The Congress in Tamilnad: nationalist politics in South India, 1919-1937 [1977 ed.]

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THE CONGRESS IN TAMILNAD

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY MONOGRAPHS ON SOUTH ASIA NO-1 General Editors: Protessor D.A. Low, Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University, Canberra Professor Peter Reeves, Department of Modern History. University of Western Australia Or. Robin Jeffrey, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVER SITY MONOGRAPHS

ON SOUTH ASIA NO-1

THE CONGRESS IN TAMILNAD Nationalist Politics in South India, 1919-1937

DAVID ARNOLD

Social Sciences Research Fellow The Flinders University of Sou th Austra

lia

Nn

MANOHAR

The Volumes in this series are published in India by Manohar Book Service and in Australia by the South Asian History Section of the Australian Natrona! University, Canberra

ISBN 0 908070 00 4

© David Arnold 1977

Furst Published 1977

Published by

Ramesh C. Jain

tor Manohar Book Service 2, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj

New Delhi-110002 Printed at

Pearl Offset Press 5/33 Kirti Nagar, Industrie! Area New Delhi-110016

ConTeENTS

INTRODUCTION

aunrkun

NATIONALIST

AND

REGIONAL

THE

NON-COOPERATION

THE

SWARAJISTS'

POLITICS

EXPERIMENT 78

DILEMMA

CONFRONTATION

113

COALESCENCE

141

RAPPROCHEMENT

175

References

191

Bibliography

223

Biographical

Notes

232

Glossary

238

Index

239

Maps:

Tables:

1

The

Madras

2

The

Tamil

1

Madras

2

Party Composition of Madras Legislature,

the 1923

3

Party

the

Madras

Madras

Presidency,

Districts

of the

Presidency

Legislative

Composition

1930

Council

of

Legislature,

1926

ll 56 88 102

INTRODUCTION

Broadly

{tury

speaking,

developed

utilized regime

that

in

achieve

rather

the

one

first

constitutional

of

two

institutional

structure,

{without of

to

the

the anti-colonial

movements

directions.

structure

self-government,

attempting

than

the

of this

to

or

they

by

the

it from within.

anti-colonial

struggle

and non-violent;

colonial

regime

from

outside

In the case

was

of the

they

the

worked

overthrow

succeeding

Either

created

cen-

generally

second

it was

almost

invariably violent. The ideology of the former inclined towards western-style liberalism and democracy; the latter towards a revolutionary nationalist and/or socialist creed.

4

The

~ leaders

anti-colonial

were

The choice determined crucial

colonial

free

struggle

to decide

was

not

a duel

the weapons

in

with which

which

the

to

fight.

by

the

between a constitutional or an armed struggle was by the socio-political environment, in which one

factor

was

regime to

the_degree of resistance

its would-be

staged

successors.

If the regime

allowed a relatively large and increasing indigenous participation in higher education, local government, the bureaucracy and other colonial institutions, if after a few clashes between demonstrators and the police the regime made concessions

rather

altogether. protest, if

If the colonial regime suppressed political it outlawed anti-colonial parties and news-

need

to resort

than

face

to violence

the

regime's

a major

confrontation,

was minimized,

papers,

then

critics

In

this

respect

the

of

Western

industrial

had

even

either

resort to secret and revolutionary means throw a system they could not penetrate.

the

anti-colonial

struggles

same

movements

basic

that

by

pattern

eliminated

to

the

societies.

submit

which can

influenced

then

to

be

or

over-

seen

class

Where

the

thc

in emer-

ging proletariat was able to establish itself within the existing political structure without a head-on collision

with

muted

acter.

the

ruling

classes,

and working-class Where

the

class

politics

demands

of

conflict

the

have

has

had

been

generally

a reformist

proletariat

have

been

charmet

by ruling-class

class

politics

militancy

-

and

During

intransigence

have

been

a more

the

and

thrust

state

in the direction

revolutionary

anti-colonial

repression,

of greater

ideology.

movement

working-

leadership

was

usual-

ly drawn from the professional middle class, but the attitudes of the middle classes as a whole were ambiguous, even contradictory. On the one hand they favoured a loosening of colonial authority and exploitation which would enable their own interests to flourish and ultimately they

sought state: the

control of the economic and political resources of the in this regard the middle class was the vanguard of

anti-colonial

movement.

On

the

other

hand

the

emergence

of the national bourgeoisie was intimately related to the changes that resulted from colonialism. The colonial state was a major employer of the professional middle class;

business

companies

ideology

of the

from

the colonizing

country

employed

local clerks, agents and merchants. Further, the ideology of the national bourgeoisie was heavily impregnated with the

of life and Under

colonizing

values

an

intransigent

sections of the methods if they structure long term

and

social

were

colonial

middle classes might found their attempts

assets social

situation

and

ally

with

strata.

the middle

demonstrations"

often

bourgeoisie,

necessary

classes and

to

whose

imitated.

persistently blocked. they might gamble with

privileged

"Mass

power's

it widely

In

the

a

regime

least

some

favour revolutionary to penetrate the state

To achieve power in the their immediate economic

even

the

most

relatively

proceeded

more

creation

answer

at

style

under-

open

colonial

cautiously.

of a "mass

allegations

that

party"

the

nation-

alist movement was not representative of anyone other than the middle classes, and they were at times essential to exploit opportunities created by an expanding electoral system. But middle-class leaderships were loath to share power with workers and peasants if they could avoid doing so. Why should

destroy

they

them

Colonial

assets

they

start

as

an

well

regimes

valued

avalanche

as

the

did

most

of

mass

colonizers?

not

unrest

voluntarily

— authority

and

which

surrender

economic

might

the

advantage

unless there was overwhelming compulsion or ultimate gain doing so. An intransigent regime reasoned that any concessions

to

the

anti-colonial

damage its power and prestige. learned through experience that

pended ation

not on repression

of influential

forces

and coercion

sections

would

irredeemably

A less intransigent regime its survival ultimately de-

of the

but

on the collabor-

indigenous

population,

—

in

or

a judicious

combination

of

force

and

persuasion.

Unless economic and social conditions were peculiarly static, collaboration could never be a once-and-for-all settlement with a class or dominant social group. In response to a changing distribution of wealth and the erosion of

the

authority

gence

of

colonial

new

of

the

classes

regime

and

pre-colonial

the

periodically

rulers,

disintegration reassessed

its

with

of old

the

emer-

ones,

position,

the

iden-

tifying new opponents and seeking out new collaborators. In the later stages of colonial rule the supply of collaborators was often running low. A new assessment of the situation might reveal to the colonial authorities that its own armed forces, police and bureaucracy were no longer filled with

reliable

collaborators,

and

that

decolonization

might

be preferable to a costly and bloody attempt to retain formal control with repressive legislation and foreign troops. On

occasions,

that

reassessment

the

anti-colonial

was

made

in

a

belated

real-

ization that the foundations were already crumbling heneath the colonial superstructure; more often, it was based upon shrewd calculations of the political and economic benefits of granting independence (rather than allowing it to be snatched at gun-point) and of retaining close ties with the colonial territory. Neo-colonialism was seldom an afterthought.

cm

In

| the \the

India

non-violent, constitutional sub-continent terrorism was

the

threat

cies

of

of

both

terrorism

the

was

nationalists

movement

was,

in essence,

variety. In some parts of intermittently important and

a factor and

the

determining British

the

rulers,

polibut

was not a fundamental characteristic of the struggle. In Tamilnad, the region of south India on which this study focusses, terrorism played very little part in shaping the

nature

and

course

Satyagraha,

sistance

which

of the

the

Gandhi

anti-colonial

distinctive

introduced

of

form

into

it

movement.

of non-violent

the

Indian

re-

nationalist

struggle, was an attempt to avoid all forms of violent conflict with the British Raj and yet so to harass and isolate the colonial regime that it would either collapse for want of, Indian supporters and collaborators, or be persuaded to come to terms with the Indian National Congress. Satyagraha was an attempt to adopt the militancy and anticonstitutionalism of the terrorist and guerilla while eschewing their violence; it aimed to be as uncompromising

as

the

ture ly,

men

of violent

means

of the colonial state. although designed to

towards

the

institutional

struc-

It failed on two counts. Firstby-pass India's colonial

institutions,

latures, Congress

secure

especially

the

central

and

provincial

legis-

satyagraha in time became a device by which the attempted to win constitutional objectives and to

a place

for itself within

istrative

structure.

divisions:

it had

This

was

the

British-made

not

what

Gandhi

admin-

himself

wanted, but since a rival or "parallel" government could only be established and sustained within India by the use of force, he gave his supporters no real alternative but to return at some point of time to constitutional politics under a colonial regime. Secondly, to be successful, satyagraha as a technique of anti-colonialism had to transcend class

to unite

the middle

classes

and the

masses. But the middle classes were jealous of powers and privileges (gained from a relatively

colonial

regime)

1921-22)

revealed

ers.

Gandhi's

and

early

suspicious

essays

the

disobedience

even

when

middle-class

hands,

in

mass

of the

mass

violence

it was

rural

satyagraha

that

tried

their own responsive

and urban (1919

accompanied

on a limited

work-

and

civil

scale:

the

campaigns also failed to achieve their avowed political objectives. Despite the gradual expansion of the Congress party, direction of the anti-colonial movement remained in

industrialists,

rural

though

with

increasing

landlords

assistance

and rich peasants.

from

The

dominance of the propertied classes within the Congress checked the agitational potential of satyagraha and tugged

the movement

away

tionalism.

It also

agreement

from direct

facilitated

between

Experience

the

the

Congress

action

and back

eventual and

of anti-colonial

the

to

constitu-

attainment

of an

Raj.

agitation

before

Gandhi's

rise to Congress leadership at the end of the First World War, gave the British in India a range of techniques with which to counter satyagraha. Repression of all violent and seditious

was

balance

British

were

aspects

employed

with

between

the

caution

agitation

for

was

one

in

their the

Indian

long

response,

fear of upsetting

coercion and collaboration

had buiit

preferred

of

term.

empire. One

on

which

the

create

and

Two other

was

to

but

it

the delicate techniques

pat-

ronize groups of loyalists who could be relied -on to help the Raj and oppose the Congress. The aim was not very dif-

ferent from the recruitment of sepoys by the English East India Company to fight its battles, but the rewards were now

more

likely

to be a share

than a mercenary's wage. \interest groups, whether ‘caste

terms,

against

the

of government

power

and patronage

The aim was to play off particular defined in class, religious or

Congress

in

the

hope

of

defeating

|the latter. The the Congress but colonial rule in roys,

Governors

other technique to convert it. India it was no

and

senior

was not to try to destroy By the later stages of longer practical for Vice-

civil

servants

to

think

of

elim-

inating the Congress. It was powerful and, within the limits of the political arena demarcated by agitation and elections, it was popular. Therefore, Congressmen had to be bullied and tempted away from the non-cooperation and civil disobedience into which Gandhi had led them and shepherded

back

could

to

the

keep

institutions

an

eye

on

them.

of colonial

The story of the Congress

has two essential

themes.

in

rule

where

Tamilnad

from

One is the evolution

- Congress as_a-regional-political_party. This story. From being a small political club in

little

active

support

outside

the rise

of the

British

1919

to

1937

of the Tamil

is a success 1919, with

the predominantly

fessional middle class, by 1937 ful organization, experienced in toral technique, and was firmly dominant party. In 1919-23 the along ideological, strategic and unable to respond effectively to

the

Brahmin

_-

WU /

pro-

the party commanded a powerboth agitational and elecestablished as the region's party was deeply divided factional lines; it seemed the serious threat posed by

anti-Brahmin and loyalist Justice Party.

By

the mid-1930s, however, the Justice Party was in rapid decline and the landslide victory of the Congress in the 1937 provincial elections marked both the virtual extinction of the Justice Party and the triumph of the Congress as a broad-based and relatively cohesive coalition of diverse political

success

not

of

become

mitment; classes. time,

the

interests.

There

a mass

party

Tamil

Congress

the Congress

through non-cooperation Tectly at the authority

depended

in

of

course,

limits

to

the

of

its

membership

or

com-

The Congress

terms

in Tamilnad

it was predominantly a party of the propertied But within the bounds of regional politics at

cr The second theme is < “pationalist movement and

“leadership

were,

its party-building.

and by-passing

held

a

remarkable

ascendancy.

the changing relationship a colonial regime. Under

attempted and and

the

to win

the

between a Gandhi's

independence

civil disobedience, aiming collaboration on which the

institutional

did

structure.

diRaj

This

strategy failed. Congress leaders, especially C. Rajagopalachari, Gandhi's principal lieutenant in Tamilnad, were hampered by factionalism within the party and by a fear, prevalent among Congressmen and the propertied classes generally, that civil disobedience might unintentionally trigger a social revolution. British rule proved stronger than

|

many able

Gandhians to divert

legislature. (identified,

follow too,

alternative strategy, some nationalists main, with the Swarajya Party) tried to

ineffective,

leadership

by its create Raj

As an in the

non-cooperation

proved

gress

had anticipated, and they were largely unattention away from the reformed provincial from

within

mainly

opposed

the

the

legislatures.

because

the

acceptance

the

legislatures,

the

Con-

of ministerial office

partymen. Having failed to expel the a rival government, and having failed

through

This,

national

Congress

British or to to topple the

evolved

a

com-

promise strategy. During the civil disobedience campaigns of 1930-33, the party built up a large-scale organization

and a fund

of public

‘advantage ing

by

its

gains,

in

these

leadership

electoral means

exclude

which

contests

from

realized

that

ousted

in Tamilnad to

sympathy

the

its

it was

Justice

rivals

and

able

1934

to

Party,

in

order

to

to turn

1937.

the

to

to

But

Congress

hav-

consolidate

satisfy

the

demands

of the electorate it would have to compromise with the British to the extent of taking office under the constitution created by the Government of India Act of 1935.

The paradox of the

(and

Jas

the

argument

a whole)

was

is

late

no

that

less

colonial true

situation

for

the Congress

the

in Tamilnad

Madras

was both

Presidency

the most

power-

\ful opponent of the British and their most_promjsing ally. Although from the early 1920s until the mid-1930s the Gov-

ernors the

of Madras

constitutional

India

Act,

close

had

relied

system

on the Justicites

created

association

the Justice Party too feeble tive role under the new, and

Through

its

very

opposition

by

with

the

the

to operate

1919

colonial

Government

regime

of

left

to continue to play a suppormore demanding, 1935 Act.

to

the

Raj

— especially

its

of the

new

constitution.

ex-

periments with non-cooperation and civil disobedience — the Congress had developed the organization and popular backing necessary

to

make

a success

British

had no particular

British

were

affection

for the Congress,

The

but

since they could not ignore its agitational and electoral successes, they tried to turn them to advantage. Provided that the Congress played constitutional politics, the power

to

rampaging the whole

their

ministerial

| and

prepared

entrust

opponent.

be

end

and

the

a substantial

degree

of

A malevolent

Congress

with

radicals

constitutional tent might bring down A Congress in office, burdened by

responsibility,

might

volutionary

erstwhile

outside the structure.

extremists,

' ronage,

to

feeding best

to British

at odds

on

governmental

guarantee

rule

its

in

against

India.

own

power

and

a violent,

pat-

re-

The terms and the date on which Indian independence would be achieved were, of course, still undetermined when the Congress took office government) was 10 years

in Madras in 1937. away. But by that

Swaraj (selfdate the Con-

gress leadership in Madras, and especially Rajagopalachari from Tamilnad, had reached an informal understanding with the provincial representatives of the Raj which foreshadowed

a peaceful

and constitutional

understanding

ization

the

was

of other

Second

World

to

be

British

War.

a vital

transfer stage,

Asian

There,

of power. too,

and African

too,

in

the

Such

an

decolon-

territories

independence

followed,

after

al-

most invariably, from the conversion of militant nationalist pponents to constitutional collaborators and successors. [It was the British style of decolonization, so easily paro{died, so effectively executed. formances of the decolonization

looked

to have

rather

Perhaps

amateurish.

A weak

a disproportionate it

was

(to

In some of story, the

effect

change

imagery)

the later perfight scenes

nationalist

on the like

punch

colonial

Pavlov's

seemed

regime.

unfortunate

dogs: colonial governments had been conditioned to respond. But in India the vital prelude to decolonization was not easily reached. It was the outcome of nearly two decades of political experimentation by both the Congress and the Raj.

gw

2,

Ol

This,

then,

sentiments,

nor

is

does

not

a

study

it attempt

of

nationalist

to probe

ideas

and

the politics

of the

{| localities, though necessarily in a discussion of the evolution of the Congress in the 1920s and 1930s there are

points at which these aspects of political life impinge upon the central themes. The concern here is with the practical difficulties which nationalist politicians faced in their attémpts-to gain independence for India — the ways in which they

sought

strategies sequences

to overcome

they

which

organization in a broader

adopted the

Fival

partiés;

to combat

nature

and character context, this

of the

the

colonial

struggle

techniques

rule; had

of the nationalist monograph seeks to

and

upon

the

party. present

And, the

story of the Congress in Tamilnad as a case-study of how nationalist parties evolved during the later stages of col-

onialism. As such, it relates many of the other countries of

which rule.

in the recent

past

have

not only to India but also Asia, Africa and America

experienced

European

i

the con-

colonial

_

to

\ i

}

-\ Gansane

oe

Ai Semalyo

in, GUNTUR _

e

i

‘SODavaRY

" weLcone

BAY OF

fouanraon?S guooara >

BENGAL

vee

200 100

Map

1.

The

Madras

{8]

Presidency.

300 kilometres 200 miles

CHaprer 1 NATIONALIST AND REGIONAL PoLiTics The Tamil Tamilnad

on

as

its

the

Country has

been

own."?

land

graphical

as

"a

country,

primarily

in

has

the

people,

south-eastern

enabled

cultural

it

to develop

character.

To

almost

defined

of the Tamil-speaking

location

sub-continent

tinctive

described

Although

the

in

a nation,

cultural

terms,

Tamilnad's

corner

of

and maintain

east

lies

geo-

the

the

Indian

a dis-

Bay

Bengal; to the west and north-west an upland rim divides Tamil country from Kerala and the Deccan. Within the region's 50,000 square miles is a gradual transition from

to

the

dry

arid

region

rice

fields

tawny

interior

relieved

and

the

For a century eighteenth century

Tamilnad

the

glimpse

province,

were

the

impression

and

outcrops

occasional

of an ornate

of the Madras Madras

Canara on the west coast Oriya linguistic regions tricts

One

flash

dominant

Presidency.

incorporated

of

prevails:

grey

of

pagoda.

of in

an

and

vivid

temple

and a half — from the end until Indian independence

was part

polyglot

palms

by

the

diversity is muted, and there the low-lying Coromandel cvast

plateaux.

of scattered

rock,

of

the 1947

green

—

A sprawling,

Malabar

and

South

and parts of the Telugu, Kannada and to the north. But the Tamil diselement

in

the

presidency:

they

con-

stituted a third of the land area and half the population — 21 million out of nearly 43 million in 1921. Tamilnad was more urban than its regional neighbours: there were 175 officially classified cities and towns in the Tamil region in

1921

compared

Malabar;

15.5

to

111

per

in the Telugu

cent

of

Tamils

districts

lived

in

and

urban

nine

areas

in

com-

pared to 10.6 of Telugus and 7.2 of Malayalis.* By 1931 nine of the 15 largest towns and cities in the presidency were located in Tamilnad, including the four most populous

Madras

and

was

1931;

(647,230),

Salem the

(182,018),

(102,179).

Calicut,

Telugus'

Cocanada

nearest

the

Madura

rival,

with

Trichinopoly

Malabar's

a population

lagged

expanding of

far

(142,843),

99,273

behind

port, in

with

—

10 65,952.°

bours,

Tamilnad

in

that,

Dravidian

south,

was

further

unlike

the

almost

distinguished

other

the

from

linguistic

whole

of

the

regions

its

of

neigh-

the

Tamil-speaking

area

was under one administration. Kerala was partitioned between the princely states of Travancore and Cochin and the Malabar district of the Madras Presidency; Andhra was split between British Madras and princely Hyderabad; Karnataka was torn between Madras, Bombay and Mysore state. By contrast, only

the

small

Tamil

population

in

the

French

enclaves

of

Pondicherry and Karikal on the east coast, in the state of Pudukkottai, and in southern Travancore lay outside the presidency. Thus, the Tamil districts of the province con-

stituted

a relatively

compact

and homogeneous

linguistic

block, and they correspond closely to the state of Madras (renamed Tamilnad or Tamil Nadu in 1969) which was formed by the reorganization of India's states on linguistic lines in 1956.

Distinctive though remained throughout the

the had

the Tamil region was, it nonetheless colonial period an integral part of

British province of Madras. From 1920 Tamil Congressmen their own "Provincial" Congress Committee, but they

could not

presidency

ignore as

political

a whole.

In

developments

particular,

which

affected

Tamilnad's

the

Congress-

men in the provincial Legislative Council had to work alongside partymen and allies from the other linguistic regions of the presidency. This was a frequent source of friction, most

noticeably

Despite

dominantly

between

Telugu

Tamil

claims

a Tamil

city.

to

In

and

Telugu

the

contrary

British

had grown far less rapidly than modest, more leisurely city, it

Congressmen.

hands

Calcutta was akin

Madras since

was

1639,

preit

and Bombay. A more to an English

county town only marginally influenced by the industrial revolution, rather than to a London, Manchester or Sheffield. Since the 1870s, the decade in which the harbour was built

and as

a

the

much

of the

in the mills,

ization. No

Madras,

which

could most

and

first

commercial

city

and

mill

established,

industrial

still

centre,

Madras

had a semi-rural

but

in

had

the

appearance

developed 1920s

and only

north-west, around the railway workshops and textile did Madras show the grim face of early industrial-

other but,

dwarfed

boast

of

cotton

city

unlike

every

of more

which

commercial

had

in

Tamilnad

Calcutta,

other

than

been

centres

town

was

as

in

the

it

was

half-a-dozen

administrative,

under

large

not

an

or

as

urban

presidency.

substantial religious,

pre-British

regimes

varied

colossus

as

Tamilnad

towns,

educational

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which

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2.

The Tamil

(11)

country.

12 had survived as district or taluk headquarters under the rulers. Madura and Trichinopoly in particular were the rivals of Madras, and during the 1920s and 1930s their rivalry found expression in the contest between Congress

factions

in the presidency

town

districts).

and

the

mofussil

new

(up-country

The great majority of Tamils lived not in the towns and cities, but on the land. The basis of economic activity in the region was overwhelmingly agricultural, with rural population densities greatest in the irrigated river valleys, especially the delta of the Cauvery. The presidency as a

whole

had

an

other

eastern

average

density

of

329

people

per

square

mile

in 1931, but in Tanjore, the district which covered most the Cauvery delta, the average density was over 600, and

districts

with

extensive

river

irrigation

of in

the

figure rose above 400 in many taluks.“ Rice was the principal crop grown on these "wet" lands: in 1922-23, for example, 47 per cent of the total cultivated area of Tanjore was under vice.> Intensive cultivation on this scale was only possible through river irrigation. Except for a narrow coastal strip, which received over 40 inches of rain a year, Tamilnad had

to subsist on a rainfall of between 20 and 40 inches, concentrated mainly in the monsoon months. In the dry interior

agriculture was assisted by tank and well irrigation: tobacco, sugar-cane, chillies, and long-staple cotton were grown. Elsewhere, on the unirrigated lands, cultivators

produced

millets

Tamilnad

cattle

groundnuts,

deep

wells

Erode

and

were

and

a major

estates Small

British

principal

were

export

used

heavy

city.

production

for

soils:

Direct

was

Nilgiri

landholders

period,

the

item and the basis

Madras

of the

food-grain

In the western

extensively

ploughing

around

in agricultural fee

(the

and oil-seeds.

and

confined

land was

seldom

in

districts

drawing

hides

water

works

Tamilnad.

Before

individual

erty and a marketable commodity, but as being collective control of the village community.

from

skins

in

tea and cof-

hills.

as

of

involvement

to the

regarded

Tamils),

and

for tanning

European

Anaimalai

predominated

of poorer

the

prop-

under the In some areas,

especially the rice lands of Tanjore, Trichinopoly and the north-east, there were leading villagers, known as mirasdars, with

hereditary

land

rights,

and

these

sometimes

controlled

agricultural production over hundreds, even thousands, of acres. Less extensive, but also involving hereditary rights, were lands held by tnandars. These were generally small

plots

of

tnamdars

land

were

given

most

by

local

frequently

rulers

as

Brahmins

rewards

and were

for

services:

usually

13 regarded

rather these

they

as

holding

than

as

land

the

solely

Presidency

was under

collection

on

more

than

their

rights,

individual

responsible

No

for

individuals.®

pre-existing

promoted

land

to

the

a quarter

religious

The

ryot

British

but

to

of

the

land

landed proprietors were tween the ryots and the their

for

his

system,

not

most

become

area

the zamindari

did

over

government

institutions

of

of

the

the

by

land

eliminate

Tamilnad

landholder, taxes.”

Madras

which

large

established as intermediaries government with rights of tax

own

estates.

The

zamindari

be-

tracts

were

to be found mainly in the northern Telugu districts, but there was a smaller belt of zamindaris in Tamilnad running from North Arcot and Salem each of these districts at century there were upwards

to Madura and the beginning of a million

zamindars.°

The ryotwari system undoubtedly political and social character. The unlike their counterparts in Bengal, or

even

Andhra,

were

British

regime

little

influence

tween

the colonial

for

the

was

the

tax-paying

and self-interest They

were

portance

too

in rural

number

to

be

valuable

society

on

the Madras

numerically

with

in

administration ryots

moulded the region's zamindars of Tamilnad, the United Provinces,

few

or

whose

and

to provide

and

the

important

— a

from

cash-crop

production,

| {

too

¥

a solid prop

intermediaries

cultivators.

be-

It

collaboration

depended

factor

expansion

the twentieth century; they constituted through which the British could hope to and, from the late nineteenth century, were extending their range of economic

derived

commanded

tolerance,

government

the progressive

Tinnevelly. In of the, twentieth acres under

of

of the

in Tamilnad.

increasing

franchise

im-

in

a social stratum regulate rural life; the wealthy ryots activity as wealth

marketing

and money-

lending was invested in western-education, enabling a new generation to enter urban professions and the bureaucracy It was largely because of this diversification that nonBrahmins from rural agrarian and trading castes came into

conflict

with

Politics

and Social

The

Tamilnad

the

Brahmins.

first steps

were taken

ta In the activities of

lwp?

Conflict

towards

by

the

nationalist

non-Brahmin

agitation

merchants

in

of Madras

mid-nineteenth century the proselytizing Christian missionaries, aided by government

officials, aroused the religious indignation of the Hindu merchants. In 1842 Pachaiyappa's College was founded in Madras under merchant patronage to provide an alternative

to

14 the educational institutions of the missionaries; and in 1844 G. Lakshmanarasu Chetti, a Telugu merchant, launched

, the

o

Crescent

of

the

newspaper

Hindu

to

defend

community ."'!°

"'the

The

rights

merchants

had

and

privileges

an

additional

grievance: they disliked the existing powers of the East ‘India Company and, with the renewal of the Company's charter “x in the offing, they sought to pressure Parliament to remove 2X \ its unfavourable features. In response to suggestions from the wm British Indian Association in Calcutta, Madras merchants ty

formed a local branch of the association in February 1852, replacing it six months later by an independent body, the

{Madras

.

a

Native

Association.

It

aimed

to

amend

the

Company

j charter, revise the taxation system, and curb missionary {activity. The association was active for 10 years, but with the transfer of British India from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858, one of the main grievances of the association was removed and by July 1862 it had become "practi-

. \

cally defunct". The

did

not

early

knowledge

of

to

political

continue.

of the

provincial

voice

leadership

Being

in

English

the

against

the

the

the

presidency

language,

administration,

protests

of

Madras

and close

merchants

government.

town,

merchants

with

some

well

placed

to the centre

were

But

the

merchant

community was, at this stage, heavily dependent on Europeancontrolled trade and European business houses in the city. Compradors, lacking an independent economic base, they were

not

sufficiently

serious

and

sustained

challenge

to

the

to mount

British.

a more

Further,

attractive wider support commercial and

behind

middle

took

centre

them

which

~ :

and confident

the city merchants had neither a sufficiently cause nor the organizational base to mobilize for the Madras Native Association. A smaller industrial

.

independent

in

could

than

producing

provide

Calcutta an

and

Indian

nationalist

It was, therefore, the the lead in organizing

Bombay,

commercial

Madras

leadership.

lagged

class

professional middle class an anti-colonial movement

which in

Tamilnad. A region which could boast few merchant princes 'and even fewer captains of industry, Tamilnad was prolific ‘in its output of graduates. By 1880 the region had 15 arts colleges and 50 high schools; Madras ing as many graduates as Bengal, and

came

from Tamilnad.

awarded

arts

Malayalis, Brahmins

‘families

degrees

Between to

450 Telugus,

predominated, in

Tanjore,

1,900

1858

Tamil

Presidency was producthe majority of them

and-1894

students

and 300 Kannarese.

most

of them

Tinnevelly,

coming

Chingleput

Madras as

Among

from and

University

against

500

the Tamils,

landholding

Trichinopoly.

15 Non-Brahmins

constituted

only

a

fifth

of

the

graduates

and

of these many were Nairs from the west coast. As yet highranking Tamil non-Brahmins saw little economic and social advantage in having degrees and becoming pen-pushers\2 ‘here

were historical

reasons

for

this

smaller percentage of the Hindu Indian regions, the Brahmins of

and

social

power

that

was

quite

communal

disparity.

J

A

population than in most Tamilnad wielded economic

disproportionate

to

| —

their

ww?

numbers. In the presidency as a whole Brahmins constituted 3.3 per cent of Hindus. In Tamilnad their percentage of the

total population ranged from one per cent in the Nilgiris to 3.7 in Tinnevelly and 6.9 in Tanjore, their area of greatest concentration.!3 Ritual supremacy in Hindu society was only

one of the bases of Brahmin power in Tamilnad, erati of the society they had long been clerks, trators

and

officials

whether

Vijayanagar viceroys, or villages Brahmins almost

karnam

or village

the

rulers

were

As the litfowl “ adminispeel

Tamil

kings,

qt

the East India Company. In the invariably held the office of

accountant,

and

in appreciation

Jey.

of their

Las,

bro nee

religious and secular services they had been awarded land rights as mirasdars and inamdars. In the rice-growing eastern

zones

Brahmins

authority, ing

generally,

were powerful

classes.

little

but

land,

also

exceptional

in

the

Cauvery

delta

not only by virtue

for their prominence

In western

they

money-lenders

and

were

Tamilnad,

frequently

and bankers. another

where

of their priestly the

Brahmins

present

they

particular,

among as

The position

respect:

in

held

small-town

of the

were

landhold-

Brahmins

divorced

from

,,,,' ‘

eal -

ad

V°

~"/

was

the

process of agricultural production. Most non-Brahmin ryots were part-time or full-time cultivators, but Tamil Brahmins considered ploughing a ritually polluting act. However

small

selves.

their holdings, They

were,

they would

therefore,

not

till

entirely

labourers, sub-tenants, and, until the formal servitude, untouchable slaves.

the

land

dependent

them-

on

hired

British outlawed The Brahmins were

free to devote themselves to religion and non-agrarian pursuits; they could easily become absentee landlords and pursue careers outside the village community. From the midnineteenth century Brahmins, particularly those from the Cauvery delta, invested their landed wealth in education,

entered

urban

non-Brahmin of

occupations

ryots.*

and

gradually

sold

their

land

vation:

Brahmin

middle

these

factors

domination

class

of

forming

were

the

together

responsible

western-educated,

in Tamilnad

from

the

for

professional

middle

of the

A

°

to ~_.

Traditional status, access to landed wealth, generations involvement in the administration, aloofness from culti-

4A

-

\

a

16

nineteenth

century.

hegemony was bureaucratic ular

71.5

literacy

per

cent

One

indicator

professional

literacy, especially in English, the key to and professional employment. The male vernacrate

among

in the

Brahmins

and

24.2

for

17.4

the

Telugu

Tamil

1921

census

Brahmins

Vellalas,

caste group in Tamilnad. were even more striking: for

of Brahmin

the

recorded

and

59.7

leading

But male 28.2 for

Brahmins

was

as against

as

for Telugu

non-Brahmin

literacy rates in English the Tamil Brahmins against

2.4

for

the

Vellalas.!

The rapid expansion of higher education in the third quarter of the nineteenth century soon created a surplus of graduates. Government service in the presidency and in

neighbouring

princely

states

offered

the main

field

for

graduate employment, but by the 1870s and 1880s jobs in the bureaucracy were becoming scarce; the European monopoly of the higher echelons and Indian nepotism made entry for out-

|siders even harder. Exclusion from bureaucratic employment | provoked the frustrated graduates to criticize selection i procedures for government service and sharpened their plaints against officials' conduct. Graduates sought

comother

occupations: they turned to law, medicine, journalism and accountancy, but there, too,

education, they ran head-

fields

their European

long

into

conflict

educated

with

European

Indians

professionals.

had advantages

over

In

some

rivals. Brahmin lawyers, equipped with a knowledge of Sanskrit and traditional Hindu law which few Europeans could hope to match, won control of the original side of their profession in the 1880s and were beginning to oust Europeans from the appellate side as well.1¢ Thus the second phase of early nationalist agitation Tamilnad in the 1880s was largely that of an emerging

in

Brahmin professional middle class in conflict with European professionals. This conflict was expressed in various forms: one was sustained Brahmin criticism of European government

servants;

.and

T.

another was resentment

racialism.

Muthuswami

The

Aiyar,

appointment

as

the

Madras High Court met with local European community. graduates Hindu, to

voice

first

against

in

1878

south

European arrogance

of

a

Brahmin

Indian

judge

lawyer,

of

the

howls of indignation from the In response a group of Brahmin

in Madras city launched their own newspaper, the defend the appointment and, more generally, to

their political

views.'?

Another

formative

incident

was the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim rioting in the town of Salem in July and August 1882. Initially a dispute over the siting of a new mosque, the dispute quickly developed into a

tussle

between

European

officials

and Hindu

vakils,

led by

17 C. Vijayaraghavachari.* European arrogance as a

Having teacher

already encountered in Mangalore, ! ie Vijaya-

raghavachari was in no mood to tolerate official mishandling of the Salem affair. For his part in the riots he was sentenced

to

judgement

other

10

years'

and

eventually

accused.’

Vijayaraghavachari

Tamilnad. -

| tween

It

was

the

transportation,

against

emerging

secured

Successful a hero

opinion

the

background

Indian

he

release

of

young

contested

the

and

Raj

middle

the

that

of

made

graduates

of mounting

professional

| Europeans that the Madras | 1884. Although the sabha

public

his

defiance

among

this

but

the

of

tension

class

be-

and

the

Mahajana Sabha was formed in May (association) claimed to represent

in the presidency,

its

membership

was

drawn

from a very narrow social base. A large number of founding members were from the mofussil with lawyers outnumbering

merchants. A non-Brahmin pleader, P. Rangiah Naidu, was one of the sabha's first presidents, but inevitably at this date

an organization Brahmin in provincial

of the western-educated

composition. The forerunner of the

was predominantly

Madras Mahajana Indian National

Sabha was Congress.

the Dele-

gates sent by the sabha attended the first meeting of the Congress at Bombay in December 1885, but the formation of a Provincial Congress Committee (PCC) for the presidency did not lead to the disbanding of the sabha. In 1894 it was affiliated to the Madras city District Congress Committee (DCC) and continued until the 1930s to function as an influential body comp!ementing the activities of the local

Congress.

The strength of the sabha and the Madras PCC in the period before 1914 lay in their ability to express the

grievances and opinion of the professional middle class. Public conferences and speech-making were the cautious first steps towards a broader political movement, but it was easier for the western-educated of Madras to identify with their social and professional counterparts in other provinces of India than to delve deeply into the grievances of other social groups in their home region. This was especially so for

the

social

an

privileges,

extreme

their

*

Brahmins.

Because

Tamil

confidence

authority

Biographical the text will

to

in

speak

of

their

Brahmins

their

on

own

behalf

religious

carried

ability

of

the

notes on persons marked with be found on pp. 232-237.

training

and

lead

and

in

an asterisk

in

within

themselves

people

as

to

a whole.

18 Religious

ship

hegemony

in

Hindu

of the exclusive

club

society

combined

with

of the western-educated,

member-

the

com-

bination of caste and class leadership together, made Brahmins responsive to the appeals of a nationalism which challenged the hold of Europeans on India's professional and

; political life, social barriers

That

was the

is

but made it difficult for them to cross to broaden the base of the Congress.

not

to

say

that

the

completely isolated. Tamil countryside as landholders.

ern

education

and

higher

incomes

professional from

the

Brahmin families to sell their lands, vakils and government servants in the early twentieth centuries who did not

acres

in

the

mofussil.

middle

class

Brahmins had contact with Although the cost of west-

A further

link

professions

tempted

few were the Brahmin late nineteenth and own at least a few

between

Brahmin

law-

yers and the countryside was through their clients. Land litigation was the most lucrative branch of the legal pro-

fession brought wealthy

their

in the Madras into frequent

ryots.

landed

At

clients

Presidency,”’ and Brahmin lawyers contact with zamindars, mirasdars

times

on

they

public

advocated

platforms

the

interests

as well

as

of

in

were and

the

law courts. By contrast, professionals seldom identified themselves with Indian business interests in their political activities. But, it must be stressed, before 1914 political

as opposed to professional links between the urban middle class and the landholders were still very fragile. Support for Congress came from the larger towns and cities; the organization in the countryside, was extremely rudimentary.

the

The

First

western

landed

political

World

education

wealth

Brahmins'

War

leadership

was

and

based

the

in

of

on

the

achieving

it

Tamil

their

professions,

and traditional

success

where

social this

existed

at

Brahmins

near-monopoly backed

authority.

dominance

by

all,

before

of

their

But

aroused

the

the

envy and hatred of the non-Brahmin communities. By the turn of the century non-Brahmin ryots and traders were beginning to realize the economic and political advantages to be gained by entering the professions; belatedly they sought to make up for their previous disinterest in western education. But it was not easy for young non-Brahmin graduates to intrude into the already crowded professions; Brahmin

confidence

and (nepotism

contrasted

with

the non-Brahmins'

lack of influence. For many first generation non-Brahmin vakils it was a hard, often frustrating, experience trying to build up a legal practice against Brahmin rivals. A generation earlier the conflict had been between Europeans and an embryonic Indian professional middle class; by 1914

a

19

new conflict

was

professional

into

\

the

emerging

middle

professions.

between

class

and

an established

the

non-Brahmins

Brahmin

seeking

entry

In self-defence-the non-Brahmins adopted two tactics. 1 Firstly, they fell back to their own castes, attempting to mobilize them through caste associations. A great number of associations were set up from the 1890s, especially between

1905

and

Their

1930,

aims

were

a period to

organization and traditions while status

and

of rapid

strengthen

mutual at the

influence

social

caste

and political

identity

change.

through

commuml

assistance; to foster pride in caste same time improving the caste's

by

sanskritization”

—

raising

its

ranking in the caste hierarchy — and by modernization, which included increased participation in western education and the professions. The drive behind such associations came from the caste's new itional caste heads.

middle class, sometimes aided by tradThey sought to play down internal

differentiation

within

tried

pressure

their

own

to

government

create

educational

nomination the Muslim

Morley-Minto couraged

By

caste

so as

emphasizing

groups

which

concessions,

to unite

caste

it behind

identity

could

win

public

constitutional fashion

natural

enough

for

reforms

communal

of

from

newcomers

advance

their

the

and

undoubtedly

en-

1909

success in the

organization.

that

they

appointments

to local boards and legislatures. The League in winning separate electorates

the

anyway,

the

leadership.

But

to a highly

it

of

was,

competitive

professional world should seek support from their castemen, and should stress a communal rather than a class or national identity,

in

order

to

own

positions.

A second non-Brahmin response to Brahmin dominance was the formation ofa fnovement designed to fuse the various non-Brahmin communities into a single anti-Brahmin political

entity. 1916

The non-Brahmin

at

a meeting

Malayali-physician, businessman,

From this

and

movement

in Madras

C.

beginning

P.

city

Tyagaraya

Natesa

sprang

took

shape

organized

Chetti,

Mudaliar,

the South

in November

by

T.M.

a Telugu

a_Tamil

Indian

including

Council

created

Madras,

the

Muslims,

first the Justice leaders demand for reserved seats determined had 28

asked

of

the

by

agitation

the

Justicites

Vellala

and persistent achieved

non-Muhammadan

and

seats:

of

which claimed in the pres-

untouchables.

India

lobbying

partial

Act

general

seats

by

of

1919.

in London

success.

non-Brahmins

a

doctor.

concentrated on pressing their in the provincial Legislative

Government

for 40 reserved

65

Christians

Devanga

Libéral

Federation, better known as the Justice Party, to represent the interests of all non-Brahmins idency

Nair,

The

were

the

At

and

By

party

awarded

decision

of

20

an

arbitrator,

The

Lord

Meston,

development

fessional

middle

in

March

1920.73

of a non-Brahmin

class

section

and

the

creation

of

class

and

a European

the

of

the

pro-

Justice

Party

to express its political views ensured that the struggle for, power in the Madras Presidency from 1919 to 1937 would be a triangular contest and not a straightforward contest between

an_indigenous

middle

Two major sections

petition.

And,

colonial

of the national bourgeoisie

to further

complicate

were in com-

the political

force, those sections were in themselves split factions, each seeking pre-eminence or a share Numerically,

the

/ small — it constituted

professional

less

than

lation of the presidency— and competition, as mich as outside

power.

middle

0.5 per

class

cent

lines

of

into competing of the spoils. was

very

of the popu-

factional and sectional pressure and a changing

electoral set-up, forced middle-class politicians to look outside their own tiny class for allies and support. The Justicites looked to their own castemen in the small towns 4

and

villages,

and

to

the

leading

non-Brahmin

zamindars,

whose

wealth and prestige could help to counter-balance the advantages the Brahmins enjoyed. The Brahmins were at first uncertain where to turn. Some, the grouping known first as the Moderates and later as the Liberals, faced political extinction

because

they

were

unable

to

adjust

to

the

new

political environment and hoped, largely in vain, that the British would help them to survive in gratitude for their loyalty and past services. Others, only a few at first, saw

\ in Gandhi's

alternative. Gandhi's still

At

an

ambitious

Quest the

for mass

agitation

a possible

for Allies

beginning

outsider

satyagrahas

schemes

to

in South

of

1919

India's

Africa

Mohandas

political

had won him

Karamchand

Gandhi

establishment.

respect

was

His

and a popu-

lar reputation for saintliness, but they did not give an entrée to the highest Congress circles. The death G.K. Gokhale, whom Gandhi regarded as his mentor, in

him of

February 1915 robbed Gandhi of one possible way of rising to all-India leadership. Obliged to follow an independent course, Gandhi's three small-scale satyagrahas in 1917-18 — at Champaran, Kaira, and Ahmedabad — demonstrated Gandhi's agitational ability and attracted to him a band of disciples, among them Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad, who were | to be lieutenants in many subsequent large-scale campaigns. *6

21

But

in

south

India

Gandhi

had

no

small-scale

saty-

agrahas to his credit, no disciples, hardly any contact. Gujaratis and Marwaris turned out to see him on his visits to Madras in 1896, 1915 and 1919, and were willing enough to make donations when he appealed for them. But they were numerically

to Gandhi campaign. the

Gandhi

Madras

Gokhale,

too

few,

had

contacts,

as

culturally

allies

and

Congressmen,

who

had

been

too

foreign,

organizers too,

partly

the

in

any

among

through

Moderates’

the

sort

to

be

Moderate

his

of

of mass

use

section

association

all-India

leader,

of

with and

partly through his South African work which had been widely publicized in the presidency through the press, led by the Indian Review, a monthly journal edited by a Tamil Brahmin, G.A. Natesan. Unfortunately for Gandhi, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri,* who took over as head of the Servants of India Society on the death of Gokhale, its founder, was less than

impressed

by Gandhi

and was

relieved

when,

after

the

year's

probation fixed by Gokhale, Gandhi saved embarrassment of refusing him membership

the Society the by withdrawing his

esteem as Gokhale's heir and a principled a sentiment which Srinivasa Sastri could

man, but it was reciprocate.”*

application

to join.

Gandhi

held

Srinivasa

Sastri

in high

not

The Tamil Moderates represented the peak of Brahmin middle-class professional and political endeavour. Lawyers for the most part, they had deeply imbibed the cultural and political values of the British but without abdicating the social ascendancy they enjoyed in Hindu society. Western education and the legal profession instilled in them a deep respect for constitutionalism. They occupied seats in the provincial Legislative Council following the Morley-Minto

constitutional reforms of V. Krishnaswami Aiyar and

1909 P.S.

and two of their luminaries, Sivaswami Aiyar held office

as executive councillors in Madras before 1914. It was not, therefore, surprising that having benefited from collaboration with the Raj, the Moderates were disinclined to resort to drastic methods to secure further constitutional progress, and to realize their ultimate nationalist goals. They

believed

that

political

advancement

in

India would

neces-

sarily be slow because ideas of responsible government and democracy could only gradually percolate down from the western-educated to the masses. The British could only be

persuaded

pressure

to yield

from

frontation.

the

power by

educated,

steady

through

but

polite

constitutional

cooperation

not

con-

22 With State for in future

branch

the declaration by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of India, on 20 August 1917, that British policy would be the "increasing association of Indians in every

of the

administration,

and

the

gradual

development

of

self-government institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integ-

ral

part

of the

British

Empire...",?”

the Tamil

Moderates

looked forward to a new, even more rewarding period of enlightened cooperation with the Raj. Although they carped at

some

of the

more

niggardly

aspects

of

the

reforms

proposed

in the report of Montagu and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, published in July 1918, they made public their willingness to work the dyarchy scheme of split government, adding a hope that at a later date many of the "reserved" subjects

would of

the

made

be made

over

government .?°

ministerial

or "transferred"

Constitutionalism and close association the Tamil Moderates strong opponents of

posals

for

mass

wanted

to

launch

ive

to the

legislation

agitation

which

an

against

became

the

law

all-India

in

Rowlatt

March

movement

with the Gandhi's

1919.

against

Act,

half

Raj pro-

regress-

Gandhi

the

Act

to

force its repeal. The Moderates spoke out against the legislation and Srinivasa Sastri condemned it in an impassioned speech in the central Legislative Council, but they would not be drawn into direct action for fear of so offending the

British that the constitutional reforms were withdrawn or reduced in scope. With the eternal faith of a liberal, Srinivasa Sastri believed that all possible constitutional tactics should be tried before venturing on a course which seemed to him an Despite Gandhi's Srinivasa Sastri

path.

Nor

would

To whom, Since

invitation to mass violence and anarchy.?? praise for his stand in the legislature, would not budge from the consitutional

his

associates.”

then,

could

Gandhi

turn?

Mrs

Annie

Besant

had

1914

done

more

than

anyone

else to enliven the politics of the southern presidency. In 1907, 14 years after following Theosophy to India, Besant was chosen president of the Theosophical Society and moved her headquarters from Benares to Adyar on the southern edge of Madras city. At first eschewing politics, Besant was too fascinated by the exercise of power to neglect them for long; she was, besides, confident of India's capacity for immediate

self-government.

League to agitate League had

the

whole

63

In September

1916

she

for this objective.*!

branches

presidency.

in

Tamilnad,

Sales

formed

Rule

Within a year the

nearly

of New India,

a Home

half

fiery

of

those

and

in

23 inexpensive,

ment

were

steadily

intervened.

rising.

Then

the

Madras

govern-

Rudely awakened from its dreams of Indian contentment by the Home Rulers, the provincial administration of Lord Pentland was in no mood to tolerate Besant. When demands for securities for her papers failed to gag her, the Madras government took the rash step of interning Besant and two of her associates, George Arundale, organizing secretary of Home Rule League, and B.P. Wadia, its treasurer, in June

1917.

By

Besant

this

move

papers

in

a national

of other

the

government

heroine. the

Sales

presidency,

unintentionally

of New India and

the

made

leaped

membership

ahead

of

Besant's

League shot up from 7,000 in March 1917 to 27,000 in December.** Gandhi thought he saw in Besant's internment an opportunity for an all-India satyagraha to force the government to release her, and feeling ran high in Madras, though

the not

ever-cautious Srinivasa Sastri advised the Madras to adopt Gandhi's suggestion until constitutional

of winning her release had been exhausted.** decision

was

reached

to set Besant free in peevish Lord Pentland

the

ment for But

constitutional Such that

was she

December the tide

Montagu

persuaded

the

September 1917: he to prejudice Indian

reforms.

PCC means

Before

Madras

any

government

did not opinion

want the against

Besant's popularity on her release from intern was chosen president of the Calcutta Congress

1917, the last non-Indian to hold the office. of her popularity was already beginning to ebb.

Her experience of internment discouraged Besant from moving on to more intensive agitation and Montagu's announcement of

August

1917

held

out

the prospect

of substantial

constitu-

tional progress in the near future. Although she criticized some aspects of the Montagu-Chelmsford report, it was obvious

ation. forms

that,

It was

and

for

now

through

Besant,

agitation

the nationalists'

ministerial

must

task

control

of

give

to work

local

education and health carry out programs that improve the conditions of the Indian people.

believed,

would

nationalists

have

a

way

to

the

re-

government,

would Only

convincing

negoti-

case

materially then, she for

demanding a further instalment of reforms and these might be won by constitutional tactics — "grievances before supply" on the model of Charles I's Parliament.™ Having

initially

set

her

target

Besant's support — however qualified Chelmsford reforms inevitably seemed Indian

ence

nationalists.

held

to

discuss

In

the

August

1918,

as

Indian

Home

Rule,

— for the Montagua betrayal to many at

a

Montagu-Chelmsford

special

report,

confer-

Besant

24

was

attacked

for

"unworkable"

wishing

reforms.

to

modify

On both

rather

than

occasions

reject

the main

the

attackers

were Tamil Brahmins of the Extremist party, especially S. Satyamurti,* a 31 year-old lawyer. Besant, however,

was tenacious and she Congress. She fought

refused hard to

to be pushed out of the keep her influence in the

national and provincial Congress committees, but when the Moderates formed a National Liberal Federation in early 1919 she could no longer occupy central ground within the Congress. She had failed to maintain the Home Rule League as an

alternative vehicle ion to the Congress

for political agitation after her electpresidency; she had neither the popu-

larity nor the organizational from within the Congress. In

ing associates resigned

support to March 1919

from the Madras

remained a vociferous critic of the no longer a power in the provincial

On

the Rowlatt

Act

Besant

itself

and

not

to

other

laws,

PCC.°©

Besant

a middle

course

Extremists, but organization.

favoured

tween that proposed by Gandhi the Moderates. She advocated

defy the Extremists she and her remainshe

was

be-

and the constitutionalism of opposition only to the Act and

suggested

the

staging

of

protest processions, the drafting of petitions, and the formulation of constitutional demands for its repeal. Gandhi spurned her proposals and offended her still more by converting her emissary, the Gujarati Jamnadas Dwarkadas, to

his views.*’ Besant's menting tee" at

response was petty.

her own suggestions Adyar to assist the

the public

peace",

Instead of imple-

she formed a "citizens' commitpolice in the "preservation of

anticipating

that

violence

would

be the

inevitable outcome of the satyagraha. °° Besant and Gandhi, never close, drifted an unbridgeable distance apart. Without

No alternative

the

Moderates

but

to

support

for his Rowlatt

Gokhale

Gandhi

While he could respect him, Gandhi viewed the

had been

or

turn

to

Besant

the

satyagraha

as

allies,

Extremists

Gandhi

in

in the Madras

seeking

had

Presidency.

the Moderates, even when they opposed Extremists with suspicion. Through

associated

shared their antipathy to believer in ahimsa he was

with

the Moderates

and he

the Extremist party; as a devout temperamentally and intellectually

opposed to the Extremists' connections with terrorist groups; and as an advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity he was distressed

by their Hindu militancy. The

ciliatory

Extremists

than

were,

as

the Moderates

their

name

towards

suggests,

British

rule

They wanted to expel the British, by terrorism if feasible; by passive resistance, especially

and the

less

con-

in India.

violence boycott

25 of

with

British the

goods,

Hindu

if they

could

revivalist

not.

Closely

movement,

the

associated

Extremists,

unlike

the Moderates, saw religion as a bond that could cement the masses and the intellectuals together in opposition to | foreign rule. Militant- Hinduism was..a.-vernaeular-rendering

of European

nationalism:

it revived

pride

and expressed a contempt for western tions which might provoke government

couched

Extremist

in political leaders

educated

Moderates,

middle

were

class

the

Tamil

rather as

as

than

much

the

religious

a part

Moderates,

Extremists

in India's

past

culture and institurepression if it were of

terms.

the

and

But

the

western-

like

the

were also mainly Brahmins.

In Tamilnad the Extremists were less conspicuous than in Maharashtra and Bengal and they never mounted the sort of revivalist activities and terrorism associated with Bal Gangadhar Tilak in the one and with the anti-partition agi-

tation of 1905-11 in the other. There were of Extremism in Tamilnad. The earliest was

two main centres Salem where

Vijayaraghavachari, Hindu hero of the anti-Muslim riots of 1882, built up a school of young nationalists imbued with

hostility

to British

rule.

Most

of Vijayaraghavachari's

pupils were Brahmins and lawyers, among them C. Rajagopalachari,* later the leading Gandhian in Tamilnad. the

The

second

Extremists

centre

of

constituted

Extremism

what

was

was

Madras

known

as

city

the

where

"Egmore

Clique" as distinct from the "Mylapore Clique" of the Moderates. A mixed group of Brahmins and non-Brahmins, the Egmore clique consisted of professionals who resented the Moderates' dominance of the professional and political life of Madras. Although it initially one of the founders of the Justice Nair, a Malayali lawyer, the most Tamil Brahmins: S. Kasturi Ranga Iyengar,* and T. Rangachari. All

long associated

with

government

fession. After nine years at Kasturi Ranga moved to Madras

included T.M. Nair, later Party and C. Sankaran prominent Extremists were Iyengar,* A. Rangaswami three were from families

service

Coimbatore in 1894 in

and

the

legal

pro-

as a lawyer, the hope of carving

out a successful practice at the High Court. He was soon disappointed by the lack of support he received from the

Moderates and drifted into the Egmore clique. In 1905 he broke away from the legal profession to edit the Hindu newspaper: under his direction it became the foremost nationalist

journal

in

censorship

and

Ranga

law to

ials.*?

His

from

the

fines

nephew,

presidency,

moderated

A.

the views

Rangaswami

journalism,

though

fear

government

expressed

Iyengar,

becoming

of

editor

followed

of

the

in editorKasturi

Tamil

26

paper Swadesamitran

in

1915

and remaining

as editor

and

director until he took charge of the Hindu in 1928. Rangaswami could thus combine several skills: renowned as a Tamil writer and an able publicist, he had also estab-

lished a reputation as publication of a study

a constitutional expert by of the Indian constitution.

The Tamil Extremists had whether in Salem or newcomers the political pre-eminence of

was

with

pride

of Salem as the headquarters of

home

that

ful Mylapore

two grudges. As mofussil men, in Madras city, they resented the presidency capital. It

Vijayaraghavachari's

disciples

Poona of the South, seeing the presidency by contrast

of Moderate

politics.

clique,

the

And,

as

the Nationalists

thought

it as the Tilakite with Madras, the

outsiders

envied

to

the

the

power-

influence

of the Moderates. One faction of the predominantly Brahmin professional middle class was in bitter competition with another. But it was not simply rivalry between "ins" and

“outs as is. sometimes fired

by

their

own

suggested.""

conception

The Extremists were

of what

India's

nationalist

movement should be and, as mofussilites and outsiders, they were encouraged to develop their own political style in con, trast to the sedate, English-language constitutionalism of ithe Moderates. Forced to look outward for support they

' explored and

new

political

journalism,

militant

terrorism.

Although

territory-vernacular

Tamilnad

Hinduism,

did

not

and,

to

experience

a

oratory lesser

terrorism

degree,

on

the

scale of Bengal and Maharashtra, ripples from the Bengali storm did break the relatively placid surface of Tamil politics in the years of agitation 1905-11. Inspired by the Bengalis' enthusiasm for swadeshi (that is, for goods made in one's own country), a Vellala lawyer in Tuticorin, V.0. Chidambaram Pillai, formed a Swadeshi Steam Navigation

Company

in November

1906

to

break

the

monopoly

held

by

British steamers operating between the port and Colombo. This and Chidambaram's part in organizing a strike at a British-owned textile mill in February 1908, aroused the

hostility

March

Brahmin ings.

of

local

European

1908 the magistrate associate

They

defied

Subramania the

provoked riots in the Police opened fire to

were

stationed

Subramania tepression

in

the

ban,

officials

prohibited Siva

but

from

their

and

employers.

Chidambaram holding

arrest

on

In

and his

public 13

meet-

March

towns of Tuticorin and Tinnevelly. suppress the riots, punitive police

district,

and

Chidambaram

and

Siva were given lengthy sentences. Government became still more severe in 1911 when R.W. Ashe,

27 Sub-Collector

terrorist The

Tamil

at

Tuticorin

for his

part

Tuticorin

Extremists

underground

or

to Hindu

V.V.S.

Aiyar,

mania

Bharati,

Aurobindo, fied their

that

they

Bharati

into

Aiyar

\the

last

did

it shake

the

for

a

on the

drove

enclave

exiles

his

writer.

venture

back

by

after

years

Tamil

activists

of

were

Pondi-

C.

poetry,

Exile,

Bharati

his

and

than

as a

of

his

not

have

the

into

journalism

died

a temple

Gurukulam,

the

contrary,

French

a Tamil

entered

language

poetry rather Shermadevi

the

Among

famous

but

on

Bharati_became

such

to

papers,

Tamil

in

effect

repression

by

agitation."

1910 was also the sanctuary of Aurobindo terrorist whose interests turned increas-

today

dared

[Sharaei trampled the

exile

assassinated

swadeshi

had a lasting

Government

mysticism.

also

was

the

contact

Subra-

and

with

and bitterness at government repression, intensinationalist fervour, but it was not until 1919-20

and

Extremist

1908,

crushing

experience

too.

cherry, which from Ghose, the Bengali

ingly

in

in

death,

for

the

British in

Madras,

was

for

patriotism

revolutionary;

life in

running

Tinnevelly

a widespread

prevailing

faith

Tuticorin

1921

his -command

district.

to

spent”

Terrorism

have

wp’

his; ve

school,

in Tamilnad;

seems

of

in

Aiyar

nor

in constitutionalism.

experience

after

expressed

V.V.S.

the

as

did

On the

chastened

the Extremists. A. Rangaswami Iyengar and K.V. Rangaswami Iyengar gave financial assistance and encouragement to the exiles, but they shied away from any overt and aggressive action against the Raj, knowing how severely it would be crushed. In this case, as in Besant's, repression was

effective in isolating the most menacing opponents of the Raj and driving political activity back into constitutional channels. Repression had its rationale: it was seldom blind

revenge. were Rule

Although

Congress

following India.

was

their

hero,

the

at first willing to cooperate with movement. She was instrumental in

Moderates Home

Tilak

Rule

A.

to allow

in

the

1915,

nearly

League,

formed

the

lieutenants,

stormy

Rangaswami but

the

return

Surat

eight in

of the years

session

Iyengar

1916,

was

association

of

Tamil

Besant in the Home persuading the

after

1907;

operated

for

did

objective wanted to

was use

their

and

not

to the

expulsion

Tilak's

mainly

a while

the end of that year the Tamil Extremists Besant and began to assert their separate immediate that they

Extremists

Extremists

one

survive

in

of

to capture the Madras PCC; the Congress as a base for

own

western

1918.

no longer identity.

J

for

Popular though

a nationalist

appeal

Both

working

in Septenber

elephant. it

India.

Besant's By

needed Their

beyond capturing

28 the

Madras

Having been Congress

legislature

committees

of the

organization

leadership:

more to

Tilak's

as pressure

the

premier

to balance

under

the

in the wilderness in

1907-08,

and

Besant's

as

groups

the

image

the

the

reforms.

expulsion

Extremists

Home

the

party.

as

their

prerequisite

within

nationalist

their

Montagu-Chelmsford

after

from the

saw

mastery

to nationalist

Rule

Congress But

Leagues

were

than

the

uncompromising

as

Extremists

wing

seen

rivals

of

strove

the

Congress with their desire to participate in the constitutional system. Tilak's solution to this dilemma was to propose "responsive cooperation", that is to enter the legislatures, but to work the constitution only so long as the British were willing to make concessions to Indian demands

for the

repeal

of repressive

legislation

and for the con-

tinuing devolution of power. Thus, the Extremists were juggling with three balls: to be seen to be hostile to the British, to be more extreme in their demands than the Moderates, and yet to prepare the way for their own entry into the legislatures.

The Rowlatt Satyagraha The

a suitable

Rowlatt way

contrast their Moderates. On

to

satyagraha shake

appeared

a defiant

to

fist

the

at

Tamil

the

Raj

to

Rajagopalachari visit

the

agitation.

and

own political stance with that of the 30 January 1919 Kasturi Ranga Iyengar

sided over a Madras protest meeting against the and on 19 February C. Vijayaraghavachari, egged

C.

Extremists

of Salem,

presidency

Gandhi

at

But

in the

to

first

wrote

give

a

to Gandhi

lead

to

refused."?

the

to

pre-

Rowlatt on by

requesting

Act,

him

anti-Rowlatt

Perhaps

he

had

not

yet lost hope of converting Srinivasa Sastri and Natesan satyagraha; certainly he was suspicious of the Tamil

Extremists. and

in his

agitation, arrived in

station and

S.

by

determination

to

of other allies

create

a co-ordinated

in Madras

national

he finally decided to make a short visit. He Madras city on 17 March, was met at the railway

Kasturi

Satyamurti,

house. **

The

absence

to

battle

for

Ranga

and

Iyengar,

taken

control

to

of

A.

stay

the

Rangaswami

in

Kasturi

Madras

PCC

was

Iyengar,

Ranga's

reaching

a climax in March 1919 and Gandhi involuntarily found himself drawn into the struggle between the Extremists and

Besant. On 18 March, the day after Gandhi's arrival, Besant resigned from the PCC, taking with her several prominent Home Rulers and Moderates: G.A. Natesan, L.A. Govindaraghava Aiyar, who had been the PCC president for the Moderates and

|

29

Home Rulers of whom had days later,

alike, B.P. Wadia and C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, both been secretaries of the Home Rule League. Ten on 27 March, Kasturi Ranga took over as PCC

president

with

T.

executive

posts.

Rangachari

and

T.V.

