A History of Czechoslovakia Between the Wars: From Versailles to Hitler’s Invasion 9780755618590, 9781350154650

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To Helen, Miroslav and Libusˇe

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Relative size of landholdings in Hungary 1910. Source: Anton Sˇpiesz, Ilustrovane´ dejiny Slovenska na ceste k sebauvedomeniu [Illustrated history of Slovakia; the road to independence] (Bratislava, 2002), p. 173. 30 Table 2.1 Average tariff levels in percentages of the value of the goods. Source: Frederick Herz, The Economic Problems of the Danubian States; A Study in Economic Nationalism (1947), p. 71.

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Table 2.2 Czechoslovak total volume of output (1913 ¼ 100). Source: Angus Maddison, ‘Economic performance in Europe 1913–1970’ in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe; the Twentieth Century – 2 (1976), p. 502.

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Table 2.3 Proportion of business capital (%). Source: Zdene˘k Karnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky (1918– 1938); dı´l prnvı´; vznik, budova´nı´ a zlata´ le´ta republiky (1918 –1929) [The Czech lands in the period of the First Republic (1918 –1938); part 1; founding, growth and golden years of the republic (1918 –1929)] (Prague, 2000), p. 219.

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Table 2.4 Rate of growth of total Czechoslovak output 1913–38. Source: ibid., p. 451.

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Table 2.5 Indices of industrial production and unemployment (numbers and percentages) for Czechoslovakia and Germany, 1933–6. Source: Zdene˘k Benesˇ et al., Facing History; The Evolution

LIST OF TABLES

of Czech-German Relations in the Czech Provinces, 1848– 1948 (Prague, 2002), p. 91.

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Table 2.6 Average wages of workers 1929– 34. Source: R. Olsˇovsky´ a kol., ‘Prˇehled hospoda´rˇske´ho vy´vpje. . . c.d.,’ p. 428 in Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky (1918– 1938); Dı´l druhy´; Cˇeskoslovensko a cˇeske˘ zeme˘ v krizi a v ohrozˇenı´ (1930 –1935) [The Czech land in the period of the First Republic (1918– 1938), part 2, Czechoslovakia and the Czech land in the crisis and under threat, (1930 –1935)] (Prague, 2002), p.49. 79 Table 2.7 Czechoslovak imports and exports, 1928, 1935. Source: Herz, Economic Problems, p. 80.

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Table 2.8 Czechoslovak exports to Europe as a percentage of total exports/Czechoslovak exports as a percentage of total European exports. Source: Maddison, ‘Economic policy’, p. 596.

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Table 4.1 Election results: number of votes and percentage share. Source: Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘, vol. 2, p. 503. 128 Table 4.2 Registered unemployment in Czechoslovakia, 1929–37. Source: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds), Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919– 39 (London, 2000), p. 99; Frederick Herz, The Economic Problem of the Danubian States; A Study in Economic Nationalism (London, 1947), p. 177.

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Table 4.3 Average weekly wages in crowns; cost of living index (1914 ¼ 100). Source: Frederick Herz, The Economic Problems of the Danubian States; A Study in Economic Nationalism (London, 1947), p. 179.

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Table 5.1 Construction of forts to the end of November 1937. Source: Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇaske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republliky (1918– 1938); dı´l trˇetı´; O prˇezˇitı´ a o zˇivot (1936– 1938) (Prague, 2003), p 464.

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Table 6.1 Number of refugees in Moravska´ Ostrava. Source: Alesˇ Homan, ‘Moravska´ Ostrava jako u´tocˇisˇte˘ uprchlı´ku˚ z ne˘mecke´ho a polske´ho za´boru na podzim roku 1938’ [‘Moravian Ostrava as a

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refuge for the people fleeing from German and Polish occupation in the autumn of 1938’] in Ostrava prˇispe˘rky k de˘jina´m a soucˇasnosti ostravy a ostravska, 21, (Ostrava, 2003), p. 229. 248 Table 6.2 National structure of refugees. Source: ibid.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It would have been impossible to write a book of historical research without the help of a great many people. Most of these work in the archives listed in the bibliography and I would like to express my thanks to the German, Czech and British staff who went out of their way to help with this research. It would be invidious to name any because all played their part. However, in the case of the research in Czech archives, the sudden appearance of a British historian was, to say the least, unusual. There is little historical research being done in the Czech Republic because of the former Marxist strait jacket on historical writing, so it was hard for staff in Czech archives to understand what a foreigner should want. But in virtually every case, staff went out of their way to be helpful and this book is therefore, in that sense, a joint Czech– English effort. In the case of the German military archives in Freiburg, the staff were familiar with the needs of German and other historians and provided an efficient and helpful service. This is only part of the historian’s debt of gratitude. Equally important is the encouragement and support by colleagues and friends. Of particular importance is the knowledge given by Czech friends, especially Miroslav and Libusˇe Chleboun, who patiently explained many aspects of Czechoslovak culture and history that would otherwise have been misunderstood or ignored. Equally important in many ways is the help given by colleagues and students at the Sleszka Univerzita in Karvina, to whom I am also extremely grateful. In Britain Professor Phil Cottrell shared his extensive knowledge of Czechoslovak economic history, gained while working with Professor Alice Teichova. Sadly, at

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the time of writing, news was received that Phil had died and will be sorely missed. I should also like to express thanks to Tomasz Hoskins at I.B.Tauris for advice and courteous cooperation in bringing this book to publication. Most of all, I have to thank my wife Helen for her love and understanding over many years while the research and writing were being done.

INTRODUCTION

This is the first history of Czechoslovakia to give equal weight to the Sudeten Germans and Czechs. Until the Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia, they were the second largest ethnic group in the First Czechoslovak Republic. But apart from the details of the crisis in the Sudetenland that began in 1936 and led to World War II, the Sudeten German aspect of this period has been largely ignored. When the study of Czechoslovak history began in 1945 after the war, it was Czech historians who wrote it. After the Communist seizure of power in 1948 most went into exile. Books and articles were also written by Sudeten Germans but these were mostly concerned with the harsh treatment that had preceded their expulsion in 1946. Earlier books by Sudeten Germans, written in the 1930s, had described the unfair treatment they received during the economic crisis. These have been ignored by Czech historians. In their struggle with the Sudeten Germans, the Czechs were the victors and they have written the history of Czechoslovakia. This is not necessarily biased and unbalanced. They have brought a unique insight into the history of the Czech people, which began with the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. It continued with the Prˇemyslid Empire in the fourteenth century and ended with the defeat of the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. Czech kings and aristocrats were replaced by Germans and these dominated the traditional Czech lands until the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918. Slovak history, on the other hand, has been largely ignored. The disadvantage for Czechs is that their history is the story of a relatively small Slav group in Central Europe

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whose country is far removed from important world events, apart from the crisis that led to World War II. But Czechoslovakia deserves closer attention. In the period between the world wars it had a very successful economy and one of the highest living standards in the world. From the Czech point of view, and that of Western historians in general, the German influence is largely negative, repressing legitimate Czech aspirations between 1620 and 1918. From the Czech point of view, it was only when the Czechs could dominate the new state of Czechoslovakia after 1918 that they could claim their legitimate recognition and have an authentic Czech history again. That they exerted great influence in the new state after 1918, exploited their political control and tried to minimise the significance of the German element is, under the circumstances, hardly surprising. This denial of Sudeten German importance is understandable, but creates bad history. The Sudeten German view, often expressed in strident form by Sudeten Germans, tends to be regarded as completely biased. Until now it has not formed a legitimate part of the history of Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1939. One recent historian, Mary Heimann, has even gone so far as to ignore the Sudeten Germans completely. Her book, Czechoslovakia; the state that failed, published in 2009, contains no references to German sources, primary or secondary. She even ignores the extensive German diplomatic papers that were translated into English and published after World War II. Instead, she lays great stress on the Czech domination of the state during the First Republic and emphasises the negative side of Czech control of Czechoslovakia. As a result her book attempts to revise Czechoslovak history by claiming that the Czechs were arrogant and were responsible for their own downfall. The reality is more complex. The history of Central Europe is like a skein of wool that is difficult to untangle. Population maps prior to World War I reveal a very large number of different ethnic groups, each with their own cultural identity, and often living in close proximity of each other. Some had barely moved in hundreds of years. Others, mostly German, had been encouraged to travel to parts of Eastern Europe and settle to fill gaps left by earlier massacres or to exploit mineral resources. Still more, notably Poles, moved in search of work following industrialisation in Bohemia and Northern Moravia or to escape foreign attack, such as the Turkish invasion of Hungary. The groups were also of different sizes and of

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unequal importance and, because they often spoke more than one language (Hungarian and their own in Hungary, German and their own in Austria), there are questions about their true nationality. Czechoslovakia fits this confused pattern. The First Czechoslovak Republic contained three major racial groups (Czechs, Germans and Slovaks) and three minor (Poles, Hungarians and Ruthenes-Ukrainians). A historian studying Czechoslovak history needs to be aware of this racial mixture and of the expectations that each had during the First Czechoslovak Republic. But to do this takes historians into uncharted waters. Historians, like the statesmen whose work they study and seek to analyse, tend to see history in abstract terms. The emotions, aspirations and fears of the people about whom they write tend to be ignored. Expressing emotion about a group of people can be seen as ‘unhistorical’ and consideration of this aspect of history can lack the calm analysis that is the hallmark of good history. In studies of the creation of Czechoslovakia, however, this has been a considerable disadvantage. To appreciate the part played in Czechoslovak history by Sudeten Germans, the historian needs to understand the Sudeten German point of view as well as that of the Czechs and Slovaks and those of the other races. Eric Pasold’s autobiography provides this. His book, Ladybird, Ladybird; the Story of a Private Venture, published in Manchester in 1977, describes his life in the Sudeten German town where he grew up. His book gives a rational and unemotional picture of Czechoslovakia between the two world wars that is far removed from the writings of exiled Sudeten Germans or of Czechs. Born Erich Pa¨sold, he was the elder son of a textile manufacturer in the West Bohemian town of Fliessen. He studied English as a young man because English was an important language for commerce, though before 1918 the firm’s business was largely with Viennese companies and visiting merchants, many of whom were Jewish. He also met, and was impressed by, Toma´sˇ Bat’a, the famous Czech entrepreneur and most important boot and shoe manufacturer in Europe. After World War I the Pa¨sold family firm developed trade with England by chance rather than design. One of the firm’s regular customers had fled to England during the war. When he reappeared after 1918, his initial post war order was taken on trust: initially he could not pay in full for his order. From that point the trade

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with London grew and was handled by Erich, the elder son and heir to the business. In the early 1930s he went to England to establish a factory and develop the English market. He was successful, became the British citizen Eric Pasold, and after World War II his company became a major manufacturer of children’s clothing. Later, in the 1970s writing his autobiography, he could look back on his life in the Habsburg Empire, Czechoslovakia and England from a neutral and realistic point of view, free of cultural bias. Pasold’s view of Czechoslovak history is therefore unique because, though born a Sudeten German, he was writing as a British citizen. By the time he wrote his autobiography he had lived in England for a long time and could look back on his past life in Czechoslovakia without the strong patriotic feelings displayed by most Sudeten Germans, especially following their expulsion after World War II. What Pasold reveals is the deep emotion that Sudeten Germans, who were originally Austrian citizens, felt when Czechoslovakia was established. What made the matter worse from the Sudeten German point of view was that they had lost their identity. They were no longer Austrian citizens, subjects of the Austro– Hungarian Empire. Their right, in their eyes, to the selfdetermination promised by Wilson in his Fourteen Points, had been denied but had been given to people whom they regarded as less important. What made it worse was that the new state of Czechoslovakia had initially been created by a group of Czech nationalists. They had seized power in Prague when the Austro –Hungarian garrison had left. Masaryk’s arrival had confirmed, in Czech eyes, the existence of the new state. It was only later, at Versailles, that the state was officially recognised and its frontiers established. In the negotiations that had led to this, representatives of the defeated states (Germany, Austria and Hungary) were all ignored. Instead the Allied statesmen, and their accompanying experts, held discussions with the Czechs and Slovaks. Their leader, Masaryk, proved an excellent advocate for the creation of an easily defended and economically sustainable Czechoslovak state. It was also fully justified in Czech eyes as the successor to earlier Czech empires, to which were added Slovaks (with American support) and a small group of Ruthenes, who were related culturally to Ukrainians. Masaryk was a capable politician – he had been a member of parliament in Vienna before World War I – and he had the experience as a philosophy professor of presenting a

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complex argument simply and clearly. He had the support of France and Czech and Slovak groups in America. He also had the confidence of Sˇtefa´nik, a Slovak who was also a general in the French army and who represented the Slovak people. From the French point of view, Masaryk not only represented Czech and Slovak interests, but also spoke for the Czech e´migre´ group that had been active in Paris in World War I. Masaryk could also point to the Czech soldiers who had fought with distinction on the Allied side during World War I and who proved that the new state of Czechoslovakia would be based on Western democratic values. A further, and very important strategic argument in French eyes, was that the new state of Czechoslovakia would include the major armaments manufacturer, Sˇkoda. This kept the company, one of the most important industrial firms in Europe, out of hostile Austrian control. It also strengthened Czechoslovakia in any future dispute or war with Austria, Germany or Hungary. These points all contributed to Masaryk’s success at Versailles, and ensured that Czechoslovakia was given frontiers that it would be able to defend, and a balanced industrial economy. The inclusion of Austrians and Hungarians, as well as small groups of Poles and Ruthenes (Ukrainians) was a small price to pay. To try and pacify them, they were given the right to their own schools and social organisations and could leave Czechoslovakia if they wished. All this did, however, was create separate ethnic groups within Czechoslovakia, which continued their own cultural activities (including education) and had little contact with other groups. In consequence anyone born into a German-speaking family would attend German schools, join German cultural organisations, work in a German company and never learn Czech, the national language. Sudeten Germans were also able to work in Germany and Austria, since they continued to share a common German system of education. This preserved their sense of cultural identity and superiority and made cultural assimilation with Czechs and a sense of common Czechoslovak identity impossible. On the other hand, Czechs who wanted to enter the world of industry and commerce learnt German, which remained the major international language. The greater part of Czechoslovak trade was also with Germany, which further strengthened the position of the German language, though it never became an official Czechoslovak state language.

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The creation of Czechoslovakia had a profound influence on the Sudeten German population. This has been ignored by historians, but is one of the key features in Pasold’s account. There was great sadness when the picture of the Austrian Emperor was replaced in schools and public buildings by that of the, to them, unknown Czech Masaryk. The realisation that Austrians would no longer control their own destinies in the new state led many to take the drastic step of trying to unite the German-speaking areas with Germany or Austria, whichever was the bordering state. The latent German– Czech antagonism also came to the surface. The German caricature of the Czechs as wily peasants and the Czech belief that all Germans were arrogant was only surpassed by the German caricature of Slovaks as being even less important. These feelings played a major part in the initial stage of Czechoslovak history after 1918 but have been ignored by historians. The desperate attempt by some Sudeten Germans to take matters into their own hands and leave the new state was bound to fail. Czechs who were former soldiers in the Allied armies were sent to restore order and ensure that the boundaries established by the Versailles treaty were maintained. This had tragic results. Some of those protesting were killed and were regarded later as martyrs, others fled to Germany and Austria and joined paramilitary groups such as the Freikorps. The exiled Sudeten German groups in Vienna and elsewhere kept the memory of their homeland alive through concerts. The Czech-dominated Government knew that Czechoslovakia could not exist in the long-term without these Sudeten areas. Nor could it be defended by a small Czechoslovak army without the frontiers that the Allies created. Most of the new frontier ran through hilly, thickly wooded land that could not be penetrated by large armies. The Czechs also knew that, to be economically viable, Czechoslovakia needed the Sudeten German industries, most of which produced consumer goods. However, in the long run they proved economically weak, which had the important political consequences of unemployment and social unrest. Before 1918 Sudeten German companies in Bohemia and northern Moravia, had been very successful. In the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire, companies had their head offices in Vienna. In the east the Slovak economy was based in Budapest. These companies tended to have factories in different part of the Habsburg Empire and also draw their resources from a wide area. Their market within the Habsburg Empire

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was vast. It stretched in the north from Galicia (which became part of southern Poland) to northern Italy and the Adriatic Sea in the south, and from Germany in the west to Romania and Bulgaria in the east. In fact, their market was even wider, since Eastern Europe – Bulgaria and Romania – was largely agricultural and had to import manufactured goods. In the west, especially in the spa towns of Marianbad and Karlsbad, crowned heads of state, aristocrats and the wealthy from all over Europe provided a market for the high quality porcelain and other goods produced in West Bohemia. Habsburg industries were also successful at international trade exhibitions and enjoyed success in foreign markets, especially Germany. But after 1918 these Sudeten German industries, chiefly porcelain, glass, textiles and musical industries, faced great difficulties. Companies in Czechoslovakia were no longer based in Vienna. Under nostrification (changing ownership from Austrian or Hungarian to Czechoslovak) they had to be Czechoslovak. The head offices had to be in Prague and they had to be nominally controlled, financed and run by Czechs. People who lived in the new Czechoslovakia could become Czechoslovak citizens. From this point of view, former Austrian citizens could remain in control, but their loyalty had to be to the new state. There were also considerable practical difficulties that were more difficult to overcome. Textile firms often had weaving mills in Bohemia, spinning in Austria and finishing in Vienna. Iron and steel works in Austria depended on Czech coal. What made matters worse, from the Sudeten German point of view, was that their former markets had disappeared behind new tariff barriers. The Successor States – the enlarged Romania and Yugoslavia and the smaller Austria and Hungary – established tariff barriers to try and protect their new industries. A number were established using machinery moved from factories in Czechoslovakia to where labour was cheaper. A further problem was that Bohemia and Moravia had contained the largest part of the Habsburg industry and needed a larger market than the Czechoslovak to be economic. The result for many Sudeten Germans was that their industry declined. There were exceptions: the Pa¨sold textile firm was more fortunate because its new British market compensated for losses elsewhere. The general result was a growing sense among Sudeten Germans that they were being penalised by the Czech-dominated Government, which favoured Czech companies. This only became worse when the Depression began to hit

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Czechoslovakia. Austrian and German aristocrats with estates in Czechoslovakia were also likely to be disloyal to the new state. When in 1936 construction of the defensive system – the Czech Maginot Line – was begun, only Czech firms were given contracts. The land for the forts was Sudeten German. Another problem was that to incorporate large numbers of people into a ‘foreign’ state against their will in 1918 ran counter to one of Wilson’s promised Fourteen Points, which had formed the prelude to the armistice and the Treaty of Versailles. Germans, Austrians and the large German-speaking groups elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine were denied this right of self-determination. Masaryk recognised the problem this would cause and spoke soothingly that in time Czechoslovakia would achieve racial harmony like Switzerland. But there were crucial differences between the two countries, which he ignored. From the beginning, Switzerland had been a confederation of states, the Eidgenossenschaft: the cooperation of equals bound together by oath. From its origins in 1291, the Swiss Confederation gradually expanded as it was joined by free imperial cities. Throughout its history it had remained a confederation of equal cantons. It is this equality, and the success of the state in maintaining its economy and independence, apart from invasion by Napoleon, that overcame the inherited problems of four languages: German, French, Italian and Romanche. Czechoslovakia was, and remained, a forced alliance of three major (Czech, German and Slovak) and three minor (Polish, Hungarian and RuthenianUkrainian) language and cultural groups. Any hope of union depended on the aspirations of all being met within an economically successful state. This never happened. The first problem was that the attempt by Sudeten Germans to break away had resulted in loss of life (creation of martyrs) as the attempted succession was repressed by force. Afterwards Czechs continued to distrust the Sudeten Germans, believing them to be disloyal to the new state. As a result, Sudeten Germans were never given the status of equality with Czechs and Slovaks. In the 1920s, elected Sudeten German members of the Czechoslovak parliament initially refused to take their seats. They were only encouraged to participate in government when the threat of the Depression showed that if they were to gain any concessions for the areas they represented, they had to take part in government. One German historian, Kurt Rabel, has even claimed that Sudeten Germans

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were loyal to the concept of the state but not to the Czech interpretation of it.1 But even he ignores the position of the smaller German community in Slovakia. It has only been possible for Czechs to reconsider the motives of Sudeten German political parties in the 1990s after the fall of Communism.2 From the Czech point of view, it was crucial that all citizens of the state should be loyal to the democratic ideal. Also, in spite of its Slav origin, Czechoslovakia was oriented towards Western liberalism. None of this matched the Sudeten German view, which considered German culture and economic achievements to be superior and who looked increasingly to strong leadership as the answer to economic depression. Another problem facing historians of Czechoslovak history is the question of the relationship between Sudeten Germans and the Nazi party. Information on this is revealed by German diplomatic correspondence that was published after World War II. In an effort to understand the causes of the war, a group of historians assessed and translated captured German diplomatic correspondence. Most was then published. The same was done in less detail for British and French diplomatic correspondence, no doubt to support the view that these countries were not responsible for causing the war. What these German documents reveal is the gradual development of two German policies. In the late 1920s, when the Nazi party was causing trouble in Austria and later in Czechoslovakia, German diplomats in Prague took no active part. They only sympathised with the families of Sudeten Germans who had been arrested by the Czech police. These professional diplomats had no sympathy for the extreme right wing rabble rousers. They were forced to change their policy when Hitler was appointed chancellor. Hitler, looking for an opportunity to undermine Czechoslovakia from within, insisted that financial help should be given to families of Sudeten Germans who had been arrested. As an Austrian, he probably had great sympathy for them. German diplomats were initially reluctant to have anything to do with this, since not only did they not sympathise with Sudeten German Nazis, but they did not want their diplomatic position to be compromised. They were overruled. The German Legation in Prague became the channel for the considerable sums of money that were sent to help families of those arrested as well as for Henlein, when he establish his Sudeten Deutsche Partei (SdP). This information in the diplomatic correspondence is

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particularly important because it shows the range of activities that Berlin supported and the way that the German Government was held to ransom by the Sudeten Germans. In one case, money had been taken from Sudeten German union funds to pay for the legal defence of a leading official. This was illegal. Sudeten Germans argued that Berlin had to supply money to pay back into union funds because there was a risk that the Czech authorities would find out what had happened. If they did, the union would be compromised as a Nazi organisation and the actions of its member would become criminal rather than political. Berlin gave in and the money was transferred. Large sums were also sent to support Henlein, Nazi newspapers and other right wing political activity. It is a sign of the importance of Sudeten German activity that it was sent even though Germany was short of foreign currency. Moreover, since the Czech Government had made any activity linked to the Nazi party illegal, the money had to be sent to firms as payment for goods allegedly sent to Germany. It was carried secretly by trusted individuals and no receipts were ever given. If they had fallen into the hands of the Czech police, those who had received the money could have been prosecuted for importing it illegally. In short, the more that Hitler supported Henlein and the SdP the greater the risk of being discovered, the money seized and of the diplomats as well as SdP activists being branded as criminals. This raises another problem that historians have not tackled: the extent to which there was a single German policy over the Sudetenland. The answer, as the diplomatic papers reveal, is that there were two policies, Hitler’s and that of the German Foreign Office. Hitler, working secretly through Henlein, aimed at destroying Czechoslovakia from within. The German Foreign Office on the other hand, unaware of Hitler’s plans, tried to undermine the Franco – Czech alliance and make Czechoslovakia dependent on Germany. This had the unexpected result that senior Nazis in the SdP such as Frank, when summoned to Prague by German diplomats and asked to account for their actions did not know what to say. The diplomats wanted to maintain cordial relations with the Czechoslovak Government. They tried, without success, to get the Foreign Office in Berlin to bring Frank and other SdP Nazis under the control of the Auslands Organisation, an independent body responsible for Germans living abroad. They were unsuccessful. Actions by leading members of the SdP caused

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considerable confusion among diplomats in Prague, who were trying to understand what was happening. A further problem about Czechoslovak history is why Henlein was so successful in persuading the British Government that the Sudetenland was on the verge of civil war. Henlein made two visits to London and his most important meetings were with Vansittart, a senior Foreign Office official and advisor to the British Government. It is clear from the German diplomatic correspondence that Henlein was careful to give accurate information about economic distress whenever this could be checked. But he built on this a picture of such extreme hardship and anti-Czech anger that Vansittart, who was anti-German, was persuaded he spoke the truth. Henlein was in any case a man who appeared open and trustworthy. He was also supported by other Germans with excellent British connections, including Prince Max von Hohenlohe-Langenberg, a Reich German who owned an estate in North Bohemia. There were many in England who were in any case sympathetic to Germany and had regretted that Czechoslovakia had been created. Collectively they supported the views presented by Henlein and Hitler. The German military archives have also shed considerable light on a neglected aspect of the final Sudeten crisis. Records show that Hitler planned to invade Czechoslovakia and conquer the country in such a short time that France would not be able to offer any support. Details of the invasion plan (route to the followed, the areas of the main and diversionary attacks and the units to be used) were drawn up, only for the attack to be postponed. The German military archives make it clear that although Hitler wanted to have a brief, victorious military campaign, he was aware of the diplomatic hazards. He was unaware of the strength of Czech defences, in spite of information supplied by Sudeten Germans who lived in the area. Although the series of Maginot style blockhouses on the northern frontier near Ostrava had been built by the summer of 1938, not all had been equipped with the full range of artillery and machine guns. Nevertheless, Hitler realised after gaining the Sudetenland and being able to inspect the Czech defences, that German casualties would have been high and the invasion of Czechoslovakia would have taken longer than planned, with serious political results. Arising from this is the question of whether British diplomats in Prague could have done more to discover the reality of the situation in the Sudetenland and foil Hitler’s plans. They faced considerable

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difficulties. One was the problem of language: few if any are known to have spoken Czech and Newton, who was sent to Prague as the Sudeten crisis developed, came from Berlin and seems to have been pro-German. Sudeten German newspapers, subsidised by Berlin, presented Nazi views and printed lies. Sometimes it seemed possible to check on the accuracy of reports. When the British Embassy in Berlin learnt that German troops had been seen close to the Czechoslovak– German frontier, it asked the German Foreign Office for details. The latter said this was a false rumour. The British Embassy sent two British officers to investigate and told the Germans where they were going. By the time the officers had arrived on the frontier there was no sign of the troops and the German Foreign Office claimed that it had been a false rumour. However, in view of the planned invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is very likely that there had been preliminary manoeuvres and the troops, having been warned by Berlin, returned to their barracks in Dresden. But the episode does reveal the difficulty in getting accurate information to prove or disprove Hitler’s increasingly violent claims. These German diplomatic and military papers reveal the way in which Sudeten German genuine grievances were exaggerated and exploited before and during the Sudeten crisis that marks the end of Czechoslovakia as a unified state. Equally important is information in Czech archives about what happened after the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. Details of this and how it was organised exclusively by the German Foreign Office are revealed. Equally important is the description of events by Eric Pasold, which shows that not all Sudeten Germans welcomed the arrival of German troops. Not all wanted to become German citizens and they rejected the claim that Germany was their spiritual home – the aim of the slogan Heim ins Reich. The loss of the Sudetenland deprived Czechoslovakia of its defences and the loss of its industries brought economic disaster to Czechoslovakia. It also caused a flood of refugees, mostly Czech but also including many German left wing politicians who had earlier fled from Nazi rule. The nature of the new Nazi administration is shown by the reports in Czech archives by those who had fled, fearing arrest or persecution, as well as those who now lived on the German side of the new frontier and feared they would be unable to continue to cross the frontier and continue to work in Czech factories. It is impossible to know the scale of this disaster, since no accurate records exist of the numbers of

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refugees from the Sudetenland. In England, as the result of the Munich Conference became clear in terms of this human tragedy, the Lord Mayor of London launched an appeal for funds to relieve the human distress. The British and French Governments also offered loans to allow potential Nazi victims (Jews and left wing Germans) to escape. Few had managed to do so before German forces occupied the Czech lands in March 1939 and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The other example of what has come to be called ‘ethnic cleansing’ took place in north Moravia. Poland and Czechoslovakia had disputed the area north of the coal and steel city of Ostrava at the end of World War I, which had a mixed Czech, German and Polish population. Poland claimed that the majority of the miners were Polish but the Czechoslovak Government could not allow it to become part of Poland, since it supplied coal to the Vı´tkovice steelworks in Ostrava and the main railway line to the east passed through it. Because of this, Czech forces had occupied the area and held it as Poland fought Russia to establish her eastern frontier. After the Munich conference Poland, sensing Czech weakness, demanded the area and occupied it soon afterwards. The result was a flood of mainly Czech refugees. Details survive of who these were. The Red Cross assisted them with temporary accommodation and helped them find work. Large-scale research in British archives was largely unnecessary because so many scholars have studied this period from a British point of view. One source that was useful were the Eden papers, which gave the views of important British politicians at the time of the Sudeten crisis. It is clear from letters in these papers that there was little support for Czechoslovakia. Instead, the letters reveal a desire that the dispute should be settled diplomatically, and not under pressure by Hitler. Czechoslovakia could be sacrificed easily provided the matter was done in a formal and legally binding manner. A group of Slovaks who favoured an independent Slovak state expressed their anti-Czech views forcefully in a booklet claiming that Czechoslovakia was not worth fighting for. Voices raised in support of Czechs were a small minority. Public opinion in Britain shared Chamberlain’s fear of war, destruction of cities by bombing and heavy loss of life and the relief at his claim to have achieved ‘peace in our time’ was widespread. There remains one problem that this research had to tackle: the search for relevant documentary and secondary material. It became clear

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that the key to understanding the period lay in German archives and records. In this respect, the two most important sources of information were the German diplomatic correspondence and the records of the German high command in the German military archives in Freiburg. The German diplomatic correspondence covered communications between the German legation at Prague and the German Foreign Office in Berlin. The correspondence provided detailed information on the progress of the Sudeten German Nazi party through its rise in the late 1920s, the Czech reaction, the creation of Henlein’s Sudeten Deutsch Partei and the growing support given by Hitler to Henlein. The reports on meetings between Czech ministers and German diplomats cast considerable light on the relations between the two sides. It also became clear why Henlein was able to persuade so many people that he was telling the truth when he described conditions in the Sudetenland. Details of who he met on visits to London, who arranged the invitations for his visits, the politicians he met in London and their reactions were all described. The dilemma of the German diplomats in Prague also became clear as they were forced to act as illegal paymasters to Henlein and his party. Complementing the published correspondence, which had never been fully explored, were the details of German military preparations ordered by Hitler. It became clear that, in spite of his dramatic gestures and fiery speeches, his actual policy towards Czechoslovakia was more cautious. He decided that he would either be able to undermine the state from within by using Henlein or risk a dramatic and rapid invasion. Either might work, but both carried risks. Any attack had to be completed in days rather than weeks, since he feared an attack by France on his western frontier. He tried to strengthen the western defences to counter this, but the risk remained. He seriously underestimated the strength of the Czechoslovak defences in northern Moravia, where he intended the main attack to take place. He was also hesitant about attacking and postponed it on at least one occasion. Hitler planned a dramatic gesture – a Blitzkrieg – that would minimise the risks, but he failed to listen to advice from the Sudeten Germans who lived in the area and knew the strength and weakness of the defensive system. His plan of using Henlein to undermine the state from within was very expensive, and it is a symptom of his lack of economic sense that he has prepared to spend very large sums on this when the country was short of foreign exchange.

INTRODUCTION

15

There was also a serious risk that the Czech police would discover what was happening, give it maximum publicity and gain widespread international support. When used together in this way, the two sources revealed events in Czechoslovakia in a way that reveals German policy towards Czechoslovakia in a new light. The other aspect of Sudeten German history was how to complete the study of its society beyond Pasold’s personal recollections and the reports of German diplomats. Fortunately, the Czech national library has collected a wide range of literature on this subject. It therefore possible to find accounts that showed the deep sadness of exiled Sudeten Germans as well as the anger that was felt by so many others. There was also a crucial report of a major trade union meeting in Prague in 1929 that showed the economic situation through Sudeten German eyes. Whether or not the figures for relative unemployment of Czechs and Sudeten Germans were accurate, they showed what the trade union leaders thought was happening. It confirmed what Pasold also described, though in his case his firm was able to find enough work for his employees to avoid much unemployment. The trade union figures of 1929 showed a society in deep distress and were probably the same as those used later by Henlein in his discussions with Vansittart and others in London. Given the problems of unemployment in south Wales and the north of England at the same time, they sounded authentic even if they were not completely accurate. Vansittart could easily be persuaded that this social and economic distress could become extremely dangerous in Czechoslovakia because of the long-standing ethnic rivalry. The final problem was to find information to show the Czech side of this period. Fortunately, there are some excellent books that cover the major aspects, and what was needed was the detail to show the impact of these events on society. But there is no history of research in the Czech Republic that allows scholars to easily find out what collections of documents exist and to provide easy access. Czechoslovak archives were originally created as state repositories to hold documents. These are held in a number of depots as well as the main archives. In the case of the regional archives in Plzenˇ, the list of documents in the search room did not state where they were stored. Only the staff computer held this information. Since documents kept in these depots were difficult to obtain, it was only with the help of sympathetic staff that documents could be specially obtained and research completed. One useful feature of

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the archives was that for many collections there was a short guide and list of documents. However, this was by no means complete, although the documents had been in the archives for a long time, many since the Communist seizure of power in 1948. After World War II, when historical research began in the West, there was no comparable scholarly work in the countries under Soviet control. Part of the problem was ideological: Communism offered what it claimed was a new, scientific and accurate version of how the past should be interpreted. It also demanded total obedience to this view and punished any who deviated from it. In the 1930s Stalin had shown what could happen to anyone who fell foul of the system by his purges. These began in Czechoslovakia in the early 1950s when the state became bankrupt following the very large investment in heavy industry demanded by Stalin. Sla´nsky´, an important member of the government, was made the scapegoat. He was tried on charges that were obviously false – spying for the West – convicted and executed. Historical research that might reveal an alternative to the state’s version of history was impossible under these circumstances. All that historians could safely do was study the history of the Communist party, stress its significance in Marxist terms and examine pre-industrial history: small firms that no longer existed. The fall of Communism in 1989 released a flood of personal reminiscences, including accounts of wartime experience by men who had fought in the Royal Air Force and the British army – subjects forbidden in the past. There were also company histories and descriptions of past events. Another valuable contribution was the excellent three-volume survey of events in the First Republic by the very experienced historian Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky (Prague, 2002– 3). The only weakness was the occasional failure to show reference points when quoting rising or falling percentages. This no doubt stems from the Communist period when statistics were quoted without any attempt at analysis. Other books that appeared after 1989 covered the German occupation of the Czech lands in March 1939, the creation of the Protectorate and the war, including accounts by men who had served in the German and Soviet armed forces. The impact of Nazi control was revealed in books on the arianisation of Jewish business and property: Drahomı´r Jancˇı´k and Eduard Kubu˚, ‘Arizace’a ariza´torˇi drobny´ a strˇednı´ zˇidovsky´ majetek v u´ve˘rech Kreditanstalt der Deutschen (1939– 45)

INTRODUCTION

17

(Prague, 2005). This showed the part played by the German Kreditanstalt Bank and who were the beneficiaries. The transfer of the Sudetenland, the refugee crisis and the war was the subject of Peter Glotz, Vyhna´nı´; Cˇe´ske´ zeme˘ jako poucˇny´ prˇı´pad (Prague, 2006). There were also more general books on the period, such as Eva Hahnova´ and Hans Henning Hahn, Sudetone˘mecka´ vzpomı´na´nı´ (Prague, 2002). Among the company histories for this period, the most important is the history of Sˇkoda by a group of historians led by Vladimı´r Karlicky´, Sve˘t okrˇı´dlene´ho sˇipu; Koncern Sˇkoda Plzenˇ (Plzenˇ, 1999). The development of the legal system from the First Republic through the period of German occupation is the subject of Ja´n Gronsky´, Komentovane´ dokumenty k u´stavnı´m de˘jima´m cˇeskoslovenska, I, 1914 – 1945 (Prague, 2005). These, and others covering similar topics, were all essential for an understanding of the period. Where the writers used statistics from sources such as bank records, they were accurate and needed no interpretation. The only problem for the historian was that, because of the small Czech population, relatively few copies of books were printed and they were seldom on sale for very long. Those that were not sold were remaindered and were only available in the Levne´ Knihy chain of bookshops. The history of the First and Second Czechoslovak Republics is the story of a relatively small Slav population who achieved their ambition of independence from Austro–German control for a relatively short period. The odds against them succeeding in creating a harmonious, multi-ethnic state were considerable. The forced addition of Austrians, Hungarians and Poles into a state apparently based on self-determination caused deep and lasting resentment. If economic conditions had been more favourable and all the groups had prospered, the chances of creating a sort of Switzerland would have been higher. But it needed Hitler to provide the funds and the motivation for the Sudeten Germans to make, and continue to make, demands that ultimately led to the fear of war and the Munich conference. But it needed a clear appreciation of German as well as Czech sources to be able to understand the complexities of this story.

CHAPTER 1 CZECHS vs GERMANS; ROLES REVERSED

Many Germans, especially if they were from the Sudetenland, would argue that the mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans after World War I was the major cause of World War II. They would point to the enmity between Czechs and Sudeten Germans and the Czech refusal to grant them equal status in the First Czechoslovak Republic. They would also argue that Sudeten German industry was not given equal status in the new state, though contributing to its economic success. This caused dangerous tension and was bound to lead to trouble. They might even argue that Hitler, far from fomenting trouble after 1935, was merely recognising the dangers of this enmity and seeking to resolve it. Any counter argument, that Germany had treated Russia worse in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk the previous year, could be dismissed as referring to a different set of conditions in another country. The German argument would of course be false, relying on prejudice, wrong information and looking back from 1939 rather than forward from 1918. But in so far that it represented the anger at the reversal of roles in the new state, it would be accurate. Sudeten Germans, who had previously dominated the Habsburg Empire, were now dominated by Czechs, whom they considered inferior. Sudeten German industry, which played an important part in creating an advanced, prosperous and industrially advanced state, was controlled by the Czech Government. This anger was very different to the situation described by Toma´sˇ Masaryk, the Czechoslovak President. Masaryk had confidently predicted in 1918 that

CZECHS vs GERMANS; ROLES REVERSED

19

Czechoslovakia would become a second Switzerland, with different nationalities living harmoniously together. In 1918, when the Allies began to prepare for peace, no one wanted another war. The loss of life on the Western Front had been greater than anyone could have imagined and elsewhere soldiers had died in large numbers in Russia, Central Europe, the Balkans and northern Italy. There had also been losses at sea. Civilians also suffered in Germany from the Allied blockade and in England to a lesser extent from zeppelin raids. The world had to be made safer by eliminating the causes of war. It was felt that World War I had been the result of extreme nationalism. A radical Serb, a member of an ultra nationalist Serbian society had, with the help of the Serbian Government, shot and killed the heir to the Austro–Hungarian Empire, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The result was an unstoppable timetable of events involving the major powers and previously secret treaties and plans for war. From this point of view it was inevitable that nations, however small, that might cause trouble in the future, should be given their own states. Czechs, who had fostered nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, should be among those rewarded in this way. They had been citizens of the Austrian part of the Austro – Hungarian Empire. So too should the Slovaks, who had been in the Hungarian part. These were to form the basis for the Czechoslovak state. Also included in the benefits of enlarged statehood were Romanians and Slavs in Hungary, Slavs in Italy and Poles in Russia and Germany. All non-Slav peoples had been removed from Hungary, reducing its population from 20,866,847 (the 1910 census) to 7,615,417 and its size from 325,411 sq. km to 92,963 sq. km.1 The principle on which this was based was self-determination, which had been enshrined in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. But self-determination was denied to the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians, who found themselves minorities in these new or enlarged states. The legal basis for these frontier changes and the creation of these new states were the Treaties of Versailles, St Germain and Trianon. They were based on three fundamentally opposed ideas. The first was that nationalist demands for autonomy or independence in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans had, by 1918, become so important that they had to be satisfied. The second was that promises made to Romania and Italy during World War I to persuade them to enter the war on

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the Allies’ side had to be kept. The third was that the defeated powers, Austria–Hungary and Germany, should not be allowed to exercise the rights of national self-determination given to others because this would make them stronger. This was a major blow to the Sudeten Germans, Austrians living in the western border areas of the new Czechoslovakia. At a stroke, they lost the dominant position and were subject to people they had formerly regarded as inferior and unworthy of having their own unique national destiny.2 But the Allies believed that these steps were necessary if a second world war was to be avoided. There was also an element of revenge in the scale of the punitive reparations that were demanded from the defeated powers, especially Germany. Within a short time the economist John Maynard Keynes, one of the British delegates to the Versailles conference, had challenged the rationale for this.3 He encouraged many to question the long-term viability of the Versailles settlement, including the Treaties of St Germain and Trianon. Calls for their revision were being made as early as the 1920s.4 The postwar condition of Czechoslovakia stands at the centre of these issues. In November 1918 it was a completely new country and in this sense it was unique. Romania, Hungary, Austria and Poland had all existed before, though in different forms.5 The new state of Yugoslavia was a federal union of south Slav states who, like the Czechs and Slovaks, were united by strong cultural links. Czechoslovakia had to be created from the wreckage of the Austro– Hungarian Empire, but it is worth asking why the state was made. Not everyone agreed that it was necessary or even advisable. For example Arthur Balfour, a member of the British postwar Government, thought that it would have been better to preserve the Austro– Hungarian Empire as a counterbalance to Germany.6 One view was that it was ‘a child of propaganda which was given great impetus by two able exiles, Masaryk and Benes’.7 The British held a neutral view in the discussions at Versailles; the Foreign Office believed that Britain had no direct or indirect interest in the matter.8 Consequently the British adopted the role of mediator. However, they did hope that Czechoslovakia would form part of a buffer against Russia, by now under Bolshevik control. Britain also hoped that the Czechs would feel that the British Government had made an honest attempt to support the best policy for each nation. By contrast the French wanted to weaken Germany and Austria. They were also anxious to remove the important Sˇkoda armament company from Austrian control.9

CZECHS vs GERMANS; ROLES REVERSED

21

The key factor was Toma´sˇ Masaryk and Edvard Benesˇ’ success in arguing for the state to be created. In particular they exploited the wartime success of 1,200 Czech soldiers who had fought courageously as the Czech Legion in the French army.10 This had been a late feature of the war. The only Czechs to oppose the Austrians directly after the war began in 1914 were those living in Russia. They petitioned the Tsar for permission to form a unit in the Russian army. This was granted and the unit was known as the Druzˇina, though it was only used for reconnaissance and propaganda, to undermine Habsburg morale. Czechs living in the Austro– Hungarian Empire were conscripted in the army, some willingly, others, like the Good Soldier Sˇvejk in Jaroslav Hasˇek’s famous novel, very unwillingly. When the Austrian forces were driven out of Serbia and Galicia in the second half of 1914, many Czechs thought that the Austro –Hungarian Empire might lose the war. To make good the early losses more conscripts, including Czechs, were recruited early in 1915 and persecution of the Czechs began. Czechs began to desert and, in one case, two regiments went over to the Russians with their officers. Once on the Russian side some wanted to join the Russian army, but the Russians were wary of using prisoners of war in fighting units. Czechs did not take an active part in the war in large numbers until much later. A total of 90,000 Czechs in Russia, including prisoners of war, were recruited into a Czech Legion after Masaryk’s visit there in May 1917.11 After the Russian Revolution, some Czechs fought in the Civil War, others fought their way east along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. From there they sailed round the world and joined the Czechs already fighting as a Czech Legion in the French army, where they served with distinction. Their valour caught the imagination of Czechs and Slovaks both in the Habsburg Empire and America, where there were important Czech and Slovak communities.12 Their importance for Czech history is recognised by the war memorials in towns and villages in the Czech Republic to those who died helping to create it. In the past these indicated clearly what they were fighting for, though more recently memorials commemorate all the dead, regardless of who they fought for. For example, in Prˇı´bor, south west of Ostrava, the memorial shows a soldier in French army uniform. In the village of Zˇd’a´r near Trnov in north Bohemia, a French helmet forms part of the memorial. By contrast, memorials for men who died fighting for the Habsburgs are rare. In Cˇesky´ Te˘sˇı´n, formerly part of the staunchly

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Austrian town of Teschen, it is hidden in a small park.13 This emphasises the extent to which Czechs dominated the new state, especially in areas that were predominantly Czech. It also helped to create a sense of national identity. This excellent Czech military reputation from World War I was used by Masaryk, a former philosophy professor and Czech representative in the Austrian Reichsrat (Parliament) to support his claims for a new Czech and Slovak state. Of mixed Czech and Slovak descent and from a peasant background, he was an ideal person to represent both races. He was also married to an American and spoke fluent English. He proved an able diplomat. Benesˇ, an efficient negotiator and administrator, was his invaluable deputy. Masaryk had been able to win the support of Americans of Czech and Slovak descent when he visited America. The Pittsburgh Convention and the Philadelphia Agreement of 1918, made by Americans of Slovak and Ruthene (Ukrainian) descent, is normally seen as cementing the union of Czechs and Slovaks.14 One historian has commented rather unfairly that only in America could support for Slovaks and Ruthenes (the people of Sub-Carpathian Russia) be found, and that it was by no means united.15 But this is not a view that is generally held. These two factors, military success and American political backing, proved to be crucial. They enabled Masaryk to transform the Czech pre-war claim to autonomy within Austria – Hungary into a demand for complete independence. The claim was first made by a group of Czech exiles in Paris in 1915 and in 1916 it became Masaryk’s official policy.16 By 1918 this group had become the Czechoslovak National Council. Masaryk was President and Prime Minister (and Minister of Finance), Sˇtefa´nik the War Minister and Benesˇ the Foreign (and Interior) Minister. This was recognised by Britain as a de facto co-belligerent government in August 1918, by America in September and France in October.17 On 18 October Masaryk issued the Washington Manifesto stating that the future state would be a parliamentary democratic republic with a liberal constitution. This claim to create a national – or multi-national – state reflected part of President Wilson’s Thirteen Points on which these demands could now be based. In America Wilson was due to run for re-election as president and was susceptible to political pressure of this kind from American Czechs and Slovaks.

CZECHS vs GERMANS; ROLES REVERSED

23

At the same time that these events were taking place in Paris, the Vienna parliament was being transformed. Many Austrians watched the growing Slav nationalism with undisguised horror.18 Recognising the force of Czech national feeling, leading Bohemian and Moravian politicians were invited to the Vienna parliament, where they formed an all-party union. Their plan was to change the monarchy into a federation of free and equal states, one of which would be composed of Czechs and Slovaks. However, on hearing news of the Allied recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council, the Czech delegates rejected the proposed federation and persuaded the imperial government to allow them to go to Geneva to negotiate with Benesˇ. While discussions were taking place there, a group of agrarians, right-wing social democrats, national socialists and others established Czech independence in Prague and formed a de facto government. They were joined by a Slovak, Dr Srobar, who also signed the declaration of independence. This was followed on 30 October by a declaration of Slovak independence from Hungary and a union of Czechs and Slovaks. The state was thus created by a self-appointed council and not by public referendum, as Masaryk’s Washington declaration had promised. By November the separate councils had dissolved, leaving the new government in Prague under the leadership of Krama´rˇ. On 14 November the new National Assembly approved the declaration of independence. Masaryk was unanimously elected president, Benesˇ foreign minister and Sˇtefa´nik war minister. Krama´rˇ returned to Prague from Geneva in November and Masaryk the following month. Elections were held in 1920, which confirmed Masaryk in power. But it was one thing to agree the principle of creating a state. To agree what it should consist of was another matter. This is where Masaryk’s own prestige played a major part in persuading the Allies. He argued that the important precedent for Czechs had been the Great Moravian Empire, created in the ninth century, whose fame had even been acknowledged by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus.19 The memory of this empire gave the Czechs a sense of national prestige that no other small Slav state possessed. Although it is referred to as ‘the Great Moravian Empire’ in fact it had three separate forms. The first had been a larger version of the present Czech Republic.20 In the thirteenth century, under the Prˇemyslid king Otakar II, the kingdom consisted of Bohemia and Moravia, plus land to the south extending almost to the Adriatic. Later,

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under the Luxemburg kings Vaclav II and III, the original southern part of the kingdom was replaced by a north–south band of territory to the east of Bohemia and Moravia. This new part of the kingdom extended from Gdansk on the Baltic southward to beyond Budapest. Although both these kingdoms subsequently lost their non-Czech territory, Czechs remembered their great European empire. Moreover, Czechs believed that their power and prestige within Europe had survived the decline of this empire. In their eyes it had only been destroyed at the Battle of the White Mountain (Czech Bila´ hora) in 1620, at the beginning of the Thirty Years War.21 This defeat had led to the subsequent German domination of the Czech lands within the German Confederation. This memory of a glorious past would not have been enough to justify the creation of a Czech and Slovak state in 1918. What made the case of the Czechs different was their economic success in the second half of the nineteenth century. This had given them the confidence to demand equal rights with Austrians. The creation of the important textile industry in Brno had been the first stage.22 This was followed by the discovery and exploitation of both lignite and bituminous coal in Bohemia and Moravia, which led to the creation of important industries. Coal mines and iron works in North Moravia and the chemical industry of North Bohemia were the most important. The new economic success of Czechs at the same time as that of the Austrians led to a revival of Czech nationalism. It also helped to create a sense of Czech cultural identity. This was reinforced by a wide range of economic, cultural and social organisations and societies and the construction of buildings such as the National Theatre. Czechs were aware that they formed a majority of the population of Bohemia but were denied civic rights. This led to the Czech–Austrian struggle in politics, economics and culture that form the background first to the demands for autonomy and later for complete independence. It was reflected on the Austrian side by cartoons showing Czechs as primitive migrants and street musicians. Czech cartoons portrayed Austrians as aggressive and domineering.23 Cartoonists believed that no reconciliation would ever be possible between them. This was still the situation at the end of World War I. Evidence of Czech economic success, reinforced by the military contribution to the Allies in World War I and American support, formed the political basis for the new state. It did however ignore the success that Sudeten German firms had enjoyed within the

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25

Austro –Hungarian Empire. But there was also the question of what Czechoslovakia should consist of geographically. Masaryk and Benesˇ argued that it should be based on the ‘Historic Provinces of the Bohemian Crown’, citing the example of the Great Moravian Empire.24 The presence of large numbers of Austrians in the areas bordering the frontier did nothing to detract from this important historical principle in their eyes. However, Masaryk claimed later that he had been willing to ‘reconstitute the traditional frontiers of Bohemia so as to cede to Germany those areas of the Sudetenland who [sic] were predominantly German in population.’25 But it was unthinkable for France in particular to give Germany more territory than she had had before World War I. Later, Masaryk accepted the frontiers established at Versailles and referred to this German-speaking group as colonists, who had arrived long after the Czech Empire had been created.26 This group, now known as Sudeten Germans, has attracted a great deal of attention.27 What is often forgotten is that these were only part of the German population of the new Czechoslovakia. There were also others further east in Slovakia. Originally German miners had been invited to work the mineral ores of the Krusˇne´ hory (German Erzgebirge ¼ ore mountains) in the west and elsewhere in Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary (later Slovakia). Evidence of their activity in Slovakia is in the names of many towns and villages with the prefix Banska´ (Slovak mine). They also settled further east in Romania and the Ukraine.28 The presence of this large German population in Bohemia, northern Moravia and southern Silesia (also included in Masaryk’s claim as traditional Czech land) led to a great deal of discussion at the Versailles conference. No one knew for certain how many Germans there were. The last census had been in 1910 on the basis of language (Ursprunsprache), but Benesˇ claimed that these figures were completely unreliable and scientifically worthless.29 Instead, he claimed that there were about 1.7 million in Bohemia and Moravia. The main Czech argument was that Bohemia and Moravia traditionally formed a united Czech territory. This was supported by Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, who was considered an expert on Habsburg history. His view was that it was natural that the Germans should demand union with Germany – Anschluss – but if this was granted it would deprive the Czechs of their natural defences and would destroy the new state’s economic

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independence. He also argued that the Czechs would have every reason to conciliate this German minority.30 In his view, it was no greater injustice to put ‘2 or 212 million Germans’ under Czech rule than 9 million Czechs under alien German rule. Against this was the realistic claim by Viscount Maugham, writing in 1954, that the Germans ‘naturally groaned under the rule of the Czechs’, because of the reversal of fortunes.31 It was also suggested by the British Foreign Office that it was a mistake to put a quarter of the new population under Czech domination. The Germans were ‘compactly situated, bitterly hostile to their Slav neighbours and in sympathy with the Saxons, Bavarians, Germans and Austrians dwelling beyond their border, and with the German capitalists and Germanised nobles within them’.32 On the whole, however, the Foreign Office had no direct interest, hoped to play the role of impartial mediator, and hoped that the Czechs would carry out the best policy for each nation. The Sudeten Germans based their demands later on the promise of self-determination under Wilson’s Thirteen Points and the armistice that had ended the war.33 On 28 October, the day that the Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed in Prague, deputies from the Germanspeaking areas of Bohemia in the former Reichsrat formed themselves into the Provisional Assembly of German Bohemia and elected their own government.34 Deputies from the German districts of northern Moravia and Silesia formed a new province, which they called the Sudetenland and also elected a provisional government.35 At first the Sudeten Germans proposed that the new state should be administered by Sudeten Germans and Czechs on an equal basis, but this was rejected by the Czechs. Josef Seliger, leader of the Reichenberg (Czech Liberec) textile workers, called for a German Bohemia that would be predominantly German, but with ill-defined frontiers.36 This too failed. The Sudeten Germans then tried an alternative approach. In southern Bohemia and Moravia the Sudeten German councils announced that they were joining their districts to their neighbours in Austria.37 At this point there was little to stop them because the frontiers of the new Czechoslovak state had not been defined at Versailles. But this ran counter to Czech claims to traditional Czech lands that were to be included in the new Czechoslovakia. This attempt to create a separate state forced the Czech Government to use force and bring the Sudeten areas under Czech control. Both sides

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had soldiers and weapons. The difference was that the Czech soldiers who had fought in France as part of the French army were prepared to fight for their new state, the Sudeten Germans were not or had no arms. A total of 53 demonstrators were killed, including 25 in Kaaden (Czech Kadenˇ) and 16 in Sternberg (Czech Sˇternberg). Young Czech soldiers were getting their revenge for past indignities.38 Many Sudeten Germans fled to Germany and Austria. An administrative council was set up in Vienna. Many ex soldiers enrolled in the new German army or in Freikorps units. Some fought in the Baltic against the Bolsheviks and Sudeten Germans were also involved in the Kapp Putsch. Other Sudeten Germans with administrative qualifications found new employment in Germany and Austria. Later the Czech Government encouraged them to return, offering an amnesty to all former soldiers. This attempt to create independent Sudeten German territory resulted in the Czech decision not to grant them equal status with the Czechs and Slovaks. As a result, they were treated as second-class citizens.39 These attempts to create independent German-speaking provinces had no influence on discussions at Versailles about the boundaries of the new Czechoslovak state. In the discussions leading to the Treaties of Trianon and St Germain the Allied representatives discussed the matter with Czechs but not with Germans.40 In the event the Allies decided that they could not give the Sudeten Germans the right to unite either with Austria (of which they had formerly been citizens) or with Germany. The Allied representatives also had to decide the frontiers of the new state. The traditional north-western boundary of Austria – Hungary followed the line of the Krusˇne´ hory and Cˇesky´ les. These formed a frontier that could be relatively easily defended. The hills to the north-west (Krusˇne´ hory) created a barrier. The densely wooded country to the south with deep valleys was even more difficult to penetrate. Allied military experts, remembering the battles of World War I, were sure that these could be easily defended by a relatively small Czechoslovak army. The south-western frontier was more difficult to establish, since there was no clear historical Czech frontier. The Allies decided to place the boundary in an area now called Sˇumava, which was also wooded and hilly, to the north-east of the Bo¨hmenwald. East of this the Allies chose a frontier that corresponded to Czech claims that the land had a predominantly Czech population or would form a defensible frontier.

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The northern boundary was agreed using similar principles, following the line of the Krkonosˇe, Orlicke´ hory, Jesenyky hory and Beskydy hory. But in this area the Allies also met ethnic difficulties. Northern Moravia had a significant Polish population of miners in the OstravaKarvina´ coal mines. These, like the Sudeten Germans in the west, demanded the right to territory that they claimed had a majority Polish population.41 On 23 January 1919 Czech troops occupied the area north-east of Ostrava, which had important coal mines that supplied the Vı´tkovice iron and steel works in Ostrava and a railway linking Czech and Slovak lands. Poland also sent soldiers, but the country was preoccupied with fighting Russia to establish the Polish eastern frontier.42 Three days later there was an armed clash between the troops in north Moravia, which forced the Supreme Council at Versailles to send an Inter-Allied Commission of Control to Teschen to establish a frontier. On 1 February Benesˇ and the Polish Foreign Minister Dmowski agreed that the dispute should be settled by plebiscite.43 The final decision was made at a conference of ambassadors at Spa on 28 July 1920, giving Hlucˇin and the southern part of Teschen to Czechoslovakia and finally settling the German–Polish frontier to the north.44 140,000 Germans and Poles were included in Czechoslovakia. It was an area of considerable strategic importance, because there were no natural defensive features. The landscape is gently rolling and offers easy access to a mechanised army. It was also close to an area of considerable economic importance: the North Moravian coalfield and the wealthy iron and steel city of Ostrava.45 The industrial development of this city had been based to a large extent on the success of the large iron and steel company Vı´tkovice. Work in the coal mines and Vı´tkovice works had attracted large numbers of ethnic Poles. Associated with this industry was an important rail network. One of the main Austro–Hungarian railway lines from Vienna to Warsaw passed close to Ostrava. A later line connecting Prague to Northern Hungary (Slovakia) crossed this at Bohumin, 15 km to the north. It was essential for Czechoslovakia to have this area north of Ostrava under its own control. If it had been included in Poland as the Poles demanded, the rail link to Slovakia would have been cut and Czechoslovakia would have also lost the coal mines that supplied coal to Vı´tkovice. For the same reason the Poles demanded that it should be part of the new state of Poland.46 This dispute remained a source of tension for

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years after the original Versailles settlement and the demand was renewed successfully after the Munich Conference. The Slovak frontier presented the same difficulties. In the north the Tatra Mountains formed a clearly defined extension to the Carpathians. This area also included Polish communities, the result of the same southward movement of people seeking new land and economic opportunities. The small area to the extreme east, populated by Ukrainians (called Ruthenes), was also included in the new state because, as non-Slavs, they had been removed from Hungary and could not be included in Russian Ukraine. It was claimed that there were important ethnic differences between this population and the majority of the Ukrainians further east. The Philadelphia Agreement of 24 October 1918 claimed that they were entitled to self-determination and could therefore join Czechoslovakia.47 The southern frontier presented further difficulties. The greater part of the Slovak area was mountainous and had no natural boundaries, apart from a section of the Danube east of Bratislava. Slovaks based their claim for the location of this southern frontier on what they believed was the national identity of the population living there. As in the case of the Sudeten Germans, Seton-Watson supported the Czech and Slovak view. He argued that this should prevail because the Slovaks only wanted their own nationals and would not want to be ‘saddled with aliens’.48 But this included many people who could claim to be Hungarian. This also became an important issue in 1939 when Hungary made similar claims to the Poles for territory on the basis of language spoken there. However, this caused serious problems in relations with Hungary. There the question of national identity was more complicated than in the Czech lands. Successive Hungarian governments had followed a policy of forcible Magyarisation. Whether or not the people spoke Hungarian as their first language, the government in Budapest made sure that they learnt it. Hungarian governments also limited educational opportunities for minority groups and severely restricted all efforts to establish a Slovak cultural identity. As a result, there were no secondary schools for Slovaks and all attempts to develop a Slovak culture had been crushed. The most that could be said was that L’udovik Stur had established the basis of a Slovak language in the 1840s.49 One consequence was the relative poverty of Slovaks compared to the Hungarians and Austrians. Statistics from 1910 in Table 1.1 show the relative size of landholdings of each of the three ethnic groups:

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Table 1.1

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Relative size of landholdings in Hungary 1910

Farm size Owned Owned Rented Owned Owned Owned Owned

above 1,000 acres above 100 – 1,000 acres 100 –1,000 acres & rented 50 –100 acres & rented 10 –50 acres & rented 5 –10 acres & rented under 5 acres

Slovak Hungarian German Other 1.7 22.3 5.3 48.8 63.1 65.9 71.2

84.8 54.3 64.4 42.6 23.9 20.9 19.4

13.8 10.5 27.0 5.9 3.9 3.4 4.1

0.3 12.9 3.3 2.7 9.1 9.8 5.3

Source: Anton Sˇpiesz, Ilustrovane´ dejiny Slovenska na ceste k sebauvedomeniu [Illustrated history of Slovakia; the road to independence] (Bratislava, 2002), p. 173.

These Hungarian figures show the relative poverty of Slovaks in relation to Hungarians and Germans. Agriculture was dominated by the very large estates, but significant changes had been made in the smaller estates, where animal husbandry and sugar beet production had been greatly improved.50 By 1911 the former draught animals had been replaced by western European beef and dairy breeds: Bern, Simmenthal and Pinzgau. This reflected a new mentality among farmers.51 Nonetheless, Slovak agriculture, like the rest of the Slovak economy, was less efficient than Czech. This explains why so much help had to be given later by Czechs to Slovaks in the new state – help that was not always welcomed. It also explains the Slovak desire to govern their own land and correct the inequalities caused by centuries of Hungarian rule. Even today there is an antipathy towards symbols of the Hungarian past. It is possible to see this in the former important silver mining town of Banska´ Sˇtiavnica, where the large Hungarian school at the end of the main square lies empty, derelict and abandoned. In contrast other buildings in the square, dating from the Renaissance, are gradually being restored. This shows that the Slovak feelings expressed at Versailles have not disappeared.52 Slovaks were able to claim that a great many people who were considered by Hungary to be Hungarian were really Slovak.53 Slovak representatives claimed that their Slovak identity had been submerged by Hungarian policy and was only waiting for an opportunity to revive. The Czechs and Slovaks were consulted at Versailles; the Hungarians, like the Germans, were not. The situation was complicated by the Hungarian Revolution and the arrival of Hungarian Communist soldiers in Slovakia in May

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1919.54 Areas occupied by Hungarians remained under Hungarian administration and army control. Under the Belgrade armistice, the Hungarian troops began to leave early in 1919, but when Be´la Kun seized power, his revolutionary forces invaded Slovakia in order to reannex it.55 This regiment contained both Slovak and Hungarian soldiers. It distributed the Slovak-language Hungarian Communist newspaper Red News and revolutionary leaflets. The Slovak Soviet Republic which it established was seen as an extension of Hungarian power and posed a threat to Czechoslovakia. To counter this a Czechoslovak military dictatorship was set up in Slovakia. The commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak army, the French General Pelle´, threatened to punish any soldiers who refused to fight against the Hungarian Red Army. In mid June a definite demarcation line was drawn at Versailles to mark the Slovak–Hungarian frontier – the third within a year.56 The Hungarian revolutionary government was given an ultimatum to evacuate Czechoslovak territory. The Slovak and Hungarian Communist troops withdrew and the Slovak Soviet Republic collapsed. The demarcation line decided at Versailles was based on Slovak claims of a Slovak majority. Inevitably this contained many who considered themselves Hungarian. There were also Slovaks to the south of the new frontier, who formed a minority in Hungary. In the north of the land claimed by the Slovaks there were small groups of Poles who also resented being part of a Czechoslovak and not the new Polish state. There were also Germans in the former mining towns (German Spitze, Slovak Sˇpis).57 These did not try to assert their cultural identity in the same way as the Sudetens of Bohemia and Moravia, though later Henlein tried to draw them into his dispute with the government. The resulting tension made Slovaks depend on the Czech majority to defend their claims. The remaining part of the new Czechoslovak state was Transcarpathian Rus’ (Subcarpathian Ukraine) in the extreme east. Here lived a group of people of Ukrainian origin. Czechs wanted to include this in the new state because it linked Czechoslovakia to Romania and the Black Sea.58 Czechs also hoped to develop trade with Russia using an existing rail link through the area. Having this area within Czechoslovakia also prevented Hungary and Poland having a common frontier. This problem of establishing Slovak national identity reflects the more general difficulty of creating the true national identity of the other

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citizens of the new state. There were no-up-to date census records. Any figures from a pre-war census suffered from the bias of the Austrian and Hungarian census takers. In the case of mixed Czech– Austrian marriages the families would have been regarded as Austrian, especially if the family spoke German as their first language. People often changed their nationality when seeking economic advantage.59 In the case of the Slovaks, the Hungarian Government had made every effort to assimilate minority groups. Sometimes in both the Czech and Slovak lands the families really had assimilated. One can see this in the cemetery in the former predominantly Austrian town of Opava (German Oppeln) west of Ostrava, which shows how far assimilation could go. The language on most of the surviving pre-war tombstones was German. Some of the dead had been important figures in the community – their status is recorded on the headstone – and they include a number with Czech names. One grave has a statue of a soldier dressed in the uniform of an Austrian mountain regiment. The inscription is in German, the name is Czech. However, cemeteries can give a misleading picture of the national identity of the former inhabitants of a town. In the cemetery of Karlovy Vary, the former spa town Karlsbad, there are a number of large and imposing German family graves round the sides of three of the burial grounds. All of the graves in the main part are Czech. One might infer that this represents the former inhabitants of the town. But this is not true. In one case, there is evidence that a former grave (presumably German) has been replaced. There was nothing sinister in this. The usual custom in Central Europe was for graves to be rented for 30 years. After that they could be rented again or bought. Often, if the family was poor, the grave rent would not be renewed and the grave was used again for another burial. Even before the Sudeten Germans were evicted from Czechoslovakia after World War II, some of the graves had fallen into disuse. The fact that all the graves in the central areas of the cemeteries were Czech and date from after World War II is no more than a natural process of renewal.60 The same is true of the cemetery at Banska´ Sˇtiavnica in Slovakia, except that in this case there are no Hungarian or German graves. All are Slovak, though this was a silver mining town where German was the official language until the Ausgleich of 1867, after which Hungarian replaced German.61 By contrast the small Jewish cemetery, though abandoned, is still intact. The absence of Hungarian and German graves does, however, indicate the depth of Czech and

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Slovak feeling against Germans and Hungarians. It is the result of the German occupation in World War II and the massacre at the village of Lidicˇe in 1942 after the assassination of Reichsprotector Heydrich. The final result was the expulsion of most Germans. Only in the former Sudeten German country districts in northern Moravia have German graves survived because they have not been needed for Czech burials.62 Since 1989 it has become easier for former Sudeten German family members to return to renovate family graves. The result of this strong Czech and Slovak antagonism has been to destroy the evidence that might otherwise have cast light on the composition of the former population. Instead, historians have to rely on official census statistics. The frontiers of the new state, based on these ethnic claims, were agreed at Versailles between the representatives of France, Britain and America after consultation with Masaryk and Benesˇ. The latter were recommended to accept the 1914 frontiers of Austria and Germany, with small changes to reduce the German-speaking minority. But on 4 April Clemenceau remarked that this was very complicated and suggested leaving matters as they were. Lloyd George and Colonel House, deputising for Wilson, agreed and the matter was decided in five minutes.63 The Treaties of St Germain and Trianon were signed in 1919, giving Czechoslovakia the new frontiers and also drastically reducing the size of Austria and Hungary. The treaties also burdened Czechoslovakia with the larger part of the former Austro –Hungarian debt.64 The state had to pay into the reparation account the value of the former Austrian Emperor’s family property that had been seized. Czechoslovakia, as one of the states that had been created out of the former Austro– Hungarian Empire, also had to pay a ‘liberation tribute’ of 1.5 milliard gold francs. Czechoslovakia’s share was half: 750 million gold francs. The next step was for Alois Rasˇı´n, Finance Minister in the new Czechoslovak Government, to establish the financial basis for the new state. This was a further demonstration of Czech domination of the state, exclusive of Sudeten German interests. Rasˇin had four aims.65 One was to introduce a new currency. The second was to replace German control of the economy by Czech. The third was to attract foreign finance to replace German capital in banks and companies. The fourth was to carry out a census to establish the basis for future economic planning. He also had to establish a Czechoslovak currency. When the new government first took control of Czechoslovakia in November 1918, Rasˇı´n knew that

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the Austro–Hungarian Bank had issued notes to the value of 30 milliard crowns.66 The ones in Czechoslovakia had to be replaced by Czechoslovak currency. On the night of 25–26 February 1919 the frontier was officially closed and guarded by soldiers, though this seems to have been largely ineffective in stopping the movement of people.67 It was intended to stop anyone taking currency out of the new state. Subsequently all but the one and two crown Austrian notes were stamped and on 10 April they were replaced with new Czechoslovak ones.68 To build up the state’s reserves the population was asked to sell or lend to the state all foreign currency. These reserves were guaranteed by state control of commerce, especially of certain exports in which the state had a virtual monopoly.69 Finally a property tax removed the remaining Austrian notes from circulation and a record was made of the ownership of state bonds. Rasˇı´n was able to balance the Czechoslovak budget by 1920, a remarkable achievement in view of the continued inflation in Hungary and Austria. The government also carried out a census of the population and their assets and this served as a basis for future taxation. Where Rasˇı´n erred was in over-valuing the new Czechoslovak currency, which made Czechoslovak goods expensive on the world market. His aim was to restore the crown to its pre-war level.70 Subsequent events proved that he had been too optimistic. The value of the new crown declined in international currency markets against the Swiss Franc from between 34 and 100 Czechoslovak crowns in April 1919 to a low of 5 in early 1920. Thereafter, as the Czechoslovak economy improved, the value of the currency rose and finally reached 16 –17 in the second half of 1922. Meanwhile, in Austria and Hungary, inflation continued. Underpinning the whole financial transformation of the economy was foreign finance. There are no figures for the immediate postwar period but by the end of the 1920s the leading foreign investors were Britain, France and the United States.71 This investment was mostly in banks and the larger concerns, of which the armaments company, Sˇkoda, was the most significant.

