The Republic of Armenia: Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization [4] 0520088042, 9780520088047

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The Republic of

ARMENIA Volume IV

The Republic of

ARMENIA

VOLUME IV

Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY • LOS ANGELES • LONDON

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1996 by The Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data (Revised for vols. 3-4) Hovannisian, Richard G. The Republic of Armenia. (Bibliography: v. 1, p. 479-518; v. 2, p. 531-572; ) Contents: v. 1. The first year, 1918—1919 — v. 2. From Versailles to London, 1919-1920 — v. 3. From London to Sèvres, February-August, 1920 — v. 4. Between crescent and sickle: partition and sovietization. 1. Armenia—History—Revolution, 1917—1920. I. Tide. DS195.5.H56 956.6'2 72-129613 ISBN 0-520-01984-9 (v. 1) ISBN 0-520-04186-0 (v. 2) ISBN 0-520-08803-4 (v. 3) ISBN 0-520-08804-2 (v. 4)

Printed in the United States of America 98765432 1 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48—1984.

Contents

LIST OF MAPS

vii

ix

ABBREVIATED TITLES 1.

THE UNITED STATES AND ARMENIA: MANDATE AND BOUNDARIES

1

2.

NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT: ARMENIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

45

3.

A SOVIET ACCORD AND THE BATTLE FOR ZANGEZUR

go

4.

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS AND ARMENIA

12 8

5.

THE TURKISH INVASION AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY

180

6.

WAR AND TRUCE

237

7.

THE DIMMING OF THE WEST

293

8.

THE WAGES OF DEFEAT

341

9.

DÉNOUEMENT: PARTITION AND SOVIETIZATION

373

TRANSLITERATION KEY

409

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

411

BIBLIOGRAPHY

417

INDEX

469

V

Maps

1.

THE PROPOSED BOUNDARIES OF ‘ WILSONIAN ARMENIA’ ’

41

2.

THE BATTLE FOR ZANGEZUR

68

3.

THE NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER

104

4.

SURMALU COUNTY

186

5.

THE INITIAL TURKISH OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 1920

189

6.

THE KARS FRONT

248

7.

THE ALEXANDROPOL OPERATION AND TRUCE

283

8.

ARMENIAN LOSSES BY THE TREATIES OF ALEXANDROPOL, MOSCOW, AND KARS

vii

397

Abbreviated Titles

Armenia Archives

State Historical Archives of Armenia (formerly of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic), Erevan. The fund, register, and file are com­ bined as, for example, 200/1/602 (fund 200, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, register 1 of 2 reg­ istries, and file 602 of 667 files in this register).

Arm. Nat. Del. Archives

Archives of the Armenian National Delegation (now deposited in the State Historical Ar­ chives, Erevan, with microfilm copies in the Nubarian Library in Paris and at the head­ quarters of the Armenian General Benevolent Union in the United States).

Banber Erevani Hamalsarani

Banber Erevani Hamalsarani. Hasarakakan gitutiunner [Vestnik Erevanskogo Universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki]. Erevan, 1967- .

Banber Hayastani arkhivneri

Banber Hayastani arkhivneri [Vestnik arkhivovArmenii]. Publ. of Chief Archival Administration attached to the Council of Ministers of the Ar­ menian Soviet Socialist Republic (from 1990, of the Republic of Armenia). Erevan, i960- .

BRITAIN, CAB

GREAT BRITAIN, CABINET OFFICE, PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE.

Cab 23

Class 23: Cabinet Minutes.

Cab 24

Class 24: Cabinet Memoranda.

Cab 25

Class 25: Supreme War Council (1917—1919).

Cab 27

Class 27: Committees: General

Cab 28

Class 28: Allied War Conferences.

Cab 29

Class 29: International Conferences.

X

ABBREVIATED TITLES

Cab 45

BRITAIN, FO

Class 45: Historical Section. Official War Histories. Correspondence and Papers. GREAT BRITAIN, FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES, PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

FO 371

Class 371 : Political The class and volume num­ bers are followed by the document numbers, the file number, and the index number; for example, FO 371/3657, 3404/9846/512/58 represents Volume 3657, Documents 3404 and 9846, File 512 (Armenia, 1919-1920), Index 58 (Caucasus).

FO 406

Class 406: Confidential Print: Eastern Affairs, 1812—1946.

FO 418

Class 418: Russia and the Soviet Union, 1821— 1954-

FO 424

Class 424: Turkey, 1841—1951.

FO 608

Class 608: Peace Conference, 1919—1920: Corre­ spondence. The volume number and file num­ bers (three figures) are followed by the docu­ ment numbers; for example, FO 608/78, 342/1/2/7948/10174 represents Volume 78, File 342/1/2 (Middle East, Armenia, Internal Situation), Documents 7948 and 10174.

BRITAIN WO

GREAT BRITAIN, WAR OFFICE ARCHIVES, PUBLIC REC­ ORD OFFICE.

WO 32

Class 32: Registered Papers: General Series.

WO 33

Class 33: Reports and Miscellaneous Papers (1853-1939).

wo 95

Class 95: War Diaries, 1914—1922.

WO 106

Class 106: Directories of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1870—1925.

British Documents

Great Britain, Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign. Policy, 1919—1939. 1st ser. Ed. W. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, et al., 27 vols. London, 1947-1986.

FRANCE, ARCHIVES DE L’ARMEE

MINISTRE D’ETAT CHARGE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE.

ETAT-MAJOR DE L’ARMEE DE TERRE. ARCHIVES DU SER­

VICE HISTORIQUE DE L’ARMEE FRANÇAISE (CHATEAU DE VINCENNES), VINCENNES.

ABBREVIATED TITLES

xi

16N

Class 16N: Commandement du grand quartier gé­ nérai The carton, dossier, and document num­ bers are listed after the class number; for ex­ ample, 16N/3016, dossier 2, no. 17.

17N

Class 17N: Missions militaires françaises (Mis­ sions to South Russia and the Caucasus, Car­ tons 581-590).

2ON

Class 20N: Front Oriental (including Corps ex­ péditionnaire d’Orient, Corps expéditionnaire des Dardanelles, Armée d’Orient, Commandement des armées alliées en Orient, Armée française d’Orient, Corps d’occupation de Constantinople, and Corps d’occupation française de Constantinople).

Hoktemberian meds reuoliutsian

Hoktemberian sotsialistakan meds reuoliutsian eu Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanake Hayastanum: Pastatghteri eu niuteri zhoghovadsu. Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian et al. Publ. of Institut Istorii, Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR—Armianskii Filial Instituía Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Armian­ skoi SSR. Erevan, i960.

Hovannisian, Republic, I

Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Arme­ nia. Volume I. The First Year, igi8—igig. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971.

Hovannisian, Republic, II

Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Arme­ nia. Volume II. From Versailles to London, 1919— 1920. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1982.

Hovannisian, Road to Independence

Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1967.

Lraber

Lraber hasarakakan gitutiunneri [Vestnik obshchestvennykh nauk]. Publ. of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Re­ public (from 1990, of the Republic of Arme­ nia). Erevan, 1966- .

Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives

Archives of the Republic of Armenia Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (now integrated into the Archives of Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun, Watertown, Massachusetts). The tide of each individual file is given only the first time the file is cited in the notes of volumes III and IV combined.

xii

ABBREVIATED TITLES

Teghekagir

Teghekagir. Hasarakakan gitutiunner [Izvestiia. Obshchestvennye nauki]. Publ. of Academy of Sci­ ences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Repub­ lic. Erevan, 1940-1965.

US ARCHIVES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (WASHINGTON, D.C.).

RG 45

Record Group 45: Records of the Department of the Navy.

RG 59

Record Group 59: General Records of the Depart­ ment of State (Decimal File, 1910—1920). Fig­ ures representing class, country, and subject precede the document numbers; for example, 860J.01/60/173 represents Internal Affairs (8), Armenia (60J), Government (.01), Doc­ uments 60 and 173.

RG 84

Record Group 84: The United States Foreign Ser­ vice Posts of the Department of State.

RG 256

Record Group 2 56: Records of the American Com­ mission to Negotiate Peace. The citation form is the same as that used in RG 59.

Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia

Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia sotsiahsticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (sbomik dokumentov). Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian, A. M. Akopian, G. M. Dallakian, Publ. of Armianskii Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Arm. SSR—Arkhivnyi Otdel MVD Arm. SSR. Erevan, 1957.

1

The United States and Armenia: Mandate and Boundaries

The organic development of the Republic of Armenia and its diplomatic efforts abroad were paralleled by President Woodrow Wilson’s belated attempt to win congressional approval of an American mandate over Armenia and by his arbitration of Armenia’s boundaries within limits set down by the Allied Supreme Council. Though the Armenians continued to hope for a miracle, they had to face the reality that there was virtually no possibility of a mandate. By the beginning of 1920, many Armenian spokesmen and supporters had already shifted their efforts toward ob­ taining direct political, military, and economic assistance for the Arme­ nian republic. Nonetheless, American religious, civic, and relief officials with experience in the Near East, insisting that a separate Armenian national existence was not feasible without foreign supervision and pro­ tection, continued to advocate an American mandate. President Wilson ultimately decided in May 1920 to put the responsibility squarely on the Senate. But he requested authorization for the mandate at a time when rejection was a foregone certainty, making his action seem either pa­ thetically naive or brazenly cynical. The Allied Powers were even more cynical, for their invitation to Wil­ son to assume the mandate and to draw the southern and western boundaries of the new Armenian state was intended to shift to the United States a responsibility they were unable or unwilling to shoulder: enforcing the Turkish peace treaty as it related to Armenia. The strategy adopted at the San Remo conference in April was to include a clause in the draft treaty binding all signatories to accept in advance the borders that would be drawn by the president within the limits of the former Ottoman provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond. Thereafter,

1

2

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

the State Department appointed a committee of experts to arbitrate reasonable boundaries based on ethnic, geographic, economic, strate­ gic, and other considerations. From this labor emerged the outline of “Wilsonian Armenia.”

Renewed Mandate Schemes

American emotional association with the Armenians may have been strong enough at the end of the world war to have induced the United States to assume the mandate over Armenia. But the policy of the Wilson administration was first to include the League of Nations Covenant in the peace treaty with Germany and only then to lobby for the Armenian mandate under provisions of the Covenant. The Armenian and pro­ Armenian forces were advised in the meantime not to press the issue. The growing rift between Wilson and the Republican leadership cul­ minated in November 1919 in the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles with Germany or to allow the United States to become a member of the League of Nations.1 A second attempt to secure ratifi­ cation by the required two-thirds majority fell short in March 1920, de­ livering another severe blow to the physically ailing president. The pro-mandate lobby, meanwhile, was in disarray. The spectrum of views among the American missionary-relief leadership was very broad. President Caleb F. Gates of Robert College in Constantinople, for ex­ ample, shared High Commissioner Mark Bristol’s views that the United States should take a role in developing the entire Near East and that the retention of the Ottoman Empire as a single entity would be the best way of simultaneously fulfilling that objective and safeguarding Ameri­ can interests and the open-door principle in trade and investment. Gates did not rule out an autonomous or independent Armenia some time in the future, but he believed that attempts to create such a state imme­ diately would result in tragic consequences for the Armenians them­ selves. At the other extreme were missionaries in the field, such as Mary Graffam of Sivas and George E. White of Marsovan, who testified to the awfulness of the cruelties inflicted upon the Armenians. No one, these observers insisted, could expect the Armenians to continue to live under even nominal Turkish sovereignty or in an administrative system in which they would be linked in any way with the Turks.2 The most prominent missionary-relief official, Dr. James L. Barton, 1 See Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, Vol. II: From Versailles to London, 1919—1920 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1982), pp. 366-372; Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (New York, 1973), pp. 100—146. 2 Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 316—330, 391—397.

THE UNITED STATES AND ARMENIA

3

vacillated between the logic of affording American guidance to the en­ tire region and the strong emotional and religious reasons for giving primacy to an American mandate over Armenia. As secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and chairman of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (later Near East Relief), Barton had witnessed firsthand the devastating consequences of the Armenian genocide. He was outraged by the personal feud between President Wilson and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, which had contrib­ uted to the Senate’s rejection of the Versailles treaty and League of Nations and thereby jeopardized the future of the Armenian people. Writing to former British Ambassador James Bryce in January 1920, Bar­ ton declared: “Our people are sick at heart over the dilatoriness of Con­ gress and the obstinacy of the President in reaching common ground on the Treaty. I have never felt such a spirit of indignation before.”3 Yet the missionary lobby, though it continued to gather funds for the “starv­ ing Armenians,” refrained from publicly campaigning for a mandate. And the pro-Armenian elements, stressing the humanitarian, altruistic, and religious motives for assisting the Armenians, did little to win over the business and military communities by underscoring practical invest­ ment opportunities and strategic factors. The Armenians were divided on many issues, but they were united in their opposition to a single United States mandate over the old Ottoman Empire or Asia Minor and even to a joint or triple mandate over Ar­ menia, Anatolia, and Constantinople. For a people who had suffered genocidal deportations and massacres, any suggestion of continued as­ sociation with Turkey seemed insidious. The Armenian press denounced the joint-mandate scheme and roundly criticized those who were trying to alleviate Armenian hunger but who endorsed the single- or triple­ mandate plan, thereby setting the stage for renewed atrocities. None­ theless, the elements associated with the Armenian National Union of America and the Armenian National Delegation in Paris were alarmed by the brash and insulting characterizations of the missionaries in the Dashnakist press and feared these would alienate the very people whose support and sympathy were essential for a satisfactory resolution of the Armenian question. The National Union continued to work closely with the missionary-relief lobby in recommending an American mandate for Armenia and complained bitterly that the Dashnakist leadership, in­ cluding Armenia’s plenipotentiary, Garegin Pasdermadjian, was under­ mining the national cause by dropping the call for a mandate in favor of direct United States aid to the Armenian republic.4 8 Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810—192] (Minneapolis, 1971), p. 234. 4 See, for example, Kochnak Hayastani, XX, 1920, and the organ of the Ramkavar (Az-

4

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

By 1920 the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA), supported by the Dashnaktsutiun, had in fact shifted its strategy from advocating a mandate to urging direct aid. The ACIA included prominent Republicans who made it clear they would oppose a mandate but might support proposals for direct political, economic, and military assistance. Vahan Cardashian, who strongly influenced ACIA chairman James Gerard, impressed upon Pasdermadjian and other Armenian rep­ resentatives that the mandate plan did not stand a ghost of a chance and that the Armenians must come out aggressively by emphasizing their ability to defend themselves if provided with arms and instructors.* 5 Pas­ dermadjian was soon persuaded and on January 7, 1920, wrote the De­ partment of State to contradict the claims of the missionaries, including James Barton and Ernest Riggs, that direct aid without a mandate would arouse the Turks, Kurds, and Tartars (Azerbaijanis) against the Arme­ nians and probably lead to further Armenian bloodshed. Such argu­ ments, Pasdermadjian protested, were cruel, for they would have the Armenians remain defenseless in the face of hostile, fully armed sur­ rounding forces.6 Throughout 1920 the rift broadened between the ACIA, the Arme­ nian Press Bureau (headed by Vahan Cardashian), Armenian plenipo­ tentiary Pasdermadjian, and the Dashnaktsutiun, on the one hand, and the missionary-relief lobby and the Armenian National Union, on the other. The ACIA tended to become increasingly vocal and often strident in its complaints about the collusion of the Allied Powers to decrease Armenia’s “legitimate territories” by excluding Cilicia and half of Turk­ ish Armenia from the new state. Great Britain and France, Gerard’s let­ ters and telegrams warned, were plotting to divide the Near East along the lines of secret wartime pacts, which would have placed Cilicia, to­ gether with Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir, in the French sphere of in­ fluence and allowed the British to control a part of historic Armenia by placing it in a Kurdish state. The ACIA dismissed arguments about the Armenians’ making up only a minority in much of this territory as put­ ting “a premium on crime,” inasmuch as the decimation of the Arme­ gayin-Ramkavarakan) Party, Azg, for 1920. See also Manuk G. Jizmejian, Patmutiun amerikahai kaghakakan kusaktsutiants, 1890—1925 (Fresno, 1930), pp. 425—444. 5 US Archives, Record Group 59, 860J.01/162, Gerard to Secretary of State, Dec. 19, 1919. See also 860J.01/174/188/215; Kochnak Hayastani, XIX (Dec. 27, 1919), p. 1572; Republic of Armenia Delegation Archives, File 385/7, H. H. VashingtoniNerkayatsutschutiun ev Amerikian Karavarutiune: Armenian Press Bureau, 1920 t. On Vahan Cardashian’s life and lobbying, see Gregory L. Aftandilian, Armenia, Vision of a Republic: The Independence Lobby in America, 1918—1927 (Boston, 1981). 6 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/173; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Pasderma­ djian to Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1920; The Papers of Frank L. Polk (Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University), File 81/186, Cardashian to Polk, Jan. 9, 1920.

THE UNITED STATES AND ARMENIA

5

nian population had resulted from the murderous policies of the Turk­ ish government.7 The pointed criticism and blatant threats drew the ire of the British Foreign Office, which found it contemptuous that the ACIA should pontificate about the Armenian cause at a time when the United States had withdrawn from the peace process and had declined to participate in the negotiation or enforcement of the Turkish treaty.8 Because James Gerard was a former ambassador and a prominent member of the Democratic Party, the Department of State tried to re­ spond to his communications with courtesy and tact but without making firm commitments. Gerard wrote Undersecretary of State Frank Polk on January 23 that the United States should prevent the Europeans from diminishing the Armenian patrimony. Senator Lodge, he claimed, con­ curred that the president had the authority to use his executive powers to help Armenia and that the only possibility was through direct aid, as a mandate was now out of the question. Polk replied that the State De­ partment had made it clear to the peace conference that the United States took a deep interest in the Armenian situation, adding, however, “I think the great difficulty is that the Armenians are claiming so much more than is good for them.”9 In February, Gerard insisted that Armenia could not be trusted to the mercy of the Allies and that Cilicia should be included in the Armenian republic or at the very least made into a temporary French mandate pending its ultimate unification with Armenia. Responding in a personal capacity, Polk concurred in Gerard’s reservations about the European Allies, ‘‘but, on the other hand, if our people won’t take a mandate, can we order them to take a mandate?” Polk added that he had not been to the region but had heard countless delegations and experts and come to the conclusion ‘‘that we should try to create a small, compact Armenia with an access to one sea, and then, as far as the United States is con­ cerned, pray for it, and also try by pressure of public opinion and by official pressure to get the European governments in some way to keep an eye on it.” He reminded Gerard, however, that the Europeans had often stated: ‘‘Well, if you think so much about Armenia, why don’t you take care of it?”10 7 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.6715/ i/ia/2,and 860J.01/203/217/234;Polk Papers, 81/ 187; Rep. of Arm. Del. Airchives, File 385/7. 8 See, for example, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Class 371, volumes 4952—4954, doc­ uments E625/E823/E2553 in file 134/58. See also Hairenik, March 16:1, 1920, for the text of telegrams exchanged between Gerard and former British foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour. 9 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, and Polk Papers, 81/187, Gerard to Polk, Jan. 23, 1920, and Polk to Gerard, Feb. 18, 1920. 10 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Gerard to Polk, Feb. 20, Gerard to President Wilson, Feb. 28, and Gerard to Polk, Feb. 29, 1920; Polk Papers, 81/188, Gerard (ACIA) to Polk, Feb. 20, 1920; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/215.

6

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Gerard, with Cardashian in the background, continued to lobby. He telegraphed Polk on February 24 that the ACIA would have an extraor­ dinary meeting in New York the next day to consider the Armenian question and asked if it might be possible to get an opinion from Pres­ ident Wilson about Armenia’s boundaries. The Allied Supreme Council should be put on notice that the United States would not stand for any sacrifice of Armenia’s rights and territories.11 Four days later, Gerard followed up with a message for Wilson in which he stated that the special meeting of the ACIA urged the president to recognize the Armenian republic and to stop the carving up of Armenia along the lines of the secret treaties of 1916. Such a partition would bar Armenia from the Mediterranean Sea and confine the country to those lands that had been awarded to imperial Russia by the Sykes-Picot agreement—and to which a revived Russia could one day again lay claim.12 After a mass meeting in Carnegie Hall in New York on March 15, Gerard cabled a resolution to the White House stressing that American nonrecognition of the Armenian republic was being misconstrued by the Turks as evidence of lack of interest in Armenia. Moreover, with the coming of spring, a concerted Turco-Tatar attack was expected. Armenia was not adequately equipped for self-defense and should at least be given a fighting chance. After hearing the speeches of Samuel S. Gompers, William T. Manning, Walter George Smith, and George B. Hyde and the messages of W. D. P. Bliss, James Cardinal Gibbons, Senators Henry Ca­ bot Lodge, John Sharp Williams, and William H. King, and Charles W. Eliot, James L. Barton, and others, the ACIA renewed the call for a free and independent Armenia extending from the Black Sea to the Medi­ terranean. 13 11 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, and Polk Papers, 81/188, Gerard to Polk, Feb. 24, and Polk to Gerard, Feb. 25, 1920. 12 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/217, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Gerard to Wilson, Feb. 28, 1920. 13 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Gerard to Wilson, March 16,1920; Polk Papers, 81/188, Gerard to Polk, March 17, 1920, enclosure; Hairenik, March 23:1—2, 26:1—2,1920. See also The Papers of Henry Cabot Lodge (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston), Box 62, Armenia file, Lodge to Barton, March 15, 1920, enclosure. Gerard continued to harass the European Allies. In a telegram to Arthur Balfour, dated March 27 and dispatched March 30, he wrote, in part:

Territorial settlement proposed for Armenia as outlined in tentative draft submitted to the President was unqualifiedly bad. ... It is most difficult to see why you should deprive Armenia of her own legitimate and natural oudets and force her to seek inad­ equate and objectionable accommodation elsewhere. ... I am constrained to observe that Great Britain and France appear to have sufficient resources for seizing rich portions of Near East, including rich portions of Armenia. They appear to have many convenient arguments in support of spurious and artificial claims of Turks, Tartars and Kurds, but they curiously confess themselves powerless to do their fixed and bounden duty to Ar­ menia, which has rendered considerable services to Allied arms and for its fidelity to

THE UNITED STATES AND ARMENIA

7

The demands of the ACIA lagged far behind the positions taken by the Allied Powers during the London conference in February-March 1920. Nor were they in keeping with the political atmosphere in Wash­ ington, D.C. Despite bipartisan appeals from such prominent citizens as former president William Howard Taft and former secretary of state William Jennings Bryan, President Wilson refused to compromise with his political opponents in order to secure ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, inclusive of the League of Nations Covenant. Hence, when the treaty was put to a vote for the second time on March 19, 1920, it fell seven short of the necessary two-thirds, again dashing Armenian hopes for an American mandate.14 By that time, the massacre of thousands of Armenians at Marash and the continuing deterioration of conditions in Cilicia and elsewhere in the Near East deeply alarmed the missionary-relief lobby. On February 26, James Barton wrote former ambassador Henry Morgenthau: “Can we not start immediately a propaganda in the form of a brief, pointed statement of the situation, calling for protest in the name ofjustice and humanity?” This was not a political issue and came under the chartered humanitarian duties of the Near East Relief. Barton asked Morgenthau to work through the New York relief office and American religious lead­ ers to emphasize that the Turkish government had shown it could not even rule Turks, much less non-Muslims, and that continued Turkish dominion over other peoples would provide the opportunity for a rep­ etition of past massacres. The war had been fought to release subject peoples from oppressive misrule, and this principle seemed to apply more to the case of Turkey than anywhere else. No Turkish promise of reform was worth the breath used to make such an utterance; the recent atrocities in Cilicia indicated that the old spirit of Turkey was alive and* is Allied cause has suffered proportionately more than any other belligerent. . .. We [United States] have saved Armenia from starvation and we will do our full duty, but it is unfair on your part to require us to help Armenia in order that you may be willing to do your duty. Europe and not America is responsible for the Turkish mess.... We believe that diminutive Armenia you propose setting up, hemmed in by enemies, shut off from direct contact with the Western world, deprived of its chief economic resources essential for attaining real independence, is a cynical betrayal of a people which has waited so long and suffered so much for redemption of its home and which deserved and had the right to expect more humane and equitable treatment at least at the hands of Britain and France. [Punctuation added.]

When the telegram arrived in the British Foreign Office, an annoyed Dwight Osborne advised: “I think we should send this absurd telegram to Mr. Davis [US Ambassador] & say that Mr. Gerard was informed that his last telegram was referred to the Fforeign] O[ffice] but that [Foreign Secretary] Lord Curzon declines to accept a message like this from a private individual.” See FO 371/4954, E2553/134/58. 14 Stone, op. cit., pp. 147—170.

8

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

seeking the chance to vent itself against innocent and unprotected peo­ ples. Finally, the sentiment of the world demanded that steps be taken to put an end to the outrages and make their renewal absolutely impos­ sible.15 On March 8, Barton informed Morgenthau that he had just re­ ceived a cable from Lord Bryce and Aneurin Williams of the British Armenia Committee stating that “unless America joins to help in bear­ ing burdens we see no hope of delivering the subject races of Turkey.” Barton asked Morgenthau, a personal friend of President Wilson: “Is there nothing we can do in this crisis? Can no pressure be brought to bear in Washington?”15 16 As the vote on ratification of the German treaty approached for a second time, Barton suggested a plan for saving the Armenians even if the treaty was rejected again. He offered to put the proposal, which entailed a program of joint responsibility with the European Allies, to Senator Lodge and asked Morgenthau to secure the president’s ap­ proval. Immediately after the defeat of the treaty, Barton again sought support for his plan, as there seemed litde hope that the United States would become a member of the League of Nations and assume the Ar­ menian mandate. He informed Morgenthau that Senator Lodge had written that the points raised in his proposal were valid but that whatever was to be done for Armenia should be initiated by the executive branch, not by Congress.17 Lodge politely put off Barton: “If you could induce the Administration to take up the subject and deal with it in some in­ telligent way as proposed in your plan, something no doubt could be effected; but we cannot get at it through the Senate.”18 Barton now reiterated to Morgenthau that without United States participation in Near Eastern matters there would be no way to emancipate the subject peoples of Turkey; the regulation of affairs would have to be left to the designs of the European powers.19 The Senate’s final rejection of the Versailles treaty left direct aid to Armenia as the most feasible alternative. On April 19, James Gerard again urged that the United States recognize Armenia and supply its government with arms, munitions, and a loan: “If we are not going to do anything for Armenia, I don’t see why we should expect the Powers 15 The Papers of Henry Morgenthau (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.), Box 5, Barton to Morgenthau, Feb. 26, 1920. 16 Ibid., Barton to Morgenthau, March 8, 1920. 17 Ibid., Barton to Morgenthau, March 11 and 19, 1920. For criticism of Barton’s “mis­ sionary plan,” see the Dashnakist organ, Hairenik, April 10:5, 11:2, 13:2, May 6:1, 11:1, June 10:1, 11:1, 1920. 18 Lodge Papers, Armenia file, Barton to Lodge, March 9 and 12, 1920, and Lodge to Barton, March 15, 1920. 19 Morgenthau Papers, Box 5, Barton to Morgenthau, March 25, 1920.

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to lend any serious attention to what we say.”20 President Wilson did recognize the Republic of Armenia on April 23, 1920, but this action failed to open the anticipated channels of American military and finan­ cial aid. The resolution introduced by Senator John Sharp Williams in 1919 authorizing the president to send a peacekeeping force to Arme­ nia, to suspend the foreign enlistment act (thereby allowing Armenian Americans to volunteer to defend their homeland), and to appropriate funds for these purposes had been long delayed and much diluted in a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Lodge had let it be known that Congress would not approve the dispatch of an expeditionary force. Gerard wrote Polk on April 29: Judging from the tenor of letters I have recently received from the majority of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am convinced that the President will have to exercise such powers as he possesses to aid Armenia, without having anything to do with Congress. All that we can now expect from the Senate is action on the recommendations of the Sub-Committee ... The President has the power to direct the Secretary of War to sell munitions to Armenia, and I suppose, if necessary, Great Britain may be asked to make delivery of such munitions beyond Batoum. Then we should lend our moral support to the Armenian Government to float a loan of $50,000,000 or more in this country. It seems to me that this is all that we can do until next election.21

On May 5, Walter George Smith, then still active in the ACIA, placed a new plan before Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby. No longer in­ sisting on an Armenia stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea, the ACIA now proposed that Armenia should include all the land east of the Euphrates River together with the Black Sea littoral as far west as Kerasund (Giresun). France or another power should assume the mandate for the Armenian lands west of the Euphrates River for a term of years, after which this region, too, would become a ‘‘part and parcel” of the Armenian republic. Meanwhile, the mandatory power in the western zone should provide Armenia with adequate transportation facilities and a free outlet at a Mediterranean port, preferably at Ayas. The memorandum continued: “Our Committee believes that, if it is impossible for America or the Powers to lend any physical aid to Ar­ menia, then the Armenian Republic be furnished necessary munitions and supplies at once for an army of 50,000 men. We believe that the known defenselessness of the Armenians is an invitation to the Turks and Tartars to attack them.” The committee recommended a loan of $100 million, half of it to be spent in the United States for the purchase 20 Polk Papers, 81/189, Gerard to Polk, April 19, 1920. 21 Ibid., Gerard to Polk, April 29, 1920. See also US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/246.

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of farm implements, railroad rolling stock, and other supplies, and the other half to establish a sound monetary system in Armenia and to assist with the repatriation of refugees.22 The urgings of the ACIA to provide the Armenians the means to fend for themselves were not accepted in all pro-Armenian quarters. For James L. Barton and other members of the missionary-relief lobby, there was concern that sending weapons to the Armenians without American supervision would only increase the danger to them. In a letter to Henry Morgenthau, Barton wrote: I do not see how the Armenians can be saved unless America is going to step in and do something. Now that is easy to say, but it is more difficult to suggest how they can step in and what they can do. ... I am convinced that if the plan suggested in Congress, namely, to raise and arm a body of Armenian soldiers to go into Turkey for the defense of their people, is carried out, we shall hear of widespread massacres throughout Turkey and in the Russian Caucasus. I can hardly think of anything that would be more liable to arouse the wrath of the Arab, the Koord and the Turk, because they would interpret such action as arm­ ing the Armenians to come out and kill Turks, Tartars and Koords. And unless such an army were well officered by American troops, I presume that is exactly what they would do. I feel that no such action should be taken because of the peril it would bring to the defenseless people over there.23

In the end, the United States neither sent arms nor suspended the foreign enlistment act. These and other provisions of the Williams res­ olution were made unrecognizable in the final recommendations of the Harding subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The resolution adopted by the Senate on May 13, 1920, simply congratulated the Republic of Armenia on being recognized by the United States, wished the Armenians well, and authorized the president to dispatch a battleship to the port of Batum to be ready to assist American citizens in case of need.24 All the professions of sympathy by Henry Cabot Lodge and other leading Republicans produced nothing more tangible in sup­ port of the Armenian republic.

Wilson 's Mandate Request It was against a backdrop of American retrenchment and reluctance to undertake foreign commitments that President Woodrow Wilson de­ cided at long last to ask Congress for authority to assume the mandate over Armenia. This decision was perplexing, as the leaders of both par­ 22 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/265. See also Polk Papers, 81/189, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Gerard to Polk, May 5, 1920, enclosure. 23 Morgenthau Papers, Box 5, Barton to Morgenthau, March 25, 1920. 24 Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2d sess., LIX, pt. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1920), pp. 6844, 6978-6979.

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ties had left no doubt that the mandate was out of the question. The pro-mandate New York Times aptly observed that the opportunity to ac­ cept the mandate had passed with the lapse of so much time since the end of the war.25 Even the Armenian press, which had repeatedly called for an American protectorate, expressed litde enthusiasm over the pres­ ident’s action. The Republican leadership maneuvered deftly during the election year of 1920 to place the responsibility for all hard decisions on the president, insisting that if he desired he could act to aid Armenia by executive decree. Woodrow Wilson, for his part, tried to evade account­ ability and held out for congressional assent. The Armenians were being used as an American political football. Wilson’s raising of the mandate issue against all odds seems to have been motivated by a mixture of idealism, altruism, intractability, self-righteousness, and political cun­ ning. He was deeply aware of the judgment of history and wished to place it clearly on the record that the abandonment of Armenia was not of his doing. History—and perhaps even the American electorate— would exonerate him if he was able to turn the mandate and especially the League of Nations into a political referendum during the forthcom­ ing national elections. Wilson must have known that the inevitable re­ jection of the mandate by Congress would weaken further the interna­ tional status of the Armenian republic, yet he was determined to proceed. A mandate over Armenia was still supported by most of the missionary-relief lobby, and even in mid-1920 Dr. Barton was able to get the annual meetings of the Methodist and Presbyterian churches to adopt resolutions calling upon the United States to fulfill its duty to humanity by undertaking the mandate.26 The question was much in Wilson’s thoughts after the second defeat of the Versailles treaty. On April 19 he wrote Cleveland Dodge: I have set my heart on seeing this Government accept the mandate for Ar­ menia. I think it is plainly marked out for us as the course of duty, and I am writing to ask how you think that object could be best served through the medium of public opinion. You and those associated with you in Armenian relief know the most effective channels of public opinion with regard to the matter and I would be pleased to see some kind of legitimate propaganda started which would have the proper effect upon our Congress, which at first blush I am afraid will be shy about accepting any mandate at all.27 25 New York Times, May 25:1—2, 26:10, 1920. 26 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8 (Washington, D.C., 1920), pp. 8056, 8073—8074; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (June 19, 1920), pp. 805—806. See also US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/252/281/283. 27 The Papers of Thomas Woodrow Wilson (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.), Box 168, Wilson to Dodge, April 19, 1920. See also Thomas A. Bryson, “Woodrow Wilson, the Senate, Public Opinion and the Armenian Mandate, 1919” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1965), p. 155.

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It was just four days later that Wilson extended de facto recognition to the Republic of Armenia. The president’s attempt to drum up public support for an Armenian mandate was too late. By the spring of 1920 the anti-mandate disposition of many influential newspapers and public figures had coalesced. Wilson added to their arsenal of political ammunition by belatedly releasing on April 3, 1920, the findings of the 1919 American Military Mission to Armenia, led by Major General James G. Harbord.28 His tardiness in transmitting Harbord’s report to Congress had allowed opponents of the mandate to speculate that the recommendations went against the president’s wishes. In reality, Harbord had listed both the pros and cons of accepting the mandate, and, if anything, arguments in favor seemed to be stated more forcefully than those against. Now, however, the op­ ponents focused only on the negative aspects, especially those regarding the significant commitment of men and money required for a minimum of five years. Despite the hard evidence that the Congress would never sanction the mandate, President Wilson became fixed on making the request. The Allied Supreme Council at San Remo had invited the United States to shoulder the obligation and asked the president to draw Armenia’s fu­ ture boundaries, further stimulating Wilson. On May 11 he wrote Sec­ retary of State Colby: “It has all along been my purpose to urge upon the Congress the acceptance of a mandate over Armenia and I would include Constantinople. What do you think?’’29 Rather than dissuading the president and impressing upon him what all political observers al­ ready knew for certain, Colby refused to disappoint his chief and en­ couraged him to proceed: At the present time, when the Allied Powers admit their inability to render any assistance and solemnly appeal to us, a refusal on our part might involve further bloodshed, and the ruin of the present Armenian Republic, and the opening of the way to further Bolshevism, Pan-Touranianism and Pan-Islamism in Turkey and in Asia. As you have done me the honor to ask for my opinion, I beg to state that after carefully re-examining the record on the subject, including your expressions relative to it, I deem it entirely consistent with that record, and expedient from every point of view, that the acceptance of a mandate over Armenia should be urged upon Congress. And I may add that I am happy to see that the course accords apparently with your desires.30

28 See Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 356—362; Congress, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Document 266, Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia (Washington, D.C., 1920). 29 Wilson Papers, Box 168, Wilson to Colby, May 11, 1920. 30 Ibid., Colby to Wilson, May 20, 1920; Bryson, op. át., pp. 143—144.

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When the ACIA learned that the president was preparing a message to Congress, James Gerard telegraphed Secretary of State Colby to warn that forcing a vote on the mandate would be fatal for Armenia. He again pressed for direct aid without reference to Congress. “Through my con­ tact with Foreign Relations Committee and members of Senate, I know that scheme will fail, and this can give wrong impression to Turks and Tartars that United States is not interested and thus ruin Armenia. Can’t we give aid whatever possible outside of Senate to Armenia directly and let the mandate question rest till after elections?”31 Such counsel had no effect on Wilson, who on May 24 submitted to both houses of Congress his formal request for authority to assume the mandate. He explained that the European Allies were already strained beyond their means and that they believed the appearance of a power free from the prepossessions of the Old World would inspire wider con­ fidence and afford stronger guarantees for stability. Thus, in response to the invitation of the Supreme Council at San Remo, the president now requested that the Congress grant authority to accept the mandate for Armenia: The sympathy with Armenia has proceeded from no single portion of our people, but has come with extraordinary spontaneity and sincerity from the whole of the great body of Christian men and women in this country by whose free-will offerings Armenia has practically been saved at the most critical juncture of its existence. At their hearts this great and generous people have made the cause of Armenia their own. It is to this people and to ¿heir Government that the hopes and earnest expectations of the struggling people of Armenia turn as they now emerge from a period of indescribable suffering and peril, and I hope that the Congress will think it wise to meet this hope and expectation with the utmost of liberality.32

Wilson continued by emphasizing the American desire to see a Chris­ tian people succored in their time of suffering and lifted from abject distress to be made whole and able to take a place among the free nations of the world: Our recognition of the independence of Armenia will mean genuine liberty and assured happiness for her people, if we fearlessly undertake the duties of guidance and assistance involved in the functions of a mandatory. It is, therefore,

51 Copies of Gerard’s telegram are in US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/261; Lodge Papers, Box 62, Armenia file, Gerard to Lodge, Nov. 10, 1920, enclosure; Rep. of Arm. Del. Ar­ chives, File 385/7; American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA), A Report of the Activities: The American Committee far the Independence of Armenia, 1918—1922 ([New York, 1922]), pp. 47—48. 32 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 7, p. 7533; [Woodrow Wilson], The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, II (New York, 1924), p. 1194 (pp. 1191—1195 for the entire address).

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with the most earnest hopefulness and with the feeling that I am giving advice from which the Congress will not willingly turn away that I urge the acceptance of the invitation now formally and solemnly extended to us by the council at San Remo, into whose hands has passed the difficult task of composing the many complexities and difficulties of government in the one-time Ottoman Empire and the maintenance of order and tolerable conditions of life in those portions of that Empire which it is no longer possible in the interest of civilization to leave under the government of the Turkish authorities themselves.33

Woodrow Wilson had made all the wrong arguments by playing upon altruistic, humanitarian, and religious motives and even excusing the European powers as being overburdened. He had not organized a na­ tional campaign to influence public opinion or gain popular support; he had not attempted a bipartisan approach to Congress and had acted against the advice of Senate Minority Leader Gilbert Hitchcock of Ne­ braska; most of all, he was ambiguous and vague. He failed to define the territory over which the mandate was to extend, the terms and condi­ tions of the mandate, the expenses and obligations involved, and the advantages and benefits to the United States. He made no direct use of the Harbord report and recommendations, and he gave no reasoned arguments based on American national interests, including investment opportunities, markets, and other economic and strategic considera­ tions. For Senator Lodge and the bloc of irreconcilable senators who had raised their voices against the pitfalls of internationalism, President Wilson’s message was but another example of his ineptitude and vul­ nerability. They delighted in goading Minority Leader Hitchcock and most other Democrats to break publicly with the president. The New York Times reported on May 25 that there was little inclination in Congress to make outlays in men and money.34 The next day, in an editorial entitled “Testing Our Altruism,’’ the Times observed that both the American people and Congress would have readily accepted the Armenian mandate immediately after the armistice, but the passage of so much time now made the task seem too great. The pro-mandate news­ paper nonetheless chided those who dismissed or belittled humanitarian motives: Meanwhile, altruism has been denounced as un-American, and if that view is not generally accepted, altruism in foreign policy has yet been condemned as a nefarious attribute of the Democratic Party and thrown into the turmoil of a Presidential campaign. Not everybody would go so far as the Borah-Hanson group, who would have us believe that the good Samaritan was a fool to run the risk of being black-jacked and robbed by the man he befriended, but our vehe-

33 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 7, p. 7534; Wilson, op. át., p. 1195. 34 New York Times, May 25:1, 1920.

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ment patriots have managed to attach a moral stigma to anything that looks like disinterested aid to others. And they control Congress. . . . The inevitable rejection of the proposal may have some beneficial results. The notion that it will teach the Armenians the lesson learned by the Balkan peoples a generation ago, that they can expect nothing from the great Powers and must work out their own deliverance, is plausible enough but for the fact that the remnant spared from the Turkish massacres is now starving to death, and before long there may be no Armenians left.... But the one really good result that may be hoped for is here in America. Our evident unwillingness to live up to our expressions of Christian sympathy will, it may be hoped, abate in some degree our conviction that we are the most moral, altruistic and beneficent people on the face of the earth.35

The Senate Debate The Republican leadership of the Senate wasted no time in crushing the president’s request. As the Republican National Convention was sched­ uled to open on June 8, Senator Lodge pushed the question through the Foreign Relations Committee to the floor in short order. In com­ mittee, he nullified the president’s proposal with a substitute motion: Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia, as requested in the message of the President dated May 24, 1920.36

The Foreign Relations Committee swiftly adopted the substitute res­ olution on May 27 by a vote of 11 to 4, with only John Sharp Williams speaking in support of the president’s position.37 That same day, Lodge reported the resolution to the floor and ordered printed as a Senate document the analysis of Brigadier General George Van Hom Mosely of the Harbord mission regarding the military and financial obligations that acceptance of a mandate over Armenia and neighboring regions would entail.38 Debate on the substitute resolution began on May 29, just five days after Woodrow Wilson had sent over his message. Everything was expe­ dited, as there were no hearings or studies conducted on the president’s request, nor were alternative ways of helping Armenia considered in committee. Lodge was determined to scotch the scheme entirely, em­ 35 Ibid., May 26:10, 1920. 36 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, p. 771437 New York Times, May 28:1, 29:17, 1920; Bryson, op. cit., pp. 164—165. 38 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, pp. 7714-7717. For the separately printed report of Van Hom Mosely, see Senate Document 281, Mandatory over Armenia: Report Made to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, United States Army, Chief of the American Military Mission, on the Military Problem of a Mandatory over Armenia (Washington, D.C., 1920).

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barrass and humiliate the president, and compel the Democrats either to break with their leader or suffer the political consequences of sup­ porting an unpopular proposal. During the ensuing Senate debates, which culminated in the final vote on June i, 1920, Henry Cabot Lodge coordinated the campaign that poked numerous holes in the proposal for an Armenian mandate. The critics pointed to the fact that the responsibilities and obligations for a state whose boundaries had not yet even been determined were at best moot; that the United States was being saddled with the “poorhouse” of the world, whereas England and France were reserving the most lu­ crative regions for themselves; that American mothers would not allow their sons to be sacrificed in a far-flung “plague spot”; that the costs associated with the mandate would be prohibitive; that the Monroe Doc­ trine of nonentanglement should be preserved; that the underhanded champions of the League of Nations were trying to force the United States into that organization “through the back door”; that “charity begins at home,” and serious domestic problems should receive priority over foreign humanitarian considerations; and that it was unconstitu­ tional to tax Americans for altruistic services. In response, the overpow­ ered supporters of the president could only recite humanitarian and altruistic arguments; Wilson had not armed them with facts and figures and had done nothing to persuade the public or the business community that a mandate for Armenia and presence in the Near East were in Amer­ ica’s own vital interest.39 In initiating the Senate debate on May 29, Lodge stated that the ques­ tion was an important one and should be given an immediate answer. Trying to avoid a direct confrontation, Minority Leader Hitchcock re­ plied: “I am not in favor of granting to the President the power to accept a mandate over Armenia, but I hesitate very much to become a party to the adoption of a resolution which, it seems to me, will have the effect of discouraging Armenia, and possibly of encouraging the enemies of Armenia.” Hitchcock proposed to draft an amendment indicating the intent of the United States to cooperate with and assist the Armenian government in working toward economic rehabilitation. The American people had contributed millions of dollars toward charity for the Ar­ menian victims, and he was certain they would want to purchase bonds and take up other obligations that would help the Armenians get back on their feet.40

39 For the Senate debates on the president’s request, see Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, pp. 7875—7890,7914—7920,7960—7962,7964-7971,8051-8073. See also Bryson, op. át., pp. 146—22i;James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia (Kent, OH, 1967), pp. 222—239. 40 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, p. 7875.

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Senator Lodge, who was still on the executive committee of the ACIA, again voiced his “very deepest sympathy for Armenia” before declaring: “I am utterly opposed to taking a mandate and binding ourselves to keep an army of at least 60,000 American troops in Armenia for an indefinite time.” The Armenians themselves were not asking for a man­ date, only for foodstuffs, arms, equipment, loans, and advisers. “There is no desire to turn a completely deaf ear to their cry for help, for they are a brave people and have struggled for centuries to preserve their religion and their liberty, and they, I think, must appeal to every Amer­ ican sympathy; but that is wholly different from taking the mandate and assuming the care of that country for we can not say how many years to come.”41 While Senator Hitchcock wanted to delay action at least until he could submit an amendment that would take the edge off the rejection of the mandate, John Sharp Williams, a longtime champion of the Armenians, seemed prepared for martyrdom along with his president: “I see no objection to taking a vote on this question right now. It seems to me that every Senator ought to know how he intends to vote.” The Congress owed a prompt reply to the president and the rest of the world, even if that decision was to decline the invitation of civilization to protect Ar­ menia until its people could fend for themselves. Armenia was sur­ rounded by hereditary enemies, but the mere presence of an American uniform, Williams claimed, would nearly settle the issue by forestalling Kurdish and Turkish attacks and leaving the Armenians at peace to work out their destiny. “My heartstrings are tied very closely to the history of this remarkable people—remarkable in very many more ways than one, but especially remarkable for their abiding faith, their constancy, their courage, and their devotion to an ideal—and I am heartily in favor of giving the President the power which he has requested.”42 Senator Andrieus Jones of New Mexico complained that the Foreign Relations Committee had not done enough work on the question and suggested that the League Covenant allowed a mandatory to be limited to “administrative advice and assistance.” The committee had not con­ sidered this or other alternatives and had not submitted a reasoned re­ port. But Lodge interjected that the question was “so plain that a child might answer it.” He believed it was only right to give notice to Europe before the congressional recess. Jones persisted, however, in asserting “that the people of the country are not willing that such an important matter as this shall be disposed of in this very perfunctory way.” The 41 Ibid., p. 7876. 42 Ibid., pp. 7876—7877. See also Thomas A. Bryson, “John Sharp Williams: An Advocate for the Armenian Mandate,” Armenian Review, XXVI (Autumn 1973), pp. 23—42.

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Foreign Relations Committee should have presented a full report and possible alternatives. The issue should be referred back to committee. Senator Lodge, his attestations of sympathy for the Armenians notwith­ standing, rejoined by underscoring the dangers, risks, and burdens of assuming responsibility for Armenia. He coaxed along Democratic Sen­ ator Hoke Smith of Georgia, who asked: “Do the mothers of our country wish their boys taken for this service?” The Armenian lands were rough and barren, whereas England and France had taken rich oil wells and copper mines elsewhere. “To the United States they offer that which can bring nothing but heavy loss of money and lives.”43 When debate on the resolution continued on May 31, Senator Hitch­ cock introduced an amendment providing for the sale of Armenian bonds in the United States. At Lodge’s bidding, however, the irreconcilables continued the attack. They took the floor to ask about the pre­ cise boundaries of the proposed mandate, to warn of embroilment with Russians and Turks, to draw a picture of American soldiers forming a “wall of flesh and blood” to defend Armenia from the rising tide of Islam “in this bloody forum every inch of which is saturated with the gore which has been poured from the veins of men for 3,000 years.” The offensive against the mandate—and, by extension, against President Wilson and the Armenians themselves—reached a high point in the lengthy oration of Senator James Reed of Missouri. Reading into the record nearly every negative argument that had been listed in the Harbord report and his own interpretation of the great danger of becoming involved with the Muslim world, Reed eventually came around to the worth of the Armenian: To begin with, if he was the right kind of man, speaking broadly, the things that have occurred never could have happened. We are told that Armenians have been slaughtered, entire families put to death, without a hand being raised. We read stories of Turkish soldiers coming to a home, murdering the entire family, including the husband and father, like so many pigs, and that no one was killed save the Armenians. That would not be possible with our race. If a massacre were proclaimed in this country by some dominant race we might be massacred, but our lives would be sold and paid for 10 to 1.

Reed continued: “Over this cesspool of criminality, of cruelty, of villainy, of race hatred the United States is asked to assume control, and to do it because the countries that have, speaking broadly, stolen the lands of these peoples all over the world decline to take control.” As usual, Uncle Sam was expected to “hold the sack.” The irreconcilable senator con­ cluded: “A more monstrous proposition was never put before the Amer4:’ Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, pp. 7877—7879.

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ican people.” The United States should turn to its domestic problems and resume its doctrine of “Americanism,” with friendly relations to all countries and entanglements with none.44 On June 1, the final day of debate, Senator Joseph Robinson of Ar­ kansas responded to Reed in an eloquent defense of taking the mandate on humanitarian grounds. At long last, a supporter of the president pointed out that the Harbord report’s estimates of troop requirements and financial outlays had been for all of Anatolia and Transcaucasia, not for Armenia alone. Such belated arguments now fell on deaf ears. Rob­ inson also spoke of America’s historic interest in the Armenian people and found it cruel and outlandish that the Armenians should be ar­ raigned in the Senate for allowing themselves to be victimized. He ex­ claimed: “It is, to say the least, uncharitable to characterize Armenians as being without courage and manhood because they have been mas­ sacred.” Deploring Senator Reed’s disparagement of the Armenians, Robinson continued: No mind familiar with history, no heart sensitive to the appeals of the op­ pressed, can be indifferent to the future of Armenia. The aspirations of Arme­ nians for nationalism and liberty invoke the cordial sympathy and appreciation of Christian peoples everywhere... . Where else than in Armenia have cruelty and outrage been so persistent? In what other land has so much innocent blood been shed? What other people have sacrificed so much on the altars of Christian faith? Massacred by the hun­ dreds of thousands, and deported into conditions worse than slavery to the num­ ber of almost a million since 1915; their lands devastated, their property seized or destroyed, their women and little girls violated and sold as slaves. This muti­ lation and torture of an unoffending race, this age-long persecution of a people because of its religion, is the shame of modern civilization. What wonder that Armenians have been scattered? What wonder that millions of them live in un­ speakable poverty? We encouraged them to fight in the cause of the Allies, with both the express and the implied promise that if we won, their persecutions should cease.

The Armenians, Robinson concluded, deserved protection not only by the rules of mercy and humanity but also on the grounds of political morals and common decency and the law of justice. “Armenian men are entitled to live and to toil. Armenian women are entitled to immunity from outrage. ... The one reward which the surviving Armenians claim is the right to live, to enjoy religious freedom and civil independence.” The Lodge resolution went counter to all these principles: “If Congress adopts this resolution, if we deny the necessary authority for this Gov­ ernment to afford to Armenia the advice and assistance of a mandatory 44 Ibid., pp. 7964-7970.

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and provide no form of effective relief, Christianity on its eastern frontier will receive a staggering blow. ... If we do this thing, we will signalize the most pathetic incident in history—the doom of a patient and suf­ fering race whose loyalty to the cause of humanity deserves a better reward from us than indifference close akin to treachery.”45 Such pleas had no effect on the irreconcilable senators, who maneu­ vered to deliver an unmitigated repudiation of Woodrow Wilson. Sena­ tor Frank Brandegee of Connecticut launched this attack by offering an alternative resolution in favor of accepting the mandate. The intent was to put the Democrats’ loyalty to the test rather than simply allowing them to vote against the Lodge resolution on procedural grounds or with the excuse that the Foreign Relations Committee had not considered other options. Taunting his sullen opponents, Brandegee observed that while the boundaries of Armenia were still undefined, there was no doubt that it was the ‘‘plague spot” of the world and the ‘‘crossroads of the con­ tagions and contests—moral, physical, religious, and otherwise.” De­ nouncing the selfish objectives of Great Britain and France, he declared: “I hope that the fever, the spirit, I may say the malignant disease, of internationalism has not so poisoned the native American common sense as that it wants to stick its nose and inject itself into every country in the world, on the theory that its self-determination is a matter of our constitutional concern and is a mere moral issue which we can not shirk without calling down upon us the condemnation of every other Christian power in the world.”46 To force a showdown on the issue, therefore, Brandegee now proposed the following substitute resolution: That the Congress hereby grants to the Executive the power to accept a man­ date over Armenia as requested in the message of the President dated May 24, 1920.47

The irreconcilables were in high spirits as they recited their patent arguments about cost, manpower, foreign entanglement, European con­ nivance, and the need of the Armenian to prove his manliness and right to exist. Senator Lodge, by contrast, tactfully couched his opposition in inoffensive terms. In a typical statement, he declared: “The Armenians are a gallant people who have struggled through the centuries to main­ tain themselves in independence and to uphold their religion. I think they deserve help.” Yet his fundamental message could not be miscon­ strued: “To invite this country to take charge of that crossroads of nations in Armenia, to commit itself to sending its troops there for an 45 Ibid., pp. 8053—8056. 46 Ibid., pp. 8056—8058. 47 Ibid., p. 8059.

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indefinite period, and to bear the expenses involved for an indefinite period, is something for which I could never bring myself to vote.”48 Most other senators who were opposed to the president’s request took care to decry the Turkish cruelties and to express sympathy for the Ar­ menians. But Senator Brandegee resisted all attempts to return the ques­ tion to committee for consideration of what alternative steps might be recommended to assist Armenia. Democratic Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana, though unable to see his way clear to vote for the mandate, denounced Brandegee’s substitute resolution as being intended to put President Wilson’s supporters ‘‘in the hole.” He and others argued that the figures that were being cited about the requirement in troops and expenditures were gross exaggerations and that the Harbord mission itself had indicated that only 10,000 troops would be needed to maintain the peace in Armenia alone, at a cost of about $14 million for the first year. Why, they questioned, had the Foreign Relations Committee not proceeded in an orderly way to find out more about the mandate and the obligations entailed? They now claimed that the Armenians could organize an army for self-defense under American supervision. They also belatedly began to quote the Harbord report’s arguments in favor of an American protectorate over the region. Above all, however, they contin­ ued to voice altruistic considerations.49 Senator Walch may well have handed ammunition to the president’s opponents when he declared: If we go into Armenia, we go in because we are desirous of doing something for those poor and afflicted people; and the more deeply they are sunk in pov­ erty, the more powerful becomes the appeal to the people of this country. If it be true that they are not as rich nor their country as fertile as those of adjacent and surrounding countries, the appeal becomes all the stronger to the people of this country to help them out in their difficulties and in their trials.50

Walch announced that he could not vote for the offensive Brandegee amendment, but neither was he prepared to vote unconditionally against acceptance of the mandate. Minority Leader Hitchcock followed by submitting a motion to send the Lodge resolution, together with all amendments and substitutes, back to committee. He and his supporters again insisted that the Foreign Relations Committee should hold hearings and investigate the charac­ ter, extent, and limitations of a mandate. The unmodified adoption of the Lodge resolution, they said, would give notice both to the Armenians and to the Turks that the United States did not sympathize with the 48 Ibid., pp. 8059-8064. 49 Ibid., pp. 8064—8066. MIbid., p. 8066.

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president in his desire to help Armenia or to prevent renewed perse­ cutions. Why, they asked, had the Foreign Relations Committee so swiftly reported out a resolution that would have deleterious consequences when it had spent weeks studying much less important issues? Such rea­ soning was of no avail, and the Hitchcock motion to refer back to com­ mittee failed by a vote of 34 in favor to 43 against, with 19 not voting.51 The defeat of Hitchcock’s motion brought up Brandegee’s substitute resolution to grant the president authority to assume the mandate. Sev­ eral Democrats tried to avoid such a categorical vote for or against the motion, protesting that they did not have enough information and that Brandegee was resorting to uncivil tactics to embarrass them. But Brandegee would not be dissuaded. In the direct confrontation that he clearly relished, only 12 Democratic senators voted to grant the president his request, 62 senators, including Brandegee, voted against the motion, and 22 found it more expedient not to vote.52 In the next move, Senator Hitchcock, who had reluctantly joined Brandegee in the vote against the mandate, now pressed for adoption of his amendment, which was in keeping with the ACIA’s program of direct aid to Armenia. Lodge’s resolution denying the president au­ thority to accept the mandate would be amended as follows: Resolvedfurther, That the President be, and he is hereby, empowered to appoint three American citizens to act with a like number of representatives of the Gov­ ernment of Armenia in the organization of a joint commission, the six so chosen to select a seventh person as chairman. Said joint commission shall be charged with the duty of supervising the preparation, issuance, offering for sale, and sale in the United States of bonds of the Armenian Government, not exceeding $50,000,000 in amount, the proceeds of which shall be available under approval of the commission for the following purposes, to wit: To purchase in the United States agricultural implements, materials for railroad development, construction, and repair in Armenia, and other similar supplies for economic development and rehabilitation that may be designated by the Armenian Government: Pro­ vided, That not to exceed one-half of this amount may be listed for the purpose of rehabilitating and establishing a sound banking and currency system for Ar­ menia, in case the Armenian Government may so decide, under the advice and approval of this joint commission. These bonds may be made payable in the United States, but the Government of the United States is not to be made in any sense responsible for the payment of either principal or interest.53

Senator Lodge rejected the amendment, asserting that he had sub­ mitted a concurrent resolution, which was not an act of legislation, 51 Ibid., pp. 8069—8070. 52 Ibid., pp. 8070-8071. See also Thomas A. Bryson, “The Thirteen Against Armenia: A Case of Political Defection,” Ararat, XI (Autumn 1972), pp. 36—42. 53 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, pp. 8071—8072.

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whereas the Hitchcock proposal constituted legislation requiring the assent of the president. Suggestions to reword the amendment to give it the form of a resolution were rebuffed, and the amendment went down to defeat by a vote of 34 in favor, 41 against, and 21 not voting.54 Senator William King of Utah then tried to salvage something by offering another substitute amendment: Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and empowered to enter into arrange­ ments, subject to the approval of Congress, with the allied powers, either through the supreme allied council or the council of the League of Nations, or otherwise, to cooperate on behalf of the United States with said powers, or the members of the League of Nations, for the proper protection of Armenia, including the advancement of supplies and commodities essential for the health and life of its people, and the preservation of its political independence and territorial integ­ rity.55

This proposal was defeated by even a larger margin: 28 in favor, 46 against (including Senator Hitchcock), and 22 not voting. By a voice vote the Senate also turned back an amendment of Senator Key Pittman of Nevada to provide Armenia advice and assistance without any military commitments.56 On June 1, 1920, the original Lodge resolution to “respectfully de­ cline’’ the president’s request for authority to accept the mandate over Armenia was passed by a vote of 52 in favor, 23 opposed, and 21 not voting.57 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican Party, and the irreconcilables, both Republican and Democrat, had achieved sweet vic­ tory over the internationalism of Thomas Woodrow Wilson. In a related development, on June 3 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives recommended that the Lodge resolu­ tion be adopted without further change.58 The committee’s Democratic members filed a minority report on June 5 stating that the language of the resolution was an insult to the president and that the Senate’s action had been hasty and improperly based on the Harbord report, which did not really apply to the Armenian situation.59 Inasmuch as Congress re­ cessed that day, the House of Representatives took no further action in the matter. The Armenian mandate was dead. The final outcome was painful but not surprising to the Armenians or to the Allied Powers. M Ibid., p. 8072; New York Times, June 2:1,4, 1920. 55 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, p. 8073. “Ibid. M Ibid. “Ibid., p. 8459; 66th Cong., 2d sess., House Report 110, Mandatory for Armenia (Wash­ ington, D.C., 1920), pt. 2, minority report. 59 Congressional Record, LIX, pt. 8, p. 8579; Bryson, “Woodrow Wilson,” p. 221.

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Woodrow Wilson, insulted and martyred, now planned to take the issue, together with United States membership in the League of Nations, to the American people during the forthcoming presidential electoral cam­ paign.

The Sequel

The Armenian question found its way into the platforms of the Repub­ lican and Democratic parties shortly after the Senate’s action. In his keynote address at the Republican National Convention in Chicago, Sen­ ator Lodge criticized Woodrow Wilson’s excessive attention to the man­ date issue at a time when he was doing almost nothing for neighboring Mexico, which was in a state of chronic turmoil. Lodge was again careful to proclaim America’s “great sympathy’’ for the Armenians, as had been demonstrated in the outpouring of charity to save “this brave and noble people.’’ The United States would no doubt help Armenia, but to con­ trol that government, to defend it through a mandate, was unacceptable. The American people would not send their sons and brothers for an uncertain length of time and spill their blood while Wilson and his kind tried to manipulate this issue to force the United States into the League of Nations.60 The party plank on Armenia deplored Wilson’s request as gross disregard for the lives of American boys and the protection of American interests. “We deeply sympathize with the people of Armenia and stand ready to help them in all proper ways, but the Republican Party will oppose now and hereafter the acceptance of a mandate for any country in Europe or Asia.’’61 The Democrats tried to avoid the subject as much as possible during their convention in New York. Though not a candidate for a third term, President Wilson suggested a plank through intermediaries. It read: We hold it to be the Christian duty and privilege of our Government to assume the responsible guardianship of Armenia, which now needs only the advice and assurance of a powerful friend to establish her complete independence and to give her distracted people the opportunities for peaceful happiness which they have vainly sought for through so many dark years of suffering and hideous distress.62

60 New York Times, June 11:3, 1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (June 19, 1920), pp. 810— 811. 61 Gidney, op. át., p. 238. 62 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New York, 1945), p. 313; Stephen Bonsai, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York, 1946), pp. 196-197; Gidney, op. át., p. 239.

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The actual plank adopted by the platform committee was very different and far more ambiguous: We express our deep and earnest sympathy for the unfortunate people of Armenia, and we believe that our Government, consistent with its Constitution and principles, should render every possible and proper aid to them in their efforts to establish and maintain a government of their own.63

During the presidential campaign, Republican candidate Warren G. Harding used the Armenian issue to attack the Democrats. On July 14 he disparaged Wilson’s attempt to force the mandate on the United States and demanded to know if his opponent, Governor James M. Cox of Minnesota, would renew the request for the mandate if elected pres­ ident. Cox avoided giving an answer until the end of September, when he asserted that he was in agreement with the party convention’s deci­ sion to desist from further recommendations to assume the Armenian mandate.64 Both candidates spoke of direct aid to Armenia, but Senator Harding emphasized that he would refuse to station American soldiers at the gateway between East and West, where the United States would inevitably become embroiled in every conflict of the Old World. His election as president indicated that the American public concurred. Armenians around the world were deeply disappointed at the turn of events and exploitation of the Armenian question for political purposes in the United States. No individual was more derisive of the tactics of Woodrow Wilson than Vahan Cardashian, director of the Armenian Press Bureau and the driving force behind the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. In a letter to Avetis Aharonian on June 30, 1920, he explained that Senator Lodge, who controlled the Senate, had made it clear from the outset that he would block any request for permission to assume the Armenian mandate. The adamant president had refused to make any concessions to the Republicans, knowing full well that he was turning Armenia into an object of partisanship and that his proposal for a mandate would be rejected forthwith. The “obstinate, selfish, and conceited” man made the request to the Senate not to help the Armenians but for his own designs. His sympathy for Armenia, Car­ dashian insisted, was purely political. Republican leaders Lodge, Root, Hughes, and Harding had all stated that it was within the president’s war powers to send aid and even troops if necessary to Armenia, but Wilson had not acted on that option; he wanted to thrust a mandate on “Gidney, op. cit., p. 238. See also Bonsai, op. át., p. 197. 64 New York Times, July 14:1—2,31:1—2, Sept. 19:16, 26:14,1920; Ralph Elliott Cook, “The United States and the Armenian Question, 1894—1924” (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1957), p. 265.

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the Americans in order to get the United States into the League of Nations. An American mandate, Cardashian advised, was an impossibil­ ity, and further lobbying would only antagonize and alienate the Repub­ licans, who undoubtedly would win the national elections in November. James Gerard, Cardashian continued, was working to get surplus goods and equipment to Armenia. The president had the power to grant this aid, but Cardashian was skeptical whether Wilson would exercise that authority, for if Armenia became self-sufficient there would be no fur­ ther justification for his mandate scheme.65 The appraisal was harsh and impugned Woodrow Wilson’s sincerity and honor, yet in the aftermath of the fiasco resulting from the mandate debate in the Senate some of Cardashian’s views seemed to ring true. Throughout the summer and fall of 1920, the ACIA, Armenian plen­ ipotentiary Pasdermadjian, and many prominent Americans continued efforts to secure direct aid for Armenia. As early as that spring, during the Senate debate, James Gerard, addressing a mass rally in New York on the occasion of the Armenian republic’s second anniversary, took for granted the defeat of the mandate and called upon the president to aid and protect Armenia by use of his executive powers, for which there were firm precedents.66 He wrote to Secretary of State Colby before and to Woodrow Wilson after the vote in the Senate to list the measures the executive branch could take to save Armenia: acting on the Senate res­ olution recommending the dispatch of a battleship to Batum; continu­ ing the shipment of foodstuffs to Armenia; delivering equipment and supplies for an army of 40,000 to 50,000 men; assigning 50 American officers to assist in the reorganization of the army; suspending the for­ eign enlistment act and allowing Armenian Americans to organize a volunteer force of 10,000 men; creating a mixed American and Arme­ nian financial commission to raise $75 million in private subscriptions, half of which would be spent in the United States; warning the Turks against further excesses against Armenians and urging the French to be more sympathetic to and protective of the Armenians in Cilicia; and asking the Allied Powers to cooperate in steps to assist Armenia. The Republican leaders, Gerard reiterated, had felt all along that the presi­ dent had the power to act. Much could be done without having to seek congressional approval.67 In midJune, Senator Lodge wrote Gerard that he recognized the ur­ 65 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Cardashian to Aharonian, June 30, 1920. 66 New York Times, May 3:18, 1920; Gidney, op. át., p. 240; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7. 67 US Archives, RG 59,86oJ.oi/268/289/299,and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/ 7, Gerard to Colby, May 21, Gerard to Joseph Tumulty, June 4, and Gerard to Colby, June 17, 1920.

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gency of helping Armenia but that, as the mandate had been rejected, it was now up to the president to make fresh recommendations or act on his own initiative.68 What the senator did not state was that if Wilson did in fact try to circumvent Congress, Lodge himself would lead a re­ newed campaign of vilification in the Senate. That there was still a great reservoir of sympathy for the Armenians in the United States was again demonstrated in the telegram of sixty American bishops to President Wilson asking that the United States, the Allies, or both together furnish the Armenian republic with arms and munitions and put ashore a bat­ talion of troops along the coast of the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.69 Similar requests were made by Garegin Pasdermadjian. In a petition to Secretary of State Colby on June 10, he described the Senate’s rejection of the mandate “so much desired by us” as a “most unfortunate inci­ dent” before getting to his main point: Armenia required arms and equipment and the support of a small international force. The present, poorly equipped army could not defend the area that President Wilson would presumably assign to Armenia in his boundary decision.70 When the State Department took the matter up with the War Depart­ ment, Secretary of War Newton Baker informed Colby that without an act of Congress, the sale, loan, or donation of arms to states that were not co-belligerents with the United States was prevented by law. He sug­ gested instead the allocation of surplus general supplies.71 Colby replied that he would approve any action that would help the situation, but in August, Baker himself decided against the shipment of surplus material because of developments in Armenia and the Caucasus.72 On August 23, James Gerard complained to Colby that the adminis­ tration had failed to act on nearly all the steps he had recommended. If President Wilson had taken the measures available to him and not re­ quiring Senate approval, the situation in Armenia would have been very different. Gerard claimed that the Republican leaders had gone along with every constructive step, including even the deployment of troops, but the president had remained inactive. All the government had done, at the urging of the ACIA and other organizations, was to send the Ar­ menians surplus flour and to extend de facto recognition to the Arme­ nian government. Gerard now asked that the decision on Armenia’s boundaries be announced immediately so the refugees could return home before the beginning of the winter snows and that 50,000 tons of 68 Lodge Papers, Box 62, Armenia file, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Lodge to Gerard, June 15, 1920. “ACIA, op. át., p. 48. 70 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/407, Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, June 10, 1920. 71 RG 59, 860J.24/-/2. 72 RG 59, 860J.24/2 enclosure/11/12.

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wheat and flour be dispatched during the winter months, as the Arme­ nian republic could not feed the refugees without the harvest from the farmlands of Western Armenia. In addition, measures should be taken to reverse the refusal of the Treasury Department to extend to Armenia a $10 million credit for surplus goods as negotiated between represen­ tatives of the Armenian government and the United States Liquidation Commission, and a public subscription should be allowed in the United States for the purpose of placing Armenia’s monetary system on firm foundations.73 Gerard also enclosed these recommendations in a letter to presiden­ tial candidate James Cox, an ACIA member, asking that he use his influ­ ence to persuade Wilson to act.74 The president’s continued reluctance to take decisive steps without having Congress share in the responsibility and accountability was interpreted as malevolence by Vahan Cardashian. In a letter to a Dashnakist leader in Boston, Cardashian complained that Gerard had offered Wilson several ways to help Armenia without refer­ ence to Congress, but the stubborn old man would not move, insisting rather on his own foredoomed mandate scheme. Woodrow Wilson, con­ cluded Cardashian, was willing to sacrifice Armenia so that he could point the finger at Congress and say, “I told you so.”75

The Boundary Commission

The defeat of the mandate for Armenia still left the issue of drawing the country’s boundaries. In its communication to President Wilson on April 26, the Allied Supreme Council at San Remo stated that no question had been found thornier than that of the frontiers of Armenia. Circum­ stances had necessitated laying aside plans for a larger Armenia, and it remained to determine what parts of the four provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond could be added to Russian Armenia without danger or impropriety and thereby make the new state self-sufficient by providing access to the sea. “The Supreme Council hopes that, however the American Government may reply to the wider matter of the Man­ date, the President will undertake this honourable duty not only for the sake of the country chiefly concerned but for that of the peace of the Near East.”76 Asking the United States to accept the mandate and the president to 73 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Gerard to Secretary of State, Aug. 23, 1920. 74 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Gerard to Cox, Sept. 4, 1920. 75 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7, Cardashian to Hambardzumian.June 9, 1920. 76 Polk Papers, 78/196. The text of the quotation is slighdy different in United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III (Washington, D.C., 1936), p. 780 (cited hereafter as Foreign Relations, 1920).

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arbitrate the boundaries had been British Prime Minister Lloyd George’s stroke of political genius. The move extricated the Allies from the heavy responsibility of having to decide whether or not to assign the fortress city of Erzerum and other strategic places to the new Armenian state. Abandonment of the scheme for a greater Armenia had already resulted in the removal from consideration of the entire region of Cilicia and three of the six Turkish Armenian provinces—namely, Sivas, Kharput, and Diarbekir. It was now a matter of deciding the southern and western boundaries of the new state within the four easternmost provinces. The Allies knew that, if he accepted, President Wilson would be sympathetic to Armenian aspirations. His position had been made clear in a message to the Allied Powers from Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby on March 24, 1920: There can be no question as to the genuine interest of this Government in the plans for Armenia, and the Government of the United States is convinced that the civilized world demands and expects the most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country. Its boundaries should be drawn in such a way as to recog­ nize all the legitimate claims of the Armenian people and particularly to give them easy and unencumbered access to the sea. While unaware of the consid­ erations governing the decision reached by the Supreme Council, it is felt that special rights over Lazistan would hardly assure to Armenia that access to the sea indispensable to its existence. It is hoped that, taking into consideration the fact that Trebizond has always been the terminus of the trade route across Armenia and that Mr. Venizelos, on behalf of the Greeks of that region, has expressed their preference for connection with Armenia rather than Turkey, the Powers will be willing to grant Trebizond to Armenia.77

Woodrow Wilson accepted the invitation of the Supreme Council on May 17, much to the relief of the Allied heads of state and much to the consternation of the American high commissioner at Constantinople, Admiral Mark L. Bristol.78 On June 24, Bristol wrote the Department of State that he was delighted with the rejection of the mandate over Ar­ menia; the only way to settle the Armenian problem was to solve the Turkish question by having one power assume control over the govern­ ment “of a united Ottoman empire.” The president’s agreement to de­ limit the boundaries had already incited the Turkish authorities suffi­ ciently to make it difficult and dangerous for American relief workers to travel into the interior. Bristol warned that the safety of Americans in Turkey would be imperiled if the United States became a party to the drawing of boundaries favorable to the Armenians. And in the absence of an adequate foreign military presence to enforce the decision, “the 77 Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 751—752; Polk Papers, 78/195. 78 Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 783; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/280.

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physical elimination of the non-Moslems in Turkey” would be the likely outcome. ‘‘The present attitude of our people in America is doing the Armenians, for whom they have the greatest possible sympathy, the greatest possible harm.”79 Although Wilson accepted the invitation from the San Remo confer­ ence in mid-May, it was not until July that the State Department began to assemble a team of experts for the assignment, and it was not until after the Treaty of Sèvres had been signed on August 10 that the bound­ ary committee began its deliberations. The committee was headed by Professor William Westermann, who in 1919 had been the chief of the Western Asia division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. His principal collaborators were Major (Professor) Lawrence Martin of the Army General Staff, who had participated as the geogra­ pher of the Harbord mission, and Harrison (Harry) G. Dwight of the Near Eastern division of the Department of State. The guidelines adop­ ted by the committee were to draw the southern and western boundaries of Armenia on the basis of a combination of ethnic, religious, economic, geographic, and military factors. The committee had at its disposal all the papers of the American peace delegation and the Harbord mission, the files of the Departments of State, War, and Interior, and the cartological services of the United States Geological Survey. Aside from the advice of experts in government service and direct consultations with General Harbord, the committee sought the input of missionaries and others with field experience who could give detailed information about the ethnic makeup of particular villages near which the border would probably pass, the roads and markets connecting certain villages, towns, and cities, and specific physical landmarks.80 The committee took into consideration the sentiments of President Wilson, the desire of the Allied Powers to do justice to the Armenians without making the Armenian state so large that its existence would be in constant jeopardy, and the need to provide the new state with ade­ quate outlets to the sea, even though the traditional Armenian home­ lands had not extended beyond the high Pontus Mountains. The war­ time deportations and massacres of the Armenians added to the complexities, as one could only estimate how many survivors there ac­ tually were and how many of these would return to or relocate in the territories assigned the Armenian republic. The committee tried to draw 79 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00/308. See also 860J.4016/41 and 760J.6715/23, Bristol to Secretary of State, Aug. 11 and Sept. 13, 1920; Thomas A. Bryson, “Mark Lambert Bristol, U.S. Navy, Admiral-Diplomat: His Influence on the Armenian Mandate Question,” Armenian Review, XXI (Winter 1968), pp. 3—22. 80 For materials on the boundary committee and its delimitation of Armenia’s western and southern borders, see US Archives, RG 59, file 760J.6715.

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boundaries in which the Armenian element, when combined with the inhabitants of the existing state in Russian Armenia, would constitute almost half the total population and within a few years form an absolute majority in nearly all districts. Such calculations took into account the heavy Muslim losses during the war and the probability that some part of the remaining Muslim population would take advantage of the pro­ visions of the peace treaty regarding voluntary relocation to territories that were to be left to Turkey or to an autonomous Kurdistan. A complicated aspect of the committee’s work related to the future of the vilayet (province) of Kharput (Kharpert). By the limits defined in the invitation of the Supreme Council, President Wilson was not au­ thorized to assign any part of that vital Armenian cultural center to the Armenian republic. Some legal scholars criticized the president for not qualifying his agreement to arbitrate the boundaries to make possible the inclusion of the sanjaks (counties) of Dersim and Kharput or at least of the strategic city and plain of Kharput; others suggested that recom­ mendations be made to the Allied Powers to amend or interpret the Treaty of Sèvres in such a way as to allow for a modest but critical border rectification.81 The question of Kharput was pressed by both Armenian delegations in Paris, by various phil-Armenian groups in Europe, by all the Armenian organizations in the United States, by the ACIA, and by prominent mis­ sionaries such as Ernest Riggs, the former president of Euphrates Col­ lege. The pro-Armenia lobby recited historic, ethnographic, economic, and strategic reasons for the award of Kharput to Armenia. Kharput was a part of the great central Armenian plateau, most of which had been included in the large province (eyalet) of Erzerum during the reign of Sultan Suleiman in the sixteenth century. This region had been identi­ fied in Ottoman sources and maps down through the nineteenth century as Ermenistan (“Armenia”). The Turkish vilayet reforms during the past decades, it was asserted, had been intended to “denationalize” the Ar­ menian provinces by ignoring geographic and local considerations and arbitrarily attaching Muslim-inhabited districts outside the core Arme­ nian region in order to dissipate the proportional strength of the Ar­ menians. This system had been applied so often that it was not possible to find two maps that were in agreement on the exact administrative boundaries of the Turkish Armenian provinces. The Taurus Mountains formed the frontier between the Armenian plateau and the Mesopota­ mian lowlands, and in the west it was the Euphrates that divided Greater Armenia and Lesser Armenia (Sebastia; Sivas). In return for the inclu­ sion in Armenia of at least the city and surrounding plain of Kharput, it 81 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/313; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 118/17.

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would be quite acceptable and just to detach the Kurdish-populated san­ jak of Hekkiari from the province of Van and the sanjak of Sairt (Seert; Sghert) from the province of Bitlis, especially as these regions lay beyond the Taurus Mountains.82 The issue was of such significance that H. G. Dwight prepared a special study, which was appended to the committee’s final report. In that doc­ ument he summarized the reasons for and against the inclusion of Kharput. He concurred that various international acts had recognized Kharput as an integral part of central Armenia; that it was a major Armenian cultural center; that not one of the 360 villages and towns of the prov­ ince was without a church, monastery, inscriptions, or other evidence attesting to Armenian origins; that Kharput was a major source of Ar­ menian doctors, lawyers, teachers, and clergy; that it was one of the richest economic and agricultural regions; that almost all of the com­ merce, crafts, and industry was in Armenian hands; that the province abounded in coal, iron ore, silver, and other minerals important for Armenia’s development; and that strategically it formed a natural line of defense. The Armenian arguments were not irrefutable, however. Dwight noted that Kharput was also a significant Muslim cultural center and that just before the world war its population had been predominantly Muslim, albeit divided into Kurd, Kizilbash, Turk, and other ethnic groups and sects. Although the commerce and agriculture had been in Armenian hands, the deportations and massacres had changed that cir­ cumstance, and it would seem inadvisable to give to Armenia a frontier region with such a high proportion of non-Armenians. Economically, Kharput’s outlet did not run up the Euphrates River to Erzerum or east­ ward over Bitlis but rather northward over Sivas and Amasia to Samson on the Black Sea. Hence, if the area was added to Armenia, the natural direction of trade and commerce would be broken, and this would be counter to the geopolitical, economic, and racial character of the region. From a strategic point of view, Kharput did in fact constitute the western buttress of the Armenian plateau, but it formed a spur and would extend significantly the frontier that Armenia would have to defend. Dwight concluded that, even if all other arguments were not sufficiently com­ pelling, the fact that President Wilson had accepted without reservation the invitation to arbitrate the boundary within the four provinces iden­ tified by the Supreme Council removed Kharput from the jurisdiction of the committee. Armenia and Turkey would be at liberty to make some 82 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 118/17; Armenian National Delegation Archives, microfilm i-D; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/178/247/251/336. See also RG 59, 760J.6715/5/15/28/41/44.

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arrangement between themselves. The most the president could do un­ der the circumstances was to indicate the advisability of a mutual un­ derstanding among the high contracting parties of the peace treaty, pos­ sibly on the basis of the purchase or exchange of territory. But because the United States had never raised the issue of Kharput with the Allied Powers, Dwight suggested that even this modest intervention would not be warranted.83 The Committee Report

The “Full Report of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Bound­ ary between Turkey and Armenia” was submitted to the Department of State on September 28, 1920, five months after the Allied Supreme Council’s invitation to President Wilson.84 The report defined the area submitted for arbitration, the sources available to and used by the com­ mittee, the principles and bases on which the work had proceeded, the need for the inclusion of Trebizond to guarantee unimpeded access to the sea, the desirability of a demilitarized frontier zone, the character of the resulting Armenian state, the immediate financial outlook of Ar­ menia, and the existing political situation in the Near East. The seven appendices of the report included the documents relative to the arbi­ tration, the maps used in drawing the boundaries, the issue of Kharput, the question of Trebizond, the status of the boundary between Turkey and Persia, the military situation in relation to Armenia, and the finan­ cial position of those parts of the four vilayets assigned to Armenia. The report noted that in arbitrating the southern and western fron­ tiers of Armenia, President Wilson could transfer any or all of the ter­ ritories of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond, require the demilitari­ zation of any adjacent Turkish territory, and provide for Armenia free access to the sea. Despite the obvious fact that the president had no technical or legal competence to deal with territory beyond the four vilayets, various Armenian representatives and American organizations had argued that Kharput was both indivisible from and indispensable for Armenia; the committee nonetheless concluded that it was beyond the president’s purview to award any part of that vilayet to Armenia and that, in any case, no such recommendation could be made. Insofar as the four provinces in question were concerned, the key factors were geography, economy, and ethnography. Historic and ethical considerations were passed over, because these had been incorporated into the consensus about the need to establish a separate Armenian state. 83 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, App. 4, “The Question of Kharput.” 84 For the full report with related materials, see RG 59, 760J.6715/65.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The territory that was being assigned to Armenia was less than half that originally claimed by Armenian spokesmen and their supporters, but it was the intent of the committee to allocate as much of the four provinces to Armenia as was in conformity with the strategic, economic, and eth­ nographic interests of the country. The geographic factor entailed both physiographic and strategic unity. The economic factor included the commercial links of various valleys with market towns and the existing or projected railroads that would enhance the development and well­ being of the entire country. The ethnographic factor was complicated by the absence of reliable prewar statistics, by the deportations and mas­ sacres of the Armenian population, and by the terrible losses suffered by the Muslim inhabitants through war casualties, flight from advancing enemy armies, and especially the ravages of typhus and other diseases. The committee had tried to determine the ethnographic distribution of Armenians, Kurds, and Turks by sanjaks and even by villages along those boundaries dictated by strategic and economic factors. Various possibilities had been considered to secure for Armenia un­ impeded access to the sea. The route through the Chorokh River Valley to Batum provided a commercial outlet only for those districts formerly within the Russian Empire and was problematic because of the unstable political conditions. To the west, along the coast of Lazistan, were the small harbors of Rize and Of, but they afforded poor anchorage and were so exposed to rough weather that in certain months cargoes could not be landed; they also lacked suitable roads to the hinterland. In keep­ ing with President Wilson’s disposition, therefore, the committee had come to the conclusion that free access to the sea necessitated the in­ clusion of Trebizond in Armenia, even though the Armenians had no ethnic claims to the city or vilayet. The economic requirement was “ab­ solute and decisive.’’ Because there would be insurmountable difficulties in attempting to build a railway along the old caravan route from the port of Trebizond up to Baiburt and Erzerum, the Kharshut (Karshit) River Valley, ending near Tireboli, had been placed in Armenia as the obvious course of the railway from the sea to the central plateau. The matter was complicated by the reluctance of the Pontic Greeks to enter into Armenia and by the fact that the Armenians themselves had re­ nounced claims to the Trebizond vilayet west of Surmene. Nonetheless, all these considerations, including the existence of an absolute Muslim majority in the province, paled before the need to guarantee Armenia free access to the sea. “The sound Turkish claim ... and that of the Pontic Greeks must be regarded as secondary to the economic welfare of the Kurdish, Turkish and Armenian population of the three Vilayets of Van, Bitlis and Erzerum.’’85 85 Ibid., pp. 1—23 (quotation on p. 23).

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General James G. Harbord, Major C. H. Mason of the War Depart­ ment, and Major Lawrence Martin of the General Staff commented on the demilitarization of the territory adjacent to the new Armenian fron­ tiers. Harbord observed that such a zone was intended primarily to pro­ tect the Armenians, as for centuries they had been considered “more or less legitimate prey.” It could be taken for granted that all Muslim elements would be hostile to the creation of the Armenian state. Most Turkish soldiers had returned home with their weapons, whereas the Armenians had always been kept unarmed. To arm them now would cause daily conflicts, but any attempt to collect weapons from the entire population would expose both Muslims and Christians to lawless, roving bands and prevent them from protecting themselves until the security of life and property had been established. The peace treaty had limited the Turkish gendarmerie to a total of 50,000 men. In the demilitarized zone, the gendarmes should be led by “a liberal number of Allied offi­ cers conscious of the importance of their duty and committed by sym­ pathy and on principle to the protection of the population on both sides of the boundary.” As a demilitarized zone of less than a day’s march in width would permit raiding parties to cross into Armenia and return without detection, the established width should be about 50 miles; al­ ternatively, all the Turkish provinces bordering on Armenia should be demilitarized.86 Major Mason believed that the most important objective of the de­ militarized zone was to prevent the creation of Cossack-like military col­ onies, the unwarranted construction of strategic railroads and highways, and the concentration of military garrisons. Large supply depots should not be allowed in the zone, and the transportation system should con­ form strictly to local economic needs. It was recognized, nevertheless, that roads and railroads were among the most important elements in overcoming the region’s backwardness and opening it to the influences of world civilization. The most effective means of dealing with such regions was through the personal contact of the Western governor or commissioner, who had to be a person of high character and able to show himself as a friend of the natives. The commissioner, serving under the League of Nations, would act as the warden of the frontier, with discretionary powers for maintaining the peace.87 Major Martin held the view that the Treaty of Sèvres provided Armenia with adequate military security by virtue of the way the boundaries were to be drawn and the strict limitations placed on the Turkish military establishment. It would be inconsistent, Martin believed, to demilitarize 86 Ibid., pp. 24-27. 87 Ibid., pp. 28—33.

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Turkish territory next to the frontier unless similar arrangements were made for the zone between Armenia and the autonomous Kurdish state to the south. From these three views, a consensus developed that the peace treaty included adequate means for demilitarizing the border zones and provided that among the superior officers of the gendarmerie there must be personnel of Allied or neutral powers who would observe and report on any tendency to build up military colonies, excessive sup­ ply depots, fortifications, or strategic railways and highways. Moreover, although President Wilson had not been asked to prescribe similar su­ pervision for the Armenian side of the frontier, such actions would be desirable in order “to accomplish a wholly satisfactory result.”88 The boundaries drawn by the committee awarded to Armenia twothirds of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis and most of the vilayets of Erzerum and Trebizond. Based on natural, economic, and strategic factors, a boundary had taken shape extending from the Persian border south of Lake Van westward into the Bitlis vilayet, encompassing the city of Bitlis, the mountains of Sassun, and the plain of Mush. The natural barrier formed by mountain ridges, ranging from 7,500 to 11,000 feet in ele­ vation (with the passes between 5,500 and 8,800 feet), split the vilayets of Van and Bitlis, leaving the Kurdish-populated sanjaks of Hekkiari and Sairt outside of Armenia and within the projected autonomous Kurdish state. In that sector the boundary ran along the main water parting be­ tween the Great Zab River and the Khoshab River to a point 18 kilo­ meters (11 miles) south of the village of Moks, 23 kilometers (14 miles) south of the city of Bitlis, and 47 kilometers (29 miles) south of Mush. From there, the boundary turned northwestward along the Murad (lower Euphrates) River, 56 kilometers (35 miles) west of Mush. From the boundary of the Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets, the frontier ran along the Buyuk (Kighi) River, leaving the town of Kighi just inside Turkey, before reaching the common borders of the sanjaks of Erzinjan and Erzerum and the vilayet of Kharput (Mamuret-ul-Aziz). A small bridgehead of the Kharput vilayet reached to a point just 20 kilometers south of Erzinjan, and the committee suggested that the 40 square ki­ lometers (15.5 square miles) involved might rightly become the subject of a future border rectification. From that salient the frontier continued northward to a point 35 kilometers (22 miles) southwest of Erzinjan and 6 kilometers (4 miles) east of Kemakh, then to the meeting place of the Erzerum and Trebizond vilayets, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) from Erzinjan. Hence, Baiburt, Mamakhatun (Terjan), and Erzinjan would fall within Armenia, whereas Kemakh would remain in Turkey. As the boundary passed into the province of Trebizond, it followed 88 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

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high peaks and water partings up to the Kelkit River and to points 38 kilometers (24 miles) southwest of Gumushkhane and 43 kilometers (27 miles) southeast of Shabin-Karahisar, then over the crest of the Pontus Mountains to the Black Sea 1 kilometer west of the village of Keshab and 9 kilometers east of the city of Kerasund. The exact marking of the frontier would be accomplished by a field boundary commission. The assignment of the harbor of Trebizond and the valley of the Kharshut River to Armenia left no further need to consider means to provide access to the sea or special privileges at the port of Trebizond or else­ where along the coast of Lazistan.89 The territorial award in the four vilayets would expand the area of the Republic of Armenia to about 60,000 square miles or 155,000 square kilometers, roughly equivalent to the country of Czecho-Slovakia or the state of Illinois. The country would be largely mountainous, with most of the arable land lying in valleys ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 feet in elevation. Geologists, the committee reported, believed that the Arme­ nian mountains were heavily mineralized and that, with the advantage of a stable government and foreign capital and the building of railroads, mining and mineral production would increase greatly. Based on prewar statistics, the population of the territories to be included in the new united Armenian state had been 3,570,000, of whom Muslims (Turks, Kurds, “Tartar” Azerbaijanis, and others) had formed 49 percent, Ar­ menians 40 percent, Lazes 5 percent, Greeks 4 percent, and other groups 1 percent. It was anticipated that large numbers of Armenian refugees and exiles would return to an independent Armenia and that far fewer Turks and other Muslims would come back to the four vilayets if they were incorporated into Armenia. Hence, after the first year of repatriation and readjustment, the population of the Armenian republic would be about 3 million, of whom Armenians would make up 50 per­ cent, Muslims 40 percent, Lazes 6 percent, Greeks 3 percent, and other groups 1 percent. The rise in the absolute number and proportion of Armenians was expected to increase steadily and rapidly in subsequent years.90 The report continued: In this area and with the immediate ethnic distribution estimated above, the greatest element of hope for the future good of this backward part of the world lies in the Armenian people. American military observers and relief workers who have visited the Armenian districts during the war and the period of the armistice 89 Ibid., pp. 50-64. See also the map accompanying the report, published inside the rear flap of Foreign Relations, 1920, III. The map bears the signature of Woodrow Wilson and is entitled, “Boundary between Turkey and Armenia as Determined by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America.” 90 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, pp. 66-70.

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saw the country and its peoples when they were at a tremendous disadvantage. This is especially true of the Armenians. It is fundamentally correct to start upon the assumption that the conditions of life existing in Turkish Armenia for the past fifty years, in Russian Armenia more particularly since the armistice, can have produced no other result than to lower greatly the moral stamina and the productive capacity of both Moslem and Christian inhabitants, and in about equal degree.91

The appointment of a mandatory would have been the best solution for the welfare of the country, and concern had been expressed about the ability of the Armenians to govern themselves, especially when nearly half the population would be Muslim. It would be fitting, therefore, if the president included a reminder to the Armenian people that the civilized world expected that there would be no reprisals against Muslims when the Armenian military forces occupied the four eastern vilayets and that they were not to attempt to rule as conquerors: The hope we place in the Armenian people is based upon the tremendous vitality they have shown under the outrageous and brutal persecutions of the past fifty years, their tenacity in respect to their religious beliefs, the capacity conceded to them by all competent and unprejudiced observers, their industry and thrift, and their initiative. This belief in the fundamentally sound character of the Armenians, despite many unattractive traits, appears most markedly in the writings of German travellers and observers who have studied the country and peoples and have written numerous books upon them during the first three years of the war. The eagerness with which the Armenians, both in their own country and away from it, have grasped at every opportunity for training and higher education warrants the belief that their undoubted powers of leadership among the Near Eastern peoples will increase with the responsibilities incurred by in­ dependence.92

The section of the report on the political situation in the Near East began: “In view of the unfortunate historic and geographic situation of Armenia, the immediate chances of the successful establishment of this state may fairly be open to question.’’ Armenia lay wedged among hostile Muslim populations, and the Western powers had acknowledged their inability or unwillingness to defend the country. “It is quite evident that the fiat of the Supreme Council will not exorcise the Turkish Nationalists out of Erzerum.” The future of the region depended largely on Russia and Great Britain. During the world war, Russia had occupied nearly all of the territories now assigned to Armenia. The geographic proximity of Russia, the economic interdependence of Russia and Western Asia, and the force of Russian political tradition made it impossible to con91 Ibid,., pp. 70—71. 92 Ibid., pp. 71—72.

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ceive of an Armenian state free of Russian influence, but that factor “may in the end be decidedly favorable to the maintenance of Armenian independence.” British policy in the Near East was aimed at preserving the strategic frontier of the empire in its two soft spots: India against attack by land from the west and the Suez Canal against attack by land from the east. “In line with this policy an independent state of Armenia will be regarded by Great Britain as one of the buffer states, for the long and weak Mesopotamian line of defense. The interests of Great Britain, therefore, combine with the general sympathy of the British public caused by the Armenian horrors of the past thirty years in forecasting continued British support of Armenia.”93 As for Kurdistan, the Treaty of Sèvres provided for a commission to prepare a scheme for the autonomy of the Kurdish regions lying to the south and southwest of the four vilayets awarded Armenia, with the pos­ sibility that the League of Nations would subsequently grant them full independence. The creation of a Kurdish state would alienate the Kurds from the Turkish Nationalists under Mustafa Kemal, as the goals of the Kurds and Armenians were allied by the mutual desire for indepen­ dence. This did not mean that the Kurds would support Armenian at­ tempts to occupy the four vilayets, but at least the 300,000 to 400,000 Kurds in the area would not engage in active resistance, and Armenia would not have to worry about attacks by Kurds from behind the new border. Racially, the Kurds were closer to the Armenians than to the Turks, and the Armenians claimed they would work in amity with them once Turkish domination was removed.94 It was important not to lose sight of the fact that, although the Treaty of Sèvres had been signed by the sultan’s government in Constantinople, actual control of inner Anatolia belonged to Mustafa Kemal’s Nation­ alists, who were unalterably opposed to the separation of the four vilayets and would probably put up a fight against the treaty and the boundary decision. They were, however, primarily interested in combating the Greek occupation of Smyrna and had concentrated their troops in the west. The poor Nationalist showing in face of the Greek offensive in recent months had lowered Turkish morale, and this might work in favor of a solution to the Armenian question. In summary, the report noted that the Armenians had a small but well-trained army ready to advance into the four vilayets when the de­ cision was given out. They had recently received arms and ammunition from Great Britain, and political conditions were conducive to their suc­ cess despite the Bolshevik coup in Azerbaijan. They had confidence in ” Ibid., pp. 74—77. 94 Ibid., pp. 79-81.

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their ability to carry out the occupation, although “a disturbing and unappraisable factor in the situation is what the Bolshevist leaders can and will do to assist the Turkish Nationalists in their resistance.” The assessment of the political outlook concluded: In the absence of mandatory supervision and protection by one of the great Powers, the continued maintenance of Armenian independence is precarious. Without such protection the play of the persistent historic forces, which have always operated in this unhappy region, may be expected to continue. The chances are that the mountainous plateau of Armenia will again, as so often in the past, be the point of contact of great historic movements in the Near and Middle East. If the traditional motives and methods of our international relations should undergo some great change, Armenia may more happily come within the protective orbit of some great power, probably Russia, and thereby maintain a great measure of its individuality and independence.95

“Wilsonian Armenia”

Even though Westermann’s boundary committee submitted its findings to the Department of State on September 28, 1920, two more months were to pass before President Wilson relayed his arbitration decision to the Allied governments. The State Department first sent the committee’s report to the War Department for its observations and requested through Ambassador Hugh Wallace in Paris formal notification from the Allied Supreme Council about the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres and an authenticated copy of the document.96 During the intervening weeks, James Gerard and others complained that the long delay in re­ leasing the president’s decision was having a detrimental effect on mo­ rale and could lead to untold suffering and tragic consequences for the Armenian people.97 It was only on November 12 that the committee’s report was finally delivered to the White House.98 Ten days later, on November 22, Woodrow Wilson signed the final report, entitled ‘‘De­ cision of the President of the United States of America Respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Armenia, Access for Armenia to the Sea, and the Demilitarization of Turkish Territory Adjacent to the Armenian Frontier.” In his cover letter to the Supreme Council, Wilson wrote: With full consciousness of the responsibility placed upon me by your request, I have approached this difficult task with eagerness to serve the best interests of the Armenian people as well as the remaining inhabitants, of whatever race or religious belief they may be, in this stricken country, attempting to exercise also 95 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 96 RG 59, 760J.6715/27/47; FO 371 /4960-4961, E12682/13045/13154/134/58. 97 RG 59, 760J.6715/34/40; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7. 98RG59, 760J.6715/64.

1. THE PROPOSED BOUNDARIES OF "WILSONIAN ARMENIA

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

the strictest possible justice toward the populations, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Greek or Armenian, living in the adjacent areas."

Unlike other parts of the world, Wilson explained, the four vilayets did not lend themselves to a boundary division based on the ethnic and religious distribution of the populations. The ethnic factor, already of a complex, intermingled character, “is further beclouded by the terrible results of the massacres and deportations of Armenians and Greeks, and by the dreadful losses also suffered by the Moslem inhabitants through refugee movements and the scourge of typhus and other diseases.’’ Be­ cause the invitation to arbitrate the boundaries had been limited to the four vilayets, Wilson had attempted to grant Armenia as large an area as possible and to ensure the new state an adequate natural frontier and geographic and economic unity. Conflicting territorial claims could not always be harmonized, and in those cases it was the president’s belief that a “healthy economic life for the future state of Armenia should be decisive.’’ But where geography permitted, all mountain and valley dis­ tricts populated predominantly by Kurds or Turks had been left in Tur­ key.99 100 The southern boundary of Armenia was determined by the rugged natural barrier extending from the south of Lake Van to the southwest of Bitlis and Mush, leaving to Turkey all of the sanjak of Hekkiari and nearly all of Sairt. This divestment was dictated not only by physiographic but also by ethnographic considerations; these regions were overwhelm­ ingly Kurdish, and their economic relations were with towns and cities to the south. Armenian claims to the upper valley of the Great Zab River, therefore, could not be satisfied, as this district was a part of the Tigris water system tied to Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. The western boundary was drawn some distance within the Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets to follow a natural geographic barrier that furnished Armenia with security and left to Turkey an area that was strongly Kurdish. This aspect of the ar­ bitration decision had been unavoidable in view of the fact that the retention by Turkey of Kharput had been determined by the Treaty of Sèvres and the president had no jurisdiction to include any part of that vilayet in the new Armenian state. In the northwest, the boundary was based primarily on the need to provide Armenia with adequate access to the sea. The well-being of the entire population of the great Armenian plateau depended on this. Con­ sequently, the claims of the Pontic Greeks could not be satisfied. It was necessary either to assign the vilayet of Trebizond to Turkey or Armenia 99 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, pp. 38—39. The full text of Wilson’s letter is published in Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 790—795. 100 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, pp. 39—40; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 791.

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in toto or to divide it between the two states. The majority of the pop­ ulation was uncontestedly Muslim, but against a decision so clearly war­ ranted on ethnographic grounds weighed heavily the future of Armenia. “It has been and is now increasingly my conviction that the arrange­ ments providing for Armenia’s access to the sea must be such as to offer every possibility for the development of this state as one capable of reas­ suming and maintaining that useful role in the commerce of the world which its geographic position, athwart a great historic trade route, as­ signed to it in the past. The civilization and the happiness of its mingled population will largely depend upon the building of railways and the increased accessibility of the hinterland of the vilayets to European trade and cultural influences.” Wilson decided to divide the province, award­ ing about 4,600 square miles (12,000 square kilometers) to Armenia, including the port and harbor of Trebizond as well as the Kharshut Valley, which was the most suitable route for a future railroad from the sea to the Armenian highlands. Kerasund, Ordu, and their hinterlands had been left to Turkey, as they were preponderantly Turkish and Mus­ lim and served as outlets for the vilayet of Sivas, which was to remain in Turkey.101 Wilson continued that it had been deemed impractical and unnec­ essary to establish a demilitarized zone that would entail elaborate pre­ scriptions and complex agencies for supervision. The Treaty of Sèvres had required the disarming of the Turkish forts and, by stipulating that some officers of the gendarmerie must be supplied by Allied or neutral powers, had created bodies that would be adequate to meet any danger of disorder along the border. It might be recommended that the supe­ rior officers of the gendarmerie in the vilayets contiguous with the fron­ tiers of Armenia be selected solely from Allied or neutral powers and that they be charged with the duty of preventing any military prepara­ tions that might be directed against the Armenian frontier.102 Woodrow Wilson ended his letter by acting on the recommendation of Westermann’s committee about issuing a caveat to the Armenians: It is my confident expectation that the Armenian refugees and their leaders, in the period of their return into the territory thus assigned to them, will by refraining from any and all form of reprisals give to the world an example of that high moral courage which must always be the foundation of national strength. The world expects of them that they give every encouragement and help within their power to those Turkish refugees who may desire to return to their former homes in the districts of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis, re­ membering that these peoples, too, have suffered greatly. It is my further expec­ tation that they will offer such considerate treatment to the Laz and the Greek 101 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, pp. 40—45; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 791—794. 102 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, p. 45; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 794.

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inhabitants of the coastal region of the Black Sea, surpassing in the liberality of their administrative arrangements, if necessary, even the ample provisions for non-Armenian racial and religious groups embodied in the Minorities Treaty signed by them upon August 10th of this year, that these peoples will gladly and willingly work in completest harmony with the Armenians in laying firmly the foundation of the new Republic of Armenia.103

The text of the arbitration decision was cabled to Ambassador Wallace in Paris on November 24, with instructions that it should be handed to the secretary-general of the peace conference for submission to the Al­ lied Supreme Council.104 Wallace responded on December 7 that he had delivered the documents that morning and that, although the Supreme Council had not expressed any views on the subject, the British Foreign Office felt that the arbitration was very generous to Armenia.105 In view of the political and military developments in Anatolia and Armenia, there was considerable hesitation about publishing the report. When the State Department informed Ambassador Wallace that the boundary decision would be released on December 17, Wallace quickly replied that the British were requesting that publication be held up until they could submit certain observations.106 The State Department readily com­ plied and, although the general content and extent of the arbitration award were made known, the president’s decision remained unpub­ lished. Perhaps it was too embarrassing to distribute the report and de­ tailed map of “Wilsonian Armenia’’ at a time when the fate and future of even the small Armenian republic of Erevan were shrouded in un­ certainty and gloom. "*3 RG 59, 760J.6715/65, p. 46; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 794—795104 Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 789—790. 105 RG 59, 760J.6715/64. Wallace’s note was signed on December 6. Already on Novem­ ber 30, Wallace had passed on the boundary decision as “personal and confidential” to Sir Eyre Crowe, who had recently replaced Lord Hardinge as British permanent under­ secretary of state for foreign affairs. See FO 371/4965, E15131/134/58. 106 RG 59, 760J.6715/70/72; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 807—808. The British For­ eign Office was clearly annoyed and bemused by Wilson’s boundary decision. In the de­ partmental minutes attached to the advance copy that Wallace had provided Crowe, the chief of the Eastern section, Dwight Osborne, wrote: “The President (or whoever has done it) awards to Armenia the greater part of the Turkish Armenian vilayets including even territory west of Trebizond which the Armenians themselves, he says, disclaimed.” Mean­ while, the Turkish Nationalists were in the process of reducing Armenia’s size by at least half. “The whole situation affords an urgent argument for a revision of the Armenian Chapter of the [Sèvres] Treaty 8c with it the Thrace 8c Smyrna Chapters, though as it will very likely be under Bolshevik control the Turks would wish it as small as possible.... Would this perhaps afford an opportunity for reconsideration of these chapters?” Crowe, who previously had served as the head of the British peace delegation in Paris, added: “President Wilson has built a castle in the air.” Foreign Secretary Curzon concluded that President Wilson’s award had not the slightest value, and if Armenia was taking shelter under the Bolshevik wing: “What is the use of bothering about her W[estem] frontier? Let us frankly admit that the Erivan Armenians are a worthless lot” See FO 371/4965» E15131/134/58.

2

Negotiation and Conflict: Armenian-Soviet Relations

Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) were circumscribed until the spring of 1920, not only because of the antipathy between their ruling parties but also because the states were separated physically by the White Armies in southern Russia. The network of Armenian institutions in So­ viet Russia was disrupted and largely dismantled by the Commissariat for Nationalities, headed by I. V. Stalin. Moreover, the Russian Com­ munist Party’s Caucasian Regional Committee (Kraikom), Caucasian Bu­ reau (Kavburo), and affiliated organizations steadfastly called for the forcible overthrow of the Armenian government, which was branded a “lackey of imperialism” and a sworn enemy of the workers and peasants. For the Armenians, the reemergence of a Russian empire in the form of the Soviet system threatened to eliminate the possibility of a free, independent, and united state. As the Red Army advanced through the Ukraine, Kuban, and Terek, Armenian diplomatic representatives in Kharkov, Kiev, Rostov-on-Don, Ekaterinodar, Novorossiisk, Sochi, and elsewhere were forced to retreat or were deprived of diplomatic immu­ nity and subjected to search and seizure and other forms of harassment. Thousands of Western Armenian refugees who had sought haven in southern Russia and the North Caucasus were again uprooted, and they repeatedly appealed to the Armenian government for the means to transfer safely to the Republic. By April, General Anton I. Denikin had been defeated, and the White Armies were in disarray. The victorious Red Army took up positions along the entire length of the Caucasus Mountains from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. The Moscow government nevertheless seemed to 45

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become more flexible, seeking trade relations with Great Britain and other Allied Powers and extending recognition to and entering into treaty relations with the Baltic states and the Georgian republic. The elimination of the buffer afforded by the White Armies prompted the Armenian government at the end of April to send a delegation to Mos­ cow to secure Soviet recognition of the Armenian republic. But at the time the negotiations began, the new Bureau-Government had just sup­ pressed the unexpected Bolshevik uprising in Armenia that followed the sovietization of Azerbaijan. The resultant tension between Armenia and Russia, the Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial disputes, and considerations of Soviet policy toward the Orient (especially the Turkish Nationalist movement) combined to interrupt the negotiations in Moscow. During the summer of 1920, despite the repeated Soviet professions of goodwill, the Red Army advanced over Karabagh into Zangezur and Nakhichevan, coercing the Erevan government to acquiesce in provisional Soviet oc­ cupation of the strategic corridor. The flow of words was matched by the contest of arms. The Shant Mission to Moscow

As the Red Army prepared to invade the Republic of Azerbaijan at the end of April 1920, the cabinet of Alexandre Khatisian decided that it was necessary to engage in direct negotiations with the Soviet govern­ ment to win recognition of Armenia’s independence.1 In consultation with the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun, it was agreed to dispatch a threemember delegation to Moscow. There was quick consensus on the se­ lection of Hambardzum Terterian and Levon Zarafian, both of whom were ideologically socialist and even regarded as “left-wing” Dashnakists. Terterian, a native of Rostov-Nor Nakhichevan, had been a class­ mate of Alexandre Miasnikian and other Armenian Bolsheviks entrusted with critical assignments by Lenin and the Council of People’s Commis­ sars (Sovnarkom). Zarafian was a native of Karabagh who had spent many years in organizational activities in Baku and consequently was well acquainted with many influential Bolsheviks. To underscore the concept and goal of united Armenia, the government wanted a Western Arme­ 1 The Armenian consul at Vladikavkaz, Hakob Sarikian, had previously reported that Bolshevik leader Grigorii (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze had informed him on April 8 that Soviet Russia was prepared to recognize Armenia’s independence and that the mutual relations between the two states should be determined through treaty arrangements. Ordzhonikidze urged Armenia to indicate its readiness to normalize relations with Soviet Russia, explain­ ing that meanwhile his government could not formally recognize the diplomatic represen­ tatives of Armenia operating on territories under Soviet rule. See State Historical Archives of Armenia, fund 200, register 1, file 581, pp. 6—7 (cited hereafter as Armenia Archives, with the fund, register, and file combined as, in this example, 200/1/581).

ARMENIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

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nian to lead the delegation. Both Terterian and Zarafian opposed the candidacy of Vahan Papazian, a native of Van, complaining that he was headstrong and inflexible. The choice then fell upon Levon Shant (Seghposian), a native of Constantinople who had been educated in Tiflis and was serving as the vice president of Parliament. Shant repre­ sented the ideal intellectual, political, and spiritual fusion of the Eastern Armenians and the Western Armenians, who in reality were mutually distrustful and separated by distinct traditions and historical processes. As events would show, however, Shant, too, tended to be inflexible and uncommunicative.2 The government instructed Shant’s delegation to enter into a treaty arrangement with Soviet Russia based on four fundamental principles: i) recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Armenian republic, inclusive of Mountainous Karabagh; 2) acceptance of the uni­ fication of Eastern (Russian) and Western (Turkish) Armenia; 3) non­ interference in the internal affairs of the Armenian republic; and 4) permission for Armenian refugees in areas under Soviet control to re­ locate to Armenia with all movable belongings.3 The delegation set out on April 30, just as details of the Soviet coup in Azerbaijan began to reach Erevan.4 While in Tiflis, Shant consented, at the urging of Arme­ nia’s diplomatic representative, Tigran Bekzadian, to allow Aramayis Erzinkian and Simeon Pirumian to travel to Moscow with the delegation on behalf of the Compatriotic Union of Karabagh in order to help bring the highland into the Armenian republic. As left-wing Mensheviks, the pair might have some influence on their fellow Marxists in Russia.5 The 2 Hambardzoum Terterian, “The Levon Chanth Mission to Moscow,” Armenian Review, VIII (Summer 1955), p. 5; Simon Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov: Depker, demker, aprumner, N (Beirut, i960), pp. 129—130. For biographical materials on Shant, see K. Panian, “The Late Levon Chanth,” Armenian Review, N (Spring 1952), pp. 34—42; S. Vratzian, Andzink nvirialk (Beirut, 1969), pp. 146—167. Terterian’s account of the mission to Moscow was first published in Armenian as “Hayastani Hanrapetutian ev Khorhrdayin Rusastani banaktsutiunnere—Levon Shanti patvirakutiune,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXIV (Jan., Feb., May 1954), pp. 1-14, 14—26, 1—15. For a biographical sketch of Terterian, see Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, II, no. 6 (1957), pp. 189—196. ’Simon Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji ev trkakan sali midjev (Beirut, 1953), pp. 101—102 (cited hereafter as Hayastane murji ev sali midjev), and Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), p. 406. Terterian, op. át., p. 6, adds a fifth point: compensation for the losses sustained by the Armenian working classes during the imperialist war (World War I). See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 1O°» May 11, 1920; Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4956, E5328/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Wardrop, April 24, 1920. 4 For copies of the delegation’s credentials, see Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 13— >75 Terterian, op. át., p. 6. For one of the pair’s appeals to Ordzhonikidze regarding Moun­ tainous Karabagh, see Slovo, July 30,1920, enclosed in US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8).i, Moser to Secretary of State, July 30, 1920. A memorandum they submitted to Lenin in Moscow on June 9 is included in Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Armenii, Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri SM Respubliki Armeniia, Kafedra Istorii Armianskogo Naroda

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

delegation departed Tiflis for Vladikavkaz on May 4, the same day that Foreign Minister Hamazasp Ohandjanian addressed the following radiotelegram to Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Grigorii V. Chicherin: According to the Third All-Russian Soviet of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Deputies, which declared the right of self-determination of Armenia, and in accordance with the decree of the Chairman of the Council of People’s Com­ missars Lenin of January 13, 1918, the Government of independent, united, democratic Armenia proposes to the Government of the Russian S.F.S.R. to enter into negotiations to establish treaty relations between the two republics on the basis of the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia. A delegation given plenipotentiary powers by my government is already within the bounds of your republic to conduct said negotiations with your gov­ ernment. Note: We can accept radiograms from you from Moscow, but cannot send directly. We can send over Tashkent or Astrakhan. Please make arrangements and inform us.6

Chicherin replied on May 17: The Soviet Government declares its agreement to sign with the Armenian Government a treaty, with the purpose of establishing friendly relations between the two peoples. The Soviet Government is awaiting your delegates, who have already set out toward Moscow. In order to eliminate the technical difficulties of your delegation’s communication from Moscow to Erevan, we have allocated our direct telegraph, over Rostov and Tiflis. We request that you come to agreement in advance with the Georgian Government regarding this.7

In Vladikavkaz for a week while arranging transportation to Rostov, the Armenian delegation conferred with Consul Hakob Sarikian on the condition of the Armenians in the Terek region and on means to re­ patriate this population to Armenia.8 The respect and deference with Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Nagpmyi Karabakh v 1918—1923 gg.: Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, ed. V. A. Mikayelian et al. (Erevan, 1992), pp. 487—494 (cited hereafter as Nagornyi Karabakh). Criticism of the behavior of Pirumian and Erzinkian once they had arrived in Moscow appeared in Mshak, nos. 14 and 16, 1920, reprinted in part in Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 408 n. 6 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, Ohandjanian to Chicherin, May 4, 1920, and File 660/3, no- 98’ May 8, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/412, p. 41, and 200/1/581, pp. 36—37; Haradj, May 6:1, 1920; Bor’ba, May 9:3, 1920; FO 371/4956, E5274/134/58 enclosure. 7 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 407; A. Esayan, Hayastani midjazgayin-iravakan drutiune, 1920—1922 (Erevan, 1967), p. 104; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 49—50, giving the date as May 18, 1920. 8 On May 5, the Bureau-Government added Dr. Haik Melkonian to the Armenian del­ egation, but by that time Shant had departed for Vladikavkaz. Melkonian traveled to Tiflis with the intent of conferring with the delegation by direct wire from there or from Vla­ dikavkaz. Because of the subsequent course of the negotiations in Moscow, he never joined the Shant delegation. See Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 38—39, 95—96. See also Esayan, op. át., p. 103.

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which the local Soviet administration treated the delegation gave cause for guarded optimism. Terterian also exchanged telegrams with Grigorii K. (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze, who was then in Baku. The two men had been active in Rostov in 1918 and were well acquainted. Apprising Ord­ zhonikidze of the delegation’s mission, Terterian asked the powerful liaison of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee to make So­ viet Azerbaijan desist from aggression against Armenia during the course of the forthcoming negotiations in Moscow. Ordzhonikidze, who at about the same time was named to head the Communist Party’s Cau­ casian Bureau, expressed satisfaction at the prospect of a Soviet-Arme­ nian treaty and gave the desired assurances, even though only a few days earlier he himself had addressed an ultimatum to Armenia to clear its troops from Mountainous Karabagh.9 When the delegation arrived in the twin cities of Rostov-on-Don and Nor Nakhichevan, it was again struck by the moderation and patriotic concern shown by Armenian Bolsheviks such as Ashot Hovhannisian, who seemed to differ gready from Avis Nuridjanian and other fanatics who had spearheaded the abortive May revolt. Shant was so encouraged that he informed his government by telegraph that Soviet Russia had already accepted Armenian independence in principle and that he an­ ticipated the swift negotiation of a favorable treaty in Moscow.10 Com­ pleting the final leg of the three-week journey, the Armenian delegation arrived in the Soviet capital on May 20 and was provided quarters in a part of the former Japanese embassy.11 The first meeting between the two sides did not occur until late at night on May 28, 1920, by coincidence the second anniversary of the Armenian republic. During that initial session, Foreign Affairs Commis­ sar Chicherin reaffirmed the desire for friendly mutual relations. He added, however, that the Soviet government had also decided to assist the Turks in their liberation struggle against the European colonialist powers. The Turks were worried that Armenia might try to subvert their supreme endeavor by striking from the rear. Soviet Russia, Chicherin continued, wished to reconcile Armenian-Turkish differences, and this 9 Terterian, op. át., pp. 6—7; Armenia Archives, 200/2/84, pp. 1—2, Sarikian to Bekzadian, May 14 and 16, 1920, and 200/1/221, p. 61, reporting that Erzinkian and Pirumian had spoken directly with S. M. Kirov and by telegraph with Sergo Ordzhonikidze regarding the fate of Mountainous Karabagh. 10 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 48, Bekzadian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 12, 1920; Haradj, May 11:4, 1920. 11 Terterian, op. cit., pp. 7—8; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 118/17; US Archives, RG 59, 760.61/5, Wallace to Secretary of State, Sept. 24, 1920, enclosure. For two letters written in 1925 by Shant to Vratzian regarding the mission to Moscow, see Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, N, pp. 346—354. Ashot Hovhannisian journeyed with the Shant delegation to Moscow.

5°

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

objective would be facilitated by an Armenian pledge not to interfere in Mustafa Kemal’s campaign against the Entente Powers. Moreover, Ar­ menia should relinquish its illusory hopes based on a Western-imposed imperialistic settlement and accept the good offices of Soviet Russia in attaining a just solution to the Armenian question. Levon Shant replied that his delegation was not empowered to discuss Armenian-Turkish relations except to gain Russian recognition of the independence of a united Armenian state inclusive of the Western Ar­ menian provinces. Both Shant and Terterian argued that the Turks would seek out the line of least resistance, using Soviet weapons and money first to destroy Armenia and then to drive out the Greeks. There­ upon they would abandon Russia and reach an accord with the Allied Powers. No people understood the devious ways of the Turks better than the Armenians. Chicherin interjected that his government was not naive. As a matter of policy it was now supporting the national liberation strug­ gles of the peoples of the East but was at the same time confident that sooner or later Turkey of its own accord would adopt the Soviet system. There would be no attempt to force that system on Armenia, for coer­ cion would only discredit Soviet Russia in the eyes of small peoples. As a manifestation of its sincere friendship for the Armenian people, the R.S.F.S.R. was offering to mediate between Armenia and Mustafa Ke­ mal’s de facto regime at Angora. The Armenian delegates asked rhetorically how Soviet mediation could be possible when the Turkish National Pact not only rejected the cession of any territory in the Western Armenian provinces but even laid claim to the Eastern Armenian districts of Kars and Ardahan. The Allied Powers had already sanctioned a united Armenia that would include much of Western Armenia and an oudet on the Black Sea. Chicherin retorted that the Armenians had often been deceived by the European imperialists and apparendy were again beguiled. The Armenian ques­ tion had to be disentangled from malevolent European intervention and given a just solution through Soviet mediation. The lengthy interview accentuated the two governments’ differences in approach, as Chicherin seemed more interested in discussing Armenian-Turkish relations than addressing the primary issues on Shant’s agenda—unqualified Soviet recognition of Armenia’s independence, the boundary conflict with Azerbaijan, the future of Armenian institutions and refugees in Russia, and the development of economic relations. Despite having no specific authorization to include Armenian-Turkish relations on the conference agenda, the Armenian delegation found the subject impossible to avoid. Terterian and Zarafian, underscoring the historical bonds between the Russian and Armenian peoples, voiced ap­ preciation of the Soviet government’s good intentions. They expressed

ARMENIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Öl

surprise, however, that Chicherin seemed to favor the inclusion of Van and Bitlis in Armenia but excluded Erzerum. This was historic Garin, the heart of the Armenian plateau, with coundess cultural monuments attesting to its indisputably Armenian character. Certainly Chicherin, representing a worker-peasant government, should not use the bour­ geois-capitalistic justification that no Armenians remained in that re­ gion, for such arguments would reward the perpetrators of calculated, brutal, wholesale deportations and massacres. Chicherin replied that aside from historical and ethnographic considerations it was necessary to resolve the question for the good of the tillers of the soil and that the interests of the Armenian toilers would not be neglected in any media­ tion. Terterian observed that his party, the Dashnaktsutiun, had always favored ownership of the land by the tillers and that in a territorial sense that principle required that the Armenian peasants gain rightful posses­ sion of the six provinces of Western Armenia.12 Chicherin ended the preliminary discussion by asking the Armenian delegation to prepare a memorandum with statistical data to substantiate its claims. Following the meeting, Levon Shant scolded Terterian for having allowed the talks to digress from the government’s directives. Terterian tried to calm Shant by insisting that he could easily demon­ strate through statistics the justice of the Armenian cause. As members of a socialist party, the Armenian delegates could not very well argue against the principle of resolving the question in the interest of the tillers of the soil. He was certain that the Turks would reject that principle as the basis for Russian mediation, but it was better to let the responsibility fall on them rather than on the Armenians.13 Despite his uneasiness, Shant reported to Erevan on June 3 that the negotiations had begun successfully and that Chicherin had given firm assurances that there would be no attempt to force Soviet rule on Armenia. It was imperative to know what territories the Allied Powers had awarded Armenia in the treaty presented to the Turkish envoys in May and what practical meas­ ures were being taken for the occupation of those lands. Chicherin, reacting to Kemalist pressure, had questioned the justice and wisdom of including Erzerum in the new state. Shant added that the drafting of the treaty with Soviet Russia would be done together with Assistant For­ eign Affairs Commissar Lev Karakhan (himself an Armenian).14 12 Terterian, op. át, pp. 8—11. See also Haradj, June 2:4, 1920; S. T. Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere hai zhoghovrdi azatagrman gprdsum (1917—1921 tt.) (Erevan, 1966), pp. 105— 107. ” Terterian, op. át., pp. 11—12. 14 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 39; Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 477. On the political and diplomatic activities of Karakhan, see H. Ts. Liloyan, Sovetakan akanavor divanagete (Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan) (Erevan, 1978).

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The Armenian delegation, having submitted its memorandum about the Western Armenian provinces and Karabagh and Zangezur, again met with Chicherin and Karakhan during the second week of June. Shant announced that in principle Armenia was prepared to accept the good offices of the Soviet government, but he doubted that the Turkish Nationalists would agree to a solution based on the proportion of Ar­ menian and non-Armenian tillers who had lived on the lands of Turkish Armenia. Chicherin, who a few days earlier had answered Mustafa Ke­ mal’s first official proposal for mutual collaboration with a pledge of cooperation and an offer to mediate between Turkey and Armenia, was gratified by Shant’s declaration and promised to do everything possible to secure for Armenia a substantial part of Western Armenia and an outlet on the Black Sea. He also implied that Russia would not support Azerbaijan’s territorial pretensions simply because Soviet rule had been established in that country. He gave the Armenian delegation to under­ stand that the Sovnarkom was tending toward recognizing Zangezur and Nakhichevan as integral parts of the Armenian republic, whereas Moun­ tainous Karabagh would be regarded as disputed, with its ultimate fate decided by plebiscite. Armenian refugees, moreover, would be permit­ ted to transfer to Armenia with all movable possessions, and important Armenian libraries and cultural treasures, such as those housed in the Lazarían academy in Moscow, could be shipped to Erevan. To assist Ar­ menia in rebuilding its shattered economic and transportation systems, Russia was prepared to donate two complete textile factories, 2.5 million gold rubles for agricultural revival, ten locomotives, and an ongoing supply of fuel oil at cost. Chicherin announced that a draft incorporating these terms was being prepared and would be submitted for considera­ tion in a few days.15 Chicherin’s declaration created a mood of heightened Armenian optimism and self-congratulation. In a radio-telegram to Tigran Bekzadian in Tiflis, Levon Zarafian relayed the news that Chicherin and Ka­ rakhan had reiterated Soviet Russia’s pledge to recognize the Republic of Armenia and to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs. A treaty of friendship highly favorable to Armenia would soon be signed. The attitude of the Bolshevik officials in Moscow, Zarafian continued, contrasted with the vile behavior of the local cadre in Armenia and the rest of the Caucasus. Zarafian advised that the Erevan government should not slacken its decisive action against Bolshevism in Armenia; even the authorities in Moscow admitted that there were no objective conditions for the establishment of Soviet rule there, and it was clear 15Terterian, op. át., pp. 13—14; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 10, July 25, 1920.

ARMENIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

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that any protest the Sovnarkom might lodge regarding the treatment of Bolsheviks would be simply pro forma.16 Despite these positive indications, no treaty was produced or signed in Moscow. Subsequent sessions showed that the Soviet government had retreated from its initial terms. The protests of the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus on the one hand and the imminent arrival of a Turkish dele­ gation on the other had apparently caused the Soviet leaders to slow the negotiation process. In an informal, late-night discussion with Terterian, Assistant Foreign Affairs Commissar Karakhan even explored the possi­ bility of Armenia’s relinquishing claims to the Turkish Armenian prov­ inces in exchange for extensive territories in Transcaucasia. Terterian was allowed to see a sketch map of Armenia that included not only Mountainous Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan—territories in dis­ pute with Azerbaijan—but also, from the old Tiflis gubemiia, the counties of Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh and much of Borchalu, together with a corridor to the port of Batum. By the Soviet-Georgian treaty of May 7, 1920, all of the province of Tiflis was identified as a part of the Georgian republic, but Karakhan implied that this question was still open to ne­ gotiation.17 Karakhan’s map would have caused even greater intra-Caucasian conflict, yet it might have been sufficiently tempting to persuade the Armenian government to give up claims to most of Western Armenia and thereby facilitate a Soviet solution to the complex Armenian-Turkish question. The only evidence uncovered regarding Karakhan’s curious explora­ tion is in Hambardzum Terterian’s memoirs. According to that account, Terterian reacted tactfully: The Armenia as drawn by the Soviet Government is quite satisfactory for the moment, commensurate with the capabilities and the real power of the newlycreated Government of Armenia. For me, and those who think like me, it is quite acceptable, and I can assure you that my personal view is shared by the present Government of Armenia. However, that is not enough to consider your proposal as acceptable. We must take into account the psychological state of mind of the Armenian people. Our people have struggled for scores of years for an indepen­ 16 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, Zarafian to Bekzadian,June 10, 1920, and File 24/24, Bulletin no. 8, June 18, 1920; Armenia Archives 200/1/607, p. 3, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920; E. K. Sarkisian, Kh. Abeghian, and A. Sarkisian, “Missiia B. Legrana: Diplomaticheskaia missiia RSFSR v Armenii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 8th yr., no. 3 (1967), pp. 36—37 (introduction by E. K. Sarkisian, and documents compiled by Abeghian and A. Sarkisian; cited hereafter as “Missiia B. Legrana”). See also Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 409, and Kianki ughinerov, V, p. 131; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no119, June 5, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 78—80, and Nagamyi Karabakh, pp. 479—481, direct wire exchange between Bekzadian and Armenian delegation, June 6, 1920. 17 Terterian, op. át., pp. 15—18.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

dent Armenia and this dream has always centered on the Turkish Armenian provinces.

