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THE CONGRESS IN TAMILNAD
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY MONOGRAPHS ON SOUTH ASIA NO-1 General Editors: Protessor D.A. Low, Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University, Canberra Professor Peter Reeves, Department of Modern History. University of Western Australia Or. Robin Jeffrey, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVER SITY MONOGRAPHS
ON SOUTH ASIA NO-1
THE CONGRESS IN TAMILNAD Nationalist Politics in South India, 1919-1937
DAVID ARNOLD
Social Sciences Research Fellow The Flinders University of Sou th Austra
lia
Nn
MANOHAR
The Volumes in this series are published in India by Manohar Book Service and in Australia by the South Asian History Section of the Australian Natrona! University, Canberra
ISBN 0 908070 00 4
© David Arnold 1977
Furst Published 1977
Published by
Ramesh C. Jain
tor Manohar Book Service 2, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj
New Delhi-110002 Printed at
Pearl Offset Press 5/33 Kirti Nagar, Industrie! Area New Delhi-110016
ConTeENTS
INTRODUCTION
aunrkun
NATIONALIST
AND
REGIONAL
THE
NON-COOPERATION
THE
SWARAJISTS'
POLITICS
EXPERIMENT 78
DILEMMA
CONFRONTATION
113
COALESCENCE
141
RAPPROCHEMENT
175
References
191
Bibliography
223
Biographical
Notes
232
Glossary
238
Index
239
Maps:
Tables:
1
The
Madras
2
The
Tamil
1
Madras
2
Party Composition of Madras Legislature,
the 1923
3
Party
the
Madras
Madras
Presidency,
Districts
of the
Presidency
Legislative
Composition
1930
Council
of
Legislature,
1926
ll 56 88 102
INTRODUCTION
Broadly
{tury
speaking,
developed
utilized regime
that
in
achieve
rather
the
one
first
constitutional
of
two
institutional
structure,
{without of
to
the
the anti-colonial
movements
directions.
structure
self-government,
attempting
than
the
of this
to
or
they
by
the
it from within.
anti-colonial
struggle
and non-violent;
colonial
regime
from
outside
In the case
was
of the
they
the
worked
overthrow
succeeding
Either
created
cen-
generally
second
it was
almost
invariably violent. The ideology of the former inclined towards western-style liberalism and democracy; the latter towards a revolutionary nationalist and/or socialist creed.
4
The
~ leaders
anti-colonial
were
The choice determined crucial
colonial
free
struggle
to decide
was
not
a duel
the weapons
in
with which
which
the
to
fight.
by
the
between a constitutional or an armed struggle was by the socio-political environment, in which one
factor
was
regime to
the_degree of resistance
its would-be
staged
successors.
If the regime
allowed a relatively large and increasing indigenous participation in higher education, local government, the bureaucracy and other colonial institutions, if after a few clashes between demonstrators and the police the regime made concessions
rather
altogether. protest, if
If the colonial regime suppressed political it outlawed anti-colonial parties and news-
need
to resort
than
face
to violence
the
regime's
a major
confrontation,
was minimized,
papers,
then
critics
In
this
respect
the
of
Western
industrial
had
even
either
resort to secret and revolutionary means throw a system they could not penetrate.
the
anti-colonial
struggles
same
movements
basic
that
by
pattern
eliminated
to
the
societies.
submit
which can
influenced
then
to
be
or
over-
seen
class
Where
the
thc
in emer-
ging proletariat was able to establish itself within the existing political structure without a head-on collision
with
muted
acter.
the
ruling
classes,
and working-class Where
the
class
politics
demands
of
conflict
the
have
has
had
been
generally
a reformist
proletariat
have
been
charmet
by ruling-class
class
politics
militancy
-
and
During
intransigence
have
been
a more
the
and
thrust
state
in the direction
revolutionary
anti-colonial
repression,
of greater
ideology.
movement
working-
leadership
was
usual-
ly drawn from the professional middle class, but the attitudes of the middle classes as a whole were ambiguous, even contradictory. On the one hand they favoured a loosening of colonial authority and exploitation which would enable their own interests to flourish and ultimately they
sought state: the
control of the economic and political resources of the in this regard the middle class was the vanguard of
anti-colonial
movement.
On
the
other
hand
the
emergence
of the national bourgeoisie was intimately related to the changes that resulted from colonialism. The colonial state was a major employer of the professional middle class;
business
companies
ideology
of the
from
the colonizing
country
employed
local clerks, agents and merchants. Further, the ideology of the national bourgeoisie was heavily impregnated with the
of life and Under
colonizing
values
an
intransigent
sections of the methods if they structure long term
and
social
were
colonial
middle classes might found their attempts
assets social
situation
and
ally
with
strata.
the middle
demonstrations"
often
bourgeoisie,
necessary
classes and
to
whose
imitated.
persistently blocked. they might gamble with
privileged
"Mass
power's
it widely
In
the
a
regime
least
some
favour revolutionary to penetrate the state
To achieve power in the their immediate economic
even
the
most
relatively
proceeded
more
creation
answer
at
style
under-
open
colonial
cautiously.
of a "mass
allegations
that
party"
the
nation-
alist movement was not representative of anyone other than the middle classes, and they were at times essential to exploit opportunities created by an expanding electoral system. But middle-class leaderships were loath to share power with workers and peasants if they could avoid doing so. Why should
destroy
they
them
Colonial
assets
they
start
as
an
well
regimes
valued
avalanche
as
the
did
most
of
mass
colonizers?
not
unrest
voluntarily
— authority
and
which
surrender
economic
might
the
advantage
unless there was overwhelming compulsion or ultimate gain doing so. An intransigent regime reasoned that any concessions
to
the
anti-colonial
damage its power and prestige. learned through experience that
pended ation
not on repression
of influential
forces
and coercion
sections
would
irredeemably
A less intransigent regime its survival ultimately de-
of the
but
on the collabor-
indigenous
population,
—
in
or
a judicious
combination
of
force
and
persuasion.
Unless economic and social conditions were peculiarly static, collaboration could never be a once-and-for-all settlement with a class or dominant social group. In response to a changing distribution of wealth and the erosion of
the
authority
gence
of
colonial
new
of
the
classes
regime
and
pre-colonial
the
periodically
rulers,
disintegration reassessed
its
with
of old
the
emer-
ones,
position,
the
iden-
tifying new opponents and seeking out new collaborators. In the later stages of colonial rule the supply of collaborators was often running low. A new assessment of the situation might reveal to the colonial authorities that its own armed forces, police and bureaucracy were no longer filled with
reliable
collaborators,
and
that
decolonization
might
be preferable to a costly and bloody attempt to retain formal control with repressive legislation and foreign troops. On
occasions,
that
reassessment
the
anti-colonial
was
made
in
a
belated
real-
ization that the foundations were already crumbling heneath the colonial superstructure; more often, it was based upon shrewd calculations of the political and economic benefits of granting independence (rather than allowing it to be snatched at gun-point) and of retaining close ties with the colonial territory. Neo-colonialism was seldom an afterthought.
cm
In
| the \the
India
non-violent, constitutional sub-continent terrorism was
the
threat
cies
of
of
both
terrorism
the
was
nationalists
movement
was,
in essence,
variety. In some parts of intermittently important and
a factor and
the
determining British
the
rulers,
polibut
was not a fundamental characteristic of the struggle. In Tamilnad, the region of south India on which this study focusses, terrorism played very little part in shaping the
nature
and
course
Satyagraha,
sistance
which
of the
the
Gandhi
anti-colonial
distinctive
introduced
of
form
into
it
movement.
of non-violent
the
Indian
re-
nationalist
struggle, was an attempt to avoid all forms of violent conflict with the British Raj and yet so to harass and isolate the colonial regime that it would either collapse for want of, Indian supporters and collaborators, or be persuaded to come to terms with the Indian National Congress. Satyagraha was an attempt to adopt the militancy and anticonstitutionalism of the terrorist and guerilla while eschewing their violence; it aimed to be as uncompromising
as
the
ture ly,
men
of violent
means
of the colonial state. although designed to
towards
the
institutional
struc-
It failed on two counts. Firstby-pass India's colonial
institutions,
latures, Congress
secure
especially
the
central
and
provincial
legis-
satyagraha in time became a device by which the attempted to win constitutional objectives and to
a place
for itself within
istrative
structure.
divisions:
it had
This
was
the
British-made
not
what
Gandhi
admin-
himself
wanted, but since a rival or "parallel" government could only be established and sustained within India by the use of force, he gave his supporters no real alternative but to return at some point of time to constitutional politics under a colonial regime. Secondly, to be successful, satyagraha as a technique of anti-colonialism had to transcend class
to unite
the middle
classes
and the
masses. But the middle classes were jealous of powers and privileges (gained from a relatively
colonial
regime)
1921-22)
revealed
ers.
Gandhi's
and
early
suspicious
essays
the
disobedience
even
when
middle-class
hands,
in
mass
of the
mass
violence
it was
rural
satyagraha
that
tried
their own responsive
and urban (1919
accompanied
on a limited
work-
and
civil
scale:
the
campaigns also failed to achieve their avowed political objectives. Despite the gradual expansion of the Congress party, direction of the anti-colonial movement remained in
industrialists,
rural
though
with
increasing
landlords
assistance
and rich peasants.
from
The
dominance of the propertied classes within the Congress checked the agitational potential of satyagraha and tugged
the movement
away
tionalism.
It also
agreement
from direct
facilitated
between
Experience
the
the
Congress
action
and back
eventual and
of anti-colonial
the
to
constitu-
attainment
of an
Raj.
agitation
before
Gandhi's
rise to Congress leadership at the end of the First World War, gave the British in India a range of techniques with which to counter satyagraha. Repression of all violent and seditious
was
balance
British
were
aspects
employed
with
between
the
caution
agitation
for
was
one
in
their the
Indian
long
response,
fear of upsetting
coercion and collaboration
had buiit
preferred
of
term.
empire. One
on
which
the
create
and
Two other
was
to
but
it
the delicate techniques
pat-
ronize groups of loyalists who could be relied -on to help the Raj and oppose the Congress. The aim was not very dif-
ferent from the recruitment of sepoys by the English East India Company to fight its battles, but the rewards were now
more
likely
to be a share
than a mercenary's wage. \interest groups, whether ‘caste
terms,
against
the
of government
power
and patronage
The aim was to play off particular defined in class, religious or
Congress
in
the
hope
of
defeating
|the latter. The the Congress but colonial rule in roys,
Governors
other technique to convert it. India it was no
and
senior
was not to try to destroy By the later stages of longer practical for Vice-
civil
servants
to
think
of
elim-
inating the Congress. It was powerful and, within the limits of the political arena demarcated by agitation and elections, it was popular. Therefore, Congressmen had to be bullied and tempted away from the non-cooperation and civil disobedience into which Gandhi had led them and shepherded
back
could
to
the
keep
institutions
an
eye
on
them.
of colonial
The story of the Congress
has two essential
themes.
in
rule
where
Tamilnad
from
One is the evolution
- Congress as_a-regional-political_party. This story. From being a small political club in
little
active
support
outside
the rise
of the
British
1919
to
1937
of the Tamil
is a success 1919, with
the predominantly
fessional middle class, by 1937 ful organization, experienced in toral technique, and was firmly dominant party. In 1919-23 the along ideological, strategic and unable to respond effectively to
the
Brahmin
_-
WU /
pro-
the party commanded a powerboth agitational and elecestablished as the region's party was deeply divided factional lines; it seemed the serious threat posed by
anti-Brahmin and loyalist Justice Party.
By
the mid-1930s, however, the Justice Party was in rapid decline and the landslide victory of the Congress in the 1937 provincial elections marked both the virtual extinction of the Justice Party and the triumph of the Congress as a broad-based and relatively cohesive coalition of diverse political
success
not
of
become
mitment; classes. time,
the
interests.
There
a mass
party
Tamil
Congress
the Congress
through non-cooperation Tectly at the authority
depended
in
of
course,
limits
to
the
of
its
membership
or
com-
The Congress
terms
in Tamilnad
it was predominantly a party of the propertied But within the bounds of regional politics at
cr The second theme is < “pationalist movement and
“leadership
were,
its party-building.
and by-passing
held
a
remarkable
ascendancy.
the changing relationship a colonial regime. Under
attempted and and
the
to win
the
between a Gandhi's
independence
civil disobedience, aiming collaboration on which the
institutional
did
structure.
diRaj
This
strategy failed. Congress leaders, especially C. Rajagopalachari, Gandhi's principal lieutenant in Tamilnad, were hampered by factionalism within the party and by a fear, prevalent among Congressmen and the propertied classes generally, that civil disobedience might unintentionally trigger a social revolution. British rule proved stronger than
|
many able
Gandhians to divert
legislature. (identified,
follow too,
alternative strategy, some nationalists main, with the Swarajya Party) tried to
ineffective,
leadership
by its create Raj
As an in the
non-cooperation
proved
gress
had anticipated, and they were largely unattention away from the reformed provincial from
within
mainly
opposed
the
the
legislatures.
because
the
acceptance
the
legislatures,
the
Con-
of ministerial office
partymen. Having failed to expel the a rival government, and having failed
through
This,
national
Congress
British or to to topple the
evolved
a
com-
promise strategy. During the civil disobedience campaigns of 1930-33, the party built up a large-scale organization
and a fund
of public
‘advantage ing
by
its
gains,
in
these
leadership
electoral means
exclude
which
contests
from
realized
that
ousted
in Tamilnad to
sympathy
the
its
it was
Justice
rivals
and
able
1934
to
Party,
in
order
to
to turn
1937.
the
to
to
But
Congress
hav-
consolidate
satisfy
the
demands
of the electorate it would have to compromise with the British to the extent of taking office under the constitution created by the Government of India Act of 1935.
The paradox of the
(and
Jas
the
argument
a whole)
was
is
late
no
that
less
colonial true
situation
for
the Congress
the
in Tamilnad
Madras
was both
Presidency
the most
power-
\ful opponent of the British and their most_promjsing ally. Although from the early 1920s until the mid-1930s the Gov-
ernors the
of Madras
constitutional
India
Act,
close
had
relied
system
on the Justicites
created
association
the Justice Party too feeble tive role under the new, and
Through
its
very
opposition
by
with
the
the
to operate
1919
colonial
Government
regime
of
left
to continue to play a suppormore demanding, 1935 Act.
to
the
Raj
— especially
its
of the
new
constitution.
ex-
periments with non-cooperation and civil disobedience — the Congress had developed the organization and popular backing necessary
to
make
a success
British
had no particular
British
were
affection
for the Congress,
The
but
since they could not ignore its agitational and electoral successes, they tried to turn them to advantage. Provided that the Congress played constitutional politics, the power
to
rampaging the whole
their
ministerial
| and
prepared
entrust
opponent.
be
end
and
the
a substantial
degree
of
A malevolent
Congress
with
radicals
constitutional tent might bring down A Congress in office, burdened by
responsibility,
might
volutionary
erstwhile
outside the structure.
extremists,
' ronage,
to
feeding best
to British
at odds
on
governmental
guarantee
rule
its
in
against
India.
own
power
and
a violent,
pat-
re-
The terms and the date on which Indian independence would be achieved were, of course, still undetermined when the Congress took office government) was 10 years
in Madras in 1937. away. But by that
Swaraj (selfdate the Con-
gress leadership in Madras, and especially Rajagopalachari from Tamilnad, had reached an informal understanding with the provincial representatives of the Raj which foreshadowed
a peaceful
and constitutional
understanding
ization
the
was
of other
Second
World
to
be
British
War.
a vital
transfer stage,
Asian
There,
of power. too,
and African
too,
in
the
Such
an
decolon-
territories
independence
followed,
after
al-
most invariably, from the conversion of militant nationalist pponents to constitutional collaborators and successors. [It was the British style of decolonization, so easily paro{died, so effectively executed. formances of the decolonization
looked
to have
rather
Perhaps
amateurish.
A weak
a disproportionate it
was
(to
In some of story, the
effect
change
imagery)
the later perfight scenes
nationalist
on the like
punch
colonial
Pavlov's
seemed
regime.
unfortunate
dogs: colonial governments had been conditioned to respond. But in India the vital prelude to decolonization was not easily reached. It was the outcome of nearly two decades of political experimentation by both the Congress and the Raj.
gw
2,
Ol
This,
then,
sentiments,
nor
is
does
not
a
study
it attempt
of
nationalist
to probe
ideas
and
the politics
of the
{| localities, though necessarily in a discussion of the evolution of the Congress in the 1920s and 1930s there are
points at which these aspects of political life impinge upon the central themes. The concern here is with the practical difficulties which nationalist politicians faced in their attémpts-to gain independence for India — the ways in which they
sought
strategies sequences
to overcome
they
which
organization in a broader
adopted the
Fival
partiés;
to combat
nature
and character context, this
of the
the
colonial
struggle
techniques
rule; had
of the nationalist monograph seeks to
and
upon
the
party. present
And, the
story of the Congress in Tamilnad as a case-study of how nationalist parties evolved during the later stages of col-
onialism. As such, it relates many of the other countries of
which rule.
in the recent
past
have
not only to India but also Asia, Africa and America
experienced
European
i
the con-
colonial
_
to
\ i
}
-\ Gansane
oe
Ai Semalyo
in, GUNTUR _
e
i
‘SODavaRY
" weLcone
BAY OF
fouanraon?S guooara >
BENGAL
vee
200 100
Map
1.
The
Madras
{8]
Presidency.
300 kilometres 200 miles
CHaprer 1 NATIONALIST AND REGIONAL PoLiTics The Tamil Tamilnad
on
as
its
the
Country has
been
own."?
land
graphical
as
"a
country,
primarily
in
has
the
people,
south-eastern
enabled
cultural
it
to develop
character.
To
almost
defined
of the Tamil-speaking
location
sub-continent
tinctive
described
Although
the
in
a nation,
cultural
terms,
Tamilnad's
corner
of
and maintain
east
lies
geo-
the
the
Indian
a dis-
Bay
Bengal; to the west and north-west an upland rim divides Tamil country from Kerala and the Deccan. Within the region's 50,000 square miles is a gradual transition from
to
the
dry
arid
region
rice
fields
tawny
interior
relieved
and
the
For a century eighteenth century
Tamilnad
the
glimpse
province,
were
the
impression
and
outcrops
occasional
of an ornate
of the Madras Madras
Canara on the west coast Oriya linguistic regions tricts
One
flash
dominant
Presidency.
incorporated
of
prevails:
grey
of
pagoda.
of in
an
and
vivid
temple
and a half — from the end until Indian independence
was part
polyglot
palms
by
the
diversity is muted, and there the low-lying Coromandel cvast
plateaux.
of scattered
rock,
of
the 1947
green
—
A sprawling,
Malabar
and
South
and parts of the Telugu, Kannada and to the north. But the Tamil diselement
in
the
presidency:
they
con-
stituted a third of the land area and half the population — 21 million out of nearly 43 million in 1921. Tamilnad was more urban than its regional neighbours: there were 175 officially classified cities and towns in the Tamil region in
1921
compared
Malabar;
15.5
to
111
per
in the Telugu
cent
of
Tamils
districts
lived
in
and
urban
nine
areas
in
com-
pared to 10.6 of Telugus and 7.2 of Malayalis.* By 1931 nine of the 15 largest towns and cities in the presidency were located in Tamilnad, including the four most populous
Madras
and
was
1931;
(647,230),
Salem the
(182,018),
(102,179).
Calicut,
Telugus'
Cocanada
nearest
the
Madura
rival,
with
Trichinopoly
Malabar's
a population
lagged
expanding of
far
(142,843),
99,273
behind
port, in
with
—
10 65,952.°
bours,
Tamilnad
in
that,
Dravidian
south,
was
further
unlike
the
almost
distinguished
other
the
from
linguistic
whole
of
the
regions
its
of
neigh-
the
Tamil-speaking
area
was under one administration. Kerala was partitioned between the princely states of Travancore and Cochin and the Malabar district of the Madras Presidency; Andhra was split between British Madras and princely Hyderabad; Karnataka was torn between Madras, Bombay and Mysore state. By contrast, only
the
small
Tamil
population
in
the
French
enclaves
of
Pondicherry and Karikal on the east coast, in the state of Pudukkottai, and in southern Travancore lay outside the presidency. Thus, the Tamil districts of the province con-
stituted
a relatively
compact
and homogeneous
linguistic
block, and they correspond closely to the state of Madras (renamed Tamilnad or Tamil Nadu in 1969) which was formed by the reorganization of India's states on linguistic lines in 1956.
Distinctive though remained throughout the
the had
the Tamil region was, it nonetheless colonial period an integral part of
British province of Madras. From 1920 Tamil Congressmen their own "Provincial" Congress Committee, but they
could not
presidency
ignore as
political
a whole.
In
developments
particular,
which
affected
Tamilnad's
the
Congress-
men in the provincial Legislative Council had to work alongside partymen and allies from the other linguistic regions of the presidency. This was a frequent source of friction, most
noticeably
Despite
dominantly
between
Telugu
Tamil
claims
a Tamil
city.
to
In
and
Telugu
the
contrary
British
had grown far less rapidly than modest, more leisurely city, it
Congressmen.
hands
Calcutta was akin
Madras since
was
1639,
preit
and Bombay. A more to an English
county town only marginally influenced by the industrial revolution, rather than to a London, Manchester or Sheffield. Since the 1870s, the decade in which the harbour was built
and as
a
the
much
of the
in the mills,
ization. No
Madras,
which
could most
and
first
commercial
city
and
mill
established,
industrial
still
centre,
Madras
had a semi-rural
but
in
had
the
appearance
developed 1920s
and only
north-west, around the railway workshops and textile did Madras show the grim face of early industrial-
other but,
dwarfed
boast
of
cotton
city
unlike
every
of more
which
commercial
had
in
Tamilnad
Calcutta,
other
than
been
centres
town
was
as
in
the
it
was
half-a-dozen
administrative,
under
large
not
an
or
as
urban
presidency.
substantial religious,
pre-British
regimes
varied
colossus
as
Tamilnad
towns,
educational
and
which
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275” RAMNAD
@Rajapalaiyam
2.
The Tamil
(11)
country.
12 had survived as district or taluk headquarters under the rulers. Madura and Trichinopoly in particular were the rivals of Madras, and during the 1920s and 1930s their rivalry found expression in the contest between Congress
factions
in the presidency
town
districts).
and
the
mofussil
new
(up-country
The great majority of Tamils lived not in the towns and cities, but on the land. The basis of economic activity in the region was overwhelmingly agricultural, with rural population densities greatest in the irrigated river valleys, especially the delta of the Cauvery. The presidency as a
whole
had
an
other
eastern
average
density
of
329
people
per
square
mile
in 1931, but in Tanjore, the district which covered most the Cauvery delta, the average density was over 600, and
districts
with
extensive
river
irrigation
of in
the
figure rose above 400 in many taluks.“ Rice was the principal crop grown on these "wet" lands: in 1922-23, for example, 47 per cent of the total cultivated area of Tanjore was under vice.> Intensive cultivation on this scale was only possible through river irrigation. Except for a narrow coastal strip, which received over 40 inches of rain a year, Tamilnad had
to subsist on a rainfall of between 20 and 40 inches, concentrated mainly in the monsoon months. In the dry interior
agriculture was assisted by tank and well irrigation: tobacco, sugar-cane, chillies, and long-staple cotton were grown. Elsewhere, on the unirrigated lands, cultivators
produced
millets
Tamilnad
cattle
groundnuts,
deep
wells
Erode
and
were
and
a major
estates Small
British
principal
were
export
used
heavy
city.
production
for
soils:
Direct
was
Nilgiri
landholders
period,
the
item and the basis
Madras
of the
food-grain
In the western
extensively
ploughing
around
in agricultural fee
(the
and oil-seeds.
and
confined
land was
seldom
in
districts
drawing
hides
water
works
Tamilnad.
Before
individual
erty and a marketable commodity, but as being collective control of the village community.
from
skins
in
tea and cof-
hills.
as
of
involvement
to the
regarded
Tamils),
and
for tanning
European
Anaimalai
predominated
of poorer
the
prop-
under the In some areas,
especially the rice lands of Tanjore, Trichinopoly and the north-east, there were leading villagers, known as mirasdars, with
hereditary
land
rights,
and
these
sometimes
controlled
agricultural production over hundreds, even thousands, of acres. Less extensive, but also involving hereditary rights, were lands held by tnandars. These were generally small
plots
of
tnamdars
land
were
given
most
by
local
frequently
rulers
as
Brahmins
rewards
and were
for
services:
usually
13 regarded
rather these
they
as
holding
than
as
land
the
solely
Presidency
was under
collection
on
more
than
their
rights,
individual
responsible
No
for
individuals.®
pre-existing
promoted
land
to
the
a quarter
religious
The
ryot
British
but
to
of
the
land
landed proprietors were tween the ryots and the their
for
his
system,
not
most
become
area
the zamindari
did
over
government
institutions
of
of
the
the
by
land
eliminate
Tamilnad
landholder, taxes.”
Madras
which
large
established as intermediaries government with rights of tax
own
estates.
The
zamindari
be-
tracts
were
to be found mainly in the northern Telugu districts, but there was a smaller belt of zamindaris in Tamilnad running from North Arcot and Salem each of these districts at century there were upwards
to Madura and the beginning of a million
zamindars.°
The ryotwari system undoubtedly political and social character. The unlike their counterparts in Bengal, or
even
Andhra,
were
British
regime
little
influence
tween
the colonial
for
the
was
the
tax-paying
and self-interest They
were
portance
too
in rural
number
to
be
valuable
society
on
the Madras
numerically
with
in
administration ryots
moulded the region's zamindars of Tamilnad, the United Provinces,
few
or
whose
and
to provide
and
the
important
— a
from
cash-crop
production,
| {
too
¥
a solid prop
intermediaries
cultivators.
be-
It
collaboration
depended
factor
expansion
the twentieth century; they constituted through which the British could hope to and, from the late nineteenth century, were extending their range of economic
derived
commanded
tolerance,
government
the progressive
Tinnevelly. In of the, twentieth acres under
of
of the
in Tamilnad.
increasing
franchise
im-
in
a social stratum regulate rural life; the wealthy ryots activity as wealth
marketing
and money-
lending was invested in western-education, enabling a new generation to enter urban professions and the bureaucracy It was largely because of this diversification that nonBrahmins from rural agrarian and trading castes came into
conflict
with
Politics
and Social
The
Tamilnad
the
Brahmins.
first steps
were taken
ta In the activities of
lwp?
Conflict
towards
by
the
nationalist
non-Brahmin
agitation
merchants
in
of Madras
mid-nineteenth century the proselytizing Christian missionaries, aided by government
officials, aroused the religious indignation of the Hindu merchants. In 1842 Pachaiyappa's College was founded in Madras under merchant patronage to provide an alternative
to
14 the educational institutions of the missionaries; and in 1844 G. Lakshmanarasu Chetti, a Telugu merchant, launched
, the
o
Crescent
of
the
newspaper
Hindu
to
defend
community ."'!°
"'the
The
rights
merchants
had
and
privileges
an
additional
grievance: they disliked the existing powers of the East ‘India Company and, with the renewal of the Company's charter “x in the offing, they sought to pressure Parliament to remove 2X \ its unfavourable features. In response to suggestions from the wm British Indian Association in Calcutta, Madras merchants ty
formed a local branch of the association in February 1852, replacing it six months later by an independent body, the
{Madras
.
a
Native
Association.
It
aimed
to
amend
the
Company
j charter, revise the taxation system, and curb missionary {activity. The association was active for 10 years, but with the transfer of British India from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858, one of the main grievances of the association was removed and by July 1862 it had become "practi-
. \
cally defunct". The
did
not
early
knowledge
of
to
political
continue.
of the
provincial
voice
leadership
Being
in
English
the
against
the
the
the
presidency
language,
administration,
protests
of
Madras
and close
merchants
government.
town,
merchants
with
some
well
placed
to the centre
were
But
the
merchant
community was, at this stage, heavily dependent on Europeancontrolled trade and European business houses in the city. Compradors, lacking an independent economic base, they were
not
sufficiently
serious
and
sustained
challenge
to
the
to mount
British.
a more
Further,
attractive wider support commercial and
behind
middle
took
centre
them
which
~ :
and confident
the city merchants had neither a sufficiently cause nor the organizational base to mobilize for the Madras Native Association. A smaller industrial
.
independent
in
could
than
producing
provide
Calcutta an
and
Indian
nationalist
It was, therefore, the the lead in organizing
Bombay,
commercial
Madras
leadership.
lagged
class
professional middle class an anti-colonial movement
which in
Tamilnad. A region which could boast few merchant princes 'and even fewer captains of industry, Tamilnad was prolific ‘in its output of graduates. By 1880 the region had 15 arts colleges and 50 high schools; Madras ing as many graduates as Bengal, and
came
from Tamilnad.
awarded
arts
Malayalis, Brahmins
‘families
degrees
Between to
450 Telugus,
predominated, in
Tanjore,
1,900
1858
Tamil
Presidency was producthe majority of them
and-1894
students
and 300 Kannarese.
most
of them
Tinnevelly,
coming
Chingleput
Madras as
Among
from and
University
against
500
the Tamils,
landholding
Trichinopoly.
15 Non-Brahmins
constituted
only
a
fifth
of
the
graduates
and
of these many were Nairs from the west coast. As yet highranking Tamil non-Brahmins saw little economic and social advantage in having degrees and becoming pen-pushers\2 ‘here
were historical
reasons
for
this
smaller percentage of the Hindu Indian regions, the Brahmins of
and
social
power
that
was
quite
communal
disparity.
J
A
population than in most Tamilnad wielded economic
disproportionate
to
| —
their
ww?
numbers. In the presidency as a whole Brahmins constituted 3.3 per cent of Hindus. In Tamilnad their percentage of the
total population ranged from one per cent in the Nilgiris to 3.7 in Tinnevelly and 6.9 in Tanjore, their area of greatest concentration.!3 Ritual supremacy in Hindu society was only
one of the bases of Brahmin power in Tamilnad, erati of the society they had long been clerks, trators
and
officials
whether
Vijayanagar viceroys, or villages Brahmins almost
karnam
or village
the
rulers
were
As the litfowl “ adminispeel
Tamil
kings,
qt
the East India Company. In the invariably held the office of
accountant,
and
in appreciation
Jey.
of their
Las,
bro nee
religious and secular services they had been awarded land rights as mirasdars and inamdars. In the rice-growing eastern
zones
Brahmins
authority, ing
generally,
were powerful
classes.
little
but
land,
also
exceptional
in
the
Cauvery
delta
not only by virtue
for their prominence
In western
they
money-lenders
and
were
Tamilnad,
frequently
and bankers. another
where
of their priestly the
Brahmins
present
they
particular,
among as
The position
respect:
in
held
small-town
of the
were
landhold-
Brahmins
divorced
from
,,,,' ‘
eal -
ad
V°
~"/
was
the
process of agricultural production. Most non-Brahmin ryots were part-time or full-time cultivators, but Tamil Brahmins considered ploughing a ritually polluting act. However
small
selves.
their holdings, They
were,
they would
therefore,
not
till
entirely
labourers, sub-tenants, and, until the formal servitude, untouchable slaves.
the
land
dependent
them-
on
hired
British outlawed The Brahmins were
free to devote themselves to religion and non-agrarian pursuits; they could easily become absentee landlords and pursue careers outside the village community. From the midnineteenth century Brahmins, particularly those from the Cauvery delta, invested their landed wealth in education,
entered
urban
non-Brahmin of
occupations
ryots.*
and
gradually
sold
their
land
vation:
Brahmin
middle
these
factors
domination
class
of
forming
were
the
together
responsible
western-educated,
in Tamilnad
from
the
for
professional
middle
of the
A
°
to ~_.
Traditional status, access to landed wealth, generations involvement in the administration, aloofness from culti-
4A
-
\
a
16
nineteenth
century.
hegemony was bureaucratic ular
71.5
literacy
per
cent
One
indicator
professional
literacy, especially in English, the key to and professional employment. The male vernacrate
among
in the
Brahmins
and
24.2
for
17.4
the
Telugu
Tamil
1921
census
Brahmins
Vellalas,
caste group in Tamilnad. were even more striking: for
of Brahmin
the
recorded
and
59.7
leading
But male 28.2 for
Brahmins
was
as against
as
for Telugu
non-Brahmin
literacy rates in English the Tamil Brahmins against
2.4
for
the
Vellalas.!
The rapid expansion of higher education in the third quarter of the nineteenth century soon created a surplus of graduates. Government service in the presidency and in
neighbouring
princely
states
offered
the main
field
for
graduate employment, but by the 1870s and 1880s jobs in the bureaucracy were becoming scarce; the European monopoly of the higher echelons and Indian nepotism made entry for out-
|siders even harder. Exclusion from bureaucratic employment | provoked the frustrated graduates to criticize selection i procedures for government service and sharpened their plaints against officials' conduct. Graduates sought
comother
occupations: they turned to law, medicine, journalism and accountancy, but there, too,
education, they ran head-
fields
their European
long
into
conflict
educated
with
European
Indians
professionals.
had advantages
over
In
some
rivals. Brahmin lawyers, equipped with a knowledge of Sanskrit and traditional Hindu law which few Europeans could hope to match, won control of the original side of their profession in the 1880s and were beginning to oust Europeans from the appellate side as well.1¢ Thus the second phase of early nationalist agitation Tamilnad in the 1880s was largely that of an emerging
in
Brahmin professional middle class in conflict with European professionals. This conflict was expressed in various forms: one was sustained Brahmin criticism of European government
servants;
.and
T.
another was resentment
racialism.
Muthuswami
The
Aiyar,
appointment
as
the
Madras High Court met with local European community. graduates Hindu, to
voice
first
against
in
1878
south
European arrogance
of
a
Brahmin
Indian
judge
lawyer,
of
the
howls of indignation from the In response a group of Brahmin
in Madras city launched their own newspaper, the defend the appointment and, more generally, to
their political
views.'?
Another
formative
incident
was the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim rioting in the town of Salem in July and August 1882. Initially a dispute over the siting of a new mosque, the dispute quickly developed into a
tussle
between
European
officials
and Hindu
vakils,
led by
17 C. Vijayaraghavachari.* European arrogance as a
Having teacher
already encountered in Mangalore, ! ie Vijaya-
raghavachari was in no mood to tolerate official mishandling of the Salem affair. For his part in the riots he was sentenced
to
judgement
other
10
years'
and
eventually
accused.’
Vijayaraghavachari
Tamilnad. -
| tween
It
was
the
transportation,
against
emerging
secured
Successful a hero
opinion
the
background
Indian
he
release
of
young
contested
the
and
Raj
middle
the
that
of
made
graduates
of mounting
professional
| Europeans that the Madras | 1884. Although the sabha
public
his
defiance
among
this
but
the
of
tension
class
be-
and
the
Mahajana Sabha was formed in May (association) claimed to represent
in the presidency,
its
membership
was
drawn
from a very narrow social base. A large number of founding members were from the mofussil with lawyers outnumbering
merchants. A non-Brahmin pleader, P. Rangiah Naidu, was one of the sabha's first presidents, but inevitably at this date
an organization Brahmin in provincial
of the western-educated
composition. The forerunner of the
was predominantly
Madras Mahajana Indian National
Sabha was Congress.
the Dele-
gates sent by the sabha attended the first meeting of the Congress at Bombay in December 1885, but the formation of a Provincial Congress Committee (PCC) for the presidency did not lead to the disbanding of the sabha. In 1894 it was affiliated to the Madras city District Congress Committee (DCC) and continued until the 1930s to function as an influential body comp!ementing the activities of the local
Congress.
The strength of the sabha and the Madras PCC in the period before 1914 lay in their ability to express the
grievances and opinion of the professional middle class. Public conferences and speech-making were the cautious first steps towards a broader political movement, but it was easier for the western-educated of Madras to identify with their social and professional counterparts in other provinces of India than to delve deeply into the grievances of other social groups in their home region. This was especially so for
the
social
an
privileges,
extreme
their
*
Brahmins.
Because
Tamil
confidence
authority
Biographical the text will
to
in
speak
of
their
Brahmins
their
on
own
behalf
religious
carried
ability
of
the
notes on persons marked with be found on pp. 232-237.
training
and
lead
and
in
an asterisk
in
within
themselves
people
as
to
a whole.
18 Religious
ship
hegemony
in
Hindu
of the exclusive
club
society
combined
with
of the western-educated,
member-
the
com-
bination of caste and class leadership together, made Brahmins responsive to the appeals of a nationalism which challenged the hold of Europeans on India's professional and
; political life, social barriers
That
was the
is
but made it difficult for them to cross to broaden the base of the Congress.
not
to
say
that
the
completely isolated. Tamil countryside as landholders.
ern
education
and
higher
incomes
professional from
the
Brahmin families to sell their lands, vakils and government servants in the early twentieth centuries who did not
acres
in
the
mofussil.
middle
class
Brahmins had contact with Although the cost of west-
A further
link
professions
tempted
few were the Brahmin late nineteenth and own at least a few
between
Brahmin
law-
yers and the countryside was through their clients. Land litigation was the most lucrative branch of the legal pro-
fession brought wealthy
their
in the Madras into frequent
ryots.
landed
At
clients
Presidency,”’ and Brahmin lawyers contact with zamindars, mirasdars
times
on
they
public
advocated
platforms
the
interests
as well
as
of
in
were and
the
law courts. By contrast, professionals seldom identified themselves with Indian business interests in their political activities. But, it must be stressed, before 1914 political
as opposed to professional links between the urban middle class and the landholders were still very fragile. Support for Congress came from the larger towns and cities; the organization in the countryside, was extremely rudimentary.
the
The
First
western
landed
political
World
education
wealth
Brahmins'
War
leadership
was
and
based
the
in
of
on
the
achieving
it
Tamil
their
professions,
and traditional
success
where
social this
existed
at
Brahmins
near-monopoly backed
authority.
dominance
by
all,
before
of
their
But
aroused
the
the
envy and hatred of the non-Brahmin communities. By the turn of the century non-Brahmin ryots and traders were beginning to realize the economic and political advantages to be gained by entering the professions; belatedly they sought to make up for their previous disinterest in western education. But it was not easy for young non-Brahmin graduates to intrude into the already crowded professions; Brahmin
confidence
and (nepotism
contrasted
with
the non-Brahmins'
lack of influence. For many first generation non-Brahmin vakils it was a hard, often frustrating, experience trying to build up a legal practice against Brahmin rivals. A generation earlier the conflict had been between Europeans and an embryonic Indian professional middle class; by 1914
a
19
new conflict
was
professional
into
\
the
emerging
middle
professions.
between
class
and
an established
the
non-Brahmins
Brahmin
seeking
entry
In self-defence-the non-Brahmins adopted two tactics. 1 Firstly, they fell back to their own castes, attempting to mobilize them through caste associations. A great number of associations were set up from the 1890s, especially between
1905
and
Their
1930,
aims
were
a period to
organization and traditions while status
and
of rapid
strengthen
mutual at the
influence
social
caste
and political
identity
change.
through
commuml
assistance; to foster pride in caste same time improving the caste's
by
sanskritization”
—
raising
its
ranking in the caste hierarchy — and by modernization, which included increased participation in western education and the professions. The drive behind such associations came from the caste's new itional caste heads.
middle class, sometimes aided by tradThey sought to play down internal
differentiation
within
tried
pressure
their
own
to
government
create
educational
nomination the Muslim
Morley-Minto couraged
By
caste
so as
emphasizing
groups
which
concessions,
to unite
caste
it behind
identity
could
win
public
constitutional fashion
natural
enough
for
reforms
communal
of
from
newcomers
advance
their
the
and
undoubtedly
en-
1909
success in the
organization.
that
they
appointments
to local boards and legislatures. The League in winning separate electorates
the
anyway,
the
leadership.
But
to a highly
it
of
was,
competitive
professional world should seek support from their castemen, and should stress a communal rather than a class or national identity,
in
order
to
own
positions.
A second non-Brahmin response to Brahmin dominance was the formation ofa fnovement designed to fuse the various non-Brahmin communities into a single anti-Brahmin political
entity. 1916
The non-Brahmin
at
a meeting
Malayali-physician, businessman,
From this
and
movement
in Madras
C.
beginning
P.
city
Tyagaraya
Natesa
sprang
took
shape
organized
Chetti,
Mudaliar,
the South
in November
by
T.M.
a Telugu
a_Tamil
Indian
including
Council
created
Madras,
the
Muslims,
first the Justice leaders demand for reserved seats determined had 28
asked
of
the
by
agitation
the
Justicites
Vellala
and persistent achieved
non-Muhammadan
and
seats:
of
which claimed in the pres-
untouchables.
India
lobbying
partial
Act
general
seats
by
of
1919.
in London
success.
non-Brahmins
a
doctor.
concentrated on pressing their in the provincial Legislative
Government
for 40 reserved
65
Christians
Devanga
Libéral
Federation, better known as the Justice Party, to represent the interests of all non-Brahmins idency
Nair,
The
were
the
At
and
By
party
awarded
decision
of
20
an
arbitrator,
The
Lord
Meston,
development
fessional
middle
in
March
1920.73
of a non-Brahmin
class
section
and
the
creation
of
class
and
a European
the
of
the
pro-
Justice
Party
to express its political views ensured that the struggle for, power in the Madras Presidency from 1919 to 1937 would be a triangular contest and not a straightforward contest between
an_indigenous
middle
Two major sections
petition.
And,
colonial
of the national bourgeoisie
to further
complicate
were in com-
the political
force, those sections were in themselves split factions, each seeking pre-eminence or a share Numerically,
the
/ small — it constituted
professional
less
than
lation of the presidency— and competition, as mich as outside
power.
middle
0.5 per
class
cent
lines
of
into competing of the spoils. was
very
of the popu-
factional and sectional pressure and a changing
electoral set-up, forced middle-class politicians to look outside their own tiny class for allies and support. The Justicites looked to their own castemen in the small towns 4
and
villages,
and
to
the
leading
non-Brahmin
zamindars,
whose
wealth and prestige could help to counter-balance the advantages the Brahmins enjoyed. The Brahmins were at first uncertain where to turn. Some, the grouping known first as the Moderates and later as the Liberals, faced political extinction
because
they
were
unable
to
adjust
to
the
new
political environment and hoped, largely in vain, that the British would help them to survive in gratitude for their loyalty and past services. Others, only a few at first, saw
\ in Gandhi's
alternative. Gandhi's still
At
an
ambitious
Quest the
for mass
agitation
a possible
for Allies
beginning
outsider
satyagrahas
schemes
to
in South
of
1919
India's
Africa
Mohandas
political
had won him
Karamchand
Gandhi
establishment.
respect
was
His
and a popu-
lar reputation for saintliness, but they did not give an entrée to the highest Congress circles. The death G.K. Gokhale, whom Gandhi regarded as his mentor, in
him of
February 1915 robbed Gandhi of one possible way of rising to all-India leadership. Obliged to follow an independent course, Gandhi's three small-scale satyagrahas in 1917-18 — at Champaran, Kaira, and Ahmedabad — demonstrated Gandhi's agitational ability and attracted to him a band of disciples, among them Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad, who were | to be lieutenants in many subsequent large-scale campaigns. *6
21
But
in
south
India
Gandhi
had
no
small-scale
saty-
agrahas to his credit, no disciples, hardly any contact. Gujaratis and Marwaris turned out to see him on his visits to Madras in 1896, 1915 and 1919, and were willing enough to make donations when he appealed for them. But they were numerically
to Gandhi campaign. the
Gandhi
Madras
Gokhale,
too
few,
had
contacts,
as
culturally
allies
and
Congressmen,
who
had
been
too
foreign,
organizers too,
partly
the
in
any
among
through
Moderates’
the
sort
to
be
Moderate
his
of
of mass
use
section
association
all-India
leader,
of
with and
partly through his South African work which had been widely publicized in the presidency through the press, led by the Indian Review, a monthly journal edited by a Tamil Brahmin, G.A. Natesan. Unfortunately for Gandhi, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri,* who took over as head of the Servants of India Society on the death of Gokhale, its founder, was less than
impressed
by Gandhi
and was
relieved
when,
after
the
year's
probation fixed by Gokhale, Gandhi saved embarrassment of refusing him membership
the Society the by withdrawing his
esteem as Gokhale's heir and a principled a sentiment which Srinivasa Sastri could
man, but it was reciprocate.”*
application
to join.
Gandhi
held
Srinivasa
Sastri
in high
not
The Tamil Moderates represented the peak of Brahmin middle-class professional and political endeavour. Lawyers for the most part, they had deeply imbibed the cultural and political values of the British but without abdicating the social ascendancy they enjoyed in Hindu society. Western education and the legal profession instilled in them a deep respect for constitutionalism. They occupied seats in the provincial Legislative Council following the Morley-Minto
constitutional reforms of V. Krishnaswami Aiyar and
1909 P.S.
and two of their luminaries, Sivaswami Aiyar held office
as executive councillors in Madras before 1914. It was not, therefore, surprising that having benefited from collaboration with the Raj, the Moderates were disinclined to resort to drastic methods to secure further constitutional progress, and to realize their ultimate nationalist goals. They
believed
that
political
advancement
in
India would
neces-
sarily be slow because ideas of responsible government and democracy could only gradually percolate down from the western-educated to the masses. The British could only be
persuaded
pressure
to yield
from
frontation.
the
power by
educated,
steady
through
but
polite
constitutional
cooperation
not
con-
22 With State for in future
branch
the declaration by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of India, on 20 August 1917, that British policy would be the "increasing association of Indians in every
of the
administration,
and
the
gradual
development
of
self-government institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integ-
ral
part
of the
British
Empire...",?”
the Tamil
Moderates
looked forward to a new, even more rewarding period of enlightened cooperation with the Raj. Although they carped at
some
of the
more
niggardly
aspects
of
the
reforms
proposed
in the report of Montagu and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, published in July 1918, they made public their willingness to work the dyarchy scheme of split government, adding a hope that at a later date many of the "reserved" subjects
would of
the
made
be made
over
government .?°
ministerial
or "transferred"
Constitutionalism and close association the Tamil Moderates strong opponents of
posals
for
mass
wanted
to
launch
ive
to the
legislation
agitation
which
an
against
became
the
law
all-India
in
Rowlatt
March
movement
with the Gandhi's
1919.
against
Act,
half
Raj pro-
regress-
Gandhi
the
Act
to
force its repeal. The Moderates spoke out against the legislation and Srinivasa Sastri condemned it in an impassioned speech in the central Legislative Council, but they would not be drawn into direct action for fear of so offending the
British that the constitutional reforms were withdrawn or reduced in scope. With the eternal faith of a liberal, Srinivasa Sastri believed that all possible constitutional tactics should be tried before venturing on a course which seemed to him an Despite Gandhi's Srinivasa Sastri
path.
Nor
would
To whom, Since
invitation to mass violence and anarchy.?? praise for his stand in the legislature, would not budge from the consitutional
his
associates.”
then,
could
Gandhi
turn?
Mrs
Annie
Besant
had
1914
done
more
than
anyone
else to enliven the politics of the southern presidency. In 1907, 14 years after following Theosophy to India, Besant was chosen president of the Theosophical Society and moved her headquarters from Benares to Adyar on the southern edge of Madras city. At first eschewing politics, Besant was too fascinated by the exercise of power to neglect them for long; she was, besides, confident of India's capacity for immediate
self-government.
League to agitate League had
the
whole
63
In September
1916
she
for this objective.*!
branches
presidency.
in
Tamilnad,
Sales
formed
Rule
Within a year the
nearly
of New India,
a Home
half
fiery
of
those
and
in
23 inexpensive,
ment
were
steadily
intervened.
rising.
Then
the
Madras
govern-
Rudely awakened from its dreams of Indian contentment by the Home Rulers, the provincial administration of Lord Pentland was in no mood to tolerate Besant. When demands for securities for her papers failed to gag her, the Madras government took the rash step of interning Besant and two of her associates, George Arundale, organizing secretary of Home Rule League, and B.P. Wadia, its treasurer, in June
1917.
By
Besant
this
move
papers
in
a national
of other
the
government
heroine. the
Sales
presidency,
unintentionally
of New India and
the
made
leaped
membership
ahead
of
Besant's
League shot up from 7,000 in March 1917 to 27,000 in December.** Gandhi thought he saw in Besant's internment an opportunity for an all-India satyagraha to force the government to release her, and feeling ran high in Madras, though
the not
ever-cautious Srinivasa Sastri advised the Madras to adopt Gandhi's suggestion until constitutional
of winning her release had been exhausted.** decision
was
reached
to set Besant free in peevish Lord Pentland
the
ment for But
constitutional Such that
was she
December the tide
Montagu
persuaded
the
September 1917: he to prejudice Indian
reforms.
PCC means
Before
Madras
any
government
did not opinion
want the against
Besant's popularity on her release from intern was chosen president of the Calcutta Congress
1917, the last non-Indian to hold the office. of her popularity was already beginning to ebb.
Her experience of internment discouraged Besant from moving on to more intensive agitation and Montagu's announcement of
August
1917
held
out
the prospect
of substantial
constitu-
tional progress in the near future. Although she criticized some aspects of the Montagu-Chelmsford report, it was obvious
ation. forms
that,
It was
and
for
now
through
Besant,
agitation
the nationalists'
ministerial
must
task
control
of
give
to work
local
education and health carry out programs that improve the conditions of the Indian people.
believed,
would
nationalists
have
a
way
to
the
re-
government,
would Only
convincing
negoti-
case
materially then, she for
demanding a further instalment of reforms and these might be won by constitutional tactics — "grievances before supply" on the model of Charles I's Parliament.™ Having
initially
set
her
target
Besant's support — however qualified Chelmsford reforms inevitably seemed Indian
ence
nationalists.
held
to
discuss
In
the
August
1918,
as
Indian
Home
Rule,
— for the Montagua betrayal to many at
a
Montagu-Chelmsford
special
report,
confer-
Besant
24
was
attacked
for
"unworkable"
wishing
reforms.
to
modify
On both
rather
than
occasions
reject
the main
the
attackers
were Tamil Brahmins of the Extremist party, especially S. Satyamurti,* a 31 year-old lawyer. Besant, however,
was tenacious and she Congress. She fought
refused hard to
to be pushed out of the keep her influence in the
national and provincial Congress committees, but when the Moderates formed a National Liberal Federation in early 1919 she could no longer occupy central ground within the Congress. She had failed to maintain the Home Rule League as an
alternative vehicle ion to the Congress
for political agitation after her electpresidency; she had neither the popu-
larity nor the organizational from within the Congress. In
ing associates resigned
support to March 1919
from the Madras
remained a vociferous critic of the no longer a power in the provincial
On
the Rowlatt
Act
Besant
itself
and
not
to
other
laws,
PCC.°©
Besant
a middle
course
Extremists, but organization.
favoured
tween that proposed by Gandhi the Moderates. She advocated
defy the Extremists she and her remainshe
was
be-
and the constitutionalism of opposition only to the Act and
suggested
the
staging
of
protest processions, the drafting of petitions, and the formulation of constitutional demands for its repeal. Gandhi spurned her proposals and offended her still more by converting her emissary, the Gujarati Jamnadas Dwarkadas, to
his views.*’ Besant's menting tee" at
response was petty.
her own suggestions Adyar to assist the
the public
peace",
Instead of imple-
she formed a "citizens' commitpolice in the "preservation of
anticipating
that
violence
would
be the
inevitable outcome of the satyagraha. °° Besant and Gandhi, never close, drifted an unbridgeable distance apart. Without
No alternative
the
Moderates
but
to
support
for his Rowlatt
Gokhale
Gandhi
While he could respect him, Gandhi viewed the
had been
or
turn
to
Besant
the
satyagraha
as
allies,
Extremists
Gandhi
in
in the Madras
seeking
had
Presidency.
the Moderates, even when they opposed Extremists with suspicion. Through
associated
shared their antipathy to believer in ahimsa he was
with
the Moderates
and he
the Extremist party; as a devout temperamentally and intellectually
opposed to the Extremists' connections with terrorist groups; and as an advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity he was distressed
by their Hindu militancy. The
ciliatory
Extremists
than
were,
as
the Moderates
their
name
towards
suggests,
British
rule
They wanted to expel the British, by terrorism if feasible; by passive resistance, especially
and the
less
con-
in India.
violence boycott
25 of
with
British the
goods,
Hindu
if they
could
revivalist
not.
Closely
movement,
the
associated
Extremists,
unlike
the Moderates, saw religion as a bond that could cement the masses and the intellectuals together in opposition to | foreign rule. Militant- Hinduism was..a.-vernaeular-rendering
of European
nationalism:
it revived
pride
and expressed a contempt for western tions which might provoke government
couched
Extremist
in political leaders
educated
Moderates,
middle
were
class
the
Tamil
rather as
as
than
much
the
religious
a part
Moderates,
Extremists
in India's
past
culture and institurepression if it were of
terms.
the
and
But
the
western-
like
the
were also mainly Brahmins.
In Tamilnad the Extremists were less conspicuous than in Maharashtra and Bengal and they never mounted the sort of revivalist activities and terrorism associated with Bal Gangadhar Tilak in the one and with the anti-partition agi-
tation of 1905-11 in the other. There were of Extremism in Tamilnad. The earliest was
two main centres Salem where
Vijayaraghavachari, Hindu hero of the anti-Muslim riots of 1882, built up a school of young nationalists imbued with
hostility
to British
rule.
Most
of Vijayaraghavachari's
pupils were Brahmins and lawyers, among them C. Rajagopalachari,* later the leading Gandhian in Tamilnad. the
The
second
Extremists
centre
of
constituted
Extremism
what
was
was
Madras
known
as
city
the
where
"Egmore
Clique" as distinct from the "Mylapore Clique" of the Moderates. A mixed group of Brahmins and non-Brahmins, the Egmore clique consisted of professionals who resented the Moderates' dominance of the professional and political life of Madras. Although it initially one of the founders of the Justice Nair, a Malayali lawyer, the most Tamil Brahmins: S. Kasturi Ranga Iyengar,* and T. Rangachari. All
long associated
with
government
fession. After nine years at Kasturi Ranga moved to Madras
included T.M. Nair, later Party and C. Sankaran prominent Extremists were Iyengar,* A. Rangaswami three were from families
service
Coimbatore in 1894 in
and
the
legal
pro-
as a lawyer, the hope of carving
out a successful practice at the High Court. He was soon disappointed by the lack of support he received from the
Moderates and drifted into the Egmore clique. In 1905 he broke away from the legal profession to edit the Hindu newspaper: under his direction it became the foremost nationalist
journal
in
censorship
and
Ranga
law to
ials.*?
His
from
the
fines
nephew,
presidency,
moderated
A.
the views
Rangaswami
journalism,
though
fear
government
expressed
Iyengar,
becoming
of
editor
followed
of
the
in editorKasturi
Tamil
26
paper Swadesamitran
in
1915
and remaining
as editor
and
director until he took charge of the Hindu in 1928. Rangaswami could thus combine several skills: renowned as a Tamil writer and an able publicist, he had also estab-
lished a reputation as publication of a study
a constitutional expert by of the Indian constitution.
The Tamil Extremists had whether in Salem or newcomers the political pre-eminence of
was
with
pride
of Salem as the headquarters of
home
that
ful Mylapore
two grudges. As mofussil men, in Madras city, they resented the presidency capital. It
Vijayaraghavachari's
disciples
Poona of the South, seeing the presidency by contrast
of Moderate
politics.
clique,
the
And,
as
the Nationalists
thought
it as the Tilakite with Madras, the
outsiders
envied
to
the
the
power-
influence
of the Moderates. One faction of the predominantly Brahmin professional middle class was in bitter competition with another. But it was not simply rivalry between "ins" and
“outs as is. sometimes fired
by
their
own
suggested.""
conception
The Extremists were
of what
India's
nationalist
movement should be and, as mofussilites and outsiders, they were encouraged to develop their own political style in con, trast to the sedate, English-language constitutionalism of ithe Moderates. Forced to look outward for support they
' explored and
new
political
journalism,
militant
terrorism.
Although
territory-vernacular
Tamilnad
Hinduism,
did
not
and,
to
experience
a
oratory lesser
terrorism
degree,
on
the
scale of Bengal and Maharashtra, ripples from the Bengali storm did break the relatively placid surface of Tamil politics in the years of agitation 1905-11. Inspired by the Bengalis' enthusiasm for swadeshi (that is, for goods made in one's own country), a Vellala lawyer in Tuticorin, V.0. Chidambaram Pillai, formed a Swadeshi Steam Navigation
Company
in November
1906
to
break
the
monopoly
held
by
British steamers operating between the port and Colombo. This and Chidambaram's part in organizing a strike at a British-owned textile mill in February 1908, aroused the
hostility
March
Brahmin ings.
of
local
European
1908 the magistrate associate
They
defied
Subramania the
provoked riots in the Police opened fire to
were
stationed
Subramania tepression
in
the
ban,
officials
prohibited Siva
but
from
their
and
employers.
Chidambaram holding
arrest
on
In
and his
public 13
meet-
March
towns of Tuticorin and Tinnevelly. suppress the riots, punitive police
district,
and
Chidambaram
and
Siva were given lengthy sentences. Government became still more severe in 1911 when R.W. Ashe,
27 Sub-Collector
terrorist The
Tamil
at
Tuticorin
for his
part
Tuticorin
Extremists
underground
or
to Hindu
V.V.S.
Aiyar,
mania
Bharati,
Aurobindo, fied their
that
they
Bharati
into
Aiyar
\the
last
did
it shake
the
for
a
on the
drove
enclave
exiles
his
writer.
venture
back
by
after
years
Tamil
activists
of
were
Pondi-
C.
poetry,
Exile,
Bharati
his
and
than
as a
of
his
not
have
the
into
journalism
died
a temple
Gurukulam,
the
contrary,
French
a Tamil
entered
language
poetry rather Shermadevi
the
Among
famous
but
on
Bharati_became
such
to
papers,
Tamil
in
effect
repression
by
agitation."
1910 was also the sanctuary of Aurobindo terrorist whose interests turned increas-
today
dared
[Sharaei trampled the
exile
assassinated
swadeshi
had a lasting
Government
mysticism.
also
was
the
contact
Subra-
and
with
and bitterness at government repression, intensinationalist fervour, but it was not until 1919-20
and
Extremist
1908,
crushing
experience
too.
cherry, which from Ghose, the Bengali
ingly
in
in
death,
for
the
British in
Madras,
was
for
patriotism
revolutionary;
life in
running
Tinnevelly
a widespread
prevailing
faith
Tuticorin
1921
his -command
district.
to
spent”
Terrorism
have
wp’
his; ve
school,
in Tamilnad;
seems
of
in
Aiyar
nor
in constitutionalism.
experience
after
expressed
V.V.S.
the
as
did
On the
chastened
the Extremists. A. Rangaswami Iyengar and K.V. Rangaswami Iyengar gave financial assistance and encouragement to the exiles, but they shied away from any overt and aggressive action against the Raj, knowing how severely it would be crushed. In this case, as in Besant's, repression was
effective in isolating the most menacing opponents of the Raj and driving political activity back into constitutional channels. Repression had its rationale: it was seldom blind
revenge. were Rule
Although
Congress
following India.
was
their
hero,
the
at first willing to cooperate with movement. She was instrumental in
Moderates Home
Tilak
Rule
A.
to allow
in
the
1915,
nearly
League,
formed
the
lieutenants,
stormy
Rangaswami but
the
return
Surat
eight in
of the years
session
Iyengar
1916,
was
association
of
Tamil
Besant in the Home persuading the
after
1907;
operated
for
did
objective wanted to
was use
their
and
not
to the
expulsion
Tilak's
mainly
a while
the end of that year the Tamil Extremists Besant and began to assert their separate immediate that they
Extremists
Extremists
one
survive
in
of
to capture the Madras PCC; the Congress as a base for
own
western
1918.
no longer identity.
J
for
Popular though
a nationalist
appeal
Both
working
in Septenber
elephant. it
India.
Besant's By
needed Their
beyond capturing
28 the
Madras
Having been Congress
legislature
committees
of the
organization
leadership:
more to
Tilak's
as pressure
the
premier
to balance
under
the
in the wilderness in
1907-08,
and
Besant's
as
groups
the
image
the
the
reforms.
expulsion
Extremists
Home
the
party.
as
their
prerequisite
within
nationalist
their
Montagu-Chelmsford
after
from the
saw
mastery
to nationalist
Rule
Congress But
Leagues
were
than
the
uncompromising
as
Extremists
wing
seen
rivals
of
strove
the
Congress with their desire to participate in the constitutional system. Tilak's solution to this dilemma was to propose "responsive cooperation", that is to enter the legislatures, but to work the constitution only so long as the British were willing to make concessions to Indian demands
for the
repeal
of repressive
legislation
and for the con-
tinuing devolution of power. Thus, the Extremists were juggling with three balls: to be seen to be hostile to the British, to be more extreme in their demands than the Moderates, and yet to prepare the way for their own entry into the legislatures.
The Rowlatt Satyagraha The
a suitable
Rowlatt way
contrast their Moderates. On
to
satyagraha shake
appeared
a defiant
to
fist
the
at
Tamil
the
Raj
to
Rajagopalachari visit
the
agitation.
and
own political stance with that of the 30 January 1919 Kasturi Ranga Iyengar
sided over a Madras protest meeting against the and on 19 February C. Vijayaraghavachari, egged
C.
Extremists
of Salem,
presidency
Gandhi
at
But
in the
to
first
wrote
give
a
to Gandhi
lead
to
refused."?
the
to
pre-
Rowlatt on by
requesting
Act,
him
anti-Rowlatt
Perhaps
he
had
not
yet lost hope of converting Srinivasa Sastri and Natesan satyagraha; certainly he was suspicious of the Tamil
Extremists. and
in his
agitation, arrived in
station and
S.
by
determination
to
of other allies
create
a co-ordinated
in Madras
national
he finally decided to make a short visit. He Madras city on 17 March, was met at the railway
Kasturi
Satyamurti,
house. **
The
absence
to
battle
for
Ranga
and
Iyengar,
taken
control
to
of
A.
stay
the
Rangaswami
in
Kasturi
Madras
PCC
was
Iyengar,
Ranga's
reaching
a climax in March 1919 and Gandhi involuntarily found himself drawn into the struggle between the Extremists and
Besant. On 18 March, the day after Gandhi's arrival, Besant resigned from the PCC, taking with her several prominent Home Rulers and Moderates: G.A. Natesan, L.A. Govindaraghava Aiyar, who had been the PCC president for the Moderates and
|
29
Home Rulers of whom had days later,
alike, B.P. Wadia and C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, both been secretaries of the Home Rule League. Ten on 27 March, Kasturi Ranga took over as PCC
president
with
T.
executive
posts.
Rangachari
and
T.V.
