The Congress in Tamilnad : nationalist politics in South India, 1919-1937 9780908070008, 0908070004

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THE CONGRESS TAMILNAD

IN

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY MONOGRAPHS

ON SOUTH

ASIA NO -1

General Editors : Professor D. A . Low , Vice - Chancellor of the Australian National University . Canberra Professor Peter Reeves , Department of Modern History . University of Western Australia Dr. Robin Jeffrey , Research School of Pacific Studies , Australian National University

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY MONOGRAPHS ON SOUTH ASIA NO - 1

THE CONGRESS TAMILNAD Nationalist Politics

in South India

,

1919 -1937

DAVID ARNOLD Social Sciences Research Fellow The Flinders University of South Australia

MANOHAR

IN

DS

184 A

75

The Volumes in this series are published in India by Manohar Book Service and in Australia by the South Asian History Section of the Australian National University , Canberia

ISBN O 908070

© David Arnold

00 4

1977

First Published 1977

Published by Ramesh C . Jain for Manohar Book Service

2. Ansari Road , Darya

Ganj

Delhi - 110002 Printed at Pearl Offset Press 5 / 33 Kirti Nagar , Industrial Area New Delhi - 110015 New

1221662

-234

CONTENTS

Page INTRODUCTION

i NATIONALIST

AND

REGIONAL POLITICS EXPERIMENT

2

THE

NON - COOPERATION

3

THE

SWARAJISTS

4

CONFRONTATION

113

5

COALESCENCE

141

6

RAPPROCHEMENT

175

References

191

Bibliography

223

Biographical Notes Glossary

232 238

Index

239

Maps :

1 2

Tables :

1 2

3

'

DI

The

LEMMA

Madras Presidency

The Tamil Districts Madras Presidency Madras

,

1930

of the

Legislative Council

Party Composition of the Madras Legislature , 1923 Party Composition of the Madras Legislature , 1926

102

INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking , the anti - colonial movements of this cen tury developed in one of two directions . Either they utilized the institutional structure created by the colonial regime to achieve self - government , or they worked outside that structure , attempting to overthrow the regime from without rather than succeeding it from within . In the case of the first the anti - colonial struggle was generally

constitutional and non - violent ; of the second it was almost invariably violent . The ideology of the former inclined towards western - style liberalism and democracy ; the latter towards a revolutionary nationalist and / or socialist creed . anti - colonial struggle

was not a duel in which the leaders were free to decide the weapons with which to fight . The choice between a constitutional or an armed struggle was The

the socio - political environment , in which one crucial factor was the degree of resistance staged by the colonial regime to its would -be successors . the regime relatively large and increasing indigenous par allowed a ticipation in higher education , local government , the bureaucracy and other colonial institutions , after a few clashes between demonstrators and the police the regime made concessions rather than face a major confrontation , then the need to resort to violence was minimized , even eliminated altogether . If the colonial regime suppressed political protest , it outlawed anti - colonial parties and news papers , then the regime ' s critics had either to submit or resort to secret and revolutionary means by which to over throw a system they could not penetrate . determined

by

If

if

if

this respect the same basic pattern can be seen in the anti - colonial movements that influenced the class struggles of Western industrial societies . Where the emer ging proletariat was able to establish itself within the existing political structure without a head - on collision with the ruling classes , class conflict has been generally In

muted and working - class politics have had a acter . Where the demands of the proletariat

reformist

char

have been met

by

ruling - class intransigence

class politics

militancy

and

state repression , working have been thrust in the direction of greater ideology . a more revolutionary and

During the anti - colonial movement leadership was usual ly drawn from the professional middle class , but the at titudes of the middle classes as a whole were ambiguous , even contradictory . On the one hand they favoured a loosen ing of colonial authority and exploitation which would en able their own interests to flourish and ultimately they sought control of the economic and political resources of the state : in this regard the middle class was the vanguard of the anti - colonial movement . On the other hand the emergence of the national bourgeoisie was intimately related to the changes that resulted from colonialism . The colonial state was a major employer of the professional middle class ; business companies from the colonizing country employed local clerks , agents and merchants . Further , the ideology of the national bourgeoisie was heavily impregnated with the ideology of the colonizing power ' s bourgeoisie , whose style of life and values it widely imitated . Under an intransigent colonial regime at least some sections of the middle classes might favour revolutionary methods if they found their attempts to penetrate the state structure persistently blocked . To achieve power in the long term they might gamble with their immediate economic and social assets and ally with even the most under privileged social strata . In a relatively open colonial situation the middle classes proceeded more cautiously . " 'Mass demonstrations " and the creation of a " mass party " were often necessary to answer allegations that the nation alist movement was not representative of anyone other than the middle classes , and they were at times essential to ex ploit opportunities created by an expanding electoral system . hips were loath to share power with But middle - class leaderships were

if

doing so . they could loauid Why workers and peasants avoid doing soich might should they start an avalanche of mass unrest which might destroy them as well as the colonizers ?

Colonial regimes did not voluntarily

surrender the economic advantage – there was overwhelming compulsion or ultimate gain in doing so . An intransigent regime reasoned that any con cessions to the anti - colonial forces would irredeemably regime damage its power and prestige . A less intransigent

assets unless

they

valued most

–

authority

and

learned through experience that its survival ultimately de not on repression and coercion but on the collabor ation of influential sections of the indigenous population ,

pended

judicious combination of force and persuasion . Unless economic and social conditions were peculiarly static , collaboration could never be a once - and - for - all settlement with a class or dominant social group . In res ponse to a changing distribution of wealth and the erosion of the authority of the pre - colonial rulers , with the emer

or

a

gence

of

colonial

tifying

disintegration

of old ones , the regime periodically reassessed its position , iden opponents and seeking out new collaborators . new In new

classes

and

the

the later stages of colonial rule the supply of collaborat ors was often running low . A new assessment of the situ ation might reveal to the colonial authorities that its own armed forces , police and bureaucracy were no longer filled with reliable collaborators , and that decolonization might be preferable to a costly and bloody attempt to retain for mal control with repressive legislation and foreign troops . On

occasions , that reassessment was

made

in

a

belated

real

ization that the foundations were already crumbling beneath the colonial superstructure ; more often , it was based upon shrewd calculations of the political and economic benefits of granting independence ( rather than allowing it to be snatched at gun - point ) and of retaining close ties with the colonial territory . Neo - colonialism was seldom an after thought . In India the anti - colonial movement was , in essence , of the non - violent , constitutional variety.. In some parts of the sub - continent terrorism was intermittently important and the threat of terrorism was a factor determining the poli cies of both the nationalists and the British rulers , but it was not a fundamental characteristic of the struggle . In Tamilnad , the region of south India on which this study focusses , terrorism played very little part in shaping the

of

anti - colonial movement . Satyagraha , the distinctive form of non - violent re sistance which Gandhi introduced into the Indian nationalist struggle , was an attempt to avoid all forms of violent con flict with the British Raj and yet so to harass and isolate the colonial regime that it would either collapse for want nature

and

course

the

of

the

.

the

constitutionalism of of the copt terrorist m eschewing their violence ; it aimed

mili and

.

Indian supporters and collaborators , or be persuaded to Satya come to terms with the Indian National Congress . Congress graha was an attempt to adopt the militancy and anti

guerilla while

be as uncompromising as the men of violent means towards the institutional struc ture of the colonial state . It failed on two counts . ly , although designed tɔ by - pass India ' s colonial to

First

institutions , especially

the

central and provincial

legis

latures , satyagraha in time became a device by which the Congress attempted to win constitutional objectives and to secure a place for itself within the British -made admin istrative structure . This was not what Gandhi himself wanted , but since a rival or " parallel " government could only be established and sustained within India by the use of force , he gave his supporters no real alternative but to return at some point of time to constitutional politics under regime . Secondly , to be successful , satyagraha a colonial technique as a of anti - colonialism had to transcend class divisions : it had to unite the middle classes and the masses . But the middle classes were jealous of their own powers and privileges ( gained from a relatively responsive colonial regime ) and suspicious of the rural and urban work ers . Gandhi ' s early essays in mass satyagraha ( 1919 and 1921 - 22 ) revealed the mass violence that accompanied civil disobedience even when it was tried on a limited scale : the political campaigns also failed to achieve their avowed objectives . Despite the gradual expansion of the Congress party , direction of the anti - colonial movement remained in middle - class hands , though with increasing assistance from industrialists , rural landlords and rich peasants . The dominance of the propertied classes within the Congress checked the agitational potential of satyagraha and tugged the movement away from

tionalism .

direct action

It also facilitated

and

back

to

constitu

eventual attainment of an and the Raj . Experience of anti - colonial agitation before Gandhi ' s rise to Congress leadership at the end of the First World War , gave the British in India a range of techniques with agreement

between

the

the Congress

to counter satyagraha . Repression of all violent and seditious aspects of the agitation was one response , but was employed with caution for fear of upsetting the delicate balance between coercion and collaboration on which the British had built their Indian empire . Two other techniques were preferred in the long term . One was to create and pat ronize groups of loyalists who could be relied on to help the Raj and oppose the Congress . The aim was not very sepoys by the English East ferent from the recruitment of fight , Company India to its battles but the rewards were now more likely to be a share of government power and patronage than a mercenary ' s wage . The aim was to play off particular groups , interest whether defined in class , religious or , against caste terms the Congress in the hope of defeating which

it

dif

the latter . The other technique was not to try to destroy Congress the but to convert it . By the later stages of colonial rule in India it was no longer practical for Vice roys , Governors and senior civil servants to think of elim inating the Congress . It was powerful and , within the limits of the political arena demarcated by agitation and elections , it was popular . Therefore , Congressmen had to be bullied and tempted away from the non - cooperation and civil disobedience into which Gandhi had led them and shepherded back to the institutions of colonial rule where the British could keep an eye on them . story

of the

Tamilnad from 1919 to 1937 has two essential themes . One is the evolution of the Tamil Congress as a regional political party . This is a success story . From being a small political club in 1919 , with little active support outside the predominantly Brahmin pro fessional middle class , by 1937 the party commanded a power ful organization , experienced in both agitational and elec toral technique , and was firmly established as the region ' s dominant party . In 1919 - 23 the party was deeply divided along ideological , strategic and factional lines ; it seemed unable to respond effectively to the serious threat posed by the rise of the anti - Brahmin and loyalist Justice Party . By the mid - 1930s , however , the Justice Party was in rapid de cline and the landslide victory of the Congress in the 1937 The

Congress

in

provincial elections marked both the virtual extinction of the Justice Party and the triumph of the Congress as a broad -based and relatively cohesive coalition of diverse political interests . There were , of course , limits to the

party - building . The Congress in Tamilnad did not become a mass party in terms of its membership or com mitment ; it was predominantly a party of the propertied classes . But within the bounds of regional politics at the time , the Tamil Congress held a remarkable ascendancy . success of

its

is

the changing relationship between a Under Gandhi ' s a colonial regime . nationalist movement leadership the Congress attempted to win independence through non - cooperation and civil disobedience , aiming rectly at the authority and collaboration on which the Raj depended and by - passing the institutional structure . This strategy failed . Congress leaders , especially C . Raja gopalachari , Gandhi ' s principal lieutenant in Tamilnad , were hampered by factionalism within the party and by a fear , The second

theme

and

di

prevalent among Congressmen and the propertied classes gen erally , that civil disobedience might unintentionally trig ger a social revolution . British rule proved stronger than

6

anticipated , and they were largely un able to divert attention away from the reformed provincial

many

Gandhians

legislature . ( identified ,

had

As

an

alternative strategy

, some

nationalists

, with the Swarajya Party ) tried to follow non - cooperation from within the legislatures . This , too , proved ineffective , mainly because the national Con the main

in

the acceptance of ministerial office Having failed to expel the British or to create a rival government , and having failed to topple the Raj through the legislatures , the Congress evolved a com promise strategy . During the civil disobedience campaigns of 1930 - 33 , the party built up a large - scale organization and a fund of public sympathy which it was able to turn to advantage in electoral contests from 1934 to 1937 . But hay ing by these means ousted the Justice Party , the Congress leadership in Tamilnad realized that in order to consolidate its gains , to exclude its rivals and to satisfy the demands of the electorate it would have to compromise with the British to the extent of taking office under the constitu tion created by the Government of India Act of 1935 . gress leadership

by

its

partymen

opposed

.

of the late colonial situation in Tamilnad (and the argument is no less true for the Madras Presidency as a whole ) was that the Congress was both the most power ful opponent of the British and their most promising ally . Although from the early 1920s until the mid - 1930s the Gov ernors of Madras had relied on the Justicites to operate the constitutional system created by the 1919 Government of India Act , close association with the colonial regime left The

paradox

the Justice Party too feeble tive role under the new , and

to continue to play a suppor demanding , 1935 Act . to the Raj -- especially its ex more

Through its very opposition periments with non - cooperation and civil disobedience – the Congress had developed the organization and popular backing necessary to make a success of the new constitution . The British had no particular affection for the Congress , but since they could not ignore its agitational and electoral successes , they tried to turn them to advantage . Provided that the Congress played constitutional politics , the British were prepared to entrust a substantial degree of power to their erstwhile opponent . A malevolent Congress rampaging outside the constitutional tent might bring down the whole structure . A Congress in office , burdened by ministerial responsibility , at odds with its own radicals and extremists , and feeding on governmental power and pat ronage , might be the best guarantee against a violent , re volutionary end to British rule in India .

independence The terms and the date on which Indian would be achieved were , of course , undetermined when the Congress took office in Madras in 1937 . Swaraj ( self government ) was 10 years away . But by that date the Con gress leadership in Madras , and especially Rajagopalachari from Tamilnad , had reached an informal understanding with the provincial representatives of the Raj which foreshadowed

still

a

peaceful

and

understanding

constitutional transfer of

was to be

a

vital

ization of other British Asian

power .

Such

an

stage , too , in the decolon

and

African territories after

al

the Second World War . There , too , independence followed , most invariably , from the conversion of militant nationalist opponents to constitutional collaborators and successors . It was the British style of decolonization , so easily paro died , so effectively executed . In some of the later per formances of the decolonization story , the fight scenes looked rather amateurish . A weak nationalist punch seemed to have a disproportionate effect on the colonial regime . Perhaps it was ( to change imagery ) like Pavlov ' s unfortunate dogs : colonial governments had been conditioned to respond . But in India the vital prelude to decolonization was not easily reached . It was the outcome of nearly two decades of political experimentation by both the Congress and the Raj . This , then , is not a study of nationalist ideas and sentiments , nor does it attempt to probe the politics of the localities , though necessarily in a discussion of the evo lution of the Congress in the 1920s and 1930s there are points at which these aspects of political life impinge upon the central themes . The concern here is with the practical difficulties which nationalist politicians faced in their attempts to gain independence for India – the ways in which they sought to overcome rival parties ; the techniques and strategies they adopted to combat colonial rule ; the con sequences which the nature of the struggle had upon ' the organization and character of the nationalist party . And , in a broader context , this monograph seeks to present the story of the Congress in Tamilnad as a case - study of how nationalist parties evolved during the later stages of col onialism . As such , it relates not only to India but also to many of the other countries of Asia , Africa and America which in the recent past have experienced European colonial

rule

.

GANJAM

R

VIZAGAPATAM

2

Mais

Ayele

DEN

I

BOMBAY

E S

EAST GODAVARY UKISTNA GUNTUR GUNTUR

WEST GODAVARY WESAVARY

KURNOOL

BELLAR

1

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RF

as NORTH ARCOT

( FI )

,

100

0

(:

S

RAMNAD NAMNAO INNEVELL

TRAVANCORE

100

100

PUDUKKOTTAIN

O

COCHINTI

Presidency

.

The Madras

[8 ]

.

Map

1

CEYLON

300

Princely states

MADURA

kilometres 200

,

DIMBATORETRICHINOPOL TCOIMBATORES TAICHINOPOLY KARIKAL TANJORE

200

V

PONDICHERRY PONDICHERRY

)(F

SOUTH ARCOT

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( )Fr

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BAY OF

NELLORE ANANTAPUR CUDDAPAH

(

Poona

miles

CHAPTER

NATIONALIST

AND

1

REGIONAL

POLITICS

The Tamil Country

has been described as " a country , almost a nation , Although primarily defined in cultural terms , on its own . " as the land of the Tamil - speaking people , Tamilnad ' s geo graphical location in the south - eastern corner of the Indian sub - continent has enabled it to develop and maintain a dis tinctive cultural character . To the east lies the Bay of Bengal ; to the west and north -west an upland rim divides the Tamil country from Kerala and the Deccan . Within the Tamilnad

region ' s

50

, 000 square miles diversity is muted , and there

is a gradual transition from the low - lying Coromandel cuast to the dry interior plateaux . One impression prevails : an region palms arid of scattered and outcrops of grey and tawny rock , relieved by the occasional flash of vivid green rice fields and the glimpse of an ornate temple pagoda . For a century eighteenth century

and

a

until

half Indian

–

the end independence

from

of in

the 1947

-

Tamilnad was part of the Madras Presidency . A sprawling , polyglot province , Madras incorporated Malabar and South Canara on the west coast and parts of the Telugu , Kannada and Oriya linguistic regions to the north . But the Tamil dis

tricts

were the dominant element in the presidency : they con a third of the land area and half the population 21 million out of nearly 43 million in 1921 . Tamilnad was more urban than its regional neighbours : there were 175 officially classified cities and towns in the Tamil region in 1921 compared to 111 in the Telugu districts and nine in Malabar ; 15 . 5 per cent of Tamils lived in urban areas com pared to 10 . 6 of Telugus and 7 . 2 of Malayalis . 2 By 1931 nine of the 15 largest towns and cities in the presidency were located in Tamilnad , including the four most populous – Madras (647 , 230 ) , Madura ( 182 , 018 ) , Trichinopoly ( 142 , 843 ) , and Salem ( 102 , 179 ) . Calicut , Malabar ' s expanding port , , was the nearest rival with a population of 99 , 273 in ; Telugus 1931 the ' Cocan ada lagged far behind with

stituted

10

65 , 952 . 3 Tamilnad was further distinguished from its neigh bours , in that , unlike the other linguistic regions of the Dravidian south , almost the whole of the Tamil - speaking area

one administration . Kerala was partitioned between princely the states of Travancore and Cochin and the Malabar

was under

district of

the Madras

Presidency ;

Andhra

was

split

between

British Madras and princely Hyderabad ; Karnataka was torn By contrast , only between Madras , Bombay and Mysore state .

the small Tamil population in the French enclaves of Pondicherry and Karikal on the east coast , in the state of Pudukkottai , and in southern Travancore lay outside the presidency . Thus , the Tamil districts of the province con

stituted a relatively compact and homogeneous linguistic block , and they correspond closely to the state of Madras ( renamed Tamilnad or Tamil Nadu in 1969 ) which was formed by the reorganization of India ' s states on linguistic lines in 1956 .

Distinctive remained

though

throughout the

the Tamil region was , it nonetheless colonial period an integral part of

British province of Madras . From 1920 Tamil Congressmen their own " Provincial " Congress Committee , but they

the had

could not ignore political developments which affected the presidency as a whole . In particular , Tamilnad ' s Congress men in the provincial Legislative Council had to work along side partymen and allies from the other linguistic regions

of

the presidency .

most

This was a frequent source of friction , Tamil and Telugu Congressmen .

noticeably between

Despite Telugu claims to the contrary Madras was pre dominantly a Tamil city . In British hands since 1639 ,

it

less rapidly than Calcutta and Bombay . A more leisurely city , it was akin to an English marginally influenced by the industrial county town only , revolution rather than to a London , Manchester or Sheffield . Since the 1870s , the decade in which the harbour was built and the first cotton mill established , Madras had developed

had grown far modest , more

commercial and industrial centre , but in the 1920s much of the city had a semi - rural appearance and only , in the north -west around the railway workshops and textile mills , did Madras show the grim face of early industrial as

a

ization

still

.

No other city in Tamilnad was as large or as varied as Madras , but , unlike Calcutta , it was not an urban colossus which dwarfed every other town in the presidency . Tamilnad could boast of more than half - a - dozen substantial towns , most of which had been and commercial centres

administrative , religious , educational under pre - British regimes and which

- - - - District

boundary

Princely states 50

0

100

200 kilometres

150

miles

50

CHITTOOR

MADRAS

Bangalore

MYSORE

) Vellore Vellore Gudiyatame ( CHINGLEPUT

n

Conjeéveram

Vaniyambadi

· NORTH

Ootacamund

Chingleput . ARCOT

Tiruvannamalaio

divannam

SALEM PONDICHERRY

NILGIRIS A.

Salem

COIMBATORE

. Calicut

SOUTH

-,--

Tiruchengody

-

Erode

MALABAR

ARCOT alcuddalore

TRICHINOPOLY

Tiruppur

Srirangam Iric chinopoly bac '

Coimbatore

Kumbakonam • KARIKAL

Tanjore

5

Dindigul

:

COCHINI

' MADURA

R

Bodirayakanur

Mannargudi

Negapetam

TANJON

TANJORES Vedaranniyam

J

MaduraLo Virudhunagar

,- - TRAVANCORE

RAMNAD

• Rajapalaiyam

/

TINNEVELLY Tinnevelly Palamcottah

• Tuticorin /

CEYLON

** Cape Comorin

Map

2

.

The

[ 11 ]

Tamil

country

.

had survived as district or taluk headquarters under the new rulers . Madura and Trichinopoly in particular were the rivals of Madras , and during the 1920s and 1930s their rivalry found expression in the contest between Congress factions in the presidency town and the mofussil ( up - country districts ) .

great majority of Tamils lived not in the towns and cities on the land . The basis of economic activity in the region was overwhelmingly agricultural , with rural popu lation densities greatest in the irrigated river valleys , especially the delta of the Cauvery . The presidency as a whole had an average density of 329 people per square mile The

, but

in 1931 , but in Tanjore , the district which covered most of the Cauvery delta , the average density was over 600 , and in other eastern districts with extensive river irrigation the figure rose above 400 in many taluks . “ Rice was the princi pal crop grown on these " wet " lands : in 1922 - 23 , for example , 47 per cent of the total cultivated area of Tanjore was under rice . 5 Intensive cultivation on this scale was only possible through river irrigation . Except for a narrow coastal strip , which received over 40 inches of rain a year , Tamilnad had to subsist on a rainfall of between 20 and 40 inches , con centrated mainly in the monsoon months . In the dry interior

agriculture

was assisted by tank and well irrigation : tobacco , sugar - cane , chillies , and long - staple cotton were grown . Elsewhere , on the unirrigated lands , cultivators produced millets (the principal food - grain of poorer Tamils ) , groundnuts , and oil - seeds . In the western districts of extensively Tamilnad cattle were used for drawing water from deep wells and ploughing the heavy soils : hides and skins were a major export item and the basis for tanning works in Erode and around Madras city . Direct European involvement in agricultural production was confined to the tea and cof fee estates of the Nilgiri and Anaimalai hills .

Small landholders predominated in Tamilnad . Before the was seldom regarded as individual prop erty and a marketable commodity , but as being under the collective control of the village community . In some areas , especially the rice lands of Tanjore , Trichinopoly and the north - east , there were leading villagers , known as mirasdars , with hereditary land rights , and these sometimes controlled agricultural production over hundreds , even thousands , of acres . Less extensive , but also involving hereditary rights , were lands held by inamdars . These were generally small plots of land given by local rulers as rewards for services : inamdars were most frequently Brahmins and were usually

British period , land

13

regarded as holding land for their religious institutions rather than as individuals . The British did not eliminate these pre - existing land rights , but over most of Tamilnad they promoted the individual ryot to become the landholder , responsible solely to the government for his land taxes . '

No more than a quarter of the land area of the Madras Presidency was under the zamindari system , by which large

landed proprietors were established as intermediaries be tween the ryots and the government with rights of tax collection on their own estates . The zamindari tracts were to be found mainly in the northern Telugu districts , but there was a smaller belt of zamindaris in Tamilnad running from North Arcot and Salem to Madura and Tinnevelly . In beginning each of these districts at the of the twentieth century there were upwards of a million acres under zamindars .

ryotwari system undoubtedly moulded the region ' s and social character . The zamindars of Tamilnad , unlike their counterparts in Bengal , the United Provinces , or even Andhra , were too few in number and commanded too little influence in rural society to provide a solid prop for the British regime or to be valuable intermediaries be tween the colonial administration and the cultivators . It was the tax - paying ryots on whose tolerance , collaboration and self - interest the Madras government depended in Tamilnad . important – a factor of increasing im They were numerically portance with the progressive expansion of the franchise in the twentieth century ; they constituted a social stratum through which the British could hope to regulate rural life ; century , the wealthy ryots and , from the late nineteenth The

political

were extending their range of economic activity as wealth derived from cash - crop production , marketing and money lending was invested in western - education , enabling a new generation to enter urban professions and the bureaucracy . It was largely because of this diversification that non Brahmins from rural agrarian and trading castes came into conflict with the Brahmins .

Politics

and

ICT Social Conflict

steps towards nationalist agitation in Tamilnad were taken by the non - Brahmin merchants of Madras city . In the mid - nineteenth century the proselytizing activities of Christian missionaries , aided by government officials , aroused the religious indignation of the Hindu merchants . In 1842 Pachaiyappa ' s College was founded in Madras under merchant patronage to provide an alternative to The

first

the 1844

educational institutions of the missionaries ; and in G . Lakshmanarasu Chetti , a Telugu merchant , launched

to defend " the rights and privileges the Hindu community . " 10 The merchants had an additional grievance : they disliked the existing powers of the East

the Crescent newspaper

of

India Company and , with the renewal of the Company ' s charter in the offing , they sought to pressure Parliament to remove its unfavourable features . In response to suggestions from the British Indian Association in Calcutta , Madras merchants formed a local branch of the association in February 1852 , replacing it six months later by an independent body , the Madras Native Association . It aimed to amend the Company charter , revise the taxation system , and curb missionary activity . The association was active for 10 years , but with the transfer of British India from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858 , one of the main grievances of the associ ation was removed and by July 1862 it had become " practi cally defunct " . "

early political leadership of the Madras merchants did not continue . Being in the presidency town , with some knowledge of the English language , and close to the centre of provincial administration , the merchants were well placed to voice protests against the government . But the merchant community was , at this stage , heavily dependent on European controlled trade and European business houses in the city . Compradors , lacking an independent economic base , they were not sufficiently independent and confident to mount a more serious and sustained challenge to the British . Further , the city merchants had neither a sufficiently attractive cause nor the organizational base to mobilize wider support for the Madras Native Association . A smaller commercial and industrial centre than Calcutta and Bombay , Madras lagged behind them in producing an Indian commercial middle class which could provide nationalist leadership . It was , therefore , the professional middle class which took the lead in organizing an anti - colonial movement in Tamilnad . A region which could boast few merchant princes , industry captains Tamilnad was prolific of and even fewer graduates By output . 1880 the region had 15 arts of in its colleges and 50 high schools ; Madras Presidency was produc ing as many graduates as Bengal , and the majority of them Between 1858 and 1894 Madras University came from Tamilnad . degrees to 1 , 900 Tamil students as against 500 awarded arts Malayalis , 450 Telugus , and 300 Kannarese . Among the Tamils , The

Brahmins

families

predominated , most of them coming in Tanjore , Tinnevelly , Chingleput

from

landholding

and Trichinopoly .

Non - Brahmins constituted of these many were Nairs

only

a

from

the west

fifth of

the

coast .

graduates and As yet high

ranking Tamil non - Brahmins saw little economic and social advantage in having degrees and becoming pen - pushers . 12 There were historical reasons for this communal disparity . A percentage population smaller of the Hindu than in most Indian regions , the Brahmins of Tamilnad wielded economic and

social

power

that was quite disproportionate

to

their

numbers . In the presidency as a whole Brahmins constituted 3 . 3 per cent of Hindus . In Tamilnad their percentage of the population ranged total from one per cent in the Nilgiris to 3 . 7 in Tinnevelly and 6 . 9 in Tanjore , their area of greatest concentration . Ritual supremacy in Hindu society was only one of the bases of Brahmin power in Tamilnad . As the erati of the society they had long been clerks , adminis trators and officials whether the rulers were Tamil kings , Vijayanagar viceroys , or the East India Company . In the villages Brahmins almost invariably held the office of karncom or village accountant , and in appreciation of their religious and secular services they had been awarded land rights as mirasdars and inamdars . In the rice - growing east ern zones generally , and the Cauvery delta in particular , Brahmins were powerful not only by virtue of their priestly authority , but also for their prominence among the landhold ing classes . In western Tamilnad , where Brahmins held they , little land were frequently present as small - town money - lenders and bankers . The position of the Brahmins was exceptional in another respect : they were divorced from the process of agricultural production . Most non - Brahmin ryots were part - time or full - time cultivators , but Tamil Brahmins considered ploughing a ritually polluting act . However small their holdings , they would not the land them selves . They were , therefore , entirely dependent on hired labourers , sub - tenants , and , until the British outlawed formal servitude , untouchable slaves . The Brahmins were free to devote themselves to religion and non - agrarian pur suits ; they could easily become absentee landlords and pur sue careers outside the village community . From the mid nineteenth century Brahmins , particularly those from the Cauvery delta , invested their landed wealth in education , entered urban occupations and gradually sold their land to non -Brahmin ryots .

lit

till

Traditional status , access to landed wealth , generations involvement in the administration , aloofness from culti vation : these factors were together responsible for Brahmin domination of the western - educated , professional middle class forming in Tamilnad from the middle of the

of

16

nineteenth

century .

hegemony was

One

indicator of Brahmin professional

literacy , especially in English , the

key

to

bureaucratic and professional employment . The male vernac ular literacy rate among Tamil Brahmins was recorded as 71 . 5 per cent in the 1921 census as against 59 . 7 for Telugu

Brahmins and 24 . 2 for Vellalas , the leading non - Brahmin caste group in Tamilnad . But male literacy rates in English were even more striking : 28 . 2 for the Tamil Brahmins against Telugu 17 . 4 for the Brahmins and 2 . 4 for the Vellalas . "

The rapid expansion of higher education in the third quarter of the nineteenth century soon created a surplus of graduates . Government service in the presidency and in neighbouring princely states offered the main field for graduate employment , but by the 1870s and 1880s jobs in the bureaucracy were becoming scarce ; the European monopoly of the higher echelons and Indian nepotism made entry for out

siders

even

harder .

Exclusion

from

bureaucratic employment

provoked the frustrated graduates to criticize selection procedures for government service and sharpened their com plaints against officials ' conduct . Graduates sought other occupations : they turned to law , medicine , education , journalism and accountancy , but there , too , they ran head long into conflict with European professionals . In some fields educated Indians had advantages over their European rivals . Brahmin lawyers , equipped with a knowledge of Sanskrit and traditional Hindu law which few Europeans could hope to match , won control of the original side of their profession in the 1880s and were beginning to oust Europeans from the appellate side as well . 16 Thus the second phase of early nationalist agitation in Tamilnad in the 1880s was largely that of an emerging Brahmin professional middle class in conflict with European professionals . This conflict was expressed in various forms : one was sustained Brahmin criticism of European government servants ; another was resentment against European arrogance and racialism . The appointment in 1878 of a Brahmin lawyer , Aiyar , as the first south Indian judge of the T . Muthuswami Madras High Court met with howls of indignation from the local European community . In response a group of Brahmin graduates in Madras city launched their own newspaper , the Hindu , to defend the appointment and , more generally , to voice their political views . 17 Another formative incident was the outbreak of Hindu -Muslim rioting in the town of July and August 1882 . Initially a dispute over the Salem in siting of a new mosque , the dispute quickly developed into a tussle between European officials and Hindu vakils , led by

. Vijayaraghavachari . * Having already encountered arrogance as a teacher in Mangalore , " Vijaya raghavachari was in no mood to tolerate official mishandling of the Salem affair . For his part in the riots he was sen tenced to 10 years ' transportation , but he contested the judgement and eventually secured his release and that of the other accused . " Successful defiance of the Raj made Vijayaraghavachari a hero among the young graduates of C

European

Tamilnad .

It was against this background of mounting tension be tween the energing Indian professional middle class and the Europeans that the Madras Mahajana Sabha was formed in May Although the sabha (association ) claimed to represent 1884 . public opinion in the presidency , its membership was drawn

social base . A large number of founding were from the mofussil with lawyers outnumbering pleader , P . Rangiah Naidu , was one merchants . A non - Brahmin of the sabha ' s first presidents , but inevitably at this date an organization of the western - educated was predominantly Brahmin in composition . The Madras Mahajana Sabha was the provincial forerunner of the Indian National Congress . Dele gates sent by the sabha attended the first meeting of the Congress at Bombay in December 1885 , but the formation of a Provincial Congress Committee (PCC ) for the presidency did not lead to the disbanding of the sabha . In 1894 it was affiliated to the Madras city District Congress Committee ( DCC ) and continued until the 1930s to function as an fluential body complementing the activities of the local from a members

very narrow

in

Congress .

strength

of

the sabha and the Madras PCC in the lay in their ability to express the grievances and opinion of the professional middle class . Public conferences and speech - making were the cautious first steps towards a broader political movement , but it was easier for the western - educated of Madras to identify with their The

period before

social

and

1914

professional counterparts

in

other provinces

of

India than to delve deeply into the grievances of other social groups in their home region . This was especially so for the Brahmins . Because of their religious training and social privileges , Tamil Brahmins carried within themselves an extreme confidence in their own ability to lead and in their authority to speak on behalf of the people as a whole .

Biographical notes on persons marked with the text will be found on pp . 232 - 237 .

an

asterisk in

18

Religious hegemony in Hindu society combined with ship of the exclusive club of the western - educated

inember , the com

and class leadership together , made responsive Brahmins to the appeals of a nationalism which challenged the hold of Europeans on India ' s professional political life , but made it difficult for them to cross social barriers to broaden the base of the Congress .

bination of caste

and

That is not to say that the professional middle class completely was isolated . Tamil Brahmins had contact with the countryside as landholders . Although the cost of west ern education and higher incomes from the professions tempted Brahmin families to sell their lands , few were the Brahmin vakils and government servants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who did not own at least a few acres in the mofussil . A further link between Brahmin law yers and the countryside was through their clients . Land litigation was the most lucrative branch of the legal pro fession in the Madras Presidency , 20 and Brahmin lawyers were brought into frequent contact with zamindars , mirasdars and wealthy ryots . At times they advocated the interests of their landed clients on public platforms as well as in the law courts . By contrast , professionals seldom identified themselves with Indian business interests in their political activities . But , it must be stressed , before 1914 political as opposed to professional links between the urban middle class and the landholders were still very fragile . Support for Congress came from the larger towns and cities ; the organization in the countryside , where it existed at all , was extremely rudimentary .

political leadership

of the Tamil Brahmins before World War was based on their near - monopoly of western education and the professions , backed by their landed wealth and traditional social authority . But the Brahmins ' success in achieving this dominance aroused the envy and hatred of the non - Brahmin communities . By the turn of the century non - Brahmin ryots and traders were beginning to realize the economic and political advantages to be gained by entering the professions ; belatedly they sought to make up for their previous disinterest in western edu cation . But it was not easy for young non - Brahmin graduates to intrude into the already crowded professions ; Brahmin confidence and nepotism contrasted with the non - Brahmins ' lack of influence . For many first generation non - Brahmin vakils it was a hard , often frustrating , experience trying to build up a legal practice against Brahmin rivals . A generation earlier the conflict had been between Europeans and an embryonic Indian professional middle class ; by 1914 a The

the

First

19

new

conflict

was emerging between

professional middle class and the into the professions .

an

established Brahmin

non - Brahmins

seeking

entry

self -defence

the non - Brahmins adopted two tactics . fell back to their own castes , attempting to mobilize them through caste associations . A great number of associations were set up from the 1890s , especially between 1905 and 1930 , a period of rapid social and political change . In

Firstly ,

they

Their aims were to strengthen caste identity through communal organization and mutual assistance ; to foster pride in caste traditions while at the same time improving the caste ' s status and influence by sanskritization21 – raising its ranking in the caste hierarchy – and by modernization , which included

increased

the professions . from

the caste

itional

's

participation

in

western

education

and

drive behind such associations came middle class , sometimes aided by trad

The new

caste heads .

differentiation within

They

sought

to

play

down

internal

caste so as to unite it behind their own leadership . By emphasizing caste identity they tried to create pressure groups which could win from the government educational concessions , public appointments and nomination to local boards and legislatures . The success of the Muslim League in winning separate electorates in the Morley -Minto constitutional reforms of 1909 undoubtedly en couraged the fashion for communal organization . But it was , anyway , natural enough that newcomers to a highly competitive professional world should seek support from their castemen , and should identity ,

the

stress a communal rather than a class or national in order to advance their own positions . 22

response to Brahmin dominance was A second non - Brahmin the formation of a movement designed to fuse the various non -Brahmin communities into a single anti - Brahmin political entity . The non - Brahmin movement took shape in r'ovember 1916 at a meeting in Madras city organized by T . M . Nair , a Malayali physician , P . Tyagaraya Chetti , a Telugu Devanga businessman , and C . Natesa Mudaliar , a Tamil Vellala doctor . sprang the South Indian Liberal From this beginning Federation , better known as the Justice Party , which claimed to represent the interests of non - Brahmins in the pres idency including Muslims , Christians and untouchables . At first the Justice leaders concentrated on pressing their demand for reserved seats in the provincial Legislative Council created by the Government of India Act of 1919 . By determined agitation and persistent lobbying in London and Madras , the Justicites achieved partial success . The party had asked for 40 reserved seats : non - Brahmins were awarded general seats by the decision of 28 of the 65 non - Muhammadan

all

20

an

arbitrator ,

Lord Meston , in March

1920

. 23

section of the pro fessional middle class and the creation of the Justice Party to express its political views ensured that the struggle for power in the Madras Presidency from 1919 to 1937 would be a triangular contest and not a straightforward contest between indigenous middle class and a European colonial power . an Two major sections of the national bourgeoisie were in com petition . And , to further complicate the political lines of force , those sections were in themselves split into competing factions , each seeking pre - eminence or a share of the spoils . The development

of

a

non

- Brahmin

professional middle class was very small – it constituted less than 0 . 5 per cent of the popu lation of the presidency24 – and factional and sectional Numerically , the

competition , as much as outside pressure and a changing electoral set - up , forced middle - class politicians to look outside their own tiny class for allies and support . The Justicites looked to their own castemen in the small towns and villages , and to the leading non - Brahmin zamindars , whose wealth and prestige could help to counter - balance the advan tages the Brahmins enjoyed . The Brahmins were at first uncertain where to turn . Some , the grouping known first as the Moderates and later as the Liberals , faced political extinction because they were unable to adjust to the new political environment and hoped , largely in vain , that the British would help them to survive in gratitude for their loyalty and past services . Others , only a few at first , saw in Gandhi ' s ambitious schemes for mass agitation a possible

alternative

.

Gandhi ' s Quest for

Allies

At the beginning of 1919 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was an outsider to India ' s political establishment . His satyagrahas in South Africa had won him respect and a popu lar reputation for saintliness , but they did not give him an entrée to the highest Congress circles . The death of G . K . Gokhale , whom Gandhi regarded as his mentor , in February 1915 robbed Gandhi of one possible way of rising to all - India leadership . Obliged to follow an independent course , Gandhi ' s three small - scale satyagrahas in 1917 - 18 – at Champaran , Kaira , and Ahmedabad – demonstrated Gandhi ' s i agitational ability and attracted to him a band of disciples , among them Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad , who were to be lieutenants in many subsequent large - scale campaigns . 5

still

But in south India Gandhi had no small - scale saty agrahas to his credit , no disciples , hardly any contact . Gujaratis and Marwaris turned out to see him on his visits to Madras in 1896 , 1915 and 1919 , and were willing enough to make donations when he appealed for them . But they were numerically too few , culturally too foreign , to be of use to Gandhi as allies and organizers in any sort of mass campaign .

Gandhi had contacts , too , among the Moderate section of the Madras Congressmen , partly through his association with Gokhale , who had been the Moderates ' - India leader , and

all

partly through his South African work which had been widely publicized in the presidency through the press , led by the Indian Review , a monthly journal edited by a Tamil Brahmin , Unfortunately for Gandhi , V . S . Srinivasa G . A . Natesan .

Sastri , *

Society

took over as head of the Servants of India the death of Gokhale , its founder , was less than by Gandhi and was relieved when , after the year ' s fixed by Gokhale , Gandhi saved the Society the

who on

impressed

probation

of refusing

him membership by withdrawing his join . Gandhi held Srinivasa Sastri in high esteem as Gokhale ' s heir and a principled man , but it was not 26 a sentiment which Srinivasa Sastri could reciprocate . 26

embarrassment

application

to

Tamil Moderates represented

of Brahmin and endeavour . Lawyers for the most part , they had deeply imbibed the cultural and political values of the British but without abdicating the social ascendancy they enjoyed in Hindu society . Western The

middle - class professional

the peak

political

and the legal profession instilled in them a deep respect for constitutionalism . They occupied seats in the provincial Legislative Council following the Morley -Minto constitutional reforms of 1909 and two of their luminaries , V . Krishnaswami Aiyar and P . S . Sivaswami Aiyar held office as executive councillors in Madras before 1914 . It was not , surprising having therefore , that benefited from collabor ation with the Raj , the Moderates were disinclined to resort to drastic methods to secure further constitutional progress , They and to realize their ultimate nationalist goals . believed that political advancement in India would neces sarily be slow because ideas of responsible government and democracy could only gradually percolate down from the

education

western - educated to the masses . The British could only be persuaded to yield power by steady but polite constitutional pressure from the educated , through cooperation not con

frontation .

22

With the declaration by Edwin Montagu , Secretary of State for India , on 20 August 1917 , that British policy would in future be the " increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration , and the gradual development of self - government institutions , with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integ ral part of the British Empire . . . " , 27 the Tamil Moderates looked forward to a new , even more rewarding period of en lightened cooperation with the Raj . Although they carped at some of the more niggardly aspects of the reforms proposed in the report of Montagu and the Viceroy , Lord Chelmsford , published in July 1918 , they made public their willingness to work the dyarchy scheme of hope that at a later date many would be made over to the of the government . 28

split

government , adding a the " reserved " subjects

of ministerial

or

"

transferred

"

half

and close association with the Raj Tamil Moderates strong opponents of Gandhi ' s pro posals for mass agitation against the Rowlatt Act , regress ive legislation which became law in March 1919 . Gandhi wanted to launch an all - India movement against the Act to force its repeal . The Moderates spoke out against the legis

Constitutionalism

made

the

lation

condemned it in an impassioned central Legislative Council , but they would .not be drawn into direct action for fear of so offending the British that the constitutional reforins were withdrawn or

speech

and

Srinivasa Sastri

in the

reduced in scope . With the eternal faith of a liberal , Srinivasa Sastri believed that all possible constitutional tactics should be tried before venturing on a course which seemed to him an invitation to mass violence and anarchy . 29

Despite

Gandhi ' s

praise

for his

stand

in

the

legislature ,

Srinivasa Sastri would not budge 10from the consitutional path . Nor would his associates . 30 To whom

Since

,

then

1914

, could Gandhi turn

Mrs Annie Besant

?

had done more

than anyone

else to enliven the politics of the southern presidency . 1907 , 14 years after following Theosophy to India , Besant was chosen president of the Theosophical Society and moved

In

her headquarters from Benares to Adyar on the southern edge of Madras city . At first eschewing politics , Besant was too fascinated by the exercise of power to neglect them for long ; she was , besides , confident of India ' s capacity for immediate self - government . In September 1916 she formed a Home Rule League to agitate for this objective . 31 Within a year the League had 63 branches in Tamilnad , nearly half of those in , the whole presidency . Sales of New India , fiery and

23

inexpensive , were steadily rising . Then the Madras govern ment intervened . Rudely awakened from its dreams of Indian contentment by the Home Rulers , the provincial administration of Lord Pentland was in no mood to tolerate Besant . When demands for securities for her papers failed to gag her , the Madras government took the rash step of interning Besant and two of her associates , George Arundale , organizing secretary of the Home Rule League , and B . P . Wadia , its treasurer , in June By this move the government unintentionally 1917 . made Besant a national heroine . Sales of New India leaped ahead of other papers in the presidency , and membership of Besant ' s League shot up from 7 , 000 in March 1917 to 27 , 000 in December . 32 Gandhi thought he saw in Besant ' s internment an opportunity for an all - India satyagraha to force the govern ment to release her , and feeling ran high in Madras , though the ever - cautious Srinivasa Sastri advised the Madras PCC not to adopt Gandhi ' s suggestion until constitutional means of winning her release had been exhausted . 33 Before any decision was reached Montagu persuaded the Madras government to set Besant free in September 1917 : he did not want the peevish Lord Pentland to prejudice Indian opinion against the constitutional reforms . Besant ' s popularity on her release from intern ment that she was chosen president of the Calcutta Congress for December 1917 , the last non - Indian to hold the office . But the tide of her popularity was already beginning to ebb . Her experience of internment discouraged Besant from moving on to more intensive agitation and Montagu ' s announcement of Such was

1917 held out the prospect of substantial constitu progress Although she criticized tional in the near future . aspects Montagu some of the - Chelmsford report , it was , , agitation obvious that for Besant must give way to negoti ation . It was now the nationalists ' task to work the re forms and through ministerial control of local government , education and health carry out programs that would materially improve the conditions of the Indian people . Only then , she believed , would nationalists have a convincing case for demanding a further instalment of reforms and these might be won by constitutional tactics – " grievances before supply " on the model of Charles I. ' s Parliament . 34

August

Having initially set her target as Indian Home Rule , Besant ' s support – however qualified – for the Montagu Chelmsford reforms inevitably seemed a betrayal to many Indian nationalists . In August 1918 , at a special confer ence held to discuss the Montagu - Chelmsford report , Besant

24

was attacked for wishing to modify rather than reject the " unworkable " reforms . On both occasions the main attackers were Tamil Brahmins of the Extremist party , especially lawyer . 3 S . Satyamurti , * a 31 year - old Besant , however , " was tenacious and she refused to be pushed out of the Congress . She fought hard to keep her influence in the national and provincial Congress committees , but when the Moderates formed a National Liberal Federation in early 1919 she could no longer occupy central ground within the Congress . She had failed to maintain the Home Rule League as an

alternative vehicle for political agitation after her elect ion to the Congress presidency ;

she had neither the popu nor the organizational support to defy the Extremists from within the Congress . In March 1919 she and her remain ing associates resigned from the Madras PCC . 36 Besant remained a vociferous critic of the Extremists , but she was no longer a power in the provincial organization .

larity

the Rowlatt Act Besant favoured a middle course be tween that proposed by Gandhi and the constitutionalism of opposition only to the Act the Moderates . She advocated , itself and not to other laws and suggested the staging of protest processions , the drafting of petitions , and the formulation of constitutional demands for its repeal . Gandhi spurned her proposals and offended her more by con verting her emissary , the Gujarati Jamnadas Dwarkadas , to his views . ” Besant ' s response was petty . Instead of imple menting her own suggestions she formed a " citizens ' commit tee " at Adyar to assist the police in the " preservation of the public peace " , anticipating that violence would be the inevitable outcome of the satyagraha . 38 Besant and Gandhi , On

still

never close ,

drifted

an

unbridgeable

distance

apart .

Without the Moderates or Besant as allies , Gandhi had no alternative but to turn to the Extremists in seeking support for his Rowlatt satyagraha in the Madras Presidency . While he could respect the Moderates , even when they opposed Through him , Gandhi viewed the Extremists with suspicion . Gokhale Gandhi had been associated with the Moderates and he shared their antipathy to the Extremist party ; as a devout believer in ahimsa he was temperamentally and intellectually opposed to the Extremists ' connections with terrorist groups ; and as an advocate of Hindu -Muslim unity he was distressed by their Hindu militancy . suggests , less con than the Moderates towards British rule in India . They wanted to expel the British , by terrorism and violence feasible ; by passive resistance , especially the boycott The

ciliatory

if

Extremists were , as their

name

25

of British

goods ,

with the Hindu

the Moderates , masses and the

if

they

could not .

Closely associated

revivalist movement , the Extremists , unlike saw religion as a bond that could cement the

opposition to foreign rule . a vernacular rendering of European nationalism : it revived pride in India ' s past and expressed a contempt for western culture and institu tions which might provoke government repression if it were

intellectuals together Militant Hinduism 'was

in

political

rather than religious terms . But the Extremist leaders were as much a part of the western educated middle class as the Moderates , and like the Moderates , the Tamil Extremists were also mainly Brahmins . couched

in

In Tamilnad the

Extremists were less conspicuous

than

sort of revivalist activities and terrorism associated with Bal Gangadhar Tilak in the one and with the anti - partition agi tation of 1905 - 11 in the other . There were two main centres in Maharashtra

of

Extremism

and

in

Bengal

Tamilnad .

they never mounted

and

The

earliest

was Salem

the

where

Vijayaraghavachari , Hindu hero of the anti - Muslim riots of 1882 , built up a school of young nationalists imbued with hostility to British rule . Most of Vijayaraghavachari ' s pupils were Brahmins and lawyers , among them C . Raja gopalachari , * later the leading Gandhian in Tamilnad . The

centre of Extremism was Madras city where constituted what was known as the " Egmore as distinct from the " Mylapore Clique " of the second

the Extremists

Clique "

Moderates .

A

mixed

group

of

Brahmins

and

clique consisted of professionals Moderates ' dominance of the professional Egmore

of Madras .

Although founders

it initially

non - Brahmins , the who resented the

and

political life

included T . M . Nair , later one of the of the Justice Party and C . Sankaran , Malayali , the most prominent Extremists were lawyer Nair a Tamil Brahmins : S . Kasturi Ranga Iyengar , * A . Rangaswami Iyengar , * and T . Rangachari . All three were from families long associated with government service and the legal pro fession . After nine years at Coimbatore as a lawyer , Kasturi Ranga moved to Madras in 1894 in the hope of carving out a successful practice at the High Court . He was soon disappointed by the lack of support he received from the Moderates and drifted into the Egmore clique . In 1905 he broke away from the legal profession to edit the Hindu news paper : under his direction it became the foremost nation alist journal in the presidency , though fear of government censorship and fines moderated the views expressed in editor ials . 39 His nephew , A . Rangaswami Iyengar , followed Kasturi Ranga from law to journalism , becoming editor of the Tamil

paper Swadesamitran

in

director until he took Rangaswami a

Tamil

could thus

writer

and

an

1915

and

charge combine

able

remaining as editor

of the Hindu in several skills :

1928

.

and

renowned

publicist , he had also estab constitutional expert by the

as

lished a reputation as a publication of a study of the Indian constitution . The Tamil Extremists had two grudges . As mo fussil men whether in Salem or newcomers in Madras city , they resented the

political

pre - eminence

of the presidency

capital .

It

was with pride that Vijayaraghavachari ' s disciples thought of Salem as the Poona of the South , seeing it as the Tilakite headquarters of the presidency by contrast with Madras , the home of Moderate politics . And , as outsiders to the power ful Mylapore clique , the Nationalists envied the influence of the Moderates . One faction of the predominantly Brahmin professional middle class was in bitter competition with another . But it was not simply rivalry between " ins " and suggested . " " outs " as is sometimes The Extremists were fired by their own conception of what India ' s nationalist movement should be and , as mofussilites and outsiders , they were encouraged to develop their own political style in con trast to the sedate , English - language constitutionalism of the Moderates . Forced to look outward for support they explored new political territory - vernacular oratory and journalism , militant Hinduism , and , to a lesser degree ,

terrorism .

Although

Tamilnad did not experience terrorism on the and Maharashtra , ripples from the Bengali storm did break the relatively placid surface of Tamil politics in the years of agitation 1905 - 11 . Inspired by the Bengalis ' enthusiasm for swadeshi ( that is , for goods made in one ' s own country ) , a Vellala lawyer in Tuticorin , V . 0 . Chidambaram Pillai , formed a Swadeshi Steam Navigation Company in November 1906 to break the monopoly held by British steamers operating between the port and Colombo . This and Chidambaram ' s part in organizing a strike at a British - owned textile mill in February 1908 , aroused the hostility of local European officials and employers . In

scale of Bengal

March 1908 the magistrate prohibited Chidambaram and his Brahmin associate Subramania Siva from holding public meet ings . They defied the ban , but their arrest on 13 March provoked riots in the towns of Tuticorin and Tinnevelly . Police opened fire to suppress the riots , punitive police were stationed in the district , and Chidambaram and Subramania Siva were given lengthy sentences . Government repression became more severe in 1911 when R . W . Ashe ,

still

Sub -

Collector at Tuticorin

terrorist for his

part

in

in

assassinated by a the swadeshi agitation . 41

1908 , was

crushing

The Tuticorin experience had a lasting effect on the Tamil Extremists too . Government repression drove activists underground or into exile in the French enclave of Pondi cherry , which from 1910 was also the sanctuary of Aurobindo Ghose , the Bengali terrorist whose interests turned increas ingly to Hindu mysticism . Among the exiles were C . Subra mania Bharati , today famous for his Tamil poetry , and V . V . S . Aiyar , also a Tamil writer . Exile , contact with Aurobindo , and bitterness at government repression , intensi fied their nationalist fervour , but it was not until 1919 - 20 that they dared to venture back into British India . Both Bharati and Aiyar entered journalism in Madras , working for Extremist papers , but Bharati died in September 1921 after being trampled on by a temple elephant . 42 Popular though

Bharati became after his death , it was for his command of the Tamil language and for the patriotism expressed in his poetry rather than as a revolutionary ; V . V . S . Aiyar spent the last years of his life running a nationalist school , the Shermadevi Gurukulam , in Tinnevelly district . Terrorism as such did not have a widespread appeal in Tamilnad ; nor did it shake the prevailing faith in constitutionalism . On the contrary , the Tuticorin experience seems to have chastened the Extremists . A . Rangaswami Iyengar and K . V . Rangaswami Iyengar gave financial assistance and encouragement to the exiles , but they shied away from any overt and aggressive action against the Raj , knowing how severely it would be crushed . In this case , as in Besant ' s , repression was

effective in isolating the most menacing opponents of the Raj and driving political activity back into constitutional channels . Repression had its rationale : it was seldom blind revenge .

Although

Tilak was their hero , the Tamil Extremists

first willing

to cooperate with Besant in the Home Rule movement . She was instrumental in persuading the Moderates to allow the return of the Extremists to the Congress in 1915 , nearly eight years after their expulsion following the stormy Surat session of 1907 ; and Tilak ' s own Home Rule League , formed in 1916 , operated mainly in western India . A . Rangaswami Iyengar was for a while one of Besant ' s lieutenants , but the association did not survive 1918 . By the end of that year the Tamil Extremists no longer needed Besant and began to assert their separate identity . Their imediate objective was to capture the Madras PCC ; beyond that they wanted to use the Congress as a base for capturing were

at

the Madras legislature under the Montagu - Chelmsford reforms . Having been in the wilderness after their expulsion from the Congress committees in 1907 - 08 , the Extremists saw mastery of the organization as the prerequisite to nationalist leadership : Tilak ' s and Besant ' s Home Rule Leagues were seen more as pressure groups within the Congress than as rivals to the premier nationalist party . But the Extremists strove uncompromising wing of the image to balance their as the Congress with their desire to participate in the constitu

tional

system .

Tilak ' s solution to this dilemma was to

responsive cooperations , that is to enter the legis , latures but to work the constitution only so long as the British were willing to make concessions to Indian demands for the repeal of repressive legislation and for the con tinuing devolution of power . Thus , the Extremists were juggling with three balls : to be seen to be hostile to the British , to be more extreme in their demands than the Moderates , and yet to prepare the way for their own entry into the legislatures . propose

The

"

Rowlatt Satyagraha satyagraha appeared

to the Tamil Extremists a suitable to shake a defiant fist at the Raj and to contrast their own political stance with that of the Moderates . On 30 January 1919 Kasturi Ranga Iyengar pre sided over a Madras protest meeting against the Rowlatt Act , and on 19 February C . Vijayaraghavachari , egged on by C . Rajagopalachari of Salem , wrote to Gandhi requesting him give presidency to visit the to a lead to the anti - Rowlatt agitation . Gandhi at first refused . 43 Perhaps he had not yet lost hope of converting Srinivasa Sastri and Natesan to satyagraha ; certainly he was suspicious of the Tamil Extremists . But in the absence of other allies in Madras and in his determination to create a co - ordinated national agitation , he finally decided to make a short visit . He arrived in Madras city on 17 March , was met at the railway station by Kasturi Ranga Iyengar , A . Rangaswami Iyengar , and S . Satyamurti , and taken to stay in Kasturi Ranga ' s house . 44 The

Rowlatt way

the Madras PCC was reaching Gandhi involuntarily found him self drawn into the struggle between the Extremists and Besant . On 18 March , the day after Gandhi ' s arrival , Besant resigned from the PCC , taking with her several prominent Home Rulers and Moderates : G . A . Natesan , L . A . Govindaraghava Aiyar , who had been the PCC president for the Moderates and The

a

climax

battle for control of in March

1919 and

29

Rulers alike , B . P . Wadia and C . P . Ramaswami Aiyar , both had been secretaries of the Home Rule League . Ten days later , on 27 March , Kasturi Ranga took over as PCC president with T . Rangachari and T . V . Venkatarama Aiyar as vice - presidents , and Satyamurti as secretary . " While it may be doubted that Gandhi struck a bargain with the Extremists , in return for associating himself with the Extremists he received their support for his satyagraha plans . On 21 and 22 March about 40 city and mofussil Extremists met at Kasturi Ranga ' s house to form a Satyagraha Sabha . Only with difficulty , however , could candidates be found for its executive posts . Gandhi was chosen president with Kasturi Ranga as vice - president and Vijayaraghavachari as secretary . In addition to Extremist reluctance to serve on the committee , there was a reluctance to decide how the sabha should express opposition to the Rowlatt Bills , and Gandhi told the meeting that a plan of action would be sent from Bombay . 46 He then left for a breathless tour of five Tamil towns – Tanjore , Trichinopoly , Madura , Tuticorin and Negapatam ; these towns had the dual advantages of being Extremist centres and readily accessible by rail . On 28 March Gandhi left Madras Home

of

whom

to return to Bombay . Only 120 people in the presidency signed his satyagraha pledge .

had

little

Extremists had more than a week to prepare campaign which Gandhi had directed to begin on 6 April . At the Madras conference Gandhi had suggested that a pro scribed book should be printed and circulated to the saty agrahis in defiance of the law . As newspaper publishers Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and Rangaswami Iyengar were asked if they would undertake the publication . They protested that " they have invested one or two lakhs in their presses and that . . . confiscation would ruin them " . " That idea aban doned , Kasturi Ranga Iyengar ' s contribution to the saty agraha was to produce and distribute copies of an unregis tered newspaper denouncing the Rowlatt Act . The single cyclostyled sheet which appeared was so innocuous that the Madras government took no action against it . 48 More enthusi astic support for Gandhi came from Sowcarpet , the Gujarati quarter of Madras city . At the instigation of Ramjee Kalyanjee , Gandhi ' s Gujarati contact in the city , Gujarati merchants observed a hartal ( suspension of business ) on 6 April , Satyagraha Day . 49 Muslim shopkeepers also res ponded to the call for a hartal . As a result of recent labour disputes and early attempts at union organization , the Extremists were able to bring tramway and textile workers

their

on to ance

The

the streets for demonstrations and to swell the attend at the evening ' s meeting on the beach to an estimated

100 , 000 , one of the largest political gatherings Madras had ever known . The hartal appealed to the educated – students , curiosity , clerks literate traders – whose and sympathy had public meetings ; by newspapers by been aroused the as well as government but the doubted whether the illiterates under stood its purpose and claimed that the organizers had whipped up enthusiasm by spreading wild and exaggerated rumours of the arbitrary powers the government would hold under the Rowlatt Act . 50 No serious disturbances occurred either in the city or in the mofussil where Extremists and Muslims organized demonstrations and public meetings . Interest was 51 confined to the major towns and evaporated after 6 April . " in India the Rowlatt satyagraha took a vio In Bombay , Calcutta and Delhi there were protracted disturbances and police firings . The most explo sive situation developed in the Punjab . By deporting two leading agitators on 10 April the Punjab government unwit tingly provoked mob attacks on the civil lines and railway yards in Amritsar . On 13 April Amritsar ' s military com mander , Brigadier - General Dyer , ordered his troops to fire on a prohibited Congress meeting at the area of waste - ground Bagh . known as Jallianwala No prior warning was given : 379 civilians were killed and about 1 , 200 wounded . The Jallianwala Bagh massacre and the violence in Bombay and Delhi persuaded Gandhi to call off his first attempt at a nation - wide satyagraha on 18 April .

Elsewhere

lent course .

In the Punjab the satyagraha released political and economic tensions which had been building up during and since the war ; in Bombay and Delhi the disturbances were equally a product of underlying discontent whi which owed nothing legislation , to the Rowlatt . In Tamilnad however , the ab amiinaint og sence of violence and the lack of sustained interest , were Lack indicative of the failure of the Extremists to mobilize grievances in the service of the - India agitation . In part this was because of their lack of influence : the city trade unions , for example , were largely under the control of Besant ' s associates , and the Extremists ' connection with . Hindu revivalism gave them no background of cooperation with Muslim agitators . But , more simply , the Extremists were not

all

interested

agraha

was

in a

stimulating mass unrest . For them the saty gesture against the Raj , coinciding convenient

with their takeover of the PCC . The failure of the saty agraha to secure the repeal of the Rowlatt Act did not , therefore , greatly disappoint them . At a meeting of the Madras Satyagraha Sabha , held on 13 July , Kasturi Ranga Iyengar advised it not to commit members to any further

31

action until Gandhi ' s ideas of

non - violence

were

properly

understood by the Indian people . He wanted all talk of satyagraha postponed indefinitely . The meeting reached no decision on this point , but the sabha ceased to function . 53 Educated opinion in the presidency was reported to be swing ing away from satyagraha as a result of violence in Bombay and northern India , 54 and the Extremists did not wish to prolong their association with a movement which might offend the propertied classes , including the voters under the new constitution . It was left to Rajagopalachari to defend satyagraha and Gandhi ' s leadership of the agitation . 55 the satyagraha behind them and with Gandhi himself uncertain about his next move , the Extremists began to prepare for the first elections to the reformed legislatures scheduled for November 1920 . Opposition to the Rowlatt Act was subsumed in a demand for a of rights to be written into the Indian constitution . 56 The main worry of the , , Extremists was however not that they would now appear too moderate , but that they would seem to the voters too radical . Having thrust the tiller in one direction by their involve ment in the Rowlatt satyagraha , it was now necessary to straighten their course by pulling it back towards the other . Significantly , at the end of 1919 they shed the old " Extremist " label and , in common with Tilakites elsewhere , adopted the name " Nationalists " . In their propaganda they repeatedly stated that it was not their intention to boycott or wreck the new constitution . ” To demonstrate their practicality and responsibility the Nationalists in their election manifestos presented a demand for Dominion Status for India as a " full and equal partner in the British Commonwealth " , but paid greater attention to a detailed program of reforms in local government , education , revenue , health and administration – all of which , on paper , would be feasible under the reforms – designed to attract the tax - paying electorate . " With

bill

The Nationalists were also worried that they were enter ing the electoral race with greater handicaps than the Moderates . The public reputation of the Moderates certainly higher through stood and their access to government patron age they could command influential support in the mofussil . Stress on political programs and commitment to party were the Nationalist alternatives to the big names of the Moderates ; and to counteract the influence of their opponents the Nationalists decided to create a new political organ ization . On 8 November 1919 a Nationalist Conference opened in Madras city . Attended by 250 Nationalists , many of them from the mofussil , the conference resolved to form a

32

Nationalist Party with Vijayaraghavachari as president . V . Rangaswami Iyengar

of Trichinopoly as

and

of the three vice - presidents . " Resolutions were passed for the formation of local committees and for intensive electioneering , but the party was - born because after the Amritsar session of the Congress at the end of December 1919 the Nationalists were fairly securely in control of the PCCs and DCCs and so did not need to create an alternative organization . Iyengar and Satyamurti toured Tamilnad in the A . Rangaswami first three months of 1920 injecting into the previously languid election campaign a vehemence which alarmed the sedate Moderates . Srinivasa Sastri , howled down on several occasions for his Moderate views and for his reluctance to speak in Tamil , was indignant at the " Satyamurthi Midlothian " while Satyamurti , whose vernacular oratory evoked warm enthusiasm in many mofussil meetings , boasted of having addressed 90 , 000 people and to have started or revived eight taluk committees April 1920 the Nationalists By in his four - week tour . 60 firmly seemed to be in command , but their ascendency was to K

one

still

be

A

shortlived .

Just

and

Religious Doctrine

At the annual session of the Congress held at Amritsar in December 1919 C . R . Das of Bengal proposed a resolution condemning the reforms as " inadequate , unsatisfactory and disappointing " and calling for " full Responsible Government " At Gandhi ' s request , the Das resolution was amended : as far as possible the Congress would work the reforms so as to secure the " early establishment of full Responsible Govern ment" . The Tamil Nationalists interpreted this as endorse ment for their ambitions to enter the legislature and to 61 follow tactics of " responsive co - operation " . At Amritsar Gandhi ' s was the voice of caution and accom

But though he appeared to favour constitutional was waiting to see how the situation would develop , waiting for an opportunity to cancel out the failure of the Rowlatt Satyagraha , waiting for a chance to elbow his way to the front of the Congress leadership . 62 By June 1920 Gandhi had found two suitable grievances on which to base a new satyagraha campaign .

modation .

participation , he

The first of these related to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre . n May 1920 an enquiry commission under Lord Hunter , appointed by the Government of India to investigate events in the Punjab , reported that the province had been in open rebellion in April 1919 and that , even though martial

unnecessarily protracted

law had been

and harsh ,

its intro

threat to the Raj . 63 The conclusions of the Hunter Report contrasted with those of an enquiry committee appointed by the All - India Congress duction

had

Committee with the

been

( AICC )

of

justified by in

June

1919

the grave

, 64

and

they presented Gandhi

A moral issue in which he delighted . , , magnitude be tolerated " he wrote " cannot of this '' scandal by the nation , it is to preserve its self - respect and partner in the Empire " . 65 a free become

sort

if

Since the issue was the Khilafat grievance . closing phases of the war India ' s Muslims had been perturbed by the prospect of Allied dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire . As Caliph of Islam , the Sultan of Turkey was revered by Indian Muslims , and through pressure on the Government of India and the British Cabinet they hoped to prevent the Empire ' s dissolution . Gandhi saw the advantages of harness ing the Khilafat grievance to the Punjab . Despite their suspicions of the Hindus , the Khilafat Muslims needed Hindu cooperation to make their agitation sufficiently threatening for the Cabinet to respond . Hindu - Muslim unity was an essential element in Gandhi ' s nationalism . By allying with the Muslim leaders he could not only bind the two religious communities together in opposition to the British ; he could also restrain Muslim inclinations towards a holy – and violent – war and induce them to follow non - violent resist Furthermore , since the Khilafat movement was directed ance . could be at the solution of a problem outside India , hoped that Hindus would not be alarmed by it as a threat to their own interests and security . The publication of the Allied peace proposals on 14 May 1920 confirmed the fears of the Muslims : the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered . The signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920 gave Gandhi the Islamic cause he wanted . 66 Now it was for him to demon strate that he would weld the Khilafat and Punjab grievances into one coordinated campaign . He proposed a program of non - cooperation leading to mass civil disobedience . Arguing that the Khilafat and Punjab demonstrated the immoral and " hopelessly indifferent " tude of the Raj to the welfare of the Indian people , Gandhi said that it was the moral duty of Indians to withdraw their cooperation from the regime . Non - cooperation was to be carried out by stages . First , there would be resignation of government titles and honorary posts , followed by the boycott of government - sponsored schools , colleges and law courts . The boycott of the new legislatures , first suggested by the Central Khilafat Committee in March , was added to the program by Gandhi at the end of June 1920 . 67 The paralysis of the The second

it

atti

34

government servants ,

was to be achieved by the and troops , and by

police

resignation

civil

of civil

disobedience against unjust laws and the refusal to pay taxes . The no tax campaign would bring agitation to its climax : mass non violent civil disobedience was calculated either to expel the British from India or to force them to heed India ' s Although Gandhi originally suggested this program demands . as the means by which India could obtain satisfaction for the Punjab and Khilafat insults , he later adjusted its objective to swaraj , claiming that his methods were faithfully followed India could be self - governing by the end of 1921 .

if

Gandhi tried to in the minds of many

trolled told

and

non

allay

fears that his program created politicians by emphasizing its con - violent nature . " I want no revolution " , he the

audience on Madras beach on 12 August , " I want ordered progress . . . I want real order to be evolved out of this chaos which is represented to me as order " . 5 Gandhi agreed with his Nationalist critics that the last stages of his program were fraught with danger , but he assured them that mass civil disobedience would not be taken up unless the Central Khilafat Committee was reasonably certain that would " be free from an outbreak of violence on the part of the people " . 03 Gandhi had no desire to re - enact the violent scenes which had accompanied the Rowlatt Satyagraha . an

it

stressed the constructive aspect of his program . Students withdrawn from schools and colleges would be edu cated in " national " institutions ; lawyers who left the courts would set up local arbitration courts to dispense " swadeshi justice to our countrymen " . Although he opposed suggestions boycott goods that a of British should be included in his program , Gandhi called for the substitution of foreign manu factures by swadeshi products , especially khadi (hand - spun , hand - woven cloth ) produced on a charka ( spinning -wheel ) and handloom . ” Gandhi further tried to reassure his critics that non - cooperation was a constitutional and legitimate course of action . He told the Madras beach meeting on 12 August that " non - cooperation is a just and religious doc trine ; it is the inherent right of every human being and it is perfectly constitutional " . ? He

Gandhi had not yet despaired

of winning over the Madras

Nationalists or at least of neutralizing their growing hostility to his leadership . He prefaced his speech on the ,

Madras beach with praise for Tilak , whose death

had occurred he was careful to answer Nationalist 73 isms of his program . 73 But on the issue of the boycott of legislatures the reformed Gandhi refused to compromise . He on

1

August

,

and

critic

cooperation " of Tilak and rejected " responsive for entering the legislatures to obstruct their progress . " I submit " , he wrote in July 1920 , " that in a sense we cooperate by joining even though the object is obstruction . Most institutions , and a British council most of all , thrive upon obstruction " . 74 Participation in the dismissed

the

any scheme

legislatures in any form would make the Nationalists the unwilling instruments of injustice ' ; and Gandhi contempt uously dismissed the argument that , because the Liberals would ignore the boycott , the Nationalists would have to contest the elections to prevent their opponents winning seats . A complete boycott of the legislatures had become "

August

1920

the central

item

of

Gandhi '

s

program .