Terterian added that thousands of Western Armenian refugees were waiting impatiently to return to Van, Mush, Sassun, and other parts of the homeland. Moreover, the Armenian dispersion, represented by Boghos Nubar’s Armenian National Delegation, would never relinquish what the Allies had included in the Turkish peace settlement. Under these circumstances, no Armenian government could renounce the na­ tional claims to the Western Armenian provinces. Terterian concluded: “Personally, I don’t believe the Allied Powers will take Turkish Armenia by armed force and will deliver it to the Armenians on a silver platter. I don’t even believe that present Armenia is in a position to occupy these provinces, and keep them of its own power resources. All the same, we cannot give up our centuries-old rights.”18 By mid-June, pressure against a treaty was building up from Azerbai­ jani and Armenian Bolshevik quarters in the Caucasus. They protested that at least 2,000 comrades, including Anastas Mikoyan, had been killed in the siftermath of the May rebellion in Armenia and that thousands of others were being tormented in prison. The reports were grossly exag­ gerated—Mikoyan was not even in Armenia—but the vitriolics of Avis Nuridjanian and others who had fled from Armenia were not without effect. At the same time, Azerbaijani Foreign Affairs Commissar Mirza Davud Huseinov led a delegation to Moscow to block a Soviet-Armenian treaty that might include any provisions short of acknowledgment of Azerbaijan’s absolute right to Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan. Huseinov and his colleagues cautioned that any other solution would undermine the new government in Baku and utterly discredit the Soviet system in the eyes of the Azerbaijani masses.19 Meanwhile, the complaints about Dashnakist repression continued to flow into Moscow. In a typical declaration, representatives of the Azerbaijani Communist Party (Anas­ tas Mikoyan and Viktor Naneishvili), the Russian Communist Party (Haikaz Kostanian), and the Armenian Communist party organizations (Avis Nuridjanian) denounced “the bandit Sebouh” for the murder of “thousands of workers and peasants.” The proletariat of Azerbaijan was appalled by the Dashnakists, who had the audacity to send a delegation

18 Ibid., p. 18. 19 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 68—70, and 200/1/604, P- 4» Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 409. See also B. G[H]. Lalabekian, V. I. Lenine ev Sovetakan kargeri hastatumn u amrapndumn Andrkovkasum (Erevan, 1961), p. 171.

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to negotiate in Moscow “while at the same time slaughtering Commu­ nists without mercy.’’20 At the end of June, Chicherin summoned Shant to warn that contin­ ued anti-Bolshevik persecutions in Armenia would end the negotiations for a treaty of friendship. Shant replied that he had no specific infor­ mation on what had occurred in Armenia, but undoubtedly the reports were malicious exaggerations, as there had never been more than a handful of Bolsheviks in Armenia. Sinister forces were afoot to poison Armenian-Soviet relations. During the same session, Chicherin retreated from his previous proposals, now suggesting that Nakhichevan should go to Armenia and Karabagh to Azerbaijan, with Zangezur remaining disputed until a plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia had studied the situa­ tion there and recommended a settlement based on the will of the in­ habitants.21 The new formula created dissension within the Armenian delegation. Terterian and Zarafian were prepared to accept the proposal, which was predicated on the recognition by Soviet Russia of Armenia’s indepen­ dence and sovereignty. Shant demurred, asserting that the delegation had been instructed to secure the inclusion of Mountainous Karabagh and had no mandate to compromise on that issue. Admitting that Shant was technically correct, Terterian and Zarafian argued that it would be deleterious to prolong the negotiations and give more time for the avowed opponents of a Soviet-Armenian accord to scuttle the treaty. Communications with Erevan were slow and irregular, and there was no time to seek new instructions. Conditions had changed drastically since the delegation had departed from Erevan in April. Chicherin’s modified scheme would award Armenia the rich, strategic corridor over Nakhiche­ van to Persia and lay the ground for the incorporation of Zangezur. As for Karabagh, Armenia would have to rely on the strong will and deter­ mination of the mountaineers to resist Azerbaijan and eventually find a way to unite with the Armenian republic. Every delegation, they con­ tended, possessed certain discretionary powers to reach an agreement, and it was in Armenia’s best interest to accept Chicherin’s terms. Shant, however, was intractable and insisted on sending a coded message to Erevan to report and request new directives.22

20 H.K.(B)K. K.K. kits Kuspat. Institut, Aradjin massayakan-heghapokhakan sharzhumnere Hayastanum (Mayisian apstambutiune): Niuter ev pastatghter, ed. K. Chazarían and M. Nersisian (Erevan, 1932). pp. 429—430; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 74; Vratzian, Hayastane muiji ev sali midjev, pp. 57—58; Bor’ba, May 26:3—4, 1920. 21 Terterian, op. át., p. 14; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletins nos. 9 and 10, July 8 and 25, 1920. 22 Terterian, op. át., pp. 14-15.

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Interruption of the Negotiations The disagreements within the Armenian delegation were minor com­ pared with the differences inside the Soviet camp. Not only did the Azer­ baijani Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), headed by Dr. Nariman Na­ rimanov and M. D. Huseinov, maintain that the annexation of the Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan passageway was imperative to bolster the Baku government and forestall renewed anti-Soviet uprisings, but such prominent Bolsheviks as Sergo Ordzhonikidze tried to manipulate events to bring about a more aggressive stance toward Armenia and Georgia. Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin often expressed alarm over this militancy, which threatened to undermine fundamental Soviet policies in the East. He urged Lenin and the Russian Communist Party Central Committee to compel the comrades in the Caucasus to abide by the decisions of the central organs. After negotiations had begun with the Shant delegation, Chicherin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze on June 2 to complain that, although inter­ national and domestic considerations necessitated a compromise with the Dashnakist government, the Azerbaijani comrades were hindering the process by expanding their pretensions even beyond Karabagh and Zangezur to include Sharur and Daralagiaz, Armenian districts that had never seriously been viewed as disputed. As it was, little was left of Ar­ menia. Shant’s delegation, after lengthy discussions and hard bargain­ ing, had finally assented to recognizing Karabagh and Zangezur as dis­ puted territories, but under no circumstance would the Armenians acknowledge Sharur-Daralagiaz as such. It was essential that the position of the Azerbaijani Revkom be reconciled with the central government’s strategy of establishing treaty relations with Armenia. “With your im­ mense influence on Baku, we are requesting that you succeed in per­ suading the Azerbaijani government to recognize the disputability of Karabagh and Zangezur but not of the Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd.”™ Ordzhonikidze resisted. On June 19 he telegraphed from Vladikavkaz that the people of Karabagh and Zangezur already considered them­ selves part of Soviet Azerbaijan and that Muslim insurgents had driven the Armenian administration out of Nakhichevan months earlier. Soviet Azerbaijan could not survive without Karabagh and Zangezur, and this question should be resolved with the Azerbaijani authorities before any treaty was concluded with Armenia. That same day, Chicherin again reminded Ordzhonikidze that the decision to reach a compromise set­ tlement with Armenia had to be faithfully implemented. Yet he also revealed a shift in tactics by declaring that neither Armenia nor Azer2’ Nagornyi Karabakh, pp. 476—477.

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baijan could be entrusted with control over Karabagh, Zangezur, Na­ khichevan, and Julfa. Rather, the Russian Red Army should assume the responsibility for protecting the population and preserving the peace in these racially mixed districts. What Chicherin implied but did not state explicitly was that preparations were being made for the Red Army to occupy the strategic land corridor leading to Turkey. Even then, Ord­ zhonikidze did not ease up: On June 21 he wrote that Mirza Davud Huseinov had informed him that Chicherin himself had just telegraphed Nariman Narimanov to condone Azerbaijan’s incorporation of Kara­ bagh and Zangezur.24 Clearly annoyed, Grigorii Chicherin took the matter to the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee during the latter part of June. He deplored the deviations of the Azer­ baijani organization, whose unsanctioned actions violated current poli­ cies. A compromise with the bourgeois governments of Georgia and Armenia was essential in order to take these areas from under the feet of the Entente Powers through diplomatic means, and the forcible so­ vietization of the two states had been deemed untimely, yet the Baku comrades were doing their utmost to block a treaty and modus vivendi. They were trying to foment rebellion and seemed to think that all ter­ ritories occupied by the Red Army in the region should automatically be awarded to Azerbaijan. Such behavior contradicted the decisions of the central organs and rendered impossible a satisfactory agreement with Armenia. Chicherin recommended the dispatch to Baku of an au­ thoritative figure unassociated with the Caucasian group to serve as the liaison of the Sovnarkom and the Russian Communist Party. On June 22 the Politburo instructed Chicherin to issue specific directives “to our most active workers in the East’’ about obeying the central committee’s decisions and to the army command requiring the compliance of “all military workers.’’25 In a further lengthy memorandum addressed to Lenin on June 29, Chicherin noted that components of the Turkish army had reportedly advanced into Nakhichevan. The intent of the Kemalists was not clear, but there was no doubt that the Turks had been affected by the antiSoviet manifestations in Azerbaijan. The Soviet mission that had been appointed to travel to Kemal’s headquarters should depart immediately to determine what lay behind the Turkish moves. Chicherin also advised that great care should be taken in dealing with prominent Caucasian 24 Ibid,., pp. 505—508; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Azerbaidzhana—Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, K istorii obrazovaniia Nagomo-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, 1918—1925: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. D. P. Gulieva (Baku, 1989), pp. 49—50 (cited hereafter by primary tide). 25 Nagpmyi Karabakh, pp. 508—509.

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

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comrades such as Ordzhonikidze, Narimanov, and Budu Mdivani, who were disgruntled with the central committee and clamored for the im­ position of Soviet rule in Georgia and Armenia. Even when ordered to desist, they continued in their provocative ways. Chicherin complained: “We were obliged to spend much energy for almost daily interventions to keep our comrades from engaging in hostile acts.” Azerbaijan was demanding Karabagh, Zangezur, and Sharur-Daralagiaz, together with Nakhichevan, Julfa, and Ordubad, territories largely under the control of the Erevan government and considered a part of Armenia. Narimanov and his collaborators wanted the Red Army to occupy these districts and hand them over to Azerbaijan in order to compensate the Muslims and placate the nationalist elements after the suppression of the recent antiSoviet movements in the country. Such calculations, Chicherin insisted, were “absolutely impermissible.” Russia’s role should be objective and impartial: “It would be a fatal mistake for the whole of our policy in the East if we begin to lean toward one national element against another national element.” To take parts of Armenia and grant them to Azerbai­ jan would give a “false color” to Soviet policies and strike a deadly blow to Communist endeavors in Armenia. Instead of awarding the contested districts to either Azerbaijan or Armenia, Chicherin recommended that the Red Army occupy them temporarily to maintain peace between the Armenian and Muslim inhabitants until conditions became more favor­ able for a negotiated settlement that would afford “adequate results” to all parties. A treaty with Armenia should be concluded as swiftly as pos­ sible, and all schemes to have the Russian army march into the heart of Armenia to effect its sovietization should be abandoned. Having this and other documents before it on June 30, the Politburo issued directives prohibiting the Red Army from advancing into Armenia and in that con­ nection cautioning the Caucasian comrades to act with extreme tact, es­ pecially in view of the proximity of the Turkish armed forces.26 The Politburo and the Sovnarkom nonetheless agreed that it was nec­ essary to interrupt the negotiations with the Armenian delegation.The pressure of the Azerbaijani Revkom and the Bolshevik organizations in the Caucasus, as well as the fact that Foreign Affairs Commissar Bekir Sami Bey of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was en route for con­ sultations in Moscow, clearly contributed to this development. Turkish notables already in the Soviet capital were urging the Sovnarkom to take decisive action to open the land corridor over Karabagh-ZangezurNakhichevan. Transfer of the Soviet-Armenian negotiations to Erevan would give the Sovnarkom time to confer with the Turkish delegation and refine its strategy. On June 29, therefore, Chicherin telegraphed Ibid., pp. 515-518.

ARMENIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

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the Armenian government that a Soviet plenipotentiary, Boris V. Legran, was being sent to Erevan “to establish friendly neighborly relations’’ by settling all disputed questions and signing a treaty between the two re­ publics. Chicherin requested that the necessary arrangements be made to facilitate the arrival, work, and communications of the Soviet mission and to guarantee its diplomatic immunity. “We are confident in the favorable results of our mission for the mutual relations and interests of our two republics. We consider it entirely appropriate that the negotia­ tion of a final treaty between Russia and Armenia should take place in Erevan between our mission and the government of the Armenian re­ public.”27 Chicherin and Karakhan also apprised Levon Shant of the change of venue and explained that Legran would be empowered to settle the question of Zangezur after studying the situation firsthand. They reiterated the position that Nakhichevan should go to Armenia and Karabagh to Azerbaijan.28 In a radio-telegram to his government on July i, Levon Shant said it had been obvious from the first meeting with Chicherin and Karakhan that the only real problem was the boundary dispute with Azerbaijan. Chicherin accepted the justice of Armenian demands and was not in­ clined to satisfy the Azerbaijanis and Armenian Bolsheviks, who were doing everything possible to obstruct an Armenian-Soviet accord. Un­ fortunately, the stream of lies emanating from Baku had affected the course of the negotiations. Soviet Azerbaijan, Shant continued, was try­ ing to exploit the presence of the Russian Red Army to implement the former Musavat regime’s plan of seizing Karabagh and Zangezur, thereby gaining the appreciation and confidence of the Turkic masses. The Baku Bolsheviks argued that the underlying cause for the success of anti-Soviet Musavatist propaganda was the fear that concessions would be made to the Armenians. They insisted that Armenia was ripe for sovietization and that the Dashnakist regime should be crushed forth­ with. Moscow was not disposed to move in that direction because of international considerations and reports from Red Army commanders showing that the Armenian government was in firm control and pre­ pared to resist. Nevertheless, the Sovnarkom could not sign a treaty with­ out taking into account the will of the Baku organization, especially as a part of the Red Army in the Caucasus was being withdrawn for service elsewhere. After some initial vacillation, therefore, the Soviet negotiators had taken a position favorable to Azerbaijan by proposing that not only

27 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 117, and 200/1/607, p. 4; “Missiia B. Legrana,” PP- 37-38; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920, according to which Chicherin’s telegram was received on July 1. 28 Terterian, op. át., p. 20.

6o

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Karabagh and Zangezur but also Nakhichevan and Sharur-Daralagiaz be regarded as disputed and placed under Red Army occupation pending a pacific resolution of the conflict. The Armenian delegation had ac­ cepted the scheme only insofar as it applied to Karabagh but not with respect to the other districts. The Soviet side was relaying this informa­ tion to Baku, but the response from there was fully predictable. Shant then outlined three options open to the Armenian government: i. To recognize Karabagh and Zangezur as disputable, on condition that the same status be assigned to Elisavetpol, Kazakh, and Akstafa (con­ trolled by Azerbaijan) and that the armed forces remain in their existing positions. The Sovnarkom might accept this compromise. 2. To word the treaty in such a way that the territory of the Republic of Armenia was defined in a general sense—that is, as comprising parts of the provinces of Erevan, Kars, Elisavetpol, Tiflis, and Batum. With Soviet mediation, mixed Armenian-Georgian and Armenian-Azerbaijani commissions would then attempt to reach agreement on the boundaries. Such a broad, declarative formula would be readily approved by the Soviet side. 3. To allow the disputability and Red Army occupation only of Kara­ bagh. This condition would be unacceptable to the Sovnarkom and would lead to a final rupture of negotiations in Moscow and their sub­ sequent resumption in Erevan. In Shant’s opinion, the first option would be the least harmful to Armenia’s interests, particularly if the government truly wanted to enter into a treaty with Russia. In that case, detailed instructions should be sent by direct wire and by radio. Soviet Russia, Shant concluded on a mildly positive note, had in principle endorsed the reunification of Ar­ menia but did not yet wish to recognize the specific territories or bound­ aries of that state. It now desired to assume the role of mediator between Armenia and the Kemalists in order to take the lead and full credit for reaching a solution to the tortuous question of Turkish Armenia.29 Armenian Foreign Minister Ohandjanian, even before receiving Shant’s report, replied to Chicherin on July 2 that the Armenian gov­ ernment could only welcome the establishment and exchange of dip­ lomatic representations. In the interest of being able to give a more competent answer to the issues raised in Chicherin’s communication of June 29, however, the Armenian government would have to consult with its delegation and was asking that facilities be provided for Shant to link Nagornyi Karabakh, pp. 519—520. Shant added that Aramayis Erzinkian and Simeon (Simonik) Pirumian were cooperating with the delegation and shared its views. See also Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 41 o; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8). 1, Moser to Secretary of State, July 15, 1920, enclosure.

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up by direct wire over Rostov and Tiflis. The Soviet government’s deci­ sion to have Legran conduct negotiations in Erevan raised uncertainty about the status of the Armenian delegation.30 Although Chicherin’s message implied the talks in Moscow were at an end, Shant reported on July 8 that Karakhan had advised him that Le­ gran’s departure was no reason for the discussions in Moscow to be discontinued: “If we do not come to an agreement here, Legran has the authority to conduct negotiations with you directly.’’ Shant cautioned that Legran was taking a great amount of Bolshevik propaganda material to Erevan and recommended that his mission be received only unoffi­ cially pending the outcome of the negotiations in Moscow. Karakhan, Shant continued, had also given notice that a Soviet mission would soon be sent to Turkey to investigate conditions in Anatolia. Karakhan re­ quested that the group be allowed to travel over Armenia via Sarikamish to Turkey, but Shant urged that, because Armenian-Russian relations had not been regulated by treaty arrangement, “these people’’ should be denied transit over Armenian territory.31 Ohandjanian replied on July 19 that the Bureau-Government was in full agreement. Karakhan should be told that Legran would be accepted only as an unofficial envoy rather than an official plenipotentiary. Even then, he could not be received in Erevan as long as negotiations contin­ ued in Moscow or, in case they were terminated, until the Shant dele­ gation had returned and given a full report to the government. Ohan­ djanian added that precautionary measures were being taken to prevent Legran from bringing Bolshevik propaganda into the country.32 As the Soviet mission prepared to set out from Moscow, Boris Legran and one of his Armenian advisers, Sahak Ter-Gabrielian, met with the Shant delegation to reiterate Soviet Russia’s cordial sentiments toward the Armenian people and republic. Legran was not unfamiliar with the Caucasus. He had attended school in Tiflis before earning a degree in law at St. Petersburg. A member of the Russian Social Democrat Party since 1903 and a Bolshevik since 1906, Legran had served on various revolutionary tribunals after the Bolshevik coup in 1917 and was ap­ pointed to the foreign affairs commissariat in the spring of 1920.33 Le30 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 85, 123— 124, and 200/1/607, p. 4, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920; “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 38. 31 “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 38—39. 32 Ibid., pp. 40-41. See also FO 371/4957, E7943/134/58, Luke to Foreign Office, July 6, 1920. 33 For biographical information on Boris Vasil’evich Legran, see A. N. Mnatsakanian, Revoliutsian Andrkovkasum ev Rusastani patviraknere, 1917—1921 (Erevan, 1961), pp. 208— 213, and the same in Russian, Poslantsy Sovetskoi Rossii v Armenii (Erevan, 1959), pp. 107110 (citations below are to the Armenian edition). His staff included first deputy Otto Andreevich Silin, secretaries Konstantin Nikolaevich Istomin and Lev Vladimirovich Shif-

Ô2

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

gran told Shant, Terterian, and Zarafian that Armenia would have Na­ khichevan and that although Zangezur temporarily would have to be regarded as contested, “I can assure you that it will be recognized as an indisputable part of Armenia.”34 Legran’s departure for Baku en route to Erevan should have made it clear that the negotiations in Moscow were suspended, yet Levon Shant did not return to Armenia. Obviously, both he and the Armenian gov­ ernment were deeply suspicious of the Sovnarkom’s strategy and pre­ ferred that a treaty be concluded in Moscow. Ohandjanian seemed to be in no hurry to recall Shant, perhaps because he wished to bide his time to determine whether the Allied Powers would actually enforce the terms of the peace treaty they were preparing to impose on the Ottoman Empire. Such calculations seemed to be borne out in Ohandjanian’s new instructions to Shant to allow Mountainous Karabagh to be re­ garded as contested only on condition that the disputed zone be ex­ tended to include the Karabagh steppes and Kazakh and that the Red Army withdraw from the entire zone, which pending a final solution would be governed by local popular administrations.35

The Red Army in Zangezur

Through the duration of the Armenian-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, armed encounters were taking place all along the ill-defined frontier between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Chicherin and Karakhan pro­ fessed the Sovnarkom’s readiness to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Armenian republic, the Red Army concentrated on the borders of Georgia and Armenia. Immediately after the sovietization of Azerbaijan, it appeared as if the Eleventh Red Army would continue to advance into Tiflis and possibly even into Erevan. Red Army detach­ ments assisted Bolshevik insurgents in the Shamshadin-Ijevan sector of northeastern Armenia but were ultimately recalled to Azerbaijan when Sergo Ordzhonikidze, chairman of the Eleventh Army’s Military Revo­ lutionary Council (Voinrevsovet) and of the Russian Communist Party’s Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo), received directives from Moscow to desist fers, military representative General Ardalion Aleksandrovich Bobrishev, chief of infor­ mation Ashot Gareginovich Hovhannisian (loannisian), and, among his advisers, Sahak Mirzoevich Ter-Gabrielian. 34 Terterian, op. át., pp. 20—21. See also France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 3, no. 328, July 14, 1920. 35 Terterian, op. át., p. 21. See also Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 54, Bulletin no. 10, July 25, 1920; Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty vneshná politiki SSSR, II (Moscow, 1958), p. 725.

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from action against Georgia and Armenia.36 The Soviet-Georgian friend­ ship treaty of May 7, 1920, was followed in mid-June by a preliminary treaty between Soviet Azerbaijan and the Republic of Georgia. During the intervening weeks, Ordzhonikidze and the Azerbaijani Revkom argued for the occupation of at least the Karabagh-Nakhichevan corridor. As it happened, on May 11 the commanding general of the Caucasus front (Ivan T. Smilga), on the pretext of halting mutual Ar­ menian-Muslim massacres, ordered the Eleventh Red Army to advance into these districts with sufficient force to preserve law and order until mixed commissions were created and had fixed the boundaries between Azerbaijan and Armenia.37 Shortly thereafter, Ordzhonikidze informed Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin that he had just returned to Baku from Karabagh, where both Muslims and Armenians were greeting the first units of the Red Army. He was confident that the expanse between Shushi and Nakhichevan-Julfa could be occupied without any serious Ar­ menian resistance.38 These calculations were upset, however, by the So­ viet reverses on the Polish front and the outbreak of anti-Soviet revolts in Elisavetpol (Ganja) and Karabagh less than a month after the pro­ clamation of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan. Baku itself appeared to be en­ dangered. General Mikhail K. Levandovskii, commander of the Eleventh Army, was sharply critical of Ordzhonikidze’s haste to establish military control over the whole of Azerbaijan, even at the risk of spreading the armed forces so thin as to make them highly vulnerable. On May 26, Levandovskii reported to his superiors that the Muslim insurgency pre­ cluded a foremarch to Ordubad, Julfa, and Nakhichevan. It was first necessary to quell the unrest incited by the khans and beks and sup­ ported not only by the backward, illiterate masses but also by a part of the Azerbaijani officer corps, which had not changed its class composi­ tion or political outlook simply by coming under the Soviet banner. The high command concurred in this evaluation and rescinded the order to advance into and over Zangezur.39 By that time, Armenia’s plenipotentiary in Azerbaijan, Martiros Harutiunian, had been released from prison and allowed to reopen the Armenian legation in Baku. Harutiunian worked tirelessly under ex­ tremely trying conditions to protect citizens of the Armenian republic in Azerbaijan and to exempt from military conscription Armenian phy­ sicians and officers who were not subjects of Azerbaijan. He met with Ordzhonikidze, Azerbaijani Revkom chairman Narimanov, and Foreign 56 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917— 1923 (Cambridge, MA, 1964), p. 227; Lalabekian, op. at., pp. 209-210. 57 Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 462. “ Ibid., pp. 464-465. * Ibid., pp. 473-474-

64

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Affairs Commissar Huseinov in efforts to gain the release of hundreds of imprisoned Armenians, among them General Baghdasarian and for­ mer assistant internal affairs minister,Sargis Manasian, who both had been kidnapped near Ijevan and taken to Baku.40 Armenia’s represen­ tative in Tiflis, Tigran Bekzadian, raised the same issue with Soviet envoy Sergei M. Kirov (Kostrikov), who like Ordzhonikidze implied that an exchange of Dashnakists and other Armenians detained in Azerbaijan for Bolsheviks jailed in Armenia following the May uprising might be effected.41 Moreover, despite their mutual insults and taunts, the gov­ ernments of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia each pro­ posed a conference to resolve the many differences between them. These hopeful indications notwithstanding, the matter dragged on for many weeks. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conference never materialized, and ultimately Manasian and many other Dashnakists were executed.42 After the Soviet-supported Armenian insurgents in Shamshadin had taken refuge in Azerbaijan at the end of June, skirmishes between con­ tingents of the Armenian and Red armies continued with little respite. The Armenian army’s reoccupation of Uzuntala, Chakhmakhlu, and other border villages raised concerns in Azerbaijan that the Armenians might attempt to press up the vales into the county capital of Kazakh. In a joint telegraph to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin at the beginning of July, the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee and Revkom, the Kavburo, the Eleventh Army’s Military Revolutionary Council, and the bureau of Armenian Communist organizations drew attention to the hardships of the Armenian rebels who had fled from Dashnakist repres­ sion. The valiant comrades had fought heroically for six weeks before having to retreat, their homes and villages pillaged by the Dashnak bands, and their fields left untended. In any agreement with the Dash­ nak regime, the Soviet government should require that the fourteen villages in the Shamshadin sector be made into a neutral zone or else patrolled by Russian troops and that the native inhabitants be guaran­ teed an unrestricted and unmolested return to their homes.43 40 See Harutiunian’s reports in Armenia Archives, 200/1/4 (the entire file), 200/2/85, p. 16, 200/2/90, pp. 1—33, and 200/2/112, pp. 8—13. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920. 41 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin nos. 9 and 10, July 8 and 25, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 7—8, and 200/2/1, p. 2. 42 See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 10/10, 11/11, 17/17; Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/3®5> especially pp. 56-70, and 200/2/112, pp. 3—7; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consu­ late, 046(68). 1, Press reports, John Randolph to Secretary of State, July 14, 1920, enclo­ sures; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, Report of July 25, 1920; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov,N, pp. 131—134, 137—141. 43 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii v period ustanovleniia i uprocheniia Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii, mai 1920—noiabr’ 1921 gg.: Sbomikdokumentov, ” ed. A. O[H]. [H]Arutiunian et al., Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 19th yr., no. 1 (1978), pp. 35—36 (cited hereafter as “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii”).

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Although the Russian Communist Party’s Politburo had ruled against the immediate forcible overthrow of the Menshevik and Dashnakist gov­ ernments, it ultimately held the Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan cor­ ridor to be contested and once more authorized the Red Army to occupy the area, ostensibly to prevent further interracial bloodshed. In a new directive issued on June 22, the commander in chief of the Red Army, Sergei S. Kamenev, informed General Levandovskii that in view of the complex political situation in Transcaucasia the Eleventh Red Army should take possession of the disputed territories of Karabagh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan, Julfa, and Ordubad, impose martial law, and assist in the formation and functioning of local soviets.44 The commander of the 32d Rifle Division, General Steiger, reported to Eleventh Army headquarters on June 27 that his political officers had established good relations with Sultan Bek Sultanov’s Kurdish forces, which included 400 mobilized horsemen and 1,500 men in reserve. Steiger added that the information at hand showed that the population of Zangezur was well disposed toward the Red Army, especially as eco­ nomic isolation from Baku and Shushi for the past three years had re­ duced the district to great poverty. He was confident that his division could easily advance into Zangezur at least as far as the Katar mines (Ghapan) in the south and Bazarchai in the west, forcing Armenian commander Drastamat Kanayan (Dro) to abandon his artillery in his retreat. The next day the operational division of the Eleventh Army in­ formed the Caucasus front command that Sultan Bek had up to 2,000 mounted men with machine guns facing Zangezur, stretching from Avdallar in the southeast to Adjiler in the southwest. The Kurds were well-disciplined sharpshooters, and the Soviet political mission had been successful in allaying their initial apprehensions about the Red Army’s intent and objectives.45 Advancing across the Zabugh (Zabukh) vale and Hakaru River to the village of Tegh on June 29, a scouting party headed by the 32d Rifle Division’s military commissar informed representatives of the Zangezur regional administration that the Red Army intended to police the district in an orderly and peaceful fashion. The commissar guaranteed that no harm would come to the Armenians if they did not resist. The Armenian spokesmen protested the impending transgression and gave notice that the proud people of Zangezur would defend their land now as in the past.46 44 Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 124—125; Mnatsakanian, op. át., p. 147. 45 Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 510—513. 46 Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 152—157; Avo [Tumayan], Nzhdeh (Beirut, 1968), pp. 103— 104; S. G. Soghomonian, Kaghakatsiakan krivnere Zangezurum 1920—1921 tvakannerin (Ere­ van, 1958), p. 47. Vardan Gevorgian, Lemahayastani herosamarte (1919—1921) (Erevan,

66

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Concentration of the 326 Rifle Division along the frontiers of Zan­ gezur created a sense of high anxiety and anticipation. To determine a course of action, the Zangezur administration summoned an extraor­ dinary consultative assembly in Goris comprising the Zangezur National Council, delegates from the four subdistricts of Goris, Sisian, Ghapan, and Meghri, commissars Zakar Yolian and Sergei Melik-Yolchian, Parlia­ ment members Arshak Shirinian and Vahan Khoreni, and military com­ manders Sako (Yapon), Nikolai Hovsepian, Garegin Nzhdeh, and Dro. Most of those present wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the Red Army, and several, including Sako, tried to put the best face possible on the coming invasion by arguing that the Red Army was the vanguard of the Russian revolutionaries, with whose help the Armenian republic would be able to incorporate at least all territories up to the prewar Russo-Turkish frontier. The gathering rejected suggestions that the local Bolshevik committee should be arrested, as it was thought that these men might soon serve as useful intermediaries. Dro, according to Nzhdeh’s subsequent account, was silent and sullen. He had only a few weeks earlier turned over Mountainous Karabagh to the Armenian Bolsheviks and withdrawn to Zangezur. Dro seemed to lose his resolve in face of the Russian army and displayed none of the verve and vigor for which he was renowned. Nzhdeh nonetheless insisted that the “Armenian Garibaldi” voice his views about the future of Zan­ gezur. Dro evasively replied that he would accept the will of the people. It was now Nzhdeh who jumped to his feet and in his unique rhetorical fashion invoked the past warriors and heroes of Siunik (Zangezur) in his call for a fight to the finish. Permitting the Red Army to occupy the district would be tantamount to handing Siunik to Azerbaijan. Bolshevik pledges were as false as their boasts about their military strength. The Azerbaijani Bolsheviks were nothing more than the old Musavatists who had put on a red cloak to seize the jewel of Armenia. Siunik had resisted in far more dire circumstances, and now only the irresoluteness of its leaders was causing an air of vacillation. The Ghapan district, Nzhdeh declared, would take arms and resist no matter what the rest of Zangezur might do. “Yesterday, our enemy was the Turk and we were united. Today, our enemies are our ‘brothers,’ the Armenian traitors against whom we shall be even more decisive.” Hesitation, Nzhdeh cautioned, 1991), p. 62 (first published in Bucharest, 1923). The head of the scouting party was Karl K. Ratnek, accompanied by district chief of the Cheka (“Extraordinary Committee”) Ar­ menak Karageozian. See Ratnek’s report in “Antidashnakskie nastroeniia trudiashchikhsia Armenii nakanune ustanovleniia Sovetskoi vlasti,” comp. A. O[H]. [HJArutiunian, O. S. Balikian, and O. A. Altysheva, Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 24th yr., no. 2 (1983), pp. 7677 (stating that the mission began on June 28).

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would lower the oppressive hand of the enemy upon the Armenian peo­ ple. Siunik might then come to its senses, but it would be too late.47 Despite Nzhdeh’s fiery words and the ultimate decision of the assem­ bly to defend Zangezur, the Armenian leaders were gripped by anxiety. They did not have long to wait, for at dawn on July 5 the 32d Rifle Division, supported by armored vehicles and field artillery, forded the Hakaru River and engaged the small Armenian detachments at Tegh and Korindzor (Kornidzor). Within a matter of hours the Red Army had dislodged the defenders and moved down into Goris. Dro’s expedition­ ary force retreated over Bazarchai to Borisovka and then all the way to Daralagiaz, leaving the Goris-Sisian-Angelaut-Nakhichevan road to the Red Army. After covering Dro’s retreat, Nzhdeh led his partisans south­ ward to his home base near the copper mines of Ghapan.48 In a leaflet addressed to the people of Zangezur, the 3 2d Division’s political commissar declared that the Red Army had come to help lib­ erate the Armenian workers and peasants from Dashnak oppression and to establish tranquility in place of the bloodshed that had drained both the impoverished Armenians and Tatars. There was no intent to conquer the region; Russia had its own vast steppes and plains and had no need of the mountains and valleys of another people. Condemning those who had incited interracial hostility, the commissar demanded that the bour­ geois-nationalist elements lay down their arms and warned that the Red Army would deal harshly with all provocateurs.49 Following the Red Army’s occupation of Goris, the underground Bol­ shevik regional committee, headed by Hakob Kamari (Bedjanian), was reorganized into the Zangezur Military Revolutionary Committee. The Revkom proclaimed the establishment of Soviet order in Zangezur and created departments for foreign affairs, military affairs, economic affairs, communications, education, provisions, requisitions, social welfare and health, and post, telegraph and roads. Armenak Karageozian of Khndzoresk, the stronghold of Bolshevism in Zangezur, headed the Cheka (ex­ traordinary committee) and ordered the arrest of prominent Dashnakists and their deportation to Azerbaijan. Members of Parliament 47 Avo, op. át., pp. 488—492. 48 Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 159—163; Ds. P. Aghayan, Hoktemberian revoliutsian ev hai zhoghovrdi azatagrume (Erevan, 1957), pp. 260—261; A. V. Vardapetian, Hayastani Karmir Banake kaghakatsiakan krivnerum 1920—1921 tvakannerin (Erevan, i960), pp. 16—17; Avo, op. át., pp. 104-106, 301; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 62-63; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavarutiune, 1920 t., Armenian diplomatic representative to British, French, Italian, Greek missions, July 10, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 1, Corbel to Ministry of War, July 10, 1920; FO 371/4958, E9341/E9345/134/58 enclosures. 49 Soghomonian, op. át., pp. 46—47.

2.

THE BATTLE FOR ZANGEZUR

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Shirinian and Khoreni went into hiding in Shinuhair (Shnher), Shirinian’s native village.50 As the 32d Rifle Division marched southward through the mountains and vales of Zangezur toward Ghapan, Bolshevik leaflets proclaimed So­ viet goodwill and pledged exemplary behavior and nonreprisal if the villagers did not resist. After the Red Army occupied Verin Khotanan on July 10, two officers and Bagrat Harutiunian, a Bolshevik teacher who had formerly served with the local partisans, approached Nzhdeh under a white flag to ask that hostilities cease and the road be opened over Ghapan and Meghri to Ordubad and Julfa. Nzhdeh retorted sarcastically that the Red Army was apparently lost, as the primary route to Nakhich­ evan and Julfa lay over Sisian to the north. When the Soviet deputation issued an ultimatum to clear the way, Nzhdeh replied that he would give an answer after conferring with the people of Ghapan. Following a con­ sultative meeting of representatives of all the district’s villages in Aradjadzor on July 12, Nzhdeh responded with his own demand that the Red Army withdraw from the bounds of Ghapan by the next morning or be prepared to be expelled by force of arms. Surprisingly, the Red Army expedition actually evacuated Khotanan before dawn and made its way back to Goris.51 Though the Soviet strategists wanted to avoid large-scale encounters, especially in the unfamiliar mountains of Zan­ gezur, the actual cause for the precipitous withdrawal may have been the receipt of orders for most of the exhausted, undermanned 3 2d Rifle Division to return to Baku. Jurisdiction over Karabagh and Zangezur and the frontier of the “Ararat republic” was being transferred to Gen­ eral Nikifor A. Nesterovskii’s 28th Rifle Division, with headquarters at Shushi. Under orders to avoid military action against the regular Ar­ menian army if possible, the 28th Division, supported by one cavalry brigade of the 32d Division and by the 55th Armored Column, was also instructed to prevent any and all Armenian incursions into the territories of Azerbaijan and Karabagh.52 The invasion of Zangezur evoked repeated protests from the Arme­ nian government. On July 12, Foreign Minister Ohandjanian challenged 50 Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 164—167. See also FO 371 /496o, E12813/134/58, Luke to FO, Sept. 29, 1920, enclosure. Khoreni was a native of Brnakot in the Sisian district. 51 G. Nzhdeh, Im pataskhane (Sofia, 1937), pp. 35-36; Avo, op. át., pp. 116, 165, 302— 306; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 64—65; H. B. Abrahamian, “Garegin Nzhdehe Siunikum (1919 t. ogostos-1921 t. hulis),” Lraber, no. 3 (1991), p. 5; Haradj, July 27, 1920; FO 371/4959, Ei 0343/134/58 enclosure. 52 “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 36—37; Nagpmyi Karabakh, p. 526; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Compte-rendu militaire, no. 3, July 25, 1920. For Turkish participation in the Red Army’s campaign in Zangezur, see Genelkurmay Baçkanhgi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Turk îstiklâlHarbi, III: Dogu Cephesi (1919—1921) (Ankara, 1965), pp. 113— 114.

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Chicherin’s sincerity in proclaiming Soviet Russia’s friendship and pre­ paredness to assist the Armenian people in their time of need when the Red Army had occupied Armenian Karabagh and was pressing into Zan­ gezur. These were inalienable parts of the Republic of Armenia, and the forcible entry of Soviet troops defied the Sovnarkom’s own principle of self-determination and raised serious doubts about Russia’s professions of goodwill. The erstwhile Musavat regime of Azerbaijan, which for two years had tried to impose its hated rule in the highlands, had been com­ pelled to pull back in face of the inflexible will of the peasantry of Karabagh and Zangezur. Recently the Ninth Assembly of Karabagh Ar­ menians, like the previous eight assemblies, had reaffirmed the local population’s indomitable determination to merge with the true fatherland, the Republic of Armenia. But Soviet Azerbaijan was pursuing the Musavat scheme by relying on the authority and armed forces of Soviet Russia. The plot to seize not only disputable but also entirely indisput­ able districts, such as Zangezur, undoubtedly entailed another objective: to link over the prostrate body of Armenia with the conniving Turkish imperialists. The Armenian government could not remain indifferent to these egregious transgressions, which violated the free will and sovereign rights of the Armenian people. It was possible that the Russian command in the Caucasus did not understand the full implications of the Azer­ baijani machinations. Hence, Soviet Russia should immediately order its troops to clear out of Zangezur and allow for the resolution of contested issues through peaceful means.53 Ohandjanian also lodged a protest with the Azerbaijani Revkom on July 13, complaining that even though the two sides had agreed to settle their differences through a bilateral conference, Azerbaijan was trying to grab Karabagh and Zangezur by force. He urgently requested with­ drawal “from Armenian territory and the disputed areas of Karabagh,’’ whose future would be among the agenda items of the proposed con­ ference. Four days later, Ohandjanian denounced the execution of Ar­ menian officers who had been taken prisoner during the Soviet incur­ sions into Armenia. This belligerent act was a crude violation of international law and threatened to sever every form of relations be­ tween the two states. Unless the Azerbaijani armed forces operating in Zangezur and Karabagh withdrew, the Armenian government would consider itself freed of all constraint.54 These developments were watched closely by Turkish Nationalist lead­ ers. General Kiazim Karabekir relayed greetings to the Eleventh Red Army and urged General Levandovskii to advance to Nakhichevan, 53 Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 532—533; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 149—150. 54 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 147, 167; Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 536, 540.

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where the troops of Soviet Russia and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey would finally establish direct contact. Karabekir realized that time was of the essence, as the Armenian expeditionary force of Major General Shelkovnikian was sweeping over Sharur and approaching Na­ khichevan. Thousands of terrified Muslim inhabitants were fleeing across the Araxes River. The news that Dro’s troops had retreated to Daralagiaz and abandoned the Goris-Sisian-Angelaut-Nakhichevan road to the Red Army was therefore a most welcome relief. In his messages sent by land and sea to the Red Army and to Soviet Azerbaijan, Karabekir deplored the counterrevolutionary activities that had been spearheaded by Nuri Pasha [Conker] and his cohorts and pledged to arrest and pun­ ish such individuals if they fell into his hands. Suggesting that for any future joint Soviet-Turkish military action the reopening of the TiflisKars-Erzerum railway link was essential, he gave assurances that he would take appropriate measures to avert resistance on the part of the local population.55 Karabekir and his officers urged swift action to save “Red Nakhichevan’’ from the Dashnak offensive. The Turkish “Red Army” around Shahtaght was insufficient to withstand the enemy force of four infantry regiments, two companies of cavalry, and eight cannons. It was clear that imperialist England was employing its Dashnak puppets to keep the Turkish Red Army separated from the Russian Red Army. In other messages on behalf of “Comrade Kiazim,” Turkish staff officers attached to the “Nakhichevan Red Turkish Army” warned that the sit­ uation was critical and that there was no time to lose. The anti-Soviet propaganda of General Edigarov, Colonel Zeinalov, and other Azerbai­ jani officers who had fled to Nakhichevan was being effectively coun­ tered by a campaign to spread the truth about the high-principled Soviet objectives. The inhabitants were horrified at the prospect of oppressive Dashnak domination and were anxiously awaiting the arrival of the Rus­ sian Red Army. “Every minute is precious.”56 The Turkish appeals, Azerbaijani pressure, and Russian desire to as­ certain the real intentions of the Turkish units in Nakhichevan led to the decision to send a Red Army detachment there. On July 16, Eleventh Army headquarters ordered the 32d Rifle Division’s cavalry brigade (then attached to the 28th Rifle Division), together with a battery of mountain guns, to set out from Gerusy (Goris) at twilight the next morn­ ing along the main road to Nakhichevan, arriving there no later than July 21. Concurrently, elements of General P. V. Kuryshko’s 18th Cavalry 55 A. N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel’nye strany Vostoka v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (1918-1920) (Moscow, 1964), p. 120; Cemal Kutay, Karabekir Ermenistan’1 nastl yok etti? (Istanbul, 1956), pp. 6—8; Nagornyi Karabakh, pp. 534—535; Kazim Karabekir, Istiklcd Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 820, 824; Vratzian, Hayastane murji eu sali midjeu, pp. 38—39. “ Nagornyi Karabakh, pp. 545—547.

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Division were to advance from Jebrail along the Araxes River to Ordubad and make contact with the Turkish detachments in that district no later than July 22. The army commanders were reminded that in moving into these territories the Red Army was not making war on Armenia. Its pri­ mary objectives were to establish liaison with the Turkish revolutionary forces, to determine what the Turkish command expected from Soviet Russia and the Red Army, and to investigate the prevailing political and military situation on the boundaries of Armenia and Turkey. Should armed forces of Dashnakist Armenia be encountered, the officers in command were to explain that the Red Army did not consider itself in a state of war with the Armenian republic and had no desire to fight. “If, despite that, the Armenians permit themselves to engage in hostile operations against our units, then give them a decisive rebuff.”57 From the Turkish perspective, it now appeared that at the very last moment the strategic passageway from Armenia to Persia might still be kept out of the control of the Erevan government.

Shifting Strategies The Red Army’s probes into Zangezur did not end the debates within the Russian Communist Party leadership about the disposition of the disputed territories or about the party’s stance toward the bourgeois Armenian republic. Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin in particular labored to contain the zeal of the Kavburo (Ordzhonikidze) and the Azerbaijani Revkom (Narimanov), which tried to provoke actions that would force the rapid sovietization of Armenia and Georgia and ensure contact and collaboration with revolutionary Turkey. In Moscow on July 7, the Politburo confirmed Chicherin’s directives ofJuly 4 to the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front. The R.S.F.S.R. intended to pursue peaceful neighborly relations with the bourgeois governments of Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey, and the Soviet authorities in the Cau­ casus should desist from any hostile measures that could jeopardize this strategy: “In no case should attempts be made presently to introduce 57 Ibid., pp. 538—539. Earlier, on July 8, General Levandovskii had instructed the gad Rifle Division commander, General Steiger, to send a small cavalry detachment to Na­ khichevan to establish a link with the Turkish division at Bayazit and to determine its military objectives. A staff member was to remain there to report periodically on the military and political situation and to counter the provocations of the Azerbaijani military person­ nel who had rebelled against and been driven from Soviet Azerbaijan. To assist in this work, Steiger was to arrange that a unit of no more than 100 Soviet-sponsored Turkish cavalrymen and infantrymen accompany the detachment from the gad Division. Until the mutual relations between the Soviet and Turkish sides had been clarified, the Red Army detachment was to refrain from active participation in any Turkish operations against Ar­ menia. See ibid., p. 526.

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Soviet power in Georgia and Armenia. The practical establishment of a modus vivendi must be reached with the governments of those repub­ lics.” It had to be explained to pro-Soviet elements in those countries that political, military, and international considerations precluded an armed uprising and that these groups should operate within the limits of the treaties already or in the process of being negotiated. The military circumstances, moreover, were not conducive to the complete occupa­ tion of Karabagh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan, Julfa, and Sharur-Daralagiaz. Rather, the Red Army should hold the districts already taken—namely, Shushi and Jebrail—together with places threatened by active ArmenianAzerbaijani hostilities. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan should be al­ lowed to control such areas. The Russian military objectives were to pre­ serve order, halt bloodshed between the Tatars and Armenians (especially in areas of mixed habitation), and assist the local population to create its own administrative apparatus (soviets) without the Red Ar­ my’s interference in civil affairs. These goals should be made known to the masses through printed circulars, appeals, and other means, with emphasis on the fact that the temporary occupation would endure only until the territorial disputes had been resolved through mixed Arme­ nian-Azerbaijani commissions presided over by the R.S.F.S.R. and guided by ethnic-demographic factors and the will of the people.58 Chicherin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze on July 9 that the center was repeatedly beset by warnings from Baku that having the Russian army occupy Karabagh and Zangezur rather than allowing Azerbaijan to an­ nex the two districts would jeopardize Soviet power in that country. If such caveats, Chicherin wrote with annoyance, were meant to further the expansionist aspirations of the Muslim nationalists, those motiva­ tions were politically harmful and unacceptable. Soviet Russia would thus appear no different from, or even worse than, the Musavat regime. But if the real concern was to broaden the Soviet sphere of influence, then the two districts should be placed under the protection of the Red Army. Russia could not tolerate in Soviet Azerbaijan a camouflaged Mu­ savat orientation, which the comrades in the Caucasus should reject and 58 Ibid., pp. 522—524. In June, Gurgen Haikuni and Ruben Katanyan, members of the first Armenian Communist Party (which had been organized in 1918 and had received recognition from the Communist International and the Russian Communist Party), urged Lenin to transform Karabagh and Zangezur into a separate Soviet republic federated with the R.S.F.S.R. They argued that the Armenian population of these districts did not want to be forced to submit to any form of Azerbaijani jurisdiction and at the same time strongly opposed the Dashnakist regime of Armenia and its agitation. These districts had been linked with Russia economically and sentimentally. The creation of the Karabagh-Zangezur Soviet Republic would provide an effective base for the establishment of Soviet rule in Armenia proper (ibid., pp. 497—498). On the original Armenian Communist Party and the waning of its influence, see Hovannisian, Republic, I, pp. 409—415.

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oppose categorically.59 Although the Politburo’s minutes dryly record the decisions and conclusions supporting Chicherin’s position, unanim­ ity was clearly lacking. On July 8, for example, Stalin informed Ordzho­ nikidze: “My opinion is that it is not possible to vacillate endlessly be­ tween the sides; it is necessary to support one of the sides, definitely, in the given case, of course, Azerbaijan with Turkey.’’ Stalin added that he had raised the issue with Lenin, who did not object.60 Two days later, on July i o, representatives of the Russian Communist Party’s Kavburo (Mdivani), the Azerbaijani Revkom (Narimanov) and Central Committee (Mikoyan and Naneishvili), and the Eleventh Army’s Military Revolutionary Council (M. K. Levandovskii, Ia. Vesnik, and B. D. Mikhailov) addressed a joint petition to the central committee in Mos­ cow. They complained that the arrangements regarding Karabagh and Zangezur, a matter connected with the proposed Armenian treaty, seemed to contradict the interests of the Caucasian revolutionary move­ ment. These districts, it was asserted, had been included in Azerbaijan throughout the period of Musavat rule and were linked economically and culturally with Baku, not Erevan. Even during the Musavatists’ reign, the Armenian villagers of Karabagh had opted for union with Azerbaijan in return for guarantees for a tranquil life. Only after the Red Army had crushed Denikin’s White forces, thereby accelerating the rate of revo­ lutionary ferment in Azerbaijan, had the Entente Powers tried to save the situation by inciting the Dashnaks to engage in massacres and im­ pose their bloody rule in these highlands. Following the Soviet coup in Baku and especially the suppression of the khan-bek revolts in the coun­ tryside, the interracial strife had ceased. The revolutionary manifesta­ tions of the Armenian villagers had forced Dro and his bands to flee beyond Goris. Mountainous Karabagh had become a base for initiating creative Soviet labor and for elevating the consciousness of the Eastern masses to wage class warfare. Unfortunately, the delay in liberating Zan­ gezur was allowing Dro and others of his kind to take cruel revenge on the partisans of the Soviet order. Decisive action, the petition continued, was required to free the work­ ing population of Zangezur, consolidate Soviet power there, and link up with the Turkish revolutionary forces in Nakhichevan and Anatolia. So­ viet rule having been welcomed so enthusiastically in Karabagh and Zan­ gezur, the least suggestion now of regarding the districts as neutral—or, even worse, of relinquishing them to Dashnak Armenia, “which will bring death to the Soviets and fire and sword to the toiling masses”— would be condemned as unforgivable abandonment and treachery. In­ 59 Nagprnyi Karabakh., p. 528. 60 Ibid., p. 524.

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terethnic conflict would ensue once again, driving the Armenian masses back into the Dashnak fold. The Muslim population, deprived of these revolutionary Armenian-inhabited districts that had led the struggle against the despised Dashnaks, would again resort to arms. Now, how­ ever, they would curse Soviet Russia for allowing themselves to be dis­ armed militarily by the Red Army and disarmed morally by Soviet pro­ paganda. The failure of Soviet Azerbaijan to retain at least the territories of the pre-Soviet republic would be tantamount to open betrayal, Armenophilia, and admission of Soviet weakness, leading perhaps to seri­ ous anti-Soviet rebellions. That, in turn, would endanger the Turkish revolutionary movement by hindering direct linkage with and assistance from Russia and Azerbaijan. The petition urged: “We warn the center against wavering on the question of Karabagh and Zangezur, in the in­ terest of not turning Azerbaijan into a dwarf, which will remain depen­ dent on the care of the Red Army and be parceled out to the Armenians and Georgians, instead of being created into a strong national base and source of class revolution in the East.”61 After Legran had arrived in Baku from Moscow and had an oppor­ tunity to exchange views with prominent comrades, he joined Ordzho­ nikidze on July 14 in telegraphing Chicherin to advise that Azerbaijan be given some satisfaction in the forthcoming treaty with Armenia. In line with views that both Chicherin and Legran had expressed in Mos­ cow, the recommendations were that Karabagh should be annexed to Azerbaijan “completely and without condition,’’ that Zangezur should be regarded as disputed, and that, as a concession to Armenia, claims to Sharur-Daralagiaz, Nakhichevan, and Ordubad should be with­ drawn.62 The question became all the more urgent when reports were received about the Armenians’ victory at Baouk-Vedi and southward march toward Sharur. On July 15, however, Legran endorsed a new set of decisions taken by the bureau of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, with the participation of Ordzhonikidze, Elena Sta­ sova, and representatives of the Eleventh Army’s Voinrevsovet: 1. Karabagh and Zangezur must be united with Azerbaijan. 2. To relinquish Nakhichevan and the others, requesting their occupation by Russian troops. 61 Ibid., pp. 529—531. That same day, the Bureau of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee heard a report on the conditions in Karabagh and Zangezur, where, it was asserted, the peasantry did not want to be placed under the rule of Armenia and was drawn strongly toward Russia, using the slogan, “The road to Russia passes through Baku.” See K istorii obrazovaniia Nagomo-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, pp. 53-5462 Nagpmyi Karabakh, p. 537.

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3. Temporarily until receiving complete information about the situation in Armenia to propose to Comrade Legran not to sign a peace treaty. 4. Temporarily during the time of the negotiations to propose to Armenia to cease all military activities.63

Curiously, Legran on one day had recommended that Zangezur be acknowledged as disputed, whereas the next day he was cited in the Azerbaijan party’s minutes as favoring the inclusion of both Karabagh and Zangezur in Soviet Azerbaijan. Moreover, all the decisions notwith­ standing, on July 16, Eleventh Army headquarters ordered the 3 2d Rifle Division’s cavalry brigade to move out from Goris to Nakhichevan to establish contact with the Turkish armed forces operating there. It was difficult for the Armenians to find even a little evidence that the Soviet side had any intention of relinquishing Sharur, Nakhichevan, and Julfa. Amid this swirl of activity and contradiction, Boris Legran’s mission entrained from Baku for Akstafa (Aghstafa) on July 21, intending to travel overland from that station to Erevan. At the frontier, however, Legran was denied diplomatic immunity, as the Armenian government maintained that the deputation was not a formal mission and was there­ fore subject to search.64 Not only had Ohandjanian been forewarned that Bolshevik propaganda would be shipped with Legran, but he wanted to avoid negotiations in Erevan as long as there was the possibility that Levon Shant might conclude an agreement in Moscow. Clearly, the Bureau-Government had no confidence in Soviet professions and be­ lieved that the various deputations being sent to the Caucasus were in­ tended first and foremost to open the avenues of communication and collusion between Russia and Nationalist Turkey. It was obvious, the Armenians insisted, that the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic objectives of the Young Turks and Azerbaijani Musavatists were now being advanced under the rubric of Bolshevism. The fact that Enver Pasha’s uncle, Gen­ eral Halil Pasha [Kut], had accompanied Legran to Baku and was car­ rying an installment of Soviet gold for Mustafa Kemal, together with pledges of much greater assistance, only reaffirmed what the Armenians held to be self-evident. Furthermore, despite the setback in Zangezur, the Armenian army had registered major gains in June and July, over­ running Zangibasar, Vedibasar, and Sharur and compelling the Muslim 63 Ibid., pp. 537-538. 64 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, and Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 10, Bulletin no. 11, Aug. 1 o, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, Corbel to Ministry of War, July 25, 1920. Hr. R. Simonian, Turk-haikakan haraberutiunneripatmutiunits (Erevan, 1991), pp. 376—377. See also Ohandjanian’s interview with the British representative in Erevan, Captain George F. Gracey, on August 21, in FO 371/4959, E11868/134/58, Luke to FO, Sept. 6, 1920, enclosure.

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Council of Nakhichevan to seek terms for the peaceful submission of the entire Nakhichevan-Julfa-Ordubad region to Armenia. Under these circumstances, the Bureau-Government claimed that it was illogical to conduct Armenian-Soviet negotiations both in Moscow and in Erevan. Shant’s delegation was fully empowered to conclude a treaty in Moscow. The Dashnakist press echoed this view by reporting that a Soviet deputation had arrived at the frontier with large packages, which it refused to submit for inspection. This could not be a bona fide diplomatic mission; no treaty existed between Armenia and the R.S.F.S.R., nor had the Armenian government been informed that the negotiations in Moscow had been permanently suspended. And if it was not possible for the two sides to reach agreement in Moscow, why was Soviet Russia now sending a delegation “the size of a regiment’’ to Ere­ van?65 The stonewalling by Ohandjanian’s cabinet alarmed Armenia’s ener­ getic representative in Tiflis, Tigran Bekzadian. The affront to the Soviet government grew greater each day Legran was forced to sit in Akstafa. In exchanges with the Soviet envoy in Georgia, Sergei Kirov, Bekzadian promised to do his utmost, including the dispatch of a special courier to Erevan, to win the assent of his government to resume the negotia­ tions immediately. Through his intercession, the Georgian government allowed Legran to travel to Tiflis after a five-day wait in Akstafa. On July 24, Bekzadian communicated with Ohandjanian by direct wire to ex­ plain that Kirov had acquiesced in Legran’s proceeding to Erevan as the head of a Soviet deputation rather than of a formal mission. Any further procrastination, Bekzadian cautioned, would be highly detrimental to Armenia. Legran’s adviser, Sahak Ter-Gabrielian, had confided that Ar­ menia’s enemies were exploiting the situation. Authorization for Legran to come to Erevan, Bekzadian concluded, was “not only acceptable but also essential.’’66 At a time when the long-delayed shipment of British arms and equip­ ment was finally being transported from Poti to Armenia, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ohandjanian was intractable, insisting that the idea of concurrent negotiations in two places on the same subject was absurd. If the Soviet government now held that the parleys had to take place in Erevan, then the beginning of such a conference would have to be put off until Levon Shant was recalled and given the opportunity to report fully on what had transpired in Moscow. Anything urgent that Legran wished to impart to the Armenian government could be relayed through Bekzadian or by courier to Erevan. Ohandjanian reminded Bek65 Haradj, July 27, 1920; FO 371/4959, E10343/134/58 enclosures. 66 “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 41—42.

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zadian that, despite the repeated assurances of Chicherin and Kirov about the peaceful intent of Soviet Russia, the Red Army was continuing to advance in Karabagh and Zangezur, and the Armenians of Azerbaijan and throughout Russia were being subjected to discrimination and per­ secution. Kirov should be told that an end to Soviet aggression within Armenia’s boundaries would create a more favorable atmosphere for the resumption of negotiations.67 Ohandjanian’s adamance deeply dis­ turbed Bekzadian, who advised that he was sending by special courier a full report on the subject.68 The courier, who arrived in Erevan on July 26, brought not only Bekzadian’s report but also a copy of a telegram from Foreign Affairs Com­ missar Chicherin. In that communication of July 19, Chicherin ex­ plained that Soviet military operations in the Caucasus had the sole purpose of keeping the peace between the Armenians and neighboring peoples. The R.S.F.S.R. was a sincere friend of workers of all nationalities and had stepped in to end the bloody conflict in the territories disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan so that a way could be found to settle the contest with impartiality and justice. In its relations with the Turkish Nationalists, Soviet Russia was trying to obtain for the Armenians suffi­ cient territory in Turkish Armenia to guarantee their free development and to deliver them from the unending state of animosity with surround­ ing Muslim peoples. It was through Russia’s intercession that the Na­ tionalists had recently suspended their mobilization against Armenia, and they had assented to Soviet mediation to resolve the ArmenianTurkish tangle. The Armenian people could have full confidence in Soviet Russia’s steadfast friendship and assistance and in its sincere de­ sire to spare them from renewed bloodshed. “The Soviet government hopes that in the process of exchanging views with Legran the Armenian government will become convinced that the course the Soviet govern­ ment has taken is correct and will find the way to conclude a lasting and permanent agreement for peaceful, friendly relations.’’69 Chicherin’s telegram was given notoriety in the Caucasian press. The Georgian newspapers ridiculed the Soviet hypocrisy ofjustifying the sei­ zure of Armenian territory as “love of the Soviets for the peoples of the 67 Ibid., p. 42. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 1, Report of de Martel, Aug. 15, 1920, and dossier 3, Report ofJuly 25, 1920; FO 371/4944, E9344/1/58, Luke to FO, July 13, 1920, enclosure. See also Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 122—123. 68 “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 43. 69 Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 373—374; [H)A. M. Elchibekian, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia solsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Erevan, 1963), p. 168; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 10—11. Contemporary sources give the date of the communication as July 20. See, for example, FO 371/4959, E10378/134/58; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 1, Corbel’s July 27, 1920, and Political report no. 4, Aug. 2, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 203.

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East, especially the Armenian people.” Soviet policy might seem to be characterized by dualism, but in fact there was no ambivalence, as dem­ onstrated in the Red Army’s occupation of Armenian territories that not even the Musavatists had seriously claimed. In Baku, Halil Pasha had connived with Legran on the one hand and with the ‘‘Musavat Bolshe­ viks” on the other. He was traveling to Anatolia at the behest of Lenin to spin a web of destruction around Armenia. Once again, the Armenian people stood at the brink of unfathomable calamity.70 The Armenian Populist Zhoghovurd also pointed to the contrast between Soviet words and deeds. No Soviet profession of amity could be believed until the Moscow government recognized Armenia’s independence, restored Karabagh and Zangezur to the Armenian republic, put an end to Azerbai­ jani aggression, and repudiated the anti-Armenian provisions in its pact with Mustafa Kemal.71 The Armenian press was unanimous in its insis­ tence that Legran should not be allowed into the country until Levon Shant’s delegation had returned to Erevan. Replying to Chicherin on July 27, Hamazasp Ohandjanian wrote that the Armenian people and government could only be thankful to Soviet Russia for its cordial expressions and its offer to help independent Ar­ menia achieve a tranquil life of progress. ‘‘But, unfortunately, my gov­ ernment must state that the friendly assurances of your government have in actuality been transformed by the local Soviet authorities and the commanders of your troops in Azerbaijan into continuous hostile ac­ tions against Armenia in the districts of Kazakh, Karabagh, and Zange­ zur.” Armenia was consequently obliged to keep large numbers of troops on the boundaries, creating a heavy burden on the peasantry and disrupting work in the fields. The presence of Soviet armed forces ‘‘not only does not assist in the prevention of bloody conflicts between Ar­ menia and Azerbaijan but on the contrary contributes to their intensi­ fication.” Armenia’s call for a conference with Soviet Azerbaijan would not be taken seriously in Baku as long as Russian troops were operating within Armenia’s frontiers. Moreover, Chicherin’s claim that Soviet Rus­ sia was trying to persuade Turkey to cede to Armenia sizable territories in Asia Minor did not correspond with the facts; only recently, Mustafa Kemal’s regime had demanded that the Armenians evacuate Olti, a dis­ trict wholly on the Russian side of the prewar international boundary. Insofar as the Armenian-Soviet negotiations were concerned, the Ar­ menian government noted that, despite its sincere desire to conclude a friendship treaty as soon as possible, the lengthy exchanges in Moscow had not produced the anticipated results. Nonetheless, the government 70 See, for example, Bor’ba, July 28:1, 1920. 71 Reprinted in Bor’ba, July 28:3, 1920.

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was not opposed to continuing the negotiations in Erevan and was now recalling Levon Shant to report, after which Legran’s delegation could proceed to Erevan for the resumption of discussions.72 The Armenian reply to Chicherin had the effect of postponing the negotiations for an unspecified time, as it would take days or weeks for Shant to get back to Erevan. But Ohandjanian’s Bureau-Government seemed to be in no hurry. In an address on foreign relations at the end of July, Ohandjanian reviewed the course of Armenian-Soviet relations and attributed much of the complication to the existence of a pact be­ tween Moscow and Angora. In view of this Soviet-Turkish collusion, the traditional Russophilism of the Armenian people loomed as a major problem. The nation should be brought to understand that Russia was now linked with the mortal enemy of Armenia and in its imperialistic designs intended to use Armenia as an avenue for collaboration with its Turkish allies.73 The Bureau-Government left no doubt that it lacked confidence in the attestations of Chicherin, Kirov, Legran, and all other Soviet officials. With British weapons now arriving in Armenia and the harsh Allied treaty with Turkey fully drafted, there seemed no reason to appoint a new Armenian delegation in order to hasten and facilitate the negotiations with Boris Vasil’evich Legran.

The Battlefield

All was not well with the Red Army in Zangezur. The rugged highlands, summer heat, malaria, and dysentery took their toll on the ill-nourished and ill-equipped troops. The initial welcome of the villagers was being supplanted by resentment over the requisitions and the zealousness of the Cheka, which arrested and imprisoned or deported to Azerbaijan military and civil officials associated with the Armenian government or the party Dashnaktsutiun. Most of all, the Armenian villagers feared that the Red Army would use coercion to effect Azerbaijan’s annexation of the district. They had resisted both Turkish and Azerbaijani encroach­ ments during the preceding years and now were highly suspicious of the attempts by the Red Army and Bolshevik agents to have them turn in their weapons and rely on the Soviet forces for protection. 72 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, and Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 179, 206—208, and 200/1/607, P- 1 !» Bulletin no. 11, Aug. 10, 1920; FO 371/4959» E10378/ 134/58 enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Political report no. 4, Aug. 2, 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, €46(68).!, Moser to Secretary of State, July 31, 1920, enclosure; Bor’ba, Aug. 5:3, 1920. “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 43—44, gives the date of this communication as July 26, 1920. 73 Bor’ba, July 31:4, 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8).i, Randolph to Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1920, enclosure. See also Ohandjanian to Gracey in FO 371/ 4959, E10342/134/58 enclosure.

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Less than three weeks after the 32d Rifle Division had advanced al­ most unopposed into Goris, Karl K. Ratnek, its military commissar, sub­ mitted a remonstrative report to the Military Revolutionary Council of the Eleventh Red Army. The Armenian population of Karabagh and Zangezur, he wrote, had long been victimized by the dominance and provocation of the abominable Dashnaks. Thanks to the Bolshevik move­ ment, which attracted the progressive youth and intelligentsia, and to the exposure of Armenian laborers from Karabagh and Zangezur to the revolutionary ferment in Baku, the villagers were gradually freeing them­ selves from the deadly bonds of nationalism. Communist cells had been organized, especially in Mountainous Karabagh, and the local popula­ tion had resisted Dashnak control in various ways—for example, by in­ tervening to stop attacks on Tatar villages or deserting the armed forces rather than engaging in interracial hostilities. Left to themselves, how­ ever, the villagers could not have shrugged off the Dashnak grip and ended national animosities. This fact raised their hopes that the Russians and the Red Army would play a messianic role. The mere appearance of the vanguard of the Red Army had forced Dro to flee from Karabagh, because he could no longer rely on the Armenian villages to his rear. Dashnak provocation failed to turn the expectant people against the Russians and the Red Army, which was embraced and welcomed with bread and salt as it advanced to Goris. Unfortunately, the euphoria soon dissolved when measures were taken to disarm the population and send the weapons to Azerbaijan. The fear of being left defenseless was being exploited by the counterrevolutionaries; even more fundamental was concern that the Red Army would try to subject the region to Azerbaijan. Although the local Bolsheviks might acquiesce, pointing to the eco­ nomic bond with Baku, the Armenian masses adamantly rejected this course. They had resisted and risen against Azerbaijan—albeit the pre­ vious Musavat government—and their memories of plunder, razing, and killing were too fresh to eliminate the interracial tension. The Azerbai­ jani Communists, moreover, did not follow the precepts of internation­ alism, which took into account the needs of all elements; they remained above all nationalists, and some were guilty of heavy-handed, inflam­ matory actions. Subjecting one people to another under the conditions of “sickly na­ tionalism” could have serious consequences, continued Ratnek, and the central party organs should address this issue. In order to keep Karabagh and Zangezur out of counterrevolutionary hands, the two districts should be granted broad autonomy until a final solution was achieved following the sovietization of the Armenian republic. In the interim, the presence of a third, superior force, represented by the Russian Red Army, was essential to maintain the peace. Both Armenians and Muslims

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were sure that interracial strife would resume should the Red Army de­ part. The masses were afraid to engage in Communist labors because they could not be certain that the Dashnaks were gone for good; in fact, there was no doubt of a Dashnak restoration in Zangezur if the Red Army left. Pointing to the strategic importance of that district, Ratnek believed that it could be made into “a wick of revolution” and that the draw of the Dashnaks could be broken if a civil war was fomented among the Armenians and blood flowed between them. Only then, and only after the formation of an Armenian Red Army, would Zangezur be a truly revolutionary land. There was now no guarantee that the Russian orientation of the Armenians was sufficient to prevent anti-Soviet erup­ tions. The local Soviet councils were becoming weak and indecisive, and this was affecting the disposition of the masses. It was critical to increase political agitation and to solve the food crisis, which, together with the question of disarmament, was being exploited by the counterrevolution­ aries.74 Turkish officers and agents, meanwhile, continued to press for deci­ sive Soviet action to open the roads to Anatolia. In Baku, Ordzhonikidze gave assurances that the way would be clear within a matter of weeks. He alarmed Halil Pasha, however, by suggesting that in order to get the Armenians to open the Alexandropol-Kars-Sarikamish route it might be necessary to give them Nakhichevan. Ordzhonikidze’s surprising an­ nouncement seemed to reflect Chicherin’s discussions with the Shant delegation and made Halil think some kind of understanding had been reached during the negotiations in Moscow. Protesting Ordzhonikidze’s intimation as a violation of the Bolshevik principle of self-determination, Halil discounted the immediate need for the Alexandropol-Sarikamish route and insisted that opening the Goris-Nakhichevan road would suf­ fice for the time being.75 Pursuant to instructions from the headquarters of the Caucasus front, the Eleventh Army on July 19 ordered the 28th Rifle Division to prepare an adequate escort for Halil Pasha, ‘‘the representative of the Turkish command,” and for the secretariat of the Soviet mission en route to Anatolia. A cavalry brigade was to protect the party as it traveled from Goris over Angelaut to Nakhichevan; to scout the roads, terrain, and positions of the Dashnak forces; and to determine the local population’s attitude toward the Turks, Dashnaks, Azerbaijanis, Soviet Russia, and the Red Army. Before returning to Goris, the officer in charge should make arrangements with the Turkish command on maintaining communica­ tion and linkage over the Nakhichevan-Goris and Ordubad-Jebrail 74 Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 548—551. 75 Karabekir, op. át., p. 844

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routes. The principal assignment, however, was to transport “in com­ plete safety” Halil and the Soviet secretariat, “together with all their burden.”76 The “burden” included 500 kilograms of Soviet gold for Mustafa Ke­ mal.77 Halil’s party arrived in Nakhichevan on July 28, just in time for the Red Army detachment to join the Turkish troops from Bayazit in blocking the continued southward thrust of General Shelkovnikian’s Ar­ menian expeditionary force. That same day, Dro telegraphed army head­ quarters from Daralagiaz that a Bolshevik column of six companies of cavalry and four artillery pieces had moved over Angelaut toward Na­ khichevan. Nzhdeh was continuing to resist at Ghapan, whereas those areas of Zangezur under Red Army occupation were being terrorized. Dro now gave notice that he planned to advance on Goris over Bazarchai (Bazarkend) and Borisovka at dawn on July 31.78 Dro’s surprise attack from Kushchibiliak with 400 sabres and 8 moun­ tain guns stunned the small Red Army detachments, which fell back to Angelaut as the Armenians reoccupied Bazarchai and Borisovka, cut the Goris-Nakhichevan road, and captured the baggage and gold that Halil Pasha’s retinue and the Soviet mission to Turkey were slowly transport­ ing to Nakhichevan.79 The defiant Armenians embarrassed and enraged General Nesterovskii, who immediately ordered the formation of a strik­ ing force to liquidate the resistance and secure the Shushi-Goris-Nakhichevan route. A wing made up of one infantry regiment of the 84th Brigade, 28th Rifle Division, a cavalry brigade of the 32d Rifle Division, and a battery of artillery was to crush Dro; the rest of the 84th Brigade was to defend Goris from possible attack by Nzhdeh’s partisans. Detailed instructions regarding quartermaster, communications, and technical services were included with the orders to recapture the Nakhichevan road and reestablish contact with the cavalry brigade that had been cut off and stranded along the Araxes River by Dro’s bold move.80 Before Nesterovskii’s men could execute these commands, Dro took Angelaut and advanced on Goris. In a parallel development on August 1, the Armenian government eliminated all military exemptions of men between the ages of twenty and thirty-two and instructed persons in those classes to report to the Erevan recruitment center within three days,

76 Nagpmyi Karabakh, pp. 540—541. 77 Halil later reported to General Ali Fuad that he had delivered three trunks of gold to Anatolia. See Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Millî mücadele hâtiralan (Istanbul, 1953), p. 473. 78 FO 371 ƒ4959, E10378/134/58 enclosure. 79 Haradj, Aug. 5:3, 6:4, 8:2, 1920; Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 570; Mnatsakanian, op. át., p. 172. 80 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 40—43. For information about General Nikifor Avromovich Nesterovskii, see Mnatsakanian, op. dt., pp. 166—171.

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failing which they would be treated as deserters.81 Also on August i, as tension built up along the borders, the acting commander of the Elev­ enth Red Army, General Vasilenko, addressed an ultimatum to Arme­ nian Commander in Chief Nazarbekian through the Dilijan headquar­ ters of Sebouh: An incessant massacre between Armenians and Tatars and Turks is taking place in Nakhichevan and Zangezur, resulting in the killing of unfortunate and defenseless families of the poor. Whole villages are being destroyed and thousands of poor people are without shelter. In order to put an end to these conflicts and to establish tranquility, we have sent the troops of the Red Army who are bringing with them the banner of peace to the entire working popula­ tion of the districts. But in the meantime you have undertaken active measures against our forces and in this way challenge the Red Army, which has not engaged in hostilities against the workers and peasants of Armenia. We must warn you that if you do not initiate immediate measures to cease the action against our forces, we will be obliged to accept this stroke on our anvils and respond with heavy blows. A reply is expected no later than August 5 by which time all hostil­ ities must have ceased.82

Sebouh informed Nazarbekian that the Bolshevik couriers were at the frontier waiting for an answer and that he had been given to understand that if the Armenians continued to block the Karabagh-Nakhichevan corridor, the Red Army might begin a general offensive against Arme­ nia.83 In his reply on August 4, the Armenian commander in chief stated that his soldiers were only protecting their country from external and internal attack. The Azerbaijani and Turkish columns trying to invade Armenia would be met with the determined resistance of the Republic’s armed forces. Territorial questions, Nazarbekian reminded Vasilenko, could not be resolved by army commanders, only by the governments of the interested parties.84 As Dro approached Goris on August 2, he, too, received an ultimatum, this one from General Nesterovskii: Your troops are attacking units of the Red Army of the R.S.F.S.R. without having given notice to the command of the Red Army. In occupying Angelaut, they have stolen the goods and valuables of our mission that was being sent to 81 FO 371/4959, Ei0378/134/58 enclosure; Abrahamian, op. át., pp. 7—8. 82 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 182; FO 371/4959, E10379/E10380/134/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 8, 1920, enclosures; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Compte-rendu militaire, no. 6, Aug. 6, 1920, and Corbel to Ministry of War, Aug. 9, 1920, text enclosed; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8).i, Randolph to Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1920, enclosure; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 118/17. 83 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 218. 84 FO 371/4959, Ei0733/134/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 16, 1920, enclosure; Armenia Ar­ chives, 200/1/581, pp. 225, 243—244.

ARMENIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

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Turkey. Such actions are causing an interruption in the friendly neighborly re­ lations between the R.S.F.S.R. and Armenia. The Red Army has no orders to attack the Armenian army. It will, however, destroy bandits and looters. Only in the event of hostile action on the part of the troops under your command or other troops against the Red Army of the R.S.F.S.R. will it take decisive measures and respond to each and every blow.

Nesterovskii asked Dro to cease all military operations, return the con­ fiscated goods of the Soviet mission, and withdraw to his previous posi­ tion. If Dro did not indicate his compliance within twenty-four hours, the Red Army would move to liquidate the adventure.85 In place of a reply, however, Dro made his own demands, insisting that the Red Army leave the confines of Zangezur within twenty-four hours or face a full-scale Armenian attack all along the front. By August 3 the Armenian expedition had advanced over Sheki and Sisian to the heights overlooking Goris, and Nzhdeh’s partisans moved from Ghapan toward Tegh. The insurgents received an exuberant welcome in Goris as the rear guard of the 28th Rifle Division hastily withdrew toward Tegh and across the Hakaru River into Karabagh.86 The jubilation was short­ lived, however; before retreating with the Red Army, the Cheka had tortured and killed Arshak Shirinian and Vahan Khoreni, members of Parliament, highly regarded native sons of Zangezur, and powerful in­ tellectuals within the Dashnaktsutiun. A brief announcement posted by the Cheka read: “Because of the treacherous attack of the Dashnak gov­ ernment on Red Zangezur, Dashnaks Arshak Shirinian, Vahan Khoreni, Zakhar Ter-Ghazarian, and M. Aghamian were shot at dawn on August 2.”87 A number of other prominent Dashnakists were taken away and killed on the road to Shushi. The fate of Khoreni, Shirinian, and the Dashnakist leaders of Zangezur captured headlines in Erevan and Tiflis 85 A. O[H]. [HJArutiunian et al., “Osvoboditel’naia missiia 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 21st yr., no. 2 (1980), p. 26 (cited hereafter as “Osvoboditel’naia missiia’’). Mnatsakanian, op. át., p. 171, dates the ultimatum as August 1. “Great Britain, War Office, 95/4958, entry of Aug. 4, 1920; Mnatsakanian, op. át., p. 172; S. Vartanian, Pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Erevan, 1959), p. 286; A. B. Kadishev, Interuentsiia i grazhdanskaia voina v Zakavkaz’e (Moscow, i960), p. 307. 87Avo, op. at., pp. 112, 486—487; Gevorgian, op. at., p. 66; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 11, Aug. 10, 1920, and File 67/30, Bekzadian to Aharonian, Aug. 10, 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, File 711, Moser to Secretary of State, Sept. 6, 1920, enclosure; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 250, 255. See also Haradj for the month of August 1920 and for eulogies of Khoreni and Shirinian, Hairenik, Sept. 29:1, Oct. 3:1, 1920. For biographical sketches of Vahan Khoreni (Ter-Gevorgian), see Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, VII, no. 10 (1968), pp. 264—268; [Armenian Rev­ olutionary Federation],HushapatumH. H.Dashnaktsutian, 1890—1950, ed. S. Vratzian (Bos­ ton, 1950), pp. 528—533. Other victims of the Cheka in Zangezur are listed by Avo, pp. 112-115.

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and precipitated angry demonstrations and formal protests.88 In an ob­ vious act of retaliation, Stepan Alaverdian, Sargis Musayelian, and Bagrat Gharibdjanian, imprisoned for their role in the May uprising, were killed on the road to the village of Kanaker, ostensibly while being moved from one prison to another. Armenian blood, Dashnakist and Bolshevik, flowed in many places. Reeling from the shock of the loss of Khoreni and Shirinian, the Bu­ reau of the Dashnaktsutiun addressed an open letter to the proletariat and socialist parties of the world to expose the sinister plot of the Russian Bolsheviks and Turkish Kemalists to crush the laborers of Armenia. The English version forwarded to London read in part: We are forced now to declare that the Soviet Government of Moscow who are declaring themselves as the protectors of all the oppressed nations and the avantgardes of international proletariat, have more than once made us believe too in this their firm will to recognise the independence of Armenia and to establish most friendly relations with the Armenian people. But in reality these last three months when they are delaying day by day the negotiations of peace with our delegation in Moscow and creating new obstacles which hinder the establishment of peaceful relations with the most oppressed nation of the East. On the one hand the Government of Moscow informs us about their high intentions for sincere friendship and on the other hand their troops here in Transcaucasia joined hands with the Tartar and Turkish bands and are invading our country and capturing our districts one after the other, causing oppression and taking away our spoils, terrorising our labouring classes, annihilating our intelligentsia and they are forcing our weak and exhausted people to strain all their forces, in order to protect their freedom, their labour and the physical existence of Ar­ menia.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation declared to the international proletariat that the Bolsheviks and Kemalists, under the pretext of fight­ ing imperialism, were actually striving to establish their own colonialist rule in the East. “We protest most energetically against this open mys­ tification in the name of oppressed nations of the East and more espe­ cially in the name of the Armenian nation by Russian and Turkish im­ perialists clothed in communistic garments.’’ The Dashnaktsutiun called upon the workers and socialist parties of the world to take immediate measures to counteract the criminal scheme against the struggling peo­ ple of Armenia.89 88 FO 371/4959, £10725/134/5830(1 Ei0733/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Aug. 7 and 12, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 28—29, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920; Haradj, Aug. 10:2, 15:1—3, 18:1, 19:2—3, 20:1—2, 22:1—2, Sept. 10:1, 1920. 89 FO 371/4959, Ei0733/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Aug. 12, 1920. For the Armenian original, see Haradj, Aug. 8:2, 1920, and for similar appeals in French, Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 17/17 and 132/31.

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In Goris, Dro issued a new ultimatum to the Eleventh Red Army’s divisional commanders on August 3. He began: There has occurred that which we were avoiding. Between the Armenian toil­ ing peasantry and the Russian democracy, in spite of the will and desire of the latter [democratic elements in Russia], military activities have begun because of your imperialistic lust for the territory of the democratic republic of Armenia. The four-week activity of your military commissars and revolutionary committees in Zangezur and Sisian, an absolute nightmare of plunder and rape of the peace­ ful toiling peasantry, culminated in the act of greatest villainy—the beastly mur­ der of Parliament members V. Khoreni and A. Shirinian, the photographs of whose outraged and disfigured bodies will be sent, together with the vigorous protest of the Armenian democracy, to the socialist organizations of all countries. This ferocious deed and your alliance with the deep-seated, bloody butcher of the Armenian peasantry, Halil Pasha, betray in the most telling way your ag­ gressive goals, which you are masking under the robe of communism.

The Armenian peasantry, Dro continued, was enthusiastically taking arms against the Bolshevik invaders, and hundreds and thousands of men were hastening to his headquarters to fight in the name of the freedom and independence that had been won at such a high price during the revolutionary struggle of the past thirty years: “I am de­ manding that you remove your bloody hands and abandon the territo­ ries of Armenia occupied by you.” Dro concluded: “Do not cause blood­ shed, for before the workers of the entire world the responsibility for the spilled blood of two brotherly peoples, Russians and Armenians, whose hearts beat in unison for the highest ideals of mankind, will fall on you. Leave Armenia! Return all the possessions of the toiling Arme­ nian peasantry which you have robbed.”90 The ultimatum further infuriated the Red Army command, which planned for quick action to recoup its losses. That same day, August 3, General Vasilenko ordered the 20th Rifle Division in the ElisavetpolKazakh sector to guard the border with Armenia closely and to reply to every attack and deal mercilessly with the Dashnaks, thereby halting their incitement of the local population. The 28th Rifle Division was to liq­ uidate Dro’s insolent bands and restore contact with Nakhichevan and the Turkish Bayazit division, and the 18th Cavalry Division was to sur­ prise the Dashnak bands from the rear. The operation should be swift and decisive. If other Dashnak bands tried to intervene from the direc­ tion of Armenia, the Red Army should destroy them without mercy and should not be constrained from extending its campaign beyond the bor­ der if necessary. All division commanders and military commissars were to work assiduously to strengthen the local revolutionary committees and 90 Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 566.

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to win the sympathy of both Muslim and Armenian inhabitants toward the Red Army and Soviet power. “The Red Army must be a tempest for the bandits and a protector for the toiling population.”91 In Shushi, General Nesterovskii organized a large striking group to redeem his honor by crushing Dro. Three regiments of the 84th Brigade and one regiment of the 83d Brigade of the 28th Rifle Division, the $2d Rifle Division’s cavalry brigade, several batteries of artillery, and various support units concentrated in the Zabugh vale facing Zangezur on the night of August 4 with orders to advance the next morning and to clear the region up to Angelaut by August 7. One regiment of the 28th Divi­ sion’s cavalry brigade was to move up the Bazarchai River to strike Dro from the rear, and two infantry regiments of the 83d Brigade were to remain on combat alert in Shushi and Aghdam to serve as reinforce­ ments where needed. The lengthy order of the day, which included many details regarding scouting, provisions, communications, and agi­ tation behind enemy lines, concluded: “No mercy to the armed Dash­ naks. Death to all who raise their hand against the Red Army.”92 This turn of events was looked upon with satisfaction by Halil Pasha and Karabekir Pasha. In his communication with General Karabekir on August 3, Halil explained that he had labored diligently to get the Red Army on the Goris-Nakhichevan road with the hope that the Dashnaks would try to prevent its passage. Only in this way would the Red Army actively engage the Armenians. He was pleased that Dro had moved to intercept the Red Army and had even captured the goods of the Soviet mission that would be traveling to Anatolia, for this assured that matters “will fall into our hands.” Dro’s actions had aroused resentment and bad feelings in the Red Army. “I am doing everything to get the Dash­ naks into conflict, since they are very naive in politics.”93 The counteroffensive began on August 5, as Nesterovskii’s striking group crossed over the Zabugh vale and Hakaru River into Zangezur. Dro’s expedition, disadvantaged by the lack of artillery and reserves, resisted for only two days before abandoning Goris.94 Nzhdeh again cov­ 91 Ibid., pp. 564-565. 92 “Boevoiput’ 11-iKrasnoi Armii,” pp. 43—46. Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 172—173, states that to liquidate the Dashnakist adventure and restore order in Zangezur, General Neste­ rovskii on August 4 created a special striking group under 84th Brigade Commander Grigorii G. Semenov and including the brigade’s 250th, 251st, and 299th rifle regiments, the 247th Rifle Regiment of the 83d Brigade, and the cavalry brigade of the 32d Rifle Division, together with auxiliary units. See also Kadishev, op. át., p. 309; “Antidashnakskie nastroeniia trudiashchikhsia Armenii nakanune ustanovleniia Sovetskoi vlasti,” pp. 81—82. 93 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 836—839, 844—845. 94 Vartanian, op. át., pp. 288—289; Nzhdeh, op. át., pp. 36-38; FO 371/4959, E10733/ 134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Aug. 12, 1920. Mnatsakanian, op. át., p. 173, gives the date of the counteroffensive as August 6, 1920.

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ered the retreat, receiving a foot wound before falling back to Ghapan. His deep disappointment in Dro was reflected in the protest the presi­ dent of the Ghapan council of peasants’ representatives addressed to the Armenian Parliament, the foreign ministry, the military ministry, and the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun. Deploring Dro’s “unwillingness or inability” to liberate Goris and the rest of occupied Zangezur, Smbat Bek Melik-Parsadanian accused him of playing “inexplicable games.” As a result, Ghapan was now being surrounded. Zangezur needed a “seri­ ous commander” immediately.95 By August 10, the 28th Rifle Division had recaptured Sisian and Angelaut and reestablished direct contact with the isolated cavalry brigade at Nakhichevan. As Dro drew into the heart of Daralagiaz, the Turkish and Russian detachments in Nakhiche­ van held joint rallies to celebrate the victory of Soviet arms. 95 Armenia Archives, 199/1/117, p. 98; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 69—70. See also Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 587-588.

A Soviet Accord and the Battle for Zangezur

The flexing of Soviet military might around the borders of Armenia compelled the Bureau-Government of Hamazasp Ohandjanian to reas­ sess its strategy regarding the resumption of parleys with Russia. At the risk of alienating the Allied Powers, Armenia now showed itself ready to satisfy some of the Soviet demands in return for recognition of the Re­ public’s sovereignty and independence. In the resulting preliminary treaty, the Erevan government had to acquiesce in the provisional oc­ cupation by the Red Army of the strategic Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan passageway. Yet the Armenian partisans in Zangezur would not abide by this arrangement and, embittered by the first taste of Soviet rule, soon unfurled the flag of rebellion. In Baku, meanwhile, the Armenian Bol­ sheviks reorganized, impatient to become the Soviet heirs of the Repub­ lic of Armenia.

The August 10 Preliminary Treaty

In a dispatch from Tiflis on July 29, Soviet plenipotentiary Boris Legran proposed that the Armenian government continue negotiations without waiting for Levon Shant and his colleagues to return from Moscow. For­ eign Affairs Commissar Grigorii Chicherin had announced the desire of Soviet Russia to help establish conditions that would foster the unhin­ dered progress and development of the Armenian people in coopera­ tion with neighboring peoples. Yet the Armenian government’s de­ meanor seemed to hinder the swift, successful conclusion of a treaty of friendship. The Soviet authorities were trying to facilitate Shant’s jour­ ney back to Erevan, but it would be detrimental to postpone the peace talks until his arrival. The situation along Armenia’s border was so tense that any further delay would cause undesirable complications, the re­

90

A SOVIET ACCORD AND ZANGEZUR

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sponsibility for which would fall upon the Armenian government. Legran also asked that a suitable building be allocated for his mission (which had grown from fourteen to more than fifty members) and that if such facilities were not available in Erevan the conference be trans­ ferred to a Soviet city, such as Baku or Vladikavkaz.1 Faced with mounting pressure along the entire frontier from Aksibara (Aghsibara) and Uzuntala in the north to Ghapan and Nakhichevan in the south, the menacing ultimatums of the Red Army command, and the repeated urging of Armenian diplomats such as Tigran Bekzadian to accept Legran in Erevan, the Bureau-Government decided on August 3 to initiate preliminary discussions in Tiflis pending the return of the Shant delegation.2 Ohandjanian wrote Legran that the Armenian gov­ ernment had often pointed out the contradiction between Soviet ex­ pressions of goodwill and the aggressive acts of the Red Army. The Soviet government wished to serve as arbiter between Armenia and Azerbaijan, whereas in fact it had consistendy sided with Azerbaijan. The Red Army commanders were demanding Armenian withdrawal from this or that district and threatened severe reprisals in case of resistance to Soviet occupation of the Karabagh-Nakhichevan corridor. Such reprehensible behavior, Ohandjanian continued, only furthered the objectives of im­ perialistic Turkey and reactionary Azerbaijan. Confronted with this ter­ rible specter, the Armenian people had no choice but to fight in defense of their independence. Unless the Red Army respected the territorial integrity and inviolability of Armenia, no trust could be placed in the professed benevolent intentions of the R.S.F.S.R., and negotiations for friendly mutual relations would not be possible. As evidence of its sincere desire to resolve these issues, however, the Armenian government was sending a delegation to Tiflis to engage in preliminary discussions.3 The delegation selected by the Bureau-Government included Minister of Communications Arshak Djamalian and Acting Minister of Welfare Artashes Babalian, with Ruben luzbashian as chief adviser. Terms to be proposed by the delegation were as follows: Soviet recognition of and

1 Armianskii Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Arm. SSR—Arkhivnyi otdel MVD Arm. SSR, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Ar­ menti (Sbomik dokumentov), ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian, A. M. Akopian, and G. M. Dallakian (Erevan, 1957), pp. 282—283; A. N. Mnatsakanian, Revoliutsian Andrkovkasum ev Rusastani patviraknere, 1917-1921 (Erevan, 1961), pp. 214—215; Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/ 4959, E10379/134/58 enclosure; France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, copy of Legran’sJuly 29, 1920 telegram; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8).i, Ran­ dolph to Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1920, enclosure. 2 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 121—122, 130—132, 154, 157—158, 164—165, 224. ’ Haradj, Aug. 10:2, 1920; FO 371/4959, E10733/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Aug. 12, 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8).i, Randolph to Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1920, enclosure.

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noninterference in the Republic of Armenia; an immediate cease-fire on all fronts; an end to ultimatums and acts of aggression by local army commanders on both sides; Soviet withdrawal from Nakhichevan and Zangezur and restoration of the status quo prevailing in Karabagh and Kazakh before the arrival of the Red Army; exclusion of Azerbaijani troops from Karabagh and the mountainous sector of Gandzak (Elisa­ vetpol, Ganja) ; safe passage for Red Army detachments being withdrawn from Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan; removal of the Red Army’s concentra­ tion along the frontiers of Armenia; and release of all Armenian political and military prisoners.4 While the delegation was en route to Tiflis, Tigran Bekzadian reported to Ohandjanian that Legran had admitted to him that Soviet Russia had an understanding with “Red Turkey.’’ That accord assertedly was not directed against Armenia but against the European imperialists. In fact, the Soviet government was trying to persuade Mustafa Kemal to make territorial concessions to Armenia. In answer to Bekzadian’s query as to why Legran had not formally recognized Armenia’s independence, for which he professed sympathy, the Soviet envoy had replied that he could sign such a document immediately; it would have litde value, however, unless the differences between Azerbaijan and Armenia were settled, inasmuch as the R.S.F.S.R. was the ally of one and the friend of the other. There should be at least broad agreement on the principles to be used in resolving the boundary disputes. Claiming that he did not yet have enough information about Zangezur and Karabagh to render an opin­ ion, Legran stated that he was convinced that Nakhichevan was indis­ pensable for and had to be included in the Armenian republic. When shown evidence that a Red Army officer (Tarkhov) in Nakhichevan had identified himself as the commander of the combined forces of Soviet Russia and Red Turkey, Legran dismissed this as an irresponsible utter­ ance by an overzealous local commander rather than a statement of Soviet government policy. Legran expressed disappointment that he had not been received by the Armenian government, but he was encouraged that an Armenian delegation was on the way to meet with him in Tiflis.5 Shortly after the Armenian representatives had arrived in the Geor­ gian capital, Dr. luzbashian met privately with Soviet adviser Sahak Ter­ Gabrielian to get a sense of Legran’s disposition. Ter-Gabrielian con­ fided that the recent flexibility shown by the Armenian government had delivered Legran from a highly embarrassing situation and had created an atmosphere for successful negotiations. When luzbashian asked why Ter-Gabrielian had not helped Shant reach an agreement in Moscow 4 Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 28, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920. 5 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, Bekzadian to Ohandjanian, Aug. 5, 1920.

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rather than having the parleys transferred to the Caucasus at a time when the Red Army was becoming increasingly aggressive, Legran’s adviser explained that there had been no other course in view of the intense Azerbaijani and Turkish campaign to scuttle the negotiations entirely. As to the territorial question, Ter-Gabrielian asserted that the Sovnarkom had decided that Zangezur should be included in Armenia. To this end, it was good that the Red Army had occupied the district. He asked, however, that Djamalian and Babalian be prepared to compromise on the issue of Karabagh.6 During their first meeting with Legran on August 6, the Armenian representatives announced that negotiations in Erevan for a permanent peace could commence as soon as the Red Army had withdrawn from Zangezur and Nakhichevan. At Legran’s request, they formally submit­ ted their government’s views in a memorandum the following day. In reporting these developments to Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin on August 7, Legran noted that he would reply by asking that Armenia assent to the Red Army’s temporary occupation of the disputed districts. He complained that the situation had been aggravated by the irrespon­ sibility of the Eleventh Army command, which had recklessly sent a cav­ alry detachment from Goris to Nakhichevan without first having secured the principal road. Consequently, the Armenian attack at Angelaut had cut off and seriously endangered that mounted group and led to the seizure of the gold that was being transported by the Soviet mission to Turkey. This shocking malfeasance came at a time when the Eleventh Red Army’s commander and Military Revolutionary Council (Voinrevsovet) were issuing “bountiful” ultimatums, threatening to smite Ar­ menia “with destructive blows” if it did not comply with their demands. The Voinrevsovet had not so much as informed Legran of its intentions and actions, and only through the Armenian delegation was he able to obtain a verbatim copy of General Vasilenko’s August 1 ultimatum to General Nazarbekian. Now the army command and Voinrevsovet had gone even further, advocating a full-scale offensive along all the borders of Armenia to liquidate the Republic. Legran added that he had written the command and Military Revo­ lutionary Council of the Caucasus Front to insist that Nakhichevan and the main road from Goris be firmly secured and that, instead of trying to follow an independent course of action that was contrary to the pol­ icies of the government, the army should faithfully abide by all instruc­ tions relayed through proper channels. Legran asked Chicherin to send precise directives to the Voinrevsovet in order to safeguard from internal 6 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, Djamalian and Babalian to Prime Minister, Aug. 5, 1920. See also Bor’ba, Aug. 8:4, 1920.

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subversion the policy of attaining a modus vivendi with Armenia. He also recommended that the Soviet military tribunal conduct a special inves­ tigation into the capricious operations in Zangezur and Nakhichevan and the humiliating loss of the gold. If Moscow wanted him to be suc­ cessful in his assignment, then it would have to lower an iron fist to put an end to the Azerbaijani partizanshchina and create an environment conducive to the cessation of hostilities. The government had to impress its view upon the army command in Azerbaijan, “which at present strives in various ways to abort our work.” Despite the complex situation, Le­ gran believed that he could reach a satisfactory agreement with Armenia if the central government supported him and still adhered to its views and strategies regarding the Caucasus.7 While the negotiations in Tiflis were in progress, it became apparent that General Nesterovskii’s striking group had recaptured Goris and opened the route to Nakhichevan. At the same time, the Eleventh Ar­ my’s 20th Rifle Division renewed its pressure on the frontier settlements in the Aksibara vale on the Kazakh front. These circumstances forced the Armenian delegates to consent to significant modifications in the optimal terms outlined by their government. Djamalian and Babalian nonetheless made the best of the situation. Having to yield to the tem­ porary occupation by the Red Army of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Na­ khichevan, they managed to hold the Armenian southern frontier at Shahtaght and Khok and, more significantly, gained for Armenia the right to operate the railroad from Erevan through Nakhichevan to Julfa, the outlet to Persia which had been cut since the Muslim uprising in the summer of 1919. Moreover, on the northeastern frontier the respective armies were to take up the positions held on July 30—that is, before the latest Red Army incursion in that sector. And as a preamble to the pro­ visional accord, Soviet Russia formally would recognize the indepen­ dence of the Republic of Armenia.8 The brief text of the agreement was completed shortly after midnight on August 10. Legran immediately apprised Ordzhonikidze in Baku of the terms, adding that the Armenian government would recover and restore the goods of the Soviet mission to Turkey. He also reported that the Red Army had scattered Dro’s forces and captured many weapons and trophies of war.9 Then, at 3 o’clock in the morning the temporary Armenian-Soviet treaty was signed: 7 Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Armenii, Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri SM Respubliki Armeniia, Kafedra Istorii Armianskogo Naroda Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Nagomyi Karabakh v 1918—1923 gg.: Sbomik dokumentav i material™, ed. V. A. Mikayelian et al. (Erevan, 1992), pp. 569—571 (cited hereafter as Nagomyi Karabakh). 8 S. T. Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani derehai zhoghovrdi azatagrmangordsum (1917—1921 tt.) (Erevan, 1966), pp. 125—126. 9 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii v period ustanovleniia i uprocheniia Sovetskoi vlasti v

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On the io August 1920, the R.S.F.S.R. in the person of the plenipotentiary representative B. V. Legran on the one side, and the representatives of the Re­ public of Armenia, A. Djamalian and A. Babalian on the other side, based on the premise of recognition of the independence and full self-determination of the Republic of Armenia, have concluded the present agreement in the following:

First. From 12 o’clock on the 10 August 1920, military operations between the troops of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Armenia are considered to be ended. Remark: Military operations that might occur after the above-mentioned date because of the absence of communication or other technical difficulties must not have any consequences contrary to any of the points of this treaty. Second. The troops of the Republic of Armenia [will] occupy the following line: Shahtaght-Khok-Aznaburt-Sultanbek and further the line northward from Kiuki and westward from Bazarchai (Bazarkend). And in the county [uezd] of Kazakh—the line they held on 30 July of this year. The troops of the R.S.F.S.R. will occupy the disputed districts: Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan, with the exception of the zone determined by this treaty for the disposition of the troops of the Republic of Armenia [see map 2]. Third. The occupation of the disputed territories by the Soviet troops does not predispose the question about the rights to these territories of the Republic of Armenia or the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic. By this temporary occu­ pation, the R.S.F.S.R. has in view the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the principles to be laid down in the peace treaty to be concluded between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Armenia as soon as possible. Fourth. With the cessation of military operations, the engaged sides must end the concentration of military forces in the disputed territories as well as on the frontiers. Fifth. Pending the conclusion of the treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Armenia, the operation of the railway in the Shahtaght-Julfa district belongs to the Armenian Railway Administration, with the proviso that it will not be used for military purposes. Sixth. The R.S.F.S.R. guarantees free passage (with arms and munitions) into Armenia of all military units of the Republic of Armenia which are now beyond the lines [to be] occupied by the Soviet troops.

The present agreement is signed in two copies, one of which is handed to the representatives of the Republic of Armenia, and the other, to the plenipotentiary representative of the R.S.F.S.R.*10 Armenii, mai 1920—noiabr’ 1921 gg.: Sbomikdokumentov,” ed. A. O[H]. [H]Arutiunian et al., Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 19th yr., no. 1 (1978), p. 46 (cited hereafter as “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii”). 10 Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 384—385; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 262, and 200/1/607, p. 17; E. K. Sarkisian [Ervand Sargsian], Kh. Abeghian, and A. Sarkisian, “Missiia B. Legrana: Diplomaticheskaia missiia RSFSR v Armenii,” Banber Hayastani arkhiv­ neri, 8th yr., no. 3 (1967), pp. 46—47 (introduction by E. K. Sarkisian, and documents compiled by Abeghian and A. Sarkisian; cited hereafter as “Missiia B. Legrana”). For Armenian translations, see Armenia Archives, 200/2/112, p. 14, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 17/17, 28/28, and 67/30. For English and French translations and sum­ maries, see FO 371/4959, E10726/E11703/134/58 enclosures; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/183, dossier 4, Revue de la Presse, 10—30 août 1920.

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Communicating by direct wire with Ohandjanian on the morning of August 10, Djamalian and Babalian transmitted the text of the agree­ ment and explained that Legran had ordered the Red Army to cease operations and had then departed for Baku for consultations. Ohan­ djanian inquired about the other points the government had proposed and voiced concern about certain ambiguities, particularly regarding the safe conduct of Armenian troops from the Soviet zone to Armenia proper. Did this provision imply that Nzhdeh would be expected to pass through the lines of the Red Army? Djamalian replied that it had been decided to allow such details to be worked out by the army commands of the two sides, and mixed commissions would define the precise boundaries. The Armenian delegation, he added, had intentionally re­ frained from pressing the point about Armenian prisoners, for this would have been of no avail. As for allowing Armenian refugees in Russia to pass over the North Caucasus to Armenia, that matter had already been decided favorably.11 Djamalian and Babalian believed they had gained significant conces­ sions despite their unenviable bargaining position. With the GorisNakhichevan route already under Soviet control, they had nonetheless secured for Armenia the right to resume operation of the Erevan-Nakhichevan-Julfa railway. And the entire agreement had been predicated on Soviet recognition of Armenian self-determination. Still, it was ironic that, by coincidence, August 10, 1920, was also the day on which Avetis Aharonian affixed his signature to the Treaty of Sèvres, which inter alia created a united Armenian state with an outlet on the Black Sea. Hence, while much of Turkish Armenia was being awarded to the Armenians, they were in fact not able even to defend their existing territories in Russian Armenia. It was a sobering reality. The Reactions The Armenian-Soviet agreement created a furor among Allied circles in the Caucasus. The European representatives had not been forewarned of the negotiations or of the Armenian strategy. The Armenian govern­ ment seemingly had softened toward Bolshevism and was beginning to rely on Soviet Russia. Damienjoseph-Alfred-Charles, Comte de Martel, the French commissioner for Transcaucasia, went so far as to tell Tigran Bekzadian that Armenia could no longer be regarded as an ally and might even be considered to be in the enemy camp. The fact that the Erevan government had just turned down an offer to purchase French 11 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 258, and 200/1/607, p. 16; Rep. of Arm. Del. Ar­ chives, File 67/30.

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arms and ammunition on a cash-and-carry basis or in return for raw materials deepened suspicions about a shift in orientation.12 Naval Commander Harry Luke, then acting as British chief commis­ sioner, reported to London on August 11 that Armenia had consented to the Soviet occupation of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan south of Shahtaght and that further negotiations were to take place in Erevan. In a meeting with Bekzadian and Babalian, Luke expressed his “amaze­ ment at this reversal of their previous decision ... and said that the Armenian government’s consent to the Bolshevik occupation of Na­ khichevan, which opened their road into northwest Persia and into Tur­ key, almost amounted to an act of treachery against Great Britain, and was especially deplorable at the time when Armenia had just received a large consignment of British munitions.’’ The Armenians, he added, explained that they had reached the limit of their resistance and pro­ fessed their continued loyalty to the Allies. They hoped to gain time in order to organize an effective defense in case the Bolsheviks failed to honor their pledges. “Though the Armenians were undoubtedly hard pressed, I am not satisfied that their military position was as desperate as they claim.’’13 In the Foreign Office, one of the clerks recalled that in 1918—1919 the British commanders in the Caucasus had backed Azer­ baijani pretensions to most of the disputed territories. Undersecretary of State Lord Hardinge of Penshurst conceded that the Armenians prob­ ably had no choice in the matter. “But there is no disguising the fact that the situation is very serious as far as Persia is concerned and I think the Official at Tiflis was quite right in making out to the Armenian Govt, that we have been badly let down by them.” Foreign Secretary Earl Cur­ zon of Kedleston scrawled the final minute: “I agree entirely with the Tiflis view. It puts an end to our help to Armenia.” The Foreign Office wired Commander Luke on August 19 that his stern language was ap­ proved.14 The Armenian government put together a dossier of materials that reviewed Armenian-Soviet relations from the time of Shant’s departure

12 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, and Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 29, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920; Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 128—129. De Martel characterized the treaty as “la défection arménienne” and claimed that the Armenians entered into negotiations without warning or consultation. Although the French publicly asserted that they had no knowledge of the negotiations, in fact on August 9 Corbel had reported that such negotiations had been in progress since August 6. See Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Corbel’s report of Aug. 9, 1920. From Constantinople, Admiral Mark Bristol wrote American Consul Charles Moser: “The action of the Armenian Government is cer­ tainly typical, is it not?” 1SFO 371/4959, E10726/134/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 11, 1920. See also Great Britain, War Office, 1000, nos. 6455 and 6467. 14 FO 371/4958, E9959/134/58.

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for Moscow in April to the signing of the provisional agreement in Au­ gust. The documents focused on Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts to unite over Armenia by means of the Red Army. In view of the extraordinary pressure exerted from all sides and the fact that the Armenian army was alone and heavily outnumbered, the government had accepted the tem­ porary arrangement in order to win some time. Armenia would none­ theless maintain its firm anti-Bolshevik policies and work to create an effective bloc in association with the Georgian republic and the khan of Maku.15 Hamazasp Ohandjanian justified Armenia’s action to George Gracey, the British representative in Erevan, and wrote to Luke and to Colonel Emile Corbel, chief of the French military mission in Transcaucasia, that unfortunately events in the south of Armenia had been misinterpreted. Armenia had repeatedly drawn attention to the impending link between the Kemalists, Azerbaijan, and Soviet Russia and had underscored the strategic importance of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan in that context. Yet the British commanders had helped Azerbaijan take control in Karabagh and had prevented the regular Armenian army from oc­ cupying Zangezur. The repeated Armenian appeals for assistance had been left unanswered. The Armenian army on its own had pressed over Vedibasar into Sharur and Nakhichevan in an effort to block the SovietTurkish union. But the state of constant alert on all the frontiers and the overextension of the lines in the south forced General Nazarbekian to halt the advance on Nakhichevan. Because of the active engagement of the Red Army and the fact that the shipment of British war materials had not been fully integrated into the armed forces, it was necessary to shorten the southern perimeter and to accept a temporary truce.16 During the last week of August, members of the French and British missions in the Caucasus arrived separately in Erevan to admonish and to exhort. Colonel Corbel, Consul Louis Nettement, and three junior officers detrained on August 24 to investigate firsthand the disposition of the Armenian government and to voice their disappointment over the Armenian-Soviet agreement and Armenia’s refusal to purchase French rifles. Reiterating the factors that had necessitated the provi­ sional agreement, Prime Minister Ohandjanian emphasized its positive aspects—namely, recognition of Armenia’s independence and the right 15 Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 30—31, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920. When Luke forwarded these explanations to the Foreign Office on September 6 (Ei 1868/134/58), Dwight Osborne wrote in the minutes: “The Armenian justification of their treaty with the Soviet is convincing.” See also US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, File 711, Toumanoff to Moser, Aug. 11 and 18, 1920. 16 FO 371/4959, E10734/134/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 16, enclosing Toumanoff to Luke, Aug. 14, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17.

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to operate the Erevan-Julfa railway. During the three-day visit, the French mission met with General Nazarbekian, Catholicos Gevorg V, and other officials and came away reassured that Armenia had not changed its political orientation. Nonetheless, Corbel suggested that the govern­ ment issue an appropriate declaration to allay suspicions and the bad impression that had been created in Europe. He was certain that the Soviets were not serious about the agreement; otherwise they would not have played Levon Shant along for two months. It was essential that Armenia and Georgia combine into an effective anti-Bolshevik bloc. Cor­ bel left two officers in Erevan to maintain better communication with the government, and Consul Nettement announced that he would soon return as the representative of the French political mission headed by Count de Martel. Before departing, the visitors again intimated that Ar­ menia should buy the Lebel rifles that France was offering.17 Commander Luke followed on August 31, bringing with him a British draft agreement relating to the use of Armenia’s ports and trade and transit privileges. He scolded Ohandjanian, declaring that the August 10 agreement was inexplicable and unjustifiable and that he had so advised Lord Curzon. Ohandjanian recited the reasons for and advan­ tages of the agreement and as evidence of Armenian loyalty pointed to the stem measures his government had taken against the Bolshevik or­ ganizers of the May revolt. Luke also complained of Bolshevik ferment in the Lori neutral zone and strongly recommended putting an end to the anarchic conditions there by reaching an accord with Georgia to allow for the dissolution (by partition) of the zone.18* Returning to Tiflis on September 2, Luke reported to the Foreign Office that the Armenian government had urged him to support its ef­ forts to get Legran to recognize Armenia’s rightful claims to Karabagh and Zangezur. The Armenians were confident that they could take pos­ session of these districts in the event that developments compelled the 17 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, File 22/22, Bulletin no. 12, App. 2, Sept. 1, 1920, and File 67/3«, Corbel to Minister of War of Armenia, Oct. 14, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 35—37; “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 51—53; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Political report no. 8, and 17N/590, dossier 3, de Martel to Foreign Minister of Armenia, Aug. 21, and Corbel’s report of Aug. 18, 1920. See also FO 371/ 4960, Ei2652/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 8, 1920. The French mission left Lieutenant Charles Valadier in Erevan as its representative. After returning to Tiflis, Colo­ nel Corbel wrote his superiors: “Il ne s’agit pas d’une trahison du gouvernement arménien envers l’Entente, mais d’une faillite de volonté qu’expliquent amplements les difficultés de la situation politique, économique et militaire.” He added that, except for Ohandjanian and two or three of his colleagues, the members of the government gave more the im­ pression of city councilmen than men of state. See 7N/829, dossier 3, “Exposé de la situation politique pour la période du 16 au 31 août, 1920,” dated Sept. 4, 1920. 18 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 12, App. 3,Sept. 1, 1920; “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 53-56.

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Moscow government to withdraw the Red Army from Azerbaijan, yet they would hesitate to act without Allied recognition of their claims. Luke wrote that he had withheld such support on the grounds that the Allies were reserving the right to intervene and draw the boundaries in case direct Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations failed. He did not, moreover, wish to prejudice any claims of a future non-Bolshevik Azerbaijani gov­ ernment. It was difficult, Luke admitted, not to sympathize with the Armenian desire to checkmate the Bolsheviks by taking control of Ka­ rabagh.19 In the Foreign Office the chief of the Eastern division, Dwight Osborne, concurred that His Majesty’s Government was not in a position to recognize Armenian claims to the disputed territories. If Russia was forced to withdraw from Azerbaijan, an “independent Tartar govern­ ment’’ would presumably be formed, and it could then negotiate a set­ tlement with Armenia. Osborne did concede that as long as Azerbaijan was under Soviet rule, it would be preferable that the Armenians control the disputed region. The Foreign Office took no action except to notify Luke on September 16 that his handling of the matter was approved.20 There was also skepticism in the Soviet camp. Ordzhonikidze sug­ gested that the Red Army occupy Shahtaght in order to meet the Turkish objection that leaving the Shahtaghtjulfa railway under Armenian juris­ diction effectively blocked Anatolia’s only avenue of direct linkage with Azerbaijan and Russia. Legran, however, warned that this would be a serious breach of the treaty and probably abort the negotiations that 19 FO 371/4959, Ei 1304/134/58, Luke to FO, Sept. 9, 1920. For Luke’s description of his meetings in Erevan and side trips to Etchmiadzin, Ani, and Kars, see his Cities and Men: An Autobiography, II (London, 1953), pp. 178—183. Regarding the party Dashnaktsutiun and the Bureau-Government, he wrote, in part (pp. 178—179): This Party, whose full name is Dashnakzutiun, a word meaning ‘Federation’, was founded as a patriotic secret society in the eighteen-nineties in order to prepare the way, if necessary by violent means, for the ultimate liberation of the Armenians living under Turkish and Russian rule. ... Without the early spade-work and ruthless determination of the Dashnakzutiun it is possible that there might not have been an independent Armenia; at the same time it was unfortunate that at this stage, when the struggling Republic needed to draw upon every possible resource on which it had any claim, the direction of affairs should be monopolized by a group holding such intransigent party principles instead of in the hands of a National Government to which all classes of Armenians could have contributed their quota... .‘None but extreme Socialists need apply’ could be said to be the watchword of the Party; but, despite all this, I must confess that Ohandjanian’s Administration, when I became personally acquainted with it at the beginning of September, proved on the whole a pleasant surprise. Isolated from contact with possible friends and supporters, Armenia seemed likely to fall an easy prey to Bol­ shevism. ... But the Armenian Ministry ... took the most drastic measures against in­ ternal Bolshevism (witness the manner in which it suppressed the Alexandropol rising) and refused to be bullied by Moscow. The Dashnak Party had many faults, but its na­ tionalism, its anti-Bolshevism and its courage were above reproach.

20 FO 371 /4959, E11304/134/58, minutes and enclosure.

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lOl

were to continue in Erevan. Such a move would only advance the cause of the Western powers, which were inciting the Turks and Armenians against each other and trying to turn the Turks against Soviet Russia. Chicherin telegraphed both Ordzhonikidze and Legran that, in view of the revolts in the Kuban and the anti-Soviet military operations of Gen­ eral Wrangel, the Soviet government and the Communist Party Central Committee had decided to honor the August 10 agreement. Legran should proceed to Erevan and do everything necessary to secure transit privileges over Armenia to Turkey and immediately gain the right to send diplomatic couriers to both Armenia and Turkey. It was also im­ portant to establish a direct telegraphic link with Mustafa Kemal’s gov­ ernment in Angora.21 On their part, the Azerbaijani and Turkish authorities were no less discontent with the Armenian-Soviet agreement than were the Allied representatives. The document was predicated, after all, on Soviet rec­ ognition of Armenian independence and left Vedibasar, Sharur, and Nakhichevan as far as Shahtaght (the primary avenue of communication between Turkey and Azerbaijan) under Armenian occupation. But that was not the full extent of the injury, for the Armenians had been au­ thorized to reopen the railroad to Julfa. Halil Pasha wrote the Eleventh Red Army on August 13 that Turkey, despite the interference of the Entente Powers, was continuing the struggle to establish direct contact with Soviet Russia in order to gain moral and material support. The failure to do so had emboldened the counterrevolutionary elements and, because of Turkey’s lack of adequate artillery, had allowed the en­ ero/ to capture a number ofcities on the western front in Anatoiia. ff conditions did not change soon, the spirit of the Turkish army and pop­ ulation would fall, the partisans of the Entente would be strengthened, and the “revolutionary government’’ in Angora would lose its prestige and collapse. In order for Russia to save the situation, it was essential that the Red Army create a small window to Turkey by taking control of Shahtaght and occupying the county of Sharur. The English, under­ standing the strategic importance of the Shahtaght narrow-gauge railway as a potential link between Russia and Turkey, were encouraging the Armenians to hold firmly to Shahtaght, the key to the entire region. Halil added that in discussions in Moscow with “Comrades Chicherin and Karakhan,” it had been agreed to preserve the status quo. The Turk­ ish forces, in deference to the wishes of Soviet Russia, had not initiated military action against the Dashnaks, whereas the Armenian government had taken advantage of the situation to roll over Zangibasar, Sharur, and Shahtaght. Halil urged the Red Army to occupy Shahtaght and Sharur 21 Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 132-135; Aghayan, op. át., pp. 277—278.

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for military and political reasons. Such action would secure the link be­ tween revolutionary Turkey and the Red Army, make enormous quan­ tities of rice and bread available to the Red Army, keep Dashnak Ar­ menia separated from Persia, and raise the prestige of the Red Army and of Soviet Russia in Persia, thereby diminishing British influence and hastening the revolution. Shahtaght and the railway from that station to Julfa on the Persian frontier should not under any circumstances be left to the Armenians.22 General Kiazim Karabekir was even more angered than Halil by the August 10 treaty and suspected that the Russians were being double­ faced, on the one hand offering support to the Turkish resistance, on the other preparing to deliver all of Nakhichevan to the Armenians. Halil Pasha’s report that Ordzhonikidze had intimated Nakhichevan might have to be ceded to Armenia to facilitate Soviet access to Anatolia only deepened Karabekir’s suspicion that a secret accord had been reached between Chicherin and Shant in Moscow or between Legran and the Armenian plenipotentiaries in Tiflis.23 On September 9, Kara­ bekir dispatched an identic telegram to Azerbaijani Revkom chairman Nariman Narimanov; to the staff of the Eleventh Red Army in Baku, its 28th Rifle Division in Shushi, and the division’s cavalry brigade in Na­ khichevan; to the head of the Turkish mission in Moscow, Bekir Sami Bey; to the Turkish commander in Baku, “Comrade Halil Pasha”; and to the Turkish delegation to the Congress of the Peoples of the East, then meeting in Baku. In it, he lodged a “hot protest” against the agree­ ment to transfer operation of the Nakhichevan-Julfa line to the Arme­ nian Railway Administration. He had received a report that Foreign Min­ ister Ohandjanian had informed Soviet Russia’s representative in Tiflis on September 6 that, in accordance with the fifth point of the August 10 treaty, the Armenian government would assume management of the railway in two days. Karabekir asserted that he was not apprised of the specific terms of the treaty, but he did know that a Soviet Azerbaijani official, Behbud Shahtaghtinskii, had on August 15 protested this agree­ ment to Soviet Russia, outlining the serious problems it created for the Soviet and Turkish sides. If the Dashnaks occupied the route to Julfa, Karabekir continued, then the Turkish detachment in Nakhichevan, whose primary assignment was to open the way between the Russian Red Army and Anatolia, would not be able to remain in that district. As long as the main railway connection over Kars was not made available to Tur-

22 Nagoryni Karabdkh, pp. 579—580. 23 Kâzim Karabekir, ïstiklâlHarbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 884—885; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Millî mücadele hâtzralan (Istanbul, 1953), p. 473; Yusuf Hikmet [Bayur], Yeni Turkiye devletinin harici siyaseti (Istanbul, 1934), p. 64.

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key and Russia, the Nakhichevanjulfa line should be kept out of Ar­ menian hands.24 Karabekir would now rely on Major Veysel Bey and other Turkish officers in Nakhichevan to prevent implementation of the ominous treaty.

The Aftermath

The Armenian-Soviet treaty of August 10 had little immediate effect in the field. Skirmishes continued along the northeastern, eastern, and southern frontiers. In the Kazakh-Ijevan sector on August 11, a Red Army detachment and Azerbaijani partisans advanced into the villages of Aksibara, Kushchi-Airum, and Mazamlu, and the next day overtook Koshkotan (Ghoshghotan) and Karadash. The Armenian 6th Infantry Regiment regained control of all the villages at nightfall of August 12. Thereafter, the Aksibara vale was the site of continual contests lasting from a few hours to a few days. At the same time, in the southern sector, Muslim armed units, occasionally aided by artillery support from the Red Army, harassed Dro’s men in Daralagiaz and threatened the single re­ maining route between Erevan and Zangezur, where, deep in the moun­ tains, Nzhdeh continued to resist Soviet control.25 In several protests to Legran and Chicherin, Prime Minister and For­ eign Minister Ohandjanian enumerated the many violations of the cease­ fire. The second article of the August 10 agreement specified that in the Kazakh-Ijevan sector the two sides would return to positions held on July 30, yet General Mikhail D. Velikanov’s 20th Rifle Division made re­ peated incursions into the villages on Armenian territory.26 Legran an­ swered on August 16 and 24 that there may have been some difficulty in communicating the terms of the agreement to the military com­ manders but that Ohandjanian was making too much of minor infrac­ tions. The Red Army command had reported that the demarcation line had not been breached. Nonetheless, to avoid any further misunder­ standing, Legran was instructing all Red Army commanders to end all hostilities and comply fully with provisions of the temporary agree24 Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 591—592. 25 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25, enclosures; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 260-261,264—266, 268, 325—326; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, File 711, Bulletins of Armenian mission in Georgia; FO 371/4959, E10733/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Aug. 12, 1920. 26 Armenia Archives, 200/1/437, pp. 58-61,200/1/581, pp. 287, 292, and 200/1/607, p. 29, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, C46(C8).i, Randolph to Secretary of State, Aug. 14, 1920, enclo­ sure.

3. THE NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER

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IO5

ment.27 Such assurances aside, armed encounters continued into the month of September at Aksibara, Boganis-Airum, Kushchi-Airum, Kotkend, and other border settlements. On September 20, Ohandjanian protested that, even though all these villages were on the Armenian side of the frontier as it had existed on July 30, General Velikanov had threat­ ened to murder Armenian prisoners if the Armenian armed forces did not withdraw. Such an ultimatum was not only a gross violation of the August 10 agreement but also a severe breach of international law re­ garding the treatment of prisoners of war.28 In his reply, Boris Legran reminded the Armenian government that it had been responsible for the long delay in beginning the negotiations for a permanent peace and that this holdup had given rise to many complications and was jeopardizing the relations between the two gov­ ernments. Only now, at the end of September, had Ohandjanian invited the Soviet mission to Erevan. Legran then revealed a significant shift in position. No longer ascribing the action in the Aksibara vale to difficul­ ties in communication or simple misunderstandings, he chided the Ar­ menian government for its “one-sided interpretation” of the August 10 agreement. As it turned out, on July 30 the villages in question had not been controlled by the Armenian army, whose aggressive action to com­ pel the Red Army units to withdraw was a serious transgression. Legran expressed regret that the Armenian government had tried to settle the dispute by force rather than through diplomatic means. Inasmuch as negotiations for a permanent peace would soon begin in Erevan, Ar­ menia should cease its attacks and leave it up to the duly authorized plenipotentiaries to determine under whose jurisdiction the villages lay. In an angry reaction to Legran’s new claims, the Armenian general staff supplied detailed descriptions of the army’s positions on July 30, show­ ing that the disputed villages had been under firm Armenian control. Minister of Military Affairs Ruben Ter-Minasian wrote the cabinet that Legran should be told to bring with him to Erevan real proof rather than fabricated claims.29 Armenia was no more successful in attempts to reopen the railroad to Julfa. Soviet and Turkish detachments at Nakhichevan blocked the 27 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, and Armenia Archives 200/1/581, pp. 296, 303, Legran to Bekzadian, Aug. 16, 1920, and Legran to Ohandjanian, Aug. 24, 1920; FO 371 /4960, E12652/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 8,1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, no. 1085, Sept. 1, 1920; “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 47—48. For Ohandjanian’s reply, see Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 298—299. 28 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30; FO 371/4960, E12813/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 23, 1920. 29 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30; Armenia Archives, 200/1 /597, pp. 26-27; FO 371/4962, Ei3994/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Stokes, Oct. 2, 1920; Simon Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov: Depker, demker, aprumner,N (Beirut, i960), pp. 155—158.

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route, and Muslim partisans from beyond the Araxes River attacked the work crews repairing the railway between Erevan and Shahtaght. Shordy after the August 10 agreement Ohandjanian wrote Legran to request that the required instructions be issued to the appropriate Soviet civilian and military authorities to assist in the implementation of the fifth point of the accord relative to operation of the railroad by the Armenian Rail­ way Administration. On September 11, Legran replied that he had given such directives immediately after signing the agreement. Armenia could begin operations without interference from the local Soviet officials.30 The Armenian commander on the southern front, Major General Shelkovnikian, telegraphed from Shahtaght to Nakhichevan on Septem­ ber 15 to ask the head of the cavalry brigade of the Red Army’s 28th Division what arrangements were being made, in accordance with the August 10 treaty and Legran’s directives, to allow the Armenian Railway Administration to begin operation of the Shahtaght-Nakhichevan-Julfa line. When would it be possible for the railway workers and agents to assume their posts, when could the actual movement of trains com­ mence, and what steps were being taken to safeguard the employees and the line itself? The brigade’s assistant commander replied that the rail­ way administration could begin operations whenever it pleased. The Red Army would place guards and sentries along the tracks to protect the workers and the line, but no other guarantees could be offered.31 Despite these and Legran’s assurances, the barricades between Shahtaght and Nakhichevan did not come down. Instead, the Turkish military presence in Nakhichevan was augmented after Eleventh Army headquarters or­ dered General Nesterovskii on September 9 to dispatch the Red Army’s Turkish regiment over Goris-Angelaut-Karmalinovka to Nakhichevan to join the Turkish Nationalist force.32 The difficulties associated with implementation of the August 10 treaty were accompanied by ongoing mutual accusations of bad faith, particularly in the treatment of ideological opponents and political pris­ oners. The murders of Khoreni and Shirinian on the one hand and of Alaverdian, Musayelian, and Gharibdjanian on the other drew reciprocal protests and professions of innocence. Legran promised to investigate Ohandjanian’s charges, and Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin re­ plied that, though he had no specific information on the subject, he believed that if excesses had occurred the Bolsheviks were not respon­ sible. It was likely that the alleged murders in Zangezur had taken place 30 Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 85, Bulletin no. 13, Sept. 15, 1920, and 200/1/621, p. 3; FO 371/4960, E12652/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 8, 1920; “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 57. 31 Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 590—591. 32 Ibid., p. 589.

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during the fighting between Armenians and Tatars before the arrival of the Red Army.33 In Ohandjanian’s subsequent protests about Soviet treatment of mem­ bers of the Dashnaktsutiun, he cited the Baku newspaper Kommunist, which had announced by name the execution of thirteen Dashnakists arrested in Karabagh. Moreover, the Soviets had adopted the brutal, medieval practice of persecuting and punishing family members of the victims. According to the August 10 agreement, the Red Army was to serve as a neutral keeper of the peace, but in fact it was wreaking havoc upon the population and allowing the Azerbaijanis and Armenian Bol­ sheviks to setde old scores. Ohandjanian demanded the withdrawal of all Azerbaijani and Armenian Bolshevik detachments from Zangezur and Karabagh and the safe conduct of individuals who wished to relocate to within the zones held by the Armenian army.34 The Armenian press denounced the “Bolshevik descendants of Gen­ ghis Khan and Leng Timur of the Middle Ages,’’ who within a few days had plundered scores of Armenian villages and carried away everything to Baku. In the Sisian district alone, 240 Dashnakists assertedly had been arrested, and many of them had been shot in the presence of their relatives and compatriots. People had begun to look back on the re­ pressive days of Tsar Nicholas II with yearning. It was “Balakhani’s golden fountains of petroleum’’ that had first enraptured the British commanders and commissioners to demand the inclusion of Karabagh in Azerbaijan and then inspired proletarian Russia to support the Musavatists masquerading as Bolsheviks. The Pan-Islamic Communists of Azerbaijan were endeavoring to sever Karabagh politically from Armenia by suppressing the Dashnaktsutiun, to ruin Karabagh economically by plundering the district in the name of “gifts’’ to Soviet Russia, the Red Army, and Lenin, and to neutralize Karabagh militarily by disarming and terrorizing the population. Haradj lamented: “Poor Karabagh. You are left masterless and forlorn, forgotten and persecuted. Your true lord, Armenia, is very distant and unable to help you at this moment. Those who are now your ‘masters’ are your grave diggers. Poor Karabagh! Will there not come a day when you will show that you are indomitable and triumphant Karabagh, inseparable from Mother Armenia?”35 On August 23, Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin wrote Ohandja89 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, 67/30, Legran to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Aug. 15,1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/560,9. 176, and 200/1/581, pp. 251—254,275276, 304; US Archives, RG 59, 890C.00/6, Moser to Secretary of State, Sept. 6, 1920, enclosure. M Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/3a; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 229—230, and 200/1/607, pp. 28—29, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920. “ Haradj, Aug. 29:2, 1920.