Venkatarama
Aiyar
as
vice-presidents, and Satyamurti as secretary."° While it may be doubted that Gandhi struck a bargain with the Extremists, in return for associating himself with the Extremists he received their support for his satyagraha plans On 21 and 22 March about 40 city and mofussil Extremists met at Kasturi Ranga's house to form a Satyagraha Sabha. Only with difficulty, however, could candidates be found for its Ranga
as
Gandhi
was
vice-president
chosen
and
president
Vijayaraghavachari
with
Kasturi
as
secretary.
In addition to Extremist reluctance to serve on the committee, there was a reluctance to decide how the sabha should express
opposition
to the
Rowlatt
Bills,and
Gandhi
told
the meeting
that a plan of action would be sent from Bombay.“® left
for
a breathless
tour
of
five
Tamil
towns
March
Gandhi
He then
— Tanjore,
Trichinopoly, Madura, Tuticorin and Negapatam; these towns had the dual advantages of being Extremist centres and
readily
to
accessible
return
signed
his
to
Bombay.
by
satyagraha
rail.
On
Only
120
pledge.
28
people
in
the
left
Madras
presidency
had
The Extremists had little more than a week to prepare their campaign which Gandhi had directed to begin on 6 April. At the Madras conference Gandhi had suggested that a proscribed book should be printed and circulated to the saty-
agrahis Kasturi
in defiance
Ranga
of the
Iyengar
and
law.
As newspaper
Rangaswami
Iyengar
publishers
were
asked
they would "they have
undertake the publication. They protested invested one or two lakhs in their presses
agraha
to
that ... confiscation would ruin them".“”’ That doned, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar's contribution to was
produce
and
distribute
copies
of
if
that and
idea abanthe satyan
unregis-
tered newspaper denouncing the Rowlatt Act. The single cyclostyled sheet which appeared was so innocuous that the Madras government took no action against it.“® More enthusiastic support for Gandhi came from Sowcarpet, the Gujarati
quarter
of Madras
city.
At the
instigation
Kalyanjee, Gandhi's Gujarati contact in merchants observed a hartal (suspension
6 April,
ponded
labour
the
to
Satyagraha the
disputes
Extremists
call
and
were
Day.“®
for
early
on to the streets for ance at the evening's
Muslim shopkeepers
a hartal.
able
of Ramjee
the city, Gujarati of business) on
attempts
to
bring
As
at
a result
union
tramway
demonstrations meeting on the
also res-
of
recent
organization,
and
textile
workers
and to swell the attendbeach to an estimated
30
100,000, one of the largest political gatherings Madras had ever known. The hartal appealed to the educated — students, clerks, literate traders — whose curiosity and sympathy had been aroused by the newspapers as well as by public meetings; but the government doubted whether the illiterates under-
stood its purpose and claimed that the organizers had whipped up enthusiasm by spreading wild and exaggerated rumours of the arbitrary powers the government would hold under the Rowlatt Act.°° No serious disturbances occurred either in the
city
or
in
the
mofussil
where
Extremists
and
Muslims
organized demonstrations and public meetings. Interest was confined to the major towns and evaporated after 6 April.*! lent
Elsewhere
in
course.
India
In
Bombay,
the
Rowlatt
Calcutta
satyagraha
and
Delhi
took
there
a vio-
were
protracted disturbances and police firings. The most sive situation developed in the Punjab. By deporting
explotwo
leading agitators on 10 April the Punjab government unwittingly provoked mob attacks on the civil lines and railway yards in Amritsar. On 13 April Amritsar's military commander, Brigadier-General Dyer, ordered his troops to fire on a prohibited Congress meeting at the area of waste-ground known as Jallianwala Bagh. No prior warning was given:
379
civilians
were
killed
Jallianwala
Bagh
nation-wide
satyagraha
Delhi
persuaded
massacre
Gandhi
to
on
and
about
and
the
call 18
1,200
violence
off his
April. *
wounded.
first
in
Bombay
attempt
The
and
at
a
In the Punjab the satyagraha released political and economic tensions which had been building up during and since the war; in Bombay and Delhi the disturbances were equally a product of underlying discontent which owed nothing to the Rowlatt legislation. In Tamilnad, however, the absence of violence and the lack of sustained interest, were
indicative of the failure of the Extremists to mobilize grievances in the service of the all-India agitation. In part this was because of their lack of influence: the’city trade
unions,
Besant's
for
example,
associates,
and
were
the
largely
Extremists'
under
the
connection
control
with
of
Hindu revivalism gave them no background of cooperation with Muslim agitators. But, more simply, the Extremists were not interested in stimulating mass unrest. For them the saty-
agraha was a convenient gesture against the Raj, coinciding with their takeover of the PCC. The failure of the satyagraha to secure the repeal of the Rowlatt Act did not,
therefore,
greatly
disappoint
them.
Madras Satyagraha Sabha, held on Iyengar advised it not to commit
At a meeting
of the
13 July, Kasturi Ranga members to any further
|
1
31
action until Gandhi's ideas of non-violence were properly understood by:the Indian people. He wanted all talk of satyagraha postponed indefinitely. The meeting reached no, decision Educated
on this opinion
point, in the
but the sabha ceased to presidency was reported
ing and
away from satya; graha as a result of northern India, and the Extremists
the
propertied
prolong
their
association classes,
constitution. satyagraha With
uncertain
prepare
It was
and
about
satyagraha his
for the
the
leadership
of
violence in Bombay did not wish to
which
voters
to Rajagopalachari
behind
next
first
a movement
including
left
Gandhi's
the
with
move,
elections
the
them
the
and
might
under
offend
the
to defend
new
agitation. °°
with
Gandhi
Extremists
to the
function.°* to be swing-
himself
began
reformed
to
legislatures
scheduled for November 1920. was subsumed in a demand for
Opposition to the Rowlatt Act a bill of rights to be written
Extremists
that
into
the
Indian
was,
moderate,
but
constitution.
however,
that
they
not
would
The
main
they
seem
to
worry
would
the
now
of
the
appear
voters
too
too
radical.
Having thrust the tiller in one direction by their involvement in the Rowlatt satyagraha, it was now necessary to straighten their course by pulling it back towards the other. Significantly, at "Extremist" label
adopted
the name
repeatedly
or wreck
stated
the
practicality
new and
the end and, in
of 1919 they shed the common with Tilakites
that
was
"Nationalists". it
constitution.
In their propaganda
not
responsibility
old elsewhere,
their
intention
To demonstrate
the
Nationalists
they
to boycott
their in
their
election manifestos presented a demand for Dominion Status for India as a "full and equal partner in the British Commonweatth", but paid greater attention to a detailed
program
of
reforms
in
local
government,
education,
revenue,
health and administration — all of which, on paper, be feasible under the reforms — designed to attract tax-paying
would the
electorate.
The Nationalists were also worried that they were entering the electoral race with greater handicaps than the Moderates. The public reputation of the Moderates certainly
stood higher and through their access to government patronage they covld command influential support in the mofussil. Stress
the
on
political
Nationalist
programs
alternatives
and
to
the
commitment
big
names
to
of
party
the
were
Moderates; and to counteract the influence of their opponents the Nationalists decided to create a new political organization. in Madras from
the
On 8 November 1919 city. Attended by
mofussil,
the
a Nationalist Conference opened 250 Nationalists, many of them
conference
resolved
to
form
a
32 Nationalist Party with Vijayaraghavachari as president and K.V. Rangaswami Iyengar of Trichinopoly as one of the three
vice-presidents.
of local
party
Resolutions
committees
was
still-born
and
were
for intensive
because
after
passed
for
the
formation
electioneering,
the
Amritsar
but
session
of
the
the Congress at the end of December 1919 the Nationalists were fairly securely in control of the PCCs and DCCs and so did not need to create an alternative organization. A. Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti toured Tamilnad in the first three months of 1920 injecting into the previously
languid
election
campaign
a vehemence
tour.
By
which
alarmed
the
sedate
Moderates. Srinivasa Sastri, howled down on several occasions ! for his Moderate views and for his reluctance to speak in Tamil, was indignant at the "Satyamurthi Midlothian" while Satyamurti, whose vernacular oratory evoked warm enthusiasm jan many mofussil meetings, boasted of having addressed 90,000 | people and to have started or revived eight taluk committees
‘in
his
four-week
seemed
to
A dust
and Religious
be
be
shortlived.
At
the
in December
condemning
firmly
annual
1919
the
in
April
command,
1920
but
the
their
Nationalists
ascendency
was
to
Doctrine session
C.R.
reforms
Das
as
of
of
the
Congress
Bengal
proposed
"inadequate,
held
at
Amritsar
a resolution
unsatisfactory
and
disappointing" and calling for "full Responsible Government" At Gandhi's request, the Das resolution was amended: as far
as
possible
secure
ment". ment
follow
the
for
The
the
Congress
“early
Tamil
their
tactics
would
establishment
Nationalists
ambitions
of
to
"responsive
work of
he
of
Satyagraha,
develop, way
the
to
waiting
Rowlatt
the
front
was
for
enter
waiting
full
the
of the
so as
Responsible
this
legislature
as
co-operation".®!
to
waiting
Congress
to
Govern-
endorse-
and
to
voice of caution and accomto favour constitutional
see
an opportunity
Gandhi had found two suitable new satyagraha campaign.
reforms
interpreted
At Amritsar Gandhi's was the modation. But though he appeared participation,
the
how
to
for
the
situation
cancel
out
a chance
leadership.*
grievances
on
to
would
the
failure
elbow
By June
which
to
his
1920
base
a
The first of these related to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. In May 1920 an enquiry commission under Lord Hunter, appointed by the Government of India to investigate events in the Punjab, reported that the province had been in open rebellion in April 1919 and that, even though martial
33 law
had
been
unnecessarily
The
conclusions
protracted
duction had been justified of
the
and
by the grave
Hunter
Report
the
sort
issue
in which
of moral
threat
contrasted
of an enquiry committee appointed by Committee (AICC) in June 1919,°" and
with
harsh,
its
intro-
to the Raj.°° with
those
the All-India Congress they presented Gandhi
he delighted.
A
"scanda) of this magnitude", he wrote, "cannot be tolerated by the nation, if it is to preserve its self-respect and
become
a free
partner
in the Empire".°°
The second issue was the Khilafat grievance. Since the closing phases of the war India's Muslims had been perturbed by the prospect of Allied dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. As Caliph of Islam, the Sultan of Turkey was revered by
Indian
Muslims,
and
through
India and the British Cabinet Empire's dissolution. Gandhi ing the Khilafat grievance to suspicions of the Hindus, cooperation to make their
for the Cabinet
to respond.
pressure
on
the
Government
of
they hoped to prevent the saw the advantages of harnessthe Punjab. Despite their
the Khilafat Muslims needed Hindu agitation sufficiently threatening
Hindu-Muslim
unity
was
an
essential element in Gandhi's nationalism. By allying with the Muslim. leaders he could not only bind the two religious
communities also
restrain
violent ance. at the
hoped
together
Muslim
— war
and
in
opposition
inclinations
induce
them
to
the
towards
to follow
British;
a
holy
he
— and
non-violent
could
resist-
Furthermore, since the Khilafat movement was directed solution of a problem outside India, it could be
that
Hindus
would
not
be
alarmed
by
it
as
a threat
to
their own interests and security. The publication of the Allied peace proposals on 14 May 1920 confirmed the fears of the Muslims: the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered. The signing
of
the
Treaty
of
Sévres
the Islamic cause he wanted.°* strate that he would into one coordinated He
proposed
in
August
gave
Gandhi
Now it was for him to demon-
weld the Khilafat campaign.
a program
1920
and
Punjab
of non-cooperation
grievances
leading
to
mass
civil disobedience. Arguing that the Khilafat and Punjab demonstrated the immoral and "hopelessly indifferent" attitude of the Raj to the welfare of the Indian people, Gandhi said that it was cooperation from
the the
moral duty of Indians to withdraw their regime. Non-cooperation was to be
carried out by stages. First; there would be resignation of government titles and honorary posts, followed by the boycott of government-sponsored schools, colleges and law courts. The
boycott
Central by
Gandhi
of
the
new
Khilafat at
the
legislatures,
Committee end
of June
first
in March, 1920.°
was
suggested
added
The
by
the
to the program
paralysis
of the
34 government was to be servants, police and
against tax
unjust
campaign
laws
would
achieved by troops, and
and
bring
the
the resignation of civil by civil disobedience
refusal
agitation
to
pay
to
taxes.
its
The
climax:
no-
mass
violent civil disobedience was calculated either to expel the British from India or to force them to heed India's
non-
demands. Although Gandhi originally suggested this program as the means by which India could obtain satisfaction for the Punjab and Khilafat insults, he later adjusted its objective to swaraj, claiming that if his methods were faithfully followed India could be self-governing by the end of 1921.
in
Gandhi tried to the minds of many
allay the fears that his program created politicians by emphasizing its con-
trolled and non-violent nature. "I want no revolution", he told an audience on Madras beach on 12 August, "I want ordered progress...I want real order to be evolved out of this chaos which is represented to me as order"'.®° Gandhi
agreed his
with
program
his
were
Nationalist fraught
critics
with
danger,
that mass civil disobedience would the Central Khilafat Committee was
would
"be
free
the people".°® scenes
which
from an outbreak
had
Gandhi
that
the
but
last
he
assured
of violence
the
them.
of
not be taken up unless reasonably certain that
on the part
had no desire to re-enact
accompanied
stages
Rowlatt
of
it
the violent
Satyagraha.
He stressed the constructive aspect of his program. Students withdrawn from schools and colleges would be edu-
cated
would
justice
in "national"
set
up
local
institutions;
arbitration
lawyers
courts
to our countrymen".”
who
to
left
dispense
Although he opposed
the courts
"swadeshi
suggestions
that a boycott of British goods should be included in his program, Gandhi called for the substitution of foreign manufactures by swadeshi products, especially khadi (hand-spun, hand-woven cloth) produced on a charka (spinning-wheel) and
handloom.”!
Gandhi further tried to reassure his critics
that non-cooperation was a course of action. He told
August
that
teine; it is is perfectly
"non-cooperation
to
is
the inherent right constitutional".7
Gandhi had not Nationalists, or at
hostility
constitutional and legitimate the Madras beach meeting on 12
his
a just
of
and
every
human
being
docand
it
yet despaired of winning over the Madras least of neutralizing their growing
leadership.
He
prefaced
Madras beach on 1 August,
with praise for Tilak, whose and he was careful to answer
the
legislatures
isms of his program.”? reformed
religious
his
speech
on
death had occurred Nationalist critic-
But on the issue of the boycott Gandhi
refused
the
to
compromise.
of
He
35 dismissed the "responsive cooperation" of Tilak and rejected any scheme for entering the legislatures to obstruct their progress. "I submit", he wrote in July 1920, "that in a sense we cooperate by joining even though the object is
obstruction.
of all,
Most
thrive
institutions,
and a British
upon obstruction".
council
Participation
most
in the
legislatures in any form would make the Nationalists the “unwilling instruments of injustice"; and Gandhi contempt-
uously
dismissed
August
1920
the
argument
that,
because
the
Liberals
would ignore the boycott, the Nationalists would have to contest the elections to prevent their opponents winning seats. A complete boycott of the legislatures had become over
the
the
central
Council
cooperation,
boycott,
that
Madras
"do
not
commented
They
to
the
presidency
expect
more
the
As he aptly in
item of Gandhi's
gain
after
than
program.
any
Nationalists
his Madras
want
everything
to
other
aspect
differed
visit,
sacrifice
by
And
speeches
by
it was
of non-
from Gandhi.
the Nationalists
anything
and
at
all.
resolutions".”
Preoccupied with their struggle against the Liberals, the Nationalists did not wish to weaken the Congress on the eve of the elections by entering a vituperative argument with Gandhi. But the council boycott issue threatened their am-
bitions
so directly
be adopted therefore,
but
to dilute Only
Madras
that
it and
the
and,
could
not
allow
his program
to
the Congress. Their objective was, non-cooperation in its entirety,
delay
most
extreme
despite
the
Nationalists
action,
they
unmodified by not to oppose
from
its
implementation.
provocation
their
Punjab
would
predilection events
and
have
for
driven
the
consitutional
the
Hunter
Report,
they did not feel that such provocation had been given. Dis< cussing the effectiveness of non-cooperation at a special meeting of the Madras PCC on 15 August 1920, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar
claimed
we want
by having
pressure
lative
elicit
to
bear
that
upon
Council". a
favourable
Nationalists
would
of non-cooperation, ensure that it had the Government.”
it
was
the
Government
a majority Even
to
that
from
approve
halting
bring we
can
of Nationalists
if constitutional
response
only
"possible
the
the
before
get
in the
pressures
British,
gradual
each
such
new
he
moral all
Legis-
thav
failed
and
to
other
implementation
step
was
taken
nationalist movement strayed too far from the constitutional path, mass violence and anarchy would follow.” Gandhi
wanted
to
rush
them
not prepared either ness to share power
to
popular support and to gauge its impact on In the background was the fear that if the into
a mass
campaign
for
which
in terms of organization or with other social groups.
of
they
were
willing-
36
the
Moreover, life-style
Gandhi's program as and identity of the
it stood was a threat to western-educated profess-
ional middle class. Themselves the products of government schools and colleges, the Madras Nationalists could not
accept
the
public
and
educational
boycott
as
a "practical
proposition"
nor one which would materially advance the nationalist cause.”* The boycotts of law courts and government service were equally unacceptable. Lawyers, the Nationalists argued, served the They
were
were
not,
government.”
instrumental
as
Gandhi
in
claimed,
giving de
justice
facto
For men who had been moulded on
these
lines
was
the
of
people. the
by western
cation, who derived their livelihood from the tions of British rule which Gandhi now sought
non-cooperation
to
servants
anathema.
edu-
very instituto undermine,
Instead, the Nationalists favoured a more agitation. They wanted a campaign which, like
restricted the Bengal
several
advantages:
economic
mercial
and
partition agitation 15 years earlier, focussed on swadeshi and the boycott of foreign goods.® Such a course offered interests;
it
it would
win
industrial
would
the
middle
threaten
support
of
class
British
India's
growing
com-
hit by the post-war
recession; it could provide opportunities for mass demonstrations without the dangers of uncontrollable mass upheaval
implicit in civil disobedience; it could be promoted, among other ways, through action in the central and provincial legislatures; and, not least in importance, it would not
involve
an
attack
on
the
occupations
professional middle class. Control lature was an essential concomitant
The
provisions
of the
granting
provincial
be
their
own
Gandhi's
Men
new
and
of of
constitution,
autonomy,
allowed
privileges
the the
although
for
of the
provincial legisswadeshi campaign.
progress
far
in
from the
"nation-building" departments. It would, the Nationalists claimed, be foolish to throw away such unprecedented opportunities and to allow them to fall into their opponents' hands ."! They would endorse a program of non-cooperation, but it would
In
the
leadership
pro-Gandhi
Its central jationalist
lims.
version
middle
months
in Madras
party
of
was
it,
of
debated
not
Gandhi's.
1920,
while
the
Nationalist
the non-cooperation
beginning
to
crystallize
figure was C. Rajagopalachari; splinter group and part of the
program,
in Tamilnad.
a
behind him were a region's Khilafat
37 Chakravarti Rajagopalachari was born in 1879 in Salem district. His father, a Brahmin karnam, is reported to have owned 50 acres of wet and dry lands.® From 1900 to 1919
Rajagopalachari had a moderately successful law practice in Salem town and for two years, 1917 to 1919, he was chairman of the municipal council. As a lawyer he made contacts among the lawyers, businessmen and leading landholders of
western Tamilnad, contacts that were to later decades in giving Rajagopalachari
base.
Until
of those
1919
who
his
became
neither travelled India until after ideas
but He
and
career
was
Gandhi's
lieutenants,
practices
was
Tilak
a Hindu
was
the
nationalist
hero
of
much
youth,
most
Rajagopalachari
restricted
by
had
a dogged,
to the religion oF his
as
his
Unlike
West: he did not leave reception of western
always
not_uncritical, attachment
was
unremarkable.
nor studied in the Independence. His
social
be invaluable in a local political
as
and
an
Indian
caste.
nationalist.
admiration
for
Tilak's
militant brand of Hindu nationalism was deepened by Rajagopalachari's membership of the circle of Brahmin
intel-
Surat
in his
lectuals late
headed
by Vijayaraghavachari
Congress
in December
twenties,
he believed
sided
that
with
India's
achieved without the
uncompromising
was
steadily
a violent hero
1907
the
in Salem.
Rajagopalachari,
Extremists
independence
and
would
struggle.°?
began,
At
until
the
then
about
probably
not
1912
be
The image of Tilak
however,
to
tarnish
as
and
Rajagopalachari started to doubt that one day terrorism and insurrection would drive the British from India. Faith in Tilak did not completely disappear until early 1920, but it eclipsed
appeared resolute; In
1919
it
easier
to practise
made
by
the
Tilak
Rajagopalachari
at
the High for him
appeal
of
Gandhi.
Gandhi
to be wavering.™ Court.
to
decided
leave
The
to move
recent
Salem
and
to Madras
death
of his
it may
also
city
wife
have
contributed to his restlessness. But there were other reasons for the move: he could hope to advance professionally more rapidly in the presidency capital than in a mofussil town; he was eager to political stage, and Kasturi
do
so.®°
It
may
also
be
that
be nearer the Ranga Iyengar
centre of the encouraged him
Rajagopalachari
had
made
to
him-
self too unpopular during his term as municipal chairman, especially among the Brahmins, to hope for a successful political
career
Rajagopalachari Perhaps, earlier,
like
he
in
took
Kasturi
found
it
Salem.
little
Ranga
However,
interest lyengar
difficult
crowded legal profession. politics. He was casting
to
once
in his
into
Madras,
law practice.
a quarter
move
Instead, about for
in
of
the
he devoted a suitable
a century
city's
over-
himself to role, a cause
yniot yu
38 that
would
absorb
his
labour
agitation
in
Nationalists'
workers'
the
alist
press
but
aspirations
conference
in their
Why,
intellectual
never and
rights.
propaganda
in
November
did
any
deep
He
showed
work,
1919
defence.”
then,
energies.
showed
dabbled
writing
leave
interest
the
Nation-
letters
the
in
for
greater
organizing
and
Rajagopalachari
He
sympathy
to
the
Nationalists
to
follow Gandhi? Firstly, Rajagopalachari sincerely believed in the efficacy of satyagraha, which appeared to him (on the basis of Gandhi's work in South Africa and in India) as a
more
practical
objectives
technique
for
achieving
India's
nationalist
than either constitutionalism or terrorism.
condly,
he
politics. campaigns
was
attracted
by
Gandhi's
spiritual
approach
to
The moral zeal that Gandhi injected into his appealed to Rajagopalachari, a Brahmin intellectual
in search of a worthy cause. There was astrong conservative, raditionalist trait in Rajagopalachari's personality. Whereas many other Nationalists shuddered at Gandhi's rejection of western society and institutions, Rajagopalachari's response
was
sympathetic.
article
in May
to free
itself
1921
bankruptcy
of
not
political
a mere
the
Rajagopalachari he
this
degereration.
from
necessity if we jing into social
lon the West
what
West.
saw
It
was,
device
to
as
described
he
the
moral
said,
wrest
in a newspaper and
in
political
India's
interest
Non-cooperation
reform
but
an
urgent
"is
at all desire to live when the West is driftanarchy. To depend for order and Government
is nothing but death to us...""%
Ambition, as well as intellectual conviction, played a part. In Madras city Rajagopalachari could only be a junior partner in the Nationalists' firm, and he chafed at their
political
caution
and
their
preoccupation
with
the
legis-
lature. On the other hand, Gandhi, deserted by the Moderates and Nationalists in turn, desperately needed a loyal lieutenant in Tamilnad, By opting for Gandhi when all the estab-
lished
unique
tics
and
politicians
opportunity
of Tamilnad.
Gandhi
in Madras
he was
and
that
"too much
to public from
noted
in April
he
were to
By
his
assume
"innate
1919.°°
him,
a central
temperament
acclaim,
Rajagopalachari position
Rajagopalachari
snyness"
in
Other writers
of an igtellectual
preferred
leadership.*!
popular
against
decision-making
their
in
had
the
was
poli-
reserved,
first
meetings
have commented
to be a popular from
behind
a
that
leader"
the
scenes
For such a man power would not come
but
from
association
with
a cause
or
personality. In time Rajagopalachari might have established himself among the Nationalists as their éméinence grise, but he was impatient and Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti were
a
39° more likely future leaders of the party. Alliance with Gandhi offered Rajagopalachari a chance to strike out on own
in
Tamilnad,
but
with
the
advantage
of
links
with
his
Gandhi's
supporters elsewhere in India. It was a gamble, but for Rajagopalachari, still an outsider, not a desperate one. Again,
many
Rajagopalachari
other
Nationalists
the Justice Brahmins
Party.
would
sequently
ministry
problem
be
in
Rajagopalachari their
lature.
with
solved
by
demands
for
Goodwill
be of greater
in
them
danger
However,
that
Brahmins
posed
between
an
in
the
seats
the
by
the
that
than
rise
of
the non-
Liberals
and
exclusively
February
to
in
"absolute
solution,
clearly
1920
con-
non-
non-Brahmin-Brahmin
communities
than
Gandhian
the
of
conceding
reserved
more
hoped
against
the
a plea
importance
characteristically
seen
challenge
office.
put
have
Nationalists
underestimated
Brahmin
all
the
The
ally
may
the
the
non-Brahmins
Madras
would,
he
justice".
which
Gandhi
legis-
asserted,
It was
later
a
approved, but it also expressed the doubts which he and his close friend T.S.S. Rajan* were beginning to have about the Nationalists' prospects of winning the election to the provincial legislature and the importance of developing political
work outside the constitutional arenas.°?
The inclusion of
not,
seemed
the
council
boycott
therefore,
in
alarm
ate way of barring
Gandhi's
non-cooperation
Rajagopalachari,
Brahmin
but
Congressmen
from
program
did
ar. appropri-
contesting
the
elections (thereby lessening communal tension in the presidency) and an opportunity to extend the range of nationalist activity.
with and
Finally, Rajagopalachari's political the mofussil than with Madras city.
the
Extremists
Many mofussil from
chari and
party
was
the
the
politicians
decision
able
city
and social associates
city
making.
to exploit
politicians.
ruled
resented the
In
As
the
the
Naidu*
and
a mofussil
conflict
felt
man,
between
addition
in
to his
Tamilnad.
excluded
Rajagopala-
the mofussil
professional
contacts in western Tamilnad, he had two valuable in T.S.S. Rajan, a Brahmin surgeon in Trichinopoly
defence
on trial
secretary
Congress
this
whom he had known for several years, Aiyar, a Madura lawyer with whom he
in
contacts were more Under the Moderates
of
of
the
the
for
Home
Rule
sediticn
Nationalist
and had
agitator
in 1918.
Conference
A. Vaidyanatha closely cooperated
P.
Varadarajulu
As organizing
in
November
Rajagopalachari had been able to draw together of mofussil Nationalists. Vijayaraghavachari,
1919,
a large number the most ob-
vious candidate for a mofussil Nationalist leader, was too cautious, too unsympathetic to Gandhi, to part from the Madras
city
leaders.
The
way
was
open
for
Rajagopalachari
to
40 lead in
a mofussil
Once
breakaway.
Gandhi
detail,
began
to explain
Rajagopalachari
. support in Madras city, as in the mofussil. It dents
had had
and
young
lawyers
was
his
non-cooperation
also
able
to
(themselves
from
the
the Nationalists' came from a small
attract
program
some
stronghold, as well group of law stumofussil)
who
banded together to form a League of Youth in 1918. They disliked the over-cautious politics of the Moderates, but
found the Nationalists even less to their liking. The Nationalists were "insincere and...merely vociferous" and they indulged in "mock heroics"; the Moderates, "though far
too weak, were, visit to Madras
were
hard
sceptical
effort",
in our opinion, honest".°> Until Gandhi's in August 1920 the League of Youth members
of non
cooperation.
warned
K.
Santhanam,*
"It a
is
law
after
30 years
graduate,
that
“our
But
discuss-
educated men have got the courage even to speak boldly and all at once to ask them to sacrifice their health and position is to meet with a well deserved rebuff. Mr Gandhi must face
facts ions
before
with
he
Gandhi
launches the
his movement".°°
League
members
were
after
converted:
they
left their careers to become full-time activists.*”
In
addition to K. Santhanam, the group included K. Subramaniam, N.S. Varadachari and K.V. Rajagopalan (all three Tamil Brahmins), the Vellala S. Ramanathan,* and G.V. Krupanidhi. They were Rajagopalachari's most loyal co-workers in the early 1920s.
But
a section
of the mofussil
of young intellectuals for Rajagopalachari to
wards
ance
non-cooperation.
of the
Khilafat
Nationalists
and a handful
in Madras city were not support enough redirect the Congress in Tamilnad to-
For
Muslims.
that
purpose
he
sought
the
assist-
Although the Muslims constituted only seven per cent the presidency's population and only about half that percentage in Tamilnad, and though they were deeply divided
between
Urdu
had developed
and
Tamil-speakers,
in the region
a vocal
by August
Khilafat
1920.°°
of
movement
The Muslims
were split into three political factions, the origins which dated back to the beginning of the century, but
of were
intensified by the Khilafat around the Prince of Arcot,
issue. A loyalist group, centred had opposed the Lucknow Pact of
Council
main
1916 between the Congress and the Muslim League (which formulated a joint constitutional demand) and formed a shortlived rival to the Muslim League in Madras in November 1917. A more enduring role was played by Muhammad Usman, a relative of the Prince of Arcot, who entered the Madras Legislative
in
1920
and
was
the
Muslim
spokesman
in
the
41
Justice A
Party. second
group
merchants
and
League
1908
Hasan,*
Lucknow
who
in
consisted
businessmen.
had
helped
and
Pact.
to
had
Born
been
at
of
Its
found
Urdu
central
and
a Madras
one
of
the
Nagpur,
educated
communal
demands
Tamil-speaking
figure
was
branch
architects at
the
Yakub
of the Muslim of
the
Muhammadan
Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, and married to a Turkish wife, Hasan had important ties with the wider Islamic world. But he firmly believed that, as a minority community, India's Muslims
had
operation
to
a merchant, iest Muslim
into
balance
with
the predominantly
and
practical
Hindu Congress.'°°
Hasan was backed by several of the city's wealthbusinessmen and traders, many of whom were goaded
support
of the
Khilafat
movement
Turkish sultan's fate piece-goods, skin and
than by leather
movement's
in Tamilnad
less
by concern
its
local
organization,
vocal
The
Abdul
than
third
entirely Urdu
Muslim
Sharar,
newspaper,
could
Muslims
on
to
in
faction
Qawni
Hindu act
a
was
fierce
the
the most
fanatical.
they
Muslims,
Pan-Islamist
Report.
Sharar
was
largest
favoured
it
and
as
was
editor
assertively
in
the
whether
Khilafat the
issue
Hindus
say
in
a course
Almost
led
bitterly
collaboration with the Congress the Raj. He questioned whether
sincerity
the
As the
they had
general
of Urdu-speaking
of Hasan's loyalty to
rely
and
violent.
composed
Majid
dainful Arcots' the
financiers
for the
the post-war contraction of trades.'°! Among them were
Moosa Sait, C. Abdul Hakim, and Jamal Muhammad.’*? more
co-
Himself
of
by
an
dis-
as of the Muslims
and
urged
followed
or
not. In his speeches and journalism he asserted that the Khilafat was a life-and-death question for Muslims and implied that, if necessary, force would be used to defend the
faith.'°?
His
supporters
were the residue of the old Muslim
elite of intellectuals and maulvis (religious teachers and scholars), though he received some backing from the poorer
Muslims
Aligarh.
of Madras The
old elite to
regain
with
lease
prestige
but
few
Congress
Conference of
in
the
from
former
appeal
1919
brothers,
by
Khilafat and
practical the
young
fired
assiduously
over
August
Ali
been
of the
were
Rajagopalachari the
and
had
the
its
scholars,
city
latter
students
was
power.
he moved
At
in Tamilnad.'°>
At
the
!™
for
Khilafat
were
Muslim
Madras
a resolution
imprisoned
but
a romantic
Some
cultivated
sympathy with Turkey during the war. For October 1919 Rajagopalachari undertook to
support
as
politicians.
Khilafat.
educated
Pan-Islam,
their
for
the
quest
renowned
cooperation
Provincial
the
declared
Khilafat organize
meetings
at
for
re-
Day on Hindu
in Tamilnad
17
he
42 supported
Hasan
and
the
moderate
merchants,
encouraging
them
to cooperate with the Congress and isolating the Sharar faction. By May 1920 Hasan and his associates, with Rajagopalachari behind them, were in control of the provincial Khilafat committee, and Sharar, who had hoped to be chosen
president, The
resigned
Madras
government
the presidency Except lation
Khilafat
in a huff./%° was
"a backwater
no
of the
doubt
correct
[Khilafat]
in calling
agitation".
in North Arcot which had a large urban Muslim popuclosely tied to piece-goods and leather trading, the
committees
were
as
much
Hindu
enterprises
as
Muslim.
Trichinopoly, among the most active centres in 1920-22, a Khilafat committee directed by T.S.S. kajan and T.V. Swaminatha Sastri, both of whom were Brahmin friends of
gopalachari,
assisted
long-established
a Tamil the
Muslim
Khilafat
Syed
Murtuza
The
moderate
land~holding
merchant.
committees
and organizational alist leadership.
The Road
by
gave
leverage
Sahib,
family,
and
Kaja
Mian
Khilafat
Rajagopalachari
he
a maulvi
needed
to
the
had
Raja-
from
Rowther,
Muslims
displace
'°”
a
and
numerical
the
Nation-
to Nagpur
The
first
clash
between
leadership
the
Khilafat-Gandhian
occurred
at
the
forces
the
Nationalist
Madras
did his
not disguise his faith in constitutional progress, nor abhorrence of non-cooperation which he held was uncon-
and
Provincial
Conference held at Tinnevelly on 21 to 23 June 1920. The conference was presided over by S. Srinivasa lyengar,* a lawyer of princely fortune and meicurial temperament, who had resigned as Advocate-General in February as a protest against government repression. Before his appointment as Advocate-General in 1916, Srinivasa Iyengar had been more at home in Moderate than Extremist circles, but the Nationalists were eager to add such a celebrity to their numbers. In his presidential address he was critical of the Reform Act, but stitutional,. }°¢
such ing
a pronouncement
the
passed forms,
Coming
example
of
a resolution but
resolution Srinivasa
Hasan
and
calling
Iyengar
was
the
on
the
a boon
Amritsar
the
former
to
the
Nationalists.
unsatisfactory
then
non-cooperation
the
Advocate-General,
Congress,
Rajagopalachari
for
and
from
Nationalists
to Gandhi's program and wanted with the support of the League Muslims,whom he had invited to
on
the
nature moved
the
stated
Follow-
conference
of the
an
Khilafat
their
re-
additional
issue.
objections
the resolution postponed, but of Youth and the Khilafat the conference, Rajagopalachari
was able to force through the non-cooperation
resolution. !°*
43
Undeterred, the Nationalists refused to be hound by the Tinnevelly resolution and continued their election campaign for the legislatures. When the Madras PCC met on 5 August to consider the Gandhian program, Rajagopalachari's contention that the PCC was already committed to non-cooperation
by the Tinnevelly conference was rejected duce a new motion. The PCC postponed its
meeting Gandhi,
on 15 August, and then then touring TamiJnad,
to a third. Although this gave time to reply to the Nation-
alists' criticism, their opposition did PCC finally approved non-cooperation on
far more
without
cautious
the council
and
aid he had to introdecision to a second
gradual
form
boycott. !!°
not diminish. 24 August, but
than
Gandhi
The in a
proposed
— and
The next round of the struggle was decided outside the regional arena when, at the beginning of September 1920, a Special Congress was called at Calcutta to decide the party's stand on non-couperation. By again using his alliance with the Khilafat Muslims and organizing his supporters to vote only for their partisans, Rajagopalachari secured the election
of
non-cooperetors
Congress to the A special train
as
the
Madras
delegates
to
the
Calcutta
almost complete exclusionof their opponents was reported to have taken 200 Khilafat Mus-
lims from North Arcot, Trichinopoly and Bangalore to the Congress. }!! The session was a success for Gandhi. With
help of Muslims and of Hindu Congressmen prospects in the elections were bleak,'!*
carry
easier
his
program
victory
in the
in
the
Subjects
open
session.
the
from provinces where Gandhi was able to
Committee, With
the
followed
by an
addition
of
the
boycott of foreign goods demanded by the Nationalists and the promise of swaraj within one year, Gandhi's non-cooperation was adopted by the Congress on 9 September defeating the
amendment Ranga
moved
Iyengar
by
and
the program.
B.C.
Pal
of
Satyamurti
to
Of the Madras
Bengal
and
delay
delegation,
the
supported
by
implementation
161
voted
Kasturi of
for Gandhi's
program and 145 voted against; significantly, 125 of the proGandhian delegates were Muslims.? Rajagopalachari's alliance with the Muslims had again brought results.
In
the
six
weeks
following
surprising
changes
transformed
candidates
for
provincial
in
Tamilnad.
Firstly,
the
many
cluding Vijayaraghavachari was
accompanied
by
the
of
the
the
the
and
Special
Nationalists
central
and A.
resignation
Congress
leadership
three
Congress
withdrew
legislatures,
Rangaswami of
of the
nine
as
in-
Iyengar. 1! This
leading
Nation-
alists from the PCC Executive Committee including Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, the president.!!® Finally, on 19 October, the
vacancies the
on the
associates
of
committee
were
filled
Rajagopalachari.
without
Although
opposition
a cautiously
by
44 pro-Gandhian
new
president,
lawyer,
the
T.V.
Venkatarama
committee
was
was
in practice
ion of Rajagopalachari and T.S.S. with Muslims, the League of Youth
occupying the remaining
Aiyar,
Rajan group
places. !1¢
elected
under
the
the
direct-
as vice-presidents, and mofussil Gandhians
At first sight it appeared abjectly surrendered the PCC to
that the Nationalists had the Gandhians, the reverse
PCC
Tamil
of
the situation in Bengal where the Nationalists under C.R. Das adopted the boycott program rather than yield control of the ly
to
Gandhi's
making
Kasturi
a strategic
Ranga
But
Iyengar's
were defiant, claiming that
ion.'!®
men.'!7
the
retreat.
kindu
The
after
Nationalists
first
editorials
the Calcutta
were
in
Congress
deploring the non-cooperation decision Congressmen were still free to run for
This view was seconded by such senior mofussil
alists
as
K.V.
Rangaswami
Iyengar
mere-
of Trichinopoly
and
and elect-
Nation
C.V.
Venkataramana Iyengar of Coimbatore. But the unexpected decision of Vijayaraghavachari to observe the council boycott by withdrawing his candidacy for the central legislature to preserve Congress unity, impressed Kasturi Ranga and per-
suaded him to stop his own open attacks.’*°
The Nationalists
Congress
to
had to choose. As Extremists they experienced after the Surat split the consequences of being herded out of the organization,
and
they
would
prefer
tolerate
Gandhian program for the present rather than return itely to the wilderness.”“! Although eager to enter legislatures, they felt that the majority decision of the
the
indefinthe
in the long term obedience to Congress might be of greater
advantage to the Nationalists: they would not lose their right to speak as Congressmen nor forfeit the opportunity eventually to reconvert the party creed. The Nationalists had been
forms
and
now
to
defy
official
to their own political very critical of the re-
Congress
policy
and
enter
the
legislatures would seem a betrayal as cynical as that they attributed to Besant and the Liberals. Further, faced with the growing popularity of Gandhi and the absence of a Nationalist leader of comparable stature after the death of Tilak, they reluctantly accepted Gandhi's lead for the present and waited for opinion in the Congress to swing back to a con-
stitutional
forced
had
So
not
program.
on the Congress imposed
the way
it
to amend
cott was not, it cooperating with
the
initiative
on
The
non-cooperation
the
Madras
and
at a national
PCC
eventually
his
reverse
seemed, by squabbling Nationalists in other
at the national
level.
by
level.
decision
had
been
Rajagopalachari
own
the
strength.
council
boy-
within the PCC but by provinces to regain
45
With
this
objective
in view
Rajagopalachari's tactics and AICC delegates held in Madras
and Rajagopalachari It
the
was
by
annual
elections
then
too
and
held.
been
argued,
Nationalists
over
For
still
as
formation
an
reverse
at
Nagpur
a month
after
present
had
Das
would
that
hopes
the
council
months
council was
taming
to
back
experiment
the
two
issue
of
agreed
of a non-Brahmin
no
longer
ministry
were
selected. !7?
boycott
after and,
with
and
than
in
Madras
and
Nagpur
it
AICC
had
But
has
Gandhi
civil a
since
the
elections
Gandhi
a compromise
for
for the Only Hasan
settled.
non-cooperation
but
copied
packed the elections on 19 October 1920.
the non-cooperators
to
met
the
C.R.
the Nationalists The
late
Congress
been
bedience
among
the Nationalists
the
that
diso-
year, 123
and
the
prospect of three years before the next provincial elections persuaded the Nationalists in Tamilnad to approve the Das compromise. The
Congress
an anomalous to
take
waiting enough
Gandhian
trial?
over
sessions
situation
the
PCC,
an opportunity
to
thwart
program.
at
Calcutta
in Tamilnad.
but
the
to return, they
Gandhians
and were
Rajagopalachari's
Would
The
Nationalists,
allow
were apie
unbeaten,
still to
powerful
non-cooperation
Pobbrao dé
relia
So
dan
gal
vss
|
fran?
Oarne!
wb
‘
tale?
the
a fair
N abrenal
cueiee
were
implement
ten
.
Cab
attempt
produced
ms
Canale hime 4
non
)
-
thy
conte st
CuapTer 2 THe NoN-COOPERATION EXPERIMENT
Once non-cooperation had program of the Congress,
been adopted as the official the practical difficulties of
im-
plementing it came to the fore. Gandhi wanted mass participation in the nationalist movement, but, paradoxically,
the program
middle
have
and
he drafted
classes;
to
give
up
to abandon
for
depended
upon
professional
careers
their
as
hope
men,
lawyers
the
initiative
not
or
government
of election
of the
peasants,
to
the
would
servants
legislatures.
Only in the later stages of the movement, after the middle classes had made their sacrifices, would the ryot and the trader be invited to defy the Raj. Grievances against foreign rule the middle classes certainly had and felt, but
could they be expected to risk their power and privileges for a movement which might either fail completely or explode
into mass
classes
revolution?
that
the
It was
fate
of non-cooperation
Tamilnad those classes orating with the Raj.
Congress the
saw
too
much
to
of the
rested
be
lost
and
by
middle
in
decollab-
Reorganization
By his
focus
tional
on the attitude
of
triumphs the
objectives
at
Congress
by
Calcutta from
and
Nagpur
achieving
constitutional
Gandhi
limited
means
to
the
shifted
constitu-
attainment
of swaraj through non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Such a drastic change necessitated the remodelling of the
Congress organization. For ficient to have an informal
the Moderates it had been suforganization that was a national
platform rather than an agitational machine. But in striving for a more distant goal, Gandhi required a Congress which could mobilize the masses and which was strong enough at the centre to restrain and direct agitation along non-violent
lines.
This
President
the
Nagpur
became
Congress
a full-time
attempted
chief 46
to
of the
do.
The
national
Congress
party
47 assisted
which
by
was
the
newly
designed
created
to "meet
disciplined
executive
181
members
in
ing
the
to
Congress
the need
direct
a
Working
for
Committee,
a compact
loosely-knit
and
mass
movement
which necessarily had to remain a broad coalition of divergent elements". To balance the CWC 4nd be a check on its power, the All-India Congress Committee was expanded from 1920
the provincial units PCCs based mainly on British
development
to
350
in
1921.
At
the
the
Madras
next
level
down,
of the Congress were reorganized, with the linguistic regions of India replac-
provinces.
In
of the Andhra movement
had
Presidency,
already
led
the
to the
separation of the Telugu districts from the Madras PCC to form an independent committee in 1917.7 But until 1920 some Telugus living and working in Madras city and in the southern
Telugu
districts
continued
PCC. The effect of the the Madras committee to
presidency Tamil
Nadu
and
themselves
to the
Nagpur reorganization was the Tamil-speaking region
in November
Congress
to attach 1921
Committee
it
changed
(TNCC).
its
name
Although
associated with knowledge of English remained circles, the creation of linguistic provinces gress in south India acknowledged the rapidly
to of
the
old
confine the
to the
prestige
in nationalist for the Conincreasing use
of the vernaculars for political discussion. Gandhi had opposed the creation of a separate Andhra PCC in 1916 and his changed attitude must have been a consequence of his realization of the potential of vernacular propaganda as as a concern for such politically "backward" regions of India
as
Gujarat,
Bihar
English-speaking
and
Andhra,
politicians
and
the
contempt
in the presidency
well
for
the
towns.?°
Beneath the PCCs the Congress was to consist of a series of committees from the district level down to the village and urban ward branches. These.would be the primary cells, whose
members
would
members
were
various had
been
levels
pay
an annual‘ subscription
of the
elected
elected
party
by
the
were
town
by members
of
linked
and
the
by
taluk
local
of four
annas.
election:
committees
sabhas.
This
DCC
The
which
gave
a democratic appearance to the working of the Congress. In theory its senior officials at the provincial and national level
party
were
chosen
pyramid.
by
indirect
In theory,
too,
urban ward committees gave the mass following. But it should matched intention. The Nagpur
election from
the
creation
the base
of the
of village
and
Congress a mass base and a not be assumed that reality Congress did not create a mass
party overnight as historians have often been tempted to assume.” What the Nagpur Congress actually did was to prepare a blueprint for the future growth of the party, but it was
many
years,
at
least
in
Tamilnad,
before
the
lower
levels
48 of
ate
the
projected
effect
organization
of Nagpur
was
to
were
established.
strengthen
The
the upper
immedi-
levels
— the
central and provincial committees — while leaving the lower levels weak and fragmentary. By linking national and regional Congress bodies more closely, Gandhi was able to give the central party leadership greater control over agitation and
propaganda gation
pulsion
in the provinces.
from
from
The
the
the
bridge
engine
But
in Tamilnad
was
not
matched
of
the
Congress
room.
reorganization
by
the the
sub-committee constitution.
to keep
the
more
was
eral issues over which the Gandhians and clashed during 1921. Rangaswami Iyengar
better
the had
navi-
powerful
one
of
pro-
the
sev-
Nationalists been a member
of
of the Congress, appointed in 1920 to revise He, like other Madras Nationalists, wanted
Congress
open
to
those
who
disagreed
mass
party
which
with
Gandhi's
ideas and tactics. The Nationalists wished, too, to guarantee for themselves a position in the national leadership by requesting that the Congress give representation in the AICC and PCCs on the basis of "interests" rather than provincial population. In particular, they wanted Madras city to be independent of the PCC, like Bombay, to be a Nationalist bastion safe from Gandhian incursions. The Nationalists were, however, in a minority. At the national level it was Gandhi's
vision
of
a disciplined
11 out
of
14 places
was
accepted,
not
Rangaswami's Whig Parliament. At the regional level Rajagopalachari's revised constitution gave Madras city only 24 places in a PCC of 820 members: Trichinopoly was given 84. Madras city's representation on the AICC was hacked down from
in
1921
to
4 out
of 25
Even this redistribution of places Rajagopalachari. The elections for the
to meet at Trichinopoly at until the beginning of the
in
1922.°
did not satisfy new PCC, scheduled
the end of July, were not announced month and in some districts
Nationalists and Gandhians clashed over how the elections should be conducted and which candidates were eligible.’ When Nationalist leaders sought to requisition old PCC to ask for the meeting of the new
a meeting committee
of to
the be
postponed until gopalachari and
the the
elections could be properly held, RajaPCC President, T.V. Venkatarama Aiyar,
already
and
its
dismissed
their
defunct
request
on
the
members
grounds
were
that
the
therefore
old
PCC
powerless
was
requisition or postpone anything.® The PCC meeting at Trichinopoly was held as arranged, but it was attended by only 218 of its 820 members. Furious at Rajagopalachari's
high-handed
Nationalists
the
whole
action
and
appealed
affair.
As
the
to
Trichinopoly
the
Congress
CWC
for
an
President
"farce",
the
investigation
C.
to
into
Vijayaraghavachari
49 was asked to investigate, but Gandhi advised the CWC to ignore his report, which favoured the Nationalist associates and called for a revision of the PCC constitution, because, Gandhi said, there was no time for "academic discussions or
legal
subtleties.
We must
think
less
of office
and
service."® Although they protested against this attitude, the Nationalists reluctantly swallowed
more
partisan their de-
of
feat. The Congress was the only home they had and they did not want to become political exiles like the Moderates before them.
In September
1921
their position by to Trichinopoly. that
for
Gandhians
shifting the The official
Trichinopoly
accessible
the
was
the
more
strengthened
PCC headquarters from Madras explanation for this move was
central
mofussil
further
than
Madras
Congressmen
who
and
now
more
formed
the
great majority of PCC members. But it was also a deliberate move to take the offices and meetings of the committee away
from
the
the
influence
direction
politicians Committee
of
of the
T.S.S.
Nationalists
Rajan
and
in Trichinopoly.!°
elected
other
and
The Tamil
in November
1921
to keep
Gandhian
them under
and
Khilafat
Nadu Congress
reflected
the
shift
in
control from Madras to the mofussil, the Nationalists to the Gandhians. The Nationalists were not given representation on the TNCC and only Rangaswami Iyengar found a place among
the
AICC
members.
The
TNCC
members
from
Madras
were
relative
newcomers — M. Singaravelu Chetti, a lawyer from a fishing caste who had gained prominence by his organizing of hartals and demonstrations in the city since 1919, and the League of
Youth
group.
Gandhian
Trichinopoly
Hindus
figures
were
and
selected
Khilafat
as
was
strongly
Muslims.
president
and
represented
Although
by
both
little-known
vice-president,
the
TNCC was managed by Rajagopalachari and two secretaries, Rajan from Trichinopoly and E.V. Ramaswami Naicker* of Erode. In all there were five Muslims in the TNCC, a far higher
number than in previous years and gopalachari's alliance with Yakub
Khilafat
and
AICC
wing.
places,
by comparison
Brahmins but
within
their
held
as many
proportion
with previous
The committee leadership for the
ivists
the
still
a consequence Hasan and the
districts
as half
of non-Brahmins
PCCs."
was intended region. Its
of Rajamoderate
the TNCC was
to provide agitational members were political
and
were
committed
to
the
sections
of
the
high
act-
Gandhian faction. They were chosen to direct and coordinate non-cooperation and civil disobedience. But, as yet, the groundwork had not been done. As will be seen shortly,
Gandhi's
Tamil
program
population,
failed
partly
to
attract
because
it
many
did
not
make
a
50 sufficiently
attractive appeal
ambitions.
divided
But
it
was
internally
The
Gandhians
Nationalists
had
also
to
carry
were
resigned
to
the
their
case
the
that
interests
the
agitation
desperately
their
short
places
and
TNCC
was
to
the
of
fund:.
on the
too
people.
PCC
The
executive
in October 1920 and were then squeezed out of the leadership of the regional party, but they would. not relinquish their hold on money belonging to the old committee and amounting to
some Rs. first
25,000.12
attempts
In this way they thwarted
to
disseminate
propaganda
to the legislatures — the verdict of not altered Nationalist hostility to Nagpur Corgress in December 1920 the
established
on
a national
to
of the
Madras
fund:
several
alists
were
sizable
drone the was
at
collect
money
basis.
committee first
of
for
the
on
sat
donations.
non-cooperation
By
of dissatisfaction
fund became a buzz being collected to
on
the
with
the
end
was
in
their
committee
of
elections
movement
appointed
6 March
demonstrative
them
the
the Calcutta Congress had the boycott. 13 At the Tilak Swarajya Fund was
Rajagopalachari
formed
the Gandhians'
against
June,
1921.
The
support
and
Nation-
for
the
promised
however,
Rajagopalachari's
treasurer
a dull
management
of
of persistent criticism: not enough meet the target of six and a half lakhs
of rupees (Rs. 650,000); the accounts were not being properly audited; the Gandhians were alarming the public by the secrecy
with
funds.
which
they
But
Nationalists,
surrounded
the real if
they
basis
the
could
collection
for this not
and
allocation
criticism
control
the
was
that
Tilak
of
the
Swarajya
Fund themselves, were eager to depict the Gandhians as dishonest and incompetent and to extol their own honesty and
integrity. © As
allowed
a
result
greater
collections Kasturi
Ranga
the
the
all-India
loans
the
Nationalists'
responsibility
in Tamilnad.
But
only Rs.
of
public
Iyengar
would
and
for
Direction later
to
contribute
the
criticism
S.
little:
179,000 had been received.'®
from
the
alists
did
not
use
these
fund, CWC
allotted
for
khadi
management
of the
fund
Srinivasa
by
national
were
of the
passed
Iyengar.
November
Moreover,
to Tamilnad and
they
to
1921
the share of
aswell
as
education,
special were
channelled through Rajagopalachari. As Gandhi's man he was trusted by the national leadership to distribute party funds as he thought fit. Much of it was spent in ways the Nationand lawyers who workers, or for of
attract
new
establish
approve
—
salaries
for
national
school
had left their profession to become propaganda against the legislature.
funds
recruits
a personal
Rajagopalachari
for
his
own
patronage
was
band
network
gradually
of
the
political By the
able
supporters
within
teachers
to
and
Tamil
Sl
Congress.” The Gandhians
Tamilnad.
Of
had
the
three — Mail,
limited
four
principal
Justice
and
access
Besant's
to the press
English
dailies
New India
in
in
1920-21,
— were
persist-
ent, often vociferous, opponents of non-cooperation. The fourth, the Findu, was the organ of the Nationalists, and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, having built the sales of his paper up to over 10,500 copies by 1920, would not risk government
displeasure and the daring an editorial Nagpur
Congress
possible policy.
the
Eindu
confiscation of his press by too Gandhi had hoped that after the
would
swing
for it was an extremely influential educated in the presidency, but its than
lukewarm.’®
Swadesamitran,
openly
critical
Of
the
with
Tamil
papers,
a circulation
of non-cooperation.
over
vernacular by
the
Gandhians'
paper
was
non-Brahmin
Mudaliar, ablest
the
of
of
7,000
attracted
writers
of
the
day.
to
lyengar's
1920,
the
Vi.
its
When
was
more
Tamil
Nadu
from June 1920, was Varadarajulu was as cautious and method-
Launched
Tiru.
in
the westernnever more
A new paper,
view
Desabhaktan.
Congressman
Desabhaktan
Tamil
point
non-cooperation,
Rangaswami
edited by P. Varadarajulu Naidu of Salem often enthusiastically pro-Gandhian, but erratic and irrational as Rangaswami was ical. From
to
paper among support was
most
promising
in December
Kalyanasundara
staff
some
V.V.S.
of
Aiyar,
a)
1917
the the
\
one-
time terrorist, took over as editor in July 1920 the paper adopted an aggressive nationalist line until September 1921 when the government prosecuted several of the editorial staff of Desabhaktan
Nadu.'®
In
and
an
Varadarajulu
attempt
to
break
Naidu
through
as
editor
the
of
Tanil
Nationalists’
domination of the press, in November 1921 Rajagopalachari contributed Rs. 10,000 of Congress money to help finance a new English paper, Swarajya, as a rival to the Hindu. Edited by
T.
Prakasam,*
activists
paper mand
was
the
Swarajya
a Telugu
including
at
first
expertise
limped
members
Congress
of
successful;
and
on till
financial
1935.
the
and,
leader,
League
assisted
though
of Youth
resources
it
could
of
the
Rajagopalachari's
Tamil rival to Swadesamitran were abandoned.”° The
organization
the non-cooperation not
interfere.
end
of
The
of volunteer
movement
Calcutta
with
corps
which
Congress
was
of
the
one
Ly
party
group,
not
Hindu,
plans
com
for
aspect
a
of
Nationalists
September
the
did
1920
called for the creation of volunteer corps in the provinces, but in Tamilnad they were not developed until towards the ad hoe
1921.
basis
Students
and
to distribute
youths
notices
were
often
recruited
of meetings,
on
to carry
an
;
52 flags
in
were
also
hartals
processions,
and
to
keep
contribute
to
Congress
extensively
and
to
used
order
to persuade
at
meetings.
They
shopkeepers
funds.
to observe
Singaravelu
Chetti in Madras city made effective use of students for this form of party work. The idea of permanent bodies of volunteers, | trained and run on semi-military lines, progressed more rapid\ly in Andhra than in Tamilnad. \Guntur formed a corps known as
N
&
~\r
which
\
combined
Hindu
Duggirala Rama Dandu
fanaticism
with
Gopalakrishnayya ("Rama's Army")
of
discipline. 21
military
In late 1923 both the Tamil and Telugu regions produced volunteer organizations designed partly to assist in the anti-liquor agitation which was then gaining momentum, but more especially to serve as the non-violent strike force of he civil disobedience movement. The Telugu Santi Sena "Peace Army") had a nominal strength of 3,366 in February 1922; the smaller Tamil Tondar Pandai ("Army of Devotees") 1,899: the government believed that both were actually much larger. The TNCC claimed that there were as many as a thousand volunteers enlisted in Tamilnad in January 1922, including 300 in Madras city, 70 in Madura and 30 in Trichin-
opoly.?? Tole
But
or
When
used
civil
arrested
melted those
were
spread
disobedience
and,
left
away.
in
never
Congress
Compared
were
used
in
a prominent
activity
was launchedthe
without
Tamilnad
The 1919
May
they
to
guidance,
to
the
into
the
leaders
countryside.
were
volunteer
volunteers
singularly
agitational
the
of
quickly
corps
Bombay
and
ineffectual .”"
Bengal,
Khilafat leaders raised their own volunteers. In at the annual conference of the Majlis-al-Ulema at
Tanjore a body known as the "Servants of Islam", comprising from 300 to 500 Muslim youths, was formed to keep order, but
it was
not
retained
as
a permanent
organization.
1920 a new corps was formed in Madras the volunteers were drilled, and they
khaki
uniforms
andcrescent
badges.**
were set up in Muslim centres like volunteers were former students of Although
it
reorganization
of
has
been
1920-21
Congress
into
a
"parallel
evidence
from
Tamilnad
“highly centralized
with it,
the
such
saying
basis
without
an
"As
long
of violence,
counter
intended
we
as
one
by
with
that
Indeed,
there
cannot
violence."#®
Khilafat
It
corps
historian
Gandhi the
government",”’
suggest
interpretation.
that
by
government"
responsible to
Other
for Khilafat Day: military-style
Vaniyambadi, where the the Islamia College. ?°
suggested
was
city wore
In March
is
have
would
to
CWC
that
make
as
there
Congressmen
a parallel seem
that
the
is no
agreed
Rajagopalachari
a Government
a
the
opposed
running
on
Government
Rajagopala-
chari and his associates saw the Congress as a rival with the British Raj for the loyalty of the public, not as an
53 alternative government apparatus. In addition to the moral and practical objection which Rajagopalachari foresaw — that without resort to arms there could not be a "parallel government" in any administrative sense — there was a further reason why Gandhians did not think in these not, at this stage, worry about the form of
would
be
occupied
optimistic
established
when
belief
the
with
the
Raj
collapsed.
strength
of popular
immediate
in
the
terms. They did government which
struggle
and
they
They had
were
an
pre-
over-
nationalism
the vulnerability of the government. Much was, left to chance, to nationalist sentiment and to
therefore, oratory
and
rather than careful planning and laborious grassroots organization. Measuring themselves against their Moderate, Home Rule and Nationalist predecessors, the Gandhians reckoned themselves pioneers of mass agitation. But, wary of mass
participation
which
The Good Ship
"Reforms"
jealous of their time Control of was of more creation of
they might
not
Gandhi
had
anticipated
that
the
cooperation by the Congress would violent confrontation between the In
be able
to control,
and
rival middle-class factions, the Gandhians devoted and energy to a struggle for political survival. the existing organization and assets of the party immediate interest and importance than the a mass party or a parallel government.
Tamilnad
this
was
not
to
be
the
adoption
of non-
provoke a direct, Indian people and case,
and
only
nonthe Raj.
briefly
—
late in 1921 —did a confrontation occur. Hampered by the intermittent sniping of the Nationalists from within the Congress, the Gandhians were also frustrated by public indifference and hostility to the movement. A primary cause of this negative response was the greater attraction of the Madras legislature and the accession to ministerial power of the
non-Brahmin
the
The
The
first
failure
and
Calcutta
before
Gandhi's
Justice
the
of
crucial
Special
council
supporters
Party.
the
boycott
setback
Congress
elections
of
the
Madras
legislature
held
barely
three
for non-cooperation
was
on
inadequate
30
time
November
1920,
to dissuade
in Tamilnad. months
leaving
electors
from going to the polls. Boycott propaganda was patchy: Rajagopalachari and Rajan toured Trichinopoly, Coimbatore and Salem districts in September and October; Khilafat and Congress
town.
funds
activists
But
the
to stage
were
Gandhians
a more
at
work
had
in
Madras
neither
extensive
the
no-vote
and
Trichinopoly
personnel
campaign.
was
nor
the
54 An easier tactic, demanding organization, than asking voters
candidates
to
success.
withdraw,
About
and
fewer party not to poll
initially
24 Nationalists
this
withdrew
workers and less was appealing to
met
with
some
their candidature
for the Madras Legislative Council, but the government was cynical about their motives for doing so, claiming that "the majority of these had little chance of success and some undoubtedly were glad of an opportunity of avoiding the
trouble
and
larger
expense
than
any
of
of canvassing
which
they
The
speed
with
which
new
as
to who
might
be
elected
better chances enlargement of
with no obvious seats there was mu] ti-member
number
Tamil
had
candidates
electorate
hitherto
had
appeared
so much
experience. 129
— many
with
no
than those withdrawing — suggests that the the electorate had created such. uncertainty
that
most
contests
were
open
races
favourites. Except in the Muslim reserved no dearth of candidates and in some large,
constituencies
of contestants
Party paign. P. after T.M.
an
like
ran.
Tanjore
an
absurdly
large
labels had little currency in the election camTyagaraya Chetti, leader of the Justice Party Nair's death in July 1919, visited some of the
districts
to
give
his
party's
support
to
a few
candid-
ates who were already running; and the Telugu K.V. Reddi Naidu conducted a last minute electioneering tour. But the Justicites did not have an election organization to nominate
and of
on
canvass
the
the
most
for
its
promising
election
own candidates.°” of
that
..-electoral
dominantly
the
Telugu
fights
in
personal
and
C.