And

it

by was

over the Council boycott , more than any other aspect of non cooperation , that the Madras Nationalists differed from Gandhi . As he aptly commented after his Madras visit , the Nationalists in the presidency " do not want to sacrifice anything at all . They expect to gain everything by speeches and resolutions " . " Preoccupied with their struggle against the Liberals , the Nationalists did not wish to weaken the Congress on the eve of the elections by entering a vituperative argument with Gandhi . But the council boycott issue threatened their am bitions so directly that they could not allow his program to be adopted unmodified by the Congress . Their objective was , therefore , not to oppose non - cooperation in its entirety , but to dilute it and delay its implementation . Only the most extreme provocation would have driven the Madras Nationalists from their predilection for consitutional action , and , despite the Punjab events and the Hunter Report , they did not feel that such provocation had been given . Dis cussing the effectiveness of non - cooperation at a special meeting of the Madras PCC on 15 August 1920 , Kasturi Ranga Iyengar claimed that was " possible to bring such moral pressure to bear upon the Government that we can get all thał we want by having a majority of Nationalists in the Legis lative Council " . Even if constitutional pressures failed to elicit a favourable response from the British , he and other Nationalists would only approve the gradual implementation of non - cooperation , halting before each new step was taken to ensure that it had popular support and to gauge its impact on the Government . In the background was the fear that the nationalist movement strayed too far from the constitutional path , mass violence and anarchy would follow . " Gandhi wanted to rush them into a mass campaign for which they were not prepared either in terms of organization or of willing ness to share power with other social groups .

it

if

36

' s program as it stood was a threat to identity of the western - educated profess

Moreover , Gandhi

the

life - style

and

ional middle class . Themselves the products of government schools and colleges , the Madras Nationalists could not accept the educational boycott as a " practical proposition " nor one which would materially advance the nationalist cause . " The boycotts of law courts and government service were equally unacceptable . Lawyers , the Nationalists argued , served the public and were instrumental in giving justice to the people . They were not , as Gandhi claimed , de facto servants of the government . 79 For men who had been moulded by western edu cation , who derived their livelihood from the very institu tions of British rule which Gandhi now sought to undermine , non - cooperation on these lines was anathema . Instead , the

agitation .

Nationalists

They wanted

partition agitation

15

a

favoured a more restricted campaign which , like the Bengal

years

earlier , focussed

swadeshi

on

and the boycott of foreign goods . 80 Such a course offered several advantages : it would threaten British economic interests ; it would win the support of India ' s growing com mercial and industrial middle class hit by the post -war recession ; it could provide opportunities for mass demon strations without the dangers of uncontrollable mass upheaval implicit in civil disobedience ; it could be promoted , among other ways , through action in the central and provincial legislatures ; and , not least in importance , it would not involve an attack on the occupations and privileges of the professional middle class . Control of the provincial legis lature was an essential concomitant of the swadeshi campaign . The provisions of the new constitution , although far from

granting

provincial

autonomy , allowed

for progress

in

the

" nation - building " departments . It would , the Nationalists claimed , be foolish to throw away such unprecedented opport

allow them to fall into their opponents ' hands . 91 They would endorse a program of non - cooperation , but it would be their own version of it , not Gandhi ' s .

unities

Gandhi ' s

and

to

Men

In the middle months of 1920 , while the Nationalist leadership in Madras debated the non - cooperation program , a pro -Gandhi party was beginning to crystallize in Tamilnad . Its central figure was C . Rajagopalachari ; behind him were a

Nationalist splinter

Muslims .

group

and

part

of

the

region

' s Khilafat

37

Chakravarti Rajagopalachari was born in 1879 in Salem district . His father , a Brahmin karnam , is reported to have owned 50 acres of wet and dry lands . 82 From 1900 to 1919 Rajagopalachari had a moderately successful law practice in Salem town and for two years , 1917 to 1919 , he was chairman of the municipal council . As a lawyer he made contacts among the lawyers , businessmen and leading landholders of western Tamilnad , contacts that were to be invaluable in later decades in giving Rajagopalachari a local political base . Until 1919 his career was unremarkable . Unlike most of those who became Gandhi ' s lieutenants , Rajagopalachari had neither travelled nor studied in the West : he did not leave India until after Independence . His reception of western ideas and social practices was always restricted by a dogged , but not uncritical , attachment to the religion of his caste . He was

a

Hindu

nationalist

as much as an

Tilak was the hero of his youth ,

militant brand of

Hindu

Indian admiration

and

was deepened

nationalism

nationalist . for Tilak ' s by

Rajagopalachari ' s membership of the circle of Brahmin intel lectuals headed by Vijayaraghavachari in Salem . At the Surat Congress in December 1907 Rajagopalachari , then in his late twenties , sided with the Extremists and until about 1912 he believed that India ' s independence would probably not be achieved without a violent struggle . 83 The image of Tilak as uncompromising , , began the hero however to tarnish and Rajagopalachari started to doubt that one day terrorism and insurrection would drive the British from India . Faith in Tilak did not completely disappear until early 1920 , but it was steadily eclipsed by the appeal of Gandhi . Gandhi 84 appeared resolute ; Tilak to be wavering . 34 In 1919 Rajagopalachari decided to move to Madras city to practise at the High Court . The recent death of his wife made it easier for him to leave Salem and it may also have contributed to his restlessness . But there were other reasons for the move : he could hope to advance profession ally more rapidly in the presidency capital than in a mo fussil town ; he was eager to be nearer the centre of the

political

stage , and

Kasturi

Ranga

Iyengar encouraged

him

to

also be that Rajagopalachari had made him self too unpopular during his term as municipal chairman , especially among the Brahmins , 86 to hope for a successful do

so .

"

political

It

may

career

in

Salem

Rajagopalachari took Perhaps , like Kasturi

.

little

However ,

once in Madras , in his law practice .

interest Iyengar

a

quarter of

about for

a

suitable role ,

Ranga

a

century

earlier , he found it difficult to move into the city ' s over crowded legal profession . Instead , he devoted himself to

politics .

He was

casting

a

cause

38

that would absorb his intellectual energies . He dabbled in labour agitation but never showed any deep sympathy for workers ' aspirations and rights . He showed greater interest in the Nationalists ' propaganda work , organizing the Nation

alist

conference in November press in their defence . 87

1919

and

writing letters

to the

Why , then , did Rajagopalachari leave the Nationalists to follow Gandhi ? Firstly , Rajagopalachari sincerely believed in the efficacy of satyagraha , which appeared to him (on the basis of Gandhi ' s work in South Africa and in India ) as a more practical technique for achieving India ' s nationalist objectives than either constitutionalism or terrorism . 88 Secondly , he was attracted by Gandhi ' s spiritual approach to politics . The moral zeal that Gandhi injected into his campaigns appealed to Rajagopalachari , a Brahmin intellectual in search of a worthy cause . There was a strong conservative , traditionalist trait in Rajagopalachari ' s personality . Where . as many other Nationalists shuddered at Gandhi ' s rejection of western society and institutions , Rajagopalachari ' s response Rajagopalachari described in a newspaper was sympathetic . May article in 1921 what he saw as the moral and political bankruptcy of the West . It was , he said , in India ' s interest to free itself from this degeneration . Non - cooperation " is not a mere political device to wrest reform but an urgent necessity if we at all desire to live when the West is drift ing into social anarchy . To depend for order and Government on the West is nothing but death to us . . . " 89

Ambition , as well as irtellectual conviction , played a part . In Madras city Rajagopalachari could only be a junior partner in the Nationalists ' firm , and he chafed at their political caution and their preoccupation with the legis lature . On the other hand , Gandhi , deserted by the Moderates and Nationalists in turn , desperately needed a loyal lieuten ant in Tamilnad . By opting for Gandhi when all the estab lished politicians were against him , Rajagopalachari had a unique opportunity to assume a central position in the poli tics of Tamilnad . By temperament Rajagopalachari was reserved , and Gandhi noted his " innate shyness " in their first meetings

in Madras in April 1919 . 90 Other writers have commented that he was " too much of an intellectual to be a popular leader " and that he preferred decision - making from behind the scenes to public leadership . ” For such a man power would not come from popular acclaim , but from association with a cause or a personality . In time Rajagopalachari might have established himself among the Nationalists as their éminence grise , but he was impatient and Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti were

39

likely future leaders of the party . Alliance with Gandhi offered Rajagopalachari a chance to strike out on his own in Tamilnad , but with the advantage of links with Gandhi' s supporters elsewhere in India . was a gamble , but for Rajagopalachari , an outsider , not a desperate one .

more

It

still

more clearly than many other Nationalists the challenge posed by the rise of the Justice Party . The Nationalists hoped that the non Again ,

Rajagopalachari

may have

seen

Brahmins would ally with them against the Liberals and con sequently underestimated the danger of an exclusively non Brahmin ministry in office . However , in February 1920 Rajagopalachari put in a plea that the non - Brahmin - Brahmin problem be solved by Brahmins conceding to the non - Brahmins all their demands for reserved seats in the Madras legis

lature .

Goodwill between the communities

be of greater

importance than

characteristically

"

absolute

would , he

justice " . 92

asserted ,

It

was

Gandhian solution , which Gandhi later approved , but it also expressed the doubts which he and his close friend T . S . S . Rajan * were beginning to have about the Nationalists ' prospects of winning the election to the pro

vincial legislature

and

the importance

of

developing

a

political

outside the constitutional arenas . 93 The inclusion of the council boycott in Gandhi ' s non - cooperation program did not , therefore , alarm Rajagopalachari , but seemed an appropri ate way of barring Brahmin Congressmen from contesting the elections ( thereby lessening communal tension in the pres idency ) and an opportunity to extend the range of nationalist work

activity . Finally

Rajagopalachari ' s political contacts were more with the mofussil than with Madras city . Under the Moderates and the Extremists the city ruled the Congress in Tamilnad . Many mofussil politicians resented this and felt excluded from party decision making . As a mofussil man , Rajagopala exploit chari was able to the conflict between the mofussil and the city politicians . In addition to his professional and social contacts in western Tamilnad , he had two valuable , Rajan surgeon in Trichinopoly associates in T . S . S . a Brahmin whom he had known for several years , and A . Vaidyanatha Aiyar , a Madura lawyer with whom he had closely cooperated in the defence of the Home Rule agitator P . Varadarajulu Naidu * on trial for sedition in 1918 . 94 As organizing secretary of the Nationalist Conference in November 1919 , Rajagopalachari had been able to draw together a large number of mofussil Nationalists . Vijayaraghavachari , the most ob vious candidate for a mofussil Nationalist leader , was too cautious , too unsympathetic to Gandhi , to part from the Madras city leaders . The way was open for Rajagopalachari to ,

40

lead

a

mofussil

breakaway .

Once Gandhi began to explain his non - cooperation program on program detail , Rajagopalachari was also able to to attract some able , i support in Madras city Nationalists ' stronghold , as well the Nationa city the as in the the mofussil . It came from a small group of law stu mofussi in dents and young lawyers ( themselves from the mofussil) who

in

,

,

They had banded together to form a League of Youth in 1918 . had disliked the over - cautious politics of the Moderates , but found the Nationalists even less to their liking . The Nationalists were " insincere and . . .merely vociferous " and they indulged in " mock heroics " ; the Moderates , " though far too weak , were , in our opinion , honest " . 95 Until Gandhi ' s visit to Madras in August 1920 the League of Youth members were sceptical of non cooperation . " is after 30 years , , hard effort " warned K . Santhanam * a law graduate , that " our educated men have got the courage even to speak boldly and at once to ask thein to sacrifice their health and position is to meet with a well deserved rebuff . Mr Gandhi must face facts before he launches his movement " . 96 But after discuss ions with Gandhi the League members were converted : they left their careers to become full - time activists . 97 In addition to K . Santhanam , the group included K . Subramaniam , N . S . Varadachari and K . V . Rajagopalan ( three Tamil , Brahmins ) the Vellala S . Ramanathan , * and G . V . Krupanidhi . They were Rajagopalachari ' s most loyal co - workers in the early 1920s .

It

all

all

of

the mofussil Nationalists and a handful in Madras city were not support enough for Rajagopalachari to redirect the Congress in Tamilnad wards non - cooperation . For that purpose he sought the assist ance of the Khilafat Muslims .

of

But young

a

section

intellectuals

to

Although the Muslims constituted only seven per cent of presidency the ' s population and only about half that per centage in Tamilnad , and though they were deeply divided between Urdu and Tamil - speakers , a vocal Khilafat movement had developed in the region by August 1920 . 98 The Muslims were split into three political factions , the origins of which dated back to the beginning of the century , but were intensified by the Khilafat issue . A loyalist group , centred around the Prince of Arcot , had opposed the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress and the Muslim League ( which form

ulated a joint constitutional demand ) and formed a short lived rival to the Muslim League in Madras in November 1917 . enduring role was played by Muhammad Usman , a relative A more of the Prince of Arcot , who entered the Madras Legislative Council in 1920 and was the main Muslim spokesman in the

.

41

Justice Party . 99 consisted of Urdu

group

second

A

and

Tamil - speaking

Its central figure

merchants

was Yakub Madras branch of the Muslim in 1908 and had been one of the architects of the Lucknow Pact . Born at Nagpur , educated at the Muhammadan Anglo -Oriental College at Aligarh , and married to a Turkish wife , Hasan had important ties with the wider Islamic world . But he firmly believed that , as a minority community , India ' s Hasan , League

and businessmen . who had helped to found

*

a

100

Muslims had to balance communal demands and practical co operation with the predominantly Hindu Congress . Himself

several of the city wealth traders many whom were goaded into support of the Khilafat movement less by concern for the Turkish sultan fate than the post war contraction of the piece goods skin and leather trades 101 Among them were Moosa Sait Abdul Hakim and Jamal Muhammad 102 As the movement financiers Tamilnad they had the largest say general they favoured its local organization and course s

'

-

.

a

in

in

.

,

,

's

in

C

-

, , .

's

by

,

a

violent

than

.

more vocal

by

of

was backed businessmen and Hasan

,

merchant iest Muslim

as

.

' to s

of

,

Urdu newspaper Qaumi Report Sharar was as bitterly dainful Hasan collaboration with the Congress

an

it

-

,

a

-

,

.

The third Muslim faction was the most fanatical Almost entirely composed of Urdu speaking Muslims was led by Abdul Majid Sharar fierce Pan Islamist and editor of

dis

of

the

to

-

,

-

if a

Madras

city

and

from

young students

at

Muslims

by

)

of ,

(

.

,

.

In

or

to

in

on

'

.

loyalty the Raj He questioned whether Muslims could rely Hindu sincerity the Khilafat issue and urged the Muslims act assertively whether the Hindus followed not his speeches and journalism he asserted that the Khilafat was life and death question for Muslims and im plied that necessary force would be used defend the faith 103 His supporters were the residue of the old Muslim elite of intellectuals and maulvis religious teachers and though he received some backing from the poorer scholars Arcots

educated ,

-

For

Khilafat

Day

he

in

to

At

.

1919

in

during the war

Rajagopalachari undertook organize Hindu Tamilnad 105 Khilafat meetings Tamilnad

17

Turkey

.

sympathy with

October support

on

,

a

in

.

.

,

+ 04

.

to

a

.

Aligarh The latter had been fired Pan Islam but for the old elite the appeal of the Khilafat was as romantic quest regain its former prestige and power Some were renowned 104 politicians practical scholars but few were Rajagopalachari assiduously cultivated Muslim cooperation with the Congress over the Khilafat At the Madras Provincial August 1919 he moved Conference resolution for the re lease of the Ali brothers imprisoned for their declared

supported Hasan and the moderate merchants , encouraging them to cooperate with the Congress and isolating the Sharar faction . By May 1920 Hasan and his associates , with Raja gopalachari behind them , were in control of the provincial

Khilafat committee , and Sharar , who president , resigned in a huff . 106 The Madras

government

was no

had

doubt

hoped

to be chosen

correct in calling

the presidency " a backwater of the ( Khilafat ] agitation " . " 0 Except ili North Arcot which had a large urban Muslim popu lation closely tied to piece - goods and leather trading , the Khilafat committees were as much Hindu enterprises as Muslim . Trichinopoly , among the most active centres in 1920 - 22 , had a Khilafat committee directed by T . S . S . kajan and T . V . Swaminatha Sastri , both of whom were Brahmin friends of Raja gopalachari, assisted by Syed Murtuza Sahib , a maulvi from a long - established land - holding family , and Kaja Mian Rowther , a Tamil Muslim merchant . The moderate Khilafat Muslims and the Khilafat committees gave Rajagopalachari the numerical leverage he needed to displace the Nation and organizational alist leadership . The

Road to Nagpur

The first clash between the Khilafat - Gandhian forces and the Nationalist leadership occurred at the Madras Provincial Conference held at Tinnevelly on 21 to 23 June 1920 . The conference was presided over by S . Srinivasa Iyengar , * a lawyer of princely fortune and mercurial temperament , who had resigned as Advocate - General in February as a protest against government repression . Before his appointment as Advocate - General in 1916 , Srinivasa Iyengar had been more at home in Moderate than Extremist circles , but the Nationalists were eager to add such a celebrity to their numbers . In his presidential address he was critical of the Reform Act , but did not disguise his faith in constitutional progress , nor his abhorrence of non - cooperation which he held was uncon stitutional . 108 Coming from the former Advocate -General , such

a

pronouncement

ing the example

of

was a boon to the Nationalists . Follow the Amritsar Congress , the conference

109

passed a resolution on the unsatisfactory nature of the re forms , but Hasan and Rajagopalachari then moved an additional . resolution calling for non - cooperation on the Khilafat issue . Srinivasa Iyengar and the Nationalists stated their objections to Gandhi ' s program and wanted the resolution postponed , but with the support of the League of Youth and the Khilafat Muslims , whom he had invited to the conference , Rajagopalachari was able to force through the non - cooperation resolution .

43

Undeterred , the

Nationalists refused to be

the

hound by

Tinnevelly resolution and continued their election campaign for the legislatures . When the Madras PCC met on 5 August program , Rajagopalachari ' s con to consider the Gandhian tention that the PCC was already committed to non - cooperation by the Tinnevelly conference was rejected and he had to intro duce a new motion . The PCC postponed its decision to a second meeting on 15 August , and then to a third . Although this gave Gandhi , then touring Tamilnad , time to reply to the Nation alists ' criticism , their opposition did not diminish . The PCC

far

finally

approved

more cautious

and

non - cooperation

gradual

form

on

24

August , but in

than Gandhi proposed

a

and

–

without the council boycott . " 10 The next round of the struggle was decided outside the regional arena when , at the beginning of September 1920 , a Special Congress was called at Calcutta to decide the party ' s

By again using his alliance with on non - cooperation . Khilafat Muslims and organizing his supporters to vote only for their partisans , Rajagopalachari secured the election

stand the

of

non - cooperators as the Madras delegates to the Calcutta Congress to the almost complete exclusion of their opponents . A special train was reported to have taken 200 Khilafat Mus lims from North Arcot , Trichinopoly and Bangalore to the Congress . " The session was a success for Gandhi . With the help of Muslims and of Hindu Congressmen from provinces where prospects in the elections were bleak , 112 Gandhi was able to carry his program in the Subjects Committee , followed by an easier victory in the open session . With the addition of the boycott of foreign goods demanded by the Nationalists and the promise of swaraj within one year , Gandhi ' s non - cooperation was adopted by the Congress on 9 September defeating the amendment moved by B . C . Pal of Bengal and supported by Kasturi Iyengar and Satyamurti to delay the implementation of Ranga the program . Of the Madras delegation , 161 voted for Gandhi ' s

program and 145 voted against ; significantly , 125 of the delegates were Muslims . 113 Rajagopalachari ' s Garidhian ance with the Muslims had again brought results .

pro

alli

In the

surprising

six weeks following the Special Congress three

changes transformed the leadership of the Congress Tamilnad . Firstly , many of the Nationalists withdrew as candidates for the provincial and central legislatures , cluding Vijayaraghavachari and A . Rangaswami Iyengar . " 4 This was accompanied by the resignation of nine leading Nation in

in

from the PCC Executive Committee including Kasturi Iyengar , the president . " 15 Finally , on 19 October , the vacancies on the committee were filled without opposition by the associates of Rajagopalachari . Although a cautiously

alists Ranga

44

. V . Venkatarama Aiyar , was elected the new president , the committee was in practice under the direct presidents , ion of Rajagopalachari and T . S . S . Rajan as vice - presidents Vice with Muslims , the League of Youth group and mofussil Gandhians group and Youth via places occupying the remaining ." he remaining pro -Gandhian

lawyer

,

T

.

-

first sight it

that the Nationalists had surrendered the PCC to the Gandhians , the reverse of the situation in Bengal where the Nationalists under C . R . Das adopted the boycott program rather than yield control of the PCC to Gandhi ' s men . " 7 But the Tamil Nationalists were mere ly making a strategic retreat . The first editorials in Kasturi Ranga Iyengar ' s hindu after the Calcutta Congress were defiant , deploring the non - cooperation decision and claiming that Congressmen were free to run for elect ion . " 18 This view was seconded by such senior mofussil Nation alists as K . V . Rangaswami Iyengar of Trichinopoly and C . V . Iyengar of Coimbatore . "19 But the unexpected Venkataramana Vijayaraghavachari decision of to observe the council boycott by withdrawing his candidacy for the central legislature to preserve Congress unity , impressed Kasturi Ranga and per suaded him to stop his own open attacks . The Nationalists had choose Extremists they experienced after the being herded out of the Surat split the consequences Congress organization they and would prefer tolerate the present program Gandhian for the rather than return indefin itely the wilderness 121 Although eager enter the legislatures they felt that the long term obedience the majority decision of the Congress might be of greater advantage they would not lose their the Nationalists right speak Congressmen nor forfeit the opportunity eventually reconvert the party to their own political creed The Nationalists had been very critical of the re defy official Congress policy and enter the forms and now legislatures would seem betrayal as cynical as that they attributed Besant and the Liberals Further faced with the growing popularity of Gandhi and the absence of Nation alist leader of comparable stature after the death of Tilak they reluctantly accepted Gandhi lead for the present and swing back waited for opinion the Congress con stitutional program The non cooperation decision had been Rajagopalachari forced the Congress at national level had not imposed the Madras PCC his own strength the way amend and eventually reverse the council boy squabbling within the PCC but cott was not seemed cooperating with Nationalists regain other provinces the initiative the national level At

abjectly

appeared

As

to

to

,

a

.

to

in

by

by

.

by

.

-

on

,

it at

, to

it

a

on

So

to

to

. in

'

s

,

a

.

to

a

to

.

to

to

as

:

to

,

in

.

to

,

to

of

.

to

120

still

45

a

to

It

With this objective in view the Nationalists copied Rajagopalachari ' s tactics and packed the elections for the AICC delegates held in Madras on 19 October 1920 . Only Hasan and Rajagopalachari among the non - cooperators were selected . was by then too late reverse the council boycott since the annual Congress met at Nagpur two months after the AICC elections and over month after the council elections had been held For the present that issue was settled But the .

.

still

a

it

a

in

Tamilnad

provincial elections approve the Das

.

Nationalists

in

three years before the next

persuaded the compromise

to

-

a

no

an

of

prospect

.

to

civil

-

. R .

C

,

argued

been

,

had hopes of taming Gandhi and has compromise with Gandhi that Das agreed the Nationalists would back non cooperation and diso experiment but for longer than year 123 bedience as The formation of non Brahmin ministry Madras and the

Nationalists

Congress sessions at Calcutta and Nagpur produced anomalous situation Tamilnad The Gandhians were able take over the PCC but the Nationalists unbeaten were waiting opportunity to return powerful and were attempt implement the enough thwart Rajagopalachari Gandhian program Would they allow non cooperation fair ?

a

to

still

,

,

-

.

trial

's

to

,

an

,

.

in

to an

The

122

-

2

had been

of the Congress

,

the

EXPERIMENT

adopted

as

COOPERATION

-

ooperation

-c

Once non program

NON

THE

CHAPTER

the

official

practical difficulties of im ,

,

of

in

on

.

to

-

?

It

a

to

,

.

to

,

,

.

to

as

in

to

to

up

,

;

of

,

,

.

to

in

cipation

it

came the fore Gandhi wanted mass parti the nationalist movement but paradoxically the program he drafted depended upon the initiative the middle classes for professional men not peasants would give lawyers or government servants have careers and abandon their hope of election the legislatures Only the later stages of the movement after the middle classes had made their sacrifices would the ryot and the defy the Raj trader be invited Grievances against foreign rule the middle classes certainly had and felt but could they be expected risk their power and privileges for movement which might either fail completely or explode into mass revolution was the attitude the middle classes that the fate of non cooperation rested and Tamilnad those classes saw too much be lost by decollab orating with the Raj

plementing

Reorganization

By

Congress

his triumphs at Calcutta and Nagpur Gandhi shifted of the Congress from achieving limited constitu tional objectives by constitutional means the attainment to

the focus

a

a

But

Congress

in

machine

Gandhi required

.

agitational

,

an

platform rather than for more distant goal

a

an

to

.

a

.

-

of swaraj through non cooperation and civil disobedience Such drastic change necessitated the remodelling of the Congress organization For the Moderates it had been suf ficient have informal organization that was national

striving

which

.

-

to

at

could mobilize the masses and which was strong enough the centre restrain and direct agitation along non violent lines -

a

.

do

to

This the Nagpur Congress attempted The Congress full time chief of the national party

President became

47

assisted by the newly created Congress which

was designed to

" meet

Working Committee

,

for a compact and loosely -knit mass movement broad coalition of diver

the need

disciplined executive to direct a which necessarily had to remain a gent elements " . ? To balance the CWC and be a check on its power , the - India Congress Committee was expanded from 181 members in 1920 to 350 in 1921 . At the next level down , the provincial units of the Congress were reorganized , with PCCs based mainly on the linguistic regions of India replac ing the British provinces . In the Madras Presidency , the development of the Andhra movement had already led to the separation of the Telugu districts from the Madras PCC . to But until 1920 some in 1917 . ? form an independent committee Telugus living and working in Madras city and in the southern Telugu districts continued to attach themselves to the old PCC . The effect of the Nagpur reorganization was to confine the Madras committee to the Tamil - speaking region of the presidency and in November 1921 it changed its name to the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee ( TNCC ) . Although the prestige associated with knowledge of English remained in nationalist circles , the creation of linguistic provinces for the Con gress in south India acknowledged the rapidly increasing use of the vernaculars for political discussion . Gandhi had opposed the creation of a separate Andhra PCC in 1916 and his changed attitude must have been a consequence of his

All

realization of the potential of vernacular propaganda as well

as a concern for such politically " backward " regions of · India as Gujarat , Bihar and Andhra , and the contempt for the English - speaking politicians in the presidency towns . '

Beneath the PCCs the Congress was to consist of a series committees from the district level down to the village and urban ward branches . These would be the primary cells , whose members would pay an annual ' subscription of four annas . The various levels of the party were linked by election : DCC members were elected by the town and taluk committees which had been elected by members of the local sabhas . This gave a democratic appearance to the working of the Congress . In theory its senior officials at the provincial and national level were chosen by indirect election from the base of the party pyramid . In theory , too , the creation of village and urban ward committees gave the Congress a mass base and a mass following . But should not be assumed that reality matched intention . The Nagpur Congress did not create a mass party overnight as historians have often been tempted to assume . “ What the Nagpur Congress actually did was to pre pare a blueprint for the future growth of the party , but was many years , at least , in Tamilnad , before the lower levels

of

it

it

48

of

the projected organization were established . ate effect of Nagpur was to strengthen the upper and provincial committees By weak and fragmentary .

The

immedi

levels

the

–

while leaving the lower linking levels national and region closely , Congress al bodies more Gandhi was able to give the greater party leadership central control over agitation and propaganda in the provinces . But in Tamilnad better navi gation from the bridge was not matched by more powerful pro pulsion from the engine room .

central

The

–

reorganization of the Congress

eral issues over which the Gandhians

and

one of the sev the Nationalists

was

clashed during 1921 . Rangaswami Iyengar had been a member of the sub - committee of the Congress , appointed in 1920 to revise the constitution . He , like other Madras Nationalists , wanted to keep the Congress open to those who disagreed with Gandhi ' s ideas and tactics . The Nationalists wished , too , to guarantee position for themselves a in the national leadership by re questing that the Congress give representation in the AICC and PCCs on the basis of " interests " rather than provincial popu lation . In particular , they wanted Madras city to be inde pendent of the PCC , like Bombay , to be a Nationalist bastion safe from Gandhian incursions . The Nationalists were , how minority , ever in a . At the national level it was Gandhi ' s vision of a disciplined mass party which was accepted , not Rangaswami ' s Whig Parliament . At the regional level Raja gopalachari ' s revised constitution gave Madras city only 24

places

Madras 11 out

in

a

PCC

of

820

members :

city ' s representation

of

14

places in

1921

Trichinopoly was given

the AICC was hacked to 4 out of 25 in 1922 . on

down

84

.

from

Even this redistribution of places did not satisfy Rajagopalachari . The elections for the new PCC , scheduled to meet at Trichinopoly at the end of July , were not announced

until

of the month and in some districts and Gandhians clashed over how the elections should be conducted and which candidates were eligible . ? When Nationalist leaders sought to requisition a meeting of the old PCC to ask for the meeting of the new committee to be postponed until the elections could be properly held , Raja the beginning

Nationalists

gopalachari and the PCC President , T . V . Venkatarama Aiyar , dismissed their request on the grounds that the old PCC was already defunct and its members were therefore powerless to requisition or postpone anything . 8 The PCC meeting at Trichinopoly was held as arranged , but it was attended by only 218 of its 820 members . Furious at Rajagopalachari ' s high - handed action and the Trichinopoly " farce " , the Nationalists appealed to the CWC for an investigation into the whole affair . As Congress President C . Vijayaraghavachari

49

was

asked

ignore

to investigate , but Gandhi advised the

his report ,

which

favoured

the

CWC

to

Nationalist associates

and called for a revision of the PCC constitution , because , Gandhi said , there was no time for " academic discussions or legal subtleties . We must think less of office and more of service . " 9 Although they protested against this partisan attitude , the Nationalists reluctantly swallowed their de feat . The Congress was the only home they had and they did not want to become political exiles like the Moderates before them .

the Gandhians further strengthened PCC headquarters from Madras tu Trichinopoly . The official explanation for this move was that Trichinopoly was more central than Madras and more accessible for the mofussil Congressmen who now formed the In

September

1921

their position by shifting the

great majority of to take the

PCC members .

offices

But

it

meetings

was

also

of the

deliberate

a

committee away from the influence of the Nationalists and to keep them under the direction of T . S . S . Rajan and other Gandhian and Khilafat politicians in Trichinopoly . 10 The Tamil Nadu Congress Committee elected in November 1921 reflected the shift in control from Madras to the mofussil , the Nationalists to the representation Gandhians . The Nationalists were not given on the TNCC and only Rangaswami Iyengar found a place among the AICC members . The TNCC members from Madras were relative newcomers – M . Singaravelu Chetti , a lawyer from a fishing caste who had gained prominence by his organizing of hartals and demonstrations in the city since 1919 , and the League of Trichinopoly was strongly represented by both Youth group . Although Gan !hian Hindus and Khilafat Muslims . - known figures were selected as president and vice -president , the by Rajagopalachari and two secretaries , TNCE . was managed move

and

little

Rajan from Trichinopoly and E . V . Ramaswami Naicker * of Erode . In all there were five Muslims in the TNCC , a far higher number than in previous years and a consequence of Raja gopalachari ' s alliance with Yakub Hasan and the moderate Khilafat wing . Brahmins held as many as half the TNCC and AICC places , but the proportion of non - Brahmins was high by comparison with previous PCCs . '

still

was intended to provide agitational for the region . Its members were political act ivists within their districts and were committed to the Gandhian faction . They were chosen to direct and coordinate non - cooperation and civil disobedience . But , as yet , the The committee

leadership

groundwork had not been done . As will be seen shortly , Gandhi ' s program failed to attract many sections of the

Tamil population ,

partly because it did not

make

a

50

their interests

to

sufficiently attractive appeal

and

.

to

to

.

it

ambitions But was also the case that the TNCC was too carry the agitation divided internally the people Gandhians were desperately short of funds The had resigned their places the PCC executive October 1920 and were then squeezed out the leadership regional relinquish party they the but would not their money belonging hold the old committee and amounting some Rs 000 this way they thwarted the Gandhians first attempts to disseminate propaganda against the elections the legislatures the verdict of the Calcutta Congress had hostility not altered Nationalist the boycott At the theostility Nagpur Congress December 1920 the Tilak Swarajya Fund was Tilak established collect money for the non cooperation movement Rajagopalachari was appointed treasurer national basis of the Madras committee formed March 1921 The Nation alists were at first demonstrative their support for the fund several of them sat the committee and promised sizable donations the end June however dull management of drone of dissatisfaction with Rajagopalachari the fund became buzz of persistent criticism not enough was being collected meet the target of six and half lakhs being properly rupees of Rs 650 000 the accounts were not public alarming by audited the Gandhians were the the secrecy with which they surrounded the collection and allocation of funds But the real basis for this criticism was that the they could not control the Tilak Swarajya Nationalists depict the Gandhians as dis Fund themselves were eager incompetent honest and and extol their own honesty and .

The

' to

In

13

.

toto

–

-

in

-

a

,

a

;

)

,

to

if

15

criticism they

were

.

result of the Nationalists

'

As

a

.

integrity

to

,

,

.

;

.

(

to

:

a

's

,

of

By

14

.

:

on

in

.

6

on

.

a

on

to

su

12

to

res

.

,

25

.

to

on

,

of in

of

on

Nationalists

greater responsibility for the management of the collections Tamilnad Direction of the fund passed Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and later Srinivasa Iyengar by November 1921 But the public would contribute little

to

.

:

.

S

to

.

in

allowed

of

as

,

16

.

to

,

in

By

to

.

or a

of

,

to

–

.

it

to

.

's

,

-

,

.

,

only Rs 179 000 had been received Moreover the share the all India fund allotted Tamilnad well as special loans from the CWC for khadi and national education were channelled through Rajagopalachari As Gandhi man he was trusted by the national leadership distribute party funds ways the Nation as he thought fit Much of was spent alists did not approve salaries for national school teachers and lawyers who had left their profession become political workers for propaganda against the legislature the Rajagopalachari gradually use these funds was able attract new recruits for his own band of supporters and personal patronage network within the Tamil establish

Congress

. 17

Gandhians had limited access to the press in . Of the four principal English dailies in 1920 - 21 , three – Mail , Justice and Besant ' s New India – were persist ent , often vociferous , opponents of non - cooperation . The fourth , the Eindu , was the organ of the Nationalists , and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar , having built the sales of his paper up to over 10 , 500 copies by 1920 , would not risk government displeasure and the possible confiscation of his press by too daring an editorial policy . Gandhi had hoped that after the Nagpur Congress the Eindu would swing over to non - cooperation , for it was an extremely influential paper among the western educated in the presidency , but its support was never more The

Tamilnad

than lukewarm . Of the Tamil papers , Rangaswami Iyengar ' s Swadesamitran , with a circulation of 7 , 000 in 1920 , was more openly critical of non - cooperation . A new paper , Tamil Nadu edited by P . Varadarajulu Naidu of Salem from June 1920 , was often enthusiastically pro -Gandhian , but Varadarajulu was as erratic and irrational as Rangaswami was cautious and method ical .

the Gandhians ' point

of view the most promising Desabhaktan . Launched in December 1917 by the non - Brahmin Congressman Tiru . Vi . Kalyanasundara Mudaliar , Desabhaktan attracted to its staff some of the ablest Tamil writers of the day . When V . V . S . Aiyar , the one time terrorist , took over as editor in July 1920 the paper adopted an aggressive nationalist line until September 1921 when the government prosecuted several of the editorial staff of Desabhaktan and Varadarajulu Naidu as editor of Tamil Nadu . 19 In an attempt to break through the Nationalists ' domination of the press , in November 1921 Rajagopalachari contributed Rs . 10 , 000 of Congress money to help finance a new English paper , Swarajya , as a rival to the Hindu . Edited by T . Prakasam , * a Telugu Congress leader , assisted by party activists including members of the League of Youth group , the paper was at first successful ; and , though it could not com mand the expertise and financial resources of the Hindu , Rajagopalachari ' s plans for a Swarajya limped on 1935 . From

vernacular paper

Tamil the

rival

was

till

to Swadesamitran

were abandoned . 20

The organization of volunteer corps was non - cooperation movement with which the

one aspect

Nationalists

of did

not interfere . The Calcutta Congress of September 1920 called for the creation of volunteer corps in the provinces , but in Tamilnad they were not developed until towards the end of 1921 . Students and youths were often recruited on an ad hoc basis to distribute notices of meetings , to carry

52

flags

processions , and to keep order at meetings . They were also extensively used to persuade shopkeepers to observe hartals and to contribute to Congress funds . Singaravelu Chetti in Madras city made effective use of students for this form of party work . The idea of permanent bodies of volunteers , trained and run on semi -military lines , progressed more rapid in

Andhra than in Tamilnad . Guntur formed a corps known as which combined Hindu fanaticism ly

in

Duggirala

Rama

with

Dandu

of

Gopalakrishnayya ( " Rama

's

Army " )

military discipline . 21

regions produced both the Tamil and organizations partly designed volunteer to assist in the anti - liquor agitation which was then gaining momentum , but more especially to serve as the non - violent strike force of In

late

1921

Telugu

civil

disobedience movement . The Telugu Santi Sena strength of 3 , 366 in February Army (" Peace " ) had a nominal ; 1922 the smaller Tamil Tondar Pandai ( " Army of Devotees " ) 1 , 899 : the government believed that both were actually much larger . 22 The TNCC claimed that there were as many as a thousand volunteers enlisted in Tamilnad in January 1922 , including 300 in Madras city , 70 in Madura and 30 in Trichin opoly . 23 But they were never used in a prominent agitational role or used to spread Congress activity into the countryside . When civil disobedience was launched the leaders were quickly the

arrested and , left without guidance , the volunteer corps melted away . Compared to the volunteers of Bombay and Bengal , those in Tamilnad were singularly ineffectual . 24

Khilafat leaders raised their own volunteers . In at the annual conference of the Majlis - al- Ulema at Tanjore a body known as the " Servants of Islam " , comprising from 300 to 500 Muslim youths , was formed to keep order , but it was not retained as a permanent organization . In March 1920 a new corps was formed in Madras city for Khilafat Day : the volunteers were drilled , and they wore military - style khaki uniforms and crescent badges . 25 Other Khilafat corps were set up in Muslim centres like Vaniyambadi , where the volunteers were former students of the Islamia College . 26 The

May

1919

Although

it

has been suggested by

one

historian that

the

reorganization of 1920 - 21 was intended by Gandhi to make the Congress into a " parallel government " with the CWC as a responsible government " , 27 there is no " highly centralized evidence

from

Tamilnad

to

suggest

that Congressmen

agreed

with such an interpretation . Indeed , Rajagopalachari opposed it , saying that " As long as there is a Government running on the basis of violence , we cannot have a parallel Government without counter violence . " 28 It would seem that Rajagopala chari and his associates saw the Congress as a rival with the British Raj for the loyalty of the public , not as an

53

alternative government apparatus . In addition to the moral and practical objection which Rajagopalachari foresaw – that without resort to arms there could not be a " parallel govern

there was a further They did these terms . , , stage worry government not at this about the form of which would be established when the Raj collapsed . They were pre occupied with the immediate struggle and they had an over optimistic belief in the strength of popular nationalism and the vulnerability of the government . Much was , therefore , left to chance , to nationalist sentiment and to oratory rather than careful planning and laborious grassroots organ ization . Measuring themselves against their Moderate , Home Rule and Nationalist predecessors , the Gandhians reckoned themselves pioneers of mass agitation . But , wary of mass participation which they might not be able to control , and jealous of rival middle -class factions , the Gandhians devoted ment "

any administrative sense why Gandhians did not think

in

reason

–

in

their time and energy to a struggle for political survival . Control of the existing organization and assets of the party of more immediate interest and importance than the creation of a mass party or a parallel government .

was

The Good

Ship

" Reforms "

Gandhi had anticipated that the adoption of non cooperation by the Congress would provoke a direct , non violent confrontation between the Indian people and the Raj . In Tamilnad this was not to be the case , and only briefly – late in 1921 – did a confrontation occur . Hampered by the intermittent sniping of the Nationalists from within the Congress , the Gandhians were also frustrated by public in difference and hostility to the movement . A primary cause of this negative response was the greater attraction of the Madras legislature and the accession to ministerial power of the non - Brahmin Justice Party .

failure of the boycott of the Madras legislature was the first and crucial setback for non - cooperation in Tamilnad . The

Calcutta Special Congress was held barely three months before the council elections on 30 November 1920 , leaving Gandhi ' s supporters inadequate time to dissuade electors The

going to the

polls .

Boycott propaganda was patchy : Rajan and toured Trichinopoly , Coimbatore September and Salem districts in and October ; Khilafat and Congress activists were at work in Madras and Trichinopoly town . But the Gandhians had neither the personnel nor the funds to stage a more extensive no - vote campaign . from

Rajagopalachari

54 An easier tactic , demanding fewer party workers and less organization , than asking voters not to poll was appealing to candidates to withdraw , and initially this met with some success . About 24 Nationalists withdrew their candidature for the Madras Legislative Council , but the government was cynical about their motives for doing so , claiming that " the majority of these had little chance of success and some undoubtedly were glad of an opportunity of avoiding the trouble and expense of canvassing an electorate so much larger than any of which they had hitherto had experience . " 29

The speed

appeared – many with no new candidates those withdrawing - suggests that the enlargement of the electorate had created such uncertainty as to who might be elected that most contests were open races with no obvious favourites . Except in the Muslim reserved seats there was no dearth of candidates and in some large , multi -member constituencies like Tanjore an absurdly large

with

better chances

which than

of contestants

number

Party paign .

P.

ran .

labels had little currency in the election cam Tyagaraya Chetti , leader of the Justice Party

. M . Nair ' s death in July 1919 , visited some of the give his party ' s support to a few candid ates who were already running ; and the Telugu K . V . Reddi Naidu conducted a last minute electioneering tour . But the Justicites dici not have an election organization to nominate and canvass for its own candidates . 30 C . Ramalinga Reddi , one of the most promising of the Telugu non - Brahmins , commented on the election that

after Tamil

T

districts to

. . . electoral fights in India are still pre personal and communal . The general politics of press and platform hardly affect the voting . The landlord , the merchant and

dominantly

lawyer have

his tribe him with ism

It

was

their clientele ; and every man has , clan or creed behind him , who follow fidelity . In this medieval sheepish

political conviction

counts for

little . 31

not , therefore , surprising that several politicians

originally intended to sail under the Congress flag switched to neutral colours rather than obey the Congress boycott . S . Srinivasa Iyengar and P . Subbarayan , * Zamindar of Kumaramangalam , were among the Nationalists who ran , while encouragement from Nationalist other candidates received 32 patrons played friends or . 32 The Liberals a surprisingly small part in the elections for the provincial legislature . Sivaswami Aiyar and Srinivasa Sastri were elected to the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State respectively ; who had

55

only Govindaraghava Aiyar of the Liberal leaders constituency for the Madras council .

chose

a

communal loyalties , promises of elected : these counted far more in the 1920 elections than party affiliations . The electors returned , not two or three clearly defined parties , but a political hotch - potch . It is , therefore , misinterpretation of the situation to claim , as Dr Irschick does , that " the Justice Party , which had little or no opposition , carried the day . Out of 98 elected seats ( for the whole presidency ) , Justice members won 63 " . 33 According to one contemporary observer , only 15 MLCs could be clearly identified as having been elected on the Justice ticket . 34 In Tamilnad non - Brahmins won five of the seven non - Muhammadan urban seats , and 19 of the 26 rural seats ( for the composition of the Madras legis lature see Table 1 ) . Since only two urban and 11 rural seats had been reserved for non - Brahmins under Lord Meston ' s arbi tration award in March 1920 , fears of Brahmin monopoly of the

Personal influence ,

reward

if

council proved reduced

the

unjustified .

number

Nationalists withdrew or instead .

The Congress

of Brahmin contestants ,

encouraged expansion But the of the

of multi -member

boycott may have and several Brahmin

non - Brahmins

to stand

electorate and the creation

seats for the first time gave members of the dominant castes as well as businessmen and lawyers from non - Brahmin communities a real opportunity to break Brahmin dominance in the legislature .

rural

Congress boycott

also have contributed to the several non -Muhammadan constituencies . The average poll for the whole presidency was 24 . 9 per cent , but in Madura , Trichinopoly and Salem districts it dropped to between 15 and 16 . 5 per cent ; and in North Arcot it was as low as 13 per cent. 35 But the explanation might lie more in newly the disinterest of the enfranchised than in a positive response to the boycott propaganda of the Congress . Clearer evidence of the impact of the boycott is to be found in the seven Muslim constituencies in Tamilnad . Only three seats were contested and 13 . 7 per cent of electors voted . In the urban constituency of Madura - Trichinopoly - cum - Srirangam 101 out of 1 , 197 (8 . 4 per cent ) of the Muslims cast their votes . " The Government of Madras attributed the low Muslim poll to coercion and intimidation by Khilafat workers . 37 Certainly , Muslim voters , being fewer in number and more concentrated in urban areas than Hindu voters , were more accessible to anti boycott propaganda , and the fate of the Khalif had aroused feelings more intense and more lasting among Muslims than had the Punjab grievance among the Hindus . But the low Muslim The

low

poll

in

may

56

poll in

was

little

All

consolation to the Congress .

the Madras legislature were filled

TABLE

the seats

.

1

Composition of the Madras Legislative Council under the Government of India Act , 1919

Elected :

Non -Muhammadan

Non -Muhammadan

Urban9 Rural

(3

reserved

56

( 25

reserved

non - Brahmins Muhammadan Muhammadan

Urban

Rural

Indian Christians Anglo - Indians Europeans Landholders Commerce and Industry

for

non -Brahmins )

for

)

2

11

Planters University

the Total elected Nominated :

Executive

Officials Others

98

Councillors ov

Total nominated Total

all

29

members

127

In August 1926 the number of nominated MLCs was raised to 34 and the total membership of the legislature to 132 :

Discouraging though the failure of the boycott was to the Tamil Gandhians , it was soon overshadowed by a worse disaster when the Governor , Lord Willingdon , * appointed a ministry exclusively from the non - Brahmin MLCs . As soon as the election results were known ( on December 8 ) , Willingdon invited the Justice leader , Tyagaraya Chetti , to form a ministry . He declined , but on his advice the Governor ap pointed three non -Brahmins : 38 A . Subbarayulu Reddi from

for Education ; P . Ramarayaningar Panagal (who became of * in 1922 ) as Minister for Local Self - Government ; and K . V . Reddi Naidu of Godavari as Minister for Development . With the resignation of Subbarayulu Reddi in April 1920 due to - health , Ramarayaningar took over as Chief Minister without relinquishing his local gov South

Arcot as Minister the Raja

ill

ernment

portfolio .

In choosing all his ministers from the non - Brahmin MLCs Willingdon was not , as one Brahmin writer alleges , 39 motiv ated by anti - Brahmin prejudice or by a wish to play off one community against another . Willingdon , as a newcomer to Madras in 1919 , had been alarmed at the extent of anti

Brahmin sentiment among British officials in the presidency . He blamed them for having egged on the non - Brahmins against the Brahmins in the past . " My job " , he confided to Montagu , " is I ' m sure to try and break this down " . 40 In his first months as Governor , Willingdon despised the non - Brahmin politicians as " certainly the dirtiest , meanest devils I 've ever come across . . . " He thought that reserved seats in the legislature gave them a " most unfair advantage " over the Brahmins . And he was convinced of the ability of several politicians Brahmin and administrators , appointing two of important posts them to under the new constitution Aiyar as Advocate -General and later Law Member C . P . Ramaswami in the Executive Council , and Sir P . Rajagopalachari as President of the Legislative Council . 42

all

Willingdon was prompted to select considerations of a different kind :

- Brahmin ministers he was determined to make a success of the Montagu - Chelmsford reforms in Madras . When Montagu toured India in 1917 , Willingdon , then Governor of Bombay , was almost alone among the heads of provinces to by

non

applaud the Secretary of State ' s proposals . By contrast , Pentland in Madras was rigidly opposed to reform and was alienating all shades of Indian opinion in the presidency 43 with his intransigence . 43 Montagu was eager to switch Willingdon , whom he had known since undergraduate days at governorship to introduce a more Cambridge , to the Madras enlightened and progressive regime . But Willingdon had reservations about the practicality of the reforms . The dyarchy constitution split government business in the pro vince into two unequal parts . Indian ministers chosen from the legislature were given charge of the " nation - building ' departments – local government , education , health , industries and development – but the Executive Council retained ex clusive control of the " reserved " departments – law , police , revenue and finance . Willingdon argued that dyarchy would not work effectively unless the Governor were " a veritable

58

archangel Gabriel " , able to persuade the two halves of his Cabinet to cooperate fully , to share available funds from the common purse fairly between them , and to shoulder joint responsibility in the legislature for decisions agreed upon in the Cabinet . 44 Seeing himself as an imaginative admini strator , attuned to India ' s political aspirations , Willingdon wanted greater financial and executive responsibility to be transferred to the ministers . But he was reconciled to the prospect of introducing the new constitution in Madras by the hope that , after a trial period , the British government would see the desirability of a further devolution of power to the provincial ministries . His overriding objective as Governor was to ensure that in Madras dyarchy , despite its limitations , would be a success .

Willingdon appreciated that dyarchy represented an en new political puzzle . The new legislature could not by be controlled a Governor and officials , manipulating a handful of zamindars and lawyers , as previous councils had been . Its working necessitated loyal ministers backed by an organized body of supporters ; they would have to muster majorities and assist the " reserved " half in carrying legis lation through the council . As a former chief whip in the House of Commons , Willingdon was predisposed by his own

tirely

parliamentary experience to see a cohesive ministerial party , largely obedient to its leaders , as the prerequisite for the By their smooth operation of the dyarchy constitution . hostile criticism of the reforms the Nationalists had shown themselves unfit for the ministerial role , even before the Congress boycott eliminated them . 45 The Liberals were loyal and more reasonable , but they were pompous , posturing in dividuals , not team men . Many of them were , in Willingdon ' s opinion , deficient in courage and resolution . Srinivasa Sastri he described as " weak as water " , and of the Liberals in general he remarked : " they ' ve no guts and won ' t fight the extremist " . 46

for the Madras legislature approached , induced Willingdon to revise his view of the non - Brahmins . " He decided that they were most likely to win the election and that from them could be drawn Justifying his decision the ministerial team he was seeking . to select non - Brahmins as ministers , Willingdon wrote to As the

elections

constitutional necessity

Montagu

on

14

December

1920

:

People are trying here to prove that there are varieties of non - Brahmins , and that they

are not and never will be a solid body as far as voting is concerned in the Council . That

59

point the future must show and I am bound to take facts as they are , that the non Brahmin vote is in the great majority and that they

the

should have

portfolios . 48

ministerial

Justice leaders had been striving for four years to for their party a strong position in the new legis lature . But it was Willingdon ' s assessment of the constitu tional situation created by dyarchy which brought the Justice Party into office in 1920 , not the merits of its case for communal representation or an electoral victory . " After the momentous decision had been taken to appoint non - Brahmin ministers , Willingdon encouraged the non - Brahmin The

secure

the united team that they had not been at the time of election . In March 1921 he appointed three council secretaries to act as ministerial whips , and he urged the non - Brahmins to act as a single party in debates and divis ions . 50 A more compelling reason than Willingdon ' s urging for the non - Brahmins to coalesce into a single party was the patronage at the command of the Minister for Local Self Through his powers to make nominations to local Government . boards and to choose which of them should have elected heads , and through his rights of financial and executive supervision , the minister possessed authority and patronage previously reserved for the district collectors . The Government of Madras spent a large share of its income on the local boards – other provinces were more parsimonious " – and the flow of funds , converted into contracts for public works , jobs in local government agencies , and licences and grants for various private enterprises , offered rich rewards to those who could control it . Local politicians could not ignore the influence which a minister in Madras 20w exercised over their affairs ; and Panagal astutely exploited his position to reward his supporters and penalize his adversaries . The ministry and the council became the focus for rivalries and quests for patronage emanating from the lowest levels of the presidency . Comparing the development in local govern ment in Madras to the spoils system in the United States of America , the Hindu commented that " . . .with a view to streng then its hold on the country the present Ministry has made a deliberate attempt to build up a party for itself in each Board and Municipality by nominating its adherence ( sic ) S2 and looking at each question from the standpoint of party . . . " MLCs to

form

non - Brahmin politicians , tried to use the satisfy the frustrated ambitions of the emer

Concurrently ,

legislature

ging

to

non - Brahmin

middle class

–

that is , to use state power

to oust Brahmins and open up the professions and government patronage for non - Brahmin exploitation . Through resolutions legislature they sought promises in the from the Executive Council that non - Brahmins would be given preference over

in government appointments and promotions . The Communal G . O . (Government Order ) of 16 September 1921 required the heads of all government departments to classify new recruits in terms of the following communal labels : Brahmin , non - Brahmin , Hindu , Indian Christian , Muslim , European , Anglo - Indian . A Second Communal 6 . 0 . followed in August 1922 , stipulating that the communal composition of every department should be published and that communal rotation should apply to promotions as well as to recruitment . In February 1924 the Madras government set up a Staff Select ion Board to supervise appointments on the communal lines laid down in the two G . 0 . s . 53 These innovations satisfied the anti - Brahminism of some ICS officials , but many more were indignant that efficiency and merit should be sacrificed for

Brahmins

First

considerations .

communal

the

"

reserved

ronage

his

"

half of

The

harder the

the government

, the more unsympathetic European

In

in

Justice Party pressed its pursuit of pat

officials

became

.

return for offices and patronage Willingdon exacted He expected the ministers to persuade their party

levy .

and clients to support government measures and actively oppose to the Congress . Although he claimed that his Cabinet was " one happy family " , in practice there was growing tension between the executive councillors and the ministers . The non - Brahmin MLCs might vote as a bloc on communal issues but the ministers and Tyagaraya Chetti were often unable to per suade them to accept responsibility for unpopular measures . 54 But in general Willingdon was satisfied with the support the Executive Council received . Proro guing the legislature in March 1922 at the end of its first session he remarked : " I feel that we may feel that the good ship ' Reforms ' has fairly successfully completed her maiden voyage " , due , he added , to the " loyal and devoted work of the crew " . 55 It was

men

all

characteristic of Willingdon ' s regime that he preferred to rely on the non - Brahmins to " use their influence and authority among the people " 56 and his non - official Publicity Bureau to combat non - cooperation , rather than set up loyalty leagues of

the type sponsored by the Government of the United Provinces . 57 In February 1922 the Governor went so far as to ask the Justice ministers and MLCs to submit the names of Congressmen whom they thought should be prosecuted mass civil disobed ience were launched . 58 More significantly , in late 1921 and early 1922 the ministerial party helped the executive coun cillors to rush through legislation for the quick prosecution

if

punishment of non - cooperators and the instigators of no tax campaigns . ' The importance of this collaboration between the Justice Party and the . Raj extended beyond repressive legislation . As the government observed later : and

of

the most important factors which set to the spread of the ( non - cooperation ] movement was the realization by a large part of the Presidency especially by the non - Brahman One a

limit

majority of the value of the reforms and of their substantial nature when compared with the shadowy benefits of Mr . Gandhi ' s brand of swaraj . 60

Middle - class non - Brahmins saw the legislature as a means by which to further their own ambitions and to improve the eco Through nomic and social position of their castemen . elected and nominated MLCs from such castes as the traditionally low ranking Nadars and Kallars , the government was implored to grant educational concessions , make nominations to local boards , end punitive police taxation , and give special priv ileges for recruitment to government employment . For a diverse range of castes the expansion of the electorate and the unexplored opportunities created by the dyarchy constitu tion made the legislature the focus of personal and communal ambitions . In time individuals and communities became dis

illusioned with their

there was

cooperation

such

was

share

of

the cornucopia .

But

in

of expectation that Gandhi ' s non poor counter - attraction .

1920 - 22

mood

a a

It was no accident that the legislature exercised so powerful a gravitational pull . Montagu had always intended that his constitutional reforms should separate the moderates firstly , by providing the moderates from the extremists : with an attractive consitutional role that would encourage

to cooperate with the British and oppose the extremists ; second ] v , by a judicious use of coercion , which combined with the success of the dyarchy constitutional experiment , would force the extremists to change to constitutional action . stay out of the Council " , he explained to Willingdon " You can February in 1921 , " but when you see the power that the Councils have , will you not very much regret that you are not in it . [ ? ] And the Councils are criticised , will not our answer be easy ; ' Go into the Councils and put them right '. [ ? ] " Rallying the moderates was not a policy of Montagu ' s invent ion : it had earlier inspired the Morley - Minto reforms . But Montagu , with more experience of India than Morley and a more liberal outlook than Minto , was an abler practitioner than his predecessors . Through Montagu them

if

62

it

became one of the basic guidelines India in the 1920s and 1930s .

British policy

of

in

The moral of the council boycott was not lost on the hapless Nationalists in Madras . In some provinces ( such as Bengal ) 63 the councils , deprived of a solid Congress phalanx , began shakily with ministries built on the shifting sands of factional allegiances . The failure of ministers unaided by a party to sustain them in office demonstrated the constitu tional wisdom of Willingdon ' s tactics and reassured Nation alists that the Congress boycott had not been an irreparable disaster . But in Madras Congressmen were confronted with an organized rival firmly ensconced in ministerial office , grow ing fat and waxing powerful on a diet of patronage . This , not Gandhi ' s mirage of swaraj , was the situation with which the regional Congress had to grapple . As Satyamurti and

Rangaswami

Iyengar warned

Until full

in December

Swaraj

1920

is actually

obtained , we

to watch carefully the work of While it is true that these

are bound Councils . councils are almost powerless great

:

good

to

our country

the

for doing any

their

scope

in the

opposite direction , viz . for mischief , is almost unlimited . 64 through Their words reverberate pebble resounding like a down a Towards

the deep

politics of well .

the 1920s

Confrontation

failure of the boycott of the Madras legislature left Gandhi ' s supporters in Tamilnad aimless and dispirited . The

Other aspects of the non - cooperation program had been neg lected before the elections and little was achieved by re turning to them in late 1920 .

Between December 1920 and February 1921 sporadic attempts were made to persuade Hindu students to leave government schools and colleges in Madras and Trichinopoly , but neither students nor their parents responded with enthusiasm . Students who were prepared to obey the boycott complained that " nation al colleges " and suitable national work was not being prov ided for them . In North Arcot a battle ranged for control of the government -assisted Islamia College in Vaniyambadi . The cause of the struggle , which resulted in a 75 per cent drop in student attendance , was a tussle between Yakub Hasan and the College trustees for control of its funds . The non cooperation issue was tacked onto this dispute and was not its cause . 66 By August 1921 the TNCC had allotted money for

63

seven end

of

national schools the year the

, but

number

attendance was small , and by the of students was less than 150 . 67

Hindus surrendered their titles or honorary posts ; were more effective in persuading Muslims to do so . In September and October 1920 the Government of Madras noted several cases of Muslim title - holders being forced by threats of violence and social ostracism to resign their honours . The government did not intervene directiy , but , characteristically , used Muslim government servants to en courage title -holders to resist intimidation . 68 By March 1921 only 51 honorary officers and six title - holders had resigned in the whole presidency . 69 The government was more alarmed at the possibility of disaffection among its own employees , es pecially Muslims in the police and bureaucracy . In March 1920 forbad government servants to attend Khilafat meet ings or in any other way associate themselves with the move ment . The ban brought protests from Abdul Sharar and Khilafat extremists in Madras city , but it seems to have been effective in discouraging open identification with the move ment by government servants . On 2 May 1921 the government sweeping government issued a more order : all servants were expected to repudiate non - cooperation and associate them selves with its suppression . In this respect the Government of Madras demanded more from its employees than the Govern ment of India and other provincial governments thought reas onable . 71 Few

Khilafatists

it

Although Willingdon prided himself on his progressive views and preferred the Justice Party to take the lead in combating non - cooperation in Madras , he was shrill and per sistent in his view that the Government of India must act firmly to crush the movement . Before August 1921 he did not regard the situation in his own province as particularly menacing , but he thought that the central government was being disastrously weak in its dealings with Gandhi , the Ali brothers and other leaders . As a minimum , Willingdon wanted to cordon off the Madras Presidency to prevent the non cooperation from infecting it , but the Government of India permission to extern would not agree to his requests for 12 Congress and Khilafat agitators . 2 Optimistic in his ex pectations for political development in Madras , Willingdon ' s pessimistic view of the all - India prospect was motivated by his own dislike of Gandhi (whom he had first encountered during the Kaira satyagraha while Governor of Bombay ) and by his preoccupation with the success of dyarchy . But he was also influenced by the views of senior civil servants who were products of the pre - reforms Pentland era . Willingdon was remembered in Bombay as having been a pawn in the hands

of the civil servants there , 73 and though in constitutional matters he could set an independent course in Madras , when law and order were at stake he leaned heavily on Sir Lionel Davidson , Home Member of the Executive Council and an ICS officer sympathetic to the non - Brahmin movement , rather than on his principal Indian advisers – Sir P . Rajagopalachari and Sir Muhammad Habibullah – who favoured a more conciliatory approach to non - cooperation . " Until

September 1921 the Madras government was held in by check the Secretary of State and the Government of India . They had two reasons for holding to a policy of restraint . First , Gandhi ' s non - cooperation and promise of swaraj in one year were so wildly impractical that few people would take seriously . It would not become a mass movement unless them provoked Indian opinion by rash repression . government the There must not be a second Jallianwala Bagh . 75 Second , the policy of rallying the moderates and undermining the extrem ists through the constitutional reforms must be given a fair trial . The Government of India explained to the provincial administrations in January 1921 that it hoped

. . . to meet the legitimate demands of the Indian legislature [ in New Delhi ] in new a manner that should do much to ease the situation . The adoption of wholesale repression would be incompatible with this policy and would entirely nullify the heal ing effect which the introduction of the reforms might otherwise be expected to

exercise . 76

succeeding Chelmsford as Viceroy in April 1921 , Lord On Reading reviewed the Government of India ' s policy , but de cided that non - intervention should continue for the present . Willingdon and his ICS advisers deplored the wait - and - see policy , but for the present they could do nothing to alter

it .

In the middle months of 1921 non - cooperation took an un expected turn in Madras . The movement gained a sudden spurt implementation energy , of not from the of Gandhi ' s original program but through the adoption of a new tactic , anti - liquor

agitation .

According

first

to

nationalist accounts ,

central India

the

agitation ,

and spread to spontaneous a move by people up Congress by the common and was then taken the . ” But prohibition was already a live political issue . In Tamilnad the Nationalist and PCC manifestos of 1920 included prohibition in their legislative programs , and the transfer

which

began

in

the south about July

northern

1921 , was

and

purely

65

of the excise portfolio to an Indian minister under dyarchy brought prohibition within the realm of practical politics . Even the Justice Party claimed prohibition was one of its aims , and British officials expressed a lip - sympathy for the idea of temperance . However , the stimulus to the anti - liquor drive seems to have been twofold . Since 1917 liquor prices had risen steeply , outpacing the incomes of labourers and urban workers . In addition , abstinence from alcohol was traditionally a high - caste virtue in Hindu society , and it was one of the aims formulated by caste associations in the first decades of the century . From the Congress viewpoint , the agitation seemed , at least at first , a convenient short cut to mass agitation . anti - liquor agitation was most marked in the mofus In Coimbatore it was led by members of the rural dom inant caste , the Gounders , aided by urban Congressmen . Gounder participation was motivated by a quest for social respectability and by concern among caste leaders at the

sil .

The

sentencing

to death of seven castemen for their part in a drunken brawl and murder in Coimbatore town . V . C . Vellingiri , Gounder one of the founders of the Gounder caste association and an MLC , joined with two Coimbatore Congressmen ,

Naicker , to organ and the which the shops were leased . Caste pan were induced to assist the agitation .