Venkatarama

Aiyar

as

vice-presidents, and Satyamurti as secretary."° While it may be doubted that Gandhi struck a bargain with the Extremists, in return for associating himself with the Extremists he received their support for his satyagraha plans On 21 and 22 March about 40 city and mofussil Extremists met at Kasturi Ranga's house to form a Satyagraha Sabha. Only with difficulty, however, could candidates be found for its Ranga

as

Gandhi

was

vice-president

chosen

and

president

Vijayaraghavachari

with

Kasturi

as

secretary.

In addition to Extremist reluctance to serve on the committee, there was a reluctance to decide how the sabha should express

opposition

to the

Rowlatt

Bills,and

Gandhi

told

the meeting

that a plan of action would be sent from Bombay.“® left

for

a breathless

tour

of

five

Tamil

towns

March

Gandhi

He then

— Tanjore,

Trichinopoly, Madura, Tuticorin and Negapatam; these towns had the dual advantages of being Extremist centres and

readily

to

accessible

return

signed

his

to

Bombay.

by

satyagraha

rail.

On

Only

120

pledge.

28

people

in

the

left

Madras

presidency

had

The Extremists had little more than a week to prepare their campaign which Gandhi had directed to begin on 6 April. At the Madras conference Gandhi had suggested that a proscribed book should be printed and circulated to the saty-

agrahis Kasturi

in defiance

Ranga

of the

Iyengar

and

law.

As newspaper

Rangaswami

Iyengar

publishers

were

asked

they would "they have

undertake the publication. They protested invested one or two lakhs in their presses

agraha

to

that ... confiscation would ruin them".“”’ That doned, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar's contribution to was

produce

and

distribute

copies

of

if

that and

idea abanthe satyan

unregis-

tered newspaper denouncing the Rowlatt Act. The single cyclostyled sheet which appeared was so innocuous that the Madras government took no action against it.“® More enthusiastic support for Gandhi came from Sowcarpet, the Gujarati

quarter

of Madras

city.

At the

instigation

Kalyanjee, Gandhi's Gujarati contact in merchants observed a hartal (suspension

6 April,

ponded

labour

the

to

Satyagraha the

disputes

Extremists

call

and

were

Day.“®

for

early

on to the streets for ance at the evening's

Muslim shopkeepers

a hartal.

able

of Ramjee

the city, Gujarati of business) on

attempts

to

bring

As

at

a result

union

tramway

demonstrations meeting on the

also res-

of

recent

organization,

and

textile

workers

and to swell the attendbeach to an estimated

30

100,000, one of the largest political gatherings Madras had ever known. The hartal appealed to the educated — students, clerks, literate traders — whose curiosity and sympathy had been aroused by the newspapers as well as by public meetings; but the government doubted whether the illiterates under-

stood its purpose and claimed that the organizers had whipped up enthusiasm by spreading wild and exaggerated rumours of the arbitrary powers the government would hold under the Rowlatt Act.°° No serious disturbances occurred either in the

city

or

in

the

mofussil

where

Extremists

and

Muslims

organized demonstrations and public meetings. Interest was confined to the major towns and evaporated after 6 April.*! lent

Elsewhere

in

course.

India

In

Bombay,

the

Rowlatt

Calcutta

satyagraha

and

Delhi

took

there

a vio-

were

protracted disturbances and police firings. The most sive situation developed in the Punjab. By deporting

explotwo

leading agitators on 10 April the Punjab government unwittingly provoked mob attacks on the civil lines and railway yards in Amritsar. On 13 April Amritsar's military commander, Brigadier-General Dyer, ordered his troops to fire on a prohibited Congress meeting at the area of waste-ground known as Jallianwala Bagh. No prior warning was given:

379

civilians

were

killed

Jallianwala

Bagh

nation-wide

satyagraha

Delhi

persuaded

massacre

Gandhi

to

on

and

about

and

the

call 18

1,200

violence

off his

April. *

wounded.

first

in

Bombay

attempt

The

and

at

a

In the Punjab the satyagraha released political and economic tensions which had been building up during and since the war; in Bombay and Delhi the disturbances were equally a product of underlying discontent which owed nothing to the Rowlatt legislation. In Tamilnad, however, the absence of violence and the lack of sustained interest, were

indicative of the failure of the Extremists to mobilize grievances in the service of the all-India agitation. In part this was because of their lack of influence: the’city trade

unions,

Besant's

for

example,

associates,

and

were

the

largely

Extremists'

under

the

connection

control

with

of

Hindu revivalism gave them no background of cooperation with Muslim agitators. But, more simply, the Extremists were not interested in stimulating mass unrest. For them the saty-

agraha was a convenient gesture against the Raj, coinciding with their takeover of the PCC. The failure of the satyagraha to secure the repeal of the Rowlatt Act did not,

therefore,

greatly

disappoint

them.

Madras Satyagraha Sabha, held on Iyengar advised it not to commit

At a meeting

of the

13 July, Kasturi Ranga members to any further

|

1

31

action until Gandhi's ideas of non-violence were properly understood by:the Indian people. He wanted all talk of satyagraha postponed indefinitely. The meeting reached no, decision Educated

on this opinion

point, in the

but the sabha ceased to presidency was reported

ing and

away from satya; graha as a result of northern India, and the Extremists

the

propertied

prolong

their

association classes,

constitution. satyagraha With

uncertain

prepare

It was

and

about

satyagraha his

for the

the

leadership

of

violence in Bombay did not wish to

which

voters

to Rajagopalachari

behind

next

first

a movement

including

left

Gandhi's

the

with

move,

elections

the

them

the

and

might

under

offend

the

to defend

new

agitation. °°

with

Gandhi

Extremists

to the

function.°* to be swing-

himself

began

reformed

to

legislatures

scheduled for November 1920. was subsumed in a demand for

Opposition to the Rowlatt Act a bill of rights to be written

Extremists

that

into

the

Indian

was,

moderate,

but

constitution.

however,

that

they

not

would

The

main

they

seem

to

worry

would

the

now

of

the

appear

voters

too

too

radical.

Having thrust the tiller in one direction by their involvement in the Rowlatt satyagraha, it was now necessary to straighten their course by pulling it back towards the other. Significantly, at "Extremist" label

adopted

the name

repeatedly

or wreck

stated

the

practicality

new and

the end and, in

of 1919 they shed the common with Tilakites

that

was

"Nationalists". it

constitution.

In their propaganda

not

responsibility

old elsewhere,

their

intention

To demonstrate

the

Nationalists

they

to boycott

their in

their

election manifestos presented a demand for Dominion Status for India as a "full and equal partner in the British Commonweatth", but paid greater attention to a detailed

program

of

reforms

in

local

government,

education,

revenue,

health and administration — all of which, on paper, be feasible under the reforms — designed to attract tax-paying

would the

electorate.

The Nationalists were also worried that they were entering the electoral race with greater handicaps than the Moderates. The public reputation of the Moderates certainly

stood higher and through their access to government patronage they covld command influential support in the mofussil. Stress

the

on

political

Nationalist

programs

alternatives

and

to

the

commitment

big

names

to

of

party

the

were

Moderates; and to counteract the influence of their opponents the Nationalists decided to create a new political organization. in Madras from

the

On 8 November 1919 city. Attended by

mofussil,

the

a Nationalist Conference opened 250 Nationalists, many of them

conference

resolved

to

form

a

32 Nationalist Party with Vijayaraghavachari as president and K.V. Rangaswami Iyengar of Trichinopoly as one of the three

vice-presidents.

of local

party

Resolutions

committees

was

still-born

and

were

for intensive

because

after

passed

for

the

formation

electioneering,

the

Amritsar

but

session

of

the

the Congress at the end of December 1919 the Nationalists were fairly securely in control of the PCCs and DCCs and so did not need to create an alternative organization. A. Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti toured Tamilnad in the first three months of 1920 injecting into the previously

languid

election

campaign

a vehemence

tour.

By

which

alarmed

the

sedate

Moderates. Srinivasa Sastri, howled down on several occasions ! for his Moderate views and for his reluctance to speak in Tamil, was indignant at the "Satyamurthi Midlothian" while Satyamurti, whose vernacular oratory evoked warm enthusiasm jan many mofussil meetings, boasted of having addressed 90,000 | people and to have started or revived eight taluk committees

‘in

his

four-week

seemed

to

A dust

and Religious

be

be

shortlived.

At

the

in December

condemning

firmly

annual

1919

the

in

April

command,

1920

but

the

their

Nationalists

ascendency

was

to

Doctrine session

C.R.

reforms

Das

as

of

of

the

Congress

Bengal

proposed

"inadequate,

held

at

Amritsar

a resolution

unsatisfactory

and

disappointing" and calling for "full Responsible Government" At Gandhi's request, the Das resolution was amended: as far

as

possible

secure

ment". ment

follow

the

for

The

the

Congress

“early

Tamil

their

tactics

would

establishment

Nationalists

ambitions

of

to

"responsive

work of

he

of

Satyagraha,

develop, way

the

to

waiting

Rowlatt

the

front

was

for

enter

waiting

full

the

of the

so as

Responsible

this

legislature

as

co-operation".®!

to

waiting

Congress

to

Govern-

endorse-

and

to

voice of caution and accomto favour constitutional

see

an opportunity

Gandhi had found two suitable new satyagraha campaign.

reforms

interpreted

At Amritsar Gandhi's was the modation. But though he appeared participation,

the

how

to

for

the

situation

cancel

out

a chance

leadership.*

grievances

on

to

would

the

failure

elbow

By June

which

to

his

1920

base

a

The first of these related to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. In May 1920 an enquiry commission under Lord Hunter, appointed by the Government of India to investigate events in the Punjab, reported that the province had been in open rebellion in April 1919 and that, even though martial

33 law

had

been

unnecessarily

The

conclusions

protracted

duction had been justified of

the

and

by the grave

Hunter

Report

the

sort

issue

in which

of moral

threat

contrasted

of an enquiry committee appointed by Committee (AICC) in June 1919,°" and

with

harsh,

its

intro-

to the Raj.°° with

those

the All-India Congress they presented Gandhi

he delighted.

A

"scanda) of this magnitude", he wrote, "cannot be tolerated by the nation, if it is to preserve its self-respect and

become

a free

partner

in the Empire".°°

The second issue was the Khilafat grievance. Since the closing phases of the war India's Muslims had been perturbed by the prospect of Allied dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. As Caliph of Islam, the Sultan of Turkey was revered by

Indian

Muslims,

and

through

India and the British Cabinet Empire's dissolution. Gandhi ing the Khilafat grievance to suspicions of the Hindus, cooperation to make their

for the Cabinet

to respond.

pressure

on

the

Government

of

they hoped to prevent the saw the advantages of harnessthe Punjab. Despite their

the Khilafat Muslims needed Hindu agitation sufficiently threatening

Hindu-Muslim

unity

was

an

essential element in Gandhi's nationalism. By allying with the Muslim. leaders he could not only bind the two religious

communities also

restrain

violent ance. at the

hoped

together

Muslim

— war

and

in

opposition

inclinations

induce

them

to

the

towards

to follow

British;

a

holy

he

— and

non-violent

could

resist-

Furthermore, since the Khilafat movement was directed solution of a problem outside India, it could be

that

Hindus

would

not

be

alarmed

by

it

as

a threat

to

their own interests and security. The publication of the Allied peace proposals on 14 May 1920 confirmed the fears of the Muslims: the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered. The signing

of

the

Treaty

of

Sévres

the Islamic cause he wanted.°* strate that he would into one coordinated He

proposed

in

August

gave

Gandhi

Now it was for him to demon-

weld the Khilafat campaign.

a program

1920

and

Punjab

of non-cooperation

grievances

leading

to

mass

civil disobedience. Arguing that the Khilafat and Punjab demonstrated the immoral and "hopelessly indifferent" attitude of the Raj to the welfare of the Indian people, Gandhi said that it was cooperation from

the the

moral duty of Indians to withdraw their regime. Non-cooperation was to be

carried out by stages. First; there would be resignation of government titles and honorary posts, followed by the boycott of government-sponsored schools, colleges and law courts. The

boycott

Central by

Gandhi

of

the

new

Khilafat at

the

legislatures,

Committee end

of June

first

in March, 1920.°

was

suggested

added

The

by

the

to the program

paralysis

of the

34 government was to be servants, police and

against tax

unjust

campaign

laws

would

achieved by troops, and

and

bring

the

the resignation of civil by civil disobedience

refusal

agitation

to

pay

to

taxes.

its

The

climax:

no-

mass

violent civil disobedience was calculated either to expel the British from India or to force them to heed India's

non-

demands. Although Gandhi originally suggested this program as the means by which India could obtain satisfaction for the Punjab and Khilafat insults, he later adjusted its objective to swaraj, claiming that if his methods were faithfully followed India could be self-governing by the end of 1921.

in

Gandhi tried to the minds of many

allay the fears that his program created politicians by emphasizing its con-

trolled and non-violent nature. "I want no revolution", he told an audience on Madras beach on 12 August, "I want ordered progress...I want real order to be evolved out of this chaos which is represented to me as order"'.®° Gandhi

agreed his

with

program

his

were

Nationalist fraught

critics

with

danger,

that mass civil disobedience would the Central Khilafat Committee was

would

"be

free

the people".°® scenes

which

from an outbreak

had

Gandhi

that

the

but

last

he

assured

of violence

the

them.

of

not be taken up unless reasonably certain that

on the part

had no desire to re-enact

accompanied

stages

Rowlatt

of

it

the violent

Satyagraha.

He stressed the constructive aspect of his program. Students withdrawn from schools and colleges would be edu-

cated

would

justice

in "national"

set

up

local

institutions;

arbitration

lawyers

courts

to our countrymen".”

who

to

left

dispense

Although he opposed

the courts

"swadeshi

suggestions

that a boycott of British goods should be included in his program, Gandhi called for the substitution of foreign manufactures by swadeshi products, especially khadi (hand-spun, hand-woven cloth) produced on a charka (spinning-wheel) and

handloom.”!

Gandhi further tried to reassure his critics

that non-cooperation was a course of action. He told

August

that

teine; it is is perfectly

"non-cooperation

to

is

the inherent right constitutional".7

Gandhi had not Nationalists, or at

hostility

constitutional and legitimate the Madras beach meeting on 12

his

a just

of

and

every

human

being

docand

it

yet despaired of winning over the Madras least of neutralizing their growing

leadership.

He

prefaced

Madras beach on 1 August,

with praise for Tilak, whose and he was careful to answer

the

legislatures

isms of his program.”? reformed

religious

his

speech

on

death had occurred Nationalist critic-

But on the issue of the boycott Gandhi

refused

the

to

compromise.

of

He

35 dismissed the "responsive cooperation" of Tilak and rejected any scheme for entering the legislatures to obstruct their progress. "I submit", he wrote in July 1920, "that in a sense we cooperate by joining even though the object is

obstruction.

of all,

Most

thrive

institutions,

and a British

upon obstruction".

council

Participation

most

in the

legislatures in any form would make the Nationalists the “unwilling instruments of injustice"; and Gandhi contempt-

uously

dismissed

August

1920

the

argument

that,

because

the

Liberals

would ignore the boycott, the Nationalists would have to contest the elections to prevent their opponents winning seats. A complete boycott of the legislatures had become over

the

the

central

Council

cooperation,

boycott,

that

Madras

"do

not

commented

They

to

the

presidency

expect

more

the

As he aptly in

item of Gandhi's

gain

after

than

program.

any

Nationalists

his Madras

want

everything

to

other

aspect

differed

visit,

sacrifice

by

And

speeches

by

it was

of non-

from Gandhi.

the Nationalists

anything

and

at

all.

resolutions".”

Preoccupied with their struggle against the Liberals, the Nationalists did not wish to weaken the Congress on the eve of the elections by entering a vituperative argument with Gandhi. But the council boycott issue threatened their am-

bitions

so directly

be adopted therefore,

but

to dilute Only

Madras

that

it and

the

and,

could

not

allow

his program

to

the Congress. Their objective was, non-cooperation in its entirety,

delay

most

extreme

despite

the

Nationalists

action,

they

unmodified by not to oppose

from

its

implementation.

provocation

their

Punjab

would

predilection events

and

have

for

driven

the

consitutional

the

Hunter

Report,

they did not feel that such provocation had been given. Dis< cussing the effectiveness of non-cooperation at a special meeting of the Madras PCC on 15 August 1920, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar

claimed

we want

by having

pressure

lative

elicit

to

bear

that

upon

Council". a

favourable

Nationalists

would

of non-cooperation, ensure that it had the Government.”

it

was

the

Government

a majority Even

to

that

from

approve

halting

bring we

can

of Nationalists

if constitutional

response

only

"possible

the

the

before

get

in the

pressures

British,

gradual

each

such

new

he

moral all

Legis-

thav

failed

and

to

other

implementation

step

was

taken

nationalist movement strayed too far from the constitutional path, mass violence and anarchy would follow.” Gandhi

wanted

to

rush

them

not prepared either ness to share power

to

popular support and to gauge its impact on In the background was the fear that if the into

a mass

campaign

for

which

in terms of organization or with other social groups.

of

they

were

willing-

36

the

Moreover, life-style

Gandhi's program as and identity of the

it stood was a threat to western-educated profess-

ional middle class. Themselves the products of government schools and colleges, the Madras Nationalists could not

accept

the

public

and

educational

boycott

as

a "practical

proposition"

nor one which would materially advance the nationalist cause.”* The boycotts of law courts and government service were equally unacceptable. Lawyers, the Nationalists argued, served the They

were

were

not,

government.”

instrumental

as

Gandhi

in

claimed,

giving de

justice

facto

For men who had been moulded on

these

lines

was

the

of

people. the

by western

cation, who derived their livelihood from the tions of British rule which Gandhi now sought

non-cooperation

to

servants

anathema.

edu-

very instituto undermine,

Instead, the Nationalists favoured a more agitation. They wanted a campaign which, like

restricted the Bengal

several

advantages:

economic

mercial

and

partition agitation 15 years earlier, focussed on swadeshi and the boycott of foreign goods.® Such a course offered interests;

it

it would

win

industrial

would

the

middle

threaten

support

of

class

British

India's

growing

com-

hit by the post-war

recession; it could provide opportunities for mass demonstrations without the dangers of uncontrollable mass upheaval

implicit in civil disobedience; it could be promoted, among other ways, through action in the central and provincial legislatures; and, not least in importance, it would not

involve

an

attack

on

the

occupations

professional middle class. Control lature was an essential concomitant

The

provisions

of the

granting

provincial

be

their

own

Gandhi's

Men

new

and

of of

constitution,

autonomy,

allowed

privileges

the the

although

for

of the

provincial legisswadeshi campaign.

progress

far

in

from the

"nation-building" departments. It would, the Nationalists claimed, be foolish to throw away such unprecedented opportunities and to allow them to fall into their opponents' hands ."! They would endorse a program of non-cooperation, but it would

In

the

leadership

pro-Gandhi

Its central jationalist

lims.

version

middle

months

in Madras

party

of

was

it,

of

debated

not

Gandhi's.

1920,

while

the

Nationalist

the non-cooperation

beginning

to

crystallize

figure was C. Rajagopalachari; splinter group and part of the

program,

in Tamilnad.

a

behind him were a region's Khilafat

37 Chakravarti Rajagopalachari was born in 1879 in Salem district. His father, a Brahmin karnam, is reported to have owned 50 acres of wet and dry lands.® From 1900 to 1919

Rajagopalachari had a moderately successful law practice in Salem town and for two years, 1917 to 1919, he was chairman of the municipal council. As a lawyer he made contacts among the lawyers, businessmen and leading landholders of

western Tamilnad, contacts that were to later decades in giving Rajagopalachari

base.

Until

of those

1919

who

his

became

neither travelled India until after ideas

but He

and

career

was

Gandhi's

lieutenants,

practices

was

Tilak

a Hindu

was

the

nationalist

hero

of

much

youth,

most

Rajagopalachari

restricted

by

had

a dogged,

to the religion oF his

as

his

Unlike

West: he did not leave reception of western

always

not_uncritical, attachment

was

unremarkable.

nor studied in the Independence. His

social

be invaluable in a local political

as

and

an

Indian

caste.

nationalist.

admiration

for

Tilak's

militant brand of Hindu nationalism was deepened by Rajagopalachari's membership of the circle of Brahmin

intel-

Surat

in his

lectuals late

headed

by Vijayaraghavachari

Congress

in December

twenties,

he believed

sided

that

with

India's

achieved without the

uncompromising

was

steadily

a violent hero

1907

the

in Salem.

Rajagopalachari,

Extremists

independence

and

would

struggle.°?

began,

At

until

the

then

about

probably

not

1912

be

The image of Tilak

however,

to

tarnish

as

and

Rajagopalachari started to doubt that one day terrorism and insurrection would drive the British from India. Faith in Tilak did not completely disappear until early 1920, but it eclipsed

appeared resolute; In

1919

it

easier

to practise

made

by

the

Tilak

Rajagopalachari

at

the High for him

appeal

of

Gandhi.

Gandhi

to be wavering.™ Court.

to

decided

leave

The

to move

recent

Salem

and

to Madras

death

of his

it may

also

city

wife

have

contributed to his restlessness. But there were other reasons for the move: he could hope to advance professionally more rapidly in the presidency capital than in a mofussil town; he was eager to political stage, and Kasturi

do

so.®°

It

may

also

be

that

be nearer the Ranga Iyengar

centre of the encouraged him

Rajagopalachari

had

made

to

him-

self too unpopular during his term as municipal chairman, especially among the Brahmins, to hope for a successful political

career

Rajagopalachari Perhaps, earlier,

like

he

in

took

Kasturi

found

it

Salem.

little

Ranga

However,

interest lyengar

difficult

crowded legal profession. politics. He was casting

to

once

in his

into

Madras,

law practice.

a quarter

move

Instead, about for

in

of

the

he devoted a suitable

a century

city's

over-

himself to role, a cause

yniot yu

38 that

would

absorb

his

labour

agitation

in

Nationalists'

workers'

the

alist

press

but

aspirations

conference

in their

Why,

intellectual

never and

rights.

propaganda

in

November

did

any

deep

He

showed

work,

1919

defence.”

then,

energies.

showed

dabbled

writing

leave

interest

the

Nation-

letters

the

in

for

greater

organizing

and

Rajagopalachari

He

sympathy

to

the

Nationalists

to

follow Gandhi? Firstly, Rajagopalachari sincerely believed in the efficacy of satyagraha, which appeared to him (on the basis of Gandhi's work in South Africa and in India) as a

more

practical

objectives

technique

for

achieving

India's

nationalist

than either constitutionalism or terrorism.

condly,

he

politics. campaigns

was

attracted

by

Gandhi's

spiritual

approach

to

The moral zeal that Gandhi injected into his appealed to Rajagopalachari, a Brahmin intellectual

in search of a worthy cause. There was astrong conservative, raditionalist trait in Rajagopalachari's personality. Whereas many other Nationalists shuddered at Gandhi's rejection of western society and institutions, Rajagopalachari's response

was

sympathetic.

article

in May

to free

itself

1921

bankruptcy

of

not

political

a mere

the

Rajagopalachari he

this

degereration.

from

necessity if we jing into social

lon the West

what

West.

saw

It

was,

device

to

as

described

he

the

moral

said,

wrest

in a newspaper and

in

political

India's

interest

Non-cooperation

reform

but

an

urgent

"is

at all desire to live when the West is driftanarchy. To depend for order and Government

is nothing but death to us...""%

Ambition, as well as intellectual conviction, played a part. In Madras city Rajagopalachari could only be a junior partner in the Nationalists' firm, and he chafed at their

political

caution

and

their

preoccupation

with

the

legis-

lature. On the other hand, Gandhi, deserted by the Moderates and Nationalists in turn, desperately needed a loyal lieutenant in Tamilnad, By opting for Gandhi when all the estab-

lished

unique

tics

and

politicians

opportunity

of Tamilnad.

Gandhi

in Madras

he was

and

that

"too much

to public from

noted

in April

he

were to

By

his

assume

"innate

1919.°°

him,

a central

temperament

acclaim,

Rajagopalachari position

Rajagopalachari

snyness"

in

Other writers

of an igtellectual

preferred

leadership.*!

popular

against

decision-making

their

in

had

the

was

poli-

reserved,

first

meetings

have commented

to be a popular from

behind

a

that

leader"

the

scenes

For such a man power would not come

but

from

association

with

a cause

or

personality. In time Rajagopalachari might have established himself among the Nationalists as their éméinence grise, but he was impatient and Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti were

a

39° more likely future leaders of the party. Alliance with Gandhi offered Rajagopalachari a chance to strike out on own

in

Tamilnad,

but

with

the

advantage

of

links

with

his

Gandhi's

supporters elsewhere in India. It was a gamble, but for Rajagopalachari, still an outsider, not a desperate one. Again,

many

Rajagopalachari

other

Nationalists

the Justice Brahmins

Party.

would

sequently

ministry

problem

be

in

Rajagopalachari their

lature.

with

solved

by

demands

for

Goodwill

be of greater

in

them

danger

However,

that

Brahmins

posed

between

an

in

the

seats

the

by

the

that

than

rise

of

the non-

Liberals

and

exclusively

February

to

in

"absolute

solution,

clearly

1920

con-

non-

non-Brahmin-Brahmin

communities

than

Gandhian

the

of

conceding

reserved

more

hoped

against

the

a plea

importance

characteristically

seen

challenge

office.

put

have

Nationalists

underestimated

Brahmin

all

the

The

ally

may

the

the

non-Brahmins

Madras

would,

he

justice".

which

Gandhi

legis-

asserted,

It was

later

a

approved, but it also expressed the doubts which he and his close friend T.S.S. Rajan* were beginning to have about the Nationalists' prospects of winning the election to the provincial legislature and the importance of developing political

work outside the constitutional arenas.°?

The inclusion of

not,

seemed

the

council

boycott

therefore,

in

alarm

ate way of barring

Gandhi's

non-cooperation

Rajagopalachari,

Brahmin

but

Congressmen

from

program

did

ar. appropri-

contesting

the

elections (thereby lessening communal tension in the presidency) and an opportunity to extend the range of nationalist activity.

with and

Finally, Rajagopalachari's political the mofussil than with Madras city.

the

Extremists

Many mofussil from

chari and

party

was

the

the

politicians

decision

able

city

and social associates

city

making.

to exploit

politicians.

ruled

resented the

In

As

the

the

Naidu*

and

a mofussil

conflict

felt

man,

between

addition

in

to his

Tamilnad.

excluded

Rajagopala-

the mofussil

professional

contacts in western Tamilnad, he had two valuable in T.S.S. Rajan, a Brahmin surgeon in Trichinopoly

defence

on trial

secretary

Congress

this

whom he had known for several years, Aiyar, a Madura lawyer with whom he

in

contacts were more Under the Moderates

of

of

the

the

for

Home

Rule

sediticn

Nationalist

and had

agitator

in 1918.

Conference

A. Vaidyanatha closely cooperated

P.

Varadarajulu

As organizing

in

November

Rajagopalachari had been able to draw together of mofussil Nationalists. Vijayaraghavachari,

1919,

a large number the most ob-

vious candidate for a mofussil Nationalist leader, was too cautious, too unsympathetic to Gandhi, to part from the Madras

city

leaders.

The

way

was

open

for

Rajagopalachari

to

40 lead in

a mofussil

Once

breakaway.

Gandhi

detail,

began

to explain

Rajagopalachari

. support in Madras city, as in the mofussil. It dents

had had

and

young

lawyers

was

his

non-cooperation

also

able

to

(themselves

from

the

the Nationalists' came from a small

attract

program

some

stronghold, as well group of law stumofussil)

who

banded together to form a League of Youth in 1918. They disliked the over-cautious politics of the Moderates, but

found the Nationalists even less to their liking. The Nationalists were "insincere and...merely vociferous" and they indulged in "mock heroics"; the Moderates, "though far

too weak, were, visit to Madras

were

hard

sceptical

effort",

in our opinion, honest".°> Until Gandhi's in August 1920 the League of Youth members

of non

cooperation.

warned

K.

Santhanam,*

"It a

is

law

after

30 years

graduate,

that

“our

But

discuss-

educated men have got the courage even to speak boldly and all at once to ask them to sacrifice their health and position is to meet with a well deserved rebuff. Mr Gandhi must face

facts ions

before

with

he

Gandhi

launches the

his movement".°°

League

members

were

after

converted:

they

left their careers to become full-time activists.*”

In

addition to K. Santhanam, the group included K. Subramaniam, N.S. Varadachari and K.V. Rajagopalan (all three Tamil Brahmins), the Vellala S. Ramanathan,* and G.V. Krupanidhi. They were Rajagopalachari's most loyal co-workers in the early 1920s.

But

a section

of the mofussil

of young intellectuals for Rajagopalachari to

wards

ance

non-cooperation.

of the

Khilafat

Nationalists

and a handful

in Madras city were not support enough redirect the Congress in Tamilnad to-

For

Muslims.

that

purpose

he

sought

the

assist-

Although the Muslims constituted only seven per cent the presidency's population and only about half that percentage in Tamilnad, and though they were deeply divided

between

Urdu

had developed

and

Tamil-speakers,

in the region

a vocal

by August

Khilafat

1920.°°

of

movement

The Muslims

were split into three political factions, the origins which dated back to the beginning of the century, but

of were

intensified by the Khilafat around the Prince of Arcot,

issue. A loyalist group, centred had opposed the Lucknow Pact of

Council

main

1916 between the Congress and the Muslim League (which formulated a joint constitutional demand) and formed a shortlived rival to the Muslim League in Madras in November 1917. A more enduring role was played by Muhammad Usman, a relative of the Prince of Arcot, who entered the Madras Legislative

in

1920

and

was

the

Muslim

spokesman

in

the

41

Justice A

Party. second

group

merchants

and

League

1908

Hasan,*

Lucknow

who

in

consisted

businessmen.

had

helped

and

Pact.

to

had

Born

been

at

of

Its

found

Urdu

central

and

a Madras

one

of

the

Nagpur,

educated

communal

demands

Tamil-speaking

figure

was

branch

architects at

the

Yakub

of the Muslim of

the

Muhammadan

Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, and married to a Turkish wife, Hasan had important ties with the wider Islamic world. But he firmly believed that, as a minority community, India's Muslims

had

operation

to

a merchant, iest Muslim

into

balance

with

the predominantly

and

practical

Hindu Congress.'°°

Hasan was backed by several of the city's wealthbusinessmen and traders, many of whom were goaded

support

of the

Khilafat

movement

Turkish sultan's fate piece-goods, skin and

than by leather

movement's

in Tamilnad

less

by concern

its

local

organization,

vocal

The

Abdul

than

third

entirely Urdu

Muslim

Sharar,

newspaper,

could

Muslims

on

to

in

faction

Qawni

Hindu act

a

was

fierce

the

the most

fanatical.

they

Muslims,

Pan-Islamist

Report.

Sharar

was

largest

favoured

it

and

as

was

editor

assertively

in

the

whether

Khilafat the

issue

Hindus

say

in

a course

Almost

led

bitterly

collaboration with the Congress the Raj. He questioned whether

sincerity

the

As the

they had

general

of Urdu-speaking

of Hasan's loyalty to

rely

and

violent.

composed

Majid

dainful Arcots' the

financiers

for the

the post-war contraction of trades.'°! Among them were

Moosa Sait, C. Abdul Hakim, and Jamal Muhammad.’*? more

co-

Himself

of

by

an

dis-

as of the Muslims

and

urged

followed

or

not. In his speeches and journalism he asserted that the Khilafat was a life-and-death question for Muslims and implied that, if necessary, force would be used to defend the

faith.'°?

His

supporters

were the residue of the old Muslim

elite of intellectuals and maulvis (religious teachers and scholars), though he received some backing from the poorer

Muslims

Aligarh.

of Madras The

old elite to

regain

with

lease

prestige

but

few

Congress

Conference of

in

the

from

former

appeal

1919

brothers,

by

Khilafat and

practical the

young

fired

assiduously

over

August

Ali

been

of the

were

Rajagopalachari the

and

had

the

its

scholars,

city

latter

students

was

power.

he moved

At

in Tamilnad.'°>

At

the

!™

for

Khilafat

were

Muslim

Madras

a resolution

imprisoned

but

a romantic

Some

cultivated

sympathy with Turkey during the war. For October 1919 Rajagopalachari undertook to

support

as

politicians.

Khilafat.

educated

Pan-Islam,

their

for

the

quest

renowned

cooperation

Provincial

the

declared

Khilafat organize

meetings

at

for

re-

Day on Hindu

in Tamilnad

17

he

42 supported

Hasan

and

the

moderate

merchants,

encouraging

them

to cooperate with the Congress and isolating the Sharar faction. By May 1920 Hasan and his associates, with Rajagopalachari behind them, were in control of the provincial Khilafat committee, and Sharar, who had hoped to be chosen

president, The

resigned

Madras

government

the presidency Except lation

Khilafat

in a huff./%° was

"a backwater

no

of the

doubt

correct

[Khilafat]

in calling

agitation".

in North Arcot which had a large urban Muslim popuclosely tied to piece-goods and leather trading, the

committees

were

as

much

Hindu

enterprises

as

Muslim.

Trichinopoly, among the most active centres in 1920-22, a Khilafat committee directed by T.S.S. kajan and T.V. Swaminatha Sastri, both of whom were Brahmin friends of

gopalachari,

assisted

long-established

a Tamil the

Muslim

Khilafat

Syed

Murtuza

The

moderate

land~holding

merchant.

committees

and organizational alist leadership.

The Road

by

gave

leverage

Sahib,

family,

and

Kaja

Mian

Khilafat

Rajagopalachari

he

a maulvi

needed

to

the

had

Raja-

from

Rowther,

Muslims

displace

'°”

a

and

numerical

the

Nation-

to Nagpur

The

first

clash

between

leadership

the

Khilafat-Gandhian

occurred

at

the

forces

the

Nationalist

Madras

did his

not disguise his faith in constitutional progress, nor abhorrence of non-cooperation which he held was uncon-

and

Provincial

Conference held at Tinnevelly on 21 to 23 June 1920. The conference was presided over by S. Srinivasa lyengar,* a lawyer of princely fortune and meicurial temperament, who had resigned as Advocate-General in February as a protest against government repression. Before his appointment as Advocate-General in 1916, Srinivasa Iyengar had been more at home in Moderate than Extremist circles, but the Nationalists were eager to add such a celebrity to their numbers. In his presidential address he was critical of the Reform Act, but stitutional,. }°¢

such ing

a pronouncement

the

passed forms,

Coming

example

of

a resolution but

resolution Srinivasa

Hasan

and

calling

Iyengar

was

the

on

the

a boon

Amritsar

the

former

to

the

Nationalists.

unsatisfactory

then

non-cooperation

the

Advocate-General,

Congress,

Rajagopalachari

for

and

from

Nationalists

to Gandhi's program and wanted with the support of the League Muslims,whom he had invited to

on

the

nature moved

the

stated

Follow-

conference

of the

an

Khilafat

their

re-

additional

issue.

objections

the resolution postponed, but of Youth and the Khilafat the conference, Rajagopalachari

was able to force through the non-cooperation

resolution. !°*

43

Undeterred, the Nationalists refused to be hound by the Tinnevelly resolution and continued their election campaign for the legislatures. When the Madras PCC met on 5 August to consider the Gandhian program, Rajagopalachari's contention that the PCC was already committed to non-cooperation

by the Tinnevelly conference was rejected duce a new motion. The PCC postponed its

meeting Gandhi,

on 15 August, and then then touring TamiJnad,

to a third. Although this gave time to reply to the Nation-

alists' criticism, their opposition did PCC finally approved non-cooperation on

far more

without

cautious

the council

and

aid he had to introdecision to a second

gradual

form

boycott. !!°

not diminish. 24 August, but

than

Gandhi

The in a

proposed

— and

The next round of the struggle was decided outside the regional arena when, at the beginning of September 1920, a Special Congress was called at Calcutta to decide the party's stand on non-couperation. By again using his alliance with the Khilafat Muslims and organizing his supporters to vote only for their partisans, Rajagopalachari secured the election

of

non-cooperetors

Congress to the A special train

as

the

Madras

delegates

to

the

Calcutta

almost complete exclusionof their opponents was reported to have taken 200 Khilafat Mus-

lims from North Arcot, Trichinopoly and Bangalore to the Congress. }!! The session was a success for Gandhi. With

help of Muslims and of Hindu Congressmen prospects in the elections were bleak,'!*

carry

easier

his

program

victory

in the

in

the

Subjects

open

session.

the

from provinces where Gandhi was able to

Committee, With

the

followed

by an

addition

of

the

boycott of foreign goods demanded by the Nationalists and the promise of swaraj within one year, Gandhi's non-cooperation was adopted by the Congress on 9 September defeating the

amendment Ranga

moved

Iyengar

by

and

the program.

B.C.

Pal

of

Satyamurti

to

Of the Madras

Bengal

and

delay

delegation,

the

supported

by

implementation

161

voted

Kasturi of

for Gandhi's

program and 145 voted against; significantly, 125 of the proGandhian delegates were Muslims.? Rajagopalachari's alliance with the Muslims had again brought results.

In

the

six

weeks

following

surprising

changes

transformed

candidates

for

provincial

in

Tamilnad.

Firstly,

the

many

cluding Vijayaraghavachari was

accompanied

by

the

of

the

the

the

and

Special

Nationalists

central

and A.

resignation

Congress

leadership

three

Congress

withdrew

legislatures,

Rangaswami of

of the

nine

as

in-

Iyengar. 1! This

leading

Nation-

alists from the PCC Executive Committee including Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, the president.!!® Finally, on 19 October, the

vacancies the

on the

associates

of

committee

were

filled

Rajagopalachari.

without

Although

opposition

a cautiously

by

44 pro-Gandhian

new

president,

lawyer,

the

T.V.

Venkatarama

committee

was

was

in practice

ion of Rajagopalachari and T.S.S. with Muslims, the League of Youth

occupying the remaining

Aiyar,

Rajan group

places. !1¢

elected

under

the

the

direct-

as vice-presidents, and mofussil Gandhians

At first sight it appeared abjectly surrendered the PCC to

that the Nationalists had the Gandhians, the reverse

PCC

Tamil

of

the situation in Bengal where the Nationalists under C.R. Das adopted the boycott program rather than yield control of the ly

to

Gandhi's

making

Kasturi

a strategic

Ranga

But

Iyengar's

were defiant, claiming that

ion.'!®

men.'!7

the

retreat.

kindu

The

after

Nationalists

first

editorials

the Calcutta

were

in

Congress

deploring the non-cooperation decision Congressmen were still free to run for

This view was seconded by such senior mofussil

alists

as

K.V.

Rangaswami

Iyengar

mere-

of Trichinopoly

and

and elect-

Nation

C.V.

Venkataramana Iyengar of Coimbatore. But the unexpected decision of Vijayaraghavachari to observe the council boycott by withdrawing his candidacy for the central legislature to preserve Congress unity, impressed Kasturi Ranga and per-

suaded him to stop his own open attacks.’*°

The Nationalists

Congress

to

had to choose. As Extremists they experienced after the Surat split the consequences of being herded out of the organization,

and

they

would

prefer

tolerate

Gandhian program for the present rather than return itely to the wilderness.”“! Although eager to enter legislatures, they felt that the majority decision of the

the

indefinthe

in the long term obedience to Congress might be of greater

advantage to the Nationalists: they would not lose their right to speak as Congressmen nor forfeit the opportunity eventually to reconvert the party creed. The Nationalists had been

forms

and

now

to

defy

official

to their own political very critical of the re-

Congress

policy

and

enter

the

legislatures would seem a betrayal as cynical as that they attributed to Besant and the Liberals. Further, faced with the growing popularity of Gandhi and the absence of a Nationalist leader of comparable stature after the death of Tilak, they reluctantly accepted Gandhi's lead for the present and waited for opinion in the Congress to swing back to a con-

stitutional

forced

had

So

not

program.

on the Congress imposed

the way

it

to amend

cott was not, it cooperating with

the

initiative

on

The

non-cooperation

the

Madras

and

at a national

PCC

eventually

his

reverse

seemed, by squabbling Nationalists in other

at the national

level.

by

level.

decision

had

been

Rajagopalachari

own

the

strength.

council

boy-

within the PCC but by provinces to regain

45

With

this

objective

in view

Rajagopalachari's tactics and AICC delegates held in Madras

and Rajagopalachari It

the

was

by

annual

elections

then

too

and

held.

been

argued,

Nationalists

over

For

still

as

formation

an

reverse

at

Nagpur

a month

after

present

had

Das

would

that

hopes

the

council

months

council was

taming

to

back

experiment

the

two

issue

of

agreed

of a non-Brahmin

no

longer

ministry

were

selected. !7?

boycott

after and,

with

and

than

in

Madras

and

Nagpur

it

AICC

had

But

has

Gandhi

civil a

since

the

elections

Gandhi

a compromise

for

for the Only Hasan

settled.

non-cooperation

but

copied

packed the elections on 19 October 1920.

the non-cooperators

to

met

the

C.R.

the Nationalists The

late

Congress

been

bedience

among

the Nationalists

the

that

diso-

year, 123

and

the

prospect of three years before the next provincial elections persuaded the Nationalists in Tamilnad to approve the Das compromise. The

Congress

an anomalous to

take

waiting enough

Gandhian

trial?

over

sessions

situation

the

PCC,

an opportunity

to

thwart

program.

at

Calcutta

in Tamilnad.

but

the

to return, they

Gandhians

and were

Rajagopalachari's

Would

The

Nationalists,

allow

were apie

unbeaten,

still to

powerful

non-cooperation

Pobbrao dé

relia

So

dan

gal

vss

|

fran?

Oarne!

wb

‘

tale?

the

a fair

N abrenal

cueiee

were

implement

ten

.

Cab

attempt

produced

ms

Canale hime 4

non

)

-

thy

conte st

CuapTer 2 THe NoN-COOPERATION EXPERIMENT

Once non-cooperation had program of the Congress,

been adopted as the official the practical difficulties of

im-

plementing it came to the fore. Gandhi wanted mass participation in the nationalist movement, but, paradoxically,

the program

middle

have

and

he drafted

classes;

to

give

up

to abandon

for

depended

upon

professional

careers

their

as

hope

men,

lawyers

the

initiative

not

or

government

of election

of the

peasants,

to

the

would

servants

legislatures.

Only in the later stages of the movement, after the middle classes had made their sacrifices, would the ryot and the trader be invited to defy the Raj. Grievances against foreign rule the middle classes certainly had and felt, but

could they be expected to risk their power and privileges for a movement which might either fail completely or explode

into mass

classes

revolution?

that

the

It was

fate

of non-cooperation

Tamilnad those classes orating with the Raj.

Congress the

saw

too

much

to

of the

rested

be

lost

and

by

middle

in

decollab-

Reorganization

By his

focus

tional

on the attitude

of

triumphs the

objectives

at

Congress

by

Calcutta from

and

Nagpur

achieving

constitutional

Gandhi

limited

means

to

the

shifted

constitu-

attainment

of swaraj through non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Such a drastic change necessitated the remodelling of the

Congress organization. For ficient to have an informal

the Moderates it had been suforganization that was a national

platform rather than an agitational machine. But in striving for a more distant goal, Gandhi required a Congress which could mobilize the masses and which was strong enough at the centre to restrain and direct agitation along non-violent

lines.

This

President

the

Nagpur

became

Congress

a full-time

attempted

chief 46

to

of the

do.

The

national

Congress

party

47 assisted

which

by

was

the

newly

designed

created

to "meet

disciplined

executive

181

members

in

ing

the

to

Congress

the need

direct

a

Working

for

Committee,

a compact

loosely-knit

and

mass

movement

which necessarily had to remain a broad coalition of divergent elements". To balance the CWC 4nd be a check on its power, the All-India Congress Committee was expanded from 1920

the provincial units PCCs based mainly on British

development

to

350

in

1921.

At

the

the

Madras

next

level

down,

of the Congress were reorganized, with the linguistic regions of India replac-

provinces.

In

of the Andhra movement

had

Presidency,

already

led

the

to the

separation of the Telugu districts from the Madras PCC to form an independent committee in 1917.7 But until 1920 some Telugus living and working in Madras city and in the southern

Telugu

districts

continued

PCC. The effect of the the Madras committee to

presidency Tamil

Nadu

and

themselves

to the

Nagpur reorganization was the Tamil-speaking region

in November

Congress

to attach 1921

Committee

it

changed

(TNCC).

its

name

Although

associated with knowledge of English remained circles, the creation of linguistic provinces gress in south India acknowledged the rapidly

to of

the

old

confine the

to the

prestige

in nationalist for the Conincreasing use

of the vernaculars for political discussion. Gandhi had opposed the creation of a separate Andhra PCC in 1916 and his changed attitude must have been a consequence of his realization of the potential of vernacular propaganda as as a concern for such politically "backward" regions of India

as

Gujarat,

Bihar

English-speaking

and

Andhra,

politicians

and

the

contempt

in the presidency

well

for

the

towns.?°

Beneath the PCCs the Congress was to consist of a series of committees from the district level down to the village and urban ward branches. These.would be the primary cells, whose

members

would

members

were

various had

been

levels

pay

an annual‘ subscription

of the

elected

elected

party

by

the

were

town

by members

of

linked

and

the

by

taluk

local

of four

annas.

election:

committees

sabhas.

This

DCC

The

which

gave

a democratic appearance to the working of the Congress. In theory its senior officials at the provincial and national level

party

were

chosen

pyramid.

by

indirect

In theory,

too,

urban ward committees gave the mass following. But it should matched intention. The Nagpur

election from

the

creation

the base

of the

of village

and

Congress a mass base and a not be assumed that reality Congress did not create a mass

party overnight as historians have often been tempted to assume.” What the Nagpur Congress actually did was to prepare a blueprint for the future growth of the party, but it was

many

years,

at

least

in

Tamilnad,

before

the

lower

levels

48 of

ate

the

projected

effect

organization

of Nagpur

was

to

were

established.

strengthen

The

the upper

immedi-

levels

— the

central and provincial committees — while leaving the lower levels weak and fragmentary. By linking national and regional Congress bodies more closely, Gandhi was able to give the central party leadership greater control over agitation and

propaganda gation

pulsion

in the provinces.

from

from

The

the

the

bridge

engine

But

in Tamilnad

was

not

matched

of

the

Congress

room.

reorganization

by

the the

sub-committee constitution.

to keep

the

more

was

eral issues over which the Gandhians and clashed during 1921. Rangaswami Iyengar

better

the had

navi-

powerful

one

of

pro-

the

sev-

Nationalists been a member

of

of the Congress, appointed in 1920 to revise He, like other Madras Nationalists, wanted

Congress

open

to

those

who

disagreed

mass

party

which

with

Gandhi's

ideas and tactics. The Nationalists wished, too, to guarantee for themselves a position in the national leadership by requesting that the Congress give representation in the AICC and PCCs on the basis of "interests" rather than provincial population. In particular, they wanted Madras city to be independent of the PCC, like Bombay, to be a Nationalist bastion safe from Gandhian incursions. The Nationalists were, however, in a minority. At the national level it was Gandhi's

vision

of

a disciplined

11 out

of

14 places

was

accepted,

not

Rangaswami's Whig Parliament. At the regional level Rajagopalachari's revised constitution gave Madras city only 24 places in a PCC of 820 members: Trichinopoly was given 84. Madras city's representation on the AICC was hacked down from

in

1921

to

4 out

of 25

Even this redistribution of places Rajagopalachari. The elections for the

to meet at Trichinopoly at until the beginning of the

in

1922.°

did not satisfy new PCC, scheduled

the end of July, were not announced month and in some districts

Nationalists and Gandhians clashed over how the elections should be conducted and which candidates were eligible.’ When Nationalist leaders sought to requisition old PCC to ask for the meeting of the new

a meeting committee

of to

the be

postponed until gopalachari and

the the

elections could be properly held, RajaPCC President, T.V. Venkatarama Aiyar,

already

and

its

dismissed

their

defunct

request

on

the

members

grounds

were

that

the

therefore

old

PCC

powerless

was

requisition or postpone anything.® The PCC meeting at Trichinopoly was held as arranged, but it was attended by only 218 of its 820 members. Furious at Rajagopalachari's

high-handed

Nationalists

the

whole

action

and

appealed

affair.

As

the

to

Trichinopoly

the

Congress

CWC

for

an

President

"farce",

the

investigation

C.

to

into

Vijayaraghavachari

49 was asked to investigate, but Gandhi advised the CWC to ignore his report, which favoured the Nationalist associates and called for a revision of the PCC constitution, because, Gandhi said, there was no time for "academic discussions or

legal

subtleties.

We must

think

less

of office

and

service."® Although they protested against this attitude, the Nationalists reluctantly swallowed

more

partisan their de-

of

feat. The Congress was the only home they had and they did not want to become political exiles like the Moderates before them.

In September

1921

their position by to Trichinopoly. that

for

Gandhians

shifting the The official

Trichinopoly

accessible

the

was

the

more

strengthened

PCC headquarters from Madras explanation for this move was

central

mofussil

further

than

Madras

Congressmen

who

and

now

more

formed

the

great majority of PCC members. But it was also a deliberate move to take the offices and meetings of the committee away

from

the

the

influence

direction

politicians Committee

of

of the

T.S.S.

Nationalists

Rajan

and

in Trichinopoly.!°

elected

other

and

The Tamil

in November

1921

to keep

Gandhian

them under

and

Khilafat

Nadu Congress

reflected

the

shift

in

control from Madras to the mofussil, the Nationalists to the Gandhians. The Nationalists were not given representation on the TNCC and only Rangaswami Iyengar found a place among

the

AICC

members.

The

TNCC

members

from

Madras

were

relative

newcomers — M. Singaravelu Chetti, a lawyer from a fishing caste who had gained prominence by his organizing of hartals and demonstrations in the city since 1919, and the League of

Youth

group.

Gandhian

Trichinopoly

Hindus

figures

were

and

selected

Khilafat

as

was

strongly

Muslims.

president

and

represented

Although

by

both

little-known

vice-president,

the

TNCC was managed by Rajagopalachari and two secretaries, Rajan from Trichinopoly and E.V. Ramaswami Naicker* of Erode. In all there were five Muslims in the TNCC, a far higher

number than in previous years and gopalachari's alliance with Yakub

Khilafat

and

AICC

wing.

places,

by comparison

Brahmins but

within

their

held

as many

proportion

with previous

The committee leadership for the

ivists

the

still

a consequence Hasan and the

districts

as half

of non-Brahmins

PCCs."

was intended region. Its

of Rajamoderate

the TNCC was

to provide agitational members were political

and

were

committed

to

the

sections

of

the

high

act-

Gandhian faction. They were chosen to direct and coordinate non-cooperation and civil disobedience. But, as yet, the groundwork had not been done. As will be seen shortly,

Gandhi's

Tamil

program

population,

failed

partly

to

attract

because

it

many

did

not

make

a

50 sufficiently

attractive appeal

ambitions.

divided

But

it

was

internally

The

Gandhians

Nationalists

had

also

to

carry

were

resigned

to

the

their

case

the

that

interests

the

agitation

desperately

their

short

places

and

TNCC

was

to

the

of

fund:.

on the

too

people.

PCC

The

executive

in October 1920 and were then squeezed out of the leadership of the regional party, but they would. not relinquish their hold on money belonging to the old committee and amounting to

some Rs. first

25,000.12

attempts

In this way they thwarted

to

disseminate

propaganda

to the legislatures — the verdict of not altered Nationalist hostility to Nagpur Corgress in December 1920 the

established

on

a national

to

of the

Madras

fund:

several

alists

were

sizable

drone the was

at

collect

money

basis.

committee first

of

for

the

on

sat

donations.

non-cooperation

By

of dissatisfaction

fund became a buzz being collected to

on

the

with

the

end

was

in

their

committee

of

elections

movement

appointed

6 March

demonstrative

them

the

the Calcutta Congress had the boycott. 13 At the Tilak Swarajya Fund was

Rajagopalachari

formed

the Gandhians'

against

June,

1921.

The

support

and

Nation-

for

the

promised

however,

Rajagopalachari's

treasurer

a dull

management

of

of persistent criticism: not enough meet the target of six and a half lakhs

of rupees (Rs. 650,000); the accounts were not being properly audited; the Gandhians were alarming the public by the secrecy

with

funds.

which

they

But

Nationalists,

surrounded

the real if

they

basis

the

could

collection

for this not

and

allocation

criticism

control

the

was

that

Tilak

of

the

Swarajya

Fund themselves, were eager to depict the Gandhians as dishonest and incompetent and to extol their own honesty and

integrity. © As

allowed

a

result

greater

collections Kasturi

Ranga

the

the

all-India

loans

the

Nationalists'

responsibility

in Tamilnad.

But

only Rs.

of

public

Iyengar

would

and

for

Direction later

to

contribute

the

criticism

S.

little:

179,000 had been received.'®

from

the

alists

did

not

use

these

fund, CWC

allotted

for

khadi

management

of the

fund

Srinivasa

by

national

were

of the

passed

Iyengar.

November

Moreover,

to Tamilnad and

they

to

1921

the share of

aswell

as

education,

special were

channelled through Rajagopalachari. As Gandhi's man he was trusted by the national leadership to distribute party funds as he thought fit. Much of it was spent in ways the Nationand lawyers who workers, or for of

attract

new

establish

approve

—

salaries

for

national

school

had left their profession to become propaganda against the legislature.

funds

recruits

a personal

Rajagopalachari

for

his

own

patronage

was

band

network

gradually

of

the

political By the

able

supporters

within

teachers

to

and

Tamil

Sl

Congress.” The Gandhians

Tamilnad.

Of

had

the

three — Mail,

limited

four

principal

Justice

and

access

Besant's

to the press

English

dailies

New India

in

in

1920-21,

— were

persist-

ent, often vociferous, opponents of non-cooperation. The fourth, the Findu, was the organ of the Nationalists, and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, having built the sales of his paper up to over 10,500 copies by 1920, would not risk government

displeasure and the daring an editorial Nagpur

Congress

possible policy.

the

Eindu

confiscation of his press by too Gandhi had hoped that after the

would

swing

for it was an extremely influential educated in the presidency, but its than

lukewarm.’®

Swadesamitran,

openly

critical

Of

the

with

Tamil

papers,

a circulation

of non-cooperation.

over

vernacular by

the

Gandhians'

paper

was

non-Brahmin

Mudaliar, ablest

the

of

of

7,000

attracted

writers

of

the

day.

to

lyengar's

1920,

the

Vi.

its

When

was

more

Tamil

Nadu

from June 1920, was Varadarajulu was as cautious and method-

Launched

Tiru.

in

the westernnever more

A new paper,

view

Desabhaktan.

Congressman

Desabhaktan

Tamil

point

non-cooperation,

Rangaswami

edited by P. Varadarajulu Naidu of Salem often enthusiastically pro-Gandhian, but erratic and irrational as Rangaswami was ical. From

to

paper among support was

most

promising

in December

Kalyanasundara

staff

some

V.V.S.

of

Aiyar,

a)

1917

the the

\

one-

time terrorist, took over as editor in July 1920 the paper adopted an aggressive nationalist line until September 1921 when the government prosecuted several of the editorial staff of Desabhaktan

Nadu.'®

In

and

an

Varadarajulu

attempt

to

break

Naidu

through

as

editor

the

of

Tanil

Nationalists’

domination of the press, in November 1921 Rajagopalachari contributed Rs. 10,000 of Congress money to help finance a new English paper, Swarajya, as a rival to the Hindu. Edited by

T.

Prakasam,*

activists

paper mand

was

the

Swarajya

a Telugu

including

at

first

expertise

limped

members

Congress

of

successful;

and

on till

financial

1935.

the

and,

leader,

League

assisted

though

of Youth

resources

it

could

of

the

Rajagopalachari's

Tamil rival to Swadesamitran were abandoned.”° The

organization

the non-cooperation not

interfere.

end

of

The

of volunteer

movement

Calcutta

with

corps

which

Congress

was

of

the

one

Ly

party

group,

not

Hindu,

plans

com

for

aspect

a

of

Nationalists

September

the

did

1920

called for the creation of volunteer corps in the provinces, but in Tamilnad they were not developed until towards the ad hoe

1921.

basis

Students

and

to distribute

youths

notices

were

often

recruited

of meetings,

on

to carry

an

;

52 flags

in

were

also

hartals

processions,

and

to

keep

contribute

to

Congress

extensively

and

to

used

order

to persuade

at

meetings.

They

shopkeepers

funds.

to observe

Singaravelu

Chetti in Madras city made effective use of students for this form of party work. The idea of permanent bodies of volunteers, | trained and run on semi-military lines, progressed more rapid\ly in Andhra than in Tamilnad. \Guntur formed a corps known as

N

&

~\r

which

\

combined

Hindu

Duggirala Rama Dandu

fanaticism

with

Gopalakrishnayya ("Rama's Army")

of

discipline. 21

military

In late 1923 both the Tamil and Telugu regions produced volunteer organizations designed partly to assist in the anti-liquor agitation which was then gaining momentum, but more especially to serve as the non-violent strike force of he civil disobedience movement. The Telugu Santi Sena "Peace Army") had a nominal strength of 3,366 in February 1922; the smaller Tamil Tondar Pandai ("Army of Devotees") 1,899: the government believed that both were actually much larger. The TNCC claimed that there were as many as a thousand volunteers enlisted in Tamilnad in January 1922, including 300 in Madras city, 70 in Madura and 30 in Trichin-

opoly.?? Tole

But

or

When

used

civil

arrested

melted those

were

spread

disobedience

and,

left

away.

in

never

Congress

Compared

were

used

in

a prominent

activity

was launchedthe

without

Tamilnad

The 1919

May

they

to

guidance,

to

the

into

the

leaders

countryside.

were

volunteer

volunteers

singularly

agitational

the

of

quickly

corps

Bombay

and

ineffectual .”"

Bengal,

Khilafat leaders raised their own volunteers. In at the annual conference of the Majlis-al-Ulema at

Tanjore a body known as the "Servants of Islam", comprising from 300 to 500 Muslim youths, was formed to keep order, but

it was

not

retained

as

a permanent

organization.

1920 a new corps was formed in Madras the volunteers were drilled, and they

khaki

uniforms

andcrescent

badges.**

were set up in Muslim centres like volunteers were former students of Although

it

reorganization

of

has

been

1920-21

Congress

into

a

"parallel

evidence

from

Tamilnad

“highly centralized

with it,

the

such

saying

basis

without

an

"As

long

of violence,

counter

intended

we

as

one

by

with

that

Indeed,

there

cannot

violence."#®

Khilafat

It

corps

historian

Gandhi the

government",”’

suggest

interpretation.

that

by

government"

responsible to

Other

for Khilafat Day: military-style

Vaniyambadi, where the the Islamia College. ?°

suggested

was

city wore

In March

is

have

would

to

CWC

that

make

as

there

Congressmen

a parallel seem

that

the

is no

agreed

Rajagopalachari

a Government

a

the

opposed

running

on

Government

Rajagopala-

chari and his associates saw the Congress as a rival with the British Raj for the loyalty of the public, not as an

53 alternative government apparatus. In addition to the moral and practical objection which Rajagopalachari foresaw — that without resort to arms there could not be a "parallel government" in any administrative sense — there was a further reason why Gandhians did not think in these not, at this stage, worry about the form of

would

be

occupied

optimistic

established

when

belief

the

with

the

Raj

collapsed.

strength

of popular

immediate

in

the

terms. They did government which

struggle

and

they

They had

were

an

pre-

over-

nationalism

the vulnerability of the government. Much was, left to chance, to nationalist sentiment and to

therefore, oratory

and

rather than careful planning and laborious grassroots organization. Measuring themselves against their Moderate, Home Rule and Nationalist predecessors, the Gandhians reckoned themselves pioneers of mass agitation. But, wary of mass

participation

which

The Good Ship

"Reforms"

jealous of their time Control of was of more creation of

they might

not

Gandhi

had

anticipated

that

the

cooperation by the Congress would violent confrontation between the In

be able

to control,

and

rival middle-class factions, the Gandhians devoted and energy to a struggle for political survival. the existing organization and assets of the party immediate interest and importance than the a mass party or a parallel government.

Tamilnad

this

was

not

to

be

the

adoption

of non-

provoke a direct, Indian people and case,

and

only

nonthe Raj.

briefly

—

late in 1921 —did a confrontation occur. Hampered by the intermittent sniping of the Nationalists from within the Congress, the Gandhians were also frustrated by public indifference and hostility to the movement. A primary cause of this negative response was the greater attraction of the Madras legislature and the accession to ministerial power of the

non-Brahmin

the

The

The

first

failure

and

Calcutta

before

Gandhi's

Justice

the

of

crucial

Special

council

supporters

Party.

the

boycott

setback

Congress

elections

of

the

Madras

legislature

held

barely

three

for non-cooperation

was

on

inadequate

30

time

November

1920,

to dissuade

in Tamilnad. months

leaving

electors

from going to the polls. Boycott propaganda was patchy: Rajagopalachari and Rajan toured Trichinopoly, Coimbatore and Salem districts in September and October; Khilafat and Congress

town.

funds

activists

But

the

to stage

were

Gandhians

a more

at

work

had

in

Madras

neither

extensive

the

no-vote

and

Trichinopoly

personnel

campaign.

was

nor

the

54 An easier tactic, demanding organization, than asking voters

candidates

to

success.

withdraw,

About

and

fewer party not to poll

initially

24 Nationalists

this

withdrew

workers and less was appealing to

met

with

some

their candidature

for the Madras Legislative Council, but the government was cynical about their motives for doing so, claiming that "the majority of these had little chance of success and some undoubtedly were glad of an opportunity of avoiding the

trouble

and

larger

expense

than

any

of

of canvassing

which

they

The

speed

with

which

new

as

to who

might

be

elected

better chances enlargement of

with no obvious seats there was mu] ti-member

number

Tamil

had

candidates

electorate

hitherto

had

appeared

so much

experience. 129

— many

with

no

than those withdrawing — suggests that the the electorate had created such. uncertainty

that

most

contests

were

open

races

favourites. Except in the Muslim reserved no dearth of candidates and in some large,

constituencies

of contestants

Party paign. P. after T.M.

an

like

ran.

Tanjore

an

absurdly

large

labels had little currency in the election camTyagaraya Chetti, leader of the Justice Party Nair's death in July 1919, visited some of the

districts

to

give

his

party's

support

to

a few

candid-

ates who were already running; and the Telugu K.V. Reddi Naidu conducted a last minute electioneering tour. But the Justicites did not have an election organization to nominate

and of

on

canvass

the

the

most

for

its

promising

election

own candidates.°” of

that

..-electoral

dominantly

the

Telugu

fights

in

personal

and

C.

