioner in Constantinople, 409, 421. 423

Deir-el-Zor, city and vilayet, 339, 416 Delarue, L’abbé, 435 n. 97 Del Proposio, Major Cesidio, 29 n. 24, 34 n. 41 Den, Colonel Petr V., 478 n. 73 Denikin, Lieutenant General Anton Ivanovich: and Armenia, 5, 103-104, 458, 468-475, 524; and British with­ drawal from Transcaucasia, 21-22, 31, 37, 110, 111, 115, 138, 176; and Trans­ caucasian republics, 21-22, 23 n. 8, 25 n. 14, 34, 109, 111, 116, 130, 131, 132, 136,156, 172, 462, 471-472, 474, 476478, 483, 510, 523-524; and Russian civil war, 30, 112, 460, 463-464, 475-

585

IN D E X

4 7 e» 4 9 3 » 5 ° 5 » 5 ° 6» 5 24 î

and British government, 95, 113, 116, 176, 460, 462-468, 476-477, 478, 480-481, 483, 500, 506, 508. See also South Russia, Armed Forces of; Volunteer Army; White Armies Denmiss, 111, 112, 176 Derby, Lord Edward Georges Villiers Stanley, 418 Derindje, 402 De Robeck, Vice Admiral John Michael: as British high commissioner in Con­ stantinople, 352, 426, 428, 445, 447, 486, 489, 493, 494, 496, 499 Deschamps, Gaston, 435 n. 97 Deschanel, Paul, 435 n. 97, 456 Desfeuilles, Paul, 435 n. 97 Devik, Kars okrug, 73, 81, 102 Dévoyants, Captain Tigran, 68 n. 18, 177 n. 21, 489 Diadin, Erzerum vilayet, 522 Diarbekir, city and vila yet, 80, 337, 339, 341,364,424,440,442,443,448,449 n. 135 »4 5 3 » 5 13 Diaz, General Armando, 24, 29, 31,34 34

Diduvar, Nakhichevan u ezd, 71, 73 Dilijan, Kazakh u ezd, 12, 13, 192, 214, 287, 300 n. 63, 303, 311, 312, 349, 513 Disar, Nakhichevan u ezd, 208, 235 Djaghetian, Grigor: as state controller, 297-298, 315 Djagri, Nakhichevan u ezd, 70-71, 73 Djamalian, Arshak, 16, 17, 72, 165, 266, 281, 283, 290-291, 312, 315 Djanfida, Etchmiadzin u ezd, 73, 181, 182 Djatkran, Erevan uezd, 77 Djibouti, 527 Djolfa, 71, 73. See also Julfa Dodge, Cleveland E., 398 n. 92 Dodge, Cleveland Hoadley, 55, 319, 320, 3 3 6 , 3 7 4 » 3 9 6 , 3 9 8 n- 92 Donjian, D., 319 n. 7 Don region, 470, 471, 475, 524 Doolittle, Hooker Austin, 88-89, 90, 338 n. 68 Dortyol, Adana vila yet, 413, 421 Douglas, Captain Archibald Sholto George, 130, 158, 159 Doumergue, Emile, 94 Dro (Drastamat Kanayan), 16, 75, 77, 91, 105, 142, 229, 263, 519 D roshak (Geneva), 18

Dsamhur (Amseyan), Tigran, 16 n. 34, 259 n. 43 Dsamoev (Dsamoyan), Grigor S., 469 Dufieux, Brigadier General Julien Claude Marie Sosthène, 416 n. 33 Dunn, Lieutenant Robert S., 353 Dvin, 387 (Paris), 465 Edif Bey: and ruin of Akulis, 236, 237 Edigarov, General, 211, 217 Eghiayan, Patriarch Zaven: See Zaven (Eghiayan) Eghiazarian, Consul General, 195 Eghin (Agn), Kharput vila ye t, 339, 407 Eghvard, Zangezur u ezd, 208, 209 Egypt, 4, 19, 27, 96, 406, 416, 418, 420, 450, 461, 524, 525 Ekaterinenfeld, Borchalu u ezd, 151 Ekaterinodar, 470, 524, 526 Ekaterinoslav, 470 n. 42, 526 Elenovka, Nor Bayazit u ezd, 301 n. 63 Eliot, Charles William, 53, 336, 398 n. 92 Elisavetpol (Ganja; Gandzak), city, u ezd, and g u b e m iia , 18, 183, 189-190, 191-

E a stern E u ro p e

195

Elkus, Abram L, 398 n. 92 Ellis, William Thomas, 398 n. 92 Elmer, Theodore Allen, 185 Enfiadjian, Artashes, 383, 401 Engidja, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 73, 107 Enver Pasha, 136, 141, 424, 489 Enzeli, 184, 185, 527 Eprem Khan, 18 Erevan, city, u ezd , and g u b e m iia , 3, 7, 70, 73, 76, 178, 182, 192, 193, 215, 247, 294, 458; conditions in, 6-7, 10, 43, 284-285, 291-292, 293, 294, 300-301, 3°2> 3°3» 3°7» 3°8»3 11»3 12; routes to, 9, 11, 42, 52, 62, 83, 140, 154, 179, 199, 201, 209, 290, 372, 377, 390,491; coop­ erative associations in, 12-13; foreign representatives at, 62,69,74,86,87-88, 102, 195-197» 284-285, 494, 512,513, 519, 520-523, 528; Azerbaijani claims in, 63-64, 168-169, 180, 181, 191, 192, 194, 198-199; conferences in, 242-243, 244-246, 250-251, 255-256, 257 Eritsian, Khachatur, 307 Erzerum, city and vila ye t, 254, 339; proposed repatriation to, 42,45, 59, 60, 387; Turkish officers in and from, 6869, 72, 78-79, 79-80, 82-83, 143, 212-

586

IN D E X

213; British control mission at, 78-83, 86, 138; future of, 332, 434, 439, 441, 442, 443, 449, 454, 455, 457, 513,517; Harbord at, 345 Erzerum congress, 82, 141, 342, 425. See also Sivas congress; Turkish Nationalist movement Erzinjan, Erzerum vilayet, 339, 344, 364, 453

Eskishehir, Brusa vilayet, 339, 407, 423 Estonia, 397, 465 Etchmiadzin (Vagharshapat), town and uezd’ 3* 73. 84» »88> *9 *. »9*. 3 13>387>

513; conditions in, 10, 12, 13, 72, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 285-287, 290, 292, 300-301, 302, 303, 306, 308,311, 5 *»

Euphrates College (Kharput), 341 Euphrates River, 309, 327, 339 Evangelical Free Churches, National Council of, 435 Evangulov, Leon G. (Levon Evanghulian), 349

Evlakh, Elisavetpol uezd, 129, 187, 210, 211, 215 Faisal, Emir, 126 n. 59, 127,412,416,419 Fall, Senator Albert Bacon, 368 n. 6, 370 Fallahs, 325 Far East, 354, 360, 469 Fenenga, Agnes, 340 Fetvadjian, Arshak, 297 Finland, 503, 510, 517 Fiske, Admiral Bradley A., 395 Fiume, 28, 219 n. 37 Fletcher, Captain, 85 Fleurot, Paul, 435 n. 97 Flye-Sainte-Marie, Lieutenant Colonel, 414 n. 28, 417 Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 414, 505, 510, 525

Forbes, Major Stewart, 75 Forbes Adam, Eric Graham, 47, 99, 440, 453. 455- 472

Fourteen Points, 123, 326 Fracchia, Captain V., 29 n. 24 France: and Armenia and Armenians, 4, 92, 96, 114, 124-128, 435, 438-440, 441, 448, 522-523; Chamber of Depu­ ties, 118; and future of Near East, 323, 333,406-407,408-409, 411-426, 433434. 435. 437- 4 4 L 453- 455. 456- 457;

and interests in Transcaucasia, 491-

495

France, Anatole, 94 Franchet d’Espérey, General Louis Félix Marie François, 114, 125, 406-407 Frankian, Ervand, 312 Fuat Sabit, 488 Gabba, Colonel Melchiade: as chief of Ital­ ian mission in Caucasus, 24, 29, 30, 31, 33-34. 36> »75. 202 n. 80, 219 n. 37, 224, 496, 497, 523 Gabutti, Major W., 29 n. 24 Galicians, 465 Gandzak Armenian National Council, 189-190 Gandzak (Ganja), 18, 169, 303. See also Elisavetpol Ganja, 169, 185 n. 39, 189, 190, 192, 303. See also Elisavetpol Garni River, 309 Gates, Caleb Frank, 317-319, 324 n. 24, 391-392, 396 n. 89 Gauvain, Auguste, 435 n. 97 Gedevanov (Gedevanishvili), Major Gen­ eral A. K., 158 Gedjevan (Kadjaran), Zangezur uezd, 208, 218 Gegechkori, Evgenii Petrovich: as Geor­ gian foreign minister, 110, 137, 141, 142, 145-146, 155, 165, 219, 221, 223225, 239-240, 349, 501, 502, 503 Geghamian, G., 293 Geghi, Zangezur uezd, 208, 226, 227, 229 Geghvadzor, Zangezur uezd, 209, 219, 226, 235 Geive, Ismid vilayet, 338, 339 Genizade, Dr., 182 Genvaz, 207, 218, 226, 235. See also Meghri Geokchai uezd, 186, 187, 188, 192 Georges-Gaulis, Berthe, 423 Georges-Picot, Charles Marie François, 406, 415, 438; and Mustafa Kemal, 424-426 Georgia, Republic of: and Armenia, 4, 5, 140-167 passim, 219-220, 224, 239, 297. 501; Armenians in, 4, 140-142, 148-153, 160-161, 261, 300, 303; and White Armies, 5, 31, 39, 111, 131, 141, 156, 461, 463,465-466, 468, 469, 476477, 478, 483, 484, 500, 510; and Italy, 23 n. 8, 24, 38-39 n. 59, 497-499; and British officials, 109-114,131-132, 135 -136, 142, 144, 154-155, 461, 466, 476