. S . Ramaswami Iyengar and E . V . ize volunteers for the picketing N

annual auctions chayats

by

and headmen

Ramaswami

of liquor shops

Violence and intimidation soon resulted , and local magis trates responded by prohibiting picketing on the grounds that it would lead to breaches of the peace . About a hundred Congressmen and Gounders were arrested for defying the bans during the period

from

September

to December

1921

.

of the Gounders the anti - liquor agitation dovetailed with the social aspiration of an influen tial section of the caste leadership . In other districts the pieces did not interlock so well . In Ramnad and Madura districts temperance activity had long been associated with neatly

In the case

the Nadars whose traditional occupation , toddy - tapping , was being replaced by ritually less polluting and economically more attractive activities like trading and money - lending . Officials feared that the Nadars would make common cause with the Congress . Some Nadars favoured a line - up with the Con gress over prohibition , but they were a minority . The lead ership of the Nadar Mahajana Sabha had already identified itself with the Justice Party and a Nadar had been nominated to the Madras legislature to represent the caste . The Nadar leadership , unlike that of the Gounders , believed that it could gain more by courting the Justice Party than by

66

flirting

with the Congress . 79 In many parts of Tamilnad the anti - liquor campaign was only one of several complex factors which fed the anti government agitation . As Dr Baker has demonstrated , local support for the movement was often a response to local

grievances or an outcome of factional strife . 80 In Salem town , for example , a major cause was a factional struggle between S . C . Venkatappa Chetti , the newly elected Municipal Chairman , and his rival , S . Ellappa Chetti , a protege of the District Magistrate and a member of the provincial legis lature . As Ellappa gravitated towards the ministerial party in the legislature , Venkatappa swung towards non - cooperation .

his direction the Salem municipal council carried a series of resolutions in September 1921 , welcoming Gandhi

Under

to

committing municipal funds and employees to picket liquor and foreign cloth shops and to purchase khadi . After the government had vetoed the resolutions , there was a lull until late December when the non - cooperators gained con trol of the local merchants ' association and sent its employ ees out to picket . For two days the non - cooperators ruled the government author town until the District Magistrate restored ity by banning all picketing and arresting leading non cooperators . But even though factionalism was of central importance to Salem ' s participation in the agitation , it should not be thought the only motivating factor . Venkatappa and many of his supporters on the municipal council were Con gressmen of long standing and thus their adherence to non cooperation was not as fortuitous as the factional division might suggest . Salem had for 40 years been a centre of Con gress activity and the town ' s intellectuals and students could be expected to respond sympathetically to anti - government agitation . Moreover , Salem ' s Devanga Chetti community , to which both Ellappa and Venkatappa belonged , contained a large percentage of poor weavers who frequented the town ' s toddy shops . Swadeshi propaganda ' could appeal to weavers threaten by ed the sale of cheap foreign cloth ; temperance to wealthier Devangas concerned , like the Gounder leaders , at the preval ence of drunkeness among their castemen . the

town

and

it

For whatever reasons was instigated and sustained , the anti - liquor agitation brought the Gandhians as near as they came to a mass movement in 1921 - 22 . But this success was achieved by going outside the original Gandhian program and by employing tactics which often strayed from Gandhian non - violence . The agitation presented the Madras government with a more serious and widespread challenge than had had to face since the heyday of Home Rule in 1916 - 17 . The gov ernment could not ward off this agitational thrust by using

it

the Justice Party as its shield . It could only preserve its authority by intervening directly to ban picketing , arrest the organizers and protect customers and shopkeepers . A direct confrontation between the Congress and the Raj had been achieved . In addition to the threat to its authority , the Madras government was compelled to intervene because it derived nearly a quarter of its revenue from duties on alcohol and the leasing of liquor shops . At first the government tried disguise impact to the of the agitation by attributing the sharp fall in income from toddy shop auctions to factors other than picketing . But in October 1921 it admitted that picketing in Coimbatore and Salem had caused drink sales to drop to a third of the previous year ' s total : the decline was even more marked

in

the Telugu

districts . 82

In

Madras ,

Willingdon ' s " Cinderella province " , payment of an annual contribution of Rs . 348 lakhs to the central exchequer was already causing financial difficulties and , added to this , the rapid fall in drink revenue would be crippling . In February 1922 Willingdon anticipated a loss of Rs . 65 lakhs due to the anti - liquor agitation ; other estimates ranged as high as 75 or 80 lakhs . 83 Such a financial disaster would force the Madras government to cut back provincial spending and in particular to reduce allocations for the ministers ' departments . As these were the areas of " nation - building government where the supporters of dyarchy hoped for the greatest achievements and where the ministers hoped to prove their worthiness before the electorate , the political reper

only be made up cussions were far - reaching . The deficit could by increasing the burden on the tax -payer ( who , in many cases , was also the voter ) and that would recoil against the British and the ministry . The Finance Secretary of the Madras Gov ernment , T . E . Moir , complained bitterly in December 1921 that The leaders of the non - co - operation movement undoubtedly hope that additional taxation

still

will

enable them to foment further antagonism to the Government and to exploit in even larger measure the hostility towards the services which is not confined to their own

ranks

. 84

Anti - liquor agitation was not the only government

of

popular Tamilnad . In form

demonstration which the faced in Salem , for example , villagers in Atur taluk violated the forest laws by collecting firewood and grazing their animals . Congressmen joined in , claiming that payment of four annas for party membership entitled villagers to free grazing in

the reserved forests . But the anti - liquor picketing was widespread the most and effective form of agitation . When agitation caught fire – the labour move two other sparks of ment in Madras city and the Mappilla rising in Malabar – it was the Congress which burnt its fingers . RS

Madras

City :

Disturbed

Times

labour movement in Madras city began among the workers in the European - owned Buckingham and Carnatic mills . The rapid rise in the price of essential commodities in 1917 - 18 added to mill -hands ' existing grievances over low pay , excessive working hours , inadequate lunch -breaks and the high -handed action of European overseers . 86 Their grievances were taken up by Home Rulers who in April 1918 formed the Madras Labour Union , India ' s first real trade union . ly under the direction of T . V . Kalyanasundara Mudaliar , editor of Desabhaktan , the MLU passed into the control of two Home Rulers , B . P . Wadia and George Arundale , assistant editor of Besant ' s New India . 87 The

Initial

Rulers had several motives in sponsoring the They had a genuine desire to labour movement in Madras city . improve the workers ' conditions and to provide the leadership the workers needed to agitate for their demands . They were also looking for a broader base to the Home Rule movement , The Home

partly

to reply to government and non - Brahmin allegations that they were a Brahmin clique with no popular support . Yoking the labour and nationalist movements together would , they believed , benefit both . " It is very necessary " , Wadia

explained , " to recognize the labour movement as an integral part of the national movement . The latter will not succeed in the right direction of democracy the Indian working organize classes are not enabled to their forces and come into their own " . 88 The rise of the British Labour Party directed the Home Rulers ' attention to the urban workers . It was widely expected in India that the Labour Party would soon be in power and it might be more sympathetic to Indian aspir ations the nationalist movement could boast of a labour wing . It was anticipated , too , that under the new franchise the more skilled and better paid workers would be voters for the Madras legislature . Adopting workers ' grievances was a Again , because the Bucking way of attracting their votes . 90 ham and Carnatic mills in Madras and Harvey ' s in Madura were European enterprises , it was easy for the nationalists to equate the plight of the workers with colonial exploitation and to argue that swaraj would mean a dramatic improvement in wages and conditions of employment . Finally , the urban workers

if

if

They could be organized far more easily were near at hand . ryots they than because were already concentrated in the factories and crowded into a few wards of Madras and other gates at the main towns . A meeting held outside the work attracting way end of the shift was a sure of attention . The workers were a captive audience . Or so it seemed . On

29

October

1918

the management

of

the Buckingham

and

Carnatic mills pre - empted a strike threat for shorter hours . by locking out the workers . Wadia invited Gandhi to Madras to help the workers as he had during the recent mill strike in Ahmedabad . Gandhi declined , pleading -health , and sent his friend , C . F . Andrews , who was unable to win any sub

ill

stantial concessions from the management . 91 Unrest among the workers continued and when Gandhi visited Madras in March . 1919 he had two meetings with the workers , numbering between 2 , 000 and 3 , 000 on each occasion . Preoccupied with his coming struggle against the Rowlatt Act and anxious to avoid class conflict , Gandhi disappointed the workers by delivering sermons about the evils of drink and gambling , offering no : practical advice on how to pursue their struggle against the 2 mill management . 92 But as part of their bid to wrest control of the Madras PCC from the Home Rulers , the Nationalists had also begun to show an interest in the Madras labour movement . Competition between them led to an intensification of labour . activity , of which a rash of minor strikes and the formation of rival trade unions were the major results .

community was furious at the rise The European business trade unionism , especially under politicians ' patronage . At this date European non - officials were completely hostile to the Congress which they equated with Bolshevism and vio lent revolution . They were astounded by the government ' s apparent indifference to their troubles , 93 and when strongly worded articles in the press and protests from employers failed to impress the Government of Madras , the Europeans took their complaints to the Government of India . 94 The Madras government hesitated to intervene in labour disputes affect ing private. enterprises , partly from a lingering attachment to laissez - faire , partly from lack of first -hand knowledge of industrial conditions . It was also inclined to blame the employers for deteriorating labour relations : there would , they complained , be little unrest the post - war imbalance between wages and prices were redressed . 95 However , the willy nilly government often found itself drawn into disputes management on the side of the . Strikes and lock - outs led to disturbances and the police were sent in to restore peace . The justice or injustice of the workers ' case was lost in the government ' s preoccupation with an immediate " law and

of

if

70

order " issue . situation

Madras came to a head in the second June about 800 Adi - Dravidas ( untouch ables ) returned to work at the Buckingham Mill in defiance of a strike called by the MLU : they had suffered severely during earlier strikes and lock - outs and felt that they could not afford a further loss of wages . Almost at once violence flared up between the Adi - Dravidas and caste -Hindu strikers , aided by Khilafat Muslims who had their own griev ances against the Adi - Dravidas . Several times during July Adi - Dravida slums in the mill area were set on fire and workers attacked . Police and British troops were unable to control the fires that raced through the wood - and - thatch hovels or to prevent violence in the maze of narrow streets in the mill area . Finally , in October 1921 a punitive police force was quartered on the area and the caste -Hindus grad ually returned to work , though the management refused to reinstate the strike leaders . The Madras government ap pointed a commission of enquiry , but its investigation was confined to the reasons for the city authorities ' failure to prevent the disturbances . The workers ' grievances which had ignored , and for this reason the led to the strike were Madras Labour Union refused to participate in the enquiry . 96 The

half of

The

workers

1921 .

On

in

27

strike was a traumatic experience for the Madras their Congress patrons . The workers felt aband

and

by the politicians . Gandhi , whose assistance was again invoked , for a second time excused himself on the grounds of -health . Willingdon claimed that this was because Gandhi " 'would have found it difficult to excuse the incendiarism and violence that has taken place " . 9 Gandhi ' s advice that the mill -hands should take up hand - spinning was received without enthusiasm . 98 Practical help was not forthcoming . Early in July the Nationalists offered their public sympathy oned

ill

to the strikers , but they were too preoccupied with their dispute with Rajagopalachari over the elections for the new

PCC to worry about them . 99 On 18 November Kalyanasundara Mudaliar asked the TNCC for

1921 when money for

strikers

reinstated , Rajagopalachari replied that he had asked Gandhi for Rs . 30 , 000 for this purpose but so far nothing had been received . 100 The TNCC had funds to spend on khadi and the anti - liquor agitation , but the labour troubles in Madras had become a liability . The propertied classes were alarmed at the eruption of urban violence and recoiled from the prospect of a greater conflagration . The Hindu , in an editorial entitled " The Failure of Authority " , spoke with anxiety of those Adi - Dravidas who might seize the opportunity of the present " disturbed times " to " begin a saturnalia of who had

not

been

outrage

"

. 101 Besant , too , disowned the strikers , but blamed the non - cooperators for unleashing the disorders . 102 Dis illusioned , the workers turned their backs on the Congress . When nationalists tried to revive labour agitation in Madras in April 1922 they met with no response . For the next five years the labour movement was quiescent , and when did

revive

in

the

the Congress . Malabar :

A

it

late 1920s

was

largely

it

in

isolation

from

Foretaste of Swaraj

The Malabar district had always been one of the most turbulent areas of the Madras Presidency . Since its annex ation by the British in 1792 there had been periodic risings in the interior taluks by the Muslim Mappilla community . Fanatical adherence to Islam and sudden , fierce uprisings were by -products of the antagonism of the Mappillas of the interior taluks to high caste Hindu landlords and money

lenders . However , since the last major outbreak in 1894 , Malabar had been relatively peaceful , and troops stationed in the Mappilla area were withdrawn during the world war for service elsewhere , leaving armed police to deal with minor

disturbances

in

The Madras

1915 and

1919

government

. 103

tried

in

vain to

isolate Malabar

Unsettled by looting and food riots in 1918 , by mounting tenant unrest , and by rumours about the fate of Turkey , Malabar was fertile ground for the Khilafat cause . During visits to Calicut and Erode by the Ali brothers in August 1920 and April 1921 , Mappillas heard from

Khilafat propaganda .

stirring

Islam , if necessary , it In February 1921 the arrest of Yakub Hasan drew an angry crowd , 10 , 000 strong and includ ing many Mappillas , into Calicut ; and only gradually , after a strong show of force by police and troops , did tension subside . 105

was

appeals

for the defence

hinted by resort to arms .

of

104

first week of August 1921 . In Mappilla bands armed with war officials and police officers , railway lines and bridges , raided police stations , and set up their own Khilafat kingdom . 106 For Willingdon and his iCS advisers it was a relief that the The name

storm broke

in

the

the of the Khilafat , knives attacked government murdered Hindus , destroyed

storm had at last broken . For months their jeremiads had by been unheeded a Government of India eager to avoid repression scale of India . Now - it gave a certain grim satisfaction – the Madras government had been proved right . The Secretariat was not unaware of the peculiarities of the Malabar situation and of the extent to which the oppressive

full

72 system had contributed to the rising , but such a splendid opportunity to flay the non - cooperators was not to Through the press , the legislature , the Publicity be missed . , through Bureau and its own statements , the Government of impressed on the public that the rising Madras repeatedly resulted from the Khilafat and non - cooperation movements , and that the murder , rape and forced conversions reported from Malabar were the inevitable outcome of Gandhi ' s anarchist antics . On the same note one Justice leader , 0 . Thanick achelam Chetti , told a conference at Salem in December 1921 that in " the present Malabar troubles we have a foretaste of the Swaraj to be attained by non - cooperation " . 107 The Madras PCC strove to refute these allegations . On 27 August it hastily formed a nine - member committee to investigate the causes of the rising . On the basis of such information as the government and martial law would allow them to collect , the committee reported that the rising had been caused by the provocative behaviour of the District Magistrate and that its leaders had never been involved in the Khilafat movement . 108 This interpretation was accepted by the CWC in September and endorsed by the Congress at Ahmedabad in December 1921 . 109

landlord

in

"

[ ed ]

it

"

,

-

to

.

"

to

of

if

.

a

"

In

to

,

,

It

carry much conviction did not however Tamilnad the effect of the rising was weaken and discredit September the non cooperation and Khilafat movements 1921 the Madras government anticipated that the rising would open serve useful purpose the eyes of the saner elements the population the disasters into which these movements are leading the country 110 Hindus who had been mildly sympathetic non cooperation or had seen some

where

In

an

a

in

;

the

town

Raja

"

high

.

so

about Malabar were running

in

a

a

to

to

in

-

;

.

,

it ,

opportunity for personal advancement by temporarily associ ating with fearing orgy of Muslim now shied away Trichinopoly fanaticism and violence throughout India disintegrated two years of active Hindu Muslim cooperation Madura municipal councillors dropped their proposal present municipal address Gandhi and Vellore Khilafat Muslim withdrew similar proposal because feelings

he

"

,

"

11

is ,

do

.

in

;

"

,

however

.

Others have been dazed Not that they not attend part take other activities there widespread fear about how things will develop

public meetings

or

.

wrote

"

to

.

-

-

to

-

"

"

in

a

in

.

" 2

it

gopalachari himself doubted the wisdom of continuing the movement now that had been tainted by Mappilla violence September 1921 When Gandhi arrived Tamilnad soon saw rising great that the had been set back non cooperation Many and had created scepticism about Hindu Muslim unity peaceful people feel that will not remain the end he

73

Perils

Grave

1921 the Government of India changed over from a non - intervention to repression . The " new policy " , welcomed by the Madras Executive Council as belated recognition of the need for a firm hand , 114 was a response to several developments , including the Malabar rising and the intensification of liquor - shop picketing . But its proxi mate cause was the arrival in India of the Prince of Wales , who had been greeted on landing at Bombay on 17 November by a hartal and five days of rioting . The Government of India was determined to prevent a repetition of this shameful epi sode elsewhere on the prince ' s tour . "15 From

August

policy of

In

with

Tamilnad

the Mappilla

the

shift

rising .

to repression in practice began Yakub Hasan , released from prison for permission to visit Malabar to

July , asked Willingdon in help to restore order there . Willingdon , his indignation already aroused by a similar request from Rajagopalachari , angrily refused . 116 Two days later Hasan presided over the Congress Provincial Conference at Tanjore . Frustrated by Willingdon ' s refusal to allow him to enter Malabar and anxious not to be outpaced by more militant Khilafat leaders , Hasan was in a defiant mood , claiming that non - cooperation had already " succeeded to a very large extent in shaking the foundations of British power . . . " in India . " 7 A rash , and perhaps not very accurate claim , but , along with other parts of his address , it was seized upon as evidence that Hasan was a dangerous agitator . He was arrested and given a stiff deterrent sentence of two years ' imprisonment . The hindu found

this sentence

quickly

" monstrously

severe " ,

118

but

it

was

convictions of Abdul Majid Sharar , leadership Hasan ' s rival for of the provincial Khilafat move ment , Varadarajulu Naidu , editor of Tamil Nadu , and the followed

by the

editorial staff of Desabhaktan , three of whom were after " grovelling apologies to the government . " 19

released

Repression was fast eliminating the leadership ; the year in which Gandhi had promised swaraj was nearly exhausted . Unless the Congress threw all its remaining strength into an agitational thrust , it would be too late . On 4 November 1921 the AICC authorized

by selected individuals strated their complete

its

the

launching

and by

of

localities

commitment to

civil

disobedience

which had demon swadeshi and non Trichinopoly on 20

annual meeting at November the TNCC debated the AICC resolution and resolved - for the present to restrict civil disobedience to individuals . This course was approved by a large majority of the 88

violence . 120 At

gopalachari and his close associates . faction there was marked reluctance

to 121

delegates present , but since the TNCC ' s total strength 820 the decision represented only the small caucus of

was

Raja .

,

'

:

to

. V .

,

M

,

of

,

-

A

a

among that court imprisonment five man committee was entrusted with the organizing of civil disobedience but when its meeting was prohibited by only Rajagopalachari the District Magistrate North Arcot and the TNCC President Subramania Sastri defied the they were arrested and sentenced ban three months im

And even

. S . S .

in

to

,

on

.

-

the campaign

Rajan

Repression brought Nationalists winced

compensations for the Congress sympathy The each time blow was struck and Srinivasa Iyengar took the opportunity resign from the Madras legislature where he had felt none too comfortable both Brahmin and Leader the .

)

of

The

.

in

to

;

as

Liberals protested at the lack of opport repressive discuss measures the Madras legis independent and some of the more members of the

Opposition

unity lature

a

as

(

.

S

to

a

in

some

.

.

T

Dr

Responsibil Coimbatore then fell the wary in

for anti liquor activities

ity for continuing

a

. V .

E

.

jail

,

prisonment 122 Ramaswami Naicker who had also been selected for civil disobedience was sentenced month

the government treatment of prisoners Congress and 123 Even Justice the non Brahmins paper believed that repression merely strengthened the civil disobedience movement 124 As the Government of along feared India and the Secretary of State had re party attacked

threatened

provoke

,

,

all

revolt

To a

pression

to

.

'

,

.

Mappilla

's

ministerial

of

the moderates

and

,

a

if

to

:

a

.

constitutional nationalists forestall this Lord Reading flew kite he would call Round Table Conference of all parties discuss constitutional reforms the Congress the agitation

called off the demonstrations being planned Calcutta for the arrival of the Prince of Wales December Das Malaviya and other leading Congressmen Reading welcomed the offer but Gandhi dithered and quibbled and

on

,

.

,

.

24

in

stopped

in

12

.

"

a

.

on

"

,

by

,

's

.

a

in

,

-

,

.

to

,

-

By

.

,

it

,

of

did not have the approval London for his offer with drew but his manoeuvre had temporarily rallied the moder ates and made Gandhi appear responsible for the failure of the negotiations 125 rounding up the non cooperation leaders Calcutta before the arrival of the Prince of Wales the Government of prevent any major disturbances there 126 Bengal was able The Government of Madras confident that non cooperators commanded little local support did not take the same pre Rajan went ahead with plans for cautions hartal Madras city for the prince arrival 13 January 1922 The demon stration was most accounts miserable failure who

75

of non - violent protest , the hartal was characterized violence . Youths stoned trams and cars which ignored the

Instead

by

hartal ,

were attacked , and the house of the Tyagaraya Chetti , was stormed by P . organizers Congress , headed by Rajan and rowdies . The Singaravelu Chetti , were unable to stop the violence . Troops oops were drafted into the city to restore government contro control : Bovernment two men were killed and two others wa wounded by gun - fire . Rajan ne two confessed to Gandhi that " violence and undue coercion have ssed to made the hartal a failure for non -violent non - cooperation . While this struggle for non - violence exists against the vio lence of our own men , one may well hesitate to take a single step forward in resistance " . 128 Gandhi thought so too , and the violence in Madras , though not on the scale of Bombay the previous November , contributed to his decision to abandon the disobedience campaign . 129 two cinemas

Justice Party leader ,

.

civil

civil

For the present , however , preparation for mass civil dis obedience continued . In the Bardoli taluk of Gujarat non payment of taxes was scheduled to begin in February ; in the , encourage Congressmen Guntur district of Andhra were without ment from Gandhi , planning their own civil disobedience cam paign . 130 Tamilnad , as usual , lagged behind , and the only suggestion for a local no - tax campaign came from the Muslim centres of North Arcot . 131 No - tax was the crunch . So far the non - cooperation move ment had at times been undisciplined and violent , but , except in Malabar , agitation had brought no irredeemable dis asters . When the Congress leaders had lost control - as in the Madras hartal – the police and troops were on hand to beat out the flames . But to embark on a no - tax campaign in several areas of India simultaneously , to take the movement from the towns and hand it over to the ryots and the landless , was to invite the complete breakdown of law and authority and the destruction of property . An editorial in the Hindu on 21 January 1922 warned that " any movement of mass civil dis obedience is to say the least extremely premature . We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the particular form of civil disobedience proposed , the non - payment of taxes , is fraught with grave perils alike to peace , tranquility and the move ment of non - violent non - cooperation " . The Madras government left no room for doubt that it would exert its full strength to crush no - tax movements . The Madras legislature rushed

legislation empowering the government to distrain the property of those who refused to pay their taxes , and the government let it be known that property confiscated would be distributed to untouchables . The Governor ' s bodyguard , four armoured cars and 200 punitive police , were dispatched to through

76

Guntur to ensure that taxes were paid ment was not going to surrender such the collection of land - tax without a

. 132 a

right

furious struggle .

as And

nationalists recoiled : they wanted national , but not at the price of social revolution and

that most

from

independence war .

civil

Gandhi spared

them

.

Following

a

clash

the United Provinces on 4 February 1922 were killed by a mob , Gandhi suspended

in

Clearly the govern

fundamental

at Chauri Chaura which

in

22

police

civil disobedience . confessed its " great relief " at this decision . 133 On 10 March 1922 Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to six years ' imprisonment . The non - cooperation and civil disobedi ence experiment was over .

men

The

To

Hindu

Fight

and win

in

One Campaign

Gandhi ' s non - cooperation movement of 1920 - 22 was an audacious attempt to redirect the course of nationalist poli tics in India . In itself the program was not new . had been foreshadowed by the boycotts and swadeshi agitation in Bengal during the anti - partition movement of 1905 - 11 . But , in 1920 , for the first time the Congress pledged itself to wresting national self - government from the British by a nation -wide direct -action campaign . The strategy was a bold one , comparable to that of Western Front generals in the First World War who believed that by a massive build - up of men and supplies they could punch through the German lines and bring the war to a swift and victorious conclusion . Gandhi wanted to break out from the stalemate and petty gains of the con stitutional trench warfare that had inhibited the advance of the Congress from its inception .

It

It

The strategy was a bold one , but had depended on the enthusiastic participation

it

a

fatal flaw .

of

the middle

classes to carry out the program of boycotts , to finance the movement , and to provide it with leadership . Unless the middle classes believed that swaraj was within their grasp ,

they were impelled by an intense sense of grievance , they would not give Gandhi the unequivocal support that non cooperation demanded . They stood aloof from non - cooperation , or hesitated at its brink . The British did not budge ; vio

unless

lence and intimidation perverted Gandhi ' s satyagraha . Men of property shrank from the prospect of a confrontation with the Raj that seemed destructive of their own interests . The

flexible had

from

if

strategy had failed , Perhaps Gandhi had been more he could have won at least some of the gains to be the old trench warfare . The opportunity existed ,

however fleetingly , in December 1921 , but Gandhi had been loath to compromise ; and the men behind him , including Rajagopalachari , 134 exhilarated by the prospect of greater successes , urged Gandhi to continue the assault rather than settle for less than swaraj .

For

the defeat of Gandhi ' s brand of convincing argument for the complete that strategy and the reversion to some form

many Congressmen

non - cooperation

abandonment

of

was

a

agitation . But not all Congressmen drew Rajagopalachari that conclusion . dismissed the idea of returning to the legislatures . He attributed the defeat not to any inherent defect in Gandhi ' s techniques , but to India ' s hesitancy and poverty which made it impossible to " fight and win in one campaign " . Instead , he reasoned , the Congress

of constitutional

would " have to carry on many campaigns before we can reach our goal " . In place of the big - push strategy he visualized progressively waves of more powerful satyagrahas divided by

troughs during which the Congress could rebuild its organ 135 ization and recover its strength . +35 That was , in essence , agitation pattern Congress to be the of in the following years 25 .

3

SWARAJISTS

'

THE

CHAPTER

DILEMMA

a

in

,

nationalist politics could not

of

and Nagpur

's

directed

boycott resolutions and was former Nationalists Gandhi reorientation

Calcutta

,

the

by

sal of

a

to

.

in

,

to

to

.

to

.

in

to

The defeat of civil disobedience and the collapse of the non cooperation movement February 1922 led reorientation of Congress strategy The pendulum swung away from direct action and back constitutional agitation Under the aegis of the Swarajya Party Congressmen began return the provincial legislatures Congress by central and and 1925 the organization was Swarajist hands But although some respects the return the legislatures represented rever

to

;

confrontation with the Raj

.

For the Brahmin Nationalists of Tamilnad

all

the

-

a

to

;

.

to

.

be ignored Hence the ration entry carry non ale for council was stated be Swarajists would not take cooperation into the legislatures dyarchy they office under would not collaborate but they try dyarchy thereby would wreck from within and recreate

India

a

in

,

to

a

,

dil to

;

,

,

,

a

;

on

-

in

of

,

it .

a

ly

in

.

to

-

in

.

in

a

to

.

to

,

to

Swarajya Party provided the means by which the Congress could regional con be restored constitutional action and text their own control Attachment the Swarajya Party rendered their communal identity less conspicuous and enabled them attack the Justice ministry from broader political front But conditions the Madras legislature the mid 1920s presented the Tamil Swarajists with They were pledged not emma take office under dyarchy only way but the which the Justice Party could be complete Congress ministry defeated was by the formation of experience Dyarchy exclude showed could not be wrecked the strength the Swarajists the legislature was depend ent their alliance with essentially constitutionalist non Congress ministry Brahmin dissidents the opportunity for which the Governor would have welcomed was created and then

But the central Swarajist and Congress leaderships despite adamantly remained the appeals from Tamilnad Swarajists cceptance opposed office Should take office 78

.

,

all

-a

to

,

.

lost

in defiance of national party policy or must they be power less spectators watching the Justice Party flourish while

their A

own

alliance disintegrated

Retrogression

in

the Policy

?

of the Congress

Following Gandhi ' s decision to

abandon

civil

disobed

ience , the Congress Working Committee meeting at Bardoli on 11 February 1922 adopted his " Constructive Programme " . Designed to keep India in readiness for a return to civil disobedience , the program stressed the production of khadi , the organization of national schools , temperance , Hindu Muslim cooperation , and the uplift of untouchables . The enlistment of Congress members and collections for the Tilak Swarajya Fund were to continue . ' Few Congressmen found this menu appetizing . Perilous though civil disobedience had been had at least thrust India to a peak of excitement and ex pectation ; by comparison to spin , to run national schools seemed tedious and unrewarding . Gandhi ' s arrest and imprison : ment shattered the morale of his followers . Their leader ' s personal invincibility had been an article of faith : it had been rumoured that the government would not dare to arrest him , or , if it did , no jail could hold him . He had been billed as a mahatma , revered as an avatar . Now his dispirit ed disciples raked the embers of a dying movement unconvinced that they could kindle it back to life .

it

Rajagopalachari , released from Vellore jail on 26 March 1922 , fell the task of supervising Gandhi ' s program . Through his three years of association with Gandhi , Raja gopalachari had become known as one of the Congressmen whose judgement and integrity Gandhi valued most . But this was his debut as an all - India leader , and he was not a success . He On

fought doggedly to preserve the original non - cooperation , but by his inflexibility he deepened divisions with Congress in the at a time when the need was for reconcili ation and a speedy redeployment of the party ' s depleted forces . He was Gandhi ' s man , not Gandhi . He lacked the capacity of his leader to inspire popular devotion ; he offer ed only arid moralizing and dogmatism . Moreover , when oppor tunities for attempting new satyagrahas occurred , Raja program

gopalachari was reluctant to seize fear of failure . The a

rigidity of his

consequence

defence

Gandhi

the snarling

of

, as

if

daunted

by

Gandhi ' s program was also

of the insecurity of his regional position .

Rajagopalachari had gained ance with

them

and had

alli

control of the TNCC through kept in that position , despite

been

of the Nationalist , wolves ,

by Gandhi and

his

80

CWC . Central Congress funds enabled Raja gopalachari to survive ; identification with Gandhi was the primary justification for his regional leadership . With Gandhi jailed , Rajagopalachari would be deposed by the Nation alists unless he clung to the wreckage of Gandhi ' s program . Because national Congress policy had become a determinant of regional party leadership , he was fighting for his own sur

associates in the

vival .

of

Congress policy after Gandhi ' s arrest came of a Civil Disobedience Enquiry by Committee the AICC at Lucknow on 7 to 9 June 1922 . The AICC noted a " widespread feeling " that in view of " the extreme ly unfair manner in which the policy of repression is being carried out by the Government " the Congress should recommend a revival of civil disobedience to compel the government to policy present " abandon their . . . " 2 However , as the enquiry collecting committee toured India evidence , the focus of in vestigation shifted and became , not what steps should be taken for a revival of civil disobedience , but whether it was desir able to switch to non - cooperation through the legislatures . As a member of the committee , Rajagopalachari , with M . A . Ansari and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar , argued for the continuation of the council boycott . In its report , submitted to the AICC in November 1922 , the committee acknowledged that the country ' s mood and the condition of the Congress precluded a revival of civil disobedience at the present time , though local saty agrahas might be undertaken . On the council entry issue the committee was too deeply divided to offer a unanimous recom mendation . 3 The AICC in its turn passed the issue on to the annua ) Congress for consideration . The

first

review

with the appointment

Congress met at Gaya in Bihar at the close of December 1922 . As the guardian of Gandhism , Rajagopalachari adamantly opposed any revision of the council boycott . He and other " No - Changers " , as they were dubbed , temporarily warded off the attempt of the " Pro - Changers " led by Das and Motilal Nehru to capture the Congress for council entry . " Defeat at the Gaya Congress provoked Das and Nehru to form an organization of their own , the - India Swarajya Party , in January 1923 to propagate their views . They stressed that they were not seceding from the Congress – the dire con sequences of such a move being now familiar – but they were invoking the idea of the Congress as a platform on which nationalists were free to express their widely different opinions . A minority had , they claimed , a right to organize itself in the hope of converting the majority to its views . The Swarajya Party was to be a pressure group within the , as Dr Gordon has Congress , not its rival . Moreover , The

all

all

if

81 argued , Das had agreed with Gandhi to try non - cooperation for a year only , then the erstwhile Nationalists were justified in expecting the Congress to keep the bargain . " The

elections

Swarajists ' immediate to

the provincial

and

objective was to contest the

central legislatures

to be

. Once elected , they proposed to present a " National Demand " for the release of Gandhi and other political prisoners , and for a Round Table Conference of representatives of the government and the main parties to draft a new consitution . The Round Table demand was an attempt to revert to the situation of December 1921 , for many of the men who joined the Swarajya Party regretted that the opportunity for a negotiated settlement had been lost . But this time the Swarajists proposed that their demand was rejected they would resort to " uniform , continuous and con sistent obstruction with a view to make Government through the Assembly and Councils impossible " . If , in response to the constitutional deadlocks the Swarajists engineered , the British responded by suspending dyarchy and resorting to repression and arbitrary rule , then an ideal situation would have been created for a revival of civil disobedience , and the Congress might carry many constitutionalists with it . Alternatively , , as many Swarajists clearly hoped , the British responded by making substantial concessions , the Con gress would gain prestige and influence from having won re dress for Indian grievances , for having pushed the stubborn British mule a few miles further along the stony track to swaraj . held

in October

1923

if

if

Against this Rajagopalachari argued that non - cooperation through the legislatures was impossible . It was a parody of boycott cooperation Gandhi ' s non . The of the councils could not be removed without the whole logic of non - cooperation collapsing . It was the keystone , not the coping . There were , possible , only , he reasoned two alternatives : either like the Liberals , one worked dyarchy and exploited the minor oppor tunities for constructive government which it allowed , or one ignored the legislatures entirely and by - passed the institu tional structure of British rule . The British , with their Irish experience in mind , had constructed the constitution with such craftsmanship that obstruction and wrecking were not feasible . And to follow the Liberals ' course would be a " retrogression in the policy of the Congress " . For nearly 40 years the Congress had used constitutional techniques with only limited success ; whereas two years of non - cooperation had power " . " shaken the throne of arbitrary Reversion to con premature stitutional action was a admission of defeat . '

appealed for a truce between the warring wings party of the until the end of April 1923 . The Swarajists , who could not afford to remain silent if they were to muster support for the elections in October , called for a special Congress session to reconsider the council entry issue . This Rajagopalachari opposed , insisting that the Gaya verdict was binding on all Congressmen – much as in 1920 Nationalists had argued that Gandhi had no right to re - open the council issue The AICC

after the Amritsar Congress .

As a compromise , Das suggested wings that both be authorized to pursue their separate Rajagopalachari spin while the Swarajists can interest – let , Rajagopalachari replied , was impossible vassed . co - existence boycott because the council was a central part of the Gandhi program ans ' . One section of the party had to " absorb and extinguish " the other . This crude Darwinism offended many Congressmen who valued party unity and an active program more than intransigence and inertia . The AICC at Bombay on 26 May Swarajist position by requesting a 1923 shuffled towards the against entry propaganda halt to council . This time Raja gopalachari was the rebel , denying the authority of the AICC resolution and urging the Tamil Congress organizations to express their dissent . "

Rajagopalachari had middle

-

of - the - road

gone

partymen by

too far .

He

his tactics

had

and Ranga

alienated the the prolong Iyengar , who

ation of civil war . The ailing Kasturi since the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee had favoured swing back from non - cooperation to council entry so a gradual as to preserve Congress unity and to quieten the Madras situ ation , had earlier seen Das as the rebel, but by June 1923 he decried the irresponsible actions of the " Non - Cooperation ' purists ' , " 12 Srinivasa Iyengar , Varadarajulu Naidu , and Vijayaraghavachari in varying degrees shared his view . Iyengar , Tamilnad ' s Swarajist leader , did not A . Rangaswami opportunity lose the to foster resentment against Rajagopala chari , observing tartly : " The Swarajya party has set out to wreck the reforms . Has Mr Achariar set out to wreck the Congress

?"

13

Having drained and weakened

his reservoir of national Congress support his regional leadership by his obduracy , Raja

gopalachari began to waver . He professed surprise and dis tress at the reaction against him and , in true Gandhian style , talked about retiring from political leadership . 14 A Special Congress held at Delhi in late September 1923 removed all ob stacles to Congressmen entering the councils while restating the party ' s basic faith in non - cooperation . Rajagopalachari , who did not attend , informed the session in a message that he would no longer stand in the Swarajists ' way . The No -Changers ,

83

stated , had done their utmost to maintain the original only They had failed and now non - cooperation program intact . " the lessons of hard experience " would convince the Swarajists of their error . 15 he

Rajagopalachari ' s capitulation

at the national level was corresponding surrender in Tamilnad . By using party funds for anti - Swarajist propaganda , and by con trol of party patronage , Rajagopalachari struggled desperate ly to maintain his regional position . In August 1924 the con changed stitution of the TNCC was for a third time in four years to minimize participation by the Pro - Changers . 16 " As long as Mr . Rajagopalachary has control over the provincial Congress funds " , complained M . K . Acharya of Chingleput , " he can easily get 50 or 60 people to vote with him at all times " . " And , as Rangaswami Iyengar had explained to M . R . Jayakar of Maharashtra in July 1922 , " The trouble in this province is due to the fact that we all gave up our offices in the Con gress Executive Committee immediately after the Calcutta Congress , and the Congress caucus is in the hands of the non cooperators " . 18 When Motilal Nehru appealed to Rangaswami and Satyamurti to secure the election of as many Pro - Changers as possible from Tamilnad for the Gaya Congress , the Tamil Con gressmen expressed their powerlessness to do so . " not matched by

a

Gandhi , prematurely released from prison in February 19 24 , was more prepared to reassess the situation than Rajagopala

chari had been . While expressing his personal antipathy to the council - entry movement , he was willing to accommodate the Swarajists and agreed to their take - over of the party organ ization at the Belgaum Congress in December 1924 . He advised Rajagopalachari to follow a similar course in Tamilnad but was not until January 1925 that Rajagopalachari publicly bowed . to Gandhi ' s advice and a further month before he actually com

it

plied with it . 20

But between 1922 and 1925 Rajagopalachari ' s position was being steadily eroded . The Muslims who had hefped him in the manoeuvres of 1920 deserted the Congress in ; 1922 , feeling that they had gained nothing by the alliance . 21 Even before the abolition of the Khalif in February 1924 , the Muslims in Tamilnad had sought other political openings : there were pro posals for a South Indian Muslim Federation to act as an dependent force : 22 Abdul Majid Sharar , Syed Murtuza of Trichinopoly , Abdul Hameed Khan of Madras and others who had been among the more extreme Khilafatists , joined the Swarajya

in

Party .

Nor was it easy to retain the support Hindu co - workers . ' No more than 36 lawyers

and had

enthusiasm suspended

of

their

84

practices

in 1920 - 22 for non - cooperation and gradually they returned to their profession . The volunteer corps broke up

and where , as in Madura in 1923 , they attempted to launch their own picketing they received not support but discourage ment from the regional leadership . 23 The Nagpur Flag Satya graha of 1923 , launched to force the Government of the Central Provinces to allow Congressmen to carry their flag through the streets of Nagpur , provided a temporary for

the Tamil activists ,

fillip

of whom travelled to Nagpur and courted imprisonment . 24 But it was soon over and there was little else to look forward to . A Tamil Nadu Khadi Board was formed in January 1924 with K . Santhanam and later S . Ramana than ( both former League of Youth Members ) as its secretaries . The work was unspectacular and few activists were satisfied with it for long . Many deserted the Congress altogether , or found more stimulating employment in journalism From

1922

many

rift

a

opened between

Rajagopalachari , support

dis

Brahmin activists , and a nebulous group of - Brahmin Congressmen led by E . V . Ramaswami Naicker and S . Ramanathan . At first their grievance was that Raja gopalachari had tricked them by capitulating to the Swarajists : ed by

a

few

satisfied

non

Ramaswami Naicker and Ramanathan resigned as the

TNCC ' s secret aries after the Delhi Special Congress to protest against the " open and ostentatious repudiation " of the fundamental princ iples of non - cooperation . They voiced their protests to the

Cocanada

Congress

their views

and

that

endorsed

, but Rajagopalachari smothered the Delhi agreement . ?

December

with khadi , disenchantment with Rajagopalachari , hankering and a for dramatic new campaigns led Rama swami join Naicker to the satyagraha begun at Vaikam in Travancore objective in 1924 . Its was to secure for untouchables the right to use a road running near a temple , a right forcibly contested by caste Hindus . Rajagopalachari abstained , dislik ing the . satyagraha partly because it would not help untouch ables generally to have access to a single road ; but he also feared that the satyagraha would amount to coercion of the Boredom

caste Hindus and stiffen their opposition to the gradual re moval of untouchability . The satyagraha ended in compromise in November 1925 with the Travancore government building a short stretch of new road . 27 In Tamil eyes prestige for the campaign went to Ramaswami Naicker while Rajagopalachari was suspected of covert hostility to the advancement of the untouchables .

rift

quickly widened . Ramaswami Naicker was becom The ing aware of his own abilities as an orator and agitator . the Congress could not give him an outlet for his energies , then he would leave it and pursue an independent course .

If

85

breach

The

came

julu Naidu , elected

in the middle months

of

covered that

eat separately at the Shermadevi Gurukulam , run by

V

district

.V.

.

1925

.

Varadara

dis

TNCC President in December 1924 , Brahmin and non - Brahmin pupils were expected a

to

national school

Aiyar , the former terrorist , in Tinnevelly Varadarajulu condemned this as caste discrimination S

.

being contrary to Congress pledges to eradicate caste prejudice . The abuse appeared to him all the more grievous in that Congress funds and sponsorship had been largely re sponsible for the setting up of the school . The revelation produced an outburst of anti - Brahminism from Varadarajulu and as

Naidu supported by Ramaswami Naicker and Kalyanasundara Mudaliar . 28 Consultations with Gandhi and Aiyar ' s resignation failed to defuse the situation . When the TNCC met in April 1925 to discuss the school , the recommendation of Rajagopala chari and Rajan that the Congress should not interfere but merely requested the school authorities to allow inter - caste dining was brushed aside ; a resolution moved by Ramanathan that nationalist bodies should not observe " gradations of merit based on birth " was carried . In the following week Rajagopalachari and six of his associates resigned from the TNCC , Rajagopalachari again maintaining that caste prejudice could not be overcome through any form of coercion .

Rajagopalachari ' s resignation marked the final with drawal of the Gandhians from leadership of the TNCC . The Swarajists took over . At the end of 1925 Srinivasa Iyengar was elected President of a predominantly Swarajist committee . Ramaswami Naicker received from the Shermadevi affair an incentive to exploit anti - Brahminism as a political and social crusade . He left the Congress in 1925 to organize the Self Respect movement which denigrated nationalism and extolled atheism , social justice and Dravidian culture . Ramanathan followed Ramaswami Naicker ' s lead and quickly established himself as the movement ' s ablest English propagandist . By their revolt Ramaswami and Ramanathan undermined the last organized Congress opposition to the Swarajists in Tamilnad and , by the task

intensifying of those

who

communal bitterness , they complicated remained within the Congress .

After the Shermadevi affair , Rajagopalachari , too , sought political base , though not outside the party . Unlike a new Jawaharlal Nehru , Rajendra Prasad and Vallabhbhai Patel , he did not turn to the municipalities : he had had his of municipal intrigue and frustration in 1917 - 18 as chairman of Salem Municipal Council . Instead , in imitation of Gandhi , he spiritual up set an ashram ( retreat ) near Tiruchengodu in south - western Salem in 1925 . He took such activists as had remained loyal to him and gave them employment organizing

fill

khadi work in the locality . Funds for the ashram came from Rajagopalachari ' s contacts at the centre – mainly from Gandhi ' s All - India Spinners ' Association , which provided a grant of Rs . 60 , 000 , and from Jamnalal Bajaj , the wealthy Central Provinces Marwari and Congressman . 30 The ashram brought Rajagopalachari face to face with the harsh realities of rural life in the poor , drought - stricken area . It posed for him the problems of relating the nation struggle alist to the lives and interests of the local popu lation . " You cannot " , he asserted , " successfully claim the trusteeship of the people unless you include the economic condition of the peasantry in your politics " . 31 But Raja gopalachari was too steeped in Brahminical elitism to proceed from such a statement to advocacy of a revolutionary trans formation of rural society . Khadi production offered one palliative , but Rajagopalachari strove for a more complete , an intellectually more attractive , solution . He turned to prohibition , the social appeal and agitational potential of which

had been

demonstrated in the

anti - liquor

movement

of

1921 . It exploited the sanskritizing ambitions of castes lower than his own and , as a Brahmin , he automatically equated the consumption of alcohol with the degeneracy of the lowest strata of Hindu society . Prohibition did not involve the coercion of caste Hindus that he feared in the Vaikam satya graha and the Shermadevi affair . It was an issue that could transcend community and party . It would , so he hoped , re direct the attention of politicians away from squabbles over patronage and communal representation and back to fundamentals . Agitation against prohibition would be hard for the British to quash without offending the traditions and convictions of Hindu civilization , and yet the government ' s drink revenue was a vulnerable spot to attack . 32 At first Rajagopalachari conducted rural propaganda meetings on prohibition and the evils of drink , and he urged caste associations and panchayats to discourage their members from drinking alcohol . But with excise in the hands of the ministry and with government servants alert for any attempt to revive anti - liquor agitation , relatively little could be achieved in this fashion . Rajagopalachari had argued that

the legislatures might be used to win minor concessions even though they could not be obstructed . It was with the hope either of achieving prohibition through the legislature or of demonstrating the limitations of dyarchy by legislators ' failure to introduce prohibition that Rajagopalachari turned to watch the progress of the Madras Legislative Council .

87

-

Full - fledged Moderatism of the Tamil Swarajya party

Tendencies Towards

were the Madras . Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti were the most conspicuous advocates of the new Swarajist line , whereas Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and , after his resignation from the Madras legislature in November 1921 , Srinivasa Iyengar were less impatient , more tolerant of the Gandhians . Vijayaraghavachari remained largely aloof : he was respected as a Congress veteran , but the snubs he had received from Gandhi and his lieutenants in his year as Congress president made him disinclined to resume a leading role in national or regional politics . Other former Nation alists , like C . V . Venkataramana Iyengar , a Coimbatore MLC , and T . Rangachari in the Assembly , waited to see the effect Swarajists iveness of the before deciding whether to join At

the

core

city Nationalists

them

of

1919 - 20

.

In Tamilnad , because of Rajagopalachari ' s rearguard action , the Swarajists only gradually gained ground . Denied access to the TNCC ' s resources until 1925 , they entered the 1923 elections short of funds , with few candidates and little organization . As late as July 1923 only Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti had declared themselves Swarajist candidates and no more than a dozen Tamil Swarajists contested seats for the Madras legislature in that year . So poor were their prospects that Motilal Nehru advised the Tamil party to con centrate on winning Assembly seats to help press the National Demand and not to bother with the Madras legislature where they were not likely to have a majority . 33 In consequence , five of the six Assembly seats for Tamilnad fell to Swarajisis , with Sivaswami Aiyar the only Liberal returned . The provincial elections were held on 31 October 1923 . Party labels were more widely employed than in 1920 , partly due to Swarajist intervention , though many non - Brahmins preferred such vague designations as " Nationalist " or " Independent " to allow them to side with whichever party or grouping was invited to form a ministry . The Justice Party encouraged this by its policy of incorporating whichever non Brahmins were , through their own efforts , elected to the legislature . 34 Nevertheless , the ministry had its adherents and it was the deployment of patronage rather than public electioneering which secured the return of many Justice MLCs they had The Tamil Swarajists were thus doubly penalized : limited access to the funds and organization of their party , and they could not rival the Justice Party ' s influence in the local government bodies . Polling was heavier than in 1920 ,

88

still

relatively low . It ranged from 28 per cent in North Arcot rural constituency , to 58 . 8 per cent in Madras though

city ,

in the Tinnevelly - Palamcottah urban In the Muslim constituencies , where polling light had been so in 1920 , the change was most marked , reach ing as high as 71 per cent in Madura - Trichinopoly urban con stituency . But the increased Muslim poll did not particularly benefit the Swarajists , except in Madras city where Moosa Sait ' s wealth and prominence made him a particularly strong candidate anyway . 35 The government assessed the outcome of the election as shown in Table 2 . In the eyes of the Madras and

77 per

constituency .

cent

government the Justice Party was best able to command a majority in the legislature , and at the end of November 1923 , Willingdon invited the Raja of Panagal to form a new ministry . TABLE

Party Composition

of

2

the Madras

Justice Anti -Ministerialists Congress ( Swarajists Independents

Total of elected addition , the

In

11

the

officials

1923

44 )

MLCS

11 6

98

nominated MLCs and expected were to support 18

ministry . 36

elections the All - India Swarajya legislatures where Swarajists were

Before the

ised that in

Legislature ,

Party prom in

a

minority

not their seats , except to prevent them being forfeited and when there might be opportunities to ob struct or overthrow the ministries . In both Madras and the Punjab , where the elections produced minority Swarajist parties , this decree was contested . The Tamil party asserted that it was " unnecessary , inexpedient and likely to lead to the disintegration of the party . . . " ; and claimed that the " situation in the Madras Council of the various parties is such that the small Swarajya Party has good chances of effect ive opposition " . 37 Significantly , this argument was voiced by the Tamil , not the Telugu Swarajists . Prakasam , elected parental keeping Assembly eye to the but a on the Telugu MLCs continuing leadership and resentful of Tamil of the Congress they would

occupy

Presidency, deplored the decision of the India Swarajya Party to permit the Swarajists in Madras in

the Madras

All and

the Punjab to take their seats as an encouragement to the " tendencies towards full - fledged moderatism '' already becoming manifest in the Madras council party . 38 The Tamil Swarajist MLCs ignored his objections and in March 1924 entered an liance with other Opposition MLCs to form the United Nation alist Party . Its leader was C . V . S . Narasimha Raju , a Telugu zamindar of moderate views who had been an MLC under the Morley -Minto constitution and a Liberal in the first dyarchy council ; its executive committee included only the Brahmin Swarajist Satyamurti among a cluster of non - Brahmin dissidents - C . Ramalinga Reddi of Chittoor , C . Natesa Mudaliar of Madras , T . A . Ramalingam Chetti * of Coimbatore , and P . Subbarayan of

al

Salem

. 39

The formation of the United Nationalists so soon after the Swarajists ' entry into the legislature was indicative of the basic situation of the Swarajists in the second and third councils . Few in number , it was logical that the Swarajists should ally with other Opposition groups to increase their effectiveness . The dominance of the Justice Party as a atively stable ministerial party provoked the formation of a rival bloc in the council strong enough to challenge and overthrow it . But it was not the numerical weakness of the Swarajists alone which was responsible for their alliance . The Tamil Swarajists , in particular , were interested less in the destruction of dyarchy than in seeking to work it to their advantage .

rel

stated objectives of the All - India Swarajya Party were to wreck dyarchy and to force a situation in which either civil disobedience or constitutional concessions would result . The Tamil Swarajists subscribed to these objectives – partly because they were the conditions for membership of the India party , partly from a conviction that they were worthy , patriotic , rather impractical , aims . Whereas Das saw the creation of a constitutional crisis as a situation to which the parliamentary traditions of the British would force them to respond , Rangaswami Iyengar and Satyamurti had not lost faith in a favourable response before that crisis was reached . Through appeals to the Labour Party in Britain , by consti tutional agitation in India , and by periodic propaganda tours in both countries , the Swarajists hoped to alarm Britain and hence quicken the pace of constitutional reform . Rangaswami Iyengar dreamed of an Indian re - enactment of Runnymeade or the Grand Remonstrance , 40 but regarded the immediate task as one of winning the votes of electors who cared more about the price of paddy or the burden of taxation than the distant The

All

if

90

of swaraj . It was a pragmatic view . failed in Tamilnad , the Swarajists argued , ignored the day - to - day concerns of the people .

prospect had

Non -

cooperation

because it had It was their to show the

task , therefore , to do " normal political work people that Swaraj meant better conditions for themselves and their children " . 41 By denouncing non - cooperation as an aber ration and calling for a return to " normal political work " , the Tamil Swarajists laid themselves open to criticism from Congressmen who feared a reversion to the politics of Gokhale Satyamurti was singled out as having and Srinivasa Sastri , mentality the " of the moderate – with his belief in the

efficacy of constitutional agitation , with his predilection for making fine speeches in decorated halls in the presence

high - placed august personages and his contemptuous dis missal of the harmless Charka as an unpractical proposition " . 42 There was much truth in the accusation . the Swarajists during compared European could be to socialists the revision ist controversy of the 1890s , the Tamil Swarajists were close to the revisionist position of Bernstein , seeking to achieve program from an existing parliamentary system , while a minimum Das was nearer to the opposite extreme , holding , like Rosa Luxemburg , that by spurning petty gains and working for a major crisis , far greater advances would ultimately be achieved .

of

If

This divergence of the Tamil Swarajists from the ortho Swarajist line did not originate with the post - election situation : it was much older . In giving evidence to the dox

Civil

Disobedience Enquiry Committee in 1922 , Rangaswami Iyengar claimed that by involving themselves in such concerns as education and land revenue in the legislatures Congressmen would not be frittering away their energies , but would be building a broad base for the nationalist movement . Raja gopalachari asked : " We should not take up an attitude of total obstruction ? " " No " , replied Rangaswami . His views , approved by Satyamurti , were cited in the committee ' s report as evidence that the Tamil Pro - Changers did not believe in the obstructionism advocated by Das and Nehru . 43 Tamil Swarajists

had not been dragged very far from by the storm tide of non - cooperation In Bengal and other provinces where the agitation had run strongly the former Nationalists had to float with the currents of non - cooperation . In Tamilnad , where the agitation had been relatively weak and directed by a rival Congress faction , the Nationalists felt less compulsion to compromise . Furthermore , The

their Nationalist moorings

their earlier preoccupation strengthened

sterial

with the legislature had been of the Justice Party to mini

by the accession office . The Brahmin

politicians of Tamilnad

-

.

91

whether Nationalists , Liberals or non - cooperators – had been profoundly disturbed by the appointment of non - Brahmin mini sters and by the communal legislation which followed . The Communal 6 . 0 . s of 1921 - 22 threatened the educational and professional future of the Brahmin middle class ; the Hindu Religious Endowments legislation , introduced at the end of the first council , was a direct challenge to the Brahmin priesthood . A community criss - crossed by ritual , social , occupational , and political differences , and so long accustom leadership , the Brahmins could not meet the Justice ed to attack by an agile regrouping into a solid phalanx . They were bewildered ; their responses were often contradictory . posed by Justice domination of To the immediate problem the Madras legislature two solutions were possible . One was to abandon the legislature entirely in the hope that , left to themselves , the non - Brahmins would lose their hostility to the Brahmins , squabble among themselves and later join the Brahmins in parties formed on non - communal lines . This course had a wide measure of support . In effect it was held by Rajagopalachari , who , as we have seen , had argued in 1920 that Brahmins should stay out of the legislature and allow the by Srinivasa Iyengar , smarting non - Brahmins a free hand ; 44 experience from his in the first year of the legislature ; 45 by and the Brahmin Liberals , who had decided by early 1923 to ignore the provincial council and concentrate on the all - India level of politics and government . 46 Kasturi Ranga Iyengar from 1921 until his death in 1923 inclined to this course . As importance an old Nationalist he did not doubt the of Con gressmen of his ilk gaining control of the Madras legislature , but in the near future he thought abstention the best course until anti - Brahminism died down and non - Brahmins had become disillusioned with collaborative politics . He did not oppose Swarajist tactics as such but feared that their premature adoption in Madras would strengthen the Justice - Raj alliance and exacerbate communalism . "

alternative course was to attempt a direct assault legislature and to overthrow the Justice ministry .

The on

the

Iyengar denounced the Liberals ' decision to abstain as a " counsel of despair " and an illus tration of precisely the sort of Brahmin arrogance that non Brahmins loathed . 48 He and other Tamil Swarajists argued that only by bearding the Justice lion in the council den would it ever be defeated ; it was folly for the nationalists legislature to turn their backs on the and just hope that things would change . For many Brahmins the Swarajya Party , because it was an all - India organization and had , on the national ( not the regional level ) , an intercommunal Rangaswami from

the

legislature

if

92

character , was an ideal base for a counter - attack against the Justicites . Nationalism expressed and elevated their indig nation at what they believed to be rank communalism ; it com pensated for the political and social ostracism threatening them in Madras . It has been remarked that the Justice min istry was interested in patronage and so cared little about the caste of its clients . 49 But where a non - Brahmin like Subbarayan might ricochet from Congress to Justice Party to United Nationalists , Brahmin politicians could not identify with a party which hounded them in the legislature , in the Press and on public platforms , which depicted them as mon

sters , foreigners and tyrants . Whether by inclination moderates or extremists , Tamil Brahmin politicians who wished to remain in provincial politics huddled together for secur ity and assurance within the protective walls of the Swarajya Party .

it

Those who believed in this second course knew that would be suicidal to operate openly as a Brahmin clique . They no longer had a numerical advantage in the electorate and the council , and the precious illusion of the Brahmin prerogative of leadership had been shattered in 1920 by the appointment of non - Brahmin ministers . was essential that the Brahmin Swarajists associate with at least a section of the non - Brahmins and for this purpose the formation of the

It

United Nationalist Party , formally (but not irrevocably ) binding the predominantly Brahmin Swarajists with the non Brahmin dissidents , was ideal . The Tamil Swarajists were encouraged in their assault tactics by developments during the first council . On the one hand , as we have seen , patronage and political advantage induced the non - Brahmin MLCs to coalesce within the Justice Party ; but , on the other hand , there was a centrifugal ten dency as MLCs , disappointed at the policies and practices of the ministry , spun off from the party . Patronage , a mag netism that could repel as well as attract , was certainly one reason for the creation of a band of non - Brahmin dissidents in the legislature . C . Ramalinga Reddi was said to have deserted the Panagal ministry in 1923 because he was not

offered the post of Education Minister he

coveted nor given patronage the in the Chittoor district board he thought his appointments he had due ; 5o C . Natesa Mudaliar was denied sought for himself and his relatives in the Madras Corpor ation and the judicial service ; 51 and T . A . Ramalingam Chetti was being pushed out of his posts as president of Coimbatore ' s district board and chairman of Coimbatore municipal council by a new Justice follower , C . s . Ratnasabapathi Mudaliar . 52 Tamil MLCs felt that the ministry was dominated by and run

93

for the Telugus – another source of conflict between the two regions . Muslim MLCs fretted for a Muslim minister or exec utive councillor . 53 Panagal could not satisfy everyone : there were not enough jobs to go round . After the 1923 elections he removed K . V . Reddi Naidu from his ministerial post to bring in a Tamil and he tried to win back Muslim support by appointing a Muslim as council secretary and securing the appointment of Muhammad Usman as Home Member of the Executive Council . Denial of patronage was not , however , the whole story .

Not all non - Brahmins shared the pragmatic approach of Tyagaraja Chetti and Panagal and some certainly felt that the Justice Party should be working for the reform and regener ation of non - Brahmin society and culture and not be confined to a quest for jobs and office . 54 If Ramalinga Reddi was ambitious to be a minister it was partly to be in a position to implement educational schemes of the type he had already undertaken as Inspector -General of Education in Mysore . Subbarayan was not feigning indignation when he protested against Tyagaraya Chetti ' s remarks that Congress prisoners should be treated like robbers and dacoits . 55 And there were other pressures on the MLCs than a score of relatives and clients clamouring to be fed juicy morsels of patronage . The electorate had been enlarged , and with constituencies cover ing a whole district , MLCs ' prospects of re - election did not depend upon patronage alone . They also depended on an abil ity to articulate and redress the grievances of the electors . Take the case of Ramalingam Chetti . He belonged to a Vellala sub - caste too thinly represented in Coimbatore to provide him with a communal base for electoral purposes . As lawyer , money - lender and agent to the Coimbatore a owners he had extensive professional contacts , and his local government posts had , temporarily , given him access to that system of influence . But his main vote -winning appeal was numerically to the dominant Gounder community , and he assidu ously cultivated the Gounders ' support by attending caste

mill

conferences , identifying with their grievances on public platforms and in the legislature , and acting in close co operation with his fellow MLCs from Coimbatore , V . C . Vellin giri Gounder and C . V . Venkataramana Iyengar . Ramalingam did not serve the Gounders slavishly – because of his mill interests he did not , for example , show the same enthusiasm for khadi as Vellingiri – but , in view of the ministry ' s poor

agricultural issues , Ramalingam ' s divorce from the Justicites was influenced by the dissatis faction of his electors . 56 record

on

temperance

and

94

As

soon

as the new

Ramalinga Reddi

moved

a

council met after the 1923 elections , vote of no - confidence in Panagal ' s

ministry . The motion was defeated by 65 votes to 43 , but , as the opposition pointed out , only 44 of the ministry ' s support ers were elected MLCs and a government whip had been used to

rally

defeat

nominated and European members behind Panagal . ” The of the no - confidence motion encouraged the formation

of tighter links

the various opposition elements and contributed to the formation of the United Nationalists in March 1924 . But both the Swarajists and the non - Brahmin dissidents had reservations about the union . The Swarajists had to keep their commitments to the ideas and tactics of the All - India party and hoped to be returned in greater numbers at the next election , this time with full Congress support . The non - Brahmins remained true to what they termed " non Brahmin interests " , promising that they would pursue communal representation and after over - throwing the Justice ruling clique replace it by a new non - Brahmin ministry . 58 There was little affection in the marriage and much suspicion , but there was enough mutual advantage for it to survive .

Fine Speeches

among

in Decorated Halls

of Madras reported in 1927 that " the one Swarajist policy of consistent and continuous obstruction within the Councils had practically never been The Government

time professed

Essentially constitutionalist in out in Madras " . 59 look , the Madras Swarajists were more anxious to dislodge the Justice Party than to wreck dyarchy . On the few occasions they did try obstruction they were either disowned by their embarrassed United Nationalist colleagues or successfully blocked by the government and its allies . pursued

broad national issues – such as provincial autonomy rights or the of Indians overseas – the Swarajists could draw almost all the anti - ministerial MLCs into their lobby . Budget grants attracted a profusion of motions for cuts in alloca tions for the Governor ' s staff , for the police and senior On

civil

servants , intended

the ministry .

to

impress the taxpayer

and

harass

But generally the United Nationalists would only move token cuts , of say Rs . 100 or a similar nominal sum ; the Swarajists pressed for a more substantial re duction they almost invariably did so alone . In March 1924 , for example , Satyamurti moved for the omission of Rs . 2 ,00 , 000 from a Budget grant of Rs . 3 , 38 , 695 for the staff and house hold of the Governor . He used the opportunity to attack Willingdon ' s appointment of a non - Brahmin ministry and gov

if

ernment

repression

of the Congress during

non - cooperation .

95

of

the proposed cut was , however , too large for the United Nationalists . When a poll was taken , only three Swarajist MLCs including Satyamurti voted for the motion , 23 United Nationalists were neutral and the great majority of Willingdon was prepared to suffer the council opposed it . budget , minor defeats but Lord Goschen * , his successor in The

size

April

1924 , used

his

powers

under the

1919 Government

of

India Act to restore grants or resubmit them to the council . The Swarajists were more successful in using points of procedure to ensnare ministers and executive councillors and to delay the business of the council . It was a tactic parti cularly suited to the position of the Madras Swarajists because

even

a

few members

could create

considerable

dis

who delighted in his own skill at repartee , excelled at this and on several occasions succeeded in infuriating members of the government . Favoured ploys points were the use of of order to stop the introduction or legislation discussion of the Swarajists opposed , adjourn ment motions on matters of " urgent public importance " , and the tabling of numerous and elaborate questions to probe every sensitive area of the administration . Twice as many questions were tabled in the second council , 1923 - 26 , as in the first , 61 and by early 1924 question time was absorbing nearly half the council ' s day as well as providing a full time occupation for bureaucrats who thought they had better work to do . The government responded by tightening council procedure . From August 1924 question time was fixed at one hour a day , and from February 1925 only specially designated (" starred " ) questions were answered in the council and open questions , replies to the rest being for supplementary published directly in the proceedings . 62 A time limit was also placed on speeches in major debates . The election of a Justice MLC , M . Ruthnaswami , as president of the council late in 1925 led to further restrictions . The Swarajists were vehement in their objections to these changes , but could do nothing to prevent them .

ruption .

Satyamurti ,

O

Far from constitution - wrecking , the Swarajists and the United Nationalists revelled in the language and conventions

of British

parliamentarianism

.

There were the customary

courtesies between members on opposing benches , the lavish praise for a deceased MLC or a retiring executive councillor , the reverence for the minutia of procedure at Westminister . Satyamurti , whose fondness for self - advertisement was one of his less attractive traits , was again conspicuous in this 3 respect . 63 Opposition and ministerial MLCs alike regarded emulation

the House of Commons as itself a demonstration for self - government and responsibility , and the

of

of fitness

Government encouraged

of Madras , intent

on

making dyarchy

a

success ,

president and secre

this . In 1922 the council ' s tary visited Westminister to study parliamentary procedure and almost invariably reference was made to practices in the

questions of procedure were raised . It was , , therefore natural for the Swarajists to identify with the parliamentary atmosphere . It was not the Swarajists who had captured the legislature , but the legislature which cap tivated the Swarajists .

Commons

when

As far as Tamilnad was concerned two issues dominated the second council and they illustrate the sort of practical probiems the Swarajists faced . They were the Hindu Religious Endowments Act and the agitation against land resettlement in Tanjore .