Ramalinga
non-Brahmins,
India
are still
communal.
politics of press and platform the voting, The landlord, the
The
Reddi,
commented
one
pre-
general
hardly affect merchant and
lawyer have their clientele; and every man has his tribe, clan or creed behind him, who follow
him
with
sheepish
ism political
It was
who
had
not,
switched
therefore,
originally
to neutral
fidelity.
conviction
surprising
intended
colours
to
sail
In this
courts
that
rather
for
several
under
the
than obey
medieval-
little.”
politicians
Congress
flag
the Congress
boycott. S. Srinivasa Iyengar and P. Subbarayan,* Zamindar of Kumaramangalam, were among the Nationalists who ran, while other candidates received encouragement from Nationalist friends or patrons.** The Liberals played a surprisingly small part in the elections for the provincial legislature. Sivaswami
Aiyar
Legislative
and
Assembly
Srinivasa
Sastri
and the Council
were
elected
of State
to
the
respectively;
SS only Govindaraghava Aiyar of the Liberal constituency for the Madras council.
leaders
chose
a
:
Personal influence, communal loyalties, promises of ~~ reward if elected: these counted far more in the 1920
elections than
not
two
or
hotch-potch.
party
three
affiliations.
clearly
It
is,
defined
therefore,
The electors returned,
parties,
but_a
misinterpretation
political of
the
situation to claim, as Dr Irschick: does, that "the Justice Party, which had little or no opposition, carried the day. Out of 98 elected seats [for the whole presidency], Justice
members won 63".°? According only
15
MLCs
could
won
five
of
had
been
reserved
be
elected on the Justice the 26 lature
the
to one contemporary
clearly
identified
ticket.°**
seven
for
observer,
having
been
In Tamilnad non-Brahmins
non-Muhammadan
rural seats (for the see Table 1). Since
as
urban
seats,
composition of only two urban
non-Brahmins
the and
and
19 of
Madras legis11 rural seats
under
Lord
Meston's
time
gave
members
arbi-
tration award in March 1920, fears of Brahmin monopoly of the council proved unjustified. The Congress boycott may have reduced the number of Brahmin contestants,’ and several Brahmin Nationalists withdrew or encouraged non-Brahmins to stand instead. But the expansion of the electorate and the creation
of multi-member
seats
for
the
first
of
the
rural dominant castes as well as. businessmen and lawyers from non-Brahmin communities a real opportunity to break Brahmin
dominance
in
The
the
legislature.
Congress
boycott
may
also
have
contributed
to
low poll in several non-Muhammadan constituencies. average poll for the whole presidency was 24.9 per
in Madura,
between
low
as
15
Trichinopoly and
13 per
16.5
cent.**
per
and
cent;
But
Salem
the
and
districts in
North
explanation
The cent,
it dropped
Arcot
might
it
was
lie
the
to
but
as
more
the disinterest of the newly enfranchised than in a positive response to the boycott propaganda of the Congress. Clearer evidence of the impact of the boycott is to be found in the seven Muslim constituencies in Tamilnad. Only three seats
in
were contested and 13.7 per cent of electors voted. In the urban constituency of Madura-Trichinopoly-cum-Srirangam 101 out of 1,197 (8.4 per cent) of the Muslims cast their votes.©
The
Government
coercion
Muslim
urban
of Madras
and intimidation
voters,
areas
being
than
attributed
fewer
Hindu
by Khilafat in
voters,
number
were
the
low Muslim
poll
to
workers.°” Certainly,
and
more
more
concentrated
accessible
to
anti-
in
boycott propaganda, and the fate of the Khalif had aroused feelings more intense and more lasting among Muslims than had the Punjab grievance among the Hindus. But the low Muslim
56 poll was little consolation to in the Madras legislature were
All
the Congress. filled.
TABLE
seats
1
Composition of the Madras Legislative under the Government of India Act, Elected:
the
Non-Muhammadan
Urban
9
Non-Muhammadan
Rural
56
(3 reserved for non-Brahmins) (25 reserved for
non-Brahmins)
EON
Muhammadan Urban Muhammadan Rural Indian Christians Anglo-Indians
Council 1919
Landholders
Commerce
Planters
and
HRA
Europeans
Industry
University
Nominated:
Executive Officials Others
Total
elected
Total
nominated
98
Councillors
29
Total all membere In August 1926 the MLCs was raised to membership
the
Discouraging
Tamil
disaster
ministry
though
Gandhians,
when
the
of
it
the
the
was
Governor,
exclusively
from
number 34 and
of nominated the total
legislature
failure
soon
of
to
the
overshadowed
Lord Willingdon,*
the
127
non-Brahmin
132.
boycott
MLCs.
by
was
a worse
appointed As
soon
to
a
as
the election results were known (on December 8), Willingdon invited the Justice leader, Tyagaraya Chetti, to forma ministry. He declined, but on his advice the Governor appointed three non-Brahmins: ** A. Subbarayulu Reddi from
57 South
Arcot
as
Minister
for
Education;
P.
Ramarayaningar
(who became the Raja of Panagal* in 1922) as Minister for Local Self-Government; and K.V. Reddi Naidu of Godavari as
Minister Reddi in over as ernment
for Development. April 1920 due to
Chief Minister portfolio.
In
choosing
by
anti-Brahmin
Willingdon
ated
was
community Madras in
all
without
his
not,
With the resignation of Subbarayulu ill-health, Ramarayaningar took
as
relinquishing
ministers
one
Brahmin
prejudice
or
Brahmins
in
the
past.
'"My
"is I'm sure to try and break
months
as
politicians
Governor,
as
Willingdon
"certainly
ever come across..." legislature gave them
Brahmins.*!
Brahmin
them C.P.
important
Ramaswami
by
Willingdon
MLCs
to
one
motiv-
play
off
success
officials in the presidency. on the non-Brahmins against
job",
he
confided
all this down".“° despised
the
the dirtiest,
to
Montagu,
In his first
non-Brahmin
meanest
devils
posts
as
was
under
new
the
appointing
constitution
Advocate-General
prompted
the
in the the
of the ability of several
to
of a different
of
I've
convinced
administrators,
and
two
of
Law
Member
—
later
Council, and Sir P. Rajagopalachari Legislative Council.‘?
considerations a
and
Aiyar
in the Executive President of the
make
a wish
gov-
non-Brahmin
alleges, ®
He thought that reserved seats a "most unfair advantage" over
And he was
politicians
to
by
the
local
against another. Willingdon, as a newcomer to 1919, had been alarmed at the extent of anti-
Brahmin sentiment among British He blamed them for having egged the
from
writer
his
select
kind:
Montagu-Chelmsford
non-Brahmin
he
was
reforms
as
ministers
determined in
Madras.
to
When Montagu toured India in 1917, Willingdon, then Governor of Bombay, was almost alone among the heads of provinces to applaud the Secretary of State's proposals. By contrast, Pentland in Madras was rigidly opposed to reform and was alienating all shades of Indian opinion in the presidency
with his
intransigence."
Willingdon,
whom
he
had
Montagu was eager to switch
known
since
undergraduate
days
Cambridge, to the Madras governorship to introduce enlightened and progressive regime. But Willingdon reservations
about
the
practicality
of
the
reforms.
at
a more had The
dyarchy constitution split government business in the province into two unequal parts. Indian ministers chosen from the legislature were given charge of the "nation-building"
departments
—
and development clusive revenue
not
work
control
and
local
— but of
finance.
effectively
government,
the
the
"reserved"
Willingdon
unless
education,
Executive the
Council
health,
departments
argued
Governor
that
retained
were
— law,
dyarchy
industries
ex-
police, would
"a veritable
S8 archangel
Cabinet to the common
Gabriel",
responsibility
in
in the Cabinet.“*
strator,
wanted
attuned
greater
transferred
prospect
able
to
persuade
the
two
halves
of
his
cooperate fully, to share available funds from purse fairly between them, and to shoulder joint the
legislature
decisions
agreed
Seeing himself as an imaginative
to
India's
financial
and
to the ministers.
of
for
introducing
the
political
admini-
aspirations,
executive
Willingdon
responsibility
to
But he was reconciled
new
constitution
in
upon
be
to the
Madras
by
the
hope that, after a trial period, the British government would see the desirability of a further devolution of power
to the provincial ministries. His overriding objective as Governor was to ensure that in Madras dyarchy, despite its limitations,
would
be
a
success.
Willingdon appreciated that dyarchy represented an tirely new political puzzle. The new legislature could
be
controlled
handful
of
by
a Governor
zamindars
and
and
lawyers,
officials, as
ennot
manipulating
previous
a
councils
had
been. Its working necessitated loyal ministers backed by an organized body of supporters; they would have to muster majorities and assist the "reserved" half in carrying legis-
lation through the council. House of Commons, Willingdon parliamentary
largely smooth
hostile
experience
obedient
of
criticism
more
dividuals,
opinion,
a
dyarchy
reforms
cohesive
team
deficient
but
they
men.
in
Many
as the prerequisite By
the Nationalists
were of
in the own
ministerial
constitution.
for the ministerial eliminated them.">
reasonable, not
see
leaders,
the
of the
themselves unfit Congress boycott
and
to
to its
operation
As a former ‘chief whip was predisposed by his
them
courage
and
for
Madras
for the
their
had
role, even before The Liberals were
pompous,
were,
posturing in
resolution.
party,
shown
the loyal
in-
Willingdon's
Srinivasa
Sastri he described as "weak as water", and of the Liberals ig general he remarked: "they've no guts and won't fight
the extremist".© As
the
elections
the
legislature
approached,
constitutional necessity induced Willingdon to revise his view of the non-Brahmins.*? He decided that they were most likely to win the election and that from them could be drawn
the ministerial team he was seeking. to select non-Brahmins as ministers,
Montagu
on
J4
December
People
here
to
prove
are not and never will as voting is concerned
be in
a solid body the Council.
are
are
1920:
trying
Justifying his decision Willingdon wrote to
varieties
of
non-Brahmins,
that
and
there
that
they
as far That
$9 point to
the
take
Brahmin that
future
facts
as
vote
they
is
should
must
show
they
in
the
have
portfolios. “®
and
are,
great
the
~
I am bound
that
the
non-
majority
and
ministerial
The Justice leaders had been striving for four years to secure for their party a strong position in the new legislature.
tional Party
But
into
communal to
in
form
secretaries
non-Brahmins
the
to
united
to
act
act
Government. and
the
and
to
through
minister
reserved
as
merits
decision
had
team
that
1921
ministerial
a single
reason
of
of
been
they
had
taken not
whips,
in
and
constitu-
the
case
been
debates
for
non-Brahmin
at
three
he
Justice
to appoint
the
he appointed than
its
victory.”
encouraged
party
the
brought
urged
Willingdon's
the
council the
and
divis-
urging
to coalesce into a single party was the command of the Minister for Local Self-
Through
choose
his
which
the
Willingdon
compelling
the non-Brahmins patronage at the
not
In March
as
assessment
dyarchy
or an electoral
ministers,
A more
boards
1920,
the momentous
of election.
ions.*°
Willingdon's
created by
office
After
time
was
representation
non-Brahmin
MLCs
it
situation
his powers which
rights
of
possessed
of financial authority
for the district
Madras spent a large other provinces were
to make nominations
them
should
and
collectors.
have
and executive patronage
The
to
elected
for
local
heads,
supervision,
previously
Government
of
share of its income on the local boards — more parsimonious*!— and the flow of
funds, converted into contracts for public works, jobs in local government agencies, and licences and grants for various private enterprises, offered rich rewards to those
who could control it. Local politicians could not ignore the influence which a minister in Madras now exercised over their affairs; and Panagal astutely exploited his position to reward his supporters and penalize his adversaries. The
ministry
quests
and
the
council
for patronage
became
emanating
the
focus
from. the
for
lowest
rivalries
levels
of
and
the presidency. Comparing the development in local government in Madras to the spoils system in the United States of America, the Hindu commented that "...with a view to strengthen its hold on the country the present Ministry has made a
deliberate Board
and
attempt
to build
Municipality
looking at each question
by
up a party
nominating
for
its
itself
adherence
from the standpoint
in each [sic]
and
of party..."
Concurrently, non-Brahmin politicians, tried to use the legislature to satisfy the frustrated ambitions of the emer-~
ging non-Brahmin
middle
class
— that
is,
to use
state power
60 to oust
Brahmins
and
open
up
the
professions
patronage for non-Brahmin exploitation. in the legislature they sought promises
and
government
Through from the
resolutions Executive
Council that non-Brahmins would be given preference Brahmins in government appointments and promotions.
over The
First Communal G.O. (Government Order) of 16 September 1921 required the heads of all government departments to classify new recruits in terms of the following communal labels: Brahmin, non-Brahmin, Hindu, Indian Christian, Muslim, European, Anglo-Indian. A Second Communal G.0O. followed in
August
1922,
every
stipulating
department
should
that
be
the
communal
published
and
composition
that
of
communal
rotation should apply to promotions as well as to recruitment. In February 1924 the Madras government set up a Staff Selection Board to supervise appointments on the communal lines laid down in the two G.0.s.5? These innovations satisfied the
anti-Brahminism of some ICS officials, but indignant that efficiency and merit should
many more were be sacrificed for
communal considerations. The harder the Justice Party pressed the "reserved" half of the government in its pursuit of patronage, the more unsympathetic European officials became. In
return
for
offices
and
patronage
Willingdon
exacted
his men
levy. He expected the and clients to support
ministers to persuade their partygovernment measures and actively
was
"one
practice
to oppose between
the Congress.
happy
the
non-Brahmin
the
family",
executive
ministers
MLCs
and
might
Although
in
councillors vote
as
Tyagaraya
he claimed there
and
the
a bloc
Chetti
on
were
fairly
added,
successfully
to the "loyal
characteristic on
the
completed
her
and devoted
to
"use
In
February
1922
Justice
ministers
voyage",
cillors
to
Governor
and MLCs
to
went
but
to per-
submit
so
due,
he
preferred
to
of the crew'.°>
influence
by the Government
the
issues
unable
unpopular measures. 5 with the support the the legislature in
maiden
among the people" and his non-official combat non-cooperation, rather than set
the type sponsored
tension
The
session he remarked: "I good ship 'Reforms' has
work
their
growing
communal
of Willingdon's regime that
non-Brahmins
his Cabinet
ministers.
often
suade them to accept responsibility for But in general Willingdon was satisfied Executive Council received. Proroguing
March 1922 at the end of its first feel that we may all feel that the
was
that
he
and
It was
authority
rely
Publicity Bureau to up loyalty leagues of
of the United far
as
the names
to
ask
Provinces.°” the
of Congressmen
whom they thought should be prosecuted if mass civil disobedjence were launched.** More significantly, in late 1921 and early 1922 the ministerial party helped the executive coun-
rush
through
legislation
for
the
quick
prosecution
61 and tax
punishment of campaigns. °°
Party the
non-cooperators
and
the
instigators
of
no-
The importance of this collaboration between the Justice and the Raj extended beyond repressive legislation. As
government
observed
later:
One of the most important factors which set a limit to the spread of the [non-cooperation]
movement was the realizationby a large part of the Presidency especially by the non-Brahman majority of the value of the reforms and of
their
substantial
nature
when
shadowy benefits of Mr. Gandhi's
compared
with
the
brand of swaraj.®
Middle-class non-Brahmins saw the legislature as a means by which to further their own ambitions and to improve the eco-
nomic
and
social
position
grant
educational
and nominated MLCs ranking Nadars and
of their
castemen.
from such castes as the Kallars, the government
concessions,
make
Through
elected
traditionally lowwas implored to
nominations
to
local
boards, end punitive police taxation, and give special privileges for recruitment to government employment.°? For a
diverse range of castes the expansion of the electorate and the unexplored opportunities created by the dyarchy constitution made the legislature the focus of personal and communal
ambitions. illusioned there
In time individuals and communities with their share of the cornucopia.
was
cooperation It
was
powerful
a
such
a mood
of
expectation
that
was a poor counter-attraction. no
accident
that
gravitational
pull.
the
Gandhi's
legislature
Montagu
became disBut in 1920-22
had
non-
exercised
always
that his constitutional reforms should separate from the extremists: firstly, by providing the
so
intended
the moderates moderates
with an attractive consitutional role that would encourage them to cooperate with the British and oppose the extremists; second]v, by a judicious use of coercion, which combined with the success of the dyarchy constitutional experiment, would force the extremists to change to constitutional action. "You can stay out of the Council", he explained to Willingdon in February 1921, "but when you see the power that the Councils
in
it.(?]
have,
And
answer
be easy;
ion:
it had
Rallying But
and
the
Montagu, a
more
practitioner
will
if
you
the
'Go
moderates
earlier with
liberal
than
not
very
Councils
into
was
not
a policy
the
experience
outlook
his
regret
than
that
criticised,
the Councils
inspired
more
much
are
and put
of
predecessors.
India was
are
not
not
our
them right’.[?]"®
of Montagu's
Morley-Minto
Minto,
you
will
Through
reforms.
than
an
invent-
Morley
abler
Montagu
62 it became one of the basic guidelines India in the 1920s and 1930s.
of
British
policy
The moral of the council boycott was not lost hapless Nationalists in Madras. In some provinces
in
on the (such as
Bengal)®*
the councils,
deprived of a solid Congress phalanx,
factional
allegiances.
The
began
shakily
a party tional
alists
to
ing not
ministries
sustain
wisdom
that
disaster. organized
with
of
the
them
in
built
failure
office
Willingdon's
Congress
on
of
shifting
ministers
demonstrated
tactics
boycott
the
had
and
not
sands
unaided
the
an
by
constitu-
reassured
been
of
Nation-
irreparable
But in Madras Congressmen were confronted with an rival firmly ensconced in ministerial office, grow-
fat and waxing powerful on Gandhi's mirage of swaraj,
the regional Congress had Rangaswami Iyengar warned
to in
a diet of patronage. This, was the situation with which
grapple. December
As Satyamurti 1920:
and
Until full Swaraj is actually obtained, we are bound to watch carefully the work of the
Councils.
While
it
opposite
direction,
is true
that
these
councils are almost powerless for doing any great good to our country their scope in the
almost unlimited.
viz.
for
Their words reverberate through the like a pebble resounding down a deep
Towards
mischief,
politics well.
is
of the
1920s
Confrontation
The failure of the boycott of the Madras legislature left Gandhi's supporters in Tamilnad aimless and dispirited. Other aspects of the non-cooperation program had been neglected before the elections and little was achieved by re-
turning
to
them
in
late
1920.
Between December 1920 and February 1921 sporadic attempts were made to persuade Hindu students to leave government schools and colleges in Madras and Trichinopoly, but neither
students
nor
their
ided
them.®°
parents
who were prepared to obey al colleges" and suitable
for
In North
responded
with
enthusiasm.
the boycott complained that national work was not being
Arcot
a battle
ranged
for
Students
"nationprov-
control
of the government-assisted Islamia College in Vaniyambadi. The cause of the struggle, which resulted in a 75 per cent drop in student attendance, was a tussle between Yakub Hasan and the College trustees for control of its funds. The non-
cooperation
its cause.®*
issue
was
By August
tacked
1921
onto
this
the TNCC
dispute
and
had allotted
was
not
money
for
63 seven national schools, but attendance end of the year the number of students
Few Hindus
Khilafatists were so. In September
noted
threats
several
surrendered
their
was was
titles
small, and by the less than 150.°7
or honorary
posts;
more effective in persuading Muslims to do and October 1920 the Government of Madras
cases
of
of violence
and
Muslim
title-holders
social
honours. The government characteristically, used courage title-holders to
ostracism
being
forced
to resign
by
their
did not intervene directly, but, Muslim government servants to enresist intimidation. By March 1921
only 51 honorary officers and six title-holders had resigned in the whole presidency.® The government was more alarmed at the possibility of disaffection among its own employees, especially Muslims in the police and bureaucracy. In March 1920
it
forbad
ings or in ment. The Khilafat
government
any ban
extremists
effective
in
servants
to
attend
Khilafat
meet-
other way associate themselves with the brought protests from Abdul Sharar and in
Madras
discouraging
city,
open
but
it
seems
identification
ment by government servants.” issued a more sweeping order:
On all
to
have
with
2 May 1921 government
move-
the
been
move-
the government servants were
expected to repudiate non-cooperation and associate themselves with its suppression. In this respect the Government of Madras demanded more from its employees than the Govern-
ment
of
onable.7!
India
and
Although
views
and
other
provincial
Willingdon
prided
preferred
the
firmly
to
crush
movement.
the
himself
Justice
combating non-cooperation in sistent in his view that the
governments
Party
to
Madras, he Government Before
thought
on his
reas-
progressive
take
the
lead
in
was shrill and perof India must act
August
1921
he
did
not
regard the situation in his own province as particularly menacing, but he thought that the central government was being disastrously weak in its dealings with Gandhi, the Ali brothers
to
cordon
and
off
cooperation
would
not
Congress
other
the
from
agree
and
leaders.
Madras
infecting
to
his
As
Presidency
it,
requests
Khilafat
a minimum,
but
for
agitators.”
to
the
Willingdon
prevent
Government
permission
Optimistic
the
to
wanted
non-
of India extern
in his
ex-
pectations for political development in Madras, Willingdon's pessimistic view of the all-India prospect was motivated by his own dislike of Gandhi (whom he had first encountered during the Kaira satyagraha while Governor of Bombay) and
his preoccupation with also influenced by the
were was
products
remembered
of the in
the success of dyarchy. But he was views of senior civil servants who
pre-reforms
Bombay
as
Pentland
having
been
era.
a pawn
Willingdon
in
the
by
hands
64 of
the
matters law and
civil
Davidson,
servants
there, 7?
and
though
in
constitutional
he could set an independent course in Madras, when order were at stake he leaned heavily on Sir Lionel Home
Member
of
the
Executive
Council
officer sympathetic to the non-Brahmin on his principal Indian advisers — Sir
and
an
ICS
movement, rather than P. Rajagopalachari and
Sir Muhammad Habibullah — who favoured approach to non-cooperation.™
a more
conciliatory
Until September 1921 the Madras government was held in check by the Secretary of State and the Government of India. They had two reasons for holding to a policy of restraint.
First,
year them
the
There
Gandhi's
non-cooperation
were so wildly seriously. It
government must
not
impractical that would not become
provoked be
a
and promise
Indian
second
opinion
of swaraj
in one
few people would take a mass movement unless
by
rash
Jallianwala Bagh. 75
repression. Second,
the
policy of rallying the moderates and undermining the extremists through the constitutional reforms must be given a fair trial. The Government of India explained to the provincial administrations in January 1921 that it hoped ...to
meet
the
legitimate
demands
of
entirely
nullify
the
the
new Indian legislature [in New Delhi] in a manner that should do much to ease the situation. The adoption of wholesale repression would be incompatible with this policy
and
would
heal-
ing effect which the introduction of the reforms might otherwise be expected to
exercise.”
On succeeding Chelmsford as Viceroy in April 1921, Reading reviewed the Government of India's policy,
cided that Willingdon policy,
it.
but
Lord but de-
non-intervention should continue for the present. and his ICS advisers deplored the wait-and-see for
the
present
In the middle months expected turn in Madras.
they
could
do
nothing
to
alter
of 1921 non-cooperation took The movement gained a sudden
an unspurt
of energy, not from the implementation of Gandhi's original program but through the adoption of a new tactic, anti-liquor agitation. According to nationalist accounts, the agitation,
which began first in the south about July
the common people
northern and central India and 1921, was a purely spontaneous
and was then taken up by the Congress.7”
But prohibition was already a live political issue. Tamilnad the Nationalist and PCC manifestos of 1920 prohibition
in
spread to move by
their
legislative
programs,
and
the
In included
transfer
65 of
the
excise
brought Even
the
portfolio
prohibition Justice
to
an
within
Party
Indian
the
minister
realm
claimed
under
of practical
prohibition
dyarchy
politics.
was one
of
its
aims,
and British officials expressed a lip-sympathy for the idea of temperance. However, the stimulus to the anti-liquor
drive seems to have been twofold. Since had risen steeply, outpacing the incomes
1917 liquor prices of labourers and
urban workers. In addition, abstinence from alcohol was traditionally a high-caste virtue in Hindu society, and it
was one of the aims formulated first decades of the century. the cut
agitation seemed, at to mass agitation.
The
sil.
anti-liquor
In
inant
Gounder
the
at
first,
associations in the Congress viewpoint,
was
most
marked
agitation
Coimbatore
caste,
least
by caste From the
it
was
Gounders,
led
by members
aided
participation
was
one of the
founders
a convenient
by
of
urban
motivated
short
in the mofus-
the
rural
Congressmen.
by a quest
for
dom-
social
respectability and by concern among caste leaders at the sentencing to death of seven castemen for their part in a drunken brawl and murder in Coimbatore town. V.C. Vellingiri
Gounder, and
an
MLC,
joined
with
of the
two
Gounder
Coimbatore
caste
Congressmen,
association
N.S. Ramaswami Iyengar and E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, to organize volunteers for the picketing of liquor shops and the annual auctions by which the shops were leased. Caste panchayats and headmen were induced to assist the agitation. Violence
and
intimidation
soon
resulted,
and
local
magis-
trates responded by prohibiting picketing on that it would lead to breaches of the peace.
the grounds About a hundred
during the period
1921.”
Congressmen
neatly
In
and
the
Gounders
case
dovetailed
were
arrested
from September
of
the
with
Gounders
the
for
defying
to December the
social
anti-liquor
aspiration
of
the
bans
agitation
an
influen-
tial section of the caste leadership. In other districts the pieces did not interlock so well. In Ramnad and Madura districts temperance activity had long been associated with the Nadars whose traditional occupation, toddy-tapping, was being
replaced
by
ritually
less
polluting
and
more attractive activities like trading and Officials feared that the Nadars would make
the Congress.
Some
Nadars
favoured
itself
to the
with
Madras
leadership,
could
gain
the
Justice
legislature
unlike
more
by
that
Party
of
courting
to
and
the
Gounders,
Justice
with
the Con-
been
nominated
a minority. The leadalready identified
a Nadar
represent
the
money-lending. common cause with
a line-up
gress over prohibition, but they were ership of the Nadar Mahajana Sabha had
economically
the
had
caste.
believed
Party
than
The
that
by
Nadar it
66
flirting with the Congress.7? In many parts of Tamilnad the anti-liquor campaign one of several complex factors which fed the anti-
only
government
agitation.
grievances
or
support town,
for
for
the
an
movement
example,
As
outcome a
Dr
was
of
major
Baker
has
often
a
factional
cause
was
demonstrated,
response
a
to
strife.®°
local
In
factional
was
local
Salem
struggle
between S.C. Venkatappa Chetti, the newly elected Municipal Chairman, and his rival, S. Ellappa Chetti, a protege of the District Magistrate and a member of the provincial legislature. As Ellappa gravitated towards the ministerial party in
the
legislature,
Venkatappa
swung
towards
non-cooperation.
Under his direction the Salem municipal council carried a series of resolutions in September 1921, welcoming Gandhi to the town and committing municipal funds and employees to picket liquor and foreign cloth shops and to purchase khadi. After the government had vetoed the resolutions, there was a lull until late December when the non-cooperators gained control of the local merchants' association and sent its employees out to picket. For two days the non-cooperators ruled the town until the District Magistrate restored government author-
ity by banning
all
picketing
gress
activity
and
the
ed
the
of
cheap
and arresting
leading
non-
cooperators.°! But even though factionalism was of central importance to Salem's participation in the agitation, it should not be thought the only motivating factor. Venkatappa and many of his supporters on the municipal council were Congressmen of long standing and thus their adherence to noncooperation was not as fortuitous as the factional division might suggest. Salem had for 40 years been a centre of Contown's
intellectuals
and
students
could
be expected to respond sympathetically to anti-government agitation. Moreover, Salem's Devanga Chetti community, to which both Ellappa and Venkatappa belonged, contained a large percentage of poor weavers who frequented the town's toddy shops. Swadeshi propaganda could appeal to weavers threatenby
Devangas ence
of
sale
concerned,
like
drunkeness
among
whatever
reasons
For
the
anti-liquor
agitation
was
achieved
going
they
and
came
by
to
a mass
by
employing
foreign
the
Gounder
their it
outside
temperance
leaders,
was in
which
instigated
the
original
often
and
Gandhians
1921-22.
the
But
strayed
to
at
castemen.
brought
movement
tactics
cloth;
the
wealthier
preval-
sustained,
as
this
Gandhian from
near
as
success
program
Gandhian
non-violence. The agitation presented the Madras government with a more serious and widespread challenge than it had had to face since the heyday of Home Rule in 1916-17. The government could not ward off this agitational thrust by using
67 the
Justice
Party
as
its
shield.
It
authority by intervening directly to the organizers and protect customers
direct confrontation been achieved. In
addition
government
was
between
to
the
compelled
could
ban and
the Congress
threat
to
to
its
only
preserve
picketing, arrest shopkeepers. A
and
the
authority,
intervene
because
Raj
its
had
the
Madras
it derived
nearly a quarter of its revenue from duties on alcohol and the leasing of liquor shops. At first the government tried to disguise the impact of the agitation by attributing the sharp fall in income from toddy shop auctions to factors other than picketing. But in October 1921 it admitted that picketing in Coimbatore and Salem had caused drink sales to drop to a third of the previous year's total: the decline was even more marked in the Telugu districts.** In Madras, Willingdon's "Cinderella province", payment of an annual contribution of Rs. 348 lakhs to the central exchequer was already
causing
financial
difficulties
and,
added
to
this,
the rapid fall in drink revenue would be crippling. In February 1922 Willingdon anticipated a loss of Rs. 65 lakhs due
to
the
anti-liquor
and
in
particular
agitation;
other
estimates
ranged
as
high as 75 or 80 lakhs.® Such a financial disaster would force the Madras government to cut back provincial spending to
reduce
allocations
"nation-building" departments. government where the supporters
for
the
ministers'
As these were the areas of of dyarchy hoped for the
greatest achievements and where the ministers hoped to prove their worthiness before the electorate, the political repercussions
were
far-reaching.
The
deficit
by increasing the burden on the tax-payer was also the voter) and that would recoil and the ministry. The Finance ernment, T.E. Moir, complained
that
The
leaders
will
enable
could
antagonism
hope
them
to
the
that
to
be
made up
(who, in many cases, against the British
Secretary of the Madras Govbitterly in December 1921
of the non-co-operation
undoubtedly
only
additional
foment
Government
still
and
movement
taxation
further
to
exploit
in even larger measure the hostility towards the services which is not confined to their
own ranks.®
Anti-liquor agitation was not demonstration which the government Salem,
for
example,
villagers
in
the only form of pupular faced in Tamilnad. In
Atur
taluk
violated
the
forest laws by collecting firewood and grazing their animals. Congressmen joined in, claiming that payment of four annas for party membership entitled villagers to free grazing in
68
the reserved
the
most
two
other
ment
the
sparks
Congress
Madras Y
widespread
in Madras
was
LC xo
forests.®°
City:
But the anti-liquor picketing
and
of
effective
agitation
city
and
the
which
burnt
form
caught
Mappilla its
of agitation.
fire
— the
rising
labour
was
When
move-
in Malabar
fingers.
— it
Disturbed Times
The labour movement in Madras city began among the workers in the European-owned Buckingham and Carnatic mills. The rapid rise in the price of essential commodities in 1917-18 added to mill-hands' existing grievances over low pay, excessive working hours, inadequate lunch-breaks and the high-handed action of European overseers. Their grievances were taken up by Home Rulers who in April 1918 formed the Madras Labour Union, India's first real trade union. Initially under the direction of T.V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar, editor
of Desabhaktan, Rulers,
B.P.
the MLU passed
Wadia
and
George
Besant's New India. *” The
labour
Home
movement
Rulers in
had
Madras
into
the
Arundale,
several
control
assistant
motives
city.
They
in
had
of two Home editor
sponsoring
a genuine
of
the
desire
to
improve the the workers
workers' conditions and to provide the leadership needed to agitate for their demands. They were
part
national
also looking for a broader base to the Home Rule movement, partly to reply to government and non-Brahmin allegations that they were a Brahmin clique with no popular support. Yoking the labour and nationalist movements together would, they believed, benefit both. "It is very necessary", Wadia explained, "to recognize the labour movement as an integral
of the
movement.
The
in the right direction of democracy classes are not enabled to organize
latter
into their own'.°®
will
not
succeed
if the Indian working their forces and come
The rise of the British
Labour Party
directed the Home Rulers' attention to the urban workers. It was widely expected in India that the Labour Party would soon
be
in
ations
power
if
wing.®®
and
it
might
the nationalist
be
more
movement
It was anticipated,
sympathetic
too,
could
boast
to
Indian
aspir-
of a labour
that under the new franchise
the the
more skilled and better paid workers would be voters for Madras legislature. Adopting workers' grievances was a
ham
and
way of attracting their votes.°° Carnatic
mills
in Madras
European enterprises, it equate the plight of the and to argue that swaraj
wages
and
conditions
Again,
and
because
the Bucking-
Harvey's
in Madura
Finally,
the
were
was easy for the nationalists to workers with colonial exploitation would mean a dramatic improvement in
of employment.
urban workers
69 were
near
than
ryots
factories
at
hand.
They
because
and
could
they
crowded
were
into
were
a captive
On 29 October
organized
already
a few wards
main towns. A meeting held end of the shift was a sure
workers
be
the
Or
pre-empted a strike the workers. Wadia
in Ahmedabad.
Gandhi
his
the
workers
friend,
C.
F.
and
3,000
as he had
so
the
and
other
it
seemed.
of the
the
Buckingham
recent
pleading
who
The
and
threat for shorter hours invited Gandhi to Madras
during
declined,
Andrews,
easily
in
of Madras
management
Carnatic mills by locking out
to help
concentrated
more
outside the work gates at the way of attracting attention.
audience.
1918
far
was
unable
mill
strike
ill-health, to
win
and
any
sub-
sent
stantial concessions from the management.*! Unrest among the workers continued and when Gandhi visited Madras in March 1919 he had two meetings with the workers, numbering between
2,000
coming
on each
struggle
occasion.
against
the
Preoccupied
Rowlatt
Act
and
of their
bid
with
his
anxious
to
avoid
class conflict, Gandhi disappointed the workers by delivering sermons about the evils of drink and gambling, offering no practical advice on how to pursue their struggle against the
mill of
management.°?
the
also
Madras
begun
Competition activity,
of
rival
to
of
But
PCC
from
show
between which
trade
an a
as part the
interest
them
unions
Home
rash
led
were
of
Rulers,
in
to
an
the
minor
the
the
Madras
to wrest
control
labour
movement.
Nationalists
intensification
strikes
major
and
results.
the
of
had
labour
formation
The European business community was furious at the rise of trade unionism, especially under politicians' patronage. At this date European non-officials were completely hostile to the Congress which they equated with Bolshevism and violent revolution. They were astounded by the government's
apparent indifference to their troubles,°? and worded articles in the press and protests from
when stronglyemployers
their
The Madras
failed
to
impress
complaints
the
Government
to the Government
of
Madras,
the
of India.®*
government hesitated to intervene in ing private enterprises, partly from
Europeans
took
labour disputes affecta lingering attachment
to laissez-faire, partly from lack of first-hand knowledge industrial conditions. It was also inclined to blame the
employers
for
deteriorating
labour
relations:
there
of
would,
they complained, be little unrest if the post-war imbalance between wages and prices were redressed.°” However, the
government
on
the
side
disturbances The the
often of
found
the
and
itself
management.
the police
drawn
were
justice or injustice of the government's preoccupation
willy-nilly
Strikes
sent
and
into
lock-outs
in to restore
workers' case was with an immediate
disputes led
peace.
lost "law
in and
to
70 order"
issue.
The situation in Madras came to a head in the second of 1921. On 27 June about 800 Adi-Dravidas (untouch-
half
ables) returned to of a strike called
luring
earlier
work at the by the MLU:
strikes
and
Buckingham Milt-th they had suffered
lock-outs
and
felt
that
defiance severely
they
could not afford a further loss of wages. Almost at once violence flared up between the Adi-Dravidas and caste-Hindu strikers, aided by Khilafat Muslims who had their own grievances against the Adi-Dravidas. Several times during July Adi-Dravida slums in the mill area were set on fire and
workers
attacked.
Police
and
British
troops
were
unable
to
control the fires that raced through the wood-and-thatch hovels or to prevent violence in the maze of narrow streets in the mill area. Finally, in October 1921 a punitive police
force
was
quartered
on
the
area
and
the
caste-Hindus
grad-
ually returned to work, though the management refused to reinstate the strike leaders. The Madras government appointed a commission of enquiry, but its investigation was confined to the reasons for the city authorities' failure to prevent the disturbances. The workers' grievances which had led to the strike were ignored, and for this reason the
Madras
Labour
Union refused
to participate
in the enquiry.**
The strike was a traumatic experience for the Madras workers and their Congress patrons. The workers felt aband-
oned by the politicians. Gandhi, whose assistance was again invoked, for a second time excused himself on the grounds of ill-health. Willingdon claimed that this was because Gandhi
“would
have
found
and violence the
mill-hands
that
it difficult
to
excuse
has taken place".°”?
should
without
enthusiasm.°®
dispute
with
take
up
the
Gandhi's
hand-spinning
Practical
help
was
incendiarism
was
not
advice
received
forthcoming.
Early in July the Nationalists to the strikers, but they were
offered their public too preoccupied with
PCC to worry
18 November
Rajagopalachari
Kalyanasundara
who had
had
not
asked
about
them.°?
Mudaliar
been
Gandhi
asked
reinstated, for
Rs.
and
the
anti-liquor
the
elections
the
TNCC
for
Rajagopalachari
30,000
nothing had been received.'°? khadi
over
On
for
this
1921
money
but
purpose the
for
when
for
replied
The TNCC had funds
agitation,
that
but
labour
sympathy their
the
new
strikers
that
so
he
far
to spend on troubles
in Madras had become a liability. The propertied classes were alarmed at the eruption of urban violence and recoiled from the prospect of a greater conflagration. The Hindu, in an
editorial
entitled
"The
Failure
of
Authority",
spoke
with
anxiety of those Adi-Dravidas who might seize the opportunity of the present "disturbed times" to "begin a saturnalia of
71
outrage''.'°! Besant, too, disowned the strikers, but blamed the non-cooperators forunleashing the disorders.’ Disillusioned,
the
workers
turned
their
backs
When nationalists tried to revive labour in April 1922 they met with no response. years
revive the
the
labour
in
the
Congress.
Malabar:
movement
late
was
1920s
A Foretaste
it
quiescent,
was
largely
on
the
Congress.
agitation in Madras For the next five and
in
when
it
did
isolation
from
of Swaraj
The Malabar district had turbulent areas of the Madras
always been Presidency.
one of Since
the its
most annex-
ation by the British in 1792 there had been periodic risings in the interior taluks by the Muslim Mappilla community. Fanatical
were
adherence
by-products
interior lenders.
to
of
Islam
the
taluks to However,
and
sudden,
antagonism
of
fierce
the
uprisings
Mappillas
of
the
high caste Hindu landlords and moneysince the last major outbreak in 1894,
Malabar had been relatively peaceful, and troops stationed in the Mappilla area were withdrawn during the world war for service elsewhere, leaving armed police to deal with minor
disturbances in 1915 and 1919.1? The Madras government Khilafat propaganda.
from
tried in vain to isolate Unsettled by looting. and
riots in 1918, by mounting tenant about the fate of Turkey, Malabar Khilafat cause. During visits to
Ali
brothers
in
August
stirring
appeals
of Yakub ing many
Hasan drew Mappillas,
was hinted a strong
show
of
subside. 1°° the
The
name
knives
murdered
for
by resort
storm of
the
attacked
Hindus,
the
and
April
defence
of
to arms.'°*
1921,
Islam,
by police
in
Khilafat,
the
government
destroyed
by rumours ground for the Erode by the
Mappillas
if
and
first
Mappilla
troops,
week
officials railway
heard
necessary,
In February
an angry crowd, 10,000 into Calicut; and only
force
broke
1920
unrest, and was fertile Calicut and
Malabar food
1921
strong and gradually,
did
of August
bands
armed
lines
and
and police
it
the arrest includafter
tension 1921.
with
war-
In
officers,
bridges,
raided
police stations, and set up their own Khilafat kingdom. !°° For Willingdon and his ICS advisers it was a relief that the storm had at last broken. For months their jeremiads had been unheeded by a Government of India eager to avoid fullscale
repression
satisfaction
of
— the
India.
Madras
Now
— it
government
gave
had
a certain
been
proved
grim
right
The Secretariat was not unaware of the peculiarities of the Malabar situation and of the extent to which the oppressive
72 landlord
system
splendid
be missed. Bureau, and
Madras
resulted
that
had
opportunity Through through
repeatedly from
the
were
antics. achelam that in
to
flay
the its
impressed
rape
the
the
to
the
rising,
non-cooperators
but
such
was
not
a
to
press, the legislature, the Publicity own statements, the Government of
on the public
Khilafat
the murder,
Malabar
contributed
and
and
forced
inevitable
that
non-cooperation
conversions
outcome
the rising
movements,
reported
of Gandhi's
from
anarchist
On the same note one Justice leader, 0. ThanickChetti, told a conference at Salem in December 1921 "the present Malabar troubles we have a foretaste of
the Swaraj
to be attained
by non-cooperation".!°7
The Madras
PCC strove to refute these allegations. On 27 August it hastily formed a nine-member committee to investigate the causes of the rising. On the basis of such information as the government and martial law would allow them to collect,
the committee reported that the rising had been caused by provocative behaviour of the District Magistrate and that
leaders had never been involved
This
interpretation
where
It did not, the effect
1921
the
endorsed the
was
by the Congress
Madras
a useful
accepted
the its
in the Khilafat movement. '® by
at Ahmedabad
the
CWC
in
September
in December 1921. 1°
and
however, carry much conviction in Tamilnad of the rising was to weaken and discredit
non-cooperation
“serve
and
and
Khilafat
government
purpose"
if
movements.
anticipated
it
"open[ed]
In
that
the
September
the
rising
eyes
of
would
the
saner elements of the population to the disasters into which these movements are leading the country", 11° Hindus who had been mildly sympathetic to non-cooperation, or had seen some opportunity for personal advancement by temporarily associ-
ating
with
fanaticism
it,
and
now
shied
violence
away,
fearing
throughout
an
India.
orgy In
of Muslim
Trichinopoly
two years of active in Madura municipal present a municipal
Hindu-Muslim cooperation disintegrated; councillors dropped their proposal to address to Gandhi; and in Vellore a
gopalachari
doubted
Khilafat Muslim withdrew a about Malabar were running
movement When that
and
now
himself that
Gandhi arrived the rising had
had
created
it
had
similar so high
been
the
proposal because feelings in the town. }!! Raja-
wisdom
tainted
of continuing
by Mappilla
the
violence.* 12
in Tamilnad in September 1921 he soon saw been "a great set-back" to non-cooperation
scepticism
about
Hindu-Muslim
unity.
"Many
feel that people will not remain peaceful to the end", he wrote. "Others have been dazed. Not that they do not attend public meetings or take part in other activities; there is,
however,
widespread
fear about how things
will develop". !!%
73
Grave
Perils From
August
1921
the
Government
of
India
changed
from a policy of non-intervention to repression. policy", welcomed by the Madras Executive Council
recognition to
the
of the need
several
for a firm hand,!*
developments,
intensification
including
the
of liquor-shop
over
The "new as belated
was a response
Malabar
rising
picketing.
But
and
its proxi-
mate cause was the arrival in India of the Prince of Wales, who had been greeted on landing at Bombay on 17 November by a hartal and five days of rioting. The Government of India
was
determined
to prevent
sode elsewhere In Tamilnad
with the in July,
help to already
a repetition
on the prince's the
shift
Mappilla rising. asked Willingdon
Two days
Willingdon's
to
anxious
not
to
be
perhaps
not
very
in practice
Willingdon, request from
epi-
began
allow
outpaced
his indignation Rajagopalachari,
later Hasan presided over the
Conference
refusal
shameful
Yakub Hasan, released from prison for permission to visit Malabar to
angrily refused.!*©
Provincial
of this
to repression
restore order there. aroused by a similar
Congress
tour.!?®
him
by
at Tanjore. to
more
enter
militant
Frustrated
Malabar
Khilafat
and
by
leaders,
Hasan was in a defiant had already "succeeded foundations of British
mood, claiming that non-cooperation to a very large extent in shaking the power..." in India."7 A rash, and
of his
seized
accurate
address,
it was
was a dangerous agitator. deterrent sentence of two
found
this
ment,
Varadarajulu
after
"grovelling
quickly Hasan's
sentence
claim,
but,
upon
along
with
as evidence
that
He was arrested and years' imprisonment.
"monstrously
severe","!®
other
parts
Hasan
given a stiff The Hindu
put
it was
followed by the convictions of Abdul Majid Sharar, rival for leadership of the provincial Khilafat move-
editorial
staff
Naidu,
editor
of Desabhaktan,
apologies"
of
three
Tamil
Nadu,
and®he
of whom were
to the government.!?®
released
Repression was fast eliminating the leadership; the year in which Gandhi had promised swaraj was nearly exhausted. Unless the Congress threw al] its remaining strength into an agitational
thrust,
it
would
be
too
late.
On
4
November
1921 the AICC authorized the launching of civil disobedience by selected individuals and by localities which had demonstrated their complete commitment to swadeshi and non-
violence. '*° At its annual meeting at Trichinopoly on 20 November
the
TNCC
for the present This course was
debated
the
to restrict approved by
AICC
resolution
and
resolved
civil disobedience to individuals a large majority of the 88
74 delegates present, but since 820 the decision represented
gopalachari faction
the TNCC's total strength was only the small caucus of Raja-
and his close associates.!*!
there
A five-man
was
a marked
committee
was
reluctance
entrusted
with
And even among
to
court
the
that
imprisonment.
organizing
of
civil disobedience, but when its meeting was prohibited by the District Magistrate of North Arcot, only Rajagopalachari and the TNCC President, M.V. Subramania Sastri, defied the ban: they were arrested and sentenced to three months' imprisonment. }2? E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, who had also been selected for civil disobedience, was sentenced to a month in jail for anti-liquor activities in Coimbatore. Responsibil-
ity
for
The
Repression brought Nationalists winced
Dr T.S.S. struck
resign
continuing
the
Rajan.
and
from
S.
campaign
Srinivasa
the
Madras
then
fell
on
the
wary
some compensations for the Congress. in sympathy each time a blow was
Iyengar
took
legislature
the
(where
opportunity he
had
felt
to
none
too comfortable both as a Brahmin and as Leader of the Opposition). The Liberals protested at the lack of opportunity to discuss repressive measures in the Madras legislature; and some of the more independent members of the ministerial party attacked the government's treatment of
Mappilla and Congress
prisoners.’*?
the civil disobedience
movement.'**
As the Government
flew
a kite:
he
call
Table
ates
and
Gandhi
Brahmins'
paper,
believed
Even Justice,
that repression
merely
the non-
strengtnened
of
India and the Secretary of State had all along feared, repression threatened to provoke a revolt of the moderates and constitutional nationalists. To forestall this, Lord Reading
would
a Round
Conference
of
all
parties to discuss constitutional reforms if the Congress stopped the agitation and called off the demonstrations being planned gn Calcutta for the arrival of the Prince of Wales on 24 December. Das, Malaviya and other leading Congressmen welcomed the offer, but Gandhi dithered and quibbled. Reading who did not have the approval of London for his offer, withdrew it, but his manoeuvre had temporarily rallied the moder-
made
the negotiations. }?5
appear
responsible
for
the
failure
of
By rounding up the non-cooperation leaders in Calcutta before the arrival of the Prince of Wales, the Government of
Bengal was able to prevent any major disturbances there. !76 The Government of Madras, confident that non-cooperators
commanded
little
local
cautions. Rajan went city for the prince's
support,
did
not
take
the
ahead with plans for a hartal arrival on 13 January 1922.
stration was, by most accounts,
"a miserable
same
pre-
in Madras The demon-
failure". 27
75 Instead of non-violent protest, the hartal by violence. Youths stoned trams and cars hartal, two cinemas were attacked, and the Justice Party leader, P. Tyagaraya Chetti,
rowdies.
Singaravelu
were two
The
drafted
men
Congress
Chetti,
were
into
were
killed
the
organizers, unable
city
and
to
two
headed
to
stop
restore
others
was characterized which ignored the house of the was stormed by
the
by
Rajan
violence.
government
wounded
and
by
Troops
control:
gun-fire.
Rajan
confessed to Gandhi that "violence and undue coercion have made the hartal a failure for non-violent non-cooperation. While lence
step
and the
this struggle for non-violence exists of our own men, one may well hesitate
forward
in
civil
resistance". '?®
the violence in Madras, though previous November, contributed
the civil For
obedience
disobedience
the
present,
however,
continued.
In
the
Gandhi
not on to his
campaign. !7°
the vioa single
thought
so
too,
the scale of Bombay decision to abandon
preparation
Bardoli
against to take
for
mass
Gujarat
civil
taluk
of
civil
disobedience
dis-
non-
payment of taxes was scheduled to begin in February; in the Guntur district of Andhra Congressmen were, without encourage-
ment
from
Gandhi,
paign. 13°
planning
Tamilnad,
as
their
usual,
suggestion for a local no-tax centres of North Arcot. 1}?! No-tax
ment had
at
was
the
times
crunch.
been
own
lagged
So
far
undisciplined
in Malabar, agitation had asters. When the Congress
behind,
campaigncame
brought leaders
the
and
no had
and
from
the
the
only
Muslim
non-cooperation
violent,
irredeemable lost control
cam-
but,
move-
except
dis— as
in
the Madras hartal — the police and troops were on hand to beat out the flames. But to embark on a no-tax campaign in several areas of India simultaneously, from the towns and hand it over to the
was
to
invite
the destruction
the
complete
of property.
breakdown
of
to take the movement ryots and the landless,
law
An editorial
and
authority
in the Hindu
on
and
21 January 1922 warned that "any movement of mass civil disobedience is to say the least extremely premature. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the particular form of civil
disobedience proposed, the non-payment of taxes, is fraught with grave perils alike to peace, tranquility and the movement of non-violent non-cooperation". The Madras government left no room for doubt that to crush no-tax movements.
it would exert its full strength The Madras legislature rushed
through legislation empowering the government to distrain the property of those who refused to pay their taxes, and government
distributed
armoured
let
to
cars
it
be
known
untouchables.
and
200
that
punitive
property
The
confiscated
Governor's
police,
were
would
bodyguard,
dispatched
the
be
four
to
76 Guntur
ment
to
ensure
was
not
that
going
taxes
to
were
surrender
paid, 12
such
Clearly
the
a fundamental
govern-
right
as
the collection of land-tax without’ a furious struggle. And from that most nationalists recoiled: they wanted national independence, but not at the price of social revolution and
civil
war.
Gandhi
spared
them.
Following
a clash
at Chauri
in the United Provinces on 4 February 1922 men were killed by a mob, Gandhi suspended
The Hindu On
10 March
years' ence
confessed 1922
its "great relief"
Gandhi
imprisonment.
experiment
fo Fight
was
The
was
arrested
in which 22 policecivil disobedience.
at this decision. }
non-cooperation
sentenced and
to six
civil
disobedi-
over.
and Win in One Campaign
Gandhi's non-cooperation audacious attempt to redirect tics in India. In itself the been
and
Chaura
foreshadowed
by
the
movement of 1920-22 was an the course of nationalist poliprogram was not new. It had
boycotts
and
swadeshi
agitation
in
Bengal during the anti-partition movement of 1905-11. But, in 1920, for the first time the Congress pledged itself to wresting national self-government from the British by a nation-wide direct-action campaign. The one, comparable to that of Western Front
World War who supplies they
the war to
break
out
and
victorious
from
the
stalemate
strategy
was
a bold
conclusion.
and
stitutional trench warfare that had the Congress from its inception. The
classes
movement, middle
to
was a bold in the First
believed that by a massive build-up of men and could punch through the German lines and bring
to a swift
It depended
strategy generals
on the
carry
and
out
the
to provide
classes
one,
enthusiastic
believed
program
it with
that
petty
gains
inhibited
but
it
had
the
leadership.
within
wanted con-
advance
a fatal
of boycotts, was
of
the
participation
swaraj
Gandhi
of
flaw.
of the middle to
finance
Unless
the
the
their
grasp,
unless they were impelled by an intense sense of grievance, they would not give Gandhi the unequivocal support that noncooperation demanded. They stood aloof from non-cooperation, or
hesitated
lence
at
its
brink.
and intimidation
property Raj that
shrank seemed
The flexible
strategy he could
The
perverted
British
Gandhi's
did
not
budge;
satyagraha.
from the prospect of a confrontation destructive of their own interests. had failed. have won at
had from the old trench
vio-
Men of
with
the
Perhaps if Gandhi had been more least some of the gains to be
warfare.
The opportunity
existed,
77 however loath
to
fleetingly,
compromise;
Rajagopalachari, successes,
settle
for
For
urged
less
many
non-cooperation
abandonment
December
and
the
Gandhi
than
to
swaraj.
Congressmen
of
men
}** exhilarated
was
that
of constitutional that
in
a
behind
the
defeat
convincing
strategy
and
Gandhi
him,
had
including
assault
rather
of
Gandhi's
brand
the
for
reversion
all
dismissed
been
of greater
the
argument
But not
Rajagopalachari
but
by the prospect
continue
agitation.
conclusion.
1921,
the
of
complete
to
some
Congressmen the
than
idea
form
drew
of
returning to the legislatures. He attributed the defeat not to any inherent defect in Gandhi's techniques, but to India's hesitancy and poverty which made it impossible to "fight and
win in one campaign". Instead, he reasoned, the would "have to carry on many campaigns before we
our goal". In place of the waves of progressively more
troughs
ization
to 25
during and
which
recover
be the pattern years.
big-push powerful
the Congress
its
could
strength, 135
of Congress
strategy he satyagrahas
rebuild
That
agitation
in
was,
the
Congress can reach
visualized divided by
its in
organ-
essence,
following
Caper
3
THe SwarauistTs’ DILEMMA
The
defeat
of civil
cooperation
disobedience
movement
in
and
February
1922
the
collapse
led
to
a
of the
non-
reorientation
of Congress strategy. The pendulum swung away from action and back to constitutional agitation. Under
direct the aegis
organization respects the
in some a rever-
of the Swarajya Party Congressmen began to return to central and provincial legislatures, and by 1925 the
was in return
Swarajist hands. But, although to the legislatures represented
the Congress
sal of the Calcutta and Nagpur boycott resolutions and was directed by former Nationslists, Gandhi's reorientation of
nationalist
politics
could
not
be
ignored.
Hence
the
ration-
ale for council entry was stated to be to carry noncooperation into the legislatures. Swarajists would not take office under dyarchy; they would not collaborate; but they would try to wreck dyarchy from within and thereby recreate a confrontation with the Raj.
For
the
Brahmin
Nationalists
of Tamilnad
Swarajya Party be restored to
provided the means by constitutional action
Party
their
text,
to
their
rendered
own
control.
Attachment
communal
the
all-India
which the Congress and, in a regional
to
identity
less
the
Swarajya
conspicuous
could con-
and
enabled them to attack the Justice ministry from a broader political front. But conditions in the Madras legislature
in the mid-1920s
emma. but
the
They
only
ly defeated
exclude
the ent
it.
strength
on
Brahmin
which
their
presented
were
way
was
pledged in
by
Dyarchy,
of the
alliance
dissidents;
the
which
the
Governor
not
the
Tamil
to
the
take
Justice
formation
experience
Swarajists with
the
would
Party
showed,
in the
opportunity
with
under
could
be
complete-
ministry not
legislature
be
to
wrecked;
was depend-
constitutionalist
for
welcomed,
a dil-
dyarchy,
could
of a Congress
essentially
have
Swarajists
office
a Congress
was
created
non-
ministry, and
then
lost. But the central Swarajist and Congress leaderships remained, despite all the appeals from Tamilnad, adamantly
opposed
to office-acceptance.
Should
78
Swarajists
take
office
79 in defiance less
of national
spectators
their
own
watching
alliance
A Retrogression
11
the
Designed
Gandhi's
1922
the
Working
India
the
of
of
Party
and
to
Committee
flourish
abandon
meeting
"Constructive
for
stressed
the
schools,
the
Congress
they
be
power-
while
of the Congress
in readiness
national
cooperation,
enlistment
his
program
organization
Muslim
Justice
decision
adopted
to keep
disobedience,
or must
disintegrated?
Congress
February
the
policy
in the Policy
Following
ience,
party
uplift
members
and
civil
disobed-
at
Bardoli
Programme".
a return
to civil
production
of khadi,
temperance,
Hindu-
of untouchables. collections
on
The
for
the
Tilak
Swarajya Fund were to continue.’ menu appetizing. Perilous though
Few Congressmen found this civil disobedience had been
pectation;
to
it
had
at
least
by
seemed tedious ment shattered personal
thrust
comparison
rumoured
that
they
to
to
spin,
and unrewarding. the morale of his
invincibility
been
India
that
had
the
been
government
a peak
of
excitement
run
national
and
ex-
schools
Gandhi's arrest and imprison followers. Their leader's
an
article
would
of
not
faith:
dare
to
it
arrest
had
him, or, if it did, no jail could hold him. He had been billed as a mahatma, revered as an avatar. Now his dispirited disciples raked the embers of a dying movement unconvinced
March
On
could
kindle
it
Rajagopalachari,
1922,
fell
the
task
back
to
released
of
life.
from
supervising
Through his gopalachari
three years of association had become known as one of
debut
all-India
judgement as
and
an
integrity
fought doggedly program, but by
Vellore
Gandhi
leader,
valued
and
he
jail
Gandhi's
on
26
program.
with Gandhi, Rajathe Congressmen whose
most.
was
not
But
a
this
success.
was his He
to preserve the original non-cooperation his inflexibility he deepened divisions with-
in the Congress at a time when the need was for reconciliation and a speedy redeployment of the party's depleted forces. He was Gandhi's man, not Gandhi. He lacked the
capacity of his leader to inspire popular devotion; he offered only arid moralizing and dogmatism. Moreover, when opportunities for attempting new satyagrahas occurred, Raja-
gopalachari was reluctant fear of failure.
to seize
them,
as
if daunted
by
The rigidity of his defence of Gandhi's program was also a consequence of the insecurity of his regional position. Rajagopalachari had gained control of the TNCC through alli-
ance the
with
Gandhi
snarling
of
and had been
the
Nationalist
kept
in that
wolves,
by
position, Gandhi
and
despite his
80 associates in the CWC. gopalachari to survive;
Central Congress funds enabled identification with Gandhi was
Rajathe
primary justification for his regional leadership. With Gandhi jailed, Rajagopalachari would be deposed by the Nationalists unless he clung to the wreckage of Gandhi's program. Because national Congress policy had become a determinant of
regional vival.
party
The
first
came
with
the
leadership,
review
of
appointment
he
was
Congress
fighting
policy
of a Civil
for
his
after
own
sur-
Gandhi's
Disobedience
arrest
Enquiry
Committee by the AICC at Lucknow on 7 to 9 June 1922. The AICC noted a "widespread feeling" that in view of "the extremely unfair manner in which the policy of repression is being
carried out by the Government" the a revival of civil disobedience to
Congress should recommend compel the government to
“abandon their present committee toured India
policy..." collecting
for
a revival
disobedience,
and
Kasturi
vestigation
shifted
able to switch As a member of council
November mood and civil
of
and became,
civil
However, as evidence, the
not what
steps
but
the enquiry focus of in-
should
whether
be taken
it was
desir-
to non-cooperation through the legislatures. the committee, Rajagopalachari, with M.A. Ansari
Ranga
Iyengar,
boycott.
In
its
argued
report,
for
the
submitted
continuation to
the
of the
AICC
in
1922, the committee acknowledged that the country's the condition of the Congress precluded a revival of
disobedience
at
the
present
time,
though
local
saty-
agrahas might be undertaken. On the council entry issue the committee was too deeply divided to offer a unanimous recommendation.? The AICC in its turn passed the issue on to the
annua]
Congress
The
for
Congress
consideration.
met
at
Gaya
in
Bihar
at
the
close
of
December 1922. As the guardian of Gandhism, Rajagopalachari adamantly opposed any revision of the council boycott. He and
other
warded
off
"No-Changers",
the
Motilal Nehru Defeat at the organization January 1923 they were not sequences of invoking the
attempt
of
as
they
the
were
dubbed,
"Pro-Changers"
temporarily
led
by
Das
and
to capture the Congress for council entry. Gaya Congress provoked Das and Nehru to form an of their own, the all-India Swarajya Party, in to propagate their views. They stressed that seceding from the Congress — the dire consuch a move being now familiar — but they were idea of the Congress as a platform on which all
nationalists were free to express their widely different opinions. A minority had, they claimed, a right to organize itself in the hope of converting the majority to its views. The Swarajya Party was to be a pressure group within the Congress, not its rival. Moreover, if, as Dr Gordon has
81 argued,
Das
a year only, in expecting The
elections
held
in
had
agreed
Swarajists'
to
the
political
Gandhi
immediate
provincial
October
a "National
with
to
try
non-cooperation
then the erstwhile Nationalists were the Congress to keep the bargain.®
1923.
Demand"
prisoners,
Once
for
and
the
and
objective
central
elected,
for
release a
was
they
Round
opportunity
revert to the situation who joined the Swarajya
for
this time the rejected they
sistent
a negotiated
contest
legislatures proposed
of Gandhi Table
representatives of the government and the draft a new consitution. The Round Table attempt to of the men
to
justified
and
the
to
to
be
present
other
Conference
of
main parties to demand was an
of December 1921, for many Party regretted that the
settlement
had
been
lost.
But
Swarajists proposed that if their demand would resort to "uniform, continuous and
obstruction
with
a view
for
to make
Government
was con-
through
the Assembly and Councils impossible’. If, in response to the constitutional deadlocks the Swarajists engineered, the British responded by suspending dyarchy and resorting to repression and arbitrary rule, then an ideal situation would have been created for a revival of civil disobedience, and the Congress might carry many constitutionalists with it. Alternatively, if, as many Swarajists clearly hoped, the
British responded by making substantial concessions, the Congress would gain prestige and influence from having won redress for Indian grievances, for having pushed the stubborn British mule a few miles further along the stony track to
swaraj.®
Against this Rajagopalachari argued that non-cooperation through the legislatures was impossible. It was a parody of Gandhi's non-cooperation. The boycott of the councils could not be removed without the whole logic of non-cooperation
collapsing. he reasoned,
Liberals,
It was the keystone, not the coping. There were, only two possible alternatives: either, like the
one
worked
dyarchy
and
exploited
the
minor
oppor-
tunities for constructive government which it allowed, or one ignored the legislatures entirely and by-passed the institutional structure of British rule. The British, with their Irish experience in mind, had constructed the constitution with such craftsmanship that obstruction and wrecking were not
feasible.®
And
"retrogression
40
years
the
to
in
follow
the
Congress
only limited success; “shaken the throne of
stitutional
the
policy
had
used
Liberals'
of
the
course
Congress".
constitutional
whereas two years arbitrary power".
action was a premature
would For
be
a
nearly
techniques
of non-cooperation Reversion to con-
admission
of defeat.®
with
had
82 The AICC appealed of the party until the
who
could
support
not
for
afford
the
for end
to
elections
a truce between of April 1923.
remain
silent
if
in October,
the The
they
called
warring wings Swarajists,
were
for
to
muster
a special
Congress session to reconsider the council entry issue. This Rajagopalachari opposed, insisting that the Gaya verdict was binding on all Congressmen — much as in 1920 Nationalists had argued that Gandhi had no right to re-open the council issue after the Amritsar Congress. As a compromise, Das suggested
that
both
interest
vassed.