Ramalinga

non-Brahmins,

India

are still

communal.

politics of press and platform the voting, The landlord, the

The

Reddi,

commented

one

pre-

general

hardly affect merchant and

lawyer have their clientele; and every man has his tribe, clan or creed behind him, who follow

him

with

sheepish

ism political

It was

who

had

not,

switched

therefore,

originally

to neutral

fidelity.

conviction

surprising

intended

colours

to

sail

In this

courts

that

rather

for

several

under

the

than obey

medieval-

little.”

politicians

Congress

flag

the Congress

boycott. S. Srinivasa Iyengar and P. Subbarayan,* Zamindar of Kumaramangalam, were among the Nationalists who ran, while other candidates received encouragement from Nationalist friends or patrons.** The Liberals played a surprisingly small part in the elections for the provincial legislature. Sivaswami

Aiyar

Legislative

and

Assembly

Srinivasa

Sastri

and the Council

were

elected

of State

to

the

respectively;

SS only Govindaraghava Aiyar of the Liberal constituency for the Madras council.

leaders

chose

a

:

Personal influence, communal loyalties, promises of ~~ reward if elected: these counted far more in the 1920

elections than

not

two

or

hotch-potch.

party

three

affiliations.

clearly

It

is,

defined

therefore,

The electors returned,

parties,

but_a

misinterpretation

political of

the

situation to claim, as Dr Irschick: does, that "the Justice Party, which had little or no opposition, carried the day. Out of 98 elected seats [for the whole presidency], Justice

members won 63".°? According only

15

MLCs

could

won

five

of

had

been

reserved

be

elected on the Justice the 26 lature

the

to one contemporary

clearly

identified

ticket.°**

seven

for

observer,

having

been

In Tamilnad non-Brahmins

non-Muhammadan

rural seats (for the see Table 1). Since

as

urban

seats,

composition of only two urban

non-Brahmins

the and

and

19 of

Madras legis11 rural seats

under

Lord

Meston's

time

gave

members

arbi-

tration award in March 1920, fears of Brahmin monopoly of the council proved unjustified. The Congress boycott may have reduced the number of Brahmin contestants,’ and several Brahmin Nationalists withdrew or encouraged non-Brahmins to stand instead. But the expansion of the electorate and the creation

of multi-member

seats

for

the

first

of

the

rural dominant castes as well as. businessmen and lawyers from non-Brahmin communities a real opportunity to break Brahmin

dominance

in

The

the

legislature.

Congress

boycott

may

also

have

contributed

to

low poll in several non-Muhammadan constituencies. average poll for the whole presidency was 24.9 per

in Madura,

between

low

as

15

Trichinopoly and

13 per

16.5

cent.**

per

and

cent;

But

Salem

the

and

districts in

North

explanation

The cent,

it dropped

Arcot

might

it

was

lie

the

to

but

as

more

the disinterest of the newly enfranchised than in a positive response to the boycott propaganda of the Congress. Clearer evidence of the impact of the boycott is to be found in the seven Muslim constituencies in Tamilnad. Only three seats

in

were contested and 13.7 per cent of electors voted. In the urban constituency of Madura-Trichinopoly-cum-Srirangam 101 out of 1,197 (8.4 per cent) of the Muslims cast their votes.©

The

Government

coercion

Muslim

urban

of Madras

and intimidation

voters,

areas

being

than

attributed

fewer

Hindu

by Khilafat in

voters,

number

were

the

low Muslim

poll

to

workers.°” Certainly,

and

more

more

concentrated

accessible

to

anti-

in

boycott propaganda, and the fate of the Khalif had aroused feelings more intense and more lasting among Muslims than had the Punjab grievance among the Hindus. But the low Muslim

56 poll was little consolation to in the Madras legislature were

All

the Congress. filled.

TABLE

seats

1

Composition of the Madras Legislative under the Government of India Act, Elected:

the

Non-Muhammadan

Urban

9

Non-Muhammadan

Rural

56

(3 reserved for non-Brahmins) (25 reserved for

non-Brahmins)

EON

Muhammadan Urban Muhammadan Rural Indian Christians Anglo-Indians

Council 1919

Landholders

Commerce

Planters

and

HRA

Europeans

Industry

University

Nominated:

Executive Officials Others

Total

elected

Total

nominated

98

Councillors

29

Total all membere In August 1926 the MLCs was raised to membership

the

Discouraging

Tamil

disaster

ministry

though

Gandhians,

when

the

of

it

the

the

was

Governor,

exclusively

from

number 34 and

of nominated the total

legislature

failure

soon

of

to

the

overshadowed

Lord Willingdon,*

the

127

non-Brahmin

132.

boycott

MLCs.

by

was

a worse

appointed As

soon

to

a

as

the election results were known (on December 8), Willingdon invited the Justice leader, Tyagaraya Chetti, to forma ministry. He declined, but on his advice the Governor appointed three non-Brahmins: ** A. Subbarayulu Reddi from

57 South

Arcot

as

Minister

for

Education;

P.

Ramarayaningar

(who became the Raja of Panagal* in 1922) as Minister for Local Self-Government; and K.V. Reddi Naidu of Godavari as

Minister Reddi in over as ernment

for Development. April 1920 due to

Chief Minister portfolio.

In

choosing

by

anti-Brahmin

Willingdon

ated

was

community Madras in

all

without

his

not,

With the resignation of Subbarayulu ill-health, Ramarayaningar took

as

relinquishing

ministers

one

Brahmin

prejudice

or

Brahmins

in

the

past.

'"My

"is I'm sure to try and break

months

as

politicians

Governor,

as

Willingdon

"certainly

ever come across..." legislature gave them

Brahmins.*!

Brahmin

them C.P.

important

Ramaswami

by

Willingdon

MLCs

to

one

motiv-

play

off

success

officials in the presidency. on the non-Brahmins against

job",

he

confided

all this down".“° despised

the

the dirtiest,

to

Montagu,

In his first

non-Brahmin

meanest

devils

posts

as

was

under

new

the

appointing

constitution

Advocate-General

prompted

the

in the the

of the ability of several

to

of a different

of

I've

convinced

administrators,

and

two

of

Law

Member

—

later

Council, and Sir P. Rajagopalachari Legislative Council.‘?

considerations a

and

Aiyar

in the Executive President of the

make

a wish

gov-

non-Brahmin

alleges, ®

He thought that reserved seats a "most unfair advantage" over

And he was

politicians

to

by

the

local

against another. Willingdon, as a newcomer to 1919, had been alarmed at the extent of anti-

Brahmin sentiment among British He blamed them for having egged the

from

writer

his

select

kind:

Montagu-Chelmsford

non-Brahmin

he

was

reforms

as

ministers

determined in

Madras.

to

When Montagu toured India in 1917, Willingdon, then Governor of Bombay, was almost alone among the heads of provinces to applaud the Secretary of State's proposals. By contrast, Pentland in Madras was rigidly opposed to reform and was alienating all shades of Indian opinion in the presidency

with his

intransigence."

Willingdon,

whom

he

had

Montagu was eager to switch

known

since

undergraduate

days

Cambridge, to the Madras governorship to introduce enlightened and progressive regime. But Willingdon reservations

about

the

practicality

of

the

reforms.

at

a more had The

dyarchy constitution split government business in the province into two unequal parts. Indian ministers chosen from the legislature were given charge of the "nation-building"

departments

—

and development clusive revenue

not

work

control

and

local

— but of

finance.

effectively

government,

the

the

"reserved"

Willingdon

unless

education,

Executive the

Council

health,

departments

argued

Governor

that

retained

were

— law,

dyarchy

industries

ex-

police, would

"a veritable

S8 archangel

Cabinet to the common

Gabriel",

responsibility

in

in the Cabinet.“*

strator,

wanted

attuned

greater

transferred

prospect

able

to

persuade

the

two

halves

of

his

cooperate fully, to share available funds from purse fairly between them, and to shoulder joint the

legislature

decisions

agreed

Seeing himself as an imaginative

to

India's

financial

and

to the ministers.

of

for

introducing

the

political

admini-

aspirations,

executive

Willingdon

responsibility

to

But he was reconciled

new

constitution

in

upon

be

to the

Madras

by

the

hope that, after a trial period, the British government would see the desirability of a further devolution of power

to the provincial ministries. His overriding objective as Governor was to ensure that in Madras dyarchy, despite its limitations,

would

be

a

success.

Willingdon appreciated that dyarchy represented an tirely new political puzzle. The new legislature could

be

controlled

handful

of

by

a Governor

zamindars

and

and

lawyers,

officials, as

ennot

manipulating

previous

a

councils

had

been. Its working necessitated loyal ministers backed by an organized body of supporters; they would have to muster majorities and assist the "reserved" half in carrying legis-

lation through the council. House of Commons, Willingdon parliamentary

largely smooth

hostile

experience

obedient

of

criticism

more

dividuals,

opinion,

a

dyarchy

reforms

cohesive

team

deficient

but

they

men.

in

Many

as the prerequisite By

the Nationalists

were of

in the own

ministerial

constitution.

for the ministerial eliminated them.">

reasonable, not

see

leaders,

the

of the

themselves unfit Congress boycott

and

to

to its

operation

As a former ‘chief whip was predisposed by his

them

courage

and

for

Madras

for the

their

had

role, even before The Liberals were

pompous,

were,

posturing in

resolution.

party,

shown

the loyal

in-

Willingdon's

Srinivasa

Sastri he described as "weak as water", and of the Liberals ig general he remarked: "they've no guts and won't fight

the extremist".© As

the

elections

the

legislature

approached,

constitutional necessity induced Willingdon to revise his view of the non-Brahmins.*? He decided that they were most likely to win the election and that from them could be drawn

the ministerial team he was seeking. to select non-Brahmins as ministers,

Montagu

on

J4

December

People

here

to

prove

are not and never will as voting is concerned

be in

a solid body the Council.

are

are

1920:

trying

Justifying his decision Willingdon wrote to

varieties

of

non-Brahmins,

that

and

there

that

they

as far That

$9 point to

the

take

Brahmin that

future

facts

as

vote

they

is

should

must

show

they

in

the

have

portfolios. “®

and

are,

great

the

~

I am bound

that

the

non-

majority

and

ministerial

The Justice leaders had been striving for four years to secure for their party a strong position in the new legislature.

tional Party

But

into

communal to

in

form

secretaries

non-Brahmins

the

to

united

to

act

act

Government. and

the

and

to

through

minister

reserved

as

merits

decision

had

team

that

1921

ministerial

a single

reason

of

of

been

they

had

taken not

whips,

in

and

constitu-

the

case

been

debates

for

non-Brahmin

at

three

he

Justice

to appoint

the

he appointed than

its

victory.”

encouraged

party

the

brought

urged

Willingdon's

the

council the

and

divis-

urging

to coalesce into a single party was the command of the Minister for Local Self-

Through

choose

his

which

the

Willingdon

compelling

the non-Brahmins patronage at the

not

In March

as

assessment

dyarchy

or an electoral

ministers,

A more

boards

1920,

the momentous

of election.

ions.*°

Willingdon's

created by

office

After

time

was

representation

non-Brahmin

MLCs

it

situation

his powers which

rights

of

possessed

of financial authority

for the district

Madras spent a large other provinces were

to make nominations

them

should

and

collectors.

have

and executive patronage

The

to

elected

for

local

heads,

supervision,

previously

Government

of

share of its income on the local boards — more parsimonious*!— and the flow of

funds, converted into contracts for public works, jobs in local government agencies, and licences and grants for various private enterprises, offered rich rewards to those

who could control it. Local politicians could not ignore the influence which a minister in Madras now exercised over their affairs; and Panagal astutely exploited his position to reward his supporters and penalize his adversaries. The

ministry

quests

and

the

council

for patronage

became

emanating

the

focus

from. the

for

lowest

rivalries

levels

of

and

the presidency. Comparing the development in local government in Madras to the spoils system in the United States of America, the Hindu commented that "...with a view to strengthen its hold on the country the present Ministry has made a

deliberate Board

and

attempt

to build

Municipality

looking at each question

by

up a party

nominating

for

its

itself

adherence

from the standpoint

in each [sic]

and

of party..."

Concurrently, non-Brahmin politicians, tried to use the legislature to satisfy the frustrated ambitions of the emer-~

ging non-Brahmin

middle

class

— that

is,

to use

state power

60 to oust

Brahmins

and

open

up

the

professions

patronage for non-Brahmin exploitation. in the legislature they sought promises

and

government

Through from the

resolutions Executive

Council that non-Brahmins would be given preference Brahmins in government appointments and promotions.

over The

First Communal G.O. (Government Order) of 16 September 1921 required the heads of all government departments to classify new recruits in terms of the following communal labels: Brahmin, non-Brahmin, Hindu, Indian Christian, Muslim, European, Anglo-Indian. A Second Communal G.0O. followed in

August

1922,

every

stipulating

department

should

that

be

the

communal

published

and

composition

that

of

communal

rotation should apply to promotions as well as to recruitment. In February 1924 the Madras government set up a Staff Selection Board to supervise appointments on the communal lines laid down in the two G.0.s.5? These innovations satisfied the

anti-Brahminism of some ICS officials, but indignant that efficiency and merit should

many more were be sacrificed for

communal considerations. The harder the Justice Party pressed the "reserved" half of the government in its pursuit of patronage, the more unsympathetic European officials became. In

return

for

offices

and

patronage

Willingdon

exacted

his men

levy. He expected the and clients to support

ministers to persuade their partygovernment measures and actively

was

"one

practice

to oppose between

the Congress.

happy

the

non-Brahmin

the

family",

executive

ministers

MLCs

and

might

Although

in

councillors vote

as

Tyagaraya

he claimed there

and

the

a bloc

Chetti

on

were

fairly

added,

successfully

to the "loyal

characteristic on

the

completed

her

and devoted

to

"use

In

February

1922

Justice

ministers

voyage",

cillors

to

Governor

and MLCs

to

went

but

to per-

submit

so

due,

he

preferred

to

of the crew'.°>

influence

by the Government

the

issues

unable

unpopular measures. 5 with the support the the legislature in

maiden

among the people" and his non-official combat non-cooperation, rather than set

the type sponsored

tension

The

session he remarked: "I good ship 'Reforms' has

work

their

growing

communal

of Willingdon's regime that

non-Brahmins

his Cabinet

ministers.

often

suade them to accept responsibility for But in general Willingdon was satisfied Executive Council received. Proroguing

March 1922 at the end of its first feel that we may all feel that the

was

that

he

and

It was

authority

rely

Publicity Bureau to up loyalty leagues of

of the United far

as

the names

to

ask

Provinces.°” the

of Congressmen

whom they thought should be prosecuted if mass civil disobedjence were launched.** More significantly, in late 1921 and early 1922 the ministerial party helped the executive coun-

rush

through

legislation

for

the

quick

prosecution

61 and tax

punishment of campaigns. °°

Party the

non-cooperators

and

the

instigators

of

no-

The importance of this collaboration between the Justice and the Raj extended beyond repressive legislation. As

government

observed

later:

One of the most important factors which set a limit to the spread of the [non-cooperation]

movement was the realizationby a large part of the Presidency especially by the non-Brahman majority of the value of the reforms and of

their

substantial

nature

when

shadowy benefits of Mr. Gandhi's

compared

with

the

brand of swaraj.®

Middle-class non-Brahmins saw the legislature as a means by which to further their own ambitions and to improve the eco-

nomic

and

social

position

grant

educational

and nominated MLCs ranking Nadars and

of their

castemen.

from such castes as the Kallars, the government

concessions,

make

Through

elected

traditionally lowwas implored to

nominations

to

local

boards, end punitive police taxation, and give special privileges for recruitment to government employment.°? For a

diverse range of castes the expansion of the electorate and the unexplored opportunities created by the dyarchy constitution made the legislature the focus of personal and communal

ambitions. illusioned there

In time individuals and communities with their share of the cornucopia.

was

cooperation It

was

powerful

a

such

a mood

of

expectation

that

was a poor counter-attraction. no

accident

that

gravitational

pull.

the

Gandhi's

legislature

Montagu

became disBut in 1920-22

had

non-

exercised

always

that his constitutional reforms should separate from the extremists: firstly, by providing the

so

intended

the moderates moderates

with an attractive consitutional role that would encourage them to cooperate with the British and oppose the extremists; second]v, by a judicious use of coercion, which combined with the success of the dyarchy constitutional experiment, would force the extremists to change to constitutional action. "You can stay out of the Council", he explained to Willingdon in February 1921, "but when you see the power that the Councils

in

it.(?]

have,

And

answer

be easy;

ion:

it had

Rallying But

and

the

Montagu, a

more

practitioner

will

if

you

the

'Go

moderates

earlier with

liberal

than

not

very

Councils

into

was

not

a policy

the

experience

outlook

his

regret

than

that

criticised,

the Councils

inspired

more

much

are

and put

of

predecessors.

India was

are

not

not

our

them right’.[?]"®

of Montagu's

Morley-Minto

Minto,

you

will

Through

reforms.

than

an

invent-

Morley

abler

Montagu

62 it became one of the basic guidelines India in the 1920s and 1930s.

of

British

policy

The moral of the council boycott was not lost hapless Nationalists in Madras. In some provinces

in

on the (such as

Bengal)®*

the councils,

deprived of a solid Congress phalanx,

factional

allegiances.

The

began

shakily

a party tional

alists

to

ing not

ministries

sustain

wisdom

that

disaster. organized

with

of

the

them

in

built

failure

office

Willingdon's

Congress

on

of

shifting

ministers

demonstrated

tactics

boycott

the

had

and

not

sands

unaided

the

an

by

constitu-

reassured

been

of

Nation-

irreparable

But in Madras Congressmen were confronted with an rival firmly ensconced in ministerial office, grow-

fat and waxing powerful on Gandhi's mirage of swaraj,

the regional Congress had Rangaswami Iyengar warned

to in

a diet of patronage. This, was the situation with which

grapple. December

As Satyamurti 1920:

and

Until full Swaraj is actually obtained, we are bound to watch carefully the work of the

Councils.

While

it

opposite

direction,

is true

that

these

councils are almost powerless for doing any great good to our country their scope in the

almost unlimited.

viz.

for

Their words reverberate through the like a pebble resounding down a deep

Towards

mischief,

politics well.

is

of the

1920s

Confrontation

The failure of the boycott of the Madras legislature left Gandhi's supporters in Tamilnad aimless and dispirited. Other aspects of the non-cooperation program had been neglected before the elections and little was achieved by re-

turning

to

them

in

late

1920.

Between December 1920 and February 1921 sporadic attempts were made to persuade Hindu students to leave government schools and colleges in Madras and Trichinopoly, but neither

students

nor

their

ided

them.®°

parents

who were prepared to obey al colleges" and suitable

for

In North

responded

with

enthusiasm.

the boycott complained that national work was not being

Arcot

a battle

ranged

for

Students

"nationprov-

control

of the government-assisted Islamia College in Vaniyambadi. The cause of the struggle, which resulted in a 75 per cent drop in student attendance, was a tussle between Yakub Hasan and the College trustees for control of its funds. The non-

cooperation

its cause.®*

issue

was

By August

tacked

1921

onto

this

the TNCC

dispute

and

had allotted

was

not

money

for

63 seven national schools, but attendance end of the year the number of students

Few Hindus

Khilafatists were so. In September

noted

threats

several

surrendered

their

was was

titles

small, and by the less than 150.°7

or honorary

posts;

more effective in persuading Muslims to do and October 1920 the Government of Madras

cases

of

of violence

and

Muslim

title-holders

social

honours. The government characteristically, used courage title-holders to

ostracism

being

forced

to resign

by

their

did not intervene directly, but, Muslim government servants to enresist intimidation. By March 1921

only 51 honorary officers and six title-holders had resigned in the whole presidency.® The government was more alarmed at the possibility of disaffection among its own employees, especially Muslims in the police and bureaucracy. In March 1920

it

forbad

ings or in ment. The Khilafat

government

any ban

extremists

effective

in

servants

to

attend

Khilafat

meet-

other way associate themselves with the brought protests from Abdul Sharar and in

Madras

discouraging

city,

open

but

it

seems

identification

ment by government servants.” issued a more sweeping order:

On all

to

have

with

2 May 1921 government

move-

the

been

move-

the government servants were

expected to repudiate non-cooperation and associate themselves with its suppression. In this respect the Government of Madras demanded more from its employees than the Govern-

ment

of

onable.7!

India

and

Although

views

and

other

provincial

Willingdon

prided

preferred

the

firmly

to

crush

movement.

the

himself

Justice

combating non-cooperation in sistent in his view that the

governments

Party

to

Madras, he Government Before

thought

on his

reas-

progressive

take

the

lead

in

was shrill and perof India must act

August

1921

he

did

not

regard the situation in his own province as particularly menacing, but he thought that the central government was being disastrously weak in its dealings with Gandhi, the Ali brothers

to

cordon

and

off

cooperation

would

not

Congress

other

the

from

agree

and

leaders.

Madras

infecting

to

his

As

Presidency

it,

requests

Khilafat

a minimum,

but

for

agitators.”

to

the

Willingdon

prevent

Government

permission

Optimistic

the

to

wanted

non-

of India extern

in his

ex-

pectations for political development in Madras, Willingdon's pessimistic view of the all-India prospect was motivated by his own dislike of Gandhi (whom he had first encountered during the Kaira satyagraha while Governor of Bombay) and

his preoccupation with also influenced by the

were was

products

remembered

of the in

the success of dyarchy. But he was views of senior civil servants who

pre-reforms

Bombay

as

Pentland

having

been

era.

a pawn

Willingdon

in

the

by

hands

64 of

the

matters law and

civil

Davidson,

servants

there, 7?

and

though

in

constitutional

he could set an independent course in Madras, when order were at stake he leaned heavily on Sir Lionel Home

Member

of

the

Executive

Council

officer sympathetic to the non-Brahmin on his principal Indian advisers — Sir

and

an

ICS

movement, rather than P. Rajagopalachari and

Sir Muhammad Habibullah — who favoured approach to non-cooperation.™

a more

conciliatory

Until September 1921 the Madras government was held in check by the Secretary of State and the Government of India. They had two reasons for holding to a policy of restraint.

First,

year them

the

There

Gandhi's

non-cooperation

were so wildly seriously. It

government must

not

impractical that would not become

provoked be

a

and promise

Indian

second

opinion

of swaraj

in one

few people would take a mass movement unless

by

rash

Jallianwala Bagh. 75

repression. Second,

the

policy of rallying the moderates and undermining the extremists through the constitutional reforms must be given a fair trial. The Government of India explained to the provincial administrations in January 1921 that it hoped ...to

meet

the

legitimate

demands

of

entirely

nullify

the

the

new Indian legislature [in New Delhi] in a manner that should do much to ease the situation. The adoption of wholesale repression would be incompatible with this policy

and

would

heal-

ing effect which the introduction of the reforms might otherwise be expected to

exercise.”

On succeeding Chelmsford as Viceroy in April 1921, Reading reviewed the Government of India's policy,

cided that Willingdon policy,

it.

but

Lord but de-

non-intervention should continue for the present. and his ICS advisers deplored the wait-and-see for

the

present

In the middle months expected turn in Madras.

they

could

do

nothing

to

alter

of 1921 non-cooperation took The movement gained a sudden

an unspurt

of energy, not from the implementation of Gandhi's original program but through the adoption of a new tactic, anti-liquor agitation. According to nationalist accounts, the agitation,

which began first in the south about July

the common people

northern and central India and 1921, was a purely spontaneous

and was then taken up by the Congress.7”

But prohibition was already a live political issue. Tamilnad the Nationalist and PCC manifestos of 1920 prohibition

in

spread to move by

their

legislative

programs,

and

the

In included

transfer

65 of

the

excise

brought Even

the

portfolio

prohibition Justice

to

an

within

Party

Indian

the

minister

realm

claimed

under

of practical

prohibition

dyarchy

politics.

was one

of

its

aims,

and British officials expressed a lip-sympathy for the idea of temperance. However, the stimulus to the anti-liquor

drive seems to have been twofold. Since had risen steeply, outpacing the incomes

1917 liquor prices of labourers and

urban workers. In addition, abstinence from alcohol was traditionally a high-caste virtue in Hindu society, and it

was one of the aims formulated first decades of the century. the cut

agitation seemed, at to mass agitation.

The

sil.

anti-liquor

In

inant

Gounder

the

at

first,

associations in the Congress viewpoint,

was

most

marked

agitation

Coimbatore

caste,

least

by caste From the

it

was

Gounders,

led

by members

aided

participation

was

one of the

founders

a convenient

by

of

urban

motivated

short

in the mofus-

the

rural

Congressmen.

by a quest

for

dom-

social

respectability and by concern among caste leaders at the sentencing to death of seven castemen for their part in a drunken brawl and murder in Coimbatore town. V.C. Vellingiri

Gounder, and

an

MLC,

joined

with

of the

two

Gounder

Coimbatore

caste

Congressmen,

association

N.S. Ramaswami Iyengar and E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, to organize volunteers for the picketing of liquor shops and the annual auctions by which the shops were leased. Caste panchayats and headmen were induced to assist the agitation. Violence

and

intimidation

soon

resulted,

and

local

magis-

trates responded by prohibiting picketing on that it would lead to breaches of the peace.

the grounds About a hundred

during the period

1921.”

Congressmen

neatly

In

and

the

Gounders

case

dovetailed

were

arrested

from September

of

the

with

Gounders

the

for

defying

to December the

social

anti-liquor

aspiration

of

the

bans

agitation

an

influen-

tial section of the caste leadership. In other districts the pieces did not interlock so well. In Ramnad and Madura districts temperance activity had long been associated with the Nadars whose traditional occupation, toddy-tapping, was being

replaced

by

ritually

less

polluting

and

more attractive activities like trading and Officials feared that the Nadars would make

the Congress.

Some

Nadars

favoured

itself

to the

with

Madras

leadership,

could

gain

the

Justice

legislature

unlike

more

by

that

Party

of

courting

to

and

the

Gounders,

Justice

with

the Con-

been

nominated

a minority. The leadalready identified

a Nadar

represent

the

money-lending. common cause with

a line-up

gress over prohibition, but they were ership of the Nadar Mahajana Sabha had

economically

the

had

caste.

believed

Party

than

The

that

by

Nadar it

66

flirting with the Congress.7? In many parts of Tamilnad the anti-liquor campaign one of several complex factors which fed the anti-

only

government

agitation.

grievances

or

support town,

for

for

the

an

movement

example,

As

outcome a

Dr

was

of

major

Baker

has

often

a

factional

cause

was

demonstrated,

response

a

to

strife.®°

local

In

factional

was

local

Salem

struggle

between S.C. Venkatappa Chetti, the newly elected Municipal Chairman, and his rival, S. Ellappa Chetti, a protege of the District Magistrate and a member of the provincial legislature. As Ellappa gravitated towards the ministerial party in

the

legislature,

Venkatappa

swung

towards

non-cooperation.

Under his direction the Salem municipal council carried a series of resolutions in September 1921, welcoming Gandhi to the town and committing municipal funds and employees to picket liquor and foreign cloth shops and to purchase khadi. After the government had vetoed the resolutions, there was a lull until late December when the non-cooperators gained control of the local merchants' association and sent its employees out to picket. For two days the non-cooperators ruled the town until the District Magistrate restored government author-

ity by banning

all

picketing

gress

activity

and

the

ed

the

of

cheap

and arresting

leading

non-

cooperators.°! But even though factionalism was of central importance to Salem's participation in the agitation, it should not be thought the only motivating factor. Venkatappa and many of his supporters on the municipal council were Congressmen of long standing and thus their adherence to noncooperation was not as fortuitous as the factional division might suggest. Salem had for 40 years been a centre of Contown's

intellectuals

and

students

could

be expected to respond sympathetically to anti-government agitation. Moreover, Salem's Devanga Chetti community, to which both Ellappa and Venkatappa belonged, contained a large percentage of poor weavers who frequented the town's toddy shops. Swadeshi propaganda could appeal to weavers threatenby

Devangas ence

of

sale

concerned,

like

drunkeness

among

whatever

reasons

For

the

anti-liquor

agitation

was

achieved

going

they

and

came

by

to

a mass

by

employing

foreign

the

Gounder

their it

outside

temperance

leaders,

was in

which

instigated

the

original

often

and

Gandhians

1921-22.

the

But

strayed

to

at

castemen.

brought

movement

tactics

cloth;

the

wealthier

preval-

sustained,

as

this

Gandhian from

near

as

success

program

Gandhian

non-violence. The agitation presented the Madras government with a more serious and widespread challenge than it had had to face since the heyday of Home Rule in 1916-17. The government could not ward off this agitational thrust by using

67 the

Justice

Party

as

its

shield.

It

authority by intervening directly to the organizers and protect customers

direct confrontation been achieved. In

addition

government

was

between

to

the

compelled

could

ban and

the Congress

threat

to

to

its

only

preserve

picketing, arrest shopkeepers. A

and

the

authority,

intervene

because

Raj

its

had

the

Madras

it derived

nearly a quarter of its revenue from duties on alcohol and the leasing of liquor shops. At first the government tried to disguise the impact of the agitation by attributing the sharp fall in income from toddy shop auctions to factors other than picketing. But in October 1921 it admitted that picketing in Coimbatore and Salem had caused drink sales to drop to a third of the previous year's total: the decline was even more marked in the Telugu districts.** In Madras, Willingdon's "Cinderella province", payment of an annual contribution of Rs. 348 lakhs to the central exchequer was already

causing

financial

difficulties

and,

added

to

this,

the rapid fall in drink revenue would be crippling. In February 1922 Willingdon anticipated a loss of Rs. 65 lakhs due

to

the

anti-liquor

and

in

particular

agitation;

other

estimates

ranged

as

high as 75 or 80 lakhs.® Such a financial disaster would force the Madras government to cut back provincial spending to

reduce

allocations

"nation-building" departments. government where the supporters

for

the

ministers'

As these were the areas of of dyarchy hoped for the

greatest achievements and where the ministers hoped to prove their worthiness before the electorate, the political repercussions

were

far-reaching.

The

deficit

by increasing the burden on the tax-payer was also the voter) and that would recoil and the ministry. The Finance ernment, T.E. Moir, complained

that

The

leaders

will

enable

could

antagonism

hope

them

to

the

that

to

be

made up

(who, in many cases, against the British

Secretary of the Madras Govbitterly in December 1921

of the non-co-operation

undoubtedly

only

additional

foment

Government

still

and

movement

taxation

further

to

exploit

in even larger measure the hostility towards the services which is not confined to their

own ranks.®

Anti-liquor agitation was not demonstration which the government Salem,

for

example,

villagers

in

the only form of pupular faced in Tamilnad. In

Atur

taluk

violated

the

forest laws by collecting firewood and grazing their animals. Congressmen joined in, claiming that payment of four annas for party membership entitled villagers to free grazing in

68

the reserved

the

most

two

other

ment

the

sparks

Congress

Madras Y

widespread

in Madras

was

LC xo

forests.®°

City:

But the anti-liquor picketing

and

of

effective

agitation

city

and

the

which

burnt

form

caught

Mappilla its

of agitation.

fire

— the

rising

labour

was

When

move-

in Malabar

fingers.

— it

Disturbed Times

The labour movement in Madras city began among the workers in the European-owned Buckingham and Carnatic mills. The rapid rise in the price of essential commodities in 1917-18 added to mill-hands' existing grievances over low pay, excessive working hours, inadequate lunch-breaks and the high-handed action of European overseers. Their grievances were taken up by Home Rulers who in April 1918 formed the Madras Labour Union, India's first real trade union. Initially under the direction of T.V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar, editor

of Desabhaktan, Rulers,

B.P.

the MLU passed

Wadia

and

George

Besant's New India. *” The

labour

Home

movement

Rulers in

had

Madras

into

the

Arundale,

several

control

assistant

motives

city.

They

in

had

of two Home editor

sponsoring

a genuine

of

the

desire

to

improve the the workers

workers' conditions and to provide the leadership needed to agitate for their demands. They were

part

national

also looking for a broader base to the Home Rule movement, partly to reply to government and non-Brahmin allegations that they were a Brahmin clique with no popular support. Yoking the labour and nationalist movements together would, they believed, benefit both. "It is very necessary", Wadia explained, "to recognize the labour movement as an integral

of the

movement.

The

in the right direction of democracy classes are not enabled to organize

latter

into their own'.°®

will

not

succeed

if the Indian working their forces and come

The rise of the British

Labour Party

directed the Home Rulers' attention to the urban workers. It was widely expected in India that the Labour Party would soon

be

in

ations

power

if

wing.®®

and

it

might

the nationalist

be

more

movement

It was anticipated,

sympathetic

too,

could

boast

to

Indian

aspir-

of a labour

that under the new franchise

the the

more skilled and better paid workers would be voters for Madras legislature. Adopting workers' grievances was a

ham

and

way of attracting their votes.°° Carnatic

mills

in Madras

European enterprises, it equate the plight of the and to argue that swaraj

wages

and

conditions

Again,

and

because

the Bucking-

Harvey's

in Madura

Finally,

the

were

was easy for the nationalists to workers with colonial exploitation would mean a dramatic improvement in

of employment.

urban workers

69 were

near

than

ryots

factories

at

hand.

They

because

and

could

they

crowded

were

into

were

a captive

On 29 October

organized

already

a few wards

main towns. A meeting held end of the shift was a sure

workers

be

the

Or

pre-empted a strike the workers. Wadia

in Ahmedabad.

Gandhi

his

the

workers

friend,

C.

F.

and

3,000

as he had

so

the

and

other

it

seemed.

of the

the

Buckingham

recent

pleading

who

The

and

threat for shorter hours invited Gandhi to Madras

during

declined,

Andrews,

easily

in

of Madras

management

Carnatic mills by locking out

to help

concentrated

more

outside the work gates at the way of attracting attention.

audience.

1918

far

was

unable

mill

strike

ill-health, to

win

and

any

sub-

sent

stantial concessions from the management.*! Unrest among the workers continued and when Gandhi visited Madras in March 1919 he had two meetings with the workers, numbering between

2,000

coming

on each

struggle

occasion.

against

the

Preoccupied

Rowlatt

Act

and

of their

bid

with

his

anxious

to

avoid

class conflict, Gandhi disappointed the workers by delivering sermons about the evils of drink and gambling, offering no practical advice on how to pursue their struggle against the

mill of

management.°?

the

also

Madras

begun

Competition activity,

of

rival

to

of

But

PCC

from

show

between which

trade

an a

as part the

interest

them

unions

Home

rash

led

were

of

Rulers,

in

to

an

the

minor

the

the

Madras

to wrest

control

labour

movement.

Nationalists

intensification

strikes

major

and

results.

the

of

had

labour

formation

The European business community was furious at the rise of trade unionism, especially under politicians' patronage. At this date European non-officials were completely hostile to the Congress which they equated with Bolshevism and violent revolution. They were astounded by the government's

apparent indifference to their troubles,°? and worded articles in the press and protests from

when stronglyemployers

their

The Madras

failed

to

impress

complaints

the

Government

to the Government

of

Madras,

the

of India.®*

government hesitated to intervene in ing private enterprises, partly from

Europeans

took

labour disputes affecta lingering attachment

to laissez-faire, partly from lack of first-hand knowledge industrial conditions. It was also inclined to blame the

employers

for

deteriorating

labour

relations:

there

of

would,

they complained, be little unrest if the post-war imbalance between wages and prices were redressed.°” However, the

government

on

the

side

disturbances The the

often of

found

the

and

itself

management.

the police

drawn

were

justice or injustice of the government's preoccupation

willy-nilly

Strikes

sent

and

into

lock-outs

in to restore

workers' case was with an immediate

disputes led

peace.

lost "law

in and

to

70 order"

issue.

The situation in Madras came to a head in the second of 1921. On 27 June about 800 Adi-Dravidas (untouch-

half

ables) returned to of a strike called

luring

earlier

work at the by the MLU:

strikes

and

Buckingham Milt-th they had suffered

lock-outs

and

felt

that

defiance severely

they

could not afford a further loss of wages. Almost at once violence flared up between the Adi-Dravidas and caste-Hindu strikers, aided by Khilafat Muslims who had their own grievances against the Adi-Dravidas. Several times during July Adi-Dravida slums in the mill area were set on fire and

workers

attacked.

Police

and

British

troops

were

unable

to

control the fires that raced through the wood-and-thatch hovels or to prevent violence in the maze of narrow streets in the mill area. Finally, in October 1921 a punitive police

force

was

quartered

on

the

area

and

the

caste-Hindus

grad-

ually returned to work, though the management refused to reinstate the strike leaders. The Madras government appointed a commission of enquiry, but its investigation was confined to the reasons for the city authorities' failure to prevent the disturbances. The workers' grievances which had led to the strike were ignored, and for this reason the

Madras

Labour

Union refused

to participate

in the enquiry.**

The strike was a traumatic experience for the Madras workers and their Congress patrons. The workers felt aband-

oned by the politicians. Gandhi, whose assistance was again invoked, for a second time excused himself on the grounds of ill-health. Willingdon claimed that this was because Gandhi

“would

have

found

and violence the

mill-hands

that

it difficult

to

excuse

has taken place".°”?

should

without

enthusiasm.°®

dispute

with

take

up

the

Gandhi's

hand-spinning

Practical

help

was

incendiarism

was

not

advice

received

forthcoming.

Early in July the Nationalists to the strikers, but they were

offered their public too preoccupied with

PCC to worry

18 November

Rajagopalachari

Kalyanasundara

who had

had

not

asked

about

them.°?

Mudaliar

been

Gandhi

asked

reinstated, for

Rs.

and

the

anti-liquor

the

elections

the

TNCC

for

Rajagopalachari

30,000

nothing had been received.'°? khadi

over

On

for

this

1921

money

but

purpose the

for

when

for

replied

The TNCC had funds

agitation,

that

but

labour

sympathy their

the

new

strikers

that

so

he

far

to spend on troubles

in Madras had become a liability. The propertied classes were alarmed at the eruption of urban violence and recoiled from the prospect of a greater conflagration. The Hindu, in an

editorial

entitled

"The

Failure

of

Authority",

spoke

with

anxiety of those Adi-Dravidas who might seize the opportunity of the present "disturbed times" to "begin a saturnalia of

71

outrage''.'°! Besant, too, disowned the strikers, but blamed the non-cooperators forunleashing the disorders.’ Disillusioned,

the

workers

turned

their

backs

When nationalists tried to revive labour in April 1922 they met with no response. years

revive the

the

labour

in

the

Congress.

Malabar:

movement

late

was

1920s

A Foretaste

it

quiescent,

was

largely

on

the

Congress.

agitation in Madras For the next five and

in

when

it

did

isolation

from

of Swaraj

The Malabar district had turbulent areas of the Madras

always been Presidency.

one of Since

the its

most annex-

ation by the British in 1792 there had been periodic risings in the interior taluks by the Muslim Mappilla community. Fanatical

were

adherence

by-products

interior lenders.

to

of

Islam

the

taluks to However,

and

sudden,

antagonism

of

fierce

the

uprisings

Mappillas

of

the

high caste Hindu landlords and moneysince the last major outbreak in 1894,

Malabar had been relatively peaceful, and troops stationed in the Mappilla area were withdrawn during the world war for service elsewhere, leaving armed police to deal with minor

disturbances in 1915 and 1919.1? The Madras government Khilafat propaganda.

from

tried in vain to isolate Unsettled by looting. and

riots in 1918, by mounting tenant about the fate of Turkey, Malabar Khilafat cause. During visits to

Ali

brothers

in

August

stirring

appeals

of Yakub ing many

Hasan drew Mappillas,

was hinted a strong

show

of

subside. 1°° the

The

name

knives

murdered

for

by resort

storm of

the

attacked

Hindus,

the

and

April

defence

of

to arms.'°*

1921,

Islam,

by police

in

Khilafat,

the

government

destroyed

by rumours ground for the Erode by the

Mappillas

if

and

first

Mappilla

troops,

week

officials railway

heard

necessary,

In February

an angry crowd, 10,000 into Calicut; and only

force

broke

1920

unrest, and was fertile Calicut and

Malabar food

1921

strong and gradually,

did

of August

bands

armed

lines

and

and police

it

the arrest includafter

tension 1921.

with

war-

In

officers,

bridges,

raided

police stations, and set up their own Khilafat kingdom. !°° For Willingdon and his ICS advisers it was a relief that the storm had at last broken. For months their jeremiads had been unheeded by a Government of India eager to avoid fullscale

repression

satisfaction

of

— the

India.

Madras

Now

— it

government

gave

had

a certain

been

proved

grim

right

The Secretariat was not unaware of the peculiarities of the Malabar situation and of the extent to which the oppressive

72 landlord

system

splendid

be missed. Bureau, and

Madras

resulted

that

had

opportunity Through through

repeatedly from

the

were

antics. achelam that in

to

flay

the its

impressed

rape

the

the

to

the

rising,

non-cooperators

but

such

was

not

a

to

press, the legislature, the Publicity own statements, the Government of

on the public

Khilafat

the murder,

Malabar

contributed

and

and

forced

inevitable

that

non-cooperation

conversions

outcome

the rising

movements,

reported

of Gandhi's

from

anarchist

On the same note one Justice leader, 0. ThanickChetti, told a conference at Salem in December 1921 "the present Malabar troubles we have a foretaste of

the Swaraj

to be attained

by non-cooperation".!°7

The Madras

PCC strove to refute these allegations. On 27 August it hastily formed a nine-member committee to investigate the causes of the rising. On the basis of such information as the government and martial law would allow them to collect,

the committee reported that the rising had been caused by provocative behaviour of the District Magistrate and that

leaders had never been involved

This

interpretation

where

It did not, the effect

1921

the

endorsed the

was

by the Congress

Madras

a useful

accepted

the its

in the Khilafat movement. '® by

at Ahmedabad

the

CWC

in

September

in December 1921. 1°

and

however, carry much conviction in Tamilnad of the rising was to weaken and discredit

non-cooperation

“serve

and

and

Khilafat

government

purpose"

if

movements.

anticipated

it

"open[ed]

In

that

the

September

the

rising

eyes

of

would

the

saner elements of the population to the disasters into which these movements are leading the country", 11° Hindus who had been mildly sympathetic to non-cooperation, or had seen some opportunity for personal advancement by temporarily associ-

ating

with

fanaticism

it,

and

now

shied

violence

away,

fearing

throughout

an

India.

orgy In

of Muslim

Trichinopoly

two years of active in Madura municipal present a municipal

Hindu-Muslim cooperation disintegrated; councillors dropped their proposal to address to Gandhi; and in Vellore a

gopalachari

doubted

Khilafat Muslim withdrew a about Malabar were running

movement When that

and

now

himself that

Gandhi arrived the rising had

had

created

it

had

similar so high

been

the

proposal because feelings in the town. }!! Raja-

wisdom

tainted

of continuing

by Mappilla

the

violence.* 12

in Tamilnad in September 1921 he soon saw been "a great set-back" to non-cooperation

scepticism

about

Hindu-Muslim

unity.

"Many

feel that people will not remain peaceful to the end", he wrote. "Others have been dazed. Not that they do not attend public meetings or take part in other activities; there is,

however,

widespread

fear about how things

will develop". !!%

73

Grave

Perils From

August

1921

the

Government

of

India

changed

from a policy of non-intervention to repression. policy", welcomed by the Madras Executive Council

recognition to

the

of the need

several

for a firm hand,!*

developments,

intensification

including

the

of liquor-shop

over

The "new as belated

was a response

Malabar

rising

picketing.

But

and

its proxi-

mate cause was the arrival in India of the Prince of Wales, who had been greeted on landing at Bombay on 17 November by a hartal and five days of rioting. The Government of India

was

determined

to prevent

sode elsewhere In Tamilnad

with the in July,

help to already

a repetition

on the prince's the

shift

Mappilla rising. asked Willingdon

Two days

Willingdon's

to

anxious

not

to

be

perhaps

not

very

in practice

Willingdon, request from

epi-

began

allow

outpaced

his indignation Rajagopalachari,

later Hasan presided over the

Conference

refusal

shameful

Yakub Hasan, released from prison for permission to visit Malabar to

angrily refused.!*©

Provincial

of this

to repression

restore order there. aroused by a similar

Congress

tour.!?®

him

by

at Tanjore. to

more

enter

militant

Frustrated

Malabar

Khilafat

and

by

leaders,

Hasan was in a defiant had already "succeeded foundations of British

mood, claiming that non-cooperation to a very large extent in shaking the power..." in India."7 A rash, and

of his

seized

accurate

address,

it was

was a dangerous agitator. deterrent sentence of two

found

this

ment,

Varadarajulu

after

"grovelling

quickly Hasan's

sentence

claim,

but,

upon

along

with

as evidence

that

He was arrested and years' imprisonment.

"monstrously

severe","!®

other

parts

Hasan

given a stiff The Hindu

put

it was

followed by the convictions of Abdul Majid Sharar, rival for leadership of the provincial Khilafat move-

editorial

staff

Naidu,

editor

of Desabhaktan,

apologies"

of

three

Tamil

Nadu,

and®he

of whom were

to the government.!?®

released

Repression was fast eliminating the leadership; the year in which Gandhi had promised swaraj was nearly exhausted. Unless the Congress threw al] its remaining strength into an agitational

thrust,

it

would

be

too

late.

On

4

November

1921 the AICC authorized the launching of civil disobedience by selected individuals and by localities which had demonstrated their complete commitment to swadeshi and non-

violence. '*° At its annual meeting at Trichinopoly on 20 November

the

TNCC

for the present This course was

debated

the

to restrict approved by

AICC

resolution

and

resolved

civil disobedience to individuals a large majority of the 88

74 delegates present, but since 820 the decision represented

gopalachari faction

the TNCC's total strength was only the small caucus of Raja-

and his close associates.!*!

there

A five-man

was

a marked

committee

was

reluctance

entrusted

with

And even among

to

court

the

that

imprisonment.

organizing

of

civil disobedience, but when its meeting was prohibited by the District Magistrate of North Arcot, only Rajagopalachari and the TNCC President, M.V. Subramania Sastri, defied the ban: they were arrested and sentenced to three months' imprisonment. }2? E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, who had also been selected for civil disobedience, was sentenced to a month in jail for anti-liquor activities in Coimbatore. Responsibil-

ity

for

The

Repression brought Nationalists winced

Dr T.S.S. struck

resign

continuing

the

Rajan.

and

from

S.

campaign

Srinivasa

the

Madras

then

fell

on

the

wary

some compensations for the Congress. in sympathy each time a blow was

Iyengar

took

legislature

the

(where

opportunity he

had

felt

to

none

too comfortable both as a Brahmin and as Leader of the Opposition). The Liberals protested at the lack of opportunity to discuss repressive measures in the Madras legislature; and some of the more independent members of the ministerial party attacked the government's treatment of

Mappilla and Congress

prisoners.’*?

the civil disobedience

movement.'**

As the Government

flew

a kite:

he

call

Table

ates

and

Gandhi

Brahmins'

paper,

believed

Even Justice,

that repression

merely

the non-

strengtnened

of

India and the Secretary of State had all along feared, repression threatened to provoke a revolt of the moderates and constitutional nationalists. To forestall this, Lord Reading

would

a Round

Conference

of

all

parties to discuss constitutional reforms if the Congress stopped the agitation and called off the demonstrations being planned gn Calcutta for the arrival of the Prince of Wales on 24 December. Das, Malaviya and other leading Congressmen welcomed the offer, but Gandhi dithered and quibbled. Reading who did not have the approval of London for his offer, withdrew it, but his manoeuvre had temporarily rallied the moder-

made

the negotiations. }?5

appear

responsible

for

the

failure

of

By rounding up the non-cooperation leaders in Calcutta before the arrival of the Prince of Wales, the Government of

Bengal was able to prevent any major disturbances there. !76 The Government of Madras, confident that non-cooperators

commanded

little

local

cautions. Rajan went city for the prince's

support,

did

not

take

the

ahead with plans for a hartal arrival on 13 January 1922.

stration was, by most accounts,

"a miserable

same

pre-

in Madras The demon-

failure". 27

75 Instead of non-violent protest, the hartal by violence. Youths stoned trams and cars hartal, two cinemas were attacked, and the Justice Party leader, P. Tyagaraya Chetti,

rowdies.

Singaravelu

were two

The

drafted

men

Congress

Chetti,

were

into

were

killed

the

organizers, unable

city

and

to

two

headed

to

stop

restore

others

was characterized which ignored the house of the was stormed by

the

by

Rajan

violence.

government

wounded

and

by

Troops

control:

gun-fire.

Rajan

confessed to Gandhi that "violence and undue coercion have made the hartal a failure for non-violent non-cooperation. While lence

step

and the

this struggle for non-violence exists of our own men, one may well hesitate

forward

in

civil

resistance". '?®

the violence in Madras, though previous November, contributed

the civil For

obedience

disobedience

the

present,

however,

continued.

In

the

Gandhi

not on to his

campaign. !7°

the vioa single

thought

so

too,

the scale of Bombay decision to abandon

preparation

Bardoli

against to take

for

mass

Gujarat

civil

taluk

of

civil

disobedience

dis-

non-

payment of taxes was scheduled to begin in February; in the Guntur district of Andhra Congressmen were, without encourage-

ment

from

Gandhi,

paign. 13°

planning

Tamilnad,

as

their

usual,

suggestion for a local no-tax centres of North Arcot. 1}?! No-tax

ment had

at

was

the

times

crunch.

been

own

lagged

So

far

undisciplined

in Malabar, agitation had asters. When the Congress

behind,

campaigncame

brought leaders

the

and

no had

and

from

the

the

only

Muslim

non-cooperation

violent,

irredeemable lost control

cam-

but,

move-

except

dis— as

in

the Madras hartal — the police and troops were on hand to beat out the flames. But to embark on a no-tax campaign in several areas of India simultaneously, from the towns and hand it over to the

was

to

invite

the destruction

the

complete

of property.

breakdown

of

to take the movement ryots and the landless,

law

An editorial

and

authority

in the Hindu

on

and

21 January 1922 warned that "any movement of mass civil disobedience is to say the least extremely premature. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the particular form of civil

disobedience proposed, the non-payment of taxes, is fraught with grave perils alike to peace, tranquility and the movement of non-violent non-cooperation". The Madras government left no room for doubt that to crush no-tax movements.

it would exert its full strength The Madras legislature rushed

through legislation empowering the government to distrain the property of those who refused to pay their taxes, and government

distributed

armoured

let

to

cars

it

be

known

untouchables.

and

200

that

punitive

property

The

confiscated

Governor's

police,

were

would

bodyguard,

dispatched

the

be

four

to

76 Guntur

ment

to

ensure

was

not

that

going

taxes

to

were

surrender

paid, 12

such

Clearly

the

a fundamental

govern-

right

as

the collection of land-tax without’ a furious struggle. And from that most nationalists recoiled: they wanted national independence, but not at the price of social revolution and

civil

war.

Gandhi

spared

them.

Following

a clash

at Chauri

in the United Provinces on 4 February 1922 men were killed by a mob, Gandhi suspended

The Hindu On

10 March

years' ence

confessed 1922

its "great relief"

Gandhi

imprisonment.

experiment

fo Fight

was

The

was

arrested

in which 22 policecivil disobedience.

at this decision. }

non-cooperation

sentenced and

to six

civil

disobedi-

over.

and Win in One Campaign

Gandhi's non-cooperation audacious attempt to redirect tics in India. In itself the been

and

Chaura

foreshadowed

by

the

movement of 1920-22 was an the course of nationalist poliprogram was not new. It had

boycotts

and

swadeshi

agitation

in

Bengal during the anti-partition movement of 1905-11. But, in 1920, for the first time the Congress pledged itself to wresting national self-government from the British by a nation-wide direct-action campaign. The one, comparable to that of Western Front

World War who supplies they

the war to

break

out

and

victorious

from

the

stalemate

strategy

was

a bold

conclusion.

and

stitutional trench warfare that had the Congress from its inception. The

classes

movement, middle

to

was a bold in the First

believed that by a massive build-up of men and could punch through the German lines and bring

to a swift

It depended

strategy generals

on the

carry

and

out

the

to provide

classes

one,

enthusiastic

believed

program

it with

that

petty

gains

inhibited

but

it

had

the

leadership.

within

wanted con-

advance

a fatal

of boycotts, was

of

the

participation

swaraj

Gandhi

of

flaw.

of the middle to

finance

Unless

the

the

their

grasp,

unless they were impelled by an intense sense of grievance, they would not give Gandhi the unequivocal support that noncooperation demanded. They stood aloof from non-cooperation, or

hesitated

lence

at

its

brink.

and intimidation

property Raj that

shrank seemed

The flexible

strategy he could

The

perverted

British

Gandhi's

did

not

budge;

satyagraha.

from the prospect of a confrontation destructive of their own interests. had failed. have won at

had from the old trench

vio-

Men of

with

the

Perhaps if Gandhi had been more least some of the gains to be

warfare.

The opportunity

existed,

77 however loath

to

fleetingly,

compromise;

Rajagopalachari, successes,

settle

for

For

urged

less

many

non-cooperation

abandonment

December

and

the

Gandhi

than

to

swaraj.

Congressmen

of

men

}** exhilarated

was

that

of constitutional that

in

a

behind

the

defeat

convincing

strategy

and

Gandhi

him,

had

including

assault

rather

of

Gandhi's

brand

the

for

reversion

all

dismissed

been

of greater

the

argument

But not

Rajagopalachari

but

by the prospect

continue

agitation.

conclusion.

1921,

the

of

complete

to

some

Congressmen the

than

idea

form

drew

of

returning to the legislatures. He attributed the defeat not to any inherent defect in Gandhi's techniques, but to India's hesitancy and poverty which made it impossible to "fight and

win in one campaign". Instead, he reasoned, the would "have to carry on many campaigns before we

our goal". In place of the waves of progressively more

troughs

ization

to 25

during and

which

recover

be the pattern years.

big-push powerful

the Congress

its

could

strength, 135

of Congress

strategy he satyagrahas

rebuild

That

agitation

in

was,

the

Congress can reach

visualized divided by

its in

organ-

essence,

following

Caper

3

THe SwarauistTs’ DILEMMA

The

defeat

of civil

cooperation

disobedience

movement

in

and

February

1922

the

collapse

led

to

a

of the

non-

reorientation

of Congress strategy. The pendulum swung away from action and back to constitutional agitation. Under

direct the aegis

organization respects the

in some a rever-

of the Swarajya Party Congressmen began to return to central and provincial legislatures, and by 1925 the

was in return

Swarajist hands. But, although to the legislatures represented

the Congress

sal of the Calcutta and Nagpur boycott resolutions and was directed by former Nationslists, Gandhi's reorientation of

nationalist

politics

could

not

be

ignored.

Hence

the

ration-

ale for council entry was stated to be to carry noncooperation into the legislatures. Swarajists would not take office under dyarchy; they would not collaborate; but they would try to wreck dyarchy from within and thereby recreate a confrontation with the Raj.

For

the

Brahmin

Nationalists

of Tamilnad

Swarajya Party be restored to

provided the means by constitutional action

Party

their

text,

to

their

rendered

own

control.

Attachment

communal

the

all-India

which the Congress and, in a regional

to

identity

less

the

Swarajya

conspicuous

could con-

and

enabled them to attack the Justice ministry from a broader political front. But conditions in the Madras legislature

in the mid-1920s

emma. but

the

They

only

ly defeated

exclude

the ent

it.

strength

on

Brahmin

which

their

presented

were

way

was

pledged in

by

Dyarchy,

of the

alliance

dissidents;

the

which

the

Governor

not

the

Tamil

to

the

take

Justice

formation

experience

Swarajists with

the

would

Party

showed,

in the

opportunity

with

under

could

be

complete-

ministry not

legislature

be

to

wrecked;

was depend-

constitutionalist

for

welcomed,

a dil-

dyarchy,

could

of a Congress

essentially

have

Swarajists

office

a Congress

was

created

non-

ministry, and

then

lost. But the central Swarajist and Congress leaderships remained, despite all the appeals from Tamilnad, adamantly

opposed

to office-acceptance.

Should

78

Swarajists

take

office

79 in defiance less

of national

spectators

their

own

watching

alliance

A Retrogression

11

the

Designed

Gandhi's

1922

the

Working

India

the

of

of

Party

and

to

Committee

flourish

abandon

meeting

"Constructive

for

stressed

the

schools,

the

Congress

they

be

power-

while

of the Congress

in readiness

national

cooperation,

enlistment

his

program

organization

Muslim

Justice

decision

adopted

to keep

disobedience,

or must

disintegrated?

Congress

February

the

policy

in the Policy

Following

ience,

party

uplift

members

and

civil

disobed-

at

Bardoli

Programme".

a return

to civil

production

of khadi,

temperance,

Hindu-

of untouchables. collections

on

The

for

the

Tilak

Swarajya Fund were to continue.’ menu appetizing. Perilous though

Few Congressmen found this civil disobedience had been

pectation;

to

it

had

at

least

by

seemed tedious ment shattered personal

thrust

comparison

rumoured

that

they

to

to

spin,

and unrewarding. the morale of his

invincibility

been

India

that

had

the

been

government

a peak

of

excitement

run

national

and

ex-

schools

Gandhi's arrest and imprison followers. Their leader's

an

article

would

of

not

faith:

dare

to

it

arrest

had

him, or, if it did, no jail could hold him. He had been billed as a mahatma, revered as an avatar. Now his dispirited disciples raked the embers of a dying movement unconvinced

March

On

could

kindle

it

Rajagopalachari,

1922,

fell

the

task

back

to

released

of

life.

from

supervising

Through his gopalachari

three years of association had become known as one of

debut

all-India

judgement as

and

an

integrity

fought doggedly program, but by

Vellore

Gandhi

leader,

valued

and

he

jail

Gandhi's

on

26

program.

with Gandhi, Rajathe Congressmen whose

most.

was

not

But

a

this

success.

was his He

to preserve the original non-cooperation his inflexibility he deepened divisions with-

in the Congress at a time when the need was for reconciliation and a speedy redeployment of the party's depleted forces. He was Gandhi's man, not Gandhi. He lacked the

capacity of his leader to inspire popular devotion; he offered only arid moralizing and dogmatism. Moreover, when opportunities for attempting new satyagrahas occurred, Raja-

gopalachari was reluctant fear of failure.

to seize

them,

as

if daunted

by

The rigidity of his defence of Gandhi's program was also a consequence of the insecurity of his regional position. Rajagopalachari had gained control of the TNCC through alli-

ance the

with

Gandhi

snarling

of

and had been

the

Nationalist

kept

in that

wolves,

by

position, Gandhi

and

despite his

80 associates in the CWC. gopalachari to survive;

Central Congress funds enabled identification with Gandhi was

Rajathe

primary justification for his regional leadership. With Gandhi jailed, Rajagopalachari would be deposed by the Nationalists unless he clung to the wreckage of Gandhi's program. Because national Congress policy had become a determinant of

regional vival.

party

The

first

came

with

the

leadership,

review

of

appointment

he

was

Congress

fighting

policy

of a Civil

for

his

after

own

sur-

Gandhi's

Disobedience

arrest

Enquiry

Committee by the AICC at Lucknow on 7 to 9 June 1922. The AICC noted a "widespread feeling" that in view of "the extremely unfair manner in which the policy of repression is being

carried out by the Government" the a revival of civil disobedience to

Congress should recommend compel the government to

“abandon their present committee toured India

policy..." collecting

for

a revival

disobedience,

and

Kasturi

vestigation

shifted

able to switch As a member of council

November mood and civil

of

and became,

civil

However, as evidence, the

not what

steps

but

the enquiry focus of in-

should

whether

be taken

it was

desir-

to non-cooperation through the legislatures. the committee, Rajagopalachari, with M.A. Ansari

Ranga

Iyengar,

boycott.

In

its

argued

report,

for

the

submitted

continuation to

the

of the

AICC

in

1922, the committee acknowledged that the country's the condition of the Congress precluded a revival of

disobedience

at

the

present

time,

though

local

saty-

agrahas might be undertaken. On the council entry issue the committee was too deeply divided to offer a unanimous recommendation.? The AICC in its turn passed the issue on to the

annua]

Congress

The

for

Congress

consideration.

met

at

Gaya

in

Bihar

at

the

close

of

December 1922. As the guardian of Gandhism, Rajagopalachari adamantly opposed any revision of the council boycott. He and

other

warded

off

"No-Changers",

the

Motilal Nehru Defeat at the organization January 1923 they were not sequences of invoking the

attempt

of

as

they

the

were

dubbed,

"Pro-Changers"

temporarily

led

by

Das

and

to capture the Congress for council entry. Gaya Congress provoked Das and Nehru to form an of their own, the all-India Swarajya Party, in to propagate their views. They stressed that seceding from the Congress — the dire consuch a move being now familiar — but they were idea of the Congress as a platform on which all

nationalists were free to express their widely different opinions. A minority had, they claimed, a right to organize itself in the hope of converting the majority to its views. The Swarajya Party was to be a pressure group within the Congress, not its rival. Moreover, if, as Dr Gordon has

81 argued,

Das

a year only, in expecting The

elections

held

in

had

agreed

Swarajists'

to

the

political

Gandhi

immediate

provincial

October

a "National

with

to

try

non-cooperation

then the erstwhile Nationalists were the Congress to keep the bargain.®

1923.

Demand"

prisoners,

Once

for

and

the

and

objective

central

elected,

for

release a

was

they

Round

opportunity

revert to the situation who joined the Swarajya

for

this time the rejected they

sistent

a negotiated

contest

legislatures proposed

of Gandhi Table

representatives of the government and the draft a new consitution. The Round Table attempt to of the men

to

justified

and

the

to

to

be

present

other

Conference

of

main parties to demand was an

of December 1921, for many Party regretted that the

settlement

had

been

lost.

But

Swarajists proposed that if their demand would resort to "uniform, continuous and

obstruction

with

a view

for

to make

Government

was con-

through

the Assembly and Councils impossible’. If, in response to the constitutional deadlocks the Swarajists engineered, the British responded by suspending dyarchy and resorting to repression and arbitrary rule, then an ideal situation would have been created for a revival of civil disobedience, and the Congress might carry many constitutionalists with it. Alternatively, if, as many Swarajists clearly hoped, the

British responded by making substantial concessions, the Congress would gain prestige and influence from having won redress for Indian grievances, for having pushed the stubborn British mule a few miles further along the stony track to

swaraj.®

Against this Rajagopalachari argued that non-cooperation through the legislatures was impossible. It was a parody of Gandhi's non-cooperation. The boycott of the councils could not be removed without the whole logic of non-cooperation

collapsing. he reasoned,

Liberals,

It was the keystone, not the coping. There were, only two possible alternatives: either, like the

one

worked

dyarchy

and

exploited

the

minor

oppor-

tunities for constructive government which it allowed, or one ignored the legislatures entirely and by-passed the institutional structure of British rule. The British, with their Irish experience in mind, had constructed the constitution with such craftsmanship that obstruction and wrecking were not

feasible.®

And

"retrogression

40

years

the

to

in

follow

the

Congress

only limited success; “shaken the throne of

stitutional

the

policy

had

used

Liberals'

of

the

course

Congress".

constitutional

whereas two years arbitrary power".

action was a premature

would For

be

a

nearly

techniques

of non-cooperation Reversion to con-

admission

of defeat.®

with

had

82 The AICC appealed of the party until the

who

could

support

not

for

afford

the

for end

to

elections

a truce between of April 1923.

remain

silent

if

in October,

the The

they

called

warring wings Swarajists,

were

for

to

muster

a special

Congress session to reconsider the council entry issue. This Rajagopalachari opposed, insisting that the Gaya verdict was binding on all Congressmen — much as in 1920 Nationalists had argued that Gandhi had no right to re-open the council issue after the Amritsar Congress. As a compromise, Das suggested

that

both

interest

vassed.