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nian that the Soviet government was filled with sentiments of friendship and brotherhood toward the Armenian people and would do everything possible to remove the obstacles to the establishment of cordial relations. Though the Sovnarkom was willing to investigate thoroughly all accu­ sations involving Russian troops in Transcaucasia, it could not but ex­ press sorrow and concern over the Armenian government’s persecution of persons supporting the Soviet program. Hopefully, the presence of Legran’s mission in Transcaucasia and of an Armenian diplomatic rep­ resentative in Moscow, Eghiazar Eghiazarian, would help to eliminate the unfortunate misunderstandings.36 In his own correspondence with the Armenian government, Legran denounced the killings of Alaverdian and his comrades not only as a violation of the spirit of the preliminary treaty but also as a serious blow to Soviet efforts to assist Armenia. Since the agreement, no Armenian political prisoner had been harmed in Azerbaijan or Russia, whereas in Armenia Bolsheviks were still being subjected to bloody repression. Legran warned that the continuation of such excesses might force the Soviet government to retaliate against Armenians imprisoned in Russia.37

The Battle for Zangezur

According to the August 10 treaty, all Armenian armed forces were to leave Zangezur, which temporarily would be occupied by the Red Army. Dro’s troops had already drawn back to Daralagiaz, but the partisans of Lieutenant Colonel Garegin Nzhdeh still controlled the Ghapan-Meghri sectors of southern Zangezur. The mountaineers of these districts had withstood several Turkish and Azerbaijani attempts to seize the highland and under the leadership of General Andranik, Dro, and Nzhdeh had driven out much of the Turkic population from the vales linking Ghapan with Goris. General Nesterovskii’s counteroffensive in August 1920 pushed Nzhdeh back to the Katar mines in Ghapan. Seemingly invinci­ ble against the Azerbaijani armed forces that had tried to capture Zan­ gezur, Nzhdeh now faced a greater challenge: Many Armenian villagers ,6 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 310, 317— 318, and 200/1/607, p. 31, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, €46(08).!, Randolph to Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1920, enclosure; FO 371/ 4960, Ei2652/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 8, 1920; Bor’ba, Aug. 29:4, 1920. The date of this communication is given as August 26, 1920, in “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 48-49. 37 Armenia Archives, 200/1/560, p. 178, and 200/1/581, pp. 281—283, 286, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, Legran to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Aug. 16 and 26, 1920; “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 47, 49; [H]A. M. Elchibekian, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Erevan, 1963), p. 150; M. V. Arzumanian, Sargis Musayelian (Erevan, 1955), pp. 64—66.

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regarded the appearance of the Red Army as the return of Russian law and order after several years of political turmoil and economic disloca­ tion. Armenian Bolsheviks advancing with the Red Army distributed cir­ culars declaring that the Soviet forces had come as the sincere friend of the Armenian people to stop the senseless interracial bloodshed and appealing to the populace to turn away from the counterrevolutionary elements around the “bandit Nzhdeh.’’38 Nzhdeh had just retreated to Ghapan on August 10 when the Arme­ nian general staff relayed the following order via Dro’s headquarters in Keshishkend: “The Minister of War commands you to establish contact with Nzhdeh to inform him that according to the signed truce he is to gather his forces, together with all others who so desire, and taking pre­ cautionary measures is to pass to our territory, bringing with him all the weapons.’’39 Receiving the message five days later, Nzhdeh was struck with disbelief. On August 17 he wrote the Ministry of War, with copies to Generals Nazarbekian and Silikian, Dro, Daralagiaz Commissar Ge­ rasim Balayan, and the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun, that he did not know what “truce’’ was being referred to, with whom that truce had been concluded, or what its terms and duration were. Moreover, if the Armenian forces were to leave their land and withdraw, then where and when were the Bolshevik and Azerbaijani bands to withdraw? What was to happen to Ghapan, Arevik (Meghri), and Goghtan? Was not the war ministry suspicious that the enemy would take advantage of Nzhdeh’s departure to crush the courageous, insurgent people of the historic Kapargoght district? And could the Erevan government adhere to a truce at a time when the Bolsheviks were plundering the whole of Zangezur? Nzhdeh concluded with what was to be the first of many similar, futile appeals for assistance: “The people are awaiting the arrival of Armenian forces to drive out the enemy.’’40 On August 20 he wrote again that he did not know where Armenian-Soviet relations were headed, but he did know that if he gave up his strong positions on the heights of Kapargoght, it would be impossible to protect Geghvadzor and Goghtan, and Azerbaijan would finally grasp its long-coveted prize. Nzhdeh asserted MAvo [Tumayan], Nzhdeh (Beirut, 1968), pp. 106-109; H. B. Abrahamian, “Garegin Nzhdehe Siunikum (1919 t. ogostos-1921 t. hulis),” Lraber, no. 3 (1991), p. 6. 89 Avo, op. át., p. 309, stating that the message was received on Aug. 15, 1920. The copy in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1, shows the order signed by Minister of Military Affairs Ter-Minasian on August 10 and relayed on August 11 from the chief of staff of the Zangezur otriad, Colonel A. I. Mirimanian, to the head of the Kapan (Ghapan) otriad, Nzhdeh. See also Vardan Gevorgian, Lemahayastani herosamarte (1919—1921) (Erevan, 1991), p. 68 (first published in Bucharest, 1923). 40 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1, Nzhdeh to Ministry of Military Affairs, Aug. 17, 1920; Gevorgian, op. át., p. 69. G. Nzhdeh, “Hai-Bolshevikian krivnere,” Hairenik Amsagir, I (Oct. 1923), p. 98, states that the letter was sent by courier to Erevan on August 18.

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that his partisans were drawing off nearly half of the hostile armed forces, barring which the brunt of the combined Azerbaijani-Turkish-Soviet pressure would fall fully upon the Armenian republic and the regular army.41 On August 2 5 the villagers and partisans of Ghapan gathered in the village of Kavart for the traditional blessing of the troops. There, Nzhdeh harangued his men, again invoking the spirits of ancient and modern heroes. Nzhdeh, wearing a red sash, was proclaimed sparapet, the title given historically to the commander in chief of the national armies, and received the oath of fidelity from his partisans.42 That same day, he ad­ dressed the Armenian military, foreign, and internal affairs ministries, the presidium of Parliament, and the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun to caution that Azerbaijani and Bolshevik agents were flooding the district with money for bribery and with propaganda asserting that the Arme­ nian government had renounced its claim to Zangezur. The braves of Zangezur, Nzhdeh wrote, had only curses for those who would abandon the struggle, but they had not given up hope that the Armenian army would soon come to their assistance. “You cannot forsake Zangezur in­ definitely, for if you do you yourselves will bring the country to ruin and strengthen Azerbaijan and Turkey.’’ Zangezur in enemy hands would open the road over Sisian and eliminate all possibility of Armenia’s in­ corporation of Nakhichevan and the lower Araxes River Valley.43 While Nzhdeh was trying to inspire confidence among his men and making repeated pleas for assistance from Erevan, the Red Army pre­ pared to pacify the southern sector of Zangezur—Ghapan, Genvaz, Arevik—and link up with the Turco-Azerbaijani detachments advancing from the direction of Ordubad. General Nesterovskii, announcing to his officers on August 11 that Dro’s adventure had been liquidated, gave instructions for the occupation of Zangezur in cordons in order to liq­ uidate the last of the Dashnak bands and secure communications be­ tween Goris and Nakhichevan. At the same time, the 20th Rifle Division would occupy and tranquilize the territory along Armenia’s northeastern frontier.44 Nesterovskii followed on August 26 with detailed operational plans to capture Nzhdeh and dump his men into the Araxes River. The 84th Brigade would set out from Goris on August 31 in two wings, the right one advancing over Khot-Halidzor-Tandzatap to the Okhchi River and the left one over Eivazlar-Zeiva (Davit Bek)-Ardsvanik, keeping in constant communication with one another. The two wings would attack 41 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1. See also his letter of complaint against Dro and others who had abandoned Zangezur, in “Hai-Bolshevikian krivnere,” p. 97. 42 Avo, op. át., pp. 118—119. 43 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1; Avo, op. át., p. 117; Gevorgian, op. át., p. 72. 44 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” p. 47.

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the Katar mines from the northeast and the northwest at dawn on Sep­ tember 3 and press the enemy into a vise, preventing its escape with weapons and artillery. Soviet order would be proclaimed in the liberated areas, and political commissars would acquaint the population with the workings of the system. The attack should be swift and decisive, and no measure should be spared to capture Nzhdeh. “Reliable and devoted persons’’ could be sent ahead to capture him.45 General Nesterovskii’s timetable was disrupted by the strong resistance both columns encountered. The partisans were on their own terrain and knew every twist and turn on the primitive roads and byways. They stalled the Red Army at Zeiva for three days before finally drawing back to the Zalingeol pass. The two columns of the 84th Brigade advanced slowly toward Ghapan, finding that a number of villages were willing to submit by extending the symbolic offering of bread and salt. By nightfall on September 6, the left column had occupied Ardsvanik, Chapni, Erkenants, Sevakar, and Barabatum (Paravatump), and the right wing had taken Verin (Upper) and Nerkin (Lower) Khotanan, Chorastan (Khlatagh), Shrvenants, Aradjadzor, and Norashenik (see map 2). With the strategic heights of Indjabel and Geghvadzor in control of the Red Army, Nzhdeh escaped to the safety of Mount Khustup. Soviet order was pro­ claimed in Ghapan, and Bagrat Harutiunian was named chairman of the district’s revolutionary committee.46 The loss of Ghapan left Nzhdeh with only the southernmost GenvazArevik district, centered around Meghri, a key village between Muslim Ordubad in the west and Azerbaijani Niuvadi in the east. The partisans of Meghri held positions at a mountain pass on one front and at Shvanidzor on the other. Unable to stand against the Red Army in conven­ tional warfare, Nzhdeh resorted to sending nighttime raids behind en­ emy lines and rolling explosive-filled barrels into the enemy camp. Central to Nzhdeh’s strategy was the defense of Kadjaran village, which linked Zangezur and the Armenian settlements of Goghtan and con­ trolled the route to Ordubad. In three days of uninterrupted batde, Nzhdeh’s partisans were able to halt the advance of the 84th Brigade from the north and the Azerbaijani and Turkish regulars and militia from the east and west.47 45 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 46 Nzhdeh, “Hai-Bolshevikian krivnere,” pp. 98—100; Gevorgian, op. cit., pp. 74—75; Ste­ mel [Stepan Melik-Parsadanian], “Garegin Nzhdehe Zangezurum,” Hairenik Amsagir, XLI (Jan. 1963), pp. 17—27; A. V. Vardapetian, Hayastani Karmir Banake kaghakatsiakan krivnerum 1920—1921 tvakannerin (Erevan, i960), pp. 18—19; Soghomonian, Kaghaka­ tsiakan krivnere Zangezurum 1920—1921 tvakannerin (Erevan, 1958), pp. 49—54. Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 175—176, states that Colonel Semenov’s striking group occupied Ghapan on September 5. 47 G. Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lemahayastani goyamarten,” Hairenik Amsagir, II (Jan. 1924), pp. 126-129; Avo, op. át., pp. 117—118.

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Nzhdeh reported to Ter-Minasian, Nazarbekian, and the Bureau that his men had annihilated a Bolshevik column at the Zalingeol tributary of the Okhchi River and claimed heavy casualties at Zeiva but that they had fought alone for seventy days and their ammunition was almost exhausted. The Bolsheviks had gathered in all the dregs of society—the professional traitors, thieves, and bandits. The “false socialist charla­ tans’’ spoke in the name of the peasants, but the peasants did not want to hear of them. Bolshevik propagandists were declaring that the Re­ public of Armenia had given up Zangezur and had repudiated any armed detachments operating there. The Red Army, the provocateurs asserted, had no hostile intent toward the Armenian republic but simply wanted to enforce the August 10 agreement and free the people from “the bandit Nzhdeh.’’ They were threatening to put to the torch any village that did not cooperate. Nzhdeh again appealed for assistance, reporting that his heavily outnumbered braves had been compelled to withdraw to the mountains of Arevik, where the batde was continuing. Matters were made more critical by the fact that the harvest season had arrived, and if the villagers were unable to reap and gather in the crops for the next two months, they would face certain famine and starvation during the severe winter.48 From his haven on Mount Khustup, Nzhdeh also addressed the people of Ghapan on September 17. In his unique style, he deplored their aban­ donment of the struggle despite the fact that for years his warriors had protected them against the Turks and Tatars, had cleared their land of enemy elements, and had kept open the routes of communication. How could it be that the courageous people of yesterday who had stoically withstood great privation were now groveling at the feet of their mortal enemies? People! Today when the Bolsheviks, bribed with Azerbaijani money, your grave diggers, are knocking on your doors with false and deceitful promises and ex­ pecting to receive bread and salt defiled by your hands, you have treacherously abandoned your wounded commander. ... Ungrateful people! How many times upon my return from battle have your wives and children embraced the neck of my horse, kissing my hand and exclaim­ ing “Dear Pasha!’’ How many times have I saved you from imminent danger, from massacre! ... Woe upon you, people; what answer will you give to your God, to your conscience, to history! People! Time will pass and the enemy, having disarmed you and deprived you of your leaders, when the name of the “Titanic Pasha’’ is no longer heard, will find a thousand and one ways to annihilate you. At that time, you will remember your commander, whose sword has expanded your land seven-fold, creating ab­ 48 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1, Nzhdeh’s Sept. 11 and 15, 1920. See also Ge­ vorgian, op. át., p. 76.

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11$

solute security for you; at that time, you will turn your gaze upon Khustup and the dark clouds nestled over its peak; you will look, you will call, but instead of your commander, the faint echoes of your mountains, and during your wander­ ing you will suddenly find my frozen body under some bush or boulder; you will fall to your knees and weep bloody tears. People! Before abandoning me, betraying me, you failed to fulfill my request: You did not send your master craftsmen with blunt instruments to gouge out my eyes, to blind me, so that I shall not witness the havoc to be visited upon you, your moral fall. I forgive you, even though history will not, and I ask that when you find me killed, bury my body on the highest peak of Khustup, whence can be seen Ghapan, and Genvaz, and Goghtan, and Geghvadzor. And until that time, do not divert your gaze from Khustup. The more often and longer you look upon that proud and black-cloud-shrouded mountain, the sooner will come, will arrive your salvation. God and my love be with you, ungrateful people!49

Despite such dramatic appeals, Nzhdeh was not prepared to die. On September 19 the representatives of thirteen villages met at Kaier and decided to defend Genvaz.50 The following day Nzhdeh received a sim­ ilar pledge from the partisan chiefs of Meghri. The battle resumed on September 21 with simultaneous attacks on Meghri, Shvanidzor, and Khustup from three directions—Ordubad in the west, Niuvadi in the east, and Ghapan in the north. The advantage the Red Army and its allies held in numbers and munitions was offset by the ability of the Armenian fighters to pass over unknown mountain trails and to harass the enemy. A barrage of grenades and explosive-filled barrels threw the Bolshevik-Turkic detachments into disarray and retreat before dawn on September 25.51 Nzhdeh’s stubborn resistance annoyed and embarrassed General Nesterovskii, who sent reinforcements to Ghapan. The commander of the 32d Rifle Division reportedly arrived in Nakhichevan to request that the Turkish regulars under Major Veysel Bey collaborate with the two Red Army cavalry regiments there by striking from Ordubad to place Nzhdeh in an inescapable vise and open the route over Meghri to Azerbaijan. Veysel arrived in Ordubad at the end of September with the 2d Battalion, 34th Regiment, 1 ith Caucasus Division, and joined the campaign. When Nesterovskii resumed the general offensive in Zangezur at the beginning of October, the 28th Rifle Division was able to recapture the villages of 49 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten,” pp. 129—130; Avo, op. át., pp. 121—123; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 80—81. 50 Nzhdeh, “Hai-Bolshevikian krivnere,” pp. 101—102. Relying on his diary, Nzhdeh dates the meeting as September 6, possibly still according to the Gregorian calendar, which then differed from the Julian calendar by thirteen days. See also Soghomonian, op. át., p. 57, who dates the meeting as September 19. 51 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten,” pp. 131—132; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 83-84.

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Kurdikend, Pkhrut, and Hand and start to flank Mount Khustup. At the same time, one group of Nzhdeh’s partisans at Shvanidzor went over to the Red Army, and the village fought against itself for a week before the line stabilized, with the upper quarter remaining loyal to Nzhdeh and the lower quarter occupied by Soviet troops. On the Ordubad front, the combined Soviet-Turkish force, with two cannons and several machine guns, bombarded the Armenian positions. While Nzhdeh’s men blocked the route of ascent, the women and children went to the fields and tried to gather in as much of the harvest as possible. Taking advantage of their commanding positions, the Armenian defenders soon put to flight the Red Army cavalry and artillery and the Turkish infantry battalion.52 Through couriers who traveled over Persian Karadagh to Tabriz and over mountain byways to Daralagiaz, Nzhdeh again wrote the Armenian government and party Bureau to complain that Zangezur had been iso­ lated for a hundred days yet continued to battle alone. It was impossible to imagine what “insane” tactics and bravery had been required to en­ dure against the superior enemy. Courageous Genvaz-Arevik would fight to the end but begged for help before it was too late.53 Nzhdeh was disappointed in the message he received via Daralagiaz from Parliament member Enovk Mirakian, who explained that Armenia was not in a po­ sition to give real assistance. “As you have done until now, you must continue your heroic struggle alone. You should know, however, that the sentiments of our party and the entire Armenian people are with you.” Nzhdeh observed with sarcasm that Armenia produced better dip­ lomats than strategists. Erevan wished to be proper by telling Legran that it had nothing to do with Nzhdeh’s Zangezur rebellion and indeed opposed it.54 The Armenian government, then beset by Turkish military action on the Kars front, could in fact do little more than lodge formal protests. In one such telegram on October 10, Ohandjanian reminded Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin that according to the August 10 treaty the Russian Red Army was to occupy the Armenian territories of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan temporarily to maintain order until the res­ olution of Armenia’s border disputes with Azerbaijan. Despite the sol­ emn obligation to follow strict neutrality and remain within the limits of the three districts, the Red Army had from the outset taken cruel and repressive measures against the Armenian population. Azerbaijani

52 Soghomonian, op. át., pp. 58—62; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 84—85. 55 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1, Nzhdeh’s letters of Oct. 2 and 5, 1920. See also Gevorgian, op. cit., pp. 85—86. 54 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lern ah ayas tan i goyamarten,” pp. 133—134; Gevorgian, op. át., p. 86.

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troops, Kurdo-Tatar bands, and Turkish national forces and their agents, headed by Halil Pasha, were accorded broad entry and freedom of move­ ment in the region. These hostile elements were compelling the Arme­ nian peasantry, under threat of annihilation, to sign petitions asking for union with Soviet Azerbaijan. Villages that refused were subjected to fire and sword, and their leaders were shot, this with the knowledge and participation of the Russian Red Army. Listing a dozen settlements in Zangezur already plundered and razed, Ohandjanian decried the con­ tinuing attacks upon the villages in Ghapan. Elsewhere in Zangezur and in Karabagh, Armenians were being forc­ ibly conscripted into the Azerbaijani army and thrown against their own brother villagers. The Armenian government could not remain indiffer­ ent to such violations of the August 10 accord, especially at a time when the Sovnarkom’s plenipotentiary (Legran) was coming to Erevan to con­ clude a treaty of friendship. The odious behavior of the Soviet authori­ ties in Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan heavily clouded the at­ mosphere for establishing friendly mutual relations. As a strong proponent of peace and friendship between the Armenian and Russian peoples, the Armenian government was now appealing to the Sovnarkom to issue orders for an immediate end to the terrorization of the Armenian villages and population and the involuntary conscription of the Armenian inhabitants into the Azerbaijani army. All elements op­ posed to the Republic of Armenia, including the Turkish and Azerbai­ jani nationalist operatives headed by Halil Pasha, should be removed from the three districts.55 Nzhdeh's Revolt Pressed into the last corner of Zangezur, Nzhdeh, his supply of ammu­ nition and bread depleted, decided that the only way to avoid a final defeat was to break out of Genvaz and recapture Ghapan. Already at the end of September he had sent his trusted lieutenants to agitate behind enemy lines and to organize espionage, sabotage, and other under­ ground resistance operations. The peasantry had experienced quick dis­ illusionment with Soviet rule, which became synonymous with daily req­ uisitions of food and animals, the arrest of village leaders, and the confusing and contradictory arrangements of local revolutionary com­ mittees. The presence of many Azerbaijani and other Muslim soldiers in the Red Army only added to the unrest. Nzhdeh now once again addressed his disaffected people: 55 Nagprnyi Karabakh, pp. 592-593; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 332.

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Ghapan! You abandoned me and left me alone, but my fortune of war, my God remained with me, and for an entire month with unprecedented success I have been smiting the enemy on the battle front of heroic Genvaz. I do not know, Ghapan, whether or not you have come to terms with your condition, but the Armenian people is sorry, unspeakably remorseful, that you have naively stretched your neck under the ignoble yoke of the enemy, and you scattered your sea of glory, your name which is crowned in glory, to the four winds. From that day, from that black day of your fall, Ghapan, losing sleep and rest, moving over mountain and rock with a few hundred loyal braves of Genvaz, I have bared my breast to the superior forces of the enemy and in place of your lost glory am creating a new glory for your land, for your name. Ghapan! Have you repented your action? What has happened to the paradise promised by the Armenian scoundrels who had sold out to Azerbaijan? Poor people, it is said that they have already disarmed you, left you leaderless, and ruined you economically. Ah! But you have seen nothing yet. Your black days have not yet come, but they are coming and will soon arrive with the Tatar forces. To foot, deceived people, to foot, your salvation is near! To foot, with weapon in hand, ready and prepared, wait for me from Khustup!56

Such bravado incensed General Nesterovskii, who on October 5 in­ formed the new Eleventh Army commander, General Anatolii Il’ich Gek­ ker (Hecker), that the 28th Rifle Division was establishing Soviet rule in Ghapan and slowly backing Nzhdeh into a corner. Gekker replied by ordering that Nzhdeh should be cut to the root.57 Yet the 28th Division, supported by Armenian Bolshevik and Muslim detachments, was unable to mount an effective, coordinated offensive against Genvaz from three directions. The initiative passed to Nzhdeh, who in a council of war on the frozen heights of Mount Khustup decided to unfurl the flag of re­ bellion throughout Ghapan on October 10. With a small party, he de­ scended toward Ghapan through a thick fog on the night of October 9 and at the village of Giutkum (Geghanush) found the first group of armed men silently awaiting his arrival. The insurgents quickly captured the small Red Army detachment, which was asleep and taken by surprise in the village schoolhouse. Gathering rifles and machine guns, the rebels advanced toward the Ghapan mines. By daybreak, the villages of Shikahogh, Vachakan, Bekh, Kavart, Barabatum, and Baghaburdj, including members of their revolutionary committees and gendarmerie, had joined the rebellion. Still, the regional army headquarters and military revolutionary committee at the Ghapan mines were unaware of what was occurring. They, too, were startled awake by bursting barrel-bombs, rolled down from the heights of Kavart and Barabatum. A part of the Red Army garrison fled along the Okhchi River toward Geghvadzor; the 56 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten,” p. 134; Gevorgian, op. cit., p. 88. 57 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 50—51. On General Gekker, see Mnatsakanian, op. cit., pp. 250-254.

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rest surrendered. One company that tried to fight its way out of the encirclement gave in after most of its men had been killed or wounded.58 According to Nzhdeh’s figures, he took prisoner two infantry regi­ ments and one cavalry regiment—in all 400 men, 200 horses, 16 ma­ chine guns, a field kitchen with supplies, and the military archive. Within a day his force had grown from a single unit to thirty-seven companies. Bagrat Harutiunian, chairman of the district revolutionary committee, and Hakob Khurshudian, one of its members who was accused of having betrayed Vahan Khoreni and Arshak Shirinian, did not live out the day. By nightfall Zeiva and Ardsvanik were also in rebel hands. As the Red Army took up new defensive positions in the direction of Goris along the heights of Indjabel-Kizildash (Karmrakar), Nzhdeh hastened back to Meghri to direct operations on the western flank, where after three days on October 13 the Turco-Tatar forces were driven back down to­ ward the plain of Ordubad.59 The sudden Armenian rising was a great affront to the honor and reputation of General Nesterovskii. Stating in his orders of October 11, 1920, that all Ghapan was in revolt, he instructed the commanders of the 83d and 84th brigades to bring up reinforcements from Shushi and Angelaut and strike over Zeiva-Ardsvanik and Khotanan into the heart of Ghapan. The expedition was to squelch the rebellion “in the most merciless manner’’ and teach the people a lesson that they would never forget. After that operation, one regiment of the 84th Brigade was to join with the 20th Division’s cavalry and the 2d Caucasian Regiment at Niuvadi to extirpate Nzhdeh’s bands in the south. The Cheka would collaborate energetically in the capture and punishment of the coun­ terrevolutionaries.60 General Nesterovskii also addressed an appeal to the people of Zan­ gezur, explaining that the Red Army had come to help the peasants and

“Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1, Nzhdeh’s report of Oct. 12, 1920; Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lemahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924), pp. 109—112; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 89-90. For accounts by Soviet historians, see A. B. Kadishev, Interventsiia i grazhdanskaia vaina v Zakavkaz’e (Moscow, i960), pp. 336—337; S. Vartanian, Pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Erevan, 1959), p. 332; Vardapetian, op. át., pp. 31—32; Soghomonian, op. át., pp. 62-64. 59 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1, Reports 18 and 19, Oct. 19,1920. Nzhdeh wrote to Daralagiaz special commissar Gerasim Balayan and to Enovk Mirakian that he had 500 prisoners, whom he wished to send to Armenia proper. Complaining about the lack of support from Erevan, he declared: “How many times victorious yet feeling defeated.” See also FO 371 ƒ4961, E13179/134/58, Stokes to FO, Oct. 19, 1920. 60 A. O[H]. [HJArutiunian et al., “Osvoboditel’naia missiia 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 21st yr., no. 2 (1980), pp. 29—31. See also Nesterovskii’s orders of Oct. 16, 1920, in “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 51—52, and those dated Oct. 14, 1920, in Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lemahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924), pp. 114-116, in Abrahamian, op. át., p. 9, and in Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 98—100.

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workers throw off the odious Dashnak yoke. The bandit Nzhdeh and his underlings had deceived the population so they could continue to sup­ port their lavish lifestyle. Nzhdeh understood that an end to interracial bloodshed and the establishment of tranquil conditions for work posed a mortal threat to his parasitic existence. The people of Zangezur should know that the Red Army was generous and forgiving but was merciless against unrepentant enemies. Before it was too late, the misguided peo­ ple should give up their arms and return to their peaceful labor. “Put down your weapons; go home; cast out Nzhdeh and his followers, who are causing impoverishment and ruin.”61 The 28th Rifle Division, reinforced by two Azerbaijani infantry regi­ ments, Muslim irregulars from the Zabugh-Hakaru district, and a com­ pany of Armenian Bolsheviks, went into action on October 17 against the first line of villages, extending from Khotanan to Zeiva. The defend­ ers held firm on the right and left flanks but yielded the village of Ardsvanik under cannon and machine-gun fire in the center and drew back to Kavart and Barabatum. Returning from Meghri, Nzhdeh used his tried and tested methods to combat the enemy. Small detachments infiltrated the opposing lines to strike from the rear when his main group attacked with explosives all along the Indjabel heights at dawn on October 18. Using darkness, fog, and the rugged terrain as natural allies, Nzhdeh routed the 83d and 84th brigades, taking many prisoners and pursuing the disorganized regiments toward Goris. By nightfall, the Armenian rebels, displaying the captured flags and standards of the Red Army, celebrated their victory, which replenished their arsenal of rifles and machine guns, ammunition, and telephone and radio equipment.62 General Nesterovskii reported to Eleventh Army headquarters in Baku on October 20 that the situation had turned critical. The entire popu­ lation had joined the rebellion, and the Armenians’ military coordina­ tion demonstrated that regular army officers were directing the bands. The 83d and 84th brigades had fought heroically but were badly bat­ tered and had only a few hundred soldiers left against an enemy force that had grown to 2,000 footmen and more than 200 mounted men. It was clear that Dro, too, had violated the terms of the August 10 agree­ ment by sending as many as 250 officers and men into the Sisian district. Nesterovskii stated that he was trying to stabilize the situation by regroup­ ing along the Bazarchai River, about 10 versts (7 miles) from Goris. It seemed that the intent of the Dashnak rebels was not only to expel the 61 “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 51—52. See also the declaration of the Revolu­ tionary Committee of Zangezur, headed by Eremia Bakunts, in Avo, op. át., pp. 108-109. 62 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924), p. 114; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 100-101; Stemel, op. át., pp. 24—25; Kadishev, op. át., pp. 338—340.

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Red Army from Zangezur but also to advance on Shushi in Karabagh. To deal with this threat, reinforcements of at least i ,500 soldiers were needed, together with mountain batteries and war planes equipped to drop bombs. Nesterovskii concluded that when a Turkish regiment made up of former prisoners of war reached Goris from Aghdam, he would be able to reorganize his division and bring it back up to combat capacity.63 Eleventh Red Army commander General Gekker, having lost confi­ dence in Nesterovskii, issued orders that same day, October 20, creating a new striking group under General P. V. Kuryshko, commander of the 18th Cavalry Division. Kuryshko had blazed a path of glory in his cam­ paigns against the Volunteer Army and anti-Soviet Mountaineers in the North Caucasus. He was now assigned the responsibility of crushing the Armenian rebels of Zangezur with the combined strength of his ist Cav­ alry Brigade, the 28th Division’s one cavalry and two infantry brigades, the 20th Division’s one cavalry brigade, the ist Turkish Rifle Regiment, and all other units operating in the Zangezur and Ordubad sectors. Gekker announced that he personally would travel to Shushi to assess the situation.64 In his first order, issued at Shushi on October 25, General Kuryshko gave notice that he had taken command of all armed forces in Karabagh and Zangezur and that his striking group should be prepared to move in two days to effect “the final liquidation of Nzhdeh’s bands and the suppression of the rebellious population of Zangezur.’’ Kuryshko warned that he would not tolerate any excuses and that those who failed to execute his orders promptly would be severely punished.65 His second order instructed the 28th Division to take up positions along the Bazar­ chai River from Mount Uch-Tapa and Halidzor on the right flank to Babailu on the left flank. Reinforcements were being sent to make the division combat-ready. Meanwhile, Armenian Bolsheviks and scouts should be used to agitate behind enemy lines. The isolated infantry reg­ iment and cavalry regiment in the Niuvadi-Astrazur (Shvanidzor) sector were to withdraw toward Goris as reserves, and contact was to be estab­ lished with the unit operating in the Ordubad sector to ascertain its 63 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 53—55; B. A. Khudaverdian, “ 11-rd Karmir Banaki ognutiune Lernayin Gharabaghi, Zangezuri u Nakhidjevani ashkhatavorutiane ev Komunistakan kazmakerputiunnerin Sovetakan ishkhanutian hastatman hamar nrants mghads paikarum,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 15th yr., no. 3 (1974), p. 144. 64 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 52—53; Vartanian, op. át., p. 332. On Petr Vasil’evich Kuryshko, see Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 178—182. Kadishev, op. át., p. 338, shows that Kuryshko’s striking group was composed of 6,000 bayonets (infantry), 1,500 sabres (cav­ alry), the Turkish “Red” Regiment, 200 machine guns, 50 cannons, and 8 armored ve­ hicles. 65 “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” p. 56; Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 594.

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condition. The 20th Division’s cavalry brigade was to concentrate at the confluence of the Hakaru and Bazarchai rivers and be prepared for swift action against the enemy on the eastern flank. The Turkish regiment was to remain in a state of readiness in Goris and await further instruc­ tions.66 Two days later, on October 27, Kuryshko revealed his plan of battle. One column, made up of the 83d and 84th rifle brigades, a battery of light artillery, a mountain battery, and one cannon, would strike at dawn on November 1 over Zeiva and Ardsvanik to the Ghapan mines, destroy­ ing the enemy with “stringent and merciless measures,” and then move along the Okhchi River to mop up the remnants of the Dashnak bands. The other column, primarily the ist Brigade of the 18th Cavalry Divi­ sion, would advance in two wings from Tatev-Tandzatap and AghvaniTandzaver to Maidash. There the two columns would join and strike over Khotanan, Aradjadzor, Shahardjik (Shardjik), Amaghu, and Giratagh, flanking the enemy and blocking its route of escape. At the same time, the 20th Division’s cavalry brigade and a battery of artillery would attack from the east, advancing over the Okhchi River to Vachakan-BekhShahardjik, where it would link up with the other columns. These mili­ tary objectives were to be achieved within three days, after which the first column would police the district from Shahardjik to Baitagh; the second, from Shahardjik to Pirlu; and the third, from Baitagh to Taghly. Meanwhile, the Turkish regiment would attack the enemy at Yaidji, then advance along the road to Nakhichevan over Vaghudi, Karakilisa (Sisian), Sheki, and Angelaut. It was instructed to deal mercilessly with the Dashnak bands but also forewarned against molesting the peaceful pop­ ulation, looting, or engaging in lawless requisitions.67 The campaign be­ gan as planned on November 1. The first column overcame the natural advantages of the rebels and within three days had captured Ardsvanik, Zeiva, Erkenants, Almalu, and Berdik. Yet it was unable to advance on the Katar mines of Ghapan because the other columns lagged far be­ hind.68 Exhausted from the unending struggle and racked with arthritic pain, Nzhdeh again wrote his comrades in Erevan on November 3, reminding them that Zangezur had fought alone for months while the regular armed forces of the Armenian republic stood passively on the border. The Bolsheviks had demonstrated what the debased internationalists 66 “Boevoi put’ 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 57—58. See also Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924), pp. 114—115. 67 “Boevoi put’ 11-i Krasnoi Armii,” pp. 59—61; Kadishev, op. át., p. 341; Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 183—185. 68 Vardapetian, op. át., pp. 32—35; Soghomonian, op. át., pp. 66—68; Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 186—187.

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had to offer—the desecration of everything that was revered, including the sanctity of the family. Unable to endure this humiliation, the people had taken arms in revolt and cleansed themselves of past errors. Nzhdeh again urged the Erevan government to deploy the army to occupy the whole of Nakhichevan and Ordubad, send reinforcements to Zangezur, punish the previous officials and commanders whose irresponsibility had brought Zangezur to utter desperation, give the region competent offi­ cials, and turn special attention to the economic needs of the highland. The occupation of Nakhichevan and Ordubad, Nzhdeh concluded, would ensure the permanent incorporation of Zangezur into the Re­ public of Armenia.69 Nzhdeh did not wait for the support he sought before launching a counteroffensive against General Kuryshko, the “Red Hannibal.” Feign­ ing a retreat on November 6, Nzhdeh drew the enemy into ambush, again using explosives and the element of surprise to break the opposing ranks and to capture men and supplies, including thirty-four machine guns, rifles and ammunition, and field kitchens. His victory at Ardsvanik halted Kuryshko’s campaign. The Red Army detachments at Kaghnut, Uzhanis, Eghvard, and Agarak had to withdraw to Azerbaijani territory on November 7, and Kuryshko’s own cavalry brigade was decimated in three days of mountain combat around Khotanan and Aradjadzor.70 General Kuryshko and his officers blamed the humiliating defeat on the inability of the cavalry and artillery to advance over the treacherous mountain paths, the heavy rainfall and fog that muddled the striking force, the enemy’s control of strategic heights and caverns, its ability to penetrate the front lines and engage in sabotage, and the Dashnak prov­ ocation that the Red Army was composed of Turks and Azerbaijanis wanting to destroy Zangezur with sword and fire. The use of the Turkish regiment along the Karahundj-Yaidji line had been a serious tactical mistake. Whatever the factors contributing to the defeat of the Red Ar­ my’s renowned hero, General Gekker abolished Kuryshko’s striking force on November 8.71 69 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 45/1. On the same day, the Dashnaktsutiun’s Bureau wrote to Nzhdeh that it could not help him because of the August 10 Armenian-Soviet treaty and that the hostilities in Zangezur had to be shown as a popular uprising. Nzhdeh would have to do the best he could without direct aid from Erevan. 70Avo, op. át., pp. 135—137; Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lemahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924), pp. 116—118; Vardapetian, op. át., pp. 34—35. Kadishev, op. át., p. 341, states that threequarters of the 84th Brigade’s enlisted men deserted their ranks. 71 Kadishev, op. át., pp. 342—344; Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 187—188. Kuryshko reported to the Eleventh Army’s general staff that half of the 28th Division had deserted because the men were barefoot and without adequate clothing and had remained unsheltered under open skies for five days (Mnatsakanian, p. 188).

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Emboldened by his impressive victory, Colonel Garegin Nzhdeh ad­ dressed the Red Army command on November 14: The Armenians of Karabagh and Zangezur have already been deprived of their leaders and ruined economically at the hands of the Red Army. The presence of your forces in Siunik is no longer tolerable. I order you, if you do not want the remnants of the Eleventh Army to be subjected to slaughter and captivity, to evacuate Zangezur immediately, failing which I shall be obliged to recover by force the territory still under your control.72

By that time, Poghos Ter-Davitian, at the head of the Armenian de­ tachment of Sisian, had engaged the Turkish regiment, wounding and taking prisoner its commander but also suffering a wound to which he would succumb a few days later. The remainder of Kuryshko’s special striking force, meanwhile, was abandoning its positions along the Ba­ zarchai and hastening into Goris. Nzhdeh now seemed invincible, as his men closed in around the routes of retreat. On November 20 the Ar­ menian rebels advanced on Goris from Sisian, Tatev, Darabas, and Halidzor. Nzhdeh’s battle plan to liberate Zangezur’s administrative center did not have to be implemented, however, for that same day all Red Army units were ordered to withdraw to Azerbaijani territory. Soviet ar­ tillery bombarded Goris from the Karashen heights on November 21 to cover the retreat. Then all was quiet. On November 22, Sparapet Nzhdeh rode triumphantly into Goris, the high point and culmination of the sixweek rebellion that had begun with a few men on Mount Khustup.73 Ironically, the Armenian victory in Zangezur came at a moment when the regular Armenian army lay prostrate before General Kiazim Kara­ bekir and the very existence of the Republic of Armenia teetered in the balance.

Reorganization of the Armenian Communist Party

The battles along Armenia’s frontiers and within Zangezur during the summer and autumn of 1920 took place at a time when the central organs of the Russian Communist Party (RKP) had decided not to at­ tempt the immediate forceful overthrow of the Georgian and Armenian

72 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924)^. n8;Avo, op. cit.,p. 132; Gevorgian, op. át., p. 106. 73 Nzhdeh, “Edjer Lernahayastani goyamarten” (April 1924), pp. 118—119; Gevorgian, op. át., pp. 106—109; Kadishev, op. át., p. 334. For explanations by Soviet historians for the failure of Kuryshko’s campaign, see Mnatsakanian, op. cit., pp. 186—189; Soghomonian, op. át., pp. 69—71. See Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 3—13, as an example of the radical revisionism by latter-day Soviet historians regarding the roles of Nzhdeh and the Red Army in Zan­ gezur.

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governments. Soviet Russia had to face the challenges posed by General Wrangel in the Crimea and by the Polish offensive, and there was con­ cern that any attempt to occupy Georgia and Armenia would serve as an invitation for the British to return to Transcaucasia. It was therefore resolved that for the time being the party organizations in the Caucasus should honor the Soviet-Georgian treaty of May 7 and that negotiations with the Armenian government should resume in Erevan. In June, at Lenin’s behest, the Politburo authorized Chicherin to instruct the army command not to advance into Armenia. The pro-Soviet insurgents in the Shamshadin district were recalled to Azerbaijan, and Legran was appointed to negotiate a treaty with the Armenian government. These decisions did not, however, deter Soviet Russia from trying to take pos­ session of the Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan corridor to Turkey on the pretext of separating the contending Azerbaijani and Armenian ar­ mies and halting the interracial bloodshed. Nor did these policies pre­ vent the local party organs in the Caucasus from continuing to call for the violent overthrow of the “bourgeois-nationalist lackeys of imperial­ ism’’ in Georgia and Armenia.74 During the same period, Bolshevik activity in Armenia had come to a virtual standstill. The chief conspirators of the May uprising were dead, imprisoned, or exiled, and the fragile Bolshevik network had withered. Even after the Armenian-Soviet provisional accord of August 10 and arrangements for further negotiations in Erevan, the Bureau-Govern­ ment maintained its unyielding intolerance of Bolshevism. The party newspapers persisted in their denunciations of the Moscow-Baku-Angora axis, the persecution of comrades in Azerbaijan, and the chilling Bol­ shevik outrages in Karabagh and Zangezur. Legalization of the Communist Party in Georgia by the May 7 SovietGeorgian treaty facilitated attempts to revive the Armenian Communist Party. In consultation with Soviet envoy Sergei Kirov and with the con­ sent of the RKP’s Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo), the “External Bureau” of the Armenian Communist organizations was formed in Tiflis some time in June 1920. Most of its members were drawn from the former Caucasian Regional Committee (Kraikom) of the RKP, including Sargis Kasian, Askanaz Mravian, Alexandre Bekzadian, and later Danush Shahverdian and Hovsep Poghosian. The External Bureau tried to assist im­ prisoned comrades in Armenia and to maintain communication with those who had escaped arrest and exile. Yet its effectiveness was circum­ scribed, and when the Georgian Menshevik government found excuses 74 See, for example, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 418—421; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, RevoUutsion kocher ev trutsikner, 1902—1921 (Erevan, i960), pp. 561—565, 568—571.

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to renew the persecution of Bolsheviks, the External Bureau virtually ceased to function.75 In view of these circumstances, the Kavburo sanctioned the formation in Baku of a new External Bureau made up of more radical comrades, including Avis Nuridjanian, Shavarsh Amirkhanian, Levon Ulibekian, and Haikaz Kostanian, who served as secretary. The External Bureau in Baku worked under the close supervision of Ordzhonikidze and the Kav­ buro and of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee. It sent agents and relief to the Armenian insurgents of Shamshadin, who had taken refuge in Azerbaijan, and succeeded in having them attached to the Eleventh Army’s 20th Division, whereby they became eligible for mess and quartermaster privileges. Moreover, the External Bureau sent funds with Soviet envoy Boris Legran for the needs of the party organi­ zation within Armenia.76 Rivalry and distrust within the small Armenian Bolshevik circles were clearly evidenced in the tension between the comrades in Baku and Tiflis. Avis Nuridjanian and his youthful supporters were disapproving of their more senior comrades in Tiflis, especially the leaders of the former Armenkom, Askanaz Mravian and Sargis Kasian. Nuridjanian and Kostanian wrote to one of their collaborators in Tiflis that all pre­ vious organizational centers had been liquidated and that as their rep­ resentative he was to “take over the work from Askanaz and others in the shortest possible time.’’77 Nuridjanian and Hmayak Nazaretian participated as representatives of the “Armenian Communist Party’’ in the Second Congress of the Communist International, held from July 19 to August 7, 1920, in Pe­ trograd and Moscow.78 In a report apparently authored by Avis, the Ar­ menian delegation reviewed the treacherous separation of Transcauca­ sia from Russia and its disastrous division into three so-called republics. The bourgeois-nationalist government of Armenia was trying to preserve 75 Askanaz Mravian, Erb eu inchpes e himnadrvel Hayastani Komunistakan (bolsh.) Kusaktsutiune? (Erevan, 1928), pp. 17—18; Kh. H. Barseghian, Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi kazmavorume (Erevan, 1965), pp. 316—318; G. B. Gharibdjanian, Hayastani Komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere Souetakan ishkhanutian haghtanaki hamar mghvads paikarum (Erevan, 1955), PP- 397—899» Vartanian, op. át., p. 264; Aghayan, op. át., p. 302; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian uruagdser, ed. Ds. P. Aghayan et al. (Erevan, 1967), p. 261. 76 Mravian, op. át., pp. 18—19; Barseghian, op. át., pp. 318—321,326—327; Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 199—200; Aghayan, op. át., p. 302; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia reuoliutsiia, p. 383. 77 Barseghian, op. át., pp. 324—326; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia reuoliutsiia, pp. 390—391. 78 On the congress, see James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International (Stan­ ford, 1964), pp. 170-222; Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, I (Stanford, 1972), pp. 271—396; Vtoroi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Intematsionala: Stenograficheskii otchet (Petrograd, 1921), also in German, French, and English editions.

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its existence by inflaming interracial hostility and striving to create a great united, independent Armenia from sea to sea by subjecting the Muslim villagers to fire and sword. “Free and independent Armenia in the hands of the Dashnaks became ‘independent’ of workers and peas­ ants and ‘free’ for speculators, Mauserists, kulaks, and Denikinist offi­ cers.” The Americans gave the Armenians a little bread to fight against Bolshevism and grabbed in return wool, cotton, and other raw materials. Bread had become a weapon in the hands of the oppressors, who pre­ viously had terrified the population with the specter of Azerbaijani mas­ sacres and now threatened to withhold flour from those who opposed the paradise created only for kulaks and speculators. Still embittered by the role the Western Armenians had played in squelching the May up­ rising, the Armenian delegates warned that the Dashnak government was driving the Muslims out of the country and making the Turkish Armenian refugees into a “Cossack class” to suppress the indigenous, revolutionary population. Nearly all the commerce of Erevan was con­ trolled by Turkish Armenians, upon whom the government was com­ pletely dependent. The plight of the laborers, the report continued, was even worse than that of the peasants. In a land dominated by Mauserists and speculators, only the Communist Party could show the way to salvation: “Either Com­ munists or Dashnaks, that is how the question is put in Armenia.” Even though Bolshevik organizational activity had begun in earnest only a year earlier, there were already 3,000 members. The Russian Communist Party had resolved to support the national liberation struggles of the peoples of the East, but in Armenia the ruling party had irreversibly linked the national liberation struggle with the victory of imperialism. “In Armenia there is no national question. In Armenia there is only the social question.” The Russian Communist Party should be prepared to help overthrow the Dashnak regime and, in cooperation with the insur­ gent peoples of the East, to draw Armenia into the common front against international imperialism.79 Although the RKP’s central organs more than once had sanctioned the formation of national-territorial Communist parties in the Transcau­ casian republics, implementation had been slow, and there even had been strong resistance from within the party. Hence, on July 30, 1920, the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of the RKP Central Committee, acting on the recommendation of the Kavburo, again resolved: “To cre­ ate Communist parties in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, giving to them the rights of party regional organizations under the jurisdiction of 79 Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 374—379; Barseghian, op. át., pp. 281, 322—323; Elchibekian, op. át., p. 117.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

the Central Committee’s Caucasian Bureau. Each of the said party or­ ganizations is to serve the entire population on its territory, regardless of national origin.”80 The Kavburo followed up by naming a Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia. Such a body may have been operating unofficially since the beginning of the month, existing side by side with the External Bureau of the Armenian Communist or­ ganizations and with virtually the same membership. In its session of September 10, the Kavburo appointed Isahak Dovlatov (Dovlatian), Avis Nuridjanian, Haikaz Kostanian, Aghasi Khanjian, and Sahak Ter-Gabrielian, with Shavarsh Amirkhanian and Vahan Shahgeldian (Karl) as al­ ternates. A sixth member of the Central Committee was to be selected from among the comrades working in Armenia. Matters relating to the Armenian Communist Party’s activities outside Armenia were to be re­ solved together by the Kavburo and ‘‘comrades Dovlatov, Avis, and Kos­ tanian.”81 In October the Orgburo confirmed all nominees with the exception of Ter-Gabrielian, who was then serving as an adviser in the Legran mission to Armenia.82 It was perhaps significant that the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, like its External Bureau, was created by appointment from above and that, from the safety and security of Baku, both bodies continued to call for the overthrow of the ‘‘bloodthirsty war-mongering Dashnak regime.”83*85 Armenian-Soviet relations during the summer and autumn of 1920 evolved on several levels. The formal exchanges between Moscow and Erevan exalted peace and friendship and respect for one another’s selfdetermination, independence, and sovereignty. Negotiations began on a promising note in Moscow but did not reach fruition, in part because of broader considerations of Soviet foreign policy and the pressure ex­ erted from within the Russian Communist Party and its affiliates in 80 G. K. Zhvaniia, Velikii Oktiabr’ i bor’ba Bol’shevikav Zakavka¿ia za Sovetskuiu vlast’ (Tbilisi, 1967), p. 276; Barseghian, op. át., pp. 321—322. 81 Zhvaniia, op. át., pp. 276, 287; Gharibdjanian, op. át., pp. 403—404; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 383; Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian urvagdser, p. 263. 82 Barseghian, op. át., p. 331; Institut Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR: Sbomik dokumentov i material™ v trekh tomakh, 1918—1922, ed. G. A. Belov et al., Ill (Moscow, 1961), p. 494. On August 13, the Kavburo appointed Ter­ Gabrielian its liaison in Armenia to direct party activities there until the assumption of responsibility by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia. See Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 384. 85 See, for example, Elchibekian, op. át., pp. 184—185; Gharibdjanian, op. át., pp. 401402; Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutianpatmutian urvagdser, pp. 263—264; H.K(Ê)K K.K kits Kuspat. Institut, Aradjin massayakan-heghapokhakan sharzhumnere Hayastanum (Mayisian apstambutiune): Niuter ev pastatghter, ed. K. Chazarían and M. Nersisian (Erevan, 1932), pp. 379-380, 383—384. See also Avis Nuridjanian’s address to the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, as reported in Bor’ba, Oct. 30:2, 1920.

A SOVIET ACCORD AND ZANGEZUR

127

Transcaucasia. The Armenian Bureau-Government remained distrustful of Soviet Russia and continued its Western orientation, which seemed the only way of realizing the goal of united, independent Armenia. The interruption of the negotiations in Moscow was not without certain ad­ vantages in the calculations of the Armenian strategists. The profuse expressions of goodwill by the Soviet and Armenian gov­ ernments were contrasted by the tension and conflict in the Caucasus. The Red Army’s drive into Karabagh and Zangezur reinforced Armenian suspicions of a formal Soviet-Turkish pact aimed at thwarting the emer­ gence of a united Armenia and revived fears of pan-Turkic and panIslamic programs, now concealed under a Soviet guise. The ArmenianSoviet preliminary treaty of August 10 remained unimplemented, as the Erevanjulfa railway stayed closed, armed encounters continued in the Aksibara vale and elsewhere in the Kazakh-Ijevan sector, and Nzhdeh’s revolt threw the Red Army out of Zangezur. The persecution of Bolshe­ viks in Armenia and of Dashnakists in Russia and Azerbaijan exacerbated the friction. The Armenian Bolsheviks, driven out of the country or far underground, seethed with resentment toward the Dashnakist govern­ ment and looked to the international Communist movement and the national liberation struggles in the East to shatter the doors of the Ar­ menian republic and usher in the day of reckoning.84 The central party organs in Moscow sometimes tried to temper the impatience of the com­ rades in the Caucasus, but the Sovnarkom’s decision to interrupt the negotiations with the Armenian government and transfer the proceed­ ings to Erevan was well calculated, as it gave the Russians time to weigh the results of exchanges that were to take place with envoys of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.84 84 Soviet Armenian historians during the final years of the Soviet Union accused the Armenian Communist bodies in Baku in 1920 of serving as the compliant agents of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, which continued to pursue the nationalist, expansionist ob­ jectives of the former Musavat regime. See, for example, Hr. R. Simonian, Turk-haikakan haraberutiunneri patmutiunits (Erevan, 1991), pp. 400—401.

4

Soviet-Turkish Relations and Armenia

Armenia’s attempts to gain Soviet recognition without having to relin­ quish its Western orientation were paralleled by the strengthening of Soviet-Turkish bonds, including the drafting of a treaty of friendship. The Sovnarkom and the Comintern turned greater attention to the co­ lonial peoples of Asia and Africa as the anticipated proletarian revolu­ tion in the West failed to materialize. Béla Kun’s Soviet regime in Hun­ gary had been short-lived, and the Communist-led manifestations in Germany were quickly suppressed. Lenin and his comrades now sought means to raise the colonial world against the anti-Soviet coalition. In­ trinsic to that strategy was the decision to aid revolutionary liberation movements, even if they were not overtly Communist in purpose and leadership. The Turkish Nationalist resistance of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was designated as one such revolutionary struggle and deemed worthy of Soviet moral, political, and military support, particularly as Turkey was regarded as the key to influencing the Muslim world. During the summer of 1920, the second congress of the Comintern formally adop­ ted this policy and tried to give direction to the anti-imperialistic cam­ paign by sponsoring a grandiose congress of the peoples of the East. The place of Soviet Russia was no less important in Mustafa Kemal’s designs to defy the Allied Powers and prevent the wresting away of Turk­ ish territories for the Greeks and Armenians. Refusing to succumb to the despair that gripped many of those around him, Mustafa Kemal looked to Soviet Russia as an effective counterbalance to the Allied Pow­ ers. Foremost in his calculations was the need to eliminate the Caucasian barrier between Russia and Turkey. That critical land bridge could be opened by sovietizing Azerbaijan, neutralizing Georgia, and crushing Armenia. Politically astute, Mustafa Kemal allowed the Young Turk fu­ gitives in Russia to lobby for Soviet aid for the Anatolian resistance and 128

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONSAND ARMENIA

I29

to prepare the ground for direct negotiations between representatives of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Russian Socialist Fed­ erated Soviet Republic.

Preliminary Exchanges Soviet-Turkish relations during 1919 were of an exploratory nature. So­ viet agents in Anatolia and Constantinople gathered information and engaged in informal exchanges with persons close to the former Young Turk dictators and to Mustafa Kemal and other organizers of the Turkish resistance movement.1 Early in their endeavors, the Nationalists decided to use the bugbear of a Soviet-Turkish coalition to frighten the Allied Powers into making major concessions to keep the Turks out of the Soviet camp. Thus, Mustafa Kemal would seek Soviet financial and mil­ itary aid while trying to pressure the West to drop plans to partition Anatolia. His vision was clear: “In case the Bolsheviks become even stronger, we could claim that the country is under danger of Bolshevik invasion unless the Entente Powers evacuate the land.”2 General Kiazim Karabekir was entrusted with the assignment of sending a few reliable men to confer with the Bolshevik underground in Baku with the goal of securing arms, equipment, money, and, if requested, troops. For the time being, however, the Red Army had to be kept outside Turkey’s frontiers so the Allies could be coerced into discarding their intent to partition the country.3 Bolshevik agents appeared in many places in 1919. In June, Colonel Kiazim Bey [Ozalp] reported from Balikesir that he had received an offer of arms and financial assistance from Bolshevik emissaries. The next month Kara Vasif Bey, a founder of the offshoot Karakol society of the disbanded Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks, Ittihad1 For early Soviet-Turkish linkages, see Richard G. Hovannisian, “Armenia and the Cau­ casus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente,’’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, IV (April 1973), pp. 129—147; A. N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel’nye strany Vostoka v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (1918—1920) (Moscow, 1964), pp. 87—100; Húsameddin Ertûrk, îki devrin perde arkast, comp. Samih Nafiz Tansu (Istanbul, 1964), pp. 244—245, 294, 388—442; Gotthard Jâschke, “Neues zur russisch-türkischen Freundschaft von 1919— 1939,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s. VI, 3—4 (1961), pp. 203—204. See also Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/5178, File 345/44 for 1920; Vahan Minakhorian, “Rus-trkakan haraberutiunnere,” Hairenik Amsagir, XVII (Jan.-Sept. 1939); Stefanos Yerasimos, Türk-Sovyet ili^kileri: EkimDevriminden "Milli Mücadele”ye ([Istanbul, 1979]), pp. 105—109. 2 Feridun Kandemir, Milli mücadele baflangtctnda Mustafa Kemal, arkadaslart ve karfisindakiler (Istanbul, [1964]), pp. 74—75. See also Käzim Karabekir, Istikläl Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 57—58. ’Kandemir, op. át., p. 89; Hovannisian, op. át., pp. 138—139. For an overview of this period, see Paul Dumont, “L’axe Moscou-Ankara: Les relations turco-soviétiques de 1919 à 1922,’’ Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, XVIII, 3 (1977), pp. 165—193.

I3O

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

ists), reported a similar offer in return for Turkey’s implementation of major economic reforms and protection of the interests of the workers and peasants. The Soviet agent asked that Turkish representatives be sent to Russia and announced that as soon as the foreign intervention against Russia had been checked a Soviet delegation would arrive for concrete negotiations.4 At the same time, exchanges between Bolshevik officials and promi­ nent Young Turk fugitives in Germany were revealing a community of interest. The Soviet strategists hoped to use the notorious Young Turk heroes Enver, Talaat, and Jemal in the effort to stir up the Muslim co­ lonial peoples against Great Britain, whereas the three exiles saw in So­ viet Russia a possible means of taking control of the Turkish Nationalist movement and, riding the great wave of anti-British revolutionary fervor, being restored to power. In any case, they were willing to render their service in the cause of driving the Allied Powers from Anatolia and Con­ stantinople. Karl Radek, a leader of the Comintern, established contact with former interior minister and grand vizier Talaat Pasha and former war minister Enver Pasha in Berlin to invite them to Moscow, where they could continue their patriotic labors without fear of capture.5 Eventually, Enver, Jemal, Behaeddin Shakir, Bedri Bey, and other Ittihadists made their way to Russia, where they joined Generals Halil Pasha and Nuri Pasha, who had escaped from British detention near Batum and at Ke­ mal’s behest had accepted assignments in Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The two generals—one the uncle, the other the half-brother of Enver Pasha—collaborated with the Azerbaijani government and even partic­ ipated in the campaigns against the Armenians of Karabagh, but at the same time they were secredy cooperating with the Bolshevik under­ ground to overthrow the Musavatists and establish Soviet rule in Azer­ baijan as a way of opening the Caucasian corridor between Russia and Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal’s most trusted agent in Baku was Dr. Fuad Sabit, a former Ittihadist associate of Enver Pasha and an army doctor who had been among the initiators of the Erzerum congress that formed the As­ sociation for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia. In his initial reports in October 1919, Sabit relayed the welcome news that Bolshevik spokes­

4 Karabekir, op. át., p. 74; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Millî mücadele hâtiralan (Istanbul, 1953), pp. 94—95; Sabahattin Selek, Millî mücadele: Anadolu ihtilâli, II (Istanbul, 1965), p. 56. 5 Cebesoy, Millî mücadele, p. 42, and his Moskova hâtiralan (21/11/1920—2/6/1922) (Is­ tanbul, 1955), pp. 60—71,158—162,231— 232; Omer Kiazim, Angora et Berlin (Berlin, 1920), pp. 158—162; Simon Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji eu trkakan sali midjev (Beirut, 1953), pp. 20—28, 36—39 (cited hereafter as Hayastane murji eu sali midjev)', A. A. Cruick­ shank, “The Young Turk Challenge in Postwar Turkey,” Middle EastJournal, XXII (Winter 1968), p. 22.

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS AND ARMENIA

1$1

men had promised generous financial assistance without requiring Tur­ key to turn Bolshevik. He, together with Halil Pasha and Nuri Pasha, was participating in an organization known as the People’s Representation of Turkey (Tûrkiye halk murahaslighi), and Halil was acting as liaison with the Russian Communist Party’s Caucasian Regional Committee.6 For its part, the regional committee reported to Moscow that it was con­ ducting talks with Turkish representatives of the Erzerum congress and that a plan ofjoint action against the anti-Soviet elements in Daghestan had been developed.7 Among the informal Soviet envoys who continued to reveal themselves in Turkey during the latter part of 1919, the most notable was Shalva Eliava, a veteran Georgian Bolshevik who had held responsible party positions in Central Asia. Making his way to Constantinople, Eliava dis­ cussed with former Ittihadist Central Committee members Kara Vasif and Baha Said, now of the Karakol society, the terms of possible Soviet assistance. Eliava announced that the Sovnarkom would recognize Tur­ key’s national rights and lend support to its struggle against the impe­ rialist bloc.8 Thereafter, Baha Said traveled to Baku to negotiate with the Caucasian Regional Committee. A draft agreement completed in Janu­ ary 1920 reflected both Bolshevik revolutionary and Ittihadist transna­ tional objectives. The pact was predicated on the liberation of all Islamic peoples from the yoke of Western, especially British, imperialism and the ultimate adoption of Soviet-type regimes by the Islamic states. To attain these goals, the R.S.F.S.R. would furnish the revolutionary organ­ izations in Turkey with arms, ammunition, and money and take imme­ diate action to foment anti-British unrest in Batum, Persia, Afghanistan, and India.9 The draft treaty, which was to take effect upon ratification by both parties, was carried to Constantinople by an agent of the Cau­ casian Regional Committee and delivered to Kara Vasif, who relayed the contents to Mustafa Kemal in February. Kemal, however, rejected the draft agreement, not only because of its pan-Islamic features but also because there was no specific recognition of the Nationalist movement or his leadership. He nonetheless let it be known that he would be pre­ pared to consider an accord based on his goals and objectives. The Mos­ cow government, too, found the ambiguous draft document unaccept­ able but continued to seek avenues of cooperation with the Turkish 6 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 358—35g; Jäschke, op. át., p. 219. See also FO 371/5178, Ei 4638/345/44 enclosure. 7 Kheifets, op. át., p. 96. 8 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (Stanford, 1967), p. 47; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, p. 60; Hovan nisi an, op. át., pp. 141—142. 9 Kheifets, op. át., pp. 96—100; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 615-619, 628-630.

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resistance movement that was consolidating under the direction of Mus­ tafa Kemal Pasha.10

The Turkish Nationalist Strategy In January 1920, Mustafa Kemal was gratified by the Ottoman Parlia­ ment’s adoption of the National Pact. That document incorporated much of his program, including the territorial integrity of Turkey and the annexation of the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which had been lost to the Russian Empire in 1878. At the same time, Kemal was both concerned and encouraged by Allied recognition of the three Transcaucasian republics. On the one hand it was troubling that the West was trying to shore up the wall between Turkey and Russia, but on the other hand the acts of recognition were in themselves a tacit Allied admission that all the support extended to the White Armies had been in vain and that the Red Army would inevitably crush General Denikin and sweep to the Caucasus Mountains. The Entente Powers, Mustafa Kemal wrote his military commanders in February, had been put in difficult straits by the linkage between the Bolsheviks and the Turks “because any nation that has so far come into touch with the Bolsheviks has either been obliged to unite with them, socially or politically, or has taken arms against them to stem the tide of their advance.” Although the British and French understood that the only way to prevent the Turks from turning to the Bolsheviks was to relinquish all occupied territory, “today it is certain that the Entente Powers do not see themselves as yet subject to such compulsion.” In­ stead, with the impending collapse of Denikin, they would try to use the Transcaucasian states to drive a deeper wedge between Russia and Tur­ key. If that scheme succeeded, Turkey would be isolated, and its ability to resist would be cut to the core. Losing their independence, the Turks would then be pressed into the Allied colonial armies and have to shed their blood to keep the Transcaucasian governments subservient to the West and to resist Bolshevik incursions into Anatolia. Even by total sur­ render to the Allies, the Turks could not escape being sacrificed, which gave them all the more reason to tear down the Caucasian barrier.11

'° Tùrk Înkilâp Tarihi Enstitûsû, Atatürk’ün tamim, telgrafve beyannameleri, IV: 1917—1935 (Ankara, 1964), pp. 294—297; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 630-632; Hovannisian, op. át., p. 142. See also FO 371/5178, E4689/345/44; Yerasimos, op. át., pp. 110—115, 134— 11 The English translation is taken from FO 371/5168, E6768/262/44, App. 2. For the same in Turkish, see Karabekir, op. át., pp. 465—467, which gives the date for the com­ muniqué as February 6, 1920, and Atatürk’ün tamim, telgraf ve beyannameleri, pp. 180-184, giving the date as February 5.

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS AND ARMENIA

*33

In the calculations of the Turkish Nationalists, the Caucasus front was the key to turning matters around and saving the country from an ir­ reparable Allied-imposed peace treaty. By combining with the Bolsheviks over the Caucasian isthmus, the Turks could open the floodgates to Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. Mustafa Kemal observed: The Allies do not possess natural positions for carrying out offensive operations to shut these open doors. The only place from which such operations can start is Batoum and even here the distance to be closed, from Batoum to the Caspian Sea, is over 400 kilometers, and the Allies will be compelled to be this far distant from the Sea.... Consequently, considering the building up of the Caucasian barrage and the scheme of the suppression of Turkey, we are compelled to have recourse to the last resorts to prevent the Entente Powers from building this barrier and to that end we must be prepared to run all sorts of risks and dangers.

The steps to be taken, Kemal continued, included official and unofficial mobilization to clear the Caucasian botdeneck. An understanding should be reached with such Islamic states as Azerbaijan and Daghestan, but if they refused and instead helped to fortify the barrier then joint action with the Bolsheviks would be taken against them. Within Turkey, it was essential that the opposition movements merge in the struggle against the external enemies and that if necessary the Turkish government be moved to Anatolia.*12 Kemal’s plan drew a mixed reaction, as some of his army commanders cautioned against extreme measures and did not favor breaking com­ munication with the Allied Powers and the sultan’s government.13 From Erzerum, General Karabekir concurred with the strategy outlined by Kemal but advised that military operations on the Caucasus front would be premature because of the lack of able-bodied men, food, and sup­ plies. The Turkish campaign, he maintained, should be timed to coin­

According to British intelligence sources, on February 5, 1920, Kemal revealed to his Representative Committee that he had received a letter from Chicherin hailing the im­ minent defeat of the White Armies and the formation of a bridge between Russia and Anatolia. The Soviet foreign affairs commissar assertedly called for a coordinated cam­ paign, with immediate Turkish operations along the frontiers of Persia, Mosul, and Ar­ menia. The provisional executive body of the Nationalist movement reportedly accepted the proposal in principle but believed that instead of taking immediate action the Turks should make careful plans for a spring offensive. See FO 371/5165, E1428/262/44 If in fact Kemal did receive such a communication from the Soviet foreign affairs commissar, it would have been four months earlier than has been generally acknowledged and ac­ cepted. 12 FO 371/5168, E6768/262/44 App. L. See also Karabekir, op. át., p. 467; Yerasimos, op. cit., pp. 144-146. 1S See, for example, FO 371/5168, E6768/ 262/44 App. M, for the reported reservations of Colonel Kiazim Bey [Ozalp].

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cide with the Soviet advance into eastern Transcaucasia after the ice­ bound flotilla was freed in the spring.14 Karabekir subsequently asserted that Mustafa Kemal and other Nationalist leaders were ready to throw in their lot with the Bolsheviks in early 1920 but had been deterred by him. There is evidence, however, that Karabekir himself contemplated inviting the Bolsheviks into Turkey if the situation became desperate. During the first months of 1920, he continued to monitor events in the Caucasus and to send couriers, agents, and even small detachments be­ yond the frontiers to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and to give heart to the Muslim elements trying to resist Armenian expansion into the west­ ern reaches of Kars province and the southern districts of Erevan prov­ ince.15 Karabekir was annoyed that he had not been informed of the ex­ changes between the Bolshevik agents and the Karakol society. He com­ plained to Kemal on March 5 that any communication or movement of Bolsheviks in Turkey would be disastrous for the country unless these were channeled through Erzerum under his personal supervision. It was important to be prepared to advance into the Soghanlu Mountains around Sarikamish at the same time the Red Army moved into Azerbai­ jan, for a unilateral offensive against Armenia might draw the British into the conflict. Because of the great snowdrifts between Erzerum and Sarikamish, it was not possible to undertake military action before the middle of April.16 On March 17, 1920, one day after the formal Allied occupation of Constantinople, General Karabekir wrote Halil Pasha and Nuri Pasha in Baku to insist that they make no move without instructions from his headquarters. He warned that if the Bolsheviks decided to advance now, they could march right into Turkey because of strong pro-Bolshevik sen­ timent stemming from the events in the capital.17 A few days later, Kara­ bekir asked the two Young Turk generals to persuade the Azerbaijani government to grant financial assistance to the Nationalist movement, which was cut off from all other sources of external support.18 Despite these concerns, he made preparations for a limited military 14 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 467-468, 534, 538, 772; Hovannisian, op. át., pp. 144—145. 15 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 456, 464, 522—523, 787; Hovannisian, op. át., pp. 145—146; FO 371/5167, E4510/262/44, Report for week ending April 14, 1920. 16 Karabekir, op. át., p. 510; see also pp. 630, 632—633. 17 Ibid., p. 523. See also FO 371/5042, E826/3/44, enclosing de Robeck to Admiralty, Feb. 18, 1920. For the activities of Nuri, Halil, and other Turkish officers in the Caucasus, see FO 371/5165—5166, File 262/44 passim. 18 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 577—578. The Azerbaijani government sent Mustafa Kemal 1 million French francs, 19,000 Ottoman gold pieces, and a certain amount of petrol, according to Mehmet-Zade Mirza-Bala, MiUi Azerbaycan hareketi: Milli Az. “Müsavat” halk ftrkast tarihi ([Berlin], 1938), p. 180.

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operation beyond the prewar Russo-Turkish frontier to secure the stra­ tegic heights from Igdir to Sarikamish and Olti. In orders to his division commanders at the end of March, Karabekir revealed his plan of action, to commence in mid-April, when, it was anticipated, the Red Army would move against Georgia and Azerbaijan. The 11 th Caucasus Division in the Van-Bayazit sector was to occupy Igdir in the shadow of Mount Ararat and take control of the lower Araxes River Valley, and the gth Caucasus Division and the 12 th Division were to capture Sarikamish and the Soghanlu mountain range. The Armenians might try to resist on all fronts, in which case they would be overwhelmed, or concentrate their armed forces and attempt to break through the Turkish lines. The division commanders were to be prepared for either eventuality, making maxi­ mum use of tribal levies and the Muslim partisans of Sharur and Na­ khichevan. They were to send trusted officers across the frontier to assist the local Muslim councils (shuras) in their military preparations and to gather reliable information. The artillery and machine-gun units should be up to full strength at the start of the campaign, whereas the infantry should have sufficient men for efficient operations, reaching full strength through subsequent recruitment. Karabekir advised that fur­ ther orders would be issued regarding money, food, clothing, and ord­ nance and that transportation needs would have to be met locally from within each division’s sphere of operation.19 At the beginning of April, one of Karabekir’s staff officers returned from Baku and reported that the two principal Turkish groups there had decided to join with the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Musavat gov­ ernment and form a new cabinet. This “revolutionary committee’’ would assume jurisdiction over all Turkish officers and soldiers serving in Azerbaijan and would call upon the Red Army to intervene only if it was unable to bring about the sovietization of Azerbaijan through its own means.20 Baha Said, now a member of the so-called Turkish Com­ munist Party in Baku, complained in his letters that the Musavat govern­ ment was portraying the Turks in a bad light and spreading mendacious rumors that the Bolsheviks intended to destroy and supplant Islam. It was necessary to bring about a bloodless coup or, if unavoidable, a rev­ olutionary upsurge to establish Soviet rule in Azerbaijan. If the Georgian and Armenian governments, prodded by the British, tried to help the Musavatists suppress the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan, then the Turkish ar19 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 556, 567—568, 603-604; FO 371/5167, E4510/E5255/262/ 44, Reports for weeks ending April 14 and April 21, 1920. On March 29, Mustafa Kemal urged General Karabekir to occupy the “three provinces” (Kars, Ardahan, Batum) and all territory between the old frontier and the Araxes River in order to be in a position of strength when the Red Army arrived there. See Dumont, op. át., p. 170. 20 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 609-612.

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mies should intervene, as the only hope for Turkey was linkage with Russia over the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks, Baha Said continued, were forming a Turkish regiment to serve as the vanguard of the Soviet mil­ itary assistance that would be sent to Anatolia. The seizure of Armenia by the Turkish Nationalists would be “a very good thing”; negotiations should be conducted in Moscow to that end. The Soviet government would assist with an international propaganda campaign to show that this operation was an essential act of self-defense rather than a repetition of past Ottoman excesses. The dispatch to Moscow of a Turkish nego­ tiator ‘‘of high character” and with a solid knowledge of revolutionary principles could be delayed no longer. Baha Said now apprised Mustafa Kemal that he and Kuchuk Talaat were ready to undertake this mission if they were so requested.21 In relaying this and other messages to Angora, Kiazim Karabekir sup­ ported the proposal for direct negotiations in Moscow by an official skilled in military and political affairs. The future of 300 million Muslims depended on Turkey’s successful collaboration with the Bolsheviks. When the Bolsheviks gained sway in Georgia and expelled the British from Batum, he would overpower ‘‘imperialist Armenia.” The Bolshe­ viks should be told that if they expected the Turkish Nationalists to co­ operate in the struggle against the West, then money, war matériel, and the necessities of life should be provided.22 In letters to Halil Pasha and Nuri Pasha, Karabekir stressed the anti-British nature of the Bolshevik movement and cautioned that the raising of a single weapon against the Red Army would be regarded as high treason against Turkey.23 He also wrote the Turkish Communist Party in Baku to urge concerted action against the Armenians in Karabagh and to inquire of the Bolsheviks what they thought of an Armenia that was controlled by the British and that abounded with Denikinist officers.24 On April 26, General Karabekir informed Mustafa Kemal and his ‘‘Representative Committee” that Azerbaijan was entering into an ac­ cord with the Bolsheviks and that his army corps would be ready in two weeks to advance to the first line of objectives beyond the old RussoTurkish frontier. By taking possession of Olti, Sarikamish, Igdir, and Sharur-Nakhichevan, his men would divide the Armenian forces and 21 Ibid., pp. 613—618; Hovannisian, pp. 145—146. For Kuchuk Talaat’s testimony during the trials of the so-called Courts of Independence in Ankara in 1926, see Vratzian, Hayastane murji eu sali midjev, pp. 31—34. 22 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 620-625, 633-634, 653-654, 703—704. 23 Ibid., p. 523. See also Cemal Kutay, Karabekir Ermenistan'i nasilyok etti? (Istanbul, 1956), pp. 10—11. 24 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 668, 670-673. See also FO 371/5167, E4346/262/44, Report for week ending April 7, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastane murji eu sali midjeu, pp. 26—28, 38-39.

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gain the strategic Soghanlu mountain range.25 Karabekir’s imagination soared as he thought ahead to the second and third stages of his personal battle plan, involving the conquest of Kars and Alexandropol and the return of Turkish armies to the positions held during the summer of 1918. It was of utmost importance to win swift Soviet acceptance of this scheme. Karabekir was generally pleased with the response from Angora that same day. After making it clear that any decision to begin military operations belonged to the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal approved the establishment of direct contact with Soviet Russia. When the Red Army moved into Georgia or forced it to become Bolshevik, the Turkish army would attack imperialist Armenia and coerce Azerbaijan into accepting Soviet rule. Russia should supply the Nationalist forces with 5 million gold rubles as a first installment, with shipments of weap­ ons, war matériel, equipment, and medical-sanitary goods to follow in quantities to be subsequently determined. Authorized envoys were being sent to Azerbaijan to work out the details.26 The personal relations between Kiazim Karabekir and Mustafa Kemal during this critical period were strained. Karabekir was suspicious and resentful of Kemal’s virtual dictatorship of the Nationalist movement and his apparent reluctance to grant Karabekir the title of Supreme Commander of the Eastern Front. He was nonetheless satisfied to learn on April 28 that Kemal’s Representative Committee had adopted the general’s plan to occupy the Soghanlu Mountains.27 Karabekir’s strategy was to keep the Armenians off guard by mobilizing his forces at some distance from the frontier. He would have the 3d Caucasus Infantry Division at Trebizond act in accordance with the Mudros Armistice while the other three divisions in the Erzerum-Van sectors secretly prepared for the offensive. And when the campaign began, Karabekir would claim that only irregulars were involved. Time was an important factor, for if the Armenians went over to the Bolsheviks before the offensive began, the future of the three sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum would be put in extreme jeopardy. Karabekir therefore sought authorization to move as soon as he deemed it appropriate.28 Mustafa Kemal’s reply on May 6 chagrined Karabekir. Although Kemal concurred that it was necessary to strike the Armenian government, a 25 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 664-666. 26 Genelkurmay Ba$kanhgi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Turk Istiklal Harbi, III: Dogu Cephesi (1919-1921) (Ankara, 1965), pp. 79-80 (cited hereafter as Dogu Cephesi)’, Karabekir, op. át., p. 667. See also FO 371/5178, E14638/345/44, Foreign Office memorandum on Bolshevik-Nationalist relations, Nov. 20, 1920. 27 Karabekir, op. át., p. 668, and, for Karabekir’s dissatisfaction with Mustafa Kemal’s separate, secretive correspondence with Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha, p. 703. 28 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 706, 715. See also FO 371/5167, E5466/262/44, Report of Department of Military Intelligence, May 27, 1920.

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puppet of the imperialist powers, he maintained that the Nationalist forces would not be in a position to challenge the Allies openly until Turkey’s partnership with the Bolsheviks had crystallized and Russia had agreed on the future boundaries of Turkey and what tangible assistance it would give. The Armenian question, Kemal explained, had aroused the nations of the world; if the Turks now tried to crush Armenia and word spread about renewed massacres, the Americans and other ele­ ments somewhat sympathetic to the Nationalist cause would turn against it. Hence, for the time being Karabekir should assist the armed forces of the Muslim councils beyond the frontier without engaging in a regular military campaign. Karabekir was outraged that Kemal, who had previ­ ously expressed his impatience to launch an offensive against Armeniaeven in the dead of winter, under the same conditions that had virtually annihilated Enver Pasha’s expedition at the end of 1914—now held back when matters were far more propitious, when Karabekir had four regular divisions and many irregular units under his command, and when the Red Army had already occupied Baku and most of Azerbaijan. Contin­ ued inactivity under these circumstances, Karabekir protested, would be “a great setback” and cause for despair.29 The First Formal Turkish-Soviet Exchange The Allied occupation of Constantinople and dispersal of the Ottoman Parliament in March 1920 played into the hands of Mustafa Kemal by giving him the excuse to declare that, because the sultan’s government could not function freely in the capital, an alternate body should be created in Anatolia, away from British warships and armies. In order to retain the support of the conservative, religious elements, Kemal initially called not for a countergovernment but rather for a body that would defend the prerogatives of the sultanate and caliphate against foreign enemies. By the time the Turkish Grand National Assembly convened in Angora on April 23, 1920, however, Kemal had created all the trap­ pings of a countergovernment. He overcame the reservations of some of his comrades to win election both as president of the Grand National Assembly and as chairman of the Council of Ministers.30 Most of the deputies concurred in the priority given by Kemal to se­ 29 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 707—708; Atatürk un tamim, telgrafve beyannameleri, pp. 318-319. Dogu Cephesi, p. 81, gives the date of this communication as May 8, 1920. See also FO 371/ 5169, E7373/262/44, Report for week endingjune 9, 1920, App. C. 30 On the organization of the Grand National Assembly, see Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London, [1964]), pp. 216—224; Elaine D. Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919—1923) (Washing­ ton, D.C., 1959), pp. 31-42.

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ISO

curing Soviet friendship and assistance. Some pointed to the Soviet ex­ periment as a successful model for defiance of the West and implemen­ tation of fundamental changes based on popular sovereignty. The primacy of Russia in the calculations of the Nationalist strategists was demonstrated in the fact that the Grand National Assembly’s first act in external affairs was to approve the text of a letter from Mustafa Kemal to the Sovnarkom extending greetings and proposing coordinated meas­ ures to eliminate the Caucasian barrier. Dated April 26, 1920, Kemal’s letter acknowledged that Soviet Russia, besides fighting in its own de­ fense, was striving to free all peoples subjected to the yoke of colonialism and could thus be assured the gratitude and collaboration of the Turkish nation. Russia and Turkey together would eliminate the obstacle posed by the Transcaucasian states: 1. We accept to join forces and operations with Bolshevik Russia against the Imperialist Governments and for the liberation of oppressed people under their rule and servitude. 2. If the Bolshevik forces conduct military operations in the direction of Geor­ gia or can ensure the inclusion of Georgia into the Bolshevik union through political means and influence, and can ensure that the Georgians themselves expel British forces stationed there, the government of Turkey will undertake to conduct military operations against the imperialist Armenian government and to ensure the inclusion of the Azerbaijan government within the group of Bol­ shevik states. 3. In order to expel the imperialist forces presently occupying our national homeland and to strengthen ourselves for the future joint struggle against im­ perialism, we request the Russian Soviet Republic to supply, for the present, five million pieces of gold, and ammunition, other technical war matériel, medical supplies,... in the amounts to be determined.31

It was apparent from the contents of the letter that Kemal expected the Red Army to flex its power in Georgia before moving into Azerbaijan, but by the time the letter was dispatched from Angora the bloodless coup in Baku had transformed Azerbaijan into a Soviet republic. The letter was hand-carried to Moscow by two officers, who finally arrived on June 1 and submitted the document through Halil Pasha to Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin.32 Halil and Fuad Sabit had come 51 Atatürk un tamim, telgrafve beyannameleri, pp. 304—305; Karabekir, op. át., p. 667;Jäschke, “Freundschaft,” pp. 205—206, and his “Zwei Streitfragen aus der Frühgeschichte der türkischen Revolution,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s. XIII, 3—4 (1971), pp. 165—167. Early Soviet publications of Kemal’s letter intentionally omitted the second point regarding military action against Armenia. British intelligence agents secured a copy of the complete original document and relayed the information to London in September 1920. See FO 371/5171, Ei 2472/262/44, Report for week ending Sept. 9, 1920. 52 Karabekir, op. át., p. 715; Yerasimos, op. át., pp. 149-150. General Ali Fuad Cebesoy later stated that a copy of the letter was taken from Baku to Moscow by Halil Pasha and delivered on June 1. See Jäschke, “Freundschaft,” p. 205.

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to Moscow purporting to be unofficial spokesmen of the Turkish Na­ tionalist movement. In their initial meetings with Soviet officials, the pair argued the advantages of dismantling the Armenian wall separating Rus­ sia and Turkey and of supplying the Nationalists with financial and mil­ itary assistance. Halil wrote Kemal that they had met with Chicherin and Karakhan and that the Soviet government had offered to help. It did not want to make this assistance public at present, however, because of its own considerations and the likelihood that Kemal himself would want to keep the matter veiled. In principle, the Soviets were prepared to give 2 million Turkish liras, half in gold, plus 60,000 rifles, artillery, and shells and ammunition for three army corps. They were even thinking of eliminating the Dashnak government of Armenia and advancing to the Turkish frontier. Kemal’s letter, Halil continued, had created a highly favorable impression. The Soviet authorities nonetheless asked that Kemal refrain from striking the Armenians, as they feared that world opinion would again condemn Turkey as the victimizer. Halil assured Kemal that if he intended to transform the Grand National Assembly into the actual government of Turkey, Soviet Russia would be ready to recognize that regime and exchange diplomatic representatives.33 Fuad Sabit, too, wrote of his endeavors on behalf of the national cause. Unfortunately, the Turkish case, he stated, had not been put properly before the peoples and especially the socialist parties of Europe. He was working to alter this situation through his numerous interviews with Western correspondents and socialist delegations. In a recent meeting in the Bolshoi Theater with the participation of British trade union rep­ resentatives, he had explained that the struggle against capitalism in Turkey was not being waged in the form of a class struggle because foreigners, together with the Greeks and Armenians, had previously dominated the country’s economy. Civil servants, army officers, and clergy in Turkey were drawn from all social classes, unlike the situation in Europe. In an expression reflecting the tact of the Turkish Nation­ alists, Sabit declared: “After the expulsion of the foreign enemy, I be­ lieve that the impact of the Russian Revolution in Turkey and in the exploited East will be greater than the French Revolution in Europe.” Fuad Sabit also wrote Kemal that, as the result of the negotiations con­ ducted by him and Halil Pasha, the Soviet authorities would supply 1 million gold pieces, 112 field guns, 10 heavy cannons, and 60,000 rifles, evenly divided between Russian, English, and French models and with 2,000 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Chicherin had announced that 35 Karabekir, op. at., pp. 798—800. On May 23, Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Lenin and Chicherin from Baku to enumerate the kinds and amount of assistance that could be given to “the Turkish patriots.’’ See Kheifets, op. át., p. 109.

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the Bolsheviks would assist the anticolonial national liberation move­ ments, as in the case of Afghanistan, even though there was no guarantee that the weapons being furnished would not one day be turned against the Soviet government. Sabit tried to allay Chicherin’s misgivings by lik­ ening the Nationalist movement to the class struggle in Europe: in Tur­ key, all classes were suppressed, and their combined struggle was against the external exploiting class as represented by the European imperial­ ists. Although Kemal had proposed joint Soviet-Turkish action in Trans­ caucasia, the Russians, Sabit continued, did not see the need, and this they would clarify in their formal reply. Moreover, a Soviet delegation would soon set out via Baku to establish regular relations with Turkey and deliver the first installment of gold, which would be followed by food and supplies. Sabit added that an Armenian delegation (Levon Shant) was engaged in negotiations in Moscow and was demanding at least enough Turkish territory as was needed to settle 300,000 refugees from the Ottoman Empire. Sabit believed the Nationalists could create a good impression and protect the territorial integrity of Turkey by pro­ posing an exchange of Muslims living within the current boundaries of the Caucasian Armenian state for the 300,000 refugees, who would thereby be resettled on the Russian side of the prewar frontier. In in­ formal consultations in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, he and Halil Pasha had suggested that a joint Turkish-Armenian-Soviet com­ mission might study the question on the spot.34 Even the intimation of such a concession by the self-proclaimed Turkish spokesmen was re­ garded as unacceptable by Mustafa Kemal and as treacherous by Kiazim Karabekir. The circle of Young Turk notables in Moscow had increased by the time Mustafa Kemal’s letter was delivered. Jemal Pasha, Behaeddin Shakir, and Bedri Bey arrived from Germany at the end of May and, like Halil and Sabit, used the opportunity to send letters to Kemal with the same couriers who had come from Angora and were returning with the Soviet government’s reply. Jemal praised Kemal for his patriotism but also recounted the personal hardships he had endured for the national cause, including two potentially fatal airplane crashes en route to Russia. He let it be known that he enjoyed significant influence in Moscow and had been given Kemal’s letter to read and to make suggestions that might be incorporated in the Soviet reply. He had proposed two agree­ ments, one public and one secret, based on consultations with Talaat and Enver in Berlin, Kemal’s letter, and his own ideas. Jemal also re­ 34 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 788—793. See also Yerasimos, op. cit., pp. 234—237; Dumont, op. át., p. 171.

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ported that the Soviet government was assisting him and his comrades in taking up assignments to heighten the revolutionary fervor of the Muslims from Persia to India in order to save Turkey from partition. From Tashkent, he would direct operations in India and Afghanistan; Bedri Bey was going to Afghanistan; Halil Pasha would take charge of activities in Persia; and Fuad Sabit was accepting a position in Kazan. Kuchuk Talaat was in Baku serving as chief of the translation bureau. Jemal confided that Enver Pasha would soon arrive in Moscow and rec­ ommended that in case of the successful negotiation of a Soviet-Turkish agreement Enver should become the Turkish point person in the Soviet capital. The Russians were sending Shalva Eliava at the head of a mission to Angora and were requesting that Kemal dispatch his own represen­ tative to Moscow. Jemal explained that he was now using the name Tash Timurov and could receive messages via Baku through Azerbaijani For­ eign Affairs Commissar Mirza Davud Huseinov.35 In a postscript, Jemal Pasha wrote that he had just been made privy to the Soviet reply to Kemal’s letter. He was pleased that it incorporated his basic suggestions and stressed the importance of the arrival of a del­ egation from Angora to enter into formal negotiations. Jemal added that Karl Radek had raised the Armenian issue with him. If the Soviet gov­ ernment could mediate a satisfactory solution to that problem, the labor parties in Europe could no longer criticize Soviet Russia, which would then be able to increase its aid to Turkey manyfold. Radek believed that some temporary concessions to the Armenian state formed on Russian territory would enhance Kemal’s moral position and result in immediate benefit to the Nationalist cause. Jemal had replied that if the Russians wished to act as intermediaries they could send such a proposal to Kemal for his consideration and response. Although Jemal could make no def­ inite commitment in Moscow, he thought that a joint Russian-TurkishArmenian commission might be able to reach some sort of understand­ ing.36 Ironically, it now appeared that the Young Turk leaders were willing to make concessions far greater than was palatable to either Mus­ tafa Kemal or Kiazim Karabekir Pasha. Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin, after consulting with Lenin, re­ plied to Mustafa Kemal’s letter on June 3, only two days after its receipt. Soviet Russia showed that it was ready to support the Anatolian move­ ment but, rather than endorsing Kemal’s proposal to invade Armenia, offered its mediation to set the mutual boundaries of Turkey, Persia, and Armenia. The Soviet government acknowledged the desire of the 35 Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralan, pp. 49—50; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 794—795, and for the letter of Behaeddin Shakir, pp. 800—801. 36 Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralan, p. 50; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 795—796.

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new Turkey to participate “in the common war against the foreign im­ perialism which menaces the two countries” and of its fundamental prin­ ciples of foreign policy, which as interpreted by the Soviet government were as follows: (1) The Declaration of the Independence of Turkey. (2) The inclusion within the Turkish state of territories indisputably Turkish. (3) The proclamation of Arabia and Syria as independent states. (4) The decision taken by the Grand National Assembly to allow Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, the territory of Batum, Oriental Thrace, and all the territories of mixed Turco-Arab popula­ tion to decide their own destiny. It is understood by this that a free referendum will take place in these localities, with the participation of the refugees and em­ igrants who were previously obliged to leave their country for reasons indepen­ dent of their wishes, and who now will be repatriated. (5) The granting of all the rights allowed to the national minorities of the most liberal states of Europe to the national minorities of the territories forming part of the new Turkish state headed by the Grand National Assembly. (6) The referring of the problem of the Straits to a conference of the states bordering the Black Sea. (7) The aboli­ tion of the practice of capitulations and economic control by foreign states. (8) The abolition of spheres of foreign influence of every kind.37

The fourth point, about the self-determination of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, and other regions, was not, of course, in Kemal’s letter, but it did follow principles proclaimed by both the Soviet and Turkish Na­ tionalist leaders. As to the proposal for a coordinated Soviet-Turkish campaign in Transcaucasia, Chicherin replied: The Soviet Government takes note of the decision of the Grand National Assembly to bring your labors and your military operations against the imperialist Governments into conformity with the noble ideals of the liberation of oppressed peoples. The Soviet Government hopes that diplomatic negotiations will enable the Grand National Assembly to establish between Turkey on the one side and Armenia and Persia on the other, clearly defined frontiers determined by justice and the right of national self-determination. The Soviet Government is always ready, at the invitation of the interested parties, to act as mediator.

The Sovnarkom also proposed the regularization of diplomatic rela­ tions based on the friendship and free will of all peoples. “The Soviet Government is following with the greatest interest the heroic struggle which the Turkish people are waging for their independence and in the present difficult days for Turkey it is happy to establish a firm foun37 Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920—1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, 1957), pp. 186—187; Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I: 1917-1924. (London, New York, and Toronto, 1951), pp. 187—188. See also Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, II (Moscow, x958)> PP- 554-555; Karabekir, op. át., p. 784; FO 371/5178, E6345/E7384/E7986/345/ 44. The date of Chicherin’s letter is given as June 2 in some sources.

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dation for the friendship which is to unite the peoples of Turkey and Russia.”38 The Soviet reply to the Grand National Assembly gave assurances of sympathy and support but also called for mediation to lay down just frontiers between Turkey and Armenia and upheld the right of selfdetermination, including a referendum after the repatriation of all ref­ ugees. In a speech given shortly after he had sent his letter to Kemal, Chicherin declared: ‘‘Toward Turkey we have decided to aid in its strug­ gle against the imperialists but only on the basis that it establish per­ manent relations and settle the boundary question with its neighbors based on mutual agreement, like the Armenians who have suffered through the centuries. Russia is the friend of all small nations who de­ pend on her.” He subsequently reported to the Eighth Congress of the Soviets that Halil Pasha, who was acting as the ‘‘representative of the nationalist revolutionary government of Asia Minor,” had suggested eth­ nic boundaries based on the prewar populations and mutual relocation to strengthen that principle and to create a homogeneous Armenian territory. Although the Armenian delegation (Shant) had accepted this formula, the Dashnak demands and conditions had been so great that it had not been possible to come to an agreement.39 Chicherin’s communication reached Angora in midJune, together with the letters of the prominent Ittihadists in Moscow, all of whom wrote of the sensitivity of the Soviet government to the Armenian question and the concern that Turkey might attack Armenia and thereby implicate Soviet Russia and seriously hamper its propaganda endeavors abroad.40 As it happened, Chicherin’s reply arrived at a moment of heightened tension between the Allied Powers and the Turkish Nationalists. In order to win time to see what developed and to demonstrate good faith in the Soviet government, Mustafa Kemal decided that it would be politic to accept in principle the offer of mediation.

Postponement of the Turkish Offensive During the six weeks between the dispatch of Mustafa Kemal’s letter and the receipt of Chicherin’s reply, the Grand National Assembly continued to grow and organize. The deputy appointed for Kars, then a part of the 58 Degras, op. át., p. 188. See also Eudin and North, op. át., p. 187; Dokwnenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, II, p. 555; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 784—785. A photocopy of the text of this letter written in French is in Atatürk'ün millî di$ politikasi, I: 19/9-/923 (Millt mücadele dönemine ait 100 beige), publication of Kûltûr Bakanhgi (Ankara, 1981), pp. 157—159. 39 Dokumenty vneshná politiki SSSR, II, pp. 657—658, 726—727. ^Jäschke, “Freundschaft,” p. 208, states that Chicherin’s letter was received in Angora on June 15, whereas the date is given as June 16 in Türk InkilâpTarihi Enstitûsû, Atatürkün söyleu ve demeçleri, I (Ankara, 1959), p. 90.

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Armenian republic, was seated with particular ostentation. Only a few days after first writing to the Soviet government, Mustafa Kemal pro­ posed and the Grand National Assembly concurred that a delegation should be sent to Moscow to negotiate a treaty of friendship and to secure assistance. The delegation confirmed on May 4 included its chair­ man, Foreign Affairs Commissar Bekir Sami Bey [Kunduh], who was regarded as pro-Western; Economic Affairs Commissar Yusuf Kemal Bey [Tengirçenk], an admirer of the Soviet experiment and regarded as proEastem; Osman Bey, a deputy from Lazistan who could speak Russian; and three staff officers.41 The instructions issued to the delegation on May 8 emphasized the need to gain Soviet recognition of the complete sovereignty and terri­ torial integrity of Turkey, as well as financial and military aid and, if requested, armed forces to prevent the West from subjugating Turkey and thereby jeopardizing Russia’s future. The “joining of the destinies” of the two countries would break the grip of Western imperialism in the East, and Turkish influence would win for Soviet Russia the gratitude and sympathy of the Muslim peoples. Russia, together with other coun­ tries along the Black Sea littoral, was to have free passage through the Straits but without compromising Turkish sovereignty over Istanbul (Constantinople). In order to achieve these objectives, unobstructed communication and transportation between the two countries (over Ar­ menia) was essential. Aside from extending monetary, military, and tech­ nical support, Russia should repatriate all remaining Turkish and other Muslim prisoners of war. Bekir Sami’s delegation was to journey under the guise of a Red Crescent mission, a cover often used by the Nation­ alists.42 When General Karabekir learned of these instructions, he was an­ noyed that nothing had been stated about the eastern boundaries, which, he insisted, should be extended to the Arpachai and Araxes riv­ ers. He telegraphed Angora to urge that the delegation take along with it the text of the 1918 treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum, which had provided for Turkish possession of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum (BrestLitovsk treaty) and half of the Erevan gubemiia (Batum treaty).43 The implication was obvious. Meeting with his staff officers on May 9, Kara­ bekir discussed the possibility of a limited offensive against Armenia to 41 Selek, op. át., pp. 111—112; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, p. 52. "Karabekir, op. át., pp. 755—756, 812. See also FO 371/5169, E7373/262/44, Report for week endingJune 9,1920. The delegation departed from Angora on May 11, according to Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, p. 51, and Yusuf Kemal Tengir§enk [Tengirçek], Vatan hizmetinde (Istanbul, 1967), p. 46, and arrived in Erzerum two weeks later, on May 25, ac­ cording to Karabekir, op. át., p. 752. "Karabekir, op. át., pp. 714, 756.

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take control of the strategic heights around Sarikamish, but he met un­ usually strong resistance on grounds that such action would draw the Armenians and Georgians into an anti-Turkish bloc and that the XV Army Corps was not yet ready for offensive action. Karabekir dismissed these reservations and that same day telegraphed Mustafa Kemal and the Grand National Assembly’s executive committee that the previously accepted conditions for action—namely, the entry of the Red Army into Transcaucasia—had already been met. The time to move had arrived. It was purposeless to delay the operation; Armenia would receive no ex­ ternal assistance, and rumors that the Entente Powers were changing their disposition toward Turkey were baseless and intended only to dis­ orient the Nationalist leaders.44 Every effort, Karabekir continued, should be taken to present the Ar­ menians in a bad light to the Christian world. They had enjoyed a strong propaganda advantage by portraying the unrest on their side of the fron­ tier as being fomented by Turkey for political and military reasons. The Turkish groups in Baku were working with the Bolsheviks to transform the image of the Armenians into that of aggressors and thereby facilitate a Turkish offensive. The time was propitious because the Soviet victory in Azerbaijan had divided the Armenians, some of whom were now join­ ing the Bolsheviks against the Dashnaks. Using these people to accuse the regime of severe repression, the Turks would gain the opportunity to quash the Dashnaks. The Turkish armies would disseminate the word that they were advancing not in vengeance but to implement Bolshevik principles with the intent of liberating the innocent masses. “In this way, Turkey will be able to stand up against the Bolshevik army from the north and give the Armenians, who have bloody aspirations, what they deserve.” Karabekir warned that if the Armenians accepted Soviet rule before the Turks moved, the Red Army and Red flag would advance right up to the frontier and “our hands will be tied.” Such an eventuality would prevent the recovery of Kars and the other districts lost to the Russian Empire in 1878, make Armenia a chronic problem, dampen the spirits of the resistance forces in Anatolia, turn the Kurds against the Turks, and obstruct Turkey’s bonds with the Turkic and other Muslim peoples of the East. Karabekir requested authority to occupy at least the Soghanlu passes and Allahekbar Mountains. The suggestion from An­ gora that this objective could be achieved with irregulars and partisans was out of the question. Karabekir cautioned that continued inactivity would exacerbate the already serious problems of desertion and short­ ages of food and supplies. The Red Army had reached the borders of Georgia and Armenia, and the time was right for the Turks to strike and 44 Ibid., pp. 714-715.

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H?

shape the future of the region according to their own desires. If neces­ sary, it could be said that the eastern army, incensed by the Armenian excesses, had taken matters into its own hands and, refusing to submit to military discipline, was acting independently.45 Mustafa Kemal’s replies on May 10 and 12 were disappointing, as they instructed Karabekir to hold back until a definite understanding had been reached with the Bolsheviks. The Entente Powers would regard an attack on Armenia as a declaration of war, and they might take active countermeasures. A successful British descent at Trebizond or elsewhere would turn popular sentiment against the Nationalists and be ruinous to the movement, and there was no guarantee that the Bolsheviks would help, as a binding treaty had not yet been concluded. Moreover, the western front, not the eastern, was the most critical at present, and Ka­ rabekir, it was implied, should be prepared to march to that theater.46 Karabekir rejected all such suggestions, insisting that even in case of grave danger in the west, the XV Corps would have to continue to protect the east from Armenian expansion and the still unknown real objective of the Bolsheviks. Once the Armenians had been crushed and the ter­ ritories rightfully belonging to Turkey had been recovered, it would be safe to transfer most of the corps to the west.47 Karabekir was perturbed by the irresoluteness of the Angora author­ ities, who did not seem to grasp the prevailing realities in the eastern theater and were far too concerned with a possible Georgian-Armenian bloc or Allied intervention. On May 30 he complained that an Armenian delegation was engaged in negotiations in Moscow and that Halil Pasha and agents of the Baku-based Turkish Communist Party had also de­ parted for the Soviet capital to speak in the name of the Turkish nation. There was the danger that these unauthorized representatives would consent to certain terms not in keeping with the instructions given to Bekir Sami’s delegation, which had arrived in Erzerum only a few days earlier. That delegation was unable to travel over Baku because the Ar­ menians had sealed the roads, but this action, Karabekir argued, af­ forded a good pretext for the Turkish army to advance into Sarikamish. He would warn the Armenian high command that the continued im­ perialistic behavior of its government would result in Armenia’s destruc­ tion and that the Turkish delegation must be accorded unhindered pas­ sage over Transcaucasia. Moreover, because of the XV Army Corps’s critical shortage of fuel, Karabekir would announce that he was occu­ 45 Ibid., pp. 715—718; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 81—82. 46 Atatürk’ün tamim, telgrafve beyannameleri, pp. 327—328; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 727—729 (dating the second communiqué as May 13). For his reply on May 15, see pp. 729—730. See also FO 371/5169, E7373/262/44, Report for week endingjune 9, 1920, App. C. 47 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 82—83.

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pying Sarikamish and surrounding forests “in a friendly manner’’ and that the Armenian army should withdraw to Novo-Selim.48 Kemal responded on June 1 that there could be no hope of justice from the West and that Turkey’s future depended on the contiguity of its boundaries with Russia and the world of Islam. Nonetheless, it would be imprudent to begin military operations before coming to a clear un­ derstanding with the Bolsheviks. If the Turks gave the Bolsheviks the benefit of their military service without a prior agreement, they would in effect be relinquishing their leverage to reap reciprocal benefits. Ke­ mal also questioned whether the XV Corps had enough strength to de­ feat the Armenians without simultaneous pressure from the direction of Azerbaijan or Georgia. The mere fact that Bekir Sami had been denied passage over Armenia was insufficient cause for a military offensive, and the occupation of Sarikamish alone would not change matters much. It was of course urgent that Bekir Sami reach Moscow as soon as possible, and Karabekir was asked to expedite the delegation’s journey.49 Disgrunded by this cautious attitude, General Karabekir continued to deluge the Angora government with requests and demands to seize Sa­ rikamish and the Soghanlu passes. On June 4 he again argued that a limited offensive was indispensable to maintain Turkish influence among the peoples of the East and to supply wood from the Sarikamish forests for his locomotives, which were now kept running with wood obtained by tearing down the houses of Erzerum. If the Red Army marched into Armenia, his divisions would advance beyond Sarikamish to strengthen Turkey’s bargaining position, especially as it had been the Bolsheviks “in the first place’’ who had proposed action against the Armenians.50 Karabekir’s repeated caveats were not without effect. In debates of the Council of Ministers and the executive committee of the Grand National Assembly, it was argued that a short, successful campaign would raise Turkey’s prestige throughout the Islamic world, expedite transit to and from Russia, check Armenian excesses against Muslims beyond the fron­ tier, and thwart Armenian designs to grab Erzerum at an opportune moment. On June 6, Kemal telegraphed Karabekir that the Council of Ministers had sanctioned an advance as far as Sarikamish for defensive purposes. Details would be forthcoming, pending which Karabekir should not move or engage in political activities.51 The next day, without 4H Karabekir, op. cit., p. 763. 49 Cebesoy, MiUimiicadele, pp. 482—483; Karabekir, op. cit., p. 764; Atatürk un tamim, telgraf ve beyannameleri, pp. 334—337. 50 Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 769—771. See also Tengirçenk, op. át., p. 147; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 83» 285-289. 51 Atatürk'ün tamim, telgraf ve beyannameleri, pp. 337—338; Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, p. 90; Dogu Cephesi, p. 84.

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS AND ARMENIA

!49

revealing the contents of his telegram, Mustafa Kemal announced in the Grand National Assembly that, in view of Armenian atrocities against die Muslim population, there now appeared to be grounds on which to re­ cover the three sanjaks—Kars, Ardahan, and Batum (collectively, Elviyei Selase)—that had been excluded from the national boundaries by the Mudros Armistice.52 Kiazim Karabekir, who had finally secured the tide of Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front, issued mobilization orders on June 8 with the objective of doubling the size of his armed force.53 The date for the offensive as far as Merdenek and the confluence of the Kars and Araxes rivers was set for June 23. Karabekir was confident that the Armenians would be unable to repeat the stiff resistance they had offered in 1918, because now pressure was also being exerted by the Bolsheviks and Azer­ baijanis from the east and by the Muslim partisans of Sharur-Nakhichevan from the south. Moreover, as Karabekir had occupied the region once before, he knew the terrain well. According to his batde plan, the 3d Caucasus Division would advance over Olti to Merdenek; the 9th Caucasus Division and the 12 th Division would capture Sarikamish and then push toward Kars as far as Novo-Selim; and the nth Caucasus Di­ vision would strike from Bayazit into Igdir and threaten Erevan, the Ar­ menian capital. The effective strength of Karabekir’s force included ap­ proximately 13,500 regulars and 5,000 tribal levies and irregulars, together with the Turkish-armed and Turkish-officered Muslim partisans in Olti, Turkish Zangibasar, and Nakhichevan, and support from air­ plane squadrons, artillery and machine-gun units, and various technical and quartermaster services.54 On June 13-14, Kemal relayed to Karabekir a draft of a note he should address to the Armenian commander in chief just before the offensive began. The note was to be written in Turkish and delivered to the com­ mander of the nearest Armenian post; then, without waiting for the Armenians to translate and reply to it, Karabekir should attack. He was to inform Angora when the note was to be delivered so the Council of Ministers could explain and justify the action to the Entente Powers. The draft communication deplored the Armenian massacres and re­ pression of the Turkish population in Kars, Ardahan, and elsewhere,

52 Selek, op. cit., p. 303; Atatürkun söylev ve demeçleri, pp. 90—91. 5SDogu Cephesi, pp. 85—86; Karabekir, op. cit., p. 777, giving June 7 as the date of the mobilization order. In his week-long speech in 1927, Mustafa Kemal said he had issued orders for mobilization on June 9, 1920, and at the same time named General Karabekir Commander of the Eastern Front. See A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig, 1927), p. 417. According to Dogu Cephesi, p. 92, Karabekir was granted the title on June 15. 54 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 772, 783; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 88-91.

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excesses attested to by the European powers themselves. The Turkish public was demanding action to redress this injustice. Thus, in order to secure the safety of the Turkish citizenry in territories considered an integral part of the Turkish patrimony and recognized as such by the Armenians in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, appropriate military measures were being initiated. In order to avoid bloodshed, the Armenian de­ tachments should be withdrawn from the territory in question.55 While making his preparations, Karabekir wrote the commanding general of the Eleventh Red Army in Baku to complain that the Arme­ nians were suppressing thousands of innocent people and that so-called independent Armenia was nothing more than a British marionette and a source of constant aggravation for both Russia and Turkey. The barrier separating these two revolutionary states should be lowered through elimination of this creation of the British imperialists.56 In a message to Soviet Azerbaijan’s military commissar the next day, Karabekir reiterated the charge of Armenian barbarism and asked that the Azerbaijani army keep the common enemy engaged to ease the burden on the Turkish nation, “which is in a struggle of life or death.” The Turkish soldiers, Karabekir continued, were full of wrath because of the suffering of their co-religionists and were impatient for revenge. “Today, Turkey is a wounded lion, but this lion, even if at the point of death, can destroy many hyenas.”57 As the date for the offensive neared, General Karabekir on June 19 ordered components of the 9th Caucasus Infantry Division at Koprikoy and cavalry and artillery units at Hasankale to advance toward the fron­ tier. The headquarters of the 12 th Division was brought up to Zevin. The 11 th Caucasus Division was directed to arm the tribal regiments, create diversions in Vedi and Davalu, block the routes from Erevan through Surmalu to Kars, and seize Kaghisman as soon as the general offensive began.58 But the operation was stayed at the last moment. Mus­ tafa Kemal was concerned about the Allied-sanctioned Greek offensive into western Anatolia, the possible involvement of the British garrison at Batum, the apparent overconfidence of Kiazim Karabekir, and most of all the Soviet government’s request that the Nationalists refrain from military action and accept its mediation instead. Although Chicherin’s letter of June 3 included certain disconcerting passages relating to Ar­ menian and Kurdish self-determination, Mustafa Kemal decided to make a show of good faith by accepting Soviet mediation in principle. Yet

55 Dogu Cephesi, p. 92. 56 Kutay, op. át., pp. 5—7. See also Karabekir, op. cit., p. 854. 57 Kutay, op. cit., pp. 9—10. 58 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 802, 804—805; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 93—95-

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because the National Pact had recognized Kars, Ardahan, and Batum as integral parts of Turkey, Kemal maintained that the occupation of Sarikamish should not be regarded as an act of aggression against Armenia, and for a few days after the receipt of Chicherin’s letter he took no action to halt Karabekir’s preparations. He subsequendy explained that the campaign was postponed only after it had been learned that a Soviet mission was en route to Anatolia by way of Kars, prompting a decision to wait and see what that delegation had to propose.59 The courier who brought Chicherin’s letter to Trebizond on June 14 apparently carried a separate communication in which the Soviet au­ thorities advised that a mission would be departing for Anatolia on June 16 by way of Baku, Tiflis, and Kars and confirmed that arrangements were being made to supply the Turkish Nationalists with 60,000 rifles, 112 light machine guns, 10 heavy cannons, and 2 million liras, half in gold. In order not to jeopardize the external relations of both the Soviets and Turks, military action should not be taken against the Armenians, especially as it seemed possible to satisfy the Turks regarding the borders through peaceful means.60 In view of these developments, Kemal wrote Chicherin on June 20 that he was pleased to note the similarities in the principles of the Grand National Assembly and the Sovnarkom and that Turkey was prepared to accept Soviet mediation. Asserting that his government had no aggres­ sive or imperialistic designs, Kemal nevertheless invoked the BrestLitovsk and Batum treaties as the basis for establishing just boundaries and friendly relations with the neighboring countries of Persia and Ar­ menia. Despite Armenian outrages, the Turks, in deference to the Soviet government, were desisting from immediate retaliation. The Grand Na­ tional Assembly’s delegation en route to Moscow would seek to lay the practical foundations for mutual trust and friendship in the service of humanity and in unbending opposition to imperialism.61 Because of this turn of events, Chief of the General Staff Ismet [Inönu] telegraphed Karabekir that same day to call off the offensive and warned that any commander failing to heed the order would be held personally accountable. Ismet demanded an immediate and definite ac­ knowledgment of receipt of the directive. Karabekir was deeply offended by this affront and inquired rhetorically how the sudden reversal should 59 Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri, p. 91. See also FO 371/4961, E13226/134/58 enclosure, and 371/5171, E12291/262/44, Report for week ending Sept. 1, 1920. “ Dogu Cephesi, p. 94. Although the publication by the Turkish general staff ascribes this letter to Chicherin, it may have been that of Halil Pasha. See note 33 above. 61 FO 371/5170, E9978/262/44, Report for week ending July 28, 1920, App. A; Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917—1958 (Seattle, 1959), p. 70. See also Kheifets, op. át., pp. 127—128.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

be explained to his men and to the people.62 In a circular to his division commanders on June 28, Karabekir nonetheless did give a partial ex­ planation. The Armenians, he complained, were taking advantage of Turkish inactivity and the internal unrest in Azerbaijan to press into Olti and Zangibasar. Yet Bolshevik confidence in the Turks had been shaken somewhat by the behavior of certain individuals (Nuri Pasha) in Azer­ baijan. A campaign under these circumstances would have posed serious problems, including a probable Armenian-Georgian military alliance. Azerbaijani Revkom chairman Nariman Narimanov had sent word, how­ ever, that Turkey’s position was safe in Azerbaijan and that soon the Bolsheviks would combine with the Turkish forces over Nakhichevan. Hence, for the sake of the nation, Karabekir would not act on his emo­ tions by undertaking an isolated operation that might detract from the general strategy.63 Mustafa Kemal also felt the need to explain. On July 1 he rationalized the Turkish withdrawal on the western front in face of the Greek offen­ sive, asserting that this was a tactical retreat to gain time so that the Islamic nations could combine against the world of Christendom. He claimed that Soviet divisions would be at the side of the Nationalists “within a month.’’64 To allay Soviet suspicions stemming from the dis­ turbances in Azerbaijan, Kemal issued a circular on July 7 denouncing as malicious rumors the reports spread by the enemy that the Bolsheviks had massacred thousands of Muslims in Azerbaijan. There had been a few incidents, but these had been fomented by certain Musavatists who had now been punished. “The sole reason for these operations in Azer­ baijan was to assist us.”65 At the same time, the public pronouncements of Kemal and others in the Grand National Assembly became more rad­ ical, lauding the high principles of the Soviet system and the imminent Russian military support at a time of alarming inroads by the Greek armies. The inordinate delays encountered by the Grand National Assembly’s delegation in reaching Moscow redoubled Karabekir’s fear that unau­ thorized persons would charade as spokesmen of the Nationalist move62 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 807—808. Mustafa Kemal stated that he rescinded authorization for the offensive on June 20, Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, p. 91, whereas the date of the communication to Karabekir is given as June 21 by Tevfik Biyikhoglu, Atatürk Anadolu’da (igiq—igzi), I (Ankara, 1959), p. 67, and as June 22 by Karabekir, op. át., p. 807. 63 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 813—814; Dogu Cephesi, p. 95. 64 FO 371/5170, E10707/262/44, Report for week ending July 28, 1920. See also E10014/262/44, and 371/5178, E8842/E14638/345/44; Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, p. 80. 65 FO 371/4944, E9803/1/58, GHQ Constantinople, Aug. 7, 1920, enclosing Kemal’s circular ofJuly 7, and 371/4970, E10707/262/44, Report for week endingjuly 28, 1920. See also Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, p. 93.

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ISS

ment. That Karabekir had cause for such concern was borne out in a letter from Chicherin to Mustafa Kemal on July 2 in which the Soviet government extended fraternal sentiments to the Turkish people through Halil Pasha, who was departing for Anatolia with the Soviet mission (and Soviet gold) ,66 A part of the problem was apparently Bekir Sami’s aversion to traveling by sea and his insistence rather on journey­ ing to Moscow by way of Bayazit, Maku, Persian Azarbayjan, and Baku. He was deterred, however, by the Armenian military operations in the Araxes River Valley and on the advice of 11 th Caucasus Division com­ mander Javid Bey returned from Maku to Bayazit and Erzerum in early July. While still at Karabekir’s headquarters, Bekir Sami sent a radiotelegram to Moscow incorporating Mustafa Kemal’s acceptance of Soviet mediation and explaining that his mission had been delayed because the Armenians had closed the roads.67 It was at that time that the Grand National Assembly’s second note to the Armenian government was dis­ patched in Bekir Sami’s name protesting the Armenian advance toward Olti and demanding the establishment of normal neighborly relations based on the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum.68 The Turkish dele­ gation finally set sail from a small harbor near Trebizond on July 12 and, traveling by train from Tuapse, arrived in the Soviet capital on July 19, more than two months after its appointment.69

Soviet-Turkish Negotiations Bekir Sami, Yusuf Kemal, and Osman beys were met in Moscow by sec­ ondary officials and given quarters in a building not far from the Krem­ lin. Many of the ranking Soviet figures were in Petrograd for the opening 66 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III (Moscow, 1959), p. 11 n. During a press conference in Tiflis on June 22, Soviet representative Sergei Kirov stated that he had engaged in a long interview with one of Mustafa Kemal’s supporters, Halil Pasha, who now took offense at being called “pasha,” as for a long time he had gone by “Comrade Halil.” Kirov re­ portedly continued: “C’est un nationaliste au sens le plus noble de ce mot. Et le mouve­ ment à la tête duquel il se trouve est la première phase de la libération du peuple turc.” See France, Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report ofJune 26, 1920. Halil Pasha departed from Moscow on July 2 with the Soviet mission traveling via Baku to Angora. See Kheifets, op. át., p. 114, who adds incorrecdy that because the Georgian Menshevik government would not allow the mission to travel by railway over its territory, lu. lu. Upmal’s mission and Halil had to pass through the Lori neutral zone between Georgia and Armenia. 67 Karabekir, op. át., p. 814; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, II, p. 556; Gotthard Jâschke, “Zu den russisch-türkischen Beziehungen, 1920—1922,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s., VII, 1—2 (1963), pp. 38—39. Tengir§enk, op. át., pp. 148—149, states that Ibrahim Tali Bey and Seyfi Bey were assigned to the delegation by General Karabekir in Erzerum. 68 See Hovannisian, Republic, III, chapter 8. 69 Tengirçenk, op. át., pp. 149—151; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 61—62; Yerasimos, op. át., p. 166.

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of the second congress of the Communist International. During the Comintern’s deliberations, which continued in Moscow after the cere­ monial inaugural session, strong differences came forth regarding bour­ geois democratic and national revolutionary movements. Ultimately, most delegates supported Lenin’s formula “to bring about the closest union between Soviet Russia and all the national and colonial liberation movements.’’ During the debates, some delegates rejected the need for the first, “bourgeois-democratic’’ phase of revolution and called instead for a Communist regime from the outset.70 Turkish representative Ismail Hakki maintained that in exploited countries such as Turkey the struggle should first be directed against foreign imperialism and only then to­ ward the establishment of international socialism. This approach was nearly the same as that of the Turkish Nationalists, who asserted that the Turkish people as a whole were exploited and that therefore the revo­ lutionary struggle would focus on delivering the nation from the claws of imperialism rather than on the class struggle. Thanks to the Russian revolution, Ismail Hakki declared, Turkey would win its freedom and then join in the international campaign against world imperialism.71 The Comintern’s ideological compromise with non-Communist national lib­ eration movements augured well for the conclusion of a Soviet-Turkish accord. Bekir Sami’s delegation, accompanied by Dr. Fuad Sabit, was first re­ ceived by Foreign Affairs Commissar Grigorii Chicherin and Assistant Commissar Lev Karakhan on July 24. During that meeting Chicherin pledged that the Turks would be fully informed of any Soviet agreement with the British and expressed his eagerness to setde all issues and es­ tablish firm treaty relations. As consensus had been reached on general principles in earlier negotiations with Jemal Pasha and Halil Pasha, the current discussions should deal with specifics. Bekir Sami voiced his plea­ sure at the prospect of a treaty of friendship but was quick to add that the preliminary exchanges with the two pashas had been of a personal nature and not officially sanctioned by the Grand National Assembly. His delegation, therefore, would have to negotiate both on principle and on detail. Chicherin announced that Karakhan would begin the discussions that very evening.72 During that late-night rendezvous the Turkish delegates emphasized 70 See Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, I (Stanford, 1972), pp. 271—396; James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International (Stanford, 1964), pp. 201—204, 206; Euden and North, op. át., pp. 64-68. 71 Vtoroi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Intematsionala: Stenograficheskii otchet (Petrograd, 1921), pp. 158-159. 72 Tengirçenk, op. át., pp. 151—152; Cebesoy, Moskova hattralan, p. 62; S. I. Kuznetsova, Ustanovlenie sovetsko-turetskikh otnoshenii (Moscow, 1961), p. 20.

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the need to open the overland route so that arms and equipment could be sent to Anatolia without further delay. Karakhan explained that the hostilities with Poland precluded the immediate shift of Soviet forces to clear the way. Moreover, military action against Armenia without direct provocation would create a bad effect in Europe and the United States. Diplomatic and political measures had already been initiated, and Ka­ rakhan was confident that unhindered transit over Transcaucasia would be possible in a week or two. When Bekir Sami complained that even a fortnight was too long, Karakhan noted that the Red Army was already under orders to occupy the Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan corridor “in favor of Azerbaijan” and that the Soviet government would inter­ vene if Armenia tried to expand to Olti. He added that as a first install­ ment of Soviet aid, 25 poods of gold, 6,000 rifles, 2 batteries of artillery, 100 machine guns, and sundry military equipment were being prepared for shipment under the direction of Halil Pasha and the first secretary of the Soviet mission to Anatolia (lu. lu. Upmal). After these initial ex­ changes, Bekir Sami telegraphed Mustafa Kemal on July 25 that he had received a cordial welcome and that the Soviet government would keep in mind Turkey’s views during its forthcoming trade negotiations with Great Britain.73 Postponement of the next scheduled session prompted Bekir Sami to write Chicherin on July 31 that it was imperative to conclude an agree­ ment quickly and clear the channels of assistance in the struggle against the common foe.74 While waiting to resume the discussions, the Turkish delegation met with various Muslim officials and deputations in Moscow. At the same time, the delegation’s military attaché, Colonel Seyfi Bey, prepared a memorandum on Turkey’s needs: 200,000 rifles and 5 mil­ lion rounds of ammunition; 350 to 400 cannons and mountain guns; 500 machine guns, with spare parts and 15,000 rounds of ammunition for each weapon; 200 telephones and cables; 5 wireless stations having an effective radius of from 200 to 500 kilometers; 200 airplanes; 100 trucks and buses; 40 automobiles; uniforms and accoutrements for 100,000 men in three army corps and heavy cloth for 50,000 overcoats; equipment for an ammunition plant in Erzerum and machines to refill cartridges; spare parts for railroad locomotives; and, until the route from Baku over Armenia to Anatolia was opened, 5,000 poods of oil per month transported on barges from Novorossiisk.75 73 Tengirçenk, op. cit., p. 152; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 62—64. Cebesoy gives the equivalent of 25 poods as 1,000 kilograms, whereas it is actually 409 kilograms, or 900 pounds. 74 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, p. 131; Tengirçenk, op. cit., p. 152; Jäschke, “Zu den russisch-türkischen Beziehungen,” p. 40. 75 Kuznetsova, op. cit., p. 22; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 78—79.

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When the two sides met again on August 4, Karakhan confirmed Bekir Sami’s information that Red Army and Turkish Nationalist detachments had linked up at Nakhichevan. He also asked that one of the Turkish officers with Bekir Sami be assigned to accompany a Soviet military of­ ficer setting out for Anatolia to report on military developments there. But most of all, Karakhan expressed displeasure over the Grand National Assembly’s ultimatum to Armenia to honor the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was not up to Turkey to make such demands; the exist­ ing Armenian state had been a part of the Russian Empire, and it was now a matter for Soviet Russia to handle. Russia did not want to resort to hostilities with the Armenians, but it was nonetheless taking precau­ tions and would decide when and if there was sufficient cause for military action. The attitude of the Armenian government was, of course, rep­ rehensible, the most recent provocation being the seizure of the gold Halil Pasha was transporting to Anatolia, and the demands of Shant’s delegation had rendered the negotiations in Moscow unproductive. Still, this was an issue with which the Soviet government had to deal. The Transcaucasian routes would be open within a month. It was unreason­ able for Turkey to demand the reestablishment of the Brest-Litovsk boundaries, especially as that treaty had been repudiated and many things had changed since 1918. The whole question would have to be reexamined, but meanwhile Turkey should not try to regulate affairs on the Russian side of the 1914 boundary. On a more agreeable note, Ka­ rakhan stated that, although his government had told the British that they would have to treat directly with Soviet Azerbaijan to secure the release of the British prisoners at Baku, the Azerbaijani Revkom had agreed to use the opportunity to effect an exchange for the Turkish prisoners at Malta. The Turkish delegation should prepare a list of per­ sons for possible exchange, taking care, of course, not to embarrass So­ viet Azerbaijan by the inclusion of questionable individuals unassociated with the Nationalist movement. Bekir Sami replied that he had come to Moscow not only to secure aid but also to achieve the more important end of entering into an alliance and treaty of friendship. His government had no imperialistic ambitions and was troubled that certain unauthorized persons had put forward programs with imperialistic overtones. Thinking that the refer­ ence was to Halil and Jemal, Karakhan denied that there were such implications in the talks held with the two pashas at a time when direct relations with Anatolia had not been possible. Because Jemal Pasha was popular in Afghanistan, where nothing was known of the sentiment that had grown up against him in Turkey, the Soviet government had decided to use him in the struggle against imperialism by directing him to Cen­ tral Asia. If that was not acceptable to the Turkish Nationalists, however,

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS AND ARMENIA

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Jemal would be recalled. Bekir Sami and Yusuf Kemal explained that, more than Jemal, the person they made reference to was Baha Said, who had negotiated a deeply flawed draft treaty with Soviet representatives in Baku. Karakhan was in full agreement, adding that the recent treach­ erous behavior of Nuri Pasha in Azerbaijan and Karabagh was another irritant, although this stupidity would not affect Soviet-Turkish relations. As for military aid, Karakhan concurred that this was a matter requiring immediate attention. He believed, however, that the Soviet government would be in a better position to give effective help once Shalva Eliava, chief of the Soviet mission, had been able to study the situation in An­ atolia firsthand. Karakhan concluded the session by offering to arrange a meeting between Eliava and the Turkish delegation, to have a military specialist consult with Colonel Seyfi Bey on Turkey’s needs, and to sched­ ule another interview with Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin.76 Reporting to Angora by courier, Bekir Sami summarized his delega­ tion’s discussions with Karakhan and asked for details about the pur­ ported Turkish ultimatum to Armenia regarding the Brest-Litovsk boundaries. Members of the Azerbaijani cabinet had voiced their con­ cern that Levon Shant might have persuaded the Soviet leaders to con­ done Armenia’s annexation of Nakhichevan and Zangezur. The Azer­ baijani Communist Party was asking that the Turkish delegation insist in its negotiations in Moscow that Nakhichevan be awarded to either Azerbaijan or Turkey or be established as a self-governing region. Ka­ rakhan, continued Bekir Sami, rejected a Turkish offensive against Ar­ menia and had even suggested a meeting between the Turkish and Ar­ menian delegations in Moscow, but the Turkish representatives had been evasive, asserting that they lacked authorization to engage in such an exchange. By contrast, certain influential Muslim Communists had confided that they saw no reason the Turks should not occupy Sarikamish and other border districts strategically and economically vital for the country. Unfortunately, Nuri Pasha had muddied the waters, and to appease the Bolsheviks he should be arrested if he tried to seek haven in Anatolia. Bekir Sami concluded by informing Angora that he had prepared a list of forty-four of “our men” arrested and sent to Malta and inquired if any others should be added for inclusion in a possible Anglo-Soviet prisoner exchange.77* In a meeting with Chicherin on August 13, Bekir Sami intimated his impatience with the pace of the negotiations and the continued block­ 76 Tengirçenk, op. át., pp. 158—161; Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralan, pp. 64—66; Vratzian, Hayastane murji ev sali midjev, pp. 251—252. See also Yerasimos, op. át., p. 167. 77 Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralan, pp. 66-67. $ee a*80 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 873-874; E. A. Zohrabian, Sovetakan Rusastane ev hai-turkakan haraberutiunnere 1920—1922 tt. (Erevan, 1979). PP- 47-48.

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age of the overland route between the two countries. Chicherin again promised that the roads would be open before the end of the month. In fact, a Soviet representative (Legran) had just signed an agreement (August 10) with the Armenians by which the Red Army would occupy Zangezur and Nakhichevan temporarily, with the Armenian Railway Ad­ ministration operating the Shahtaght-julfa railroad.78 Bekir Sami ob­ jected that instead of unsealing the Transcaucasian routes permission for the Armenians to control the strategic railroad would make matters worse. Following up on previous discussions with Halil Pasha, Chicherin now suggested that Turkey facilitate a solution to the perplexing Armenian problem by relinquishing Van, Bitlis, and Mush and engaging in an ex­ change of populations. Once Halil Pasha had arrived in Anatolia, he would present this scheme to the government of the Grand National Assembly. Bekir Sami quickly retorted that there were no Armenian provinces in Turkey, that the two peoples had coexisted for centuries, and that the Grand National Assembly would not prevent the return of innocent refugees but would never cede a foot of territory to the Ar­ menians. The Armenian government, he complained, was exploiting Russia’s goodwill to keep the roads tightly closed.79 Bekir Sami came away from the meeting with the impression that the Soviet government, in return for extending diplomatic, political, and military support to the Turkish Nationalists, was seeking sufficient territorial concessions to be able to take credit for solving the Armenian question. These troubling innuendos notwithstanding, Chicherin wrote Bekir Sami that same day (August 13) that a commission was being formed to complete the tech­ nical negotiations and draft the Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship. An­ drei V. Sabanin of the commissariat’s department of economic law and Eastern affairs expert Evgenii A. Adamov would serve as the Soviet spe­ cialists.80 The importance attributed to the Turkish revolutionary movement by the Soviet leaders was evidenced in the fact that Lenin personally re­ ceived Bekir Sami’s delegation on August 14. Reiterating the fundamen­ tal principle of extending aid to peoples subject to imperialistic oppres­ sion, Lenin explained that the challenges posed by the Polish army and General Wrangel had interfered with Russia’s furnishing significant tan­ gible support to the Turks, but he was confident that matters would soon change. Bekir Sami expressed his government’s firm belief that the

78 See chapter 3. See also Kheifets, op. át., p. 116. 79 Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 68—72; Tengir$enk, op, át., p. 162. 80 Dokumenty vneshná politiki SSSR, III, p. 131; Tengirçenk, op. át., p. 161; Jäschke, "Zu den russisch-türkischen Beziehungen,” p. 41.