—
wings
be
let
authorized
to
Rajagopalachari
Co-existence,
pursue
spin
while
Rajagopalachari
their
separate
the
replied,
Swarajists
was
because the council boycott was a central part ans' program. One section of the party had to
extinguish" the other.!°
can-
impossible
of the Gandhi"absorb and
This crude Darwinism offended many
Congressmen who valued party unity and an active program more than intransigence and inertia. The AICC at Bombay on 26 May 1923 shuffled towards the Swarajist position by requesting a halt to propaganda against council entry. This time Rajagopalachari was the rebel, denying the authority of the AICC resolution and urging the Tamil Congress organizations to
express
their
dissent."
Rajagopalachari had gone too far. He had middle-of-the-road partymen by his tactics and ation
of
since
a
civil
the Civil
ailing
Disobedience
Enquiry
Committee
Congress
non-cooperation
unity
Srinivasa
and
to
Iyengar,
to
Iyengar,
had
quieten
council
who
favoured
he
'purists’."!?
from
Ranga
ation, had earlier seen Das as the rebel, but by June 1923 decried the irresponsible actions of the "Non-Cooperation
preserve
back
Kasturi
so
to
swing
The
entry
as
gradual
war.
alienated the the prolong-
the
Varadarajulu
Madras
Naidu,
situ-
and
Vijayaraghavachari in varying degrees shared his view. A. Rangaswami Iyengar, Tamilnad's Swarajist leader, did
lose
chari,
wreck
the
opportunity
to
reforms.
Has
Mr
his
reservoir
observing
the
Congress?” and
13
Having
weakened
gopalachari
tress at the talked about
Congress
tartly:
drained his
began
held
foster
regional
to
reaction retiring
''The
waver.
at Delhi
resentment Swarajya
Achariar
set
party
out
by
his
professed
has
set
out
the
Congress
obduracy,
surprise
not
Rajagopala-
to wreck
of national
leadership
He
against
and
to
support
Raja-
dis-
against him and, in true Gandhian style, from political leadership.’* A Special
in late
September
1923
stacles to Congressmen entering the councils the party's basic faith in non-cooperation. who did not attend, informed would no longer stand in the
the session Swarajists'
removed
ail
ob-
while restating Rajagopalachari,
in a message that he way. The No-Changers,
83 he
stated,
had
done
non-cooperation "the
lessons
their
program
of
hard
of their error.?®
utmost
to
intact.
maintain
They
experience"
had
would
the
failed
convince
original
and
the
now
only
Swarajists
Rajagopalachari's capitulation at the national level was not matched by a corresponding surrender in Tamilnad. By using party funds for anti-Swarajist propaganda, and by con-
trol ly
to
of party
maintain
stitution
years long
patronage, his
of the
Congress
Mr.
can easily
regional
TNCC
to minimize
as
Rajagopalachari
was
position.
changed
participation
Rajagopalachary
funds",
complained
has
M.K.
get 50 or 60 people
for
struggled
In
August
a third
time
desperate-
1924
the
in
by the Pro-Changers.**© control
over
Acharya
the
of
con-
four
"As
provincial
Chingleput,
"he
to vote with him at all
times".’”
And, as Rangaswami Iyengar had explained to M.R. Jayakar of Maharashtra in July 1922, "The trouble in this province is due to the fact that we all gave up our offices in the Con-
gress
Executive
Committee
immediately
after
the Calcutta
Congress, and the Congress caucus is in the hands of the noncooperators".'® When Motilal Nehru appealed to Rangaswami and Satyamurti to secure the election of as many Pro-Changers as possible
gressmen
from
Tamilnad
expressed
their
for
the
Gaya
powerlessness
was
Gandhi, prematurely released more prepared to reassess the
the
council-entry
chari
had
been.
Swarajists ization at
and the
While
expressing
movement,
he
was
Congress,
to
do
the
from prison in situation than
his
personal
willing
agreed to their take-over of Belgaum Congress in December
Tamil
so.!%
Con-
February 1924, Rajagopala-
antipathy
to
to
accommodate
the party 1924. He
the
organadvised
Rajagopalachari to follow a similar course in Tamilnad but it was not until January 1925 that Rajagopalachari publicly bowed to Gandhi's advice and a further month before he actually com-
plied with it.?° being
But
steadily
manoeuvres
they
between
had
abolition
of
gained of
1922
and
eroded.
1920
the
The
deserted
nothing
Khalif
by
Tamilnad had sought other posals for a South Indian
dependent
force:?*
Nor
was
it
co-workers.
in
Abdul
Trichinopoly, Abdul been among the more Party.
Hindu
1925
Rajagopalachari's
Muslims the
the
who
had
Congress
alliance.*!
February
1924,
to
Majid Sharar,
retain
No more
hetped
in;1922,
Even
the
him
in
feeling
before
Muslims
was
the
the
that
in
political openings: there were proMuslim Federation to act as an in-
Syed Murtuza of
Hameed Khan of Madras extreme Khilafatists,
easy
position
than
the
36
support
lawyers
and others joined the and
had
who had Swarajya
enthusiasm
suspended
of
their
84 practices in 1920-22 for non-ccoperation and returned to their profession. The volunteer and
where,
their
as
own
in
Madura
picketing
they
in
1923,
they
received
gradually they corps broke up
attempted
not
ment from the regional leadership. 7? The Nagpur graha of 1923, launched to force the Government Central Provinces to allow Congressmen to carry
through
the
streets
of Nagpur,
to
forward
provided
the Tamil activists, many of whom courted imprisonment.**But it was
little
else
look
formed in January than (both former
The
work
was
1924 with League of
unspectacular
with it for long. Many found more stimulating
to.
to
launch
support but discourageFlag Satyaof the their flag
a temporary
travelled soon over
A Tamil
to Nagpur and there
Nadu
Khadi
fillip and was
Board
for
was
K. Santhanam and later S. RamanaYouth Members) as its secretaries.
and
few
activists
were
satisfied
deserted the Congress altogether, employment in journalism
or
From 1922 a rift opened between Rajagopalachari, supported by a few Brahmin activists, and a nebulous group of dissatisfied non-Brahmin Congressmen led by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker
and S. Ramanathan. At first their grievance was that Rajagopalachari had tricked them by capituliating to the Swarajists: Ramaswami Naicker and Ramanathan resigned as the TNCC's secretaries after the Delhi Special Congress to protest against the
“open
and ostentatious repudiation”
iples of non-cooperation.*® They Cocanada Congress that December,
their views
and endorsed
Boredom
and
with
a hankering to
use
contested
a road
by caste
dramatic running
Hindus.
with
caste Hindus and stiffen moval of untouchability. stretch
went of
covert
ing the
to
then
1925
with
the
of new road.?” Ramaswami
hostility
campaigns
led
near
a temple,
a right
Rajagopalachari
Travancore
In Tamil
the
while
he would
could
leave
not
forcibly
abstained,
dislik-
not help untouchroad; but he also coercion of the
give
government
eyes
prestige
him
building
for the
Rajagopalachari
advancement
The rift quickly widened. aware of his own abilities
Congress
Ramaswami
begun at Vaikam in Travancore secure for untouchables the
their opposition to the gradual reThe satyagraha ended in compromise in
Naicker to
Rajagopalachari,
new
ing the. satyagraha partly because it would ables generally to have access to a single feared that the satyagraha would amount to
November
princ-
voiced their protests to the but Rajagopalachari smothered
disenchantment
Naicker to join the satyagraha in 1924. Its objective was to
right
fundamental
the Delhi agreement. 7°
khadi,
for
of the
of
the
was
a short
campaign
suspected
untouchables.
Ramaswami Naicker was becomas an orator and agitator. If an
it and pursue
outlet
an
for
his
independent
energies,
course.
85
julu
The breach Naidu,
came
in the middle
elected
covered
that
in
Congress
TNCC
Brahmin
months
President
and
non-Brahmin
in
of 1925.
December
pupils
were
Varadara-
1924,
dis-
expected
to
eat separately at the Shermadevi Gurukulam, a national school trun by V.V.S. Aiyar, the former terrorist, in Tinnevelly district. Varadarajulu condemned this as caste discrimination and as being contrary to Congress pledges to eradicate caste prejudice. The abuse appeared to him all the more grievous
that
sponsible
for the
produced
Naidu
an
failed
1925
chari
to
merely dining
that
merit
up of the
the
the
Rajan
had
school.
of anti-Brahminism
Naicker and
Consultations
defuse
with
Gandhi
situation.
school,
that
the
When
the
Congress
been
largely
re-
The revelation
from
Varadarajulu
Kalyanasundara
and
the
Aiyar's
TNCC
recommendation should
not
resignation
met
in
April
of Rajagopala-
interfere
but
requested the school authorities to allow inter-caste was brushed aside; a resolution moved by Ramanathan
nationalist based
on
Rajagopalachari
TNCC,
bodies
birth"
and
Rajagopalachari
could
drawal
sponsorship
by Ramaswami
to discuss and
and
setting
outburst
supported
Mudaliar.*®
funds
should
was
not
carried.
six of his
not be overcome
again
of the Gandhians
In
the
associates
maintaining
through
Rajagopalachari's
observe
any
following
resigned
that
of
week
from
the
caste prejudice
form of coercion.”®
resignation
from
"gradations
marked
leadership
the
final
of the TNCC.
with-
The
Swarajists took over. was elected President
At the end of 1925 Srinivasa Iyengar of a predominantly Swarajist committee.
crusade.
the
Congress
justice
and
Ramaswami incentive Respect
atheism,
He
left
movement
followed
himself
their
Naicker received from the Shermadevi affair an to exploit anti-Brahminism as a political and social
social
Ramaswami
as
revolt
organized
the
which
denigrated
Naicker's
movement's
Ramaswami
Congress
in
1925
ablest
to
Self-
and extolled
and
established
culture.
quickly
English
the
propagandist.
the
Swarajists
and, by intensifying communal bitterness, the task of those who remained within the
1
Ramanathan
and Ramanathan undermined
opposition
the
nationalism
Dravidian
lead
to organize
in
last
By
hows
Tamilnad
they complicated Congress.
|
| ,.''s)
After the Shermadevi affair, Rajagopalachari, too, sought a new political base, though not outside the party. Unlike
Jawaharlal
Nehru,
Rajendra
Prasad
and
Vallabhbhai
Patel,
he
did not turn to the municipalities: he had had his fill of municipal intrigue and frustration in 1917-18 as chairman of Salem
Municipal
Council.
Instead,
in
imitation
of
Gandhi,
set up an ashram (spiritual retreat) near Tiruchengodu in south-western Salem in 1925. He took such activists as had remained loyal to him and gave them employment organizing
he
86 khadi
work
in
the
locality.
Funds
for
the
ashram
came
from
Rajagopalachari's contacts at the centre — mainly from Gandhi's All-India Spinners' Association, which provided a grant of Rs.
60,000,
Provinces
and
. The ashram harsh realities
area. alist
lation.
from
Marwari
and
Jamnalal
trusteeship
cannot",
of
from
a statement
such
he
wealthy
Central
the
peasantry
was
too
problems of relating and interests of the
asserted,
of the people
condition
gopalachari
the
*”
brought Rajagopalachari face to face with the of rural life in the poor, drought-stricken
It posed for him the struggle to the lives "You
Bajaj,
Congressman.
unless in
you
your
"successfully
include
advocacy
of
a
claim
the
politics". 3?
steeped in Brahminical to
the nationlocal poputhe
economic
elitism
But
Raja-
to proceed
revolutionary
trans-
formation of rural society. Khadi production offered one palliative, but Rajagopalachari strove for a more complete, an
intellectually
more
attractive,
prohibition, the social appeal which had been demonstrated in
1921.
It exploited
lower
than
his
own
the consumption
strata
coercion
graha
of Hindu
and
of
the
and,
as
caste
society.
Hindus
a Brahmin,
with
he
affair.
turned
of castes
he automatically
did
feared
in
not
of the
the
to
potential of movement of
ambitions
the degeneracy
Prohibition
that
He
agitational anti-liquor
sanskritizing
of alcohol
the Shermadevi
solution.
and the
involve
Vaikam
It was an issue
that
equated
lowest
the
satya-
could
transcend community and party. It would, so he hoped, redirect the attention of politicians away from squabbles over patronage and communal representation and back to fundamentals. Agitation against prohibition would be hard for the British
to
quash
Hindu
without
offending
civilization,
a vulnerable
and
yet
the
the
traditions
spot to attack.”
At first
Rajagopalachari
and
government's
conducted
rural
convictions
drink
revenue
of
was
propaganda
meetings on prohibition and the evils of drink, and he urged caste associations and panchayats to discourage their members from drinking alcohol. But with excise in the hands of the ministry and with government servants alert to revive anti-liquor agitation, relatively
achieved
in this
fashion.
Rajagopalachari
for any attempt little could be
had argued
that
the legislatures might be used to win minor concessions even though they could not be obstructed. It was with the hope either of achieving prohibition through the legislature or of
demonstrating
failure
to
watch
to
the
the
limitations
introduce
progress
of
prohibition of the
dyarchy
that
Madras
by
legislators'
Rajagopalachari
Legislative
turned
Council.
87
Tendencies At
city
Towards
the
core
Nationalists
Satyamurti were Swarajist line,
resignation Srinivasa
Gandhians.
from
Full~fledged of
of
the
Tamil
Moderatiam Swarajya
1919-20.
the
Madras
were
legislature
less
in
impatient,
Vijayaraghavachari
more
remained
as a Congress veteran, but Gandhi and his lieutenants
alists, like C.V. and T. Rangachari
of the
them,
the
Madras
and
November
1921,
tolerant
largely
aloof:
of
the
he
the snubs he had in his year as
Congress president made him disinclined role in national or regional politics.
iveness
were
Iyengar
the most conspicuous advocates of the new whereas Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and, after his
Iyengar
was respected received from
party
Rangaswami
to resume a leading Other former Nation-
Venkataramana Iyengar, a Coimbatore MLC, in the Assembly, waited to see the effect-
Swarajists
In Tamilnad,
before
because
of
deciding
whether
Rajagopalachari's
to join
rearguard
action, the Swarajists only gradually gained ground. Denied access to the TNCC’s resources until 1925, they entered the 1923 elections short of funds, with few candidates and little organization. As late as July 1923 only Rangaswami Iyengar
and
Satyamurti
the
Madras
and
no
more
prospects centrate
Demand
than
that
on
and
with
of
the
declared
a dozen
legislature
Motilal
winning
not
they were not five
had
six
to
Sivaswami
The provincial
that
Nehru
with
Swarajist
Swarajists
year.
advised seats
the
So
to
the
Madras
the
seats
only
elections
for
Tamil
were
were
on
for
to con-
the
National
legislature
where
In consequence, fell
returned.
held
seats
their
party
press
Tamilnad
Liberal
candidates
contested
poor
help
to have a majority.*?
Assembly
Aiyar
Tamil
Assembly
bother
likely
in
themselves
to
Swarajists
31 October
1923
Party labels were more widely employed than in 1920, partly due to Swaraiist intervention, though many non-Brahmins preferred such vague designations as "Nationalist" or "Independent" to allow them to side with whichever party or grouping was invited to form a ministry. The Justice Party encouraged this by its policy of incorporating whichever nonBrahmins were, legislature.”
through their own efforts, elected to the Nevertheless, the ministry had its adherents
and it was the deployment of patronage rather than public electioneering which secured the return of many Justice MLCs
The Tamil Swarajists were thus doubly penalized: they had limited access to the funds and organization of their party, and they could not rival the Justice Party's influence in the local
government
bodies.
Polling
was
heavier
than
in
1920,
88
though North city,
still
relatively
It ranged
from
28 per
cent
Arcot rural constituency, to 58.8 per cent in and 77 per cent in the Tinnevelly-Palamcottah
constituency.
had
low.
been
In
so
the
light
ing as high stituency. benefit the
Muslim
in
1920,
constituencies,
the
change
was
Madras urban
where
most
in
polling
marked,
reach-
as 71 per cent in Madura-Trichinopoly urban conBut the increased Muslim poll did not particularly Swarajists, except in Madras city where Moosa
Sait's wealth and prominence made him a particularly strong candidate anyway. > The government assessed the outcome of the election as shown in Table 2. In the eyes of the Madras
government
the
Justice
Party
was
best
able
to
majority in the legislature, and at the end of Willingdon invited the Raja of Panagal to form
TABLE Party
Composition
of
the
Madras
44
Congress (Swarajists) Independents
11 6
the
were
Before
ised
that
the
in
elections
legislatures
98
18 nominated expected
the ministry.©
the
MLCs
to
All-India
where
1923
37
of elected MLCs
officials
November 1923 a new ministry.
Legislature,
Justice
In addition,
11
a
2
Anti-Ministerialists Total
command
and
support
Swarajya
Swarajists
Party
were
in
prom-
a minority
they would not occupy their seats, except to prevent them being forfeited and when there might be opportunities to obstruct or overthrow the ministries. In both Madras and the Punjab,
where
that
was
parties, the
it
this
the
to
the
the
of
the
in the Madras
such that the small ive opposition".*”
by
was
"unnecessary,
disintegration
“situation
elections
decree
Tamil,
not
Assembly
and resentful
but
produced
contested.
inexpedient
party...";
Council
Telugu
keeping
of continuing
and
and
party
likely
claimed
to
asserted
lead
that
parties
to
the
is
has good chances of effectthis argument was voiced
Swarajists.
a parental
Tamil
Swarajist
The Tamil
of the various
Swarajya Party Significantly,
the
minority
eye
Prakasam,
leadership
on
the
elected
Telugu
MICs
of the Congress
89 in the Madras Presidency, deplored the decision of the AllIndia Swarajya Party to permit the Swarajists in Madras and the Punjab to take their seats as an encouragement to the
“tendencies manifest in
towards full-fledged moderatism" the Madras council party.*® The
already becoming Tamil Swarajist
MLCs ignored his objections and in March 1924 entered an alliance with other Opposition MLCs to form the United Nationalist
Party.
Its
leader
zamindar
of moderate
council;
its
Morley-Minto Swarajist —C.
constitution executive
Satyamurti
Ramalinga
T.A.
Ramalingam
Salem.* the
The
was
views
Reddi
and
among of
included
a cluster
Chittoor,
C.
of Coimbatore,
into
the
Raju,
an MLC
a Liberal
of the United
entry
Narasimha
had been
committee
Chetti*
formation
Swarajists'
C.V.S.
who
of
in
under
the
first
only
the
non-Brahmin
Natesa
and
Mudaliar
P.
the
dyarchy
Brahmin
dissidents of
Subbarayan
Nationalists
legislature
a Telugu
so
was
soon
Madras,
of
after
indicative
of
the basic situation of the Swarajists in the second and third councils. Few in number, it was logical that the Swarajists should ally with other Opposition groups to increase their effectiveness. The dominance of the Justice Party as a rel-
atively
stable
ministerial
party
provoked
the
formation
of a
rival bloc in the council strong enough to challenge and overthrow it. But it was not the numerical weakness of the Swarajists alone which was responsible for their alliance. The
the
Tamil
their
advantage.
The
were
civil
The
Swarajists,
destruction
to
stated
wreck
because India
objectives
of
dyarchy
Swarajists
they
party,
particular,
than
disobedience
Tamil
in
of dyarchy
were
partly
or
the
and
to
in
the
force
conditions
from
a
interested
to
All-India
constitutional
subscribed
were
seeking
to
a
for
situation
in
to
membership
which
of
they
either
result.
— partly
the
were
in
Party
would
objectives
that
less
it
Swarajya
concessions
these
conviction
work
All-
worthy,
patriotic, if rather impractical, aims. Whereas Das saw the creation of a constitutional crisis as a situation to which the parliamentary traditions of the British would force them
to respond, Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti had not lost faith in a favourable response before that crisis was reached. Through appeals to the Labour Party in Britain, by constitutional agitation in India, and by periodic propaganda tours in both countries, the Swarajists hoped to alarm Britain and hence quicken the pace of constitutional reform. Rangaswami Iyengar dreamed of an Indian re-enactment of Runnymeade or the
one
Grand
Remonstrance,**
of winning
price
of paddy
the
votes
but
of
or the burden
regarded
electors
the
who
of taxation
immediate
cared
than
more
the
task
about
distant
as
the
90 prospect
of
swaraj.
{t was
a pragmatic
view.
Non-cooperation
had failed in Tamilnad, the Swarajists argued, because it had ignored the day-to-day concerns of the people. It was their task, therefore, to do "normal political work to show the
people their
that Swaraj
meant
children".*!
By
better
conditions
denouncing
for
themselves
non-cooperation
as
an
and
aber-
ration and calling for a return to “normal political work", the Tamil Swarajists laid themselves open to criticism from Congressmen who feared a reversion to the politics of Gokhale and the
Srinivasa Sastri. "mentality of the
Satyamurti was moderate — with
singled out as having his belief in the
efficacy of constitutional agitation, with his predilection for making fine speeches in decorated halls in the presence of high-placed august personages and his contemptuous dismissal of the harmless Charka as an unpractical proposition"."* There
was
could
be
much
truth
compared
ist controversy of to the revisionist
a minimum
in
to
program
the
accusation.
European
If
socialists
the
Swarajists
during
the
revision-
the 1890s, the Tamil Swarajists were close position of Bernstein, seeking to achieve
from
an
existing parliamentary system,
while
Das was nearer to the opposite extreme, holding, like Rosa Luxemburg, that by spurning petty gains and working for a major crisis, far greater advances would ultimately be
achieved.
This divergence of the Tamil Swarajists from the orthodox Swarajist line did not originate with the post-election situation: it was much older. In giving evidence to the
Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee in 1922, Rangaswami Iyengar claimed that by involving themselves in such concerns
as education
and
land
revenue
in the
legislatures
Congressmen
would not be frittering away their energies, but would be building a broad base for the nationalist movement. Raja-
gopalachari
asked:
approved
Satyamurti,
total as
"We
cbstruction?"
by
evidence
that
the
should
not
take
"No",
replied
Tamil
Pro-Changers
were
up
an
Rangaswami.
cited
in
the
attitude His
committee's
did
not
the obstructionism advocated by Das and Nehru.“? The Tamil
Swarajists
had
not
been
their Nationalist moorings by the storm In Bengal and other provinces where the strongly the former Nationalists had to of non-cooperation. In Tamilnad, where relatively
Nationalists
weak
and
felt
directed
less
by
compulsion
their earlier preoccupation with strengthened by the accession of
sterial
office.
The
Brahmin
a rival
to
the the
dragged
of
views,
report
believe
very
far
in
from
tide of non-cooperation. agitation had run float with the currents the agitation had been
Congress
compromise.
faction,
legislature had been Justice Party to mini-
politicians
the
Furthermore,
of Tamilnad
—
91 whether
Nationalists,
Liberals
or
non-cooperators
— had
profoundly disturbed by the appointment of non-Brahmin sters and by the communal legislation which followed.
Communal
G.O.s
professional
Religious
of
1921-22
future
of
Endowments
the
and
Brahmin
the
educational
middle
legislation,
the first council, was a priesthood. A community
occupational,
threatened
class;
introduced
direct challenge criss-crossed by
political
differences,
the
at
the
so
long
been
mini The
and
Hindu
end
of
to the Brahmin ritual, social,
and
accustom-
ed to leadership, the Brahmins could not meet the Justice attack by an agile regrouping into a solid phalanx. They were
bewildered; the
to
To
the
Madras
abandon
themselves,
the
their
immediate
legislature
the
Brahmins,
Brahmins
responses
in
the
problem two
non-Brahmins
parties
often
posed
entirely would
among
formed
on
contradictory.
by Justice
solutions
legislature
squabble
were
were
in
lose
themselves
the
domination
possible.
hope
their
and
non-communal
One
that,
hostility
later
was
left
to
join
lines.
of
the
This
course
had a wide measure of support. In effect it was held by Rajagopalachari, who, as we have seen, had argued in 1920 that
Brahmins
should
non-Brahmins a free from his experience and
by
the
Brahmin
stay
out
of
the
legislature
who
had
decided
and
allow
hand;** by Srinivasa Iyengar, smartin, in the first year of the legislature;*
Liberals,
by
early
to
1923
the
to
ignore the provincial council and concentrate on the all-India level of politics and government.“© Kasturi Ranga Iyengar from 1921 until his death in 1923 inclined to this course. As
an old
Nationalist
gressmen of his but in the near
he did not
doubt
the
importance
of Con-
ilk gaining control of the Madras legislature, future he thought abstention the best course
until anti-Brahminism died down and non-Brahmins had become disillusioned with collaborative politics. He did not oppose Swarajist tactics as such but feared that their premature adoption
and
in
Madras
exacerbate
would
strengthen
communalism. "7
the
Justice-Raj
alliance
The alternative course was to attempt a direct assault on the legislature and to overthrow the Justice ministry. Rangaswami Iyengar denounced the Liberals' decision to abstain from the legislature as a "counsel of despair" and an illustration
of
precisely
the
sort
of
Brahmin
arrogance
that
non-
Brahmins loathed.“® He and other Tamil Swarajists argued that: only by bearding the Justice lion in the council den would it ever be defeated; it was folly for the nationalists
to turn things
because
national
their
would it
was
backs
change. an
(if not
on the For
legislature
many
all-India
the regional
Brahmins
and
organization
level),
the
just
and
hope
Swarajya had,
on
that
Party, the
an intercommunal
92 character,
Justicites. nation
at
was
an
ideal
base
Nationalism
what
they
for
expressed
believed
to
a counter-attack
and
be
pensated for the political and social them in Madras. It has been remarked istry was interested in patronage and
the caste of its clients.*?
elevated
rank
against
their
the
indig-
communalism;
it
com-
ostracism threatening that the Justice minso cared little about
But where a non-Brahmin
Subbarayan might ricochet from Congress to Justice United Nationalists, Brahmin politicians could not
like
Party to identify
with a party which hounded them in the legislature, in the Press and on public platforms, which depicted them as monsters, foreigners and tyrants. moderates or extremists, Tamil
to
remain
ity and Party.
in provincial
assurance
within
the
huddled
They no and the
of
appointment
Brahmin
of
the
wished
secur-
Swarajya
course knew that it a Brahmin clique.
leadership
of non-Brahmin
had
been
shattered
ministers.
It was
Brahmin Swarajists associate with non-Brahmins and for this purpose
binding
walls
for
longer had a numerical advantage in the electorate council, and the precious illusion of the Brahmin
prerogative
United
together
protective
Those who believed in this second be suicidal to operate openly as
would
the the
politics
Whether by inclination Brahmin politicians who
Nationalist
the
Party,
predominantly
dissidents,
was
formally
Brahmin
ideal.
The Tamil Swarajists were tactics by developments during
in
1920
by
the
essential
that
at least a section of the formation of the
(but
not
Swarajists
irrevocably)
with
the
encouraged in their the first council.
one hand, as we have seen, patronage and induced the non-Brahmin MLCs to coalesce
non-
assault On the
political advantage within the Justice
Party; but,-on the other hand, there was a centrifugal tendency as MLCs, disappointed at the policies and practices of the ministry,.spun off from the party. Patronage, a magnetism that could repel as well as attract, was certainly one
reason in
the
for
deserted
the
legislature.
the
offered
the
due;
C.
the patronage °°
sought
creation
and
Tamil
MLCs
Education
in the Chittoor
Natesa
the
Ramalinga
ministry
of
for himself
ation
C.
Panagal
post
of a band
Mudaliar
and his
judicial
was
in
of non-Brahmin Reddi
1923
Minister
district denied
relatives
service;*!
and
was
because he
dissidents
said
to
he
coveted
board
was
nor
not
he thought
appointments
in the Madras T.A.
have
he
given
his
had
Corpor-
Ramalingam
Chetti
was being pushed out of his posts as president of Coimbatore's district board and chairman of Coimbatore municipal council by a new Justice follower, C.S. Ratnasabapathi Mudaliar.» felt
that
the
ministry
was
dominated
by
and
run
93
for
the
Telugus
the
Executive
— another
source
of conflict
between
the
two
regions. Muslim MLCs fretted for a Muslim minister or executive councillor.°? Panagal could not satisfy everyone: there were not enough jobs to go round. After the 1923 elections he removed K.V. Reddi Naidu from his ministerial post to bring in a Tamil and he tried to win back Muslim support by appointing a Muslim as council secretary and securing the appointment of Muhammad Usman as Home Member of Denial
Council.
of
patronage
Not all non-Brahmins Tyagaraja Chetti and to
a quest
for
to
implement
as
however,
the
whole
story.
the
be working for the reform and regenersociety and culture and not be confined
jobs
and
office.°”
to be a minister
undertaken
not,
shared the pragmatic approach of Panagal and some certainly felt that
Justice Party should ation of non-Brahmin
ambitious
was
educational
If
Ramalinga
it was partly
schemes
Inspector-General
of
the
Reddi
was
to be in a position
type
of Education
he
had
already
in Mysore.
Subbarayan was not feigning indignation when he protested against Tyagaraya Chetti's remarks that Congress prisoners should be treated like robbers and dacoits.** And there were other pressures on the MLCs than a score of relatives and
clients
clamouring
electorate
ing a whole
depend ity to
had
been
to be fed
district,
enlarged,
upon patronage articulate and
MLCs'
alone. redress
juicy morsels and
with
prospects
a
lawyer,
him with
a communal
money~lender
and
constituencies
of re-election
They also depended on the grievances of the
Take the case of Ramalingam Chetti. Vellala sub-caste too thinly represented
provide
of patronage.
base
agent
the
cover-
did
an abilelectors.
purposes.
Coimbatore
mill-
owners he had extensive professional contacts, and his government posts had, temporarily, given him access to
system to
the
of influence. numerically
But
dominant
his
main
Gounder
not
He belonged to a in Coimbatore to
for electoral to
The
vote-winning community,
appeal
and
he
AS
local that
was
assidu-
ously cultivated the Gounders' support by attending caste conferences, identifying with their grievances on public platforms operation
giri
and in the legislature, and acting in with his fellow MLCs from Coimbatore,
Gounder
and
C.V.
Venkataramana
Iyengar.
close coV.C. Vellin-
Ramalingam
did not serve the Gounders slavishly — because of his mill interests he did not, for example, show the same enthusiasm
for khadi as Vellingiri — but, in view of the ministry's poor record on temperance and agricultural issues, Ramalingam's divorce from the Justicites was influenced by the dissatis-
faction of his electors.©
94 As soon as the new council met after the 1923 elections, Ramalinga Reddi moved a vote of no-confidence in Panagal's ministry. The motion was defeated by 65 votes to 43, but, as
the ers
opposition pointed out, only 44 of were elected MLCs and a government
rally
nominated
and
European
members
defeat of the no-confidence motion of tighter links among the various
contributed
to
the
formation
the ministry's supportwhip had been used to
behind
Panagal.*?
The
Nationalists
in
encouraged opposition
of
the
United
be
returned
the formation elements and
March 1924. But both the Swarajists and the non-Brahmin dissidents had reservations about the union. The Swarajists had to keep their commitments to the ideas and tactics of the
All-India
party
and
hoped
to
in
greater
numbers
at the next election, this time with full Congress support. The non-Brahmins remained true to what they termed "nonBrahmin interests", promising that they would pursue communal representation and after over-throwing the Justice ruling clique replace it by a new non-Brahmin ministry.°® There was little affection in the marriage and much suspicion, but there was enough mutual advantage for it to survive.
Fine
Speeches
in Decorated
Halls
The Government of Madras reported in 1927 that "the onetime professed Swarajist policy of consistent and continuous obstruction within the Councils had practically never been
pursued
in Madras".*°?
Essentially
broad
issues
constitutionalist
in out-
look, the Madras Swarajists were more anxious to dislodge the Justice Party than to wreck dyarchy. On the few occasions they did try obstruction they were either disowned by their embarrassed United Nationalist colleagues or successfully blocked by the government and its allies.
or
On
the
almost grants
tions civil
rights
national
of
Indians
— such
overseas
all the anti-ministerial attracted a profusion of
for the Governor's servants, intended
as
— the
provincial
Swarajists
autonomy
could
draw
MLCs into their lobby. Budget motions for cuts in alloca-
staff, for to impress
the the
police and senior taxpayer and harass
the ministry. But generally the United Nationalists would only move token cuts, of say Rs. 100 or a similar nominal sum; if the Swarajists pressed for a more substantial reduction they almost invariably did so alone. In March 1924, for example, Satyamurti moved for the omission of Rs. 2,00,000 from a Budget grant of Rs. 3,38,695 for the staff and household of the Governor. He used the opportunity to attack
Willingdon's appointment of a non-Brahmin ernment repression of the Congress during
ministry and govnon-cooperation.
95 The size of the proposed cut was, however, too large for the United Nationalists. When a poll was taken, only three Swarajist MLCs including Satyamurti voted for the motion, 23
United
Nationalists
the council
minor April India
were
opposed
neutral
it.®
and
Willingdon
the
great
majority
was prepared
of
to suffer
budget defeats, but Lord Gaschen*, his successor in 1924, used his powers under the 1919 Government of Act to restore grants or resubmit them to the council.
The
Swarajists
were
more
successful
in
using
points
of
procedure to ensnare ministers and executive councillors and to delay the business of the council. It was a tactic particularly suited to the position of the Madras Swarajists because even a few members could create considerable disruption. Satyamurti, who delighted in his own skill at repartee, excelled at this and on several occasions succeeded in infuriating members of the government. Favoured ploys
were the use of points of discussion of legislation ment
the
motions
on
tabling
of
matters
numerous
of
order to stop the introduction or the Swarajists opposed, adjourn"urgent
and
public
elaborate
importance",
questions
every sensitive area of the administration. questions were tabled in the second council,
the first,®!
and by early
1924
question
to
probe
Twice as 1923-26,
and
many as in
time was absorbing
nearly half the council's day as well as providing a fulltime occupation for bureaucrats who thought they had better work to do. The government responded by tightening council
procedure.
From
hour a day, ("starred")
August
1924
question
time
was
fixed
at
one
and from February 1925 only specially designated questions were answered in the council and open
for supplementary questions, replies to the rest being published directly in the proceedings.®* A time limit was also placed on speeches in major debates. The election of Justice
MLC,
vehement
in
in
1925
nothing
M.
led
to
to
Ruthnaswami,
further
their
prevent
as
president
to
these
restrictions.
objections
them.
The
of
the
council
Swarajists
changes,
but
were
could
a
late
do
Far from constitution-wrecking, the Swarajists and the United Nationalists revelled in the language and conventions
of
British
courtesies praise for
the
parliamentarianism.
There
were
the
customary
between members on opposing benches, the lavish a deceased MLC or a retiring executive councillor,
reverence
for
the
minutia
of
procedure
at
Westminister.
Satyamurti, whose fondness for self-advertisement his less attractive traits, was again conspicuous
respect.°' emulation
of
fitness
of
Opposition the
for
House
and ministerial
of
Commons
self-government
and
as
MLCs
itself
was one in this
alike regarded
a demonstration
responsibility,
and
the
of
96 Government of Madras, intent on making dyarchy a success, encouraged this. In 1922 the council's president and secretary visited Westminister to study parliamentary procedure
and almost
invariably
reference
was made
to practices
in the
Commons when questions of procedure were raised. It was, therefore, natural for the Swarajists to identify with the parliamentary atmosphere. It was not the Swarajists who had
captured
the
legislature,
tivated
the
Swarajists.
As
far
as
Tamilnad
but
was
the
legislature
concerned
two
whith
issues
cap-
dominated
the second council and they illustrate the sort of practical probiems the Swarajists faced. They were the Hindu Religious Endowments Act and the agitation against land resettlement in Tanjore.
Legislation
for
the
control
of Hindu
religious
endow-
ments, which were a major potential source for ministerial patronage, had been inhibited before 1920 by the British reluctance to interfere in religious matters. With the ad-
vent
of elected
The enormous teries along
ministers
in
1920
this
wealth and influence of with the power Brahmins
the endowments an obvious Religious Endowments Bill
target for was passed
obstacle
the Justicites. in March 1923 at
It attracted
was
before
rushed
consulted
but
not
through
exclusively,
the
council
and because
it was
from
thought
removed.
Hindu temples and derived from them
close of the first council.“ ism, mainly,
was
the
widespread
Brahmins,
public
opinion
unnecessarily
monasmade
A Hindu the
critic-
because
had
been
it
vindictive:
"a pernicious measure" T. Rangachari called it.*® The Swarajists opposed the bill and demanded its amendment or repeal in their election manifestos. Swarajya called the Justice Party a "Colossus bestriding the Presidency with one foot
firmly
implanted
in
the
mutts
[monasteries]
and
temples
the other in the local and district boards".® The
Governor
had
his
own
reservations
about
the
and
bill
and
sent it back to the legislature for revision. It was unsuccessfully opposed by the Swarajists and some of the other United Nationalists. Questions then arose as to the legality of the second council amending a measure inherited from the first council, and the bill was resubmitted in 1925. It did not pass through all its stages before the second council was
dissolved for the
the
and
so
it
again
featured
in
the
election
campaign
the third council in 1926. Srinivasa Iyengar, by 1926 Tamil Swarajist leader, declared his complete aversion
bill
and
attributed
Swarajist
public opposition to it.°” Naidu,
Ramaswami
Naicker
and
success
in the
On the other hand, Kalyanasundara
election
Varadarajulu
Mudaliar
to
to
supported
97 the legislation and accused its opponents of Brahmin alism. The bill finally became law in 1927. The
Bill
agitation
illuminates
Firstly,
it
against
two
showed
the
the
facets
Hindu
of
party
the
as
Religious
Swarajya
an
agency
commun-
Endowments
Party
in Tamilnad.
through
which
Brahmins tried to protect their interests in provincial politics. This necessarily hampered closer association with the
non-Brahmin United Nationalists and offended non-Brahmin Congressmen. Secondly, the Swarajists, operating within the framework of electoral politics had to collect all the pro-
vincial
grievances
party's
had
to
funds issue
they
strength.
be
weighed
that
would
in the
immediate struggle
and
hasten
grievance
against
the
To a greater
were:
ryotwari
could
1926
delay
the
Party.
than
by
communal
a
increase
votes
to
but
it
and The
replace
the
permanent
temple
was
exploit
their
support
and
The bill
not
was
an
an
in
legislation
the debates Madras.
legislature
resettlements
swaraj,
to
non-Brahmin
Brahmin
Swarajists
Justice
extent
in order
losing
elections.
or
for
of
valuable
land dominated legislature in
the
find
danger
against
1923
government, the dyarchy
could
The
their
or
local
questions of primary issues
periodic
settlement
and
could
the legislature assume the right to dictate the nature of land taxation? MLCs demanded a change from the reassessment of ryotwari land every 30 years to a permanent settlement in
the belief
that
this
would
share of the profit from resolution for permanent 1921,
issue
and
the
was
committee
referred
leave
the
cultivator
his own labour settlement was
of
MLCs
and
recommended
the
a fairer
and improvements. A carried in December
officials
to
revolutionary
which
the
change
of
giving the legislature the power to dictate future increases in the assessment rates. On the issue of permanent settlement the committee was divided.® The
government
rejected
the
report's
allow
either
recommendations
and
in August 1922 announced the enhancement of land revenue rates in the Tanjore and Trichinopoly districts by as much as 18 per cent on dry lands and 25 per cent on wet. Sir Arthur Knapp, the
Home
Member,
legislature
refused
to contest
to
the new rates.’”°
ened civil disobedience if the new rates but for the present they concentrated on
of
the
spokesmen
Swarajists
elections,
in
to
the
could
Tanjore
legislature.
field
they
pledged to reduce or abolish for permanent settlement.”!
Unlike
the
were not securing
most
only one candidate
ran
the Two
three
mtrasdars
The mirasdare
candidates
the
threat-
modified, the election
districts
in the who
or
1923
were
where
enhancements and to agitate Swarajists were elected;
98 the third seat went to a pro-Swarajist Vellala mtrasdar, S. Muthiah Mudaliar.* On 14 December 1923 Muthiah Mudaliar moved
a
resolution
enue rates assessment
narrowly
in
the
legislature
that
the
enhanced
rev-
of
the
ministerial
for Tanjore should not be introduced until a new policy had been formulated, but his proposal was
defeated
by
the
combined
and
nominated
members.7?
ive
The government held and asserted that the
votes
that the new rates were not excessagitation was "primarily political
in character". After Knapp had the mirasdars in February 1924,
rejected a second appeal fron many of them began to despair
meeting
of March
of
achieving
not to by the
at
redress
through
Mayavaram
at
constitutional
the
end
channels.7?
mirasdare
a
resolved
pay the April revenue instalment. They were encouraged difficulty the government experienced in disposing of
property
attached
from
earlier
defaulters,
by Knapp's
admission that for the present 18 per cent ing for land revenue increases, and by the of his thrown
At
hastily-drafted out on 28 March
public
would be the ceilignominious defeat
Madras Land Revenue Settlement Bill, 1924 by a legislature which demanded
full control over resettlement.” But the mirasdare were not the intrepid satyagrahis the nationalist press exhorted them to be. Their lands, among the richest in the presidency,
were too valuable to gamble with and by the end of April kist (instalment of revenue) payments were up to 75 per cent of the demand.7> A proposal by Congress zealots for mass civil disobedience was rejected by a mirasdars' conference at Mannargudi on 18-19 May; so was a suggestion that the local
mirasdars' But,
August
as
tation
the
1924
association mirasdars
the
quickly The
should
highest
died
merge
wavered,
rates
agitation
the
Tanjore DCC. 7°
government
were
away.7’
resettlement
with
the
scaled
had
down
a dual
relented.
and
In
the
agi-
importance.
On
its negative side it demonstrated the weakness of the Swarajists and their allies in the legislature against the combined votes
of
the
ministerial
and
official
members.
If
the
constitution-
al path were blocked, there was little the Swarajists would, or could, do for their electors. Neither the Swarajist MLCs nor the majority of mirasdars were prepared for a confront-
ation
with
confiscation
On
the
nection
the
of
government
positive
between
property
side, the
the
which
and
would
might
Swarajists
Congress
and
involve
still
the
had
result
imprisonment
revived
in
the
ests.
the
Swarajya
Most
party
was
significantly,
a
watchdog
the
old
wealthier
landlords.
only
Brahmin
Although many leading mirasdars were Brahmins, the of Vellalas like Muthiah Mudaliar weakened Justice that
failure.
Swarajists
for
had
and
con-
involvement criticisms
placed
inter-
the
99 Congress
in
the
forefront
of
the
ing landholding system. And campaign with constitutional
agitation
against
the
exist-
they followed up their Tanjore activity on behalf of the other
landholders and tenants elsewhere in the Madras Presidency, while, by default the Justice Party, its voice muted by collab-
oration
with
the
Raj,
of the mirasdars A Hopeless played
At
and
Basis
appeared
ryots.
for a Party
the beginning of a straightforward
anti-constitutionalists. oppose the Congress and,
dyarchy,
to
demonstrate
over non-cooperation limits of the Madras the exception of the stable a ministry as as
the
only
game
far
less
active
in
the
interests
System
the dyarchy period Willingdon had game of constitutionalists versus
He relied on the Justicites to by their successful working of
the
superiority
of
parliamentarianism
and civil disobedience. Within the game, Willingdon was successful: with Punjab, no province had produced as Madras. But Willingdon did not see this
for
a Governor
to
play.
Indeed,
the
success
of the first game engendered a second type of contest, this time playing off one constitutionalist group against another. At the time of the no-confidence motion in the Legislative Council in November 1923 Willingdon had advised the European and the
nominated Secretary
MLCs to support Panagal, but, so of State, if a similar situation
he informed occurred he
would not intervene even if it meant the fall of the ministry.” The election of Swarajists in 1923 and the creation of the United Nationalists did not alarm him because he believed that in In time
Tories,
ition
Madras the they would
and
after
the Radicals
Swarajists were not constitution-wreckers. emerge as Radicals against the Justice
three
might
years
cooling
be ready
their
heels
in
for office.”
oppos-
It was left for Lord Goschen, as Willingdon's successor, to supervise the second game. This was to be a fairly evenly matched bout following the Queensbury rules of constitution-
alism and with Goschen appearing as Willingdon's role of trainer in the He
the
In undertaking
sought
to replace
non-Brahmin
inter-communal
this
the
role
Justicites
parties
Goschen
communal
with
and
referee Justice
had
division
their
several
Brahmin
contrasting
rather than corner.
he had been tradition. Willingdon
motives
in Madras
opponents
progressive
servative programs. Goschen was the eldest Unionist and had been an MP for 10 years.
in
between
and
by
two
con-
son of a Liberal Like Willingdon,
educated in Westminister's powerful parliamentary He understood the reasons which impelled
to
appoint
a
non-Brahmin
ministry,
but
he
was
100
anxious to create a two-party requisite
for
were his of State
system,
the development
that presumed
of a healthy
superiors. Witness Lord for India in May 1924:
pre-
legislature.
Olivier, Labour's "A communal basis
So
Secretary may be a
necessary transitional expedient, but it is one of kinds of bases possible for National Parliamentary
the worst insti-
tutions".®° Or the Conservatives' Lord Birkenhead in July 1927: "It always seemed to me obvious that the Brahmin-nonBrahmin division was a hopeless basis for a party system.. .""8!
Goschen knew what was expected of him.°? depend
It
was, in addition, exclusively on the
disadvantageous Justice Party.
for the Raj During non-
to
cooperation such dependence had been necessary to combat Congress, but with non-cooperation defeated and with the
Justice
Party
pushful
servant.
was
time
1923
ever
hungry
for the master Sir
and court
Willingdon,
tributing
C.P.
favourite
was
alleged
appointments
for
more
to reassert
patronage
Ramaswami
of Goschen
by
the
his
and
Aiyar,
Law
as he had
Justice
power,
independence
Member
been
ministers
and promotions
in the gift
to
the it
of the
since
of
be
dis-
of the
reserved half to Brahmins and to be conspiring with the Brahmin Swarajists to overthrow the Justice ministry. Goschen dismissed such allegations as part of the Justicites' perpet-
ual
feud
with
patronage.®*
the
Brahmins
and their
ceaseless
quest
A report drafted by the Government
for
of Madras
in 1926 complained that "the main interference during the past three years was that attempted by the Ministers in regard
civil
be
ial
to
patronage
servants
taught
office
that
alike it
and
did
was
them
tional system, of dyarchy, to
then
not
reserved
that
have
the an
side..."°*
Justice
automatic
into
and
active
civil
was
right
disobedience.
participation
in the
and, by inducing them to moderate the nationalist
share in movement
evidence
the
constitutionalism.
There
Governor
leadership to
had
in
1925-26
that
and
to
minister-
it was time to press on with the grand prepared. Congressmen had been forced
non-cooperation
to lure
the
felt
its perquisites.
And, finally, scheme Montagu had
abandon
on
to
Now
the
task
the and
running streng-
constitu-
Congress
in
Madras would participate in Goschen's game. The majority of the United Nationalists formally joined the Congress on the eve of the 1926 elections and they constituted the largest element among the Congress MLCs returned. As their origins and their performance in the second council indicated, the United Nationalists were not ottt to destroy dyarchy but to
slip
into
the Justicites'
chairs.
In
late
1925
and early
1926
101 they negotiated with the leaders of the Responsivists, a splinter group of Swarajists who had rejected "non-cooperation through the legislatures" for "responsive cooperation".®> Until
he
resigned
from
Vice-Chancellor Reddi,
the
of
United
the
the
legislature
new
Andhra
Nationalists'
in
March
1926
University,
most
C.
to
become
Ramalinga
articulate
spokesman,
openly favoured responsivism. The Swarajists had, he pointed out in December 1925, promised to reduce land taxation and to end corruption in local government, and "once you promise redress of such grievances,. how can you taboo office as something unclean?"®* The death of C.R. Das in June 1925, following the failure of the Swarajists to paralyse dyarchy in Bengal,
fied
favoured
cooperation. Strong
the
United
Madras.
posed
though
tactical
shift
the
of
Nationalists
Srinivasa
pull
decided
Iyengar,
the Responsivists
Nationalists
ambitions
joined
the
Iyengar
majorities
to
TNCC
in Madras
was,
to
that
would
and other
quali-
all
Swarajists
publicly
if the United have
however,
if the
to
almost
the
president,
they
In private, that
obstruction
cling
insisted
Congress
hinted
from
responsivism
the
and
of office.°’
Rangaswami
tial
a
Congress
to
provinces
in
op-
renounce
Srinivasa won
in
and
substan-
1926
the
party would change its policy and take office.°* Srinivasa Iyengar hoped that a Congress electoral landslide would force from the British enough concessions to justify a more respon-
sive
the
policy
by the Congress,
party,
he
would
be
in
and,
as the president-elect
a position
to
direct
it.
For
part, the United Nationalists wanted the electoral asset the name and organization of the Congress, which at its
of
their of
Cawnpore session in December 1925 had officially adopted the Swarajist program. They knew, too, that incorporation within
the Congress and temporary renunciation of office was better than a three-cornered contest in which the Justice Party would be likely to win against a divided Congress and Responsivist opposition. It was, C.V.S. Narasimha Raju told the Responsivist
leaders,
parties of
In the
the
elections
Congress
effective ing his
was
campaigning
the Congress anced
"absolutely
necessary"
in Madras.©
won
party's
in
in November the
and
urban
party
a large measure
candidates
the interests
in
1926
to
have
the
involvement
Tamilnad
of the principal
two
greatest
constituencies,
of rural
only
in
strength
but
through
agrarian
support.
Srinivasa
communities
issues
In select-
Iyengar
bal-
in the con-
stitutency — by choosing a VelJala and a Vanniyar in Chingleput, for example, running two Vellalas and a Brahmin in Tanjore, and seeking a prominent Gounder to contest in
Coimbatore
or Salem.
But
the choice
of candidates
was
small.
102 Fach
non-Muhammadan
from
40,000
with
a total
smaller
constituency
population
to
and
75,000
had
stituencies
in
most
voters.
fewer
The
voters.
incorporated
covered
cases
several
a whole
of over
urban
The
district,
1,500,000
and
Christian
con-
constituencies
Muslim
and
districts
or
towns;
a
were few
strayed over linguistic boundaries. Thus, to win a seat a candidate had to be a man of exceptional wealth and influence, or such a person's protege. Such men were few and it was not, therefore,
1926
were
MLCs.
previous had
Of
former the
the
in
1926
old
elected
been
many
United
MLCs
MLCs.°°
than
Composition
Congress
Nationalist 1926,
Party
51
lines
years,
a new
TABLE
Party
the
10 of the
in previous
rather
of
in
in Tamilnad
than
pack
that
Justice,
98
council;
previously
drawn of
surprising
deck.
had
but
were
11
Total
98
were
in
22 nominated
the
132-member
According to the government's figures Congress was the largest single party, but
third
of the
shrunk to ents were antipathy
ministry
the
number
1926
of seats.
The
MLCs
legis-
(Table 3), the held less than
Justice
Party
had
a
21 MLCs, but many of those described as Independformer Justicites who in view of Goschen's known to the party had cpted for neutrality until a new
was
an ambitious in
total
candidates
clearly
36 21
of elected MLCe
lature.*!
the
reshuffling
Legislature, 41
there
of
3
of the Madras
officials
in
more
it was
Congress
In addition
Independent
sat
24 Congress
Independents Justice
and
and
candidates
formed.
Governor
legislature.
As
in
free
1920,
the
election
to dictate
the
results
balance
left
of power
On 22 November 1926 Goschen invited Narasimha Raju, as leader of the Congress party in the legislature, to form a
ministry.
for the
two
Narasimha
days
election
gestions
in which
results
was
had
by Congressmen
"very
anxious"
to consult been
that
his
announced
the
to
do
so,
but
there
had
been
party.°*
party
take
As
office
soon
asked
as
sug-
rather
103 than "waste its years in futile opposition".°? But Congressmen in the council and outside it agreed that a Congress
ministry
could
not
be
formed
the AICC or the annual
without
the prior
Congress.°*
approval
Narasimha
of
Raju returned
to Goschen on 24 November to regret that the party could not form a ministry because the Congress forbad its members to take
he
if
office.
and
at
least
Goschen
Gauhati
He
would
a month
This
keep
the
wait
until
the
other
later
Goschen
extremists of
however,
15
before not
impress
them
Congress
open
and
like
forming
his
annual
do.
He
the
to
form
that
that
a ministry
Congress
session
at
ministry.°° that
the
mod-
Madras
mem-
could not constitute a great blow to the
that
responsivists".
by asserting
Governor
regretted
demonstrated
were
on
would
the
the Congress party it would have been
among
game
MLCs
could
erate elements in ministry "because bers
did,
the
©
the
He
did,
election
a
however,
verdict
had
gone against the Panagal ministry and by refusing to include the former ministers in the new ministry. °” He turned to
the amorphous, acephalous Independents and together his ministerial team. Subbarayan
Chief
R.N.
Minister
Arogyaswami
Ranganatha,
a
with
A.
Ranganatha
Mudaliar,
former
an
government
Mudaliar
Indian
servant
from them pieced was appointed from
Christian as
the
Bellary,
and,
Second
like
and
and
Third Ministers. The choice of Subbarayan as Chief Minister was an interesting one, particularly in view of Goschen's
aim of drawing Gounder
Dublin
tice in Central
the Congress
zamindar,
before
qualifying
United
had
as
responsivism. studied
a barrister
A 37-year-oid
at Madras,
and
setting
Oxford
up
and
prac-
Madras. Since 1920 he had been returned by the South Landholders constituency which mustered less than 60
electors. Although he had and left the Justice Party gress
into
Subbarayan
Nationalist
in
stituents.
1926,
He
leaders,
presumably had,
resigned as in 1922 and Subbarayan
not
however,
wishing
been
a council secretary had been among the
did
to
not
join
antagonize
a Congressmen
until
the
his
Con-
con-
the
Calcutta Congress and was a close friend of Rajagopalachari. One critic described him as an opportunist with a "secondclass brain", who was in the legislature "because it was easy for him to be there".°® But opportunism and mediocrity were common
enough
struct
a new ministerial
position was originality.
Acceptance
in
the
council
and
Subbarayan's
amiable
dis-
some compensation for his lack of resolution and He was a figure around whom Goschen could con-
of Office
party.
no Crime
For many Tamil Congressmen the a convenient short-term solution to
Independent ministry was the Swarajists' dilemma.
104 It excluded the Justice Party from office while placing ministerial power in the hands of men less communal and nationalistic than their predecessors. If the ministry
more dis-
appointed the Congress or if the Congress at Gauhati lifted the ban on office, the Congress MLCs could vote it out. "We shall
break
it",
boasted
Satyamurti,
"but
how
we
shall
break
it and when is for us to determine'.°? Even when the Congress met and decided to keep the ban, the confidence of the Congressmen
that they
remained
were
masters
undiminished.
of
the
Madras
situation
Rajagopalachari was one of the ministry's principal backers. It kept the Brahmin Swarajists from the temptation of ministerial office, a necessary precaution against a new
outbreak
of anti-Brahminism,
and
it encouraged
non-Brahmins
to discard the narrow communalism of the Justice leadership.°° No less significantly, the ministry allowed Rajagopalachari to make his own legislative experiments. He persuaded Subbarayan to take up the cause of prohibition and threaten
to resign
if the progress
Rajagopalachari, ion
were
achieved
were it
of a Prohibition
blocked
would
by
be
the
Bill,
drafted
Governor.
a worthwhile
by
If prohibit-
reform;
if
it
were
not,- the futility of working dyarchy at all might be demonstrated and a situation created favourable for a resumption
of civil disobedience. !°! in
Other
Congressmen
keeping
had
Subbarayan
in
contribution
which
had
off
of patronage
different
office.
starved
the
The
ideas
of
the
exorbitant
transferred
advantages
provincial
departments
of
funds since 1920 were now being remitted — 57 lakhs in March 1926, 167 lakhs a year later — thus offering the ministers a unique opportunity to implement constructive reforms. '°? The MLCs of all parties had spent too lavishly on the elections to wish to see the council dissolved and a new election held, the outcome of which was unpredictable.!°? And some Congressmen hoped that keeping Subbarayan in power would not only cut the the
the
a case the
its
1927,
did
with
flow
to Justicites
Congressmen. 0 Since the Subbarayan ministry seemed
of
A
government
spoilt
Justice
former A.
not
child,
Party
by
proxy.
suddenly
resorted
position.’°5
Ramaswami
"desire"
its "present
or
to
In‘an
Mudaliar
"even
s:.ength
Congress the best
deprived
tantrums
editorial
announced
contemplate"
but
also
divert
it to
could not take office. alternative. It was
of
and
parental
threats
in Justice
that
the
forming
in the council..."
favour, to
on
Justice
regain
9 March Party
a ministry
1
Other
Justice leaders criticized dyarchy as unworkable — despite their obvious success in having worked it for six years —
105 and
called
wreck
the
1927
the
ministry
on
the
Congress
constitution.
Justicites
and
asked
moved
MLCs
to
During
the
fulfil
budget
a no-confidence
the Congress
to support
their
pledges
debates
motion
to
of March
against
them.
The
the
Justice
and Congress votes together might be enough to oust Subbarayan, but, while the ban on office-holding by the Congress remained,
the
alternative
would
be
a
Justice
or
a
reorganized
Independent ministry backed by the Justice Party. Neither would be as favourable to the Congress as the existing ministry. S. Venkatachelam Chetti,* who had replaced Narasimha Raju as Congress leader in the legislature after the latter's election
as
Iyengar
president
giving
his
own
to take
office
prevent
the Justice
Congress
of
the
opinion
wasabluff.
MLCs
to
S.
Muthiah
consulted
that
Srinivasa
abstain
from
the
Mudaliar
Srinivasa
Justice
Iyengar
promise
advised
to office. !°”
ministry facade.
of
the
no-confidence
Party returning
By these tactics the appearing in the Congress by
council,
was One
Tanjore,
vote
not
the
so
as
to
saved, but cracks were breakaway group, heade
wanted
to
dismiss
the
care-
taker ministry and take office regardless of the Congress ban; another, consisting mainly of Telugu and Malayali MLCs resentful of the control exercised by Srinivasa Iyengar and his Tamil
associates,
that
the
Justicites
constitutional party's
tactics
leader.
wanted
would
crisis came,
As an Andhra
the
not
would
ministry
form
result.
however,
defeated
a new
The main
from
in
ministry
Prakasam,
patriot,
as an ambitious
been
consequence
the
belief
and
so
attack the
a
on the
Telugu
politician
jealous of the rise of Rajagopalachari and Srinivasa Iyengar to the highest levels in the national Congress, Prakasam seized the chance to condemn the opportunism and cynicism
which
he believed
had
the
of Congress
support
for the Independent ministry. "Congressmen", he explained in a statement published on 20 May 1927, "were found at the doors of some ministers at all hours of the day and night waiting .to get some of their own men nominated for taluq and district
boards
and
some
other
favours". !°¢
At the request of Telugu and Malayali MLCs Prakasam, the Congress Working Committee in May
explanation
of the
conduct
of the
legislative
egged on by called for an
party
in Madras.
On the basis of explanations by Venkatachelam Chetti and his deputy, Satyamurti, Srinivasa Iyengar as Congress president steered through the CWC a resolution absolving the Congress leadership in the council from any blame. There had, it said, been "no possibility of wrecking dyarchy" in Madras at the time of the no-confidence motion in March; indeed, the party
had
"done
thening
all
of the
that
lay
in its power
bureaucracy
by
means
to prevent of an
the
alliance
strengof
the
:
106 bureaucracy
with
communalism
a party
and
to
whose
repress
securing office..."
avowed
policy
nationalism
1¥9
Prakasam was furious partisan behaviour of the
for
is
to promote
the
at wnat he believed Congress president.
purpose
of
to be the In speeches
in Madras he denounced Srinivasa Iyengar and his henchmen, and called for the overthrow of Subbarayan and the destruct-
ion
of dyarchy.
who
for
excitable
Telugu,
his
leadership called for
Srinivasa Congress 1927, by In
own
of an
He
was
and
by
ends
joined R.K.
was
by
trying
to
as
president
secretary deferred the which time it lad been July
1927
the
Although
leadership contributed the instigators of its
non-Brahmin
Sambamurti,
foment
Srinivasa Iyengar. The AICC meeting to discuss
Iyengar
Coimbatore.
B.
Shanmugham
and
Congressmen
of
Coimbatore,
hostility
to
the
Telugus and Malayalis the CWC's verdict, but
A.
Rangaswami
lyengar
as
meeting until late October overtaken by new developments.
Non-Brahmin
the
another
Chetti*
Confederation
frustration
felt
by
met
the
at
Justice
to the surly mood of the conference, most controversial resolutions were
or
recent
defectors
from
the
Congress
— Shanmugham Chetti, Ramaswami Naicker, V. Chakkarai Chetti and Varadarajulu Naidu. The first resolution urged Justicites to join the Congress so as to swamp its Brahmin element and convert it to a non-Brahmin party; the second condemned dyarchy as unworkable and declared that the Justice Party
would
not
take
office
until
provincial
duced; the third, which was not passed, Aiyar as Law Member of having contrived
Justice
Party
Aiyar's
enter
stooge,
Had
the
in
1926
and,
demanded
Justicites
the Congress,
the
attacking
the
recall
taken
Tamil
seriously
was
intro-
accused Ramaswami the defeat of the
Goschen
of
Congress
autonomy
the
the
might
as
Ramaswami
Governor.
}!°
resolution
well
have
to
suddenly assumed a more non-Brahmin character; certainly the responsivist elements within the party would have been strengthened. Dr Irschick assumes that a non-Brahmin influx
did occur and that the conversion of the Tamil Congress from a predominantly Brahmin to an overwhelmingly non-Brahmin organization was a consequence of the Coimbatore resolution. }!? There is no evidence to support this assumption. Congressmen feared
a Justice
flood,
but
be no more than a trickle."
were
relieved
Not a single
when
it
proved
to
leading Justicite
resurfaced in the Congress at this time, nor was the policy and leadership of the Tamil Congress noticeably altered as a result. The increasingly non-Brahmin character of the Congress after 1927 — especially from 1930 — had more fundamental causes: the second generation of western-educated and
107 middle-class non-Brahmins no longer clung to the protection of the communal safeguards and organizations of their elders, and from the late 1920s the Congress was more successful in making
appeals
The
were
to
the
immediate
to
make
Goschen
interests
consequences even
more
of
the
non-Brahmins.
of
the
Coimbatore
hostile
and more determined than ever to igned dyarchy constitution. His
were
issues
irresponsible
and
to
the
make a success suspicion that
blinkered
from
by communalism and patronage
resolutions
Justice
seeking
Party
of the malthe Justicites
larger political
was confirmed.}!?