Czechoslovak industry; the Habsburg legacy and Czech economic control from 1918 An essential part of the new Czech-dominated state was its successful industrial development. This consisted mainly of medium and small

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companies but was dominated by two industrial giants: Sˇkoda and Bat’a. Both were Czech. This created the economic power that made Czechoslovakia one of the most advanced industrial states between the two world wars. It later played an important part in the German struggle against the Soviet Union from 1941. Czech domination of industry was another source of rivalry between Czechs and Sudeten Germans and added to the tension between the two. Prior to 1989 and the end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, Czech Marxist historians tended to present their economic history before 1848 in terms of small-scale development: cottage industry and estate capitalism.72 For instance there are studies of small-scale iron workings in the village of Jince, north of Prˇibram, in the sixteenth century, a smithy in Trˇebı´ce from the seventeenth century and trade fairs at Veltrusy north of Prague.73 Marxist historians often ignored the period from the 1848 Revolution to the First Republic and the German occupation from 1938. One exception was an article on the ceramic industry at Rakovnı´k from 1883 to 1945, but that was a Czech and not an Austrian industry.74 These historians were trying to establish, in Marxist terms, the development from ‘feudal’ to ‘capitalist’ economic society. They were also wanting to stress the importance, for them, of the postwar Stalinist economic development. This led them to ignore the growth of companies, great and small, within the Czech lands. Western economic historians, presenting the same process in terms of more gradual development, were hampered by a lack of knowledge of the companies. Instead they analysed economic growth in terms of the overall development within the Habsburg Empire.75 Concepts such as ‘modern economic growth’ are useful as general indicators of the process of this development but tell us nothing about the individual achievements on which this growth is based.76 This is particularly important since the Czech lands developed into an area of major economic and industrial importance. Communications, particularly the transport of raw materials and finished goods, demand good rail and, in Europe, waterway networks. The Rivers Elbe (Czech Labe) and Oder (Czech ´ stı´ nad Labem (via the Elbe) Odra) linked the industries of Prague and U and Ostrava (via the Oder) to the Baltic.77 This was of particular importance to the heavy engineering and iron and steel industries because companies could buy and transport their raw materials more cheaply. The Vı´tkovice iron and steel company, for example, brought its

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iron ore from northern Sweden. Railways had also developed in response to industrial needs.78 Since 1989 a number of company histories have been published, which show the range of industries that established Czechoslovakia as a leading industrial power. It is also possible to examine a wide range of company archives. These show the importance of the Austro– Hungarian heritage and help to explain why the transfer of ownership from Austria to Czechoslovakia was so traumatic for Sudeten Germans and added to the tension between them and Czechs. Larger companies have retained their archives for their own research. Others – especially where they were merged with larger ones after the Communist seizure of power in 1948 – were sent to regional archives and to Prague.79 From these it is now possible to see what the First Republic inherited in terms of economic and industrial assets. Before World War I, the area which became Czechoslovakia had been a country of mostly small and medium sized firms with a number of large companies in major cities. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were the most important producers of coal, iron, sugar and machinery.80 The area also had the second highest per capita income after the Alpine countries.81 Anthracite mining had been developed in the west around Kladno and Plzenˇ: the Sˇkoda engineering works in Plzenˇ took its supplies of iron and steel from Kladno. The other important source of anthracite was in the Ostrava-Karvina´ area, where the coal mines supplied the Vitkovice iron works, which were under the control of the Austrian branch of the Rothschild family from 1840 to 1938. This was the first to introduce coal-fired furnaces and the puddling process of smelting iron in the Empire and in 1910 Vı´tkovice was producing over 50 per cent of all Bohemian pig iron. The main source of lignite was in western Bohemia, in the area of Teplice-Most-Chomutov (German: Teplitz-Bru¨x-Komotau). This amounted to 90 per cent of Bohemian output. By 1880 it had become the second most important lignite-producing area in Europe behind Germany and over half was exported. The largest user in Bohemia was the Prager-Eisenindustrie-Gesellschaft, an amalgam of three smaller firms that had the Bohemian monopoly of the Thomas Gilchrist steelmaking process from 1879. Associated with it, though on a smaller scale, was the expanding chemical industry. Brewing was also a major business, and scientific improvements played an important part here as well. The chemical industry made a wide variety of basic chemicals,

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including sulphuric and hydraulic acid and products based on these that included explosives, paints and artificial fertilisers. The third important industry was sugar production. Much land had been used for the cultivation of sugar beet in the 1860s and sugar exports increased. By 1912, 72 per cent of production was being sold abroad. As in the case of the other industries, engineering formed the basis of sugar production and part of the success of large engineering firms was built on the manufacture of sugar-refining equipment. Another, older, industry was textile manufacturing, of which the centre was Brno (German: Bru¨nn). Originally a centre of woollen textiles, the area changed to cotton production when American cotton, imported through Hamburg, became freely available. These industries faced severe competition in the crisis of the 1870s but were able to survive through creating cartels that shared out the available market on the basis of production capacity. These industries formed a major part of Austrian industrial development before the end of World War I. The most famous company was the armaments manufacturer Sˇkoda, which had its main factory in Plzenˇ. During the First Czechoslovak Republic this was seen as a Czech company and represented Czech superiority over Sudeten German. The history of this and other companies plays an important part in the relations between Czechs and Sudeten Germans and symbolised Czech economic dominance. This was resented by Sudeten Germans and added to the tension between the two ethnic groups. Sˇkoda had been founded in 1859 by Count Arnosˇt Waldstein, who built a factory to house equipment from a bankrupt firm at Sedlec u Sˇt’a´hlav.82 Initially it employed 120 workers but the company collapsed after the Prussian victory in the Austro –Prussian War. The 27-year-old Emil Sˇkoda was then put in charge. Born in 1839 in Cheb, he had studied at the Czech Technical College and in Stuttgart and Karlsruhe. He had also worked in Chemnitz and Magdeburg. He showed outstanding managerial abilities and in 1869 bought the company from Waldstein. Initially he concentrated on steel production and processing. In 1871 he added a foundry and in the 1880s a new forge, steel works and preparation plant. He also created a network of domestic and foreign sales offices. In 1886 he began his first experiments with armour plate and the first 150 mm cannon gun carriage was produced. By 1890 he was making long-barrelled field cannon. At the same time the factory began producing steam engines and equipment for

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sugar refineries, brick works, mines, breweries and a number of other industries. To raise more capital for further expansion, Sˇkoda made the firm into a publicly owned company with a capital of 25 million crowns. When he died in 1900 the firm was employing 4,000 workers and 200 office staff and had an international reputation. The company supplied water turbines to Niagara Falls, parts for shipbuilding in England and France, components to the French Schneider company and had helped build the Suez Canal. It was the largest arms manufacturer in the Austro–Hungarian Empire. However, at the end of the war it was facing ruin. The market for armaments had collapsed and there were large unpaid debts. The board of directors resigned, seeing no future for the firm. But the new board found a strong partner in the French Schneider company, which bought 60,000 shares and the balance of 43,000 were bought by the principal Czech bank, the Zˇivnostenska´ Banka.83 Sˇkoda is the best-known Czechoslovak company and helped to make Plzenˇ an important industrial city. Another industrial city was Prague. This was as much an industrial as an administrative centre and a number of large companies had their head offices there. One of the most important was the Austrian railway engineering company Ringhoffer.84 Originally established in 1769 by the coppersmith Franz Ringhoffer, in 1852 the company began repairing and later building railway wagons.85 In 1867 the firm started making railway carriages. Between 1869 and 1874 Ringhoffer made three luxury dining and sleeping cars for the Austrian Empress Elizabeth and by 1900 the firm was making carriages for European royal houses.86 By 1909, when Franz Ringhoffer died, the company was one of the largest engineering works in Bohemia. Two years later, under pressure from major banks, the firm was transformed into a joint stock company and a general engineering company that had been created was sold. After the end of World War I the demand for luxury railway carriages collapsed. The company was still controlled by the Austrian Ringhoffer aristocratic family and can be seen as one of the most important Sudeten German companies, though with headquarters in Prague. The company survived by joining a cartel of railway wagon makers to share out the available orders.87 Ringhoffer also bought shares in similar companies in Stude´nka, Kolı´n and Cˇeska´ Lı´pa, established a wagon-building works in Koprˇivnice and bought shares in the Sousedı´k electrical engineering company in Vsetin. In this way the company managed not only to survive but expand

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into new areas. This was one of the most successful Sudeten Geman companies. Closely associated with Ringhoffer was the Tatra company. This too had a long history. It had been founded in 1850 by Igna´c Schustala as a carriage works and became a limited company in 1858.88 Schustala developed an international trade; his carriages were awarded gold medals at international exhibitions. In 1866 he was given the title of supplier of carriages to the Prussian court and in this respect he was similar to Ringhoffer. Between 1870 and 1880 he was making almost 1,200 carriages a year and exporting them throughout the Austro–Hungarian Empire and even to St Petersburg and Turkey.89 In 1881 he began making railway wagons, financed by the Gutmann brothers of Ostrava. By the end of the century he had changed from carriages to railway wagons as railways replaced road travel. The next development was the company’s first car, made for the textile magnate Baron von Liebig. This was a Benz Victoria, which was given the name President. In 1898 the company, now renamed Nesseldorf, made its first lorry and in 1903 it built a motor coach. A succession of different types of cars and lorries followed, including military vehicles for the Austro–Hungarian army during World War I. In 1920 the company was renamed Tatra, to emphasise the change from Austro–Hungarian to Czechoslovak control.90 These engineering companies could not have functioned without efficient iron and steel works. One of the most important was Vı´tkovice in Ostrava.91 This began in 1828 as the Rudolf Ironworks, founded by the Cardinal Archbishop of Olomouc, Archduke Rudolf. In 1843 it was sold to the Viennese banker Salomon Mayer Rothschild for 321,500 florins. S. M. Rothschild was one of the five sons of the founder of the Rothschild bank in Vienna and his brothers ran the bank’s other branches in London, Paris, Naples and Frankfurt. Under Salomon Rothschild’s control a Belgian type blast furnace was installed – the first in Austria –Hungary – creating the most modern puddling mill in Europe. In 1864 Rothschild installed three Bessemer converters, further improving efficiency. These used less fuel and were used to process Hungarian pig iron. The foundation of Vı´tkovice’s further expansion was laid by the partnership of S. M. Rothschild and two brothers, Wilhelm and David Gutmann. The first priority was to have sufficient coal supplies. In 1868 the Doubrava and Orlova´ coal mining company was created. In 1871 this became the Combined Vı´tkovice Coal Mining

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Company which controlled the firm’s six mines.92 The next stage was to enter into partnership with the Austrian Count Larisch-Mo¨nnich, who owned coal mines at Karvina´ east of Ostrava and Count Andra´ssy, who supplied Hungarian pig iron. This led to the creation of the Sophie iron works. As the company grew, so too did the workforce: from 370 to 3,700 in the first 30 years. Most were from Bohemia, Galicia (later southern Poland), Prussia and Hungary. In the business crisis of the 1870s there was a run on the Austrian Commercial and Trading Credit Bank, which was a major shareholder. But the business survived. The Rothschilds amalgamated the iron and steel works with the coal mines and created the Vı´tkovice Mining and Iron Corporation in 1873. Half of the shares were owned by the Rothschilds and the Gutmann brothers.93 The joining of coal mining and iron and steel production led to further technical advances. In 1879 Vı´tkovice carried out the first European trials of the new Gilchrist Thomas process for removing phosphorus in steel production. A number of open hearth and crucible furnaces were then built, together with a forge, hardening and machine shops. Vı´tkovice built the first tube rolling mill in the Austro– Hungarian Empire in 1883 and a new cast steel plant in 1889. Production of armour plate began in 1893.94 The first tube rolling mill in the Austro– Hungarian Empire was constructed in 1883, making tubes up to 14 inches in diameter, after Rothschild had bought the Sophie Iron works in Ostrava.95 To remain in the forefront of technical development, Vı´tkovice began using the Stiefel method of seamless tube production from 1907. By the end of World War I construction of a Mannesmann rolling mill had also begun.96 As Vı´tkovice moved increasingly into the production of high quality steel it became essential to obtain supplies of high grade iron ore in place of the lower grade Hungarian. Sweden was the main supplier of ore of this type. When the Swedish Bergsverksaktiebolaget Freja (Freja Mining Company) was founded in Malmo¨ in 1897, Vı´tkovice became the major shareholder, owing 2,500 of the 2,465 shares. Total control was achieved in 1910, when Vı´tkovice bought the remaining shares.97 This guaranteed the company’s long-term future. A new steelworks and rolling mill were opened between 1909 and 1916 and Vı´tkovice products were sold through a cartel and the company’s sales offices. In the early days of the company, the main items had been steel plates and girders. This led in the 1850s to the creation of a workshop for

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making parts for bridges. A number were built using a combination of alloy and ductile steel – a result of the company’s growing technical expertise in steel production.98 Later, bridges were built in Galicia, Styria, Italy and over the Danube. The same construction designs were also used in building the Pula market in 1903 and the L’viv railway station in 1914. Vitkovice had also begun making boilers by the end of the nineteenth century and from this moved first into repairing railway locomotives and later into the design and construction of them as well as the manufacture of railway wheels. Vitkovice thus became a very large engineering company and to support its varied activities had two coking plants: the Vı´tkovice and Karolina and its own brick, gas and lime works, as well as the coal mines. Wartime armament production included forged gun barrels, cannon mountings, artillery shells, air chambers for torpedoes, hand grenades, armour plate and gun turrets for battle cruisers and land fortifications. So effective was the armour plate – it had proved superior to Krupp’s and Vickers’ in tests at Pula – that Vı´tkovice became the sole manufacturer of armour plate for the Austro– Hungarian navy. To meet increased demand a new armour plate works had been built in 1899, equipped with an 8,000 ton press, and a further 10,000 ton bending press was added in 1902. The company also made armour-piercing projectiles, for which a patent had been granted in 1908. Production was maintained during the war by using prisoners of war to replace the men who had been conscripted into the army. At first Russian, Serbian and Italian prisoners were employed but from mid-1916 only Italians were used. There is no record of accidents but an outbreak of cholera killed hundreds of prisoners in 1918. This included the 248 Italians who are known to have died there during the war. Production was thus maintained throughout the war, though the use of unskilled foreign labour probably led to a decline in output. Once the war was over the company faced the same problem as at the Sˇkoda works in Plzenˇ – no demand for armaments and unpaid debts. What helped Vı´tkovice survive was the network of sales representatives that had been established before World War I, first in Germany in 1902 and then in the Netherlands in 1906. Besides these established agencies the company had supplied the Austro –Hungarian shipyards in the Adriatic at Trieste, Pula and Rijeka, as well as in Russia. Recovery began in 1923 when the company supplied Germany and former German markets in

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Western Europe during the Ruhr crisis and subsequently enlarged its system of representatives. The economic assets of the new Czechoslovak state were not confined to heavy engineering and coal and steel production. Another major Czech company which developed an international reputation was the Bat’a shoe company, founded by Toma´sˇ Bat’a.99 He came from a long line of shoe makers in Zlı´n, whose small-scale, local business was typical of shoe making in the nineteenth century Austro–Hungarian Empire.100 In 1894 or 1895 he started a business with his brother and sister making and selling their own shoes. It failed, but he began again, making a lighter, canvas shoe instead of the heavy shoes that had formerly been the stock in trade. These proved more successful and he began looking for ways of increasing production. He went first to Frankfurt to look for punching and sewing machines for his factory.101 Although he found a wide range, all were driven by steam power which at that time he did not have. By the end of the century Bat’a had bought a steam engine, increased production and taken on more workers.102 To develop his factory further Bat’a decided to go to America to see for himself how shoes could be made more efficiently. Factory production of shoes had originated in America, where there had been a shortage of skilled craftsmen. Machines had been designed to compensate for this: Blake’s Sole Stitching machine of 1858, McKay’s leasing and royalty system of these machines in 1861, the Goodyear Welt and Sole Stitchers of 1880, Matzeliger’s Lasting Machine and Singer’s machine for sewing uppers. It was typical of Bat’a that he should have wanted to get firsthand experience and work in an American factory. When he went to America in 1904 he found at first that he could not get a job because he could not match the speed of the skilled American factory workers. But by dint of hard work and perseverance he managed to improve and got a job. He realised for the first time the importance of proper training for each of the specialised aspects of shoe making and the way that machines could be used to speed up production. When he returned to Zlı´n he introduced American production methods into his factory. Using the profits from his canvas shoes, he built a new factory and tightened discipline, introducing penalties for bad workmanship. Other entrepreneurs followed his example and by 1910 five more shoe factories had also been established in the town. Bat’a’s new methods of improving production were unpopular and caused a strike, which he broke by firing

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the organisers and tightening discipline. He had no more trouble. After this crisis production again improved and by 1910 Bat’a was employing 1,500 workers and producing 3,000 pairs of shoes a day. Since his business was now well established, he commissioned the company’s chief architect, Vladimı´r Karfı´k, to design a villa for him.103 Still not satisfied that he had reached maximum output, Bat’a paid a second visit to America in 1913 to study the scientific management systems created by Taylor, Gilbreth and Ford.104 This showed that, for example, making a pair of shoes could be divided into a series of tasks. The craftsman working alone had to cut out each piece of canvas, shape it over a last, sew the uppers and then attach these to the sole and heel. By dividing shoe making into separate tasks, each could be done by a skilled worker more quickly. This only required workers to be trained in a single part of the work. They could achieve a high standard of workmanship and rapid speed. Cutting out the parts and doing the preliminary shaping was done in one part of the factory. These parts were then sent to the assembly line where they were made into shoes. The pace of work – and therefore the output – was decided not by the speed of the individual worker but by the speed of the assembly line. By 1913 Bat’a was using conveyor belts, which had become widely used in factories, as well as time and motion studies for measuring workers’ tasks more scientifically.105 When World War I broke out Bat’a saw that there would be a huge demand for military boots and that demand for his canvas shoes would fall. He rushed to Vienna – everything about Bat’a shows him to be a man of tremendous energy – and won a contract for 50,000 pairs of military boots. This kept the factory going and ensured that his workers would not be conscripted into the army. To change from making canvas shoes to military boots was hard and production was slow to begin with. But with time the problems were overcome and he received more orders. By the end of the war, output had reached 10,000 pairs of military boots a day. There was also a small production line for civilian shoes. To meet the total demand more workers were employed and by 1918 5,000 were working for Bat’a. The manufacture of army boots was very profitable: his profits rose from 4,008,786 crowns in 1914 to 47,964,586 crowns in 1918, though inflation played a part in this. It enabled Bat’a to buy forests to provide wood for his woodworking department, improve the machinery in his factories and build houses for the workers who were

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coming to work in Zlı´n. He also subsidised food for the workers when inflation and growing shortages increased prices. When the war ended and the Czechoslovak Republic was formed, Bat’a, like other manufacturers, faced the prospect of unpaid government bills. In 1918 he was owed 3.3 million (Austrian) crowns. But he owed 9 million crowns to the Czech Bank Union, had borrowed money from the Zˇivnostenska´ banka and there were unpaid taxes. As with other companies, the machines that Bat’a had bought for war production were not as useful for peacetime. Many of the new buildings had only been temporary. Czechoslovak shoe making, dominated by Bat’a, accounted for almost 80 per cent of Austro– Hungarian production. Bat’a, like other companies, had to develop an export market to take the anticipated surplus production. It also led Bat’a to set up factories abroad where there were better supplies of raw materials and where shoes could be designed to suit local tastes. Not everyone admired Bat’a. J. Hampden Jackson, writing in 1935, said that ‘Bat’a out Heroded Herod in tyranny and out Forded Ford in efficiency’.106 Bat’a, Sˇkoda, Ringhoffer and Vitkovice were internationally famous companies. However, the strength of the Czechoslovak economy was based as much on medium-sized and small companies as on these large businesses. One of the products of the nineteenth century scientific revolution was the growth of a chemical industry. Most of this was concentrated in U´sti nad Labem (German Aussig) in north-west Bohemia. One of the more unusual however was not there but in the railway town of Bohumin (German Oderberg) near Ostrava. This was the Oderberge Chemische Werke. It had been founded not by an Austrian or Czech like the other companies but by a German, Rudolf Goldschmidt. He came from an old established family firm of dye merchants in Breslau (now the Polish town Wrocław) founded in 1810.107 Breslau was an important Prussian industrial city, second in importance to the Ruhr. Rudolf was a trained chemist; he had studied chemistry at the Breslau technische hochschule. He realised that the old vegetable dyes were being replaced by the new aniline dyes. These produced a wider range of colours and were less likely to fade.108 Like Salomon Rothschild, Goldschmidt realised that industry in the Austro– Hungarian Empire was not as well developed as in Germany. In 1902 he established the factory in Oderberg to exploit German advanced industrial methods. Bohumin was on one of the main railway lines from Vienna to

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St Petersburg and was close to supplies of coal tar (from the Vı´tkovice coke plants) for making the dyes. Goldschmidt was an entrepreneur and built the new factory. Expertise for running the new company came from his partnership with the German chemical company Farbwerke A.G. (formerly Lucius Bru¨ning) in Ho¨chst am Main. Although there are few records of the early part of this venture, it appears that Goldschmidt intended to sell his dyes to the cotton factories that were replacing woollen textiles in Brno (German Bru¨nn). The business was still small when World War I broke out. During the war the market for dyes was limited principally to those needed for the Austro–Hungarian uniforms. He had to find a profitable alternative to the aniline dyes and in 1917 he began making saccharine, which had been discovered by Constantin Fahlberg in 1879. At that point of the war, although sugar production was at a high level, most was either being bought by the government for making explosives or was being exported. The civilian population, accustomed to a good supply of sugar, was limited to a small weekly ration. Saccharine was a convenient, cheap alternative. German manufacturers welcomed the chance to develop a partnership with a company in Austria. There were restrictions on using saccharine in Germany because of medical fears about the effect of consuming large quantities. Goldschmidt also believed that if Russia collapsed – as appeared likely in 1917 – a new market could be created in the east. He opened a new factory in partnership with the main German saccharine manufacturer, Saccharine A.G. (formerly Fahlberg List). This had a capital of 4 million crowns and the head office in Vienna. Although the company was small by comparison with those described above, Goldschmidt was able to call on a wide range of experienced and important figures to fill places on his supervisory board. They included Dr Georg Zetter, vice-president of the Bund Oesterreichischer Industrieller in Vienna and the Viennese chemical consultant Ing. Chem. Julius Neudorfer. In 1918, in recognition of the need for a link with the large chemical industry in U´sti nad Labem, Johann Futschik of the Oesterreichische Chemische und Metallurgische Produktion joined the board to advise on the purchase of raw materials. Ownerships – and control – of the company was shared between Saccharine A.G., Goldschmidt and the Union Bank of Vienna. Goldschmidt had 709 votes at the annual general meeting, Saccharine had 707 and the Union Bank 662. It remained

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essentially a Sudeten German company, though nominally controlled by Czechs. The market for saccharine, like most other commodities, was covered by a cartel agreement and the company supplied the Vienna cartel office with details of raw material and production costs for different levels of sweetness. The result of these discussions was that the cartel office agreed that the company could have an annual output of 120,000 kg of saccharine at different levels of sweetness to a maximum of 150 times that of sugar. To guarantee that the company kept to this limit, representatives of the cartel office paid regular visits and the company had to deposit a bond of 300,000 crowns as surety. The end of the war changed the outlook for this as for other companies and in the long run this led to a diversification of production into other chemicals for domestic and industrial use. Goldschmidt’s company produced saccharine for the civilian market. Other consumer firms included the many Sudeten German companies making glass and crystal, for which Czechoslovakia had a worldwide reputation. Most was produced in relatively small companies in Bohemia and Moravia. One of these, which developed an international reputation and exported much of its production to England, was S. Reich, later Cˇeskomoravske´ Skla´rny a.s., founded in 1813. As with Goldschmidt’s chemical company, glass production combined craftsmanship, skill and science. As with most other Czechoslovak companies, except for Bat’a, glass makers did not use mass production methods but made their profits from making smaller quantities of more specialised glass products. Imaginative design and colour were the main characteristics of Czech glass manufacture.109 A number of small firms had been established at Kra´sno nad Becˇvou (now part of Valasˇske´ Mezirˇicˇı´), Vsetı´n and Velke´ Karlovice along the Becˇva river, where there were suitable supplies of sand and a good supply of wood for heating the furnaces. The ´ sobrno west of Olomouc, Rapotin company also owned glassworks at U near Sˇumperk and Novy´ Bor in Bohemia. Equally important was the influence of the glass-making school in Novy´ Bor, established in 1870, to which an artistic studio was added later.110 The company manufactured engraved crystal bowls in at least 29 different designs with matt and glossy surfaces in colours that included blue, violet, green, rose and ice gold.111 Reich’s products also included coloured lampshades in different sizes and ceiling bowls for electric lights. Besides these there were shades for standard, paraffin and gas lamps, all in a variety of colours and of

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different designs. Reich also made tableware, which included wine and spirit glasses and glass soda siphons. The colours were created by chemical formulae – the result of research and practical experience.112 This is another example of the advanced nature of the factories that formed Czechoslovak industry. It is when Czechoslovak companies are compared to British that this technical progress becomes clear. By comparison, in England it was only in World War I that a department of glass science was opened at Sheffield University. Czech firms were therefore technically and artistically more advanced. In the nineteenth century the largest market for Reich was in Vienna but gradually the company’s sales expanded to include the whole of the Austro–Hungarian Empire, as well as England, America, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. Sales within the Habsburg Empire were handled from a warehouse in Vienna, where the head office was officially situated.113 The most significant foreign sales were to England. Of total sales of 1.6 million crowns, roughly one-third (505,438 crowns) were to England, 487,223 crowns were sales to Vienna, Milan and Naples and glass worth 472,637 crowns was sent to Berlin. There were also sales of glass shades for gas lamps to Austria and Berlin amounting to approximately 43,000 crowns and smaller sales to Paris and Holland. Technical ability and artistic design was also the secret of the success of Moravia a.s. This was a hardware company founded in 1854 at Hlubocˇky´ (German Hombok) in the Bystrˇicˇka valley east of Olomouc. In 1888 Moravia became a public company with a capital of 400,000 crowns. The latest British machines were installed and the founder, Ignatz Mechanek, designed and manufactured a wide range of cast iron products that were exhibited at major world exhibitions. By 1900 he was making 278 different items, which won 27 medals, 20 of them gold. By the outbreak of World War I a second factory had been opened nearby and the combined output included American flat irons, ovens, slowburning stoves, treadle sewing machines, clocks, household furniture, crosses for graves and a range of nails and rivets. Moravia was also working closely with Toma´sˇ Bat’a, supplying nails and rivets for shoes and boots. Bat’a’s increased production of army boots during World War I provided Moravia with a growing market and Bat’a stimulated Moravia’s search for greater efficiency. To complete this brief survey of companies mention can be made of two small Sudeten German firms that are typical of a wide range of

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small-scale but profitable businesses. The first is a general hardware company, the Brankauer Draht-Blechwaren und Na¨gelfabrik of Hradec nad Moravici near Opava (German: Troppau).114 Founded in 1863 by Carl Dobrazil to make nails, it developed into a general hardware company. Situated within a short distance of Ostrava and a supply of iron from the Vı´tkovice works, it is an example of small-scale entrepreneurial activity. During World War I it extended its range of products by making parts for bridges, possibly as a sub contractor to Vı´tkovice. By the end of the war it had grown from a general hardware company into a more specialised maker of house and furniture locks, which were exported all over the Austro – Hungarian Empire. In the immediate postwar period it was very profitable. Its goods were sold in an area from Rome to Warsaw and as far East as Lemburg (Polish: Lvo´v, Ukrainian: Lviv). The liquidation balance in 1919, when the currency was being changed from Austrian into Czechoslovak crowns, showed where goods were being sold. Not only were the traditional areas of southern Poland, Vienna, Hungary and Moravia well represented, but there were also sales to Budapest, Bucharest, northern Italy, Constantinople, Thessalonika, Alexandria and Cairo. There was a spirit of optimism in the company. New machines were bought in Berlin, Vienna and Brno to improve the company’s efficiency.115 In the postwar boom Brankauer made profits of 1.01 million crowns in 1919, 2.8 million crown in 1920 and 0.8 million crowns in 1921. There were home sales of 14.5 million crowns and exports to Vienna (5.6 million crowns), Italy, (2.3 million crowns), Yugoslavia (12.6 million crowns) and Romania and Bulgaria (200,000 crowns each). The directors were a cross-section of the local Czech, German and Polish business community. The chairman, Eduard Nedela, was a local councillor. Directors included Heinrich Janotta, president of the Opava branch of the Silesian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Franz Hammer, a factory owner and councillor, and Rudolf Pollak, who was a director of the local branch of the Viennese Union Bank. The other company in this brief survey is Optimit a.s., founded in Vienna in 1863 by a group of Jewish factory owners, textile merchants and their wives and business associates.116 Optimit is typical of a number of Jewish entrepreneurial concerns that drew on a wide range of ideas, expertise and capital from within the large Viennese Jewish community. To begin with, the company was called Schneck und

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Kohnberger. The owners began by buying a textile mill and spinning works at Odry and Benesˇov in northern Moravia. The Depression had begun in the 1870s and production costs had fallen. The owners’ intention was to manufacture high quality clothing for the Viennese market that could be sold by their business associates. They were not in competition with the mass market for clothing that was the preserve of the textile city of Brno, the ‘Moravian Manchester’. The company exhibited at the Vienna World Exhibition in 1873 and won a number of awards. They moved into rubber production with a device consisting of rubber bands and hooks to make boots and shoes fit better. From this the company moved to producing drive belts for electric motors. Electric power was replacing steam and by 1910 Optimit was making conveyor belts that were sold in Germany as well as Austria– Hungary.117 Like the large companies referred to above, Optimit was combining advanced scientific knowledge with a flair for business that would guarantee its long-term success.

‘Nostrification’ – creating the Czechoslovak economic state The information on companies given above shows that the industrial development of the Czech lands was marked by innovation, scientific knowledge and efficient use of natural resources. In general, capital had been provided by Viennese banks and Jewish finance had played an important part. After 1918, Alois Rasˇı´n, the new Czechoslovak Finance Minister, had to transform the Austro– Hungarian banks and companies into Czechoslovak institutions. Given the task of creating the economic basis of the state, Rasˇin could only hope that the different racial groups could work together as harmoniously as they had done under the Habsburgs. As far as possible, the old bureaucratic and property-owning elites were left intact. The Government started with the reasonable assumption that those who chose to live in the new state would become citizens. The Treaty of St Germain had defined citizenship of the new Austria and the terms for becoming a citizen of the new Czechoslovak state. Article 70 defined citizens of the former Austrian-Hungary as those who had Heimrecht or pertinenza (the legal right to reside there). Czechs and Slovaks who spoke their own language and had lived all their lives in the area that became Czechoslovakia were covered by Article 77. So too were those who had

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adopted German language and culture as a means of entering the state civil service or industry but who still considered themselves Czechs or Slovaks.118 Austrians living in Czechoslovakia were not forced to make a quick decision. Article 78 gave them 12 months to make their choice. If they decided not to become Czechoslovak citizens they would have to leave. This covered the German speakers. Article 80 gave minority groups (Poles and Hungarians) six months to decide. This was for the people living in disputed territories: Hungarians in southern Slovakia and Poles – termed locally Slonzaks by Czechs – in the area around Teschen. Married women and children under 18 were ordered to accompany the head of the family. Those living in Sub Carpathian Ruthenia also became Czechoslovak citizens and their rights were guaranteed under Articles 10 – 13.119 As a result, all who lived in the new state could become a citizen but they could not hold dual nationality. But it is also unlikely that the regulations about leaving the state were enforced. In the big industrial city of Ostrava, for example, ethnic Poles formed a useful reserve of labour. Prejudice against them may well have made it difficult to obtain Czechoslovak nationality and many stayed there. For example the Jewish Alexander family moved from Poland into Ostrava, partly to find work and also to escape Polish anti-Semitism. The father was an experienced leather worker but never took Czechoslovak nationality. He was not forced to leave Czechoslovakia and remained in Ostrava until the Sudetenland crisis.120 This shows that whatever the formal terms of the Treaty of St German, the reality was often different. Czech– Polish, Czech–Austrian and Slovak–Hungarian ethnic rivalries over land remained throughout the period of the First and Second Republics. Once the question of nationality had been established, the Czechoslovak Government could turn to the control of the country’s economic resources. The so-called ‘nostrification’ law was passed on 11 December 1919. This was based on Article 297 of the Versailles treaty, which allowed the successor states to buy capital shares from their former owners or take them as reparations.121 This new law stated that any joint stock company with a subsidiary in the territory of Czechoslovakia should transfer its headquarters to that country. It also had to assign the ownership of the subsidiary to Czechoslovak subjects (with possible share-holding of ‘allied’ capital).122 This meant that a majority of the directors had to be Czechoslovak citizens.123 A total of

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231 companies, which had originally been Austrian or Hungarian, were made Czechoslovak. They either transferred their headquarters or divided the shares.124 But since there were heavy financial penalties for closing a company in Austria, many companies left a registered office in Vienna.125 Many companies that had been subsidiaries of Austrian firms established their headquarters in Prague. This was a reasonable decision, but it caused great difficulties for leading Austrian industrialists who lived in Vienna and had directed their companies from there. It left open the question of where a person who had homes in Prague and Vienna officially lived and therefore what his nationality was. The initial Austrian reaction to the creation of the Czechoslovak state had been to protest and leading industrialists were unwilling to relinquish control of their firms. In any case they were experienced, energetic and able people with important business connections. The Czechoslovak Government therefore moved very carefully in defining national identity and the legal status of inhabitants of the new state. There was no point in antagonising people who might be won over. The example of the Oderberge Chemische Werke shows how the owners kept control. Before 1918 the directors had been Austrian and German. They included the German Rudolf Goldschmidt, the vicepresident of the Bund Oesterreichischer Industrielle in Vienna, a representative of the Oesterreichische Chemische und Metallurgische Produktion and members of the Union Bank and Saccharin A.G.126 After the creation of Czechoslovakia power was officially put into the hands of Goldschmidt’s close associate, Georg Lo¨vy, who was appointed managing director and became a Czechoslovak citizen. To emphasise his new nationality he was referred to as Jirˇi Lo¨vy, though he remained at heart an Austrian. The Union Bank sold its shares to the main Czech bank, the Zˇivnostenska´ banka. As before, the major part of the profits – up to 40 per cent – went to Saccharin A.G. and the rest was shared between Goldschmidt and the Czech bank. In this respect, little changed except that the shares formerly owned by the Austrian bank were now in the hands of the main Czech commercial bank. The reason why there was so little change was that the pre-1918 agreement specified the payment of the royalty to Saccharin A.G. on saccharine production and the shareholders were paid a share of the profits. The firm remained successful because of the high price of saccharine. This had been established by the Vienna cartel office after negotiations with

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Goldschmidt, and resulted from the company’s monopoly within the Habsburg Empire. After 1918 a similar cartel office was established in Prague for the Czechoslovak Republic. Inevitably it worked under the same rules, probably with the same personnel, and Goldschmidt kept his monopoly and high prices until 1937. This was very important for the company, because it provided the main part of the profits. The Optimit company tackled the problem in another way. It had been founded by a group within the Viennese Jewish community who had bought two factories to supply the Viennese market with high quality clothes. Under nostrification the official choice was for the owners to sell their factories or settle in the new republic. Instead they divided the company into two separate parts. The main one remained Schneck und Kohnberger (after the original founders) and became the trading agency. The manufacturing side became Optimit gumove´ a textilne´ za´vody a.s.127 The official statement in the Prager Tageblatt on 12 December 1922 declared that Optimit had taken over the 60-year old company Schneck and Kohnberger. New shares to the value of 11 million Czech crowns were issued, underwritten by the Allgemeine Bo¨hmische Bank in Prague. To meet the requirements of the nostrification law a board was created consisting of a Czech lawyer, Alois Bruncˇlik, a company employee, Viktor Irmenbach, two representatives of the Allgemeine Bo¨hmische Bank (both Jewish) and two Viennese, Conrad Tiring and Carl Mislap. The transfer of business from Austrian to Czechoslovak banks was also carried out by the transfer in 1920 of all the Credit-Anstalt Czechoslovak branches and liaison offices to the Bo¨hmische Escomptebank.128 What did change was the influx of foreign capital into Czech banks that increased their power and encouraged firms to look to them for finance rather than Austrian. This is one area in which Czech influence increased. The owners of both these companies were able to obey the letter of the nostrification law while maintaining control and this proved a model for others. The nomination of a hand-picked majority of the board ensured that control by the original owners was not broken. Nor could nostrification change the way that cartels operated or alter any contracts that had already been signed, as in the case of the royalty payment on saccharine. Most important, those framing the nostrification law had hoped that it would hand control of the new state to Czechs. They were wrong. Sudeten Germans, now reluctant

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citizens of the state, still owed their loyalty to Austria or Germany, not the Czech-dominated state. The optimistic forecast by Professor R. W. Seton-Watson and Masaryk that harmonious Czech–Austrian relations were not only possible but likely was proved wrong. Sudeten Germans in four areas tried to establish national territories, but these were short-lived.129 The Czechs refused to accept them and sent troops there in November and December. The Sudeten Germans who were elected to the new Czechoslovak parliament initially refused to enter it. They were supported by anti-Czech demonstrations in Vienna in March 1919, under the banner ‘Nieder tschechischen Tyrannei’ (‘Down with Czech tyranny’).130 There were also demonstrations when Sudeten Germans protested against the Czech refusal to allow them to vote in Austrian elections. Troops opened fire and more than 50 were killed, but there were no more disturbances. Business was conducted in much the same way as before. Sudeten German industrialists saw advantages in being in the new state, though growing autarky in the other states that had benefited from the collapse of the Austro–Hungarian Empire (Hungary, Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia) forced companies to look for markets elsewhere. On paper it looked as if Masaryk and Benesˇ had achieved their ambition, but they could not rely on the loyalty of Sudeten German workers or aristocrats or German landowners who were able to keep their estates. Industrial prosperity would also guarantee long-term harmony between them and Czechs if prosperity could be maintained and both sides see an advantage in supporting the new state.

CHAPTER 2 DIPLOMACY, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWING RESENTMENT

Masaryk, Benesˇ and the Czechs who had created the First Czechoslovak Republic were no doubt elated by their success. After decades of unsuccessful political activity, trying to gain equality with Germans within the Habsburg Empire, they had created a new republic that the Czechs would dominate. Germany and Austria were financially crippled by the world war and accompanying inflation. The Germans had been largely ignored at Versailles when the Allies had discussed the creation of Czechoslovakia. France had supported Masaryk and Benesˇ and even British diplomats who would have preferred a restoration of the Habsburg Empire were at pains to appear fair minded. The new Czechoslovak Government at Prague, consisting of all groups save the Germans, quickly established order when trouble flared in the Sudetenland and also evicted the Hungarian Bolsheviks from the southern Slovak frontier zone. The new finance minister, Alois Rasˇin, created an efficient financial structure and stabilised the economy. But the country had to defend itself from the potential threat from Hungary, which had lost so much territory. Once that had been achieved, the country was able to develop its industrial potential, though this was more likely to benefit the Czechs than Sudeten Germans. This chapter also shows that the relative success of Czech companies increased Czech–Sudeten German tension. This was made worse by German claims that in Germany there was full employment and general prosperity. This increased the desire of many Sudeten Germans for the

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Sudetenland to become part of Germany or, at the very least, to have autonomy within Czechoslovakia. The first few years showed great economic success. But once this initial euphoria had passed, it was clear that the state could only survive in the long-term with the help of the major world powers and the support of the new and as yet, untried, League of Nations. Benesˇ was aware that Czechoslovakia was a small and vulnerable state. His long-term policy as foreign minister was therefore to work to minimise tension between Czechoslovakia and her neighbours, especially Germany. He also tried to encourage the French to regard Czechoslovakia as a useful ally within the system of diplomatic alliances that France created. This, he hoped, would ensure French support. There remained the potential threat from Hungary, which lost a great deal of land, including that which formed the southern border of the Slovak part of the republic. There was also tension with Poland. One reason was the disputed territory around Teschen (Czech: Cˇesky´ Te˘sˇı´n, Polish: Cieszyn), with a large Polish population and rich coal reserves. The other concerned Ukrainian nationalists based in Ruthenia (the extreme east of Czechoslovakia) who tried to foment unrest within the Ukrainian population of eastern Poland. To try and control all this and ensure longterm security, Benesˇ created an alliance with Romania and Yugoslavia, which faced similar problems of national minorities. How he tried to achieve this and how far he succeeded up to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor of Germany is the subject of this next chapter. Czechoslovakia owed her creation to a large extent to French support. It is an irony of history that France was also largely responsible for the destruction of Czechoslovakia in September 1938. The French Government, Czechoslovakia’s most important ally, failed to help when the country was threatened by Hitler. The Munich Conference marked the end of Czechoslovakia as a viable economic entity.1 This unwittingly fulfilled Seton-Watson’s prediction at Versailles in 1919 that, without the Sudeten area, Czechoslovakia would be weak and defenceless.2 After Munich, Czechoslovakia was faced by the threat of German aggression with no possible protection. This was an outcome that the peacemakers of 1919 had not anticipated. Nor had Masaryk and Benesˇ ever considered that the state they were instrumental in creating would ever be abandoned by its allies. They knew from the outset that Czechoslovakia needed international support. Benesˇ, as foreign minister, was ideally

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suited for this role of guiding his country through the diplomatic changes of the 1920s and 1930s. A basically kind man, tactful and considerate, he was also a consummate diplomat and tough negotiator.3 France initially appeared to be the protector of Czech and Slovak interests. France had supported Czech claims in the Versailles discussions about the creation of the new state and had included Czechoslovakia in the postwar treaties that followed. This seemed to show that France was supporting Czechoslovakia, but in reality France was more concerned with protecting herself. To understand this situation one needs to look at the condition of France in 1918 and in the interwar years up to the Munich Conference.

The diplomatic defence: Czechoslovakia and France, an unequal alliance France had ended the war in 1918 dangerously weakened. By November the French had made greater sacrifices of capital and manpower than any of the other Allies. In a single battle, the siege of Verdun, 300,000 French had been killed. French losses of dead and wounded in the war were enormous: they totalled about one-tenth of all young Frenchmen: 1.32 million.4 Even after World War II seats on the Paris Metro were still reserved for mutile´s aux guerres (disabled war veterans) and these were only the survivors. These losses were serious because there was no substitute for a large army, even with modern weapons. Before the war, the French population had been just under 40 million and had stopped increasing. Germany’s had reached 60 million in 1905 and had grown by about 5 million a year. From the French point of view it was vital in 1919 to get everything that could strengthen her own defence. To this end France first tried to get control of the left bank of the Rhine: the 1914 attack had come from there. In 1917, before the Russian Revolution, France and Russia had agreed to create a separate Rhineland state when Germany had been defeated. But Britain was not a signatory to this agreement and, in any case, Russia had sued for peace after the Revolution. Alsace and Lorraine, taken from France in 1871, were returned in 1918, but this was not enough to give France longterm security against German military revival. At Versailles the French tried again to gain the Rhineland, but Britain and America opposed this on the grounds that more than 5 million Germans lived on the west bank. Instead, the Saar was placed under temporary French control, to

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compensate for losses in the French coalfields. The final decision on its nationality was to be decided later by plebiscite. These were the French gains at Versailles. But France expected that Versailles would also give France an Anglo– American guarantee that would ensure her future safety against a resurgent Germany. America’s decision not to sign the Versailles settlement ended these hopes. France turned instead to international diplomacy to provide security. It was only a question of time before Germany would recover, in spite of the punitive reparations payments, the limits placed on the size of the army and the banning of offensive weapons. One promising line for French diplomacy was to try and create a barrier of states east of Germany that would help to encircle it. This provided Czechs and Slovaks with the illusion of French support but Czechoslovakia was not the first state that France approached in her search for security. The first choice was Russia, but the revolutionary government had turned away from European alliances and had defaulted on earlier large French loans. Nor was Czechoslovakia France’s second choice. Under pressure from the army, the French Government next turned to Poland, which was much larger and with which France had emotional ties – Polish nationalists had been given asylum when Poland was under Russian and German control. Both France and Poland needed security. Poland had been given territory from Germany (after the Upper Silesian plebiscite) and the socalled Polish Corridor, an area of land joining Poland to the Baltic. The German Baltic port of Danzig had also been placed under League of Nations authority. Thus Poland also needed defence against Germany to guarantee her possession of this former German territory. Poland wanted protection against Russia for similar reasons. Poland had rejected the eastern frontier proposed at Versailles and in 1920 had successfully fought Russia, gaining more territory. Poland therefore faced possible threats from Russia and Germany, both potentially powerful states, but Poland lacked easily defended frontiers. The French offer of a defensive alliance appeared to solve this problem by promising French support and the treaty was signed on 19 February 1921. As further help there was also a military convention and a 400 million franc loan to enable Poland to purchase French arms. In return France gained a commercial agreement that was extremely favourable. France also hoped that Poland would join a more ambitious plan for a central European alliance that would also include Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and possibly

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Russia.5 But Poland’s rivalry with Czechoslovakia over the Teschen coalfield on the border between northern Moravia and Poland made it unlikely that the two countries could be allies. Czechoslovakia also distanced herself from Poland after the short Polish–Russian war. In any case, Czechoslovakia wanted to create an alliance of Slav states in Central Europe and this would have included Yugoslavia and a much smaller Poland.6 French support for Czechoslovakia also alienated Poland, which made Poland jealous of Czechoslovakia. After Poland had refused to join the proposed French-led alliance of Central European states, France signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia in January 1924 which imposed no military obligations, and followed this with treaties of friendship with Yugoslavia and Romania. Czechoslovakia was to be a key element in this new policy. It had one of the best armaments industries in Europe and frontiers that could be defended by the relatively small army that the country could hope to raise. The standard of this army was likely to be high: troops in the Czech Legion had fought with distinction as part of the French army in World War I and could be relied on to fight bravely again. There were also personal links between France and the new Czechoslovak state. The Slovak, Milan Sˇtefa´nik, had been a general in the French army and in 1915 a Czech e´migre´ group had been established in Paris. There it published Masaryk’s programme announcing the struggle against Habsburg power in the first edition of its journal La Nation Tche`que.7 This French– Czechoslovak treaty left Poland defenceless. Distrusting France, Poland turned instead to Hungary, another country that had no allies. Poland and Czechoslovakia were not the only countries that wanted defence against a resurgent Germany. As in the case of Polish fears of Germany and Russia, Yugoslavia and Romania also needed protection, this time against a resurgent Hungary.8 As an ally of Germany, Hungary had lost a great deal of territory and also had to pay compensation, though not on the same scale as Germany. Her territorial losses however were another matter. The Treaty of Trianon had taken two-thirds of the former Hungarian territory. Ninety per cent of this land was given to Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Northern Hungary became the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, Transylvania went to Romania, Croatia to Yugoslavia, Galicia to Poland and Fiume to Italy. As a result Hungary was reduced in size from 282,000 to 93,000 square km and only kept 7.6 million of its former 18.2 million inhabitants,

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roughly 60 per cent.9 About half of the approximately 3.2 million who were thus transferred found themselves in a minority in these new states. Hungarians deeply resented these losses and successive governments have never abandoned hopes of regaining all or part of the territory. However, as noted above, not all those who the Hungarian Government regarded as Hungarian necessarily saw themselves in the same light. Merely speaking Hungarian and adopting Hungarian culture as a path to careers in industry or the bureaucracy proved nothing. This had been recognised in the Treaty of St Germain in the case of German speakers in Czechoslovakia, who were free to decide their own nationality. This freedom for the former minority groups in Hungary made little difference to Hungarian public opinion. The successor states, Romania and Yugoslavia, aware of this, signed treaties with France to defend themselves from Hungarian revenge. To add further protection the states also signed treaties with each other, forming the Little Entente.10 Though many considered this a French creation, it had originally been proposed by Benesˇ, afraid that France was proposing to build economic and political relations with Hungary. It had begun with the Czech leaders wanting to be the leading influence in the Danube basin.11 Benesˇ used the Hungarian danger and French negotiations with Hungary to form an alliance with Yugoslavia in 1920. Ex-King Charles’ attempt to regain the Hungarian throne in April and October 1921 was seen as a threat by Romania and Benesˇ used this to strengthen the link with Yugoslavia and form an alliance with Romania. Benesˇ’ success in getting the Allies to permanently ban the Habsburg dynasty from the Hungarian throne, in the face of British and Italian opposition, led to a series of treaties that constituted the Little Entente. These were the treaties between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia of 14 August 1920, Czechoslovakia and Romania of 23 April 1921 and Romania and Yugoslavia of 7 June 1921. These treaties were all directed against Hungary and represented the fear that Hungary might try to regain the territory taken by the Treaty of Trianon. They also complemented the Treaty of La´ny that Czechoslovakia had signed in 1921 with Austria. This was provide support against Hungarian claims over the Burgenland and to stop the Habsburgs returning. But Austria did not join the Little Entente, partly because she had to remain neutral and partly to avoid alienating Germany. The Little Entente was meant to keep the major powers out of the Danube basin and

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give the new states an opportunity to develop independently. It was not directed against Germany, which only posed a potential threat to Czechoslovakia. This series of treaties was concluded by the Franco– Czechoslovak pact of 25 January 1924. This provided for consultation and concerted action if there was a threat to either country or to the peace settlement. It also included a provision against a Habsburg restoration and an Anschluss. In all other respects it was deliberately vague, though it did provide each side with a potential influence in the other’s region. The final stage in this system of alliances was the treaties of friendship with Romania (10 June 1926) and Yugoslavia (11 November 1927). In neither case was there any obligation to assist each other if attacked by a third party and France placed a far lower value on these alliances than these allies did.12 But the treaties did provide diplomatic support for Yugoslavia in the dispute with Italy over Dalmatia and Albania, and for Romania in its dispute with Russia over the province of Bessarabia. This network of treaties created an extensive system, dominated by France and aimed at Germany. It was strengthened by French loans, most of which were intended for buying French arms. France’s allies wanted to repay these loans with exports of agricultural products – Romania in particular was a major exporter of grain. But although France was a major grain importer, American cereals were cheaper and France bought those: Romanian grain was more expensive. The French tariff structure made it difficult for her allies to repay the loans with any other goods. French tariffs also encouraged trade with French colonies rather than Eastern Europe. Lacking the means of repaying these loans from profitable trade within the Danube states – autarky in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Romania also hindered trade between them which might have raised money – the debtor countries were forced to float new loans to repay the original ones. An idea of the scale of autarky can be seen from the figures for average tariffs in Table 2.1. It is hardly surprising under these circumstances that trade within Europe was severely restricted, which hindered cooperation between members of the Little Entente. Furthermore, the general level of tariffs rose steadily after World War I. By 1927 most had increased by about half. But as the economic crisis deepened, tariffs rose still further: by 1931 they had increased by about the same amount.13 Czechoslovakia’s position in this system of alliances was different from that of the other states. The Franco – Czechoslovak treaty of 1918

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWING RESENTMENT Table 2.1

61

Average tariff levels in percentages of the values of the goods Agriculture Chemicals Textiles Machines All goods

Austria CzechoSlovakia Hungary Yugoslavia Romania Poland Germany France Italy

16.6 34.1

22.3 42.9

14.6 28.6

25.6 46.2

18.6 35.8

32.1 48.3 29.3 27.5 26.9 18.1 27.4

19.1 37.8 18 29.3 15.5 78.1 28.1

29.8 29.2 294.3 49.6 24 70.6 18.6

33 22.8 22.9 41.6 10.9 38.9 25.4

30.7 33.6 99.2 43.4 19.8 54 27.4

Source: Frederick Herz, The Economic Problems of the Danubian States; A Study in Economic Nationalism (1947), p. 71.

had made the Czech Legion part of the French army. As a result, senior French officers, representing the French General Staff, played an important part in the formation of the new Czechoslovak army as well as its strategy and training. In 1920 General Pelle´, Head of the French Military Mission in Czechoslovakia, was made Chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff.14 Of three loans provided by the French Government one, of 1.149 million francs, was specifically for military purposes.15 France provided the experience that the new army lacked and this, like the diplomatic support, appeared to be a powerful guarantor of the new Czechoslovak state. This was important in 1925 at the Locarno Conference, when Germany accepted her western frontiers with France but not those in the east. Instead, in October 1925 Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium and Poland signed arbitration treaties with Germany to settle any future frontier disputes. To add greater weight to these, treaties of mutual guarantee were also signed between Czechoslovakia, France and Poland the following month – one of the few acts of cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Poland. These treaties were especially important for Czechoslovakia because the German voluntary guarantee of her western frontiers at Locarno in October 1925 had undermined the moral value of the terms of the original Versailles settlement. These now appeared legally less binding. The British decision to guarantee some frontiers but not others also had the effect of

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grading frontiers in order of importance. In Britain’s view, some might be renegotiated, others would not. Czechoslovakia had to put her faith in international treaties, the League of Nations and anything else that appeared to strengthen world peace. To this end, Czechoslovakia signed the Peace of Paris in August 1928. Coming at the end of a decade in which many of the postwar problems appeared to have been solved, this treaty appeared to its signatories to offer excellent prospects for maintaining peace. It was far from being a meaningless piece of paper. It was not pacifist and did not ban war, which was justified in self-defence. Furthermore, Britain made it clear that she considered that it included the right to defend ‘certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety’.16 For America, the treaty did not deny her the right to oppose any infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, the belief that Americans alone had the right to decide their own destiny.17 In other words, the Peace of Paris was regarded by the powers that signed it as an important statement of principle rather than a contractual obligation. Each state remained free to take whatever action it considered appropriate in a crisis. As a result, no machinery was established for enforcing the pact. Two powers, Japan and Italy, soon flagrantly violated it, claiming they were fighting defensive wars. But when it was signed it seemed to create a foundation for peaceful international relations.

Threats to Czechoslovakia The next danger to Czechoslovakia came in 1931 from the Sudeten Germans. Elections in Germany in the previous September had produced an ominous result: the Nazi party gained 95 seats in the Reichstag, an increase from 12 to 107. This was bound to have an influence on Sudeten Germans. Even before this the Nazi party had shown its contempt for democracy and the election of so many more Nazis made the normal work of government impossible. Hitler had made it clear that he wanted to revise the Versailles treaty. At the same time there were moves by the international community to create greater economic cooperation: Briand’s proposal for a European Union was discussed in January 1931 by a League of Nations committee. This failed to produce any clear decision. One unexpected result however was a

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series of secret discussions between the German Foreign Minister, Julius Curtius, and the Austrian Chancellor with the aim of establishing an Austro–German economic union. On 21 March Germany and Austria announced that they had signed a treaty establishing a customs union, which other countries could also join. On the surface this appeared to meet some of the aims of the international community – it offered free trade at a time of mounting economic crisis. But it was impossible to separate economics from politics. The customs union was likely to lead to an increase in German power: Germany would dominate the new union. France and the Little Entente were alarmed: Czechoslovakia and the other Danube states already traded with Germany and Austria on a large-scale. Between 1923 and 1929 Austria’s exports to Czechoslovakia had risen from 167.4 million schillings to 294.6 million schillings (i.e. by approximately 76 per cent) and Czechoslovakia’s share of Austrian exports had risen from 10.2 to 12 per cent.18 If Czechoslovakia joined the customs union, it would become, at best, a junior partner. This would effectively destroy the French system of alliances. Fortunately for Czechoslovakia, France decided that this customs union had to be stopped. The alliances – and with them French security – had to be maintained. It was not easy to see how this could be done however. From Britain’s point of view the union had the advantage that it would help create free trade – an important consideration at that time. But the likely repercussions were a political crisis and possibly war. In the event, the Council of the League agreed to refer the proposed union to the Permanent Court of International Justice because it flouted the terms of the Versailles settlement. This did not automatically mean that the treaty would be termed illegal: the legal position was not clear. But France was not prepared to risk the union being approved and put increasing pressure on Austria not to sign the treaty. France was helped by the Austrian banking crisis and on 3 September the Austrian Chancellor announced to the Committee on European Union that the treaty had been abandoned. Only the German delegate opposed this. Two days later the Permanent Court issued its verdict: the customs union would be contrary to the treaties and protocol. The decision, by a majority of eight judges to seven, shows that this was a political rather than a legal decision. The majority included France, Italy, Romania and Poland (France and her allies); the minority were Germany, Britain and the United States. This decision contributed to the collapse of the

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Weimar Republic, which had always depended for popular support on successful German foreign policy. It was also the end of economic stability. But from the Czechoslovak point of view, the threat of an enlarged and stronger Germany had disappeared. Czechoslovakia could continue to export large quantities of manufactured goods to Germany and Austria, but on an equal basis, not as a junior partner. This was a relief to the Czechoslovak Government. Germany and Austria had been important markets for Czech products for a long time, though they had probably favoured Czech industrial goods rather than Sudeten German consumer items. The Czechoslovak– Austrian treaty of 1921 had also helped to stimulate trade by lowering tariffs by about a third. German companies were keen to expand and invest in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs had to try and maintain their independence. Czechoslovak governments also had to protect the country’s agricultural interests. There had been a gradual move from the countryside to the towns, as in other European states, but in 1918 over half the Czechoslovak inhabitants (54.24 per cent) still lived in the countryside and the position did not change significantly in the 1920s.19 This proportion had only declined slightly since the end of the nineteenth century. It had not been changed very much by the modest land reform. The Government had bought estates and distributed the land to Czechs, many of them former members of the Czech Legion. Most of these estates (350 of the 400) had been Austrian. 20 This had caused great resentment among Sudeten Germans, who saw it as transferring traditional German land to Czechs.21 It was the main complaint in German petitions to the League of Nations Minorities Commission from 1922 to 1926.22 But Benesˇ had not deliberately tried to change the ethnic composition of the Sudeten area by colonising it with Czechs. The transfer of land had undoubtedly reduced the economic power of German landowners but putting Czechs on the land had been the foundation of a multi-ethnic society like Switzerland. He tried to calm German– Czech relations. The votes of the Czech and German peasant parties were important. Later, when harvests increased in 1929 and world prices of primary commodities fell, Czechoslovakia had to protect these agricultural interests from cheap foreign competition by Czechoslovakia’s allies. The Agrarian Party was able to prevent the import of cheap foreign grain from Romania. This failure to cooperate economically with Czechoslovakia’s alliance partners destroyed all

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prospect for strengthening the Little Entente. Any earlier prospect of economic cooperation had also been hindered by the other members’ efforts to increase industrialisation, which had limited Czechoslovak exports to her allies. The agricultural crisis gave Germany an opportunity to weaken Romania’s link with Czechoslovakia and the other members of the Little Entente. Germany first increased agricultural tariffs in 1929, reducing imports of Romanian grain. This helped drive down Romanian prices of agricultural products, which fell from an index of 100 in 1929 to 68.2 in 1930.23 Faced with declining trade and a major economic crisis Yugoslav, Romanian and Hungarian representatives met in Bucharest in July 1931. They proposed that the industrial countries should help them by creating preferential tariffs on agricultural imports. This was rejected by the other states because it ran counter to existing most favoured nation treaties between European industrial states and their overseas cereal suppliers. In August another conference was held in Warsaw that approved the proposal and arranged for it to be discussed at a League of Nations conference in November. When this met Britain, as before, was committed to free trade. France faced a dilemma. She had to find a way of helping her allies by buying their grain – maintaining the Little Entente – but also had to support the large numbers of French peasants who were grain producers. To try and resolve this dilemma the French Commerce Minister, Pierre Flandin, toured south-east Europe, proposing to subsidise cereal exports to other countries instead of introducing preferential French tariffs on her own imports. Germany tried to weaken the French alliance by proposing a system of preferential tariffs for German trade with Romania and Hungary in September 1931.24 This proposed treaty contained safeguards for Czechoslovak and other third party interests but in October and November strong protests were raised against Germany’s proposals. Germany withdrew them and instead signed interim agreements with Hungary and Romania in December. In the case of Romania, Germany promised to import 200,000 tons of grain per month from January 1932. Czechoslovakia could only watch Germany’s growing power from the sidelines. Her future security depended on the strength of the French system of alliances. But it was not only Czechoslovak national security that was at stake. Not all Czechoslovak farmers were Czech and the Czechoslovak Government had to protect the interests of all its farmers. In the frontier

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districts of north Moravia and Bohemia the Sudeten farmers eked out a living on upland farms where the soil was poor. They had too to be protected in this tariff war if the Government were to claim it had the interests of all farmers and their families at heart. The Czech Agrarian Party had considerable power. The French system of alliances was thus extremely important. It was to strengthen France’s allies that France tried to rebuild the economies of the five Danubian states: Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria. Of these, Czechoslovakia alone was economically secure. The Austrian economic crisis that had begun with the collapse of the Creditanstalt Bank in 1931 had spread first to Germany and then to Hungary and Romania, both of which suspended foreign exchange payments.25 Yugoslavia also suffered from the ending of German reparation payments under the Hoover moratorium. France tried to ease this crisis by proposing a Czechoslovak– Hungarian commercial treaty in December 1931, which Austria, Romania and Yugoslavia might join later. This would have created a customs union. It failed because of opposition from the Czech Agrarian Party, though Hungary and Czechoslovakia did sign a barter agreement later, in December 1932, exchanging Hungarian pigs and eggs for Czech coal.26 This benefited the Czech coal mines in northern Moravia rather than the Sudeten German brown coal mining in Bohemia. When Benesˇ, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, was asked to consider signing a treaty with Austria and Hungary he rejected it. Although anxious to preserve the existing alliances that guaranteed Czechoslovakia’s existence, Benesˇ was also afraid of a Habsburg revival and its effect on the Sudeten Germans. Andre´ Tardieu, French prime minister and foreign secretary from March 1932, proposed a system of mutual tariff reductions in the Danube region, leading eventually to the creation of a free trade area.27 This Tardieu Plan was considered by Britain, Italy, the Danubian states and Poland in March –May 1932, though without reaching any agreement. Discussions continued at the Stresa Conference, where it became clear that not only were the Danube states unable to absorb all the grain they produced but they also wanted both French capital and German markets. Britain had favoured free trade until February 1931 when the Depression forced her to introduce protective tariffs. This was followed by the agreement at the Ottawa Conference in July– August 1932 to introduce a system of imperial preferences, which favoured Canadian wheat. Germany and Austria

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continued to discuss ways of reducing tariffs in July 1932 as did Austria and Poland in January 1933, when new tariffs were proposed. But these countries failed to reach any practical solution to these profound economic problems. Germany failed to honour her commitments to Romania to buy cattle and large quantities of grain. This made Romania’s economic crisis worse. Czechoslovakia took no active part in these discussions about agriculture. Her problems were principally industrial: Czechoslovakia was one of the world’s leading industrial states. The economic crisis hit her trade with Germany and Austria as well as her other foreign trade.

Czechoslovak industrial development; from new beginning to crisis, 1918 –30 It has been shown already that Czechoslovak industry was divided between Czechs and Sudeten Germans and was a source of pride to both. For this reason it was a source of tension in the long run because of uneven prosperity. But in 1918 both faced serious problems. Czechoslovakia began with a serious economic burden: the country was regarded by the Allies as a part of a former enemy alliance and had to pay its share of war debts. Czechs and Slovaks had hoped that their country would be regarded as part of the victorious Allied states and be given special privileges, but their hopes were dashed at the Versailles peace conference. It is also a measure of the fear that the Allies felt that for a time it seemed possible that the Sˇkoda factory would be seized as part of the war reparations. It was regarded as an Austrian armaments factory – a view held by France, one of the Czech and Slovak leaders’ firmest allies. In addition to this financial burden, the new republic had to pay a so-called liberation contribution, which was part of the Austro–Hungarian reparation debts. Furthermore, the republic had to pay the maintenance costs of the Czech legions that had fought for the Allies. To make matters worse, there were Austrian wartime debts to companies that were unlikely to be paid. There was a further problem over rising wages. During the war the government had created a so-called ‘social wage’, which included an allowance for each member of the family.28 This was to help large families when food prices were rising steeply. In the mining industry this amounted to between 14 and 42 per cent of a weekly wage. After the war the social wage was gradually reduced and

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there were many strikes. However, an eight-hour working day was introduced. Most employers signed contracts with their workers and productivity rose again. The Government was able to create a stable currency in a short time and trade continued with its former main trading partners, Germany and Austria. A large part of Czechoslovak industry, both Czech and Sudeten German, was able to some extent to overcome the problems of autarky in the other Central European states of Poland, Hungary and Romania, which had formerly bought Bohemian and Moravian products. Many firms established new markets overseas, but not all were fortunate. The greatest difficulty was experienced in West Bohemia, where the Sudeten German glass and porcelain industries had been a source of considerable local pride.29 The standard of their products was very high, but they had depended to a large extent on sales in the large spas of Marianburg (Maria´nske´ Lazne) and Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary). There was considerable pride in the best-known manufacturers and designers: Michael Mo¨rtl and Eduard Schickel of Karlsbad, the Thun’sche Manufaktur of Klo¨sterle and Greta Heinisch and Dina Kuhn of Brno and Neu Titschein. Also important as a designer of Sucessionist style porcelain was Ernst Wahliss of the Alexandra porcelain works at Teplitz (Czech Teplice). Wahliss was able to use moulds for the Imperial style in Vienna for local production.30 The companies struggled to survive. Their tableware and ornaments were shown at the German exhibition in Brno in 1928, an exhibition devoted to Sudeten German manufactures, which emphasised the division between Czech and Sudeten German industry in Czechoslovakia.31 Although well known, in general the companies suffered from foreign competition and trade wars, especially in the Depression. This was a serious blow to Sudeten German self-esteem, as was the unemployment that resulted in lower sales. This was a further source of Sudeten German resentment. The chinaware industry only reached 60 per cent of its pre-war output in 1928, though it was supported by the Sudeten German Fachschule at Teplitz Scho¨nau and the glass industry, of which the best-known firm was Oertel of Haida, was only making about one-third of its potential production in 1938.32 It was a similar story in jewellery manufacture. This lack of financial success was in spite of the industries being supplied with talented and well-trained staff by the Sudeten German Fachschule in Haida and Gablonz. Czech companies, in comparison, prospered, adding to the

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tension between Czechs and Sudeten Germans. Companies that served a military or (Czech) nationalistic purpose did better, with government help. Armaments, chemicals, machinery, motor vehicles and rubber all increased their output, but the lack of progress in many Sudeten firms led to bitter complaints. Many felt that the Czech Government was deliberately punishing them for the German resistance in the early days of the Republic. Many Czechoslovak firms, both Czech and Sudeten German, found new world markets. After an initial crisis in the early years of the republic, 1919– 22, Czechoslovak industry made steady progress. By the onset of the Depression, Czechoslovakia had become one of the dozen strongest industrial countries in the world. The figures in Table 2.2 show how the output of Czechoslovak industry increased between the founding of the republic and the Depression.33 One of the initial problems for the new state was the division of industry into ‘Czech’ and ‘German’ parts. In view of the initial hostility of the German population to the new state, this could have proved a serious obstacle to industrial progress. Sudeten Germans tended to believe that the Czechs, now in control, were exploiting their new power to the disadvantage of the Sudeten Germans. Nostrification may have created a ‘Czechoslovak’ economy. It did not transform Austrian factories and businesses into Czechoslovak. The attempt to transfer ownership to citizens of the state was as much as could be achieved. In this respect, it was essential that both Czech and German companies should be successful if harmony between the two groups was to be created. Any fall in profits that hit one group harder than another would prove disastrous for Sudeten German– Czech relations. The figures in Table 2.3 show how ownership in the Czechoslovak economy was divided. The figures are unfortunately not dated. But they throw an interesting light on the structure of Czechoslovak industry and probably refer to the mid or late 1920s, after industrial mergers and new companies had been established by nostrification. The most important feature is the Czech dominance of heavy industry, leather, shoe making and ceramics, of which Sˇkoda and Bat’a are the outstanding examples. This emphasised Czech industrial power, which was not shared equally by Sudeten German firms. But these were only the better known of a wide range of companies, many of which had existed for a long time. More important for the Sudeten German area were the glass and

Czechoslovak total volume of output (1913 ¼ 100)

Source: Angus Maddison, ‘Economic performance in Europe 1913– 1970’ in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe; the Twentieth Century – 2 (1976), p. 502.33

90.4 97.7 95.1 103.0 113.7 127.1 126.6 136.1 148.1 152.2 147.2 142.7 136.5 130.7 125.7 124.5 134.7 149.8

1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937

Table 2.2

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWING RESENTMENT Table 2.3

71

Proportion of business capital (%)

Heavy industry Textiles Porcelain Glass Ceramics Musical instruments Paper Leather Shoe manufacture

Czech

Sudeten German

60 11 10 14 75 10 20 68 85

40 89 90 86 25 90 80 32 15

Source: Zdene˘k Karnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky (1918 – 1938); dı´l prnvı´; vznik, budova´nı´ a zlata´ le´ta republiky (1918 –1929) [The Czech lands in the period of the First Republic (1918– 1938); part 1; founding, growth and golden years of the republic (1918– 1929)] (Prague, 2000), p. 219.

porcelain industries. These were Bohemia’s special pride and produced very high quality goods, but they suffered badly from tariff wars after 1918. Even in 1928–9, when most industries were flourishing, these were still working at only 60 per cent of the pre-war level, which increased Czech–Sudeten German tension.34 During the Depression they declined even more, mainly because of a trade war with Hungary. As late as 1938 the glass industry was only producing about one-third of its normal output. Before the war, successful companies in the Austro –Hungarian Empire had built their reputation by exhibiting at international trade fairs, where they won medals and diplomas. They were then regarded as Austrian. After 1918 they were either Czech or Sudeten German, though situated in Czechoslovakia. As noted in the previous chapter, the companies included the coach builder Sˇustala in Koprˇivnice in Moravia, whose coaches were bought throughout the Habsburg Empire and as far away as St Petersburg.35 The cars that he began making from 1894 – the first was a Benz Viktoria for Baron von Liebig, a textile magnate – were also for the rich and famous. A similar concern, catering for royalty and aristocracy, was the Ringhoffer company of Smı´chov in Prague.36 The firm had built state trains for the Emperor of Austria– Hungary, the kings of Romania and Bulgaria, railway carriages for the Rothschilds,

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the Archduke Dernberg and the Austrian War Ministry. Carriages for general passenger use were also exported to Russia and South America and the company manufactured a wide range of railway carriages for different companies. The huge engineering concerns were at the outset dominated by Sˇkoda, with its main factory in Plzenˇ and its rivals in Prague, which in the 1930s merged to become the Czech Cˇesky´ Kolben Dane˘k. The needs of these and other engineering firms for steel were met by companies such as Vı´tkovice in Ostrava, owned by the Viennese branch of the Rothschild family.37 Best known of all was the A. and T. Bat’a shoe manufacturer. As noted above Bat’a, copying Ford’s system of mass production and with an elaborate system of welfare, became the largest shoe manufacturer in the world after World War I.38 In 1937 Bat’a accounted for 85.7 per cent of Czechoslovak shoe production and Czechs took considerable pride in this Czech company.39 Coal mines and iron and steel works were also part of this leading industrial group. All required considerable capital investment to maintain their efficiency, but they also generated huge profits. As large concerns, they were also considered more important for the economy than the medium and small companies. By 1930 the largest 115 companies, which employed more than one thousand workers, accounted for 16.6 per cent of the total labour force.40 There were important industrial cities: Ostrava (iron and steel), Brno (textiles) and Plzenˇ (heavy engineering and beer).41 Outside the big cities, towns often specialised in products made from raw materials in the region: glassmaking and porcelain in West Bohemia and a textile industry that had originally been based on flax rather than cotton. But even in the early days of the Republic there were great differences between firms. Some were efficient, employing modern technology. On the Czech side these included Bat’a and the Poldi iron and steel works at Kladno. There were also some German companies, including the Mannesmann works at Chomutov and the Varnsdorf textile factory. Many of the medium and small companies were backward by comparison. Their weakness was hidden by their membership of international cartels. Whereas Britain had relied on free trade and opposed any measures that might restrict it, the continental experience was different. In Germany and the Austro –Hungarian Empire, internal trade and the export market had been controlled and the market divided between manufacturers. The agreements that formed the basis of this

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were the cartels. In some cases it was the banks that organised a trade, in others, government departments. Examples of this are the Hungarian monopoly of sugar organised by banks and the sale of tobacco in Austria, which was a state monopoly. A third type of cartel was that between manufacturers of the same product. Officially ended in 1918, especially when they were controlled by German and Austrian firms, cartels reappeared in different forms, often with large foreign participation.42 An example of this in Czechoslovakia was the cartel organised by the manufacturers of metal tubes. The most important company in the Danube area was Mannesmannro¨hren-Werke A. G. of Chomutov, which was owned by the parent firm in Du¨sseldorf and which dominated the cartel. German and Czechoslovak firms combined in nine bilateral cartels in 1926 and joined other international groups. The manager of the great Styrian iron and steel company, the Alpine Montan Company, had hoped in 1919 that the proposed German – Austrian customs union would take place. He felt that union with Germany was ‘an economic necessity of the first rank’.43 But this did not happen and Stinnes traded steel for Czech lignite. In the new postwar Europe the company aimed at dividing the Central European market for pig iron, unprocessed goods, rails, iron sleepers and plate.44 In 1924 it formed a cartel with Czechoslovak producers. Banks, and political parties linked to them, also played an important part. As in Germany and Austria, banks played a major part in financing industry and in the case of Czechoslovakia, this was the way in which foreign capital participated in Czechoslovak industry when it was reconstituted after 1919. There were five major joint stock banks: Zˇivnostenska´, Cˇeska´ Eskomptnı´, Anglo-Czechoslovak, Czech Bank Union and Bank for Commerce and Industry, formerly La¨nderbank. The most important was the Zˇivnostenska´, linked to Kramarˇ’s National Democrat party and controlling 90 companies.45 There were at least 1,152 cartel arrangements in Czechoslovakia during the First Republic, 212 with foreign partners. The largest single group – 74 – consisted of chemical companies. The iron and steel industry, fundamental to the Czechoslovak economy, was consolidated in 1921 into a single selling agency, the Prodejna sdruzˇeny´ch cˇeskoslovensky´ch zˇeleza´ren (Selling agency of the United Czechoslovak Iron Works). It was dominated by the Vı´tkovice works, which produced 90 per cent of Czechoslovak steel during the First Republic. Vı´tkovice exports accounted for 47 per cent of cartel sales in 1923 (12 per cent was

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to Du¨sseldorf and 41 per cent to north-west Europe and overseas markets: Argentina, India, China and South Africa). In 1926 and 1929 cartels helped to develop exports to the new postwar states, Romania and Poland, as well as world markets. What made this possible was the worldwide network of agencies that cartel organisations could support, together with diplomats who regularly supplied commercial information about the markets where they were living. Even with the backing of cartels, it was difficult to find different markets when the new postwar states erected high protective tariffs to safeguard their own new industries. In textile manufacturing, for example, factories were established in Hungary using obsolete Czech and German machinery. They were protected by new Hungarian tariffs and these guaranteed profits that encouraged other companies to move to Hungary.46 The erection of tariff barriers was a common feature in postwar Europe and was not confined to the economically weaker states of Eastern Europe. Later, autarky created problems for the Danube states when they could not find markets for their goods and needed to repay French loans. During the Depression, when conditions were at their worst, all countries imposed tariffs. Czechoslovakia, for example, had ad valorem duties of 50 per cent on imports.47 This was by no means the highest; Bulgaria had duties of 97 per cent. In the immediate postwar years, a further problem for Czechoslovak companies was that some industries were divided between Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and had difficulties operating across the new frontiers. Before 1918 firms had been able to move raw materials and goods freely within the Habsburg Empire. The textile industry, for example, was divided between Austrian spinning and finishing mills and Czechoslovak weaving mills.48 There were also textile businesses divided between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. One example of this is the Perutz family, which had factories in both countries. During the war they made material for uniforms, rucksacks, stretchers and bandages.49 When stocks of yarn were exhausted they made yarn from paper. After the war they imported ladies’ fashions from France and Switzerland until they could begin production again. In 1914 the area that became Czechoslovakia had 3.5 million cotton spindles (compared to 1.1 million in Austria), 136,000 cotton looms (11,000 in Austria), 1.9 million wool spindles (181,000 in Austria) and 37,000 wool looms (1,280 in Austria).50 The postwar situation was made worse for both sides by the

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Czechoslovak Government’s decision to try and develop its own spinning mills, and protect them with tariffs. Whether this decision was based on perceived economic advantages for the new Czechoslovak state or on economic nationalism directed against Austria one cannot say. What is clear is that, as the table above shows, the majority of these weaving mills were Sudeten German and had been a part of integrated Habsburg concerns. Under the new conditions, it became extremely difficult for Czechoslovak companies to recover their pre-war prosperity. It was not until 1923 that the level of pre-war production was achieved. The situation in Hungary was similar. The Hungarian Rima steel works owned iron ore mines in northern Hungary (later Slovakia) and had bought its coke from the Ostrava-Karvina´ area. After 1918 Rima had difficulty in getting its iron ore and coke because these had to come from Czechoslovakia – now a foreign country.51 These examples from Austria and Hungary show how the collapse of the Habsburg Empire damaged trade and forced it to take new directions. Czechoslovakia can be seen as the most successful of the new states after 1918. But the impressive figures for total output (GNP) that are normally quoted only tell half the story. In the Czech western half of the country, the Czech companies were generally successful. But business in Slovakia and Ruthenia, by contrast, was more backward and suffered from Czech and German competition. These areas did not enjoy the same level of prosperity. To try and improve the situation, communications were improved between the Czech and Slovak lands through better roads and by building new railway lines.52 Bratislava was linked in 1929 to the railway from Ostrava to Brˇeclav, close to the Austrian frontier. Another line, built in 1937, linked Vsetı´n and Puchov to Bratislava. There were also railway improvements in central Slovakia in 1936 –41 connecting the mining town of Banska´ Bystrica to the iron and steel city of Kosˇice to the east and to the wider Slovak rail network.53 These new lines were intended to unite the two parts of Czechoslovakia. But they had the effect of opening Slovak industry to competition from the more efficient Czech companies. This highlighted the Slovak economic problems. The Hungarian policy of denying education to minorities had limited Slovak growth, which was also held back by the lack of raw materials and the mountainous nature and low fertility of much of the land. Output per acre was lower than in Bohemia and Moravia, where yields had increased

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Table 2.4

OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Rate of growth of total Czechoslovak output 1913 – 38 Annual average compound growth rate

1913– 29 2.7

1920 – 1929 6.0

1929 –1937 –0.2

Source: ibid., p. 451.

as a result of state help after the redistribution of former Austrian estates.54 There were also fewer large towns in the Slovak lands and thus a more scattered population, which raised distribution costs. The result of these Government efforts to unify the country through improving communications was thus to weaken the Slovak economy. Slovak companies closed or were bought by Czech banks, which exploited the lower labour costs. This can be seen in the case of the Harmanec paper works that were bought by the Moravia Bank of Brno. Under Czech control and properly financed it became very successful as a major cellulose exporter. Many workers who lost their jobs from this process of modernisation and farmers who could not make a proper living were forced to emigrate: about 200,000 left during the 20-year period of the First Republic to avoid starvation.55 Figures for Czechoslovakia’s postwar trade are not easy to find, but it is possible to establish trends. In the early years after the war, Czechoslovakia was able to increase her exports by devaluing her currency and was the only country to be able to control the subsequent inflation.56 Exports played a major part in the Czechoslovak economy and cartels were an important element of this. The figures in Table 2.4 show how the Czechoslovak economy developed in the 1920s, in comparison with the earlier wartime experience and the later Depression. These figures reveal the scale of the success of the 1920s, once production had improved in 1923. The figures for Czechoslovakia in this period are higher than for any other European country except the USSR (9.4), where production was increased under state planning. This made Czechoslovakia the tenth strongest industrial country in the world. During the years 1925 –34 Czechoslovakia was ranked 12th in terms of industrial output per capita and 17th for GNP per capita between Austria and Greece.57 These figures are equally impressive when set against the West European average of 3.6 for 1920– 29. The decline in the period 1929 – 37 hides a much steeper fall during

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Table 2.5 Indices of industrial production and unemployment (numbers and percentage) for Czechoslovakia and Germany, 1933– 6 Czechoslovakia Industrial production Unemployment, total Unemployment, total percentage Germany Industrial production Unemployment, total Unemployment, total percentage

1933

1934

1935

1936

60.2 739,000 5.01%

60.7 677,000 4.6%

70.1 686,000 4.68%

80.2 632,000 4.23%

66.8 4,804,000 7.26%

78 2,718,000 4.11%

94 2,151,000 3.25%

106.3 1,593,000 2.41%

Source: Zdene˘k Benesˇ et al., Facing History; The Evolution of Czech-German Relations in the Czech Provinces, 1848 –1948 (Prague, 2002), p. 91.

the Depression: –18.2 per cent, though this was not as severe as in Austria (–22 per cent) and Poland (–20.7 per cent). The main social problem caused by the Depression was unemployment: the average rate in Czechoslovakia was 11.07 per cent. This compares favourably to industrial production and unemployment in Germany during the years of rising political crisis, 1933–6, when Germany was held up by Nazism as the model for Sudeten German aspirations. In Germany the figures reflect the drive towards rearmament at the expense of consumer products.58 Table 2.5 shows the relative position of Czechoslovakia and Germany. Unfortunately the author does not indicate the base year (100) for industrial production. Nor is it clear whether the year is the same for both countries or whether it is the highest point reached in the preceding years, which might be different. Nonetheless, the comparison between the peak and trough in the cycle is significant and reflects the public perception of the crisis. These figures show that industrial output was rising in Germany and unemployment falling – in fact, there was a shortage of skilled workers in Germany by the late 1930s. In Czechoslovakia, by contrast, industrial output rose much more slowly and unemployment declined at the same, slow pace. Whereas in Germany 4.3 million people found, or were given, work between 1933 and 1936, in Czechoslovakia the number was only

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about 100,000 – less than one per cent of the working population. For Sudeten Germans the contrast was stark and sharpened their resentment against the Czech-dominated Government. Sudeten Germans felt they were trapped in a country where they were treated unfairly by the Czechs while their fellow Germans in Germany were enjoying great prosperity. But this was only half the story. The Sudeten Germans did not realise that the increase in factory production was only in the armaments industries. Nor did they know about the discontent in the work camps that had been created to make work for the unemployed. They only heard what the German Government wanted them to hear. Sudeten Germans were anxious to receive news from Germany that was independent of the Czech media. They believed German Government propaganda that claimed that the country was prosperous again. They did not know about the short-time working in the consumer industries that was the source of much social unrest. The Sudeten Germans looked back to the second half of the 1920s in Czechoslovakia, when incomes had been rising steadily, and unemployment had been no more than 2–3 per cent.59 They knew that in their own case, even those who still had work in the early 1930s were being paid less and were often working fewer hours. This perception that they were suffering economic hardship in comparison with their German neighbours brought out their resentment of Czech rule that had been temporarily eased by the prosperity of the 1920s. Worst hit were the factories meeting consumer needs: textiles, glass and ceramics. As the figures above show, most of the textile and glass industry was in German hands. In the areas of Czechoslovakia that were entirely German or no more than 20 per cent Czech, unemployment in 1931 reached 19.2 per cent.60 Even in districts where there were up to 20 per cent Germans, the unemployment rate was still 9.16 per cent. It is hardly surprising that this helped to radicalise public opinion and played on the old nationalistic stereotypes. In Czechoslovakia, as in other countries, economists and government had never before experienced a human and economic disaster on this scale. Welfare support for the unemployed was overwhelmed and ministers and economic experts could not restore public confidence. The figures in Table 2.6 show how wages declined during the Depression. A further indication of the effect of the Depression can be seen from the figures in Table 2.7 for Czechoslovakia’s imports and exports for 1928 and 1935.