IN D E X

-477,482,484; delegation in Paris, 110, 112,144 n. 12,145, 146 n. 19, 154, 155, 224 n. 51, 507, 509-510; Bolsheviks in, 136, 152, 163; and French officials, 142 -143, 146, 491-492, 493-494; and American officials, 143-146, 349, 400, 518, 519 n. 122; Constituent Assembly, 148, 149, 150, 151, 161, 165, 225; and Soviet Russia, 479, 502-503, 508, 509; recognition of, 497-502 Georgian Mensheviks (Social Democrat Labor Party of Georgia), 32, 92, 135136, 141, 146, 149-150, 158-159, 165, 166, 247, 248, 474; Armenian affiliate of, 149, 150 Georgian National Democrat party, 150, 159 n. 60, 165, 221 n. 45 Georgian Nationalist party, 150, 165 n. 73 Georgian People’s (Menshevik) Guard, 141, 143, 150-151 Georgian Social Federalist party, 151, 165 Georgian Social Revolutionary party, 151, 165, 247. See also Armenian Social Rev­ olutionaries; Russian Social Revolution­ ary party Gerard, James Watson: as chairman of American Committee for Indepen­ dence of Armenia, 53, 94, 115, 321, 336, 3 5 6 n- 116>3 7 3 »374 n. 22,375,377 n. 32,387» 389» 390, 3 9 3 »3 9 5 »396 - 3 9 7 » 3 9 9 »4 3 6 Germany, 141, 184 n. 37, 406; interests in Caucasus, 27, 462, 463, 467, 482, 485486, 495-496, 525 Gerusy. See Goris Geul-Aisori, Erevan uezd, 66, 73 Gevorg V (Sureniants), Catholicos, 16, 242, 285, 346, 513, 520 Ghamazian, General, 513 Ghambarian, Iurii (Stepan), 313-314 Ghambashidze, David, 224 Ghapan (Kafan), Zangezur uezd, 207, 208, 209, 218, 226, 235 Gharibdjanian, Bagrat, 251 Ghazarian, Arshak, 16 n. 34 Ghazarian, Gevorg, 266 Ghazarosian, Dr., 417 n. 36 Ghazazian, Koriun, 16 n. 34, 256, 261 Ghukasian, Ghukas, 251 Gibbons, Herbert Adams, 94 Gibbons, James Cardinal, 94, 398 n. 92 Gibello-Socco, Major Giuseppe, 29 n. 24 Giers, Ambassador Michael de, 472 Gimorri, Adriano, 94

587

Giorgiewitz, Sava (Sahak Gevorgian), 526 Giulkhandanian, Abraham, 16 n. 34, 266; as minister of interior and justice, 18, 286-288, 292, 293, 294, 315, 513 Giulnazarian, Konstantin, 513 Giulnazarian, Movses, 234, 235, 236 Giultapa, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Gladstone, William, 520 Goghb. See Kulp Goghtan National Council, 235 Goghtan (Ordubad) district, Nakhichevan uezd, 213, 218, 234, 235, 236 Golitsyn, Grigorii, 240 n. 97 Gooch, George Peabody, 94, 435 Goode, Sir William Athelstane Meredith, 44

Gordsavor (Tiflis), 254 Gori, town and uezd, 3, 129 Goris (Gerusy), Zangezur uezd, 5, 198, 199, 207, 208, 209, 211, 216-217, 218, 226, 235, 290 Gorkii, Maksim, 294 Gough-Calthorpe, Admiral. See Calthorpe Gouraud, General Henri Joseph Etienne: in Syria and Cilicia, 414, 415, 419, 424,

425

Gracey, Captain George Frederick Han­ del: as British representative in Erevan, 112, 139, 216, 228, 484-485, 512, 513, 5 l6 Graffam, Mary Louise, 328-329, 344 Granafei, Captain, 29 n. 24, 34 Grattan-Bellew, Colonel Charles Christopher, 74-75 Great Britain: military withdrawal from Caucasus, 20-27, 30-31. 32. 43-44. 88, 89, 104-139 passim, 185, 374, 376; and Transcaucasian republics, 20-21, 88, 1’75~l T7’ 460-468, 475-478, 482-486, 489-490, 494-501, 504-511; Eastern Committee, 20-21, 22 n. 5, 175 n. 16, 184 n. 37; War Cabinet, 20-22, 113, 115, 116, 117, 126, 132-134; Admiralty Office views, 21, 22, 26, 37, 505-506; and Russian question, 21-22, 30-31, 44, 458-468, 473-474. 476-481, 5°5“ 508; Foreign Office views, 21—22, 2527. 3°. 37-38. 41-42, 57-58, 95-102, 104, 112-114, 116, 132-134, 136, 175 n. ! 5 >3 2 3 . 4 ! 0 . 4 1 5 . 4 l8 , 429-43°. 4 3 4 . 436, 440-441, 445, 447, 450, 451-452, 453,455,460-464, 466-468,476, 482483, 486, 491, 493, 494-495, 498-5°°,

588

IN D E X

504, 505—506; India Office views, 21, 22, 42, 97, 410-411, 429, 430, 444 n. 121, 447, 450-455, 505-506; Parlia­ ment, 21, 94-95» 119-122» 131» 436» 4 3 7 » 4 63 » 4 7 8» 4 7 9 Î Treasury Office views, 21, 22, 97, 101, 420 n. 48, 450, 487; War Office views, 21, 22, 27, 35, 36, 37, 40, 42, 43“44» 59-6o, 95, 97100, 101, 102, 109-110, 111-112, 115116, 132-134, 407, 410, 411, 420 n. 48, 428-429, 430, 450-451, 460-467, 476, 4 83 » 4 9 5 » 5°6, 508-509; Inter-Depart­ mental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, 22, 31, 112, 442, 452, 505; and Armenia and Armenians, 40-42, 4344, 47-48, 57-61, 94-96, 97-102, 114122 passim, 126-128, 407-411, 4264 3 °» 43 5 - 4 3 7 » 43S, 4 4 0 - 4 4 1 »4 4 ^ 4 5 5 » 486, 500, 519-522; high commission at Constantinople, 40-41, 45-46, 124, 13 2» 177 » 3 5 2- 3 5 3 »409-41°» 426-428, 445, 486, 489, 490, 493, 499, 504; and future of Near East, 322-323,404, 412, 418, 426-431, 433-457 P™™ Greece and Greeks, 60, 178 n. 22, 227, 3 1 7 »3 2 4 »325» 3 3 2 , 360, 392 n. 72, 405, 406, 422, 429, 430, 435 n. 98, 438, 439, 4 5 1 » 5 1 4 » 524» 528 Green, Major Joseph C.: and Armenian relief, 89-90, 115, 143-146, 338 n. 68 Greenfield, Dr. James: as Armenian rep­ resentative in Berlin, 525, 526 Greenwood, Sir Hamar, 491 Greer, David Hummell, 398 n. 92 Grey of Fallodon, Viscount Edward, 430431

Gribbon, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Har­ old, 99, 102 Grigorian, Sirakan, 16 n. 34, 303, 305 Grkh-bulag, Erevan uezd, 302 Gronna, Senator Asie J., 368 n. 6 Grundy, Thomas Edward Milligan, 112, 519.

Guernier, Charles, 435 n. 97 Gulesian, Moses H., 378 Gumridagh, Mount, 73, 103 Gumushane, Trebizond vilayet, 162 n. 64, 339. Gvardjaladze, Konstantin G., 224 n. 51 Hadjin, Adana vilayet, 413, 416, 423 Haidar-Pasha, 124, 338, 339 Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun. See Dashnaktsutiun

Hai Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun. See Armenian Populist party Hajinskii, Djamo, 172 n. 9 Hajinskii, Mahmed Hasan, 172 n. 9, 231 n. 76, 232, 233 Hajinskii, Mehdi Bek, 231 n. 76 Haji-Samlu, Zangezur uezd, 211, 217 Hakaru (Akera) river valley, 207, 208, 209, 226, 236, 239 Hakhumian, Tigran, 245 Hakhverdian, Major General Hovhannes (Ivan Akhverdov): as minister of mili­ tary affairs, 19, 75, 513 Hakobian, Dr. Mikayel, 341 Hakobian, Nshan, 245, 520 Halid Bey, 78 Halidé Edib (Adivar), 318 n. 4, 324, 329 Halil Bey, Colonel: in Nakhichevan, 6869, 70, 72,74 n. 33, 75, 76, 86, 105-107, , 108, 183, 203, 205, 211, 225-226, 227, 229-230, 235, 349 Halil Pasha (Kut), General: in Caucasus, 177, 212-213, 228, 229, 487, 504 Hama, Damascus vilayet, 419 Hamaspiur, Khoren, 185 n. 39 Hamazasp (Srvandztian), 72, 142 Hamelin, General, 415 Handamedj, Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 235 Hankey, Sir Maurice Pascal Alers, 23 n. 8, 4 4 » 455 Haradj (Erevan), 200, 257, 475 Harbin, 469 Harbord, Major General James Guthrie: and American Military Mission to Ar­ menia, 48-57, 58, 61, 196, 334-365 passim, 371, 372, 376, 392 n. 73, 395,

405

Harding, Senator Warren Gamaliel, 368 n. 6; and Armenia, 370, 375, 377 - 3 7 9 » 380, 381, 382, 384, 389, 390 Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord Charles: as permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs, 451, 463, 500 Harmsworth, Cecil Bisshopp, 95 Harputlian, Levon, 341 Hart, Albert Bushnell, 387 Harutiunian, Martiros, 16 n. 34, 215; and negotiations with Azerbaijan, 231-233; and negotiations for united govern­ ment, 272-277 Harutiunian, Samson, 242, 291-292; and negotiations for united government, 270-277, 279 Hasan Bey, 63, 80

IN D E X

Hasankale, Erzerum vilayet, 83, 104, 162 "• 64. 339» 346

Haskell, Colonel William Nafew: appoint­ ment as Allied commissioner in Ar­ menia, 52, 54-57, 60, 61, 89, 113, 334; reports of, 114, 125, 372, 376, 384-385 n. 53; and disputed territory, 159, 195206, 216, 221, 227, 228, 235, 236, 239; in Armenia, 195-197, 315» 522, 529» and Armenian relief, 196, 299, 397402; extension of jurisdiction, 203, 399-400; and Harbord mission, 347, 349 n. 96, 350 Hatch, Harold A., 398 n. 92 Haven, William Ingraham, 398 n. 92 Hayastani ashkhatavor (Erevan), 200, 257 Hayastani dzain (Erevan), 244 Hayastani Kooperatsiia (Erevan), 12 Hayastan (Paris), 270 Heathcote-Smith, Commander Clifford Edward, 409 n. 14 Helsinki, 526 Hemphill, A lexander Julian, 46, 398 n. 92

Henderson, Arthur, 118 Herrick, Myron T., 398 n. 92 Hiatt, Walter Sanders, 352 n. 107 Hibben, John Grier, 395 Hilmi Bey, Colonel, 226 Hippeau, Edmond, 174 Hirtzel, Sir Arthur, 444 n. 121 Hitchcock, Senator Gilbert Monell, 369,

374» 384

Hnchakian party. See Armenian Social Democrat Hnchak party Hohler, Thomas Beaumont, 352 Holman, Major General Herbert Camp­ bell: and Denmiss, 112, 113, 462, 465, 476- 4 7 7 ,4 8 0

Holt, Hamilton, 397 n. 90, 398 n. 92 Homs, Damascus vilayet, 419 Hoover, Herbert Clark: as Allied Director General of Relief, 40,44,46,49-50,55, 89, 143, 144-145; and proposed Ar­ menian repatriation, 47, 48-57 passim,