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RS.F.S.R. was not indifferent to the Turkish struggle against imperial­ ism, but he complained that the Armenians kept the road sealed and that Russia’s allowing them to retain Shahtaght and to resume operation of the Julfa railway was the cause of great astonishment. Lenin assertedly concurred that this had been a mistake but added that the problem was being studied and the error would be corrected. Yusuf Kemal, writing years later, claimed that Lenin then said, “If we can’t rectify it, you will.” The Turkish delegation, according to Yusuf Kemal, had heard just what it wanted, and this impression would be imparted to Mustafa Kemal, Kiazim Karabekir, and other Nationalist leaders responsible for deter­ mining if and when to attack Armenia.81

The Draft Treaty A draft treaty incorporating the principles of Soviet-Turkish cooperation and friendship was negotiated between the Turkish delegation and the Soviet specialists between August 17 and 24. It was decided to separate the political and military aspects of the treaty. The amount of military aid Soviet Russia would supply was not finalized, but it was agreed that several cargoes would be shipped from Novorossiisk and Tuapse before the onset of winter. Colonel Seyfi Bey, expressing the Turkish delega­ tion’s concern that shipments by sea might detract from the urgency of opening the land route over Armenia, asked that some of the matériel be transported to Baku for transit over the Transcaucasian railway system as soon as possible.82 The Soviet-Turkish draft treaty of friendship was signed on August 24, 1920. As military and financial aspects were purposely left out of the document, the treaty consisted of a preamble declaring the intent of the two sides to live in friendship and brotherhood, followed by eight arti­ cles, as summarized below: Article 1 committed the contracting parties not to recognize any treaty or obli­ gation forcibly imposed on the other, and Russia specifically recognized the Grand National Assembly as the sole representative of Turkey and pledged to

81 Tengirçenk, op. dt., pp. 162—163; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 72—74; Biyiklioglu, op. át., pp. 67, 70. See also Kheifets, op. dt., pp. 115—116; Kuznetsova, op. dt., p. 21; Zohrabian, op. dt., p. 47. 82 Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 78—79, 82; Biyiklioglu, op. dt., p. 69. For Allied intel­ ligence reports on Soviet shipments of arms and equipment, especially to the ports of Trebizond and Rize, see Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Bulletin for the period Sept. 20-30, and Rapport militaire up to Oct. 15, 1920. Spector, op. dt., p. 78, shows that the initial shipments included 10 million gold rubles, 30,000 rifles with 1,000 rounds of ammunition for each, 30,000 bayonets, 250 to 300 machine guns with ammunition, 25 to 30 mountain guns, and large quantities of grenades.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

reject any international instrument that had not been deliberated and ratified by that body. Article 2 declared as null and void all previous treaties between Russia and Tur­ key. Article 3 bound the two governments to take all necessary measures to reestablish railroad passenger and freight traffic as soon as possible to protect their rela­ tionship and to safeguard against being separated under any circumstance. Article 4 extended to citizens of one country residing in the other the protection of the laws of the land and included provisions regarding the right of inheri­ tance and other civil regulations. Article 5 stipulated that the two contracting parties would extend most-favored status to one another’s subjects. Article 6 accepted in principle that merchant vessels of all nations would have free passage through the Straits and the Black Sea according to international law and that the security of and full Turkish sovereignty over Istanbul would be guaranteed by a compact of countries bordering the Black Sea. Article 7 pledged the two sides to regulate financial, economic, and other rela­ tions in the shortest possible time. Article 8 provided for the conclusion of a diplomatic and consular convention as soon as the treaty was ratified.83

A secret annex committed the two governments to keep one another informed about all developments pertaining to relations with other countries. Further questions, such as a post-telegraph convention, the regularization of trade, and the repatriation of remaining Turkish pris­ oners of war, were left for subsequent action.84 The Soviet-Turkish draft treaty of August 24 was a major accomplishment for Bekir Sami’s dele­ gation, especially as it came only two weeks after the sultan’s represen­ tatives had affixed their signatures to the humiliating Treaty of Sèvres. By and large, Soviet Russia had accepted the legitimacy of the Turkish National Pact and agreed to base future relations on equality, friendship, and mutual support. Two days after signing the draft treaty, Bekir Sami wrote to Chicherin to reaffirm Turkey’s acceptance of Soviet mediation in establishing the borders with Persia and Armenia but complained that the Armenian government was crudely attempting to rely on the ultraimperialistic treaty (of Sèvres) and on American arbitration, thereby signifying rejec­ tion of the impartial mediation of Soviet Russia.85 During a meeting between Bekir Sami and Chicherin on August 28, most of the discussion centered on the Armenian problem. The two officials first agreed that their governments would exchange any proposals made to them by the Allied Powers, and Chicherin promised to look into the question of al­ 83 Cebesoy, Moskwa hâtiralan, pp. 80—81; Tengirçenk, op. át., pp. 178—180; Kuznetsova, op. át., pp. 21—22. 84 Tengirçenk, op. át., pp. 180—181. See also Kheifets, op. át., pp. 117—118. 85 Dokument} vneshná politiki SSSR, III, p. 325 n. 8. See also Kheifets, op. át., p. 124.

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lowing Turkish prisoners of war and refugees to repatriate. He gave as­ surances that the roads between Russia and Turkey would be opened but cautioned that the purpose of this action would only be to reestablish regular communication. He accepted the rationale for Turkish occu­ pation of Sarikamish and Shahtaght, insisting, however, that no harm should come to the Armenian inhabitants during that operation. The Turks would not think of molesting unarmed Armenians, Bekir Sami replied; by contrast, the Armenians themselves had been oppressing the Muslims of Kars, Shahtaght, and Nakhichevan for several months, and immediate measures should be taken to halt these violations. He added that the onset of winter would compound the difficulties in getting Rus­ sian military aid to Anatolia and suggested therefore that the Soviet gov­ ernment supply a million gold rubles so that the Nationalists could pur­ chase weapons directly from Italy.86 Chicherin then turned the discussion to the importance of solving the Armenian question. The boundaries as defined in the Turkish National Pact, Chicherin began, seemed to be too broad and in need of some correction based on the ethnic principle. Establishment of the borders claimed by the Nationalists would contravene the basic right of each people freely to determine its own destiny. In this regard, it was essential that a part of the provinces of Van and Bitlis be given to the Armenians. Bekir Sami first asserted that he was not authorized to discuss or accept any alteration of the National Pact; he then went on to insist that there was no such thing as an Armenian province, that the Armenians had lived intermixed with Muslims throughout the Ottoman Empire, that they did not form even a third of the population in any given province, and that implementation of Chicherin’s suggestion would violate the fundamental rights of the overwhelming Muslim majority and thereby constitute a severe breach of the principles proclaimed by the Soviet government itself. Bekir Sami was alarmed at Chicherin’s continued adamance that an exchange of populations should take place so that the Armenians could have a homogeneous national home, his reiteration that both Halil Pa­ sha and Jemal Pasha had accepted the plan, and his implication that the amount of Soviet aid was contingent on a satisfactory solution to the problem. Bekir Sami protested that he had no inkling that Soviet aid 86 Tengirçenk, op. cit., pp. 165—166; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 82—83. See also Gotthard Jäschke, “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kampfes der Türkei um ihre Unabhän­ gigkeit,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s., V, 1—2 (1957), p. 49, and Dokumenty vneshneipolitiki SSSR, III, pp. 726—727. Kheifets, op. át., p. 132, states that both Ordzhonikidze and Kirov sup­ ported the Turkish position regarding the necessity of occupying Sarikamish and Shah­ taght and influenced Chicherin’s concession to Bekir Sami on the “correctness” of this measure.

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might be linked to this issue. Halil and Jemal had no right to speak in the name of the Turkish nation. If the Turkish people, who had been struggling against Allied plans to award much of their territory to the Greeks and Armenians, learned that a friendly neighboring government was adhering to the same policy, they might well ask what value there was in a Soviet-Turkish treaty; when it came down to the partition of Turkey, there seemed to be no difference between the Western impe­ rialists and Soviet Russia. Chicherin demurred, pointing out that his government was seeking only a small area for the Armenians so that the Armenian question could be settled fairly and an end could be put to the baneful enmity between the two peoples. Bekir Sami tried to be firm but diplomatic in order not to jeopardize the military and financial support for which he had traveled to Moscow. The Turkish government, he said, would allow the repatriation of only those Armenians who had been Ottoman subjects, and even then such persons would be required to return to their place of origin. Not a single non-Ottoman subject would be let into the country. Turkey would ex­ tend to the Armenian minority all the guarantees enjoyed by minority groups in the most progressive states. Chicherin, according to Bekir Sa­ mi’s report to Angora, would not budge, continuing to demand that the Armenians be granted a part of Van and of Mush (Bitlis vilayet) in pro­ portion to their prewar numbers and that the Muslims there should be settled elsewhere. Each people, Chicherin argued, had the right to sep­ arate from other peoples, and the Armenians were no exception. They should have an area entirely independent of Turkey. The Muslims of Kars and Ardahan also should have the right of self-determination, Chicherin admitted, and both of these questions should be investigated and resolved by a mixed commission. It would be impossible, Bekir Sami responded, to create an indepen­ dent country for the sake of a few thousand Armenians. Furthermore, an Armenian state in Van and Bitlis was in the interest of neither Turkey nor Russia. And if the principle put forward by Chicherin was adopted, what was there to prevent the formation of a miniscule Armenia in every Ottoman province? This would be a preposterous outcome. Maintaining that he had no authority to discuss the question, Bekir Sami offered to convey Chicherin’s views to the Grand National Assembly but insisted that there should be no delay in the shipment of Soviet aid. Chicherin gave assurances that his government would not hold up the promised assistance and concluded the interview by saying that he would be sat­ isfied if only “a small part” of Van and Bitlis was ceded to the Armeni­ ans.87 H7 Tengirçenk, op, át., pp. 167—168; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 83—86.

SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS AND ARMENIA

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Bekir Sami reported to Angora that the Soviet leaders seemed to be afraid that if they did not do something to settle the Armenian problem, it would be taken over entirely by the Americans and Europeans, thus freezing out the Russians. Moreover, as the Armenians were regarded as victims, the Moscow regime needed to satisfy them in order to mollify the proletariat and the socialist parties in the West. Another possible explanation was that Russia wanted to shift a part of Turkish territory to Armenia in order to strengthen the pro-Soviet element there and bring about the rapid overthrow of the Dashnakist government. The formation of a relatively large Armenian state marked for ultimate sovietization would clearly benefit the Russians. Bekir Sami also drew attention to the fact that Assistant Foreign Affairs Commissar Lev Karakhan, former sec­ retary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee Varlam Ava­ nesov, and many Soviet and Communist officials in the Caucasus and Turkestan were Armenian and wielded considerable influence. Bekir Sami concluded by advising that the Grand National Assembly seriously deliberate whether its strategies and policies should continue to be based on anticipated Russian aid or whether it should explore the possibility of securing support from other quarters. In any case, the government should take immediate measures to move large numbers of tribesmen and others from the regions of Diarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, and elsewhere to Van and Bidis to fill the empty towns and villages and to demonstrate thereby that the population of this area was solidly Muslim.88 The Turkish delegation decided to send Yusuf Kemal back to Turkey with the draft treaty, Bekir Sami’s report and recommendations, and several other relevant documents and letters. On September 2, Yusuf Kemal set out from Moscow with Osman Bey, who was overseeing the shipment of a million gold rubles and one railroad car of Mauser am­ munition and machine guns. By that time, eight other carloads of mu­ nitions were ready for transport at the Moscow railway depot. In Rostov, Yusuf Kemal learned that 6,000 English rifles, 300,000 bullets, 100 ma­ chine guns, and 8 English cannons were already en route to Turkey. Osman Bey remained in Rostov to ship this and future consignments of the promised Soviet assistance. Once the receipt of the million pieces of gold was confirmed by the Angora government, the Soviets would be prepared to send the remaining 4 million, as requested by Mustafa Ke­ mal.89 88 Tengirçenk, op. át., pp. 169—170; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 86—87. 89 Tengirjenk, op. át., pp. 171—173, 181; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, p. 82; Biyikhoglu, op. át., pp. 20,85, stating that a shipment of Soviet arms arrived at Trebizond on September 22; and Kuznetsova, op. át., p. 22, confirming that Yusuf Kemal took with him the first million of the promised 5 million rubles in gold. According to Dokument^ vneshná politiki SSSfí, III, p. 675 n. 54, during the summer of 1920 Sergo Ordzhonikidze was authorized

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Traveling on a small motor launch from Tuapse, Yusuf Kemal surrep­ titiously made his way into Trebizond on September 15. From there he telegraphed the contents of the draft treaty to Angora. In his commu­ nications with Mustafa Kemal and Kiazim Karabekir, Yusuf Kemal em­ phasized Lenin’s comment about the Soviet mistake in concluding an agreement with the Armenians and the intimation that the Turks could rectify the error. He came away from Moscow firmly believing that the Soviets would not intervene in case of a Turkish offensive against Ar­ menia. Yusuf Kemal also reported that the Soviet government was allo­ cating 3 million liras in credit for Turkey from its account in Italy and had given him a cipher letter to that effect to be handed to its Italian representative. On orders from Chief of the General Staff Ismet, Yusuf Kemal set out for Angora to report more fully on the activities of the Bekir Sami mission and on his assessment of the strategies of the Sovnarkom and Russian Communist Party.90 Yusuf Kemal’s impression that, despite Chicherin’s demand for a part of Van and Bitlis for the Armenians, the Red Army would not move to help the Armenians in case of a Turkish offensive confirmed the infor­ mation that was reaching Angora from Halil Pasha, Enver Pasha, and other prominent Turks who were collaborating with the Russians. In a message to Kiazim Karabekir and Mustafa Kemal on August 3, Halil explained that the Soviet strategy was to recognize the Armenian gov­ ernment in order to wean it away from the British but that both this act and the offer of mediation between Turkey and Armenia were simply intended to gain time until Soviet rule could be imposed. The difficulties encountered on the Polish front had prolonged the life of Armenia and Georgia, as the Tenth Army had to be withdrawn from the Caucasus, and the unrest in Azerbaijan had fully occupied the Eleventh Army. Halil also stated that in July the Soviet government had shipped from Rostov to Baku rifles, ammunition, artillery, and machine guns intended for the Nationalist movement. Much of this material was already being trans­ ió supply the Turks 6,000 rifles with 5 million rounds of ammunition and 17,600 artillery shells, and in September, 200.6 kilograms of Soviet gold were delivered in Erzerum. See also Yerasimos, op. dt., pp. 171—173. According to Kheifets, op. dt., p. 118, Kirov cautioned Chicherin on August 17 that the absence of munitions was crippling the development of the Kemalist movement, and he recommended supplying the Nationalists from Novorossiisk to Trebizond pending the opening of land routes over Georgia and Armenia. He discounted the threat of British naval surveillance, noting that he had been able to direct large quantities of petroleum products from Baku to Astrakhan at a time when the Caspian Sea was heavily patrolled by the British and their allies. He was confident that even more supplies could slip through the British blockade on the Black Sea. 90 Tengirçenk, op. dt., pp. 173—192; Biyiklioglu, op. dt., p. 7o;Jâschke, “Beiträge,” p. 51, stating that Yusuf Kemal carried 1 million gold rubles with him.

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ported by 200 ox carts from the railroad station of Evlakh toward Shushi. The sooner the road over Goris and Nakhichevan was secure, the sooner the weapons would reach Anatolia. He added that Mustafa Subhi and other Turkish Bolsheviks in Baku were trying to organize a Turkish Bol­ shevik regiment from former prisoners of war.91 Under the impact of this and similar reports, Mustafa Kemal spoke at length in the Grand National Assembly on August 14 about the course of Soviet-Turkish relations and his government’s attitude toward Bolshe­ vism. The Bolsheviks, he said, had asked for Turkey’s cooperation in the struggle against imperialism. With Turkish assistance the Red Army had crossed over the North Caucasus into Azerbaijan and prepared to ad­ vance into Georgia and Armenia. Contact between the Soviets and Turks had been established in May, but the Soviet reverses on the Polish front and the Azerbaijani uprisings at Ganja and elsewhere had interrupted this development and assisted the Armenians and Georgians. The Ar­ menians had exploited the situation by advancing into Olti and Zangibasar. They had approached the frontier at Tuzla, but Turkish forces sent across the old boundary to hold the strategic Barduz-Tuzla line had halted this movement. Though the time had not yet come for a decisive blow against the Armenians, their attacks had ceased, and elements of the Turkish and Soviet armies had joined from opposite directions at Nakhichevan. This union, despite all the obstacles, was evidence of the determination of both countries to defeat their common enemies. The Bolsheviks, Kemal continued, had ascribed significant political and social importance to the Armenian issue, because in the West the Armenians had been viewed as having been victimized. Fortunately, the Armenians had now shown their ingratitude (by attacking the Red Army in Zangezur and seizing the Soviet gold intended for the Turkish Na­ tionalists), and it was likely that the Bolsheviks would decide to give “this insolent nation’’ the lesson it deserved. The success of the Bolsheviks on the Polish front would be a triumph for the Turkish Nationalist move­ ment as well; not only would the common enemy be weakened, but cooperation between Moscow and Angora would be expedited and strengthened. It was well known that the views of the Grand National Assembly were not based on Bolshevik principles, and there was no thought of imposing those tenets on the Turkish people. Rather, the Grand National Assembly stood on a platform of populism, the render­ ing of power directly to the people. This principle was not, of course, in conflict with the Bolshevik program, and there were even certain signif­ 91 Karabekir, op. at., pp. 836-839. For testimony from the 1926 trials in Ankara, see Gabriel Lazian, Hayastan ev hai date: Hai-eu-Rus haraberutiunneru luisin tak (Cairo, 1957), pp. 256-258.

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icant parallels between the Soviets and the Turks, who as members of the broader Islamic community transcended national boundaries, as did the Bolsheviks. Similarities also existed in the external environment, as the West viewed both Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey as pariahs marked for elimination. The Bolsheviks, however, were concerned pri­ marily with the exploited classes within a given nation, whereas in the Turkish case the entire nation was exploited and the struggle would be conducted differently. The world imperialists, headed by Great Britain, would fail in their campaign to obliterate the Turkish nation and prevent the Bolsheviks, who were striving to liberate all downtrodden people, from extending a helping hand. The Soviets had already begun to lend material support and were taking measures to broaden the avenues of communication and cooperation. Most recendy they had sent the Turks direct and indirect invitations to participate in the Congress of the Peo­ ples of the East, which was to be held in Baku.92 The First Congress of the Peoples of the East

The Third (Communist) International, following Lenin’s strategy to sup­ port and utilize anticolonial movements in Asia and Africa, issued a sum­ mons in July 1920 for a congress of Eastern peoples to take place at Baku in September. Many participants were already in Russia as fugitives, but a large number of others had to travel great distances and surmount serious obstacles to reach Baku. Of the nearly 1,900 persons attending the conference were many Turks, among them influential members of the erstwhile Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihadists). It was clear that the Soviet rulers, despite their wariness of persisting Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic sentiment, hoped to use the prestige of these well-known figures to win over the various Turkic and other Muslim peoples of the East. For their part, Enver Pasha and his Young Turk comrades wanted to take advantage of the resources of Soviet Russia and the revolutionary potential of the peoples of Asia and Africa to expel the Allied Powers from Turkey and to further their personal and collective political am­ bitions. It was not insignificant that Enver Pasha traveled from Moscow to Baku with Grigorii Zinoviev, Karl Radek, Béla Kun, and other mem­ bers of the Comintern’s executive committee.93 92 For the English translation see FO 371/5178, E13226/345/44 enclosure, and for the Turkish original see Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, pp. 89-99. See also FO 371/4961, Ei3226/134/58 enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 2, Report no. 56, Dec. 30, 1920; Kutay, op. át., pp. 30—31; Selek, op, át., p. 309. 93 See Brian Pearce, translator and annotator, Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, September 1920: Stenographic Report (London, 1977), pp. ix-xiv.

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On July 20 the executive committee appealed to the “enslaved pop­ ular masses’’ of Persia, Armenia, and Turkey to send large delegations to the Baku congress. The workers and peasants of the West had now risen against their exploiters and were summoning the East to unite in the campaign to overturn world capitalism and imperialism. It was those imperialists of the Entente Powers who had made the Turkish sultan a prisoner and were imposing a treaty intended to plunder the Turkish people and deprive them of purely Turkish territory. Yet the people of Turkey should be wary of their present leaders, who might come to an agreement with the oppressors in exchange for less severe terms of peace: Peasants of Anatolia! You are being urgently summoned to rally under the flag of Kemal Pasha, to fight against the foreign invaders, but at the same time we know that you are trying to form your own people’s party, your own peasants’ party, which will be able to carry forward the fight in the event that the pashas make peace with the predators of the Entente.

The appeal also called upon the Armenians to turn away from their manipulators: Peasants and workers of Armenia! For years you have been the victims of foreign capital, which has talked at length about the massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds, has stirred you up to fight against the Sultan and has continually gained new advantages from your fight against him. During the war the foreign capitalists not only promised you independence but also incited your teachers, priests and merchants to lay claim to the land of Turkish peasants, so that unend­ ing war might rage between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, from which they might extract unending profit, since so long as discord persists between you the foreign capitalists will profit by it, through frightening Turkey with the threat of an Armenian rising and frightening the Armenians with the threat of pogroms by the Kurds.... It has not been possible to establish peace in Syria, and you, peasants of Ar­ menia, whom the Entente, despite all its promises, are allowing to starve, so as the better to keep control of you—you are coming to understand more and more clearly that hope of salvation through help from the capitalists of the Entente is utterly senseless. Even your bourgeois government of the Dashnaktsutyun party, those lackeys of the Entente, have been forced to turn to the workers’ and peas­ ants’ government of Russia with a request for a peace treaty and for assistance. Now we see that you yourselves are beginning to understand your own needs, and so we address ourselves to you, in our capacity as representatives of the European proletariat, possessing great experience accumulated in our struggle, in order to help you achieve your emancipation. We say to you: the time when the European and American capitalists could suppress you by means of their own forces has passed, never to return. Everywhere in Europe and America the work­ ers have risen in arms against the capitalists and are waging bloody war against them.

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The Comintern’s executive committee looked forward to the presence of thousands of workers and peasants in Baku on September i to join in the struggle against the common enemy.94 The text of this appeal was apparently still unknown to Mustafa Kemal when he spoke in the Grand National Assembly on August 14 about the forthcoming congress. Yet because no invitation was addressed directly to him or to the Grand National Assembly, Kemal decided not to send a formal delegation to Baku but rather to be represented unofficially by Ibrahim Tali Bey [Ongören], who was then in Moscow with Bekir Sami’s delegation. Nonetheless, Kemal followed these developments closely and received letters from his supposed political foes, Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Jemal Pasha, as well as other Ittihadists, about their dealings with leaders of the Communist International. Talaat Pasha wrote from Berlin through General Karabekir that Karl Radek had volunteered the view that the Armenians were an ignorant and bloodthirsty people and entirely untrustworthy. They were the constant cause of problems and disturbances and were liked neither by Lenin nor by Trotsky. Radek assertedly added that if the Turks decided to settle the Armenian ques­ tion in their own way Soviet Russia would not intervene, as a real inde­ pendent Armenian state was an impossibility. Talaat urged an immediate attack on Armenia, believing it a certainty that Russia would not move. A Turkish victory in the eastern theater would have an enormous impact on the western front and in the Western world. Enver Pasha, Talaat concluded, would give more details.95 Writing on August 26, shortly after he had arrived in Moscow, Enver Pasha addressed Mustafa Kemal as “Dear Brother’’ and explained that he had come to work for the salvation of the fatherland by organizing the Islamic world. The Soviet leaders, he wrote, shared his views and had agreed to support the Turkish national movement, even if Turkey would not become Communist. Enver believed that conditions in Europe were beginning to turn in favor of the Turks and that the more they resisted, the greater would become the dissension and turmoil among the Allied Powers. Consultations with various Islamic organizations in Berlin had led to the consensus that measures against the English should be coor­ dinated through a single center, and it was for that purpose that he had endured great hardship to reach Moscow. Azerbaijan, although losing its independence, would be preserved as a separate state, and there were even plans to reorganize its army and possibly send that force to Anatolia to help the Nationalists. Enver, who had conferred with Bekir Sami’s 94 Ibid., pp. 1—5. See also Euden and North, op. át., pp. 79—80; Spector, op. át., pp. 24424595 Kutay, op. át., pp. 23—27. See also Cebesoy, Millî mücadele, p. 42; Lazian, op. át., pp. 244-245-

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delegation and sat with it at a number of receptions, added that he was impressed with its caliber and was doing whatever possible to advance its viewpoints.96 In a letter to Karabekir, Enver denounced the prepos­ terous scheme to create a “Greater Armenia” and called for a mortal blow without the slightest pang of conscience: “I anticipate your vic­ tory.”97 Enver Pasha addressed the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East but was not listed as an official delegate, apparently because of the or­ ganizers’ concerns about his popularity and controversial past. More than two-thirds of those who registered claimed to be Communists, some from as far away as China and India. Azerbaijanis and Turks made up the strongest contingents, whereas some 160 Armenians, many of them in Baku since the failure of the May uprising in Armenia, formed the largest non-Muslim group. The congress, held from September 1 to 7, 1920, was a clamorous affair, with a babble of mutually unintelligible languages and dialects. According to some observers, it was much like an Oriental bazaar, as people were constantly coming and going, bar­ tering and trading, brandishing swords and daggers, and performing their namaz prayers.98 A Muslim Social Democrat newspaper in Tiflis reported that the congress provided a forum for the Bolsheviks “to sound their trumpets and beat their drums,” threatening to unleash the fury of the East in order to intimidate the West into making concessions. They also hoped to use the congress to prepare the way to seize other lands, as had already occurred in Azerbaijan.99 The Comintern leaders tried to keep tight control over the proceed­ ings. Nariman Narimanov, head of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Com­ mittee, welcomed the delegates and submitted for acceptance by accla­ mation the nomination of Grigorii Zinoviev as chairman, as well as a roster for the presidium and honorary presidium of the congress. In his opening address, Zinoviev, flanked by several honorary presidium mem­ bers from the West, such as John Reed (United States), Thomas Quelch 96 Cebesoy, Millimücadele, pp. 50—52, 157—158. 97 Kutay, op. át., pp. 28—30. 98 On the Baku congress, see, for example, Kommunisticheskii International i osvobozhdenie Vostoka: Peruyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka, Baku 1—8 Sent. 1920 (Petrograd, 1920); the translation and annotations of Brian Pearce; Spector, op. át., pp. 46-61; Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 18—32, 52—53; A. B. Harutiunian (Harents), Arevelki zhoghovurdneri aradjin hamagumare (Erevan, i960). For a réévaluation of the significance of the Baku congress by the last generation of Soviet Armenian historians, see, for example, Hr. R. Simonian, Turk-haikakan haraberutiunneri patmutiunits (Erevan, 1991), pp. 385—396. 99 FO 371/5435, N5641/244/38 enclosure. The chairman of the Muslim Council of Georgia labeled the congress “a farce, having no significance for Eastern peoples, espe­ cially Moslems.” For other reactions to the congress, see Archives de l’Armée, 20N/183, dossier 4, Revue de la Presse, 1—15 and 16—30 sept. 1920. See also US Archives, RG 59, 861.00/7713 enclosure.

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(England), Alfred Rosmer (France), and Karl Steinhardt (Austria), set the general tone by asserting that the revolutionary workers and peasants of the West were coming to the assistance of the awakening East. There were two streams: the swift, forceful one made up of the Russian and European proletariat, and the meandering one from the oppressed East. “We want these two streams to draw closer and closer together, so that the second stream may be cleansed of national prejudices, so that they may be merged in one single, tumultuous, powerful stream which, like the sea, will sweep all obstacles from its path and clear the land of all the evil from which we have suffered so long.”100 Soviet Russia, Zinoviev continued, would patiently support elements, such as Mustafa Kemal’s government in Anatolia, “which are not yet with us and even on some questions, are against us.” The Comintern would reach out to democratic, national movements while awaiting “a real people’s revolution.” Zinoviev denounced the international impe­ rialistic “bandits” who were the cause of so much suffering, including that of Armenia, “which yesterday all the governments of the Entente wanted to defend and whom nobody is now defending.” He raised the boisterous gathering to a frenzied pitch by calling for a jihad—a holy war—against the British and French capitalists.101 Karl Radek, the secretary of the Comintern’s executive committee, filled the second session by developing the theme that the European proletariat would fight to the death to destroy capitalism and to help emancipate the “grey-haired East.” The recent world war had pushed aside German capitalism and opened the way for British and French predominance in the Near East. They did not want to free the Arabs from Turkish misrule but rather “to liberate the Arabs from the petro­ leum” that could have made them a prosperous people. “If, comrades, we inquire how the British, French and Americans have liberated the unfortunate Armenians, whom they ceaselessly incited, for so many de­ cades, to fight against the Turks and Kurds, and to whom they promised freedom and cultural development,” one had only to look at the ex­ ample of Marash, where the French had abandoned 20,000 Armenians to Mustafa Kemal’s merciless army. Now the United States was posing as the savior of the Armenians and encouraging them to fight against neighboring peoples with whom historical fate had determined that they must coexist. But American bread could not save the Armenians. “You know that the Armenian Republic, which is full of hatred for the Bol­ shevism of Soviet Russia, led as it is by bourgeois intrigues in the service 100 Pearce, op. át., pp. 21—32. 101 Ibid., pp. 32—37. See also Spector, op. at., p. 53; Peruyi s"ezd narodou Vostoka, pp. 3942.

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of the Entente, this Armenian Republic has now been obliged to make peace with Soviet Russia, for it realizes that no salvation can be expected from the Entente.” The British had 80,000 troops to liberate the Arabs from their petroleum in Mesopotamia, yet they were unable to spare a single soldier for impoverished Armenia. Radek concluded by invoking the name of Allah to summon the East to take the extended hand of the Russian workers and peasants in overthrowing the yoke of capitalism.102 During the same session, Dr. Behaeddin Shakir, former Ittihad Cen­ tral Committee member and a key figure in the annihilation of the Ot­ toman Armenians, spoke at length of Turkey’s wartime policies and the absence of any desire for conquest. This was demonstrated in the fact that the Turkish government had sanctioned and happily recognized the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Behaeddin Shakir’s self­ absolution did not pass without a sharp rebuke from an Azerbaijani del­ egate who insisted that Turkey, far from being a simple tool in German hands, had pursued grand, imperialistic designs.103 By September 4 the organizers of the Baku congress were becoming uneasy about the slow pace of the proceedings, which required multilin­ gual translation, and about the questionable disposition of many dele­ gates. Still, considerable time was allocated to Turkish speakers. After a delegate from the North Caucasus had denounced Nuri Pasha and other Turkish notables involved in anti-Soviet activities in Daghestan and Azer­ baijan and had criticized Enver Pasha for betraying the fundamental objectives of the Young Turk revolution,104 the congress heard a pre­ pared text by Enver Pasha himself. Whatever qualms Zinoviev and Radek may have had regarding Enver’s presence in Baku, they hoped to use him to spread Soviet influence in Central Asia and beyond and therefore allowed his views to be aired.105 Beginning each paragraph with the sal­ utation, “Comrades,” Enver, who claimed to represent the union of revolutionary organizations of North Africa, Arabia, and India, drew at­ tention to his years of struggle against imperialism, beginning in Tripoli against the Italian invaders and continuing up to the emancipation of Azerbaijan. Though Turkey opposed all capitalist-imperialist regimes, it had been left no alternative during the world war except to enter the 102 Pearce, op. tit., pp. 38—52; Pervyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka, pp. 59-61. 103 Pearce, op. át., pp. 55—56; Pervyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka, pp. 77—78. 104 Pearce, op. át., pp. 64—67. For a detailed report on the proceedings, see Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, “Politique Orientale des Bolcheviks,” Oct. 1920. 105 Kirov asserted that Enver was not allowed to speak personally because of intense hostility toward him among the delegates; in fact, however, there is much evidence that the Bolsheviks feared that Enver was too popular and might cause a “great manifestation.” See Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Political report for Sept. 1—15, 1920. For a report on Enver’s activities in Baku, see FO 371/5435^564/244/38. See also 371/5439, N2539/467/38 enclosure.

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German camp for self-preservation. There was no doubt about which side Turkey would have chosen had Soviet Russia existed then. Enver felt fortunate to be standing “shoulder to shoulder with a true and hon­ est ally,” the Third International, “in opposition to imperialism and capitalism, which is not satisfied with robbing us naked but is trying to drink our blood and destroy us.” The Turkish people were engaged in a heroic struggle in which there was now real hope of victory because the Eastern world had stepped forward under the banner of the Com­ intern to join in “breaking the teeth of the wild beasts and depriving them of their strength for good.” Enver concluded: “Long live the al­ liance of the oppressed! Down with the oppressors, who tremble before this alliance!”106 The statement of Mustafa Kemal’s representative, Colonel Ibrahim Tali, followed. Not unlike Enver, he characterized the developments in Turkey as being a grassroots reaction to Western exploitation. The forces of world imperialism had brought Turkey to a state of complete break­ down, compelling the peasantry to take arms to defend their national frontiers and means of production. They realized that they had been deceived by the American professor (Woodrow Wilson) who spoke of the right of all peoples to freedom but in fact let the Western capitalists send their creatures—the Venizelist Greeks from the west and the Dashnakist Armenians from the east—to deprive the Turkish peasant of his last crust of bread. The Anatolian movement was not in the least based on the bourgeoisie, as was supposed in the West. “Speaking frankly, I can tell you that since the accomplices of Western capitalism in the East—the Dashnaks, the supporters of Venizelos, and the old courtier Pashas too, their tools—have used the Sultan’s court in the interests of British capitalism ... , the Anatolian revolutionaries have turned to the East, where the revolution has risen like the dawn.” The Turkish peas­ ants and revolutionaries had bound their destinies with that of the Third International. The Grand National Assembly had demonstrated this by the decision to send a delegation to Moscow, and it was overjoyed “that the hand sincerely extended from Anatolia has been clasped with the same sincerity.”107 106 Pearce, op. át., pp. 76—79. See also Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralan, pp. 25—28; Yerasimos, op. át., pp. 179-180. 107 Pearce, op. át., pp. 79—82. See also Peruyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka, pp. 112—116; Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 29—31; Gotthard Jäschke, “Die Ankara-Türkei auf dem Kongress von Baku 1920,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s., VII, 1—4 (1961), pp. 185—186. Ostrovskii read the Russian text of both Ibrahim Tali’s and Enver’s addresses, whereas the Turkish texts were read by Turkish Communists Mehmed Emin and Ismail Hakki, respectively. A relevant report by Armenia’s diplomatic representative Martiros Harutiunian to his government is in State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 4, pp. 21-22.

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Taking precautions that the words of the two Turkish spokesmen should not be viewed as the official position of the congress, the presid­ ium pushed through a resolution expressing sympathy with the Turkish struggle against world imperialism and, echoing the decision of the sec­ ond congress of the Comintern, proclaiming “that it will support those general-national revolutionary movements which seek to free the op­ pressed peoples of the East from the yoke of foreign imperialists.’’ The congress took note of the fact, however, that the current movement in Turkey was directed only against foreign oppressors and not toward emancipating Turkish peasants and workers or eliminating the major obstacle to the liberation of the East—namely, interethnic animosity. For these reasons the congress found it necessary to show particular caution in relation to those persons who had led the Turkish peasants and workers to the slaughter in the interests of one of the imperialist powers. Such persons (Enver) would have to prove in deeds that they were prepared to make amends for past errors and to serve the toiling masses. And in declaring support for the resistance movement in Turkey (Mustafa Kemal), the congress also urged the workers and peasants there to create their own independent organization to ensure the final emancipation through a social revolution. “Only in this way can the toiling people of Turkey succeed in freeing themselves from all their oppressors and exploiters, and only then will the land, the factories, the mines, and all the country’s wealth be put at the service of the toilers and the toilers alone.’’108 American John Reed was unable to deliver his speech because of time constraints, but his text was appended to the published proceedings. He, too, addressed the Armenian question. American capitalists, Reed said, were collecting millions of dollars for the starving Armenians while they themselves were starving the Cubans, Filipinos, and American Ne­ groes. Cleveland H. Dodge wrote emotional descriptions of the terrible Turks driving the poor Armenians to the desert, yet he treated thousands of American workers no better. The Armenians were grateful to the United States, but for what did they have to be thankful except wordy declarations? The missionaries were more concerned about protecting their properties in Turkey than protesting against the Armenian atroc­ ities. Now the capitalists were promising food, not because of any phil­ anthropic sentiment but rather to exploit Armenia’s mineral wealth and reservoir of cheap labor: “Uncle Sam is not one ever to give anybody something for nothing.’’ The capitalists, afraid that other peoples would follow the example of Russia and Azerbaijan, were offering the Arme­ los pearce> opt cit., pp. 82—83. See also Pervyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka, pp. 116—1 i7;Jaschke, “Die Ankara-Türkei,” pp. 187—188.

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nians food while at the same time trying to starve the Soviet republics. “I represent thousands of revolutionary American workers who know this, and who understand that, acting together with the Armenian work­ ers and peasants, with the toiling masses of the whole world, they will overthrow capitalism.” There was only one road to freedom: ‘‘Follow the red star of the Communist International!”109 A report in the name of the Armenian participants, dated September 4, 1920, was virtually the same as the one submitted a few weeks earlier to the Comintern congress by Avis Nuridjanian. Like some fifty other reports, it was appended to the transcript of the proceedings without having been delivered orally. At the same time, the Armenian delegates addressed an appeal to the Baku congress describing the past and pres­ ent exploitation and manipulation of the Armenian people. Whereas the German and Turkish imperialists had ruined Turkish Armenia, the Entente imperialists, using beautiful phrases, were now partitioning Tur­ key and turning Russian Armenia into a reactionary base from which to attack the revolutionary East and in the first instance to deprive the newly liberated Azerbaijani masses of their victory. Emerging from the bosom of capitalism, the party Dashnaktsutiun had called the Armenian people to arms against Turkish oppression yet was unconscionably re­ lying on the tsarist oppressors and Western imperialists. That party was responsible for the annihilation of the toiling peasantry of Turkish Ar­ menia and was now preparing a new calvary for the workers and peasants of Transcaucasian Armenia. The bloody Dashnak regime, which had been established in Russian Armenia to serve Western financial capital and cut off the working masses from Soviet Russia, had with its Musavat counterpart spread sword and fire over the entire region. Whatever de­ struction the Turkish imperialists had left unfinished, the Dashnak gov­ ernment was now completing. But thousands of workers had risen against the lackeys of imperialism during the Communist-led May re­ bellion. The throne of the criminals had been shaken but not yet over­ turned, and the Dashnak reign of terror was now exacting cruel ven­ geance. The working Armenian masses called upon the revolutionary East and Soviet peoples to help crush once and for all the bloody am­ bitions of the Armenian counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie and their lords, the international vultures. Armenia was to become the beloved socialist fatherland of the toilers, regardless of nationality. Under the flag of the Communist International and with the assistance of the neigh­ boring peoples of the East, Armenia would be liberated and participate in the final overthrow of world imperialism.110 i°9 Pearce, op. át., pp. 85—88. See also Pervyi J’ezd narodov Vostoka, pp. 122—124. 110 Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 397—400, and for the report of the Armenian

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The last three days of the Baku congress were dominated by the or­ ganizers, who presented the Comintern’s (and therefore the congress’s) theses on colonial and national questions, Soviet construction in the East, and the agrarian question.* 111 Each thesis emphasized the impor­ tance of and support for national liberation movements yet maintained that final emancipation would be achieved only with the establishment of the Soviet system. All of the orators mentioned the Turkish resistance and the Armenian problem, on the one hand vowing not to allow the Western imperialists to partition Turkey, on the other hand offering the Armenians a secure collective future in a federation of Soviet states. If the movement led by Mustafa Kemal simply expelled the foreign inter­ ventionists but left the power in the hands of landlords and speculators, what was the gain for the toilers? The masses had to rise against their enslavers, both foreign and native. Béla Kun exclaimed: “Whoever wants the peoples of the East to be free from all forms of exploitation and oppression, whoever wants to be liberated from foreign colonists and from the native agents of foreign imperialists, whoever wants to replace the rule of pashas, khans, beys, usurers, and other bloodsuckers by the rule of the working masses can take no road but that of Soviet power.”112 The rapporteur on the agrarian question noted that the Armenians had been “driven from their land, forced to take refuge in barren moun­ tains, deprived of their homes and livelihoods and stripped of all they possess by Kurdish landlords, the aghas.” The peasants of all other na­ tionalities, even if not expelled from their lands, had litde comfort in their lives because they could not enjoy the fruits of their labor. Only the complete triumph of the socialist revolution and a worldwide Com­ munist economy could free the peasantry of the East from ruin, want, poverty, famine, and exploitation.113 The message should have been clear to Mustafa Kemal and others like him. As he prepared to adjourn the Congress of the Peoples of the East on September 7, Grigorii Zinoviev declared: “The first tinkle of the chair­ man’s bell on this platform was the funeral knell of the world bour­ geoisie.” Peoples who for years had drawn daggers against one another were now united in the common struggle. In his lengthy concluding address, Zinoviev again referred to the Armenians. “We have frequently spoken about Armenia here. There is not one Armenia: there is, on the one hand, workers’ and peasants’ Armenia, to which we extend a fra­ delegates, pp. 391—396. See also Harutiunian (Harents), op. cit., pp. 72-80; Armenia Ar­ chives, 200/2/90, p. 10, Martiros Harutiunian’s report; US Archives, RG 59,861.00/7626, Bristol to Secretary of State, Oct. 9, 1920, enclosure. 111 Pearce, op. at., pp. 89—161. U2 Ibid., p. 127. Ibid., p. 133.

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ternal hand, and, on the other, the accursed bourgeois Armenia of the Dashnak hangmen.” In the relations between the East and the workers of Europe and Soviet Russia, many problems had to be worked out It was essential to eliminate the roots of distrust and for all to realize that the workers of East and West were members of one family, struggling for the same ideals and against the same enemies. The chairman con­ cluded with a renewed call for a jihad against the plundering British and French imperialists.114 According to some accounts, the congress organizers were disap­ pointed in the results and cut the proceedings short. They seemed to have regretted Enver Pasha’s presence in Baku, where he conferred with and was sought out by various Turkic deputations, and they wanted to get him back to Moscow as soon as possible. Zinoviev reportedly told Lenin that the gathering had been a failure, and John Reed and other Comintern members came away disillusioned. British intelligence sources concluded that, according to various participants, the congress was ‘‘a piece of bluff on a grand scale.” If the intent was to bring together true representatives of the Eastern peoples, then it had been a fiasco, because those present were ‘‘a motley crew,” but if the purpose was to draw up the dregs of society and agents and provocateurs, then perhaps it had been a success.115 Significantly, despite Soviet Russia’s professions of goodwill toward the Armenian republic and a pledge to recognize the independence and sovereignty of that state, there was no hint during the proceedings of the Baku congress that either Russia or the Comin­ tern was willing to tolerate the permanent existence of a non-Communist Armenia. On the contrary, the eradication of the Dashnakist govern­ ment and the establishment of Soviet rule in both Armenia and Georgia were seen as important and inevitable prerequisites to the desired social revolution in Anatolia. Before adjourning, the Baku congress adopted Zinoviev’s proposal to convene annually and in the interim to entrust the direction of affairs to a forty-eight-member Council of Propaganda and Action of the East, which would meet periodically in Baku and function on a permanent basis through a seven-member presidium. Two of the seven members would be appointed by the Comintern’s executive committee and be vested with the power of veto. The roster of the Council of Propaganda and Action was made up largely of Muslim deputies, with only one Ar­ menian (Avis Nuridjanian) and one Georgian (Filipp Makharadze).116 114 Ibid., pp. 156-161. 115 FO 371/5171, E13451/262/44. For an English translation of Zinoviev’s public dec­ laration hailing the work of the congress, printed in Pravda, Sept. 18, 1920, see FO 371/ 5435« N244/244/38 enclosure. 116 Pearce, op. át., pp. 145—152; Spector, op. át., pp. 54, 60-61; Harutiunian (Harents),

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Yet even with the tight control the Comintern guaranteed itself through the absolute power of veto, it never summoned another congress.117 Nonetheless, the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, drawing to­ gether nearly 2,000 participants from many lands, provided important propaganda value and was long given a place of honor in Soviet histo­ riography.

The Turkish Exchanges

The Baku congress reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to assist Mustafa Kemal but left no doubt that his struggle was regarded as only the first stage of the revolution, which was to be completed by a total internal social restructuring. For both sides, however, that point of ultimate ten­ sion was held within narrow margins, given the immediate mutual need to collaborate against the West. The high visibility enjoyed by Turkish spokesmen at the congress reflected this need. At the same time, Turkish leaders tried to attenuate their own ideological and personal differences to save the country from partition. Mustafa Kemal willingly accepted the help of the deposed Ittihadist dictators, now operating abroad. The se­ cret correspondence between Angora, Berlin, Baku, and Moscow dem­ onstrated that the association between the president of the Grand Na­ tional Assembly and the former Young Turk rulers of the Ottoman Empire was far more intimate than was generally believed. When General Karabekir learned that Enver had arrived in Russia, he flattered the exiled leader by writing that his presence in the Soviet capital came at a critical time for the fatherland and had created an encouraging atmosphere, adding, “We look forward to your efforts to save the country.’’ Karabekir urged Enver to emphasize at the Baku con­ gress that the routes between Anatolia and the East had to be opened and that the Armenian problem should be settled in such a way as to satisfy Turkey’s vital national interests. Sarikamish should be included in Turkey to make possible the rebuilding of the eastern provinces, and the Armenians should not be allowed to possess an army that could threaten the security of Anatolia. Karabekir also advised Enver to remain in Baku to organize Azerbaijani military assistance for the Nationalist cause rather than setting out on distant assignments in Turkestan, Af­ ghanistan, or elsewhere. He should be careful not to arouse Russian or

op. át., pp. 51—53. The Comintern appointed Elena D. Stasova and Mikhail Pavlovich (Welt­ mann) as its presidium members. 117 On the aftermath of the Baku congress, see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. át., pp. 406-416.

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Azerbaijani suspicions, which might jeopardize the shipment of aid. At present, Turkey could rely only on the Russians.118 Enver did not receive this letter before the Baku congress adjourned. However, he himself wrote both Karabekir and Kemal from Baku to advise them that the Russians had no immediate plans to move against Armenia and that to wait for them to complete their operations on the western front would give the Armenians time to grow stronger and crush Turkey. The Turkish army should attack now with the forces at hand; Russia would not intervene. The delegates to the Baku congress, Enver wrote Mustafa Kemal, had shown great warmth toward Turkey, and the Communists were ascribing primary importance to a Soviet-Turkish al­ liance because they believed that Turkey led the Islamic world. In view of the fact that the Red Army was composed largely of men of Christian origin, Enver thought their appearance in Anatolia might leave a bad impression, and he was therefore exploring the possibility of forming Muslim divisions in the Caucasus. It would take until the following spring to get this help to Turkey, but he was confident that Kemal could hold out until then. Perhaps looking ahead to his own return, Enver stressed the necessity of putting aside “internal differences” for the sake of the national cause.119 Mustafa Kemal not only acknowledged receipt of the letters of Enver, Talaat, Jemal, and Halil pashas but also thanked them for their patriotic efforts. He underscored the threat of Bolshevism to the independence of Turkey and advised the Young Turk notables that in their endeavors they should downplay the theme of unity of the Islamic world in order to keep the Russians from becoming suspicious. Instead, they should give the impression that their principal aim was to force the English out of India. He wrote Enver that Soviet aid was essential if Turkey was to stand up to the British and that an accord to that end was being nego­ tiated with Moscow. Should future trouble result from this strategy, Tur­ key would exert its influence in the Muslim world to obviate any abuse of the agreement.120 Kemal wrote Jemal Pasha that it was not possible to send officers to assist him in Afghanistan; the defense of the homeland came first. He nonetheless complimented Jemal on his activities. Kemal also expressed confidence that he, too, would be successful in his goal of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey.121 To 1 ,8 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 875—876. 119 Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, p. 233; Cemal Kutay, Atatürk-EnverPa$a hâdiseleri (Istanbul, 1956), pp. 35—36. For a subsequent letter of Enver, see Galip Kemali Söylemezoglu, Basimiza gelenler: Yakin birmâzinin hâtiralan, Mondrosdan-Mudanyaya, 1918—1922 (Istanbul, 1939)> PP- 171-172. 120 Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 55—56; Kutay, Atatürk-Enver, pp. 39—40. 121 Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan, pp. 57—58.

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Talaat, Kemal wrote that the parallel labors of Talaat in the West, of himself in Anatolia, and of others in the East would have an important effect on the destiny of the country. He asked that Talaat, in his pursuits in the West, bear in mind Kemal’s views and act in harmony with them.122 Though Mustafa Kemal actively sought Russian assistance and praised the Soviet government for its commitment to liberate all oppressed peo­ ples, he took precautions to prevent the spread of communism in Tur­ key. To block genuine Bolshevik activities in the country, he arranged for the creation of pseudo-Communist groups made up of political pro­ gressives sympathetic to the Soviet system but loyal to the Nationalist cause. These societies, which also included a number of former Young Turks, existed only as long as Kemal deemed them useful and expedi­ ent.125 The Russian Communist Party, for its part, hoped to prepare for the second stage of the Turkish revolution through the aegis of true Turkish Communists. At the invitation of Mustafa Subhi, Ismail Hakki, and other ideological Bolsheviks, an organizing conference of Turkish Communists was held in Baku on September 15. The agenda included statements on the current situation, the colonial question, the Russian revolutionary movement, the program of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP), reports from delegates, and election of the TKP Central Com­ mittee.124 Kemal was alert to the danger posed by these committed Com­ munists, and when TKP chairman Mustafa Subhi led a number of his comrades to Anatolia in January 1921 Kemal summarily arranged to have them drowned in the Black Sea off Trebizond.125 By that time, he had also dealt with the Armenian question by cutting the Gordian knot and unraveling the Republic of Armenia. Ibid., p. 59. 10 On the state-sponsored Turkish “Communist” groups, see Feridun Kandemir, Ata­ türk’ün kurdugu Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Istanbul, n.d.); Rasih Nuri Ileri, Atatürk ve Komünizm (Istanbul, 1970); Ertürk, op. át., pp. 530-554; Harris, op. át., pp. 80-88. 124 A. M. Shamsutdinov, Natsional’no-osvoboditel’naia bor’ba v Turtsii, 1918—1923 gg. (Mos­ cow, 1966), pp. 154—164; Harris, op. át., pp. 63—66, and on Mustafa Subhi, pp. 50—61. E. K. Sarkisian (E. Gh. Sargsian), Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i natsional’ruHfSvoboditel’naia bor’ba v Turtsii (1918—1922) (Erevan, 1958), pp. 65-68. See also Cebesoy, Moskova hätiralan, pp. 38-43; FO 371/5171, E12472/262/44, Report for week ending Sept. 9, 1920, and 371/5178, E14638/345/44 enclosure. 125 On the activities of Subhi and questions related to his murder, see Paul Dumont, “Bolchevisme et Orient: Le parti communiste turc de Mustafa Suphi, 1918-1921,” Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, XVIII, 4 (1977), pp. 377—409. See also Sarkisian, op. át., pp. 70-73; Shamsutdinov, op. át., pp. 165-174; Harris, op. át., pp. 89-91; Jäschke, “Freund­ schaft,” pp. 208-218, 222; Simonian, op. át., pp. 405—406.

The Turkish Invasion and Soviet Diplomacy

In September 1920 the Turkish Nationalists made the bold move of striking across the former Russo-Turkish frontier into the Republic of Armenia. For Turkey, the elimination of the Armenian front in the east would open the way to Azerbaijan and Russia and allow Mustafa Kemal to concentrate his armies against the Greek threat from the west. The Armenians had often warned of an impending invasion, but the Allies— and perhaps the Armenians themselves—did not believe the Nationalists would actually move as long as British, French, and Greek military forces were operating in Asia Minor and worldwide sympathy for the Armeni­ ans focused attention on the “debt of humanity’’ to that long-suffering people. Yet the Treaty of Sèvres made it unmistakable that the Allied Powers intended to destroy the Ottoman Empire and keep what was left of Turkey in political and economic servitude. Mustafa Kemal needed to take some dramatic action to serve notice that the treaty would not be accepted and that there would be no peace until the West was ready to offer new terms in keeping with the principles of the Turkish National Pact. The invasion of the Armenian republic became the trenchant Turkish response to the Treaty of Sèvres and to the shaping of a united, independent Armenian state. At the same time, the Bolshevik strategists of Soviet Russia hoped to achieve their goals in the Caucasus through pressure and diplomacy. To that end, Boris Legran arrived in Erevan in October 1920 to resume the negotiations that had been interrupted in Moscow in June. Although the Armenian government was in receipt of many reports about the subversive intent of Legran’s delegation, the Soviet envoy showed him­ self to be conciliatory. He even agreed to the terms of a draft treaty, the formalization of which would have been most favorable to Armenia. The Bureau-Government of Hamazasp Ohandjanian nonetheless remained

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highly skeptical of Soviet Russia and continued to cling desperately and, in the end, futilely to its Western orientation.

Turkish Calculations Mustafa Kemal was convinced that the success of the Turkish Nationalist movement required the political and military support of Soviet Russia and the removal of the threat of Armenian expansion into the regions of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van. Yet during the summer of 1920 he was reluctant to authorize General Kiazim Karabekir to begin the offensive against Armenia because of concerns about the Greek pene­ tration into Anatolia, the possibility of British intervention, and the am­ biguities in the Soviet attitude. He had suspended orders to occupy Sarikamish and the Soghanlu passes in June, and as late as August 1 the chief of the general staff, Colonel Ismet Bey, had scolded Karabekir on his independent actions and continuous carping to march. There was little likelihood that Armenia, which was fully engaged “by our ally Azer­ baijan,’’ would be capable of offensive action against the eastern prov­ inces under Karabekir’s jurisdiction. Halil Pasha had written from Russia that any Armenian attack on Turkey would be answered by immediate, potent counteraction from the rear. Hence, Karabekir should leave only one division for defensive purposes along the Armenian frontier and transfer the rest of his men to the western theater against the Greeks. Ismet chided Karabekir: “Our enemies with their accursed friends are awaiting the division of our forces and rejoice at any manifestation of dissension. ... The heaviness of the situation is unprecedented in our history, and we are being led by the instincts of the self-preservation of the people. Your insistence on separate action will cause great harm and bring upon you the curses of future generations.” The Grand National Assembly had taken note of Karabekir’s tendency toward insubordina­ tion and demanded compliance with its directives. “Otherwise your in­ dependent actions, which have no justification, will be viewed as trea­ son.”1 General Karabekir, staunchly protesting his unswerving loyalty to the national cause, nonetheless stubbornly evaded sending troops to the western front and skillfully continued to manipulate events toward ac­ tion against Armenia.2 Even with the recurrent tension among the Nationalist leaders, Mus­ tafa Kemal never lost sight of the importance of Soviet assistance. He tried to raise troop morale by giving assurances that Soviet men and 1 France, Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Rapport militaire, 15 Sept. 1920, App. 3; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25, Svodka no. 21, Sept. 3, 1920. 2Kâzim Karabekir, istüdâlHarbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 817, 858—860.

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munitions were en route. The arrival of the Red Army cavalry battalion in Nakhichevan in July was applauded enthusiastically in the Grand Na­ tional Assembly, as the linkage of the Soviet and Turkish detachments opened a window through Bayazit to Azerbaijan and stymied the Ar­ menian drive to recapture the lower Araxes River Valley and the lines of communication and transportation to Persia.3 The Nationalists re­ peatedly impressed upon Soviet officials and military commanders the danger posed by Armenia as an outpost of the Entente Powers and a major obstacle to Soviet-Turkish collaboration. The Azerbaijani leaders and Young Turk fugitives in Russia both lent their support to this strat­ egy. General Karabekir and others with expansionist views, however, were concerned that if Soviet rule was established in Armenia before the Turkish army had occupied the mountain range around Sarikamish, recovery of any territory beyond the 1914 Russo-Turkish border would be impossible. The receipt of Soviet financial and military aid was vital, but it was even more important to crush the Armenians while the Red Army was still tied up on the Polish front and engaged against Baron Wrangel in the Crimea.4 In response to Mustafa Kemal’s request for a general assessment of the political-military situation in the east, Karabekir wrote on August 11 that Russia’s intent to sovietize both Armenia and Georgia immediately after the Red Army’s occupation of Azerbaijan had been postponed be­ cause of the challenges posed by the Poles and Wrangel. The Tenth Red Army had been withdrawn from the Caucasus front, and the Eleventh Army was being heavily taxed by the ongoing unrest in Azerbaijan. The Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) had decided therefore to enter into peace negotiations with Georgia and Armenia as a way of diminishing British influence until the opportune moment arrived to sovietize the two countries. The Bolsheviks promised to inform the Turks beforehand when they were ready to implement their original plan. These developments and the stubborn Armenian resistance in Zangezur had prevented the Red Army from coming to the active assistance of Anatolia. In fact, it had been necessary to send Turkish battalions to Nakhichevan to relieve the isolated Red Army cavalry detachment there and to prevent the complete closure of that critical avenue of commu­ nication to the east. Although Karabekir expressed concern about the spread of undue Bolshevik influence in Anatolia, he nonetheless wel­ comed Soviet Russia’s efforts to develop both political and military re3 Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitùsù, Nutuk, Kemâl Atatürk, III: Vesikalar, (Istanbul, [i960]), PP- 94-95; Genelkurmay Ba§kanhgi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Turk Istiklâl Harbi, III: Dogu Cephesi (1919—1921) (Ankara, 1965), pp. 104—109 (cited hereafter as Dogu Cephesi). 4 Cemal Kutay, KarabekirErmenistan’i nasilyok etti? (Istanbul, 1956), p. 36; Dogu Cephesi, p. 124.

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lations with the Grand National Assembly over the Karabagh-Nakhichevan corridor and by motor launches over the Black Sea.5 Halil informed Karabekir shortly thereafter that the Red Army would invade Armenia between August 21 and 25 in the direction of Erevan and Alexandropol-Kars and that he had given assurances of Turkish col­ laboration. Karabekir recommended that in such a case the Turkish army should advance toward Kars as far as the Araxes River and NovoSelim whether or not Turkish help was requested. Though Mustafa Ke­ mal and the general staff approved this contingency, Karabekir was cau­ tioned not to initiate even the smallest movement without first receiving the sanction of the Council of Ministers. As it happened, the Soviet invasion did not materialize in August, according to Halil Pasha because of the continuing difficulties with Wrangel’s army, the fear of British intervention, and the necessity to deploy a part of the Eleventh Army to the North Caucasus to suppress Muslim insurgency.6 Even with these developments, conditions during the summer of 1920 seemed to militate in favor of a Turkish offensive. The Armenian dip­ lomatic mission to Moscow had been unable to conclude a treaty with Soviet Russia, and further negotiations were being transferred to Erevan. Armenian-Soviet relations were tense, even hostile, in view of the Red Army’s occupation of and the Armenian revolts in Zangezur, the inces­ sant clashes along the border in the Kazakh-Ijevan sector, and the harsh treatment of Bolsheviks in Armenia and of Dashnakists in Azerbaijan. The Turkish delegation in Moscow, by contrast, signed a draft treaty of friendship on August 24, and even before that the Sovnarkom began to fulfill its pledge to aid the Nationalists with gold and weaponry. Motor launches laden with arms and ammunition were slipping across the Black Sea to harbors and inlets near Trebizond. In western Anatolia, a lull in the Greek offensive gave rise to speculation that Venizelos wanted to end the operation now that the sultan’s government had signed the Treaty of Sèvres. In the south, the French garrisons in Cilicia were hardpressed by the Nationalists, prompting the French government to ex­ tend feelers for an accord with Mustafa Kemal in return for economic concessions and guarantees for the safety of the Christian population. The dissension among the Allies encouraged the Nationalists. The Ital­ ians were disingenuous in attempts to disguise their sympathy for the Turkish resistance movement. Reports were rife about Italian agents of­ fering aid to the Nationalists and arranging for the secret sale and ship­ ment of arms and ammunition. Under these circumstances—especially with Yusuf Kemal, Enver Pasha, Halil Pasha, and others giving assurances 5 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 135—136. 6 Ibid., pp. 136-137.

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that the Red Army would not intervene to help Armenia—Mustafa Ke­ mal Pasha decided that the time was right to grant General Karabekir authorization to march.

The First Phase In September 1920 the Armenian army still suffered from the after­ effects of the May uprising and the serious cracks that had appeared in the military establishment. The officer corps, though well trained in the military academies of imperial Russia, had not yet adjusted to the needs of a small, evolving nation-state. Friction between the officers and par­ tisan chieftains remained pronounced despite the government’s efforts to integrate the ranks. The constant state of alert and frequent clashes all along the frontier exhausted the army and kept its regiments dis­ persed and unable to concentrate on a single front. The soldier’s lot was harsh, and draft evasion and absence without leave were commonplace. Fortunately, the long-awaited British rifles and uniforms had finally ar­ rived, and even before receiving that assistance the expeditionary forces commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shahmazian and Major General Shelkovnikian had rolled over Zangibasar, Vedibasar, and Sharur and captured the critical railroad junction and crossroads at Shahtaght. The Treaty of Sèvres renewed hope that, despite the obvious difficul­ ties, the Allied Powers would regard implementation of the terms relat­ ing to Armenia as a matter of honor. In anticipation of the boundaries that were to be drawn by President Wilson, the Armenian government tried to establish control over all land up to the prewar frontier in order to be prepared to advance into whatever sector of Western Armenia would be awarded to the Republic. During the summer of 1920, the army occupied the Peniak district of Olti and much of the Araxes Valley between Erevan and Shahtaght. Then, on September 7, a small expe­ ditionary force headed by partisan chieftain Sassuntsi Manuk moved out from Igdir to recapture the salt mines of Kulp (Koghb) and the sur­ rounding highlands of Surmalu county. Advancing from the Araxes River, the expedition overcame the spirited defense of Kurdish tribes­ men and by nightfall on September 9 had taken Pirlu, Chinchavat, Kulp, Kamishlu, Pirsakh, and Sogutli, seizing stores of military equipment and wheat. The sense of exhilaration was dampened, however, when Sas­ suntsi Manuk fell mortally wounded during an attempted Kurdish coun­ terattack on Pirlu that evening. The expeditionary force nonetheless continued to advance, taking Agarak, Suki, and Kiagin the next day and by September 13 reaching the southwestern limits of the county by oc­ cupying Takialtu, Grampa, Karadash, Ogrudja, Alikhanlu, Upper and Lower Shami, Mount Kabakhta, Mirzakhan, Aghdash, Kazikaparan, and

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Osmankoy. Much of the Kurdish population fled over the Bartoghi Mountains and the old international border into Bayazit.7 The Armenian restoration in Surmalu was solemnly observed in Erevan during the he­ ro’s funeral accorded Manuk of Sassun.8 While the Armenian expeditionary forces tried to fill out into the border districts of the provinces of Erevan and Kars, General Karabekir was planning to hurl them back far beyond their starting points. He had long been supplying the Muslim partisans on the Armenian side of the frontier and had even established a Turkish bridgehead in the BarduzTuzla sector to prevent the Armenians from occupying the whole of Olti county. In late August and early September, elements of the Turkish 9th Caucasus Infantry Division engaged the Armenian forward positions be­ tween Olti and Sarikamish in artillery duels and in skirmishes with scout­ ing parties. Turkish aerial reconnaissance over that sector increased in frequency, and various Turkish troop movements were reported by Ar­ menian intelligence.9 Yet the very regularity of these reports lulled the Armenian commanders into believing that nothing unusual was taking place. Whereas General Karabekir could gather valuable information from Muslim sources behind the Armenian lines, the elimination of the Armenian population on the Turkish side of the frontier deprived Ar­ menian intelligence of a similar advantage. Yet despite Kiazim Karabekir’s bravado, there was evidence that his armed forces were severely undermanned, disgruntled, and riddled with desertion. In addition, it seemed highly unlikely that the Turks would try to invade at a time when the Greek armies had occupied the major cities of western Anatolia, the British navy patrolled the Black Sea, and Soviet Russia was still occupied with the Poles and General Wrangel. An attack appeared all the more unthinkable when Armenian intelligence intercepted Ismet Bey’s Au­ gust 1 telegram demanding that Karabekir transfer all but one division to the western front.10 General Karabekir’s XV Army Corps was better organized, however, than was believed by Armenian intelligence. At the end of August he placed his divisions and the irregular regiments of Kerasund (Giresun), Tortum, and Narman on a war footing and began to move elements of ’Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4960, E12813/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 13, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Rapport militaire, 15 Sept. 1920; State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 621, p. 6; Hakob Ter-Hakobian, Hayastani verdjin aghete (Constantinople, 1921), pp. 26—27. 8 For descriptions of the life, works, and funeral of Sassuntsi Manuk, see Haradj, Sept. 12:1—4,14:2,1920; Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, II, no. 11 (1958), pp. 345— 356. 9 Armenia Archives, 200/1/441, p. 167, 200/1/607, pp. 40-51, and 200/1/62 i,pp. 1— 6passim; FO 371/4960, E12813/134/58, Gracey to Luke, Sept. 13, 1920, enclosures. 10 Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 42; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24.

4 THF CCYIFNTTY OF

TlI

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the 12th Infantry Division toward the border. On September 1 he con­ firmed the plan of the commander of the 9th Caucasus Division, Lieu­ tenant Colonel Halid, to begin by expelling the Armenians from the Peniak district. Halid was instructed to lead his “best and strongest troops’’ to teach the Armenians “a good lesson.’’ Part of the division would distract the Armenian ist Infantry Regiment while the main force attacked Mount Vaskut (Baskot) and flanked the enemy’s positions. As soon as the 9th Division’s 29th Regiment reached the Peniak River, driv­ ing the Armenians toward the mountain passes to Merdenek and Ardahan, the militia units and components of the 3d Caucasus Division would strike from the rear, blocking the way to the Pandjuret pass and squeezing the Armenians into an inescapable vise. The element of sur­ prise was essential to the success of the operation.11 To keep the enemy off guard, General Karabekir transferred his field headquarters from Hasankale back to Erzerum on September 2. There he welcomed the first formal Soviet delegation, which because of Shalva Eliava’s illness was headed by lu. lu. Upmal (Angarskii), the first secre­ tary. In response to Upmal’s assurances of Soviet sympathy and support, as demonstrated by the 200 kilograms of gold the mission was carrying to Angora, Karabekir did not lose the opportunity to emphasize Turkey’s importance in winning the friendship of the Islamic world for Russia and to insist upon elimination of the Dashnakist barrier separating Tur­ key from Russia and the Muslim peoples of the East. Karabekir was im­ pressed with the high caliber and integrity of the delegation and came away from the exchanges all the more convinced that Halil, Enver, Talaat, and other Young Turks were correct in their belief that the Red Army would not step in to help the Armenians.12 By the beginning of September, Chief of Staff Ismet Bey had come around to favoring a limited offensive. On September 2 he sent a rec­ ommendation to Kemal and Karabekir to propose to the Azerbaijani government through Halil Pasha a joint campaign against Armenia. If Azerbaijan agreed, Karabekir should capture the mountain range around Sarikamish and advance into the plain of Kars. Precautionary measures should be taken to secure the neutrality and nonintervention of Georgia, and during the operation the Armenian civilian population should not be harmed.13 By that time, Karabekir had decided to wait no longer. It was imperative to seize the mountain passes before the early autumn snows blocked these crucial routes. The attack on the Peniak

11 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 127—128. 12 Karabekir, op. dt., pp. 863—864,867,877, 882—884. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/ 829, dossier 3, Reports nos. 13 and 16, 1920. 13 Karabekir, op. dt., pp. 870—872.

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district would begin deep in the night of September 12—13. Karabekir sent officers and agents behind the Armenian lines to prepare the Kurd­ ish population of Olti to rise at the same moment that the 9th Caucasus Division attacked from the southwest. The estimated 2,000 Turkish reg­ ulars and equal number of irregulars and chete bands faced two Arme­ nian battalions totaling about 1,500 men. One battalion was stationed at the small village of Israil with a machine-gun squad and four mountain guns on the slopes of Mount Vaskut; the other, with a machine-gun squad and two mountain guns, held the Akundir pass between Peniak and Merdenek and the Pandjuret pass between Peniak and Ardahan. Beginning on September 10, the Armenian positions on Mount Vaskut and on the right wing of the Sarikamish detachment at Mount Keroghli were bombarded every day by artillery. Turkish and Armenian scouts spotted each other and engaged in minor skirmishes before retiring. Still, the Armenian command did not believe anything extraordinary was occurring.14 The Armenians were rudely awakened when five battalions of Turkish regulars with machine guns, cannons, and cavalry and the several units making up the Olti detachment attacked from front and rear at 2:30 in the morning of September 13. Asleep physically and militarily, the Ar­ menians were caught in a blistering cross fire. They attempted to resist until dawn, when the unit on Mount Vaskut abandoned its positions and, joining with the Peniak guard detachment, made its way to the village of Kosor. The battalion at Israil retreated toward the Pandjuret pass, but both the Olti-Ardahan and Olti-Merdenek roads had been cut, and the column was driven back under a hail of bullets from concealed positions above. Throughout the day, the trapped Armenians were pursued by the two regiments and the militia units directed by Colonel Halid. It was only at nightfall, after crossing over treacherous mountain byways and being harassed by partisans native to the district, that the decimated Armenians broke out of the encirclement; they regrouped the next af­ ternoon a short distance from Merdenek. In a single day, the Armenians had suffered more than 200 casualties and been forced to abandon can­ nons and machine guns. The hard-won Armenian occupation in June of the Peniak coal fields was wiped away in a few hours, and a great wave of anxiety spread among soldiers and civilians that a full-scale Turkish invasion might be imminent.15 14 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 19, and 200/1 /607, p. 110; FO 371/4960, E11896/ E12108/E12651/134/58 enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Rapport mil­ itaire, 15 Sept. 1920; Karabekir, op. át., p. 882. 15 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 129—130, stating that eight cannons and four machine guns had been captured from the Armenians; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, no. 14, Oct. 1, 1920; Haradj, Sept. 16:2, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 19, and 200/1/627, p. 1 ; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Compte-rendu... militaire, no. 12,21 Sept. 1920.

5. THE INITIAL TURKISH OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 1920

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The Armenian command did not seem to share this concern, ascrib­ ing the reverse to the unfavorable Armenian positions, the hostility of the local population, and the concentration of most of the enemy army in a small sector in order to reestablish the lines that had existed in June. The Armenian garrison at Sarikamish had not been able to come to the assistance of the Olti detachment because of Karabekir’s diversionary maneuvers around Mount Keroghli. At Kars, Lieutenant General Pirumian and Major General Hovsepian continued to boast that the Arme­ nian forces were far superior to those of the Turks, who had taken a minor victory by seizing the initiative on their chosen ground.16 For his part, General Karabekir was elated by the swiftness and precision of the preliminary action that had secured the mountain passes leading to Olti, Ardahan, and Merdenek. To Colonel Halid he wrote: “Starting with the commanders and also all the brave officers and soldiers, kissing your eyes, we congratulate and commend you on this success in teaching a lesson in humanity and morality in face of the intolerable enmity and atrocities of the Dashnak tyrants against the people.”17 Most of all, Kara­ bekir had demonstrated to Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Bey, and other doubt­ ers that his force alone was adequate to deal with the Armenians. The wariness of Angora could not withstand the test of Kiazim Karabekir’s easy success.

The Sarikamish Operation The Turkish operation in Olti elicited no response from the Allied Pow­ ers or Soviet Russia. In Western circles by 1920, Armenian warnings were met with much skepticism. The Armenians had often sounded the alarm about an impending invasion, Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic intrigues, and Soviet-Turkish collusion, yet nothing had happened. There was even suspicion that the Armenians complained the loudest when they them­ selves were planning or already involved in some questionable activity. The silence of the West in the immediate aftermath of the expulsion of the Armenians from Olti reinforced Karabekir’s hand and influenced Mustafa Kemal to reactivate the plan to capture Sarikamish which had been suspended in deference to a Soviet request in June. The general 16 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 20; FO 371 /496o, E12813/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, Sept. 23, 1920. For stinging criticism of the Armenian military command at Kars by Governor Stepan Korganian, see Armenia Archives, 199/1/159, P1-1» PP- 45“5®» and H.K.(B)K.K.K. kits Kuspat. Institut, Aradjin massayakan-heghapokhakan sharzhumnere Hayastanum (Mayisian apstambutiune): Niuter ev pastatghter, ed. K. Ghazarian and M. Nersisian (Erevan, 1932), pp. 127—148. The province of Vanand (Kars) was placed under mar­ tial law on September 14. See Armenia Archives, 199/1/133, pt. I, p. 57. 17 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 130—131.

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staff had previously held that the vexing Armenian problem could not be resolved without the help of Soviet Russia, but the swift, impressive operation in the Olti-Peniak district strengthened the view that unilat­ eral action by Turkey was now feasible. Because of difficulties elsewhere, Russia had put off the military campaign against Armenia for an unde­ termined time and was instead negotiating with the Erevan government. Mustafa Kemal’s Council of Ministers took heart from the successes against the French in Cilicia, the departure of the British garrison at Batum, and the circumstances that diminished the likelihood of Russian intervention on behalf of the Armenians. Eliminating the Armenian threat from the east would free much of the XV Corps for service in meeting the far greater Greek menace from the west.18 Immediately after receiving from Yusuf Kemal Bey the terms of the Soviet-Turkish draft treaty of August 24, 1920, Mustafa Kemal on Sep­ tember 20 authorized General Karabekir to occupy the province of Kars as far as Kaghisman (Kaghzvan), Novo-Selim, and Merdenek and, if con­ ditions permitted, even farther. The foremost objective was the destruc­ tion of the Armenian army. For this reason, secrecy and surprise were of the utmost importance. In order to ensure the neutrality of the Geor­ gians, they should be led to believe that they would be allowed to have the lands they coveted in the region. The Commander of the Eastern Front should communicate with the Georgian authorities to that end and in no case seize any of the Georgian-occupied territories in the three sanjaks of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars. At the same time, however, pre­ cautions should be taken in the event of Georgian hostilities against the Turks.19 Karabekir replied three days later that the offensive would begin on September 27, with the immediate objective of the 9th Caucasus Division and the 12 th Infantry Division being the Karakurt-Sarikamish-Mount Allahekbar line. He would engage in diversionary maneuvers to keep the plan a secret until the last possible moment. Only one day before the scheduled operation would he order the Turkish battalions at Nakhiche­ van to join forces with the Red Army cavalry detachment there to drive the Armenians out of Shahtaght, and not until the morning of the of­ fensive would he gather the ashiret (tribal) regiments along the south bank of the Araxes River to capture Kaghisman when the main force struck out toward Sarikamish.20 By that time, Karabekir commanded ™ Ibid., pp. 138, 145. 19 Karabekir, op. át., p. 887; Dogu Cephesi, p. 146; US Archives, RG 59, 76oG.62/orig., Moser to Secretary of State, No. 7, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, military reports, Oct.-Nov. 1920. 20 Genelkurmay Ba$kanhgi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi, 13th yr., no. 49 (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1134; Dogu Cephesi, p. 146.

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more than 25,000 officers, enlisted men, and partisans in the four di­ visions and various auxiliary units (including the fugitive Azerbaijani regiment) attached to the XV Army Corps. On the left flank, the 3d Caucasus Division (7th, 8th, and 11th Caucasus Regiments) protected the eastern littoral of the Black Sea from around Trebizond to the boundary of Batum county, although one regiment had been deployed at Olti to participate in the Peniak operation. The broad right flank was the responsibility of Lieutenant Colonel Javid’s 11 th Caucasus Division (18th, 33d, and 34th Caucasus Regiments), headquartered at Bayazit and with detachments and ashiret regiments extending from Van to Nakhichevan, the border district of Surmalu around Kulp and Igdir, and the hill country along the Araxes River opposite the province of Kars. In the center, on the main routes from Erzerum to Kars, were Lieutenant Colonel Halid’s 9th Caucasus Division (17th, 28th, and 29th Caucasus Regiments) and Lieutenant Colonel Rushtu’s 12th Infantry Division (34th, 35th, and 36th Regiments). Each division had batteries of field and mountain cannons, light and heavy machine-gun squads, hospital­ medical and quartermaster companies, and tribal and militia units.21 The relative calm after the loss of Peniak seemed to reassure the Ar­ menians that the Turks would advance no farther. Generals Hovsepian and Pirumian in Kars even believed they could recover the Peniak dis­ trict. Between September 22 and 24, small Armenian detachments of the 4th Infantry Regiment probed the Barduz sector of the front, briefly occupying the heights of Kiamarjakh and Tandirlu before being repelled by Turkish regulars and artillery of the 17th Regiment. Armenian scouts to the north reported that the Turks held a line from Mount Zamp and the Pandjuret pass to Yaila and Akriag and were digging trenches in those positions. On September 25, Turkish reconnaissance parties were observed south and west of Merdenek; in the Barduz-Olti sector Turkish artillery bombarded the Armenian positions on Mount Keroghli; and Turkish regulars and Kurdish irregulars were spotted near the villages of Kosor, Mshegh, Arseniak, and Vagover.22 In his order of the day on September 24, 1920, General Karabekir revealed the plan of battle to his commanders: “To put an end to the oppression of the Dashnak Armenians against the Muslim population, the Grand National Assembly has decided to take counteraction, and the necessity of our operation has been agreed to by the Russian gov­ ernment.’’ The 9th Caucasus Division and the 12th Division were to be prepared to attack at dawn on September 27. The first day’s objectives were the heights of Mounts Deveboynu, Khorum, Ayideresi, Chambar, 21 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 139-141; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 886-887. 22 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 24/24 and 25/25; Dogu Cephesi, p. 147.

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and Allahekbar. From these strategic positions, the two divisions would move on Sarikamish, occupying Kizilkilisa, Mount Husein Aghayurd (Soghanlu pass), Mount Kumru, and Bashkoy and then, if the situation warranted, advancing into the plain of Kars. Their zones of responsibility would be separated by the Sarikamish road. A company of the 36th Regiment should be ready to march on Karaurgan-Khandere with can­ nons. The right flank, mobilizing the tribal levies in the Alashkert-Karakose sector, was to advance on Kaghisman, and the left flank in the Olti sector was to close the gap to the 9th Division. The Commander of the Eastern Front also cautioned against Armenian tricks, such as the raising of white flags or the shouting of “Allah! Allah!” to confuse the Turkish soldiers. General Karabekir announced that his observation post would be at Akmezar, on the Russian side of the prewar frontier. The commanders of the 9th and 12 th divisions and the 36th Regiment were to confirm by noon on September 26 that they were ready.23 Speaking before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on September 25, Chief of Staff Ismet declared that the Dashnak Armenians were holding peti­ tions in one hand claiming to be victims of massacres while in their other hand they clutched a dagger with which they were stabbing the Turkish villagers. Everywhere there was talk of the Armenians’ occupying Erzerum and the rest of so-called Turkish Armenia. Carried away with this fantasy, the Armenians, especially the Dashnaks, were perpetrating their violence right up to the border. It was necessary to take countermea­ sures, and this was obvious to “our friends.” Recently, in the Olti district, retaliation had been taken against an Armenian regiment, which was forced to abandon its heavy weaponry and disperse. Continued Arme­ nian lawlessness would naturally draw the same response.24 According to communications intercepted by British intelligence, Mustafa Kemal that same day informed the commanders of the Turkish reserve units about the imminent action. Perhaps referring to the re­ ports of Bekir Sami, Yusuf Kemal, and others that Chicherin had ac­ knowledged the justice of Turkish possession of Sarikamish and Shahtaght, Kemal alleged that the operation had been condoned by Soviet Russia. “The present order was issued as a result of consultations during the previous two months between the General Headquarters and the Government and friendly and allied nations.” In view of the fact that the Turkish army was engaged on five fronts, it was not possible, Kemal wrote, to concentrate in one place to score a decisive victory. Internal revolts had prevented a successful counteroffensive against the Greeks, whereas Armenian treachery in Cilicia necessitated the diversion of a2 2S Karabekir, op. át., pp. 887—888; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 149—150. 24 Dogu Cephesi, p. 131.

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sizable force to that theater. The Armenians were also raising obstacles to communication with Muslim people (the Azerbaijanis) who had promised their help and were blocking the receipt of aid from Soviet Russia. An entire army had to be held in reserve as a deterrent against any Armenian attempt to seize the eastern provinces and help the Greek invaders. Hence, after consulting with its allies, the government of the Grand National Assembly had decided that a concerted offensive should be undertaken to eliminate the Armenian front; a defensive posture would be assumed on the other fronts. All military elements operating in the eastern theater would be combined into the Army of the Araxes (Aras), whose mission was to open and maintain the routes of commu­ nication with allied forces in the east and northeast (Azerbaijan and Russia) and to thwart the aggressive designs of the Armenians. The op­ eration would be swift so as to discourage external intervention. The reserve units, Kemal concluded, were to be ready for all exigencies and rapid movement to any point needed.25 General Karabekir had to set back the beginning of the operation by one day because of logistical problems, but on September 26 he sent Mustafa Kemal a cipher tele­ gram that the offensive would begin at dawn two days later: “I am march­ ing against the Armenian army. Our preparations are complete. I trust that, with the help of Allah, we will be victorious.”25 26 On September 27, Mustafa Kemal called the Grand National Assembly into secret session, during which he announced that the Turkish armies would march at daybreak. His declaration was met with a noisy demonstration of ap­ proval and enthusiastic, patriotic speeches.27 At 3 o’clock in the morning on September 28, the four divisions of 25 FO 371/5178, E14638/345/44 enclosure. 26 Kutay, op. át., pp. 39—40; Karabekir, op. át., p. 888. For the final detailed battle plan, see Dogu Cephesi, pp. 151—159. 27 Kutay, op. át., pp. 40—41. Various dates have been given for the beginning of the Armenian-Turkish war. These include September 13, the date of the Turkish advance into the Peniak district in Olti; September 21, 23, and 24, dates on which limited encounters took place along the front lines; and September 28—29, the start of the Turkish campaign to capture Sarikamish. Mustafa Kemal subsequently explained that the Armenians had begun the war by attacking on September 24, prompting the Turkish armies to advance on September 28. See A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig, 1927), p. 417. Earlier Soviet sources maintained that the Dashnak government of Armenia, encouraged and incited by the Entente Powers, gave the Turks the excuse to attack by engaging in ill-advised operations along the frontier. See, for example, Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin’s report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920 in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty vneshná politiki SSSR II, p. 727. This interpretation was repeated in nearly all Soviet publications on the subject until the 1960s, when both Turkish and Soviet sources showed that the attack on Armenia was authorized as early as June 1920 and that at the beginning of September of that year General Karabekir received orders to make a limited advance into the province of Kars. See, for example, E. A. Zohrabian, Sovetakan Rusastane ev hai-turkakan haraberutiunnere 1920—1922 tt. (Erevan, 1979), pp. 26—65 passim.

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the XV Army Corps went into action. It was the gth Caucasus Division’s assignment to dislodge the Armenian ist Infantry Regiment from a string of mountains between Shirokaya and Ziaret in the north and Chambar in the south; then, drawing together its regiments at Paldum pass, it was to cut the road and railroad from Sarikamish to Kars and entrap the main enemy force. The 12th Infantry Division was to engage the Armenian 4th Regiment at Karakurt and Khandere and drive the defenders beyond the Yenikoy-Mejinkert-Karaurgan line before advanc­ ing around Mount Surb Khach and entering Sarikamish from the south. When the attack began, the Armenian ist Regiment resisted for several hours before falling back under artillery fire to the Bashkoy-VerishanMount Kumru-Mount Husein Aghayurd line. The left flank under Lieu­ tenant Kantardjian put up a spirited defense, slowing the progress of the 9th Division and preventing it from occupying the Laloghlu-Salut approaches to the Sarikamish-Kars road and railway. In the southern sector, the 12th Division managed to occupy Karakurt and Karaurgan, driving thousands of Armenian villagers from the harvest toward Sari­ kamish and Kars, but, as in the case of the 9th Division, the failure of certain components to discharge their assignments on schedule hin­ dered the advance. Sarikamish, the primary objective for the first day of the campaign, remained in Armenian hands at nightfall. The inability of the 9th Division to complete its flanking maneuvers and the slow pace of the 12th Division deprived General Karabekir of the satisfaction of taking the entire Armenian garrison prisoner.28 In his orders for September 29, Karabekir instructed the 9th Division to maneuver menacingly in the direction of Verishan-Salut-Devik to force the enemy detachment that was still resisting at Laloghlu to with­ draw. As the 9th Division encircled Sarikamish from the east, the 12 th Division would enter the town and forts from the south and take re­ sponsibility for their occupation.29 The Armenian command at Kars, re­ alizing that the Turkish army was trying to seize Novo-Selim and cut the rails, decided to evacuate Sarikamish on the night of September 28. Subsequently criticized for acting in haste, the Armenian generals jus­ tified their decision by asserting that the 2,500 men in the Sarikamish sector and the 1,500 in the Olti-Merdenek sector were insufficient to hold those positions without significant reinforcements. Colonel A. I. Mirimanian’s 4th Infantry Regiment fell back to Novo-Selim, and Lieu­ tenant Colonel Shahbudaghian’s 5th Infantry Regiment abandoned Kaghisman and took up positions on the Berna heights. The resistance 28 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, and File 24/24, Svodka no. 14, Oct. 1, 1920; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 160—162; Karabekir, op. át., p. 888. 29 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 163—166.

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of the Armenian right flank allowed the entire Sarikamish garrison and civilian population to retreat toward Kars without casualties. At the same time, the Olti-Merdenek detachment withdrew to the village of Rodionovka, and the company at Ardahan crossed to the Georgian side of the Kur River. The Armenian front ran along a line from Mount Kabakhtapa and Karakhach, west of Haram-Vardan, to the hill country around NovoSelim, Berna, and Azadava. As Novo-Selim offered no suitable defensive positions, the Armenian forces soon drew back to the heights in front of Begli-Ahmed, extending from Agiar to Verin (Upper) and Nerkin (Lower) Kotanli and Berna.30 When the Azerbaijani cavalry regiment scouted Sarikamish at dawn on September 29, the Armenians were already gone. The 12th Division’s 35th and 36th regiments, which took possession of the city, found that the Armenians had departed so swiftly that they had no time to transport or destroy great stockpiles of provisions and military matériel. The 9th Caucasus Division, meanwhile, advanced unopposed from the Paldum pass to the railway line at Devik and to the Bezirgan pass.31 In Surmalu a detachment of Turkish regulars and Kurdish partisans captured Khalfalu and Sultanabad and tried without success to drive into Igdir. That night a Turkish attempt to flank the Armenian positions at HaramVardan also failed, but the next day the Turkish Olti detachment reached Merdenek, where the Armenian ist Regiment and partisans had carted away or disabled the armor and equipment. The Olti detachment was now reorganized as the Merdenek detachment and headed by the commander of the 8th Regiment, 3d Caucasus Division. At Kaghisman the 11 th Caucasus Division’s expeditionary force of Turkish regulars and tribal regiments took control of the southern sector of Kars province. Although Armenian counterattacks initially made some headway, by Oc­ tober 2 the Armenians had cleared out of Novo-Selim for a second time and taken up defensive positions near Begli-Ahmed.32 Within three days, General Kiazim Karabekir had captured the strategic fortress of Sarika­ mish and the surrounding Soghanlu range and forests and had de­ scended into the plain of Kars. The Armenians were stunned. In announcing the victory at Sarikamish to the Grand National Assem­ bly on September 29, Mustafa Kemal declared that Turkey had done everything possible to live in peace with its neighbors, but the Dashnaks 30 Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 111; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 30, 96; Haradj, Sept. 30:4, 1920. 31 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 165, 166. 32 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 889—890; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., p. 31; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 169170; FO 371/4960, Ei22i6/Ei227o/Ei23i7/i34/58.See the Armenian generad staffs review of military activity in 371 ^962, E13994/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Stokes, Sept. 30» 192°-

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had disregarded this sincere desire and had instead intensified their attacks upon the Turkish army and the innocent Muslim population in places such as Kulp, Kaghisman, and Olti. The Turkish army was left with no choice and had therefore occupied Sarikamish and a number of strategic heights, capturing two cannons and other arms and ammu­ nition.33 Despite this impressive achievement, Mustafa Kemal remained anxious about Allied or Russian intervention and called a temporary halt to the offensive. He was most concerned about a possible British naval descent at Batum or Trebizond and the reaction of Soviet Russia. Gen­ eral Karabekir, too, was sensitive to the Russian factor and wrote Mustafa Kemal that he would advance no farther for the present in order to consolidate his gains and to assess the attitude of the Bolsheviks. After reviewing the 12th Division at Sarikamish, Karabekir returned to Erzerum, where trouble had been brewing because of accusations impli­ cating him in graft and corruption and the disappearance of some 50,000 weapons.34 Only a few days later, on October 7, Mustafa Kemal congratulated Karabekir and characterized his victory at Sarikamish as having enor­ mous military, economic, and political significance. Now, with Turkish victory over the Armenian defenders at Kars a certainty, the Georgians would not dare to intervene or attempt any future military operations. Politically, the Armenians would be forced to negotiate with the Angora government either directly or through Russian mediation. In this way, the Armenian strategy to use the Russians to gain a favorable solution to the Armenian question would be completely thwarted.35 Mustafa Ke­ mal also instructed Bekir Sami Bey in Moscow to present all the Turkish justifications for the occupation of Olti and Sarikamish and to play up the importance of that operation in clearing the barrier between Russia and Turkey, thus allowing the Turks to exert their influence on the Muslim peoples of the East in favor of Soviet Russia.36 The Armenian Reaction The fall of Sarikamish caught the Armenian government by surprise. Even with the frequent skirmishes along the border and the Turkish incursion into Barduz and Peniak, the Armenian leaders did not believe M Sabahattin Selek, Milli mücadele: Anadolu ihtilâli, I (Istanbul, 1963), pp. 310-311; Ku­ tay, op. át., pp. 43-44. M Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 889—892; Kutay, op. cit., p. 45; A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, pp. 409-417. 85 Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1136. 56 Kutay, op. cit., pp. 45—46; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Moskova hâtiralan (21/11/1920—2/6/1922) (Istanbul, 1955), p. 92; A. N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel’nye strany Vostoka v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (1918—1920) (Moscow, 1964), pp. 135—136.

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that Mustafa Kemal, beset by so many other problems, would dare to launch an offensive against the Republic. Indeed, Armenian intelligence had intercepted communications that showed serious strains between Kiazim Karabekir and Mustafa Kemal and reported mass desertion and disaffection in the Turkish army and a profusion of opposition to the Nationalists in Anatolia. It was hoped that sooner or later the Nation­ alists, like the sultan’s government, would acquiesce in the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. Karabekir’s easy victory at Sarikamish showed, however, that the Armenians had underestimated the Turkish resistance move­ ment and overestimated their own strength and potential. On September 30 the Bureau-Government, declaring the country un­ der a state of siege, established martial law, issued mobilization orders for men up to thirty-five years of age, adopted stringent measures against desertion, and exhorted the populace with the call, “Everyone toward the front! Everything for the front!”37 Minister of Military Affairs Ruben Ter-Minasian warned that at the hour when “all loyal and genuine chil­ dren of Armenia are mobilizing to crush the enemy under the blows of their powerful fist,” any person evading military service or being absent without leave would be punished according to wartime laws and regu­ lations. Deserters would be hanged in public.38 In its appeal to the populace, the government declared that the Ar­ menian people were again face to face with the Turkish pashas, who wished to give them no peace and to annihilate the Republic. The army had covered the withdrawal of the civilian population before the troops had evacuated Sarikamish and Kaghisman in orderly fashion. Military morale was high, and volunteers were flocking to the colors. The Ar­ menian people, which had won its freedom with great sacrifice and had recently crushed the Bolshevik adventure, would not allow the Turkish pashas to achieve their diabolic goal: Citizens! However unfavorable the circumstances, you must leave your per­ sonal work. Everyone and everything for the front. Not one deserter will remain in Armenia. Not one youth will sit at home. Everything for the soldiers. Villager, laborer, intellectual, official, artisan, student, women—you must all assist our army, because only through your united efforts will the odious scourge of the pashas be shattered and will Armenia be completely free of the nightmare of the Turkish chauvinists. 37 Armenia Archives, 198/1/58, pp. 190, 195, 199/1/152, pp. 39, 40, and 200/1/607, p. 117; Haradj, Sept. 30:1, Oct. 1:4, 1920; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., p. 45. See also Simon Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), pp. 420—421, 428. 38 Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 45—46,49—51, for Ter-Minasian’s appeal on September 30, pp. 40-41, and for Minister of Internal Affairs Sargis Araratian’s notice of the death pen­ alty, pp. 49-51; Armenia Archives, 199/1/244, p. 3; Haradj, Oct. 1:4, 3:4, 5:1, 1920.

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For the Armenian people there was only one choice—“to be victorious or to die.’’39 Prime Minister Ohandjanian also denounced the base scheme of the Turkish pashas, adding: “These are historic times. Recall the days of 1918; remember Sardarabad and Karakilisa, as a new summons to her­ oism is being read. ... To arms, without wavering and more than ever with self-confidence. ... I summon you to a holy war. The enemy will be defeated only on the day when all of you stand as one person ready to fight and die. Citizens! To arms, toward the front, toward victory.’’40 The Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun reiterated this theme: “The Turkish pashas are again trying to trample the Armenian world under their crude feet and to subject our working people to physical annihilation.’’ Taking advantage of the internal difficulties of the Allied Powers and secure from the side of Russia, the reactionary pashas considered the time right to eliminate the Armenian state, which was hateful in their sight. This was the last, desperate attempt of the pashas to prevent the unification of Eastern and Western Armenia as the independent Republic of Ar­ menia. The Armenian people knew well the meaning of Turkish domi­ nation. Western Armenia had been converted into a wasteland, and the imprint of Turkish devastation was still evident in the Eastern Armenian districts of Kars, Ardahan, Shirak, and Pambak. The pashas were even more inhuman than the Bolsheviks, and if the Armenian soldier had bravely bared his breast against the Bolsheviks, then surely he would be all the more determined in the crucial struggle against the Turkish en­ slavers. “All comrades to work, toward the front. Not one able-bodied man shall remain at home. Everything for the front. Every effort for victory. Everyone for the government. Let the Turkish pashas, who want to strangle the Armenian people, see how a revolutionary, self-conscious people which has achieved independence through profuse bloodshed defends itself.’’41 Though frequently smarting under the overbearing attitude of the Dashnaktsutiun, the parties to the right (Zhoghovrdakan-Populist and Sahmanadir Ramkavar) and to the left (Hnchakist, Social Democrat La­ bor, and Social Revolutionary) joined the dominant party on October 1 in the formation of an interparty council and issued individual and joint appeals for a national crusade against the unholy alliance of Turkish pashas and Bolshevik commissars.42 The Social Revolutionaries, having 59 Haradj, Oct. 1:1, 1920; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 38—39. See also Armenia Archives, 200/1/625, p. 34, and 200/2/86, pp. 19—20. 40 Armenia Archives, 199/1/244, p. 1, 200/1/625, p. 33, and 200/2/86, p. 25; Haradj, Oct. 2:1, 1920. 41 Haradj, Oct. 1:3, 1920; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 33—36. 42 Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 53, 60—61; Haradj, Oct. 7:3, 9:4, 1920. Among its first ac-

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been the most reserved regarding Armenian independence, now de­ clared that the scarcely closed wound of the Armenian democracy had been slashed open again, creating a mortal danger. The Armenian de­ mocracy had to depend on its own means to preserve its existence, es­ pecially as the European imperialists seemed to be “our loyal friends” only during banquet toasts and speeches. The political life of Armenia had been such that the social differences with the predominant party had created a difficult atmosphere for united action, but the national crisis required that political ideals be laid aside. “We must forget every­ thing and concentrate only on one endeavor, the defense of the front. ... At such a moment, the Social Revolutionaries must be found in the front ranks, putting their entire means at the service of the defense of the fatherland.”* 43 The Ramkavar Party announced that all Armenians would rise without hesitating to defend the freedom of the fatherland, which had been won through the blood of tens of thousands of martyrs. “Force against force. ... The people with the state.”44 Patriotic manifestations were numerous in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish invasion. Hundreds of men left their field labor to vol­ unteer for military service, and many soldiers absent without leave re­ turned to their regiments. The crush of young men at the recruitment centers was so great that it was difficult to enlist and assign them prop­ erly. So many women volunteered sis nurses that most had to be turned away.45 A sense of urgency and cohesion prevailed as members of the Bureau-Government set out for the several fronts to lend encourage­ ment and help inspire confidence: ministers Simon Vratzian and Ar­ tashes Babalian at Kars, Abraham Giulkhandanian at Kazakh-Ijevan, Sargis Araratian at Surmalu, and Arshak Djamalian and Gevorg Chaza­ rían at Alexandropol, as well as Parliament members Sergei Melik-Yolchian at Nor-Bayazit and Hakob Ter-Hakobian and Hambardzum Terterian at Ashtarak.46 tivities, the interparty council dispatched Dashnakist Hakob Ter-Hakobian, Populist Kostantin Giulnazarian, and Hnchakist Lazo (Hakob Ghazarian) to organize patriotic rallies in Ashtarak, Etchmiadzin, and Oshakan. See Haradj, Oct. 9:3, 1920. 43 Vratzian, op. át., pp. 421—422; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 55—56- For the declaration of the Armenian Social Democrat Party, see Haradj, Oct. 3:3, 1920. 44 Hayastani Dzain, in Vratzian, op. át., p. 422. 45 Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 75—76; Garo Sassuni, Hai-trkakanpaterazme ( 1920-in) (Beirut, 1969), pp. 54-57. 46 Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 111; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24; TerHakobian, op. át., p. 46; Haradj, Oct. 1:4, 9:3, 1920. Babalian had again assumed the post of minister of welfare and reconstruction, and Sargis Araratian acted as minister of internal affairs. The responsibilities of the ministers were assumed temporarily by the assistant min­ isters, as follows: Vahagn Krmoyan, internal affairs; Martiras Shatirian, finance; Ruben Kadjberuni, welfare; Stepan Kamsarakan, agriculture and state properties; Avetis Ohan­ djanian, communications; Petros Sotnikian, education and culture. See Haradj, Oct. 3:4, 1920.

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A wave of public demonstrations spread over Armenia and Georgia. In Tiflis, up to 10,000 persons gathered in front of the Armenian lega­ tion on October 6 in a show of solidarity. There, scores of Armenian youth, generally aloof from the concerns of the “peasants” who made up the Armenian republic, volunteered for military service. After a stir­ ring oration by Tigran Bekzadian, the throng marched to each of the Allied missions for more speeches and finally to the Soviet legation, where emotions were whipped by the chairman of the Armenian Na­ tional Council of Georgia, Bagrat Topchian, Social Revolutionary spokesman Tarkhanian, and Dashnaktsutiun Central Committee mem­ ber Koriun Ghazazian. Pointing to the Soviet mission, Kazazian ex­ claimed: In the name of the revolutionary workers of the Great East, we have come here to make inquiry of those who pretend to call themselves revolutionary, while in fact they have allied with base counterrevolutionaries. By what right or by which revolutionary tradition do they come to weaken our—the Eastern work­ ers’—position? By which socialist principle do they collaborate with the domi­ nant classes of our land—the khans, beks, pashas? We here today, as revolution­ aries, protest against those who discredit the revolution, who engage in vile actions in our reality and who extend their hands to the butchers of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives, to the Enver pashas, to the Talaats, and disguise all this under a revolutionary red flag. Standing face to face, we direct this ques­ tion to the Bolsheviks and await an answer.47

Challenged to defend the honor of Soviet Russia and of Bolshevism, Leonid Stark, who had replaced Sergei Kirov as the head of the Soviet mission, appeared on his balcony to address the crowd. In a declaration frequently interrupted by hoots and howls, Stark stated that from its inception Soviet Russia had recognized the right of all peoples to selfdetermination up to and including independence and separation, as had been demonstrated in the cases of the Baltic states, Finland, and Georgia. “We have recognized, we do recognize, and we shall continue to recognize the independence of Armenia so long as this is the will of the working people.” Stark was met with taunts from the crowd: “Your ally, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, also wants to recognize us in your way!” and “What about Karabagh, Zangezur, Kazakh?” He shouted back that blood was not on Bolshevik hands but rather on those of the Entente Powers. Soviet Russia was helping the oppressed peoples of the East

47 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 17/17, 24/24, and 67/30; Ter-Hakobian, °P- át., PP* 70-71; Vratzian, op. át., pp. 422—423; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Corbel’s no. 1292, Political situation to Oct. 15, 1920; FO 371/4961, E13221/134/58 enclosure; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/1/26, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 7 and 11, 1920, enclosures.

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against the imperialists, and the gains of the Armenian working masses were as precious to Russia as those of the workers of India, Persia, and Turkey. The Dashnaktsutiun had become a tool of the Entente, and it was now up to the Armenian people to decide either to be with revolu­ tionary Russia or to allow the old ways to continue. Russia had offered to mediate between Armenia and Turkey, and despite the fact that no positive response had been received from the Armenian government, the offer still stood. The crowd chanted in unison, “You lie! You lie!’’ Karabagh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and Kazakh were unmistakable ex­ amples of Soviet Russia’s “friendly intervention.’’48 In its appeal to the “civilized world” on October 8, the Armenian government maintained that the sultan’s cabinet in Constantinople and Mustafa Kemal in Angora were in fact collaborating against the Republic to keep the Armenian people in servitude. The heroic centuries-long Armenian struggle against Turkish oppression had inspired a hunger for freedom and independence, spurring the Armenian people to break their chains and organize a free and independent government. By the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, the Allied Powers and the Turkish gov­ ernment had recognized the sovereignty of the united Armenian state, and Turkey had relinquished its claim over historically Armenian lands. Now, while awaiting President Wilson’s arbitration of the precise bound­ aries in the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond, the Ar­ menian people had begun their peaceful labors to reconstruct the dev­ astated country, but the sudden Turkish attack had interrupted this process and forced thousands of peasants to leave the harvest to defend the hard-won freedom of the fatherland. The Turkish government, not wanting to accept the terms of the treaty it had been forced to sign, was using “its official agent, Mustafa Kemal,” to drive into the heart of the Armenian republic. “The Armenian government in this moment of cri­ sis appeals in the name of the entire Armenian people to all the civilized peoples of the world and to their governments to protest decisively against the sinister intent of the Turkish Nationalists, and it fervidly begs for assistance.” The holy batde of the Armenian people in defense of its national honor, freedom, and independence was a struggle in the name of the inalienable rights of all peoples, and therefore Armenia was confident its call would not remain unanswered by the civilized world.49 48 Armenia Archives, 200/1/442, pt. II, p. 93; Slovo, Oct. 6, 1920; Vratzian, op. dt., pp. 423—424. For the protests of the Armenian government to Soviet Foreign Affairs Com­ missar Chicherin and Soviet envoy Legran, see Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 1—2, no. 14, Oct. 1, and p. 153, no. 15, Oct. 15, 1920. See also Haradj, Oct. 8:4, 14:1, 1920. 49 Armenia Archives, 200/2/86, pp. 26—27; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/28, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 8, 1920, enclosures. For other appeals and protests, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 115/14, 116/15, 118/17,241/140.

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Diplomatic Endeavors

Shortly before the Turkish invasion, Prime Minister Ohandjanian wrote Avetis Aharonian in Paris that the small Armenian army was extended over 700 versts (400 miles) without adequate arms and munitions. The Ross rifles shipped by the British were in bad shape, and a large part was unusable. The Greeks had given 4,000 rifles of a model entirely unfa­ miliar to the Armenian cadre and troops, and of the 3,800 shipped by the French, half had to be given to the Georgians as the price of trans­ port and transit, and most of the half that had reached Armenia needed repairs. Moreover, the 5 million rounds of ammunition acquired from General Wrangel and other sources were rusted and might not work. Armenia’s transportation system, Ohandjanian continued, was in sham­ bles, as trains and automobiles were idle for the lack of fuel. Few horses remained in the country, and the army had to rely on the slow-moving ox carts to transport the troops. There was little bread for the army, and the workers were striking because of the critical shortage of food. Ar­ menia was in immediate need of 50,000 tons of wheat and a large fi­ nancial loan; “otherwise, we are finished.”50 In his next message, Ohandjanian stated that the Turkish offensive had begun only after the Kemalists had received technical assistance from the Soviets via Maku and that radio conversations between the Turks and Russians were being picked up by the Armenian army.51 On the first day of the general offensive, September 28, Ohandjanian wrote Tigran Bekzadian in Tiflis that the situation was so serious that it might be necessary to empty Sarikamish. The Turks clearly intended to capture the entire province of Kars and impose the suffocating terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, thereby voiding the Treaty of Sèvres and extinguishing Armenian independence. The British and French com­ missioners in Tiflis should be asked to apprise their governments of these developments and to urge them to take swift countermeasures; the Greeks should be called on to relieve the pressure on Armenia by re­ suming offensive operations in Anatolia; the Georgians should be ap­ proached for fuel oil so that troops could be transported to the front and should be reminded of Turkish pretensions to Batum; General Wrangel’s representatives should be consulted about supplying muni­ tions and possibly landing an armed force at Trebizond. And Boris Le­ gran, the Soviet envoy who was supposed to be conducting negotiations in Armenia, should be told that his government, as an ally of Turkey, should honor its pledge to use its influence to halt Turkish aggression.52 50 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Aharonian, Aug. 28, 1920. 51 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Aharonian, Sept. 27 and Oct. 1, 1920. 52 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, and Armenia Archives, 200/2/81, p. 5. See also Zohrabian, op. át, p. 64.

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Bekzadian had in fact been making the rounds since the initial Turk­ ish operation at Peniak had deprived Armenia of its single source of coal. He now portrayed the loss of Sarikamish as a serious threat to all the Allied Powers and to the implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres. He appealed for strong pressure on the sultan’s government to control Mus­ tafa Kemal and establish order in the interior provinces, resumption of the Greek offensive and an Allied naval descent at Trebizond to threaten the Turkish armies from the rear and cut off the receipt of contraband goods, and inclusion of conditions in the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations and the Soviet-Polish peace talks requiring Russia to suspend aid to Tur­ key and exert its influence to make Mustafa Kemal withdraw from Ar­ menian territory. The Armenians, Bekzadian claimed, could hold their own by concentrating their forces on any given front, but because of Soviet and Azerbaijani pressure from the east and south the army had to be kept dispersed, thereby creating a critical situation. In appealing for arms, ammunition, and oil and kerosene, Bekzadian, like other Ar­ menian spokesmen in Constantinople, Paris, London, Washington, and elsewhere, warned that the Turkish offensive was aimed at the Treaty of Sèvres and toward restoration of the notorious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was a matter not only of honor but also of the Allied Powers’ own self­ interest that they should act decisively to quash the Turkish govern­ ment’s disingenuous attempt to achieve its purposes through agents such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha.53 On September 29 and 30, Bekzadian personally presented the Ar­ menian case during interviews in the British, French, Italian, and Greek missions, in the Georgian foreign ministry, and in the Soviet legation. Ironically, it was Boris Legran who first received Bekzadian. During a two-hour exchange on the evening of September 29, Bekzadian re­ minded Legran of his communications in which he had declared that the Soviet government had influenced Mustafa Kemal to desist from aggressive action and instead to recognize the right of the Armenians to self-determination. Legran’s lengthy reply was significant, as it seemed to convey the official stance taken by the Soviet government. By signing the Treaty of Sèvres, Armenia had linked its political orientation entirely with the Entente imperialists and against Turkey. The Armenians naively believed that the Entente would give them Turkish Armenia, that Wood­ row Wilson would draw the final boundaries, and that all that remained was to occupy that land with their own forces. With this objective, the

55 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/16/17, Moser to Secretary of State, Sept. 17 and Oct. 1, 1920, enclosures, and RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Bekzadian to Moser, Sept. 24, 29, Oct. 8, and Toumanoff to Moser, Oct. 2, 4, 1920; FO 371/4960, Ei2811/134/58, Luke to Foreign Office, Sept. 25, 1920, enclosure.

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Armenian government had formed a large army and begun fighting against Turkey, which could not tolerate the terms of the Sèvres treaty. In view of the aggressive intentions of the Armenians, as clearly enun­ ciated in the official organ Haradj, the Kemalists decided to seize the initiative and “liquidate the Armenian front.” The Turkish offensive, therefore, was a reaction to Armenian designs. If the Armenian govern­ ment was disposed to reach an agreement with its neighbors and to resolve the territorial disputes, then it would have responded to Soviet Russia’s offer to serve as a mediator. Whereas Kemal’s government had indicated its consent, Armenia had not bothered to reply. But if Armenia would make such a declaration, even at this late date, Russia would have proof of the Republic’s desire for peace and would be able to influence Mustafa Kemal to cease his wrongful offensive. Bekzadian refuted Legran’s interpretation, explaining that if any men­ tion of military force had been made in the Armenian press, it was in relation to providing protection for the refugee population when it be­ came possible to return to the desolate regions of Turkish Armenia, where all semblance of law and order had vanished and bandit groups roamed the countryside. There was no intent to engage the Turkish army in batde, even though such a conflict would become inevitable if the Kemalists refused to recognize the cession of Turkish Armenia. As to Legran’s suggestion that the Armenian government publicly declare its acceptance of Soviet mediation, Bekzadian promised to pass on the proposal to his superiors but offered the opinion that such a pronounce­ ment would actually be harmful at a time when the Turkish army was moving and would break the morale and momentum of Armenian re­ sistance. Unfortunately, the Armenian people had been deeply disillu­ sioned by the actions of the Soviet government, and they could not trust the Turks at all.54 In his report of the interview, Bekzadian wrote Ohandjanian that Le­ gran was trying to ensnare the Armenians by having them turn against the Entente and give up hope of implementing the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, then drawing them into the Soviet orbit. To Legran, however, Bekzadian had simply stated that Armenia had no desire to fight against the Turks but that Mustafa Kemal’s regime had demanded that mutual relations be established on the basis of the Treaty of BrestLitovsk. Legran interjected that any such intent was a “stupidity” and that he would telegraph his government that very day to exert pressure on Kemal to halt the unwarranted advance. Bekzadian reported that he 54 Armenia Archives, 200/2/81, pp. 6—7; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, Bek­ zadian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 29, 1920. See also US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/ 17, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1920, enclosure.

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thought Legran was playing a game by giving a declarative answer. It was inconceivable that Mustafa Kemal would have begun the offensive with­ out the previous assent of Soviet Russia. “It seems to me that we shall receive aid from no quarter now and as always during these past two years we are left to our own fate and must rely on our own, albeit weak, forces.’’ The danger was great, and unless it was met quickly and firmly, “our condition will be grave from the point of view of establishment of Soviet rule in our country.”55 In his meetings on September 30 with the new British chief commis­ sioner, Colonel C. B. Stokes (Commander Harry Luke departed on Sep­ tember 29), French representatives Colonel Emile Corbel and Consul Louis Nettement, and Greek envoy Skeferis, Bekzadian emphasized the Turkish objective of eliminating the Armenian front to link up with the Bolsheviks and to concentrate all available force against the Greek army and implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres. Soviet Russia, he said, would do nothing to stop the Turks, as the Sovnarkom, after the signing of the Sèvres treaty, had come to the conclusion that Armenia was irreversibly bound to the Entente and its policies. This, Bekzadian implied, should be regarded as all the more reason for the Allied Powers to assist Ar­ menia.56 The Allied officials in Tiflis responded with strong expressions of sym­ pathy. Colonel Corbel and Consul Nettement told Bekzadian that they would do their utmost to have their government release surplus muni­ tions from depots in Bulgaria. Corbel telegraphed the military ministry in Paris with the recommendation to hasten the shipment of arms and an Allied descent around Trebizond “if we wish to stave off the danger of extermination threatening Armenia.”57 He also informed the Arme­ nian Ministry of Military Affairs that General Gabriel Korganian was ne­ gotiating in Paris for the purchase of 10,000 Lebel rifles, 20 field can­ nons, and 30,000 shells.58 British Chief Commissioner Stokes also recommended support of the Armenians, although he chided Bekzadian for the Armenian govern­ ment’s August accord with Soviet envoy Legran. Shortly thereafter he traveled to Erevan, where on October 3 he conferred with Prime Min­ ister Ohandjanian and Minister of Military Affairs Ter-Minasian. Stokes again criticized the Armenian-Soviet agreement of August 1 o for making possible the union of the Turkish and Bolshevik forces, and he urged Ohandjanian to collaborate more closely with Georgia. Armenia should ’’Armenia Archives, 200/2/86, pp. 11—14. 56 Ibid,., pp. 15—16. 57 See Corbel’s reports in Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, 20N/186, dossier 3, and 20N/1080, dossier 3. See also US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/24 enclosure. 58 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 239/138; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3.

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also discard its anti-Muslim demeanor and try to resolve major differ­ ences with its neighbors through the aegis of a Transcaucasian federa­ tion or confederation, especially if Azerbaijan managed to throw off the odious Russian yoke. Ohandjanian explained once again the circum­ stances that had compelled his government to enter into a provisional treaty with Soviet Russia, the ongoing efforts to strengthen the Repub­ lic’s bonds with Georgia (despite the evasiveness and aloofness of the Georgians), and the importance of resolving territorial questions as a precondition for any successful federative system. Although the Arme­ nian leaders were disturbed that Stokes was advancing his Islamophile views even while in Erevan and that he did not seem very well disposed toward Armenia, the British representative in fact left the meeting sat­ isfied that Ohandjanian’s government was prepared to resist both the Turks and the Bolsheviks.5960 The next day, Ter-Minasian communicated by wireless with Vratzian and Babalian in Kars to inform them that Stokes and Captain George Gracey were setting out to inspect the Kars front. Aside from extending Stokes a smart reception, the two government members were advised to act as Russophobie as possible, “since that is his weak point.” Stokes was now the most influential Allied representative in the Caucasus and be­ cause of his connections in London was considered the final word among British governing circles. He favored the establishment of sepa­ rate Azerbaijani and Daghestani states in confederation with Georgia and Armenia, although he had conceded that Azerbaijani territory should begin beyond Askeran, leaving Mountainous Karabagh to Ar­ menia. Vratzian and Babalian should emphasize the importance of Kara­ bagh for Armenia militarily and ethnographically yet also show them­ selves to be supportive of the liberation of Azerbaijan and Daghestan. Nothing should be done to give Stokes the least inkling that the Arme­ nians had any Russophile tendencies remaining.6” Colonel Stokes was pleased with the high spirits of the commanders and troops on the Kars front and upon his return to Tiflis reported to 59 Armenia Archives, 200/1/427, p. 389, and 2oo/i/6o7,p. 149, no. 15, Oct. 15, 1920; Haradj, Oct. 5:4, 6:3, 1920. 60 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 8. Stokes and Captain Gracey were welcomed at Kars on October 5 by municipal and military leaders and thousands of townspeople. After re­ viewing the honor guard and cavalry, Stokes inspected the front. General Silikian also personally inspected conditions along the front and reported to Prime Minister Ohandja­ nian that the army would soon be able to drive the enemy out of Kars province. Shortly thereafter, Kars governor Korganian, Sebouh, Vratzian, and Babalian were received with professions of loyalty by the Kurdish and Turkish notables of the Zarushat district. The newspaper Haradj highlighted editorials on the fidelity of Armenia’s Muslim population, which had learned of the oppressive policies of the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan and the chaos and anarchy besetting the Muslims in the areas controlled by Mustafa Kemal’s riffraff. See Razmik, Oct. 18:12, 1920; Haradj, Oct. 7:4, 8:3-4, 10:4, 13:4, 15:2, 1920.

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London on October 6 that he was deeply impressed with the unity of the Armenian parties and public against both Turks and Bolsheviks. Armenian morale was good despite the loss of Sarikamish. The Arme­ nian government, contrary to his initial doubts, had taken a firm stand against Bolshevism. It was now trying to reinforce the Turkish front, but the lack of fuel and the pressure from the direction of Azerbaijan hin­ dered this effort. Thanks to the British munitions received in July, the regular army was well equipped. The Armenians would probably launch a counteroffensive in about a week. Their main problems were the short­ age of lumber and fuel oil and the need to maintain sizable military elements all along the borders. Stokes concluded: “In view of very cred­ itable manner in which Armenia is doing her utmost to meet very serious danger which threatens her, and bearing in mind probable conse­ quences to our position in Middle East if Turks and Bolsheviks succeed in joining hands across Armenia, I trust His Majesty’s Government will carefully consider every possible means of assisting Armenia.’’61 The British high commissioner in Constantinople, Admiral John de Robeck, was also supportive of Armenia. When former prime minister Alexandre Khatisian put to him Armenia’s need for 16,000 tons of oil each month because of the Azerbaijani embargo, de Robeck quickly agreed to allocate 1,000 tons monthly for Armenia’s “immediate re­ quirements.”62 On October 17 he reported to London that 1,000 tons had indeed been discharged at Batum and that with strict economy the shipment might suffice for a month. It was imperative to continue the supply of fuel oii to enable Armenia to resist the combined attack of the Turks from Olti, Sarikamish, and Kaghisman, the Kurds from around Igdir, the sardar of Maku from around Shahtaght, and the Bolsheviks from Kazakh. In his capacity as commander of the Mediterranean fleet, de Robeck also forwarded his recommendation to the Admiralty Of­ fice.63 In support of the recommendation, the Foreign Office drew the at­ tention of the Admiralty Office to reports that Bolshevik leader S. M. Kirov was coordinating a network of motor launches between Novoros­ siisk, Poti, Batum, Rize, and Trebizond with a view to strengthening the bonds between Soviet Russia and the Turkish Nationalists. Foreign Sec­ retary Curzon asked that a ship be dispatched to Trebizond for increased vigilance and to prevent the illegal shipment of war matériel.64 The Ad­ miralty Office replied at the end of October that if essential to British 61 FO 371 /496o, E12836/134/58. See also E12566/134/58. 62 FO 371 /496o, E12423/134/58. 63 FO 371 /49Ô1, E12926/E13101/E13167/134/58. See also US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 23, 1920. 64 FO 371 /496o, E12705/134/58.

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interests a monthly supply of fuel could be provided to Armenia, but it also pointed out that doing so might cause difficulties in meeting all the needs of the British fleet and asked that the shipments be paid for in sterling upon delivery.65 Assistant Foreign Secretary J. A. C. Tilley in­ formed the Armenian government through Avetis Aharonian on Novem­ ber 2 that in case of absolute need His Majesty’s Government was pre­ pared to supply sufficient liquid fuel to Armenia against payment on delivery to meet the immediate requirements for military transport. “I am to ask what suggestions you are able to make regarding payment for these deliveries.”66 Armenia, of course, was unable to pay, and the matter soon settled itself by the course of developments on the battlefield. If Allied officials in Tiflis and Constantinople showed themselves to be sympathetic with the Armenians, the American representatives were skeptical from the outset. Tigran Bekzadian’s repeated appeals to Charles Moser, the United States consul in Tiflis, were backed by Ernest Yarrow, director of American relief operations in Armenia after the de­ parture of Colonel William Haskell. On October 5, Yarrow reported that the Turks had attacked without warning at Merdenek, Sarikamish, and Kaghisman, causing 50,000 Armenian refugees to flee. The Armenian government had few remaining resources and no money for external purchases and was now appealing to the United States for help.67 Moser relayed these requests to the Department of State through American High Commissioner Mark Bristol in Constantinople. Bristol, as was his practice, added his own evaluations. On October 15 he wrote the State Department that the reports of a Turkish offensive were only from native sources and not confirmed. The Armenians had started the trouble by moving into Olti in the summer. Moreover, in one communication they claimed the Turks were attacking, whereas in other messages they spoke merely of Turkish preparations for an invasion. “I am suspicious of such reports from Turks, Tartars, and Armenians, for often it means those who publicize it, do it to justify an offensive of their own.” The Turks, Bristol explained, would not be foolish enough to advance, for they knew such action would put them in disfavor with almost all nations. An im­ minent offensive was illogical in view of the Greek threat from the west. “The Armenians may desire to have it appear that the Turks are attack­ ing to force our President to act more rapidly on boundary question and to get aid.”68 65 FO 371/4961, E13166/134/58, Admiralty to FO, Oct. 23, 1920. 66 FO 371/4961, E13317/134/58, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 335/5, Tilley to Aharonian, Nov. 2, 1920. See also File 239/138, Aharonian to Foreign Minister of Arme­ nia, Nov. 8, and Aharonian to Tilley, Nov. 9, 1920. 67 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/4, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 8, 1920. “RG59, 760J.67/19.

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In relaying several reports from the Armenians, Bristol wrote that the messages were typical of the “present, rather uncertain republic.’’ They might not be incorrect, but they created a false impression by what they omitted. Bristol cautioned that the Armenians’ talk of opposition to Bol­ shevism must be taken with a grain of salt.69 On October 16, he added: “I would point out ... that it is to the advantage of both the Russian Armenia [sic] and the Nationalist Turks to advertise their present hos­ tilities. The former to solicit foreign help and money, and the latter as a show of strength to counteract any reports of the plight of the Kemalist movement in Anatolia.’’ The British, Bristol complained, were trying to maintain control of the Caucasus as a highway to the East and to put the local republics under obligation. This was the reason British vessels were reportedly sailing for Batum with fuel and ammunition for the Arme­ nians.70 Bristol’s denigration of the Armenians and their methods con­ tinued unabated throughout the crisis. On November i he wrote that the Armenians had cried much about nonexistent aggression. “I am inclined to doubt the importance of the reported attack of the Nation­ alists on the Armenians. I can see the advantage to the Armenians in having such a report widely circulated; I can see no advantage, saving one, to the Turks in making this attack and there are many excellent reasons why they should not make such an attack. Therefore I desire to warn the Department in advance not to take these reports too seri­ ously.’’71 In Europe, meanwhile, the monotonous Armenian appeals for Allied military intervention fell on deaf ears. The Allied Powers, having created a united Armenia on paper, steadfasdy refused to allocate the armed forces necessary to implement that decision. Beginning on October 5, Avetis Aharonian wrote each of the Allied Powers, the Conference of Ambassadors (formerly Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassa­ dors) of the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, Marshal Ferdinand Foch and the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, and scores of politicians, statesmen, and intellectuals to point out that the Turks were striving to combine with the Bolsheviks in order to supplant the Treaty of Sèvres with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Armenia could have defended itself if it was not simultaneously pinned down on three fronts by the Turks, Azerbaijani “Tatars,” and Russian Bolsheviks. General Karabekir, the champion of Pan-Turkism, intended to join Turkey and fi,J RG 59, 860J.00/4. 70 RG 59, 760J.67/5, and The Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Box 66, Caucasus file. 71 RG 59, 760J.67/35. Utilizing the colored information of his intelligence officer, Lieu­ tenant Robert S. Dunn, who maintained that the Armenians had initiated the hostilities, Bristol cautioned Consul Moser against being taken in by Armenian propaganda. See RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, US High Commission to Moser, Oct. 28, 1920.

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Azerbaijan, and the Bolsheviks countenanced this scheme, as they were persuaded that the Muslim world could thereby be thrown into revolu­ tionary upheaval, helping to propagate communism. As the attack against Armenia was also an attack on the Allied Powers and the Sèvres treaty, the Allies should intervene to relieve Armenia. Aharonian ap­ pealed for practical measures, such as the occupation of Trebizond to sever communications between the Turks and Bolsheviks and draw off a part of the Kemalist forces. Once again, Avetis Aharonian made a “supreme appeal’’ for tangible assistance.71 72 The Armenian petitions were supported by many pro-Armenian or­ ganizations. The Armenian Red Cross and Refugee Fund, the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund, the British Armenia Committee, and persistent advocates of the Armenian cause such as Emily Robinson ham­ mered the British government with requests for arms and matériel, dip­ lomatic measures, and pressure on the Soviet and Turkish govern­ ments.73 On behalf of the British Armenia Committee, Arnold Toynbee wrote the Foreign Office on October 13 that the Armenians might be able to put up a successful resistance to the Turks unless they were sub­ jected to a simultaneous attack by the Red Army in Azerbaijan. The Committee believe that a junction between the Kemalist and the Bolshe­ vik forces is the object of this Nationalist advance, and that the Nationalists would never have diverted forces from the Greek front towards Erivan if they were not counting upon Bolshevik co-operation here. Both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks stand to gain by a junction of forces. It may put heart into their people and they may be reckoning on it as a piece of bluff, to alarm the Allies. Possibly they may be overrating the effect of this move on the general situation but an incidental result of it may be the destruction of the Republic of Erivan. The Committee have no doubt that H.M.G. would de­ plore this, and that they will take any steps in their power to avert it. The Committee realise that the despatch of British troops to deal with this fresh defiance of the Turkey treaty by the Nationalists in Anatolia is out of the question.... But they venture to suggest to H.M.G. action on the two following lines, which, they believe, would be both practical and effective, if carried out:(i) That H.M.G. should supply the Erivan Republic with further munitions and other necessities for their troops (e.g. quinine, to combat the malaria epi­ demic among them.) (ii) That they should put pressure upon the Soviet Government, through its representatives here, to keep its hand off Armenia during this attack from the Turkish side. The Moscow Govt, may disclaim responsibility for the “Soviet Re­ public of Azerbaijan”, but it is evident that the Bolshevik forces in Trans-Caucasia are in reality dependent upon Moscow, and the Committee have no doubt that, 71 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 237/136; FO 371/4961, E12885/134/58; US Ar­ chives, RG 59, 760J.67/6 enclosure; League of Nations, Procès-Verbal of the Tenth Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), pp. 66—69. 75 FO 371 /4961, E13175/134/58.

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if Moscow were informed by its representatives in London that any further Bol­ shevik aggression against Erivan would seriously prejudice the conclusion of peace and the resumption of trade, the Moscow Govt, could and would veto any further Bolshevik military adventures in that quarter.74

Though the British Foreign Office tried to deal with the Armenian crisis in such a way as not to be accused of reneging on public declara­ tions of His Majesty’s Government, it was clearly annoyed by what it considered incessant, excessive demands. On receipt of Aharonian’s in­ itial communication of October 5, the chief of the Eastern section, Dwight Osborne, minuted the document skeptically: “We receive a ‘su­ preme appeal’ from the Armenians about once a month. We are usually unable to do anything, but Armenia continues to exist. I am not sure that these Turkish attacks are not exaggerated by the Armenians in order to bring about Allied or Greek occupation of the area for which Pontine Greeks demand autonomy.’’75 Even after news of the Turkish offensive had been confirmed, the Foreign Office minimized the problem, point­ ing out that the Armenians had held their own and that the Turks had advanced no farther after the action around Sarikamish. On another appeal from Aharonian, A. E. R. MacDonell wrote: “When the question of supplying arms to Armenia arose the Armenians declared they could place 30,000 to 40,000 men in the field. They have now received more than they expected & according to intelligence reports received there are no very great Turkish forces opposed to them.’’ Dwight Osborne added: “A further demand for Allied military intervention, presumably at Trebizond. We have no further news of the fighting.’’76 By mid­ October, Assistant Secretary Tilley was instructing: “It is more conven­ ient not to answer.”77 In its replies to the British Armenia Committee and other pro-Armenia groups, the Foreign Office explained that Ar­ menia was being supplied with fuel oil and that there was no hard evi­ dence of Bolshevik or Azerbaijani involvement. As His Majesty’s Govern­ ment had shipped a cargo of arms and ammunition and others were reportedly being sent by the French and Greeks, no further munitions were required. Moreover, Soviet Russia declined to accept any respon­ sibility for alleged activities of its agents in Azerbaijan.78 Within the For­ eign Office, Tilley did suggest on October 19 that it might be advisable to lodge a protest with the Soviet government against the unprovoked 74 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 135/34; FO 371/4960, E12619/134/58. 75 FO 371 /496o, E12478/134/58, minute. 76 FO 371 /496o, E12683/134/58, minute. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 239/ 138, Aharonian to Derby, Oct. 12, 1920. 77 FO 371/4960, Ei2683/134/58, minute. See also E12478/134/58, Tilley to Derby, Oct. 19, 1920. 78 FO 371 /496o, E12619/134/58 enclosure.