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWING RESENTMENT Table 2.6

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Average wages of workers 1929 –34 Crowns

Year

Men

Women

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934

22.10 22.17 21.71 20.78 19.66 19.11

13.76 13.77 13.37 12.68 12.68 11.96

Source: R. Olsˇovsky´ a kol., ‘Prˇehled hospoda´rˇske´ho vy´vpje. . .c.d.,’ p. 428 in Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky (1918 – 1938); Dı´l druhy´; Cˇeskoslovensko a cˇeske˘ zeme˘ v krizi a v ohrozˇenı´ (1930 – 1935) [The Czech land in the period of the First Republic (1918– 1938), part 2, Czechoslovakia and the Czech land in the crisis and under threat, (1930– 1935)] (Prague, 2002), p.49.

Table 2.7

Czechoslovak imports and exports, 1928, 1935 Million gold dollars

1928 1935

Imports

Exports

960 281

1,061 309

Source: Herz, Economic Problems, p. 80.

This shows the overall decline in both imports and exports. Although it is impossible to know the human scale of the tragedy, it does help to indicate the effect of this on the consumer industries in the Sudeten areas, which were particularly badly hit by the economic crisis. This helps to explain the significance of the later rise of Henlein’s party. In 1933, business began to recover and, by the end of the 1930s, exports accounted for 40 per cent of output.61 Much has been made of the difficulties posed by autarky in Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The greater part of Czechoslovakia’s trade continued to be with Western Europe as the figures in Table 2.8 show. These figures show that the recovery from the Depression was not complete by 1938. Exports had still not reached the level they had been at when the world recession began. But looking at the broader

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Table 2.8

OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Czechoslovak exports to Europe as a percentage of total exports

1928 84.4

1938 70.1

Czechoslovak exports as a percentage of total European exports 1928 4.1

1938 3.4

Source: Maddison, ‘Economic policy’, p. 596.

picture it is clear that Czechoslovak exports to world markets recovered more quickly than those from the rest of Europe. On the other hand, the figures for Czechoslovak exports to Europe for 1938 are incomplete. The transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany at the end of September deprived Czechoslovakia of an important part of its industry. Figures for Czechoslovak exports as a percentage of total European exports tell a different story. The success of large industrial combines such as Sˇkoda contributed a great deal to Czechoslovakia’s exports, and this continued until the outbreak of war in 1939. The most likely interpretation of these figures is to emphasise once again the division between the medium and small German consumer goods industries and the large Czech companies such as Sˇkoda, CˇKD (Cˇeskomoravska´ Kolben Dane˘k) and Bat’a. This is the position in late September, when the Munich Conference transferred the German border territories occupied by Sudeten Germans to Germany and left the remains of Czechoslovakia to the Czechs and Slovaks. The history of Czechoslovakia from its creation in 1918 is one of consolidation and the search for a new identity. The new Czechoslovak Government after 1918 – there were initially no German members and Slovaks played a less important role – fought to establish control over ‘the Czech and Slovak lands’. This resulted in three actions that involved the use of military force. The first was the crushing of separatist movements among the Sudeten Germans. The second was the seizure of the economically important area near Ostrava, which contained coal mines that supplied Czech iron and steel works and contained a rail link with Slovakia. This latter area had to be seized and held by troops because it contained a Polish majority. The third action was in driving the Hungarian forces loyal to Bela Kun from the southern borderlands of the new Slovak part of the state. These actions established de facto

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political control but Poland and Hungary never forgot or forgave Czechoslovakia for seizing what they regarded as ethnically Polish and Hungarian land under Wilson’s claim to grant ethnic freedom. The threat to revise these frontiers bedevilled relations between Czechoslovakia and her neighbours throughout the interwar years and destroyed all hope of military and economic alliances. Once order had been established in Czechoslovakia after these actions, the new currency could be introduced, the economy stabilised and a new start made to economic life. An attempt was made to nationalise the economic resources of the new Czechoslovakia and foreign capital, mostly French and British, replaced Austrian. After an initial economic boom following the war and the slump that followed, companies began to develop new markets overseas as well as recovering their trade with Germany and Austria, all of which remained important throughout the First Republic. The second half of the 1920s was a period of economic growth and prosperity and Sudeten Germans, both workers and factory owners, saw advantages in living in a stable state that was spared the economic crises of Germany and Austria. Sudeten Germans entered parliament and a start was made to creating a multi-ethnic state, though the Sudeten Germans were punished for their earlier separatist movements by being denied equality with Czechs and Slovaks. Political cooperation between Czechs and Germans lasted until the onset of the slump in Czechoslovakia in 1931.

CHAPTER 3 THE ENEMY WITHIN; SUDETEN GERMAN NATIONALISM AND THE SUDETEN NAZI PARTY

At the end of World War I the world of the Sudeten Germans was turned upside down. When the First Czechoslovak Republic was formed they found that they were no longer in control of the state, its parliament and administration. In the old Austro –Hungarian Empire it had been Germans who had held the reins of power, but in the new Czechoslovakia this was no longer true. There had been tensions between Germans and Czechs for a long time, but until 1918 there had been no doubt about who was in charge. After November 1918, power was in the hands of Czechs, a race that had been characterised in German nationalist papers as ill-educated country bumpkins or travelling musicians. One cartoon had shown a German dancing, shackled like a performing bear, while the wily Czech Wenceslas played a tune on a pipe, accompanied by his twintailed, dog-size lion. The bad feeling was mutual. Czechs saw Germans as aggressive and domineering. Germans had been largely ignored at Versailles when the new Czechoslovak state had been defined and attempts by Sudetens later to join their communities to Austria had been crushed by Czech troops and armed police. Some Sudetens had died, others had fled to Germany and Austria. Initially, Sudeten Germans had refused to join the new Czech-dominated Government but gradually they became reconciled to the new state. They saw advantages in belonging to it and Sudeten politicians entered parliament. But there remained many Sudetens for whom extreme German nationalism, as

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shown by the Nazi party, offered an attractive outlet for their feelings. This chapter shows what happened to the Sudeten Nazi party until it was crushed in 1933 and explains the attraction of Henlein’s party that succeeded it. It also reveals how German diplomats in Prague gradually became drawn into Sudeten German politics. This chapter also shows why improvements in Czech defences increased tensions between Czechs and Sudeten Germans.

German nationalism and the Sudeten German Nazi party The starting point for Sudeten German nationalism was their sadness at losing their Austrian nationality and becoming, against their will, citizens of the new Czech-dominated state of Czechoslovakia. It was something that they never forgave or forgot. The same is true of those who fled from the fighting in Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II and others who were expelled in 1946 – 7. Sudeten leadership was concentrated in the former Sudeten regional council (deutschbo¨hmischen Landesregierung), which had moved to Vienna when the Czechs began their military conquest of the Sudetenland. Their leader, Lodgmann von Auer, was active among the diplomat community, presenting the case for Sudeten self-determination and wrote Fu¨r die Selbstbestimmung Deutschbo¨hmens, which was published in Vienna in 1919.1 The final point in the struggle for self-determination came in 1919 when the Treaty of St German was signed. At that time there was a Sudeten German committee in Vienna that claimed to speak for all Sudetens. When the treaty was signed, their last hope of a separate state was lost. Lodgmann made a prophetic statement: ‘After the flag of the right to self-determination had fallen, it became our duty to pick it up and with our weak hands raise it high.’2 This was echoed in the title of a biography of Henlein written in 1998: Die Fahne von Saaz; Konrad Henlein in seiner Zeit (The flag of Saaz; Konrad Henlein in his time).3 It presents Henlein as an almost mythical character who emerges as a figure from folklore to lead his people. The ending of the Sudeten hopes by the Treaty of St Germain made a similar impression on the Sudeten German, Erich Pa¨sold. He came to Britain in the 1930s and became the successful British businessman Eric Pasold, and still had memories of this 30 years later. His description of events is not bitter, but reflects his sadness.

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Then suddenly it [the war] was over. Combined Italian, French and British forces won the decisive battle of the Piave. The Austro –Hungarian army ceased to resist, and disintegrated. The soldiers threw away their arms and went home to their hungry families. The Monarchy was defenceless. Prague was garrisoned by Magyar troops, who left to return to Hungary. Their arms were picked up by the Sokols, the politically orientated Czech nationalist organisation of gymnasts, and on 28 October the independent republic of Czechoslovakia was proclaimed. Were we part of it? No, said our teacher [Eric was a 12-year-old school boy]. President Wilson promised peace based on self-determination, which could only mean that both the Czech- and Germanspeaking Bohemians had the right to independence. What was going to happen to our Egerland and other large non-Slav territories? I heard much talk of our joining up with the truncated Austria, and even becoming a small, self-governing state which, in addition to Eger and Franzenbad, would include Karlsbad and Marianbad. We would have liked that very much, but Prague stopped both schemes by sending troops, and a number of civilians lost their lives. I was twelve years old when I sang the Austrian national anthem for the last time in school. The picture of Emperor Karl was taken down from the classroom wall and that of President Masaryk, who meant nothing to us, was hung in its place. We were no longer Austrians, said our teacher, his voice trembling with emotion. I was bewildered. The wicked Serbs had started the war, and I knew from the illustrated papers that our soldiers had won almost every battle. How could it be that we were to become Czechoslovaks against our will? No one seemed to know, one rumour was followed by another, and our fate hung in the balance for a very long time . . . The Monarchy did not fall apart because of senile decay but was torn apart by brute force.4 This was not the rambling of a sentimental old man or a plea by a patriotic liberal German. Eric Pasold was writing as a hard-headed, unsentimental, middle-aged former Sudeten German businessman who had come to England to open a factory and stayed. He was realistic in his assessment of the Czech-controlled governments of the First Republic. His autobiography contains no reference to Sudeten politics and is only

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concerned with telling his family’s history and how he came to be living in England. Nevertheless, it is evident that he could never forget the shock and sense of loss that marked the end of World War I and the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic. There were others who thought that the new state of Austria, deprived of a large part of its economic resources, would not be able to survive on its own. This became part of Austrian official policy, which ignored the fact that the new, small states which had been created would be forced to continue the former pattern of trade to some extent at least. The official view was expressed by Walre´ de Bordes: The Allied Powers had compelled them, for the present, to dwell in this little state; but it was plainly impossible that this artificial creation should continue to exist – the official propaganda had supplied plenty of arguments in this sense. For the time being they had to conform to the will of the Entente, but in one way or another salvation would finally come. The sooner it was recognised that the state was unable to exist, the quicker the hour of deliverance would arrive . . .5 If this was a commonly held view of many Austrians, some Sudeten Germans saw matters in a different light. They saw no reason why they should become submerged in a Slav-run state when they had dominated the Habsburg Empire. The decision to include them in the new Czechoslovakia against their will and in direct contradiction to Wilson’s promises was, as far as they were concerned, unacceptable. One answer to the problem, as they saw it, was to use direct political action to gain their ends. The rise of fascist politics seemed to them to provide the answer. Ever since Mussolini had come to power in 1922 after his so-called March on Rome, extreme right wing movements had been active in European politics. One of the most energetic was the German Heimwehr movement in Germany, Austria and among the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. Sudeten Germans and Austrians had much in common. Both felt that they had been treated unfairly by the peace settlement and were resentful at the rise of Slav states. Sudeten Germans felt they had been denied the rights to self-determination that had been promised by President Wilson but only given to others. Austrians resented the loss of

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Styria, an Austro– Hungarian province in the east, which had been given to the new Yugoslav state. The Heimwehren (right wing) and Arbeiterwehren (left wing) paramilitary movements appealed to the disenchanted young by giving them a set of Germanic ideals. They received a great deal of help in weapons and money from Bavaria.6 An example from Austria showed how this pan-German movement operated and many Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia must have had similar views. Extreme German nationalism was popular at the university in Graz. Students marched through the town, with the more extreme Heimatschutz members taking the lead. On the surface, the movement was often light hearted, but beneath this was another, darker side. As Martin Pollack has shown in his biography of his Austrian father, who became a Nazi official: They had learnt to hate everything around them: the puny new state, the parliamentary democracy and the political parties, the clerics and the Bolsheviks, the capitalists and the Jews, the foreign powers who vetoed the Anschluss with Germany, and the Slovenes ‘who stole lower Styria from us.’ They wanted to subvert society, turn it upside down, smash all institutions of state; everything should be subordinated to a strong leader. ‘Unquestioning obedience in the service of the German Volk; unity and purity of the Volk.’ They were prepared to uphold these principles fanatically (a term of approbation to them) and uncompromisingly, to fight political opponents, dissenters, Christian Socialists and Reds without quarter, regardless of casualties or state laws.7 Sudeten Germans were not confined to Czechoslovakia. There were also Sudeten German cultural organisations in Austria and Germany, organised by people who had been driven out of Czechoslovakia when they had tried to organise the independence movement. These large groups (200,000 in Vienna, 200,000 in the rest of Austria and 250,000 in Germany) tried to keep alive their sense of Sudeten identity while in exile from their homeland.8 Their needs were met by journals such as Großbo¨hmerland (Greater Bohemia) and Sudetendeutsches Jahrbuch (Sudeten German Yearbook), and nostalgic, sad songs were composed such as the Deutsches Leid in Bo¨hmen by Hilda Hadina-Ko¨nigsreiter.

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‘Es klingt ein Lied vom Leide, Vom Leide durch den Wind: Die Heimat ist verloren, Du heimatloses Kind! Es fa¨llt wie lauter Tra¨nen, Wie Tra¨nen durch den Schnee, Das Auge wird mir tru¨be, Ich weiß nicht, wo ich geh’. Ich geh’ als wie im Traume, Im Traume durch die Welt – Sind alle ihre Freuden Vergiftet und verga¨llt. Ich wollt’, ich ko¨nnte wandern, Wohl wandern durch den Wind, Durch die verlorne Heimat Als heimatloses Kind.’9

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There is the sound of a sad song Of sadness carried by the wind; The homeland is lost, You exiled child! It is like heavy tears falling, Like tears through snow, My eyes will mist over, I don’t know where I’m going, I’m walking as if in a dream, In a dream through the world All your happiness Is poisoned and spoilt. I wish I could wander, Truly wander as the wind, Through the lost homeland Like a child with no true home.

The song speaks of a tune carried by the wind in mid winter, saying that the singer, a child, has lost its homeland and is stateless. As the child sheds tears on the snow it, wanders in a dream, not knowing where it is going. All previous joys are poisoned and lost and the child’s only wish is to return home. These songs and journals circulating among Sudeten Germans living outside Czechoslovakia helped to keep alive the sense of betrayal at Versailles. It also served to strengthen the resolve of young Sudeten Germans living inside Czechoslovakia to regain their former position in society and bring back the exiles. The violence that this cultural extremism fostered in Austria and Czechoslovakia caused great anxiety among Czechs. The Czechdominated Government tried to maintain order by decreeing that any attack on the unity of the state was a serious crime. This was reinforced in a law in 1927 defining political crimes more precisely.10 The Nazi element in Sudeten society had to tread warily to avoid being prosecuted. They got an opportunity to be more active in 1929. By then many Czechoslovak firms were very successful, but, as noted above, Sudeten German industries such as porcelain and glass had failed to recover their former prosperity. The difference between Czech wealth and Sudeten unemployment was evident to the latter. This gave the Sudeten Nazis an opportunity to create a cultural organisation that

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would capitalise on this sense of grievance. In 1929 an organisation was formed that claimed to be no more than a German cultural society. This was the Volkssport, or Verband Volkssport, Nationalsozialistischer Verband fu¨r Wandern, Radfahren, Spiel und Sport aller Art (the National Socialist club for walking, cycling, games and all types of sport) to give the organisation its full name. It appeared to offer young Sudeten Germans opportunities for all types of outdoor activity – very popular in the 1920s and 1930s – under the general umbrella of the Nazi party. This was designed to appeal to young Sudeten Germans who wanted to pursue these activities within a German cultural setting. It was officially recognised and was approved by the state in April. Based in Fulnek under the leadership of Leo Schubert, in reality it provided the first stage of complete Nazi indoctrination. Volkssport put on courses in the Sudetenland on leadership (Fu¨hrerkurse): not training leaders but instilling discipline under party leaders. Volkssport also taught map reading and weapons training, judo and offered a range of physical activities. These meetings were held weekly as Heimatabende.11 But this was only the start. The organisation became more confident and gradually became more openly Nazi, with its members wearing a uniform: swastika arm bands and jackboots. In other words, what had begun officially as a purely social and sports club had become integrated into the German SA (Sturm Abteiling). Wanting to enlarge its membership at the German University in Prague, the organisation invited Goebbels to speak in February 1930. The poster announcing his visit was headed ‘Achtung hier Deutschland. Der Nationalsozialismus marschiert. Burschen heraus zur N. S. Woche! Alle Mann an die Front.’ (‘Attention. This is Germany. National Socialism is on the march. Contribute to National Socialist week! Everyone must take an active part’). This provided a suitably provocative and energetic tone to a visit by a leading German Nazi. These events were taking place against a background of growing economic uncertainty. Although the economic depression did not hit Czechoslovakia until later, the Sudeten Social Democratic Party and the German Gewirkschaftsbund held a joint conference on 7 September 1930 to alert members and the Government to the growing problem of unemployment. On the Sudeten German side, many firms had never recovered their pre-war prosperity and, as a result, unemployment had

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remained high. If the figures given to the conference were correct, unemployment was twice as high among Sudeten German workers as among Czechs. The conference was told that in 41 purely Sudeten German districts, there were 27,042 unemployed out of a total of 1.5 million. In 61 purely Czech districts, 27,288 were unemployed out of a total population of 2.8 million.12 Taking the population as a whole, there were on average twice as many Sudeten Germans unemployed (18 per 1,000) as Czech (9 per 1,000). Speakers also complained about the decline of traditional Sudeten German companies (porcelain, glass, metal industries) and workers also gave accounts of their hardships in the textile, leather, tobacco and other industries. The conference raised genuine concerns among Sudeten German workers about the way they were treated by the Government. Sudeten industries faced even greater difficulties in the 1930s. For example, the firm M. Joss & Lo¨wenstein, which made shirts and collars, had to close its factory in Klattau in 1931 and the factory was not reopened until 1938.13 This spectre of unemployment raised the fear among Czech politicians that the Nazi party in Czechoslovakia posed a serious threat to the state and had to be brought under control. Members of Volkssport were forbidden to wear their uniform in public. However, all that happened was that the uniform was changed to blue cap, white shirt and black tie. In place of the swastika the caps carried a metal badge with the monogram VS (Volkssport), which could be easily reversed to SA. In the same year in Austria, this fanaticism gave rise to acts of violence that included an attempted seizure of power in Upper Styria in 1931. This stimulated German nationalist fervour and membership of the Austrian and Sudeten Nazi parties increased. The two were closely linked. On 14 March 1932 the Sudetendeutscher Heimatbund held a memorial concert (Gedenk Feier) of music by Mozart, Delßinger, Cherubini and Reger in Salzburg.14 This was to commemorate those who had died in March 1919 in the attempt to break away from the new Czechoslovak state. It linked Sudeten Germans to wider German culture and patriotism. In Czechoslovakia Volkssport membership rose from 5,000 to 40,000 in 1932 and their marches became more openly nationalistic with the singing of the Nazi song ‘Die Fahne hoch’ (‘Raise high the flag’).15 This led to the trial in Brno in September 1932 of a number of Nazis on the charge of having attacked state security by organising Nazi storm troop

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groups under the guise of Volkssport and Jungsturm organisations. This was the first time that German Nazism had been put on trial in Czechoslovakia and evidence presented to the court brought out clearly the aims and methods of Hitler’s movement.16 The accused were found guilty and given jail sentences of 1 –2 years.17 This evidence of a threat by the Nazis to seize power led the Czech Government to round up the leaders of this movement. Five leading Sudeten German parliamentary representatives, Rudolf Jung, Hans Krebs, Leo Schubert, Hans Knirsch and Rudolf Kasperov, were put on trial after their parliamentary immunity had been lifted on 1 January 1933. But the decision was not universally welcomed; on 23 January the Communist party stated: ‘We don’t need a trial. Give us bread and work.’18 The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933 made matters worse. Czechs could only watch events in Germany with growing anxiety. Young Germans everywhere saw Hitler’s appointment as a signal for a new aggressive assertion of what they regarded as their rights. Hitler had gained power after a period of unprecedented political violence in Germany. This reinforced the belief that mayhem paid political dividends. Members of the SA believed that their moment had come to seize power in Germany and it became difficult for Hitler to control the rising level of violence. The Reichstag fire in February gave Hitler the excuse to try and suppress all political opponents. Political leaders were arrested and canvassing for any but the Nazi party was almost impossible. On 8 March relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia were hit by the decision by the Czechoslovak National Bank to forbid the transfer of money to Germany.19 Four days later the German Foreign Ministry approved a similar ban on payments to Czechoslovakia. This move, an attempt by the Czechoslovak Government to control the Czechoslovak economic crisis, worsened relations between the two countries and also made the economic and political crisis in the Sudetenland (due to rising unemployment) more serious. In Germany in the same month the enabling act was passed that gave Hitler absolute power. The subsequent persecution of members of the Social Democratic party drove many into exile into the Sudeten area. Here they joined Sudeten Germans who also opposed the Nazis and were led by Robert Mayr-Harting, leader of the Christian Socialists and Franz Spina, the Agrarian leader. Both were, or had been, ministers and supported the Czech Government.20 In April the congress of the (German) Social

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Democrats in Czechoslovakia proposed working with the Czechoslovak Communist party against fascism. In May Karl Hilgenreiner, professor at the German university in Prague and apostolic prelate, spoke of Hitlerism as the political death of Sudeten Germans.21

Czech Government action against the Sudeten Nazi party The Czechoslovak Government, supported by both Czechs and many Sudeten Germans, felt able to take more active measures against Sudeten Nazis. On 9 June a new law was passed creating a state of emergency with fines up to 50,000 crowns.22 This allowed the authorities in Plzenˇ to put 42 Nazis from the west Bohemian textile town of Asch (Czech Asˇ) on trial for attending Nazi meetings in Germany during the German electoral campaign in early March.23 The result, as Dr Koch, the German diplomatic representative in Prague reported to Berlin, was disastrous for the Sudeten Nazis. In his letter of 19 June, Dr Koch reported: The extraordinary deterioration in the whole situation of the national Sudeten Germans is characterised by the circumstance that at present no fewer than 1,300 political suits are pending against national Sudeten Germans and that close to 700 persons are in prison awaiting trial. House searches and arrests are daily occurrences. Particularly the national student corporations in Prague have to suffer under the pressure of the authorities and have to avoid any connection with German organisations in the Reich. The tendencies of the young Sudeten German students towards making an uncompromising national spirit prevail at the Prague University encounter the opposition not only of all the other German parties but naturally also that of the Government and the entire Czech people. On the Czech side, at any rate, they are resolved not to tolerate a definitely national atmosphere at the University; they are even considering converting the University from a German one into a university for all national minorities of the state (thus including Jews and Hungarians). In this way any element of a consciously German character of the University would be finished for good. Even now such sharp protests are being raised among the Czech public against planned new construction of German university institutes that will probably

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result in a long postponement of these projects, hitherto under concrete discussion. The bulk of the ‘laws (press law and state of emergency) for the protection of democracy,’ some of them already issued and some being planned, which make possible intensifying all punitive measures for actions against the governmental order, are not directed merely against Czech fascists, but in particular against German National Socialists and Nationalists. They not only find the approval of the German Government parties; it is also noticeable that German opposition parties like the Christian Social party or the Labour and Economy Group [Arbeit und Wirtschaftsgemainschaft] do not oppose this legislation with any elementary resistance, but merely display a lame sort of opposition.’ [The recent trial of Nazis at Plzenˇ] will be followed by trial after trial. For the assurances by the Sudeten German National Socialist Party that it is pursuing a policy within the framework of the state find as little credence as the repeated Reich German statements denying a connection between the National Socialism of the German Reich and the Sudeten Germans . . . Any connection, no matter how innocent, with national Germany and the leading movement there and the gleichgeschaltet groups [groups calling for the uniting of all Germans in one state] can result in dangerous judicial proceedings. The prohibition of another 98 Reich German newspapers, just issued, has now cut a further tie between Sudeten Germans and the Germans in the Reich. Both countries have come into the situation of almost total mutual blockade. The result is that the political atmosphere among the Sudeten Germans is becoming charged with new inflammables, since National Socialism is indeed growing just as much as the activity of the Czech rulers, the Sudeten German activists [German parties supporting the Government], the Social Democrats, and the Reich German e´migre´s [German political refugees from Germany living in Czechoslovakia] who dominate the Czech press and the major part of the German language press with their political opinions.24 Dr Koch’s reports from Prague provide a valuable insight into events in Czechoslovakia as seen through German eyes. It is clear from this and other

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reports that Dr Koch was not necessarily a Nazi member or even a supporter of the Nazi party. He was a professional diplomat who had been in Prague since 1921 and was on good terms with the leading Czech political figures.25 On the other hand, he did have a strong belief in the superiority of German culture over Czech and was sympathetic to the general Sudeten German aim of increasing its political power at the expense of Czech and other national groups. This ensured that his reports were accurate, while at the same time avoided alienating Nazi sensibilities in Germany when he was in direct contact with Nazi party members. Czech historians have described this period as one of indecision. Under an able but colourless prime minister, Jan Malpetr, ‘The government hesitated between repression and accommodation of the national minorities.’ 26 Koch’s reports, as will be seen, present a very different picture. The Czech police were able to crush the Sudeten Nazi party and did not need any additional government help. As the Czech grip tightened on Sudeten German activists, Koch was concerned with the humanitarian issue of providing financial support for defence lawyers and to help wives and families of prisoners. But, as will be seen, he could not do this openly in the name of the German Government. While the Czechoslovak Government was taking firm action against all perceived enemies of the state, it continued to receive the support of other Sudeten German parties. One example is the German Agrarian Party which, at their congress on 18 –19 June, spoke out strongly against all forms of fascism – Czech as well as German.27 But Koch’s reference to a Czech– German mutual blockade and the continued rise of national feelings points to another problem. At a time of rising unemployment among Sudeten Germans (not mentioned by Koch!), many of them wanted more active support from their parliamentary representatives, both in government and opposition. Merely supporting the Czechs to try to minimise Nazi influence was not enough. Students at the German university in Prague were fired by Nazi propaganda. Czech action against this university was deeply resented by all Sudeten Germans. To open it to minorities and deprive it of its traditional, historic role was one thing, to propose opening it to Hungarians and Jews was deeply offensive. Furthermore, the terror and general uncertainty caused by the widespread house searches and arrests made all Sudeten Germans fear the (Czech-dominated) Government. It seemed to many that even to be German would invite arrest and imprisonment.

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In vain the Czechs claimed that this was ‘authoritarian democracy’, i.e. it justified the steps taken against those seeking to destroy the state from within and necessary under the circumstances. But the continued antiGerman action made many wonder how long this would continue. On 23 June Koch reported that recent legislation had now made the Nazi party a ‘secret organisation’ and membership had become high treason. However, the Czech authorities were careful to avoid using the full rigour of the law against lesser individuals. The previous day seven young Sudeten Germans from the west Bohemian town of Eger (Czech Cheb) had been sentenced to relatively light prison terms for taking part in the celebrations of the ‘Day of National Labour’ in the German border town of Waldsassen. Two of them were ‘Reich Germans’ (Germans whose nationality was German not Czechoslovak). One, Max Hauer, was a journeyman tailor, the other Max Heitzer, was a store clerk. They had been held in jail for seven weeks awaiting trial and Koch was afraid that this and similar trials would damage Sudeten Germans’ livelihoods. The trial also showed that in the border area the German population was mixed. Although most were officially Czechoslovak citizens, there were others who had come since the founding of the Republic and had never applied for, or been granted, Czechoslovak citizenship. This was an issue of considerable political importance, since the arrest and imprisonment of ‘Reich Germans’ in Czechoslovakia could be exploited by the German Government as an attack on German citizens. Equally important, the Czechoslovak Government was using a law passed in 1923 against individuals and groups considered a danger to the state ten years later, under very different conditions. When originally passed, the law had served as part of the basic framework for protecting the state. In 1923 the initial problems of attempted Sudeten succession had been resolved, and the coal mining area near Ostrava with a mixed Polish–Czech population that had been disputed with Poland was also quiet. The Government did not need to use this new legislation at that time. But in 1933 the law formed the basis for charges against Sudeten Germans and their Nazi groups, as the report in the official Prager Tageblatt of 23 June made clear. To remind his superiors at the German Foreign Office, Koch included the main details of this legislation in his report of 23 June. These covered the ‘preparation of conspiracies’ (paragraph 2) and ‘subversive organisations’ (paragraph 17, section 1).28

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The main parts of the first paragraph had been intended to allow action to be taken against anyone trying, as an individual, to subvert the state from within or in league with a foreign power. The penalty was 1 – 5 years for a minor offence and 5 – 10 years for more serious cases. The second paragraph concerned membership of organisations and had a similar aim. Penalty for membership was from one month to two years – not as serious a crime as premeditated personal action against the state. The National Assembly also passed, on 10 July, a law giving the government power to suppress newspapers that were ‘dangerous to the state’.29 The problem for Koch, as the official German representative in Prague, was that he represented a state that claimed to govern on the basis of the Nazi party programme. This clearly stated that it aimed to unite all Germans in a single country – clearly subversive under this Czechoslovak law. The original programme of the Nazi party had stated in paragraph 1: ‘We demand the union of all Germans in Greater Germany on the basis of self-determination of nations.’ To make this absolutely clear, paragraph 2 had stated that the programme could never be changed. The Czechoslovak courts had used this as the basis for prosecuting Nazi party members. The courts stated, logically, that since the Nazi aim was to create a greater Germany including all Germans, this could only be achieved by detaching large parts of Czechoslovakia. The Nazi party was therefore an organisation seeking to destroy the unity of the state. Moreover, the absence of this demand for unity from the current Nazi programme merely meant that the Nazi party was pursuing these aims secretly. This made the party, by definition, a secret organisation. Koch’s comments on this situation make his dilemma clear: Whoever, then – be he Reich German or Czechoslovak – lends a helping hand in any way to the Reich German National Socialist Workers’ party in the attainment of the aforementioned goal, is a criminal . . . and any one who, without promoting this special aim, by his own action Joins the party, Enters ‘into relations’ with it (!) Participates in its other activities in any manner whatsoever, assists its members . . . materially or otherwise, is punishable . . . under paragraph 17.30

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This made the position of Koch and every other German – Reich as well as Sudeten – extremely dangerous. Membership or even any form of association with the Nazi party could result in a prison sentence – there were no fines. From the moment that a person was arrested he would expect to spend at least four weeks in prison awaiting trail. To Koch, this was vindictive. But he did realise that the attitude of the government and courts stemmed from Czech fear. In his view the Czechs were not principally worried about losing territory, since they could rely on ‘their numerous friends . . . the enemies of Germany’ (France and the Little Entente) to protect them. Nor did Koch think that the Czechs were afraid that the Sudeten Germans might become too powerful. In Koch’s view, it was a tragedy that National Socialism was only supported by the German minority.31 The real Czech fear, in his opinion, was that the Nazis might help Czech fascists gain power. This he considered impossible since National Socialism was the inexorable foe of all minorities. Koch’s main concern as a German diplomat in Prague was to try and restore some form of harmony to German-Czech relations. He believed that Czechs would calm down if they did not feel that they were constantly under threat. German radio frequently broadcast speeches claiming Germans living outside Germany for the German Reich. Although this was popular with Germans living abroad, it was disastrous for the Sudeten Germans. To emphasise this he quoted from newspaper reports of a speech by Wagner, the Bavarian Interior Minister: ‘The new Germany shall include all German regions as far as the German tongue is heard.’ He also pointed out that this ‘fills the Czech prisons with innocent people.’32 The greatest problem concerned students at the German university, who were most likely to take action and were most at risk. Czech arrests of these put Koch in a very difficult position. Every time a German was arrested, his family and friends came to the legation and demanded that Koch and his staff should get them released. If they were not able to do this, the family and friends complained bitterly. In practice, the legation was powerless to do anything, since it could not appear to be supporting people considered criminals in Czech eyes. As a final appeal to his superiors at the Foreign Office, Koch wrote: ‘If the prosecutions by the Czechs of National Socialism should increase in severity, life for the Germans in this country will become a hell.’ Fortunately for Koch and the Sudeten Germans who were not proNazi, violence in Germany and elsewhere diminished in June. Hitler

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realised that he had to rein in the SA. Ro¨hm, their leader, was disillusioned at the lack of success and threatened to launch a Second Revolution (Hitler’s accession to power had been the first). Ro¨hm had built up the SA membership to between 3.5 and 4 million with the ultimate aim of forming a government. To curb this power Hitler ordered that the many unauthorised SA camps of protective custody should be closed and he disbanded the SA’s auxiliary police.33 It was in any case in the interest of both the German and Czechoslovak governments that harmony should be restored. In July Mastny´, the Czech ambassador in Berlin, promised that although his government could not interfere with normal judicial procedures, every effort would be made to deal with offences by administrative measures rather than through the courts. But he did not want to make an official statement, since this would be unpopular with Czech political opinion.34 In July Koch was able to report more optimistically that he had been told that the position of Reich German citizens had improved. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry had assured him that it had agreed with judicial authorities that before any Reich citizen was arrested, the Foreign Office would be informed.35 Reich citizens would only be prosecuted if they took part in political activities. No one would be prosecuted for mere connection with the Nazi party or similar organisations. As to the Pilsen (Czech: Plzenˇ) and Eger (Czech: Cheb) trials, these had arisen out of the ‘general uneasiness which the German revolution [Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor] had aroused from the beginning’. This fear had now subsided. However, there remained the question of the trials of Czechoslovak citizens in Germany. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry believed that relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia would only be eased if the Germans showed a similar conciliatory attitude. These conversations between Koch and Krofta, the Czechoslovak Interior Minister, were on a personal basis – ‘a gentleman’s agreement’ – as Benesˇ had insisted that no official concessions could be made. Equally optimistic from the German point of view was a friendly meeting between Hitler and Mastny´. This had received wide and favourable publicity in the Czechoslovak press. These friendly relations between the German diplomat and Czechoslovak minister mask the realities of Czechoslovak internal politics. Czech fear and suspicion of Sudeten Germans remained. On 21 August Koch reported a return to Czech police activity directed

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against real or suspected Nazis.36 The offices of student organisations in Moravia had been searched and SA uniforms and pictures of Hitler found. Arrests had followed. Sudeten German burgomasters (elected by popular vote) had not been confirmed in their appointments by the Czechoslovak authorities if they were members of the Nazi party. There were daily arrests and trials of Reich and Sudeten Germans. Koch, in a tone of outrage, claimed that it was unsafe for Reich Germans to enter Czechoslovakia. He also complained that: . . . every liar, every forger, every hater of Germany found in this country an asylum, a field of operation from which he could spew undisturbed his venom into Germany! When the German people are described every day in the newspapers here as assassins, arsonists, Huns, and cutthroats, there is no censor to put a stop to these activities against a neighbouring state with which normal relations were allegedly desired! Koch was particularly angry that one newspaper, A.I.Z., had portrayed the Prussian Minister President (Go¨ring), even before the trial in Leipzig had begun, as the person who had started the Reichstag fire. Koch was also concerned that when the Supreme Court heard the appeal concerning the Volkssport trial in early October, it would uphold the original conviction, which Koch believed would amount to an attack on the ‘entire administration of the Reich’. He also thought it ridiculous that the Czechs should still take seriously the 10-year-old Nazi party programme demanding the union of all Germans in one Reich. Kamil Krofta, a distinguished historian and friend of Benesˇ, claimed that Czech action against Nazis was aimed at protecting Sudeten Germans from the spirit of the Third Reich. Koch poured scorn on this idea and continued: Only yesterday I talked with the leader of the Sudeten German National Socialists and could with a good conscience state as my impression that not one of the Sudeten German parties was gravitating towards the other side of the border. All of them accepted this state as a basis and were prepared for practical cooperation. If here and there along the border a few young people in despair as a result of years of unemployment should cross over and try to get into the SA or one of the labour camps, that should

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be attributed to the real reasons: youthful romanticism, craving for action, hunger; and the poor fellows should not be barred from every chance of returning to their homeland. Koch was clearly out of touch with reality. Members of the Nazi party were not merely idealist young men with a yearning for adventure. Nor were the labour camps attractive places. Organised along military lines, the work was often extremely arduous, building roads or draining marshes, usually on meagre rations.37 Working class boys, used to hard physical labour and poor food, might cope with this. Middle class boys were less suited to it. Naturally, Nazi propaganda portrayed the camps in a different light. As to the 10 Reich Germans from Asch, who had been arrested Koch, as a humane German nationalist, was indignant about the way they had been treated. They had taken part in a Nazi celebration in Germany and on their return were tried, convicted and imprisoned. On their release they were to be expelled from Czechoslovakia, ‘driven from home, from their positions and into want’. Harsh treatment of this sort would surely force Germany to retaliate, expelling equal numbers of Czechoslovaks from Germany. In fact, as Koch subsequently had to admit, matters were by no means as one sided as he claimed. Whereas in Czechoslovakia all those arrested were tried, one Czechoslovak citizen in Germany, Walter Tschuppik, editor of a Munich newspaper, had been arrested and held for six months without trial after Hitler had come to power. A further 291 Czechoslovak citizens had been expelled from Germany through administrative procedures. Behind all this however was Krofta’s fear that sooner or later Germany would attack Czechoslovakia. To try and avoid this and ease the renewed tension, Koch suggested to Krofta that If the Czechoslovak government would decide to halt the e´migre´s and the hate propaganda, then it would also be possible to put a stop to the daily attacks which National Socialism was broadcasting across the border into Czechoslovakia. Krofta shrugged his shoulders nervously, but thanked me warmly for the visit and asked that it be repeated soon. Both men could see the problem. Both wished to ease the tension. Neither was free to control the laws that created it.

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Czechoslovak perseverance paid off. On 3 October the Sudeten branch of the Nazi party was disbanded.38 Realising that Nazis would merely move to other organisations and regroup, the government also banned the National Party, which had expressed similar ideas. Three parliamentary deputies who had been pro-Nazi, Jung, Kaspar and Schubert, were arrested. A fourth, Krebs, escaped to Germany in October.39 More arrests were likely.

Henlein and the Sudetendeutsche Heimat Front Konrad Henlein now emerges as the man trying to unite all Sudeten Germans inside one party. Although he is a man who played an important part in the events that led to World War II, and appears to be responsible for helping to create the Munich crisis, Henlein is an ambiguous figure. He is described by William Shirer, who saw many of the events at firsthand as ‘a mild mannered gymnastics teacher’.40 Others who met him, Vansittart, adviser to the British government and von Bu¨low, the German Foreign Minister, both considered him honest and straight forward. Born at Maffersdorf near Reichenberg in 1898 the son of a bookkeeper, Konrad Henlein had a German father and Czech mother.41 After army service in World War I, during which he was taken prisoner, he became a bank clerk in Gablonz. In 1925 he became a full-time instructor for the Deutsche Turnverein, a nationalistic German (Vo¨lkisch) gymnastic society. He showed administrative ability and by 1929 had joined the executive board of the Deutsche Turnverband, an umbrella organisation for Sudeten German gymnastic groups in Czechoslovakia. By 1931 he had been appointed Turnverbandssturmwalt and controlled the Turnverband. He attracted general Sudeten German attention in July 1933 when he organised a gymnastic festival at Saaz. Up to this point he was not an openly political figure. The Turnverband was, after all, only a gymnastic association. But in the politics of the 1920s and 1930s, any organisation that was limited to the Sudeten German community played an important part in cultural politics. In its own way it was similar to the Czech gymnastic organisation Sokol, which had been founded in the second half of the nineteenth century and became a symbol of Czech culture. Sokol held similar gymnastic displays and also owned houses at universities where Czech students were able to stay.

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In view of Henlein’s experience and nationalistic views, he was considered by Sudeten Nazis to be a suitable person to help lead the Sudeten political movement. After the Sudeten Nazi party was banned in September 1933, Henlein was approached by members of the DNSAP (Sudeten German Nazi party) and DNP (Sudeten German nationalist party) who asked him to found a new movement. This was announced on 1 October with the name Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront. It was not openly Nazi and Henlein hoped that it could be a new party that would appeal to Sudeten Germans regardless of class and political affiliation. In fact, Henlein had come under the influence of the Austrian social thinker Othmar Spann and believed that the ideal German society was elitist, hierarchical and anti-liberal. In launching his new organisation, Henlein also had the support of an influential secret, intellectual and elitist society, the Kamaradschaftsbund. On the surface, the Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront was concerned solely with creating unity (Volksgemeinschaft) among the Sudeten Germans, but it did exclude Jews. This new organisation attracted the attention of the German legation in Prague. On 5 October 1933, Koch reported its creation to the German Foreign Office. He did not realise that the Kameradschaftsbund, a small group little known to the general public, wielded great power within the Sudeten community. At this stage, Henlein’s chances of starting a political party were slight, since both President Masaryk and the Minister of the Interior had refused to meet him. The Czechoslovak Government had achieved its immediate aim of crushing extreme Sudeten German nationalism. Koch reported on 10 October that Sudeten politics had split into three parts. Supporting the Government were the Agrarian League (Landbu¨ndler) and Social Democrats, whose support was restricted to Bohemia and Moravia.42 These formed the first group. The second consisted of Opposition groups that generally backed the Government: the Christian Social, Business party (Gewerbler) and Labour and Economy group (Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft). The third part consisted of the former members of the Nazi and Nationalist parties. Henlein’s attempt to form a new Popular Front (Volksfront) party had initially been unsuccessful and all hopes of creating a Peoples’ Council (Volksrat) had been abandoned for the foreseeable future in the light of the general confusion. Henlein’s attempt to form a new party had failed because the Czechs had seen it, correctly, as an attempt to reunite Sudeten

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nationalists. Instead, Henlein prepared to move cautiously, stating that he wished to take part in the government, accepted the principle of democracy and the existing state and ‘despite a Christian–German ideology, extends a welcome to every Jew who declares his allegiance to the German community’. Koch thought it unlikely that the police would be taken in by such claims; they broke up Henlein’s first press conference. It was also open to question whether this anodyne political programme would appeal to the Sudeten German nationalists that Henlein was wanting to attract. He was not alone in bidding for the Sudeten voters. Spina, Minister for Public Health and representing the Agrarian League, also appealed to them. The two men tried to join forces, though clearly Koch favoured Henlein for his ‘sprightliness and honesty’. As to the Sudeten situation, Koch saw this as a return to the conditions of 1918 after the revolution (the Czech seizure of power). The German national population is in the clutches of the Czech authorities as it never before was. Terror and confusion are being spread by the arrest of the leaders, the suspension of the newspapers, the seizure of party property, continued house searches and interrogations, and commissions that are already beginning to investigate the activities of Sudeten German government employees in the national parties. On the Sudeten German side there is, moreover, the feeling that all that has been going on has not made a sufficiently deep impression on the Reich German public and press and that no help is to be expected from Germany.43 What was worse from the Sudeten German point of view was that the dissolution of these parties deprived them of 15 votes in parliament. The Government, determined to control German nationalism in any form, passed a further law on 25 October that would make it easier to abolish political parties and suspend their publications.44 The acid test for all parties was to be total loyalty to the state. Faced with this situation, Koch could only recommend that the Sudeten Germans should be left to find their own answers to these problems. He ended his report: ‘It seems to me always to be dangerous and inexpedient to relieve them of this responsibility.’ This was the official German diplomatic opinion in Prague. Vigorous action by the Czechoslovak Government helped to damp down the extreme Sudeten German behaviour. But it did not end it

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completely. It was left to the Czechoslovak ambassador to Germany, Mastny´, to lodge an official complaint on 15 November with the German Foreign Office about the ‘rabble rousing activity’ of the Heimatbund (Sudeten German Home League).45 The German reply was that action had already been taken to reorganise it and change the personnel running it. Both sides agreed that the general atmosphere had become less tense and that decisions in recent trials had been handled in a constructive way.46 Both the German official and the Czechoslovak ambassador were anxious to appear conciliatory and Mastny´ was able to report confidentially that Benesˇ had almost certainly agreed to pardon the ten Reich Germans from Asch. Officially, good relations had been restored. This had been helped by the Czechoslovak wish to avoid offending Germany and the fact that the German Foreign Office consisted of professional diplomats who shared the Czech distaste for Nazi hooliganism. But when it came to Czech verbal attacks on Nazi mistreatment of Jews, both sides trod very warily. In this memorandum to Koch of 15 November, the Director of Department II explained that the Czechoslovak ambassador had been anxious to avoid discussing a particular case. This was the trial in Czechoslovakia of a former member of the SA. A Jewish lawyer had tried to use this to publicise the ‘alleged’ mistreatment of Jews in German concentration camps. But he had been overruled by the Czech judge, who considered the material irrelevant to the case. Mastny´, trying to avoid giving offence to the German diplomat, described this as an ‘outrageous speech’ and ‘atrocity propaganda of the most outrageous kind’. Mastny´ also said that he was ‘afraid that the outrageous speech of the counsel would perhaps be taken up in the German press and through misunderstanding of the facts might offer occasion for vehement new attacks on the Czech courts’. Mastny´ was right to act cautiously. In a letter from the German Foreign Minister to Koch of 23 November, it is clear that the German police were seizing Czechs at the same rate that Sudeten Germans were being arrested in Czechoslovakia.47 Benesˇ suggested that the two countries should each exchange political prisoners. This would have removed Sudeten Nazis from Czechoslovakia and the Czechs might have been able to keep them out if they tried to return, but the matter was not taken up, perhaps because the Nazi party wanted to keep them in Czechoslovakia as martyrs.

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German financial support The arrest and imprisonment of large numbers of Sudeten Germans created a serious social problem. The families of these men were without the main breadwinner and their position was desperate. By 14 December Hitler had been made aware of this and ordered that steps be taken to provide relief.48 The view from the German Legation in Prague was that the problem was virtually insoluble. The Czechs considered that any contact between Sudeten Germans and Germany was criminal activity. As Koch explained: The misery which the Sudeten National Socialists are now experiencing is in large part to be attributed to thoughtless evidence of sympathy by careless and unsuspecting persons in the Reich, to letter writing, to sending of propaganda material, and of declarations of solidarity across the border. Knirsch, the Sudeten Nazi leader, had been warned by Hitler that Germany would not be able to give him any help for a long time. But this message was not passed on properly by the local leaders to the party members, who believed the party in Germany would help them. All that could be done by the legation was to provide financial help to families of prisoners. But even this ‘would have to travel with completely dimmed lights. If the Czechs and Sudeten Germans whose attitude is hostile should learn the least thing about this then the action will turn out to be most harmful to the National Socialists here.’ This was of particular importance, especially to about 300 Sudeten Germans awaiting trial. If the Czechs learnt of official support for party members from Germany, this would turn the courts against the accused. The Czechs would believe that the Nazi party had been financed by Germany from the beginning and the sentences would be much harsher. This was no mere speculation. The Czech newspaper Vecˇer had obtained details of a German relief plan to help the dissolved Nazi party even before this information reached the German legation by official channels! A further problem was that the leadership of the Sudeten Nazi party had been ‘atomised’. The leader (Knirsch) was dead, Krebs had fled to Germany and Jung, Kaspar and others were in prison. The party newspaper had been banned.

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The party members have crept into every possible hole. The driftwood that had been moored around the party has already floated off in different directions (Home Front, Agrarian Youth League, Kameradschaftspartei) . . . There are traitors everywhere . . . No one trusts anyone else. However, something had to be done to help the families of party members. Koch’s proposal was to use four men whose names had been given him by Knirsch before he died. They were not known at the legation but had to be trusted. No receipts could be given for any money handed out because of the need for total security; the police were watching all known party members and searched houses. A further problem was the strict foreign exchange regulations, which allowed the police to seize any money that the owner could not prove to be ‘Czechoslovak’, even if it was intended for humanitarian purposes. All money had to be handled by members of the party, not the legation. If the Czechs discovered any official connection they would regard the action as interference in domestic policy. If that happened the Government would openly side with the e´migre´s. The scale of the help needed shows how effective the Czech Government and police had been in curbing the Sudeten Nazis. As a first step, Koch suggested that the legation should be given 3,000 RM for emergencies; the legal costs of the trials also had to be met. Here the position was even more delicate. When . . . the party raised the bail for Krebs [who subsequently fled to Germany] (200,000 Czech crowns) and had to expand its paper, the Dux Tag, it took 600,000 Czech crowns out of the coffers of the National Socialist Trade Unions, in the certain expectation of getting the money back from the party leadership in the Reich. If this deficit is not covered at once, there is great danger that responsible trade union leaders, in particular Kaspar, who is under arrest, will be called to account by a criminal judge for this offence. This would pull the whole proceedings down from the political level to the level of common criminal proceedings, quite apart from the effect on the injured workers. The trade union was dissolved by the Government; it seems however, that the deficit has not yet been

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discovered, so that it is still possible to repair the damage . . . The cost: 75,000 RM. Another problem was to know how to help party members who were in prison. The difficulty was that only the Czechoslovak Government knew who was in jail for political offences and where they were held. Nor was there any information about who these might be; the Czechs had seized party membership records. The legation could not officially ask for details of these men. In any case, even when the legation did have details, no prisoner was allowed to receive anything other than a few cigarettes and a little chocolate each week. What worried the prisoners most was how they could raise the money for their defence. Lawyers’ fees were not fixed at official rates as in Germany and were likely to be high. Much good could be done for those awaiting trial if money could be passed through a third party. The estimated cost was 15,000 RM. The last item was the support of Knirsch’s widow, who was penniless, and help for families of the main leaders in prison. Koch’s proposal in this case was for a monthly allowance of 5,000 RM for the time being as an experiment. These proposals concerned party members living in towns and cities. The condition of those in the countryside was not known at the legation and Koch ends his report: I do not believe that it will be possible to go beyond this sphere and include within the relief action the distress out in the country, where National Socialists have received disciplinary punishment and lost their jobs. One must always remember that the Sudeten German NSDAP is today no longer something definite; no one knows for certain who belongs to it. Moreover, it is quite inconceivable that such assistance can be kept secret in the case of people who live next door to Social Democrats and Communists. However, if the assistance from the Reich becomes known, then the person involved will be arrested and prosecuted under the Law for the Protection of the Republic, and would thus experience still greater distress. In this way the blessing turns to misery. Clearly, something had to be done. Two days later a committee of staff from the Foreign Ministry, Prague legation, Ministry of the Interior and

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Ministry of Propaganda had been formed and held its first meeting.49 It decided that it was not feasible to send money through a charitable organisation such as the Red Cross. The German Red Cross would regard this as a political act and the Czech Red Cross would also refuse to handle it. The money would have to be taken into Czechoslovakia by diplomatic courier and distributed by a trusted person or persons. Payment had to be kept secret. For security reasons, no instructions would be issued or receipts given. No official German organisation, the Kamaradschaftsbund or even what remained of the Sudeten German Nazi party should know about it. As to the amount to be given, the German Foreign Ministry was providing 10,000 RM immediately and a further 5,000 RM a month for six months, though this was expected to increase. To meet the defence expenses in the political trials of Sudeten and Reich Germans, up to 30,000 RM should also be given. This decision was made as a matter of principle; the German Foreign Ministry did not have this money. This would have to come from a special fund that the German Finance Ministry would create and which the German Foreign Ministry would administer. In addition, the German Propaganda Ministry had been asked for information on providing the 75,000 RM to replace the money taken from the National Socialist trade union funds. This completed the financial arrangements for emergency relief. Steps also had to be taken to stop any more Sudeten party members being incriminated by material being sent to them. Prince Waldeck, a German Foreign Ministry Councillor, was asked to send strict instructions to all German party offices. That had been the situation in mid-December: the remnants of the Sudeten Nazi party were in hiding or in prison and their dependents were in dire financial straits. By 12 January their position had become even more serious.50 Henlein’s earlier attempt to recreate the Nazi party in another form had had limited success. Now it was crushed like the Sudeten Nazi party. Its meetings were banned and the secretary and Henlein’s chief supporters were arrested. All known members of the Sudeten Nazi party in Dux and Bodenbach were put under police supervision and ordered to report three times a day. It was extremely difficult under the circumstances to make contact with any of them. However, the provisional party executive was still at liberty, though its members were also being watched by the police. It was only with the

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greatest difficulty that contact could be made with a leading member of the executive. Although Koch was grateful for the financial and moral support that had been given, he asked that in future no neutral middleman be used because of the risk of being arrested. There remained one problem. There was a rumour that a group of young army officers in Dresden were expecting a Czech fascist putsch at the end of February or the beginning of March in Brno. They wanted to exploit the uncertainty that this would create and launch a similar putsch in the Sudeten German area. In the opinion of the Sudeten German who reported this to the German legation, the idea was extremely dangerous. Any attempted putsch was bound to fail. Whether or not the information was correct Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, took steps to prevent anything happening. He banned all contact between Reich Germans and Sudeten Germans unless they were authorised by party offices in Dresden or Passau. He forbade all pro-Sudeten demonstrations in border areas. No Nazi propaganda, press or publicity material was to be sent to Czechoslovakia, nor were any party members or organisations to engage in political activity extending across the frontier. Finally, he reminded all party members that no Sudeten Germans should be allowed to join the SA, the SS, St, HJ or be admitted to the labour camps. This effectively ended all contact between party members on the two sides of the German –Czechoslovak frontier. The outlook for the Sudeten Nazi party was bleak. It had been completely crushed by the Czech police. In March it was agreed at the Foreign Ministry that the Sudeten party was still disorganised and there remained nothing except a few pockets of resistance.51 Moreover, the minute continued ‘Under present conditions there was no question in the foreseeable future of a National Socialist political organisation in Czechoslovakia. For years the Sudeten Germans would have to hold out by their own strength.’ In other words, nothing had changed in the past six months. This was in contrast to Austria, where the movement was much stronger. As a result, there was no point in setting up a Nazi militant organisation for the Sudeten Germans in Germany. Hess had therefore decided that all matters relating to Sudeten German matters would be handled by the Volksdeutsch Council. The task of the Sudeten Heimatbund (German Home League) was to organise the Sudeten Germans already in Germany and was to be subordinate to the Volksdeutsch Council.

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The aim of this moderate policy was to try and calm the political situation in Czechoslovakia and enable the Sudeten Nazi party to reorganise. Towards the end of March it became clear that Hess’ orders to the party not to interfere in Czechoslovakia were being ignored. Koch reported that young German Nazis were crossing the frontier into northern Bohemia and were ‘wanting to “start something” – just what they do not even know themselves’.52 These had to be stopped. It was equally important that nothing should be done in Germany about the Sudeten German question, since many Sudeten Germans were in prison. But Benesˇ had spoken about this in a friendly way to Koch and the prospects for better German –Czechoslovak relations appeared to be good. 28 March marked a turning point in Sudeten German affairs. At a meeting at the Foreign Office in Berlin it was agreed that although the Sudeten Germans should be left to develop independently, there were signs that a new German nationalist movement was beginning to take shape. If this movement was to succeed, it was essential that there should be no noticeable intervention by any Reich German organisations. Municipal and parliamentary elections would soon be held and if the Czechoslovak Government had evidence of outside interference it would have a legal justification for annulling German electoral lists. However, non-political cultural and Volksdeutsch links between Germany and the Sudeten Germans would continue, using specially trained and careful agents. Assuming that this new Sudeten German movement would continue to grow, it was unlikely that it could be directed from Prague. In that case, assistance would be sent from Austria, Bavaria, Saxony and Silesia. The few Germans in Slovakia would be managed from Bratislava.53 Finally, it was reported that the relief programme initiated by Hitler had been completed. The elections that had caused Koch so much concern brought an end to popular support for the Sudeten Social Democrats, who had been the focus for e´migre´ attacks on Germany. The Social Democrats were replaced in the government by the Sudeten German Agrarian Party. Earlier these had supported Czech policies against the Sudeten German Nazi party. But in the new political climate of mid-May their leader Spina began to look for ways of improving relations with Germany.54 The Sudeten German Agrarian Party was concerned about the decline in German– Czechoslovak commercial relations, which had affected trade

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in brewery barley, hops and malt. Spina discussed with Koch the possibility of ending German commercial restrictions but was told that the chances were slight while the e´migre´ press was allowed to scream day after day at the Reich Germans’ expressions like murderous brown gang, Huns, cultural shame, butchers, a Government that feigns regret over the excesses of the e´migre´s, but does nothing about it and that permits the agreement on mutual recognition of national emblems to be trampled underfoot by the lower authorities. But there were also other problems to solve before normal trade could be resumed. Koch complained of the ‘scandalous and vexatious manner in which German imports for a full year have been throttled by the Czech authorities, especially by a Foreign-Exchange Control operating with poison and dagger’. Concessions had been given to Holland, Belgium and other states but not to Germany and it was up to the Sudeten German Agrarian Party to put pressure on their government to ease these restrictions. Subsequent discussions with Benesˇ were friendlier, but Koch believed that they were not meant seriously. Masaryk was unlikely to continue as president indefinitely and Benesˇ was trying to gain Sudeten German support for when he would be president. Koch’s assessment of Benesˇ was ‘To us he presents himself as an amiable gentleman in small things, while simultaneously in the world outside, in the bigger political issues which affect us, he is active behind the scenes as creator of all the obstacles (rearmament question, Saar question, Danube pact, financial question).’

Causes of German –Czechoslovak tension Against this general easing of tension there were a few signs that Sudeten Germans felt that they were being discriminated against. A report by the German military attache´, von Falkenhorst, to the Reichswehr Ministry in July 1934 mentioned that Sudeten German army officers in the Czechoslovak army were discontented.55 They were never appointed to senior positions. This, he thought, undermined the efficiency of the Czechoslovak army. But it was a tense time for Czech– German relations. To some degree the Czechoslovak Government was right to regard young

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Sudeten German officers as potential Nazi supporters. The murder of Dolfuss in Austria on 25 July showed the danger from young Nazis. There were also political attacks on Czechoslovakia from Germany. One extreme case that Koch complained about to the Ministry of Propaganda was the charge made in the rabidly anti-Semitic Nazi paper Der Sturmer, that Masaryk was partly Jewish.56 To make an attack on a head of state was, in Koch’s view, unforgivable and the paper should be banned. This was a brave move by Koch. He knew the true nature of the Nazi state but made his stand on what he still believed to be decent, humanitarian behaviour. It was this professional approach to his work that made him respected by Czech politicians and gave him the freedom to speak to them reasonably, and at times bluntly, on matters relating to German – Czechoslovak relations. Later, in February 1935, Koch reported a discussion with Krofta, a close friend of Benesˇ and later Foreign Minister. Koch’s report gives a picture of how relations between the two men were normally conducted. . . . I saw Minister Krofta today on various matters. As usual after we had dealt with these matters, we continued the conversation for a while.57 I asked him to have a look at the latest number of Otto Strasser’s Revolution, in which the murder of the German Fu¨hrer and Chancellor is openly advocated.58 This led him (Krofta) to mention the ‘unhappy affair’ at Za´horˇı´ which neither of us had mentioned until then.59 I replied that now that the clandestine radio station had been silenced, I was no longer interested in Za´horˇı´. The rest was a matter for the public prosecutor. As, however, he had raised the matter, I felt I should say that with a little goodwill on the part of the Czechoslovak authorities the murder could have been avoided. Krofta said a Note was being drafted on the matter. Their postal services and police were not up to standard; moreover, so young a State lacked experience in such matters. I interjected that if he was trying to put the blame on the incompetence of his officials, I would have to refrain from comment. In my experience the real obstacle lay in the lack of goodwill shown by this State in all matters brought up for discussion with it by Germany. After being en poste in Czechoslovakia for 14 years, I had come to the conclusion

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that the effectiveness of a German Minister in this State was practically nil. Krofta disputed this, but was nevertheless remarkably subdued – more so than I had ever seen him. I therefore decided to go over to the attack. The conversation shows the close professional relationship between the German diplomat and Czech minister. Both knew and respected each other. Both had a personal and national point of view that they wanted to vindicate. Koch felt that his protests should have been given greater consideration by the Czech authorities. Krofta knew that much of this was true and was reduced to making rather feeble excuses about police incompetence that both men knew were untrue. The crushing of the Sudeten German Nazi party in the second half of 1933 showed how effective the Czech police were. Krofta knew that German e´migre´s were allowed free rein in Czechoslovakia to attack Hitler’s regime but could do little to control them until an event such as the murder of the radio announcer at Za´horˇı´, which the police could not ignore. In this position, Koch was able to raise the more general question of the German e´migre´s and their political activity in Czechoslovakia, concentrating on the case of Otto Strasser. He showed that Strasser should have been prosecuted under Czechoslovak law, ‘But no Public Prosecutor would take any action.’ Exploiting his advantage, Koch continued ‘Was this situation to continue? If so, it was certainly time for us to show clearly to the world the gulf which yawned between M. Benesˇ’ proud words at Geneva and the actual behaviour of his government.’60 Krofta was forced into admitting that ‘Strasser would have to be stopped’. The man had been allowed too much liberty. He too felt that this could not continue. There were admittedly great difficulties. The Social Democrats – the internal political situation – the forthcoming elections . . . I interposed that these matters did not concern me. It was for the government to gain sufficient authority within the country to enable them to fulfil their international obligations. The conversation was conducted without personal animosity. We parted on friendly terms as always. As this was a purely personal and confidential conversation, I would ask you not to make use of it either for foreign consumption or in your relations with Minister Mastny´. [Czechoslovak ambassador to Germany].