The
Justice leaders were themselves divided as to the wisdom of the resolutions. Some of the younger non-Brahmins were en-
thusiastic, but openly hostile,
K.V. Reddi Naidu, the former minister, was and Panagal, though he did not criticize the
resolutions in public, attempted a private reconciliation with Goschen. The resolutions also threatened the party's main source of the threat not
income — the zamindars, to work dyarchy.1!*
who
were
alarmed
at
The Coimbature resolutions were no less embarrassing Srinivasa Iyengar and his associates. They no longer had
excuse his
to
own
keep
convictions,
confidence It
was
the
motion
Independent
Venkatachelam
against
defeated.
ministry
With
the
the
ministry
votes
of
and Independent MLCs whose loyalty generous distribution of patronage
ly been nominated
67
votes
to
4 others).'5
the
freed himself Congressman's
Once
1919
With
again
dyarchy
1926 come
local
boards
Goschen's
56
the
and
to
suggest
further
Government
of
India
Act,
was
23
Against
a no-
August
nominated,
Congress, support
Congress.
which
1927.
official
14
survived
Justice
Subbarayan
He
was
by
in the
had
constitutional
steps.
This time it was by the Indian Statutory Cominvestigate the working
been speculating on the under the provisions of not
and
the
politics
become, was shaken. 8 November 1927 of an by Sir John Simon, to
Congressmen in Tamilnad had of such a commissicn which,
moved
— the ministry
(38
active
the kaleidoscope,
on
office.
had been stiffened by a — about 16 MLCs had recent-
from dependence on the caretaker no longer.
legislature had announcement on mission, headed of
to
opposition's
Chetti
in
to an
scheduled
Since
outthe
until
1929.
constitutional
reme-
Varadarajulu Naidu had seen the commission as an argument in favour of Congressmen taking office, reasoning that Congress ministers would best be able to point out to the commission
the
limitations
dies.'¥
shattered
At
of dyarchy
But the hopes
by the
a stroke
the
and
propose
which many Congressmen
appointment
Secretary
of
of an "all-white" State,
Lord
had were
committee.
Birkenhead,
had
108
offended the
politicians
preparation
At the
December joint
of all
of
their
annual
1927,
resolution
session
Besant
parties
own
of the Congress
returned
with
by excluding
them
constitution.
Srinivasa
to
active
Iyengar
from
at Madras
politics
in
to
deploring
move
the
a
Secretary of State's "utter disregard of India's right of self-determination" and pledging Congressmen to boycott the
Commission.'!”?
For once the Justice Party marched
"The
may
with
the
Congress.
Commission
Governors
Justice come,
and European
on
27
tour
November
the
1927
country,
Associations
and
in step
warned
dine
that
with
go back.
Indians
will have neither share nor part in such a Commission". 12° On
the
25
January
legislature
1928
a resolution
with
opposing
the commission
in
any
its
cooperation
existing
by
form was
carried in the Madras Legislative Council by a majority of 32. Among the 12 MLCs who abstained were the Second and Third Ministers and the Raja of Panagal.!!°
The adverse vote on the Simon Commission forced Goschen to rethink his tactics. The game was not going as he had expected.
True,
there
was
Simon
Commission
to
the
still
the
Justice
hope
ministerial
of at
party,
there
Justice
parties
would
reached
Madras.
Such
but
also
to obstruct
was
Party
had
with
the
least
but
a danger
join
hands
the work an
some
been
Congress outcry
that
not
dethroned
only
might
MLCs defecting
against
the
the Congress to
oust
of the commission
outcome
and
be
and
Subbarayan
when
disastrous
it
for
dyarchy; certainly, it would damage Goschen's political career. Frantically, the Governor set about shoring up Subbarayan's ministry. "It is very necessary", he had written to Birkenhead in November 1927, "that the Ministry... should be made a steadying force at the present mo.rent". !*° the
He refused to accept Subbarayan's offer to resign over Simon Commission vote, but the Chief Minister had made
himself unpopular with the commission without
his own party by issuing a welcome consulting other Independent MICs.
to
Ranganatha Mudaliar, the Second Minister, was a Theosophist and a long-standing follower of Besant and he urged the Independents to join in the boycott of the commission.
Arogyaswami
Mudaliar,
his more purposeful post
‘was not On
in
2 March
the
Third
colleague,
jeopardy. 1928
But
Minister,
was
believing
that
it was.
Venkatachelam
Chetti,
drawn
along
by
his ministerial
encouraged
by
the
split within the ministerial party, introduced a no-confidence motion, the third against the ministry in 18 months. By what
the Hindu described introduced
his
motion
as "astonishing before
many
of
laxity", the
Venkatachelam.
Congress
MLCs
were
109 present
in
approval
the
of a third
for moving
at
this
offer
Ministers
failure
reversal
on
of the of
ministers
no
MLCs. He compelled
the
reshuffling the
and,
fortune,
Law
them
against
therefore,
same
juncture
occurred.
the
Membership,
the
overjoyed
Subbarayan's
and
he
Third
regarded
cooperation concluded
with
that
the
of a majority
intended
himself
as
a bluff,
out
Goschen
opportunity
considered
for
political
Aiyar's
appointing
Subbarayan's
laid
lawyers
a
cold.'?°
of Madras
and
ministry
divided,“assailed
sheet
below
began
and
Congressmen
startled
a clean
House
tenure a
far been a Brahmin preserve. He it would be foolish to offend the from the Cabinet, and he promoted Venkatarama Sastri, to the post, portfolio to Muhammad Usman, Home
Council.
and
in the
Government
Government
Brahmin
of
resign, but they felt resignations that
Goschen which had
by
the
to a
the
to resign if the portfolio were not restored. refused to give way, accepted the resignation
advised
Executive
the
proportion
as tantamount
of Ramaswami
had
win
protested
in
the
that
to
Venkatarama
was
of
aside
Second
confidence
end
Goschen
Goschen,
motion
he
a second
At
non-Brahmin to what had so had, however, decided that Brahmins by excluding them the Advocate-General, T.R. but transferred the police
Member
the
votes
requisite
brushed
informed
enjoyed
six
the
and summoned vote
by
sort.'?)
no-confidence
earlier
longer
council,
of this
He
latest
failed
did not actually ask them to to do so and handed in their
evening. }?? of
good
7 March.
the
it
of the
to resign
Commission,
At
and
a resolution
unexpected
second
Simon
council,
could
his
of writing
the
not
Venkatarama
red,
political last
by Justicites
and
to
threaten
Sastri
paper
embossed
on
longer,
Congressmen.
been
found
his
crest
arithmetic
much
and
desk
of
the
anew.
internally
The
Justice
the
new
Party had to be won back to collaboration and to dyarchy. The Justicites had coveted the patronage Ramaswama Aiyar had exercised as Law Member, and Venkatarama Sastri's impetuous
folly
Member
was M.
Goschen's Krishnan
opportunity.
Nair,
He
a Justicite
one of the few Justice leaders the Coimbatore resolutions and
appointed from
as
Malabar
who
to dissociate themselves to express a willingness
had
Law
been
from to
work with the Simon Commission. Keeping Subbarayan as Chief Minister, Goschen appointed as Second and Third Ministers S. Muthiah Mudaliar from Tanjore and M.R. Sethuratnam Aiyar of
in
Trichinopoly,
1926
and
voted
both
of
against
whom
had
run
cooperation
on
the
with
Congress
the
ticket
commission
in
January. Goschen made his conditions clear: the ministers were not to hinder the work of the Simon Commission and they were to work dyarchy. They agreed. !2# In reply to accusations
110 that
he
had
betrayed
Sethuratnam
in
the
shrugged
Council
of an office
and
in
the
Congress
his
cooperate
in
its
his
and
electors,
said:
"Once
working,
the
sin or crime".!*°
protested
formation
and
shoulders
is no great
The Hindu
part
the
that
of
for
political
Goschen
"to
groups
to
we
are
acceptance
take
sustain
an active parti-
cular individuals in power is an improper exercise of gubernatorial influence and patronage."**© Improper perhaps, but effective.
When
yet
another
no-confidence
motion
was
flung
at the ministry on 20 March it was repulsed by a majority of 23. One of the casualties of the crisis was Rajagopalachari's Prohibition Bill. Despite promises made by the ministers to
sponsor prohibition prohibition was not
Mudaliar
"shameful
reached Even
petty
the
legislation, Subbarayan now declared feasible, a view repeated by Muthiah
as
Excise
Minister.
the
lowest
depths
betrayal",
cleanest
intrigues
commented
of
non-party
Rajagopalachari, bitterly:
intrigue
issue
cannot
over offices".'*’
the
experience
led
him
"Party
politics
at
this
have
self-seeking...
be
steered
Rajagopalachari's
experiment in legislative politics the next two years he continued to schemes,
and
furious
that
clear
first
had failed. Although press his prohibition
to
conclude
that
only
of
for
under
a constitution which provided at least provincial autonomy for India would it be possible to carry out such far-reaching reforms. But
The
patched-up
the
real
barque
victor
of
of
the
Subbarayan's
coup was
ministry
not Goschen
or
sailed
on.
Subbarayan,
but Panagal. From the low ebb of the 1926 elections and the shoals of the Coimbatore conference, Panagal had rescued his party. Goschen had been forced to turn back to the Justicites when the crisis over the Simon Commission showed the impossibility of substituting the Congress as the dominant conStitutionalist party. Changes in the procedure of the
commission announced in mid-1928 were seized upon as a justification for the reversal of the Justice Party's earlier hostility to the commission. In September a committee of the Madras
legislature
was
set
up
to
cooperate
with
the
Commission.!?°
In personal terms, Panagal's triumph was short-lived. He died on 16 December 1928. Among the candidates for the party leadership was Subbarayan who hoped to merge his supporters,
including
his
Brahmin
Third
Minister,
with
the Justice
group.
But the Justice Party was cial legislature and with
now the major force in the provinan election scheduled for the end
office
and
of
1929,
demand
its
without that
leaders
the
were
Subbarayan party
open
confident its
without
of
being
having
membership
to
returned
to
bow
to
Brahmins.
to
his
When
lll the non-Brahmin Subbarayan lost
of
Chittoor,
Confederation met at Nellore in October to a compromise candidate, B. Muniswami
in
the
The dilemma.
year 1929 Personal
lature.
Dyarchy
dized the
the
last
Justice
contest
party
leader.
brought a deepening of the Swarajists' rivalries and communal bitterness jeopar-
semblance
Party
for
1929, Naidu
had
of
not
were
party
been
unity
within
destroyed
reviving.
and
Congressmen
the
the
legis-
fortunes
canvassed
of
vari-
ous schemes which might allow their party to take office in Madras if they secured a majority in the elections scheduled for later in the year. The events of the past three years demonstrated
suffice
to
ramshackle
that
nothing
exclude
coalition
"There
was
no
lature
without
the
less
than
Justicites
of
the
meaning",
a Congress
and
to
Congress
Party
Venkatachelam
ministry
keep
Chetti
in
would
together the
the
council.
remarked
in
May 1929, "in a man getting married with a view to follow celibacy"; there was no sense in sitting in the legis-
jists'
being able to take office. !??
Srinivasa
Iyengar
failure
policy. leader
In
in
and he
1925-26
south
threw
was
the
to harmonize he
India.
himself
main
seemed He
into
casualty
regional the
was
most
rich,
politics
interests
of
dynamic
the
Congress
resourceful,
with
Swara-
with national
a fervour
energetic
that
trasted with his professional image as the shrewd and culous lawyer. In a peculiarly personal sense he made
Swarajists'
of
his
year
Iyengar
the
dilemma in
the
strove
for
provincial
architect
chose, and main rival
or
of the
his
own.
Madras
power
regional
1926
won, a seat was Motilal
After
legislature
and
the bitter
prominence
levels.
Congress
in
at
campaign
metithe
experience
1920-21,
Although
con-
the
he
Srinivasa
national, was
in Tamilnad,
for the central Assembly. Nehru, who after the death
not
the
main
Srinivasa
There his of Das was
the principal Swarajist. Suspecting Nehru of sympathizing with the Responsivists and wishing to establish himself as a national leader of the first order, Srinivasa Iyengar posed as the champion of the more extreme Congress elements, siding with the orthodox Swarajists in 1925-27 and joining with
Jawaharlal Nehru and to lead the movement national
role
Subhas Chandra Bose of Bengal for "complete independence".
Srinivasa
Iyengar
staunchly
opposed
in 1928-29 In his
office
acceptance under the existing constitution, but at the regional level he could only retain a secure political base by
hinting
gress
would
to
the
opt
United
for
Nationalists
office,
and
in
1926
by supporting
that
the
the Tamil
Con-
Congress MLCs in 1926-27 in their defence of Subbarayan's ministry. But this political schizophrenia could not continue indefinitely. At the national level Srinivasa lyengar
112 was
pushed
aside
leadership
at
by
the
the
end
of
return
of Gandhi
1928
and
between Motilal and Gandhi on pendence issue and Jawaharlal In
He
tried,
a speech
too
late,
in Madras
to
on
he
one and
dithered
side Bose
restore
19 May
to
of on
his
1929
active
disastrously
the the
complete other.
regional
he
political inde-
authority.
explained
that
for
several years he had supported the political experiment of refusing office under dyarchy. But, he went on, "In this Province our experiment has proved to be a disastrous failure and a party which was wholly defeated in 1926 has come back into greater power as an anti-national and reactionary
Ministry". In a province like Madras, of a strong, well-organized party like vented
a direct
ment,
he
exclude
now
its
fight
between
believed
rival
that
and
the
revive
the
where the intervention the Justicites pre-
Congress
Congress
the
and
must
the
take
nationalist
govern-
office
struggle. *3°
to
The CWC and the AICC did not agree. They were tired of Swarajist experiments and they looked forward either to Congress participation in constitutional discussions which would scrap dyarchy or to a resumption of civil disobedience for the achievement of complete swaraj. The CWC and AICC meetings at
Bombay
on
23-25
May
1929
provincial autonomy for for or against office.
Swarajya
asked,
It was
in
Tanjore
the
plete
a baffled Tamil
district
and
Nadu
in
independence,
the
TNCC's
request
office
when
dispirited
Provincial
August
moved
1929.
on his
Mudaliar* of Chingleput, was Srinivasa Iyengar's regional ability to provide the Tamil
dyarchy
is "about
Srinivasa
Iyengar
Conference
The
behalf
defeated base had Congress
at
by a been with
Mudaliar gress
in
he
had
held
for
December
to
second
too,
the
Tamil
in his place.°?
lution, he retired from lucrative law practice.
So,
Iyengar
and
it had
had
a resilient,
failed
four
years,
After the
complete
the Congress to The meteor had
Swarajya
to resolve
office-seeking
for
com-
Muthuranga
with the of TNCC
Muthuranga
the Lahore Con-
independence
reso-
return to his burnt itself out.
Party.
the dilemma
Justice
who
large majority. eroded by his inthe policy it
leaving
attending
to be
Vedaranniyam
resolution
by C.N.
needed to survive in constitutional competition Justice Party. In disgust he resigned the post president
for
the Congress committees to decide What is the point, Prakasam’s
of taking
got rid of?"!3!
attended
dismissed
Like
posed
Party.
Srinivasa
by dyarchy
GuapterR
4
CONFRONTATION
The Congress met at Calcutta at the end of December 1928 charged with a mood of frustration and anger. On its second tour of India, beginning in October 1928, the Simon Commission met with boycotts and black-flag demonstrations in almost every town and city it visited. On 30 October Lajpat Rai,
veteran
Punjabi
commission,
was
Congressman,
received
widely
lathi
believea,
were
leading
blows
the
from
cause
a procession the
of his
police
November. In the Bardoli taluk of Gujarat, had successfully led a satyagraha against a
hancement
interest
of
the
local
in Gandhi's
land
revenue,
non-violent
against
thereby
tactics.
which,
death
on
17
Vallabhbhai 22 per cent
arousing
By contrast,
the
the
it
Patel en-
new
the
Swarajists, repeatedly frustrated in their attempts to obstruct and destroy dyarchy, were either abandoning noncooperation through the legislatures for responsivism or
admitting existing
the
Motilal
had,
with
futility
form Sir
of
Nehru, Tej
principal architect parties' conference Report was designed Simon
Commission
of constitutional
government. the
president
Bahadur
and,
Sapru,
of
the
the
agitation Calcutta
Liberal
under
the
Congress,
leader,
been
the
of a constitution drafted at an alland published in August 1928. The Nehru to offer a positive alternative to the in
order
to
attract
the
widest
range
of
political support Motilal had been obliged to make Dominion Status the pivot of the constitutional scheme.' To a section of Congressmen this was an unacceptable retreat from the resolution
Nehru in
for
complete
and passed
December
1927.
without The
independence
opposition
Independence
proposed
at the for
by
Madras
India
Jawaharlal
Congress
League,
directed
by the younger Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose and Srinivasa Iyengar, denounced the Nehru report and campaigned for the restoration of complete independence as the objective of the Congress.
113
114 In
this
re-established
party
atmosphere
his
them
the
tension
leadership.
organizations
allowed
uf
to
freedom
the
to
and
In
uncertainty
resigning
Swarajists
experiment
in
control
1924-25,
Gandhi
of
Gandhi
with
legislative
had been earlier.
when the Then he
mediated
between
the
had
politics, confident that once their experiments had failed they would no longer shun civil disobedience. But Gandhi was
a maturer politician in 1928 than he Congress met at Calcutta eight years
had
been setting the pace in the Congress; now he was trying to restrain Jawaharlal and the young Congressmen and to prevent
a rift
Nehrus,
in
the
father
Nationalists new
generation
party.
At
and
son,
who
were
who wanted
Calcutta
between
he
the
older
a constitutional impatient
for
generation
settlement
freedom
and
the
of
and
for
the
a con-
frontation with the Raj. Through Gandhi's intervention a compromise was reached: if within one year the British did not grant Dominion Status to India, the Congress would launch
civil disobedience Britain.
to
wrest
complete
independence
To this challenge the British made no But Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, was perturbed civil disobedience and particularly by the
Congressmen, like
Irwin,
to 31
Sapru,
like
being
following
Motilal drawn
the
Nehru,
into
the
and
even
struggle
well-established
from
immediate response. by the prospect of danger of moderate
respected
against
British
the
policy,
Liberals, Raj.
tried
rally the moderates and avert a head-on collision.? On October 1929, two months before the year given in the
Calcutta ultimatum was due to expire, Irwin announced that the "natural issue of India's constitutional progress" was Dominion Status and that a Round Table Conference would be
called to discuss the next stage to be taken towards this objective. ® But the declaration came too late and was too timid to satisfy the Congress. At first many Congressmen, including Gandhi, welcomed Irwin's statement, but they wanted
to know exactly what was implemented. They could
being promised and when it would be not put their names to an agreement
they had not read, and the idea of civil disobedience in 1930 had already gathered too much momentum to be so easily halted. If Jawaharlal, hand-picked by Gandhi as the next’ Congress
president,
would
rather
resign
than
negotiate,
that
would
create the split Gandhi was anxious to avoid. Meeting, in memory of Lajpat Rai, at Lahore in December 1929, the Congress took the momentous decision to reject the Round Table Con-
ference as an unsatisfactory response to the demand for Dominion Status, and to launch civil disobedience for complete independence.
115 There
wide
followed
observance
a
of
lull.
Other
"Independence
than
Day"
calling
on
26
for
nation-
January
1930,
the
CWC had no program for civil disobedience, and the campaign's direction was left in Gandhi's hands. Gandhi drafted a list of eleven demands, ranging from prohibition to halving land revenue and the abolition of the salt tax: it was a compendium of the issues Congressmen had touched upon at different times in the past decade." But Gandhi wanted one clear issue that would dramatize the exploitative nature of colon-
ial
rule
and
symbolize
the
identification
of the
with the masses. In late February he fixed In a letter to Irwin on 2 March 1930 Gandhi unless
the
eleven
demands
were
and
the
met
by
the
Congress
on the salt tax. explained that
government,
he
would initiate a satyagraha against the salt laws on 11 March. When the ultimatum was, predictably, rejected he set out from his ashram at Ahmedabad with 79 satyagrahis, to walk 240 miles to Dandi on the Gulf of Cambay where he intended to make salt from sea water. Perhaps of all Gandhi's campaigns, this was
the
most
dramatic
had
greatest
emotional
impact.
News
of his daily progress was flashed to papers throughout India and the western world, its impact magnified by newspaper photographs and cinema films of the march. The media's coverage and the simple drama of Gandhi's Palm Sunday won for the salt satyagraha an emotional popular response unparalleled in his earlier campaigns. It was a brilliant opening to two and a half years of intense agitation.
Anticipation at
With
first
after
Madras,
the
these
national
wholly
out
TNCC
the
of
had
CWC
developments
step.
requested
suggested
a
When,
in
Tamil
permission
new
Congressmen
July
1929,
to take
boycott
of
the
two
office
were
months
in
legislatures
there were vehement protests from Tamil MLCs.> In anticipation of elections in late 1929 or early 1930, Srinivasa Iyengar, Rajagopalachari and Tamil Congressmen of all per-
suasions
were
Independent
out
campaigning
parties.
against
Vallabhbhai
the
Patel,
Justice
the
and
hero
of
Bardoli,
was bewildered when he arrived in Tamilnad in August to preside over the provincial conference at Vedaranniyam. He complained that he felt stifled by the communal atmosphere — he was confronted on several occasions by Self-Respecters demonstrating sessive
against
concern
for
seemed indifferent leaders foresaw.
Brahmin
jobs
to
the
and
Congressmen
office.©
coming
battle
— and
Tamil
which
by
the
ob-
Congressmen
all-India
116 Irwin's
announcement
was
received
with
enthusiasm
by
most Tamil Congressmen, especially Nationalist non-Brahmins who hoped logjam in the Madras legislature.
by the former United that it would free the Thus, the decision of the
bitterly
Congress
Lahore
Congress
resign
in
resented
to
Madras;
withdraw
difficult
boycott
the
legislatures
Chetti
MLCs
in
the
was
either
refused
Legislative
to
Shanmugham Chetti in the Assembly resigned, recontested as Independents. "Many local
Congressmen", the Chief reported pithily at the
it
Five
Venkatachelam
Council and R.K. but successfully
find
from the.
or defied.
to
Secretary of the Madras government end of January 1930, "continue to
reconcile
legislatures
a personal
with
loyalty
to
unwillingness
the
Congress
to
mandate
to do so.” Satyamurti, dreading a return to the "suicidal policy" of 1920, canvassed for a new nationalist party to
continue
to work
in the Madras
legislature.
A few private
meetings were held, attended by Venkatachelam Chetti and others who had already decided to defy the ban, but within
two weeks Satyamurti abandoned the idea and resigned his seat in the council.® Unlike Venkatachelam Chetti, a prospering
merchant,
Satyamurti
financial A.
support.
Rangaswami
cautious",®
was
the
depended
Iyengar,
obediently
Congress
Conference
that
he
on
"ever
resigned
decision
most
Congress
to
his
loyal
boycott
bitterly
seat
patrons
though
the
in
the
his
careful
and
Assembly.
Round
regretted.
for
Table
He
consoled
It
him-
self with the expectation that civil disobedience would be neither popular nor widespread; that the "Pro-Changers" would have to lie low for a while, but would soon return to lead the Congress back to constitutional action.’° Ranga-
swami
was
a more
Srinivasa
Iyengar
mistaken. the
sober and
The Government
imminent
Government
of
crisis.
judge
Satyamurti,
of Madras
India's
of
it had
the
political
but
for
once
had no stronger
been
hesitancy
in
inclined
tackling
scene he
than
was
badly
premonition
to
jeer
at
Jawaharlal
the
of
Nehru
and other "extremists". "If the Government of India were to strike hard instead of moralising at length," commented one executive councillor in March 1929 on New Delhi's latest equivocations, "there would be no trouble".’! Having crushed a revival of labour unrest in 1926-28, which had included a
protracted network,
and violent
and
frustrated
strike
on the South
Congress
attempts
Indian
to
Railway
organize
demon-
strations against the second visit of the Simon Commission to Madras city in December 1928, the Madras government had begun to be complacent about its own strength and the loyalty and
moderation
of the Tamil
districts.
Towards
the
end of 1929
117 when, on the advice of the Government of India, it rounded up "extremists", the haul in Tamilnad was less than half-adozen. The Tanjore resettlement agitation had long since died away and in Tamilnad, unlike the Telugu delta districts, there were no new resettlements due which would give the
Congressmen an opportunity to repeat their Bardoli tactics. With the exception of the activities of Singaravelu Chetti — almost the only self-styled Communist in the region — Tamilnad was immune to the rash of left-wing peasant and workers'
organizations which affected northern India. A sunlit, peaceful vista it may not have been, but the Madras government believed itself adequately sheltered from what it anticipated would be a passing shower.
Except
in two respects.
In
1923
began.
If
when
the
government
asked district magistrates to submit reports on the character and suppression of non-cooperation in their areas, two important considerations had emerged. The first was that the Congress could be aseclecticas a magpie: it would pick up any attractive local grievances which caught its eye and incorporate them into its loosely constructed nest. The best reaction to this appeared to be to quash the secondary agitations
as
soon
as
they
the
Congress
seized
the initiative and the government hesitated, the local population would begin to feel it could flaunt government authority with impunity. There was the complaint, however, that 1921-22 district officials had been afraid to act promptly
and
resolutely.
They
had
been
confused
non-cooperation
had
spread
by
the
Government
in
of
India's "soft" line towards the Congress and Khilafat leaders and hampered by the difficulties of securing a conviction quickly enough to have a deterrent effect. The speed with
which
_ 1921
was
attributed
to
this
in the Telugu
uncertainty
among
delta
the
in
late
magistracy
and police. If a new crisis developed, would the Government of India support the demands of the Madras Secretariat and the
district
officers
Against this balanced a second
There
had
been
regional
levels
to the more
village
firm,
evidence at
the
too.
of this
end
of
official
G.T.H.
district in the Andhra delta cooperation, warned in 1923: carry bad
things
spirit
far.
which
pre-emptive
is
They
still
leave in
occurring
1921;
to
follow.
C.F.V.
but
observers
Bracken,*
it
at
the national
and
at the district
and
was
also
Collector
of
apparent
the
Godavari
during the later stages of non"Measures of repression do not... a bad
impression
evidence’.
out vindictiveness was his formula.!? course
action?
predilection for the "hard" line had to be consideration — the -backlash from repression.
perceptive
levels
for
Williams,
the
behind
Resolute
and
action
It was not an easy young
a
with-
Under-Secretary
118 in Madras, noted in January 1930 that "if Congress will cry 'repression'...if we do will cry 'victory'. The question is of a
was this view confined to official circles. owned Madras Mail, so damning of government
non-cooperation,
provincial sures
It was months own
in January
governments
and
thus
1930
against
playing
into
advised
rushing
the
hands
we do too much, too little, Congress via media".!* Nor
The Europeaninertia during
the
central
into
of
repressive
the
and
mea-
"extremists". }®
this policy of caution which prevailed in the first of 1930. As the Government of Madras recorded in its
history
it
of
the
was
civil
disobedience
considered
that
ultimately
repay
did
necessary,
strengthening become
suffering
the
forbearance
Government,
their
from
movement:
case
sheer
would
either
if the use
or
by
official
the
by
of force
movement
disregard
for
it. It was not then anticipated that the movement would receive the degree of support
that
Responding the
jists
it eventually
to
secured.'¢
the Call
By contrast with regional Congress
quickly
the protracted in 1922-25, in
surrendered
their
lyengar, defeated by the contradictions, resigned
failure as TNCC
session.
C.N.
and withdrew in
March
boycott
member.
from
His
1930,
of
the Congress
successor,
having
the
Madras
places
on the TNCC.
Muthuranga
legislature
was
for control of leading Swara-
Srinivasa
to resolve his own political President in September 1929
altogether
struggled
Rajagopalachari
struggle 1930 the
after
Mudaliar,
half-heartedly
the
of
which
obvious
the
he
to
had
Lahore
resigned
resist
been
the
a
replacement.
He
salt
returned in April 1930 to head the TNCC; the party headquarters, in Madras city since 1925, were shifted back to Trichinopoly; and T.S.S. Rajan resumed his old post as party Secretary.? On the surface, it was just like old times. Authorized
by
the
TNCC
and
the
AICC
to
direct
beaches
with
little
the
satyagraha in Tamilnad, Rajagopalachari approached the task with characteristic caution. The Telugus organized dashes to the
nearest
salt
how the struggle so impetuous and dramatic
than
march
a month
preparations. the march and
creeks
than
— from a
He
and
thought
as
to
would develop, but Rajagopalachari was not he was concerned more with imitating Gandhi's with
early
violating
March
estimated that satyagraha camp
the
salt
to mid-April
he at
law.
He
— to make
took
his
would need Rs. 20,000 Vedaranniyam, his
more
for
119 destination. Through his Saurashtras in Madura and Ahmedabad, he was able to
Swarajists' he selected
lieutenants in Tamilnad, the South Indians in Bombay and collect most of this. Madras,
citadel, gave very — with the help of
Vaidyanatha Aiyar in march. Most of them
Madura — a were young
khadi
years.
uates
who
work
grahis
Ramnad,
had
some
in
came
Salem
recent
from
and
education
Madura
Bombay
Rajagopalachari's
little.'® From 300 applicants Rajan in Trichinopoly and hundred volunteers - clerks, students
and
About
had
shown
a quarter
district;
Madras
provided
caution
the
about
was
an
the grad-
interest
of the
city,
saty:
in
Tinnevelly,
a dozen
apparent,
for and
each.!?
too,
in
the
route
he chose. It shunned, by more than 150 miles, Madras city and ran from Trichinopoly through the Cauvery delta to Vedaranniyum
Tanjore had been a Congress stronghold for more than a generation and memories of the Swarajists' opposition to the Ilindu Religious
Endowments
Bill
and
resettlement
might
be
hoped
to
ensure a favourable reception for the marchers. Here, more than in any other area of Tamilnad, Rajagopalachari could expect
assistance
route a
long
avoided
the
detour
Kumbakonam
to
from
areas
include
vakils,
of
merchants
Kallar
the
old
and Mannargudi.?°
and
mirasdars.
concentration
Brahmin
The march
centres
and
was given
of
The
followed
Tanjore,
the air of
a pilgrimage, beginning on Tamil New Year's the accompaniment of hymns and the blessings
Day (13 April) to of priests; and
many
Rameswaram
Vedaranniyam
orthodox
the sacred chari
made
among
the
("The
Forest
Brahmins
places
frequent
of
to
be
of the Tamil stops
untouchables
and
to
the
Vedas")
second
only
coast.”!
conduct
the
Kallars
was to
considered
En route,
temperance (one
of
by
among
Rajagopala-
propaganda
the
district's
largest but, except for a few zamindars, mirasdars and vakils, less prosperous agrarian custes), but it was mainly to the urban middle class and the .andlords that he directed his campaiga. only
The experience of 1920-22 a slow and timid response
Tamilnad.
The
march
was,
led Rajagopalachari to to the salt satyagraha
therefore,
to
be
the
expect in
unhurried
opening scene of the civil disobedience drama. Tension would gradually increase as the satyagrahis neared their goal, as
public interest was aroused, and as the government's restraint gave way to impulsive repressive measures. Vedaranniyam was designed to be a showpiece of disciplined satyagraha in south
India;
pathy
only
and
when
it had
government
succeeded
hostility
did
visualize the conflict spreading organized, satyagraha camps.”*
in attracting
public
Rajagopalachari
to other,
equally
and
well-
sym-
Rajan
120 The Government of Madras own fear of over-reacting
its
steadying
hand.
Dandi
made
Jawaharlal
and
large.
the
Nehru
No
on
14
salt
April,
in the
immediate
Vedaranniyam
issued
Vallabhbhai action
Patel but
was
arrested
Gandhi,
first
week
On
27 March
was,
marchers.
instructions
remained aloof, held back by and by the Government of India's
to district
who
of April,
therefore,
officers
the
on
had
7 March
reached
was
permitted
Madras
that
left
and
at
against
government
volunteers
should be dispersed, but arrests should be avoided, except the case of leaders violating the law, so as to prevent an
in
over-crowding of the jails. On 3 April, 10 days before Rajagopalachari left Trichinopoly, J.A. Thorne, the District Magistrate of Tanjore, requested permission to treat the marchers as an unlawful assembly as soon as they entered his district, to arrest Rajagopalachari and to caution sympathizers on the route. On 8 April Thorne wired Madras for permission to arrest Rajagopalachari when he entered Tanjore district. On both occasions permission was refused.” Thorne was too sceptical of the efficacy of a policy of drift to accept these refusals as a counsel of inaction. On 6
April
he
issued
instructions
to the
sub-divisional
strates and the District Superintendent interfere with satyagrahis who remained
gard
assistance
given
to the marchers
magi-
of Police not to orderly, but to re-
as a criminal
offence.
A circular on these lines was drafted the following day and sent to the presidents and chairmen of the district and local boards in the area to be covered by the march. Three thousand copies were later printed in Tamil and distributed ahead
of the
main
Since
body
to
be
of marchers.?* ignored
would
be
disastrous,
this
was
the
sort of publicity Rajagopalachari wanted. He used the circular as an illustration of India's oppression and a violation ‘of Hindu traditions of charity and hospitality.?* Rangaswami Iyengar, whose reserve towards the salt satyagraha had begun to melt with the success of Gandhi's march, published an
editorial in the Hindu on 10 April questioning the legality of Thorne's threats and calling it "preposterous" to treat a
band
of
satyagrahis
as
an
broken the salt laws. The its own, but was satisfied
unlawful
assembly
before
they
had
Government of Madras had doubts of that Thorne's circular was a deter-
rent to sympathizers, "made difficulties for the volunteers and diminished the effect of their march". Triumphal receptions had been planned by K. Santhanam and an advance party of
marchers,
but
after
the
circular
"the
lukewarm
were
glad
of an excuse for refusing hospitality, and few owners or trustees of a charity were sufficiently 'patriotic' to risk
prosecution".”®
The arrest and conviction of V. Pantulu
121 Aiyar, until recently one of Tanjore's MLCs, and of a nonBrahmin mirasdar during the early stages of the march through Tanjore showed that Thorne had not been bluffing. In Gujarat many village officers had resigned to support the satyagraha:
in Tanjore only two — a Kallar village headman and a Vellala karnam — resigned during Rajagopalachari's march. Nevertheless, towards the end of the march the mood changed and there
were
mistic
signs
of
enthusiasm
Rajagopalachari
in
the
villages
informed
the press
and
towns.
that
An
"The
opti-
masses
are responding to the call in a truly marvellous manner. The atmosphere is being purified of all sectional and party feeling in a way the most optimistic among us may not have expected".?” Government officials were correspondingly dis-
heartened
that
the marchers
had
not been
stopped.”®
On 28
April Vedaranniyam was reached, a camp established, and two days later Rajagopalachari was arrested for breaking the salt laws. By early May civil disobedience had taken off as an agitational campaign. Throughout India it had acquired a strength and popularity which the Government of India had not anticipated. And behind the popular enthusiasm was the cut-
ting
edge
of violence.
Chittagong tities
Frontier
of
Armoury
arms
and
Province
In Bengal
on
18 April
ammunition;
the
arrest
and
terrorists escaped
at
Peshawar
of Congress
raided
with in
On
5 May
Gandhi
regional captains. still, however, on by
the
force
if
was
and
with
manufacture
of
the
of
volunteers.
salt
continued,
At
quan-
North-West
provoked
people and existing forces could not be
him
The stress in government the arrest of leaders and
necessary,
illicit
arrested
the
leaders
disturbances which resulted in the death of 30 caused serious doubts as to the ability of the to maintain control in the area. A new policy as long delayed as it had been in 1921.”
the
large
many
of
the
instructions was the dispersal, Vedaranniyam
therefore,
despite
the arrests of Rajagopalachari and Santhanam and despite police raids on the piles of salt the satyagrahis had collected. There were natural salt pans at Vedaranniyam and it was almost impossible for the police to prevent the manufacture of
salt
as
long
as
the
satyagrahis
50 more volunteers arrived the month the total number
Laksnmipathi,
Madras
pursue
League
of
— trying
stationed
preaching
erally.
who
for
Youth,
to
against
the
gave
incite
in the area
In
three
the
and
salt
remained
years the
had been
volunteers
disaffection
touring
government's
there.
On
5 May
at the camp, and by the middle was nearly 200.°° Mrs Rukmani
laws
the
and
opinion
president
among
new
the
of the
activities
policemen
neighbouring
government
villages
authority
Vedaranniyam
of
was
to
gen-
fast
122 becoming
a
eastern
May
festering
Tanjore.
the
sore
spreading
It could
police
raided not
just
no
the
camp,
to
its
longer this
volunteers
and
stores
Vedaranniyam
and
were
thwarted
poison
confiscate
time -to
arrest
salt.
About
arrested including, unexpectedly, Rajan who the camp. Rajan had been the main supplier for
which was the most Attempts to revive Rameswaram to
quickly
was
his
arrest
factor in establish by
On 29
the
135
were
was on a visit of funds and and
conviction
the ending of the a new one near
the
to
camp.
police.
Although Rajagopalachari had clearly counted on Tanjore provide the men and money to sustain the Vedaranniyam
camp,
manned of
it
decisive it or to
throughout
be tolerated.?!
paradoxically
by Congressmen
the
original
it
was
almost
from
marchers
exclusively
outside
were
organized
the district.
from
the
Only
district,
only
and
five
three
of the satyagrahis rounded up on 29 May. Rajan at Trichinopoly fed the camp with supplies, money and new recruits. Rajagopalachari had, in fact, been over-cautious in going for an area of traditional Congress support. By and large,
once tne initial excitement of the march was over, Tanjore was indifferent. It is worthwhile briefly to consider why. The leading land-holders had had their share of agitation in
1923-24 and they had achieved a sufficient degree of success in persuading the government to reduce the highest resettlement rates not to be impelled by a sense of grievance into joining
civil
ion and
competition
plummeting the The
and
disobedience.
grain
prices
government they dominant strata
Kallar
among ially
Hindu
decent
urban
from
that
They
Burmese
turned for in Tanjore
middle
were
resulted
class
rice
unhappy
from
Swadesamitran
people",
commented
world
imports,
but
the
depress-
it was
to
assistance, not the Congress society — the Brahmin, Vellala,
and
rural
the most politicized in Tamilnad. among the Brahmins, a great number
and
about
the
circulated Thorne,
landlords
widely:
"tend
— were
There were, especof literates and the
to
"even
regard
ordinary
politics
through Hindu spectacles".°? But the economic life of the delta was to a large extent dependent on the Public Works Department for the supply of irrigation water to the padd fields, and this in itself was an inducement to Patel, at the time of his visit to Vedaranniyam
Tamilnad
Provincial
Land -League, but there an attempt
Tanjore's
The political dominant
mtrasdar
Conference
nowhere in to imitate
political
bosses
faction
was
were
trains
1929,
ran
divided
headed
and Christian
in
the Cauvery Bardoli.*®
by
Kallar,
A.T.
on
had
loyalty.® for the
formed
delta
in
different
on factional
Samiappa
local was
gauge
lines.
Pannirselvam,
and N.R.
a
1930
a
tracks.
The
Justicite,
Mudaliar,
2
123 Vellala.
Throughout
president
of
1930
Tanjore
Pannirselvam's
district
board
was
recent
being
election
relentessly
as
contested by the rival faction, headed by P.S. Rajappa, a Kallar zamindar from Tanjore taluk, and abetted by A. Veeriah
Vandayar, a Kallar, and C.R. Lakshmivaraha Iyengar, mirasdar spokesman and one of Kumbakonam's Brahmin Congress leaders. The faction leaders were so busily engaged in their ding-dong battle for the prestige and spoils of local government from the district board down to the taluk boards, and of every temple, education and cooperative society committee in the district that they could scarcely spare a thought for making
salt from sea-water.*©
A further reason for the indifference of Tanjore is less easily identified. Partly because Tanjore was a district with such a long tradition of involvement in provincial and
nationalist politics, partly because its upper strata were so emphatically divided by caste, by occupation and by inherited authority from the poor cultivators, artisans and landless
labourers, broader political participation in Tanjore was temporarily blocked. There were grievances in Tanjore which could well have provided the basis for a mass agitation: the government was alarmed throughout the civil disobedience movement
that
the
Congress
leaders
Kallar
masses,
educationally
backward,
socially suppressed and economically exploited, would revolt against the government and against the landlords; at Vedaranniyam the local population had asked that the forest laws should be made the target of the satyagraha, but the Congress organizers refused on the grounds that salt was the national issue and must be taken up first.°”7 At times the were
remarkably
selective.
In
Tanjore
pitched their agitation at a level that would not class interests of the district's dominant strata
it meant
made
the
of
stultification
factional
pation of local Tanjore in 1930
rivalry
as
of the movement. the
motivation
notables in Congress an aggrieved faction
Much
for
they
damage the even though
has
the
been
partici-
agitations, * but in held aloof from civil
disobedience rather than jeopardize its privileged social and economic position by initiating a mass agitation. It did so wisely, for in less than a decade the Cauvery delta became
the
scene
cultural
Beaten that
ally.
of a bitter
labourers,
like
struggle
between that
landlords
still
and
continues.
agri-
Doge
Rajagopalachari satyagraha Even
a
struggle
in
before
had
miscalculated
Tamilnad he
reached
would
gain
in his
anticipation
momentum
Vedaranniyam
only
events
in
gradu-
Madras
124 city
could
showed
excite
doing
by
contrast
popular
it might
assume
with
Tanjore,
support
the
local
who,
Swarajist
opening
stages
satyagraha
because
Congressmen,
they T.
leaders,
came
were
local
mainly
Prakasam
response city and
salt
from
agitation
and
but
character.
it was
of the
the
and participation,
a violent
Expecting no substantial gopalachari had neglected the
of its
that
left
from with
without
party
K.
direction
Pressure
activists
turned
Nageswara
in so
Madras, Rajathe resignation
satyagraha.
Telugus,
that
and
to
Rao
for
a
students,
the
for
in
Andhra
guidance
and leadership. The first attempts at salt-making on the Madras beach at the beginning of April were amateurish, comic even; the quantities of salt produced ludicrously small and crude. But their activities were a technical breach of the salt laws and the police intervened to confiscate the salt and salt-making utensils and to disperse the satyagrahis, according to the instructions already laid down by the Madras government. Police action in turn stimulated public interest
and,
encouraged
by donations
fine
was
just
The
satyagraha
Marwaris, Prakasam their satyagraha:
and the
the
sort
Rao
the police.
a hartal
was
quickly on
city's
22
escalated
against
April.
Gujaratis
decided to their cars
in Tanjore, press.
In protest
held
the
of provocation
and, like Thorne's circular protests in the nationalist
with
from
Nageswara Rao attachment of
that
fired
it
Prakasam
attracted
into
the
and
continue in lieu of
a
strong
a confrontation
arrest
Intended
as
of Nageswara
a peaceful
demonstration, it degenerated into the intimidation of shopkeepers who had defied the hartal and clashes between police and demonstrators, whose numbers were swollen by mill-hands on strike from the charges by mounted
city's police
Choolai textile mills. Two major and lathi-wielding constables were
carried out before the crowd dispersed.*® The arrest of Prakasam on 23 April failed to check the agitation. It had acquired a macabre momentum of its own: salt making continued,
have
more
been
satyagrahis,
thrashed
paper run by the indignation:
including
by the police.
Congressman
S.
women,
were
Sutandira
Ganesan
reported
Sangu,
in Madras,
cried
Those who defy the Salt Act may be imprisoned or fined. That is all laid down in the Salt
Act.
should
But
be
the
made
Salt
to
Act
does
trample
not
upon
say
the
that
people,
horses
nor
is it laid down in it that the volunteers should be beaten like dogs as they were beaten on the
Beach Road on Friday morning.*°
to
a Tamil
with .
125 On the
evening
of 27 April
an all-parties
the Madras beach to protest at the violent satyagrahis by the police.
Venkatachelam
Chetti,
of
the
audience
Choolai
the
of
the
Madras
Corporation
to
re-open
the
mills,
swelled
organizers'
at the potice patrolling skirmishes
followed.
their
fury
on
across
the
2,000
people
control.
the outskirts
Led
by the
and
rifle-butts,
meeting streets
a
crowd.
darkened
after of
the
were
troop
sands
of
leaders
herded
Triplicane,
While
armed
to
had
but
of the crowd
constables soware
fled.
from
there,
were
of
the
thrown
and
Police,
discipline and restraint public criticism, vent
disperse
away
Stones
Commissioner
C.B. Cunningham, the police, their weakened by 10 days of tension and
the
of nonwere
on
By the time the meeting began the mill-hands, angered by the failure
management
beyond
brutal treatment On the platform
councillors
and several Justicites. arrival of nearly 5,000
meeting was held
at
fought
raced
what
the
to
remained
After
the
with
an
hour
beach
and
lathis
and
fro
of
about
into
entrance
to
the the
Pycrofts Road, stone-throwing began again. Under Cunningham's directions police marksmen tried to pick off the instigators: five people were wounded, including a fifty-year old woman, and three killed, among them a lawyer who had been getting
down from a bus when the police fired.*! Unintentionally,
the
nationalists
in
Madras
city
had
blundered into a confrontation with the Raj that was so shocking that it temporarily obscured party and sectional divisions. Politicians of all parties demanded an enquiry into the to
shooting
Ootacamund
Madras the
and
Mahajana
blame
for
to
a deputation petition
Sabha
the
held
incidents
the
its
in
of High
Court
Governor,
own
but
lawyers in
vain.
investigation
the
city
travelled The
which
between
22
placed
and
27
April squarely on the police."? The Madras Corporation for once set aside its party bickering and condemned the shooting in a resolution which only the European councillors opposed. G.A. Natesan, a Liberal and opponent of civil disobedience, said that in 45 years as a citizen of Madras he had never known a time when "public feeling has been provoked to such
a height
as it is now". *?
The government and the police against their Indian
29 April Europeans jeered at, drivers abused.
ation, civil
Europeans
and racial
disobedience
feelings."
the
city
in
community defended During the battle
the on
near the beach had been insulted and of cars and their passengers stopped and in Madras
bitterness was
Sergeant
police
European critics. were
responsible
O'Callaghan,
lathi-play
unaccustomed
as much and
for who
who
to
such
as any hostility the
had
had
intensity
been
deen
humili-
to
of their
instructing
too
severely
126
injured
in the
clashes
a press
communique,
on 22 April
to participate
in those
on the 29th, felt it "a great disappointment" to have "missed the big fight".“5 And the government, far from calling for an enquiry, issued Cunningham's account of the week's incidents — purged of some of its more provocative remarks — as generously
rewarded
the
policemen
who
had taken part, and promoted Cunningham to the post of Inspector-General of Police with responsibility for combating civil disobedience throughout the presidency. Such
could
a polarization
not
corporation
endure.
to
its
The
between
the
mill-hands
squabbles
rulers
and
returned
and
to
its drains.
the
work,
The
ruled the
city poli-
ticians were, for the moment, cowed by the savagery of the scene they had witnessed on the sands. But a legacy of bitterness remained, and Madras Congressmen and their allies
saw how
such
incidents
could
be
exploited
to keep
alive
public resentment against the government. In January and February Congressmen organized the picketing of foreign
cloth-shops in the city, less with the intention of preventing cloth sales and promoting swadeshi than of creating incidents between police and picketers. The incidents were carefully staged with respected citizens on hand to give "eye-witness" accounts
of
police
of reports in legislature.
"brutality",
and
these
formed
the nationalist press and questions In the narrow and congested streets
the
in of
basis
the George
Town it was obstructing
difficult for any picketing to take place without traffic, and when the police moved in to dis-
stander
received
perse
the
image
of
compounded
panies
picketers
who
innocence
its
with
by
the
or
blows.
using
reputation
of the Malabar
canes
women
for
Special
lathis
The
it
picketers;
brutality
Police,
was
Congress by
often
the
government
quartering
formed
a by-
highlighted
to
com-
suppress
its
the
1921 rising, on the city to combat civil disobedience and picketing. The consequence was, ex-minister Arogyaswami Mudaliar said on 7 February 1931, that "Everyday, this Government has ... [made] converts to the cause of the Congress by tens of thousands -- people who were lukewarm before with reference to the Congress are to-day its enthusiastic
supporters"."?
An exaggeration,
ative of the extent to which the were successful in keeping alive
with
the
Raj.
no doubt, tactics a sense
but
it is indic-
of the nationalists of confrontation
Deliberate provocation of incidents with the police might seem to indicate that there was little spontaneous support for civil disobedience in Tamilnad. But in some cases the violence which accompanied Congress demonstrations occurred because Congress agitators struck a spark which
127
ignited local discontent. This was most apparent during the second phase of the civil disobedience between
May
the picketing
a
laborious
and
of
August
1930.
liquor
Salt
and
process
except
district,
for
making
was
cloth-shops.
in
a
few
As
areas
in Tamilnad movement,
abandoned
for
salt-making
like
was
Vedaranniyam
with natural salt pans which were far from the main centres of population, its agitational potential was limited. In
Coimbatore
ing
salt
from
saline
example,
earth
was
the
soon
Picketing brought Congressmen onto and villages, where the public was
the police limited to
salt-making
forced to respond to Vedaranniyam, Madras
sites
in South
Arcot,
experiment
abandoned
as
of extract-
futile.”
the streets in the towns bound to notice them and
their activities. From being city and a few secondary
the agitation
spread
end of May and early June to the interior districts Tamilnad, which had previously been quiet. gress
The
ion.
change
planning
in
than
In the ports
recruited
from
agitational
to
the
of Madras
unemployed
first
tactics
impact
was
of
and Tuticorin
youths,
who,
from
due
the
less
world
picketers boredom
of to
at the
Con-
depress-
were
or
for
a
fee, would join the campaign. Hit by a shrinking exportimport trade, half-a-dozen firms ceased business in Tuticorin
in August 1930, while Congress volunteers "with their gay coloured badges and ribbons" roamed the streets urging unemployed coolies and peons to join them.*® Inland, unemployed
handloom weavers were often willing recruits or the cause of violence against the police. and hit
and out
for picketing In Coimbatore
Salem the Telugu-speaking Devanga weavers were severely by the sudden fall in demana for their products in Bombay the Central Provinces. of work by the closure
In July of looms
3,000 weavers were in Salem town, and
"cause",
they
thrown were
quickly recruited by local Congressmen (who included Devanga merchants and lawyers) to conduct door-to-door propaganda against
foreign
misfortune".°° 10,000 weavers
cloth,
the
were
told,
"of
their
In Coimbatore a majority of the town's were unemployed by the end of July and were
drafted by Gujarati and Devanga , cotton traders to picket fareign cloth and liquor shops.°! In Gudiyatam taluk, North Arcot, the victims of the depression were Tamil weavers (Kaikolans
by August.
arrested attacked
and
or
Sengunthars), On
7
July
at the town the police,
sacked
the
liquor
when
4,000 six
of Gudiyatam, besieged them
shops.
of
whom
Congress
After
were
out
agitators
of work were
a large crowd of weavers in the magistrate's office,
a detachment
police had restored government control the trate reported that in Gudiyatam there was of enmity against Government... The origin
of reserve
District Magis"no general feeling of the trouble
128 seems
to
have
suffering easy
victim In
been
from
the
bad times
to
many
with
the
towns
weaver
comminity
and whose
more
anti-Government of Tamilnad
in
rowdy
who
have
been
elements
became
propaganda". °* the
middle
months
of
1930
the discontent of the poor was channelled into the mainstream of civil disobedience by middle-class politicians and young activists who were themselves committed to nationalist objectives. Madura was such a case. From 1930 to 1932 civil disobedience in Madure was: led and financed by N.M.R. Subbaraman,* a wealthy young Congressman, and other members of the Saurashtra community, which constituted a third of the city's population. The Saurashtras' involvement has been attribute1
to their from
a faction
ported It
struggle
headed
in turn
is
by the
that
the
"supra-local
balance"
and
control
that
supremacy under
and
Saurashtra
connections
their
cover
of the municipal
chairman,
by the Justice
claimed
Congress
to wrest
objective
of the
civil
R.S.
Naidu,
Independent leaders to
and
sup-
ministries.
sought
to redress was
council
in the
the
achieve
disobedience
local
local
im-
movement.°*
While it is true that Subbaraman was deeply involved in wunicipal politics, this interpretation takes too narrow a view of the reasons for Saurashtra commitment Prominent Saurashtras had been striving since through
a
newspaper, to improve ity,
and
the
caste
caste
schools,
and a highly successful the social and economic
bulk
cotton
association,
of
which
weavers
with
were
skilled
to the Congress. the 1890s —
a, Saurashtra
weavers' cooperative — conditions of the communbut
a reputation
impoverished
for hard
silk
drinking.©
As aspirants to Brahminical status and as a community which traced its origins to Gujarat, the Saurashtras could not readily identify with the non-Brahmin movement: one of the most enterprising Saurashtras, L.K. Tulsiram, incurred considerable hostility from his community by trying to do so in 1919-20. Gradually, during the 1920s young Saurashtras were
attracted
late
1920s
identity.
to
the
Subbaraman
and
Congress
made
one young
khadi work. was chosen as marchers.°® Gandhi, who
ing with
the communities
Saurashtras
urged Some
in
Gujarati
them to abstain
On the merits
of
the
big
to
their
Saurashtra
to
broader,
the
national
party
who had
he addressed,
during
Saurashtra high
a
been
in
the
engaged
in
to a meeting
of
treasurer for the Vedaranniyam at times had a flair for identify-
of khadi
own
to
his
1927
from alcohol
and were unenthusiastic; a rival
and
donations
the
and
visit
abjure
Saurashtras
merchants
many
spoke
dealt
of the weavers
quality
textiles.
to Madura
foreign
were
in
cloth.*
divided.
foreign
regarded But
and
cloth
it as
Saurashtras
129 who
had
branched
for
the
salt
of Chari
out
and Ram which
into
satyagraha,
made
chemicals
sizeable
and
or
who,
dyes,
like
donations
like
the
to the
Subbaraman,
had
firm
TNCC
interests in Madura's mill industry, welcomed any form of swadeshi agitation which would favour Indian cloth against
British
and Japanese
imports.°®
There
were
no such
ambigu-
ities with regard to alcohol. The caste leaders wished to free their community from the stigma of drink and to enhance the prestige of the Saurashtras. With 2,000 Saurashtra
weavers out of work by September 1930, the picketing of liquor shops provided an opportunity for middle-class
Saurashtras to direct the energies of the unemployed against liquor. Through intensive picketing, sustained despite the arrest of Subbaraman and his associates and despite several clashes with the police, Madura's liquor sales were down to
a third of their normal
level by October.°®
It was the
communal ambitions, nationalist sympathies and broad material interests of the Saurashtra middle class, using the unemployed weavers,
faction
rather
than
a bid
in the municipal
to
overthrow
council,
an
which
centre of the civil disobedience movement Civil
checked
months;
disobedience
through in
was not
a tinder-dry
most
other
areas
did not burn at all. Certain remained largely unaffected.
proletariat.
After
it
the revival
made Madura fire
a storm-
racing
In Madura
flickered
tottering
in Tamilnad.
a forest
region.
already
and
it
un-
raged
smouldered
for
or
sections of the population One of these was the industrial
and defeat
of militant
union-
ism in 1926-28, the workers had again swerved away from strike action and in Madras city relations between mill-hands and Congressmen had not fully recovered from the trauma of the 1921 strike at the Buckingham and Carnatic mills. The
participation of the Choolai workers in the April 1930 disturbances was exceptional and fortuitous: their connection with the civil disobedience movement ceased as soon as the mills
strike
re-opened
on
1 May.
at
Harvey's
mills
in
employees
of mills
in which
In Madura
February,
there but
were
the
rumours
workers
of a
backed
down when the management threatened to stop production altogether because it was suffering financial losses due to the depression. The Madura Congressmen showed no interest in adopting the workers' grievances, perhaps because Subbaraman and his associates did not want a strike to spread to the The Muslims,
cooperation,
disillusioned Gandhians,
Hindu
stood
and
with
militancy
who had
they
aside
they
been
from
had
leading
the
the Swarajists viewed
with
a share.®
as they had
alarm
in the Hindu Maha
participants
movement.
the
Sabha.
They
rise
The
in non-
were
as
been with the of a new
Congress,
130 complained
the Muslim
“absolutely
press
pro-Hindu
the Arya Samajists
in
mentality"
the
late
1920s,
and was
had
"under
an
the
and the Hindu Maha Sabha''.®*
thumb
of
Even those
Muslim MLCs who sympathized with the nationalist aspirations of the Congress in launching civil disobedience felt a duty to their electorate and their community to stay in the legis-
lature to press Muslim demands for government posts and concessions.** As the campaign intensified Hindu-Muslim conflict
developed.
shop-keepers
Muslims
North
the
city
Arcot
and
foreign-cloth
resented
them and sought
movement
dealers
and the mofussil
understandably,
against
Khilafat
of
in Madras
who,
directed
Many
Trichinopoly a decade
Congress
and
towns
were
picketing
police protection.
districts,
before,
strongholds
tension
became
of
acute.
In
the
An
unexpected communal riot in Vellore on 28 August 1931, started by jeering and a scuffle between Muslim and Congress processions in the town, was described by the Inspector-General of
Police local
as
"a spontaneous
Muhammedans
to
expression | of
the
the hostility
Congress".®
of the
Although, like the miraedare of Tanjore, most of the substantial landholders in Tamilnad held aloof from the movement and were content to seek compensation for the effects of the
depression
government,
extensive
reason
for
rural
rapid
this
castes
Since
the
who
of the
acted
marketing, °”
non-Brahmin
and
the
movement,
Along
and
stimulus
the
in
War
of
and
the
there
caste
was
town
had
education
associations
of
main
and
been in
a
the
partici-
production
availability
more
The
students
accelerating
cash-crop
greater
1921.
between
the
provincial
disobedience
high-school
in
the
of youths
World
with
castes
to
been
as a link
First
of primary
peasant
civil
it had
involvement
countryside.
Presidency.®°
pation
in
than
the end of the
expansion
entreaties
involvement
was
surrounding
Madras
direct
and protracted
from rural the
through
and
and
the
education
encouraged ryots to send their sons to western-style schools and colleges. Away from their home environment the students
were
receptive to new ideas
ment
service
in penetrating less
the
the onceinaccessible
by the
preoccupied
generation
and
with
late
1920s
Brahmin
of middle-class
success
of non-Brahmins
professions
made
many young
"monopoly"
non-Brahmins
than
had
and govern-
non-Brahmins
the
been.
previous
In the
towns and cities of Tamilnad the students joined youth leagues, ran their own student papers, participated in the black flag demonstrations against the Simon Commission and
Congress processions
than
civil
in
1920-22,
disobedience
and hartals.°®
students
movement
were
by
To a far greater extent
stirred
an
to participate
intellectual
and
in
the
emotional
in
131
commitment
Satyagraha,
to
India's
the
freedom.
enthusiasm
The
aroused
launching
by
Gandhi's
of the
salt
march
and
reports of arrests and police brutality pushed many students and youths into the agitation in the middle months of 1930. Rajagopalachari, trying to tap this reservoir of student excitement,
urged
that
at
least
one
generation
of
India's
youth should throw itself into the national struggle: "Is not adventure the peculiar privilege and duty of youth?",
he asked.°°
There were also
cipation.
In the
depression
and
pressures
graduate
unemployment
atmosphere
with
urban Tamilnad, in agitation as
economic
behind
of uncertainty
student
created
already
parti-
by the
high
in
students and youths often saw participation a more attractive and satisfying activity
than continuing an education which offered no certain rewards.” Their parents and relatives might at first disapprove, but more often they were willing to offer a limited measure of support: food, money, a disused building where the satya-
grahis
could
stay.
At
first
a few boys waving flags would come to any harm. Madras, created its own
picketers
became
there
into
the
small
The Brunt
a nuisance
to
the
existed
was
local
authorities;
towns
and
villages.
Naidu.
former
renewed
did not
in
S. Muthiah
second
Congress
recreate
1920-22.
ao third-rate,
elections a Justice
and
The
by to
Mudaliar
third
and
the political
new
unemployed
and
ministers,
a reduced resurrect
boycott
in October 1930 ministry under
Governor,
on government
files
were
defeated,
majority, joined the United Nation-
the
politician
below
the
Sethuratnam
return
situation
Sir
of
George
little
of
the opinions
mental secretaries and executive councillors. therefore, show the enthusiasm Willingdon had
a Justice
which
had
Stanley,*
and the least diligent of the four Governors Madras during the dyarchy period. "I agree" was his usual
comment
they
the most stubborn of them local heroes and martyrs
parents and relatives were drawn, often bethe fray. The mood of confrontation spread
but Subbarayan, re-elected with other opposition MLCs alist Party. The
thac
of Everything
B. Muniswami
ministry
the
and way
Following the provincial Independents were replaced by Aiyar,
to fear
anc decked in khadi and Gandhi caps But agitation, as we have seen in momentum: the demonstrators and
were dispersed by the police beaten or arrested. In this were born, and wildered, into
was no reason
imagination received eloquent
of depart-
He did not, displayed in
132 drawing
the
Justice
Party
into
che
struggle
against
the
Congress in 1920-22. During the middle months of 1930 the legislature had not been in session and when it did meet the burden for defending government policies rested not with the Justice ministers, Executive Council: Krishnan Nair, the
police, in
owed
the
his position
cabinet,
he was
but with the two former Justicites on the Muhammad Usman, the Home Member, and Law Member. Usman, responsible for the
not
slow-witted
to
his
and
to Muslim own
claims
to have
abilities.
easily
confused
in
and
its
A
its
largely
Brahmin
composition
by
bull
the
the jibes and interjections of the United 1920-22 the opposition in the council had
a place
of
a man,
legislature
Nationalists. been inhibited antipathy
by
In by
to non-
cooperation, but in 1930-33 there was a far more experienced and largely non-Brahmin opposition leadership — which included Venkatachelam
Chetti,
Arogyaswami
Mudaliar,
Ramalingam
as well as Subbarayan — to harass the government and the Congress from within the legislature. Moreover,
Chetti
to abet the
novelty of dyarchy had gone. Its limitations were known though the powers and patronage of the ministry had not ceased
to
be
an
attraction
there
was
no
longer
for commnal privileges. Politicians had begun ward to the day when dyarchy would be scrapped. The
obedience
Government more
of Madras,
openly
and
therefore,
directly
10 years before. On 4 June 1930 its servants in all departments,
tracy
and
police
alone,
were
than
a scramble
to look
opposed
had
civil
seemed
and
fordis-
necessary
the government warned that and not those in the magis-
expected
to
"show
by
every
means
at... [their] disposal... [their] strong and active disapproval of the movement." Every public servant, especially touring officials, “should take every opportunity...of
promoting loyalty to exposing by informal
representations
and
the Government and of talks and discussions
economic
fallacies
countering and the lies, mis-
that
are
used
in
support of the Congress Programme".”7! Official encouragement was given to anti-Congress meetings by Muslims, Indian Christians, district and local board presidents and by leading landholders. The government was particularly eager to
recruit the latter, believing that the "zamindars and big landholders...constitute a class with a real stake in the country" and passessed "considerable local influence..."