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Turkish attack, “if only to show that we are not unconcerned,” but it was now Foreign Secretary Curzon who wrote, “I don’t see the good.”79 During the month of October, Armenia’s unofficial diplomatic rep­ resentative in London, Major General Iakov Bagratuni, was able to ar­ range interviews with Osborne and Tilley and submitted memorandums on the state and needs of the Armenian army and on measures the Allied Powers could take to save Armenia. During his talk with Osborne, Ba­ gratuni “rattled” about a military diversion at Trebizond, offering some Armenian contingents to participate in the operation, but Osborne re­ plied that if the Armenians could spare troops for a descent at Trebizond then surely they should have enough to repel the Turks from the existing field of batde.80 In his meeting with Tilley on October 25, Bagratuni argued that the security of Armenia was the best possible guarantee for peace in the Near East and Central Asia and for thwarting Turco-Bol­ shevik schemes. He pointed to the firmness of the Armenian troops after the initial setback at Sarikamish and asserted that Armenia had dem­ onstrated that it was worthy of Allied material and moral support. He now requested additional supplies for an army made up of four brigades divided into nine regiments and six battalions together with garrison, militia, artillery, and technical units.81 Bagratuni followed up two days later with a memorandum reiterating the steps that could be taken by Great Britain and the Allies to relieve Armenia.82 But the Armenian ap­ peals had a hollow ring, and when Bagratuni warned that Kars was in grave danger, Osborne minuted the ledger: “If the Armenians with their trained & equipped forces cannot hold Kars with its strong modern for­ tifications against the discontented & ill-disciplined Nationalist forces they had better make what terms they can as soon as possible. There are no Bolsheviks attacking them at present. They cannot exist entirely on Allied support.” Lord Curzon, weary of the Armenian problem, added: “I am afraid the Armenians are in colloquial language ‘a rotten lot.’ ”83 On October 29, the Foreign Office wired Colonel Stokes that there would be no military diversion at Trebizond.84 Without a new commitment of aid from Great Britain, the Armenian appeals to the various organs of the Paris Peace Conference were hope­ less. On October 12, Marshal Foch reminded the Conference of Am­ bassadors that in March he had reported that four divisions would be 79 FO 371 /496o, E12836/134/58, minutes. 80 FO 371/4961, E13441/134/58, minute. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 355/

5-

81 FO 82 FO 88 FO 84FO

371/4961, Ei3255/134/58,Tilley memorandum. 371 /49Ô1, E13401/134/58 enclosure. 371 /49Ô2, E13646/134/58, minutes. 371/4961, Ei3307/134/58 enclosure.

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needed to impose the Armenian chapter of the Turkish peace treaty. As there was no manpower to spare, the desired aid to Armenia could not be given, except for munitions.85 Foch reiterated these conclusions in letters to Avetis Aharonian on October 12 and 20 and explained that “the occupation of Trebizond goes beyond the present possibilities of the Entente.”86 This turn of events seemed to vindicate the position of the British War Office, which was prepared to write off Armenia and minimize Great Britain’s losses by seeking an accommodation with the Turks and re­ verting to the traditional strategy of using Turkey as a bulwark against Russia. On October 26 the Foreign Office wrote the War Office that Colonel Stokes was strongly recommending the shipment of arms and matériel to Armenia and Georgia, and it asked for an assessment of a possible joint Soviet-Turkish attack on Armenia. The War Office was still cautious in its response. The Army Council reported that at least three Turkish divisions were operating on the Kars and Igdir fronts to effect war plans contemplated by the Nationalists as early as May. In view of the inability of Russia to spare troops or even to hold firmly onto the Caucasus, the Turkish Nationalists had apparently decided to attack di­ rectly into the heart of Armenia, where success would yield the maxi­ mum result and the most booty as well as open the way to Azerbaijan and Russia. The Bolshevik pressure from the northeast and the guerrilla activity in the south may have been intended to divide the Armenian military forces. The Army Council concluded: Armenia has been, and may still be, in considerable danger. Her economic sit­ uation is deplorable. The grain reserves are reported to be low. Paper money has been overissued. The railways have almost ceased running; not only from lack of oil, but owing to the bad state of both the rolling-stock and permanent­ way. But with the arms and equipment lately supplied by the Allies an army of 40,000 should have been able to take to the field. Moral [e] is reported good. The approach of winter is, from the external point of view, in favour of Armenia. Should the Georgians co-operate whole-heartedly, and essential material aid be supplied by the Allies, Armenia may be able to hold out till the spring, or until the Bolsheviks wish and are in a position to concentrate on her elimination.87

Legran 's Arrival in Armenia

The Bureau-Government of Hamazasp Ohandjanian was convinced that the Turkish invasion would not have taken place unless it had been countenanced by Soviet Russia. The Red Army’s frequent probes in the 85 FO 371 ƒ4961,E13155/1 34/58 enclosure; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/9 enclosure. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/39, Aharonian to Foch, Oct. 12, 1920. 86 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/39. See also US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/24 enclosure; FO 371/4962, 13463/134/58 enclosure. 87 FO 371/4961, Ei3262/134/58.

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Kazakh sector and its occupation of Zangezur only reinforced that view. The government had repeatedly reminded the Russian Sovnarkom of its declarations about the right of self-determination and about its sup­ posed restraints upon Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalists. The Sovnarkom was now asked to demonstrate its sincerity by coercing its Turkish allies to withdraw from Armenian territory. At the same time, the Bureau-Gov­ ernment made arrangements to receive Soviet envoy Boris V. Legran, who had been denied passage from Tiflis to Erevan as long as Levon Shant’s delegation was still in Russia. Ohandjanian remained firmly com­ mitted to a Western orientation, but the pressure along the frontiers and Shant’s belated return led him to invite Legran to Armenia. Legran’s secretary, Konstantin Istomin, spent most of the month of September in Erevan trying to secure housing and facilities for a mission of more than sixty members, from the Soviet plenipotentiary down to cooks and chauffeurs. The difficulties in locating such spacious accom­ modations were so great that Legran made known his annoyance by suggesting that the negotiations be conducted in Baku, Vladikavkaz, or some other Soviet city. During the latter part of the month, the Arme­ nian foreign ministry and internal ministry and the Erevan municipal administration concentrated on meeting Legran’s requirements in or­ der to eliminate cause for further delay. The Turkish invasion had made the Armenian government ready and willing to resume negotiations as soon as possible.88 The Shant delegation returned to Erevan on September 14 after a journey of more than a month. Departing from Moscow on August 11, the delegation had to remain in Rostov-on-Don for a week because Soviet operations against Wrangel had tied up nearly all the trains. Only through the intercession of prominent Armenian Bolshevik Sargis Lukashin (Srabionian) was the delegation provided transportation south­ ward over Armavir and Vladikavkaz to Tiflis. En route, Armenian dep­ utations from Mineralnye Vody, Piatigorsk, Kislovodsk, and other places in the North Caucasus petitioned the delegation to help arrange the transfer of their people to the Republic of Armenia. In Tiflis the dele­ gation urged Legran to hasten to Erevan, but it was now Legran who stalled for time, explaining that he was investigating the Karabagh-Zangezur question and would have to go to Baku for consultations before coming to Erevan.89 88 See Armenia Archives, file 200/1/597* $ee al80 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/ 24, no. 13, Sept. 15, 1920. For a personnel roster of Legran’s mission, see E. K. Sarkisian, Kh. Abeghian, and A. Sarkisian, “Missiia B. Legrana: Diplomaticheskaia missiia RSFSR v Armenii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 8th yr., no. 3 (1967), p. 34 (introduction by E. K. Sarkisian, and documents compiled by Abeghian and A. Sarkisian; cited hereafter as “Mis­ siia B. Legrana”). 89 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /607, p. 55, and 200/2/86, p. 37; Hambardzoum Terterian,

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Levon Shant, Hambardzum Terterian, and Levon Zarafian, back in Erevan after an absence of four and a half months, reported to the cabinet, the Parliament’s Dashnakist faction, and other civic and politi­ cal leaders about the prevailing political and economic conditions in Russia. They recommended a modus vivendi with Soviet Russia, even at the price of some compromises regarding the Treaty of Sèvres, in order to secure the Red Army’s withdrawal from Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and hopefully Karabagh. Ohandjanian’s Bureau-Government would not budge on Sèvres and, according to Terterian, was confident in the Ar­ menian army, which had recently received arms and equipment from Great Britain.*90 On September 19, five days after Shant’s return, Ohandjanian, in his capacity as foreign minister, formally invited Legran to Erevan.91 Legran still tarried, however, apparently on instructions from Moscow. His ex­ cuses about inadequate accommodations were followed by explanations that the Georgian authorities were not providing him with a suitable train.92 The Turkish invasion raised many questions about Soviet poli­ cies. Legran asked Chicherin for instructions regarding the TurkishArmenian boundary, transit over Armenian territory to Turkey, the dis­ puted territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and other issues that would come up during the negotiations in Erevan. He expressed con­ cern that the Turks would not stop at Sarikamish and Shahtaght, which they claimed to have seized in order to ensure communication and tran­ sit with the Soviet republics. Chicherin’s response showed that the urgency for a treaty with Ar­ menia had passed. The question of boundaries had been deliberated at great length, he explained, and the consensus was that for the present neither Zangezur nor Nakhichevan could be given to Armenia. In any agreement with the Armenian government, the status of those territories should be left open. Chicherin added that comrades with full knowledge of affairs in the Caucasus believed that under no circumstances would the Dashnak government willfully and peacefully open up the routes for the transport of military matériel to Anatolia over its territory. Even if the Armenians assented to such a provision, they would do everything to prevent its implementation. Armenia was being made into an Entente fortress, and the chances of getting anything from the Dashnak govern­ ment through friendly means were decreasing.93 “The Levon Chanth Mission to Moscow,” Armenian Review, VIII (Autumn 1955), pp. 94— 96. 90 Terterian, op. at., pp. 96—97. See also Simon Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov: Depker, demker, aprumner,V (Beirut, 1966), pp. 159-160. 91 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /607, p. 151. 92 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Armenia Archives, 200/1/597, P* 3993 S. T. Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere hai zhoghovrdi azatagrman gordsum (1917—

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Legran, however, still seemed hopeful, and on October 3 he wrote Chicherin that the Turks apparently intended to reestablish the bound­ aries as drawn under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. It was clear to the Turks that even if Soviet Russia wanted to intervene there were not enough Red Army forces in the Caucasus to halt the Turkish advance. Legran sought approval of the terms he would put to the Armenian government—namely, that it should renounce all plans to occupy by force the Turkish Armenian vilayets awarded by the Treaty of Sèvres, agree to Soviet mediation in the establishment of an equitable boundary between Armenia and Turkey, and guarantee Russia the right to trans­ port military goods over Armenian railways. Acceptance of these terms would give Soviet Russia the bases to demand in the strongest possible language that the Turks halt their military action and withdraw their forces from Armenian territory. In response to Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s suggestion that the time seemed right to raise the question of the sovi­ etization of Armenia, Legran replied that such a move was not advisable under the present circumstances. Both the Dashnaks and the Entente would exploit the issue for anti-Soviet propaganda, and the Armenian masses might view the appearance of the Red Army as a joint TurkishSoviet invasion. As Legran was preparing to depart for Erevan on Oc­ tober 9, Chicherin again expressed doubt that the envoy could reach agreement with the Dashnakist government. He instructed Legran to be cautious in his negotiations in order to avoid drawing Russia into the war. Chicherin concurred that the Turkish advance was dangerous and could be used in the hands of the Entente for anti-Soviet provocation. The Dashnak government should be assured categorically that Russia had no desire to harm Armenia in any way and if requested was willing to act as a mediator to end the tragic conflict. In view of the fact that the Soviet leaders had apparently condoned the Turkish occupation of Sarikamish in the west and Shahtaght in the south, Chicherin advised that as long as the Turkish army remained on the present line and did not press into the heart of Armenia, there would be no grounds for Soviet intervention. At the same time, however, he instructed Ordzho­ nikidze to advise the Kemalists that continuation of the campaign was considered untimely, as it could provoke the Entente Powers into re­ newed military involvement.94 1921 tt.) (Erevan, 1966), pp. 138—139. Throughout the period of the Turkish invasion of Armenia, the Soviet government maintained its policy of providing the Nationalists with financial and military aid. Shalva Eliava, chief of the Soviet mission to Anatolia, telegraphed from Baku on September 18 that the Kemalist movement would collapse before the end of the year if it was deprived of Soviet assistance. On September 29 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party decided to continue the shipment of arms and money and to demonstrate Soviet Russia’s strong sympathy and support for the Turkish national liberation struggle against the Entente. See Kheifets, op. át., pp. 131—132. 94 Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 140—142; Kheifets, op. át., pp. 133—134.

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Only on the night of October 9—10, ten days after the Turkish capture of Sarikamish, did the Soviet mission set out for Erevan. In a discussion with Tigran Bekzadian at the Tiflis railway station, Legran stated the Soviet position. The Armenians, he said, had to choose between two diametrically opposed orientations: that of the Entente imperialists or that of revolutionary Russia. The Turks had moved under the Russian revolutionary banner, as the Allied Powers were trying to strike the death knell of Turkey. “We thought the Armenian government, too, would be with us, but after the Treaty of Sèvres, it veered even more sharply toward the Entente’s imperialist policies instead of toward us.’’ Lately, the Ar­ menian leaders had apparently begun to vacillate a little, but they had to move swifdy in adopting a strong, healthy political orientation before it was too late. Bekzadian replied that each time his government tried to follow a measured path it came up against the Turkish Pan-Islamists, who kept the Armenian people locked in a life-or-death struggle and who under the Soviet red banner were now threatening the existence of the Armenian republic. The Armenian people were again deprived of the necessary conditions for constructive labor. Their genuine Russo­ phile sentiment had not delivered them from mortal danger, nor had it even been appreciated by Soviet Russia. Thus, the Armenian people could rely only on their own resources. They would not, however, allow themselves to be manipulated in the Entente’s anti-Soviet crusade: “Our policy is one of peacefulness and of self-defense against whoever threat­ ens our people and our independence.’’95 The organ of the Dashnaktsutiun’s Bureau, Haradj, was more direct in its criticism of Soviet Russia. On October 9 the paper editorialized on the unacceptable rationalizations of Boris Legran and Leonid Stark re­ garding the Turkish offensive. “Those explanations leave no doubt that the present Turkish invasion has been organized not only with the knowledge but also with the explicit consent and support of the Bolshe­ viks.’’ From the Soviet view, Armenia had committed the “grave error’’ of defending its territory and people from the Turkish butchers. The “wonderful Bolshevik logic’’ would have the Armenians surrender with­ out resisting, allowing the Turkish hordes to inundate the country. At that point, Armenia could be assured of Soviet Russia’s “friendship” and “mediation.” But because Armenia did not have the sense to heed the wise counsel of the Bolshevik “benefactors” and had resorted to the “counterrevolutionary” and “imperialistic” strategy of self-defense, it was not worthy of Soviet concern and should be liquidated for the sake of victory of the “Eastern Red International.” The editorial cautioned the Armenian people not to be lulled by deceptive Bolshevik declara­

95 “Missiia B. Legraría,” pp. 63-64.

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tions. “The Bolsheviks today are the allies of our historic enemies, the Turks, and there is only one means of salvation. ... And that means is through the sacred force of arms.’’96 Despite such caveats, Legran was met at the Erevan railway station on October 11 by an honor guard headed by commandant Arshavir Shah­ khatuni, Assistant Foreign Minister Movses Petrosian, Assistant Military Minister General Hovhannes Hakhverdian, Hambardzum Terterian of the Shant delegation, and other officials. The military band struck up with the chords of the “Internationale” and “Mer Hairenik” as Legran inspected the honor guard and then returned to his coach, reportedly flattered by the fanfare.97 At noon Hamazasp Ohandjanian formally re­ ceived him as prime minister and several hours later as foreign minis­ ter.98 The next day, Haradj, noting that the work of the Shant mission in Moscow had been interrupted “for reasons beyond our control,”

96 Haradj, Oct. 9:2, 1920. 97 Ibid., Oct. 12:3, 1920; Arsh. Shahkhatuni, “Sovetakan despan Legrane ev Hayastani sovetakanatsume,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXIX (March 1961), pp. 93—94. About the arrival of Legran’s delegation, with some sources inaccurately giving the date as October 12 or 13, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, Bekzadian to Armenian delegation, Oct. 20, 1920, and File 67/30, Toumanoff to Allied chiefs of mission and representatives of Greece and the United States, Oct. 15, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/2/96, pp. 1—2; Ar­ chives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossiers 1 and 3, Corbel’s reports of October 15, 1920 (stating that the Soviet delegation arrived on October 12), and 20N/183, dossier 4, Revue de la Presse, 16—31 Oct. 1920; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, p. 158, noting that Legran was also pleased that he had been met at the border by Minister of Communications Arshak Djamalian. 98 Haradj, Oct. 12:3, 13:3, 1920. According to Terterian, op. át., pp. 97-98, Legran re­ fused to detrain, demanding that the Armenian government first agree that the bases for the negotiations should be renunciation of the Treaty of Sèvres, free passage of Soviet troops and munitions to help the Turkish Nationalists against the Entente Powers, and acceptance of Soviet mediation to setde the territorial disputes between Armenia and its neighbors. The Armenian cabinet, together with the Shant delegation and former prime minister Hovhannes Kachaznuni (who had just returned from the United States), assertedly went into emergency session. During the ensuing debate, Kachaznuni insisted on unequivocal rejection of the demands, whereas the Shant delegation argued for an accord with Soviet Russia, especially as the Turkish army was only a short distance from Kars. Terterian has written that the cabinet ultimately accepted the delegation’s proposal to reply ambiguously that an agreement satisfactory to both sides could be worked out during the negotiations. The next morning, Terterian, who had drafted the text, and Zarafian deliv­ ered the government’s answer to Legran and invited him to the city. The Soviet envoy now supposedly accepted the ceremonies of welcome and paid his first courtesy call to Prime Minister Ohandjanian. Legran’s senior adviser, Sahak Ter-Gabrielian, met privately with Terterian that afternoon and revealed that the prevailing belief in Baku had been that the Armenians would reject the Soviet ultimatum and thereby give cause for immediate military operations. He commended the Armenian government for its realistic stance and, although he was the liaison of the Russian Communist Party’s Caucasian Bureau, allegedly intimated that the forthcoming negotiations should be drawn out until Armenia had found a way to end the undeclared war with Turkey. No other evidence has been found to corroborate Terterian’s version. See also Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 411—412; Ter-Hakobian, op. cit., pp. 106—107.

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called for a permanent agreement based on justice for the Armenian people. Two months had passed since the temporary Armenian-Soviet agreement of August 10, yet the Bolsheviks had still not honored its terms. The Red Army was supposed to occupy Karabagh and Zangezur to establish a neutral zone and halt the bloodshed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but instead the Soviet forces had subjected the population to unspeakable persecution and were trying to turn the region over to Azerbaijani Turkic control. Although these facts impaired the prognosis for successful Armenian-Soviet negotiations, there was still room for hope that Soviet Russia would sign a treaty by which Armenia’s indepen­ dence would be recognized and safeguarded and the Armenian people would be able to breathe freely on the frontiers.99 When the negotiations began on October 13, Armenia was again rep­ resented by Shant, Terterian, and Zarafian; Soviet Russia was repre­ sented by Legran, his deputy Otto A. Silin, senior adviser Sahak Ter­ Gabrielian, and military attaché General Ardalion A. Bobrishev.100 The Armenian strategy was to try to use Russian influence to prevent any further Turkish advance and to stall on substantive issues until snow had closed the passes from Azerbaijan, thereby diminishing the threat of Soviet aggression. In consultation with Colonel Stokes, who arrived in Erevan on October 15 for a second time, the Armenian cabinet decided to reject categorically the demand to renounce the Treaty of Sèvres but to show itself to be amenable to granting Russia transit privileges under certain conditions. The necessary guarantees, however, would be so stringent that Legran would be hard put to accept them. Those condi­ tions, which were incorporated into a memorandum by Minister of Mil­ itary Affairs Ruben Ter-Minasian and shared with Colonel Stokes, would require that Russia recognize the independence and sovereignty of united Armenia, inclusive of Trebizond and Erzerum in the west and Zangezur and Nakhichevan in the south; coerce the Turkish armies to withdraw from Armenian territory; place half the munitions transported to Turkey at the disposal of the Armenian government for defensive purposes; and grant 5 million gold rubles in economic aid.101 "Haradj, Oct. 12:2, 1920. 100 Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 335, 337, 344. 101 Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 142—143; Zohrabian, op. át., pp. 68—70; Ter-Hakobian, op. ál., pp. 106—107; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 411—412. Reflecting the hard-line stance of the Armenian government, Haradj on October 14 cast doubts on the Soviet representatives’ assertions that the Moscow government opposed the Turkish invasion and was disposed very favorably toward Armenia. “In place of words, we need evidence, whose language is far more eloquent and indisputable.’’ Three days later, the paper editorialized: “We should never be taken in by the beautiful and comforting words of the Turks and their Bolshevik allies. For the Armenians, the most dangerous imperialism is to be found in the Bolshevik-Turkish alliance. Those who came with high-sounding phrases about selfdetermination while at the same time colluding with the Turkish pashas to destroy Armenia can never be trusted.” See Haradj, Oct. 14:2, 17:2, 1920.

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Stokes was fully satisfied with the memorandum and offered the opin­ ion that the Soviets were bluffing, as their forces in Azerbaijan were weak, popular discontent in that country was increasing, and thousands of Musavat supporters were ready to revolt. With the Red Army still tied down against the Poles and Baron Wrangel, Stokes believed the Arme­ nians could safely concentrate nearly their entire army on the Kars front. He called for an Armenian-Georgian alliance that would commit Geor­ gia to defend against possible Soviet aggression and allow the Armenians to combine all their resources against the Turkish menace. Such a union, Stokes maintained, would receive strong moral and military backing from the Allied Powers.102 Colonel Stokes reported these developments to London by high-pri­ ority telegrams. On October 13 he wrote that the Armenian government had rejected Legran’s demand for unqualified Soviet use of Armenia’s railroad to enable the Bolshevik forces to join the Turkish Nationalists. Loyal to the Allied Powers, Armenia was mobilizing all eligible men. For the moment, Armenia could hold its own against the existing Turkish and Red Army elements, but at some future time the Bolsheviks might bring up sufficient reinforcements to overwhelm the country.103 Three days later Stokes laid out the Armenian strategy to remain evasive until the snows closed the passes and Georgia committed itself to active in­ volvement in case of Soviet aggression. In view of the maximal Armenian conditions for a treaty with Russia, Stokes wrote: “I doubt whether ne­ gotiations will be prolonged. I see no harm in Armenian Government trying to gain time by offering these terms.” The Armenian war minister would be returning to Tiflis with him that day to try to arrange a secret defensive alliance with Georgia. If successful, the Armenians could with­ draw enough men from the Azerbaijani front ‘‘to make [a] clean sweep of Turks in Kars region.”104 Stokes’s newly found enthusiasm for the Armenians was not shared in the British Foreign Office. Dwight Osborne wrote on a memorandum received from Avetis Aharonian: ‘‘We shall never hear the end of Ar­ menia’s indignant rejection of the Bolshevik offer & her unshakeable fidelity to the Allies.”105 In another departmental minute, he quipped: “I wish the Armenians would accept the Bolshevik terms and purchase peace at the cost of a rupture with the Allies. Unfortunately they realize it will pay them better to continue to play the role of Joseph repelling 102 Armenia Archives, 200/1/597, p. 90; Great Britain, War Office, 95/4958, entry for Oct. 13, 1920. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report for Oct. 16-31, 1920. 105 FO 371/4961, E13011/134/58. 104 FO 371/4961, E13194/134/58. See also WO 33/1000, no. 6687. 105FO 371/4961, Ei3221/134/58, minute.

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the advances of Potiphar’s wife & to represent themselves as the last line of Allied defence against a Bolshevik invasion of Asia.”106 When Emily Robinson of the Armenian Red Cross and Refugee Fund wrote that the Armenian refusal of the Bolshevik demands might jeopardize the safety of the orphans and refugees and inquired how His Majesty’s Govern­ ment could contemplate regularizing relations with Turkey or establish­ ing trade with Soviet Russia at a time of joint Turkish-Bolshevik action against Armenia, Osborne noted with annoyance: ‘T suppose we must bear with this foolish and ignorant woman.”107

The Georgian Stance When Colonel Stokes departed from Erevan with Ruben Ter-Minasian, he was optimistic that an Armeno-Georgian alliance could result in a bloc strong enough to repel both Turks and Russians and ultimately to combine with a liberated Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The Georgian press had roundly condemned the Turkish invasion of Armenia and declared that this aggression was equally a menace to the stability and future of the Georgian republic. Noi Zhordania’s government was nonetheless not prepared to tie its fate with that of the beleaguered Armenians. Turkish envoys were already making secret overtures in Tiflis, giving assurances of no hostile intent and even implying that Turkey would not object to Georgia’s occupation of certain territories in contention with Armenia. The Georgian army had in fact already probed beyond the Kur River into the Geol (Ozero) and Childer districts of the Ardahan okrug (county). This maneuver, coming immediately after the Turkish occu­ pation of Sarikamish, had forced the Armenian command to send a part of the 8th Regiment and a battalion of Western Armenians to reassert Armenian jurisdiction in these Muslim-populated districts.108 A diplo­ matic flap followed. On October 13, Tigran Bekzadian complained to the Georgian foreign ministry that Georgian military detachments and civil officials had entered the district, hoisted the Georgian flag at Zurzuna, and tried to impose their rule in an integral part of the Armenian republic. The Georgian government, rather than ending this illegal en­ croachment, was now reportedly sending reinforcements from Akhalkalak. For a people that was engaged against a terrible enemy in order 106 FO 371 ƒ4962, E13765/134/58, minute. 107 FO 371 ƒ4962, E13490/134/58, minute. 108 Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, political and military reports of Oct. 15,1920, identifying the Georgian force as the 3d Infantry Brigade; WO 95/4958, entry for Oct. 12, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/621, p. 8. The Georgians also detained Armenia’s gov­ ernor of Ardahan, Colonel Kadimov. See Armenia Archives, 200/1/159, pt. II, p. 115.

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to defend its territorial integrity and that was bearing the full brunt of the blows of a menace common to both countries, the behavior of the Georgian authorities was incomprehensible and deeply disappointing. The Armenian government protested the violation of its territory and asked that all Georgian personnel be withdrawn immediately from the Geol and Childer districts.109 In his reply on October 18, Acting Foreign Minister Konstantin Sabakhtarashvili stated that the county of Ardahan figured among the ter­ ritories in dispute between the two governments pending a setdement by mutual agreement or arbitration. Therefore, the claim that the two districts were inalienable parts of the Armenian republic and that their provisional occupation was an act of usurpation came as a surprise. The Georgian presence in the county of Ardahan was as legal as that of the Armenians. Moreover, in view of the Turkish invasion, the movement of small Georgian detachments into the districts in question was in the interest of both Armenia and Georgia. Thanks to the Georgian opera­ tion, the Turkish advance on Ardahan had stopped, and the hostile chetnik bands had been brought under control. The occupation of Childer and Geol was a strategic necessity and should not be construed as an attempt to predispose the fate of the Ardahan okrug. The Georgian government was prepared to enter into negotiations about the reestab­ lishment of the status quo there.110 Also on October 18, Colonel Stokes reported to the Foreign Office that the Georgian cabinet had discussed the Armenian request for a secret defense pact against the Bolsheviks but had put off a decision for a few days pending the return of Foreign Minister Evgenii Gegechkori. Acting Foreign Minister Sabakhtarashvili had told Stokes and Ter-Minasian that Georgia would assist Armenia by allowing it to recruit vol­ unteers in Georgia, placing no hindrance on the transit of military goods, and protesting to the new Soviet minister (Aron Sheinman), who would reach Tiflis in a day or two. The Georgian people, Sabakhtarash­ vili declared, were prepared to defend themselves against Bolshevik ag­ gression but could not go to war against Russia simply to support Ar­ menia. He did, however, favor the Armenian request for a British military descent at Trebizond and the shipment of arms and matériel to both republics. Stokes wrote the Foreign Office that he would continue to pressure the Georgian government to join in a defensive alliance but

109 Armenia Archives, 200/1/621, p. 17, and 200/2/81, p. 4; FO 371/4961, E13009/ 134/58, Stokes to FO, Oct. 18, 1920. "° Armenia Archives, 200/1/442, pt. II, pp. 499—500, 200/1/560, pt. II, p. 314, and 200/1/621, p. 23; Zohrabian, op. át., p. 67.

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explained that his task would be much easier if as an incentive he could promise the Georgians arms and ammunition.111 Ruben Ter-Minasian returned to Erevan on October 19 without the draft of a defense pact. He did inform Stokes, however, that his govern­ ment would prolong the negotiations with Legran pending the outcome of the ongoing efforts to form an Armeno-Georgian entente.112 Three days later, Captain H. C. Court, the Erevan representative of the British chief commissioner after George Gracey’s departure on sick leave, tel­ egraphed Stokes that the conditions the Armenian government had pre­ sented to Legran were essentially those that Stokes had read in Erevan, except that the territorial demand had been expanded to include Erzinjan and Kharput in Western Armenia. Contrary to all expectations, Le­ gran was studying the proposals and even appeared willing to accede to the basic conditions for an Armenian-Soviet friendship treaty. He would soon leave for Baku to communicate the terms to his government, to the authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan, and to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. As these consultations would take about a month, the Armenians would gain time to train new recruits and to concentrate their armed forces on the Kars front and in the Kazakh sector, the only route from Azer­ baijan that would stay open after the first few snowfalls. The Armenians would not, however, attempt a new counteroffensive against the Turks until negotiations with the Georgians had produced positive results.113 A one-day Armeno-Georgian conference in Tiflis on October 25 clar­ ified the Georgian position. The Armenian delegates, Stepan Mamiko­ nian, Smbat Khachatrian, and Tigran Bekzadian, wanted to put the ques­ tion of a military alliance first on the agenda, whereas the Georgian delegates, Noi Ramishvili, Konstantin Sabakhtarashvili, and Simeon Mdivani, trying to exploit Armenia’s present vulnerability, maintained that resolving territorial disputes first would facilitate discussions about a mu­ tual defense agreement. The Georgians pressed their claims to most of the Olti and Ardahan okrugs, wanted to dissolve the neutral zone in Lori, and demanded Armenia’s unconditional recognition of Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh as integral parts of the Republic of Georgia.114 Not until the second session that day did Ramishvili, Georgian min­ ister of military affairs and internal affairs, address the question of mu­

111 FO 371/4961, E13307/134/58. See also Armenia Archives, 200/1/427, p. 405; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 25, 1920. 1,2 FO 371/4966, E15522/134/58; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 44. See also Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), p. 230. 113 FO 371/4964, Ei4902/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 1, 1920, enclosure. 114 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 42, and 200/2/81, p. 8. See also 200/1/607, p. 83-

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tual collaboration. Georgia, he said, regarded the invasion of Armenia as a serious threat to its own security and had resolved to assist Armenia morally and materially. His government had protested the Turkish at­ tack to Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin, and in public rallies certain Georgian leaders had been so emphatic in their denunciation of Soviet-Turkish collusion that the foreign ministry had found it nec­ essary to apologize to the Soviet mission. Armenians living in Georgia were being allowed to volunteer for military service in Armenia, and military goods were passing in transit over Georgian territory, thereby violating the country’s neutrality and straining relations with Russia. As­ serting that these actions went far beyond the limits of benevolent neu­ trality, Ramishvili exclaimed: “What more do you want?’’ Georgia had entered into treaty relations with Soviet Russia and did not wish to pro­ voke a war, whereas the Muslim population of Ajaría, Akhaltsikh, and other border areas would be strongly opposed to any action directed against Mustafa Kemal. In case of attack, however, Georgia was prepared to defend itself and could be fully mobilized within three days.115 Bekzadian reported to Erevan that the Georgians did not believe the threat from Russia was serious or that Armenia would be forcibly sovi­ etized, and they were unwilling to take arms against Kemal for the sake of the Armenians. Despite their stated anxiety over the intentions of the Turkish Nationalists, they did not in fact feel menaced from that direc­ tion. It was clear, Bekzadian concluded, that there would be no defense agreement. If the Georgians did not interfere with Armenian recruit­ ment, transit, and export of goods, this would be the most that could be expected under the existing circumstances.116 Colonel Stokes, too, was disappointed and asked the British Foreign Office whether he should exert strong pressure on the Georgian gov­ ernment to reconsider its stance.117 Even before receiving a reply, how­ ever, he telegraphed with alarm that the Georgians were preparing to enter into negotiations with the Kemalists to save themselves at the price of abandoning the Armenians. The secret Georgian-Turkish contacts, Stokes continued, bore the character of treason toward Armenia.118 In

115 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 42, and 200/2/83, pp. 7—8; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16. American Consul Moser reported to the Department of State on October 8: “Georgia doesn’t seem to think menace to Armenia is threatening her and has blind faith in her army and treaty with Russia.” See US Archives, RG 59, 760.61/6. 116 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 42—43, 200/2/95, pp. 1—3, and 200/1/607, pp. 150-151. Reports of Major General Kishmishian regarding the failure to receive Georgian military aid despite the pledges of the Georgian government are in 200/1/221, pp. 147— 149. See also Rep. of Ann. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 16, Nov. 2, 1920. 117FO 371/4963,E14222/134/58. 118 FO 371/4962, Ei3727/134/58. The chief of the French military mission, Colonel

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his conversations with Tigran Bekzadian, Stokes voiced frustration over the indecisiveness and lack of direction from London.119 The reaction of the Foreign Office was largely one of resignation. Ran­ ald MacDonell noted that Georgia was just doing what came naturally for the Transcaucasian states, “climbing down on whichever side of the fence most suited to them at the moment.” Assistant Secretary of State J. A. C. Tilley wrote: “I did not much believe in the Georgian intention of helping Armenia. I tried to get M. Gueguechkori to put the intentions of his gov­ ernment in writing but though he proposed to do so I never expected him to fulfil his promise & Mr. Ghambashidze tells me he soon repented of it. The Georgians are more likely to agree with their adversaries quickly in order to save Batoum, as here reported.” Foreign Secretary Curzon added: “I have never been much of a believer in either the bonafides or the valour of Georgia.” The Foreign Office simply informed Colonel Stokes that his “handling of the situation” was approved.120 The Armenian-Soviet Draft Treaty

The strategy of the Bureau-Government, dominated by Ohandjanian and Ter-Minasian, to drag out the Armenian-Soviet negotiations until the passes between Azerbaijan and Armenia had become snowbound was upset by the unexpected conciliatory disposition of Boris Legran. Within a few days he seemed to have transformed from a stern adversary with ultimatum in hand to an accommodating sympathizer prepared to make concessions far in excess of anything warranted by the prevailing political and military circumstances. In negotiations with the Shant del­ egation, Legran indicated the Sovnarkom’s willingness to recognize the absolute independence of the Armenian republic and to assist in effect­ ing Turkish withdrawal from the occupied territories and even from the border districts beyond the Russo-Turkish boundary of 1914. Instead of insisting on direct Soviet intervention through mediation, he accepted the Armenian formula of “friendly cooperation” and left the question of the Western Armenian boundaries open, though he continued to call for Armenian renunciation of the Treaty of Sèvres. In addition, the treas­ ures of the Armenian Apostolic Church which had been sent to Russia for safekeeping during the world war were to be returned, and important Armenian libraries and cultural institutions in Russia would be trans­ ferred to the jurisdiction of the Armenian government. Moreover, all Armenians who so desired would be permitted to immigrate to the Ar­ Corbel, also regarded Georgian “neutrality” as tantamount to “hostility” toward Armenia. See Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report for Oct. 16—31, 1920. 1,9 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 43. 120 FO 371 /49Ô2, E13727/134/58, minutes.

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menian republic. Armenian concessions included the provisional with­ drawal of claims to Mountainous Karabagh and the granting of the right of transit of Soviet armed forces and munitions over Armenian territory on condition that these would in no event be turned against Armenia.121 Legran’s surprising demeanor may have reflected the Soviet strategy to feign genuine friendship while biding time to see how matters devel­ oped, or perhaps it was the result of growing Soviet misgivings about the ultimate designs of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin had directed Legran to pursue a cautious policy by avoiding as much as possible the “sharpening of questions” and to leave the solution of seriously disputed issues for a more propitious moment.122 On October 14 he instructed Legran to make the Kemalists understand that Russia considered military action untimely and dangerous, as it might provoke the Entente to intervene. “Be very careful in your deal­ ings with the Kemalists and with the Armenians and do not allow for any possibility of our being drawn into active engagements.” The Ar­ menians should be told that Soviet Russia was prepared to act as medi­ ator. The next day, Chicherin reminded Legran that Russia did not have the means to curtail the Turkish advance and that it was necessary to work in all ways through diplomatic channels. “Do not make any prom­ ises that you believe we are unable to fulfill. And stress our sincere friend­ ship toward the Armenian people and our desire to assist them in every way.”123 Legran informed Chicherin on October 24 that the Armenian side had agreed in principle to allow the transport of Soviet military material over Armenian territory; only after long discussions and pressure had the Armenians acquiesced in relinquishing their claim to Karabagh, urg­ ing that Soviet Russia should recognize outright the inclusion of Zan­ gezur and Nakhichevan in the Republic. Shant’s delegation insisted that the Turkish army be forced to withdraw to the Erzerum line, but Legran had agreed only to the reestablishment of the international boundary of 1914—that is, Turkish evacuation of the province of Kars. He also maintained that the final status of Nakhichevan and Zangezur should be determined through the good offices of Soviet Russia, as provided for in the preliminary agreement that had been signed in Tiflis on Au­ gust 10.124 Legran apparently made even more concessions on the disposition of Zangezur and Nakhichevan before the two sides signed four integral 121 Terterian, op. át., p. 99. Rem Kazandjian, “K voprosu o tak nazyvaemom mirnom dogovore mezhdu RSFSR i Dashnakskoi Armeniei ot 28 oktiabria 1920 g.,” Lraber, no. 11 (1982), p. 45 n. 42. 125 Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 143—144. '"/ttd.pp. 144-145.

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documents on October 28, 1920. These consisted of a protocol of un­ derstanding, the draft project of a treaty of peace and friendship, and two addendums on transit and transportation and on communication over Armenian territory. The protocol of understanding read: The plenipotentiaries of the Government of the R.S.F.S.R., Boris Vasil’evich Legran, and the plenipotentiaries of the Government of the Republic of Arme­ nia, Levon Shant, Hambardzum Terterian, and Levon Zarafian, exchanging their credentials on October 28 and finding them to be in proper form and order, have agreed as follows: I. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. on the one side and the Government of the Republic of Armenia on the other side accept the obligation to sign the draft peace treaty and all addendums relating to it in this proposed protocol on con­ dition: 1 ) that the Governments of the R.S.F.S.R. and A.S.S.R. [Azerbaijani Socialist Soviet Republic] recognize the inalienable rights of the Republic of Armenia to the territory of the disputed districts—the Nakhichevan and Zangezur uezds—and will remove from those boundaries all military forces that are un­ der the command of the R.S.F.S.R. and A.S.S.R.; 2) that the Government of the Republic of Armenia, on its part, will unre­ servedly renounce all claims to the so-called district of Karabagh, with the exception of the triangle formed by the eastern boundary of the Novo-Bayazit uezd, a part of the eastern boundary of the Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, and the northern boundary of the Zangezur uezd—along an agreed-upon line from Mount Gikal-Dagh to Mount Chichakli; 3) that the R.S.F.S.R., taking into account the difficult situation of the work­ ing people of Armenia, makes a non-repayable loan of two and a half million gold rubles. II. The Republic of Armenia, wishing to settle in a friendly manner the ques­ tion of disputed territories in the provinces of Turkish Armenia with the Gov­ ernment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, is ready to accept the friendly cooperation of the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. to reach a solution to these questions, provided that: 1 ) the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey withdraws its forces to beyond the former Russo-Turkish boundary of 1914; 2) the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey renounces the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Batum Convention; 3) the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey recognizes unconditionally the independence of the Republic of Armenia within the boundaries as determined in the peace treaty of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Re­ public of Armenia. After implementation of the afore-mentioned conditions, with the friendly cooperation of the R.S.F.S.R., there will be determined the bases for the peaceful settlement of disputed territorial questions.125 125 Armenia Archives, 200/1/628, p. 1; “MissiiaB. Legrana,” pp. 71—72. The erroneous date given for the draft treaty is October 21 in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, and Ter-Hakobian, op. át., p. 108. For a discussion by a Soviet author detracting from the significance of the draft project, see Kazandjian, op. át., pp. 38—46.

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The draft treaty that followed consisted of a preamble attesting to the mutual desire of the two sides to live in peaceful coexistence and the body of the text, made up of seventeen articles, paraphrased as follows: Article I. The R.S.F.S.R. recognized without reservation the independence of the Republic of Armenia and voluntarily relinquished all sovereign rights belong­ ing to Russia in relation to the land and people of Armenia. Based on the principle of self-determination, “the R.S.F.S.R. considers as just the annexa­ tion to the Republic of Armenia of districts of Turkish Armenia and is pre­ pared to exert its friendly influence upon allied governments with the goal of bringing about the actual annexation of the designated districts or parts thereof to Armenia.” Article II. Russia renounced all forms of interference in the internal affairs of Armenia. Article III. The mutual boundaries of Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan, “which enters into the structure of the Russian Soviet Federation,” would be resolved by a conference of the two sides with the participation of the R.S.F.S.R. If no mutually acceptable solution was reached, the question would be settled by referendum. Article IV. The R.S.F.S.R. recognized as parts of the Armenian republic the prov­ ince of Kars, the province of Erevan except for the Nakhichevan uezd, and the southwestern sector of Elisavetpol province with the towns of Karvansarai (Ijevan) and Dilijan. The fate of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan, in the absence of mutual agreement, would be determined by referendum. (This point was in conflict with the proposed division of the disputed districts indi­ cated in the foregoing protocol and the two addendums, apparently because of a belated Armenian concession to withdraw claims to Karabagh in return for Zangezur and Nakhichevan.) Russia would also recognize any territories entering the Armenian republic as the result of agreements between Armenia and other states in the Caucasus region. Article V. Each side would bar from its territory any government or group in­ tending to engage in hostilities against the other signatory. The Armenian republic would give no quarter to officers of the Volunteer Army and other armed forces that had fought against Soviet Russia and, except for officers of Armenian origin, would not permit such persons to join the Armenian army, even as volunteers. Armenia was obliged to expel all such individuals upon the coming into force of the treaty, and this prohibition was to apply equally to officers of Armenian origin who had enlisted after March 1, 1920. No foreign armed forces would be allowed on the territory of either side except for those of friendly governments that had entered into a military convention and were not in a state of war with the other side. Neither signatory would allow coun­ tries at war with the other to use its ports or territory for the transport or transit of armed forces or military materials. Article VI. Armenians living on Russian territory who had reached the age of eighteen could opt for Armenian citizenship, and the same right would be accorded to individuals of Russian origin living in Armenia. Such persons could retain all their possessions but would be obliged to depart for the coun­ try of their citizenship within two years, having the right freely to take all movable belongings. The option would be available for two years from the

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coming into force of the treaty, with the details to be arranged through sep­ arate agreement of the two sides. Article VII. Refugees of both countries, as well as persons forcibly resettled by the former tsarist government on territory presently a part of the Republic of Armenia (such as Molokans and other religious sectarians), who wished to return to their homeland were to do so in the shortest possible time. Article VIII. Upon the treaty’s entering into force, Armenia would free from imprisonment or other forms of punishment and subsequent persecution all persons who had acted on the territory of Armenia in support of the R.S.F.S.R. or the political parties belonging to the Third (Communist) International, whereas the same consideration would be extended to persons in Soviet Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan who had acted in favor of the Republic of Armenia or the party Dashnaktsutiun. Such persons were to be granted the right to depart freely. Article IX. Until the conclusion of a trade convention between the two sides, commercial relations were to be based on most-favored-nation status and ex­ emption from transit fees and tariffs. Article X. Any formal bilateral trade agreement would be founded on the prin­ ciples of most-favored nation and exemption from duties. Article XI. Diplomatic and consular relations would be established immediately after the signing of the treaty and would be regulated by the existing laws of the two countries until the completion of a diplomatic convention. Article XII. The settlement of questions of public and individual law involving the two governments, one government and citizens of the other government, or citizens of the two governments would be dealt with by special mixed com­ missions established upon ratification of the treaty. Article XIII. The Russian government at its own expense would return to Ar­ menia all goods and valuables evacuated during the world war, including treas­ ures and archives of the monastery of Etchmiadzin. It would also transfer to the Armenian republic ownership of the Lazarían (Lazarev) Institute of Ori­ ental Languages in Moscow and would return to Armenia archives, libraries, museums, and artistic creations of great scientific, cultural, and historic sig­ nificance to the degree that such restitution did not cause fundamental and irreparable harm to the institutions in which these materials were currently housed. A mixed commission would settle all questions relating to the transfer of the goods and properties. Article XIV. Russia acknowledged that various types of government property found on the territory of the Armenian republic were now solely the posses­ sions of Armenia. If such goods had been taken to a third country since August 1914, Armenia would have the right to demand their restoration. Russia also agreed to release Armenia from any and all responsibility for the former Rus­ sian Empire’s debts and other kinds of obligations. All such claims of creditors in the share that pertained to the Republic of Armenia would be placed upon the account of Russia. Article XV. The Russian government, taking into consideration the devastation of Armenia during the war and the absence of the means of rapid economic recovery for the working peasantry, agreed to allocate oil equivalent to normal annual consumption, with 500,000 poods of that amount to be shipped upon signature of the treaty; to transfer rolling stock for Armenia’s use, the number and duration to be determined by a mixed commission; and to provide Ar­ menia with textile machinery and technical equipment for the production of cotton.

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Article XVI. The flags and coats of arms of the two countries were to be mutually recognized and respected as a sign of friendship. Article XVII. The treaty was subject to ratification, with the exchange of protocols of ratification to take place in Moscow.126

The draft Armenian-Soviet treaty was a major coup in favor of Arme­ nia. At a time when the Turkish armies were threatening the fortress of Kars and poised to advance all the way to the confluence of the Arpachai and Araxes rivers, the plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia had recognized all of Kars province and nearly all of Erevan province as integral parts of the Armenian republic. Most territories in dispute with Azerbaijan would be included in Armenia either by mutual agreement or by refer­ endum. Legran in principle even recognized Armenia’s right to at least a part of Turkish Armenia and would commit his government to turn that prospect into a reality. In addition, he made generous cultural, financial, and economic concessions to Armenia. And nowhere in the document did the Republic of Armenia formally have to renounce the Treaty of Sèvres. Armenia’s conditional concessions were incorporated into two adden­ dums on transportation and communications. The first, composed of fourteen articles, gave Russia the right of all modes of military transport and transit over the Armenian railroads, with the R.S.F.S.R. guarantee­ ing that this privilege would in no way be used contrary to the sovereign rights and independence of Armenia.127 Soviet troop movements were to be in echelons of no more than 400 men each, and the total number of Soviet personnel on Armenian territory at any given time was not to exceed 1,000 men. Except for officers, commissars, and guards, whose number should not exceed 5 percent of the total composition of each echelon, the Soviet troops were to pass unarmed over Armenian terri­ tory. The R.S.F.S.R. would grant Armenia 30 percent of all transported arms and ammunition, including artillery shells. The Soviet men and matériel were to be directed to destinations beyond the TrebizondErzerum-Bitlis-Van line and in no case were to be used against the Arme­ nian republic. The fuel and other supplies required for the transporta­ tion were to be furnished by the R.S.F.S.R., with any related material improvements becoming the property of the Republic of Armenia, whereas the Armenian government would repair without delay damage to the railroad, rolling stock, and station structures.

126 Armenia Archives, 200/1 ƒ628, pp. 3-7, and for an Armenian translation, 200/2/12, pp. 29-32. 127 Armenia Archives, 200/1/628, pp. 8—10, 200/2/12, p. 33, and 200/2/112, pp. 22— 26.

2^2

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

A mixed commission, which would begin to function within three days after the treaty came into force, would arrange the technical details. It would determine the points along the route where Soviet representatives would supervise the proper movement of men and supplies, help resolve possible misunderstandings without interfering in the operations of the station-masters and other officials, and decide on the means of payment for the transportation. The Armenian government, in exchange for suit­ able compensation, would also grant the R.S.F.S.R. the right to use the part of the narrow-gauge Shahtaght-Maku-Bayazit trunk line which was under Armenian control, as well as rolling stock and other property for that line. The provisions included in the last two articles of the first addendum turned it strongly to Armenia’s advantage. Article XIII read: With the intent of establishing such necessary guarantees as will safeguard the military security of the Republic of Armenia from Turkey, the following are to be implemented: i. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is obliged not to allow the concentration of military forces in the districts adjacent to the bor­ ders of Armenia and in particular at Erzerum, while the size of the permanent garrison at Erzerum is to be determined by the mixed commission referred to in point 3 of this article. In case of special need to concentrate [Turkish] troops, that question shall be the subject of a determination by the same commission. These limitations must not obstruct military operations in Anatolia, in the direc­ tion of Constantinople, Mesopotamia, and Syria. 2. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is permitted to keep troops east of the line [of Trebizond-Erzerum-Bitlis-Van] only in the number needed to maintain internal order in the region and the immediate protection of the border. The limits on the size of these forces shall be deter­ mined by the mixed commission indicated in point 3 of this article. 3. In order to work out the details and supervise the exact execution of the conditions indicated in the foregoing points..., the Governments of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia will form mixed com­ missions, to which Turkey and Armenia shall appoint an equal number of mem­ bers under the presidency of a representative of the R.S.F.S.R. The designated commissions shall be created no later than seven days after the coming into force of this treaty.128

Article XIV was even more emphatic: This agreement becomes an inseparable part of the peace treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Armenia and enters into force immediately after the following conditions are met:

128 Armenia Archives, 200/1/628, pp. 9—10, 200/2/12, p. 33, and 200/2/112, p. 25.

THE TURKISH INVASION AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY

233

1. Cessation of military activities between Armenia and Turkey, evacuation of the Turkish forces presently occupying parts of the former Russian Empire which according to the peace treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Ar­ menia pass to the territorial composition of the latter, and withdrawal of the Turkish forces to beyond the 1914 state boundaries between Russia and Turkey. 2. Recognition by the A.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. of the inalienable right of the Republic of Armenia to the territories of the disputed districts—the uezds of Nakhichevan and Zangezur—and withdrawal from those uezds of all forces which are subject to the R.S.F.S.R. and A.S.S.R. commands. In the event of such acceptance, the Republic of Armenia on its part relinquishes all claims to the district of so-called Karabagh, mountainous and plain. [The last sentence was added to the typed text in handwriting.]129

By the second addendum, in the same format and consisting of seven articles, the Republic of Armenia granted the R.S.F.S.R. the right to establish communications with allied governments by means of tele­ graph, radio-telegraph, and courier over Armenian territory. The RS.F.S.R. guaranteed that such contact would not be used against Ar­ menia and that the laying of new telegraph and telephone cables, as well as the repair and improvement of existing ones, would be done by ar­ rangement of the Armenian government at no cost to it. The two sides guaranteed each other the complete safety of diplomatic couriers and the inviolability of diplomatic post and pouches. The cost of imple­ menting the provisions of the addendum was to be borne by the RS.F.S.R., and a mixed commission would deal with technical details. Enactment of the addendum on communications, as in the case of the first addendum, was made contingent on the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal by Turkey and on recognition by Soviet Russia and Azerbai­ jan of Armenia’s incorporation of Nakhichevan and Zangezur in return for its relinquishing claims to Karabagh.130 The protocol, draft treaty, and two addendums concluded by Boris Legran and Levon Shant on October 28, 1920, seemed almost too good to be true and offered the Armenian government a valuable fallback position in case the Allied Powers failed, as seemed increasingly likely, to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. Russia in “friendly cooperation” would be committed to exert its influence to secure the evacuation of the Turk­ ish army not only from the existing Armenian territory but also from the districts beyond the frontier which might eventually be brought into the Republic. Soviet Russia—and by extension Soviet Azerbaijan—would ac­ knowledge Armenia’s right to most of the territory in contention be­ tween Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia would win formal recognition of its independence and sovereignty, gain title to all former Russian state 129 Armenia Archives, 200/1/628, p. 10, 200/2/12, p. 33, and 200/2/112, p. 26. 1S0 Armenia Archives, 200/1/628, pp. 11—12, and 200/2/12, p. 34.

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properties and possessions on its territory, benefit from Russian financial and economic aid, and gather in its dispersed people and cultural treas­ ures. In return for granting Russia transit and communication privileges, Armenia was to receive a significant percentage of the munitions trans­ ported over its territory, and these concessions were contingent upon Turkish withdrawal to beyond the international boundary of 1914. Le­ von Shant, Hambardzum Terterian, Levon Zarafian, and others who had favored an accommodation with Soviet Russia now felt vindicated. In fact, the draft documents completed on October 28 were more satisfac­ tory and promising than the most optimistic outcome hoped for when the negotiations had begun in Moscow five months earlier—at a time when there seemed to be no serious threat of a Turkish invasion. Leaving Otto Silin in charge of the Soviet mission in Erevan, Boris Legran entrained for Tiflis the day after the protocols were signed. From Tiflis on November 1, he telegraphed the contents of the draft agree­ ments to Chicherin, urging acceptance of the treaty as a means of pre­ venting the Entente Powers from using Armenia for their purposes, strengthening Soviet influence and prestige in the Caucasus, and pro­ viding a direct route to Persia and Turkey. Moreover, even if the treaty failed to affect Turkey in the desired way, it would nonetheless thwart the Entente’s attempts to create an anti-Soviet Armenian-Georgian con­ federation. Legran then set out for Baku to place the drafts before the Russian Communist Party’s Kavburo, headed by Ordzhonikidze; the Azerbaijani Revkom and Communist Party, headed by Nariman Nari­ manov; and I. V. Stalin, who had been sent on special assignment to the Caucasus as the extraordinary representative of the party’s central com­ mittee.131 By the time Legran arrived in Baku, however, major changes were occurring. The Turkish offensive had resumed, and Soviet strate­ gists were contemplating the sovietization of Armenia. The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and External Bureau continued to issue declarations from Baku, calling upon the Armenian people to overthrow the “bloodsucking lackeys of imperialism’’ and establish So­ viet rule, and the Kavburo and other regional bodies urged the Sovnarkom and central organs of the Russian Communist Party to take a de­ cisive stand against the Armenian petty bourgeois, nationalist regime.132 Already on October 14, the Politburo, upon the recommendations of Lenin and Chicherin, responded to a communication from Ordzhoni­ 131 Kazandjian, op. cit., p. 40; Alikhanian, op. át., pp. 152—153. Stalin was appointed on September 20, departed from Moscow on October 16, and arrived in Baku at the end of the month. See Kheifets, op. át., p. 134. 132 See, for example, Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Revoliutsion kodier eu trutsikner, 1902—1921 (Erevan, i960), pp. 561—571; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 397—400, 418—421.

THE TURKISH INVASION AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY

235

kidze by deciding to harmonize its views with those of the Kavburo and Armenian Communist Party about the need to take firm measures to establish Soviet rule in Armenia, to give Armenia aid in halting further Turkish aggression, and to protect the future Soviet Armenian govern­ ment.133 Armenia’s unofficial diplomatic representative in Moscow, Eghiazar Eghiazarian, wrote his government on October 20 that momentous decisions were being made by the Soviet leaders, among them to effect soon the sovietization of Armenia.134 Legran may not have been aware of these developments when he ap­ proved the protocols in Erevan on October 28. Thus, when he presented the documents on November 4 to an enlarged meeting of the Azerbai­ jani Communist Party Central Committee attended by Stalin and Ord­ zhonikidze, the draft Soviet-Armenian treaty was denounced by Stalin and rejected by an overwhelming vote of those assembled.135 On Novem­ ber 5, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Lenin and Chicherin that such a treaty should never be signed and in subsequent messages em­ phasized that Legran’s protocols were only drafts and in no way bind­ ing.136 Armenia’s diplomatic representative in Baku, Martiros Harutiunian, reported that some Armenian Communists who had begun to understand the significance of the Armenian republic had strenuously objected to the repudiation of the draft treaty during the extraordinary meeting of November 4 and had walked out in protest.137 Even after the rebuff by Stalin and his comrades, Legran apparently hoped that the central organs would overrule the regional bodies. On November 7 he telegraphed Chicherin that he had come to Baku to receive the central government’s sanction to sign the treaty and other directives. He asked in another message whether he should resume ne­ gotiations with the Armenian government.138 Chicherin replied with ob­ vious annoyance: “I do not understand how it is that you should ask

133 Kazandjian, op. át., p. 41; S. T. Alikhanian, G. K. Ordjonikidzen ev Sovetakan kargeri hastatume Hayastanum (Erevan, 1974), pp. 27—28. 134 Kazandjian, op. át., p. 41. 135 Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere, p. 153, and Ordjonikidze, pp. 24—26; Kazandjian, op. át., p. 40. See also Kheifets, op. át., pp. 141—143. For a description of Stalin’s activities in Baku, see Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, MA, 1964), pp. 229—230. 136 Kazandjian, op. át., p. 40. 137 Armenia Archives, 200/1/597, p. 137, and “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 76, Harutiunian to Foreign Minister, Nov. 9, 1920. Earlier, on October 21, Harutiunian wrote Ohandjanian that the Turkish invasion of the Armenian republic had apparently caused some remorse among the Armenian Bolsheviks for their “treacherous actions.” Although these same persons had done everything possible to obstruct an Armenian-Soviet treaty of friendship, they belatedly seemed to be coming to their senses and opposing the designs of the Turkish “Communists.” See 200/1/4, pp. 26—27. 138 Kazandjian, op. át., p. 41 n. 18.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

about a treaty when I was speaking about the demands that have to be presented to Armenia.”139 It was clear, therefore, by the beginning of November 1920 that the draft treaty would need “detailed reconsider­ ation and very basic changes.” This decision by the central authorities was undoubtedly influenced in no small measure by the Armenian re­ verses on the field of battle and the Turkish capture of the great bastion of Kars. 139 Ibid., p. 42 n. 26.

1. Simon Vratzian

2. Levon Shant

3. Hambardzum Terterian

4. Levon Zarafian

5. Grigorii Chicherin and Lev Karakhan

6. Boris Legran

7. Sahak Ter-Gabrielian

8. General Mikhail Levandovskii

9. General Nikifor Nesterovskii

10. General Mikhail Velikanov

11. Garegin Nzhdeh

12. Vahan Khoreni

13. Garo Sassuni

14. Vahan Navasardian

15.

General Movses Silikian

16. Vahe Ardzruni and Smbat

18. Baron Petr Wrangel

17. Colonel Mazmanian

19. Mustafa Kemal and Kiazim Karabekir

■M

20. Artashes Babalian

22. Arshak Hovhannisian

24. Vahan Minakhorian

21. Bishop Garegin Hovsepian

23.

Sargis Araratian

25. Ashot Hovhannisian

26. Stamps of the Republic of Armenia

27. Currency of the Republic of Armenia

28. Currency of the Republic of Armenia

29. Currency of the Republic of Armenia

30. Currency of the Republic of Armenia

31. Kars Fortress from Holy Apostles Church

6

War and Truce

In October 1920 the Armenian government and army high command were optimistic that the tide of battle would turn in Armenia’s favor. The Turkish offensive had halted after the capture of Sarikamish, the Armenian ranks had stabilized as many additional units and hundreds of volunteers arrived, rows of heavy cannons were trained westward from the forts of the citadel of Kars, and reports about the size and condition of the enemy forces bolstered the view that a concerted counteroffensive could thrust the Turks back to the Sarikamish passes. The belated con­ clusion of a draft Armenian-Soviet treaty of peace included terms far more favorable than the Erevan government’s actual political leverage would seem to warrant. There was guarded hope that Soviet Russia really opposed the Turkish offensive and would coerce General Karabekir’s army to withdraw. Yet all such calculations were based on confidence that the morale of the troops remained high and that the men would fight with the same determination that had saved Erevan in 1918 at the battles of Sardarabad and Bash-Abaran. In mid-October few could have predicted that within a matter of days the Armenian army would suc­ cumb to panic and flight and abandon the fortress of Kars to the enemy. The sudden collapse of the army and the fall of Kars sealed the fate of Alexandropol and in a larger sense the Republic of Armenia. The feeble rear-guard resistance of the army was paralleled by desperate efforts of the government to minimize Armenia’s inevitable losses. It was pre­ sumed that Mustafa Kemal would prefer to have a small, independent Armenian buffer state on Turkey’s eastern flank than an immediate bor­ der with Russia, which might for the moment be an ally for reasons of expediency but nevertheless remained the formidable power that had been the long-time nemesis of the Ottoman Empire.

237

238

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The Battlefield

By mid-October, five Armenian infantry regiments, two cavalry battal­ ions, and several partisan detachments had taken up positions in an arc around Kars. The arrival of the 7th Regiment from Dilijan and the 8th Regiment from Igdir, the formation of a large Western Armenian vol­ unteer battalion of nearly 1,000 men near Kizil-Chakhchakh, the fervid activities of various civilian auxiliary organizations, and the many mani­ festations of patriotism throughout the Republic created a strong sense of optimism and anticipation. Skirmishes during the first part of October showed that the army not only could hold its own but even could make favorable adjustments along the front line. The two Armenian airplanes, commanded by Captain Artur V. Gulian, conducted aerial reconnais­ sance and dropped small bombs with considerable accuracy on Turkish artillery positions near Novo-Selim and on storage depots near Sarika­ mish. The Armenian defenders were able to beat back several Turkish attempts to capture the strategic heights of Mount Ziaret (Surb Eghia). Moreover, the Muslim population of Childer, Zarushat, and Aghbaba showed no disposition to assist the Turkish invaders.1 Cabinet members Artashes Babalian and Simon Vratzian arrived in Kars on October 2 and reported to Erevan two days later that the Ar­ menian administration and army from top to bottom had a positive out­ look and that many peasants who had fled to the fortress were beginning to return to their fields. The two cabinet members were highly critical of Lieutenant General Daniel Bek Pirumian and Msyor General Harutiun Hovsepian, who had sounded the call to retreat at the first sight of the Turkish regiments. Babalian and Vratzian deplored the harmful ri­ valry between the civil and military administrations at Kars, a problem that had existed for months without resolution. They urged that Sebouh immediately be transferred to Kars; the Western Armenians making up much of the population had no trust in the generals but would rally around Sebouh, whose prestige had soared since his suppression of the Bolshevik uprising in May.2 Member of Parliament Levon Tadeosian reported from Kars to Prime Minister Hamazasp Ohandjanian and the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun 1 State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 427, p. 395» and 200/1/607, PP- x55—156, no. 15, Oct. 15, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Haradj, Oct. 9:4,15:3,1920; Genelkurmay Baçkanhgi HarbTarihi Dairesi, Turk IstiklâlHarbi, III: Dogu Cephesi (1919—1921) (Ankara, 1965), pp. 170—172 (cited hereafter as Dogu Cephesi). For details of the military operations from September to December 1920 as reported by the French mission in the Caucasus, see France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/ 187, dossier 1. 2 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 8; Artashes Babalian, “Karsi ankume,” Hairenik Amsagir, I (Oct. 1923), p. 55.

WAR AND TRUCE

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that the generals were trying to exploit the situation by imposing martial law as a way to get rid of the civil administration of Governor-General Stepan Korganian. Tadeosian recommended that if the government did place Kars under extraordinary regulations the military governor should be sent from the outside and that in no case should Pirumian or Hovsepian be appointed to the post. Despite this caveat, Minister of Military Affairs Ruben Ter-Minasian replied that the time was inopportune to make sweeping changes in the high command. Once the Turkish men­ ace had been dealt with, he would revamp the entire military structure. The generals at Kars should be put on notice, however, that because any further incompetence on their part would lead to death and suffering of both military and civilian populations they would be held personally responsible for misconduct.3 The army’s structural problems were not confined to the Kars front. After more than two years of Armenian independence, the army re­ mained top-heavy with a large, conservative officer corps accustomed to classical battle strategies. Commander in Chief Nazarbekian was in Ere­ van with the general staff. Lieutenant General Movses (Moisei) Silikian served as senior commander of the theater of battle but maintained his headquarters at Alexandropol, some 70 kilometers (43 miles) from Kars. From Alexandropol, Silikian’s chief of staff, Colonel Alexandre Vekilov (Vekilian), plotted the military operations on the front. At Kars, General Pirumian was the commander of both the fortress and the front, with Colonel Vahan Ter-Arakelian his chief of staff, whereas General Hovsepian commanded the central theater along the road and railroad be­ tween Kars and Sarikamish. Dro Kanayan held the far left flank in Surmalu with the 9th and 10th infantry regiments, partisan units, and the mounted units of Kuro Tarkhanian. The far right flank, facing Merdenek and Ardahan, was commanded first by Colonel Dmitrii Korganian of the cavalry corps and subsequently by Sebouh, who relied primarily on his brigade and the volunteers of Smbat, Pilos, and other Western Armenian partisans.4 The gulf between officers and enlisted men was typical of the old 3 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 18. 4 Hovhannes Sahakian, “Erku tari haikakan banakin medj,” in Edjer mer azatagrakan patmutenen (Paris, 1937), pp. 101—105, and, in the same volume, Tigran Baghdasarian, “Ha­ yastani Hanrapetutian verdjaluisin,” pp. 235—237,242—243; Garo Sassuni [K. Sasuni], Haitrkakan paterazme (1920-in) (Beirut, 1969), p. 58 (also published in serial form in Hairenik Amsagir'm 1926). For biographical sketches of Sebouh (Arshak Nersesian), Smbat (Paroyan; Baroyan), Mushegh (Avetisian), and the army’s only Western Armenian regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tigran Baghdasarian, see Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, II, nos. 2, 3, 9 (1957-1958), pp. 38-51, 93—100, 265—281, and VIII, no. 7 (1971), pp. 155—179; Gabriel Lazian, Heghapokhakan demker (mtavorakanner ev haidukner) (Cairo, 1945), pp. 369—377, for Sebouh.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Russian army but particularly harmful in the small-scale warfare that characterized the Armenian operations. The breach was even more pro­ nounced between the regular army officers and the partisans. The West­ ern Armenian detachments, courageous and daring under their guer­ rilla chieftains, often became alienated and unreliable when integrated into the regular army and forced to take orders from officers who spoke Armenian with a heavy Russian accent, if at all. On the right flank, Smbat and his followers were deeply distrustful of Colonel Korganian, especially as he had served as the chief of staff of the Alexandropol Revolutionary Committee in May before swearing allegiance to the government and helping to suppress the uprising. Even after Korganian’s cavalry battal­ ions were placed under Sebouh’s command, the friction was not elimi­ nated. Sebouh himself was disgrunded with General Hovsepian, accus­ ing him of failing to supply the right flank in an orderly and timely fashion and complaining bitterly that his brigade, made up of the 7th and 8th regiments, was being dispersed all along the front. Only when Sebouh threatened to refuse the command did General Silikian assign him the 8th Regiment, but even then its companies were spread over a wide expanse, from Geol and Childer in the north to Haji Khalil (Halil) in the south.5 The regular army officers, starting with Generals Nazarbekian and Silikian, believed that partisans could not wage effective war­ fare in an organized state and tried to diminish the role of the Western Armenian volunteers, yet they also realized that they could not do with­ out popular leaders such as Sebouh, who during the May uprising had remained steadfastiy loyal to the government while much of the regular army vacillated. Among political circles there was considerable sentiment for putting Dro Kanayan in charge of the defense of Kars. A charismatic leader of both partisans and regulars, Dro had demonstrated his skill defending Igdir and the county of Surmalu and protecting the bridges across the Araxes River. More of a partisan than a career officer, Dro nonetheless built up around him a professional cadre of regular army officers. Gen­ eral Nazarbekian with the army general staff was not sympathetic to the suggestion to transfer him to Kars, and Dro himself cut short the dis­ cussion by insisting that he should remain in Surmalu to defend Erevan in the likely event of a concerted enemy drive across the Araxes.6 Throughout the war, Dro ably defended the approaches to Etchmiadzin and Erevan, but in the end it was success or failure at Kars that was to determine the fate of the Armenian republic. 5 Armenia Archives, 200/2/104, p. 2; Baghdasarian, op. dt., pp. 237—240; Sassuni, op. dt., pp. 59-61. 6 Baghdasarian, op. dt., pp. 234—235; Simon Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov: Demker, depker, aprumner, IV (Beirut, 1965), pp. 195—196.

WAR AND TRUCE

24I

Babalian, Vratzian, and others urged consolidation of military oper­ ations under General Silikian, who should direct the front from the close proximity of the citadel of Kars.7 Once again, the high command failed to act on the recommendation, in part not to offend fellow generals Pirumian and Hovsepian and in part to avoid confusion and demorali­ zation in the officer corps at a time when the Turkish army was just a short distance from the strategic fortress.8 Hence, the chain of command led from Erevan to Alexandropol to Kars to the front lines. The orders often had to pass through three or four levels, increasing the possibility of delay and mishandling. On the other side, General Kiazim Karabekir stood just behind his divisions, and there was never a question about who was in full control. Despite these difficulties, the Armenian commanders, especially Gen­ eral Silikian and Colonel Vekilov, were confident that the Armenian army was stronger and better organized than the opposing force and that a well-executed counteroffensive would throw the Turks back to the positions held before the beginning of hostilities in mid-September. Ar­ menian intelligence sources had underestimated the size of the Turkish divisions, placing their active combat strength at about 5,000 men.9 By contrast, the Armenian army on the Kars front rose to nearly 10,000 troops, excluding ordnance, quartermaster, signal corps, artillery, and garrison units. The center of the front along the Sarikamish-Kars road and railroad near Begli-Ahmed and Haram-Vardan was held by the ist Regiment of Colonel Mazmanian, the 4th of Mirimanian, the 5th of Shahbudaghian, and the 7th of Ishkhanian. Sebouh manned the Merdenek sector with a part of Tigran Baghdasarian’s 8th Regiment, the ist and 2d cavalry battalions of Colonel Korganian, and the partisan de­ tachments of Smbat and other Western Armenian warriors. In all, four­ teen regular army battalions took up positions from around Merdenek in the north to the impregnable heights of Haram-Vardan in the center and Mount Haji Khalil in the south. In the Surmalu sector, Dro checked each and every probe by the Kurdish levies supported by the Turkish 1 ith Caucasus Division, and his expeditionary force actually penetrated

7 Silikian left a favorable impression on Allied military officials. The French representa­ tive reported: “Le Général, homme d’une cinquantaine d’années, portant jeune encore, m’a produit bonne impression.” 8 Babalian, op. át., p. 55. 9Sassuni, op. cit., p. 59. Sassuni asserts that the Turkish force was made up of 25,000 troops. Although Armenian intelligence sources may have underestimated the size of the opposing army on the Kars front, their reports in 1920 correctly identified the four divi­ sions under General Karabekir’s command and the approximate strength of their respec­ tive constituent regiments. See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 17/17, 24/24, and 25/ 25-

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deeper into the hill country on the slopes of Mount Ararat along the old Russo-Turkish frontier.10 Most of the Armenian troops were outfitted in the warm uniforms supplied by the British, and several battalions received the newly arrived Ross rifles, which although heavy and clumsy allowed nearly every infan­ tryman to carry a weapon.11 Many soldiers absent without leave had re­ turned to their regiments, and most substrength units had been built up with volunteers from Tiflis, Erevan, and the Lori neutral zone. The Armenian general staff was confident that the concentration of half the army on the Kars front, backed by the heavy-barreled fortress cannons, would overwhelm the ill-clad, poorly fed, and deeply disgruntled Turkish troops, especially as there were confirmed reports of aggravated dissen­ sion between Mustafa Kemal and General Karabekir. On operational maps in General Silikian’s headquarters, Colonel Vekilov plotted out the maneuvers for a counteroffensive. Before dawn on October 14, General Hovsepian’s forces in the center of the front were to thrust from Mount Ziaret, Mount Beshkaya, and Berna and break through the enemy lines held by the 17th, 28th, and 29th regiments of the 9th Caucasus Division and the XV Corps’ cavalry regiment north of the railway and by the 12th Division’s 34th and 35th regiments and ashiret units to the south. On the right flank, the ist Regiment, backed by the 7 th, would attack from the fortifications of Haram-Vardan; on the left, the 4th Regiment was to make diversionary probes in the direc­ tion of Kaghisman. As soon as the ist Regiment successfully engaged the Turkish forces, the 5th Regiment was to take possession of the Berna heights on the main road, after which all three columns would converge and drive the Turkish army back to the Sarikamish gorge. In the north­ ern sector, the mounted units of Smbat and Korganian were to dislodge the Turks from Mount Demir Kapu and recapture Merdenek or, de­ pending on developments, ride south to harass the enemy from the rear. It was with high spirits that on October 12 Bishop Garegin Hovsepian presided over the traditional blessing of the troops in the historic me­ dieval church of the Holy Apostles (Arakelots) in Kars.12 10 Baghdasarían, op. cit., pp. 241—243; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, and 20N/ 187, dossier 1, Valadier’s military report up to Oct. 15,1920. See also Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4964, Ei4902/134/58, enclosing Court to Stokes, Oct. 28, 1920. 11 Lieutenant Valadier reported that the Armenian army was accustomed to using the Lebel system rifle and that the Ross system rifles recendy received from the British were causing serious problems. “Ceci présente les gros inconvénients d’armer des hommes avec une arme dont l’usage leur est inconnu à priori.” Hence, the Ross rifles were being dis­ tributed mainly to the reserves and irregulars. Valadier inspected the Kars front on October 912 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Sassuni, op. cit., pp. 69—71; Hakob Ter-Hakobian, Hayastani verdjin aghete (Constantinople, 1921), p. 100; Haradj, Oct. 16:4, 1920. Ex-

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On the night of October 13—14, no one slept in Silikian’s headquar­ ters as the general staff awaited the news from the front. But the oper­ ation did not get off to a good start. The ist and 7th regiments failed to attack at the appointed hour in the dead of night and instead began to move out at dawn, two to three hours behind schedule. Silikian and Vekilov were enraged that General Hovsepian had forfeited the element of surprise. When the ist Regiment finally advanced from Haram-Vardan, it encountered strong, organized resistance from the Turkish 9th Division. The Armenian units nonetheless advanced from Mount Ziaret to Mount Kizilgedik on the right flank and from Mount Beshkaya toward Laloghlu in the center. The Turkish 29th Regiment had to pull back and call for reinforcements from divisional headquarters. The 5th Reg­ iment, thinking that the right column had broken through the Turkish lines, struck out toward Berna; it, too, registered initial success, pushing back the 12th Division’s 34th Regiment and 5th ashiret regiment before coming under blistering artillery fire and having to turn northward. To the south, the Armenian 4th Regiment successfully conducted its diver­ sionary operation and moved forward several kilometers without en­ countering serious resistance. Communication between the three col­ umns was irregular and delayed, and throughout the operation General Hovsepian did not leave his field headquarters in a railway coach be­ tween Kars and Begli-Ahmed.13 In Alexandropol, Silikian and Vekilov paced the floor, as the initial reports from the front indicated that all was not going well. The head­ quarters staff cheered up in early afternoon upon receiving news that the Armenian regiments were making progress against the entrenched enemy and were flanking the left wing (28th Regiment) of the 9th Di­ vision. But hopes were dashed in late afternoon when two newly re­ cruited companies of the 5th Regiment broke ranks and fled, throwing the rear into confusion. By nightfall the Armenian ist and 5th regiments were in rapid retreat, and the 4th Regiment had to be recalled to prevent its being cut off. The Armenian troops relinquished all the hard-won ground of that day and did not stop until they reached Vladikars, just a short distance from the fortress. Only when they learned that the Turks were not in hot pursuit did the Armenians reoccupy the hills to the east of Begli-Ahmed and establish a perimeter from Mount Haji Khalil to Mounts Akbaba (Aghbaba), Ziaret, and Chalkiran in the north.14 cerpts from the diary and memoir of Bishop Hovsepian are published as “Hayaget u hogevorakan gordsich Garegin Hovsepiani dzeragire,” introduction by Bagrat A. Ulubabian, BanberHayastani arkhivneri, 30th yr., no. 3 (1989), pp. 105—160 (cited hereafter as “Gare­ gin Hovsepiani dzeragire”). See also Valadier’s report of October 15 in Archives de 1’Armée 7N/829, dossier 3, and 20N/187, dossier 1. ,s Dogu Cephesi, pp. 173—174; Babalian, op. át., p. 57; Baghdasarian, op. át., pp. 244—245; 14 Armenia Archives, 200/1/427, pp. 395—396; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 72—76; “Garegin

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In the Merdenek sector, too, the Armenian operations were poorly coordinated. Initially, Smbat was able to capture Mount Demir Kapu, but Korganian’s cavalry and the artillery that were supposed to give sup­ port from the left flank did not arrive until three hours later. The Turk­ ish commanders, seeing that Smbat’s men were exposed and without cannon cover, ordered a counterattack and recaptured the mountain. Only then did the Armenian left flank join the battle, but it was now alone and suffered heavy casualties before having to withdraw.*15 The confidence of the Armenian general staff was crushed on October 14, as was the morale of the army, which had retreated in disarray. Mem­ bers of the cabinet and legislature, the military and civil administrations of Kars, and Bishop Garegin Hovsepian, having gone out to Vladikars to witness the anticipated Armenian triumph, watched in horror as of­ ficers and men of all ranks hastened toward the safety of the forts. For several hours, General Hovsepian was unable to give an account of his regiments’ status. When matters became somewhat calmer on October 15, it was learned that the army had suffered about 600 casualties, in­ cluding 100 dead, during the single-day campaign.16 Moreover, the Ar­ menians had lost several critical heights between Haram-Vardan and Begli-Ahmed. This serious setback was all the more difficult to accept when it was learned from Armenian intelligence that the Turkish regi­ ments had actually been preparing to withdraw. By the afternoon of October 14, they were sending their mechanized vehicles and heavy equipment to the rear. The panic that had begun in the 5th Regiment, however, allegedly saved the day for the Turks and irreversibly turned the tide of the war. Although Generals Nazarbekian and Silikian arrived for a second time to inspect the front, encourage the troops, and give new directives, the possibility of the fall of Kars now permeated the Ar­ menian psyche.17 Hovsepiani dzeragire,” pp. 114—115; Haradj, Oct. 16:4, 20:1, 1920. See also Kazim Kara­ bekir, Istiklâl Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), pp. 894—895; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 174—175. 15 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 64—65, 72—73; Armenia Archives, 200/1/427, p. 395. 16 The Turkish command reported that the 9th Caucasus Division had suffered only 9 killed and 36 wounded; the Armenian side had lost 118 dead and 300 wounded. The 12th Division incurred 18 casualties, whereas the Armenians in that theater had left behind 77 dead, as well as three machine guns and a large amount of ammunition. See Dogu Cephesi, P- 17517 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 76—83; “Garegin Hovsepiani dzeragire,” pp. 115, 117—118. Even after the military setback on October 14, Artashes Babalian submitted a misleading report to Erevan that there was very little change in the front line and that troop morale was high. He admitted that there had been as many as 250 casualties, adding that it was essential for the government and commander in chief to impress upon the local commanders the critical importance of holding Kars and retaking their previous positions. See Armenia Archives, 200/1/159, pt. II, pp. 115-116.

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Resumption of the Turkish Offensive The military encounters of October 14 brought the Turkish army to the Merdenek-Novo-Selim-Kaghisman line, completing the first phase of the undeclared war against Armenia and bolstering General Karabekir’s confidence that he could capture the mighty fortress of Kars and march all the way to the Arpachai (Akhurian) River. He immediately ordered the 9th and 12 th divisions to gather all available information about the forts and city of Kars, the administrative and military organization, the roads and railway, and geographic and topographic features, including even the depth and flow of the Kars River.18 Karabekir later implied that he discounted the Angora authorities’ concerns that the Georgians might make common cause with the Armenians or that Soviet Russia might intervene on their behalf. He nonetheless maintained that rapid action was imperative to obviate the undesirable possibility of Armenia’s sovietization before the Turkish offensive had achieved its full objectives. The troops were in high spirits and impatient to advance, and the ashiret units on both sides of the front were ready to support the war effort.19 Despite these boasts, there is evidence that Karabekir was more cau­ tious than he subsequently claimed. In fact, upon the Turkish occupa­ tion of Sarikamish, it was Ismet Bey’s general staff that urged him to push on to Kars. Karabekir replied that the line his divisions had estab­ lished east of Sarikamish afforded the strongest natural defenses be­ tween the old frontier and the Arpachai River. Even a joint ArmenianGeorgian counteroffensive could easily be repelled from these commanding positions, whereas an advance to the east of Kars would make the army vulnerable to sudden Georgian strikes. Karabekir there­ fore asked about the advantages of pressing the offensive before a firm understanding had been attained with Georgia and Soviet Russia. On October 7, Mustafa Kemal and the entire Council of Ministers explained that the conquest of Kars would produce major military and political benefits. A large part of the Armenian army would be destroyed, and the threat of Georgian intervention would disappear; politically, the fall of Kars would compel the Armenians to sue for peace on terms dictated by the Angora government. The Armenians would have to deal with the Turks either directly or through the aegis of Russia, which would have to acquiesce in the Grand National Assembly’s conditions. Hence, it was of immediate importance “to take matters into our own hands.’’ The Commander of the Eastern Front was given freedom of action to make use of all favorable opportunities.20 18 Dogu Cephesi, p. 176. 19 Karabekir, op. cit., p. 895. 20 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 181—182, 303.

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Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Bey had obviously come around to the view that no external force would intervene to prevent the capture of Kars. To ensure the neutrality of Georgia, they sent a special envoy to Tiflis to give assurances that the Grand National Assembly desired a strong, independent Georgia and wished to enter into direct negotiations for the establishment of mutually beneficial relations. The Turkish people had never desired to harm their neighbors, and the military operations against Armenia were only intended to put a stop to the cruelty against the Muslim population, to block Armenian incursions into Turkish ter­ ritory, and to dissuade Armenia from trying to expand at the expense of Turkey. The Grand National Assembly, moreover, was prepared to accept the orally transmitted Georgian request to refrain from military action in Ardahan on condition that the Georgians preserve strict neu­ trality and disarm Armenian soldiers retreating into that area. Because Turkey had no aggressive designs against Georgia, the Grand National Assembly wished to know the purpose of the Georgian mobilization and required an explanation of the intentions of the Tiflis government. Ap­ parently on Karabekir’s recommendation, another envoy, Hilmi Bey [Uran] (a prominent Ittihadist who had fled to Ardahan when the Brit­ ish and Armenians occupied Kars in the spring of 1919), was also sent to Tiflis. He explained that the current Armenian policies were as much a threat to Georgia as to Turkey and that the purpose of the Turkish advance was to establish peace and tranquility in the region by ending the tyranny of the bloodthirsty Dashnak bands. All outstanding issues between Turkey and Georgia could be settled in a most friendly manner, for which purpose Zhordania’s government should dispatch a mission to Angora as soon as possible.21 Regardless of whether Mustafa Kemal Pasha or Kiazim Karabekir Pa­ sha was more impatient to retrieve Kars for Turkey, all were agreed by October 20 that the time had come for the assault on the great fortress. Chief of Staff Ismet sent a cipher to Karabekir stating that, after studying the situation, the general staff and Mustafa Kemal had determined that the Georgians would not become involved in the conflict, making the moment propitious to deal the Armenians a final blow. As the object was to destroy the Armenian army at Kars or in front of the fortress, decisive action was required. The Commander of the Eastern Front could extend the duration of military service and keep the men under arms for as long as necessary.22 On the same day, a conscription order was issued for all

21 Karabekir, op. dt., p. 896; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 178—180; Feridun Kandemir, Kâzim Kara­ bekir (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 166—167. 22 Genelkurmay Ba§kanligi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi, 13th yr., no. 49 (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1138.

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men between the ages of thirty-two and thirty-six in the sanjaks of Bayazit and Erzinjan, and Karabekir revealed his battle plan in great detail to his division commanders.23 After authorizing Karabekir to storm the fortress, Mustafa Kemal tried to influence foreign opinion by blaming the Armenians for the hostili­ ties. In a press release distributed by the Anatolian news agency on Oc­ tober 23, the Grand National Assembly declared that the Erevan gov­ ernment since its inception had done everything possible to decimate the large Turkish-Muslim element under its dominion. Because the West ignored the voice of the Muslim population, the Dashnaks had perpe­ trated every conceivable form of cruelty to expand the Armenian patri­ mony by forcing the Turks from their homes and resettling immigrants in their places. In the Erevan district alone, nearly 200 villages had re­ portedly been burned and most of the 135,000 Muslims eliminated. Not content with this brutality, the Dashnaks had sent their bands into Azer­ baijan, burning some 20 villages in Karabagh and massacring the inhab­ itants. And when the Turkish population of Kars had attempted to assert its right to self-determination—a right that the Entente Powers appar­ ently wished to reserve only for their protégés—General Atamian (sic) had bombarded and devastated most of the affected villages. Using the arms supplied to them in the name of the Christian, imperialist West, the Armenians were extending their bloody regime right up to the Ot­ toman frontier. The Turkish people had been deeply aroused by the suffering of their brothers in race and religion and had been restrained only by the influence exerted by the Angora government. But the Dash­ nak bands, not satisfied with their dirty work outside the Ottoman boundaries, were now violating Turkish territory and implementing the same methods of death and destruction to create a fait accompli in an­ ticipation of the American president’s boundary decision. The Arme­ nian forces had attacked Turkish border posts on September 24, clearly intending to capture Erzerum, but the Turkish army had been prepared and in a defensive countermeasure had occupied Sarikamish. The Turk­ ish people had no aggressive designs against the Armenians or any other people. They were simply exercising the primordial right of the nation. All responsibility for the bloodshed fell squarely on the Armenian lead­ ers and their imperialistic sponsors, whose objective was the obliteration of the Turkish nation.24 On October 24, a day sifter this public declaration, General Karabekir 23 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 185—187; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 895—896. 24 Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report on political situation, Dec. 1, 1920, App. 6, and 20N/183, dossier 4, Revue de la Presse, 16—30 Nov. 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17.

6. THE KARS FRONT

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issued orders for his army to march at daybreak on October 27. Like Enver Pasha in his abortive plan of 1914, Karabekir intended to avoid a direct frontal attack by investing Kars from the rear and cutting the railway and main road to Alexandropol. Most of Halil Bey’s 9th Caucasus Division, together with the Azerbaijani and XV Corps cavalry, several ashiret regiments, and light and heavy cannons, was to pass undetected around the left wing of the Armenian defenses to the heights of Magharajik, Vezinkoy, and Yaghni to the east of the fortress. The 12 th Divi­ sion, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Osman Nuri, would en­ gage the Armenians in diversionary maneuvers from the Uchlar heights to Mount Akbaba along the heavily fortified western approach. A con­ glomerate division that was being organized under Colonel Rushtu would apply pressure from the west and northwest and complete the encirclement of the fortress city. The artillery would be positioned such that it could come to the immediate assistance of the divisions in case of a sudden Armenian charge. Every effort was to be made to keep out of the sights of the fortress cannons. Meanwhile, Colonel Javid’s 11th Caucasus Division and ashiret regiments would capture the county of Surmalu and if possible bridge the Araxes River and block the Alexandropol-Erevan railroad, further splintering the enemy army and setting the stage for a march on Erevan. The 3d Caucasus Division was to remain poised in the direction of Olti and ready to send reinforcements wher­ ever needed or to take swift counteraction in case of attempted Georgian intervention. The entire front would be supervised by General Karabekir from the nearby hills of Berna.25 On October 20, Javid Bey had already sent the 11th Division’s 34th Caucasus Regiment into action around Igdir, along with hundreds of Kurdish tribesmen from the Alashkert district. During the day-long ar­ tillery duel, the Turco-Kurdish force occupied the villages of Karabulagh and Sogutli and pressed the Armenian defenders to the Araxes River, but the next day a counterattack spearheaded by Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai A. Khudabashian’s 9th Infantry Regiment inflicted heavy casu­ alties upon the Kurds and reestablished the previous line.26 A more concerted Turkish attack in Surmalu began before dawn on October 24, the immediate objectives of the 34th Regiment being Igdir, the district capital, and the Markara and Karakala bridges leading to Erevan and Etchmiadzin. Simultaneous operations began in the direc­ tions of Kiulluk-Charukhchi, Sultanabad-Igdir, and Dashburun-Karakoy-

25 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 895—897; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 304—305; Kandemir, op. át., p. 167. See also Cemal Kutay, Karabekir Ermenistan’i nasilyok etti? (Istanbul, 1956), p. 49. “Great Britain, War Office, 106/330, no. 227; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 102—104; Simon Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), p. 429; Dogu Cephesi, p. 210.

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unlu-Markara (see map 4). Dro’s expedition rebuffed the attacks from Sultanabad and Orgov on Igdir, but the battie for control of the Araxes bridges raged for three days. On the second day, Armenian armored vehicles sent out from Kanaker joined Kuro Tarkhanian’s detachment and, crossing the Markara bridge under a hail of machine-gun fire, broke the Turkish cordon that had isolated Igdir. Both sides showed extraordinary determination in a pitched battle near Dalikdash; Colonel Tarkhanian lost half of his 260 men before the Turco-Kurdish forces finally broke ranks and fled on October 26. Then, as the Armenians were restoring communications between Markara and Igdir, elements of the Turkish 1 ith Caucasus Division attacked the Karakala bridge lead­ ing to Sardarabad and Etchmiadzin. Capturing the western bridgehead, the Turks were unable to dislodge the defenders from the eastern side in close-range combat and finally set fire to the bridge before retreating. Colonel Khudabashian distinguished himself in these battles and with the support of Colonel Tarkhanian’s men and Lieutenant Colonel Halberian’s recently formed 10th Infantry Regiment drove the Turks and Kurds toward Kulp, up the slopes of Mount Ararat, and into the Bartoghi Mountains along the old Russo-Turkish frontier. Dro’s expeditionary force took up positions from the Karakala bridge to Verin and Nerkin Charukhchi, Yaidji, Khoshkhabar, the Igdir-Khalfalu road, Sultanabad, Mount Gasimtach, Dalikdash, Karakoyunlu, Dashburun, and Diza. With a strong officer corps enjoying the trust of the men, the Armenian de­ fenders had fought stubbornly and victoriously against both regulars and irregulars.27 Around Kars, from the night of October 24 and continuing for the next three days, the Turkish regiments slipped over mountain byways to their assigned locations, leaving their tents pitched and campfires burn­ ing at their previous sites to deceive the Armenians. The freezing weather, heavy rain and fog, and breakdown in telephone communica­ tions hampered their movement, requiring Karabekir to put off the be­ ginning of the assault until October 28 and then for two more days. By October 27, Colonel Halid’s contingents had skirted the outermost Ar­ menian positions and reached their assigned destinations around Vezinkoy, and the 12 th Division filled in the area west of the 9th Division and south of Kars. Rushtu’s mix of regulars and partisans scouted the roads in the northwest, with orders to prevent the arrival of Armenian rein­ forcements or the escape of the regiments at Kars, which constituted the bulk of the Armenian army.28 27 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 429—430; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 109—111; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 105—110; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 45—46; Dogu Cephesi, p. 211. See also FO 371/4964, E14902/134/58 enclosure. 28 For details of these movements, see Dogu Cephesi, pp. 187—194.

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During this period, the Armenians remained entrenched to the west and south of the lowest forts. Armenian reconnaissance parties did not encounter the enemy, and both General Pirumian and General Hovse­ pian took lightly recommendations for more thorough scouting to the rear of the fortress. Pirumian, who was partially incapacitated by a bro­ ken leg suffered in an automobile accident, seemed confident in the impregnability of the network of forts, concrete barriers, and trenches that made up the renowned fortress. On October 28, however, news arrived that Turkish and tribal cavalry regiments had advanced from Khalifoghlu to disrupt the rails at Mazra (Matsra), a short distance east of Kars. The Armenian villagers and armored train were able to repel the attack and repair the railway, but there was no longer any doubt that Kars was in serious danger of encirclement. More than 2,000 Turkish troops had passed to the east of the fortress and now controlled the Yaghni-Vezinkoy heights and the villages of Khalifoghlu and Dashkovo.29 That same morning, the 12th Division’s 36th Regiment and artillery bombarded the Armenian 8th Regiment near the village of Haji Khalil. Since October 18, three ashiret regiments had tried unsuccessfully to dislodge the Armenian defenders from atop 9,000-foot Mount Haji Khalil. What they were unable to achieve by arms, however, a howling blizzard accomplished, driving the Armenians down the slope. Thus, the 36th Regiment found the commanding positions empty and before be­ ing forced off the mountain itself directed its fire at the enemy below. The Armenians now showed little will to fight. There were rumors that the Turks were menacing Kars from the rear and sealing the routes of escape. As the battalion at Haji Khalil retreated to the fortified positions of Uchlar and the outlying forts of Kars, the Armenian 4th Regiment left the heights near Begli-Ahmed and drew back to Prokhladnoe village; the 5th Regiment, meanwhile, abandoned the heavily fortified Akbaba heights and entered the low-lying forts near the Kars River.30 On the evening of October 28, General Pirumian telegraphed Gen­ eral Silikian that the enemy had occupied the Samavat-Uchlar positions and that the Armenian troops had withdrawn from Akbaba and HaramVardan. Pirumian was taking action to contract and stabilize the front in order to create a reserve. Although the Armenians had fallen back to the lower line of forts and the successful Turkish flanking maneuver had exposed Kars from the rear, Pirumian still voiced confidence that the fortress would hold. It was essential to keep the Alexandropol-Kars road and railroad open. A council of war held in Pirumian’s headquarters on 29 Ter-Hakobian, op. tit., pp. 102—103; Sassuni, op. tit., pp. 111—116; Babalian, op. tit., p. 61. 30 Sahakian, op. tit., pp. 105-115; Dogu, Cephesi, p. 190. See also Kandemir, op. tit., p. 167.

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October 29 adopted a plan for a limited counteroffensive to recapture the heights of Yaghni and Vezinkoy and thereby relieve the threat to Fort Lazarev. Colonel Mazmanian’s ist Regiment was to lead the charge.31 In response to the renewed Turkish offensive, the Armenian general headquarters dispatched most of Colonel Karapet Hasan-Pashayan’s 2d Regiment from the southern front to protect the Alexandropol-Kars line, and General Silikian sent Colonel Apresian’s Shirak militia and Sassuntsi Mushegh’s mounted detachment (which rode without halting from the Aghbaba district near Alexandropol) to defend the threatened strategic villages of Subatan and Bash-Gadiklar.32 Now, at the last mo­ ment, the Ministry of Military Affairs appointed General Hovhannes Ghazarian (Ivan Kazarov) to replace General Hovsepian, who immedi­ ately set out with his staff to the village of Novo-Troitskoe.33 Ironically, this belated action saved Hovsepian from captivity and the humiliation of delivering Kars to Kiazim Karabekir. Yet, despite the foreboding, Gen­ eral Pirumian continued to put the best face on the situation. On the evening of October 29, he informed the military ministry by radiogram that although the fortress was surrounded on three sides, it was well armed and had the power to repel the enemy. The army command had decided to fight to the end, and measures were being taken to elevate the mood of the soldiers: “We have faith in the fortress and the spirit of the Armenian people and trust in ultimate victory.’’34 The unrealistic confidence of the Armenian senior officers may have stemmed from the almost mythological significance ascribed to the for­ tress of Kars, which in normal times billeted as many as 40,000 troops. The mountain on which the fortress had been constructed sloped from the northeast to the southwest, with the city located on the southwestern slope, facing the plain. Fortifications were built on both sides of the Kars River, along which the officers’ quarters and American orphanages were now located. The road to Alexandropol passed through the river gorge under the shadow of the citadel. In the military councils, it had been decided to prohibit the 40,000 civilian inhabitants of Kars from leaving in order not to undermine troop morale or give cause for panic. Some civilians found ways to depart during the Turkish offensive, but the vast majority remained in place, apprehensive and fearful on the night of October 29. That same evening, Colonel Mazmanian tried to recover the heights 31 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 48; Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), p. 242; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 431. 32 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 113—114. 33 Babalian, op. át., p. 62. 34 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 49; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., p. 113.

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of Vezinkoy, but his men refused to follow. Humiliated by this insubor­ dination and cowardice, Mazmanian pressed a Mauser revolver to his head and ended his life. Fort Lazarev’s vulnerability now imperiled the entire city, but General Pirumian continued to insist that Kars would not fall without a good fight.35 General Karabekir thought otherwise. The offensive had progressed more smoothly and successfully than even the most optimistic predictions. The Armenians had abandoned their key trenches and fled to the fortress without engaging the Turks in serious combat. Bolshevik agents were helping by spreading defeatist propa­ ganda and urging the Armenian soldiers not to resist the “Turkish Red Army,” which was coming to liberate Armenia from the Dashnak op­ pressors. Karabekir had his men wear red insignias and advance under red banners. In his order of the day on October 29, the Commander of the Eastern Front declared that with the help of Allah the Turkish flag would fly above the fortress of Kars the next day.36 The Fall of Kars

As the situation at Kars turned critical, the Armenian government des­ perately cast about for external intervention. In a telegram to Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin on October 20, Hamazasp Ohan­ djanian protested that Russian munitions shipped from Tuapse to Treb­ izond were now being directed against the Armenian people. Although the Soviet government had declared its friendly intentions and its read­ iness to use its connections with the Kemalists to bring about the cession of enough Turkish Armenian territory to provide adequate living space for the Armenian people, the fact was that the Grand National Assembly refused to recognize any Armenian rights to these provinces. On the contrary, the Turks, emboldened by the arms and ammunition supplied by Russia, had invaded the existing Armenian state with the goal of re­ viving the imperialistic treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Batum. These de­ velopments were incomprehensible to the Armenian people at a time when a Soviet envoy had arrived in Erevan to negotiate a treaty of friend­ ship. The military shipments to Turkey should cease immediately. “Oth­ erwise we shall be unable to explain to our people the contradictions between your words on the one hand and your actions on the other.”37 A few days later, Ohandjanian wrote again to protest the participation of Red Army detachments in Nakhichevan in the operations of the Turk­ 35 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 431; Sassuni, op. át., p. 117; Kutay, op. át., pp. 49-5036 Kutay, op. át., p. 50. See also Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1149; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 195—197. 37 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 31, and 200/1/607, p. 147.

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ish regulars and irregulars against Daralagiaz and the positions held around Shahtaght by General Shelkovnikian’s troops. The evidence of such irrefutable involvement turned Soviet professions of goodwill into offensive platitudes.38 In a message written in English and marked “very secret,’’ Minister of Military Affairs Ruben Ter-Minasian telegraphed British Chief Com­ missioner Stokes on October 26 that the Armenian government had no faith in Soviet declarations or offers of mediation. “I consider this mo­ ment most suitable for transfer of the role of mediator between Turkey and Armenia from Soviet Russia to Great Britain.” Ter-Minasian ex­ plained that the situation was critical, as the Turkish 1 ith Division was closing in around Igdir and the 3d Division was moving toward Olti and Merdenek. “Under such conditions we will not be able to oppose Turk­ ish advance and Armenia is threatened by entire destruction. I am sure that Great Britain will not allow the young Republic of Armenia to be annihilated and that she will take measures to save Armenians.” Aside from requesting arms, ammunition, and military equipment, Ter-Mina­ sian urged that the Allies halt the Turkish 3d Division by landing troops at Trebizond or advancing from Ardahan. “I hope that you will take decisive measures and will inform me accordingly.”39 Prime Minister Ohandjanian also appealed to Colonel Stokes: “The moment has arrived when the Allies must definitely aid Armenia without delay. The country is ready to fight and make further sacrifices provided she will not be alone in the struggle.” It was essential that the Allies organize a military descent at Trebizond, increase Greek pressure on the Kemalists in western Anatolia, and supply Armenia with arms, ammu­ nition, heavy guns, oil, and transportation facilities. “My government awaits your definite reply regarding the method, extent, and date of assistance that your government is able to render Armenia. ... Other­ wise that part of the Allied front held by Armenia must inevitably be broken.”40 In Tiflis, Tigran Bekzadian continued to make the rounds of the Allied missions, where he declared that fierce and bloody battles were occur­ ring around Kars. The Armenians were fighting heroically but under the blows of superior enemy forces had drawn back to the fortress. The enemy advance, combined with encirclement of the Armenian flanks, had created a catastrophic situation. The fall of Kars might be imminent. Such a calamity would lead unavoidably to the capitulation of Alexandro-

38 Armenia Archives, 200/1 ƒ597, pp. 130—134. 39 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 44. 40 Armenia Archives, 200/1/497, p. 21, and 200/1/602, p. 61. For a similar appeal to the French government, see also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3.

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pol and leave thousands of hapless people without food or provisions during the severe winter months. The Armenian government, aban­ doned and left to its own resources, might soon be constrained to submit to whatever conditions were dictated by the enemy in order to spare the rest of the population. Bekzadian closed with a hollow appeal for the governments that had recognized the Armenian republic but deprived it of effective assistance to act resolutely “at this last possible moment.”41 In his personal exchanges with Stokes and French military commis­ sioner Emile Corbel, Bekzadian came away without any hope. Stokes seemed despondent, complaining that his many urgent messages to Lon­ don had remained unanswered and that his government rejected the proposed role of mediator between the Armenians and Turks on grounds that it had no relations with the outlaw regime of Mustafa Ke­ mal. Stokes urged the Armenians to concentrate their entire army on the Kars front, as he was certain the Red Army would not join in a simultaneous attack. His intelligence sources had intercepted a letter from the Soviet mission in Tiflis to a Bolshevik agent in Batum empha­ sizing that the Council of People’s Commissars had repudiated the use of force to sovietize Georgia or Armenia; Legran, the Soviet envoy in Erevan, had been directed to strengthen the Communist organization there to achieve the Sovnarkom’s objectives without military action.42 In his report to Erevan, Bekzadian offered the opinion that he could place no more trust in Stokes’s advice than he could in the professions of friendship and nonaggression by A. L. Sheinman, the Soviet repre­ sentative in Tiflis. Colonel Corbel told Bekzadian that a shipment of munitions for Armenia had just arrived in Poti, but he could offer no encouragement about an Allied landing at Trebizond. Corbel listened pensively as Bekzadian noted that Armenia had been left alone in an unequal battle, that no one was willing to help, but that everyone would blame his government for seeking a truce to save its people. When Bek­ zadian showed himself to be critical of the Bureau-Government for not shifting its political orientation and reaching an understanding with the Bolsheviks and Turks, Corbel could only concur that Armenia had every 41 See, for example, FO 371/4962, E13646/134/58 enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, enclosing Bekzadian to Corbel, Oct. 30, 1920; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/11, Moser to Secretary of State, Oct. 31, 1920, enclosure, and RG 84, Tiflis Con­ sulate, Class 711, Bekzadian to Moser, Oct. 30, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/ 3a, Bekzadian’s letters of Oct. 30, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/597, p. 89. 42 E. K. Sarkisian, Kh. Abeghian, and A. Sarkisian, “MissiiaB. Legrana: Diplomaticheskaia missiia RSFSR V Armenii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 8th yr., no. 3 (1967), p. 37 (intro­ duction by E. K. Sarkisian, and documents compiled by Abeghian and A. Sarkisian; cited hereafter as “Missiia B. Legrana”); Archives de l’Armée, 20N/182, dossier 2, Report of Nov. 16, 1920.

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right to seek such an accommodation, as it was obvious that the Allies would not come to its rescue.43 With no hope extended from Tiflis, the Armenian government issued a desperate public appeal on October 30: Several of the forts of Kars have not withstood the Turkish assault. And now within and around Kars fateful battles are in progress. It may be that Kars will fall, but the Armenian people time and again must establish new positions from which to defend its fatherland, its honor, its freedom. Each and every Armenian is obliged to fight to the last drop of blood in order to prevent the iniquitous enemy from annihilating the people and scuttling Ar­ menia’s independence. Today, Armenia is waging a battle of life or death. Every Armenian must realize that defeat is death for all of us. Citizens, the government of the Republic of Armenia is employing all military means to defend the land and people. And if each and every Armenian citizen fulfills his obligations to the fatherland selflessly during these decisive days, we are confident that in the end the Armenian people will emerge victorious from this agonizing struggle. Citizens, with all your strength support the government and the military com­ mand. Everyone toward the front! Everything for the front!44

Saturday, October 30, 1920, was a cold and gloomy day at Kars. Tor­ rential freezing rain had fallen all night, and now the fog rose up to meet the low-lying black clouds. The troops had drawn into the inner forts, and many were deserting to seek their families and help them to escape. Still, in General Pirumian’s headquarters there was no panic or belief that the fortress would fall that day. Colonel Babadjanov, the Bul­ garian commander of the fortress cannons, was prepared to unleash a barrage as soon as the enemy moved into the open plain below the citadel. Bishop Garegin Hovsepian had been on the front lines to bless and encourage the troops and now rested comfortably in Pirumian’s quarters. At first glance that morning, everything seemed calm in the forts and in the city. At 10 o’clock, however, telegraph and telephone communications were cut from the rear of the fortress. After having postponed the investment of Kars for three days, partly because Colonel Halid had met stronger Armenian resistance than ex­ pected in the Yaghni-Vezinkoy sector and was reportedly apprehensive about beginning the operation without greater preparation, General Karabekir on the eve of the assault issued his final orders from his head­ quarters at Uchlar Tapa (Tepe). The 9th Division was to take the lead 43 “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 72—73. 44 Armenia Archives, 199/1/244, p. 4.

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by advancing at 8 o’clock in the morning with several battalions of the 17th and 29th regiments, breaking into the forts from the east. Other battalions, the cavalry regiments, and the ashiret units were to strike northward, take control of the Kars-Alexandropol road and railroad, and prevent the escape of the retreating Armenians and their armored train and rolling stock. The 12 th Division was to protect the flank of the 9th Division and approach the great fortress from the direction of Vladikars in the west to draw the attention of the Armenian defenders and facili­ tate the 9 th Division’s operations. Colonel Rush tu’s conglomerate divi­ sion to the northwest of Kars was to apply pressure from the direction of Prokhladnoe and prevent the flight of the Armenians to the north.45 At daybreak on October 30, everything did not proceed entirely ac­ cording to plan. The 12th Division’s 36th Regiment was startled by an Armenian flanking maneuver and was able to drive the enemy back to the forts only after calling up the division’s reserve, delaying the advance until 10 o’clock. At 9th Division headquarters, Colonel Halid was ap­ parently so desirous of being remembered as the conqueror of Kars that he concentrated nearly all of his forces against the forts without fulfilling his assignment of taking firm control of the road and railway to Alexandropol. Nonetheless, October 30 was to be the last day the Armenian flag would fly over the citadel of Kars. Suddenly, troops of the 17th Turkish Regiment appeared in Fort Lazarev, dispersing the Armenian defenders and quickly capturing this commanding height.46 At about 10:30 in the morning, the 12th Division’s 34th Regiment entered the city almost unopposed from the plain, followed shortly thereafter by the 35th and 36th regiments. The civilian population was thrown into confusion and chaos. Thousands of townspeople and troops now mixed together in a frenzied attempt to get to safety by passing through the river gorge in the direction of Alexandropol. By 11 o’clock, the commotion of the terrified masses rose up to the citadel. After only a few volleys from the fortress cannons, upon which so much trust had been placed, the guns fell silent as the artillerymen joined the infantry in flight. As the throngs pressed through the gorge, they were suddenly petrified by the sight of Turkish soldiers and machine guns trained on them from the heights of Fort Radiev. Under a hail of bullets, the pop­ ulation surged forward and backward to escape the trap. Many towns­ people fled back to their homes and went into hiding, anticipating the worst, whereas the entire 5th Regiment of Colonel Shahbudaghian was taken prisoner. At noon, Captain Gulian lifted off from the Kars aero­ 45 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 197—198. Ibid., pp. 199-201.

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drome in the only operable Armenian aircraft, leaving the other to the Turks.47 The instinct for survival created scenes of pandemonium, as soldiers, abandoning their positions and tossing away their weapons, pushed to the head of the multitude trying to get through the gorge. Men on horseback rode roughshod over the civilians, and some soldiers stripped off their uniforms and hid under the cots and in the closets of the Amer­ ican orphanages and hospitals. Dr. Edward Fox, the physician in charge of Near East Relief operations in Kars, commented with disgust on the contemptible cowardice of the Armenian soldiers and the unreliability of the Armenians overall: “Anyone would be pro-Turkish after having worked with the Armenians for a year and seeing how they behaved and when one realized what liars and thieves they are.” He admitted that there had been some indiscriminate shootings of Armenians in Ameri­ can institutions and certain indignities until regular Turkish officers had arrived and restored order. Fox also reported that the Near East Relief storehouses had been broken into and plundered, but he suspected that the Armenians were as much involved as the Turks.48 General Karabekir had in fact given his men strict orders not to disturb the Americans in any way, and his senior officers soon halted the excesses occurring in the American institutions.49 It was obvious by noon that Kars was doomed. General Pirumian’s chief of staff, Colonel Ter-Arakelian, two officials of the city administra­ tion, and Bishop Garegin set out from the citadel with a tattered white flag in search of high-ranking Turkish officers to offer a peaceful sur­ render in return for a pledge of nonretribution against the civilian pop­ ulation and treatment of military personnel as prisoners of war accord­ 47 For descriptions of the fall of Kars, see Sahakian, op. dt., pp. 117—124; Babalian, op. dt., pp. 62—63; Baghdasarian, op. dt., pp. 250—251; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 118—133; “Garegin Hovsepiani dzeragire,” pp. 119—127; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 79. See also Karabekir, op. dt., p. 897; Kandemir, op. dt., p. 168. The French military mission reported that the Armenians had put up a “heroic” defense until October 28 despite blizzard conditions. See 7N/829, dossier 3, Rapport militaire of Nov. 1, 1920. Even when the details of the fall of Kars had become known, the French mission tended to lighten Armenian responsibility for the collapse: “la fatigue, la famine, le manque de vêtements et d’équipements pour les mobilisés, l’incapacité du comman­ dement avaient à ce point désorganisé l’armée que Kars, défendu par 25,000 hfommes], a été pris presque sans combat par 12,000 Turcs environ, à la faveur d’une surprise.” See 20N/187, dossier 1, Exposé de la situation politique pour la période du 1 au 15 Novembre 1920. 4K US Archives, RG 59,760J.67/74, Bristol to Secretary of State, Jan. 17,1921, enclosure. See also The Papers of Mark L. Bristol (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.), Box 2, Bristol’s War Diary, Dec. 15, 1920, and RG 45, Box 714, Bristol’s War Diary, Dec. 16, 1920. 49 Fox subsequently told Colonel Stokes in Tiflis: “Turks looted Kars for days on the grounds that most property had been previously looted by Armenians from Moslems.” See FO 371/4965, Ei5886/134/58, Stokes to FO, Dec. 11, 1920.

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ing to international law.50 At 1 o’clock in the afternoon, General Pirumian sent his final radiogram to army headquarters stating that the fortress was under attack from the direction of Vezinkoy. Everything was in utter turmoil, as the civilian and military population was fleeing. “The fate of the fortress is sealed.’’51 By that time, the Turkish flag flew atop the citadel. Yet the fortress was so large that the Armenian officers and civilian officials gathered at Pirumian’s headquarters had to wait nearly two hours for Turkish offi­ cers of the 17th Regiment to discover them. The momentous victory at Kars had been so swift that even the Turkish officers seemed temporarily overwhelmed. They treated the Armenian notables with deference, curs­ ing warfare and the dark forces that had cast the Turks and Armenians against one another.52 Most of the 2,000 Armenian junior officers and enlisted men who fell prisoner were taken to the railway station and then transported for confinement and labor in Erzerum. Subsisting under extremely harsh conditions during the winter of 1920—1921, many of these men died in captivity. Also taken prisoner but treated with civility were Generals Pirumian, Ghazarian, and Araratian, Colonels Vekilov, Ter-Arakelian, and Babadjanov, Acting Minister of Welfare Artashes Babalian, Vice Governor Ruben Chalkhushian, Mayor Hamazasp Norhatian, and Bishop Garegin Hovsepian, among others.53 By the mid-afternoon of October 30, the last pockets of Armenian resistance had been silenced by the converging divisions of Colonels Halid, Osman Nuri, and Rushtu. General Karabekir then rode triumphandy into Kars and immediately telegraphed Angora of his complete victory. The Armenians had given up so quickly that they had left intact enormous quantities of military matériel, locomotives and freight cars, communications and technical equipment, and light and heavy artillery with thousands of shells.54 The poorly clad Turkish soldiers would hence­

50 ‘‘Garegin Hovsepiani dzeragire,” pp. 121—123. 51 Armenia Archives, 200/1/621, p. 54; Sassuni, op. át., p. 123. 52 “Garegin Hovsepiani dzeragire,” p. 123; Artashes Babalian, “Mi tari gerutian medj,” Hairenik Amsagir, II (April 1924), p. 55. 5SThe number of enlisted men taken prisoner is given as 1,150 in FO 371/4962, Ei 3827/134/58 enclosure and Archives de l’Armée, 20N/182, dossier 2, Report of Nov. 9, 1920. This count was probably taken from Karabekir’s initial estimate relayed to Angora. See Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. nos. 1139, 1141. Karabekir, op. át., p. 1024, states that in October 1921, 98 Armenian officers and 531 enlisted men were re­ leased and returned to Armenia. The figure apparently includes Armenian prisoners taken not only at Kars but also at other places and at other times. Presumably the remaining prisoners of war had not survived. For a description of life as Turkish prisoners, see “Gare­ gin Hovsepiani dzeragire,” pp. 125—158; Babalian, op. át., II (April-May 1924), pp. 5465,96-112. 54 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 897—898, also reported that he had seized enough war material to carry on the struggle for ten years; Kutay, op. át., pp. 50-51; Dogu Cephesi, p. 203.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

forth wear warm British uniforms stripped from the captured Armeni­ ans. The Armenian casualties during the Turkish assault on Kars were estimated at 1,500, with 500 killed.55 Nevertheless, because Colonel Halid had failed to close the trap, most of the battalions had managed to escape over Blagodamoe and Prokhladnoe.56 Although as many as 8,000 Armenian soldiers remained scattered between Kars and Alexan­ dropol, the fall of the fortress ended the effective fighting potential of the Armenian army.57 On October 31, Mustafa Kemal telegraphed his praise and deepest appreciation to General Karabekir and his officers and troops. “Captur­ ing a fortress such as Kars is for the soldiers of any nationality a matter of great pride and honor.” The men had fulfilled their duties with valor and should be congratulated “down to the lowest soldier.”58 In the name of the Grand National Assembly, news of the glorious victory at Kars was telegraphed around the country. The Turks had done everything pos­ sible, the communication began, to live in peace and justice with the Armenians, but these sincere efforts had borne no results except to en­ courage the Dashnaks to try to impose their domination over “our peo­ ple.” They were obsessed with grabbing the Turkish homeland, massa­ cring the Muslim elements, and weakening the Turkish defense forces. Hence, it had become a matter of life or death to take action against the Dashnak Armenians. Kars had now been captured, and this joyous news, together with the insidious provocations of the Armenians, should be disseminated to the populace, down to the last person.59 General Karabekir addressed a circular to the Armenian inhabitants of Kars on November 2, offering them security and demanding compli­ ance with his arrangements. “The Dashnaks are the reason for your tragedy and the cause of animosity between our peoples,” the message read; the Dashnaks desired to enslave others, and the Armenian people should come to understand what terrible creatures they were. The pur­ pose of the Turkish military action was to liberate both Muslims and Christians from the Dashnak yoke so that the two could live in harmony. It was now necessary to establish an Armenian government that would behave toward Turkey as a good neighbor. The defeat of the Dashnaks 55 General Karabekir reported on November 3 that he had lost only 9 killed and 42 wounded during the operations and that the preliminary count of Armenian deaths was 1,110, of which 270 had occurred in a battle outside of Kars at Bash-Gadiklar on October 31. He expected these figures to rise when a count was in for the outlying areas of Kars. See Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1146, and Karabekir, op. át., p. 897. 56 For the controversy surrounding Halid’s responsibility for allowing most of die Ar­ menian garrison to escape, see Dogu Cephesi, pp. 201—202. 57 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 132—133; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10. 58 Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1142. 59 Ibid., doc. no. 1143.

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by the strong Turkish army was a triumph of justice. Karabekir pledged to look after the Armenians having come under his jurisdiction but threatened to deal severely with traitors, spies, and all who hid or har­ bored Armenian officers or soldiers. The Armenian populace was given forty-eight hours to report the whereabouts of concealed military per­ sonnel and to turn in all weapons, including hunting rifles, pistols, knives and daggers, and bombs, grenades, and dynamite. Merciless pun­ ishment awaited those who did not comply.60 Many explanations have been offered for one of the most ignoble defeats in Armenian military history. These include the incompetence and divisiveness of the Armenian high command at Kars; the lack of cohesion between officers and enlisted men and between Western Ar­ menian partisans and Eastern Armenian regulars; the assignment of un­ trained recruits to the front lines, where they were given to quick fatigue and panic; the defeatist propaganda of Bolshevik agents; the lack of time to become accustomed to and trained in the use of the cumbersome Ross rifles; the failure to seize the initiative and engage in offensive operations that would raise troop morale; the irregularities in commu­ nication and transportation; the shortage of general reserves; the need to deploy significant forces to the Kazakh, Nakhichevan, and Surmalu fronts; and the superiority of the enemy in terms of commanders, num­ bers, and discipline.61 Yet when all was said and done, the fact remained that the Armenians had collapsed at a critical moment and given up the fight as much for psychological as for military reasons. The largest and mightiest fortress of all Transcaucasia was again in Turkish hands.

Alexandropol

The day after the fall of Kars, columns of mud-splattered soldiers and civilians crammed the road to Alexandropol. The disorderly retreat of the Armenian regiments continued up to Kizil-Chakhchakh, just a short distance from the Arpachai River and Alexandropol. Only Sebouh’s de­ tachments from the Ardahan and Zarushat sectors withdrew in full order and formation. During an informal military council held at the village of Novo-Troitskoe on October 31 and attended by General Hovsepian, Sebouh, Colonel Mirimanian, Colonel Baghdasarian, and other officers, 60 Ibid., doc. no. 1145. 61 See, for example, Babalian, op. dt., pp. 63—68; Ter-Hakobian, op. dt., pp. 113—116; Sassuni, op. dt., pp. 179-212; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, “Verdjin antskere Hayastanum.” A description of the purported treacherous activity of Bolshevik agents in Kars is given in Haradj, Nov. 9:4, 1920. For similar criticism by the last generation of Soviet Armenian historians, see, for example, Hr. R. Simonian, Turk-haikakan haraberutiunneripatmutiunits (Erevan, 1991), pp. 399—400.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

a proposal to regroup and recapture Kars before the enemy had time to bring up reinforcements and become adjusted to the fortress was dismissed by Hovsepian, who insisted that the troops would not fight. An attempt would be made to protect Alexandropol from positions around Kizil-Chakhchakh. Even there, however, General Hovsepian was reluctant to leave his railway coach until Sebouh cajoled him to show himself to the troops and help regroup the 5,000 soldiers in the dis­ trict.62 On the right flank, Sebouh’s men, primarily the 8th Regiment and Smbat’s detachment, took up positions on the slopes of Beyuk and Ku­ chuk Ghemli (Kmly) and at the village of Vardanlu. The center, near the railroad, was held by the battalions of Colonel Hasan-Pashayan’s 2d Regiment, which had arrived from the southern front, together with elements of the ist and 7th regiments, whereas the left flank was en­ trusted to the cavalry of Colonel Korganian and the partisans of Sassuntsi Mushegh. The establishment of this tenuous line did not halt the wide­ spread desertion, especially among the enlisted men from the plain of Shirak, who wanted to get to their families before the Turkish army appeared. Even the intensely patriotic Western Armenian units shrank with alarming rapidity, prompting Sebouh to order the execution by firing squad of several deserters as a warning to the rest. Rumors were rife that the Turks were in hot pursuit. The sighting of a few unidentified horsemen created fear and terror. Although the Armenian armored train Vardan Zoravar scouted between Kizil-Chakhchakh and Kars and found that the Turkish forces had advanced no farther than Mazra, the loss of the entire province of Kars and perhaps even Alexandropol loomed as a very real possibility.63 In Alexandropol commandant Arsen Shahmazian, cabinet members Arshak Djamalian and Gevorg Ghazarian, and Governor Garo Sassuni tried to maintain order. These efforts were undermined, however, by the overlapping jurisdictions of the representatives of the central gov­ ernment, the provincial governor, the city council, and the zemstvo ad­ ministration. In addition, arriving by train from Erevan on November 1 to assess the situation and hearten the troops were some twenty govern­ ment and party officials, among them Minister of Military Affairs TerMinasian, Commander in Chief Nazarbekian, former prime minister Hovhannes Kachaznuni, and Speaker of Parliament Levon Shant. Dur­ ing a consultative meeting of these officials and the local authorities, strong pressure was brought to bear on Ter-Minasian to assume com­ mand of the front and lead a mixed military and civilian army reminis­ 62 Baghdasarian, op. cit., pp. 252—256; Sassuni, op. cit., pp. 135—136. 6S Sassuni, op. cit., pp. 137—138, 147—148.

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cent of that which fought in the battle of Sardarabad in 1918. Follow­ ing an inspection of the front with General Nazarbekian, however, TerMinasian reported that demoralization and desertion were so advanced that he could not accept the charge. While several of the Erevan officials, including member of Parliament Enovk Mirakian, set out to join Sebouh’s units, Ter-Minasian, Nazarbekian, Kachaznuni, and the rest re­ turned to Erevan to advise the government to sue for a truce without delay, as everyone—soldier and civilian—was begging for peace.64 In an­ ticipation of this eventuality, the internal affairs ministry ordered the Alexandropol provincial, municipal, and zemstvo administrations to stay in place to assist the population in case of a Turkish occupation of the city, which was the headquarters of all Near East Relief operations in Armenia. The inhabitants were to be encouraged to remain in Alexan­ dropol and weather the storm as they had done in 1918.65 General Kiazim Karabekir, uplifted by his sweet victory at Kars, now prepared to implement the third phase of his long-conceived opera­ tional plan—the occupation of all territory up to the Arpachai and Araxes rivers and the capture of Alexandropol to vanquish the Armenian government. He subsequently wrote that this decision was met with re­ sistance from Angora. Mustafa Kemal allegedly was worried about a rup­ ture in Soviet-Turkish relations. The Greek army was poised for a deeper penetration into western Anatolia, and if the Red Army also turned against Turkey because of the Armenian campaign, the Nationalists would be caught in the nightmare of a war on two fronts. Even the Georgians, if they considered their vital interests in jeopardy, might join the batde. To avoid such undesirable consequences, the Turkish divi­ sions should remain concentrated in and around Kars. Karabekir boasted that he replied to the doubters in Angora that he would not stop the pursuit of one enemy for fear of another imaginary foe. If the Georgians tried anything, he would rout them after first giving the Ar­ menians another sharp blow: “I am advancing.”66 Despite Karabekir’s sarcasm about the reluctance in Angora to con­ tinue the offensive, there is evidence that such action was exactly what Mustafa Kemal desired. As early as October 31, Chief of the General Staff Ismet advised Karabekir that the military victory at Kars should be

64 Khatisian, op. át., p. 250; Sassuni, op. cit., pp. 139—143; H. Irazek [Hakob Ter-Hakobian], Edjer Hayastani ankakhutianpatmutiunits (Cairo, 1959), pp. 71—73; Armenia Archives, 200/2/86, p. 70. See also Ashot Hovhannisian, “Hamazgayin krizise” (Noyemberian heghapokhutian hingerord taredardzi artiv) (Erevan, 1926), pp. 11—12. 65 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 144—145, 159—160, maintains that certain compromised officials such as himself were authorized by government representatives to leave Alexandropol be­ fore the arrival of the Turkish army. 66 Karabekir, op. cit., p. 899. See also Kutay, op. át., pp. 51—52.

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used to further the fundamental goals of the Nationalist movement. Spe­ cifically, he should seize all Armenian arms and destroy Armenia as a military power before peace was concluded between the two sides. The eastern army should be ready to transport the captured war matériel to the western front. Ismet Bey asked for detailed information about the strength and positions of the remaining Armenian forces. He urged the immediate continuation of the offensive.67 In his reply, Karabekir explained that it was possible to move either in the direction of Erevan or of Alexandropol. The first route was open and offered a sure and decisive outcome, but the condition of the roads and surrounding terrain might make it difficult to provision the troops. The second route would also be fatiguing because of the severe winter weather, with the consequence that the military objective might not be attained so quickly, but it afforded much better communication and transportation facilities. Moreover, the capture of Alexandropol might be sufficient to bring the Armenians completely to their knees and to settle the whole Armenian question without the need for any further action. Karabekir had decided on this option and after giving his men a brief, well-deserved rest would resume the offensive.68 The Turkish army marched out of Kars on the morning of November 3. The 9th Division advanced north of the railway and made camp at Meds Parget and Novo-Petrovka, and the 12th Division proceeded south of the railroad toward Subatan and Khajivali (Hajiveli). The next day the expedition reached the Kars River between Kars and Alexandropol and came under fire from the Armenian armored train. For the rest of the day, the Turkish artillery bombarded the Armenian positions near Kizil-Chakhchakh. For two days, Sebouh’s troops at the Ghemli and Vardanlu heights held their ground with renewed courage. When eight companies of the Turkish 29th Regiment and a squadron of cavalry advanced through the Argina gorge toward Kizil-Chakhchakh and were joined by the 28th Regiment from the northwest, however, the Arme­ nian center abandoned the village and railroad station and drew back to the Arpachai River. The left wing, without making contact with the Turkish 12th Division, retreated, together with General Hovsepian and his staff, toward the Alexandropol-Erevan railway near the stations of Aghin and Ani. Sebouh was then ordered to regroup his men at MollaMusa, the gateway to Alexandropol.69 As various military units crossed the Arpachai River into the Severskii

67 Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1144. 68 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 204—205. 69 Baghdasarían, op. át., pp. 256—257; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 148—153; Armenia Archives, 200/1/441, p. 176, and 200/1/602, p. 104; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 205—209.