· Legislation for the control of Hindu religious endow ments , which were a major potential source for ministerial patronage , had been inhibited before 1920 by the British reluctance to interfere in religious matters . With the ad vent of elected ministers in 1920 this obstacle was removed . The enormous wealth and influence of Hindu temples and monas teries along with the power Brahmins derived from them made the endowments an obvious target for the Justicites . A Hindu Religious Endowments Bill was passed in March 1923 at the close of the first council . 64 It attracted widespread exclusively , mainly , , ism but not from the Brahmins , because it was rushed through the council before public opinion had been consulted and because it was thought unnecessarily vindictive : " a pernicious measure " T . Rangachari called . 65 The Swara jists opposed the and demanded its amendment or repeal Swarajya called the Justice in their election manifestos . Party a " Colossus bestriding the Presidency with one foot firmly implanted in the mutts (monasteries ] and temples and the other in the local and district boards " . 66

critic

it

bill

The Governor had his own reservations about the bill and sent it back to the legislature for revision . It was un successfully opposed by the Swarajists and some of the other

Questions then arose as to the legality amending of the second council a measure inherited from the first council , and the was resubmitted in 1925 . It did pass through stages not its before the second council was again featured in the election campaign dissolved and so for the third council in 1926 . Srinivasa Iyengar , by 1926 the Tamil Swarajist leader , declared his complete aversion to

United

Nationalists .

all it

bill

bill and attributed Swarajist success in the election to public opposition to it . 67 On the other hand , Varadarajulu

the

Naidu ,

Ramaswami

Naicker

and Kalyanasundara Mudaliar

supported

97

the

legislation

alism . 68

and

bill

its

accused

finally

opponents

of

Brahmin

commun

. The agitation against the Hindu Religious Endowments Bill illuminates two facets of the Swarajya Party in Tamilnad . Firstly , it showed the party as an agency through which Brahmins tried to protect their interests in provincial poli tics . This necessarily hampered closer association with the The

non - Brahmin

United

Congressmen . framework of

became

Nationalists

Secondly

law

and

in

1927

offended

non - Brahmin

, the Swarajists , operating within

the

electoral politics had to collect all the pro grievances they could find in order to increase their vincial party ' s strength . The danger of losing non - Brahmin support

had to be weighed against valuable Brahmin votes and temple funds in the 1923 and 1926 elections . The was not an delay swaraj , issue that would hasten or but it was an immediate grievance for the Swarajists to exploit in their struggle against the Justice Party .

bill

greater extent than communal legislation or local , land dominated the debates and questions of the dyarchy legislature in Madras . The primary issues were : could the legislature replace the periodic ryotwari resettlements by a permanent settlement and could the legislature assume the right to dictate the nature of land taxation ? MLCs demanded a change from the reassessment of ryotwari land every 30 years to a permanent settlement in CI the belief that this would leave the cultivator a fairer To

a

government

share

of the profit

resolution

from

his

own

labour

for permanent settlement

was

and

improvements .

carried

in

A

December

1921 , and the committee of MLCs and officials to which the issue was referred recommended the revolutionary change of giving the legislature the power to dictate future increases in the assessment rates . On the issue of permanent settle ment the committee was divided . 69 The government rejected the report ' s recommendations and August in 1922 announced the enhancement of land revenue rates in the Tanjore and Trichinopoly districts by as much as 18 per cent on dry lands and 25 per cent on wet . Sir Arthur Knapp ,

the Home Member , refused

allow either the mirasdars or the 70 The mirasdars threat rates . ened civil disobedience if the new rates were not modified , but for the present they concentrated on securing the election of spokesmen to the legislature . Unlike most districts where the Swarajists could field only one candidate in the 1923 elections , in Tanjore they ran three candidates who were pledged to reduce or abolish the enhancements and to agitate for permanent settlement . Two Swarajists were elected ; to

legislature to contest the

new

98

the third seat went to S . Muthiah Mudaliar . *

a

pro - Swarajist

Vellala mirasdar ,

Muthiah Mudaliar resolution in the legislature that the enhanced rev enue rates for Tanjore should not be introduced until a new assessment policy had been formulated , but his proposal was narrowly defeated by the combined votes of the ministerial and nominated members . 72

moved

On

14

December

1923

a

held that the new rates were not excess asserted that the agitation was " primarily political in character " . After Knapp had rejected a second appeal from the mirasdars in February 1924 , many of them began to despair of achieving redress through constitutional channels . 73 At a meeting at Mayavaram at the end of March mirasdars resolved not to pay the April revenue instalment . They were encouraged by the difficulty the government experienced in disposing of property attached from earlier defaulters , by Knapp ' s public admission that for the present 18 per cent would be the ceil ing for land revenue increases , and by the ignominious defeat of his hastily - drafted Madras Land Revenue Settlement Bill , The

ive

government

and

thrown

out

on

full control

28

March

1924 by

a

legislature

which

demanded

mirasdars were not the intrepid satyagrahis the nationalist press exhorted them to be . Their lands , among the richest in the presidency , were too valuable to gamble with and by the end of April kist ( instalment of revenue ) payments were up to 75 per cent of the demand . 75 A proposal by Congress zealots for mass civil disobedience was rejected by a mirasdars ' conference at Mannargudi on 18 - 19 May ; so was a suggestion that the local mirasdars ' association should merge with the Tanjore DCC . 76 But , as the mirasdars wavered , the government relented . In August 1924 the highest rates were scaled down and the agi 77 tation quickly died away . over

resettlement . 74

But the

The resettlement agitation had a dual inportance . On negative its side it demonstrated the weakness of the Swarajists

their allies in the legislature against the combined votes of the ministerial and official members . If the constitution and

path were blocked , there was little the Swarajists would , or could , do for their electors . Neither the Swarajist MLCs nor the majority of mirasdars were prepared for a confront ation with the government which would involve imprisonment and confiscation of property and might result in failure . On the positive side , the Swarajists had revived the old con nection between the Congress and the wealthier landlords . Although many leading mirasdars were Brahmins , the involvement of Vellalas like Muthiah Mudaliar weakened Justice criticisms that the Swarajya party was a watchdog only for Brahmin inter ests . Most significantly , the Swarajists had placed the

al

still

99

Congress in the forefront of the agitation against the exist ing landholding system . And they followed up their Tanjore campaign with constitutional activity on behalf of the other landholders and tenants elsewhere in the Madras Presidency , while , by default the Justice Party , its voice muted by collab oration with the Raj , appeared far less active in the interests of the mirasdars and ryots . A

Hopeless Basis

for

a

Party

System

At the beginning of the dyarchy period Willingdon had played a straightforward game of constitutionalists versus anti - constitutionalists . He relied on the Justicites to oppose the Congress and , by their successful working of dyarchy , to demonstrate the superiority of parliamentarianism over non - cooperation and civil disobedience . Within the limits of the Madras game , Willingdon was successful : with the exception of the Punjab , no province had produced as stable a ministry as Madras . But Willingdon did not see this as the only game for a Governor to play . Indeed , the success of the first game engendered a second type of contest , this time playing off one constitutionalist group against another . At the time of the no - confidence motion in the Legislative Council in November 1923 Willingdon had advised the European and nominated MLCs to support Panagal , but , so he informed the Secretary of State , a similar situation occurred he would not intervene even it meant the fall of the ministry . 78 The election of Swarajists in 1923 and the creation of the United Nationalists did not alarm him because he believed that in Madras the Swarajists were not constitution -wreckers . In time they would emerge as Radicals against the Justice Tories , and after three years cooling their heels in oppos ition the Radicals might be ready for office . "

if if

It was left for Lord Goschen , as Willingdon ' s successor , supervise to the second game . This was to be a fairly evenly matched bout following the Queensbury rules of constitution alism and with Goschen appearing as referee rather than in Willingdon ' s role of trainer in the Justice corner . In undertaking this role Goschen had several motives . sought He to replace the communal division in Madras between the non -Brahmin Justicites and their Brahmin opponents by two inter - communal parties with contrasting progressive and con servative programs . Goschen was the eldest son of a Liberal Unionist and had been an MP for 10 years . Like Willingdon , he had been educated in Westminister ' s powerful parliamentary tradition . He understood the reasons which impelled Willingdon to appoint a non - Brahmin ministry , but he was

100

anxious

to create

a

two - party system

, that presumed pre

requisite for the development of a healthy legislature . So were his superiors . Witness Lord Olivier , Labour ' s Secretary of State for India in May 1924 : " A communal basis may be a necessary transitional expedient , but it is one of the worst

bases possible for National Parliamentary insti 80 Or the Conservatives ' Lord Birkenhead in July 1927 : " It always seemed to me obvious that the Brahmin - non 181 Brahmin division was a hopeless basis for a party system . . . " Goschen knew what was expected of him . 82 It was , in addition , disadvantageous for the Raj to depend exclusively on the Justice Party . During non cooperation such dependence had been necessary to combat the Congress , but with non - cooperation defeated and with the Justice Party ever hungry for more patronage and power , it was time for the master to reassert his independence of the

kinds

of

tutions " .

pushful servant . Sir C . P . Ramaswami Aiyar , Law Member since 1923 and court favourite of Goschen as he had been of Willingdon , was alleged by the Justice ministers to be dis

tributing appointments

promotions in the gift of the reserved half to Brahmins and to be conspiring with the Brahmin Swarajists to overthrow the Justice ministry . Goschen dismissed such allegations as part of the Justicites ' perpet ual feud with the Brahmins and their ceaseless quest for patronage . 83 A report drafted by the Government of Madras in 1926 complained that " the main interference during the past three years was that attempted by the Ministers in regard to patronage on the reserved side . . . " 04 Governor and civil servants alike felt that the Justice leadership had to be taught that it did not have an automatic right to minister ial office and its perquisites . and

finally , it

And , scheme Montagu

was time to press on with the grand prepared Congressmen had been forced to had . cooperation abandon non and civil disobedience . Now the task was to lure them into active participation in the constitu tional system , and , by inducing them to share in the running of dyarchy , to moderate the nationalist movement and streng then

constitutionalism .

There was evidence in 1925 - 26 that the Congress in Madras would participate in Goschen ' s game . The majority of the United Nationalists formally joined the Congress on the eve of the 1926 elections and they constituted the largest element among the Congress MLCs returned . As their origins and their performance in the second council indicated , the United Nationalists were not out to destroy dyarchy but to slip into the Justicites ' chairs . In late 1925 and early 1926

101

negotiated with the leaders of the Responsivists , a group of Swarajists who had rejected " non - cooperation through the legislatures " for " responsive cooperation " . es Un he resigned from the legislature in March 1926 to become Vice - Chancellor of the new Andhra University , C . Ramalinga Reddi , the United Nationalists ' most articulate spokesman , openly favoured responsivism . The Swarajists had , he pointed out in December 1925 , promised to reduce land taxation and to end corruption in local government , and " once you promise redress of such grievances , how can you taboo office as some thing unclean ? " 86 The death of C . R . Das in June 1925 , follow ing the failure of the Swarajists to paralyse dyarchy in . Bengal , favoured a tactical shift from obstruction to quali . fied cooperation . Strong though the pull of responsivism was , almost all the United Nationalists decided to cling to the Swarajists in Madras . Srinivasa Iyengar , the TNCC president , publicly op posed the Responsivists and insisted that if the United they

splinter

til

Nationalists joined the Congress they would have to renounce ambitions of office . 87 In private , however , Srinivasa and

if the Congress won substan other provinces in 1926 the party would change its policy and take office . 88 Srinivasa Iyengar hoped that a Congress electoral landslide would force from the British enough concessions to justify a more respon sive policy by the Congress , and , as the president - elect of the party , he would be in a position to direct it . For their part , the United Nationalists wanted the electoral asset of the name and organization of the Congress , which at its Cawnpore session in December 1925 had officially adopted the Rangaswami

tial

Iyengar hinted that

majorities

in

Madras

Swarajist program .

and

They knew

, too , that incorporation within

the Congress and temporary renunciation of office was better than a three - cornered contest in which the Justice Party would be likely to win against a divided Congress and Responsivist opposition . It was , C . V . S . Narasimha Raju told the Respon sivist leaders , " absolutely necessary to have only two parties in Madras . 89 In the elections in November 1926 the greatest strength of the Congress was in the urban constituencies , but through effective campaigning and party involvement in agrarian issues the Congress won a large measure of rural support . In select ing his party ' s candidates in Tamilnad Srinivasa Iyengar bal anced the interests of the principal communities in the con

stitutency

–

by

choosing

put , for example , running

Tanjore , and seeking Coimbatore or Salem .

a

a

Vellala and two Vellalas

a

Vanniyar

and

a

in

Brahmin

Chingle in

prominent Gounder to contest in But the choice of candidates was small .

102

Each non - Muhammadan

constituency

covered

a

whole

district

,

with a total population in most cases of over 1 , 500 , 000 and from 40 , 000 to 75 , 000 voters . The urban constituencies were smaller and had fewer voters . The Muslim and Christian con stituencies incorporated several districts or towns ; a few strayed over linguistic boundaries . Thus , to win a seat a candidate had to be a man of exceptional wealth and influence , or such a person ' s protege . Such men were few and it was not , therefore , surprising that many of the Congress candidates of 1926

were

former

Justice , United Nationalist

and Independent

MLCs . Of the 98 elected MLCs in 1926 sat in the previous council ; in Tamilnad 10 of the 24 Congress candidates Party lines were more clearly had previously been MLCs . 90 previous years , but it was reshuffling drawn in 1926 than in of the old pack rather than a new deck . , 51 had

TABLE

3

Party . Composition of the Madras Legislature ,

1926

Congress Independents

Justice Total of elected MLCs In and

addition there were 22 nominated MLCs 11 officials in the 132 -member legis

lature . 91

According to the government ' s figures ( Table 3 ) , the Congress was the largest single party , but held less than a third of the total number of seats . The Justice Party had shrunk tn 21 MLCs , but many of those described as Independi ents were former Justicites who in view of Goschen ' s known antipathy to the party had opted for neutrality until a new ministry was formed . As in 1920 , the election results left an ambitious Governor free to dictate the balance of power in the legislature . Goschen invited Narasimha Raju , as party in the legislature , to form a ministry . Narasimha was " very anxious " to do so , but asked for two days in which to consult his party . 92 As soon as the election results had been announced there had been sug gestions by Congressmen that the party take office rather On

leader

22

November

of the

1926

Congress

103

than

its

" waste

years

in

futile opposition "

. 93

But Congress Congress

in the council and outside it that a could not be formed without the prior approval of the AICC or the annual Congress . 94 Narasimha Raju returned to Goschen on 24 November to regret that the party could not form a ministry because the Congress forbad its members to take office . He did , however , impress on the Governor that he and at least 15 other MLCs would like to form a ministry if Goschen would wait until the annual Congress session at Gauhati a month later before forming his ministry . 95 agreed

men

ministry

This Goschen could not do . He regretted that the mod erate elements in the Congress party could not constitute a ministry " because it would have been a great blow to the extremists among them and demonstrated that the Madras mem bers of the Congress were responsivists " . 96 He did , however , keep the game open by asserting that the election verdict had gone against the Panagal ministry and by refusing to include the former ministers in the new ministry . 97 He turned to the amorphous , acephalous Independents and from them pieced together his ministerial team . Subbarayan was appointed Chief Minister with A . Ranganatha Mudaliar from Bellary , and R . N . Arogyaswami Mudaliar , an Indian Christian and , like Ranganatha , a former government servant as the Second and Third Ministers . The choice of Subbarayan as Chief Minister

interesting

particularly

of

Goschen ' s A 37 - year - oid Gounder zamindar , Subbarayan had studied at Madras , Oxford and Dublin before qualifying as a barrister and setting up prac tice in Madras . Since 1920 he had been returned by the South Central Landholders constituency which mustered less than 60 electors . Although he had resigned as a council secretary and left the Justice Party in 1922 and had been among the United Nationalist leaders , Subbarayan did not join the Con gress in 1926 , presumably not wishing to antagonize his con stituents . He had , however , been a Congressmen until the Calcutta Congress and was a close friend of Rajagopalachari . One critic described him as an opportunist with a " second class brain " , who was in the legislature " because it was easy for him to be there '' . 98 But opportunism and mediocrity were enough common in the council and Subbarayan ' s amiable dis position was some compensation for his lack of resolution and was aim

an

in

view

' of drawing the Congress into responsivism .

originality . struct

a

new

Acceptance

For

a

one ,

He was

of office

many

convenient

a

figure around

ministerial party .

whom

Goschen

could

con

no Crime

the Independent ministry was solution to the Swarajists ' dilemma .

Tamil Congressmen

short - term

104

It excluded the Justice Party from office while placing ministerial power in the hands of men less communal and nationalistic than their predecessors . If the ministry

more

dis

if

appointed the Congress or the Congress at Gauhati lifted the ban on office , the Congress MLCs could vote it out . " We shall break it " , boasted Satyamurti , " but how we shall break and when is for us to determine " . 99 Even when the Congress met and decided to keep the ban , the confidence of the Con gressmen that they were masters of the Madras situation remained undiminished .

it

the ministry ' s principal Swarajists from the temptation necessary precaution against a new

Rajagopalachari was one backers . It kept the Brahmin

of

of ministerial office , a outbreak of anti - Brahminism ,

and communalism

it

encouraged

non - Brahmins

of the Justice leadership . 40 significantly ministry , the No less allowed Rajagopalachari legislative experiments to make his own . He persuaded prohibition Subbarayan to take up the cause of and threaten to resign the progress of a Prohibition Bill , drafted by Rajagopalachari , were blocked by the Governor . If prohibit ion were achieved it would be a worthwhile reform ; if it were not , the futility of working dyarchy at all might be demon strated and a situation created favourable for a resumption of civil disobedience . 101 to discard the narrow

if

different ideas of the advantages in office . The exorbitant provincial contribution which had starved the transferred departments of funds since 1920 were now being remitted – 57 lakhs in March 1926 , 167 lakhs a year later - thus offering the ministers a unique opportunity to implement constructive reforms . The MLCs of all parties had spent too lavishly the elections wish see the council dissolved and new election held the outcome which was unpredictable 103 And some Congress power would not only cut men hoped that keeping Subbarayan patronage off the flow of Justicites but also divert the Congressmen 104 Since the Congress could not take office the Subbarayan ministry seemed the best alternative was case of government by proxy Other

Congressmen had

, to

.

It

.

a

.

.

to

it

in

.

of

a

to

to

on

102

in keeping Subbarayan

of parental favour

,

A

,

spoilt child suddenly deprived the Justice Party resorted tantrums

9

on to

and

in

an

In

105

.

editorial

106a

-

it

in

–

"

. . .

in

"

"

or

"

.

"

"

,

position

A

former

to

regain threats Justice March 1927 Ramaswami Mudaliar announced that the Justice Party forming ministry did not desire even contemplate with its present sirength the council Other despite Justice leaders criticized dyarchy as unworkable having worked their obvious success for six years

its

105

fulfil

and called on the Congress MLCs to their pledges to During the budget debates of March wreck the constitution . 1927 the Justicites moved a no - confidence motion against the ministry and asked the Congress to support them . The Justice and Congress votes together might be enough to oust Subbara yan , but , while the ban on office -holding by the Congress remained , the alternative would be a Justice or a reorganized Independent ministry backed by the Justice Party . Neither would be as favourable to the Congress as the existing min istry . S . Venkatachelam Chetti , * who had replaced Narasimha Raju as Congress leader in the legislature after the latter ' s election as president of the council , consulted Srinivasa Iyengar giving his own opinion that the Justice promise not to take office was a bluff . Srinivasa Iyengar advised the Congress MLCs to abstain from the no - confidence vote so as to prevent the Justice Party returning to office . 102 By these tactics the ministry was saved , but cracks were appearing in the Congress facade . One breakaway group , headed by S . Muthiah Mudaliar of Tanjore , wanted to dismiss the care taker ministry and take office regardless of the Congress ban ; another , consisting mainly of Telugu and Malayali MLCs resent ful of the control exercised by Srinivasa Iyengar and his Tamil associates , wanted the ministry defeated in the belief that the Justicites would not form a new ministry and so a constitutional crisis would result . The main attack on the party ' s tactics came , however , from Prakasam , the Telugu leader . As an Andhra patriot , as an ambitious politician jealous of the rise of Rajagopalachari and Srinivasa Iyengar to the highest levels in the national Congress , Prakasam seized the chance to condemn the opportunism and cynicism which he believed had been the consequence of Congress support for the Independent ministry . " Congressmen " , he explained in a statement published on 20 May 1927 , " were found at the doors of some ministers at hours of the day and night waiting . to get some of their own men nominated for taluq and district boards and some other favours " . 108

all

At the request of Telugu and Malayali MLCs egged on by Prakasam , the Congress Working Committee in May called for an explanation of the conduct of the legislative party in Madras . On the basis of explanations by Venkatachelam Chetti and his deputy , Satyamurti , Srinivasa Iyengar as Congress president steered through the CWC a resolution absolving the Congress leadership in the council from any blame . There had , it said , possibility wrecking dyarchy been " no of " in Madras at the time of the no - confidence motion in March ; indeed , the party had " done all that lay in its power to prevent the streng thening of the bureaucracy by means of an alliance of the

106

bureaucracy with communalism

securing

and

a party whose avowed to repress nationalism

office . . . "

policy is to promote for the purpose of

Prakasam was furious at what he believed to be the partisan behaviour of the Congress president . In speeches in Madras he denounced Srinivasa Iyengar and his henchmen , and called for the overthrow of Subbarayan and the destruct

ion of dyarchy . He was joined by B . Sambamurti , another excitable Telugu , and by R . K . Shanmugham Chetti * of Coimbatore , who for his own ends was trying to foment hostility to the leadership of Srinivasa Iyengar . The Telugus and Malayalis called for an AICC meeting to discuss the CWC ' s verdict , but Srinivasa Iyengar as president and A . Rangaswami Iyengar as

Congress secretary 1927 , by which

deferred

time

it

the meeting

liad been

until late by

overtaken

new

October developments .

In July 1927 the Non - Brahmin Confederation met at Coimbatore . Although the frustration felt by the Justice leadership contributed to the surly mood of the conference , the instigators of its most controversial resolutions were non - Brahmin Congressmen or recent defectors from the Congress – Shanmugham Chetti , Ramaswami Naicker , V . Chakkarai Chetti and Varadarajulu Naidu . The first resolution urged Justic ites to join the Congress so as to swamp its Brahmin element and convert it to a non - Brahmin party ; the second condemned dyarchy as unworkable and declared that the Justice Party would not take office until provincial autonomy was intro duced ; the third , which was not passed , accused Ramaswami Aiyar as Law Member of having contrived the defeat of the Justice Party in 1926 and , attacking Goschen as Rama swami Aiyar ' s stooge , demanded the recall of the Governor . 110 the Justicites taken seriously the resolution to enter the Congress , the Tamil Congress might well have suddenly assumed a more non - Brahmin character ; certainly the responsivist elements within the party would have been strengthened . Dr Irschick assumes that a non - Brahmin influx Had

a

:

1927

especially

from

the second generation

1930

had more

of western

fundamen educated and

-

after

causes

–

gress

tal

–

.

-

a

,

in

at 112

did occur and that the conversion of the Tamil Congress from a predominantly Brahmin to an overwhelmingly non - Brahmin organization was a consequence of the Coimbatore resolution . " Congressmen There is no evidence to support this assumption . feared a Justice flood , but were relieved when it proved to 12 single leading Justicite be no more than a trickle . Not resurfaced the Congress this time nor was the policy and leadership of the Tamil Congress noticeably altered as result The increasingly non Brahmin character of the Con

107

middle - class non - Brahmins no longer clung to the protection of the communal safeguards and organizations of their elders , and from the late 1920s the Congress was more successful in appeals making to the interests of the non -Brahmins . The immediate consequences of the Coimbatore resolutions were to make Goschen even more hostile to the Justice Party and more determined than ever to make a success of the mal igned dyarchy constitution . His suspicion that the Justicites

were irresponsible and blinkered from seeking larger political issues by communalism and patronage was confirmed . " 13 The Justice leaders were themselves divided as to the wisdom of the resolutions . Some of the younger non - Brahmins were en thusiastic , but K . V . Reddi Naidu , the former minister , was openly hostile , and Panagal , though he did not criticize the

public , attempted a private reconciliation with Goschen . The resolutions also threatened the party ' s main source of income – the zamindars , who were alarmed at 114 the threat not to work dyarchy . 11

resolutions

in

resolutions were no less embarrassing to Iyengar and his associates . They no longer had an excuse to keep the Independent ministry in office . Against his own convictions , Venkatachelam Chetti moved a no confidence motion against the ministry on 23 August 1927 . It was defeated . With the votes of the nominated , official and Independent MLCs whose loyalty had been stiffened by a generous distribution of patronage – about 16 MLCs had recent ly been nominated to local boards – the ministry survived by 67 votes to the opposition ' s 56 ( 38 Congress , 14 Justice and 4 others ) . " 15 With Goschen ' s active support Subbarayan had freed himself from dependence on the Congress . He was the Congressman ' s caretaker no longer . The

Srinivasa

Coimbatore

kaleidoscope , which politics in the had beconie , was shaken . This time it was by the announcement on 8 November 1927 of an Indian Statutory Com mission , headed by Sir John Simon , to investigate the working of dyarchy and to suggest further constitutional steps . Since Congressmen in Tamilnad had been speculating on the out 1926 come of such a commission which , under the provisions of the Once

again

legislature

1919 Government

the

of

India Act , was not scheduled

until

1929

.

Varadarajulu Naidu had seen the commission as an argument in favour of Congressmen taking office , reasoning that Congress ministers would best be able to point out to the commission

limitations of dyarchy

the

dies . 116 a

But by the appointment

propose

many

constitutional reme

Congressmen

had were

of an " all - white " committee . stroke the Secretary of State , Lord Birkenhead , had

shattered

At

and

the hopes which

108

,

27

.

.

'

a

by

on

of

a

Commission forced Goschen his tactics The was not going as he had Party True the Justice had been dethroned and hope least some Congress MLCs defecting

the

Simon game

of

still

at

,

.

rethink

expected

.

to

The adverse vote

118

.

.

12

32

in

by

in

a

25

On

in

go

"

,

.

on

in

117

offended politicians of all parties by excluding them from the preparation of their own constitution . At the annual session of the Congress at Madras in December 1927 , Besant returned to active politics to move a joint resolution with Srinivasa Iyengar deploring the Secretary of State ' s " utter disregard of India ' s right of self - determination " and pledging Congressmen to boycott the step Commission . For once the Justice Party marched with the Congress Justice November 1927 warned that The Commission may come tour the country dine with Governors and European Associations and back Indians will have neither share nor part such Commission 118 January 1928 resolution opposing any cooperation the legislature with the commission its existing form was Legislative majority carried the Madras Council Among the MLCs who abstained were the Second and Third Ministers and the Raja of Panagal

there was the ministerial

's

it

'

.

"

at

"

,

. . .

"

,

is

It

"

a

be

in

to

.

's

.

,

,

;

.

an

to

it

to

a

,

to

party but with the outcry against the danger that the Congress and Simon Commission there was parties join Justice would hands not only oust Subbarayan but also obstruct the work of the commission when reached Madras Such outcome might be disastrous for political dyarchy certainly would damage Goschen Frantically shoring up career the Governor set about ministry very necessary Subbarayan he had written Birkenhead November 1927 that the Ministry20 steadying force should made the present moment to

to

a

,

by

,

of

no

. -

in

many

the

confidence

months what Venkatachelam the Congress MLCs were "

"

,

his motion before

a

motion the third against the ministry the Hindu described as astonishing laxity

introduced

encouraged

introduced 18

party

By

Chetti

Venkatachelam

ministerial

by

.

it

.

1928

,

the

,

March

split within

,

2

On

in

,

,

.

in

to

-

a

,

.

a

by

,

's

to

accept Subbarayan resign over He refused offer the Simon Commission vote but the Chief Minister had made issuing himself unpopular with his own party welcome the commission without consulting other Independent MLCs Theosophist Ranganatha Mudaliar the Second Minister was long standing follower of Besant and he urged the and join Independents the boycott of the commission Arogyaswami Mudaliar the Third Minister was drawn along his more purposeful colleague believing that his ministerial post was not jeopardy But was

109

present in the council , and it failed by six votes to win the approval of a third of the council , the requisite proportion for moving a resolution of this sort . !21 Goschen , overjoyed at this unexpected good fortune , brushed aside Subbarayan ' s second offer to resign and summoned the Second and Third Ministers on 7 March . He informed them that he regarded the failure of the latest no - confidence motion as tantamount to a reversal of the earlier vote against cooperation with the Simon Commission , and , therefore , he concluded that the ministers no longer enjoyed the confidence of a majority of MLCs . He did not actually ask them to resign , but they felt compelled to do so and handed in their resignations that evening . 122

At the saine

juncture

reshuffling occurred

a

second

opportunity

for

political

. At the end of Ramaswami Aiyar ' s tenure , Membership of the Law Goschen had considered appointing a non - Brahmin to what had so far been a Brahmin preserve . He had , however , decided that it would be foolish to offend the by excluding

them from the Cabinet , and he promoted , the Advocate -General T . R . Venkatarama Sastri , to the post , but transferred the police portfolio to Muhammad Usman , Home Member of the Executive Council . Venkatarama protested and was advised by Brahmin lawyers and Congressmen to threaten to resign the portfolio were not restored . Goschen refused to give way , accepted the resignation which had been intended as a bluff , and a startled Venkatarama Sastri found himself out in the cold . 123

Brahmins

if

Goschen laid a clean sheet of writing paper on his desk in Government House and below the red , embossed crest of the Government of Madras began his political arithmetic anew . Subbarayan ' s ministry could not last much longer , internally divided , assailed by Justicites and Congressmen . The Justice Party had to be won back to collaboration and to dyarchy . The

Ramaswama Aiyar had Venkatarama Sastri ' s impetuous folly was Goschen ' s opportunity . He appointed as the new Law Member M . Krishnan Nair , a Justicite from Malabar who had been one of the few Justice leaders to dissociate themselves from

Justicites

exercised

had

as

coveted the patronage

Law

Member ,

and

the Coimbatore resolutions and to express a willingness to Keeping Subbarayan as Chief work with the Simon Commission . , appointed Minister Goschen as Second and Third Ministers S . Muthiah Mudaliar from Tanjore and M . R . Sethuratnam Aiyar of Trichinopoly , both of whom had run on the Congress ticket in 1926 and voted against cooperation with the commission in January . Goschen made his conditions clear : the ministers were not to hinder the work of the Simon Commission and they were to work dyarchy . They agreed . 124 In reply to accusations

110

that he had betrayed the Congress and his electors , shrugged his shoulders and said : Sethuratnam " Once we are , the acceptance in the Council and cooperate in its working 125 of an office is no great sin or crime " . 125

's of

by

a

by

,

a

"

:

least provincial autonomy carry out such far reaching -

to

press his prohibition conclude that only under

of

Subbarayan

ministry sailed

, on .

up barque

-

The patched

's

.

it

a

at

,

the next two years he continued schemes the experience led him constitution which provided for India would be possible reforms

to to

.

in

.

"

's

-

be

. . .

-

of

"

"

,

.

as

,

,

.

to

.

on

20

.

-

it no

,

126

The Hindu protested that for Goschen " to take an active part in the formation of political groups to sustain parti cular individuals in power is an improper exercise of guber Improper perhaps but natorial influence and patronage . " yet effective When another confidence motion was flung ministry majority at the March was repulsed Rajagopalachari 23 One of the casualties of the crisis was Despite promises made by the ministers Prohibition Bill legislation Subbarayan now declared that sponsor prohibition prohibition was not feasible view repeated Muthiah Rajagopalachari Mudaliar Excise Minister furious at this Party politics have shamefui betrayal commented bitterly intrigue reached the lowest depths and self seeking Even the cleanest non party issue cannot steered clear of petty intrigues over offices Rajagopalachari 127 first legislative politics had failed experiment Although for

or

But the real victor of but Panagal From the of shoals the Coimbatore conference Panagal had rescued his party Goschen had been forced turn back the Justicites when the crisis over the Simon Commission showed the iinpos sibility substituting the Congress the dominant con Changes stitutionalist party the procedure of the just commission announced mid 1928 were seized upon as Party ification for the reversal the Justice earlier hostility September the commission committee of the cooperate with the Commission Madras legislature was set

personal terms

to

a

's

.

-

in

open

an

its

to

to

that the party

election scheduled for the end being returned confident and without having bow his membership

. to

demand

were Subbarayan

to

office without

with

of

,

cial legislature and of 1929 its leaders

.

,

,

to

.

16

's

,

on In

Panagal triumph was short lived He Among the candidates December 1928 for the party merge his supporters was Subbarayan who hoped including his Brahmin Third Minister with the Justice group But the Justice Party was now the major force the provin died leadership

28 128

.

a

to In

up

.

to

of

-

in

.

in

as

of

.

to

,

of

.

Subbarayan the coup was not Goschen low ebb the 1926 elections and the

Brahmins

When

111

the non - Brahmin Subbarayan lost

Confederation to

a

met

compromise

at Nellore in October

1929 ,

. Muniswami

Naidu

candidate ,

B

of Chittoor , in the contest for party leader .

The year 1929 brought a deepening of the Swarajists ' dilemma . Personal rivalries and communal bitterness jeopar dized the last semblance of party unity within the legis

lature . Dyarchy had not been destroyed and the fortunes of the Justice Party were reviving . Congressmen canvassed vari ous schemes which might allow their party to take office in they secured a majority in the elections scheduled Madras for later in the year . The events of the past three years demonstrated that nothing less than a Congress ministry would suffice to exclude the Justicites and to keep together the ramshackle coalition of the Congress Party in the council . " There was no meaning " , Venkatachelam Chetti remarked in May 1929 , " in a man getting married with a view to follow celibacy " ; there was no sense in sitting in the legis lature without being able to take office . 129

if

,

a

,

-

In in

at

in

.

.

by

s

'

in

27

-

in

,

to

by

a

,

.

"

27

-

"

to

in

,

a

, to

.

,

.

a

,

,

in

.

,

,

-

in

in

.

'

.

In

as

a

,

. he

- to

in

In

. '

26

Iyengar was the main casualty of the Swara harmonize regional interests with national policy 1925 seemed the most dynamic Congress energetic leader south India He was rich resourceful and he threw himself into politics with fervour that con trasted with his professional image the shrewd and meti peculiarly personal sense he made the culous lawyer Swarajists dilemma his own After the bitter experience of his year the Madras legislature 1920 21 Srinivasa Iyengar strove for power and prominence at the national not Although he was the main the provincial or regional levels architect of the 1926 Congress campaign Tamilnad Srinivasa chose and won seat for the central Assembly There his main rival was Motilal Nehru who after the death of Das was Suspecting Nehru of sympathizing the principal Swarajist with the Responsivists and wishing establish himself as national leader of the first order Srinivasa Iyengar posed as the champion of the more extreme Congress elements siding with the orthodox Swarajists 1925 and joining with Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose of Bengal 1928 29 lead the movement for complete independence his national role Srinivasa Iyengar staunchly opposed office acceptance under the existing constitution but the regional level he could only retain secure political base hinting the United Nationalists 1926 that the Con supporting the Tamil gress would opt for office and Congress MLCs 1926 their defence of Subbarayan ministry But this political schizophrenia could not con tinue indefinitely At the national level Srinivasa Iyengar

Srinivasa

jists failure

112

the return of Gandhi to active political leadership at the end of 1928 and he dithered disastrously between Motilal and Gandhi on one side of the complete inde pendence issue and Jawaharlal and Bose on the other .

aside

was pushed

by

He tried , too late , to restore his regional authority . In a speech in Madras on 19 May 1929 he explained that for several years he had supported the political experiment of refusing office under dyarchy . But , he went on , " In this Province our experiment has proved to be a disastrous failure and a party which was wholly defeated in 1926 has come back into greater power as an anti - national and reactionary Ministry " . In a province like Madras , where the intervention of a strong , well - organized party like the Justicites pre vented a direct fight between the Congress and the govern - . ment , he now believed that the Congress must take office to

its rival

exclude The

and

revive the nationalist

and the AICC

CWC

did not agree .

struggle .

They

were

13

tired of

Swarajist experiments and they looked forward either to Con gress participation in constitutional discussions which would scrap dyarchy or to a resumption of civil disobedience for the achievement of complete swaraj The CWC and AICC meetings at Bombay

on

23 - 25 May

dismissed the TNCC ' s request for the Congress committees to decide What is the point , Prakasam ' s taking office when dyarchy is " about to 1929

provincial autonomy for for or against office . Swarajya asked , of got rid of ?. 131

It

was

a

baffled and dispirited Srinivasa Iyengar

be

who

.

to

.

- to

,

resilient

.

Tamil Swarajya Party Like Srinivasa resolve the dilemma posed by dyarchy office seeking Justice Party

too had the had failed

,

and

a

Iyengar

it

,

So

.

,

to

in

to

132

attended the Tamil Nadu Provincial Conference at Vedaranniyam in Tanjore district in August 1929 . The resolution for com plete independence , moved on his behalf by C . N . Muthuranga Mudaliar * of Chingleput , was defeated by a large majority . Srinivasa Iyengar ' s regional base had been eroded by his in ability to provide the Tamil Congress with the policy it needed to survive in constitutional competition with the Justice Party . In disgust he resigned the post of TNCC president he had held for four years , leaving Muthuranga 132 Mudaliar in his place . After attending the Lahore Con gress independence reso December second the complete lution he retired from the Congress return his lucrative law practice The meteor had burnt itself out

CHAPTER

4

CONFRONTATION

The

Congress met at Calcutta

at the

end

of

December

1928

with a mood of frustration and anger . On its second tour of India , beginning in October 1928 , the Simon Commission met with boycotts and black - flag demonstrations in almost every town and city it visited . On 30 October Lajpat Rai , the veteran Punjabi Congressman , leading a procession against the commission , received lathi blows from the police which , it was widely believed , were the cause of his death on 17 November . In the Bardoli taluk of Gujarat , Vallabhbhai Patel had successfully led a satyagraha against a 22 per cent en hancement of the local land revenue , thereby arousing new interest in Gandhi ' s non - violent tactics . By contrast , the Swarajists , repeatedly frustrated in their attempts to ob struct and destroy dyarchy , were either abandoning non cooperation through the legislatures for responsivism or admitting the futility of constitutional agitation under the existing form of government . Motilal Nehru , the president of the Calcutta Congress , charged

had , with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru , the Liberal leader , been the principal architect of a constitution drafted at an all parties ' conference and published in August 1928 . The Nehru Report was designed to offer a positive alternative to the Simon Commission and , in order to attract the widest range of

political

Motilal had been obliged to make Dominion pivot Status the of the constitutional scheme . ' To a section of Congressmen this was an unacceptable retreat from the resolution for complete independence proposed by Jawaharlal Nehru and passed without opposition at the Madras Congress in December 1927 . The Independence for India League , directed by the younger Nehru , Subhas Chandra Bose and Srinivasa Iyengar , denounced the Nehru report and campaigned for the restoration of complete independence as the objective of the support

Congress .

113

114

In this atmosphere of tension and uncertainty Gandhi re - established his leadership . In resigning control of the party organizations to the Swarajists in 1924 - 25 , Gandhi had allowed them the freedom to experiment with legislative politics , confident that once their experiments had failed they would no longer shun civil disobedience . But Gandhi was politician in 1928 than he had been when the a maturer Congress met at Calcutta eight years earlier . Then he had been setting the pace in the Congress ; now he was trying to restrain Jawaharlal and the young Congressmen and to prevent a rift in the party . At Calcutta he mediated between the , Nehrus father and son , between the older generation of nationalists who wanted a constitutional settlement and the generation who were impatient for freedom and for a con new frontation with the Raj . Through Gandhi ' s intervention a compromise was reached : within one year the British did not grant Dominion Status to India , the Congress would launch civil disobedience to wrest complete independence from

if

Britain . To

this challenge the British

made

no immediate response .

But Lord Irwin , the Viceroy , was perturbed by the prospect

civil

of

particularly by the danger of moderate like Motilal Nehru , and even respected Liberals ,

disobedience

and

Congressmen , like Sapru , being drawn into the struggle against the Raj . Irwin , following the well - established British policy , tried to rally the moderates and avert a head - on collision . ? On 31 October 1929 , two months before the year given in the Calcutta ultimatum was due to expire , Irwin announced that the " natural issue of India ' s constitutional progress " was Dominion Status and that a Round Table Conference would be called to discuss the next stage to be taken towards this objective . 3 But the declaration came too late and was too timid to satisfy the Congress . At first many Congressmen ,

including Gandhi , welcomed Irwin ' s statement , but they wanted to know exactly what was being promised and when it would be implemented . They could not put their names to an agreement they had not read , and the idea of civil disobedience in 1930 had already gathered too much momentum to be so easily halted . If Jawaharlal , hand - picked by Gandhi as the next Congress president , would rather resign than negotiate , that would create the split Gandhi was anxious to avoid . Meeting , in memory of Lajpat Rai , at Lahore in December 1929 , the Congress took the momentous decision to reject the Round Table Con ference as an unsatisfactory response to the demand for Dominion Status , and to launch civil disobedience for com plete independence .

115

There

lull

followed

of

a . Other than Independence Day " on

calling for nation

January 1930 , the 26 no program for disobedience , and the campaign ' s direction was left in Gandhi ' s hands . Gandhi drafted a list of eleven demands , ranging from prohibition to halving land revenue and the abolition of the salt tax : it was a com pendium of the issues Congressmen had touched upon at ent times in the past decade . " But Gandhi wanted one clear issue that would dramatize the exploitative nature of colon

wide observance CWC

had

"

civil

differ

ial

rule

and

a

identification of the Congress February with the masses . In late he fixed on the salt tax . In a letter to Irwin on 2 March 1930 Gandhi explained that unless the eleven demands were met by the government , he would initiate a satyagraha against the salt laws on 11 March . When the ultimatum was , predictably , rejected he set out from his ashram at Ahmedabad with 79 satyagrahis , to walk 240 miles to Dandi on the Gulf of Cambay where he intended to make salt from sea water . Perhaps of all Gandhi ' s campaigns , this was the most dramatic and had the greatest emotional impact . News of his daily progress was flashed to papers throughout India and the western world , its impact magnified by newspaper photographs and cinema films of the march . The media ' s cover age and the simple drama of Gandhi ' s Palm Sunday won for the salt satyagraha an emotional popular response unparalleled in his earlier campaigns . It was a brilliant opening to two and

symbolize the

half years of intense agitation .

Anticipation With these national developments Tamil Congressmen were at first wholly out of step . When , in July 1929 , two months after the TNCC had requested permission to take office in Madras , the CWC suggested a new boycott of the legislatures there were vehement protests from Tamil MLCs . In antici pation of elections in late 1929 or early 1930 , Srinivasa Iyengar , Rajagopalachari and Tamil Congressmen of all per suasions were out campaigning against the Justice and Independent parties . Vallabhbhai Patel , the hero of Bardoli , was bewildered when he arrived in Tamilnad in August to pre side over the provincial conference at Vedaranniyam . He complained that he felt stifled by the communal atmosphere – he was confronted on several occasions by Self - Respecters demonstrating against Brahmin Congressmen – and by the ob sessive concern for jobs and office . Tamil Congressmen coming seemed indifferent to the battle which all - India leaders foresaw .

116

Irwin ' s announcement was received with enthusiasm by Tamil Congressmen , especially by the former United Nationalist non - Brahmins who hoped that it would free the ' logjam in the Madras legislature . Thus , the decision of the Lahore Congress to withdraw from the legislatures was either bitterly resented or defied . Five Congress MLCs refused to resign in Madras ; Venkatachelam Chetti in the Legislative Council and R . K . Shanmugham Chetti in the Assembly resigned , but successfully recontested as Independents . " Many local Congressmen " , the Chief Secretary of the Madras government reported pithily at the end of January 1930 , " continue to find it difficult to reconcile a personal unwillingness to boycott the legislatures with loyalty to the Congress mandate Satyamurti , dreading a return to the " suicidal to do so " . ' policy " of 1920 , canvassed for a new nationalist party to continue to work in the Madras legislature . A few private most

meetings were held , attended by Venkatachelam Chetti and others who had already decided to defy the ban , but within two weeks Satyamurti abandoned the idea and resigned his seat in the council . Unlike Venkatachelam Chetti , a prospering merchant , Satyamurti depended on Congress patrons for his financial support .

Iyengar , " ever loyal though careful and A . Rangaswami cautious '' , º obediently resigned his seat in the Assembly . It was the Congress decision to boycott the Round Table Conference that he most bitterly regretted . He consoled him self with the expectation that civil disobedience would be neither popular nor widespread ; that the " Pro - Changers " would have to lie low for a while , but would soon return to Ranga lead the Congress back to constitutional action . 10 swami

was

Srinivasa

more sober

a

Iyengar

and

of the political

judge

scene than Satyamurti , but for once he was badly

mistaken . The Government of Madras had no stronger premonition of the imminent crisis . It had been inclined to jeer at the Government of India ' s hesitancy in tackling Jawaharlal Nehru and other " extremists " . " If the Government of India were to strike hard instead of moralising at length , " commented one executive councillor in March 1929 on New Delhi ' s latest equivocations , " there would be no trouble " . " Having crushed a revival of labour unrest in 1926 - 28 , which had included a

protracted

and

violent strike

on

the South

Indian Railway

frustrated Congress attempts to organize demon strations against the second visit of the Simon Commission to

network , and

Madras city in December to be complacent about

moderation

of the

1928

, the Madras government had begun

its own strength and Tamil districts . Towards

the

loyalty

the

end

of

and 1929

117

when ,

on

the advice

of

the Government

of India

,

it

rounded

extremists " , the haul in Tamilnad was less than half - a dozen . The Tanjore resettlement agitation had long since died away and in Tamilnad , unlike the Telugu delta districts , there were no new resettlements due which would give the Congressmen an opportunity to repeat their Bardoli tactics . With the exception of the activities of Singaravelu Chetti up

"

the only self - styled Communist in the region – Tamilnad the rash of left -wing peasant and workers ' organizations which affected northern India . A sunlit , peace may not have been , but the Madras government ful vista believed itself adequately sheltered from what it anticipated would be a passing shower . almost

was immune to

it

respects . In 1923 when the government asked district magistrates to submit reports on the character Except

in

cooperation in their areas , two impor tant considerations had emerged . The first was that the Congress could be as eclectic as a magpie : it would pick up grievances caught any attractive local which its eye and in corporate them into its loosely constructed nest . The best reaction to this appeared to be to quash the secondary agitations as soon as they began . If the Congress seized the initiative and the government hesitated , the local popu lation would begin to feel it could flaunt government author ity with impunity . There was the complaint , however , that in 1921 - 22 district officials had been afraid to act promptly They had been confused by the Government of and resolutely . India ' s " soft " line towards the Congress and Khilafat leaders and hampered by the difficulties of securing a conviction and

suppression

two

quickly

enough

of

non -

to have

a

deterrent effect .

The

speed

with

non - cooperation had spread in the Telugu delta in late 1921 was attributed to this uncertainty among the magistracy and police . If a new crisis developed , would the Government of India support the demands of the Madras Secretariat and the district officers for firm , pre - emptive action ? which

Against this predilection

for the

" hard "

line

had to be

consideration – the backlash from repression . occurring There had been evidence of this at the national and regional levels at the end of 1921 ; but it was also apparent to the more perceptive official observers at the district and village levels too . G . T . H . Bracken , * Collector of the Godavari district in the Andhra delta during the later stages of non cooperation , warned in 1923 : " Measures of repression do not . . . carry things far . They leave a bad impression behind and a spirit bad which is in evidence ' . Resolute action with out vindictiveness was his formula . 13 It was not an easy course to follow . C . F . V . Williams , the young Under - Secretary balanced

a

second

still

118

if

in Madras , noted in January 1930 that " we do too much , Congress will cry ' repression ' . . . we do too little , Congress victory cry question will ' ' . The is of a via media " . 14 Nor was this view confined to official circles . The European

if

inertia during non 1930 advised the central and provincial governments against rushing into repressive mea sures and thus playing into the hands of the " extremists " . 15 It was this policy of caution which prevailed in the first

Mail ,

Madras

owned

so

damning

- cooperation , in January

months own

of

1930 .

of

government

As the Government

history of the

civil

of Madras recorded

disobedience

in

its

movement :

it was considered that forbearance would ultimately repay the Government , either by strengthening their case if the use of force did become necessary , or by the movement suffering from sheer official disregard for it . It was not then anticipated that the movement

would

receive

the degree

that it eventually secured . 16

Responding

to

the

of

support

Call

By contrast with the protracted struggle for control of the regional Congress in 1922 - 25 , in 1930 the leading Swara jists quickly surrendered their places on the TNCC . Srinivasa Iyengar , defeated by the failure to resolve his own political contradictions , resigned as TNCC President in September 1929 and withdrew from the Congress altogether after the Lahore session . His successor , C . N . Muthuranga Mudaliar , resigned in March 1930 , having struggled half -heartedly to resist the boycott of the Madras legislature of which he had been a Rajagopalachari was the obvious replacement . He member . returned in April 1930 to head the TNCC ; the party head quarters , in Madras city since 1925 , were shifted back to Trichinopoly ; and T . S . S . Rajan resumed his old post as party Secretary . ” On the surface , it was just like old times .

Authorized by the

satyagraha

in

Tamilnad ,

TNCC

and

the AICC to

direct the salt

Rajagopalachari approached

the task

with characteristic caution . The Telugus organized dashes to the nearest salt creeks and beaches with little thought as to how the struggle would develop , but Rajagopalachari was not so impetuous and he was concerned more with imitating Gandhi ' s dramatic march than with violating the salt law . He took more than a month – from early March to mid - April – to make his preparations . He estimated that he would need Rs . 20 , 000 for the march and a satyagraha camp at Vedaranniyam , his

119

destination .

Through

his lieutenants

in

Tamilnad , the in Bombay and

Saurashtras in Madura and South Indians , he was able to collect most of this . Madras , the Swarajists ' citadel , gave very little . 18 From 300 applicants he selected - with the help of Rajan in Trichinopoly and Vaidyanatha Aiyar in Madura - a hundred volunteers for the march . Most of them were young - clerks , students and grad uates who had some education and had shown an interest in khadi work in recent years . About a quarter of the satya grahis came from Madura district ; Madras city , Tinnevelly , Ramnad , Salem and Bombay provided about a dozen each . 19

Ahmedabad

Rajagopalachari ' s caution was apparent , too , in the route he chose . It shunned , by more than 150 miles , Madras city and Trichinopoly through the Cauvery delta to Vedarannivam . ran from Tanjore had been a Congress stronghold for more than a gener ation and memories of the Swarajists ' opposition to the llindu Religious Endowments Bill and resettlement might be hoped to ensure a favourable reception for the marchers . Here , more than in any other area of Tamilnad , Rajagopalachari could expect assistance from vakils , merchants and mirasdars . The route avoided the areas of Kallar concentration and followed long detour to include the old Brahmin centres of Tanjore , a Kumbakonam and Mannargudi . 20 The march was given the air of pilgrimage beginning , a on Tamil New Year ' s Day ( 13 April ) to the accompaniment of hymns and the blessings of priests ; and Vedaranniyam (" ' The Forest of the Vedas " ) was considered by many orthodox Brahmins among to be second only to Rameswaram the sacred places of the Tamil coast . 21 En route , Rajagopala chari made frequent stops to conduct temperance propaganda among the untouchables and the Kallars (one of the district ' s largest but , except for a few zamindars , mirasdars and vakils , less prosperous agrarian castes ) , but it was mainly to the urban middle class and the windlords that he directed his campaiga . '

experience of 1920 - 22 led Rajagopalachari to expect a slow and timid response to the salt satyagraha in Tamilnad . The march was , therefore , to be the unhurried opening scene of the civil disobedience drama . Tension would gradually increase as the satyagrahis neared their goal , as public interest was aroused , and as the government ' s restraint gave way to impulsive repressive measures . Vedaranniyam was designed to be a showpiece of disciplined satyagraha in south India ; only when it had succeeded in attracting public sym Rajagopalachari and Rajan pathy and government hostility did Raja spreading visualize the conflict to other , equally well organized , satyagraha camps . 22 campsing only

The

120

Madras remained aloof , held back by reacting its own fear of over and by the Government of India ' s steadying hand . Vallabhbhai Patel was arrested on 7 March and Jawaharlal Nehru on 14 April , but Gandhi , who had reached Dandi and made salt in the first week of April , was left at large . No immediate action was , therefore , permitted against the Vedaranniyam marchers . On 27 March the Madras government issued instructions to district officers that volunteers should be dispersed , but arrests should be avoided , except in the case of leaders violating the law , so as to prevent an The Government

over - crowding of the

of

jails .

On

3

April ,

10

days before

Rajagopalachari left Trichinopoly , J . A . Thorne , the District Magistrate of Tanjore , requested permission to treat the marchers as an unlawful assembly as soon as they entered his district , to arrest Rajagopalachari and to caution sympath

the route . On 8 April Thorne wired Madras for per Rajagopalachari Tanjore mission to arrest when he entered permission district . On both occasions was refused . 23 Thorne was too sceptical of the efficacy of a policy of drift to accept these refusals as a counsel of inaction . On 6 April he issued instructions to the sub - divisional magi

izers

on

District Superintendent of Police not to satyagrahis interfere with who remained orderly , but to re gard assistance given to the marchers as a criminal offence . A circular on these lines was drafted the following day and presidents sent to the and chairmen of the district and local boards in the area to be covered by the march . Three thou sand copies were later printed in Tamil and distributed ahead of the main body of marchers . 24 strates

and

the

Since to be ignored would be disastrous , this was the sort of publicity Rajagopalachari wanted . He used the cir cular as an illustration of India ' s oppression and a violation of Hindu traditions of charity and hospitality . 25 Rangaswami

Iyengar , whose reserve towards the salt satyagraha had begun to melt with the success of Gandhi ' s march , published an editorial in the Hindu on 10 April questioning the legality of Thorne ' s threats and calling it " preposterous " to treat a band of satyagrahis as an unlawful assembly before they had broken the salt laws . The Government of Madras had doubts of its own , but was satisfied that Thorne ' s circular was a deter rent to sympathizers , " made difficulties for the volunteers Triumphal recep and diminished the effect of their march " . tions had been planned by K . Santhanam and an advance party of marchers , but after the circular " the lukewarm were glad of an excuse for refusing hospitality , and few owners or trustees of a charity were sufficiently ' patriotic ' to risk prosecution " . 26 The arrest and conviction of V . Pantulu

121

Aiyar ,

until

recently one of Tanjore ' s MLCs , and of a non during the early stages of the march through Tanjore showed that Thorne had not been bluffing . In Gujarat

Brahmin mirasdar

village officers had resigned to support the satyagraha : in Tanjore only two – a Kallar village headman and a Vellala during Rajagopalachari ' s march . Neverthe karnam – resigned less , towards the end of the march the mood changed and there were signs of enthusiasm in the villages and towns . An opti

many

mistic Rajagopalachari are responding

is

atmosphere

ing

in

way

a

to the

informed

call

in

a

being purified of the most optimistic

the

press that

all

sectional

masses manner . The

" The

truly marvellous among

and

party

feel

us may not have

officials were correspondingly dis the marchers had not been stopped . 28 On 28 April Vedaranniyam was reached , a camp established , and two days later Rajagopalachari was arrested for breaking the salt laws . expected

"

heartened

By

. 27

that

early

agitational

Government

May

civil

campaign .

disobedience

had taken

it

had

at Peshawar

in

Throughout

popularity which

India

off

as an acquired a

the Government of India had not And behind the popular enthusiasm was the cut ting edge of violence . In Bengal terrorists raided the Chittagong Armoury on 18 April and escaped with large quan strength

and

anticipated .

tities of

arms and

ammunition ;

the North -West

Frontier Province the arrest of Congress leaders provoked

disturbances which resulted in the death of 30 people and caused serious doubts as to the ability of the existing forces to maintain control in the area . A new policy could not be as long delayed as it had been in 1921 . 29 May Gandhi was arrested and with him many of the captains . The stress in government instructions was , however , on the arrest of leaders and the dispersal , necessary , of the volunteers . At Vedaranniyam by force the manufacture of salt continued , therefore , despite the arrests of Rajagopalachari and Santhanam and despite police raids on the piles of salt the satyagrahis had collect On

regional

still

5

if

illicit

ed

.

There were

natural salt

pans

at Vedaranniyam

and

it was

almost impossible for the police to prevent the manufacture of salt as long as the satyagrahis remained there . On 5 May 50 more volunteers arrived at the camp , and by the middle of the month the total number was nearly 200 . 30 Mrs Rukmani Laksnmipathi , who for three years had been president of the Madras League of Youth , gave the volunteers new activities to pursue – trying to incite disaffection among the policemen stationed in the area and touring the neighbouring villages preaching against the salt laws and government authority gen erally . In the government ' s opinion Vedaranniyam was fast

122

festering sore spreading its poison throughout a Tanjore On 29 . It could no longer be tolerated . 31 eastern May the police raided the camp , this time to arrest the volunteers and not just to confiscate salt . About 135 were arrested including , unexpectedly , Rajan who was on a visit to the camp . Rajan had been the main supplier of funds and

becoming

stores for Vedaranniyam and it was his arrest and conviction which was the most decisive factor in the ending of the camp . Attempts to revive it or to establish a new one near were quickly thwarted by the police . 32 Rameswaram Although Rajagopalachari had clearly counted on Tanjore to provide the men and money to sustain the Vedaranniyam camp , paradoxically it was almost exclusively organized and Only five by Congressmen manned from outside the district .

the original marchers were from the district , only three the satyagrahis rounded up on 29 May . Rajan at Trichin opoly fed the camp with supplies , money and new recruits . Rajagopalachari had , in fact , been over - cautious in going for an area of traditional Congress support . By and large , once the initial excitement of the march was over , Tanjore was indifferent . It is worthwhile briefly to consider why . The leading land - holders had had their share of agitation in 1923 - 24 and they had achieved a sufficient degree of success in persuading the government to reduce the highest resettle ment rates not to be impelled by a sense of grievance into joining civil disobedience . They were unhappy about the plummeting grain prices that resulted from the world depress ion and competition from Burmese rice imports , but it was to the government they turned for assistance , not the Congress . The dominant strata in Tanjore society – the Brahmin , Veliala , and Kallar urban middle class and rural landlords – were among the most politicized in Tamilnad . There were , espec ially among the Brahmins , a great number of literates and the Hindu and Swadesamitran circulated widely : " even ordinary people , decent " commented Thorne , " tend to regard politics through Hindu spectacles " . 33 But the economic life of the delta was to a large extent dependent on the Public Works Department for the supply of irrigation water to the paddy fields , and this in itself was an inducement to loyalty . 34 Patel , at the time of his visit to Vedaranniyam for the Tamilnad Provincial Conference in 1929 , had formed a local Land League , but nowhere in the Cauvery delta in 1930 was there an attempt to imitate Bardoli . 3 .

of of

Tanjore

' s political trains

ran on different gauge tracks . bosses were divided on factional lines . The dominant faction was headed by A . T . Pannirselvam , a Justicite , The

political

mirasdar and Christian Kallar ,

and

N

. R . Samiappa Mudaliar ,

a

123

Throughout 1930 Pannirselvam ' s recent election as president of Tanjore district board was being relentessly contested by the rival faction , headed by P . S . Rajappa , a Kallar zamindar from Tanjore taluk , and abetted by A . Veeriah Iyengar , mirasdar Vandayar , a Kallar , and C . R . Lakshmivaraha

Vellala .

spokesman

and

one

of

Kumbakonam

's

Brahmin

Congress leaders .

faction leaders were so busily engaged in their ding - dong battle for the prestige and spoils of local government from the district board down to the taluk boards , and of every temple , education and cooperative society committee in the district that they could scarcely spare a thought for making The

salt

from

sea - water . 36

further reason for the indifference of Tanjore is less identified . Partly because Tanjore was a district with such a long tradition of involvement in provincial and nationalist politics , partly because its upper strata were so emphatically divided by caste , by occupation and by inherited authority from the poor cultivators , artisans and landless labourers , broader political participation in Tanjore was temporarily blocked . There were grievances in Tanjore which could well have provided the basis for a mass agitation : the A

easily

throughout the civil disobedience that the Kallar masses , educationally backward , socially suppressed and economically exploited , would revolt against the government and against the landlords ; at Vedaranniyam the local population had asked that the forest laws should be made the target of the satyagraha , but the Congress organizers refused on the grounds that salt was the national issue and must be taken up first . 37 At times the Congress leaders were remarkably selective . In Tanjore they pitched their agitation at a level that would not damage the class interests of the district ' s dominant strata even though it meant the stultification of the movement . Much has been made of factional rivalry as the motivation for the partici pation of local notables in Congress agitations , 38 but in Tanjore in 1930 an aggrieved faction held aloof from civil government was alarmed

movement

disobedience rather than jeopardize its privileged social and economic position by linitiating a mass agitation . It did so wisely , for in less than a decade the Cauvery delta became the scene of a bitter struggle between landlords and agri cultural labourers , a struggle that still continues . Beaten

like

Dogs

Rajagopalachari had miscalculated in his anticipation that satyagraha in Tamilnad would gain momentum only gradu ally . Even before he reached Vedaranniyam events in Madras

124

city showed by contrast with Tanjore , that the agitation could excite popular support and participation , but that in so doing it might assume a violent character . Expecting no substantial response from Madras , Raja gopalachari had neglected the city and with the resignation of its Swarajist leaders , was left without direction in the opening stages of the salt satyagraha . Pressure for a local satyagraha came from local party activists and students , who , because they were mainly Telugus , turned to the Andhra Congressmen , T . Prakasam and K . Nageswara Rao for guidance and leadership . The first attempts at salt - making on the Madras beach at the beginning of April were amateurish , comic ludicrously small and even ; the quantities of salt produced crude . But their activities were a technical breach of the salt laws and the police intervened to confiscate the salt and salt - making utensils and to disperse the satyagrahis , according to the instructions already laid down by the Madras government . Police action in turn stimulated public interest and , encouraged by donations from the city ' s Gujaratis and Marwaris , Prakasam and Nageswara Rao decided to continue their satyagraha : the attachment of their cars in lieu of a fine was just the sort of provocation that fired Prakasam and , like Thorne ' s circular in Tanjore , it attracted strong protests in the nationalist press .

it

satyagraha

The

quickly escalated

into

a

confrontation

police . In protest against the arrest of Nageswara Rao a hartal was held on 22 April . Intended as a peaceful demonstration , it degenerated into the intimidation of shop keepers who had defied the hartal and clashes between police

with

the

demonstrators , whose numbers were swollen by mill - hands from the city ' s Choolai textile mills . Two major charges by mounted police and lathi -wielding constables were carried out before the crowd dispersed . 39 The arrest of Prakasam on 23 April failed to check the agitation . had acquired a macabre momentum of its own : salt making con tinued , more satyagrahis , including women , were reported to have been thrashed by the police . Sutandira Sangu , a Tamil paper run by the Congressnian S . Ganesan in Madras , cried with and on

strike

It

U

indignation :

Those who defy the Salt Act may be imprisoned or fined . That is all laid down in the Salt Act . But the Salt Act does not say that horses should be made to trample upon the people , nor is it laid down in it that the volunteers should

be beaten Beach

Road

like on

dogs as they were beaten Friday morning . 40

on

the

125

the evening of 27 April an - parties meeting was held on protest the Madras beach to at the brutal treatment of non violent satyagrahis by the police . On the platform were Venkatachelam Chetti , councillors of the Madras Corporation By the time the meeting began the and several Justicites . nearly , angered by the failure arrival of 5 000 mill - hands , management of the Choolai to re - open the mills , swelled the audience beyond the organizers ' control . Stones were thrown at the police patrolling the outskirts of the crowd and skirmishes followed . Led by the Commissioner of Police , C . B . Cunningham , the police , their discipline and restraint weakened by 10 days of tension and public criticism , vent their fury on the crowd . While constables fought with lathis and - butts , a troop of armed sowars raced to and fro across the darkened sands to disperse what remained of the meeting after the leaders had fled . After an hour about away from the beach and into the 2 , 000 people were herded streets of Triplicane , but there , at the entrance to Pycrofts Road , stone - throwing began again . Under Cunningham ' s directions police marksmen tried to pick off the instigators : five people were wounded , including a fifty - year old woman ,

all

On

rifle

three killed ,

and down

from

a

among them

bus when

a

the police

lawyer

who had been

getting

fired . * 1

Unintentionally , the nationalists in Madras city had blundered into a confrontation with the Raj that was so shock ing that it temporarily obscured party and sectional divis ions . Politicians of all parties demanded an enquiry into the shooting and a deputation of High Court lawyers travelled to Ootacamund to petition the Governor , but in vain . The Madras Mahajana Sabha held its own investigation which placed the blame for the incidents in the city between 22 and 27 April squarely on the police . 42 The Madras Corporation for once set aside its party bickering and condemned the shooting in a resolution which only the European councillors opposed . . A . Natesan , a Liberal and opponent of civil disobedience , said that in 45 years as a citizen of Madras he had never known a time when " public feeling has been provoked to such

G

a

height as The

it is

government

police against 29

now "

. 43

and

the European

their Indian critics .

April Europeans near the

beach had

community defended the

During the battle been

insulted

and

on

jeered at , drivers of cars and their passengers stopped and Europeans in Madras were unaccustomed to such humili abused . ation , and racial bitterness as much as any hostility to disobedience was responsible for the intensity of their feelings . 44 Sergeant O 'Callaghan , who had been instructing the city police in lathi -play and who had been too severely

civil

126

injured in the clashes on 22 April to participate in those on the 29th , felt it " a great disappointment " to have " missed the big fight " . 45 And the government , far from calling for an enquiry , issued Cunningham ' s account of the week ' s inci

of its

more provocative remarks – as the policemen who had taken part , and promoted Cunningham to the post of Inspector -General of Police with responsibility for combating

dents a

–

press

civil

purged

of

communique

disobedience

some

, generously rewarded

throughout the presidency .

polarization between the rulers and the ruled endure . The mill - hands returned to work , the corporation to its squabbles and its drains . The city poli ticians were , for the moment , cowed by the savagery of the Such could not

a

witnessed on the sands . But a legacy of bitterness remained , and Madras Congressmen and their allies saw how such incidents could be exploited to keep alive public resentment against the government . In January and February Congressmen organized the picketing of foreign cloth - shops in the city , less with the intention of preventing cloth sales and promoting Swadeshi than of creating incidents between police and picketers . The incidents were carefully staged with respected citizens on hand to give " eye -witness " accounts of police " brutality '' , and these formed the basis of reports in the nationalist press and questions in the legislature . In the narrow and congested streets of George Town it was difficult for any picketing to take place without obstructing traffic , and when the police moved in to dis perse the picketers with canes or lathis it was often a by stander who received the blows . The Congress highlighted its image of innocence by using women picketers; the government scene they

had

compounded

its reputation for brutality

by

quartering com

the Malabar Special Police , formed to suppress the 1921 rising , on the city to combat civil disobedience and picketing . 46 The consequence was , ex -minister Arogyaswami Mudaliar said on 7 February 1931 , that " Everyday , this Government has . . . [made converts to the cause of the Con gress by tens of thousands -- people who were lukewarm before with reference to the Congress are to - day its enthusiastic supporters " . 47 " An exaggeration , no doubt , but it is indic ative of the extent to which the tactics of the nationalists were successful in keeping alive a sense of confrontation with the Raj . panies

of

Deliberate provocation of incidents with the police might seem to indicate that there was little spontaneous support for civil disobedience in Tamilnad . But in some cases the violence which accompanied Congress demonstrations oc curred because Congress agitators struck a spark which

127

ignited local discontent . This was most apparent in Tamilnad during the second phase of the civil disobedience movement , between May and August 1930 . Salt making was abandoned for the picketing of liquor and cloth - shops . As salt - making was a laborious process except in a few areas like Vedaranniyam with natural salt pans which were far from the main centres of population , its agitational potential was limited . In Coimbatore district , for example , the experiment of extract ing salt from saline earth was soon abandoned as futile . 48 Picketing brought Congressmen onto the streets in the towns and villages , where the public was bound to notice them and the police forced to respond to their activities . From being limited to Vedaranniyam , Madras city and a few secondary salt - making sites in South Arcot , the agitation spread at the end of May and early June to the interior districts of Tamilnad , which had previously been quiet . The change in agitational tactics was due less to Con gress planning than to the first impact of the world depress ion . In the ports of Madras and Tuticorin picketers were recruited from unemployed youths , who , from boredom or for a fee , would join the campaign . Hit by a shrinking export import trade , half - a - dozen firms ceased business in Tuticorin in August 1930 , while Congress volunteers " with their gay coloured badges and ribbons " roamed the streets urging un employed coolies and peons to join them . 49 Inland , unemployed handloom weavers were often willing recruits for picketing or the cause of violence against the police . In Coimbatore and Salem the Telugu - speaking Devanga weavers were severely hit by the sudden fall in demanü for their products in Bombay and the Central Provinces . In July 3 , 000 weavers were thrown by out of work the closure of looms in Salem town , and were quickly recruited by local Congressmen (who included Devanga merchants and lawyers ) to conduct door - to -door propaganda against foreign cloth , the " cause " , they were told , " of their misfortune " . 50 In Coimbatore a majority of the town ' s 10 , 000 weavers were unemployed by the end of July and were drafted by Gujarati and Devanga cotton traders to picket foreign cloth and liquor shops . 51 In Gudiyatam taluk , North , depression Arcot the victims of the were Tamil weavers ( Kaikolans or Sengunthars ) , 4 , 000 of whom were out of work agitators were by August . 52 On 7 July when six Congress large Gudiyatam , arrested at the town of a crowd of weavers attacked the police , besieged them in the magistrate ' s office , and sacked the liquor shops . After a detachment of reserve police had restored government control the District Magis trate reported that in Gudiyatam there was " no general feeling

of enmity against Government . . .