5 8 9

Hovsepian (Ossipov), General Harutiun: on Kars front, 75, 79, 80, 81, 85, 345 Hughes, Charles Evans: and aid to Ar­ menia, 53, 54, 336, 367, 373, 375, 386, 3 9 3 » 3 9 4 » 3 9 5 » 39» n. 92 Ibrahimov, Captain, 216 Idjevan, Kazakh uezd, 10, 12, 312 Igdir, Surmalu uezd, 10, 13, 73, 83, 84, 102, 105, 179, 181, 188, 192 Imperiali di Francavilla, Ambassador Guglielmo, 37-38, 496 n. 50, 498 India, 27, 32, 35, 175,452,461, 477, 484, 486, 506, 524-526 Ingush, 465 Insom, Lieutenant, 29 n. 24 International, Second (Socialist), 118-119 Iorga, Nicolae, 94 Iran, 442. See also Persia Iraq, 425, 447. See also Mesopotamia Ireland, 450, 461 Irkutsk, 469 Isfahan, 443, 528 Ishkhanian, Bashkhi, 252, 312 Ishkhanian, Eghishe, 210 n. 6 Ishkhanian, Misha, 217 Ismail Bey, 104 Ismid, city and vilayet, 338, 339, 407 Iso Bek, 63 Italy: aspirations of, 2, 332,406,422,438, 4 3 9 » 451; interests in Transcaucasia, 20-39 passim, 74, 75, 111-112, 175, 482, 4 9 5 - 4 9 9 » 523 Ittihad (Baku), 474 Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and Progress; Young Turk) party and Ittihadists, l 3b -l 37> 141» l 7°> l 76>212-213, 229, 259» 326, 352, 353, 406, 429, 443, 444, 446, 447, 450, 474, 489, 495, 500, 504, 530

Iuzbashian, D., 470 n. 42 Iuzbashian, G., 292 n. 31 Iveriia (Tiflis), 166 n. 73 Izmir. See Smyrna

H4 Hornbeck, Captain Stanley Kuhl: and Harbord mission, 354, 362-363 House, Colonel Edward Mandell, 28, 46, 318 Hovhannisian, Arshak, 16 n. 34, 305 Hovhannisian, P.: in Terek, 470 n. 42 Hovhannisian, Tigran, 292 n. 31 Hovsepian, Nikolai, 209

Jackson, Frank Watterson, 398 n. 92 Jackson, Jesse Benjamin, 340 Jackson, Lieutenant Colonel John Price: and Harbord mission, 344 n. 83, 355, 362-363 Jafar Bey, 63, 77, 79 Jafarov, Mohammed Iusuf: as Azerbaijani foreign minister, 76, 110, 129, 171, 172

590

IN D E X

n. 9, 177, 179-180, 181, 198, 202-203, 205, 214-215, 220 n. 43, 230-231 Jaffa, 324, 339 Jalal-oghli, Borchalu u ezd , 13, 157, 302 Jalut, Nukhi u ezd, 187 Jamalinskii, Sained Bey. See Sained Bey James, Arthur Curtiss, 398 n. 92 Japan, 48 n. 26; and Transcaucasia, 501, 510, 512 n. 104 Jaquith, Harold Clarence, 46, 382 Java: Armenians of, 524 Jebel-Bereket sa n ja k , 421 Jebrail (Kariagin) u ezd, 208, 211, 212, 215 Jemal Pasha, Mersinli, 351, 421 Jerablus, Urfa san jak, 339, 415 Jessup, Henry Wynams, 393, 396 n. 88 Jevad Pasha, 490 Jevanshir u ezd, 3, 191, 193 Jews, 184 n. 37, 324, 439, 466, 471, 485, 486 Jezire district, 425 Jihan, Adana vila yet, 413, 421 Johnson, Lieutenant F. G., 71 n. 26 Johnson, Senator Hiram Warren, 368 n. 6 Judson, Harry Pratt, 398 n. 92 Julfa, Nakhichevan u ezd , 64, 71, 73, 76, 77, 106, 107, 135, 156, 192, 200, 208, 211; railway, 11, 75, 76, 199-200, 201, 202, 496, 521 Kabardins, 465 Kachaznuni, Hovhannes (Ruben I.), 16 n. 34, 97, 281, 298; in United States, 382, 383, 386-387, 388, 389, 391, 397, 401, 402, 472 Kadimov, Colonel, 63 Kadjberuni, Ruben, 16 n. 34, 302 Kaghaki (Kialaki), Nakhichevan u ezd, 208, 235 Kaghisman, town and okru g, 3, 73, 192, 193; Armenian rule at, 10, 11, 62, 63, 77, 346; military action around, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 103 Kaisaria. See Caesarea Kalantar, Arsen: at Stavropol, 470 n. 42 Kalantarian, Anna, 230 Kalaydjian, Reverend Mihran T., 319 Kalb Ali Khan. See Nakhichevanskii, Kalb Ali Khan Kanayan, Drastamat. S ee Dro Kaplanov, Rachiel, 172 n. 9 Karababa, Zangezur u ezd , 208, 209

Karabagh, 87, 217, 513; Armeno-Azer­ baijani dispute, 4, 5, 64, 92, 98, 129, i 3 °> i 5 6> x7 3 > ! 9 4 . ! 9 9 >215, 221, 222, 223, 229, 261, 364, 439, 448, 492, 521,530; Armenians of, 116, 129, 194195,198,211,215,216,225; as strategic corridor, 91, 168, 195, 198, 210, 211, 227, 488 Karabaghlar, Erevan u ezd , 67, 73 Karabekir, Major General Kiazim, 488, 490; emissaries in Transcaucasia, 63, 68-69, 105-106, 183, 225-226; and Allied officials, 65, 78, 79-80, 81, 82, 3 4 5 >346’ 361; attitude toward Armeni­ ans, 65, 68-69, 345, 361; and Young Turk fugitives, 212-213, 229 Karabekov, Karabey: and Azerbaijani Ittihad party, 487, 502 Karadagh, 207 Karakeshishian, Colonel: at Bash-Norashen, 70 Karakilisa, Alexandropol u ezd , 214,253 n. 31, 305; improvements at, 10, 13, 290, 307. 309, 311, 312, 398; orphans and refugees at, 196, 300-301 n. 63, 303, 398 Karakurt, Kaghisman u ezd, 73; military action around, 79, 85, 102 Karalar, Erevan u ezd, 77 Karanlugh, Nor-Bayazit u ezd , 73, 287 Karapetian, Archimandrite Hovhan: at Smyrna, 353 n. 108 Karaurgan, Kaghisman u£zd, 11, 73, 79, 181 Kara Vasif Bey, 329, 489 Kariagin u ezd, 3, 191; infantry unit, 215. See also Jebrail Kars, city, okru g, and oblast, 3, 73, 180, 229, 327, 364, 441, 458; Armenian ref­ ugees in and repatriation to, 6,7,42,44, 262, 272, 300-301 n. 63, 302, 398; and transportation routes, 9, 10, 62, 131, 147, 290, 522; Armenian rule in, 9, 10, 12, 13, 20, 43, 62, 77, 179, 181, 272, 290, 291, 293, 294, 303 n. 68, 308, 311, 345-346, 513; military activities in, 68, 72, 73-87 p a ssim , 92, 102-103, 130, 156, 180, 181, 182, 200, 229, 235, 521; disputed claims to, 154-155, 191, 192193, 212 Kars Muslim Council, 155, 182, 514 Karvansarai, Kazakh u ezd, 10. See also Idjevan Kasian, Sargis H., 250 n. 22, 251

IN D E X

Kastamuni, city and vila y e t , 339, 407 (Tiflis), 153, 209 n. 4 Kazakh town and u ezd, 3, 12, 189 n. 54, 191, 192, 193, 194, 214, 226 Kazan, 459 Kazarov (Ghazarian), General H.: in Zangezur, 228, 239 Kazvin, 527 Kemal Pasha, Mustafa, 78 n. 44, 143, 177, 181, 457; and Allied officials, 82, 83, 100, 328, 329, 342-344» 351» and Ar­ menians, 82, 83, 106 n. 122, 343, 351, 422, 425, 426; and Young Turk fugi­ tives, 137, 212; and sultan’s govern­ ment, 330, 351; and Cilicia, 137, 212; and Soviet Russia, 488, 503 Keorkizian, Arsen, 245 Kerasund, Trebizond vila yet, 339, 364 Kerimov: in Constantinople, 490 Kerobian, H. K.: and Harbord mission, 338 n. 68 Kerr, Sir Philip Henry, 26 n. 15, 32-33,

K a vk a zsk o e slovo

448- 449’ 493’ 507

Keshishkend, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 73, 105, 208, 287, 290 Kevorkov (Gevorgian), Matik: at Djibouti, 527

Khachadoorian (Khachaturian), First Lieutenant Harutiun H.: and Harbord mission, 335, 340, 341 Khachatrian, Smbat, 16 n. 34; and nego­ tiations with Georgia, 156-165 Khachaturian, Astvadsatur, 274, 520 Khachik, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 71, 73, 225 Khamarlu, Erevan u ezd, 13, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 105, 180 Khankend, Shushi u ezd, 208, 211, 212, 218 n. 34 Khan Khoiskii, Fathali, 169; as Azer­ baijani foreign minister, 172, 238, 239240, 502, 503, 519; and negotiations with Armenia, 231-233, 239-240 Khanoyan, Sargis, 251 Khanukhlar, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 73; Armenians at, 70, 71, 106, 107, 236 Kharkov, 470 n. 42, 526 Kharput (Kharpert; Mamuret-ul-Aziz), city and vilayet, 319, 330, 332, 339, 341, 408,424,440,442,443,448,449 n. 135, 453

Khas-Mamedov, Khalil Bek, 172 n. 9 Khatisian, Alexandre (A. I.), 16 n. 34, 265, 474; as prime minister, 2, 4, 15, 17, 18,

591

19» 43» 72» 92-93» l 56> 160, 165, 166, 169, 190, 221-225, 230, 244, 257, 280282, 294-295, 302, 313, 315, 383, 395, 473» 495» 501» ö 11^ ^ » 529“ 53°î and

Allied representatives, 5, 67, 73-74, 79, 86, 135, 138, 156, 196, 199, 200-202, 216, 220-222, 223, 224, 227-228, 229, 511-512, 517, 519-521, 522, 523, 528; and negotiations for united govern­ ment, 15, 17, 269, 271, 272-277, 278; as foreign minister, 18,165,213-215, 219, 239-240, 260-261, 294-295, 315 Khatisian, Gevorg, 10, 16 n. 34 Khnadsakh, Zangezur u ezd , 208, 217 Khndirian, H.: at Bucharest, 526 Khnus, Erzerum vila yet, 43, 256, 339, 441 Khodjamirian, H.: in Nukhi and Aresh, 187-188 Khodjavank (Tiflis), 153 Khodjayan, I.: in Azerbaijani parliament, 185 n. 39, 189 Khoi, 186 Khojamarziarian: at Novorossiisk, 470 n. 42

Khondkarian, Arsham: as Social Revolu­ tionary spokesman, 17, 181, 200, 247248, 281, 283 Khorasan, Erzerum vila yet, 73, 339, 346, 348- 3 4 9 ,4 4 1