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barracks and the fortress of Alexandropol, Colonel Shahmazian tried without success to hold the men on the western perimeter of the city. By then, Alexandropol was in a state of chaos, as many townspeople joined the stream of terrified refugees from Kars fleeing toward BashAbaran and Karakilisa. Shops and warehouses were broken into, as loot­ ers argued with the militia that it was better they take the goods than leave them for the Turks to enjoy. Bolsheviks who had been imprisoned after the May uprising were now released, both to spare them from phys­ ical harm and, more important, to use them as intermediaries with the Turks, who continued to advance under red banners and with Bolshevik slogans. The freed Bolsheviks immediately issued a leaflet calling upon the population not to resist the Turks, who came as comrades. Several of the Bolsheviks tried to proclaim the city under Soviet rule, but they were given stern warnings by Shahmazian and Sebouh and sent to their homes. Nonetheless, much of the city’s population had lost all faith in the government and viewed the establishment of Soviet order as the only possible salvation.70 As the Turkish army approached the Arpachai River on November 5, General Silikian transferred his headquarters to Jajur on the Alexandropol-Karakilisa line, whereas most members of the provincial, municipal, and zemstvo administrations left the city for Bayandur in violation of directives from Erevan. The government, announcing that those officials would be held accountable for dereliction of duty, appointed Levon Sargsian as its representative and named him acting mayor of Alexan­ dropol. To the north of the city, Sebouh’s troops fought spiritedly against three Turkish columns and turned them back before nightfall on November 5, prompting General Silikian and some municipal offi­ cials to return to the city.71 Even as the Bureau-Government was faced with the inescapable need 70 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 154—158; Simon Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji ev trkakan sali midjev (Beirut, 1953), pp. 116—117; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 270, and 200/ 2/104, p. 4; Gabriel Lazian, Hayastan ev hai date: Hai-ev-Rus haraberutiunneru luisin tak (Cairo, 1957), pp. 261—262; Haradj, Nov. 9:4, 1920. A Bolshevik meeting in Alexandropol on November 10 demanded the sovietization of Armenia. On November 16 a military revolutionary committee was organized in Alexandropol with the tacit permission of the Turkish command, and this body declared the establishment of Soviet rule on November 17. For criticisms by Soviet historians of the Alexandropol Bolsheviks, who were manipu­ lated by the Turkish occupiers, see, for example, H[A].M. Elchibekian, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Erevan, 1963), pp. 208— 211. See also Ds. P. Aghayan, Hoktembereev hai zhoghovrdi azatagrakanpaikare (Erevan, 1982), PP- 317—318; Hovhannisian, op. cit., pp. 13—14. 71 Irazek, op. át., pp. 73—74; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 155—156; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 433; E. A. Zohrabian, Sovetakan Rusastane ev hai-turkakan haraberutiunnere 1920— 1922 tt. (Erevan, 1979), p. 75. For a subsequent government directive to arrest and try the heads of the Alexandropol city administration and militia for dereliction of duty, see Ar­ menia Archives, 200/1/607, pp. 201-202; Haradj, Nov. 9:1, 1920.

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to sue for a truce, it continued to issue futile appeals. On November 5, Ohandjanian telegraphed the Allied governments and President Wilson that Armenia had been crushed in the struggle against the common foe. Kars was lost, and Alexandropol was on the verge of falling. Armenia “sends a last appeal and begs actual relief by intervention in the armed conflict and causing the enemy to cease military operations through diplomatic channels.’’72 In Tiflis, Tigran Bekzadian called at every Allied mission to deplore the abandonment of Armenia despite its fidelity to the Allied cause. For six weeks he had reported regularly on the cata­ strophic Turkish advance and urged strong counteraction and pressure both on the Kemalists and on the Constantinople government, but no positive response had been forthcoming. As half of the Armenian re­ public was now occupied by the enemy and the population faced anni­ hilation, the government might be obliged to spare the people by sub­ mitting to a costly truce. It was particularly bitter that this tragic situation came at a time when Armenia had been recognized by the Allied Powers and had attained de jure status by virtue of its participation in the Treaty of Sèvres. The resources and patience of a martyred people had run out, and the government would have to come to terms with the aggressors unless at this last moment the Allied Powers actively intervened.73 It was clear by November 1920 that the Allied Powers would not in­ tervene. When, for example, Colonel Stokes telegraphed to London on November 5 that in the absence of Allied help Armenia would probably save itself by becoming Bolshevik but that Ohandjanian had put off the offer of Soviet mediation in the expectation of immediate Allied sup­ port, Foreign Office Eastern division chief Dwight Osborne wrote in the minutes: “As was to be expected the Armenians blame us for all their troubles simply because we have done most for them. It is quite untrue to say that they have delayed anything ‘in expectation of immediate Al­ lied support’, by which I suppose they mean military support. They had no grounds whatever for expecting military support from us & I think we should make this clear both here to the President of the Armenian Delegation & at Erivan.’’74 The French and Americans were no more reassuring. Colonel Corbel 72 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/30; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report of Nov. 16, 1920; FO 371/4963, Ei4514/134/58. 7S FO 4965, Ei5519/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 7, 1920, enclosure, and WO 95/4959, entries for Nov. 2 and 4, 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Bekzadian to Moser, Nov. 4, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, Bekzadian to Allied mis­ sions, Nov. 5, and a subsequent communication, Nov. 11, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/ 2/81, pp. 21—22. See also Bekzadian’s report of his meeting with Stokes, 200/1/602, pp. 12-13. 74 FO 371/4963, E14100/134/58. A message to the effect suggested by Osborne was dispatched to Colonel Stokes on November 19.

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and Consul Nettement explained to Bekzadian that their many tele­ grams requesting aid for Armenia had not produced results, except that some arms and ammunition were reportedly en route from Varna.75 American Consul-General Charles Moser regretted the difficult situation in which the Armenian people and government found themselves, but he reminded Bekzadian that the United States was not a signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres. The American government had recognized the inde­ pendence of Armenia and had helped as much as possible, but it had never assumed any commitment to defend the Republic. The responsi­ bility for the current crisis, therefore, belonged to powers other than the United States of America.76 In its appeal to the Armenian public on November 5, Ohandjanian’s government declared that the army had been stunned by the fall of Kars and that the enemy was hastening to exploit that advantage. All the Armenian villages up to the Arpachai River were again being emptied, and once more the peasants were being turned into miserable refugees. “Again plunder and devastation, again famine and misery, again mas­ sacre.’’ The Turkish forces striking into the heart of the plain of Shirak were small, yet the population had surrendered to fear and panic. “What is this flight? Where are the masses, which have lost their head, fleeing? There is nowhere to run.” The merciless enemy was to the rear, and the sealed boundaries of Georgia were to the fore. It was now a question “either to be saved through battle—or to die with honor.” The people had to overcome their paralysis. “Forget your personal work, forget for a moment your wretched calculations, forget your field, your vineyard, your workshop, your store. Forget everything and throw yourself toward the front.”

Armenian soldier, you, who are called to the glory of Free Armenia, where is your reputed courage and boldness? Have you forgotten the heroic battles of Sardarabad and Karakilisa? Have you erased from memory those thousands of heroes who sacrificed themselves for the glory of the fatherland? . . . Consolidate your ranks and forward to positions. Forward fearlessly and daringly. The enemy is small in number and weak. One attack, one strong blow, and victory is certain. People of Armenia .. . only your own power will save you. . . . Come to your

75 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 10. See also Corbel’s reports in Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829 and 20N/187. According to reports in these files and in 17N/590, dossier 2, the SS Boris arrived in Poti on October 29, bringing from the Allied storage depots in Bulgaria 6,200 Lebel rifles, 5,316 bayonets, and 6,500,400 bullets. Because of the discouraging military situation in Armenia, these arms were turned over to Georgia at the beginning of December. 76 US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Moser to Bekzadian, Nov. 6, 1920 (also in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17). See also RG 59, 760J.67/23.

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senses, gather your entire strength. The enemy is threatening our existence. If we want to live, we must fight. War or death—there is no other way.77

The Cease-fire

The hope of the Armenian government was that all elements of the population would join to slow the enemy advance and make the invasion costly enough that the Turks would be more disposed to offer relatively lenient terms of peace. Even as the Turkish offensive resumed on No­ vember 3, Hamazasp Ohandjanian, in his role as foreign minister, ad­ dressed a telegram through General Karabekir to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey: The Turkish and Armenian peoples having lived as neighbors for centuries, the common boundaries of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia now dictate that there be peaceful relations between those governments based on mutual respect and the vital interests of each country.... From the declarations of the Grand National Assembly, it is clear to the Ar­ menian government and people that the Turkish people and the Grand National Assembly, accepting along with other civilized peoples the principle of self-de­ termination, have recognized the right of the Republic of Armenia to a peaceful and independent existence. Taking all this into consideration, the Armenian people and government find it incomprehensible and surprising that your troops have advanced toward the boundaries of Armenia without explaining the reasons and purposes, especially after your categoric declaration that you would not pass beyond the borders of the Ottoman state. The offensive is causing unnecessary bloodshed. With the desire to end the conflict through peaceful means, the Armenian government already on October 8 through its plenipotentiary representative in Constantinople has tried to learn from Turkish circles close to you the reasons for the assault in order to find an avenue of mutual agreement. Now, motivated by the same sentiments, the Armenian government is directly addressing the Grand National Assembly to come to a mutual understanding and accord. Confident that such a course can and will be found, the Armenian government is requesting from your government to set the time and place for your and our representatives to meet in order to clarify the reasons for the conflict and to seek a peaceful solution.78

The following day, General Nazarbekian instructed General Silikian to request a cease-fire from the Turkish command. Because of the in­ tense fighting around Kizil-Chakhchakh, however, the Armenian com77 Armenia Archives, 199/1/244, p. 6, 200/1/602, p. 80, and 200/2/86, pp. 62—63; “Turkiayi nvajoghakan kaghakakanutiune Hayastanum,” comp. O. Balikian, V. Evoyan, and G. Sargsian, Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 12th yr., no. 1 (1971), p. 36 (cited hereafter as “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune’’). See also Haradj, Nov. 7:2, 1920. 78 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 73; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 501—502.

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muniqué could not be delivered to one of Karabekir’s officers until the afternoon of November 5?9 From Erevan, Captain H. C. Court reported to Colonel Stokes that any further delay in suing for peace might pro­ duce an antigovemment uprising. Ohandjanian’s cabinet, Court ex­ plained, did not favor direct Soviet intervention because that would give the Russians a strong foothold in Armenia, which could lead to a coup d’état. The cabinet preferred that the Allies act as mediators with Mus­ tafa Kemal, as any resulting settlement would be more effective and more permanent than one reached through Soviet mediation. The British commissioners in Tiflis and Constantinople were asked to take part in this endeavor, and the Allied Powers could assist by exerting pressure on Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha’s cabinet in Constantinople and by using the good offices of American and French contacts with Mustafa Kemal. Ohandjanian was skeptical of the explanation that the Allies had no relations with Kemal and therefore could not influence him. The Ar­ menian government, Court continued, was intensely anti-Bolshevik and was ready to help the Turks if they intended to fight against the Bolshe­ viks. The existence of an independent Armenia, the government be­ lieved, was in Turkey’s own interest. Yet Arshak Djamalian, who had just returned from Alexandropol, reported that much of the population re­ garded the Turks as Bolsheviks and that all classes were now turning in favor of sovietization. As many as 100,000 refugees had collected on the road to Karakilisa and in the Lori neutral zone.79 80 It was not until the early hours of November 7 that the Armenian command in Alexandropol received from Karabekir a packet, which in­ cluded a communication from Turkish Acting Foreign Affairs Commis­ sar Ahmed Mukhtar. Karabekir claimed that he had not received Ohandjanian’s November 3 telegram addressed to the Grand National Assembly until three days later, giving rise to speculation that he was intentionally delaying its transmission until he had achieved his military objectives.81 The telegram of Ahmed Mukhtar, dated November 2, 1920, was laced with a combination of revolutionary rhetoric, triumphal gloat­ ing, and feigned solicitude: At the hour of a complete victory coming to crown the efforts of its armies of the eastern front, the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey wishes to renew to the Armenian people the offer of peace made previously and to give to it once more the assurance that it does not now harbor nor has it ever harbored the idea of depriving the Armenian of his independence or any of his rights. We believe, however, that the Armenian government should act in the 79 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 78. See also Irazek, op. dt., pp. 75—76. 80 Copy in Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 105. 81 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 102, 270; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11.

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same way toward us and cease to serve as the docile instrument of British im­ perialism in the Orient. We are conscious that the long, bloody battles between the Turkish and Ar­ menian peoples up to the year 1918 were caused essentially by the ambitions of tsarism to establish its domination over eastern Anatolia. The fall of the imperial regime of Russia led to a period of calm, thanks to the cold-bloodedness of Turkey in face of the terrible massacres perpetrated by the Armenian bands after the retreat of the Russians. The peace which we established was broken anew when English imperialism wanted to vanquish Mesopotamia and put its hands on Persia and the petroleum of Baku; and just as Armenia had served tsarism it now placed itself at the service of England and opened against us a new era of hostility, which has added to the grand profits of the financiers of London. The Turkish people, which virtually alone in the Orient has resisted the rapaciousness of the Occidental capitalists, cannot permit the unceasing Armenian plots against its life and the attack on its eastern provinces in an attempt to extend a hand to the British armies in Mes­ opotamia and Persia in order to annihilate for all time the little freedom and independence which still remains in unfortunate Asia. It is these considerations and the incessant attacks of the Armenian troops that have forced us to act vigorously against your state, but not wanting to pass up the opportunity to put to an end the effusion of blood, we are asking the Erevan government to consider the present note as a formal offer of peace on the part of the government of the [Grand] National Assembly of Turkey. All that is necessary is for Armenia to give us effective assurances that henceforth it does not contemplate any aggressive designs against us and will cease being the outpost in the Orient of English capitalists. We are ready to give the Armenian people similar assurances and ask to that effect that negotiations for peace begin promptly in the hope that our moderation and our pacific sentiments will be fully appreciated by you.82

Together with Ahmed Mukhtar’s communication, the packet in­ cluded General Karabekir’s reply to General Silikian’s request for a cease-fire. Pending an answer from his government to Ohandjanian’s November 3 telegram, Karabekir agreed to grant a truce and avoid fur­ ther bloodshed on certain conditions. In order to guarantee the security of his armed forces, to have firm proof that the Armenian proposal was real and sincere, and to safeguard the positions of both armies during the peace negotiations, he offered the following terms (paraphrased) : 1. The Armenian armed forces located to the west of the Arpachai River were to clear that region as well as Alexandropol (Gumru) and withdraw at least 15 kilometers (9 miles) east of the river. 2. The city of Alexandropol would not be placed under Turkish military oc­ cupation, except for the fort and the railway station. 3. Inasmuch as Alexandropol had great importance as a junction on the TiflisErevan railway, the Armenians were to raise no objections or obstacles to the 82 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 64—65, and 200/2/97, pp. 1—2; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 500—501.

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occupation by the Turkish army of a radius of 10 kilometers (6 miles) around the city. 4. For the duration of the cease-fire, there was to be no attack or firing on the Turkish forces from any quarter or for any reason. 5. The Armenian armed forces would clear the west bank of the Arpachai by 10 o’clock in the morning and complete the withdrawal from Alexandropol by 5 o’clock in the afternoon on November 7.

The note concluded: “If these conditions are not accepted and an an­ swer agreeing to them is not received by 8 o’clock in the morning on 7 November 1920, I shall be obliged to resume the military operations and all resulting material and moral responsibility will fall on you as the commander of the Armenian army.”83 Karabekir’s letter, dated November 6, was received at General Silikian’s headquarters at 1 o’clock in the morning on November 7, just a few hours before the expiration of the time limit. After translation of the Turkish text, Silikian, Assistant Minister of Military Affairs Hakhverdian, Sebouh, Shahmazian, and Enovk Mirakian spoke by direct wire at 3 o’clock with Ohandjanian, members of the cabinet, Commander in Chief Nazarbekian, and Dro in Erevan. A sense of emergency permeated the exchange; no one doubted Karabekir’s ability and desire to continue the offensive, and at least two hours would be required to deliver the Armenian reply to the Turkish command. After those assembled in Al­ exandropol had advised that the government could not count on the army to hold the enemy at the Arpachai line, the cabinet went into extraordinary session.84 At 5 o’clock, General Nazarbekian informed General Hakhverdian that, much to his personal regret, Prime Minister Ohandjanian had just told him that the government had agreed to Kara­ bekir’s conditions and had instructed him to transmit this decision to the Turkish commander. Nazarbekian authorized Hakhverdian because of the shortage of time to decide where the affected elements of the army were to be sent. In view of the momentous responsibility, Hakh­ verdian asked to be informed officially by telegram with the signatures of the prime minister, the military minister, and the commander in chief. He suggested that the troops be withdrawn in equal parts toward Erevan and Karakilisa. Nazarbekian replied that Ter-Minasian wanted Sebouh and the light artillery to take up positions at Jajur and Silikian’s headquarters to transfer to Erevan.85 83 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 101—103, and 200/2/86, pp. 74—75; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune,” pp. 37—38. See also Karabekir, op. át., p. 897; Kutay, op. át., p. 54; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 502—503; A. Esayan, Hayastani midjazgayin-iravakan drutiune, 1920—1922 (Erevan, 1967), p. 46. 84 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 141, and 200/1/621, pp. 58—59. 85 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 142.

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At 5:20 in the morning on November 7, Ohandjanian, Ter-Minasian, and Nazarbekian sent the following radiogram to Hakhverdian and Silikian: “Having heard the Turkish Eastern Front Commander in Chief Ferik Kiazim Karabekir’s proposed terms for an armistice and taking into consideration the military situation and the opinion of the military com­ mand of Alexandropol, the government unanimously decided to accept the terms proposed by the Turks and charges the command to imple­ ment the same.’’86 Ten minutes later, Sebouh, whose men had held back the Turks at the entrance to Alexandropol, addressed Ohandjanian by direct wire to express his deep discontent with the hasty acquiescence in the Turkish demands. Asserting that the strength of the Turks had been grossly exaggerated, he warned that once the terms of the armistice had been fulfilled the Turks would be in a much stronger position to demand even more and to put the Armenians into calamitous straits. The Turks should be told that the present lines would be held during the negotiations for peace. If they rejected this proposal, then the battle should continue, as only veteran fighters were now at the front. “This is my final answer and if the government does not concur with me, I am relinquishing my command.’’ Ohandjanian replied that the government had taken all factors fully into account, including the opinion of the supreme military command. The troops, not excepting those of Sebouh, were unwilling to continue the battle, and there was no choice but to submit to the Turkish conditions. The government was ordering Sebouh to remain at his post. The old warrior had at least stated for the record his outrage at the humiliation of the Armenian army.87 At dawn on November 7, General Silikian sent a courier to the Turkish line with his government’s acceptance of Karabekir’s terms. By nightfall, all Armenian units had crossed to the eastern side of the Arpachai River, and except for the militia the entire Alexandropol garrison had evacu­ ated the city. The 7th and 8th regiments constituting Sebouh’s 4th Bri­ gade withdrew to Jajur, where the 7th Regiment took up positions be­ tween the railroad station and the village and the 8th Regiment on the right flank held the snow-covered hills around Aghkilisa and the zig-zag road leading over the 9,000-foot pass toward Hamamlu (Spitak). The far left flank at Haji-Nazar was defended by one battalion of the 6th Regiment brought up from the Dilijan sector. Several partisan detach­ ments and a part of the civilian population of Alexandropol took refuge in the heights of Norashen and Bash-Abaran. The ist and 4th regiments drew back with cannons and machine guns to Molla-Geokcha and Horom (Khorum) on the slopes of Mount Aragads (Alagiaz). General Hov86 Armenia Archives, 200/2/86, p. 71. See also 200/1/602, p. 42. 87 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 143.

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sepian, Smbat, and Sassuntsi Mushegh made the village of Sogudi the military center of the Aragads region. Colonel Korganian’s cavalry and two battalions of the 2d Regiment protected the railroad to Erevan from the station of Aghin.88 General Karabekir announced to his troops the Armenian acceptance of his conditions and ordered the 9th and 12 th divisions to range along the Arpachai River pending the Armenian withdrawal to the required lines. The 12 th Division would take control of the Shuragial-Tiknis-Pirvali area, the 9th Division would maintain order in the Molla-MusaGhemli-Vardanlu district, and the Azerbaijani cavalry and ashiret regi­ ments would be held in reserve. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon, Major Emin Bey, commander of the 28th Regiment, would lead his men, a company of cavalry, and a battery of artillery across the Arpachai to occupy the railway station and inner fort of Alexandropol. As the Ar­ menians had accepted all the conditions for the truce, there was no cause to give provocation for the resumption of hostilities. The Turkish command had agreed not to place the city of Alexandropol under mil­ itary occupation, and any officer or enlisted man apprehended there would face severe punishment, as would those who molested the civilian population or tried to take “even the most common object.’’89 In Alexandropol, the Armenian government was represented by Le­ von Sargsian for civilian affairs and Major General Pavel D. Melik-Shahnazarian for military affairs. The general staff instructed Melik-Shahnazarian to supervise closely the terms of the truce. During the temporary occupation of Alexandropol, neither the Turks nor the Armenians were to remove arms, ammunition, or military stores from the fortress. The Turkish positions should be checked to ensure that they did not extend more than 10 kilometers from the city and that a neutral zone of 3 to 5 kilometers was maintained between the Turkish and Armenian lines. The Armenians were to be allowed to use the railroad through Alexan­ dropol without interference or the need of written permission from the Turkish command. Officers were to retain their weapons, but enlisted men were to pass unarmed through the zone of occupation. Fuel oil to operate the railroads and kerosene and bread for the needs of the pop­ ulation were to be transported freely on the railway, and telegraphic communications through Alexandropol were to be available for both sides. Minister of Communications Djamalian telegraphed Sargsian to create in consultation with General Melik-Shahnazarian a commission

88 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 17/17,67/3«, and 116/115; Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/441, pp. 177—178. See also FO 371/4962, E13960/134/58 enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 17N/590, dossier 2, Reports of Nov. 8 and 10, 1920. 89 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 213—214.

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of persons to take up with the Turks military matters not covered in the armistice. In case of serious questions, the commission was to seek di­ rectives from the high command in Erevan.90 The first companies of Turkish infantry and cavalry, in all some 600 men, took possession of the Alexandropol railway station and inner fort on the evening of November 7. They were followed by several more battalions during the next three days and placed under the leadership of Emin Bey, whom Karabekir named commandant of the fortress. Enovk Mirakian reported that the Turks began to plunder the warehouses, including those of the Near East Relief, on November 8 and 9. In a letter sent through the headquarters of the commander of the rear, Major General Mikhail V. Areshian, in Karakilisa, Mirakian warned the govern­ ment that the Turks had occupied the post and telephone offices and were censoring all communications.91 With Karabekir’s requirements for a cease-fire having been met, Hamazasp Ohandjanian telegraphed Foreign Affairs Commissar Ahmed Mukhtar on November 8 that the Armenian government had received with satisfaction the Turkish suggestion to commence negotiations for peace, especially as it corresponded with the Armenian proposal to es­ tablish a lasting entente based on mutual respect. He recommended Alexandropol as a suitable site for the conference, particularly as it af­ forded equal telegraphic facilities for both sides. “Taking advantage of this opportunity, my government assures you that it is entirely in accord with the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to con­ clude a lasting peace responsive to the vital needs of the two states, guaranteeing for the Republic of Armenia its cultural and industrial development and creating the grounds of mutual friendship and right thereby contributing to the work of peace in the Orient to the benefit of our two peoples.” Ohandjanian denied that the Armenians had ever served as agents of tsarism or any other form of imperialism. “The gov­ ernment of Armenia does not allow itself to be guided by transitory considerations or by the daily changes of atmosphere but only by the strong desire to establish the foundations for stable relations with Turkey while remaining a viable state.” Ohandjanian hoped that a swift re­ sponse from Angora would lead to a resolution to the long-standing and heavily laden question of Armeno-Turkish relations.92* 90 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, pp. 156—160. See also 200/2/104, pp. 4—5, for a report of conditions in Alexandropol on November 7, when most of the city administration and militia had abandoned the city. 91 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 270; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11. 92 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 177—178, 200/1/621, pp. 55, 83, and 200/2/97, pp. 11—12. For the government’s public declaration about the truce, see 199/1/244, p. 6, 200/1/448, p. 1, and 200/1/621, p. 56. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Haradj, Nov. 9:1—2, 1920.

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The New Turkish Demands

Commander of the Eastern Front Kiazim Karabekir crossed over the Arpachai River on November 8 to inspect Emin Bey’s garrison and to relay to Erevan a communication from his government. The packet was delivered to the Armenian front lines near Jajur and conveyed from Sebouh’s headquarters to General Areshian in Karakilisa, where the con­ tents were translated and forwarded by direct wire to Erevan shortly before dawn on November 9. In his cover letter, Karabekir stated that in compliance with the request of General Silikian he had ordered a cease-fire as soon as his terms had been met, pending a reply from his government to the Armenian proposal to begin negotiations for peace. He was now transmitting verbatim his government’s conditions for an armistice. As soon as the Armenian government accepted and fulfilled the terms, the peace negotiations could begin in Alexandropol. An an­ swer was required within twenty-four hours of delivery of the packet to the Armenian front line.93 Mustafa Kemal’s demands were staggering: 1. Within twenty-four hours, the Armenian army had to turn over to the Turk­ ish command in Alexandropol 2,000 rapid-fire rifles with accessories, 20 heavy and 40 light machine guns with the requisite animals, three horse-drawn batter­ ies of heavy cannons, 4,000 cases of rifle ammunition, 6,000 cannon shells, 1 locomotive, and 50 railroad cars. The Armenian regular and irregular armed forces were to withdraw east of a line from the course of the Arpachai (Akhurian) River to Alagiaz station, Kirmizlu, Kulidjan, Nalband station, and Vorontsovka. The railway lying to the west of that line was to be left wholly intact and operative. 2. Within three days, the Armenian regular and irregular armed forces were to withdraw farther, east of the line of Surmalu-Araxes station-Kizil-ZiaretMount Alagiaz-Tanagirmaz-Novo-Mikhailovka-Lorut-Shamut-Yalvandagh. 3. Immediately after conclusion of the truce, all military transport between Sanahin and Alexandropol was to end. In order to ensure compliance with this term, Turkish commissions would be placed at Sanahin and Karakilisa. The Ar­ menian government would guarantee the inviolability of these commissions and their unhindered communication with the Turkish command at Alexandropol. 4. The peace delegations of the two sides would arrive in Alexandropol within three days after the truce took effect and be prepared to begin negotiations as soon as the first two conditions had been fully implemented. 5. For the duration of the truce, the Turkish armed forces would not advance beyond the Arpachai-Nalband-Vorontsovka line identified in the first condition. 6. Both sides were to cease hostilities as soon as the truce was signed.949 9S Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 151, and 200/2/86, p. 80; Ter-Hakobian, op. át., pp. 117—118; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 504; Esayan, op. át., p. 47. 94 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, and File 67/30, Toumanoff to Allied missions, Nov. 12, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 151, 202—203, and 200/2/97, pp. 3— 4; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00/17, Moser to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1920, and RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Toumanoff to Moser, Nov. 12, 1920; FO 371/4963—4965,

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Submission to the Turkish ultimatum would eliminate all possibility of further Armenian resistance, place half the territory of the Armenian republic under foreign occupation, and hand over to the Turkish army supervision of the country’s primary artery of communication and trans­ portation with the outside world. Even with such acquiescence, there was no guarantee that the Turks would not exploit Armenia’s resulting helplessness to make additional, still harsher demands. It seemed that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, though having repudiated the sultan’s govern­ ment, was nonetheless bent on reviving the Batum treaty that the Young Turk regime under the sultan had thrust upon the Armenians in 1918. Stalling for a little time to decide on a course of action, Hamazasp Ohandjanian replied to Karabekir on November 9 that his government had just received the new Turkish terms and requested an extension of twenty-four hours, until 7 o’clock in the evening on November 10, to give an answer.95 The matter became even more perplexing on the night of November 9 with the receipt of another telegram, this one from Ahmed Mukhtar, dated November 8. Mukhtar’s communiqué, as paraphrased below, out­ lined the principles upon which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey offered to establish peace with Armenia: 1. The question of boundaries would be settled on the simple grounds of statistics and plebiscite. In keeping with the principle of self-determination pro­ claimed by President Wilson and the Bolsheviks, the population of all disputed districts would be invited to decide their political future by opting to form their own state or choosing to join either Armenia or Turkey. The plebiscite should be conducted as soon as possible, pending which order would be maintained by the gendarmerie of both sides. Such a solution was in the interest of all humanity, including the Turkish and Armenian inhabitants of the disputed territories. It had to be noted with regret, however, that the Erevan government in order to be pleasing to the Western imperialists, especially England, was disposed to other kinds of solutions based on the political ideologies and objectives of the West and giving great offense to the peoples of Africa and Asia. 2. Turkey was prepared to place all its resources at the disposal of its neighbors so that they could develop in complete independence and security. 3. Turkey would assist Armenia with provisions and would help reestablish normal economic conditions in the country. 4. Each side should agree to grant free passage over all its railroads and routes of communication to persons and goods of the other side and should raise no obstacles to transit to the sea or to third countries. 5. Turkey would permit the return home of all Armenians who had fled dur-*95

E14301/E14431/E14541/E15520/134/58 enclosures; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report of Nov. 16, 1920, and 20N/187, dossier 1, Report on political situation, Nov. 1—15, 1920; Dogu Cephesi, p. 215. The terms for a truce are paraphrased. 95 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /607, p. 203.

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ing the world war and accord them the rights enjoyed by ethnic minorities in the most civilized countries. 6. Armenia would have to give “necessary guarantees” for Turkey’s security requirements. The Armenian negotiators should set out for Alexandropol fully empowered to sign a treaty of peace.

Ahmed Mukhtar concluded that the Turkish conditions for a truce were being relayed separately through General Karabekir.96 The Turkish principles of peace on the one hand and actual condi­ tions for a truce on the other were characteristic of the tactics adopted by Mustafa Kemal’s government to speak in a conciliatory tone while making harsh demands. The new Turkish requirements for a truce were intended to preclude further Armenian resistance and to bring what was left of the country into the Turkish orbit of influence. Even in the seem­ ingly moderate principles upon which the peace negotiations were to be based, there were ominous implications. The offer of a plebiscite gave the aura of a democratic, progressive solution to the territorial disputes but in fact predetermined the outcome by virtue of the fact that the Armenian population had either been massacred or driven from the region. Moreover, the ambiguous reference to “necessary guarantees” for the security of Turkey presaged even more demands before a peace treaty was actually concluded. The reply that Hamazasp Ohandjanian telegraphed to Ahmed Mukh­ tar on November 10 was intended to evade acceptance of the new terms without giving obvious cause for the resumption of warfare. The Arme­ nian government, Ohandjanian began, was appreciative of the pacific spirit shown in Ahmed Mukhtar’s letter of November 2 and had ac­ cepted the terms of the armistice that had been proposed through Gen­ eral Karabekir. In keeping with the tenor of Ahmed Mukhtar’s letter and his note of November 8, the Armenian government had already named a peace delegation, which was prepared to depart for Alexan­ dropol to resolve existing differences about the terms and to conclude a mutually satisfactory peace. Inasmuch as the two governments were in general accord on the principles of peace, the initial conditions for an armistice had been fulfilled, and Turkey had received all the guarantees needed to conduct the negotiations in complete freedom and security, the peace conference should begin immediately. The Armenian dele­ gates were awaiting Ahmed Mukhtar’s notification relative to the open­

96 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 218—219, and 200/2/86, pp. 84—85; FO 371/ 4965, E15522/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 22, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Political report, Dec. 1, 1920, enclosure; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 507— 508.

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ing date of the conference, where any matters requiring further eluci­ dation could be addressed by the representatives of both governments.97 General Karabekir later wrote that the Armenian response was exactly what he had desired in order to have an excuse to resume the offensive and crush the Armenians into abject submission. Even before Ahmed Mukhtar had replied to Ohandjanian, Karabekir notified the Armenians on November 10 that he would not grant the twenty-four-hour extension of his time limit. The Armenian government should not confuse the preliminary terms he had offered to the Armenian command on Novem­ ber 6 with the formal conditions the Grand National Assembly had sub­ sequently made known on November 8. These did not constitute a re­ vision in the Turkish position, and the Armenian government’s placing them in that light raised serious questions about its sincerity. Because Armenia had not accepted the Turkish terms, thereby preventing the opening of negotiations, “it is with regret that I am announcing the resumption of military operations.’’98 In his reply on November 11, Ohandjanian also expressed the deep regret of the Armenian government that its desire to put an end to the bloodshed between the two neighboring peoples—a desire that had dic­ tated acceptance and execution of the truce terms initially offered by Karabekir—had not been sufficiently appreciated. It was equally disap­ pointed that Karabekir was resuming hostilities even before the Angora government had replied to the latest Armenian proposal. “While being obliged to take corresponding measures, my government firmly hopes that your government will do right by our peaceful desire to find the grounds that will conform to the interests and honor of the two peo­ ples.” Armenia awaited the Turkish response.99

The Parliamentary Debate

On the evening of November 11, the various Armeno-Turkish exchanges and developments since the beginning of the month were put before an extraordinary session of Parliament presided over by former prime min­ ister Kachaznuni and attended by prominent political, civic, and intel­ lectual figures. In his lengthy report, including verbatim readings of the exchanged correspondence and successive Turkish conditions for a 97 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 227, 200/2/86, pp. 81—82, and 200/2/97, pp. 4— 5; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 505—506. 98 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 229, and 200/2/86, pp. 82—83; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 506. See also Karabekir, op. át., p. 900, and Harb Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi (Sept. 1964), doc. no. 1148. 99 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 240, 200/1/625, p. 43, 200/2/86, p. 83, and 200/ 2/97, p. 6; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 115/14.

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truce, Prime Minister Ohandjanian underscored the striking difference between the words and actions of the opposing side. Armenia, he said, had demonstrated its good faith by accepting and fulfilling all the Turk­ ish demands, but these now had been followed by new terms amounting to an ultimatum intended to deprive Armenia of more than half its ter­ ritory and every means of self-defense. The open-ended requirement of “guarantees for security” indicated clearly that Turkey would make fur­ ther demands, perhaps including the total elimination of Armenia to satisfy Mustafa Kemal. The Armenian people was in grave peril: “It must either fight or be slaughtered mercilessly by the Turks. The government, exhausting all peaceful means, must again rely on arms, because there is no other way for the salvation of the land and people.”100 During the parliamentary debate, former prime minister Khatisian, who had recendy returned from abroad, declared that all wars eventually culminated in a peace treaty. But there were different kinds of settle­ ments: those of victors and vanquished, which caused negative conse­ quences for decades, and those of honor, which served the interests of both sides and allowed each to develop and prosper. The Armenian people sought an honorable peace materially and morally, keeping firm the country’s foundations. This was a war of the people in which every citizen had to participate, whether at the front or at the rear. It was not unusual for nations at war to seek external support. The Armenian peo­ ple had repeatedly appealed to foreign powers, but these petitions had fallen on deaf ears. At least, it had become self-evident that there would be no outside intervention. “We have now been engaged in battle against the enemy for two months but have neither received help nor heard any sound of intercession from any quarter.” The Armenians had to stop knocking on the doors of others and instead draw upon their own innate potential. The conditions for a truce, Khatisian continued, were aimed at achiev­ ing Turkish domination of the Armenian republic, yet they did not spec­ ify what territories would be left for a national existence. In fact, the Turks could easily declare the entire country in dispute and thereby grab whatever they wanted. They were offering Armenia an outlet to the sea, but where was that to be—in Turkey, where at any moment they could shut the door and strangle Armenia? There was no doubt that the “nec­ essary guarantees” exacted by the Turks would include the total disar­ mament and demilitarization of Armenia. The Armenian people should understand that beneath the glittering words of the Turks were dark and sinister intentions. No one, Khatisian concluded, was opposed to peace 100 The stenographic record of this session of Parliament is in Haradj, Nov. 13—17, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 499—507.

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and harmony, but “which people and what current would agree to dig its grave with its own hands?’’ Peace with honor could only be achieved through the determined resistance of the people, as had occurred dur­ ing the siege of the Paris Commune and more recently in the Soviet offensive against Warsaw. Fortunately, the enemy was not large, and one strong, concerted push could turn the tide of battle. It was up to the Parliament—the representatives of the nation—to stir the populace from its lethargy and fatalism and infuse in it sobriety and vitality to defend its life, its honor, and its homeland.101 On behalf of the Social Revolutionary (SR) faction, Arsham Khondkarian declared that nothing was surprising in Prime Minister Ohandjanian’s report. There was no such thing as a vile enemy, a cunning enemy, a noble enemy—enemies were enemies. As always, the victorious side wanted to impose its will on the vanquished, and in this case the Turks were stretching their paws over Armenia. The Armenian people could not submit to the extreme Turkish demands, but if they were to fight it would be not to die but rather to be victorious. Yet the prime minister had said nothing about what measures the government was taking to ensure victory. Unfortunately, the state mechanism was weak and unhealthy. The conditions that had brought the current govern­ ment to power (the May uprising) were known to all. That crisis had passed months ago, yet the Bureau-Government had still not honored its pledge to restore parliamentary democracy and withdraw from power. This was a fundamental shortcoming that had to be rectified in order to create an administration representative of all the people and the en­ tire state. The formation of such a government would give the people a strong moral and psychological boost and help them shrug off their recent shameful and cowardly stupor, which could warrant only the con­ tempt of others. The revitalization of government and people was essen­ tial for the salvation of the Armenian republic.102 Dashnakists Haik Sargsian and Hambardzum Terterian rose in de­ fense of the government and in opposition to the SR faction’s proposal to form a new cabinet.103 Sargsian reminded his colleagues that the strug­ gle against the Turks was not new; it had begun years before the estab­ lishment of the Armenian republic and could only continue. But this

101 Haradj, Nov. 17:2, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 508—510. Khatisian, op. át., p. 251, subsequently wrote that on November 10 he had placed before the govern­ ment the reasons to accept the Turkish terms and had then reiterated these points in Parliament on November 11, but the stenographic record of the session does not indicate this position, even though it would seem to be in keeping with Khatisian’s general dis­ position. 102 Haradj, Nov. 17:2—3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 510—511. 103 Haradj, Nov. 17:3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 511—512.

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was no reason for despair. The people were coming to their senses, and it was important not to break that momentum by raising the question of a new government. On the contrary, a monolithic government with a single will was required. The present government needed only to take a firm stand, meting out harsh punishment to those who abandoned their posts and shirked their obligations. The Armenian people, free­ dom-loving and courageous, had often endured against a more powerful enemy. Now, once more, they would deliver a crushing blow to the ag­ gressors. Terterian observed that if a change in government would make a dif­ ference, then the proposal of the Social Revolutionary faction might be given serious consideration, but in fact personages figured very little in the current struggle. It had been said that the side with the strongest nerves could claim victory. The Armenian people, regrettably, did not have nerves of steel, and this had been the cause for the setbacks on the field of batde. The Turkish success was above all psychological. If the people could free themselves from their mental paralysis, there would be a good chance of victory. However painful the truth, it had to be said that much of the population was still not fully imbued with the concept of national independence and that the military establishment was not permeated with the Armenian spirit. These realities aside, the SR sug­ gestion would violate the precepts of the parliamentary system. As long as the Armenian Parliament functioned, there were no grounds to ac­ cept the formation of a nonrepresentative cabinet. Such a measure not only was untimely but also would be regarded by the enemy as a sign of internal dissension. Terterian supported the SR view that it was necessary for the govern­ ment to take decisive measures to revitalize the popular spirit. The Turk­ ish demands made it clear that Mustafa Kemal wanted to eliminate Ar­ menia. If the Republic accepted those demands, there would be no need for negotiations, because within twenty-four hours the Turks would put a prepared text in front of the Armenians to sign. There were two op­ tions: to sign without negotiating or even reading the Turkish terms for peace, or to fight. The Parliament could not accept the first alternative and would call upon the people to cleanse themselves of the blot on their honor. The enemy was not strong, and the Armenians had the sympathy of the democratic elements of Europe and Russia, who realized that Kemal’s intention was to destroy a heroic people struggling for its very existence. These factors should arouse the masses, strengthen their self-confidence, and inspire them to defend their lives and freedom with a single will. The parliamentary debate on November 11 was brought to an end with the unanimous adoption (the three SR deputies abstaining) of the

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resolution submitted by the Dashnakist faction: “Hearing the govern­ ment’s report and approving of its policies, the Parliament orders the concentration of all resources to guarantee the work of defending the country. At the same time, it calls upon the parliamentary presidium to direct an appeal to the people.”104 The government also addressed the Armenian people on November 11. Standing firmly on the conditions of the truce offered by Karabekir on November 6 and implemented the following day, the Armenian gov­ ernment had suggested the immediate opening of negotiations. But the Turks had rejected this sincere proposal and, violating the truce, had resumed military operations. “After the events of the past few days, it should be clear to all that the enemy does not desire peace with the Armenian people but wants to impose his will on us by force of arms, trampling our country and annihilating our people and uprooting our state.” The enemy had compelled the Armenian people to take up arms again as the only way to preserve their existence. “Only by fighting shall we be able to save our land, our independence, our lives. Only by fight­ ing can we force the barbaric enemy to conclude a peace with us. This is the final decisive battle. All of you to arms. Everything for victory.”105 Prime Minister Ohandjanian telegraphed the Allied Powers and Presi­ dent Wilson that the new Turkish ultimatum was meant to obliterate Armenia. The government had refused the demands, and the people “are resolved to fight to the death.”106

The Final Battles

The renewal of hostilities lasted less than a week. The Armenian army was too demoralized to put up an effective defense. There were many feats of individual valor and daring, and for two days Sebouh’s men stood firm on the Jajur line in the face of the main enemy thrust. Overall, however, the army continued to give ground in all directions, forcing the Armenian government to prostrate itself in defeat.

l (MVratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 512—513. According to Haradj, Nov. 13:3, 1920, there were four abstentions. 105 Armenia Archives, 199/1/244, p. 8; Haradj, Nov. 12:1, 1920. That same day, the cabinet authorized the military ministry to allow imprisoned officers to return to active duty without granting them a pardon. Previously, on October 18, some of the personnel of the Vardan Zoravar armored train who had been confined since the suppression of the Bolshevik-led May uprising were granted permission to volunteer for service without re­ ceiving pardons. See Armenia Archives, 199/1/118, Council of Ministers meeting nos. 346 and 355. 106 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/32; Armenia Archives, 200/2/101, p. 1. See also FO 371/4964, Ei4614/E14618/E14636/134/58. “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune,” p. 39, gives the date of the declaration as November 9.

7. THE ALEXANDROPOL OPERATION AND TRUCE

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On November 11 the Turkish 9th Caucasus Division passed beyond the limits set by the initial truce with the objective of capturing Jajur and its railroad tunnels leading to Karakilisa. The Armenian 7 th and 8th regiments defended their snow-covered positions that day and even re­ captured two villages, taking prisoner a Turkish platoon with one officer. The Turkish probe to the south of Alexandropol by the 12 th Division the next day was more successful, as General Hovsepian continued to avoid combat and withdrew his forces from Horom to Molla-Geokcha. The Armenian left flank along the railroad to Erevan resisted until noon on November 12 before Colonel Korganian retreated from Aghin and took up positions at Kizilkilisa and Mount Shuragial.107 The resumption of the Turkish offensive also affected the fronts in Surmalu and Nakhichevan. On November 12 the Armenian general staff ordered all armed forces in Surmalu to retreat with the inhabitants of Igdir and the surrounding Armenian villages to the east bank of the Araxes River. The withdrawal, which was intended to create a stronger perimeter for defense, was accomplished by nightfall. The 9th and 10th regiments, the 12th Mountain Artillery Battery, and the 8th Light Artil­ lery Battery crossed over the Markara bridge and took up positions from Igdalu to Sarajalar. A part of the 10th Regiment was deployed toward Ani to reinforce Korganian’s cavalry, and the artillery batteries were sent to Sardarabad to defend the approaches to Erevan. Hence, Dro’s re­ peated victories in the Surmalu theater had come to naught, as the Ar­ menians, without being directly harassed by the Turks, abandoned the only trans-Araxes county of the province of Erevan.108 On the southern front, the Turkish detachments and Muslim partisans under the command of Major Veysel Bey began to advance on November 12 but were pressed back by elements of the Armenian 2d and 3d reg­ iments. On November 14 the Turks tore up the rails near Norashen station and tried to blow up the Ortlu-Tazakend bridge while the Ar­ menian armored train was crossing. Under machine-gun and artillery fire from the heights of Ulia-Norashen, two Armenian companies were able to repair the bridge and allow the armored train to escape. Accord­ ing to Armenian (and, later, Turkish) sources, Soviet gunmen stood out among the Turkish troops.109 As news of continued setbacks on the other 107 Sassuni, op. cit., pp. 163—167; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/34; FO 371/4963, Ei4293/134/58; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report ofNov. 16,1920; Haradj, Nov. 13:4, 17:4, 1920. 108 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 260, 266; Dogu Cephesi, p. 219; Sassuni, op. át., p. 165. 109 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, pp. 250, 284, 287; Dogu Cephesi, p. 219; Veysel Unûvar, Istiklâl harbinde Bolçeviklerle sekiz ay, 1920—1921 (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 60—82, and for his description of Soviet-Turkish relations in Sharur-Nakhichevan, pp. 46—81 passim. See also Dogu Cephesi, pp. 218-219; Haradj, Nov. 18:2, 1920.

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fronts spread among the Armenian ranks, General Shelkovnikian’s men, too, became dispirited and infected with defeatism. They steadily gave ground on November 15 and 16, losing nearly all of Sharur and, after making a brief stand at the villages of Kushchi-Demurchi and Makhta, pulling north of the strategic Volch’i Vorota pass. By November 17 the enemy forces, led by battalions of the 18th and 34th regiments of the 11th Caucasus Division, were at Sadarak in the county of Erevan; the Armenians had retreated to Arasdayan and Afshar station. Parts of the Armenian 2d and 3d regiments, as well as the mounted partisans of Makedon, took haven in the flanks of Daralagiaz. General Shelkovnikian reported to Nazarbekian that the soldiers would fight no more and that whole companies panicked when a small enemy force appeared under the Soviet red banner.110 The loss of Surmalu and Sharur-Nakhichevan tightened the Turkish cordon around Erevan. To the north, General Hovsepian had no heart to fight. The Western Armenian partisans of Smbat and Sassuntsi Mushegh engaged the Turk­ ish 35th and 36th regiments and reoccupied Aghin station and the vil­ lage of Ghrekh (Krykh) for a few hours on November 15, but Smbat was carried away unconscious with a severe head wound, ending his partic­ ipation in the war. Of the regular army units, only Colonel Mirimanian’s 4th Regiment continued to show some resistance, thanks to the bearing and discipline of the commanding officer. The Armenian positions on the Erevan railroad stabilized at Ani station on November 16.111 The most intense encounters took place around Jajur, which con­ trolled the railroad to Karakilisa and Sanahin on the one hand and the main road to Dilijan-Ijevan and Azerbaijan on the other. An attempted counterattack over the Mount Shishtapa pass by the Armenian 8 th Reg­ iment on November 13 did not materialize because of a raging blizzard and great snowdrifts. The next day the half-frozen Armenian infantry was subjected to a heavy bombardment, followed by a Turkish charge all along the line. After several hours of close combat against the 29th Regiment, Sebouh’s units pulled back from Jajur village and station to stronger defensive positions near the mountain pass from Jajur to Hamamlu. Sebouh and Colonel Baghdasarian were certain they could hold that line. Suddenly, however, the terrifying sound of artillery fire roared from the rear. With the battalion of the Armenian 6th Regiment having abandoned Haji-Nazar, Turkish artillery and infantry ( 17th Regiment) had stealthily made their way over the crude mountain road from Di110 Armenia Archives, 200/1/441, p. 180, and 200/1/602, p. 300; Unûvar, op. át., pp. 63-67; Hovhannisian, op. át., p. 12; Haradj, Nov. 17:4, 1920. See also Archives de l’Armée, 17N/590, dossier 2, Report of Nov. 19, 1920. 111 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 168—170; Armenia Archives, 200/1/441, p. 180, and 200/1/602, p. 268; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 217, 223; Haradj, Nov. 17:4, 18:4, 1920.

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raklar village to Ghaltaghchi vale. By the afternoon of November 14, the Turks were bombarding the villages of Ghaltaghchi (Kaltakhchi) and Aghbulagh (Akbulag) on the railroad behind the Armenian lines. To avoid encirclement, Sebouh ordered the 8th Regiment to cover the with­ drawal of the artillery and supply trains, followed by the infantry. During that operation, the Armenians suffered nearly 100 casualties in the Turk­ ish cross fire but managed to escape toward Hamamlu.112 The inhabitants of Ghaltaghchi village were not so fortunate. They were unable to flee before the Turkish occupation of their settlement, whereas the people of Aghbulagh refused to leave and instead hung out red banners and prepared to meet the Turks with bread and salt as the allies of Soviet Russia. When the first Turkish companies appeared in Ghaltaghchi on the evening of November 14, their commanders assured the villagers that no harm would come to them, but they took the local priest and several other notables as hostages. The next day, after the Armenian regiments had fallen back to the east of the Jajur tunnel, three Turkish columns marched into Ghaltaghchi and Aghbulagh. That night they summoned all the inhabitants of Ghaltaghchi to register; those who tried to hide would be hanged, their homes burned. The men were then separated into groups of twenty each and taken into various houses, where they were bayoneted, after which the women and children were subjected to the same fate. Several wounded men taken for dead crawled out from under the heap of bodies and made their way to Pokr Kapanak (Ghapanak) and Hamamlu, where they told of the night of horrors. Nor did the red banners spare the people of Aghbulagh, where scores of villagers were put to the sword.113 On November 15 the Turkish regiments held both ends of the Jajur tunnel and controlled the routes to Karakilisa. The 3,000 men under Sebouh’s command had shrunk to less than half that number because of desertion and flight. Sebouh himself had to admit that he could resist no longer. To preserve his cadre, he would have to retreat to Semenovka and leave open to the Turks the route over Karakilisa and Dilijan to Azerbaijan. That, in turn, would require the withdrawal of the 6th Reg­ iment from the Dilijan-Ijevan sector.114 The commander of the rear, Gen1 ,2 Baghdasarian, op. át, pp. 260-266; Sahakian, op. dt., pp. 125—129; Irazek, op. dt., pp. 79—82; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 203, and 200/2/101, p. 1. 113 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 322; “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune, ” pp. 40-41; Sa­ hakian, op. dt., pp. 129—130; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Haradj, Nov. 18:4, 19:4, 1920. See also Hovhannisian, op. dt., pp. 14—15; “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune, ” pp. 43—50. In May 1921 the Soviet Armenian government reported that it had arranged to have buried 11,896 corpses, 90 percent of them women and children, from the territory that had been occupied by the Turkish army. Of these, 2,100 were at Ghaltaghchi, 1,176 at Aghbulagh, and 1,110 at neighboring Barapol. 114 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 270,318. See also Karabekir, op. dt., pp. 901-902.

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eral Areshian, complained that Sebouh was given to unwarranted haste and panic. Areshian’s orderly evacuation of the military goods from Karakilisa was interrupted by Sebouh’s command for all armed forces to leave the city. This directive had created pandemonium, as the railway workers and telegraph operators had abandoned their posts. Only swift, stern action by Areshian had restored order and forced some of the transportation and communications specialists to return. Areshian de­ manded either that he be relieved of his position or that clear directives be given from Erevan that he was in charge of all military functions in the rear, without reference to Sebouh. The full evacuation of Karakilisa was premature, as there was no indication that the Turks intended an immediate advance on the city.115 The fall of Kars and Alexandropol increased Georgian anxieties about the ultimate Turkish objectives. At the same time, the Georgian govern­ ment took advantage of Armenia’s vulnerability to place armed forces in the Lori neutral zone in the county of Borchalu on the pretext of protecting the district and the approaches to Tiflis. Acting Foreign Min­ ister Sabakhtarashvili broached the subject with Colonel Stokes and Tig­ ran Bekzadian at the end of October, insisting that it was imperative to keep the Sanahin-Sadakhlu sector of the railway out of Turkish hands.116 Bekzadian and the Armenian commissioner of the neutral zone, Valad Valadian, gained their government’s approval to protest any infringe­ ment of the zone but at the same time to keep the Armenian inhabitants calm and to discourage active resistance.117 On November 5, General Areshian reported from Karakilisa that the Georgians had sent an ech­ elon of cavalry to Sanahin station and that General Karalov, who had been appointed the Georgian military attaché in Armenia, was not al­ lowing Armenians to pass beyond Sanahin without permits.118 In a conversation by direct wire with General Karalov, Prime Minister Ohandjanian asked what the Georgians’ purpose was; in entering the neutral zone without the prior assent of the Armenian government, they had committed a hostile act. Karalov answered that Georgia had only the most friendly sentiments toward Armenia and had no intention of predetermining the status of the disputed territory. It was merely be­ cause of current strategic considerations that Georgian troops would be introduced up to the northern boundary of Armenia. The Georgian government gave full guarantees about the inviolability of the territory and the temporary nature of the occupation. Ohandjanian responded

115 Armenia Archives, 116 Armenia Archives, 1,7 Armenia Archives, 1 ,H Armenia Archives,

200/1/602, p. 318. 200/1/221, pp. 150, 153. 200/2/81, p. 2. 200/1 /602, p. 84.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

that neither political nor strategic considerations could justify the Geor­ gian action without the prior agreement of Armenia. The Armenian government had offered Georgia a defensive alliance under the terms of which the occupation of Lori might be condoned, but the Georgian move in the absence of such an accord was tantamount to a stab in the back. Ohandjanian asked that Karalov proceed to Erevan fully empow­ ered to conclude a military defense pact. Karalov evasively responded that he would do so if authorized by the Georgian high command.119 Konstantin Sabakhtarashvili meanwhile informed Colonel Stokes that his government had heard from reliable sources that the Turks, now in control of Alexandropol, intended to occupy the Lori neutral zone in Borchalu county and seize control of the railroad leading to Tiflis. To prevent this, the Georgian government, assertedly with the consent of the Armenian government, had sent troops into Sanahin and the rest of the zone.120 When the Georgians learned of the second set of Turkish conditions for a truce, including the posting of a commission at Sanahin and the prohibition on transport of military matériel from that point to Alexandropol, General Karalov protested to Karabekir that the neutral zone, having been included in the former Tiflis gubemiia, was an inalien­ able part of the Georgian republic and had been so recognized by Soviet Russia. All foreign pretensions to the district and to the railroad therein were inadmissible.121 Unable to prevent the Georgian occupation of Lori, the Armenian government on November 13 authorized Tigran Bekzadian to sign a provisional accord in Tiflis permitting Georgian armed forces to police the neutral zone for a period of ninety days without compromising Ar­ menian claims to the district.122 As it happened, however, the Georgians did not stop at the limits of the neutral zone but advanced on November 15 and 16 into Jalal-oghli, Bzovdal, and Shahali. The Georgian govem119 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 84—85. 12° po 371 /4q66, E15559/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 10, 1920. The Armenian govern­ ment in fact opposed the unilateral Georgian action and instructed Bekzadian on Novem­ ber 7 to lodge a protest with the Georgian government. See Armenia Archives, 200/1 / 602, p. 383. Colonel Corbel, chief of the French military mission, accused the Georgians of hostility and treason toward Armenia. See, for example, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, Political report for Nov. 1—15, 1920, and the reports of the French mission in 7N/829, dossier 3. 121 Armenia Archives, 200/1/621, p. 207; Khatisian, op. át., pp. 258—259; FO 371/4964, Ei5027/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 28, 1920, and for his report on Georgian-Turkish Nationalist exchanges, FO 371/4948, E15488/1/58. 122 Armenia Archives, 200/2/102, pp. 1—3; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30, Bek­ zadian to Aharonian, Nov. 27, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report of Nov. 30, 1920; FO 371/4963, E14373/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 15, 1920. The accord was signed by Minister of War G. S. Lordkipanidze and Acting Foreign Minister K. B. Sa­ bakhtarashvili for Georgia and by S. G. Mamikonian, S. A. Khachatrian, and T. A. Bekza­ dian for Armenia.

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ment replied ambiguously to Bekzadian’s protest, and on November 17 Georgian Chief of Staff General Zakariadze informed General Areshian that Armenia’s representative in Tiflis had personally assented to the operation.123 Bekzadian denied the allegation categorically, and the Ere­ van government announced that the agreement was for the temporary occupation of the neutral zone only, not of the undisputed territory of the Armenian republic. The Georgians were engaged in an unfriendly act against Armenia and, according to the American assistant directorgeneral of the Caucasus branch of Near East Relief, Victoria Harris, were blocking the passage of Armenian refugees beyond Sanahin.124 The ma­ neuver could be rationalized by the defense concerns of the Georgian government, but it had dire consequences. The advance caused such deep resentment among the Armenian population that Soviet strategists were able to stage a revolt in Lori in February 1921, giving the Red Army the desired excuse to march on Tiflis and effect the forcible sovietization of the Republic of Georgia the following month.125 The Capitulation

During the renewed Turkish offensive between November 11 and 17, the Armenians had lost all of Surmalu and Sharur-Nakhichevan and had been driven back to Ani station on the Alexandropol-Erevan line and to Hamamlu on the Alexandropol-Karakilisa-Sanahin line. The 4th Regi­ ment put up a final fight at Molla-Geokcha on November 16—17 but to no avail.126 There was nothing left for the Armenian government except to capitulate. Trying desperately to avoid the establishment of Soviet 123 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 422, and 200/1 /607, pp. 214—215; FO 371 ƒ4964— 4965, E14957/E15175/134/58, and 371/4976, Ei4665/5217/58 enclosures; Archives de l’Armée, 17N/590, dossier 2, and 20N/186, dossier 3, Report of Nov. 29, 1920. 124 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 368, 371, 380, 391—392, and 200/1/621, p. 7; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00/16, Moser to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1920, enclosing V. Harris to F. S. McCullum, Nov. 13, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Military report to Dec. 1, 1920; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 423. 125 For the revolt in Lori, see, for example, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/182, dossier 1, and 20N/186, dossier 3; S. Kh. Karapetian, Zinvads apstambutiune Lorum 1921 tvakanin (Erevan, 1955); A. N. Mnatsakanian, Revoliutsian Andrkovkasum ev Rusastani patviraknere, 1917-1921 (Erevan, 1961), pp. 277—303; Institut Istorii—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK EPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Armianskoi SSR, Hoktemberian sotsialistakan meds revoliutsian ev Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanake Hayastanum: Pastatghteri ev niuterizhoghovadsu (Erevan, 1960), pp. 428—436,471—472,481,487—488; G. K. Zhvaniia, Velikii Oktiabr’ i bor’ba Bol’shevikov Zakavkaz’ia za Sovetskuiu vlast’ (Tbilisi, 1967), pp. 301— 317. See also Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917—1923 (Cambridge, MA, 1964), pp. 234—241; Akademiia Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR— Gruzinskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS-Arkhivnoe Upravlenie Gru­ zinskoi SSR, Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii: Dokumenty i materialy (1917—1921 gg.) (Tbilisi, 1958), pp. 641-720. 126 Haradj, Nov. 19:4, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

power in Armenia, the Bureau-Government of Hamazasp Ohandjanian decided to deal directly with the Turks, calculating that Mustafa Kemal would prefer a small, independent Armenia on Turkey’s eastern frontier over a common boundary with a revived and powerful Russian empire disguised under a Soviet cover. On November 15, Ohandjanian received Foreign Affairs Commissar Ahmed Mukhtar’s telegram informing the Armenian government that it had apparently confused the preliminary terms offered by General Karabekir to halt the bloodshed and the official terms of the Grand National Assembly, which were made known two days later on November 8. The interests of both the Armenian and Turkish peoples required that the Armenian government accept and implement the conditions for an armistice.127 In another telegram, Mukhtar expressed profound regret that the Armenian refusal had given cause for renewed hostilities. The Turkish government hoped Armenia would soon recognize the moderation and justice of the terms for a truce and indicate its readiness to begin negotiations for peace.128 In his reply, also dated November 15, Ohandjanian stated that his government, always desirous of friendly neighborly relations with Tur­ key, had demonstrated its pacific spirit by complying with all the con­ ditions required by General Karabekir on November 6. Then came the Armenian surrender: “Wishing further to give you, one more time, the assurance of our good intentions and with the goal of stopping the bloodshed and establishing a durable peace with the Turkish people, my government informs you that it accepts the terms of the armistice proposed by you on the date of November 8 of this year, and asks you, to this effect, to arrange a cease-fire on all fronts.’’129 Acting Minister of Internal Affairs Sargis Araratian and Staff Captain Georgii G. Yablokov (Gevorg Khndzorian) carried this communication, together with a letter from Nazarbekian to Karabekir, to Ani station on November 16. The next day Yablokov proceeded alone to Alexandropol, where he handed the messages to Karabekir. The Turkish commander treated Yablokov with deference and even offered to order a cease-fire immediately.130 In his reply to Nazarbekian, Karabekir expressed satis­ faction with and appreciation for the Armenian government’s wishes to enter into permanent peaceful relations with Turkey. He had tele­ graphed to Angora Armenia’s acceptance of the Turkish terms and its readiness to fulfill all obligations. He was therefore ordering a cease-fire

127 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, 128 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, 129 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, 130 Khatisian, op. át., pp. 251—252;

p. 273. p. 293; “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune,” p. 40. p. 291. “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 83; Zohrabian, op. át., p. 81.

WAR AND TRUCE

29I

along the entire front and requested that Nazarbekian issue a corre­ sponding order to the Armenian forces.131 Also on November 17, Veysel Bey, the Turkish commander on the southern front, wrote General Shelkovnikian that he had halted military operations upon being informed of a truce “between Armenia and Red Turkey.” As the Armenian side still had not laid down its arms, however, Veysel warned that responsi­ bility for the consequences of continued resistance would fall on the Armenian command. Within a few hours, the last shots had been fired.132 On November 18, Sargis Araratian arrived in Alexandropol to sign the armistice agreement. His attempt to lighten the Turkish terms was rejected by Karabekir, who complained that the Armenians had become the blind agents of the British and could not be trusted. They had spurned Angora’s offer to negotiate and instead had done everything in their power to help the Western imperialists impose the Treaty of Sèvres on Turkey. Under these circumstances, Turkey could not decrease the guarantees required for its security. Armenia, Karabekir continued, would not be allowed to interfere with the linkage between Turkey and Russia. Turkey did not want Armenia to become a Soviet state, however, and opposed Russian mediation. Armenia should remain a separate country “within ethnographic boundaries.”133 Having no way out but to comply with the onerous terms of the ar­ mistice, the Armenian command turned over carloads of weapons and ammunition and most of the army’s pack mules, and the Armenian reg­ iments retreated to the lines stipulated in the truce. The Turkish army remained in occupation of the territories captured during the renewed offensive, including Jajur, Sogutli, Aghin, and Kavtarlu. The Armenian positions extended along a straight line from Araxes station in the south­ west, over Mount Kizil-Ziaret, Mount Aragads, Tanagirmaz, Bash-Abaran, Novo-Mikhailovka, and Shamut in the northeast. The two sides were separated by a demilitarized zone of up to 30 kilometers (18 miles), in which the Armenian civil administration and gendarmerie continued to function. Sebouh’s brigade drew back to Dilijan, whereas in the Aragads district the Armenians remained in control of several villages from Tana­ girmaz to Adiaman and Karaburun. Colonel Korganian’s cavalry units held a perimeter around Araxes station as far as Karaburun, and in the south General Shelkovnikian’s units pulled back to the outskirts of Khamarlu.134 *” Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 310, 329, 422; “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 83; Zohrabian, op. át., p. 88. 132 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 324. See also Unûvar, op. át., p. 69. 133 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, “Verdjin antskere Hayastanum.” See also FO 371 ^964, E14568/134/58; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/1085, dossier 1, Rapport mensuel, Nov. 1920. 134 Karabekir, op. át., p. 902; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Archives de l’Armée,

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

For good measure, General Karabekir prepared a plan of action in case of Armenian noncompliance. The 8th Regiment (3d Caucasus Di­ vision), 28th Regiment (9th Caucasus Division), 35th Regiment (12th Division), several batteries of artillery, and various militia and ashiret units were to defend Alexandropol and expand the Turkish zone of occupation as far as Hamamlu. The remainder of the 9th and 12 th di­ visions, together with the Azerbaijani and XV Corps’ cavalry regiments and the Kerasund militia, was to march on Etchmiadzin and Erevan by way of the Alexandropol-Erevan railway and Mount Alagiaz. The 11th Caucasus Division’s detachment at Igdir was to occupy Sardarabad and be in a position to link up with the main force when it arrived at Karaburun and Ashnak. Meanwhile, Major Veysel’s detachment in the Araxes Valley would push northward as far as the Baouk Vedi-Khamarlu line. As it happened, there was no need to implement the plan. Armenia had been crushed.135 Armenia’s prostration was reflected in the radically altered tone of the editorials in Haradj. What was essential, the Dashnaktsutiun’s central organ wrote on November 20, was that Armenia should be independent. “Let Armenia be small, very small, but let it be independent.’’ Greece, Italy, and other countries had begun their existence in a confined area. Armenia could no longer be a plaything of Russia. “Our historic enemy, Turkey, can accept our independent existence only when we are ready once and for all to break with Russia.’’ There was only one way out of the present crisis, and that was for the Armenian people to reach a modus vivendi with Turkey and to turn away from Russia and from En­ gland and the other Western imperialists. The time had come for Ar­ menia to adopt a Turkish orientation.136 The war was over. 17N/59o, dossier 2, Reports of Nov. 19 and 23, 1920; WO 106/330, no. 230. See also Türk Inkilâp Tarihi Enstitûsû, Atatürk'ün söylev vedemeçleri, I (Ankara, 1959), pp. 124—125. The Armenian government’s declaration on November 20, 1920, regarding the armistice is in Armenia Archives, 200/2/97, p. 16; and Haradj, Nov. 23:1, 1920. 155 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 223—225. 136 Haradj, Nov. 20:2, 1920.

7

The Dimming of the West

The war between the Turkish Nationalists and Armenia was fought against a backdrop of protest and supplication. Armenophile societies deplored with raised voices the abandonment of Armenia, insisting that the “civilized world” was duty-bound to save the martyred Armenian people from final collapse and obliteration. The pro-Armenian groups sometimes embarrassed or troubled the Western governments, but in the end they were unsuccessful in altering the Allied decision to avoid armed intervention to halt the Turkish offensive. The crushing military defeat of Armenia coincided with the inaugural session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. Before the Christmas recess in 1920, both the Assembly and the Council of the League delib­ erated on ways to help the Armenians. But the League, after all, was controlled by the same countries that had rejected direct involvement in the Turkish-Armenian war. Moreover, the organization had no mili­ tary resources of its own and was limited to moral influence. Inasmuch as Mustafa Kemal’s government was regarded as an outlaw regime by the dominant powers, even moral influence could be of no avail. Ar­ menian spokesmen argued that acceptance of the Armenian republic into membership in the League would strengthen their country’s inter­ national standing. Yet the Covenant of the League of Nations bound constituent members to guarantee the territorial integrity of all other member states—a responsibility that ultimately would militate against admission. Ironically, although certain British and French delegates waxed eloquent about the international community’s obligations toward the Armenian people, they were instructed by their own governments to circumvent all such commitments. 293

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Allied, Recalculations

The general staffs of the Allied Powers had never believed that the Ar­ menians could defend against a Russian or joint Soviet-Turkish invasion. Soon after the end of the world war, they were prepared to write off Armenia as falling within the Russian and Turkish spheres of influence. In London, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Henry Wilson spear­ headed the War Office’s efforts to draw back to the railheads in Meso­ potamia and Persia as the first line of defense of the British Empire. Sooner or later the Caucasus region would be reclaimed—and rightly so—by Russia. Secretary of War Winston Churchill had repeatedly ar­ gued for a complete British evacuation of the Caucasus. On that issue, he had locked in heated exchanges with Foreign Secretary Curzon, who was committed to supporting the Transcaucasian republics for moral and especially for political reasons. Great Britain, Curzon argued, was publicly pledged and obliged to assist the Armenians. As long as he could retain the backing of Prime Minister Lloyd George, Curzon was able to fend off the War Office’s pragmatism, first winning Allied de facto rec­ ognition of the three Transcaucasian states and then securing a com­ mitment to furnish them arms. Eventually, in July 1920, the last British garrison was withdrawn from Batum, but Curzon tried to uphold his government’s pledges by insisting on Armenia’s having direct access to the seaport of Batum and incor­ porating the easternmost Ottoman provinces. With the interests of the British Empire paramount, however, Curzon also expressed growing skepticism, impatience, and annoyance with Armenia and the other Transcaucasian republics as they proved incapable of meeting the ex­ ternal challenges to their independence. The Armenian-Soviet negoti­ ations in Moscow following the sovietization of Azerbaijan, culminating in the protocol signed in Tiflis on August 10, accelerated the process of reassessment in the Foreign Office. Its ledgers came to include many disparaging remarks about the Armenians—their untrustworthiness, their false alarms, their double-dealings, and their knack for placing the blame for their own shortcomings on others. During the Turkish inva­ sion, the Armenians repeatedly demanded Allied military intervention and made it seem that they could have repelled the Turkish armies but for having been abandoned by the West. For the Armenians, even the measured encouragement and support of the Allies ended with the fall of Kars and Alexandropol. Until that time, British Chief Commissioner C. B. Stokes had urged his govern­ ment to show the Armenians more active assistance and even com­ plained to Armenian representative Tigran Bekzadian about the unre­ sponsiveness and passivity of the Allies. But with the Armenian collapse

THE DIMMING OF THE WEST

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on the field of battle, Stokes reemphasized the view that the British Empire should regain its position in the Islamic world by disavowing the Greek cause and reaching an understanding with Mustafa Kemal. The Armenians, he now argued, would be better off if they made their peace with the Turks and renounced grandiose designs for a united Armenia than if they relinquished the last real possibility of independence (and jeopardized vital British interests in Asia) by going over to the Bolshe­ viks.1 On November 6, Colonel Stokes telegraphed London that the inva­ sion of Armenia had modified the political equation. The Turks now wanted to gain control of Azerbaijan, whereas the Bolsheviks intended to hold it at any price. Discord between the two outcast regimes seemed inevitable. Great Britain was hostile to both but would fight neither. “Moment is opportune to secure friendship of one of the two against the other. . .. Friendship with Turks will cost us abandonment of our policy of supporting Greek expansion in Turkey. It will bring to our side whole of Islam and it is vital to continuance of Eastern Empire that Islam should be on our side,’’ Stokes telegrammed, adding that he could es­ tablish contact with Mustafa Kemal through his agents in Tiflis.2 Stokes also advised British General Headquarters in Constantinople that prep­ arations to ship arms and ammunition to Armenia should be halted in view of the fact that the Armenians were arranging an armistice with the Turks. He now proposed that those munitions be delivered to Georgia, which was resolved to resist an attack of either Bolsheviks or Turks.3 The War Office swiftly blocked the dispatch of additional weapons for Ar­ menia, and on November 13 the Admiralty Office ordered that no more fuel be supplied to that country.4 In Constantinople, Armenian religious leaders met with the Allied high commissioners to complain that their repeated warnings about Turco-Bolshevik collusion had been ignored and that the Allies had cho­ sen not to implement the clause in the Mudros Armistice allowing them to occupy any or all of the Turkish Armenian provinces in case of dis­ order. British High Commissioner Sir John de Robeck confided to the Foreign Office: “I could of course only assure them of continued sym­ pathy. ... I can not however help feeling that causes of collapse of Ar­ menia have been as much moral as material. Had sympathy of Allies assumed an ever so little more concrete form, Armenians would perhaps 1 State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 602, pp. 10—13, Bekzadian to Ohandjanian, Nov. 5, 1920. 2 British Documents, XIII, p. 170. ’Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4962—4963, E13861/E14035/E14460/134/58; War Office, 95/4958, entry for Nov. 10, 1920. 4 FO 371 /49Ô3, E14156/E14386/134/58.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

have been encouraged to offer a more serious resistance than I am at present inclined to believe can have been the case.”5 The change in disposition of the Allied Powers was obvious to Arme­ nian representatives. On November 12, Tigran Bekzadian wrote his gov­ ernment: ‘‘Yesterday, I saw Stokes who finally tore off his mask and said that if he were the leader of England he would be cooperating with the Kemalists, since that was an anti-Bolshevik movement and through such collaboration England would raise its fallen prestige in the Muslim world.... It is evident that we have nothing to expect from the British.”6 Ohandjanian on November 14 instructed Bekzadian that, as Stokes was undoubtedly reflecting the current British policy and was linked with the agents of Mustafa Kemal, he should be asked to find grounds for an accord between the Armenians and Turks based on the new British po­ sition. Stokes should be given to understand that Armenia might be amenable to his suggested course of action and that a meeting with the Kemalist representative would be desirable.7 Ohandjanian had reference to Colonel Kiazim Bey [Dirik], who had come to Tiflis to assure the Georgian government that the Turkish Nationalists harbored no ag­ gressive designs against Georgia. Stokes knew of Kiazim’s whereabouts and indirectly helped set up an unofficial rendezvous in a private home on November 15 so that Bekzadian could determine whether a peace treaty might be attainable without Soviet intercession.8 The meeting was aborted by the resumption of hostilities in Armenia, but on November 16 Ohandjanian informed Bekzadian that the government was forced to accept General Karabekir’s harsh terms for a truce and that an at­ tempt would be made to conclude peace without external mediation. Bekzadian was to continue his discussions with Allied, Turkish, and Bol­ shevik representatives in Tiflis.9 Two days later, Bekzadian reported that Kiazim Bey had again delayed their meeting, apparently because of the 5FO 371/4963, Ei4023/134/58. See also E14513/134/58. 6 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 255; E. K. Sarkisian, Kh. Abeghian, and A. Sarkisian, “Missiia B. Legrana: Diplomaticheskaia missiia RSFSR v Armenii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 8th yr., no. 3 (1967), p. 77 (introduction by E. K. Sarkisian, and documents compiled by Abeghian and A. Sarkisian; cited hereafter as “Missiia B. Legrana”). See also 200/2/ 101, pp. 1—2; S. V. Kharmandarían, “Kvoprosu ob ustanovlenii Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 6 (1958), pp. 96-97, Silin to Legran, Nov. 13, 1920. 7 Armenia Archives, 200/1/625, p. 61; “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 78; H[A]. M. Elchibekian, Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoUutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Ere­ van, 1963), p. 179; E. A. Zohrabian, Sovetakan Rusastane ev hai-turkakan haraberutiunnere 1920—1922 tt. (Erevan, 1979), p. 78. 8 “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 81 ; Armenia Archives, 200/2/101, p. 1; Zohrabian, op. át., p. 80. Bekzadian reported that Kiazim Bey arrived in Tiflis on November 13 (200/1/625, p. 16). The date of November 20 is given in apparent error by Gotthard Jâschke, “Neues zur russisch-türkischen Freundschaft von 1919—1939,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s.,VI, 3—4 (1961), p. 221. 9 “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 81—82; Zohrabian, op. át., pp. 80—81.

TH E DI M MIN G O F TH E WEST

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success of Turkish arms. Stokes and the other Allied representatives were trying to avoid Bekzadian, who again advised his government that no help would be forthcoming from the West and that Armenia would have to negotiate direcdy either with the Turks or with the Russians.10 Alexandre Khatisian, who was to head the Armenian peace delegation, traveled incognito to Tiflis to confer with the Allied commissioners and if possible with Kiazim Bey. In a rendezvous on November 19, Kiazim Bey told Khatisian that the Turks had invaded Armenia to coerce its government into renouncing the Treaty of Sèvres and dealing directly with the Nationalists as well as to ensure the proper treatment of Muslims in Armenia. The Angora government, Kiazim asserted, desired a stable Armenia as a buffer against Russia. In reply to Khatisian’s inquiry as to how far the Turks would advance, Kiazim Bey answered that once the offensive had begun it was hard to tell where the drive would end. The Turks were aware that the Azerbaijanis were impatiently awaiting their arrival, but they were concerned that the Bolsheviks would deploy a large army to hold that region and possibly even to sovietize Georgia.11 Meeting with Colonel Stokes, Khatisian explained that his government had no choice but to make peace with the Turks or with the Bolsheviks. He was inclined to believe that the British would concur that it was preferable to deal with the Turks. Armenia was now prepared to accept significantly less territory than had been awarded by the Treaty of Sèvres. Khatisian wanted to know if such a peace would have the approval of His Majesty’s Government and, if so, whether the British would become a party to the negotiations. Otherwise the terms would be highly unfa­ vorable to Armenia and would lack any element of durability. The Ar­ menian people, Khatisian continued, were in a fog. On the one hand, there were reports that the Allies, particularly the English, were aiding the Kemalists in order to turn the Turks against the Bolsheviks; on the other hand, the Bolsheviks were giving assurances that they could effect a favorable settlement with Turkey if only Armenia would renounce the Treaty of Sèvres and cooperate with the Bolsheviks in their eastern pol­ icies. The Bolsheviks were not insisting that Armenia accept the Soviet system, because they believed that this would inevitably occur in due course. The Armenian government, Khatisian concluded, wanted peace, but it sought terms that would as far as possible meet with the approval of His Majesty’s Government.12 When Stokes reported this information to the Foreign Office, Eastern

10 “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 82. 11 FO 371/4964, Ei4792/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 20, 1920, enclosure. See also Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), pp. 252—254. 12 FO 371/4964, Ei4759/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 18, 1920.

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specialist Dwight Osborne wrote: “A peace with the Turks is clearly pref­ erable as well as logical, but we can not unfortunately be party to the negotiations. If the treaty awards Armenia a fair territory we can subse­ quently endorse it 8c disregard Pres. Wilson’s ultimate decision. This competition to make peace with Armenia & the propaganda referred to are indications that the Bolshevik-Nationalist alliance may split over op­ posing ambitions of the two parties in the Caucasus. I think we should send a non-committal reply.” Assistant Secretary of State J. A. C. Tilley surmised inaccurately: ‘‘I gather that the sort of terms the Turks would make would be to enact a promise to be content with the present limits of the Armenian Republic. I do not think that would satisfy the Powers but if President Wilson’s ideas [on the boundaries] turn out to be on a large scale the existence of the proposed treaty might be a good reason for modifying them. A treaty with the Turks would clearly be better than one with the Bolsheviks.” The Foreign Office telegraphed Stokes: ‘‘We could obviously not be party to a treaty with the Nationalists but we realize that Armenians may have no option, the alternative of treaty with Soviet being doubtless worse.”13 Futile Endeavors Abroad

While the Armenian government directed appeals far and near, Avetis Aharonian’s delegation in Paris redoubled its output of memorandums and petitions and met with every available Allied official on the far chance that something might be done for Armenia. Through the Polish ambassador, for example, Aharonian unsuccessfully requested that the Warsaw government include a clause in the forthcoming Soviet-Polish treaty of peace obliging Russia to respect the various treaties by which the Allied Powers had concluded the world war.14 More attention was turned to persuading Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos to resume the Greek offensive in Anatolia, which would draw off much of the Turk­ ish army from the Armenian front and reinforce the Greek hold over the historic Ionian coastal region. Venizelos replied through the Greek embassy that the request could not be satisfied because the Allied Powers would have to authorize a further advance and, for the time being at least, the Turks were not engaging the Greek army. When Aharonian18 18 FO 371 ƒ4964, E14759/134/58, minutes and enclosure. 14 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 17/17, 117/16, and 140/39; Avetis Aharonian, Sardarapatits minchev Sevr ev Lozan (kaghakakan oragir) (Boston, 1943), pp. 99—100; FO 371/ 4962, E13464/E13577/134/58 enclosures; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/14, Wallace to Secretary of State, enclosure; France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/182, dossier 2, Report of Nov. 9, 1920, and 7N/829, dossier 1, and 20N/186, dossier 3, Corbel’s nos. 448—449, Oct. 21, 1920.

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asked permission from Greek Chargé d’Affaires Leon V. Melas to raise this issue with the Allied Powers, Melas explained that the Greek army was not prepared for a winter campaign. Venizelos, it was clear, did not want to resume the offensive. Nonetheless, Greek Ambassador Kaklamanos encouraged Aharonian by expressing confidence that the League of Nations would extend a major loan to Armenia and that the Kemalist movement was having the effect of uniting the Allies against the Nation­ alists, as the French and Italians were afraid that unless they supported a strong joint campaign the British would arrange for the Greek army to advance into the Turkish interior.15 Addressing Venizelos directly on November 10, Aharonian wrote that, though he understood the international complications that had halted the Greek operations, Armenia in its moment of utter need was again appealing for decisive measures. The defeat of Armenia could not but have a deleterious effect on the fortunes of Greece.16 Aharonian’s re­ quest for continued “heroic action” against the Kemalists was destined to be his last appeal to Venizelos, for only a few days later the Greek electorate voted to restore the monarchy and to recall King Constantine. The champion of Greek republicanism was put out of office, signaling the beginning of the end of the Greek presence in Asia Minor. The ineptitude of the newly installed royalist officers would help the Turkish Nationalists turn the tide of battle near the Sakaria River in 1921 and dump the Greeks into the sea at Smyrna in 1922.17 As the Italians were believed to have close links with the Turkish Na­ tionalists, Aharonian also tried to secure their good offices. Meeting in October with Italy’s representative on the Council of the League, Tomasso Tittoni, in the home of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Hymans, Aharonian asked the Italians to do what was possible to influence the Turks to withdraw from Armenian territory. Because Italy had no par­ ticular interest in Armenia, this intercession would be an act of altruism to which the Turks might respond. Expressing personal sympathy, Tit­ toni promised to relay the request to Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza. Although the Italian government did not act on the suggestion, it im­ plicated the other Allied Powers in compounding Armenia’s woes. On October 27, for example, Italian diplomat Carlo Galli told Aharonian that at the insistence of the British, the Conference of Ambassadors (which had succeeded the Paris Peace Conference and the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors) had agreed not to deal with the 15 Aharonian, op. át., pp. 97-98; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 117/16, Circular no. 2, and File 237/136, Aharonian to Foreign Minister of Armenia, Oct. 7, 1920. 16 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 118/17, 140/39, and 354/i17 See Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction ofa City (London, 1972), and reprinted with a new introduction (Kent, OH, and London, 1988).

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enforcement of the Turkish treaty and to take the position that all ques­ tions of that nature should be addressed to the Allied governments in­ dividually.18 The doors of the French foreign ministry at the Quai d’Orsay had never been opened wide for the Armenians, and now Aharonian found it increasingly difficult to gain entry. In meetings with Director of Polit­ ical Affairs Beretti on November 7 and 9, Aharonian reiterated the litany of Allied pledges and warned that without quick, decisive action Armenia might have to submit to Soviet rule. Beretti dismissed the possibility of an Allied naval descent at Trebizond and, when pressed by Aharonian for some other means to stop the Turkish advance, reportedly looked bewildered, whispering that nothing more could be done. France had 80,000 men in Syria and Cilicia and lacked additional forces to assist Armenia, and the situation was the same for the British. Complaining against this “impossible justice,” Aharonian found it curious that there were enough Allied troops to occupy Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and the Straits, but when the matter came to Armenia the Allies claimed to be powerless, in effect throwing the Republic into the lap of the Bolshe­ viks. Beretti commiserated with Aharonian, professing that Armenia should be saved and suggesting that an appeal be addressed to the pres­ ident of the Conference of Ambassadors. The advice had an ironic ring, as Great Britain and France had already agreed that the ambassadors should refer all such appeals to their respective governments.19 The Armenians were not unaware of these tactics, yet they had no alternative other than to go back and forth to the individual govern­ ments, the Conference of Ambassadors, and the League of Nations. On November 10, Aharonian made another “supreme appeal” to the Con­ ference of Ambassadors, as well as to President Wilson, the League of Nations, and other bodies. The events in Armenia, he began, were the logical outgrowth of the absence of external assistance. A quarter of the Armenian people had been sacrificed on the nation’s road to indepen­ dence, yet the Turkish invasion now came to threaten the fragile exis­ tence of the struggling state, which up to the present had existed only through its own efforts and without benefit of the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. After a long and heroic resistance, Armenia, aban­ doned and isolated, had been overrun by the enemy. Armenia protested with all its might against the circumstances that had brought about its victimization and the violation of the peace treaty. The invasion, Aha­ ronian continued, challenged the very principles for which the Allies had fought and won the war and constituted a serious threat to their 18 Aharonian, op. át., pp. 97—99. 19 Ibid., pp. 100-101.

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fundamental interests in Asia. The Armenian government now made a final supreme appeal to the Principal Allied Powers to intervene by rapid and effective means to guarantee respect for the Treaty of Sèvres and to free the territory of Armenia “if it is not again to become a new and inevitable theater of hecatombs.” Once more, Aharonian oudined the steps the Allies could take to save Armenia.20 Jules Cambon, president of the Conference of Ambassadors, placed the Armenian appeal before that body on November 12. He explained that because previous notes had not been answered the Armenian del­ egation had requested that the secretary-general call the matter to the attention of the conference in the hope of receiving a response. As in­ structed, British Ambassador Lord Derby maintained that the confer­ ence was not competent to deal with the appeal. After a brief discussion, Cambon was given authorization to reply to Aharonian that, though the Conference of Ambassadors was sympathetic, its powers did not extend to enforcing the Treaty of Sèvres and that therefore the Armenian del­ egation should address the ambassadors separately so that they could inform their respective governments.21 The buck passed back and forth.22 In the United States, meanwhile, the pro-Armenian lobby also cast about for ways to salvage the Armenians. The American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) became increasingly alienated from Woodrow Wilson. James Gerard and Vahan Cardashian bitterly accused the president of politicizing the mandate issue for personal gain and of unnecessarily delaying for weeks his decision on the Armenian boundaries, ultimately informing the Allied Powers only at the end of November 1920. Still, the ACIA pressured Wilson in various ways. On October 26, for example, shordy before the presidential election, Ge­ rard wrote Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby to remind him that, al­ though the Williams resolution introduced in 1919 to give Armenia mil­ itary assistance had been gready diluted by the time Warren Harding reported it out of committee in May 1920, the Senate had nonetheless authorized the president to dispatch an American warship with marines to Batum. Gerard asked that at least this small measure of relief now be implemented.23 In the State Department, the chief of the Near Eastern division, Warren Robbins, favored the recommendation.24 When the de­ 20 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 239/138, nos. 2943—2959; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/31. Numerous similar appeals are in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/39. 21 FO 371/4963, Ei4270/134/58; US Archives, RG 59, 185.5136/58. 22 See Cambon’s reply to Aharonian on November 17, in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 121/20. 23 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/351; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7. 24 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00/10, Robbins to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1920.

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partment sought the opinion of the British Foreign Office, however, the response was discouraging. Deeming the proposal both worthless and ridiculous, the Foreign Office answered diplomatically that the Turkish armies had already cut the railroad between Batum and Erevan and that the landing of a contingent of marines at the port would do nothing to relieve the Armenians. It might, on the contrary, stir deep resentment and hostility among the Georgians, who had made certain commitments regarding Batum in their treaty with Soviet Russia.25 Woodrow Wilson, a lame-duck president serving his final months in office, pursued the matter no further. On December 17, Gerard and other members of the ACIA visited President-elect Warren G. Harding at his home in Ohio to gain his ap­ proval of and support for a memorandum that underscored an abiding American interest in the autonomous development of a “self-governing and free state’’ of Armenia, as demonstrated by the aid extended to Armenian survivors throughout the Near East and by President Wilson’s arbitration of the Armenian boundary. The memorandum outlined the Allied Powers’ failure to fulfill their pledges regarding Armenia and de­ manded that they take measures to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. Con­ gress, the memorandum concluded, should authorize financial aid to the Armenian government so that, “when put in possession of its rightful territory,’’ Armenia would be able to attain “proper development.’’26 Harding assertedly intimated that he would endorse these principles after his inauguration. Gerard also submitted the memorandum to Woodrow Wilson, with the request that he place it before the Allied Powers and issue a stern warning to the two Turkish governments at Constantinople and Angora about the attack on Armenia.27 Wilson did not reply.28 The Armenia America Society, which was regarded as more moderate than the ACIA and which included major relief and missionary figures, also engaged in a flurry of activities to save the Armenians. Walter 25 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00/13/15a, Secretary of State to Davis, Nov. 24, and Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 26, 1920. 26 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7; American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, A Report of the Activities: The American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, 1918—1922 (New York, 1922), pp. 49—52. See also The Papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Box 62, Armenia file, Henry W. Jessup to Lodge, Dec. 20, 1920, and Gerard to Lodge, Dec. 20 and 22, 1920. 27 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 385/7. 28 On January 15, 1921, Wilson’s secretary, Joseph Tumulty, wrote Gerard: “While the President did not feel justified in acting on the suggestion made in your letter, he is not unmindful of the issue involved in the present serious plight of Armenia, or of the necessity of the most generous spirit of co-operation among the Powers in the effort to preserve the independence of the Armenian people.” See ACIA, The American Committee for the Indepen­ dence of Armenia, p. 52.

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George Smith and William Peet set out for Geneva to ask the Assembly of the League of Nations to intercede, and James Barton solicited the support of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to have the United States extend a $20 million loan to Armenia.29 Cleveland Dodge, acting on Barton’s assurances that Lodge had agreed to guide the measure through Con­ gress, recommended to Woodrow Wilson that he include the request in his final annual message. Wilson willingly concurred and in his address on December 7 urged Congress to authorize the Treasury to make a loan to Armenia similar to those granted to the Allied Powers during the world war.30 Once again, however, nothing more came of the pro­ posal. By the end of 1920, the Armenia America Society had begun to think in terms of an Armenian “national home” within the confines of the new Turkish state.31 The concept would crystallize in 1921, bringing about a sharp break between the society and the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, which remained characteristically, albeit unrealistically, true to its name.

The British Position

Great Britain represented the last hope for tangible assistance. Even though the British had disappointed the Armenians on issues such as the territorial disputes with Azerbaijan, the granting of guaranteed fi­ nancial loans, and the assignment of officers to train the Armenian army, they had nonetheless dispatched a shipment of arms and equipment, pressured the Georgians in favor of free access for Armenia to the port of Batum, and supported the creation of a moderately sized united Ar­ menian state. Thus, though Great Britain had not materialized as the staunch champion of Armenian rights in the postwar period, it had dem­ onstrated more than any other Allied Power the desire to achieve an equitable solution to the Armenian question, which had engaged and embarrassed Europe for several decades. Although extending de facto recognition and cautious support to Ar­ menia, the British government was deeply suspicious of the revolutionary socialist party that dominated the country. The Foreign Office, for ex29 See The Papers of Henry Morgenthau, Box 6, Correspondence, Nov.-Dec., 1920, and Lodge Papers, Box 62, Barton to Lodge, Dec. 4 and 11, 1920, and Lodge to Barton, Dec. 7 and 13, 1920. 30 [Woodrow Wilson], The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, II (New York, 1924), pp. 1219—1220. 31 On the activities of this organization, see Thomas Bryson, “The Armenia America Society: A Factor in American-Turkish Relations, 1919—1924,” Armenian Review, XXIX (Spring 1976), pp. 53—75; Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810—1927 (Minneapolis, 1971), pp. 247—280passim; and US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00P81/original-35, and 860J.01/378/434.

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ample, much preferred to deal with cultured, conservative, tactful Boghos Nubar Pasha or his representative in London, James Malcolm, than with melancholy, radical Dashnakist writer Avetis Aharonian or his London representative, Major General Iakov Bagratuni. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office had to admit that the existing government was the only legitimate political entity in Armenia and therefore invited Aha­ ronian alone to sign the Turkish peace treaty at Sèvres in August 1920. General Bagratuni, despite the poor impression he made, was accepted unofficially as the Armenian minister to His Majesty’s Government. The defeat of the Armenian army by the Turkish Nationalists in the fall of 1920 served to enhance the derisive expressions recorded in the ledgers of the Foreign Office. The minutes of Dwight Osborne and Ran­ ald MacDonell brimmed with sarcasm about the cowardliness, unwor­ thiness, and pretentiousness of the Armenians, who continued to clamor about their right to the Turkish Armenian provinces at a time when, despite having been armed by the British, they were unable to hold on to the Russian Armenian districts that constituted the existing state. As the minutes were passed upward to the senior officials, the comments became more terse and guarded yet continued to reveal irritation with the Armenian problem and the Armenians themselves. To Bagratuni’s appeal on November 6 for an Allied descent at Trebizond, the Foreign Office replied curtly that the Armenian government had already been informed that the Versailles military committee (headed by Marshal Foch) had decided that only arms and equipment might be made avail­ able to assist the Armenian army.32 General Bagratuni called at the Foreign Office on November 9 to announce that Avetis Aharonian was arriving in London in the hope of conferring with Lord Curzon. Osborne replied evasively that the foreign secretary might be too occupied to grant a personal interview. In his minutes on this exchange, Osborne, reflecting the annoyance that had grown up in the Foreign Office, suggested what might be said to Aha­ ronian if Curzon decided to receive him: It is possible that Lord Curzon might think it worth while to point out to Mr. Aharonian that Armenian propaganda is defeating its own object, that H.M.G. is not a charity organization and that instead of perpetual appeals for foreign pity and assistance we should like to see evidence of some self-reliance and po­ litical ability in Armenia; that the continued existence of Armenia as an auton­ omous state is dependent on Armenian efforts and capacity and cannot be based on foreign armies and foreign money; that we will supply fuel for transport and military equipment for their army but that they must provide from the numerous and rich Armenian colonies abroad the men and the money to defend and 32 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4; FO 371/4962, E13811/134/58.

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establish their country on a sound footing; that, once and for all, we cannot send an army to assist them and that we cannot spare any troops for Trebizond nor do we consider that to do so would save Armenia; that we view this reiterated demand for the occupation of Trebizond with some suspicion especially when it is accompanied by the suggestion that the Armenians themselves hope shortly to be able to send some of their troops there; that the surrender of Kars and the reported establishment of a Soviet Government at Alexandropol strengthen our doubts of the capacity of Armenia to maintain an independent existence; that it is clearly futile to press for our [de jure] recognition of Armenian independence when Armenia is neither politically, financially nor militarily independent and has no frontiers to recognise; finally that we fully appreciate and sympathize with Armenia’s sufferings in the past, have done and will continue to do in the future what is possible, within reason, to assist and support her, but that what we want to see now is concrete evidence of some constructive and administrative ability at home instead of a purely external policy based on propaganda and mendi­ cancy.33

When the memorandum came across Curzon’s desk, the foreign secre­ tary wrote: “A very sound note from Mr. Osborne. But someone else must deliver the message.”34 That message was imparted to Aharonian by Assistant SecretaryJ. A. C. Tilley during a meeting in the Foreign Office on November 12. Aha­ ronian cautioned that the success of the Bolshevik-Turkish campaign against Armenia would open the routes to the Mediterranean and to the Orient and jeopardize the vital interests of Great Britain and the other Allied Powers. He maintained that a small Allied force would be suffi­ cient to occupy the Trebizond-Erzerum line and that if this was impos­ sible thousands of Armenians in the United States and elsewhere and many ‘‘conscientious foreigners” would volunteer for service in a Britishsponsored international expedition—an ‘‘army of peace.” Tilley dis­ missed Aharonian’s arguments: ‘T made it quite clear that it was wholly out of the question that H.M.G. should send any military aid of any kind or accept a mandate or do anything whatsoever to render assistance— even the sending of arms was now precluded by the Turkish advance.” He did add, however, that Mustafa Kemal could not prevent the imple­ mentation of the Treaty of Sèvres. It would first be enforced in the Arab lands, Smyrna, Thrace, and the Straits. After the Allies had implemented the treaty in those areas, they would move slowly into Kemal’s centers of strength in Anatolia. Meanwhile, the Armenians would have to find a way to deal with the Turks. Even now, the British were encouraging the formation of a new Turkish army to march under the sultan’s banner against Mustafa Kemal. Aharonian found it ironic that the Allies seemed 33 FO 371 ƒ4963, E14033/134/58. 54 Ibid.

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to be prepared to enforce the treaty everywhere except in Armenia and had forgone the opportunity to occupy the eastern provinces in accor­ dance with the terms of the Mudros Armistice. Tilley counseled patience, insisting that the Armenians would ultimately benefit from the enact­ ment of the treaty in the areas already under Allied control.35 Though the British government turned down the Armenian requests for assistance, the Foreign Office did try to cajole the sultan’s govern­ ment into ratifying the Treaty of Sèvres. On November 8, High Com­ missioner de Robeck reported on his efforts to obtain ratification. Turk­ ish Foreign Minister Sefa Bey, however, was taking advantage of Kemal’s success to exert counterpressure for concessions such as “a benevolent interpretation” of the treaty, assurances that the Greek army would with­ draw from all territories not awarded Greece by the treaty, and protec­ tion against the possibility that the Armenian frontier would be drawn ‘‘in sense entirely adverse to Turkey.”36 Two days later, de Robeck tel­ egraphed that Armenia had been overrun and was lost to the Allies. The Turkish Nationalists would now be even less disposed to agree to any proposal of the sultan’s government relative to acceptance of the treaty. The British high commissioner was reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the opportunity to reconcile the Nationalist leaders had vanished and that the treaty could be imposed only by force, but even this course was problematic in view of the decreasing number of British troops in and around Constantinople.37 The Foreign Office instructed de Robeck on November 17 to make an emphatic statement that the Nationalist attack on Armenia had pro­ duced strong anti-Turkish feelings that might result in demands to revise the treaty in a manner unfavorable to Turkey. The delay in ratification would only increase that danger, as it implied the continuation of a state of war.38 But threats unsustained by force had little effect on the sultan’s government, which was fully aware of the cleavages among the Allied Powers and the intense dissatisfaction of the French and Italian govern­ ments with the inequitable gains reaped by the British in the Treaty of Sèvres and with British sponsorship of Greek expansion in Asia Minor. The Nationalist victory against Armenia strengthened the French hand; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Georges Leygues (Millerand’s suc­

35 Compare the accounts of Tilley and Aharonian in FO 371/4963, E14103/134/58, and Aharonian, op. cit., pp. 101—103. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 117/16, Circular no. 4, Nov. 25, 1920; Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915— 1923 (London and Sydney, and New York, 1984), p. 213. 36 FO 371/5057, E13897/3/44; British Documents, XIII, pp. 170—171. 37 FO 371/5057, Ei4008/3/44; British Documents, XIII, pp. 174—175. 38 FO 371/5057, E14029/3/44 enclosure; British Documents, XIII, p. 175. See also 371/ 5058, E14597/E15417/3/44.

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cessor) now insisted that significant modifications of the peace treaty were necessary in order to appease Mustafa Kemal and thereby block Bolshevik expansion in the Near East. An understanding could be reached with Kemal, the French believed, by restoring Smyrna to Turk­ ish sovereignty and dropping the unwarranted support for the creation of Greater Greece.39 Similar views were expressed within the British government by the War Office, whose position was bolstered by the Turkish victory over Arme­ nia, the defeat of General Wrangel’s anti-Soviet army in the Crimea, and the overthrow of Prime Minister Venizelos by the Greek electorate. In responding to a Foreign Office inquiry about the possible shipment of arms to Georgia, the War Office advised on November 24 that no useful purpose would be served by such aid, then added: Should, however, it be the intention of His Majesty’s Government to reconsider their policy towards Turkey, with a view to the creation of a buffer State against Russia, the Army Council view the military support of Georgia in a totally differ­ ent light. For they consider that Georgia, with the co-operation of Turkey, which in its turn would require Allied stiffening, might be able to preserve effective resistance to a Bolshevik advance into Trans-Caucasus, and might even secure the co-operation of Azerbaijan. The political adjustments which might be nec­ essary in such case as regards Batum and Armenia are the concern of the Foreign Office. But, without a friendly base in Turkey, the Council consider that such assistance as they could afford to Georgia would prove as fruitless as had been hitherto rendered in Trans-Caucasia.40

The War Office’s call for a rapprochement with Turkey in order to erect an effective barrier against the spread of Bolshevism was also stated in a memorandum of the general staff on November 22. As the result of the Turkish capture of Kars and Alexandropol and the Bolshevik oc­ cupation of Karabagh and Nakhichevan, Armenia would shrink to an area around Erevan and Lake Sevan. Georgia would probably fall next. It was obvious that the Turkish government was delaying ratification of the peace treaty in view of the favorable turn of events. Both the Com­ mittee of Union and Progress, headed by Enver and Talaat, and the Nationalists, headed by Mustafa Kemal, were working for a drastic revi­ sion of the peace treaty. For this purpose, the Young Turks had thrown in their lot with the Bolsheviks. The Nationalists, by contrast, had ac­ quired Russian arms and ammunition and were using the Russians to seize much of Armenia, but they did not want the Bolsheviks to penetrate Anatolia. The general staff concluded that the options open to Great Britain were to send reinforcements to Constantinople, to withdraw the 39 British Documents, XIII, pp. 201—202. 40 FO 371 ƒ4964, E14649/134/58.

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existing troops, or to readjust Allied policy. As the first two options were impractical, British policy should be directed toward a revision of the peace treaty in order to induce a break between the Turkish Nationalists and Soviet Russia. This objective could be achieved by revising the treaty with respect to the disposition of Smyrna, the province of Kars, and possibly Thrace. The change of government in Greece offered a golden opportunity to make “gracious concessions’’ to the Turks, thereby “re­ creating Turkey as a buffer State between the Entente Powers and Russia, and removing some of the principal underlying causes of unrest throughout the British dominions in Egypt, Mesopotamia and India.’’41 By the end of November, the Foreign Office was clearly on the defen­ sive, trying to uphold the pledges of Lloyd George’s government re­ garding the Armenians while adjusting to radically altered political and military conditions. Commenting on the memorandums of the War Of­ fice, Dwight Osborne wrote on November 25 that they were apparently based “on the assumption of a break between the Turks 8c Bolsheviks & the creation by us of a Turkish barrier to a Bolshevik or Russian advance through the Caucasus.’’ He continued: “This is what I hope will happen in the future. But the W.O. seem to assume (I think unnecessarily) that this involves the suppression of Armenia (which is impossible) & the giving of Batoum to Turkey (which is also impossible). It is practically an offer to us to arm Georgia if we will revise the treaty in favour of Turkey.’’ Tilley added: “It is primarily a plea for revision of the Turkish treaty 8c the initiation of a policy founded on friendship with Turkey.”42 Secretary of War Winston Churchill took the lead in calling for a réév­ aluation of British policy toward Turkey during a conference of ministers on December 2. Supported among others by the secretaries of state for India and the colonies (Montagu and Milner, respectively), Churchill argued that it was impossible for Great Britain to maintain its position in the Near East and India “except on a basis of friendly relations with Turkey.” The recent Greek election had given Britain a chance to lighten its burdens by arriving at an understanding with the Turks and making the conditions of the peace treaty less severe. As a result of Brit­ ish policy in that part of the world, an unnatural alliance had sprung up between the Turks and the Bolsheviks. That entente was under strain and apparently cracking, providing Great Britain with an opportunity to extricate itself from a most difficult situation. The restoration of Turkish suzerainty over Smyrna, Churchill maintained, was an indispensable step toward the pacification of the region. Lloyd George, however, continued to defend his Greek policy and over Churchill’s subsequent protest cir­ 41 British Documents, XIII, pp. 183—189 (E15721/2719/44). 42 FO 371/4964, Ei4649/134/58, minutes.

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culated minutes stating that the cabinet was in general agreement on the following points: “That His Majesty’s Government should continue to press the Turks to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres, and should resist at­ tempts to modify the Treaty directly and at once. In the event of the subsequent non-fulfilment of certain terms of the Treaty, the opportu­ nity should be taken to reconsider the situation which would then arise, in a light more favourable to Turkey.”43 The actual sense of the meeting, Churchill insisted, was “that we should make a definite change in our policy in the direction of procuring a real peace with the Moslem world and so relieving ourselves of the disastrous reaction both military and financial to which our anti-Turk policy has exposed us in the Middle East and in India.”44 Voices in the Wind

While Lloyd George and Curzon tried to hold the British cabinet at bay, they were deluged with petitions and protests from pro-Armenian groups. The supplications were futile and unrealistic, in view of the fact that Armenia had been overrun and Lloyd George was under strong pressure to abandon the Greeks and return to the traditional British policy of friendship with Turkey. The British Armenia Committee, headed by Member of Parliament Aneurin Williams, continued to sub­ mit memorandums supporting Armenia’s appeal for a military landing at Trebizond. On November 23, Captain George Gracey, who had recentiy returned to London from Erevan, delivered a new petition from the British Armenia Committee asking that British naval forces exercise a more vigilant patrol of the Black Sea and urging that the sultan himself be authorized to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres. The committee demanded that in case of a possible revision of the treaty there be no weakening of the clauses relating to Armenia and that the revision of other clauses be made contingent upon Turkish withdrawal from all territory awarded to Armenia through President Wilson’s arbitration, the return of captured arms and ammunition, and the payment of indemnity and reparations for wrongs and damages.45 Not even the Foreign Office could regard these conditions without expressing profound surprise and irritation. In a report written on November 15, H. W. Harcourt of the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund deplored the lack of British support for the Armenians, whose plight was “inconceivable”: 43 Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Class 23: Cabinet: Minutes (1916—1939), vol. 23, Cab. Concl. 70(20), minute 4(App. Ill), Conference of Ministers, Dec. 2, 1920. 44 Ibid., minute 3(App. I). 45 FO 371/4966, E15061/134/58. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 336/6. On the British Armenia Committee, see Nassibian, op. dt., pp. 44—50.

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Armenia is no more. In the little circle between Erivan and Lake Sevan some resistance is being offered but I have no hope of any real recovery. So has come upon us that tragedy which we have heard the possibility of for months. All the work of the American Committee [Near East Relief] and our own is undone, the efforts of the people to build again their ruined national life. For the future as far as I can see, nothing will save even a remnant of the nation in their home land but the immediate intervention of European troops. It is probable that the part of Armenia holding out will link up with Soviet Russia, not from any real Bolshevik feeling, but in despair of assistance from the Allies, clutching at the only remaining hope of safety. The culminating horror the people fear is an incursion of the wild tribes of Tartars from Azerbaijan. Already the agreement of Turks and Russians has broken down and I fully expect to see hostilities between the Kemalists and the Soviet troops in the near future. British policy is suspected of giving a covert support to the Turks as a means of getting the Russians out of Baku. I hope such an immoral policy is not indeed ours for it would mean delivering over the whole Caucasus to barbarism and Armenia to extinction. But one has to remember the very strong “Moslem block” school who to my mind have never thought out the ultimate end of their plan in the light of the past history of Moslem rule. This school of course is obsessed with the idea that Russia is the enemy and in seeing the dangers of an imperialist Russia, the eastern antagonist of the British Empire, lose sight of the equally serious dangers arising from encouragement given to the Pan Islam or Pan Tu­ ranian idea.46

As Parliament prepared to adjourn for the Christmas recess, Lloyd George was present in the House of Commons on December 22 to pro­ mote an appropriations bill and answer questions relating to his govern­ ment’s domestic and foreign programs. Pressed by conservative mem­ bers who were critical of the prime minister’s Eastern policies and who demanded fundamental changes in the Turkish treaty, Lloyd George continued to defend his support of the Greeks and to minimize the challenge posed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. “Are we to found our policy upon the scraps that are picked up in newspapers about these generals who are mythical because we know nothing about them, who become legends because nobody has ever seen them, and were great warriors because they never fought a battle, except against Armenians.”47 The jibe brought Aneurin Williams to his feet in a final apologia for the Armenians. His assessment of the circumstances that had led to the Armenian tragedy faithfully mirrored the sentiments of the Armenians themselves: Any settlement in the Near East must be just to all races, and I regret that the Prime Minister should have seemed to sneer at the Armenians. The mere fact 46 FO 371 /4966, E15739/134/58 enclosure. 47 Great Britain, Parliament, The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, CXXXVI (London, 1920), col. 1899.

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that they were now thoroughly down would have been enough to protect them from that sneer, and it is a most unjust way of speaking of them. The right hon. Gentleman implied that they have surrendered Kars in an unjustifiable way. He denied that they were unarmed. The facts are that they did receive some arms in the summer from our Government, but it was only, as you may say, at the tenth, if not the eleventh, hour. Up to that time they had implored our Govern­ ment to send men to help them organize their defensive forces, and our Gov­ ernment had steadily refused to do it. They had asked for arms, and they had been refused arms; they fought for themselves; they had bought aeroplanes, for instance, and our Government had stopped the delivery of those aeroplanes; and almost at the very last minute some arms were sent to men who had not been helped to organize themselves; and again at the very last minute, when there seemed to be no other hope of any barrier against the junction of the Bolsheviks and the Turks, then indeed there was great readiness to send large quantities of arms for these people, when it was utterly hopeless, and when the time was altogether too late to be of any use. Is it wonderful that they were not able to resist the attack of a nation of 100,000,000 people from the North, combined with the attack of the Turks from the South, and the Tartars from the East? Is it wonderful that some of the Armenians believed that the Kemalists had been deliberately sent by the British Government to attack them, and to make their way to Baku to recover the oil-fields out of the hands of the Russians?48

Williams read into the record several of the prime minister’s own dec­ larations regarding the restoration and restitution of the Armenian peo­ ple and the commitment of His Majesty’s Government to the establish­ ment of a separate Armenian state. If for no other reason, the Armenians had won that right by the fact that they had held back the Turkish armies for several months after the disintegration of the Russian military forces in 1917—1918 and had prevented the Turks from attacking the British forces in Mesopotamia from the rear. Williams pointed to the trail of broken promises, the failure to detach Turkish Armenia from the juris­ diction of the Turkish government at the end of the war, the renewed massacres of Armenians in Cilicia and elsewhere, and the current cava­ lier manner in which the Armenians were being abandoned.49 Against shouts from the benches to end the debate and put the question, Wil­ liams continued: Are we going to break our pledges to people because they are weak, insignificant and unorganised, or are we going to pay honourable debts? Nothing has been done! .. . We even allowed these Kemalist Turks to overrun not only the Turkish province of Armenia, but also the Republic that was formerly Russian territory, and which was recognised by the Treaty of Sevres and was thereby recognised as an independent country. Why did the Entente not do what they were urged to do at the end of the war, when the Turks were in a humble mood? They were urged to occupy Trebizond and other ports. Why did we evacuate the line of 48 Ibid., col. 1901. 49 Ibid., cols. 1902—1904.

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communication to Batoum? It was done with the idea that it was economical, and with the idea that pressure would be put upon the United States to compel them to take up the responsibility for Armenia which honourably fell on us.50

Amid a growing and impatient commotion in the House, Williams con­ cluded: “Our interests, if not our honour should indicate to us the ab­ solute necessity of securing peace for those people, and give them that help which they are honourably entitled to ask from us which we have never yet been willing to give them because we have sought to avoid the responsibilities which we were glad enough to undertake in the War.” Williams and the debate were silenced by a division of the House, with the supporters of Williams being outvoted, 153 to 30.51 Nor did Aneurin Williams ingratiate himself to the Foreign Office, where a minute by Osborne characterized the speech as “a pathetic plea, largely inaccurate in its facts, to which no one in the House seemed to listen.”52 By the end of 1920, the Armenians could find little quarter in any sector of His Majesty’s Government. Armenia and the League of Nations In their incessant appeals for assistance, Armenian spokesmen turned also to the League of Nations. Many member states had made public professions of sympathy for Armenia, and their delegates now voiced the urgency of saving the long-suffering Armenian people, warning that fail­ ure to do so would severely impair the prestige and mission of the League of Nations. The first session of the Assembly of the League con­ vened in November 1920, but the nine-member Council of the League had been in operation since the beginning of the year. Dominated by the Principal Allied Powers, the Council had addressed the Armenian question on several occasions when Great Britain, France, and Italy wished to put off or avoid action by passing the issue to the League. At the same time, however, those same Allied governments instructed their representatives on the Council to block any substantive measures. The Armenian question was thus tossed to and fro. In March 1920, at a time when no Allied Power was willing to assume the mandate for Armenia, the Allied Supreme Council suggested that the League of Nations was best suited to serve in that capacity and to appeal for financial aid from the world community. When the message was placed before the Council of the League, however, British delegate Arthur J. Balfour, arguing that the organization was already overbur­ 50 Ibid., cols. 1904—1905. 51 Ibid., col. 1906. 52 FO 371 ƒ4966, E16098/134/58, minutes.

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dened, volunteered to draft a reply explaining why the League could not accept the charge. In that answer to the Allied Supreme Council, the League expressed the “warm desire’’ to cooperate in the establish­ ment of a secure and independent Armenia but noted that it lacked the financial and military resources of a state; hence, assumption of the man­ date by one of the powers under Article XXII of the League Covenant would be the best solution. Failing this, the League would be willing to inquire whether any of its members would shoulder the duty on condi­ tion that the Supreme Council clear the territories assigned Armenia of Turkish forces, guarantee Armenia free access to the sea, and protect the country pending arrangements for its defense. Moreover, if the Su­ preme Council would extend provisional financial backing for Armenia, the Council of the League would recommend to the Assembly at its first gathering that it commit to a collective guarantee of all member states. In any case, the League was always ready to confer with the Allied Su­ preme Council on ways to help Armenia.53 Though not unanticipated, the League’s response was not acceptable to the Supreme Council. During their meeting at San Remo in April 1920, Prime Ministers Lloyd George of Britain, Alexandre Millerand of France, and Francesco Nitti of Italy tried another diversion, inviting the United States to accept the mandate and asking President Wilson to arbitrate the boundaries of Armenia within the limits of the four east­ ernmost provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Supreme Council then wrote the League that it had not expected that body to assume the man­ date; rather, it simply hoped the League would indicate what support might be forthcoming. The Allies were supplying Armenia with arms but could not consider the financial question until the United States had made a decision on the mandate.54 Meeting at Rome in May, the Council of the League indicated its satisfaction with the action of the Allied Pow­ ers yet inquired again whether they were prepared to consider the guar­ antees necessary for the League to encourage some other government to take the mandate. Once more, the League offered to confer with the Supreme Council on measures to ensure the security of the Armenian republic.55 The Allied Powers knew full well that the United States Congress would deny President Wilson the authority to accept the mandate, but the maneuver afforded them some time and another excuse to shift part 5S League of Nations, Procès- Verbal of the Third Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), pp. 15—33, and Procès-Verbal of the Fourth Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), pp. 27-29; FO 371/5107, E2542/56/44. 54 FO 371/5109, E15794/56/44 enclosure. 55 League of Nations, Procès- Verbal of the Fifth Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), pp. 149-152, 158-159.

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of the blame for the nonfulfillment of pledges regarding the Armenians. Significantly, after Wilson’s futile request had been spurned by the Sen­ ate at the beginning of June, the Allied Supreme Council did not com­ municate with the League on possible alternative measures. At its Sep­ tember meeting in Paris, the Council of the League reminded the Supreme Council of their previous exchanges and inquired whether it should put to the inaugural session of the Assembly the question of a mandate provisionally guaranteed by the Allied Powers.56 Again, the Su­ preme Council did not respond. When the Council next met in Brussels in October, Lord Balfour made it clear that his government could not offer any financial guar­ antees. And when Secretary-General Eric Drummond circulated Avetis Aharonian’s appeals about Turkish violations of the Treaty of Sèvres, Balfour reiterated the view that the League was not competent to deal with the issue. The League of Nations worked with and through organ­ ized states, whereas the attack on Armenia was the work of an irregular army and a renegade regime. The Council, therefore, could only urge the Assembly to petition the Allied Powers to intervene on behalf of Armenia.57 Acting on Balfour’s suggestion, the Council of the League had Drummond reply to Aharonian on October 23 that the disorders in Anatolia and Armenia were deplorable but that the obligation to en­ force the peace belonged to the powers party to the Treaty of Sèvres.58 The next day, the Council relayed Aharonian’s protests to the British, French, Italian, and Japanese governments with a renewed offer to con­ fer and cooperate.59 A few days later, on November 2, the Council wrote all member states that the Allied Powers had not responded to its communication. As the situation had become critical, the League was faced with the double request for financial and military assistance for Armenia. The problem was complicated further by the fact that President Wilson had still not announced his decision on Armenia’s boundaries, and most govern­ ments were preoccupied with their own financial concerns. Echoing Bal­ four’s arguments, the Council stated that the League was powerless to deal with outlaw armies. It had no troops or police force, whereas eco­ nomic pressure held no terror for those who lived by plunder and 56 League of Nations, Procés- Verbal of the Ninth Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), pp. 29, 115. 57 League of Nations, Procès- Verbal of the Tenth Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), pp. 3—5, 67—71. See also FO 4960—4961, E12083/E12885/E12916/ Ei 3070/134/58; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 237/136, Oct. 12 and 23, 1920, Dele­ gation Secretary to Foreign Minister of Armenia. 58 Tenth Session of the Council, pp. 17, 72—73; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 132/31. 59 FO 371/4961, Ei 3393/134/58 enclosure; Tenth Session of the Council, pp. 7, 53, 7475-

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who were indifferent to world public opinion. To hold out undue hope to the Armenians would be “a most cruel kindness to this hardly tried people.” The Assembly of the League nonetheless might wish to appeal to the Supreme Council to alleviate Armenia’s plight and repeat the offer to seek a mandatory power if the Allied Powers gave certain guar­ antees.60 On November 10, Prime Minister Lloyd George finally answered the League’s October 24 letter about the Armenian crisis: In reply, I have the honour to inform you that the Allied Powers are doing everything that is possible to meet the immediate military needs of the Armenian Republic of Erivan in the Caucasus by the supply of war material and fuel for military transport. As regards the future, I have the honour to remind you that in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres, President Wilson has been asked to arbitrate on the question of the boundaries between Armenia and Turkey, and that until he has pronounced his decision no useful result can be expected to accrue from any discussion on the action to be taken to ensure the execution of the Treaty.61

As pressure on the Allied Powers mounted, the first secretary of the French embassy, Aimé de Fleuriau, called at the British Foreign Office to express his government’s view that it would be “inconvenient” if the Armenian question was brought up during the forthcoming meeting of the League of Nations Assembly. Fleuriau and British Assistant Secretary of State Tilley were in agreement that no useful discussion was possible as long as Armenia remained an “unknown quality.” Suggesting that it would be better to avoid saying anything, Fleuriau asked that His Majes­ ty’s Government, like that of France, instruct its delegation in Geneva to discourage any attempt to raise the Armenian question. In his mem­ orandum on this interview, Tilley wrote: “I think we should do so. I do not feel that it is a matter we want to hear very much about. Whatever may have been expected of us originally we intend to do as little as we can for Armenia either in men or money.” Foreign Secretary Curzon initialed his concurrence.62 Proposals for Intervention

The inaugural session of the Assembly of the League of Nations con­ vened at Geneva on November 15. In an air of high emotion, the dele­ gates of the forty-one member states heard uplifting speeches and elected Paul Hymans of Belgium president. The session, which lasted 60 FO 371 ƒ4962, E13737/134/58. 61 FO 371/4964, Ei4666/134/58 enclosure. 62 FO 371/4963, Ei4026/134/58; Nassibian, op. át., p. 214.

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until December 18, was taken up primarily with organizational matters, but it was the Armenian question more than any other issue that aroused and engaged the representatives. There were two aspects to the question: intervention and membership in the League. In its report of activities since January, the Council focused on the responsibilities entrusted to the League in the treaties of peace, attempts to mediate various territorial disputes, and humanitarian undertakings in relief, repatriation, and health. High on the list of endeavors in the interest of peace and justice was the heading, “Protection of Armenia.’’ The Council, it was explained, had since March entered into several exchanges with the Allied Supreme Council and had forwarded to that body Armenia’s communications about the Turkish invasion, with offers to consult and cooperate in measures to safeguard the Armenian repub­ lic.63 Lord Robert Cecil, a former British foreign secretary now representing South Africa, called for swift action. The tribulations of the Armenian people were known to all: There is no greater tragedy in the history of the world. A people of great intel­ ligence, of great cultivation, an ancient civilisation, gradually being exterminated by the operation of a Government which apparently was devoid of pity when dealing with this section of its subjects; that has been the history of Armenia, an age-long martyrdom. It has culminated during the late war in massacres, the horror and the cold-bloodedness of which have rarely been seen, and never surpassed. When we first heard of them during the war they were terrible; but every detail that has come out since, every bit of information which has come to our hands after the war has closed, has shown that, so far from the horrors being exaggerated, they were, if anything, underrated.64

The League of Nations, Cecil continued, could not be an exponent of public morality unless it did the utmost to secure the Armenian peo­ ple from the repetition of past horrors. The Council had done what it could, and if there was any criticism to be voiced it should be directed toward “another international body of great importance which has per­ haps not seconded the action of the League in quite the way we should have desired.’’ Asking that the Assembly not recess without taking some practical step to remedy the situation, Cecil introduced the following resolution: That the Council be requested to take into immediate consideration the sit­ uation in Armenia, and to present for the consideration of the Assembly pro63 League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings (Meetings Held from the lyth of November to the 18th ofDecember 1920) (Geneva, 1920), pp. 113—114. 64 Ibid., p. 95.

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posais for averting the danger which now threatens the remnant of the Armenian race, and also for establishing a permanent settlement of that country.65

Avetis Aharonian, who arrived in Geneva as the Assembly convened on November 15, wrote the League three days later that the victorious Turkish Nationalists were demanding that Armenia repudiate the Treaty of Sèvres. The Armenian government wished to announce in advance that any such action would be the result of extreme duress and should be regarded as null and void by the international community.66 Meeting with Robert Cecil, Aharonian and General Korganian asserted that no more than 25,000 soldiers would be needed to occupy Trebizond and its hinterland, thereby forcing a Turkish withdrawal from Armenia. Cecil, however, was skeptical that the men and finances for such a cam­ paign could be found and was not persuaded by Aharonian’s argument that much of the required resources could be raised within the com­ munities of the Armenian dispersion.67 Addressing the Assembly on November 20, Senator Henri Lafontaine of Belgium repeated the urgent call for action. “In time of peace Ar­ menia is dying, a nation of a million inhabitants is being destroyed under the eyes of a League of Nations which comprises 41 States, with their armies numbering millions and with their fleets lying at Constantinople within a stone’s throw of the place where these unfortunate people are being butchered.” The cost of creating a military expedition to relieve Armenia would be moderate, and there were officers in many member countries who were ready to volunteer. “From a technical point of view, the financial problem does not exist, any more than does the military problem. The only problem is that of the good will of those who are here, to put an end to this terrible drama.” Interrupted by frequent applause, Lafontaine warned that failure to intervene would be a serious discredit to the League of Nations, whereas decisive action would show that the whole of humanity was behind the world organization.68 Tomasso Tittoni, erstwhile foreign minister of Italy, spoke up for the Council, on which he served, by oudining its actions since being ap­ proached by the Allied Supreme Council in March. As recentiy as Oc­ tober it had again offered to consult on measures to assist Armenia, but Lloyd George had replied that the Allied Powers were already supplying fuel and munitions and that no useful purpose would be served by study­ ing the means to enforce the Turkish treaty until President Wilson ren­ 65 Ibid., p. 96. “Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 117/16, Circular no. 3, Nov. 20, 1920. See also US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/37, Wallace to Secretary of State, Nov. 19, 1920. 67 Aharonian, op. át., pp. 103—104. 68 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, pp. 165—166.

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dered his decision on the Armenian boundary. Despite its best efforts, the Council of the League was unable to help in the form required— money and soldiers. “There we have, indeed, the whole difficulty of the Armenian question,” Tittoni observed. The League had been born amid worldwide turbulence and lacked the strength of Hercules to strangle in the cradle “the monster which desires to perpetuate war and hinders the establishment of universal peace.” Only with the passage of time could the League mature and blossom into “manhood.”69 The Cecil resolution asking the Council to make definite recommen­ dations for averting the danger besetting Armenia was amended by La­ fontaine on November 22 to stipulate “that a Committee of six Members be appointed to consider what steps, if any, could be taken to put an end to the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists.”70 In support of the amended resolution, Miroslav Spalaikovitch of the Serb-CroatSlovene (Yugoslav) kingdom labeled the Turkish invasion “a new con­ spiracy against liberty.” His own people had “full knowledge of this abominable system of methodical and premeditated extermination prac­ tised upon a whole people by means of a constant series of individual condemnations, of summary executions and wholesale massacres.” The Great Powers were morally bound to save Armenia. “We must never hesitate, Gentlemen, to raise our voice in favour of oppressed, martyred and massacred peoples. Let us hasten now to raise it on behalf of the Armenian nation, and let us take every opportunity of raising it to in­ crease the prestige of the League of Nations, and affirm our lofty hu­ manitarian mission by creating precedents of actions which in the future will represent, I am convinced, the most precious moral and political capital vested in the League.” Hjalmar Bran ting of Sweden, a comrade of the Dashnaktsutiun in the Second International, warned that a rep­ etition of the systematic massacre of Armenians would be a strong re­ proach to humanity. The Great Powers had the men and money to in­ tervene and should be pressured to see “that these crimes should not be repeated, that there should be an end to this extermination.” It was time “to pass from words to acts.”71 Arthur James Balfour put the issue in a different perspective and tact­ fully chided the Assembly for its emotional, unobjective approach. “Con­ sider, if you will, for a moment not the general need for helping the Armenians if we can, but the practical difficulties which lie in the way. Good intentions are the foundations of good policy, but good intentions by themselves are perfectly useless unless means can be found for car­ 69 Ibid., pp. 175—176. 70 Ibid., p. 184. 71 Ibid., pp. 184—187.

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rying them into effect.” The framers of the Covenant had in view or­ ganized states that were influenced by public opinion and ultimately by the threat of economic sanctions. ‘‘What does Mustapha Kemal care about the opinion of the League of Nations, or the opinion of the civ­ ilised world, or the fact that before any tribunal of humane people his action will be condemned?” He was the leader of ‘‘bands of brigands” who were “utterly insensible” to all the principles upon which the League was founded. Had the United States been willing, with all its men, money, and public spirit, to take the mandate for Armenia in the way that Great Britain and France had done in lands such as Mesopo­ tamia and Syria, matters would have been different. No other state was willing to undertake the responsibility unless it was given financial guar­ antees and the necessary support in men and munitions. Trying to pre­ vent the issue from being sent back to the Council of the League, Balfour proposed that the Assembly make a worldwide appeal for assistance, failing which nothing could be done: Mr. President, let me say that protestations of good intentions and good-will are things which have been lavished on Armenia for a generation at least. For many, many years, all statesmen who have considered this question have felt the gravity of the problem; they have all in their separate measure endeavoured to do what they can, and what they have been able to do has been, I grieve to say, insignif­ icant. It is a tragic situation. We stand like people on the shore looking at the survivors of a wreck holding on to their ship which is about to be finally foun­ dered. We give them words of encouragement, we express our horror at their position and our sympathy with their misfortunes, but so far we have not been fortunate enough to find a method of giving them effective aid.72

René Viviani of the French delegation was not so pessimistic. Neither Cecil’s resolution nor Lafontaine’s amendment sufficed. To ask the Council of the League to find a mandatory power when it was clear that no nation would come forward was an exercise in futility, whereas the creation of a committee of six would simply obscure the problem and relieve the Council of its responsibility. The only feasible course was to urge the Council to approach the governments for another kind of man­ date: the use of moral and material authority to intervene between the combatants in order to effect a settlement by arbitration. Viviani there­ fore proposed a substitute motion: The Assembly, anxious to co-operate with the Council in order to put an end, in the shortest time possible, to the horrors of the Armenian tragedy, requests the Council to arrive at an understanding with the Governments with a view to 72 Ibid., pp. 187—189.

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entrusting a Power with the task of taking the necessary measures to stop the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists.