The

origin of

the

trouble

128

seems

have been with the weaver community who have been from bad times and whose more rowdy elements became victim to the anti -Government propaganda " . 08 to

suffering easy

ns of Tamilnad in the middle months of 1930 In many towns the discontent of the poor was channelled into the mainstream of civil disobedience by middle - class politicians and young activists who were themselves committed to nationalist object ives . Madura was such a case . From 1930 to 1932 civil dis obedience in Madura was led and financed by N . M . R . Subbaraman , * young Congressman , and other members of the a wealthy Saurashtra community , which constituted a third of the city ' s population . The Saurashtras ' involvement has been attributed to their struggle to wrest control of the municipal council from a faction headed by the chairman , R . S . Naidu , and sup ported in turn by the Justice and Independent ministries . It is claimed that the Saurashtra leaders sought in the Congress " supra - local connections to redress the local im balance " and that their objective was to achieve local supremacy under cover of the civil disobedience movement . "

While it is true that Subbaraman was deeply involved in municipal politics , this interpretation takes too narrow a view of the reasons for Saurashtra commitment to the Congress . Prominent Saurashtras had been striving since the 1890s through a caste association , caste schools , a Saurashtra newspaper , and a highly successful weavers ' cooperative – to improve the social and economic conditions of the commun ity , the bulk of which were skilled but impoverished silk and cotton weavers with a reputation for hard drinking . " As aspirants to Brahminical status and as a community which traced its origins to Gujarat , the Saurashtras could not readily identify with the non - Brahmin movement : one of the most enterprising Saurashtras , L . K . Tulsiram , incurred con siderable hostility from his community by trying to do so in 1919 - 20 . Gradually , during the 1920s young Saurashtras were attracted to the Congress and to a broader , national identity . Subbaraman made donations to the party in the late 1920s and one young Saurashtra who had been engaged in khadi work was chosen as treasurer for the Vedaranniyam marchers . 56 Gandhi , who at times had a flair for identify ing with the communities he addressed , spoke to a meeting of Saurashtras in Gujarati during his 1927 visit to Madura and urged them to abstain from alcohol and abjure foreign cloth . " On the merits of khadi the Saurashtras were divided . of the big Saurashtra merchants dealt in foreign cloth and were unenthusiastic ; many of the weavers regarded it as a rival to their own high quality textiles . But Saurashtras

Some

129

out into chemicals and dyes , like the firm of which made sizeable donations to the TNCC for the salt satyagraha , or who , like Subbaraman , had interests in Madura ' s mill industry , welcomed any form of swadeshi agitation which would favour Indian cloth against British and Japanese imports . 58 There were no such ambigu ities with regard to alcohol . The caste leaders wished to free their community from the stigma of drink and to enhance the prestige of the Saurashtras . With 2 , 000 Saurashtra weavers out of work by September 1930 , the picketing of liquor shops provided an opportunity for middle - class Saurashtras to direct the energies of the unemployed against liquor . Through intensive picketing , sustained despite the who had

branched Chari and Ram

arrest of Subbaraman and his associates and despite several clashes with the police , Madura ' s liquor sales were down to a third of their normal level by October . 59 It was the , communal ambitions nationalist sympathies and broad material interests of the Saurashtra middle class , using the unemployed weavers , rather than a bid to overthrow an already tottering faction in the municipal council , which made Madura a storm centre

of

the

civil

disobedience movement

in

Tamilnad . 60

Civil

disobedience was not a forest fire racing un region . through checked a tinder - dry In Madura it raged for ; months in most other areas it flickered and smouldered or did not burn at . Certain sections of the population largely remained unaffected . One of these was the industrial proletariat . After the revival and defeat of militant union ism in 1926 - 28 , the workers had again swerved away from strike action and in Madras city relations between mill - hands and Congressmen had not fully recovered from the trauma of the 1921 strike at the Buckingham and Carnatic mills . The

all

participation of the Choolai workers in the April

1930

dis

turbances was exceptional and fortuitous : their connection with the civil disobedience movement ceased as soon as the mills re - opened on 1 May . In Madura there were rumours of a strike at Harvey ' s mills in February , but the workers backed down when the management threatened to stop production alto gether because it was suffering financial losses due to the depression . The Madura Congressmen showed no interest in adopting the workers ' grievances , perhaps because Subbaraman and his associates did not want a strike to spread to the employees of mills in which they had a share . " The Muslims , who had been leading participants in non cooperation , stood aside from the movement . They were as disillusioned with the Swarajists as they had been with the Gandhians , and they viewed with alarm the rise of a new Hindu militancy in the Hindu Maha Sabha . The Congress ,

130

complained the Muslim press in the late 1920s , had an absolutely pro -Hindu mentality " and was " under the thumb of the Arya Samajists and the Hindu Maha Sabha " . 62 Even those

"

Muslim

of

MLCs

who

the Congress

sympathized in

launching

with the nationalist aspirations

civil

disobedience

felt

a

duty

to their electorate and their community to stay in the legis lature to press Muslim demands for government posts and con cessions . 63 As the campaign intensified Hindu -Muslim con developed . Many of the foreign - cloth dealers and shop - keepers in Madras city and the mofussil towns were Muslims who , understandably , resented Congress picketing

flict

directed against them and sought police protection . 64 In North Arcot and Trichinopoly districts , strongholds of the Khilafat movement a decade before , tension became acute . An unexpected communal riot in Vellore on 28 August 1931 , started by jeering and a scuffle between Muslim and Congress process ions in the town , was described by the Inspector -General of Police as " a spontaneous expression of the hostility of the local Muhammedans to the Congress " . 65 Although , like the mirasdars of Tanjore , most of the substantial landholders in Tamilnad held aloof from the move ment and were content to seek compensation for the effects of the depression through direct entreaties to the provincial government , rural involvement in civil disobedience was more extensive and protracted than it had been in 1921 . The main reason for this was the involvement of youths and students from rural castes who acted as a link between the town and the surrounding countryside . Since the end of the First World War there had been a rapid expansion of primary and high - school education in the Madras Presidency . 66 Along with the accelerating partici pation of the peasant castes in cash - crop production and marketing , 67 and the stimulus of caste associations and the non - Brahmin movement , the greater availability of education encouraged ryots to send their sons to western - style schools and colleges . Away from their home environment the students were receptive to new ideas and the success of non - Brahmins in penetrating the once inaccessible professions and govern ment service by the late 1920s made many yourg non - Brahmins less preoccupied with Brahmin " monopoly " than the previous generation of middle - class non - Brahmins had been . In the towns and cities of Tamilnad the students joined youth leagues , ran their own student papers , participated in the black flag demonstrations against the Simon Commission and in Congress processions and hartals . To a far greater extent than in 1920 - 22 , students were stirred to participate in the civil disobedience movement by an intellectual and emotional

131

commitment to India ' s freedom . The launching of the satyagraha , the enthusiasm aroused by Gandhi ' s march

salt and

reports of arrests and police brutality pushed many students and youths into the agitation in the middle months of 1930 . Rajagopalachari , trying to tap this reservoir of student excitement , urged that at least one generation of India ' s youth should throw itself into the national struggle : " Is not adventure the peculiar privilege and duty of youth ? " , he asked

. 69

pressures behind student parti of uncertainty created by the depression and with graduate unemployment already high in urban Tamilnad , students and youths often saw participation There were also economic In the atmosphere

cipation .

agitation as a more attractive and satisfying activity than continuing an education which offered no certain rewards . Their parents and relatives might at first disapprove , but more often they were willing to offer a limited measure of support : food , money , a disused building where the satya grahis could stay . At first there was no reason to fear thai in

boys waving flags anc decked in khadi and Gandhi caps would come to any harm . But agitation , as we have seen in Madras , created its own momentum : the demonstrators and picketers became a nuisance to the local authorities ; they were dispersed by the police and the most stubborn of them beaten or arrested . In this way local heroes and martyrs were born , and parents and relatives were drawn , often be a

few

wildered , into the fray . The mood of confrontation spread into the small towns and villages . The

Brunt of Everything

Following the provincial elections in October 1930 the Independents were replaced by a Justice ministry under B . Muniswami Naidu . S . Muthiah Mudaliar and Sethuratnam Aiyar , the former second and third ministers , were defeated , but Subbarayan , re -elected by a reduced majority , joined with other opposition MLCs to resurrect the United Nation alist Party . The renewed Congress boycott and the return of a Justice ministry did not recreate the political situation which had existed in 1920 - 22 . The new Governor , Sir George Stanley , *

little

imagination was a third - rate , unemployed politician of and the least diligent of the four Governors Madras received during the dyarchy period . " I agree " was his usual eloquent comment on government files below the opinions of depart mental secretaries and executive councillors . He did not , therefore , show the enthusiasm Willingdon had displayed in

132

drawing the Congress in

struggle against the During the middle months of 1930 the

Justice Party into

che

1920 - 22 . had not been in session and when it did meet the burden for defending government policies rested not with the Justice ministers , but with the two former Justicites on the Executive Council : Muhammad Usman , the Home Member , and

legislature

, responsible for the claims to have a place in the cabinet , not to his own abilities . A bull of a man , he was slow -witted and easily confused in the legislature by the jibes and interjections of the United Nationalists . In 1920 - 22 the opposition in the council had been inhibited by its largely Brahmin composition and by its antipathy to non cooperation , but in 1930 - 33 there was a far more experienced and largely non - Brahmin opposition leadership – which included Venkatachelam Chetti , Arogyaswami Mudaliar , Ramalingam Chetti as well as Subbarayan – to harass the government and to abet the Congress from within the legislature . Moreover , the novelty of dyarchy had gone . Its limitations were known and though the powers and patronage of the ministry had not ceased to be an attraction there was no longer a scramble for communal privileges . Politicians had begun to look for ward to the day when dyarchy would be scrapped . Krishnan Nair , the

police ,

owed

Law

Member

Usman

his position to Muslim

The Government

of Madras , therefore , opposed

civil dis

obedience more openly and directly than had seemed necessary 10 years before . On 4 June 1930 the government warned that its servants in all departments , and not those in the magis tracy and police alone , were expected to " show by every means at . . . ( their ) disposal . . . [ their ] strong and active dis approval of the movement . " Every public servant , especially touring officials , " should take every opportunity . . . of promoting loyalty to the Government and of countering and exposing by informal talks and discussions the lies , mis representations and economic fallacies that are used in support of the Congress Programme " . " Official encouragement was given to anti - Congress meetings by Muslims , Indian Christians , district and local board presidents and by lead ing landholders . The government was particularly eager to recruit the latter , believing that the " zamindars and big landholders . . . constitute a class with a real stake in the country and possessed " considerable local influence . . . " Most of them were " loyal beyond question " . But , in the government ' s own assessment , " the brunt of everything was borne by the police force " . The police were constantly , "" constantly overstrained and overworked abused in the Press ove fandl] often under taunts and insults and by the Public , [and under can Presidency restrained from action . . . " 13 The newly created Presidency created

133

General Reserve of 664 armed police , combined with highly mobile district armed reserves , played the main part in sup pressing agitation in the mofussil . " During the year of civil disobedience from March 1930 to March 1931 the Madras government was constantly concerned to balance repressive measures with gestures that would reassure what was variously termed " general moderate opinion " or " the political public " . 75 Response to the Simon Commission ' s report , published in June 1930 , was negative and disappoint ing , but the government held out the prospect of a new con stitution , warning of the dangers of violence and economic dislocation the Congress were not checked . But civil dis obedience was no longer the glimpse of hell that it had seemed to moderate politicians and men of property in 1920 - 22 . To be sure , it was often violent , but – and this is of fundamental importance in understanding the difference between the Tamil Congress in the 1920s and that in the 1930s - civil dis obedience was no longer regarded by the majority of the pro fessional and commercial middle classes or by the bulk of the landholders and cultivators as a revolutionary movement that menaced their lives and property . On the contrary , reports of lathi charges and of policemen beating up satyagrahis in the jails were now the cause of concern to " the political public " . Civil disobedience had been largely successful in by - passing the Justice Party and creating a direct confront ation with the Raj . The Congress had not created a mass movement , - indeed , it avoided unleashing one -- but civil dis obedience induced an important shift in the attitudes of the propertied classes .

if

The

Pact and After

the efforts of the Viceroy , Lord Irwin , and the constitutionalists Sapru and Jayakar , a settlement was reached between the Congress and the Government of India at the beginning of March 1931 . Under the terms of the Gandhi Through

Indian

civil disobedience and the Second Round Table Conference later in the year . This was clearly an attempt to draw the Congress back into the constitutional game . In return the government promised to remove the ordinances introduced against civil disobedience in some provinces and to release all prisoners convicted for civil disobedience offences but who had not used or advocated violence . Salt could be col lected by villagers in areas adjacent to salt pans but only for their domestic use ; village officers who had resigned in sympathy with civil disobedience would be reinstated their Irwin Pact the Congress

agreed

to

participate

"

discontinued "

in

if

134

posts had not already been filled . The right to picket liquor and cloth shops was conceded but picketing must be " unaggres sive " in character and free from " coercion , intimidation , restraint , hostile demonstration , obstruction to the public , or any offence under the ordinary law " – failure to observe these conditions would result in the suspension of the right to picket locally . 76 In Tamilnad there was some criticism of the Pact by Congressmen who had wanted any enquiry into police conduct political prisoners . ” and the release of But , in view of by complete the almost exhaustion of the movement March 1931 , the idea of an agreement with the government was not opposed and there were no regrets that Gandhi had compromised rather

all

than tried to fight on as he had done in December 1921 . Congressmen were generally elated by the fact that the Vice roy had negotiated with Gandhi as an equal , and because of

this

sense

of triumph the pact brought

hostilities rather Conflict

than

a

an

intensification of

truce . government

the Congress in

. Tamilnad developed rapidly over the drink issue . Rajagopala chari and other partymen encouraged caste panchayats to fine or ostracize those who defied caste prohibitions on the con sumption of alcohol . He argued that this was a legitimate practice long sanctioned by Hindu society and beyond the authority of the government to interfere . " . . . must " , Rajagopalachari wrote to Stanley ' s private secretary on 8 September 1931 , " be open to classes and castes who have hitherto permitted their members to use intoxicating liquor , which , in a very great measure , contributes to their lower status in Hindu society , to seek to raise themselves socially as well as economically by adopting the practice of so - called higher castes in regard to total abstinence . " 78 Rajagopala chari , Brahmin and nationalist , was back at his old caste - and drink tactics . The Madras government was sure that in many cases the dictation of caste panchayats amounted to physical coercion and was politically motivated . There was , for example , a report from Salem that caste fines were paid into Congress funds . '9 between

the

and

it

More serious was the question of liquor - shop picketing . In the first months after the pact the government was gener ally disposed to allow " peaceful " picketing . On 6 March 1931 , a day after the publication of the pact , the Chief Secretary magistrates advised district " to take no notice whatever of picketing unless and until it threatens serious disorder or danger to the public peace . . . " 80 But by early May reports were

reaching the Secretariat

of aggressive Congress picketing

135

the cordoning

off of drink shops , and unfettered discretion " to tackle picketing . 81 This provoked a series of disputes be magistrates tween and Congress organizers over the terms on picketing which was allowed under the Gandhi - Irwin Pact and almost daily letters from Rajagopalachari to the Governor and the Secretariat asking for details of confidential instruct ions supplied to local officials concerning picketing . Raja gopalachari ' s letters by turns obsequious and threatening , rapidly exhausted the tolerance of the Under - Secretary , Williams , and the new Chief Secretary , G . T . H . Bracken . After one exchange of letters , Bracken noted on 5 September that " Mr . Rajagopalachari ' s object in continually writing and making allegations is , presumably , partly to establish his position as an ' intermediary ' between the Government and the

which

had amounted

to

district magistrates

people "

given

"

. 82

The

equally

were

magistrates incensed

and

the

by

police officers in the districts were tactics of the Congress after the pact .

M . K . Vellodi , District Magistrate of North Arcot , wrote to Williams on 29 October :

During the very large

Officers

Department

last six number

and

from

and

months I have received of reports from Police

officers of

also from

a

the Excise

my Sub

-Divisional

Magistrates of incidents relating to picketing which in my opinion constitute definite breaches of the pact . I have received reports of con sumers being obstructed , abused , black -mailed and in some instances assaulted by picketers acting in the name of Congress . . . I am aston

at the moderation with which the Police rank in this District have behaved throughout the last few months . I myself have been at pains to see that the conditions of a pact by no means easy to work are faithfully observed by officers subordinate to me . 63 ished

of

every

Williams thought Vellodi ' s report an " admirable document " , but Bracken would not allow him to send a copy to Rajagopalachari . Other district magistrates and the Commissioner of Police asked the Secretariat for assurances that when – it was no longer a question of " " – the next civil disobedience campaign began they would have the authorization to crush the Congress " on the very day that Civil Disobedience is renewed " . "

if

For once the Government of India was in agreement with the Madras predilection for prompt , decisive action against the Congress . As early as July 1931 the Government of India

136

began

to

draft plans for the suppression of

a

new

civil dis

obedience campaign , fearing the Gandhi might after all decide against participation in the Round Table Conference in London . Although Gandhi ' s departure from Bombay on 29 August postponed preparations , they were soon resumed and the provincial govern ments were consulted as to the nature of the ordinances they would require in combating a revived movement . 86 By December it was clear that the crisis was imminent . On 28 December 1931 Gandhi returned to India disillusioned by his failure to make any headway in London : he was far better at face - to - face negotiations than round table wrangling over constitutional details . But , despite the certainty of renewed conflict , the Congress leadership had made few plans of its own , perhaps anticipating that there would again be negotiations between Gandhi and the Viceroy , now Lord Willingdon , certainly ex pecting that repression would be as gradually applied as had been

in

1930 .

it

This time , however , the government was in no mood to Rebuffed , Gandhi advised the CWC to revive civil disobedience and at once the government launched its pre emptive strike . Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel were arrested at daybreak on 4 January 1932 ; ordinances were promulgated where they were not already in force ; and Congress committees out lawed and party leaders rounded up before they had a chance to set the agitational machine in motion . In Tamilnad alone 404 Congressmen were arrested and convicted in January 1932 . 87 The Madras government ' s faith in attack seemed vindicated .

negotiate .

first bewildered and disoriented , the Tamil Congress had escaped capture launched a counter - attack . In Madras city in January and February 1932 small bands of pick eters were posted to attract crowds and to provoke police aggression . In one incident on 25 January Mrs Rukmani Lakshmipathi posted two volunteers outside a store selling foreign cloth in Rattan Bazaar Road to picket and distribute leaflets advocating the boycott of foreign goods . A crowd of 200 soon gathered and , anticipating a breach of the peace , Inspector V . A . Currie gave the picketers two minutes to perse . When they ignored his warning , the two volunteers At

men

who

dis

were beaten with canes as an " unlawful assembly " . They crawled across the road to Mrs Lakshmipathi ' s waiting car and were driven to hospital for medical attention ; there they were arrested . Inspector Currie claimed that he was following instructions issued to the police on 4 January 1932 which stipulated that picketers should be dispersed " vigorously ' ; Mrs Lakshmipathi complained that the police used " all their might " in beating the volunteers ; it was , she added , " the 88 most violent thing I have ever witnessed " . 58 Accounts of the

137

incident were reported in the press that evening and repeated the volunteers went on trial ; and the beating formed the basis of questions in the legislature . It demonstrated that the Congress was not easily quietened . The government was annoyed at Currie ' s " error of judgement " in walking into the Congress trap , but , as Bracken observed , " the conditions under which the Police are working are extremely difficult and some allowance must be made for those who err owing to 20 excess of , , zeal " . 89 This however was not an isolated case . 90 when

Tamil Congress would not maintain its defiance of the weight of repression was too great and Congressmen began to doubt the value of trying to continue their campaign against such odds . By April 1932 the civil disobedience movement had disintegrated , and the only activi ties were occasional " conferences " held secretly in fields or temples , the circulation of cyclostyled leaflets and news sheets , and minor instances of incendiarism . But the govern . ment ' s counter - propaganda was slow , because it was more scrupulous in investigating incidents than the nationalists , and in such a war of propaganda as the Congress was engaged with the Raj , speed and drama made greater impact than be lated apologies and rebuttals . 91 The

the Raj for long :

of Civil Disobedience

The Function

Civil

disobedience

had been crushed

, but had it failed

?

proclaimed objective of the movement was to win for complete independence India from colonial rule . This was not achieved and 13 years were to intervene between the formal independ abandonment of civil disobedience in 1934 and Indian struggle Congressmen ence in 1947 . But for some the was not only directed at winning independence . The

For Gandhi the struggle itself was at least as important constitutional goal . Civil disobedience was an oppor tunity for Indians to develop their own political strength

as any

on

and acknowledge . 23 January 1930 about the boycott

Table Conference Gandhi explained : The

it

Britain perceive

and to make Young India

and

the decision to launch

British people

must

realize

civil

Writing in of the Round

disobedience ,

that the Empire

will not realize India have generated power within to enforce our will . The English have paid dearly for their freedom such as it is . They therefore

is

to

unless

come to we in

only respect adequate

an

end

those

.

who

This they

are prepared to pay an

price for their

own

liberty .

The

real

138

conference , therefore , has to be

among

our

selves . Rajagopalachari saw civil disobedience as having two complementary objectives . Firstly , in a regional context , it was to build up the strength of the party by mobilizing as many volunteers and sympathizers as possible and establishing active committees throughout Tamilnad . The careful prepar ations for the Vedaranniyam march indicate this as much as the widespread and intensive liquor agitation of 1931 . A broad based party would resolve the communal problem by incorpor ating a non - Brahmin ma jority ; a strong party could flex its muscles and make its opponents appreciate its strength . Secondly ,

in

an

of organized strength

contest , through demonstrations

and popular

support , the Congress would

negotiate with the British the sort of constitutional settlement it wanted . Complete independence , which Rajagopalachari had rejected as an impractical objective

be

in

position

all - India

a

at the

to

Vedaranniyam

conference

in

August

1929

, might be

an

ultimate aim , but the immediate task of the Congress was to secure a more suitable constitution than dyarchy . In 1921 Rajagopalachari had opposed Congress participation in a Round Table Conference because he felt that " we had not shown enough strength

" a premature settlement would end in very un terms . . . " 92 But in 1921 the dyarchy constitu tion had only recently been introduced ; in 1930 - 33 its successor was being devised while the civil disobedience movement was in progress . " This " , explained Rajagopalachari in Madras in October 1930 , " was the psychological moment , when the Round Table drama was being played in London , for them to carry on the real fight here . It was no use telling people imagine to that that was the theatre of action . The theatre of action was in India " . 93 "

and

satisfactory

was agitation in India to determine constitution Speaking of the making in London ? Two ways were possible . differences between Extremists and Moderates in 1919 , Raja gopalachari suggested that the one in practice helped the other . " Moderate opinion gets its value only by pointing at the strength of Nationalist discontent , and the growing dangers thereof . Nationalist opinion is duly restrained and shaped into a true political force by the opposition of moderate opinion " . 94 It might be that in 1930 - 32 he hoped How

that Congress agitation would

stiffen the demands of the Liberals at the three Round Table Conferences . If the British feared that their position in India was seriously challenged by the Congress , they would try to rally the mod erates by making concessions to

them

.

The more

persistent

the

139

Congress agitation in India , the greater the harvest the moderates would reap for other Indians to enjoy . But it is more likely that by 1930 Rajagopalachari thought the Liberals too deficient in courage and deter mination to play a useful role in London . It was now a case proving agitation Congress through of the that the British must come to terms with the Congress and not with other parties . Failure to meet the demands of the Congress would result in the breakdown of any constitution it opposed . By contrast with his attitude in December 1921 , in October 1931 Rajagopalachari welcomed Gandhi ' s participation in the Round Table Conference because " Last year , we made Britain perceive our strength " . 95 The moment seemed opportune to drive a hard bargain . Even the Congress failed to secure all its con stitutional aims at the conference it was , Rajagopalachari suggested to Gandhi , better " to try and get as much as you can under the existing circumstances , so that the necessity for resorting to Satyagraha ( to force further concessions ] may be reduced to a minimum . . . " , rather than allow the con stitution to be drafted without the Congress . It was essential that the pressure on the British should be main tained while Gandhi was in London : Rajagopalachari ' s per sistent letters to the Government of Madras and the intensive picketing during the Gandhi - Irwin Pact period were partly designed to achieve this end .

if

Rajagopalachari was too optimistic , and when Gandhi returned at the end of December empty - handed from the Round Table Conference , Rajagopalachari wrote that " India has been turned back from the London Conference in tragic unfulfil Reluctantly , he turned back to civil disobedience , ment " . 97 continuing to keep one eye on developments in London . In courting imprisonment for the last time during the movement in August 1933 , Rajagopalachari explained this as a gesture of protest against the recent discussion on safeguards by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the constitution . 98 Rajagopalachari was not alone in Tamilnad in relating civil disobedience to constitutional objectives . A similar attitude on the part of the moderate nationalists and former Swarajists helps to explain their greater willingness to participate in agitation in 1930 - 33 than in 1920 - 22 . The Madras government , too , noted that , by contrast with non cooperation , civil disobedience was " designed to precipitate the constitutional issue . . . " 99

practice , the Congress contributed very little to of the constitution embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 . Its achievements were indirect . Through the

In form

140

agitation

the Tamil Congress built a broad basis of support those classes which were enfranchised under the new act , and by the organizational strength developed in the struggle against the Raj , the party was in effect augmenting its power vis - a - vis its other opponent , the Justice Party . among

CHAPTER

5

COALESCENCE

first

years of the dyarchy constitution the Congress in Tamilnad was perplexed , at times almost para lysed , by its own disunity . had two clear opponents – the Raj and the Justice Party – but it failed to devise a poli tical strategy which would either knock out both or despatch the one and enable the Congress to concentrate its blows on the other . Instead , Brahmin and non - Brahmin Congressmen con stantly tried to trip each other for alleged communal slights or favouritism ; one faction bickered with another and did not hesitate to publicize its grievances in the press and on public platforms ; and leaders and would -be leaders punched and jostled their rivals and made faces when Gandhi or the Congress Working Committee told them to remember their nation

For the

10

It

alist

manners .

1930 the situation changed . Not magically , for personal , factional communal and abuse remained part of the region ' s political slang . But the Tamil Congress emerged internally more cohesive and organ from civil disobedience izationally more powerful than it had been during the previous decade . As in a balance , the fortunes of the Congress rose as those of the Justice Party fell . As the social composition of the Justice Party , and especially of its leadership , con tracted , that of the Congress expanded . A mass party it did not become , either in terms of the size of its membership or the thrust of its policies , but its influence and popularity extended far enough to win a dramatic success for the Congress in the first elections under the new constitution . From

if

The

Party

Consolidates

Srinivasa Iyengar resigned from leadership of the Swarajists early in 1930 , he left no heir apparent . Tamil Rangaswami Iyengar preferred the influence he now exercised as editor of the Hindu and as Congress veteran to an active leadership role . C . N . Muthuranga Mudaliar , Srinivasa When

141

142

' s nominee for the TNCC president in 1929 , commanded authority within the party : he did not have the stature to rival Rajagopalachari . Saryamurti , having failed to create a new Congress party within the legislature , with Iyengar

little

from the political stage . In the absence of an accepted leader and in view of the renewed boycott of the legislatures , the Swarajist element of the Tamil Congress preferred to wait in the wings until , as in 1922 - 23 , the moment seemed opportune for them to return .

drew

the unexpected strength of the civil disobedience movement forced them to participate . It was clear that the Congress ban would not be lifted before the elections to the legislatures in September 1930 . To defy the Congress boycott at the height of public enthusiasm for civil disobedience might be considered treachery and damage the future political career of those who called themselves nationalists . And it is certain that many of them were genuinely excited by the struggle and moved by the suffering of the activists . Satyamurti , who " apparently feared political extinction he failed to advertise " , was drawn into the movement by Rajagopalachari in October 1930 as his successor as TNCC president . Satyamurti avoided arrest until January 1932 , when he was caught and imprisoned in the pre - emptive strike . Iyengar , * formerly a close professional and poli K . Bashyam tical associate of Srinivasa Iyengar , was a more enthusiastic convert to civil disobedience . In March 1930 he resigned from the TNCC in protest against the boycott of the legis latures , but promised to help the satyagraha . He collected funds for the Vedaranniyam march and with Muthuranga Mudaliar and the latter ' s nephew , M . Bhaktavatsalam , he organized swadeshi propaganda in Madras and the mofussil During Rajagopalachari ' s brief between April and July 1930 . spell of freedom in October 1930 , Bashyam was his right - hand man in Madras and it was Bashyam , in conjunction with Telugu Congressmen , who directed the city ' s picketing in the first months of 1931 , on one occasion receiving a severe beating in a police lathi - charge . 3 On the resumption of civil dis obedience in January 1932 Bashyam evaded arrest to continue to organize resistance , but he was imprisoned in March for leading a demonstration in protest against the visit to Madras of the Lothian Committee on the franchise . " But

if

Swarajists did not

long - term commit ment to civil disobedience . Their faith in constitutional action was unshaken , but they saw the political gains , for themselves and for their group to be won by assisting the agitation at that juncture . They , like Rajagopalachari , believed that civil disobedience could influence the outcome The

former

have

a

143

of

the

marked

constitutional discussions in London . 5 This was in the Nationalists ' basic hostility to

contrast with

non - cooperation

favourable the period after

Their participation created cooperation for with other groups civil disobedience .

in

1920 - 22 .

atmosphere

a

in

Although there had been no challenge to Rajagopalachari ' s leadership during the movement from the ex - Swarajists , there was one from an increasingly powerful group of party activists . With the collapse of the non - cooperation movement in 1922 of the Congress volunteers , numbering no more than 2 , 000 , drifted away from the party . The higher caste and better educated ones who remained gravitated towards Rajagopalachari and participated in his struggle against the Swarajists ; later they served in the Tamil Nadu branch of the All - India Spinners ' Association , which had its headquarters at Tiruppur , or they followed him to the Tiruchengodu ashram , where they lived on a modest salary from Congress funds . A few of the non - Brahmins defected with Ramaswami Naicker and Ramanathan to form the Self - Respect movement . But there remained an other group of activists who could seldom boast of education or high caste . Several , like N . Annamalai Pillai * of Tiruvannamalai in North Arcot , were the sons of dancing most

girls

and

prostitutes ;

some ,

Virudhunagar in Ramnad were despised castes ; yet others ,

like

from

K

. Kamaraj

Nadar

*

from

relatively poor families

and

Srinivasavarada Iyengar , a Brahmin from Madura district , cared less for their little plot of land than for the life of a political vagabond . '

like

R

.

Although drawn into the Congress between these activists distrusted Raja gopalachari and

1918 came

and

to ,

1922

des

pise him . They were alienated by his intellectualism his aloofness from the back - slapping camaraderie of the party menials . Gandhi had caught their imagination by the boldness

of his

civil

non - cooperation and disobedience program , but they were disappointed by the failure of the movement and did not share either Gandhi ' s scruples about non - violence nor his obsession with spinning . After 1922 they drifted away from They the Congress mainstream into backwaters of their own . followed Subramania Siva , who had been a central figure in the Tinnevelly disturbances of 1908 and who imbued in them a zest for physical and verbal violence and a contempt for Europeans . They held unofficial satyagrahas – like the abortive " sword satyagraha " in 1924 in Madura or the more sensational cam paign against the statue of General Neill , a British hero of singing They toured Tamilnad 1857 , in Madras in 1927 . ' nationalist songs and performing patriotic dramas . The orthodox Gandhians were inclined to shun them as violent ,

144

the Swarajists were more sympathetic , canvass at election times or employing their services as orators and flag -wavers . Humble beginnings , but by the late 1920s this group of activists – which for con group venience may be called the Kamaraj - Annamalai

youths , but

uncouth

paying

them

to

Pillai

firmly established on the middle rungs of the party organization in Tamilnad . They were experienced in the rough - and -tumble of local faction fights and they had contacts with local big men . In Ramnad , for example , Kamaraj and his friend K . S . Muthuswami hitched themselves to the anti - Justice faction in Virudhunagar and were instrumental in bringing several wealthy Nadars into civil disobedience and making the town one of the centres of They were also closely allied with the movement . P . S . Kumaraswami Raja , * a leading figure in the Telugu after

two

of its

most

active

members

–

was

speaking Raja

community in neighbouring Rajapalaiyam . By 1930 Kumaraswami was president of the Ramnad DCC with Kamaraj and Muthuswami as his lieutenants . 9

Emboldened by the displacement of the Swarajists in group tried March - April 1930 , the Kamaraj - Annamalai to gain control of the TNCC by proposing that Rajagopalachari should concentrate on the Vedaranniyam satyagraha , leaving

Pillai

the post of president to an activist . The bid failed : the did not have a candidate who could rival Rajagopala chari . A year later , however , they lined up with Satya murti , his reputation enhanced by a term in prison . In the TNCC elections in May 1931 Rajagopalachari was re - elected as president with Rajan as secretary and N . M . R . Subbaraman of Madura as treasurer , but Satyamurti was pushed in as vice president and the activists occupied most of the remaining places on the TNCC ' s Working Committee . "

activists

Satyamurti and the activists was not fortuitous . Himself poor and a pedlar of his own peppery brand of nationalist oratory , Satyamurti had much in common with the activists ' way of life . He was ambitious to be a Congress leader , but hampered by his dependence on patrons such as Srinivasa Iyengar , he had always had to take second place in the Tamil party hierarchy . The activists provided him with support within the party ; he gave them access to the highest echelons of the Congress and a champion to field against Rajagopalachari . There were other benefits to be anticipated . Satyamurti , unlike Rajagopalachari , was an advocate of Congress participation in the local boards ; his ambition to be a minister was well -known . By allying with him the activists could use the party organization to launch themselves into the local boards and the legislatures . '2 Once elected , they could manipulate the resources of the party and The

alliance

between

145

the

government

to advance

fortunes .

their

own

personal

political

and

their position in the Kamaraj local and Muthuswami themselves became secretaries of the TNCC in the mid - 1930s and in this way a new non - Brahmin element was injected into the party leadership . Biographers of Kamaraj have seen the 1931 TNCC elections as a triumph for the activists over Rajagopala chari and a prelude to the rift in the party in the late 1930s between Kamaraj and Satyamurti on one side and Rajagopalachari and his associates on the other . 13 This interpretation ex aggerates Satyamurti ' s strength and underestimates Rajagopala chari ' s political dexterity . 1937 the activists consolidated and regional party organization .

By

No doubt

the

1931

TNCC

Rajagopalachari was annoyed at the outcome of elections , but he turned it to his advantage .

could manipulate the vain , ambitious Satyamurti as he could not have done Srinivasa Iyengar or Rangaswami Iyengar . By nominating Satyamurti his successor as TNCC president in

He

1935 , Rajagopalachari converted Satyamurti a rival into a ' s second term as presi hostility dent aroused considerable within the party , especi ally from his former Swarajist colleagues Muthuranga Mudaliar inviting and Bashyam Iyengar . When the critics proposed Iyengar Congress Srinivasa back to lead the Tamil it was Rajagopalachari ' s intervention which saved Satyamurti and warded off the threat to them both , just as was Rajagopala responsibility Satyamurti chari who took the for ' s mismanage participation Congress ment of in the local board elections in 1935 - 36 . 14 Moreover , through Satyamurti he could exercise an indirect control over the Kamaraj - Annamalai Pillai group while preserving his own close contacts with Gandhi and the national Congress leadership . 15 As long as Rajagopalachari was the essential link between the Gandhian High Command and the Tamil Congress , Satyamurti was inevitably the junior partner .

October

1930

and again

in May

dependent .

it

By the Swarajists ' involvement in civil disobedience , by the elimination of his main rivals for regional leadership , and by drawing together the reins of party control into his own hands , Rajagopalachari was able to exercise a command over the party which had persistently evaded him in the 1920s . This centralization of control and internal consolidation was the preliminary stage of a wider process of coalescence . 16

Panting to take Office It was closely followed by the creation of sensus within the Tamil party on the future aims

a

virtual con and

tactics

146

of

. For a period of about a year , from mid - 1932 , this was in doubt . Civil disobedience had helped to draw the Tamil Congressmen together and there was a danger that its swift collapse in 1932 would destroy the cooperation that had been achieved . to

the Congress

late

1933

In September

1932

Gandhi protested

al proposals under consideration

by

the

against constitution

British

government

would give the untouchables a separate electorate from the caste Hindus . Fearing that this would irreparably split the Hindus , Gandhi fasted until the untouchable leaders agreed to reserve seats for untouchables ( whom he now called Harijans ) within a joint Hindu electorate . The agreement , known as the Poona Pact , was incorporated into the 1935 constitution . 17 Among Gandhi ' s supporters , and indeed among many Indians who sympathized with his social views , the fast stimulated concern for the plight of the untouchables . Raja gopalachari , who had been at Poona during the fast and the negotiations , abandoned much of the caution he had shown on the issue of untouchability during the 1920s and campaigned in Tamilnad for the opening of temples to the Harijans . He relied mainly on persuasion , proposing through Subbarayan in the Madras legislature a that would authorize the holding among of referenda the users of a particular temple to decide whether or not it should be opened to the Harijans . 18 He ran into difficulties – the Madras legislature had no jurisdiction in such matters and the orthodox Hindus vigorously opposed any radical change in the treatment of untouchables – and a version of Rajagopalachari ' s introduced in the central legis August lature was withdrawn in 1934 . 19 which

bill

bill

The

political

Harijan campaign

in

Tamilnad

was

not without its

Although it offended many of the orthodox Brahmins who had been Congress supporters in the past , it won for the party new co - workers among non - Brahmin caste Hindus and among untouchable leaders . Previously the Madras government and , with varying success , the Justice Party had championed the cause of the untouchables , but from 1932 the Congress established a claim to have advanced their interests . 20 In view of the large number of seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes under the 1935 Act this was a sig nificant development . The Congress made a real contribution During Gandhi ' s tour of to the welfare of the Harijans . Tamilnad in 1933 - 34 about Rs . 10 , 000 were collected for the Harijan movement , most of which was spent on wells , roads , water - supplies and accommodation as well as for scholarships Compared with the vast and hostels for Harijan students . 21 scale of the problem of untouchability these measures were superficial : the economic and social oppression of the achievements .

147

untouchables was unrelieved . asset for the Congress .

But they were

a

useful

political

Harijan movemer: t also opened up a new front against the government at a time when civil disobedience had died out . It was fear that the Congressmen would make political capital from the Harijan issue that led the Madras government to block Rajagopalachari ' s temple entry bill in the legislature in 1932 - 33 , and there were rumours that funds collected for Harijan work would find their way into Congress coffers to finance a revival of civil disobedierice . 22 The agitation brought Congressmen and their allies back onto public plat forms and into the news at a time when the Congress appeared crushed and its official organizations were illegal . While Rajagopalachari was engaged in the Harijan move Satyamurti , who was too orthodox in his outlook to , ment welcome any material or legal improvement of the Harijans ' position , 28 sought an alternative issue on which to revive the Congress in Tamilnad . In association with the United The

Nationalists

in

legislature he took up the cause of the cultivators hit by falling crop prices during the

landholders and the depression . In November 1933 the opposition moved a resolution in the Madras legislature for a reduction in land revenue rates to compensate for the losses sustained by a gri culturists ; Satyamurti , from outside the legislature , co operated with the MLCs in organizing a " Land Revenue Day " to demand a 33 . 3 per cent cut in land taxation . The agitation

quickly mobilized locally influential moderate politicians in the mofussil including Brahmin mirasdars in Tanjore and V . C . Vellingiri Gounder of Coimbatore who presided over the Madras Presidency Ryotwari Landholders ' Conference organized by United

Nationalists

and Congressmen

in

January

1934

.

24

the agrarian agi Congress " political stunt " and " not a spontaneous move on the part of the average ryot , who , if left to himself would make the best of things and pay his taxes " , 25 the Government of India persuaded it to amounting to 60 lakhs of rupees in January make concessions 1934 . In Tamilnad agrarian agitation continued to smoulder Congressmen and tried to fan it into flame ; in Andhra it quickly developed into a widespread attack on the zamindari system and gave Telugu politics a more radical character in the mid - 1930s . 26

Although the Madras

tation , like the Harijan

The

in

still

and

agrarian

saw

, as

activities

a

of the nationalists

- 33 served to keep the Congress active while it was outlawed and recovering from the blow struck against They gave Congressmen time disobedience in early 1932 .

1932

civil

Harijan

government

movement

148

re - examine the political situation before planning a return constitutional action . Partly from loyalty to Gandhi , Rajagopalachari made a last gesture of civil disobedience in August 1933 , but the TNCC would not follow his lead and he accepted that it would be futile to try to continue the to to

movement . ?

With the publication of the White Paper on the proposed Indian constitution in March 1933 , the general character of the future provincial and central governments was made known . Agitation was no longer likely substantially to affect the nature of the new Government of India Act . With this in view in April 1933 Rangaswami Iyengar took the initiative in pro posing the abandonment of civil disobedience and the substi tution of constitutional work as the Congress program . In a series of editorials in the Hindu before his death in February 1934 , Rangaswami Iyengar argued that civil disobedi ence , although had produced an unexpectedly strong wave of feeling , had been beaten to a standstill by gov nationalist repression ernment . " What " , he asked , " is the best method utilising unprecedented awakening to achieve perm of this anently beneficial results ?" His reply was that " The newly tapped national energy has to be trained into channels of constructive activity it is not to fritter itself away in efforts of a barren or negative character " . 28 He saw the Harijan work undertaken by Rajagopalachari and others as an indication that Congressmen were eager to pursue " construct ive " work , but argued that the legislatures under the new constitution would offer the provincial autonomy Congressmen had sought for nearly 20 years and it was through them that the party ' s practical ambitions could be fulfilled . 29

it

if

Unlike the bitter debate over strategies

in the mid general consensus in the Tamil Congress in the mid - 1930 ' s that this was the only course possible . Dis cussion , therefore , centred not on shether to return to the legislatures , but when . Some partymen felt was premature entry to discuss council until the reforms were finalized or until the Government of India released Congress prisoners and 1920

' s , there

was

a

it

the ban on party organizations . 30 But encouraged by generally response Iyengar ' s Rangaswami the favourable to

removed

editorials , Satyamurti October

1933

launched

in anticipation

of

a a

Madras Swarajya

fifth

round

Party

in

of provincial

elections under dyarchy which was never in fact held . The party manifesto was an up - dated version of the Swarajist stressing the importance of nation programs of the 1920s , legislatures alist control of the and listing the " burning grievances of the people " that the party would seek to re dress . ” More remarkable than the program was the range of

149

Along secured from its inception . Swarajists , , Satyamurti Iyengar Bashyam side former like and Muthuranga Mudaliar , were Satyamurti ' s allies from the Kamaraj Annamalai Pillai group and several of Rajagopalachari ' s Agreement on a parliamentary program Brahmin associates . afforded an internal unity absent in the 1920s . support which the party

Party

April sider

lines

Nehru

six months of the creation of the Madras Swarajya similar bodies were forined throughout India and in Satyamurti and other leaders met in Delhi to con 1934 the formation of a national party organization on the of the All - India Swarajya Party created by Das and in January 1923 . But although Gandhi said that he was

Within

participate in

parliamentary program , most of his that it should be adopted as the Congress program and not entrusted to a separate organization . An informal conference of Congress leaders at Ranchi followed by a meeting of the AICC (which had never been declared illegal ) at Patna in mid - May approved the abandonment of civil disobedience and the adoption of a constitutional pro gram to be carried out by the Congress through its own Parliamentary Board . The first task was to elect candidates and organize the campaigns for elections to the central Assembly scheduled for November 1934 . 82 unable to

a

associates were enthusiastic

In contrast with Gandhi ' s negative attitude towards the reorientation of Congress strategy , Rajagopalachari rapidly established himself as one of the leading spokesmen for the new policy . As early as February 1933 he had remarked that Congress the leaders were not " like religious fanatics (who ] would for ever stick to a particular policy " , adding that " it were proved that the boycott of the Federal Assembly and the Provincial Councils under the future Constitution would result in irreparable harm to the country , the Congress would not boycott the legislatures " . 33 At Ranchi and Patna he insisted that the old differences between " No - Changers" and " Pro - Changers " were no longer relevant and that agreement on a parliamentary program would be a unifying force among Con gressmen . " I feel it is best to have a united and coordin ated plan " , he said , " and not break into groups with opposing policies ." 34 With civil disobedience abandoned , his regional base strengthened , and the new constitution imminent , Raja gopalachari was too convinced of the advantages of returning to the legislatures to revive the controversies of the 1920s .

If

Although the AICC had only resolved to contest the Assembly elections and did not forecast what the attitudes of Congressmen would be to elections under the new constitu tion , for most Tamil Congressmen the logic of their regional

150

political

situation dictated that a return to the legislatures would not mean a return to the frustrations of the Swarajists the Congress were to avoid the trap into in the late 1920s . which Srinivasa Iyengar ' s alliance had stumbled in 1926 - 28 , the party must be able to take office to exclude the Justic ites and to control patronage itself . The disaster of the Independent ministry must not be repeated . On this issue there was a general consensus among the Tamil leadership . Referring to the Justice Party , Satyamurti claimed in July a communal 1934 that " the single consideration of preventing itself in power should and reactionary Party from entrenching be a conclusive argument in favour of Congressmen accepting office , if they come in a majority " . 35 . Rajan , reflecting on the situation created by Congress support for the Subbara yan ministry , remarked in June 1935 that this time " the Con gress could not afford to put dolls in positions of power and responsibility , but must accept office in the wider interests of the country " . 36 Rajagopalachari ' s conviction was that " no futile wrecking should be attempted , but as much benefit should be wrung out of the Councils as possible for streng thening the prestige and position of the Congress " . 37 In his perception civil disobedience was no longer of immediate use once the 1935 Government of India Act made the new constitu tion a fait accompli , though it remained an ultimate sanction

If

if

to be invoked Governor ' s veto

the constitutional path were blocked or the intransigence of the Raj . 38

by the

here " , wrote Lord Erskine , * the new Governor of June 1935 , " the leaders are simply panting to take office " . 39 But , to be fair , it was not simply a question of personal ambition and hatred of the Justice Party , strong though those motives clearly were . As far as Tamilnad was concerned , there was no real choice . Civil disobedience could not be revived in the foreseeable future and the Congress had accumulated since would forfeit much of the support For the 1930 if it refused to work the new constitution . whole of the dyarchy period Congressmen had been in opposition , whether in the legislatures or outside them , but they had not created a rival government of their own . Gandhi had not shown them a practical alternative to participation in the elaborate mechanism of control by which the British ruled India . And many Congressmen were weary of 17 years in the jails and on the streets . They were growing old : Rajagopala chari was 56 in 1935 , Satyamurti 48 . They wanted to be in authority and to use the powers of the provincial government in ways which they believed would advance the cause of Indian nationalism and serve the interests of the Indian people They wanted to reform the rather than the foreign rulers . " Down

Madras

in

it

151

land revenue system , relieve the tax burden of the poor , reduce high salaries paid to government servants , introduce prohibition and promote cottage industries . 40 They were not revolutionaries ; they did not wish to transform Tamil society structurally : so , barring interference by the Governor or obstruction by the Secretariat , a Congress ministry under provincial autonomy should be able to achieve many of its objectives .

Tamil Congress leaders to the growth of left India in the mid - 1930s was a further factor in their eagerness to take office under the new con stitution . In 1934 the Congress Socialist Party was formed by young Congressmen who were disappointed at the abandonment of civil disobedience and who wanted the Congress to adopt a more radical social and economic program . Although Jawaharlal Nehru did not join the party , his speeches in the mid - 1930s were often charged with socialist language and ideology . " In 1933 , for example , he called for the Congress to lead The aversion of the - wing movements in

India

to the great human goal of social and economic equality , to the ending of an exploitation of nation by nation and class by class , to national freedom within the framework of an international cooperative

socialist world federation . This is empty idealist dream as some people imagine . It is within the range of the practical politics of to - day and the near future . "

not

such

an

The Congress " old Guard " , consisting of Rajagopalachari , Rajendra Prasad , Vallabhbhai Patel and other close associates of Gandhi , made no secret of their dislike of socialism . Congress Socialist Party was a CWC Their welcome to the new decrying resolution " loose talk " about class warfare and the Rajagopalachari , never an inter confiscation of property . 43 nationalist and jealous of the trust Gandhi placed in Jawaharlal , * * conspired with other Congress leaders to keep Nehru out of high Congress office and to stop him making socialist speeches during his two terms as Congress president . Having failed to block Nehru ' s election as president , Raja gopalachari tried to face " the practical difficulty of get ting Jawaharlal to be reasonable " , and he was somewhat re assured by Nehru ' s presidential address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936 which emphasized that in India swaraj would have to precede socialism . 45 But by June 1936 Rajagopalachari was complaining that it was impossible to work with Nehru while he continued to preach socialism . At the end of the month Rajagopalachari , Rajendra Prasad , Vallabhbhai Patel and sev eral other CWC members resigned in protest against Nehru ' s

152

which they held to be " prejudicial to the best interests of the country and the success of the national struggle for freedom which we all hold to be the first and paramount concern of the country " . 46 Although Gandhi helped to patch up a compromise between Nehru and the old Guard , the basic disagreement between their ideas and

socialist

tactics

propaganda

. Rajagopalachari , remained

little

who even in 1930 had understand and where it differed from Gandhism , * 7 was unwilling to go further than the declaration of social and economic rights which the Congress , at Nehru ' s prompting , had passed at Karachi in 1931 . 48 He believed that Nehru ' s social ism and disagreement with the old Guard were responsible for creating divisions within the Congress at the very time when Rajagopalachari was working for party unity ; and he could not accept Nehru ' s view that the new constitution must be wrecked . Although there were few socialists in Tamilnad in the mid 1930s , Rajagopalachari wanted to keep the direction of the

ing

of

socialism

all - India

party out of socialist hands . He and other Tamil Congress leaders wanted to direct the party towards consti tutionalism and would not allow it to be captured by the left wing . United

Front

Even though

it

was not

until after

the

1937

provincial

elections that the national Congress leadership committed itself to the acceptance of office under the new constitution , the conviction that it would do so provided the basis for the creation of a broad united front against the Justice Party in Tamilnad . The revived

United

council tried to become

Nationalists in the fourth Madras party an alternative ministerial

to

the Justicites , but it was clear that once the Congress decided to return to the legislature in strength there would They had limited funds and lacked even be no room for them . a skeletal organization outside the legislature . But while the Justice Party remained in office and the Congress un committed to office - acceptance , the United Nationalists flirted with both the major parties . In July 1933 Subbarayan declared that " it should be the policy of the nationalists to join together into a single party , get into power and work the constitution however defective it might be . . . " 49 He hoped to be able to rally the United Nationalists and the Congress men who wanted to return to the legislatures behind his own leadership , but the formation of the Madras Swarajya Party by his rival , Satyamurti , in October drove him back to intriguing

153

with the Justice ministry

, however , Subbarayan and most of the other United Nationalists were certain that , with the new constitution to be introduced with in a few months , they could delay their decision no longer and joined the Congress .

for office . 50

By

1936

The Liberals were in an even weaker position . Since 1923 they had abandoned the Madras legislature and provincial poli tics to hunt for prominence and influence in New Delhi , Simla They continued to make speeches to select audi and London . publish ences and to their views in English - language journals , they in Madras but never developed a party machine , never following , never freed themselves from popular cultivated a overwhelmingly they were to an Brahmin membership . So , play any part in Madras politics under the new constitution , they had to ally with one of the major parties . Because of its lingering communalism and its failing strength the Justice Party did not tempt them and they opted for the Con gress , urging to take office under the new constitution Although and to carry out a moderate reform program . 51 Satyamurti was alarmed that their entry might lessen his own chances of office , Rajagopalachari welcomed the Liberals as further strengthening the Congress party . ”

if

it

The nature of legislative politics in Madras under dyarchy had encouraged the fragmentation of MLCs along communal lines . Elected by separate constituencies from the Hindus , the Muslim and , to a lesser extent , Christian , MLCs tended to form their own communal units with communal demands ; the untouchable MLCs were nominated members who again regarded themselves primarily as communal representatives ; and by the mid - 1930s MLCs from the less advanced caste -Hindu communities had banded together to form a Backward Classes League in pro test against the domination of the Justice Party by the high est non - Brahmin castes . 53 But in the Madras Presidency the preponderance numerical of the Hindus and the resources of the Congress and Justice parties so outweighed small communal parties that by 1937 the latter opted for integration or alliance with the two main parties .

relations between Hindus and Muslims were the bitterness which had been growing in northern India in the late 1920s and early 1930s . Muslim politicians had been willing either to enter the Justice In

Tamilnad

relatively free

from

of improved government or to join with the Khilafat issue . After wards of both tactics , the independent course and in Party in search

representation in education and and Swarajists over

the Gandhians

1924 , dissatisfied with the re Muslim MLCs had followed a more 1930 Yakub Hasan , the former

154

Khilafat leader , organized

a separate Muslim party . However , the legislature in the 1930s led him to believe that so small a minority as the Muslims in Madras could not act effectively as an independent force but needed to ally with a major party – his preference was clearly for the Congress – which would reward Muslim support with special concessions . 54 The possibility of co - operation with the Congress was accepted by two other prominent Muslims – Abdul Hameed Khan , a former Swarajist and in 1935 the first Muslim mayor of Madras , and M . Jamal Muhammad , a Tamil - speaking Muslim and the spokesman of the leather and hides producers They disagreed with in Tamilnad . Hasan ' s view that inte gration with the Congress would be desirable , preferring a separate Muslim party which could ally with the Congress without losing its communal identity . They anticipated that the Congress majority in the new provincial legislature would be a small one and that a Muslim party , holding the balance , could extract concessions from the Congress as the price for its cooperation . In August 1936 Jamal Muhammad was selected president of the provincial Muslim Parliamentary Board , set up by the All - India Muslim League but almost en tirely under local control . 55 MPB candidates for the pro vincial elections in February 1937 were pledged to work the new constitution and to press for reforms on behalf of the Muslim community , but were free to combine with other poli tical organizations for these ends . In only two cases in Tamilnad did MPB and Congress Muslim candidates contest the same seats . 57

his

experience

in

Progressive A rival Muslim organization , the Muslim Party , was formed in July 1936 by C . Abdul Hakim and Abdul Lateef Farouki , both former Khilafat leaders . Hakim claimed that the Congress had repeatedly ignored Muslim interests and that , since the MPB was pro - Congress , was inimical to true Nuslim interests . 58 The MPP was to be an independent communal party , but in practice Hakim received the support of the Justice Party and avoided election contests against Justice Muslim candidates . 59

it

Although as a result of the Poona Pact the Scheduled Castes or Harijans were given 16 reserved seats in Tamilnad under the new constitution , the attempt of untouchable leaders in Madras to contest the 1937 elections as an independent body failed . The Madras Presidency Scheduled Castes Election Board was formed in October 1936 to sponsor Harijan candidates regardless of their political affiliations . Without funds and organization , the board soon disintegrated . Many prospective candidates then joined the Congress or made secret agreements to declare themselves in favour of the Congress after election

;

155

a

few were

patronized by the Justice Party . 60 did not attempt to form its

The

Indian

Christian own political party . Though under dyarchy Madras had been the only province with separate electorates for Christians (with five MLCs ) , experience had shown that only through participation in the major parties could Christians hope to compete with Hindus and Muslims , and the Congress was anxious to have them . 61 Although the leading Indian Christians were generally loyalist and pro

Justice

in

community

the 1920s , the growing

strength

of

the Congress in

the early 1930s persuaded many Indian Christians to shift their allegiance to the nationalist party .

Subbarayan ' s view , expressed in July 1936 when he re the Congress , that in Madras there was no room for a third major party and that one had either to be a Justicite or accepted one . 62 a Congressman was a widely had been one of the lessons of his own ministry . Nevertheless , in May 1936 a new party , optimistically called the People ' s Party , was formed to occupy middle ground between the Justice and Congress par ties . It offered moderate nationalism through legislative tactics , but generally identified itself with the non - Brahmin movement and favoured a modest social reform program . 63 The party ' s formation was largely the outcome of rivalry between the Telugu Maharaja of Pithapuram and the Raja of Bobbili , * who replaced Muniswami Naidu as Justice Chief Minister in November 1932 . In Tamilnad it was directed by S . Muthiah , Mudaliar from 1928 - 30 Subbarayan ' s Second Minister , and its main appeal was to the leaders of the backward classes move ment , especially M . A . Manickavelu Naicker , a Vanniyar MLC

joined

It

from

North Arcot .

The

Vanniyars , concentrated

in

northern

Tamilnad and , numbering about three million , the largest caste in Tamilnad , had failed to win a place for themselves in the Justice oligarchy : their community , though so numerous , was

largely composed of poor agricultural labourers , tenants and petty ryots , and the Justice Party ' s support in their dis tricts came almost exclusively from the landholding castes of

Vellalas , Reddis and Naidus . The Congress endeavoured to gather Vanniyar support in the mid - 1930s , notably by identify ing itself with Vanniyar opposition to the Criminal Tribes Act in 1935 , 64 but the Congress , too , was dominated by the Vanniyars ' overlords . Manickavelu Naicker attempted , there fore , to use the People ' s Party as a vehicle for Vanniyar ambitions . At a Vanniyar conference in North Arcot in October 1936 , the Maharaja of Pithapuram claimed that the community should win 12 seats in the new provincial legislature and form an " effective minority party '' , able to press its communal demands . 65 In the 1937 elections 12 Vanniyars contested seats , five as candidates for the People ' s Party , but only the two

156

Congress Vanniyar

candidates were elected

This crushing defeat

and

the

.

failure of

the People

's

Party to win more than one seat in Tamilnad in 1937 illustrate the extent to which politics in Tamilnad had become polarized between the Congress and Justice parties . The Vanniyar lead ers belatedly acknowledged this in July 1937 when they re solved to seek communal aims in future through the Congress . 66 If the Congress had only been an alliance of existing

politicians

would not have been appreci Iyengar ' s electoral alliance of 1926 ; it might , like that alliance , have disintegrated Congress the had declined to take office . However , the coal escence of Congressmen and their allies at the level of pro vincial politics within a constitutionalist party was accom panied by the expansion and consolidation of party support in the localities . The underlying strength of the Tamil Congress was in its party organization and its ability to mobilize a large part of those enfranchised in 1937 .

ably

and

office - seekers it

stronger than Srinivasa

if

Zamindar - Ridden The strength of the Justice Party in its early years lay in its appeal to non - Brahmins from the professional and , to a lesser extent , landholding classes who sought to displace the Brahmins and establish their own hegemony . During the 1920s many of the Justicites ' immediate ambitions were achieved

through legislation and through the distribution of govern ment patronage to non -Brahmins . Many of the more enterprising non - Brahmin politicians began to find the Justice Party too restricting for their ambitions : they entered the Congress , or like the Tamil Brahmins before them , they sought power out

side the presidency .

The Justice Party ' s loss of office in this trend . Although the leadership proved resilient and regained office in 1930 , the party was losing to the Congress the support of its original middle - class contin gent . This contraction can be attributed to the success of the Congress in scoring political victories against the Justice Party , but it was also a reflection of the increasing domination of the party by zamindars and bankers . 1926

encouraged

Justice Party was created by a group of non professionals and businessmen , from its early years it attracted the financial support and political backing of the zamindars , especially those in Andhra . The big landholders Although the

Brahmin

loyalists and opposed to non - cooperation ; they resented of Brahmin lawyers and they wanted a larger say in provincial politics than that allowed by the allocation to were

the power

157

of six of the

98 elected seats in the Madras council . not uncommon for zamindars to sponsor candidates for other constituencies , and Willingdon and Goschen encouraged 67 the zamindars to take a prominent part in politics . 67 Until

them

It

was

his death in 1929 the Raja of Panagal was one of the main links between the Telugu zamindars and the Justice Party

and

he provided ( or collected from other big landholders ) the funds the party needed to run its newspapers and conduct propaganda outside the legislature . One of the offers Subbarayan made in his bid for Justice leadership in 1929 was to take over from Panagal the financing of the party . 68 Headed by the Raja of Bobbili and the Kunararaja of Venkatagiri , the Telugu zamindars played a central part in the leadership contest and were aggrieved when the compromise candidate , Muniswami Naidu , denied them a place in his ministry and seemed unsympathetic to zamindar interests . 69 They

were

not the only discontented

ative source of funds of Chettinad , a prince

group .

The

altern

zamindars was the Raja among the indigenous bankers of Tamilnad and de facto head of Ramnad ' s Nattukkottai Chetti community . The Raja had provided part of the party ' s financial backing in the late 1920s without completely identifying himself with the Justicites . However , in 1930 his son , M . A . Muthiah Chetti , entered the legislature through the seat reserved for Nattukkottais and expected a ministerial post . Together the Nattukkottais and the Telugu zamindars formed a justice " Ginger Group " in November 1930 to show displeasure at their omission from Muniswami ' s ministry . 70 For two years Muniswami Naidu kept a precarious hold on the party leadership , but in November 1932 he was kicked out by Bobbili . ” In 1936 Muthiah Chetti was brought into the ministry to replace the aging S . Kumaraswami Reddi , who had been Third Minister since to the Telugu

1930 .

These leadership

changes

corresponded to

a

shift

in the

party ' s centre of gravity away from the professional middle class and merchants to the zamindars , bankers and industrial

ists .

the 1930s the Telugu zamindars were under attack wing Congressmen leading a movement for zamindari from left politics abolition – in Andhra were developing a more radical character than in Tamilnad – and they needed the Justice Party as a shield to protect their economic privileges and political authority . It was now meaningful for the Congress to char acterize the Justice Party as being " zamindar ridden " , and evidence could be found in its opposition to tenants ' rights in the amendment of the Madras Estates Land Act in November 1933 . " In Tamilnad , where zamindari lands were less extens ive and the zamindars as a political force less conspicuous , By

158

agrarian

had not yet reached such a crisis as in zamindars , like Subbarayan , protected

relations

. Indeed their interests

Andhra

some

joining rather

by

Congress .

antagonizing

than

the

Rajagopalachari in his enthusiasm for a nationalist united front and his antipathy to socialism , welcomed the entry into the Congress not only of zamindars and big land lords , but industrialists and business magnates as well . He urged capitalists not to fear the Congress , but to enter it to protect their interests . There had been some sympathy

from the South Indian Chamber of Commerce – of which the Justicite Tyagaraya Chetti had been a founder – for the Con gress during civil disobedience because of the party ' s commit ment to Swadeshi and later with its promises to foster indig enous enterprises and curb British financial interference . 74 But big business in Tamilnad was rather scared of the Congress and inclined to play safe by backing the Justice Party . The Coimbatore - owners , for example , had been so

still

mill

dependent on the favours of successive Justice ministries and local pro - Justice notables that the majority of them declared for the Justice Party on the eve of the 1937 elections . The Nattukkottais were a special case . Their massive banking interests in Burma , Malaya and Indo - China made them feel de pendent on British goodwill and – at this date – doubtful that an independent India could give them adequate protection over seas . The

Justice Party did

not become as completely

identified

with the big landlord interest as the short - lived United Party in Bihar or the National Agriculturist Party in the United Provinces . 76 The zamindars alone could not dominate politics in the Madras Presidency and they attempted to draw the non Brahmin middle - class back into the Justice Party by depicting the Congress as a party of revolutionaries and collectivists who would " crush constitutionalism in this country " and cause " the extinction of the Indian mercantile and propertied classes " . ” It was an unconvincing picture of the Tamil branch of the Congress with its leadership clearly eager for

office

and

The

averse to socialism .

Justice leadership

was aware

of

the need to

revital

party and to extend its social base and organization to reach the expanded electorate under the 1935 constitution . However , for a party which relied on ministerial patronage and intrigue in the legislature , which had grown complacent

ize

from

the

its

bankers ,

long years

it

was

party -building

in

office

difficult

in

the

to

and was run by

stoop

localities

.

zamindars to the menial task In December 1934

and

of

159

V

. V . Ramaswami ,

a

Nadar

Justicite

and

chairman

of

Virudhunagar

municipality , urged the party leadership to meet to discuss its difficulties " before it is too late to prevent the col lapse of the party " . 78 Ramaswami recommended the creation of party , a smaller and more active executive the appointment of a propaganda board with at least two propagandists per dis trict , the publication of more party newspapers , and the adoption of a revised party program . 9 His suggestions were approved by the Justice leadership in July 1935 but , except for a brief propaganda drive in the following three months , there was little change from the previous lethargy . The party leadership then looked to E . V . Ramaswami Naicker for help . Ramaswami Naicker ' s shift towards communism , following his visit to Soviet Russia in 1932 , alienated some of his earlier Self- Respect backers . They were men of property and prominence such as R . K . Shanmugham Chetti and W . P . A . Soundara

pandiya Nadar , MLC , and who were interested in the elevation their communities , not in revolution . 80 In March 1934 Rama swami was imprisoned for an allegedly seditious article published in his paper Kudi Arasu and his enthusiasm for communism was further cooled by the banning of the Communist Party of India and other left -wing organizations by the Government of India in July 1934 . He moderated his opinions and showed renewed interest in cooperating with the Justice Party which had befriended him after his break with the Con gress in 1925 . Although many of Ramaswami ' s co -workers , including Ramanathan and P . Jeevanandam , sympathized with the anti - Brahminism of the old Justice Party , they could not leap like performing animals from communism to the Justice Party ' s zamindars and bankers at Ramaswami ' s command . In 1935 they formed a Socialist Self -Respect League and by this route began a return journey to the Congress , Ramanathan rejoining the party at the close of 1936 . 01

of

loss of his ablest lieutenants and his preference loosely for a - coordinated movement rather than a structured party meant that Ramaswami Naicker could not make over to the Justice Party the sort of party machinery which needed to match the Congress . What he offered them was a radical social and economic program which the : Justice leadership at first shelved and then adopted in a diluted form as its election manifesto in 1936 . This borrowed heavily from the Congress ( including prohibition and the reduction of the salaries of top government servants ) and from the old Justice program ( communal representation ) , but was spiced with pro posals for a minimum living wage , government control of public services , the elimination of middle - men between agriculturists The

it

160

, and the eradication of rural indebtedness . 82 was ludicrously at variance with the record and the aspirations of the Justice leadership , but its adoption was indicative of the desperate straits in which the Justic ites found themselves on the eve of the 1937 provincial and

consumers

The program

elections .