—

wings

be

let

authorized

to

Rajagopalachari

Co-existence,

pursue

spin

while

Rajagopalachari

their

separate

the

replied,

Swarajists

was

because the council boycott was a central part ans' program. One section of the party had to

extinguish" the other.!°

can-

impossible

of the Gandhi"absorb and

This crude Darwinism offended many

Congressmen who valued party unity and an active program more than intransigence and inertia. The AICC at Bombay on 26 May 1923 shuffled towards the Swarajist position by requesting a halt to propaganda against council entry. This time Rajagopalachari was the rebel, denying the authority of the AICC resolution and urging the Tamil Congress organizations to

express

their

dissent."

Rajagopalachari had gone too far. He had middle-of-the-road partymen by his tactics and ation

of

since

a

civil

the Civil

ailing

Disobedience

Enquiry

Committee

Congress

non-cooperation

unity

Srinivasa

and

to

Iyengar,

to

Iyengar,

had

quieten

council

who

favoured

he

'purists’."!?

from

Ranga

ation, had earlier seen Das as the rebel, but by June 1923 decried the irresponsible actions of the "Non-Cooperation

preserve

back

Kasturi

so

to

swing

The

entry

as

gradual

war.

alienated the the prolong-

the

Varadarajulu

Madras

Naidu,

situ-

and

Vijayaraghavachari in varying degrees shared his view. A. Rangaswami Iyengar, Tamilnad's Swarajist leader, did

lose

chari,

wreck

the

opportunity

to

reforms.

Has

Mr

his

reservoir

observing

the

Congress?” and

13

Having

weakened

gopalachari

tress at the talked about

Congress

tartly:

drained his

began

held

foster

regional

to

reaction retiring

''The

waver.

at Delhi

resentment Swarajya

Achariar

set

party

out

by

his

professed

has

set

out

the

Congress

obduracy,

surprise

not

Rajagopala-

to wreck

of national

leadership

He

against

and

to

support

Raja-

dis-

against him and, in true Gandhian style, from political leadership.’* A Special

in late

September

1923

stacles to Congressmen entering the councils the party's basic faith in non-cooperation. who did not attend, informed would no longer stand in the

the session Swarajists'

removed

ail

ob-

while restating Rajagopalachari,

in a message that he way. The No-Changers,

83 he

stated,

had

done

non-cooperation "the

lessons

their

program

of

hard

of their error.?®

utmost

to

intact.

maintain

They

experience"

had

would

the

failed

convince

original

and

the

now

only

Swarajists

Rajagopalachari's capitulation at the national level was not matched by a corresponding surrender in Tamilnad. By using party funds for anti-Swarajist propaganda, and by con-

trol ly

to

of party

maintain

stitution

years long

patronage, his

of the

Congress

Mr.

can easily

regional

TNCC

to minimize

as

Rajagopalachari

was

position.

changed

participation

Rajagopalachary

funds",

complained

has

M.K.

get 50 or 60 people

for

struggled

In

August

a third

time

desperate-

1924

the

in

by the Pro-Changers.**© control

over

Acharya

the

of

con-

four

"As

provincial

Chingleput,

"he

to vote with him at all

times".’”

And, as Rangaswami Iyengar had explained to M.R. Jayakar of Maharashtra in July 1922, "The trouble in this province is due to the fact that we all gave up our offices in the Con-

gress

Executive

Committee

immediately

after

the Calcutta

Congress, and the Congress caucus is in the hands of the noncooperators".'® When Motilal Nehru appealed to Rangaswami and Satyamurti to secure the election of as many Pro-Changers as possible

gressmen

from

Tamilnad

expressed

their

for

the

Gaya

powerlessness

was

Gandhi, prematurely released more prepared to reassess the

the

council-entry

chari

had

been.

Swarajists ization at

and the

While

expressing

movement,

he

was

Congress,

to

do

the

from prison in situation than

his

personal

willing

agreed to their take-over of Belgaum Congress in December

Tamil

so.!%

Con-

February 1924, Rajagopala-

antipathy

to

to

accommodate

the party 1924. He

the

organadvised

Rajagopalachari to follow a similar course in Tamilnad but it was not until January 1925 that Rajagopalachari publicly bowed to Gandhi's advice and a further month before he actually com-

plied with it.?° being

But

steadily

manoeuvres

they

between

had

abolition

of

gained of

1922

and

eroded.

1920

the

The

deserted

nothing

Khalif

by

Tamilnad had sought other posals for a South Indian

dependent

force:?*

Nor

was

it

co-workers.

in

Abdul

Trichinopoly, Abdul been among the more Party.

Hindu

1925

Rajagopalachari's

Muslims the

the

who

had

Congress

alliance.*!

February

1924,

to

Majid Sharar,

retain

No more

hetped

in;1922,

Even

the

him

in

feeling

before

Muslims

was

the

the

that

in

political openings: there were proMuslim Federation to act as an in-

Syed Murtuza of

Hameed Khan of Madras extreme Khilafatists,

easy

position

than

the

36

support

lawyers

and others joined the and

had

who had Swarajya

enthusiasm

suspended

of

their

84 practices in 1920-22 for non-ccoperation and returned to their profession. The volunteer and

where,

their

as

own

in

Madura

picketing

they

in

1923,

they

received

gradually they corps broke up

attempted

not

ment from the regional leadership. 7? The Nagpur graha of 1923, launched to force the Government Central Provinces to allow Congressmen to carry

through

the

streets

of Nagpur,

to

forward

provided

the Tamil activists, many of whom courted imprisonment.**But it was

little

else

look

formed in January than (both former

The

work

was

1924 with League of

unspectacular

with it for long. Many found more stimulating

to.

to

launch

support but discourageFlag Satyaof the their flag

a temporary

travelled soon over

A Tamil

to Nagpur and there

Nadu

Khadi

fillip and was

Board

for

was

K. Santhanam and later S. RamanaYouth Members) as its secretaries.

and

few

activists

were

satisfied

deserted the Congress altogether, employment in journalism

or

From 1922 a rift opened between Rajagopalachari, supported by a few Brahmin activists, and a nebulous group of dissatisfied non-Brahmin Congressmen led by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker

and S. Ramanathan. At first their grievance was that Rajagopalachari had tricked them by capituliating to the Swarajists: Ramaswami Naicker and Ramanathan resigned as the TNCC's secretaries after the Delhi Special Congress to protest against the

“open

and ostentatious repudiation”

iples of non-cooperation.*® They Cocanada Congress that December,

their views

and endorsed

Boredom

and

with

a hankering to

use

contested

a road

by caste

dramatic running

Hindus.

with

caste Hindus and stiffen moval of untouchability. stretch

went of

covert

ing the

to

then

1925

with

the

of new road.?” Ramaswami

hostility

campaigns

led

near

a temple,

a right

Rajagopalachari

Travancore

In Tamil

the

while

he would

could

leave

not

forcibly

abstained,

dislik-

not help untouchroad; but he also coercion of the

give

government

eyes

prestige

him

building

for the

Rajagopalachari

advancement

The rift quickly widened. aware of his own abilities

Congress

Ramaswami

begun at Vaikam in Travancore secure for untouchables the

their opposition to the gradual reThe satyagraha ended in compromise in

Naicker to

Rajagopalachari,

new

ing the. satyagraha partly because it would ables generally to have access to a single feared that the satyagraha would amount to

November

princ-

voiced their protests to the but Rajagopalachari smothered

disenchantment

Naicker to join the satyagraha in 1924. Its objective was to

right

fundamental

the Delhi agreement. 7°

khadi,

for

of the

of

the

was

a short

campaign

suspected

untouchables.

Ramaswami Naicker was becomas an orator and agitator. If an

it and pursue

outlet

an

for

his

independent

energies,

course.

85

julu

The breach Naidu,

came

in the middle

elected

covered

that

in

Congress

TNCC

Brahmin

months

President

and

non-Brahmin

in

of 1925.

December

pupils

were

Varadara-

1924,

dis-

expected

to

eat separately at the Shermadevi Gurukulam, a national school trun by V.V.S. Aiyar, the former terrorist, in Tinnevelly district. Varadarajulu condemned this as caste discrimination and as being contrary to Congress pledges to eradicate caste prejudice. The abuse appeared to him all the more grievous

that

sponsible

for the

produced

Naidu

an

failed

1925

chari

to

merely dining

that

merit

up of the

the

the

Rajan

had

school.

of anti-Brahminism

Naicker and

Consultations

defuse

with

Gandhi

situation.

school,

that

the

When

the

Congress

been

largely

re-

The revelation

from

Varadarajulu

Kalyanasundara

and

the

Aiyar's

TNCC

recommendation should

not

resignation

met

in

April

of Rajagopala-

interfere

but

requested the school authorities to allow inter-caste was brushed aside; a resolution moved by Ramanathan

nationalist based

on

Rajagopalachari

TNCC,

bodies

birth"

and

Rajagopalachari

could

drawal

sponsorship

by Ramaswami

to discuss and

and

setting

outburst

supported

Mudaliar.*®

funds

should

was

not

carried.

six of his

not be overcome

again

of the Gandhians

In

the

associates

maintaining

through

Rajagopalachari's

observe

any

following

resigned

that

of

week

from

the

caste prejudice

form of coercion.”®

resignation

from

"gradations

marked

leadership

the

final

of the TNCC.

with-

The

Swarajists took over. was elected President

At the end of 1925 Srinivasa Iyengar of a predominantly Swarajist committee.

crusade.

the

Congress

justice

and

Ramaswami incentive Respect

atheism,

He

left

movement

followed

himself

their

Naicker received from the Shermadevi affair an to exploit anti-Brahminism as a political and social

social

Ramaswami

as

revolt

organized

the

which

denigrated

Naicker's

movement's

Ramaswami

Congress

in

1925

ablest

to

Self-

and extolled

and

established

culture.

quickly

English

the

propagandist.

the

Swarajists

and, by intensifying communal bitterness, the task of those who remained within the

1

Ramanathan

and Ramanathan undermined

opposition

the

nationalism

Dravidian

lead

to organize

in

last

By

hows

Tamilnad

they complicated Congress.

|

| ,.''s)

After the Shermadevi affair, Rajagopalachari, too, sought a new political base, though not outside the party. Unlike

Jawaharlal

Nehru,

Rajendra

Prasad

and

Vallabhbhai

Patel,

he

did not turn to the municipalities: he had had his fill of municipal intrigue and frustration in 1917-18 as chairman of Salem

Municipal

Council.

Instead,

in

imitation

of

Gandhi,

set up an ashram (spiritual retreat) near Tiruchengodu in south-western Salem in 1925. He took such activists as had remained loyal to him and gave them employment organizing

he

86 khadi

work

in

the

locality.

Funds

for

the

ashram

came

from

Rajagopalachari's contacts at the centre — mainly from Gandhi's All-India Spinners' Association, which provided a grant of Rs.

60,000,

Provinces

and

. The ashram harsh realities

area. alist

lation.

from

Marwari

and

Jamnalal

trusteeship

cannot",

of

from

a statement

such

he

wealthy

Central

the

peasantry

was

too

problems of relating and interests of the

asserted,

of the people

condition

gopalachari

the

*”

brought Rajagopalachari face to face with the of rural life in the poor, drought-stricken

It posed for him the struggle to the lives "You

Bajaj,

Congressman.

unless in

you

your

"successfully

include

advocacy

of

a

claim

the

politics". 3?

steeped in Brahminical to

the nationlocal poputhe

economic

elitism

But

Raja-

to proceed

revolutionary

trans-

formation of rural society. Khadi production offered one palliative, but Rajagopalachari strove for a more complete, an

intellectually

more

attractive,

prohibition, the social appeal which had been demonstrated in

1921.

It exploited

lower

than

his

own

the consumption

strata

coercion

graha

of Hindu

and

of

the

and,

as

caste

society.

Hindus

a Brahmin,

with

he

affair.

turned

of castes

he automatically

did

feared

in

not

of the

the

to

potential of movement of

ambitions

the degeneracy

Prohibition

that

He

agitational anti-liquor

sanskritizing

of alcohol

the Shermadevi

solution.

and the

involve

Vaikam

It was an issue

that

equated

lowest

the

satya-

could

transcend community and party. It would, so he hoped, redirect the attention of politicians away from squabbles over patronage and communal representation and back to fundamentals. Agitation against prohibition would be hard for the British

to

quash

Hindu

without

offending

civilization,

a vulnerable

and

yet

the

the

traditions

spot to attack.”

At first

Rajagopalachari

and

government's

conducted

rural

convictions

drink

revenue

of

was

propaganda

meetings on prohibition and the evils of drink, and he urged caste associations and panchayats to discourage their members from drinking alcohol. But with excise in the hands of the ministry and with government servants alert to revive anti-liquor agitation, relatively

achieved

in this

fashion.

Rajagopalachari

for any attempt little could be

had argued

that

the legislatures might be used to win minor concessions even though they could not be obstructed. It was with the hope either of achieving prohibition through the legislature or of

demonstrating

failure

to

watch

to

the

the

limitations

introduce

progress

of

prohibition of the

dyarchy

that

Madras

by

legislators'

Rajagopalachari

Legislative

turned

Council.

87

Tendencies At

city

Towards

the

core

Nationalists

Satyamurti were Swarajist line,

resignation Srinivasa

Gandhians.

from

Full~fledged of

of

the

Tamil

Moderatiam Swarajya

1919-20.

the

Madras

were

legislature

less

in

impatient,

Vijayaraghavachari

more

remained

as a Congress veteran, but Gandhi and his lieutenants

alists, like C.V. and T. Rangachari

of the

them,

the

Madras

and

November

1921,

tolerant

largely

aloof:

of

the

he

the snubs he had in his year as

Congress president made him disinclined role in national or regional politics.

iveness

were

Iyengar

the most conspicuous advocates of the new whereas Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and, after his

Iyengar

was respected received from

party

Rangaswami

to resume a leading Other former Nation-

Venkataramana Iyengar, a Coimbatore MLC, in the Assembly, waited to see the effect-

Swarajists

In Tamilnad,

before

because

of

deciding

whether

Rajagopalachari's

to join

rearguard

action, the Swarajists only gradually gained ground. Denied access to the TNCC’s resources until 1925, they entered the 1923 elections short of funds, with few candidates and little organization. As late as July 1923 only Rangaswami Iyengar

and

Satyamurti

the

Madras

and

no

more

prospects centrate

Demand

than

that

on

and

with

of

the

declared

a dozen

legislature

Motilal

winning

not

they were not five

had

six

to

Sivaswami

The provincial

that

Nehru

with

Swarajist

Swarajists

year.

advised seats

the

So

to

the

Madras

the

seats

only

elections

for

Tamil

were

were

on

for

to con-

the

National

legislature

where

In consequence, fell

returned.

held

seats

their

party

press

Tamilnad

Liberal

candidates

contested

poor

help

to have a majority.*?

Assembly

Aiyar

Tamil

Assembly

bother

likely

in

themselves

to

Swarajists

31 October

1923

Party labels were more widely employed than in 1920, partly due to Swaraiist intervention, though many non-Brahmins preferred such vague designations as "Nationalist" or "Independent" to allow them to side with whichever party or grouping was invited to form a ministry. The Justice Party encouraged this by its policy of incorporating whichever nonBrahmins were, legislature.”

through their own efforts, elected to the Nevertheless, the ministry had its adherents

and it was the deployment of patronage rather than public electioneering which secured the return of many Justice MLCs

The Tamil Swarajists were thus doubly penalized: they had limited access to the funds and organization of their party, and they could not rival the Justice Party's influence in the local

government

bodies.

Polling

was

heavier

than

in

1920,

88

though North city,

still

relatively

It ranged

from

28 per

cent

Arcot rural constituency, to 58.8 per cent in and 77 per cent in the Tinnevelly-Palamcottah

constituency.

had

low.

been

In

so

the

light

ing as high stituency. benefit the

Muslim

in

1920,

constituencies,

the

change

was

Madras urban

where

most

in

polling

marked,

reach-

as 71 per cent in Madura-Trichinopoly urban conBut the increased Muslim poll did not particularly Swarajists, except in Madras city where Moosa

Sait's wealth and prominence made him a particularly strong candidate anyway. > The government assessed the outcome of the election as shown in Table 2. In the eyes of the Madras

government

the

Justice

Party

was

best

able

to

majority in the legislature, and at the end of Willingdon invited the Raja of Panagal to form

TABLE Party

Composition

of

the

Madras

44

Congress (Swarajists) Independents

11 6

the

were

Before

ised

that

the

in

elections

legislatures

98

18 nominated expected

the ministry.©

the

MLCs

to

All-India

where

1923

37

of elected MLCs

officials

November 1923 a new ministry.

Legislature,

Justice

In addition,

11

a

2

Anti-Ministerialists Total

command

and

support

Swarajya

Swarajists

Party

were

in

prom-

a minority

they would not occupy their seats, except to prevent them being forfeited and when there might be opportunities to obstruct or overthrow the ministries. In both Madras and the Punjab,

where

that

was

parties, the

it

this

the

to

the

the

of

the

in the Madras

such that the small ive opposition".*”

by

was

"unnecessary,

disintegration

“situation

elections

decree

Tamil,

not

Assembly

and resentful

but

produced

contested.

inexpedient

party...";

Council

Telugu

keeping

of continuing

and

and

party

likely

claimed

to

asserted

lead

that

parties

to

the

is

has good chances of effectthis argument was voiced

Swarajists.

a parental

Tamil

Swarajist

The Tamil

of the various

Swarajya Party Significantly,

the

minority

eye

Prakasam,

leadership

on

the

elected

Telugu

MICs

of the Congress

89 in the Madras Presidency, deplored the decision of the AllIndia Swarajya Party to permit the Swarajists in Madras and the Punjab to take their seats as an encouragement to the

“tendencies manifest in

towards full-fledged moderatism" the Madras council party.*® The

already becoming Tamil Swarajist

MLCs ignored his objections and in March 1924 entered an alliance with other Opposition MLCs to form the United Nationalist

Party.

Its

leader

zamindar

of moderate

council;

its

Morley-Minto Swarajist —C.

constitution executive

Satyamurti

Ramalinga

T.A.

Ramalingam

Salem.* the

The

was

views

Reddi

and

among of

included

a cluster

Chittoor,

C.

of Coimbatore,

into

the

Raju,

an MLC

a Liberal

of the United

entry

Narasimha

had been

committee

Chetti*

formation

Swarajists'

C.V.S.

who

of

in

under

the

first

only

the

non-Brahmin

Natesa

and

Mudaliar

P.

the

dyarchy

Brahmin

dissidents of

Subbarayan

Nationalists

legislature

a Telugu

so

was

soon

Madras,

of

after

indicative

of

the basic situation of the Swarajists in the second and third councils. Few in number, it was logical that the Swarajists should ally with other Opposition groups to increase their effectiveness. The dominance of the Justice Party as a rel-

atively

stable

ministerial

party

provoked

the

formation

of a

rival bloc in the council strong enough to challenge and overthrow it. But it was not the numerical weakness of the Swarajists alone which was responsible for their alliance. The

the

Tamil

their

advantage.

The

were

civil

The

Swarajists,

destruction

to

stated

wreck

because India

objectives

of

dyarchy

Swarajists

they

party,

particular,

than

disobedience

Tamil

in

of dyarchy

were

partly

or

the

and

to

in

the

force

conditions

from

a

interested

to

All-India

constitutional

subscribed

were

seeking

to

a

for

situation

in

to

membership

which

of

they

either

result.

— partly

the

were

in

Party

would

objectives

that

less

it

Swarajya

concessions

these

conviction

work

All-

worthy,

patriotic, if rather impractical, aims. Whereas Das saw the creation of a constitutional crisis as a situation to which the parliamentary traditions of the British would force them

to respond, Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti had not lost faith in a favourable response before that crisis was reached. Through appeals to the Labour Party in Britain, by constitutional agitation in India, and by periodic propaganda tours in both countries, the Swarajists hoped to alarm Britain and hence quicken the pace of constitutional reform. Rangaswami Iyengar dreamed of an Indian re-enactment of Runnymeade or the

one

Grand

Remonstrance,**

of winning

price

of paddy

the

votes

but

of

or the burden

regarded

electors

the

who

of taxation

immediate

cared

than

more

the

task

about

distant

as

the

90 prospect

of

swaraj.

{t was

a pragmatic

view.

Non-cooperation

had failed in Tamilnad, the Swarajists argued, because it had ignored the day-to-day concerns of the people. It was their task, therefore, to do "normal political work to show the

people their

that Swaraj

meant

children".*!

By

better

conditions

denouncing

for

themselves

non-cooperation

as

an

and

aber-

ration and calling for a return to “normal political work", the Tamil Swarajists laid themselves open to criticism from Congressmen who feared a reversion to the politics of Gokhale and the

Srinivasa Sastri. "mentality of the

Satyamurti was moderate — with

singled out as having his belief in the

efficacy of constitutional agitation, with his predilection for making fine speeches in decorated halls in the presence of high-placed august personages and his contemptuous dismissal of the harmless Charka as an unpractical proposition"."* There

was

could

be

much

truth

compared

ist controversy of to the revisionist

a minimum

in

to

program

the

accusation.

European

If

socialists

the

Swarajists

during

the

revision-

the 1890s, the Tamil Swarajists were close position of Bernstein, seeking to achieve

from

an

existing parliamentary system,

while

Das was nearer to the opposite extreme, holding, like Rosa Luxemburg, that by spurning petty gains and working for a major crisis, far greater advances would ultimately be

achieved.

This divergence of the Tamil Swarajists from the orthodox Swarajist line did not originate with the post-election situation: it was much older. In giving evidence to the

Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee in 1922, Rangaswami Iyengar claimed that by involving themselves in such concerns

as education

and

land

revenue

in the

legislatures

Congressmen

would not be frittering away their energies, but would be building a broad base for the nationalist movement. Raja-

gopalachari

asked:

approved

Satyamurti,

total as

"We

cbstruction?"

by

evidence

that

the

should

not

take

"No",

replied

Tamil

Pro-Changers

were

up

an

Rangaswami.

cited

in

the

attitude His

committee's

did

not

the obstructionism advocated by Das and Nehru.“? The Tamil

Swarajists

had

not

been

their Nationalist moorings by the storm In Bengal and other provinces where the strongly the former Nationalists had to of non-cooperation. In Tamilnad, where relatively

Nationalists

weak

and

felt

directed

less

by

compulsion

their earlier preoccupation with strengthened by the accession of

sterial

office.

The

Brahmin

a rival

to

the the

dragged

of

views,

report

believe

very

far

in

from

tide of non-cooperation. agitation had run float with the currents the agitation had been

Congress

compromise.

faction,

legislature had been Justice Party to mini-

politicians

the

Furthermore,

of Tamilnad

—

91 whether

Nationalists,

Liberals

or

non-cooperators

— had

profoundly disturbed by the appointment of non-Brahmin sters and by the communal legislation which followed.

Communal

G.O.s

professional

Religious

of

1921-22

future

of

Endowments

the

and

Brahmin

the

educational

middle

legislation,

the first council, was a priesthood. A community

occupational,

threatened

class;

introduced

direct challenge criss-crossed by

political

differences,

the

at

the

so

long

been

mini The

and

Hindu

end

of

to the Brahmin ritual, social,

and

accustom-

ed to leadership, the Brahmins could not meet the Justice attack by an agile regrouping into a solid phalanx. They were

bewildered; the

to

To

the

Madras

abandon

themselves,

the

their

immediate

legislature

the

Brahmins,

Brahmins

responses

in

the

problem two

non-Brahmins

parties

often

posed

entirely would

among

formed

on

contradictory.

by Justice

solutions

legislature

squabble

were

were

in

lose

themselves

the

domination

possible.

hope

their

and

non-communal

One

that,

hostility

later

was

left

to

join

lines.

of

the

This

course

had a wide measure of support. In effect it was held by Rajagopalachari, who, as we have seen, had argued in 1920 that

Brahmins

should

non-Brahmins a free from his experience and

by

the

Brahmin

stay

out

of

the

legislature

who

had

decided

and

allow

hand;** by Srinivasa Iyengar, smartin, in the first year of the legislature;*

Liberals,

by

early

to

1923

the

to

ignore the provincial council and concentrate on the all-India level of politics and government.“© Kasturi Ranga Iyengar from 1921 until his death in 1923 inclined to this course. As

an old

Nationalist

gressmen of his but in the near

he did not

doubt

the

importance

of Con-

ilk gaining control of the Madras legislature, future he thought abstention the best course

until anti-Brahminism died down and non-Brahmins had become disillusioned with collaborative politics. He did not oppose Swarajist tactics as such but feared that their premature adoption

and

in

Madras

exacerbate

would

strengthen

communalism. "7

the

Justice-Raj

alliance

The alternative course was to attempt a direct assault on the legislature and to overthrow the Justice ministry. Rangaswami Iyengar denounced the Liberals' decision to abstain from the legislature as a "counsel of despair" and an illustration

of

precisely

the

sort

of

Brahmin

arrogance

that

non-

Brahmins loathed.“® He and other Tamil Swarajists argued that: only by bearding the Justice lion in the council den would it ever be defeated; it was folly for the nationalists

to turn things

because

national

their

would it

was

backs

change. an

(if not

on the For

legislature

many

all-India

the regional

Brahmins

and

organization

level),

the

just

and

hope

Swarajya had,

on

that

Party, the

an intercommunal

92 character,

Justicites. nation

at

was

an

ideal

base

Nationalism

what

they

for

expressed

believed

to

a counter-attack

and

be

pensated for the political and social them in Madras. It has been remarked istry was interested in patronage and

the caste of its clients.*?

elevated

rank

against

their

the

indig-

communalism;

it

com-

ostracism threatening that the Justice minso cared little about

But where a non-Brahmin

Subbarayan might ricochet from Congress to Justice United Nationalists, Brahmin politicians could not

like

Party to identify

with a party which hounded them in the legislature, in the Press and on public platforms, which depicted them as monsters, foreigners and tyrants. moderates or extremists, Tamil

to

remain

ity and Party.

in provincial

assurance

within

the

huddled

They no and the

of

appointment

Brahmin

of

the

wished

secur-

Swarajya

course knew that it a Brahmin clique.

leadership

of non-Brahmin

had

been

shattered

ministers.

It was

Brahmin Swarajists associate with non-Brahmins and for this purpose

binding

walls

for

longer had a numerical advantage in the electorate council, and the precious illusion of the Brahmin

prerogative

United

together

protective

Those who believed in this second be suicidal to operate openly as

would

the the

politics

Whether by inclination Brahmin politicians who

Nationalist

the

Party,

predominantly

dissidents,

was

formally

Brahmin

ideal.

The Tamil Swarajists were tactics by developments during

in

1920

by

the

essential

that

at least a section of the formation of the

(but

not

Swarajists

irrevocably)

with

the

encouraged in their the first council.

one hand, as we have seen, patronage and induced the non-Brahmin MLCs to coalesce

non-

assault On the

political advantage within the Justice

Party; but,-on the other hand, there was a centrifugal tendency as MLCs, disappointed at the policies and practices of the ministry,.spun off from the party. Patronage, a magnetism that could repel as well as attract, was certainly one

reason in

the

for

deserted

the

legislature.

the

offered

the

due;

C.

the patronage °°

sought

creation

and

Tamil

MLCs

Education

in the Chittoor

Natesa

the

Ramalinga

ministry

of

for himself

ation

C.

Panagal

post

of a band

Mudaliar

and his

judicial

was

in

of non-Brahmin Reddi

1923

Minister

district denied

relatives

service;*!

and

was

because he

dissidents

said

to

he

coveted

board

was

nor

not

he thought

appointments

in the Madras T.A.

have

he

given

his

had

Corpor-

Ramalingam

Chetti

was being pushed out of his posts as president of Coimbatore's district board and chairman of Coimbatore municipal council by a new Justice follower, C.S. Ratnasabapathi Mudaliar.» felt

that

the

ministry

was

dominated

by

and

run

93

for

the

Telugus

the

Executive

— another

source

of conflict

between

the

two

regions. Muslim MLCs fretted for a Muslim minister or executive councillor.°? Panagal could not satisfy everyone: there were not enough jobs to go round. After the 1923 elections he removed K.V. Reddi Naidu from his ministerial post to bring in a Tamil and he tried to win back Muslim support by appointing a Muslim as council secretary and securing the appointment of Muhammad Usman as Home Member of Denial

Council.

of

patronage

Not all non-Brahmins Tyagaraja Chetti and to

a quest

for

to

implement

as

however,

the

whole

story.

the

be working for the reform and regenersociety and culture and not be confined

jobs

and

office.°”

to be a minister

undertaken

not,

shared the pragmatic approach of Panagal and some certainly felt that

Justice Party should ation of non-Brahmin

ambitious

was

educational

If

Ramalinga

it was partly

schemes

Inspector-General

of

the

Reddi

was

to be in a position

type

of Education

he

had

already

in Mysore.

Subbarayan was not feigning indignation when he protested against Tyagaraya Chetti's remarks that Congress prisoners should be treated like robbers and dacoits.** And there were other pressures on the MLCs than a score of relatives and

clients

clamouring

electorate

ing a whole

depend ity to

had

been

to be fed

district,

enlarged,

upon patronage articulate and

MLCs'

alone. redress

juicy morsels and

with

prospects

a

lawyer,

him with

a communal

money~lender

and

constituencies

of re-election

They also depended on the grievances of the

Take the case of Ramalingam Chetti. Vellala sub-caste too thinly represented

provide

of patronage.

base

agent

the

cover-

did

an abilelectors.

purposes.

Coimbatore

mill-

owners he had extensive professional contacts, and his government posts had, temporarily, given him access to

system to

the

of influence. numerically

But

dominant

his

main

Gounder

not

He belonged to a in Coimbatore to

for electoral to

The

vote-winning community,

appeal

and

he

AS

local that

was

assidu-

ously cultivated the Gounders' support by attending caste conferences, identifying with their grievances on public platforms operation

giri

and in the legislature, and acting in with his fellow MLCs from Coimbatore,

Gounder

and

C.V.

Venkataramana

Iyengar.

close coV.C. Vellin-

Ramalingam

did not serve the Gounders slavishly — because of his mill interests he did not, for example, show the same enthusiasm

for khadi as Vellingiri — but, in view of the ministry's poor record on temperance and agricultural issues, Ramalingam's divorce from the Justicites was influenced by the dissatis-

faction of his electors.©

94 As soon as the new council met after the 1923 elections, Ramalinga Reddi moved a vote of no-confidence in Panagal's ministry. The motion was defeated by 65 votes to 43, but, as

the ers

opposition pointed out, only 44 of were elected MLCs and a government

rally

nominated

and

European

members

defeat of the no-confidence motion of tighter links among the various

contributed

to

the

formation

the ministry's supportwhip had been used to

behind

Panagal.*?

The

Nationalists

in

encouraged opposition

of

the

United

be

returned

the formation elements and

March 1924. But both the Swarajists and the non-Brahmin dissidents had reservations about the union. The Swarajists had to keep their commitments to the ideas and tactics of the

All-India

party

and

hoped

to

in

greater

numbers

at the next election, this time with full Congress support. The non-Brahmins remained true to what they termed "nonBrahmin interests", promising that they would pursue communal representation and after over-throwing the Justice ruling clique replace it by a new non-Brahmin ministry.°® There was little affection in the marriage and much suspicion, but there was enough mutual advantage for it to survive.

Fine

Speeches

in Decorated

Halls

The Government of Madras reported in 1927 that "the onetime professed Swarajist policy of consistent and continuous obstruction within the Councils had practically never been

pursued

in Madras".*°?

Essentially

broad

issues

constitutionalist

in out-

look, the Madras Swarajists were more anxious to dislodge the Justice Party than to wreck dyarchy. On the few occasions they did try obstruction they were either disowned by their embarrassed United Nationalist colleagues or successfully blocked by the government and its allies.

or

On

the

almost grants

tions civil

rights

national

of

Indians

— such

overseas

all the anti-ministerial attracted a profusion of

for the Governor's servants, intended

as

— the

provincial

Swarajists

autonomy

could

draw

MLCs into their lobby. Budget motions for cuts in alloca-

staff, for to impress

the the

police and senior taxpayer and harass

the ministry. But generally the United Nationalists would only move token cuts, of say Rs. 100 or a similar nominal sum; if the Swarajists pressed for a more substantial reduction they almost invariably did so alone. In March 1924, for example, Satyamurti moved for the omission of Rs. 2,00,000 from a Budget grant of Rs. 3,38,695 for the staff and household of the Governor. He used the opportunity to attack

Willingdon's appointment of a non-Brahmin ernment repression of the Congress during

ministry and govnon-cooperation.

95 The size of the proposed cut was, however, too large for the United Nationalists. When a poll was taken, only three Swarajist MLCs including Satyamurti voted for the motion, 23

United

Nationalists

the council

minor April India

were

opposed

neutral

it.®

and

Willingdon

the

great

majority

was prepared

of

to suffer

budget defeats, but Lord Gaschen*, his successor in 1924, used his powers under the 1919 Government of Act to restore grants or resubmit them to the council.

The

Swarajists

were

more

successful

in

using

points

of

procedure to ensnare ministers and executive councillors and to delay the business of the council. It was a tactic particularly suited to the position of the Madras Swarajists because even a few members could create considerable disruption. Satyamurti, who delighted in his own skill at repartee, excelled at this and on several occasions succeeded in infuriating members of the government. Favoured ploys

were the use of points of discussion of legislation ment

the

motions

on

tabling

of

matters

numerous

of

order to stop the introduction or the Swarajists opposed, adjourn"urgent

and

public

elaborate

importance",

questions

every sensitive area of the administration. questions were tabled in the second council,

the first,®!

and by early

1924

question

to

probe

Twice as 1923-26,

and

many as in

time was absorbing

nearly half the council's day as well as providing a fulltime occupation for bureaucrats who thought they had better work to do. The government responded by tightening council

procedure.

From

hour a day, ("starred")

August

1924

question

time

was

fixed

at

one

and from February 1925 only specially designated questions were answered in the council and open

for supplementary questions, replies to the rest being published directly in the proceedings.®* A time limit was also placed on speeches in major debates. The election of Justice

MLC,

vehement

in

in

1925

nothing

M.

led

to

to

Ruthnaswami,

further

their

prevent

as

president

to

these

restrictions.

objections

them.

The

of

the

council

Swarajists

changes,

but

were

could

a

late

do

Far from constitution-wrecking, the Swarajists and the United Nationalists revelled in the language and conventions

of

British

courtesies praise for

the

parliamentarianism.

There

were

the

customary

between members on opposing benches, the lavish a deceased MLC or a retiring executive councillor,

reverence

for

the

minutia

of

procedure

at

Westminister.

Satyamurti, whose fondness for self-advertisement his less attractive traits, was again conspicuous

respect.°' emulation

of

fitness

of

Opposition the

for

House

and ministerial

of

Commons

self-government

and

as

MLCs

itself

was one in this

alike regarded

a demonstration

responsibility,

and

the

of

96 Government of Madras, intent on making dyarchy a success, encouraged this. In 1922 the council's president and secretary visited Westminister to study parliamentary procedure

and almost

invariably

reference

was made

to practices

in the

Commons when questions of procedure were raised. It was, therefore, natural for the Swarajists to identify with the parliamentary atmosphere. It was not the Swarajists who had

captured

the

legislature,

tivated

the

Swarajists.

As

far

as

Tamilnad

but

was

the

legislature

concerned

two

whith

issues

cap-

dominated

the second council and they illustrate the sort of practical probiems the Swarajists faced. They were the Hindu Religious Endowments Act and the agitation against land resettlement in Tanjore.

Legislation

for

the

control

of Hindu

religious

endow-

ments, which were a major potential source for ministerial patronage, had been inhibited before 1920 by the British reluctance to interfere in religious matters. With the ad-

vent

of elected

The enormous teries along

ministers

in

1920

this

wealth and influence of with the power Brahmins

the endowments an obvious Religious Endowments Bill

target for was passed

obstacle

the Justicites. in March 1923 at

It attracted

was

before

rushed

consulted

but

not

through

exclusively,

the

council

and because

it was

from

thought

removed.

Hindu temples and derived from them

close of the first council.“ ism, mainly,

was

the

widespread

Brahmins,

public

opinion

unnecessarily

monasmade

A Hindu the

critic-

because

had

been

it

vindictive:

"a pernicious measure" T. Rangachari called it.*® The Swarajists opposed the bill and demanded its amendment or repeal in their election manifestos. Swarajya called the Justice Party a "Colossus bestriding the Presidency with one foot

firmly

implanted

in

the

mutts

[monasteries]

and

temples

the other in the local and district boards".® The

Governor

had

his

own

reservations

about

the

and

bill

and

sent it back to the legislature for revision. It was unsuccessfully opposed by the Swarajists and some of the other United Nationalists. Questions then arose as to the legality of the second council amending a measure inherited from the first council, and the bill was resubmitted in 1925. It did not pass through all its stages before the second council was

dissolved for the

the

and

so

it

again

featured

in

the

election

campaign

the third council in 1926. Srinivasa Iyengar, by 1926 Tamil Swarajist leader, declared his complete aversion

bill

and

attributed

Swarajist

public opposition to it.°” Naidu,

Ramaswami

Naicker

and

success

in the

On the other hand, Kalyanasundara

election

Varadarajulu

Mudaliar

to

to

supported

97 the legislation and accused its opponents of Brahmin alism. The bill finally became law in 1927. The

Bill

agitation

illuminates

Firstly,

it

against

two

showed

the

the

facets

Hindu

of

party

the

as

Religious

Swarajya

an

agency

commun-

Endowments

Party

in Tamilnad.

through

which

Brahmins tried to protect their interests in provincial politics. This necessarily hampered closer association with the

non-Brahmin United Nationalists and offended non-Brahmin Congressmen. Secondly, the Swarajists, operating within the framework of electoral politics had to collect all the pro-

vincial

grievances

party's

had

to

funds issue

they

strength.

be

weighed

that

would

in the

immediate struggle

and

hasten

grievance

against

the

To a greater

were:

ryotwari

could

1926

delay

the

Party.

than

by

communal

a

increase

votes

to

but

it

and The

replace

the

permanent

temple

was

exploit

their

support

and

The bill

not

was

an

an

in

legislation

the debates Madras.

legislature

resettlements

swaraj,

to

non-Brahmin

Brahmin

Swarajists

Justice

extent

in order

losing

elections.

or

for

of

valuable

land dominated legislature in

the

find

danger

against

1923

government, the dyarchy

could

The

their

or

local

questions of primary issues

periodic

settlement

and

could

the legislature assume the right to dictate the nature of land taxation? MLCs demanded a change from the reassessment of ryotwari land every 30 years to a permanent settlement in

the belief

that

this

would

share of the profit from resolution for permanent 1921,

issue

and

the

was

committee

referred

leave

the

cultivator

his own labour settlement was

of

MLCs

and

recommended

the

a fairer

and improvements. A carried in December

officials

to

revolutionary

which

the

change

of

giving the legislature the power to dictate future increases in the assessment rates. On the issue of permanent settlement the committee was divided.® The

government

rejected

the

report's

allow

either

recommendations

and

in August 1922 announced the enhancement of land revenue rates in the Tanjore and Trichinopoly districts by as much as 18 per cent on dry lands and 25 per cent on wet. Sir Arthur Knapp, the

Home

Member,

legislature

refused

to contest

to

the new rates.’”°

ened civil disobedience if the new rates but for the present they concentrated on

of

the

spokesmen

Swarajists

elections,

in

to

the

could

Tanjore

legislature.

field

they

pledged to reduce or abolish for permanent settlement.”!

Unlike

the

were not securing

most

only one candidate

ran

the Two

three

mtrasdars

The mirasdare

candidates

the

threat-

modified, the election

districts

in the who

or

1923

were

where

enhancements and to agitate Swarajists were elected;

98 the third seat went to a pro-Swarajist Vellala mtrasdar, S. Muthiah Mudaliar.* On 14 December 1923 Muthiah Mudaliar moved

a

resolution

enue rates assessment

narrowly

in

the

legislature

that

the

enhanced

rev-

of

the

ministerial

for Tanjore should not be introduced until a new policy had been formulated, but his proposal was

defeated

by

the

combined

and

nominated

members.7?

ive

The government held and asserted that the

votes

that the new rates were not excessagitation was "primarily political

in character". After Knapp had the mirasdars in February 1924,

rejected a second appeal fron many of them began to despair

meeting

of March

of

achieving

not to by the

at

redress

through

Mayavaram

at

constitutional

the

end

channels.7?

mirasdare

a

resolved

pay the April revenue instalment. They were encouraged difficulty the government experienced in disposing of

property

attached

from

earlier

defaulters,

by Knapp's

admission that for the present 18 per cent ing for land revenue increases, and by the of his thrown

At

hastily-drafted out on 28 March

public

would be the ceilignominious defeat

Madras Land Revenue Settlement Bill, 1924 by a legislature which demanded

full control over resettlement.” But the mirasdare were not the intrepid satyagrahis the nationalist press exhorted them to be. Their lands, among the richest in the presidency,

were too valuable to gamble with and by the end of April kist (instalment of revenue) payments were up to 75 per cent of the demand.7> A proposal by Congress zealots for mass civil disobedience was rejected by a mirasdars' conference at Mannargudi on 18-19 May; so was a suggestion that the local

mirasdars' But,

August

as

tation

the

1924

association mirasdars

the

quickly The

should

highest

died

merge

wavered,

rates

agitation

the

Tanjore DCC. 7°

government

were

away.7’

resettlement

with

the

scaled

had

down

a dual

relented.

and

In

the

agi-

importance.

On

its negative side it demonstrated the weakness of the Swarajists and their allies in the legislature against the combined votes

of

the

ministerial

and

official

members.

If

the

constitution-

al path were blocked, there was little the Swarajists would, or could, do for their electors. Neither the Swarajist MLCs nor the majority of mirasdars were prepared for a confront-

ation

with

confiscation

On

the

nection

the

of

government

positive

between

property

side, the

the

which

and

would

might

Swarajists

Congress

and

involve

still

the

had

result

imprisonment

revived

in

the

ests.

the

Swarajya

Most

party

was

significantly,

a

watchdog

the

old

wealthier

landlords.

only

Brahmin

Although many leading mirasdars were Brahmins, the of Vellalas like Muthiah Mudaliar weakened Justice that

failure.

Swarajists

for

had

and

con-

involvement criticisms

placed

inter-

the

99 Congress

in

the

forefront

of

the

ing landholding system. And campaign with constitutional

agitation

against

the

exist-

they followed up their Tanjore activity on behalf of the other

landholders and tenants elsewhere in the Madras Presidency, while, by default the Justice Party, its voice muted by collab-

oration

with

the

Raj,

of the mirasdars A Hopeless played

At

and

Basis

appeared

ryots.

for a Party

the beginning of a straightforward

anti-constitutionalists. oppose the Congress and,

dyarchy,

to

demonstrate

over non-cooperation limits of the Madras the exception of the stable a ministry as as

the

only

game

far

less

active

in

the

interests

System

the dyarchy period Willingdon had game of constitutionalists versus

He relied on the Justicites to by their successful working of

the

superiority

of

parliamentarianism

and civil disobedience. Within the game, Willingdon was successful: with Punjab, no province had produced as Madras. But Willingdon did not see this

for

a Governor

to

play.

Indeed,

the

success

of the first game engendered a second type of contest, this time playing off one constitutionalist group against another. At the time of the no-confidence motion in the Legislative Council in November 1923 Willingdon had advised the European and the

nominated Secretary

MLCs to support Panagal, but, so of State, if a similar situation

he informed occurred he

would not intervene even if it meant the fall of the ministry.” The election of Swarajists in 1923 and the creation of the United Nationalists did not alarm him because he believed that in In time

Tories,

ition

Madras the they would

and

after

the Radicals

Swarajists were not constitution-wreckers. emerge as Radicals against the Justice

three

might

years

cooling

be ready

their

heels

in

for office.”

oppos-

It was left for Lord Goschen, as Willingdon's successor, to supervise the second game. This was to be a fairly evenly matched bout following the Queensbury rules of constitution-

alism and with Goschen appearing as Willingdon's role of trainer in the He

the

In undertaking

sought

to replace

non-Brahmin

inter-communal

this

the

role

Justicites

parties

Goschen

communal

with

and

referee Justice

had

division

their

several

Brahmin

contrasting

rather than corner.

he had been tradition. Willingdon

motives

in Madras

opponents

progressive

servative programs. Goschen was the eldest Unionist and had been an MP for 10 years.

in

between

and

by

two

con-

son of a Liberal Like Willingdon,

educated in Westminister's powerful parliamentary He understood the reasons which impelled

to

appoint

a

non-Brahmin

ministry,

but

he

was

100

anxious to create a two-party requisite

for

were his of State

system,

the development

that presumed

of a healthy

superiors. Witness Lord for India in May 1924:

pre-

legislature.

Olivier, Labour's "A communal basis

So

Secretary may be a

necessary transitional expedient, but it is one of kinds of bases possible for National Parliamentary

the worst insti-

tutions".®° Or the Conservatives' Lord Birkenhead in July 1927: "It always seemed to me obvious that the Brahmin-nonBrahmin division was a hopeless basis for a party system.. .""8!

Goschen knew what was expected of him.°? depend

It

was, in addition, exclusively on the

disadvantageous Justice Party.

for the Raj During non-

to

cooperation such dependence had been necessary to combat Congress, but with non-cooperation defeated and with the

Justice

Party

pushful

servant.

was

time

1923

ever

hungry

for the master Sir

and court

Willingdon,

tributing

C.P.

favourite

was

alleged

appointments

for

more

to reassert

patronage

Ramaswami

of Goschen

by

the

his

and

Aiyar,

Law

as he had

Justice

power,

independence

Member

been

ministers

and promotions

in the gift

to

the it

of the

since

of

be

dis-

of the

reserved half to Brahmins and to be conspiring with the Brahmin Swarajists to overthrow the Justice ministry. Goschen dismissed such allegations as part of the Justicites' perpet-

ual

feud

with

patronage.®*

the

Brahmins

and their

ceaseless

quest

A report drafted by the Government

for

of Madras

in 1926 complained that "the main interference during the past three years was that attempted by the Ministers in regard

civil

be

ial

to

patronage

servants

taught

office

that

alike it

and

did

was

them

tional system, of dyarchy, to

then

not

reserved

that

have

the an

side..."°*

Justice

automatic

into

and

active

civil

was

right

disobedience.

participation

in the

and, by inducing them to moderate the nationalist

share in movement

evidence

the

constitutionalism.

There

Governor

leadership to

had

in

1925-26

that

and

to

minister-

it was time to press on with the grand prepared. Congressmen had been forced

non-cooperation

to lure

the

felt

its perquisites.

And, finally, scheme Montagu had

abandon

on

to

Now

the

task

the and

running streng-

constitu-

Congress

in

Madras would participate in Goschen's game. The majority of the United Nationalists formally joined the Congress on the eve of the 1926 elections and they constituted the largest element among the Congress MLCs returned. As their origins and their performance in the second council indicated, the United Nationalists were not ottt to destroy dyarchy but to

slip

into

the Justicites'

chairs.

In

late

1925

and early

1926

101 they negotiated with the leaders of the Responsivists, a splinter group of Swarajists who had rejected "non-cooperation through the legislatures" for "responsive cooperation".®> Until

he

resigned

from

Vice-Chancellor Reddi,

the

of

United

the

the

legislature

new

Andhra

Nationalists'

in

March

1926

University,

most

C.

to

become

Ramalinga

articulate

spokesman,

openly favoured responsivism. The Swarajists had, he pointed out in December 1925, promised to reduce land taxation and to end corruption in local government, and "once you promise redress of such grievances,. how can you taboo office as something unclean?"®* The death of C.R. Das in June 1925, following the failure of the Swarajists to paralyse dyarchy in Bengal,

fied

favoured

cooperation. Strong

the

United

Madras.

posed

though

tactical

shift

the

of

Nationalists

Srinivasa

pull

decided

Iyengar,

the Responsivists

Nationalists

ambitions

joined

the

Iyengar

majorities

to

TNCC

in Madras

was,

to

that

would

and other

quali-

all

Swarajists

publicly

if the United have

however,

if the

to

almost

the

president,

they

In private, that

obstruction

cling

insisted

Congress

hinted

from

responsivism

the

and

of office.°’

Rangaswami

tial

a

Congress

to

provinces

in

op-

renounce

Srinivasa won

in

and

substan-

1926

the

party would change its policy and take office.°* Srinivasa Iyengar hoped that a Congress electoral landslide would force from the British enough concessions to justify a more respon-

sive

the

policy

by the Congress,

party,

he

would

be

in

and,

as the president-elect

a position

to

direct

it.

For

part, the United Nationalists wanted the electoral asset the name and organization of the Congress, which at its

of

their of

Cawnpore session in December 1925 had officially adopted the Swarajist program. They knew, too, that incorporation within

the Congress and temporary renunciation of office was better than a three-cornered contest in which the Justice Party would be likely to win against a divided Congress and Responsivist opposition. It was, C.V.S. Narasimha Raju told the Responsivist

leaders,

parties of

In the

the

elections

Congress

effective ing his

was

campaigning

the Congress anced

"absolutely

necessary"

in Madras.©

won

party's

in

in November the

and

urban

party

a large measure

candidates

the interests

in

1926

to

have

the

involvement

Tamilnad

of the principal

two

greatest

constituencies,

of rural

only

in

strength

but

through

agrarian

support.

Srinivasa

communities

issues

In select-

Iyengar

bal-

in the con-

stitutency — by choosing a VelJala and a Vanniyar in Chingleput, for example, running two Vellalas and a Brahmin in Tanjore, and seeking a prominent Gounder to contest in

Coimbatore

or Salem.

But

the choice

of candidates

was

small.

102 Fach

non-Muhammadan

from

40,000

with

a total

smaller

constituency

population

to

and

75,000

had

stituencies

in

most

voters.

fewer

The

voters.

incorporated

covered

cases

several

a whole

of over

urban

The

district,

1,500,000

and

Christian

con-

constituencies

Muslim

and

districts

or

towns;

a

were few

strayed over linguistic boundaries. Thus, to win a seat a candidate had to be a man of exceptional wealth and influence, or such a person's protege. Such men were few and it was not, therefore,

1926

were

MLCs.

previous had

Of

former the

the

in

1926

old

elected

been

many

United

MLCs

MLCs.°°

than

Composition

Congress

Nationalist 1926,

Party

51

lines

years,

a new

TABLE

Party

the

10 of the

in previous

rather

of

in

in Tamilnad

than

pack

that

Justice,

98

council;

previously

drawn of

surprising

deck.

had

but

were

11

Total

98

were

in

22 nominated

the

132-member

According to the government's figures Congress was the largest single party, but

third

of the

shrunk to ents were antipathy

ministry

the

number

1926

of seats.

The

MLCs

legis-

(Table 3), the held less than

Justice

Party

had

a

21 MLCs, but many of those described as Independformer Justicites who in view of Goschen's known to the party had cpted for neutrality until a new

was

an ambitious in

total

candidates

clearly

36 21

of elected MLCe

lature.*!

the

reshuffling

Legislature, 41

there

of

3

of the Madras

officials

in

more

it was

Congress

In addition

Independent

sat

24 Congress

Independents Justice

and

and

candidates

formed.

Governor

legislature.

As

in

free

1920,

the

election

to dictate

the

results

balance

left

of power

On 22 November 1926 Goschen invited Narasimha Raju, as leader of the Congress party in the legislature, to form a

ministry.

for the

two

Narasimha

days

election

gestions

in which

results

was

had

by Congressmen

"very

anxious"

to consult been

that

his

announced

the

to

do

so,

but

there

had

been

party.°*

party

take

As

office

soon

asked

as

sug-

rather

103 than "waste its years in futile opposition".°? But Congressmen in the council and outside it agreed that a Congress

ministry

could

not

be

formed

the AICC or the annual

without

the prior

Congress.°*

approval

Narasimha

of

Raju returned

to Goschen on 24 November to regret that the party could not form a ministry because the Congress forbad its members to take

he

if

office.

and

at

least

Goschen

Gauhati

He

would

a month

This

keep

the

wait

until

the

other

later

Goschen

extremists of

however,

15

before not

impress

them

Congress

open

and

like

forming

his

annual

do.

He

the

to

form

that

that

a ministry

Congress

session

at

ministry.°° that

the

mod-

Madras

mem-

could not constitute a great blow to the

that

responsivists".

by asserting

Governor

regretted

demonstrated

were

on

would

the

the Congress party it would have been

among

game

MLCs

could

erate elements in ministry "because bers

did,

the

©

the

He

did,

election

a

however,

verdict

had

gone against the Panagal ministry and by refusing to include the former ministers in the new ministry. °” He turned to

the amorphous, acephalous Independents and together his ministerial team. Subbarayan

Chief

R.N.

Minister

Arogyaswami

Ranganatha,

a

with

A.

Ranganatha

Mudaliar,

former

an

government

Mudaliar

Indian

servant

from them pieced was appointed from

Christian as

the

Bellary,

and,

Second

like

and

and

Third Ministers. The choice of Subbarayan as Chief Minister was an interesting one, particularly in view of Goschen's

aim of drawing Gounder

Dublin

tice in Central

the Congress

zamindar,

before

qualifying

United

had

as

responsivism. studied

a barrister

A 37-year-oid

at Madras,

and

setting

Oxford

up

and

prac-

Madras. Since 1920 he had been returned by the South Landholders constituency which mustered less than 60

electors. Although he had and left the Justice Party gress

into

Subbarayan

Nationalist

in

stituents.

1926,

He

leaders,

presumably had,

resigned as in 1922 and Subbarayan

not

however,

wishing

been

a council secretary had been among the

did

to

not

join

antagonize

a Congressmen

until

the

his

Con-

con-

the

Calcutta Congress and was a close friend of Rajagopalachari. One critic described him as an opportunist with a "secondclass brain", who was in the legislature "because it was easy for him to be there".°® But opportunism and mediocrity were common

enough

struct

a new ministerial

position was originality.

Acceptance

in

the

council

and

Subbarayan's

amiable

dis-

some compensation for his lack of resolution and He was a figure around whom Goschen could con-

of Office

party.

no Crime

For many Tamil Congressmen the a convenient short-term solution to

Independent ministry was the Swarajists' dilemma.

104 It excluded the Justice Party from office while placing ministerial power in the hands of men less communal and nationalistic than their predecessors. If the ministry

more dis-

appointed the Congress or if the Congress at Gauhati lifted the ban on office, the Congress MLCs could vote it out. "We shall

break

it",

boasted

Satyamurti,

"but

how

we

shall

break

it and when is for us to determine'.°? Even when the Congress met and decided to keep the ban, the confidence of the Congressmen

that they

remained

were

masters

undiminished.

of

the

Madras

situation

Rajagopalachari was one of the ministry's principal backers. It kept the Brahmin Swarajists from the temptation of ministerial office, a necessary precaution against a new

outbreak

of anti-Brahminism,

and

it encouraged

non-Brahmins

to discard the narrow communalism of the Justice leadership.°° No less significantly, the ministry allowed Rajagopalachari to make his own legislative experiments. He persuaded Subbarayan to take up the cause of prohibition and threaten

to resign

if the progress

Rajagopalachari, ion

were

achieved

were it

of a Prohibition

blocked

would

by

be

the

Bill,

drafted

Governor.

a worthwhile

by

If prohibit-

reform;

if

it

were

not,- the futility of working dyarchy at all might be demonstrated and a situation created favourable for a resumption

of civil disobedience. !°! in

Other

Congressmen

keeping

had

Subbarayan

in

contribution

which

had

off

of patronage

different

office.

starved

the

The

ideas

of

the

exorbitant

transferred

advantages

provincial

departments

of

funds since 1920 were now being remitted — 57 lakhs in March 1926, 167 lakhs a year later — thus offering the ministers a unique opportunity to implement constructive reforms. '°? The MLCs of all parties had spent too lavishly on the elections to wish to see the council dissolved and a new election held, the outcome of which was unpredictable.!°? And some Congressmen hoped that keeping Subbarayan in power would not only cut the the

the

a case the

its

1927,

did

with

flow

to Justicites

Congressmen. 0 Since the Subbarayan ministry seemed

of

A

government

spoilt

Justice

former A.

not

child,

Party

by

proxy.

suddenly

resorted

position.’°5

Ramaswami

"desire"

its "present

or

to

In‘an

Mudaliar

"even

s:.ength

Congress the best

deprived

tantrums

editorial

announced

contemplate"

but

also

divert

it to

could not take office. alternative. It was

of

and

parental

threats

in Justice

that

the

forming

in the council..."

favour, to

on

Justice

regain

9 March Party

a ministry

1

Other

Justice leaders criticized dyarchy as unworkable — despite their obvious success in having worked it for six years —

105 and

called

wreck

the

1927

the

ministry

on

the

Congress

constitution.

Justicites

and

asked

moved

MLCs

to

During

the

fulfil

budget

a no-confidence

the Congress

to support

their

pledges

debates

motion

to

of March

against

them.

The

the

Justice

and Congress votes together might be enough to oust Subbarayan, but, while the ban on office-holding by the Congress remained,

the

alternative

would

be

a

Justice

or

a

reorganized

Independent ministry backed by the Justice Party. Neither would be as favourable to the Congress as the existing ministry. S. Venkatachelam Chetti,* who had replaced Narasimha Raju as Congress leader in the legislature after the latter's election

as

Iyengar

president

giving

his

own

to take

office

prevent

the Justice

Congress

of

the

opinion

wasabluff.

MLCs

to

S.

Muthiah

consulted

that

Srinivasa

abstain

from

the

Mudaliar

Srinivasa

Justice

Iyengar

promise

advised

to office. !°”

ministry facade.

of

the

no-confidence

Party returning

By these tactics the appearing in the Congress by

council,

was One

Tanjore,

vote

not

the

so

as

to

saved, but cracks were breakaway group, heade

wanted

to

dismiss

the

care-

taker ministry and take office regardless of the Congress ban; another, consisting mainly of Telugu and Malayali MLCs resentful of the control exercised by Srinivasa Iyengar and his Tamil

associates,

that

the

Justicites

constitutional party's

tactics

leader.

wanted

would

crisis came,

As an Andhra

the

not

would

ministry

form

result.

however,

defeated

a new

The main

from

in

ministry

Prakasam,

patriot,

as an ambitious

been

consequence

the

belief

and

so

attack the

a

on the

Telugu

politician

jealous of the rise of Rajagopalachari and Srinivasa Iyengar to the highest levels in the national Congress, Prakasam seized the chance to condemn the opportunism and cynicism

which

he believed

had

the

of Congress

support

for the Independent ministry. "Congressmen", he explained in a statement published on 20 May 1927, "were found at the doors of some ministers at all hours of the day and night waiting .to get some of their own men nominated for taluq and district

boards

and

some

other

favours". !°¢

At the request of Telugu and Malayali MLCs Prakasam, the Congress Working Committee in May

explanation

of the

conduct

of the

legislative

egged on by called for an

party

in Madras.

On the basis of explanations by Venkatachelam Chetti and his deputy, Satyamurti, Srinivasa Iyengar as Congress president steered through the CWC a resolution absolving the Congress leadership in the council from any blame. There had, it said, been "no possibility of wrecking dyarchy" in Madras at the time of the no-confidence motion in March; indeed, the party

had

"done

thening

all

of the

that

lay

in its power

bureaucracy

by

means

to prevent of an

the

alliance

strengof

the

:

106 bureaucracy

with

communalism

a party

and

to

whose

repress

securing office..."

avowed

policy

nationalism

1¥9

Prakasam was furious partisan behaviour of the

for

is

to promote

the

at wnat he believed Congress president.

purpose

of

to be the In speeches

in Madras he denounced Srinivasa Iyengar and his henchmen, and called for the overthrow of Subbarayan and the destruct-

ion

of dyarchy.

who

for

excitable

Telugu,

his

leadership called for

Srinivasa Congress 1927, by In

own

of an

He

was

and

by

ends

joined R.K.

was

by

trying

to

as

president

secretary deferred the which time it lad been July

1927

the

Although

leadership contributed the instigators of its

non-Brahmin

Sambamurti,

foment

Srinivasa Iyengar. The AICC meeting to discuss

Iyengar

Coimbatore.

B.

Shanmugham

and

Congressmen

of

Coimbatore,

hostility

to

the

Telugus and Malayalis the CWC's verdict, but

A.

Rangaswami

lyengar

as

meeting until late October overtaken by new developments.

Non-Brahmin

the

another

Chetti*

Confederation

frustration

felt

by

met

the

at

Justice

to the surly mood of the conference, most controversial resolutions were

or

recent

defectors

from

the

Congress

— Shanmugham Chetti, Ramaswami Naicker, V. Chakkarai Chetti and Varadarajulu Naidu. The first resolution urged Justicites to join the Congress so as to swamp its Brahmin element and convert it to a non-Brahmin party; the second condemned dyarchy as unworkable and declared that the Justice Party

would

not

take

office

until

provincial

duced; the third, which was not passed, Aiyar as Law Member of having contrived

Justice

Party

Aiyar's

enter

stooge,

Had

the

in

1926

and,

demanded

Justicites

the Congress,

the

attacking

the

recall

taken

Tamil

seriously

was

intro-

accused Ramaswami the defeat of the

Goschen

of

Congress

autonomy

the

the

might

as

Ramaswami

Governor.

}!°

resolution

well

have

to

suddenly assumed a more non-Brahmin character; certainly the responsivist elements within the party would have been strengthened. Dr Irschick assumes that a non-Brahmin influx

did occur and that the conversion of the Tamil Congress from a predominantly Brahmin to an overwhelmingly non-Brahmin organization was a consequence of the Coimbatore resolution. }!? There is no evidence to support this assumption. Congressmen feared

a Justice

flood,

but

be no more than a trickle."

were

relieved

Not a single

when

it

proved

to

leading Justicite

resurfaced in the Congress at this time, nor was the policy and leadership of the Tamil Congress noticeably altered as a result. The increasingly non-Brahmin character of the Congress after 1927 — especially from 1930 — had more fundamental causes: the second generation of western-educated and

107 middle-class non-Brahmins no longer clung to the protection of the communal safeguards and organizations of their elders, and from the late 1920s the Congress was more successful in making

appeals

The

were

to

the

immediate

to

make

Goschen

interests

consequences even

more

of

the

non-Brahmins.

of

the

Coimbatore

hostile

and more determined than ever to igned dyarchy constitution. His

were

issues

irresponsible

and

to

the

make a success suspicion that

blinkered

from

by communalism and patronage

resolutions

Justice

seeking

Party

of the malthe Justicites

larger political

was confirmed.}!?