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The conversation reveals the complexity of Czechoslovak party politics at a critical time. Czechoslovak governments were always coalitions because of the many political parties. Benesˇ had to balance the support of his own party, the Czech National Socialists, against the opposition Sudeten German Agrarian and Social Democrats. The latter wanted to attack Hitler’s regime in support of fellow Social Democrats in Germany, the former wanted to improve relations with Germany and minimise the risk from Germany. The two policies were diametrically opposed. The problem of the e´migre´s was made even more complicated by the refusal of the German State Secretary von Bu¨low on 5 February 1935 to discuss the e´migre´ issue separately from the proposed Danube agreement.61

Henlein, the Heimat Front and the SdP (Sudetendeutsche Partei – the Sudeten German party) At the same time that von Bu¨low was blocking any official discussion with the Czechoslovak Government about the German e´migre´s, Steinacher and Ullmann of the Volksdeutsch council was looking for ways of increasing the number of German nationalists in the Czechoslovak parliament. In a letter to the Foreign Office they suggested that Henlein should be given a subsidy of 3 million Czech crowns (300,000 RM) for election expenses. Roediger, a senior councillor at the Foreign Office, passed the suggestion to Koch, who raised the same objections as he had to earlier payments to the families of Sudeten Nazis. Such a large sum could not be disguised and it would give the Czechoslovak Government the excuse to suppress Henlein’s Sudeten German Heimat Front. Henlein needed the support of Sudeten German leaders, otherwise the Czechs would ban his party. Henlein had already quarrelled with Spina, Czechoslovak Minister of Public Health and Leader of the German Agrarian Party. But the party had blocked a ban on Henlein’s Heimat Front because it hoped to get his support in forthcoming elections. The continued help of the Sudeten German Agrarian Party depended on keeping links between Henlein and Germany secret, otherwise the Agrarians would disown Henlein. Furthermore, there was a current debate in parliament between Benesˇ and the opposition on whether Henlein’s party should be registered as a party. It was by no means certain that the Heimat Front would be officially recognised. If it wasn’t, the subsidy would be

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lost. The most that Koch could offer was the suggestion that Henlein should be told that, if he won, his election debts would be paid. Koch was also concerned that some of Henlein’s supporters were careless: some had been arrested in Brno for political activity and brought before the Public Prosecutor. Koch’s most important reservation about Henlein was that some of his supporters were not sufficiently committed to German nationalism. I would like to point out, in strict confidence, that I have constantly and even quite recently been receiving complaints from confidants in the National Socialist movement here to the effect that while there are certainly no personal objections to the leader, Henlein, there are, however, among the men in his immediate circle still some who in their hearts reject the Third Reich and who, as one of the leading National Socialists told me, while indeed being quite willing to accept funds from the Reich, would prefer to use them for the purpose of developing a policy like that of Herr Dolfuss in Vienna. [right wing nationalism] This reveals one of Henlein’s problems. He was undoubtedly a German nationalist and favoured an authoritarian, right wing regime. But when he had tried to create a new movement after the crushing of the Sudeten Nazi party, he had to rely on a broad band of right wing opinion. He could not limit himself to members of the banned Sudeten German Nazi party because most were in prison or in hiding. His immediate circle therefore included people who included men who could be termed fascist in the broadest sense rather than committed Nazis. But overriding these reservations was the desire of the Volksdeutsch council in Germany that Henlein should be given substantial financial help to fight the coming elections. Hitler had earlier shown his support for Sudeten Germans in the crisis of December 1933 and this encouraged the Volksdeutsch council to act boldly. The Saar plebiscite had also shown enormous popular support for Hitler and the transfer of the area to Germany on 1 March 1935 gave great encouragement to Germans everywhere. This encouraged the council to think that the coming elections would mark a decisive point in Sudeten German history. The promise of support from both Czech and Sudeten German Agrarian parties also raised Henlein’s hopes. Both parties wanted to defeat Benesˇ

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in the elections due to be held on 19 May. Further support was given to Henlein on 11 March by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign minister, who ordered that all attacks on Henlein in the German press had to stop. Crucially for Henlein’s election plans, the advice of Koch in Prague was ignored. The German Finance Ministry agreed in principle to subsidise Henlein and funds were transferred. As to the attitude of Czechs, it is evident that they felt strong enough to act decisively against any perceived threat to the state. Extreme German nationalism had played a small but significant part of the history Czechoslovakia of the First Republic up to this point. It was small because extreme German parties did not win a large part of the Sudeten German votes, but significant because it showed that in spite of the prosperity of the 1920s, two extreme German parties, the DNSAP (Sudeten German Nazi Party) and DNP (Sudeten German national party) had held eight and seven seats in parliament in 1929.62 In general, however, Sudetens had come to accept their position in the new state, though they resented the fact that they were not legally on an equal footing with Czechs and Slovaks. The anger of the early years after November 1918 had given way to an acceptance of the new conditions and a desire to share in the economic benefits that the new state offered. Sudeten German parties had joined Czech-dominated coalition governments and individuals had been given ministerial office. But all this was changed by the Depression which, as already noted, bore more heavily on the Sudeten German industries than Czech. Under these conditions, a Sudeten German party that could appeal to a wide spectrum of Sudeten German opinion had a wide appeal, especially as other parties (Sudeten Nazis and German Nationals) had either been crushed or had shown themselves unable to protect Sudeten Germans from the harsh reality of the Depression (Social Democrats and other parties in government and opposition). A German party appealing to traditional values and led by an apparently honest and well-respected individual from local politics who had shown himself a good organiser was likely to be successful. German money undoubtedly helped him to get his message across to Sudeten voters.

Czech military response The events described above created a potential threat to the state from within. There was also a fear that Hungary might pose a military danger

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if its government actively tried to regain lost territory and there was also for a time the threat from Bela Kun. But the Czechoslovak army was not expected to face a major military attack. This changed after Hitler was appointment Chancellor in January 1933 and was followed by the announcement of German rearmament. The subsequent rise of the Sudeten Nazi party described above also posed a new threat to Czechoslovakia. The two dangers forced the Czechoslovak Government to strengthen the armed forces to cope with civil disorder and a potential threat from Germany. Of all the weapons available, tanks seemed to be the most important. But their role in any future war was unclear. Strategy in the 1920s had assumed, following French military advice, that tanks would be infantry support weapons, rather than fighting independently in groups.63 This had been challenged in 1923 by Lt. Col. Vesey, who proposed that special units should be formed, consisting of tanks, motorised infantry and mobile artillery. This was seven years before Liddell Hart proposed a similar strategy. The idea received further support in 1930 from Capt. Sovadina in his Armoured formations and in 1935 from Major Papousˇek in Tanks in combat, tactical use in examples. But these pamphlets, like the writings of Liddell Hart in Britain and de Gaulle in France, failed to gain official Czechoslovak army support. But the army did need some form of armoured vehicle. The first had been armoured cars: several Lancias had been brought to Czechoslovakia by Italian legionaries. Their popularity led to others being built on Fiat chassis at the Sˇkoda Plzenˇ works and these were used by the Czechoslovak army between 1919 and 1925. Then the Sˇkoda-Praga L (PA-1) with four-wheel drive was made. This was armed with two heavy machine guns and had a maximum speed of 70 km/h (43 mph). This was followed by the PA II, the zˇelva (tortoise), which remained in army use until 1937. Then came the PA III in 1924, 12 of which were bought by the Czechoslovak army. There was also a Tatra vehicle in 1929.64 These were expensive. The zˇelva cost 680,000 crowns without armament. A Tatra Type 27 armoured car was 627,000 crowns without armament and 720,000 crowns with. By comparison the Fiat Torino, made under licence by Sˇkoda and known as the Sˇkoda-Fiat 18BL, only cost 262,000 crowns. The next armoured vehicles were the half tracks designed by Joseph Vollmer, who had been responsible for designing German tanks in World War I. These half tracks were favoured over tanks, whose

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tracks wore out quickly on the cobbled Czechoslovak roads. But Vollmer’s ideas failed to gain army support and the Government turned next to tankettes – fast, light reconnaissance vehicles and later, in the 1930s, to tanks. The first tanks used by the Czechoslovak army were seven Renault FT 17 light tanks, which were bought in 1922– 4. These had been successful in World War I and were used for training. In the absence of any clear need for national defence, no Czech tanks were designed until the 1930s. From 1929 the army relied instead on a variety of armoured vehicles. It had eight Tatra armoured trains (to keep the railways open in an emergency), 12 self-propelled guns and 12 vehicles with machine guns, two Lancia armoured cars, 12 armoured cars made from Fiat Torinos, 15 heavy Sˇkoda type 27 armoured cars and 7 Renault M-18 light tanks.65 When Germany announced in 1932 that it was going to rearm, it was clear that Czechoslovakia might be one of the first targets. Most tank development was done by Sˇkoda, but the rivalry between Sˇkoda and CˇKD resulted in each company producing a variety of designs.66 In 1930 Sˇkoda made a light tank, named the MU 4, which had a weight of three tons and a speed of 40.5 km/h (25 mph). It was based on the successful Vickers Carden-Loyd design and was armed with two machine guns. The Czechoslovak army did not buy any but it was exported to Romania, Sweden, Hungary and Afghanistan. The same year, CˇKD began the design of a more substantial light tank named the P-II, which initially was designed to have a Vickers cannon. This was developed into the LT 34 that became one of the two main Czechoslovak army’s tanks in the 1930s and carried a Sˇkoda cannon instead of the Vickers. CˇKD also bought the rights to the CardenLoyd design and produced a light tank that was based on this.67 A number were purchased by the Czechoslovak army, but it proved unpopular with tank crews who nicknamed it ‘Black Peter’ (‘cˇerny´ Petr’ ¼ bad luck). CˇKD continued to make a range of light tanks which cost about the same as the earlier armoured cars: 723,646 crowns fully armed.68 One version, the LT38, was exported to a number of countries. This was heavier, faster and better armed and armoured than the Carden-Loyd tank. It had a speed of 35 km/h (21 mph) and range of 190 km (118 miles). It carried two heavy machine guns and a 37.2 mm Sˇkoda gun that had originally been

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designed for anti-aircraft use. It had comparatively light armour to give it greater speed. By comparison, the first German tanks were armed initially only with heavy machine guns. The German army also realised that it would take time to develop their own tanks and initially concentrated on light tanks that could be used for training. Four companies were asked to submit prototypes based on the Carden-Loyd designs: Krupp, MAN, Rheinmetall, Henschel and Daimler-Benz. The Krupp model was chosen and became the PzKpfw 1 (Panzerkampfwagen).69 Made first in 1933 without a turret as a training vehicle – it was originally known under the name landwirtschaftliche Schlepper (agricultural tractor) – in 1934 it became a lightly armoured tank with a speed of 37 km/h (23 mph), a range of 200 km (125 miles) and an armament of two heavy machine guns. Production began with orders for a total of 585 in 1933 – 4.70 The Czech and German tanks were similar in speed and range, though the Czech was much heavier (10.5 tons to the German 5.4 tons). But the Czech was superior because of its heavy, and very accurate, Sˇkoda gun. In addition to these tanks, the Czechoslovak army purchased a variety of cars and lorries in the early 1930s – orders that kept the companies going during the Depression. In 1934 – 5 Tatra built 77 military vehicles and 87 heavy artillery lorries (some with tracks on the two rear pairs of wheels to give extra mobility). Among these were a number of 2.5 ton lorries armed with light machine guns, costing 184,040 crowns each.71 Sˇkoda made a similar range of tracked and wheeled vehicles but there is no record of production figures.72 CˇKD was in a similar financial position and was probably given similar government orders but no details are available. This made the Czechoslovak army better equipped to fight a mobile war if attacked by Germany. In addition, all three companies designed tracked vehicles for pulling artillery. The Sˇkoda and CˇKD vehicles were successful.73 The Tatra heavy tractor on the other hand, which had tracks and road wheels, was supposed to have a maximum weight of 10 tons when armed with a canon and machine gun. But the prototype weighed 15 tons without armament and no more were built.74 Sˇkoda was also an important manufacturer of artillery, small arms and ammunition though its subsidiaries.

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Aircraft production, another aspect of Czech –Sudeten German tension Faced with the German military threat, Czechoslovakia had to improve its army and air force. Neither benefited Sudeten German companies, which could not be trusted to work efficiently for the defence of Czech interests. But the orders for Czech companies and the exclusion of Sudeten German firms from this lucrative and important market increased tensions between the two groups. Sˇkoda was the main beneficiary. It had manufactured aircraft engines during World War I for Austro-Daimler as part of the aircraft production programme. After the creation of the First Republic a Czechoslovak aircraft industry was established. This consisted of the state-owned Military Aircraft Factory (later renamed Letov) and the private companies Aero and Avia. In 1919 the Aero Company began building a small two-seater Hansa C1 aircraft.75 In 1922 the Military Aircraft Research Institute was founded in Prague. The same year Sˇkoda made Spanish Hispano Suiza engines under licence. In 1926 it bought the Aero company and built Albatross, Brandenburg and de Havilland aircraft under licence.76 From 1923 the Walter factory at Jinonice near Prague was producing aero engines, initially under licence, but later of its own design. Later the company manufactured Dewoitine fighter aircraft with Lorraine engines under licence – probably the result of the French connection between Sˇkoda and its French owners. In 1927–8 it experimented with Pratt and Whitney Wasp and Hornet engines in a new aircraft, the Aero A– 30. Development continued and in 1929 a new fighter was designed, equipped with Vickers machine guns. The Czechoslovak air force bought 25 and others were exported to Finland, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Paraguay. At the end of the 1920s there were three Czechoslovak aircraft companies: Letov, Aero and Avia. Letov had the very experienced Alois Sˇmolik as chief designer, whose all-metal aircraft, the Sˇm-16, was only the second of this type – the first was made by Junkers. In the 1930s other companies entered the aircraft industry. These included CˇKD (Praga), Bat’a at Zlı´n and Ringhoffer (Tatra and Benesˇ-Mra´z). In 1931 Sˇkoda built a new aircraft factory at Letnˇany; the engines came from Mlada´ Boleslav. The stage was now set for larger scale production of more modern aircraft. This raised the strength of the air force in the same way that tank development helped modernise the army.

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The improvement of frontier defences. Another source of tension between Czechs and Sudeten Germans As tension mounted after the start of German rearmament in 1933, Czechoslovakia also looked for ways of increasing its defences to complement the army and air force. Under French influence, the Government decided to build a system of artillery and machine gun posts similar in concept to the Maginot Line. In 1934 the Chief of the General Staff, General L. Krejcˇı´ made a survey of what was considered potentially the weakest area of the Czechoslovak frontier. This was the area west of Ostrava known as the ‘MO sector’. Elsewhere along the northern and western frontier with Germany, hills formed a barrier that enemy troops and tanks would find difficult to penetrate in massed formations. But it was inhabited by Sudeten Germans and it was their land that had to be bought for the new defences. This was bitterly resented, because it was seen by Sudeten Germans as Czech incursion into Sudeten German territory, much as the settling of Czech military veterans on German estates had been after World War I. In this area near Ostrava the land is low lying and gently rolling. On 16 April 1935 military engineering centres were officially established at Novy´ Bohumı´n (EGHQ II) and Kra´lı´ky (EGHQ III).77 These centres were made responsible for carrying out surveys and building the defensive works. A start had already been made at Bohumı´n in the autumn of 1934 and the survey work was rapidly carried out in 1935 with the help of French military experts. At this stage the building programme was not resented by the local inhabitants. The defensive blockhouses occupied comparatively little land and farming continued undisturbed. It was also an area of mixed Czech, Polish and German people which had voted in a referendum to be part of Czechoslovakia. The building of local defences was therefore welcomed. Looking back on the troubled history of the Sudetenland in this period, it seems very unlikely that, however well the Sudeten Germans had been treated, they could have come to terms with the perceived loss of status and prestige. They were bound to look back to the days of the Habsburg Empire when Germans had been in control. Nor were they alone in this. The Hungarians, who had lost even more territory than the Austrians, also continued to resent the loss of territory. After the Munich Conference they put pressure on the weakened Czechoslovak

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Government and regained part of southern Slovakia. Later, during the war, they allied themselves first with Russia and later with Germany in their attempt to regain more lost territory. As noted above, the Sudeten problem had been made worse by the Sudeten German attempt to create independent areas in 1919. When this was put down with some loss of life, the Czechs refused to give them equal status with the Czechs and Slovaks. Even so, many people came to terms with life in Czechoslovakia in the 1920s as they enjoyed the stability of the new state. It was the Depression of the 1930s and the more serious and long-term economic collapse of the Sudeten areas that gave rise to renewed demands for social relief and ultimately autonomy. But even this might not have created a serious crisis. The Sudeten Nazi party, which might have provided a focus for this unrest was crushed and any hope of resistance ended. The main factor that ultimately contributed to the crisis was the money paid to Henlein and the latter’s ability to unite the majority of Sudeten Germans within one, broad party.

CHAPTER 4 HENLEIN, THE SDP (SUDETEN DEUTSCHE PARTEI) AND GERMAN MONEY

By 1935 the economic and social conditions of Sudeten Germans was probably worse than that of the Czechs. Sudeten Geman industries were linked closely to the consumer market, which was hit hard by the recession. This damaged both the export and home markets. In the mind of the Sudeten German population the political parties that were supposed to represent their interests were failing to provide adequate support. The system of social benefit, which had been adequate and effective under normal economic conditions, had been overwhelmed by the Depression. Social relief for the unemployed and their families was paid by the trade unions, not the government, and this was also seen by the Sudeten Germans as favouring the Czechs. Hitler’s political ambitions had aroused fear in the Czech-dominated parliament and government contracts designed to strengthen Czechoslovakia were given to Czech rather than Sudeten German companies. Czech memories of the disloyalty of Sudeten Germans in 1918, when they had tried to break away, only made matters worse. From the Sudeten German point of view, the Czech action in crushing their neo Nazi movement in the late 1920s had punished not only the ringleaders. It has also reduced their families to poverty. Many were regarded as patriots by Sudeten Germans. In Germany, Hitler’s actions in asserting German power reminded Sudeten Germans of their own inferior position in Czechoslovakia. When Konrad Henlein founded a

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new Sudeten German political party, it appeared to offer new hope to an economically and socially depressed community. This chapter shows how Sudeten German political power increased, how it was financed by German money and that this led to attempts to influence British public opinion. Henlein’s victory in the May elections was as dramatic as it was unexpected. No one, probably not even Henlein himself, could have foreseen how he had been able to unify the politically fragmented Sudeten Germans into a single party that gained the most Sudeten German votes. In fact, so large was his support in these elections that his was the large single party, Sudeten German or Czech. Czech politics had been fragmented; there were many Czech parties and all Czechoslovak governments had been coalitions because of this. But in spite of Henlein’s new political power, he could not expect to become a partner in a Czech-dominated Government. However, the size of the party gave him the chance to speak on behalf of all Sudeten Germans and put pressure on the Czech-dominated Government to alleviate Sudeten hardship. Where this would lead was by no means clear but Henlein would certainly challenge dominant Czech political power.

Official German reaction to the victory The scale of Henlein’s victory in the May elections took everyone by surprise. He won 1.2 million of the 1.8 million Sudeten German votes, between 62 and 63 per cent of the electorate.1 Membership of his party had grown from 9,500 in October 1933 to 384,982 two years later.2 Koch welcomed it in enthusiastic though cautious tones and was clearly unaware of the election subsidy that Henlein had received from Germany. Koch’s analysis of the reasons for the victory and the likely Czech response show that he felt it was no more than a beginning of a revival of Sudeten German political fortunes. Probably never before has the official machinery [announcing the election results] worked quite so slowly and cumbrously. Indeed, there even seems to be some deliberate intent: efforts are being made to convey to the people bit by bit certain unpleasant results of the elections so as to prevent too much excitement.

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The Sudeten Germans The great sensation of the day . . . is Henlein’s tremendous victory in the Sudeten German camp . . . He will have forty-four seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the rest of the German parties will have to be satisfied with twenty-two, that is to say half their present number of deputies. This is also from our point of view a very gratifying result, regardless of whether or not the Henlein party is really as close to our political ideas as it is still assumed to be in some Reich German circles. This does not greatly matter at the moment; the decisive point is that for the first time in their history two-thirds of the Sudeten German community have consolidated themselves into one bloc. Hitherto there have been two [sic] categories of Sudeten Germans; those in the Government, those who would have liked to be there and those who formed the opposition. In these circumstances it was easy for the Czechs to cripple the influence of the German parties by playing them off one against the other. In the future they will be confronted only by one large German party, for the three much shrunken rump parties hardly count any longer. This change must naturally not be overrated; a minority is always a minority and cannot effect a decisive influence on Government policy. But it can, nevertheless, tip the balance in some questions; one need only bear in mind a future election of the State President. The value of this new German bloc, now called the SdP (Sudeten deutsche Partei or Sudeten German party) was that it could embarrass the Government. But the party itself was a motley collection of people and the new deputies represented a variety of shades of opinion within the Sudeten community. Koch continued: Of course, there is some food for thought . . . when one looks at the future party deputies. At the head are a few old parliamentarians such as Rosche and Peters who are basically not Sudeten-front people at all but simply opportunist politicians; then a few men seeking the limelight such as Kundt and Neuwirth, and finally plenty of young people, partly adherents of the Kamaradschaftsbund

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and partly leaning more towards National Socialism. As regards their attitude towards the Czechoslovak State, practically all shades are represented in the party, ranging from implicit loyalty to absolute rejection. It will require a very firm hand to keep this conglomeration together, especially as their leader Henlein has no government powers at his disposal. It would be idle to predict what the Czech attitude will be to this change in the German camp. For the moment they do not themselves know . . . For the present, fury and dismay prevail . . . It is significant that late yesterday afternoon, when the news broke that Henlein’s party had obtained more votes than the strongest Czech party, the public in Wenceslas Square, which before had been moving along quietly, fairly exploded. Crowds of people formed everywhere, curses were hurled at the Government and order had to be restored with the aid of police truncheons. [There had been serious anti-German riots in 1930]. There is danger, which must not be underrated, in the scale and unexpectedness of Henlein’s victory. The thought that the Germans will in future exert greater influence on the State – na´ˇs stat, our State as the Czechs say – stirs up again all the old feelings of hatred amongst the Czechs, irrespective of party; the repercussions are unpredictable. ‘Poor man! He succeeds too well!’ so the Polish minister said to me yesterday with regard to Henlein. That Henlein is not labouring under any illusions about these matters is shown by the three telegrams to the President, the Minister President and the Minister of the Interior . . . In thus taking his stand on the Constitution, which, as we all know, was adopted without reference to the Germans, he is doing something that no German party leader has so far dared to do and which is certainly not altogether approved throughout the rank and file of his people. The greatest problem for Henlein was the attitude of the German press. Any open support or satisfaction at his victory would be taken by the Czechs to mean that the whole movement was really a disguised Nazi party. Sudeten Germans had repeatedly asked Koch to advise the German press to express moderate views or indifference to the victory.

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The scale of Henlein’s victory is shown by the election results. But who were the people who had voted for him in such large numbers? They represented a cross-section of Sudeten German society, excluding the Communists and supporters of the Social Democrats and activist parties. There were many who simply saw him as a patriotic German who stood above party politics and offered a new unity in their struggle for political justice. There were others who represented the former far right, whose party had been crushed. Typical of these was Karl Lutz.3 Lutz was born in 1902 in Zwickau in Bohemia and went to the local volkschule from 1913 to 1917. Then he attended unterrealschule, the basic commercial school, in Teplitz. Finally, to train for a specific career, he attended the Prague mining school (Handelsschule Bergmann) for a year, 1918 –19. But this did not give him the trade certificate (Fachpru¨fung) that would establish him as a fully qualified craftsman. He either failed to complete the course or decided he did not want to become a miner. Instead he began work in the office of Dr Kluber, a Jewish lawyer in Teplitz and, after three years, started to work as office manager for another Jewish lawyer, Dr Lo¨bner. He stayed there for 23 years until Dr Lo¨bner, realising the consequences of Hitler’s rise to power, left and presumably emigrated. Karl Lutz then moved to Aussig, where he was appointed office manager in the local branch of the Prague insurance company, Allgemeine Assuranz Versicherung. His skills included perfect typing, excellent knowledge of bookkeeping and he proved an efficient office manager. He could also speak English (he had attended a nine-month course at the English school in Teplitz) and French. Behind this appearance of a careful and efficient bureaucrat lay a more interesting history. Lutz had been born the son of an Austrian forest official. There does not seem to have been much opportunity for an ambitious young man to improve his chances locally and in consequence he was largely self-taught. But he was a voracious reader, owning over 100 books. He claimed to have been attracted to German national politics in his early 20s and joined the DNSAP (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei) in Turn-To¨plitz in August 1923. This raises an important question: why did he join this far-right German nationalist party? In the year he became a member he was working for a Jewish solicitor, and one might have thought that Lutz would not have held strong anti-Semitic views. It is of course possible that Dr Klauber was a non-practising Jew who, like many other Jews in public professions, had been baptised. To all

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appearances men like him were Germans whose Jewishness only became apparent when the Nazis decreed that all people with Jewish parents or grandparents were regarded as Jews, regardless of baptism.4 But Lutz continued to work for Dr Klauber until June 1923 and then was given a better position with another Jewish lawyer, Dr Lo¨bner. This loyalty to Jewish lawyers may be explained by the fact that he lacked the important Beruf certificate, which made it difficult for him to get another, comparable job. In any event, he continued working for the Jewish lawyer Dr Lo¨bner for 23 years. At the same time, Lutz also worked hard as a member of the DNSAP. He never married and was able to devote his whole life to his work and political activities. By the time the party was dissolved in 1933, Lutz had become a local leader, holding a number of important posts. For this reason he was put under police supervision in 1934– 5. He joined Henlein’s SdP when it was established in January 1935. As further proof of his German loyalties, Lutz was a member of the Turnverein Jahn in Teplitz from 1921 and the Teplitz branch of the DHV (the vo¨lkisch Handels-und Industrieangestellten Verband) from 1922. A further proof of his loyalty to German right wing politics was that he had been fined for his political activities many times. Lutz was a hard-working, self-taught, efficient bureaucrat. But he lacked the social prestige of the professional administrator (Beamter) who had recognised qualifications. This probably made him an outsider with a chip on his shoulder, who resented men with a higher status who had achieved it in a far easier way. This would explain the attraction of far right German politics, which gave a sense of being part of a racially superior social community. For Lutz, this emphasised the difference between Germans and Czechs. What is certainly true is that Lutz is typical of the committed right wing local politicians who formed an important element in Henlein’s party. With the help of such political activists and a great many normally non-political Sudeten Germans, Henlein had the largest German party in Czechoslovakia. But this alone would not get Henlein a place in government because the Czech parties united against him and were supported by the ‘activist’ (i.e. pro-democracy) Sudeten German parties. Henlein’s control of so many Sudeten German votes would, however, allow him to act as the spokesman for this group in general, but this only added to the Czech hostility. The Czech votes were divided between a number of parties, as Table 4.1 shows.

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Table 4.1

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Election results: number of votes and percentage share Czech lands

Parties RSVMaL CˇSDSD CˇZˇOSS SdP CˇSNS CˇSL KSCˇ

DSAP DCVP CˇsND DAWG LpVK

Czechoslovakia

Number of votes

Share

Position votes

Share

2829,145 3818,667 8397,376 11,220,440 4692,675 5570,962 6559,358 8293,361 9162,781 7403,891 10142,147 1113,824

13.16 13.00 6.31 19.38 11.00 9.06 8.88 4.65 2.58 6.41 2.25 2.14

2 3 8 1 5 6 4 9 11 7 12 10

14.29 12.57 5.44 15.18 9.18 7.48 10.32 3.64 1.98 5.55 1.73 2.04

Sudeten German parties – SdP, DSAP DCVP, DAWG. Source: Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘, vol. 2, p. 503.5

The figures in Table 4.1 show how important Henlein had now become. On the Czech side the election results were less clear-cut. The government coalition was now in a minority because it had lost nine seats held by Czech parties and 11 held by Sudeten German. One of the weaknesses of the Republic was the relatively large number of Czech political groups. Most Czech parties were republican (74 per cent of votes in the 1935 elections) and the nationalist and Communist parties had only 14 and 12 per cent respectively.6 In the uncertain situation created by the 1935 elections, the Government was approached by the Czech Small Traders’ Party, who saw a chance to increase their power. This had gained much support among the lower middle class, which had been hit by the economic crisis. It now held 17 seats, an increase of five. But this was not enough to make it a valuable coalition partner. It seemed likely that the German parties that had traditionally supported the Government would continue to do so: the Social Democrats and Small Farmers, though they now held only 11 and five seats respectively.

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The unknown factor remained the Slovaks, who had 22 seats. If they supported the Government, which was unlikely, the Government would be able to ignore Henlein, because the Slovaks would not sit in a cabinet with the Germans. Of the other Czech parties, the National Union, led by Kramarˇ and Strˇibny´ had lost votes: it had been well supported in Prague but had done badly elsewhere. Parties on the extreme left and right had done better than expected. The Communists had increased their vote by almost 100,000 and held 30 seats. The Czech fascists under Gajda had won six and entered parliament for the first time. In all cases this reflected the economic crisis. All that remained to be decided were details of the Senate Representatives and elections in self-governing corporations, which could have considerable local significance. These elections changed the face of Czechoslovak politics. The dramatic change in the Sudeten German vote reflects a number of factors. Chief is Henlein’s ability to appeal to a wide variety of Sudeten Germans. The substantial funds he received enabled him to do this effectively. Another factor was the economic crisis, which had hit the Sudeten area harder than the Czech, leaving Sudeten Germans feeling that the Czechs had received greater help from the state. There was also a disillusionment with Sudeten German politicians who had supported the (Czech) Government in the crisis rather than try to gain more for their own people. A further factor was the general feeling that Sudeten Germans were not being treated fairly by the state in a variety of ways, and that a stronger and more vigorous approach was needed. Examples of this disillusion include the young army officers who complained that promotion was blocked and businessmen who felt the needs of their areas (better roads, government contracts for firms during the crisis) were being ignored. The support of the Agrarian parties, both Sudeten German and Czech, that Koch had referred to in February undoubtedly played their part in helping to make Henlein’s party respectable in political terms. Even the earlier Czech attempts to block the creation of the party had played some part in commending it to Sudeten German voters. Finally, there were the links with the remnants of the former Sudeten Nazi party, whose members wanted a new, dynamic pan-German movement and who thought they saw this in Henlein’s Heimat Front. With so wide a variety of support within the Sudeten German community, it had seemed to Koch that Henlein

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had not at this stage needed any further help from the German Government or Nazi party. The Government reacted quickly to Henlein’s victory by banning all SdP public activities, including the party congress planned for April 1936, the ‘Sudeten German Cultural Festival’ and speeches by visiting Nazi leaders. All political and propaganda activity was made illegal.7 For a time it seemed that the party might also be banned. This had the effect of emphasising differences within it and in the first half of 1936 this led to the creation of ‘Courts of Honour’ which were an attempt to rid the party of individuals and groups it considered undesireable. This struggle between the old Nazis and the Kameradschaftsbund even threatened the leadership of Henlein. For a time it looked as if the SdP would disintegrate and was unable to fulfil the role that Hitler had planned for it and on which German money had been spent. For a time the Czechoslovak Government was able to control political events.

German financial help for Henlein But, unknown to Koch, Henlein had received almost three million Czech crowns from the Volksbund. The Volksbund fu¨r das Deutschtum in Ausland, to give the organisation its full title, has appeared to historians to be a relatively minor body and they have tended to ignore it.8 In fact, as the case of the Henlein subsidy makes clear, it was able to exert considerable influence. Its proposal to give Henlein three million Czech crowns was agreed in spite of Koch’s objections. Moreover, the money was transferred so carefully that Koch never learnt of it. A letter from Steinacher, head of the Volksbund, to the Foreign Ministry of 29 May gives enough detail to show how the transfer was made.9 The first step was for the Volksbund to provide 272,852 RM from its own funds for ‘the work in Czechoslovakia’ (presumably a reference to Henlein’s election expenses). Part of this, 87,852.50 RM had already been sent to Czechoslovakia in Czech crowns as cash. The balance of 185,000 RM had been promised to German firms in Czechoslovakia in the form of an irrevocable guarantee to cover the money sent by these firms to Henlein. The Deutsche Bank und Kontogesellschaft acted as joint guarantors to remit the money to Czechoslovakia by 10 August 1935. To support these statements in discussions with the German Foreign Office, the Volksbund was prepared to show receipts in an oral discussion, but was

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clearly not prepared to hand over any written evidence (though Henlein later provided the Foreign Office with a receipt dated 28 August for the full amount ‘for election expenses’).10 Steinacher asked for the money owing to the Volksbund to be paid into his account with the Deutsche Bank und Gesellschaft in Berlin. Almost as an afterthought Steinacher writes ‘I take it this can be done within the limits of the foreign exchange permits at the Foreign Ministry’s disposal.’ Although Koch was not informed of this financial help given to Henlein, he soon noted a change in Benesˇ’ attitude towards Germany. Whereas in the past the Czechoslovak Government had tended to ignore or excuse the e´migre´s’ activities, by early June Benesˇ realised that they had to be curbed in view of the much greater importance of Henlein and his party.11 Ignoring the earlier rebuffs he had suffered, Benesˇ explained to Koch that nothing less than a treaty was necessary to resolve the issues between the two countries. Whereas the German Government had claimed that the general principles of international law were adequate, Benesˇ claimed that these were ‘vague, disputed, imprecisely formulated or not formulated at all, and generally came off worst, in a democratic State at least, in competition with the concrete laws on the protection of persons, freedom of the press and the like’. Benesˇ wanted a treaty that he could ‘hold under the noses of the e´migre´’s friends, particularly the Socialists’. But for Koch, the memory of the e´migre´s’ activities was too important to be ignored. Koch pointed out that for years e´migre´ papers such as Der Gegen-Angriff, Neue Vorwa¨rts, Die deutsche Revolution, Die Simpl and others had been printed in Czechoslovakia. Although appearing in Prague and Carlsbad (Czech: Karlovy Vary), they were intended for Germany and were taken secretly over the frontier. In Koch’s view they ‘fraudulently enjoyed the full protection of the press law, although in fact they did not belong to the press of this country at all and really represent nothing more than a cunning method of meddling in the internal politics of a neighbouring State’. Benesˇ tried to counter this by saying that he had no knowledge of these activities. But Koch replied that he found the remark outrageous and referred to an article on the front pager of Otto Strasser’s Die deutsche Revolution which reported a ‘personal and oral discussion’ between him and Minister Krofta on the Schwarze Front’s plans for forging money. For details of a private conversation to reach the editor of the paper suggested to Koch

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that there was either a close relationship between the Foreign Ministry and the e´migre´s or that e´migre´ agents had infiltrated the ministry.12 As a result, Koch said he doubted whether it was safe to hold any confidential meetings with ministry officials. This caught Benesˇ unprepared. As before, he was trapped between Czech right wing parties (especially the Agrarians) who wanted the e´migre´s to be silenced and the left wing (principally the Social Democrats) who wanted to spur them on to even more radical acts. The Right invoked international law, the Left the laws of the state governing freedom. Benesˇ’ main concern was that at some time there would be a clash with the Sudeten German Front and many radicals would cross the frontier. An international treaty would muzzle these. It was a view that Koch supported because of the damage that such people had done to Germany’s reputation. But in Koch’s view the proposal had come two years too late. In June 1935 the activities of German e´migre´s had died down and there was less public interest. Benesˇ alone would benefit from such a treaty. Events in Berlin in September made it clear that Benesˇ’ fear of greater Sudeten German activity was likely to be realised. A meeting was held on 2 October at the German Foreign Ministry attended by members of the Sudeten German Party and senior Foreign Ministry officials to discuss the Sudeten Germans’ claims for funds.13 According to the secret minutes of this meeting, the Sudeten Germans claimed that Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, had given Henlein verbal assurances that his election expenses would be met. The claim consisted of 1. 330,000 RM for election expenses, of which 145,000 RM had not yet been paid. 2. 400,000 RM for the political work of the party, which approximated to the 12 monthly instalments of 30,000 RM originally agreed. The Sudeten Germans needed 585,000 RM (185,000 þ 400,000), of which 50,000 RM should be transferred at once, the second 50,000 sent within ten days and the balance paid in instalments which would be completed by 10 November at the latest. Because the matter was so urgent, Schacht had already sanctioned the transfer of 250,000 RM, of which the first instalment of 50,000 RM had already been paid. The money, mostly in the form of cheques, was sent by special courier to the legation in Prague to be paid out to the party. This method was used

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because the transfer had to be made in 24 hours – not enough time to get sufficient foreign exchange – though this would be sent in future. The Prague legation was to suggest a method of transfer that would involve it (the legation) as little as possible. But the matter did not end there. A fortnight later another secret letter was sent by Renthe-Fink, Senior Councillor at the German Foreign Ministry, to Legation Councillor Stein.14 This referred again to money that was still waiting to be transferred (185,000 RM) and asked what was the minimum the Sudeten German party needed for its political work, as there was a serious shortage of foreign exchange. It was followed on 16 November by a report that 185,000 RM had been transferred to the legation to meet election expenses.15 It had also been agreed to pay 15,000 RM a month to the party, of which 3,000 RM would be paid to the party’s representative in Berlin. While these steps were being taken to encourage more aggressive political action by Henlein, the German Foreign Ministry adopted a sharper tone in dealings with the Czech ambassador, Mastny´. On 17 October Mastny´ handed in a protest about the tone of the German press, which von Neurath countered with reference to the Czechoslovak– Russian Assistance Pact and the continued attacks by e´migre´s in Czechoslovakia.16 Soon afterwards, a new paper, Die Zeit, was launched in Prague, linked to Henlein. As in other matters concerning Sudeten Nazi politics, the newspaper was created on the basis of a verbal promise of money from Germany rather than any written agreement. In January the result was a dispute concerning the German Finance Ministry, the German Foreign Ministry and Hess, as to whether the money could be found to continue to subsidise the paper.17 The matter had begun with a request from the German Ministry of Propaganda for a special grant of 200,000 RM. The Ministry of Finance refused to pay and suggested that the Propaganda Ministry draw on its budget for the following year. Hess then took the step of personally approaching the Finance Minister with an urgent request: make the payment or the paper would cease publication, with serious political consequences. But the matter was further complicated by the fact that if the paper collapsed, the Czechoslovak authorities might make a judicial investigation, which would reveal where the money promised to finance it had come from. The Czechs would then ban the party. Under these circumstances the Foreign office had to accept that, although the Sudeten German party had acted

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irresponsibly, it had to have the funds to keep the paper in print. Von Bu¨low-Schwante, head of the Protocol Department at the German Foreign Ministry, agreed and the money was paid. The appearance of Henlein’s newspaper made Benesˇ, president since the end of 1935, more anxious to come to terms with Germany and minimise the potential Sudeten threat. The moderate Koch had always tried to ease Czechoslovak– German relations and had tried to block the sending of funds to Henlein’s party. He was seen in Berlin as too proCzech and was replaced by Eisenlohr at the beginning of February. This was another sign of the increasing political pressure on Benesˇ. On 21 February Benesˇ took the opportunity of holding a long, informal and friendly meeting with the new German diplomat to try and create a more favourable political climate. In a long report dated 26 February, Eisenlohr shows how Benesˇ talked about a wide range of topics that he thought had a bearing on Czechoslovak– German relations. This was not a discussion – Benesˇ gave Eisenlohr a three-hour talk (‘he marshalled his statements as in a university lecture’) – but it shows how far Benesˇ was prepared to go to try and settle outstanding differences.18 He began by claiming that at the Versailles Conference he had not wanted to take so much German territory but had been frustrated by Lloyd George. He had wanted to exchange the small Hlucˇin area west of Ostrava, for a large German populated area. He also stressed his support for the Locarno Treaty, which had guaranteed Germany’s western frontiers and had followed a policy of accommodation over German rearmament. Benesˇ spoke of his unprejudiced attitude towards Germany, his sense that the two peoples shared a common historical past and of his constant search for better relations with Germany. He explained that Czechoslovakia’s treaties were not aimed at Germany and were not military – Czechoslovakia was not Russia’s aircraft carrier.19 Benesˇ even stated that he thought that the failure of the proposed Austro – German customs union had been the fault of other countries rather than Czechoslovakia.20 He also considered that Austria should never be used as a tool against Germany. With regard to his policy as Foreign Minister, he had always supported the League of Nations and in his relations with France he had tried to balance British and French policies. He had also been happy to accept a simple Arbitration Treaty with Germany at the time of Locarno. German rearmament had been foreseen both by himself

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and by France and he thought it entirely reasonable, though the speed at which it had been carried out had caused problems in international relations. He was at his most persuasive on the question of German nationalism. He was quite open-minded about Germany . . . He well knew what German culture had meant and still meant for his people. He knew what it meant that, regardless of all the struggles of the nationalities, his people had for centuries lived closely together with the Germans, even though the Czechs had not fared well under the Habsburgs; he knew that from here, where we now were, from the Hradcˇany, great German Emperors had ruled their Reich and that, as he had once told an Italian diplomat, Czechs had formed the vanguard of the German armies at the capture of Milan and Rome. He also understood that the National Socialist Movement had had to come in Germany as reaction to national humiliation and social disintegration. Dictatorship he regarded as something ‘transitional’, as every form of State, and amongst them especially that of a dictatorship, was according to the experience of history, conditional and bound by the time factor. Dictatorship might well be unsympathetic to many members of political parties in Czechoslovakia, and their own party attitude might make them hostile towards it; but these were shortsighted hotheads. Germany’s form of Government was no concern of his, for it was a purely internal affair of the German people. Here, too, he claimed to be entirely without prejudice. As to diplomatic relations with Germany, these had not yet been as fruitful as he would have wished. Although his private conversations with diplomats had always been friendly, public relations had not been good, even though he had ‘repeatedly stretched out his hand’. In seeking a policy that would give his country security, Benesˇ had always supported the League of Nations. But the Japanese invasion of Manchuria had shown him that Article 16 of the Covenant was unworkable if it applied to the whole world. When he had pressed Sir John Simon on whether the League would support China, the latter had shown the problems of sending support by asking what naval forces Czechoslovakia would send. The alternative for Benesˇ was to form

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regional alliances for mutual support, to which Eisenlohr replied that Germany saw these as dangerous; they would spread conflict where the support was given automatically. Benesˇ stressed that the Russian pact was not intended as a threat to Germany. Czechoslovakia was in any case a western country and Benesˇ made it quite clear that he would fight Communism ruthlessly within his own country. He also said that he had been offered a military pact and a guarantee against Poland but had rejected both. The German fear that Czechoslovakia was building airfields for Russian aircraft, that Czechoslovakia would thus become a ‘Russian aircraft carrier’ and that factories to repair Russian aircraft were being constructed were false. Also, the claim that a squadron of Russian aircraft had been stationed in Czechoslovakia, was also untrue.21 No airfields or factories had been built and there were no Russian military aircraft in Czechoslovakia, ‘nor indeed would he ever countenance anything of the kind’. He was not foolish enough to make his country a Russian ‘place d’armes’. On the question of the proposed Anschluss, Benesˇ said that he naturally preferred that it should not take place, though he recognised the shared German – Austrian culture. His fear was that it should be seen by all the neighbouring states as a destabilising influence. These were all young states and needed time to consolidate their internal cohesion. He quoted the phrase ‘L’Anschluss c’est la guerre’ (‘the Anschluss means war’) that had been attributed to him, but which he said he had never used. It illustrated the fear that countries had, which was shared by all the European states. From time to time some countries might express different views, hoping that others ‘would pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them’ but Germany should not be misled. Significantly in view of later events, Eisenlohr told Benesˇ . . . no one could foresee how things will develop in Austria. If however, these developments were to bring union with the German Reich nearer then, first, we, too, had the right, which was not exclusively confined to other nations, to realise our national fulfilment and consolidation, and, furthermore, it would then be a task of common political endeavour so to shape this process as to ensure that it could lead to no disturbance of the peace of Europe. I asked him not to forget that it was the habit of all peoples to repay with bitter enmity any attempt to prevent their national

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unification, but that hitherto those countries which had helped others to attain their national ideals had always been able to count with certainty on prolonged gratitude. Though he was, and always had been, an opponent of the Anschluss, I should like to think that he would not always remain one. Finally Benesˇ put a ‘question to be answered by the German conscience,’ whether at bottom it would not be better for us if Austria, bound to us by ties of friendship, culturally one with us, supporting us in foreign policy, were yet to remain a separate State. He added that he was against any kind of Danubian Federation, for that would simply lead to a stupid attempt to use Austria as a political pawn against Germany. Needless to say, the German view of these conversations was that Benesˇ was lying and that there was evidence of Russo – Czechoslovak military cooperation. Whether he really wanted close cooperation with Germany would only be seen from the way he handled events in the future.

The Rhineland crisis The first test came a fortnight later on 7 March 1936 when German troops reoccupied the Rhineland. An hour and a half after German soldiers had reached the Rhine, Eisenlohr reported to the German Foreign Ministry on his meeting with Krofta, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister.22 Eisenlohr had claimed that the German action had been defensive, that it was in line with Hitler’s desire to pacify Europe and that there might be advantages for Czechoslovakia. Krofta’s reply was that his personal impression was favourable and it would have a good effect on the British Government. At the same time, he could not accept Hitler’s argument that France had invalidated the Locarno Pact through her treaty with Russia. ‘He asked himself with anxiety whether France would permit herself to be confronted with a fait accompli by us [Germany] once again.’ His own attitude was therefore favourable and ‘He could . . . assure me that his Government would exert all their influence with the Western Powers in order to make possible the realisation of our proposals.’ This was a personal remark, intended to calm Eisenlohr. The Russians took a different view. The Soviet Government urged the French to take a firm stand, believing that this would be the first of a

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series of German illegal actions. As to Russia’s attitude towards Britain, no instructions were sent to Ambassador Maisky until 10 March.23 It was only when Eden had shown that Britain would not take any action that Russia promised to support any action that the League decided was necessary. Czechoslovakia made it clear that she would follow France unreservedly and Benesˇ proposed economic sanctions to cause the collapse of the German regime.24 The German Government learnt of this and regarded Czechoslovakia as her most implacable enemy. But when France took no action, Czechoslovakia had to follow suit and try and avoid giving offence to Germany. While this was going on, Eisenlohr was urging Krofta to use his influence on the press to ensure that it showed a calm reaction and ‘that our relations were not strained by excited comment [presumably Czech reaction]’. A different sort of ‘excited comment’ was to be expected from Henlein’s Sudeten party. Early in 1936 an anonymous letter was sent from the Sudetenland, assuring Hitler that the writer looked on him as ‘a Messiah’.25 Two days before the reoccupation of the Rhineland the German Foreign Ministry had asked Eisenlohr for a report on Sudeten German morale. In his reply of 9 March Eisenlohr said that the industrial area of North Bohemia had suffered high unemployment and that Benesˇ had shown that he was fundamentally opposed to all things German, including the Sudeten German community.26 The election of Benesˇ as president in place of Masaryk should have lowered Sudeten German morale still further. The Prussian Secret State Police had received information in February that the Sudeten German community was in despair and feared that their economy would collapse still further. If this were to happen, the Sudeten German party had orders to arm all Germans. Eisenlohr had learnt from a reliable source that the Sudeten German Turnorganisation (German Gymnastic Organisation) had given its members orders on how they should act if disturbances should occur. But he did not know what arms the Sudetens had and he reported that so far they had borne their ‘economic misery and political bondage’ very calmly. There was, however, a serious risk of trouble breaking out. The Rhineland crisis increased this danger. Although Krofta had spoken approvingly of Germany’s action, there was considerable debate among European countries about whether sanctions should be imposed. Germany had become the main trading partner for Denmark, Turkey and the Balkan countries and accounted for 40.5 per cent (Greece and

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Turkey) and 52 per cent (Bulgaria).27 Germany also had considerable trade with many other European countries. The proposed sanctions posed particular problems for the Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia. In his report of 14 March, Eisenlohr pointed out that Germany was the main customer and supplier of Czechoslovak industry and sanctions would cause immense damage.28 The Czechoslovak Government had restricted trade with Germany and had created a balance of trade that was favourable to Czechoslovakia. The result was that 500 million crowns were frozen in the German clearing system and banks, and this did not include investments in Germany. Besides the money held in Germany that the Czechs would not be able to recover if they imposed sanctions, there would be the problem of finding alternative markets for Czechoslovak goods. Germany accounted for about 18 per cent of Czechoslovak trade (about 1,200 million crowns). It would be difficult to find new markets for this volume of exports and it was unlikely that the markets in Germany could be recovered after sanctions were lifted. The loss of German imports (machinery, instruments etc.) to the Czechoslovak economy would be even more serious. Nevertheless, if necessary, Czechoslovakia would give her full support to France if the latter decided to impose sanctions. Fortunately for Czechoslovak industry – Sudeten German as well as Czech – no sanctions were imposed. On 18 March Krofta, the Foreign Minister, told the Czechoslovak parliament that the state would not take any independent action over the remilitarisation of the Rhineland.29 Instead it would support all efforts by its allies to reach a peaceful solution, This reasonable attitude was not reciprocated. Go¨ring had complained to Mastny´, the Czechoslovak ambassador to Germany, that airfields were being prepared for Russian aircraft in Czechoslovakia following the Russo –Czechoslovak treaty. Mastny´ had denied this and was assured by Benesˇ that there were no preparations for Russian aircraft to land in Czechoslovakia. When Mastny´ raised the matter with the German Foreign Ministry he was told that ‘these declarations would assuredly not dispel the mistrust which had been brought about by the conclusion of the Russo-Czechoslovak alliance and the many visits of Russian military personnel to Czechoslovakia’. The truth, as Eisenlohr reported on 26 March, was that senior Russian military personnel had visited Prague and had proposed a military alliance.30 Under this agreement, some Russian air force units would be sent to

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Czechoslovakia. But the Czechs had rejected this. The original source for the rumour was Hungarian propaganda in Geneva. The alliance, which in any case was of doubtful military value because there was no common frontier, was used by Germany as a constant irritant in German – Czechoslovak relations, much as the e´migre´s’ actions had been in the past. More important however, the report of 26 March shows that the German legation knew about Czechoslovak foreign policy. The Sudeten German party member Peters was a friend of Krofta, and they were both members of the same Masonic lodge. This was the main value of the Sudeten German party to Germany. It supplied information about government policy and business that was not officially available. Krofta realised that anything he said would be passed to Henlein and thence to Germany, but he had already shown a willingness to cooperate with Germany. The information he supplied to Peters was useful in two ways. For the German Foreign Ministry it was a source of information on Czechoslovakia and its allies that could be used to supplement information from the Paris and London embassies. The other advantage of the party was as a source of information on the general mood of the Sudeten Germans. This had to be monitored carefully if Hitler was to use the party as a weapon in his Drang nach Osten (drive to the East). Eisenlohr’s letter to the German Foreign Ministry of 16 April shows the weakness of Czechoslovakia and how it could be exploited. He began by emphasising that the Czechs had become aware of how precarious their state was. Every domestic disturbance or external threat was seen as a danger to the state’s continued existence. ‘the frame of mind of the people thus resembles that of the inhabitants of a house who fear, on observing signs of an earthquake, that roof and walls may come tumbling down about their ears’. For Eisenlohr the fundamental weakness within the state was that Czechs, who formed the majority, had seized control and taken everything for themselves, with the result that the other races felt they had been deprived of their rights and oppressed. In foreign matters, all the states bordering Czechoslovakia, except for Romania in the east, posed a potential threat. This was why Benesˇ considered that the state needed 15 years of peace to be consolidated. The economic plight of the Sudeten Germans – 500,000 unemployed out of the Czechoslovak total of 800,000 – was the result of having industries that were designed to serve the whole Habsburg Empire.

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Eisenlohr believed that the Czech policy of favouring their own race was dishonest and only added to the misery. He thought that every aspect of German National Socialism was distasteful, frightening and hateful to the Czechs. The Fu¨hrer principle was in opposition to traditional democratic forms, the racial principle, the revival of national feeling in Germany, the emphasis on the unity of the whole German community with the spread of this idea across the frontier. Every example of Germany’s increased power and independence from the spread of National Socialism in Austria to Germany’s leaving the League of Nations was seen by Czechs as disastrous. Furthermore, as Germany increased its power, the Czechs feared an increased threat from Poland and Hungary. Even Austria’s decision to end military restrictions on the size of its armed forces and the fear that Bulgaria and Hungary might take the same step were seen as a consequence of Germany’s actions. Eisenlohr argued that, as a result, Germany’s rise posed a threefold danger to Czechoslovakia. The first was the fear of attack by a foreign power. The second was of an Anschluss, which would encircle the state politically, economically and culturally. The third was that the SdP would weaken or even destroy the state. Any action for independence would be copied by the Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenes who would also form racial parties and challenge the Czechs. These threats made it essential to maintain good relations with Germany. For Eisenlohr, the Czechs had always been an ‘island in the German sea’ and threatened with assimilation, which would destroy them as a race. To avoid this, they had always maintained tense relations with Germans and had followed consistently anti-German policies since the war. They had relied on French support, but the reoccupation of the Rhineland had shown that they could not hope for much from this ally. In any future war, Czechoslovakia would be the first victim and even the rapid advance of French troops across the Rhine, as in 1805, would not save them. Nor could Russia offer much hope, for it was so far untried. In any future war involving Germany and France, the latter might abandon Czechoslovakia. Eisenlohr considered that everything depended on Benesˇ. He had managed to outmanoeuvre his rival Hodzˇa and was in complete control of foreign policy, even to the extent of having his own ministry.

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He cultivated close relations with the press and the armed forces, visited barracks, increased the size of the army and improved equipment and armament. He could not overcome the racial divisions, which seriously weakened its effectiveness as a fighting force. Although in Germany he was regarded as the ‘Father of Lies’, elsewhere he had considerable prestige as a result of his 15 years as Foreign Minister. In Czechoslovakia he was not liked, but was feared and respected. He was regarded as an emotionless ‘thinking machine’ who could look at matters dispassionately and solve difficulties by reasoned argument. Although diffident by nature, he led a well-ordered life and was indefatigable; his subordinates had difficulty in keeping up with him. ‘Everything he said bore the stamp of rational sobriety; he liked to lecture and tried to carry conviction to his listeners by a compelling exposition, and to make them see things his way. He was never afraid of tackling difficult issues and had an absolute mastery of affairs down to the last detail. Everything was carefully weighed in advance; he would never take a step without first testing his foothold. The German character appeared to him to be sinister and incomprehensible. In this difficult situation, Czechoslovakia could only rely on France and Britain for support, since the League of Nations had proved unable to solve international disputes. During the Rhineland crisis ‘the British neither knew where Czechoslovakia was and nor did they wish to know’ and the French showed no wish to challenge Germany. The only long-term solution, Eisenlohr suggested, was to form a real de´tente with Germany who is so much feared while his [Benesˇ’] relations with the German Reich could always be repoisoned and so endangered anew by oppression of the Sudeten Germans. Thus such a policy would only be workable if the Czechoslovak Government seriously endeavoured to satisfy the Sudeten Germans by treating them justly. One can conceive of Benesˇ bringing himself to accept such a solution if he were to see no other way out and once he had recognised that it is precisely the oppression of the German minority that is bound to provoke the worst dangers for his country. Benesˇ might come to realise this; the Czechs were unlikely to do so. In any case, Benesˇ was only likely to allow measures that did not threaten

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national sovereignty, though he might accept international supervision of the Sudeten German issue by the League of Nations. This offered the best prospect of long-term peace. Eisenlohr’s rational analysis of Czechoslovakia’s situation with regard to Germany was meant to offer a solution to the problem. In reality, given Hitler’s desire to crush the state as part of his proposed eastward expansion, the report showed the way that the Sudeten Germans could be used to destroy Czechoslovakia. Any attempt by Benesˇ to be reasonable and treat the Sudeten Germans more justly could be exploited to make more, and greater, demands. In June 1936 such actions to placate the Sudeten Germans were still in the future. The immediate problem for the Sudeten Nazis in their effort to destabilise Czechoslovakia was disunity within the SdP. This had appeared in May in articles in Die Zeit and Rundschau, two Sudeten German party papers. Friction had developed between Henlein and Kaspar (a former member of the banned Sudeten Nazi party). There was a real possibility that the party would be split into factions, with disastrous consequences.31 There was also the danger, after the arrest of the Sudeten deputy Brand early in June, that correspondence seized by the police would show the links between the party and Germany.32 If that happened, the Czechs would inform the British of the Sudeten party’s real position, to try and win their support for Benesˇ’ policy. The SdP would be banned.33 Feuding within the party was not the only problem facing Henlein’s party. The economic crisis had weakened the credit institutions and there was a danger that Czechs might make inroads into Sudeten German territory by buying property – Benes’ attempt at ‘colonising’ the territory. The problem concerned financial loans. In the past the Reiffeisen Savings Bank and Sudeten German Savings Bank had been able to offer credit, but both were now short of capital. Czech banks were in a better position but would only make loans if they thought that the property would pass into Czech hands. The problem was not confined to peasant holdings but included houses and landed property. Nor were the larger German institutions, the Kreditanstalt der Deutschen and Bund der Deutschen, able to safeguard German landed property either. The alternative proposed by Eisenlohr to the German Foreign office was to create a new body, which would need at least 10 million crowns. This would offer cheap credit on reasonable terms, to reduce the burden of

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personal debt, provide security for house property and land holdings and acquire large estates that were threatened with closure. The fund could be attached to the Kreditanstalt der Deutschen and be administered by the Kredit der Deutschen. This would avoid compromising the authorities, especially the Czechoslovak Foreign Exchange and Bank Control. It is unlikely, in view of Germany’s serious shortage of foreign exchange, that this trust was established, but it does reveal another aspect of what the Sudeten Germans regarded as ill treatment by Czechs. It also showed that Henlein and others regarded Germany as a rich country that would help them out of their financial difficulties. In reality the Reichsbank’s foreign currency reserves had fallen to a dangerously low level in the years 1932– 5 and it is surprising that any money could have been sent to help the Sudeten Germans.34

Henlein in London Henlein went to London in December 1935 and July 1936 to explain Sudeten German problems to leading British politicians.35 During these visits he only met people who were pro-German or at least sympathetic enough to want to meet him as the representative of the main Sudeten German party. Henlein spoke very little English and was therefore dependent either on interpreters or on other people’s ability to speak German.36 The visits were arranged by Group Captain Christie, director of Intelligence at the Air Ministry.37 Christie wanted the Foreign Office to have more information on events in the Sudetenland. On his first visit, Henlein met politicians and diplomats. On the second he gave a lecture at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This gained him the reputation in Britain of an honest and fair-minded person who felt very strongly that his fellow Sudeten Germans had been ill-treated.38 It seemed that Henlein wanted to share his views with as wide an audience as possible so that these injustices should be put right. The result was the invitation for his second visit in July 1936. There was already a group of influential people who were sympathetic to his views and were impressed by the apparent reasonableness of his argument.39 These included the historian G.P. Gooch, who was President of the Peace Council for three years. He wanted the Versailles Treaty to be revised, but was anxious about Hitler’s brutality.40 When talking to Gooch and others sympathetic to Germany, Henlein denied that he was

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receiving instructions from Berlin. He claimed that Czechoslovakia was disintegrating because of internal pressures.41 The German Charge´ d’Affaires in Paris, Freiherr von Stein, reported to the German Foreign Office on Henlein’s second visit on 21 July 1936. He wrote that Henlein had had meetings with Vansittart, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was known to hold anti-German views. Vansittart said that the British Government was in principle prepared to advise and help the Sudeten Germans. He considered that the Czechoslovak nationality problem was ‘an open wound in Europe’. Vansittart also promised that the British Government would raise the matter at the League of Nations and that the British press would give full coverage to the subject. Henlein also met Hadow, the First Secretary at the British Legation in Prague, who was also sympathetic to the Sudeten Germans. Hadow kept to the line adopted by the British Legion, that the Czech repression of Sudeten Germans was reprehensible, foolish and a danger to peace. Von Stein’s report shows how Henlein described the Sudeten problem. For three years I have preached an understanding; as I see the situation today, it will be almost impossible for me during the coming winter to continue to maintain calm and order among the broad masses of the Sudeten Germans, and I fear the worst. Henlein then described in detail what he considered to be the denial of national identity and other repressive measures made by the Czech Government against the Sudeten German community. He stressed the devastating insecurity, the constant threats and the oppression of Sudeten Germans which were expected as a result of the new socalled State Defence Law and its executive provisions.42 ‘July 11 . . . the day when these regulations were promulgated, had been the day of doom for the Sudeten German community.’ Another source of oppression was Benesˇ’ personal cabinet, which effectively ruled the country. Vansittart took great interest in Henlein’s description of Sudeten complaints. However, von Stein believed that Vansittart’s aim was to solve this Sudeten problem to prevent the area being incorporated into Germany. Henlein’s visits to London and his discussions with senior diplomats and politicians marks a new stage in the Sudeten fight for independence

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from Czech rule. The reason why his visit was so successful was that he was able to speak with complete conviction about what he considered to be Czech exploitation of his fellow Sudeten Germans. The problem of the racial friction was insoluble. There is evidence of Czechs ruling the country for the benefit of fellow Czechs – the failure to grant government contracts to Sudeten Germans is only one example. But the Germans were unable to accept the changes resulting from the Treaty of Versailles. At about the time that Henlein was talking to the British about what he considered Czech misgovernment, Patrick Leigh Fermor was walking across Europe. His description of meeting a Sudeten German in Bratislava shows how little attitudes had changed since 1918 within the wider German community. [Hans’] family lived in Prague and, like many Austrians at the break-up of the Empire, they had found themselves citizens of the new-born Republic, tied there beyond uprooting by old commitments; in this case by a family bank. Hans helped to run an associate establishment in Bratislava – or Pressburg as he still firmly called it . . . and felt rather cut off from life. Vienna was his true home.43 The break-up of the Habsburg Empire had happened fewer than 20 years previously and, for all but the young, the memory of the loss of prestige and political power was still a bitter memory for Sudeten Germans. The situation was made worse by the efforts of Sudeten Germans to regain this lost power. This was understandable, but no one could justify the methods used by members of the Sudeten Nazi party and its successors helped by Hitler and the German Government. All acted illegally and they were fully aware of this. For British diplomats and politicians, Henlein and Hitler represented a new type of politician that they had never previously experienced. The British were fully aware that diplomats presented their country’s view in the best possible way, but they were expected to be truthful. But for a man to claim, with apparently righteous indignation, that the Czechs were persecuting his fellow citizens while actively pursuing illegal policies that made this inevitable, was something new. British diplomats had no experience or knowledge of Czechoslovakia in the mid-1930s and

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were only concerned with trying to maintain peace in Europe. This proved a recipe for disaster. While Henlein was presenting his view of the Sudeten problem to a wider and more sympathetic British audience, he was also trying to bring his own party under control. There were people in Germany who wanted to settle the divisions in a violent manner. Both Henlein and von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, were aware of this and both hoped that the matter could be settled peacefully. The Foreign Minister made his position clear in a meeting in August: I told him that he should make vigorous efforts to do so, for there was no question of our becoming involved in warlike complications in the foreseeable future on account of the Sudeten Germans. The Sudeten Germans must first rely on their own exertions in their struggle, and we would naturally give them moral, and as far as possible, financial support.44 Henlein impressed the Foreign Minister as he had impressed British diplomats and politicians in London. He appeared to all as ‘a most sensible and downright man’. He had used his visit to London as an opportunity to warn the British that the Sudeten Germans might be driven to an act of despair by the Czech Government policies. He had deliberately said this because he believed the British wanted to maintain peace in Europe. To emphasise the importance of his work, Henlein also mentioned that he had met Hitler on a number of occasions, inferring that he had the latter’s support. No doubt Hitler’s personal interest in Sudeten German affairs helped to solve the problems in Henlein’s party. In September the German Foreign office promised to renew party funding for a further six months. It is significant that Henlein apparently needed the help of Hitler and others in the Nazi party to end the feuding between himself and Frank. The two men were very different; Henlein was not a rabid Nazi; Frank certainly was. Nor was Henlein strong or ruthless enough to bring men such as Frank under control. It needed outside pressure to make the two come to some form of agreement for the sake of the party. It also suited Hitler to have two men in these positions who would be continuously feuding. As in other cases, Hitler held the balance. In October Henlein was able to tell the German Foreign Office that his

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two opponents had been reinstated in the party and its council. In cooperation with the German Nazi party he was also planning to develop links with Sudeten German trade and agricultural workers organisations. Henlein was also hoping that with the help of funds from the Deutsche Arbeitsfront he could set up labour and training camps to relieve rural unemployment as in Germany. In addition he hoped to create the land protection fund already referred to, which would ensure that Sudeten German property would remain in Sudeten German hands.45 While Henlein was being forced to reinstate his opponents in the party and was developing popular measures to relieve rural distress among Sudeten Germans, Benesˇ was doing all he could to appear conciliatory to the SdP. In October he promised to try and get a pardon for Sudeten Germans who had been arrested, and in one case convicted, of acts against the security of the state.46 At about the same time Sudeten parliamentary deputies were looking for ways of undermining the Czech government’s power. In November Kreisl, a lawyer and member of the Council of Leaders of the Sudeten German Party, visited the German Foreign Ministry. He said that it was difficult for Sudeten German deputies to support the German foreign policy in their speeches in Prague because they did not know what that policy was.47 The result was an invitation from Weisa¨cker to Frank and Kreisl to meet and coordinate Sudeten German and official German policy. Meanwhile continued pressure was put on the Czech Government to stop prosecuting members of Henlein’s party. Von Neurath, representing the German Foreign Office, complained to the Czechoslovak ambassador in Berlin that Sudeten Germans were being arrested on trivial charges – mere membership of the Nazi party – and then kept for a long time in prison before being brought to trial.48 The ambassador agreed that the legal process was indeed slow and said he would try to improve matters. In reply he pointed out that Czechs were also being arrested and held for long periods in Germany. Von Neurath’s reply is a model of Nazi disingenuousness: ‘I replied that I could hardly believe that we had arrested and imprisoned Czechoslovak citizens who merely belonged, for example, to the Czechoslovak Democratic Party or the Czechoslovak Gymnastic Associations.’ The actual charge against the Czechoslovaks was spying. Whether or not this was true, it was a

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suitably vague offence that could be guaranteed to arouse popular German anger against them. By the end of 1936 the apparent danger that the Sudeten area would erupt in violence had been emphasised again. Prince Max von Hohenlohe-Langenburg of Rotenhaus in Northern Bohemia (a Reich German, not a Sudeten) paid a visit to London in November and met Eden, Sir Samuel Hoare, Winston Churchill and Vansittart.49 Prince Hohenlohe, a member of Henlein’s party, then went to see the Czechoslovak ambassador in London, Jan Masaryk, and told him what he had done. Masaryk became very agitated; this was the second time that he had been bypassed on a matter of internal Czechoslovak policy and he felt his position was becoming impossible. On his return to Czechoslovakia, Prince Hohenlohe told Benesˇ on 3 December of Vansittart’s belief that ‘now was the last moment – this was emphatically repeated three times – for rational discussions with the SdP.’ Benesˇ agreed to meet Henlein to discuss Sudeten issues. On 27 January 1937 the German Foreign Ministry continued its pressure on the Czechoslovak Government as a prelude to any meeting between Benesˇ and the Sudeten German leaders. The charge was made that the Czechoslovak Government was acting as Russia’s agent.50 The same arguments were used as before and when Mastny´, the Czechoslovak ambassador, flatly denied them, he was told that he did not know what was going on in his own country. Mastny´ pointed to steps that had been taken to improve German –Czechoslovak relations: principally the banning of e´migre´ newspapers. Weisa¨cker, the German Foreign Ministry Councillor, countered by saying that although Germany could understand Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy in the 1920s, from January 1933 Czechoslovakia ‘had thrown herself into the arms of the Russians. She must now take the consequences’. Weisa¨cker continued ominously ‘. . . whether any such agreement [Germany claimed there was a secret military agreement] existed or not was practically speaking irrelevant. If Czechoslovakia had an alliance with Russia, the Czechoslovak military leaders would have to consider what this meant for their country in the event of war.’ Weisa¨cker argued that it was inevitable that Russia would support Czechoslovakia, and not the other way round. He also argued that the presence of Russian officers in Czechoslovakia could only mean one thing. ‘The whole dispute as to whether Czechoslovak airfields were to be at the disposal of Russian squadrons had therefore already been

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resolved.’ Mastny´ could only repeat that his Government wanted to improve the position of the Sudeten Germans and German–Czechoslovak relations. Weisa¨cker ‘merely took note of this statement’, hiding any direct relationship between the Sudeten German issue and Germany’s foreign policy. In January Henlein again visited Berlin and asked for a monthly allowance of 15,000 RM so that he could continue to build up his party. The Foreign Ministry agreed to pay this. At the end of the month it appeared that the pressure by Henlein and Prince Hohenlohe on international opinion had succeeded.

Negotiations on Sudeten issues Benesˇ agreed to meet Sudeten German groups to discuss their demands. But since Henlein was not a parliamentary deputy, he and his party were not invited to take part. Instead, the meeting was arranged between Hodzˇa, Benesˇ’ deputy and prime minister and German ‘activist’ parties who supported the Government. These drew up a joint set of demands, but they did not cover two matters that Henlein and the German Foreign Ministry felt were essential: full recognition of Sudeten rights and equal status with Czechs.51 The document that formed the basis of subsequent negotiations proved to be far more reasonable and moderate than the Czechs had feared. The German ‘activist’ parties were as anxious as the Czechs to limit Henlein’s growing power. The document began: In order to promote understanding between the peoples of our State and thus form a basis for the peaceful cooperation of all the nationalities, the representatives of the German coalition Parties submit the following demands which have arisen from the vital needs of the German people in this State. After this, the document called for unemployment to be eased by distributing state contracts more fairly, allowing all minorities to work in the civil service, improving welfare services for the young, providing education in German, and for German to be used in courts, public offices and parliament. It also called for a parliamentary commission to be set up to examine grievances. This is not to say that the Government had not provided agricultural relief and social assistance already, but

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restricting imports gave more help to Czechoslovak industries.52 But the Sudeten Germans had suffered for a long time from a failure to find substitute markets and the Depression had brought matters to a head. It was also too easy to assume that the government’s relief measures had benefited other people. The negotiations between Hodzˇa and the Sudeten German party representatives lasted for three weeks.53 Henlein’s party was not invited but promised not to disturb the negotiations. Then the Government announced a unilateral offer of constitutional rights. It was intended as a start to the political process of reconciliation between Czechs and Sudeten Germans. Henlein and Prince Hohenlohe had claimed that the Sudeten German area was on the point of civil war. But while the negotiations were taking place, and tension in the Sudeten German territory was apparently high, Henlein failed to say what he wanted the Government to do. To make matters worse from his point of view, conflicting statements were appearing in the Sudeten German press. Nor was it clear whether or not the SdP would join the negotiations if invited. This was gradually undermining the prestige of the leaders. The Sudeten German press reported that although the Czech-controlled Government claimed that it had always wanted to give the minorities their full rights, none of the Sudeten Germans believed this. The Government now promised concessions. It would not build large Czechs schools in German areas, it would appoint more from minority groups to government posts and give more government contracts to Sudeten German firms. But whether or when this would actually happen was less clear. There was no legal obligation to carry out these promises; everything depended on administrative decisions at a local level. However, at first sight, it looked as if the ‘activists’ had gained major concessions and their prestige rose at the expense of the SdP. Henlein’s problem was to decide how to present his views on the government’s apparent generosity in a speech to be given to his party on 28 February. German diplomats in Prague recognised his problem: He will not find it easy to strike the right chord. On the one hand, regard for the members of his party requires him to set forth clearly the basic demands of the Sudeten German Party with regard to the Volksdeutsche in this country, and in this way to show how little significance there is in what has been granted to the Activists and thus how much remains for the Sudeten German

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Party to fight for. On the other hand however, he ought to guard against pitching his demands so high that they seem to affect the unity of the State (regional autonomy!). For he would thereby present the Czechoslovak Government, who, especially since Rutha’s [a member of the SdP] last journey to London, have again become very nervous and irritable towards the Sudeten German Party, with the most convenient pretext for accusing the Party of hostility to the State and rejecting every demand made by the Party. An opportunity of this kind would also certainly be used by the Government to make it clear in London that it was not the fault of the Czechs if, despite their proven goodwill over pleasing the minority, no further concessions could be made, but that of the Henlein people, who wished to tear the State asunder. If however Henlein shows himself in his speech to be firm, moderate and conciliatory, then he can never hope by means of negotiations to have his point of view recognised amicably, yet he will still remain fit for negotiation [verhandlungfa¨hig ] and thus, at the same time, he will be an important factor in both the domestic and foreign policy of the State. Henlein accordingly trod a fine line between outright condemnation of the Czech concessions and demanding more autonomy. Pressure was being maintained on London by the visit of one of the senior members of the SdP, Rutha, who had earlier accompanied Henlein. It was in Germany’s interest that the British should be told that the Czech concessions were insincere and inadequate. A telegram sent by the German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy the following day put the matter clearly. The discussions between the Czechoslovak Government and representatives of the German national group were confined to the so-called German splinter parties, which constitute only about a third of the German National group and can in no way represent politically the German community in Czechoslovakia. The Henlein party was not brought into the discussion. The result achieved by the above discussions cannot be regarded as in any way satisfactory from the German point of view, since the Czech Government, although they have, presumably for outward

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appearances, made a few concessions that seemed harmless to them, have attached to them so many reservations to essential points that in practice the execution of the concessions made to German demands falls to the discretion of the Czech Government. Moreover, in some essential points the Czech Government were not prepared to make concessions of any kind. The Reuter report quoted in your telegram under reference to the effect that in political circles in Berlin the concessions were described as a step forward does not therefore accord in any way with the facts. On the contrary, the German press here has been instructed to describe the outcome as thoroughly unsatisfactory.54 The purpose of this was clear: the British must not be allowed to think that the Sudeten crisis was over and the British Government must not believe Czech claims that they have made substantial concessions. The German ambassador to London was instructed: ‘You should say that to bring about a real de´tente it would be necessary for the Czech Government to enter into negotiations with the Henlein Party, which alone can be considered as representative of the German national group, and to conduct them to a satisfactory conclusion.’ This explains why Henlein did not attempt to join the earlier negotiations. He had decided, or been instructed, to stand aloof from the other German parties so that he could have freedom to demand complete autonomy – something that went far beyond what the other German parties wanted.