Those

Not Against Us Are With Us

In June 1934 the Government of India responded to the decision of the AICC at Patna in May to abandon civil dis obedience by lifting its ban on Congress organizations . As the first elections under the Government of India Act of 1935 were not held until February 1937 the Congress had nearly three years in which to recover its strength and revive its organization . In the Madras Presidency the Congress had the additional advantage of two preliminary electoral rounds against the Justice Party before the deciding bout in 1937 .

round was the elections to the central Legis lative in November 1934 . In Tamilnad the Congress Firstly , it asked the public fought on three main issues . to demonstrate through the ballot boxes its continued support despite the government ' s attempt to crush the party ; secondly , it asked voters to register their protest at the repressive measures used by the government since 1930 ; and thirdly , The

first

Assembly

it

sought approval for its demand that the new constitution should be drafted by a constituent assembly in India , not by Parliament . It was emphasized that these were national , not regional , issues and that , therefore , the Justice Party should stand aside . Rajagopalachari further claimed that since they alone Congressmen had been the victims of repression

qualified

voice public indignation at government measures during civil disobedience . In practice , regional Rajagopalachari and Rajan , and local issues played a part . the Congress candidate for the Tanjore - Trichinopoly constitu ency , repeatedly explained that a Congress victory at the polls would not be taken as a mandate for temple entry legis lation ; 83 and Congress propaganda exploited the discontent of businessmen and merchants affected by the depression and by the tariff arrangements made at the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference in July 1932 . 84 were

to

Congress candidates for the seven Assembly constitutencies covering Tamilnad were chosen in July and August 1934 on the basis of recommendations by local party workers and sympath izers , but with the approval . of regional Congress leaders and the central Congress Parliamentary Board . Of the seven can didates , three – Satyamurti , Muthuranga Mudaliar and

161 Venkatachelam Chetti - had previously been Swarajist MLCs and the candidate for the Muslim constituency – Syed Murtuza

Swarajist

. T . S . Avanashilingam Chetti , can , constituency didate for the Coimbatore - Salem - North Arcot Rajan , and P . S . Kumaraswami Raja for the Madura - Tinnevelly Ramnad constituency , were all men of wealth who could rely on the support of some of the local notables as well as the party activists even though they had not previously contested seats in the legislatures . In 1923 and 1926 the Assembly elections had been held simultaneously with those for the provincial legislatures : 1934 was the first occasion on which the Congress could devote all its attention and re sources to the Assembly contests . It was also the first opportunity to use the strength of the party organization and the public sympathy built up during the civil disobedience had

been

a

MLA

movement .

election campaign of Kumaraswami Raja illustrates Congress how the candidates , while not neglecting the urban and rural notables , relied heavily on the party machine to mobilize support . During his tours of the southern dis tricts Kumaraswami personally canvassed those whom he des cribed in his diary as " big - wigs " and " important men " generally lawyers , businessmen and landholders – as well as members of the three district boards (he was a member of the board Ramnad board himself) , leading zamindars and caste leaders . leadin including the Raja of Ramnad , head of the Maravars , an agra . ja of numbering rian caste about half a million in the southern most districts of Tamilnad , and the Nattukkottais ' Raja of Chettinad . In Madura he appealed to the Saurashtras , who played had such a prominent part in civil disobedience , claiming that it was " because he had been assured that Madura which was absolutely a Congress city would support him en bloc that he had agreed to stand . . . " Regional Congress leaders , including Rajagopalachari , M . Bhaktavatsalam and Venkatachelam Chetti , toured the constituency in August and September , while within each district full - time activists arranged tours , held and addressed meetings , scrutinized the electoral rolls , distributed handbills and canvassed voters in their homes . In his home district of Ramnad , where he was president , DCC Kumaraswami was assisted by Kamaraj and K . S . Muthuswami , the DCC ' s treasurer and secretary , by two Naidus , R . Krishnaswami and G . Alagiriswami Naidu , operating from his home taluk of Srivilliputtur , and several Maravar activists including S . O . S . P . Odayappa , president of the newly - formed Karaikudi DCC , and R . V . Swaminathan , one of the " new men " to enter the TNCC in 1931 and a rising local politician . * The

'

–

162

Without

without

a

party organization to compete with the Congress program

Justice - sponsored

candidates wealth and influence . P . Varadarajulu Naidu ran for the Coimbatore - Salem - North Arcot seat on a socialist manifesto , but he was without influential local backers and since his departure from the Congress in 1930 he commanded only a dwindling band of sup and

a

common

relied almost entirely

on

the

their

own

porters . A . Ramaswami Mudaliar , contesting the Madras City constituency , campaigned on his record as a delegate to the Round Table Conference ; R . K . Shanmugham Chetti , who had also deserted the Congress in 1930 , contested the Indian Commerce seat on the basis of his career in the Assembly , of which he had recently become president . In a bid to win Brahmin voters , the

Justice Party

opened

its

membership

to

all

com

munities in September 1934 , but in Madras city , where Ramaswami Mudaliar was contesting against Satyamurti , only about 50 Brahmins voted for the Justice candidate out of about 4 , 000 on the rolls . 86 Shanmugham Chetti canvassed the presidents of district boards and chairmen of municipal councils , but relied mainly on the votes of the Nattukkottai Chettis for his election . This , along with Shanmugham ' s un popularity for having been an Indian representative at the Ottawa conference , caused his defeat . M . A . Muthiah Chetti , now chairman of the Justice Party ' s executive committee , had entered into a secret agreement with Congress councillors in the Madras Corporation promising Nattukkottai votes for Venkatachelam Chetti in return for the unanimous election of Muthiah as the first mayor of Madras . The votes Shanmugham victory to his expected gave had from the Nattukkottais

Congress opponent . 87

victory of the Congress was overwhelming . It won all of the seats in Tamilnad and captured 80 per cent poll of the . Only in the Commerce constituency did a rival glean candidate more than a third of the votes cast . " There The seven

were factors in the Congress landslide which made it unreli able as a forecast – the Assembly electorate was far smaller than that for the dyarchy provincial legislature ; was invariably more nationalistic ; it contained a larger per centage of Brahmins . Excuses could be made for the poor performance of the Justice - sponsored candidates – the party did not regard itself as an extra - provincial organization ; had not mobilized its full resources for the election ; the Nattukkottais ' betrayal could be blamed for the loss of the Commerce seat – but the outcome was widely interpreted as a Justice reverse and the party ' s demoralization dates from this election .

it

it

163

of

The

second

round was long and hard

fought , consisting

a series of local conflicts from 1935 to 1937 for control of the district boards and municipal councils . Legislation passed by the Madras council at the end of

' s ministry in 1930 reduced the powers of nomination and supervision exercised by the Minister for Local Self Government . These powers had been the basis of the Justice ministries ' influence in the localities , and it has been argued that their reduction was responsible for the decline of Subbarayan

Justice Party in the 1930s . 89 However , the Raja of Bobbili , as the local - government minister , sought to rebuild his party after the shock of the 1934 elections , not by attempting to create an organization comparable to that of the Congress , but by turning back to the local boards and reconstituting them to his own advantage . In 1934 he swept ' away the taluk boards , promising to replace them by panchayat boards at the lowest level and bifurcating district boards to perform many of the tasks formerly assigned to the taluk boards . In practice , the scheme involved doubling the places and patronage of the district boards and reintroducing nomin ation . The opportunities for manipulation were enormous and Bobbili exploited them with the single -mindedness of a fanatic . Election circles were drawn to suit pro - Justice candidates ; the bifurcation of district boards was determined more by the interests of ministerial supporters than by natural the

nominations were made in excess of the original after the election results were known so as to tilt the balance in favour of pro - Justice factions and secure the election of loyal presidents ; retiring presidents were for bidden to make staff appointments so that all possible patron age in this field would be at the command of the incoming boundaries ; quota

and

president . 90 In the Tiruvannamalai District Board a seat reserved for Anglo - Indians , supposedly on a population basis , was converted to an additional Adi - Dravida seat when Tampoe , Bobbili ' s roving agent A .M . C . and Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards , reported that he had been unable to find any Anglo - Indians resident in the area ; 91 in the Dharmapuri Board last minute nominations , published in an extra - ordinary edition of the Fort St . George Gazette on the morning of the elections for board president , secured by one vote the election of a Justice candidate . 9 Except Excep

in

the mid -

1920s

when

the

Swarajists

attempted

to

control of the Madras Corporation and other municipal councils , the Tamil Congress had not made a systematic effort to capture local government boards . Rajagopalachari opposed

win

the involvement

belief that it

of

Congressmen

would

distract

in

local

them

from

government

agitational

in the and

164

Constructive Program work and " would entail enormous labour and expense and would also breed local opposition to the Congress " . 93 But Satyamurti , who succeeded Rajagopalachari as TNCC president in May 1935 , and a majority of party leaders , activists and sympathizers believed that by ousting the supporters of the Justice Party from positions of influ

the Congress could undercut its patronage for itself . The experience of the 1934 Assembly elections , in which local government presi dents and chairmen had used their influence to favour Justice candidates , confirmed this opinion . There were other considerations too . The franchise for local - government elections was roughly that for the provincial legislature under the 1935 Act : it would be invaluable to the party to experience have the of contesting and winning elections in this broader electorate before the new constitution came into operation . Party activists , especially those from the Kamaraj - Annamalai Pillai group , were eager to use the Congress to thrust them into positions of power and profit in the local government bodies ; and the Congress wanted to build on the sympathy won during civil disobedience it had to help its local patrons and to join in their factional struggles . ence

rival

in

local

and

government

command

if

1935 Satyamurti announced the formation of the Congress Civic Board to select party candidates for local elections . Its program pledged candidates to work for the removal of corruption , the promotion of swadeshi goods , the improvement of local education and medical ties , the extension of water supplies and roads , and the voting of addresses to nationalist leaders . The board ' s composition reflected the cooperation between Congress factions which had characterized Satyamurti ' s Madras Swarajya Party 18 months earlier . Satyamurti , Kumaraswami Raja and Bhaktavatsalam were its officers with former Swarajists , local activists and associates of Rajagopalachari among its In

Tamil

May

Nadu

facili

members .

94

local - government seats that followed reorganization , the Congress became the vehicle from Bobbili ' s politicians hitching a ride . The Civic for ambitious local protect against open opportunism by Board tried to itself stipulating that its nominees must obey Congress mandates or , they disagreed with them , resign their seats . But Satya murti and his colleagues were so anxious to make a success of their campaign and to win contests against pro - Justice factions that they were often careless in their selection of In

the scramble for

if

candidates and ineffective in their belated attempts to dis cipline those elected on the party ticket . Satyamurti had himself encouraged the influx of opportunists by declaring

165

that

with

"

those

us"

who have

. 95

not

been

and

are not against us are

In some contests the campaign was a striking success . In Madura , for example , the Congress won 21 out of 36 seats in the municipal elections in October 1935 , its campaign having been greatly assisted by the strength of the local

party organization built up during the assistance of the Saurashtras .

civil

disobedience

and by

. R . Subbaraman , whose support was communal as well as Congress - based , was elected chairman and the party ' s councillors remained disciplined and generally united . 96 In Madras city , where elections were held in October 1936 for the enlarged Corporation Council , the Congress overcame disputes among its own members over the selection of candidates to mount the most intensive election

eering yet won

27

of

known

for

a

the 40 seats

N. M

corporation election . The Congress for the general constituencies , and

the addition of councillors and aldermen elected or by other routes it had a majority of the 65 -member council . 97 Control of the corporation , which had evaded Congressmen and their allies for a dozen years , was at last theirs .

with

chosen

the Congress faced stiffer opposition . The influence of the Raja of Chettinad was so pervasive that government servants frequently harassed Congressmen who can vassed against his nominees for the North Ramnad District Board . 98 In the Pallathur circle the election on 23 November . 1936 was characterized by intimidation , the obstruction of voters and bribery by both the Raja ' s supporters and their Congress opponents . C . V . C . T . Venkatachalam Chetti , the Raja ' s son - in - law , candidate , and prospective district board presi dent , lost the Pallathur election , and on the insistence of the Raja and the advice of Tampoe , Bobbili ordered a re election on the grounds that the election had not been " con ducted properly owing to systematic interruption of polling at all the polling stations " . 99 However , both the Election Commissioner and the Madras High Court upheld the original result and dismissed the case for a re - election . 100 In

northern

Ramnad

In these three cases , by fair means or foul , the Congress overcame its opponents . The decisive contests were fought , over the local boards and the provincial elections in February 1937 merely registered an ascendency the Congress had already superior organization , corruption and by by by achieved volvement with local factions .

in

Elsewhere , the

campaign

was more hazardous . In the Board in November 1935

elections for the Tinnevelly District the Congress

won

31

of

the 52 seats , but disagreement

166

the Congress board members over a suitable president for . M . D . T . Kumaraswami Mudaliar , brother of a Justice MLC and scion of one of the principal landholding families in Tinnevelly , asked permission to join the Congress party in the board , despite having been elected as an Independent . At a meeting of the Congress board members , presided over by Satyamurti , Kumaraswami Mudaliar was suggest Satyamurti ed as the Congress candidate for president . followed candidate

among

the desirability of choosing a candidate who had been elected on the Congress ticket , but in a poll Kumaraswami won the nomination . Although it was clear that he had joined the Congress to further his own ambitions , Satyamurti was power less to intervene beyond asking Kumaraswami Mudaliar to obey Congress directives . At the end of December 1935 Kumaraswami was elected president over a Justice opponent , but five Congressmen refused to vote for him and yet refused to resign for violating their election pledge to support the party ' s nominee . 101 Within a few months there was an open breach between the leader of the board ' s Congress Party and the president . Kumaraswami was accused of disloyalty to the Congress by allowing an address to be voted to the Governor , by refusing to participate in a swadeshi exhibition and accepting tenders for board contracts against the public interest . But Kumaraswami Mudaliar was by then too secure to be dislodged by the Congress . In the 1937 provincial elections his personal influence and that which he exercised as president enabled him to defeat a Congress candidate for the Tinnevelly seat in the Legislative Council . 102

stressed

Then

came

the most

striking

example of campaign the

TNCC

mismanage

.

.

,

P

in

In

–

. of

Trichinopoly ment the local government Trichinopoly municipality affair 1934 the was suspended by Bobbili because of gross irregularities his admini stration by the chairman Ratnavelu Thevar Ratnavelu

local power by assiduously exploiting anti distributing anti Muslim feelings the town municipal contracts and offices to his allies and clients gain election He failed however the Madras legis lature 1926 and 1930 as Justice candidate 1934 he defected the Congress and was welcomed influential local notable and valuable recruit for the contest against as

In

a

to

the Justice Party

an .

to

a

to

,

in

,

.

-

in

by

to

had risen Brahmin and

in

to

by

-

a

,

the Congress

its Trichinopoly organiz control

105

won

a

now

1936

largely under Ratnavelu

,

ation

August

's

In

.

.

in

in

.

With Congress assistance he was elected unopposed election the legislature December January 1934 and 1936 was elected president of the South Trichinopoly District Board 104 The rewards for joining the Congress were clearly very considerable

majority

167

on the restored municipal council and , after extens ive consultation with local partymen , the Civic Board nomin ated Ratnavelu as its candidate for chairman . On the election day , however , T . S . S . Rajan led a revolt by several Congress and Independent councillors which gave the election to a Christian Congressman and caused Ratnavelu ' s defeat . The revolt had two motives . Rajan disliked Ratnavelu , whom he had reason to believe was a man " of strong hates and bitter com munalism " unacceptable to the Brahmins , Muslims and Christians in Trichinopoly . Since the suspension of the municipal coun in 1934 communal tension declined : Rajan felt that Ratnavelu ' s re - election would " re - open old sores " . Rajan also wanted to protest against the TNCC ' s obsession with winning seats and posts in local boards regardless of the mer

of seats

cil

loyalty of its candidates and often in disregard of of proven loyalty and long service . for the replied that local Con TNCC Satyamurti and Bhaktavatsalam gressmen had been fully consulted before the choice of Ratnavelu had been made 107 Rajagopalachari although he had and

106

its

.

,

Congressmen

in

,

balance despite own ineptness

Bobbili

's

party

On

.

to

.

-

a

it

In

.

108

in

to

,

if

an

.

to

on

a

as

's

,

at

the local government campaign the start regarded totally unjustifiable action breach of party discipline impress Congressmen He wanted Tamilnad and elsewhere the duty of absolute obedience to the decisions of the party leadership obedience that would be essential the Congress were remain united and effective the legislatures under the new constitution For Ratnavelu temporary set back February 1937 was no more than legislature he was elected the Madras as the Congress Trichinopoly constituency candidate for the Urban opposed

Rajan

gerrymandering

and

the

participation

the

nationalist

and

their clients

,

faction leaders influence with little

no

movement

as

of men

previous record of was

a

and

,

influx

or

The

wealth

in

of

of

.

,

,

to

a

.

to

to

a

in

.

it

,

's

the Congress which emerged the victor from the local elections of 1935 and 1936 The struggle undoubtedly weakened the Justice Party the dis large number of its erstwhile supporters tricts and caused defect the Congress Those who helped the Congress were rewarded with slice of the patronage pie of local govern ment and could look forward further rewards when was generally anticipated the Congress took office under the new constitution was

marked

fea

,

on

'

to

of

of

.

:

ture of the expansion of the Tamil Congress between 1934 and 1937 The process was one of mutual attraction the factions needed the organization the Congress and its provincial operation scale break the Justicites hold the local boards while the Congress needed men of prominence and wealth

168

to play

off

against pro - Justice notables and to finance its campaigns election . By 1937 the local Congress committees by were staffed both activists and their patrons from the leading urban and rural castes . The activists were often the

themselves with the routine of party Their patrons – lawyers , bankers , , merchants landholders and manufacturers – were the presidents and treasurers , collecting or controlling the funds , presiding public meetings having , say in the selection over and a large party running of candidates or themselves for seats on local boards and in the legislature . In the 1937 elections only a third of the Congress candidates in Tamilnad were activists and prison graduates . The remainder were patrons and local notables . 109 The domination of the party organization by

secretaries

organization

and

busied

and propaganda .

further their personal interests through the institutional structures of British rule , neces sarily limited the leadership ' s capacity to manoeuvre . Des pite Rajagopalachari ' s stress on unity and discipline , the predominance of patrons and local notables jostled the party towards office - acceptance and increased the likelihood of a mutiny within the Congress if the national leadership forbad such

men

,

concerned

ministerial office The

to

.

composition

of

the

Congress

committees

and

the

limited objectives of their principals also acted as a check Although the Congress repeatedly on the party ' s expansion . expressed its commitment to the creation of a mass party , in practice membership was not extended beyond patrons , acti vists and sympathizers before 1937 . At the height of non

cooperation the TNCC had claimed to have between 30 , 000 and 60 , 000 paid - up members . In the late 1920s the figure was placed , seldom above 20 000 . 110 In October 1935 it was re ported to be 55 , 004 ; 60 per cent of the members were said to live in the rural areas . 111 Out of a total Tamil popu people lation of some 25 million this was a remarkably small , , population though number in terms , it was similar to the Congress membership scale of in other parts of India at the time . " 12 Before 1937 the Tamil Congress did not attract the membership of the urban and rural masses . It skimmed the middle strata of society ; it incorporated a cadre of highly experienced local activists ; and it possessed a regional net work of committees and cells that reached almost every town and village . But it was not a mass party and neither its rivalry with the Justice Party nor its struggle against the Raj dictated that it should be one .

169

" Yellow

Box

ki jai "

Although Congress leaders proclaimed universal suffrage to be the desirable basis for a swaraj constitution , the Tamil Congressmen were happy to settle for rather less . Under dyarchy the Madras electorate had been between three and four per cent of the population , and , in the hope of undercutting the Justice Party ' s social base and utilizing their superior party organization , the Congress claimed that under the new constitution " the larger the franchise , the better for the Congress " . 113 Asked in 1932 to state his immediate con stitutional objectives , Satyamurti asked for provincial autonomy and an electorate of 36 million ( equivalent to 10 Anticipating an elector per cent of India ' s population ) . 114 Iyengar , Rangaswami ate of about this size observed in 1933 that it would be a mammoth task for the Congress to " educate " and mobilize so many voters and that it would stretch the party ' s organizational resources to the limit . Once the Congress had returned to a constitutional course , Satyamurti , too , was anxious that the party should devote all its ener gies to winning the new electorate . " As it finally emerged from the protracted franchise discussions , the electorate was larger than Congressmen had expected and at 6 . 4 million voters ( 14 per cent of the total population of the Madras presidency ) was more than four times larger than under dyarchy .

provincial legislature

was divided into an upper and , respectively , the Legislative Council and lower house called the Legislative Assembly . For the Council there was a high property qualification : voters were ryots or inamdars paying an annual rent of over Rs . 300 , estate - holders with an income , , payers of not less than Rs . 1 500 and of tax on an income of not less than Rs . 7 , 500 per annum ; there were also provisions for title - holders and occupants of public offices . For the 117 whole presidency the Council electorate was about 25 , 000 . 117

The

a

.

, a

50

.

peculiarity

in

and

a

another

,

province

to

.

,

of

.

Rs

.

at

a

,

,

;

-

,

.

-

on

It

,

to

large The broader Assembly franchise gave the vote section of the ryots traders and wealthier urban workers Pay property and tax paying qualifications was based ers of municipal and local board taxes motor vehicle tax and house tax were among the latter inamdars ryotwari occupancy ryots and owners of rural property with tenants rentable value of least Rs or urban property with value of not less than 100 constituted the former There were further provisions for retired servicemen and for the wives voters and wives widows and mothers of retired military personnel Franchise provisions varied from one the Madras

170

.

119

Presidency was that those who could prove themselves literate were entitled to vote , whereas in other provinces a specified level of formal education was required , and it was through this literacy clause that many voters were enrolled . "18 Since the literacy , women ' s and some other franchises were not granted automatically but only by appeal to local registration officials , the Congress , by far the best organized party in the presidency , was able to seek out and enrol eligible voters . For this purpose the Congress organized its own " Literates ' Enrolment Day " on 27 May 1936 . The nature of the franchise unquestionably favoured the Congress ,

,

,

35

,

)

17

seats

(

General

,

,

,

Muthiah Mudaliar

its

own

committee

the former minister

Hammond committee

.

representations to the

provincial

,

and

.

recom

,

prepared

government

for delimitation

in

of

a

provincial

a

,

mendations headed by own

the

.

Madras

S

In

,

to

.

it

,

.

,

,

,

25

nine for Indian Christians ,

,

29

:

for urban constituencies and others distributed between landholders trade unions the Madras University and commercial and business constituencies The specify how the reserved seats for Act did not however scheduled castes and for women would be distributed nor did stipulate how constituencies should be demarcated These tasks were assigned Delimitation Committee under Sir appointed by the Secretary Laurie Hammond State 1935 152

,

to

.

All

by election for Muslims

:

46

in

to

or

.

In

The general character of the two chambers was deter mined by the 1935 Government of India Act the Council eight members nominated by the Governor addition six there were to be members for General constituencies seven for Muslims three for Indian Christians and one for Europeans of the 215 Assembly seats were be filled

made

its

opposing

Two

.

schemes were advanced

first

-

be

,

it

-

.

a

of

it in

.

;

to

;

to

.

, ,

to

-

to

.

-

-

,

,

by

proposed the Government of Madras and by Party the Justice wanted to scrap the multi member constitu encies which had existed for the non Muhammadan Rural and Except Madras City Urban seats during the dyarchy period necessary where double member constituencies were allow Scheduled Caste candidates contest reserved seats under the terms of the Poona Pact they favoured single member bring the MLAS They would constituencies was argued closer the electorate there would more opportunity representatives for members of smaller castes send to the legislature and the expense and difficulty of canvassing vast constituencies would be removed 120 Although the Con gress did not participate the proceedings the Hammond provincial and committees made known its support for rival scheme through Subbarayan and the Madras Mahajana Sabha It was claimed that multi member constituencies had worked The

171

well under not

would

dyarchy , were understood by the coupled encourage communalism

if

of distributive voting already

use

in

voting would allow dominant communities

in

electorate , and with the system

Madras .

Cumulative

their votes for their own candidates to the exclusion of minorities ; but distributive voting would prevent this as each voter would have to split his votes , thus giving opportunity for candidates from minorities and forcing the major parties to court minority interests to gain maximum support . It was to plump

-

"

on

in

it

,

In

121

also claimed that small constituencies could easily be con trolled by local territorial magnates : the larger the con stituency , the less opportunity for bribery and corrupt practices . most provinces the Hammond Committee accepted the views of the provincial government and delimitation committee rejected the proposal for single member con but Madras perpetuate the stituencies the grounds that they would in

,

in

s

'

a

or

.

of

by

,

of

in

-

a

.

in

to

-

it

.

! 23

,

-

,

,

in

a

in

.

an

. . ." ,

-

or

domination of the main caste sub caste each electoral perversely area 122 but the committee also opted for Following cumulative rather than distributive voting majority vote appeal from the Madras government and the Madras legislature March 1936 the Secretary of State restored the single member scheme except where double con stituencies were needed for the Scheduled Caste seats but kept the cumulative voting Although the Congress did not get the multi member constituencies wanted the final system does not appear have adversely affected the Congress the election The party fear of small constituencies majority of votes pro which Justice notable might control presidency outweighed everywhere by the was almost the strength Congress size the electorate the the ganization and by its own men of wealth and influence

its

polling

employed

Each

provin

Madras opted for coloured ballot boxes for every constituency This was in help illiterate voters tended but also simplified the educating task of the Congress its voters November 1936 the Madras Election Officer allotted colours the major parties largely according their requests almost every constituency the presidency the Congress candidates chose yellow as the colour be displayed their ballot boxes by contrast with Bihar where the party was unable adopt one colour throughout the province Tamilnad the Congress exploited the opportunity the full with flags posters and volunteers clad yellow remind voters of its colour Vote for Gandhi and the yellow box and Yellow box chose

own

system

and

.

In

In

124

,

"

to

"

"

:

in

to

.

to

–

on

to

in

.

to

to

In

it

"

"

in

,

to

.

government

.

cial

influenced the outcome of the

of

Another factor which elections was the method

172

ki jai"

election

.

of

in

's ;

to

125

( " Victory to the yellow box " ) were its slogans . Candidates from other parties made little attempt imitate deliberately Independents these tactics some avoided the Justice Party colour the belief that any identification with that party would adversely affect their chances

.

In

,

of

Finally the timing the elections also influenced the result the 1934 Assembly elections Willingdon had mis to

a

to

.

to

be

-

an

takenly expected anti Congress vote from Madras and had give directed the polls held there first lead provinces voting later Because Madras had voted Congress

in

-a

.

a

a

in

in

of

's

26

in

,

.

in

to

of in

it

in

1934 was one the last provinces vote 1937 Congress victories Bihar Orissa and the United Provinces were already known before polling day and featured last minute propaganda The party successes northern India also increased the likelihood of the national leadership deciding favour office cceptance and thus persuaded provincial Congress ministry was waverers Madras that possibility strong now

to

as

;

,

.

be

of

gairing

majority

an

, 130

.

–

–

's

in

;

-

in

.

in

.

on

to

a

"

"

as

"

.

127

a

to

,

"

,

in

the coming elections "

. . .

"

remarked Satyamurti going 1937 are be test not only of patriotism capacity of our business The regional Congress early July campaign began 1936 with the formation of prepare the party tour committees of local activists organizations for electioneering month later the regional Parliamentary Committee began select candidates the Nearly 500 advice of local Congressmen and their patrons applicants sought Congress nomination for about 100 Assembly and Council seats Tamilnad 128 The names of most of the selected candidates were published mid December with the approval of the central Congress Parliamentary Committee January 129 the last few names followed early There were only five rejected applicants who contested against the party nominees and of these only one Kumaraswami Mudaliar president of the Tinnevelly district board was elected illustration of the discipline the party could command

January but also

in

it

,

In

.

as

in

in

a

)

,

,

,

,

a

.

,

of

93

it

.

13

22

To

of

(

•

both houses and the resilience of the Justice Party the past the possible Congress contested as many seats Tamilnad contested out of Council seats and supported three Independents unofficially For the Assembly ran can didates for 106 seats and backed three Independents two whom were Scheduled Caste candidates Taken together the 106 Congress candidates covered range wide of castes and occu pations though the majority were drawn from the highest Chettis Reddis and Naidus and castes Brahmins Vellalas view

sure

173

131

from the professional and commercial middle class in the towns and the substantial landholders (often those with busi ness connections ) in the countryside .

to

50

,

,

in

.

as

,

in

,

,

to

.

to

Candidates were required donate Rs the election and finance their own electioneering but the party assisted them with local activists tours by regional and national leaders publicity the press and printed mater Congress president toured the ials Jawaharlal Nehru despite his antipathy region October 1936 and Satyamurti fund

,

to

,

in

"

no

133

.

"

done

a

to

in

:

of

.

,

to

;

to

,

.

On

an

.

at

9

,

in

'

s

to

by

,

to

style and energy socialism tried imitate Nehru touring car for nearly 000 miles three months before the elections and visiting most constituencies least once 132 Rajagopalachari also campaigned intensively and showed un expected ability at making election speeches and mixing with the public election day Congress sympathizers and wealthy candidates provided cars motor buses and other vehicles transport voters the polls humbler style activists led processions of villagers the nearest polling booth shouting nationalist slogans and waving party flags As the they District Magistrate Madura observed of the Congress way have gone the village elector other party has

to

in

+

in

it

,

on

,

–

constituencies

.

Muslim

up

,

It

–

.

.

on

-

of

it

21

's

)

in

(

, . or

56

or

A

of

,

in

a

In

if

of

to

33

.

,

.

,

of

53

.

34

. V .

V

,

,

no

,

,

to

in

.

of

a

,

a

,

in

,

to

Unable revive its fortunes through the local boards by demoralized its electoral setbacks the Assembly and organization party local elections and without rival the Congress the Justice Party conducted fitful and des pondent campaign The selection candidates began November 1936 and names were published December 1936 and January 1937 but some of the candidates refused run as Justicites or withdrew realizing like Ramaswami of Virudhunagar that they had chance of winning The party ran only three candidates for the Council and for Congress the Assembly little more than half the number candidates addition there were about dozen Independents who might elected have joined the Justice Party the legislature striking aspect the Justice campaign was that of its candidates had previously been elected nominated the legislatures four cases had un successfully contested election Despite the Congress party intake moderate nationalists had only such candidates among its 106 and four them had entered the legislatures the mid 1930s the Congress ticket The Justice Party was fielding its old team was also concentrating the peri pheral constituencies Scheduled Caste Christian land might pick support holders and business seats where from special interest groups rather than the main Hindu and

174

For a new party with little local organization , the People ' s Party ran a large number of candidates , but most of its nominees were Independents hoping to improve their

chances by borrowing the name of a regional party . The can didates were little - known men , generally without established political careers . Of its 31 candidates , 17 came from the Arcots and Tanjore , the districts in which its Tamil organ izers , Muthiah Mudaliar and Manickavelu Naicker , lived and

in which they could hope to attract the support of their own castes ( the Vellalas and Vanniyars ) . Of the Muslim parties , the Muslim Parliamentary Board sponsored nine candidates in Tamilnad , five of whom had previously been members of the legislatures ; the Muslim Progressive Party ran only five , all in northern Tamilnad where the party ' s leader , Abdul Hakim could exert personal influence .

in

it

In

93 .

of

in .

a

to

.

in

,

85

to

20

to

-

of

13

of

10

,

.

46

26

In

135

The polls were held without any major incidents over a four - day period in mid - February . The result was a Congress landslide , greater than even the party ' s most ardent support ers had hoped . the Legislative Council the Congress won of the total seats winning the had contested Fifty two per cent Tamilnad the regional poll went only per Congress the and cent the Justice Party Assembly Congressmen the 215 were elected the Congress candidates Tamilnad winning their seats The Justice Party was reduced mere 21 seats The Congress 70

approximately per cent of the poll Tamilnad and all the urban seats except one Scheduled Caste seat Madras all except one of the General Rural seats and sev eral of the special constituencies Its poorest performance expectedly was the Muslim Christian and landholders constituencies The MPB won six Muslim seats Tamilnad one for the MPP two for Congress and one Independent The Justice Party won two of the five Christian Assembly Independents and Justicites took seats the Congress three the landholders seats won

,

in

,

in

,

its

and the

a

,

It

largest majority

other areas

the Congress had won provincial rivals had the

Tamilnad

.

massive victory over

in

with victories as sweeping

as

the presidency

in

,

Nevertheless

of

.

,

.

'

.

,

,

to

.

,

.

,

in

swept

largest popular vote of the Congress

its provincial rival turn back

the

Raj

.

now

to

With

could

vanquished

,

.

,

17

, .

's

of

in

provinces years of struggle of India After years preparation Congress after the had finally swamped Party the Justice any

the Congress

CHAPTER

6

RAPPROCHEMENT

Civil

disobedience and the assertive manner of the Congress the Gandhi - Irwin Pact aroused in British officials in the Madras Presidency a bitter animosity to the nation alist leaders . Revenge for the insults and the impertinence of the upstart Congress was a powerful motive in their urg ings for prompt and decisive action against the party in the event of a revival of civil disobedience . The feelings of the officials were widely shared by the European business community in the presidency , which felt that it was being victimized by the swadeshi propaganda of the Congress coin ciding with the loss of markets caused by the depression and Significantly , when at the the influx of Japanese cloth . end of 1931 the Government of India gave the Madras govern ment permission to inform the business community that a re newal of civil disobedience would be met by stern measures , was the European , not the Indian , commercial organizations that were confided in by the Chief Secretary . In a crisis the government ' s identification with British interests re mained very strong .

following

it

But the Governor and his senior advisers had not lost sight of the wider political objectives with which the dyarchy period began . There was undoubtedly a satisfaction seeing Congress in the crushed in 1932 , but , as Bracken , the Secretary , Chief had noted 10 years earlier , vindictiveness untempered by constructive measures would achieve very little . In Tamilnad the crushing of civil disobedience was a catharsis for the government in 1932 : purged of its pent up fury , it could afterwards settle to the practical diffi culty of , to adapt Rajagopalachari ' s comment on Nehru , getting the Congress to be reasonable . Thus , the sequel to confron tation was not a lingering bitterness between the Congress and the Raj , but a growing appreciation that nationalist leaders and colonial administrators had a mutual interest in a smooth , non - revolutionary transfer of power .

175

176

The

Party Most Likely When

he

took

to

Succeed

up the governorship

of Madras

in November

Erskine inherited in large measure willingdon ' s aging policy – as old as dyarchy itself - of relying on the Justice Party . Aristocrat and landlord , Erskine had no inherent aversion to the zamindar - dominated Justicites . Indeed , addressing the Madras Landholders ' Association in February 1935 he appealed to the major landholders to partic ipate fully in the political life of the presidency under the new constitution . But Erskine was a more perceptive and innovative Governor than Stanley , his predecessor , and he soon realized that the the Justice Party was incapable of 1934 ,

Lord

adapting to the 1935 Act . only

He urged

new

the

political

environment created by the

Justice ministers

to

revitalize their party ,

Initi

to be met with evasion and " supine indolence " . " ally , he thought Bobbili worthier than his two colleagues and suggested that the Chief Minister might reshuffle his team , bringing in Subbarayan , for example , from the United Nation alists , to attract the moderate constitutionalists back to Subbarayan was not the Justice Party . The ploy failed . unwilling to take office on his own terms , but the Justice Party was so riddled with personal rivalry and imprisoned by its own inertia that Bobbili could not make such a move with out alienating many of his supporters . Thus , it was in vain pressed that Erskine the Justicites to build up their party in the localities and to form a broad constitutionalist front : ' these were the tasks on which the Congress , not the Justice Party , was engaged . Moreover , like Goschen , Erskine found difficult to understand the Justice ministry ' s preoccupation with the acquisition and distribution of time patronage . He was particularly annoyed by the card - sharping to which Bobbili resorted in reshuffling the local boards in 1935 - 37 . 8

it

full

Gradually , Erskine warmed to the idea of a Congress ministry to replace the politically bankrupt Justicites . He was at first very cautious about suggesting such a change of tactics to his superiors , partly because Willingdon , who

remained Viceroy until 1936 , loaded him with avuncular advice from New Delhi , based on impressions formed 15 years earlier , as to which Justicites were or were not trustworthy and able . Willingdon had anticipated a Congress defeat in the 1934

Assembly elections and was furious that Madras , the province he had nursed through non - cooperation , should betray him . But Willingdon and his advisers had not forgotten the long

177

scheme of drawing the Congress back to con action ; and by the middle months of 1935 Willingdon was agreeing with Erskine ' s tentative suggestions that a Congress ministry in Madras might , after all , be " safe " and " play the game " . 10

term Montagu

stitutional

Erskine ' s assessment of the situation went far beyond realization of the effete nature of the latter - day Justice Party . He believed that many of the Congressmen were in

practice

moderate

men

,

constitutionalists

by

inclination ,

a

who

had taken shelter in the Congress as protection against the anti - Brahmin squall . The Madras Congress was , he noted , an conglomeration of tories , radicals , socialists and " amazing even communists " , " 1 with the bulk of the party and its leader ship in favour of accepting office and working the constitu tion . Indeed , on the eve of the 1937 elections , Rajagopala chari had an audience with the Governor , in the course of which he informed Erskine that he wanted to take office and doubted that the Congress national leadership would oppose this . When Erskine expressed his surprise at this ,

Rajagopalachari

long , complicated and to me almost explanation of what the Madras Congress meant by " wrecking the constitution " . In result it boiled down to the fact that , they got a real clear majority on which they could depend , the Congress Party would work the reforms down here . Their idea of " wrecking ' appears to be to pass at various times . . . resolutions saying they do not like the Reforms .

went into

a

unintelligible

if

12

Further , Erskine believed that the Justice Party had made itself unpopular , especially by its agrarian and local government policies , during its many years of office . " The ryots " , he reported to Zetland , the Secretary of State for India in February 1937 , " are fed up with the Justice Party , particularly in the southern areas , as every sin of omission or commission of the past fifteen years is put down to them " . 13 But , though the ryots desired a change , they wanted security for their property and not a destructive clash between the Congress and the government : the Congress must take office to work , not to obstruct , the constitution . 14 Erskine was increasingly sympathetic to the interests of the ryots , anticipating that the ryotwari system would have to be over hauled under the new constitution , 15 and less and less dis posed to protect those agrarian dinosaurs , the zamindars . When Jawaharlal Nehru concluded his 1936 tour of the presi dency with an impassioned attack on the zamindars of Andhra ,

178

wanted the govern displeasure . Erskine , however , favoured non involvement : " the leader of the Congress Party attacks two

of the Madras executive councillors

ment to

show

If

the Zamindari system surely it is up to the Zamindars to organise counter - propaganda " , he wrote . " It is no crime to advocate Socialism as long as it is not Socialism with violence . " 16 A ryot - oriented Congress ministry promised to be more popular and adaptable than a Justice one dominated by intransigent zamindars and leaning on the Raj for support . There were broader

side , there was do

if

it

took

considerations , too .

relatively

office .

little

damage

The Government

of

On

the negative

the Congress could Madras had accepted

since 1927 that a new constitution would entail the transfer of the key portfolios withheld under dyarchy – revenue , law and the police – but the 1935 Act gave the Governor reserved powers which might be used in emergencies to protect key they appeared to be threatened areas of the administration under the new ministries . From 1929 Madras had had a Services Commission , designed to remove appointments and promotions in the low and middle levels of government service from ministerial control and political influence . 17 Since the end of civil disobedience the central and provincial governments had been tightening up the organization of the police so as to minimize political interference under the new constitution and to ensure the continuance of striking forces which might be needed in the event of a constitution al impasse and a revival of civil disobedience . 18 Careful consideration had been given to legislation to control the press on the assumption that it was better to have the new ministries inherit and perhaps repeal such legislation rather than try to introduce it when they were already in stalled . 19 Although the expansion of the electorate had been criticized by previous Governors and by civil servants for enfranchising the " unthinking ryots " , there was re assurance in the creation of a second chamber in the provin cial legislature designed to give representation to " a large stratum of ' solid ' people , not merely big zamindars or other landholders , but also bankers , professional or business men , merchants and retired officials , to whom the rough and tumble of popular political contest is distasteful . . . " and to support 20the Governor against the " vagaries of the lower house " . 20 Erskine was at pains to persuade the Congress that he believed in constitutional fair play and an impartial civil service , 21 but he had the satisfaction of knowing that he was not having to walk the tight - rope without a safety -net .

if

On

energy

the positive side , Erskine was impressed by the He did and organizational capacity of the Congress .

179

not want to trap or frustrate the Congress , but to channel its enormous energy into constructive ministerial activity . Just as Willingdon had needed the Justice Party to make a success of dyarchy , so Erskine needed the Congress to run the new constitution in Madras . It alone could reach the voters and form a stable ministry backed by a majority in the legis lature . Erskine ' s concern for a stable ministry did not arise only from his assessment of Madras politics : it was also a result of his 12 years in the Commons and a reaction to the instability he saw in the parliamentary politics of France , Germany and Italy in the 1920s and early 1930s . ?

It is difficult to assess the extent to which Erskine ' s growing confidence in the Congress was shared by other Europeans in Madras . Certainly he had the backing of Sir

Geoffrey Bracken , who in 1935 was promoted from Chief Secretary to Executive Councillor and appears to have been Erskine ' s closest adviser in the two years before the intro duction of the new constitution . Further down the admin istrative hierarchy attitudes were more ambiguous . District officials and police officers had reason to fear that a Congress ministry might interfere with their work and jeopar dize their future careers in India . But there is some evi

to suggest that they too welcomed the prospect of a stable ministry and wished to avoid a new confrontation be tween the Congress and the Raj . A . R . C . Westlake , District Magistrate of Madura in 1937 was clearly impressed by the thoroughness of the Congress election campaign by contrast dence

with the lackadaisical Justicites and gave his unsolicited opinion that in his district " Nearly all the Congress members are well - to - do and are not likely to develop left wing ten dencies in economic matters " . 23 Less than six years earlier , Magistrate as District of South Arcot , Westlake had been pleading for tough measures to crush a revived civil dis 24 obedience campaign .

24

European non - officials were also reconciling themselves to the prospect of a Congress ministry in Madras . Once a champion of the Justice Party , the European - owned Madras Mail had , by the mid - 1930s become impatient with the ineptness of its fumbling protege . It , too , was sickened by the Justicites preoccupation with patronage , commenting in an editorial on

1935 that " If the Justice Party is really determined reorganization , it should be one of its first proclam ations that , so far as it is concerned , the spoils system sympathy for the party , must go " . In a bid to revive European the Justice leadership suggested that if it were returned to office under the new constitution it would offer a minister ial post to a European . Replying to this offer , W . M . Langley , 1

June

upon

180

president of the South Indian Branch of the European Associ ation , told the branch ' s annual conference on 13 January 1937 that he was opposed to the appointment of a European minister : Europeans should organize themselves separately within the legislature and support whichever party favoured their

interests .

European

F

non -

.E.

James ,

officials

of the principal spokesmen of the Madras , took a sterner line , warn

one in

ing the Congress not to encourage election rowdyism or to expect that the constitutional issue could be reopened for another 10 years . But beneath his gruffness was a practical awareness that it would probably be the Congress , not the Justice Party , that the Europeans would have to come to terms with after the elections. 25 Furthermore , James , as a leader of the European non -officials in the central Assembly , had been increasingly concerned at the potential menace of Indian communism rather than nationalism . ? Mutual antipathy to communism was bringing the Madras Europeans and the Congress right wing closer together than would have seemed possible in 1920 - 22 when in European eyes Gandhi ' s followers were indistinguishable from " Bolsheviks " . The

Difficulties

in which

They

Find Themselves

Having anticipated

a Congress majority of about 90 in provincial , the elections Erskine was surprised at the 159 - seat majority it won . But , as he confided to Lord Linlithgow , the Viceroy , " I am not at disturbed by this development as I am sure they will take office and work the constitution " . 27 Rajagopalachari , who at the last minute replaced Satyamurti as the Congress candidate for the University constituency , gave the Governor every reason to believe that this would be the case , himself opening negoti ations on 3 March , a week before he was officially elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party in Madras . 28 With such a large majority and with so many MLAs bent on office acceptance , with the Congress holding a majority in five provincial assemblies and a dominant position in two others , the pressure within the Congress to form ministries was enormous . However , the Congress had not made a declaration in favour of office during the election campaign ; on the contrary , its manifesto , published in August 1936 , pledged the national party to the " entire rejection " of the 1935 Government of india Act which had been " imposed on India against the declared will of the people " . Instead , the Congress promised to call a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for a self - governing India . 29 Rajagopalachari and Satyamurti had seen this avowed hostility to the con stitution as little more than a tactic , designed to keep up

all

181

pressure on the Raj until the last possible moment , to demon strate that the party had not become a mere suppliant for

office ,

and to win a symbolic concession from the British that would give the impression that acceptance of office was a triumphant vindication of the policy of fighting the Raj by constitutional means . 30 However , Nehru and the Congress left wing remained opposed to the acceptance of office ; and Gandhi , partly to preserve party unity and partly from his own aversion to constitutionalism , wanted the negotiation of a more substantial concession from the British than Raja

gopalachari had anticipated .

On his return from a meeting of the CWC at Wardha on , Rajagopalachari February 28 told Erskine that the Congress would ask for an assurance from the Governors that they would behave constitutionally before Congress would form ministries in the provinces in which it had majorities . Erskine replied that he did not think a written assurance could be given ; Rajagopalachari added that personally he would be willing to accept a verbal assurance , but the CWC Failing this , he would probably want a written guarantee . suggested , the Viceroy could discuss a suitable formula with . Gandhi . However , although Erskine and Rajagopalachari were in basic agreement on the desirability of the Congress taking office with a minimum of negotiation and fuss , their superiors were reluctant to make any concessions , real or symbolic , and a war of attrition followed .

After consulting the Secretary of State , the Viceroy informed

Erskine

on

7

March

that the greatest mistake

1937

not only would it be on our part to take any steps which will streng then the position of the central Congress party machine vis - a -vis the Provinces or will help to extricate Congress from the difficult ies in which they find themselves and which are

of their

own

creation . . .

Rajagopalachari should , the Viceroy continued , be informed that he could expect " the utmost help , sympathy and support " from the Governor within the framework of the 1935 Act , but guarantee an oral or written could not be given . 32 The government ' s policy was " to sit tight and , while keeping the closest watch on all developments , to refrain from committing ourselves in any way " . 33 Rajagopalachari , meeting Erskine again on 9 March , was disappointed by this intransigence . He regretted that with out

an

assurance

the Congress would be unable to take

office

182

in Madras and other Congress - majority provinces . This would " a disastrous course " but , he added , Congressmen " had to consider what was best for them in India as a whole " . 34 Rajagopalachari then left for Delhi where , at the meet ings of the CWC and AICC , he emerged as the national spokes

be

man

his

of

for the

office - acceptance section of the Congress , pitting against the hostility of Nehru and the caution The resolution finally adopted by the AICC a compromise , but office acceptance remained con

arguments

Gandhi . represented

tingent

on

an

assurance

from

the

British

government

or

the

Governors .95 Rajagopalachari returned to Madras still opti mistic as to the possibility of a Congress ministry by April . On 25 March he met Erskine again and , despite the

impossibility of the Governor offering the assurance demanded by the Congress , Erskine saw that the Congress leader " wanted to come to some agreement " . At Erskine ' s suggestion , Raja gopalachari returned later in the day with a formula which the Governor believed was " fairly satisfactory " . The draft acknowledged that the Governor could not make a pledge not to use his special powers , but said that the Congress would accept a promise from him " not to use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of the Cabinet in matters appertaining to and within the legitimate scope of the provincial Ministry " . 36 At that point Gandhi arrived in Madras and torpedoed the negotiations because the formula did not his inter pretation of the Congress demand . 37 On the other side , the Viceroy and the Secretary of State found Rajagopalachari ' s draft equally unacceptable . An impasse had been reached and on 27 March the breakdown of the negotiations was made public , degree of bitterness , born of frustration , accompanied by a Rajagopalachari toured the province , trying on both sides . 38 to maintain party unity , but discouraging talk of civil dis obedience or the display of anti - British hostility by party extremists . Although with such a large majority , the Congress should be able to defeat any other ministry the Governor might create , the government might call his bluff by dissolving the legislature . The party could not afford , another election so soon and in a poll caused by Congress refusal to take office it would lose much of its existing support . Even the threat of dissolution might break up the Congress and tempt a section of the party to declare in favour of office in defiance of the national leadership . The ghost of Subbarayan ' s ministry haunted the Congress in Madras . 39

fit

still

183

Believing that it was only a matter of time before the Congress gave way , the Viceroy opposed Erskine ' s desperate suggestion of a dissolution , and discussion began on the formation of an Interim Ministry . Erskine first approached V . S . Srinivasa Sastri , the Liberal , who was not a member of legislature , to give a chance to the non - Justice elements , the but Srinivasa Sastri was well aware of the fury and anger he would attract from the Congress and his Liberal associates , and refused . * Erskine then turned to Sir K . V . Reddi Naidu , a Justice minister in 1920 - 23 and a proven loyalist . Reddi Naidu was ready and eager to oblige , hastily nailing together

ministry of diverse talents , made up mainly of former Justicites . A program was invented for the ministry , but it so blatantly lacked popular support and could not survive a meeting of the legislature , that it merely served to cari cature the idea of a Madras legislature without a Congress a

ministry . 41

crisis continued . Intermediaries attempted to the dead lock , but Rajagopalachari and Erskine were baffled and embittered by their powerlessness to solve the situation created by the intransigence of their superiors . Erskine , in a moment of exhaustion , wondered the Congress had ever seriously intended to take office . 42 Then at the end of July the logjam was broken . Statements made by the Viceroy on 21 and 22 June , which did little more than explain the constitutional problem in detail and reiterate the gov ernment ' s initial position , were seized upon by the CWC at Wardha on 7 July as sufficient assurance for the Congress to take office . 43 was , as the immensely relieved Erskine noted with surprise , an " abject and unconditional surrender " The

break

if

It

. ** Rajagopalachari ' s ministry , long - planned and much -awaited , took office as soon as decently possible after the funeral of the " assurance " demand . It embodied the nationalist united front which the Congress had become in the Madras Presidency Rajagopalachari , who as head over the previous seven years . officially provincial ministry of the was known as the Prime Minister and Premier , also held the office of Finance Minister thus assuming direct responsibility for the introduction of prohibition . Prakasam , as the leading Telugu MLA , potentially Rajagopalachari ' s greatest rival for leadership of the pro vincial legislative party , accepted the post of Minister for Revenue , which entailed special responsibilities to investi gate the land revenue systems of the province in preparation Rajan , for for the land reforms Congress had promised . given for the Trichinopoly affair , was nominated to the Legislative Council as Minister for Public Health and by

the Congress

184

Religious

Endowments . Yakub Hasan was rewarded for having post joined Congress re the with the of Minister for Public Works ; Subbarayan by appointment as Minister for Education and Legal Affairs ; Ramanathan by the office of Minister of Information . Erstwhile Swarajists and activists , as well as recent recruits to the party , were included , and posts were

carefully distributed

claims

to

for representation

satisfy communal and linguistic in provincial ministry .

There was , however , one notable

omission :

Satyamurti .

Despite having craved office for at least 15 years , despite his dedication to constitutionalism and his tireless elect ioneering in 1936 - 37 , despite having stood down from the University constituency to allow Rajagopalachari to enter the

legislature , Satyamurti received no reward . 45

Perhaps

deliberate spite by Rajagopalachari against the only

it

was

the Tamil Congress ; per assessment of Satyamurti ' s unpopularity with the Telugu Congressmen . abilities The consequence was to drive Satyamurti into informal oppos Congressman

haps

it

who

rival

might

was based and his

on

a

him

realistic

in

to Rajagopalachari , to revive the factionalism Raja gopalachari had sought to overcome through the politics of coalescence . Satyamurti ' s disappointment was inflamed by Kamaraj and his associates into disaffection , yet it was not Satyamurti , who died in prison in 1943 , but Kamaraj who

ition

emerged as the Congress boss in Tamilnad and the man who levered Rajagopalachari out of the party by the mid - 1950s

..

But in 1937 such developments were barely perceived . Unheeding protests from the Congress left and from a small minority of activists that the acceptance of office and the working of the constitution were contrary to the party ' s basic objectives , the Congress in Madras settled down to enjoy the exercise of power and the perquisites of office , for so long the forbidden fruit . In just over two years in office , Rajagopalachari ' s ministry proved itself a friend of the businessman , a defender of the rich peasant , and a patron of hand - spinners and weavers . Despite the inclusion in the ministry of V . V . Giri , formerly a labour organizer , as Minister for Labour , the ministry was generally unsympathetic to the interests of the industrial proletariat , the voters among whom had largely opted for the Congress in 1937 , and it was responsible for the suppression of several labour disputes . 46 As minister for the police department , Raja gopalachari gradually stepped up the investigation and pro secution of communists , especially in Malabar and the Andhra delta districts . His anti - communist stand was warmly applauded by the presidency ' s European business community and held up as an example worthy of imitation in other provinces . 47

185

Despite the introduction temple entry by Harijans

of legislation and

to

remove

designed to allow

their principal social

disabilities little was attempted to ameliorate the economic plight of the untouchables and of landless labourers . Raja gopalachari at last had the opportunity to begin to implement his prohibition schemes , but neither the ryotwari nor zamin dari systems of landholding were overhauled . There was too little time . 48 ,

Once the leading No - Changer , Rajagopalachari was now acclaimed by British commentators as the ablest Congress parliamentarian . His close , largely harmonious , relations with Erskine epitomized the rapprochement which had taken place between the nationalist leaders and the principal representatives of British authority in Madras . 49 And it was characteristic of his attitudes that as premier he prevented the publication of an official circular , on the lines of that issued by the UP Congress ministry , warning government ser vants that they would be watched by Congressmen to see that they abandoned their old , autocratic ways . " No such circular is called for " , Rajagopalachari noted in January 1938 , " or desirable " . 50 His relations with the non - Tamil members of the ministry and legislature were not so harmonious as those with European officials and non - officials . The Telugus , never happy at having to serve under a Tamil , suspected Rajagopalachari and Erskine of conspiring to advise the Secretary of State against accepting the legislature ' s recommendation for a separate Andhra province . Certainly ,

it

contrary to Rajagopalachari ' s faith in a nationalist any encouragement to the forces of centri fugal regionalism , whether Telugu , Tamil or any other , and the issue was shelved until after independence . Despite the tensions , the ministry survived without a major internal crisis . Perhaps that was the greatest achievement of Raja gopalachari ' s united front tactics . was

united

front to give

The accession

virtual provincial economic or social

to power

of the

Congress

under

a

system

of

autonomy did not result in any radical changes in south India . Such changes were not to be expected : the Congress had agreed to work within the constraints of the colonial constitutional framework . had taken office not to transform the society and economy structurally , but to exploit the powers enjoyed by ministers under the 1935 Act , to prevent a lurch to the left and to

It

exclude the

Justicites .

186

The

Revolution That Never

Was

years separated the formation of the Congress mini Indian independence in August 1947 . The twists at the end of the tale of British India remained – not least the Quit India movement of 1942 , the creation of Pakistan , and the central role of Jawaharlal Nehru in the final nego tiations for independence . But , although much was undecided Ten

stries

from

the future development of nationalist politics at the level in 1937 , the Congress - Raj rapprochement in the provinces by 1937 constituted an essential prelude to decolonization . about

all - India

It has been claimed that the " British Indians had made it impossible for them to attained independence through revolution . India movement climaxed India ' s nationalist overthrew introduce

powerful

a

effective political

left India because stay . India The midwar Quit revolution , which regime " . 51 But to

the notion of revolution into the context of de colonization in India – and to identify it specifically with the Quit India movement - is to obscure the process of re adjustment and reassessment which characterized the British Raj in its last 30 years and to ignore the extent to which Congressmen were participants in ( even captives of ) the institutional structures created by the British .

Gandhi ' s tactics of non - violent non - cooperation and civil disobedience were potentially revolutionary . faith fully followed they could have severed the Congress complete ly from the legislatures , wrenched the professional middle class away from government service and other collaborative roles ; they could have thrown open membership of the Congress club to the masses . Effective boycotts and mass civil dis obedience were , in theory , capable of paralysing the Raj and replacing by a new political system under Indian control . practice But in Gandhi ' s tactics were not revolutionary . As we have seen in the context of Tamilnad , the propertied classes , who were the dominant social element in the Congress , shied away from satyagraha in 1919 - 22 when it was at its most menacing because they feared a political and social holocaust Satyagraha in which they might perish along with the Raj . was at its most successful when it was linked to specific , grievances local or as in 1930 - 33 , directed towards limited

If

it

constitutional objectives

.

By

1937

its function

was

clear :

satyagraha was being used by the Congress as a clamp from outside the constitutional system to exert pressure inside

that

system

.

187

Gandhi ' s tactics were employed in this fashion not only to appease the fears of vakils and landlords . The sheer weight of British repression showed the impossibility of winning swaraj through a single agitational campaign . Ad herence to non - violence created its own limitations . As Rajagopalachari observed in 1922 , it was impossible to have government without violence . a parallel the Congress agitations failed to expel the British and if it was imposs ible to construct a parallel government without violating the ideal of ahimsa , then the Congress had to settle for more immediate gains . It could not operate in defiant isolation Raj Acceptance from the . of office in 1937 was an acknowledge

If

ment

of that .

The shift in the directional thrust of Gandhian tactics in the service of the Congress did not mean that the party had been defeated by the Raj . The achievement gained by the civil disobedience movement of 1930 - 33 established Congress as the dominant political party in India . Without the parti cipation of the Congress the new constitution was in jeopardy . A dozen years before he became prime minister , Clement Attlee showed an awareness of this pivotal importance of the Congress when he criticized the 1935 Act for containing provisions hostile to the Congress .

question that said in Parliament The

we ]:

should put

is this

[he

Does this Constitutional scheme provide a medium through which the living forces of India can operate , because what we have to deal with are the forces of modern India , a living India , and not the dead India of the past . we are to do anything , with India we have to bring modern forces to play , and it is here that the importance of

If

the attack good or dominating

ill

the Congress party comes in . For , the Congress party is one of the factors in the situation . It is no

on

use ignoring it ,

and

it is useless

and

futile

merely to abuse it . We may disagree with it , but within it are very many of the forces that are going to make for modern India . 52 In Tamilnad the Congress had succeeded not only in forcing the government to acknowledge its dominant position , but also , by knocking out the Justice Party from what had been a three - cornered contest , the Congress embarked on 30 years of hegemony in Tamil politics which was helped by the separation of the old province ' s non - Tamil area – where

Congress power had become weaker than

in

Tamilnad

–

in

the

188

1956 reorganization of the states on linguistic lines , and interrupted only by the rise to power of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in 1967 . The resignation of the Congress ministry protest against Britain ' s involvement of in October 1939 in India in the Second World War and the Quit India movement in 1942 did not alter the eagerness of the Tamil Congressmen to return to the constitutional system at a later date nor did those episodes imperil the dominant political position of the

Congress achieved by

factors

Two

.

be stressed in the rapprochement and the Raj in Tamilnad in the 1930s . provincial agreement not , as yet , an

should

tween the Congress

Firstly , this

1937

was

a

be

all

British were withdrawing from the provinces in order to consolidate their position at the centre . This strategic retreat was designed to preserve British control

India one .

The

of defence , external affairs , currency and other matters of primary importance to Britain while entangling the Congress in the net of provincial government . As Chief Secretary , Bracken predicted in December 1934 that

Provincial preoccupations will weaken the grip of any all - India movement . . . Provincial jealous

ies will play will probably

all

important part in future and adversely affect Congress as an - India party . In other words trouble in an

future is likely to be provincial and so local ised and a mass all - India movement will be increasingly difficult for even Mr . Gandhi to organize . '

Similarly ,

an important reason why the Secretary of State Viceroy and the wished to avoid negotiations with Gandhi (and Congress encourage to - Governor discussion in the provinces ) was to weaken the power of the central Congress organization . 54

to be disappointed . The projected , Indian federation in the 1935 Act , was shelved partly because of the refusal of the princes ( intended to counterbalance the Congress at the centre ) to participate ; Gandhi , the CWC and the AICC demonstrated their continuing authority over the provincial committees , not least by the resignation of the ministries in 1939 and Quit India . The British had , therefore , to concede power at the centre after the Second World War in a manner similar to that in the

In

this regard the British were

proposed

provinces

a

decade

before .

The second factor in the rapprochement was the restricted character of the political arena in which the prelude to de colonization occurred . The electorate in Tamilnad in 1937 was

189

as

restricted in terms of franchise provisions and the of the population enfranchised as that created

centage England

Raj

per -

.

in

by the 1867 Reform Act . In its struggle against the against the Justice Party the Tamil Congress had

and

emerged

its earlier

from

base

among

the Brahmin

professional

middle class and had recruited widely among the property holding classes generally ; it clearly commanded the elect orate , defined by property and tax qualifications , which the British had set up under the 1935 Act . In identifying itself with this broad band of the middle strata of society , the Congress was committing itself to a peaceful transfer of power . Merchants and ryots , businessmen and landlords , had continuing against grievances their the British , but the intensity of that conflict was moderated by the prospect of an end to colonial rule in the foreseeable future , and by concern at the rise of left - wing militancy British eager Congress ness to have the take office in 1937 in the provinces majority where it had won a was to a considerable extent motivated by a wish to strengthen the party ' s right against its left wing . Neither the colonial power nor its heir apparent wished to see the Raj demolished and the propertied classes hacked to pieces by an onslaught of hammers and

sickles

.

was a compromise . It was an acknow the vigour of its nationalist movement , an admission that the support of the Raj had been steadily eroded . But the British ensured that power was transferred to politicians who represented the interests of the proper

India

ledgement

's

independence

of

tied classes

politicians

and were likely who had attained

to be

hostile

to communism ;

positions of authority within the institutional structure of the colonial state . Power passed , not into the hands of revolutionaries , but into the hands of a Congress that had proved itself to be " safe " .

191

NOTES Chapter

Nationalist 1

0

2

General

.

737

.

Census 1922 )

3

Regional Politics ,

. H . K . Spate

A p

and

,

of India p . 10 .

Census 1932 )

,

Census Map

IV

.

9

- 45

A . T . A . Learmonth , India and Pakistan : Regional Geography ( 3rd edn , London , 1967) ,

39 ,

.

pp .

and

and

of India , p

1

1921 :

,

of India ,

1931

:

Madras ,

XIII , pt I , , XIV , pt II ,

(Madras ,

Madros

(Madras

1931 : Madras , XIV

,

pt

I,

pp

.

15

,

,

21 and

Tamil Nadu Archives , Madras ( hereafter TNA ) , Madras Government Order (6 . 0 . ) 1731 , Development , 27 Nov 1923 , p . 47 . Dharma Kumar

8

, Land

and Caste in South India : Labour in the Madras Presidency during the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge , 1965 ) , pp . 12 - 13 , 18 - 19 . Nilmani Mukherjee , The Ryotwari System in Madras , 1792 - 1827 (Calcutta , 1962 ) . Kumar , Land and Caste , p . 11 . David Washbrook , " Country Politics : Madras 1880 to 1930 " John Gallagher , Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal ( eds . ) ,

Agricultural

Locality , Province

Nation : Essays on Indian Politics , , 1973 ) , pp . 155 - 211 . R . Suntharalingam , " The Madras Native Association : A Study of an Early Indian Political Organization " , Indian Economic and Social History Review , IV , 3 ( Sept 1870 - 1940

10

(Cambridge

and

1967) ,

11 12

p . 237 . Ibid . , p . 251 . Anil Seal , The Emergence of Indian Nationalism : Competition and collaboration in the Later Nineteenth

, 1968 ) , pp . 104 - 7 ; R . Suntharalingam , and Nationalist Awakening in South India , 1852 - 1891 ( Tucson , 1974 ) , pp . 112 - 15 . " Notes prepared in the Madras Government Secretariat for Lord Meston " , Meston Papers , F . 136 / 33 , India Office Library , London , (hereafter IOL ) . Century

Politics

13

,

( Cambridge

192

Notes to pages 14

16 17

21

Andre Beteille , Castes old and New : Essays in Social Structure and Social Stratification ( Bombay , 1969 ) , p . 165 ; E . Kathleen Gough , " Caste in a Tanjore Village " , in E . R . Leach ( ed . ) , Aspects of Caste in South India , Ceylon and North -West Pakistan (Cambridge , 1960 ) , p . 22 ; Gilbert Slater ( ed . ) , Some South Indian Villages ( London

15

15 -

,

1918 )

,

68 - 9 , 220 . 1921 : Madras ,

pp

.

of XIII , pt I , pp . 128 - 9 . Suntharalingam , Nationalist Awakening , pp . 137 - 9 . R . Suntharalingam , " The 'Hindu ' and the Genesis of Nationalist Politics in South India , 1878 - 1885 " , South , ( Aug 1972 ) , pp . 66 - 70 . Asia , , Dawn and Achievement of Indian Parthasarathy R . T. Being Freedom : the Life and Times of C . Vijiaraghavachariar , Patriot and Thinker (Salem , , pp 1953) . 5 - 18 . R . Suntharalingam , " The Salem Riots , 1882 : Judiciary versus Executive in the Mediation of a Communal Dispute " , , 3 ( July 1969) , pp . 193 - 208 . Modern Asian Studies , , Suntharalingam Nationalist Awakening , p . 198 . Religion , M . N . Srinivas and Society among the Coorgs of , South India ( London 1952 ) , p . 30 ; M . N . Srinivas , Social Change in Modern India ( Berkeley , 1967 ) , pp . 1 - 45 . , David Arnold " The Gounders and the Congress : Political , Recruitment in South India 1920 - 1937 " , South Asia , IV , , , (Aug 1974 ) pp . 7 - 8 David Arnold , Robin Jeffrey and James , Manor " Caste Associations in South India : A Comparative Analysis " , Indian Economic and Social History Review , XIII , 3 , ( July - Sept 1976 ) . For the early career of the Justice Party , see Eugene F . Irschick , Politics and Social Conflict in South India : The Non - Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism , 1916 - 1929 ( Berkeley , 1969 ) , chs . 3 - 5 . Report on the Indian Franchise (Cmd . The Southborough 141 , 1919 , p . 19 ) noted that there were only 179 , 388 literate in English in the Madras Presidency in a population of nearly 40 millions . Judith M . Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise to Power : Indian Politics , Census

India ,

II

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

III

1915 - 1922

26

(Cambridge ,

1972) , ch .

3.

. N . Jagadisan ( ed . ) , Letters of the Right Honourable V . S. Srinivasa Sastri ( 2nd edn , Bombay , 1963) , pp . 41 , 43 . T

193

Notes to pages

22

- 28

of Commons Debates , 97 ( 1917 ) , col . 1695 . National Archives of India , New Delhi , Government of India , Home Department , Political Section , [hereafter H . Poll ) , Proceedings , Sept 1918 , Deposit [hereafter D - ] no . 20 , Fortnightly Report on the Internal Political Situation from Madras , second half of July 1918 [hereafter FR I or FR II, as appropriate ] . 29 P . Kodanda Rao , The Right Honourable V . S . Srinivasa Sastri : A Political Biography (Bombay , 1963 ) , pp . 48 - 56 ; Jagadisan , Srinivasa Sastri , p . 49 . 30 Gandhi to Srinivasa Sastri, 9 Feb 1919 , Gandhi to Srinivasa Sastri , tel . , 11 March 1919 , collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [ hereafter CWMG ] (New Delhi , from 27

House

28

1958 ) ,

31

32

33

XV

, ,

pp .

88

,

128

.

Towards Nation - wide Agitation and Organization : The Home Rule Leagues , 1915 - 18 " , in D . A . Low ( ed . ) , Soundings in Modern South Asian History ( London , 1968 ) , pp . 158 - 95 . Ibid . , pp . 172 , 174 - 7 . Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise , pp . 141 - 4 ; B . Pattabhi Sitaramayya History of the Indian National Congress , I , 1885 - 1935 H

.F.

Owen

"

,

( reprinted

35

36

37 38

39

"

II

II

pp

40

,

, New Delhi , 1969 ) , p . 133 . Towards Nation - wide Agitation " ,

p . 178 ; Annie , Supply Adyar pamphlet , 1923 ) . Besant Grievances before ( H . Poll , Procs Aug 1918 , D - 28 , FR I May 1918 ; Procs Sept 1918 , D - 40 , FR I Aug 1918 . Apr 1919 , D - 49 , FR H . Poll , Procs Mar 1919 . , Jamnadas Dwarkadas to Besant 27 Feb 1919 , Adyar Archives . , July , , Apr 1919 . H . Poll Procs 1919 D - 47 FR Ranga Iyengar ( Delhi , 1963) , V . K . Narasimhan , Kasturi

Owen

C

.

23 - 44

.

. J . Baker ,

"

Politics

in South

India ,

1917 - 1930 "

,

PhD

dissertation , Cambridge University , 1973 , pp . 113 - 18 ; David Washbrook , review of Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise , Modern

VII , 1 ( Jan 1973 ) , pp . 109 - 10 ; . A . Washbrook , The Emergence of Provincial Politics : The Madras Presidency , 1870 - 1920 , ( Cambridge , 1976 ) , ch . 5 .

Asian Studies , D

41 42

43 44

Narasimhan ,

Ranga , pp . 55 -69 . , Prema Nandakumar Subramania Bharati (New Delhi , 1968) . Vijayaraghavachari , 23 Feb 1919 , CWMG , XV , p . 96 . Gandhi to

Report 1919 ,

Kasturi

of the

TNA ,

G

Commissioner

. O.

222

of Police , Madras ,

, Public (Confidential ) ,

25

Mar 1919 .

24 Apr

194

to pages 29 - 33 .

Notes

.

Poll ,

11

July

II

53

Procs Apr 1919 , D - 49 , FR Mar 1919 ; Report of the Executive Committee of the Madras Provincial Congress Committee , 1919 (Madras , 1920 ) , p . 4 , Adyar Archives . Report of the Commissioner of Police , 25 Mar 1919 , TNA , G . O . 222 , Public ( Conf . ) , 24 Apr 1919 . Ibid . , p . 2 . H . Poll , Procs July 1919 , D - 47 , FR I Apr . 1919 . Report of the Commissioner of Police , 4 Apr 1919 , TNA , G . O . 222 , Public (Conf. ) , 24 Apr 1919 , p . 4 . Police Report , 6 Apr 1919 , TNA , G . O . 222 , Public ( Conf . ) , 24 Apr 1919 , pp . 8 - 11 ; Madras Times (English ; Madras ) , supplement , 8 Apr 1919 , Adyar Archives . TNA , 6 . 0 . 223 , Public (Conf . ) , 25 Apr 1919 . (ed . ) , Essays on Gandhian Politics : The Rowlatt R . Kumar Satyagraha of 1919 ( London , 1971 ) . TNA , Under - Secretary ' s Secret File [hereafter SF ) 271 ,

54

H

45

46

47 48 49 50

51 52

H

1919 ,

p

.

19

. Poli , Procs July

.