Most
of
them
But,
everything
"constantly
and by
were
in
the
was
beyond
government's
borne
by
overstrained
the Public,
‘restrained
"loyal
[and]
the
and
own
police
often
from action..."
question".7”
“
assessment,
force".
overworked,
under
The
abused
taunts
‘The newty
"the
and
brunt
police in
the
insults
created
of
were
Press
Presidency
133 General
Reserve
mobile
pressing
March what
was
report, ing,
the
1931
political but
664
year
the Madras
public".’>
published
the of
civil
"general
Response
June
government
was
with
held
constantly
moderate
out
was
the
part
from
gestures
to the
1930,
with
the main
disobedience
government
termed
in
combined
mofussil.”
measures
variously
police,
reserves, played
in
repressive
the
armed
armed
agitation
During
balance
of
district
that
highly
in
March
1930
and
prospect
of
to
reassure
or
"the
Commission's
negative
to
concerned
would
opinion"
Simon
sup-
disappoint-
a
new
con-
stitution, warning of the dangers of violence and economic dislocation if the Congress were not checked. But civil disobedience was no longer the glimpse of hell that it had seemed
to moderate sure,
it
importance
was
Congress
in
politicians
in
often
and men
violent,
understanding
the
1920s
and
of property
but
— and
the
this
difference
that
in
the
in
is
1920-22.
of
between
1930s
To be
fundamental
the
Tamil
— civil
dis-
obedience was no longer regarded by the majority of the professional and commercial middle classes or by the bulk of the landholders and cultivators as a revolutionary movement that menaced their lives and property. On the contrary, reports of lathi charges and of policemen beating up satyagrahis in the jails were now the cause of concern to "the political public". Civil disobedience had been largely successful in by-passing the Justice Party and creating a direct confront-
ation with movement — obedience propertied
the Raj. The Congress had not created a mass indeed, it avoided unleashing one — but civil disinduced an important shift in the attitudes of the classes.
The Pact and After Through the efforts of the Indian constitutionalists Sapru
reached the
between
beginning
Irwin
Pact
of
the Congress March
the Congress
and
1931.
Viceroy, Lord Irwin, and the and Jayakar, a settlement was
the Government
Under
the
"discontinued"
terms
civil
of
of
the
India
at
Gandhi-
disobedience
and
agreed to participate in the Second Round Table Conference later in the year. This was clearly an attempt to draw the Congress back into the constitutional game. In return the
government against
promised
civil
to remove
disobedience
in
the
some
ordinances
provinces
introduced
and
to
release
all prisoners convicted for civil disobedience offences but who had not used or advocated violence. Salt could be collected
for
by
their
sympathy
villagers
domestic
with
civil
in
use;
areas
adjacent
village
disobedience
to
officers would
be
salt
who
pans
had
but
only
resigned
reinstated
if
in
their
134 posts had and cloth
not already been filled. The right to picket liquor shops was conceded but picketing must be "unaggres-
sive" in character and free from "coercion, intimidation, restraint, hostile demonstration, obstruction to the public, or any offence under the ordinary law" — failure to observe
these to
conditions
picket
would
result
locally.”
In Tamilnad there was Congressmen who had wanted
and
the
the
the
release
almost
idea
of all
complete
political
of an agreement were
hostilities
rather
with
of
of the right
prisoners.”’ the
the
elated
roy had negotiated with Gandhi this sense of triumph the pact
a truce.
movement
government
that Gandhi he had done
generally
than
suspension
some criticism of the Pact by any enquiry into police conduct
exhaustion
and there were no regrets than tried to fight on as
Congressmen
in the
by
But,
by
was
in
March
not
view
1931,
of
opposed
had compromised rather in December 1921.
the
fact
that
the
Vice-
as an equal, and because of brought an intensification of
Conflict between the government and the Congress in Tamilnad developed rapidly over the drink issue. Rajagopalachari
and
other
partymen
encouraged
caste
panchayats
to
and
the
fine
or ostracize those who defied caste prohibitions on the consumption of alcohol. He argued that this was a legitimate
practice
authority
long sanctioned of
the
Rajagopalachari
by Hindu
government
wrote
to
to
society
interfere.
Stanley's
private
beyond
"...it
must",
secretary
8 September 1931, "be open to classes and castes who hitherto permitted their members to use intoxicating
on
have liquor,
which, in a very great measure, contributes to their lower status in Hindu society, to seek to raise themselves socially as well as economically by adopting the practice of so-called
higher
castes
chari, Brahmin drink tactics.
cases
the
coercion
example,
in regard to total abstinence."”®
and nationalist, was back at his old The Madras government was sure that
dictation
and
was
a report
Congress funds. 7? More
Rajagopala-
serious
of
caste
panchayats
amounted
from
Salem
that
fines
politically
was
the
motivated.
caste
question
of
There
to
was,
were
liquor-shop
caste-andin many
physical for
paid
into
picketing.
In the first months after the pact the government was generally disposed to allow "peaceful" picketing. On 6 March 1931, a day after the publication of the pact, advised district magistrates "to take no
picketing
danger
were
unless
and
until
it
threatens
to the public peace..."°
reaching
the
Secretariat
of
the Chief Secretary notice whatever of
serious
disorder
But by early May reports
aggressive
Congress
or
picketing
135
which
had
district
tackle
tween which
almost the
amounted
magistrates
the
cordoning
were
picketing.®!
given
off
of drink
"unfettered
This
provoked
from
Rajagopalachari
shops,
and
of disputes
be-
discretion"
a series
magistrates and Congress organizers over the picketing was allowed under the Gandhi-Irwin
daily
letters
Secretariat
ions
to
supplied
gopalachari's
rapidly
asking
to
local
letters
exhausted
the
for
details
officials
by
turns
tolerance
of
to
cunfidential
concerning
obsequious
of
the
the
to
terms on Pact and
Governor
instruct-
picketing.
and
and
Raja-
threatening,
Under-Secretary,
Williams, and the new Chief Secretary, G.T.H. Bracken. After one exchange of letters, Bracken noted on 5 September that "Mr, Rajagopalachari's object in continually writing and
making allegations is, presumably, partly position as an ‘intermediary’ between the
to establish his Government and the
people".®?
The magistrates and police equally incensed by the tactics
M.K.
Vellodi,
Williams
on
29
District
October:
During the very large
Officers
Magistrate
officers in the of the Congress of
North
last six months I have number of reports from
and
from
officers
districts after the
Arcot,
wrote
received Police
of the
were pact.
to
a
Excise
Department and also from my Sub-Divisional Magistrates of incidents relating to picketing which in my opinion constitute definite breaches of the pact. I have received reports of consumers
and
in
acting
ished
being
some in
at
obstructed,
instances
the
the
name
of
moderation
abused,
assaulted Congress
with
black-mailed
by
...
which
picketers I
am
the
aston~
Police
of every rank in this District have behaved throughout the last few months. I myself have been at pains to see that the conditions of a pact by no means easy to work are faithfully observed by officers subordinate to me. Williams thought Vellodi's report an "admirable document", but Bracken would not allow him to send a copy to Rajagopalachari.®™
Other the
district
Secretariat
question
of
magistrates
"if"
for
and
assurances
— the
next
the
that
civil
Commissioner —
it
disobedience
they would have the authorization to the very day that Civil Disobedience the the
when
of
was
Police
no
asked
longer
campaign
crush the Congress is renewed".®
a
began “on
For once the Government of India was in agreement with Madras predilection for prompt, decisive action against Congress. As early as July 1931 the Government of India
136 began
to draft
obedience
plans
campaign,
for
the
fearing
suppression
the
Gandhi
of
might
a new
civil
after
dis-
all
decide
against participation in the Round Table Conference in London. Although Gandhi's departure from Bombay on 29 August postponed
preparations, they were soon resumed and the provincial governments were consulted as to the nature of the ordinances they would require in combating a revived movement.** By December
it was
1931
clear
that
Gandhi
the
returned
crisis
was
imminent.
to India disillusioned
make any headway in London: he was far negotiations than round table wrangling details. But, despite the certainty of
Congress leadership had anticipating that there
made few plans would again be
Gandhi and the Viceroy, pecting that repression
had been
in
now Lord would be
1930.
This time, however, the negotiate. Rebuffed, Gandhi
disobedience and emptive strike. lawed
and
party
leaders
Madras
bv his
December
failure
of its own, perhaps negotiations between
government was in no mood to advised the CWC to revive civil
launched its prePatel were arrested
1932; ordinances were promulgated in force; and Congress committees
government's
to
Willingdon, certainly exas gradually applied as it
rounded
up
to set the agitational machine in 404 Congressmen were arrested and
The
28
better at face-to-face over constitutional renewed conflict, the
at once the government Gandhi and Vallabhbhai
daybreak on 4 January they were not already
On
faith
in
before
they
had
a chance
motion. In Tamilnad convicted in January
attack
seemed
at
where out-
alone 1932.°
vindicated.
At first bewildered and disoriented, the Tamil Congressmen who had escaped capture launched a counter-attack. In Madras city in January and February 1932 small bands of picketers were posted to attract crowds and to provoke police aggression. In one incident on 25 January Mrs Rukmani Lakshmipathi posted two volunteers outside a store selling foreign
cloth
in
Rattan
Bazaar
Road
to
picket
and
distribute
leaflets advocating the boycott of foreign goods. A crowd of 200 soon gathered and, anticipating a breach of the peace, Inspector V.A. Currie gave the picketers two minutes to disperse. When they ignored his warning, the two volunteers were beaten with canes as an "unlawful assembly". They crawled across the road to Mrs Lakshmipathi's waiting car and were driven
to
arrested.
hospital
instructions
Inspector issued
for
medical
Currie
to
the
attention;
claimed
police
stipulated that picketers should Mrs Lakshmipathi complained that
on
that 4
there
he was
January
they
were
following
1932
which
be dispersed "vigorously"; the police used "all their
might" in beating the volunteers; it was, she most violent thing I have ever witnessed'".°*
added, "the Accounts of
the
137 incident
when
were
the
reported
volunteers
went
trap,
as
in
the
on
press
that
trial;
and
evening
the
and
repeated
beating
formed
basis of questions in the legislature. It demonstrated that the Congress was not easily quietened. The government was annoyed at Currie's "error of judgement" in walking into the Congress
which
the
but,
Police
allowance
must
zeal".®°
are
be
This,
Bracken
working
made
however,
for
was
are
Congressmen
their
began
campaign
disobedience
ties
were
to
against
movement
occasional
doubt
such
had
extremely
those
who
not
The Tamil Congress would Raj for long: the weight
the
observed,
the
an
err
conditions
difficult
owing
to
under
and
some
excess
of
isolated case. °°
not maintain its defiance of of repression was too great and value
odds.
By
of
trying
April
disintegrated,
"conferences"
temples, the circulation of sheets, and minor instances
"the
the
and
held
to
1932 the
continue
the
civil
only
secretly
in
activi-
fields
cyclostyled leaflets and newsof incendiarism. But the govern
or
ment's counter-propaganda was slow, because it was more scrupulous in investigating incidents than the nationalists, and in such a war of propaganda as the Congress was engaged with the Raj, speed and drama made greater impact than be-
lated
The
apologies
Funetion Civil
India
The
complete and
in
1947.
13
independence
of civil
directed
had
But
at
been
objective
years
%)
Disobedience
disobedience
abandonment ence
of Civil
proclaimed
achieved
only
and rebuttals.
were
crushed,
of
for
some
had
it
failed?
movement
was
to
win
from colonial
to
intervene
disobedience
winning
the
but
in
rule.
between
1934
Congressmen
independence.
and
the
This
the
Indian
struggle
for
was not
formal
independ-
was
not
For Gandhi the struggle itself was at least as important as any constitutional goal. Civil disobedience was an opportunity for Indians to develop their own political strength
and
to make
Young Table
Gandhi
Britain
perceive
and acknowledge
India on 23 January 1930 about Conference and the decision to
explained:
The is
British
to
come
people
to
an
must
end.
realize
This
it.
Writing
in
the boycott of the Round launch civil disobedience,
they
that
will
the
not
Empire
realize
unless we in India have generated power within to enforce our will. The English have paid dearly for their freedom such as it is. They therefore only respect those who are prepared to pay an adequate price for their own liberty. The real
138 conference,
therefore,
selves.
Rajagopalachari
complementary
saw
has
civil
objectives.
to
be
among
disobedience
Firstly,
in
a
our-
as
regional
having
two
context,
it
was to build up the strength of the party by mobilizing as many volunteers and sympathizers as possible and establishing active committees throughout Tamilnad. The careful prepar-
ations
for
the
Vedaranniyam
march
indicate
this
as
much
as
widespread and intensive liquor agitation of 1931. A broadbased party would resolve the communal problem by incorporating a non-Brahmin majority; a strong party could flex its
muscles
and
make
Secondly,
in
its
opponents
appreciate
an
all-India
contest,
its
strength.
through
of organized strength and popular support, the be in a position to negotiate with the British constitutional settlement it wanted. Complete
which Rajagopalachari had rejected as an at the Vedaranniyam conference in August
ultimate secure
aim,
but
a more
the
suitable
immediate
strength"
and
tion
had
only
"a
premature
terms..."
recently
of
constitution
Rajagopalachari had opposed Table Conference because he
satisfactory
task
%
than
demonstrations
Congress would the sort of independence,
impractical 1929, might
the
the
Congress
dyarchy.
objective be an
In
was
1921
to
Congress participation in a Round felt that "we had not shown enough
settlement
But
been
in 1921
introduced;
would
end
the dyarchy in
in
1930-33
very
un-
constituits
successor was being devised while the civil disobedience movement was in progress. "This", explained Rajagopalachari in Madras in October 1930, "was the psychological moment, when the Round Table drama was being played in London, for them to carry on the real fight here. It was no use telling people to imagine that that was the theatre of action. The theatre
of action was in India".°? How
was
agitation
in
India
to
determine
constitution-
making in London? Two ways were possible. Speaking of the differences between [:xtremists and Moderates in 1919, Rajagopalachari suggested that the one in practice helped the
other. "Moderate opinion gets its value only by pointing the strength of Nationalist discontent, and the growing
dangers thereof. Nationalist opinion shaped into a true political force by
is duly restrained the opposition of
that
the
moderate
opinion". ®
It
Liberals
at
Round
Congress
British
agitation
the
feared
three
that
might
would
their
be
that
stiffen
Table
position
in
1930-32
demands
Conferences. in
challenged by the Congress, they would erates by making concessions to them.
India try The
was
he
of
at
and
hoped
the
If the
seriously
to rally the modmore persistent the
139 Congress
agitation
moderates
But
thought
would
it
is
the
reap
in
more
India,
for
other
likely
Liberals
too
the
greater
Indians
that
by
to
1930
deficient
come
to
terms
with
his
with
the
harvest
Congress
the
enjoy.
Rajagopalachari
in courage
mination to play a useful role in London. of the Congress proving through agitation must
the
and
deter-
It was now a case that the British
and
not
with
other
parties. Failure to meet the demands of the Congress would result in the breakdown of any constitution it opposed. By contrast
Rajagopalachari
attitude
welcomed
in
December
Gandhi's
1921,
in
October
participation
in
1931
the Round
Table Conference because "Last year, we made Britain perceive our strength".°® The moment seemed opportune to drive a hard bargain. Even if the Congress failed to secure all its constitutional aims at the conference it was, Rajagopalachari suggested to Gandhi, better "to try and get as much as you can
under
may
be
for
the
existing
resorting
reduced
stitution
circumstances,
to Satyagraha to
[to
a minimum...",
to be drafted
so
force
rather
without
that
further than
the
necessity
concessions]
allow
the Congress.°
the
con-
It was
essential that the pressure on the British should be maintained while Gandhi was in London: Rajagopalachari's persistent letters to the Government of Madras and the intensive
picketing
during
designed
to
the Gandhi-Irwin
achieve
Rajagopalachari
returned
at
the
end
this
end.
was
too
of
Pact
period
optimistic,
December
were
and when
empty-handed
from
partly
Gandhi the
Round
Table Conference, Rajagopalachari wrote that "India has been turned back from the London Conference in tragic unfulfilment".°? Reluctantly, he turned back to civil disobedience, continuing
courting in
August
to
1933,
of protest
Joint
keep
one
imprisonment
eye
for
on
the
developments
Rajagopalachari
against
Parliamentary
the
recent
Committee
last
time
explained
in
London.
during
discussion
this
on
In
the movement
as
a gesture
safeguards
by the
on the constitution.
Rajagopalachari was not alone in Tamilnad in relating civil disobedience to constitutional objectives. A similar
attitude on the part of the Swarajists helps to explain
participate Madras
in agitation
government,
cooperation,
civil
the constitutional the
India
In practice,
form of the Act
of
too,
in
noted
1930-33 that,
than by
in
1920-22.
contrast
disobedience was "designed
to
issue..."%?
the
Congress
constitution
1935.
moderate nationalists and their greater willingness
Its
contributed
embodied
achievements
very
in the
were
with
former to
The
non-
precipitate little
Government
indirect.
to
of
Through
140 agitation
among
the
those
act,
and
its
power
struggle
by
Tamil
classes the
against
Congress
which
organizational the
vis-a-vis
Raj,
its
built
were
the
other
a broad
enfranchised strength
party
was
opponent,
basis
under
of
developed in
the
effect
Justice
the in
support
new
the
augmenting
Party.
CHAPTER
5
CoALESCENCE For
the
Congress
first
10
years
in Tamilnad
of
was
the
dyarchy
perplexed,
lysed, by its own disunity. It Raj and the Justice Party — but
constitution
at
times
the
almost
para-
had two clear opponents — the it failed to devise a poli-
tical strategy which would either knock out both or despatch the one and enable the Congress to concentrate its blows on the
other.
stantly
or
not
tried
Instead,
favouritism;
hesitate
public
to trip one
Brahmin
and
faction
bickered
each
to publicize
platforms;
and
non-Brahmin
other
its
for alleged
and
communal
another
and
would-be
leaders
punched
in the press
con-
slights
with
grievances
leaders
Congressmen
did
and on
and jostled their rivals and made faces when Gandhi or the Congress Working Committee told them to remember their nationalist manners. From 1930 the situation changed. factional, communal and personal abuse
region's political slang. But the from civil disobedience internally
izationally
decade.
as
those
As
more if
in
powerful
than
a balance,
of the Justice
Party
the
Tamil Congress emerged more cohesive and organ-
it had been fortunes
fell.
become,
either
in
terms
of
the
during
of
As the
of the Justice Party, and especially of tracted, that of the Congress expanded.
not
Not magically, for remained part of the
size
the
the previous
Congress
social
rose
composition
its leadership, conA mass party it did
of
its
membership
or
the thrust of its policies, but its influence and popularity extended far enough to win a dramatic success for the Congress in the first elections under the new constitution.
The Party Tamil
When
Consolidates Srinivasa
Swarajists
Iyengar
early
in
resigned
1930,
he
from
left
no
leadership heir
of the
apparent.
Rangaswami Iyengar preferred the influence he now exercised as editor of the Hindu and as Congress veteran to an active leadership
role.
C.N.
Muthuranga
141
Mudaliar,
Srinivasa
142 lyengar's
nominee
for
little authority stature to rival
the
TNCC
president
within the party: Rajagopalachari.
in
1929,
he did not Satyamurti,
commanded
have the having failed
to create a new Congress party within the legislature, withdrew from the political stage. In the absence of an accepted leader and in view of the renewed boycott of the legislatures, the Swarajist element of the Tamil Congress preferred to wait in the wings until, as in 1922-23, the moment seemed opportune
for
them to return.
But movement
the unexpected forced them to
Congress ban legislatures
strength of the civil disobedience participate. It was clear that the
would not be in September
lifted 1930.
before the elections To defy the Cengress
to the boycott
at the height of public enthusiasm for civil disobedience might be considered treachery and damage the future political career of those who called themselves nationalists. And it is certain that many of them were genuinely excited by the struggle and moved by the suffering of the activists. Satyamurti, who "apparently feared political extinction if he failed to advertise",! was drawn into the movement by Rajagopalachari in October 1930 as his successor as TNCC
president.
when K.
Satyamurti
he was
caught
Bashyam
Iyengar,*
avoided
and
arrest
imprisoned
formerly
until
January
in the pre-emptive
a close
professional
1932,
strike.
and
poli-
tical associate of Srinivasa Iyengar, was a more enthusiastic convert to civil disobedience. In March 1930 he resigned from the TNCC in protest against the boycott of the legis-
latures,
but
promised
to
help
the
satyagraha.
funds for the Vedaranniyam march and Mudaliar and the latter's nephew, M.
organized between
spell
man
in
swadeshi
April
and
Madras
and
of
freedom
Congressmen,
who
propaganda
July
in
it
1930.%
October was
directed
in
Madras
1930,
the
collected
with Muthuranga Bhaktavatsalam,
During
and
in
city's
the
he
mofussi]
Rajagopalachari's
Bashyam
Bashyam,
He
was
his
conjunction
picketing
in
brief
right-hand
with
the
Telugu
first
months of 1931, on one occasion receiving a severe beating in a police lathi-charge.? On the resumption of civil disobedience in January 1932 Bashyam evaded arrest to continue
to organize resistance, but he was leading a demonstration in protest Madras of the Lothian Committee on
ment
The
former
to civil
action
was
themselves agitation
believed
Swarajists
disobedience.
unshaken,
and
at
that
for
that
civil
but
their
did
they
not
Their saw
group to
juncture.
They,
disobedience
imprisoned in March for against the visit to the franchise." have
faith
the
long-term
like
commit-
in constitutional
political
be won could
a
gains,
by assisting
for
the
Rajagopalachari,
influence
the
outcome
143
is was in constitutional discussions in London.* contrast with the Nationalists' basic hostility to
of the marked
1920-22.
in
non-cooperation
for
atmosphere
favourable
disobedience.
civil
after
the period
in
groups
other
with
cooperation
a
created
participation
Their
Although there had been no challenge to Rajagopalachari's leadership during the movement from the ex-Swarajists, there was one from an increasingly powerful group of party activists.
With
most
of
drifted
educated
the
the
collapse
Congress
away
from
ones
who
of the non-cooperation
volunteers,
the party. remained
numbering
The higher
yravitated
movement
no
more
caste
than
and
towards
in 1922
better
2,000,
Rajagopalachari
and participated in his struggle against the Swarajists; later they served in the Tamil Nadu branch of the All-India Spinners' Association, which had its headquarters at Tiruppur, or they followed him to the Tiruchengodu ashram, where they
lived on a modest salary from Congress funds. A few of the non-Brahmins defected with Ramaswami Naicker and Ramanathan to
form
other
the
Self-Respect
group
movement.
of activists
or high caste. Tiruvannamalai
who
But
could
there
seldom
remained
boast
of education
Several, like N. Annamalai Pillai* of in North Arcot, were the sons of dancing
girls and prostitutes; Virudhunagar in Ramnad
some, like K. Kamaraj Nadar* from were from relatively poor families
despised castes; yet others, like R. Srinivasavarada a Brahmin from Madura district, cared less for their
plot
of land
these
pise
than
Although
activists
him.
for
drawn
They
the
into
distrusted were
life
the
of a political
Congress by
his
non-cooperation
they were not share
disappointed by either Gandhi's
obsession the
with
Congress
followed
and
spinning.
mainstream
Subramania
Tinnevelly
for physical
Siva,.
disturbances
and verbal
civil
Iyengar, little
and
1918
came
and
camaraderie imagination
disobedience
of by
the the
After
1922
they
backwaters
who had 1908
violence
been
and
who
of
their
a central imbued
and a contempt
in
his
party boldness
program,
drifted
1922
to des-
intellectualism,
the failure of the movement scruples about non-violence
into
of
his
and
vagabond.°®
between
Rajagopalachari
alienated
aloofness from the back-slapping menials. Gandhi had caught their of
an-
away
own.
figure them
but
and nor
did his
from
They
in the
a zest
for Europeans
They held unofficial satyagrahas satyagraha" in 1924 in Madura or
— like the abortive "sword the more sensational cam-
orthodox
to shun
paign against the statue of General Neill, a British hero 1857, in Madras in 1927.’ They toured Tamilnad singing Nationalist songs and performing patriotic dramas. The
Gandhians
were
inclined
them as violent,
of
144
uncouth
youths,
paying them services as by the late
venience
but
the
Swarajists
were
more
sympathetic,
to canvass at election times or employing their orators and flag-wavers. Humble beginnings, but 1920s this group of activists — which for con-
may be called
the
Kamaraj-Annamalai
Pillai
group
after two of its most active members — was firmly established on the middle rungs of the party organization in Tamilnad. They were experienced in the rough-and-tumble of local faction fights and they had contacts with local big men. In Ramnad,
for example, Kamaraj and his friend K.S. Muthuswami hitched themselves to the anti-Justice faction in Virudhunagar and were instrumental in bringing several wealthy Nadars into
civil
the
P.S.
disobedience
movement.®
Kumaraswami
speaking
1930
Raja
Kumaraswami
Raja,* was
1930,
control
should
by
also
a
town
leading
in
the
figure
of
the
displacement
A year
later,
of the
by proposing
Vedaranniyam
murti, his reputation NCC elections in May president
with
president
and
Rajan
fortuitous.
brand
of
with the Congress such
place
as
as
secretary
Satyamurti
and
N.M.R.
was
occupied
between
Satyamurti
Himself
in the Tamil
him with
but
support
poor
advocate
ambition him
the
of
oratory,
Iyengar,
and
he
the
Satyamurti,
to be
could
to
themselves into the elected, they could
in
common
take
second
The activists
he
gave
them
in
the
well-known. party
to be a patrons
provided
access
and a champion other benefits
Rajagopalachari, local
was
own peppery
was ambitious dependence on
always
of
vice-
remaining
of his
had
the
as
activists
had
party;
was
the
much
unlike
use
the
had
participation
a minister
activists
in
Satyamurti
party hierarchy.
within
Congress
leaving
Subbaraman
of
and a pedlar
the highest echelons of the Congress against Rajagopalachari. There were anticipated.
in
tried
Rajagopalachari
pushed
most
activists' way of life. He leader, but hampered by his
Srinivasa
that
Kamaraj
enhanced by a term in prison. In the 193] Rajagopalachari was re-elected as
activists
nationalist
group
By
they lined up with Satya-
on the TNCC's Working Committee.!?
not
Swarajists
of
The bid failed: the could rival Rajagopala-
places
alliance
with
satyagraha,
as
the
centres
Telugu-
DCC
Pillai
Madura
The
treasurer,
however,
the
Ramnad
the post of president to an activist. activists did not have a candidate who
chari.’®
in
the
with
Rajapalaiyam.
Kamaraj-Annamalai the
of
allied
neighbouring
of the TNCC on
one
closely
lieutenants.°
the
concentrate
the
president
as his
Emboldened
to gain
making
were
community
and Muthuswami March-April
and
They
to field to be
was
boards;
By allying
organization
to
to
an
his
with
launch
local boards and the legislatures. !*Once manipulate the resources of the party and
145 the government fortunes. By
local
1937
and
themselves
in this
party TNCC
between
advance
the
regional
their
activists party
became
and
of
his
chari's
triumph
and
associates
to
No doubt
rift
Satyamurti
on
Satyamurti's
political
for
the
the
the
element
Biographers
a prelude
Kamaraj
aggerates
a
personal
organization.
way a new non-Brahmin as
own
consolidated
secretaries
leadership.
elections
chari and
to
of
in
on
other.!?
strength
Kamaraj
TNCC
in
was
the
and
party
into
the
over
in
was
and
the
1931
Rajagopala-
the
late
1930s
Rajagopalachari
interpretation
annoyed
the
Muthuswami
seen
and
in
mid-1930s
injected
have
side
This
position
the
activists
one
political
and underestimates
dexterity.
Rajagopalachari
their
Kawaraj
the
and
at the
ex-
Rajagopala-
outcome
of
the 1931 TNCC elections, but he turned it to his advantage. He could manipulate the vain, ambitious Satyamurti as he could not have done Srinivasa Iyengar or Rangaswami Iyengar. By nominating Satyamurti his successor as TNCC president in
October 1930 and again in May 1935, Rajagopalachari converted a rival into a dependent. Satyamurti’s second term as president aroused considerable hostility within the party, especially from his former Swarajist colleagues Muthuranga Mudaliar and Bashyam Iyengar. When the critics proposed inviting Srinivasa
Iyengar
back
to
lead
the
Tamil
Congress
it
was
Rajagopalachari's intervention which saved Satyamurti and warded off the threat to them both, just as it was Rajagopala-
chari who took the responsibility for Satyamurti's mismanagement of Congress participation in the local board elections in 1935-36.'"
Moreover,
indirect control while preserving
national was the
Congress
through
Satyamurti
leadership.’®
As
the was
partner. the and own
the
the
could
exercise
an
over the Kamaraj-Annamalai Pillai group his own close contacts with Gandhi and the
the essential link between Tamil Congress, Satyamurti By
he
Swarajists'
involvement
long
as Rajagopalachari
Gandhian High Command inevitably the junior in
civil
and
disobedience,
by
elimination of his main rivals for regional leadership, by drawing together the reins of party control into his hands, Rajagopalachari was able to exercise a command over party
which
centralization preliminary
Panting sensus
stage
to take
It was
had
of
and
a wider
evaded
internal
process
of
him
in
the
consolidation
1920s.
coalescence. '®
was
This
the
Office
closely
within
persistently
of control
the
followed
Tamil
party
by
on
the
the
creation future
of a virtual
aims
and
con-
tactics
146 of the Congress. For a period of about a year, from mid-1932 to late 1933, this was in doubt. Civil disobedience had helped to draw the Tamil Congressmen together and there was a
danger that cooperation al
In
its swift collapse in 1932 that had been achieved.
September
proposals
which the
would
caste
the
to
Harijans)
give
known
as
the
Gandhi
reserve
within
the
Gandhi
untouchables
Fearing
that
fasted
seats
Poona
Pact,
Among
until
for
a joint
constitution.!”?
protested
consideration
Hindus,
Hindus,
agreed
1932
under
would
by
against
the
British
a separate
this
would
the
was
electorate.
constitution-
electorate
irreparably
leaders
(whom
he
into
the
The
incorporated
Gandhi's
the
government
untouchable
untouchables
Hindu
destroy
supporters,
now
from
split
called
agreement,
and
1935
indeed
among
many Indians who sympathized with his social views, the fast stimulated concern for the plight of the untouchables. Raja-
gopalachari,
negotiations,
who
had
been
abandoned
at
Poona
much
of
during
the
caution
the issue of untouchability during the in Tamilnad for the opening of temples relied mainly on persuasion, proposing the
Madras
of referenda
whether into
legislature
among
or not
in such matters
of
change
— the
and
in
was withdrawn
The
political
orthodox
past,
it
Harijan
the
the
Rajagopalachari'’s
lature
bill
users
Madras
fast
and
had
shown
would
authorize
bill
Brahmins for
who had
the
Hindus
the
temple
in
1934.?9
Tamilnad
Although
party
no
it
on
in
the
was
not
decide
He ran
many
legisits
of
supporters
any
a version
without
among
holding
opposed
— and
central
offended
co-workers
to
jurisdiction
vigorously
been Congress new
had
untouchables
introduced
in August
campaign
legislature of
the
1920s and campaigned to the Harijans. He through Subbarayan in
a particular
orthodox
treatment
achievements.
won
that
of
he
it should be opened to the Harijans.’®
difficulties
radical
a
the
the
the
in the
non-Brahmin
caste Hindus and among untouchable leaders. Previously the Madras government and, with varying success, the Justice Party had championed the cause of the untouchables, but from 1932 the Congress established a claim to have advanced their interests.?° In view of the large number of seats reserved
for the Scheduled Castes under the 1935 Act this was a significant development. The Congress made a real contribution
to the
welfare
Tamilnad
in
of the Harijans.
1933-34
about
Rs.
During
10,000
Harijan movement, most of which was water-supplies and accommodation as
and hostels
scale of the superficial:
for Harijan
students.?!
Gandhi's
were
tour
collected
of
for
the
spent on wells, roads, well as for scholarships
Compared
with
the vast
problem of untouchability these measures were the economic and social oppression of the
147
untouchables asset
for
was
the
unrelieved.
But
Congress.
The
Harijan
movemert
the
Harijan
issue
also
they
were
opened
up
the
Madras
a useful
a new
political
front
against
the government at a time when civil disobedience had died out. It was fear that the Congressnen would make political capital from
that
led
government
to
block
Rajagopalachari's temple entry bill in che legislature in 1932-33, and there were rumours that funds collected for Harijan work would find their way into Congress coffers to
finance a revival
of civil
disobedierce.”*
The agitation
brought Congressmen and their allies back onto public platforms and into the news at a time when the Congress appeared crushed and its official organizations were illegal. While Rajagopalachari was engaged Satyamurti, who was too orthodox
ment,
welcome
any
material
position, *
the
sought
Congress
in
Nationalists
an
or
legal
improvement
In
association
alternative
Tamilnad.
in the
in the in his
legislature
issue
he took
on
Harijan outlook
of
the
which
with
moveto
Harijans' to
the
revive
United
up the cause
of the
landholders and cultivators hit by falling crop prices during the depression. In November 1933 the opposition moved a resolution in the Madras legislature for a reduction in land revenue rates to compensate for the losses sustained by agriculturists;. Satyamurti, from outside the legislature, co~
operated with demand a 33.3
quickly
the per
MLCs cent
mobilized
in organizing a "Land cut in land taxation.
locally
influential
Revenue Day" to The agitation
moderate
politicians
in the mofussil including Brahmin mirasdars in Tanjore and V.C. Vellingiri Gounder of Coimbatore who presided over the Madras Presidency Ryotwari Landholders' Conference organized
by United
Nationalists
Although
tation,
like
stunt"
and
ryot,
who,
the
the
"not if
Madras
Harijan
1934.
and
left
concessions
to
Congressmen
system
developed
and
gave
the mid-1930s.?6 in
The
Harijan
1932-33
still civil
served
tried
Telugu
to
agrarian
a Congress
on the part
would
fan
to
make
60
lakhs
agitation it
into
a widespread
politics
and agrarian
outlawed and disobedience
the
1934.7
the
agi-
"political
of the average
best
of
things
the Government of India persuaded
agrarian
into
in January
saw
as
move
himself
amounting
In Tamilnad
quickly
government
movement,
a spontaneous
and pay his taxes"',”®
make
and Congressmen
to keep
flame;
activities
the Congress
rupees
continued
attack
a more
recovering from in early 1932.
of
on
radical of
the
active
in
it to
in January
to smoulder
Andhra
the
it
zamindari
character
in
nationalists
while
it was
the blow struck against They gave Congressmen time
148 to
to
re-examine
the
constitutional
Rajagopalachari
August
accepted
1933,
but
that
Indian
the
the
constitution
future
provincial
was
no
nature of the ‘in April 1933
series
of editorials
ence,
constitutional
1934,
nationalist
1933,
central
likely
of civil work
in the
Rangaswami it
had
feeling,
repression.
had
follow
been
to
his
lead
Paper
the
general
governments
and
Congress
before
the
proposed
made
of
known.
affect
death
that
unexpectedly
asked,
to
a
the
program.
his
argued
beaten
he
he
character
was
the
disobedi-
strong
the
In a
in
civil
standstill
"is
substi-
wave
by
gov-
best
method
itself
away
of utilising this unprecedented awakening to achieve permanently beneficial results?" His reply was that "The newly tapped national energy has to be trained into channels of constructive
activity
Harijan
undertaken
efforts
if
it
work
that
by
Congressmen
ive"
work,
but
argued
that
had
sought
for
nearly
20
constitution party's Unlike
1920's,
not
of a barren or negative
indication
the
is
would
offer
practical the
there
the mid-1930's
was
a
that
were
the
debate
eager
and
it
could
over
was
of
India
the
as
in
an
"construct-
autonomy
Congressmen
was
under
through
in
the
the
course
new
them
fulfilled.?°
strategies
only
others
of
to pursue
be
consensus
this
He saw the
and
legislatures
provincial
years
general
fritter
character".2®
ambitions
bitter
to
Rajagopalachari the
in
Act. With this in view the initiative in pro-
the
an
and
on the
disobedience
as
Gandhi,
to continue
White
a return
disobedience
to
Hindu
"What",
loyalty
substantially
Iyengar
produced
planning
of civil
to try
of the
and
before
from
not
futile
March
abandonment
of
although
ernment
would
be
in
gesture
new Government of India Rangaswami Iyengar took
the
February
TNCC
longer
posing
"tution
Partly
a last
the publication
Agitation
situation
action.
made
it would
movement.”” With
political
in
Tamil
the
that
mid-
Congress
possible.
Dis-
in
cussion, therefore, centred not on »hether to return to the legislatures, but when. Some partymen felt it was premature to discuss council entry until the reforms were finalized or
until
the Government
removed the ban on party the generally favourable
editorials,
Satyamurti
October 1933 in elections under party manifesto
released
prisoners
organizations.*° But encouraged response to Rangaswami Iyengar's
launched
a Madras
anticipation of a fifth dyarchy which was never was an up-dated version
programs of the 1920s, stressing alist control of the legislatures grievances of the people" dress.*! More remarkable
Congress
that than
the the
the and
Swarajya
Party
and by
in
round of provincial in fact held. The of the Swarajist
importance of nationlisting the “burning
party would program was
seek to rethe range of
149 support
which
the
party
secured
from
its
inception.
Along-
side former Swarajists, like Satyamurti, Bashyam Iyengar and Muthuranga Mudaliar, were Satyamurti's allies from the Kamaraj-
Annamalai Pillai group and several of Rajagopalachari's Brahmin associates. Agreement on a parliamentary program afforded Party
April sider
lines
an
internal
Within
similar
six
unity
months
bodies
of
absent
the
were
in
the
creation
formed
of
throughout
1934 Satyamurti and other leaders the formation of a national party of
the
All-India
1920s.
Swarajya
Party
the
Madras
India
and
met in Delhi organization
created
by
Das
Swarajya in
to on
and
conthe
Nehru in January 1923. But although Gandhi said that he was unable to participate in a parliamentary program, most of his
associates
were
enthusiastic
that
it
should
be adopted
as the
Congress program and not entrusted to a separate organization. An informal conference of Congress leaders at Ranchi followed by a meeting of the AICC (which had never been declared illegal) at Patna in mid-May approved the abandonment of civil disobedience and the adoption of a constitutional program to be carried out by the Congress through its own Parliamentary Board. The first task was to elect candidates
and
organize
Assembly
the
scheduled
campaigns
for
elections
for November
to
1934.
the
central
In contrast with Gandhi's negative attitude towards the reorientation of Congress strategy, Rajagopalachari rapidly established himself as one of the leading spokesmen for the new policy. As early as February 1933 he had remarked that the Congress leaders were not "like religious fanatics [who] would for ever stick to "If it were proved that
and
the
would
Provincial
result
in
would not boycott he
insisted
a particular policy", adding that the boycott of the Federal Assembly
Councils
under
irreparable
that
the
harm
the
to
the
legislatures".°?
the
old
differences
"Pro-Changers" were no longer a parliamentary program would
future
Constitution
country,
At Ranchi
between
the
Congress
and Patna
"No-Changers"
and
relevant and that agreement on be a unifying force among Con-
gressmen. "I feel it is best to have a united and coordinated plan", he said, "and not break into groups with opposing policies."** With civil disobedience abandoned, his regional base
strengthened,
and
the
new
AICC
had
only
gopalachari was too to the legislatures Although
Assembly
the
elections
of Congressmen tion, for most
would Tamil
convinced to revive
and did not
constitution
imminent,
of the advantages the controversies resolved
forecast
be to elections Congressmen the
to
what
under logic
Raja-
of returning of the 1920s.
contest
the
the attitudes
the new constituof their regional
150 political would not
situation dictated that a return to the legislatures mean a return to the frustrations of the Swarajists
in the late 1920s. If the Congress were to avoid the trap into which Srinivasa Iyengar's alliance had stumbled in 1926-28, the party must be able to take office to exclude the Justic-
ites and to control patronage Independent ministry must not there was a general consensus Referring
1934
and
to
that
the
"the
reactionary
be
a conclusive
on
the
office,
yan
Party
Party,
from
argument
situation
could
not
afford
favour
itself
by Congress June
1935
to put
in
dolls
Rajan,
support
that
in
for
this
in
July
a communal
power
of Congressmen
a majority".°*> in
claimed
of preventing
entrenching
in
created
remarked
responsibility, but of the country".**
Satyamurti
consideration
if they come in
ministry,
gress
Justice
single
itself. The disaster of the be repeated. On this issue among the Tamil leadership.
should
accepting
reflecting the
time
positions
Subbara-
"the
Con-
of power
and
must accept office in the wider interests Rajagopalachari's conviction was that
"no futile wrecking should be wrung out
should of the
be attempted, but as Councils as possible
thening the prestige and position perception civil disobedience was
of no
much benefit for streng-
the Congress". ” In his longer of immediate use
once the 1935 Government of India Act made the new constitution a fatt accompli, though it remained an ultimate sanction to be invoked if the constitutional path were blocked by the
Governor's
veto or the intransigence
"Down
here",
wrote
Lord
of the Raj.°*
Erskine,*
the
new
Governor
of
Madras in June 1935, "the leaders are simply panting to take office". But, to be fair, it was not simply a question of personal
though
ambition
and
those
motives
forfeit
much
hatred
clearly
of
the
Justice
were.
As
far
Party,
as
strong
Tamilnad
was
concerned, there was no real choice. Civil disobedience could not be revived in the foreseeable future and the Congress
would
of
the
support
it had
accumlated
1930 if it refused to work the new constitution. whole of the dyarchy period Congressmen had been whether
in
the
legislatures
or
outside
them,
but
since
For the in opposition,
they
had
created a rival government of their own. Gandhi had not shown them a practical alternative to participation in the
elaborate mechanism of control by India. And many Congressmen were
jails chari
and on the was
authority
56
and
in
streets.
1935,
to use
which weary
They were
Satyamurti
the powers
48.
the British of 17 years
growing They
old:
wanted
of the provincial
not
ruled in the
Rajagopala-
to
be
in
government
in ways which they believed would advance the cause of Indian nationalism and serve the interests of the Indian people rather
than
the
foreign
rulers.
They
wanted
to
reform
the
151 land revenue system, reduce high salaries
prohibition
and
relieve paid to
promote
the tax burden of the poor, government servants, introduce
cottage
industries."°
They
were
not
revolutionaries; they did not wish to transform Tamil society structurally: so, barring interference by the Governor or obstruction by the Secretariat, a Congress ministry under
provincial
autonomy
objectives.
The
of
aversion
left-wing
factor
in
stitution.
by of
young civil
more
should
radical
1933,
for
India
to
to
achieve
Congress
India
to
take
in
the
mid-1930s
office
the
Congress
Socialist
social
and
economic
program.
the
he
great
equality, nation
called
human
goal
of
nation
and
a further
was
formed
Although
con-
abandonment to adopt a
Jawaharlal
in the mid- 1930s and ideology.”
the
Congress
social
and
by
growth
new
to
lead
economic
of an exploitation
class
its
was
the
Party
speeches language
for
to the ending
by
under
of
to the
disappointed at the wanted the Congress
the party, his with socialist
example,
many
leaders
1934
Congressmen who were disobedience and who
Nehru did not join were often charged In
in
eagerness
In
able
of the Tamil
movements
their
be
class,
to
of
national
freedom within the framework of an international cooperative socialist world federation. This is not such an empty idealist dream as some people imagine.
It
is
within
the
range
of the practical
politics of to-day and the near future.* The
Rajendra
Congress
"Old
Prasad,
Guard",
Vallabhbhai
of Gandhi, made no secret Their welcome to the new
consisting
Patel
of their Congress
and
of
Rajagopalachari,
other
close
associates
dislike of socialism. Socialist Party was a CWC
resolution decrying "loose talk" about class warfare confiscation of property.** Rajagopalachari, never
nationalist
Jawaharlal,“” Nehru out socialist
Having
jealous
of the
conspired
trust
failed
to block
tried
Jawaharlal
to
to
be
Gandhi
placed
with other Congress
of high Congress office speeches during his two
gopalachari
ting
and
Nehru's
face
"the
in
to keep
and to stop him making terms as Congress president.
election
practical
reasonable",
leaders
and the an inter-
and
as president,
he
difficulty was
of
Raja-
somewhat
get-
re-
assured by Nehru's presidential address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936 which emphasized that in India swaraj would have to precede socialism. But by June 1936 Rajagopalachari was
complaining he
continued
that it was impossible to preach
Rajagopalachari,
eral
other
CWC
socialism.
Rajendra
members
Prasad,
resigned
in
to work with Nehru while
At
the
end
Vallabhbhai
protest
of
the
Patel
against
month
and
sev-
Nehru's
152 socialist the
propaganda
best
interests
national
first
and paramount
Gandhi
Old
struggle
helped
Guard,
tactics
to
the
which
of
the
for
they
held
country
freedom
which
and
to
we
be
the
all
"prejudicial
success
hold
concern of the country"."®
patch
basic
up
a compromise
disagreement
remained.
between
between
their
to
of
be
to
the
the
Although
Nehru
ideas
and
the
and
Rajagopalachari, who even in 1930 had little understanding of socialism and where it differed from Gandhism,“” was unwilling to go further than the declaration of social and economic
rights
which
passed at Karachi in ism and disagreement
the
Congress,
1931."® with the
at
Nehru's
prompting,
had
He believed that Nehru's socialOld Guard were responsible for
creating divisions within the Congress at the very time when Rajagopalachari was working for party unity; and he could not
accept Nehru's view that the new constitution must be wrecked. Although there were few socialists in Tamilnad in the mid1930s, Rajagopalachari wanted to keep the direction of the all-India party out of socialist hands. He and other Tamil Congress leaders wanted to direct the party towards consti-
tutionalism
and
wing.
would
not
allow
it
to
be
captured
by
the
left
United Front Even though it was not until after the 1937 provincial elections that the national Congress leadership committed itself to the acceptance of office under the new constitution, the conviction that it would do so provided the basis for the creation of a broad united front against the Justice Party in Tamilnad. The
council
revived
tried
United
to become
Nationalists
an alternative
in
the
fourth
ministerial
Madras
party
to
the Justicites, but it was clear that once the Congress decided to return to the legislature in strength there would
be no room for them. They had limited funds and lacked even a skeletal organization outside the legislature. But while the Justice Party remained in-office and the Congress un-
committed to office-acceptance, the United Nationalists flirted with both the major parties. In July 1933 Subbarayan declared that "it should be the policy of the nationalists to join together into a single party, get into power and work
the constitution to be
able
to
however defective
rally
the
United
it might be..."
Nationalists
and
the
He hoped
Congress-
men who wanted to return to the legislatures behind his own leadership, but the formation of the Madras Swarajya Party by his rival, Satyamurti, in October drove him back to intriguing
153
with
the Justice
Subbarayan
certain
and
that,
ministry
most
of
with
the
The
had
tics and
to
ences in
Liberals
abandoned
hunt
London.
and
for
They
to
Madras,
in
the
delay
an
and
continued
their
never
to
be
weaker
influence
make
views
in
speeches
in
no
Since
provincial
New to
Delhi,
select
English-language
developed
a party
with-
longer
position. and
were
introduced
decision
legislature
to
however,
Nationalists
their
even
Madras
prominence
they
By 1936,
United
constitution
could
were
publish
but
other
new
in a few months, they joined the Congress. they
for office.*°
the
machine,
and
1923
poli-
Simla
audi-
journals
never
cultivated a popular following, never freed themselves from an overwhelmingly Brahmin membership. So, if they were to play any part in Madras politics under the new constitution, they had to ally with one its lingering communalism
Justice
Party
did
not
further
strengthening
of the major parties. . Because and its failing strength the
tempt
them
and
they
opted
for
of
the
Con-
gress, urging it to take office under the new constitution and to carry out a moderate reform program.*! Although Satyamurti was alarmed that their entry might lessen his own chances of office, Rajagopalachari welcomed the Liberals as
the Congress party. *
The nature of legislative politics in Madras under dyarchy had encouraged the fragmentation of MLCs along communal lines. Elected by separate constituencies from
Hindus, tended
the
the
to
Muslim
form
untouchable
themselves
mid-1930s
had banded
MLCs
primarily
MLCs
and,
their
from
together
own
to
were
as
the
a
lesser
extent,
Christian,
nominated
members
who
communal
communal
less
to form
units
communal
representatives;
advanced
a Backward
test against the domination of est non-Brahmin castes.°? But
with
caste-Hindu
Classes
again
and
the
MLCs
demands;
regarded by
the
communities
League
in pro-
the Justice Party by the in the Madras Presidency
highthe
numerical preponderance of the Hindus and the resources of the Congress and Justice parties so outweighed small communal parties that by 1937 the latter opted for integration or alliance with the two main parties. In Tamilnad relations between Hindus and Muslims were relatively free from the bitterness which had been growing in northern India in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Muslim politicians had been willing either to enter the Justice Party in search of improved representation in education and government or to join with the Khilafat issue. After wards of both tactics, the independent course and in
the Gandhians and Swarajists over 1924, dissatisfied with the reMuslim MLCs had followed a more 1930 Yakub Hasan, the former
154
Khilafat leader, organized a separate Muslim party. However, his experience in the legislature in the 1930s led him to believe
could to
that
so
with
a major
not
ally
act
small
a minority
effectively
as
party
as
the
Muslims
an independent
— his
force
preference
was
in
Madras
but
clearly
needed for
the Congress ~ which would reward Muslim support with special concessions. The possibility of co-operation with the
Congress was accepted by two other prominent Muslims — Abdul Hameed Khan, a former Swarajist and in 1935 the first Muslim mayor of Madras, and M. Jamal Muhammad, a Tamil-speaking
Muslim and the spokesman of the leather and hides producers in Tamilnad. They disagreed with Hasan's view that integration with the Congress would be desirable, preferring a separate Muslim party which could ally with the Congress without
losing
its
communal
the Congress majority in would be a small one and
identity.
They
anticipated
the new provincial legislature that a Muslim party, holding the
balance, could extract concessions from the price for its cooperation. In August 1936
selected
president
Board,
set
up
tirely under
by
local
of
the
Muslim
community,
tical
organizations
Tamilnad same
did
seats.
MPB
that
All-India
were
for
and
Justice
Muslim
Congress
but
had
and
failed.
as
or Harijans
the
in Madras
new
the
repeatedly
with
In only
candidates
other
two
en-
poli-
cases
contest
Muslim
in
the
Progressive
Abdul Hakim and leaders. Hakim
ignored
Hakim received
avoided
a result
were
election
of
given
constitution,
to contest
The
almost
for the pro-
Muslim
Abdul claimed
interests
was pro-Congress, it was inimical The MPP was to be an independent
in practice
Party
Although
under
combine
Muslim
organization,
Muslim candidates. °° Castes
to
ends.*
Congress
but
were pledged to work the reforms on behalf of the
was formed in July 1936 by C. Farouki, both former Khilafat
the
League
Parliamentary
MPB candidates
free
these
Muslim
Muslim
February 1937 to press for
but
that, since the MPB Nuslim interests.°®
party,
provincial
Congress as the Jamal Muhammad was
7
A rival
Party, Lateef
the
control.*®
vincial elections in new constitution and
that
Madras
the
1937
the
the
Presidency
16
the
contests
against
Poona Pact the
reserved
attempt
elections
Scheduled
of
as
the Congress in favour of
seats
of the
Justice
Scheduled
in Tamilnad
untouchable
an
Castes
Board was formed in October 1936 to sponsor regardless of their political affiliations. organization, the board soon disintegrated. candidates then joined to declare themselves
support
and
to true communal
leaders
independent Election
body
Harijan candidates Without funds and Many prospective
or made secret agreements the Congress after election;
155 a
few
were
patronized
Christian
community
by
the
did
not
Justice
Party.®°
attempt
to
form
its
The
Indian
own
political
party. Though under dyarchy Madras had been the only province with separate electorates for Christians (with five MLCs),
experience had shown that only major parties could Christians
Muslims,
and
the
Congress
was
through participation in the hope to compete with Hindus and
anxious
to
have
them. ®
Although
the leading Indian Christians were generally loyalist and proJustice in the 1920s, the growing strength of the Congress in the early 1930s persuaded many Indian Christians their allegiance to the nationalist party. Subbarayan's
view,
expressed
in
July
1936
joined the Congress, that in Madras there third major party and that one had either
a Congressman
the new
was a widely accepted
lessons of his own ministry. party, optimistically called
to occupy ties. It tactics,
movement party's
to
when
shift
he
re-
was no room for a to be a Justicite or
one.®*
It had been one of
Nevertheless, in May 1936 a the People's Party, was formed
middle ground between the Justice and Congress paroffered moderate nationalism through legislative
but
and
generally
identified
itself
with
outcome
of
favoured a modest social
formation
was
largely
the
the
non-Brahmin
reform program.®? rivalry
The
between
the Telugu Maharaja of Pithapuram and the Raja of Bobbili,* who replaced Muniswami Naidu as Justice Chief Minister in November
1932.
Mudaliar,
In Tamilnad
from
1928-30
it
was
directed
Subbarayan's
Second
by
S.
Muthiah
Minister,
and
its
main appeal was to the leaders of the backward classes movement, especially M.A. Manickavelu Naicker, a Vanniyar MLC from
North
Arcot.
The
Tamilnad and, numbering in Tamilnad, had failed
Justice
largely
oligarchy:
composed
Vanniyars,
their
of poor
concentrated
in
northern
about three million, the largest to win a place for themselves in community,
agricultural
though
so
labourers,
numerous,
tenants
petty ryots, and the Justice Party's support in their districts came almost exclusively from the landholding castes Vellalas, Reddis and Naidus. The Congress endeavoured to
caste the
was
and
of
gather Vanniyar support in the mid-1930s, notably by identifying itself with Vanniyar opposition to the Criminal Tribes Act in 1935,°" but the Congress, too, was dominated by the Vanniyars' overlords. Manickavelu Naicker attempted, therefore, to use the People's Party as a vehicle for Vanniyar ambitions. At a Vanniyar conference in North Arcot in October 1936, the Maharaja of Pithapuram claimed that the community
should
an
win
12 seats
"effective
in
minority
demands.*> In the five as candidates
the new provincial
party",
able
legislature
to press
1937 elections 12 Vanniyars for the People's Party, but
its
and
communal
form
contested seats, only the two
156
Congress This
Party
the
Vanniyar
candidates
crushing
to
extent
win
defeat
more
to which
than
were
elected.
the
failure
and
one
politics
seat
in
Tamilnad
in
Tamilnad
in
future
of the in
had
People's
1937
illustrate
become
polarized
the
Congress. ®
between the Congress and Justice parties. The Vanniyar leaders belatedly acknowledged this in July 1937 when they re-
solved
to
seek
If the politicians ably
1926;
the
stronger
it
communal
aims
through
Congress had only been an alliance of existing and office-seekers it would not have been apprecithan
might,
Congress
Srinivasa
like
had
that
declined
Iyengar's
alliance,
to
take
electoral
have
office.
alliance
disintegrated However,
the
of
if
coal-
escence of Congressmen and their allies at the level of provincial politics within a constitutionalist party was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of party support in the
was
localities.
large
in its part
The
party
underlying
organization
of those
strength
and
enfranchised
of
the
its ability
in
Tamil
Congress
to mobilize
1937.
a
Zamindar-Ridden The
in its
strength
appeal
of the
Justice
to non-Brahmins
Party
from
in
its
early
years
the professional
lay
and,
to
a lesser extent, landholding classes who sought to displace the Brahmins and establish their own hegemony. During the 1920s many of the Justicites' immediate ambitions were achieved through legislation and through the distribution of government patronage to non-Brahmins. Many of the more enterprising
non-Brahmin
politicians
restricting
or
side
1926
like
the
for
the Tamil
their
this
to
ambitions:
Brahmins
presidency.
encouraged
began
The
before
trend.
Justice
find
they
them,
the
entered
Party's
Although
Justice
they
the
the
Party
sought
loss
of
too
Congress,
power
out-
office
leadership
in
proved
resilient and regained office in 1930, the party was losing to the Congress the support of its original middle-class contingent. This contraction can be attributed to the success of the Congress in scoring political victories against the Justice Party, but it was also a reflection of the domination of the party by zamindars and bankers.
Although
Brahmin
the
Justice
professionals
attracted
the
the
of
financial
Party
was
created
support
and
political
and
businessmen,
from
by
its
increasing
a group early
-backing
of non-
years
of
the
zamindars, especially those in Andhra. The big landholders were loyalists and opposed to non-cooperation; they resented
power
provincial
Brahmin
politics
lawyers
than
that
and
they
allowed
wanted by.
the
a larger
allocation
say
to
in
it
157
them
of six of the
It was
not
other
uncommon
constituencies,
the zamindars provided
funds
the
propaganda
(or
party
zamindars
and
made
to take over
to
in
the Madras
sponsor
Willingdon
part
and
council.
candidates
Goschen
for
encouraged
in politics.®’
Until
the Raja of Panagal was one of the main Telugu zamindars and the Justice Party and
collected
from
needed
to
in
bid
outside
Subbarayan
for
seats
to take a prominent
his death in 1929 links between the he
98 elected
the
run
other
its
legislature.
his
from Panagal
for
big
landholders)
newspapers
One
Justice
the financing
and
of the
the
conduct
leadership
offers in
1929
was
of the party.°®
Headed by the Raja of Bobbili and the Kumararaja of Venkatagiri, the Telugu zamindars played a central part in the leadership contest and were aggrieved when the compromise candidate, Muniswami Naidu, denied them a place in his ministry and
seemed unsympathetic
to zamindar
interests.°°
They were not the only discontented group. The alternative source of funds to the Telugu zamindars was the Raja of Chettinad, a prince among the indigenous bankers of Tamilnad
and
de
facto
head
of
Ramnad's
Nattukkottai
Chetti
community.
The Raja had provided part of the party's financial backing in the late 1920s without completely identifying himself with the Justicites. However, in 1930 his son, M.A. Muthiah Chetti, entered the legislature through the seat reserved for
Nattukkottais
and
Nattukkottais and "Ginger Group" in
omission Naidu
kept
expected
a ministerial
post.
from Muniswami's a precarious
aging 1930.
S.
Chetti
was
Kumaraswami
These
the
the Telugu zamindars formed a Justice November 1930 to show displeasure at their
ministry.”
hold
For two years Muniswami
on
the
party
leadership,
into
the
ministry
November 1932 he was kicked out by Bobbili.”
Muthiah
Together
brought
Reddi,
leadership
who
changes
had
been
Third
corresponded
to
to
but
In 1936
replace
the
Minister
a shift
in
since in
the
party's centre of gravity away from the professional middle class and merchants to the zamindars, bankers and industrialists. By the 1930s the Telugu zamindars were under attack from left-wing Congressmen leading a movement for zamindari abolition — politics in Andhra were developing a more radical character than in Tamilnad — and they needed the Justice Party
as a shield authority.
acterize
the
to protect It
was
now
Justice
their
economic
meaningful
Party
as
evidence could be found in its in the amendment of the Madras 1933.7
ive
and
In
the
Tamilnad,
zamindars
where
as
being
for
privileges the
Congress
"zamindar
and
to
ridden",
political char-
and
opposition to tenants' rights Estates Land Act in November
zamindari
a political
lands
force
were
less
less
extens-
conspicuous,
158 agrarian relations had not yet reached such a crisis as in Andhra. Indeed some zamindars, like Subbarayan, protected their interests by joining rather than antagonizing the Congress. Rajagopalachari in his enthusiasm for a nationalist united front and his antipathy to socialism, welcomed the entry into the Congress not only of zamindars and big landlords, but industrialists and business magnates as well. He urged capitalists not to fear the Congress, but to enter it
to protect from
the
Justicite
gress
their
South
Tyagaraya
during
ment
interests.’?
Indian
civil
to Swadeshi
enous enterprises
There had been some
Chamber
Chetti
had
of Commerce
disobedience
and
been
a
because
later with
its
and curb British
— of which
founder
of
promises
the
Party.
The
Coimbatore
on
the
mill-owners,
favours
of
for
successive
the
— for
the
party's
to foster
financial
Con-
commit-
indig-
interference.”™
But big business in Tamilnad was still rather Congress and inclined to play safe by backing dependent
sympathy
scared of the the Justice
example,
Justice
had
been
so
ministries
and
local pro-Justice notables that the majority of them declared for the Justice Party on the eve of the 1937 elections.” The Nattukkottais were a special case. Their massive banking interests in Burma, Malaya and Indo-China made them feel de-
pendent on British goodwill and — at an independent India could give them
this date — doubtful] that adequate protection over-
seas,
with
in
The Justice the
big
Bihar
Brahmin
the
or
the
Presidency
would
as
"crush
"the extinction classes".7? It branch
ize to
they
into
attempted
the
in
the
United
not dominate to
politics
draw
the
Justice
Party
in
country"
and
cause
clearly
eager
for
revolutionaries
this
and
by
non-
depicting
collectivists
Indian mercantile and propertied unconvincing picture of the Tamil
was its
aware of the need to revitalsocial base and organization
averse
the
for
intrigue
its
bankers,
Congress
Party
Party
The Justice leadership the party and to extend
reach
from
of
could
United
leadership
However, and
and
alone
constitutionalism
of the was an
short-lived
its
and
the
the
identified
with
office
of
back
a party
as
as completely
Agriculturist
zamindars
middle-class
become
interest
National
The
Madras
Congress
who
did not
landlord
Provinces.” in the
Party
long
to socialism.
expanded
a party in
the
years
electorate
which
legislature,
in office
it was difficult
party-building
in
relied
the
and
under
was
1935
ministerial
which
to stoop
localities.
on
the
had
run
grown
by
December
patronage
complacent
zamindars
to the menial In
constitution.
and
task of
1934
159 V.V. Ramaswami, a Nadar municipality, urged the
Justicite and chairman of Virudhunagar party leadership to meet to discuss
lapse of the party".’°
Ramaswami
its difficulties
a smaller
and
"before
more
it
active
is too
party
late
executive,
a propaganda board with at least two trict, the publication of more party
adoption
of a revised
approved
by
the
party
Justice
program.”
leadership
for a brief propaganda drive there was little change from
party help. his
leadership
then
to prevent
recommended
the
the
appointment
to
of
propagandists per disnewspapers, and the
His
in
July
suggestions
1935
but,
E.V.