Khoreni (Ter-Gevorgian), Vahan, 16, 165, 209, 258, 283, 304-305 Khorhurd. See Armenian Khorhurd Khor-Virap, Erevan u ezd , 73, 77 Khozapin, Lake, 154, 157 Khoznavar, Zangezur u ezd , 208, 217 Khram River, 157, 161 Khrimian (Hairik), Mkrtich, 515 Khustup, Mount, 208, 226 Kialashian, Garnik, 16 n. 34 Kiarim-arkh, Etchmiadzin u ezd, 73, 181, 182 Kiarimbek-diza, Nakhichevan u ezd, 71,73 Kichik(Küchük) Vedi, Erevan u ezd, 73,77 Kidston, George Jardine: in Foreign Of­ fice, 25 n. 14, 30,41, 100, 101, 102, 111, 162 n. 64, 203 n. 84, 219 n. 37, 400 n. 98, 418, 429, 463, 473, 482-483, 485 n. 11, 496 n. 50, 498 n. 58 Kiev, 526 Killis, Aintab sa n ja k , 413, 415 King, Henry Churchill: and King-Crane commission, 322-334 King, Senator William Henry, 372, 384, 398 n. 92

592

IN D E X

King-Crane commission, 322-334, 340, 364. 371 Kishmishian, General Iosif A.: as military attaché in Tiflis, 158, 160-162, 195 Kislovodsk, 526 Kitur, Arsen, 43, 527 Kizilbash, 325, 420 Kizil Irm ak River, 339, 342 Kizilkilisa, Kaghisman okru g, 73, 103 K ld e (Tiflis), 165 n. 73 Knox, Senator Philander Chase, 368 n. 6 Kocharian, Ghazar (Kechel Ghazar), 235, 236 Kojassar, Sergeant-M ajor Aram , 335 n. 57 Kokand, 526 Kolchak, Adm iral Aleksandr Vasil’evich, 35» 3® n - 59» 459» 462, 464 >469» 478 Konia, city and vila yet, 338, 339, 423, 440 Korganian, General Gabriel (Gavriil Georgievich Korganov): as military at­ taché o f Republic delegation, 96, 9 9 101, 336, 385, 508 n. 94 Korganian (Korganov), Stepan A.: as Kars governor, 77, 79, 80, 85, 345, 514 Korindzor, Zangezur u ezd , 208, 217 Korkotian, Zaven, 12 Kotuz, Erevan u ezd, 66, 67, 73, 77 Krafft-B onnard, Antony, 94 Krikorian (Grigorian), K. K., 352 Kristapor (Mikaelian), 257, 494 Kuban, 470, 476, 524 Küchük Talaat, 212 Kulp (Goghb), Surm alu u ezd , 11, 13, 63, 73, 84, 92, 105, 181, 346 Kurdistan, 423, 427, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 451 Kurds and Kurdish question, 45, 59, 81, 84, 85, 105, 123, 133, 138, 325, 327 K urd T epe, Adana vila yet, 413, 421 K urd Yusuf, 421 Kur River, 77, 154, 155 Kusikian, A., 292 n. 31 Lagodegh, Signakh u ezd , 300 Lansing, Secretary o f State Robert F.: and Arm enian question, 46, 53, 54, 58, 115, 122, 123, 316, 334, 355, 369 n. 7, 373, 384, 397, 430, 431, 432, 517-518 Latvia, 397, 465 Lazistan, 449 n. 135, 453 Lazo (Hakob Ghazarian), 149 n. 29 League o f Nations: and future o f N ear East and Arm enia, 36, 113, 118, 131,

197, 261, 263, 322, 330, 331, 357, 358, 360, 395, 440, 454, 468; American atti­ tude toward, 197, 316, 366-371, 377, 405, 431, 432; convocation of, 456 League o f O ttom an Liberals, 443 Lebanon, 324, 330 Légion d ’O rient, 268,378 n. 34,412,419. See also A rm enian Legion Lenin, Vladim ir Il’ich, 249, 509 Lenkoran, town and u èzd , 3, 130, 211, 222 Lenroot, Senator Irvine L., 368 n. 6 Leo (Arakel Babakhanian), 312 Lepsius, Johannes, 94 Leslie, Brigadier G eneral W alter Stewart, 414 Letters, Major R., 130 Lithuania, 397, 465 Livingston, M ajor Charles E., 159 Lloyd George, David: and British with­ drawal from Caucasus, 21-28, 32-33, 115-116, 118, 119, 128; and Russian question, 22, 459-464, 478-481; and future o f N ear East and Arm enia, 60, 128, 405-406, 411-412, 414, 433, 434, 435» 436» 437- 438, 4 4 L 449- 459; and Transcaucasian republics, 501 n. 69,

505-511 Lodge, Senator H enry Cabot, 355 n. 114; and ACIA, 53, 115, 336, 367-368, 393, 394; and Versailles treaty, 367, 368369, 371; and Williams resolution, 373, 3

7

5

»

3

7

7

.

3

8

4

,

3

8

7

,

3

8

9

, 3

9

0

London conference, 404, 456-457, 529 Long, W alter H um e, 491, 507 Longuet, Jean, 118 Lordkipanidze, Alexandre, 159 Lord Mayor’s Fund, 122 Lori, Borchalu u ezd, 12, 303, 491; neutral zone in, 5, 11, 130, 154, 158, 159, 161162, 166, 364 Loris-Melikov, Dr. Jean: in Caucasus, 492-494 Loris-Melikov, General Mikhail T., 493 n. 38 Loti, Pierre, 435 Lowell, Abbot Lawrence, 387 Luke, Com m ander H arry Charles, 486, 499-500 Luzzatti, Luigi, 94, 523 Lybyer, Professor Albert Howe, 323, 330 Lynch, Frederick H enry, 398 n. 92

593

i n d e x

McCormick, Vance Criswell, 398 n. 92 McCoy, Brigadier General Frank Ross: and H arbord mission, 335, 340, 345, 348» 349» 352, 353 n * 108 MacDonell, A. E. Ranald, 473 Macedonia, 31, 96 MacFarland, Charles Stedman, 397 n. 90, 398 n. 92 MacFarland, Henry Brown Floyd, 398 n. 92 M ackinder, Sir H alford John, 468, 477 Macler, Frédéric, 94, 435 M ahmedbekov, Eybat Guli, 172 n. 9 Mailian Brothers, 349 Main, Jo h n H anson Thom as, 46, 50, 382 M akharadze, Gerasim F.: as envoy to A r­ menia, 159-160 Makino, Baron Nobuaki, 48 n. 26 Makinskii, Ali Khan, 182 Maklakov, Ambassador Vasilii Alek­ seevich, 472 Maksapetian, Arm enak, 16 n. 34, 42, 43, 76, 287, 305, 309 Maku, town and khanate, 64, 65, 73, 75, 105, 528 Malatia, K harput vila y e t, 328, 339, 342, 364 Malcolm, James: as National Delegation representative in London, 96-97, 268 n. 64 Malkhas (Artashes Hovsepian), 16 n. 34,

305

Malkhasian, Arshak: in Azerbaijani p ar­ liament, 185 n. 39, 189, 190, 502 Malkhasian, Stepan, 292 n. 31 Mallet, Sir Victor Alexander Louis, 25, 26 n. *5» 33» 47» M4 n. 12 Maloyan, Manvel, 244 Mamikonian, Stepan G.: and negotiations with Georgia, 156-165 M anandian, Hakob, 312 Manasian, Sargis, 16 n. 34, 72, 286 Manavian, G. M., 319 n. 7 Manchuria: Arm enians of, 469 Mandates. See Paris Peace Conference M andinian, Mikayel M., 13 M anukian, Aram, 286 Manukian, Hmayak, 16 n. 34, 42, 305 Manukian, Katarine, 16 n. 34 Marash, city and san ja k , 413, 414, 415, 416, 421, 422, 423 Marcora, Lieutenant Melchiorre, 29 n. 24 Mardin, Diarbekir vila y e t, 339, 340

Maritime Provincial Zemstvo, Provisional G overnm ent of, 469 M arm ara, Sea of, 440, 453 M arquart, Joseph, 94 Marseilles, 325 Marshall, Vice-President Thom as Riley,

384

Marsovan, Sivas vila yet, 329, 337, 339, 344» 351» 407 Martin, Major Lawrence: and H arbord mission, 334 n. 83, 362, 364 Martino, Giacoma de, 48 n. 26 Martiros, Sharur-Daralagiaz u ezd, 70, 73, 208, 218 M artirosian, N., 244 Mashadi Samad, 514 Massehian, Hovhannes Khan, 527 Matsui, Keishiro, 48 n. 26, 501 n. 69 Mauclair, Camille, 94, 435 n. 97 Mdivani, Simeon Gurgenovich: and negotiations with Arm enia, 158, 160164 Mears, Eliot Grinnell: and H arbord mission, 337, 352 n. 107, 354, 362, 363 Meda, Filippo, 94 M editerranean Sea, 22, 339; as proposed outlet for Arm enia, 260, 320, 321, 324, 328, 348, 449 Megaramov (Mahmed M uharamov), 509 Meghri, Zangezur u ezd, 207, 208, 209, 218, 226 M ehmandarov, General Samed Bek: as Azerbaijani m inister o f military affairs, 129, 172 n. 9, 175, 218 M ehmed Bey, Colonel, 183 M ehmed Chavush, 67 M ehmed Effendi, Colonel, 67 M ehmed VI (Vahideddin), Sultan, 80 Meillet, Antoine, 94, 435 Mekhitarists, Arm enian Roman Catholic order, 525 Meliazgerd (Malazkert), Bitlis vila yet, 441 Melik-Aslanov, K hudadad, 172 n. 9 Melik-Azarian, 148 Melik-Esayan, 210 n. 6 Melik-Hiuseinian, Colonel Bughdan, 209 n. 3 Melikian, Arshavir, 249, 250 n. 22, 251 Melikian, Captain Suren, 383, 402 Melikian, Eghishe, 470 n. 42 Melikian, Hovakim, 17 n. 34 Melik-Musian, Ashot, 234, 235, 237 M elik-Stepanian, Smbat, 210 M elik-Tankian, Archbishop Nerses, 237

594

IN D E X

Melik-Yolchian, Sergei, 229 Melkonian, Artashes, 17 Melkonian, Hovhannes: as m ayor o f Alexandropol, 288, 315 M erdenek, A rdahan okrug, 73.77,85» 103 M erendi, Captain Alberto, 29 n. 24 Mersina, A dana vilayet, 125, 127, 128, 320, 340, 413, 415, 418, 419 Meskene, Aleppo vilayet, 413, 416 Mesopotamia, 2,4 , 2 7 ,3 2 ,4 3 ,5 3 ,5 5 , 255, 322, 325, 330, 333, 340, 380, 406, 418, 420, 442, 447, 448, 486, 491, 506, 524, 527 Mexico, 354 Mezere, K harput vilayet, 339, 341 Micheli, Lieutenant Colonel Carlo, 29 n. 24 » 33 . 38 Mikayelian, Arsen, 72 Millar, William Bell, 398 n. 92 Mille rand, Prime Minister Alexandre,

Moore, Benjamin Burgess: in Tiflis, 8 9 90, 91, 144, 195, 350 M orgenthau, Am bassador H enry, 46, 398 n. 92; and H arbord mission, 48-57, 334; and jo in t m andate plan, 321-322, 329 . 392 . 393 . 395 . 398 Moscow, 30, 111, 156,459,480; offensive against, 460, 464, 475, 506 Mosely, Brigadier G eneral George Van H orn: and H arbord mission, 335, 336,