British attitudes to the Sudeten crisis The British Government was worried about the effect of the increase in Sudeten German political influence and its effect on the European balance of power. Britain was therefore prepared to try and act as an honest broker between the Sudeten German demands and the Czech Government. The Sudeten Germans and Hitler were aware of this and encouraged Sudeten German representatives to go to London and present their case to influential British politicians who were either pro-German or prepared to listen to the Sudeten Germans claims. This explains the reasons for Rutha’s visit to London. This had taken place at the same time as the negotiations and showed Henlein’s strategy. Like Henlein, Rutha posed as a reasonable man whose purpose was to explain the

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seriousness of the Sudeten position by means of maps and ‘facts’. He had a meeting with Lord Cranborne at the Foreign Office, where he also met Vansittart who, as an advisor to the British Government, was in general anti-German and might be considered independent. Vansittart, in general, was cool, to the point, and reserved, admirably informed about conditions in the Sudeten German distressed area, obviously without sympathy for the New Germany, but at pains, as a realistic politician, to do her justice. Cranborne behaved in a much friendlier way towards Germany and appeared relaxed, open-minded and less calculating. He was keenly interested in the Czech attempt, demonstrated to him with the aid of population maps, at Czech penetration of the German settlement area by means of corridors stretching up to the frontiers and thus to split the old German settlements into islands. C [ranborne] stated that he would inform Mr. Eden about this. . .’ Vansittart only became vehement on one occasion, namely, when he spoke about Benesˇ, whom he called an old fox, who now – instead of with the Sudeten German Party – had negotiated with the ‘little’ parties . . . It seemed to him that the old fox, by his intransigence, was upsetting the whole European conception . . . British policy was now clear. The aim was to intervene in European problems that threatened to erupt into violence and so far Vansittart felt that the British policy had been successful. He quoted the examples of Austria, Germany’s relations with Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Croat problem. All that remained was the apparently dangerous Sudeten German matter, made all the worse by Czechoslovakia’s position in Central Europe. Vansittart’s comment shows the deep-seated fear of war that was to plague Chamberlain in the prelude to Munich: ‘If anything should happen amongst you people, everything would blow up. Reason must at last prevail in this corner of the world.’ It was clear that Rutha had sent a regular bulletin of information to Vansittart about the distressing economic conditions in the Sudeten area. It had all been true, as Vansittart had found when he had checked it. It is impossible to know what this information consisted of. The national position is clear however: the crisis in the Sudeten area had

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lasted for a long time. Even when the Czechoslovak economy was beginning to recover in 1937, it had not reached the 1929 level.55 Exports had suffered most. The figures for registered unemployed in Table 4.2 tell a similar story. Total figures for unemployed were much higher: 50,000 in 1929 and 738,000 in 1932.56 Only just over half of all industrial workers were members of trade unions in the 1930s.57 Although these figures are for the whole of Czechoslovakia, there can be no doubt that the Sudeten German area was badly hit by the slump. Because of the severe effect of the Depression on Sudeten German industry, it was known as a ‘graveyard of industries’.58 This was the area that contained the majority of consumer business: clothing, textiles, glass and ceramics, though there was also an important chemical industry and coal mining in the west, which did not suffer as much. The efforts of the Czech Government to create new industries, especially of military importance, was resented by the Sudeten Germans because these new industries were located in Czech and not German areas. This was not merely nationalist chauvinism; it made more sense to locate industries away from the frontier, but inevitably this meant that they did not help ease Sudeten German economic problems. The effect of the Depression was felt for a long time. Even those who were fortunate enough to keep their jobs had their wages progressively cut. National records in Table 4.3 show the picture for the whole country. Examples from surviving company records show this in more detail. The small hardware company Brankauer Draht-Blechwaren und Na¨gelfabrik in Hradec nad Moravici in northern Moravia, is one example.59 The company’s sales both in Czechoslovakia and abroad declined in the late 1920s because of import restrictions in traditional markets. The first step to save it from bankruptcy during the Depression in 1932 was to reduce the factory workforce by 35 per cent (from 534 to Table 4.2 1929 42

Registered unemployment in Czechoslovakia, 1929–37 (000)

1930 105

1931 291

1932 554

1933 738

1934 677

1935 686

1936 623

1937 409

Source: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds), Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919– 39 (London, 2000), p. 99; Frederick Herz, The Economic Problem of the Danubian States; A Study in Economic Nationalism (London, 1947), p. 177.

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Table 4.3 Average weekly wages in crowns; cost of living index (1914 ¼ 100) Weekly wage in real value

1930 1932 1934 1936

Average weekly wage

Cost of living index (1914 ¼ 100)

214.75 215.48 209.76 207.84

121 129 128 123

Source: Frederick Herz, The Economic Problems of the Danubian States; A Study in Economic Nationalism (London, 1947), p. 179.

348) and the office staff from 60 to 44. As the Depression deepened, wages were cut each year. In the case of Moravia a.s., a larger hardware company, the crisis can be seen from the fall in sales, from 66.7 million crowns in 1929 to 42.1 million crowns in 1936, a fall of 36 per cent.60 Exports suffered most, from 27.3 million crowns to 9.9 million crowns in the same period. Bat’a, which bought shoe nails and tacks, provided a lifeline, but the factory workforce was cut and wages reduced. A similar situation can be seen in the glass company, Reich a.s. Sales were mostly of lampshades and glass tableware and exports played a major part in company sales. As these declined, the workforce was cut from 2,113 workers and 133 staff in 1930 to 1,814 workers and 124 staff in 1933, a fall of 15 per cent and 7 per cent respectively.61 In this respect, Reich was not typical. Other companies were hit worse by the Depression. Unemployment in the glass industry as a whole had fallen by 75 per cent by early 1933.62 In the medium sized towns that were typical of the Sudeten area, many of the companies produced similar goods and all were hit by the Depression in the same way. In many cases, industries were based on locally available raw materials. Food prices declined as well, but not to the same extent, which increased the hardship suffered by the unemployed and those on short time. There was clearly plenty of information about the effect of the crisis that could be given to British politicians. The Czech Government could not end this economic crisis in the Sudetenland and, until that happened, Henlein and Rutha could stress the hardships caused by the harsh economic conditions. Vansittart was susceptible to this information

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because parts of Britain were also slow to recover from the slump and suffered similar privations. But while Vansittart and the British Government were anxious to support reasonable Sudeten German demands if this could guarantee peace, there were limits to how far they would go. Britain would only support changes that would bring peace and Vansittart was well aware that the logical outcome of the Sudeten claims was union with Germany. To emphasise Britain’s position, Vansittart’s comment is significant: ‘Any changes in the frontier meant war; Britain needed peace. “We are prepared, within the present frontiers and on the basis of Czechoslovakia’s present constitution, to help you in every way that is at all possible, provided that you continue to guarantee a policy of moderation.’ Vansittart spoke bluntly about his fears that Germany would foment trouble in the Sudetenland and then send in large numbers of volunteers, which would lead to war. Rutha tried to counter this by claiming that the Sudetens were acting independently. His party’s demands were: An end to the expropriation of Sudeten German property, An end to the campaign of incitement, Strict instructions to the administrative authorities and to the frontier defence organisations [which were in Sudeten German territory] An end to the use of foreign capital [in Czech banks] to extend Czech influence, Modest compensation for Sudeten German losses [since 1918] Restoration of the limited local autonomy that had previously existed Communal elections Elections of representatives to statutory health and employment bodies [which controlled the distribution of unemployment payment] Large-scale measures of social relief, not in proportion to the population ratio but for the areas where distress is greatest. Vansittart agreed with this but did not give an opinion on a further demand that Czechoslovakia should be reconstituted into a nationalities state – a first step towards the separation of the Sudeten area and its transfer to Germany. Having gained Vansittart’s support for what were

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reasonable measures to relieve social distress, Rutha went one stage further. It was not in his interest to give the impression that these measures to relieve distress would end the risk of civil disturbance. He closed by claiming that if the present situation went on much longer ‘such a state of revulsion vis-a`-vis the State and of despair might be reached that nobody would any longer have the right or power to refuse the Sudeten Germans their right of self-determination’. This was a clear threat that Henlein might take matters into his own hands and call on Hitler to transfer the Sudeten area to Germany. Vansittart promised to raise the matter in the House of Commons and suggested that Rutha should ask Lord Lothian to do the same in the House of Lords. Vansittart also said that another British diplomat, Newton, would be appointed to Prague in March, and that he would be told to raise the Sudeten German issue with the Czechs at his first official meeting. The appointment of a new man to Prague at this point is significant. It shows how seriously the British Government regarded the matter but it also had the effect of putting a man in place who was not necessarily familiar with all the background details – Czech as well as German. It was likely that he would be more influenced by Henlein and Rutha than Benesˇ, especially in view of Vansittart’s opinion of the latter. However, his instructions were that he should not put any pressure on Czechoslovakia and only suggest indirectly that Britain would be glad to see the Sudeten German demands satisfied.63 Rutha’s remarks to Vansittart were intended to test Britain’s reaction to what Henlein was about to announce. Henlein’s speech of 28 February ´ sti nad Labem) spelt out the programme in detail.64 in Aussig (Czech: U What he wanted amounted to total separation of the Sudeten area from the rest of Czechoslovakia, but remaining within the state, i.e. autonomy. Each national community would be self-governing with separate legal rights and ‘the language boundaries of 1918 safeguarded by law’. The Czech press, both left and right, naturally opposed this, since it would create separate states within the country and lead to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, since Hungary and Poland would make similar demands. In his report to the German Foreign Ministry, Eisenlohr referred to a friendly discussion he had had with Hodzˇa. Eisenlohr had mentioned possible trade talks and the release of two Czechs from long prison sentences. But he then warned Hodzˇa not to reject Henlein’s proposals, since they did not threaten Czechoslovak

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sovereignty ‘but were intended to offer, in a conciliatory way, the basis for a tenable settlement [Ausgleich]’. Hodzˇa, wishing to maintain what he thought was a good relationship, asked for six months to carry out the agreement with the other German groups and said that in the meantime he was always ready to discuss matters with the Sudeten German Party. Eisenlohr’s final point to the Foreign Ministry was that the British Charge´ d’Affaires, Hadow, would also be recommending Henlein’s proposal to the British Government. From Henlein’s point of view, matters were progressing in a very satisfactory way. He had described the Sudeten German community as still suffering from the effects of economic depression and he was able to give sufficient detail to support his argument. He was also able to point to measures taken by Czechs to increase their own influence in Sudeten German areas, to support the Czechs living there. He claimed that these represented a Czech desire to disrupt the affairs of the Sudeten German community. The repeated threat of civil disorder and the implied support of Germany was enough to alarm the British Government. The Czech ambassador, Jan Masaryk, found that all this was going on behind his back and he was not being given an opportunity of refuting the allegations. But in March Germany began to make mistakes. On 3 March an official in the German Political Division IV reported that Frank, Henlein’s deputy and a long-term Nazi, had been summoned by Himmler. Frank was told that Go¨ring wanted 25,000 male and 40,000 female Sudeten German farm workers to be sent immediately to Germany to work for the Four Year Plan. This was tantamount to assuming that Henlein’s party and Czechoslovakia were already under German control. The German official reported that Frank ‘had voiced his misgivings as regards both foreign and national community [Volkstum] policy’. Frank pointed out that the Czechoslovak Government would raise objections and that the people were needed in Czechoslovakia to support Henlein’s political work. In reply he was told ‘that the fulfilment of the Four Year Plan made this measure indispensable and that, besides, the Sudeten Germans would join the Reich in any case in the not too distant future’. Himmler tried to soften the blow by saying that the transfer must be done legally and that the people would only be needed for four weeks. But to emphasise the importance of the demand, Himmler told Frank that the Special Commissioners of the Party were already

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arriving in Berlin to carry out detailed planning of the work. It was of course bluff and a crude attempt to bully a subordinate Nazi official. Frank must have been badly shaken and it was a foretaste of what was later to happen under the Protectorate. But on this occasion no more was heard of the German demand. Henlein’s appeal for Sudeten autonomy, the visits to London and discussions between Germans and the Czechoslovak Government thoroughly alarmed the Czech public. As a result, Mastny´ told the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, that his Government would like to sign a treaty guaranteeing Czechoslovak territorial integrity.65 This would ensure that whatever happened as a result of Henlein’s campaign, Czechoslovakia would remain intact. Von Neurath refused to discuss it. He said that no talks could begin until the Czechoslovak – Russian treaty had been ended. When Mastny´ repeated his earlier statement that the treaty was not aimed at Germany, von Neurath told him that he had different information. Von Neurath was equally dismissive when told that considerable progress had been made in improving the conditions of Sudeten Germans. His comment was that ‘the effect on the largest German party, that of Konrad Henlein, had not been exactly favourable’. He also complained that the e´migre´ press had again become very active. To put further pressure on the Czech Government, Czechs living in Germany had been ordered to fill in forms giving personal details and it looked to Czechs as if Germany was preparing for war – a charge strongly denied by von Neurath. German pressure on the Czech Government continued. In mid April the German Foreign Ministry reported that it had been given permission to acquire Czech crowns to the value of 50,000 RM, which was presumably part of the allocation of funds agreed earlier.66 In mid April Benesˇ had a meeting with Eisenlohr.67 Benesˇ tried unsuccessfully to have a press truce – the German press was again attacking the Czech Government. Eisenlohr said the Czechs had to act first and control the press. The rest of the discussion followed a familiar pattern: Benesˇ said he would do all he could to improve relations with Germany and the position of the minorities, but for all his apparent quiet optimism, he was ill at ease and was waiting ‘to see whether someone will turn up and carry him off or whether we [the German Government] will make a mistake which he could turn to his own advantage’.

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On the eve of the Anschluss Henlein was in a very strong position. His Sudeten party, with generous German financial support, had gained wide support among the majority of Sudeten Germans. The other Sudeten German parties had lost popularity and were in a small minority as supporters of Czechoslovak democracy. Henlein and his colleagues had also made a good impression in London as the representatives of the Sudeten Germans. He had been able to persuade Vansittart, chief advisor to the Foreign Office, of the justice of the Sudeten case. Henlein had been able to point to the very real hardship and economic distress that had marked the Sudeten economy – ‘the graveyard of industries’. Benesˇ’ plans for gradual integration of Czechs and Germans by Czech colonisation of German areas had been turned against him as examples of Czech chauvinism. Sudeten Germans felt that they had lost power and influence in the early days of the Republic and, ever since, had faced discrimination. Their lack of true political status – they were not equal to Czechs and Slovaks in law – was due to earlier Czech reaction to Sudeten German attempts to break away from the Republic. The attempts by the Czech Government to foster industrial development during the Depression had been seen by Sudeten Germans as yet another attempt to help Czechs at their expense. The reality was that the Government wanted to develop industries in areas away from the frontier, where they would be less vulnerable in a German attack. Most striking of all is the double standard by which the German Foreign Office treated the Czechoslovak Government. Money was sent illegally to Henlein and no attempt was made to try and limit the activities of Sudeten Nazis. Indeed, every effort was made to coordinate SdP political activity in parliament with official German policy. At the same time, the Czechoslovak ambassador was criticised repeatedly for his government’s treaty with Russia. Whenever Sudeten German Nazis were arrested on legitimate charges, equal numbers of Czechs living in Germany were also taken into custody. Every effort was made to isolate Czechoslovakia from her allies. At the same time, Hitler had already decided to invade the country and had ordered a plan to be drawn up. The Rhineland crisis showed the Czechoslovak Government how weak its position really was and, in consequence, Benesˇ did all he could to placate Germany. All was to no avail.

CHAPTER 5 HITLER'S MANIPULATION OF SUDETEN GERMAN GRIEVANCES

Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor in 1933 did not seem to pose any immediate threat to Czechoslovakia. The main problem was Hungary, which had lost a great deal of territory in 1918 and would try to recover it if possible. This is the justification for the alliance of Danubian states, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, all of which had gained parts of Hungary after World War I. Czechoslovakia was also supported by a French alliance and more general promises of help from the Soviet Union. This seemed to offer sufficient support as Hitler began to rebuild German prestige by developing armed forces and occupying the Rhineland. This alarmed the Czechoslovak Government, which began to strengthen the country’s defences by building a chain of forts similar to the French Maginot Line. Since these were inevitably built in the Sudeten German areas, they aroused hostility because they were seen as spreading Czech influence and taking Sudeten German land. But this did not necessarily lead to civil unrest and apparently did not pose any threat to internal Czechoslovak security. This came later, when Hitler stimulated Sudeten German discontent to the point where it appeared that the country was on the verge of civil war. When planning Germany’s eastward expansion, Hitler knew that he had to destroy Czechoslovakia. But he realised that he had to tread carefully to avoid alerting Czechoslovakia’s allies, since he did not know how effective the system of alliances might be. In July 1936 he

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decided that Czechoslovakia would never collapse while the wily Benesˇ was able to counter Henlein’s demands on behalf of the Sudeten Germans. He was left with the option of a lightning attack that would conquer the country before Czechoslovakia’s allies could come to her assistance. In the Sudeten German territory the German Foreign Ministry had already begun to support Henlein’s carefully prepared – and expensive – campaign on behalf of the SdP. Henlein and others had tried to win British support by persuading the British Government that the Sudeten Germans were on the verge of civil war. As a result of subsequent British pressure, Benesˇ had agreed to meet Henlein to discuss Sudeten grievances. The German Foreign Ministry had put additional pressure on the Czechoslovak Government through its minister in Prague. All had seemed set for a final confrontation, between Henlein and Benesˇ. But all that had happened was that the Czech Prime Minister, Hodzˇa, had held discussions with representatives of the Activist Sudeten German parties. The Czechoslovak Government’s promised reforms that were later offered did not seem to provide the real equality that the Sudeten Germans felt was their right and the promised reforms were not carried out.

Order No. 23; the plan to attack Czechoslovakia In the light of this, Hitler decided to attack Czechoslovakia and solve the problem by force. In July 1936 he issued Order 23 to begin military preparations for a war against Czechoslovakia. By June 1937 the outline plan for the invasion had been completed and in July the OKH (Oberkommand des Heeres - the army high command) issued its first battle plan.1 The attack was to be made by the Heeres Gruppenkommando 3 based in Dresden and led by the 8th army.2 The plan was to enter Czechoslovakia through the Landeshute Pforte and attack Pardubitz (Czech: Pardubice). Detailed studies were made of the Czechoslovak defensive system, which included road blocks on minor roads across the frontier.3 This information was gathered by Sudeten Germans living in the area, some of whom were members of the local defence force. On 30 November the Heeres Gruppenkommando 3 was informed of the plan. On 12 January 1938 the 8th army was also told of its role. One month later detailed plans for the transport of the 8th army were announced and on 5 March the OKH announced that the 18th and

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28th Divisions would be used. By April the plans had reached an advanced stage.4 During the next months further details were added. Maps of the Czech fortifications were sent to military units between 13 and 27 April.5 Mobilisation of the appointed troops began and further details of the battle plan were completed. There was a lull in May as men and horses were temporarily released from the army to help with the harvest. In June it was agreed at army headquarters that the attack would be made either the following spring or an opportunity might come for an attack at the end of September or in October.6 This is the background against which events in Czechoslovakia need to be seen. The German Foreign Ministry, which was not informed of the planned attack, followed a different policy. It tried to isolate Czechoslovakia diplomatically by breaking the political links between Czechoslovakia and France and make Czechoslovakia subordinate to Germany.

Henlein’s demand for Sudeten autonomy In the summer of 1937 the stage was set for the final part of Henlein’s campaign to try and get autonomy for the Sudeten Germans within Czechoslovakia. In July a new government was formed under Hodzˇa (his third). This was a coalition, like all other Czechoslovak governments. It consisted of four Czech parties (Agrarian, Social Democrat, Benesˇ’ National Socialists and Traders) and three German (Christian Socialist, Agrarian and Social Democrats): the Activist parties. But it failed to gain wide support among Sudeten Germans and by September Hodzˇa was facing serious difficulties. He was forced to invite Henlein and Prince Max von Hohenlohe-Langenburg (the pro-Nazi Reich German who had been to London to support the SdP) to discuss outstanding Sudeten issues. The outcome was predictable. Each side restated its previous position and made no concessions. But this was the point when the Czechs finally accepted that they had to negotiate directly with Henlein as the leader of the largest Sudeten party. This meeting did little to ease tension in the Sudeten area, where the SdP continued to stir up trouble. The events described in the German press were exaggerated or untrue, but because they were expensively funded by Hitler, they were freely available and were widely believed by the Sudeten Geman population. German-language newspapers often published lurid articles about what they claimed were Czech misdeeds:

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‘Die Polizeimethoden in der Tschechoslowakei’ (‘Police methods in Czechoslovakia’) (Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 June 1937) ‘Prager Schikanen gegen o¨sterreichisches Angeho¨rige’ (‘Prague’s chicanery against Austrian citizens’) (Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 July 1938), ‘Die Verhaftung des SdP Schulungsleiters Dr Suchy’ (‘The execution of Dr Suchy, an SdP school leader’) (Ostrauer Zeitung 8 July 1938) and Hans Ryser, Lebenskampf der Ostmar (Life and death struggle of East Moravia).7 In October Sudeten German newspapers claimed again that they were being deliberately victimised by the Czech police. Attention was focused on an incident at Teplitz-Scho¨nau on the 17th, where there had been a struggle between the SdP deputy leader Frank and Czech police. Czechs suspected that this had been deliberately provoked by Frank and that the SdP and the German Foreign Ministry had planned the incident. Czech suspicions were confirmed when German newspapers published the contents of a letter from Henlein to Benesˇ even before the letter had been delivered. Czechs were able to claim that the contents had either been leaked to the German Foreign Ministry or the latter had planned the incident. As a result of this revelation, the Czechoslovak Government was able to claim that its own version of the incident was the true one. But it was also clear that whoever was responsible, Germany and Czechoslovakia were moving towards war. This put England and France in a difficult position. Neither was prepared to fight Germany and the initial reaction of both was that neither wished to intervene. However, in November France decided that it was in her interest to try and restrain Germany and renewed her support for Czechoslovakia. Henlein continued to put pressure on the Czech Government by making it clear that he wanted the Sudeten German areas to become autonomous. This would transform Czechoslovakia from a democratic, multi-national state into a state of separate nationalities, for it was likely that the other racial groups – Poles, Hungarians and possibly Slovaks – would also demand autonomy. It would also destabilise the Slovak part, where Henlein also had a strong following among the German population: he had won over 90 per cent of the votes in the municipal elections of 1938.8 For this reason the Czechs resolutely refused even to consider the demand for autonomy. However, since there was sympathy for the Sudeten Germans in England, Henlein was able to persuade the Czechoslovak Government gradually to begin to accept that it might become necessary. The German Foreign Ministry thought that this

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would take a long time. In November, Eisenlohr’s report shows how modest the German Foreign Ministry aims were: the unrest here goes much deeper than M. Benesˇ is willing to admit to me. If we succeed in carrying out this programme, and for the moment it looks as if we shall, we have three months of calm which will have a beneficial effect here and elsewhere, we gain various points of importance to us without giving anything in return, and, above all, we have synchronized our foreign policy with our press policy, as far as Czechoslovakia is concerned. Actually, disturbances are only to be apprehended from possible Sudeten German incidents and from the continuing efforts of the Sudeten German Press Centre to use our newspapers as mouthpieces for their excitement . . . I hope that we shall preserve an unshakeable calm there. The question, however, which is already engaging my attention is what the position will be after the three months have expired. If, for instance, a vacuum should ensue, I fear that calm would not last long and then there might be a schism between foreign policy and press policy.9 Eisenlohr recommended that further efforts be made to silence the e´migre´ press. He also suggested that Hitler should meet the Czech ambassador Mastny´ and appear conciliatory. Beyond that he hoped that the change in German censorship policy in January might lead to a cultural agreement and that from March there could be a fuller exchange of people such as athletes, businessmen and professors. ‘Later, perhaps in agreement with Konrad Henlein, we might consider giving M. Benesˇ a kind of trial period, to see what he achieves in the minority question.’ Henlein realised that he was losing support among the Sudeten Germans, who saw little progress towards political reform. On 19 November he wrote a long letter to Hitler, with a copy to the German Foreign Minister setting out, in very strong language, the injustices that he claimed the Sudeten Germans were suffering.10 His exaggerated tone shows that he was afraid of losing political momentum. He probably also realised that the German diplomats were only concerned with improving the living conditions of Sudeten Germans and exercising diplomatic control over Czechoslovakia. Their acceptance that improvements might

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take time conflicted with his own short-term goals and the hopes of those who had voted for him in such large numbers in mid 1935. He may even have believed his own rhetoric about the imminent danger of civil unrest. He certainly faced opposition within his own party. He must have realised that by stating his ideals in very broad terms he had created a party with the potential for serious internal discord. This came to a head in December in a clash with the old Nazis. As noted above, the DNSAP (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei – the Sudeten Nazi party) had been active in the 1920s and early 1930s and former members had never accepted Henlein’s more moderate policy. But he realised that he had to avoid alienating the German Nazi party. In his discussions with Altenburg, an official at the German Foreign Ministry, Henlein emphasised the need for discipline in his party, the need to recall Herr von Chamier, the press adviser at the German legation in Prague (who supported the old Nazis) and the need to ban the opposition paper Der Aufbruch, which was spreading ideas in Germany. Altenburg took a similar view on the need to avoid alienating Sudeten Nazis who had political allies in Germany. It has been keenly regretted in Germany also that a break with such personalities as Kaspar and Haider [both extreme Nazis] could not have been avoided, especially as they were people who, in the past, had rendered services to the movement. I expressed the hope that perhaps at a later period matters might be adjusted. For the moment it was essential . . . to strengthen Henlein’s authority in order to avoid any deepening of the schism. Herr Henlein showed great confidence in future developments. I informed him that we had no intention of interfering with the internal disputes of the Sudeten German Party, that our desire was that unity and order must be maintained and that naturally the responsibility must remain with him as leader.11

November 1937; the Hossbach minutes While the German Foreign Ministry and Henlein were speculating on the future of the SdP in Czechoslovakia, Hitler was preparing the German military, naval and diplomatic leaders for war. In November 1936 he had been given details of the number of army officers needed for

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the planned attack on Czechoslovakia and of the Czechoslovak railway network.12 A year later he assembled the heads of the armed forces and the Foreign Minister so that he could prepare them for the war he was planning against Czechoslovakia. Present at the Reich Chancellery were the War Minister Field Marshall von Blomberg, the Commander in Chief of the Army Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, the head of the Luftwaffe, Colonel General Go¨ring and the Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath. The minutes of this conference of 10 November 1937 by Col. Hossbach gives an outline of Hitler’s future intentions.13 Hitler began by claiming that the German people needed more living space and additional resources of food and raw materials and that these could be obtained most easily in Europe. He pointed out that these would have to be seized by force and said that the rearmament programme had almost been completed, making it possible to start a war within a short time. This was the course to be followed. He reinforced this argument for war in the short term by claiming that the weapons that were new now would be obsolete by the mid 1940s. Any delay in going to war would benefit Germany’s enemies because it would give them more time to complete their rearmament. Hitler therefore said he expected to go to war by 1943–5. He set out three possible situations, which included the following: our first objective . . . must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in this war would, however, increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation would clearly take the form of an attack towards Silesia, toward the north or toward the west. If the Czechs were overthrown and a common German – Hungarian frontier achieved, a neutral attitude on the part of Poland could be the more certainly counted on in the event of a Franco – German conflict. [Hitler] believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question would be cleared up in due

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course by Germany . . . It would of course be necessary to maintain a strong defence on our western frontier during the prosecution of our attack on the Czechs and Austria . . . it had to be remembered that the defence measures of the Czechs were growing in strength from year to year . . . Even though the populations concerned, especially of Czechoslovakia, were not sparse, the annexation of Czechoslovakia would mean the acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 8 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and 1 million from Austria was practicable.14 In Hitler’s view the advantages of this would be shorter and more easily defended frontiers, freeing of forces for other purposes and the addition of up to 12 new divisions (one new division for each million of population). Hitler believed that Italy would not object to Germany seizing Czechoslovakia but her attitude towards Austria was unknown. As to Britain’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia, the visits by Halifax and Chamberlain later in November were likely to confirm that Britain wanted peace in Europe and was prepared to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to achieve this.15 With regard to Russia – Czechoslovakia’s other ally with France – speed of conquest was all-important to forestall any help that Russia might give. Another possibility was that France and Britain would declare war on Italy. If this were to happen, Germany would have a chance of seizing Czechoslovakia and Austria without the risk of being attacked by France or Britain. This rather vague general outline of future events ignored too many matters to be taken as a blueprint for war. In the first place, Hitler had ordered plans to be drawn up for a war on Czechoslovakia alone. To attack both Czechoslovakia and Austria together was impractical. His comments on forcible emigration of the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia also show that this was no more than a vague possibility and not a detailed plan. His assumption that he could raise up to 12 new divisions from the two countries was equally impractical if he had already expelled most Czechs. As will be seen later, Hitler resolutely refused to allow any Slavs to enter the German army, so the Czechs and Slovaks would not have been used as army recruits. He might have agreed to use them as allies, as happened with the Slovaks, who fought in southern Russia in Operation Barbarossa.

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The outline for future war came as a shock to the military leaders. Blomberg and Fritsch repeatedly stressed that Germany should not fight Britain and France because of their military superiority. Blomberg was also anxious about the German military defences on the Rhine that were of ‘insignificant value’ and pointed out that the four motorised divisions intended for the west still had no vehicles. The Czech defences were already very strong and up to the standard of the Maginot Line; they would slow a German advance considerably. Fritsch reported that a detailed study was being made of these as part of the plans for war against Czechoslovakia. He was clearly worried that war was imminent and suggested giving up his leave, only to be reassured by Hitler that war was unlikely before the summer of 1938. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of this conference. Hitler clearly wanted to prepare his military leaders for war and the reaction of Blomberg and Fritsch shows that they were taken by surprise. More important for this study is the proposed treatment of the Czechs, whose resources would be seized and the bulk of the population expelled and presumably starved to death.

Sudeten deutsche Partei policy While Hitler was preparing his military leaders, the SdP continued to disrupt Czechoslovak life. In December there was a new cause for Sudeten German complaint to the Czechoslovak Government and German reprisals against Czechs in Germany. The Czechoslovak system of frontier defences was being extended and the National Defence Law had been passed to allow the Government to expropriate land needed for this. It was inevitably Sudeten German land and property that was taken, though adequate compensation was paid.16 By 22 December the Czech authorities had issued 30 orders to sell landed property at Ja¨gerndorf in North East Moravia to the Czech authorities within three months. One hundred and twenty people had also lost their jobs, which may have been connected with the same expropriations. The German Foreign Ministry decided that reprisals should be taken against Czechs living in Germany.17 Hess, Hitler’s deputy, said the present ratio of 1:1 should be increased to 2:1, doubling the number of Czechs to be penalised; Hitler agreed. Dr Weitz of the Gestapo was given the task of putting this into effect and as a start seven Czechs were ordered to

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transfer their property to Germans within three months. The Czech ambassador complained that this was grossly unfair. The Czechoslovak authorities had offered to suspend the compulsory alienation of rights of Sudeten citizens. But when the Czech Government tried to negotiate a settlement of the issue, it was told that this would imply exactly parallel behaviour, i.e. ‘terror against terror’. The German Foreign Ministry followed this with a more conciliatory suggestion that the matter could be solved, but only if all seizures of land for defence works were cancelled. The Czechs could not do this because it would jeopardise their creation of an effective defensive system. Defence against the perceived danger from Germany and the ‘enemy within’ remained of paramount importance. In February, as elections were approaching, Eisenlohr took stock of the situation in Czechoslovakia. In his report, he showed that the Czechs were afraid of Henlein’s party because it stood for a political view that was anathema to them (the leadership principle in place of democracy). He showed that Henlein was popular with Sudeten Germans because he cut across traditional occupational and religious divisions. This had given him the election success. But it had not given him a place in the Government. The other Sudeten German parties had helped the Government keep Henlein out by accepting government posts in successive coalitions, giving the Government a majority in parliament. The result was that the SdP, though hardened by severe combat was condemned to being practically without influence. It could offer its adherents – not composed of idealists [Nazis] only – little more than inflammatory speeches. As a rising against the overwhelming power of the Government was pointless and the idea of a seizure of power like that of the NSDAP in the Reich was an impossible goal for a minority, there remained for the increasingly agitated and radicalised masses, who saw no tangible successes and no prospect of coming to power, only the hope of armed intervention by Germany. This hope, fed by a whispering campaign, was no secret to the Government and is in contravention of the official party declarations of loyalty.18 There is great danger in this, especially at moments of excitement such as followed the Teplitz incident. This gives the Czechs the welcome argument that one cannot come to an understanding

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with Henlein, either because his statements are not honestly meant, or because his supporters do not regard them as binding on themselves. This is the ‘double track system’ of Sudeten German politics so decried by the Czechs.19 This diplomatic assessment of the Sudeten problem from the German point of view shows what had gone wrong for the Sudeten Nazi party. The German Foreign Ministry and Hitler must have wondered whether the money they had poured into Henlein’s account had been wasted. It certainly helps to explain why Hitler had decided, six months previously, to order the army to prepare to attack Czechoslovakia and to warn the army leaders and German Foreign Minister in November that they should expect war. Eisenlohr’s comment on the Czech response also helps to explain why Czech and German attitudes had remained fixed. Each demanded that the other side should make considerable concessions, but this proved impossible. Benesˇ had certainly realised that he had to try and conciliate Sudeten Germans and influence Czechs. In his Reichenberg speech in August 1936 he had tried to encourage the Sudeten Germans but had offered them too little. His efforts to make the Czechs more receptive to Sudeten German aspirations had also failed. The Government’s offers to improve the Sudeten German economic situation early in 1937 had also been unsatisfactory from the Sudeten German point of view because it had only offered help in proportion to the size of the Sudeten German population and left everything in the hands of the (Czech) bureaucracy. The problem was that the Sudeten German area had suffered much more than the Czech since the creation of the First Republic. Conditions in the Depression had made matters worse and the Sudeten Germans wanted the Czech-controlled Government to recognise this and help them. But even the promise of more jobs in the civil service would not have satisfied them. This was partly because many of the jobs would have been elsewhere in the Republic and would have been under Czech control. Also, few Sudeten Germans spoke Czech fluently and could not have worked outside the German-speaking area. At best, the proposal would have given them one-fifth of all posts, but they wanted to have total control of the Sudetenland, which would be administered by their own people. The Government had also hoped that meeting the demands of Sudeten Activist parties would increase support for them at Henlein’s

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expense. Henlein tried to undermine this by claiming in his Aussig speech that these were not serious offers and that what was needed was protection of their homeland, the principle of self-determination and compensation for wrongs done since 1918 – a flexible demand that could be guaranteed to cause endless argument if accepted. But these draft proposals were prepared very quickly and, although they were presented to parliament by Henlein’s parliamentary deputies, it was a year before they were put before the parliamentary council. They were sure to fail because the Czech majority opposed them. Another insuperable problem in the Sudeten German area was that the races were mixed; there was no clear racial frontier as Henlein was claiming: they [the draft racial laws] are not the last word in wisdom, for it is impossible to delimit one from one another by means of a hedge of legal paragraphs, or to bring to a stop the eternal conflict between Germans and Czechs in all spheres of cultural, economic, and political life by threatening so many weeks or months of imprisonment in each individual case. The draft laws breathe the spirit of self-defence; the minority tries to take refuge from the majority under the cloak of the lawgiver. This is no longer a necessity for the Sudeten German Party; today it is on the offensive.20 It was one thing to be ‘on the offensive’ but quite another to know what to do. Was the SdP to persevere under the slogan ‘all or nothing’ as in its hitherto unswerving, but fruitless, opposition? Or had the moment come to ‘. . . grasp the proffered hand, take its place at the conference table, and attempt to work for the gradual solution of a problem’ which, according to Benesˇ, ‘. . . is not a political but also a psychological one, and which, therefore, can only be attacked and settled by degrees’. There was also the further question whether the SdP would be prepared to negotiate alongside the activist parties and at some time even enter the government. Eisenlohr said he had had a long talk with Henlein along these lines. He found that Henlein had not considered these questions; he was evidently following Hitler’s orders and Hitler was not interested in solving the problems. Eisenlohr continued ‘when I realised he was not clear in his mind on any of these issues, I advised him to reflect on them so that he might be prepared and resolute for any eventuality that might arise.’ Henlein, probably at a loss as to whether to admit his real

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position, merely replied that the Sudeten German people would follow him whatever he decided. But he needed the support of the German Government and needed to harmonise his actions with those of Germany. What he wanted to know above all was whether to continue to attack the Czechoslovak Government or whether to take part in a gradual settlement of the problem. Eisenlohr’s advice was that he should realise that German policy was to gain its ends by peaceful means ‘as has been stated many times before’. The Foreign Ministry would support and advise him but he should not make unrealistic demands (‘cry for the moon’). Germany’s ultimate aim, as Eisenlohr understood it, was to take Czechoslovakia out of the French camp and into the German. If Henlein’s party were ever in government, it would be expected to play its part in achieving this. This shows, once again, how far apart the German Foreign Ministry was from Hitler, who had already decided to invade Czechoslovakia and crush the Czechs.

Anschluss and Heim ins Reich From this point it is Austria that dominates the international scene. From time to time other matters intrude: there were discussions between Henlein and the Slovak leader Hlinka, in which the Slovak leader expressed a desire for independence.21 Hlinka, an extreme right wing Slovak nationalist, hoped for cooperation between his party and Henlein’s. In February Sudeten German leaders met leading Hungarian politicians and were told of Hungary’s desire to ‘contribute to Czechoslovakia’s disappearance from the map’.22 Further talk of cooperation between the two was swiftly forbidden by the German Foreign Ministry. This was because Hitler was beginning to put pressure on Austria, in line with his earlier prediction at the November 1937 conference, that there would be war in the summer of 1938. Hitler began his campaign in February by inviting the Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Schuschnigg left Vienna for Berlin on 11 February. At the meeting Hitler demanded concessions for Austrian Nazis, including seats in the government. It was known in Czechoslovakia that Schuschnigg had gone to meet Hitler and this increased Czech fear of a similar diplomatic attack on them. Throughout this stage of the crisis Eisenlohr had no difficulty in getting what he wanted from the Czechoslovak Government. One example is given in his

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report of 25 February, when he met the prime minister, Hodzˇa, to discuss Sudeten German complaints. Eisenlohr made three requests. The first was that the big German electrical firm, Siemens and Halske, should be able to maintain contact with its Czech subsidiary, Elektrotechna, and that it should be given government contracts again. The second was a request by the Sudeten German Athletic Club to attend the Breslau Sports Festival. The third was that the Auslands-Organisation should be made legal. Hodzˇa promised his support for all three, even though the Auslands-Organisation was a German body that would cooperate with and support the SdP. One comment by Eisenlohr showed how completely the German Government was dominating the Czechs: ‘I stated, without encountering any disagreement, that Czechoslovakia would in the long run only be able to find security in close friendship with Germany.’23 Hodzˇa, anxious to ingratiate himself with Eisenlohr, said that there would shortly be a government reshuffle. He would not be able to exclude the activist parties yet but could replace the Jewish Social Democrat Minister Czech by Jaksch, a young activist, who was more acceptable to the SdP. Hodzˇa also promised to hold the communal elections as soon as he could be sure of cooperation from the SdP. Pressed on what he would do immediately, he spoke of giving the Sudeten areas de facto autonomy within the framework of the constitution and moving the composition of his government further to the right by including the Slovak autonomists and the Czech National Democrats. He would also try to ensure that the Czech civil servants in the Sudeten German area would not behave in a chauvinist manner. Finally, all Sudeten German officials would be transferred to the Sudeten German areas. Eisenlohr pointed out that the root of the Sudeten German problem was the fact that Sudeten Germans saw themselves as being under foreign domination and that, to establish confidence, it was necessary to establish lasting contact between the Government and the SdP on a regular basis. Eisenlohr suggested that two committees should be established for this purpose; the Sudeten would be led by Henlein, whom Eisenlohr described as ‘an upright and sincere man’. Hodzˇa promised to consider this. A day later Eisenlohr met Beran, the leader of the Agrarians, the largest Czech party. Beran was worried about the rising German threat and was anxious to appear conciliatory. He said he was opposed to the idea of collective security and wanted close relations with Germany. He proposed organising large-scale peasant demonstrations to support

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this, provided Germany acted in a conciliatory manner. He also said that Czechoslovakia could not give up its alliances (with France and Russia) until it knew how it stood in relation to Germany. Beran also reported that the Communists were getting worried about the Government’s antiCommunist policy and were planning to distribute five million leaflets and hold a thousand meetings to try and rally support. There remained two items that were harming relations between the Sudeten Germans and the Government: German anti-Nazi e´migre´ activity and the SdP demand for the release of Sudeten Germans. On the first, Beran said he thought that the e´migre´ press must be silenced (it was supported by the Social Democrats). As to the second, he thought that the prisoners – there were fewer than had been quoted in the German press – should be released soon as a mark of goodwill. In a final comment on Schuschnigg’s speech to the Austrian Federal Council after meeting Hitler, Beran said that he considered it reasonable, calm and correct. Beran said he did not wish to interfere in a matter between Hitler and Austria. However, Germany had every intention of interfering in Czechoslovak politics. Masaryk and Benesˇ had resisted German efforts to recognise the Auslands-Organisation for a long time, but Benesˇ’ Government had finally been forced to do so on 23 February. The German reaction was swift and predictable. Having described this recognition as helping to improve relations between the two countries, the head of the organisation set out how it was to be presented to the Czech Government by Eisenlohr.24 It . . . seems to be necessary to specify to the German Minister in Prague [Eisenlohr] the principles which must be followed in the negotiations regarding the recognition of the AuslandsOrganisation; and all the more as press articles have reproduced versions of the bases of recognition which are incompatible with the views of the Auslands-Organisation. Thus it has been indicated as an argument against recognition that the Auslands-Organisation is a political association, whereas membership of political associations is prohibited for foreigners in Czechoslovakia. As against this it must be emphasised in Prague that the task of the Auslands-Organisation is to bring together, in a spirit of comradeship, Party members abroad, and to take care in a social and charitable sense of all Reich-Germans living abroad. Conscious that they are enjoying the right of hospitality, it is

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the obvious duty of the Auslands-Organisation and its members to observe strictly the laws of the country and to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs. The fulfilment of this duty is carefully watched over by all departments of the Auslands-Organisation and by the Reich Missions abroad. The Auslands-Organisation is thus not political in character within the meaning of legislation governing associations in Czechoslovakia. Above all it is not, however, to be regarded as an association or even as a party, and the legislation on associations is therefore not applicable to it. The Auslands-Organisation is rather a part of the N.S.D.A.P., which, as a public corporation of the Reich, has to maintain the internal unity of the population of the German State. As such a part, neither it nor its regional groups possess a legal personality of their own. Membership of the N.S.D.A.P. involves membership of the Auslands-Organisation for all Reich nationals living abroad; this cannot be acquired otherwise. A member of the N.S.D.A.P. pursues no other political aims than such as already result from his position as a citizen of the Reich. He has merely assumed increased duties by his membership. If it is generally recognised that foreigners may associate to form national colonies in their countries of residence for convivial, social, cultural and charitable activities, the Reich Germans abroad must be permitted to participate in the Auslands-Organisation in the same way. This comprises: Free adherence to the N.S.D.A.P.; Subordination to the leadership of the N.S.D.A.P. Freedom of association and assembly for the N.S.D.A.P. and its branches [Gliederungen ] insofar as these are active in the country of residence; and freedom of contact with the N.S.D.A.P in the Reich. The German Minister has the same rights in regard to members of the Auslands-Organisation in the country of residence as towards all Reich nationals. They are subject to his political discipline. This right can . . . be described as a right of control, though it does not derive from the constitution of the Auslands-Organisation but from the general political status of the Minister.

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Free adherence to the N.S.D.A.P. for members of the AuslandsOrganisation involves the right to attend meetings of the N.S.D.A.P. and permission to wear uniform at them, the display of the Reich flag on Reich festivals, the flying of pennants with Reich colours on vehicles, and the wearing of the party badge on civilian clothing. A member of the Auslands-Organisation may not only himself belong to the branches and affiliated associations of the N.S.D.A.P. in the country of residence or in the Reich, but may also invite other Reich nationals to join the N.S.D.A.P., its organisations and dependent organisations. Punishment of Reich-Germans because they are members of these bodies will have to be expressly excluded, in contrast to the legal practice hitherto prevailing. Before new members are received into the N.S.D.A.P. and its affiliated associations, the organs of the Auslands-Organisation may arrange for enquiries about their political reliability to be addressed to other Reich nationals . . . There is no question of the SA, SS, N.S.K.K.25, N.S.F.K.26 and the National Socialist University Lecturers’ League [Nationalsozialistischer Dozentenbund ] functioning in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, in order to bring Reich-German youth together, and also for charitable purposes, the establishment of the H.J.,27 the National Socialist Students’ Union [Nationalsozialistischer Studentenbund ] and the Women’s League [Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft ] is necessary. The letter also states that the Nazi Party has the right to decide times of meetings ‘so far as is necessary, in agreement with the Czechoslovak authorities’. Members of the Nazi Party are subject to courts in Germany, and not the Czechoslovak courts. Nor do the Czechoslovak authorities have any right to interfere with an investigation into party membership conducted by the Nazi Party. The Auslands-Organisation of the N.S.D.A.P. requires freedom to call meetings of Reich nationals and organise festivals in order to maintain esprit de corps, to train its members and to participate solemnly in [German] national festivals and commemorations. In view of the limited circle of participants, any supervision of such events by the authorities of the country of residence can only extend to the observance of security arrangements and the checking

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of the nationality of the participants. The same applies to meetings and festivals of the affiliated associations of the N.S.D.A.P. Reich Germans also had to have the right to maintain communications with the Party and attend meetings of the Nazi party abroad, including training courses and youth camps. The final comment was that these conditions had to be met in full by the Czechoslovak authorities and there could be no discussion of the Party programme. At a stroke the Czechoslovak authorities had allowed the Nazi party to organise its members as if they were in Germany, to exclude the Czech authorities from investigating the Nazi party’s activities or membership or even to bring them before a Czechoslovak court. Although the long statement refers specifically to Reich and not Sudeten Germans, in practice it would have been extremely difficult for the Czechoslovak authorities to distinguish between them or exclude Sudeten Germans from Nazi meetings or rallies. Everyone had to carry an identity card, which could be checked, but the possibility of checking hundreds if not thousands of cards of people wanting to attend a rally, when national feelings were running high, is not something that Czech police would have wanted to contemplate. Nor could the Czechoslovak Government easily go back on its promise to recognise the organisation. This was bad news for the Czechoslovak Government. Events in Russia added to its problems. This crisis coincided with Stalin’s purge of General Tukhachevsky and other generals on a charge of spying. This weakened the army and made it unlikely that Russia would be able to give effective military help to Czechoslovakia. The Austrian crisis also encouraged Hungary to try and start joint military planning with Germany for an attack on Czechoslovakia. Hungarians wanted to regain territory lost at the Treaty of Trianon. Ribbentrop (Foreign Minister) warned Keitel (Commander-in-chief of the armed forces) of this approach, suggested that it should not be encouraged in case news of it reached other countries and asked for confirmation that no commitments had been made. Ribbentrop was encouraged to tell the Hungarians that ‘an Anschluss represented the most reasonable solution of the Austrian question’. For Schuschnigg, the attempt to forestall Hitler by holding a plebiscite on independence in Austria was thus a desperate move. Austria had been saved by Italy in 1934 after the murder of Dollfuss,

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when the Nazis had attempted a coup d’e´tat. But the creation of the Rome– Berlin Axis in 1936 ended hopes of continued Italian support for Austria. Nor was there any likelihood of help from France, which was facing political instability. The only other country that could help Austria was Czechoslovakia, but she could not afford to alienate Germany. When Hitler sent his ultimatum on 11 March demanding that Schuschnigg should resign, he did so and was replaced by the Nazi Seyss Inquart. On the 12th Seyss Inquart invited German troops into Austria and the next day announced the union of the two countries. A month later, on 10 April, a Nazi-controlled plebiscite recorded a vote of 99.75 per cent in favour of the Anschluss. As these events were taking place, Eisenlohr took steps to prevent trouble in Czechoslovakia. On 11 March, the same day that Hitler sent his ultimatum, Eisenlohr had a meeting with Frank, Henlein’s deputy.28 Eisenlohr confirmed that elections would soon be held, that the party would enter the Czechoslovak Government, that there would be an amnesty and that there would be regular contacts between the Prime Minister and the SdP. Eisenlohr knew that Frank was taking an intransigent attitude towards the Czechoslovak Government. He was making impossible demands that would hinder peaceful relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia and make war more likely. This was not the policy of the Foreign Ministry. On the other hand, it was precisely what Hitler was wanting. Frank, no doubt uncertain about what he should do, assured me [Eisenlohr] that he would adapt himself entirely to lines of Reich policy. As I have evidence however, that he was not sincere, and as he, moreover, expressed the intention after leaving the Legation of “checking” my communication by making enquiries in Berlin, I therefore request that neither he nor Henlein should be received at the Foreign Ministry or any other Ministry, but be referred to the [Volksdeutsche ] Mittelstelle,29 and that, if necessary, they be given full instructions regarding policy. In this way Eisenlohr, unaware of Hitler’s plans, tried to control events in Czechoslovakia. The next step was to stop the Czechoslovak Government taking any steps to interfere with Hitler’s plans for Austria. The first was to spread rumours in Berlin of military activity in Munich to pose a potential threat

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to the western Czechoslovak defences, though the Czech Government made it clear that it had no intention of interfering with German policy.30 At the same time the German Government claimed that the entry of German troops into Austria and the union of the two countries was no more than a ‘family matter’ and that Germany wanted to continue friendly relations with Czechoslovakia.31 This was emphasised by Go¨ring to the Czech ambassador Mastny´ at a reception on 11 March; ‘I have already given you my word; I repeat it [in the presence of the Hungarian Minister] and give you in addition the word of the Supreme Head of the State.’32 German troops had been ordered to keep at least 15 km away from the frontier. But it is also clear that the Czechoslovak Government wanted to maintain Czech morale and confidence in its military forces. On 13 March Czech military celebrations, including an air display, were held in Olomouc to commemorate the Legionaries’ skirmish at Bachmacˇ. Frontier defences had also been strengthened. All this was necessary since it soon became clear that Germany would not make any concessions. The German Foreign Ministry refused a Czech request for a non-aggression treaty, saying that none was needed in view of the earlier Czechoslovak–German Arbitration Agreement. Hitler referred in a speech to the need to ‘show more consideration for the 312 million Germans in Czechoslovakia’.33 In the days following the Anschluss, as it became clear that no action would be taken by Czechoslovakia or any other Western state, Eisenlohr redoubled his efforts to control Henlein and the SdP. His report of 16 March shows the position as far as he and the German Foreign Ministry were concerned. Rejection of Frank’s policy [Frank had earlier wanted SdP policy to be aggressive] has had salutary effect. Have had exhaustive discussions separately with Henlein, who has recently been avoiding me, and with Frank, and have received following assurances: 1. Course of German foreign policy as communicated by Legation is to be sole determining factor for policy and tactical procedure of Sudeten German Party. My instructions are to be strictly observed. 2. Public speeches and press will be passed in agreement with me. Editorial staff of Die Zeit [the main SdP newspaper] to be improved.

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3. Party leadership is abandoning former intransigent course, which might eventually lead to political complications, and will adopt policy of gradual furthering of Sudeten German interests. Aims are to be determined always jointly with me and supported by parallel diplomatic action. Racial Protection Law [proposed by the SdP in April 1937, which would have created a register of members of each nationality and would have led to separate national legal groups] and ‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be in the forefront. 4. If consultation with Berlin offices is necessary or desirable before any of Henlein’s important propaganda declarations, this would be proposed and arranged through Legation. 5. All communications from Sudeten Germans to German offices are to pass through hands of Legation. 6. Henlein will have weekly contact with me and, if requested, come to Prague at any time. Hope henceforth to keep Sudeten German Party under close control, which is more than ever necessary for coming developments in foreign policy. Please inform Ministries concerned and Mittelstelle, and request support for this unified steering of Sudeten German Party.34 If Eisenlohr’s plans had been observed, there would never have been any justification for Hitler to attack Czechoslovakia. The Sudeten Germans would have made steady progress towards achieving their aim of equality within the state and influencing Czechoslovak policy. Whether Eisenlohr hoped for Sudeten German– Czech equality or restoration of German political control (as before 1918) cannot now be known. What is clear is that war and the destruction of Czechoslovakia were not his ultimate object. Other countries shared a similar view. Chamberlain calmed British fears with his statement on 14 March in the House of Commons. He reported Go¨ring’s assurances to Mastny´ and also Neurath’s statement that the German–Czechoslovak Arbitration Agreement was still recognised. Halifax, Foreign Secretary since Eden’s resignation in February and pro-German, stated that the Austrian Question would not be brought before the League of Nations.35 He considered that Austria could not have remained independent indefinitely. France and Russia made it clear that they stood by their treaty obligations

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to help Czechoslovakia, though in the treaty of 1935 Russia would only come to the assistance of the Czechs if France had already done so.36 Meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia continued. It was important that the German troops should practise carrying out the initial stages of the invasion to ensure that they were practical. This explains the report of troop movements in Saxony and Bavaria in mid-March. They could not be hidden but could be explained as the normal deployment of troops. The Czech Military Attache´ in Berlin, Lt. Col. Benesˇ, was ordered to make enquiries, since the information he received did not match the official German Government statements. Eisenlohr’s report shows that the German Military Attache´, like the German legation staff, was being deliberately misinformed by his own government. On being asked what he knew of military preparations in Saxony and Bavaria, Lieutenant Colonel Toussaint [the German Military Attache´] replied that so far he had heard nothing about this. If, however, they had actually been made, of which as he said he was ignorant, they would certainly not be directed in any way against Czechoslovakia. In his opinion, the Government of Czechoslovakia had no cause whatever for uneasiness . . . I instructed Counsellor of Legation Hencke to telephone to the Foreign Ministry and request confirmation . . . The [Foreign] Minister, Prince Bismarck . . . made enquiries from the responsible authorities . . . [He then] stated that the German Government stood fast on the declarations which had been given to Minister Mastny´ and added that no special military measures had been taken on the Czechoslovak frontier. Eisenlohr repeated this to Krofta, the Czech Foreign Minister. Events were now moving very quickly. A telegram sent by the German Foreign Minister to Eisenlohr on 18 March reveals the rift between German official policy and Hitler’s war aims. On 11 March Eisenlohr had reported to Berlin that he had privately informed Frank that he had been assured by the Czech prime minister that the SdP would be invited to join the government and that elections would be held. Eisenlohr gave the impression that this was a friendly conversation. The telegram of 18 March from Mackensen (German State Secretary) to Eisenlohr marked ‘Strictly Secret’, paints a different picture:

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For Head of Mission personally. . . . Frank has given the following information on your interview with him to the War Ministry official in question: As representative of the Third Reich, you had to demand from the Sudeten German Party a complete reorientation of their policy. The Party must abandon its opposition and adopt a friendly attitude to State and Government. Previous conditions for joining the Government (equality of rights and compensation) must be abandoned. The Party must assume an Activist policy and attain its ends step by step. Frank declared that you personally presented these demands as an ultimatum, with the addition that, if the Sudeten German Party did not accept them, they would be disavowed by both you and the Reich. Since acceptance of this programme would mean a total reversal of policy for the Sudeten German Party, it must on account of different currents of thought in Berlin [there follows a gap in the document] dispel. . .get the consent of responsible Reich-German authorities that this policy was really desired by the ReichGermans. Frank’s letter to me of March 14th develops the same line of thought, though by no means in so weighty a manner. I replied to Frank that naturally the German Minister merely repeated the policy of responsible Government circles. Kindly report immediately what you actually did say to Frank. Frank apparently intends to visit you again together with Henlein in the course of the next few days. What is striking about this is the sense of urgency. Eisenlohr had clearly meant to represent official Foreign Ministry policy to Frank and had no doubt taken a strong line with him because he knew that Frank, a committed Nazi, would ignore him otherwise. But Frank’s concern that he was breaking with official Nazi policy – he had been told to cause trouble – had led him to appeal to the War Ministry and not the Foreign Ministry. It suggests that he – and presumably Henlein – had been taken into Hitler’s confidence about plans to attack Czechoslovakia (the gist of the November 1937 meeting reported by Hossbach). Frank need not have been told any details of Hitler’s order No. 23 to prepare war plans but may have realised from reports of troop movements in Saxony and Bavaria that something along these lines was indeed being planned.

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His concern that Eisenlohr was ordering him to follow a policy of cooperation cut across what he knew or believed Hitler’s policy to be. He therefore had to take his complaint not to the Foreign Ministry but to the military authorities and only later wrote to the Foreign Ministry when he did not get a satisfactory answer to his first letter. Because of the flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding the Anschluss earlier, Mackensen was not able to take action on Frank’s letter of 14 March for several days. Finally, on 18 March, at 1.30 a.m., his telegram was sent to Eisenlohr. Eisenlohr replied promptly, stressing that he had always followed Foreign Ministry policy and emphasising that both Henlein and Frank had agreed unreservedly with what he had said. He continued ‘I have in no wise demanded that Sudeten German Party should abandon its role of opposition or become Activist or friendly to the State or Government.’ Eisenlohr had however stressed that the SdP should say it had no confidence in Czechoslovak Government promises, but it should not attack the alliances with France and Russia. Eisenlohr also stressed the importance of the Czech promises of reform, which would effectively put the Sudeten areas under Sudeten control. Hoping that he had effectively dealt with Frank’s criticism, he ended with the comment ‘It remains to be seen whether he [Frank] will now keep his promises’, in other words, whether he would take his instructions from Eisenlohr as he had agreed. A week later it seemed that events were unfolding in the way he had foreseen. Two of the activist parties, the German Agrarian (Landbund) and the German Christian Socialist Party, joined the SdP and the Prime Minister, Hodzˇa, put pressure on the Social Democrat Party to replace the Jewish Health Minister, Czech.37 Hodzˇa also promised to include the SdP in the government after the next elections. He would also arrange to hold elections for communal assemblies after National Independence Day (28 October), so that the SdP could have seats there too. As to possible opposition from Czech parties to the inclusion of the SdP in government, Hodzˇa thought that he would be able to overcome their opposition since the SdP and Social Democrats could follow a similar social policy. Much of the rest of the long conversation was a Czech confirmation of earlier promises concerning the amnesty and removal of laws about Czech officials in frontier areas. But when Eisenlohr repeated his request that Sudeten Germans should have greater freedom regarding their

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support for Nazi ideology and practice, Hodzˇa made it clear that the Czechs would not allow total freedom: he would not have anyone punished for raising his right arm in the German salute, and he also had no objection to the long white stockings which the Sudeten Germans liked to wear as emblems. But when Czechs talked of democracy they meant it seriously, and the mistrust felt for the Sudeten German Party had its origins in this fundamental democratic ideology. The [Czech] demand must be made that the Sudeten German Party should reconcile itself with the methods and responsibility of democracy. He would not object to Sudeten Germans expressing an ideology, providing they stayed within the constitution. Put another way, if he gave the Sudeten Germans the freedom to express an opinion, Germany must not interfere.

Sudeten Germans and the Anschluss It has been said that revolutionary activity is always most likely to break out when conditions begin to improve. There seems to be an inner force that tries to propel reform more quickly than the authorities wish and it is when they try to reassert their control that violence breaks out. So it was in this case. At the end of March the Czechoslovak Government had reached a general agreement with Eisenlohr about progress towards real reform. Foreign countries had been reassured about Germany’s aims regarding Czechoslovakia. But members of the SdP, sensing victory, decided to press for action. The events are described graphically by Eisenlohr in a telegram of 31 March. Following the merger of the German Activist parties with the SdP about 36 meetings of Henlein’s movement with some 500,000 members took place in Sudeten German area on Sunday, March 27. Demonstrations naturally overshadowed by happenings in Austria and were characterized by very violent outbreaks of enthusiasm on part of Sudeten German people, who expect complete reshaping of their destiny. In this connection, understand from reliable

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agent that, for instance, [Nazi] Party flags were hoisted on town hall at Asch, accompanied by pealing of all church bells, during armed demonstration. Out of 34,000 inhabitants of Eger, 25,000 Germans deployed likewise to accompaniment of church bells. Henlein movement war standard was hoisted on town hall. Out of 18,000 inhabitants of Saaz, 15,000 Germans marched shouting ‘One people, one Reich, one Fu¨hrer!’ [the Nazi slogan ‘Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fu¨hrer’] In Go¨rkau, where Government representatives had forbidden German salute, speaker commenced his address with words ‘On behalf of you all I salute our Fu¨hrer and the entire German people with upraised hands.’ In locality where formerly Activist or non-party burgomaster went over to Sudeten German Party, this even was symbolised by hoisting German Sudeten Party flag on town hall to accompaniment of peals of church bells. On orders from above Czechoslovak police and gendarmerie showed great restraint. At various places Government representatives were obliged to render military salute to Sudeten German Party flag. Population feel behaviour of police to be helplessness and abdication of civil authority. They reckon on complete volte-face after April 10 [probably a reference to the plebiscite on union of Austria with Germany] and possibly even direct Reich intervention. . . . Party leaders of Sudeten German Party have recognised present enthusiastic mood as dangerous. The SdP leaders tried to calm this enthusiasm by enlarging their party organisation, seeing this as a way of enforcing control through party discipline. This was necessary because there were also rumours that members of German athletic clubs in the frontier areas were being armed and that the former Ordnerdienst, a semi-military organisation that had protected party meetings earlier, was being recreated. Hodzˇa was sufficiently worried to indicate that he wanted to settle all outstanding differences, which in effect would have conceded all the SdP demands. The only promising news for the Czechs was that the ambassador in London, Jan Masaryk, had returned to Prague with encouraging news for the General Staff about a British guarantee of support. The general opinion was that war was likely. The Czech Chief of General Staff, Krejcˇi, had said to the departing Austrian Military Attache´, Longin ‘We shall probably come to blows.’38

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The same day that demonstrations were being reported, the German Charge´ d’Affaires in Czechoslovakia, Henke, reported other disturbing news. 39 Nazi party, SA and SS authorities in Austria were circulating rumours along the frontier that German troops would invade Bohemia and Moravia after the 10 April Austrian plebiscite. Sudeten Germans were being asked to form fighting units as soon as possible. Henlein considered these rumours extremely dangerous and asked that they be stopped. He also showed the strength of popular feeling in his report that in Krumau (Czech: Krumlov in Bohemia) large numbers of uniforms were being made in preparation for the entry of German troops. Women’s organisations were making a great many swastika flags and many more were being imported illegally. Henlein was worried because he felt that events were slipping out of his control. His moderate policy was being criticised by students in Prague because they thought it was delaying the entry of German troops. The Czechs responded by arming frontier inhabitants, Sokol clubs and the Red Guard in the Sudeten frontier area. Czech frontier police were reinforced and heavily armed and motorised groups were formed. The immediate result was considerable diplomatic activity, in the course of which France restated support for Czechoslovakia. But as the date of the Austrian plebiscite approached, Henlein’s problems increased. Frank reported on 9 April that the situation in northern Bohemia was ‘catastrophic and shattering’.40 The problem was the negotiations between Henlein and the Czech Government. Sudeten Germans thought that by holding discussions with the Czehcoslovak Government, Henlein was betraying the original demand for autonomy. It was also beginning to be realised that autonomy within Czechoslovakia would only make the economic situation worse. It would not protect them from the threatened economic crisis, it might create additional customs barriers and this would radicalise the population. Henlein’s agent, Dr Eckert, thought that a ‘single shot for Sudeten Germans would suffice to start blood bath among Czechs’. Illegal frontier activity was continuing on the western and southern Bohemian (Austrian) frontiers and 200 Sudeten Germans had fled to Austria when called up for military service in Czechoslovakia. Austrian authorities had asked the SdP to try and stop any more doing this. Hitler’s earlier speech criticising the separation of 10 million Germans from their rightful homeland was taken to mean that decisive action would take place after 10 April. It was therefore fortunate that there

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was a ban on public meetings. Henlein felt that only a broadcast by Hitler would calm the situation. It must have seemed to Hitler that his plans for eastward expansion, outlined in November 1937 and recorded by Hossbach, were working well. Austria had been seized without any foreign intervention and the Sudeten German population had reached the point where they expected German troops to enter Bohemia and Moravia. The fear of Henlein and Frank that they were losing control of the Sudeten German population could be ignored. These men had served their purpose by pressing for autonomy for the Sudeten areas and had raised Sudeten German expectation. So far Britain and France had also shown that they would not oppose German plans. This was partly because of pro-German feelings among influential British politicians and partly because of French internal political and economic weakness. Nor was it likely that the two would unite against Germany. But a report of 14 April showed that a further German advance might be more difficult than expected. Henlein could not make progress unless he held discussions with the Czechoslovak Government. He had managed to persuade Hodzˇa to move elections forward to June, but his discussions with Czechs was weakening his political support among SdP members. Support for the Sudeten German case was also declining abroad. Henlein’s failure to make specific demands was leading the British diplomatic representative in Prague, Basil Newton, to question whether he really did want to solve the Sudeten problem.41 On the other hand, Newton believed that tension was rising in the Sudeten area and that this was at a more dangerous level than among the leadership.42 He probably thought he understood the Germans; he had served as charge´ d’affaires in Berlin from 1930 to 1936 before being sent to Prague in 1937 as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.43 But the German army recognised that if Hitler tried to solve the problem by force – i.e. invade Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Sudeten Germans – France and probably Britain, would come to her aid. This forced Hitler and the army high command to reconsider plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, now known as Operation Green (Fall Gru¨n). In a record of discussions between Hitler and Keitel on 21 April it was agreed that the idea of a sudden attack had to be abandoned because of world opinion. Instead, there should be diplomatic discussions, leading gradually to a crisis and war. Alternatively, the

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murder of a German minister in the course of an anti-German demonstration could justifiably lead to lightning action. Czechoslovakia would be invaded in a number of places simultaneously, following the earlier meticulous planning, and be supported by the German air force. Victory must be won in four days and Germany’s allies, Hungary and Poland, invited to take their share of territory. Any delay beyond four days would lead to a European crisis and foreign intervention. It is now clear that this was based on a false estimate of the strength of the Czechoslovak army, which was stronger than the Germans believed.44 Henlein’s eight demands, known as the Karlsbad Programme and made on 24 April, were intended to begin this diplomatic crisis. Like the demands made to the Serbian Government in 1914, they were intended to be so humiliating that the Government receiving them would be unable to accept. They stopped short of demanding total autonomy or union with Germany immediately, but if accepted they would have led to this at some point. Henlein kept Sudeten German support. Czechs realised that if accepted, the demands would breach the constitution and undermine Czechoslovak democracy. But since the demands were made in a moderate tone, Czechs believed that they were to form the basis for negotiations.45 However, on the German side the demands were meant to be seen as final. Hitler expected that this would provoke a diplomatic crisis and lead to war. The German Foreign Ministry, finally informed of the invasion plans, sent a secret circular to all head of missions the next day. This stated that preparations for mobilisation had already begun and warned the missions that war could break out. On 28 April the army high command began to monitor the situation in Czechoslovakia on a daily basis.46 Meanwhile the Czechoslovak Government continued military preparations. They had hoped for Russian military support. One aspect was Russian cooperation in strengthening the Czechoslovak air force. Czechoslovakia had signed an agreement with Russia to build a Russian bomber, the S.B.1, under licence as the B-71 This was a modern, light bomber with a maximum speed of 430 kph (268 mph) and a range of 1000 km (625 miles). The first 20 aircraft had been flown to Czechoslovakia and later another 16 were ordered and sent.47 But this proved to be the limit of Russian military help. Romania and Poland both refused to allow Russian troops to cross their territory. At the end of the first week in May, Eisenlohr reported on frontier incidents involving Czech soldiers.48 According to articles in Die Zeit,

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these men, with the connivance of their officers, had been causing disturbances in a number of places including Troppau, Ma¨hrischScho¨nberg, Tachau, Falkenau and Trautenau. Eisenlohr assumed that the Czechs were beginning to recover their confidence and were asserting their authority. The German Government was taking no action on behalf of the Sudeten population and this was seen by the latter as a sign of weakness. The SdP had vigorously complained to the Government to restrain the Czech soldiers. But these reports need to be examined closely. It was Hitler’s policy by now to encourage Sudeten Germans to create disturbances that could lead to international intervention and a conference, rather than a German invasion as originally planned. These reports of disturbances were precisely what Hitler wanted to hear. But Hitler took no direct action, leaving tension to build up in England and France. Germany’s calm acceptance may also mean that the alleged disturbances were completely fictitious. In other words, the German Government had not been alerted and did not know what it was supposed to complain about. It is also doubtful that Czech soldiers were confident enough to cause disturbances. Any Czechs living in the frontier towns listed in Die Zeit knew that they were in a small minority and the outbreak of popular feeling after the Anschluss will have made them very wary about provoking the local Sudeten German population. In short, the newspaper reports are much more likely to be either fictitious or exaggerated. They continued to cause alarm abroad, however, and on 10 May Kirkpatrick, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Berlin, suggested to Bismarck, an official at the German Foreign Ministry, that the British and German Governments should settle the matter between themselves.49 He did not think that it was necessary to involve any other countries – he was afraid that France would intervene in any war between Germany and Czechoslovakia and Britain would be drawn in. He suggested that the German Government should tell the British what concessions would solve the Sudeten problem and Britain would put pressure on Czechoslovakia to accept them. To encourage the German Government to accept this proposal, Kirkpatrick said that if the Sudeten problem was solved, Britain and Germany could sign an agreement on the size of the German air force. On 12 May Henlein was in Berlin to be briefed for another visit to London to see Vansittart.50 Hitler’s plan was to raise the diplomatic tension still further. Henlein was told that he must present the Karlsbad

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demands as the terms for ending the Sudeten crisis and any Czech opposition would result in a demand for self-determination.51 According to Henlein, it was the Czechs who were provoking the crisis and not the Sudeten Germans. Although claiming that Czechoslovakia was disintegrating, he had to discourage Britain from trying to restore political stability. Henlein was also told to try and find out what Benesˇ had told the British Government. He was also instructed to deny that he was acting on instructions from Berlin and to say that no one in Germany had known the terms of the demands before he made his speech. Like Henlein’s other statements, this too was a lie and there was a danger that he might be found out. On the day that Henlein was in Berlin, Eisenlohr wrote to the Foreign Ministry to warn them that the Czechs could learn of the weekly consignments of money and documents that were being sent to the SdP via the legation. The next day Eisenlohr reported that the majority of the Sudeten population was expecting an Anschluss with Germany. But he also believed that the Czechs had regained their courage and that both sides were prepared to fight. Frank and other SdP officials claimed that they could no longer control the situation by enforcing party discipline. Negotiation was the only way to solve the problem, but the danger, as both he and the Czechs were aware, was that the SdP might use this to raise their demands. This could only end in Henlein appealing to Germany for help. Since most Czechs believed that the SdP were directed by Germany, and that the Karlsbad demands had also been drawn up by Germany, the prospect for peace was not good. All that Czechs could hope for was a temporary lessening of tension, which could allow normal negotiations to continue. But Eisenlohr was no longer dictating SdP policy. Instructions were coming from Berlin. Even Stranik, representing the Berliner Tageblatt in Prague, found that he was out of step with the current political reality, as he found when meeting Wannemacher, editor in chief of Die Zeit, on 18 May.52 Stranik was told that the line to be followed by journalists was to be completely negative: there would be no negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government. The time for autonomy had passed and, even if offered, it would be rejected. Instead the SdP would demand a plebiscite and would ‘strive for it with all their might.’ When Stranik objected and said that he had been given the opposite instructions by his own newspaper,