The

Justice leaders were themselves divided as to the wisdom of the resolutions. Some of the younger non-Brahmins were en-

thusiastic, but openly hostile,

K.V. Reddi Naidu, the former minister, was and Panagal, though he did not criticize the

resolutions in public, attempted a private reconciliation with Goschen. The resolutions also threatened the party's main source of the threat not

income — the zamindars, to work dyarchy.1!*

who

were

alarmed

at

The Coimbature resolutions were no less embarrassing Srinivasa Iyengar and his associates. They no longer had

excuse his

to

own

keep

convictions,

confidence It

was

the

motion

Independent

Venkatachelam

against

defeated.

ministry

With

the

the

ministry

votes

of

and Independent MLCs whose loyalty generous distribution of patronage

ly been nominated

67

votes

to

4 others).'5

the

freed himself Congressman's

Once

1919

With

again

dyarchy

1926 come

local

boards

Goschen's

56

the

and

to

suggest

further

Government

of

India

Act,

was

23

Against

a no-

August

nominated,

Congress, support

Congress.

which

1927.

official

14

survived

Justice

Subbarayan

He

was

by

in the

had

constitutional

steps.

This time it was by the Indian Statutory Cominvestigate the working

been speculating on the under the provisions of not

and

the

politics

become, was shaken. 8 November 1927 of an by Sir John Simon, to

Congressmen in Tamilnad had of such a commissicn which,

moved

— the ministry

(38

active

the kaleidoscope,

on

office.

had been stiffened by a — about 16 MLCs had recent-

from dependence on the caretaker no longer.

legislature had announcement on mission, headed of

to

opposition's

Chetti

in

to an

scheduled

Since

outthe

until

1929.

constitutional

reme-

Varadarajulu Naidu had seen the commission as an argument in favour of Congressmen taking office, reasoning that Congress ministers would best be able to point out to the commission

the

limitations

dies.'¥

shattered

At

of dyarchy

But the hopes

by the

a stroke

the

and

propose

which many Congressmen

appointment

Secretary

of

of an "all-white" State,

Lord

had were

committee.

Birkenhead,

had

108

offended the

politicians

preparation

At the

December joint

of all

of

their

annual

1927,

resolution

session

Besant

parties

own

of the Congress

returned

with

by excluding

them

constitution.

Srinivasa

to

active

Iyengar

from

at Madras

politics

in

to

deploring

move

the

a

Secretary of State's "utter disregard of India's right of self-determination" and pledging Congressmen to boycott the

Commission.'!”?

For once the Justice Party marched

"The

may

with

the

Congress.

Commission

Governors

Justice come,

and European

on

27

tour

November

the

1927

country,

Associations

and

in step

warned

dine

that

with

go back.

Indians

will have neither share nor part in such a Commission". 12° On

the

25

January

legislature

1928

a resolution

with

opposing

the commission

in

any

its

cooperation

existing

by

form was

carried in the Madras Legislative Council by a majority of 32. Among the 12 MLCs who abstained were the Second and Third Ministers and the Raja of Panagal.!!°

The adverse vote on the Simon Commission forced Goschen to rethink his tactics. The game was not going as he had expected.

True,

there

was

Simon

Commission

to

the

still

the

Justice

hope

ministerial

of at

party,

there

Justice

parties

would

reached

Madras.

Such

but

also

to obstruct

was

Party

had

with

the

least

but

a danger

join

hands

the work an

some

been

Congress outcry

that

not

dethroned

only

might

MLCs defecting

against

the

the Congress to

oust

of the commission

outcome

and

be

and

Subbarayan

when

disastrous

it

for

dyarchy; certainly, it would damage Goschen's political career. Frantically, the Governor set about shoring up Subbarayan's ministry. "It is very necessary", he had written to Birkenhead in November 1927, "that the Ministry... should be made a steadying force at the present mo.rent". !*° the

He refused to accept Subbarayan's offer to resign over Simon Commission vote, but the Chief Minister had made

himself unpopular with the commission without

his own party by issuing a welcome consulting other Independent MICs.

to

Ranganatha Mudaliar, the Second Minister, was a Theosophist and a long-standing follower of Besant and he urged the Independents to join in the boycott of the commission.

Arogyaswami

Mudaliar,

his more purposeful post

‘was not On

in

2 March

the

Third

colleague,

jeopardy. 1928

But

Minister,

was

believing

that

it was.

Venkatachelam

Chetti,

drawn

along

by

his ministerial

encouraged

by

the

split within the ministerial party, introduced a no-confidence motion, the third against the ministry in 18 months. By what

the Hindu described introduced

his

motion

as "astonishing before

many

of

laxity", the

Venkatachelam.

Congress

MLCs

were

109 present

in

approval

the

of a third

for moving

at

this

offer

Ministers

failure

reversal

on

of the of

ministers

no

MLCs. He compelled

the

reshuffling the

and,

fortune,

Law

them

against

therefore,

same

juncture

occurred.

the

Membership,

the

overjoyed

Subbarayan's

and

he

Third

regarded

cooperation concluded

with

that

the

of a majority

intended

himself

as

a bluff,

out

Goschen

opportunity

considered

for

political

Aiyar's

appointing

Subbarayan's

laid

lawyers

a

cold.'?°

of Madras

and

ministry

divided,“assailed

sheet

below

began

and

Congressmen

startled

a clean

House

tenure a

far been a Brahmin preserve. He it would be foolish to offend the from the Cabinet, and he promoted Venkatarama Sastri, to the post, portfolio to Muhammad Usman, Home

Council.

and

in the

Government

Government

Brahmin

of

resign, but they felt resignations that

Goschen which had

by

the

to a

the

to resign if the portfolio were not restored. refused to give way, accepted the resignation

advised

Executive

the

proportion

as tantamount

of Ramaswami

had

win

protested

in

the

that

to

Venkatarama

was

of

aside

Second

confidence

end

Goschen

Goschen,

motion

he

a second

At

non-Brahmin to what had so had, however, decided that Brahmins by excluding them the Advocate-General, T.R. but transferred the police

Member

the

votes

requisite

brushed

informed

enjoyed

six

the

and summoned vote

by

sort.'?)

no-confidence

earlier

longer

council,

of this

He

latest

failed

did not actually ask them to to do so and handed in their

evening. }?? of

good

7 March.

the

it

of the

to resign

Commission,

At

and

a resolution

unexpected

second

Simon

council,

could

his

of writing

the

not

Venkatarama

red,

political last

by Justicites

and

to

threaten

Sastri

paper

embossed

on

longer,

Congressmen.

been

found

his

crest

arithmetic

much

and

desk

of

the

anew.

internally

The

Justice

the

new

Party had to be won back to collaboration and to dyarchy. The Justicites had coveted the patronage Ramaswama Aiyar had exercised as Law Member, and Venkatarama Sastri's impetuous

folly

Member

was M.

Goschen's Krishnan

opportunity.

Nair,

He

a Justicite

one of the few Justice leaders the Coimbatore resolutions and

appointed from

as

Malabar

who

to dissociate themselves to express a willingness

had

Law

been

from to

work with the Simon Commission. Keeping Subbarayan as Chief Minister, Goschen appointed as Second and Third Ministers S. Muthiah Mudaliar from Tanjore and M.R. Sethuratnam Aiyar of

in

Trichinopoly,

1926

and

voted

both

of

against

whom

had

run

cooperation

on

the

with

Congress

the

ticket

commission

in

January. Goschen made his conditions clear: the ministers were not to hinder the work of the Simon Commission and they were to work dyarchy. They agreed. !2# In reply to accusations

110 that

he

had

betrayed

Sethuratnam

in

the

shrugged

Council

of an office

and

in

the

Congress

his

cooperate

in

its

his

and

electors,

said:

"Once

working,

the

sin or crime".!*°

protested

formation

and

shoulders

is no great

The Hindu

part

the

that

of

for

political

Goschen

"to

groups

to

we

are

acceptance

take

sustain

an active parti-

cular individuals in power is an improper exercise of gubernatorial influence and patronage."**© Improper perhaps, but effective.

When

yet

another

no-confidence

motion

was

flung

at the ministry on 20 March it was repulsed by a majority of 23. One of the casualties of the crisis was Rajagopalachari's Prohibition Bill. Despite promises made by the ministers to

sponsor prohibition prohibition was not

Mudaliar

"shameful

reached Even

petty

the

legislation, Subbarayan now declared feasible, a view repeated by Muthiah

as

Excise

Minister.

the

lowest

depths

betrayal",

cleanest

intrigues

commented

of

non-party

Rajagopalachari, bitterly:

intrigue

issue

cannot

over offices".'*’

the

experience

led

him

"Party

politics

at

this

have

self-seeking...

be

steered

Rajagopalachari's

experiment in legislative politics the next two years he continued to schemes,

and

furious

that

clear

first

had failed. Although press his prohibition

to

conclude

that

only

of

for

under

a constitution which provided at least provincial autonomy for India would it be possible to carry out such far-reaching reforms. But

The

patched-up

the

real

barque

victor

of

of

the

Subbarayan's

coup was

ministry

not Goschen

or

sailed

on.

Subbarayan,

but Panagal. From the low ebb of the 1926 elections and the shoals of the Coimbatore conference, Panagal had rescued his party. Goschen had been forced to turn back to the Justicites when the crisis over the Simon Commission showed the impossibility of substituting the Congress as the dominant conStitutionalist party. Changes in the procedure of the

commission announced in mid-1928 were seized upon as a justification for the reversal of the Justice Party's earlier hostility to the commission. In September a committee of the Madras

legislature

was

set

up

to

cooperate

with

the

Commission.!?°

In personal terms, Panagal's triumph was short-lived. He died on 16 December 1928. Among the candidates for the party leadership was Subbarayan who hoped to merge his supporters,

including

his

Brahmin

Third

Minister,

with

the Justice

group.

But the Justice Party was cial legislature and with

now the major force in the provinan election scheduled for the end

office

and

of

1929,

demand

its

without that

leaders

the

were

Subbarayan party

open

confident its

without

of

being

having

membership

to

returned

to

bow

to

Brahmins.

to

his

When

lll the non-Brahmin Subbarayan lost

of

Chittoor,

Confederation met at Nellore in October to a compromise candidate, B. Muniswami

in

the

The dilemma.

year 1929 Personal

lature.

Dyarchy

dized the

the

last

Justice

contest

party

leader.

brought a deepening of the Swarajists' rivalries and communal bitterness jeopar-

semblance

Party

for

1929, Naidu

had

of

not

were

party

been

unity

within

destroyed

reviving.

and

Congressmen

the

the

legis-

fortunes

canvassed

of

vari-

ous schemes which might allow their party to take office in Madras if they secured a majority in the elections scheduled for later in the year. The events of the past three years demonstrated

suffice

to

ramshackle

that

nothing

exclude

coalition

"There

was

no

lature

without

the

less

than

Justicites

of

the

meaning",

a Congress

and

to

Congress

Party

Venkatachelam

ministry

keep

Chetti

in

would

together the

the

council.

remarked

in

May 1929, "in a man getting married with a view to follow celibacy"; there was no sense in sitting in the legis-

jists'

being able to take office. !??

Srinivasa

Iyengar

failure

policy. leader

In

in

and he

1925-26

south

threw

was

the

to harmonize he

India.

himself

main

seemed He

into

casualty

regional the

was

most

rich,

politics

interests

of

dynamic

the

Congress

resourceful,

with

Swara-

with national

a fervour

energetic

that

trasted with his professional image as the shrewd and culous lawyer. In a peculiarly personal sense he made

Swarajists'

of

his

year

Iyengar

the

dilemma in

the

strove

for

provincial

architect

chose, and main rival

or

of the

his

own.

Madras

power

regional

1926

won, a seat was Motilal

After

legislature

and

the bitter

prominence

levels.

Congress

in

at

campaign

metithe

experience

1920-21,

Although

con-

the

he

Srinivasa

national, was

in Tamilnad,

for the central Assembly. Nehru, who after the death

not

the

main

Srinivasa

There his of Das was

the principal Swarajist. Suspecting Nehru of sympathizing with the Responsivists and wishing to establish himself as a national leader of the first order, Srinivasa Iyengar posed as the champion of the more extreme Congress elements, siding with the orthodox Swarajists in 1925-27 and joining with

Jawaharlal Nehru and to lead the movement national

role

Subhas Chandra Bose of Bengal for "complete independence".

Srinivasa

Iyengar

staunchly

opposed

in 1928-29 In his

office

acceptance under the existing constitution, but at the regional level he could only retain a secure political base by

hinting

gress

would

to

the

opt

United

for

Nationalists

office,

and

in

1926

by supporting

that

the

the Tamil

Con-

Congress MLCs in 1926-27 in their defence of Subbarayan's ministry. But this political schizophrenia could not continue indefinitely. At the national level Srinivasa lyengar

112 was

pushed

aside

leadership

at

by

the

the

end

of

return

of Gandhi

1928

and

between Motilal and Gandhi on pendence issue and Jawaharlal In

He

tried,

a speech

too

late,

in Madras

to

on

he

one and

dithered

side Bose

restore

19 May

to

of on

his

1929

active

disastrously

the the

complete other.

regional

he

political inde-

authority.

explained

that

for

several years he had supported the political experiment of refusing office under dyarchy. But, he went on, "In this Province our experiment has proved to be a disastrous failure and a party which was wholly defeated in 1926 has come back into greater power as an anti-national and reactionary

Ministry". In a province like Madras, of a strong, well-organized party like vented

a direct

ment,

he

exclude

now

its

fight

between

believed

rival

that

and

the

revive

the

where the intervention the Justicites pre-

Congress

Congress

the

and

must

the

take

nationalist

govern-

office

struggle. *3°

to

The CWC and the AICC did not agree. They were tired of Swarajist experiments and they looked forward either to Congress participation in constitutional discussions which would scrap dyarchy or to a resumption of civil disobedience for the achievement of complete swaraj. The CWC and AICC meetings at

Bombay

on

23-25

May

1929

provincial autonomy for for or against office.

Swarajya

asked,

It was

in

Tanjore

the

plete

a baffled Tamil

district

and

Nadu

in

independence,

the

TNCC's

request

office

when

dispirited

Provincial

August

moved

1929.

on his

Mudaliar* of Chingleput, was Srinivasa Iyengar's regional ability to provide the Tamil

dyarchy

is "about

Srinivasa

Iyengar

Conference

The

behalf

defeated base had Congress

at

by a been with

Mudaliar gress

in

he

had

held

for

December

to

second

too,

the

Tamil

in his place.°?

lution, he retired from lucrative law practice.

So,

Iyengar

and

it had

had

a resilient,

failed

four

years,

After the

complete

the Congress to The meteor had

Swarajya

to resolve

office-seeking

for

com-

Muthuranga

with the of TNCC

Muthuranga

the Lahore Con-

independence

reso-

return to his burnt itself out.

Party.

the dilemma

Justice

who

large majority. eroded by his inthe policy it

leaving

attending

to be

Vedaranniyam

resolution

by C.N.

needed to survive in constitutional competition Justice Party. In disgust he resigned the post president

for

the Congress committees to decide What is the point, Prakasam’s

of taking

got rid of?"!3!

attended

dismissed

Like

posed

Party.

Srinivasa

by dyarchy

GuapterR

4

CONFRONTATION

The Congress met at Calcutta at the end of December 1928 charged with a mood of frustration and anger. On its second tour of India, beginning in October 1928, the Simon Commission met with boycotts and black-flag demonstrations in almost every town and city it visited. On 30 October Lajpat Rai,

veteran

Punjabi

commission,

was

Congressman,

received

widely

lathi

believea,

were

leading

blows

the

from

cause

a procession the

of his

police

November. In the Bardoli taluk of Gujarat, had successfully led a satyagraha against a

hancement

interest

of

the

local

in Gandhi's

land

revenue,

non-violent

against

thereby

tactics.

which,

death

on

17

Vallabhbhai 22 per cent

arousing

By contrast,

the

the

it

Patel en-

new

the

Swarajists, repeatedly frustrated in their attempts to obstruct and destroy dyarchy, were either abandoning noncooperation through the legislatures for responsivism or

admitting existing

the

Motilal

had,

with

futility

form Sir

of

Nehru, Tej

principal architect parties' conference Report was designed Simon

Commission

of constitutional

government. the

president

Bahadur

and,

Sapru,

of

the

the

agitation Calcutta

Liberal

under

the

Congress,

leader,

been

the

of a constitution drafted at an alland published in August 1928. The Nehru to offer a positive alternative to the in

order

to

attract

the

widest

range

of

political support Motilal had been obliged to make Dominion Status the pivot of the constitutional scheme.' To a section of Congressmen this was an unacceptable retreat from the resolution

Nehru in

for

complete

and passed

December

1927.

without The

independence

opposition

Independence

proposed

at the for

by

Madras

India

Jawaharlal

Congress

League,

directed

by the younger Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose and Srinivasa Iyengar, denounced the Nehru report and campaigned for the restoration of complete independence as the objective of the Congress.

113

114 In

this

re-established

party

atmosphere

his

them

the

tension

leadership.

organizations

allowed

uf

to

freedom

the

to

and

In

uncertainty

resigning

Swarajists

experiment

in

control

1924-25,

Gandhi

of

Gandhi

with

legislative

had been earlier.

when the Then he

mediated

between

the

had

politics, confident that once their experiments had failed they would no longer shun civil disobedience. But Gandhi was

a maturer politician in 1928 than he Congress met at Calcutta eight years

had

been setting the pace in the Congress; now he was trying to restrain Jawaharlal and the young Congressmen and to prevent

a rift

Nehrus,

in

the

father

Nationalists new

generation

party.

At

and

son,

who

were

who wanted

Calcutta

between

he

the

older

a constitutional impatient

for

generation

settlement

freedom

and

the

of

and

for

the

a con-

frontation with the Raj. Through Gandhi's intervention a compromise was reached: if within one year the British did not grant Dominion Status to India, the Congress would launch

civil disobedience Britain.

to

wrest

complete

independence

To this challenge the British made no But Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, was perturbed civil disobedience and particularly by the

Congressmen, like

Irwin,

to 31

Sapru,

like

being

following

Motilal drawn

the

Nehru,

into

the

and

even

struggle

well-established

from

immediate response. by the prospect of danger of moderate

respected

against

British

the

policy,

Liberals, Raj.

tried

rally the moderates and avert a head-on collision.? On October 1929, two months before the year given in the

Calcutta ultimatum was due to expire, Irwin announced that the "natural issue of India's constitutional progress" was Dominion Status and that a Round Table Conference would be

called to discuss the next stage to be taken towards this objective. ® But the declaration came too late and was too timid to satisfy the Congress. At first many Congressmen, including Gandhi, welcomed Irwin's statement, but they wanted

to know exactly what was implemented. They could

being promised and when it would be not put their names to an agreement

they had not read, and the idea of civil disobedience in 1930 had already gathered too much momentum to be so easily halted. If Jawaharlal, hand-picked by Gandhi as the next’ Congress

president,

would

rather

resign

than

negotiate,

that

would

create the split Gandhi was anxious to avoid. Meeting, in memory of Lajpat Rai, at Lahore in December 1929, the Congress took the momentous decision to reject the Round Table Con-

ference as an unsatisfactory response to the demand for Dominion Status, and to launch civil disobedience for complete independence.

115 There

wide

followed

observance

a

of

lull.

Other

"Independence

than

Day"

calling

on

26

for

nation-

January

1930,

the

CWC had no program for civil disobedience, and the campaign's direction was left in Gandhi's hands. Gandhi drafted a list of eleven demands, ranging from prohibition to halving land revenue and the abolition of the salt tax: it was a compendium of the issues Congressmen had touched upon at different times in the past decade." But Gandhi wanted one clear issue that would dramatize the exploitative nature of colon-

ial

rule

and

symbolize

the

identification

of the

with the masses. In late February he fixed In a letter to Irwin on 2 March 1930 Gandhi unless

the

eleven

demands

were

and

the

met

by

the

Congress

on the salt tax. explained that

government,

he

would initiate a satyagraha against the salt laws on 11 March. When the ultimatum was, predictably, rejected he set out from his ashram at Ahmedabad with 79 satyagrahis, to walk 240 miles to Dandi on the Gulf of Cambay where he intended to make salt from sea water. Perhaps of all Gandhi's campaigns, this was

the

most

dramatic

had

greatest

emotional

impact.

News

of his daily progress was flashed to papers throughout India and the western world, its impact magnified by newspaper photographs and cinema films of the march. The media's coverage and the simple drama of Gandhi's Palm Sunday won for the salt satyagraha an emotional popular response unparalleled in his earlier campaigns. It was a brilliant opening to two and a half years of intense agitation.

Anticipation at

With

first

after

Madras,

the

these

national

wholly

out

TNCC

the

of

had

CWC

developments

step.

requested

suggested

a

When,

in

Tamil

permission

new

Congressmen

July

1929,

to take

boycott

of

the

two

office

were

months

in

legislatures

there were vehement protests from Tamil MLCs.> In anticipation of elections in late 1929 or early 1930, Srinivasa Iyengar, Rajagopalachari and Tamil Congressmen of all per-

suasions

were

Independent

out

campaigning

parties.

against

Vallabhbhai

the

Patel,

Justice

the

and

hero

of

Bardoli,

was bewildered when he arrived in Tamilnad in August to preside over the provincial conference at Vedaranniyam. He complained that he felt stifled by the communal atmosphere — he was confronted on several occasions by Self-Respecters demonstrating sessive

against

concern

for

seemed indifferent leaders foresaw.

Brahmin

jobs

to

the

and

Congressmen

office.©

coming

battle

— and

Tamil

which

by

the

ob-

Congressmen

all-India

116 Irwin's

announcement

was

received

with

enthusiasm

by

most Tamil Congressmen, especially Nationalist non-Brahmins who hoped logjam in the Madras legislature.

by the former United that it would free the Thus, the decision of the

bitterly

Congress

Lahore

Congress

resign

in

resented

to

Madras;

withdraw

difficult

boycott

the

legislatures

Chetti

MLCs

in

the

was

either

refused

Legislative

to

Shanmugham Chetti in the Assembly resigned, recontested as Independents. "Many local

Congressmen", the Chief reported pithily at the

it

Five

Venkatachelam

Council and R.K. but successfully

find

from the.

or defied.

to

Secretary of the Madras government end of January 1930, "continue to

reconcile

legislatures

a personal

with

loyalty

to

unwillingness

the

Congress

to

mandate

to do so.” Satyamurti, dreading a return to the "suicidal policy" of 1920, canvassed for a new nationalist party to

continue

to work

in the Madras

legislature.

A few private

meetings were held, attended by Venkatachelam Chetti and others who had already decided to defy the ban, but within

two weeks Satyamurti abandoned the idea and resigned his seat in the council.® Unlike Venkatachelam Chetti, a prospering

merchant,

Satyamurti

financial A.

support.

Rangaswami

cautious",®

was

the

depended

Iyengar,

obediently

Congress

Conference

that

he

on

"ever

resigned

decision

most

Congress

to

his

loyal

boycott

bitterly

seat

patrons

though

the

in

the

his

careful

and

Assembly.

Round

regretted.

for

Table

He

consoled

It

him-

self with the expectation that civil disobedience would be neither popular nor widespread; that the "Pro-Changers" would have to lie low for a while, but would soon return to lead the Congress back to constitutional action.’° Ranga-

swami

was

a more

Srinivasa

Iyengar

mistaken. the

sober and

The Government

imminent

Government

of

crisis.

judge

Satyamurti,

of Madras

India's

of

it had

the

political

but

for

once

had no stronger

been

hesitancy

in

inclined

tackling

scene he

than

was

badly

premonition

to

jeer

at

Jawaharlal

the

of

Nehru

and other "extremists". "If the Government of India were to strike hard instead of moralising at length," commented one executive councillor in March 1929 on New Delhi's latest equivocations, "there would be no trouble".’! Having crushed a revival of labour unrest in 1926-28, which had included a

protracted network,

and violent

and

frustrated

strike

on the South

Congress

attempts

Indian

to

Railway

organize

demon-

strations against the second visit of the Simon Commission to Madras city in December 1928, the Madras government had begun to be complacent about its own strength and the loyalty and

moderation

of the Tamil

districts.

Towards

the

end of 1929

117 when, on the advice of the Government of India, it rounded up "extremists", the haul in Tamilnad was less than half-adozen. The Tanjore resettlement agitation had long since died away and in Tamilnad, unlike the Telugu delta districts, there were no new resettlements due which would give the

Congressmen an opportunity to repeat their Bardoli tactics. With the exception of the activities of Singaravelu Chetti — almost the only self-styled Communist in the region — Tamilnad was immune to the rash of left-wing peasant and workers'

organizations which affected northern India. A sunlit, peaceful vista it may not have been, but the Madras government believed itself adequately sheltered from what it anticipated would be a passing shower.

Except

in two respects.

In

1923

began.

If

when

the

government

asked district magistrates to submit reports on the character and suppression of non-cooperation in their areas, two important considerations had emerged. The first was that the Congress could be aseclecticas a magpie: it would pick up any attractive local grievances which caught its eye and incorporate them into its loosely constructed nest. The best reaction to this appeared to be to quash the secondary agitations

as

soon

as

they

the

Congress

seized

the initiative and the government hesitated, the local population would begin to feel it could flaunt government authority with impunity. There was the complaint, however, that 1921-22 district officials had been afraid to act promptly

and

resolutely.

They

had

been

confused

non-cooperation

had

spread

by

the

Government

in

of

India's "soft" line towards the Congress and Khilafat leaders and hampered by the difficulties of securing a conviction quickly enough to have a deterrent effect. The speed with

which

_ 1921

was

attributed

to

this

in the Telugu

uncertainty

among

delta

the

in

late

magistracy

and police. If a new crisis developed, would the Government of India support the demands of the Madras Secretariat and the

district

officers

Against this balanced a second

There

had

been

regional

levels

to the more

village

firm,

evidence at

the

too.

of this

end

of

official

G.T.H.

district in the Andhra delta cooperation, warned in 1923: carry bad

things

spirit

far.

which

pre-emptive

is

They

still

leave in

occurring

1921;

to

follow.

C.F.V.

but

observers

Bracken,*

it

at

the national

and

at the district

and

was

also

Collector

of

apparent

the

Godavari

during the later stages of non"Measures of repression do not... a bad

impression

evidence’.

out vindictiveness was his formula.!? course

action?

predilection for the "hard" line had to be consideration — the -backlash from repression.

perceptive

levels

for

Williams,

the

behind

Resolute

and

action

It was not an easy young

a

with-

Under-Secretary

118 in Madras, noted in January 1930 that "if Congress will cry 'repression'...if we do will cry 'victory'. The question is of a

was this view confined to official circles. owned Madras Mail, so damning of government

non-cooperation,

provincial sures

It was months own

in January

governments

and

thus

1930

against

playing

into

advised

rushing

the

hands

we do too much, too little, Congress via media".!* Nor

The Europeaninertia during

the

central

into

of

repressive

the

and

mea-

"extremists". }®

this policy of caution which prevailed in the first of 1930. As the Government of Madras recorded in its

history

it

of

the

was

civil

disobedience

considered

that

ultimately

repay

did

necessary,

strengthening become

suffering

the

forbearance

Government,

their

from

movement:

case

sheer

would

either

if the use

or

by

official

the

by

of force

movement

disregard

for

it. It was not then anticipated that the movement would receive the degree of support

that

Responding the

jists

it eventually

to

secured.'¢

the Call

By contrast with regional Congress

quickly

the protracted in 1922-25, in

surrendered

their

lyengar, defeated by the contradictions, resigned

failure as TNCC

session.

C.N.

and withdrew in

March

boycott

member.

from

His

1930,

of

the Congress

successor,

having

the

Madras

places

on the TNCC.

Muthuranga

legislature

was

for control of leading Swara-

Srinivasa

to resolve his own political President in September 1929

altogether

struggled

Rajagopalachari

struggle 1930 the

after

Mudaliar,

half-heartedly

the

of

which

obvious

the

he

to

had

Lahore

resigned

resist

been

the

a

replacement.

He

salt

returned in April 1930 to head the TNCC; the party headquarters, in Madras city since 1925, were shifted back to Trichinopoly; and T.S.S. Rajan resumed his old post as party Secretary.? On the surface, it was just like old times. Authorized

by

the

TNCC

and

the

AICC

to

direct

beaches

with

little

the

satyagraha in Tamilnad, Rajagopalachari approached the task with characteristic caution. The Telugus organized dashes to the

nearest

salt

how the struggle so impetuous and dramatic

than

march

a month

preparations. the march and

creeks

than

— from a

He

and

thought

as

to

would develop, but Rajagopalachari was not he was concerned more with imitating Gandhi's with

early

violating

March

estimated that satyagraha camp

the

salt

to mid-April

he at

law.

He

— to make

took

his

would need Rs. 20,000 Vedaranniyam, his

more

for

119 destination. Through his Saurashtras in Madura and Ahmedabad, he was able to

Swarajists' he selected

lieutenants in Tamilnad, the South Indians in Bombay and collect most of this. Madras,

citadel, gave very — with the help of

Vaidyanatha Aiyar in march. Most of them

Madura — a were young

khadi

years.

uates

who

work

grahis

Ramnad,

had

some

in

came

Salem

recent

from

and

education

Madura

Bombay

Rajagopalachari's

little.'® From 300 applicants Rajan in Trichinopoly and hundred volunteers - clerks, students

and

About

had

shown

a quarter

district;

Madras

provided

caution

the

about

was

an

the grad-

interest

of the

city,

saty:

in

Tinnevelly,

a dozen

apparent,

for and

each.!?

too,

in

the

route

he chose. It shunned, by more than 150 miles, Madras city and ran from Trichinopoly through the Cauvery delta to Vedaranniyum

Tanjore had been a Congress stronghold for more than a generation and memories of the Swarajists' opposition to the Ilindu Religious

Endowments

Bill

and

resettlement

might

be

hoped

to

ensure a favourable reception for the marchers. Here, more than in any other area of Tamilnad, Rajagopalachari could expect

assistance

route a

long

avoided

the

detour

Kumbakonam

to

from

areas

include

vakils,

of

merchants

Kallar

the

old

and Mannargudi.?°

and

mirasdars.

concentration

Brahmin

The march

centres

and

was given

of

The

followed

Tanjore,

the air of

a pilgrimage, beginning on Tamil New Year's the accompaniment of hymns and the blessings

Day (13 April) to of priests; and

many

Rameswaram

Vedaranniyam

orthodox

the sacred chari

made

among

the

("The

Forest

Brahmins

places

frequent

of

to

be

of the Tamil stops

untouchables

and

to

the

Vedas")

second

only

coast.”!

conduct

the

Kallars

was to

considered

En route,

temperance (one

of

by

among

Rajagopala-

propaganda

the

district's

largest but, except for a few zamindars, mirasdars and vakils, less prosperous agrarian custes), but it was mainly to the urban middle class and the .andlords that he directed his campaiga. only

The experience of 1920-22 a slow and timid response

Tamilnad.

The

march

was,

led Rajagopalachari to to the salt satyagraha

therefore,

to

be

the

expect in

unhurried

opening scene of the civil disobedience drama. Tension would gradually increase as the satyagrahis neared their goal, as

public interest was aroused, and as the government's restraint gave way to impulsive repressive measures. Vedaranniyam was designed to be a showpiece of disciplined satyagraha in south

India;

pathy

only

and

when

it had

government

succeeded

hostility

did

visualize the conflict spreading organized, satyagraha camps.”*

in attracting

public

Rajagopalachari

to other,

equally

and

well-

sym-

Rajan

120 The Government of Madras own fear of over-reacting

its

steadying

hand.

Dandi

made

Jawaharlal

and

large.

the

Nehru

No

on

14

salt

April,

in the

immediate

Vedaranniyam

issued

Vallabhbhai action

Patel but

was

arrested

Gandhi,

first

week

On

27 March

was,

marchers.

instructions

remained aloof, held back by and by the Government of India's

to district

who

of April,

therefore,

officers

the

on

had

7 March

reached

was

permitted

Madras

that

left

and

at

against

government

volunteers

should be dispersed, but arrests should be avoided, except the case of leaders violating the law, so as to prevent an

in

over-crowding of the jails. On 3 April, 10 days before Rajagopalachari left Trichinopoly, J.A. Thorne, the District Magistrate of Tanjore, requested permission to treat the marchers as an unlawful assembly as soon as they entered his district, to arrest Rajagopalachari and to caution sympathizers on the route. On 8 April Thorne wired Madras for permission to arrest Rajagopalachari when he entered Tanjore district. On both occasions permission was refused.” Thorne was too sceptical of the efficacy of a policy of drift to accept these refusals as a counsel of inaction. On 6

April

he

issued

instructions

to the

sub-divisional

strates and the District Superintendent interfere with satyagrahis who remained

gard

assistance

given

to the marchers

magi-

of Police not to orderly, but to re-

as a criminal

offence.

A circular on these lines was drafted the following day and sent to the presidents and chairmen of the district and local boards in the area to be covered by the march. Three thousand copies were later printed in Tamil and distributed ahead

of the

main

Since

body

to

be

of marchers.?* ignored

would

be

disastrous,

this

was

the

sort of publicity Rajagopalachari wanted. He used the circular as an illustration of India's oppression and a violation ‘of Hindu traditions of charity and hospitality.?* Rangaswami Iyengar, whose reserve towards the salt satyagraha had begun to melt with the success of Gandhi's march, published an

editorial in the Hindu on 10 April questioning the legality of Thorne's threats and calling it "preposterous" to treat a

band

of

satyagrahis

as

an

broken the salt laws. The its own, but was satisfied

unlawful

assembly

before

they

had

Government of Madras had doubts of that Thorne's circular was a deter-

rent to sympathizers, "made difficulties for the volunteers and diminished the effect of their march". Triumphal receptions had been planned by K. Santhanam and an advance party of

marchers,

but

after

the

circular

"the

lukewarm

were

glad

of an excuse for refusing hospitality, and few owners or trustees of a charity were sufficiently 'patriotic' to risk

prosecution".”®

The arrest and conviction of V. Pantulu

121 Aiyar, until recently one of Tanjore's MLCs, and of a nonBrahmin mirasdar during the early stages of the march through Tanjore showed that Thorne had not been bluffing. In Gujarat many village officers had resigned to support the satyagraha:

in Tanjore only two — a Kallar village headman and a Vellala karnam — resigned during Rajagopalachari's march. Nevertheless, towards the end of the march the mood changed and there

were

mistic

signs

of

enthusiasm

Rajagopalachari

in

the

villages

informed

the press

and

towns.

that

An

"The

opti-

masses

are responding to the call in a truly marvellous manner. The atmosphere is being purified of all sectional and party feeling in a way the most optimistic among us may not have expected".?” Government officials were correspondingly dis-

heartened

that

the marchers

had

not been

stopped.”®

On 28

April Vedaranniyam was reached, a camp established, and two days later Rajagopalachari was arrested for breaking the salt laws. By early May civil disobedience had taken off as an agitational campaign. Throughout India it had acquired a strength and popularity which the Government of India had not anticipated. And behind the popular enthusiasm was the cut-

ting

edge

of violence.

Chittagong tities

Frontier

of

Armoury

arms

and

Province

In Bengal

on

18 April

ammunition;

the

arrest

and

terrorists escaped

at

Peshawar

of Congress

raided

with in

On

5 May

Gandhi

regional captains. still, however, on by

the

force

if

was

and

with

manufacture

of

the

of

volunteers.

salt

continued,

At

quan-

North-West

provoked

people and existing forces could not be

him

The stress in government the arrest of leaders and

necessary,

illicit

arrested

the

leaders

disturbances which resulted in the death of 30 caused serious doubts as to the ability of the to maintain control in the area. A new policy as long delayed as it had been in 1921.”

the

large

many

of

the

instructions was the dispersal, Vedaranniyam

therefore,

despite

the arrests of Rajagopalachari and Santhanam and despite police raids on the piles of salt the satyagrahis had collected. There were natural salt pans at Vedaranniyam and it was almost impossible for the police to prevent the manufacture of

salt

as

long

as

the

satyagrahis

50 more volunteers arrived the month the total number

Laksnmipathi,

Madras

pursue

League

of

— trying

stationed

preaching

erally.

who

for

Youth,

to

against

the

gave

incite

in the area

In

three

the

and

salt

remained

years the

had been

volunteers

disaffection

touring

government's

there.

On

5 May

at the camp, and by the middle was nearly 200.°° Mrs Rukmani

laws

the

and

opinion

president

among

new

the

of the

activities

policemen

neighbouring

government

villages

authority

Vedaranniyam

of

was

to

gen-

fast

122 becoming

a

eastern

May

festering

Tanjore.

the

sore

spreading

It could

police

raided not

just

no

the

camp,

to

its

longer this

volunteers

and

stores

Vedaranniyam

and

were

thwarted

poison

confiscate

time -to

arrest

salt.

About

arrested including, unexpectedly, Rajan who the camp. Rajan had been the main supplier for

which was the most Attempts to revive Rameswaram to

quickly

was

his

arrest

factor in establish by

On 29

the

135

were

was on a visit of funds and and

conviction

the ending of the a new one near

the

to

camp.

police.

Although Rajagopalachari had clearly counted on Tanjore provide the men and money to sustain the Vedaranniyam

camp,

manned of

it

decisive it or to

throughout

be tolerated.?!

paradoxically

by Congressmen

the

original

it

was

almost

from

marchers

exclusively

outside

were

organized

the district.

from

the

Only

district,

only

and

five

three

of the satyagrahis rounded up on 29 May. Rajan at Trichinopoly fed the camp with supplies, money and new recruits. Rajagopalachari had, in fact, been over-cautious in going for an area of traditional Congress support. By and large,

once tne initial excitement of the march was over, Tanjore was indifferent. It is worthwhile briefly to consider why. The leading land-holders had had their share of agitation in

1923-24 and they had achieved a sufficient degree of success in persuading the government to reduce the highest resettlement rates not to be impelled by a sense of grievance into joining

civil

ion and

competition

plummeting the The

and

disobedience.

grain

prices

government they dominant strata

Kallar

among ially

Hindu

decent

urban

from

that

They

Burmese

turned for in Tanjore

middle

were

resulted

class

rice

unhappy

from

Swadesamitran

people",

commented

world

imports,

but

the

depress-

it was

to

assistance, not the Congress society — the Brahmin, Vellala,

and

rural

the most politicized in Tamilnad. among the Brahmins, a great number

and

about

the

circulated Thorne,

landlords

widely:

"tend

— were

There were, especof literates and the

to

"even

regard

ordinary

politics

through Hindu spectacles".°? But the economic life of the delta was to a large extent dependent on the Public Works Department for the supply of irrigation water to the padd fields, and this in itself was an inducement to Patel, at the time of his visit to Vedaranniyam

Tamilnad

Provincial

Land -League, but there an attempt

Tanjore's

The political dominant

mtrasdar

Conference

nowhere in to imitate

political

bosses

faction

was

were

trains

1929,

ran

divided

headed

and Christian

in

the Cauvery Bardoli.*®

by

Kallar,

A.T.

on

had

loyalty.® for the

formed

delta

in

different

on factional

Samiappa

local was

gauge

lines.

Pannirselvam,

and N.R.

a

1930

a

tracks.

The

Justicite,

Mudaliar,

2

123 Vellala.

Throughout

president

of

1930

Tanjore

Pannirselvam's

district

board

was

recent

being

election

relentessly

as

contested by the rival faction, headed by P.S. Rajappa, a Kallar zamindar from Tanjore taluk, and abetted by A. Veeriah

Vandayar, a Kallar, and C.R. Lakshmivaraha Iyengar, mirasdar spokesman and one of Kumbakonam's Brahmin Congress leaders. The faction leaders were so busily engaged in their ding-dong battle for the prestige and spoils of local government from the district board down to the taluk boards, and of every temple, education and cooperative society committee in the district that they could scarcely spare a thought for making

salt from sea-water.*©

A further reason for the indifference of Tanjore is less easily identified. Partly because Tanjore was a district with such a long tradition of involvement in provincial and

nationalist politics, partly because its upper strata were so emphatically divided by caste, by occupation and by inherited authority from the poor cultivators, artisans and landless

labourers, broader political participation in Tanjore was temporarily blocked. There were grievances in Tanjore which could well have provided the basis for a mass agitation: the government was alarmed throughout the civil disobedience movement

that

the

Congress

leaders

Kallar

masses,

educationally

backward,

socially suppressed and economically exploited, would revolt against the government and against the landlords; at Vedaranniyam the local population had asked that the forest laws should be made the target of the satyagraha, but the Congress organizers refused on the grounds that salt was the national issue and must be taken up first.°”7 At times the were

remarkably

selective.

In

Tanjore

pitched their agitation at a level that would not class interests of the district's dominant strata

it meant

made

the

of

stultification

factional

pation of local Tanjore in 1930

rivalry

as

of the movement. the

motivation

notables in Congress an aggrieved faction

Much

for

they

damage the even though

has

the

been

partici-

agitations, * but in held aloof from civil

disobedience rather than jeopardize its privileged social and economic position by initiating a mass agitation. It did so wisely, for in less than a decade the Cauvery delta became

the

scene

cultural

Beaten that

ally.

of a bitter

labourers,

like

struggle

between that

landlords

still

and

continues.

agri-

Doge

Rajagopalachari satyagraha Even

a

struggle

in

before

had

miscalculated

Tamilnad he

reached

would

gain

in his

anticipation

momentum

Vedaranniyam

only

events

in

gradu-

Madras

124 city

could

showed

excite

doing

by

contrast

popular

it might

assume

with

Tanjore,

support

the

local

who,

Swarajist

opening

stages

satyagraha

because

Congressmen,

they T.

leaders,

came

were

local

mainly

Prakasam

response city and

salt

from

agitation

and

but

character.

it was

of the

the

and participation,

a violent

Expecting no substantial gopalachari had neglected the

of its

that

left

from with

without

party

K.

direction

Pressure

activists

turned

Nageswara

in so

Madras, Rajathe resignation

satyagraha.

Telugus,

that

and

to

Rao

for

a

students,

the

for

in

Andhra

guidance

and leadership. The first attempts at salt-making on the Madras beach at the beginning of April were amateurish, comic even; the quantities of salt produced ludicrously small and crude. But their activities were a technical breach of the salt laws and the police intervened to confiscate the salt and salt-making utensils and to disperse the satyagrahis, according to the instructions already laid down by the Madras government. Police action in turn stimulated public interest

and,

encouraged

by donations

fine

was

just

The

satyagraha

Marwaris, Prakasam their satyagraha:

and the

the

sort

Rao

the police.

a hartal

was

quickly on

city's

22

escalated

against

April.

Gujaratis

decided to their cars

in Tanjore, press.

In protest

held

the

of provocation

and, like Thorne's circular protests in the nationalist

with

from

Nageswara Rao attachment of

that

fired

it

Prakasam

attracted

into

the

and

continue in lieu of

a

strong

a confrontation

arrest

Intended

as

of Nageswara

a peaceful

demonstration, it degenerated into the intimidation of shopkeepers who had defied the hartal and clashes between police and demonstrators, whose numbers were swollen by mill-hands on strike from the charges by mounted

city's police

Choolai textile mills. Two major and lathi-wielding constables were

carried out before the crowd dispersed.*® The arrest of Prakasam on 23 April failed to check the agitation. It had acquired a macabre momentum of its own: salt making continued,

have

more

been

satyagrahis,

thrashed

paper run by the indignation:

including

by the police.

Congressman

S.

women,

were

Sutandira

Ganesan

reported

Sangu,

in Madras,

cried

Those who defy the Salt Act may be imprisoned or fined. That is all laid down in the Salt

Act.

should

But

be

the

made

Salt

to

Act

does

trample

not

upon

say

the

that

people,

horses

nor

is it laid down in it that the volunteers should be beaten like dogs as they were beaten on the

Beach Road on Friday morning.*°

to

a Tamil

with .

125 On the

evening

of 27 April

an all-parties

the Madras beach to protest at the violent satyagrahis by the police.

Venkatachelam

Chetti,

of

the

audience

Choolai

the

of

the

Madras

Corporation

to

re-open

the

mills,

swelled

organizers'

at the potice patrolling skirmishes

followed.

their

fury

on

across

the

2,000

people

control.

the outskirts

Led

by the

and

rifle-butts,

meeting streets

a

crowd.

darkened

after of

the

were

troop

sands

of

leaders

herded

Triplicane,

While

armed

to

had

but

of the crowd

constables soware

fled.

from

there,

were

of

the

thrown

and

Police,

discipline and restraint public criticism, vent

disperse

away

Stones

Commissioner

C.B. Cunningham, the police, their weakened by 10 days of tension and

the

of nonwere

on

By the time the meeting began the mill-hands, angered by the failure

management

beyond

brutal treatment On the platform

councillors

and several Justicites. arrival of nearly 5,000

meeting was held

at

fought

raced

what

the

to

remained

After

the

with

an

hour

beach

and

lathis

and

fro

of

about

into

entrance

to

the the

Pycrofts Road, stone-throwing began again. Under Cunningham's directions police marksmen tried to pick off the instigators: five people were wounded, including a fifty-year old woman, and three killed, among them a lawyer who had been getting

down from a bus when the police fired.*! Unintentionally,

the

nationalists

in

Madras

city

had

blundered into a confrontation with the Raj that was so shocking that it temporarily obscured party and sectional divisions. Politicians of all parties demanded an enquiry into the to

shooting

Ootacamund

Madras the

and

Mahajana

blame

for

to

a deputation petition

Sabha

the

held

incidents

the

its

in

of High

Court

Governor,

own

but

lawyers in

vain.

investigation

the

city

travelled The

which

between

22

placed

and

27

April squarely on the police."? The Madras Corporation for once set aside its party bickering and condemned the shooting in a resolution which only the European councillors opposed. G.A. Natesan, a Liberal and opponent of civil disobedience, said that in 45 years as a citizen of Madras he had never known a time when "public feeling has been provoked to such

a height

as it is now". *?

The government and the police against their Indian

29 April Europeans jeered at, drivers abused.

ation, civil

Europeans

and racial

disobedience

feelings."

the

city

in

community defended During the battle

the on

near the beach had been insulted and of cars and their passengers stopped and in Madras

bitterness was

Sergeant

police

European critics. were

responsible

O'Callaghan,

lathi-play

unaccustomed

as much and

for who

who

to

such

as any hostility the

had

had

intensity

been

deen

humili-

to

of their

instructing

too

severely

126

injured

in the

clashes

a press

communique,

on 22 April

to participate

in those

on the 29th, felt it "a great disappointment" to have "missed the big fight".“5 And the government, far from calling for an enquiry, issued Cunningham's account of the week's incidents — purged of some of its more provocative remarks — as generously

rewarded

the

policemen

who

had taken part, and promoted Cunningham to the post of Inspector-General of Police with responsibility for combating civil disobedience throughout the presidency. Such

could

a polarization

not

corporation

endure.

to

its

The

between

the

mill-hands

squabbles

rulers

and

returned

and

to

its drains.

the

work,

The

ruled the

city poli-

ticians were, for the moment, cowed by the savagery of the scene they had witnessed on the sands. But a legacy of bitterness remained, and Madras Congressmen and their allies

saw how

such

incidents

could

be

exploited

to keep

alive

public resentment against the government. In January and February Congressmen organized the picketing of foreign

cloth-shops in the city, less with the intention of preventing cloth sales and promoting swadeshi than of creating incidents between police and picketers. The incidents were carefully staged with respected citizens on hand to give "eye-witness" accounts

of

police

of reports in legislature.

"brutality",

and

these

formed

the nationalist press and questions In the narrow and congested streets

the

in of

basis

the George

Town it was obstructing

difficult for any picketing to take place without traffic, and when the police moved in to dis-

stander

received

perse

the

image

of

compounded

panies

picketers

who

innocence

its

with

by

the

or

blows.

using

reputation

of the Malabar

canes

women

for

Special

lathis

The

it

picketers;

brutality

Police,

was

Congress by

often

the

government

quartering

formed

a by-

highlighted

to

com-

suppress

its

the

1921 rising, on the city to combat civil disobedience and picketing. The consequence was, ex-minister Arogyaswami Mudaliar said on 7 February 1931, that "Everyday, this Government has ... [made] converts to the cause of the Congress by tens of thousands -- people who were lukewarm before with reference to the Congress are to-day its enthusiastic

supporters"."?

An exaggeration,

ative of the extent to which the were successful in keeping alive

with

the

Raj.

no doubt, tactics a sense

but

it is indic-

of the nationalists of confrontation

Deliberate provocation of incidents with the police might seem to indicate that there was little spontaneous support for civil disobedience in Tamilnad. But in some cases the violence which accompanied Congress demonstrations occurred because Congress agitators struck a spark which

127

ignited local discontent. This was most apparent during the second phase of the civil disobedience between

May

the picketing

a

laborious

and

of

August

1930.

liquor

Salt

and

process

except

district,

for

making

was

cloth-shops.

in

a

few

As

areas

in Tamilnad movement,

abandoned

for

salt-making

like

was

Vedaranniyam

with natural salt pans which were far from the main centres of population, its agitational potential was limited. In

Coimbatore

ing

salt

from

saline

example,

earth

was

the

soon

Picketing brought Congressmen onto and villages, where the public was

the police limited to

salt-making

forced to respond to Vedaranniyam, Madras

sites

in South

Arcot,

experiment

abandoned

as

of extract-

futile.”

the streets in the towns bound to notice them and

their activities. From being city and a few secondary

the agitation

spread

end of May and early June to the interior districts Tamilnad, which had previously been quiet. gress

The

ion.

change

planning

in

than

In the ports

recruited

from

agitational

to

the

of Madras

unemployed

first

tactics

impact

was

of

and Tuticorin

youths,

who,

from

due

the

less

world

picketers boredom

of to

at the

Con-

depress-

were

or

for

a

fee, would join the campaign. Hit by a shrinking exportimport trade, half-a-dozen firms ceased business in Tuticorin

in August 1930, while Congress volunteers "with their gay coloured badges and ribbons" roamed the streets urging unemployed coolies and peons to join them.*® Inland, unemployed

handloom weavers were often willing recruits or the cause of violence against the police. and hit

and out

for picketing In Coimbatore

Salem the Telugu-speaking Devanga weavers were severely by the sudden fall in demana for their products in Bombay the Central Provinces. of work by the closure

In July of looms

3,000 weavers were in Salem town, and

"cause",

they

thrown were

quickly recruited by local Congressmen (who included Devanga merchants and lawyers) to conduct door-to-door propaganda against

foreign

misfortune".°° 10,000 weavers

cloth,

the

were

told,

"of

their

In Coimbatore a majority of the town's were unemployed by the end of July and were

drafted by Gujarati and Devanga , cotton traders to picket fareign cloth and liquor shops.°! In Gudiyatam taluk, North Arcot, the victims of the depression were Tamil weavers (Kaikolans

by August.

arrested attacked

and

or

Sengunthars), On

7

July

at the town the police,

sacked

the

liquor

when

4,000 six

of Gudiyatam, besieged them

shops.

of

whom

Congress

After

were

out

agitators

of work were

a large crowd of weavers in the magistrate's office,

a detachment

police had restored government control the trate reported that in Gudiyatam there was of enmity against Government... The origin

of reserve

District Magis"no general feeling of the trouble

128 seems

to

have

suffering easy

victim In

been

from

the

bad times

to

many

with

the

towns

weaver

comminity

and whose

more

anti-Government of Tamilnad

in

rowdy

who

have

been

elements

became

propaganda". °* the

middle

months

of

1930

the discontent of the poor was channelled into the mainstream of civil disobedience by middle-class politicians and young activists who were themselves committed to nationalist objectives. Madura was such a case. From 1930 to 1932 civil disobedience in Madure was: led and financed by N.M.R. Subbaraman,* a wealthy young Congressman, and other members of the Saurashtra community, which constituted a third of the city's population. The Saurashtras' involvement has been attribute1

to their from

a faction

ported It

struggle

headed

in turn

is

by the

that

the

"supra-local

balance"

and

control

that

supremacy under

and

Saurashtra

connections

their

cover

of the municipal

chairman,

by the Justice

claimed

Congress

to wrest

objective

of the

civil

R.S.

Naidu,

Independent leaders to

and

sup-

ministries.

sought

to redress was

council

in the

the

achieve

disobedience

local

local

im-

movement.°*

While it is true that Subbaraman was deeply involved in wunicipal politics, this interpretation takes too narrow a view of the reasons for Saurashtra commitment Prominent Saurashtras had been striving since through

a

newspaper, to improve ity,

and

the

caste

caste

schools,

and a highly successful the social and economic

bulk

cotton

association,

of

which

weavers

with

were

skilled

to the Congress. the 1890s —

a, Saurashtra

weavers' cooperative — conditions of the communbut

a reputation

impoverished

for hard

silk

drinking.©

As aspirants to Brahminical status and as a community which traced its origins to Gujarat, the Saurashtras could not readily identify with the non-Brahmin movement: one of the most enterprising Saurashtras, L.K. Tulsiram, incurred considerable hostility from his community by trying to do so in 1919-20. Gradually, during the 1920s young Saurashtras were

attracted

late

1920s

identity.

to

the

Subbaraman

and

Congress

made

one young

khadi work. was chosen as marchers.°® Gandhi, who

ing with

the communities

Saurashtras

urged Some

in

Gujarati

them to abstain

On the merits

of

the

big

to

their

Saurashtra

to

broader,

the

national

party

who had

he addressed,

during

Saurashtra high

a

been

in

the

engaged

in

to a meeting

of

treasurer for the Vedaranniyam at times had a flair for identify-

of khadi

own

to

his

1927

from alcohol

and were unenthusiastic; a rival

and

donations

the

and

visit

abjure

Saurashtras

merchants

many

spoke

dealt

of the weavers

quality

textiles.

to Madura

foreign

were

in

cloth.*

divided.

foreign

regarded But

and

cloth

it as

Saurashtras

129 who

had

branched

for

the

salt

of Chari

out

and Ram which

into

satyagraha,

made

chemicals

sizeable

and

or

who,

dyes,

like

donations

like

the

to the

Subbaraman,

had

firm

TNCC

interests in Madura's mill industry, welcomed any form of swadeshi agitation which would favour Indian cloth against

British

and Japanese

imports.°®

There

were

no such

ambigu-

ities with regard to alcohol. The caste leaders wished to free their community from the stigma of drink and to enhance the prestige of the Saurashtras. With 2,000 Saurashtra

weavers out of work by September 1930, the picketing of liquor shops provided an opportunity for middle-class

Saurashtras to direct the energies of the unemployed against liquor. Through intensive picketing, sustained despite the arrest of Subbaraman and his associates and despite several clashes with the police, Madura's liquor sales were down to

a third of their normal

level by October.°®

It was the

communal ambitions, nationalist sympathies and broad material interests of the Saurashtra middle class, using the unemployed weavers,

faction

rather

than

a bid

in the municipal

to

overthrow

council,

an

which

centre of the civil disobedience movement Civil

checked

months;

disobedience

through in

was not

a tinder-dry

most

other

areas

did not burn at all. Certain remained largely unaffected.

proletariat.

After

it

the revival

made Madura fire

a storm-

racing

In Madura

flickered

tottering

in Tamilnad.

a forest

region.

already

and

it

un-

raged

smouldered

for

or

sections of the population One of these was the industrial

and defeat

of militant

union-

ism in 1926-28, the workers had again swerved away from strike action and in Madras city relations between mill-hands and Congressmen had not fully recovered from the trauma of the 1921 strike at the Buckingham and Carnatic mills. The

participation of the Choolai workers in the April 1930 disturbances was exceptional and fortuitous: their connection with the civil disobedience movement ceased as soon as the mills

strike

re-opened

on

1 May.

at

Harvey's

mills

in

employees

of mills

in which

In Madura

February,

there but

were

the

rumours

workers

of a

backed

down when the management threatened to stop production altogether because it was suffering financial losses due to the depression. The Madura Congressmen showed no interest in adopting the workers' grievances, perhaps because Subbaraman and his associates did not want a strike to spread to the The Muslims,

cooperation,

disillusioned Gandhians,

Hindu

stood

and

with

militancy

who had

they

aside

they

been

from

had

leading

the

the Swarajists viewed

with

a share.®

as they had

alarm

in the Hindu Maha

participants

movement.

the

Sabha.

They

rise

The

in non-

were

as

been with the of a new

Congress,

130 complained

the Muslim

“absolutely

press

pro-Hindu

the Arya Samajists

in

mentality"

the

late

1920s,

and was

had

"under

an

the

and the Hindu Maha Sabha''.®*

thumb

of

Even those

Muslim MLCs who sympathized with the nationalist aspirations of the Congress in launching civil disobedience felt a duty to their electorate and their community to stay in the legis-

lature to press Muslim demands for government posts and concessions.** As the campaign intensified Hindu-Muslim conflict

developed.

shop-keepers

Muslims

North

the

city

Arcot

and

foreign-cloth

resented

them and sought

movement

dealers

and the mofussil

understandably,

against

Khilafat

of

in Madras

who,

directed

Many

Trichinopoly a decade

Congress

and

towns

were

picketing

police protection.

districts,

before,

strongholds

tension

became

of

acute.

In

the

An

unexpected communal riot in Vellore on 28 August 1931, started by jeering and a scuffle between Muslim and Congress processions in the town, was described by the Inspector-General of

Police local

as

"a spontaneous

Muhammedans

to

expression | of

the

the hostility

Congress".®

of the

Although, like the miraedare of Tanjore, most of the substantial landholders in Tamilnad held aloof from the movement and were content to seek compensation for the effects of the

depression

government,

extensive

reason

for

rural

rapid

this

castes

Since

the

who

of the

acted

marketing, °”

non-Brahmin

and

the

movement,

Along

and

stimulus

the

in

War

of

and

the

there

caste

was

town

had

education

associations

of

main

and

been in

a

the

partici-

production

availability

more

The

students

accelerating

cash-crop

greater

1921.

between

the

provincial

disobedience

high-school

in

the

of youths

World

with

castes

to

been

as a link

First

of primary

peasant

civil

it had

involvement

countryside.

Presidency.®°

pation

in

than

the end of the

expansion

entreaties

involvement

was

surrounding

Madras

direct

and protracted

from rural the

through

and

and

the

education

encouraged ryots to send their sons to western-style schools and colleges. Away from their home environment the students

were

receptive to new ideas

ment

service

in penetrating less

the

the onceinaccessible

by the

preoccupied

generation

and

with

late

1920s

Brahmin

of middle-class

success

of non-Brahmins

professions

made

many young

"monopoly"

non-Brahmins

than

had

and govern-

non-Brahmins

the

been.

previous

In the

towns and cities of Tamilnad the students joined youth leagues, ran their own student papers, participated in the black flag demonstrations against the Simon Commission and

Congress processions

than

civil

in

1920-22,

disobedience

and hartals.°®

students

movement

were

by

To a far greater extent

stirred

an

to participate

intellectual

and

in

the

emotional

in

131

commitment

Satyagraha,

to

India's

the

freedom.

enthusiasm

The

aroused

launching

by

Gandhi's

of the

salt

march

and

reports of arrests and police brutality pushed many students and youths into the agitation in the middle months of 1930. Rajagopalachari, trying to tap this reservoir of student excitement,

urged

that

at

least

one

generation

of

India's

youth should throw itself into the national struggle: "Is not adventure the peculiar privilege and duty of youth?",

he asked.°°

There were also

cipation.

In the

depression

and

pressures

graduate

unemployment

atmosphere

with

urban Tamilnad, in agitation as

economic

behind

of uncertainty

student

created

already

parti-

by the

high

in

students and youths often saw participation a more attractive and satisfying activity

than continuing an education which offered no certain rewards.” Their parents and relatives might at first disapprove, but more often they were willing to offer a limited measure of support: food, money, a disused building where the satya-

grahis

could

stay.

At

first

a few boys waving flags would come to any harm. Madras, created its own

picketers

became

there

into

the

small

The Brunt

a nuisance

to

the

existed

was

local

authorities;

towns

and

villages.

Naidu.

former

renewed

did not

in

S. Muthiah

second

Congress

recreate

1920-22.

ao third-rate,

elections a Justice

and

The

by to

Mudaliar

third

and

the political

new

unemployed

and

ministers,

a reduced resurrect

boycott

in October 1930 ministry under

Governor,

on government

files

were

defeated,

majority, joined the United Nation-

the

politician

below

the

Sethuratnam

return

situation

Sir

of

George

little

of

the opinions

mental secretaries and executive councillors. therefore, show the enthusiasm Willingdon had

a Justice

which

had

Stanley,*

and the least diligent of the four Governors Madras during the dyarchy period. "I agree" was his usual

comment

they

the most stubborn of them local heroes and martyrs

parents and relatives were drawn, often bethe fray. The mood of confrontation spread

but Subbarayan, re-elected with other opposition MLCs alist Party. The

thac

of Everything

B. Muniswami

ministry

the

and way

Following the provincial Independents were replaced by Aiyar,

to fear

anc decked in khadi and Gandhi caps But agitation, as we have seen in momentum: the demonstrators and

were dispersed by the police beaten or arrested. In this were born, and wildered, into

was no reason

imagination received eloquent

of depart-

He did not, displayed in

132 drawing

the

Justice

Party

into

che

struggle

against

the

Congress in 1920-22. During the middle months of 1930 the legislature had not been in session and when it did meet the burden for defending government policies rested not with the Justice ministers, Executive Council: Krishnan Nair, the

police, in

owed

the

his position

cabinet,

he was

but with the two former Justicites on the Muhammad Usman, the Home Member, and Law Member. Usman, responsible for the

not

slow-witted

to

his

and

to Muslim own

claims

to have

abilities.

easily

confused

in

and

its

A

its

largely

Brahmin

composition

by

bull

the

the jibes and interjections of the United 1920-22 the opposition in the council had

a place

of

a man,

legislature

Nationalists. been inhibited antipathy

by

In by

to non-

cooperation, but in 1930-33 there was a far more experienced and largely non-Brahmin opposition leadership — which included Venkatachelam

Chetti,

Arogyaswami

Mudaliar,

Ramalingam

as well as Subbarayan — to harass the government and the Congress from within the legislature. Moreover,

Chetti

to abet the

novelty of dyarchy had gone. Its limitations were known though the powers and patronage of the ministry had not ceased

to

be

an

attraction

there

was

no

longer

for commnal privileges. Politicians had begun ward to the day when dyarchy would be scrapped. The

obedience

Government more

of Madras,

openly

and

therefore,

directly

10 years before. On 4 June 1930 its servants in all departments,

tracy

and

police

alone,

were

than

a scramble

to look

opposed

had

civil

seemed

and

fordis-

necessary

the government warned that and not those in the magis-

expected

to

"show

by

every

means

at... [their] disposal... [their] strong and active disapproval of the movement." Every public servant, especially touring officials, “should take every opportunity...of

promoting loyalty to exposing by informal

representations

and

the Government and of talks and discussions

economic

fallacies

countering and the lies, mis-

that

are

used

in

support of the Congress Programme".”7! Official encouragement was given to anti-Congress meetings by Muslims, Indian Christians, district and local board presidents and by leading landholders. The government was particularly eager to

recruit the latter, believing that the "zamindars and big landholders...constitute a class with a real stake in the country" and passessed "considerable local influence..."