349. 381-362

Moses, Senator George Higgins, 368 n. 6 Mosul, city and vilayet, 43, 339, 442, 506 Mott, Jo h n R., 398 n. 92 M ountainous Karabagh. See Karabagh M ountaineer Republic o f N orth Caucasus and Daghestan, 109, 141, 232, 464 M ountaineers, 109, 141, 143, 170, 184 n. 3 7 ,2 0 2 ,4 6 1 -4 6 2 ,4 6 5 ,4 8 7 ,5 0 4 . See also Daghestan; N orth Caucasus Mourey, Gabriel, 435 n. 97 458- 457> 5 1 8 Mravian, Askanaz, 250-251, 252 Milne, General George Francis, 406; and Mudge, Brigadier G eneral A rthur, 414 British withdrawal from Caucasus, 31, 3 5 .3 7 .4 4 .1 to, 112, 113, x 14,131-134. M udros Armistice, 40, 78, 317, 320, 342, 137. 138; and proposed Arm enian 412, 420, 434 repatriation, 58-59, 60, 428; and Mus­ M uratbekian, Bishop K horen, 16, 348 M urm ansk, 458, 460 lim uprisings in Arm enia, 6 5 ,7 4 ,7 7 ,7 9 , 80, 81, 82, 101; attitude toward G eor­ Musa Dagh, 418 n. 39 Musavat (Turkic Federalist) party: in gians and Azerbaijanis, 138, 142, 144, Azerbaijan, 170, 172, 186, 189, 231, »55 . 176. 461 Milner, Lord Alfred, 21 4 7 4 . 4 8 7 . 5 ° 2 , 5 !9 M inakhorian, Vahan: as Social Revolu­ Mush, Bitlis vilayet, 6 6 ,2 5 8 ,3 0 3 ,3 3 9 ,3 6 4 , tionary spokesman, 17 n. 34, 283, 312, 387, 415, 439, 441, 454, 455, 457, 513 Musinian, Mkrtich: as m ayor o f Erevan, 516 Minden: A rm enian prisoners o f war at, 257 . 347 . 513 Muslims in Arm enia, 62-108 passim, 178525 M inkend, Zangezur uezd, 208, 212, 217 183, 283 Mirakian, Enovk, 17 n. 34 Nakhichevan, town and uezd, 13, 62, 73, M irimanian, Colonel, 345 129, 168, 208, 234-236, 364, 441, 488, Mirzababev, Mirbazir, 17 n. 34 521 ; Muslim rising in, 6 4 -7 7 ,8 1 ,9 1 -9 2 , Mirzayan (Suny), Grigor, 313 105-108, 116, 119 m 36, 130, 178, 179, Misakian, Shavarsh, 272, 273 343; proposed neutral zone in, 189-205 M khitarian, Arshaluis, 149 n. 29, 242, 279 passim, 216, 228, 236, 384-385 n. 53; M ndoyants, Ashot, 195 and military operations in Zangezur, Molla-Kamar, Surm alu uezd, 73, 84, 181 2 i i , 213, 227, 229. See also Sharur-N aMolokans, 159, 306 khichevan M onroe Doctrine, 116,354,355,358,368, Nakhichevan Muslim Council, 65, 70, 37 ° 204, 205 Montagu, Sir Edwin Samuel: as secretary Nakhichevan River, 70, 71 o f state for India, 410, 450, 454, 455 Nakhichevanskii, Kalb Ali Khan, 63, 6 9 M ontgomery, George Redington, 323, 70, 71, 105, 107, 108, 205, 349 33°. 397 n. 90 Nalchadjian, Vahan, 17 n. 34 Monzie, Senator Anatole Pierre A rm and Narinian, Captain Ruben, 217 de, 174

IN D E X

Naservaz, Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 235, 236 Navasardian, Vahan, 17 n. 34, 266 Nazarabad, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Nazarian, Artashes, 17 n. 34 Near East Relief (NER), 224, 350 n. 101, 382, 398, 400, 401, 402, 418 Nehram, Nakhichevan uezd, 66, 73 Nestorians, 109, 325 Netherlands East Indies, 524 Nevruz, Leon, 526 New, Senator Harry Stewart, 368 n. 6, 375» 379» 380-381, 384 n- 52 Newcombe, Brigadier General H. K., 484 New Julfa (Nor Jugha), 528 New Republic, 374 New York Times, 318, 321, 353, 374, 393 Nidzh, Nukhi uezd, 187 Nikoghosian, Zarmair, 290 Nitti, Prime Minister Francesco Saverio, 36, 441, 456, 481, 497, 498, 510 Nonancourt, Commandant Emile de: as chief of French mission in Caucasus, 143, 173, 219 n. 37, 224,400 n. 98,492, 494

Noradoungian, Gabriel Effendi, 270 n. 71, 449 n. 135 Norashen, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 70, 73 » !05 Nor Ashkhatavor (Tiflis), 7 n. 10, 153, 158. See also Ashkhatavor

Norhatian, Hamazasp: as mayor of Kars, 288, 345, 514 Nor Nakhichevan, 244, 470, 526. See also Rostov-on-Don Nor (Novo) Bayazit, town and uezd, 10, 12, 70, 71, 72, 73, 105, 251, 286, 287, 29° »

2

9

3

»

301

n -

63 » 3° 3 » 3° 7 » 3 °

8 »

3 11

Norris, Commodore David Thomas, 110 Nors, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Nors-Mazra, Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 217, 225 North, Frank Mason, 398 n. 92 North, Rachel B., 340-341 North Caucasus, 6, 250, 308, 470, 525; and Volunteer Army, 24, 109, 460, 461-462, 463, 464, 465-467, 487; Turks and Bolsheviks in, 462,465, 467, 488,504. See also Daghestan; Mountain­ eers North Persia, 68, 92, 131, 191, 210 n. 5, 452, 467, 496, 499. See also Persia Novarese, Lieutenant Colonel Vittorio, 29 n. 24

595

Novocherkask, 471 Novorossiisk, 44, 470 n. 42, 477, 524 Novo-Selim, Kars okrug, 73, 85 Nubar Pasha, Boghos: as president of Ar­ menian National Delegation, 2, 17, 35 n. 42, 61, 96, 243, 244, 245, 318, 336, 3 5 5 »3 83 »3 85 »400,407, 4 3 4 »4 3 8 n- 109 » 443-447» 449» 457» 5X7; and negotia­ tions for united government, 15, 254, 258, 267-270, 272-273, 274, 276, 278, 279; and agreement with Kurds, 443447

Nukhi, town and uezd, 3, 18, 186-187, 188, 192, 222, 225, 302; infantry unit, 215

Nuri Pasha: escape of, 136-137; in Azer­ baijan, 169, 177, 189, 212, 213, 220, 228, 487, 504 Nzhdeh (Harutiunian), Lieutenant Colo­ nel Garegin, 218-219, 226, 229, 235, 236, 239 Obnovlenie (Tiflis), 166 n. 73, 221 n. 45 O’Connell, William Cardinal, 397 n. 90 O’Conner, Thomas Power, 120, 435 Odessa, 458,470 n. 42, 471,493, 510, 526 Ohandjanian, Avetis, 17 n. 34, 283, 309 Ohandjanian, Hamazasp, 17 n. 34, 266, 268 n. 64, 434, 444, 447 Ohanessian, Sergeant Dick, 335 n. 57, 350 n. 101 Okhchi, Zangezur uezd, 208, 218 Okhchichai River, 207, 209, 217, 218, 229, 235» 236 Oliver, Lieutenant: at Ardahan, 130, 155 Olti, town and okrug, 137, 229, 291; mili­ tary action in, 63,77,78, 79,80,92,104, 105 » Georgian claims to, 154-155, *57

Omar Agha: at Kaghisman, 63, 81, 84 Omsk, 469 Ordu, Trebizond vilayet, 339, 364, 408 Ordubad, town and district, 13,64,68,76, 92, 107, 202, 208, 212 Orel, 475 Orgov, Surmalu uezd, 73, 84, 105 Orlando, Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele, 23-25, 29, 34, 36, 322 Oshakan, Etchmiadzin uezd, 302 Ossetians, 465 Ottoman Empire: fate of, 2, 3, 21, 25, 596°, 97-99,101-102,122-128,176-177, 261-262, 316-365 passim, 391-397» 404-457 passim, 504, 529-530

596

IN D E X

Ozanian, General Andranik. See An­ dranik Ozanian, Meruzhan, 264 Painlevé, Paul, 94, 435 n. 97 Palestine, 27,322,324,330,333,406,412, 506 Palian, Major Ruben: at Kaghisman, 346 Paltaleoni, Lieutenant Massimo, 29 n. 24 Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic agitation: fear of revived, 10, 26, 27, 65, 79, 92, 97, 130, 168, 173, 194, 336, 350, 380, 3 9 5 >3 9 6 . 4 3 °. 4 4 * »4 4 8 . 4 5 2 . 462, 487. 489, 490, 491, 492, 495, 500, 519 Papadjanian, Mikayel, 245, 472 Papian, Abgar, 185 n. 39 Papazian, Vahan, 17 n. 34, 215, 282-283, 3° 5> 3° 9>520 Papovian, Al., 292 n. 31 Paraka, Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 235 Paris, Treaty of (1856), 122 Paris Peace Conference: and Armenia and Armenians, 2, 4, 48, 51, 54, 55-56, 58, 95, 114, 118, 123-128, 138, 145, 167, 191, 194, 196, 197, 215, 220, 255, 260, 261, 267, 316, 318, 356, 367, 404406, 407-408, 437, 439-440, 441, 500, 501, 511-512, 517-518; and future of Near East, 4, 28-29, 45, 82, 123-124, 134 n. 87, 239, 317, 322-324, 404-407, 411-412, 426-427, 428, 429, 431-432, 437-441, 443-444, 447, 4 5 5 - 4 5 7 ; Su­ preme Council of, 4, 26 n. 15, 27-28, 45, 48, 219 n. 37, 372, 404, 405, 429, 431, 447, 448, 453, 456, 459, 489, 507, 509, 512, 514, 515, 517, 518, 523, 527, 530; and Transcaucasia, 25, 26 n. 15, 27-28,63,65,66,75,118,141,144-145 156, 185, 191, 196, 197, 201, 203, 205, 215, 220, 224, 500-501, 505-511; Council of Four of, 25, 26 n. 15, 48, 49, 51, 323, 324; Council of Heads of Dele­ gations (Council of Five) of, 48,51 n. 34, 55-56» 58» H4> 124. 128, 145, 405; Council of Ten of, 51 n. 34; American withdrawal from, 430-433; Interna­ tional Conference of Premiers of, 456, 501 n. 69; and Russian question, 459, 478-481, 483; Council of Foreign Min­ isters of, 501 Parker, Alton Brooks, 386, 395 Paronian, Arshak, 185 n. 39, 190 Partridge, Ernest C., 41 n. 1, 344