The Assembly, Viviani concluded, had been given all the responsibility and none of the authority and should not put itself into a position to take decisions and then have no means to execute them.73 The remainder of the lengthy session of November 22 was spent trying to reconcile the resolutions on the floor. Fridtjof Nansen of Norway stressed the humanitarian aspect of sparing the Armenian people from destruction even in the absence of a political solution. The organization of an expedition was only a matter of men and money; the United States may have declined the mandate, but it had not refused to assist in deliv­ ering a people from annihilation. A direct appeal from the League would surely elicit a positive response from America. “It is true that it is a risk for the League to take up a question which it cannot solve, but as far as I can see it is a much greater risk to do absolutely nothing, and to say it is such a difficult and dangerous question that we dare not touch it.’’74 Romanian representative Thomas Jonnesco reminded the delegates that the massacres were of long standing. “If there are any Armenians still alive, it is due to their will to live, due to the resistance they have offered to their oppressors.’’ The League was devoid of material force, but at least the forty-one member states could give Armenia their united moral support. Jonnesco favored addressing all the governments to see if any was willing to take practical measures on behalf of the Armenians. The moral strength of the League would encourage the Armenians and might induce some government to intervene. Canadian delegate Charles Joseph Doherty agreed that the failure of the Council to find a solution was no reason to give up or to discount “an exceptional remedy for this exceptional case.” In fact, all the proposed measures could be at­ tempted. Justice was the foundation for peace and required that unre­ dressed wrongs be resolved.75 In a conciliatory gesture, Robert Cecil stated that he did not oppose the proposals made by others. He simply wanted something to be done. A great event was threatening the world, and the League could not re­ main indifferent. He was ready to accept any means of assistance: But I am bound to say that I should regard with horror any decision of this Assembly which should definitely set aside action in this grave emergency and declare that a Society which has been brought into existence in order to preserve 7S Ibid., pp. 189—192. 74 Zbid., pp. 192-193. 13 Ibid., pp. 193-195.

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peace was powerless in the face of a great emergency of this kind.... A shipwreck is taking place. A nation is actually in process of extermination. Shall we not make some effort to launch a lifeboat to the protection of those who are in this extreme danger, or shall we merely stand aside and say, “We can do nothing. You must perish because we are unable to intervene’’?76

Viviani replied that he was only suggesting that the Assembly, through the Council, ask the Great Powers to select a state to accept the respon­ sibility for ending the hostilities and reaching a negotiated settlement. As the motions on the floor required unanimous consent, Viviani asked Cecil and Lafontaine for their help. “We are told Armenia is suffering; she is in her agony and is appealing for help. These appeals reach us here. What solution is proposed to us? A Committee. When there is in the house a sick person on the point of death, do we send for a doctor? ... No Gentlemen, we pause on the threshold and say: ‘A Committee.’ ’’ Viviani announced that unless Cecil and Lafontaine backed his proposal, he would proceed no further. “Either we shall find a Power which will mediate and we shall bow to her decision and assist her; or there will be nobody willing to intervene, and we shall be bound to acknowledge a failure on the part of humanity.’’ With such an outcome likely, Viviani seemed ready to soften the ultimate road to retreat: “In that case we should not despair but work with the greater energy and courage to strengthen the League of Nations and provide it for future occasions, when humanity is faced with similar troubles, with the weapon which it now lacks.”77 In his skillful maneuvers to protect Great Britain from embarrassment, Lord Balfour again spoke with skepticism about the possibility of nego­ tiating with Mustafa Kemal; there was no “civilised power” in Asia Mi­ nor, and nothing could be offered that Kemal would take. Balfour’s cold calculations were met with an impassioned exhortation by Viviani. Was the League simply to recognize its “international insolvency”? If Bal­ four’s logic were to be followed: “We shall, in fact, have arrived at a purely negative result. We shall have neither war, nor fleet, nor money, nor army, nor mediation, nor arbitration. We shall have to recognise that in this Assembly there is no impulse of sympathy or conscience in favour of those who are being assassinated.” Mustafa Kemal might be beyond the pale of civilized governments, but he could still be influ­ enced by the fact that the whole of world opinion was behind the gov­ ernment appointed for negotiation or mediation. To the applause of the assembled delegates, Viviani noted that if “this wound” was allowed to fester only one conclusion would follow: “There is nothing left for us 16 Ibid., pp. 195-197. 77 Ibid., PP- ipV-^O-

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but to continue our theoretical and academic discussions before the world, which will say: ‘Assuredly, there is no new thing under the sun.’ "78 At the end of the long plenary session on November 22, the Assembly of the League, desiring to do something about the Armenian crisis, fi­ nally reconciled and unanimously adopted the combined Cecil-Lafon­ taine and Viviani resolutions: The Assembly, anxious to co-operate with the Council, in order to put an end in the shortest time possible to the horrors of the Armenian tragedy, requests the Council to arrive at an understanding with the Governments with a view of entrusting a Power with the task of taking the necessary measures to stop the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists, and The Assembly further decides to nominate a Committee of six members to consider and report to the Assembly during this session the steps, if any, which can be taken for this object.79

The Response

Immediately after the Assembly’s meeting, the Council of the League instructed Secretary-General Eric Drummond to prepare the draft of a communication to the member states, which it approved the next day and dispatched on November 24. Beginning with the text of the Assem­ bly’s resolution, the message continued: The Council, after deliberation, decided to forward this Resolution to the Governments of all the States Members of the League of Nations and to the Government of the United States of America, the President of which has already accepted the task of fixing the frontiers of Armenia. The Council begs your Government to inform it, if it would be disposed, either alone or together with others to undertake in the name of the League of Nations this mission of a supremely humanitarian nature which, moreover, involves no obligation of a permanent kind. In case of a favourable reply, it would be grateful if you would inform it of your decision as speedily as possible, in order that it may be able to inform the Assembly before the end of the present Session.80

In a separate message to President Wilson on November 25, the League emphasized that the United States was not being asked to accept a mandate for Armenia: “The Council would never have thought of 78 Ibid., pp. 199-201. 79 League of Nations, Secretariat, OfficialJournal: Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly during Its First Session (November 15th to December 18th 1920) (Geneva, 1921), p. 33. See also The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 202. 80 League of Nations, Procès-Verbal of the Eleventh Session of the Council of the League ofNations (Geneva, 1920), p. 83; The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 242; FO 371/ 4964, E14931/134/58. There are minor differences of text in these sources.

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asking the United States to assume obligations which they did not desire to undertake; but the United States will understand that the Council felt itself bound to offer them the possibility of undertaking a task of such high humanitarian importance, being aware that the fate of Armenia has always been an object of particular interest on the part of the Amer­ ican people, and that the President of the United States has already accepted the task of fixing the frontiers of this country.”81 During the next several days, the governments of Brazil and Spain responded affirmatively to the League’s invitation, as did President Wil­ son. Brazilian Foreign Minister Azevedo Marques wrote that his govern­ ment was prepared to assist in putting an end to Armenia’s desperate position, and Spanish Prime Minister Eduardo Dato replied that his gov­ ernment did not fully understand ‘‘the exact construction” to be put on the wording of the Assembly’s resolution but nevertheless was ready to cooperate ‘‘in any steps of a moral or diplomatic nature directed towards the achievement of the pacific aims which the League of Nations is pursuing with such zeal and devotion.”82 In Washington, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby advised Wilson on November 26 to accept the League’s invitation and recommended that the president select Ambas­ sador Henry Morgenthau as his personal representative. Colby conceded that the mission would probably fail to end hostilities on a mutually acceptable basis but would nonetheless be one ‘‘the world would wel­ come and history approve.”83* 85 In his cable to Hymans on November 30, Wilson noted that although the Senate had withheld permission to assume the Armenian mandate, the United States had repeatedly shown its solicitude for the Armenian people: I am without authorization to offer or employ military forces of the United States in any project for the relief of Armenia, and any material contributions would require the authorization of the Congress which is not now in session and whose action I could not forecast. I am willing, however, upon assurances of the moral and diplomatic support of the principal powers, and in a spirit of sympa­ thetic response to the request of the Council of the League of Nations, to use my good offices and to proffer my personal mediation through a representative whom I may designate, to end the hostilities now being waged against the Ar­ menian people and to bring peace and accord to the contending parties, relying upon the Council of the League of Nations to suggest to me the avenues through

81 Eleventh Session of the Council, p. 84. See also FO 371 ƒ4965, E15090/134/58 enclosure. 82 Eleventh Session of the Council, pp. 86—87; Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 244. See also League of Nations, First Assembly, Assembly Document 155, Situation in Armenia: Telegrams Received and Despatched by the Council (Geneva, 1920); FO 371/4965, Ei 5298/134/58. 85 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/37a.

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which my proffer [offer] should be conveyed and the parties to whom it should be addressed.84

Paul Hymans expressed the League’s appreciation and informed Wil­ son that the Brazilian and Spanish governments were being advised to communicate with him directly on the best way to cooperate. Negotia­ tions could be opened immediately with the Armenian government in Erevan. “As regards the Kemalists the Council is taking steps to find out the most effective method of getting into touch with them and will in­ form you on this point as soon as possible.’’85 Presenting these messages to the Assembly of the League on December 2, Hymans exclaimed that the Armenian misfortunes had horrified the world. “I am sure that we are here united heart and soul in the desire that Armenia should be saved, and in hopes for the re-establishment of an equitable and lasting peace, which will permit this unhappy people to heal its wounds, to reconstruct its independent life, and to work out its destiny.’’ There was now a gleam of hope, and the world would follow President Wilson’s efforts with great anticipation. Robert Cecil, stating that Hymans had fully expressed the Assembly’s sentiments, emphasized the need to mo­ bilize world opinion. “We have at our disposal in this great weapon of publicity a weapon of enormous strength and power, the means by which we can secure at the back of our policies the public opinion of the world, which is after all more powerful than any army.’’ The League should not relax its efforts because of the impending mediation but rather should make every effort to give Armenia the resources and guidance that would allow it to become a self-respecting and self-supporting nation.84 86 85 The British government, as usual, was approached to facilitate the work of the League. For example, the committee of six created to in­ vestigate means to assist Armenia requested that the Foreign Office in­ quire of Colonel Stokes “whether in his opinion there is fair prospect of enabling Armenia to defend herself provided she is furnished with competent political and military advisers in sufficient numbers, adequate supplies of munitions, equipment, clothing, and food, and provided these are furnished promptly.”87 The reaction in the Foreign Office was 84 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III (Washington, D.C., 1936), pp. 804—805 (cited hereafter as Foreign Relations, 1920); US Archives, RG 59, 7605.00/390. See also The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 354; Eleventh Session of the Council, p. 85. 85 FO 371/4966, Ei5752/134/58; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/42 lA. 86 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, pp. 242—246. See also the memoran­ dum of the Armenian delegation relative to the Armenian-Turkish war and means of in­ tervention by the League of Nations, in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 130/29. 87 FO 371/4964, Ei4847/134/58.

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one of skepticism and sarcasm. J. A. C. Tilley observed: “We can ask Col. Stokes but I do not believe that a wilderness of advisers or any amount of supplies would save Armenia, because she lacks fighting men, not so much numbers sis physique & morale being—through no fault of their own—inadequate.’’ To this, Foreign Secretary Curzon scribbled impa­ tiently: “ ‘Lack of morale’ ie cowardice not their fault? Read the account that came in yesterday of their disgraceful surrender of Kars.’’88 Never­ theless, on November 30 the Foreign Office dutifully forwarded the League’s request to Stokes, who had already reported in no uncertain terms that it was too late to help Armenia and that any supplies intended for that country should now be consigned to Georgia.89 In a related development on December 2, Paul Hymans asked that the British government facilitate President Wilson’s mediation efforts by asking the opinions of its representatives at Constantinople and Tiflis about channels of communication to and negotiation with the Kemalists. In the Foreign Office, Eastern division chief D. G. Osborne was furious: “This is quite absurd. Must we forward these enquiries or shall we reply that communication with Mustafa Kemal can be sent via (i) Constanti­ nople (ii) Rome (iii) Moscow, the first being preferable. The Const’pie Gov’t is now in official touch with Angora.’’90 Even as Tilley instructed that the League’s request be telegraphed to the new British high com­ missioner, Sir Horace Rumbold, in Constantinople, Osborne continued to carp: “If the League of Nations, as is apparently their intention, ap­ proach Mustafa Kemal on the subject of Armenia, they will probably be met with counter-claims to Smyrna & Thrace. Would this perhaps afford an opportunity for reconsideration of these three Chapters?”91 And when the League relayed another Armenian protest about the violation of the Treaty of Sèvres, Osborne could not contain his irritation: “The League has listened to the Supreme Appeal & has most imprudently invoked further intervention by President Wilson. The latter is, there is good reason to believe, quite incapable of working himself & his Irish Secretary, Tumulty, reigns in his stead.”92 On December 8, Rumbold replied that he and the French high com­ missioner had explored the idea of having Wilson’s messages delivered to Mustafa Kemal by the mission the sultan’s government had sent to Angora, but the Turkish authorities were resisting with the excuse that such action could be taken as recognition of Mustafa Kemal’s regime. 88 Ibid., minutes. 89 Ibid., enclosure. See also FO 371/4965. E15429/134/58. 90 FO 371/4965, E15174/134/58, Hankey to Crowe, Dec. 3, 1920, and minutes. 91 FO 371/4965, E15131/134/58, minutes. See also E15489/134/58. 92 FO 371 /49Ô5, E15093/134/58.

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Moreover, American High Commissioner Mark Bristol was unwilling to cooperate without precise directives from Washington. The best course, therefore, was to have President Wilson telegraph his instructions to Admiral Bristol, who could then consult with the Allied high commis­ sioners on ways to deliver the messages.93 Prime Minister Lloyd George relayed this information to the Council of the League only on December 17. Paul Hymans then forwarded the suggestion to Wilson, adding that Lloyd George had also indicated that basic issues underlying a solution to the Armenian question involved not only Armenia and Turkey but also the whole complex problem of Soviet Russia.94 Meanwhile, on December 7, Wilson wrote the State Department that he wished to appoint as his personal mediator Henry Morgenthau, “in whose skill and good sense in such matters I have the highest confi­ dence.”95 Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis informed Hymans of the appointment on December 15 and again asked assurances of dip­ lomatic support from the Allied Powers.96 But the Morgenthau mission never materialized, nor did Wilson ever instruct Admiral Bristol to trans­ mit any communications to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In a letter to Hymans on January 18, 1921, Davis expressed Wilson’s disappointment at not having received explicit pledges of support from the Principal Powers. The president believed the Armenian question had not been resolved because some powers had refused to recognize the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and others had shirked their obligation to enforce those terms. The United States, Wilson declared, bore no responsibility in this failure, but he concurred with Lloyd George that the Armenian question' was “but one detail in this vast Russian problem” and that only with the cooperation and collaboration of the Principal Powers was there any hope for the pacification and independence of Armenia.97 ACIA secre­ tary Henry Jessup denigrated Wilson for having refused to send the memorandum shown to Harding demanding that the Allied Powers en­ force the peace treaty. Instead, the lame-duck president had now made this “beautifully-worded pronunciamento, doing the Armenian cause no good ... by linking it up to the Russian chaotic conditions.”98 93 FO 371/4965, Ei5450/134/58; The Papers of Mark L. Bristol, War Diary, Dec. 14, 1920. 94 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.67/56!/»; FO 371/4965, E15450/134/58 enclosure; Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 809. 95 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/84, Wilson to Davis, Dec. 7, 1920. 96 US Archives, RG 59, 7605.67/470, and Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 807. On Morgen­ thau’s appointment, see the Morgenthau Papers, Box 6, Department of State to Morgen­ thau, Dec. 15, 1920. 97 US Archives, RG 59, 7605.67/570. See also 7605.67/54/600/64/68/70/76. 98 US Archives, RG 59, 8605.01/394,5essup to Secretary of State, March 18, 1921.

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Application for League Membership While the League considered measures to assist Armenia, the Republic’s application for membership was pending before that body. The appli­ cation was strengthened by the fact that Armenia had been recognized by the Principal Allied Powers and had been a signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres. When the League came into existence in January 1920, all the peace settlements except for the Turkish treaty had been concluded, and the signatory parties, aside from the defeated powers, became char­ ter members of the world organization. Armenia had not been admitted because the Turkish treaty had not yet been formulated. The question was complicated further by the remote possibility that Armenia would be assigned a mandatory power under Article XXII of the Covenant, in which case membership would have to be deferred for the duration of the mandate. Moreover, member states were required to have a stable government and fixed boundaries (the Treaty of Sèvres did not define the precise boundaries of Armenia) and by Article X to commit them­ selves to defend all other members from external aggression. Avetis Aharonian, having already submitted several memorandums on Armenia’s right to membership in the League of Nations, made a formal application to the Council of the League in May 1920." Secretary-Gen­ eral Eric Drummond replied that only the Assembly of the League was empowered to admit new members and that Aharonian should complete the necessary procedures so that the application could be placed on the agenda of the first session of that body.99 100 On September 25, Aharonian wrote Paul Hymans, president of the League’s Council, that because the Treaty of Sèvres gave final formulation to the recognition of the Arme­ nian republic by the Allied Powers, the Armenian government was ap­ plying for admission.101 Drummond distributed the application to the League’s Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval, and Air Questions, which dealt with matters of arms control and limitation. To 99 Fifth Session of the Council, pp. 19, 166—167. For documents relative to Armenia’s ap­ plication, see Assembly Document 56, Application by the Armenian Republic for Admission to the League: Memorandum by the Secretary-General (Geneva, 1920). 100 Assembly Document 56, p. 2; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/35, Aharonian to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Aug. 18, 1920. 101 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 237/136, Aharonian to Hymans, Sept. 25, 1920, and File 130/29, Drummond to Armenian Delegation, Sept. 30, 1920; FO 371/496 i,E 12884/ 134/58 enclosure. When news of the application reached London, Osborne wrote in the minutes: “This was to be anticipated,” to which Tilley reacted, “We cannot contest it.” Eyre Crowe observed: “The decision is in the hands of the Assembly, where a 2/3ds majority is required for recognition. I doubt whether the Armenian State will be considered a sufficiently well-established Power to justify admission before its boundaries are fixed.” Curzon rejoined: “I hope not.”

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the three subcommissions Aharonian and General Korganian provided the requisite information on Armenia’s form of government, existing territory and frontiers, composition and size of the armed forces, and permanent ground and air forces needed for purposes of defense. In its findings, the commission recommended that Armenia be allowed to re­ tain all existing military components, with the right to request an upward revision based on new developments (such as expansion of the bound­ aries as provided for by the Treaty of Sèvres).102 In October, Drummond requested authenticated copies of the doc­ uments by which Armenia had declared its independence, together with subsequent documents and letters of de facto or de jure recognition. Armenia was also invited to send a representative to Geneva to provide further explanation should the Assembly so require.103 Aharonian sub­ mitted the necessary documents and wrote on October 24 that he him­ self would be present in Geneva. At the same time, he drew attention to the fact that the most solemn act in connection with Armenia’s appli­ cation was its recognition by the Principal Allied Powers and all other signatories of the treaty signed at Sèvres on August 10. In that treaty, Armenia was acknowledged as a fully independent state. Moreover, Aharonian and Boghos Nubar had signed a treaty on minorities that included provisions relative to the supervision of the League of Nations. Armenia was not a charter member of the League simply because the Turkish treaty had not been signed when the organization came into existence; it was now only just that Armenia be accorded its rightful place.104 In its report the Secretariat-General concluded that Armenia qualified for membership. The Republic had been duly constituted and recog­ nized by Allied and other governments and had completed all the nec­ essary formalities. Article 93 of the Treaty of Sèvres stated explicidy that the Principal Allied Powers recognized Armenia as a sovereign and in­ dependent state.105 Many governments tended to regard Armenia in the category of Finland and Poland and were therefore prepared to grant it recognition and admission, though they were not similarly inclined in 102 Tenth Session of the Council, p. 107. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 130/29, Secretary of Military Subcommittee to Armenian Delegation, Oct. 5, and Drummond to Armenian Delegation, Oct. 8, 1920; FO 371/4965. E15106/134/58 enclosure. 103 Assembly Document 56, pp. 2, 10; FO 371/4965, E15106/134/58 enclosure; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 239/138, Aharonian to Drummond, Oct. 14 and 18, 1920, enclosures. 104 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 130/129, Aharonian to Drummond, Oct. 24, 1920. See also File 130/129, Aharonian to Drummond, Oct. 18, 1920; Assembly Document 56, p. 10. 105 Assembly Document 56, pp. 2—5; FO 371 /49Ô5, E15106/134/58 enclosure. See also World Peace Foundation, The First Assembly of the League of Nations, IV (Boston, 1921), pp. >35-! 36, 156, 158-163, 173-175» 218-220.

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the cases of Azerbaijan, the Ukraine, and other states on territories of the former Russian Empire. The fluid situation caused by the Turkish invasion had created an unwelcome test case, as by admitting Armenia to membership the League presumably would be binding its members to defend the territorial integrity of the country. Weighing against the widespread sympathy for Armenia and a general disposition to accept the Republic into membership was the onerous, if not impossible, duty to guarantee the territorial integrity of a state without clearly defined borders and already prostrate before the invader. When the Assembly of the League convened in November, questions of membership were referred to the Fifth Committee on the Admission of New States. Chaired by Don Antonio Huneeus of Chile, the commit­ tee operated in the absence of a precise ruling on whether the admission of a state implied or entailed recognition by all other members and, if so, whether previously unrecognized states thereby became de facto al­ lies. There were many differences of opinion, even on whether all legal questions had to be settled before the League acted on applications for membership or whether the precedents set in making individual, prac­ tical decisions should shape the ultimate answers to the unresolved legal questions. An ad hoc committee of international jurists was set up to consider these issues, and the Fifth Committee distributed the many applications for membership to several subcommittees to determine if the necessary documents were in order; if the applying government had been recognized and, if so, by what countries; if the government was stable and fully independent and the boundaries of the state were de­ fined; and if its conduct with regard to the regulation of armaments had been satisfactory.106 Armenia’s application, together with those of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Ukraine, and Costa Rica, was considered by the third subcommittee, chaired by Fridtjof Nansen. During its deliberations from November 20 to 28, the subcommittee received additional supporting materials from Aharonian and prepared a report showing that Armenia’s application was in order and that there could be no doubt that the government was “really representative of the Armenian people.’’ In view of the dangers facing Armenia, however, the government was not stable, and the coun­ try’s boundaries had not been fixed, as Wilson’s award might expand the territory from the existing 70,551 square kilometers, or 26,305 (ac­ tually 27,232) square miles, to as much as 214,000 square kilometers, or 80,000 (actually 82,604) square miles. “The attitude in its interna­ tional relations of the Armenian Government inspires the fullest confi­ 106 League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, II (Geneva, 1920), pp. 157-162.

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dence in its desire to maintain the given word,” the report read. The Republic had been recognized by a number of countries, and its rep­ resentatives maintained that as a signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres it had been granted de jure recognition by all other parties to that interna­ tional instrument. The third subcommittee reported favorably on the applications of Armenia and Georgia but raised questions about that of Azerbaijan, especially as a Bolshevik government had seized power there.107 The Fifth Committee considered the subcommittee’s report on Ar­ menia on December i, after first rejecting the applications of Azerbaijan and the Ukraine. Dr. Nansen explained that the subcommittee was unanimous in its sympathy for the Armenian people but was obliged to note that Armenia was unable to give complete answers to certain ques­ tions. Although issues relating to the stability of the government and territorial sovereignty were troubling, Rodrigo Octavio of Brazil reiter­ ated the argument that Armenia would have been a charter member if the Turkish treaty had been completed earlier and that it had been allowed to sign a convention for the protection of minorities under the supervision of the League. He hoped the committee would unanimously grant Armenia every possible encouragement in its efforts to maintain independence. René Viviani concurred, stating that he opposed any res­ ervations, even if these might be based on facts. Armenia’s admission to membership would strengthen the League’s efforts at mediation. Sup­ port was also voiced by Greek representative Nicolas Politis and South African delegate Cecil, who announced that he would vote in favor of admission but believed the Assembly should be cautioned that such ac­ tion would eliminate the possibility of placing Armenia under the pro­ tection of a mandatory power and that other member states would be obliged to cooperate in the country’s defense. H. A. L. Fisher of the British Empire Delegation tried to slow the momentum by asking whether it might not soon be evident that Armenia would fare better in the hands of a mandatory power. Ignoring the fact that for two years Armenia had sought but failed to find a mandatory power and that the Allied Supreme Council had repeatedly tried to shift the responsibility in this matter, Fisher was able to postpone the vote on admission until the Fifth Committee’s next session.108 At this juncture, the domination of Great Britain and France again became boldly manifest. As the admission of Armenia could further em­ barrass the Allied Powers, Fisher immediately telegraphed a coded mes­ sage to London: ‘‘Viviani and Lord R. Cecil are trying to rush Armenia 107 Ibid,., pp. 218—219. 108 Ibid., pp. 173—175.

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into League. Mr. Balfour and I feel great doubts about throwing this burden on League. When it comes up to Assembly we might easily be defeated on sentimental grounds by Nations who would never lift a fin­ ger in Armenian cause. Would you regard such a result as politically injurious? Answer most urgently.”109 On December 2, Lloyd George put the matter to a conference of ministers, which noted that although the Covenant entailed an under­ taking to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of member states against external aggression, Armenia’s boundaries were not yet defined; the League, the ministers concluded, would only be weakened by assum­ ing obligations that could not be fulfilled. Yet the cabinet was sensitive to public opinion: “While the Conference generally agreed with Mr. Balfour and Mr. Fisher that it was undesirable for Armenia to be admit­ ted to the League, it was felt, equally strongly, that for the British Gov­ ernment to adopt an isolated attitude of opposition, when other nations were unanimous in favour of admission, would create a very disagreeable position from a political point of view.”110 It was decided to fall back, therefore, on the previously tried and proven method of joining the other Principal Allied Powers in instructing their representatives in Ge­ neva to deflect both obligation and blame. As French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Georges Leygues and Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza were then in London to confer on the effects of the ouster of Venizelos in Greece and to set the groundwork for possible revisions in the peace treaty with Turkey, immediate consultation on a coordi­ nated strategy was expedited.111 When the matter was taken up that afternoon and the next morning, all concurred that the Armenian question was an embarrassment and that action on Armenia’s application should be put off. Hence, it was agreed that the three powers would send the following identical tele­ gram to the heads of their respective delegations in Geneva: The representatives of the three Governments, assembled in London, having considered the question which has been raised at Geneva of the admission of Armenia to the League of Nations, have come to the unanimous conclusion that it is impossible to take that step at this moment because the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Armenia is constituted an independent State, is not yet ratified. And, besides, the boundaries of Armenia, as they have been defined by President Wilson, in reply to the offer of arbitration which the Powers made to him in the matter, are so extended that the Powers who belong to the League of Nations 109 FO 371/4964, Ei5025/134/58; British Documents, VIII, p. 856 n. 5. "° Cab 23/23, Cab. Concl. 70(20), minute 4 (App. Ill), Dec. 2, 1920; Nassibian, op. cit., p. 214. 111 Minutes of the London discussions are in British Documents, VIII, pp. 809—865.

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could hardly in the light of existing conditions accept the responsibility to guar­ antee or maintain them.112

The message was sent to Balfour on December 3 with further instruc­ tions: “You should concert with your French and Italian colleagues as to whether you should take the initiative in communicating the decision of the three Governments to the League of Nations, or whether you should merely defend the same point of view when the question is raised.’’113 When the decision of the Allied Powers was leaked to the press, Aharonian telegraphed Bagratuni on December 4 to protest to the Foreign Office. This severe blow at a time of negotiations between the Kemalists and Armenia would only encourage and harden the enemy and cast the Armenian people into profound despair at having been openly and com­ pletely abandoned by the Allies. Bagratuni was instructed to ask what measures the Allies had taken to reassure and assist Armenia. In trans­ mitting the telegram to Tilley on December 6, Bagratuni again com­ plained that the action of the Allies would make the Turks even more exacting during the peace negotiations. “I will be much indebted to you if you will kindly inform me whether, besides the above mentioned re­ fusal to accept Armenia in the League of Nations, there were any other decisions to assist Armenia morally or in any other way.’’114 Tilley’s sub­ sequent reply was terse and cold: “I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 6th re­ garding the decision concerning the application of the Armenian Republic of Erivan for entry into the League of Nations and to state that as far as His Lordship is aware no other decisions were taken by the Council.”115 A change in disposition was already noticeable in Geneva when the Fifth Committee of the Assembly next met on December 3. The French delegate, now Jean Hennessy, first supported Fisher’s maneuver to have the application of Georgia lumped together with those of the Baltic republics and to suggest that these “young states” on territories of the former Russian Empire should not be dealt with in an offhand manner. It was unlikely that they could be granted immediate admission, but the League could show them goodwill by allowing them to participate in its various technical organizations. The next day, Armenia’s application was 1 ,2 Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Report, no. 32, Dec. 15, 1920. See also British Docu­ ments, VIII, pp. 841—842, 849—850, 856—857. 1 ,3 FO 371/4964, Ei5025/134/58 enclosure; British Documents, VIII, p. 857. 114 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 116/15; FO 371 /49Ô5, E15294/134/58. 115 FO 371/4965, Ei5294/134/58, enclosing Tilley to Bagratuni, Dec. 13, 1920.

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placed in the same category.116 Thus, despite all the efforts since the end of the world war to prove that its case historically, politically, geograph­ ically, and morally stood apart from those of other successor states of the Russian Empire, Armenia had been dropped into a common, un­ favorable classification. As Allied pressure built up to defer action on Armenia’s application, Cecil retreated from his unreserved advocacy of admission, now sug­ gesting that Armenia, Georgia, and the three Baltic republics be admit­ ted conditionally upon their acknowledgment that because of the pre­ vailing situation they would not necessarily be protected by Article X of the Covenant. Edouard Benes of the Czech and Slovak Republic went further by proposing that the committee not make a final recommen­ dation for or against admission but rather urge that the states in question be invited to take part in the League’s technical organizations so that as soon as political conditions allowed they could be formally considered full members of the League of Nations. The committee ultimately fol­ lowed Fisher’s strategy to deny these states immediate admission by charging a subcommittee to come up with an arrangement that would allow “fairly intimate relations” with the League.117 The resulting for­ mulation was considered on December 6: The Committee recommends that the Assembly should inform the Govern­ ments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia: (a) That their requests for admission have been received with sympathy, but that the circumstances are such as to preclude the Assembly from arriving at a definite decision. (b) That pending the subsequent decision of the Assembly these States may participate in such Technical Organisations of the League as are of general in­ terest.118

When the plan was put to the Fifth Committee, Cecil tried to broaden the areas of participation, and Nansen advocated the immediate admis­ sion of Georgia as a way of facilitating assistance to Armenia. Fisher held firm, however, and the recommendation was adopted by a vote of 9 to 6. Before recessing, Nansen, Cecil, and Newton W. Rowell of Canada disparaged the press reports that the Allied conference in London had determined that Armenia would be denied admission. Smarting under the sting of an obvious truth, Rowell insisted that the Assembly of the League alone was authorized to act on applications: “The question of 116 Meetings of the Committees, II, pp. 183, 185—188. 117 The First Assembly of the League of Nations, IV, p. 158; Meetings of the Committees, II, pp. 185-187, 238-239. 118 Meetings of the Committees, II, p. 195.

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admission of States must be settled at Geneva, and not in London or Paris or Rome.”119 In presenting the Fifth Committee’s report to the Assembly on De­ cember 15, chairman Huneeus explained that the guiding principle had been that all free states giving adequate guarantees of their sincere in­ tention to fulfill their international obligations should be admitted. Without awaiting a ruling on whether admission necessarily involved recognition by all other member states, the Fifth Committee recom­ mended in favor of the admission of Austria, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Fin­ land, and Luxembourg; against the admission of several other appli­ cants, including Azerbaijan and the Ukraine; and for the special status of certain other states—the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia— that were beginning a new life in a normal manner and that desired to participate in the concert of nations but still had significant problems to solve. As exclusion would only discourage these countries and em­ bolden disruptive elements, ‘‘let us then give the States the best welcome that we can, let us show them our sympathy, and give them access to the Technical Organisations, notably that of Labour.”120 After the Assembly of the League admitted the five recommended states on December 16, Dr. Nansen explained that his subcommittee had desired to do its utmost for Armenia but that because of great dif­ ficulties, including enemy occupation, admission could not be recom­ mended. Though Armenia might automatically become a member of the League if the Treaty of Sèvres was ratified, it was now necessary to deal with existing realities. Moreover, if the protection of a mandatory power could be secured, that would be of greater benefit to Armenia than admission to the League of Nations. ‘‘It is no lack of goodwill to Armenia, and no lack of desire to admit her to the League which has affected us in our discussions; it is goodwill for Armenia that has influ­ enced us.”121 Canadian representative Rowell, feeling the need for a definite state­ ment of sympathy, submitted the following resolution: The Assembly earnestly hopes that the efforts of the President of the United States, energetically supported by the Governments of Spain and Brazil and by the Council of the League, will result in the preservation of the Armenian race, and in securing for Armenia a stable Government exercising authority through­ out the whole of the Armenian State as the boundaries thereof may be finally '"’Ibid., pp. 195-199. 120 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, pp. 561—568,613—614; FO 371/ 4966, Ei 5881/134/58. 121 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, pp. 587—588; The First Assembly of the League of Nations, IV, p. 159.

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settled under the Treaty of Sèvres, so that the Assembly may be able to admit Armenia into full membership of the League at its next Session.122

When President Hymans called for a vote on the committee’s proposal to put off the admission of the Republic of Armenia, twenty-one states supported the motion and only eight (Canada, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Salvador, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Venezuela) stood for admission. Viviani of France and Cecil of South Africa abstained in eloquent si­ lence.123 Once Armenia had been denied full admission, George N. Barnes of the British Empire Delegation rose to challenge the second half of the committee’s recommendation, regarding participation in the work of the technical organizations. Pointing out that Armenia as a selfgoverning state could adhere at any time to various international con­ ventions, Barnes then argued for total exclusion: I should like to know if they are bringing Armenia or other States into the Tech­ nical Organisations in a fuller sense; if so, in what sense, because we have heard a great deal about the expenses of the Technical Organisations. Are you going to bring these small States in, and thereby add to the expenses, or is this question of the admission of small States into the Technical Organisations a mere matter of dishonest window-dressing? It presents itself to me merely in that light. You are going to salve your con­ science by first of all denying a State admission and then passing a resolution which means absolutely nothing.124

Ironically, Robert Cecil, a steady advocate of the Armenian cause, now concurred with Barnes, though his reasons differed: “I feel the one thing we must not do with regard to Armenia is to hold out prospects of assis­ tance which we do not intend to fulfil.” It seemed doubtful that the members would defend Armenia from external aggression as required by Article X, and nothing would be more disastrous than ‘‘to pretend you are going to do something which you have no real intention of carrying out.” Cecil asserted: ‘‘That is why I was unable to vote for the admission of Armenia.” To offer the consolation of participation in tech­ nical organizations ‘‘will seem little better than mockery to the unhappy people of Armenia.” Membership in the Assembly of the League, or at least the right to address that body on certain occasions, would be wel­ come. ‘‘That would be to give to Armenia a real privilege and advantage which would enable it better to fight and to struggle in the terrible 122 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 588; FO 371/4966, E16014/134/ 58. 123 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, pp. 588—589; The First Assembly of the League of Nations, IV, p. 160. Thirteen member states abstained in the vote. 124 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 589.

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conditions in which she is now placed.” Unless the Assembly was pre­ pared to offer that small advantage, an invitation to participate in the technical organizations would be hollow. In the absence of some mean­ ingful action, ‘‘an expression of regret can be recorded, which really is not of much value, and that only of value to ourselves.” Barnes skillfully maneuvered to keep the issue in abeyance, arguing that an affirmative vote would be ‘‘a farce” and a negative vote would appear “to give a slap in the face to Armenia, which no one is desirous of doing.” The Assembly took the escape route by referring the matter back to com­ mittee and adopting Rowell’s resolution of goodwill, with the hope that conditions would soon allow Armenia to be admitted to full member­ ship.125 For a final time, the question of Armenian participation in the tech­ nical organizations was raised in the Assembly of the League on the afternoon of December 16. After a vote was taken to allow Estonia, Lat­ via, Lithuania, and Georgia to participate in the technical organizations, President Hymans suggested that like action should be taken in regard to Armenia. Presumably wishing to deprive the League of any camou­ flage in its abandonment of Armenia, Robert Cecil opposed the pro­ posal: “To offer to Armenia in the present condition of affairs the right to participate in the Technical Organisations appears to me to be offer­ ing not a stone in the place of bread but rather a puff of smoke.” In view of this objection, Hymans ruled that the previous decision to refer the matter back to committee stood.126 Armenia had been denied ad­ mission to the League of Nations and, at the insistence of professed friends, even participation in affiliated commissions. It remained for Secretary-General Eric Drummond to write Avetis Aharonian of the League’s deep sympathy and its sincere hope that conditions would al­ low Armenia to be seated the next time the nations of the world gathered in Geneva.127

A Last Hurrah

It seemed that the Assembly’s actions on December 16 had put the Ar­ menian question to rest. Surprisingly, on the very next day, Romanian delegate Thomas Jonnesco announced that the following telegram had just been received from his government: In order to give speedy and real assistance to the Armenian people, who are apparently on the point of perishing, Roumania proposes to the Nations assem­ 125 Ibid., pp. 590-594. 126 Ibid., p. 634; The First Assembly of the League of Nations, IV, p. 159. 127 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 130/29, Drummond to Aharonian, Dec. 20, 1920.

THE DIMMINGOFTHE WEST

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bled at Geneva that an international expeditionary force should be formed, charged with the duty of establishing order and peace in Armenia. This international force should be placed under the command of an inter­ allied general staff, and might comprise a force of 40,000 men made up of detachments of all the countries belonging to the League of Nations according to their proportionate populations. Roumania declares herself ready at this moment to assist in this work with men, material and money.128

Jonnesco exclaimed: “We have all been of the opinion that something must be done for Armenia. Speaking personally, I have never been hap­ pier than when I received that telegram. I say, frankly and without hes­ itation, that we are all trying to discover how we can really and effectively come to the aid of this people which is in imminent peril of destruction.’’ Romania’s unanticipated declaration was met with applause by many delegates distressed and conscience stricken by the League’s failure to intervene effectively on behalf of Armenia. At the same time, however, the timing of the initiative was perplexing in view of the facts that the Armenians had begged in vain for such an expedition since the onset of the Turkish offensive in September and that the Assembly of the League was scheduled to adjourn on December 18, the very next day. President Hymans paid tribute to the “generous and humanitarian mo­ tives” that had inspired the proposal and suggested that the Council of the League be asked to examine the question. The same would apply to recommendations of the committee of six, which had been set up to determine what measures might be taken to assist Armenia. Upon Rob­ ert Cecil’s objection, the Assembly agreed to refer the Romanian tele­ gram to the committee of six with instructions to report back the next day.129 During the final gathering of the Assembly, Henri Lafontaine re­ ported that the committee, having met six times, found that the Arme­ nians had been unable to defend themselves, largely because of weak­ ness in military and political organization. Hence, Armenia needed the means of helping itself rather than a military expedition. Such assistance could be provided for a comparatively moderate sum. As the Assembly of the League was adjourning that day, the committee recommended the formation of a special commission to coordinate efforts toward that end. There were two possible solutions to the Armenian problem: mili­ tary or pacific intervention. World opinion supported the League in finding peaceful solutions. There were serious reports that the United States Senate was prepared to open a credit of $25 million, and as soon 128 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 672. 129 Ibid., pp. 673-674.

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as those or other funds became available the League could act, possibly through a high commissioner for Armenia. Lafontaine’s committee thanked the Romanian government for its initiative and hoped that it would eventually find “vigorous support” from the world powers. With­ out ruling out armed action by an international police force, the League, as an organization of peace, should try to save Armenia without blood­ shed. The Assembly should therefore ask the Council to select a special commission to begin work immediately.130 René Viviani, formerly a leading proponent of intervention, now op­ posed the creation of a commission whose recommendations might fur­ ther embarrass the Allied Powers and suggested instead that the entire question be entrusted to the Council, which was composed “of all that is best” in the League and “of men who are known throughout the whole world and whose authority is greater than ours.” In a move to deflect the Romanian proposal, Viviani now submitted the following res­ olution: The Assembly, recalling its decision of November 22nd, 1920, will continue to co-operate with the Council, which is entrusted with the duty of safeguarding the future of Armenia, referring for advice, if it should be necessary, to the Members of the League. The Assembly notes that, in response to the initiative taken by the League, universal sympathy has already been shown for Armenia, and that Armenia has received offers of mediation on her behalf from President Wilson, Spain and Brazil.

The Council was asked to report to the second session of the Assembly on what it had been able to achieve.131 Jonnesco quickly interjected that Viviani’s resolution in no way resem­ bled that put forward by the Romanian delegation. He used the oppor­ tunity to hurl barbs at those who previously had spoken so eloquently about the need to save Armenia: I remember the sorrow that was expressed in this hall a month ago, and the general sympathy that was felt for Armenia. I see that neither sorrow nor sym­ pathy exist any longer. If the Armenian people is not threatened with extermi­ nation, I am very glad of it. If, however, Armenia continues to have her existence threatened, and to be exposed to massacre and all the horrors of invasion, the question continues, and means of solving it must be found. The only means we considered to be a practical one was to intervene effectively and to put aside our expression of sorrow.132 130 Ibid., pp. 727, 741-742. 131 Ibid., pp. 728—729; Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly, p. 33. 132 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, p. 729.

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In sharp rebuttal, Viviani insisted that the Assembly had no authority to decide on the formation of an army of 40,000 men and regretted insinuatingly that although the Romanian proposition might have been useful had it been made weeks earlier, at this point it was too little, too late. Lafontaine added that his committee had studied the issue at great length and had concluded that the question of a military expedition presented numerous difficulties and that these had to be examined by competent persons acquainted with the country and knowledgable about the organization of such an undertaking. Moreover, as the Ro­ manian project now stood, it required the collaboration of all member states, a condition not likely to be met. Hence, it should be left to the Council of the League to determine whether there was good reason to appoint a special commission to pursue the matter. The Persian dele­ gate, Emir Zoka-ed-Dowleh, was careful to express profound sympathy for the Armenians before getting to his central point: “Is not the whole world weary of sending troops in the direction of Asia Minor and Ar­ menia?” To the applause of the tired delegates, he concluded that, al­ though peaceful intervention was welcome, “this is not the time to begin a new war.”133 The Assembly settled the issue by adopting Viviani’s motion and leav­ ing it to the Council of the League to decide whether or not to form a commission to examine further the Romanian resolution and related issues.134 Thus, the Armenian question was set aside by the first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. In his concluding remarks on December 18, President Hymans expressed hope and confidence in the future of the international organization and pointed to its challenges and achievements. The few paragraphs relating to Armenia were steeped in generalities:

In the midst of our work we have seen a piteous apparition come before us. The heart-rending condition of Armenia has been brought to our notice. For a long time the Great Powers have been preoccupied with the Armenian problem and they have been unable to solve it. Politics, after all, are not wholly ruled by sentiment: ways and means must be considered. We have not found a mandatory, but at least we have succeeded in finding a mediator. We have had the good fortune to see President Wilson, who was one of the founders of the League of Nations, accept this mission of mediator... . We are still faced with great difficulties. Armenia is much in our thoughts and we earnestly desire to save her. It is our duty to work for this end. We must devote ourselves to this task. The Council will persist in its endeavour, by all the means 1M Ibid., pp. 729—731. 1M Ibid., pp. 731—732; The First Assembly of the League

Nations, IV, pp. 197—198.

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in its power, to help and save her. You may have every confidence in the Council. We are unanimously agreed in desiring to save this martyred people from the enemies who for so many years have shown no mercy.135

With sustained applause, the delegates from many countries rose to be home in time for the Christmas holiday. The first session of the As­ sembly of the League of Nations became history—as did the Republic of Armenia. 135 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, pp. 760—761.

8

The Wages of Defeat

As the League of Nations looked on helplessly “from the other shore,’’ the Turkish armies crossed over the Arpachai River and occupied Al­ exandropol, posted control officers at Sanahin on the railroad to Geor­ gia, and received arms, ammunition, supplies, equipment, and animals exacted from Armenia as the price of a truce. Though relishing his im­ pressive victory, General Kiazim Karabekir professed goodwill toward the Armenian people and the hope their leaders would turn away from the disastrous policies that had poisoned Armeno-Turkish relations. In fact, the Angora government explicidy instructed Karabekir to show himself to be solicitous of the Armenians, thereby disarming them diplomati­ cally, even as he took action to secure Turkey’s territorial and political objectives and to eliminate Armenia both politically and physically.1 It was now clear that an Allied naval descent at Batum or Trebizond would not materialize and that the most the West could offer Armenia was “a puff of smoke.” The Armenian government faced the dilemma of having to choose between Turkey and Russia. A harsh peace with Turkey would shatter visions of a united homeland but might allow for the continued exis­ tence of a small, independent state centered around Erevan. Alterna­ tively, Armenia could abandon its Western orientation and seek the pro­ tection of Russia by becoming a Soviet republic and relying on the Red Army to force the Turks back to the prewar frontiers. Even when sovi­ 1 Kâzim Karabekir, IstiklälHarbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), p. 901. See also Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Ar­ menian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications,” YaleJournal of International Law, XIV, 2 (1989), p. 328, giving the following translated excerpt: “Our withdrawal from Armenia as a part of a peace settlement is out of the question. Rather, you will resort to a modus operandi intended to deceive the Armenians and fool the Europeans by an ap­ pearance of peacelovingness. In reality, however, the purpose of all this is to achieve by stages the objective.... These instructions reflect the real intent of the Cabinet. They are to be treated as secret, and are meant only for your eyes.”

341

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

etization became the only real option, the Dashnakist Bureau-Govern­ ment was slow to act, hoping that somehow it or the Western powers could bargain with Mustafa Kemal to leave at least Van and a Black Sea outlet to independent Armenia. The peace negotiations at Alexandropol soon quashed all such illusions. Calculations and Strategies As long as the Red Army was engaged against General Wrangel and the Poles, the policy makers in Moscow wanted to sovietize Armenia through political agitation and internal subversion rather than through direct military intervention. It was true that Red Army units had breached the Shamshadin-Ijevan frontier in support of Azerbaijan and pro-Soviet Ar­ menian rebels and that an entire division had tried unsuccessfully to crush Nzhdeh’s partisans in Zangezur, yet during the summer of 1920 Lenin and the Politburo had ruled against the forceful sovietization of Georgia and Armenia. Economic and political pressures and incentives were to be exerted to turn Armenia away from the West. The dispatch of Boris Legran’s mission to Erevan was a part of this strategy. Hoping to use the Turkish Nationalists as a jumping board into the Muslim world, the Sovnarkom demanded that the Armenian government re­ pudiate the Treaty of Sèvres, sever ties with the Entente Powers, and permit Soviet armed forces and munitions to pass freely over Armenia into Turkey. In return, Soviet Russia would work to attain an equitable settlement of the Armenian question. The Sovnarkom countenanced and possibly even sanctioned the Turk­ ish advance into Sarikamish and Olti but became alarmed when Kara­ bekir captured Kars and moved on Alexandropol. There were reports that Nuri Pasha and an anti-Bolshevik Azerbaijani regiment were partic­ ipating in the campaign, which coincided with intensified unrest in Azer­ baijan and the North Caucasus.2 Karabekir’s ultimatum to the Armenian government to give Turkey free access over the routes leading to Azer­ baijan only served to confirm fears that the Turkish Nationalists in­ tended to assist the anti-Soviet elements. The Allies, it was even sug­ gested, had struck a deal with Mustafa Kemal, which would account for Karabekir’s refusal to heed Soviet injunctions against the deepening in­ vasion of Armenia. Soviet calculations were not consistent, however. Ap­ prehension that the Entente Powers might try to reoccupy Batum en­ hanced the importance of Mustafa Kemal and made it preferable, in the worst scenario, that the strategic port be controlled by the Turks rather 2 The presence of Nuri and the Azerbaijani regiment at Kars was also reported by the French military mission in the Caucasus. See France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dos­ sier 1, Report on political situation, Nov. 1—15, 1920, dated Nov. 16, 1920.

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than by the British. This concern was sufficiently compelling to prompt Foreign Affairs Commissar Grigorii Chicherin to warn the British gov­ ernment that any attempt to seize Batum would have serious repercus­ sions, as it would be regarded as an act hostile to Soviet Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan and a prelude to the opening of a new front against Russia.3 Chicherin also reminded the Tiflis government that it was committed by the Soviet-Georgian treaty to prevent any foreign power from using Georgian territory for activities unfriendly to Russia.4 While in Baku on November 6, Stalin extolled the third anniversary of the Bolshevik rev­ olution and lauded the friendship between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, declaring that the Turkish revolutionary movement, although bourgeois in character, was resisting the Entente imperialists and cre­ ating such ferment in the Caucasus and the Near East as was unimagin­ able three years earlier.5 Despite Stalin’s pronouncements and his deep-seated resentment of the Armenian Dashnakists and Georgian Mensheviks, the Sovnarkom, especially Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin, was wary of the Turks and tried to stay the offensive. In Tiflis, Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Leonid Stark told Tigran Bekzadian that Chicherin had sent two firm commu­ niqués to the Angora government through General Karabekir. Legran was now wiring Moscow about Turkish noncompliance and requesting new directives in view of the continued aggression. Evidence of a pre­ existing Turkish-Soviet understanding on the permissible limits of the Turkish advance is contained in Stark’s messages to Stalin and Chicherin first that the Turks would probably pass the line “known to Moscow” and then that they had “already passed the line.”6 In a telegram to Legran on November 5, Chicherin warned of Western efforts to win over the Kemalists, perhaps at the price of sacrificing Armenia, and cautioned that an armed confrontation with Turkey might develop if Armenia be­ came a Soviet state and requested Russian protection.7 Two days later, Chicherin dismissed as pure deception the Turkish justification that the offensive was intended to liberate Armenia from the Dashnakist yoke ’ Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III (Moscow, 1959), pp. 329—330; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report of Nov. 19, 1920, enclosing Radio Moscow information of Nov. 18, and Report on political situation, Dec. 1, 1920. 4 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, p. 330; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Reports of Nov. 16, 19, and Dec. 1, 1920. 5J. V. Stalin, Works, IV: 1917—1920 (Moscow, 1953), pp. 405—406. 6 State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 602, pp. 11-12; A. N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel’nye strany Vostoka v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (1918—1920) (Moscow, 1964), p. 143. See also the report of Bekzadian’s meeting with Soviet representative A. L. Sheinman, in Armenia Archives, 200/2/81, p. 11. 7 S. T. Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere hai zhoghovrdi azatagrman gordsum ( 1917—1921 tt.) (Erevan, 1966), pp. 160—161.

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and noted that swift action was required to stop the Turks before they crushed Armenia and forced it to submit to a merciless truce. He wrote the Russian Communist Party’s Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo) that the only effective intercession would entail the sovietization of Armenia or the deployment of the Red Army. The appearance of even a single Red Army soldier, Chicherin asserted, would be sufficient to halt the Kem­ alists. Until that time, the Turks would respond with polite, conciliatory words but continue to do whatever they pleased.8 In another message, on November 7, Chicherin instructed that the Turks should be cautioned that future military aid was dependent on their acceptance of a Soviet-mediated armistice with Armenia and on their commitment to eject any Entente force that might try to occupy Batum. Stalin, then still in Baku, was given the authority to suspend the shipments, if necessary. As the immediate goal was to stop the conflict and arrange a truce, nothing should be said for the time being about Turkish withdrawal to the prewar frontiers.9 At a party conference in Moscow, Lenin expressed his own misgivings that the objectives of the Kemalists were not limited to Armenia, and he stressed that develop­ ments in the Caucasus had to be followed closely.10 Upon receipt of news of Karabekir’s occupation of Alexandropol, the Sovnarkom on November 7 appointed Budu (P. G.) Mdivani, a Geor­ gian, to serve as the Soviet mediator to bring about the cessation of hostilities, the conclusion of an armistice, and the acceptance of Soviet arbitration. According to some reports, the purpose was to get the Ar­ menian government to renounce all claims to Turkish Armenia in ex­ change for a Turkish withdrawal to the prewar frontiers. If the Kemalists refused to suspend operations, Soviet Russia would regard that as an unfriendly act and an indication that the Turks wished to interfere in the affairs of Soviet Azerbaijan.11 In Tiflis, Soviet envoy A. L. Sheinman told Tigran Bekzadian that Chicherin was doing everything possible to 8 Ibid.., pp. 161—162; E. A. Zohrabian, Sovetakan Rusastane ev hai-turkakan haraberutiunnere 1920—1922 tt. (Erevan, 1979), pp. 78—79. 9 Alikhanian, op. dt., pp. 161—162; Zohrabian, op. dt., p. 79. 10 S. I. Kuznetsova, Ustanovlenie scrvetsko-turetskikh otnoshenii (Moscow, 1961), p. 24; G. B. Gharibdjanian, V. I. Lenineev Andrkovkasizhvghovurdneri.azatagrumeÇExe'va.n, 1960), p. 117. 11 S. V. Kharmandarian, “K voprosu ob ustanovlenii Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 6(1958), p. 95; Alikhanian, op. dt., p. 172. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3 and 20N/187, dossier 1, Report on political situation, Nov. 1-15,1920, and 17N/590, dossier 2, Report of Nov. 18, 1920. Also appointed but apparently not actively participating in Mdivani’s mission were Muslim Communists Behbud Shahtaghtinskii and Jelal Korkmazov (Karagozov according to Alikhanian). During the November 4 meeting of the Communist Party’s Caucasian Bureau in Baku, Sheinman recommended that Leonid Stark, the Soviet envoy in Georgia, be sent to determine Mustafa Kemal’s intentions, but Stalin insisted on the appointment of Mdivani, overruling Sheinman’s ob­ jection that it would be preferable that the representative be from the central government rather than a native of the region. See S. T. Alikhanian, G. K. Ordjonikidzen ev Sovetakan kargen hastatume Hayastanum (Erevan, 1974), pp. 25—27; Kharmandarian, op. dt., p. 95.

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stop the Turks. Mustafa Kemal, he believed, had won concessions from the Entente and was prepared to betray the Bolsheviks.12 Martiros Harutiunian, Armenia’s representative in Baku, wrote on November 9 that the situation was changing rapidly, as Legran was returning to Tiflis and then probably to Armenia, accompanied by Budu Mdivani and three other Soviet officials.13 As the Sovnarkom tried to maintain an equilibrium in the Caucasus, Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin on November 11 formally re­ newed the Soviet offer of mediation to the two sides: In view of the appeal of the Armenian Government about the mediation of the Soviet Government between Armenia and Turkey and the agreement upon such mediation by the representation of the Turkish Nationalist Government [Bekir Sami Bey], the Soviet Government informs you that it is taking upon itself such mediation and is sending into the area of military action its liaison Mdivani. The Soviet Government is anticipating that further military activities will cease.14

Within four days, both the Angora and Erevan governments re­ sponded to the Soviet offer. Acting Foreign Affairs Commissar Ahmed Mukhtar avoided explicit acceptance of mediation but expressed deep appreciation of the Sovnarkom’s humanitarian motivation. He drew at­ tention to the fact that military action had been put off once before in deference to Moscow’s wishes but that the Armenians had only taken advantage of the situation to arm and attack Turkey. The peace the Grand National Assembly now proposed to the Armenians was “one of such moderation and equity [as to be] without precedent.’’ Naturally, Turkey could make no concessions insofar as its territorial integrity and independence were concerned, and the Soviet representatives should be fully cognizant of this fact.15 In his radiogram, Prime Minister Hamazasp Ohandjanian accepted Mdivani as a mediator and announced Armenia’s readiness to cease fire as soon as it learned that the Turkish command was prepared to do the same. Armenia was committed to settle all disputes by pacific means.16 On November 15, Ohandjanian complained to Bekzadian that the Turks were continuing the offensive and that news of the impending 12 Armenia Archives, 200/1/620, p. 263; Zohrabian, op. át., pp. 77—78; “Turkiayi nvajoghakan kaghakakanutiune Hayastanum,” comp. O. Balikian, V. Evoyan, and G. Sargsian, BanberHayastani arkhivneri, 12th yr., no. 1 (1971), pp. 42—43 (cited hereafter as “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune ’ ’ ). 1J Armenia Archives, 200/1/597, p. 134, and 200/2/90, p. 29. 14 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, p. 325; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 230— 232, and 200/1/625, p. 42; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/30; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 422. l5Kheifets, op. át., pp. 137—138, 145. 16 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 257, 264; Kharmandarian, op. át., p. 96.

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Soviet mediation was sapping the little that remained of the Armenian will to fight. Bekzadian was asked to clarify with Legran the status of the mediation and to determine the whereabouts of Mdivani and his in­ tended date of departure for the war zone. Ohandjanian continued to express skepticism about the Sovnarkom’s designs, inasmuch as there was irrefutable evidence that Red Army units were collaborating with the Turkish forces on the Sharur front. Bekzadian reported that after a twohour meeting with Legran he had come away feeling that no real results were expected from the mediation. Legran had urged that Armenia, without compromising its independence, seek the military protection of Soviet Russia. If Armenia would renounce the Treaty of Sèvres and place itself under Russia’s wing, the Soviets would coerce the Turks to with­ draw to the prewar frontier.17 The next day, Ohandjanian instructed Bekzadian to tell Legran that the questions he raised were complex and could be discussed in detail once Legran had arrived in Erevan. Mean­ while, in order to avoid even greater losses, the government was acqui­ escing in the Turkish terms for a truce.18 Bekzadian further reported that Budu Mdivani had arrived from Baku and would soon depart with Legran for Armenia. Ohandjanian urged that the Soviet envoys leave immediately, as the Tiflis-Erevan road might be cut at any moment, and that Mdivani go direcdy from Karakilisa to Alexandropol in order to save critical time.19 On November 18, Bekza­ dian wired that the Soviet officials had set out for Erevan the previous night. Legran had been heard to complain that the Armenians were always late in recognizing favorable conditions and then had to settle for far less satisfactory terms. Bekzadian now believed there was no choice but to opt for Russian protection, as direct negotiations with the Turks would not succeed. Legran had promised to respect Armenia’s sovereignty and to force the Turks to withdraw. This pledge, Bekzadian urged, should be given in writing during the forthcoming consultations in Erevan. He concluded by reiterating that nothing could be expected from the Entente and that there was strong sentiment that a new Ar­ menian cabinet should be formed to place the country in a better po­ sition to deal with either the Turks or the Russians.20 17 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 287—288; E. K. Sarkisian, Kh. Abeghian, and A. Sarkisian, “Missiia B. Legrana: Diplomaticheskaia missiia RSFSR v Armenii,” Banber Ha­ yastani arkhivneri, 8th yr., no. 3 (1967), pp. 80—81 (introduction by E. K. Sarkisian, and compilation of documents by Abeghian and A. Sarkisian; cited hereafter as “Missiia B. Legrana”). See also Armenia Archives, 200/2/81, pp. 11—14. 18 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 294; “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 81—82. See also Zohrabian, op. át., pp. 80—81. 19 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 294, and 200/1/625, P- *6* See a^so 200/1/607, pp. 211, 214, 215. 20 “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 82. See also Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4964,

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Turkish calculations were linked with potential and actual external responses to the military operations against Armenia. Mustafa Kemal, wary of General Karabekir’s penchant for self-made decisions and an­ noyed with the admonitions and near insubordination of the Com­ mander of the Eastern Front, nonetheless had authorized the advance into the mountain passes around Sarikamish and Olti and then called a temporary halt to test the reactions of the Allied Powers and Soviet Rus­ sia. The failure of the Allies to take firm countermeasures and the in­ ability of the Armenians to mount an effective defense emboldened Ke­ mal to order the assault on Kars. The return of all territory awarded to the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3,1918) now became a distinct possibility. And with the Armenian withdrawal from Alexandropol, the county of Surmalu, and the southern part of the county of Erevan, the expansion of Turkey to the boundaries initially imposed on Armenia by the Treaty of Batum (June 4, 1918) was no longer out of the question. These calculations seemed to be borne out in the initial meetings between the Nationalist envoy in Tiflis, Colonel Kiazim Bey, and officials of the Soviet mission. During those exchanges, Kiazim Bey reportedly spoke about the implementation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, by which Soviet Russia had ceded the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Sheinman replied that the treaty had been nullified and that the Moscow government would remain true to its engagements with respect to Geor­ gia and could not tolerate the obliteration of Armenia. He intimated that if Kemal, prodded by the Allies, circumvented the proffered medi­ ation, a serious strain in Soviet-Turkish relations would result. There were also disconcerting reports that Kiazim Bey had given the Georgian government a Turkish guarantee of Georgia’s territorial integrity and had offered to regulate disputed questions by amicable means on con­ dition that the railroad from the Armenian frontier at Sanahin to the Azerbaijani frontier at Poili be placed at Turkey’s disposal.21 The American consul in Tiflis, Charles Moser, lent credence to the reports of a developing rift between the Turks and Soviets. The Turkish Nationalists, he believed, had been encouraged by representatives of the Entente Powers to press beyond Kars in the hope of driving the Red Army out of Azerbaijan. Agents of the British commission were in secret communication with Kiazim Bey, and Colonel Stokes had told Moser E14569/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 17, 1920, stating that Mdivani departed for Erevan on November 16; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, Report on political situation, Nov. 1-15, 1920. 21 Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Corbel’s Nov. 16, and Political report, Nov. 30, 1920; 20N/183, dossier 4, Revue de la Presse, 16—30 Nov. 1920; 20N/187, dossier 1, Report on political situation, Nov. 1—15, 1920.

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that Russia and the Kemalists would soon be “at each other’s throats” in Azerbaijan. The Turkish advance on Alexandropol was in direct de­ fiance of the wishes of the Soviet government.22 The crisis in Soviet-Turkish relations eased somewhat following the signing of the Soviet-Polish peace treaty in October and the sudden col­ lapse of General Wrangel’s army in the Crimea in November. Soviet anxiety turned to relative confidence, as thousands of troops were freed for transfer to the Caucasus. Moser reported that at a press conference a Soviet spokesman had made reference to the fact that Russian armies had captured Erzerum four times during the past hundred years and if necessary could do so a fifth time. The Kemalists, on their part, had become eager to explain their innocence regarding pretensions to Ba­ tum and would probably confine themselves to extensive gains in Ar­ menia. Whereas Kiazim Bey had initially invoked the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, he now dropped such references and hastened to reiterate the Grand National Assembly’s friendship and acceptance of Soviet media­ tion.23 Whatever pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic designs Karabekir or Kemal may have harbored were tempered by the Soviet triumph over General Wran­ gel. Soviet strategists welcomed the news that the Turks were emptying most of the supplies from the fortress of Kars and sending them toward Erzerum and the western front, thereby indicating that a further advance on the Caucasus front was not likely. In fact, both the Turkish foreign affairs commissar and the chief of staff sent congratulatory messages to Moscow on the victory over Wrangel and the treaty with Poland, which together effectively ended foreign intervention in Russia and reinforced the friendship between revolutionary Turkey and Soviet Russia.24 The Turkish offensive had the effect of pushing the Armenian gov­ ernment reluctantly toward Russia. Prime Minister Ohandjanian ac­ cepted the offer of Mdivani’s mediation, and some elements within the government and diplomatic corps insisted that there was now no rea­ sonable alternative to the Russian orientation. Even in these circum­ stances, however, Ohandjanian and other prominent Dashnakists still calculated that the Kemalists might allow the existence of an Armenian state as a buffer to Russia, which sooner or later would revert to its traditional position of rival and adversary of Turkey. Having an inde­ 22 US Archives, RG 59, 760J.67/34, Moser to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1920. Kiazim Bey told American Vice-Consul H. A. Doolittle that the treaty with Armenia “would be lenient.” See RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 711, Moser to Secretary of State, Nov. 20,1920. 23 US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate C4Ô(C8). 1, Moser to Secretary of State, Nov. 22, 1920, enclosing Slavo, Nov. 20, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Reports of Nov. 16 and 30, 1920. 24 Kuznetsova, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

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pendent, albeit small, Armenia would be preferable to being reabsorbed into a Russian empire. On his return from Europe at the end of October, former premier Alexandre Khatisian echoed this view: “Turkey is at­ tacking Armenia without wanting to destroy her, for the Turks are in­ terested in avoiding having an immediate boundary with Russia. In spite of the apparent friendly attitude toward Russia, Turkey feels menaced by her. Armenia could be not only an object of political discord between Russia and Turkey but could actually become their battlefield.’’25 In his meeting with Khatisian in Tiflis after Armenia had surrendered, Kiazim Bey insisted that his government wished to see independent states in the Caucasus as a barrier to Russia. The defeat of Wrangel had made it impossible for Turkey to sustain the anti-Soviet Muslim elements in Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus. The future of Soviet-Turkish re­ lations, Kiazim maintained, depended entirely on the Entente’s attitude toward revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.26 On November 19, just before departing for Erevan to head the Armenian peace delegation, Khatisian told American Vice-Consul Hooker A. Doolittle that Armenia had been abandoned by the West and was therefore prepared to give up Trebizond, Erzerum, Mush, and Bitlis in the hope of persuading the Turks to permit Armenia to retain Van with an outlet to the sea. Armenia, how­ ever, was helpless and would have no choice but to accept whatever terms the Turks wished to impose.27 In his meetings with the British, French, and Italian representatives (Stokes, Corbel, and Gabba, respectively), Khatisian voiced regret that the Soviet government rather than the En­ tente Powers had volunteered to act in the role of mediator. The Ar­ menian government had always been ready to submit to the will of the Allies and was astonished at not even having been informed about their intent to revise the Treaty of Sèvres in favor of Turkey. In the coming negotiations with the Turks, Khatisian declared solemnly, the Dashnaktsutiun would make a supreme attempt not to let Armenia fall com25 Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report on political situation, Nov. 16-26, 1920, dated Dec. 1, 1920. 26FO 371/4964, Ei4793/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 20, 1920. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report on political situation, Nov. 16-26, 1920, App. 6. In a meeting on November 21 with Bagrat Topchian, president of the Armenian National Council of Georgia, Kiazim Bey again disavowed any Turkish intent to eliminate Armenia’s existence as a free and independent state. Showing himself to be solicitous of Armenian prisoners of war, he explained that reports of excesses at Kars were untrue. There had been only a minor incident of Kurdish looting, which had been brought to a swift end when General Karabekir had four Kurdish offenders hanged. As Kars was considered a war zone, the prisoners had been sent toward Sarikamish. Kiazim Bey hoped that a quick resolution of the Armenian-Turkish conflict would allow for the expeditious return of the prisoners. See Armenia Archives, 200/1 /’427, p. 425. 27 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.00/18, Moser to Secretary of State, Nov. 20, 1920. See also Simon Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), pp. 435—436.

35°

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

pletely under Moscow’s domination. The party Bureau did not want a rupture with the Entente and believed it would be better to deal directly with the Kemalists. Armenia was bowing to Turkish might yet trying to evade mediation by the enemies of the Entente. This fidelity came at a high price, as Legran was promising that Russia would reestablish the prewar frontiers only if Armenia sought Soviet protection and called in the Red Army.28

Political Maneuvers in Erevan Boris Legran and Budu Mdivani arrived in Erevan on November 19 and that same night met for three hours with Prime Minister Hamazasp Ohandjanian and Minister of Military Affairs Ruben Ter-Minasian.29 In response to Legran’s query regarding the causes and conditions of the truce to which the Armenian government had just submitted, Ohan­ djanian explained that Armenia could resist no longer and that Bekzadian’s reports made it clear that Legran himself did not expect any real results from Soviet mediation. Asserting that this was a distortion of his views, Legran nonetheless emphasized that effective mediation would require the presence and backing of an armed force. The Turks were realistic politicians and would be more amenable to positive mediation if they realized that the Armenians possessed an alternative to helpless diplomatic exchanges. Since the beginning of the conflict, he had urged the Armenian government to renounce its intent to resolve the Arme­ nian question based on the Treaty of Sèvres and to appeal instead for Soviet intercession to attain an equitable settlement. Unfortunately, the Armenian government had allowed the critical moment to pass; repu­ diation of Sèvres would no longer satisfy the Kemalists. The purpose of Soviet mediation was to alter the existing balance to be more favorable to the Armenian side, and because the Armenians had already bowed to the Turkish terms some other force was needed to effect that change—the Red Army. Terming as “fantastic” Ohandjanian’s state­ ment that persons in league with the Turkish Nationalists had intimated that the Grand National Assembly would grant Armenia parts of the vilayets of Van and Erzerum, with a narrow corridor to the sea if Armenia would renounce the Sèvres treaty, Legran wanted to know the minimum desiderata of the Armenian government and at what point the Arme­ 28 Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), pp. 252254; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Reports of Nov. 19, 22, and 30, 1920. 29 Armenia Archives, 200/1/412, pp. 129—133, 200/1/427, pp. 419—423, and 200/1/ 602, pp. 332—336; “Missiia B. Legrana,” pp. 85—92. On the journey of Legran’s mission to Erevan, see Arsh. Shahkhatuni, “Sovetakan despan Legrane ev Hayastani sovetakanatsume,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXIX (March 1961), pp. 95—97.

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nians would take up arms again rather than submit to Turkish demands. Ohandjanian replied that Legran himself had characterized the Turks as realists who would have to take into account long-term objectives and relationships. Those considerations would be based not only on success of arms but also on political and strategic factors that made advanta­ geous the existence of a sizable Armenian state on Turkey’s eastern flank. Legran sought to narrow the discussion by asking if Armenia was pre­ pared to cede Kars, for in that case Russian mediation or military inter­ cession would be unnecessary. Ohandjanian turned the question around to ask if the loss of Kars would be accepted by Soviet Russia, which as the successor of the Russian Empire had not officially recognized Ar­ menia’s independence and might regard Turkish territorial pretensions as affecting its own basic rights and interests. Legran demurred, stating that this was a much too formal view; the Sovnarkom had explicitly rec­ ognized Armenia’s right to self-determination, and the future of Kars was certainly of greater importance to Armenia than to Russia. Only the introduction of the Red Army into Armenia would provide the necessary backing to enable Soviet diplomatic efforts to deliver the country from the quagmire. Ruben Ter-Minasian entered the discussion by declaring that in the past the Armenian people had paid with millions of lives for their Rus­ sian orientation. The assistance of Russia had always been too little and too late; the situation was no different now. It was obvious that the Kemalists had another force behind them, that of either the Entente Powers or Soviet Russia. Politically, there was no good reason for Russia to risk war with Turkey for the sake of Armenia, as doing so would alienate the Muslim world, which was intrinsic to the Soviet strategies against the Entente. On the contrary, there were strong indications that the Turks and Russians intended to unite over the body of the Armenian republic. The joint Soviet-Turkish military operation in the direction of Sharur had produced a profound psychological effect on the Armenian soldiers, who felt helpless in face of this combination. Russia could dispel these misgivings by recognizing Armenia’s right to the former Russian Arme­ nian territories up to the 1914 boundaries and by declaring unequivo­ cally that the extreme demands of the Kemalists would not be tolerated. A categoric statement and threat of military intervention would be suf­ ficient to force the Turks back to the boundaries that Legran himself had recognized. The presence of a few Red Army contingents, Legran reiterated, was essential to curb the Turkish appetite. The Turks would not risk further action unless they intended to advance on Baku, but even with the sanc­ tion and support of the Entente they knew that Soviet Russia would

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defend the region with all its might. The isolated instance of SovietTurkish operations in Sharur-Nakhichevan had been blown far out of proportion. The Red Army unit in question had been cut off by Nzhdeh’s revolt in Zangezur, and its localized action had nothing to do with Soviet policy toward Armenia. It was true that Russia wanted to influence Mustafa Kemal in the liberation struggle of the peoples of the East, but by the same token the Sovnarkom could not remain indifferent to the imperialistic tendencies within the Kemalist movement that had brought about the invasion of Armenia: “Kars in the hands of Armenia does not make Armenia imperialistic, but Kars in the hands of Turkey can make the Kemalists imperialists, and this was a recognized threat to Russia and not in the interest of Soviet Russia.” If Russia previously had not been able to be more assertive because of the deployment of the Red Army against the Poles and General Wrangel, that situation had now changed. Budu Mdivani, the Soviet mediator, could not disguise his disdain for the Dashnakist leaders. The demoralization of the army and public, he insisted, stemmed from causes other than those given by Ruben TerMinasian. It was obvious that the Entente did not want and had no power to help Armenia and that Soviet Russia alone could save the Armenian people. “It is time to acknowledge this fact and to consent to sovietiza­ tion immediately as the only way of sparing the Armenian people and Armenia from a final collapse.” Legran tactfully interjected that al­ though Armenian acceptance of the Soviet system naturally would be desirable, it was not a prerequisite to Russian mediation. Mdivani, re­ plying to Ohandjanian’s query about his instructions, stated that he was directed to do everything possible to have the Turkish armies withdraw to the prewar boundary. In this regard, Legran asked that amnesty be granted to all imprisoned Bolsheviks. Such action would relieve Mdivani from the embarrassment of having the Turks question how Soviet Russia could intercede for a government that had jailed as many as 400 Com­ munists. Ohandjanian agreed to take up the issue with his cabinet but reminded the Soviet representatives that their mediation was not for the sake of the Armenian government as a political party but rather for an entire people. The lengthy exchange did little to increase Ohandjanian’s confidence in Soviet mediation, especially as the blunt expressions of Mdivani were believed to reflect Soviet policy more accurately than the cautious, oblique diplomatic language used by Boris Legran. The next day, November 20, Legran telegraphed Sergo Ordzhoni­ kidze in Baku that both Ohandjanian and the Turks were apparendy trying to evade Soviet mediation. In order to continue in power, the Dashnaktsutiun seemed prepared to make maximal concessions in di­ rect, bilateral negotiations with the Turks. Because its prestige had plum­

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meted, the party would try to retain control through the formation of a pseudo-coalition cabinet with Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, whose followings in Armenia were very small. There was, however, a crisis both in the party and in government, as one faction of the Dashnaktsu­ tiun had come to the conclusion that Russian intervention was impera­ tive. Still, no clearly dominant position had yet evolved.30 Legran re­ ported to Chicherin that Ohandjanian’s right-wing faction favored peace at any price in order to avoid Soviet intercession and the introduction of the Red Army, which were regarded as irreversible precursors to so­ vietization. The right wing believed the Entente would reach an accom­ modation with the Kemalists and back them in efforts to expel Russia from Transcaucasia. In that event, any Soviet-supported Armenian gov­ ernment would stand entirely alone and fall victim to even harsher Turk­ ish demands. Hence, major concessions would now be made to reach a separate settlement with Turkey. To this end, the right wing was attempt­ ing to create a coalition government of all political parties in order to demonstrate that Armenia was sincere in its desire for peaceful coexis­ tence with Turkey.31 Legran’s analysis was generally accurate: Ohandjanian wanted to limit Soviet mediation to political pressure on Turkey without allowing the Red Army into Armenia. It was nonetheless obvious that his war cabinet would have to be supplanted by a cabinet of peace. Most of the Dash­ naktsutiun’s Bureau and parliamentary faction initially favored a widely based coalition that would be more acceptable to the Turks, whereas the minority advocated a coalition of the socialist elements with the goal of entering into an agreement with Soviet Russia. In decisions of Novem­ ber 14 and 15, the party leadership called on Hovhannes Kachaznuni to form a broad coalition. Having only recently returned from his mis­ sion to Europe and the United States, Kachaznuni had not been involved in the intraparty disputes of the preceding year. He was well known and acceptable to the Turks, having served on the Transcaucasian and Ar­ menian delegations that had negotiated with Ottoman representatives in Trebizond and Batum in 1918. Kachaznuni began efforts to organize a five- or seven-member coalition but soon came up against insurmount­ able difficulties. Only the Armenian Social Democrats (Specifists), headed by Bakhshi Ishkhanian and Davit Ananun, agreed to serve un­ conditionally. The Social Revolutionaries insisted that any new cabinet should investigate certain acts of the Bureau-Government, including its treatment of Bolsheviks, and if warranted hold the ministers personally accountable. The Zhoghovrdakan-Populists demanded enough portfo50 Kharm an darían, op. át., pp. 98—99; Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere, pp. 167—168. 51 Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere, pp. 168—169.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Iios to balance those of the socialist parties. A final effort to organize a government on a personal, individual basis also failed, and Kachaznuni had to inform the Dashnakist parliamentary faction that he was with­ drawing his candidacy.32 By that time, Ohandjanian’s crippled govern­ ment had been forced to accept the crushing Turkish terms for a truce and to come reluctantly to the realization that Mustafa Kemal might not, after all, favor a viable Armenia as a buffer on Turkey’s eastern frontier. Consequently, Armenia tilted to the left and toward an accommodation with Soviet Russia. These developments coincided with the return of Alexandre Khatisian from Tiflis, where he had met with Allied, Georgian, and Turkish offi­ cials. In a futile attempt to persuade the Allies to act, Khatisian told Colonel Stokes and Colonel Corbel that the Soviets were prepared to intercede militarily but that the Armenian government was stalling until the Allies had made their position known.33 Receiving no encourage­ ment, Khatisian set out for Erevan to head the Armenian peace dele­ gation. All along the way, he was met with terror-stricken, mud-mired refugees and soldiers begging for peace. This scene would leave an in­ delible impression on Khatisian and influence his disposition during the negotiations with General Karabekir in Alexandropol. On his return to Erevan, Khatisian went straight to a meeting of the Dashnakist parlia­ mentary faction, where on the night of November 20 he reported em­ phatically that nothing could be expected from the Allies. The Arme­ nians were left face to face with the Turkish armies and had to salvage what they could. That same night the party faction and Bureau decided that Hamazasp Ohandjanian should withdraw from power in favor of a cabinet of peace. Simon Vratzian was called upon to become the party’s candidate for prime minister.34 A member of the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun and an editor of its organ, Haradj, Simon Vratzian had served in the Bureau-Government as 32 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 422; FO 371/4964, E14623/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 20, 1920; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report of Nov. 22, 1920; Simon Vratzian, “Husher motik antsialits,” Hairenik Amsagir, II (Nov. 1923), pp. 63-64, and his Kianki ughinerov: Depker, demker, aprumner, V (Beirut, 1966), pp. 180—181. 33 Khatisian, op. át., p. 254; Armenia Archives, 200/1/625, pp. 3—8. Corbel reported to Paris: “Ce serait une injustice, à mon avis, d’accuser l’Arménie d’avoir trahi l’Entente. Les dirigeants n’ont reçu, depuis le début de l’offensive turque, aucune aide, aucune réponse à leurs appels.” See 20N/187, dossier 1, Exposé de la situation politique pour la période du 1 au 15 Novembre 1920. 34 Khatisian, op. át., pp. 254—256. There appears to be a discrepancy in Khatisian’s ac­ count. He first states that he left Tiflis on November 20 and arrived in Erevan the next night, and then writes that he reached Erevan on the night of November 20 and went directly to the meeting of the Dashnakist faction. British and French sources show that he was in Tiflis on November 19, but it is possible that he left that same night, arriving in Karakilisa on the morning of November 20 and in Erevan that night.

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minister of agriculture and state properties. Regarded as a left-wing so­ cialist, Vratzian was expected to form a government that would be able to seal an accord with Soviet Russia. Vratzian tended to believe that, as both were socialist, the Bolsheviks and Dashnakists shared certain prin­ ciples and could reach a modus vivendi. Armenia had no significant industries or proletariat and had already nationalized the land. The So­ viet leaders might be persuaded that a friendly, independent Armenia would be in Russia’s own interest. Legran had repeatedly professed the absence of any intent to sovietize Armenia by force. Yet Vratzian, too, hoped to limit Soviet intercession to diplomatic and political measures.35 Moreover, before taking office he made a final effort to involve the Allied Powers. Through the Armenian mission in Tiflis, he let it be known to British Chief Commissioner Stokes that the Bolsheviks were offering to push the Turks back to the prewar boundary, by either peaceful or armed means, on condition that Armenia allow the Red Army to enter the country and have free transit over Armenia to Turkey. Before making a final decision, Vratzian was seeking the reaction of the British govern­ ment. Stokes replied that he had already telegraphed London for advice, pending which he could express no opinion, except that His Majesty’s Government had previously stated that it could not participate in any negotiations between Armenia and the Kemalists. The Foreign Office reconfirmed this position on November 28, adding, however, that a treaty with the Turks was preferable to one with the Soviets.36 The transition of the premiership from Hamazasp Ohandjanian to Simon Vratzian took place on the evening of November 23, during a session of Parliament attended by only thirty-five deputies and chaired by Hovhannes Kachaznuni. Ohandjanian first read a brief statement: “Honorable Mr. President. I have the honor herewith to request that you present to the Parliament of Armenia my resignation and that of the government of the Republic of Armenia presided over by me.’’ Ohandjanian then outlined the changes that had occurred since the previous session on November 11 and the circumstances that had led to acceptance of the Turkish truce terms on November 18. As a delegation had now been selected to begin negotiations in Alexandropol, the cab­ inet had submitted its resignation to give the nation the greatest possible latitude.37 35 Vratzian, “Husher,” pp. 64—65, and Kianki ughinerov, pp. 182—183. On the life and political career of Vratzian, see Richard G. Hovannisian, “Simon Vratzian and Armenian Nationalism,” Middle East Studies, V (Oct. 1969), pp. 192—220. 36 FO 371/4965, E15081/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 23, 1920; Great Britain, War Of­ fice, 95/4958, entry for Nov. 23, 1920. 37 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11. The stenographic minutes of the session are also included in Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 513—515; Haradj, Nov. 25:2, 1920.

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On behalf of the Dashnakist faction, Sahak Torosian commended the Bureau-Government for having brought the country through the grave crisis caused by the May uprising. It had been known that the Turks would eventually attack in order to deny Armenia its rightful patrimony, but that blow had fallen sooner and more sharply than expected. The collapse of the Armenian army had deep psychological causes, but these were not irreversible. The new Armenian government should carefully reexamine the political situation. The people wanted peace, a desire shared by the government, which had taken arms only in self-defense. The Dashnakist faction understood that the government that had led the country through difficult straits now had to resign, and the faction deemed that act honorable and creditable. On behalf of the Social Rev­ olutionary faction, Arsham Khondkarian accepted the cabinet’s resig­ nation, a move his party had been recommending for some time. Ohandjanian’s government had its faults, but these, Khondkarian of­ fered magnanimously, were due more to the prevailing state of affairs than to personal shortcomings. Regarding the impending formation of a new government as a historic change of political orientation, the Social Revolutionary party was prepared to cooperate fully to bring the most qualified and dedicated individuals into the governance of the nation.38 By a vote of 34 in favor and 1 abstaining, the resolution of the Dash­ nakist faction was adopted: “The Parliament, having heard the report of the Prime Minister about the resignation of the cabinet and the dec­ larations of the deputies, finds the resignation to be honorable and, accepting the resignation, passes to the election of a new prime minis­ ter.’’ By an identical count, Simon Vratzian was then selected to form a new cabinet. In his brief acceptance speech, Vratzian noted that he was cognizant of the heavy burden placed upon him. The government he was to form could be successful only if it had the full support of the nation. “I believe that with your and the country’s assistance we shall be able to find a way out of this critical situation.’’39 He asked for one day’s time to organize his cabinet. Vratzian had in fact already prepared his ministerial slate, made up of “left-wing” Dashnakists and two Social Rev­ olutionaries: Simon Vratzian

minister-president; foreign affairs; interim internal

AFFAIRS

Drastamat Kanayan (Dro)

military affair

58 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 514; Har­ adj, Nov. 25:2, 1920. w Armenia Archives, 198/1/75, pp. 1, 3; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 514515; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11.

THE WAGES OF DEFEAT

Hambardzum Terterian Arshak Hovhannisian

357

finance; interim welfare

AGRICULTURE AND STATE

PROPERTIES

Arsham Khondkarian

JUDICIAL affairs; INTERIM

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

Vahan Minakhorian

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND

CULTURE40*

After Parliament confirmed this slate on November 24, Prime Minister Vratzian outlined his platform. “The present government is called into existence at a time of extraordinary adversity. The Turkish armed forces have occupied large portions of our country, and the inhabitants of this area have been dislocated and as refugees are being decimated by cold and famine.” Armenia’s international standing had been undermined, its administrative machinery weakened, financial means and communi­ cations disrupted, food and supplies from abroad cut off, internal re­ sources depleted, judicial procedures interrupted, and morale broken. The nation was passing through an unbearable crisis. Under these cir­ cumstances, the government would deal with immediate problems, leav­ ing long-range political, economic, and social objectives for more aus­ picious times. The underlying troubles of the Transcaucasian peoples, Vratzian de­ clared, had been caused by the imperialist powers, whose continuous, bloody battles had devastated Armenia. The policies of those powers had sapped the democratic, creative spirit of the Armenian people and brought about the recent, disastrous conflict with Turkey. The govern­ ment’s foremost objective, therefore, was to pull the country out of the political maelstrom of imperialism and ruinous foreign influences. Con­ ditions had to be created to allow the Armenian democracy to live and develop in harmony with all neighboring peoples. As the prevailing re­ 40 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, and File 67/30, Bekzadian to Aharonian, Nov. 27, 1920; Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov, p. 183; Armenia Archives, 200/1/487, p. 123, and 200/1/597, p. 144; Haradj, Nov. 26:1, 1920. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/183, dossier 4, Revue de la Presse, 16—30 Nov. 1920. On receipt of this information in the British Foreign Office, Ranald MacDonell minuted: “Vratzian was I think in the former Govt without a portfolio. He is either Secretary or VicePresident of the Dashnac Secret Committee 8c ran its Dashnac Intelligence 8c Publicity Bureau. He was formerly a journalist by profession. Dro is the leader of the Dashnac partizan army. His having come in as Minister] of W[ar] may not be a bad thing as it will make the Ministry responsible for the actions of these partizan troops.” See FO 371/4964, E14907/134/58. As Minakhorian was also to be a member of the Armenian peace dele­ gation that was preparing to depart for negotiations with the Turkish representatives in Alexandropol, his duties as minister of education and culture were assumed temporarily by Arshak Hovhannisian. The resignations of Assistant Welfare Minister Ruben Kadjberuni and Assistant Finance Minister Martiros Shatirian were announced on November 27. See Haradj, Nov. 26:1, 27:1, 1920.

THE WAGES OF DEFEAT

359

quantity. Torosian called upon the government to lay the basis for the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples to live in harmony and to secure a lasting peace with Turkey founded on equity and justice. The Armenian people had always looked upon Russia as a friend, but should it now try to undermine Armenia’s independence it would be met with armed re­ sistance. “We need an honorable peace with all.” In a concise statement on behalf of the Social Revolutionary faction, Levon Tumanian termed the prime minister’s declaration “adequate.” Although the government had avoided making unrealistic promises, the SR faction nevertheless would have welcomed a statement on the changes to be introduced in existing policies. The Social Revolutionar­ ies, who at this critical moment had given two ministers to the new cab­ inet, pledged full cooperation. Ironically, the party that had been the most reserved toward and for a long time even critical of Armenian national independence had now joined in a coalition that had very little chance of survival. The short session concluded that evening with the adoption by a vote of 30 in favor and 2 abstaining of a brief resolution: “The Parliament, having heard the declaration of the Prime Minister, gives its approval.”42 While still prime minister-elect, Simon Vratzian sent a radiogram to Mustafa Kemal to announce that his government would adopt a platform of peace with all neighbors. The Armenian people wished to put an end to the tragic animosity with Turkey and to live in harmony. It was now up to the government of the Grand National Assembly to show that it truly desired the existence of an independent Armenia and to accord to the Armenian people their minimal national aspirations.43 In his reply a few days later, Mustafa Kemal acknowledged Vratzian’s sentiments in favor of tranquil, neighborly relations. The Turkish champion expressed hope that the negotiations for peace in Alexandropol would produce such results and that Armenia would free itself from the harmful foreign influences that had severely hindered its development.44 The Negotiations in Alexandropol

One of Hamazasp Ohandjanian’s last official acts was to sign on Novem­ ber 22 the credentials of the Armenian delegates to the peace confer­ ence. Alexandre Khatisian was named first delegate, assisted by Abraham 42 Haradj, Nov. 27:1, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 517—518. 43 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 358; Atatürk’ün millî di§ politikasi, I: 1919—1923 (Millî mücadele dönemine ait 100 belge), publication of Kùltûr Bakanhgi (Ankara, 1981), pp. 181— 182. 44 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 423, and 200/1/625, p. 44; Atatürk’ün millî di$ po­ litikasi, pp. 183-184.

360

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Giulkhandanian, former minister of finance, and Stepan Korganian, for­ mer governor-general of the province of Kars. The delegation’s advisers and counselors included Levon Zarafian (of the Shant delegation), So­ cial Revolutionary Vahan Minakhorian, Senate (Supreme Court) mem­ ber Tigran Hovhannisian, Kostantin Khodjamirian (the cabinet’s direc­ tor of affairs), military specialists Colonel P. Ataev and Captain G. G. Khndzorian (Yablokov), and several ordnance personnel and stenogra­ pher-typists. The delegation was authorized to sign a treaty of peace as well as additional conventions and other agreements. Armenia’s quan­ dary was demonstrated in the contradictory instructions to Khatisian to hold out for the minimal boundary acceptable to the government but also to return with a signed treaty in hand.45 On the afternoon of November 22, Khatisian, Legran, and Mdivani consulted with the cabinet about last-minute details. The Soviet envoys gave assurances that they would do their best to influence Turkey in favor of Armenia, but once more Legran insisted that intervention, to be effective, would require the introduction into Armenia of at least two Red Army regiments. Again, Ohandjanian rejected the proposal, certain that opening the way to the Red Army would result in permanent oc­ cupation. Khatisian’s delegation entrained for Alexandropol after mid­ night on November 22—23, the a*r °f foreboding enhanced by the winter darkness and cold. A couple of hours later, Budu Mdivani and his staff followed in a separate train.46 The Armenian government’s deep-seated suspicion of Soviet Russia and its hope of reaching a modus vivendi through direct negotiations with Nationalist Turkey were reflected in an editorial in Haradj. It was essential, the paper wrote on November 23, for Armenia to adopt a new, realistic political orientation based on Armeno-Turkish friendship. The previous course of following powers that abandoned the Armenians as soon as they were no longer needed had to be changed. “If the Turks in justice recognize our complete independence, give us such bound­ aries and create such conditions by which our people can develop freely economically and culturally, Armenia and the Armenian people in that case will not only establish peace with the Turks but will be their best friends.’’47 The next day, the editorial cautioned that those who still looked to Russia for salvation were naive. Russia was interested primarily in retaining Baku; and everything else in the Caucasus was negotiable. 45 The credentials, rosters, and ledgers of the delegation are in Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/636. For criticism of the instructions to Khatisian as being unrealistic, see Hakob TerHakobian, Hayastani verdjin aghete (Constantinople, 1921), p. 119. 46 Khatisian, op. át., pp. 256—257; Archives de l’Armée, 17N/590, dossier 2, Report of Nov. 24, 1920. 47 Haradj, Nov. 23:2, 1920.

THE WAGES OF DEFEAT

361

There was no doubt that Russia would sacrifice Armenian interests in return for peace with the Entente Powers. The present Russo-Turkish accord would not last long, and Armenia had to avoid becoming a party to the inevitable rivalry. There was no alternative to peace with Arme­ nia’s permanent neighbor, Turkey. “Let us be circumspect and saga­ cious and not repeat past errors. Whoever is a true friend of the Arme­ nians should not push Armenia on to such a path that will become the cause of massacres or hinder the improvement of relations and lasting amity between the Armenian and Turkish peoples.”48 After an arduous journey with many halts, the Armenian delegation arrived at the Alexandropol railway station at dawn on November 24. Greeted by members of Karabekir’s staff, the delegation was assigned quarters in the fortress, away from the city, where Karabekir had allowed an Armenian Bolshevik revolutionary committee to take charge of the civil administration. A few hours later Alexandre Khatisian called on General Karabekir, who as instructed from Angora acted most cordially and professed a sincere desire for peace. He regretted that Armenia’s leaders had not accepted the Grand National Assembly’s initial offers and thereby avoided all the horrors of the recent war. But the past could not be changed, and it was now necessary to establish the basis for firm, permanent relations. Tactfully underscoring Armenia’s helplessness, Karabekir asserted that he had planned to occupy only the Olti-Sarikamish sector, but when he saw how easy it was to advance against the inexperienced, poorly commanded Armenian troops he had resumed the campaign. Karabekir declared ominously that Turkey desired the existence of a prosperous and productive Armenian state “within eth­ nographic boundaries.” To flaunt Turkey’s rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres, he announced that his delegation would include the commander of the Erzerum garrison, Hamid Bey, and a deputy from Erzerum to the Grand National Assembly, Suleiman Nejati Bey. Karabekir was emphatic in ruling out any external mediation, especially as a truce had already been concluded between the two sides and former interior minister Sar­ gis Araratian himself had stated that Soviet involvement was not desira­ ble.49 During his initial interview with Budu Mdivani that same day, Kara­ bekir categorically rejected Soviet mediation, as Armenia had accepted all the Turkish conditions for a truce and the Angora government had explicidy instructed him to treat with the Armenians alone. Naturally,

48 Haradj, Nov. 24:2, 1920. 49 Khatisian, op. át., pp. 260-262; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, “Aleksandrapoli banaktsutiunner. ” For French reports on the negotiations, see Archives de l’Armée, 20N/108, dossier 1.

362

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

that did not preclude direct exchanges between Mdivani and Karabekir as allies working for the same cause. Karabekir maneuvered skillfully to bring Mdivani under his influence, emphasizing the revolutionary na­ ture of the Turkish Nationalist movement and suggesting that the Red Army should eliminate Menshevik Georgia as a base of operations for the imperialist powers.50 Rather than protesting Karabekir’s declara­ tions, Mdivani acquiesced in his exclusion as a fait accompli. To Khatisian’s inquiry as to what he would do about the situation, which was an affront to Soviet Russia, Mdivani replied that he would inform Moscow, but as the Turks had disallowed his mediation he could not be a party to the negotiations. He promised to do what was possible to influence Karabekir outside the sessions.5’ As it happened, Mdivani spent much of his time in the city organizing and participating in public meetings and rallies directed against the Dashnaktsutiun and the Erevan government. In a return visit to Mdivani on November 25, Karabekir again stressed that the Red Army should move on Tiflis, promising to take action to block any attempted British intervention at Batum or elsewhere and asking therefore for the contin­ ued flow of Soviet military aid.52 This tactic may have been a ploy to divert the attention of Russia from Armenian affairs. Mdivani’s passivity surprised Legran, who telegraphed Ordzhonikidze and Chicherin that because of Karabekir’s objection Mdivani had not even submitted the Soviet views and proposals. This, Legran complained, was a serious blun­ der. Mdivani should be given specific directives about the conditions of peace that would be acceptable to the Soviet government.53 In his visit with the Armenian delegation on November 25, General Karabekir reiterated Turkey’s desire to live in peace with a neighboring, independent Armenia. These assurances and Karabekir’s cordiality raised Armenian hopes that an equitable settlement might yet be pos­ sible. After the two heads of delegation had agreed to open the formal conference late that afternoon, the Armenians put their views into a memorandum that justified the inclusion in the Armenian republic of the Russian Armenian territories, together with Bayazit, Van, and Mush, and an outlet to the Black Sea at the small port at Rize. Claims to Diarbekir, Bitlis, Erzerum, and other lands to the west would be dropped.54

50 Zohrabian, op. cit., p. 90; Kharmandarian, op. át., p. 99; Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere, p. 123; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Report on political situation, Nov. 16—26, 1920. 51 Khatisian, op. cit., p. 262. 52 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, “Aleksandrapoli banaktsutiunner”; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 374. See also Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere, pp. 173—174 53 Kharmandarian, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 54 Khatisian, op. tit., p. 263; “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 94.

THE WAGES OF DEFEAT

363

At the first plenary session, Khatisian, trying to curry favor, suggested that Karabekir preside, as the Turks controlled Alexandropol and might therefore be regarded as the hosts. This attempt to stroke Karabekir’s amour propre was futile, for in his opening statement the Turkish chief negotiator declared that, because his country upheld the right of selfdetermination for all peoples and was unshakable in its will to be free and independent, the Armenian government had to renounce in writing the Treaty of Sèvres as a scheme of the Entente imperialists to enslave the peoples of Asia by turning them against each other. Placed in a discomfiting situation, Khatisian replied that the Armenian government first wished to have an indication of how basic questions, such as the matter of boundaries, were to be settled. The current peace conference could be taken as a de facto disavowal of the Sèvres treaty, inasmuch as the Armenian side was present to negotiate a new treaty pursuant to the goal of securing for the Armenian people the prospect of peaceful, un­ hindered development. Karabekir was implacable, insisting that before proceeding a formal repudiation in writing was essential as evidence of Armenia’s sincerity, especially in view of the Armenian government’s recent appeals for intervention by those European imperialists. Khati­ sian agreed to have an answer at the next session but in the meantime wished to place on the table several questions—namely, the issue of So­ viet mediation, the release of detained civil officials in Kars and Alex­ andropol, the transit of goods on the railroad from Karakilisa to Erevan, and the utilization of the telegraph between Alexandropol and Erevan. Karabekir concluded the session by reiterating that there was no need for mediation, but the Armenian delegation if it so desired could submit this and the other questions in writing. He also agreed to extend the truce for ten days.55 The Armenian delegates returned to their quarters discouraged by Karabekir’s intransigence. A meeting of the delegation including advi­ sers and counselors decided that there was no way to escape Karabekir’s demand. The Treaty of Sèvres had in actuality already been voided by the Turkish military victory, and it was now hoped that the Angora gov­ ernment would concede to Armenia enough territory for it to become a viable state. Khatisian argued that if the Allied Powers proved willing and able to impose the Sèvres treaty it would be obvious that the Ar­ menian government had been forced to repudiate that instrument un­ der duress, whereas if the West was not prepared to take the necessary measures to implement the treaty then it would make no difference 55 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, “Aleksandrapoli banaktsutiunner”; Khatisian, op. át., pp. 264—265; Zohrabian, op. át., pp. 94—95; Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 377. 386-

3 64

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

whether or not Armenia issued a formal renunciation.56 The question nonetheless had such a fundamental bearing on state policy that the delegation requested the government’s approval. After a midnight meet­ ing of the cabinet on November 25—26, Prime Minister Vratzian con­ curred in the delegation’s position.57 The delegation spent much of November 26 composing the text of the declaration in such a way as to imply certain commitments and ex­ pectations from the Angora government: In view of the fact that the vital interests of Turkey are violated and threatened by the Treaty of Sèvres and that the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey recognizes and respects the freedom and independence of the Re­ public of Armenia and is indicating its readiness to extend real guarantees for Armenia’s well-being and economic development, and desiring to turn a new page in the mutual relations of the two states and to establish long-lasting, friendly relations between Turkey and Armenia, the peace delegation on instruc­ tion of the government is announcing, on the suggestion of Turkey, that it is disavowing the Treaty of Sèvres.58

At the same time that Khatisian apprised Karabekir informally of this action, he submitted in writing a request to permit the mediation and participation of representatives of Soviet Russia, inasmuch as the Sovnarkom had accepted the Armenian appeal for mediation, the Turkish Nationalist envoy in Moscow (Bekir Sami Bey) had assented to Russia’s offer, and the presence of Soviet intermediaries could not deter the course of the negotiations, given that Russia and Turkey were friends and allies.59 Prior to the second session on November 27, Vahan Minakhorian assessed the Turkish position in a letter to his Social Revolu­ tionary comrade, Arsham Khondkarian. The Turkish argument against Russian mediation, he wrote, was, first, that Turkey and Armenia had already agreed on the terms for a truce and, second, that the Armenian government had accepted the principles of peace proposed by the Turk­ ish government, such as the resolution of disputed territorial questions on the basis of statistics and plebiscites, the repatriation of Turkish Ar­ menian refugees, Turkish economic assistance to Armenia, and the im­ plementation of “real guarantees’’ for Turkey’s security. Karabekir had not disguised his distrust of the Russians, complaining about their re­ pression of Turkish officials in Azerbaijan and believing that Soviet-Turk­ 56 Khatisian, op. át., p. 265; Zohrabian, op. át., pp. 97—98. 57 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 373, 388, and 200/2/104, p. 6; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, “Aleksandrapoli banaktsutiunner”; Khatisian, op. át., p. 265. 58 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 377, and 200/2/104, p. 8; “Missiia B. Legrana,” PP- 93-9459 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, p. 374, and 200/2/97, p. 17.

THE WAGES OF DEFEAT

365

ish collaboration would be of short duration. He blamed the British for inciting one people against another. Even British Colonel Alfred Raw­ linson, whom Karabekir was holding hostage in Erzerum, had urged the Turks to attack Armenia and Georgia. The Turks, Minakhorian con­ cluded, felt strong and confident; the enormous quantities of arms and ammunition required of Armenia as one condition of the truce were being exacted not because of any real need but rather to prevent the Armenians from trying to help the English if they sent a military expe­ dition to Batum. The Kemalists ascribed great significance to the victory over Armenia and the fall of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, these par­ allel developments striking the death knell of the Treaty of Sèvres.60 General Karabekir had prepared theatrically for the second plenary session on November 27 by having a military band strike up with the chords of the “Internationale” upon Khatisian’s formal renunciation of the Treaty of Sèvres. “Now, when we are liberated from European im­ perialistic repression, we can speak freely as two neighboring peoples,” he proclaimed. Skillfully, even as he made manifestations of Soviet-Turk­ ish friendship and gave similar assurances to Budu Mdivani, Karabekir rejected Khatisian’s request to permit the participation of Soviet repre­ sentatives. Rather, he proposed that the conference pass immediately to the question of boundaries. The session concluded with an agreement that the two sides would prepare boundary proposals with explanatory notes and maps and exchange these for study prior to the next plenary session.61 Taking advantage of Armenia’s vulnerability, the Turkish command that same day complained that Armenian troops had violated the neutral zone in the districts of Sharur and Shahtaght and, threatening to break off the negotiations, demanded that the armed forces withdraw from the region into Daralagiaz in order to avoid the repetition of such infrac­ tions.62 The ominous ultimatum raised anxieties about Turkish designs on the Sharur-Nakhichevan region, but the government was helpless to resist. In a radio transmission after midnight on November 27—28, Vra­ tzian replied through Khatisian that the government had accepted the pacific settlement of all disputed questions with neighboring states and was confident that the Angora government shared this principle. The demand to withdraw on the Daralagiaz line was an entirely new condi­ tion, to which there was no reference in the truce signed on November 60 Armenia Archives, 200/1/609, pp. 1—2. 61 Khatisian, op. dt., p. 266. See also Karabekir, op. dt., p. 902, for his telegram to Angora announcing the Armenian renunciation of the Treaty of Sèvres. 62 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /602, p. 377; FO 371 /49Ô5, E15175/134/58, Stokes to FO, Nov. 30, 1920; WO 95/4958, entry for Nov. 30, 1920. See also “Turkiayi kaghakakanutiune,” pp. 41—42.

366

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

18. Yet, however harsh the latest Turkish demand, and because negoti­ ations for peace had already begun, the government, in order to dem­ onstrate its sincerity, had issued the necessary directive for full compli­ ance. Vratzian also affirmed the Armenian program for peace previously agreed upon by Khatisian and former prime minister Ohandjanian. Be­ ginning to lose faith in Armenia’s ability to reach a satisfactory agree­ ment with the Kemalists, Vratzian instructed Khatisian to rely as much as possible on the intercession of the Soviet representative. Khatisian replied that the Turks had effectively removed Mdivani, who was spend­ ing his time in propaganda and provocation against the Armenian gov­ ernment.63 In Erevan, meanwhile, Boris Legran was urging Vratzian to avoid the imminent calamity by proclaiming Armenia a Soviet republic or at least by inviting the Red Army to protect the country. He denounced Ohan­ djanian and Ter-Minasian for having rejected this advice. In view of what was taking place in Alexandropol, the Armenian government should recall its delegation and establish Soviet rule. Vratzian pointed out that the Turkish army, which had demonstrated its powers of horrendous devastation, could reach Erevan more easily and quickly than the Red Army. If Russia believed that it could control the Turks, then what was preventing it from moderating the Turkish demands? And what guar­ antee was there that the mere declaration of sovietization would deter the Turks? The sovietization of Armenia would sever all links with the West and result in an economic blockade at a time when Russia itself was starving. And in the international arena, Armenia’s rights, especially those relating to Western or Turkish Armenia, would be lost. Vratzian called for Russian support without sovietization or deployment of the Red Army. Legran was gready annoyed with this response, insisting that Armenia must relinquish hope in the West and renounce once and for all the Treaty of Sèvres. Only the Red Army could now save Armenia.64 The developments in Alexandropol deepened the anxieties and sus­ picions of the Soviet leaders. On November 27, Foreign Affairs Com­ missar Chicherin instructed Ordzhonikidze to report immediately on the progress of the negotiations and on Mdivani’s activities. It was im. 63 Armenia Archives, 200/1/602, pp. 377, 386—388, 390; “Missiia B. Legrana,” p. 95; Khatisian, op. át., pp. 266—267. Khatisian also reported that able-bodied Armenian men in the areas under Turkish occupation were being conscripted and sent to Kars and beyond for forced labor (200/1/602, p. 374). For reports of censorship on the correspondence of the delegation, see 200/1/602, pp. 406—409. Khatisian tried unsuccessfully to secure the release of the many Armenian civil officials taken prisoner at Kars. Karabekir explained that, as these men had participated in one way or another in hostilities against his army, they would be removed from the front but would not be regarded as prisoners of war. See 200/1/602, pp. 366—367. 64 Vratzian, “Husher,” pp. 66—69, anA » lL 1 hfp kh

tr*

Si

ITâ ej tb

/U ym

ds k h dz gh

a n* n u« n S" Fr 83 hi 4> f ft Oo

m hl y or—1 23 n sh vo1 oro ch P

Diphthongs _¡u4

«C

—U, Vs

»ƒ

— u^oy’oro2

btt

—ia or ya5

wy

—ai, ay8 or a2

jw

—ia4orya4»8

— iu 1 In initial position only. 2 The letter j is not transliterated in final position. 3 When followed by a vowel. 4 In Soviet Armenian orthography only. 5 When preceded by a vowel.

dj r s V t r ts V p k o f

Glossary of Place Names

Nearly all place names in the text appear in the form most widely used prior to 1921, as listed in the column on the left. Sites that have been renamed or given existing alternate forms are listed in the column on the right. Easily recognizable variants (e.g., Erzerum—Erzurum, and Korindzor—Kornidzor) are not included. Because of the present un­ certainty about the ultimate status of Mountainous Karabagh, names in that district are shown only as being within Mountainous Karabagh. Many place names are again being changed in the former Soviet Union, some to their original form.

Former Name

Subsequent Name(s) (Soviet and post-Soviet)

Ablah Achasu Adiaman (Erevan province) Aghamzalu Aghasibekli Aghbulagh (Akbulag) Aghdjakend, Nerkin (Lower) Aghdjakend, Verin (Upper) Aghkilise Aintab Aisori Akhta Aksibara (Aghsibara) Aksibara (Lower) Alagiaz Alashkert Alexandretta

Aigestan, Azerbaijan Achadjur, Armenia Garnhovit, Armenia Marmarashen, Armenia Aghaslu, Armenia Lusaghbiur, Armenia Shahumian, Azerbaijan Verishen, Azerbaijan Krashen, Armenia Gaziantep, Turkey Giulasar, Armenia Hrazdan, Armenia Voskepar, Armenia Askibara, Azerbaijan Aragads, Armenia Eleçkirt, Turkey Iskenderun, Turkey

411

412

Alexandropol Alexandrovka Alikuchak Ali Mamed

Angelaut Angora Ani Arazdayan Arpa Astazur Baouk-Vedi Barana Basargechar Bash-Abaran Bash-Garni Bash-Norashen

Bayazit Bazarchai Bazarchai River Blagodarnoe Bozburun, Mount Buniatlu Bzovd, Mount Bzovdal

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Leninakan; Giumri (Kumairi), Armenia Komosor, Turkey Kuchak, Armenia Almamed; Dvin Sovkhoz; Lusarat, Armenia Angeghakot, Armenia Ankara, Turkey Aniköy; Ocakh, Turkey Eraskh, Armenia Areni, Armenia Shvanidzor, Armenia

Vedi, Armenia Noyemberian, Armenia Vardenis, Armenia Abaran; Aparan, Armenia Garni, Armenia Ilichevsk; Sharur (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan Dogubayazit, Turkey Goraik, Armenia Barkushat River, Armenia Çakmak, Turkey Mount Erakh, Armenia Karmrakar, Mountainous Karabagh Mount Bazumtar, Armenia Bazum, Armenia

Charkhedj Constantinople

Kaiseri, Turkey Getashen; Chaikend, Azerbaijan Krasnoselsk (incorporated in), Armenia Avetaranots, Mountainous Karabagh Kuibishev; Haghardzin, Armenia Istanbul, Turkey

Darabas Darachichak Daralagiaz Dashushen Davalu

Darbas, Armenia Dsaghkadzor, Armenia Vayots Dzor; Vaik, Armenia Karashen, Mountainous Karabagh Ararat, Armenia

Caesarea Chaikend Chambarak

Chanakhchi

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

413

Dirakler Djatkran Djul Dokhkuz Dsegh Dvegh

Karnut, Armenia Vosketap, Armenia Artavan, Armenia Kanachut, Armenia Tumanian, Armenia Dovegh, Armenia

Ekaterinodar Ekaterinoslav Elenendorf Elenovka Elisavetpol Engidja (Erevan uezd) Engikend (Manasbek; Manasgiugh) Eritsatumb

Krasnodar, Russian Federation Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine Khanlar, Azerbaijan Sevan, Armenia Kirovabad; Ganja, Azerbaijan Norabats, Armenia Norashen; Manashen, Azerbaijan

Gallipoli Ganja (Gandzak) Gedjevan Geoigiumbet Germanis (Jermanis) Gerusy Ghalacha (Kalacha) Ghaltakhchi (Kaltakchi) Gharaghshlagh Ghregh (Krykh) Ghrghi Ghulali Ghushchi Giutkum Grkh-bulag

Çanakkale, Turkey Kirovabad; Ganja, Azerbaijan Kadjaran, Armenia Geghanist, Armenia Keolanlu, Armenia Goris, Armenia Berdavan, Armenia Hartagiugh, Armenia Dostlug; Hayanist, Armenia Dzoraget, Armenia Artsvaberd, Armenia Aigedzor, Armenia Tazagiugh; Tasik, Armenia Geghanush, Armenia Akunk, Armenia

Hadjin Haji-Eilas

Hajikend (Hajishen) Haji-Nazar Hamamlu

Saimbeyli, Turkey Ipakli; Masis Sovkhoz; Darakert, Armenia Kamo, Azerbaijan Kamo village, Armenia Spitak, Armenia

luva

Shahumian, Armenia

Jafarabad

Argavand, Armenia

Bardzravan, Armenia

414

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Jalal-oghli Jghin

Stepanavan, Armenia Geoljghin, Armenia

Karabaghlar (Erevan uezd) Karabulagh (Elisavetpol uezd) Karaburun Karadash (Kazakh uezd) Karakilisa (Alexandropol uezd) Karakilisa (Sisavan) Karakoyunlu (Kazakh uezd) Karalar Karanlukh, Nerkin (Lower) Kariagin Karkhun (Gharghun) Karvansarai Kavarachai River Kavtarlu Kerasund Keshishkend Khachaparakh Khamarlu (Ghamarlu) Khankend

Chimankend; Urtsadzor, Armenia Martunashen, Azerbaijan Karakert station, Armenia Sevkar, Armenia Kirovabad; Vanadzor, Armenia Sisian, Armenia Geolkend; Aigut, Armenia Aralez, Armenia Martuni, Armenia Fizuli, Azerbaijan Djrarat, Armenia Ijevan, Armenia Gavaraget River, Armenia Panik, Armenia Giresun, Turkey Mikoyan; Egheknadzor, Armenia Zahmat; Khachpar, Armenia Artashat, Armenia Stepanakert, Mountainous Karabagh Gai, Armenia Aknashen, Armenia Chorastan, Armenia Martuni, Mountainous Karabagh Karmrashen, Armenia Akyaka, Turkey Ghoshavank; Haikadzor, Armenia Mounts Geghmaghan and Tirinkatar Voskevan, Armenia Kotigegh; Shavarshavan; Koti, Armenia Sarahart, Armenia Tuzluca, Turkey Lernadzor, Armenia Dostlu; Barekamavan, Armenia Demurchi (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan

Khatunarkh, Nerkin (Lower) Khatunarkh, Verin (Upper) Khlatagh Khonashen Kirmizlu Kizil-Chakhchakh Kizilkilisa Kizil-Ziaret, Mount Koshkotan (Ghoshghotan) Kotkend

Kulidjan Kulp (Koghb) Kurdikend (Krdikend) Kurumsulu (Ghurumsulu) Kushchi-Demurchi

Lalkend (Lalakend)

Lalgegh; Vazashen, Armenia

4H

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Jalal-oghli Jghin

Stepanavan, Armenia Geoljghin, Armenia

Karabaghlar (Erevan uezd) Karabulagh (Elisavetpol uezd) Karaburun Karadash (Kazakh uezd) Karakilisa (Alexandropol uezd) Karakilisa (Sisavan) Karakoyunlu (Kazakh uezd) Karalar Karanlukh, Nerkin (Lower) Kariagin Karkhun (Gharghun) Karvansarai Kavarachai River Kavtarlu Kerasund Keshishkend Khachaparakh Khamarlu (Ghamarlu) Khankend

Chimankend; Urtsadzor, Armenia Martunashen, Azerbaijan Karakert station, Armenia Sevkar, Armenia Kirovabad; Vanadzor, Armenia Sisian, Armenia Geolkend; Aigut, Armenia Aralez, Armenia Martuni, Armenia Fizuli, Azerbaijan Djrarat, Armenia Ijevan, Armenia Gavaraget River, Armenia Panik, Armenia Giresun, Turkey Mikoyan; Egheknadzor, Armenia Zahmat; Khachpar, Armenia Artashat, Armenia Stepanakert, Mountainous Karabagh Gai, Armenia Aknashen, Armenia Chorastan, Armenia Martuni, Mountainous Karabagh Karmrashen, Armenia Akyaka, Turkey Ghoshavank; Haikadzor, Armenia Mounts Geghmaghan and Tirinkatar Voskevan, Armenia Kotigegh; Shavarshavan; Koti, Armenia Sarahart, Armenia Tuzluca, Turkey Lernadzor, Armenia Dostlu; Barekamavan, Armenia Demurchi (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan

Khatunarkh, Nerkin (Lower) Khatunarkh, Verin (Upper) Khlatagh Khonashen Kirmizlu Kizil-Chakhchakh Kizilkilisa Kizil-Ziaret, Mount

Koshkotan (Ghoshghotan) Kotkend Kulidjan Kulp (Koghb) Kurdikend (Krdikend) Kurumsulu (Ghurumsulu) Kushchi-Demurchi

Lalkend (Lalakend)

Lalgegh; Vazashen, Armenia

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

415

Molla-Geokcha Molla-Musa Moseskend

Manashen, Azerbaijan Leninavan, Mountainous Karabagh Göle, Turkey Karmirgiugh; Krasnoselsk; Karmir, Armenia Maralik, Armenia Voskehask, Armenia Mosesgegh, Armenia

Nalband Nedjelu, Nerkin (Lower) Nedjelu, Verin (Upper) Nerkin Gharanlugh (Karanlukh) Nor-Bayazit (Novo-Bayazet) N ovo-Mikhailovka Novo-Petrovka Novo-Selim

Shirakamut, Armenia Sayat Nova, Armenia Nizami, Armenia Martuni, Armenia Kamo, Armenia Mikhailovka, Armenia Agçalar, Turkey Selim, Turkey

Okhchi Ordaklu Ortakilisa

Voghchi, Armenia Ljashen, Armenia Mayisian, Armenia

Paravatumb

Petrovka Petrovsk Pokr Kapanak (Ghapanak) Prokhladnoe

Barabatum (incorporated in Ghapan), Armenia Hatsarat (incorporated in Kamo), Armenia Azizbekov; Zaritap, Armenia Leningrad; St. Petersburg, Russian Federation Kayah, Turkey Makhachkala, Russian Federation Hovit, Armenia Melikköy, Turkey

Ramis Rehanlu Romanovo Ruschuk

Urmis (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan Kalinin; Aigavan, Armenia Yeniköy, Turkey Ruse, Bulgaria

Salónica Sardarabad Seidkend

Thessalonica, Greece Hoktember, Armenia Shurakend, Armenia

Manasbek (Manasgiugh) Margushavan Merdenek Mikhailovka

Pashakend Pashalu Petrograd

416

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Shahali Sharifabad (Taza Karkhun) Sheki Shishkert Shorlu-Demurchi Shorlu-Mehmandar Shushikend Sis Sisian Smyrna Sogutli (Alexandropol uezd) Sultanbek Suluk

Vahagni, Armenia Araxes, Armenia Shaki, Armenia Lijk, Armenia Shorlu; Dashtavan, Armenia Hovtashat, Armenia Shosh, Mountainous Karabagh Kozan, Turkey Hatsavan, Armenia Izmir, Turkey Sarnaghbiur, Armenia Bardzruni, Armenia Azat, Azerbaijan

Tanagirmaz (Danagirmaz) Tauzkala Tauzkend Terter (Tartar) Tghna

Hovit; Nigavan, Armenia Berd, Armenia Tovuz, Armenia Mir Bashir; Tartar, Azerbaijan Chananab (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan Tbilisi, Georgia Trabzon, Turkey Karmir Giugh, Mountainous Karabagh Stalingrad; Volgograd, Russian Federation

Tiflis Trebizond Trnavarz (Drnavaz) Tsaritsyn

Ulukhanlu Urut Uzunlar Uzuntala

Masis, Armenia Vorotan, Armenia Odzun, Armenia Honut; Aigehovit, Armenia

Vardashen (Nukhi uezd) Vladikavkaz

Vorontsovka

Oghuz, Azerbaijan Ordzhonikidze; Vladikavkaz, Russian Federation Kalinino; Tashir, Armenia

Zangu River Zarushat Zeitun Zeiva Zurzuna

Hrazdan River, Armenia Arpaçay, Turkey Sûleymanh, Turkey Davit Bek, Armenia Çildir, Turkey

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File 527. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, igig t. Petruar [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turk­ ish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, February 1919]. File 528. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, igig t. Mart [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turk­ ish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, March 1919]. File 529. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, igig t. April [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turk­ ish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, April 1919]. (The files that follow are part of the original archives of the Dashnaktsutiun.) File 1283/26. H. H. D. Arevmtian Evropayi Kedronakan Komite, igig [A. (Ar­ menian) R. (Revolutionary) F. (Federation) Central Committee of Western Europe, 1919]. File 1378/9. H. H. D. Germania, igi6—ig2O [A.R.F.: Germany, 1916-1920]. File 14060/260. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, igi8 [A.R.F. Central Committee of America, 1918]. File 14070/270. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, igig [A.R.F. Central Committee of America, 1919]. File 1408/28. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, ig2o [A.R.F. Central Committee of America, 1920]. File 1546/27. H. H. D. g-rd Endhanur Zhoghov igig t. [A.R.F. 9th General Meeting, 1919]. File 1649. H. H. D.: Gharabagh [A.R.F.: Karabagh]. File 1650/1. H. H D.: Petrvarian Sharzhman Masin, ig2i t. [A.R.F.: About the February Movement, 1921]. File 1651/2. H H. D.: Petruarian Sharzhman Masin, ig2i t. [A.R.F.: About the February Movement, 1921]. File 1687/18. H.H.D. Erkrord Midjazgainakan, igig [A.R.F.: Second Inter­ national, 1919]. File 1688/19. H H. D.: Erkrord Midjazgainakan, ig2O [A.R.F.: Second Inter­ national, 1920]. Armenian National Delegation. Archives of the Armenian National Delegation. (Transferred in 1972 from Paris to the Armenian State Historical Archives, Ere­ van, with microfilm copies deposited in the Nubarian Library in Paris and at the international headquarters of the Armenian General Benevolent Union in New York). Microfilm Roll C-i (pp. 1-2052: Delegation minutes, correspondence, and documents, refugee affairs, National Congress, Phil-Armenian Congress, Lausanne conferences, 1918—1924). C-2 (pp. 2053-4049: Delegation correspondence and memoranda, refugee affairs, League of Nations, Lausanne conferences, Cilicia, Armenian Na­ tional Home, 1922—1924). C-3 (pp. 4050-6203: History of Armenian Question, statistical data, Armenian orphans and refugees, delegation correspondence, 1921—1924). O4 (pp. 6204-8277: Delegation correspondence, Paris Peace Conference, Allied policies, Armenian orphans and refugees, 1919—1924). O5 (pp. 8278-10047: Armenian National Congress, news agency releases, 1919-1923).

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C-6 (pp. 10048—12019: News agency releases, 1922—1923). C-7 (pp. 12020-14208: Armenian Press Bureau, League of Nations and ref­ ugees, Cilicia, general correspondence, 1918—1925). C-8 (pp. 14209—15727: Armenophile societies, 1918—1924). C-9 (pp. 15728—17785: Near East Relief, Transcaucasian affairs, Armenian communities in Western Europe, 1920—1929). C-10 (pp. 17786—18594 and new series [n.s.] pp. 1-1214: Armenian com­ munities in Europe and Near East, conditions in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Cilicia, correspondence of Noradoungian, Tekeyan, Alpoyadjian, and others, 1919-1924). C-i 1 (pp. 1215—3131 n.s.: Conditions in Cilicia and Syria, Armenian com­ munities in Near East and United States, 1919—1922). C-12 (pp. 3132—5166 n.s.: Catholicosate of Cilicia, Patriarchates of Constan­ tinople and Jerusalem, Mekhitarist Brotherhood, Republic of Armenia Del­ egation, general correspondence, 1919—1924). C-13 (pp. 5167-6695 n.s.: Armenian Legion and Legion d’Orient, History of Armenian Question, Cilicia, National Home, correspondence of General Andranik, Patriarch Zaven, Gulbenkian, Melkonian, and others, 19191925)D-i (pp. 1-2000: National Congress, general correspondence, memoranda, 1919-1924). D-2 (pp. 2001—3881: Peace conference, delegation minutes, correspondence, memoranda, 1920-1923). D-3 (pp. 3882—5902: Delegation committees, Allied policies, Turkish Nation­ alist foreign relations, Cilicia and the Armenian Legion, 1920—1924). D-4 (pp. 5903—8301: Conditions in Cilicia, National Home, delegation mem­ oranda, correspondence of Damadian, Sevasly, Esayan, Chobanian, and oth­ ers, 1920-1924). D-5 (pp. 8302-10143: Peace conferences, conditions in Cilicia, refugees, del­ egation correspondence, 1919—1923). D-6 (pp. 10144—12019: Conditions in Transcaucasia, Paris Peace Conference, delegation secretariat, Armenophile societies, Soviet-Turkish relations, So­ viet Armenia, League of Nations, general correspondence, 1919—1924). i-D (pp. 1—2050: Andonian’s history of Armenian Question and National Del­ egation, minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, minutes of National Delegation, Paris Peace Conference, Treaty of Sèvres, Armenians in the world war, 1915-1924). 2-D (pp. 2051—2320: Cilicia, National Home, refugee affairs, 1919—1923). France Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Quai d’Orsay), Paris. Guerre igi4~igi8: Turquie. Cartons 887—889. Arménie: août 1914-mai 1918. Cartons 890—893. Légion d'Orient: septembre 1916-avril 1918. Cartons 894—895. Arméniens du Caucase: octobre 1917-avril 1918. Ministère d’Etat Chargé de la Défense Nationale. Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre. Service Historique (Château de Vincennes), Vincennes. Classe 16N. Commandement du Grand Quartier Générai T.O.E. 3ème Bureau E. File 3016 (Légion d’Orient). Files 3051 —3052 (Turkish-Caucasus front, 1917—1919). Files 3060—3061 (Caucasus, Cilicia, etc., 1917—1919).

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Files 3152—3154 (Comptes-rendus des Armées Alliées en Orient, 19171919)Files 3180—3187 (Caucasus: Turkish invasion of, massacres of Armenians in, conditions of refugees in, British occupation of, Armenian republic in, 1917-1919). Files 3194—3206 (Intelligence reports, correspondence, and documents relating to Turkey, Asia Minor, Transcaucasia, Armenians, Allied poli­ cies, 1915—1920). Classe 17N. Missions Militaires Françaises. Files 581—585 (Mission in South Russia, including numerous reports on the Caucasus, Armenian refugees, Pan-Islamic movements). Files 589—590 (Mission in the Caucasus). Classe 20N. Front Oriental Commandement des Armées Alliées en Orient (C.A.A.). 2ème Bureau. Files 139—144. Bulletins de renseignements, comptes-rendus, correspondance: Em­ pire Ottoman, Arménie, Caucase, etc. 1916—1919. Files 157—158. (Armenian survivors and conditions in Cilicia, Allied pol­ icies and rivalries, Soviet-Turkish relations, 1919—1921.) Files 166—170. Renseignements de la Marine, 1917—1921. File 171. Conférence des hauts-commissaires, 1919—1920. File 172. Correspondance et renseignements relatifs à l Armée du Levant, 1916— 1921. Files 173—175. Comptes-rendus et renseignements britanniques; renseignements divers, 1916—1922. Files 186—187. Caucase: Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan et Arménie, 1919—1921. Corps d’Occupation de Constantinople (C.O.C.), puis Corps d’Occupation Fran­ çaise de Constantinople (C.O.F.C.). 2ème Bureau. Files 1081—1084. Bulletins de renseignements journaliers et hebdomadaires: ren­ seignements politiques, économiques et militaires, 1920-1923. File 1085. Rapports mensuels concernant la politique intérieure et extérieure. . . , 1920-1923. File 1086/1. Renseignements sur la Turquie, la Géorgie, l Arménie. . . , 1920— 1921. File 1088. Armée française du Levant. . . à la chute d’Aïntab, 21 février, 1921. File 1095. Renseignements de la Marine . . . Turquie, Russie méridionale, Cau­ case, Arménie. Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan, Syrie et Cilide . . . , 1920—1923. File 1115. Télégrammes . . . Evénements de Cilide et résistance à l’occupation française; rensdgnements sur le Kurdistan et l’Arménie, 1919—1923.

Republic of Georgia Archives of the Delegation to the Conference of Peace and of the Government in Exile. (Now deposited in Houghton Library, Harvard University). Boxes 1—2. The Russian Revolution and the Situation in the Caucasus prior to the Bolshevik Invasion. Box 3. The Caucasus and Turkey in 1918—1919. Boxes 4—7. The Transcaucasian Federation and Independent Georgia. Boxes 8—9. Independent Georgia: Ministry ofFordgn Affairs. Boxes 10—12. Independent Georgia: Ministry ofFinance, Trade, and Industry. Boxes 13—15. Independent Georgia: Ministry of Agriculture. Boxes 18. Independent Georgia: People’s Guard.

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Box 19. Peace Conference in Trebizond; End of Transcaucasian Federation; Inde­ pendent Georgia and Its Relations with Turkey and Germany. Boxes 20—23. Georgia, English Military Command in Transcaucasia, Russian White Army. Box 24. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Boxes 25—30. Georgian Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris. Box 31. Georgian Diplomatic Representation in Paris. Box 32. Georgian Legation in Rome. Box 33. Georgian Legation in Berlin. Box 34. Georgian Legation in Constantinople. Box 35. Georgian Legation in Berne. Box 36. Interrelations among Georgia, Northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Poland, Bielorussia, Baltic, and Scandinavian Countries. Box 37. Georgia and Soviet Russia. Box 80. The Georgian and Foreign Press about Georgia.