Most

of

them

But,

everything

"constantly

and by

were

in

the

was

beyond

government's

borne

by

overstrained

the Public,

‘restrained

"loyal

[and]

the

and

own

police

often

from action..."

question".7”

“

assessment,

force".

overworked,

under

The

abused

taunts

‘The newty

"the

and

brunt

police in

the

insults

created

of

were

Press

Presidency

133 General

Reserve

mobile

pressing

March what

was

report, ing,

the

1931

political but

664

year

the Madras

public".’>

published

the of

civil

"general

Response

June

government

was

with

held

constantly

moderate

out

was

the

part

from

gestures

to the

1930,

with

the main

disobedience

government

termed

in

combined

mofussil.”

measures

variously

police,

reserves, played

in

repressive

the

armed

armed

agitation

During

balance

of

district

that

highly

in

March

1930

and

prospect

of

to

reassure

or

"the

Commission's

negative

to

concerned

would

opinion"

Simon

sup-

disappoint-

a

new

con-

stitution, warning of the dangers of violence and economic dislocation if the Congress were not checked. But civil disobedience was no longer the glimpse of hell that it had seemed

to moderate sure,

it

importance

was

Congress

in

politicians

in

often

and men

violent,

understanding

the

1920s

and

of property

but

— and

the

this

difference

that

in

the

in

is

1920-22.

of

between

1930s

To be

fundamental

the

Tamil

— civil

dis-

obedience was no longer regarded by the majority of the professional and commercial middle classes or by the bulk of the landholders and cultivators as a revolutionary movement that menaced their lives and property. On the contrary, reports of lathi charges and of policemen beating up satyagrahis in the jails were now the cause of concern to "the political public". Civil disobedience had been largely successful in by-passing the Justice Party and creating a direct confront-

ation with movement — obedience propertied

the Raj. The Congress had not created a mass indeed, it avoided unleashing one — but civil disinduced an important shift in the attitudes of the classes.

The Pact and After Through the efforts of the Indian constitutionalists Sapru

reached the

between

beginning

Irwin

Pact

of

the Congress March

the Congress

and

1931.

Viceroy, Lord Irwin, and the and Jayakar, a settlement was

the Government

Under

the

"discontinued"

terms

civil

of

of

the

India

at

Gandhi-

disobedience

and

agreed to participate in the Second Round Table Conference later in the year. This was clearly an attempt to draw the Congress back into the constitutional game. In return the

government against

promised

civil

to remove

disobedience

in

the

some

ordinances

provinces

introduced

and

to

release

all prisoners convicted for civil disobedience offences but who had not used or advocated violence. Salt could be collected

for

by

their

sympathy

villagers

domestic

with

civil

in

use;

areas

adjacent

village

disobedience

to

officers would

be

salt

who

pans

had

but

only

resigned

reinstated

if

in

their

134 posts had and cloth

not already been filled. The right to picket liquor shops was conceded but picketing must be "unaggres-

sive" in character and free from "coercion, intimidation, restraint, hostile demonstration, obstruction to the public, or any offence under the ordinary law" — failure to observe

these to

conditions

picket

would

result

locally.”

In Tamilnad there was Congressmen who had wanted

and

the

the

the

release

almost

idea

of all

complete

political

of an agreement were

hostilities

rather

with

of

of the right

prisoners.”’ the

the

elated

roy had negotiated with Gandhi this sense of triumph the pact

a truce.

movement

government

that Gandhi he had done

generally

than

suspension

some criticism of the Pact by any enquiry into police conduct

exhaustion

and there were no regrets than tried to fight on as

Congressmen

in the

by

But,

by

was

in

March

not

view

1931,

of

opposed

had compromised rather in December 1921.

the

fact

that

the

Vice-

as an equal, and because of brought an intensification of

Conflict between the government and the Congress in Tamilnad developed rapidly over the drink issue. Rajagopalachari

and

other

partymen

encouraged

caste

panchayats

to

and

the

fine

or ostracize those who defied caste prohibitions on the consumption of alcohol. He argued that this was a legitimate

practice

authority

long sanctioned of

the

Rajagopalachari

by Hindu

government

wrote

to

to

society

interfere.

Stanley's

private

beyond

"...it

must",

secretary

8 September 1931, "be open to classes and castes who hitherto permitted their members to use intoxicating

on

have liquor,

which, in a very great measure, contributes to their lower status in Hindu society, to seek to raise themselves socially as well as economically by adopting the practice of so-called

higher

castes

chari, Brahmin drink tactics.

cases

the

coercion

example,

in regard to total abstinence."”®

and nationalist, was back at his old The Madras government was sure that

dictation

and

was

a report

Congress funds. 7? More

Rajagopala-

serious

of

caste

panchayats

amounted

from

Salem

that

fines

politically

was

the

motivated.

caste

question

of

There

to

was,

were

liquor-shop

caste-andin many

physical for

paid

into

picketing.

In the first months after the pact the government was generally disposed to allow "peaceful" picketing. On 6 March 1931, a day after the publication of the pact, advised district magistrates "to take no

picketing

danger

were

unless

and

until

it

threatens

to the public peace..."°

reaching

the

Secretariat

of

the Chief Secretary notice whatever of

serious

disorder

But by early May reports

aggressive

Congress

or

picketing

135

which

had

district

tackle

tween which

almost the

amounted

magistrates

the

cordoning

were

picketing.®!

given

off

of drink

"unfettered

This

provoked

from

Rajagopalachari

shops,

and

of disputes

be-

discretion"

a series

magistrates and Congress organizers over the picketing was allowed under the Gandhi-Irwin

daily

letters

Secretariat

ions

to

supplied

gopalachari's

rapidly

asking

to

local

letters

exhausted

the

for

details

officials

by

turns

tolerance

of

to

cunfidential

concerning

obsequious

of

the

the

to

terms on Pact and

Governor

instruct-

picketing.

and

and

Raja-

threatening,

Under-Secretary,

Williams, and the new Chief Secretary, G.T.H. Bracken. After one exchange of letters, Bracken noted on 5 September that "Mr, Rajagopalachari's object in continually writing and

making allegations is, presumably, partly position as an ‘intermediary’ between the

to establish his Government and the

people".®?

The magistrates and police equally incensed by the tactics

M.K.

Vellodi,

Williams

on

29

District

October:

During the very large

Officers

Magistrate

officers in the of the Congress of

North

last six months I have number of reports from

and

from

officers

districts after the

Arcot,

wrote

received Police

of the

were pact.

to

a

Excise

Department and also from my Sub-Divisional Magistrates of incidents relating to picketing which in my opinion constitute definite breaches of the pact. I have received reports of consumers

and

in

acting

ished

being

some in

at

obstructed,

instances

the

the

name

of

moderation

abused,

assaulted Congress

with

black-mailed

by

...

which

picketers I

am

the

aston~

Police

of every rank in this District have behaved throughout the last few months. I myself have been at pains to see that the conditions of a pact by no means easy to work are faithfully observed by officers subordinate to me. Williams thought Vellodi's report an "admirable document", but Bracken would not allow him to send a copy to Rajagopalachari.®™

Other the

district

Secretariat

question

of

magistrates

"if"

for

and

assurances

— the

next

the

that

civil

Commissioner —

it

disobedience

they would have the authorization to the very day that Civil Disobedience the the

when

of

was

Police

no

asked

longer

campaign

crush the Congress is renewed".®

a

began “on

For once the Government of India was in agreement with Madras predilection for prompt, decisive action against Congress. As early as July 1931 the Government of India

136 began

to draft

obedience

plans

campaign,

for

the

fearing

suppression

the

Gandhi

of

might

a new

civil

after

dis-

all

decide

against participation in the Round Table Conference in London. Although Gandhi's departure from Bombay on 29 August postponed

preparations, they were soon resumed and the provincial governments were consulted as to the nature of the ordinances they would require in combating a revived movement.** By December

it was

1931

clear

that

Gandhi

the

returned

crisis

was

imminent.

to India disillusioned

make any headway in London: he was far negotiations than round table wrangling details. But, despite the certainty of

Congress leadership had anticipating that there

made few plans would again be

Gandhi and the Viceroy, pecting that repression

had been

in

now Lord would be

1930.

This time, however, the negotiate. Rebuffed, Gandhi

disobedience and emptive strike. lawed

and

party

leaders

Madras

bv his

December

failure

of its own, perhaps negotiations between

government was in no mood to advised the CWC to revive civil

launched its prePatel were arrested

1932; ordinances were promulgated in force; and Congress committees

government's

to

Willingdon, certainly exas gradually applied as it

rounded

up

to set the agitational machine in 404 Congressmen were arrested and

The

28

better at face-to-face over constitutional renewed conflict, the

at once the government Gandhi and Vallabhbhai

daybreak on 4 January they were not already

On

faith

in

before

they

had

a chance

motion. In Tamilnad convicted in January

attack

seemed

at

where out-

alone 1932.°

vindicated.

At first bewildered and disoriented, the Tamil Congressmen who had escaped capture launched a counter-attack. In Madras city in January and February 1932 small bands of picketers were posted to attract crowds and to provoke police aggression. In one incident on 25 January Mrs Rukmani Lakshmipathi posted two volunteers outside a store selling foreign

cloth

in

Rattan

Bazaar

Road

to

picket

and

distribute

leaflets advocating the boycott of foreign goods. A crowd of 200 soon gathered and, anticipating a breach of the peace, Inspector V.A. Currie gave the picketers two minutes to disperse. When they ignored his warning, the two volunteers were beaten with canes as an "unlawful assembly". They crawled across the road to Mrs Lakshmipathi's waiting car and were driven

to

arrested.

hospital

instructions

Inspector issued

for

medical

Currie

to

the

attention;

claimed

police

stipulated that picketers should Mrs Lakshmipathi complained that

on

that 4

there

he was

January

they

were

following

1932

which

be dispersed "vigorously"; the police used "all their

might" in beating the volunteers; it was, she most violent thing I have ever witnessed'".°*

added, "the Accounts of

the

137 incident

when

were

the

reported

volunteers

went

trap,

as

in

the

on

press

that

trial;

and

evening

the

and

repeated

beating

formed

basis of questions in the legislature. It demonstrated that the Congress was not easily quietened. The government was annoyed at Currie's "error of judgement" in walking into the Congress

which

the

but,

Police

allowance

must

zeal".®°

are

be

This,

Bracken

working

made

however,

for

was

are

Congressmen

their

began

campaign

disobedience

ties

were

to

against

movement

occasional

doubt

such

had

extremely

those

who

not

The Tamil Congress would Raj for long: the weight

the

observed,

the

an

err

conditions

difficult

owing

to

under

and

some

excess

of

isolated case. °°

not maintain its defiance of of repression was too great and value

odds.

By

of

trying

April

disintegrated,

"conferences"

temples, the circulation of sheets, and minor instances

"the

the

and

held

to

1932 the

continue

the

civil

only

secretly

in

activi-

fields

cyclostyled leaflets and newsof incendiarism. But the govern

or

ment's counter-propaganda was slow, because it was more scrupulous in investigating incidents than the nationalists, and in such a war of propaganda as the Congress was engaged with the Raj, speed and drama made greater impact than be-

lated

The

apologies

Funetion Civil

India

The

complete and

in

1947.

13

independence

of civil

directed

had

But

at

been

objective

years

%)

Disobedience

disobedience

abandonment ence

of Civil

proclaimed

achieved

only

and rebuttals.

were

crushed,

of

for

some

had

it

failed?

movement

was

to

win

from colonial

to

intervene

disobedience

winning

the

but

in

rule.

between

1934

Congressmen

independence.

and

the

This

the

Indian

struggle

for

was not

formal

independ-

was

not

For Gandhi the struggle itself was at least as important as any constitutional goal. Civil disobedience was an opportunity for Indians to develop their own political strength

and

to make

Young Table

Gandhi

Britain

perceive

and acknowledge

India on 23 January 1930 about Conference and the decision to

explained:

The is

British

to

come

people

to

an

must

end.

realize

This

it.

Writing

in

the boycott of the Round launch civil disobedience,

they

that

will

the

not

Empire

realize

unless we in India have generated power within to enforce our will. The English have paid dearly for their freedom such as it is. They therefore only respect those who are prepared to pay an adequate price for their own liberty. The real

138 conference,

therefore,

selves.

Rajagopalachari

complementary

saw

has

civil

objectives.

to

be

among

disobedience

Firstly,

in

a

our-

as

regional

having

two

context,

it

was to build up the strength of the party by mobilizing as many volunteers and sympathizers as possible and establishing active committees throughout Tamilnad. The careful prepar-

ations

for

the

Vedaranniyam

march

indicate

this

as

much

as

widespread and intensive liquor agitation of 1931. A broadbased party would resolve the communal problem by incorporating a non-Brahmin majority; a strong party could flex its

muscles

and

make

Secondly,

in

its

opponents

appreciate

an

all-India

contest,

its

strength.

through

of organized strength and popular support, the be in a position to negotiate with the British constitutional settlement it wanted. Complete

which Rajagopalachari had rejected as an at the Vedaranniyam conference in August

ultimate secure

aim,

but

a more

the

suitable

immediate

strength"

and

tion

had

only

"a

premature

terms..."

recently

of

constitution

Rajagopalachari had opposed Table Conference because he

satisfactory

task

%

than

demonstrations

Congress would the sort of independence,

impractical 1929, might

the

the

Congress

dyarchy.

objective be an

In

was

1921

to

Congress participation in a Round felt that "we had not shown enough

settlement

But

been

in 1921

introduced;

would

end

the dyarchy in

in

1930-33

very

un-

constituits

successor was being devised while the civil disobedience movement was in progress. "This", explained Rajagopalachari in Madras in October 1930, "was the psychological moment, when the Round Table drama was being played in London, for them to carry on the real fight here. It was no use telling people to imagine that that was the theatre of action. The theatre

of action was in India".°? How

was

agitation

in

India

to

determine

constitution-

making in London? Two ways were possible. Speaking of the differences between [:xtremists and Moderates in 1919, Rajagopalachari suggested that the one in practice helped the

other. "Moderate opinion gets its value only by pointing the strength of Nationalist discontent, and the growing

dangers thereof. Nationalist opinion shaped into a true political force by

is duly restrained the opposition of

that

the

moderate

opinion". ®

It

Liberals

at

Round

Congress

British

agitation

the

feared

three

that

might

would

their

be

that

stiffen

Table

position

in

1930-32

demands

Conferences. in

challenged by the Congress, they would erates by making concessions to them.

India try The

was

he

of

at

and

hoped

the

If the

seriously

to rally the modmore persistent the

139 Congress

agitation

moderates

But

thought

would

it

is

the

reap

in

more

India,

for

other

likely

Liberals

too

the

greater

Indians

that

by

to

1930

deficient

come

to

terms

with

his

with

the

harvest

Congress

the

enjoy.

Rajagopalachari

in courage

mination to play a useful role in London. of the Congress proving through agitation must

the

and

deter-

It was now a case that the British

and

not

with

other

parties. Failure to meet the demands of the Congress would result in the breakdown of any constitution it opposed. By contrast

Rajagopalachari

attitude

welcomed

in

December

Gandhi's

1921,

in

October

participation

in

1931

the Round

Table Conference because "Last year, we made Britain perceive our strength".°® The moment seemed opportune to drive a hard bargain. Even if the Congress failed to secure all its constitutional aims at the conference it was, Rajagopalachari suggested to Gandhi, better "to try and get as much as you can

under

may

be

for

the

existing

resorting

reduced

stitution

circumstances,

to Satyagraha to

[to

a minimum...",

to be drafted

so

force

rather

without

that

further than

the

necessity

concessions]

allow

the Congress.°

the

con-

It was

essential that the pressure on the British should be maintained while Gandhi was in London: Rajagopalachari's persistent letters to the Government of Madras and the intensive

picketing

during

designed

to

the Gandhi-Irwin

achieve

Rajagopalachari

returned

at

the

end

this

end.

was

too

of

Pact

period

optimistic,

December

were

and when

empty-handed

from

partly

Gandhi the

Round

Table Conference, Rajagopalachari wrote that "India has been turned back from the London Conference in tragic unfulfilment".°? Reluctantly, he turned back to civil disobedience, continuing

courting in

August

to

1933,

of protest

Joint

keep

one

imprisonment

eye

for

on

the

developments

Rajagopalachari

against

Parliamentary

the

recent

Committee

last

time

explained

in

London.

during

discussion

this

on

In

the movement

as

a gesture

safeguards

by the

on the constitution.

Rajagopalachari was not alone in Tamilnad in relating civil disobedience to constitutional objectives. A similar

attitude on the part of the Swarajists helps to explain

participate Madras

in agitation

government,

cooperation,

civil

the constitutional the

India

In practice,

form of the Act

of

too,

in

noted

1930-33 that,

than by

in

1920-22.

contrast

disobedience was "designed

to

issue..."%?

the

Congress

constitution

1935.

moderate nationalists and their greater willingness

Its

contributed

embodied

achievements

very

in the

were

with

former to

The

non-

precipitate little

Government

indirect.

to

of

Through

140 agitation

among

the

those

act,

and

its

power

struggle

by

Tamil

classes the

against

Congress

which

organizational the

vis-a-vis

Raj,

its

built

were

the

other

a broad

enfranchised strength

party

was

opponent,

basis

under

of

developed in

the

effect

Justice

the in

support

new

the

augmenting

Party.

CHAPTER

5

CoALESCENCE For

the

Congress

first

10

years

in Tamilnad

of

was

the

dyarchy

perplexed,

lysed, by its own disunity. It Raj and the Justice Party — but

constitution

at

times

the

almost

para-

had two clear opponents — the it failed to devise a poli-

tical strategy which would either knock out both or despatch the one and enable the Congress to concentrate its blows on the

other.

stantly

or

not

tried

Instead,

favouritism;

hesitate

public

to trip one

Brahmin

and

faction

bickered

each

to publicize

platforms;

and

non-Brahmin

other

its

for alleged

and

communal

another

and

would-be

leaders

punched

in the press

con-

slights

with

grievances

leaders

Congressmen

did

and on

and jostled their rivals and made faces when Gandhi or the Congress Working Committee told them to remember their nationalist manners. From 1930 the situation changed. factional, communal and personal abuse

region's political slang. But the from civil disobedience internally

izationally

decade.

as

those

As

more if

in

powerful

than

a balance,

of the Justice

Party

the

Tamil Congress emerged more cohesive and organ-

it had been fortunes

fell.

become,

either

in

terms

of

the

during

of

As the

of the Justice Party, and especially of tracted, that of the Congress expanded.

not

Not magically, for remained part of the

size

the

the previous

Congress

social

rose

composition

its leadership, conA mass party it did

of

its

membership

or

the thrust of its policies, but its influence and popularity extended far enough to win a dramatic success for the Congress in the first elections under the new constitution.

The Party Tamil

When

Consolidates Srinivasa

Swarajists

Iyengar

early

in

resigned

1930,

he

from

left

no

leadership heir

of the

apparent.

Rangaswami Iyengar preferred the influence he now exercised as editor of the Hindu and as Congress veteran to an active leadership

role.

C.N.

Muthuranga

141

Mudaliar,

Srinivasa

142 lyengar's

nominee

for

little authority stature to rival

the

TNCC

president

within the party: Rajagopalachari.

in

1929,

he did not Satyamurti,

commanded

have the having failed

to create a new Congress party within the legislature, withdrew from the political stage. In the absence of an accepted leader and in view of the renewed boycott of the legislatures, the Swarajist element of the Tamil Congress preferred to wait in the wings until, as in 1922-23, the moment seemed opportune

for

them to return.

But movement

the unexpected forced them to

Congress ban legislatures

strength of the civil disobedience participate. It was clear that the

would not be in September

lifted 1930.

before the elections To defy the Cengress

to the boycott

at the height of public enthusiasm for civil disobedience might be considered treachery and damage the future political career of those who called themselves nationalists. And it is certain that many of them were genuinely excited by the struggle and moved by the suffering of the activists. Satyamurti, who "apparently feared political extinction if he failed to advertise",! was drawn into the movement by Rajagopalachari in October 1930 as his successor as TNCC

president.

when K.

Satyamurti

he was

caught

Bashyam

Iyengar,*

avoided

and

arrest

imprisoned

formerly

until

January

in the pre-emptive

a close

professional

1932,

strike.

and

poli-

tical associate of Srinivasa Iyengar, was a more enthusiastic convert to civil disobedience. In March 1930 he resigned from the TNCC in protest against the boycott of the legis-

latures,

but

promised

to

help

the

satyagraha.

funds for the Vedaranniyam march and Mudaliar and the latter's nephew, M.

organized between

spell

man

in

swadeshi

April

and

Madras

and

of

freedom

Congressmen,

who

propaganda

July

in

it

1930.%

October was

directed

in

Madras

1930,

the

collected

with Muthuranga Bhaktavatsalam,

During

and

in

city's

the

he

mofussi]

Rajagopalachari's

Bashyam

Bashyam,

He

was

his

conjunction

picketing

in

brief

right-hand

with

the

Telugu

first

months of 1931, on one occasion receiving a severe beating in a police lathi-charge.? On the resumption of civil disobedience in January 1932 Bashyam evaded arrest to continue

to organize resistance, but he was leading a demonstration in protest Madras of the Lothian Committee on

ment

The

former

to civil

action

was

themselves agitation

believed

Swarajists

disobedience.

unshaken,

and

at

that

for

that

civil

but

their

did

they

not

Their saw

group to

juncture.

They,

disobedience

imprisoned in March for against the visit to the franchise." have

faith

the

long-term

like

commit-

in constitutional

political

be won could

a

gains,

by assisting

for

the

Rajagopalachari,

influence

the

outcome

143

is was in constitutional discussions in London.* contrast with the Nationalists' basic hostility to

of the marked

1920-22.

in

non-cooperation

for

atmosphere

favourable

disobedience.

civil

after

the period

in

groups

other

with

cooperation

a

created

participation

Their

Although there had been no challenge to Rajagopalachari's leadership during the movement from the ex-Swarajists, there was one from an increasingly powerful group of party activists.

With

most

of

drifted

educated

the

the

collapse

Congress

away

from

ones

who

of the non-cooperation

volunteers,

the party. remained

numbering

The higher

yravitated

movement

no

more

caste

than

and

towards

in 1922

better

2,000,

Rajagopalachari

and participated in his struggle against the Swarajists; later they served in the Tamil Nadu branch of the All-India Spinners' Association, which had its headquarters at Tiruppur, or they followed him to the Tiruchengodu ashram, where they

lived on a modest salary from Congress funds. A few of the non-Brahmins defected with Ramaswami Naicker and Ramanathan to

form

other

the

Self-Respect

group

movement.

of activists

or high caste. Tiruvannamalai

who

But

could

there

seldom

remained

boast

of education

Several, like N. Annamalai Pillai* of in North Arcot, were the sons of dancing

girls and prostitutes; Virudhunagar in Ramnad

some, like K. Kamaraj Nadar* from were from relatively poor families

despised castes; yet others, like R. Srinivasavarada a Brahmin from Madura district, cared less for their

plot

of land

these

pise

than

Although

activists

him.

for

drawn

They

the

into

distrusted were

life

the

of a political

Congress by

his

non-cooperation

they were not share

disappointed by either Gandhi's

obsession the

with

Congress

followed

and

spinning.

mainstream

Subramania

Tinnevelly

for physical

Siva,.

disturbances

and verbal

civil

Iyengar, little

and

1918

came

and

camaraderie imagination

disobedience

of by

the the

After

1922

they

backwaters

who had 1908

violence

been

and

who

of

their

a central imbued

and a contempt

in

his

party boldness

program,

drifted

1922

to des-

intellectualism,

the failure of the movement scruples about non-violence

into

of

his

and

vagabond.°®

between

Rajagopalachari

alienated

aloofness from the back-slapping menials. Gandhi had caught their of

an-

away

own.

figure them

but

and nor

did his

from

They

in the

a zest

for Europeans

They held unofficial satyagrahas satyagraha" in 1924 in Madura or

— like the abortive "sword the more sensational cam-

orthodox

to shun

paign against the statue of General Neill, a British hero 1857, in Madras in 1927.’ They toured Tamilnad singing Nationalist songs and performing patriotic dramas. The

Gandhians

were

inclined

them as violent,

of

144

uncouth

youths,

paying them services as by the late

venience

but

the

Swarajists

were

more

sympathetic,

to canvass at election times or employing their orators and flag-wavers. Humble beginnings, but 1920s this group of activists — which for con-

may be called

the

Kamaraj-Annamalai

Pillai

group

after two of its most active members — was firmly established on the middle rungs of the party organization in Tamilnad. They were experienced in the rough-and-tumble of local faction fights and they had contacts with local big men. In Ramnad,

for example, Kamaraj and his friend K.S. Muthuswami hitched themselves to the anti-Justice faction in Virudhunagar and were instrumental in bringing several wealthy Nadars into

civil

the

P.S.

disobedience

movement.®

Kumaraswami

speaking

1930

Raja

Kumaraswami

Raja,* was

1930,

control

should

by

also

a

town

leading

in

the

figure

of

the

displacement

A year

later,

of the

by proposing

Vedaranniyam

murti, his reputation NCC elections in May president

with

president

and

Rajan

fortuitous.

brand

of

with the Congress such

place

as

as

secretary

Satyamurti

and

N.M.R.

was

occupied

between

Satyamurti

Himself

in the Tamil

him with

but

support

poor

advocate

ambition him

the

of

oratory,

Iyengar,

and

he

the

Satyamurti,

to be

could

to

themselves into the elected, they could

in

common

take

second

The activists

he

gave

them

in

the

well-known. party

to be a patrons

provided

access

and a champion other benefits

Rajagopalachari, local

was

own peppery

was ambitious dependence on

always

of

vice-

remaining

of his

had

the

as

activists

had

party;

was

the

much

unlike

use

the

had

participation

a minister

activists

in

Satyamurti

party hierarchy.

within

Congress

leaving

Subbaraman

of

and a pedlar

the highest echelons of the Congress against Rajagopalachari. There were anticipated.

in

tried

Rajagopalachari

pushed

most

activists' way of life. He leader, but hampered by his

Srinivasa

that

Kamaraj

enhanced by a term in prison. In the 193] Rajagopalachari was re-elected as

activists

nationalist

group

By

they lined up with Satya-

on the TNCC's Working Committee.!?

not

Swarajists

of

The bid failed: the could rival Rajagopala-

places

alliance

with

satyagraha,

as

the

centres

Telugu-

DCC

Pillai

Madura

The

treasurer,

however,

the

Ramnad

the post of president to an activist. activists did not have a candidate who

chari.’®

in

the

with

Rajapalaiyam.

Kamaraj-Annamalai the

of

allied

neighbouring

of the TNCC on

one

closely

lieutenants.°

the

concentrate

the

president

as his

Emboldened

to gain

making

were

community

and Muthuswami March-April

and

They

to field to be

was

boards;

By allying

organization

to

to

an

his

with

launch

local boards and the legislatures. !*Once manipulate the resources of the party and

145 the government fortunes. By

local

1937

and

themselves

in this

party TNCC

between

advance

the

regional

their

activists party

became

and

of

his

chari's

triumph

and

associates

to

No doubt

rift

Satyamurti

on

Satyamurti's

political

for

the

the

the

element

Biographers

a prelude

Kamaraj

aggerates

a

personal

organization.

way a new non-Brahmin as

own

consolidated

secretaries

leadership.

elections

chari and

to

of

in

on

other.!?

strength

Kamaraj

TNCC

in

was

the

and

party

into

the

over

in

was

and

the

1931

Rajagopala-

the

late

1930s

Rajagopalachari

interpretation

annoyed

the

Muthuswami

seen

and

in

mid-1930s

injected

have

side

This

position

the

activists

one

political

and underestimates

dexterity.

Rajagopalachari

their

Kawaraj

the

and

at the

ex-

Rajagopala-

outcome

of

the 1931 TNCC elections, but he turned it to his advantage. He could manipulate the vain, ambitious Satyamurti as he could not have done Srinivasa Iyengar or Rangaswami Iyengar. By nominating Satyamurti his successor as TNCC president in

October 1930 and again in May 1935, Rajagopalachari converted a rival into a dependent. Satyamurti’s second term as president aroused considerable hostility within the party, especially from his former Swarajist colleagues Muthuranga Mudaliar and Bashyam Iyengar. When the critics proposed inviting Srinivasa

Iyengar

back

to

lead

the

Tamil

Congress

it

was

Rajagopalachari's intervention which saved Satyamurti and warded off the threat to them both, just as it was Rajagopala-

chari who took the responsibility for Satyamurti's mismanagement of Congress participation in the local board elections in 1935-36.'"

Moreover,

indirect control while preserving

national was the

Congress

through

Satyamurti

leadership.’®

As

the was

partner. the and own

the

the

could

exercise

an

over the Kamaraj-Annamalai Pillai group his own close contacts with Gandhi and the

the essential link between Tamil Congress, Satyamurti By

he

Swarajists'

involvement

long

as Rajagopalachari

Gandhian High Command inevitably the junior in

civil

and

disobedience,

by

elimination of his main rivals for regional leadership, by drawing together the reins of party control into his hands, Rajagopalachari was able to exercise a command over party

which

centralization preliminary

Panting sensus

stage

to take

It was

had

of

and

a wider

evaded

internal

process

of

him

in

the

consolidation

1920s.

coalescence. '®

was

This

the

Office

closely

within

persistently

of control

the

followed

Tamil

party

by

on

the

the

creation future

of a virtual

aims

and

con-

tactics

146 of the Congress. For a period of about a year, from mid-1932 to late 1933, this was in doubt. Civil disobedience had helped to draw the Tamil Congressmen together and there was a

danger that cooperation al

In

its swift collapse in 1932 that had been achieved.

September

proposals

which the

would

caste

the

to

Harijans)

give

known

as

the

Gandhi

reserve

within

the

Gandhi

untouchables

Fearing

that

fasted

seats

Poona

Pact,

Among

until

for

a joint

constitution.!”?

protested

consideration

Hindus,

Hindus,

agreed

1932

under

would

by

against

the

British

a separate

this

would

the

was

electorate.

constitution-

electorate

irreparably

leaders

(whom

he

into

the

The

incorporated

Gandhi's

the

government

untouchable

untouchables

Hindu

destroy

supporters,

now

from

split

called

agreement,

and

1935

indeed

among

many Indians who sympathized with his social views, the fast stimulated concern for the plight of the untouchables. Raja-

gopalachari,

negotiations,

who

had

been

abandoned

at

Poona

much

of

during

the

caution

the issue of untouchability during the in Tamilnad for the opening of temples relied mainly on persuasion, proposing the

Madras

of referenda

whether into

legislature

among

or not

in such matters

of

change

— the

and

in

was withdrawn

The

political

orthodox

past,

it

Harijan

the

the

Rajagopalachari'’s

lature

bill

users

Madras

fast

and

had

shown

would

authorize

bill

Brahmins for

who had

the

Hindus

the

temple

in

1934.?9

Tamilnad

Although

party

no

it

on

in

the

was

not

decide

He ran

many

legisits

of

supporters

any

a version

without

among

holding

opposed

— and

central

offended

co-workers

to

jurisdiction

vigorously

been Congress new

had

untouchables

introduced

in August

campaign

legislature of

the

1920s and campaigned to the Harijans. He through Subbarayan in

a particular

orthodox

treatment

achievements.

won

that

of

he

it should be opened to the Harijans.’®

difficulties

radical

a

the

the

the

in the

non-Brahmin

caste Hindus and among untouchable leaders. Previously the Madras government and, with varying success, the Justice Party had championed the cause of the untouchables, but from 1932 the Congress established a claim to have advanced their interests.?° In view of the large number of seats reserved

for the Scheduled Castes under the 1935 Act this was a significant development. The Congress made a real contribution

to the

welfare

Tamilnad

in

of the Harijans.

1933-34

about

Rs.

During

10,000

Harijan movement, most of which was water-supplies and accommodation as

and hostels

scale of the superficial:

for Harijan

students.?!

Gandhi's

were

tour

collected

of

for

the

spent on wells, roads, well as for scholarships

Compared

with

the vast

problem of untouchability these measures were the economic and social oppression of the

147

untouchables asset

for

was

the

unrelieved.

But

Congress.

The

Harijan

movemert

the

Harijan

issue

also

they

were

opened

up

the

Madras

a useful

a new

political

front

against

the government at a time when civil disobedience had died out. It was fear that the Congressnen would make political capital from

that

led

government

to

block

Rajagopalachari's temple entry bill in che legislature in 1932-33, and there were rumours that funds collected for Harijan work would find their way into Congress coffers to

finance a revival

of civil

disobedierce.”*

The agitation

brought Congressmen and their allies back onto public platforms and into the news at a time when the Congress appeared crushed and its official organizations were illegal. While Rajagopalachari was engaged Satyamurti, who was too orthodox

ment,

welcome

any

material

position, *

the

sought

Congress

in

Nationalists

an

or

legal

improvement

In

association

alternative

Tamilnad.

in the

in the in his

legislature

issue

he took

on

Harijan outlook

of

the

which

with

moveto

Harijans' to

the

revive

United

up the cause

of the

landholders and cultivators hit by falling crop prices during the depression. In November 1933 the opposition moved a resolution in the Madras legislature for a reduction in land revenue rates to compensate for the losses sustained by agriculturists;. Satyamurti, from outside the legislature, co~

operated with demand a 33.3

quickly

the per

MLCs cent

mobilized

in organizing a "Land cut in land taxation.

locally

influential

Revenue Day" to The agitation

moderate

politicians

in the mofussil including Brahmin mirasdars in Tanjore and V.C. Vellingiri Gounder of Coimbatore who presided over the Madras Presidency Ryotwari Landholders' Conference organized

by United

Nationalists

Although

tation,

like

stunt"

and

ryot,

who,

the

the

"not if

Madras

Harijan

1934.

and

left

concessions

to

Congressmen

system

developed

and

gave

the mid-1930s.?6 in

The

Harijan

1932-33

still civil

served

tried

Telugu

to

agrarian

a Congress

on the part

would

fan

to

make

60

lakhs

agitation it

into

a widespread

politics

and agrarian

outlawed and disobedience

the

1934.7

the

agi-

"political

of the average

best

of

things

the Government of India persuaded

agrarian

into

in January

saw

as

move

himself

amounting

In Tamilnad

quickly

government

movement,

a spontaneous

and pay his taxes"',”®

make

and Congressmen

to keep

flame;

activities

the Congress

rupees

continued

attack

a more

recovering from in early 1932.

of

on

radical of

the

active

in

it to

in January

to smoulder

Andhra

the

it

zamindari

character

in

nationalists

while

it was

the blow struck against They gave Congressmen time

148 to

to

re-examine

the

constitutional

Rajagopalachari

August

accepted

1933,

but

that

Indian

the

the

constitution

future

provincial

was

no

nature of the ‘in April 1933

series

of editorials

ence,

constitutional

1934,

nationalist

1933,

central

likely

of civil work

in the

Rangaswami it

had

feeling,

repression.

had

follow

been

to

his

lead

Paper

the

general

governments

and

Congress

before

the

proposed

made

of

known.

affect

death

that

unexpectedly

asked,

to

a

the

program.

his

argued

beaten

he

he

character

was

the

disobedi-

strong

the

In a

in

civil

standstill

"is

substi-

wave

by

gov-

best

method

itself

away

of utilising this unprecedented awakening to achieve permanently beneficial results?" His reply was that "The newly tapped national energy has to be trained into channels of constructive

activity

Harijan

undertaken

efforts

if

it

work

that

by

Congressmen

ive"

work,

but

argued

that

had

sought

for

nearly

20

constitution party's Unlike

1920's,

not

of a barren or negative

indication

the

is

would

offer

practical the

there

the mid-1930's

was

a

that

were

the

debate

eager

and

it

could

over

was

of

India

the

as

in

an

"construct-

autonomy

Congressmen

was

under

through

in

the

the

course

new

them

fulfilled.?°

strategies

only

others

of

to pursue

be

consensus

this

He saw the

and

legislatures

provincial

years

general

fritter

character".2®

ambitions

bitter

to

Rajagopalachari the

in

Act. With this in view the initiative in pro-

the

an

and

on the

disobedience

as

Gandhi,

to continue

White

a return

disobedience

to

Hindu

"What",

loyalty

substantially

Iyengar

produced

planning

of civil

to try

of the

and

before

from

not

futile

March

abandonment

of

although

ernment

would

be

in

gesture

new Government of India Rangaswami Iyengar took

the

February

TNCC

longer

posing

"tution

Partly

a last

the publication

Agitation

situation

action.

made

it would

movement.”” With

political

in

Tamil

the

that

mid-

Congress

possible.

Dis-

in

cussion, therefore, centred not on »hether to return to the legislatures, but when. Some partymen felt it was premature to discuss council entry until the reforms were finalized or

until

the Government

removed the ban on party the generally favourable

editorials,

Satyamurti

October 1933 in elections under party manifesto

released

prisoners

organizations.*° But encouraged response to Rangaswami Iyengar's

launched

a Madras

anticipation of a fifth dyarchy which was never was an up-dated version

programs of the 1920s, stressing alist control of the legislatures grievances of the people" dress.*! More remarkable

Congress

that than

the the

the and

Swarajya

Party

and by

in

round of provincial in fact held. The of the Swarajist

importance of nationlisting the “burning

party would program was

seek to rethe range of

149 support

which

the

party

secured

from

its

inception.

Along-

side former Swarajists, like Satyamurti, Bashyam Iyengar and Muthuranga Mudaliar, were Satyamurti's allies from the Kamaraj-

Annamalai Pillai group and several of Rajagopalachari's Brahmin associates. Agreement on a parliamentary program afforded Party

April sider

lines

an

internal

Within

similar

six

unity

months

bodies

of

absent

the

were

in

the

creation

formed

of

throughout

1934 Satyamurti and other leaders the formation of a national party of

the

All-India

1920s.

Swarajya

Party

the

Madras

India

and

met in Delhi organization

created

by

Das

Swarajya in

to on

and

conthe

Nehru in January 1923. But although Gandhi said that he was unable to participate in a parliamentary program, most of his

associates

were

enthusiastic

that

it

should

be adopted

as the

Congress program and not entrusted to a separate organization. An informal conference of Congress leaders at Ranchi followed by a meeting of the AICC (which had never been declared illegal) at Patna in mid-May approved the abandonment of civil disobedience and the adoption of a constitutional program to be carried out by the Congress through its own Parliamentary Board. The first task was to elect candidates

and

organize

Assembly

the

scheduled

campaigns

for

elections

for November

to

1934.

the

central

In contrast with Gandhi's negative attitude towards the reorientation of Congress strategy, Rajagopalachari rapidly established himself as one of the leading spokesmen for the new policy. As early as February 1933 he had remarked that the Congress leaders were not "like religious fanatics [who] would for ever stick to "If it were proved that

and

the

would

Provincial

result

in

would not boycott he

insisted

a particular policy", adding that the boycott of the Federal Assembly

Councils

under

irreparable

that

the

harm

the

to

the

legislatures".°?

the

old

differences

"Pro-Changers" were no longer a parliamentary program would

future

Constitution

country,

At Ranchi

between

the

Congress

and Patna

"No-Changers"

and

relevant and that agreement on be a unifying force among Con-

gressmen. "I feel it is best to have a united and coordinated plan", he said, "and not break into groups with opposing policies."** With civil disobedience abandoned, his regional base

strengthened,

and

the

new

AICC

had

only

gopalachari was too to the legislatures Although

Assembly

the

elections

of Congressmen tion, for most

would Tamil

convinced to revive

and did not

constitution

imminent,

of the advantages the controversies resolved

forecast

be to elections Congressmen the

to

what

under logic

Raja-

of returning of the 1920s.

contest

the

the attitudes

the new constituof their regional

150 political would not

situation dictated that a return to the legislatures mean a return to the frustrations of the Swarajists

in the late 1920s. If the Congress were to avoid the trap into which Srinivasa Iyengar's alliance had stumbled in 1926-28, the party must be able to take office to exclude the Justic-

ites and to control patronage Independent ministry must not there was a general consensus Referring

1934

and

to

that

the

"the

reactionary

be

a conclusive

on

the

office,

yan

Party

Party,

from

argument

situation

could

not

afford

favour

itself

by Congress June

1935

to put

in

dolls

Rajan,

support

that

in

for

this

in

July

a communal

power

of Congressmen

a majority".°*> in

claimed

of preventing

entrenching

in

created

remarked

responsibility, but of the country".**

Satyamurti

consideration

if they come in

ministry,

gress

Justice

single

itself. The disaster of the be repeated. On this issue among the Tamil leadership.

should

accepting

reflecting the

time

positions

Subbara-

"the

Con-

of power

and

must accept office in the wider interests Rajagopalachari's conviction was that

"no futile wrecking should be wrung out

should of the

be attempted, but as Councils as possible

thening the prestige and position perception civil disobedience was

of no

much benefit for streng-

the Congress". ” In his longer of immediate use

once the 1935 Government of India Act made the new constitution a fatt accompli, though it remained an ultimate sanction to be invoked if the constitutional path were blocked by the

Governor's

veto or the intransigence

"Down

here",

wrote

Lord

of the Raj.°*

Erskine,*

the

new

Governor

of

Madras in June 1935, "the leaders are simply panting to take office". But, to be fair, it was not simply a question of personal

though

ambition

and

those

motives

forfeit

much

hatred

clearly

of

the

Justice

were.

As

far

Party,

as

strong

Tamilnad

was

concerned, there was no real choice. Civil disobedience could not be revived in the foreseeable future and the Congress

would

of

the

support

it had

accumlated

1930 if it refused to work the new constitution. whole of the dyarchy period Congressmen had been whether

in

the

legislatures

or

outside

them,

but

since

For the in opposition,

they

had

created a rival government of their own. Gandhi had not shown them a practical alternative to participation in the

elaborate mechanism of control by India. And many Congressmen were

jails chari

and on the was

authority

56

and

in

streets.

1935,

to use

which weary

They were

Satyamurti

the powers

48.

the British of 17 years

growing They

old:

wanted

of the provincial

not

ruled in the

Rajagopala-

to

be

in

government

in ways which they believed would advance the cause of Indian nationalism and serve the interests of the Indian people rather

than

the

foreign

rulers.

They

wanted

to

reform

the

151 land revenue system, reduce high salaries

prohibition

and

relieve paid to

promote

the tax burden of the poor, government servants, introduce

cottage

industries."°

They

were

not

revolutionaries; they did not wish to transform Tamil society structurally: so, barring interference by the Governor or obstruction by the Secretariat, a Congress ministry under

provincial

autonomy

objectives.

The

of

aversion

left-wing

factor

in

stitution.

by of

young civil

more

should

radical

1933,

for

India

to

to

achieve

Congress

India

to

take

in

the

mid-1930s

office

the

Congress

Socialist

social

and

economic

program.

the

he

great

equality, nation

called

human

goal

of

nation

and

a further

was

formed

Although

con-

abandonment to adopt a

Jawaharlal

in the mid- 1930s and ideology.”

the

Congress

social

and

by

growth

new

to

lead

economic

of an exploitation

class

its

was

the

Party

speeches language

for

to the ending

by

under

of

to the

disappointed at the wanted the Congress

the party, his with socialist

example,

many

leaders

1934

Congressmen who were disobedience and who

Nehru did not join were often charged In

in

eagerness

In

able

of the Tamil

movements

their

be

class,

to

of

national

freedom within the framework of an international cooperative socialist world federation. This is not such an empty idealist dream as some people imagine.

It

is

within

the

range

of the practical

politics of to-day and the near future.* The

Rajendra

Congress

"Old

Prasad,

Guard",

Vallabhbhai

of Gandhi, made no secret Their welcome to the new

consisting

Patel

of their Congress

and

of

Rajagopalachari,

other

close

associates

dislike of socialism. Socialist Party was a CWC

resolution decrying "loose talk" about class warfare confiscation of property.** Rajagopalachari, never

nationalist

Jawaharlal,“” Nehru out socialist

Having

jealous

of the

conspired

trust

failed

to block

tried

Jawaharlal

to

to

be

Gandhi

placed

with other Congress

of high Congress office speeches during his two

gopalachari

ting

and

Nehru's

face

"the

in

to keep

and to stop him making terms as Congress president.

election

practical

reasonable",

leaders

and the an inter-

and

as president,

he

difficulty was

of

Raja-

somewhat

get-

re-

assured by Nehru's presidential address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936 which emphasized that in India swaraj would have to precede socialism. But by June 1936 Rajagopalachari was

complaining he

continued

that it was impossible to preach

Rajagopalachari,

eral

other

CWC

socialism.

Rajendra

members

Prasad,

resigned

in

to work with Nehru while

At

the

end

Vallabhbhai

protest

of

the

Patel

against

month

and

sev-

Nehru's

152 socialist the

propaganda

best

interests

national

first

and paramount

Gandhi

Old

struggle

helped

Guard,

tactics

to

the

which

of

the

for

they

held

country

freedom

which

and

to

we

be

the

all

"prejudicial

success

hold

concern of the country"."®

patch

basic

up

a compromise

disagreement

remained.

between

between

their

to

of

be

to

the

the

Although

Nehru

ideas

and

the

and

Rajagopalachari, who even in 1930 had little understanding of socialism and where it differed from Gandhism,“” was unwilling to go further than the declaration of social and economic

rights

which

passed at Karachi in ism and disagreement

the

Congress,

1931."® with the

at

Nehru's

prompting,

had

He believed that Nehru's socialOld Guard were responsible for

creating divisions within the Congress at the very time when Rajagopalachari was working for party unity; and he could not

accept Nehru's view that the new constitution must be wrecked. Although there were few socialists in Tamilnad in the mid1930s, Rajagopalachari wanted to keep the direction of the all-India party out of socialist hands. He and other Tamil Congress leaders wanted to direct the party towards consti-

tutionalism

and

wing.

would

not

allow

it

to

be

captured

by

the

left

United Front Even though it was not until after the 1937 provincial elections that the national Congress leadership committed itself to the acceptance of office under the new constitution, the conviction that it would do so provided the basis for the creation of a broad united front against the Justice Party in Tamilnad. The

council

revived

tried

United

to become

Nationalists

an alternative

in

the

fourth

ministerial

Madras

party

to

the Justicites, but it was clear that once the Congress decided to return to the legislature in strength there would

be no room for them. They had limited funds and lacked even a skeletal organization outside the legislature. But while the Justice Party remained in-office and the Congress un-

committed to office-acceptance, the United Nationalists flirted with both the major parties. In July 1933 Subbarayan declared that "it should be the policy of the nationalists to join together into a single party, get into power and work

the constitution to be

able

to

however defective

rally

the

United

it might be..."

Nationalists

and

the

He hoped

Congress-

men who wanted to return to the legislatures behind his own leadership, but the formation of the Madras Swarajya Party by his rival, Satyamurti, in October drove him back to intriguing

153

with

the Justice

Subbarayan

certain

and

that,

ministry

most

of

with

the

The

had

tics and

to

ences in

Liberals

abandoned

hunt

London.

and

for

They

to

Madras,

in

the

delay

an

and

continued

their

never

to

be

weaker

influence

make

views

in

speeches

in

no

Since

provincial

New to

Delhi,

select

English-language

developed

a party

with-

longer

position. and

were

introduced

decision

legislature

to

however,

Nationalists

their

even

Madras

prominence

they

By 1936,

United

constitution

could

were

publish

but

other

new

in a few months, they joined the Congress. they

for office.*°

the

machine,

and

1923

poli-

Simla

audi-

journals

never

cultivated a popular following, never freed themselves from an overwhelmingly Brahmin membership. So, if they were to play any part in Madras politics under the new constitution, they had to ally with one its lingering communalism

Justice

Party

did

not

further

strengthening

of the major parties. . Because and its failing strength the

tempt

them

and

they

opted

for

of

the

Con-

gress, urging it to take office under the new constitution and to carry out a moderate reform program.*! Although Satyamurti was alarmed that their entry might lessen his own chances of office, Rajagopalachari welcomed the Liberals as

the Congress party. *

The nature of legislative politics in Madras under dyarchy had encouraged the fragmentation of MLCs along communal lines. Elected by separate constituencies from

Hindus, tended

the

the

to

Muslim

form

untouchable

themselves

mid-1930s

had banded

MLCs

primarily

MLCs

and,

their

from

together

own

to

were

as

the

a

lesser

extent,

Christian,

nominated

members

who

communal

communal

less

to form

units

communal

representatives;

advanced

a Backward

test against the domination of est non-Brahmin castes.°? But

with

caste-Hindu

Classes

again

and

the

MLCs

demands;

regarded by

the

communities

League

in pro-

the Justice Party by the in the Madras Presidency

highthe

numerical preponderance of the Hindus and the resources of the Congress and Justice parties so outweighed small communal parties that by 1937 the latter opted for integration or alliance with the two main parties. In Tamilnad relations between Hindus and Muslims were relatively free from the bitterness which had been growing in northern India in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Muslim politicians had been willing either to enter the Justice Party in search of improved representation in education and government or to join with the Khilafat issue. After wards of both tactics, the independent course and in

the Gandhians and Swarajists over 1924, dissatisfied with the reMuslim MLCs had followed a more 1930 Yakub Hasan, the former

154

Khilafat leader, organized a separate Muslim party. However, his experience in the legislature in the 1930s led him to believe

could to

that

so

with

a major

not

ally

act

small

a minority

effectively

as

party

as

the

Muslims

an independent

— his

force

preference

was

in

Madras

but

clearly

needed for

the Congress ~ which would reward Muslim support with special concessions. The possibility of co-operation with the

Congress was accepted by two other prominent Muslims — Abdul Hameed Khan, a former Swarajist and in 1935 the first Muslim mayor of Madras, and M. Jamal Muhammad, a Tamil-speaking

Muslim and the spokesman of the leather and hides producers in Tamilnad. They disagreed with Hasan's view that integration with the Congress would be desirable, preferring a separate Muslim party which could ally with the Congress without

losing

its

communal

the Congress majority in would be a small one and

identity.

They

anticipated

the new provincial legislature that a Muslim party, holding the

balance, could extract concessions from the price for its cooperation. In August 1936

selected

president

Board,

set

up

tirely under

by

local

of

the

Muslim

community,

tical

organizations

Tamilnad same

did

seats.

MPB

that

All-India

were

for

and

Justice

Muslim

Congress

but

had

and

failed.

as

or Harijans

the

in Madras

new

the

repeatedly

with

In only

candidates

other

two

en-

poli-

cases

contest

Muslim

in

the

Progressive

Abdul Hakim and leaders. Hakim

ignored

Hakim received

avoided

a result

were

election

of

given

constitution,

to contest

The

almost

for the pro-

Muslim

Abdul claimed

interests

was pro-Congress, it was inimical The MPP was to be an independent

in practice

Party

Although

under

combine

Muslim

organization,

Muslim candidates. °° Castes

to

ends.*

Congress

but

were pledged to work the reforms on behalf of the

was formed in July 1936 by C. Farouki, both former Khilafat

the

League

Parliamentary

MPB candidates

free

these

Muslim

Muslim

February 1937 to press for

but

that, since the MPB Nuslim interests.°®

party,

provincial

Congress as the Jamal Muhammad was

7

A rival

Party, Lateef

the

control.*®

vincial elections in new constitution and

that

Madras

the

1937

the

the

Presidency

16

the

contests

against

Poona Pact the

reserved

attempt

elections

Scheduled

of

as

the Congress in favour of

seats

of the

Justice

Scheduled

in Tamilnad

untouchable

an

Castes

Board was formed in October 1936 to sponsor regardless of their political affiliations. organization, the board soon disintegrated. candidates then joined to declare themselves

support

and

to true communal

leaders

independent Election

body

Harijan candidates Without funds and Many prospective

or made secret agreements the Congress after election;

155 a

few

were

patronized

Christian

community

by

the

did

not

Justice

Party.®°

attempt

to

form

its

The

Indian

own

political

party. Though under dyarchy Madras had been the only province with separate electorates for Christians (with five MLCs),

experience had shown that only major parties could Christians

Muslims,

and

the

Congress

was

through participation in the hope to compete with Hindus and

anxious

to

have

them. ®

Although

the leading Indian Christians were generally loyalist and proJustice in the 1920s, the growing strength of the Congress in the early 1930s persuaded many Indian Christians their allegiance to the nationalist party. Subbarayan's

view,

expressed

in

July

1936

joined the Congress, that in Madras there third major party and that one had either

a Congressman

the new

was a widely accepted

lessons of his own ministry. party, optimistically called

to occupy ties. It tactics,

movement party's

to

when

shift

he

re-

was no room for a to be a Justicite or

one.®*

It had been one of

Nevertheless, in May 1936 a the People's Party, was formed

middle ground between the Justice and Congress paroffered moderate nationalism through legislative

but

and

generally

identified

itself

with

outcome

of

favoured a modest social

formation

was

largely

the

the

non-Brahmin

reform program.®? rivalry

The

between

the Telugu Maharaja of Pithapuram and the Raja of Bobbili,* who replaced Muniswami Naidu as Justice Chief Minister in November

1932.

Mudaliar,

In Tamilnad

from

1928-30

it

was

directed

Subbarayan's

Second

by

S.

Muthiah

Minister,

and

its

main appeal was to the leaders of the backward classes movement, especially M.A. Manickavelu Naicker, a Vanniyar MLC from

North

Arcot.

The

Tamilnad and, numbering in Tamilnad, had failed

Justice

largely

oligarchy:

composed

Vanniyars,

their

of poor

concentrated

in

northern

about three million, the largest to win a place for themselves in community,

agricultural

though

so

labourers,

numerous,

tenants

petty ryots, and the Justice Party's support in their districts came almost exclusively from the landholding castes Vellalas, Reddis and Naidus. The Congress endeavoured to

caste the

was

and

of

gather Vanniyar support in the mid-1930s, notably by identifying itself with Vanniyar opposition to the Criminal Tribes Act in 1935,°" but the Congress, too, was dominated by the Vanniyars' overlords. Manickavelu Naicker attempted, therefore, to use the People's Party as a vehicle for Vanniyar ambitions. At a Vanniyar conference in North Arcot in October 1936, the Maharaja of Pithapuram claimed that the community

should

an

win

12 seats

"effective

in

minority

demands.*> In the five as candidates

the new provincial

party",

able

legislature

to press

1937 elections 12 Vanniyars for the People's Party, but

its

and

communal

form

contested seats, only the two

156

Congress This

Party

the

Vanniyar

candidates

crushing

to

extent

win

defeat

more

to which

than

were

elected.

the

failure

and

one

politics

seat

in

Tamilnad

in

Tamilnad

in

future

of the in

had

People's

1937

illustrate

become

polarized

the

Congress. ®

between the Congress and Justice parties. The Vanniyar leaders belatedly acknowledged this in July 1937 when they re-

solved

to

seek

If the politicians ably

1926;

the

stronger

it

communal

aims

through

Congress had only been an alliance of existing and office-seekers it would not have been apprecithan

might,

Congress

Srinivasa

like

had

that

declined

Iyengar's

alliance,

to

take

electoral

have

office.

alliance

disintegrated However,

the

of

if

coal-

escence of Congressmen and their allies at the level of provincial politics within a constitutionalist party was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of party support in the

was

localities.

large

in its part

The

party

underlying

organization

of those

strength

and

enfranchised

of

the

its ability

in

Tamil

Congress

to mobilize

1937.

a

Zamindar-Ridden The

in its

strength

appeal

of the

Justice

to non-Brahmins

Party

from

in

its

early

years

the professional

lay

and,

to

a lesser extent, landholding classes who sought to displace the Brahmins and establish their own hegemony. During the 1920s many of the Justicites' immediate ambitions were achieved through legislation and through the distribution of government patronage to non-Brahmins. Many of the more enterprising

non-Brahmin

politicians

restricting

or

side

1926

like

the

for

the Tamil

their

this

to

ambitions:

Brahmins

presidency.

encouraged

began

The

before

trend.

Justice

find

they

them,

the

entered

Party's

Although

Justice

they

the

the

Party

sought

loss

of

too

Congress,

power

out-

office

leadership

in

proved

resilient and regained office in 1930, the party was losing to the Congress the support of its original middle-class contingent. This contraction can be attributed to the success of the Congress in scoring political victories against the Justice Party, but it was also a reflection of the domination of the party by zamindars and bankers.

Although

Brahmin

the

Justice

professionals

attracted

the

the

of

financial

Party

was

created

support

and

political

and

businessmen,

from

by

its

increasing

a group early

-backing

of non-

years

of

the

zamindars, especially those in Andhra. The big landholders were loyalists and opposed to non-cooperation; they resented

power

provincial

Brahmin

politics

lawyers

than

that

and

they

allowed

wanted by.

the

a larger

allocation

say

to

in

it

157

them

of six of the

It was

not

other

uncommon

constituencies,

the zamindars provided

funds

the

propaganda

(or

party

zamindars

and

made

to take over

to

in

the Madras

sponsor

Willingdon

part

and

council.

candidates

Goschen

for

encouraged

in politics.®’

Until

the Raja of Panagal was one of the main Telugu zamindars and the Justice Party and

collected

from

needed

to

in

bid

outside

Subbarayan

for

seats

to take a prominent

his death in 1929 links between the he

98 elected

the

run

other

its

legislature.

his

from Panagal

for

big

landholders)

newspapers

One

Justice

the financing

and

of the

the

conduct

leadership

offers in

1929

was

of the party.°®

Headed by the Raja of Bobbili and the Kumararaja of Venkatagiri, the Telugu zamindars played a central part in the leadership contest and were aggrieved when the compromise candidate, Muniswami Naidu, denied them a place in his ministry and

seemed unsympathetic

to zamindar

interests.°°

They were not the only discontented group. The alternative source of funds to the Telugu zamindars was the Raja of Chettinad, a prince among the indigenous bankers of Tamilnad

and

de

facto

head

of

Ramnad's

Nattukkottai

Chetti

community.

The Raja had provided part of the party's financial backing in the late 1920s without completely identifying himself with the Justicites. However, in 1930 his son, M.A. Muthiah Chetti, entered the legislature through the seat reserved for

Nattukkottais

and

Nattukkottais and "Ginger Group" in

omission Naidu

kept

expected

a ministerial

post.

from Muniswami's a precarious

aging 1930.

S.

Chetti

was

Kumaraswami

These

the

the Telugu zamindars formed a Justice November 1930 to show displeasure at their

ministry.”

hold

For two years Muniswami

on

the

party

leadership,

into

the

ministry

November 1932 he was kicked out by Bobbili.”

Muthiah

Together

brought

Reddi,

leadership

who

changes

had

been

Third

corresponded

to

to

but

In 1936

replace

the

Minister

a shift

in

since in

the

party's centre of gravity away from the professional middle class and merchants to the zamindars, bankers and industrialists. By the 1930s the Telugu zamindars were under attack from left-wing Congressmen leading a movement for zamindari abolition — politics in Andhra were developing a more radical character than in Tamilnad — and they needed the Justice Party

as a shield authority.

acterize

the

to protect It

was

now

Justice

their

economic

meaningful

Party

as

evidence could be found in its in the amendment of the Madras 1933.7

ive

and

In

the

Tamilnad,

zamindars

where

as

being

for

privileges the

Congress

"zamindar

and

to

ridden",

political char-

and

opposition to tenants' rights Estates Land Act in November

zamindari

a political

lands

force

were

less

less

extens-

conspicuous,

158 agrarian relations had not yet reached such a crisis as in Andhra. Indeed some zamindars, like Subbarayan, protected their interests by joining rather than antagonizing the Congress. Rajagopalachari in his enthusiasm for a nationalist united front and his antipathy to socialism, welcomed the entry into the Congress not only of zamindars and big landlords, but industrialists and business magnates as well. He urged capitalists not to fear the Congress, but to enter it

to protect from

the

Justicite

gress

their

South

Tyagaraya

during

ment

interests.’?

Indian

civil

to Swadeshi

enous enterprises

There had been some

Chamber

Chetti

had

of Commerce

disobedience

and

been

a

because

later with

its

and curb British

— of which

founder

of

promises

the

Party.

The

Coimbatore

on

the

mill-owners,

favours

of

for

successive

the

— for

the

party's

to foster

financial

Con-

commit-

indig-

interference.”™

But big business in Tamilnad was still rather Congress and inclined to play safe by backing dependent

sympathy

scared of the the Justice

example,

Justice

had

been

so

ministries

and

local pro-Justice notables that the majority of them declared for the Justice Party on the eve of the 1937 elections.” The Nattukkottais were a special case. Their massive banking interests in Burma, Malaya and Indo-China made them feel de-

pendent on British goodwill and — at an independent India could give them

this date — doubtful] that adequate protection over-

seas,

with

in

The Justice the

big

Bihar

Brahmin

the

or

the

Presidency

would

as

"crush

"the extinction classes".7? It branch

ize to

they

into

attempted

the

in

the

United

not dominate to

politics

draw

the

Justice

Party

in

country"

and

cause

clearly

eager

for

revolutionaries

this

and

by

non-

depicting

collectivists

Indian mercantile and propertied unconvincing picture of the Tamil

was its

aware of the need to revitalsocial base and organization

averse

the

for

intrigue

its

bankers,

Congress

Party

Party

The Justice leadership the party and to extend

reach

from

of

could

United

leadership

However, and

and

alone

constitutionalism

of the was an

short-lived

its

and

the

the

identified

with

office

of

back

a party

as

as completely

Agriculturist

zamindars

middle-class

become

interest

National

The

Madras

Congress

who

did not

landlord

Provinces.” in the

Party

long

to socialism.

expanded

a party in

the

years

electorate

which

legislature,

in office

it was difficult

party-building

in

relied

the

and

under

was

1935

ministerial

which

to stoop

localities.

on

the

had

run

grown

by

December

patronage

complacent

zamindars

to the menial In

constitution.

and

task of

1934

159 V.V. Ramaswami, a Nadar municipality, urged the

Justicite and chairman of Virudhunagar party leadership to meet to discuss

lapse of the party".’°

Ramaswami

its difficulties

a smaller

and

"before

more

it

active

is too

party

late

executive,

a propaganda board with at least two trict, the publication of more party

adoption

of a revised

approved

by

the

party

Justice

program.”

leadership

for a brief propaganda drive there was little change from

party help. his

leadership

then

to prevent

recommended

the

the

appointment

to

of

propagandists per disnewspapers, and the

His

in

July

suggestions

1935

but,

E.V.