Pasdermadjian, Garegin (Armen Garo), 17 n. 34, 266; and Boghos Nubar, 269, 446; as envoy to Washington, 383, 384, 387,388,391,395,399,401,474,517 n. 116, 518, 527 Pasdermadjian, Vahan, 84 Pashalu, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 73, 208, 225 Pataban, Haik: at Addis Ababa, 526 Patrick, Mary Mills, 317; 324, 335 Pears, Lieutenant Colonel C. P., 43 Pech, Lieutenant Edgar, 408 Peet, William Wheelock: and future of Ar­ menians, 45, 319, 320, 324, 328, 3723 7 3 » 3 7 6 n. 30 Penfield, Frederic Courdand, 53, 336, 395

Peniak, Olti okrug, 73, 79 Pepinov, A. D., 172 n. 9 Pershing, General John Joseph, 51, 55 Persia, 19,76,131, 165,254; British inter­ ests in, 2, 27, 32,65,447,482,483,484, 486, 499, 506; and Armenia, 42, 194, 198, 199 255, 261, 524 Peters, Mayor Andrew James, 387 Petrograd, 480, 526 Petrosian, H., 209 n. 3 Petrosian, Levon, 17 n. 34 Petrosian, Movses, 258 Petrovsk, Daghestan oblast, 35, 110, 192, 308, 465, 493 Phillips, William C., Assistant Secretary of State, 375 n. 25, 380 Pichon, Foreign Minister Stephen, 48 n. 26, 433 Picot. See Georges-Picot Piépape, Colonel de, 414 n. 28, 415, 417 Pignot, Emile, 435 n. 97 Piraeus, 402 Piralian, Artem, 383 Pirdoudan, Zangezur uezd, 208, 218 Pirumian, Major General Daniel Bek, 85, 5 *4

Plimpton, George Arthur, 398 n. 92 Plowden, Lieutenant Colonel John Chi­ chele: as British representative at Ere­ van, 66, 67-68, 69, 74-75, 80, 85-88, 129 Poidebard, Antoine: as French represen­ tative at Erevan, 75, 81 n. 57, 92, 156, 174,219 n. 37,315,348 n. 95,492,522523

Poincaré, President Raymond, 433 Poindexter, Senator Miles, 368 n. 6

IN D E X

Poland, 56, 388, 397, 477, 480, 503, 517 Poland, William B.: and Harbord mission, 3 5 5 . 36 2 Polk, Undersecretary of State Frank Lyon: as head of American peace dele­ gation, 48 n. 26, 114-115, 122, 124, 125, 126 n. 60, 128, 355, 369 n. 7, 372, 376, 392 n. 73, 430, 41, 432, 479; and recognition of Armenian republic, 517, 518 Pontus: future of, 332, 528-529 Populists. See Armenian Populist party Poti, port of, 175, 339, 402, 496, 526 Potskhov, Ardahan okrug, 155, 157 Prosser, Captain H. R., 79, 86 Quai d’Orsay. See France Radcliffe, Major General Sir Percy Pollexfen de Blaquiere: as chief of military operadons, 460-461 Rafibekov, Khudadad, 172 n. 9 Rafiev, Mustafa Vekilov, 231 n. 76 Rakka, Aleppo vilayet, 339, 416 Ramishvili, Noi Vissarionovich, 141, 142, 143, 148, 152, 153, 160-163, l64> 224 Ramis (Urmis), Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 235» 236 Ramkavar party. See Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar party Rashid Pasha, 345 Rasulzade, Mehmed Emin, 135, 177, 211, 231, 502 Rauf Bey, Husein, 181, 342, 425 Ravndal, Gabriel Bie, 320-321, 324, 328, 372

Rawlinson, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred, 78, 80-83, 86, 100, 134 n. 85 Red Army. See Russia, Soviet Reed, Senator James A., 368 n. 6 Refet Bey, Colonel, 423-424 Reformed Hnchak party. See Armenian Reformed Hnchak party Rehanlu, Erevan uezd, 73, 77 Renaudel, Pierre, 118, 435 n. 97 Reshid Pasha, 421 Resht, 527 Revel, Gabrielle, 94 Rhea, Colonel James C., 219 n. 37; and proposed Sharur-Nakhichevan neutral zone, 203, 204-206, 212, 227; and Zangezur crisis, 220, 221-225 Rhinelander, Philip Mercer, 395, 398 n. 92

597

Rickard, Edgar, 398 n. 92 Riggs, Ernest Wilson, 397 n. 90 Riggs, Henry Harrison, 341 Riggs, Lieutenant Colonel F. Francis, 335 n. 56 Rind, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 73, 208, 225 Ripault, Louis, 435 n. 97 Rize, Trebizond vilayet, 449 n. 135 Robert College, 317, 318, 323 Robinson, Emily, 94 Robinson, Lieutenant Colonel Donald A., 204 n. 88, 301 Rodd, Ambassador James Rennel, 33, 36 Rolland, Major Louis: in Cilicia, 417, 419 Romanelli, Pietro, 94 Rome, 33, 38, 497, 498, 523, 527 Romieu, Lieutenant Colonel Louis, 414 n. 28, 417 Root, Elihu: and aid to Armenia, 53, 94, 320 n. 11,336,384 n. 52,375,377,394, 3 9 5 . 398 n. 92, 432 Rostom (Zorian), 18, 257 Rostov-on-Don, 16, 86, 244, 470, 526 Rowlandson, Colonel: in North Caucasus, 465-466 Rtskhiladze, Grigorii, 489 n. 23 Rumania, 57 n. 50, 203 n. 85, 524 Rumelia, 357 Runyon, William Nelson, 397 n. 90 Ruschuk (Ruse), 114 Russia, 9,32,113,138,224,234, 250,358, 359. .477. 482-483, 516-517; civil war and intervention in, 21-22, 23, 29, 31, 34 - 3 5 . 4 4 . 9 5 . 9 6> 11Q. l l 8 , 119. 4 5 °. 458-460, 463-464,477, 478-481, 507508, 524; Armenians in, 42, 261, 469, 470-471,526. See also Volunteer Army; White Armies Russia, Soviet, 34,452; and Allied Powers, 21-22, 34-35, 44, 452, 478-481, 514; Red Army of, 106, 459, 464, 475, 478, 503, 529; and Transcaucasia, 169, 170, 171, 248-249, 479, 488, 502-503, 508, 519, 524 n. 140; and Turkish National­ ist movement, 178-179, 213, 488, 503, 519, 521; Council of People’s Commis­ sars (Sovnarkom) of, 247,502-503; and Armenia, 248-249, 253 n. 31 Russian Communist Party, 152, 248-252; and external concern about BolshevikTurkish collaboration, 26, 27, 33, 109, 111, 170, 176, 177, 461, 462, 468, 487, 4 9 5 >504; Caucasus Regional Commit-

59«

IN D E X

tee (Kraikom) of, 240 n. 97, 249, 250, 311; activities in Armenia, 248-252 Russian Constitutional Democrat party (Kadet), 149 n. 29, 242 Russian Political Conference (Paris), 103, 122, 472-473 Russians in the Caucasus, 111, 131, 140, 147 n. 25, 184, 210-211, 469, 476,514 Russian Social Democrat Labor Party (Bolshevik). See Russian Communist Party Russian Social Democrat Labor Party (Menshevik), 149 n. 29, 150, 153, 248 Russian Social Revolutionary party, 148, 153, 246-248. See also Armenian Social Revolutionaries; Georgian Social Revo­ lutionary party Rustambekov, Shafi Bek, 231 n. 76 Rustem Bey, Alfred, 342, 425 Sabah-Gulian, Stepan, 254 n. 33 Sabakhtarashvili, Konstantin Bezhanovich, 158, 160, 497-498 Sackville-West, Major General 'Charles John, 128, 505 Sadarak, Erevan u ezd , 66, 73 Safrastian, Aram, 17 Saghatelian, Hovhannes (Ivan Iakov­ levich), 470 Sahak II (Khabayan), Catholicos of Cilicia, 340, 417, 418, 419 Sahakian, Avetik: in cabinet and parlia­ ment, 16, 17 n. 34, 18, 19,93, 244, 284, 299. 3° 3> 306. 3 »4> 5 lst~ 5 l 3 >5!5 Sahakian, Sako, 247 Sahakian, Varvare, 17 n. 34 Sahmanadir Ramkavar party. S ee Ar­ menian Sahmanadir Ramkavar party S a k a rtvelo (Tiflis), 159 n. 60, 165 n. 73 Sakhalkho-Saktne (Tiflis), 166 n. 73 Sako (Hambardzum Sargsian), 209 Salonica, 96, 134 n. 87 Samed Bey (Jamalinskii): as Azerbaijani governor in Nakhichevan, 105-106, 107, 183, 195, 205, 221, 229-230, 349 Samshvildo, Tiflis u ezd, 151, 157 Samson, Trebizond vila y e t, 339, 344,408, 427 Samtreti, Tiflis u ezd, 151, 157 Samur River, 3, 135 Sanahin, Borchalu u ezd , 11, 157, 161, 290 San Remo conference, 447, 530 Sapanja, Ismid vila yet, 338, 339 Saraflan, Levon, 17 n. 34

Sargsian, Eprem, 17 n. 34, 286-287 Sargsian, G., 470 n. 42 Sargsian, Haik, 17 n. 34, 257, 305 Sarikamish, Kars okru g, 11,77, 79,81,85, 102, 104, 108, 180, 290, 300, 309, 345 Sarikian, Hakob, 470 n. 42 Sarukhanian, Hovhannes, 251 Sassun, 513, 515; partisan unit, 64, 84, 196 Sassuni, Armen, 42 Sassuni, Garo, 17 n. 34,283, 296,305,515 Savoia Aosta, Prince Aimone di, 29 n. 24 Schieffelin, William Jay, 398 n. 92 Schlumberger, Gustave, 435 n. 97 Schneur, Colonel Alexandre K., 103 n. 112 Schurmann, Jacob Gould, 395 Schwind, Lieutenant F. L., 65, 69-70, 71 Scialoja, Vittorio, 48 n. 26 Scott, George T., 398 n. 92 Sfcbouh (Arshak Nersesian), 17 n. 34, 72, 103 Selim Mountains, 287 Serijanian, Private Dicran, 335 n. 57, 345, 352 n. 107 Serobian, Archbishop Mushegh, 340 Ses, Nakhichevan u ezd , 73, 208, 225 Sevan, Lake, 73, 178, 284, 286, 309, 349,

364. 387

Sevasly, Mihran: and Armenian National Union of America, 375 n. 25, 377-378, 379-380, 393 n. 75 Sevastopol, 470 n. 42, 526 Sevian, Egor, 251 Sevumian, Ovi (Hovhannes), 312 Seyeghian, Archbishop Augustine, 327, 338 n. 68 Sforza, Count Carlo: as Italian high com­ missioner in Constantinople, 23 n. 8, 29; as assistant foreign minister, 424,

498.523

Shabadin, Zangezur u e zd , 208, 218 Shaghrutian, Colonel, 84 Shahardjik, Zangezur u ezd, 208, 226 Shahinian, Garnik, 17 n. 34, 513 Shahkhatuni, Arshavir: as commandant of Erevan, 196, 230, 346-347» 5 12 Shahmazian, Lieutenant Colonel Arsen, 266; in Zangezur, 209, 210, 216, 217, 218, 220 n. 42, 226, 228 Shahsvarian: as Meghri commander, 209 n. 3 Shahtaght, Nakhichevan u ezd , 70, 73, 76; partisan unit, 196