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Wannemacher said that all authoritative Reich-German quarters (i.e. the Nazi party) approved of his attitude. Finally, Wannemacher told Stranik not to continue to learn Czech because a German invasion was expected in the near future. Eisenlohr was understandably confused to hear this: These directives given out only yesterday by Wannemacher in no way correspond with instructions transmitted to me today by Counsellor of Legation Hencke, regarding tactics to be adopted until further notice. Suggest informing Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle with a view to further directives. Kindly telegraph instructions. Two days later, on 20 May, the Czech ambassador in Berlin again complained of German troop movements, this time in Silesia and northern Austria, and said that he knew of orders to the SA and SS to hold themselves in readiness on 21 and 22 May. State Secretary Weizsa¨cker tried to play down the importance of this, but he also tried to discover if the information was accurate. The same day officials at the German Foreign Ministry dismissed these reports as ‘pure nonsense’ in discussions with the British ambassador, the German legation in Prague and the Czech ambassador. However, it is very likely that the information was correct. The Kriegstagebuch der Heeeresgruppe 3 for 21 May states that the attack on Czechoslovakia could take place at any time.53 Troops were ready to move and the SA and SS also had a part to play in the invasion. The reports had led the Czechoslovak Government to mobilise forces and it was only on 21 May that these were reduced – only one class of reservists, with specialists and technicians were called up – after Eisenlohr had denied that there were any German troop concentrations. At the same time, as a conciliatory gesture, Hodzˇa promised Frank that a plebiscite could be held. Hodzˇa was under considerable stress and was almost in despair. Two incidents show how serious relations between Czechs and Sudeten Germans had become. At Eger on the evening of 20 May two Sudeten Germans on motorcycles were challenged by a Czech policeman. When they refused to stop, they were shot and subsequently died. Two versions of the incident quickly emerged. The Sudeten German was that the men were merely farmers who did not stop because they had not been challenged correctly. The Czech version was that they were Sudeten German party officials. The incident raised tension and there was a tavern brawl, which was

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also exaggerated by the SdP. The other incident, at Komotau, was when a Sudeten German tax official used the Nazi greeting ‘Sieg Heil’, the significance of which was also exaggerated.54 The following day Ribbintrop told the British ambassador that ‘a large number of people had been injured, some of them seriously’ at Komotau and that the two Sudeten motorcyclists had been shot from an ambush. He considered that ‘a continuation of this persecution of the Sudeten Germans must inevitably give rise to a very serious situation’.55 It seemed to Eisenlohr that the Czechoslovak Government was losing control. To try and restore Czech public confidence, the frontiers were closed, troop movements were reported and the Sudeten German population was moved from the frontier zone. The British Embassy in Berlin sent two military attache´s, Colonel Mason-MacFarlane and Major Strong, to Silesia and Saxony to try and find out whether there was any truth in the story of German troop movements. Whether this was any more than a propaganda move is uncertain. Not only were they expected to cover a very large area. It was also difficult to get close to the frontier, which runs along the top of wooded hills. The British ambassador’s comment to Weizsa¨cker gave the latter ample warning of their visit.56 In any case, it was very brief. Colonel MacFarlane drove over 1,100 km along almost the whole German– Czechoslovak boundary and sent his assistant to other points on the frontier.57 On 23 May the British ambassador told Weizsa¨cker that the military aattache´s had not seen any German soldiers. By the time the British diplomats visited the area, any German soldiers were back in barracks. As the crisis developed, the Czechoslovak Government had to assess the value of the treaties it had with other countries. The main ally was France, but that country had shown in earlier international crises that it was not prepared to take action against an aggressor. At the time of the May crisis the French were more ambivalent, at times publicly stating support for Czechoslovakia and at others far more interested in reaching an understanding with Germany. Russia had given promises of support but Stalin’s purges has serious weakened the army and many felt it could no longer be relied on for military help. A further problem was the refusal of both Romania and Poland to allow Russian troops to cross their territory. Romania was an ally in the Little Entente, but differences with Poland over disputed territory had never been resolved. Poland stated on 24 May that she would be neutral in any conflict.58 Nor could

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Yugoslavia, the other ally in the Little Entente be relied on. This country had shown a much greater interest in coming to terms with Germany than giving support to Czechoslovakia. In any case, the purpose of the Little Entente was to act against Hungary, not Germany. The reason for Romanian and Yugoslav pro-German policy was in both cases economic. They had incurred large debts to France but could not repay them with agricultural products. Germany, on the other hand, needed to import food and used this to develop extensive trade with both countries. With this at stake, neither country could afford to antagonise Germany. At a meeting early in May, both promised to cooperate in appeasing Germany. They were prepared to send military help if Hungary attacked Czechoslovakia but not if there was a German– Czechoslovak war.59 This destroyed the value of the Little Entente as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned. As to Britain, which had no treaty with Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain’s fear of a catastrophic war played a major part in his policy, as it did for British public opinion. On the other hand, on 24 May America promised to support France and Britain if war broke out.60 Also important was the attitude of men like Halifax who was pro-German and others who had never accepted the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918. The appointment of pro-German officials such as Newton to the British legation in Prague also influenced the attitude of the British Foreign Office. All that was left for Czechoslovakia in the doom-laden days of the summer of 1938 was therefore a determination to defend her territory with whatever means were available. At the same time, Britain was continuing to put pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to make concessions. On 23 May the British ambassador suggested that a British observer should be sent to the Sudeten German area to help to solve the problem. The German Foreign Ministry’s view was that it had no objection but considered that direct pressure on the Czech Government was more important than arbitration. By the 28th the crisis had passed. Hodzˇa announced that the Czech troops would return to barracks and negotiations could continue with Henlein and the SdP. On the surface this appeared to offer renewed hope of a satisfactory solution. However, a conversation between Frank, HeydenRynsch and Weizsa¨cker at the German Foreign Office in Berlin reveals the real intentions of the SdP. On the subject of elections, which Hodzˇa had arranged to give the SdP seats in local councils, Frank said that the SdP would claim that the elections were worthless.61 They were to be held ‘at

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the bayonet’s point’. Frank claimed that the mobilisation had given the Czechoslovak army control of elections and this would rob elected Sudeten German officials of their rights. Frank also claimed that Czechoslovakia was ‘deploying her army against foreign countries and was entrenching herself on every frontier’. He said the Czech censorship law made it impossible to give details (presumably the claim was false anyway), but he had referred to this in discussions with Hodzˇa. Frank wanted to undermine the German diplomats’ confidence in the coming elections and their faith in the effectiveness of the Czech defensive measures (the Czech Maginot Line). Henlein also claimed that the Czechs were taking provocative measures because they had been promised French and Russian support, but that the patience of the SdP negotiators would not last long. The Czech Government was countering this by trying to weaken Sudeten support for Henlein. Frank quoted Czech propaganda, which claimed that Germany would not support Henlein; the crisis was ‘an impotence test of the German Reich’ (Germany had taken no action), ‘Hitler and Henlein have left you in the lurch’ and ‘the Czech government is all powerful’. To counter this, Henlein suggested that Vienna should make daily news broadcasts in Czech. When the Germans suggested using economic sanctions against the Czechs, Frank became evasive and advised against it. He realised that the effect would be felt by Sudeten Germans who would blame him and Henlein for the resulting economic misery. Independently of this, Hitler issued a secret directive to the army on 28 May: ‘It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.’62 An article appeared in the Vo¨lkische Beobachter claiming a Czech provocation, which would have justified German action.63 But Hitler still did not move. He stressed that he would look for a political excuse to justify the surprise attack and that the invasion, backed by propaganda, would be rapid to forestall any intervention by other countries. He also hoped that Poland and Hungary would demand territory and the Slovaks independence, making it more difficult for the Czechs to resist.64 During the Rhineland crisis, Germany had believed that the Czechoslovak army would only be able to delay the Wehrmacht for a week at best, and opinion had not changed significantly.65 The Czechoslovak army would be immobilised by attacks on its communication system and brought to battle to prevent it being withdrawn into Slovakia. But industry must not be attacked unless absolutely necessary. The following day the orders were issued for

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air attacks against France (Operation Red) to coincide with Operation Green.66 By the beginning of June it appeared unlikely that Hitler would get any justification for this attack. On 1 June Eisenlohr reported that he had learnt that the British had suggested that if negotiations between the Czech Government and Henlein broke down, they could be referred to a neutral commission. Hodzˇa had agreed.67 But it was not clear whether leading British politicians believed that Sudeten autonomy was practical and appropriate. In a conversation with the Foreign Office, Butler admitted that although he supported the idea publicly, privately he did not.68 What mattered to many British politicians and public figures was not the future of Czechoslovakia but the rule of law. Nothing sums this up better than a letter in the Eden Papers from Hilton to a German professor and the latter’s reply. [Hilton to Haushofer, 9 June 1938] There have been alarming times in the past four weeks and I fear they may come again. I can only hope that cool heads will be able to counsel the German government and prevent another sudden coup which will probably mean war. I feel certain, and have good reason to believe, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would mean war with us. Few people here have much love for the Czechs or sympathise with their attitude to the Sudetendeutsche if they would not fight for the Czechs – but they would fight for the rule of law in Europe. Much as I sympathise with much of Hitler’s doctrine, his actions have given me an appalling unrest and sense of insecurity and lack of trust in his word. Nobody believes what he said about the Brenner, not even the Italians and the Tyrolese are not the least worried by it (personally over the South Tyrol and Memel I should back Hitler up to the hilt if he took steps – especially the former which was the greatest injustice in all the peace treaties in the way of territorial adjustment.) [Haushofer’s reply, 10 June 1938] I daresay many people are rather gloomy about the future if Central-European questions are allowed to drift in the same direction as they have been drifting these last weeks. For German eyes there might be something to be amused [about] in the sight of the Czechs pulling the legs of British statesmen with considerable success – if it were not for the question of 312 million Germans and beyond that a question of life and death for perhaps another 10 or 20 million of young men all over Europe.69

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This exchange between a pro-German writer and his German friend explains Chamberlain’s dilemma. He was ready to expect the worse in this crisis: that war would break out which would again kill huge numbers of young men. Against this he felt, like many other British, that Czechoslovakia was an artificial state in which Czechs had been mistreating their fellow German citizens. The problem could only be solved by giving the Sudeten Germans autonomy. The tension generated by these events had a further result. Fear of war was driving visitors away from the famous spas of Marianbad and Karlsbad, which were in the war zone.70 Eisenlohr reported on 9 June that their position, which had been precarious before the start of the crisis, was now desperate and could lead to complete ruin. He singled out the violent language in the German press and radio stations as being responsible for making tourists from Germany and elsewhere cancel their visits. Eisenlohr’s view was that these press reports and broadcasts had been useful during the crisis in countering Czech mobilisation but were now seen as signs of Germany’s aggressive intentions. Most international opinion was now supporting the Czechs, though the London Observer had an article on 16 June reporting a British view that the Czechs would be responsible for their own fate.71 In the light of this Hitler issued another directive on 18 June. This no longer referred to war as inevitable in the immediate future. Instead, he said the Czech problem would be solved after 1 October by exploiting political opportunities. Moreover, the war plans (Operations Green and Red) would only be put into practice if he could be sure that France and Britain would not intervene.72 These plans had not been changed. In fact, because they were so detailed and the different parts carefully coordinated, it would have been extremely difficult to change anything. There could be no invasion from Austria, because the Anschluss had taken place after Operation Green had been planned. The need for rapid results – within four days – also made it difficult to make any changes. In the meantime, negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the SdP continued, giving the German Foreign Ministry an excuse to tell the British ambassador whether the Sudeten German aims were or were not being satisfied and thus maintaining the diplomatic pressure. Germany also continued to spread false rumours. On 18 July the British ambassador told Weizsa¨cker that reports of Czech partial mobilisation were false and he hoped that correct information would be given to the German press.73 At

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the same time, British observers had been sent to the main Sˇkoda factory in Plzenˇ to report on Czech preparations for war.74 They found the factory extremely busy and working three shifts. They were producing arms for the Czechoslovak army, artillery for Yugoslavia, and a large casting for a Russian cruiser, as well as locomotives for India and South Africa. The British team were also told by Colonel Sokoup, a general staff officer, that many Sudeten Germans were hindering production in key industries, but the British delegation considered that Sˇkoda was not affected. Meanwhile, the German Foreign Ministry continued to put pressure on the British Government, claiming that the Czechs were not making any significant progress towards meeting the Karlsbad demands. On 19 July, the Foreign Ministry sent a telegram to the German ambassador in London claiming that the Czech Government was acting in a very half-hearted way towards meeting the specific SdP demands. The main German complaints were that the Czechs were still refusing to grant full equality to the Sudeten Germans. Proposed Czech legislation did not go far enough to meet the SdP demands and that, in short, the Czechoslovak Government is not willing to abandon previous intransigent attitude towards Germans. In fact, they refuse on practically all important points to grant full equality of status with the Czechs to the 3 1/2 million strong German national group which, together with the region populated by latter, was incorporated into Czechoslovakia against its will in 1919.75 This information was duly passed on by Dirksen, the German ambassador, to Cadogan, the British Under Secretary of State. Dirksen claimed that the negotiations in Prague were completely unsatisfactory because the Czechs had conceded virtually nothing. Compromise was therefore impossible. In short, the German description of events in Prague showed that Henlein and the other SdP representatives had carefully followed the intransigent policy agreed earlier. Above all, this was intended to put the Czechs in the wrong and give Germany an excuse to intervene directly in Czechoslovak affairs. To reinforce this view, Weizsa¨cker told the British ambassador on 20 July that the report by the British observer, saying that there were no Czech military preparations, was completely false and that the Czech army was virtually fully mobilised!

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The negative result of the tour [by British observers] is in marked contrast with information available here, which is based partly on reports from eye witnesses in the regions concerned, and partly on observations which anyone was in the position to make across the German frontier.76 However, it would be wrong to assume that Weizsa¨cker and others in the Foreign Ministry believed all they were told to say to foreign ambassadors. In a conversation with Ribbentrop, Weizsa¨cker made his own worries about the possible war with France and Britain very clear. Ribbentrop, as a senior Nazi official, wanted to ensure that the Foreign Ministry followed the official Nazi line and spoke with one voice about the Czechoslovak problem. He said that if necessary Germany must go to war with the Western powers and defeat France decisively in a battle in western Germany. He was confident of victory: We were provided with raw materials for a war of no matter what duration; Go¨ring was directing aircraft production in such a way that we were superior to all opponents. At this I remarked that it was necessary to speak to third parties in such a way as to obtain credence. And even if it was our business to fool foreign countries, it was nevertheless our duty not to dupe one another. I did not believe we should win this war . . . It was utopian to wish to bring about this state of affairs with aircraft; I did not therefore understand how this war was to be won; and I was just as incredulous about our powers of endurance. Weizsa¨cker’s view was that it would be better to use economic pressure against Czechoslovakia. This view was reinforced by his report of 22 July that the Gauleiter of Danzig, Forster, had returned from London convinced that Britain would declare war on Germany if the latter attacked Czechoslovakia.77 The steady diplomatic pressure on Britain and Hitler’s threats of war brought concrete results for Germany. On 22 July Chamberlain told the German ambassador of his fear of a deadlock in the negotiations between the SdP and the Czechoslovak Government. If that happened, he hoped that the German Government would be patient. Chamberlain

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mentioned the possibility of a temporary agreement and inferred that he would be prepared to put pressure on the Czech Government to accept this. Dirksen replied that the German Government considered the reforms proposed were completely unacceptable and he had the impression that the British Government shared this view. He also suggested that a Sudeten German agent should be sent to London to present his case to the British Government. But before that could be done, Chamberlain had decided that Lord Runciman should go to Prague as an unofficial mediator. His task would be to examine the problem, the reasons for the differences and suggest a solution.78 The Runciman Mission was a desperate attempt to solve a problem that Chamberlain thought threatened to cause a catastrophic war. Chamberlain’s unfortunate comment later about ‘a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing’ reveals his lack of knowledge of Czechoslovakia, its history and the reasons for the crisis. In one sense, Britain only had herself to blame. Since 1930 the main British diplomatic representatives in Prague had been pro-German rather than pro-Czech or neutral. This coloured the reports they sent back to the Foreign Office in London. None of these representatives had the experience of, for example, Dr Koch, the German minister in Prague in the 1920s and early 1930s, who was there for over ten years. It is also unlikely that the British diplomats could speak Czech, so they were only able to judge the mood of the people at second hand, from Englishspeaking Czechs or through German-language newspapers. For many British diplomats, the Germans were closer culturally and British diplomats in Prague probably had to rely on their knowledge of German to do their work. When it came to the Sudeten crisis, they were more likely to take the German than the Czech view, as the Runciman visit showed. This mission was therefore at a disadvantage from the beginning. What made matters worse was that Lord Runciman was temperamentally unsuited to the job. As a former shipping magnate his experience was in dealing with industrial disputes and trade unions. This was not a good preparation for dealing with complicated cultural matters with a long history. In discussions between SdP representatives and members of the mission, the British found the SdP arguments very difficult to understand. The concepts of Rechtsperso¨nlichkeit (legal personality) and Siedlungsgebiet (national territory), central to the SdP case, the British found almost

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impossible to understand.79 Equally important was the SdP tactic of overwhelming the British group with information and their criticisms of the Czechoslovak Government attitude. But they did this with considerable skill, appearing as moderate and as fair minded as Henlein had appeared to Vansittart and others earlier. While negotiations continued between the SdP and the Czech Government, Runciman had meetings with Benesˇ and Hodzˇa. By comparison with the lengthy meetings with the SdP, those with the Czech leaders were relatively short and confined to administrative matters. The effect was to make the mission appear to be favouring the Sudeten Germans. Slovak parties also approached Runciman, hoping to make progress in their dispute between Slovak political parties and the Hungarian Government. But as Runciman and his staff listened to all interested parties and read the submissions of each, they rapidly realised that there was little chance of finding a solution. Indeed, on 8 August, one week after the mission’s arrival in Prague Ashton-Gwatkin, Runciman’s deputy, noted in his diary that Runciman was ‘beginning to disengage himself’.80 He continued to accept hospitality from SdP supporters however. He spent five out of six week ends at estates belonging to German aristocrats in Bohemia who were supporters of the SdP and comparatively little time with Czechs. Runciman had no idea that this behaviour was politically insensitive. While this was happening, German military preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were continuing. Early in August the German air attache´ in Czechoslovakia reconnoitred the Freudenthal area south of Upper Silesia for possible landing grounds for paratroops.81 On 25 August the attack was again delayed, although it was felt that France would only support Czechoslovakia if she could be sure of British help. By then it had become clear that Hungary would not join the attack unless Yugoslavia remained neutral. Horthy had told Hitler on a visit on 21 – 26 August that Hungary had only just begun to rearm and needed one or two years to reach full strength. After Ribbentrop had assured Horthy that Czechoslovakia’s allies (France, Britain, Yugoslavia and Romania) would not support her, Horthy agreed to take part but would not be ready before 1 October. In the event, none of this really mattered. By the time Runciman returned to England, Chamberlain was preparing to make his first visit to Germany. The result of his attempts to solve the Sudeten problem

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and find ‘peace with honour’ resulted in the Munich Conference and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Czech military response The German occupation of the Rhineland had a major impact on Czechoslovakia’s security. The lack of effective response by Britain and France had underlined the unwillingness of these countries to go to war. As a result, the Czechoslovak Government realised that it had to improve its own defences. The first steps had been taken when Hitler announced German rearmament, but from 1936 there was a new sense of urgency. Sˇkoda, as the main artillery and small arms producer and an important manufacturer of military vehicles, played a leading role in this rearmament. In fact, the demand was so great that the company had difficulty coping with all the enquiries. Some of the orders received in 1936 had to be delayed until 1937 and, in that year, the volume of new orders grew by another 39 per cent.82 Apart from a range of military vehicles based on civilian cars and lorries, Sˇkoda’s main contribution to Czechoslovak rearmament was the LT35 medium tank. It was armed with two heavy machine guns and a 37.2 mm Sˇkoda gun.83 It had a road speed of 40 km/h (25 mph) and a range of 193 km (120 miles). The hull and turret were of riveted and bolted armour plate with a maximum thickness of 35 mm at the front. Production began in 1936. It was technically advanced, having a 12-speed gearbox combined with a pneumatically operated transmission, which made it easy to drive. The suspension was exceptionally hard wearing. However, it proved unreliable, probably because of its technically complex design. 160 were built for the Czechoslovak army. Sˇkoda also designed two other tanks, the S-11b, which was tested in 1938, and the S-11r/T-21. Neither went into production, though the latter was later built under licence in Hungary as the Turan.84 The other major engineering company, CˇKD, built a similar tank, the LT-35.85 Sˇkoda and CˇKD, though rivals, exchanged designs and shared production orders.86 The LT-35 was also armed with a Sˇkoda 37.2 mm gun and 2 heavy machine guns. It had a road speed of 42 km/h (26 mph) and a range of 201 km (125 miles). It was originally designed for the export market in the early 1930s, and was sold to Afghanistan, Latvia, Peru, Sweden (where it was also built under licence), Switzerland and

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Yugoslavia. It was ordered by the army in 1937 and was the outright winner in the military trials of the following year. This resulted in an order for 150 tanks, to be made immediately. But because of the Munich Conference, the first tanks were not delivered until 1939. The British army showed an interest in this tank and tested it in March 1939.87 Tatra, another major engineering company, also contributed to the rearmament programme, producinng military vehicles. Starting in 1936, large numbers of the military version of the standard four-seater T 72 saloon and touring car were sold to the army. Similar versions were also bought by the police and exported to China. The prototype of a new four-wheel drive vehicle, on which all wheels could be steered, was made in 1936. No details of this have survived; it was probably taken to Germany during the war.88 Tatra also built another military command car in 1938 and the prototype of a heavy artillery tractor in 1937. The army ordered 50 but this was later cancelled. An earlier, six-wheel lorry had been sold to the army in the early stages of rearmament. Very large quantities of small artillery, small arms and ammunition were also made by Sˇkoda. Of this, two outstanding examples were the LK (Lehky´ kulomet) ZB vz30 and the Besa heavy machine gun. The light machine gun was tested by the British army. The staff at Enfield could hardly praise it enough after seeing a test trial.89 But before it could be used in Britain, it had to be modified to take the British rimmed cartridge and different explosive charge and was named the Bren gun. 90 It was very accurate, the long barrel could be changed quickly and it had a very smooth action. It entered service with the British army as the standard infantry light machine gun and remained in service until the 1950s. The Besa heavy machine gun was fitted to Czech and most British tanks.

Aircraft production The only military aircraft produced in Czechoslovakia in large numbers was the Avia B534. Developed from the Hawker Fury – the first production fighter to exceed 200 mph in level flight – the first orders for the Avia were placed in 1933.91 In appearance it was a sleek biplane with an enclosed cockpit and fixed undercarriage. It was designed to counter the standard German bomber of the 1930s, the Dornier Do 17.92 Performance was excellent – it had a high rate of climb and a maximum speed of 406 km/h (252 mph). But this was gained at the expense of severely

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limiting the pilot’s view. A much faster monoplane version was developed, which had a maximum speed of 535 km/h (334 mph). By 1939 450 were in service with the Czechoslovak air force, more than half of which were of the later model. There were also two ground attack aircraft.93 One was the Letov Sˇ-328, first built in 1934, of which 73 were made between 1934 and 1939. A number were exported to Finland. It was a biplane with a maximum speed of 280 km/h (175 mph). The other, also a biplane, was the Aero 100, built between 1934 and 1938. It had a maximum speed of 260 km/h (162 mph). The Praga company, best known as a manufacturer of lorries, designed two training aircraft. The first, the E-39, was for initial training, and was built in 1933. A total of 41 were made between 1933 and 1939. The other, an advanced trainer, was the E-241, of which 33 were made between 1936 and 1939. Other aircraft companies tried to meet the needs for different types of aircraft. Avia designed an aerobatic aircraft, the Ba-122, of which 10 were built between 1936 and 1938. Aero built a German heavy bomber, the Bloch MB-200, under licence from 1936. This had a maximum speed of 245 km/h (153 mph). There were also plans to build the Russian B-71 aircraft, of which 20 had been flown to Czechoslovakia. Tatra also began aircraft production in 1934 and in 1935 bought a licence to manufacture the Bu¨cker Bu¨-131, a light aircraft for training civilian and military pilots. A total of 35 were made as the Tatra T-131. The engine, a German Hirth HM-504, was also made under licence. Next, a licence was taken out to build the British Avro 626 as the Tatra T-126 with an Avia engine. Tatra also designed and built a small, single-seat aircraft, the T-101, which established a new world record for long distance flight for its class from Prague to Khartoum. Later, the company also designed a twin-engined bomber in 1937 code named T-2 and a single-engine monoplane named the T-3, but neither entered production.94 The significance of the above is that although neither the Czechoslovak army nor air force were large enough to take on the Germans on equal terms, the quality of many of the weapons and aircraft was very high. The adoption of the Bren and Besa machine guns by the British army has already been mentioned. Even more important in World War II was the number and quality of Czech weapons and military equipment and aircraft that were used by the German army and others such as the Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian that were allied to it. The handing over of the Sudeten lands to Germany in September

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1938, which effectively dismembered Czechoslovakia, and the subsequent invasion of the rest of Bohemia and Moravia, is therefore of great significance.

Frontier defence With the assistance of French engineers, the idea of a line of defensive forts was developed into a very elaborate system that followed the Czechoslovak–German border as far as the frontier with Austria. Further east, it also provided a defence on the southern Slovak frontier against possible Hungarian attack.95 The first news of the construction of these forts was a report in the British Sunday Chronicle. This stated that they would have a permanent garrison of 70,000 and that this could be raised to 250,000 in 24 hours.96 Along the frontiers the defence consisted largely of a single line of forts and blockhouses of different sizes. Prague was given additional protection with a second line of forts to provide defence in depth. In north Moravia, which was seen as the most vulnerable part of the frontier with Germany, there were three defensive lines. The first stage of this system was the construction to the west of Ostrava of five infantry forts, designed to be fitted with artillery and topped with machine gun turrets. These were supported by two other artillery forts. The budget was two million crowns for buying land, 119,465 crowns for building the forts, ten million crowns for communications and six million crowns for additional concrete antitank barriers. Compulsory purchase of the land began in March 1936 and on average owners of the land received 15,000 crowns per hectare for farm land and 6,000 crowns for woodland. The original French plan for these forts did not include the machine gun turrets. These, together with a large number of mortars, were Czech modifications. The bunkers were supported by separate anti-tank guns and infantry blockhouses at Novy´ Bohumin and Darkovicˇky. Each bunker was protected by lines of concrete anti-tank obstacles, ditches and barbed wire. As the international tension rose and Czechoslovak weakness was revealed, the Czechs realised that these defences had to be built as quickly as possible. The Ministry of Defence divided the sector into five parts and chose contractors by tender. They built four types of fort to a common standard. Construction began in October 1935 and was completed at the end of July 1936. The next sections were allocated to contractors in

HITLER'S MANIPULATION OF SUDETEN GERMAN GRIEVANCES 207 Table 5.1

Construction of forts to the end of November 1937 Forts

Total planned under final program Total handed over by 15.11.1937 Total under construction on 15.11.1937 Under contract To be built

Heavy

Light

1,276 223 156 1,053 1,120

15,436 5,361 3,268 10,102 12,195

Source: Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇaske´ zeme˘ v ´erˇe prvnı´ republliky (1918– 1938); dı´l trˇetı´; O prˇezˇitı´ a o zˇivot (1936– 1938) (Prague, 2003), p 464.

April and construction was finished by the end of the year. The Smolkov artillery fort, a much larger building, was built between February 1936 and September 1938. Supplying the weapons proved more difficult and in September 1938 the forts were still waiting for four machine gun turrets, four casemate mortars and related equipment. Manning of the new defences began in August 1937 with the creation of the 4th frontier guard regiment. Its task was to protect the Bohumin-Jamnice area. By August 1938 the regiment consisted of four battalions and support units. By the time of the Munich Conference in September this had increased to 7,997 men following total mobilisation. After the Munich Conference the Czech troops tried to remove all the artillery and ammunition before handing the forts over to the German forces. This description of the planning, construction and armament of the Ostrava area of the defences is matched by what happened elsewhere along the frontiers with Germany and Hungary. All forts were built to the same standard and specification and were constructed at the same time. A French loan helped to finance it in 1936, but requests for another loan in 1937 were rejected. The figures in table 5.1 above provide a picture of the large-scale of this defensive network. The scale of these fortifications and the evidence that the Czechs were well-prepared and willing to fight has led to discussions about whether they would have succeeded in holding back a German attack. There is also the question of what would have happened if they had fought. Would this have forced France and Britain to come to their help and would this have brought America into the war? None of these questions

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can be answered with any certainty. But it is clear that one of the weaknesses of the Czech position, highlighted by a German military report, is that the Czechs could not rely on the loyalty of any Sudeten German soldiers or officers. This weakened the value of the elaborate defences, though these were manned by Czech soldiers. It is also true that since these were in Sudeten German areas they were vulnerable to people with local knowledge of the true state of their preparedness. The forts were well equipped with provisions and most had their own water supply, but they might have become isolated by flanking movements. Part of the German battle plan was to rely on local Sudeten German guides when invading and the Germans had detailed knowledge of the defences from the secret visits by German officers who had local Sudeten German members of the defence forces as their guides. There was also the problem that airborne troops could have captured key forts by landing directly on them, as was done in the invasion of France and Belgium in 1940. In general, however, as Hitler realised when he saw the defences later, the German losses would have been very heavy and at the least the German attack would have been slowed. It would therefore have been impossible for the generals to keep to Hitler’s plans for defeating the Czechoslovak army in four days. But the fact remains that the main argument that forced Benesˇ and his Government to submit to the Munich diktat was the French refusal to offer assistance, the inability of Russia to offer any realistic assistance and the effect of the prolonged diplomatic pressure by Chamberlain and his Government to give way to the ever greater Sudeten German demands, backed by Hitler. In conclusion, what makes this part of the story of German– Czech rivalry so interesting is not the series of moves by Hitler and the diplomatic response, or lack of it, by the other major powers. What this chapter has shown is the way that Hitler worked to a vague, long-term plan that was hidden behind impressive rhetoric that suggested something quite different. His decision to attack Czechoslovakia was the result of frustration. He wanted to expand Germany eastward and believed that Germans had to right to hold all the Czechoslovak territory, but he could not see how he could defeat Benesˇ diplomatically. As far as Hitler was concerned, this made war inevitable. The lack of response by Britain and France to German rearmament and the military occupation of the Rhineland made this relatively easy. Hitler was well

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aware that there were strong currents of opinion in Britain that felt that the creation of Czechoslovakia had been a mistake. Hitler’s speech to his generals and Foreign Minister in November 1937 was intended to make them aware of his general plans. It also helped to emphasise that his Order No. 23 was not merely a plan that might be used but one that would definitely be put into practice. But Hitler then realised that he had misjudged the mood of the British and French Governments. What then followed was a bizarre situation in which Hitler tried to bring about a political crisis that would give him an excuse to invade the Sudeten areas. But since this could not be made public, the German Foreign Ministry continued to believe that Germany’s aim was to break the Franco – Czechoslovak alliance and bring Czechoslovakia under German control. This explains the conflict over SdP policy with regard to its aims and in its relations with the Czechoslovak Government. It also explains why Henlein, Frank and other senior SdP members felt they had to keep control of the increasingly volatile situation in the Sudeten areas after the Anschluss. Hitler eventually got control of Czechoslovakia because he and others (German diplomats and the SdP) had persistently exaggerated the danger of civil unrest among the Sudeten German population and Hitler claimed that this would lead to a catastrophic war. Chamberlain, the British public, Roosevelt and others believed that the Munich Conference had brought ‘peace in our time’. Within six months they found they had been duped.

CHAPTER 6 HENLEIN'S ELECTION VICTORY, CRISIS, INTERNATIONAL ALARM AND THE MUNICH CONFERENCE

In the final period before the Munich Conference, Hitler used Henlein to increase tension between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech Government. Sudeten German newspapers, financed by Hitler, made exaggerated claims about Czech mistreatment of Sudeten Germans, knowing that these claims could not easily be checked. But there remained a problem. Henlein had to appear reasonable in his demands, indicating that, if these were met, the internal problem could be solved. On the other hand, his demands had to rise to a point where they could not be accepted by the Czechoslovak Government. At the same time he had to keep international support, for if his demands were to become extreme, this support would be lost. Henlein also had to consider Sudeten German opinion if he was to remain in control of this disparate party. This, and the events that led to the Munich Conference, are the subject of this chapter. The most important political event in Czechoslovakia after Henlein’s election victory was Masaryk’s decision on 21 November 1935 to resign as president. He was 85 and senile. Edvard Benesˇ, his likely successor, tried to get the support of Henlein’s party in the coming election. But he was rejected and had to rely on Esterha´zy, leader of part of the Hungarian nationalist party, and Hlinka, an extreme right wing Slovak.

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In December Benesˇ was elected as the second Czechoslovak president. His first test was Germany’s occupation of the demilitarised Rhineland, which was a breach both of the Treaty of Versailles and the 1926 Locarno Treaty. When it became clear that neither Britain nor France would take effective action against Germany, Benesˇ made preparations to suspend the 1920 constitution in any crisis and replace it with another, giving the Government dictatorial powers under the authority of a Supreme Defence Council. This would be accompanied by an order creating a 25 km (16 miles) military zone along the frontier. Czechs would replace Sudeten Germans in all positions of authority. This enraged the Sudeten Germans, who claimed that virtually all state positions had already been filled by Czechs. As a result Sudeten Germans had been deprived of 44,000 posts.1 Benesˇ’ latest proposal would make Sudeten Germans completely subject to Czechs. On 28 February 1938 Hitler raised the political stakes by declaring that it was Germany’s duty to protect ‘ten million Germans’ and this was followed on 13 March by the Anschluss, uniting Austria and Germany. Like Hitler’s other actions, this too had been expressly forbidden by the Versailles Treaty. Events in the Sudetenland now moved rapidly towards a crisis. On 24 April Henlein made a speech in Karlsbad (Czech: Karlovy Vary) demanding the Sudeten German right to act as mouthpiece for the Nazi Party. He called for the right to ‘profess’ and ‘disseminate’ Nazi views. These were sufficiently vague for him to be able to say almost anything. Equally vague was his demand that all the unjust treatment of Sudeten Germans that had been imposed since 1918 should end. He also called for measures that would give the Sudetenland autonomy within Czechoslovakia. These demands were backed by force. A paramilitary unit, the Freiwilliger Schu¨tzkorps was quickly formed. This threatened European peace and Britain and France persuaded the Czechoslovak Government to accept Henlein’s demands. Benesˇ believed that Hitler was using this opportunity to invade Czechoslovakia and on 21 May order the partial mobilisation of Czechoslovak forces. This May crisis brought the threat of war closer, and alarmed Britain and France. It did not help Czechoslovakia. The propaganda of Henlein and others persuaded Britain that their claims about Czech mistreatment of Sudeten Germans were justified. France told Czechoslovakia that the alliance between the two would not apply if Czechoslovakia started a war. Hitler, thwarted by Benesˇ’ bold defence of his country was

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outraged, claimed that Czechoslovakia was provoking war and branded Benesˇ a warmonger. The result of Henlein’s bold claims on behalf of the Sudeten Germans was predictable. In the local elections at the end of May, Henlein won a landslide victory, with between 87 and 90 per cent of the Sudeten German vote. This ensured that the Sudeten crisis would continue. By July British public opinion was supporting Sudeten Germans rather than Czechs. Questions were asked in the House of Commons about whether their problems were being solved and in August the Times, whose editor was pro-German, argued that the Sudeten German problem should have been solved long ago. In an attempt to restore peace, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, sent the Liberal MP and cabinet minister Lord Runciman, to mediate. This was an unfortunate choice. Runciman and his advisors were pro-German and spent more time with Sudeten Germans than Czechs. Runciman’s previous experience in negotiating between trade unions and businessmen was of no value in this situation, which was far more complicated than he or his advisors could understand. His subsequent report was predictably anti-Czech. The crisis finally came on 5 September, when Benesˇ announced his Fourth Plan, accepting nearly all the demands that Henlein had made in his Karlsbad speech. This was not what Hitler or Henlein wanted, since it could mark the end of the crisis. Probably as a result, two Sudeten German members of parliament provoked the Czech police and were arrested. This gave Henlein the excuse to end negotiations. Hitler had to increase political pressure on the Czechoslovak Government and did so in his Nuremberg speech of 12 September, vowing to support the Sudeten Germans. Three days later Henlein fled to Germany after failing to seize power in a coup d’etat. Faced with this continued threat to peace, Neville Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden on 15 September to negotiate directly with Hitler. Chamberlain agreed to his demand that the Sudetenland should be transferred to Germany and France agreed to this on the 18th, insisting however that the rest of Czechoslovakia should be guaranteed. On the 19th the Czechoslovak Government reluctantly accepted this, which destroyed the unity of Bohemia, the traditional centre of Czech royal power. But when Chamberlain visited Hitler again on the 22nd at Bad Godesberg, he was told that this was not enough. German troops must immediately occupy the Sudetenland to

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protect Germans. In addition, there were further problems to be resolved: Slovak autonomy together with Polish and Hungarian demands for territory. So great was the fear of war that Roosevelt joined Chamberlain, Mussolini and other world leaders in calling for an end to the problem. Chamberlain’s broadcast ‘How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying to get on gas masks because of a quarrel in a far away country between a people of whom we know nothing’ shows how little he understood the reality of the situation.2 On 28 September Hitler agreed to a conference and this was convened at Munich the following day. This agreed the terms to be given to Czechoslovakia. No Czechs had been invited; the Czechoslovak ambassador to Germany, Mastny, attended as an observer. The wellknown terms were presented to the Czechoslovak Government, which was given virtually no time to consider them. It was impossible for the Government to reject these, since Britain and France had made it clear that they would not give any support. Reduced to the bare essentials, Hitler’s policy in the final Czechoslovak crisis of September 1938 and the subsequent dismemberment of what remained of Czechoslovakia was based on no more than bluff. Conditions in the Sudeten German area were never as bad as Hitler claimed, though there was serious hardship and widespread discontent. Events that he claimed were ‘proof’ of Czech hostility were exaggerated or deliberately provoked. Nor was there any real risk of civil war in Czechoslovakia. Equally, there had been discontent in the predominantly Polish area around Teschen (Czech: Cˇesky´ Te˘sˇı´n) and Freistadt (Czech: Karvina´-Frysˇta´t) for a long time, but nothing to suggest that the area was in such ferment that a transfer to Poland would solve the matter. The same could be said about the southern border of Slovakia inhabited by a majority of Hungarian speakers or the Ruthene area in the extreme east. Yet within six months of the Munich Conference Czechoslovakia had lost territory to Germany, Poland and Hungary and the remaining Czech lands in Bohemia and Moravia had been absorbed into Greater Germany as the Protectorate. Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist, but without creating the peace and stability that Hitler and German diplomats had claimed would be the result. Every move by Hitler was accompanied by violent threats of imminent destruction. He claimed in every case to be acting in the name of peace, trying to find a solution to events that were rapidly falling into

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chaos. He succeeded partly because he appeared plausible and because he was a unique head of state. Diplomats and politicians had never encountered such a man before in that position. He was the first to base his aggressive policy on the simple, Machiavellian thesis that anything was permissible if it was successful. His later policy from March 1939 to the outbreak of World War II was no more than a continuation of this. He wanted more living space for Germans. At the same time he was thinking of ways of disposing of (killing) all the inhabitants of these lands in Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR that could not be ‘Germanised’. In the case of the Czechs, at the centre of this study, this would have resulted in a ‘solution’ that would have destroyed them as a race, either by starving them or turning them into some form of second class ‘German’ people.3 Fortunately for the Czechs, Hitler never had the time or opportunity to complete these plans and put them into effect, though German control of the former Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 caused immense hardship. It also resulted later in the expulsion of virtually all of the Sudeten Germans in an act of revenge. Only those married to Czechs or who were regarded as pro-Czech were allowed to stay and they changed the spelling of their German family name to make them appear ‘Czech’. The German presence in Czechoslovakia disappeared. The period of German control from September 1938 to the end of World War II is the subject of this chapter.

Background to the Munich Conference Behind these well-known facts of the build up to the Munich Conference is a complex situation that also needs to be explained. By August 1938 Hitler’s plans for invading Czechoslovakia were complete and the army had been persuaded that it could be successful. The Sudeten German political demands had been backed by German writers in Czechoslovakia and Germany, who claimed that the Sudeten Germans had never been treated fairly and that Czechs and Germans had hated each other for centuries. In Berlin, Rudolf Jung’s book, Die Tsche chen; Tausend Jahre deutsch-tschechischer Kampf had appeared in 1937 in a second, enlarged, edition. In 1938, as the crisis deepened, there were attempts to influence British foreign policy and public opinion by articles in the Times, Observer, Daily Mail and Daily Express. To this were added books such as the apparently reasonable pro-Sudeten book by

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‘Diplomaticus’, The Czechs and their Minorities, published in London. The earlier, measured, Czech response to German claims in Josef Chmelarˇ, The German problem in Czechoslovakia, published in Prague in 1936, had failed to carry equal weight. There were British newspapers that took a pro-Czechoslovak view: Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times, News Chronicle and Daily Herald, besides the important provincial newspapers Manchester Guardian and Yorkshire Post.4 When the Slovak separatists were encouraged to seek independence in 1938, there appeared the strident Should Britain go to war – for Czechoslovakia? published by the Slovak Council in Geneva. This opened with a section headed ‘Why is Czechoslovakia not worthy of being helped?’ which set the tone of the whole book. The earlier, liberal and pro-Czech views of Wickham Steed, former foreign editor of The Times and Professor Seton-Watson carried no weight because they were out of favour.5 Nor did the report by a group of British students in We saw Czechoslovakia, published in 1938. They declared: ‘Is Czechoslovakia worth defending? To those of us who saw something of its achievements in the past 18 years and felt something of the passion of its people for democracy and social justice, only one answer is possible. We say “Yes”.’ Toynbee, writing in the Economist in July 1937, had also warned that if Britain ignored events in Central Europe she would eventually either have to accept German domination of Europe or Britain would have to fight to keep a balance of power. But there were more powerful influences on Chamberlain. Most Conservatives considered that fascism was somehow ‘all right’. The influential Cliveden Set and the 30 peers and 30 MPs in Anglo–German fellowships also influenced him. It was not merely Chamberlain’s ignorance of Czechoslovak affairs and his urgent desire to avoid war that made the crisis from August 1938 so severe. What is clear from the British diplomatic correspondence is that the Foreign Office knew that Hungary and Poland were also pressing demands against Czechoslovakia. This widened the problem by threatening a more general European war. In the case of Hungary, the Versailles settlement had awarded Czechoslovakia land on her Hungarian frontier that was occupied by a majority of Hungarian speakers. Hungarian hopes of regaining this territory had never disappeared, but had been held in check by the Little Entente. Hungarian relations with Romania and Yugoslavia were also in

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a state of ‘virtually constant tension’.6 During the August 1938 crisis the Hungarians attended a conference of the Little Entente at Bled. In return for a promise of non-violence, Hungary were given assurances that the condition of the Hungarian minority would be improved, though this promise was never ratified.7 There were also German –Hungarian discussions at Kiel, where Hitler promised Upper Slovakia to Hungary if the two countries jointly attacked Czechoslovakia. But Hungary was worried about possible action by the Little Entente in the event of a German– Czechoslovak war.8 The German view was that Yugoslavia would remain neutral but the Hungarian army was still relatively weak and the Government preferred a peaceful solution. This crisis in August, accompanied by Czechoslovak mobilisation, made the British Government anxious to try and find a solution to the problem that was not only about the Sudeten Germans but also the other minorities as well. Liddell Hart, writing to Eden on 10 September, offered an analysis of a possible German–Czech war to help the Government form its policy. He stressed British military weakness (inadequate anti-aircraft defence) and the likelihood that Germany would attack Czechoslovakia from Austria, between Brno and Bratislava.9 He thought that Germany might initially make rapid progress there. But he felt it would be unable to conquer the whole country quickly. The Czech army was capable of putting up a prolonged resistance, provided the Germans did not have total control of the air. The only help that the French could offer was to tie down German forces on the Maginot Line. Nor could Russia offer any more assistance. Its army was unbelievably slow, though it might invade East Prussia, if given permission by Latvia and Lithuania to enter their territory. The central problem would be how to remove the German forces if the initial stage of the war came to a halt. This might be done by economic pressure and by demoralising the German troops. This was a serious attempt to provide the Government, via Eden, with a realistic military assessment of the situation. However, it had one serious weakness. It assumed that the German army had a battle plan to invade Czechoslovakia from Austria. This was unlikely. The Anschluss had taken place little more than a year earlier. No battle plan would have been made before then unless Hitler was working to a timetable that made the seizure of Austria a first step. There was no evidence for that. Nor was it likely that the German military planners would have had time to make a detailed invasion plan between the Anschluss and the

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August 1938 crisis. A further weakness was that any invasion from that part of Austria would require large numbers of troops and all their equipment, including tanks, to be moved by rail from Germany. The build up and initial manoeuvres to test the battle plan would alert foreign diplomats and the Czech army, which could take defensive measures. There was also a line of bunkers and defence posts to protect the southern frontier. It was much easier for Germany to plan an invasion based on the existing military base at Dresden. Even in that case, however, rumours about the initial troop manoeuvres reached foreign diplomats and the Czechs, who had time to prepare their defence. A plebiscite seemed to offer a way out of this dangerous situation. It had become Henlein’s chief demand, and therefore might solve the problem. But, as the Foreign Office memorandum of 11 September showed, opinions were mixed about whether it might prove a long-term solution.10 The Foreign Office opinion was that, in any case, Britain had a moral and legal obligation to prevent aggression, especially since Britain would quickly be drawn into any general war. Alternatively, the races could be separated: ‘No one wants to compel a person to stay in a state to which they are not loyal.’ But if a plebiscite were held to establish popular choice, it needed law and order to guarantee that the results were fair. Also, if Germany were to take the territory after the plebiscite, a fourpower conference would be needed to provide stability and give people time to leave. There was also the problem of German treatment of the Jews and the risk that the Czechs would resist and ‘go down fighting’. This would be the first stage of dismembering Czechoslovakia. It was a perceptive assessment of the situation and was borne out by results.

Hungarian and Polish demands Discontent among the Hungarian population of Slovakia also formed part of this crisis and was part of Hitler’s final demand at Bad Godesberg. On 14 September, the Hungarian Charge´ d’Affaires in Prague asked what the British attitude was towards the treatment of these people.11 The message was passed to the Foreign Office in London. In reply, Vansittart told the Hungarian ambassador that any concessions offered to the Sudeten Germans should also automatically be given to other minorities.12 The Hungarian Government moved quickly to exploit this. The Times had carried an article on 7 September on the possibility of

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the Sudeten Germans being given a plebiscite. On 15 September the British ambassador in Budapest, Sir G. Knox, was told by the Hungarian Foreign Minister that if the Sudeten Germans were given a plebiscite, Hungary would demand the same for her minority in Slovakia.13 The same day, Chamberlain had his first meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler appeared reasonable. He knew that he would not be able to invade Czechoslovakia before 1 October and, in the meantime, was concerned to keep up the pressure on the Sudeten issue. Chamberlain, for his part, made his position as an arbitrator clear: ‘In principle I had nothing to say against the separation of the Sudeten Germans from the rest of Czechoslovakia, provided that the practical difficulties could be overcome.’14 However, far from easing the tension as Chamberlain had hoped, Hitler continued to raise demands. In Czechoslovakia many expected war to break out. Sudeten Germans had no definite information about what was happening. Czech newspapers were heavily censored, no German newspapers could be imported and German information was regarded, correctly, as propaganda. Radios and telephones had been confiscated and all contact with the outside world was broken. To give one example of conditions in the Sudetenland, the German population of the textile town of Fleissen in west Bohemia were fleeing to Germany, terrified by stories of Germans being hunted and beaten by Czechs.15 Factories, shops and businesses were closed and the town was deserted. There was a feeling of helplessness and that war was inevitable. The Czechs were equally tense. Poland used this crisis to press her claim regarding the Polish minority in the Cˇesky´ Te˘sˇı´n area in north Moravia. The Polish Government, like Hitler and the Hungarians, claimed that Poles were being persecuted. On 16 September, Kennard, the British ambassador in Warsaw, reported that the Polish Government was considering sending a note to the British, French and Czechoslovak Governments demanding self-determination for the Polish minority.16 The same day he also reported that if any concessions were given to the Sudeten Germans, the Polish Government would demand the same for its people. When the Hungarian Government learnt of this it demanded the same. Following the large increase in the military budget – which took the army above the limits imposed by the Treaty of Trianon – the Hungarian Government was able to back its demands with the threat of military force.17 But it was initially very cautious and although there was a partial Hungarian mobilisation, this was not announced officially.

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While Hungary was cautious, Poland was more aggressive. On 19 September Knox reported from Budapest that the Polish and Hungarian Governments were working together. The Poles had announced that if any Sudeten territory was transferred to Germany, Poland would seize Teschen (Cˇesky´ Te˘sˇı´n – the Czech half of the former town of Teschen, divided by the River Olsˇa).18 The frontier was only lightly defended at this point and lacked the elaborate system of bunkers that had been built elsewhere on the German and Hungarian frontiers.19 Poland backed this campaign of intimidation with an aggressive anti-Czech press campaign, and increased its forces on the frontier. The reason for this, as Kennard made clear in his report from Warsaw, was that it appeared that Britain and France were about to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. In that case, Poland would seize Teschen and Britain would be faced with a fait accompli.20 The same day, Knox sent a Hungarian note that proposed to unite the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia with ‘their mother country’ and asked for British support. Meanwhile, Poland continued to raise the political pressure. Kennard reported a rumour that the Poles were considering sending a note to Czechoslovakia demanding a revision of the frontier along ethnographic lines. This had originally been agreed by the Polish and Czech National Councils on 5 November 1918, but was never carried out. Polish demands were backed by further demonstrations of a build up of troops in Krako´w, though the Poles insisted that force would only be used as a last resort. Similarly, the Hungarians claimed that military reinforcements sent to the Slovak frontier were merely defensive, matching the Czech troops already there. The Czechoslovak Government, recognising Hungarian weakness, had not hesitated to strengthen its eastern frontier.

French and British policy While pressure had been mounting on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to Hungary and Poland, France and Britain had been considering their own policy. Chamberlain believed that the Sudeten Germans should not be offered a plebiscite, because Hungary and Poland would also demand one for their minorities. The Czechoslovak ambassador in London, Jan Masaryk, also opposed giving the Sudeten Germans a plebiscite, though for different reasons.21 In his view the (Czech) population would not agree to it. He also claimed that ‘the areas

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in question have formed a territorial and economic part of the historical lands of Bohemia for a thousand years. If they, by hook or by crook, were attached to Germany, nothing would stand in the way of German expansion through East and South East Europe.’ Ignoring this sound advice, Chamberlain proposed transferring Sudeten German territory to Germany. Some found the proposal deeply offensive. Colin Coote, writing to Eden on 20 September, called it: a squalid scuttle. It is surely analogous in many points to the affair which caused your resignation . . . You said there must be a settlement by agreement. This is a sacrifice of the method of negotiation and a surrender to a naked threat. You said . . . that there must be no breach of our solidarity with France. This plan means bitter recriminations with France, leading to a dissolution of this solidarity. Already the rubber stamps which exist to supply Mr Chamberlain with a Cabinet are explaining that they were forced to surrender because France would not fight . . . there seems to be no limit whatever to the Nazi policy of blackmail. Personally I was not in the least concerned to keep the Sudetens within Czechoslovakia, but most deeply concerned with the method by which any change in their status was effected.22 Not surprisingly, the French initially resisted this proposal to transfer the Sudetenland to Germany. They were unwilling to abandon their Czech allies and were promised support by the USSR. But eventually they bowed to British pressure, on condition that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia would be guaranteed by Britain and France. This was the plan put to Benesˇ. On 20 September he rejected it, but was forced to accept the following day when it became clear that this was an ultimatum. If he had continued to reject the proposal, Britain and France claimed they would not have been responsible for the outcome. Unwillingly he accepted and the Government fell. Chamberlain paid a second visit to Hitler, at Godesberg, to put the plan to him, but Hitler now raised the stakes. He refused to accept the Anglo– French proposal, claimed that Sudeten Germans were being massacred and insisted that German troops should be sent at once to protect them. This sequence of events is now so well known that it is hard to realise that at the time few ordinary people had much idea of what was really

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going on. The Western press described events (both fact and fiction) and the public in Britain, France and elsewhere were made aware of the serious nature of the crisis. They also knew that Chamberlain was being forced to make concessions in the interests of what he regarded as world peace. For the ordinary Czech living far away from the Sudetenland, life was no doubt very different. The Sudeten German complaints were not new. Few can have realised how close the country was to being dismembered. The atmosphere is described most vividly in Mark Slouka’s novel The Visible World, based on the experiences of his Czech parents in Czechoslovakia in this period. Hanusˇ, a Czech former inmate of the Mauthausen concentration camp, who returned from there a cripple, describes the events after the war to a 12-year-old boy. This is what I’m trying to say to you: For a long, long time, nothing happens. And then it does. In a place called Berchtesgaden, a tall Englishman with a white moustache named Chamberlain unfolds himself from a limousine. Arguments are made. Tea is sipped. Important men stab their fingers . . . at the polished table. ‘Sie mu¨ssen . . . Wir werden . . . Etwas Tee, mein Herr?’ In Bad Godesburg this Englishman smoothes his hair with his right hand and says. ‘I take your point, Herr Ribbentrop. And yet, if I may . . . we feel that . . . in the matter of . . . Can I take that as your final position? And it comes to pass.’ Mr Hanusˇ smiled. ‘Berchtesgaden. Bad Godesberg. Berlin. All those Bs. But you look around . . . Nothing has happened.23 But in Prague a new Czechoslovak Government was formed under General Syrovy who ordered mobilisation.24 The August crisis had severely strained the existing Czechoslovak system of coalitions and the new Government was intended to provide a stronger foundation for resisting German pressure. The cabinet consisted of experts and individuals representing national institutions. They included the mayor of Prague, Dr Zenkl and Dr Butovsky, head of the patriotic Sokol organisation. Political parties were excluded, minimising the influence of Henlein’s SdP and party rivalry. A separate committee was formed to include political representatives, but the members were former ministers

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who accepted the Anglo– French proposals for the Sudetenland. Their role was purely advisory. Having formed a new government, President Benesˇ invited the Slovak People’s Party for talks. The appointment of the new government calmed Czech fears but demonstrations continued in Hungary and Poland, each of which continued to move troops towards the frontier. Faced with Poland’s determination to get Teschen and British and French support for Polish demands, the Czechoslovak Government finally agreed to cede Teschen provided assurances of friendly cooperation were given in return.25 Hungary, on the other hand was only given British assurances that her claims would ‘receive consideration at the appropriate moment’.26 Britain and France were more concerned about their reply to Hitler than dealing with Hungary. What ultimately swayed both Britain and France was the apparent military strength of Germany and their own perceived weakness. Britain had begun to rearm and in at least two ways Czechoslovakia was helping Britain and should in turn have been supported. One was the Anglo – Czech cooperation between the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield Lock and Sˇkoda. This was the development of a British version of the Czech Lehky Kulomet (light machine gun) ZB vz30, which became known as the Bren Gun – the standard infantry light machine gun of World War II.27 The other was armour plate supplied to the Admiralty by the Vı´tkovice steel works. In April a British technical expert, W. S. Walker of the steel company Firth, Brown & Co., was sent to Vı´tkovice to supervise a secret Admiralty order.28 This was followed on 31 May by a report that a British draftsman, C. C. Bachelor, would also be sent there. Following a conference at Vı´tkovice in April 1938, the Admiralty had expressed an interest in buying about 3,000 tons of plate, which may have been in addition to the earlier secret contract that Walker and Bachelor were supervising.29 On 28 September Newton sent a telegram from the British legation in Prague to say that 200 tons of armour plates were ready to be delivered and suggested that they should be sent to Britain via the Polish port of Gdynia.30 The Czech authorities had agreed to facilitate this export and Newton suggested that Poland be contacted to make the necessary arrangements. Both these items required continued Czech cooperation and should have ensured that Czechoslovakia received fair treatment, at least from Britain.

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The Munich Conference But neither Britain nor France felt that they were prepared to fight for what they considered a distant country that neither knew nor cared much about. France had hoped an alliance with Czechoslovakia would help protect her against a resurgent Germany, not the other way round. Chamberlain wanted to avoid the horrors of another major war and had been informed in Cabinet that the British army was still weak, though rearmament had begun. If he had realised that his action in giving way to Hitler would have allowed Hitler to equip another 11 infantry divisions with modern weapons after March 1939, he might have thought twice before accepting Mussolini’s suggestion. As it was, the proposal for a conference at Munich on 29 September was accepted and was greeted with relief by public opinion in Britain and France. At Munich Mussolini presented Britain and France with proposals that had been decided by Hitler in advance, but which Hitler pretended he had not seen. He welcomed them as a solution to the Sudeten problem. The discussions, which lasted for a total of 13 hours, resulted in an agreement to transfer areas occupied by a majority of German speakers to Germany in stages. The transfer was to begin on 1 October and be completed by 10 October. The four powers also called on the Czechoslovak Government to settle its differences with Hungary and Poland as soon as possible. The negotiations were finally finished early on the morning of 29 September and the Czech representatives received a copy at 2 a.m. The first official information given to the Czech Government was a letter from Hencke, the German Charge´ d’Affaires in Prague, to the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs at 6.20 a.m. on 30 September.31 This enclosed the text of the agreement that had been made by the four powers and invited the Czechoslovak Government to send a representative and a military expert to a meeting of the International Commission. It assumed that the Czechoslovak Government would accept the terms. The first meeting of the International Commission was to be held at 5 p.m. the same day, at the German Foreign Ministry. It provided virtually no opportunity for the International Commission to discuss the arrangements for the transfer, which was to begin the following day. The Czechoslovak Government was also given very little time to reply. It was the Italian ambassador

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who was given the task of seeing the Czechoslovak President or ‘some other high Czechoslovak official’, urging him to accept the Munich Agreement and avoid any incidents during the transfer of territory.32 At about noon the principal Italian, French and British diplomats met Krofta, the Czech Foreign Minister, who told them bluntly: ‘The President and the Government submit to the conditions of the Munich Agreement which has come into being without Czechoslovakia and against her.’ When the French ambassador tried to offer condolences, he was cut short: ‘We have been forced into this situation; now everything is at an end; today it is our turn, tomorrow it will be the turn of others.’ When the British representative said, with some difficulty, that Chamberlain had ‘done his utmost’ he received the same reply. At 12.50 p.m. Hencke was informed that Mastny´, the Czechoslovak ambassador in Berlin, and General Husa´rek of the general staff, would fly to Berlin. They reached the German Foreign Ministry in time to attend the second part of the session. By then the commission, which had begun the meeting at 5.30 p.m., had already agreed to appoint a sub-committee to handle the evacuation of Zone I (which consisted of territory with at least 90 per cent German-speakers). The commission had also agreed that the supervision of the Czech evacuation and German occupation would be left to German and Czech liaison officers. This removed the matter from international control and left it in German hands. The other main issue, the defining of the areas in which a plebiscite should be held, was also left to a sub-committee. The Czech representatives were not invited to speak and the meeting lasted less than four hours. At no other time in history has a state been destroyed so quickly. It is easy to condemn Chamberlain. Immediately after the war there was considerable discussion about the causes of Munich and the French historian E´tienne Mantoux, writing in 1946, expressed the general sense of postwar frustration: In the dismal days of September 1938, when the best hearts were rent between a sense of honour and a love of peace, the life and liberty of Czechoslovakia weighed very little against the heavy pressure of the ‘guilt complex’ [of Versailles]. After all, was it not only a question of frontiers? The perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sovereignties, but in food, coal and transport.33

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That sums up historical opinion after the war. In Prague, after the Munich conference, Krofta tried to get the Germans to end anti-Czech propaganda and his deputy asked for details of the imprisonment and illtreatment in Germany of an important Czech Foreign Ministry official. Both Krofta and his deputy stressed that this made it difficult for the Czechoslovak Government to carry out the Munich Agreement. It was also the Czech wish that the agreement would herald a new era in Czech–German relations ‘now that all points of friction, including, for all practical purposes, the Russian pact, had been removed by the Munich Agreement’. The Czechs wished for coexistence between the ‘great [German] and the small Czech people, inspired by mutual respect’.34 Hencke expressed similar views and asked for all Reich nationals to be released from prison as a gesture of good will.

Renewed Polish and Hungarian demands The Polish Government also renewed its pressure. About midnight on 30 September Poland demanded the transfer of the area of Teschen and Freistadt and a plebiscite in the surrounding area, to be agreed by 2 October.35 Its tone was peremptory and a summary was sent by the British legation in Prague to the Foreign Office. The language is similar to that used by Hitler and offered ample opportunity for further disputes on points of detail. The main points were: 1. The Czechoslovak [plan] is entirely insufficient and dilatory and [the] Polish Government can no longer have faith in declarations of [the] Czechoslovak Government. 2. [The] Polish Government therefore make[s] [the]following categorical demands: (a) Evacuation of a certain defined area within 24 hours as from mid-day October 1. (b) The cession of [the] remainder of [the] districts of Teschen Frysztat within ten days starting from the same date. (c) Public utilities and communications in evacuated areas to be left intact and defensive works to be disarmed. (d) [The] Question of plebiscite in other areas to be subsequently agreed between the two Governments with the possible participation of third parties.

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(e) Persons of Polish tongue born in [the] districts of Teschen Frysztat to be immediately released from military service and all political prisoners of Polish origin to be released. (f) A reply accepting or rejecting demands [is] to be given by mid-day October 1. Should [this] reply not be forthcoming or contain a refusal [the] Polish Government will hold [the] Czechoslovak Government solely responsible for the consequences.36 Benesˇ had appealed to Britain for support against these Polish demands. He had pointed out that if the Polish claim was met, it would not only take important coalmines but would also cut rail communications between the Czech and Slovak lands. But after Munich, such hopes of support were in vain and on 1 October Benesˇ accepted the Polish ultimatum.37 The same day Morton, the British military attache´ in Prague, informed Major General Ismay at the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Czechs had offered to sell arms to Britain.38 Although these were a different calibre to the standard British weapons, Morton warned: If the four Power agreement involves the Czechs handing them to the Germans, it will be necessary to keep a close watch on what happens to them. If they are not used to strengthen German defence forces, the Germans may endeavour to sell them to countries already armed with weapons of a similar type [i.e. Romania, Yugoslavia], obtaining thereby further political and economic advantages. Or the weapons may be used in Spain, China, Palestine etc [Palestine was a British mandated territory]. This perceptive and important comment was apparently ignored, with disastrous consequences for the subsequent war. At the same time that Benesˇ was forced to accept the Anglo–French terms, the Hungarians made a similar claim for self-determination for Slovaks and Ruthenes.39 But for Britain and France, the immediate crisis was over. The Sudeten question had been settled, the transfer of land would take place under international supervision and the future of the remainder of the state was guaranteed. They also assumed that the Hungarian and Polish problems would also be solved quickly and peacefully.

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The four powers had agreed a framework for carrying out the Munich Agreement that on the surface appeared reasonable. It provided for international supervision of the handover of territory. Census returns were available to establish the proportions of German and Czech speakers. Property in these territories was to be handed over intact and no damage would be done to public utilities. A moratorium was imposed that prevented companies with branches in the Sudetenland transferring goods from there to the Czech area.40 The Czechs were to be allowed to remove weapons, ammunition and artillery from their defensive system, which were in the first two zones.41 There was to be provision for exchange of individuals and families who might wish to change from one ethnic area to another. Also, the rights of any Sudeten Germans who continued to live outside the new German territory would be protected. Many of the arrangements would take time to put into practice. It was also agreed that soldiers from Britain, France and Italy would supervise the transfer of territory. But almost immediately questions were raised that invalidated the proposals: should these be regular soldiers or reservists? Should they be armed? What powers would they have? It was suggested that the British contingent would consist of members of the British Legion, but they were not suitable for this role. Instead, the British wanted to send regular troops. Italians proposed to use reservists. It was also difficult to agree whether they should be armed. This was only one problem. Another was the appointment of observers for the plebiscite, for which the Saar plebiscite was to be the model, and which would be held before the end of November.42 Each issue had to be agreed between the four powers and by the Czechoslovak Government. To simplify matters and try to make progress, sub committees were created to deal with specific matters and these reported back to the main committee, of which the chairman was the German Foreign Minister. On the very first day, 1 October, the Commission realised that the Czechs would not have enough time to remove guns and ammunition from the former frontier defences.43 On 2 October the French agreed with the Czechs that they should be given extra time: 15 days to remove the heavy guns and ammunition.44 The same day, Hitler told the German members of the Commission his plans for plebiscites.45 The demand for these had always formed part of his strategy for seizing the Sudetenland and he made it clear that he intended to take full advantage of this concession.

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Transfer of territory In Hitler’s view, where there was a large German majority, the area in which a plebiscite would be held should be enlarged to include surrounding territory. The Germans hoped they would get that as well. Hitler was prepared to exchange small German-language enclaves for similar Czech ones. He would however insist that the area between Zwittau and Silesia – the whole northern frontier territory – would become German. The result of the proposed plebiscites would leave 300,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia. Of these, 140,000 would be in Slovakia and the Ruthene area, 30,000 of which would be in Pressburg (Slovak Bratislava), 18,000 in the language enclave of Iglau in Moravia, about 40,000 in Prague, 50,000 in Brno and the remainder in other small language islands. The Germans also wanted to have a plebiscite in Ma¨hrisch-Ostrau (the Moravian part of the industrial city of Ostrava, south of the River Ostravice). Hitler believed that the majority of the population were Polish speaking (termed locally Slonzaks) and pro-German, and that there was also many Germans.46 Success in this plebiscite would give Hitler control of one of the main Czechoslovak steel producers, the important Vı´tkovice works. These were important details, but they were ignored by British diplomats. British public opinion had welcomed Chamberlain’s claim to have achieved ‘peace in our time’ and avoid war. They were unaware of the way the agreement had been manipulated by the Germans. One of those who supported the agreement was Sir Roger Lumley, Governor of Bombay, who ‘praised the courage of Chamberlain to avoid war’.47 He believed that it was right that Chamberlain had saved the lives of 10 million or so by sacrificing ‘under pressure and threats’ the minorities in Czechoslovakia which would not have been worth a war. He also believed that if Britain did declare war, it would be better to do it when the country was better prepared. Meanwhile, it appeared that the first stage of the transfer was going smoothly. In the predominantly German areas, the German soldiers were apparently given a warm welcome. Troops marched along streets lined with Nazi banners and crowds thronged the streets giving the Nazi salute.48 It was the same in the countryside, where smiling, relaxed German soldiers were welcomed as liberators from Czech oppression.49 But these pictures were intended as propaganda. As one Sudeten German, who had become by then the British citizen Eric Pasold, wrote later:

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It was with a heavy heart that I followed the advance of the German troops, read about border incidents, and looked at the photographs of so many familiar places. There was a picture of the barrier being raised at the frontier at Wildenau to let Hitler’s army enter, of the main street at Asch lined with cheering men, women and children, of the historic market square at Eger packed with people giving the Nazi salute, and of swastika flags everywhere. Yet I knew that the hearts of thousands of Sudetenlanders were as heavy as mine, in spite of the photographs in The Times which told a story of nothing but jubilation and flowers for the Fu¨hrer and his soldiers.50 Hitler had already made preparations for absorbing the Sudeten territory into the Nazi state. On 1 October Hitler issued an order appointing Henlein the Reichskommissar for the Sudeten territory.51 His main responsibility was the full incorporation (Aufbau) of the area into the German Reich. But Henlein did not have supreme power in the Sudetenland. This was reserved for the military commander of the occupying forces who held the title Oberbefehlshaber des Heeresgruppen.52 He had three tasks: the arrest of named political figures, the issue of new (German Reich) laws and the appointment of officials to enforce the new legal arrangements. Germans quickly put their own interpretation on the Munich Agreement. It had been agreed at Munich that the Czechs would be allowed to remove weapons and equipment from the defences, and they had been given extra time to do this. But when Czech soldiers began to remove concrete anti-tank ‘hedgehogs’ on 3 October they were stopped by the Germans.53 Hitler had already decided that he would not wait for international approval of the transfer, as agreed at Munich, but would immediately incorporate the Sudetenland into Germany. One result was that Woermannn, Director of the German Political Department, refused to accept a British proposal that there should be international control of the transfer. On 3 October, the International Commission gave way and agreed that the neutral zone separating the German and Czech troops would be supervised by Czech police until German troops arrived. The Commission also noted that a fight had broken out between Germans after the occupation; Nazis were taking revenge on their opponents. When Polish troops entered the Teschen area, Hungary demanded that

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talks on the Hungarian minority should begin three days later, on 6 October. Henke, reporting from Prague, said that the Hungarians wanted Slovakia to be independent of Prague so that they could take control of that and Ruthene lands, but were opposed by Italy.54 Poland, with an interest in small Polish minority groups in northern Slovakia, wanted Slovakia to be independent. There were also Slovak demands for separation from Czechoslovakia. The question of plebiscites – a matter of interest to Hungary and Poland as well as Germany – was taken a stage further on 4 October. Germany proposed that the 1918 statistics should be used and where there was a 51 per cent German majority, the area should go to Germany. The Czechs opposed this very strongly and it was only after several hours’ discussion that a French compromise was accepted: that the statistics of 1910 and 1921 were to be compared and an average taken. It was rapidly becoming clear, however, that the four powers were not going to let Czech opposition delay the process. The next day, 5 October, the four powers agreed the line of the new frontier, which German soldiers would reach by 10 October. Their decision was based on population statistics of 1918, and they agreed the figure of 51 per cent German as forming the majority population.55 The Czechs argued against this, because it would give Germany control of a much larger area and cut important Czech road and rail communications. It would also leave Czech groups in German territory. To overcome the problem of minority groups, the Germans suggested exchanging populations ‘as soon as possible’. The Munich Agreement had specified that people would have the right to move within six months and a German–Czech commission would consider the matter. A memorandum by Weizsa¨cker, the State Secretary, shows that Germany was using international support to defeat Czech opposition. Referring to Czech territory that he wanted for Germany, Weizsa¨cker wrote: it was just at that very point that there could be no tampering with the frontier line on the part of the Germans. Trifling deviations from the strict ethnographical determination of the zones to be transferred without a plebiscite were of course contemplated in the Munich Agreement in certain exceptional cases. For the place under discussion, however, no amendment could be considered. The Italian representative then made the following proposal: In order to meet the anxiety of the Czech delegates regarding the

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cutting of certain railway lines which would be absorbed into German-occupied territory, these railway lines should be crossed as late as possible – but naturally within the time limit fixed for October 10. The Czech and German authorities should also get in touch with each other at once, today if possible, to regulate this through traffic, also for the period after German occupation. The German delegate urged the Czechs to deliver the answer to the proposal of the four Powers immediately, if possible in the course of the evening but at the latest by midday on October 6 [the following day]. The difficulties entailed by a delay in this answer were obvious – the entry of the troops on October 6 was imminent. The Czech representatives were then, at a suitable moment, confronted with the protocol of the session of midday on the 5th, which the four Powers had already agreed on and were committed to.56 The episode demonstrates the way that Hitler was able to take the parts of the Sudetenland that he wanted for strategic or economic reasons. The Germans were able to produce maps that showed, or claimed to show, authentic records of ethnic distribution. Neither Henderson, the British ambassador, nor Francois-Poncet, the French, had any idea whether these were accurate when they signed the protocol. By the time the British Government realised what had happened and reprimanded Henderson, it was too late. What both ambassadors wanted was a smooth transfer of territory that would restore cordial international relations. Hitler had stated that this was his last territorial demand. When the Czechs pointed to the effects of these proposals on the Czechoslovak economy, Attolico, the Italian ambassador, pretended to play the role of honest broker. The end result was never in doubt. German dominance was emphasised by the peremptory refusal to make any serious concession and by the German demand for immediate agreement. The same day Hungary renewed its pressure on the Czech Government by claiming that Hungarians were still being persecuted. The Czech reply was to propose starting negotiations on 15 October, by which time the Sudeten transfer would have been completed. Encouraged by Czech weakness, Slovak separatists also increased their demands for independence. At a meeting on 5 October at Zˇilina, the Populists and all other Slovak parties, except for the Social Democrats, agreed to pursue the Populist demand for autonomy. This envisaged

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the transfer of power to a Slovak autonomous government of five ministers, who were to be appointed by Tiso, the vice-president of the Populist Party. The Prague Government was forced to give way and Tiso was appointed Minister for Slovak Administration on 6 October. What had formerly been Czechoslovakia now became Czecho-slovakia, a federal state.