Ramaswami
were
except
in the following three the previous lethargy.
looked
col-
the creation of
months, The
Naicker
for
Ramaswami Naicker's shift towards communism, following visit to Soviet Russia in 1932, alienated some of his
earlier Self-Respect backers. They were men of property and prominence such as R.K. Shanmugham Chetti and W.P.A. Soundara-
pandiya
of
Nadar,
their
MLC,
communities,
Ramaswami
was
published
and
who
not
imprisoned
in his paper
in
for
were
interested
revolution.®
an
allegedly
Kudi
Arasu
and
in July
1934.
He
in
the
In
elevation
March
seditious
his
enthusiasm
1934
article
for
communism was further cooled by the banning of the Communist Party of India and other left-wing organizations by the
Government
of
India
moderated
his
opinions
and showed renewed interest in cooperating with the Justice Party which had befriended him after his break with the Congress in 1925. Although many of Ramaswami's co-workers,
including
Ramanathan
and
P.
Jeevanandam,
sympathized
with
the
anti-Brahminism of the old Justice Party, they could not leap like performing animals from communism to the Justice Party's zamindars and bankers at Ramaswami's command. In 1935 they
formed
began
a
a Socialist return
Self-Respect
journey
to
the
League
Congress,
the party at the close of 1936.% The
loss
of
his
ablest
lieutenants
and
by
this
Ramanathan
and
his
route
rejoining
preference
for a loosely-coordinated movement rather than a structured party meant that Ramaswami Naicker could not make over to the Justice Party the sort of party machinery which it needed to match the Congress. What he offered them was a radical social and economic program which the:Justice leadership at first shelved and then adopted in a diluted form as its election manifesto in 1936. This borrowed heavily from the Congress (including prohibition and the reduction of the
salaries
of
top
government
servants)
and
from
the
old
Justice
program (communal representation), but was spiced with proposals for a minimum living wage, government control of public
services,
the
elimination
of middle-men
between
agriculturists
160 and The
consumers, and the eradication uf rural indebtedness. program was ludicrously at variance with the record and
the aspirations of the Justice leadership, but its adoption was indicative of the desperate straits in which the Justicites found themselves on the eve of the 1937 provincial elections.
Those
Not Against
Us Are
With
Us
In June 1934 the Government of India responded to the decision of the AICC at Patna in May to abandon civil disobedience by lifting its ban on Congress organizations. As
the
were
first
elections
not
three
held
years
organization.
under
until
in
which In
the
Government
February
to
the
1937
recover
Madras
the
its
of
India
Act
and
revive
Congress
strength
Presidency
the
had
of 1935
nearly
Congress
had
its
the
additional advantage of two preliminary electoral rounds against the Justice Party before the deciding bout in 1937. The
lative
first
round
Assembly
fought
on
in
three
was
November
main
to demonstrate
the
through
issues.
the
elections
to
the
it
asked
1934.
In
Tamilnad
ballot
boxes
its
Firstly,
despite the government's attempt to crush it asked voters to register their protest
central
the
Legis-
Congress
the
continued
public
support
the party; secondly, at the repressive
measures used by the government since 1930; and thirdly, it sought approval for its demand that the new constitution should be drafted by a constituent assembly in India, not by Parliament. It was emphasized that these were national, not regional, issues and that, therefore, the Justice Party should stand aside. Rajagopalachari further claimed that since Congressmen had been the victims of repression they alone
were
qualified
to
voice
public
indignation
at
government
measures during civil disobedience. In practice, regional and local issues played a part. Rajagopalachari and Rajan, the Congress candidate for the Tanjore-Trichinopoly constituency,
repeatedly
explained
that
a
Congress
victory
at
the
polls would not be taken as a mandate for temple entry legislation;°? and Congress propaganda exploited the discontent of businessmen
the
tariff
Conference
and
arrangements
affected
made
in July 1932.
Congress
covering
merchants
candidates
Tamilnad
were
for
chosen
at
the
the
by
the
Ottawa
seven
in July
depression
Imperial
Assembly
and
August
and
by
Economic
constitutencies
1934
on
the
basis of recommendations by local party workers and sympathizers, but with the approval of regional Congress leaders and
the
central
didates,
Congress
three
Parliamentary
— Satyamurti,
Board.
Muthuranga
Of
the
Mudaliar
seven
and
can-
161 Venkatachelam
and had
Chetti
—
had
previously
the candidate for the been a Swarajist MLA.
didate Rajan, Ramnad
been
Swarajist
MLCs
Muslim constituency — Syed Murtuza — T.S. Avanashilingam Chetti, can-
for the Coimbatore-Salem-North Arcot constituency, and P.S. Kumaraswami Raja for the Madura-Tinnevellyconstituency, were all men of wealth who could rely on
the support of some of the local party activists even though they
notables as well as the had not previously contested
seats in the legislatures. In 1923 and 1926 the Assembly elections had been held simultaneously with those for the provincial legislatures: 1934 was the first occasion on
which
the
Congress
sources to the opportunity to
could
devote
all
and
the
how and
the Congress candidates, while rural notables, relied heavily
movement.
public
The
its
Assembly contests. use the strength of
sympathy
election
built
campaign
mobilize support. tricts Kumaraswami
up
of
attention
and
during
the
disobedience
Kumaraswami
During his personally
re-
It was also the first the party organization
civil
Raja
illustrates
not neglecting the urban on the party machine to
tours of the southern discanvassed those whom he des-
cribed in his diary as "big-wigs" and "important men" — generally lawyers, businessmen and landholders — as well as members of the three district boards (he was a member of the Ramnad board himself), leading zamindars and caste leaders including the Raja of Ramnad, head of the Maravars, an agrarian caste numbering about half a million in the southernmost districts of Tamilnad, and the Nattukkottais’ Raja of Chettinad. In Madura he appealed to the Saurashtras, who
had played claiming
such a prominent
that
it
was
which was absolutely
"because
part
a Congress
he
in civil
had
city
bloe that he had agreed to stand..." leaders, including Rajagopalachari, M. Venkatachelam
September, arranged
Chetti,
while
tours,
electoral rolls, in their homes.
within
held
toured
and
each
the
distributed In his home
assured
support
that
Madura
him en
Regional Congress Bhaktavatsalam and
constituency
district
addressed
been
would
disobedience,
full-time
meetings,
in
August
activists
and
scrutinized
the
handbills and canvassed voters district of Ramnad, where he was
DCC president, Kumaraswami was assisted by Kamaraj and K.S. Muthuswami, the DCC's treasurer and secretary, by two Naidus,
R. Krishnaswami and G. Alagiriswami Naidu, operating from his home taluk of Srivilliputtur, and several Maravar activists including Karaikudi
to enter
S.0.S.P. DCC, and
the TNCC
Odayappa, president of the newly-formed R.V. Swaminathan, one of the "new men"
in
1931
and a rising
local
politician.®
162
and
Without
without
relied
almost
a
a party
organization
common
program
entirely
P,. Varadarajulu Naidu ran Arcot seat on a socialist
influential
Congress
local
in
porters.
A.
he
Ramaswami
deserted
the
about
Brahmins
and
wealth
his
only
Mudaliar,
Congress
with
the
Justice-sponsored
own
since
commanded
constituency, campaigned Round Table Conference;
compete
and
candidates
influence.
departure
a dwindling
contesting
the
band
from
of
1930,
contested
the
the
sup-
Madras
on his record as a delegate R.K. Shanmugham Chetti, who
in
Congress
for the Coimbatore-Salem-North manifesto, but he was without
backers
1930
the
on their
to
City
to the had also
Indian
Commerce
seat on the basis of his career in the Assembly, of which he had recently become president. In a bid to win Brahmin voters, the Justice Party opened its membership to all communities in September 1934, but in Madras city, where Ramaswami Mudaliar was contesting against Satyamurti, only
SO
voted
for
the
about 4,000 on the rolis.°©
presidents councils,
Chettis
of district
but
relied
boards
mainly
for his election.
popularity
for
having
been
the
Corporation
Justice
candidate
Shanmugham Chetti
on
and
This, an
the
chairmen votes
of
of
canvassed
the
of municipal the
along with
Indian
out
Nattukkottai
Shanmugham's
representative
at
un-
the
Ottawa conference, caused his defeat. M.A. Muthiah Chetti, now chairman of the Justice Party's executive committee, had entered into a secret agreement with Congress councillors in
Madras
Venkatachelam
Muthiah had
as
expected
Congress
The
the
Chetti
first
from
the
all
seven
able
as
of
the
of
in return
mayor
opponent.°”
victory
promising
for
Congress
in
was
Tamilnad
votes
the unanimous
of Madras.
Nattukkottais
the
seats
Nattukkottai The
gave
election
votes
victory
captured
of
Shanmugham to
overwhelming.
and
for
his It
80
per
won
cent
of the poll. Only in the Commerce constituency did a rival candidate glean more than a third of the votes cast.°* There were factors in the Congress landslide which made it unreli-
a forecast
— the
Assembly
electorate
was
far
smaller
than that for the dyarchy provincial legislature; it was invariably more nationalistic; it contained a larger percentage of Brahmins. Excuses could be made for the poor performance of the Justice-sponsored candidates — the party did not regard itself as an extra-provincial organization; it had not mobilized its full resources for the election; the Nattukkottais' betrayal could be blamed for the loss of the Commerce seat — but the outcome was widely interpreted
as a Justice reverse from this election.
and
the
party's
demoralization
dates
163
of of
The second round was long and hard fought, consisting a series of local conflicts from 1935 to 1937 for control the district boards and municipal councils.
Legislation passed by the Madras Subbarayan's ministry in 1930 reduced
and supervision exercised Government. These powers
council at the powers
the end of of nomination
by the Minister for Local had been the basis of the
SelfJustice
ministries’ influence in the localities, and it has been argued that their reduction was responsible for the decline of the Justice Party in the 1930s.% However, the Raja of Bobbili, as the local-government minister, sought to rebuild his party after the shock of the 1934 elections, not by
attempting the
to
create
Congress,
reconstituting
away
the
but
by
them
taluk
an
organization
turning
to
his
boards,
back
own
promising
comparable
to
the
local
advantage. to
In
replace
to
that
of
1934
he
swept
boards
them
by
and
panchayat
boards at the lowest level and bifurcating district boards to perform many of the tasks formerly assigned to the taluk boards. In practice, the scheme involved dcubling the places and patronage of the district boards and reintroducing nomination. The opportunities for manipulation were enormous and Bobbili
exploited
Election the
the
circles
bifurcation
interests
boundaries;
them
were
of
with
the
drawn
district
pro-Justice
boards
of ministerial
nominations
single-mindedness
to suit
were
was
supporters made
quota and after the election results the balance in favour of pro-Justice election
bidden age
in
of
loyal
presidents;
this
field
would
to make
president.°° reserved
was
In the
be
Tampoe,
Bobbili's
Municipal
to
an
Councils
and
in an extra-ordinary
by
the one
morning vote
the
of
the
Local
of
all of
District
more
the
by
original
were
possible
the
for-
patron-
Board a seat
a population
and
Inspector
seat
reported
tilt the
incoming
on
Adi-Dravida agent
fanatic.
natural
presidents
command
Boards,
when
that
basis, .
of
he had
Anglo-Indians resident in the area; 91 last minute nominations, published
edition
of the Fort St.
elections
election
excess
supposedly
roving
by
a
were known so as to factions and secure
so that
the
additional
been unable to find any in the Dharmapuri Board on
at
Tiruvannamalai
Anglo-Indians,
than
retiring
appointments
for
converted
A.M.C.
staff
in
determined
of
candidates;
of
a
for
board
Justice
George
president,
Gazette
secured
candidate.
Except in the mid-1920s when the Swarajists attempted to win control of the Madras Corporation and other municipal councils, the Tamil Congress had not made a systematic effort to capture local government boards. Rajagopalachari opposed the
involvement
belief
that
it
of
Congressmen
would
distract
in
them
local
from
government
agitational
in
the
and
164 Constructive
Program
and
expense
and
the
supporters
would
work
also
and
"would
breed
local
entail
enormous
opposition
labour
to
the
Congress". $3 But Satyamurti, who succeeded Rajagopalachari as TNCC president in May 1935, and a majority of party leaders, activists and sympathizers believed that by ousting
of the Justice
Party
from positions
of influ-
ence in local government the Congress could undercut its rival and command patronage for itself. The experience of the 1934 Assembly elections, in which local government presi-
dents and chairmen had used their influence to favour Justice candidates, confirmed this opinion. There were considerations too. The franchise for local-government
other
have
in
elections under the this
the
was roughly that for the provincial legislature 1935 Act: it would be invaluable to the party to
experience
broader
operation. Party Kamaraj-Annamalai
to
thrust
them
government
of
electorate
contesting
before
for
for
In
into
bodies;
May
Nadu
local
the
1935
positions
and
if
Satyamurti
Congress
Civic
elections.
removal
Its
the
reflected
of power
Congress
winning
elections
constitution and
into
from the use the Congress
profit
wanted
came
to
in
build
the
on
local-
disobedience it had to help its in their factional struggles. announced
Board
to
program
of corruption,
goods, the improvement ties, the extension of voting of addresses to
composition
new
activists, especially those Pillai group, were eager to
sympathy won during civil local patrons and to join
Tamil
and
the
the
the
select
pledged
formation
party
of
the
candidates
candidates
promotion
the
of
to
swadeshi
work
of local education and medical faciliwater supplies and roads, and the nationalist leaders. The board's
the
cooperation
between
Congress
factions which had characterized Satyamurti's Madras Swarajya Party 18 months earlier. Satyamurti, Kumaraswami Raja and Bhaktavatsalam were its officers with former Swarajists,
local
activists
members.°* from
and
associates
of Rajagopalachari
among
its
In the scramble for local-government seats that followed Bobbili's reorganization, the Congress became the vehicle
for ambitious
Board tried stipulating
local
politicians
to protect itself that its nominees
hitching
a ride.
The
Civic
against open opportunism by must obey Congress mandates
if they disagreed with them, resign their seats. murti and his colleagues were so anxious to make
a
But Satyasuccess of
their campaign and factions that they
to win contests against pro-Justice were often careless in their selection
himself
the
candidates and ineffective in their belated cipline those elected on the party ticket. encouraged
influx
of
opportunists
or,
of
attempts to disSatyamurti had by
declaring
165
that "those with us,95
who have
In some
not
contests
been
the
and
are not
campaign
was
against
a striking
In Madura, for example, the Congress won 21 in the municipal elections in October 1935,
having
party
been
greatly
organization
assisted
built
by
up
the
out its
strength
during
us are
civil
of
success.
of..36 seats campaign the
local
disobedience
and
by
the assistance of the Saurashtras. N.M.R. Subbaraman, whose support was communal as well as Congress-based, was elected
chairman and the party's councillors generally united.** In Madras city,
remained disciplined and whereelections were held
Congress
own
in October
selection
eering won 27
1936
for
the
enlarged
Corporation
of candidates
to mount
the most
overcame
disputes
yet known of the 40
with the
among
its
members
the
over
intensive
the
election-
for a corporation election. The Congress seats for the general constituencies, and
addition
of councillors
and
aldermen
chosen by other routes it had a majority council. °7 Control of the corporation, Congressmen and their allies for a dozen
elected
or
of the 65-member which had evaded years, was at last
theirs.
The
Council,
In northern Ramnad the Congress faced influence of the Raja of Chettinad was
stiffer opposition. so pervasive that
government servants frequently harassed Congressmen who canvassed against his nominees for the Nerth Ramnad District
Board.** 1936
was
voters
Congress
In the Pallathur circle the election on 23 November.
characterized
and bribery
opponents.
son-in-law,
dent, the
candidate,
lost
Raja
election ducted
the
and
on
by
by both
the
properly
the
C.V.C.T.
Raja's
election,
advice
grounds
owing
of
to
Tampoe,
that
the
the
and
obstruction
supporters
and
&istrict
board
Venkatachalam
and prospective
Pallathur
the
intimidation,
Chetti,
of
their
the
on
the
insistence
election
had
not
Bobbili
systematic
ordered
interruption
a
re-
been
of
Raja's
presiof
"con-
polling
at all the polling stations".°? However, both the Election Commissioner and the Madras High Court upheld the original
result and dismissed In
these
three
the case for a re-election.°°
cases,
by
fair
means
or
foul,
the
Congress
overcame its opponents. The decisive contests were fought over the local boards, and the provincial elections in February 1937 merely registered an ascendency the Congress had already achieved by superior organization, by corruption and by involvement with local factions.
Elsewhere,
elections the
for
Congress
the
the
won
campaign
Tinnevelly
31
of
the
was 52
more
District seats,
hazardous. Board
but
in
In the
November
disagreement
1935
166 followed among the Congress board members over a suitable candidate for president. M.D.T. Kumaraswami Mudaliar, brother of a Justice MLC and scion of one of the principal landholding families in Tinnevelly, asked permission to join the
as
Congress
an
party
in
Independent.
At
the
board,
presided over by Satyamurti, ed as the Congress candidate
stressed
elected
the
the
on
desirability
the
nomination.
despite
a meeting
Congress
Although
of
the
having
been
Congress
elected
board
members,
Kumaraswami Mudaliar was suggestfor president. Satyamurti
of
choosing
it
was
ticket,
but
in
a candidate a poll
clear
that
who
had
Kumaraswami
he
had
joined
been
won
the
Congress to further his own ambitions, Satyamurti was powerless to intervene beyond asking Kumaraswami Mudaliar to obey
Congress directives. was elected president Congressmen refused for violating their
nominee.'®! between
Within
the
president. Congress
leader
by
At the end of December 1935 Kumaraswami over a Justice opponent, but five
to vote for him election pledge
a
few
of
Kumaraswami
allowing
months
the
there
board's
was
an
was
Congress
accused
address
and yet refused to resign to support the party's
to
an
open
Party
of disloyalty
be
voted
to
breach
and
the
to
the
the
Governor,
by refusing to participate in a swadeshi exhibition and accepting tenders for board contracts against the public interest.
But
Kumaraswami
Mudaliar
to be dislodged by the elections his personal
Congress. influence
Tinnevelly
Legislative
president
enabled seat
in
him to defeat the
In and
was
by
then
too
secure
the 1937 provincial that which he exercised as
a Congress
candidate
Council. !%
for the
Then came the most striking example of TNCC mismanagement of the local government campaign — the Trichinopoly affair. In 1934 the Trichinopoly municipality was suspended by Bobbili because of gross irregularities in his administration by the chairman, P. Ratnavelu Thevar. Ratnavelu
had risen to local power by assiduously exploiting antiBrahmin and anti-Muslim feelings in the town by distributing municipal contracts and offices to his allies and clients.’
Ye
failed,
however,
to
gain
election
to
the
Madras
legis-
lature in 1926 and 1930 as a Justice candidate. In 1934 he defected to the Congress and was welcomed as an influential local notable and a valuable recruit for the contest against the
Justice
Party.
With
Congress
assistance
he
was
elected
unopposed in a by-election to the legislature in December 1934 and in January 1936 was elected president of the South
Trichinopoly District Congress
ation
In
were
clearly
August
1936
now
largely
Board.'°*
very
the
under
The rewards
considerable.
Congress,
Ratnavelu's
its
for joining
Trichino;nopoly
control,!°° won
the
organiz-
a majority
167 of seats on the restored municipal council and, ive consultation with local partymen, the Civic
ated
Ratnavelu
and
Independent
day,
as
however,
its
candidate
T.S.S.
Rajan
led
councillors
a
for
chairman.
revolt
which
after Board
by
gave
On
the
several
the
extensnomin-
election
Congress
election
to
a
Christian Congressman and caused Ratnavelu's defeat. The revolt had two motives. Rajan disliked Ratnavelu, whom he had reason to believe was a man "of strong hates and bitter communalism" unacceptable to the Brahmins, Muslims and Christians
in Trichinopoly.
cil
in
1934
Ratnavelu's
also its
Congressmen TNCC
and
loyalty
of
its
and
in
of
declined:
the
old
local boards
Rajan
obsession
with
often
in
replied
mer-
disregard
long service."
Bhaktavatsalam
coun-
that
regardless of the
and
loyalty and
felt
sores".
the TNCC's
candidates
municipal
Rajan
"re-open
against
posts
of proven
Satyamurti
suspension
would
to protest
seats
and
the
tension
re-election
wanted
winning
Since
communal
that
local
of
For the Con-
gressmen had been fully consulted before the Ratnavelu had been made. !07 Rajagopalachari, opposed the local government campaign at the
choice of although he had start, regarded
and
to
Rajan's action as a totally unjustifiable breach discipline. He wanted to impress on Congressmen elsewhere
the
duty
of the party
leadership,
legislatures
under
if
the
Congress
were
to
the
of
absolute
obedience
an obedience
remain
new
that
united
and
constitution.!°°
of party in Tamilnad
the
would
decisions
be essential
effective
For
in
the
Ratnavelu
it was no more than a temporary set-back. In February 1937 he was elected to the Madras legislature as the Congress candidate for the Trichinopoly Urban constituency. On
balance,
party's
victor
own
struggle
despite
ineptness,
from
the
local
undoubtedly
it
Bobbili's
gerrymandering
was
the
Congress
weakened
the
Justice
elections
of
1935
and
and
which
1936.
Party
the
emerged
The
in
the
the
dis-
tricts and caused a large number of its erstwhile supporters to defect to the Congress. Those who helped the Congress were rewarded with a slice of the patronage pie of local govern-
ment
and
could
The
influx
look
forward
generally anticipated, constitution.
of
wealth
and
participation
ture
1937.
of the
needed scale
boards,
The
of
the
faction
influence
in
the
expansion
process
operation
was
while
to
further
with
of the one
and
little
of
Tamil
rewards
took
leaders
nationalist
the organization
of
to
Congress
or
the Congress
no
and
men
as
under
was
hold
new
of
record
a marked
between its
was
the
clients,
attraction:
Justicites'
needed
when,
previous
Congress
mutual
the
their
movement,
of the Congress
break
office
the
1934
men
of
fea-
and
factions
provincial on
of prominence
the
and
local
wealth
/
|
|
|
168
to play
off against
election
were
pro-Justice
campaigns.
staffed
By
1937
by both activists
the
notables local
and to finance
Congress
its
committees
and their patrons
from the
leading urban and rural castes. The activists were often the secretaries and busied themselves with the routine of party
organization and propaganda. Their patrons — lawyers, bankers, merchants, landholders and manufacturers — were the presidents
and
over
treasurers, public
collecting
meetings,
and
or
controlling
having
a
the
large
say
funds,
in
presiding
the
selection
of party candidates or themselves running for seats on local boards and in the legislature. In the 1937 elections only a third of the Congress candidates in Tamilnad were activists and
prison
notables.°?
graduates.
The
The domination
remainder
were
patrons
and
of the party organization
such men, concerned to further their through the institutional structures
local
by
personal interests of British rule, neces-
sarily limited the leadership's capacity to manoeuvre. Despite Rajagopalachari's stress onunity and discipline, the predominance of patrons and local notables jostled the party
towards mutiny
office-acceptance
within
ministerial The
limited
the
office.
Congress
composition
objectives
on the party's expressed
its
of
and
increased
if
the
of the Congress their
expansion.
commitment
to
principals
Although the
the
60,000
paid-up
ported
to
TNCC
had
seldom placed above be
55,004;
60
per
also
have
late
cent
of
beyond At the
to
In the
20,000.1°
committees
creation
claimed
members.
likelihood
In October of
the
forbad
and the
acted
as
a check
repeatedly
a mass
party,
patrons, actiheight of non-
between
1920s
of a
leadership
the Congress
practice membership was not extended vists and sympathizers before 1937. cooperation
the
national
the
30,000
figure
in
and
was
1935 it was re-
members
were
said
to live in the rural areas.'"! Out of a total Tamil population of some 25 million people this was a remarkably small number, though, in population terms, it was similar to the scale of Congress membership in other parts of India at the
time.1!?_
Before
1937 the Tamil
Congress did not attract the
membership of the urban and rural masses. It skimmed the middle strata of society; it incorporated a cadre of highly experienced local activists; and it possessed a regional network
of
committees
and
village.
Raj
dictated
rivalry
with
and
cells
But
it
was
that
it
should
the Justice
not
that
a mass
Party
be
nor
reached
one.
party
its
almost
and
every
neither
struggle
against
town
its
the
'
169
"Yellow Box ki jai" to
Although
be
the
Tamil
desirable
Congressmen
dyarchy
per the
Congress
the
cent of Justice
Madras
leaders
basis
were
for
happy
a
proclaimed
to
electorate
swaraj
suffrage
constitution,
settle
had
universal
for
been
rather
between
the
less.
three
Under
and
four
the population, and, in the hope of undercutting Party's social base and utilizing their superior
party organization, the Congress claimed that under the new constitution "the larger the franchise, the better for the
Congress".133 stitutional
autonomy
and
Asked
in 1932
objectives, an
to state his immediate
Satyamurti
electorate
of
36
asked
for provincial
million
per cent of India's population).'™*
con-
(equivalent
to
10
Anticipating
an elector-
party's organizational resources to the limit." Congress had returned to a constitutional course,
Once the Satyamurti,
ate of about this size, Rangaswami Iyengar observed in 1933 that it would be a mammoth task for the Congress to "educate" and mobilize so many voters and that it would stretch the too, gies from
was anxious that the party should devote all its enerto winning the new electorate."°As it finally emerged the protracted franchise discussions, the electorate was
larger
(14 was
than
Congressmen
had
expected
and
per cent of the total population more than four times larger than
lower
The provincial house called,
at 6.4
annual
rent
legislature was divided into an upper and respectively, the Legislative Council and
of over
Rs.
300,
of not less than Rs. 1,500, not less than Rs. 7,500 per
for title-holders
whole
presidency
and
estate-holders
and payers of annum; there
occupants
the
Council
there was a high or inandars paying
of public
electorate
was
with
ers
was
based
of
municipal
and house tenants,
rentable
value
were
on property
tax were
occupancy
value
of not
further
wives of military
province
and
of
tax-paying
local-board
among the ryots
at
less than
to another,
and
least
provisions
voters and personnel.
and
Rs.
for
taxes,
latter;
Rs.
owners
of
offices. about
motor
to a large workers. tax,
property
with
inamdare, rural
50 or urban
a peculiarity
For the
25,000.12”
vehicle
property
the
servicemen
Pay-
ryotwari
with
former.
wives, widows and mothers of Franchise provisions varied
and
income
qualifications.
100 constituted retired
an
tax on an income of were also provisions
The broader Assembly franchise gave the vote section of the ryots, traders and wealthier urban
It
voters
of the Madras presidency) under dyarchy.
the Legislative Assembly. For the Council property qualification: voters were ryots
an
million
and
for
retired from one
in the Madras
a
2
There
the
170 Presidency was that those who could prove themselves literate were entitled to vote, whereas in other provinces a specified level of formal education was required, and it was through
this
literacy clause
the
literacy,
granted
For
and
automatically
officials, the
women's
that many voters were enrolled.'!®
was
purpose
by
by far
able
the
other
only
the Congress,
presidency,
this
some
but
to
Congress
mined
The
by
favoured
general
the
the
character
1935
to
the best
seek
out
and
organized
Enrolment Day" on 27 May 1936.19 unquestionably
franchises
appeal
were
local
its
own
not
registration
organized enrol
Since
party
in
eligible
voters.
"Literates'
The nature of the franchise
Congress.
Government
of
the
of
two
chambers
India
Act.
was
deter-
In the
Council,
in addition to six or eight members nominated by the Governor, there were to be 46 members: 35 for General constituencies,
seven
for
Muslims,
three
for
Indian
Christians
and
one
for
Europeans. All of the 215 Assembly seats were to be filled by election: 152 General seats (17 for urban constituencies), 29 for Muslims, nine for Indian Christians, and 25 others distributed between landholders, trade unions, the Madras University, and commercial and business constituencies. The Act did not, however, specify how the reserved seats for
scheduled it
castes
stipulate
tasks
were
and
how
for women
constituencies
assigned
to
a
would
be distributed
should
Delimitation
Laurie Hammond, appointed In Madras, the provincial
be
demarcated.
Committee,
nor did
These
under
Sir
by the Secretary of State in 1935. government prepared its own recom-
mendations for delimitation and a provincial committee, headed by S. Muthiah Mudaliar, the former minister, made
own representations to schemes were advanced. the
the
Hammond
Two
its
opposing
The first, proposed by the Government of Madras and by Justice Party, wanted to scrap the miti-member constitu-
encies
Madras where
which
City
had
Urban
Caste
the terms of the constituencies.
closer
existed
double-member
Scheduled
to the
seats
for the non-Muhammadan
during
the
vast
candidates
Poona Pact, They would,
electorate;
constituencies
would
gress did not participate and provincial committees
It was
scheme
claimed
through
that
dyarchy
constituencies
were
to contest there
period.
necessary
reserved
would
to
seats
and
Except
allow
under
be more
opportunity
to send representatives to the and difficulty of canvassing
be removed.!2° in it
Rural
they favoured single-member it was argued, bring the MLAs
for members of smaller castes legislature; and the expense
rival
committee.
Aithough
the proceedings of the made known its support
Subbarayan
multi-member
and
the
Madras
constituencies
the ConHammond for a
Mahajana
had
Sabha.
worked
171 well
under
would of
dyarchy,
not
distributive
voting
were
encourage
would
understood
communalism
voting
allow
already
dominant
if
in
by
the
electorate,
coupled
use
communities
in
with
the
Madras.
to
and
system
Cumulative
plump
their
votes
for their own candidates to the exclusion of minorities; but distributive voting would prevent this as each voter would have to split his votes, thus giving opportunity for
candidates from minorities and forcing the major court minority interests to gain maximum support.
also
claimed
that
small
constituencies
could
parties It was
easily
be
to
con-
trolled by local territorial magnates: the larger the constituency, the less opportunity for bribery and corrupt
practices. 12? In
most
provinces
the
Hammond
Committee
views of the provincial government and but in Madras it rejected the proposal
stituencies on the grounds that domination of the main caste or
area...",!22
but perversely
accepted
the
delimitation committee, for single-member con-
they would "perpetuate the sub-caste in each electoral
the committee
also opted
for
cumulative rather than distributive voting. Following an appeal from the Madras government and a majority vote in the Madras legislature in March 1936, the Secretary of State restored the single-member scheme, except where double constituencies were needed for the Scheduled Caste seats, but kept the cumulative voting. }?3 Although the Congress did not get the multi-member constituencies it wanted, the final
system
in the
does
not
election.
appear
The
to
have
adversely
party's
fear
affected
of small
the
Congress
constituencies
in
which a pro-Justice notable might control a majority of votcs was almost everywhere in the presidency outweighed by the size of the electorate, by the strength of the Congress organization and by its own men of wealth and influence.
Another factor which influenced the outcome of the elections was the method of polling employed. Each provincial
government
coloured tended
task
1936
of
to
chose
ballot
boxes
help
the
its
for
illiterate
Congress
the Madras
in
Election
own
system
every
voters,
Madras
constituency.
"educating"
Officer
and
but
it
its
also
allotted
voters.
opted
This
was
for
simplified
colours
in-
the
In November
to the major
parties largely according to their requests. In almost every constituency in the presidency the Congress candidates chose yellow as the colour to be displayed on their ballot boxes ~
by contrast
with
Bihar
where
the party was unable
one colour throughout the province.!7*
Congress exploited the posters and volunteers
colour:
"Vote
opportunity to clad in yellow
for Gandhi
and
In Tamilnad
to adopt
the
the full with flags, to remind voters of its
the yellow
box" and
"Yellow
box
172
ki jai"
("Victory to the yellow box")
were its slogans. '?°
Candidates from other parties made little attempt to imitate these tactics; some Independents deliberately avoided the Justice Party's with that party
election.
colour in the belief that any identification would adversely affect their chances of
Finally, the timing of the elections also influenced the result. In the 1934 Assembly elections Willingdon had mistakenly expected an anti-Congress vote from Madras and had
directed
the polls
to be held
there
first
to give
Congress
victories
in
and
the
deciding
in favour
of office-acceptance
and
provinces voting later. Because Madras had in 1934 it was one of the last provinces to Bihar,
Orissa
a lead
to
voted Congress vote in 1937. United
Provinces
were already known before polling day and featured in lastminute propaganda’’® The party's successes in northern India also increased the likelihood of the national leadership waverers
now
in
a strong "...
Madras
that
possibility.
the
coming
a provincial
elections",
Congress
remarked
thus
persuaded
ministry
Satyamurti
was
in
January 1937, “are going to be a test not only of patriotism but also of our business capacity".'2” The regional Congress campaign began as early as July 1936 with the formation of "tour
committees"
of
local
activists
to
prepare
the
party
100
Assembly
organizations for electioneering; a month later the regional Parliamentary Committee began to select candidates on the advice of local Congressmen and their patrons. Nearly S00 applicants
sought
Congress
nomination
and Council seats in Tamilnad.'2° selected candidates were published approval
the last
of
the
central
few names
Congress
followed
only five rejected applicants party's nominees and of these president of illustration view
To
of
Congress
contested
be
of
gaining
contested
as many
resilience
13 out
Independents
about
Parliamentary
in January.'*
Committee;
There were
who contested against the only one — Kumaraswami Mudaliar,
the Tinnevelly district board — was elected, an of the discipline the party could command. 12°
sure
the
early
for
The names of most of the in mid-December with the
of
of
a majority
the
22 Council
unofficially.
Justice
seats For
in
both
Party
seats the
and
and
the
past,
supported
three
as possible. Assembly
in
houses
it
In Tamilnad ran
93
in
the
can-
it
didates for 106 seats and backed three Independents, two of whom were Scheduled Caste candidates. Taken together the 106 Congress candidates covered a wide range of castes and occupations, though the majority were drawn from the highest castes (Brahmins, Vellalas, Chettis, Reddis and Naidus) and
173 from
the
ness
connections)
fund
Candidates were required and to finance their own
towns
professional
and the
assisted
them
in
with
to
in
by
tried
car
middle
landholders
the
class
1936
countryside. '*
to donate Rs. 50 to electioneering, but
activists,
and
to
for
tours
Satyamurti,
imitate
nearly
in
Nehru's
9,000
miles
the
(often those with busi-
by
despite
style
in
the election the party
regional
publicity in the press, and Nehru as Congress president
October
socialism,
touring
commercial
local
national leaders, ials. Jawaharlal region
and
substantial
and
printed matertoured the his
and
three
antipathy
energy,
months
before
the elections and visiting most constituencies at least once. }%? Rajagopalachari
also
the
public.
election
led
processions
expected
ability
at
On
candidates provided transport voters to shouting District
have
of
nationalist
gone
done", 133
Unable
the
to
making
intensively
election
day
Congress
cars, motor the polls;
villagers
slogans
Magistrate
to
campaigned
of
Madura
village
revive
showed
and
mixing
sympathizers
and
an
un-
with
wealthy
buses and other vehicles to in humbler style, activists
to
and
the
nearest
waving
observed
elector
its
speeches
and
in
fortunes
polling
party
of
the
a way
Congress:
no other
through
the
booth,
flags.
As the
party
local
"they
has
boards,
demoralized by its electoral setbacks in the Assembly and local elections, and without a party organization to rival the
Congress,
pondent
November
the
Justice
and
names
campaign. 1936
January 1937, Justicites or
Virudhunagar,
The
Party
selection were
conducted
a
fitful
of candidates
published
and
began
in December
in
des-
1936
and
but some of the candidates refused to run as withdrew, realizing, like V.V. Ramaswami of
that
party ran only three the Assembly, little
they had no chance of winning.'*" candidates for more than half
the the
The
Council and 53 for number of Congress
candidates. In addition there were about a dozen Independents who might, if elected, have joined the Justice Party in the legislature. A striking aspect of the Justice campaign was that 33 of its 56 candidates had nominated to the legislatures or successfully contested election. intake of moderate nationalists,
among
the
its
106
mid-1930s
fielding
pheral
its
and
four
of
them
on the Congress
old
team.
constituencies
It was
previously been elected or (in four cases) had unDespite the Congress party's it had only 21 such candidates
had
entered
ticket. also
— Scheduled
the
legislatures
The Justice
concentrating
Caste,
Christian,
Party
on
the
land-
was
in
peri-
holders and business seats — where it might pick up support from special interest groups, rather than the main Hindu and Muslim constituencies.
174 For
People's
of
its
a new party Party
ran
nominees
a
were
with
little
large
local
number
of
Independents
organization,
candidates,
hoping
to
the
but
most
improve
their
chances by borrowing the name of a regional party. The candidates were little-known men, generally without established political careers. Of its 31 candidates, 17 came from the Arcots and Tanjore, the districts in which its Tamil organizers, Muthzah Mudaliar and Manickavelu Naicker, lived and in which they could hope to attract the support of their own castes (the Vellalas and Vanniyars). Of the Muslim parties,
the
Muslim
Parliamentary
Board
sponsored
nine
candidates
in
Tamilnad, five of whom had previously been members of the legislatures; the Muslim Progressive Party ran only five, all in northern Tamilnad where the party's leader, Abdul Hakim
could
exert
The four-day
landslide,
personal
influence.
polls were held without period in mid-February.
greater
than
ers had hoped. *%5
In the Legislative total 46 seats, winning
Tamilnad. the the
Congress Assembly
Congress
Fifty-two and 215
candidates
all
the
urban
the
party's
most
ardent
support-
Council the Congress won 26 of the 10 of the 13 it had contested in
cent
only 20 per Congressmen
Justice Party was won approximately
swept
per
even
any major incidents over a The result was a Congress
of the
cent were
in Tamilnad
regional
poll
to the Justice elected, 85 of
winning
their
went
Party. the 93
to
In
seats.
The
Caste
seat
reduced to a mere 21 seats. The Congress 70 per cent of the poll in Tamilnad and
seats
except
one
Scheduled
in
Madras, all except one of the General Rural seats, and several of the special constituencies. Its poorest performance was, expectedly, in the Muslim, Christian and landholders
constituencies. The MPB won six Muslim seats to one for the MPP, two for Congress, and one
in Tamilnad Independent.
The Justice Party won two of the five Christian Assembly seats, the Congress three. Independents and Justicites took
the
landholders'
seats.
Nevertheless,
with
victories
as
sweeping
in
other
areas
of the presidency as in Tamilnad, the Congress had won a massive victory over its provincial rivals. It had the largest majority and the largest popular vote of the Congress in any of India's provinces. After 17 years of struggle, after years of preparation, the Congress had finally swamped the Justice Party.
could
With
now
its
turn
provincial
back
to
rival
the
Raj.
vanquished,
the
Congress
CHapter
6
RAPPROCHEMENT Civil disobedience and the assertive manner of the following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact aroused in British in the Madras Presidency a bitter animosity to the
alist leaders. of the upstart ings
for
prompt
Revenge Congress and
for was
decisive
Congress officials nation-
the insults and the impertinence a powerful motive in their urgaction
against
the
party
in
the
depression
and
event of a revival of civil disobedience. The feelings of the officials were widely shared by the European business community in the presidency, which felt that it was being victimized by the swadeshi propaganda of the Congress coinciding
with
the
loss
of
markets
caused
by
the
the influx of Japanese cloth.’ Significantly, when at the end of 1931 the Government of India gave the Madras government permission to inform the business community that a renewal of civil disobedience would be it was the European, not the Indian,
met by stern measures, commercial organizations
that were confided in by the Chief Secretary.” In a crisis the government's identification with British interests remained
very
But sight of
strong.
the the
Governor and his senior advisers had not lost wider political objectives with which the
dyarchy period began. There was undoubtedly a satisfaction in seeing the Congress crushed in 1932, but, as Bracken, the Chief Secretary, had noted 10 years earlier, vindictiveness untempered by constructive measures would achieve very little. In Tamilnad the crushing of civil disobedience was
a catharsis up fury, it culty
of,
to
the
Congress
and
the
tation
leaders
was
a smooth,
Raj,
and
for the government in 1932: purged of its pentcould afterwards settle to;the practical diffiadapt
to
not
a
but
be
Rajagopalachari's
reasonable.
lingering
a growing
colonial
Thus,
bitterness
the
appreciation
administrators
non-revolutionary
comment
transfer
178
scquel
between
had
of
on
that
the
to
getting
confron-
Congress
nationalist
a mutval
power.
Nehru,
interest
in
176
The Party Most
Likely
to Sueceed
When he took up the governorship of Madras in November Lord Erskine inherited in large measure Willingdon's
1934,
aging policy — as old as dyarchy itself — of relying Justice Party. Aristocrat and landlord, Erskine had
inherent
aversion
to
the
zamindar-dominated
on no
the
Justicites.
Indeed, addressing the Madras Landholders' Association in February 1935 he appealed to the major landholders to partic-
ipate fully in the political life of the presidency under the new constitution.® But Erskine was a more perceptive and innovative
Governor
than
Stanley,
his
predecessor,
and
he
revitalize
their
soon realized that the the Justice Party was incapable of adapting to the new political environment created by the 1935 Act. He
only
urged
to
be met
the
Justice
with
evasion
ally, he thought Bobbili suggested that the Chief
bringing alists,
in Subbarayan,
to
attract
the
its
out
was
own
so
riddled
inertia
alienating
that
many
and
for
with
of
indolence".”
party,
Initi-
than his two colleagues and might reshuffle his team,
example,
from
the
United
constitutionalists
Nation-
back
to
ploy failed. Subbarayan was not on his own terms, but the Justice personal
Bobbili his
that Erskine pressed the in the localities and to
to
“supine
worthier Minister
moderate
the Justice Party.® The unwilling to take office Party
ministers
could
rivalry
not
supporters.®
make
and
imprisoned
such
Thus,
it
a move was
in
by
with-
vain
Justicites to build up their party form a broad constitutionalist
front:’ these were the tasks on which the Congress, not the 'Justice Party, was engaged. Moreover, like Goschen, Erskine ‘found it difficult to understand the Justice ministry's full-
time
preoccupation
with
the
acquisition
and
distribution
of
;patronage. He was particularly annoyed by the card-sharping to which Bobbili resorted in reshuffling the local boards in 1935-37. Gradually, Erskine warmed to the idea of a Congress ministry to replace the politically bankrupt Justicites. He was at first very cautious about suggesting such a change of tactics to his superiors, partly because Willingdon, who remained Viceroy until 1936, loaded him with avuncular advice from New Delhi, based on impressions formed 15 years earlier,
as
to
which
Justicites
were
or
wete
not
trustworthy
had
not
forgotten
and
able.”
Willingdon had anticipated a Congress defeat in the 1934 Assembly elections and was furious that Madras, the province he had nursed through non-cooperation, should betray him.
But
Willingdon
and
his
advisers
the
long-
177 term Montagu scheme of drawing the Congress back to constitutional action; and by the middle months of 1935 Willingdon was agreeing with Erskine's tentative suggestions that a Congress ministry in Madras might, after all, be
"safe"
and "play
the game".}°
Erskine's assessment of the situation went far beyond a realization of the effete nature of the latter-day Justice Party. He believed that many of the Congressmen were in practice moderate men, constitutionalists by inclination, who had taken shelter in the Congress as protection against the anti-Brahmin squall. The Madras Congress was, he noted, an "amazing conglomeration of tories, radicals, socialists and
even communists",'? ship
in
tion. chari
favour
with the bulk of the party and
of accepting
Indeed, on the had an audience
office
and
working
its
the
leader-
constitu-
eve of the 1937 elections, Rajagopalawith the Governor, in the course of
which he informed Erskine that he wanted to take office and doubted that the Congress national leadership would oppose this.
When
Erskine
expressed
Rajagopalachari went
into
a
long,
unintelligible Congress
In result
meant
his
surprise
complicated
explanation by
it boiled
of what
"wrecking
down
and
the
at
this,
to
me
the
almost
Madras
constitution".
to the
fact
that,
if
they got a real clear majority on which they could depend, the Congress Party would work
the reforms down here. Their idea of "wrecking" appears to be to pass at various times...
resolutions Further,
saying
Erskine
they
do
believed
not
that
like
the
the
Reforms.*?
Justice
Party
had
made itself unpopular, especially by its agrarian and local government policies, during its many years of office. "The ryots", he reported to Zetland, the Secretary of State for India
in
February
particularly
in
1937,
the
"are
southern
fed
up
with
areas,
as
the
Justice
every
sin
Party,
of
omission
wanted
security
or commission of the past fifteen years is put down to them")? But,
though
for
their
Congress to
work,
the
and not
increasingly anticipating
hauled under
posed When
dency
ryots
property the to
government:
obstruct,
a
change,
a destructive
the
the
they
Congress
clash
must
constitution.
between take
the new constitution,!®
Jawaharlal
those
Nehru
agrarian
concluded
impassioned
attack
and
dinosaurs, his
1936
on the
less and the
tour
the
office
Erskine
sympathetic to the interests of the that the ryotwari system would have
to protect with an
desired
and not
was
ryots, to be over-
less dis-
zamindars.
of
zamindars
the
presi-
of Andhra,
178 two of the Madras executive councillors wanted the government to show displeasure. Erskine, however, favoured non-
involvement: the
"If
Zamindari
organise advocate
system
more
popular
if
it
of
the
since
“powers
areas under
took
1927
and the
surely
and
it
key
adaptable
zamindars
There were there was
do
of
A ryot-oriented
intransigent side,
leader
counter-propaganda", Socialism as long as
violence."
be
the
up
to
wrote. is not
Congress
than
Party
the
on
The
Zamindars
ministry
the
Government
— but
might
be
withheld
the
used
1935
Raj
in
one
promotions
Commission, in
the
from ministerial
the end
of civil
low
designed and
to remove
middle
control
levels
and political
disobedience
transfer
protect
key
be threatened had a
and
government
service
influence.'?
the central
law
reserved
appointments
of
by
accepted
the
— revenue,
to
to
support.
had
of the administration if they appeared to the new ministries. From 1929 Madras had
Services
dominated
the Governor
emergencies
to
On the negative Congress could
entail
dyarchy
gave
to
promised
for
of Madras
would
under
Act
attacks
"It is no crime Socialism with
a Justice
leaning
a new constitution
portfolios
police
is
he it
Congress
broader considerations, too. relatively little damage the
office.
that
which
and
the
Since
and provincial
governments had been tightening up the organization of the police so as to minimize political interference under the new constitution and to ensure the continuance of striking forces which might be needed in the event of a constitution-
al
impasse
and a revival
of civil
consideration had been given press on the assumption that
to it
rather
it
ministries
than
try
to
criticized
by
stalled.'®
been
inherit
and perhaps
Although
introduce
the
disobedience.’
legislation to control was better to have the
the new
when
in-
repeal
expansion
previous
Careful
such
they
of the
Governors
and
legislation
were
already
electorate
by
civil
had
servants
for enfranchising the "unthinking ryots", there was reassurance in the creation of a second chamber in the provincial legislature designed to give representation to "a large
stratum of 'solid' people, not merely big zamindars or other landholders, but also bankers, professional or business men, merchants and retired officials, to whom the rough and tumble
of popular political contest is distasteful..." and to support the Governor against the "vagaries of the lower house".?° Erskine was at pains to persuade the Congress that he believed in constitutional fair play and an impartial civil service,?? but he was not having to On
energy
the
and
positive
he had the satisfaction of knowing that walk the tight-rope without a safety-net. side,
organizational
Erskine
capacity
was
of
impressed
the
by
Congress.
the
He
did
179 not its
Just
want to trap or enormous energy
as Willingdon
success
new
of
form
had needed
dyarchy,
constitution
and
frustrate the Congress, but to channel into constructive ministerial activity.
a
stable
so
in
the
Erskine
Madras.
ministry
It
Justice
needed
backed
alone by
Party
the
to make
Congress
could
to
reach
a majority
in
result
of his
instability
Germany
and
It
is
growing
Europeans
12 years
he
saw-in
Italy
in
difficult
confidence
Geoffrey
Madras.
to
Executive
Bracken,
Secretary Erskine's
in
in
in the Commons
the
the
closest
and
and
early
assess
the
extent
Certainly
he
the in
Congress
1935
was
Councillor
adviser
in
the
was
to
the
two
which by
from
appears
years
to
the
voters
legis-
not arise also a
to the
France,
Erskine's
other
backing
promoted
and
of
1930s. 7?
shared
had
the
a reaction
politics
1920s
to
who
parliamentary
run
the
lature. Erskine's concern for a stable ministry did only from his assessment of Madras politics: it was
a
of Sir
Chief
before
have
been
the
intro-
duction of the new constitution. Further down the administrative hierarchy attitudes were more ambiguous. District officials and police officers had reason to fear that a
Congress
dize
ministry
their
future
might
interfere with
careers
dence to suggest that they stable ministry and wished
in
India.
with
the
of
the
Congress
lackadaisical
A.R.C. clearly
election
Justicites
and
opinion that in his district "Nearly are well-to-do and are not likely to
dencies
work
there
is
and
jeopar-
some
too welcomed the prospect of to avoid a new confrontation
tween the Congress and the Raj. Magistrate of Madura in 1937 was thoroughness
their
But
in economic matters".??
Westlake, impressed
campaign
gave
his
all the develop
by
evia be-
District by the
contrast
unsolicited
Congress members left wing ten-
Less than six years
earlier,
as District Magistrate of South Arcot, Westlake had been pleading for tough measures to crush a revived civil dis-
obedience to
campaign.”*
European non-officials were also reconciling the prospect of a Congress ministry in Madras.
themselves Once a
champion of the Justice Party, the European-owned Madras Mail had, by the mid-1930s become impatient with the ineptness of
its fumbling protege. It, too, was sickened by the Justicites preoccupation with patronage, commenting in an editorial on 1 June 1935 that "If the Justice Party is really determined
upon reorganization, it should be one of its first ations that, so far as it is concerned, the spoils
proclamsystem
must go". In a bid to revive European sympathy for the party, the Justice leadership suggested that if it were returned to office under the new constitution it would offer a ministerial
post
to
a
European.
Replying
to
this
offer,
W.M.
Langley,
180
president ation,
of the
told
the
South
branch's
Indian
annual
Branch
of the European
conference
on
13
Associ-
January
1937
that he was opposed to the appointment of a European minister: Europeans should organize themselves separately within the legislature and support whichever party favoured their interests. F.E. James, one of the principal spokesmen of the European non-officials in Madras, ing the Congress not to encourage
expect
that
the
constitutional
took a sterner line, election rowdyism or
issue
could
be
warnto
reopened
for
another 10 years. But beneath his gruffness was a practical awareness that it would probably be the Congress, not the Justice Party, that the Europeans would have to come to terms with after the elections.*> Furthermore, James, as a leader of the European non-officials in the central Assembly, had been increasingly concerned at the potential menace of
Indian communism to communism was Congress
right
rather than nationalism.*° Mutual antipathy bringing the Madras Europeans and the
wing
closer
possible in 1920-22 when in were indistinguishable from
The Difficulties Having
together
the provincial
elections,
development
I am sure
constitution".?”?
have
seemed
Gandhi's
followers
Find Themselves
a Congress
majority
Erskine
159-seat majority it won. But, as Linlithgow, the Viceroy, "I am not
as
would
European eyes "Bolsheviks".
in Which They
anticipated
than
was
at
90
who
office
at
the
this
and work
last
in
the
confided to Lord all disturbed by
take
Rajagopalachari,
about
surprised
he at
they will
of
the
minute
replaced Satyamurti as the Congress candidate for the University constituency, gave the Governor every reason
believe ations
that
on
this
3 March,
would
a week
leader of the Congress such
a
large
be
majority
the
case,
before
he
Legislative
and
with
so
himself
was
Party
many
opening
officially
the pressure enormous.
in
favour
within
However,
of
office
the Congress
the
Congress
during
the
to
had
MLAs
bent
on
election
made
a
campaign;
contrary, its manifesto, published in August the national party to the "entire rejection"
With
office
in five two others,
form ministries not
elected
in Madras.7°
acceptance, with the Congress holding a majority provincial assemblies and a dominant position in
to
negoti-
was
declaration
on
the
1936, pledged of the 1935
Government of india Act which had been "imposed on India against the declared will of the people". Instead, the
Congress promised to call a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for a self-governing India.”* Rajagopalachari and Satyamurti had seen this avowed hostility to the con-
stitution
as
little
more
than
a tactic,
designed
to
keep
up
181 pressure on strate that
office,
the the
and
Raj until party had
the not
last possible become a mere
to win a symbolic
concession
moment, to demonsuppliant for
from the
British
that would give the impression that acceptance of office was a triumphant vindication of the policy of fighting the Raj by
constitutional
left
wing
Gandhi,
means.°°
remained
partly
However,
opposed
to
to preserve
the
Nehru
acceptance
party
unity
own aversion to constitutionalism, a more substantial concession from
gopalachari On
had
his
28 February,
from
a meeting
Rajagopalachari
for
of
told
ask
an
assurance
from
would
be willing
to accept
a verbal
Congress
and partly
the
Erskine
would
the
of office;
and
from his
wanted the negotiation the British than Raja-
anticipated.
return
and
the
CWC
that
at
Wardha
of
on
the Congress
Governors
that
assurance,
but
they
would behave constitutionally before Congress would form ministries in the provinces in which it had majorities. Erskine replied that he did not think a written assurance could be given; Rajagopalachari added that personally he would probably suggested, the
Gandhi.”
in basic
office
were
However,
agreement
with
to
of attrition
After
informed
on
not
only
party
help
ies are
any
followed.
on
and
the
and
Secretary
it
of
concessions,
7 March
would
Rajagopalachari
desirability
of negotiation
be
1937 the
vis-a-vis
to extricate
in which of their
the
fuss,
real
of State,
that
greatest
to take any steps which position of the central
machine
Rajagopalachari
Erskine
the
make
consulting
Erskine
our part then the
that from
although
a minimum
reluctant
a war
the CWC
want a written guarantee. Failing this, Viceroy could discuss a suitable formula
the
Congress
the
their
or
were
taking
superiors
symbolic,
the
and
Viceroy
mistake
on
will strengCongress
Provinces
or
will
from the difficult-
they find themselves own creation...
should,
Congress
he with
Viceroy
and
which
continued,
he could expect "the utmost help, the Governor within the framework
be
informed
sympathy and support" of the 1935 Act, but
an oral or written guarantee could not be given.*? The government's policy was "to sit tight and, while keeping the closest watch on all developments, to refrain from committing
ourselves
in any way". °3
Rajagopalachari,
disappointed out
an
by this
assurance
the
meeting
Erskine
intransigence.
Congress
would
again
on
9 March,
He regretted
be
unable
to
was
that with-
take
office
182 in
Madras
and
other
Congress-majority
provinces.
This
would
be "a disastrous course" but, he added, Congressmen “had consider what was best for them in India as a whole".™ Rajagopalachari
ings
of
man
for
the
the
CWC
then
and
left
AICC,
he
for
Delhi
emerged
office-acceptance
as
section
of
where,
the
at
national
the
the
Congress,
to
meet-
spokes-
pitting
his arguments against the hostility of Nehru and the caution of Gandhi. The resolution finally adopted by the AICC
represented a compromise, but office acceptance remained contingent on_an assurance from the British government or the Governors °° Rajagopalachari returned to Madras still optimistic as to the possibility of a Congress ministry by
April.
On
25 March
impossibility
by to
he met
Erskine
and,
despite
of the Governor offering the assurance
the Congress, Erskine saw come to some agreement".
gopalachari
again
returned
demanded
that the Congress leader At Erskine's suggestion,
later
in
him
"not
the
day
with
to
use
his
the
a formula
"wanted Raja-
which
the Governor believed was "fairly satisfactory". The draft acknowledged that the Governor could not make a pledge not to use his special powers, but said that the Congress would
accept
a promise
interference
matters
from
or set aside
appertaining
the provincial At
that
to
the
and
Ministry".**
point
the negotiations pretation of the
Gandhi
advice
within
legitimate
in Madras
because the formula Congress demand.°7
powers
of the Cabinet
the
arrived
special
and
of
in
scope
of
torpedoed
did not fit his interOn the other side, the
Viceroy and the Secretary of State found Rajagopalachari's draft equally unacceptable. An impasse had been reached and
on 27 March
the
breakdown
to maintain
party
accompanied by a on both sides.*
obedience
of the negotiations
degree of bitterness, Rajagopalachari toured
unity,
or the display
but
discouraging
of anti-British
extremists. Although with Congress should be able to
such a defeat
was
made
public,
born of frustration, the province, trying
talk
of civil
hostility
dis-
by party
large majority, the any other ministry the
Governor might create, the government might call his bluff by dissolving the legislature. The party could not afford another election so soon, and in a poll caused by Congress
refusal
Support.
to take
Congress
Even
and
tempt
favour of office
ghost
office
the
a
lose
much of its existing
of dissolution
section
in defiance
of Subbarayan's
Madras. *
it would
threat
of
the
party
might to
of the national
ministry
still
haunted
break
declare
up in
leadership.
the
Congress
the
The in
183 Believing that it Congress gave way, the
was only a matter of time Viceroy opposed Erskine's
before the desperate
suggestion of a dissolution, and discussion began-on the formation of an Interim Ministry. Erskine first approached
V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, the the legislature, to give a
but
Srinivasa
Sastri
was
Liberal, who was not a member of chance to the non-Justice elements,
well
aware
of
the
fury
and
anger
he
would attract from the Congress and his Liberal associates, and refused.’ Erskine then turned to Sir K.V. Reddi Naidu, a
Justice
Naidu
minister
was
in
ready
1920-23
and eager
and
a proven
to oblige,
loyalist.
hastily
Reddi
nailing
together
a ministry of diverse talents, made Justicites. A program was invented
up mainly of former for the ministry, but
meeting
merely
so blatantly
. cature
of
the
and
situation
that
of a Madras
embittered
in
ever
a moment
on
the
21
and
by
by the
seriously
of July
Viceroy
the
support
legislature,
created
Erskine,
end
popular
and
it
could
legislature
not
served
without
it
survive
to
a
cari-
a Congress
The crisis continued. Intermediaries attempted to the deadlock, but Rajagopalachari and Erskine were
baffled
had
the
idea
ministry."? break
lacked
of
22
powerlessness
exhaustion,
intended
logjam
constitutional
their
intransigence
wondered
to take
was
broken.
June,
which
problem
in
if
office."*
did
detail
to
of their
Statements little
and
solve
the
superiors. the
Congress
Then
at the
made
more
reiterate
by
than
the
the
explain
gov-
ernment's initial position, were seized upon by the CWC at Wardha on 7 July as sufficient assurance for the Congress to take office."? It was, as the immensely relieved Erskine
noted
with
surprise,
an
by the Congress.” took
the
Rajagopalachari's office
as
"assurance"
soon
as
demand.
"abject
and
ministry,
decently
unconditional
long-planned
possible
It embodied
and
after
the
the
surrender”
much-awaited,
nationalist
funeral
united
of
front which the Gongress had become in the Madras Presidency over the previous seven years. Rajagopalachari, who as head
of the provincial
Minister
thus
and
assuming
ministry
Premier,
direct
also
was
held
officially the
responsibility
office
for
the
known
as
the Prime
of Finance
Minister
introduction
of
prohibition. Prakasam, as the leading Telugu MLA, potentially Rajagopalachari's greatest rival for leadership of the provincial legislative party, accepted the post of Minister for Revenue, which entailed special responsibilities to investigate the land revenue systems of the province in preparation for
the
land
reforms
Congress
had
promised.
Rajan,
given for the Trichinopoly affair, was nominated to the Legislative Council as Minister for Public Health and
for-
184 Religious Endowments. Yakub Hasan was rewarded for having re-joined the Congress with the post of Minister for Public Works; Subbarayan by appointment as Minister for Education and
Legal
Affairs;
Information.
recent
recruits
Ramanathan
Erstwhile to
by
the
Swarajists
the
party,
office
and
were
of
activists,
included,
and
Minister
as
well
posts
carefully distributed to satisfy communal and linguistic claims for representation in provincial ministry. There
was,
Despite having his dedication
however,
one
notable
omission:
craved office for at to constitutionalism
of
as
were
Satyamurti.
least 15 years, despite and his tireless elect-
ioneering in 1936-37, despite having stood down from the University constituency to allow Rajagopalachari to enter legislature, Satyamurti received no reward." Perhaps it deliberate spite by Rajagopalachari against the only
Congressman
haps
who
might
it was based
rival
him
on a realistic
in
the
Tamil
abilities and his unpopularity with the The consequence was to drive Satyamurti ition to Rajagopalachari, to revive the gopalachari
had
sought
to
coalescence. Satyamurti's Kamaraj and his associates Satyamurti, who died in emerged as the Congress
levered
Congress;
assessment
overcome
the was
per-
of Satyamurti's
Telugu Congressmen. into informal opposfactionalism Raja-
through
the
disappointment was into disaffection,
politics
of
inflamed by yet it was not
prison in 1943, but Kamaraj who boss in Tamilnad and the man who
Rajagopalachari
out of the party
by the mid-1950s.
But in 1937 such developments were barely perceived. Unheeding protests from the Congress left and from a small minority of activists that the acceptance of office and the working
of
the
constitution
office,
Rajagopalachari's
were
contrary
to
the
party's
basic objectives, the Congress in Madras settled down to enjoy the exercise of power and the perquisites of office, for so long the forbidden fruit. In just over two years in
ministry
proved
itself
a friend
of
the businessman, a defender of the rich peasant, and a patron of hand-spinners and weavers. Despite the inclusion in the ministry of V.V. Giri, formerly a labour organizer, as Minister for Labour, the ministry was generally unsympathetic to the interests of the industrial proletariat, the voters among
whom
had
largely
opted
for
the
Congress
in
1937,
and
it was responsible for the suppression of several labour disputes.*° As minister for the police department, Rajagopalachari gradually stepped up the investigation and prosecution of communists, especially in Malabar and the Andhra delta districts. His anti-communist stand was warmly
applauded by the presidency's European business community and held up as an example worthy of imitation in other provinces. “7
185 Despite
the
introduction
of
temple entry by Harijans disabilities, little was
plight
of
the
untouchables
legislation
designed
to
allow
and to remove their principal social attempted to ameliorate the economic
and
of
landless
labourers.