1919

,

D

- 48

,

FR

I

May

1919

, citing

a

report from the Collector of North Arcot . Suspension C . Rajagopalachari , " Satyagraha : The Present

Disobedience " , 5 May 1919 , TNA , SF 271 , 11 July ; speech at Madura - Ramnad District Conference in 1919 English ; Madras ) , 22 Nov 1919 . Hindu (English Madra S . Satyamurti ( ed . ) , The The Montagu - Chelmsford Proposals Montagu chets of Citizens (Madras , 1918 ) ; S . Satyamurti , Rights citize (Madras , 1919 ) . Hindu , 19 Dec 1919 , 5 Mar , 26 Apr 1920 . Programme " ; A . Rangaswami S . Satyamurti , " The Congress Iyengar , " Financial Programme " ; " Programme of the Nationalist Party " : leaflets in Adyar Archives . Hindu , 8 , 10 Nov 1919 . Srinivasa Sastri to P . S . Sivaswami Aiyar , 13 Apr 1920 , in Jagadisan ( ed . ) , Srinivasa Sastri , p . 66 ; Hindu ,

of Civil 1919

56

57

58

59 60

3

,

;

6

;

Mar

.

1920 .

. Kasturi Ranga Iyengar , " Foreword " , Resolutions Passed at the Indian National Congress , Amritsar , 1919 (Madras , S

1920 ) .

, Gandhi ' s Rise , pp . 188 - 9 ; P . H . M . " Gandhi in 1919 : Loyalist or Rebel ? " , in Gandhian Politics , pp . 43 - 63 . Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise , pp . 240 - 1 . Brown

63 64

Ibid . ,

pp .

233 - 40 .

van

den

Kumar

Dungen ( ed . ) ,

,

195

Notes to pages 33 - 37 65 66

67

68 69

71 72 73 74

75

76

77 78 79

India (English ; Ahmedabad ) , 9 June 1920 , CWMG , . 482 . Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise , pp . 216 - 20 ; for the background of Muslim politics in India , see P . Hardy , The Muslims of British India (Cambridge , 1972 ) , esp . ch . 7 . For Gandhi ' s motives in adopting the council boycott , see Richard Gordon , " Non - Cooperation and Council Entry , 1919 - 20 " , in Gallagher , Johnson and Seal ( eds . ) , Locality , Province and Nation , pp . 139 -41 . Hindu , 13 Aug 1920 . " More Objections Answered " , Young India , 18 Aug 1920 ; published interview in Madras Mail ( English ; Madras ) , [ hereafter cited as Mail ] , 12 Aug 1920 . Young India , 18 Aug 1920 ; Hindu , 13 Aug 1920 . " Boycott of Goods v . Non - Co - operation Programme '' , Young India , 25 Aug 1920 . Young

XVII ,

p

, 13 Aug

1920 . Ibid . , Young India , 14 July 1920 . " Councils ' Boycott " , Young India ,

Hindu

July 1920 . 14 , , Aug Gandhi to C . F . Andrews 23 1920 CWMG , XVIII , p . 191 . Gujarati , Navajivan ; " Madras Tour " ( Ahmedabad ) , 29 Aug , , , pp , 1920 CWMG XVIII . 209 213 . Hindu , 16 Aug 1920 . Speeches of A . Rangaswami Iyengar and S . Srinivasa Iyengar , Hindu , 6 , 16 Aug 1920 . Hindu

,

16

Ibid .

Aug 1920

.

83

Iyengar , Hindu , 16 Aug 1920 . , Aug 1920 . 16 Aug 25 Nilkan Perumal , Rajaji : A Biographical Study (Calcutta , 1948 ) , pp . 11 - 12 ; Directory of the Madras Legislature ( Madras , 1938 ) , pp . 214 - 15 . Speeches of C . Rajagopalachari , Governor - General of India , June 1948 - January 1950 (New Delhị , 1950 ) , pp . 191 - 2 ; Monica Felton , I Meet Rajaji ( London , 1962 ) , pp . 137 , 162 ; Parthasarathy , Dawn , p . 156 ; Rajagopalachari ' s speech at the Srinivasa Sastri Centenary Celebrations , Rajaji Hall , Madras , 22 Sept

84

C

80 8

82

Kasturi

Ranga

Hindu ,

1969 .

. Rajagopalachari , Chats Behind

pp . 48 - 9 ; Francis ( London p

.

192

,

.

1969 )

,

p

Watson

.

173

;

,

Bars

(Madras ,

n

.d.) ,

Trial of Mr . Gandhi Speeches of C . Rajagopalachari , The

196

Notes 85

on

87

89

91

92

93 94

95

97

98

99

100

101

.

103

348 .

Hindu ,

Oct

II

11 ,

15

1919

.

Nov

1919

;

pp

. 71 - 2 ;

1918

H

.

New

India

.

Poll ,

( English

Watson , Gandhi , pp . 173 - 4 . Hindu , 21 May 1921 ; speech at Madura - Ramnad Conference , in Hindu , 22 Nov 1919 .

Procs

Sept

; Madras

)

,

District

Gandhi , Experiments , p . 348 . C . R . Srinivasan in Hindu , 15 May 1935 ; K . Subba Rau , Men in the Limelight : Life Sketches (Madras , 1941) , pp . 100 f . Hindu

, 21

Hindu ,

Feb

26

Aug ,

1920

.

Oct 1920 ; Rajan ' s speech at Salem District Conference , in Hindu , 6 Mar 1920 . H . Poll , Procs Aug 1918 , D - 30 , FR I June 1918 . S . Ramanathan , League of Youth (Madras , 1946 ) , p . 3 ; K . V . Rajagopalan , In and out of the Law (Madras , 1957 ) , 7

p . 186 . Hindu , 13 Aug 1920 . Ramanathan , League , pp . 11 - 14 ; K . Santhanam , " How I first met Mahatma Gandhi " , Bhavan ' s Journal , XV , 16 ( 9 Mar 1969 ) , pp . 33 - 5 . For details , see Kenneth McPherson , " The Muslims of Madras and Calcutta : Agitational Politics in the Early 1920s " , South Asia , V (Dec . 1975 ) , pp . 32 -47 . K . I . McPherson , " The Political Development of the Urdu and Tamil - speaking Muslims of the Madras Presidency , 1901 to 1937 " , MA dissertation , University of Western Australia , 1968 , pp . 76 f . K . I . McPherson , " Yakub Hasan : Communalist or Patriot ? " , University Studies in History , V , 4 ( 1970 ) , pp . 73 - 7 . Mail , 25 Apr 1921 ; McPherson , " Political Development " , p

102

- 41

Rajagopalachari , Chats , July 1918 , D - 20 , FR 21

88

37

Interview with C . R . Narasimhan (Rajagopalachari ' s son ) , Madras , 13 Feb 1970 ; M . K , Gandhi , The Story of My Experiments with Truth ( 2nd edn , Ahmedabad , 1940 ) , p

86

pages

.

The

96

;

Non

TNA

,

SF 407

,

6

May

1923

,

p

.

38

.

- Co - operation and Khilafat Movements

in

the

Madras Presidency ( Madras , n . d . [ c . 1923 ] ) , p . 35 ; TNA , G . O . 607 , Public (Conf . ) , 22 Sept 1920 , p . 9 ; , S . M . Fossil The Islamic South (Madras , 1941 ) , p . 22 . Report ; , Sept Qaumi (Urdu Madras ) 8 1919 , 11 Apr 1920 , Presidency Reports Newspaper Madras Native [ hereafter NNR ) .

197

Notes to pages 41 - 47 104

McPherson , " Muslims of Madras and Calcutta " , p . 39 . Fossil , Islamic South , pp . 3 , 59 , 126 , 173 , 189 identi fies some of the leading young Khilafatists . The

division between the moderate merchants and more extreme maulvis was an all - India one : Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise , pp

105

H

.

.

Nov

106

107 108

109 110 111 112

113 114 115 116

117 118

119 120 121 122

123

194

,

Poll ,

1919 ,

205 . Procs D

- 14 ,

Oct 1919 , FR I Oct

- 59 , FR I Sept 1919 ; Procs 1919 ; Hindu , 16 , 18 Oct 1919 .

D

II

May Procs July 1920 , D - 95 , FR 1920 . July , , Procs 1920 D - 90 FR I Mar . 1920 . Hindu , 21 June 1920 . Hindu , 23 , 24 June 1920 ; Ramanathan , League , pp . 9 - 10 ; H . Poll , Procs July 1920 , D - 97 , FR June 1920 . , , , Aug Hindu 6 16 25 1920 . Hindu , 6 Sept 1920 . Gordon , " Non -Cooperation and Council Entry '' , pp . 143 - 7 . , Sept Hindu 10 1920 . Hindu , 11 , 13 , 17 , 18 Sept 1920 . Hindu , 13 , 15 , 20 Sept 1920 . Hindu , 20 Oct 1920 . J . H . Broomfield , Elite Conflict in a Plural Society : Twentieth - Century Bengal ( Berkeley , 1968 ) , p . 167 . Hindu , 10 Sept 1920 . Hindu , 16 , 18 Sept 1920 . Editorial , Hindu , 13 Sept 1920 ; Narasimhan , Kasturi Ranga , p . 192 . M . K . Acharya in Hindu , 22 Sept 1920 . Hindu , 19 Oct 1920 . Gordon , " Non - Cooperation and Council Entry '' , pp . 148 - 52 .

Poll , H . Poll , H

.

II

Chapter The 1

2

3

Non -

Cooperation Experiment

,

2

pp

.

46

- 77

Gopal Krishna , " The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization , 1918 - 23 " , Journal of Asian Studies , XXV , 3 (May 1966 ) , p . 415 . John G . Leonard , " Politics and Social Change in South India : A Study of the Andhra Movement " , Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies , V , 1 (Mar 1967 ) , pp . 60 - 7 . Brown , Gandhi ' s Rise , p . 299 ; cf . Gordon , " Non Cooperation and Council Entry '', p . 134 .

198

Notes to pages 4

47 - 54

Michael Brecher , Nehru : A Political Biography ( London , 1959 ) , pp . 72 - 3 ; Krishna , "'Mass Organization " , esp . . 419 . . Rangaswami Iyengar , " Minute of Dissent " , Adyar Archives ; Hindu , 15 , 17 Nov 1920 . Hindu , 14 , 18 Feb 1921 ; Krishna , "'Mass Organization " , p . 423 . Hindu , 3 , 15 , 16 July 1921 . Hindu , 16 , 20 July 1921 . p

5

7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

15 16

Ā

Hindu

,

15

Hindu ,

7

Aug

Sept

1921

.

1921 . 1921 .

Hindu , 22 Nov Hindu , 16 July 1921 , 3 Dec 1923 . Hindu , 19 Oct 1920 . Hindu , 8 Mar , 29 Apr 1921 . Hindu , editorials , 7 , 21 July 1921 . Hindu , 22 Nov 1921 . M . K . Acharya in Hindu , 16 Aug 1921 . At the end of January 1921 the CWC agreed to Rajagopalachari ' s request for Rs . 8 , 600 : Indian National Congress , 1920 - 23 (Allahabad , 1924 ) , p . 85 . In August 1921 Rajagopala

chari reported

that Rs . 96 , 000 was available to the Tilak Swarajya Fund and a further Rs . 60 , 000 was being sought from the CWC : Hindu , 10 Aug 1921 . Gandhi to Kasturi Ranga Iyengar , 8 Jan 1921 , CWMG , XIX , Tamilnad

18

p

205

.

20

Hindu , 17 Sept 1921 . G . Rudrayya Chowdari , Prakasam Delhi , 1971 ) , pp . 124 - 35 .

21

Non

19

i

.

from

22

23 24 25 26

27 28

29

- Co - operation

Ibid .

and

Khilafat ,

: p

A

Political

.

28

Study

(New

.

" TNCC Annual Report , 1921 - 22 " , AICC Papers , Nehru Memorial Library , New Delhi , [hereafter AICCP ) , 1 / 169 - G , p . 6 ; Hindu , 11 , 17 Jan 1922 . Broomfield , Elite Conflict , p . 209 . Non - Co - operation and Khilafat , p . 47 . Hindu , 19 Nov 1920 . Dietmar Rothermund , The Phases of Indian Nationalism and other Essays (Bombay , 1970 ) , p . 125 Young India , 12 Jan 1922 . Sept 1920 . H . Poll , Procs Dec 1920 , D - 84 , FR

II

199

Notes to pages 30

31

54

Hindu , 15 , 21 , 27 Sept , 13 Oct 1920 ; Washbrook , Emergence of Provincial Politics , pp . 317 - 22 . C . Ramalinga Reddi , " Dyarchy and After " , Indian Review (English ; Madras ) , May 1922 , p . 296 . Hindu , 20 Oct 1920 ; Sixty - first Birthday Commemoration Volume presented to Dr . R . K . Shanmukham Chettiar (Annamalai

33

37

38 39

40

41 42 43 44

47 48

49 50

51

53 54

,

p

.

96

.

Ibid . - Co - operation and Khilafat , p . 38 . Hindu , 15 , 17 Dec 1920 . Ayyar , In the Legislature R . V . Krishna (Madras , 1956 ) , p . 11 .

of

those Days

Willingdon to Montagu , 8 Feb 1920 , Willingdon Papers [hereafter WP ] , F . 93 / 4 , IOL . Willingdon to Montagu , 5 Feb 1920 , ibid . Willingdon to Montagu , 7 June , 14 Dec . 1920 , ibid . Edwin S . Montagu , An Indian Diary ( London , 1930 ) ,

pp . 129 , " Note by

135

-6 .

His Excellency c

.

1919

Willingdon

,

1919

,

WP ,

F

WP , F . 93 / to Montagu ,

Lord

. 4

.

93 /

2

Willingdon on Reforms ; Willingdon to Montagu ,

Jan , 8 Feb 1920 , ibid . For Willingdon ' s earlier hopes for the Moderates , see Willingdon to Montagu , 28 Oct 1919 , ibid . Willingdon to Montagu , 29 Mar 1920 , ibid . Willingdon to Montagu , 14 Dec 1920 , ibid . 7

Ibid .

Cf. Irschick , Politics

and Social Conflict , p . 172 . Willingdon to Montagu , 21 Mar 1921 , WP , F . 93 / 4 ; interview with P . T . Rajan , Madras , 30 Jan 1971 . John Gallagher , " Congress in Decline : Bengal 1930 to 1939 " , Gallagher , Johnson and Seal ( eds . ) , Locality ,

Province

52

1952 )

Non

19 Oct

46

,

Irschick , Politics and Social Conflict , p . 178 . " Non - Brahmin " , Hindu , 15 Dec 1920 . Government of India , Reports on the Working of the Reformed Constitution , 1927 (Calcutta , 1928 ) , pp . 88 - 9 .

Report " ,

45

-60

and

Nation ,

p

.

281 ,

note

28

.

Hindu , 12 July 1923 ; Christopher John Baker , The Politics , , 1976 ) , pp . 54 -63, Cambridge of South India 1920 - 1937 ( 99 - 131 . One illustration was the rapid rise of K . Sitarama Reddi in South Arcot : Hindu , 26 Jan 1921 , 26 Jan 1922 . Irschick , Politics and Social Conflict , pp . 230 - 44 . Willingdon to Montagu , 12 May , 3 Aug 1921 , WP , F . 93 / 4 .

200

Notes to pages

Dec 1920 . Jan , 2 , 5 , 15 Feb 1921 . , TNA SF 407 , 6 May 1923 , pp . 37 - 8 ; Hindu , Hindu , 10 Aug, 22 Nov 1921 .

,

1920

II

D

-84 ,

Public

May

1921

302

SF

Hindu

,

. O.

G

1921

,

May

8

May

1920

172

Procs

Aug 1920

.

10

,

p

.

Ch

, .

Sec

. , 1 ) . ,

TNA

,

1921

SF

[

2

,

Jan

,

,

Madras

Chief Secretary Apr 1921 315 SF

,

TNA

28

to

, ]

(

. ,

.

p

, .

,

. 4

Ch

1921

Gol

1920

315

,

16

.pp

,

"

2

,

to

SF

.

in

7

-

to ,

,

Apr

,

on

's

"

. , .g . , 34

E

pp

.

Govt of India Sept Madras Gol Sec 2

,

editorial

Report John Scurr his Indian Tour 1919 23 Adyar Archives Apr 1921 Discussion notes 315

76

1920

,

Procs

-A

Poll

-

. 127

,

May

-

H

12

TNA

Sept 1920 ; Procs

II

FR

Oct . 1920 . MLCP , I , 21 Mar 1921 , p . 836 . TNA , 6 . 6 . 180 , Public , 15 Mar 1920 ; pp . 29 - 30 , 37 - 8 .

;

70

Procs Dec D - 66 , FR

.

8

69

,

1920

1920

,

. Poli ,

Dec

Nov

19

,

H

17

6 ;

68

31

,

66 67

, Hindu , Hindu

,

64 65

2

63

,

62

265

60

.

58 59

,

57

Legislative

VII ,

B

56

Council Proceedings [hereafter MLCP ), , p 27 Mar 1922 . 3646 . Willingdon ' s address to the Madras legislature : MLCP , IV , 16 Dec 1921 , p . 1937 . TNA , SF 315 , 2 Apr 1921 , p . 37 ; SF 328 , 15 Nov 1921 , pp . 47 - 9 , 72 - 80 ; Peter D . Reeves , " The Politics of Order : ' Anti - Non - Cooperation ' in the United Provinces , 1921" , Journal of Asian Studies , XXV , 2 ( Feb 1966 ) , pp . 261 - 74 . TNA , SF 338 , 1 May 1922 , p . 34 . Reports on . . . the Reformed Constitution , 1927 , pp . 38 - 9 Non - Co - operation and Khilafat , pp . 32 - 3 . petitions See the and resolutions of the Nadar Mahajana , Sabha ( Hindu 20 Dec 1920 ) , the Maravar Association Sept , ( Hindu 8 1921 ) , and the Kallar Maha Sangam (Hindu , Sept 13 1921 ) . For Adi - Dravida loyalist meetings , see , Hindu 23 Nov 1920 , 10 Aug 1921 . Montagu to Willingdon , 10 Feb 1921 , WP , F . 93 / 4 . For Montagu ' s long - term view , see S . D . Waley , Edwin Montagu ( Bombay , 1964 ) , pp . 156 , 197 , 200 . Broomfield , Elite Conflict , ch . V , " The Moderates ' Failure " . Madras

.

55

60 - 64

201

Notes to pages 77

64

-69

Rajagopalachari , Hindu ,

21 May

1921

; Hasan , Hindu ,

1921 . Arnold , "Gounders ' , p . 9 . Robert L . Hardgrave , The Nadars of Tamilnad : The Political culture of a Community in Change ( Berkeley , 1969 ) , pp . 136 - 8 , 194 ; letter from a Nadar to Tamil Nadu ( Tamil ; Salem ) , 28 Nov 1921 , NNR . Christopher Baker , " Non - cooperation in South India " , in C . J . Baker and D . A . Washbrook , South India : Political Institutions and Political Change , 1880 - 1940 (Delhi , 1975 ) , pp . 98 - 149 . TNA , SF 407 , 6 May 1923 , pp . 27 - 9 ; Hindu , 16 , 20 Sept 1921 , H . Poll , F . 13 / 1922 , FR Jan 1922 . , 4 Aug 1921 , p . 361 ; 1 Sept 1921 , p . 580 ; MLCP , 12 Oct 1921 , p . 879 ; TNA , 6 . 0 . 1135 , Revenue , 19 June 27 Aug

78

79

80

81

II

II

1922 .

83 84

85

Willingdon to Montagu , 1 May 1921 , 11 Feb 1922 , WP , F . 93 / 4 ; MLCP , V , 4 Mar 1922 , p . 2483 . T . E . Moir to Secretary , Gol , Finance , 13 Dec 1921 , IOL , Madras Procs , G . 0 . 1221 , Finance (Conf . ) , Jan 1922 . Non - Co - operation and Khilafat , p . 18 ; TNA , SF 407 ,

May 1923 , p . 28 . . D . Murphy , " Labour Organisations in the Cotton Mills of Tamilnad , 1918 - 1939 " , dissertation PhD thesis , University of Western Australia , 1976 , pp . 79 - 80 . 87 TNA , 6 . 0 . 342 , Public (Conf. ) , 18 Apr 1918 . For a detailed account of the formation of the Madras Labour Union , see Murphy , " Labour Organisations '' , ch . 3 . 88 Cited in B . Shiva Rao , The Industrial Worker in India 6

E

89 90

91

( London , 1939 ) , p . 16 . Besant in New India , 3

1918 . Rajagopalachari at Madras Labour Conference (Hindu , Rajas 22 Mar 1920 ) ; notes by Executive Councillor C . G . Todhunter , 26 Jan 1919 , TNA , letter 63 , Public ( Conf . ) , 12 Feb 1919 , p . 5 . TNA , 6 . 0 . 1029 , Public (Conf . ) , 9 Nov 1919 ; H . Poll , Procs Nov 1918 , D - 24 , FR Oct 1918 . Wadia often referred to Gandhi ' s involvement in the Ahmedabad mill dispute : e . g . H . Poll , Procs Aug 1918 , D - 30 , FR I June

II

1918

92

July

.

of Police , Madras , 25 Mar . O . 222 , Public (Conf . ) , 24 Aug 1919 , p .

Report of the Commissioner 1919 ,

TNA

,

G

10

.

202

Notes to pages 69 93

(English ; Trichinopoly ) , 26 May 1920 ; cf . Mail , 10 Dec 1918 . , 6 . 0 . 562 , Public (Conf . ) , 7 Sept 1920 . , letter 63 , Public (Conf . ) , 12 Feb 1919 , notes , esp .

Wednesday Review NNR TNA

95

TNA

Todhunter ,

Sept Secs .

Jan

26

1920

7

96

73

, notes

1919 , by

R

p

5;

.

.A .

G. O.

Graham

563 , Public (Conf . ) , and A . R . Knapp , Ch .

, G . 0 . 671 , Public , 7 Oct 1921 , pp . 1 - 7 ; Murphy , Labour Organisations " , pp . 134 -43 . Willingdon to Reading , 26 July 1921 , WP , F . 93 / 5 . Hindu , 17 Sept 1921 . Hindu , 11 July 1921 ; Narasimhan , Kasturi Ranga , p . 198 . Hindu , 22 Nov 1921 . Hindu , editorial , 1 Sept 1921 . Hindu , editorial , 2 Sept 1921 . For the Justice Party ' s reactions , see Irschick , Politics and Social Conflict , TNA

"

97 98 99

100

101 102

pp .

103

R

188 - 92 .

. H . Hitchcock ,

1921

: 04

. 05 106

107 108 109 110

Ibid . ,

112

Hindu , Hindu ,

117

119 120

.

10 - 15

,

178 - 80 .

Dec 1921 . 30 Aug , 10 Sept 1921

a

detailed account .

3

.

328

1921 , p . 71 . Hindu , 20 Sept 1921 ; Non - Co - operation and Khilafat , p . 14 ; Hindu , 27 Aug 1921 . C . Rajagopalachari , Rajaji ' s 1920 Life (Madras , 1941 ) , p . 107 , entry for 16 Feb 1922 .

,

Nov

Jail

p

.

3.

D

.A .

Low

Notes " , Navajivan

" My

. 204 .

Willingdon

118

pp

Indian National Congress , 1920 - 23 , pp . 11 , 154 . Confidential circular , 310 S , 3 Nov 1921 , TNA , SF

p

116

History of the Malabar Rebellion ,

p

Gandhi ,

115

A

1925 ) ,

. 19 ; Mail , 4 , 5 Apr 1921 . TNA , G . O . 103 , Public , 25 Feb 1921 . Hitchcock , Malabar Rebellion , gives

15

111

(Madras ,

,

's "

note ,

1

Dec

,

1921 ,

25

Sept

1921

TNA

,

338

SF

,

,

CWMG

1

, XXI ,

May 1922

,

of India and the First Non , Journal of Asian Studies , , pp ) . 247 - 8 .

The Government

Cooperation Movement ,

1920 - 22 "

XXV , 2 (Feb 1966 Willingdon to Montagu , 27 Aug 1921 , WP , F . 93 / 4 . TNA , 6 . 0 . 618 , Public (Conf . ) , 19 Sept 1921 . Hindu , editorial , 7 Nov 1921 . Willingdon to Reading , 18 Sept 1921 , WP , F . 93 / 5 . Indian National Congress , 1920 - 23 , pp . 72 - 3 .

203

to pages

Notes

124

125 126

127 128

129

Justice ,

131 132

pp

.

1699

1921 , NNR . Cooperation Low " Non Movement " , pp . 249 - 50 . , Broomfield Elite Conflict , pp . 222 - 3 . , New India 16 Jan 1922 . Gandhi , " Violence in the Camp "' , Young India , 9 Feb 1922 . Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru , 19 Feb 1922 , Jawaharlal Nehru , A Bunch of old Letters (2nd edn , Bombay , 1960 ) ,

.

23

,

.

Madras Procs , G . 0 . 1002 , 28 Aug 1922 , pp . 13 - 14 ; Hindu , 21 , 23 Jan 1922 . Non - Co - operation and Khilafat , p . 44 . IOL , Madras Procs , G . O . 432 , Judicial ( Police ) , 18 Aug 1923 , p . 11 ; TNA , 6 . 0 . 130 , Revenue , 19 Jan 1922 ; Hindu , 21 Jan 1922 ; Swadesaoni tran ( Tamil ; Madras ) , 21 Jan 1922 , IOL

NNR . 133

,

13 Dec

,

p

130

1921

editorial ,

Hindu ,

Feb

13

1922 .

134

C . Rajagopalachari , Gandhiji ' s Teachings and Philosophy

135

Rajagopalachari ,

21 .

for

Feb

18

.

1

-

180

-

-

1920

,

- 9 , entry

163

.

of .

p

. ,

Ibid

108

3

78

Indian National Congress

,

.

-

1

(

.

219 Madras

, -

N

in

II,

150

Mitra

.

,

.

6

20

,

,

,

1922

.

May 1923

.pp

,

)

18

June

.

18

,

India

,

7

Young

8

(

,

:

to

. ) ,

ed

(

,

14

"

-

"

,

Cooperation and Council Entry Swarajya Party manifesto Oct 1923 Register The Indian Annual 1923 Swaraj Speeches of Desabandhu Das The Way 1923 Madras 1923

Hindu

25

.N , pp . pp

-

II,

,

my

.

63

-

.

,

)

58

M

.R .

4 5

,

of

)

,

Report the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee Allahabad 1922 Jayakar The Story Bombay life 1922

pp 1959 Gordon Non

6

.pp

Dilemma

,

'

Swarajists

(

3

2

1

The

Chapter

pp .

pp

Jail Life ,

.

1922 .

.

,

p

23

, 1963 ) ,

122

( Bombay

;

122

123

Hindu , 22 , 23 Nov 1921 . Hindu , 8 , 15 Dec 1921. Hindu , 17 , 22 Dec 1921 ; MLCP , IV , 13 Dec f . ; 15 Dec 1921 ; 20 Jan 1922 , p . 2062 .

20

121

- 81

74

204

Notes to pages 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18

21 22

23 24

25 26

28

29 30

31 32

33 34 35

36 37 38

39

- 89

Hindu , 14 June 1923 . Hindu , 19 May 1923 .

Hindu ,

28

May

,

8

,

Hindu , editorial ,

16

June

1923

.

15 June 1923 . Swadesami tran , 19 June 1923 , NNR . Hindu , 20 Aug 1923 . Hindu , 17 , 19 Sept 1923 . Hindu , 1 Sept 1924 . Hindu , 3 July 1923 . Rangaswami Iyengar to Jayakar , 17

July 1922 , Jayakar , . 30 . Motilal Nehru to Satyamurti , 27 Nov 1922 , Satyamurti Papers , (hereafter SP ) , NML ; Hindu , 12 Dec 1922 . Gandhi to Rajagopalachari , 24 Aug 1924 , CWMG , XXV , pp . 36 - 7 ; Gandhi to Rajagopalachari , 15 Sept 1924 , ibid . , p . 149 ; Young India , 15 Jan 1925 . Jaridah - i - Rozgar (Urdu ; Madras ) , 4 Feb 1922 , NNR . Sutandiran ( Tamil ; Madras ) , 16 Sept 1923 , NNR . Hindu , 19 Apr , 2 , 9 , 24 July 1923 . Hindu , 28 May , 16 June , 5 , 13 July 1923 . Interviews Madras , with K . Subramanyam ( 4 Feb 1971 ) , K . S . Subramanian ( 10 My

19

81

Life ,

II ,

p

Feb 1971 ) , N . S . Varadachari ( 5 Feb 1971) . Hindu , 17 , 20 , 26 Sept , 1 Oct 1923 . Hindu , 29 , 31 Dec 1923 . Hindu , 8 , 11 , 17 Apr 1924 . Gandhi to Rajagopalachari , 13 Apr 1924 , CWMG , XXIII , p . 438 ; Gandhi to Rajagopala chari , 15 Apr 1924 , ibid . , p . 443 ; Rajagopalachari to Gandhi , ibid . , note 1 ; Young India , 1 May 1924 . TNA , SF 407 , 6 May 1923 , p . 41 .

Hindu

Tamil

,

19 Jan , 2 , Nadu , 29 Mar

6

,

16

1925 ,

Feb

,

NNR

12

,

21

,

25

Hindu , 6 , 9 , 10 , 15 , 20 , 30 1925 . Hindu , 1 , 2 , 4 , 6 , 12 May 1925 . Ramanathan , League , pp . 22 - 4 . Motilal Nehru to Satyamurti , 27 Nov 1922 A . P . Patro , For details

MLCP ,

XV ,

27

Nov

Mar 1925

.

. Apr

1923 ,

p

, . 31 .

SP

,

NML

.

see Reports on . . . the Reformed Constitution , 1927 , pp . 91 - 2 . Handbook of Information on the Administration of the Presidency of Madras (Madras , 1928 ) , p . 28 . Hindu , 11 , 14 Jan 1924 . Swarajya (English ; Madras ) , 24 Jan 1924 , NNR . Hindu , 14 Mar 1924 .

205

Notes to pages 89 - 96 40 41 42 43 44

Hindu , 28 Jan 1925 . Rangaswami Iyengar , Hindu

Letter

from

Civil

"

D

,

Apr

10

. R . " , Bapatla ,

1922

Hindu

Disobedience Enquiry Report , See above p . 39 ; Rajagopalachari ,

,

12

pp "

.

. May 74

1922

-5.

.

Revision Proposals

51

Examined " , Young India , 25 May 1922 . Hindu , 13 Dec 1922 . Hindu , 7 Apr 1923 . Hindu , editorials , 15 May 1922 , 29 May 1923 . Hindu , 7 Apr 1923 ; Swadesami tran , 1 , 2 May 1923 , NNR . Baker , The Politics of South India , 1920 - 1937 , pp . 81 - 2 . MLCP , XV , 27 , 28 Nov 1923 , 149 ; K . Iswara Dutt , Sparks and Fumes (Madras , n . d . ) , p . 21 . MLCP , XVII , 6 Mar 1924 , pp . 140 - 5 .

52

MLCP

45 46 48

49 50

,

, p. ; 12 Nov 1923 MLCP , Aug 1924 , pp . 328 - 9 .

53

Hindu ,

54

See

19

260

55 56

.

MLCP

XV

,

27 Nov

1923

Irschick , Politics

and

,

p

XV

,

28

Nov

1923 ,

.

19 ,

XV

,

27 Nov

1923

,

p

Social Conflict , 95

.

20

; XIX ,

pp

.

172 - 5

,

.

, pp . 2125 f . ; VIII , Sept 1923 , pp . 398 -416 ; Hindu , 28 Jan 1922 . For the undiluted patronage interpretation of Ramalingam Chetti and his associates , see Baker , The Politics of South India , 1920 - 1937 , pp . 66 - 71 . MLCP , XV , 27 - 28 Nov 1923 . Hindu , 20 Mar 1924 ; see , for example , the resolution on communal representation moved by C . Natesa Mudaliar (who later rejoined the Justice Party ) and A . Chidambaram , , Nadar : MLCP XXII 7 Feb 1925 , pp . 511 f . Reports on . . . the Reformed Constitution , 1927 , p . 85 . MLCP , XVII , 21 Mar 1924 , pp . 906 - 14 . Reports on . . . the Reformed Constitution , 1927 , pp . 57 , E . . , see g

MLCP

, IV ,

Jan

21

1922

16

57 58

59

60 61 62

61 .

MLCP p

63

Ē

. 11 .

. g.,

MLCP ,

22 Aug 1924

XVII ,

8

,

Mar

pp

.

1924

723

-4 ; XXII ,

,

.

p

3

Feb

391; 22 Mar

.

.

1925

1924

,

,

. 935 . For details , see Irschick , Politics and Social Conflict , pp . 251 - 7 ; Baker , " Politics in South India , 1917 - 1930 " , pp . 97 - 107 . Hindu , 2 Oct 1923 . Cf . Sir P . S . Sivaswami Aiyar , " The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Bill " , Indian Review , Mar 1923 , pp . 339 -44 . p

65

, XIX ,

206

Notes to pages 66

67 68

69 70 71

72 73 74 75 76

77 78

79 80

81

82

83

84

85 86

87

88 89 90

Cited in

96

- 102

.

Poll ,

H

F

.

/ 1923 ,

II

July

1923 . Nov 1926 . Hindu , 17 , 20 Feb 1925 . MLCP , IV , 14 Dec 1921, pp . 1740 - 82 ; XVIII , 31 Mar 1924 , appendix V , pp . 181 - 223 . Hindu , 22 Oct 1922 . Hindu , 26 Oct 1923 ; A . Rangaswami Iyengar , " Election Manifesto " , Adyar Archives . MLCP , XV , 14 Dec 1923 , pp . 476 - 95 ; 15 Dec 1923 , pp . 510 - 32 . H . Poll , F . 25 / 1924 , FR I Feb 1924 , FR Mar 1924 . , , , MLCP XVIII 28 Mar 1924 pp . 21 - 74 . Hindu ,

25

FR

27

II

. Poll , F . 25 / 1924 , FR I May 1924 . May 1924 . Ibid . , FR Ibid . , FRs Aug , Sept 1924 . Willingdon to Lord Peel , 2 Dec 1923 , WP . F . 93 / 5 . Willingdon to Peel , 7 Jan 1923, WP , F . 93 / 4 . Olivier to Goschen , 29 May 1924 , Goschen Papers [hereafter GP ) , IOL , D . 595 / 2 . Birkenhead to Goschen , 29 July 1927 , GP , D . 595 / 2 . Cf . Lord Irwin , Viceroy , to Goschen , 22 Nov 1926 , GP , D . 595 / 5 . Goschen to Birkenhead , 11 Aug 1925 , GP , D . 595 / 2 ; Goschen ' s ''Memorandum " for Lord Peel , 3 Jan 1929 , GP , D . 595 / 3 . Justice , editorial , 3 Aug 1927 , reprinted in Mirror of Being a Collection of the Leading Articles the Year : in Justice , 1927 (Madras , 1928 ) . Goschen to Olivier , 21 May 1924 , GP , 595 / 2 . Draft letter by A . Y . G . Campbell , Ch . Sec . Madras , to Home Dept . , Gol , 1 Aug 1927 , TNA SF 583 , 10 Aug 1927 , p . 44 . Responsivist Program , drafted 14 - 15 Feb . 1926 , Mitra , Annual Register , 1926 , I , p . 46 . Hindu , 8 Dec 1925 . Cf . his statement in Hindu , 19 Sept H

II

1925 . Hindu , 21 Sept 1925 . Hindu , 24 , 30 Nov 1926 . Narasimha Raju to Jayakar , 1 Feb 1926 , Jayakar Papers , NAI , 497 , . For details , see David Arnold , " Nationalism and Regional Politics : Tamilnad , India , 1920 - 1937 " , D . Phil . dissertation , University of Sussex , 1973 , appendix 3 .

II

207

Notes to pages

102 - 108

92

of Information on the Administration of the Presidency of Madras , p . 28 . Goschen to Birkenhead , 18 Nov 1926 , GP , D . 595 / 2 .

93 94

Hindu , editorial ,

23

Nov

1926

1926

21 Nov

1926

91

Handbook

George

NNR . 95 96 97

98

99 100 101 102 103

105 106 107

108 109 110

111 112 113 114 115

116

117

, Tamil Nadu ,

1926

.

; Swadesamitran , 24 Nov , Swarajya , 18 Nov 1926 ,

II

1927 , p . 17 . , Justice editorial , pp . 20 - 22 . Aug

May

10

1927

,

Mirror of

the

Year ,

was Goschen ' s : Goschen to Birkenhead , 6 1927 GP , D . 595 / 2 . Reprinted in Mirror of the Year , p . 13 . Venkatachelam Chetti to Srinivasa Iyengar , 12 Mar 1921 ; Srinivasa Iyengar to Satyamurti , 16 Mar 1927 , AICCP , G - 34 / 81 - M . The metaphor

July

,

Mitra , Annual Register , Hindu , Hindu ,

27 May

4

July

1927 . 1927 .

Irschick , Politics

and

1927

, I,

p

.

26

.

Social Conflict ,

pp .

319 - 22

,

356

Satyamurti , Hindu , 24 Sept 1927 . Goschen to Birkenhead , 6 July 1927 , GP , D . 595 / 2 . TNA , SF 583 , 10 Aug 1927 , p . 45 . Venkatachelam Chetti to Satyamurti , 22 July 1927 , SP , Madras ; MLCP , XXXVI , 23 Aug 1927 , pp . 85f . ; Hindu , 23 Aug 1927 . Tamil Nadu , 21 Nov 1926 , NNR . Report of the Indian National Congress , Madras , 1927 (Madras , 1928 ) , pp . 28 f .

119

Mirror of the Year , p . MLCP , XXXVIII , 24 Jan pp . 294 - 333 .

120

Goschen

118

Nov

17

Goschen to Sir Malcolm Seton , 25 Nov 1926 , GP , D . 595 / 2 . Ibid . Goschen to Birkenhead , 2 Dec 1926 , ibid . , K . M . Balasubramaniam , South Indian Celebrities , (Madras , 1939 ) , pp . 100 - 101 . Hindu , 29 Dec 1926 . Hindu , 19 Nov 1926 . Young India , 7 Apr 1927 ; Hindu , 16 Mar 1928 . Mail , 2 Mar 1926 ; Hindu , 15 July 1927 . Campbell to Home Dept . , Gol , 1 Aug 1927 , TNA , SF 583 , 10

104

Joseph , Hindu ,

to

Birkenhead ,

280 1928 17

.

,

pp

Nov

.

193

f.;

25

Jan

,

GP ,

D

.

595

1927

1928

/ 2.

,

.

208

to pages 109 -118

Notes 121 122

123 124

125 126

127 128

129 130

131 132

Hindu , 2 Mar 1928 . Goschen to Birkenhead , 15 Mar 1928 , GP , D . 595 / 3 ; MLCP , XLI , 13 Mar 1928 , pp . 31 - 42 . Goschen to Irwin , 20 Jan 1928 , GP , D . 595 / 6 ; Goschen to Birkenhead , 15 Mar 1928 , GP , D . 595 / 3 . Goschen to Birkenhead , 29 Mar 1928 , ibid . Hindu , 9 Apr 1928 . Hindu , editorial , 15 Mar 1928 . Hindu , 19 Mar , 20 Apr 1928 . MLCP , XLIII , 3 Sept 1928 , p . 64 , 4 Sept 1928 , pp . 198 Hindu , 20 May 1929 .

ff .

Ibid .

Swarajya , Hindu , 31

22 May 1929 , NNR Aug , 2 Sept 1929

; Hindu ,

Chapter Confrontation , 1

S

. Gopal,

( London ,

2

3 4 5

8 9

10

11

.

113 - 140

1929

.

4

.

The Viceroyalty 1957 ) , p . 35 .

of Lord Irwin ,

1926

- 1931

. A . Low , " Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the First Round Table Conference " , in Low ( ed . ) , Soundings , p . 302 . Gopal, Irwin , p . 50 . Sitaramayya , Indian National Congress , I , p . 366 . Hindu , 12 , 24 July 1929 . Hindu , 9 , 11 Sept 1929 . H . Poll , F . 18 / 1930 , FR II Jan 1930 . , , , Mail 6 11 13 Jan , 1930 . , p . 29 . Jayakar , My Life , Rangaswami Iyengar to Sapru , 18 Feb 1930 , Sapru Papers , , A 44 ; B . Shiva Rao to Sapru , 9 Jan 1930 , Sapru Papers , , R 129 ( Photostats of Sapru Papers in possession of Professor D . A . Low , Canberra . ) N . E . Majoribanks , Ch . Sec . , 3 Mar 1929 , TNA , SF 613 , D

II

II

14 12

pp

27 May

.

TNA

II

Mar 1929 ,

,

SF

13

Bracken

14

13

Jan

15

Mail ,

16

The

,

to

Ch

1930 3

Jan

Civil

( 1931 ] )

p

407

.

14

.

1923 . . , Madras , 23 Jan 1923 , ibid . , , TNA , SF 613 , 14 Mar 1929 , p . 41 . 6

.

May Sec

1930

.

Disobedience Movement , , p . 3.

1930 -

31

(Madras ,

p

.

9

.

n

.d .

209

Notes to pages 17 18 19

20

21 22

23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

32

33 34 35 36

Hindu Hindu Hindu

Civil

, , ,

Hindu

Civil

39

40

41

43

,

1930 . 1930

Apr

Apr

9

Mar ,

14

,

8

,

.

14

Apr

1930

.

Apr

11

1930

16

Apr

1930

1930

.

.

.

Disobedience , p . 161 . , Hindu 25 Apr 1930 . Civil Disobedience , pp . 162 - 3 . Gopal , Irwin , pp . 66 - 71 . Civil Disobedience , p . 164 .

Ibid . , Ibid

.,

Civil

Ibid . Hindu ,

pp p

.

.

,

9

166

164

Disobedience 2

Sept

.

; Hindu ,

,

1929

p

.

2

,

3

155

, .

5

June

,

.

and Municipal , 24 Mar 1930 ; July , , , Aug Hindu 3 18 29 Oct 1930 ; Civil Disobedience , p . 155 . For an account of factional politics in Tanjore before the salt satyagraha , see David Washbrook , " Political Change in a Stable Society : Tanjore District , TNA

,

6

.0 .

to

India ,

* 38

3

- 125

Disobedience , p . 158 . , Hindu 15 , 19 , 23 Apr 1930 ; Mail , Hindu , 21 , 29 Apr 1930 . Civil Disobedience , p . 159 . Ibid . , pp . 159 -60 .

1880 37

4

118

Hindu ,

1226

1920 " pp 2

,

, Local

. 20 -68 ,

Apr

Baker

in

1930

.

Especially , Baker ,

and Washbrook

, ( eds . ) ,

South

- cooperation in South India '', ( eds . ) , South India , pp . 98 - 149 . C . B . Cunningham , Comm . of Police , to Ch . Sec . , Madras , 1 May 1930 , TNA , 6 . 0 . 275 A ( S - 1) , Public (Police ) ( Conf . ) , 12 May 1930 , pp . 1 - 5 . . Sutandira Sangu ( Tamil ; Madras ) , 26 Apr 1930 , NNR ; cf . Azad Hind (Urdu ; Madras ) , 27 Apr 1930 , NNR . A Cunningham to Ch . Sec . , 1 May 1930 , TNA , G . O . 275 A ( S - 1 ) , Public ( Police ) (Conf. ) , 12 May 1930 , pp . 9 - 20 ; Hindu , 28 Apr 1930 . Madras Mahajana Sabha , Report of the Non - official Enquiry on Police Excesses in Madras on the 22nd , 25th and 27th April , 1930 (Madras , 1930 ) . Proceedings of the Council of the Corporation of Madras , 29 Apr 1930 , pp . 31 - 2 . " Non

in Baker and Washbrook ,

210

Notes to pages

especially , C . E . Wood to Venkatachelam Chetti , 30 1930 , TNA , G . O . 275 A (S - 1 ) Public ( Police ) , ( Conf . ) ,

22

,

-D

17

.

Ch

95 , to .

p

.

4

36

. .

.

,

-

,

.

-

In

,

-: :

.

,

Madura

,

in

XXXII

,

:

,

1921

Madras

,

India

XIII

,

of

of

;

99

Census

.

of 5

.

,

pp

,

.

.

,

267

"

. pp

.

of

,

,

Ramachari Madura the Seventh 23

See

. K .

interview with also resolutions

;

1930

1971

P

p

p

,

pp

,

.

p

,

"

-7

,

217

220

Apr

8

Feb

787

200

170

179 the Baker has moderated this line of argument Baker The Politics of Dr

, ,

:

pp

.

,

,

-

,

in

of

-

. ' , , , . -

,

. O .

12

on

,

(

8

.) , ,

. ) ,

18

3

,

G

,

;

5

. ( p . ,

,

.

Ch

,

,

. 25

,

,

to if 28 )

-

S

(

,

"

, ,

)

1

,

Hindu

.

,

:

,

,

L & M

,

S

-

2591

)

( 45

. 0 .

;

1930

G

,

Nov

1930

TNA

June

1930

, ,

,

9

,

Hindu

.

later joined the

Varadarajulu Naidu

,

,

(

hands

-

mill

Feb

.) ,

Madura Labour Conf

,

&

. R .

.

1931

dismissed from

S

,

letter

.

17

Oct

Public Works

However

:

picketing

Magistrate

27

.

L

-

4

-

2

.

.

pp .

o

1707

,

of District

Report G

L & M

G

. O .

,

4438 June 1931

13

,

.

.

,

p

.

.

7

p

;

7

.

-

6

pp-

G

,

.

1

in

Saurashtra Conference reported Hindu Jan 1929 Hindu Oct 1927 AICCP 116 of 1930 Ibid Civil Disobedience 139 For the disputes over the municipal council see TNA . , , ,

59 58 57

.

,

,

. 0 .

,

G

, ,

,

;

.

J.

M

;

- 25 5

,

pp

.

18

.

A

-

a

,

. J .

(

part 17

56

1937

Saunders The Sourashtra Community Sociology South India American Journal

27

61

SF

, ,

19

3

23 ,

, 12

,

. . ) 0 ,

,

( T

G

revised version his thesis but not substantially altered for Saurashtra participation South India 1920 1937 146 A

55

Baker

1926

60

Apr

1931

Politics of South India 1920 Politics South India

The

54

683

Oct 1930 Hindu June 1930 July 1930 TNA Communique Press 1251 Public Sept Conf 1930 Hindu June 1930 Sept 1930 TNA 1251 Public Conf July 1930 TNA Russell Sec Madras July 1930 843 Public Conf exaggerated For useful account of the impact depression Presidency the the Madras see Baker . . O B . .

52

53

TNA

Hindu June 1930 Civil Disobedience Tinnevelly Aug Hindu 1930 Green DSP Aug Sec Madras 1930 TNA 1398 Public

6

50

51

1930

. 0 . - 303

G

,

Feb

Feb

,

TNA

.

4

6

, .

Mail

21

,

;

,

27

12

1931

4

Mail ,

Jan

Public

. ,

48

Report

, ,

47

46

1930 , pp . 54 - 5 . by Cunningham , 11 May 1930 ( Police ) , 28 May 1930 , p .

May

12

45

.

See

Apr

8

44

125 - 129

211

Notes to pages

62 63

64

130 - 135

, 17 Dec 11 May 1926 , NNR . Basheer Ahmed Sayeed

Qaumi Report 5

,

G

-1 (

,

1929

NNR

; see also Azad Hind ,

President , 16 Mar 1930 , AICCP, Khan , Mail , 5 Feb 1930 ; proceedings of Madras Presidency Muslim Conference , reported in Hindu , 6 Dec 1929 and reflected in Qawni Report , 25 Jan , 3 Feb 1930 , NNR . Mail , 27 Apr 1931 ; E . J . Rowlandson , Commr of Police , to Ch . Sec . , 24 Feb 1931 , TNA , SF 683 - D , 22 Apr 1931 ,

ii) /

pp . 55 - 6 . Cunningham

to

INC

- D ; Abdul Hameed

182

1 Aug 1931 , TNA , , 31 Aug 1931 , p . 31 . Hugh Tinker , The Foundation of Local Self - Government in 66 India , Pakistan and Burma ( London , 1954 ) , pp . 348 - 9 . 67 Washbrook , " Country Politics " . 68 See Arnold , " Gounders " , pp . 12 - 13 . 69 Hindu , 3 , 10 Apr 1930 . 70 Mail, 12 Apr 1930 . 71 TNA , G . O . 696 , Public , 4 June 1930 . 72 Civil Disobedience , pp . 41 , 43 . 73 TNA , 6 . 0 . 485 , Public ( Police ) , 12 Sept 1931 , p . 15 ; cf . Stanley ' s remarks presenting police awards on 27 Oct 1930 (Hindu , 30 Oct 1930 ) . 74 David Arnold , " The Armed Police and Colonial Rule in South India , 1914 - 1947 " , Modern Asian Studies , forth coming 1977 . The police fired on crowds 13 times during the civil disobedience movement in Tamilnad

Gol ,

, ,

,

TNA

.

737

. .

5

1931

- -

1931

Dec

7

.

Oct

,

. O .

,

TNA

24

,

1930

-

,

.

Feb

17

.

,

p

,

8 34

.

,

p

31

,

-5

,

683

1931

, ,

, ,

ibid

Conf Conf

( (

. 230 . .)

.

F

. (D ,

,

3

1931

Public Public

Mar 1931

28

27 May

SF

TNA

Ibid

1219

.

TNA

May

1032 35

. 23 O , , . TNA

251

138

6

(

Poll

p

.

H

- .; ,

Ibid

Demi Official Aug 1931

Sept Crombie Sept 29 1931

.) .) . , , , p 3 7 .

.

61

,

G

LV

D

1931 : MLCP ,

Dec

1

to . ) A 33 , . 4 D . / . 30 /

pp

1931

,

Apr

Rajagopalachari 1013 Public Conf

D

78 80 79 84 83 82 81

and

III

22

76

1930

1931 . 157 . FRs , 1930 , passim ; tel . from Madras to H . Poll , 257 / / 1930 . Gopal , Irwin , pp . 140 - 4 . See speech of Rukmani Lakshmipathi ,

., G G . . p O O . . . -5

75

Apr

1

p

,

,

(Conf . )

24 26

between

Under - Secretary , Madras ,

to

, Public

SF

882

pp pp

.0.

. .

G

,

65

212

Notes to pages

, SF 754 , 15 Dec 1931 , pp . 8 a - b . Ibid . , pp . 8 f . TNA , G . O . 386 A , Public , 7 Mar 1932 . Figures for the number of people imprisoned for participation in the civil disobedience in Tamilnad vary from official to Congress sources , and , in view of the policy of dis persal employed in 1930 , are not in themselves an accurate guide to the number of participants in the agitation . Between March and October 1930 , 4 , 168 . people were convicted for civil disobedience offences in the Madras Presidency , according to government TNA

, LIV , 29 Jan 1931 , p . 533 . Of these less than half were in Tamilnad , where the highest figures were for Madura (368 ) , Coimbatore (287 ) , Tanjore ( 277 ) , Madras ( 148 ) , and Trichinopoly ( 143 ) . These Tamilnad figures were , however , overshadowed by the greater in tensity of the movement in the Andra delta districts – West Godavari (628 ) , Guntur ( 550 ) , and Kistna (339 ) with Malabar also conspicuous ( 339 ) . Congress estimates for the same period were over 2 , 000 for Tamilnad alone : AICCP , G - 189 / 177M , p . 2 . From the beginning of January 1932 until mid -March 1932 the number of con victions was 1 , 425 for the presidency : among the leaders were Malabar ( 175 ) , Madura ( 137 ) , Guntur : ( 147 ) , Tanjore ( 102 ) , Salem ( 91) , and West Godavari (90 ) : MLCP , LXI , , p 24 Mar 1932 . 1013 . For civil disobedience in the Kistna - Godavari delta districts , see Brian Stoddart , " Agitational Politics in the Tamil - and Telugu - speaking Regions of Madras Presidency , 1925 - 1935 " , PhD dissert ation , University of Western Australia , 1976 . TNA , G . O . 731 ( S - 12) , Public ( Conf . ) , 9 May 1932 , p . 14 . Ibid . , pp . 59 -61 . See , for example , the case of Forrester Paton , a Scottish missionary and victim of police zeal , in TNA ,

.

1932

Poll

Feb

.

21

.

,

p

's

Teachings

.

India

15

Young

,

,

"

Waste

?

a

it

.

Is

,

Rajagopalachari 1931

Gandhiji

Oct 1930 Nov 1919 "

7

, ,

12

,

Rajagopalachari Hindu Hindu

.

95 94 93 92

.

1932

II

1932

FR

July

/4 / 32 ,

91

SF 765 , 1 MLCP , Jan ,

18

90

,

89

; .

88

MLCP

H

sources :

,

86 87

. 139

Feb

85

135

Oct

213

Notes to pages

139 - 144

97

Rajagopalachari to Gandhi , 2 July 1931 , 33 / 30 / 31 , pp . 60 - 4 . Rajagopalachari , " The closing Chapter " ,

98

Hindu

,

Civil

.

Aug 1933

7

Disobedience ,

.

p

Chapter

136

.

.

p

,

-

SF

,

;

,

.

I

FR

,

.

,

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;

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,

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40 ( ,

pp

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.) ,

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.

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,

Madras 1961

.

. .

,

,

,

,

32

.

31

,

"

,

/

/

10

)

, 18

.

II

the Civil Gandhi Kalar Sankara Raja

Directory

1932

,

and

6

-

35

. A .

;

1931

father

C

May

)

(

Rajaji

my

17

,

Mail

.

pp

1970

,

tantai )

,

,

remarks en

's

Satyamurti

in

.

)

Madras

,

;

Almanack

1932

(

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India

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,

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pp

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of

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.

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Kamaraj

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-

1933

,

.

,

,

pp

.

309

F

(

,

wealthy Nadars

Madras and Southern

Rajaji Ayyamuthu Singarampalayam

(

Oct see Hindu

FR

18 7

,

/ 8 10 ; / H 33 . ,

pp

.

,

,

of

.

H

;

Poll

1932

Chockalingam

See

"

A

,

"

;

70

-

pp

.

,

)

,

. S .

. ;

11 15 (

- - )

10 14

T

,

1932

Diary Disobedience 151 Rajapalaiyam Disobedience Movement Rajapalaiyam Manram Interview with Rajapalaiyam Mar 1971 Apr 1930 Mail Apr 1930 Hindu

Civil

of

,

'

R

(

pp

. .

FR

July IIparticipation

July

9 9

11 10

32

/ 5 /

18

,

F

1903

Chidambara Bharati Maturai jizza tiyakkikal malar Madura District Freedom Fighters Commemoration Kamaraj Volume Madura 1948 69 Gandhite Kamaraj Madras 1955 Chockalingam pp Kamaraj Chockalingam Poll

the

12

.

28 14

, ,

28

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.

.

H

;

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K

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17

p

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,

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,

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6

,

22 12

D

. 0 .

,

6

Gandhite 7

5

174

Disobedience

-

4 5

.

,

India

Young

Apr Hindu Mar 21 June 1930 Hindu Oct 1930 Mail Jan 1931 TNA Apr 1931 683 Hindu Mar 1932 Poll Mar 1932 Bashyam and Muthuranga Mudaliar See speeches reported Hindu Oct 1930 Aug 1928 TNA 720 Public Conf 708 Apr 1937 Public Conf 104 193 , , , ,

1 2 3

Civil

pp

141

O

,

Coalescence

. Poll ,

H

.

16

37

99

1931 .

Dec

10

.

96

214

,

.

6

,

5

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,

,

;

1936

)

, ,

;

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,

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IV

. 1/

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RPP

,

to

[

,

Feb

Rajendra Prasad Papers hereafter RPP Rajagopalachari reel Gandhi

1936

:

,

in

in

,

.

( ed ).,.), ,

.

,

.

,

.

TNA

857

,

,

Dec 1933

1933

SF

Nov

,

28

,

27

.

,

22

,

2

,

;

59

.

p

. ,

,

,

.

1933

July

Apr 1933

;

II

FR

33 ,

/5 /

18

, .

.

Poll

30

.

H

,

1934

p

;

.

.

1933 1933

Apr

agrarian

see Stoddart

3

. .

.

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27 FR 7

, , 33 ,

ch

, -

esp

Aug

ibid to

,

10

,

. to

. Jan 1934 background For the

1933

Feb 1933

.

Oct

Apr

20

19

,

849

1932

38

.

,

GoI

1934

/ 9 /

18

,

17

16

SF

,

25

;

to

28

, p

,

20 in

,

, , , ,

SF

,

Dec

the Kistna Godavari delta

editorial editorial 30

.

H

Poll

Hindu

.

,

,

, 33

/

11

/

50

, 13 , 3

. ,

.

,

Feb

Gol

Agitational Politics

TNA

1933

.

,

.

H

, ,

. ,

Madras

859

Hindu Hindu Hindu

June

804

Dec 1933

editorial

Nov

Ch

.

20 Ch

Sec

TNA

Aug

Feb 1934 Sec Madras

"

Hindu

21 Feb 1934

Poll

Hindu Hindu

20

-

a

,

. . ."

by

"

as

.

8

,

20

.

C

M

in .

the Poona Pact

Hindu

SF

NNNN

25 24 23 22

30 29 28

ed

Low (

Oct 1932

July description of Gandhi protector and the saviour of the Depressed classes of India leading Tamil Adi Dravida and participant Rajah

politics

31

73 .

-

pp

. D.

,

"

Low

. A . 13

, . , 7

;

Hindu

113 movement

. Struggle

Indian

the

165

D

in

of '' 98 ,

/ ), 10 / pp

18

/ 11 23 / , 33 ;

50

the A

Phil

Feb 1933 Aug 1934

3

,

facets

:

1977

Harijan

the

Law

32 .

"

London

1972

,

,

-

,

,

and the

2

, ,

Civil Martial Raj

,

H

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)

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in

,

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political ramifications of Universifications of

47 (

. A .

D

For the see Congress

Jan Hindu See the

27

,

,

(B

A

ombay

Rajendra Prasad

District level Politicians University , dissertation of Sussex cation

1917

21

Kamaraj

"

A

"

-

13 ;

12

pp

:

. K . 16 17

.

,

,

,

;

V

6

9

, .

Study

large Contrast this situation Tamilnad and Presidency extent the Madras as whole with the Bengal internal conflict raging the 1930s Gallagher Congress Decline the United Provinces Brennan Political Change Rohilkhand Study of the Relationships between 1932 1952

Provincial

17

Gandhite

.

Rajagopalachari

,

,

Justice

1935

microfilm

Aug

11

16

Kamaraj

Narasimhan

Dec

Oct 1935

,

NAI

Kamaraj

for example

See 11

15 14

)

, ,

p

-

23

pp

1967

Hindu

- 148

145

Chockalingam

.

13

Notes to pages

215

Notes to pages •

32

H

.

Poll ,

149 - 153

3

(Allahabad

33 34 35

36 37

Hindu ,

39

2.

Hindu

July 1935 .

8

,

1934 1936

July

12

.

/

596

12

1930 - 1934

.d .) ,

Apr

17

: Indian National Congress , pp . 176 - 9 . 1933 .

34

.

; see also

Bashyam

1936

.

's

speech

24

Feb

Lord Erskine to Lord Zetland , Secretary 9 June 1935 , Erskine Papers [hereafter D

40

n

17 June 1935 . Rajagopalachari to Rajendra Prasad ,

IV / 38

,

Feb

17

Hindu , Hindu , 25 Nov Hindu ,

/6 /

1936

in

,

Hindu ,

RPP

,

of State , EP )

,

IOL ,

.

Rajagopalachari , Hindu , 12 July 1936 ; K . Santhanam , , 24 Aug 1936 ; Satyamurti , Hindu , 5 June 1933 ; Bashyam , Hindu , 25 Nov 1936 ; resolutions of the 38th

Hindu

41

42 43 44

45

46

47 48 49

50

Tamil Nadu Provincial Conference , Hindu , 8 Dec 1936 . For the intricacies of left - wing politics in India at this time , see John Patrick Haithcox , Communism and Policy , Nationalism in India : M . N . Roy and Comintern 1920 - 1939 (Princeton , 1971 ) , chs . 8 - 10 . Jawaharlal Nehru , India and the World (London , 1936 ) , pp . 62 - 3 . Indian National Congress , 1930 - 1934 , pp . 184 - 5 , 187 - 8 . Rajagopalachari , " Foreign Propaganda " , Young India , 1 Mar 1928 ; Rajagopalachari ' s attitudes to Jawaharlal Nehru are most fully revealed in the Rajendra Prasad Papers for 1935 - 37 . Rajagopalachari to Rajendra Prasad , 7 Feb 1936 , RPP , 1 / 1 ; Nehru ' s Lucknow address is reprinted in Dorothy Norman ( ed . ) , Nehru : The First Sixty Years ( London , 1965 , pp . 48 . 424 I Rajagopalachari to Rajendra Prasad , 7 June 1936 , RPP , IV / 5 ; Rajendra Prasad , Rajagopalachari , et al . , to Nehru , 29 June 1936 , in Nehru , old Letters , pp . 184 - 5 ; Brecher , Nehru , pp . 223 - 6 . Rajagopalachari , Chats , esp . pp . 28 - 9 . Hindu , 2 July 1934 . Satyamurti ' s view was very similar : Hindu , 29 May 1934 . Hindu , TNA ,

26

July

SF 849 , 20

1933 . Feb

Erskine to Zetland ,

1934 15

,

Mar

pp . 1936

21

,

- 34 ; Hindu , 13 Nov EP , D . 596 / 12 . '

1933

;

)

216

: Notes to pages 51

of

53 54 55

56 57

. S . Srinivasa Sastri reported in Hindu , 1934 , and his address to the Madras League , Hindu , 6 Jan 1936 .

See speeches 22 Mar , 4 , 7 Apr

Liberal

52

153 - 157

V

Hindu , 30 Dec 1935 . Hindu , 24 Mar 1932 , 26 Feb , 25 Mar 1935 . Hasan reported in Hindu , 17 Dec , 3 Aug , 28 Nov 1936 ; Hindu Weekly , 6 Dec 1936 ; McPherson , " Yakub Hasan " , pp . 81 - 2 . Hindu , 3 Aug , 20 Sept 1936 . Hindu , 16 Oct 1936 . K . I . McPherson , " The Social Background and Politics of the Muslims of Tamil Nad " , Indian Economic and Social History Review , VI , 4 (Dec 1969 ) , pp . 381 -402 ; Hindu , 11 Feb 1937 . The Congress - League agreement was an , India one but in some provinces it was barely observed . Hindu , 3 , 5 Aug , 21 Sept 1936 ; Justice , 14 Feb 1937 . Hakim ' s feud with the MPB leaders was an old one : " A Muslim '' , letter in Hindu , 12 Oct 1936 . Justice , 5 Aug , 21 Sept , 27 Nov 1936 ; Hindu Weekly , 15 Nov 1936 .

all

58

59 60

61

62

63 64 65 66

67

68

71

Hindu , 5 , 23 Nov , 8 Dec 1936 ; Justice , 7 Dec 1936 . R . N . Arogyaswami Mudaliar , Hindu , 16 Apr 1928 ; Rajagopalachari , Hindu , 20 Jan 1937 ; George Joseph , Hindu , 25 Jan 1937 ; Rajendra Prasad to Rajagopalachari , 8 May 1936 , RPP , IV / 3 . , Hindu 12 July 1936 . , Hindu 16 May , 9 June 1936 . Hindu , 16 Apr , 14 June 1935 . Hindu , 25 July , 26 Oct 1936 . Hindu , 13 July 1937 . For the later course of Vanniyar politics , see Lloyd I . and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph , " The Political Role of India ' s Caste Associations " , Pacific Affairs , XXXIII , 1 (Mar 1960 ) , pp . 5 - 22 . See the comments of Chittaranjan ( Telugu ; Rajahmundry ) , 20 Apr 1926 , NNR ; Goschen to Birkenhead , 19 Nov 1925 , GP , D . 595 / 2 . Goschen to 1930 . Hindu , 24 ,

Peel ,

3

Jan

1929

,

GP

Oct 1930 ; Nilkan (Coimbatore , 1960 ) ,

,

D

.

595

Perumal ,

/ 6 ; Mail ,

12 Mar

Bobbili : A Biography p . 43 . Hindu , 15 Nov 1930 . Perumal , Bobbili , pp . 43 - 53 ; Hindu , 10 Oct 1932 ; Stanley to Sir Samuel Hoare , Secretary of State , 23 Nov 1932 , Papers , IOL , E . 240 / 10 . Templewood 25

217

Notes to pages 72

73 74

76

Hindu , Hindu ,

1

,

3

Hindu ,

,

Nov

8

July

12

1933

1936

.

.

Mar 1930 , 15 Aug 1934 ; South India Chamber Commerce Golden Jubilee , 1910 - 1960 (Madras , 1961) , pp . 23 - 6 .

of

5

Hindu , 23 Jan 1937 . Rajendra Prasad , Autobiography ( Bombay , 1957 ) , pp . 360 - 1 ; P . D . Reeves , " Landlords and Party Politics in the United Provinces , 1934 - 7" , in Low ( ed . ) , Soundings , pp . 261 - 93 .

78 79

Justice , Justice , Hindu , 7

80

CID

77

157 - 164

9

,

, 23 , 1934 .

Nov

28

24

Dec

1936

.

31 Dec Jan , 30 Mar

report

the

on

, 1 Apr 1935 . Self - Respect League ,

22

June

1934

,

,

Nov

, SF 896 , 16 Oct 1934 , pp . 15 - 16 , 20 . Ibid . , p . 18 ; Ramanathan in Hindu , 1 Nov 1934 , 10 Apr 1935 ; Hindu , 1 July , 3 Aug , 2 Nov 1936 , 19 Jan 1937 . It is indicative of the breadth of Rajagopalachari ' s united front that he , as well as Bobbili , was angling for the Self - Respect League in September 1934 : Justice , 29 Sept 1934 . Hindu , 15 Nov 1935 , 23 Dec 1936 . C . Rajagopalachari , " The Congress Campaign " , Indian Review , Aug 1934 , pp . 511 - 12 ; Hindu , 13 , 15 Aug , 6 , 10 Sept 1934 . Hindu , 21 July , 15 , 29 Aug , 5 Oct 1934 . Diary of P . S . Kumaraswami Raja , Gandhi Kalai Manram , Rajapalaiyam ; Hindu , Aug , Sept , Oct 1934 . The quotation is from Hindu , 5 Sept 1934 . Interview with R . Krishnaswami Naidu , Srivilliputtur , 19 Mar 1971 . Hindu , 14 Nov 1934 ; Justice , 19 Nov 1934 . Erskine to Hoare , 23 Nov 1934 , EP , D . 596 / 12 ; H . Poll , 136 / 34 ; H . Poll , 18 / 12 / 34 , FRs Dec 1934 ; Hindu , 8 Dec 1934 ; Justice , 19 Nov 1934 . Hindu , 12 , 15 , 16 , 19 Nov 1934 . Baker , The Politics of South India , 1920 - 1937 , pp . 230 - 6 . TNA

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89 90

TNA , 1935

;

G

92 94

186

,

. O . 522 ,

L&M

,

L &M

,

17 6

Jan 1935

;

Feb

.

1937

6

.0 .

4603 ,

L &M

8

Russell , Local Self - Govt Dept , Madras , 29 Nov 1935 TNA , G . O . 4984 , L & M , 3 Dec 1935 , p . 15 . Hindu , 5 Jan 1937 ; TNA , G . Os 1 & 2 , LSG , 3 Jan 1937 . Tampoe

93

.0 .

G

Hindu , Hindu ,

to

8

T. B.

,

Jan

13 ,

15

1935 . May ,

9

July

1935

.

218

Notes to pages

July

1935

Oct

1935

.

; Hindu , 29 June , 11 July , 4 , 13 , 14 Nov 1935 H . Poll , 18 / 10 / 35 , FR I Oct 1935 . , Hindu 27 to 31 Oct 1936 . TNA , G . 0 . 17 , Public (Conf . ) , 14 Jan 1937 ; G . O . 271 , Home ( Conf . ) , 21 Jan 1937 ; Hindu , 16 , 20 , 21 , 23 Nov 2

;

.