Resignation of Benesˇ These events made it impossible for Benesˇ to remain as president. His policy of cooperation with Britain and France and his support for the League of Nations had totally failed to protect Czechoslovakia. It was announced on 6 October that he would resign. He no longer represented Czech interests. Czechs regarded the Munich Agreement as a national disaster and compared it to the Battle of the White Mountain of 1620, which had resulted in Habsburg domination for almost 300 years.57 Prague became a city in mourning, with people openly crying in the streets. There was now a fundamental change in Czech politics. Munich ended the political diversity that had been a hallmark of the First Republic. In its place was a desire for national unity and strong, authoritarian government. Western democratic ideals, which had formerly been the basis for government, were now rejected. In this new, authoritarian political climate the state centralised all institutions. Sokol for example, the nationalistic gymnastic organisation, took over all youth activities including the Boy Scouts. Separate legislatures were created in Slovakia and Ruthenia and there was also a return to religion, including Catholicism. All this contributed to efficient government. The main emphasis in Czech foreign policy was the desire to ally herself closely with Germany. The immediate result was the appointment of a new Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, who epitomised the new Czech subservience to Germany. His first request was that Germany should guarantee the new Czechoslovak state, but he was informed that this would not be done until all outstanding questions had been settled. One concerned the Hungarian minority. Hungary tried to exploit Czechoslovakia’s weakness, appealing again for German support and claiming that Hitler had promised Pressburg (Slovak: Bratislava) to Hungary. This new Hungarian demand created problems for Hitler. His dream of expansion eastward assumed that both the Czech

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and Slovak lands would become German puppet states. Hungary had recently announced a large military budget and had designs on the whole of Slovakia and the Ruthene area. If Hungary got these, it would block German eastward expansion. There was also the danger, from Hitler’s point of view, that if Hungary gained the Ruthene territory she would have a common frontier with Poland. There had already been signs that these two countries had tried to form a common policy against Czechoslovakia and they might do the same against Germany. The German army expressed a similar fear and recommended that Slovakia should not be separated from the rest of the remaining Czech state. The initial German reply to Hungarian demands on 6 October was therefore evasive. Events in Slovakia had their own momentum however. On 6 October the Slovak Government was created under Tiso and announced an anti-Jewish policy and a willingness to settle outstanding territorial issues. From the German point of view, these events appeared promising. A memorandum prepared by the Political Department of the German Foreign Office for Hitler on 7 October recommended that Slovakia should be made dependent on the Czech Government.58 It would then be relatively easy to control if Germany dominated the Czech lands. Slovakia would became a puppet state. It was unlikely that Slovakia could become economically independent, but the country did have natural resources of timber and minerals. It also had part of the Czech armaments industry. The memorandum opposed a Hungarian–Slovak or Polish–Slovak union. Poland had been strengthened by seizing Teschen and might try to get Slovakia as well. As to the eastern Ruthene area, it was in Germany’s interest that this too should be dependent on Slovakia and the Czech lands. Germany might expand eastwards beyond the Ruthene province, and could use these as the basis for an enlarged Ukraine, which could include Ukrainians in Poland as well. Germany’s policy should therefore be to encourage all people in this region to demand self-determination, since this would keep Hungary and Poland out. As to the German population of Slovakia, Hitler had no intention of moving them. They could form the nucleus for further German expansion eastwards. German troops had meanwhile advanced to the demarcation line (the new frontier) agreed by Germany and the other powers. Control of the Sudeten territory had begun cautiously: initially Freikorps, SS and police were not allowed to take independent action. Nor were party leaders allowed to enter the new territory on 6 October. But once the transfer

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was completed Hitler paid a visit. He found that the Czech defences had been much stronger than he had imagined. If the invasion had gone ahead as planned, progress would have been much slower than expected and there would have been considerable loss of life. It would thus have been impossible to defeat Czechoslovakia before France could mobilise. Hitler also realised how valuable the defensive system and armaments were. He therefore decided that the Czechs should not be allowed to remove any guns or ammunition. On 8 October an order was issued to this effect, reinforcing the earlier action by German troops in stopping Czechs removing anti-tank defences. By 10 October the German advance had been completed. Czechoslovakia had lost 39.7 per cent of its industry and 42.8 per cent of its factory workers.59 Refugees were leaving the Sudetenland for the Czech state; a total of 160,000– 170,000 Czechs, anti-fascist Germans and Jews fled.60 In the final stage of the transfer German soldiers were entering territory that was at most 51 per cent German and contained a great many Czechs. This can be seen very clearly in the case of Opava, where German propaganda photographs showed a sea of German banners and gave the impression that most if not all of the population was Sudeten German. The reality was far different. The total population of the district of Opava was 64–66,000.61 Of these the Czech population of the town of Opava was 21,518 in 1930 and 9,452 in 1939. In the district of Opava the figures were 31,765 in 1930 and 26,498 in 1939. To the east, in the adjoining district of Bilovec, the figures tell a similar story: 40,025 Czechs in 1930 and 34,132 in 1939. The town of Opava was far from being totally German and Czechs were expelled or fled in large numbers. This example explains why some photographs, taken by inhabitants and not Nazi press photographers, tell a different story. In this case the soldiers received a far less enthusiastic welcome. In the village of Batosˇovice, about 35 km (20 miles) south-west of Ostrava, very few villagers made the Nazi salute as German troops entered on 10 October.62 Most people seem to be looking on in sullen silence. Frantisˇek Klecˇka, who lived there, said it only had a small German minority. The official German report in the Lagebericht of 19 March spoke of a muted and hostile atmosphere (Die Stimmung des Volkes ist verbissen und keineswegs freundlich) in the occupied territory.63 A military parade by a panzer division on the 19th (a Sunday) helped to emphasise German power. This was typical of the final stage of the German occupation.

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Some Czech villages lay within the Sudetenland and were incorporated into Germany. One example is the district of Sˇumvald north of Olomouc.64 In 1930 it had a Czech population of about 63,500; in 1939 this had fallen to about 47,500. Areas such as this, which had a predominantly Czech population, were more forcibly Germanised than those in the Protectorate. The active discrimination took the form of prohibition of all Czech cultural activities, the use of German instead of Czech in primary schools, the closing of secondary schools, the seizing of Czech farms, the expulsion of farmers and the imposition of forced labour. Czechs were also treated much more harshly by the courts than Sudeten Germans.65 To complete the process of Germanisation, Volksdeutsch such as Gottfried Terza and his wife, Tyrolean Germans from Bolzano, were brought to take the place of Czechs who were expelled. The remaining Germans lived in Prague, Brno and some isolated areas. These people had assumed that the Munich settlement would bring them similar benefits to those living in the Sudetenland. Their resentment was matched by that of the Czechs who saw the whole affair as a tragedy for their country. The rights of these German citizens had been guaranteed by the Czechoslovak Government and the International Commission had ordered the British Legion to protect them. But there was a risk that they would be persecuted or would at least face opposition from Czechs. This caused Keitel, the supreme army commander, to inform the German Foreign Ministry on 10 October: ‘If the situation in Bru¨nn and Iglau assumes a threatening character for the Germans living there, it is to be reckoned with that the Fu¨hrer will order the immediate entry of German troops into those areas.’ 66 This was an example of Hitler’s aggressive language and did not necessarily represent what was happening elsewhere in the Sudetenland. For example, when Eric Pasold returned to Fleissen he found a town that was quiet and little changed apart from swastika flags and having to drive on the right hand side of the road. There was a shortage of coins, which were being hoarded, and people used postage stamps instead.67 In Asch a similar action was taken, except that the stamps were overprinted, and given ten times their nominal value. The exchange rate was changed from 1 crown ¼ 834 pfennigs to 1 crown ¼ 10 pfennigs by the army and finally to 1 crown ¼ 12 pfennigs by Go¨ring on 10 October. This made him popular until people realised that they were no better off since costs were higher in Germany. It did however make items in the Sudeten German

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shops very cheap for Germans from the Reich and led to a large influx of Germans looking for goods that were not only cheap but more easily found than in Germany.68 The completion of the German occupation and the Polish seizure of land had a profound effect on the Czech economy. Not only was a large part of the industrial capacity of the state lost, but so too was a large part of the assets of the major banks. For example, the Bo¨hmische Union Bank (‘BUB’), founded in 1872, had branches throughout the Sudetenland. It kept its German character during the First Czechoslovak Republic and had many Jewish customers. The transfer of the branches in the Sudetenland to German control officially dated from 1 November 1938, but even before then many branches had notices ‘Deposits for Deutsche Bank accepted here’. Eventually Deutsche Bank took 23 branches, transferring the assets and liabilities. BUB only kept a few named customers. Separating these branches from the head office in Prague proved very difficult.69 The incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany also had an effect on all road and rail traffic. On 11 October W. Hough wrote to Halifax from the British legation in Prague that the railways through the occupied territories were not working round Bohumin.70 This had been one of the key railway terminals that originally had linked Vienna with St Petersburg and Prague with the Slovak lands. Hough reported that the railway from Poland had been torn up near the frontier. This line was the only one to Constanzia, the oil terminal in Romania, though the line had been blocked by congestion and there were in any case few oil tanker trucks. If this report by Hough is correct – Prague is over four hours by train from Bohumin and this may have been no more than an exaggerated rumour – it was probably intended by Czechs or Poles to block railway links between the coal and steel city of Ostrava and Germany. Navigation on the Elbe, which normally carried goods almost to the Czechoslovak frontier, was also temporarily suspended. This was a serious blow to Britain, because the consignment of 200 tons of armour plates for the Admiralty had not yet been sent from Vı´tkovice. Newton confirmed this by telegram on 13 October. Fortunately for the Admiralty, on 15 October Kennard, the British ambassador in Warsaw, was able to report that the Polish Ministry of Foreign affairs had approved arrangements for forwarding the armour plate from Bohumin through Poland.

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If people in England thought that the Munich Agreement would usher in a period of peaceful relations with Germany, they soon found they were mistaken. On 11 October, the day after the Sudetenland had been finally incorporated into Germany, Hitler gave a speech in Saarbru¨cken.71 In it he claimed credit for bringing 10 million Germans into Germany and made it clear that he regarded this now as solely a matter of internal German politics. Instead of expressing gratitude to England for helping to bring this about he said that there were English politicians who were a threat to peace. He named Duff Cooper, Eden and Churchill as warmongers (Duff Cooper and Eden had both resigned from the Government). He also made it clear that he regarded the threat from these men as very serious. He said there was a danger from international Judaism and Bolshevism, but his call for redoubled efforts to strengthen Germany’s western defences showed that he regarded the threat as coming from the west, not the east. There was strong reaction in Britain to this, which was reported by Dirksen, the German ambassador in England, to State Secretary Weizsa¨cker. The point of view repeatedly emphasised by our friends in the Conservative Party seems to me to be particularly worthy of attention. It is said that the Fu¨hrer, by mentioning Churchill, Eden, and above all Duff Cooper,72 has given these individuals just the opportunity for emerging once more from the eclipse which they had suffered. The mere fact that the Fu¨hrer actually considered them worthy of mention gives them a platform from which to publicize their views and aims with some hope of a hearing from the public. Chamberlain’s position is thought to have been made thereby more difficult . . .73 The real purpose of Hitler’s speech was to prepare the German people for war at some point. He had been denied the military conquest of Czechoslovakia. Keitel’s earlier threat of war was also reflected in a request to the German ambassador in Tokyo to find out what Japan’s reaction would be to a European war.74 On 12 October Hitler informed the Foreign Minister that he did not want to hold any more plebiscites and the International Commission should be closed as soon as possible. This would leave all matters to be discussed by German and Czech

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officials, with the inevitable results. Hitler also wanted to create effective links between Germany and Austria and said that Germany should aim to persuade the Czechs to allow a motorway and rail link to be built from Breslau to Vienna via Brno. He also planned to seize the important Vı´tkovice steelworks in Ostrava at some time: Regarding the Ma¨hrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz area, the State Secretary is to ask the Polish Ambassador to come to see him and to tell him the following: In contrast to Germany’s lack of interest in Oderberg75, she is interested in Ma¨hrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz. Future developments will decide whether Ma¨hrischOstrau and Witkowitz are to remain in Czechoslovakia. If the future of these areas comes up for discussion, we shall demand a plebiscite under international control. As to the question of Hungary, Hitler’s view was that the Hungarians had missed an opportunity to get the territory they wanted earlier. The Fu¨hrer invited the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign minister to visit him at Obersalzburg and there advised them both to press their cause somewhat more energetically. In the critical days which followed, the Hungarians did nothing and this explains their present difficult diplomatic situation. Hitler considered that Hungary should get the area in Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians and that Germany would do nothing to stop her. To reach a decision, discussions were held the following week between Germany, Czechoslovakia and Italy about the Slovak territory that should be given to Hungary. Slovaks and Hungarians both claimed Pressburg (Slovak: Bratislava), once the city in which Hungarian kings had been crowned, the industrial city of Kashau (Slovak: Kosˇice) and a number of towns of regional importance. Meanwhile, Czech troops were occupying the southern Slovak frontier area and Ruthenia. The frontier had also been strengthened with an efficient system of bunkers that had been built since 1936.76 Neither side would give way and appealed to Germany and Italy to arbitrate. Germany firmly rejected a Hungarian suggestion that the matter should be decided by a four-power conference (similar to Munich). Finally, on 31 October Hitler and

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Mussolini reluctantly agreed to act as arbiters and a meeting was held in Vienna on 2 November.77 Weizsa¨cker made it quite clear to the major powers that the International Commission set up to settle the Czech–German dispute would not be invited to take part. Poland and Romania, which also had interests in the outcome, were also excluded, though Poland received some small areas of territory on the northern and eastern borders. The Vienna arbitration finally completed the division of Czechoslovakia into ethnic parts. Czechoslovakia lost 4,760 square miles of territory and 972,092 of its population according to the 1930 census. In the Slovak part just over half – 53.9 per cent – were Hungarian. Hungary’s population increased by 11.7 per cent and the territory by 13 per cent. Czecho-slovakia, as it now was, kept Bratislava but lost Kosˇice (70,000 inhabitants) and Uzˇhorod (27,000). But this did not mark the end of Hitler’s ambition in what remained of Czechoslovakia. On 21 October he ordered the army to be ready at any time: 1. To defend German frontiers and protect Germany against surprise air attacks. 2. To liquidate the remaining Czech state. 3. To occupy Memelland.78 Czechoslovakia had now lost about 30 per cent of her territory. The economy had been severely damaged, and it was widely expected that there would be high unemployment in the coming winter. The results for the population of the remaining Czech lands were serious and long lasting.

The consequences of Munich: political terror and the refugee crisis The transfer of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany had three important results. It fatally undermined the economic viability of the remaining Czech and Slovak lands. After Hitler’s threats, many of the Czech inhabitants felt they would not be able to live safely in the Sudetenland and fled to the Czech state, taking as much of their money as possible. This made the economic situation there worse. People who knew they would be victimised by the new regimes –

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principally Jews and members of German opposition parties who had attacked Nazi Germany – knew they also had to leave. This threw much of the textile trade into confusion, because most of the wholesale merchants were Jewish and they left unpaid bills.79 The result was a flood of refugees from the Sudetenland. The same was true of the area in north Moravia occupied by Polish forces. Here there were similar reasons – the fear of ethnic persecution and the awareness of Polish anti-Semitism. This drove people from their homes. Hitler’s orders to the army referred to above make it only too plain that these fears were fully justified. In the case of Czechs, the statements made by refugees to officials in the regional office in Plzenˇ are witness to the scale of human distress.80 The following examples reveal this human disaster. Rudolf Plesˇa´k was born on 27 November 1889 in the village of Litice a few kilometres to the south-west of Plzenˇ.81 At the time of Munich he was working for a business preparing cooked meat in the nearby village of Sˇte˘novice, a few kilometres further out from Plzenˇ. The business was probably a small family-run shop with a kitchen attached, and he lived above it in a furnished flat that he owned that was valued at 120,000 crowns. He was also a member – probably an active member – of the Czech National party. When the Germans completed their seizure of territory, the new frontier put his village of Sˇte˘novice inside Germany. On 21 October the Gestapo arrested Rudolf – he was on their list of political Czech activists – and threatened to put him in prison. After being released, he fled to Plzenˇ. Va´clav Jakuba was born on 21 January 1911 in Dobrˇany, south-west of Plzenˇ and was employed at the large Sˇkoda factory in Plzenˇ.82 He too found himself within the German Reich and was required to attend German political meetings. As a Czech he felt himself threatened and moved to Plzenˇ. Va´clav Babka was born on 20 September 1891 in Tlucˇna´, west of Plzenˇ.83 He worked at the Sˇkoda factory for 24 years. After the German military occupation he was told at the new German administrative office that there would be restrictions imposed in the frontier zone. He thought this would stop him working at the Sˇkoda factory and came to live in Plzenˇ. Josefa Kocˇarkova´ was a widow, born on 18 March 1895 who had been living at Strˇibo, some distance west of Plzenˇ.84 She too found herself

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living inside Germany. She had a small widow’s pension, but this was too small to meet her needs and she depended on money sent by her children. Under new German currency regulations the transfer of money would be forbidden. Immediately after the occupation, many people were arrested, some because they were on a list of political opponents, others simply at random. By 19 March the army, under orders from Neurath, had arrested 600 Communists. A week later this had risen to 2,500.85 They were interrogated by the Gestapo and then most, thoroughly frightened, were released.86 To hold an official post in a town was no protection. In letters of 9 November, it was reported that among the many people arrested in the small town of Kotterbad was the town’s Rechtsanwalt Dr Singer, who was almost certainly Jewish, together with the tenants of a lodging house for workers at a meat shop.87 One person, presumably a Slovak, was expelled and sent to Kosˇice. In another case, a number of citizens of a small village of Igla were arrested and later released with a caution. Scared by this news another person, unnamed, a tenant of a small business, also fled to Plzenˇ. These brief glimpses of life under German rule in the month following the German occupation throw considerable light on German aims in the new territory. In the case of Rudolf Plesˇa´k, the Gestapo crushed political opposition by driving people out of the German territory and into the Czech. The Gestapo were fulfilling the first order that had been given to the army before the occupation had begun, to destroy political parties. It is very unlikely that Rudolf was a major figure in the local Nationalist party. But to remove a local official from village life made sure that no one else would dare to oppose the new regime. Va´clav Babka was the victim of regulations intended to stop an extensive smuggling network that had developed and the widow Josefa Kocˇarova´ was penalised by currency regulations concerning the transfer of funds from one country to another. The case of Va´clav Jakuba shows how Hitler was putting pressure on the big Sˇkoda factory by interfering with the right of its employees to cross the frontier freely when travelling to and from work. The Germans could also cut supplies of coal from the west and north Bohemian coalfields owned by Sˇkoda that were now in Germany. The only remaining important sources of coal were in the Karvina´ area east of Ostrava, now under Polish control. The German seizure of the Sudetenland and the Polish extension of territory into

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North Moravia made it much more difficult for Sˇkoda to continue its armaments and industrial production. This reveals the extent of the economic disruption caused by the Munich Agreement. Equally important was the imposition of Nazi law on the territory transferred to Germany. The Sudeten German communities had been a refuge for Social Democrat and Communist opponents of Hitler and had also contained Jewish communities. These, and the people who sympathised with them, came under immediate attack. It was also an opportunity for rivals to settle old scores under the guise of enforcing the new political standards. A clear demonstration of this new Nazi policy is the example of Dr Otto Tippmann in the chemical town of Aussig (Czech: U´stı´ nad Labem). His case shows how dangerous pro-Jewish or pro-Social Democrat views could be under the new regime.88 Dr Tippmann was a doctor working for a chemical company in the town. On 19 October 1938 he was summoned to appear before a Gestapo tribunal to face eight charges. These were: 1. That he was doing the work of the Social Democrat Party [bei der Sozialdemokratischen Partei organisiert]. 2. He had personal connections with Director Mattl, a Social Democrat, the representative of the chief medical officer in the regional health fund in Aussig. 3. Following a statement by Director Prochaska, he had given information about the health fund to a reporter of a Jewish newspaper. 4. He had opposed the views of Dr Schwertner following the death of General Field Marshall von Hindenburg. 5. He had spoken against the choice of the SdP candidate in the newspaper Der deutsche Arzt. 6. He was a freemason. 7. How had he gained the post of factory doctor in a chemical firm? 8. He had treated Jewish patients. He was summoned to face these charges the following day before Dr Friedrich Tauber, the Bezirksa¨rztefu¨hrer, and two other judges. It showed how quickly medical services had been brought under political control. Under the Nazi Fu¨hrprinzip the leader at every level had absolute power. None of the acts that Dr. Tippmann was charged with

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had been illegal before the Sudetenland was transferred to Germany. It was only the absolute power of the Nazi state, with its hatred of Jews and of all political opposition, especially on the left, that had turned what had been normal life into illegal activity. Dr Tippmann was thus facing not only political-criminal charges but also accusations that could not only end his career as a doctor but send him to prison or concentration camp. Dr Tauber pointed out that he could avoid answering these charges by leaving Aussig and moving to Peterswald or Scho¨nwald, industrial towns near Ostrava. Dr Tippmann had no intention of giving in so easily and made a vigorous defence of his German background. He had been born in Aussig in 1893, the second of seven children. He attended Volkschule and Gymnasium in Aussig and studied medicine at the German university in Prague between 1912 and 1919, which included a period of military service in World War I. During this time he served on the front line first as a medical orderly in 1915 and in 1916 as medical lieutenant. He was twice wounded and decorated five times. After qualifying as a doctor he began work in Aussig in November 1922. He had married in May 1922 and at the time of the trial had a 15-yearold son, Paul. His marriage had ended in September 1936 and he had custody of his son. His former wife, Auguste (ne´e Schuma) was from a completely Arian family. In June 1938 he married Margaretha (ne´e Michel), also from a completely Arian family. She and her four sisters had been members of vo¨lkisch groups for a long time. His son, in the fifth class of the Aussig gymnasium, had been a member of the Turnerjugend for a long time. This information established Dr Tippmann as a German patriot, who had spent all his life in a German cultural environment. He had a distinguished war record and his private life had been impeccable. His two marriages were unblemished politically and his second wife and son had shown their German cultural affiliation by membership of German vo¨lkisch groups. On the more straightforward question of his political affiliation, he denied that he had ever been a member of the Social Democratic party and was not in sympathy with it. He had stated this to his colleague Dr Hu¨ttl. However, in this politically charged atmosphere, the information was not enough to clear Dr Tippmann of all charges. He had to show that he had personally been a true German patriot. His explanation of what a patriotic young German was likely to do during the rise of Henlein and

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the SdP shows the range of German patriotic groups in Sudeten society. Dr Tippmann explained that he came from a family of traditional German nationalists (national eingestellten Familie) and had always personally taken part in nationalist activities. While at university he had been in the Germania reading and speaking club and later joined other vo¨lkisch groups. Since the age of 26 he had been a member of the Ruderund Eislaufvereines Aussig 1874, from 1922 he had been in the Deutsche Turnverein Scho¨npreisen, and had been an active competitor. Since 1932 he had also been a member of the Deutsche Turnverein Aussig. This covered his principal cultural activities. While at school he had also been a member of the Bund der Deutschen in Bo¨hmen and for many years had been a member of the Deutscher Kulturverband. As a public-spirited German he had also been doctor for a volunteer fire brigade, the freiwillige Feuerwehr Scho¨npreisen. This participation in German cultural activities was important. So too was his sporting activity in gymnastics and running – he was well aware that Hitler laid great emphasis on physical activity that created strong, healthy German patriots. Finally, Dr Tippmann showed his support for SdP activities by pointing to the example of an unemployed SdP member, Frau Julia Do¨rfler, whom he had helped. He had also provided medical help for children’s holiday activities organised by Frau Richter, the Frauenschaftsfu¨hrerin. Turning to the specific charges, Dr Tippmann challenged them by pointing out that the charge concerning Dr Mattl could not be proven because he was dead. In any case, he had never had any political connection with him. As to the charge that he had defamed the memory of Hindenburg, he said that when he and others were in a coffee house, a colleague had expressed an opinion based on an article in the Social Democratic newspaper Volksrecht. He had merely replied that he stood by his own views (Und ich bleibe doch bei meine Meinung). A colleague, Dr Schwertner, had agreed to support this under oath. As a former frontline German soldier in the Austrian army in Russia and Albania he had the highest opinion of Hindenburg. Dr Tippmann also returned to the subject of his social activities by pointing out that he had held important posts in medical administration for a number of years, but none of these had been political. Dr Tippmann also had to deal with the charge that he was pro-Jewish and had helped to choose a Jewish doctor for the medical fund. This

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charge concerned the appointment of a Jewish doctor, Dr Heimburg, from Brno. Dr Tippmann’s defence was that he was never a member of the panel that made the appointment and he had no influence on its decisions. He then came to the central issue. He had been offered the post of doctor at a large chemical company in Aussig in January 1938. Knowing that Dr Tauber already held the post, he asked why he was being offered it. The director conducting the interview, Dr Rˇipa, said that the board had decided to appoint an Aussig doctor and that, if he did not accept, the post would be offered to someone else. Also, if the local German doctors created any difficulties the board would appoint a Czech doctor from Prague. Dr Tippmann asked for time to consider this offer, consulted the senior German doctor in Aussig and they agreed that it would be better to have a German doctor than a Czech. After further discussions, he had assumed that Dr Tauber was unable to continue to work full time at the factory. He accepted the offer and began work in November. There remained one charge: that he was a freemason, but he turned this to his advantage. He admitted being admitted to the Aussig lodge in November 1934 but claimed that he had done this because his former school friends from the Aussig gymnasium were also members. Far from being a secret society with anti-German aims, it turned out in Dr Tippmann’s description to have been yet another German patriotic group. The first duty of members, according to Dr Tippmann, was to be loyal to fellow Germans and their homeland (Volk und Heimat). The lodge was also committed to improving the conditions of Germans in the Czech state (which was also Henlein’s rallying cry). Members also tried to stem the influx of Jews into positions of authority in the Prague lodge. This was also deeply resented by the Czechs and eventually led to violence between the two groups in April 1938, which had to be put down by the police. At the end of the Gestapo interview Dr Tippmnn was told that he would be hearing further from the Bezirksa¨rztefu¨hrer (the leading Nazi doctor in the district) Dr Tauber. In two subsequent discussions with him, Dr Tauber said that he had complete confidence in Dr Tippmann’s patriotic attitude (vo¨lkische Gesinnung) and had always regarded him as a good German. He also said that he had not understood the way the Freemasons had worked and had been under a misunderstanding

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concerning his part in the appointment of the Jewish doctor. Although Dr Tippmann would not be able to continue his work in the medical finance office, Dr Tauber assured him that because he was of true German blood, Dr Tauber would help him find alternative employment and would recommend to the Gauaerztfu¨hrer, Dr Feitenhansl, to have all sanctions against him lifted. Finally, Dr Tippmann pointed out in his defence to the Gestapo that the charges against him had destroyed his career (meine wirtschaftliche Existenz), which he had followed in Aussig for 16 years. He said that all he now wanted was to remain in his home district (Heimat) and continue working. He admitted he had made mistakes, but he had never treated any Jews in private practice and was, above all, a completely German patriot. The case is interesting for a number of reasons. The first was the complete transformation of Sudeten German society by being incorporated into Germany. Attitudes and activities that had been acceptable and legal in the past could be, and often were, transformed into matters of almost life and death importance. A man like Dr Tippmann, a prominent member of the local German society in Aussig, could be dismissed from his post and have to face a Gestapo tribunal that could have sent him to prison or concentration camp. Local rivalries were emerging and old scores being settled. His acceptance of the job of factory doctor while it was still being held by a local Nazi lay behind the charges against him. He emerges from the detailed report as a distinguished war veteran, active in all aspects of social and cultural life in the German community, a man with a social conscience who was willing to take on onerous duties and was above all a ‘good German’. He also shared, or claimed to share, the Nazi hatred of Jews. But he was never a member of the Nazi party. The picture he gives of Aussig society also reveals the way that everything, including membership of the Freemasons, formed part of this inward-looking German culture, in which Czechs had no place. The suggestion by a Czech director that a Czech doctor from Prague might be appointed to a position was enough to make him want to accept the post. But the result was a lingering suspicion that he had been part of a conspiracy against Dr Tauber, whose position he had taken. When Dr Tauber was given the leading position in the local politico-medical Nazi heirachy, it was inevitable that he would try and get his revenge. Only his distinguished war record and

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impeccable German credentials saved Dr Tippmann from disgrace and an end to his medical career. To further emphasise his power, Dr Tauber made it clear that Dr Tippmann could not be reinstated, even though all charges against him had been proved false, but he would be offered another post through the goodwill of Dr Tauber. Nothing could demonstrate Nazi political power more clearly than this. Nazi pressure on all opponents, or perceived opponents, of the new regime forced many Czechs to abandon their homes and flee into Czech territory. It is impossible to know how many became refugees in this way. But in the case of the area occupied by Poland in North Moravia the position is much clearer. The Poles did not expel Czechs, nor did they arrest political opponents, but the new Polish authorities made it clear that they were going to increase the number of Poles living there. The basis of their claim to the land around Cˇesky´ Te˘sˇı´n and Karvina´ was that the majority of the inhabitants spoke Polish. Under the principle of self-determination this area, in Polish eyes, should have been given to Poland after World War I. But there were also important economic reasons why Poland wanted this area. One was the coalfield that formed an extension of the larger one in southern Poland and on which the iron and steel industry of Katovice was based. The other was the important iron and steel works at Trˇinec, which used coal from the Karvina´ coalmines. The seizure of this land by Poland at the beginning of October 1938 had been preceded by strong anti-Czech propaganda. This alone was enough to persuade many Czechs to flee when Polish troops arrived. Jews were also the subject of anti-Semitic propaganda and there were a number of Germans who also decided to leave. These people left at the rate of 80– 100 a day, beginning early in October 1938. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the total, not all of whom were given permission to stay, and the nationality. What is striking about these figures is the relatively small number of Germans among the refugees. The reason is political. Poland was unwilling to alienate Germans because Germany had shown such an aggressive attitude towards seizing the Sudetenland. The small number who were not categorised were a mixture of Slovaks, Ruthenes and Ukrainians who had come west in search of work. On the other hand, there were a number of Jews who took fright and left, many of them small shopkeepers and traders. The large numbers of Czechs posed a serious problem for the Czech authorities. They were temporarily housed

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Table 6.1 Date 12.11.1938 26.11.1938 15.12.1938 01.01.1939 31.01.1939 01.03.1939 01.04.1939 29.04.1939 01.06.1939

OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Number of refugees in Moravska´ Ostrava No. applying for refugee status

No. given permission

9,304 11,176 13,635 15,220 18,952 22,374 23,979 24,376 24,801

9,043 10,569 12,669 14,013 16,887 18,514 19,473 19,553 19,897

Source: Alesˇ Homan, ‘Moravska´ Ostrava jako u´tocˇisˇte˘ uprchlı´ku˚ z ne˘mecke´ho a polske´ho za´boru na podzim roku 1938’ [‘Moravian Ostrava as a refuge for the people fleeing from German and Polish occupation in the autumn of 1938’] in Ostrava prˇispe˘rky k de˘jina´m a soucˇasnosti ostravy a ostravska, 21, (Ostrava, 2003), p. 229.

by the Red Cross when they first arrived and personal details were registered. The majority were workers and many were already employed in Ostrava, but like those living near Plzenˇ, found themselves on the wrong side of the frontier. In the case of Ostrava, where the river formed the new frontier, the city was divided. Workers who were driven out of the Trˇinec iron and steel works could be employed by the larger Vı´tkovice company. There were also similar, though smaller, steel works in the surrounding area and, from that point of view, it was not impossible to find employment for many of the refugees. The cost of supporting those who had no work was high. These were not the only areas which changed hands. The Vienna arbitration had given a large part of southern Slovakia to Hungary. Pressburg (Bratislava) remained in Slovak hands but the industrial city of Kashau (Kosˇice) was given to Hungary, and Slovakia kept the cathedral city of Nitra. Details of the actual transfer of territory and the final frontier were to be agreed by a Hungarian– Czechoslovak commission. Transfer of the territory began on 5 November and ended five days later. On 2 November a report reached the Government in Bratislava that terrorists were being trained in Hungary who would be used to occupy Czechoslovak territory.89 Whether or not this was true, it soon emerged that the Hungarian soldiers who were sent to

HENLEIN'S ELECTION VICTORY Table 6.2 Date 12.11.1938 26.11.1938 15.12.1939 01.01.1939 31.01.1939 01.03.1939 01.04.1939 29.04.1939 01.06.1939

249

National structure of refugees Total

Czechs

Germans

Poles

Jews

Others

9.043 10,569 12,669 14,013 16,887 18,514 19,437 19,553 19,897

8,511 10,085 12,218 13,584 16,437 18,059 18,970 19,029 19,317

123 115 110 108 118 123 157 175 229

6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

353 324 311 304 308 308 308 309 309

50 45 30 17 24 24 37 39 41

Source: ibid.

occupy the land were terrifying the Slovak inhabitants. This ensured that they left and became refugees like the Czechs in the Sudetenland. Official complaints by the Slovak autonomous government such as that of 7 November had little or no effect. On 8 November, for example, there was a report concerning three people. These were police officer Michal M. and carpenter Emil S. in the village of Kra´l’ovsky´ Chlmec and Martin T. in the village of Mierovo, all of whom were forced to leave their homes. Some Czechs and Slovaks deeply resented this transfer of land to Hungary. The Minister of Education, M. Cˇernak, appealed to the intelligentsia not to leave, hoping to keep a Slovak presence in the area.90 Violence by Hungarian soldiers continued across the ceded territory and in some cases the local Hungarian population joined in, looting Slovak property. As the occupation continued, Hungarian police expelled Slovaks. The Hungarian threats were intended to be taken seriously. Those Slovaks who left, such as Jozef K., his wife Elisˇka and Katerina M. from the village of Blahova´-Bellova Ves, did so because they felt their lives were in danger.91 They left behind property and possessions worth 6,000 crowns. Others suffered greater losses. Jozef N. of the village of Lu´cˇ na Ostrove left behind property valued at 25,000 crowns.92 Many of those seized had been taken by Hungarian soldiers to the local police station, told to give their nationality and were then put on a bus and sent across the new frontier into Czechoslovakia. To make it appear that the Slovaks were leaving of their own free will, they were forced to sign documents

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to that effect. An alternative was to accuse them of having arms. They were then arrested, briefly imprisoned, their possessions and property were confiscated and they were expelled. In some cases, such as in the village of Nova´ Vieska, the local Hungarians were so confident that they did not wait for soldiers to arrive before expelling Slovak inhabitants.93 In the village of Gbelce, treatment of Slovaks was even worse. The Central Office of the Slovak League reported to the Czechoslovak Red Cross that villagers there were being killed by terrorists.94 By 20 November it had become clear that the Hungarians had decided to expel as many Slovaks as possible from the ceded territory. Official complaints by the Slovak autonomous government had no effect. The result was that the Slovak police decided to retaliate by expelling Hungarians, and anyone with a house in Hungary.95 The next day, 21 November, Hungary announced that it would send all remaining Slovak citizens out of the occupied territory.96 On 22 November the government in Prague passed a law granting autonomy to Slovakia and the Ruthene area.97 Two days later there was a report that all Czechoslovak nationals would be expelled from Hungary. Attacks on Czechoslovak citizens continued. On 25 November, three weeks after the signing of the arbitration award and the beginning of the Hungarian occupation, there was a report from Nove´ Za´mky that houses and shops belonging to Czechs, Slovaks and Jews had been looted and destroyed and 450 Jews expelled. The Slovak Government requested compensation and proposed to seize Hungarian property of the same value. By the end of November, Hungarian hatred of Czechoslovak property had resulted in the desecration of a monument to Czechoslovak soldiers in Lucˇenec. Life in general became even more difficult. Prices of food and household goods increased by up to 100 per cent and the exchange rate between the Hungarian pengo¨ and Czechoslovak crown changed to Hungary’s advantage. The Slovak school became Hungarian – forcing any remaining Slovaks to have their children educated in Hungarian – and the local branch of Bat’a was been taken over by the Hungarian firm Ika.98 Finally, there were attempts by Hungarian soldiers in some areas to force Slovaks to sign a petition asking for their villages to be annexed to Hungary. At the beginning of December the Slovak authorities finally retaliated and also began negotiations for the transfer of the remaining Slovaks to Slovakia. They also offered to stop the expulsion of Hungarians if the Hungarian authorities stopped harassing Slovaks.99 In spite of all

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complaints by the Slovak Government, attacks, harassment, arrest, torture and beating of Slovak citizens in the occupied territory continued at least to the end of March. By then many Slovaks had left and the administration and all aspects of social life had become Hungarian. The theme that runs through this chapter is Hitler’s success in destroying Czechoslovakia. He persuaded Chamberlain, through Henlein’s propaganda, that the Sudetenland was on the brink of civil war. He posed as the popular hero of the Germans there. He claimed that the settlement of this matter would bring lasting peace and that it would be his last claim to territory. But Hitler knew that Poland and Hungary also wanted to seize parts of Czechoslovakia and that he could present the crisis as likely to lead to a European war. No one challenged this. His stage management of the Munich Conference was masterly. He pretended that he had not seen Mussolini’s proposals and said he considered that they would bring lasting peace. It needed comparatively little time to persuade Chamberlain to accept them, because he knew that many British Conservatives thought that Czechoslovakia was worth sacrificing for the sake of peace. Once the agreement had been signed, the safeguards were not worth the paper they were written on. For example, the German advance into the Sudetenland was so rapid – only ten days – that decisions on which troops should be used for international supervision were overtaken by events. Germany supplied all the important maps showing the population statistics. These were not challenged. Germany’s refusal to give way on any important matter, whether it concerned the proportion of Germans in an area or the economic effect of land allocation, left the Czechs little choice but to accept. Leaving disputes to be decided by German and Czech officials merely put more power into German hands. The transfer of land to Germany, Poland and Hungary resulted in forms of ethnic cleansing. The entry of German troops between lines of cheering, flag-waving Sudeten Germans was a carefully staged propaganda event. The reality was different, as Eric Pasold made clear. Many Sudetens had not wanted to become German citizens, subject to oppressive Nazi control. The Czechs, abandoned by their former allies, were powerless to resist and even before the creation of the Protectorate in March 1939, the remainder of Bohemia and Moravia had become in effect a German client state that was barely economic. This was the legacy of Munich.

CONCLUSION

The Munich Conference and the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany marked Hitler’s success in manipulating Sudeten German resentment. It also destroyed the hopes of liberal democracy in Central Europe. All Masaryk’s expectations about creating a harmonious, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic state that could provide a legitimate homeland for Czechs and Slovaks had been destroyed. His work had been continued by Benesˇ, who put his faith in the League of Nations and international agreements designed to protect the new state. Early in the history of the First Czechoslovak Republic Masaryk and Benesˇ had also taken the precaution of creating international alliances. The Little Entente had joined Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia in mutual defence against Hungary, which had lost a great deal of territory to each of the Little Entente’s members. Alliances with France and Russia had promised, in Czech eyes, that two major countries would protect Czechoslovakia against any attack. The reality was that France had tried to protect herself against Germany by encircling her with states linked to France. The alliance was not intended primarily to defend France’s allies. In the Sudeten crisis France was unable to support Czechoslovakia because of political and economic weakness. Nor was Russia able to provide the help it had promised. This was partly because any military assistance would only be given if France acted first. It was also difficult for Russia to assist Czechoslovakia because there was no direct land link between the two countries and because Russia’s military forces had been seriously weakened by Stalin’s purges. These alliances were backed by the League of Nations, a new and untried international body supported by most major powers. Benesˇ was

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in charge of foreign policy until he was forced to resign after the Munich Conference and the subsequent transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. He was careful, kindly, methodical, a good negotiator and extremely hard working and put his trust in what appeared, on paper, to be castiron security. But it became clear in the early 1930s that the League of Nations lacked the unity and power to control large nations when they attacked others who were weaker. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and Japan’s invasion of Manchuria revealed the weakness of international guarantees. In Abyssinia’s case the lapse was even more serious: it was a member of the League of Nations. Hitler also challenged international agreements. His announcement that Germany would re-arm was in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. It threatened Czechoslovakia and the Government took steps to improve its defences. With the help of France, an elaborate system of blockhouses was devised to protect the vulnerable area of North Moravia and defend Prague. A line of defences was constructed close to the frontier west of Ostrava that could have at least slowed any German invasion sufficiently to have given France and Russia the chance to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia. The French Maginot Line, on which the Czechoslovak system was based, has been dismissed as useless because in 1940 it failed to halt the German advance. But in the case of Czechoslovakia the defences would have blocked the most likely area of a German attack. A similar line close to the southern Czechoslovak–Hungarian frontier was designed to stop any weaker Hungarian invasion. The Czechoslovak Maginot line was an efficient system of carefully related block houses of different sizes and with different levels of armament, giving mutual support. With the transfer of the Sudetenland, this was lost to Germany and the Czech lands were defenceless. Even then, the quality of the Czech weapons – especially tanks, artillery and light machine guns – used by men determined to fight for their country, might have forced France’s allies to come to her aid. At the very least, the Czechoslovak forces could have fought bravely like the Poles in September 1939 and in view of the initial German weakness in its equipment, the result would not necessarily have been the quick victory that Hitler expected. The key factor would have been the relative strength of the two air forces, and it is clear that in this respect the Czechoslovak was no match for the German. The cavalier treatment of Czechoslovakia at Munich and the obvious desire of Britain and France

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to abandon the country destroyed the Czechoslovak will to resist a German invasion. But it is unlikely that Czech military action would have been the spark to begin World War II. Hitler, who apparently possessed great powers of leadership, determination and political courage, was in reality a gambler. Although, once launched, his invasion would have been difficult to stop, effective action by the large French army might have had some effect. All this is speculation and probably pointless as no such action took place, though there has been considerable speculation. As the German documents show, Hitler never launched the planned military attack on Czechoslovakia, because he feared possible French reaction. Instead, he exaggerated the civil unrest in the Sudetenland. He also used Henlein to persuade Chamberlain and other British statesmen of its seriousness and claimed that he would be forced to invade Czechoslovakia to protect fellow Germans. Chamberlain, remembering the human cost of World War I, was easily persuaded. Many other influential British people considered that Czechoslovakia was not worth defending and some even thought it should never have been created in the first place. Another question is whether Czechoslovakia could have been saved if Masaryk and Benesˇ’ policy towards the Sudeten Germans had been different. Given their initial hostility to being transferred to another state and losing their formerly privileged status, it is unlikely that Sudeten Germans could have become good Czechoslovak citizens. Masaryk’s claim that the new state could become another Switzerland was based on a false understanding of the political and social basis of that state. It might on the other hand have been no more than wishful thinking or a chance remark. Nor could the Czechoslovak Government allow the Sudeten Germans to join Germany and Austria. As a result, their attempt to break away from the new Czechoslovak state was crushed with some loss of life and the creation of martyrs. Exiles in Austria and Germany kept the idea alive that sometime they could return and regain their former status. But the episode had persuaded Czechs that the Sudedten Germans could never be trusted and they were denied equality with the Czechs and Slovaks. The promise, enshrined in the Versailles settlement, that they could have their own schools and cultural organisations failed to give them the social position that they wished for. Instead they were able to live a virtual separate existence within Czechoslovakia, providing a German life from the cradle to the

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grave, much as they had enjoyed under the Habsburgs. This became significant after the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. The ´ stı´ nad Labem showed that proof of loyalty example of Dr Tippmann in U to the new regime depended on evidence of participating in German education and cultural activities. Another question is whether greater economic success would have persuaded Sudeten Germans to become loyal citizens of the new state. Work, full employment and the prosperity resulting from this would certainly have done much to ease the social tensions, especially since Sudeten Germans felt that the Czech-dominated Government was actively favouring the Czechs. But in this case the new international economic and industrial situation was against them. Many firms in West Bohemia had supplied luxury goods for the heads of state, aristocrats and the wealthy who had visited the spas of Karlsbad and Marianbad. After 1918 this trade declined and there was no suitable alternative market for these goods in the new Czechoslovakia. Other firms had exported their goods throughout the Austro –Hungarian Empire. Before 1918 the industries of Bohemia and Moravia produced goods that were superior to anything made further east, especially since Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary were mainly agricultural. All this changed after 1918. Romania and Bulgaria were enlarged at the expense of Hungary, and all these states tried to establish their own industries, often using old equipment bought from Czechoslovakia. The countries raised tariffs to protect their new firms and benefited from the cheaper labour to keep prices down. In addition, before 1918 companies had often divided their manufacturing between different factories: for example spinning had been in one place, weaving in another. Firms had also obtained their raw materials from other parts of the Habsburg Empire. Before 1918 this had not been a problem because there had been no internal tariffs. But after 1918 the position was different. Companies had to be reformed to cope with this new situation. In addition, the demand that all companies in Czechoslovakia should be owned and run by citizens of the new state forced Sudeten Germans to either become Czechoslovak citizens or live in Austria and control their firms through Czech or Slovak agents. None of this was likely to win the support of the Sudeten Germans. These included wealthy, aristocratic Austrian families such as Ringhoffer, whose company made railway carriages for heads of state and aristocracy and the Larisch family who owned coal mines east of Ostrava.

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Where firms were controlled by Austrian banks through majority share holding, these shares and the power they gave passed to Czechoslovak banks, many of which received substantial amounts of capital from Britain, France and America. Nor was it easy to see how the Sudeten German firms, producing mainly consumer goods, could regain their former prosperity. There were some exceptions, but these achieved their success by developing export markets, especially with Britain. These included the Pa¨sold family’s textile firm in Fliessen in West Bohemia. Not only was Britain still one of the richest countries in the world, but London provided access to the very large British Empire market. Technical and artistic expertise played an essential part in developing these new markets for Czechoslovak companies, though later, in the Depression, there was fierce competition from companies elsewhere. The other way to enlarge and maintain their sales was through membership of international cartels. If the company was sufficiently large and already had a share of the international market, it could command an equivalent place in the cartel. But in other cases, this was not an option. It was expensive to join and provide guarantees. This put it out of reach of smaller companies such as Brankauer near Ostrava, whose extensive lock-making market collapsed after 1918 because of Romanian and Hungarian tariffs. The firm eventually became part of the American Yale and Towne company and survived the Depression. There is also the question whether the Czech-dominated Government could have done more to improve the lives of Sudeten Germans and minimise the latter’s sense of unequal and unfair treatment. This would have been difficult to achieve without giving back to the Sudeten Germans their former dominant position in society. The creation of German-speaking areas within the state made it inevitable that there would be little contact between the two groups. Few Germans made an effort to learn Czech, partly because they did not need it for their normal lives, but also because they would have been forced to recognise the equal status of Czechs. As a result, it was easy for both sides to believe rumours about the other and assume that because the Czechs had political control they would inevitably use this to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the Sudeten Germans. One point that the Sudeten Germans failed to appreciate was the need to give financial and administrative support to the Slovak area as well. This lacked raw materials and very much industry. Its agriculture was

CONCLUSION

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also less advanced. The soil was less fertile and there had been little attempt under Hungarian rule to advance the living standards of Slovaks. Czech help with administration, and the tendency to buy and close down inefficient Slovak firms, did not endear Slovaks to Czechs either, and helped to create the Slovak desire for independence at the time of the Sudeten crisis. Benesˇ and the Czechoslovak Government could also be accused of increasing tension between Czechs and Germany. After Hitler came to power, many Jews and left wing politicians fled to Czechoslovakia. Being German speakers, they settled among Sudeten Germans. This need not have caused trouble. But many continued their political activity, attacking Hitler and the Nazi state in newspapers and with a clandestine radio station. Benesˇ could have stopped this. But he chose to allow it, partly because he was strongly opposed to Nazi policies and partly because he relied on Czech and Sudeten German socialist parties for political support. All Czechoslovak governments were coalitions because of the many political parties and Benesˇ could not easily take effective action without alienating his supporters. When he or his ministers were challenged about this by German diplomats, they claimed they were unaware of it and would take all necessary steps to halt it. They seldom did, and Benesˇ was regarded by Germans as wily and untrustworthy – ‘the fox’, in the words of one diplomat. In any case, Nazi organisations in Germany did exactly the same, attacking Czechoslovakia. German diplomats in Prague tried to prevent this, because they wanted to maintain good relations with the Czechoslovak Government, but with limited success. Also, whenever Sudeten Germans were arrested for political activity, a similar number of Czechs were arrested in Germany and accused of spying, or a similar, general charge was made against them. As the Sudeten crisis developed, the Germans began to arrest more Czechs for each Sudeten German that the Czech police arrested. Benesˇ was apparently overconfident that he could solve problems of this sort by giving elaborate explanations, which could be understood and appreciated. This tended to turn meetings into lectures. Eisenlohr, a German diplomat in Prague, describes one meeting as a three-hour lecture. It failed to persuade Eisenlohr and merely reinforced Benesˇ’ reputation as an experienced but devious politician. In any case, Nazi policy was to make outrageous claims about Czechoslovakia, especially in its relations with Russia, which Germany claimed was undermining

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German– Czechoslovak relations. When the Czechoslovak ambassador in Berlin protested that the charges were untrue, his claims were dismissed: he did not know his own government’s policy. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see how the Sudeten German situation could have been improved without undermining the unity of the state. Hitler’s claims for autonomy, through Henlein, were designed to create a federal state, which the Czechoslovak Government could not accept. Sudeten German claims that they were loyal to the state as an institution but not to the Czech interpretation fail to carry weight. Nor could the economy of the Sudeten German areas have been improved without a reordering of economic relations between Czechoslovakia and her former trading partners, now independent states. It is hard to see how this could have been achieved under the circumstances. If the events of the 1920s and 1930s were, under the circumstances, inevitable, could more have been done to reveal the true conditions of life in the Sudetenland, which, though serious, were not as bad as Henlein and Hitler claimed? To do so would have required British diplomats in Prague to be completely even handed in their relationship with Czechs and Sudeten Germans. But although German was widely spoken, Czech was not. Newton, for example, was sent from Berlin to Prague during the Sudeten crisis and did not have time to become fluent in the language. British diplomats may also have spent less time in Prague than the Germans. Dr Koch, the principal German diplomat at the Prague legation in the 1920s and 1930s, was there for ten years. Relations between foreign diplomats and the Czechoslovak Government could only be established gradually with the development of mutual confidence. At no time was the pro-German bias of British officials shown more clearly than in the visit by Runciman at the height of the Sudeten crisis. Not only was he totally unsuited to the task of mediation, but he showed himself more at ease with Germans than Czechs, spending his weekends with wealthy Sudeten Germans and giving little time to Czechs. His experience as a shipping magnate who negotiated with British trade union officials was no preparation for arguments about the extremely complicated claims by both sides, which left him and his aides very confused. Would it have been better, as some senior British statesmen believed, that Czechoslovakia had never been created? It is difficult to see how this

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could have happened. Nationalism is potentially dangerous and unstable and, although it only seldom showed itself in assassination, it had undermined political unity in multi-national states before World War I. The Czech belief that they deserved at the very least a degree of autonomy within the Austro – Hungarian Empire had existed from the last decades of the nineteenth century. The growth of Czech self-confidence with the development of industry had led to the building of the Czech national theatre in Prague and the creation of Czech savings banks. In World War I the e´migre´ Czechs in Paris had demanded increased Czech political power. To counter this the Government in Vienna was considering giving some autonomy to Czechs at least in Bohemia, where they formed a majority of the population. Whether this could have been done, however, is debatable, given the likely Austrian opposition and the previous disunity of Czech politicians. Growing industrial development and with it rising Czech self-confidence, especially in North Moravia, would have increased Czech demands. Furthermore, the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 was part of a much greater reorganisation of national boundaries within Europe that was designed to eliminate the nationalism that had ‘caused’ World War I. If Czechs had been merely given a measure of autonomy in Bohemia and no action had been taken elsewhere in Europe, the problem of Serb and Romanian nationalism would have remained with the risk of further Balkan wars. These problems appear in hindsight to have been so severe that it is hard to see how the statesmen at Versailles could have solved them in any other way, given the circumstances of the time. It is also clear that, under similar circumstances, Germany tried to treat Russia in a similar way in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. By creating an independent Ukraine, which threatened the supply of grain and coal to Russia, that country would have been deprived of the main source of her food and industrial power and seriously weakened. This was Germany’s aim: to weaken a potential future enemy. Without fundamental changes to the Treaty of Versailles and abandoning volatile national minorities, it is hard to see how the history of Europe could have been changed in the 1930s. In the early 1930s, in spite of the Depression, Czechoslovakia remained stable. The Czech police maintained law and order and there was no risk of attack by

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Germany or Hungary. However, the appointment of Hitler as chancellor in Germany made some form of fundamental change inevitable. Not only was he determined that Germany should regain her place in the world, but she should also expand. The only area where he could do this was to the east, where Germany faced economically and militarily weak states. The Depression played into his hands, allowing Germany to gain access to oil by buying Romanian wheat: Romania was one of the major oil producers, though the industry was mostly in foreign hands. Large-scale German purchase of Romanian oil did not begin until the outbreak of World War II for this reason. But before then Romania had to repay French loans. It could not do this with wheat, which France bought more cheaply from America. Instead, Germany bought Romanian agricultural produce at favourable rates and supplied manufactured goods in return. In this way Germany gained control of the Romanian economy. This weakened the Little Entente. Germany was also able to destabilise Central European politics by opening relations with Hungary, which had never accepted the loss of territory to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Hitler could also appeal to Austrians as fellow Germans, although the attempted seizure of power by Nazis in the 1920s was crushed. Italian support blocked Hitler’s further moves in that direction until Italy and Germany had formed an alliance – the Pact of Steel – and Hitler was able to gain Austria by the threat of force. The social and economic problems in the Sudetenland played into Hitler’s hands. In Henlein he had a man who was able to persuade all who met him that he was honest and straightforward. His claims that conditions in the Sudetenland were extremely serious were backed by evidence that could be checked, though Henlein exaggerated their significance. Henlein’s claims that he was acting independently of Hitler were also believed, increasing his credibility. Pro-German sentiment in Britain was also a major advantage, even though Britain had no alliance with Czechoslovakia and should not have been involved in the dispute. Lack of knowledge of the country and a lack of interest in supporting it against the more favoured Germany, sealed Czechoslovakia’s fate. The ability of Hitler and other senior Nazis to lie persuasively also played an important part. The Munich Conference revealed the weakness of international treaties and institutions and, under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that subsequently the Czechoslovak Government

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decided to expel the Sudeten German population and finally end the problem. Czechoslovakia, abandoned by its allies and lacking the means of defending itself, was dismembered by Germany, Poland and Hungary and the Slovaks became independent German puppets. This marked the end of Czechoslovakia as a liberal, Western-orientated, democratic state.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Kurt Rabel, Staatsbu¨rgerliche Loyalita¨t in den Bo¨hmischen La¨ndern zwischen 1914 und 1938 (Munich, 1959). 2. Ve˘ra´ Olivova´, ‘The Czechoslovak government and its “disloyal” opposition 1918– 1938’ in J. Morison, The Czech and Slovak experience (London, 1992).

Chapter 1 Czechs vs Germans; Roles Reversed 1. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her successors; the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences 1919– 1937 (London, 1937), pp. 206– 7. 2. R. E. Herzstein, Waldheim; the missing years (New York, 1989), p. 28. 3. J. M. Keynes, The economic consequences of the peace (London, 1919). 4. Hungary lost the most territory and population. The Hungarian case is presented in Sir Robert Donald, The tragedy of Trianon; Hungary’s appeal to humanity (London, 1928). 5. Poland had been divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria in the four partitions of 1772, 1793, 1795 and 1815. Two Polish revolts against Russia in 1830 and 1863 had both been defeated. 6. Harold I. Nelson, Land and power; British and Allied policy on Germany’s frontiers 1916– 1919 (London, 1963), p. 43. 7. This view of H. A. L. Fisher in his History of Europe is quoted in Viscount Maugham, At the end of the day (London, 1954), p. 362 8. Harold I. Nelson, Land and power; British and Allied policy on Germany’s frontiers, 1916– 1919 (London, 1963), p. 97. 9. J. Hampden Jackson, The post-war world; a short political history 1918– 1934 (London, 1935), p. 54.

NOTES

TO PAGES

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10. Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky (1918– 1938); Dı´l prvnı´, Vznik, budova´nı´a zlata´ le´ta republiky(1918 – 1929) [The Czech homeland in the period of the First Republic (1918– 1938); Part 1, origin, growth and golden age of the republic (1918 – 1929)] (Prague, 2000), p. 27. 11. Helmut and Alison Gemsheim, Historic events 1839–1939 (London, 1960), p.176. Many had wanted to join the Russian Druzˇina unit which the Russians intended to use to stir up revolt in the Czech lands, Cecil Parrott, The bad Bohemian; the life of Jaroslav Hasˇek, creator of the Good Soldier Sˇvejk (London, 1978), p. 157. 12. Slovaks from Eastern Slovakia had traditionally escaped poverty and occasional starvation by emigrating. A Slovak who escaped more recently was Robert Maxwell, the media tycoon, who joined the British army during World War II. 13. The former German-speaking town of Teschen, on the Czech – Polish frontier, is now divided between Poland and the Czech Republic by the River Olsˇa (Polish Olsa). The two towns are Cieszyn and Cˇesky´ Teˇsˇı´n. 14. Details are in Ja´n Gronsky´, Komentovane´ dokumenty k u´stavnı´m de˘jina´m cˇeskoslovenska; I, 1914–1945 [Annotated documents on the history of Czechoslovakia] (Prague, 2005), p. 32; Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (eds), Conditions of democracy in Europe, 1919–39; systematic case studies (London, 2000), p. 87. 15. Eric Hobsbawm, The age of empire 1875– 1914 (London, 1987), pp. 154– 5. 16. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomı´r Luzˇa (eds), A history of the Czechoslovak Republic 1914– 1948 (Princeton, 1973), p. 14. 17. Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (eds), Conditions of democracy, p. 87. 18. R. E. Herzstein, Waldheim, the missing years (New York, 1980), p. 29. 19. Josef Macek, Histoire de la Boheˆme des origines a` 1918 (Paris, 1984), p. 11. 20. The traditional Czech view is based on historical claims that are difficult to prove or disprove. The German claim, inevitably, is different. It is accepted by both that the first inhabitants of Central Europe were a Celtic tribe, known to Germans as the Boii (hence the German name for Bohemia – Bo¨hmen – the home of the Boii). Czechs and Germans agree that in 1 BC the Germanic Marcomanni and Quadri tribes displaced them. Czechs claim that the Slav arrival in 6 AD in turn displaced these. The Germans claim that some Germanic people remained. The Czechs claim therefore that Germans did not enter the ‘Historic Provinces of the Bohemian Crown’ until they were invited as colonists in the twelfth century. The Germans claim that there is an unbroken history of German occupation from before 6 AD. The ‘Historic Provinces of the Bohemian Crown’ consisted of the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia and the Duchy of Southern Silesia. The Czech word for Bohemia is Cˇechy and the people who live there are Cˇesˇi – Czechs. Cecil Parrott, Jaroslav Hasˇec, a stury of Sˇvejk and the short stories (Cambridge, 1982), p. 23. 21. Reminding young Czechs of this was one of the first aims of the new regime after the fall of the Communism in 1989. The Communist party had suppressed all memories of this sort, stressing instead the unity of Slavs under Russian leadership. Two children’s picture books gave a graphic account of this

264

22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

NOTES

TO PAGES

24 –26

period in Czech history: Zdene˘k Bı´gl, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ za poslednı´ch Prˇemyslovcu˚ [The Czech lands under the last of the Prˇemyslids] (Prague, 1993) and Helena Mandelova´, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ za vla´dy Lucemburku˚ [The Czech lands in the reign of the Luxemburgs] (Prague, 1993). The growth of Moravian industry is described in De˘jiny moravy, Dı´l 3/1, Jan Jana´k, Hospoda´rˇsky´ rozmach moravy 1740– 1918; Vlastive˘da moravska´ zeme˘ a lid; nova rˇada, svazek 7 [History of Moravia; Part 3/1; Jan Jana´k, The economic development of Moravia 1740– 1918; the national history of Moravia, people and countryside, new part, section 7] (Brno, 1999). Zdene˘k Benesˇ and Va´clav Kural (eds), Facing History; the evolution of CzechGerman relations in the Czech provinces, 1848– 1948 (Prague, 2002), pp. 30 – 1. Germans in Alsace and Lorraine, transferred to Germany after 1870, had a similar reputation. For a definition of this territory, see footnote 11. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Knaves, fools and heroes in Europe between the wars (London, 1974), p. 131. This was in his first radio broadcast after assuming the position of President of Czechoslovakia. The word originated among Austrian Germans who referred to the Historic Provinces of the Empire as die Sudetenla¨nder, making the inhabitants Sudeten Germans (Sudetendeutsche), J. W. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia before Munich: the German minority problem and British appeasement policy (Cambridge, 1973), p. 22 They continued to be German-speaking communities for a very long time. Records of the important Slovak silver mines in the mining archives in Banska´ Sˇtiavnica are in German until the separation of Hungary and Austria in 1867, after which they are in Hungarian. From the mid eighteenth century until then the mining academy in that town had given all its tuition in German to students from the whole of the Austro – Hungarian Empire. All spoke German as well as at least one other language. The Germans in the Ukraine became known as the Volga Germans. Mark Cornwall, ‘Dr Edvard Benesˇ and Czechoslovakia’s German Minority, 1918– 1943’, in J. Morison (ed.), The Czech and Slovak experience (London, 1992), p. 174. Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The making of a new Europe; R. W. SetonWatson and the last years of Austria-Hungary (London, 1981), p. 355. Viscount Maugham, At the end of the day (London, 1954), p. 362. Nelson, Land and power, pp. 65, 97. This point has been made many times by Germans representing the former Sudeten population. One of the most recent examples is Eckart Thurich, Schwierige Nachbarschaften; Deutsche und Polen – Deutsche und Tschechen im 20. Jahrhundert; eine Darstellung in Dokumenten (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 16 – 17, which quotes three extracts from President Wilson’s statements in 1918. Alfred D. Low, The Anschluss movement 1918– 1919 and the Paris peace conference (Philadelphia, 1974), p. 91. Ibid., p. 92.

NOTES

TO PAGES

26 –31

265

36. Peter Glotz, Die Vertreibung; Bo¨hmen als Lehrstu¨ck (Berlin, 2004), pp. 104– 5. 37. For an account of the Sudeten attempt to break away from the new state of Czechoslovakia, see Paul Wolisch, Die sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den Jahren 1918 –1919 (Vienna and Leipzig, 1932), passim. 38. Glotz, Die Vertreibung, p. 106. 39. Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (eds), Conditions of democracy, p. 91. 40. The negotiations are discussed in Nelson, Land and Power, p. 283. 41. By contrast, there were only 31,000 Czechs (0.1 per cent of the total population) in Poland, Werner Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch (Cologne, 1959), p. 37. 42. Anita J. Praz˙mowska, A history of Poland (London, 2004), p. 166. 43. Markert (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch; Polen, p. 26. 44. David Turnock, The Economy of East Central Europe, 1815– 1989; stages of transformation in a peripheral region (London, 2006), p. 186 mistakenly refers to ‘Te˘sˇı´n’. The former German town Teschen was divided in 1920 along the line of the River Olsˇa (Polish Olsa). The Polish part became Cieszyn, the Czech part Cˇesˇky´ Te˘sˇı´n. 45. The matter is discussed in Norman J. G. Pounds, The Upper Silesian Industrial Region (Indiana, 1958), pp. 132– 41, 181– 4. 46. These coal mines formed part of the large Polish coalfield that supplied the steel works at Katowice. East of Ostrava, near the town of Karvina´, Polish and Czech coal mines are situated close to the frontier formed by the River Olsˇa. 47. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her successors; the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences 1919– 1937 (London, 1937), pp. 215– 21. 48. Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, Making of new Europe, p. 355. 49. Dusˇan Kova´cˇ, Dejiny Slovenska [History of Slovakia] (Prague 1998), pp. 110–3, Anton Spiesz, Illustrovane´ Dejiny Slovenska na ceste k sebauvedomeniu [Illustrated history of Slovakia; the road to independence] (Bratislava, 2001), pp. 109–11. 50. Scott M. Eddie, ‘Agricultural production and output per worker in Hungary 1870– 1913’, in John Komlos (ed.), Economic development in the Habsburg monarchy and in the successor states (New York, 1990), pp. 229– 30. 51. Antal Voros, ‘The age of preparation: Hungarian agrarian conditions between 1848– 1914’ in Joseph Held (ed.), The modernization of agriculture; rural transformation in Hungary, 1848– 1975 (New York, 1980), pp. 91 – 129. 52. Vladimir Mecˇiar played on this when he was the Slovak prime minister in the 1990s. 53. Prame˘ny kohlasu velke´ rˇijnove´ socialisticke´ revoluce avzniku CˇSR, Boj o sme˘r vy´voje cˇeskoslovenske´ho statu [Principal sources for the socialist October revolution of the emerging Czechoslovak Republic; struggle for the creation of the Czechoslovak state] vol. 1 (Prague, 1965), p. 103, quoted in Yeshayahu Jelinek, ‘The Treaty of Trianon and Czechoslovakia: Reflections’, in Be´la K. Kira´ly, Peter Pastor and Ivan Sanders (eds), War and Society in East Central Europe, vol. VI; Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, a Case Study of Trianon (New York, 1982), p. 441. 54. Ve˘ra Olivova´, The doomed democracy; Czechoslovakia in a disrupted Europe 1914– 1938 (London, 1972), pp. 114– 6.

266

NOTES

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31 –35

55. Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (eds), Conditions of democracy, p. 92 56. The map showing this is in Dusˇan Kova´cˇ, Dejiny Slovenska (Prague, 1998), p. 182. 57. Eduard Winter, Die Deutschen in der Slowakei und in Karpathorussland (Mu¨nster in Westfalen, 1926), passim. There is also a map showing the towns in Eva Hahnova´ and Hans Henning Hahn, Sudetone˘mecka´ vzpomı´na´nı´ a zapomı´na´nı´ [Sudeten Germany remembering and forgetting] (Prague, 2002), p. 104. 58. Ibid., p. 442– 3. 59. Herzstein, Waldheim, p. 28. 60. I am grateful to Miroslav Chleboun and Kurt Schindler for explaining this. The custom in the Czech lands and probably elsewhere in Central Europe as well is for graves to be owned by families, who return to decorate them on the evening before All Saints Day (the night of 31 October– 1 November known in England as Halloween). 61. This is shown by the mining records. 62. Although the former Sudeten houses are owned by Czechs, most are only used as week end and holiday cottages. Few people live permanently in many of these villages. 63. Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The making of a new Europe, p. 356. 64. Alice Teichova, An economic background to Munich; international business and Czechoslovakia 1918– 1938 (Cambridge, 1974), p. 238. 65. The following is based on Alois Rasˇı´n, Financial policy of Czechoslovakia during the first year of its history (London, 1923), passim. 66. Ibid., p. 34. 67. Peter M. Garber, Michael G. Spencer, The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; lessons for currency reform (Princeton, NJ, 1994), p. 11. 68. Iva´n T. Berend and Gyo¨rgy Ra´nki, Economic development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries (New York, 1974), p. 181. 69. Rasˇı´n, Financial policy, p. 45. 70. Berend and Ra´nki, Economic development, p. 181. 71. Teichova, An economic background to Munich, p. 2. 72. For a discussion of this see Richard L. Rudolph, ‘Social structure and the beginning of Austrian economic growth’, in John Komlos (ed.), Economic development in the Habsburg Monarchy and in the Successor States (New York, 1990), pp. 133– 47. 73. Karel Trˇiska, ‘Jinecke´ panstvı´ v 18. stoletı´’ [‘The manor of Jince in the 18th century’], Strˇedocˇesky´ sbornı´k historicky (Ostrava, 1990), 17, pp. 97 – 111, Jana Krotilova´, Vanda Jirˇikovska´, ‘Z historie kova´rny v Trˇebı´zi’ [‘The history of the smithy at Trˇebı´cˇ’], ibid. (Prague, 1981), 16, pp. 99–105 and Otakar Sˇpecinger, ‘Pru˚myslova´ vy´stava ve Veltrusı´ch’ [‘Trade fairs at Veltrusy’], ibid., pp. 83–98. 74. Va´clav Kru˚ta, ‘Economicky´ vy´voj Rakovnicky´ch keramicky´ch za´vodu˚ v letech 1883– 1945’ [‘The economic development of the Rakovnı´k ceramic industry 1883– 1945’], ibid. (Prague, 1980), 15, pp. 79 – 95.

NOTES

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35 – 40

267

75. David F. Good, ‘Modern economic growth in the Habsburg monarchy’ in Komlos (ed.), Economic development, pp. 201–20, Nachum Gross, ‘AustriaHungary in the world economy’ in Komlos (ed.), Economic development, pp. 1 – 45 and Gyo¨rgy Ra´nki, ‘On the development of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’ in Komlos (ed.), Economic development, pp. 47 – 54. David Turnock, The economy of East Central Europe, 1815 –1989; stages of transformation in a peripheral region (London, 2006) provides a good overall explanation of the area. 76. For an analysis of Simon Kuznets’ definition of Modern Economic Growth and its application to this area see Rudolph, ‘Social structure’, p. 202 ff. 77. Turnock, Economy of East Central Europe, pp. 120– 1. 78. Ibid., pp. 134– 5. 79. Researchers should be warned, however, that many records have not been catalogued and are also stored in outposts away from the main archives. Short histories of companies, where they exist, are very useful, but research is a long and complicated process. No Czech or other foreign historians appear to be using these records. 80. David F. Good, The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750– 1914 (Berkeley, 1984), p. 133. 81. Herbert Matis, ‘Disintegration and Multi-national Enterprises in Central Europe during the Post-war Years (1918– 23), in Alice Teichova and P. L. Cottrell (eds), International Business and Central Europe 1918– 1939 (Leicester, 1983), p. 296. 82. Petr Kozˇı´sˇek and Jan Kra´lı´k, L & K – Sˇkoda 1895– 1995; Part Two, the flight of the winged arrow (Prague, 1995), p. 6. 83. Unusually, there was no foreign capital in this wholly Czech bank, which also had holdings outside Czechoslovakia, Steiner, European history, p. 285. 84. The company’s history has been written by Ludvı´k Losos and Ivo Mahel, Salonnı´ vozy Ringhoffer [Ringfhoffer railway carriages] (Prague, 1999). 85. Ibid., pp. 21 – 2. 86. Ibid., p. 48. 87. Ibid., p. 23. 88. Miroslav Gomola, Historie automobilu˚; Tatra 1898– 1998, II, na´kladnı´ a specia´lnı´ vozidla (Brno, 2000), pp. 17 – 42; Na´kladnı´ automobily-Trucks (Koprˇivnice, 2000), p. 4. 89. Tatra Technical Museum, Koprˇivnice, p. 5. 90. Ibid., p. 9. 91. The following is based on Jana Machotkova´, Vı´tkovice in documents 1828– 2003 (Ostrava, 2003). 92. These were the Louis, Hlubina, Teresia, Oskar and Bettina. 93. Ibid., p. 54. 94. Ibid., p. 60. 95. Ibid., p. 62. 96. It was finished two years later. Ibid. 97. Ibid., p. 74.