Ramaswami

were

except

in the following three the previous lethargy.

looked

col-

the creation of

months, The

Naicker

for

Ramaswami Naicker's shift towards communism, following visit to Soviet Russia in 1932, alienated some of his

earlier Self-Respect backers. They were men of property and prominence such as R.K. Shanmugham Chetti and W.P.A. Soundara-

pandiya

of

Nadar,

their

MLC,

communities,

Ramaswami

was

published

and

who

not

imprisoned

in his paper

in

for

were

interested

revolution.®

an

allegedly

Kudi

Arasu

and

in July

1934.

He

in

the

In

elevation

March

seditious

his

enthusiasm

1934

article

for

communism was further cooled by the banning of the Communist Party of India and other left-wing organizations by the

Government

of

India

moderated

his

opinions

and showed renewed interest in cooperating with the Justice Party which had befriended him after his break with the Congress in 1925. Although many of Ramaswami's co-workers,

including

Ramanathan

and

P.

Jeevanandam,

sympathized

with

the

anti-Brahminism of the old Justice Party, they could not leap like performing animals from communism to the Justice Party's zamindars and bankers at Ramaswami's command. In 1935 they

formed

began

a

a Socialist return

Self-Respect

journey

to

the

League

Congress,

the party at the close of 1936.% The

loss

of

his

ablest

lieutenants

and

by

this

Ramanathan

and

his

route

rejoining

preference

for a loosely-coordinated movement rather than a structured party meant that Ramaswami Naicker could not make over to the Justice Party the sort of party machinery which it needed to match the Congress. What he offered them was a radical social and economic program which the:Justice leadership at first shelved and then adopted in a diluted form as its election manifesto in 1936. This borrowed heavily from the Congress (including prohibition and the reduction of the

salaries

of

top

government

servants)

and

from

the

old

Justice

program (communal representation), but was spiced with proposals for a minimum living wage, government control of public

services,

the

elimination

of middle-men

between

agriculturists

160 and The

consumers, and the eradication uf rural indebtedness. program was ludicrously at variance with the record and

the aspirations of the Justice leadership, but its adoption was indicative of the desperate straits in which the Justicites found themselves on the eve of the 1937 provincial elections.

Those

Not Against

Us Are

With

Us

In June 1934 the Government of India responded to the decision of the AICC at Patna in May to abandon civil disobedience by lifting its ban on Congress organizations. As

the

were

first

elections

not

three

held

years

organization.

under

until

in

which In

the

Government

February

to

the

1937

recover

Madras

the

its

of

India

Act

and

revive

Congress

strength

Presidency

the

had

of 1935

nearly

Congress

had

its

the

additional advantage of two preliminary electoral rounds against the Justice Party before the deciding bout in 1937. The

lative

first

round

Assembly

fought

on

in

three

was

November

main

to demonstrate

the

through

issues.

the

elections

to

the

it

asked

1934.

In

Tamilnad

ballot

boxes

its

Firstly,

despite the government's attempt to crush it asked voters to register their protest

central

the

Legis-

Congress

the

continued

public

support

the party; secondly, at the repressive

measures used by the government since 1930; and thirdly, it sought approval for its demand that the new constitution should be drafted by a constituent assembly in India, not by Parliament. It was emphasized that these were national, not regional, issues and that, therefore, the Justice Party should stand aside. Rajagopalachari further claimed that since Congressmen had been the victims of repression they alone

were

qualified

to

voice

public

indignation

at

government

measures during civil disobedience. In practice, regional and local issues played a part. Rajagopalachari and Rajan, the Congress candidate for the Tanjore-Trichinopoly constituency,

repeatedly

explained

that

a

Congress

victory

at

the

polls would not be taken as a mandate for temple entry legislation;°? and Congress propaganda exploited the discontent of businessmen

the

tariff

Conference

and

arrangements

affected

made

in July 1932.

Congress

covering

merchants

candidates

Tamilnad

were

for

chosen

at

the

the

by

the

Ottawa

seven

in July

depression

Imperial

Assembly

and

August

and

by

Economic

constitutencies

1934

on

the

basis of recommendations by local party workers and sympathizers, but with the approval of regional Congress leaders and

the

central

didates,

Congress

three

Parliamentary

— Satyamurti,

Board.

Muthuranga

Of

the

Mudaliar

seven

and

can-

161 Venkatachelam

and had

Chetti

—

had

previously

the candidate for the been a Swarajist MLA.

didate Rajan, Ramnad

been

Swarajist

MLCs

Muslim constituency — Syed Murtuza — T.S. Avanashilingam Chetti, can-

for the Coimbatore-Salem-North Arcot constituency, and P.S. Kumaraswami Raja for the Madura-Tinnevellyconstituency, were all men of wealth who could rely on

the support of some of the local party activists even though they

notables as well as the had not previously contested

seats in the legislatures. In 1923 and 1926 the Assembly elections had been held simultaneously with those for the provincial legislatures: 1934 was the first occasion on

which

the

Congress

sources to the opportunity to

could

devote

all

and

the

how and

the Congress candidates, while rural notables, relied heavily

movement.

public

The

its

Assembly contests. use the strength of

sympathy

election

built

campaign

mobilize support. tricts Kumaraswami

up

of

attention

and

during

the

disobedience

Kumaraswami

During his personally

re-

It was also the first the party organization

civil

Raja

illustrates

not neglecting the urban on the party machine to

tours of the southern discanvassed those whom he des-

cribed in his diary as "big-wigs" and "important men" — generally lawyers, businessmen and landholders — as well as members of the three district boards (he was a member of the Ramnad board himself), leading zamindars and caste leaders including the Raja of Ramnad, head of the Maravars, an agrarian caste numbering about half a million in the southernmost districts of Tamilnad, and the Nattukkottais’ Raja of Chettinad. In Madura he appealed to the Saurashtras, who

had played claiming

such a prominent

that

it

was

which was absolutely

"because

part

a Congress

he

in civil

had

city

bloe that he had agreed to stand..." leaders, including Rajagopalachari, M. Venkatachelam

September, arranged

Chetti,

while

tours,

electoral rolls, in their homes.

within

held

toured

and

each

the

distributed In his home

assured

support

that

Madura

him en

Regional Congress Bhaktavatsalam and

constituency

district

addressed

been

would

disobedience,

full-time

meetings,

in

August

activists

and

scrutinized

the

handbills and canvassed voters district of Ramnad, where he was

DCC president, Kumaraswami was assisted by Kamaraj and K.S. Muthuswami, the DCC's treasurer and secretary, by two Naidus,

R. Krishnaswami and G. Alagiriswami Naidu, operating from his home taluk of Srivilliputtur, and several Maravar activists including Karaikudi

to enter

S.0.S.P. DCC, and

the TNCC

Odayappa, president of the newly-formed R.V. Swaminathan, one of the "new men"

in

1931

and a rising

local

politician.®

162

and

Without

without

relied

almost

a

a party

organization

common

program

entirely

P,. Varadarajulu Naidu ran Arcot seat on a socialist

influential

Congress

local

in

porters.

A.

he

Ramaswami

deserted

the

about

Brahmins

and

wealth

his

only

Mudaliar,

Congress

with

the

Justice-sponsored

own

since

commanded

constituency, campaigned Round Table Conference;

compete

and

candidates

influence.

departure

a dwindling

contesting

the

band

from

of

1930,

contested

the

the

sup-

Madras

on his record as a delegate R.K. Shanmugham Chetti, who

in

Congress

for the Coimbatore-Salem-North manifesto, but he was without

backers

1930

the

on their

to

City

to the had also

Indian

Commerce

seat on the basis of his career in the Assembly, of which he had recently become president. In a bid to win Brahmin voters, the Justice Party opened its membership to all communities in September 1934, but in Madras city, where Ramaswami Mudaliar was contesting against Satyamurti, only

SO

voted

for

the

about 4,000 on the rolis.°©

presidents councils,

Chettis

of district

but

relied

boards

mainly

for his election.

popularity

for

having

been

the

Corporation

Justice

candidate

Shanmugham Chetti

on

and

This, an

the

chairmen votes

of

of

canvassed

the

of municipal the

along with

Indian

out

Nattukkottai

Shanmugham's

representative

at

un-

the

Ottawa conference, caused his defeat. M.A. Muthiah Chetti, now chairman of the Justice Party's executive committee, had entered into a secret agreement with Congress councillors in

Madras

Venkatachelam

Muthiah had

as

expected

Congress

The

the

Chetti

first

from

the

all

seven

able

as

of

the

of

in return

mayor

opponent.°”

victory

promising

for

Congress

in

was

Tamilnad

votes

the unanimous

of Madras.

Nattukkottais

the

seats

Nattukkottai The

gave

election

votes

victory

captured

of

Shanmugham to

overwhelming.

and

for

his It

80

per

won

cent

of the poll. Only in the Commerce constituency did a rival candidate glean more than a third of the votes cast.°* There were factors in the Congress landslide which made it unreli-

a forecast

— the

Assembly

electorate

was

far

smaller

than that for the dyarchy provincial legislature; it was invariably more nationalistic; it contained a larger percentage of Brahmins. Excuses could be made for the poor performance of the Justice-sponsored candidates — the party did not regard itself as an extra-provincial organization; it had not mobilized its full resources for the election; the Nattukkottais' betrayal could be blamed for the loss of the Commerce seat — but the outcome was widely interpreted

as a Justice reverse from this election.

and

the

party's

demoralization

dates

163

of of

The second round was long and hard fought, consisting a series of local conflicts from 1935 to 1937 for control the district boards and municipal councils.

Legislation passed by the Madras Subbarayan's ministry in 1930 reduced

and supervision exercised Government. These powers

council at the powers

the end of of nomination

by the Minister for Local had been the basis of the

SelfJustice

ministries’ influence in the localities, and it has been argued that their reduction was responsible for the decline of the Justice Party in the 1930s.% However, the Raja of Bobbili, as the local-government minister, sought to rebuild his party after the shock of the 1934 elections, not by

attempting the

to

create

Congress,

reconstituting

away

the

but

by

them

taluk

an

organization

turning

to

his

boards,

back

own

promising

comparable

to

the

local

advantage. to

In

replace

to

that

of

1934

he

swept

boards

them

by

and

panchayat

boards at the lowest level and bifurcating district boards to perform many of the tasks formerly assigned to the taluk boards. In practice, the scheme involved dcubling the places and patronage of the district boards and reintroducing nomination. The opportunities for manipulation were enormous and Bobbili

exploited

Election the

the

circles

bifurcation

interests

boundaries;

them

were

of

with

the

drawn

district

pro-Justice

boards

of ministerial

nominations

single-mindedness

to suit

were

was

supporters made

quota and after the election results the balance in favour of pro-Justice election

bidden age

in

of

loyal

presidents;

this

field

would

to make

president.°° reserved

was

In the

be

Tampoe,

Bobbili's

Municipal

to

an

Councils

and

in an extra-ordinary

by

the one

morning vote

the

of

the

Local

of

all of

District

more

the

by

original

were

possible

the

for-

patron-

Board a seat

a population

and

Inspector

seat

reported

tilt the

incoming

on

Adi-Dravida agent

fanatic.

natural

presidents

command

Boards,

when

that

basis, .

of

he had

Anglo-Indians resident in the area; 91 last minute nominations, published

edition

of the Fort St.

elections

election

excess

supposedly

roving

by

a

were known so as to factions and secure

so that

the

additional

been unable to find any in the Dharmapuri Board on

at

Tiruvannamalai

Anglo-Indians,

than

retiring

appointments

for

converted

A.M.C.

staff

in

determined

of

candidates;

of

a

for

board

Justice

George

president,

Gazette

secured

candidate.

Except in the mid-1920s when the Swarajists attempted to win control of the Madras Corporation and other municipal councils, the Tamil Congress had not made a systematic effort to capture local government boards. Rajagopalachari opposed the

involvement

belief

that

it

of

Congressmen

would

distract

in

them

local

from

government

agitational

in

the

and

164 Constructive

Program

and

expense

and

the

supporters

would

work

also

and

"would

breed

local

entail

enormous

opposition

labour

to

the

Congress". $3 But Satyamurti, who succeeded Rajagopalachari as TNCC president in May 1935, and a majority of party leaders, activists and sympathizers believed that by ousting

of the Justice

Party

from positions

of influ-

ence in local government the Congress could undercut its rival and command patronage for itself. The experience of the 1934 Assembly elections, in which local government presi-

dents and chairmen had used their influence to favour Justice candidates, confirmed this opinion. There were considerations too. The franchise for local-government

other

have

in

elections under the this

the

was roughly that for the provincial legislature 1935 Act: it would be invaluable to the party to

experience

broader

operation. Party Kamaraj-Annamalai

to

thrust

them

government

of

electorate

contesting

before

for

for

In

into

bodies;

May

Nadu

local

the

1935

positions

and

if

Satyamurti

Congress

Civic

elections.

removal

Its

the

reflected

of power

Congress

winning

elections

constitution and

into

from the use the Congress

profit

wanted

came

to

in

build

the

on

local-

disobedience it had to help its in their factional struggles. announced

Board

to

program

of corruption,

goods, the improvement ties, the extension of voting of addresses to

composition

new

activists, especially those Pillai group, were eager to

sympathy won during civil local patrons and to join

Tamil

and

the

the

the

select

pledged

formation

party

of

the

candidates

candidates

promotion

the

of

to

swadeshi

work

of local education and medical faciliwater supplies and roads, and the nationalist leaders. The board's

the

cooperation

between

Congress

factions which had characterized Satyamurti's Madras Swarajya Party 18 months earlier. Satyamurti, Kumaraswami Raja and Bhaktavatsalam were its officers with former Swarajists,

local

activists

members.°* from

and

associates

of Rajagopalachari

among

its

In the scramble for local-government seats that followed Bobbili's reorganization, the Congress became the vehicle

for ambitious

Board tried stipulating

local

politicians

to protect itself that its nominees

hitching

a ride.

The

Civic

against open opportunism by must obey Congress mandates

if they disagreed with them, resign their seats. murti and his colleagues were so anxious to make

a

But Satyasuccess of

their campaign and factions that they

to win contests against pro-Justice were often careless in their selection

himself

the

candidates and ineffective in their belated cipline those elected on the party ticket. encouraged

influx

of

opportunists

or,

of

attempts to disSatyamurti had by

declaring

165

that "those with us,95

who have

In some

not

contests

been

the

and

are not

campaign

was

against

a striking

In Madura, for example, the Congress won 21 in the municipal elections in October 1935,

having

party

been

greatly

organization

assisted

built

by

up

the

out its

strength

during

us are

civil

of

success.

of..36 seats campaign the

local

disobedience

and

by

the assistance of the Saurashtras. N.M.R. Subbaraman, whose support was communal as well as Congress-based, was elected

chairman and the party's councillors generally united.** In Madras city,

remained disciplined and whereelections were held

Congress

own

in October

selection

eering won 27

1936

for

the

enlarged

Corporation

of candidates

to mount

the most

overcame

disputes

yet known of the 40

with the

among

its

members

the

over

intensive

the

election-

for a corporation election. The Congress seats for the general constituencies, and

addition

of councillors

and

aldermen

chosen by other routes it had a majority council. °7 Control of the corporation, Congressmen and their allies for a dozen

elected

or

of the 65-member which had evaded years, was at last

theirs.

The

Council,

In northern Ramnad the Congress faced influence of the Raja of Chettinad was

stiffer opposition. so pervasive that

government servants frequently harassed Congressmen who canvassed against his nominees for the Nerth Ramnad District

Board.** 1936

was

voters

Congress

In the Pallathur circle the election on 23 November.

characterized

and bribery

opponents.

son-in-law,

dent, the

candidate,

lost

Raja

election ducted

the

and

on

by

by both

the

properly

the

C.V.C.T.

Raja's

election,

advice

grounds

owing

of

to

Tampoe,

that

the

the

and

obstruction

supporters

and

&istrict

board

Venkatachalam

and prospective

Pallathur

the

intimidation,

Chetti,

of

their

the

on

the

insistence

election

had

not

Bobbili

systematic

ordered

interruption

a

re-

been

of

Raja's

presiof

"con-

polling

at all the polling stations".°? However, both the Election Commissioner and the Madras High Court upheld the original

result and dismissed In

these

three

the case for a re-election.°°

cases,

by

fair

means

or

foul,

the

Congress

overcame its opponents. The decisive contests were fought over the local boards, and the provincial elections in February 1937 merely registered an ascendency the Congress had already achieved by superior organization, by corruption and by involvement with local factions.

Elsewhere,

elections the

for

Congress

the

the

won

campaign

Tinnevelly

31

of

the

was 52

more

District seats,

hazardous. Board

but

in

In the

November

disagreement

1935

166 followed among the Congress board members over a suitable candidate for president. M.D.T. Kumaraswami Mudaliar, brother of a Justice MLC and scion of one of the principal landholding families in Tinnevelly, asked permission to join the

as

Congress

an

party

in

Independent.

At

the

board,

presided over by Satyamurti, ed as the Congress candidate

stressed

elected

the

the

on

desirability

the

nomination.

despite

a meeting

Congress

Although

of

the

having

been

Congress

elected

board

members,

Kumaraswami Mudaliar was suggestfor president. Satyamurti

of

choosing

it

was

ticket,

but

in

a candidate a poll

clear

that

who

had

Kumaraswami

he

had

joined

been

won

the

Congress to further his own ambitions, Satyamurti was powerless to intervene beyond asking Kumaraswami Mudaliar to obey

Congress directives. was elected president Congressmen refused for violating their

nominee.'®! between

Within

the

president. Congress

leader

by

At the end of December 1935 Kumaraswami over a Justice opponent, but five

to vote for him election pledge

a

few

of

Kumaraswami

allowing

months

the

there

board's

was

an

was

Congress

accused

address

and yet refused to resign to support the party's

to

an

open

Party

of disloyalty

be

voted

to

breach

and

the

to

the

the

Governor,

by refusing to participate in a swadeshi exhibition and accepting tenders for board contracts against the public interest.

But

Kumaraswami

Mudaliar

to be dislodged by the elections his personal

Congress. influence

Tinnevelly

Legislative

president

enabled seat

in

him to defeat the

In and

was

by

then

too

secure

the 1937 provincial that which he exercised as

a Congress

candidate

Council. !%

for the

Then came the most striking example of TNCC mismanagement of the local government campaign — the Trichinopoly affair. In 1934 the Trichinopoly municipality was suspended by Bobbili because of gross irregularities in his administration by the chairman, P. Ratnavelu Thevar. Ratnavelu

had risen to local power by assiduously exploiting antiBrahmin and anti-Muslim feelings in the town by distributing municipal contracts and offices to his allies and clients.’

Ye

failed,

however,

to

gain

election

to

the

Madras

legis-

lature in 1926 and 1930 as a Justice candidate. In 1934 he defected to the Congress and was welcomed as an influential local notable and a valuable recruit for the contest against the

Justice

Party.

With

Congress

assistance

he

was

elected

unopposed in a by-election to the legislature in December 1934 and in January 1936 was elected president of the South

Trichinopoly District Congress

ation

In

were

clearly

August

1936

now

largely

Board.'°*

very

the

under

The rewards

considerable.

Congress,

Ratnavelu's

its

for joining

Trichino;nopoly

control,!°° won

the

organiz-

a majority

167 of seats on the restored municipal council and, ive consultation with local partymen, the Civic

ated

Ratnavelu

and

Independent

day,

as

however,

its

candidate

T.S.S.

Rajan

led

councillors

a

for

chairman.

revolt

which

after Board

by

gave

On

the

several

the

extensnomin-

election

Congress

election

to

a

Christian Congressman and caused Ratnavelu's defeat. The revolt had two motives. Rajan disliked Ratnavelu, whom he had reason to believe was a man "of strong hates and bitter communalism" unacceptable to the Brahmins, Muslims and Christians

in Trichinopoly.

cil

in

1934

Ratnavelu's

also its

Congressmen TNCC

and

loyalty

of

its

and

in

of

declined:

the

old

local boards

Rajan

obsession

with

often

in

replied

mer-

disregard

long service."

Bhaktavatsalam

coun-

that

regardless of the

and

loyalty and

felt

sores".

the TNCC's

candidates

municipal

Rajan

"re-open

against

posts

of proven

Satyamurti

suspension

would

to protest

seats

and

the

tension

re-election

wanted

winning

Since

communal

that

local

of

For the Con-

gressmen had been fully consulted before the Ratnavelu had been made. !07 Rajagopalachari, opposed the local government campaign at the

choice of although he had start, regarded

and

to

Rajan's action as a totally unjustifiable breach discipline. He wanted to impress on Congressmen elsewhere

the

duty

of the party

leadership,

legislatures

under

if

the

Congress

were

to

the

of

absolute

obedience

an obedience

remain

new

that

united

and

constitution.!°°

of party in Tamilnad

the

would

decisions

be essential

effective

For

in

the

Ratnavelu

it was no more than a temporary set-back. In February 1937 he was elected to the Madras legislature as the Congress candidate for the Trichinopoly Urban constituency. On

balance,

party's

victor

own

struggle

despite

ineptness,

from

the

local

undoubtedly

it

Bobbili's

gerrymandering

was

the

Congress

weakened

the

Justice

elections

of

1935

and

and

which

1936.

Party

the

emerged

The

in

the

the

dis-

tricts and caused a large number of its erstwhile supporters to defect to the Congress. Those who helped the Congress were rewarded with a slice of the patronage pie of local govern-

ment

and

could

The

influx

look

forward

generally anticipated, constitution.

of

wealth

and

participation

ture

1937.

of the

needed scale

boards,

The

of

the

faction

influence

in

the

expansion

process

operation

was

while

to

further

with

of the one

and

little

of

Tamil

rewards

took

leaders

nationalist

the organization

of

to

Congress

or

the Congress

no

and

men

as

under

was

hold

new

of

record

a marked

between its

was

the

clients,

attraction:

Justicites'

needed

when,

previous

Congress

mutual

the

their

movement,

of the Congress

break

office

the

1934

men

of

fea-

and

factions

provincial on

of prominence

the

and

local

wealth

/

|

|

|

168

to play

off against

election

were

pro-Justice

campaigns.

staffed

By

1937

by both activists

the

notables local

and to finance

Congress

its

committees

and their patrons

from the

leading urban and rural castes. The activists were often the secretaries and busied themselves with the routine of party

organization and propaganda. Their patrons — lawyers, bankers, merchants, landholders and manufacturers — were the presidents

and

over

treasurers, public

collecting

meetings,

and

or

controlling

having

a

the

large

say

funds,

in

presiding

the

selection

of party candidates or themselves running for seats on local boards and in the legislature. In the 1937 elections only a third of the Congress candidates in Tamilnad were activists and

prison

notables.°?

graduates.

The

The domination

remainder

were

patrons

and

of the party organization

such men, concerned to further their through the institutional structures

local

by

personal interests of British rule, neces-

sarily limited the leadership's capacity to manoeuvre. Despite Rajagopalachari's stress onunity and discipline, the predominance of patrons and local notables jostled the party

towards mutiny

office-acceptance

within

ministerial The

limited

the

office.

Congress

composition

objectives

on the party's expressed

its

of

and

increased

if

the

of the Congress their

expansion.

commitment

to

principals

Although the

the

60,000

paid-up

ported

to

TNCC

had

seldom placed above be

55,004;

60

per

also

have

late

cent

of

beyond At the

to

In the

20,000.1°

committees

creation

claimed

members.

likelihood

In October of

the

forbad

and the

acted

as

a check

repeatedly

a mass

party,

patrons, actiheight of non-

between

1920s

of a

leadership

the Congress

practice membership was not extended vists and sympathizers before 1937. cooperation

the

national

the

30,000

figure

in

and

was

1935 it was re-

members

were

said

to live in the rural areas.'"! Out of a total Tamil population of some 25 million people this was a remarkably small number, though, in population terms, it was similar to the scale of Congress membership in other parts of India at the

time.1!?_

Before

1937 the Tamil

Congress did not attract the

membership of the urban and rural masses. It skimmed the middle strata of society; it incorporated a cadre of highly experienced local activists; and it possessed a regional network

of

committees

and

village.

Raj

dictated

rivalry

with

and

cells

But

it

was

that

it

should

the Justice

not

that

a mass

Party

be

nor

reached

one.

party

its

almost

and

every

neither

struggle

against

town

its

the

'

169

"Yellow Box ki jai" to

Although

be

the

Tamil

desirable

Congressmen

dyarchy

per the

Congress

the

cent of Justice

Madras

leaders

basis

were

for

happy

a

proclaimed

to

electorate

swaraj

suffrage

constitution,

settle

had

universal

for

been

rather

between

the

less.

three

Under

and

four

the population, and, in the hope of undercutting Party's social base and utilizing their superior

party organization, the Congress claimed that under the new constitution "the larger the franchise, the better for the

Congress".133 stitutional

autonomy

and

Asked

in 1932

objectives, an

to state his immediate

Satyamurti

electorate

of

36

asked

for provincial

million

per cent of India's population).'™*

con-

(equivalent

to

10

Anticipating

an elector-

party's organizational resources to the limit." Congress had returned to a constitutional course,

Once the Satyamurti,

ate of about this size, Rangaswami Iyengar observed in 1933 that it would be a mammoth task for the Congress to "educate" and mobilize so many voters and that it would stretch the too, gies from

was anxious that the party should devote all its enerto winning the new electorate."°As it finally emerged the protracted franchise discussions, the electorate was

larger

(14 was

than

Congressmen

had

expected

and

per cent of the total population more than four times larger than

lower

The provincial house called,

at 6.4

annual

rent

legislature was divided into an upper and respectively, the Legislative Council and

of over

Rs.

300,

of not less than Rs. 1,500, not less than Rs. 7,500 per

for title-holders

whole

presidency

and

estate-holders

and payers of annum; there

occupants

the

Council

there was a high or inandars paying

of public

electorate

was

with

ers

was

based

of

municipal

and house tenants,

rentable

value

were

on property

tax were

occupancy

value

of not

further

wives of military

province

and

of

tax-paying

local-board

among the ryots

at

less than

to another,

and

least

provisions

voters and personnel.

and

Rs.

for

taxes,

latter;

Rs.

owners

of

offices. about

motor

to a large workers. tax,

property

with

inamdare, rural

50 or urban

a peculiarity

For the

25,000.12”

vehicle

property

the

servicemen

Pay-

ryotwari

with

former.

wives, widows and mothers of Franchise provisions varied

and

income

qualifications.

100 constituted retired

an

tax on an income of were also provisions

The broader Assembly franchise gave the vote section of the ryots, traders and wealthier urban

It

voters

of the Madras presidency) under dyarchy.

the Legislative Assembly. For the Council property qualification: voters were ryots

an

million

and

for

retired from one

in the Madras

a

2

There

the

170 Presidency was that those who could prove themselves literate were entitled to vote, whereas in other provinces a specified level of formal education was required, and it was through

this

literacy clause

the

literacy,

granted

For

and

automatically

officials, the

women's

that many voters were enrolled.'!®

was

purpose

by

by far

able

the

other

only

the Congress,

presidency,

this

some

but

to

Congress

mined

The

by

favoured

general

the

the

character

1935

to

the best

seek

out

and

organized

Enrolment Day" on 27 May 1936.19 unquestionably

franchises

appeal

were

local

its

own

not

registration

organized enrol

Since

party

in

eligible

voters.

"Literates'

The nature of the franchise

Congress.

Government

of

the

of

two

chambers

India

Act.

was

deter-

In the

Council,

in addition to six or eight members nominated by the Governor, there were to be 46 members: 35 for General constituencies,

seven

for

Muslims,

three

for

Indian

Christians

and

one

for

Europeans. All of the 215 Assembly seats were to be filled by election: 152 General seats (17 for urban constituencies), 29 for Muslims, nine for Indian Christians, and 25 others distributed between landholders, trade unions, the Madras University, and commercial and business constituencies. The Act did not, however, specify how the reserved seats for

scheduled it

castes

stipulate

tasks

were

and

how

for women

constituencies

assigned

to

a

would

be distributed

should

Delimitation

Laurie Hammond, appointed In Madras, the provincial

be

demarcated.

Committee,

nor did

These

under

Sir

by the Secretary of State in 1935. government prepared its own recom-

mendations for delimitation and a provincial committee, headed by S. Muthiah Mudaliar, the former minister, made

own representations to schemes were advanced. the

the

Hammond

Two

its

opposing

The first, proposed by the Government of Madras and by Justice Party, wanted to scrap the miti-member constitu-

encies

Madras where

which

City

had

Urban

Caste

the terms of the constituencies.

closer

existed

double-member

Scheduled

to the

seats

for the non-Muhammadan

during

the

vast

candidates

Poona Pact, They would,

electorate;

constituencies

would

gress did not participate and provincial committees

It was

scheme

claimed

through

that

dyarchy

constituencies

were

to contest there

period.

necessary

reserved

would

to

seats

and

Except

allow

under

be more

opportunity

to send representatives to the and difficulty of canvassing

be removed.!2° in it

Rural

they favoured single-member it was argued, bring the MLAs

for members of smaller castes legislature; and the expense

rival

committee.

Aithough

the proceedings of the made known its support

Subbarayan

multi-member

and

the

Madras

constituencies

the ConHammond for a

Mahajana

had

Sabha.

worked

171 well

under

would of

dyarchy,

not

distributive

voting

were

encourage

would

understood

communalism

voting

allow

already

dominant

if

in

by

the

electorate,

coupled

use

communities

in

with

the

Madras.

to

and

system

Cumulative

plump

their

votes

for their own candidates to the exclusion of minorities; but distributive voting would prevent this as each voter would have to split his votes, thus giving opportunity for

candidates from minorities and forcing the major court minority interests to gain maximum support.

also

claimed

that

small

constituencies

could

parties It was

easily

be

to

con-

trolled by local territorial magnates: the larger the constituency, the less opportunity for bribery and corrupt

practices. 12? In

most

provinces

the

Hammond

Committee

views of the provincial government and but in Madras it rejected the proposal

stituencies on the grounds that domination of the main caste or

area...",!22

but perversely

accepted

the

delimitation committee, for single-member con-

they would "perpetuate the sub-caste in each electoral

the committee

also opted

for

cumulative rather than distributive voting. Following an appeal from the Madras government and a majority vote in the Madras legislature in March 1936, the Secretary of State restored the single-member scheme, except where double constituencies were needed for the Scheduled Caste seats, but kept the cumulative voting. }?3 Although the Congress did not get the multi-member constituencies it wanted, the final

system

in the

does

not

election.

appear

The

to

have

adversely

party's

fear

affected

of small

the

Congress

constituencies

in

which a pro-Justice notable might control a majority of votcs was almost everywhere in the presidency outweighed by the size of the electorate, by the strength of the Congress organization and by its own men of wealth and influence.

Another factor which influenced the outcome of the elections was the method of polling employed. Each provincial

government

coloured tended

task

1936

of

to

chose

ballot

boxes

help

the

its

for

illiterate

Congress

the Madras

in

Election

own

system

every

voters,

Madras

constituency.

"educating"

Officer

and

but

it

its

also

allotted

voters.

opted

This

was

for

simplified

colours

in-

the

In November

to the major

parties largely according to their requests. In almost every constituency in the presidency the Congress candidates chose yellow as the colour to be displayed on their ballot boxes ~

by contrast

with

Bihar

where

the party was unable

one colour throughout the province.!7*

Congress exploited the posters and volunteers

colour:

"Vote

opportunity to clad in yellow

for Gandhi

and

In Tamilnad

to adopt

the

the full with flags, to remind voters of its

the yellow

box" and

"Yellow

box

172

ki jai"

("Victory to the yellow box")

were its slogans. '?°

Candidates from other parties made little attempt to imitate these tactics; some Independents deliberately avoided the Justice Party's with that party

election.

colour in the belief that any identification would adversely affect their chances of

Finally, the timing of the elections also influenced the result. In the 1934 Assembly elections Willingdon had mistakenly expected an anti-Congress vote from Madras and had

directed

the polls

to be held

there

first

to give

Congress

victories

in

and

the

deciding

in favour

of office-acceptance

and

provinces voting later. Because Madras had in 1934 it was one of the last provinces to Bihar,

Orissa

a lead

to

voted Congress vote in 1937. United

Provinces

were already known before polling day and featured in lastminute propaganda’’® The party's successes in northern India also increased the likelihood of the national leadership waverers

now

in

a strong "...

Madras

that

possibility.

the

coming

a provincial

elections",

Congress

remarked

thus

persuaded

ministry

Satyamurti

was

in

January 1937, “are going to be a test not only of patriotism but also of our business capacity".'2” The regional Congress campaign began as early as July 1936 with the formation of "tour

committees"

of

local

activists

to

prepare

the

party

100

Assembly

organizations for electioneering; a month later the regional Parliamentary Committee began to select candidates on the advice of local Congressmen and their patrons. Nearly S00 applicants

sought

Congress

nomination

and Council seats in Tamilnad.'2° selected candidates were published approval

the last

of

the

central

few names

Congress

followed

only five rejected applicants party's nominees and of these president of illustration view

To

of

Congress

contested

be

of

gaining

contested

as many

resilience

13 out

Independents

about

Parliamentary

in January.'*

Committee;

There were

who contested against the only one — Kumaraswami Mudaliar,

the Tinnevelly district board — was elected, an of the discipline the party could command. 12°

sure

the

early

for

The names of most of the in mid-December with the

of

of

a majority

the

22 Council

unofficially.

Justice

seats For

in

both

Party

seats the

and

and

the

past,

supported

three

as possible. Assembly

in

houses

it

In Tamilnad ran

93

in

the

can-

it

didates for 106 seats and backed three Independents, two of whom were Scheduled Caste candidates. Taken together the 106 Congress candidates covered a wide range of castes and occupations, though the majority were drawn from the highest castes (Brahmins, Vellalas, Chettis, Reddis and Naidus) and

173 from

the

ness

connections)

fund

Candidates were required and to finance their own

towns

professional

and the

assisted

them

in

with

to

in

by

tried

car

middle

landholders

the

class

1936

countryside. '*

to donate Rs. 50 to electioneering, but

activists,

and

to

for

tours

Satyamurti,

imitate

nearly

in

Nehru's

9,000

miles

the

(often those with busi-

by

despite

style

in

the election the party

regional

publicity in the press, and Nehru as Congress president

October

socialism,

touring

commercial

local

national leaders, ials. Jawaharlal region

and

substantial

and

printed matertoured the his

and

three

antipathy

energy,

months

before

the elections and visiting most constituencies at least once. }%? Rajagopalachari

also

the

public.

election

led

processions

expected

ability

at

On

candidates provided transport voters to shouting District

have

of

nationalist

gone

done", 133

Unable

the

to

making

intensively

election

day

Congress

cars, motor the polls;

villagers

slogans

Magistrate

to

campaigned

of

Madura

village

revive

showed

and

mixing

sympathizers

and

an

un-

with

wealthy

buses and other vehicles to in humbler style, activists

to

and

the

nearest

waving

observed

elector

its

speeches

and

in

fortunes

polling

party

of

the

a way

Congress:

no other

through

the

booth,

flags.

As the

party

local

"they

has

boards,

demoralized by its electoral setbacks in the Assembly and local elections, and without a party organization to rival the

Congress,

pondent

November

the

Justice

and

names

campaign. 1936

January 1937, Justicites or

Virudhunagar,

The

Party

selection were

conducted

a

fitful

of candidates

published

and

began

in December

in

des-

1936

and

but some of the candidates refused to run as withdrew, realizing, like V.V. Ramaswami of

that

party ran only three the Assembly, little

they had no chance of winning.'*" candidates for more than half

the the

The

Council and 53 for number of Congress

candidates. In addition there were about a dozen Independents who might, if elected, have joined the Justice Party in the legislature. A striking aspect of the Justice campaign was that 33 of its 56 candidates had nominated to the legislatures or successfully contested election. intake of moderate nationalists,

among

the

its

106

mid-1930s

fielding

pheral

its

and

four

of

them

on the Congress

old

team.

constituencies

It was

previously been elected or (in four cases) had unDespite the Congress party's it had only 21 such candidates

had

entered

ticket. also

— Scheduled

the

legislatures

The Justice

concentrating

Caste,

Christian,

Party

on

the

land-

was

in

peri-

holders and business seats — where it might pick up support from special interest groups, rather than the main Hindu and Muslim constituencies.

174 For

People's

of

its

a new party Party

ran

nominees

a

were

with

little

large

local

number

of

Independents

organization,

candidates,

hoping

to

the

but

most

improve

their

chances by borrowing the name of a regional party. The candidates were little-known men, generally without established political careers. Of its 31 candidates, 17 came from the Arcots and Tanjore, the districts in which its Tamil organizers, Muthzah Mudaliar and Manickavelu Naicker, lived and in which they could hope to attract the support of their own castes (the Vellalas and Vanniyars). Of the Muslim parties,

the

Muslim

Parliamentary

Board

sponsored

nine

candidates

in

Tamilnad, five of whom had previously been members of the legislatures; the Muslim Progressive Party ran only five, all in northern Tamilnad where the party's leader, Abdul Hakim

could

exert

The four-day

landslide,

personal

influence.

polls were held without period in mid-February.

greater

than

ers had hoped. *%5

In the Legislative total 46 seats, winning

Tamilnad. the the

Congress Assembly

Congress

Fifty-two and 215

candidates

all

the

urban

the

party's

most

ardent

support-

Council the Congress won 26 of the 10 of the 13 it had contested in

cent

only 20 per Congressmen

Justice Party was won approximately

swept

per

even

any major incidents over a The result was a Congress

of the

cent were

in Tamilnad

regional

poll

to the Justice elected, 85 of

winning

their

went

Party. the 93

to

In

seats.

The

Caste

seat

reduced to a mere 21 seats. The Congress 70 per cent of the poll in Tamilnad and

seats

except

one

Scheduled

in

Madras, all except one of the General Rural seats, and several of the special constituencies. Its poorest performance was, expectedly, in the Muslim, Christian and landholders

constituencies. The MPB won six Muslim seats to one for the MPP, two for Congress, and one

in Tamilnad Independent.

The Justice Party won two of the five Christian Assembly seats, the Congress three. Independents and Justicites took

the

landholders'

seats.

Nevertheless,

with

victories

as

sweeping

in

other

areas

of the presidency as in Tamilnad, the Congress had won a massive victory over its provincial rivals. It had the largest majority and the largest popular vote of the Congress in any of India's provinces. After 17 years of struggle, after years of preparation, the Congress had finally swamped the Justice Party.

could

With

now

its

turn

provincial

back

to

rival

the

Raj.

vanquished,

the

Congress

CHapter

6

RAPPROCHEMENT Civil disobedience and the assertive manner of the following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact aroused in British in the Madras Presidency a bitter animosity to the

alist leaders. of the upstart ings

for

prompt

Revenge Congress and

for was

decisive

Congress officials nation-

the insults and the impertinence a powerful motive in their urgaction

against

the

party

in

the

depression

and

event of a revival of civil disobedience. The feelings of the officials were widely shared by the European business community in the presidency, which felt that it was being victimized by the swadeshi propaganda of the Congress coinciding

with

the

loss

of

markets

caused

by

the

the influx of Japanese cloth.’ Significantly, when at the end of 1931 the Government of India gave the Madras government permission to inform the business community that a renewal of civil disobedience would be it was the European, not the Indian,

met by stern measures, commercial organizations

that were confided in by the Chief Secretary.” In a crisis the government's identification with British interests remained

very

But sight of

strong.

the the

Governor and his senior advisers had not lost wider political objectives with which the

dyarchy period began. There was undoubtedly a satisfaction in seeing the Congress crushed in 1932, but, as Bracken, the Chief Secretary, had noted 10 years earlier, vindictiveness untempered by constructive measures would achieve very little. In Tamilnad the crushing of civil disobedience was

a catharsis up fury, it culty

of,

to

the

Congress

and

the

tation

leaders

was

a smooth,

Raj,

and

for the government in 1932: purged of its pentcould afterwards settle to;the practical diffiadapt

to

not

a

but

be

Rajagopalachari's

reasonable.

lingering

a growing

colonial

Thus,

bitterness

the

appreciation

administrators

non-revolutionary

comment

transfer

178

scquel

between

had

of

on

that

the

to

getting

confron-

Congress

nationalist

a mutval

power.

Nehru,

interest

in

176

The Party Most

Likely

to Sueceed

When he took up the governorship of Madras in November Lord Erskine inherited in large measure Willingdon's

1934,

aging policy — as old as dyarchy itself — of relying Justice Party. Aristocrat and landlord, Erskine had

inherent

aversion

to

the

zamindar-dominated

on no

the

Justicites.

Indeed, addressing the Madras Landholders' Association in February 1935 he appealed to the major landholders to partic-

ipate fully in the political life of the presidency under the new constitution.® But Erskine was a more perceptive and innovative

Governor

than

Stanley,

his

predecessor,

and

he

revitalize

their

soon realized that the the Justice Party was incapable of adapting to the new political environment created by the 1935 Act. He

only

urged

to

be met

the

Justice

with

evasion

ally, he thought Bobbili suggested that the Chief

bringing alists,

in Subbarayan,

to

attract

the

its

out

was

own

so

riddled

inertia

alienating

that

many

and

for

with

of

indolence".”

party,

Initi-

than his two colleagues and might reshuffle his team,

example,

from

the

United

constitutionalists

Nation-

back

to

ploy failed. Subbarayan was not on his own terms, but the Justice personal

Bobbili his

that Erskine pressed the in the localities and to

to

“supine

worthier Minister

moderate

the Justice Party.® The unwilling to take office Party

ministers

could

rivalry

not

supporters.®

make

and

imprisoned

such

Thus,

it

a move was

in

by

with-

vain

Justicites to build up their party form a broad constitutionalist

front:’ these were the tasks on which the Congress, not the 'Justice Party, was engaged. Moreover, like Goschen, Erskine ‘found it difficult to understand the Justice ministry's full-

time

preoccupation

with

the

acquisition

and

distribution

of

;patronage. He was particularly annoyed by the card-sharping to which Bobbili resorted in reshuffling the local boards in 1935-37. Gradually, Erskine warmed to the idea of a Congress ministry to replace the politically bankrupt Justicites. He was at first very cautious about suggesting such a change of tactics to his superiors, partly because Willingdon, who remained Viceroy until 1936, loaded him with avuncular advice from New Delhi, based on impressions formed 15 years earlier,

as

to

which

Justicites

were

or

wete

not

trustworthy

had

not

forgotten

and

able.”

Willingdon had anticipated a Congress defeat in the 1934 Assembly elections and was furious that Madras, the province he had nursed through non-cooperation, should betray him.

But

Willingdon

and

his

advisers

the

long-

177 term Montagu scheme of drawing the Congress back to constitutional action; and by the middle months of 1935 Willingdon was agreeing with Erskine's tentative suggestions that a Congress ministry in Madras might, after all, be

"safe"

and "play

the game".}°

Erskine's assessment of the situation went far beyond a realization of the effete nature of the latter-day Justice Party. He believed that many of the Congressmen were in practice moderate men, constitutionalists by inclination, who had taken shelter in the Congress as protection against the anti-Brahmin squall. The Madras Congress was, he noted, an "amazing conglomeration of tories, radicals, socialists and

even communists",'? ship

in

tion. chari

favour

with the bulk of the party and

of accepting

Indeed, on the had an audience

office

and

working

its

the

leader-

constitu-

eve of the 1937 elections, Rajagopalawith the Governor, in the course of

which he informed Erskine that he wanted to take office and doubted that the Congress national leadership would oppose this.

When

Erskine

expressed

Rajagopalachari went

into

a

long,

unintelligible Congress

In result

meant

his

surprise

complicated

explanation by

it boiled

of what

"wrecking

down

and

the

at

this,

to

me

the

almost

Madras

constitution".

to the

fact

that,

if

they got a real clear majority on which they could depend, the Congress Party would work

the reforms down here. Their idea of "wrecking" appears to be to pass at various times...

resolutions Further,

saying

Erskine

they

do

believed

not

that

like

the

the

Reforms.*?

Justice

Party

had

made itself unpopular, especially by its agrarian and local government policies, during its many years of office. "The ryots", he reported to Zetland, the Secretary of State for India

in

February

particularly

in

1937,

the

"are

southern

fed

up

with

areas,

as

the

Justice

every

sin

Party,

of

omission

wanted

security

or commission of the past fifteen years is put down to them")? But,

though

for

their

Congress to

work,

the

and not

increasingly anticipating

hauled under

posed When

dency

ryots

property the to

government:

obstruct,

a

change,

a destructive

the

the

they

Congress

clash

must

constitution.

between take

the new constitution,!®

Jawaharlal

those

Nehru

agrarian

concluded

impassioned

attack

and

dinosaurs, his

1936

on the

less and the

tour

the

office

Erskine

sympathetic to the interests of the that the ryotwari system would have

to protect with an

desired

and not

was

ryots, to be over-

less dis-

zamindars.

of

zamindars

the

presi-

of Andhra,

178 two of the Madras executive councillors wanted the government to show displeasure. Erskine, however, favoured non-

involvement: the

"If

Zamindari

organise advocate

system

more

popular

if

it

of

the

since

“powers

areas under

took

1927

and the

surely

and

it

key

adaptable

zamindars

There were there was

do

of

A ryot-oriented

intransigent side,

leader

counter-propaganda", Socialism as long as

violence."

be

the

up

to

wrote. is not

Congress

than

Party

the

on

The

Zamindars

ministry

the

Government

— but

might

be

withheld

the

used

1935

Raj

in

one

promotions

Commission, in

the

from ministerial

the end

of civil

low

designed and

to remove

middle

control

levels

and political

disobedience

transfer

protect

key

be threatened had a

and

government

service

influence.'?

the central

law

reserved

appointments

of

by

accepted

the

— revenue,

to

to

support.

had

of the administration if they appeared to the new ministries. From 1929 Madras had

Services

dominated

the Governor

emergencies

to

On the negative Congress could

entail

dyarchy

gave

to

promised

for

of Madras

would

under

Act

attacks

"It is no crime Socialism with

a Justice

leaning

a new constitution

portfolios

police

is

he it

Congress

broader considerations, too. relatively little damage the

office.

that

which

and

the

Since

and provincial

governments had been tightening up the organization of the police so as to minimize political interference under the new constitution and to ensure the continuance of striking forces which might be needed in the event of a constitution-

al

impasse

and a revival

of civil

consideration had been given press on the assumption that

to it

rather

it

ministries

than

try

to

criticized

by

stalled.'®

been

inherit

and perhaps

Although

introduce

the

disobedience.’

legislation to control was better to have the

the new

when

in-

repeal

expansion

previous

Careful

such

they

of the

Governors

and

legislation

were

already

electorate

by

civil

had

servants

for enfranchising the "unthinking ryots", there was reassurance in the creation of a second chamber in the provincial legislature designed to give representation to "a large

stratum of 'solid' people, not merely big zamindars or other landholders, but also bankers, professional or business men, merchants and retired officials, to whom the rough and tumble

of popular political contest is distasteful..." and to support the Governor against the "vagaries of the lower house".?° Erskine was at pains to persuade the Congress that he believed in constitutional fair play and an impartial civil service,?? but he was not having to On

energy

the

and

positive

he had the satisfaction of knowing that walk the tight-rope without a safety-net. side,

organizational

Erskine

capacity

was

of

impressed

the

by

Congress.

the

He

did

179 not its

Just

want to trap or enormous energy

as Willingdon

success

new

of

form

had needed

dyarchy,

constitution

and

frustrate the Congress, but to channel into constructive ministerial activity.

a

stable

so

in

the

Erskine

Madras.

ministry

It

Justice

needed

backed

alone by

Party

the

to make

Congress

could

to

reach

a majority

in

result

of his

instability

Germany

and

It

is

growing

Europeans

12 years

he

saw-in

Italy

in

difficult

confidence

Geoffrey

Madras.

to

Executive

Bracken,

Secretary Erskine's

in

in

in the Commons

the

the

closest

and

and

early

assess

the

extent

Certainly

he

the in

Congress

1935

was

Councillor

adviser

in

the

was

to

the

two

which by

from

appears

years

to

the

voters

legis-

not arise also a

to the

France,

Erskine's

other

backing

promoted

and

of

1930s. 7?

shared

had

the

a reaction

politics

1920s

to

who

parliamentary

run

the

lature. Erskine's concern for a stable ministry did only from his assessment of Madras politics: it was

a

of Sir

Chief

before

have

been

the

intro-

duction of the new constitution. Further down the administrative hierarchy attitudes were more ambiguous. District officials and police officers had reason to fear that a

Congress

dize

ministry

their

future

might

interfere with

careers

dence to suggest that they stable ministry and wished

in

India.

with

the

of

the

Congress

lackadaisical

A.R.C. clearly

election

Justicites

and

opinion that in his district "Nearly are well-to-do and are not likely to

dencies

work

there

is

and

jeopar-

some

too welcomed the prospect of to avoid a new confrontation

tween the Congress and the Raj. Magistrate of Madura in 1937 was thoroughness

their

But

in economic matters".??

Westlake, impressed

campaign

gave

his

all the develop

by

evia be-

District by the

contrast

unsolicited

Congress members left wing ten-

Less than six years

earlier,

as District Magistrate of South Arcot, Westlake had been pleading for tough measures to crush a revived civil dis-

obedience to

campaign.”*

European non-officials were also reconciling the prospect of a Congress ministry in Madras.

themselves Once a

champion of the Justice Party, the European-owned Madras Mail had, by the mid-1930s become impatient with the ineptness of

its fumbling protege. It, too, was sickened by the Justicites preoccupation with patronage, commenting in an editorial on 1 June 1935 that "If the Justice Party is really determined

upon reorganization, it should be one of its first ations that, so far as it is concerned, the spoils

proclamsystem

must go". In a bid to revive European sympathy for the party, the Justice leadership suggested that if it were returned to office under the new constitution it would offer a ministerial

post

to

a

European.

Replying

to

this

offer,

W.M.

Langley,

180

president ation,

of the

told

the

South

branch's

Indian

annual

Branch

of the European

conference

on

13

Associ-

January

1937

that he was opposed to the appointment of a European minister: Europeans should organize themselves separately within the legislature and support whichever party favoured their interests. F.E. James, one of the principal spokesmen of the European non-officials in Madras, ing the Congress not to encourage

expect

that

the

constitutional

took a sterner line, election rowdyism or

issue

could

be

warnto

reopened

for

another 10 years. But beneath his gruffness was a practical awareness that it would probably be the Congress, not the Justice Party, that the Europeans would have to come to terms with after the elections.*> Furthermore, James, as a leader of the European non-officials in the central Assembly, had been increasingly concerned at the potential menace of

Indian communism to communism was Congress

right

rather than nationalism.*° Mutual antipathy bringing the Madras Europeans and the

wing

closer

possible in 1920-22 when in were indistinguishable from

The Difficulties Having

together

the provincial

elections,

development

I am sure

constitution".?”?

have

seemed

Gandhi's

followers

Find Themselves

a Congress

majority

Erskine

159-seat majority it won. But, as Linlithgow, the Viceroy, "I am not

as

would

European eyes "Bolsheviks".

in Which They

anticipated

than

was

at

90

who

office

at

the

this

and work

last

in

the

confided to Lord all disturbed by

take

Rajagopalachari,

about

surprised

he at

they will

of

the

minute

replaced Satyamurti as the Congress candidate for the University constituency, gave the Governor every reason

believe ations

that

on

this

3 March,

would

a week

leader of the Congress such

a

large

be

majority

the

case,

before

he

Legislative

and

with

so

himself

was

Party

many

opening

officially

the pressure enormous.

in

favour

within

However,

of

office

the Congress

the

Congress

during

the

to

had

MLAs

bent

on

election

made

a

campaign;

contrary, its manifesto, published in August the national party to the "entire rejection"

With

office

in five two others,

form ministries not

elected

in Madras.7°

acceptance, with the Congress holding a majority provincial assemblies and a dominant position in

to

negoti-

was

declaration

on

the

1936, pledged of the 1935

Government of india Act which had been "imposed on India against the declared will of the people". Instead, the

Congress promised to call a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for a self-governing India.”* Rajagopalachari and Satyamurti had seen this avowed hostility to the con-

stitution

as

little

more

than

a tactic,

designed

to

keep

up

181 pressure on strate that

office,

the the

and

Raj until party had

the not

last possible become a mere

to win a symbolic

concession

moment, to demonsuppliant for

from the

British

that would give the impression that acceptance of office was a triumphant vindication of the policy of fighting the Raj by

constitutional

left

wing

Gandhi,

means.°°

remained

partly

However,

opposed

to

to preserve

the

Nehru

acceptance

party

unity

own aversion to constitutionalism, a more substantial concession from

gopalachari On

had

his

28 February,

from

a meeting

Rajagopalachari

for

of

told

ask

an

assurance

from

would

be willing

to accept

a verbal

Congress

and partly

the

Erskine

would

the

of office;

and

from his

wanted the negotiation the British than Raja-

anticipated.

return

and

the

CWC

that

at

Wardha

of

on

the Congress

Governors

that

assurance,

but

they

would behave constitutionally before Congress would form ministries in the provinces in which it had majorities. Erskine replied that he did not think a written assurance could be given; Rajagopalachari added that personally he would probably suggested, the

Gandhi.”

in basic

office

were

However,

agreement

with

to

of attrition

After

informed

on

not

only

party

help

ies are

any

followed.

on

and

the

and

Secretary

it

of

concessions,

7 March

would

Rajagopalachari

desirability

of negotiation

be

1937 the

vis-a-vis

to extricate

in which of their

the

fuss,

real

of State,

that

greatest

to take any steps which position of the central

machine

Rajagopalachari

Erskine

the

make

consulting

Erskine

our part then the

that from

although

a minimum

reluctant

a war

the CWC

want a written guarantee. Failing this, Viceroy could discuss a suitable formula

the

Congress

the

their

or

were

taking

superiors

symbolic,

the

and

Viceroy

mistake

on

will strengCongress

Provinces

or

will

from the difficult-

they find themselves own creation...

should,

Congress

he with

Viceroy

and

which

continued,

he could expect "the utmost help, the Governor within the framework

be

informed

sympathy and support" of the 1935 Act, but

an oral or written guarantee could not be given.*? The government's policy was "to sit tight and, while keeping the closest watch on all developments, to refrain from committing

ourselves

in any way". °3

Rajagopalachari,

disappointed out

an

by this

assurance

the

meeting

Erskine

intransigence.

Congress

would

again

on

9 March,

He regretted

be

unable

to

was

that with-

take

office

182 in

Madras

and

other

Congress-majority

provinces.

This

would

be "a disastrous course" but, he added, Congressmen “had consider what was best for them in India as a whole".™ Rajagopalachari

ings

of

man

for

the

the

CWC

then

and

left

AICC,

he

for

Delhi

emerged

office-acceptance

as

section

of

where,

the

at

national

the

the

Congress,

to

meet-

spokes-

pitting

his arguments against the hostility of Nehru and the caution of Gandhi. The resolution finally adopted by the AICC

represented a compromise, but office acceptance remained contingent on_an assurance from the British government or the Governors °° Rajagopalachari returned to Madras still optimistic as to the possibility of a Congress ministry by

April.

On

25 March

impossibility

by to

he met

Erskine

and,

despite

of the Governor offering the assurance

the Congress, Erskine saw come to some agreement".

gopalachari

again

returned

demanded

that the Congress leader At Erskine's suggestion,

later

in

him

"not

the

day

with

to

use

his

the

a formula

"wanted Raja-

which

the Governor believed was "fairly satisfactory". The draft acknowledged that the Governor could not make a pledge not to use his special powers, but said that the Congress would

accept

a promise

interference

matters

from

or set aside

appertaining

the provincial At

that

to

the

and

Ministry".**

point

the negotiations pretation of the

Gandhi

advice

within

legitimate

in Madras

because the formula Congress demand.°7

powers

of the Cabinet

the

arrived

special

and

of

in

scope

of

torpedoed

did not fit his interOn the other side, the

Viceroy and the Secretary of State found Rajagopalachari's draft equally unacceptable. An impasse had been reached and

on 27 March

the

breakdown

to maintain

party

accompanied by a on both sides.*

obedience

of the negotiations

degree of bitterness, Rajagopalachari toured

unity,

or the display

but

discouraging

of anti-British

extremists. Although with Congress should be able to

such a defeat

was

made

public,

born of frustration, the province, trying

talk

of civil

hostility

dis-

by party

large majority, the any other ministry the

Governor might create, the government might call his bluff by dissolving the legislature. The party could not afford another election so soon, and in a poll caused by Congress

refusal

Support.

to take

Congress

Even

and

tempt

favour of office

ghost

office

the

a

lose

much of its existing

of dissolution

section

in defiance

of Subbarayan's

Madras. *

it would

threat

of

the

party

might to

of the national

ministry

still

haunted

break

declare

up in

leadership.

the

Congress

the

The in

183 Believing that it Congress gave way, the

was only a matter of time Viceroy opposed Erskine's

before the desperate

suggestion of a dissolution, and discussion began-on the formation of an Interim Ministry. Erskine first approached

V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, the the legislature, to give a

but

Srinivasa

Sastri

was

Liberal, who was not a member of chance to the non-Justice elements,

well

aware

of

the

fury

and

anger

he

would attract from the Congress and his Liberal associates, and refused.’ Erskine then turned to Sir K.V. Reddi Naidu, a

Justice

Naidu

minister

was

in

ready

1920-23

and eager

and

a proven

to oblige,

loyalist.

hastily

Reddi

nailing

together

a ministry of diverse talents, made Justicites. A program was invented

up mainly of former for the ministry, but

meeting

merely

so blatantly

. cature

of

the

and

situation

that

of a Madras

embittered

in

ever

a moment

on

the

21

and

by

by the

seriously

of July

Viceroy

the

support

legislature,

created

Erskine,

end

popular

and

it

could

legislature

not

served

without

it

survive

to

a

cari-

a Congress

The crisis continued. Intermediaries attempted to the deadlock, but Rajagopalachari and Erskine were

baffled

had

the

idea

ministry."? break

lacked

of

22

powerlessness

exhaustion,

intended

logjam

constitutional

their

intransigence

wondered

to take

was

broken.

June,

which

problem

in

if

office."*

did

detail

to

of their

Statements little

and

solve

the

superiors. the

Congress

Then

at the

made

more

reiterate

by

than

the

the

explain

gov-

ernment's initial position, were seized upon by the CWC at Wardha on 7 July as sufficient assurance for the Congress to take office."? It was, as the immensely relieved Erskine

noted

with

surprise,

an

by the Congress.” took

the

Rajagopalachari's office

as

"assurance"

soon

as

demand.

"abject

and

ministry,

decently

unconditional

long-planned

possible

It embodied

and

after

the

the

surrender”

much-awaited,

nationalist

funeral

united

of

front which the Gongress had become in the Madras Presidency over the previous seven years. Rajagopalachari, who as head

of the provincial

Minister

thus

and

assuming

ministry

Premier,

direct

also

was

held

officially the

responsibility

office

for

the

known

as

the Prime

of Finance

Minister

introduction

of

prohibition. Prakasam, as the leading Telugu MLA, potentially Rajagopalachari's greatest rival for leadership of the provincial legislative party, accepted the post of Minister for Revenue, which entailed special responsibilities to investigate the land revenue systems of the province in preparation for

the

land

reforms

Congress

had

promised.

Rajan,

given for the Trichinopoly affair, was nominated to the Legislative Council as Minister for Public Health and

for-

184 Religious Endowments. Yakub Hasan was rewarded for having re-joined the Congress with the post of Minister for Public Works; Subbarayan by appointment as Minister for Education and

Legal

Affairs;

Information.

recent

recruits

Ramanathan

Erstwhile to

by

the

Swarajists

the

party,

office

and

were

of

activists,

included,

and

Minister

as

well

posts

carefully distributed to satisfy communal and linguistic claims for representation in provincial ministry. There

was,

Despite having his dedication

however,

one

notable

omission:

craved office for at to constitutionalism

of

as

were

Satyamurti.

least 15 years, despite and his tireless elect-

ioneering in 1936-37, despite having stood down from the University constituency to allow Rajagopalachari to enter legislature, Satyamurti received no reward." Perhaps it deliberate spite by Rajagopalachari against the only

Congressman

haps

who

might

it was based

rival

him

on a realistic

in

the

Tamil

abilities and his unpopularity with the The consequence was to drive Satyamurti ition to Rajagopalachari, to revive the gopalachari

had

sought

to

coalescence. Satyamurti's Kamaraj and his associates Satyamurti, who died in emerged as the Congress

levered

Congress;

assessment

overcome

the was

per-

of Satyamurti's

Telugu Congressmen. into informal opposfactionalism Raja-

through

the

disappointment was into disaffection,

politics

of

inflamed by yet it was not

prison in 1943, but Kamaraj who boss in Tamilnad and the man who

Rajagopalachari

out of the party

by the mid-1950s.

But in 1937 such developments were barely perceived. Unheeding protests from the Congress left and from a small minority of activists that the acceptance of office and the working

of

the

constitution

office,

Rajagopalachari's

were

contrary

to

the

party's

basic objectives, the Congress in Madras settled down to enjoy the exercise of power and the perquisites of office, for so long the forbidden fruit. In just over two years in

ministry

proved

itself

a friend

of

the businessman, a defender of the rich peasant, and a patron of hand-spinners and weavers. Despite the inclusion in the ministry of V.V. Giri, formerly a labour organizer, as Minister for Labour, the ministry was generally unsympathetic to the interests of the industrial proletariat, the voters among

whom

had

largely

opted

for

the

Congress

in

1937,

and

it was responsible for the suppression of several labour disputes.*° As minister for the police department, Rajagopalachari gradually stepped up the investigation and prosecution of communists, especially in Malabar and the Andhra delta districts. His anti-communist stand was warmly

applauded by the presidency's European business community and held up as an example worthy of imitation in other provinces. “7

185 Despite

the

introduction

of

temple entry by Harijans disabilities, little was

plight

of

the

untouchables

legislation

designed

to

allow

and to remove their principal social attempted to ameliorate the economic

and

of

landless

labourers.