Great Britain Admiralty Office Archives. Public Record Office (London). Class 1. Admiralty and Secretarial Papers, 1660-1934. Cabinet Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 21. Registered Files (1916—1939). 153“154- Future of Syria, 1919. 158. Relations between France and Great Britain and Their Policy re Russian and Turkish Peace, 1919. 173. Trading Relations with Russia, 1920. 174. Smyrna, 1920. 177. Bolshevik Influence on Moslems, 1920. 184. Turkey: Peace Negotiations, 1920. Class 23. Cabinet: Minutes (1916—1939). 1—12. War Cabinet Minutes, "W. C. ’ Series, 1916—1919. 13—16. War Cabinet: A’Minutes, 1917—1919. 17. War Cabinet: ‘X’Minutes, 1918. 18—23. Cabinet Conclusions, 1919—1920. 37—38. Conclusions, 1919—1921. 40—44. Imperial War Cabinet: Minutes, 1917—1918. Class 24. Cabinet Memoranda (1913—1939). 1—5. ‘G’War Series, 1915—1920. 6-88. ‘G.T. 'Series, 1917-1919. 92-117. ‘C.P.’Series, 1919-1920. 143—145. War Cabinet: Eastern Reports, 1917—1919 154“155* Cabinet: Foreign Countries Reports, 1919—1922. Class 25. Supreme War Council (1917—1919). 42. Turkey: Reports on Pan-Turanian Movement and on Turkey in Asia and Its Problems. 43. Turkey and South Russia: Reports on the Military and Strategical Situation. 72. Eastern and Central Asian Question. 104. Near East: Situation Report. 107. Near East: Situation Report. 118. The Ottoman Empire and Trans-Caucasia: Military Occupation. 120—126. Circulated Papers.

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127. Miscellaneous Unnumbered Papers (including history of Supreme War Coun­ cil). Class 27. Cabinet Committees: General Series (igi^—iggg). 24. Eastern Committee: Minutes of Meetings, 1918—1919. 25—39. Eastern Committee: Memoranda, 1918. Class 28. Allied (War) Conferences (igi^—igso). 1—8. Anglo-French and Allied Conferences: ‘I.C. ’Series, 1915—1919. 9. Miscellaneous Papers, 1915—1920. Class 29. International Conferences (igiô—iggg). 1 —6. ‘P’ (Peace) Series, 1916—1920. 7—2 2. War Cabinet: Paris ( W. C.P. ’ Series), 1919—1920. 23—27. War Cabinet: Paris (‘M’Series), 1919. 28. Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation, 1919—1922. 29—35. Peace Conference (‘A.J.’ Series), 1920—1922. 37—40. Council of the Heads of Governments (Four), 1919. 41. Ministers ofForeign Affairs (‘C.M. ’ Series), 1920. 42—52. Council of Ambassadors (‘C.A.’ Series), 1920. 69—78. Heads ofDelegations of the Five Powers (‘H.D.’ Series), 1919—1920. 81—90. Allied and International Conference on the Terms of Peace and Related Subjects (‘I. C.P. ’ Series), 1919—1920. Class 45. Cabinet Office Historical Section. Official War Histories: Correspondence and Papers. 105. Russia, South (including Transcaucasia), 1918—1919. 106—109. Transcaucasia and Turkey, 1917—1923. Foreign Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 96. Miscellanea, Series II. Turkish Atrocities in Armenia (vols. 205—212). Class 371. Political: General Correspondence, igig—igso. Geographic Classification 34: Persia. Geographic Classification 38: Russia. Geographic Classification 44: Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. File 519 (Future of Turkey). File 521 (Situation in Turkey and the Caucasus). File 1270 (Misdeeds of Turkish Officers and Breaches of Armistice). File 2117 (Syria and Cilicia). File 3050 (Kurds and Future of Kurdistan). File 3349 (Relief Activities). File 50535 (Situation in Southeast Europe and Turkey in Asia). File 106312 (Spheres of Allied Command). File 151671 (Anglo-French Conference on the Turkish Settlement). Geographic Classification 58: The Caucasus. File 512 (Armenians and the Future of Armenia). File 806 (General Torcom). File 1015 (Caucasus: Georgia and Azerbaijan). File 1773 (Situation at Batum). File 2244 (North Caucasus Republic). File 2473 (Georgian Economic Mission). File 2893 (Armenian-Georgian Hostilities). File 5890 (Situation in the Caucasus). File 7882 (Caucasian Prisoners in Germany). File 11067 (Affairs in the Caspian and British Evacuation of Caucasus). File 14518 (Military Situation in the Caucasus). File 15439 (Situation at Enzeli).

434

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File 16214 (Armenian Military Mission). File 25355 (Administration of Kars). File 33623 (Petroleum Executive and the Caucasus). File 39980 (Concessions in the Caucasus). File 42186 (Lenkoran Republic). File 47637 (Petroleum, Baku). File 47761 (Trade Conditions). File 60982 (Caucasus Copper Company). File 67164 (Claims against General Torcom). File 72426 (Armenian Occupation of Nakhichevan). File 89370 (Mikayel Varandian’s Correspondence Regarding Karabagh). File 91659 (Financial Questions and Accounts Due in Azerbaijan). File 98451 (Resident Commissioner [Haskell] in Armenia). File 102582 (Repatriation of the Caucasian Prisoners in Germany). File 104606 (Claims against the Turkish Government). File 109090 (Armenian Economic Mission [Kachaznuni] in Europe). File 113944 (Situation in Grozny and North Caucasus Oil Fields). File 115966 (Escape of Nuri Pasha). File 119397 (Harbord Mission). File 129487 (Bolshevik Outrages in Georgia). File 133200 (Assyrians in Transcaucasia and North Persia). File 134519 (Loris-MelikovMission). File 137211 (Azerbaijani Political Mission [Vezirov] to Constantinople). File 148704 (Fuel Problems in Caucasia). File 149194 (Armenian Bank Notes). File 159649 (Alleged Armenian Purchase of Airplanes). File 162432 (Situation on the Caspian). File 164095 (Armenian Officers Interned at Madras). File 166439 (Film “Ravished Armenia” or “Auction of Souls”). File 167087 (Oil Stocks at Baku). File 168734 (Press Extracts). File 168738 (Situation in Azerbaijan). File 168898 (Proposed French Wireless Station at Batum). File 170408 (Colonel Stokes). File 170788 (Situation in Georgia). File 170842 (Ghambashidze as Georgian Representative). File 171821 (Turkish Activities in the Caucasus). File 172087 (Situation in Daghestan). File 176894 (Future of Batum). 1920 Geographic Classification 44: Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. File 3 (3/44) (Asiatic Provinces). File 11 (Kurds and the Future of Kurdistan). File 27 (Relief of Armenians). File 56 (Treaty with Turkey). File 262 (Intelligence Reports). File 272 (Movement of CUP [Young Turk] Leaders). File 345 (Bolshevik Propaganda and Activity). File 621 (Pontus). File 1214 (Cilicia).

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435

Geographic Classification 58: The Caucasus. File 1 (1/58) (Caucasus). File 5 (Military Needs of Azerbaijan). File 24 (Armenian Interests in Egypt). File 36 (Press Extracts). File 51 (Italian Mission in the Caucasus). File 59 (Alleged Military Convention between Turkey and Azerbaijan). File 69 (Captain Gracey). File 134 (Situation in Armenia). Class 406. Confidential Print: Eastern Affairs, 1812—1946. Class 608. Peace Conference, igig—ig2O: Correspondence. Middle East, Political (Files 341—390). Armenia (File 342/1). Armenians (File 342/5). Azerbaijan (File 342/12). Caucasia (File 347/1). Commissions (File 349/1 ). Georgia (File 356/2). Outrages (File 374/1). Peace Conference (File 375/1). Statistics (File 384/2). Turkey (File 385/1). Treaties (File 385/3). Russia-Political (Files 591—615). Georgia (File 599/3). Internal Situation (File 602/1). Legal (Files 1781—1830). Arrests File 1782/1. Court-Martials File 1789/3. Massacres File 1809/1. Thais File 1825/1. Military (Files 2121—2145). Armenia File 2121/2. Occupation File 2137/2. Russia File 2139/2. Turkey File 2142/1/1. Reference Eastern Mission (Turkey), 1920 (Files 1—493). Class 800. Private Collections: Ministers and Officials. Private Papers of Lord Balfour. Private Papers of Lord Robert Cedi. Private Papers of Sir Eyre A. Crowe. Private Papers of Earl Curzon. India Office Archives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Class L/P&S/10. Political and Secret Subject Files. War Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 32. Registered Papers: General Series, 1855—1925. Class 33. Reports and Miscellaneous Papers, 1853—1939. Class 95. War Diaries, 1914-1922. Class 106. Directorates of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1870—1925. Private Papers. The Papers of Lord ArthurJ. Balfour (British Museum, London).

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United States of America American Board of Commissioners (ABC) for Foreign Missions (Houghton Library, Harvard University), Cambridge, Massachusetts. ABC Files. 3. Fordgn Department. Missionaries, Letter Books. 16.5. Miscellaneous Papers relating to the Near East Missions. 16.9.1. Turkey Mission. New Series, ig2O—ig2g. 16.9.3. Western Turkey Mission. 16.9.5. Central Turkey Mission. 16.9.7. Eastern Turkey Mission. 16.9.8. Eastern Turkey Mission. Women’s Board. New Series 2 (1959—1965 acquisitions). The Papers of Isabella M. Blake. The Papers of Clarence D. Ussher. New Series 4(1967). The Personal Papers ofJames L. Barton. New Series 6. Special Collections. Biographical Collection (Box and File) 6/5. Mr. and Mrs. James L. Barton. 6/6. J. L. Barton. 13/23. Lawson Powers Chambers. 13/25- William Nesbitt Chambers. 16/34. Mary Floyd Cushman. 19/43- Mr. and Mrs. Theodore Allen Elmer. 22/7. Agnes Fenenga. 23/37. Frank Gates. 45/24. W. W. Peet. 46/25. Mr. and Mrs. Ernest C. Partridge. 46/50. Mr. and Mrs. Ernest Wilson Riggs. Mr. and Mrs. Henry H. Riggs. 60/40. Dr. and Mrs. C. D. Ussher. 66/8. Ernest A. Yarrow. The National Archives (Washington, D.C.). Record Group 5. United States Grain Corporation. Record Group 38. Office of Naval Intelligence. Record Group 45. Records of the Department of Navy. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Political Relations between the United States and Turkey, igio—ig2o (Micro­ film Publication 365: 8 rolls). File 711.67. United States Grain Corporation. Political Relations between Armenia and Other States. File 760J.00. Political Affairs. File 760J.60G. Armenia and Georgia. File 760J.61. Armenia and Russia. File 760J.67. Armenia and Turkey. File 760J.90C. Armenia and Azerbaijan.

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Political Relations between Russia and the Soviet Union and Other States, igio— 192g (Microfilm Publication 340: 20 rolls). File 761.67. Russia and Turkey. File 761.90C. Russia and Azerbaijan. World War I and Its Termination, igi4~ig2g (Microfilm Publication 367: 518 rolls). File 763.72. European War. File 763.72119. Termination of the War. Political Relations between Turkey and Other States, igio—ig2g (Microfilm Publication 363: 29 rolls). File 767.68. Greece. File 767.68118. Termination of War and Lausanne Conference. File 767.90C. Azerbaijan. Interned Affairs of Armenia (Microfilm Publication Ti 192: 8 rolls). File 860J.00. Political Affairs. File 86oJ.oop81. Political Affairs—Popular Comment. File 860J.01. Government. File 860.20. Military Affairs and the Army. File 860J.4016. Race Problems. File 86oJ-4Oi6p8i. Race Problems-Popular Comment. File 860J.404. Religion. File 860J.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 860J.50. Economic Affairs. File 860J.51. Financial Affairs. File 860J.63. Mines and Mining. Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union, igio—ig2g (Microfilm Pub­ lication 316: 177 rolls). File 861.00. Political Affairs. File 861.01. Government. File 861.20. Military Affairs and the Army. File 861.4016. Race Problems and the Nationality Question. File 861.48. Calamities and Disasters. Internal Affairs of Turkey, igio—i gzg (Microfilm Publication 353:88 rolls). File 867.00. Political Affairs. File 867.00B. Bolshevism. File 867.01. Government. File 867.03. Legislative Branch. File 867.04. fudicial Branch. File 867.20. Military Affairs and the Army. File 867.4016. Race Problems. File 867.404. Religion. File 867.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 867.52. Lands. File 867.911. Public Press. Internal Affairs of Greece, igio-ig2g (Microfilm Publication 443: 45 rolls). File 868.00. Political Affairs. File 868.01. Government. File 868.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 868.51. Refugee Settlement Commission. Internal Affairs of Asia, igio-ig2g (Microfilm Publication 722: 28 rolls). File 890C.00. Azerbaijan. File 890D.4016. Syria: Racial Disturbances.

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File 890D.48. Syria: Calamities and Disasters. File 890G.48. Mesopotamia: Calamities and Disasters. Internal Affairs ofPersia, igio-igzg (Microfilm Publication 715: 37 rolls). File 891.00. Political Affairs. File 891.4016. Racial Problems. File 891.48. Calamities and Disasters. File 891.6363. Mines and Mining: Petroleum. Record Group 84. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. Record Group 256. Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Mi­ crofilm Publication 820: 563 rolls). File 103.97. American Relief Administration. File 123. Diplomatic and Consular Service Personnel File 180.01. Principal Councils of Peace Conference. File 180.0201. Plenary Sessions, Minutes. File 180.03. Supreme Council. File 180.03101. Supreme Council, Minutes. File 180.032. Conference of Foreign Ministers. File 180.03201. Conference ofForeign Ministers, Minutes. File 180.033. Conference of Ambassadors. File 180.03301. Conference of Ambassadors, Minutes. File 180.034. Council ofFour. File 180.03401. Council of Four, Minutes. File 180.03402. Council ofFour, Decisions. File 180.035. Heads ofDelegations. File 180.03501. Heads ofDelegations, Minutes. File 180.03502. Heads ofDelegations, Resolutions. File 180.036. Conference of Powers with Special Interest. File 180.03601. Conference of Powers with Special Interest, Minutes. File 180.037. Council of Ministers. File 180.03701. Council of Ministers, Minutes. File 180.038. International Council of Premiers. File 180.03801. International Council of Premiers, Minutes. File 180.040. Supreme War Council. File 180.0401. Supreme War Council, Minutes. File 180.05. Supreme Economic Council. File 180.0501. Supreme Economic Council, Minutes. File 181.94. Inter-Allied Mission (Haskell) to Armenia. File 181.9402. Inter-Allied Mission to Armenia, Reports. File 183.9 Conference Delegations, Armenia. File 184.001. American Commissioners Plenipotentiary. File 184.00101. American Commissioners Plenipotentiary, Steering Committee. File 184.016. American Field Mission (Riggs) to South Russia (and Transcau­ casia). File 184.01602. American Field Mission to South Russia, Report. File 184.021. American Military Mission (Harbord) to Armenia. File 184.02102. American Military Mission to Armenia, Report. File 184.1. American Delegation Personnel. File 184.611. S. H. Bulletins. File 184.612. E. S. H. Bulletins. File 185.005. Turkey, Armistice Negotiations. File 185.5. Turkey, Conditions of Peace. File 185.513 Turkey, Political Clauses.

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File 185.5136. Turkey, Political Clauses, Boundaries. File 861.00. Russia, Political Affairs. File 861.48. Russia, Social Matters. File 861G.00. Georgia. File 861G.00B. Georgia, Bolshevism. File 861K.00. Caucasus—Azerbaijan. File 861K.911. Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Press. File 867.00. Turkey, Political Affairs. File 867.00B. Turkey, Political Affairs, Bolshevism. File 867.20. Turkey, Military Affairs and the Army. File 867.4016. Turkey, Social Matters and Race Problems. File 867B.00. Armenia, Political Affairs. File 867B.001. Armenia, Chief Executive. File 867B.01. Armenia, Government. File 867B.20. Armenia, Military Affairs and the Army. File 867B.4016. Armenia, Race Problems. File 867B.48. Armenia, Calamities and Disasters. File 867B.5018. Armenia, Food Conditions and Shortages. File 867B.51. Armenia, Financial Conditions. File 867B.77. Armenia, Railways. File 891.00. Persia, Political Affairs. File 891.48. Persia, Calamities and Disasters. Public and Private Papers. The Papers of Tasker H. Bliss (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Mark L. Bristol (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Cleveland H. Dodge (Princeton University). The Papers offames G. Harbord (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck (Hoover Institution, Stanford University). The Papers of Edward M. House (Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University). The Papers of Charles E. Hughes (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of Henry Cabot Lodge (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston). The Papers of Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (Library of Congress, Division of Manu­ scripts) . The Papers ofFrank L. Polk (Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University). The Papers of Elihu Root (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Diary of William L. Westermann (Butler Memorial Library, Columbia Uni­ versity) . The Papers of Henry White (Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts). The Papers of T. Woodrow Wilson (Library of Congress, Division of Manu­ scripts) .

Official Publications Armenia [Republic of, 1918—1920] Council of Ministers. Karavarakan Lratu [Government Bulletin]. Erevan, 1919-1920. Delegation to the Conference of Peace. The Armenian Question before the Peace Conference. [Paris, 1919]. ------- . L Arménie transcaucasienne. Territoires, frontières, ethnographie, statistique. Paris, 1919. ------- . Données statistiques des populations de la Transcaucasie. Paris, 1920.

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Armenia [Republic of, 1991- ] Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Armenii. Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri SM Respubliki Armeniia. Kafedra Istorii Armianskogo Naroda Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Nagomyi Karabakh v 1918—1923 gg. Sbomik dokumentov i materialov [Mountainous Karabagh in 1918—1923. Collection of Documents and Materials]. Ed. V. A. Mikayelian et al. Erevan, 1992.

Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun] Kaghvadsner H. H. D. 9-rd Endh. Zhoghovi voroshumnerits [Excerpts from the De­ cisions of the Ninth Gen (eral) Meeting of the A.R.F.]. Erevan, 1920. Kazmakerpakan kartonner, hastatvads 9-rd Endh. Zhoghovi koghmits [Organiza­ tional Regulations, Confirmed by the Ninth Gen (eral) Meeting]. Erevan, 1919The Bureau. Hushapatum H. H. Dashnaktsutian, 1890-1930 [Commemorative Volume of the A. R. Federation, 1890-1950]. Ed. S. Vratzian. Boston, 1950. Azerbaijan [Republic of] Délégation Azerbaidjanienne à la Conférence de la Paix. L'Azerbaïdjan en chif­ fres. [Paris, 1919]. ------- . Bulletin dinformations de l'Azerbaïdjan. Paris, 1919—1920. 12 issues. ------- . Carte de la République de l'Azerbaïdjan. [Paris, 1919]. ------- . Claims of the Peace Delegation of Caucasian Azerbaïdjan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris. Paris, 1919. ------- . Composition anthropologique et ethnique de la population de l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919. ------- . Economie and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaïdjan. Paris, 1919. ------- . La République de l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919. ------- . Revendications de la Délégation de Paix de la République de l'Azerbaïdjan du Caucase présentées à la Conférence de la Paix à Paris, 1919. [Paris, 1919].

Communist International Kommunisticheskii Intematsional i osvobozhdenie Vostoka. Pervyi s "ezd narodov Vostoka, Baku 1—8 Sent. 1920 [The Communist International and the Liberation of the East. The First Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, Sept. 1-8, 1920]. Petrograd, 1920. Vtoroi Kongress Kommunisticheskogp Intemationala. Stenograficheskii otchet [Second Congress of the Communist International. Stenographic Minutes]. Petro­ grad, 1921.

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Index

Abas-Geol, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Achadjur, Kazakh uezd: map of 104 Adamov, Evgenii Aleksandrovich, 158 Adiaman, Alexandropol uezd, 291; map of, 283 Adjiler, Zangezur uezd, 65 Afghanistan, 131, 133, 141, 142, 156, 177, 178 Africa, 128, 166, 171, 276, 316, 330, 335 Afshar, Erevan uezd, 285 Agarak, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Agarak, Zangezur uezd, 121; map of, 68 Aghamian, Mikayel, 85 Aghbaba district, Kars okrug, 238, 252, 393; map of, 248, 283, 397 Aghbulagh (Akbulag), Alexandropol uezd, 286; map of, 283 Aghdam (Agdam), Shushi uezd, 88, 119; map of, 397 Aghdash, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Aghin, Alexandropol uezd, 264, 273, 284, 285, 291; map of, 283 Aghkilisa (Akkilisa), Alexandropol uezd, 272; map of, 283 Aghudi, Zangezur uezd: map of, 68 Aghvani, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Agiar, Kars okrug, 196 Agn, Kharput vilayet: map of, 41, 397 Agrak, Kaghisman okrug: map of, 248 Aharonian, Avetis: as president of Re­ public of Armenia Delegation, 25, 96, 203, 209-214, 221, 298-301, 304, 305, 314, 317, 327-328, 332, 336. See also Armenian Republic Delegation

Ahmed Mukhtar. See Mukhtar, Ahmed Ajaría and Ajarians, 225 Ákbaba (Aghbaba), Mount, 243, 249, 251; map of, 189, 248 Akhalkalak, town and uezd, 53, 222, 223, 224; map of, 41, 397 Akhaltsikh, town and uezd, 53, 224, 225; map of, 397 Akhtala, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Akhurian River. See Arpachai River Akmezar, Mount, 193; map of, 189 Akori, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Akriag, Olti okrug, 192; map of, 189 Aksibara (Aghsibara, Askibara), Ka­ zakh uezd, 91, 94, 103, 105, 127; map of, 104 Akstafa (Aghstafa), Kazakh uezd, 60, 76, 77; map of, 41, 104 Akulis, Nakhichevan uezd: map of, 41, 68, 397 Akundir (Aghundur), Olti okrug 188; map of, 189 Alagiaz, Mount, 275, 292. See also Aragads, Mount Alagiaz station, Etchmiadzin uezd: map of, 283 Alam, Kaghisman okrug: map of, 248 Alashkert, Erzerum vilayet, 193, 249; map of, 397 Alaverdi, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Alaverdian, Stepan K., 86, 106, 108 Alexandropol, city and uezd, 100 n. 19, 137, 200, 305, 389; map of, 41, 248, 283, 397; and Armenian-Turk­ ish war, 237, 239, 241, 243, 249, 252, 254-255, 257, 260-267, 269275, 277, 284, 287-290, 292, 294, 307, 341-342, 344, 347, 348, 374; railway, 249, 257, 264, 292; and Ar­ menian-Turkish negotiations, 342,

469

470

INDEX

Alexandropol (continued) 346, 354-355» 357 n- 40» 359-372, 385; Treaty of, 390-402 Alexandropol Military Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), 240, 265 n. 70, 367 Alexandrovka, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Alexandrovka, Kars okrug: map of, 189, 248 Ali Fuad, General [Cebesoy], 83 n. 77 Alikhanlu, Surmalu uezd, 184 Allahekbar ( Allah-Akber), Mount, 146, 191, 193; map of, 189 Allied and Associated Powers (Allies) : and Armenians 1, 4-9, 12—13, 23, 26-33» 35-36, 40, 43, 51, 90, 159 n. 82, 102, 184, 201,204-214, 221, 233, 241 n. 7, 254-256, 266, 269, 282, 293-308, 310, 312-317, 327333» 338, 349» 354-355» 363» 369» 406—407; Supreme Council of, 1,6, 12-13, 28-29, 31-33, 38, 40, 44, 312—317, 330; and Soviet Russia, 46, 160, 166; and Turkey, 50, 54, 62, 80, 128-130, 132-134, 138, 144, 146, 150, 160, 168, 180, 183, 190, 197, 199, 202, 218, 222, 326, 342» 347» 396, 399» 402-403; and Armenian-Soviet agreement, 96— 97, 100—101. See also Entente Powers Almalu, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Alp Arslan, Sultan, 370 Amaghu, Zangezur uezd, 120 Amasia, Sivas vilayet, 32 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 3 American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 30 American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE), 3, 310. See also Near East Relief American Committee for the Indepen­ dence of Armenia (ACIA), 303, 326; and mandate for Armenia, 4— 9, 13, 17, 22, 25—28; and Armenian boundaries, 31, 301-302 American Military Mission to Armenia, 12. See also Harbord, Major General James G. Amirkhanian, Shavarsh M., 124, 126 Ananun (Ter-Danielian), Davit, 353 Anatolia, 3, 19, 39, 44, 61, 74, 78, 82, 100-102, 150, 198, 216, 270, 314; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 128— 13o» 133» 136> 138» H2» H6, 151»

x53» löö-iö8» 161, 165, 167-168, 170, 172, 176-179, 182-183, 217, 307; Association for the Defense of the Rights of, 130; and Greece, 181, 185, 203, 254, 263, 298; and Tur­ key, 210-211, 232, 305, 370, 385. See also Asia Minor; Ottoman Em­ pire; Turkey and Turks Andranik (Ozanian), General, 108 Angelaut, Zangezur uezd, 67, 71, 82— 84, 89, 93, 106, 117, 120; map of, 68 Angora (Ankara), city and vilayet, 50, 80, 123, 190, 202, 259, 325; Na­ tionalist government in, 101, 148, 163, 197, 247, 278, 297, 341, 361, 363-365, 400-401; and SovietTurkish relations, 136—137, 139, 141-142, 144-145, 148-149, 151, 153 n. 66, 157, 162-164, 177, 187, 343» 3455 and Armenian-Turkish relations, 245, 263, 274, 278, 290291» 297. 3°2» 341’ 345» 361» 363365» 385» 39 b 396, 400-402 Ani, Kars okrug, 393; map of, 248, 397 Ani station, Alexandropol uezd, 264, 289—290; map of, 283 Apresian, Colonel, 252 Arabia and Arabs, 10, 143, 170—171, 305 Arabkir, Kharput vilayet: map of, 41 Aradjadzor, Zangezur uezd, 69, 111, 120; map of, 68 Aragads (Alagiaz), Mount, 272, 273, 291; map of, 41, 283, 397 Ararat: map of, 41, 186, 397; Mount, 242, 250, 369, 384, 388, 393; plain, 393 Araratian, Major General Kristapor, 259 Araratian, Sargis, 361; as minister of internal affairs, 198 n. 38, 200, 290-291, 384 Arasdayan, Erevan uezd, 285 Araxes (Aras), Army of, 194 Araxes bridges, 250 Araxes River, 71, 72, 83, 106, 135 n. 19,145,149,184, 191,192, 231, 240, 249, 263, 284, 371, 394, 406; map of, 41, 186, 189, 283, 397 Araxes River Valley, 110, 135, 153, 182-184, 275, 291, 292, 387 Araxes station: map of, 283 Ardahan, town and okrug, 50, 132, 135 n. 19, 137, 145,149,151,162,187, 188, 190, 191, 196, 199, 222-

INDEX

224, 239, 254, 261, 347, 369; map of, 189, 248, 397 Ardost, Kars okrug: map of, 189, 248 Ardsvanik, Zangezur uezd, 110, 111, 117, 118, 120, 121 ; map of, 68 Areshian, Major General Mikhail Vasil’evich, 274, 275, 286, 287 Arevik. See Meghri Argina, Kars okrug, 264; map of, 248 Arjesh, Van vilayet: map of, 41 Armavir, Kuban oblast, 215 Armen Garo. See Pasdermadjian, Ga­ regin Armenia America Society, 302, 303 Armenian Apostolic Church, 99, 226, 242 Armenian army, 64, 69, 84—85,96, 98, 103, 105, 107, 108, 122, 184-197 passim, 203, 205, 213, 216, 229, 237-278 passim, 282-287, 289, 303-304, 352, 356, 367, 378-379 Armenian boundaries, 1—44 passim, 50-52,96, 106,143, 160-162, 164, 179, 181, 184, 202, 204, 220, 231232, 3O1-3O2’ 3°9> 3*5’ 31?, 322“ 326, 329, 342, 349-350, 362, 400401; map of, 41, 397 Armenian Bureau-Government, 46,48 n. 8, 76, 77, 80, 90-91, 100 n. 19, 109, 123, 127, 180, 198, 200, 214216, 226, 252, 280, 290, 342, 353356 Armenian Communist Party, 54, 73 n. 58, 122-127, 235, 377, 400; Ex­ ternal Bureau of, 123—124, 126, 234, 374; Armenkom of, 124; Cen­ tral Committee of, 234, 374, 375 n. 8, 380 Armenian Khorhrdaran (legislature). See Armenian Parliament Armenian mandate, 3—28 passim, 313— 314, 322-328 Armenian Military Revolutionary Com­ mittee (Revkom), 375—380, 382— 383, 386-387, 389-392,401, 404405 Armenian National Delegation, 54, 304; and mandate issue, 3. See also Nuber Pasha, Boghos Armenian National Union of America, 3-4 Armenian Parliament (Khorhrdaran), 47, 66-67, 85, 87-89, 110, 114, 200, 216, 238, 278-282, 354-359, 384, 386, 389 Armenian Populist Party (Hai Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun), 79, 199, 353

471

Armenian press, 3, 11, 107, 123, 205, 207 n. 60, 218-219, 292, 354, 360 Armenian Press Bureau, 4, 25 Armenian Railway Administration, 102, 106, 158 Armenian Red Cross and Refugee Fund, 211, 222 Armenian refugees, 37, 42, 45, 47, 50, 52, 54,96, 140, 209, 222, 230, 267, 364, 368, 395, 407 Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund, 211, 309 Armenian Republic Delegation, 31, 210-211, 212, 266, 298-301, 304, 314, 317, 327-328. See also Aharonian, Avetis Armenian Revolutionary Federado n. See Dashnaktsutiun Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) Party, 199-200 Armenian Senate (Supreme Court), 360 Armenian Social Democrat Hnchak Party, 199, 200 n. 42 Armenian Social Democrat Labor Party (“Specifist”), 199, 353, 377, 404 Armenian Social Revolutionaries, 199-201, 280-281, 353, 356, 359, 360, 364, 377, 379, 388 Armenophile societies, 4-9, 13, 17, 22, 25-28, 31, 211-212, 293, 3013°3’ 3°9 Arpachai (Akhurian) River, 145, 231, 245, 261, 263, 264, 265, 267, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 341, 371, 393, 395» 399’ 4o1’ maP of, 283 Arseniak, Olti okrug, 192; map of, 189 Artik, Alexandropol uezd: map of, 283 Artsakh. See Karabagh Artvin, town and okrug: map of, 397 Ashnak, Etchmiadzin uezd, 292; map of, 283 Ashtarak, Etchmiadzin uezd, 200; map of, 283 Asia, 12, 24, 128, 166, 222, 270, 276, 295, 3o1’ 363- See a^° Central Asia Asia Minor, 3, 79, 144, 180, 299, 306, 321, 339 Askeran, Shushi uezd, 207; map of, 397 Astrakhan, 48, 164 n. 89 Astrazur, Zangezur uezd, 119 Astvadsatrian, Arshaluis, 404 Ataev, Colonel P., 360 Austria, 170, 334 Autonomous Siunik, 405 Avanesov, Varlam Aleksandrovich, 163

w

INDEX

97, 200, 207, 238, 241, 244 n. 17, 259 Babayan, Varos, 404 Badakend, Elisavetpol uezd: map of, 68 Bagaran, Kaghisman okrug: map of, 248 Baghaburdj, Zangezur uezd, 116; map of, 68 Baghdasarian, Colonel Tigran, 241, 261, 285 Baghdasarian, Major General, 64 Bagratuni, Major General Iakov (Hakob) G., 213, 304, 332 Baha Said, 131, 135-136, 157 Baiburt, Erzerum vilayet, 34, 36; map of, 41, 397 Baitagh, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Baker, Newton: as United States sec­ retary of war, 27 Baku, city, wezd, and gubemiia, 46, 49, 57, 59, 60, 62-65,69,90, 107, 139, 166, 270, 311, 345, 376 n. 11; gov­ ernment in, 54, 56; and Soviet Rus­ sia, 73-77, 79, 81, 91, 94, 96, 102, 118, 123, 124, 126, 138, 150, 151, 157,166,215,217 m 93,219m 98, 224, 234, 235, 310, 343, 346, 352, 360, 379, 400; and Turkey, 129, 130, 134-136, 142, 146, 147, 153, 155, 156, 159, 164, 165, 351, 406; Congress, 166-179; and sovietiza­ tion of Armenia, 373-375, 378, 380, 382-383, 399 Balakhani oil fields, 107 Balayan, Gerasim: as Daralagiaz com­ missioner, 109, 117 n. 59 Balfour, Arthur James: and British pol­ icies, 5 n. 8,6 n. 13,312, 314, 318319’ 321’ 331-332 Balkans, 15 Baltic states, 46, 201, 332—334 Baouk-Vedi, Erevan uezd, 75, 292; map of’ 397 Barabatum (Paravatump), Zangezur uezd, 111, 116, 118; map of, 68 Barana, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Barapol, Alexandropol uezd, 286 n. 113 Barduz, Olti okrug, 192, 197; map of, 189’ 397 Barkushat Mountains: map of, 68 Barnes, George N.: in League of Nations, 335-336 Babadjanov, Colonel: at Kars, 256, 259 Bartoghi (Aghridagh) Mountains, 250; map of, 186 Babailu, Zangezur uezd, 119 Babalian, Dr. Artashes: as minister of Barton, James Levi: and Armenian aid, 2-4, 6-8, 10-11, 303 welfare and reconstruction, 91,93—

Avdallar, Zangezur uezd, 65 Avetisian, Mushegh. See Sassuntsi Mushegh Ayas, Mediterranean port of, 9 Ayideresi, Mount, 192; map of, 189 Azadava, Kars okrug, 196; map of, 189, 248 Azarbayjan, Persia, 153, 373 Azat, Kars okrug: map of, 189, 248 Azerbaijan, Republic of, 4, 37, 46, 47, 294; and Bolsheviks, 39,46,66; and Armenia, 46, 50, 53-55, 74; and League of Nations, 329—330, 334 Azerbaijan, Soviet, 72 n. 57, 169, 173— 174, 226, 285—286, 310; and Ar­ menia, 49, 56-59, 62—64, 66—67, 69-71, 74-76, 78-82, 84, 91-95, 97, 98, 100, 103, 107—115 passim, 118, 121, 122, 125, 127, 130, 156, 157, 180-183, 2O4> 207, 208, 210-214, 216, 220-222, 228, 229, 233, 234, 247, 249, 292, 3°3’ 359» 378’ 38°-382’ 385’ 395> 399, 406, 407; and Georgia, 63, 307; and Turkey, 71, 74, 76, 84, 101, 110-115, 128, 133-137, 139, 146, 148-150, 152, 156, 157, 164, 168-169, 171, 177, 180-183, 187, 192, 195, 196, 211, 214, 249, 273, 292, 295, 297, 344, 347-349’ 384’ 373’ 375’ 378’ 38o~381’ 4O2“4°3'’ and Soviet Russia, 73—76, 78, 79, 80-82, 91-95, 98, 115, 123, 125, 134-138, 139, 155, 156, 165, 180183, 207, 212, 214, 224, 295, 342343’ 347-348’ 373-375’ 378’ 38o382 Azerbaijani Communist Party, 54, 81, 127 n. 84, 234; Central Committee of, 64, 75, 124, 157, 235, 374, 375 n. 8, 382; Organizational Bureau and Political Bureau of, 380 Azerbaijani Musavat Party (Turkic Fed­ eralist), 59, 66, 70, 73-74, 76, 79, 81, 107, 127 n. 84, 130, 135, 174, 221’ 373’ 381 Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), 56, 58, 63, 70, 72, 74, 152, 156, 169, 234, 375, 378, 380383 Aznaburt, Nakhichevan uezd, 95; map of, 68

INDEX

Bash-Abaran, Etchmiadzin uezd, 237, 265, 272, 291; map of, 283, 397 Bash-Gadiklar, Kars okrug, 252, 260 n- 55 Bashkale, Van vilayet: map of, 41 Bashkoy, Kaghisman okrug: map of, 189 Bashkoy, Kars okrug 193, 195; map of, 189 Bash-Norashen, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd: map of, 41, 68, 397 Bash-Shuragial, Kars okrug: map of, 248, 283 Batum, city, port, and oblast, 255, 353; and Armenia, 9—10, 26, 34, 53, 60, 135» 137> 208, 210; map of, 41, 397; future of, 53, 60, 143, 226; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 130133» 135 n- *9> 136-137» H3» T45> 149-151, 153, 208, 347; treaty of, 145, 228, 253, 276, 347; and Tur­ key, 191-192, 197, 203, 228, 302, 348, 399; and Great Britain, 208, 210, 226, 294, 303, 307-308, 362, 364; and Allies, 255, 301, 312, 341—344,4°2 Bayandur, Alexandropol uezd, 265; map of, 283 Bayazit, Erzerum vilayet, 72 n. 57, 83, 87> 135» 149» *53» 182, 185, 192, 232, 247, 362, 368; map of, 41,186 Bazarchai (Bazarkend), Zangezur uezd, 65, 83, 88, 95, 122; map of, 68 Bazarchai (Vorotan) River, 118, 119, 120; map of, 41, 68 Bedri Bey, 130, 141—142 Begli-Ahmed, Kars okrug, 196, 241, 243-244, 251; map of, 189, 248, 397 Behaeddin Shakir, 130, 141, 171 Bekh, Zangezur uezd, 116, 120; map of, 68 Bekir Sami Bey [Kunduh] : as Turkish foreign affairs commissar, 58, 102, 145, 147-148, 153-158, 160-164, 168, 193, 197, 345, 364, 399-400 Bekkoy, Kars okrug: map of, 189 Bekzadian, Alexandre Artem’evich, 123: as Armenian foreign affairs commissar, 374-375, 382, 401402 Bekzadian, Tigran Artem’evich: and Armenian-Soviet relations, 47, 52, 64, 77-78, 91-92, 96-97, 218, 343“346’ 35°’ and Armenian-Turk­ ish war, 201, 203-206, 209, 218, 254-255, 266-267, 287-289; and

473

Armenian-Georgian relations, 222, 224-226; and Allies, 294-297 Belgium, 299, 315, 317, 369 Benes, Edouard, 333 Berdik, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Beretti: as French director of political affairs, 300 Berlin, Germany, 130, 141, 168, 177 Berna, Kars okrug, 195, 196, 242, 243, 249; map of, 189, 248 Beshkaya, Mount, 242—243; map of, 248 Beyuk Ghemli (Kmly), Kars okrug, 262, 264, 273; map of, 248, 283 Bezirgan, Kars okrug, 196; map of, 189 Bitlis, city and vilayet, 158,163; and Ar­ menian boundaries, 1, 28, 32—34, 36, 42, 43, 51, 161, 162, 164, 181, 202, 231, 232, 349, 362, 400; map of, 41, 397 Black Sea, 27, 45, 145, 164 n. 89, 183, 185, 192, 309; and Armenian boundaries, 6, 9, 32, 36,44, 50, 52, 96, 143, 160, 179, 342, 362; map of, 41, 397 Blagodamoe (Chakmak), Kars okrug, 260; map of, 189, 248 Bliss, William Dwight Porter, 6 Bobrishev, General Ardalion Aleksan­ drovich, 62 n. 33, 220, 379, 386 Boganis-Airum, Kazakh uezd, 105; map of, 104 Bolsheviks or Bolshevism, 12, 44 n. 106, 169, 269, 276, 407; and Azerbaijan, 39, 130, 330, 342-343, 373-374» 377» 382; and Turkey, 40, 86, 113, 129, 131-138, 141, 146149, 152, 157, 165-166, 171 n. 105, 178-179, 197, 206-214, 218-219, 295-297, 305, 307, 310311, 345; and Armenia, 46,49, 5256, 59, 61-62, 64, 66-67, 69, 76» 80-87, 9o» 96-97» 99» 106-110, 112-113, 116, 118-120, 123-127, 146, 170, 198-199, 201, 215, 220223, 235 n. 137, 238, 253, 255, 261, 265-266, 2820.105, 295297» S00, 310» 352-353» 355» 36b 367, 384-385, 388-389, 403-405; and Caucasus, 58, 180, 307, 373374; and Near East, 307 Borchalu uezd, 53, 287-288; map of, 104 Borian, Bagrat A., 378 n. 14, 387 n. 43 Borisovka, Zangezur uezd, 83; map of, 68 Boston, Massachusetts, 28

474

INDEX

Brandegee, Senator Frank Bosworth, 20-22 Branting, Hjalmar, 318 Brazil, 323-324, 330, 334, 338 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 145, 150—151, 153» löö-W» 203-205, 210, 217, 228, 253, 347-348, 394 Bristol, Rear Admiral Mark Lambert: as American high commissioner in Constantinople, 2, 29, 209—210, 326 British Armenia Committee, 8, 2li­ ai 2, 309 Brnakot, Zangezur uezd, 67 n. 50; map of, 68 Brussels, Belgium, 314 Bryan, William Jennings, 7 Bryce, Viscount James, 3, 8 Bulgaria, 206, 256, 267 n. 75, 334 Buyuk (Kighi) River, 36; map of, 41 Bzovd, Mount: map of, 283 Bzovdal, Alexandropol uezd, 288; map of, 283

Cambon, Jules-Martin: as president of the Conference of Ambassadors, 301 Canada, 320, 333-335 Cardashian, Vahan: and Armenian mandate and boundaries, 4, 6, 25— 26, 28, 301. See also American Com­ mittee for the Independence of Ar­ menia Caspian Sea, 45, 133, 164 n. 89 Catherine II, Empress, 370 Caucasus, 10, 27, 52—54, 61, 127, 139, 289, 315, 342 n. 2; and Commu­ nists, 56—58, 73, 74, 163; and Red Army, 59,63,65,82, 117, 132, 153, 182, 217; and Soviet Russia, 70, 76, 78,93,94, 123, 180,216,217,229, 234, 294, 298, 308, 343-345, 348, 360, 367-368, 373, 374, 390; and Allies, 96-98, 207, 214; and Tur­ key, 128, 130, 133-137, 139, 164, 178, 292, 298, 308, 402; and Great Britain, 210, 310. See also Transcau­ casia Caucasus Mountains, 45, 407 Caucasus Regional Committee (Kraikom). See Russian Communist Party Cecil, Edgar Algernon Robert Gas­ coyne: in League of Nations, 316322, 324, 330, 333, 335-337 Central Asia, 131,156, 171, 213 Chakhmakhlu, Kazakh uezd, 64 Chalkhushian, Ruben: as Kars vice gov­ ernor, 259

Chalkiran, Mount, 243; map of, 248 Chambar, Mount (Chambar Dagh), 192, 195; map of, 189 Chambarak, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Chapni, Zangezur uezd, 111 ; map of, 68 Chardakhlu, Elisavetpol uezd: map of, 104 Charkhedj, Kazakh uezd, 379; map of, 104 Charsanjak, Kharput vilayet: map of, 397 Charukhchi, Nerkin (Lower) and Verin (Upper), Surmalu uezd, 249, 250; map of, 186 Cheftlik-Kelkit, Erzerum vilayet: map of, 41 Cheka (Extraordinary Committee), 66 n. 46, 67, 80, 85, 117, 404 Chemishgezak, Kharput vilayet: map of, 41 Chichakli, Mount, 228 Chicherin, Grigorii Vasil’evich, Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar: and Armenian-Soviet relations, 48—52, 55-64, 70, 72-74, 75, 77-80, 90, 93, 101-103, 106-107, 1X4» 123» 133 n. 11, 253, 362, 373, 375, 386; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 139144, 151, 153-158, 160-162, 164 n. 89, 193, 194 n. 27, 216-217, 225, 227, 234—235; and ArmenianTurkish negotiations, 343—345. 353» 366-367, 399-402 Childer (Chalder) district, Ardahan okrug, 222-223, 238, 240; map of, 41,248, 397 Chile, 329 Chilingarian, Artashes, 384, 404 China, 169 Chinchavat, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Chorastan, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Chorastan (Khlatagh), Zangezur uezd, 111 ; map of, 68 Chorokh River: map of, 397 Chorokh River Valley, 34 Chubar, Grigor, 389 Churchill, Winston Spencer: as British secretary of war, 294, 308—309 Cilicia, 7, 193, 311; and Armenian boundaries, 4-5, 29; and France, 26, 183, 191, 300 Colby, Bainbridge, Secretary of State, 9, 12-13, 26-27, 29, 301, 323 Committee for the Salvation of the Fa­ therland, 405 Committee of Union and Progress,

INDEX

129, 166, 307. See also Ittihad ve Terakki Party; Young Turks Communist International (Comin­ tern), 73 n. 58, 166, 168—170, 173—x74» 176—177; Second Con­ gress of, 124, 128, 154; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 128, 130, 154; Third Congress of, 166, 230; and sovietization of Armenia, 373, 378 Communists. See Armenian Commu­ nist Party; Azerbaijani Communist Party; Bolsheviks; Russian Commu­ nist Party Congress of the Peoples of the East, 102, 166—177 Constantine, King of Greece, 299 Constantinople (Istanbul), 2, 29, 39, 47, 145, 160, 202, 204, 232, 266, 302, 317; and proposed United States mandate, 3, 12; and Soviet Russia, 129—131; and Allied poli­ cies, 134, 138, 208-209, 269; Ar­ menian leaders in, 295; and Great Britain, 295, 306-307, 325 Corbel, Lieutenant Colonel Emile: as French chief of military mission in Transcaucasia, 97 n. 12, 98-99, 206, 255, 266, 288 n. 120,349,354 Cossacks, 35, 125 Costa Rica, 329, 334 Council of Propaganda and Action of the East, 176 Court, Captain H.C.: as British repre­ sentative in Erevan, 224, 269 Cox, Governor James Middleton: as presidential candidate, 25, 28 Crimea, 123, 182, 307, 348 Crowe, Sir Eyre, 44 n. 105 and n. 106, 327 n. 101 Cubans, 173 Curzon of Kedleston, Earl (George Na­ thaniel) : as British secretary for for­ eign affairs, 7 n. 13, 44 n. 106, 97, 99, 208, 213, 226, 294, 304-305, 39> 3X5’ 325> 327 n- 1O1> 332 Czechoslovakia or Czech, 37, 333 Daghestan, 130, 131, 133, 171, 207, 222 Dalikdash, Surmalu uezd, 250 Darabas, Zangezur uezd, 122; map of, 68 Daralagiaz district, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 56, 67, 71, 83, 89, 103, 108, 109, 114, 117 n. 59, 254, 285, 365, 405; map of, 68

475

Dashburun (Tash-Burun), Surmalu uezd, 249, 250; map of, 186 Dashkovo, Kars okrug, 251 ; map of, 248 Dashnaktsutiun (Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun), 73 n. 58, 146, 183, 304, 318, 362; and mandate issue, 3-4, 28; press of, 3, 77, 107, 123, 205, 207 n. 60, 218, 219, 292, 354» 380; Bureau of, 46, 86, 89, 109, 110, 112, 114, 121 n. 69, 199, 218, 238, 255, 265, 350, 353-354, 384; and Bureau-Government, 46, 48 n. 8, 76, 80, 90, 91, 100 n. 19, 123, 127, 180, 198, 200, 214-216, 226, 280, 290, 342, 353-354’ 356; and Soviet Russia, 51, 54, 56, 59, 64-65, 67, 71-72, 74, 75, 80-82, 85-88, 100 n. 19, 101-102, 107, 109-110, 112, 114, 118, 120—121, 125-127, 140, 144, 163, 167, 172, 174, 176, 187, 214-218, 230, 343, 349’ 352-359’ 367’ 373~38i; and Turkey, 190, 192-193, 194 n. 27, 196, 198-202, 246-247, 253, 260, 280-282, 343, 348, 350, 352-359, 367, 375’ 391’ 4o°-4°2; and sovi­ etization of Armenia, 373—381, 384-389, 392, 400-402, 404 Dato, Eduardo: as Spanish prime min­ ister, 323 Davalu, Erevan uezd, 150 Davis, John, United States Ambassa­ dor, 7 n. 13 Davis, Norman Hezekiah: as acting sec­ retary of state, 326 Davit Bek, Zangezur uezd. See Zeiva De Martel, Comte. See Martel, Comte Damien-Joseph-Alfred-Charles de Demir Kapu, Mount, 242, 244; map of, 248 Denikin, Lieutenant General Anton Ivanovich, 45, 74, 125, 132, 136 Derby, Lord Edward Georges Villiers Stanley: as British ambassador to France, 301 De Robeck, Vice Admiral John Mi­ chael: as British high commissioner in Constantinople, 208, 295, 306 Dersim sanjak, Kharput vilayet, 31 ; map of, 41 Deveboynu, Mount, 192; map of, 189 Devejian, Hovhannes: as minister of justice and education of Mountain­ ous Armenia, 406 n. 84 Devik, Kars okrug 195-196; map of, 189 Diarbekir, city and vilayet, 163: and Ar-

476

INDEX

Diarbekir (continued) menian boundaries, 29, 362; map of, 41, 397 Dilijan, Kazakh uezd, 84, 229, 238,272, 285, 286, 291, 378, 379, 385-386, 389-390; map of, 104, 397 Diraklar, Alexandropol uezd, 285, 286; map of, 283 Divrig, Sivas vilayet: map of, 41 Diza, Surmalu uezd, 250; map of, 186 Djamalian, Arshak, 200: as minister of communications, 91, 262, 269, 273; and Armenian-Soviet provi­ sional accord, 93—96, Djanfida, Etchmiadzin uezd: map of, 186 Djolfa, Persia: map of, 397 Dodge, Cleveland Hoadley, 11, 173, 303 Doherty, Charles Joseph: in League of Nations, 320 Doolittle, Hooker Austin: as American vice-consul in Tiflis, 348 n. 22, 349 Dovlatov (Dovlatian), Isahak Ivano­ vich: as member of Armenian Com­ munist bodies, 126, 375 Dro (Drastamat Kanayan) : and Arme­ nian-Soviet relations, 65-67, 71, 74, 83-89, 94, 103, 108-109, 118, 379» 383-388, 404; and ArmenianTurkish war, 239—241, 250, 271, 284; as minister of military affairs, 356; as provisional head of Soviet Armenia, 387-389, 391-393, 402 Drummond, Sir Eric: as secretary-gen­ eral of League of Nations, 314, 322, 327-328, 336 Dsegh, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Dunn, Lieutenant Robert S., 2100.71 Dvegh, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Dwight, Harrison (Harry) Griswold: and Armenia’s boundaries, 30, 32— 33 Edigarov, General, 71 Eghiazarian, Eghiazar: as Armenia’s representative in Moscow, 108, 235 Eghiazarian, Smbat: as minister of fi­ nance of Mountainous Armenia, 406 n. 84 Eghvard, Etchmiadzin uezd: map of, 283 Eghvard, Zangezur uezd, 121 ; map of, 68 Egypt» 3°8 Eivazlar, Zangezur uezd, 110 Ekaterinodar, Kuban oblast, 45 Elenendorf, Elisavetpol uezd: map of, 104

Eliava, Shalva Zurabovich: as Soviet en­ voy to Turkey, 131, 142, 157, 187, 217 n. 93 Eliot, Charles William, 6 Elisavetpol (Ganja; Gandzak), city, uezd, and guberniia: map of, 41, 104, 397; and Armenian-Soviet rela­ tions, 60, 63, 87, 92, 229, 387, 389 Emin Bey, Major, 273, 274, 275 England and English, 16, 18, 86, 101, 140, 163, 168, 170, 178, 254, 270, 276, 292, 296-297, 365, 394, 402. See also Great Britain Entente Powers: and Turkey, 50, 101, 129, 132-133, 146-147, 149, 167, 174, 182, 194 n. 25, 217-218, 219 n. 98, 227, 247,308,363,395-396, 399; and Armenia, 57, 99 n. 17, 174, 182, 194 n. 27, 205-206, 214, 234» 311» 342-352, 354 n- 33» 368, 375» 377» 395-396; and Soviet Rus­ sia, 74, 170-171, 174, 182, 194 n. 27, 201-202, 204-206, 218, 227, 234, 361, 375, 377, 381. See also Allied Powers and Associated Powers Enver Pasha, 76, 137 n. 27, 183, 201, 249» 3°7; and Soviet-Turkish rela­ tions, 130,138,141-142, 164,166, 168-169, 171-173, 176-178, 187 Erevan, city, uezd, and guberniia, 44, 47-48, 51, 55, 59-62, 74, 125, 184-185, 206-207, 222, 224-225, 249, 264, 292, 309-310; map of, 41, 68, 283, 397; government, 46, 52, 58, 72, 90, 96, 109, 121, 191, 211-212, 237, 247, 270, 276, 289, 3t5» 324» 332, 362, 369, 406-407; and Red Army, 62, 183; and Ar­ menian-Soviet relations, 76—80, 85, 93-94» 96» 98-99» 101, 103, 105106, 110, 114-115, 117 n. 59, 120, 123, 126-127, 180, 183, 215-219, 229, 231, 234-235, 253, 255, 307, 342, 345-346» 366, 376, 382, 386392, 400-401, 404-408; and Ar­ menian-Turkish relations, 134, 145, 149-150, 238, 240-242, 244 n. 17, 249, 262-266, 269-271, 273-275, 284-289, 292, 302, 341, 345, 347, 349» 359» 363» 367» 369-370» 372» 384, 392-393, 395-396; Soviet me­ diation in, 350-359 Erkenants, Zangezur uezd, 111, 120 Ermolenko, Colonel N. K., 390 n. 52 Erzerum, city and vilayet, 71, 305, 361; and Armenian boundaries, 1, 28— 29» 31-34» 36, 38, 42-43» 51» t8i,

INDEX

202, 220, 349-350, 362; map of, 41,189,397; and Turkey, 130—131, iS?» 147-Í48» *53» i55» 164 n. 89, 187, 192-193, 197, 227, 231-232, 247, 259, 365; and Rus­ sia, 348 Erzinjan, Erzerum vilayet, 36, 224,247; map of, 41 Erzinkian, Aramayis, 47, 49 n. 9, 60 n. 29 Estonia, 333, 336 Etchmiadzin (Vagharshapat), town and uezd, 200 n. 42, 230, 240, 249250, 292, 391; map of, 41, 186, 248, 283, 397 Euphrates College (Kharput), 31 Euphrates River, 9, 31—32, 36; map of, 41, 189, 397 Europe and European, 5, 7 n. 13, 8, 13-14, 20, 24, 31, 42, 49-50, 92, 99, 140-142, 149, 155, 163, 167168, 170, 176, 200, 210, 281, 303, 310, 341, 349, 353, 363, 365, 370, 395 Evlakh, Elisavetpol uezd, 165; map of, 41 Filipinos, 173 Finland, 201, 328, 334 Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens: in League of Nations, 330-333 Fleuriau, Aimé de, 315 Foch, Field Marshal Ferdinand, 210, 213-214, 304 Fox, Dr. Edward, 258 France, 140, 170, 176, 325, 342 n. 2, 354 n. 34, 394; and Armenians, 4— 5, 6 n. 13, 9, 16, 18, 20, 26, 203204, 212, 241 n. 7, 255, 258 n. 47, 266, 269, 288 n. 120, 293, 299300, 306, 312-315, 319, 330-332» 335» 349; and Armenian-Soviet agreement, 96-99; and Turkey, 132, 180, 183, 191, 258 n. 47, 269, 299.306-307; Quai d’Orsay of, 300 Fuad Sabit. See Sabit, Dr. Fuad

Gabba, Colonel Melchiade: as chief of Italian mission in Transcaucasia, 349 Galli, Carlo, 299 Ganja (Gandzak), Elisavetpol uezd, 165; map of, 41, 104. See also Elisa­ vetpol Garin (Karin; Erzerum), 51 Gasimtach, Mount, 250; map of, 120 Gates, Caleb Frank: as president of Robert College, 2 Gegechkori, Evgenii Petrovich: as

477

Georgian foreign minister, 223, 226 Geghvadzor, Zangezur uezd, 109, 111, 113, 116; map of, 68 Gekker (Hecker), General Anatolii Il’ich: as Eleventh Red Army com­ mander, 116, 119, 121, 376 Geneva, Switzerland, 303, 315, 317, 328, SSi-SS», 334» 336-337 Genghis Khan, 107 Genvaz, Zangezur uezd: 110, 111, 113, 114, 115-116 Geol (Ozero), Ardahan okrug, 222— 223, 240. See also Merdenek Georgia, Republic of, 46, 48, 56, 131, 196; and Soviet Russia, 53, 57—58, 62-63, 72-73, 75, 77-78, 92, 122123, 126, 135, 137, 139, 165, 176, 182, 216, 221, 255, 297, 302, 342344» 347» 373-374» 400, 405; and Armenia, 60, 98, 203, 206-207, 221-226, 245-246, 249, 267, 287289, 303, 354, 373, 395, 404; and Azerbaijan, 63; and Great Britain, 99, 214, 295,307,325; and Turkey, 128, 135-136, 146-148, 152, 153 n. 66,164, 171,187,191,197, 201, 225, 245-246, 249, 263, 287-288, 296-297, 299, 308, 341, 362, 365, 367, 403; Muslim Council of, 169 n. 99; Armenian National Council of, 201, 349 n. 26; and League of Nations, 329-334, 336 Georgian Communist Party, 123 Gerard, James Watson: as chairman of American Committee for the Inde­ pendence of Armenia, 4—6, 7 n. 13, 8-9, 13, 26-28; and Armenian boundaries, 40, 301—302 Germany and German, 38, 128, 406; and peace treaty, 2, 8; Young Turks in, 130, 141, 170-172, 174 Getabek, Elisavetpol uezd, 376; map of, 104 Gevorg V (Sureniants), Catholicos, 99 Ghaltaghchi (Kaltakhchi), Alexandro­ pol uezd, 286; map of, 283 Ghambashidze (Gambashidze), David D., 226 Ghapan (Kafan; Kapan), Zangezur uezd: map of, 41, 68, 397; and So­ viet-Armenian relations, 66-67, 69, 83» 85, 89, 91, 108-113, 115-117, 120 Gharibdjanian, Bagrat B., 86, 106 Ghazarian, Gevorg: as minister of pub­ lic education and culture, 200, 262

478

INDEX

Chazarían, Major General Hovhannes (Ivan Kazarov), 252, 259 Ghazazian, Koriun, 201, 404 Ghemli, Kars okrug, 262, 264, 273; map of, 248, 283 Ghoshghotan, Kazakh uezd, 103 Ghrekh (Krykh), Alexandropol uezd, 285; map of, 283 Ghulali, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Gibbons, James Cardinal, 6 Gikal-Dagh, Mount, 228 Giratagh, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Giulkhandanian, Abraham, 200; and Armenian-Turkish negotiations, 359“36°’ 39b 394 Giulnazarian, Kostantin, 200 n. 42 Giutkum (Geghanush), Zangezur uezd, 116; map of, 68 Goghtan, 109, 111, 113; map of, 68 Gompers, Samuel S., 6 Goris (Gerusy), Zangezur uezd, 165; map of, 41,68, 397; and ArmenianSoviet relations, 66-67, $9» 71» 74” 75, 80-87, 88’ 89» 93“94»lo6> lo8» 110, 117-120, 122 Gracey, Captain George Frederick Handel, 98, 207, 309 Graffam, Mary Louise, 2 Grampa, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Great Britain, 39, 133 n. 11,140, 170172, 176, 354 n. 34; and Armeni­ ans, 4, 6 n. 13, 9, 20, 38,44, 77, 80, 107, 164, 184-185, 203-204, 206214, 216, 223-226, 242, 246, 254, 260, 269-270, 291—316 passim, 319, 324-325« 330-335» 343» 349’ 355’ 373; Foreign Office of, 5, 7 n. 13, 44, 97, 99-100, 150, 208, 211-214, 221, 223, 225-226, 266, 294-298, 302-309, 312, 315, 324325» 332, 357 n. 40; and Soviet Rus­ sia, 46, 130-131, 154-157, 204, 343’ 373-374; and Armenian-So­ viet agreement, 97-101; and Cau­ casus, 123, 310; and Turkey, 132, 134-136, 138-140, 147, 166, 178, 180-183, 191, 193, 197, 291-298, 303-310, 321, 347, 355, 362, 364, 367; Admiralty Office of, 208, 295; Army Council of, 214, 307; War Of­ fice of, 214, 294-295, 307-308; and Greece, 295, 309; Parliament of, 309-310; House of Commons of, 310, 312 Great Powers, 15, 40, 318, 321, 339.

See also Allied and Associated Pow­ ers; Entente Powers Great Zab River, 36, 42; map of, 41, 397 Greece and Greeks, 292; and Armeni­ ans, 29, 37, 42, 43, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 212, 330; Pontic, 34, 42, 212; and Turkey, 39, 50, 128, 140, 150, 152, 162, 172, 180-181, 183, 185, 191, 193, 194, 204, 206, 209, 211-212, 254, 263, 295, 298, 299, 306-308, 331, 365; and Great Brit­ ain, 295, 309, 310 Gulian, Captain Artur Vasil’evich, 238, 257 Gumru, 270, 391. See also Alexandro­ pol Gumushkhane, Erzerum vilayet, y¡\ map of, 41, 397

Haghardzin, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Haghpat, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Haikuni, Gurgen, 73 n. 58 Hai Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiu n. See Armenian Populist Party Haji Khalil (Halil), Mount, 240, 241, 243’ 251; map of, 248 Haji-Nazar, Alexandropol uezd, 272, 285; map of, 283 Hakaru River, 65,67, 85, 88, 118, 120; map of, 41, 68, 397 Hakhverdian, Major General Hovhan­ nes (Ivan Akhverdov): as assistant military minister, 219, 271—272 Hakki, Ismail. See Ismail Hakki Bey Halberian, Lieutenant Colonel, 250 Halid, Lieutenant Colonel: and Arme­ nian-Turkish war, 187—188, 192, 250, 256-257, 259-260 Halidzor, Zangezur uezd, 110, 119, 122; map of, 68 Halil Pasha [Kut]: and Soviet-Turkish relations, 76, 79, 82—83, 87, 88, 101-102, 115, 130, 131, 134, 136, 139-140, 142, 144, 147, 151 n. 60, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 161-162, 164, 178, 181, 183, 187 Hamamlu (Spitak), Alexandropol uezd, 272, 285-286, 289, 292; map of, 104, 283, 397 Hamid Bey, 361, 394 Hand, Zangezur uezd, 114; map of, 68 Haradj (Erevan), 107, 205, 207 n. 60, 218-219, 220 n. 101, 292, 354, 360 Haram-Vardan (Garam-Vartan), Kars okrug, 196, 241-244, 251; map of, 189, 248 Harbord, Major General James Gutrie:

INDEX

and Armenian mandate and boundaries, 12, 14—15, 18—19, 21, 23, 30, 35 Harcourt, H. W., 309 Harding, Senator Warren Gamaliel, 10, 25, 301-302, 326 Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord Charles: as British undersecretary for for­ eign affairs, 44 n. 105, 97 Harris, Victoria, 289 Harutiunian, Bagrat, 69, 111, 117 Harutiunian, Martiros: as diplomatic representative in Baku, 63, 172 n. 107, 235, 345 Hasankale, Erzerum vilayet, 150, 187; map of, 41, 189, 397 Hasan-Pashayan, Colonel Karapet, 252, 262 Haskell, Colonel William Nafew: as Al­ lied commissioner in Armenia, 209 Hekkiari (Hakkari), sanjak of, 32, 36, 42; map of, 41, 397 Hennessy, Jean: in League of Nations, 332 Hilmi Bey [Uran], 246 Hitchcock, Gilbert Monell: as Senate minority leader, 14, 16-18, 21-23 Hnchakian Party. See Armenian Social Democrat Hnchak Party Holy Apostles (Arakelots) Church, Kars, 242 Hopa, Trebizond vilayet: map of, 41, 397 Horom (Khorum), Alexandropol uezd, 272, 284; map of, 283 Hovhannisian, Arshak: as minister of agriculture and state properties, 357» 383-384» 388 Hovhannisian, Tigran, 360 Hovhannisian (loannisian), Ashot Gareginovich: as Armenian Com­ munist leader, 49, 62 n. 33, 374 n. 2, 389-39° Hovsepian, Bishop Garegin, 242, 244, 256, 258 Hovsepian (Ossipov), Major General Harutiun: and Armenian-Turkish war, 190, 192, 238-244, 251-252, 261-262, 264, 273, 284-285 Hovsepian, Nikolai, 66 Hrazdan (Zangu) River: map of, 186, 397 Hughes, Charles Evans, 25 Huneeus, Don Antonio: in League of Nations, 329, 334 Hungary, 128 Husein Aghayurd, Mount, 193, 195; map of, 189

479

Huseinov, Mirza Davud: as Azerbaijani foreign affairs commissar, 54, 56, 57, 64, 142, 381 Hyde, George B., 6 Hymans, Paul: as Belgian foreign min­ ister and president of Council of League of Nations, 299, 315, 323— 327» 335-337» 339 Ibrahim Tali Bey [Öngören], 168, 172 Igdalu, Etchmiadzin uezd, 284; map of, 186 Igdir, Surmalu uezd: and Turkish inva­ sion of Armenia, 135, 136, 149, 184, 192, 196, 208, 214; and Ar­ menian-Turkish war, 238, 240, 249, 250, 254, 292; map of, 41, 186, 397 Igdirmava, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Ijevan (Karvansarai), Kazakh uezd: and Armenian-Soviet relations, 62, 64, 103, 127, 183, 229; and ArmenianTurkish war, 200, 285, 286; and so­ vietization of Armenia, 342, 374, 376» 377» 379» 384» 385í maP °f» 1O4» 397 Imirkhan Mountains: map of, 189 India, 39, 131, 133, 142, 169, 171, 178, 202, 308-309 Indjabel, Zangezur uezd, 111, 117, 118 Indjasu, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Ionia, 298 Ireland or Irish, 325 Ishkhanian, Bakhshi, 353, 404 Ishkhanian, Lieutenant Colonel, 241 Islam or Islamic, 131, 135, 148, 152, 168, 187, 207, 295, 391. See also Pan-Islamism Ismail Hakki Bey, 154, 172 n. 107,179 Ismet Bey [Inönu] : as chief of the gen­ eral staff, 151, 164, 181, 185, 187, 190» J93» 245-246» 263-264 Ispir, Erzerum vilayet: map of, 41, 397 Israil, Olti okrug, 188 Istanbul. See Constantinople Istomin, Konstantin Nikolaevich, 61 n. 33, 215 Italy or Italian, 164, 171, 183, 204, 292, 299, 306, 312-314, 317, 331, 332, 349 Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and Pro­ gress) Party, 246; and Soviet Russia, 129—131, 144, 166, 168, 177; Cen­ tral Committee of, 131, 171. See also Young Turks luzbashian, Dr. Ruben S.: and Arme­ nian-Soviet negotiations, 91—92 Izmir. See Smyrna

480

INDEX

Jafarabad, Etchmiadzin uezd: map of, 186 Jajur, Alexandropol uezd, 265, 271, 272, 275, 282-287 passim, 291, 387; map of, 283 Jalal, Kaghisman okrug: map of, 283 Jalal-oghli, Borchalu uezd, 288; map of, 104, 283, 397 Japan and Japanese, 49, 314 Javid, Lieutenant Colonel, 153; and Armenian-Turkish war, 192, 249 Jebrail, Kariagin uezd, 72, 73, 82; map of. 68, 397 Jemal Pasha: and Soviet-Turkish rela­ tions, 130, 141-142, 154,156-157, 161-162, 168, 1 Jessup, Henry Wynams, 326 Jones, Senator Andrieus Aristieus, 17 Jonnesco, Thomas: in League of Nations, 320, 336 Julfa, Nakhichevan uezd: and Arme­ nian-Soviet relations, 57,58,63,65, 69» 73. 76-77’ 94-96,100-106 pas­ sim, 127; map of, 68, 397; and So­ viet-Turkish relations, 158, 159

Kabakhta, Mount, 184 Kabakhtapa, Mount, 196; map of, 186 Kachaznuni, Hovhannes (Ruben Iva­ novich): as former prime minister, 219 n. 98, 262, 263, 278, 353-355, 384 Kadimov, Colonel Ibrahim, 222 n. 108 Kadjaran (Gedjevan), Zangezur uezd, 111 ; map of, 68 Kadjberuni, Ruben: as assistant minis­ ter of welfare, 200 n. 46, 357 n. 40 Kafan, Zangezur uezd. See Ghapan Kaghisman (Kaghzvan), town and okrug 150, 191, 193, 196, 197, 198, 208, 209, 242, 245, 369, 385; map of, 41, 186, 189, 248, 397 Kaghnut, Zangezur uezd, 121 ; map of, 68 Kaklamanos: as Greek ambassador in France, 299 Kalacha (Ghalacha), Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Kal akeran, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Kaier, Zangezur uezd, 113; map of, 68 Kaltakhchi, Alexandropol uezd, 286; map of, 283 Kamari (Bedjanian), Hakob M., 67 Kamenev, General Sergei Sergeevich, 65 Kamishlu, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Kamsarakan, Stepan: as assistant min­

ister of agriculture and state prop­ erties, 200 n. 46 Kanaker, Erevan uezd, 86, 250 Kanayan, Drastamat. See Dro Kantardjian, Lieutenant, 195 Kapan, Zangezur uezd. See Ghapan Kapanak, Meds and Pokr, Alexandro­ pol uezd, 286; map of, 283 Kapargoght district, Zangezur uezd, 109 Kapudjik, Mount: map of, 68 Karabagh (Mountainous), 130, 183, 207, 247; map of, 41, 68, 397; and Armenian-Soviet negotiations, 46— 47, 49, 52-60, 62, 91-92, 94-95, 97-99’ 1O7. 229, 233; Compatri­ otic Union of, 47; and ArmenianSoviet conflict, 62—63, 65—66, 69— 70, 73-78, 79-81, 84, 114-115, 119, 122-123, 127, 201-202, 216, 220, 227, 307; Ninth Assembly of, 70; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 157; Azerbaijani cession of, 380383’ 399 Karabekir, General Kiazim, Eastern Front Commander, 242: and Ar­ menian-Soviet relations, 70-71, 88, 102-103, 122, 181—184; and So­ viet-Turkish relations, 129, 133— 138, 141-142, 145-153 passim, 159, 164, 168-169, 177-178, 237, 389,401—402; and Armenian-Turk­ ish war, 185—198 passim, 210, 237, 241, 245-253, 256-261, 263-264, 268-273, 275-278, 282, 288, 290292, 296, 341-348, 349 n. 26; and Armenian-Turkish negotiations, 354’ 361-37U 384-385. 390-396, 399 Karabulagh, Surmalu uezd, 249; map of, 186 Karaburun, Etchmiadzin uezd, 291, 292; map of, 283 Karadagh, Persia, 114 Karadash (Sevkar), Kazakh uezd, 103, 376, 377; maP °f. 1O4 Karadash, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Karageozian (Gharageozian), Arme­ nak M.: as Cheka chief in Zangezur, 66 n. 46, 67 Karah un dj, Zangezur uezd, 121; map of, 68 Karakala bridge, Surmalu uezd, 249— 250; map of, 186 Karakhach, Kars okrug 196; map of, 189, 248 Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich: as Soviet assistant foreign affairs commissar,

INDEX

481

lations, 60, 62, 64, 79, 87, 92, 94, 51-53» 59’ 61-62, 101, 140, 15495, 103, 127, 183, 200-202, 208, 157’ 163 Karakilisa, Alexandropol w«zd, 120, 215, 224, 261, 374-376, 387, 389 199’ 265, 267, 269, 271, 274-275, Kazan, Russia, 142 284-286, 289, 346, 354 n. 34, 363, Kazi kap aran, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 367, 404; map of, 104, 248, 397 Kelkit River, 37; map of, 41, 397 Karakol society, 129, 131 Kemakh, Erzerum vilayet, 36; map of, Karakose, Erzerum vilayet, 193 Karakoyunlu, Surmalu uezd, 249—250; 41 Kemal Bey, Yusuf. See Yusuf Kemal Bey map of, 186 [Tengirçenk] Karakoyunlu Vale, Kazakh uezd: map Kemal Pasha, Mustafa, 51-52, 57, 76, of, 104 225, 242, 306; and Turkish Nation­ Karakurt, Kaghisman okrug, 191, 195; alists, 39, 52, 128-137, 139-147, map of, 189 152, 159, 164-165, 168, 180, 181— Karalov, General: and Armenian-Geor­ 183, 198, 211, 215, 293, 296-297, gian relations, 287—288 Karashen, Zangezur uezd, 122 299> 3°7. 342, 345» 347. 35°. 399Î and Allies, 50, 98, 138, 293, 295Karaurgan, Kaghisman okrug, 193, 297, 299, 305, 345, 347; and Ar­ 195; map of, 189, 397 menia, 60, 86, 180—184, 187, 190— Kara Vasif Bey, 129, 131 198, 201-206, 207 n. 60, 237, Kariagin, Jebrail uezd: map of, 397 Karjavan, Zangezur uezd: map of, 68 245-247, 255, 260, 266, 269, 275Karmalinovka, Nakhichevan uezd, 106; 277, 279, 281, 295-297, 311, 318, map of, 68 322, 332, 342-348, 350, 354-355, Karmir Aghbiur, Kazakh uezd: map of, 359’ 366-367, 369, 384, 396, 309, 405; and Soviet Russia, 79, 83, 86, 104 92, 101, 127-153, 155, 159, 163Kars, city, okrug, and oblast, 132, 360, 165, 167-168, 170, 172-173, 175, 394; map of, 41, 189, 248, 283, 177-182, 203, 206, 211, 215, 217, 397; and Armenian-Turkish con­ 224, 227, 253, 263, 307, 343-348, flict, 50, 82, 102, 114, 134, 135 373; and Greeks, 180, 254, 295, n. 19, 137, 145-146, 149, 151, 299, 365; and Great Britain, 310161-162, 183, 185, 187, 190-193, 311, 320; and League of Nations, 194 n. 27, 195-19?’ 199-200. 203, 318-322, 324-326 207, 213-214, 219 n. 98, 221, 224, 227, 231, 236, 237-247, 248, 250- Kerasund (Giresun), Trebizond vilayet, 9, 37,42, 185, 292; map of, 41, 397 266 passim, 287, 294, 307—308, Keroghli, Mount, 188, 190, 192; map 31U 325’ 342. 347-348’ 349 n- 26, of, 189 351-352’ 363. 366 n. 63, 369, 370-371. 385. 399i and Armenian- Keshab, Trebizond vilayet, 37 Soviet relations, 60, 162, 229, 305, Keshishkend, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 109; map of, 397 387, 389, 400, 407; and SovietTurkish relations, 71; Treaty of, Khac ha trian, Smbat Artem’evich, 224, 288 n. 122 391’403 Kars River, 149, 245, 252, 264; map of, Khajivali (Hajiveli), Kars okrug, 264; map of, 248 41, 189, 248 Khalfalu, Surmalu uezd, 196, 250; map Karvansarai. S^Ijevan of, 186 Kasian (Ter-Gasparian), Sargis Ivano­ vich: as Armenian Communist Khalifoghlu, Kars okrug, 251; map of, 248 leader, 123-124, 374“375’ 377. Khamarlu (Artashat), Erevan uezd, 389 n. 49, 390, 401 291-292; map of, 283, 397 Katanyan, Ruben, 73 n. 58 Katar mines (Ghapan), Zangezur uezd, Khandere, Kaghisman okrug 193, 195; map of, 189 65, 108, 111, 120; map of, 68 Kavart, Zangezur uezd, 110, 116, 118; Khanjian, Aghasi, 126 Khankend, Shushi uezd: map of, 397 map of, 283 Kharkov, Ukraine, 45 Kavtarlu, Alexandropol uezd, 291 Kazakh, town and uezd: map of, 41, Kharput (Kharpert; Mamuret-ul-Aziz), city, sanjak, and vilayet, 224; and Ari°4. 3975 an6 Armenian-Soviet re-

482

INDEX

201, 208; and Armenian-Soviet re­ lations, 49 n. 9, 64, 77, 78, 80, 123; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 153 n. 66, 161 n. 86, 164 n. 89, 171 n. 105 Kirs, Mount: map of, 68 Kishmishev (Kishmishian), Major Gen­ eral Iosif A., 225 n. 116 Kislovodsk, Terek oblast, 215 Kiuki, Nakhichevan uezd, 95; map of, 68 Kiulluk, Surmalu uezd, 249; map of, 186 Kizilbash, 32 Kizil-Chakhchakh, Kars okrug, 238, 261-262, 264, 268; map of, 248, 283 Kizildash (Kamrakar), Zangezur uezd, 117 Kizilgedik, Mount, 243 Kizilkilisa, Alexandropol uezd, 284; map of, 283 Kizilkilisa, Olti okrug, 193; map of, 189, 248 Kizil-Ziaret, Alexandropol uezd, 275, 291; map of, 283 Kober, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104, 283 Koghb, Surmalu uezd. See Kulp Kommunist (Baku), 107 Komunist (Erevan), 390 Koprikoy, Erzerum vilayet, 150; map Khorum, Mount, 192; map of, 189 of, 41 Khoshab River, 36; map of, 41 Korganian, Major General Gabriel Khoshkhabar, Surmalu uezd, 250; map (Gavriil Georgievich Korganov), of, 186 206, 317, 328 Khot, Zangezur uezd, 110; map of, 68 Khotanan, Nerkin (Lower) and Verin Korganian, Stepan A., 190 n. 16; as governor-general of Kars, 239; and (Upper), Zangezur uezd, 69, 111, Armenian-Turkish negotiations, 117-118,120-121 ; map of, 68 207 n. 60, 360, 394 Khudabashian, Lieutenant Colonel Ni­ Korganov (Korganian), Colonel of kolai A., 249—250 Cavalry Dmitrii: and ArmenianKhurshudian, Hakob, 117 Turkish war, 239, 240, 242, 262, Khustup, Mount, 111—114, 11^> 122î 273, 284, 291 map of, 68 Korindzor (Kornidzor), Zangezur Kiagin, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 uezd, 67; map of, 68 Kiamarjakh, Olti okrug, 192 Korkmazov, Jelal, 344 n. 11 Kiazim Bey [Dirik], Colonel: as Turk­ Koshkotan (Ghoshghotan), Kazakh ish Nationalist representative in Tif­ uezd, 103; map of, 104 lis, 296-297, 347-349» 389-39o Kosor, Olti okrug 188, 192; map of, Kiazim Bey [Ozalp], Colonel, 129 Kiev, Ukraine, 45 189 Kostanian, Haikaz A., 54, 124, 126 Kighi, Erzerum vilayet, 36; map of, 41, Kotanli, Nerkin (Lower) and Verin 397 (Upper), Kars okrug, 196: map of, King, Senator William Henry, 6, 23 189, 248 Kirmizlu, Etchmiadzin uezd, 275; map Kotkend (Kotikegh), Kazakh uezd, of, 283 105; map of, 104 Kirov (Kostrikov), Sergei Mironovich,

Kharput (continued) menian boundaries, 4, 29, 31—33, 42; map of, 41, 397 Kharshut (Karshit) River Valley, 34, 37, 42; map of, 41,397 Khatisian, Alexandre (A. I. Khatisov): as former prime minister, 46, 208, 279—280; and Armenian-Turkish negotiations, 297, 349, 354, 359372, 384-385, 390-396 Khdskonk, Kaghisman uezd: map of, 248 Khlatagh, Zangezur uezd, 111 ; map of, 68 Khnatsakh, Zangezur uezd: map of, 68 Khndzoresk, Zangezur uezd, 67; map of, 68 Khnus, Erzerum vilayet, 368; map of, 4L 397 Khodjamirian, Kostan tin, 360 Khoi, Persia: map of, 397 Khok, Nakhichevan uezd, 94-95; map of, 68 Khondkarian, Arsham: as Social Revo­ lutionary leader, 280, 356, 364; as minister of justice and commerce, 357» 388 Khorasan, Erzerum vilayet: map of, 41, 186 Khoreni (Ter-Gevorgian), Vahan, 66— 69; execution of, 85, 86, 87, 106,

INDEX

Krmoyan, Vahagn: as assistant minister of internal affairs, 200 n. 46 Kronstadt naval base, 403 Kuban oblast, 45, 101 Kuchuk Ghemli (Kmly), 262; map of, 248, 283 Kuchuk Talaat, 136, 142, 307 Kulidjan, Alexandropol uezd, 275; map of, 283 Kulp (Koghb),Surmalu uezd, 184,192, 197, 250; map of, 186 Kumru, Mount, 193, 195; map of, 189 Kun, Béla, 128, 166, 175 Kurdikend, Zangezur uezd, 114; map of, 68 Kurdistan and Kurds, 4, 6 n. 13, 10, 17, 143, 146, 150, 175, 207 n. 60, 371, 374; and Armenians, 31, 32, 34» 36, 37» 39’ 42’ 115, 167, 184, 185, 188, 208, 241, 249, 250, 349; and Red Army, 65; and Turkey, 192, 196, 249, 250; map of, 397 Kur River, 196, 222; map of, 41, 104, 397 Kursali, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Kurtan, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Kurumsulu (Ghurumsulu), Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Kuryshko, General Petr Vasil’evich: and Armenian-Soviet relations, 71, 119-122, 376, 389 Kushchi-Airum, Kazakh uezd, 103, 105; map of, 104 Kushchi-Demurchi, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 285; map of, 397 Lafontaine, Senator Henri: in League of Nations, 317-322, 337“339 Lalakend, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Laloghlu, Kars okrug, 195, 243; map of, 189 Latvia, 333, 336 Lausanne, Treaty of, 403 Lazarían Academy of Moscow, 52, 230 Lazistan and Lazes, 143, 145; and Ar­ menian boundaries, 29, 34, 37, 42; map of, 41 Lazo (Hakob Chazarían), 200 n. 42 League of Nations, 39, 210: and Ar­ menia, 2-3, 7-8, 11, 23-24, 35, 293’ 299-300, 303, 312-341, 368; Covenant of, 2, 7, 17, 293, 313, 319, 327, 333; and United States, 16, 24, 26; Assembly of, 293, 303, 312-324 passim, 327 n. 101, 328340; Council of, 293, 299, 312-327 passim, 337—340; Commission for Military, Naval, and Air Questions

483

of, 327; Committee on Admissions, 329-334; technical organizations of, 333-336 Legran, Boris Vasil’evich: and Arme­ nian-Soviet relations, 59, 61-62, 75-80, 90-94, 99-101, 103-106, 108, 114-115, 123-124, 126, 158, 180, 203-206, 214-222, 226-228, 231. 233-235, 255, 391, 404; and Armenian-Turkish negotiations, 342, 345-346, 350-353, 355, 360, 362, 367-368, 401-402; and sovietiza­ tion of Armenia, 369, 374, 378— 379’ 382-389 Leng Timur, 107 Lenin (Ul’ianov), Vladimir Il’ich, 56, 168, 176; and Armenia, 46, 48, 63, 64, 73 n. 58, 79, 107, 123, 164, 234’ 235’ 342, 344’ 373’ 376 n- 1U 379-380,389,406; and Turkey, 57, 74, 79, 128, 140 n. 33, 154, 158159, 164, 344; and Georgia, 342 Leninakan. See Alexandropol Levandovskii, General Mikhail Karlo­ vich: as Eleventh Red Army com­ mander, 63, 65, 70, 72 i). 57, 74 Leygues, Georges: as French prime minister and foreign minister, 306, 331 Lithuania, 333, 336 Lloyd George, David: as British prime minister, 294, 308-310, 313, 315, 317, 326, 331 Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot: and Ar­ menia, 3, 5, 8-10, 14-27 passim, 3°3 London, England, 86, 97, 204, 208, 212, 213, 221, 225, 255, 266, 270, 294’ 295, 304, 309, 327 n. 101, 33°’ 33 U 334’ 355’ 399 London conference (February-March 1920), 7 Lordkipanidze, Grigorii Spiridono­ vich: as Georgian minister of war, 288 n. 122 Lori district, Borchalu uezd, 99, 153 n. 66, 224, 242, 269, 287-289,389, 405; map of, 41, 104, 397 Lorut, Borchalu uezd, 275; map of, 104, 283 Lukashin (Srabionian), Sargis, 215 Luke, Commander Harry Charles, 206; as British chief commissioner in Transcaucasia, 97-100 Luxembourg, 334 MacDonell, A. E. Ranald, 212, 226, 304, 357 n. 40

484

INDEX

Magharajik, Kars okrug, 249; map of, 248 Makedon, khmbapet, 285 Makharadze, Filipp Iseevich, 176 Makhta, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 285 Maku, town and khanate, Persia, 98, 153» 2O3» 2o8» 232; map of, 41, 397 Malatia, Kharput vilayet: map of, 41 Malazkert, Bitlis vilayet: map of, 41, 397 Malchanov, Mikhail V., 404 n. 81 Malcolm, James A., 304 Maidash, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Mali Kapanak, Alexandropol uezd. See Kapanak Malta, 156—157 Mamakhatun (Terjan), Erzerum vila­ yet, 36; map of, 41 Mamikonian, Stepan Grigorievich, 224, 288 n. 122 Manasian, Sargis, 64 Manning, William Thomas, 6 Marash, city and sanjak, 7, 170 Mardin, Diarbekir vilayet, 163 Markara, Etchmiadzin uezd, 249, 250, 284, 391; map of, 186 Marques, Azevedo: as Brazilian foreign minister, 323 Marsovan, Sivas vilayet, 2 Martakert, Jevanshir uezd: map of, 397 Martel, Comte Damien-Joseph-AlfredCharles de: as French commis­ sioner in Transcaucasia, 96, 97 n. 12, 99 Martin, Major (Professor) Lawrence, 3o» 35 Martuni, Shushi uezd: map of, 397 Marxists, 47, 404 Masis, 388. See also Ararat, Mount Mason, Major C. H., 35 Mastara, Etchmiadzin uezd: map of, 283 Mazamlu, Kazakh uezd, 103; map of, 104 Mazmanian (Mazmanov), Lieutenant Colonel, 241, 252-253 Mazra (Matsra), Kars okrug, 251, 262; map of, 248 Mdivani, Budu (P. G.), 58, 74; and Ar­ menian-Turkish negotiations, 344— 348, 350, 352, 360-362, 365-368, 374» 39°’ 4°°-4°2 Mdivani, Simeon Gurgenovich, 224 Mediterranean Sea, 27, 208, 305; and Armenian boundaries, 6, 9 Meghri (Arevik), Zangezur uezd, 66, 69, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118; map of, 68, 397

Mehmed Emin, 172 n. 107 Mejinkert, Verin, Kaghisman okrug, 195; map of, 189 Melas, Leon V.: as Greek chargé d’af­ faires in Paris, 299 Melikian, Hovhannes, 404 Melik-Parsadanian, Smbat Bek, 89 Melik-Shahnazarian, Major General Pavel D., 273 Melik-Yolchian, Sergei, 66, 200; as minister of internal affairs of Moun­ tainous Armenia, 406 n. 84 Melkonian, Dr. Haik, 48 n. 8 Mensheviks: Armenian, 47, 353; Geor­ gian, 65, 123, 153 n. 66, 343, 362, 374» 405 Merdenek, Ardahan okrug, 149, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 196, 209, 239, 241, 242, 244, 245, 254; map of, 189, 397 Mesopotamia (Iraq), 31, 39, 42, 133, 170, 232, 270, 294, 300, 308, 311, 319 Mexico, 24 Miasnikian (Miasnikov), Alexandre Feodorovich, 46, 406 Middle East, 40, 208, 309 Mikhailov, Boris Danilovich, 74 Mikhailovka, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 54, 74 Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front (Voinrevsovet), 62, 64, 72, 74-75, 81, 92, 376, 382. See also Russia, Soviet: Red Army oper­ ations of, Millerand, Alexandre: as former French prime minister and foreign minister, 306, 313 Milner, Lord Alfred: as British colonial secretary, 308 Minakhorian, Vahan: as minister of public education and culture, 357; and Armenian-Turkish negotia­ tions, 360, 364-365 Minasian, Minas: as minister of health of Mountainous Armenia, 406 n. 84 Mineralnye Vody, Terek oblast, 215 Minkend, Zangezur uezd: map of, 68 Minorities Treaty, 44 Mirakian, Enovk, 114, 117 n. 59, 263, 271, 274 Mirimanian, Colonel A. L, 195, 241, 261, 285 Mirzakhan, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Moks, Van vilayet, 36; map of, 41

INDEX

Molla-Geokcha, Alexandropol uezd, 272, 284, 289; map of, 283 Molla-Kamar, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Molla-Musa, Kars okrug, 264, 273; map of, 283 Monroe Doctrine, 16 Montagu, Sir Edwin Samuel, 308 Morgenthau, Henry, 7-9, 323, 326 Moscow, Russia, 45, 58, 72, 75, 86, 100, 123, 124, 163, 211-212, 220 n. 101, 325: and Armenian-Soviet relations, 46-49, 52—55,60-62, 76, 77, 79, 82, 90, 92, 94, 98, 108, 126, 127, 141, 147, 156, 180, 216, 219, 230, 231, 234, 235, 294, 342-345> 347» 35o» 367» 376» 379» 389» 391» 392, 399; and Soviet-Turkish rela­ tions, 80, 101, 102, 130, 131, 136, 139-145» H8» *5!» löS-iö6» 162165, 166, 168, 172, 176-178, 197, 215» 343-345» 347» 348» 362, 364, 400-402; Treaty of, 391, 398-399, 402-403 Mosely, Brigadier General George Van Horn, 15 Moser, Charles Kroth: as United States consul in Tiflis, 209, 2ion. 71, 267, 347 Mosul, city and vilayet, 133 n. 11 Mountainous Armenia (Lernahayastan): government in, 405—406 Mountainous Karabagh. See Karabagh Movseskend, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Mravian, Askanaz A., 123, 124, 375 Mren, Kaghisman okrug: map of, 6 Mshegh, Olti okrug, 192; map of, 189 Mudros Armistice, 137, 295, 306 Mukhtar, Ahmed: as Turkish acting foreign affairs commissar, 269— 270, 274, 276-278, 290, 345, 396, 401 Murad (Lower Euphrates) River, 36; map of, 397 Murghiz, Mount: map of, 104 Musayelian, Captain Sargis, 86, 106 Mush, Bidis vilayet, 36, 42, 54, 158, 162, 349, 362, 368, 401; map of, 41» 397 Muslim(s), 18, 58, 73, 138, 142, 211, 225, 296, 309; and Armenia, 3132, 34» 35» 37» 38» 42-43» 56» 63, 71, 74, 78, 81, 87, 94, 103, 106, 111, 115, 116, 118, 125, 134, 135, 140, 148—149, 161, 185, 192, 194, 207, 222, 238, 246, 247, 258 n. 49, 260, 284, 297, 370, 371, 382, 383,

485

395; and Soviet Russia, 128, 130, 145» 155, 162, 166, 183, 381; and Turkey, 145, 146, 148—149, 178, 187» !97» 310» 342» 349» 351» 37°371; Communists, 157, 176, 344 n. 11 Muslim Social Democrats, 169 Mustafa Subhi. See Subhi, Mustafa

Nakhichevan, town and uezd, 46, 135, 161, 165, 261; map of, 41, 68, 397; and Armenian-Soviet relations, 52— 58 passim, 60,62,63,65,67,69, 70, 71, 73-77» 82-84, 88-98 passim, 101—103, lo8» 110» n3-115> 120, 121, 123, 136, 149, 155, 182, 183, 202, 216, 220, 227-229, 233, 254, 307; Azerbaijani cession of, 1 So183, 380-383; an77» 237. 247, 347, 371; and Ar­ menians, 1, 3, 140, 162, 171, 204, 211, 268, 294, 303, 313, 353, 394, 399,406—407; and peace treaty, 62, 180, 202; Parliament of, 132, 138. See also Turkey

Paldum pass, Kars okrug, 195-196; map of, 189 Palestine, 300 Palu, Diarbekir vilayet: map of, 397 Pamaut, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Pambak district, Alexandropol uezd, *99 Pandjuret, Olti okrug, 187—188, 192; map of, 189 Pan-Islamism and Pan-Islamic, 12, 76, 107, 166, 190, 218, 310, 348 Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkic, 12, 76, 166, 190, 210, 310, 348 Papazian, Vahan, 47 Paravakar, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Parget, Meds, Kars okrug, 204; map of, 248 Paris, France, 3, 30-31, 40, 44, 203204, 206, 314, 334, 354 n. 33 Paris Commune, 280 Paris Peace Conference, 213, 299; Conference of Ambassadors of, 210, 213, 299-300 Pasdermadjian, Garegin (Armen Garo) : and Armenian mandate, 34, 26-27 Pavlovich (Weltmann), Mikhail Lazarovich, 177, 373 Peet, William Wheelock, 303 Peniak, Olti okrug 184,187—188,191— 192, 194 n. 27, 197, 204; map of, i«9. 397 Peniak River, 187; map of, 189 Peri River: map of, 41

487

Persia (Iran), 33, 36, 55, 72, 94, 97, 102, 114, 131, 133, 142, 143, 151, 160, 167, 182, 202, 234, 270, 294, 339» 373’ 393’ 395’ 4o6 Peru, 335 Petrograd (St. Petersburg), Russia, 124, 153 Petrosian, Movses: as assistant foreign minister, 219 Piatigorsk, Terek oblast, 215 Pilos (Sargisian), khmbapet, 239 Pirlu, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Pirlu, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Pirsakh, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Pirumian, Lieutenant General Daniel Bek, 190, 192, 238-239, 241, 251253’ 256’ 258-259 Pirumian, Simeon, 47,49 n. 9,60 n. 29 Pirvali, Kars okrug, 27$', map of, 248, 283 Pittman, Senator Key, 23 Pkhrut, Zangezur uezd, 114; map of, 68 Plur, Surmalu uezd: map of, 186 Poghosian, Hovsep, 123 Poili bridge, 347 Pokrovka, Kars okrug: map of, 248 Poland and Polish, 63, 123, 155, 158, 164, 165, 182, 185, 204, 221, 298, 328, 342, 348, 352, 377 Politis, Nicolas, 330 Polk, Frank Lyon: as United States un­ dersecretary of state, 5—6, 9 Pontus Mountains, 30, 37; map of, 41 Populists. See Armenian Populist Party Portugal, 335 Poti, port of, 77, 208, 255, 267 n. 75 Privolnoe, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Prokhladnoe, Kars okrug, 251, 256, 260; map of, 248, 283

Quai d’Orsay. See France Quelch, Thomas, 169 Radek, Karl, 130, 142, 166, 168, 170171 Ramishvili, Noi Vissarionovich: as Georgian interior minister, 224— 225 Ratnek, Karl Karlovich, 66 n. 46, 80— 82 Rawlinson, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred, 365 Red Crescent Society, 145 Reed, John: at Baku congress, 169, 173’ 176 Reed, Senator James Alexander, 18— 19

488

INDEX

Riggs, Ernest Wilson, 4, 31 Rize, Trebizond vilayet, 34, 159 n. 62, 208, 362, 368; map of, 41, 397 Robbins, Warren Delano, 301 Robinson, Emily, 211, 222 Robinson, Senator Joseph Taylor, 19 Rodionovka, Ardahan okrug, 196; map of, 189 Romania, 320, 335-340 Romanovo, Kars orkug: map of, 248 Rome, Italy, 313, 325, 334 Root, Elihu, 25 Rosmer, Alfred, 170 Rostov-on-Don, Don oblast, 45, 46,4849, 60, 163-164, 215 Rowell, Newton W.: in League of Nations, 333-336 Ruben. See Ter-Minasian, Ruben Rumbold, Sir Horace, 325 Rushtu, Lieutenant Colonel: and Ar­ menian-Turkish war, 192, 249— 250, 256, 259 Russia, Soviet (R.S.F.S.R.), 242, 250; Red Army operations of, 45-46, 57-60, 62-67, 69-72, 73-79, So85, 87-88, 90-94, 96, 103-108, 109-115, 116-122, 124, 127, 129, 132, 134—139, 146, 148, 150, 155156, 158, 164—165, 178, 182-184, 187, 191, 211, 214, 216-217, 220221, 253, 255, 263, 289, 341, 342355» 360’ 362, 366, 373, 375-379, 3°3’ 385-39o’ 39L 402, 407; and Armenian-Soviet negotiations, 45— 62 passim, 90—108 passim, 126—127; Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) of, 46, 52—53, 57—60, 62, 70,92, 108, 115, 127, 128, 131, 139’ H3’ 15b 182, 183, 206, 215, 226, 255, 342-345’ 351-352, 364’ 401; and Great Britain, 46, 130, 13 L 154-157’ 204, 307, 310, 373374; and Turkey, 49, 53, 57-58,61, 70-72, 74-76, 78-80, 82-84, 8687, 89, 92-94, 98, 100-102, 110, 113-115, 121, 253, 263, 284, 286, 294-298, 305, 307-308, 310-311, 341-369 passim, y¡4, 390-392, 400-402; and Georgia, 53, 57-58, 62-63, 72,75,77-78,92,122-123, 126, 135, 137, 139, 165, 176, 182, 216, 221, 255, 297, 302, 343; and Armenian-Soviet conflict, 62—89 passim, 108—122 passim; and Cau­ casus, 70, 76, 78, 93, 94, 123, 180, 216, 217, 229, 234, 294, 298, 308, 343’ 344’ 345’ 348’ 36°’ 367’ 368, 373-374’’ and Azerbaijan, 73-76,

78-79,80-82,91-95,98,115,123, 125, 134-138, 139, 155, 156, 165, 180-183, 2O7’ 212’ 214’ 224’ 295» 342-343’ 347-348’ 373-375’ 378, 380—382; and Armenian Commu­ nist Party, 122-126; and SovietTurkish relations, 128—179 passim; and Armenian-Turkish negotia­ tions, 180-236 passim; and Arme­ nia, 245, 253-261, 269, 281, 284, 289-292, 294-297, 304, 326, 341369, 373—4o8 passim; New Eco­ nomic Policy of, 406 Russia and Russian, 6, 18, 270; and Caucasus, 10; and Armenians, 28, 30, 38-40; Empire, 34, 45, 132, 146, 156, 233, 329, 332-333, 349, 351, 407; Molokans, 230 Russian Communist Party, 54, 72, 73 n. 58, 164, 179; Caucasian Re­ gional Committee (Kraikom) of, 45, 123, 131; Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo) of, 45,49,62,64,72,74, 123-124, 126, 219 n. 98, 234-235, 344’ 374-375’ 382; Central Com­ mittee of, 49,56, 74,101,125,163, 217 m 93, 373, 374, 375, 387; Po­ litical Bureau (Politburo) of, 57, 58, 65, 72, 74, 123, 234, 342, 400; and Armenia, 122-127, 373-375, 383; Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of, 125, 126; and Turkey, 367 Russian Social Democrat Party, 61

Sabakhtarshvili, Konstantin Bezhanovich: as Georgian acting foreign minister, 223-224, 287—288 Sabanin, Andrei Vladimirovich, 158 Sabit, Dr. Fuad: and Soviet-Turkish re­ lations, 130, 139-142, 154 Sadakhlu, Borchalu uezd, 287; map of, 104 Sadarak, Erevan uezd, 285 Sahakian, Avetik (Father Abraham), 388 Sahmanadir Ramkavar Party. See Ar­ menian Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) Party Said, Baha. See Baha Said Sairt (Seert, Sghert), town and sanjak, 32, 36, 42; map of, 41, 397 Sakaria River, 299 Sako (Yapon), 66 Salut, Kars okrug, 195; map of, 189 Salvador, 335 Samavat, Kars okrug 251; map of, 248

INDEX

Samson (Samsun), Trebizond vilayet, 32 Sanahin, Borchalu uezd, 275, 285, 287, 289, 341, 347; map of, 104, 397 San Remo conference (April 1920): and Turkish peace treaty, 1 ; and Ar­ menians, 12—14, 28—30, 313 Sarajalar, Erevan uezd, 284 Sardarabad, Etchmiadzin uezd, 199, 237’ 250, 263, 267, 284, 292; map of, 41, 186, 397 Sargisian, Pilos, Khmbapet, 239 Sargsian, Haik, 280 Sargsian, Levon, 265, 273 Sarikamish (Sarighamish), Kars okrug: map of, 41, 397; and Armenian-So­ viet relations, 61, 82; and Arme­ nian-Turkish relations, 82, 134136, 146-149, 151, 157, 161, 177, 181, 182, 185, 187-188, 190-198 passim, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212213, 216-218, 222, 237, 238, 241, 242, 245, 247, 342, 347, 349 n. 26, 361 Sarikian, Hakob: at Vladikavkaz, 46 n. 1 Sassun, Bitlis vilayet, 36,54; map of, 41, 397 Sassuni, Garo (Karo Sasuni), 241 n. 9, 262 Sassuntsi Manuk (Manuk of Sassun), 184-185 Sassuntsi Mushegh (Mushegh of Sas­ sun), 252, 262, 273, 285 Sebouh (Arshak Nersesian), 54, 84, 207 n. 60; and Armenian-Turkish war, 238-239, 240-241, 261-262, 264-265, 271, 272, 275, 282, 285287, 291; and sovietization of Ar­ menia, 378-379, 386 Sefa Bey: as Turkish foreign minister, 306 Semenov, Colonel Grigorii Grigor’e­ vich, 88 n. 92, 111 n. 46 Semenovka, Nor-Bayazit uezd, 286; map of, 104 Serb-Croat-Slovene (Yugoslav) king­ dom, 318 Sevakar, Zangezur uezd, 111 ; map of, 68 Sevan, Lake, 307, 310, 389, 396, 405; map of, 41, 104, 397 Severek, Diarbekir vilayet: map of, 41 Sevkar (Karadash), Kazakh uezd, 376, 377: map of, 104 Sèvres, Treaty of, 40, 233, 304; and Ar­ menia, 30, 35, 39, 42, 43, 44 n. 106,96, 184, 202, 203, 204, 205,

489

206, 210, 211, 216, 217, 218, 219 n. 98, 220, 226, 231, 266, 297, 300-302, 311, 314, 317, 325-326, 327, 328, 330, 334, 335, 342, 346, 350, 368; revision of, 31, 395-396, 399, 407; and Turkey, 160, 180, 183, 198, 202—206, 210-211, 291, 3°5“3°9’ 31L 3 >7’ 327-33 h 349’ 361, 363-365, 378, 399, 407; and the United States, 267 Seyfi Bey, Colonel, 155, 157, 159 Sforza, Count Carlo: as Italian foreign minister, 299, 331 Shabadin, Zangezur uezd: map of, 68 Shabin-Karahisar, Sivas vilayet, 37; map of, 41 Shahali, Borchalu uezd, 288; map of, 104, 283 Shahardjik (Shardjik), Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Shahbudaghian, Lieutenant Colonel, 195, 241, 257 Shahgeldian, Vahan (Karl), 126 Shahkhatuni, Arshavir, 219 Shahmazian, Lieutenant Colonel Ar­ sen: and Armenian-Turkish war, 184, 262, 265, 271 Shahtaght (Shatakht), Nakhichevan uezd, 184, 208; map of, 41, 68; and Armenian-Soviet relations, 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 102, 106, 158, 159, 161, 191, 216, 217, 254; and Tur­ key, 193, 216, 217, 232, 365, 367, 371, 394 Shahtaghtinskii, Behbud, 102, 344 n. 11 Shahverdian, Danush (Daniel Aleksan­ drovich), 123 Shakir, Behaeddi n. See Behaeddin Shakir Shami, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Shamkhor, Elisavetpol uezd: map of, 1O4> 397 Shamshadin district, Kazakh uezd, 62, 64,123-124,342; map of, 104,397 Shamut, Borchalu uezd, 275, 291; map of, 283 Shant (Seghbosian), Levon: and Ar­ menian-Soviet negotiations, 47, 48 n. 8, 49-52, 55—56, 59-62, 76-77, 79, 80, 82, 90-92, 99, 102, 141, 144, 156-157, 215-216, 219-220, 226-228, 233, 360; as speaker of Parliament, 262 Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 56, 58, 60, 73, 75, 228; map of, 68 Sharur district, 135, 184, 285; and Ar­ menian-Soviet relations, 56, 71, 75,

49°

INDEX

Siunik, 66—67, 122, 405. See also Zan­ Sharur district (continued) gezur 7$, 98, 101, 346, 351, 405; map of, 68; and Turkey, 365, 367, 371, 394 Sivas (Sebastia), city and vilayet: and Armenian boundaries, 2,4, 29, 31Sharur-Nakhichevan region, 136, 149, 285, 289, 352, 365, 367, 369, 385, 32,42 393» 395» 398, 4°3 n- 77- See also Skeferis: as Greek representative in Tif­ lis, 206 Nakhichevan Shatirian, Martiros: as assistant minis­ Smbat (Baroyan/Paroyan), 239-244, 262, 273, 285 ter of finance, 200 n. 46, 357 n. 40 Sheinman (Sheiman), Aron L’vovich, Smilga, General Ivan Tenisovich, 63 Smith, Senator Hoke, 18 223’ 255’ 344’ 347’ 4°° Sheki, Zangezur uezd, 85, 120; map of, Smith, Walter George, 6, 9, 302-303 Smyrna (Izmir), 39, 44 n. 106, 299, 68 Shelkovnikian (Shelkovnikov), Major 3°5’ 3o7-3o8, 325 General Grigorii Artem’evich, 71, Sochi, Chernomorskaia oblast, 45 Socialist International, Second, 318 83, 106, 184, 254, 285, 291 Shiffers, Lev Vladimirovich, 61—62 Soghanlu Mountains, 134—135, 137, 146, 148, 181, 193; map of, 189 n- 33 Shikahogh, Zangezur uezd, 116; map Sogudi, Alexandropol uezd, 273, 291; map of, 283 of, 68 Shinuhair (Shnher), Zangezur uezd, Sogudi, Surmalu uezd, 184, 249; map of, 186 69; map of, 68 Shirak, 199, 252, 262, 267. See also Sotnikian, Petros: as assistant minister of education and culture, 200 n. 46 Alexandropol Shirinian, Arshak, 66, 69; execution South Africa: in League of Nations, of, 85, 86, 87, 106, 117 316’ S30’ 335 Soviet Russia. See Russia, Soviet Shirokaya, Mount, 195; map of, 248 Spain, 323-324, 334, 338 Shishkert, Zangezur uezd: map of, 68 Spalaikovitch, Miroslav: in League of Shishtapa, Mount, 285; map of, 283 Nations, 318 Shnegh, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Shrvenants, Zangezur uezd, 111 ; map Srvandztian, Hamazasp, 404 Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Iosif Vissarion­ of, 68 ovich, Commissar for Nationality Shukar, Surmalu uezd, 120; map of, Affairs: and Armenian-Soviet rela­ 186 Shulaver, Borchalu uezd: map of, 397 tions, 45, 63, 64, 73-74, 374, 376 n. 11, 377, 380, 389; as Russian Shuragial, Mount, 273, 284; map of, Communist Party representative in 283 Baku, 234-235; and Soviet-Turkish Shuragial district, Kars okrug: map of, 248 relations, 343-344 Shushi, town and uezd, 165; and Ar­ Stark, Leonid, 201, 218, 343, 344 n. 11 menian-Soviet relations, 63, 65, 69, Stasova, Elena Dmitrievna, 75, 177 73’ 83, 85, 88, 117, 119 n. 116, 374, 375 n. 8 Shvanidzor, Zangezur uezd, 111, 113, Steiger, General, 65, 72 n. 57 114, 119; map of, 68 Silikian, Lieutenant General Movses Steinhardt, Karl, 170 (Moisei P. Silikov), 109, 207 n. 60; Stokes, Lieutenant Colonel Claude Bayfield: and Armenia, 206-208, and Armenian-Turkish war, 239— 213, 214, 220-222, 223-226, 254, 244, 251-252, 265, 268, 270-272, 255, 258 n. 49, 266, 269, 287-288, 275 Silin, Otto Andreevich: and Armenian324-325, 347, 349, 354-355; as British chief commissioner in Soviet negotiations, 61 n. 33, 220, Transcaucasia, 294—298 234; and Soviet rule in Armenia, St. Petersburg, Russia, 61. See also Pe­ 387-388, 391, 393 trograd Sisian village and district, Zangezur uezd: and Armenian-Soviet rela­ Straits, 143, 145, 160, 300, 305 tions, 66, 67, 69, 71, 85, 87, 89, Subatan, Kars okrug, 252, 264; map of, 248 107, 110, 118, 122; map of, 68,397

INDEX

Subhi, Mustafa: as Turkish Communist leader, 165, 179 Suez Canal, 39 Suki, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Suleiman, Sultan, 31 Sultanabad, Surmalu uezd, 196, 249250; map of, 186 Sultanbek, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 95; map of, 68 Sultanov, Sultan Bek, 65 Surb Khach, Mount, 195; map of, 248 Surmalu uezd, 150,184—185,192,196, 200, 239-241, 249-250, 261, 275, 284-285, 289, 347, 369, 384-385, 393-394; maP of» 186> 283» 397 Surmene, Trebizond vilayet, 34; map of, 41 Sweden, 318 Switzerland, 335 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 6 Syria, 133, 143, 167, 232, 300, 319

Tabriz, Persia, 114; map of, 397 Tadeosian, Levon (Papasha), 238— 239» 388 Taft, William Howard, 7 Taghly, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Takialti, Surmalu uezd, 184; map of, 186 Talaat Pasha, Mehmed, 130, 141, 168, 178, 179, 187, 201 Tali Bey, Ibrahim. See Ibrahim Tali Bey [Ongörun] Talin, Etchmiadzin uezd: map of, 283 Tanagirmaz, Alexandropol uezd, 275, 291; map of, 283 Tandirlu, Olti okrug, 192; map of, 189 Tandzatap, Zangezur uezd, 110, 120; map of, 68 Tandzaver, Zangezur uezd, 120; map of, 68 Tarkhanian: as Social Revolutionary spokesman, 201 Tarkhanian, Kuro, 239, 250 Tarkhov, Colonel V., 92 Tartars, 4, 6 n. 13, 9, 10, 13, 85, 100, 209, 310, 311. See also Tatar (s) Tashkent, 48, 142 Tatar(s),67, 73, 81, 84, 107, 112, 115, 116, 117, 210 Tatev, Zangezur uezd, 120, 122; map of, 68, 397 Tatvan, Van vilayet: map of, 41 Taurus Mountains, 31-32; map of, 41 Tauz, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Tauzkala (Berd), Kazakh uezd: map of, 104 Tauzkend, Kazakh uezd: map of, 104

49I

Tegh, Zangezur uezd, 65, 67, 85; map of, 68 Ter-Arakelian, Colonel Vahan: in Kars, 239» 258-259 Ter-Davitian, Hovsep, 404 Ter-Davitian, Poghos: in Zangezur, 122 Terek oblast, 45, 48 Ter-Gabrielian, Sahak Mirzoevich: as Soviet adviser, 61, 77, 92—93, 126, 219 n. 98, 220, 374-375 Ter-Ghazarian, Zakhar, 85 Ter-Hakobian, Hakob, 200; as minister of provisions of Mountainous Ar­ menia, 406 n. 84 Terjan (Mamakhatun) Erzerum vila­ yet, 36; map of, 41 Ter-Minasian, Gedeon: as controller of Mountainous Armenia, 406 n. 84 Ter-Minasian, Ruben: as minister of military affairs, 105, 112, 198, 206— 207, 220, 222-224, 226, 239, 254, 262-263, 271-272, 350-352, 366, 3 84 Terter, Jevanshir uezd: map of, 397 Terterian, Hambardzum, 200; and Ar­ menian-Soviet negotiations, 46—47, 49”51» 53-55» 62, 216, 219-220, 227, 234, 379, 384, 386-389; and Armenian-Turkish exchanges, 280281 ; as minister of finance and wel­ fare, 357 Tevfik Pasha: as grand vizier, 269 Thrace, 44 n. 106, 143, 305, 308, 325 Tiflis (Tbilisi), 47-48, 52-53, 60-61, 64, 71, 77, 85, 90, 97, 99, 151, 153 n. 66,169, 201, 203, 206-207,209, 255, 258 n. 49, 295, 325, 355; map of, 41, 68, 397; and Red Army, 62; and Armenian-Soviet relations, 91— 92, 94, 102, 123-124, 215, 218, 227, 234, 344-345» 387» 389; and Armenian-Georgian relations, 221— 224, 256, 289; and Armenian-Turk­ ish relations, 242, 246, 266, 269270, 287-288, 297, 390; and Geor­ gian-Turkish relations, 296, 362; and Soviet-Georgian relations, 343; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 347, 349» 354» 4°° Tigris River, 42; map of, 41, 397 Tiknis, Kars okrug 273; map of, 283 Tilley, Sir John Anthony Cecil: as Brit­ ish assistant foreign secretary, 209, 212-213, 226, 305-306, 308, 315, 324, 327 n. 101, 332

492

INDEX

Tireboli (Tripoli), Trebizond vilayet, 34, 171; map of, 41 Tittoni, Tomasso, 299, 317 Topchian, Bagrat, 201, 349 n. 26 Torosian, Sahak, 356—359 Tortum, Erzerum vilayet, 185; map of, 1 Toynbee, Arnold Joseph, 211 Transcaucasia, 19, 53, 65, 174, 207, 226, 353, 357, 391; and Allies, 96, 98, 132; and Soviet Russia, 108, 124-125, 127, 134, 139, 141, 143, 146, 211, 375, 378, 381-383; and Great Britain, 123, 294; and Tur­ key, 139, 141, 143, 147, 155-156, 158, 261, 403. See also Caucasus Trebizond, city and vilayet, 137, 147, 151, »53» i59n- 62, 163 n. 89,164, 179, 183, 192, 197, 223, 253, 353, 388; and Armenian boundaries, 1, 28-29, 33-34, 36-37, 42-43, 44 n. 106, 181, 202, 220, 231-232, 349; map of, 41, 397; and Turkish invasion, 203-204, 206, 208, 211214; and Allied Powers, 254—255, 300, 304-305, 309, 311, 317, 341 Trotsky, Leon (Lev Davidovich), 168 Tuapse, Chernomorskaia oblast, 153, 159, 164, 253 Tumanian, Levon, 359 Tumulty, Joseph Patrick, 302 n. 28, 325 Turanian state, 370—371 Turkestan, 163, 177 Turkey and Turks, 66, 370—371; and Allied peace treaty, 1, 5, 35, 54, 80, 160, 180, 183, 198, 202, 203—206, 210-211, 214, 291, 300, 304-310, 3 >5» 31?» 327-33 G 35°’ 361> 3633$5’ 395-396> 407; and Armenia, 2-8, 10, 12-15, 17-18, 21, 26, 2940, 42-43, 47, 49-50, 52-54, 56, 60—61, 70-72, 78-80, 82-85, 86— 87, 89, 91-93, 96-98, 100-102, 105-106,108,110-115, 117> 119_ 123, 125, 237-309 passim, 311, 313» 316-322, 326, 341-375, 378, 383-386, 389—403; non-Muslims in, 30; Nationalists, 38-40, 44 n. 106, 46, 52, 70, 76, 78, 106, 128—147 passim, 150—152, 154, 156, 158—159, 161, 164—166, 168, 177, 179, 180, 181-183, 19®, 202, 208, 210-211, 213-214, 215, 217 n. 93, 221,225, 293, 296-298, 299, 304, 306-308, 317, 342, 345, 347, 350, 360, 362, 364, 374, 391, 395, 398-400, 406-407; and Greece,

39, 50, 128, 140, 150, 152, 162, 172, 180-181, 183, 185, 191, 193, 194, 204, 206, 209, 211-212, 254, 263, 295, 298, 299, 306-308; and Soviet Russia, 49, 53, 57—58, 61, 70-72, 74-76, 78-80, 82-84, 86— 87, 89, 92-94, 98, 100-102, 110, 113-115, 121, 253, 263-264, 294, 298, 305, 307-308, 310-311, 341369 passim, 374, 383-386, 389392, 398-403; and Allies, 50, 54, 62, 80, 128-130, 132-134, 138, 144, 146, 150, 160, 168, 180, 183, 190, 197, 199, 202, 218, 222, 326, 342, 347, 396, 399, 402-403; Grand National Assembly of, 58, 71, 127, 129, 137, 138-140, 143146, 148-149, 151-153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 162—163, 165, 168, 172, 177, 181-183, 192-194, 196, 228, 232, 245-247, 253, 260, 268-270, 274, 276, 278, 290, 345, 348, 350, 359» 361, 364. 368, 394-396,401402; and Azerbaijan, 71, 74, 76, 84, 101, 110-115, 128, i33-137’ 139» 146, 148-150, 152, 156, 157, 164, 168-169, 171, 177, 180-183, 187, 192, 195, 196, 211, 214, 249, 273, 292, 295, 297, 344, 347-349’ 364’ 373’ 375’ 378, 380-381, 402-403; and Caucasus, 128, 130, 133—134, 136, 139, 164, 178, 308, 402; and Soviet-Turkish relations, 128—179 passim, 341—369 passim, 374, 383— 386, 389-392, 398-403; People’s Representation of, 131; and Great Britain, 132, 134-136, 138—140, 147, 166, 178, 180-183, 191, 193, 197, 291-298, 303-311, 321, 347, 355’ 362, 364, 367; army of, 135137, 185, 187-188, 191-192, 195196, 241-242, 244 n. 16, 249-250, 284—285, 292; Council of Ministers of, 138, 148-149, 183, 191, 245; and United States, 138, 155, 269, 325-326; and Armenian-Turkish relations, 180-192, 341-372, 390403 passim; and Georgia, 225, 245— 246, 249, 263, 296, 362, 365, 367, 403; Commissariat for Religious Af­ fairs of, 395 Turkish Communist Party, 135-136, 147, 172 n. 107; Central Commit­ tee of, 179 Turkish National Pact, 50, 132, 151, 160-161, 180 Turkish “Red” Rifle Regiment, 119, 120, 121, 122

INDEX

Tuzla, Olti okrug, 165, 185; map of, 189

Uchlar Tapa (Tepe), Kars okrug, 249, 251, 256; map of, 248 Uch-Tapa, Mount, 119; map of, 68 Ukraine, 45, 329-330, 334 Ulia-Norashen, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 284 Ulibekian, Levon, 124 United States of America, 167, 169, 172-174, 219 n.98, 353; and Ar­ menians, 1-44 bassim, 163, 170, 173, 209, 258, 206-267, 269, 3013°3> 3°5> 3*2, SiS-SH» 319~32o, 322-326, 334, 337-339,349,406407; Senate of, 1-3, 8-9, 13, 1516, 18, 19, 20-23, 25, 27,301,314, 323, 337; State Department of, 2, 4-5, 27, 29-30, 33, 40, 44, 209, 301,326; and Republicans, 2,4,10, 11, 15, 23, 24-27; Congress of, 3, 8-10,11-15,17,19-20, 23, 27-28, 302-303, 313, 323; and Demo­ crats, 5, 14, 16, 20, 22-23, 24-25; White House of, 6, 40; Secretary of War of, 9; House of Representatives of, 15, 23; War Department of, 27, 3o» 35> 4°; Liquidation Committee of, 28; Treasury Department of, 28, 303; Interior Department of, 30; and Turkey, 138, 155, 269, 325326, 395 Upmal (Angarskii), lu. Iu., 153 n. 66, 155» 187 Urartu, 371 Urfa, town and sanjak, 163 Urmia, Lake: map of, 397 Uruguay, 335 Unit, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Uzhanis, Zangezur uezd, 121; map of, 68 Uzunlar, Borchalu uezd: map of, 104 Uzuntala, Kazakh uezd, 64, 91, 377; map of, 104 Vachakan, Zangezur uezd, 116, 120 Vagharshapat. See Etchmiadzin Vaghudi, Zangezur uezd, 120 Vagover, Olti okrug 192; map of, 189 Valadian, Valad: as Lori neutral zone commissioner, 287 Valadier, Lieutenant Charles: as French representative in Erevan, 99 n. 17, 242 n. 11 Van, city and vilayet, 47,137, 158,163, 192; and Armenian boundaries, 1, 28, 32-34, 36, 54, 161-162, 164,

493

181, 202, 231-232, 342, 350, 362, 400-401; map of, 41, 397 Van, Lake, 36, 42-43, 135, 349, 368, 370-371; map of, 41, 397 Vanand. S&Kars Vardanlu (Vartanlu), Alexandropol uezd: map of, 104, 283 Vardanlu, Kars okrug 262, 264, 273; map of, 248, 283 Vardan Zoravar (“General Vardan’’) armored train, 262, 282 n. 105 Varna, Bulgaria, 267 Varshamian, Gevorg, 404 Vasif Bey, Kara. See Kara Vasif Bey Vasilenko, General: as Eleventh Red Army commander, 84, 87, 93 Vaskut (Baskot), Mount, 187—188; map of, 189 Vedibasar district, Erevan uezd, 76, 98, 101, 150, 184 Vekilov (Vekilian), Colonel Alexan­ dre: at Alexandropol, 239—243, 259 Velikanov, General Mikhail Dmitrie­ vich: as Red Army 20th Rifle Divi­ sion commander, 103, 105, 376 Venezuela, 335 Venizelos, Eleutherios Kyriakou, 307, 331; as Greek prime minister, 172, 183; and Armenian boundaries, 29; and Turkey, 298-299, 365 Verishan (Verishen), Kars okrug, 195; map of, 189 Versailles, Treaty of: and the United States, 2—3, 7-8, 11 Versailles Allied Military Committee, 210, 304 Vesnik, Ia. I.x 74 Veysel Bey [Unûvar], Major, 103, 113, 284, 291-292 Vezinkoy, Kars okrug, 249—253, 256, 259; map of, 248 Viviani, René: in League of Nations, 319-322, 330, 335, 338-339 Vladikars, Kars okrug 243—244, 256; map of, 189, 248 Vladikavkaz, Terek oblast, 46 n. 1, 48, 56, 91, 215 Volch’i Vorota (Wolves’ Gates), Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 285 Volunteer Army, 119, 229. See also White Armies Vorontsovka, Borchalu uezd, 275; map of, 104, 283, 397 Vostan, Van vilayet: map of, 41 Vratzian, Simon, 200, 207, 238, 241; as prime minister, 354—359, 364366, 369, 378-379, 382-388, 392,

494

INDEX

Vratzian, Simon (continued) 404; as head of Salvation Commit­ tee of Fatherland, 405 Wallace, Ambassador Hugh, 40, 44 Walsh, Senator Thomas James, 21 Warsaw, Poland, 280, 298 Washington, D.C., 7-8, 204, 323, 326 Westermann, Professor William Linn, 30, 40, 43 White, George Edward, 2 White Armies, 45-46, 74, 132, 133 n. 11 Williams, Aneurin, 8, 309—312 Williams, Senator John Sharp: and Ar­ menian mandate, 6, 9—10, 15, 17, 301 Wilson, President T. Woodrow, 172, 266, 276, 282, 298; and Armenian mandate, 1-3, 6-16, 18, 20-21, 23-28, 313-314, 322-326; and Ar­ menian boundaries, 28—31, 33, 36, 37 n. 89, 40, 42-44, 184, 202, 204, 301-302, 309, 315, 317, 322-326, 329, 331, 334; and Armenian loan, 303; and mediation for Armenia, 338-339 Wilson, Sir Henry: as Chief of Imperial General Staff, 294 Wrangel, General Baron Petr Niko­ laevich, 101, 123, 158, 182, 183, 185, 203, 215, 221, 307, 342, 348349> 352, 377

Yablokov, Georgii G. (Gevorg Khndzorian), 290, 360 Yaghni, Kars okrug, 249, 251—252, 256; map of, 248 Yaidji, Surmalu uezd, 250; map of, 186 Yaidji, Zangezur uezd, 120-121; map of, 68 Yaila, Ardahan okrug, 192; map of, 189 Yakulian, Pavel, 386, 392 Yalvandagh, Borchalu uezd, 275 Yarrow, Ernest A., 209 Yenikoy, Kaghisman okrug, 195; map of, 189 Yolian, Zakar, 66 Young Turks, 76, 276; and SovietTurkish relations, 128—130, 134, 141-142, 166, 171, 177-179, 182, 187, 307. See also Ittihad ve Terakki Yugoslavia, 318 Yusuf Kemal Bey [Tengirçenk], 183;

and Soviet-Turkish negotiations, i45> *53> *57» *59’ 163-164, 191, 193

Zabugh (Zabukh), Zangezur uezd, 65, 88, 118; map of, 68 Zakariadze, General: as Georgian chief of staff, 289 Zakatal, town and okrug: map of, 41, 397 Zalingeol, Zangezur uezd, 111—112 Zamp, Mount, 192 Zangezur uezd: and Armenian-Soviet relations, 46, 52-60, 62-76, 78, 79-84, 85, 87, 88-90, 92-95, 9799, 103, 106, 108-123, 127» 155» 157—158, 165, 182-183, 201-202, 215-216, 220, 227-229, 233, 342, 352, 376, 380-382, 387, 389,405406; National Council of, 66; Mili­ tary Revolutionary Committee of (Revkom), 67; map of, 68, 397; Azerbaijani cession of, 380—383; and Armenian-Turkish relations, 385 Zangibasar district, Erevan uezd, 76, 101, 149, 152, 165, 184 Zarafian, Levon: and Armenian-Soviet negotiations, 46—47, 50, 52, 62, 216, 219 n. 98, 220, 228, 234, 392; and Armenian-Turkish negotia­ tions, 360 Zarushat (Zarishat), district, Kars okrug, 207 n. 60, 238, 261; map of, 248 Zeinalov, Colonel, 71 Zeiva (Davit Bek), Zangezur uezd, no112, 117—118, 120; map of, 68 Zevin, Erzerum vilayet, 150; map of, 189 Zhordania, Noi Nikolaevich: as Geor­ gian prime minister (minister-pres­ ident), 222, 246 Ziaret (Surb Eghia), Mount, Kars okrug, 238, 242-243; map of, 248 Ziaret, Mount, Olti okrug, 195: map of, 189 Zibni (Dspni), Kaghisman okrug: map of, 248 Zinoviev (Radomilskii), Grigorii Ev­ seevich: and Comintern, 166, 169— 171, 175”176 Zoka-ed-Dowleh, Emir, 339 Zurzuna, Ardahan okrug, 222

Errata Volume I, printings 1-3 and Volume II, printing 1

VOLUME I Page (line, note, or index)

For

Read

22(23), 35(9), 42(6), 460(39), 538 (index)

Nazarabekian (Nazarabekov)

Nazarbekian (Nazarbekov)

80(15), 523(index)

Ardsakh

Artsakh

236(22), 532(index)

Colonel Halil

Captain Halil

396(6), 410(11), 414(22), 524(index)

Varlaam Avanesov

Varlam Avanesov

4o8 (5)» 538(index) 42o(n.n), 453(6), 525 (index)

Askenaz Mravian

Askanaz Mravian

Bahaeddin-Shakir

Behaeddin Shakir

448(n.i), 547(index)

Zavalashin

Sergei Zavalishin

492(24)

A. Babayan

A. Babalian

53o(index)

Elenovka, Erevan uezd

Elenovka, NovoBayazit uezd

For

Read

68(32), 70(8), 105(32), 106(15), 183(20), 203(26), 225(26), 229(38), 349(4), 588(index)

Colonel Halil

Captain Halil

94(23), 593(index)

Joseph Marquart

Joseph Markwart

VOLUME II Page (line, note, or index)

495

496

ERRATA

138(2), i39(!)

Insert line 1 from page 139 as line 2 of page 138

142(23), 492(1), 595 (index)

Emile de Nonancourt

Charles-Marie de Nonancourt

159(7)> 592(index)

Major Livingston

Lieutenant Colonel Livingston

252(14), 312(17), 589 (index)

Bashkhi Ishkhanian

Bakhshi Ishkhanian

288(20), 594(index)

Hovhannes Melkonian

Dr. H. Melkonian

287(17), 58o(index)

Mesrop Bek Asratikian

Mesrop Bek Saratikian

309(10), 603 (index)

Zavalashin

Sergei Zavalishin

346(24), 599 (index)

Archbishop Mesrop Smbatian

Bishop Mesrop Ter-Danielian

379(11,17,20), 567(!5)

Vartan Malcolm

Vartan Malcom

559