Raja-
gopalachari at last had the opportunity to begin to implement his prohibition schemes, but neither the ryotwari nor zamindari systems of landholding were overhauled. There was too
little time.*®
Once the leading No-Changer, Rajagopalachari was now acclaimed by British commentators as the ablest Congress parliamentarian. His close, largely harmonious, relations with Erskine epitomized the rapprochement which had taken
place between the nationalist leaders and the principal representatives of British authority in Madras.“? And it characteristic
the
of
publication
issued
vants they
by the
that
his
attitudes
of an
UP Congress
they
would
abandoned
watched
old,
as
never
happy
at
officials having
to
on
by
autocratic
Congressmen
under
prevented
lines
government
ways.
to
"No
such
of
that
ser-
see
that
circular
in January 1938, "or non-Tamil members of so harmonious as those
and non-officials. serve
he
the
warning
is called for", Rajagopalachari noted desirable".*° His relations with the the ministry and legislature were not
with European
premier
circular,
ministry,
be
their
that
official
was
a Tamil,
The Telugus, suspected
Rajagopalachari and Erskine of conspiring to advise the Secretary of State against accepting the legislature's recommendation for a separate Andhra province. Certainly, it was contrary to Rajagopalachari's faith in a nationalist
united front to fugal
the
give
issue
tensions, crisis.
was
the
shelved
that
united
The accession virtual provincial
economic not
to be
had
taken
structurally,
exclude
the
1935
until
was
front
the
the
but
Act,
to
greatest
tactics.
to
the Justicites.
forces
any
in south
transform
prevent
had
the
the powers a
lurch
society the
the
Raja-
a system radical
to work and
within
economy
by ministers
left
and
to
of
were
framework.
enjoyed
to
of
Such changes
constitutional
and
internal
achievement
agreed
centri-
Despite
a major
India.
of
other,
of the Congress under did not result in any
Congress
to exploit
the
or
independence.
without
of the colonial not
to
Tamil
after
survived
changes
expected:
office
Telugu,
to power autonomy
or social
the constraints
encouragement
whether
ministry
Perhaps
gopalachari's
under
any
regionalism,
It
186
The Revolution
That Never
Was
Ten years separated the formation of the Congress ministries from Indian independence in August 1947. The twists at the end of the tale of British India remained — not least the
and
Quit
India
the
central
tiations
about
movement
for
the
role
of
1942,
of Jawaharlal
independence.
future
the
But,
development
creation
Nehru
although
in
of
the
much
of nationalist
Pakistan,
final
was
politics
nego-
undecided
at
the
all-India level in 1937, the Congress-Raj rapprochement in the provinces by 1937 constituted an @ssential prelude to
decolonization. [~
It has
Indians
been
had
attained
made
claimed it
independence
that
the "British
impossible
for
through
them
revolution.
to
left
stay.
The
India because India
midwar
Quit
India movement climaxed India's nationalist revolution, which overthrew a powerful effective political regime". ™ But to
introduce
the
colonization the
Quit
Raj
in
adjustment
notion
in India — and
India
its
movement
and
institutional
were
30
years
and
the
it
context
process
to
extent
in
characterized
ignore
the
(even
created
by
the
of de-
specifically
to obscure the
which
participants
structures
into
to identify
— is
reassessment
last
Congressmen
of revolution
captives
British.
the
of)
with
of re-
to
British
which
the
Gandhi's tactics of non-violent non-cooperation and civil disobedience were potentially revolutionary. If faith-
fully followed they could have severed the Congress completely from the legislatures, wrenched the professional middle class away from government service and other collaborative roles; they could have thrown open membership of the Congress
club
to
the
masses.
obedience were, replacing it by But in practice
we have
seen
Effective
boycotts
was
at
dis-
in theory, capable of paralysing the Raj and a new political system under Indian control. Gandhi's tactics were not revolutionary. As
in the
context
of Tamilnad,
classes, who were the dominant social shied away from satyagraha in 1919-22 menacing in which
and mass civil
the pfopertied
element in the when it was at
Congress, its most
because they feared a political and social holocaust they might perish algng with the Raj. Satyagraha
its
most
successful
when
it
was
linked
to’ specific
local grievances or, as in 1930-33, directed towards limited constitutional objectives. By 1937 its function was clear: satyagraha was being used by the Congress as a clamp from outside the constitutional system to exert pressure inside that system.
187 Gandhi's
to appease weight
tactics
the
of
fears
British
were
employed
of vakils
repression
in
and
this
landlords.
showed
the
fashion
not
The
only
sheer
impossibility
of
winning swaraj through a single agitational campaign. Adherence to non-violence created its own limitations. As Rajagopalachari observed in 1922, it was impossible to have a parallel
government
agitations
failed
to
without
expel
the
It could
not
violence.
If
the
if
Congress
British
and
it was
operate
in defiant
imposs-
ible to construct a parallel government without violating ideal of ahimsa, then the Congress had to settle for more
immediate from
ment
the
Raj.
Acceptance
The
shift
of that.
in the
had
gains.
been
of office
in the directional
service
of the
defeated
by
Congress
the
did
Raj.
in
1937
thrust not
The
was
isolation
an
acknowledge-
of Gandhian
mean
that
achievement
the
tactics
the
gained
civil disobedience movement of 1930-33 established as the dominant political party in India. Without
party by
the
Congress the parti-
cipation of the Congress the new constitution was in jeopardy. A dozen years before he became prime minister, Clement Attlee
showed an awareness of when he criticized the hostile
to
the
Congress.
this 1935
pivotal Act for
The question that we said in Parliament]:
scheme
provide
living
what
forces
we have
should put Does this
a medium
of
importance containing
to deal
is this [he Constitutional
through
India
can
which
operate,
with
of the Congress provisions
are the
the
because
forces
of
modern India, a living India, and not the dead India of the past. If we are to do anything with India, we have to bring modern forces to play, and it is here that the importance of
the
good
attack or
ill,
dominating
on
the
the
Congress
Congress
factors
in
it are
very
use ignoring it, and merely to abuse it.
but
within
are going
In forcing
but also,
been
a
to make
party
the
it We
comes
is
situation.
one
in. of
It
For
the
is
no
is useless and futile may disagree with it,
many
for modern
of the
forces
India.*
that
Tamilnad the Congress had succeeded not only in the government to acknowledge its dominant position,
by knocking
three-cornered
years of hegemony separation of the Congress
party
power
had
out the Justice
contest,
the
Party
Congress
from what had embarked
on
in Tamil politics which was helped by old province's non-Tamil area — where become
weaker
than
in
Tamilnad
—
in
30
the the
188 1956 reorganization of the states on linguistic lines, and interrupted only by the rise to power of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in 1967. The resignation of the Congress ministry in October 1939 in protest against Britain's involvement of India in the Second World War and the Quit India movement in 1942 did not alter the eagerness of the Tamil Congressmen to return to the constitutional system at a later date nor did
those
episodes
Congress
imperil
achieved
by
the
1937.
dominant
political
position
of the
Two factors should be stressed in the rapprochement tween the Congress and the Raj in Tamilnad in the 1930s. Firstly, this was a provincial agreement not, as yet, an
India one. in order to
The British consolidate
were withdrawing from their position at the
be~ all-
the provinces centre. This
strategic retreat was designed to preserve British control of defence, external affairs, currency and other matters of primary importance to Britain while entangling the Congress in the net of provincial government. As Chief Secretary,
Bracken
predicted
Provincial
of
any
in
December
preoccupations
all-India
ies will play will probably all-India future is
1934
that
will
weaken
the
movement...Provincial
grip
jealous-
an important part in future and adversely affect Congress as an
party. likely
In other words trouble to be Provincial and so
in local-
ised and a mass all-India movement will be increasingly difficult for even Mr. Gandhi organize.
to
Similarly, an important reason why the Secretary of State and the Viceroy wished to avoid negotiations with Gandhi (and to
was
encourage
to weaken
Congress-Governor
the
power
discussion
of the
central
in
the
Congress
provinces)
organization.™
In this regard the British were to be disappointed. The proposed Indian federation, projected in the 1935 Act, was shelved partly because of the refusal of the princes (intended to counterbalance the Congress at the centre) to participate; Gandhi, the CWC and the AICC demonstrated their continuing
authority over the provincial resignation of the ministries British
had,
therefore,
to
committees, in 1939 and
concede
the Second World War in a manner provinces a decade before.
power
similar
not least by the Quit India. The
at
to
the
that
centre
in
the
after
The second factor in the rapprochement was the restricted character -of the political arena in which the prelude to decolonization occurred. The electorate in Tamilnad in 1937 was
:
:
189
as restricted centage
of
England
in terms
the
by
of franchise
population
the
1867
provisions
enfranchised
Reform
Act.
In
it
clearly
as
its
and
that
the per-
created
struggle
against
in
the
Raj and against the Justice Party the Tamil Congress had emerged from its earlier base among the Brahmin professional middle class and had recruited widely among the propertyholding
classes
orate,
defined
British
with
had
this
Congress
power.
their
generally;
by property
set up under
broad
was
band
of
committing
Merchants
continuing
and
and
the
the
tax
1935 Act.
middle
itself
ryots,
commanded
qualifications,
to
strata
grievances
against
the
elect-
which
In identifying of
society,
a peaceful
businessmen
the
transfer
and
but
itself
the
landlords,
British,
the
of
the
had
intensity of that conflict was moderated by the prospect of an end to colonial rule in the foreseeable future, and by concern at the rise of left-wing militancy. British eager-
ness
where
to
have
the
Congress
it had won
motivated
by
a majority
a fish
to
take
was
office
strengthen
in
1937
in
to a considerable the
party's
the provinces
extent
right
against
its left wing.°® Neither the colonial power nor its heir apparent wished to see the Raj demolished and the propertied classes hacked to pieces by an onslaught of hammers and
sickles.
India's
ledgement
admission
of
independence the
that
vigour
the
of
was
support
its
a compromise. nationalist
of the
Raj
It was
movement,
had been
eroded. But the British ensured that power was to politicians who represented the interésts of
tied classes and were likely politicians who had attained
the
institutional
passed,
hands
not
into
structure
the
of a Congress
hands
that
an
acknow-
an
steadily
transferred the proper-
to be hostile to communism; positions of authority within
of the
of
colonial
state.
revolutionaries,
had proved
but
Power
into
itself — to be "safe".
the
7
|
191
NOTES Chapter Nationalist 1
and Regional
1
Politics,
pp.
9-45
O.H.K. Spate and A.T.A. Learmonth, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography (3rd edn, London, 1967),
p. 737. Census
of
India,
1921:
Madras,
XIII,
Census
of India,
1931:
Madras,
XIV,
Census
of India,
1931:
Madras,
XIV,
1922), p. 39, 1932),
Map
p.
IV.
10.
Tamil Nadu Government
pt
I,
(Madras,
pt
II,
(Madras,
pt
I, pp.
15, 2land
Archives, Madras [hereafter TNA], Madras Order (G.0.) 1731, Development, 27 Nov 1923,
« 47,
Dharma Kumar, Land and Caste in South India: Agrtcultural Labour in the Madras Presidency
Nineteenth Century Nilmani
(Cambridge,
Mukherjee,
The
1965), pp.
Ryotwart
System
1792-1827 (Calcutta, 1962). Kumar, Land and Caste, p. 11.
during
12-13,
in
Madras,
the
18-19.
David Washbrook, "Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930", John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (eds.), Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on’Indian Politics,
1870-1940
R.
(Cambridge,
Suntharalingam,
Study
of
Indian
1967), Ibid., Anil
an
Economie
Indian
The
pp.
Madras
Emergence
Polities 13
(Cambridge,
1852-1891
of Indian
"Notes Lord
(Tucson,
prepared
Meston",
Library,
1968),
and Nationalist
1974),
London,
pp.
pp.
Papers,
[hereafter
Association:
Organization",
Review,
IV,
A
3 (Sept
Nationalism:
in the Later Nineteenth 104-7;
Awakening
in the Madras
Meston
Native
History
Competition and Collaboration Century
155-211.
Political
and Soctal
p. 237. p. 251.
Seal,
"The
Early
1973),
R.
in South
112-15.
Goveriiment
F.
136/33,
IOL].
Suntharalingam,
India,
Secretariat
India
Office
for
192 Notes
to
pages
14
Andre
Beteille,
Structure p.
15-21
165;
E.
Castes
and Social
in E.R. Leach (ed.), Ceylon and North-West
15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22
Slater
Census
of India,
(London,
Nationalist
Asia,
II,
R.T.
26
"Caste
Eesaye
in
(Bombay, a
in
Soctal
Tanjore
1969),
Village",
Aspects of Caste in South India, Pakistan (Cambridge, 1960), p. 22;
Some South
68-9,
1921:
Politics
(Aug
1972),
Parthasarathy,
1953), pp. 5-18.
R.
Suntharalingam,
versus
Executive
Modern
Asian
220.
Madrae,
Indian
XIII,
Villages
pt
I, pp.
in
pp.
in
South
India,
128-9.
1878-1885",
66-70.
Dawn and Achievement
the
Salem
Riots,
Mediation
111,
Nationalist
3
(July
(Salem,
1882:
of
Judiciary
a Communal
1969),
Awakening,
South
of Indian
and Times of Patriot and Thinker
"The
Studies,
Suntharalingam,
p.
pp.
198.
Dispute",
193-208.
M.N. Srinivas, Religion and Society among the Coorge of South India (London, 1952), p. 30; M.N. Srinivas, SoctaZ Change in Modern India (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 1-45. David Arnold, "The Gounders and the Congress: Political Recruitment
1974),
in
South
pp. 7-8,
"Caste
Analysis",
25
pp.
Gough,
Freedom: Being the Life C. Vijiaraghavachariar,
Manor,
24
New:
Suntharalingam, Nationalist Awakening, pp. 137-9. R. Suntharalingam, "The 'Hindu' and the Genesis of
(Aug
23
(ed.),
1918),
and
Stratification
Kathleen
Gilbeit
Old
India,
David
Associations
Indian
For
the
early
Arnold,
Economie
XIII, 3, (July-Sept 1976). career
of
1920-1937",
the
in
Robin
South
Jeffrey
South
India:
A
Justice
Party,
see
and Social
History
Asta,
and
IV,
James
Comparative
Review,
Eugene
F.
Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929 (Berkeley,
1969),
The Southborough
chs.
Report
3-5.
on the
Indian
Franchise
(Cmd.
141, 1919, p. 19) noted that there were only 179,388 literate in English in the Madras Presidency in a population of nearly 40 millions. Judith M. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922 (Cambridge, 1972), ch. 3. T.N. Jagadisan (ed.), Letters of the Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri (2nd edn, Bombay, 1963), pp. 41, 43.
193 Notes 27 28
to pages
22-28
House of National
India,
Commons Debates, 97 (1917), col. 1695. Archives of India, New Delhi, Government
Home
Department,
Political
Section,
H. Poll], Proceedings, Sept 1918, no. 20, Fortnightly Report on the
Situation
29 30
31
32 33
[hereafter
P.
Sastri:
Rao,
FRII,
The
second
Right
A Political
Jagadisan,
Srinivasa
H.F.
Owen,
"Towards
D.A.
Low
as
half
of
July
appropriate].
Honourable
Biography
Sastri,
p.
[hereafter
Deposit [hereafter Internal Political
(Bombay,
V.S.
1918
Srinivasa
1963),
49.
D-]
pp.
48-56;
Gandhi to Srinivasa Sastri, 9 Feb 1919, Gandhi to Srinivasa Sastri, tel., 11 March 1919, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [hereafter CWMG] (New Delhi, from 1958), XV, pp. 88, 128. Organization:
The
Nation-wide
Home
pp.
1968),
172,
pp.
158-95.
174-7.
Brown, Gandhi's Rise, History of the Indian (reprinted,
35
H.
Poll,
36 37 38 39
H.
Poll,
Besant,
Rule
(ed.), Soundings
(London,
Ibid.,
Owen,
New
"Towards
Delhi,
Procs
Aug
Leagues,
Procs
Jamnadas
Apr
Dwarkadas
1969),
before 1918,
1915-18",
p.
133.
Agitation",
Supply
D-28,
1919,
to
and
pp. 141-4; B. Pattabhi National Congress, 1,
Nation-wide
Grievances
Agitation
in
in Modern South Asian History
Sept 1918, D-40, FR I Aug 1918. D-49,
Besant,
(Adyar
FR
27
I
FR
May
II
Feb
p.
Sitaramayya, 1885-1935
178;
Annie
pamphlet, 1918;
Mar
1919,
Procs
1919.
Adyar
1923).
Archives.
H. Poll, Procs July 1919, D-47, FR II Apr 1919. V.K. Narasimhan, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar (Delhi, 1963),
pp. 23-44. C.J. Baker, "Politics in South India, 1917-1930", PhD dissertation, Cambridge University, 1973, pp. 113-18; David Washbrook, review of Brown, Gandhi's Rise, Modern Astan Studies, VII, 1 (Jan 1973), pp. 109-10;
D.A.
41 42 43 44
Madras,
FRIor
Kodanda
34
40
from
of
Washbrook,
The Madras ch.S.
Narasimhan,
The Emergence
Presidency,
of Provincial Politics:
1870-1920,
Kasturi Ranga,
(Cambridge,
pp.
55-69.
of
Police,
Prema Nandakumar, Subramania Bharati Gandhi to Vijayaraghavachari, 23 Feb Report
1919,
of
TNA,
the
G.O.
Commissioner
222,
Public
1976),
(New Delhi, 1919, CWMG, Madras,
(Confidential),
25
1968). XV, p.96.
Mar
24 Apr
1919.
194 Notes 45
to
pages
H.
29-33
Poll,
of
the
Procs
Congress
46 47 48 49
G.O.
Ibid.,
1919,
Committee
Conmittee,
Archives. Report
Apr
Executive of
the
p.
2.
222,
1919
D-49,
II
(Conf.),
Mar
the Madras
of
Police,
(Madras,
Commissioner
Public
FR
of
24
1920),
Apr
25
1919.
1919;
Report
p.
Adyar
Provincial 4,
Mar
1919,
TNA,
50
H. Poll, Procs July 1919, D-47, FR I Apr. 1919. Report of the Commissioner of Police, 4 Apr 1919, TNA, G.O, 222, Public (Conf.), 24 Apr 1919, p. 4. Police Report, 6 Apr 1919, TNA, G.O. 222, Public (Conf.),
51 $2
supplement, 8 Apr 1919, Adyar Archives. TNA, G.O. 223, Public (Conf.), 25 Apr 1919. R. Kumar (ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politica:
53 54 ss
56
24 Apr
1919,
Satyagraha
pp.
8-11;
of 1919
S.
Satyamurti
(Madras,
1918);
(Madras,
(ed.),
1919).
S.
59 60
Hindu,
63 64
(English;
Madras),
The
1971).
Rowlatt
of Civil Disobedience", 5 May 1919, TNA, SF 271, 11 July 1919; speech at Madura-Ramnad District Conference in Hindu (English; Madras), 22 Nov 1919.
Hindu, 19 Dec 1919, S. Satyamurti, "The
62
(London,
Times
TNA, Under-Secretary's Secret File [hereafter SF] 271, 11 July 1919, p. 19. H. Poll, Procs July 1919, D-48, FR I May 1919, citing a report from the Collector of North Arcot. C. Rajagopalachari, "Satyagraha: The Present Suspension
57 58
61
Madras
Iyengar,
“Financial
Nationalist 8,
Srinivasa
10
Sastri
in
Jagadisan
S.
Kasturi
3,
6 Mar
at the 1920). Brown,
“Gandhi
Party": Nov
1920.
Ranga
Gandhi's in
to
Programme";
1919:
leaflets
P.S.
in
Iyengar,
Adyar
pp.
"Foreword",
Loyalist
188-9;
or
Rangaswami
of
P.H.M.
the
Archives.
13 Apr
p.
66;
1920,
Hindu,
Resolutions
Amritsar,
Rebel?",
Gandhian Politics, pp. 43-63. Brown, Gandhi's Rise, pp. 240-1. Ibid., pp. 233-40.
A.
Aiyar,
Sastri,
Congress,
Proposals
of Citizens
"Programme
Sivaswami
Srinivasa
National Rise,
Rights
5 Mar, 26 Apr 1920. Congress Programme";
1919.
(ed.),
Indian
The Montagu-Chelmsford
Satyamurti,
in
1919
van
den
Kumar
Passed
(Madras, Dungen,
(ed.),
195
Notes
to pages 33-37
6S
Young
66
Brown,
67
68 69 70 7 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 8c 81 82 83
India
XVII, p. 482.
(English;
Gandhi's
Rise,
9 June
pp.
for the
216-20;
Muslim politics in India, see P. British India (Cambridge, 1972), For Gandhi's motives in adopting
1920,
Locality, Hindu,
Province
13
Aug
and Nation,
1920.
CWMG,
background
of
Hardy, The Muslims of esp. ch. 7. the council boycott,
see Richard Gordon, "Non-Cooperation and 1919-20", in Gallagher, Johnson and Seal
pp.
139-41.
Council (eds.),
Entry,
"More Objections Answered", Young India, 18 Aug 1920; interview published in Madras Matl (English; Madras),
[hereafter cited as Mail], 12 Aug 1920. Young India, 18 Aug 1920; Hindu, 13 Aug 1920. "Boycott of Goods v. Non-Co-operation Programme", India, 25 Aug 1920. Hindu, 13 Aug 1920. Ibid., Young India, 14 July 1920.
"Councils'
Boycott",
Gandhi
to
C.F.
Hindu,
16 Aug
Young
Andrews,
India,
23
Aug
14 July
1920,
CWMG,
“Madras Tour", Navajitvan (Gujarati; 1920, CWMG, XVIII, pp. 209, 213. Speeches
of
A.
1920.
Rangaswami
Iyengar
Iyengar, Hindu, 6, 16 Aug Hindu, 16 Aug 1920.
Ibid.
Kasturi
Hindu,
Nilkan 1948),
(Madras,
Ranga
16 Aug,
India, pp.
Iyengar, 25
Aug
1920.
Hindu,
16 Aug
1920.
1920.
XVIII,
Ahmedabad),
and
S.
Young
p.191.
29 Aug
Srinivasa
1920.
Perumal, Rajaji: A Biographical Study (Calcutta, pp. 11-12; Directory of the Madras Legislature
Speeches pp.
1938),
June
191-2; 137,
pp.
Centenary
214-15.
of C. Rajagopalachari, 1948-January
Monica
162;
1950
Felton, speech
Celebrations,
1969. C. Rajagopalachari,
Governor-General
(New
I Meet
Parthasarathy,
Rajagopalachari's
84
Ahmedabad),
at
Dawn,
the
Rajaji
Chate
Delhi,
Rajaji p.
Hall,
Behind
156;
Srinivasa Bars
1950),
(London,
Sastri
Madras,
(Madras,
22
of 1962), Sept
n.d.),
pp. 48-9; Francis Watson, The Trial of Mr. Gandhi (London, 1969), p. 173; Speeches of C. Rajagopalachari,
p. 192.
196 Notes
on
85
pages
37-41
Interview with C.R. Narasimhan (Rajagopalachari's son), Madras, 13 Feb 1970; M.K. Gandhi, The Story of My Experimente with Truth (2nd edn, Ahmedabad, 1940),
p.
86
348.
Rajagopalachari,
1918, D-20, FR II Hindu, 11, 15 Nov
87
21
Oct
1919.
July 1918. 1919; New
1921;
in Hindu,
pp. 100 f. Hindu, 21 Feb 1920. Hindu, 26 Aug, 7 Oct District Conference,
94 95
H.
96 97
Hindu,
13 Aug 1920.
1920s",
South Asia,
99
173-4.
India
Poll,
Procs
(English;
Sept
Madras),
Gandhi, Experimente, p. 348. C.R. Srinivasan in Hindu, 15 May 1935; K. Subba Rau, Men in the Limelight: Life Sketches (Madras, 1941),
May
pp.
H.
90 91
21
Conference,
Poll,
S.
K.V.
Procs
Aug
Ramanathan,
speech
22
at
Madura-Ramnad
Nov
District
1919.
1920; Rajan's speech at in Hindu, 6 Mar 1920.
1918,
League
Rajagopalan,
p. 186.
D-30,
FR
of Youth
I June
(Madras,
In and Out of the Law
Salem
1918.
1946),
(Madras,
p.
3;
1957),
Ramanathan, League, pp. 11-14; K. Santhanam, "How I first met Mahatma Gandhi", Bhavan'e Journal, XV, 16 (9 Mar 1969), pp. 33-5. For details, see Kenneth McPherson, "The Muslims of Madras and Calcutta: Agitational Politics in the Early
98
K.I.
McPherson,
"The
and Tamil-speaking
V
(Dec.
1978),
Political
Muslims
pp.
32-47.
Development
of the Madras
of
the
Urdu-
Presidency,
1901 to 1937", MA dissertation, University of Western Australia, 1968, pp. 76 f. K.I. McPherson, “Yakub Hasan: Commnalist or Patriot?",
University
Studies
101
Mail,
102
The Non-Co-operation
103
71-2;
Watson,
92 93
100
pp.
88 89
Hindu,
Gandht,
Chats,
p.
96;
25
Apr
TNA,
SF
1921;
407,
in Hietory,
McPherson,
6 May
1923,
V,
4
(1970),
"Political
p.
38.
pp.
73-7.
Development",
and Khilafat Movements
in the
Madras Presidency (Madras, n.d. [c. 1923]), p. 35; TNA, G.0. 607, Public (Conf.), 22 Sept 1920, p. 9; S.M. Fossil, The Islamic South (Madras, 1941), p. 22.
Gaunt
Madras
Report
(Urdu;
Presidency
Madras),
8
Sept
1919,
Native Newepaper Reporte
11
Apr
1920,
[hereafter MIR].
|
197 Notes 104
to
pages
41-47
McPherson,
"Muslims
of
Madras
and
Calcutta",
p.
39.
Fossil, Islamie South, pp. 3, 59, 126, 173, 189 identifies some of the leading young Khilafatists. The division between the moderate merchants and more extreme
maulvis
was
pp. 194, H. Poll,
105
an all-India
205. Procs
Oct
Procs
July
1920,
Procs
July
1920,
1919,
one:
Brown,
D-59,
FR
Gandhi's
I
Sept
Nov 1919, D-14, FR I Oct 1919; Hindu, H. Poll, Procs July 1920, D-95, FR II
106 107 108 109 110 lll 112 113 114 11s 116 117
H.
Poll,
H.
Poll,
D-90,
FR
I
Hindu, Hindu,
21 June 1920. 23, 24 June 1920;
Hindu, Hindu, Gordon, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu,
6, 16, 25 Aug 1920. 6 Sept 1920. "Non-Cooperation and Council 10 Sept 1920. 11, 13, 17, 18 Sept 1920. 13, 15, 20 Sept 1920. 20 Oct 1920.
Hindu, Hindu,
10 Sept 1920. 16, 18 Sept 1920.
Ramanathan, D-97,
FR
16, May
1919;
Mar.
Procs
18 Oct 1920.
1919.
1920.
League,
II
Rise,
June
pp.
1920.
Entry",
9-10;
pp.
143-7.
J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth-Century Bengal (Berkeley, 1968), p. 167.
118 119 120
Editorial, Hindu, Ranga, p. 192.
M.K.
121 122 123
Acharya
13
Sept
in Hindu,
Hindu, 19 Oct 1920. Gordon, "Non-Cooperation
1920;
22 Sept and
Chapter The Non-Cooperation 1
Gopal
Krishna,
Congress
Experiment, "The
as a Mass
Asian Studies,
Narasimhan,
Kasturi
1920.
Council
Entry",
pp.
148-52.
2 pp.
Development
Organization,
46-77 of
the
Indian
1918-23",
XXV, 3 (May 1966), p. 415.
National
Journal
of
John G. Leonard, "Politics and Social Change in South India: A Study of the Andhra Movement", Journal of Commorwealth Political Studies, V, 1 (Mar 1967), pp. 60-7. Brown, Gandhi's Cooperation and
Rise, p. 299; cf. Gordon, Council Entry", p. 134.
"Non-
198 Notes
to
4
pages
Michael
47-54
Brecher,
1959),
pp.
p. 419.
Nehru:
72-3;
Krishna,
A Political "Mass
Organization",
A. Rangaswami Iyengar, "Minute of Archives; Hindu, 15, 17 Nov 1920.
Hindu,
14,
Hindu,
3,
p. 423. Hindu,
18
Feb
15,
16,
1921;
16 July
20
July
Biography
Dissent",
Krishna,
"Mass
‘19 20
28 29
p.
205.
G.
Rudrayya
was
that
being
Kasturi
17 Sept 1921.
Delhi,
1971),
"TNCC
Annual
Memorial
p.
At
pp.
96,000
sought
Chowdari,
Hindu,
11,
Prakasam:
Hindu,
19 Nov
1920.
New
1921-22",
Delhi,
17 Jan
1922.
Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. Non-Co-operation and Khilafat,
the
and
of
8 Jan
Young India, 12 Jan 1922. Procs
Dec
1920,
D-84,
Hindu,
1921,
A Political p.
to
a further
CWC:
CWMG,
Study
AICC
Papers,
[hereafter
XIX,
(New
Nehru
AICCP],
1/169-G,
209. p. 47.
FR
10
28.
Dietmar Rothermund, The Phases of Indian and other Essays (Bombay, 1970), p. 125 Poll,
end
available
Fund
Iyengar,
124-35.
Report,
Library,
was
from
and Khilafat,
6;
H.
the
In August 1921 Rajagopala-
Swarajya
Ranga
Hindu, Ibid.
Rs.
the Tilak
Non-Co-operation
i 21 22 23 24 2s 26 27
60,000
from
Aug 1921. Gandhi to
18
Organization",
1921.
1924), p. 85.
reported
Tamilnad
Rs.
Adyar
1921 the CWC agreed to Rajagopalachari's request 8,600 : Indian National Congress, 1920-23
(Allahabad,
chari
esp.
1921.
Hindu, 15 Aug 1921. Hindu, 7 Sept 1921. Hindu, 22 Nov 1921. Hindu, 16 July 1921, 3 Dec 1923. Hindu, 19 Oct 1920. Hindu, 8 Mar, 29 Apr 1921. Hindu, editorials, 7, 21 July 1921. Hindu, 22 Nov 1921. M.K. Acharya in Hindu, 16 Aug 1921.
January for Rs.
(London,
II
Sept
Nationalism 1920.
199 Notes
to
Hindu,
30
40 41 42 43 44 4s 46 47 48 49 50
15,
(English;
Hindu, Volume
32
36 37 38 39
54-60
21,
27 Sept,
Madras),
May
1920;
Washbrook,
1922,
p.
296.
20 Oct 1920; Sixty-first Birthday Commemoration presented to Dr. R.K. Shanmukham Chettiar
(Annamalai, 1952), Irschick, Politics
"Non-Brahmin",
Government
Reformed
Ibid.
p. 96. and Social
Hindu,
15
of India,
Constitution,
Dec
Reports
Conflict,
1920.
1927
on the
(Madras,
1956), p. 11.
Willingdon {hereafter
to Montagu, 8 WP], F. 93/4,
Willingdon Willingdon Edwin
S.
to Montagu, to Montagu,
Montagu,
An
pp. 129, 135-6.
p.
(Calcutta,
Feb 1920, IOL.
178.
Working
1928),
Non-Co-operation and Khilafat, p. 38. Hindu, 15, 17 Dec 1920. R.V. Krishna Ayyar, In the Legislature
pp.
of
those
Willingdon
Diary
88-9.
|
5S Feb 1920, ibid. 7 June, 14 Dec. 1920,
Indian
of the
(London,
Days
Papers
tbid.
1930),
"Note by His Excellency Lord Willingdon on Reforms Report", c. 1919, WP, F. 93/2; Willingdon to Montagu, 19 Oct 1919, WP, F. 93/4.
Willingdon
Ibid.
to
Montagu,
For Willingdon's
7 Jan,
earlier
see Willingdon to Montagu, 28 Willingdon to Montagu, 29 Mar Willingdon
Cf.
to
Montagu,
Irschick,
Politics
Willingdon to Montagu, interview
with
52
Province and Nation, Hindu, 12 July 1923;
Gallagher,
of South India, 99-131. K.
26
One
Sitarama
Jan
1922.
Irschick,
14
Johnson
illustration
Politics
ibid.
for
the Moderates,
Oct 1919, ibid. 1920, ibid. 1920,
Madras,
in
and
tbid.
Conflict, 30
Decline: Seal
p.
South
was
the
Arcot:
12 May,
Jan
rapid
Baker,
1976),
Hindu,
Conflict,
172.
1971.
Bengal
(eds.),
(Cambridge,
and Social
Willingdon to Montagu,
1920,
p. 281, note 28. Christopher John
1920-1937 in
hopes
21 Mar 1921, WP, F. 93/4;
"Congress
Reddi
Dec
8 Feb
and Social
Rajan,
John
1939",
Gallagher,
P.T.
$1
$3 54
13 Oct
Emergence of Provinetal Politics, pp. 317-22. C. Ramalinga Reddi, "Dyarchy and After", Indian Review
31
33 34 35
pages
rise 26
pp.
1930
to
Locality,
The
Politics
pp. 54-63,
of
Jan
1921,
230-44.
3 Aug 1921, WP, F. 93/4.
|
|
200 Notes
to
pages
60- 64
55
Madras
56
Willingdon's
VII, IV,
s7
Legislative
27 Mar
1922,
Council
p.
address
16 Dec
1921,
Proceedings
3646.
to
p.
1937.
the
Madras
[hereafter MLCP],
legislature:
MLCP,
TNA, SF 315, 2 Apr 1921, p. 37; SF 328, 15 Nov 1921, pp. 47-9, 72-80; Peter D. Reeves, "The Politics of Order: 'Anti-Non-Cooperation' in the United Provinces,
1921", Journal pp. 261-74.
of Astan
Studies,
XXV,
2
Reports
the Reformed Constitution,
(Feb
TNA, SF 338, 1 May 1922, p. 34.
58 s9 60 61
on
...
Non-Co-operation
and
Khilafat,
pp.
1966),
1927,
32-3.
pp.
38-9
See the petitions and resolutions of the Nadar Mahajana Sabha (Hindu, 20 Dec 1920), the Maravar Association
(Hindu,
8 Sept
1921),
and the
Kallar
Maha
Sangam
(Hindu,
13 Sept 1921). For Adi-Dravida loyalist meetings, see Hindu, 23 Nov 1920, 10 Aug 1921. Montagu to Willingdon, 10 Feb 1921, WP, F. 93/4. For Montagu's long-term view, see S.D. Waley, Edwin Montagu (Bombay, 1964), pp. 156, 197, 200. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, ch. V, "The Moderates’
62 63
Failure". Hindu, 17 Dec
64 65 66 67 68
Hindu, TNA,
Hindu, H.
69 70 71 72 73 74 7S 76
Dec
SF
1920.
31 Jan, 2, 5, 15 Feb 1921. 407,
6 May
1923,
pp.
37-8;
1920,
D-84,
10 Aug, 22 Nov 1921.
Poll,
1920,
Procs
D-66,
Dec
FR
II
Oct.
1920.
FR
Hindu, II
19 Nov
Sept
1920;
MLCP, 1, 21 Mar 1921, p. 836. TNA, G.O. 180, Public, 15 Mar 1920; SF 302,
pp. 29-30, 37-8.
TNA, G.O. 265, Public, 12 May 1921.
2 May 1921; Hindu,
1920. Procs
8 May 1920, editorial,
H. Poll-B, Procs May 1920, 172-6; Procs-A, Aug 1920, 127-8. “John Scurr's Report on his Indian Tour", 1919, pp. 16, 23, Adyar Archives. E.g., Discussion in notes to SF 315, 2 Apr 1921, pp. 34-7.
Govt.
of India
Madras,
4
Sept
[Gol], 1920,
to Chief
TNA,
Gol, to Ch.Sec., Madras, 2 Apr 1921, p. 10.
SF
28
Secretary
315,
Jan
2 Apr
1921,
[Ch.Sec.],
1921,
TNA,
SF
p.
315,
1.
201 Notes 77 78 79
to
pages
Rajagopalachari, Hindu, 21 27 Aug 1921. Arnold, "Gounders",p. 9.
Robert L. Political 1969),
80
64-69
Nadu
May
1921;
Hasan,
Hardgrave, The Nadare of Tamilnad: The Culture of a Community in Change (Berkeley,
pp.
(Tamil;
136-8,
194;
Salem),
Christopher
Baker,
28
letter Nov
from
1921,
a Nadar
NNR.
"Non-cooperation
in
1975),
pp.
98-149.
82
MLCP,
8s
1921,
H.
Poll,
II,
F.
4 Aug
13/1922,
1921,
p.
FR
361;
II
Jan
1 Sept
1921,
p.
580;
12 Oct 1921, p. 879; TNA, G.O. 1135, Revenue, 19 June 1922. Willingdon to Montagu, 1 May 1921, 11 Feb 1922, WP, F. 93/4; MLCP, V, 4 Mar 1922, p. 2483.
T.E. Moir to Secretary, GoI, Finance, 13 Dec 1921, IOL, Madras Procs, G.O. 1221, Finance (Conf.), Jan 1922.
Non-Co-operation
and
Khilafat,
p.
18;
TNA,
6 May 1923, p. 28. E.D. Murphy, "Labour Organisations in of Tamilnad, 1918-1939", dissertation
the PhD
87
TNA,
1918.
University G.O.
detailed Union,
of Western
342,
account
see
in B.
Australia,
Public
Murphy,
1976, Apr
formation
"Labour
pp.
16.
22 Mar 1920); notes by C.G. Todhunter, 26 Jan
(Conf.), 12 Feb TNA, G.O. 1029, Procs Nov 1918,
referred
dispute 1918.
Report 1919,
H.Poll,
G.O.
222,
Cotton Mills thesis,
Worker
Executive Councillor 1919, TNA, letter 63,
involvement Procs
of the Commissioner
TNA,
Industrial
1919, p. 5. Public (Conf.), D-24, FR II Oct
to Gandhi's
: e.g.
The
Public
Aug
407,
79-80.
For a
of the Madras
Besant in New India, 3 July 1918. Rajagopalachari at Madras Labour Conference
p.
SF
Organisations",
89 90
1939),
Rao,
18
Cited
(London,
Shiva
of the
(Conf.),
88
92
India",
16, 20 Sept
1922.
86
91
Tamil
in C.J. Baker and D.A. Washbrook, South India: Politicai Institutions and Political Change, 1880-1940 (Delhi,
TNA, SF 407, 6 May 1923, pp. 27-9; Hindu,
84
to
South
81
83
Hindu,
9 Nov 1918.
1919; Wadia
ch.
3.
in India
(Hindu, Public
H.Poll, often
in the Ahmedabad
1918,
of Police, (Conf.),
D-30,
Madras,
24 Aug
Labour
FR
mill
I June
25 Mar
1919,
p.
10.
202 Notes
93 94 95
96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 “04 205 106 107 108 109 110 lll 112 113 114 M5 116 117 118 119 120
to
pages
69-73
Wednesday
Review
(English;
Trichinopoly),
26 May
1920
NNR; cf. Mail, 10 Dec 1918. TNA, G.O. 562, Public (Conf.), 7 Sept 1920. TNA, letter 63, Public (Conf.), 12 Feb 1919, notes, esp. Todhunter, 26 Jan 1919, p. 5; G.O. 563, Public (Conf.), 7 Sept 1920, notes by R.A. Graham and A.R. Knapp, Ch.
Secs. TNA,
G.O.
"Labour
671, to
Reading,
17 Sept 11 July
Hindu, Hindu,
7
Organisations",
Willingdon
Hindu, Hindu,
Public,
1921. 1921;
pp.
26
1921
Ibid.,
TNA,
Hitchcock, (Madras,
134-43.
July
1921,
G.O.
103,
of the
pp.
Public,
10-15,
3 Dec
Indian
National
Hindu,
30
25
Feb
Malabar Rebellion,
Hindu,
Aug,
Confidential 15 Nov 1921,
1921. 10
Sept
Murphy,
F.
93/5.
Ranga,
Malabar
p.
198.
310
1921.
gives
1920-23, S,
Rebellion,
178-80.
1921.
Congress,
circular, p. 71.
WP,
Kasturi
p. 19; Mail, 4, 5 Apr 1921.
Hitchcock,
1-7;
1921. For the Justice Party's Politics and Social Conflict,
A History
1925),
pp.
1921.
Hindu, editorial, 2 Sept reactions, see Irschick, R.H.
1921,
Narasimhan,
22 Nov 1921. editorial, 1 Sept
pp. 188-92.
Oct
3 Nov
a detailed pp.
11,
1921,
account.
154.
TNA,
SF
328,
Hindu, 20 Sept 1921; Non-Co-operation and Khilafat, p. 14; Hindu, 27 Aug 1921. C. Rajagopalachari, Rajaji'’s 1920 Jail Life (Madras, 1941), p. 107, entry for 16 Feb 1922. Gandhi, "My Notes", Navajivan, 25 Sept
1921,
p- 204.
Willingdon'’s note, 1 Dec 1921, TNA, SF p. 3. D.A. Low, "The Government of India and
Cooperation
Movement,
1920-22",
Willingdon
to Montagu,
27 Aug
Willingdon
to
18
XXV,
2 (Feb 1966),
pp.
247-8.
TNA, G.O. 618, Public (Conf.), Hindu, editorial, 7 Nov 1921.
Indian
Reading,
National
Congress,
Sept
338,
Journal
1921, 19
1920-23,
WP,
Sept
1921,
CWMG,
the
First
F.
93/4.
1922, Non-
of Asian Studies,
1921.
WP,
pp.
1 May
XXI,
F.
72-3.
93/5.
203 Notes
121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132
to
pages
74-81
Hindu,
22,
23
Nov
1921.
Hindu,
17,
22
Dec
1921;
Hindu, 8, 1S Dec 1921.
MLCP,
Nehru, p. 23.
A Bunch
of Old Letterae
IOL, Madras Procs, G.O. Hindu, 21, 23 Jan 1922.
1002,
IOL,
432,
Non-Co-operation Madras
1923, p. 11; 21 Jan 1922; NNR.
Procs,
Dec
1921,
Rajagopalachari,
C.
and Khilafat, G.0.
editorial,
Rajagopalachari,
(Bombay,
1963),
13
p.
1922.
Feb
Indian Ibid., Report
28
edn,
Aug
p.
pp.
Bombay,
1922,
44.
Judicial
1922.
Gandhiji's
21.
Jail
Life,
1699
pp.
Dilemma,
pp.
1960),
13-14;
(Police),
Teachings
pp.
Chapter
The Swarajists'
(2nd
TNA, G.O. 130, Revenue, 19 Jan Swadesamitran (Tamil; Madras),
135
wne
2062.
New India, 16 Jan 1922. Gandhi, "Violence in the Camp", Young India, 9 Feb 1922. Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 19 Feb 1922, Jawaharlal
Hindu,
108-9,
18
1959), pp. 58-63.
Story
Gordon,
"Non-Cooperation
The Way
to Swaraj:
Aug
1922; Hindu, 21 Jan 1922,
and Philosophy
entry
for
18 Feb
3
78-122
National Congress, 1920-23, pp. 180-1. p. 163. of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee
(Allahabad, 1922) M.R. Jayakar, The
an
13
p.
Low, '"'Non-Cooperation Movement", pp. 249-50. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 222-3.
133 134
of my
Life,
and
Council
11,
1922-25
Entry",
:
(Bombay,
pp.
150-1.
Swarajya Party manifesto, 14 Oct 1923, in N.N. Mitra (ed.), The Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, pp. 219-20;
Speeches
of Desabandhu
1923 (Madras, 1923), pp. 20-6.
won
IV,
f.; 15 Dec 1921; 20 Jan 1922, Justice, 13 Dec 1921, NWR.
Young India, Hindu,
18 June
18 May 1922. 1923.
Das,
Madras,
204 Notes
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
to
pages
Hindu,
14 June 1923.
Hindu,
19
May
1923.
Hindu,
28 May, 8, 16 June 1923.
Hindu,
20 Aug 1923.
Hindu,
3 July
Hindu, editorial, Swadesamitran, 19 Hindu, Hindu,
17, 19 1 Sept
Rangaswami
My Life, Motilal
Papers,
20
81-89
Gandhi
pp. Pp.
149;
Sept 1923. 1924.
1923.
Iyengar
11, p. 30.
Nehru to
36-7;
to
[hereafter
to
Jayakar,
Satyamurti,
SP],
NML;
Rajagopalachari,
Gandhi
Young
17 27
July
Nov
Hindu,
24
Aug
India,
15 Jan
(Urdu;
1925.
Madras),
1924,
with
Feb
K.
Hindu, Hindu, 13 Apr chari,
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Gandhi,
16 June,
Subramanyam
1971),
Hindu,
25 26 27
28 May,
N.S.
(4
5,
1971),
Varadachari
17, 20, 26 Sept,
(5
Feb
15
Apr
1924,
itbid.,
note
ibid.,
1;
p.
Young
443;
Tamil
Nadu,
Hindu,
1,
Hindu,
6,
9,
2,
29
Mar
10,
4,
15,
6,
1925,
20,
12 May
NNR. 30
Apr
1925S.
1922,
1923.
K.S.
NNR.
see Reports
1927, pp. 91-2.
on
...
Interviews Madras, (10
to Rajagopalachari, Gandhi to RajagopalaRajagopalachari
1 May
21,
25
1924.
Mar
to
1925.
1925. SP, NML.
the Reformed Constitution,
Handbook of Information on the Administration Presidency of Madras (Madras, 1928), p. 28. Hindu, 11, 14 Jan 1924. . Swarajya (English; Madras), 24 Hindu, 14 Mar 1924.
36,
50,
32, 38-9, 54, 58, 64, 69-70 ’ 74; and Rowlatt satyagraha, 28-31; become Swarajists, 81,
126,
education
62-3, 79; see algo Shermadevi Gurukulam Nationalists,
78,
116,
19,
78,
89,
130
92-4;
enter Congress, 106-7, 130-1, 138; enter western
54
34,
politics,
movement,
Natesa Mudaliar, C., 19, 89 Natesan, G.A., 21, 28, 125
National
186;
85,
Non-Brahmins, 39, 156; appointed ministers, 55-7; constitute Opposition, 132;
C.V.S.,
105
177,
dissidents,
124 84
Naidus, 155, 172 Nair, T.M., 19, 25, Nairs, 15 Narasimha
16
65
65
120,
157,
complete independence, 111-14; opposes office-
ist
142, 145, 149, 160; TNCC President, 112, 118, 141 Muthuswami, K.S., 144-5, 161 T.,
Chettis,
162 Negapatam, 29 Nehru, Jawaharlal,
Nehru, Motilal, 80, 83, 87, 90, 111-14; Report, 113 Neill satyagraha, 143 Newspapers' role in national-
Muthiah Chetti, M.A., 157, 162 Muthiah Mudaliar, S., 98, 105, 170; Minister, 109-10 , 131; leader People's Party, 155, 174 Mudaliar,
Nattukkottai
Gandhians,
70, 80
acceptance, 181-2; socialism, 151-2
174
Muthuranga
with
53,
character
of, 25-8; oppose council boycott, 34-6, 42-4, 62;
18-20,
patronage, 100; in 55, 58; against
13-14;
Madras
87, 92; against
59-61,
also
and professions, 130;
59-60,
92-3,
for
elections, 1920, lead agitation missionaries,
organization legislature,
in
57,
59,
use legislature Brahmin domination,
91, 96, 156; see
Brahmin-non-Brahmin
conflict Non-Cooperation, movement,
42-79,
hunger
81,
33-6,
90,
5-6,
82-4;
100,
143,
38-40,
247
176;
through
latures,
the
78,
80-1,
legis101
North Arcot, 13; Congress and Khilafat activity in, 42-3, 62, 75, 130; elections,
1920,
88
55;
1923,
Odayappa,
Sergeant,
S.0.S.P.,
161
125
Office-acceptance issue: in 1920s, 78-9, 101-12; 1930s, 150, 153, 168, 172 177, 179-83, 187, 189 Olivier, Lord, 100 Conference,
160,
162
Pachaiyappa's College, 13 Pal, B.C., 43 Panagal, Raja of, 57, 88, 108, 110, 157
Pannirselvam, A.T., 122-3 Pantulu Aiyar, V., 120-1
“Parallel government", $2-3, 187 Peasants, see ryots Pentland, Lord, 23, 63 People's Party, 155-6,
Picketing, foreign
84,
cloth,
131;
66,
of
4
126-7,
134, 136, 142; of liquor shops, 65-7, 73-4, 127, 129, 134-5
Pithapuram, Maharaja of, 155 Police, 57, 94, 117; during civil disobedience, 120-7,
130-7, 142; punitive, 26, 61, 70, 75; under 1935 constitution, 178-9, 184; urged to resign, 34, 63 Pondicherry, 10, 27 Prakasam,
T.,
51,
88-9;
attacks Tamil Swarajists, 88-9, 105-6, 112; leads Satyagraha in Madras, 124;
Swara-
104,
151;
introduced,
185; Justice Party and, 65, 159 Publicity Bureau, 60, 72 Punjab
"grievance",
55
Qaumi Report, Quit India 188
30,
41
movement,
Rajagopalachari,
32-5,
186,
C.,
5,
28, 31, 53, 74, 85, 105, 115, 143, 148;
7,
103, agrees
to Delhi compromise, 82-4; and labour, 38, 70; and Malabar Rebellion, 72-3;
as leader of the Tamil Gandhians, 36, 39-40, 44; as
174
see
jists Prohibition: agitation for, 64-8, 70, 74, 128, 131, 134; Congress proposals for,
O'Callaghan,
Ottawa
Minister, 183 "Pro-Changers",
Premier,
183-5;
Tiruchengodu
attaches 37-9;
ashram,
himself
attempts
Nationalists' the
to
press,
communal
51;
to
at
&5-6;
to Gandhi break
control
of
attitudes
problem,
39
91, 104, 138; attitudes to dyarchy, 86, 110, 138, attitudes to local boards,
85,
144,
titudes
163-4,
167;
at-
to untouchables,
84, 86, 146-7; aversion to socialism and communism,
15i-2,
158,
184;
backs
Independent ministry, 104; Brahminism of, 86, 119, 134; campaigns for pro-
hibition, 86, 104, 110, 119, 134-5, 185; campaigns
248 60-1; TNCC,
in elections, 1934, 1937, 173: controls
44-5,
48-50,
83,
87,
118,
144-5; cultivates Muslim support, 41-3; favours
council entry, 149-50; and office-acceptance, 150, 177, 180-1; importance of centre-regional links to, 39, 80, 86, 145; in Salem, 26, 37; interpretation of
non-cooperation and civil disobedience, 38, 77, 81, 138-2,
142,
150;
leads
No-
Changers, 79-81; ieads salt satyagraha, 118-24; nego-
tiates
proposes
with
Erskine,
non-cooperation,
relations
42-3;
181-3;
with
Satya-
murti, 142, 144-5, 180, 134; united front tactics, 149, 152-3, 158, 167-8, 185; views on "parallel government", 52-3
Rajagopalachari,
64
Rajagopalan
Rajan,
Sir
K.V.,
T.S.S.,
P.,
57,
40
39, 44, 85,
150; as TNCC Secretary, 49, 118, 144; contests 1934 elections, 160-1; leads Trichinopoly revolt, 167;
participates
in non-
cooperation, 42, 53, 74-5; and civil disobedience, 119, 122; Minister, 183
Rajapalaiyam, 144 Rajappa, P.S., 123 Rajendra Prasad, 20, 83, Ramalinga Reddi, C., 54, 92-4, 101 Ramalingam Chetti, T.A.,
92-3,
132
Ramanathan, Respect
S.,
40;
movement,
151 89, 89,
in Self-
84-5,
143; Minister, 184; Te159
joins Congress,
159, 173
Ramaswami, V.V.,
Ramaswami Aiyar, Sir C.P., 29, 57, 100, 106, 109 Ramaswami Iyengar, N.S., 65
Ramaswami Mudaliar, A., 104, 162 Ramaswami Naicker, E.V.: anti-Brahminism
in Congress,
106; 74,
96,
49,
65,
Self-Respect
leads
84;
of,
movement, 85, 143; allies with Justice Party, 159
Rameswaram,
Ramnad,
Rangachari,
Mudaliar,
Ranganatha
108-9
87,
29,
25,
1.,
96
DCC,
161;
119,
65,
144
122
119,
A.,
103,
Rangaswami Iyengar, 48-9, 101, 106; advocates council entry, 148, 169; and civil disobedience, 116, 120; constitutionalism of, 89; contests 1923 elections,
87; editor, 25-6, 29, 51, 141; leads Tamil Swara-
jists, 82-3; observes council boycotts, 43,
116;
participates in Nationalist activities, 25-7, 29, 32, 38; views on Madras 62,
legislature,
Rangaswami 27,
32,
Iyengar,
44
Mudaliar,
Ratnasabapathi 92 C.S.,
Reading,
Reddi
Thevar,
Lord,
Naidu,
K.V-,
P., 17
Rangiah Naidu,
Ratnavel
91
74 V., K.
64,
Sir
183 57, 93, 107, 172 keddis, 155,
P->
166-7
54,
249 "Responsive
Cooperation",
Round
Conference:
35,
101
Table
Proposed,
‘116,
74,
138;
136-9,
162
Rowlatt
agraha,
Act,
24,
Ruthnaswami,
Ryots,
185;
and
13,
and
77,
81,
Second,
69;
M.,
95
18,
Congress,
Justice
enfranchised,
Salem, 9, 13; and obedience, 119, gress in, 25-6,
147,
99,
169,
177;
178
civil dis127; Con37, 53,
66-7, 85; elections, 1920, $5; municipal council, 37, 66, 85; riots, 1882, 16-17 Salt satyagraha, 115, 118-22, 124, 127, 129, 131, 142 Sambamurti, B., 106 Samiappa Mudaliar, N.R., 122 Sankaran Nair, C., 25 Sanskritization, 19, 86 Santhanam, Sapru, Sir
113-14,
Satyagraha,
K., Tej
133
40, 84, 120-1 Bahadur,
3-4,
186;
see
also Ahmedabad, Bardoli, Champaran, Kaira, Madura, Nagpur, Neill, Salt, Vaikam Satyagrahis, 119-22, 124-5, 131, 133; see also
Volunteers
Satyamurti,
105,
169;
S.,
activitists,
bition
to
28,
allies
be
38,
with
144-5;
83,
am-
a minister,
145, 184; at Calcutta Congress, 43; attacks Besant, 24; boasts Swara-
jists
dent
will
break
ministry,
Indepen-
104;
on
patrons, from
hostility
ism,
189;
Party,
dence 184;
34
75,
character of, 95, 145; contests 1934 elections, 160, 162; constitutionalism of, 62, 89-90; depenexcluded
saty-
28-32,
15,
114,
133,
22,
28,
173;
local
ministry,
to
social-
involvement
board
114-5, 164-7; disobedience,
and
116;
elections,
organizer,
in
joins civil 142; orator
32,
172-3;
orthodoxy, 147; PCC Secretary, 29; revives Swarajya Party, 148-9, 152; Swarajists, 87, 89, 94-5;
TNCC 164;
president, 142, vice-president,
145, 144
Saurashtras: participate in civil disobedience, 128-9; support
161,
165
Congress,
119,
Scheduled castes, see Harijans Self-Respect movement,
115,
143,
159
Sethuratnam
Aiyar,
109-10,
85,
M.R.,
131
Shanmugham Chetti, R.K., 159, contests 1934 elections, 162; in Assem-
bly,
Sharar,
106,
Abdul
116,
162
Majid,
41-2,
63, 73, 83 Shermadevi Gurukulam, 85-6 Simon
113,
Commission,
116,
Singaravelu
52,
75,
21,
54,
Sivaswami
130;
117
87
Socialism, 151, Soundarapandiya W.P.A.,
107-10,
Report,
Chetti,
Aiyar,
159
27,
M.,
Sir
178 Nadar,
133
49,
P.S.,
250
South South
South
Sutandira Sangu, 124
Arcot, 127 Canara, 9
Indian
Commerce,
Swadeshi, 34, 36, 66, 73,
of
Chamber
126, 142, 164, 166, 175;
158
South Indian Liberal Federation, 19 Srinivasa Iyengar, S., 50, 82, 87, 96, 116,
144-5,
156; and Madras legislature, 74, 91, 105-8; Congress president, 101, 105; office acceptance issue and, 101,
111-12; opposes council boycott, 42, 54; rivalry with Motilal Nehru, 111,
and
Srinivasavarada
143
Subbarayan,
P.,
144,
165
didate
110-11,
Chief
revived,
with
128-9,
92-3,
for Justice 157;
Opposition,
170;
103-10;
131-2,
can-
leadership,
character
Minister,
of
146,
in
103;
152-3, 155, 176; Law Minister, 184, rejoins Congress,
158
Subbarayulu Reddi, A., 56-7 Subramania Bharati, C., 27
Subramania
Subramania
Subramaniam,
Sastri,
Siva,
K.,
26,
40
Malayali
M.V.,
143
74
of,
87,
with Gandhians, 83, differences with Telugu
and
jectives,
R.,
Frederick, 131-3, 134, 176 Student involvement in nationalist activity, 30, 40-1, 51-2, 62-3, 66, 119, 124, 130-1 N.M.R.,
contest 85, 87;
composition
Swara-
Swarajya, 51, 96, 112 Swarajya Party, All-India, 78, 113, formed, 80; ob-
Srivilliputtur, 161 Stanley, Sir George
Subbaraman,
111-12;
TNCC, 118, 144
Gandhi,
Iyengar,
agitation, 26-7, 76 Swaminatha Sastri, T.V., 42 Swaminathan, R.V., 161 Swarajists, Tamil: aims and tactics, 78, 88-92, 94-101,
jists, 88-9, 105-6; party revived, 148-9, 152, 164; post-1930, 139, 141-3, 145, 184; resigned from
113; TNCC president, 85, 112; withdraws from politics, 112, 118, 141 Srinivasa Sastri, V.S., 32,
54, 58, 183; 21-3, 28
26, Si, 122
Suadesanitran,
81,
149;
89-90;
struggle
No-Changers,
Tamilnad: 9-13
Tamilnad
character
Congress:
character of, in 106-7, 133, 141,
164, ship
81-3 of,
changing 1930s, 148,
167-8, 189; memberof, 168; subordinate
committees of, 47-8, 82, 167-8, 172 | 51, 73 Tamil Nadu, itComm Tamil Nadu Congress
tee, 73, 85, 112, 118,
148,
166-7;
51, 62,
allots
70, 85, 1435
funds,
of, 48, 835 constitution sour ces of formed, 47;
funds for, 50, 52,
154,
147;
under Gandhians,
118;
under Raja
48-52, 73-4, 79» 85; achari goP?
251 and
Satyamurti,
under
Tamil
Swarajists,
Nadu
Khadi
Tamil-Telugu
105-6,
184-5
Tampoe,
12,
Civil
119-24;
54;
Telugu
rivalry, 163,
14,
29,
districts,
93,
101
Andhra
Temperance, see Prohibition Terrorism, 3, 24-7, 37-8, 121 Thanickachelam, Chetti, 0. ’
72
Thorne, J.A., 120-2, 124 Tilak, B.G., 25, 27-8, 34-5, 37, 44; Swarajya Fund, 50, 79
Tinnevelly,
13-15;
obedience ence,
1920,
in,
143
Tiruppur,
143
Tiruvannamalai
163 Trichinopoly, 97, 120; Khilafat
48-9,
dis-
confer-
42-3;
district
ashram,
85-6,
board, 165-6; 26, 143
Tiruchengodu
civil
119;
riots,
1908,
district 9,
14,
board,
29,
73,
as a Gandhiancentre, 12, 42-3,
52-3,
disobedience
elections, 88;
district
Troops,
34,
municipal
62,
in,
72;
119,
1920,
55;
board,
council, 70-1,
75
Tulsiram, L.K., 128 Tuticorin, 26-7, 29,
civil
130
1923,
166;
Uuited
56,
United
172,
111; 1930-6,
147,
152-3
Provinces,
185
155;
Con-
13,
75, 79, 84; Party, 19,
see
also
Dravidas, Harijans Usman, Muhammad, 40-1;
Member,
93,
Vaidyanatha
158,
Adi
Home
109,
132
Aiyar,
A.,
39,
155-6,
174
119 Vaikam satyagraha, 84, 86 Vallabhbhai Patel, 20, 85, 120, 136, 151; in Tamilnad, 115, 122
Vaniyambadi, 52
Vanniyars,
Varadachari,
101,
N.S.,
40
115,
122,
Varadarajulu Naidu, P., 39, 51, 73, 82, 96; contests 1934 elections, 162; TNCC president, 85 Vedaranniyam: conference,
1929,
112,
satyagraha,
118-23,
138, 142, 144 Veeriah Vandayar, Vellalas,
155,
172,
16,
93,
174;
disobedience,
A.,
98,
and
121-3
Vellingiri Gounder, 65, 93, 147 Vellodi, M.K., 135
138;
127-8,
123
101,
civil
V.C.,
Vellore,
127
C.T., 165 Venkatachelam Chetti, S., 116, and civil disobedi-
60
Nationalists:
join
166-7
Tyagaraya Chetti, P., 19, 75, 93, 158; Justice Leader,
54,
131-2,
146,
1920,
see
94-6;
Untouchables, and Justice
in,
1926,
92,
gress, 100-2,
97-9;
elections,
97;
10,
84
165
disobedience
1923,
89,
85
Board,
A.M.C.,
Tanjore,
144-5;
1923-6,
72,
Venkatachalam
ence,
125,
79,
130
Chetti,
132;
C.V.
contests
1934 elections, 161-2; Leader Madras legislature Congress Party, 105,
{
5
252 107-8,
111
Kumararaja
Venkatagiri, 187
Venkatappa Chetti,
Aiyar,
Venkatarama
Sastri,
44, 48
Venkataramana
66
T.V.,
29,
T.R.,
Iyengar,
44, 87, 93
of,
S.C.,
Venkatarama
Vijayaraghavachari,
Justice Party, 20, 156-9, 176 Zetland, Lord, 177
109
C.V.,
C.,
82;
and Nationalist leadership, 28-9, 32, 39; Congress president, 48, 87; leader of Salem Extremists, 17, 25-6, 37; obeys council
boycott,
43
Village officers, 133
Virudhunagar,
15, 121,
144
Volunteers, 120-2, corps, 51-2, 84
Wadia,
B.P.,
Wales,
23,
Prince
of,
137,
29,
143;
68
73-4
Weavers, 66, 127-9, 184 Westlake, A.R.C., 179
Williams, C.F.V., Willingdon, Lord, 73,
95,
157;
117, 135 67, 70,
appoints
non-Brahmin ministry, 56-60, 62, 94; critical
of Government ‘of India's
handling of non-cooperation 63, 71; uses Justice Party against non-cooperation,
60-1, 99, 131, 136, 176-7
Working
class,
see also
Young
India,
179; Viceroy,
1-2,
Labour
4,
184;
137
Zamindars, 13, 58, 119, 185; and Congress, 18, 103, 123,
132, 147, 161, 177-8; and
107,
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