Raja-

gopalachari at last had the opportunity to begin to implement his prohibition schemes, but neither the ryotwari nor zamindari systems of landholding were overhauled. There was too

little time.*®

Once the leading No-Changer, Rajagopalachari was now acclaimed by British commentators as the ablest Congress parliamentarian. His close, largely harmonious, relations with Erskine epitomized the rapprochement which had taken

place between the nationalist leaders and the principal representatives of British authority in Madras.“? And it characteristic

the

of

publication

issued

vants they

by the

that

his

attitudes

of an

UP Congress

they

would

abandoned

watched

old,

as

never

happy

at

officials having

to

on

by

autocratic

Congressmen

under

prevented

lines

government

ways.

to

"No

such

of

that

ser-

see

that

circular

in January 1938, "or non-Tamil members of so harmonious as those

and non-officials. serve

he

the

warning

is called for", Rajagopalachari noted desirable".*° His relations with the the ministry and legislature were not

with European

premier

circular,

ministry,

be

their

that

official

was

a Tamil,

The Telugus, suspected

Rajagopalachari and Erskine of conspiring to advise the Secretary of State against accepting the legislature's recommendation for a separate Andhra province. Certainly, it was contrary to Rajagopalachari's faith in a nationalist

united front to fugal

the

give

issue

tensions, crisis.

was

the

shelved

that

united

The accession virtual provincial

economic not

to be

had

taken

structurally,

exclude

the

1935

until

was

front

the

the

but

Act,

to

greatest

tactics.

to

the Justicites.

forces

any

in south

transform

prevent

had

the

the powers a

lurch

society the

the

Raja-

a system radical

to work and

within

economy

by ministers

left

and

to

of

were

framework.

enjoyed

to

of

Such changes

constitutional

and

internal

achievement

agreed

centri-

Despite

a major

India.

of

other,

of the Congress under did not result in any

Congress

to exploit

the

or

independence.

without

of the colonial not

to

Tamil

after

survived

changes

expected:

office

Telugu,

to power autonomy

or social

the constraints

encouragement

whether

ministry

Perhaps

gopalachari's

under

any

regionalism,

It

186

The Revolution

That Never

Was

Ten years separated the formation of the Congress ministries from Indian independence in August 1947. The twists at the end of the tale of British India remained — not least the

and

Quit

India

the

central

tiations

about

movement

for

the

role

of

1942,

of Jawaharlal

independence.

future

the

But,

development

creation

Nehru

although

in

of

the

much

of nationalist

Pakistan,

final

was

politics

nego-

undecided

at

the

all-India level in 1937, the Congress-Raj rapprochement in the provinces by 1937 constituted an @ssential prelude to

decolonization. [~

It has

Indians

been

had

attained

made

claimed it

independence

that

the "British

impossible

for

through

them

revolution.

to

left

stay.

The

India because India

midwar

Quit

India movement climaxed India's nationalist revolution, which overthrew a powerful effective political regime". ™ But to

introduce

the

colonization the

Quit

Raj

in

adjustment

notion

in India — and

India

its

movement

and

institutional

were

30

years

and

the

it

context

process

to

extent

in

characterized

ignore

the

(even

created

by

the

of de-

specifically

to obscure the

which

participants

structures

into

to identify

— is

reassessment

last

Congressmen

of revolution

captives

British.

the

of)

with

of re-

to

British

which

the

Gandhi's tactics of non-violent non-cooperation and civil disobedience were potentially revolutionary. If faith-

fully followed they could have severed the Congress completely from the legislatures, wrenched the professional middle class away from government service and other collaborative roles; they could have thrown open membership of the Congress

club

to

the

masses.

obedience were, replacing it by But in practice

we have

seen

Effective

boycotts

was

at

dis-

in theory, capable of paralysing the Raj and a new political system under Indian control. Gandhi's tactics were not revolutionary. As

in the

context

of Tamilnad,

classes, who were the dominant social shied away from satyagraha in 1919-22 menacing in which

and mass civil

the pfopertied

element in the when it was at

Congress, its most

because they feared a political and social holocaust they might perish algng with the Raj. Satyagraha

its

most

successful

when

it

was

linked

to’ specific

local grievances or, as in 1930-33, directed towards limited constitutional objectives. By 1937 its function was clear: satyagraha was being used by the Congress as a clamp from outside the constitutional system to exert pressure inside that system.

187 Gandhi's

to appease weight

tactics

the

of

fears

British

were

employed

of vakils

repression

in

and

this

landlords.

showed

the

fashion

not

The

only

sheer

impossibility

of

winning swaraj through a single agitational campaign. Adherence to non-violence created its own limitations. As Rajagopalachari observed in 1922, it was impossible to have a parallel

government

agitations

failed

to

without

expel

the

It could

not

violence.

If

the

if

Congress

British

and

it was

operate

in defiant

imposs-

ible to construct a parallel government without violating ideal of ahimsa, then the Congress had to settle for more

immediate from

ment

the

Raj.

Acceptance

The

shift

of that.

in the

had

gains.

been

of office

in the directional

service

of the

defeated

by

Congress

the

did

Raj.

in

1937

thrust not

The

was

isolation

an

acknowledge-

of Gandhian

mean

that

achievement

the

tactics

the

gained

civil disobedience movement of 1930-33 established as the dominant political party in India. Without

party by

the

Congress the parti-

cipation of the Congress the new constitution was in jeopardy. A dozen years before he became prime minister, Clement Attlee

showed an awareness of when he criticized the hostile

to

the

Congress.

this 1935

pivotal Act for

The question that we said in Parliament]:

scheme

provide

living

what

forces

we have

should put Does this

a medium

of

importance containing

to deal

is this [he Constitutional

through

India

can

which

operate,

with

of the Congress provisions

are the

the

because

forces

of

modern India, a living India, and not the dead India of the past. If we are to do anything with India, we have to bring modern forces to play, and it is here that the importance of

the

good

attack or

ill,

dominating

on

the

the

Congress

Congress

factors

in

it are

very

use ignoring it, and merely to abuse it.

but

within

are going

In forcing

but also,

been

a

to make

party

the

it We

comes

is

situation.

one

in. of

It

For

the

is

no

is useless and futile may disagree with it,

many

for modern

of the

forces

India.*

that

Tamilnad the Congress had succeeded not only in the government to acknowledge its dominant position,

by knocking

three-cornered

years of hegemony separation of the Congress

party

power

had

out the Justice

contest,

the

Party

Congress

from what had embarked

on

in Tamil politics which was helped by old province's non-Tamil area — where become

weaker

than

in

Tamilnad

—

in

30

the the

188 1956 reorganization of the states on linguistic lines, and interrupted only by the rise to power of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in 1967. The resignation of the Congress ministry in October 1939 in protest against Britain's involvement of India in the Second World War and the Quit India movement in 1942 did not alter the eagerness of the Tamil Congressmen to return to the constitutional system at a later date nor did

those

episodes

Congress

imperil

achieved

by

the

1937.

dominant

political

position

of the

Two factors should be stressed in the rapprochement tween the Congress and the Raj in Tamilnad in the 1930s. Firstly, this was a provincial agreement not, as yet, an

India one. in order to

The British consolidate

were withdrawing from their position at the

be~ all-

the provinces centre. This

strategic retreat was designed to preserve British control of defence, external affairs, currency and other matters of primary importance to Britain while entangling the Congress in the net of provincial government. As Chief Secretary,

Bracken

predicted

Provincial

of

any

in

December

preoccupations

all-India

ies will play will probably all-India future is

1934

that

will

weaken

the

movement...Provincial

grip

jealous-

an important part in future and adversely affect Congress as an

party. likely

In other words trouble to be Provincial and so

in local-

ised and a mass all-India movement will be increasingly difficult for even Mr. Gandhi organize.

to

Similarly, an important reason why the Secretary of State and the Viceroy wished to avoid negotiations with Gandhi (and to

was

encourage

to weaken

Congress-Governor

the

power

discussion

of the

central

in

the

Congress

provinces)

organization.™

In this regard the British were to be disappointed. The proposed Indian federation, projected in the 1935 Act, was shelved partly because of the refusal of the princes (intended to counterbalance the Congress at the centre) to participate; Gandhi, the CWC and the AICC demonstrated their continuing

authority over the provincial resignation of the ministries British

had,

therefore,

to

committees, in 1939 and

concede

the Second World War in a manner provinces a decade before.

power

similar

not least by the Quit India. The

at

to

the

that

centre

in

the

after

The second factor in the rapprochement was the restricted character -of the political arena in which the prelude to decolonization occurred. The electorate in Tamilnad in 1937 was

:

:

189

as restricted centage

of

England

in terms

the

by

of franchise

population

the

1867

provisions

enfranchised

Reform

Act.

In

it

clearly

as

its

and

that

the per-

created

struggle

against

in

the

Raj and against the Justice Party the Tamil Congress had emerged from its earlier base among the Brahmin professional middle class and had recruited widely among the propertyholding

classes

orate,

defined

British

with

had

this

Congress

power.

their

generally;

by property

set up under

broad

was

band

of

committing

Merchants

continuing

and

and

the

the

tax

1935 Act.

middle

itself

ryots,

commanded

qualifications,

to

strata

grievances

against

the

elect-

which

In identifying of

society,

a peaceful

businessmen

the

transfer

and

but

itself

the

landlords,

British,

the

of

the

had

intensity of that conflict was moderated by the prospect of an end to colonial rule in the foreseeable future, and by concern at the rise of left-wing militancy. British eager-

ness

where

to

have

the

Congress

it had won

motivated

by

a majority

a fish

to

take

was

office

strengthen

in

1937

in

to a considerable the

party's

the provinces

extent

right

against

its left wing.°® Neither the colonial power nor its heir apparent wished to see the Raj demolished and the propertied classes hacked to pieces by an onslaught of hammers and

sickles.

India's

ledgement

admission

of

independence the

that

vigour

the

of

was

support

its

a compromise. nationalist

of the

Raj

It was

movement,

had been

eroded. But the British ensured that power was to politicians who represented the interésts of

tied classes and were likely politicians who had attained

the

institutional

passed,

hands

not

into

structure

the

of a Congress

hands

that

an

acknow-

an

steadily

transferred the proper-

to be hostile to communism; positions of authority within

of the

of

colonial

state.

revolutionaries,

had proved

but

Power

into

itself — to be "safe".

the

7

|

191

NOTES Chapter Nationalist 1

and Regional

1

Politics,

pp.

9-45

O.H.K. Spate and A.T.A. Learmonth, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography (3rd edn, London, 1967),

p. 737. Census

of

India,

1921:

Madras,

XIII,

Census

of India,

1931:

Madras,

XIV,

Census

of India,

1931:

Madras,

XIV,

1922), p. 39, 1932),

Map

p.

IV.

10.

Tamil Nadu Government

pt

I,

(Madras,

pt

II,

(Madras,

pt

I, pp.

15, 2land

Archives, Madras [hereafter TNA], Madras Order (G.0.) 1731, Development, 27 Nov 1923,

« 47,

Dharma Kumar, Land and Caste in South India: Agrtcultural Labour in the Madras Presidency

Nineteenth Century Nilmani

(Cambridge,

Mukherjee,

The

1965), pp.

Ryotwart

System

1792-1827 (Calcutta, 1962). Kumar, Land and Caste, p. 11.

during

12-13,

in

Madras,

the

18-19.

David Washbrook, "Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930", John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (eds.), Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on’Indian Politics,

1870-1940

R.

(Cambridge,

Suntharalingam,

Study

of

Indian

1967), Ibid., Anil

an

Economie

Indian

The

pp.

Madras

Emergence

Polities 13

(Cambridge,

1852-1891

of Indian

"Notes Lord

(Tucson,

prepared

Meston",

Library,

1968),

and Nationalist

1974),

London,

pp.

pp.

Papers,

[hereafter

Association:

Organization",

Review,

IV,

A

3 (Sept

Nationalism:

in the Later Nineteenth 104-7;

Awakening

in the Madras

Meston

Native

History

Competition and Collaboration Century

155-211.

Political

and Soctal

p. 237. p. 251.

Seal,

"The

Early

1973),

R.

in South

112-15.

Goveriiment

F.

136/33,

IOL].

Suntharalingam,

India,

Secretariat

India

Office

for

192 Notes

to

pages

14

Andre

Beteille,

Structure p.

15-21

165;

E.

Castes

and Social

in E.R. Leach (ed.), Ceylon and North-West

15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22

Slater

Census

of India,

(London,

Nationalist

Asia,

II,

R.T.

26

"Caste

Eesaye

in

(Bombay, a

in

Soctal

Tanjore

1969),

Village",

Aspects of Caste in South India, Pakistan (Cambridge, 1960), p. 22;

Some South

68-9,

1921:

Politics

(Aug

1972),

Parthasarathy,

1953), pp. 5-18.

R.

Suntharalingam,

versus

Executive

Modern

Asian

220.

Madrae,

Indian

XIII,

Villages

pt

I, pp.

in

pp.

in

South

India,

128-9.

1878-1885",

66-70.

Dawn and Achievement

the

Salem

Riots,

Mediation

111,

Nationalist

3

(July

(Salem,

1882:

of

Judiciary

a Communal

1969),

Awakening,

South

of Indian

and Times of Patriot and Thinker

"The

Studies,

Suntharalingam,

p.

pp.

198.

Dispute",

193-208.

M.N. Srinivas, Religion and Society among the Coorge of South India (London, 1952), p. 30; M.N. Srinivas, SoctaZ Change in Modern India (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 1-45. David Arnold, "The Gounders and the Congress: Political Recruitment

1974),

in

South

pp. 7-8,

"Caste

Analysis",

25

pp.

Gough,

Freedom: Being the Life C. Vijiaraghavachariar,

Manor,

24

New:

Suntharalingam, Nationalist Awakening, pp. 137-9. R. Suntharalingam, "The 'Hindu' and the Genesis of

(Aug

23

(ed.),

1918),

and

Stratification

Kathleen

Gilbeit

Old

India,

David

Associations

Indian

For

the

early

Arnold,

Economie

XIII, 3, (July-Sept 1976). career

of

1920-1937",

the

in

Robin

South

Jeffrey

South

India:

A

Justice

Party,

see

and Social

History

Asta,

and

IV,

James

Comparative

Review,

Eugene

F.

Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929 (Berkeley,

1969),

The Southborough

chs.

Report

3-5.

on the

Indian

Franchise

(Cmd.

141, 1919, p. 19) noted that there were only 179,388 literate in English in the Madras Presidency in a population of nearly 40 millions. Judith M. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922 (Cambridge, 1972), ch. 3. T.N. Jagadisan (ed.), Letters of the Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri (2nd edn, Bombay, 1963), pp. 41, 43.

193 Notes 27 28

to pages

22-28

House of National

India,

Commons Debates, 97 (1917), col. 1695. Archives of India, New Delhi, Government

Home

Department,

Political

Section,

H. Poll], Proceedings, Sept 1918, no. 20, Fortnightly Report on the

Situation

29 30

31

32 33

[hereafter

P.

Sastri:

Rao,

FRII,

The

second

Right

A Political

Jagadisan,

Srinivasa

H.F.

Owen,

"Towards

D.A.

Low

as

half

of

July

appropriate].

Honourable

Biography

Sastri,

p.

[hereafter

Deposit [hereafter Internal Political

(Bombay,

V.S.

1918

Srinivasa

1963),

49.

D-]

pp.

48-56;

Gandhi to Srinivasa Sastri, 9 Feb 1919, Gandhi to Srinivasa Sastri, tel., 11 March 1919, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [hereafter CWMG] (New Delhi, from 1958), XV, pp. 88, 128. Organization:

The

Nation-wide

Home

pp.

1968),

172,

pp.

158-95.

174-7.

Brown, Gandhi's Rise, History of the Indian (reprinted,

35

H.

Poll,

36 37 38 39

H.

Poll,

Besant,

Rule

(ed.), Soundings

(London,

Ibid.,

Owen,

New

"Towards

Delhi,

Procs

Aug

Leagues,

Procs

Jamnadas

Apr

Dwarkadas

1969),

before 1918,

1915-18",

p.

133.

Agitation",

Supply

D-28,

1919,

to

and

pp. 141-4; B. Pattabhi National Congress, 1,

Nation-wide

Grievances

Agitation

in

in Modern South Asian History

Sept 1918, D-40, FR I Aug 1918. D-49,

Besant,

(Adyar

FR

27

I

FR

May

II

Feb

p.

Sitaramayya, 1885-1935

178;

Annie

pamphlet, 1918;

Mar

1919,

Procs

1919.

Adyar

1923).

Archives.

H. Poll, Procs July 1919, D-47, FR II Apr 1919. V.K. Narasimhan, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar (Delhi, 1963),

pp. 23-44. C.J. Baker, "Politics in South India, 1917-1930", PhD dissertation, Cambridge University, 1973, pp. 113-18; David Washbrook, review of Brown, Gandhi's Rise, Modern Astan Studies, VII, 1 (Jan 1973), pp. 109-10;

D.A.

41 42 43 44

Madras,

FRIor

Kodanda

34

40

from

of

Washbrook,

The Madras ch.S.

Narasimhan,

The Emergence

Presidency,

of Provincial Politics:

1870-1920,

Kasturi Ranga,

(Cambridge,

pp.

55-69.

of

Police,

Prema Nandakumar, Subramania Bharati Gandhi to Vijayaraghavachari, 23 Feb Report

1919,

of

TNA,

the

G.O.

Commissioner

222,

Public

1976),

(New Delhi, 1919, CWMG, Madras,

(Confidential),

25

1968). XV, p.96.

Mar

24 Apr

1919.

194 Notes 45

to

pages

H.

29-33

Poll,

of

the

Procs

Congress

46 47 48 49

G.O.

Ibid.,

1919,

Committee

Conmittee,

Archives. Report

Apr

Executive of

the

p.

2.

222,

1919

D-49,

II

(Conf.),

Mar

the Madras

of

Police,

(Madras,

Commissioner

Public

FR

of

24

1920),

Apr

25

1919.

1919;

Report

p.

Adyar

Provincial 4,

Mar

1919,

TNA,

50

H. Poll, Procs July 1919, D-47, FR I Apr. 1919. Report of the Commissioner of Police, 4 Apr 1919, TNA, G.O, 222, Public (Conf.), 24 Apr 1919, p. 4. Police Report, 6 Apr 1919, TNA, G.O. 222, Public (Conf.),

51 $2

supplement, 8 Apr 1919, Adyar Archives. TNA, G.O. 223, Public (Conf.), 25 Apr 1919. R. Kumar (ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politica:

53 54 ss

56

24 Apr

1919,

Satyagraha

pp.

8-11;

of 1919

S.

Satyamurti

(Madras,

1918);

(Madras,

(ed.),

1919).

S.

59 60

Hindu,

63 64

(English;

Madras),

The

1971).

Rowlatt

of Civil Disobedience", 5 May 1919, TNA, SF 271, 11 July 1919; speech at Madura-Ramnad District Conference in Hindu (English; Madras), 22 Nov 1919.

Hindu, 19 Dec 1919, S. Satyamurti, "The

62

(London,

Times

TNA, Under-Secretary's Secret File [hereafter SF] 271, 11 July 1919, p. 19. H. Poll, Procs July 1919, D-48, FR I May 1919, citing a report from the Collector of North Arcot. C. Rajagopalachari, "Satyagraha: The Present Suspension

57 58

61

Madras

Iyengar,

“Financial

Nationalist 8,

Srinivasa

10

Sastri

in

Jagadisan

S.

Kasturi

3,

6 Mar

at the 1920). Brown,

“Gandhi

Party": Nov

1920.

Ranga

Gandhi's in

to

Programme";

1919:

leaflets

P.S.

in

Iyengar,

Adyar

pp.

"Foreword",

Loyalist

188-9;

or

Rangaswami

of

P.H.M.

the

Archives.

13 Apr

p.

66;

1920,

Hindu,

Resolutions

Amritsar,

Rebel?",

Gandhian Politics, pp. 43-63. Brown, Gandhi's Rise, pp. 240-1. Ibid., pp. 233-40.

A.

Aiyar,

Sastri,

Congress,

Proposals

of Citizens

"Programme

Sivaswami

Srinivasa

National Rise,

Rights

5 Mar, 26 Apr 1920. Congress Programme";

1919.

(ed.),

Indian

The Montagu-Chelmsford

Satyamurti,

in

1919

van

den

Kumar

Passed

(Madras, Dungen,

(ed.),

195

Notes

to pages 33-37

6S

Young

66

Brown,

67

68 69 70 7 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 8c 81 82 83

India

XVII, p. 482.

(English;

Gandhi's

Rise,

9 June

pp.

for the

216-20;

Muslim politics in India, see P. British India (Cambridge, 1972), For Gandhi's motives in adopting

1920,

Locality, Hindu,

Province

13

Aug

and Nation,

1920.

CWMG,

background

of

Hardy, The Muslims of esp. ch. 7. the council boycott,

see Richard Gordon, "Non-Cooperation and 1919-20", in Gallagher, Johnson and Seal

pp.

139-41.

Council (eds.),

Entry,

"More Objections Answered", Young India, 18 Aug 1920; interview published in Madras Matl (English; Madras),

[hereafter cited as Mail], 12 Aug 1920. Young India, 18 Aug 1920; Hindu, 13 Aug 1920. "Boycott of Goods v. Non-Co-operation Programme", India, 25 Aug 1920. Hindu, 13 Aug 1920. Ibid., Young India, 14 July 1920.

"Councils'

Boycott",

Gandhi

to

C.F.

Hindu,

16 Aug

Young

Andrews,

India,

23

Aug

14 July

1920,

CWMG,

“Madras Tour", Navajitvan (Gujarati; 1920, CWMG, XVIII, pp. 209, 213. Speeches

of

A.

1920.

Rangaswami

Iyengar

Iyengar, Hindu, 6, 16 Aug Hindu, 16 Aug 1920.

Ibid.

Kasturi

Hindu,

Nilkan 1948),

(Madras,

Ranga

16 Aug,

India, pp.

Iyengar, 25

Aug

1920.

Hindu,

16 Aug

1920.

1920.

XVIII,

Ahmedabad),

and

S.

Young

p.191.

29 Aug

Srinivasa

1920.

Perumal, Rajaji: A Biographical Study (Calcutta, pp. 11-12; Directory of the Madras Legislature

Speeches pp.

1938),

June

191-2; 137,

pp.

Centenary

214-15.

of C. Rajagopalachari, 1948-January

Monica

162;

1950

Felton, speech

Celebrations,

1969. C. Rajagopalachari,

Governor-General

(New

I Meet

Parthasarathy,

Rajagopalachari's

84

Ahmedabad),

at

Dawn,

the

Rajaji

Chate

Delhi,

Rajaji p.

Hall,

Behind

156;

Srinivasa Bars

1950),

(London,

Sastri

Madras,

(Madras,

22

of 1962), Sept

n.d.),

pp. 48-9; Francis Watson, The Trial of Mr. Gandhi (London, 1969), p. 173; Speeches of C. Rajagopalachari,

p. 192.

196 Notes

on

85

pages

37-41

Interview with C.R. Narasimhan (Rajagopalachari's son), Madras, 13 Feb 1970; M.K. Gandhi, The Story of My Experimente with Truth (2nd edn, Ahmedabad, 1940),

p.

86

348.

Rajagopalachari,

1918, D-20, FR II Hindu, 11, 15 Nov

87

21

Oct

1919.

July 1918. 1919; New

1921;

in Hindu,

pp. 100 f. Hindu, 21 Feb 1920. Hindu, 26 Aug, 7 Oct District Conference,

94 95

H.

96 97

Hindu,

13 Aug 1920.

1920s",

South Asia,

99

173-4.

India

Poll,

Procs

(English;

Sept

Madras),

Gandhi, Experimente, p. 348. C.R. Srinivasan in Hindu, 15 May 1935; K. Subba Rau, Men in the Limelight: Life Sketches (Madras, 1941),

May

pp.

H.

90 91

21

Conference,

Poll,

S.

K.V.

Procs

Aug

Ramanathan,

speech

22

at

Madura-Ramnad

Nov

District

1919.

1920; Rajan's speech at in Hindu, 6 Mar 1920.

1918,

League

Rajagopalan,

p. 186.

D-30,

FR

of Youth

I June

(Madras,

In and Out of the Law

Salem

1918.

1946),

(Madras,

p.

3;

1957),

Ramanathan, League, pp. 11-14; K. Santhanam, "How I first met Mahatma Gandhi", Bhavan'e Journal, XV, 16 (9 Mar 1969), pp. 33-5. For details, see Kenneth McPherson, "The Muslims of Madras and Calcutta: Agitational Politics in the Early

98

K.I.

McPherson,

"The

and Tamil-speaking

V

(Dec.

1978),

Political

Muslims

pp.

32-47.

Development

of the Madras

of

the

Urdu-

Presidency,

1901 to 1937", MA dissertation, University of Western Australia, 1968, pp. 76 f. K.I. McPherson, “Yakub Hasan: Commnalist or Patriot?",

University

Studies

101

Mail,

102

The Non-Co-operation

103

71-2;

Watson,

92 93

100

pp.

88 89

Hindu,

Gandht,

Chats,

p.

96;

25

Apr

TNA,

SF

1921;

407,

in Hietory,

McPherson,

6 May

1923,

V,

4

(1970),

"Political

p.

38.

pp.

73-7.

Development",

and Khilafat Movements

in the

Madras Presidency (Madras, n.d. [c. 1923]), p. 35; TNA, G.0. 607, Public (Conf.), 22 Sept 1920, p. 9; S.M. Fossil, The Islamic South (Madras, 1941), p. 22.

Gaunt

Madras

Report

(Urdu;

Presidency

Madras),

8

Sept

1919,

Native Newepaper Reporte

11

Apr

1920,

[hereafter MIR].

|

197 Notes 104

to

pages

41-47

McPherson,

"Muslims

of

Madras

and

Calcutta",

p.

39.

Fossil, Islamie South, pp. 3, 59, 126, 173, 189 identifies some of the leading young Khilafatists. The division between the moderate merchants and more extreme

maulvis

was

pp. 194, H. Poll,

105

an all-India

205. Procs

Oct

Procs

July

1920,

Procs

July

1920,

1919,

one:

Brown,

D-59,

FR

Gandhi's

I

Sept

Nov 1919, D-14, FR I Oct 1919; Hindu, H. Poll, Procs July 1920, D-95, FR II

106 107 108 109 110 lll 112 113 114 11s 116 117

H.

Poll,

H.

Poll,

D-90,

FR

I

Hindu, Hindu,

21 June 1920. 23, 24 June 1920;

Hindu, Hindu, Gordon, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu,

6, 16, 25 Aug 1920. 6 Sept 1920. "Non-Cooperation and Council 10 Sept 1920. 11, 13, 17, 18 Sept 1920. 13, 15, 20 Sept 1920. 20 Oct 1920.

Hindu, Hindu,

10 Sept 1920. 16, 18 Sept 1920.

Ramanathan, D-97,

FR

16, May

1919;

Mar.

Procs

18 Oct 1920.

1919.

1920.

League,

II

Rise,

June

pp.

1920.

Entry",

9-10;

pp.

143-7.

J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth-Century Bengal (Berkeley, 1968), p. 167.

118 119 120

Editorial, Hindu, Ranga, p. 192.

M.K.

121 122 123

Acharya

13

Sept

in Hindu,

Hindu, 19 Oct 1920. Gordon, "Non-Cooperation

1920;

22 Sept and

Chapter The Non-Cooperation 1

Gopal

Krishna,

Congress

Experiment, "The

as a Mass

Asian Studies,

Narasimhan,

Kasturi

1920.

Council

Entry",

pp.

148-52.

2 pp.

Development

Organization,

46-77 of

the

Indian

1918-23",

XXV, 3 (May 1966), p. 415.

National

Journal

of

John G. Leonard, "Politics and Social Change in South India: A Study of the Andhra Movement", Journal of Commorwealth Political Studies, V, 1 (Mar 1967), pp. 60-7. Brown, Gandhi's Cooperation and

Rise, p. 299; cf. Gordon, Council Entry", p. 134.

"Non-

198 Notes

to

4

pages

Michael

47-54

Brecher,

1959),

pp.

p. 419.

Nehru:

72-3;

Krishna,

A Political "Mass

Organization",

A. Rangaswami Iyengar, "Minute of Archives; Hindu, 15, 17 Nov 1920.

Hindu,

14,

Hindu,

3,

p. 423. Hindu,

18

Feb

15,

16,

1921;

16 July

20

July

Biography

Dissent",

Krishna,

"Mass

‘19 20

28 29

p.

205.

G.

Rudrayya

was

that

being

Kasturi

17 Sept 1921.

Delhi,

1971),

"TNCC

Annual

Memorial

p.

At

pp.

96,000

sought

Chowdari,

Hindu,

11,

Prakasam:

Hindu,

19 Nov

1920.

New

1921-22",

Delhi,

17 Jan

1922.

Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. Non-Co-operation and Khilafat,

the

and

of

8 Jan

Young India, 12 Jan 1922. Procs

Dec

1920,

D-84,

Hindu,

1921,

A Political p.

to

a further

CWC:

CWMG,

Study

AICC

Papers,

[hereafter

XIX,

(New

Nehru

AICCP],

1/169-G,

209. p. 47.

FR

10

28.

Dietmar Rothermund, The Phases of Indian and other Essays (Bombay, 1970), p. 125 Poll,

end

available

Fund

Iyengar,

124-35.

Report,

Library,

was

from

and Khilafat,

6;

H.

the

In August 1921 Rajagopala-

Swarajya

Ranga

Hindu, Ibid.

Rs.

the Tilak

Non-Co-operation

i 21 22 23 24 2s 26 27

60,000

from

Aug 1921. Gandhi to

18

Organization",

1921.

1924), p. 85.

reported

Tamilnad

Rs.

Adyar

1921 the CWC agreed to Rajagopalachari's request 8,600 : Indian National Congress, 1920-23

(Allahabad,

chari

esp.

1921.

Hindu, 15 Aug 1921. Hindu, 7 Sept 1921. Hindu, 22 Nov 1921. Hindu, 16 July 1921, 3 Dec 1923. Hindu, 19 Oct 1920. Hindu, 8 Mar, 29 Apr 1921. Hindu, editorials, 7, 21 July 1921. Hindu, 22 Nov 1921. M.K. Acharya in Hindu, 16 Aug 1921.

January for Rs.

(London,

II

Sept

Nationalism 1920.

199 Notes

to

Hindu,

30

40 41 42 43 44 4s 46 47 48 49 50

15,

(English;

Hindu, Volume

32

36 37 38 39

54-60

21,

27 Sept,

Madras),

May

1920;

Washbrook,

1922,

p.

296.

20 Oct 1920; Sixty-first Birthday Commemoration presented to Dr. R.K. Shanmukham Chettiar

(Annamalai, 1952), Irschick, Politics

"Non-Brahmin",

Government

Reformed

Ibid.

p. 96. and Social

Hindu,

15

of India,

Constitution,

Dec

Reports

Conflict,

1920.

1927

on the

(Madras,

1956), p. 11.

Willingdon {hereafter

to Montagu, 8 WP], F. 93/4,

Willingdon Willingdon Edwin

S.

to Montagu, to Montagu,

Montagu,

An

pp. 129, 135-6.

p.

(Calcutta,

Feb 1920, IOL.

178.

Working

1928),

Non-Co-operation and Khilafat, p. 38. Hindu, 15, 17 Dec 1920. R.V. Krishna Ayyar, In the Legislature

pp.

of

those

Willingdon

Diary

88-9.

|

5S Feb 1920, ibid. 7 June, 14 Dec. 1920,

Indian

of the

(London,

Days

Papers

tbid.

1930),

"Note by His Excellency Lord Willingdon on Reforms Report", c. 1919, WP, F. 93/2; Willingdon to Montagu, 19 Oct 1919, WP, F. 93/4.

Willingdon

Ibid.

to

Montagu,

For Willingdon's

7 Jan,

earlier

see Willingdon to Montagu, 28 Willingdon to Montagu, 29 Mar Willingdon

Cf.

to

Montagu,

Irschick,

Politics

Willingdon to Montagu, interview

with

52

Province and Nation, Hindu, 12 July 1923;

Gallagher,

of South India, 99-131. K.

26

One

Sitarama

Jan

1922.

Irschick,

14

Johnson

illustration

Politics

ibid.

for

the Moderates,

Oct 1919, ibid. 1920, ibid. 1920,

Madras,

in

and

tbid.

Conflict, 30

Decline: Seal

p.

South

was

the

Arcot:

12 May,

Jan

rapid

Baker,

1976),

Hindu,

Conflict,

172.

1971.

Bengal

(eds.),

(Cambridge,

and Social

Willingdon to Montagu,

1920,

p. 281, note 28. Christopher John

1920-1937 in

hopes

21 Mar 1921, WP, F. 93/4;

"Congress

Reddi

Dec

8 Feb

and Social

Rajan,

John

1939",

Gallagher,

P.T.

$1

$3 54

13 Oct

Emergence of Provinetal Politics, pp. 317-22. C. Ramalinga Reddi, "Dyarchy and After", Indian Review

31

33 34 35

pages

rise 26

pp.

1930

to

Locality,

The

Politics

pp. 54-63,

of

Jan

1921,

230-44.

3 Aug 1921, WP, F. 93/4.

|

|

200 Notes

to

pages

60- 64

55

Madras

56

Willingdon's

VII, IV,

s7

Legislative

27 Mar

1922,

Council

p.

address

16 Dec

1921,

Proceedings

3646.

to

p.

1937.

the

Madras

[hereafter MLCP],

legislature:

MLCP,

TNA, SF 315, 2 Apr 1921, p. 37; SF 328, 15 Nov 1921, pp. 47-9, 72-80; Peter D. Reeves, "The Politics of Order: 'Anti-Non-Cooperation' in the United Provinces,

1921", Journal pp. 261-74.

of Astan

Studies,

XXV,

2

Reports

the Reformed Constitution,

(Feb

TNA, SF 338, 1 May 1922, p. 34.

58 s9 60 61

on

...

Non-Co-operation

and

Khilafat,

pp.

1966),

1927,

32-3.

pp.

38-9

See the petitions and resolutions of the Nadar Mahajana Sabha (Hindu, 20 Dec 1920), the Maravar Association

(Hindu,

8 Sept

1921),

and the

Kallar

Maha

Sangam

(Hindu,

13 Sept 1921). For Adi-Dravida loyalist meetings, see Hindu, 23 Nov 1920, 10 Aug 1921. Montagu to Willingdon, 10 Feb 1921, WP, F. 93/4. For Montagu's long-term view, see S.D. Waley, Edwin Montagu (Bombay, 1964), pp. 156, 197, 200. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, ch. V, "The Moderates’

62 63

Failure". Hindu, 17 Dec

64 65 66 67 68

Hindu, TNA,

Hindu, H.

69 70 71 72 73 74 7S 76

Dec

SF

1920.

31 Jan, 2, 5, 15 Feb 1921. 407,

6 May

1923,

pp.

37-8;

1920,

D-84,

10 Aug, 22 Nov 1921.

Poll,

1920,

Procs

D-66,

Dec

FR

II

Oct.

1920.

FR

Hindu, II

19 Nov

Sept

1920;

MLCP, 1, 21 Mar 1921, p. 836. TNA, G.O. 180, Public, 15 Mar 1920; SF 302,

pp. 29-30, 37-8.

TNA, G.O. 265, Public, 12 May 1921.

2 May 1921; Hindu,

1920. Procs

8 May 1920, editorial,

H. Poll-B, Procs May 1920, 172-6; Procs-A, Aug 1920, 127-8. “John Scurr's Report on his Indian Tour", 1919, pp. 16, 23, Adyar Archives. E.g., Discussion in notes to SF 315, 2 Apr 1921, pp. 34-7.

Govt.

of India

Madras,

4

Sept

[Gol], 1920,

to Chief

TNA,

Gol, to Ch.Sec., Madras, 2 Apr 1921, p. 10.

SF

28

Secretary

315,

Jan

2 Apr

1921,

[Ch.Sec.],

1921,

TNA,

SF

p.

315,

1.

201 Notes 77 78 79

to

pages

Rajagopalachari, Hindu, 21 27 Aug 1921. Arnold, "Gounders",p. 9.

Robert L. Political 1969),

80

64-69

Nadu

May

1921;

Hasan,

Hardgrave, The Nadare of Tamilnad: The Culture of a Community in Change (Berkeley,

pp.

(Tamil;

136-8,

194;

Salem),

Christopher

Baker,

28

letter Nov

from

1921,

a Nadar

NNR.

"Non-cooperation

in

1975),

pp.

98-149.

82

MLCP,

8s

1921,

H.

Poll,

II,

F.

4 Aug

13/1922,

1921,

p.

FR

361;

II

Jan

1 Sept

1921,

p.

580;

12 Oct 1921, p. 879; TNA, G.O. 1135, Revenue, 19 June 1922. Willingdon to Montagu, 1 May 1921, 11 Feb 1922, WP, F. 93/4; MLCP, V, 4 Mar 1922, p. 2483.

T.E. Moir to Secretary, GoI, Finance, 13 Dec 1921, IOL, Madras Procs, G.O. 1221, Finance (Conf.), Jan 1922.

Non-Co-operation

and

Khilafat,

p.

18;

TNA,

6 May 1923, p. 28. E.D. Murphy, "Labour Organisations in of Tamilnad, 1918-1939", dissertation

the PhD

87

TNA,

1918.

University G.O.

detailed Union,

of Western

342,

account

see

in B.

Australia,

Public

Murphy,

1976, Apr

formation

"Labour

pp.

16.

22 Mar 1920); notes by C.G. Todhunter, 26 Jan

(Conf.), 12 Feb TNA, G.O. 1029, Procs Nov 1918,

referred

dispute 1918.

Report 1919,

H.Poll,

G.O.

222,

Cotton Mills thesis,

Worker

Executive Councillor 1919, TNA, letter 63,

involvement Procs

of the Commissioner

TNA,

Industrial

1919, p. 5. Public (Conf.), D-24, FR II Oct

to Gandhi's

: e.g.

The

Public

Aug

407,

79-80.

For a

of the Madras

Besant in New India, 3 July 1918. Rajagopalachari at Madras Labour Conference

p.

SF

Organisations",

89 90

1939),

Rao,

18

Cited

(London,

Shiva

of the

(Conf.),

88

92

India",

16, 20 Sept

1922.

86

91

Tamil

in C.J. Baker and D.A. Washbrook, South India: Politicai Institutions and Political Change, 1880-1940 (Delhi,

TNA, SF 407, 6 May 1923, pp. 27-9; Hindu,

84

to

South

81

83

Hindu,

9 Nov 1918.

1919; Wadia

ch.

3.

in India

(Hindu, Public

H.Poll, often

in the Ahmedabad

1918,

of Police, (Conf.),

D-30,

Madras,

24 Aug

Labour

FR

mill

I June

25 Mar

1919,

p.

10.

202 Notes

93 94 95

96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 “04 205 106 107 108 109 110 lll 112 113 114 M5 116 117 118 119 120

to

pages

69-73

Wednesday

Review

(English;

Trichinopoly),

26 May

1920

NNR; cf. Mail, 10 Dec 1918. TNA, G.O. 562, Public (Conf.), 7 Sept 1920. TNA, letter 63, Public (Conf.), 12 Feb 1919, notes, esp. Todhunter, 26 Jan 1919, p. 5; G.O. 563, Public (Conf.), 7 Sept 1920, notes by R.A. Graham and A.R. Knapp, Ch.

Secs. TNA,

G.O.

"Labour

671, to

Reading,

17 Sept 11 July

Hindu, Hindu,

7

Organisations",

Willingdon

Hindu, Hindu,

Public,

1921. 1921;

pp.

26

1921

Ibid.,

TNA,

Hitchcock, (Madras,

134-43.

July

1921,

G.O.

103,

of the

pp.

Public,

10-15,

3 Dec

Indian

National

Hindu,

30

25

Feb

Malabar Rebellion,

Hindu,

Aug,

Confidential 15 Nov 1921,

1921. 10

Sept

Murphy,

F.

93/5.

Ranga,

Malabar

p.

198.

310

1921.

gives

1920-23, S,

Rebellion,

178-80.

1921.

Congress,

circular, p. 71.

WP,

Kasturi

p. 19; Mail, 4, 5 Apr 1921.

Hitchcock,

1-7;

1921. For the Justice Party's Politics and Social Conflict,

A History

1925),

pp.

1921.

Hindu, editorial, 2 Sept reactions, see Irschick, R.H.

1921,

Narasimhan,

22 Nov 1921. editorial, 1 Sept

pp. 188-92.

Oct

3 Nov

a detailed pp.

11,

1921,

account.

154.

TNA,

SF

328,

Hindu, 20 Sept 1921; Non-Co-operation and Khilafat, p. 14; Hindu, 27 Aug 1921. C. Rajagopalachari, Rajaji'’s 1920 Jail Life (Madras, 1941), p. 107, entry for 16 Feb 1922. Gandhi, "My Notes", Navajivan, 25 Sept

1921,

p- 204.

Willingdon'’s note, 1 Dec 1921, TNA, SF p. 3. D.A. Low, "The Government of India and

Cooperation

Movement,

1920-22",

Willingdon

to Montagu,

27 Aug

Willingdon

to

18

XXV,

2 (Feb 1966),

pp.

247-8.

TNA, G.O. 618, Public (Conf.), Hindu, editorial, 7 Nov 1921.

Indian

Reading,

National

Congress,

Sept

338,

Journal

1921, 19

1920-23,

WP,

Sept

1921,

CWMG,

the

First

F.

93/4.

1922, Non-

of Asian Studies,

1921.

WP,

pp.

1 May

XXI,

F.

72-3.

93/5.

203 Notes

121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

to

pages

74-81

Hindu,

22,

23

Nov

1921.

Hindu,

17,

22

Dec

1921;

Hindu, 8, 1S Dec 1921.

MLCP,

Nehru, p. 23.

A Bunch

of Old Letterae

IOL, Madras Procs, G.O. Hindu, 21, 23 Jan 1922.

1002,

IOL,

432,

Non-Co-operation Madras

1923, p. 11; 21 Jan 1922; NNR.

Procs,

Dec

1921,

Rajagopalachari,

C.

and Khilafat, G.0.

editorial,

Rajagopalachari,

(Bombay,

1963),

13

p.

1922.

Feb

Indian Ibid., Report

28

edn,

Aug

p.

pp.

Bombay,

1922,

44.

Judicial

1922.

Gandhiji's

21.

Jail

Life,

1699

pp.

Dilemma,

pp.

1960),

13-14;

(Police),

Teachings

pp.

Chapter

The Swarajists'

(2nd

TNA, G.O. 130, Revenue, 19 Jan Swadesamitran (Tamil; Madras),

135

wne

2062.

New India, 16 Jan 1922. Gandhi, "Violence in the Camp", Young India, 9 Feb 1922. Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 19 Feb 1922, Jawaharlal

Hindu,

108-9,

18

1959), pp. 58-63.

Story

Gordon,

"Non-Cooperation

The Way

to Swaraj:

Aug

1922; Hindu, 21 Jan 1922,

and Philosophy

entry

for

18 Feb

3

78-122

National Congress, 1920-23, pp. 180-1. p. 163. of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee

(Allahabad, 1922) M.R. Jayakar, The

an

13

p.

Low, '"'Non-Cooperation Movement", pp. 249-50. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 222-3.

133 134

of my

Life,

and

Council

11,

1922-25

Entry",

:

(Bombay,

pp.

150-1.

Swarajya Party manifesto, 14 Oct 1923, in N.N. Mitra (ed.), The Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, pp. 219-20;

Speeches

of Desabandhu

1923 (Madras, 1923), pp. 20-6.

won

IV,

f.; 15 Dec 1921; 20 Jan 1922, Justice, 13 Dec 1921, NWR.

Young India, Hindu,

18 June

18 May 1922. 1923.

Das,

Madras,

204 Notes

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

to

pages

Hindu,

14 June 1923.

Hindu,

19

May

1923.

Hindu,

28 May, 8, 16 June 1923.

Hindu,

20 Aug 1923.

Hindu,

3 July

Hindu, editorial, Swadesamitran, 19 Hindu, Hindu,

17, 19 1 Sept

Rangaswami

My Life, Motilal

Papers,

20

81-89

Gandhi

pp. Pp.

149;

Sept 1923. 1924.

1923.

Iyengar

11, p. 30.

Nehru to

36-7;

to

[hereafter

to

Jayakar,

Satyamurti,

SP],

NML;

Rajagopalachari,

Gandhi

Young

17 27

July

Nov

Hindu,

24

Aug

India,

15 Jan

(Urdu;

1925.

Madras),

1924,

with

Feb

K.

Hindu, Hindu, 13 Apr chari,

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Gandhi,

16 June,

Subramanyam

1971),

Hindu,

25 26 27

28 May,

N.S.

(4

5,

1971),

Varadachari

17, 20, 26 Sept,

(5

Feb

15

Apr

1924,

itbid.,

note

ibid.,

1;

p.

Young

443;

Tamil

Nadu,

Hindu,

1,

Hindu,

6,

9,

2,

29

Mar

10,

4,

15,

6,

1925,

20,

12 May

NNR. 30

Apr

1925S.

1922,

1923.

K.S.

NNR.

see Reports

1927, pp. 91-2.

on

...

Interviews Madras, (10

to Rajagopalachari, Gandhi to RajagopalaRajagopalachari

1 May

21,

25

1924.

Mar

to

1925.

1925. SP, NML.

the Reformed Constitution,

Handbook of Information on the Administration Presidency of Madras (Madras, 1928), p. 28. Hindu, 11, 14 Jan 1924. . Swarajya (English; Madras), 24 Hindu, 14 Mar 1924.

36,

50,

32, 38-9, 54, 58, 64, 69-70 ’ 74; and Rowlatt satyagraha, 28-31; become Swarajists, 81,

126,

education

62-3, 79; see algo Shermadevi Gurukulam Nationalists,

78,

116,

19,

78,

89,

130

92-4;

enter Congress, 106-7, 130-1, 138; enter western

54

34,

politics,

movement,

Natesa Mudaliar, C., 19, 89 Natesan, G.A., 21, 28, 125

National

186;

85,

Non-Brahmins, 39, 156; appointed ministers, 55-7; constitute Opposition, 132;

C.V.S.,

105

177,

dissidents,

124 84

Naidus, 155, 172 Nair, T.M., 19, 25, Nairs, 15 Narasimha

16

65

65

120,

157,

complete independence, 111-14; opposes office-

ist

142, 145, 149, 160; TNCC President, 112, 118, 141 Muthuswami, K.S., 144-5, 161 T.,

Chettis,

162 Negapatam, 29 Nehru, Jawaharlal,

Nehru, Motilal, 80, 83, 87, 90, 111-14; Report, 113 Neill satyagraha, 143 Newspapers' role in national-

Muthiah Chetti, M.A., 157, 162 Muthiah Mudaliar, S., 98, 105, 170; Minister, 109-10 , 131; leader People's Party, 155, 174 Mudaliar,

Nattukkottai

Gandhians,

70, 80

acceptance, 181-2; socialism, 151-2

174

Muthuranga

with

53,

character

of, 25-8; oppose council boycott, 34-6, 42-4, 62;

18-20,

patronage, 100; in 55, 58; against

13-14;

Madras

87, 92; against

59-61,

also

and professions, 130;

59-60,

92-3,

for

elections, 1920, lead agitation missionaries,

organization legislature,

in

57,

59,

use legislature Brahmin domination,

91, 96, 156; see

Brahmin-non-Brahmin

conflict Non-Cooperation, movement,

42-79,

hunger

81,

33-6,

90,

5-6,

82-4;

100,

143,

38-40,

247

176;

through

latures,

the

78,

80-1,

legis101

North Arcot, 13; Congress and Khilafat activity in, 42-3, 62, 75, 130; elections,

1920,

88

55;

1923,

Odayappa,

Sergeant,

S.0.S.P.,

161

125

Office-acceptance issue: in 1920s, 78-9, 101-12; 1930s, 150, 153, 168, 172 177, 179-83, 187, 189 Olivier, Lord, 100 Conference,

160,

162

Pachaiyappa's College, 13 Pal, B.C., 43 Panagal, Raja of, 57, 88, 108, 110, 157

Pannirselvam, A.T., 122-3 Pantulu Aiyar, V., 120-1

“Parallel government", $2-3, 187 Peasants, see ryots Pentland, Lord, 23, 63 People's Party, 155-6,

Picketing, foreign

84,

cloth,

131;

66,

of

4

126-7,

134, 136, 142; of liquor shops, 65-7, 73-4, 127, 129, 134-5

Pithapuram, Maharaja of, 155 Police, 57, 94, 117; during civil disobedience, 120-7,

130-7, 142; punitive, 26, 61, 70, 75; under 1935 constitution, 178-9, 184; urged to resign, 34, 63 Pondicherry, 10, 27 Prakasam,

T.,

51,

88-9;

attacks Tamil Swarajists, 88-9, 105-6, 112; leads Satyagraha in Madras, 124;

Swara-

104,

151;

introduced,

185; Justice Party and, 65, 159 Publicity Bureau, 60, 72 Punjab

"grievance",

55

Qaumi Report, Quit India 188

30,

41

movement,

Rajagopalachari,

32-5,

186,

C.,

5,

28, 31, 53, 74, 85, 105, 115, 143, 148;

7,

103, agrees

to Delhi compromise, 82-4; and labour, 38, 70; and Malabar Rebellion, 72-3;

as leader of the Tamil Gandhians, 36, 39-40, 44; as

174

see

jists Prohibition: agitation for, 64-8, 70, 74, 128, 131, 134; Congress proposals for,

O'Callaghan,

Ottawa

Minister, 183 "Pro-Changers",

Premier,

183-5;

Tiruchengodu

attaches 37-9;

ashram,

himself

attempts

Nationalists' the

to

press,

communal

51;

to

at

&5-6;

to Gandhi break

control

of

attitudes

problem,

39

91, 104, 138; attitudes to dyarchy, 86, 110, 138, attitudes to local boards,

85,

144,

titudes

163-4,

167;

at-

to untouchables,

84, 86, 146-7; aversion to socialism and communism,

15i-2,

158,

184;

backs

Independent ministry, 104; Brahminism of, 86, 119, 134; campaigns for pro-

hibition, 86, 104, 110, 119, 134-5, 185; campaigns

248 60-1; TNCC,

in elections, 1934, 1937, 173: controls

44-5,

48-50,

83,

87,

118,

144-5; cultivates Muslim support, 41-3; favours

council entry, 149-50; and office-acceptance, 150, 177, 180-1; importance of centre-regional links to, 39, 80, 86, 145; in Salem, 26, 37; interpretation of

non-cooperation and civil disobedience, 38, 77, 81, 138-2,

142,

150;

leads

No-

Changers, 79-81; ieads salt satyagraha, 118-24; nego-

tiates

proposes

with

Erskine,

non-cooperation,

relations

42-3;

181-3;

with

Satya-

murti, 142, 144-5, 180, 134; united front tactics, 149, 152-3, 158, 167-8, 185; views on "parallel government", 52-3

Rajagopalachari,

64

Rajagopalan

Rajan,

Sir

K.V.,

T.S.S.,

P.,

57,

40

39, 44, 85,

150; as TNCC Secretary, 49, 118, 144; contests 1934 elections, 160-1; leads Trichinopoly revolt, 167;

participates

in non-

cooperation, 42, 53, 74-5; and civil disobedience, 119, 122; Minister, 183

Rajapalaiyam, 144 Rajappa, P.S., 123 Rajendra Prasad, 20, 83, Ramalinga Reddi, C., 54, 92-4, 101 Ramalingam Chetti, T.A.,

92-3,

132

Ramanathan, Respect

S.,

40;

movement,

151 89, 89,

in Self-

84-5,

143; Minister, 184; Te159

joins Congress,

159, 173

Ramaswami, V.V.,

Ramaswami Aiyar, Sir C.P., 29, 57, 100, 106, 109 Ramaswami Iyengar, N.S., 65

Ramaswami Mudaliar, A., 104, 162 Ramaswami Naicker, E.V.: anti-Brahminism

in Congress,

106; 74,

96,

49,

65,

Self-Respect

leads

84;

of,

movement, 85, 143; allies with Justice Party, 159

Rameswaram,

Ramnad,

Rangachari,

Mudaliar,

Ranganatha

108-9

87,

29,

25,

1.,

96

DCC,

161;

119,

65,

144

122

119,

A.,

103,

Rangaswami Iyengar, 48-9, 101, 106; advocates council entry, 148, 169; and civil disobedience, 116, 120; constitutionalism of, 89; contests 1923 elections,

87; editor, 25-6, 29, 51, 141; leads Tamil Swara-

jists, 82-3; observes council boycotts, 43,

116;

participates in Nationalist activities, 25-7, 29, 32, 38; views on Madras 62,

legislature,

Rangaswami 27,

32,

Iyengar,

44

Mudaliar,

Ratnasabapathi 92 C.S.,

Reading,

Reddi

Thevar,

Lord,

Naidu,

K.V-,

P., 17

Rangiah Naidu,

Ratnavel

91

74 V., K.

64,

Sir

183 57, 93, 107, 172 keddis, 155,

P->

166-7

54,

249 "Responsive

Cooperation",

Round

Conference:

35,

101

Table

Proposed,

‘116,

74,

138;

136-9,

162

Rowlatt

agraha,

Act,

24,

Ruthnaswami,

Ryots,

185;

and

13,

and

77,

81,

Second,

69;

M.,

95

18,

Congress,

Justice

enfranchised,

Salem, 9, 13; and obedience, 119, gress in, 25-6,

147,

99,

169,

177;

178

civil dis127; Con37, 53,

66-7, 85; elections, 1920, $5; municipal council, 37, 66, 85; riots, 1882, 16-17 Salt satyagraha, 115, 118-22, 124, 127, 129, 131, 142 Sambamurti, B., 106 Samiappa Mudaliar, N.R., 122 Sankaran Nair, C., 25 Sanskritization, 19, 86 Santhanam, Sapru, Sir

113-14,

Satyagraha,

K., Tej

133

40, 84, 120-1 Bahadur,

3-4,

186;

see

also Ahmedabad, Bardoli, Champaran, Kaira, Madura, Nagpur, Neill, Salt, Vaikam Satyagrahis, 119-22, 124-5, 131, 133; see also

Volunteers

Satyamurti,

105,

169;

S.,

activitists,

bition

to

28,

allies

be

38,

with

144-5;

83,

am-

a minister,

145, 184; at Calcutta Congress, 43; attacks Besant, 24; boasts Swara-

jists

dent

will

break

ministry,

Indepen-

104;

on

patrons, from

hostility

ism,

189;

Party,

dence 184;

34

75,

character of, 95, 145; contests 1934 elections, 160, 162; constitutionalism of, 62, 89-90; depenexcluded

saty-

28-32,

15,

114,

133,

22,

28,

173;

local

ministry,

to

social-

involvement

board

114-5, 164-7; disobedience,

and

116;

elections,

organizer,

in

joins civil 142; orator

32,

172-3;

orthodoxy, 147; PCC Secretary, 29; revives Swarajya Party, 148-9, 152; Swarajists, 87, 89, 94-5;

TNCC 164;

president, 142, vice-president,

145, 144

Saurashtras: participate in civil disobedience, 128-9; support

161,

165

Congress,

119,

Scheduled castes, see Harijans Self-Respect movement,

115,

143,

159

Sethuratnam

Aiyar,

109-10,

85,

M.R.,

131

Shanmugham Chetti, R.K., 159, contests 1934 elections, 162; in Assem-

bly,

Sharar,

106,

Abdul

116,

162

Majid,

41-2,

63, 73, 83 Shermadevi Gurukulam, 85-6 Simon

113,

Commission,

116,

Singaravelu

52,

75,

21,

54,

Sivaswami

130;

117

87

Socialism, 151, Soundarapandiya W.P.A.,

107-10,

Report,

Chetti,

Aiyar,

159

27,

M.,

Sir

178 Nadar,

133

49,

P.S.,

250

South South

South

Sutandira Sangu, 124

Arcot, 127 Canara, 9

Indian

Commerce,

Swadeshi, 34, 36, 66, 73,

of

Chamber

126, 142, 164, 166, 175;

158

South Indian Liberal Federation, 19 Srinivasa Iyengar, S., 50, 82, 87, 96, 116,

144-5,

156; and Madras legislature, 74, 91, 105-8; Congress president, 101, 105; office acceptance issue and, 101,

111-12; opposes council boycott, 42, 54; rivalry with Motilal Nehru, 111,

and

Srinivasavarada

143

Subbarayan,

P.,

144,

165

didate

110-11,

Chief

revived,

with

128-9,

92-3,

for Justice 157;

Opposition,

170;

103-10;

131-2,

can-

leadership,

character

Minister,

of

146,

in

103;

152-3, 155, 176; Law Minister, 184, rejoins Congress,

158

Subbarayulu Reddi, A., 56-7 Subramania Bharati, C., 27

Subramania

Subramania

Subramaniam,

Sastri,

Siva,

K.,

26,

40

Malayali

M.V.,

143

74

of,

87,

with Gandhians, 83, differences with Telugu

and

jectives,

R.,

Frederick, 131-3, 134, 176 Student involvement in nationalist activity, 30, 40-1, 51-2, 62-3, 66, 119, 124, 130-1 N.M.R.,

contest 85, 87;

composition

Swara-

Swarajya, 51, 96, 112 Swarajya Party, All-India, 78, 113, formed, 80; ob-

Srivilliputtur, 161 Stanley, Sir George

Subbaraman,

111-12;

TNCC, 118, 144

Gandhi,

Iyengar,

agitation, 26-7, 76 Swaminatha Sastri, T.V., 42 Swaminathan, R.V., 161 Swarajists, Tamil: aims and tactics, 78, 88-92, 94-101,

jists, 88-9, 105-6; party revived, 148-9, 152, 164; post-1930, 139, 141-3, 145, 184; resigned from

113; TNCC president, 85, 112; withdraws from politics, 112, 118, 141 Srinivasa Sastri, V.S., 32,

54, 58, 183; 21-3, 28

26, Si, 122

Suadesanitran,

81,

149;

89-90;

struggle

No-Changers,

Tamilnad: 9-13

Tamilnad

character

Congress:

character of, in 106-7, 133, 141,

164, ship

81-3 of,

changing 1930s, 148,

167-8, 189; memberof, 168; subordinate

committees of, 47-8, 82, 167-8, 172 | 51, 73 Tamil Nadu, itComm Tamil Nadu Congress

tee, 73, 85, 112, 118,

148,

166-7;

51, 62,

allots

70, 85, 1435

funds,

of, 48, 835 constitution sour ces of formed, 47;

funds for, 50, 52,

154,

147;

under Gandhians,

118;

under Raja

48-52, 73-4, 79» 85; achari goP?

251 and

Satyamurti,

under

Tamil

Swarajists,

Nadu

Khadi

Tamil-Telugu

105-6,

184-5

Tampoe,

12,

Civil

119-24;

54;

Telugu

rivalry, 163,

14,

29,

districts,

93,

101

Andhra

Temperance, see Prohibition Terrorism, 3, 24-7, 37-8, 121 Thanickachelam, Chetti, 0. ’

72

Thorne, J.A., 120-2, 124 Tilak, B.G., 25, 27-8, 34-5, 37, 44; Swarajya Fund, 50, 79

Tinnevelly,

13-15;

obedience ence,

1920,

in,

143

Tiruppur,

143

Tiruvannamalai

163 Trichinopoly, 97, 120; Khilafat

48-9,

dis-

confer-

42-3;

district

ashram,

85-6,

board, 165-6; 26, 143

Tiruchengodu

civil

119;

riots,

1908,

district 9,

14,

board,

29,

73,

as a Gandhiancentre, 12, 42-3,

52-3,

disobedience

elections, 88;

district

Troops,

34,

municipal

62,

in,

72;

119,

1920,

55;

board,

council, 70-1,

75

Tulsiram, L.K., 128 Tuticorin, 26-7, 29,

civil

130

1923,

166;

Uuited

56,

United

172,

111; 1930-6,

147,

152-3

Provinces,

185

155;

Con-

13,

75, 79, 84; Party, 19,

see

also

Dravidas, Harijans Usman, Muhammad, 40-1;

Member,

93,

Vaidyanatha

158,

Adi

Home

109,

132

Aiyar,

A.,

39,

155-6,

174

119 Vaikam satyagraha, 84, 86 Vallabhbhai Patel, 20, 85, 120, 136, 151; in Tamilnad, 115, 122

Vaniyambadi, 52

Vanniyars,

Varadachari,

101,

N.S.,

40

115,

122,

Varadarajulu Naidu, P., 39, 51, 73, 82, 96; contests 1934 elections, 162; TNCC president, 85 Vedaranniyam: conference,

1929,

112,

satyagraha,

118-23,

138, 142, 144 Veeriah Vandayar, Vellalas,

155,

172,

16,

93,

174;

disobedience,

A.,

98,

and

121-3

Vellingiri Gounder, 65, 93, 147 Vellodi, M.K., 135

138;

127-8,

123

101,

civil

V.C.,

Vellore,

127

C.T., 165 Venkatachelam Chetti, S., 116, and civil disobedi-

60

Nationalists:

join

166-7

Tyagaraya Chetti, P., 19, 75, 93, 158; Justice Leader,

54,

131-2,

146,

1920,

see

94-6;

Untouchables, and Justice

in,

1926,

92,

gress, 100-2,

97-9;

elections,

97;

10,

84

165

disobedience

1923,

89,

85

Board,

A.M.C.,

Tanjore,

144-5;

1923-6,

72,

Venkatachalam

ence,

125,

79,

130

Chetti,

132;

C.V.

contests

1934 elections, 161-2; Leader Madras legislature Congress Party, 105,

{

5

252 107-8,

111

Kumararaja

Venkatagiri, 187

Venkatappa Chetti,

Aiyar,

Venkatarama

Sastri,

44, 48

Venkataramana

66

T.V.,

29,

T.R.,

Iyengar,

44, 87, 93

of,

S.C.,

Venkatarama

Vijayaraghavachari,

Justice Party, 20, 156-9, 176 Zetland, Lord, 177

109

C.V.,

C.,

82;

and Nationalist leadership, 28-9, 32, 39; Congress president, 48, 87; leader of Salem Extremists, 17, 25-6, 37; obeys council

boycott,

43

Village officers, 133

Virudhunagar,

15, 121,

144

Volunteers, 120-2, corps, 51-2, 84

Wadia,

B.P.,

Wales,

23,

Prince

of,

137,

29,

143;

68

73-4

Weavers, 66, 127-9, 184 Westlake, A.R.C., 179

Williams, C.F.V., Willingdon, Lord, 73,

95,

157;

117, 135 67, 70,

appoints

non-Brahmin ministry, 56-60, 62, 94; critical

of Government ‘of India's

handling of non-cooperation 63, 71; uses Justice Party against non-cooperation,

60-1, 99, 131, 136, 176-7

Working

class,

see also

Young

India,

179; Viceroy,

1-2,

Labour

4,

184;

137

Zamindars, 13, 58, 119, 185; and Congress, 18, 103, 123,

132, 147, 161, 177-8; and

107,

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