268

NOTES TO PAGES 41 – 49

98. Ibid., p. 46. 99. The correct spelling for the name is Bat’a but books written for English readers have simplified this to Bata. The Czech spelling is used here. 100. Anthony Cekota, Entrepreneur extraordinary; the biography of Tomas Bata (Rome, 1968), pp. 1– 9. Marek Kudzbel, Bata; the business miracle. The story of an extraordinary entrepreneur (Marianka, 2006), pp. 12 – 14. 101. Ibid., p. 43. 102. Kudzbel, Bata, p. 20. 103. A full description of this imposing house is in Pavel Nova´k, 10 þ 1 Bat’ovsky´ch vil [10 þ 1 Bat’a villas] (Zlı´n, 2000), pp. 9 – 20. 104. Scientific management was a system in which production was divided into a series of related tasks. Workers were trained to perform a single task efficiently in series on a production line. This led to great improvements in speed and efficiency. But in time it created problems of boredom from the repetition of the work. For an introduction to this subject see D. S. Pugh (ed.), Organisation theory; selected readings (3rd. ed., London, 1990). 105. Kudzbel, Bata, p. 24. 106. Jackson, Post war world pp. 56 – 7. Jackson’s other comments on Czechoslovakia’s post-war development were more favourable. 107. Information on the Breslau company is taken from Adressbuch fu¨r Breslau und Umgebung (Breslau, 1921) in the Archiwum panstwowe (regional archives) in Wrocław. 108. In 1880 the chemical company Ho¨chst produced 1,100 dyes; in 1887 this had risen to 10,000; Ernst Ba¨umler, A century of chemistry (Du¨sseldorf, 1968), p. 75. 109. The following is based on the company records in the Zemsky´ archiv in Opava. 110. This was one of a number of specialist industrial schools established in Czechoslovakia. There was a similar school for stonemasons and sculptors at Horˇice in north Bohemia from 1884. It used stone from nearby quarries 111. Zemsky´ archiv, Opava. Reich company records, CˇMS, 156, S. Reich, Vienna warehouse 1912 –1927; figures for 1912– 4. 112. A list of the chemicals is in ibid, 278, production expenses and stock records. 113. Zemsky´ archiv, Opava, Reich company records, CˇMS, 278, S. Reich & Co., Krasno, Bilanz 1911– 23, pp. 5 – 6. Further information is in ibid, 957, the Balancˇnı´ knihi (account books). Ibid. 154, details of sales. 114. The company records are in the Zemsky´ archiv in Opava. See also Patrick Crowhurst, ‘The making of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the national control of companies: the nostrification policy and economic nationalism, 1918– 1938’, Journal of Industrial History, 5 (2), (2000), p. 99. 115. Zemsky´ archiv, Opava, Brankauer company records, 137, Rocˇnı´ bilance s prˇilohavi r. 1900– 1919. Balance 28.2.1919. 116. The company records are in the Zemsky´ archiv in Opava. See also Crowhurst, ‘Nostrification’, pp. 97 –8. 117. Electrical power was being used in Austria from 1886; Roman Sandgruber, ‘The electrical century; the beginnings of electrical supply in Austria’ in

NOTES

118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

130.

TO PAGES

50 –56

269

H. Matis (ed.), The economic development of Austria since 1870 (Aldershot, 1994), p. 45. Slovaks would normally have learnt Hungarian and entered the Hungarian state service. The text is in Gronsky´ (ed.), Komentovane´ dokumenty, p. 44. This became important in the crisis over the Sudetenland and Teschen in the late 1930s. Details of what happened are given below. I am grateful to Zuzana Skacelova´ (ne´e Alexnder) for this information. Zara Steiner, The lights that failed; European international history 1919– 1933 (London, 2005), p. 284. Vladimı´r Karlicky´, et al., Sve˘t okrˇı´dlene´ho Sˇı´pu; koncern Sˇkoda Plzenˇ, 1918– 1945, [The world of the winged arrow; the final stage of Sˇkoda in Plzenˇ] (Plzenˇ, 1999), p. 643. For discussion of ‘nostrification’ see Crowhurst, ‘Making of the First Czechoslovak Republic’, pp. 94 – 102. Karlicky´ et al., Sve˘t Sˇkoda Plzenˇ 1918– 1945, p. 634. Matis, ‘Disintegration’, p. 305. Information on this is in the company records in the Zemsky´ archiv in Opava, series BCHZ. The company records are in the Zemsky archiv in Opava. Matis, ‘Disintegration’, p. 307. The areas were German Bohemia (Deutsch-Bo¨hmen) based in Liberec (German Reichenberg), Sudetenland (northern Bohemia and Moravia) based in Opava (German Troppau), the Bohemia Forest District in south Bohemia and German southern Moravia. The two latter tried to gain incorporation into Austria, Bruegel, Czechoslovakia, pp. 22 – 3. Zdene˘k Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ v e´rˇe prvnı´ republiky; dı´l prvnı´, Vznik, budova´nı´ a zlata´ le´ta republiky (1918 – 1929) [The Czech homeland in the period of the First Republic (1918 – 1938); Part 1, origin, growth and the golden age of the republic (1918 – 1929)] (Prague, 2000), pp. 37 – 44.

Chapter 2 Diplomacy, Industrial Development and Growing Resentment 1. France was an ally of Czechoslovakia. Britain, which took the lead in the negotiations with Hitler that led to the Munich Conference, was not. 2. Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The making of a new Europe, p. 355. 3. Edward Taborsky, President Edvard Benesˇ between east and west 1938– 1948 (Stanford, Cal., 1981), p. 2. Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, described him in 1923 as ‘The little man for whom we send when we are in trouble. And he always puts us right’, ibid. 4. Angus Maddison, ‘Economic policy and performance in Europe 1913–1970’, Fontana Economic History of Europe; the Twentieth Century – 2 (London, 1976), p. 447.

270

NOTES

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58 – 66

5. Praz˙mowska, History of Poland, p. 171. 6. Piotr S. Wandycz, The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926– 1936 (Princeton, N. J., 1988), pp. 3 – 5. 7. Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘, 1, pp. 20 – 1. 8. For Romania see Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866–1947 (Oxford, 1994), p. 426. 9. La´zlo´ Kontler, A history of Hungary (London, 2002), p. 342. 10. Kaiser, Economic diplomacy, p. 10. 11. Steiner, The lights that failed, pp. 299– 301. 12. For Romania see Hitchins, Rumania, pp. 427– 8. 13. Czechoslovak tariffs rose on average from 31.3 per cent in 1927 to 50 per cent in 1931. Within the Little Entente, Romanian tariffs rose from 42.3 per cent in 1927 to 63 per cent in 1931 and Yugoslavia from 32 to 46,: Herz, Economic problems, p. 72. 14. Teichova, An economic background to Munich, p. 369. 15. Ibid., p. 368. 16. Quoted in E. H. Carr, International relations between the two world wars (1919 – 1939) (London, 1955), pp. 118– 9. 17. It was originally declared to stop European powers suppressing the South American revolts that broke out early in the nineteenth century. The policy was named after President James Monroe though it was actually drafted by his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. It remained in force throughout the nineteenth century and in 1912 was extended to include non-European powers (i.e. Japan). 18. Herbert Matis, ‘Disintegration and Multinational Enterprises in Central Europe during the Post-war Years (1918– 1923)’ in Alice Teichova and P. L. Cottrell (eds), International Business and Central Europe 1918–1939 (Leicester, 1983), p. 81. 19. In Bohemia the figure was 53.89, in Moravia and Czechoslovak Silesia it was 55.04 per cent, Karnı´k, Cˇeske´ Zeme˘, 1, p. 278. 20. Kaiser, Economic diplomacy, p. 18. The state had bought up Austrian estates and distributed them through the State Land Office. It regarded this as compensation for the losses at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620; Zdene˘k Benesˇ et al. (eds), Facing history; the evolution of Czech-German relations in the Czech provinces, 1848– 1948 (Prague, 2002), p. 88. 21. Walther Kienast (ed.), Bohemica; Probleme und Literatur seit 1945; von Ferdinand Seibt; Special edition No. 4 of Historische Zeitschrift (Munich, 1970), Theodor Schieder and Theodor Schieffer (eds), p. 277. 22. Cornwall, ‘Benesˇ and the German Minority’, p. 181. 23. The index continued to fall: 50.8 in 1931 and 44.7 in 1932; Kaiser, Economic diplomacy, p. 19. 24. Ibid., p. 43. 25. For details of the collapse of the Creditanstalt, see Charles P. Kindleberger, A financial history of Western Europe (London, 1984), p. 372. 26. James Foreman-Peck, A history of the world economy; international economic relations since 1850 (Brighton, 1983), p. 216.

NOTES

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66 –74

271

27. Piotr S. Wandycz, The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926– 1936; FrenchCzechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (Princeton, N. J., 1988), p. 224. 28. Josef Gruber, Czechoslovakia; a survey of economic and social conditions (New York, 1924), pp. x – xi. 29. Frederick Herz, The economic problems of the Danubian states; a study in economic nationalism (London, 1947), p. 174. 30. There is an example of Wahliss’ work in the Blackwell house at Bowness-onWindemere, which is now a museum of Arts and Crafts design. 31. Von deutscher Kultur in der Tschechoslowakei; aus Anlaß der Ausstellung fu¨r zeitgeno¨ssische Kultur in Bru¨nn 1928 (Eger, 1928), p. 117ff. 32. Ibid. 33. Karnı´k gives slightly different figures for Czechoslovak manufacturing production for a shorter period: (1913 ¼ 100) 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 76.7 75 86 78 82 107. Unfortunately, as for all the statistics he quotes, no source is given; Cˇeske´ zeme˘, I, p. 227. 34. Herz, Economic problem of the Danubian states, p. 174. 35. Tradice/pokrok, prosperita [Tradition, progress, prosperity] (Koprˇivnice, 1990), no pagination. 36. Ludvı´k Losos, Ivo Mahel, Salonnı´vozy Ringhoffer (Prague 1999), passim. 37. For a brief overview, see Jana Machotkova´, Vitkovice in documents 1828– 2003 (Vı´tkovice, Ostrava, 2003), passim. 38. Turnock, The economy of East Central Europe, p. 202. 39. Alice Teichova and P. L. Cottrell, ‘Industrial structures in West and East Europe during the Inter-war period’, in Alice Teichova and P. L. Cotrell, International business and Central Europe, 1918– 1939 (Leicester, 1983), p. 40. 40. Ibid., p. 36. 41. For the development of industry in Moravia up to the end of World War I, see Jan Jana´k, Hospoda´rˇsky´ rozmach moravy 1740 –1918; De˘jiny moravy dı´l 3/1; Vlastive˘da moravska´ zeme˘ a lid; nova rˇada, svazek 7 [The industrial development of Moravia, 1714– 1918; the history of Moravia part 3/1, the national history of Moravia and its people, part 7] (Brno, 1999), passim. 42. Teichova and Cottrell, ‘Industrial structures’, p. 35. 43. F. L. Carsten, The first Austrian Republic 1918– 1938; a study based on British and Austrian documents (London, 1986), p. 146. 44. Matis, ‘Disintegration and multi-national Enterprises’, p. 81. 45. Teichova and Cottrell, ‘Industrial Structures’, pp. 50 – 1. 46. Turnock, The economy of East Central Europe, p. 212. 47. Maddison, ‘Economic policy and performance in Europe’, p. 463. 48. Foreman-Peck, A history of the world economy, p. 189. 49. Georgina Ferry, Max Perutz and the secret of life (London, 2007), p. 5.

272

NOTES

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74 –88

50. Herbert Matis, ‘Disintegration and Multi-national enterprises in Central Europe during the Post-war Years’, in Teichova and Cottrell (eds), International business, p. 79. 51. For further information about how Rima solved these problems, see Elizabeth Aboross, Inflation and industry in Hungary 1918–1929 (Berlin, 1994), p. 84. 52. Turnock, East Central Europe, p. 229. 53. Banska´ Bystrica was one of the important mining towns traditionally famed for silver and copper production. Copper mining had been controlled by the Fuggers in the Middle Ages. Copper mining in eastern Slovakia continued until the 1990s, when it failed to match international competition and was forced to close. 54. Frank B. Tipton and Robert Aldrich, An economic and social history of Europe 1890– 1939 (London, 1987), p. 190. 55. Turnock, East Central Europe, p. 184. The situation is similar today, except that the main Slovak immigrants to Britain appear to be Romanies, who are traditionally at the bottom of the social scale and often live in poor or substandard housing. 56. Ibid. 57. Vladimı´r Karlicky´, Petr Hofman, Frantisˇek Jana´cˇek, Antona´n Klimek, Vladislav Kratky´, Sve˘t okrˇı´dlene´ho sˇı´pu; Koncern Sˇkoda Plzenˇ, 1918–1935 [The world of the flying arrow; the Sˇkoda company in Plzenˇ 1918–1945] (Plzenˇ, 1999), p. 637. 58. Adam Tooze, The wages of destruction; the making and breaking of the Nazi economy (London, 2007), p. 97. 59. Benesˇ, Facing history, p. 84. 60. Ibid., p. 92. 61. Teichova and Cottrell, ‘Industrial structures’, p. 40.

Chapter 3 The Enemy Within; Sudeten German Nationalism and the Sudeten Nazi Party 1. Eva Hahnova´ and Hans Henning Hahn, Sudetone˘mecka´ vzpomı´na´nı´ a zapomı´na´bı´ [Sudeten Germany, remembering and forgetting] (Prague, 2002), p. 30. 2. Molisch, Sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung, p. 186. 3. The author is Veronika Arndt and the book was published in Magdeburg in 1998. 4. Eric W. Pasold, Ladybird, ladybird; a story of private enterprise (Manchester, 1977) pp. 34 – 5. 5. Matis, ‘Disintegration’, pp. 74 – 5. 6. F. L. Carsten, The First Austrian Republic 1918– 1938 (London, 1986), p. 74. 7. Martin Pollack, The dead man in the bunker; discovering my father (London, 2006), p. 59. 8. Hahnova´ and Hahn, Sudetone˘mecka´ vzpomı´na´nı´ a zapomı´na´nı´, pp. 87 – 92. 9. Ibid., pp. 85 – 6. 10. Law 125/1927, 14 June 1927, Ja´n Gronsky´ (ed.), Komentovane´ dokumenty k u´stavnı´m de˘jina´m ˇceskoslovenska, vol. 1, 1914– 1945 [Documents on the judicial history of Czechoslovakia with commentary] (Prague 2005), pp. 199– 226.

NOTES

TO PAGES

89 –96

273

11. Ibid. 12. Die Wirtschaftskrise und die Sudetendeutsche Arbeiterschaft. Protokoll der gemeinsamen Reichskonferenz der deutschen sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in der tschechoslowakischen Republik und des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes am 7. September 1930 in Prag, Produktenbo¨rse (Prague, 1930), p. 13. 13. Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R2/13535. The Deutsche Union Bank owned 8,400 shares in the company. 14. Hahnova´ and Hahn, Sudetone˘mecka´ vzpomı´na´nı´, p. 98. 15. Ibid., p. 125. 16. Ve˘ra Olivova´, ‘The Czechoslovak Government and its “disloyal” opposition, 1918– 1938’, in J. Morison (ed.), The Czech and Slovak experience (London, 1992), p. 98. 17. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C, (1933– 1937), (London, 1950), vol. 1, p. 584. 18. Ibid., p. 135. 19. Ibid., p. 203. The dispute was resolved in April with the signing of a new German – Czechoslovak Foreign Exchange agreement. 20. Ibid., p. 204. Dr Koch, the German diplomatic representative in Prague, complained to the German Foreign Minister that these two men should be supporting Germany against the Czechoslovak Government and not the other way round, as they were doing. 21. Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘ (vol. 2, Prague, 2002), p. 134. 22. Gronsky´, Komentovane´ dokumenty, pp. 227– 8. 23. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series. C, vol. I, pp. 583– 4. 24. Ibid., p. 583. 25. In a letter from Koch to the German Foreign Office dated 3 February 1935, Koch says that he had held a position at the Prague legation for 14 years, ibid., vol. III, p. 902, 26. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomı´r Luzˇa (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918– 1948 (Princeton, N. J., 1973), p. 148. 27. Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘, p. 133. 28. The law is in Gronsky´, Komentovane´ dokumenty, pp. 178–86. 29. Mamatey and Luzˇa, History of the Czechoslovak Republic, p. 148. 30. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C, vol. I, p. 596. 31. Koch was referring to the German Sudeten minority in the Czech lands. There were relatively few Germans in Slovakia, in spite of the many place names that record the presence of German miners. In Slovakia Germans formed only 4.5 per cent of the population – 148,214 – in 1930. This placed them third, behind Slovaks and Hungarians, Anton Sˇpiesz, Ilustrovane´ dejiny Slovenska na ceste k sebauvedomeniu [Illustrated history of Slovakia on the path to independence] ((Bratislava 2001), p. 196. Germans had only 1.7 per cent of the votes in 1935, Dusˇan Kova´cˇ, Dejiny Slovenska [History of Slovakia] (Prague, 1998), p. 203. It is also significant that a recent book on the Sudeten question concentrates on the majority of Germans in the Czech lands. Germans in Slovakia are barely mentioned; Hahnova´ and Hahn, Sudetone˘mecka´ vzpomı´na´nı´ a zapomı´na´nı´, passim.

274 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59.

NOTES

TO PAGES

97 –111

Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series C, vol. I, p. 597. Joachim Fest, Hitler (London, 1982), p. 450. Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series C, vol. I, pp. 654– 5. Ibid., pp. 655– 7. Ibid., pp. 799– 803. For a description of these camps in 1934, when high-school graduates were sent as part of the attempt to create a new, classless society, see Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in power 1933– 1939 (London, 2005), pp. 299– 300. Documents on German Foreign Police, Series. C., vol. 1, p. 892. He later worked in the Ministry of the Interior and became a Reichstag deputy, ibid, vol. III, p. 990. William L. Shirer, The rise and fall of the Third Reich (London, 1998), p. 358. The following is taken from Philip Rees, Biographical dictionary of the extreme right since 1890 (1990), p. 177. Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, fascism or social democracy; social classes and the political origins of regimes in interwar Europe (New York, 1991), p. 294, Ibid., pp. 904– 6. Gronsky´, Komentovane´ dokumenty, pp. 229– 36. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C, vol. II, pp. 126– 8. These had been the Volksturm’s appeal against the original decision of the Brno court and a trial at Hlucˇin, west of Ostrava in northern Moravia. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C, vol. II, pp. 147– 8. Ibid., p. 228. Ibid., pp. 249– 51. Ibid., pp. 348– 51. Ibid., pp. 617– 8. Ibid., pp. 670. The German population in the Slovak lands was small and lived in scattered communities that were difficult to organise politically. Documents on German Foreign Policy, vol. II, pp. 822– 4. Ibid., vol. III, p. 141. Ibid., p. 158. Ibid., pp. 902– 3. Otto Strasser, a member of the Nazi Party since 1925, had left in 1930 after a clash with Hitler and founded the Kampfgenossenschaft. He founded a weekly paper, Die Schwarze Front. Early in 1933 he fled to Vienna and then to Prague. His e´migre´ supporters took the name Schwarze Front. The Schwarze Front operated a clandestine radio from Za´horˇı´, calling for revolution in Germany. The Abwehr (German Intelligence Department) learnt of it in December 1934. Repeated demands by the German legation in Prague for it to be closed were ignored. On the night of 23–24 January 1935 the announcer, Rudolf Formis, was shot. The Czech police report of 25 January named three Reich Germans as responsible. They had fled to Germany. The Gestapo reported to the German Foreign Minister that these men could not be traced

NOTES

TO PAGES

112 –119

275

60. Presumably Koch was referring to Benesˇ’ speeches at the League of Nations Council of 7 and 10 December 1934. For the text of these, see League of Nations Official Journal December 1934, pp. 1723– 8 and 1745– 8. 61. Ibid., p. 905. 62. Ka´rnı´k, Cˇeske´ zeme˘, vol. 2, p. 560. 63. The following is based on Patrick Crowhurst, ‘Czechoslovakia, Czech tanks and the Second World War; the Munich Conference reconsidered’, Kosmas, vol. 19, No 2 (2006), pp. 95 – 8. 64. A photograph of the 1924 Sˇkoda armoured car, called the ‘zˇelva’ or tortoise is in Karlicky´ et al., Sˇkoda, p. 110. A photograph of the Tatra armed car, with a machine gun turret, of 1929 is in Rosenkranz, Tatra trucks, p. 184. For details of the Sˇkoda armoured cars, Zdene˘k Zˇalud, ‘Rozvoj cˇeskoslovenske´ obrne˘ne´ techniky [‘Development of Czechoslovak.armoured technology’] in Jaroslav Folta (ed.), Zbrojnı´ technika v ˇceskoslovensku ve 20. stoletı´ [Weapons technology in Czechoslovakia in the 20th century] (Prague, 2005), pp. 164– 5. 65. Toma´sˇ Pavlicka, ‘Obrne˘na´ vozidla z Tatrovky’ [‘Armoured vehicles from Tatra’] in Karel Rosenkaranz, Jan Kozlovsky´ (eds), K de˘jina´m Tatry Koprˇivnice; sbornı´k prˇı´spe˘vku˚ IV; [From the history of Tatra in Koprˇivnice; proceedings] (Koprˇivnice, 1990), pp. 31 – 50. 66. Zˇalud, ‘Rozvoj’, pp. 170–3. 67. Technical details of the construction are in Zˇalud, ‘Rozvoi’, pp. 168– 70. 68. Pavlica, ‘Obrne˘na´ vozidla’, p. 35. 69. B. T. White, Tanks and other A.F. V.s of the Blitzkrieg Era 1939– 1941 (Poole, 1972), pp. 1, 15, 97 – 8. 70. Peter Chamberlain and Hilary Doyle, Encyclopedia of German tanks of World War Two; the complete illustrated directory of German battle tanks, armoured cars, selfpropelled guns and semi-tracked vehicles, 1939– 1945 (London, 2004), pp. 18 – 9, 42; David Miller, Tanks of the world from World War I to the present Day (London, 2004), pp. 104– 7, 38 – 9. 71. Pavlica, ‘Obrne˘na´ vozidla’, p. 40. 72. There is a photograph showing three tracked vehicles: a light and heavy tank and an artillery vehicle, as well as a number of lorries, in Karlicky´ et al., Sˇkoda, p. 237. The photograph is dated 1934. 73. Zˇalud, ‘Rozvoj’, pp. 190–2. 74. Rosenkranz, Tatra trucks, pp. 65, 116– 7. 75. Miroslav Gomola, Automobily Aero aneb Cililink a jeho sestry (Brno, undated), pp. 18 – 21. 76. Jaroslav Folta, ‘Zamysˇlenı´ nad cestami cˇeske´ techniky’ [‘Thoughts on the development of Czech technology’] in Jaroslav Folta (ed.), Cˇeska´ technika na pozadı´ sve˘tove´ho vy´voje 1 [Czech technology in a worldwide context] (Prague, 2004), p. 28. 77. The following is based on Josef Durcˇa´k, Opevnˇova´nı´ Ostravska v letech 1935 azˇ 1938 [Fortifications in the Ostrava area in the years 1935 to 1938] (Opava, 2005), p. 74.

276

NOTES

TO PAGES

123 –132

Chapter 4 Henlein, the SdP (Sudeten Deutsche Partei) and German Money 1. German documents, Ser. C, IV, pp. 186– 9, Volker Zimmermann, Sudetsˇtı´ Ne˘mci v nacisticke´m sta´te˘ [Sudeten Germans in the Nazi state] (Prague, 2001), p. 39. 2. Ibid. 3. The following is based on Lutz’s Bewerbungbogen in the okresnı´ archiv, U´stı´ nad Labem, Landrat records, karton 1. 4. Hitler’s theory was based on his belief that there was something in the blood that created a person’s identity, hence the theory of Jewish, German, Arian etc. blood. 5. Slightly different figures are given in Rolf Sternberger and Bernhard Vogel, Die Wahl der Parlamente. Europa (2 vols, Berlin, 1969), quoted in Dirk BergSchlosser, Jeremy Mitchell, Conditions of democracy in Europe, 1919– 39 (London, 2000), p. 101. Sternberger and Vogel only give the number of seats won for the elections of 1935. This shows the Czech Agrarian party with 46 seats in first place in the results, followed by the SdP with 44 out of a total of 301. There are a number of minor spelling mistakes: Slowak People’s Party for Slovak People’s Party, Zisper German Party for Zipser German and German Association for Leb. and Econ., in which the Leb. is short for Leben. 6. Olivova´, Czechoslovak Government, p. 90. This was a slight increase in the Communist vote, which had averaged about ten per cent in the 1920s and early 1930s, Luebbert, Liberalism, fascism or social democracy, p. 294. 7. Olivova´, Czechoslovak government, p. 197. 8. For example, neither of the most recent studies of the Third Reich refer to it in their index: Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in power, 1933– 1939 (London, 2005) and Adam Tooze, The wages of destruction; the making and breaking of the Nazi economy (London, 2006). 9. German documents, Ser. C, III, pp. 229– 30. 10. Ibid., p. 969n. 11. Among the e´migre´s were Communists who had fled from Germany in 1933. One was Walter Ulbricht, who was a founder member of the German Communist party and a Reichstag deputy in 1928– 33. He fled first to Prague and later to Moscow. Norman Davies, Europe at war 1939– 1945; no simple victory (2006), p. 380. Ulbricht became the First Secretary of the East German Communist party after the war. 12. Hundreds of Jews and their Christian partners had entered Czechoslovakia between the boycott of Jewish businesses on 1 April 1933 and the Tag und Blut und Boden law of September 1935. But a great many others who were opposed to the regime also came. However, of the 8,000– 10,000 who entered Czechoslovakia, most were in transit. But even to enter, they had to prove that their lives were in danger; Kurt R. Grossmann, ‘Die Exilsituation in der Tschechoslowakei’, in Manfred Durzak (ed.), Die deutsche Exilliteratur 1933– 1945 (Stuttgart, 1973), pp. 65 – 6.

NOTES 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

TO PAGES

133 –147

277

German documents, Ser. C, IV, pp. 679– 80. Ibid., p. 742. Ibid., p. 821. Ibid., p. 744. Ibid., p. 1,026. Ibid., pp. 1177– 83. This was true. The treaties were intended to protect Czechoslovakia from Hungary. This was also correct. France had been the main country opposing it. As a result of the Russo– Czechoslovak pact, Czechoslovakia began to build a small number of Russian aircraft, but the number was insignificant before the Sudeten crisis and the Munich Conference. German documents, Ser. C, V, p. 33. James Thomas Emmerson, The Rhineland crisis 7 March 1936; a study in multilateral diplomacy (London, 1977), p. 141. Ibid., p. 157. Joachim C. Fest, Hitler (London, 1982), p. 551. German documents, Ser. C, vol. V, p. 70. Emmerson, Rhineland crisis, p. 172. German documents, Ser. C, vol. V, pp. 157– 8. Ibid, pp. 194– 5. Ibid, pp. 307– 8. Ibid, pp. 625– 7 Ibid, pp. 608– 9. Ibid, p. 624. Tooze, Wages of destruction, pp. 71 – 2. German documents, Ser. C, V, p. 898. Note on a conversation between Henlein and Sir R. Vansittart in May 1938. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919– 1939, 3rd. ser., vol. 1938 (London, 1949), p. 630. Keith Middlemas, Diplomacy of illusion; the British Government and Germany, 1937– 39 (London, 1972), p. 91. By comparison, Benesˇ realised that assimilation of the German population would have to be made artificially by deliberate colonisation and ‘Czechisation’, Cornwall, ‘Benesˇ and the German Minority’, pp. 184– 5. Richard Griffiths, Fellow travellers of the Right; British enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933– 39 (London, 1980), passim Frank Eyck, G. P. Gooch. A study in history and politics (London, 1982), pp. 418–20. This became law on 13 May 1936 and established a frontier zone in which special restrictions were to be enforced. Anthony Read, The devil’s disciples; the lives and times of Hitler’s inner circle (London, 2004), p. 482. Patrick Leigh Fermor, A time of gifts; on foot to Constantinople from the Hook of Holland to the middle Danube (London, 1977), p. 225.

278 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

NOTES

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148 –164

German documents, Ser. C, vol. V, pp. 898– 9 Henlein was promised between 5 and 6 million RM. German documents, Ser. C, vol. V, p. 1108. Ibid., vol. VI, p. 57. Ibid., pp. 118– 9. Ibid., pp. 182– 3. Ibid., pp. 316– 7. Ibid., pp. 308– 13. Luebbert, Liberalism, fascism or social democracy, p. 291. Ibid., pp. 468– 70. Ibid., p. 472. Alice Teichova, The Czechoslovak economy 1918– 1980 (London, 1988), p.23. Berend and Ra´nki, Economic development in East Central Europe, p. 254. Luebbert, Liberalism, fascism, or social democracy, p. 291. Herz, Economic problems, p. 175. Patrick Crowhurst, ‘The making of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the national control of companies: the nostrification policy and economic nationalism, 1918– 1938’, Journal of Industrial History (2002), vol. 5, No. 2, p. 101. Ibid., records of the Hombok and Marienthal factories. Zemsky´ archiv, Opava, CˇMS company records, Inv. Cˇ. 157, sales records 1928 – 33. Berend and Ra´nki, Economic development, p. 254. Middlemas, Diplomacy of illusion, p. 137. German documents, Ser. C, Vol. VI, pp. 490– 1. Ibid., pp. 582– 3. Ibid., p. 652. Ibid., pp. 653– 7.

Chapter 5 Hitler’s Manipulation of Sudeten German Grievances 1. Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 Nov. 1945– 1 Oct. 1946 (Nuremberg, 1949), col. III, p. 39 (hereafter cited as Nuremberg Trial). 2. The following is based on German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 64/18, p. 2, Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe 3 Befreiung des Sudetenlandes, Teile A und B. 3. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 64/19, pp. 11 – 27. These reports also assessed the different forms of artillery that would be needed to destroy the various forms of defence. 4. Nuremberg Trial, vol. III, p. 37. 5. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 64/19, 13 – 27 April 1938. 6. Ibid, 9 June 1938.

NOTES

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165 –180

279

7. All were among material confiscated by the police in Ostrava, Zemsky´ archiv, Opava, Krajsky soud v Moravske´ Ostrave˘, cˇk III/747. 8. Miroslav Moulis, ‘Henleinovci a obecnı´ volby v roce 1938’ [‘Heinlein’s support in the municipal elections in 1938’] in Zdene˘k Radvanovsky´ (ed.), Historie okupovane´ho pohranicˇı´ 1938– 1945, vol. 7 [The history of the cross border occupation 1938– 1945] (U´stı´ nad Labem, 2003), p. 171. 9. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 45 – 6. 10. Ibid., pp. 49 – 62. 11. Ibid., pp. 64 – 6. 12. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 1/v 88, Deckung des Mob. Bedarfes an Offizieren 13. The full report is in German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 29 – 39. 14. Ibid., p. 35. 15. Press reports stated that Britain’s attitude had not changed, though there was an underlying unease about the situation in Czechoslovakia, ibid., p. 78. 16. See below 17. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, p. 94. 18. After the war, Sudeten Germans tried to argue that there was a difference between loyalty of behaviour and loyalty of sentiment. Rabl, writing in 1959, claimed that there was no legal justification for the Czechoslovak state and that Sudeten Germans were loyal to the state in terms of their behaviour; Kurt Rabel, Statsbu¨rgerliche Loyalit im Nationalita¨tenstaat; Dargestellt an den Verha¨ltnissen in den Bo¨hmischen La¨ndern zwischen 1914 und 1938 (Munich, 1959), pp. 134– 6, 148– 50. 19. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, p. 118. 20. Ibid., p. 120. 21. Ibid., pp. 124– 5. 22. Ibid., pp. 133– 7. 23. Ibid., p. 138. 24. Ibid., pp. 146– 9. 25. Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps, the Nazi Motor Corps 26. Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps, the Nazi Flying Corps 27. Hitlerjugend, Hitler Youth 28. Ibid., p. 155. 29. This was a political organisation dealing with German minorities abroad. There were two other organisations with a similar purpose: Verein fu¨r das Deutschtum im Ausland and the Auslands-Organisation already referred to. The first was originally an imperial body concerned with the protection and expansion of German minorities abroad and was apparently fused with the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. The second was a Nazi body responsible for Reich Germans living abroad. 30. Ibid., pp. 155– 6. 31. Ibid., p. 157. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., pp. 162– 3.

280

NOTES

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181 –196

34. Ibid., pp. 169– 70. 35. Ibid., pp. 171– 3. 36. Ibid., p. 170. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Knaves, fools and heroes in Europe between the wars (London, 1974), p. 136. 37. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 186– 91. 38. Ibid., pp. 208– 9. 39. Ibid., p. 210. 40. Ibid., pp. 226– 7. 41. Ibid., pp. 236– 7. 42. Lacroix, French ambassador in Prague, to Bonnet, Foreign Minister, Prague 15 April 1938, Documents diplomatiques franc
ais 1932– 1939, 2nd Ser. Vol. IX (21 March– 9 June 1938) (Paris, 1974), pp. 382– 3. Lacroix believed the information had come from Hodza. 43. National Archives, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1939. Born in 1889, Newton had joined the Foreign office as a clerk in 1912 and served in Peking and Washington before going to Berlin. He was knighted in the New Year’s Honours List in 1939 as KCMG, presumably for his services in Prague. 44. For an analysis of this, see Marian Zgorniak, ‘Forces armies allemandes et tche´choslovaques en 1938,’ Revue d’histoire de la deuxie`me guerre mondiale, 122 (1981), pp. 61 – 72. 45. Ibid., p. 245. 46. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 64/12, Kriegstagebuch. 47. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 249, 256. Some if not all of these aircraft were transferred to the Slovak air force during World War II. Charles K. Kliment and Brˇetislav Nakla´del, Slovenska´ armada 1939 – 1945 (Prague, 2006), p. 195. 48. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, p. 260. 49. Ibid., pp. 265– 6 50. Ibid., pp. 273– 4. 51. Ibid., p. 274. 52. Ibid., p. 289. 53. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 64/12. 54. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 304– 5. 55. Ibid., pp. 311– 3. 56. Ibid., p. 318. 57. Ibid., pp. 349– 50. 58. Ibid., p. 333. 59. Ibid., p. 331. The meeting had been at Sinaia in Romania on 3 – 5 May. 60. Ibid., p. 333. 61. Ibid., pp. 354– 6. 62. Ibid., pp. 358– 62. 63. Nuremberg Trial, p. 43. 64. Ibid., p. 44.

NOTES

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196 –205

281

65. James Thomas Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis 7 March 1936; a study in multilateral diplomacy (London, 1977), p. 141. 66. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 379– 82. 67. Ibid., pp. 375– 6. 68. Butler is presumably R. A. Butler; the letter is in University of Birmingham, Eden Papers, 13/1/55E, conversation of 17 June 1938. 69. David Douglas Hilton to Professor Albrecht Haushofer, London, 9 June 1938, the reply is dated the following day; University of Birmingham, Eden Papers, 13/1/55B. 70. Ibid., pp. 398– 9. 71. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 67/59, report from the German military attache´ in London to the German high command. 72. Full details of the plan are in the German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 64/20, Generalstabes 1938, 14.2.1938. 73. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 490– 1. 74. National Archives, Foreign Office FO 371/21782, p. 193. 75. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, pp. 495– 7. 76. Ibid., pp. 501– 2. 77. Ibid., p. 506. 78. Full details of the Runciman visit are in Paul Vysˇney, The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938; prelude to Munich (London, 2003), passim. 79. Ibid., p. 149. 80. Ibid., p. 160. 81. Nuremberg Trial, pp. 49 – 52. 82. Karlicky´ et al., Sˇkoda, p. 647. 83. Miller, Tanks, pp. 36 – 7, Chamberlain, Doyle, Encyclopedia of tanks, p. 42. 84. Karlicky´ et al, Sˇkoda, p. 316 85. Miller, Tanks, pp. 38 – 9, Chamberlain, Doyle, Encyclopedia of tanks, p. 43. 86. B. T. White, Tanks and other AFVs of the Blitzkrieg era 1939– 41 (Poole, 1972), p. 96. 87. I am grateful to the librarian at the Bovington Tank Museum for this information. 88. Rozenkranz, Tatra trucks, p. 212. 89. Chris McNab, Twentieth century small arms (London, 2001), p. 149 90. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH 67/59, Report dated 12 May 1938. 91. Zbyne˘k Va´lka, Stı´hacı´ letadla 1939– 1945 [Fighter aircraft 1939– 1945] (Olomouc, 1999), pp. 77 – 81; Mike Spick, The illustrated directory of fighters (London, 2004), pp. 24 – 5, 190– 2. 92. Bill Gunston, The illustrated directory of fighting aircraft of World War II (London, 2004), pp. 366– 9 93. The following aircraft formed the Slovak air force during World War II; details are taken from Kliment and Nakla´del, Slovenska´ armada, pp. 188– 193. 94. Tatra; tradidice, pokrok, prosperita [Tatra, tradition, progress, prosperity] (Koprˇivnice, 1990), no pagination.

282

NOTES

TO PAGES

206 –218

95. Josef Durcˇa´k, Opevnˇova´nı´ Ostravska v letech 1935 azˇ 1938 [Fortifying the Ostrava area from 1935 to 1938] (Opava, 2005), passim and Ivo Vondrovsky´, Opevne˘nı´ z let 1936– 1938 na Slovensku [Fortifying Slovakia 1936 –1938] (Varnsdorf, 2004), passim, Martin Vanˇourek, Hranicˇa´rˇi od Hlucˇı´na [The men of (the fortress of) Hranicˇar from Hlucˇin] (Mohelnice, 2000). Ivo Vondrovsky´ has written a series of books on different parts of this defensive system. 96. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RHG 67/59, report from London 31 March 1938. The report also said that the Czechs were preparing an ultra modern road to allow 50,000 Russian troops to enter Czechoslovakia.

Chapter 6 Henlein’s Election Victory, Crisis, International Alarm and the Munich Conference 1. Quoted in Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia, the state that failed (London, 2011), p. 78. 2. Radio broadcast, 27 September 1937. 3. This is discussed at length in Boris Celovsky, Germanisierung und Genozid; Hitlers Endlo¨sung der tschechischen Frage. Deutsche Dokumente 1933 – 1945 (Dresden and Brno, 2005), passim. 4. Harry Hanak, ‘Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,’ in Rechcigl (ed.), Czechoslovakia, p. 793. 5. J. V. Polisˇensky´, Britain and Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1966), pp. 71 – 5. SetonWatson is widely known and respected in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; there is a statue of him in Zˇilina in Slovakia. 6. Stephen Borsody, ‘Czechoslovakia and Hungary’ in Richcigl (ed.), Czechoslovakia, p. 670. 7. Kontler, History of Hungary, p. 371. 8. Herbert Michaelis and Ernst Schraepler (eds), Ursachen und Folgen vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart. Eine Urkunden und Dokumentensammlung zur Zeitgeschichte; vol. 12, Das dritte Reich; Das sudetendeutsche Problem; Das Abkommen von Mu¨nchen und die Haltung der Großma¨chte (Berlin, no publication date) (hereafter referred to as Das Dritte Reich), discussion between Ribbentrop, Imre´dy and Ka´nya, 23 August 1938, pp. 273– 4 9. University of Birmingham, Eden Papers, 13/1/68G, Captain Liddell Hart to Eden, 10 June 1938. 10. National Archives, Foreign Office, FO 371/21782. 11. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919– 1939; 3rd ser., vol. III 1938– 9 (London, 1950), p. 1. 12. Ibid., pp. 1 – 2. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919– 1939, p. 1. 13. Ibid., pp. 1 – 2. 14. A. J. P. Taylor, The origins of the Second World War (London, 1964), p. 217. 15. Pasold, Ladybird, pp. 483– 4. 16. Ibid., p. 3.

NOTES

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218 –227

283

17. For Hungarian policy, see Kontler, History of Hungary, pp. 371– 2. The Hungarian army received Austrian weapons when the Austrian army was reequipped with German, Sir Ralph Glyn to the Foreign Office, Budapest, undated, Eden Papers, 13/1/68E. 18. The older part of the town, north of the river, was already Polish. The river at that point forms the frontier. The river is not very wide and normally shallow. It could easily be crossed at any point. 19. Ivo Vondrovsky´, Pevnosti; opevne˘nı´ z let 1936 – 1938 [Forts; defensive works from the years 1936 – 1938] (Varnsdorf, 1993), pp. 53 – 4, 56. 20. Documents on British Foreign Policy, pp. 8 – 9. 21. Eden Papers, 13/1/66Z, Masaryk to Halifax, 12 November 1938. 22. Eden Papers, 13/1/66C, Colin R. Coote to Eden, 20 September 1938. 23. Mark Slouka, The visible world (London, 2008), p. 79. 24. Ibid., p. 21. 25. Documents on British Foreign Policy, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 23 Sept. 1938, ibid., pp. 24 – 5, 27, 35. 26. Knox to Halifax, Budapest, 26 Sept. 1938, ibid., p. 37. 27. For a description of the Czech gun see Chris McNab, Twentieth-century small arms (Hoo near Rochester, 2001), p. 149. 28. National Archives, Foreign Office, FO 371/21581, f. 87. 29. Ibid., f. 80. 30. Ibid., ff.113 – 4. 31. German documents, Ser. D, vol. II, p. 1. 32. Ibid., pp. 4 – 5. 33. E´tienne Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace or the economic consequences of Mr. Keynes (London, 1946), p. 18. 34. Ibid., p. 5. 35. Documents on British Foreign Policy, Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 27 Sept. 1938, ibid., p. 41. 36. Ibid., Newton to Halifax, Prague, 1 Oct. 1938, p. 62. 37. Ibid., Kennard to Halifax, Warsaw, 1 Oct. 1938, p. 93. 38. National Archives, Foreign Office, FO 371/21581, ff. 133–4. 39. Documents on British Foreign Policy, Halifax to British Delegation, Foreign Office, 29 Sept. 1938, ibid., pp. 48 – 9. 40. See for example the copy of the transfer moratorium in the Tatra company archives, Koprˇivnice, Bo¨hmische Escompte Bank to Dr Hans Ringhoffer, Prague 3 Sept. 1938. 41. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the International Commission, Berlin, 1 Oct. 1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, p. 12. 42. Frantisˇek Kavka, An outline of Czechoslovak history (Prague, 1960), p. 5. 43. Documents on British Foreign Policy, Newton to Halifax, Prague, 1 Oct. 1938, p. 67. 44. Ibid., Note by Roberts, Foreign Office, 2 Oct. 1938, p. 77. 45. Ibid., Memorandum by Foreign Ministry official, Berlin, 2 Oct. 1938, pp. 15–16.

284

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227 –235

46. There was considerable rivalry between Germans and Czechs from the second half of the nineteenth century. For details see Karel Jirˇı´k, ‘Vı´tkovice – nejvice germanizovana´ obec v Prˇedlitavsku’ [‘Vı´tkovice – the most Germanised area in pre-Lithuania’], Ostrava, 16, (Ostrava, 1991), pp. 162– 95. 47. Eden Papers, 13/1/66P, Sir Roger Lumley to Eden, 2 October 1938 48. One example is the town of Zˇatec in North West Bohemia shown in Peter Glotz, Vyhna´nı´; Cˇeske´ zeme˘ jako poucˇny´ prˇı´pad [Exile; the example of the Czech lands] (Prague, Litomysˇl, 2006), p. 99. 49. Ibid., p. 102. 50. Pasold, Ladybird, p. 486. 51. The following is from Herbert Michaelis and Ernst Schraepler (eds), Ursachen und Folgen; Vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart; Part 12, Das Dritte Reich; Das sudetendeutsche Problem; Das Abkommen von Mu¨nchen und das Haltung der Großmachte (Berlin, no date), pp. 481– 2. 52. German military archives, Freiburg, RH64/18, Kriegstagebuch des H. Gru. Kdo. 3, 3 Oct. 1938 53. Ibid. 54. Das Dritte Reich, Telegram from Henke, Prague, 4 Oct. 1938, Memorandum of State Secretary, 4 Oct. 1938, pp. 489– 90. 55. Ibid., Protocol signed by German Foreign Minister and British, French and Italian ambassadors, Berlin, 5 Oct. 1938, pp. 32 – 3. 56. Ibid., memorandum by State Secretary, Berlin, 5 Oct. 1938, pp. 33 – 4. 57. The following is based on Ivo K. Feierabend, ‘The Second Czech Republic, September 1938 – March 1939’ in Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr. (ed.), Czechoslovakia past and present, vol. 1; International, social and economic aspects (Hague, 1968), pp. 65 – 75. 58. Ibid., memorandum by the Director of the Political Department, Berlin, 7 Oct. 1938, pp. 46 –9. 59. Jan Gebhart and Jan Kuklı´k, Druha´ republika 1938– 1939; sva´r demokracie a totality v politicke´m, spolecˇenskem a kulturnı´m zˇivote˘ [The Second Republic 1938– 1939; the quarrel between democracy and totalitarianism in political, economic and cultural life] (Prague, 2004), p. 163. 60. Benesˇ et al., Facing History, p. 117. 61. Oldrˇich Svoboda, Cˇesˇi v Opave˘ a na Opavsku, 1938– 1945; vzpomı´nky III [Czechs in and around Opava, 1938– 1945; recollections III] (Prague, 2003), p. 16. The book contains the recollections of Czechs living there and who witnessed the events. 62. Radan La´sˇek, Jednotka urcˇenı´ SOS [SOS; determined forces] (Prague, 2006), pp. 92 – 3. SOS was the frontier defence force. 63. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH2/298, Lagebericht No. 1, Berlin, 19 March 1939. 64. Jan Kourˇil, Jan Bortosˇ and Jaroslava Cˇajova´, Zapomenute´ pohranicˇı´; Sˇumvald u Unicˇova 1938– 1945 [Oblivion across the frontier, Sˇumvald u Unicˇova 1938– 1945] (Prague, 1999), passim.

NOTES

TO PAGES

235 –248

285

65. Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler’s prisons; legal terror in Nazi Germany (New Haven & London, 2004), p. 200. 66. German documents, Ser. D, vol. 1, Keitel to the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 10 Oct. 1939, p. 53. 67. Pasold, Ladybird, pp. 486– 7. 68. Volker Zimmermann, Die Sudetendeutshe im NS-Staat (Essen, 1999), pp. 189–90. 69. Harold James, The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi economic war against the Jews (Cambridge 2001), pp. 148– 9. 70. National Archives, Foreign Office, FO 371/21581, ff 70, 1189. 71. Das Drite Reich, pp. 505– 6. 72. The passage in Hitler’s speech was: ‘It only needs that in England, instead of Chamberlain, Mr Duff Cooper or Mr Eden or Mr Churchill should come to power, and then we know quite well that it would be the aim of these men immediately to begin a new World War.’ 73. German Documents, Ser. D, vol. 1, pp. 305– 6. 74. Weizsa¨cker to Ott, Berlin, 11 Oct. 1938, ibid., pp. 681– 2. 75. Oderberg (Czech Bohumin) was an important railway junction between the Vienna– Warsaw line and the Prague – Slovakia line. It was also an industrial town with chemical and other factories. 76. For details of these bunkers that were similar in design to the Czech, see Ivo Vondrovsky´, Pevnosti; Opevne˘nı´ z let 1936– 1938 na Slovensku (Varnsdorf, 1993), passim. 77. German Documents, Ser. D, vol. 1, Circular from State Secretary, Berlin, 31 Oct. 1938, p. 117. 78. Hitler’s directive to the Wehrmacht, Berlin, 21 Oct. 1938, ibid., pp. 99 – 100. It is also in Das Dritte Reich, pp. 534– 5. 79. Pasold, Ladybird, p. 487. 80. For details of the German terror campaign against Czechs, see Volker Zimmermann, Die Sudetendeutschen im NS-Staat (Essen, 1999), pp. 98 – 100. 81. This and subsequent statements are in the Archiv me˘sta, Plzenˇ, Prˇiloha a prohlasˇenı´, 18 Nov. 1938, cˇ. 887. 82. Ibid., 16 Nov. 1938. 83. Ibid., 12 Nov. 1938. 84. Ibid., 17 Nov. 1938. 85. German Military Archives, Freiburg, RH2/298, Lagebericht No. 1, Berlin 19 March 1939, Lagebericht No. 2, 25 March 1939. 86. Evans, Third Reich in power, p. 685. 87. Vı´tkovice company archives, Ostrava, VHHT/10, Hla´sˇenı´ zabyka´nı´ v Kotsbası´ch, 1938–9. 88. The following is based on the Sta´tnı´ okresnı´ archiv, U´stı´ nad Labem, archives of the Landrat 1938 –1945, karton 1. 89. The following is based on Ladislav Dea´k, Viedenska´ arbitra´zˇ; 2 November 1938; Dokumenty II, okupa´cia (2 November 1938– 14 marec 1939) [The Vienna

286

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

NOTES

TO PAGES

249 –250

Arbitration, 2 November 1938, Documents II; occupation (2 November 1938 – 14 March 1939)] (Martin, Slovakia, 2003), passim. Ibid., report of 9 November 1938, pp. 39 – 40. Ibid., report of 12 November 1938, p. 50. Ibid., report of 14 November 1938, pp. 55 – 6. Ibid., report of 16 November 1938, p. 39. Ibid., report of 16 November 1938, p. 72. Ibid., report of 20 November 1938, p. 82. Ibid., report of 21 November, p. 89. Sˇpiesz, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 205 Dea´k, Viedenska´ Arbitra´zˇ, Report of 27 November 1938, p. 101. Ibid., report of 3 December 1938, p. 130.

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Rechcigl, Miroslav (ed.), Czechoslovakia past and present, vol. 1 (Hague 1968) Rees, Philip, Biographical dictionary of the extreme right since 1890 (London, 1990) Reynolds, David, The long shadow; the Great War and the Twentieth Century (London, 2014) Rudolph, Richard L., Banking and industrialisation in Austria-Hungary; the role of banks in the industrialisation of the Czech Crown lands, 1873– 1914 (Cambridge, 1976) ———, ‘Social structure and the beginnings of Austrian economic growth’, in Komlos, John (ed.), Economic development in the Habsburg monarchy and in the successor states (New York, 1990) Sandgruber, Roman, ‘The electrical century; the beginnings of electrical supply in Austria’, in Matis, H., The economic development of Austria since 1870 (Aldershot, 1994) Seton-Watson, Hugh and Christopher, The making of a new Europe-Watson; R.W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary (London, 1981) Shirer, William L., The rise and fall of the Third Reich; a history of Nazi Germany (London, 1998) Slouka, Mark, The visible world (London, 2008) The Slovak Council, Should Britain go to war – for Czechoslovakia? An appeal to common sense – for the sake of World Peace (Geneva, 1937) Smetana, Vit, In the shadow of Munich; British policy towards Czechoslovakia from the endorsement to the renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1936–1942) (Prague, 2008) Spa¨ter, Jo¨rg, Britische Debatten u¨ber Deutsche und Nazis 1902– 1945 (Go¨ttingen, 2003) Spick, Mike, The illustrated directory of fighters (London, 2004) Sˇpecinger, Otokar, ‘Pru˚myslova´ vy´stava ve Veltrusı´ch’, Strˇedocˇesky´ sbornı´k historicky, 1990, 17 Sˇpiesz, Anton, Ilustrovane´ dejiny Slovenska na ceste k sebauvedomeniu (Bratislava, 2002) Steiner, Zara, The lights that failed; European international history 1919– 1933 (London, 2005) Sternberger, Rolf and Vogel, Bernhard, Die Wahl der Parlamente. Europa (2 vols, Berlin, 1969) Svoboda, Oldrˇich, Cˇesˇi v Opave˘ a na Opavsku, 1938–1945; vzpominky III (Prague, 2003) Stone, Norman and Strouhal, Edouard (eds), Czechoslovakia; crossroads and crises 1918– 1988 (London, 1989) Tatra; tradice, pokrok, prosperita (Koprˇivnice, 1990) Taylor, A.J.P., The origins of the Second World War (London, 1964) Teichova, Alice, An economic background to Munich; international business and Czechoslovakia 1918– 1938 (Cambridge, 1974) ———, The Czechoslovak economy 1918– 1989 (London, 1988) Teichova, Alice and Cottrell, P.L., ‘Industrial structures in West and East Europe during the inter-war period’, in Teichova and Cottrell (eds), International business ——— (eds), International business and Central Europe, 1918– 1939 (Leicester, 1983) Thurich, Eckart, Schwierige Nachbarschaften; Deutsche und Polen – Deutsche und Tschechen in 20. Jahrhundert; eine Darstellung in Dokumenten (Stuttgart, 1990) Tipton, Frank B. and Aldrich, Robert, An economic and social history of Europe 1890– 1939 (London, 1987) Tooze, Adam, The wages of destruction; the making and breaking of the Nazi economy (London, 2007)

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Trˇiska, Karel, ‘Jinecke´ panstvi v 18. stoletı´’, Strˇedocˇesky´ sbornı´ historicky, 1990, 17 Turnock, David, The economy of East Central Europe, 1815–1989; Stages of transformation in a peripheral region (London, 2006) Va´lka, Zbyne˘k, Stı´hacı´ letadla; 1939 –1945/Velka´ Brita´nie – Ne˘mecko (Olomouc, 1999) Vanˇourek, Martin, Hranicˇa´rˇi od Hlucˇina (Mohelnice, 2000) Lord Vansittart, The mist procession; the autobiography of Lord Vansittart (London, 1958) Von deutscher Kultur in der Tschechoslowakei; aus Anlaß der Ausstellung fu¨r zeitgeno¨ssische Kultur in Bru¨nn 1928 (Eger, 1928) Vondrovsky, Ivo, Pevnosti; opevne˘nı´ z let 1936– 1938 (Varnsdorf, 1993) Voros, Antal, ‘The age of preparation: Hungarian agricultural conditions between 1848– 1914’ in Held, Joseph (ed.), The modernisation of agriculture; rural transformation in Hungary, 1848– 1914 (New York, 1980) Vysˇny´, Paul, The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938 (London, 2003) Wachsmann, Nikolaus, Hitler’s prisons; legal terror in Nazi Germany (New Haven & London, 2004) Wandycz, Piotr S., The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926– 1936; FrenchCzechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (Princeton, NJ, 1988) Wheeler-Bennett, John W., Munich, prologue to tragedy (London, 1948) ———, Knaves, fools and heroes in Europe between the wars (London, 1974) White, B.T., Tanks and other AFVs of the Blitzkrieg era (Poole, 1972) Winter, Eduard, Die Deutschen in der Slowakei und in Karpathorussland (Mu¨nster in Westfalen, 1926) Wolisch, Paul, Die sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den Jahren 1918– 1919 (Vienna and Leipzig, 1932) Yeshahahu, A. Jelinek, The lust for power: nationalism, Slovakia and the Communists 1918– 1948 (Boulder, Col., 1983) Zgorniak, Marian, ‘Forces armies allemandes et tsche´choslovaques en 1938’, Revue d’histoire de la deuxie`me guerre mondiale, 122 (1981) Zimmermann, Volker, Sudetsˇtı´ Ne˘mci v nacisticke´m sta´te˘; politika a na´lada obyvatelstva v rˇı´sksˇe´ zˇupe˘ udety (1938– 1945) (Prague, 2001) [Czech translation of the German Die Sudetendeutschen im NS-Staat (Essen, 1999)]

INDEX

Agrarian League (Landbu¨ndler), 101 Agrarian Party, 64, 66, 90, 276n aircraft, 119, 136, 191, 204– 5 A. I. Z., 98 Alexander family, 50 Allgemeine Bo¨hmische Bank, Prague, 52 Allgemeine Zeitung, 165 Alpine Montan Company, 73 Andra´ssy, Count, 40 Anglo-Czechoslovak Bank, 73 Anschluss, 25, 60, 136– 7, 141, 161, 174– 81, 186, 192, 211, 216 Arbeit und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft see Labour and Economy Group Arbeiterwehrn, 86 Arbitration Treaty, 134 armoured vehicles, 116– 8, 203– 4 Asˇ see Asch Asch, 91, 99, 229, 235 Auer, Lodgmann von, 83 Auslands Organisation, 10, 175–8, 279n Aussig see U´stı´ nad Labem Austrian Commercial and Trading Credit Bank, 40 Austro-Hungarian debt, 33 Balfour, Arthur, 20 Bank for Commerce and Industry, 73

Banska´ Sˇtiavnica, 30, 32 Bat’a, 35, 42 – 4, 47, 69, 72, 80, 119 Bat’a, Toma´sˇ, 42 – 4, 47 Battle of the White Mountain, 1, 24, 232, 270n Becˇva, River, 46 Benesˇ, Edvard, 21 – 3, 25, 28, 33, 53– 6, 59, 64, 66, 109– 11, 113, 131–4, 138, 140, 142, 145, 148, 150, 154, 160– 1, 163, 166, 172, 176, 192, 202, 211– 2, 232, 252–3, 257 Beran, Rudolf, 175– 6 Bergsverksaktiebolaget Freja, 40 Berliner Tageblatt, 192 Beskydy hory, 28 Blomberg, Field Marshall von, 168, 170 Bodenbach, 107 Bohumin, 28, 44, 236, 285n Bo¨hmische Union Bank, 236 de Bordes, Walre´, 85 Brankauer Draht-Blechwaren und Na¨gelfabrik, 48, 156, 256 Bratislava, 29, 75, 232, 238, 248 Breslau, 44 British Foreign Office, 26 Brno, 24, 37, 45, 49, 68, 72, 76, 108, 114, 235, 238, 274n Bruncˇllik, Alois, 52

296

A HISTORY

OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Bru¨nn see Brno Bru¨x see Most Bu¨low, von, Bernhard Graf, 100 Bund Oesterreichischer Industrielle, 45, 51 Bystrˇicˇka, 47 Carlsbad see Karlovy Vary cartel, 73 – 4, 76 ceramics, 71, 78 Cˇeska´ Eskomptnı´ Bank, 73 Cˇeska´ Lı´pa, 38 Cˇeskomoravske´ Skla´rny, 46 Cˇesky´ Kolben Dane˘k (CˇKD), 72, 80, 119, 203 Cˇesky´ les, 27 Cheb see Eger Chomutov, 36, 73, 194 Christian Socialists, 90, 92 Christie, Group Captain, 144 Chvalovsky´, Frantisˇek, 232 coal, 24, 28, 36, 39, 42, 55, 66, 71, 80, 90, 94, 155, 236, 241, 265n Credit-Anstalt Bank, 52, 66 Curtius, Julius, 63 Czech Bank Union, 73 Czech Legion, 21, 58, 64, 67 Czech National theatre, 24 Czech-Romania treaty, 60 Czech-Yugoslav treaty, 60 Czechoslovak National Council, 22 – 3 Czechoslovak-Russian Assistance Pact, 133, 277n Day of National Labour, 94 Der Aufbruch, 167 Der Gegen-Angriff, 131 Der Sturmer, 111 Deutsche Arbeitsfront, 148 Deutsche Bank, 236 Deutsche Bank und Kontogesellschaft, 130– 1 Deutsche Union Bank, 273n Die Deutsche Revolution, 131

Die Simpl, 131 Die Zeit, 133, 142, 181, 190– 2 Dobrazil, Carl 48 Doubrava, 39 Dresden, 108, 163 Druzˇina, 21, 263n Dux, 107 Eger, 94, 97, 187, 193 Egerland, 84 Eisenlohr, 134, 136–7, 139–42, 158–60, 166, 172, 174–6, 180–2, 185–6, 191–2, 194, 197, 257 Elbe, River, 35 Elektrotechna, 175 Erzgebirge, see Krusˇne´ hory ethnic diversity of Central Europe, 2 Fahlberg, Constantin, 45 Farbwerke A. G., 45 Flandin, Pierre, 65 Fliessen, 217, 235, 256 Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, 56 –8, 60 Franzenbad, 94 Freikorps, 2 Fritsch, Colonel General Baron von, 168, 170 Gablonz, 68, 100 German Agrarian Party (Landbund), 93, 185 German Christian Social, Business Party (Gewerbler), 101, 185 German Foreign Office, 10, 12 – 4, 94, 101, 103, 106– 7, 109, 131– 2, 137, 140, 147– 8, 150, 164– 5, 170–2, 174, 181, 190, 192, 209 German miners, 25 German Peoples’ Council (Volksrat), 101 German Popular Party (Volksfront), 101 German Red Cross, 107 German Social Democrats, 101, 106 Gewirkschaftsbund, 88 glass, 46 – 7, 67 – 8, 71, 78, 89

INDEX

297

Goebbels, Joseph, 88 Goldschmidt, Rudolf, 44 – 6, 51 – 2 Gooch, G. P., 144 Go¨ring, Colonel General Hermann, 98, 139, 159, 168, 181, 200, 235 Graz, 86 Great Moravian Empire, 1, 23 Großbo¨hmerland, 86 Guttmann, Wilhelm and David, 39

Hodzˇa, Fedor, 150– 1, 158–9, 164, 175, 185– 7, 189, 195– 7, 202 Hohenlohe-Langenberg, Prince Max von, 11, 149– 51, 164 Hombok see Hlubocˇky´ Hradec nad Moravici, 48, 156 Hungarian loss of territory, 58 Hungarian Revolution, 3 hydraulic acid, 37

Habsburg industry, 6 – 7, 37, 47 – 8, 51, 71, 74 – 5 Haida, 68 Hammer, Franz, 48 Harmanek, 76 Hauer, Max, 94 Heim ins Reich, 12, 174 Heimwehr, 85 – 6 Heinisch, Greta, 68 Heizer, Max, 94 Henlein, Konrad, 9 – 11, 14, 31, 79, 83, 100– 2, 107, 113– 5, 122– 33, 138, 144– 5, 147– 8, 150, 156, 158– 61, 163– 4, 167, 171– 2, 181– 2, 186, 188– 90, 192, 196, 209– 12, 251, 254, 258, 260 Hess, Rudolf, 108– 9, 170 Hilgenreiner, Karl, 91 Hitler, Adolf, 9 – 11, 14, 17 – 8, 55, 62, 90–1, 97, 104, 114, 116, 122, 138, 142, 145, 153, 161–2, 169–70, 172, 176, 180–1, 189, 191, 203, 208–10, 237, 253–4, 260 Hitler’s proposed air attack on France (Fall Rot, Operation Red), 196– 7 Hitler’s proposed attack on Czechoslovakia (Fall Gru¨n, Operation Green), 11 – 4, 161, 163– 4, 168, 189, 192– 3, 202, 217, 235, 254 Hlinka, Fr. Andrej, 174 Hlubocˇky´, 47 Hlucˇin, 28, 134, 274n Ho¨chst am Main, 45

Irmenbach, Viktor, 52 iron, 36, 39, 42, 47, 71, 80 Ja¨gerndorf, 170 Janotta, Heinrich, 48 Jesenyky hory, 28 jewellery, 68 Jews, 102– 3, 127, 217, 233– 4, 236–7, 240– 1, 247, 249–50, 257, 276n Jince, 35 Jung, Rudolf, 90, 104 Kaaden, 27 Kadenˇ see Kaaden Kamaradschaftsbund, 101, 107, 130 Kapp Putsch, 27 Karlovy Vary, 32, 68, 84, 131, 198, 255 Karlsbad see Karlovy Vary Karlsbad Programme, 190–2 Karvina´, 28, 36, 40, 75, 247, 265n Kasperov, Rudolf, 90 Keynes, John Maynard, 20 Kladno, 36, 72 Klattau, 89 Klo¨sterle, 68 Knirsch, Hans, 90, 104 Koch, Dr., 91 – 106, 108– 34, 200, 258, 273n Kolı´n, 38 Komotau see Chomutov Koprˇivnice, 38, 71 Kramarˇ, Karel, 23, 73 Kra´sno nad Becˇvou, 46

298

A HISTORY

OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Krebs, Hans, 90, 104– 5 Kreditanstalt der Deutschen, 143– 2 Krknosˇe, 28 Krofta, Kamil, 99, 111– 2, 131, 138– 40, 183 Krumau, 188 Krumlov see Krumau Krusˇne´ hory, 25, 27 Kun, Be´la, 31, 80, 116 Labour and Economy Group, 92, 101 La¨nderbank see Bank for Commerce and Industry Landholding in Hungary, 3 Larisch-Mo¨nnich, Count, 40 League of Nations, 55, 62, 65, 134– 5, 138, 145, 252– 3 Liberec see Reichenberg Lidicˇe, 33 Little Entente, 59, 63, 65, 96, 194, 216, 252, 260 Locarno Conference, 61, 137, 211 locks, 48 Lo¨vy, Georg, 51 Lutz, Karl, 126– 7 L’viv, 41 M. Joss and Lo¨wenstein, 89 Maffersdorf, 100 Maginot Line, Czech, 8, 12, 83, 120, 162, 170, 206–8, 216, 234, 236, 253 Malpetr, Jan, 93 Mannesmannro¨hren Werke A. G., 73 Marianbad, 68, 84, 198, 255 Marianske´ Lazne see Marianbad Masaryk, Toma´sˇ, 4 – 6, 8, 18, 21 – 3, 25, 33, 53 – 4, 84, 101, 110– 11, 138, 176, 210, 252, 254 Mastny´, Vojte˘ch, 97, 103, 112, 133, 139, 149, 166, 171, 181, 193 Maugham, Viscount, 26 Mayr-Harting, Robert, 90 Mechanek, Ignaz, 47 Mislap, Carl, 52

Moravia a.s., 47 Moravia Bank, 76 Mo¨rtl, Michael, 68 Most, 36 Munich Conference, 55 – 6, 80 National Democratic Party, 73 Nazi, 86 – 9 Nedela, Edouard, 48 Nesseldorf, 39 Neu Titschin, 68 Neue Vorwa¨rts, 131 Newton, Basil, 12, 158, 189, 258, 280n Nostrification, 7, 33, 36, 49 – 52, 69 Novy´ Bor, 46 Oder, River, 35 Oderberg see Bohumi Oderberge Chemische Werke, 44, 51 Oertel, 68 Oesterreichische Chemische und Metallurgische Produktion, 45, 51 Olomouc, 181 Opava, 32, 234 Oppeln see Opava Optimit gumove´ a textilne´ za´vody a.s., 48– 9, 52 Ordnerdienst, 187 Orlicke´ hory, 28 Orlova´, 39 Ostraue Zeitung, 165 Ostrava, 13, 28, 32, 36, 39, 48, 50, 71– 2,75, 80, 94, 228, 236, 253 Otakar II, 23 Ottawa Conference, 66 Pasold, Eric, 3 –4, 6, 13, 15, 83, 235, 256 Peace Council, 144 Peace of Paris, 62 Pelle´, General, 61 Permanent Court of Justice, 63 Pertinenza, 49 Philadelphia Agreement, 22, 29

INDEX Pittsburg Convention, 22 Plzenˇ, 36 – 7, 72, 91 – 2, 97, 199 Poldi ironworks, 72 Pollack, Martin, 86 Pollack, Rudolf, 48 porcelain, 68, 71, 89 Prager Eisenindustrie Gesellschaft, 36 Prager Tageblatt, 94 Prague University, 91, 93 Prˇemyslid Empire, 1, 23 Pressburg see Bratislava Pribram, 35 prisoners of war, 41 Prodejna sdruzˇeny´ch cˇeskoslovensky´ch zˇeleza´ren, 73 Provincial Assembly of German Bohemia, 26 Pula, 41 Rabel, Kurt, 8 Rakovnı´k, 35 Rapotin, 46 Rasˇin, Alois, 33 – 4, 49, 54 refugees, Czech, 13, 234, 239– 40, 247– 9 German, 13, 234, 239– 40, 247– 9 Reich, S., 46 –7, 156 Reichenberg, 26, 100 Reifeisen Savings Bank, 142 Rijeka, 41 Rima steel works, 75 Ringhoffer, 38 – 9, 71, 255 Romania, 20, 25, 31, 55, 57 –9, 63, 65, 67, 74, 79, 162, 194, 202, 236, 255, 260 Rothschild, Salomon, 36, 39–40, 44, 71 Royal Institute of International Affairs, 144 Runciman Mission, 200– 3, 212, 258 Rundschau, 142 Ruthenes, 29 Saaz, 100 Saccharine A. G., 45 – 6, 51

299

Schickel, Eduard, 68 Schneck und Kohnberger, 48 – 9, 52 Schneider, 38 Schubert, Leo, 88, 90 Schustala, Igna´c, 39, 71 Scientific management, 43, 71, 268n Seliger, Josef, 26 Seton-Watson, Professor R. W., 25 – 6, 29, 53, 55, 215, 282n Shirer, William, 100 shoes, 42 – 3, 69, 71 Siemens and Halske, 175 Silesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 48 Simon, Sir John, 135 Sˇkoda, 5, 17, 20, 35, 37, 41, 69, 72, 80, 118–9, 199, 203, 240 Sˇkoda, Emil, 37 – 8 Slonzaks, 50 social wage, 67 Sokol, 84, 100, 188, 232 Sousedı´k, 38 Spa Conference, 28 Spann, Othmar, 101 Spina, Franz, 90 Sˇrobar, Dr., 23 steel, 36, 39, 42, 71, 80, 236 Sˇtefa´nik, Milan, 22 – 3, 58 Stein, Freiherr von, 145 Sternberg, 27 Sˇternberg see Sternberg Strasser, Otto, 112, 131, 274n Stresa Conference, 66 Stude´nka, 38 Sturm Abteilung (SA), 88, 90, 97 – 8, 108 Stur, L’udovik, 29 Styria 86 Sudetendeutscher Heimatbund, 89, 108 Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront, 101, 113, 129 Sudeten German Agrarian Party, 109, 113 Sudeten German Athletic Club, 175

300

A HISTORY

OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN THE WARS

Sudeten German Nationalist Party (DNP), 101, 115 Sudeten German Nazi Party (DNSAP), 101, 115, 167 Sudeten German Party (SdP), 9 – 10, 14, 122– 130, 138, 141– 2, 148, 152, 164, 167, 170– 2, 175– 6, 180–2, 184– 7, 192, 195, 199– 200, 202, 209, 222, 276n Sudeten German Savings Bank, 143 Sudeten German Social Democratic Party, 88, 109, 113 Sudeten Germans, exile, 6, 8, 27, 53, 83, 86 – 7 Sudeten Germans, expulsion, 1, 32, 83 Sudeten German Turnorganisation, 138 sugar, 36 – 7, 45, 73 sulphuric acid, 37 Sˇumava, 27 Sˇumvald, 235 Sˇustala see Schustala Igna´c Tag, 105 Tardieu, Andre´, 66 tariffs, 60 – 1, 66 – 7, 71, 74 – 5, 256, 270n Tatra, 39, 204 Tatra Mountains, 29 Teplice, 36, 68, 171 Teplitz see Teplice Teplitz Scho¨nau, 68 Teschen, 28, 55, 57, 213, 219, 222, 225, 265n Textile industry, 24, 37, 71 – 2, 74, 78, 89 Thirteen Points, 22, 26 Thun’sche Manufaktur, 68 Tippmann, Dr. Otto, 242–7, 255 Tiring, Conrad, 52 Transcarpathian Rus’, 31 Treaty of La´ny, 59 Treaty of St Germain, 19 – 20, 27, 33, 49 – 50, 59, 83

Treaty of Trianon, 19 – 20, 27, 33, 58– 9, 218 Treaty of Versailles, 19– 20, 25 – 7, 29, 33, 50, 54, 56, 61 – 2, 67, 134, 144, 211, 215, 253, 259 Trebice, 35 Trieste, 41 Troppau see Opava Tschuppik, Walter, 99 Turmverband, 100 unemployment, 77 – 8, 87, 89, 122, 138, 140, 154– 5 Union Bank, Vienna, 45, 48, 51 Ursprungsprache, 25 U´sobrno, 46 U´stı´ nad Labem, 35, 44, 158 Vaclav II and III, 24 Vansittart, Sir Robert., 11, 15, 100, 145, 149, 154– 5, 157, 191, 217 Vecˇer, 104 Velke´ Karlovice, 46 Veltrusy, 35 Verband Volkssport, Nationalsozialistischer Verband fu¨r Wandern, Radfahren, Spiel und Sport aller Art (Volkssport), 88 – 90, 98 Verein fu¨r das Deutschtum im Ausland, 279n Vienna Arbitration, 239, 248 Vienna cartel office, 51 Vı´tkovice steel works, 13, 28, 35 – 6, 39– 41, 48, 71, 73, 222 Vo¨lkische Beobachter Volksbund, 130 –1 Volksdeutsch Council, 108, 113– 4 Volksdeutsch Mittellstelle, 193, 279n Volksgemeinschaft, 101 Vsetı´n, 38, 4 wages, 79, 155 Wahliss, Ernst, 68 Waldsassen, 94

INDEX war memorials, Austro-Hungarian, 21 Czech, 21 Washington Manifesto, 22 – 3 Weiza¨cker, Ernst von, 193–5, 198–200 Wilson, President, Woodrow, 22, 26, 81, 64

301

Yugoslavia, 20, 55, 58– 9, 65, 79, 162, 195, 199, 202, 216 Za´horˇı´, 111– 2 Zetter, Dr. Georg, 45 Zˇivnostenska´ Banka, 38, 44, 73, 196 Zlı´n, 42