IN D E X

Shahtaghtinskii, Hamid, 172 n. 9 Shahtaghtinskii khans, 63 Shahverdian, Danush, 251 Shamil Bek (Airumlinskii): at Kulp, 63, 84, 346 Shant (Seghbosian), Levon, 17, 284, 515, 520 Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 3, 9, 195-206 passim

Sharur-Nakhichevan region, 4,63-72, 75, 77» 83, 105-108, 135, 178-179» 181, 193, 194, 198-205, 210, 212, 216, 217, 222, 223, 227, 228, 229, 300, 302, 349, 35°» 385 n. 53. See also Nakhichevan Shaw, Albert, 398 n. 92 Sheikh Murad, Adana vilayet, 339, 421 Shekerjian, Major Haig, 337, 338 n. 68, 344» 352 n. 107 Shelkovnikian, Major General, 69-70 Shelley, Lieutenant Colonel James E., 205 Shemakha, town and uezd, 3, 184, 186187, 188 Shengelaia, Lev, 247 n. 15 Sherman, Senator Lawrence Y., 368 n. 6 Shikhlinskii, Lieutenant General Ali Agha Ismail oghli, 206, 211, 216, 487-488 Shirazlu, Erevan uezd, 73, 77 Shirinian Arshak, 17 n. 34, 209, 210, 305 Shroma (Tiflis), 166 n. 73, 247 n. 15 Shulaver, Borchalu uezd, 151, 154, 157 Shurnukh, Zangezur uezd, 208, 239 Shushi, town and uezd, 129, 191, 198, 199, 208, 211, 225 Shuttleworth, Colonel (Acting General) Digby Inglis, 76, 110, 129, 130, 135,176 Siberia, 469, 479 Silikian, Major General Movses P., 81 n. . 5 7 » 5 13 Simferopol, 470 n. 42, 526 Simko, 64 Simpson, James Young, 27, 144 n. 12 Sinapian, Grigor, 527 n. 151 Sis, Adana vilayet, 339, 416, 421, 423 Sisian, Zangezur uezd, 73, 207, 208, 211, 217,218 Sivas congress, 342, 343, 425 Sivas (Sebastia), city and vilayet, 40, 339, 408; Armenian claims to, 82, 332, 364, 448,449 n. 135; Mustafa Kemal at, 212, 342-344, 424, 425-426; Harbord at, 342-344; Georges-Picot at, 424, 425426 Sloane, William, 398 n. 92 Slovo (Tiflis), 153

599

Smbat (Baroyan), 258-259 Smbatian, Archbishop Mesrop, 346 Smith, Alfred Emanuel, 53 Smith, Edward Lincoln, 398 n. 92 Smith, Walter George: and assistance for Armenians, 45, 46,47, 50, 55, 117-122, 324, 329 n. 36, 336, 382, 396 Smyrna: Greek occupation of, 2, 28, 47, 59, 124, 342, 343, 356, 524 Sochi, 141, 526 Société des Etudes Arméniennes, 435 Sofia, 52, 114 Sonnino, Baron G. Sidney: as foreign minister, 23-24, 30, 34, 35-36, 37 Sotsial-Demokrat (Tiflis), 153 Sotsialist Heghapokhakan (Tiflis), 248 South America, 524 South Russia, 5, 43, 109, 112, 113, 462, 4 7 L 493 South Russia, Armed Forces of, 5,39,103, 109, 460, 466, 467, 470-472, 493, 524. See also Denikin; Volunteer Army Southwest Caucasus Government, 104 Soviet Russia. See Russia, Soviet Sovnarkom. See Russia, Soviet Speer, Robert Eliot, 398 n. 92 Speers, James M., 398 n. 92 Stamboltsian, Elisabeth, 230 Stavrodakis, Dr., 528 Stavropol, 470 n. 42 Steed, Henry Wickham, 117 Stevens, Vice-Consul Patrick William Jo­ seph: at Batum, 32, 131-132, 496 Stokes, Lieutenant Colonel Claude Bayfield: and Transcaucasian republics, 32, 176, 213, 487-49!» 4 9 9 » 5°2, 5 ° 3“ 5 °5 Straits: future of, 320, 324, 329, 331, 332, 348, 405, 438, 439, 440, 451, 452 Straus, Oscar Solomon, 398 n. 92 Sukhum, city and okrug, 159, 192-193, 526 Sulemanie, Mosul vilayet, 339, 442 Sultanbek, Nakhichevan uezd, 71,73, 105, 208, 225 Sultanov, Khosrov Bek: as Azerbaijani governor in Karabagh, 92, 169-170, 173, 198, 206, 211, 212, 213, 215, 218, 220-221, 227, 229 Sultanov, Sultan Bek, 211 Supreme Economic Council (SEC), 43-44, 97, 400-401 Surmalu uezd, 9, 12, 64, 66, 72, 73, 75, 83, 105, 106, 168, 178, 179, 180, 183, 194, 235, 300 n. 63, 301

6o

o

Surmenian, G., 84 Suruj, Urfa sanjak, 413, 415 Sushehir, Sivas vilayet, 339, 344 Svadjian, Leon, 465 n. 24 Svanetia, 496 Switzerland, 436 Sykes-Picot agreement, 127, 323, 411, 424 Syria, 2, 4, 27, 126, 127, 128, 139, 322, 324, 325, 330, 333, 340, 380, 411, 412, 415, 425, 427, 438, 439, 448, 491, 524

IN D E X

406, 255, 406, 442,

Tabriz, 18, 65, 71, 191, 528 Tadeosian, Levon, 17 n. 34, 264 Taft, William Howard, 94, 367, 371, 398 n. 92 Taganrog, 470 n. 42, 474 Taghianosian, Stepan, 185 n. 39 Tahtadjian, Ferdinand, 328, 338 n. 68 Tairov, Abbas Guli Bey, 234, 236, 237 Talaat Pasha, 424 Talas, Caesarea vilayet, 339, 407 Tamashev, Iurii A., 295-296 Tanakerd (Tanagirt), Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 235 Taranto, port of, 29, 31, 33 n. 39, 35, 270 Tarsus, Adana vilayet, 340, 413, 419, 421 Tatev, Zangezur uezd, 208, 209, 226, 387 Taurus Mountains, 320, 364, 412, 415, 439, 440, 441, 447, 449, 453, 455 Tazakend (Astabad), Nakhichevan uezd,

73> 107

Tegh, Zangezur uezd, 208, 217 Tehran, 65, 231, 527 Tekeyan, Vahan, 243, 244; and negotia­ tions for united government, 269, 270277, 278 Tekinskii, Khan: as Azerbaijani represen­ tative in Erevan, 64, 67, 76, 92, 171, 180, 184, 188 Telav, town and uezd, 149, 300 Telfeyan, Aram, 470 n. 42 Telfeyan, Hrand G., 319 n. 7 Telford, Colonel Charles, 513 Tell-Abad, Urfa sanjak, 415 Temir-Khan-Shura, Daghestan oblast, 460, 465 Le Temps (Paris), 147, 457 Temurian, Iusuf Bek, 17 n. 34 Ter-Antonian, Ivan, 237-238 Ter-Asaturov, Consul Mikhail, 526 Ter-Azarian, A., 185 n. 39

Ter-Davitian, Colonel Poghos, 209 n. 3 Ter-Davitian, Hovsep, 17 n. 34, 264 Terek, 470, 524 Ter-Gabrielian, Sahak, 294 Ter-Gevorgian, Mikayel, 17 n. 34 Ter-Grigorian, Mihran, 17 n. 34 Ter-Hairapetian, Sahak, 210 n. 6 Ter-Hakobian, Hakob (Irazek), 17, 234 n. 82, 286 Ter-Hakobian (Der-Hagopian), Abra­ ham, 269, 383, 385, 387, 390 Ter-Harutiunian, Gegham, 17 n. 34 Ter-Israelian: in Azerbaijani parliament, 185 n. 39 Ter-Khachatrian, Grigor, 242 Ter-Mikayelian, Anushavan, 17 n. 34 Ter-Mikayelian, Hovhannes, 17 n. 34 Ter-Minasian, Ervand, 297 Ter-Minasian, Ruben, 17 n. 34, 160, 200' 201, 265, 266 n. 58, 283, 309 Ter-Minasian, S., 292 n. 31 Ter-Poghosian, Lieutenant Mikayel, 385 Terrioki, Finland, 526 Ter-Sahakian, Simon, 217 Ter-Stepanian, Garegin, 150 n. 32, 165 Ter-Stepanian, Nshan: and negotiations for united government, 270-277, 278 Terterian, Hambardzum, 17 n. 34, 265 n. 54, 296 Ter-Torosian, Vardan, 17 n. 34 Teruni, Hakob, 210 Terzipashian, Avetis, 243 n. 5, 244, 245 Tevi, Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 234 Thomas, Albert, 94, 118,435 n. 97,493 n. 36 Thomson, Acting Major General William Montgomerie, 30, 31-32, 33, 169, 176, 185 Thrace, 337, 405, 438 Thwaites, Major General William: as di­ rector of military intelligence, 24, 25 n. 13» 3 5 >3 7 » 5 9 »4 6 l>486 Tiflis (Tbilisi), city, uezd, and gubemiia, 3, 9, 14, 24, 144, 157, 191, 192, 193, 290, 398; Armenians in, 7,86,140,148-153; British officers at, 30,66,74-75,86,94, 130, 132, 136, 155; foreign missions at, 114, 137-139, 174 - 175 . 176 - 177 » 195196, 197, 200-201, 220, 221-222, 224225, 349, 491-494. 496» 519-52°; as Georgian capital, 134-167 passim, 501502; conferences in, 156-165, 221-224, 233» 239-240

IN D E X

Tigranian, Sirakan, 17 n. 34, 230, 284, 312, 314

Tigris River, 309, 339 Tilley, Sir John Anthony Cecil: as assistant foreign secretary, 100-101, 448, 463, 468, 500 Times (London), 94, 117, 147, 479 Tireboli, Trebizond vilayet, 339, 364 Tiriakian, Ashot, 394 n. 83 Tittoni, Foreign Minister Tommaso, 3638, 48 n. 26 Tokat, Sivas vilayet, 339, 344, 407 Tonian, Ashot, 470 n. 42 Topchian, Bagrat, 149, 256 Topchibashev, Ali Mardan: as president of Azerbaijani delegation in Paris, 174, 180, 507, 509 Toporavan (Parvana), Lake, 154, 157 Torcom, General, 381 Torgomian, Dr. Vahan, 338 n. 68 Toromanian, Toros, 312 Torosian, Lieutenant Colonel Smbat, 209 Torosian, Sahak, 17 n. 34, 42, 154, 287 Torretta, Marquis della, 507 Toshian, Toros, 310 n. 85 Totomiants, Vahan, 12, 312 Transcaspia, 131, 499, 525 Transcaucasian Federative Republic (1918), 14, 19, 147, 161, 163, 296 Transylvania, 525 Trebizond, city and vilayet, 60, 83, 94, 126, 162 n. 64, 254, 262, 332, 339, 350 Trotsky, Lev Davidovich, 475 Tsaritsyn, 31, 460 Tsereteli, Iraklii Georgievich, 110, 155, 507 »509