Dec

3

.

1936

1937

Feb

,

,

927

Mar

,

,

16

12

, ,

.

.S .

A

,

to

.

,

L & M

. 0 . 19

June

1934

.

, ;

L & M

,

)

1126

,

/

.

1936

109

For

,

84

19

11

,

to

:

TNCC 2

dated

memo

to

.

,

estimated Dec

)

,

703

,

1936

656

Indian Allahabad

(

March

total

a

,

AICCP

:

–

November 1934

31

.

P

gave

( 62

,

36 "

figures -

,

AICCP

,

,

Oct 1935

earlier set of Office Report 1935

,

,

"

,

,

2

p

.

"

,

. ;

/ / C .

Hindu

TNCC

Dec 1929

R

- in

,

14

G

81

1922

B

,

/

18

22

;

-

,

,

36

000

175

)

,

18

G

-

,

14

(

AICC

The

000

)

,

in

,

'

"

,

of 30 ,

,

-

/

1

,

AICCP

,

;

( . 78

.

15

p

.

)

,

National Congress 1936

.

.

/

P

,

"

,

10

.

p

,

22

"

.

. ,

,

;

, "

:

and

for

1923

Bihar 805 and the United Provinces submitted higher provincial membership totals

Only

the

Annual Report claims

586

/

( i)

)

Kw

,

56

/

( i)

534 of 1935 655 TNCC

for

735

iii

1921

and

TNCC

an

in 15

,

,

to 30

,

,

1927 1927

Bhaktavatsalam

(

169

283

1921

early

Mar AICCP

gives

"

,

for gives

1923

500

of

18

,

/6 .

in

25

,

"

-

60

AICCP

AICC

2

1921

members

Apr

16

May

,

5

, .

.

Hindu

1929

112

Arnold

and

.

14

ch

Congress

see Arnold Gounders Nationalism and Regional Politics

the mid 1930s

P

.

districts

1921 000

111

14

RPP

illustration of the character of the

p

110

IV

, ,

,

1936

22

107

10 , 11 ,

,

,

et ;

,

of

's

108

Rajan views were also recorded Bhulabhai Desai Feb 1936 Appeal Sept Bhulabhai Desai Papers NML dated Bashyam 1936 from Rajan al AICCP 636 Aug 1936 Hindu Rajagopalachari Aug 1936 Aug Hindu Gandhi

106

in

; .

1932

G

, 19

636

S

-

Jan

8

,

Dec Aug 1936 Aug 1936

Kuppuswami 1936 AICC Secretary

.

26

Sept

June 86

( 27 .

P

, ,

L & M

. O , .

1

;

,

7

,

22

Aug

3044 1934

G

;

, , ,

15 29 19

Hindu Hindu the Diary

30

,

S

.0 .

105

Hindu

1936

Gopalakrishnier

2483

1934

Hindu

Jan Dec 1935

1935

AICCP

1936

104

15

Feb

6

,

Mar

24

28

,

Sept

TNA 8

103

3

,

Hindu

Aiyar and

. , V. ,

,

Nov

18

102

Sept

20

,

Justice 26

101

.

532

6

.0 .

G

LSG

,

,

LSG

,

TNA 1937

,

5248

.0 .

100

.0.

6

;

TNA ,

G

1936

99

,

97 98

10

Justice ,

6

96

,

Hindu

168

LSG

95

-

165

219

Notes to pages 113 114

115 116

117

169 - 173

Satyamurti , Hindu , Hindu Bose ,

,

4

15

May 1932 . May 1933 , SP

14

May

1935

.

Cf . Satyamurti

to Subhas Chandra

(Madras ) .

Hindu , editorial , 7 Apr 1933 ; A . Rangaswami Iyengar , Federal Constitution for India (Madras , 1933 ) .

Hindu , 16 Apr 1934 , 18 Nov 1935 , 17 Feb Government of India Act , 1935 : Proposals Majesty ' s Government for the Electorate

. of His

1936

for the Council State and for Provincial Legislative Councils (Cmd . 4998 ) ( London , 1935 ) , pp . 4 - 6 . For the numbers actually enfranchised for both Houses , see the Govt of Madras circular published in Hindu , 12 Jan 1937 . Government of India Act , 1935 , 25 & 26 Geo . 5 , ch . 42 , sixth schedule , pt . : Madras , in The Public General Acts ( London , 1935 ) , pp . 909 - 14 . Satyamurti , Hindu , 2 , 23 May 1936 ; reports of enrolment from Salem district and Madras city , Hindu , 9 , 11 June ,

of

118

119

II

1936 .

120 121 122

123 124 125

126

127

128 129 130 131

132

MLCP , 9 Mar

LXXXI , 1936

.

11 Mar

1936

,

22

-4,

37 - 42

; Justice , editorial ,

Hindu , 19 Nov 1935 ; MLCP , LXXXI , 11 Mar 1936 , 47 - 54 . Government of India Act , 1935 : Report of the Committee appointed in connection with the Delimitation of the Constituencies , I , Report (Cmd . 5099 ) ( London , 1936 ) , pp . 16 - 18 , 21. Justice , 20 , 24 Mar 1936 . Hindu , 3 Nov 1936 ; " Report of the - India Parliamentary

,

, AICCP ,

All

Committee " 15 Mar 1937 E - I ( a ) / 842 of 1936 - 37 . Hindu , 3 Nov 1936 , 18 Jan , 13 Feb 1937 ; Lord Erskine , " Madras and the new Constitution " , Asiatic Review , XXXVII , Jan 1941 , p . 21 . E . g . , Hindu , 16 Feb 1937 . Mail , 7 Jan 1937 . Hindu , 10 , 11 July , 28 Aug , 22 Oct 1936 , 9 Jan 1937 . Hindu , 16 , 28 Dec 1936 , 6 Jan 1937 . Hindu , 19 Jan 1937 ; Mail , 28 Jan 1937 . For a more detailed analysis of the candidates , see Arnold , " Nationalism and Regional Politics " , ch . 8 and

appendix 4 . For contrasting views of Nehru ' s tour , see Jawaharlal Nehru , The Discovery of India (reprinted , Bombay , 1966 ) , p . 68 , and TNA , SF 981 , 10 Jan 1937 . For Satyamurti ' s campaigning : Hindu , 19 Oct 1936 , 11 , 27 Jan , 15 , 16 Feb 1937 .

220

Notes to pages

. R . C . Westlake , District Magistrate , (Conf . ) , 8 Apr 1937 , p . 21 . Hardgrave , Nadars , 185 -6 ; Mail , 1 , 4 ,

TNA

A

Public Jan

,

19

708

, appendix

4

21 , 23

.

Chapter

.

/ 8 .

D

,

EP

D

,

596

596

.

Willingdon

,

.

,

/

EP

;

Erskine

8

Nov

notes

1935

.

,

8

/

, .

L & M

,

1935

to 12

June

6

,

.

4603

1936

,

15

,

596

D

. EP ,

, G

to .O

,

TNA

E

Mar

to

;

to

,

.

/ 8 / ; ; 8 .

D

.

D

"

2

,

EP 19

,

EP

,

12

,

,

EP

.

.

/

D

, ,

3

EP

,

,

9

,

to to

.

12

.

.

)

9

7

-

(S

1935

1935

.0 .

;

7

.

Apr

.

. ) ,

6

. Conf

467

.O .

G

Nov

,

TNA 1933

)

Police

1936

Public

12

/

.

,

May

,

; 9 .

474f

16

D

EP

,

. .pp

,

)

,

596

228

(

, ,

pp

6

,

(

10

31

6

Dec

565

1935

Services 600 Public (

letter

July

Jan 1937 Jan 1929

. 22 0 . ,

TNA

TNA

Home

,

3761

XLVI Public

,

E

Conf

,

MLCP

, ,

.g ( , , , ., , . )

SF

.

/

596

D

1937

,

981

Feb

EP

TNA

Ibid

,

to

Zetland

8

to

Erskine

,

15 14 13

/ 8 .

596

17 16

.

D

12 11

.

,

23

to

,

13

, , ,

Willingdon Willingdon Erskine Nov 1934 Erskine June 1935 596 Willingdon Willingdon Erskine Nov 1934 Aug 1935 Erskine 596 Low Civil Martial Lawl Erskine Zetland June 1935 596 Viceroy Erskine Lord Linlithgow Feb 1937 Zetland

18

.

.

.

6

,

.

to to

Aug 1935

. g .,

14

Zetland

Willingdon

Erskine

19

31

/

,

.

55

-

16

.

242

.

,

,

p

758

25

,

Hindu

)

,

25

, (

SF

,

-

1939

see

.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Cambridge esp 1972 Apr 1932 Feb 1935 to Willingdon June 1935

1900 TNA

Erskine Ibid Erskine Erskine

pp

,

in

For the underlying economic changes of this period Amiya Kumar Bagchi Private Investment India

25

, 33 /

.

.

,

Poll

H

in

Binny

of

the complaints

See

&

.

6

189

pp

-

,

175

Rapprochement

10

,

original returns are in TNA , G . O . 710 , Public (Elections ) , 9 Apr 1937 . The results are analyzed in wearisome detail in Arnold , " Nationalism and Regional

Politics"

1

,

. O.

The

.

135

16

G

1937 .

Co

134

,

F

133

173 - 178

221

Notes 20

to

pages

178

- 183

Stanley to Hoare , 28 Jan 1932 , Templewood Papers , Majoribanks , cited in Erskine to E . 240 / 10 ; Sir Norman Linlithgow , 6 Apr 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . The phrase

unthinking ryots " was used

by the Revenue Divisional , , Saidapet Officer E . Virabhadra Pillai , 22 Feb 1937 : , , TNA 6 . 0 . 710 Public ( Elections ) , 9 Apr 1937 , p . 88 . Government of India , Views of Local Governments on the "

21

Recommendations of the Indian Statutory Commission (New Delhi , 1930 ) , p . 8 . Hindu , 2 Dec 1935 ; TNA , 6 . 0 . 17 , Public ( Conf . ) , 14 Jan 1937 ; G . O . 271 , Home ( Conf . ) , 21 Jan 1937 . Hindu , 2 Dec 1935 ; Erskine to Linlithgow , 17 Apr 1936 , EP

23 24

25 26

27 28

29

30

32 33 34 35

38

,

D

. G

, SF

41

/ 8.

708 ,

754 ,

Public (Conf . ) , ,

15

p

.

14

8

.

8

Jan

Apr 1937

1937

,

pp .

20

-2.

.

Erskine to Zetland , 8 Feb 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 12 ; Erskine to Linľithgow , 26 Feb 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 3 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . AICC , Election Manifestu , issued 23 Aug 1936 , in Directory of the Madras Legislature , part II , pp . 1 - 6 . E . g . , Satyamurti to V . K . Krishna Menon , 11 Sept 1936 , .

Poll ,

51 / 11 /

36

; Rajagopalachari , Hindu , 12 July 1936 . 3 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . 7 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 .

Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , Linlithgow to Erskine , tel . , Ibid .

Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 9 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . Hindu , 16 to 19 Mar 1937 . Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 25 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . Ibid . ; Erskine to Zetland , 20 Apr 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 12 ; Erskine in Mail , 18 Sept 1942 . Linlithgow to Erskine , tel . , 26 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 ; Hindu , 27 Mar 1937 . Erskine to Linlithgow , 10 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 ; Report on " Anti - Constitution Day " in Madras by the Commissioner of Police , 2 . Apr 1937 , TNA , 6 . 0 . 835 , Public ( Conf . ) , 28 Apr

40

596

.O.

Dec 1931 Mail , 13 Jan 1937 ; Hindu , H . Poll , F. 7 / 11 / 34 . TNA

H

31

,

TNA

1937

,

p

.

2

.

Linlithgow to Erskine , 15 Mar 1937 ; Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 29 Mar 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 29 Mar 1937 ; Erskine to Linlithgow , 1 May 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 .

222

Notes to pages 42

43

44 45

46

47 48

51 52

53 54 55

183 - 189

Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 24 June 1937 ; Erskine to Linlithgow , 26 June 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 . For details , see John Glendevon , The Viceroy at Bay : Lord Linlithgow in India , 1936 - 1943 ( London , 1971 ) , pp . 62 - 7 . Erskine to Linlithgow , tel . , 8 July 1937 , EP , D . 596 / 8 .

Rajaji ,

pp . 125 - 6 ; Mail , 16 Jan 1937 . Relations between the Congress ministry and textile workers in Tamilnad are discussed in Murphy , " Labour Organisations in the Cotton Mills " , chs . 7 - 9 .

Felton ,

/ 1 / 38 , F . 7 / 1 / 39 . For the career of the Congress ministry , see R . Coupland , Indian Politics , 1936 - 1942 ( London , 1944 ) . Ibid . , pp . 112 , 133 , 176 ; Erskine , " Madras and the new Constitution " , pp . 15 - 16 ; Subba Rau , Limelight , pp . 100 - 8 . TNA , G . O . 98 , Public (Services ) , 19 Jan 1938 . , Francis G . Hutchins India ' s Revolution : Gandhi and the Quit India Movement (Cambridge , Mass . , 1973) , pp . 1 - 2 . House of Commons Dehates , 302 ( 1935 ) , col . 1824 . TNA , SF 930 , 17 Dec 1935 , p . 3 . Marquess of Zetland , " Essayez " : The Memoirs of Lawrence , Second Marquess of Zetland ( London , 1956 ) , p . 221 . H

. Poll ,

Ibid . ,

pp

F

.

.

6

219

,

221

.

223

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1

.

Private Papers (

a

)

(b )

Society , Madras . Library , India Office London ( IOL ) Erskine Papers , D . 596 ( EP )

Adyar

Archives , Theosophical

Goschen Papers , D . 595 Meston Papers , F . 136 Templewood Papers , E . 240

(GP )

Willingdon Papers ,

(c )

(d )

(e )

(f) ( g)

F . 93 (WP ) . S . Kumaraswami Raja Papers , Gandhi Kalai Manram , Rajapalaiyam , Ramnad , Tamilnad . National Archives of India , New Delhi (NAI ) Jayakar Papers M.R . Rajendra Prasad Papers (RPP ) Nehru Memorial Library , New Delhi (NML ) All - India Congress Committee Papers (AICCP ) Bhulabhai Desai Papers Papers S . Satyamurti (SP ) Tej Bahadur Sapru Papers (photostats in the possession of Professor D . A . Low , Canberra ) Papers , Madras ( in the possession S . Satyamurti of Mrs Lakshmi Krishnamurti ) (SP ) P

Government (a )

(b )

Archives

India Office Library , London : Madras Proceedings : Public and Revenue Depts . National Archives of India , New Delhi : Government of India , Home Dept . , Political Branch .

Tamil

(H .

Poll )

Archives , Madras

( TNA ) Development , Finance , Home , Local & Municipal ( L & M ) Local Self - Government ( LSG ) , Public , Public Works & Labour , and Revenue Depts . Under -Secretary ' s Secret Files (SF ) Nadu

Fortnightly Situation

Reports (FR )

on

the

Internal Political

224

3.

Official Publications Census of India , 1921 :

Madras , XIII , parts Press , 1922) . , 1931 : Madras , XIV , parts Census of India

1

&

2

(Madras : Government

1

&

2

(Madras : Government Press , 1932 ) . Government of India , East India Constitutional Reforms : Return showing the Results of the Elections in India , 1937 (New Delhi : Government Press , 1937 ) . Government of India , Reports on the Working of the Reformed Constitution , 1927 ( Calcutta : Government

Press ,

1928 )

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; resigned from groundnut Congress business in 1919 to become activist . Partici pated in civil disobedience and local satyagrahas , 1923 - 32 ; imprisoned at least four times . Vice - President North Arcot DCC , 1934 , MLA (Congress ) , Tiruvannamalai General

ANNAMALAI

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BASHYAM

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.

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13th Raja of Bobbili ; b . 1901 ; Kamma Naidu ; zamindar . MLC ( Justice ) , Vizagapatam , 1930 - 37 . Chief Minister and Minister for Local Self -Government , 1932 -

BOBBILI .

37

.

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1932

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MUTHURANGA MUDALIAR

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dt . ;

,

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26

.

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,

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.L.

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B

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ed

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of

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s

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1927

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RAMASWAMI

Dravida

Kazhagam

E

.

V

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colleges , Madras .

, S. 1887 - 1943 ; Tamil Brahmin ; ed . Christian and colleges , Madras , B . A . , B . L . High Court vakil , Madras . Madras PCC Secretary , 1919 - 21 ; TNCC Secretary 1926 , 1936 , Vice - President , 1932 - 35 , President , 1935 - 36 . Secretary , Tamil Nadu Swarajya Party , 1923 - 24 . Councillor ,

SATYAMURTI Law

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SHANMUGHAM

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Arcot , 1923 - 34 ; Congress Chief Whip in LA , Deputy 1926 - 29 . President , LA , 1931 ; President , 1933 - 34 . Dewan , Cochin , 1935 - 41 . Central Finance Minister , 1947 - 48 . Salem - North

236

, S. 1874 - 1941 ; Tamil Brahmin ; ed . colleges Presidency High Court , and B. A . , B . L . , , ; vakil Madras Advocate -General 1916 - 20 . MLC Madras DCC President , ( Independent ) , University , 1920 - 21 . 1923 - 26 ; TNCC President , 1925 - 29 ; President , Indian Congress , National 1926 - 27 . MLA Central (Congress ) , Madras City , 1926 - 30 ; deputy leader of the Congress Party

SRINIVASA Madura

in

IYENGAR

LA .

SRINIVASA SASTRI , V . S . 1869 - 1946 ; Tamil Brahmin ; ed . College Kumbakonam . Headmaster , Triplicane High School . joined Servants of India Society ; President 1915 f . 1906 Imperial Legislative Council , MLC (nominated ) , 1913 - 16 ; , 1916 - 20 ; Member Council of State , 1920 - 24 . Governor Agent , General ' s South Africa 1927 - 28 . Round Table Conferences , 1930 - 31 . MLC ( nominated ) 1937 . STANLEY ,

G

.F.

1872

- 1938 ;

Financial Secretary ,

6th

son

Office ,

of

16th

Earl of

Derby .

1921 - 22 . MP (Conservative ) Preston , 1910 - 22 , Willesden East , 1924 - 29 . Parliamentary Parliamentary Under - Secretary , Home Office , 1922 - 23 ; Ministry Secretary , of Pensions , 1924 - 29 . Governor of Madras , 1929 - 34 . War

, N . M . R . b . 1905 ; Saurashtra ; ed . High School ; Imprisoned 1930 , businessman . TNCC Treasurer , 1930 - 36 . 1932 . Chairman , Madura Municipal Council , 1935 - 42 . MLA (Congress ) Madura General Urban , 1937 .

SUBBARAMAN

SUBBARAYAN , P . Kumaramangalam Wadham

1889 - 1962 ;

,

Gounder ;

Zamindar

of

. Presidency College , Madras , College , Oxford , Trinity College , Dublin , M . A . , Salem

dt . ;

ed

High Court Advocate , Madras , 1918 f . MLC LL . D . ( Independent and Nationalist ) , South Central Landholders , 1920 - 37 ; Council Secretary , 1921 - 22 ; Chief Minister and Minister for Local Self - Government , 1926 - 30 . Leader of the United Nationalists , 1930 - 37 . MLA (Congress ) ,

Tiruchengodu General Rural , Affairs , 1937 - 39 .

and Legal

Indonesia ,

Ambassador to Lok Sabha , 1957 -62 .

1937

;

Home

1949 - 51 ;

Minister Minister Rajya

for Education

1947 - 48

Sabha

,

;

1954

- 57 ;

Balija Naidu . One of NAIDU , P . 1887 - 1957 ; the founders of the Madras Presidency Association , 1917 ; Editor , Tamil Nadu , 1920 f . ; imprisoned 1918 , 1922 , 1923 . TNCC Vice - President , 1922 -23 ; President , 1924 - 25 . Left Congress 1930 . General Secretary , Hindu Maha Sabha , 1940 ; Vice - President , 1942 - 44 .

VARADARAJULU

237

Telugu Vysia ; VENKATACHE LAM CHETTI , S . 1887 - 1958 ; , ; Pachaiyappa businessman Madras ed . ' s College , Madras . President , Madras Corporation , 1925 - 26 . MLC (National Congress ) , Madras City Non - Muhammadan Urban , 1923 - 34 ; MLA Central (Congress ) , Indian Commerce , 1934 .

, C. 1852 - 1944 ; Tamil Brahmin ; lawyer ; College , ed Madras . MLC , 1895 - 1901 ; Imperial Legislative Council , 1913 - 16 . President , Indian National Congress , 1920 .

VIJAYARAGHAVACHARI

. Presidency

- 1941 ; 1st Baron of Ratton , 1910 ; 1st 1st Earl and Marquis , 1936 . ADC to Governor of Victoria , 1895 . MP ( Liberal ) , Hastings , 1900 - 06 , Bodmin , 1906 - 10 . Junior Lord of the Treasury , , 1913 - 19 ; Governor of Bombay 1905 - 12 . Governor of , Madras 1919 - 24 . Governor -General of Canada , 1926 - 31 ; Viceroy of India , 1931 - 36 .

WILLINGDON .

Viscount ,

1866

1924 ;

238

GLOSSARY

or non - killing

ahimsa

doctrine of

ashram

spiritual retreat , training centre

charka

spinning wheel

hartal

closing of

inamdar

a

karnam

khaddar khadi

kist lathi

non - violence

shops

offices

and

as

a

mark

protest or sorrow villager with hereditary rights in

plot of land village accountant

a

of small

hand - spun , hand -woven cloth

instalment

of revenue

iron -bound bamboo especially by police

heavy

stick used as

weapon

,

panchayat

religious teacher villager with hereditary land rights a leading rural localities village council or court , body of arbitrators

ryot

peasant

sabha

association

satyagraha

passive resistance , especially as advocated Gandhi

sowars

mounted

swadeshi

production

Swaraj

self - government

, independence

taluk

administrative

area

vakil

agent , representative , lawyer

maulvi mirasdar

mofussil

Muslim

troops

of

home -manufactured

of foreign goods

within

a

,

and boycott

district

by

239

INDEX

Acharya ,

M

.K . ,

113 , 115 , Bashyam , K .

83

Adi - Dravidas ,

70 , 163 , 115 , 119 ; satya

Ahmedabad ,

Ali ,

Muhammad

85

commit Commit tee : 33 , 73 , 80 , 82 , 103 , 106 , 112 , 149 , 160 , 182 , ; 188 Madras delegates to , , 45 48 - 9 ; membership of ,

opposes 108

47

All - India Spinnners ' Associ ation , 86 , 143 Anamalai Hills , 12 Andhra , 147 , 156 - 8 , 177 , 184 - 5 ; Congress in , 52 , 67 , 75 ; movement , 47 Andrews , Rev . C . F . , 69

Pillai ,

N

.,

Ansari , M . A . , 80 Arcot , Prince of , 40 Arogyaswami Mudaliar , 126 , 132 ; Minister , 108 - 9

Arundale , George , Ashe ,

R . W. ,

Backward

Classes

.N . ,

,

of ,

Bombay

,

,

30 - 1 ,

176 10

,

. 119

52 ,

73 ,

161

153

86

;

142

,

161 ,

155

,

157 ,

in

,

75

, Subhas Chandra ,

Sir

111

Geoffrey , , 179 , 188 ; on re

- 13 ,

135

24

and Justice Party , 156 - 9 Bardoli , 75 , 79 ; satyagraha ,

-5 ;

as

37 - 40 , 84 , 149 ; as Moderates , Liberals , 21 , 153 ; as Swarajists , 78 , 91- 2 , 97 , 101 ; elitism of , 15 , 17 - 18 ; landholders , 12 , 15

168

.,

; Congress

Gandhians ,

187

League

Raja

163 - 7 ,

Nationalists ,

23 , 68

Baker , Dr C . J . , 66 Bankers , and Congress ,

Bobbili ,

M

Bihar , 47 , 158 ; elections 1937 , 171 - 2 Birkenhead , Lord , 100 , 107 - 8

137

Atur , 67 Aurobindo Ghose , 27 Avanashilingam Chetti , T . S . ,

Bajaj , Jamnalal ,

,

pression , 117 , 175 Brahmins , Tamil , 55 , 156 , 162 , 172 ; and professions , 15 - 16 , 18 - 19 , 60 ; as Extremists ,

26

Attlee , Clement ,

,

Simon Commission

Bracken ,

143

103

, 149

relations with Gandhi ,

;

23 - 4 Bhaktavatsalam 164 , 167

Bose

R

145

Besant , Annie , 27 , 71 ; and Home Rule movement , 22 - 3 ;

...41 , 02 : Congress All - India Comece

Annamalai

142 ,

76

161

Shaukat ,

and

122

Bengal , 13 , 62 ; Congress in , 44 , 52 , 90 , 101 ; agitation against partition of, 25 - 6 ,

graha , 20 , 69

Aiyar , V . V . S . , 27 , 51 , Alagiriswami Naidu , G . ,

,

,

18

,

98

,

147 ;

pre

in Congress ,

dominance 17 , 49 , 106 ;

priests ,

96

; reaction

to

96

- 7,

5 15

, ,

Justice Party , 20 , 39 , 78 , 90 - 2 , 104 ; support for Congress , 119

,

122

-

3

240

Brahmins , Telugu ,

16

Brahmin - non - Brahmin conflict , 13 , 18 - 20 , 39 , 115 , 166 - 7 ; Birkenhead on , 100 ; Goschen and , 99 - 100 ; in Congress , 84 - 5 , 106 , 141 ; Willingdon on , 57 British Indian Association , 14 Buckingham and Carnatic Mills , 68 - 70 , 129 Businessmen 36 - 7 , 41 , and 173

,

Congress , , 160 - 1 , 189 ; Party , 55 , 156 ,

and 158

Justice

Bureaucracy , 1 , 3 , 13 see also Government

Indian

Civil

Calcutta ,

Calicut ,

10

,

,

Cauvery

128

30

,

74

,

Chakkarai

9

,

130

12

,

15

,

Chetti ,

19 , 65

119 V

,

.,

Champaran satyagraha ,

Chauri Chaura

,

, 63 ; servants , 16

Service

, 71 Caste associations , 86

,

122

,

-3

106 20

76

Chelmsford , Lord , 22 , 64 Chettinad , Raja of , 157 ,

161 ,

165

Chettis ,

172 ; see also Devanga Nattukkottai Chettis Chidambaram Pillai , v . o . c . , 26 Chingleput , 14 , 101 Chittoor district board , 92 Choolai mills , 124 - 5 , 129 Christians , Indian : join Con gress , 155 ; links with

and

anti - liquor

Coimbatore :

agitation ,

65

, 67 , 74 ; civ in , 127 ;

il disobedience boycott

propaganda council in , 53 ; district board , 92 ;

MLCs ,

in ,

93 ;

municipal council ,

textile mills ,

Commons , House 99 - 100 , 179 Communal

93

92

;

158 95

-6 ,

legislation , 60 ,

91

,

Communism 184 , 189

of ,

, 58

117 , 159 ,

,

180 ,

Congress

activists : compo sition of , 40 , 143 ; electioneering , 173 ; 184 ;

in

Congress

144

,

161 ,

ministry ,

participate in agi tations , 84 , 124 , 128 , 142 ; role in party organization ,

49 , also

- 5 , 164 , 168 ; see Kamaraj - Annamalai

144

Pillai

group

, satyagrahis ,

volunteers Congress Civic Board , 164 - 7 Congress ministry , 1937 - 9 , 183 -

5

,

188

Congress Parliamentary Board , 149 , 160 , 172 Congress Party , Madras Legis lature : 1926 - 30 , 100 - 12 , 115 - 16 ; 1937 - 9 , 174 , 180 Congress Socialist Party , 151

Congress Working Committee , 47 - 9 , 72 , 79 , 105 - 6 , 112 , 115 , 136 , 141 , 151 , 182 - 3 , Party , , , Justice 19 122 132 188 ; provides funds , 50 , 80 position , ; 155 173 - 4 in Constitutionalism : as a Madras legislature , 153 , 170 British policy , 6 - 7 , 61 - 2 , , , , , Civil disobedience 4 - 6 34 36 99 - 100 , 133 , 179 ; as a , , , , , , 45 - 6 60 98 100 112 150 nationalist strategy , 21 - 2 , , , , ; ; 182 186 1921 - 2 73 - 6 78 - 9 26 - 7 , 35 - 6 , 38 , 81 , 89 - 90 , , , , , , , , 1930 - 34 114 - 39 141 - 9 160 - 1 95 - 6 142 150 - 2 184 164 - 5 , 175 , 179 ; Enquiry adopted , Council boycott : Committee , 1920 , 80 , 82 , 90 . 43 - 5 ; debated , 34 - 6 ;

241

effect of , 53 - 5 , 62 ;

renewed , 131 ,

1930

,

115

- 16

,

Ellappa Chetti ,

118 ,

Erode ,

Council entry issue : 1920 , 35 - 6 , 39 , 43 - 5 ; 1922 - 4 , 62 , 79 , 80 - 3 ; 1933 - 5 , 148 - 50 , Crescent 14 Criminal Tribes Act , 155 Cunningham , C . B . , 125 - 6 Currie , V . A . , 136 - 7

179 - 80 ,

district

-9

Dravida Munnetra Dwarkadas ,

73

112

Party attacks , nature

of ,

system

under ,

22

127

, 163

Kazhagam ,

Jamnadas ,

Dyarchy , 61 ,

,

board

,

,

24

132 104

57

,

;

,

188

Justice

106

178

;

-7;

successful working of , 81 , 96 , 99 , 108 - 9 , 111 , 179 ; Swarajists propose to wreck , 78 , 89 , 94 , 105 ; voting 155 ,

169 - 71 ;

Willingdon on , 58 - 9 Dyer , Brigadier -General , East India Company , Education , western , 130 "

Egmore

Clique " ,

25

14

13

36

,

Ganesan

,

34

s

,

.,

124

Gandhi , M . K . , 39 , 49 , 51 , 63 , 69 - 70 , 82 , 85 , 146 , 151 - 2 ; accommodates Swarajists , 83 ; and Hindu -Muslim unity , 24 , 33 , 72 , 79 ; and Row latt satyagraha , 20 - 4 , 28 - 1 , 34 ; assessment of his tactics , 3 - 5 , 76 - 7 , 186 - 7 ; at Amritsar Con gress , 32 ; Calcutta Con gress , 43 ; attends Round Table Conference , 136 , 139 ;

calls off civil disobedi

ence , 1922 , 75 - 6 ; com promise with Nationalists , 45 , 81 ; dithers over Round Table proposal , 74 ; Harijan campaign of , 146 ; in South

Africa , 20 - 1 , 38 ; insists on constitutional guarantee , 181 - 2 ; leads salt saty

30

- 15 - 19 ,

Forest

36 , 43 , laws 67 , 123

24 - 5

Depression : effect on agri culture , 122 , 130 , 147 ; impact on civil disobedi ence , 127 - 8 , 129 - 31 , 175 Dharmapuri

5

Farouki , Abdul Lateef , 154 Foreign goods , boycott of ,

Davidson ,

66

184 -

Extremists , see Nationalists

Party , 80 ; proposes comp promise with No - Changers , 82 ; strategy of , 89 - 90

Desabhaktan , 51 , 68 , Devanga Chettis , 19 ,

66

Europeans , 12 , 16 - 18 , 99 , 170 ; hostility to Congress , 69 , 125 - 6 , 175 ; opposition to communism , 180 , 184 ; reconciled to Congress ,

Das , C . R . , 32 , 101 , 111 ; compromises over non cooperation , 44 - 5 , 81 ; favours Round Table Confer ence , 74 ; founds Swarajya

186

.,

Erskine , attitude to Congress 176 - 8 , 180 - 3 , 185 ; disappointed by Justice Party , 176 - 8

142

Sir Lionel , 64 Decolonization , 1 - 3 , 7 ,

12

S

, 71 Lord , 150 ;

,

121 ; negative council entry , 149 - 50 ; promises swaraj in one year , 34 , 64 , 73 ;

agraha ,

attitude

115

to

,

242

proposes and directs non cooperation , 32 - 5 , 40 , 46 , 53 , 61 , 76 - 7 ; reorganizes Congress , 46 - 8 , 52 ; returns to Congress leadership , 112 - 14

;

visits

,

21 66

Presidency , 38

,

40

43

,

, ,

Madras 28

72

-9,

,

34

128

146 , 182 Gandhi - Irwin Pact , 133 - 6 , 139 , 175 Gandhians , 6 , 36 , 42 - 5 , 48 - 51 , 53 , 62 , 66 , 85 ,

129 ,

Giri ,

,

-5 ,

87

,

. V . , 184 Gokhale , G . K . 20 - 1 , 24 Gopalakrishnayya , Duggirala , 52 Gordon , Dr R . , 80 Goschen , Lord , 95 , 157 ; nego

tiates with Congress , . 102 - 3 ; relations with Justice Party , 99 - 100 , 106

ence ,

to 116

135 - 6

,

civil 120

disobedi

- 1 , 133 ,

of India Act ,

,

139

180 - 1 ,

,

148

185 , ate under , 178 , 189

Government 29 , 59 ,

,

150 187

146

,

,

-8 ;

160

164

1919 ,

of Madras ,

,

elector ,

169 - 70 ,

13 ,

23 ,

146 - 7 , 170 - 1 , 178 and labour unrest , 69 - 70 ;

and

liquor agitation ,

86

134

,

67 , ; policy -5 towards

non - cooperation

, 63 - 7 ,

servants , 16 , , 103 , 130 ;

71 ,

18

,

86

to oppose non

cooperation and civil disobedience , 63 , 132 ; Congress asks to resign , 34 , 36 , 46 ; reduction of salaries proposed , 94 , 151 , 159 ; warning to , 185 Govindaraghava Aiyar , L . A . , 28 , 55 Gudiyatam , 127

Gujaratis , 127 - 8 Guntur ,

21

,

29

64

Hakim 174

,

124 ,

75 - 6

C

Hammond

154

, Abdul , 83 ,

Committee ,

Harijans ,

,

Muhammad

. Abdul , 41 ,

Khan

Hameed

,

154

,

170 -

170 -

Harijan movement ,

2

,

146

, 154

1

185

-8 ,

160

Government 6 , 19 , 68 , 95 , 107 ; see also Dyarchy Government of India Act , 1935 , 6

,

Habibullah , Sir

Independ

ent ministry , 107 - 10 Gounders , 65 - 6 , 93 , 101 Government of India , 32 , 147 ; policy to non - cooperation , 63 - 4 , 71 , 73 - 4 , 117 ;

policy

71 - 2

Government expected

V

supports

policy towards disobedience , 116 - 18 , 120 - 1 , 124 - 6 , 132 - 7 , 139 , 175 ; reaction to Malabar Rebellion ,

25

143

- 7;

73 - 5 , 117 ;

civil

Hartals , 29 - 30 , 49 , 73 - 5 , 124 , Harvey

130

' s mills ,

68 ,

129

; in Khilafat movement , 41 - 2 , 49 , 62 , 71 - 3 ; Minister ,

Hasan

, Yakub ,

154

184

Hindu : founded ,

16

; manage

ment and editorship of , 25 - 6 , 51 , 141 ; on council

entry ,

Independ 108 , 110 ; , 59 ; on Party on Justice cooperation and civil non disobedience , 44 , 70 , 73 , 148

;

on

ent ministry ,

243

- 6 , 120 , 122 Hindu Maha Sabha , 129 Hindu -Muslim conflict ,

Industrialists

75

130

, 153 ,

166 -

30 16

,

7

Hindu : reaction to mission aries , 13 - 14 ; revivalism , 24 - 6

,

30

Hindu Religious Endowments Act , 96 - 7 , 119 Home Rule movement , 22 - 4 , 27 - 9 , 39 , 53 , 66 ; and

labour , 68 -

Hunter Report Inamdars

,

12

,

9

,

32 15

,

-3 , 169

, and Congress , ; , and Justice 129 158 Party , 157 - 8 Interim ministry , 183 4,

35

Independent Ministry , 103 - 5 , , 182 , , , 150 131 128 107 - 10 : anti Indian Civil Service , , Brahminism of 57 60 ; attitudes to Congress , 5 , 95 , 117 - 18 , 121 , 16 , 71 , , 175 , 178 - 9 , 188 ; 134 - 5 attitudes to Justice Party , 60 , 100 ; influence on Governors , 63 - 4 , 131 Indian National Congress : annual sessions , Bombay , 1885 , 17 ; Surat , 1907 , 27 , 37 , 44 ; Calcutta , 1917 , 23 ; Amritsar , 1919 , 32 , 42 , 82 ; Nagpur , 1920 , 45 - 8 , 50 - 1 , 78 ; Ahmedabad , 1921 , 72 ; Gaya , 1922 , 80 , 82 - 3 ; Cocanada , 1923 , 84 ; Belgaum , 1924 , 83 ; Cawnpore , 1925 , 101 ; Gauhati , 1926 , 103- 4 ; Madras , 1927 , 108 , 113 ; Calcutta , 1928 , 113 - 14 ; Lahore , 1929 , 112 , 114 , 116 , 118 ; Karachi , 1931 , 152 ; Lucknow , 1936 , 151 ; special sessions , Calcutta , 1920 , 43 - 6 , 50 - 1 , 53 , 78 , 103 , 114 ; Delhi , 1923 , 82 - 4 Indian Review , 21

Irschick , Dr

E

. F . , 55 ,

106

Irwin , Lord , 114 - 16 , 133 Islamia College , 52 , 62

Jallianwala

Bagh

64

Jamal

Muhammad

,

30 ,

, 41 ,

James , F . E . , 180 Jayakar , M . R . , 83 ,

Jeevanandam ,

Journalism ,

P 16

,

Justice ,

51 ,

74

154

133 159

. ,

Newspapers

32 ,

26

,

Justice ministry ,

;

also

see

104 , 108 1920 - 23 ,

- 7 , 59 - 60 , 62 ; 1923 - 6 , 88 , 94 , 100 , 103 ; 1930 - 7 , 131 - 2 , 152 - 3 , 157 Justice Party , 20 , 39 , 65 , 56

78

,

133 ,

90

,

146

94

,

,

96

150

,

-

7

, 99 -

168 - 70

100

,

,

172 , 180 , 187 , 189 ; attempts to revitalize , 158 - 60 , 179 ; collaboration with the Raj , 5 , 61 , 63 , 132 , 176 , 179 ; 57 , 91 , 99 , composition of , 141 , 153 , 156 - 8 ; decline of , 6 , . 162 - 3 , 176 - 7 ; in 1920 , elections , 54 - 5 ; 1923 , 87 - 8 ; 1926 , 102 ; 1934 , 160 - 2 ; 1937 , 154 - 5 , 158 , 173 - 4 ; founded , 19 ; in Opposition , 104 - 12 ; opened to Brahmins , 162 ; see also Non - Brahmins

Kaikolans , 127 Kaira satyagraha ,

Kallars , 61 ,

20

-63

, 121 - 3 Mudaliar ,

119

Kalyanasundara anti - Brahminism T . V . , 51 ,

,

;

4

;

, ,

in

-

,

,

in

;

,

,

-8

90

,

,

,

;

,

, ,

:

; - ; 6 ,

4

,

,

,

;

56

of ,

,

111

, ,

;

8

;

97

109

87

,

, 4

-

no

confidence

,

Madras

,

,

,

99

105

,

in

94

-

;

-

;

, ;

, -

7

100

as

58

, ,

, ,

74 5

a

;

16

,

-

,

Lord

,

Linlithgow Literacy

114

, ,

183 180

franchise

,

,

153

54

,

Congress

,

24

,

Liberals

174

91 ;

-

,

169

,

house

)

upper

70

Legislative Council

,

.

,

,

,

-

disobedience elections

10

107

9

14

158

fran

70

-

8

-

elect

Madras

1923

-6

131

170

,

,

7

,

,

,

, of ,

172

,

,

,

137

53

1930

Madras

154

169

civil

1926

and 138

, 40

;

36

, -

40

,

;

,

3

-

176

composition

96

, , ,

42

,

,

58

55

, ,

34

, ,

25 18

84

,

,

2

-

44

170

152

164

-

89

, ,

123

, as

, : 97

,

. M . , 16

,

,

87

,

173

Assembly

132

,

,

161

Central elections 1934

Legislative Council during

and

127

Assembly

1937

-

,

6

75

,

68

.R .,

C

,

,

;

,

,

, W

, ,

,

119

111

160

5 ;

,

;

,

,

,

., 121

136

Lakshmivaraha Iyengar

15

,

;

,

,

,

,

,

,

, ,

. D . T . ,

M

.,

Rukmani

,

,

Chetti

,

Lakshmanarasu

179

178

G

-

,

70

British

113

Lakshmipathi

S

, ,

-

185

,

Lajpat Rai

65

14

;

155

Labour Party

,

landless

169

124

electorate

101

systems

-

,

49

Legislative

motions

and

116

68

,

, ;

184

,

,

65

,

in 29 ,

,

,

,

68

51

1920

157

119

urban

Congress 129

46

,

2

-

,

21

. ,

V

144

122

183

of Youth

League

73

, P . s .,

,

Labour

83

50

126

Kumaraswami Reddi Kumbakonam

Congress

ions

40

.V .,

,

164

loyal

117

151

chise for

Kumaraswami Raja

161

158

issue

composition

159

,

161

,

172

Lawyers

160

Kumaraswami Mudaliar 166

,

,

,

,

a

,

25

,

86980 40

,

,

-

,

161

,

Kudi Arasu

Langley

149

8

97

,

R

, G

,

Krupanidhi

130 147 12 13

Legislative

132

109

133

agitation

political

54

,

55

, ;

-

. M , . , ,

Sir Arthur

Knapp

revenue Tanjore

168

154

Krishnan Nair Krishnaswami Krishnaswami Aiyar

123

,

82

,

4

-

-

4

,

,

79 33

, 52

,

,

49

93

Muslims 63

153

130

3

, , 3 , , 83 40 , 3 83 , ,

movement

87

S

. ,

,

-c

;

30

, ,

,

70

66

,

34

, ,

128

71

70 36

-.

3043 4

-

,

28

satyagrahapateko council boycott Khadi

Khilafat

4

,

5

,

,

ooperation Rowlatt supports 43

in

;

-

4

35

part

86

1 to ;

councils

opposes non

119

187

Land

, ,

,

50

,

37

5

-

Iyengar favours eventual

kanga

43

164

161

DCC

return 91 , ;

149

,

143

Congress

and

and Justice 189 Party 155 173 as ists 132 156 178 103 170 electorate

-

K

,

, -

Kasturi

123

119

166

Pillai

Kamaraj Annamalai

Karaikudi

29

. , ,

,

,

68

70

;

6

-

,

,

184

group

,

96

,

85

in

161

landlords

176

,

Landholders 71 147

involvement labour Ramjee Kalyanjee Kamaraj Nadar 143

(

of ,

244

245

Local board : elections , 1934 - 7 , 163 - 7 , 176 ; patronage , 59 , 87 , 92 - 3 , 123 ,

105 ,

163 ,

Lucknow Pact , 40 -

166 1

stronghold , 48 - 9 , 87 , 119 , 124 ; civil diso bedience and , 119 , 124 - 7 , 142 ; DCC , 17 ; Corporation , 125 - 6 , 163 , 165 ; disturb ances , 1921 , 70 - 1 ; rivalry with mofussil , 12 , 26 , 39 - 40 ; textile mills in , ,

68 - 9 ,

124 ,

129

Act , 157 , Madras Labour Union 68 - 70

Madras Estates

Land

Landholders '

Madras

tion ,

Associa

176

Madras Mahajana Sabha , 17 , 125 , 170 Madras Mail , 51 , 118 , 179 Madras Native Association , 14

Madras provincial Congress Committee , 17 , 23 , 47 , 72 ; 24

,

contest to control , 27 - 30 , 44 - 5 ; dis non - cooperation

cusses 35 , 43

,

University , 14 ; constituency , 170 , 180 ,

Madras 184

Madura

,

gress

9

,

12

- 13 , 29 ; Con

activity

in

, 52 ,

84 , 119 , 128 - 9 ; elections , 1920 , 55 ; 1923 , 88 ; municipal council ,

65 , 72 ,

155 ,

174

Mappillas , Maravars ,

71 -

128 - 9 , 165 ; sword saty agraha , 143 ; textile mills in , 68 , 129 Malabar , 9 - 10 , 184 ; rebellion , 68 , 71 - 3 ; Special Police , 126

2

,

M

.A . ,

74

161

Marwaris , 21 , "'Mass party " ,

Madras city , 9 - 10 ; as a Nationalist - Swarajist

10

Mannargudi , 98 , 119 Mannickavelu Naicker ,

53 , 141 ,

124

Mayavaram ,

,

2

168

,

5

,

46

-8 ,

186

98

Merchants , traders ,

13 - 14 , , 169 , 178 ; and Con gress , 17 - 18 , 29 - 30 , 41 - 2 , 52 , 66 - 7 , 119 , 127 , 130 , 157

160

,

168 ,

189

Meston award , 20 , 55 Mian Rowther , Kaja , 42 Middle classes and national ism , 2 , 4 - 5 , 46 , 76 , 133 , 189 ; see also , Lawyers ,

Merchants

Mirasdars , 12 , 15 ; gress , 18 , 97 - 9 , 121 -

3

,

130

Moderates , 138

20

,

24

; character

40 ; see

Moir ,

, 147

T

and 119

-9 ,

,

46

Con

,

of , 21 - 2 ,

also Liberals

. E . , 67

, E . S . , 22 , 57 - 8 ; declaration , 22 ; his long term policy , 61 - 2 , 100 ,

Montagu

177

Montagu - Chelmsford report , 22 - 3 ; reforms , 23 , 28 ; see also Dyarchy , Govern

ment of India Act , 1919 Moosa Sait , 41 , 88

Morley -Minto reforms ,

61

Muniswami

Naidu ,

B

19

, 21 ,

. : Leader

of the Justice Party , 111 , 157 ; Chief Minister , 131 ,

, 157 Murtuza , Syed , 42 , 83 , 161 Muslims , and civil disobedi ence , 129 - 30 , 132 ; and 155

246

Congress , 29 - 30 , 41, 44 , 83 , 153 - 4 ; and Justice Party , 19 , 40 - 1 , 153 ; elections , 1920 , 54 - 5 ; 1923 , 88 ; in Madras legis lature , 170 , 173 - 4 Muslim League , 19 , 40 - 1 , 154 Muslim Parliamentary Board , , 174 154 Muslim

Progressive Party ,

, 174 Muthiah Chetti 154

,

M

.A . ,

157

,

162

Muthiah Mudaliar , S . , 105 , 170 ; Minister , 109 - 10 , 131 ; leader

98

,

People ' s Party , 155 , 174 Mudaliar , C . N . ,

Muthuranga 142 ,

145

,

149 ,

160

;

TNCC

President , 112 , 118 , 141 Muthuswami , K . S . , 144 - 5 , 161 Muthuswami Aiyar , T . , 16 Clique " , 25 - 6 " My lapore Nadar Maha Sangam , Nadars , 61 , 65 Nageswara Rao , K . , Nagpur satyagraha , Naidu , R . S . , 128 Naidus , 155 , 172

Nair , T . M . , Nairs , 15

19

Narasimha Raju 101 - 3 , 105

,

25

,

C

124 84

, 54 89 ,

Natesa Mudaliar , C . , 19 , 89 Natesan , G . A . , 21, 28 , 125 National schools , 34 , 36 , 50 , 62 - 3 , 79 ; see also Sherma

devi Gurukulam Nationalists , , 74 ; 32

38

- 9 , 54 , 58 , 64 , 69 - 70 ,

and

Rowlatt

satyagraha ,

Swarajists , 78 , 81 , 87 , 90 ; character of , 25 - 8 ; oppose council boycott , 34 - 6 , 42 - 4 , 62 ; 28 - 31 ; become

with Gandhians ,

48 - 51 , 53 ,

70

,

80

Chettis ,

Nattukkottai

157 ,

162

Negapatam , 29

, Jawaharlal , 85 , 116 , 177 , 186 ; advocates complete independence ,

Nehru

120 ,

111 - 14 ; opposes office acceptance , 181 - 2 ; preaches Preaches 2 socialism , 151 - 2 51 Nehru , Motija Motilal , 80 , 83 , 87 , , 90 90 111 - 14 ; Report , 113 Neill satyagraha , 143 Newspapers ' role in national ist politics , 30 , 51 , 115 ,

:.

,",

122 ,

126

Nilgiris , " No

,

132

12 ,

- Changers

"

,

137

,

141

15

, see Swarajists

: Confederation , Coimbatore , 1927 , 106 - 7 , 119 ; Nellore , 1929 , 111 ;

Non - Brahmin

dissidents , movement ,

78

19 ,

, 89 ,

92 - 4

;

130

-Brahmins , 39 , 156 ; appointed ministers , 55 - 7 ; constitute Opposition , 132 ; enter Congress , 106 - 7 , 130 - 1 , 138 ; enter western education and professions , 13 , 18 - 20 , 130 ; hunger for patronage , 59 - 60 , 92 - 3 , 100 ; in elections , 1920 , 55 , 58 ; lead agitation against missionaries , . 13 - 14 ; organization in Madras legislature , 57 , 59 , 87 , 92 ; use legislature against Brahmin domination , 59 -61 , 91 , 96 , 156 ; see

Non

65

. V .S . ,

rivalry

also Brahmin -non - Brahmin

conflict

-6 , 82 - 4 ; 38 - 40 , , 100 , 143 ,

Non - Cooperation , movement , 33 - 6

42 - 79 , 81 ,

90

,

5

247

, 186

, , , ,

. , 85

5

C

,

,

74

,

;

,

.

, ,

,

53

,

,

, 70 ;

3 ;

72

,

38

,

. ;

to

-

6

85

,

-

5

at ,

;

44

40

; 39 -

,

36

,

,

to

9 ;

'

39

86

;

,

to to

, ,

communism

;

184

backs

ministry

104

;

, 119

,

,

,

86

of

pro 110

,

,

185

;

5

,

, -

134

104

,

campaigns for

hibition

,

at

86

;

4

-

Brahminism

119

,

, to

to

,

,

2

-

and

158

Independent 134

167

untouchables 146 aversion 7 ;

,

,

86

84

socialism 151

138

local boards

163

,

,

144

110

,

;

, ,

,

attitudes

titudes

attitudes

138

104

dyarchy

.

,

to

,

;

51 attitudes communal problem

,

;

,

in

;

,

9 ;

88

,

10

,

,

6

-

control of

Nationalists

85

,

-

7

, ;

-

26

,

1935 184

27

,

to

.T , ,

,

,

103

agrees

148

,

to as

37

,

7

-

,

,

;

,

120

, ,

178

186

as

,

-

6

of ,

,

,

4

,

during

34 9

,

75

under

,

32 - 5

Delhi compromise

91 155

urged resign 63 Pondicherry Prakasam 51 attacks Tamil Swarajists 88 105 112 leads satyagraha Madras 124 9

143

the press

127

punitive

,

7

70

; ;

,

142

constitution

-

31

, ,

, 3

1

,

;

73 -

, 7

94

117

disobedience

-

,

61

126

of

Maharaja

57

,

civil 130

; ,

,

Pithapuram

of 66

84

,

-

, , 5- 65 ,

,

,

134

Police

142

174

liquor

131

,

30

labour and Malabar Rebellion leader of the Tamil Gandhians Premier 133 Tiruchengodu ashram attaches himself Gandhi attempts break

23

, ,

, ,

's

,

136

129

115

and

-

government

Picketing foreign cloth shops

188

105

4

.

,

120

41

,

13 88

,

,

,

A

,

,

3

-

122

Peasants see ryots Pentland Lord 63 People Party 155

134

Qaumi Report

,

"

Rajagopalachari

187

,

"

52

162

157

Pannirselvam Pantulu Aiyar

Parallel

57

of

. T , .

,

Raja

110

,

108

160 ,

V

Panagal

55

"

, 60 , 72

Bureau

grievance

Report movement Quit India

,

's

. C . ,

43

B

,

100

College

Pachaiyappa

,

189

Conference ,

Ottawa

Pal

187 ,

172

Punjab ocenami

179 - 83 , , Olivier Lord , 177

,

,

,

101 - 12 153 , 168

,

150

"

78

;

70 , 74 , 128 , 131 , ; Congress proposals 134 for , 104 , 151 ; introduced , 185 ; Justice Party and , 65 , 159

28

- 9,

for ,

64 - 8 ,

Publicity

Odayappa , 1920s , 1930s ,

Prohibition : agitation

4 ;

' Callaghan ,

jists

7

Sergeant , 125 161 S.O. S . P ., acceptance Office issue : in O

Minister , 183 Pro - Changers " , see Swara

32

88

"

ament ,

; through the legis latures , 78 , 80 - 1 , 101 North Arcot , 13 ; Congress and Khilafat activity in , 42 - 3 , 62 , 75 , 130 ; elections , 1920 , 55 ; 1923 , 176

campaigns

248

elections , 1934 , 60 - 1 ; 1937 , 173: controls TNCC , 44 - 5 , 48 - 50 , 83 , 87 , 118 ,

143 ;

in

Ramaswami Ramaswami

- 5 ; cultivates Muslim support , 41 - 3 ; favours council entry , 149 - 50 ; and office - acceptance , 150 , 177 , 180 - 1 ; importance of centre - regional links to , 39 , 80 , 86 , 145 ; in Salem , 144

26

,

37

;

29

murti ,

142 ,

144 - 5 ,

,

180

134

united front tactics , 149 , 152 - 3 , 158 , 167 - 8 , 185 ; views or " parallel govern

ment

"

, 52 - 3

Rajagopalachari , Sir 64

P

.;

57

,

Rajagopalan K . V . , 40 Rajan , T . S . S . , 39 , 44 , 85 , 150 ; as TNCC Secretary , 49 , 144 ; contests 1934 eiections , 160 - 1 ; leads Trichinopoly revolt , 167 ; participates in non cooperatior , 42 , 53 , 74 - 5 ; 118 ,

,

civil

disobedience , , ; 119 122 Minister , 183 Ministence , 144 Rajapalaiyam Rajapala Rajappa , P . S . , 123 Rajendra Prasad , 20 , 83 , 151 Ramalinga Reddi , C . , 54 , 89 , and

;

92 - 4 , 101 Ramalingam Chetti

92

- 3,

132

Ramanathan ,

Respect

,

T. A . ,

s . , 40 ; in

movement

,

84 -

89 ,

Self 5

,

,

Ramaswami

V

. V.,

184

159 ,

Aiyar , Sir 100

,

re

;

159

106

,

,

Mudaliar , Naicker ,

173

C

.P. ,

109

N

.S ., A

E

. ,

65 104

. V. :

anti - Brahminism of ,

96

,

,

Congress , 49 , 65 , 74 , 84 ; leads Self - Respect movement , 85 , 143 ; allies with Justice Party , 159 Rameswaram , 119 , 122 Ramnad , 65 , 119 , 161 ; DCC , 106

- cooperation and civil disobedience , 38 , 77 , 81 , 138 - 9 , 142 , 150 ; leads No Changers , 79 - 81; ieads salt satyagraha , 118 - 24 ; nego tiates with Erskine , 181 - 3 ; proposes non - cooperation ,

relations with Satya

57

Ramaswami 162

non

42 - 3 ;

,

,

Ramaswami Iyengar

of

interpretation

Minister ,

joins Congress ,

;

in

144

Rangachari 96

;

Ranganatha 108 -

,

1

.,

25

,

Mudaliar ,

29 , A

87 ,

.,

103 ,

9

Iyengar , 48 - 9 , ; advocates council entry , 148 , 169 ; and civil disobedience , 116 , 120 ; constitutionalism of , 89 ; contests 1923 elections , 87 ; editor , 25 - 6 , 29 , 51 , 141 ; leads Tamil Swara jists , 82 - 3 ; observes council boycotts , 43 , 116 ;

Rangaswami 101 ,

106

participates

in

ist activities , 32 ,

National

25 - 7 , 29 , ; 38 views on Madras

legislature , 62 , 91 Rangaswami Iyengar , K . V . , 27 , 32 , 44 Rangiah Naidu , P . , 17

Ratnasabapathi C . S . , 92

Mudaliar ,

Thevar , P . , Reading , Lord , 64 , 74 Reddi Naidu , Sir K . V . ,

Ratnaveli

57 , 93 , 107 , 183 Kedais , 155 , 172 .

166

54

-7

,

249

" Responsive

Cooperation

35 , 101 Round Table

"

,

28

,

Conference :

proposed , 74 , 77 , 81 , 114 , 116 , 138 ; Second , 133 , 136 - 9 , 162 Rowlatt Act , 22 , 69 ; saty ' agraha , 24 , 28 - 32 , 34 Ruthnaswami , M . , 95 Ryots , 13 , 15 , 18 , 75 , 147 , 185 ; and Congress , 189 ; and Justice Party , 99 , 177 ; enfranchised , 169 , 178 Salem

,

9

,

13

obedience ,

;

civil dis

and

119 ,

127 ;

Con

character of ,

, 145 ; elections , 95

contests 1934 160 , 162 ; constitutional ism of , 62 , 89 - 90 ; depen dence on patrons , 116 ; excluded from ministry , 184 ; hostility to social ism , 173 ; involvement in local board elections , 114 - 5 , 164 - 7 ; joins civil disobedience , 142 ; orator ; and organizer , 32 , 172 - 3 , ; orthodoxy 147 PCC Sec retary , 29 ; revives Swara jya Party , 148 - 9 , 152 ; Swarajists , 87 , 89 , 94 - 5 ; TNCC president , 142 , 145 , 164 ; vice - president , 144 Saurashtras : participate in civil disobedience , 128 - 9 ; support Congress , 119 ,

gress in , 25 - 6 , 37 , 53 , 66 - 7 , 85 ; elections , 1920 , 55 ; municipal council , 37 , 66 , 85 ; riots , 1882 , 16 - 17 Salt satyagraha , 115 , 118 - 22 , 124 , 127 , 129 , 131 , 142 Sambamurti , B . , 106

Scheduled castes , see

Sami appa Sankaran

Self - Respect

Mudaliar , N . R . , Nair , C . , 25 Sanskritization , 19 , 86

Santhanam , Sapru , Sir

. , 40 , 84 , Tej Bahadur ,

K

122

120

-

1

113 - 14 , 133 Satyagraha , 3 - 4 , 186 ; see also Ahmedabad , Bardoli , Champaran , Kaira , Madura , Nagpur , Neill , Salt , Vaikam Satyagrahis , 119 - 22 , 124 - 5 , 131 , 133 ; see also

Volunteers Satyamurti, S . ,

28

allies activitists , 144 105

,

169 ;

bition 145

,

to

184

be

a

,

38

, 83 ,

with - 5 ; am

minister ,

; at Calcutta

Congress , 43 ; attacks Besant , 24 ; boasts Swara jists will break Indepen dent ministry , 104 ;

161 ,

165

Harijans

movement

115 , 143, 159 Sethuratnam Aiyar , 109 - 10 , 131

M

,

85

,

.R. ,

Chetti , R . K . , , contests 1934 elections , 162 ; in Assem bly , 106 , 116 , 162 Sharar , Abdul Majid , 41 - 2 , 63, 73 , 83 Shanmugham 159

Shermadevi Gurukulam , 27 , 85 - 6 Simon Commission , 107 - 10 ,

113 , 116 , 130 ; Report , 133 Singaravelu Chetti , M . , 49 , 52 , 75 , 117 Sivaswami Aiyar , Sir P . s . , 21 , 54 , 87 Socialism , 151, 178 Soundarapandiya Nadar , W . P . A . , 159

250

South Arcot , 127 South Canara , 9 South Indian Chamber Commerce , 158

Sutandira

of

126

South Indian Liberal Federation , 19 Srinivasa Iyengar , S . , 50

,

156 74

;

,

82

,

87

,

96

,

and Madras 91 , 105 - 8 ;

president ,

101 ,

116

,

144 -

5

,

Congress

; office

acceptance issue and , 101 , 111 - 12 ; opposes council boycott , 42 , 54 ; rivalry with Motilal Nehru , 111 , 113 ; TNCC president , 85 , 112 ; withdraws from poli

tics , 112 , 118 , 141 Srinivasa Sastri , V . s . , 54 , 58 , 183 ;

21 - 3 ,

32

,

Gandhi ,

and

28

Srinivasavarada Iyengar ,

R

.,

143

Srivilliputtur , 161 Stanley , Sir George

Frederick , 131 - 3 , 134 , 176 Student involvement in nation alist activity , 30 , 40 - 1 , 51 - 2 , 62 - 3 , 66 , 119 , 124 , 130 - 1

Subbaraman , 144 ,

165

,

N

.M.R . ,

.,

128

-9,

-3,

170 ; can leadership , didate for Justice , ; ; 110 - 11 157 character of 103 Chief Minister , 103 - 10 ; in Opposition , 131 - 2 , 146 , 152 - 3 , 155 , 176 ; Law Mini

Subbarayan

ster , 158

184 ,

P

92

rejoins Congress ,

Subbarayulu Reddi ,

A . ,

142 ,

agitation ,

legislature ,

105

,

56 -

Subramania Bharati , C . , Subramania Sastri , M . V . , Subramania Siva , 26 , 143 Subramaniam , K . , 40

7

27 74

,

Sangu

Swadesami tran , Swadeshi , 34 ,

124

26 36

164 26

,

,

,

51 ,

66 166

-7,

, ,

122 73

,

175

76

Swaminatha Sastri , T . V . Swaminathan , R . V . , 161

,

; 42

Swarajists , Tamil : aims and tactics , 78 , 88 - 92 , 94 - 101 , 111 - 12 ; composition of , 87 , contest with Gandhians , 83 , 85 , 87 ; differences with Malayali and Telugu Swara jists , 88 - 9 , 105 - 6 ; party revived ,

148 -

TNCC ,

,

9

,

152

,

112

,

164

post - 1930 , 139 , 141 - 3 , 145 , 184 ; resigned from Swarajya

118

,

51

,

144 96

;

Swarajya Party , All - India , 78 , 113 , formed , 80 ; ob jectives , 81 , 89 - 90 ; revived , 149 ; struggle with No - Changers , 81 - 3 Tamilnad :

character

of ,

9 - 13

Tamilnad Congress : changing character of , in 1930s , 106 - 7 , 133 , 141 , 148 , 164 , 167 - 8 , 189 ; member ship of , 168 ; subordinate committees of , 47 - 8 , 82 , 167 - 8 , 172 Tamil Nadu , 51 , 73 Tamil Nadu Congress Commit tee , 73 , 85 , 112 , 118 , . 148 , 166 - 7 ; allots funds , 51 , 62 , 70 , 85 , 143 ;

constitution of ,

48

,

83

;

formed , 47 ; sources of funds for , 50 , 52 , 134 , 147 ; under Gandhians , 48 - 52 , 73 - 4 , 79 , 83 , 87 , 118 ; under Rajagopalachari

251 and Satyamurti , 144 - 5 ; under Swarajists , 85 Tamil Nadu Khadi Board , 84 Tamil - Telugu rivalry , 10 , 93 , 105 - 6 , 184 - 5

Tampoe , A . M . C . , Tanjore , 12 , 14 ,

163 ,

165

29 ,

Civil

97 -

in ,

9

;

disobedience ; elections , 1920 , ; 54 1923 , 97 ; 1926 , 101 Telugu äistricts , see Andhra 119 - 24

Terrorism ,

3

,

24

- 7,

37

- 8,

Thanickachelam , Chetti , 72

Thorne , J . A . , Tilak , B . G . , 37

,

44

120 - 2 ,

25 , 27 - 8 , ; Swarajya Fund ,

79

,

119 ;

1920 , 42 , board 165 - 6 ; , 26 143

ence

Tiruchengodu

,

confer

district riots , 1908 , ;

3

ashram

,

85

143

Tiruppur , 143 Tiruvannamalai

- 5,

50

district

board ,

disobedience in , 119 , 130 elections , 1920 , 55 ; 1923 , 88 ; district board , 166 ; municipal council , 166 - 7 Troops , 34 , 70 - 1 , 75 Tulsiram , L . K . , 128 Tuticorin , 26 - 7 , 29 , 127 158

54

56

,

;

Chetti ,

Justice

, 60

,

93 ,

P

.,

,

75

1923

-6 ,

19

Leader ,

Uited Nationalists :

join Con

;

,

40 - 1 ;

109 ,

Home

132

,

A

satyagraha ,

.,

39

,

86

84

,

Vallabhbhai Patel , 20 , 85 , 120 , 136 , 151 ; in Tamilnad ,

115 , 122 Vaniyambadi , 52 Vanniyars , 101, 155 - 6 , 174 Varadachari , N . S . , 40 Varadarajulu Naidu , P . , 39 , 51 , 73 , 82 , 96 ; contests 1934 elections , 162 ; TNCC 85

conference , , 122 , 138 ; 118 - 23 , 127 - 8 ,

Vedaranniyam :

163

93 ,

94 - 6

president ,

-6 ,

, 112 , satyagraha ,

1929

,

115

, 144 Vandayar , Veeriah , , Vellalas 16 93 , 138

Trichinopoly , 9 , 14 , 29 , 73 , 97 , 120 ; as a Gandhian Khilafat centre , 12 , 42 - 3 , 48 - 9 , 52 - 3 , 62 , 72 ; civil

Tyagaraya

,

Vaidyanatha Aiyar 119 Vaikam

civil dis

Tinnevelly , 13 - 15 ; obedience in ,

121

34

92

Member

O.,

124

,

gress , 100 - 2 , 111 ; 1930 - 6 , 131 - 2 , 147 , 152 - 3 United Provinces , 13 , 158 , 172 , 185 Untouchables , 75 , 79 , 84 ; and Justice Party , 19 , 146 , 155 ; see also Adi Dravidas , Harijans Usman , Muhammad

Prohibition

Temperance , see

89

142

. , 123 98 , 101 , A

, 172 , 174 ; and civil disobedience , 121 - 3 155

Vellingiri 65 ,

93 ,

Vellodi , Vellore ,

,

Gounder

116

V

.C .,

147

M

.K . ,

72 , Venkatachalam C. T . , 165 Venkatachelam

,

,

and

135

, 130 Chetti ,

79

C

. V.

Chetti , S . , civil disobedi

ence , 125 , 132 ; contests 1934 elections , 161 - 2 ; Leader Madras legislature

Congress Party ,

105

,

252

Justice Party ,

- 8 , 111

107

Venkatagiri , Kumararaja of ,

156 - 9 , 176 Zetland , Lord ,

157

Chetti , Venkatarama Aiyar , Venkatappa

S T

44 , 48

.C . ,

.V.,

Venkatarama Sastri , T . R . Iyengar , c Venkataramana

.87,

Venka

,

6

29

,

, 109 .V . ,

Vijayaraghavachari , C . , 82 ; 93achari and Nationalist leadership , Cadership 28 - 9 , 32 , 39 ; Congress president , 48 , 87 ; leader of Salem Extremists , 17 , 25 - 6 , 37 ; obeys council boycott , 43

Village officers ,

,

15

,

121 ,

133

Virudhunagar ,

144

Volunteers , 120 - 2 , corps , 51 - 2 , 84

137

,

143 ;

Wadia , B . P . , 23 , 29 , 68 Wales , Prince of , 73 - 4 Weavers , 66 , 127 - 9 , 184

Westlake , Williams ,

. R . C . , 179 . F . V . , 117 , 135 Willingdon , Lord , 67 , 70 , 73 , 95 , 157 ; appoints A

C

non - Brahmin 56 -60 , 62 ,

of

ministry ,

94

;

Government

critical of India ' s

handling of non - cooperation 63 , 71 ; uses Justice Party against non - cooperation , 60 - 1 , 99 , 131 , 179 ; Viceroy ,

136 , 176 - 7 Working class , 1 - 2 , see also Labour

Young

India

Zamindars , and 132

,

,

,

184 ;

137

13 ,

Congress , 147

4

58

, 161 ,

,

18

,

119 , 185 ; 103 , 123

177

-8 ;

and

,

20

177

,

107

,