Tsghna (Chananab), Nakhichevan uezd, 208, 234, 235 Tulin, Captain Abraham, 380-381 Tumanian, Hovhannes, 314 Tumanian, Levon, 17 n. 34, 283 Tumanian (Tumanov), Vice-Consul Mi­ khail G., 195, 204-205 Tumbul, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Tumulty, Joseph Patrick, 384 Turian, Stepan, 308 Turkic socialist bloc: in Azerbaijani parlia­ ment, 172, 186 Turkish empire. See Ottoman Empire Turkish Nationalist movement, 63, 352, 427,448, 449 n. 135, 450, 495; and suspected collusion with Bolsheviks, 26, 27, 33, 109, 111, 170, 171, 176, 177, 461, 462, 468, 487, 495, 504; and Trans­

6 0 1

caucasia, 131, 133, 170, 177, 261, 347, 467, 488, 489, 490, 504-505; and American representatives, 343-344, 3 5 °» 35 L 3 5 3 î and France, 420-426, 438,451. See also Kemal Pasha, Mustafa Turkish Wilsonian League, 317, 337 Turkomans, 325, 420 Tyler, Major Royall, 89 Tyrer, Major Reginald, 129 Ufa, 459 Ukraine, 450,465,470, 4 7 1»4 7 5 »4 7 6»47 9 Ulakishla, Konia vilayet, 338 n. 69, 339 Ulia-Norashen, Sharur-Nakhichevan uezd, 7 0 , 73 Ulukhanlu, Erevan uezd, 11, 73, 179, 183 Union of Consumer Cooperatives of Ar­ menia, 12 Union of Unions of Armenia, 304 United States of America: and future of Armenia and Near East, 4, 42-58, 8892, 96, 114-118, 120, 121-122, 123124, 143, 144-145, 197 » 3 l6- 4 ° 3 im, 404-405, 517-519; Congress, 29, 114-115, 123, 293, 294, 316, 333, 334, 3 5 4 »365» 3 66- 3 6 7 »37 °» 3 7 L 3 7 2 , 373, 3 7 4 »39 °» 3 9 4 »3 9 5 »3 9 9 »401» 4 3 °» 43 *» 432; Department of State, 116, 122, 3 l8»3 5 1»372, 3 7 6 »3 8?» 3 88»5 *7 »5 l8 ; Armenian representatives in, 255, 3833 9 1» 3 9 4 * » Grain Corporation (USGC), 399-400, 401, 402; and recognition of Transcaucasian republics, 501, 517, 518, 519 n. 122 Urfa, town and sanjak, 413,414,415,421, 422 Ussher, Clarence Douglas: and plan of Armenian repatriation, 44-48, 59, 89, 324; in Nakhichevan and Akulis, 7 5 » 106-108, 203-204, 235-236 Usubbekov (Yusufbayli), Nasib Bek: as Azerbaijani prime minister, 64, 68, 76, 110, 129, 138, 169, 172, 176, 177, 188, 190, 198, 199, 201, 202, 206, 213, 220, 221-225, 227, 231 n. 76, 249, 487-488, 502, 504, 519, 520 Uzun Hadji, Sheikh, 467 Uzunlar (Odzun), Borchalu uezd, 159 Uzuntala, Kazakh uezd, 11 Vagharshapat, 10. See also Etchmiadzin Valadian, Valad, 159 Valeri, Major Lorenzo, 29 n. 24

6o

2

IN D E X

Vallotton, Benjamin, 94 Van, city and vilayet: proposed repatria­ tion to, 42, 44-45» 5 9 »60, 44!» 454Î ref­ ugees from, 43, 243, 254, 256, 303; partisan unit, 64, 76, 84; future of, 162 n. 64, 326, 332, 364, 387,434,439,440, 449 n. 135, 454, 457, 517; Kurdish claims to, 442, 443; prelate of, 521 Vanand, 234 Vansittart, Robert Gilbert: and future of Armenia, 47, 57-58, 59 n. 55, 60, 90, 97, 98, 102, 124 n. 54, 440, 455 Varandian (Hovhannisian), Mikayel, 17 n. 34, 18, 118-119, 266 n- 5®» 523» 527 Vardapetian, Lieutenant Colonel G., 159 Vardashen, Nukhi uezd, 187 Varkhuna, Tiflis uezd, 151 Varshamian, Gevorg, 17 n. 34, 64 Vaspurakan, 513. See also Van Vedibasar, Erevan uezd, 64, 66, 68, 77, 179, 204, 222 Vekilov, V. R., 232 Venizelos, Eleutherios Kyriakou, 38, 273, 5 29

Veradsin (Kasapian), Minas, 259 n. 43 Verakazmial Hnchakian party. See Ar­ menian Reformed Hnchak party Verishan, Kars okrug, 103 Vermishian, Kristapor I., 242 Versailles, Treaty of, 2, 37, 48, 197, 366372, 3 7 3 »3 9 5 »3 9 6 n- 89» 4 °*» 4 3 1»458 Vestnik Armenii (Irkutsk), 469 Vezirov, Mir Yusuf Bek: as Azerbaijani envoy in Constantinople, 489-490 Vickrey, Charles Vernon, 55, 336, 398 n. 9 2 , 399 Victor Emmanuel III, King, 23, 34 Vienna, 526 Villaret, Captain Gustave: and Harbord mission, 349 Vita, Giuseppe, 29 n. 24 Vladikavkaz, 9, 526 Vladivostok, 469 Volch’i Vorota, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 70 Volga River, 460 Volunteer Army, 113, 134 n. 87; and Ar­ menia, 5, 103-104, 115, 140-141, 468475, 487, 493, 516-417, 523-524; and Caucasus, 5, 30, 31, 42, 110, 111, 112, 113,135,296, 460-468, 473-474» 47e4 7 7 » 5°°> 5°4- See abo Denikin; South Russia, Armed Forces of; White Armies

Vorontsov-Dashkov, Count Illarion Ivan­ ovich, 240 n. 97 Vratzian, Simon, 13 n. 25,16,17 n. 34,43, 165, 166, 257,259,261 n. 46, 265, 266 n. 58, 272-277, 283, 295, 310,312,315,

Waite, Vice-Consul John Alexis, 112 Wallace, Ambassador Hugh Campbell, 431, 432, 493, 501 n. 69, 517, 518 Wall Street Journal (New York), 403 Wardrop, John Oliver: as British chief commissioner in Transcaucasia, 111— 114, 115, 133, 137-138, 142, 155, 160, 162 n. 64, 172 n. 9, 176-177, 202, 203, 213, 216, 219 n. 37, 220, 224, 227, 228, 239, 284-285, 315, 400, 462, 466,467, 473-474» 476-477» 482, 483, 484-486, 487-491, 493,494,496, 497 n. 52,499, '501, 502, 503-505, 511, 519-523 Warsaw, 526 Webb, Rear Admiral Richard: as British assistant high commissioner in Constan­ tinople, 41, 45-46, 122, 124; and Ar­ menian survivors, 409, 410, 427, 445, 487, 489, 490 Wegner, Armin T., 94 Westermann, William Linn, 28 n. 20, 46, 50-51, 318, 321 n. 15 Wheeler, Harry A., 398 n. 92 White, George Edward, 329 White, Henry, 46,48 n. 26,53,54,55,320 n. 11, 355 n. 114, 432 White, Stanley, 397 n. 90, 398 n. 92 White Armies, 4, 5, 21-22, 26, 30, 31, 35, 44,95,96, 111, 130, 140, 148, 160, 172, 175, 210, 229, 458, 459, 468-469, 471. See also Russia; Volunteer Army Wilbur, Ray Lyman, 398 n. 92 Williams, Aneurin: and British-Armenia Committee, 94, 117-118, 120, 435 Williams, Senator John Sharp, 53, 336, 370 n. 9, 373, 374, 393, 396; resolution on Armenia, 374, 382, 384, 385, 387, 389-390, 391 Williams, Talcott, 398 n. 92 Wilson, Colonel Arnold Talbot, 442 Wilson, Edith Bolling Galt, 371 Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Hughes: as Chief of Imperial General Staff, 21, 24» 3 °» 3 5 » 5 9 » 9 8» 115» 124 » l 3*> *3 3 » 452, 461, 506-511

603

IN D E X

Wilson, President T. Woodrow, 46, 55, 260, 410, 518; and protection of Ar­ menia, 4, 28-29, 48, 49, 51, 56, 120121, 122-124, 316, 333, 373-374» 375 n. 25,377 n. 32,386,387,390,395,401, 405; and Near East missions, 322, 323, 334» 348, 384» 365» 372, 4 ° 5 >and V er­

sailles treaty, 366-371, 431 Wise, Rabbi Stephen Samuel, 94, 318, 398 n. 92 Wood, Major General Leonard, 397 n. 90 Woytinsky, Wladimir S., 497 n. 52 Wrangel, Baron Petr Nikolaevich, 460,

524

Zakatal, town and okrug, 184, 186-187; infantry unit, 215 Zangezur uezd, 3, 12, 71, 105, 202, 303, 305, 488; Armeno-Azerbaijani struggle for, 4, 5, 64, 76, 91, 92, 106, 135, 168, 191-195, 198, 199-200, 201, 206, 207234, 261, 364, 439, 441, 471, 472, 473474, 489, 492, 519, 520, 521 Zangibasar district, 9, 106, 179, 181, 182, 183,222,521 Zangu (Hrazdan) River, 309, 346, 513 Zavalashin, 309 Zavarian, Mikayel, 257 Zaven (Eghiayan), Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, 114, 327, 337 n. 68, 352, 445

Yaghjian, Haik, 17 n. 34, 160 Yale, William, 323 Yamkhana, Nakhichevan uezd, 71, 73 Yapon (Hovhannes Paronian), 217 Yarimdja, Nakhichevan uezd, 71 Yarrow, Ernest A., 50, 90, 338 n. 68 Yasun Burun peninsula, 339, 364 Yenije, Adana vilayet, 413, 421 Yezidis, 84, 302 Yokohama, 527 Yolian, Zakar, 17 n. 34 Yozgat, Angora vilayet, 339, 407, 409

Zabukh, Zangezur itezd, 212, 217 Zakarian, Mikayel, 210 Zakarian, Nikoghos, 470 n. 42

Zavriev, Davit, 313 Zeitun, Adana vilayet, 339, 413, 416, 513 Zevin (Zivin), Erzerum vilayet, 73, 82 Zhoghovrdi dzain (Tiflis), 242 Zhordania, Noi Nikolaevich: as Georgian prime minister, 110, 138, 141, 142, 144 n. 12, 155, 166, 501 Zindjirlu, Erevan uezd, 70, 73 Zinkevich, Colonel Mikhail M., 470, 474, 516-517, 524 Zionism, 330, 333, 451 Znamia revoliutsii (Tiflis), 153 Zohrabian (Zurabov), Arshak Gerasimo­ vich, 153, 248, 252 Zorian, Stepan, 252 Zorian, Zori, 150 n. 32 Zubian, Davit, 17, 283 Zvartnots, 312